foreignpolicy--2020-03-16--Transparency and Testing Work Better Than Coercion in Coronavirus Battle

Transparency and Testing Work Better Than Coercion in Coronavirus Battle With the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 reaching pandemic proportions and U.S. President Donald Trump declaring a national emergency , now is a critical moment to learn from countries ’ responses thus far and rapidly implement effective strategies to limit the impact of the virus .
Yet Americans are at risk of learning the wrong comparative lessons in the face of this global emergency .
In times of crisis , authoritarian responses based in high-profile displays of state power can seem attractive .
But it is the far less conspicuous public-health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective responses so far .
Last week , Trump announced a surprise ban on travelers from much of Europe and extended it on Saturday to the United Kingdom and Ireland .
This travel ban , which goes against World Health Organization ( WHO ) advice and international law , is unlikely to significantly affect the U.S. COVID-19 epidemic .
Indeed , it may have worsened it , by creating crowded scenes in unprepared airports as panicked travelers returned home .
But it mirrors headline-grabbing efforts in China and elsewhere that use forced restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stop transmission .
This can distract from the success of widespread testing , openness and transparency , and effective public-health communication , which have been the key ingredients of effective response in several countries where political openness is also valued .
China ’ s response to the coronavirus in late January was a remarkable show of state power that included a lockdown of nearly 60 million people in Hubei province , with strict measures sequestering people to their homes and cutting off nearly all travel , and further restraints on another 700 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This response has been lauded by Trump as “ strong ” and showing “ great discipline ” and by the WHO director-general as “ setting a new standard for outbreak response.
” China has seen a rapid decline in new cases in recent weeks and may be on the way to controlling the outbreak .
Some have worried that this kind of authoritarian state control can not be replicated in more open societies .
But focusing on social control may miss many of the most effective components of China ’ s response .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ journal Science suggests that restrictions on movement in Hubei did not stop the spread of the virus within China , but likely only slowed it by three to five days .
More research is needed to understand what has and has not worked in China .
But while the unprecedented lockdowns have gotten the most attention , the country has also employed more recognized public-health measures at extraordinary scale , including building temporary hospitals and deploying thousands of health workers to screen people , isolate those with the virus , and provide medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the early failures that allowed the outbreak to grow in the first place , as those who attempted to raise the alarm early were threatened and critical information flows to leaders and the public were blocked .
Many fled Wuhan to avoid the lockdowns .
South Korea ’ s response , in stark contrast , has been grounded in transparency , open information , and technology-supported deployment of public-health measures .
The state has a clear strategy built by the executive branch and communicated transparently to the public through twice-daily press briefings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large numbers of people and identifying the hot spots of infections , such as the cities of Daegu and Gyeongsan , which have been designated “ special care zones ” and flooded with extra supplies and staff .
Testing has been made free and easy—with some 50 drive-thru centers providing testing and supporting rigorous contact-tracing .
Instead of city-wide cordons and universal lockdowns , the government has deployed a smartphone app to allow self-quarantine for people who have come in contact with coronavirus , connecting them to case workers and monitoring to ensure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China have not been banned , but instead must download a “ Self-Diagnosis App ” and use it to send daily updates on their condition .
A massive social-distancing campaign has been deployed to cancel mass gatherings and slow the spread of the virus through voluntary measures that keep people apart .
This approach is born out of a very different political context .
In South Korea , open media report widely , elections are highly competitive , and the previous president was removed by impeachment after massive street protests by millions over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The main opposition party has been active in criticizing the government response to coronavirus in the lead-up to the next elections , including pushing back against suggestions of a broader lockdown of Daegu .
New cases in South Korea have begun to slow , and the country is hopefully turning a corner .
President Moon Jae-in has suggested that the country is entering a “ phase of stability.
” This shows that democratic governance and noncoercive approaches can be effective against the coronavirus—but only if they are vigorous and rooted in all-out efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump declared a state of emergency under the Stafford Act that triggers a surge in government powers and funding .
These powers should be focused on ramping up public-health capacities , getting testing on track , and enabling widespread voluntary participation in measures to halt the virus , not on sweeping coercive measures .
Using public-health powers to ensure social distancing is appropriate—the prohibition of mass gatherings by local authorities can be paired with the use of the president ’ s bully pulpit in support of a voluntary social-distancing campaign .
Deploying technologically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as isolation and contact tracing should be a top priority .
But there is an important line between public-health measures to encourage distancing and isolate people with the virus and sweeping lockdowns that outlaw travel and movement .
We can be learning from , and collaborating with , countries and regions that appear to be balancing democratic openness with rapid , concerted public-health action , including South Korea , Taiwan , and Hong Kong .
No response is perfect , and the world may yet see resurgent outbreaks , but relative success thus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of core public-health intervention amid open politics .
Travel bans are dramatic .
They are a unilateral prerogative of executive power .
And they fit well into a narrative about keeping out “ foreign ” disease .
But they have largely proved ineffective in fighting disease outbreaks and evidence suggests this holds true in this outbreak .
U.S. officials still assert coronavirus-related bans have been helpful , but concede that the efforts at containment have not prevented the virus from spreading within U.S. communities unchecked and untracked .
Perhaps most importantly , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time when coordinated global action is urgently needed .
In the medium term , shifting from isolationism to transnational cooperation and coordination can enable the United States to learn in real time what ’ s working and coordinate policies across borders to stop transmission .
Quickly rebuilding coordination capacity for global health inside the National Security Council could help .
South Korea ’ s global health diplomacy efforts and decision to provide regular public updates in English provide a model .
The United States , a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) convene world leaders in a more coordinated response .
The Chinese example can and should push the United States to ramp up global health efforts in support for low- and middle-income countries where people may face the harshest impacts of this outbreak .
Focusing on the right lessons from abroad could make or break the course of this fast-changing pandemic .
Now is not the time for authoritarian disease response or for isolationism .
Neither will serve the United States well .

With the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 reaching pandemic proportions and U.S. President Donald Trump declaring a national emergency, now is a critical moment to learn from countries’ responses thus far and rapidly implement effective strategies to limit the impact of the virus. Yet Americans are at risk of learning the wrong comparative lessons in the face of this global emergency. In times of crisis, authoritarian responses based in high-profile displays of state power can seem attractive. But it is the far less conspicuous public-health work that seems to be separating the effective responses so far.
With the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 reaching pandemic proportions and U.S. President Donald Trump declaring a national emergency, now is a critical moment to learn from countries’ responses thus far and rapidly implement effective strategies to limit the impact of the virus. Yet Americans are at risk of learning the wrong comparative lessons in the face of this global emergency. In times of crisis, authoritarian responses based in high-profile displays of state power can seem attractive. But it is the far less conspicuous public-health work that seems to be separating the effective responses so far.
Last week, Trump announced a surprise ban on travelers from much of Europe and extended it on Saturday to the United Kingdom and Ireland. This travel ban, which goes against World Health Organization (WHO) advice and international law, is unlikely to significantly affect the U.S. COVID-19 epidemic. Indeed, it may have worsened it, by creating crowded scenes in unprepared airports as panicked travelers returned home.
But it mirrors headline-grabbing efforts in China and elsewhere that use forced restrictions on travel and movement to try to stop transmission. This can distract from the success of widespread testing, openness and transparency, and effective public-health communication, which have been the key ingredients of effective response in several countries where political openness is also valued.
China’s response to the coronavirus in late January was a remarkable show of state power that included a lockdown of nearly 60 million people in Hubei province, with strict measures sequestering people to their homes and cutting off nearly all travel, and further restraints on another 700 million people or more throughout the country. This response has been lauded by Trump as “strong” and showing “great discipline” and by the WHO director-general as “setting a new standard for outbreak response.” China has seen a rapid decline in new cases in recent weeks and may be on the way to controlling the outbreak. Some have worried that this kind of authoritarian state control cannot be replicated in more open societies.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
But focusing on social control may miss many of the most effective components of China’s response. A recent transmission modeling study in the journal Science suggests that restrictions on movement in Hubei did not stop the spread of the virus within China, but likely only slowed it by three to five days. More research is needed to understand what has and has not worked in China. But while the unprecedented lockdowns have gotten the most attention, the country has also employed more recognized public-health measures at extraordinary scale, including building temporary hospitals and deploying thousands of health workers to screen people, isolate those with the virus, and provide medical care.
Authoritarian political institutions actually contributed to the early failures that allowed the outbreak to grow in the first place, as those who attempted to raise the alarm early were threatened and critical information flows to leaders and the public were blocked. Many fled Wuhan to avoid the lockdowns.
South Korea’s response, in stark contrast, has been grounded in transparency, open information, and technology-supported deployment of public-health measures. The state has a clear strategy built by the executive branch and communicated transparently to the public through twice-daily press briefings. The government has concentrated on testing large numbers of people and identifying the hot spots of infections, such as the cities of Daegu and Gyeongsan, which have been designated “special care zones” and flooded with extra supplies and staff.
Listen Now: Don't Touch Your Face A new podcast from Foreign Policy covering all aspects of the coronavirus pandemic Learn More
Testing has been made free and easy—with some 50 drive-thru centers providing testing and supporting rigorous contact-tracing. Instead of city-wide cordons and universal lockdowns, the government has deployed a smartphone app to allow self-quarantine for people who have come in contact with coronavirus, connecting them to case workers and monitoring to ensure they follow quarantine orders. Travelers from China have not been banned, but instead must download a “Self-Diagnosis App” and use it to send daily updates on their condition. A massive social-distancing campaign has been deployed to cancel mass gatherings and slow the spread of the virus through voluntary measures that keep people apart.
This approach is born out of a very different political context. In South Korea, open media report widely, elections are highly competitive, and the previous president was removed by impeachment after massive street protests by millions over her handling of a previous crisis. The main opposition party has been active in criticizing the government response to coronavirus in the lead-up to the next elections, including pushing back against suggestions of a broader lockdown of Daegu.
New cases in South Korea have begun to slow, and the country is hopefully turning a corner. President Moon Jae-in has suggested that the country is entering a “phase of stability.” This shows that democratic governance and noncoercive approaches can be effective against the coronavirus—but only if they are vigorous and rooted in all-out efforts to deploy public-health measures.
On Friday Trump declared a state of emergency under the Stafford Act that triggers a surge in government powers and funding. These powers should be focused on ramping up public-health capacities, getting testing on track, and enabling widespread voluntary participation in measures to halt the virus, not on sweeping coercive measures. Using public-health powers to ensure social distancing is appropriate—the prohibition of mass gatherings by local authorities can be paired with the use of the president’s bully pulpit in support of a voluntary social-distancing campaign. Deploying technologically advanced options for basic public-health activities such as isolation and contact tracing should be a top priority. But there is an important line between public-health measures to encourage distancing and isolate people with the virus and sweeping lockdowns that outlaw travel and movement.
We can be learning from, and collaborating with, countries and regions that appear to be balancing democratic openness with rapid, concerted public-health action, including South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. No response is perfect, and the world may yet see resurgent outbreaks, but relative success thus far demonstrates the value of rapid deployment of core public-health intervention amid open politics.
Travel bans are dramatic. They are a unilateral prerogative of executive power. And they fit well into a narrative about keeping out “foreign” disease. But they have largely proved ineffective in fighting disease outbreaks and evidence suggests this holds true in this outbreak. U.S. officials still assert coronavirus-related bans have been helpful, but concede that the efforts at containment have not prevented the virus from spreading within U.S. communities unchecked and untracked. Perhaps most importantly, they drive a wedge between countries at a time when coordinated global action is urgently needed.
In the medium term, shifting from isolationism to transnational cooperation and coordination can enable the United States to learn in real time what’s working and coordinate policies across borders to stop transmission. Quickly rebuilding coordination capacity for global health inside the National Security Council could help. South Korea’s global health diplomacy efforts and decision to provide regular public updates in English provide a model. The United States, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, could be pushing to (virtually) convene world leaders in a more coordinated response. The Chinese example can and should push the United States to ramp up global health efforts in support for low- and middle-income countries where people may face the harshest impacts of this outbreak. Focusing on the right lessons from abroad could make or break the course of this fast-changing pandemic.
Now is not the time for authoritarian disease response or for isolationism. Neither will serve the United States well.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-16--Fear of China Made Taiwan a Coronavirus Success Story

As the new coronavirus sweeps across much of the world and cases exceed 160,000 , there is one country that seems to have things under control , despite being only 110 miles from China and having experienced its first case on Jan. 21 .
Taiwan has only 67 cases ( as of March 16 ) , which is admirable in itself , especially when compared to its larger East Asian neighbors .
Taiwan has been tackling its coronavirus outbreak despite being frozen out of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) and continual bullying from China .
In short , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fight the coronavirus .
And in doing so , Taiwan is making its efforts look easy—though they are anything but .
Taiwan ’ s anti-coronavirus strategy utilizes a combination of early vigilance , proactive measures , and information sharing with the public , as well as applying technology in the form of analyzing big data and online platforms .
All this is done with an impressive level of public transparency and engagement , in stark contrast to China ’ s use of draconian and coercive measures and censorship to handle the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mysterious illness in Wuhan started emerging in December 2019 , Taiwan treated the news with utmost urgency .
There are many hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese working in China , which means there is a high frequency of flights and travelers between the country and Taiwan—although the numbers have shrunk since China started limiting tourism to the country for political reasons .
Taiwan took measures early on , including inspecting plane passengers coming from Wuhan starting Dec. 31 , banning Wuhan residents on Jan. 23 , suspending tours to China on Jan. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visitors on Feb. 6 .
Recognizing that it had to ensure an adequate supply of medical equipment , including face masks , for health professionals and the public , Taiwan ’ s government stopped exports of surgical face masks on January 24 while requesting local companies to step up production .
Daily production is set to reach 10 million soon , divided between the public , medical , and industrial sectors .
The government also took control of face mask distribution from the private sector on Jan. 31 , ensuring there would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as has happened in other places such as Hong Kong .
Taiwan also implemented a purchasing policy on Feb. 6 in which every Taiwanese can buy a certain amount of adult and children ’ s masks per week from pharmacies and clinics for NT $ 5 ( $ 0.17 ) each .
And to allow for easier distribution and prevent long lines outside clinics , Taiwanese can now start ordering their masks online and pick them up at a later date .
To ensure coordination , Taiwan set up a unified command @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health and Welfare , which manages resources , holds daily briefings , and is in control of public messaging .
The authorities have also moved quickly to track down infected persons and map the cases to show the sources of infection .
Educating the public on the risks of the illness and precautions to take through television notices and posters is also a big part of anti-coronavirus efforts .
As a major tech powerhouse , it ’ s no surprise that Taiwan made use of tech tools to fight the outbreak .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developing platforms to inform people where masks are currently available and where infected people have been .
Taiwan ’ s health insurance and immigration agencies integrated local and foreign residents ’ 14-day travel history with their health insurance card data , allowing hospitals , clinics , and pharmacies to access that information when dealing with patients .
People undergoing self-quarantine were called frequently by officials and had their phones tracked to make sure they didn ’ t leave their residence .
It also helps that Taiwan has one of the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1990s—which provides affordable , comprehensive , and convenient services to its entire population , including the elderly and low-income groups .
User health data is stored on a centralized system accessible to hospitals and clinics , so doctors can quickly see their patients ’ history .
While travel bans might seem a little controversial , the main priority for any country must be the safety of its own citizens .
Though China criticized countries such as the United States and Australia for imposing travel bans on Chinese , the country locked down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in late January .
This was still not enough to prevent Hubei from being ravaged with more than 67,000 cases and more than 3,000 deaths , and the entire province remains in lockdown .
The measures came too late .
By the time Wuhan was locked down on Jan. 23 , 5 million people from the city were estimated to have had already dispersed across the country and overseas , leading to the spread of the coronavirus to every single Chinese province and region .
Wuhan ’ s plight shows that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is enacted early on , not after an outbreak has happened .
This is why Taiwan was right to enact one from early February .
Up until March , South Korea only barred visitors from Hubei , while Japan barred those coming from Hubei and Zhejiang provinces .
Astonishingly , it has only been from March 9 that Japan has halted visas for Chinese while requiring Chinese visitors to self-quarantine for two weeks .
As a result , South Korea has the world ’ s fourth-highest number of cases at more than 8,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Ironically , a little credit should also go to China for banning its own people from visiting Taiwan as individual tourists in 2019 , in addition to limiting Chinese tour groups to Taiwan from 2016 .
This meant Taiwan has had many fewer Chinese visitors and has become much less dependent on Chinese tourism revenue .
Worries over reduced tourism revenue , as well as concerns over offending China , may be why South Korea and Japan had been reluctant to enforce a ban on all Chinese visitors until recently .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s staunch vigilance and self-reliance during the coronavirus outbreak is the constant bullying from China .
Given that Taiwan has faced everything from its giant neighbor—the spreading of fake news , military threats , the withholding of vital medical information during the SARS outbreak in 2003—the country knows it must be on its fullest guard whenever any major problem emerges in China .
Taiwan shows that countries need to be proactive and take multiple measures they deem necessary .
It is already too late for some to contain the coronavirus , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making use of technology , and maintaining control of vital supplies such as masks and other medical equipment .
Taiwan is doing its bit to aid global efforts by helping its Pacific island ally Palau test a suspected case and sharing information with Prague , the capital of the Czech Republic .
The island state is also willing to play a bigger role in WHO , if U.N. member states allow it .
The coronavirus can be fought , and those countries that succeed may stand in a place to help and defend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , Taiwan may be best placed to do so—if others allow it .

As the new coronavirus sweeps across much of the world and cases exceed 160,000, there is one country that seems to have things under control, despite being only 110 miles from China and having experienced its first case on Jan. 21. Taiwan has only 67 cases (as of March 16), which is admirable in itself, especially when compared to its larger East Asian neighbors.
As the new coronavirus sweeps across much of the world and cases exceed 160,000, there is one country that seems to have things under control, despite being only 110 miles from China and having experienced its first case on Jan. 21. Taiwan has only 67 cases (as of March 16), which is admirable in itself, especially when compared to its larger East Asian neighbors.
Taiwan has been tackling its coronavirus outbreak despite being frozen out of the World Health Organization (WHO) and continual bullying from China. In short, Taiwan has had to rely on itself to fight the coronavirus. And in doing so, Taiwan is making its efforts look easy—though they are anything but.
Taiwan’s anti-coronavirus strategy utilizes a combination of early vigilance, proactive measures, and information sharing with the public, as well as applying technology in the form of analyzing big data and online platforms. All this is done with an impressive level of public transparency and engagement, in stark contrast to China’s use of draconian and coercive measures and censorship to handle the coronavirus outbreak.
When the first news about a mysterious illness in Wuhan started emerging in December 2019, Taiwan treated the news with utmost urgency. There are many hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese working in China, which means there is a high frequency of flights and travelers between the country and Taiwan—although the numbers have shrunk since China started limiting tourism to the country for political reasons.
Taiwan took measures early on, including inspecting plane passengers coming from Wuhan starting Dec. 31, banning Wuhan residents on Jan. 23, suspending tours to China on Jan. 25, and eventually banning all Chinese visitors on Feb. 6.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
Recognizing that it had to ensure an adequate supply of medical equipment, including face masks, for health professionals and the public, Taiwan’s government stopped exports of surgical face masks on January 24 while requesting local companies to step up production. Daily production is set to reach 10 million soon, divided between the public, medical, and industrial sectors.
The government also took control of face mask distribution from the private sector on Jan. 31, ensuring there would be no hoarding of supplies or exploitative pricing, as has happened in other places such as Hong Kong. Taiwan also implemented a purchasing policy on Feb. 6 in which every Taiwanese can buy a certain amount of adult and children’s masks per week from pharmacies and clinics for NT$5 ($0.17) each. And to allow for easier distribution and prevent long lines outside clinics, Taiwanese can now start ordering their masks online and pick them up at a later date.
To ensure coordination, Taiwan set up a unified command center, led by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which manages resources, holds daily briefings, and is in control of public messaging. The authorities have also moved quickly to track down infected persons and map the cases to show the sources of infection. Educating the public on the risks of the illness and precautions to take through television notices and posters is also a big part of anti-coronavirus efforts.
Listen Now: Don't Touch Your Face A new podcast from Foreign Policy covering all aspects of the coronavirus pandemic Learn More
As a major tech powerhouse, it’s no surprise that Taiwan made use of tech tools to fight the outbreak. This includes using big data for analytics and developing platforms to inform people where masks are currently available and where infected people have been. Taiwan’s health insurance and immigration agencies integrated local and foreign residents’ 14-day travel history with their health insurance card data, allowing hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies to access that information when dealing with patients. People undergoing self-quarantine were called frequently by officials and had their phones tracked to make sure they didn’t leave their residence.
It also helps that Taiwan has one of the world’s best health systems—thanks to massive reforms in the 1990s—which provides affordable, comprehensive, and convenient services to its entire population, including the elderly and low-income groups. User health data is stored on a centralized system accessible to hospitals and clinics, so doctors can quickly see their patients’ history.
While travel bans might seem a little controversial, the main priority for any country must be the safety of its own citizens. Though China criticized countries such as the United States and Australia for imposing travel bans on Chinese, the country locked down an entire province of about 60 million people in late January. This was still not enough to prevent Hubei from being ravaged with more than 67,000 cases and more than 3,000 deaths, and the entire province remains in lockdown.
The measures came too late. By the time Wuhan was locked down on Jan. 23, 5 million people from the city were estimated to have had already dispersed across the country and overseas, leading to the spread of the coronavirus to every single Chinese province and region.
Wuhan’s plight shows that a travel ban is only useful when it is enacted early on, not after an outbreak has happened. This is why Taiwan was right to enact one from early February.
Up until March, South Korea only barred visitors from Hubei, while Japan barred those coming from Hubei and Zhejiang provinces. Astonishingly, it has only been from March 9 that Japan has halted visas for Chinese while requiring Chinese visitors to self-quarantine for two weeks. As a result, South Korea has the world’s fourth-highest number of cases at more than 8,000, while Japan has more than 700.
Ironically, a little credit should also go to China for banning its own people from visiting Taiwan as individual tourists in 2019, in addition to limiting Chinese tour groups to Taiwan from 2016. This meant Taiwan has had many fewer Chinese visitors and has become much less dependent on Chinese tourism revenue. Worries over reduced tourism revenue, as well as concerns over offending China, may be why South Korea and Japan had been reluctant to enforce a ban on all Chinese visitors until recently.
In fact, what helped fuel Taiwan’s staunch vigilance and self-reliance during the coronavirus outbreak is the constant bullying from China. Given that Taiwan has faced everything from its giant neighbor—the spreading of fake news, military threats, the withholding of vital medical information during the SARS outbreak in 2003—the country knows it must be on its fullest guard whenever any major problem emerges in China.
Taiwan shows that countries need to be proactive and take multiple measures they deem necessary. It is already too late for some to contain the coronavirus, but they can still focus on public education, making use of technology, and maintaining control of vital supplies such as masks and other medical equipment.
Taiwan is doing its bit to aid global efforts by helping its Pacific island ally Palau test a suspected case and sharing information with Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic. The island state is also willing to play a bigger role in WHO, if U.N. member states allow it.
The coronavirus can be fought, and those countries that succeed may stand in a place to help and defend others. Despite being shut out by China, Taiwan may be best placed to do so—if others allow it.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-16--In Historic First, Peace Corps to Evacuate Volunteers Worldwide Amid Pandemic

In Historic First , Peace Corps to Evacuate Volunteers Worldwide Amid Pandemic The Peace Corps is for the first time in its history halting its operations globally and evacuating all of its volunteers , a drastic step for the small U.S. agency that shows the knock-on effects of the global coronavirus pandemic even in developing countries still untouched by the outbreak .
“ As COVID-19 continues to spread and international travel becomes more and more challenging by the day , we are acting now to safeguard your well-being and prevent a situation where Volunteers are unable to leave their host @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Olsen wrote in a letter to volunteers .
It joins a raft of other government agencies grappling with how to respond to the rapidly spreading new virus that has roiled markets , upended global trade , and derailed international diplomacy .
Peace Corps volunteers have already been evacuated in China and Mongolia , but “ it has become clear in the last 48 hours that numerous posts must follow suit , ” Olsen said in the letter .
“ It is against this backdrop that I have made the difficult decision to temporarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evacuate all of our Volunteers.
” The Peace Corps , a government-run volunteer program established in 1961 , has about 7,000 volunteers serving in over 60 countries .
They will be evacuated to head off a scenario in which volunteers are trapped in their host countries due to international travel restrictions .
“ We are not closing posts , and we will be ready to return to normal operations when conditions permit , ” Olsen stressed .
She added that host country staff will remain in their current positions , and the Washington-based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of operations plan .
The Peace Corps hasn ’ t specified when it would resume operations .
“ The safety of our volunteers is our highest priority .
We will temporarily suspend our operations as long as it takes to keep them safe , ” Marjorie Wass , a Peace Corps press officer , told Foreign Policy .
The decision is set to disrupt projects that volunteers work on worldwide , including in some of the world ’ s least developed and poorest countries .
Nearly half of all volunteers serve in Africa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rising—though still in limited numbers—across the continent stemming in part from travelers from Europe and Asia .
As of March 10 , 105 cases have been reported in 10 African countries , according to the latest data available from the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .
The Peace Corps ’ decision comes as other U.S. federal agencies are scrambling to respond to the crisis .
The State Department raised worldwide travel advisory to Level 3 on March 11 , meaning it advises U.S. citizens to reconsider traveling abroad .
The department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad to stem the flow of the virus , which has infected over 160,000 people and killed over 6,000 , mostly in China , where the virus appears to have originated .

The Peace Corps is for the first time in its history halting its operations globally and evacuating all of its volunteers, a drastic step for the small U.S. agency that shows the knock-on effects of the global coronavirus pandemic even in developing countries still untouched by the outbreak.
The Peace Corps is for the first time in its history halting its operations globally and evacuating all of its volunteers, a drastic step for the small U.S. agency that shows the knock-on effects of the global coronavirus pandemic even in developing countries still untouched by the outbreak.
“As COVID-19 continues to spread and international travel becomes more and more challenging by the day, we are acting now to safeguard your well-being and prevent a situation where Volunteers are unable to leave their host countries,” Peace Corps Director Jody Olsen wrote in a letter to volunteers.
It joins a raft of other government agencies grappling with how to respond to the rapidly spreading new virus that has roiled markets, upended global trade, and derailed international diplomacy.
Peace Corps volunteers have already been evacuated in China and Mongolia, but “it has become clear in the last 48 hours that numerous posts must follow suit,” Olsen said in the letter. “It is against this backdrop that I have made the difficult decision to temporarily suspend all Peace Corps operations globally and evacuate all of our Volunteers.”
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
The Peace Corps, a government-run volunteer program established in 1961, has about 7,000 volunteers serving in over 60 countries. They will be evacuated to head off a scenario in which volunteers are trapped in their host countries due to international travel restrictions. “We are not closing posts, and we will be ready to return to normal operations when conditions permit,” Olsen stressed. She added that host country staff will remain in their current positions, and the Washington-based headquarters will remain open under its continuity of operations plan.
The Peace Corps hasn’t specified when it would resume operations. “The safety of our volunteers is our highest priority. We will temporarily suspend our operations as long as it takes to keep them safe,” Marjorie Wass, a Peace Corps press officer, told Foreign Policy.
The decision is set to disrupt projects that volunteers work on worldwide, including in some of the world’s least developed and poorest countries. Nearly half of all volunteers serve in Africa, where reported cases of coronavirus are rising—though still in limited numbers—across the continent stemming in part from travelers from Europe and Asia. As of March 10, 105 cases have been reported in 10 African countries, according to the latest data available from the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The Peace Corps’ decision comes as other U.S. federal agencies are scrambling to respond to the crisis. The State Department raised worldwide travel advisory to Level 3 on March 11, meaning it advises U.S. citizens to reconsider traveling abroad. The department also halted most travel for its employees abroad to stem the flow of the virus, which has infected over 160,000 people and killed over 6,000, mostly in China, where the virus appears to have originated.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-16--Joe Biden Isn’t a Liberal or a Moderate. He’s a Christian Democrat.

Joe Biden is nothing if not familiar to Americans .
After watching him in the spotlight of U.S. politics for more than four decades , there ’ s a natural tendency to assume one already knows the former vice president—not just his personality and biography but the character of his political ideas .
It has become second nature to describe his politics with such ready-made labels as “ centrist ” or “ moderate.
” None of these labels is entirely false .
But they also obscure much of the specific content of Biden ’ s platform and worldview .
Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ s of a type that will likely be less familiar at first glance to American voters .
Biden ’ s campaign has thus far been very different from those of recent Democratic presidential nominees .
Hillary Clinton embodied a form of technocratic liberalism based on a deep-seated faith in data , free markets , and the benign nature of U.S. military hegemony abroad .
None of these is prominent in Biden ’ s current platform , which is much more about restoring a lost unity and civility at home than pursuing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there was a charge of idealistic progressivism in Barack Obama ’ s two successful bids for the presidency that is entirely absent from Biden ’ s mode of self-presentation .
In fact , the most obvious reason why Obama chose Biden as his running mate on both occasions is precisely that he was intended to function as a counterpoint to Obama ’ s own disruptive appeal , complementing the overall message of “ Change !
” with a more familiar and reassuring under-melody .
It is therefore a mistake to assume that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama ” —and even more so to think that his campaign constitutes a reiteration of Clinton ’ s failed bid for the presidency in 2016 .
A more fruitful comparison emerges from the obvious fact that Biden seeks to trace a middle path between Donald Trump ’ s far-right nationalism and Bernie Sanders ’ s democratic socialism .
Long before the notion of a “ Third Way ” was appropriated by British Labour Party leader Tony Blair in the 1990s , this was a staple talking point of a specific strand of continental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself from both fascism on the far-right and revolutionary socialism on the far-left during the interwar and immediate postwar years : the political tradition of Christian democracy .
This is the family of political parties that came to power in most continental European countries in the aftermath of World War II under the leadership of such figures as Konrad Adenauer , Alcide De Gasperi , and Robert Schuman .
But it also remains prominent today in Germany under the chancellorship of Angela Merkel and in the European Union ’ s Parliament and Commission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the helm .
Biden ’ s two main political rivals at the moment are routinely thought of in reference to European political traditions—social democracy in the case of Sanders and far-right nationalism in the case of Trump .
It ’ s time to do the same for Biden .
The Democratic front-runner ’ s political ideology isn ’ t a watered-down version of his rivals ’ or even his predecessors ’ .
It is best understood as approximating a distinct European tradition—one that may indicate Bidenism ’ s ultimate legacy in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finds a powerful echo in Biden ’ s current political stance and rhetoric .
Consider his campaign ’ s constant claim that it ’ s involved in “ a battle for the soul of America ” : This points to the idea of a spiritual and ultimately existential threat against which Biden presents himself as a bulwark .
The threat in question is evidently the divisive politics and abrasive style of the current U.S. president .
In standing against him , Biden therefore claims to be restoring national unity and a sense of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s “ soul ” is given further substance by Biden ’ s frequent references to notions of “ dignity , ” “ honor , ” “ decency , ” and “ hard work.
” All these terms point to an idealized vision of American society as a harmonious and organically integrated order , one that rests on a foundation of mutual cooperation and a shared set of moral values—and , crucially , is temporally situated somewhere in the past .
“ This is not how our parents educated us ” is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speeches .
This is the deeply conservative dimension to Biden ’ s promise to “ heal ” the divisions that cut across American society—one that is reminiscent of European Christian democracy ’ s historic emphasis on the values of “ national unity ” and “ restoration ” of the social order in the aftermath of World War II .
Alcide De Gasperi , for instance , used to describe the Italian democrazia cristiana of the 1940s and ’ 50s as a “ party of the nation , ” since he thought of it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s conflicting social groups and interests .
Biden has a similar view of the Democratic Party ’ s role in the contemporary United States .
Given the way in which the Republican Party has been transformed under the leadership of Trump , Biden seems to think it ’ s now the role of the Democrats to reunite the whole nation under the banner of its traditional moral and political principles of inclusiveness and civility .
The same organic conception of society also underpins Biden ’ s main social and economic policy proposals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advocacy for universalist welfare entitlement programs such as “ Medicare for All ” and free public college tuition , Biden thinks that the role of state intervention in the economy should be focused on the protection of socially disadvantaged groups .
This is evident in his proposed extension of Obamacare “ for those who need it ” ( e.g.
, the uninsured and the “ left behind ” ) and free tuition for community colleges “ in the most disadvantaged areas.
” This approach is justified with reference to another classically Christian democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best of their ability to the well-being of society as a whole .
While this involves some measure of socioeconomic redistribution , it steers clear of the more radical idea that society should aspire to some form of substantive—as well as formal—equality .
Indeed , Biden has explicitly presented his socioeconomic policy platform as a way of making sure that everyone has a “ stake ” in the capitalist economy and implicitly as a way of protecting it from the perceived threat of radical takeover by either the far-left or the far-right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Christian democratic parties in Europe that supported welfare-state policies in the aftermath of World War II as explicitly anti-revolutionary measures .
Their intuition was that improving the conditions of the worse-off through targeted aid measures , such as cash transfers or benefits-in-kind , was bound to undercut the case for more radical transformations of the existing socioeconomic order by giving them something to lose .
Thus , for instance , throughout the 1950s and ’ 60s , it was Christian democrats—not social democrats—who pushed forward many policies incentivizing homeownership for the working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Finally , the signature feature of Biden ’ s political style is his commitment to social reconciliation through political compromise .
From the beginning of his political career , Biden has cultivated an image of himself as a “ bridge-builder.
” Indeed , this is arguably the main reason for his now-disavowed but nonetheless long-standing support for a variety of “ tough on crime ” legislative bills as a senator throughout the 1980s and ’ 90s .
Even if those bills are now widely perceived as having had an overwhelmingly negative effect , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it should not be forgotten that during the 1980s and ’ 90s , they enjoyed widespread support among both African Americans and working-class whites and Democrats and Republicans .
Biden supported these policies before they fell out of favor precisely because they sought to bring together the various components of American society while “ reaching out ” across the political aisle .
Biden ’ s approach to such law-and-order questions again parallels the thinking of Christian democratic parties in Europe .
For instance , during the 1960s and ’ 70s , both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very firm stance against the so-called “ Red Terrorism ” of far-left revolutionary groups such as the Brigate Rosse and Baader-Meinhof—in some cases going as far as reviving extraordinary criminal justice procedures that hadn ’ t been used since the end of the fascist and national-socialist regimes .
These measures were justified precisely as a compromise between the far-right ’ s demands for a complete suspension of the democratic order and the center-left ’ s calls for a more lenient approach .
For Biden , just as for European-style Christian democracy , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ merely tactical political tools .
They are elevated to the status of moral principles in their own right .
A less persuasive objection to this comparison would be that comparing Bidenism with Christian democracy overlooks the simplest ideological motivation for Biden ’ s candidacy : that he merely represents the American political and economic establishment ’ s desperate and internally incoherent grasping for any palatable alternative to Trump .
In other words , if you scratch the surface of Bidenism , it reveals nothing more than anti-Trumpism .
There may be some truth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hardly negates the comparison with European Christian democracy .
The latter succeeded in the postwar years not least because it was propped up and held together with material support from American political , economic , and military actors .
The U.S. establishment was attracted to Christian democracy less by the substance of its philosophy than by the perception it was the safest bet to stave off the risk of both fascist resurgence and communist revolution .
The comparison with Christian democracy can also help shed light on Biden ’ s future prospects as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand , his promises of moral restoration , social protection , and political reconciliation constitute a formidable electoral weapon .
Christian democrats succeeded in keeping both the far-left and the far-right out of power for several decades after the end of World War II precisely on the basis of a coalition that united social elites , the urban middle classes , and the rural poor against the perceived threat of radical takeover .
The same insight also suggests that , if he is indeed elected , Biden is likely to be far more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Sanders would have been as president .
His presidency would likely leave ample space for the two main factions within the Democratic Party—the Clintonian liberal wing and Sanders ’ s democratic socialist one—to continue shaping policy in important ways , even though neither is likely to get all of what they want .
In this sense , the result wouldn ’ t be very much unlike the constant struggle for compromise between the center-right and the center-left wings of continental European Christian democratic parties during their period of political hegemony in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , Biden ’ s conservative pragmatism is likely to leave him without any clear sense of direction beyond the defeat of the more radical political forces he is standing against .
As the prospect of both fascist resurgence and communist revolution began to wane in postwar continental Europe , Christian democracy lost its way , falling prey to widespread clientelism and corruption .
Ultimately , this is what brought down the Italian democrazia cristiana at the beginning of the 1990s and has also weakened the German Christian Democratic Union and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identities ever since .
Seen in this light , Biden might succeed in defeating both Sanders and Trump .
But his presidency would probably end up being rather weak and aimless , without doing much to address the United States ’ deeper social and political problems .
For this year ’ s voters , however , that may well be enough .

Joe Biden is nothing if not familiar to Americans. After watching him in the spotlight of U.S. politics for more than four decades, there’s a natural tendency to assume one already knows the former vice president—not just his personality and biography but the character of his political ideas. It has become second nature to describe his politics with such ready-made labels as “centrist” or “moderate.”
Joe Biden is nothing if not familiar to Americans. After watching him in the spotlight of U.S. politics for more than four decades, there’s a natural tendency to assume one already knows the former vice president—not just his personality and biography but the character of his political ideas. It has become second nature to describe his politics with such ready-made labels as “centrist” or “moderate.”
None of these labels is entirely false. But they also obscure much of the specific content of Biden’s platform and worldview. Biden is, in fact, a moderate—but he’s of a type that will likely be less familiar at first glance to American voters.
Biden’s campaign has thus far been very different from those of recent Democratic presidential nominees. Hillary Clinton embodied a form of technocratic liberalism based on a deep-seated faith in data, free markets, and the benign nature of U.S. military hegemony abroad. None of these is prominent in Biden’s current platform, which is much more about restoring a lost unity and civility at home than pursuing a forward- or outward-looking agenda.
Similarly, there was a charge of idealistic progressivism in Barack Obama’s two successful bids for the presidency that is entirely absent from Biden’s mode of self-presentation. In fact, the most obvious reason why Obama chose Biden as his running mate on both occasions is precisely that he was intended to function as a counterpoint to Obama’s own disruptive appeal, complementing the overall message of “Change!” with a more familiar and reassuring under-melody. It is therefore a mistake to assume that Biden merely stands for “Obamaism without Obama”—and even more so to think that his campaign constitutes a reiteration of Clinton’s failed bid for the presidency in 2016.
A more fruitful comparison emerges from the obvious fact that Biden seeks to trace a middle path between Donald Trump’s far-right nationalism and Bernie Sanders’s democratic socialism. Long before the notion of a “Third Way” was appropriated by British Labour Party leader Tony Blair in the 1990s, this was a staple talking point of a specific strand of continental European conservatism, which sought to distinguish itself from both fascism on the far-right and revolutionary socialism on the far-left during the interwar and immediate postwar years: the political tradition of Christian democracy.
This is the family of political parties that came to power in most continental European countries in the aftermath of World War II under the leadership of such figures as Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, and Robert Schuman. But it also remains prominent today in Germany under the chancellorship of Angela Merkel and in the European Union’s Parliament and Commission, with Ursula Von der Leyen at the helm.
Biden’s two main political rivals at the moment are routinely thought of in reference to European political traditions—social democracy in the case of Sanders and far-right nationalism in the case of Trump. It’s time to do the same for Biden. The Democratic front-runner’s political ideology isn’t a watered-down version of his rivals’ or even his predecessors’. It is best understood as approximating a distinct European tradition—one that may indicate Bidenism’s ultimate legacy in the United States.
Stemming out of a 19th century intellectual endeavor to reconcile Catholic social doctrine with modern democracy, the Christian democratic ideology can be characterized in terms of three core principles: a morally tinged conception of the “natural order” as a harmonious and organically integrated society; a remedial conception of the welfare state as a way to protect social unity and stability from the threat of radical takeover; and a conception of democratic practice as a constant process of compromise and reconciliation between conflicting social interests.
Each of these three features finds a powerful echo in Biden’s current political stance and rhetoric. Consider his campaign’s constant claim that it’s involved in “a battle for the soul of America”: This points to the idea of a spiritual and ultimately existential threat against which Biden presents himself as a bulwark. The threat in question is evidently the divisive politics and abrasive style of the current U.S. president. In standing against him, Biden therefore claims to be restoring national unity and a sense of mutual civility.
This concept of America’s “soul” is given further substance by Biden’s frequent references to notions of “dignity,” “honor,” “decency,” and “hard work.” All these terms point to an idealized vision of American society as a harmonious and organically integrated order, one that rests on a foundation of mutual cooperation and a shared set of moral values—and, crucially, is temporally situated somewhere in the past. “This is not how our parents educated us” is a frequent refrain in Biden’s stump speeches.
This is the deeply conservative dimension to Biden’s promise to “heal” the divisions that cut across American society—one that is reminiscent of European Christian democracy’s historic emphasis on the values of “national unity” and “restoration” of the social order in the aftermath of World War II. Alcide De Gasperi, for instance, used to describe the Italian democrazia cristiana of the 1940s and ’50s as a “party of the nation,” since he thought of it as a mechanism to reconcile the country’s conflicting social groups and interests.
Biden has a similar view of the Democratic Party’s role in the contemporary United States. Given the way in which the Republican Party has been transformed under the leadership of Trump, Biden seems to think it’s now the role of the Democrats to reunite the whole nation under the banner of its traditional moral and political principles of inclusiveness and civility.
The same organic conception of society also underpins Biden’s main social and economic policy proposals. In contrast to Sanders’s advocacy for universalist welfare entitlement programs such as “Medicare for All” and free public college tuition, Biden thinks that the role of state intervention in the economy should be focused on the protection of socially disadvantaged groups. This is evident in his proposed extension of Obamacare “for those who need it” (e.g., the uninsured and the “left behind”) and free tuition for community colleges “in the most disadvantaged areas.”
This approach is justified with reference to another classically Christian democratic idea: that everyone should contribute to the best of their ability to the well-being of society as a whole. While this involves some measure of socioeconomic redistribution, it steers clear of the more radical idea that society should aspire to some form of substantive—as well as formal—equality. Indeed, Biden has explicitly presented his socioeconomic policy platform as a way of making sure that everyone has a “stake” in the capitalist economy and implicitly as a way of protecting it from the perceived threat of radical takeover by either the far-left or the far-right.
This closely resembles the logic of the Christian democratic parties in Europe that supported welfare-state policies in the aftermath of World War II as explicitly anti-revolutionary measures. Their intuition was that improving the conditions of the worse-off through targeted aid measures, such as cash transfers or benefits-in-kind, was bound to undercut the case for more radical transformations of the existing socioeconomic order by giving them something to lose. Thus, for instance, throughout the 1950s and ’60s, it was Christian democrats—not social democrats—who pushed forward many policies incentivizing homeownership for the working classes in both Germany and Italy.
Finally, the signature feature of Biden’s political style is his commitment to social reconciliation through political compromise. From the beginning of his political career, Biden has cultivated an image of himself as a “bridge-builder.” Indeed, this is arguably the main reason for his now-disavowed but nonetheless long-standing support for a variety of “tough on crime” legislative bills as a senator throughout the 1980s and ’90s.
Even if those bills are now widely perceived as having had an overwhelmingly negative effect, especially on African American and working-class communities, it should not be forgotten that during the 1980s and ’90s, they enjoyed widespread support among both African Americans and working-class whites and Democrats and Republicans. Biden supported these policies before they fell out of favor precisely because they sought to bring together the various components of American society while “reaching out” across the political aisle.
Biden’s approach to such law-and-order questions again parallels the thinking of Christian democratic parties in Europe. For instance, during the 1960s and ’70s, both Italian and German Christian democrats took a very firm stance against the so-called “Red Terrorism” of far-left revolutionary groups such as the Brigate Rosse and Baader-Meinhof—in some cases going as far as reviving extraordinary criminal justice procedures that hadn’t been used since the end of the fascist and national-socialist regimes. These measures were justified precisely as a compromise between the far-right’s demands for a complete suspension of the democratic order and the center-left’s calls for a more lenient approach.
For Biden, just as for European-style Christian democracy, such acts of compromise and reconciliation are not merely tactical political tools. They are elevated to the status of moral principles in their own right.
Of course, there are also aspects of Biden’s platform that fail to overlap with the historical experience of continental European Christian democracy. Although Biden is a devout Catholic (one who has apparently been wearing a rosary under his sleeve since the death of his son Beau in 2015), he remains firmly within the American tradition of secularism, which posits a strict “wall of separation” between politics and religion. Europe’s Christian democracy, by contrast, is partly rooted in an attempt to directly translate principles of Catholic social doctrine into a democratic political platform. In this sense, Biden is a distinctly Americanized version of this European strand of political conservatism.
A less persuasive objection to this comparison would be that comparing Bidenism with Christian democracy overlooks the simplest ideological motivation for Biden’s candidacy: that he merely represents the American political and economic establishment’s desperate and internally incoherent grasping for any palatable alternative to Trump. In other words, if you scratch the surface of Bidenism, it reveals nothing more than anti-Trumpism.
There may be some truth to the substance of this critique—yet it hardly negates the comparison with European Christian democracy. The latter succeeded in the postwar years not least because it was propped up and held together with material support from American political, economic, and military actors. The U.S. establishment was attracted to Christian democracy less by the substance of its philosophy than by the perception it was the safest bet to stave off the risk of both fascist resurgence and communist revolution.
The comparison with Christian democracy can also help shed light on Biden’s future prospects as both candidate and president. On one hand, his promises of moral restoration, social protection, and political reconciliation constitute a formidable electoral weapon. Christian democrats succeeded in keeping both the far-left and the far-right out of power for several decades after the end of World War II precisely on the basis of a coalition that united social elites, the urban middle classes, and the rural poor against the perceived threat of radical takeover.
The same insight also suggests that, if he is indeed elected, Biden is likely to be far more open to political influence than either Clinton or Sanders would have been as president. His presidency would likely leave ample space for the two main factions within the Democratic Party—the Clintonian liberal wing and Sanders’s democratic socialist one—to continue shaping policy in important ways, even though neither is likely to get all of what they want. In this sense, the result wouldn’t be very much unlike the constant struggle for compromise between the center-right and the center-left wings of continental European Christian democratic parties during their period of political hegemony in the postwar years.
On the flip side, however, Biden’s conservative pragmatism is likely to leave him without any clear sense of direction beyond the defeat of the more radical political forces he is standing against. As the prospect of both fascist resurgence and communist revolution began to wane in postwar continental Europe, Christian democracy lost its way, falling prey to widespread clientelism and corruption. Ultimately, this is what brought down the Italian democrazia cristiana at the beginning of the 1990s and has also weakened the German Christian Democratic Union and other continental European Christian democratic parties’ political identities ever since.
Seen in this light, Biden might succeed in defeating both Sanders and Trump. But his presidency would probably end up being rather weak and aimless, without doing much to address the United States’ deeper social and political problems. For this year’s voters, however, that may well be enough.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-16--What the West Can Learn From Africa’s Ebola Response

What the West Can Learn From Africa ’ s Ebola Response Exactly six years ago , in mid-March 2014 , Liberians woke up to texts , calls , and screenshots that all suggested the same thing : Trouble was coming .
It wasn ’ t the sort of trouble we were used to—namely , war—but it was the kind of trouble that could be spread through the simplest of affectionate gestures or through the dutiful expression of one ’ s faith .
No one had yet heard of the thousands of people who had died of unknown causes in Gueckedou @ @ @ @ @ @ @ east of Liberia ’ s border town of Foya .
And no one knew that the virus causing these deaths had spread rapidly across Guinea in the months before .
What we did know on that morning was that samples sent two months before to Lyon , France , had finally yielded results .
It was the Ebola virus disease .
The more than 60 percent of Liberia ’ s population under the age of 35 hardly remembered the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the mid-1990s .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they would have been busy dodging bullets .
Panic peaked that morning .
A woman said to be carrying the virus had crossed the Guinean border into Liberia ’ s Foya district .
She was making a beeline for Kakata , an hour ’ s drive outside of Monrovia , and the authorities were hard-pressed to intercept her .
That panic dissipated as life went on .
Weeks went by without news .
Those in Monrovia—nearly a third of the country ’ s population—and those in neighboring cities saw no cause for alarm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Among such a youthful , optimistic , and largely undereducated population , one case of Ebola can become ten thousand .
The first days of the 2014 Ebola outbreak and Liberia ’ s response from that point on can offer important lessons to European and North American governments .
Those first days of the 2014 Ebola outbreak and Liberia ’ s response from that point on can offer important lessons to European and North American governments in light of the World Health Organization ’ s announcement that the new coronavirus is now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Madrid to London to New York .
The Liberian government ’ s reaction to the crisis and the approach we took in Liberia could serve as a model for how Western countries , many of which are underprepared for a crisis of this magnitude , can respond .
First and foremost , leaders must communicate with citizens effectively .
The success of the response in Liberia , a deeply religious country , hinged on our ability to resolve a confrontation between faith and science that was extremely fraught .
People had flocked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and come out infected .
Our Islamic communities had been hit hardest : Ebola had spread through the performance of burial rites for the dead , which mandate washing the body and burying it within 24 hours—a pillar of Islam .
As a government , we stood no chance of addressing the crisis if we could not engage effectively with the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia and its diverse interfaith clerical figures to make the case for caution .
But educating the public in general was just as vital .
Our communication had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population .
Then-President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf ’ s administration , with our development partners , engaged pop stars to compose jingles and songs .
“ Ebola Is Real ” and other songs became some of the most-played songs on the radio .
Vietnam and other countries have already effectively adopted this method in response to the coronavirus outbreak .
But the truth itself is the easiest thing around which to craft a unified message from any government to any public—especially in a crisis .
Not only does it limit confusion , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other resources to contain the epidemic and prevent its resurgence .
Telling the truth is especially important because , when lives are at stake , misinformation is sure to spread .
In a political and economic context in which a large section of the public distrusts their government because of real or perceived failures , the onset of a crisis renders those anxieties more acute .
Pretending we had the whole situation under control and could do it all ourselves would not have instilled calm in Liberia .
We had to ask for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the world answered .
Sirleaf swallowed the nation ’ s pride .
She published an op-ed asking for the world ’ s assistance to fight Ebola , beseeching global leaders to come together to address the crisis .
And help flooded in—from the United States , from Europe , from Asia , from Latin America .
And , of course , our fellow Africans did not fail us .
Sirleaf led daily meetings and ensured that her government spoke with one voice .
There was no confusion and no contradictions .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a halt , our neighbor Ivory Coast had closed its border , and major airlines had suspended all flights .
And yet Liberians still gathered for big events and packed nightclubs .
We knew we had to impose a curfew .
That unity of command made it easier for me , as minister of finance , to move a core team from my office to work daily from the Ministry of Health .
We ensured that the health ministry had the resources it needed , in record time , to function in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough .
Liberians are vivacious , enterprising , and fun-loving people—and that made it incredibly difficult to contain Ebola ’ s spread .
By July 2014 , the economy had ground to a screeching halt , our neighbor Ivory Coast had closed its border , and the major airlines had suspended all flights indefinitely .
And yet Liberians still gathered for big events and packed nightclubs .
We knew we had to impose a curfew .
To begin , the government imposed a 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. restriction , which curbed evening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daytime traffic .
We cleared the offices of the country ’ s largest employer , the government , by allowing only essential staff to return to work .
Our municipalities took a hit to major sources of revenue when we prohibited the rental of public venues for events .
The country ’ s bustling lifestyle flatlined .
Open-air marketplaces emptied .
The usually lively , sunny Christmas season was as dead as it had been since the end of the Liberian civil war .
But a dead Christmas season was preferable to dead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saving lives .
China has already heeded this lesson to reduce its coronavirus crisis , and countries such as South Korea and Italy have imposed similarly draconian—but essential—measures in the past few weeks .
The unfortunate fact is that even in circumstances like these , many people keep travel promises to their children , check off their bucket-list commitments , or simply go about their daily lives wearing recklessness as a badge of courage .
Some dismiss the possibility of their infection on the grounds that the echelons of power and class in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scourges .
The spread of the coronavirus at the Conservative Political Action Conference last month debunked that theory , sending a U.S. senator into self-isolation .
Since then , Canada ’ s prime minister has done the same after his wife tested positive , and an Australian cabinet official has been hospitalized with coronavirus .
In times like these , Murphy ’ s Law gleefully asserts itself .
While a rapidly spreading virus feasts on an insufficiently vigilant populace , an economic crisis looms .
The only question is this : What will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the pandemic ?
For Liberia , it was economic .
The global prices of rubber and iron ore , our major exports , sunk to lows in 2014 from which they have yet to recover .
The loss of revenue from these sources put heavy strain on our growth and development projections .
Then came Ebola to sink the economy altogether , sending all foreign direct investors fleeing with their capital and invoking force majeure clauses as they abandoned their commercial pursuits .
The global economy today faces a challenge in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less devastating , if not for whole countries then for working-class citizens who do things like drive buses , load cargo , and take care of toddlers ; they lack the luxury of working from home .
Layoffs have already begun in the sectors hardest-hit by the coronavirus , and the fall in oil prices has only made matters worse .
At Liberia ’ s Ministry of Finance , we rode two elephants with one foot on each back .
We mobilized domestic and external resources for the fight in front of us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the recovery .
We began developing a post-Ebola recovery plan midcrisis .
As a result of that forward planning , we raised funding for economic recovery not only in Liberia , but also in the other affected countries such as Guinea and Sierra Leone .
At a time when some had little faith in the international system , it was refreshing to find that the multilateral institutions led by the World Bank , IMF , and African Development Bank were very useful ; they delivered .
In spite of this , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to communicate effectively .
Something as simple as a phone call from one health minister to another was a difficult experience in 2014 , before the transmission and distribution of fiber-optic cable in Monrovia .
This problem is now replicating itself in advanced countries , where technology breaks down barriers .
Geopolitical tensions need not hinder communication among trade partners on matters of mutual interest , such as the prevention of a looming pandemic .
And adversaries should band together to combat this virus .
The loss of innocent lives is currently lower @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a comparison often misguidedly invoked to trivialize the coronavirus .
But , unlike influenza , the coronavirus has a higher mortality rate and no treatment or vaccine .
Thousands of deaths are too high a price for a failure to engage due to political rivalry .
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has taken pains to distinguish between the countries that have failed to contain the virus due to a lack of political will rather than a lack of resources .
The West was Liberia ’ s first port of call when dealing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one , and we overcame that outbreak through the resilience of the Liberian people , an abundance of medical equipment , and the financial and human resources that our partners provided .
Much wealthier nations , confronted with a pandemic , must not spare any such effort in defense of their own people .
They should build partnerships and deploy both their resources and political will to end this pandemic .

Exactly six years ago, in mid-March 2014, Liberians woke up to texts, calls, and screenshots that all suggested the same thing: Trouble was coming. It wasn’t the sort of trouble we were used to—namely, war—but it was the kind of trouble that could be spread through the simplest of affectionate gestures or through the dutiful expression of one’s faith. No one had yet heard of the thousands of people who had died of unknown causes in Gueckedou, Guinea, just a few hours east of Liberia’s border town of Foya. And no one knew that the virus causing these deaths had spread rapidly across Guinea in the months before.
Exactly six years ago, in mid-March 2014, Liberians woke up to texts, calls, and screenshots that all suggested the same thing: Trouble was coming. It wasn’t the sort of trouble we were used to—namely, war—but it was the kind of trouble that could be spread through the simplest of affectionate gestures or through the dutiful expression of one’s faith. No one had yet heard of the thousands of people who had died of unknown causes in Gueckedou, Guinea, just a few hours east of Liberia’s border town of Foya. And no one knew that the virus causing these deaths had spread rapidly across Guinea in the months before.
What we did know on that morning was that samples sent two months before to Lyon, France, had finally yielded results. It was the Ebola virus disease. The more than 60 percent of Liberia’s population under the age of 35 hardly remembered the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the mid-1990s. Even if they had been born then, they would have been busy dodging bullets.
Panic peaked that morning. A woman said to be carrying the virus had crossed the Guinean border into Liberia’s Foya district. She was making a beeline for Kakata, an hour’s drive outside of Monrovia, and the authorities were hard-pressed to intercept her. That panic dissipated as life went on. Weeks went by without news. Those in Monrovia—nearly a third of the country’s population—and those in neighboring cities saw no cause for alarm. They thought it was a hoax. Among such a youthful, optimistic, and largely undereducated population, one case of Ebola can become ten thousand.
The first days of the 2014 Ebola outbreak and Liberia’s response from that point on can offer important lessons to European and North American governments.
Those first days of the 2014 Ebola outbreak and Liberia’s response from that point on can offer important lessons to European and North American governments in light of the World Health Organization’s announcement that the new coronavirus is now a pandemic—and the evidence in rising caseloads from Madrid to London to New York. The Liberian government’s reaction to the crisis and the approach we took in Liberia could serve as a model for how Western countries, many of which are underprepared for a crisis of this magnitude, can respond.
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First and foremost, leaders must communicate with citizens effectively. The success of the response in Liberia, a deeply religious country, hinged on our ability to resolve a confrontation between faith and science that was extremely fraught. People had flocked for refuge to their places of prayer and come out infected. Our Islamic communities had been hit hardest: Ebola had spread through the performance of burial rites for the dead, which mandate washing the body and burying it within 24 hours—a pillar of Islam. As a government, we stood no chance of addressing the crisis if we could not engage effectively with the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia and its diverse interfaith clerical figures to make the case for caution.
But educating the public in general was just as vital. Our communication had to be forceful but engaging to our young population. Then-President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s administration, with our development partners, engaged pop stars to compose jingles and songs. “Ebola Is Real” and other songs became some of the most-played songs on the radio. Vietnam and other countries have already effectively adopted this method in response to the coronavirus outbreak.
But the truth itself is the easiest thing around which to craft a unified message from any government to any public—especially in a crisis. Not only does it limit confusion, but it also facilitates the pooling of human and other resources to contain the epidemic and prevent its resurgence. Telling the truth is especially important because, when lives are at stake, misinformation is sure to spread.
In a political and economic context in which a large section of the public distrusts their government because of real or perceived failures, the onset of a crisis renders those anxieties more acute. Pretending we had the whole situation under control and could do it all ourselves would not have instilled calm in Liberia. We had to ask for help. And, when we did, the world answered.
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Sirleaf swallowed the nation’s pride. She published an op-ed asking for the world’s assistance to fight Ebola, beseeching global leaders to come together to address the crisis. And help flooded in—from the United States, from Europe, from Asia, from Latin America. And, of course, our fellow Africans did not fail us. Sirleaf led daily meetings and ensured that her government spoke with one voice. There was no confusion and no contradictions.
By July 2014, the economy had ground to a halt, our neighbor Ivory Coast had closed its border, and major airlines had suspended all flights. And yet Liberians still gathered for big events and packed nightclubs. We knew we had to impose a curfew.
That unity of command made it easier for me, as minister of finance, to move a core team from my office to work daily from the Ministry of Health. We ensured that the health ministry had the resources it needed, in record time, to function in emergency mode.
But that was not enough. Liberians are vivacious, enterprising, and fun-loving people—and that made it incredibly difficult to contain Ebola’s spread. By July 2014, the economy had ground to a screeching halt, our neighbor Ivory Coast had closed its border, and the major airlines had suspended all flights indefinitely. And yet Liberians still gathered for big events and packed nightclubs. We knew we had to impose a curfew.
To begin, the government imposed a 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. restriction, which curbed evening movements. Then we had to clear daytime traffic. We cleared the offices of the country’s largest employer, the government, by allowing only essential staff to return to work. Our municipalities took a hit to major sources of revenue when we prohibited the rental of public venues for events.
The country’s bustling lifestyle flatlined. Open-air marketplaces emptied. The usually lively, sunny Christmas season was as dead as it had been since the end of the Liberian civil war. But a dead Christmas season was preferable to dead Liberians. This was the cost of saving lives. China has already heeded this lesson to reduce its coronavirus crisis, and countries such as South Korea and Italy have imposed similarly draconian—but essential—measures in the past few weeks.
The unfortunate fact is that even in circumstances like these, many people keep travel promises to their children, check off their bucket-list commitments, or simply go about their daily lives wearing recklessness as a badge of courage. Some dismiss the possibility of their infection on the grounds that the echelons of power and class in which they move are impervious to such scourges. The spread of the coronavirus at the Conservative Political Action Conference last month debunked that theory, sending a U.S. senator into self-isolation. Since then, Canada’s prime minister has done the same after his wife tested positive, and an Australian cabinet official has been hospitalized with coronavirus.
In times like these, Murphy’s Law gleefully asserts itself. While a rapidly spreading virus feasts on an insufficiently vigilant populace, an economic crisis looms. The only question is this: What will hurt us first, the economic crisis or the pandemic?
For Liberia, it was economic. The global prices of rubber and iron ore, our major exports, sunk to lows in 2014 from which they have yet to recover. The loss of revenue from these sources put heavy strain on our growth and development projections. Then came Ebola to sink the economy altogether, sending all foreign direct investors fleeing with their capital and invoking force majeure clauses as they abandoned their commercial pursuits.
The global economy today faces a challenge in the reverse order. But it is no less devastating, if not for whole countries then for working-class citizens who do things like drive buses, load cargo, and take care of toddlers; they lack the luxury of working from home. Layoffs have already begun in the sectors hardest-hit by the coronavirus, and the fall in oil prices has only made matters worse.
At Liberia’s Ministry of Finance, we rode two elephants with one foot on each back. We mobilized domestic and external resources for the fight in front of us, while crafting and communicating ambitious plans for the recovery. We began developing a post-Ebola recovery plan midcrisis. As a result of that forward planning, we raised funding for economic recovery not only in Liberia, but also in the other affected countries such as Guinea and Sierra Leone. At a time when some had little faith in the international system, it was refreshing to find that the multilateral institutions led by the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank were very useful; they delivered.
In spite of this, we and our neighbors struggled throughout the crisis to communicate effectively. Something as simple as a phone call from one health minister to another was a difficult experience in 2014, before the transmission and distribution of fiber-optic cable in Monrovia.
Geopolitical tensions need not hinder communication among trade partners on matters of mutual interest, such as the prevention of a looming pandemic. And adversaries should band together to combat this virus.
This problem is now replicating itself in advanced countries, where technology breaks down barriers. Geopolitical tensions need not hinder communication among trade partners on matters of mutual interest, such as the prevention of a looming pandemic. And adversaries should band together to combat this virus.
The loss of innocent lives is currently lower than the annual mortality rate of influenza, a comparison often misguidedly invoked to trivialize the coronavirus. But, unlike influenza, the coronavirus has a higher mortality rate and no treatment or vaccine. Thousands of deaths are too high a price for a failure to engage due to political rivalry.
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has taken pains to distinguish between the countries that have failed to contain the virus due to a lack of political will rather than a lack of resources. The West was Liberia’s first port of call when dealing with a disease far deadlier than this one, and we overcame that outbreak through the resilience of the Liberian people, an abundance of medical equipment, and the financial and human resources that our partners provided.
Much wealthier nations, confronted with a pandemic, must not spare any such effort in defense of their own people. They should build partnerships and deploy both their resources and political will to end this pandemic.