foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Black Lives Matter in Indonesia, Too

Black Lives Matter in Indonesia, Too

In the indelible photograph of Obby Kogoya , the black Indonesian university student is flat on his stomach on the road ; a policeman ’ s hand claws at his nostrils and another cups his chin while he screams in obvious pain .
He is framed by a dense tangle of arms and legs of police who have ganged up to arrest him for participating in a peaceful protest .
Even if you have never been to Indonesia , let alone the university town of Yogyakarta in Central Java where Kogoya went to school , the image of craven police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be familiar .
The echoes with the plight of African Americans is not lost on Indonesians from Papua and West Papua , the country ’ s two easternmost provinces , which are populated mainly by dark-skinned Melanesians and home to a long-standing separatist struggle .
Recently , Papuans have been juxtaposing the photo of Kogoya , who was arrested in 2016 at age 21 , with George Floyd , the 46-year-old black man killed by Minneapolis police in late May .
“ In Papua , we have a lot of names like George @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Papuan international relations lecturer who lives in the regional capital of Jayapura .
“ It ’ s interesting to see just how much Papuans are relating to # BlackLivesMatter .
Papuans share the anger of black Americans … and we are demanding now that people around the world , but especially Indonesians , realize we have same suffering here.
” That Black Lives Matter is proving so resonant halfway around the world should be no surprise .
Over the past two weeks , countries from New Zealand to the U.K. have seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the case of Indonesia , and of Papua , is one of the movement ’ s most powerful ripple effects .
Seven years after it started in the United States , Black Lives Matter ’ s framework for understanding systemic racism and violence against black people is providing a novel way to understand a little-known , little-reported , heavily militarized and racialized conflict in the world ’ s fourth-most populous country.The echoes with the plight of African Americans is not lost on Indonesians from Papua and West Papua .
Many foreigners don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but they make up the majority of the 4.3 million people who live in Papua and West Papua .
These are Indonesia ’ s easternmost provinces , on one end of New Guinea island , which is split between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea .
The two provinces were annexed by the postcolonial Indonesian republic in 1963 .
Today , Indonesian Papua is tightly patrolled by the Indonesian military , and it remains almost forbidden to both foreign journalists—who rarely get permits and when they do are heavily surveilled—and domestic ones , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laws .
Papua is also home to the world ’ s largest gold mine , Grasberg , which was until recently operated by an American company , Freeport .
Under an increasingly heavy-handed military presence , Papuans have faced sundry human rights abuses : police killings and beatings , the intimidation of indigenous leaders , forced conversions , and the detention of peaceful activists .
And when Papuans go to other islands in Indonesia , they face racism , surveillance , and dormitory raids .
There is a complex mix of factors in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militarized posture toward Papua is similar to many states ’ attitudes toward separatism , which is typically quelled with extreme force—think of India-administered Kashmir or Catalonia in Spain .
But it is enmeshed with broader racism , so Papuan identity is besieged from two sides .
Colorism is pervasive in Indonesia and affects dark-skinned people not just from Papua but also from such eastern provinces as Flores and Maluku .
The reasons for this include both the colonial hangover common to many Asian countries—Indonesia was under Dutch rule until 1945—and domestic majoritarianism coming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sundanese .
Fairness creams and beauty products are ubiquitous , the vast majority of television and film actors are light-skinned , and black skin is heavily stigmatized .
“ Yet , Papua is mainly thought of as a political issue , so we don ’ t always talk about racism , even though racism is of course at the root of the Papua conflict , ” Rumkabu said .
“ Yes , yes , we are black people .
Black is Papuan , Papuan is black.
” But Indonesia ’ s public sphere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sea change .
On social media , ethnic Papuans , prominent non-Papuan activists , and thousands of Indonesian “ netizens ” are all suddenly talking about Papua , often tagging their discussions with the hashtag # PapuanLivesMatter .
An issue that was once confined to local dissidents and niche activists suddenly has gone national .
“ I have personally never witnessed so many people from my generation speak about Papua and with so much passion , ” said Jordinna Joaquin , a 17-year-old who edits Kudeta magazine in Jakarta .
On June 1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We need to talk about Papua ” that immediately went viral .
The editors were flooded with feedback , and the post , which collated reading material and talking points about the Papua conflict , got more than 12,000 likes and was shared widely .
It echoed the millions of stylized posts that have flooded American social media in recent days with information about bailout funds , reading lists , talking scripts , and more .
Joaquin noted that the COVID-19 quarantine made it possible for her team to both create these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on social media , “ where all these conversations are taking place.
” When Papuans go to other islands in Indonesia , they face racism , surveillance , and dormitory raids .
Papuan diaspora outside of Indonesia has been galvanized by # BlackLivesMatter , too .
The prominent independence leader Benny Wenda , who resides in exile in Oxford , started tweeting with the hashtag May 31 .
“ The George Floyd case is opening the world ’ s opinion , and it ’ s helping us come together as a human family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ This brutality is not only happening in the USA but the whole world.
” In his decades of activism—many of his family members were freedom fighters—he said he has never seen human rights in Papua so connected to a global movement .
“ The response has been really overwhelming , ” said Veronica Koman , an Indonesian lawyer and veteran Papua rights activist who now lives in de facto exile in Australia .
Koman ’ s advocacy has often felt lonely , and the Indonesian government has tried to arrest her for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ She said she had gotten used to Papua being a somewhat niche concern until this month .
“ It actually started with social media , especially on Facebook , which most Papuans use , and they commented immediately on the George Floyd case and how they could relate to what was happening , ” Koman said .
They especially picked up on how it was filmed on a smartphone , which has become more prevalent in documenting police brutality in Papua , too , she said .
“ In both cases , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The discourse also quickly spread to non-Papuan Indonesians , Koman said .
While the Floyd protests captured world news headlines and attention , Indonesians started to speak out on police brutality against dark-skinned people in their own backyard .
Koman organized a livestreamed panel on June 1 on # BlackLivesMatter and Papua with two Papuan activists , Cisco Mofu and Mikael Kudiai , where they spoke for more than an hour about their everyday experiences with racism and discrimination , crude media portrayals of Papuans , and how their experiences with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans .
“ George Floyd died like an animal , ” Mofu said , and his death was recorded “ second by second .
… I think that ’ s not so different from what happened at the dorm in Surabaya in 2019.
” He was referring to an incident last year in the Javanese port city of Surabaya , where a university dorm of 43 Papuan students was attacked by Islamist militia groups for displaying Papuan flags ; the local police then doubled down by tear-gassing the students and trapping them there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Photos and videos went viral across Indonesian-language media , leading to protests across Papua .
But American media has an easier time documenting and amplifying accounts of police brutality than Indonesian outlets do , said Mofu , which makes direct action in Indonesia much harder .
Police brutality to Papuans living outside Papua , like Kogoya in Yogyakarta and the university students in Surabaya , is also much easier to report than brutality in the region itself .
The countless violent incidents inside Papua , like the murder of activist Yawan Wayeni @ @ @ @ @ @ @ document or publicize .
Although Indonesia has much stricter gun control laws than the United States , Indonesian police have killed Papuans with such tools as water cannons and by physical force .
Still , the 2019 protests after the Surabaya incident were a turning point for discussing racism against Papuans , Rumkabu said .
“ # BlackLivesMatter has been echoing around Papuan circles for a while , but now the time is just right because of last year ’ s widespread anti-racism protests , ” she said .
“ That was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that ’ s why the Floyd protests are resonating so much now.
” Something that unites Indonesian Papuans more broadly is their experience with racism .
Indonesian Papua is extremely diverse , comprising more than 250 tribes , and there are different factions of Papuans who advocate for different goals , from complete independence to more equitable and less militarized relations with Jakarta .
But regardless of their political position on separatism , something that unites Indonesian Papuans more broadly is their experience with racism , and that , primarily , is what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Koman ’ s panel , Kudiai spoke at length about the pervasive , casual racism that Papuans face , beyond police brutality , including being called “ monkeys , ” which protesters have since used as a rallying cry .
Mofu noted how media portrayals foreground physical attributes like dreadlocks and dark skin to otherize ethnic Papuans .
“ Other Indonesians really don ’ t realize that everyday racism is such a big part of Papuans ’ experience , and the fact that people are listening to them now is really a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ George Floyd protests have reverberated worldwide after months of social distancing and sheltering in place because of the coronavirus .
Thousands of people have marched in Paris and London , German footballers have called for justice , and solidarity protests have taken place as far away as Australia , where activists have used the moment as a chance to examine police brutality against indigenous citizens .
Even the specific issue of Papuan black lives has taken on an international dimension ; on June 3 , protesters in The Hague , Netherlands , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , held signs mentioning Papua and picturing Kogoya .
Indonesian American writer Teta Alim , who lives in Washington , D.C. , recently posted to Instagram an infographic about human rights in Papua and recognized the unique parallels between where she lives today—America ’ s capital , which has seen thousands of protesters on the streets for days on end—and her home in Indonesia .
“ Had I made this post last year , it might have not got the attention it did now , but this response has been completely overwhelming , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ magazine Buah on the Indonesian diaspora .
The willingness of young Indonesians to educate themselves about human rights in Papua shows a desire to forge a diaspora identity “ beyond batik and rendang , ” said Teta , referring to the Javanese textile and Sumatran stewed meat dish , exported staples of mainstream Indonesian culture .
“ Indonesian identity also means thinking about social justice there.
” Of course , there are limits to the usefulness of a site-specific American movement and hashtag in a Southeast Asian archipelago .
“ Racism is one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , “ but not the only one .
Being black , being Papuan , being Melanesian is really difficult .
Indonesia is not only against us because we are black but also because we fight for independence.
” Some feel that the newfound space for discussing human rights in Papua may have come too late .
Some feel that the newfound space for discussing human rights in Papua may have come too late , given the intense campaign of demographic transformation that Jakarta has applied to the region over the decades .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ how to support us , our quest for justice , our healing , and so on , ” Rumkabu said .
“ And that ’ s great .
But I find it hard to be hopeful in the long run .
Because inside here , honestly , people are struggling even more than before.
” She took a gloomy view of Jayapura , whose population , she said , is so full of nonindigenous Papuans today that it “ looks like Yogyakarta.
” Ever since annexing Papua in the sixties , Jakarta has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provinces by transplanting workers and bureaucrats en masse from other islands , especially Java .
There is even a phenomenon of “ Papua dakwah , ” or proselytization , where Islamic preachers have been energetically working to convert the majority-Christian Papuans to Islam .
“ The goal is to ‘ Indonesianize ’ us , and after that , I feel there will be even less room to talk about race , ” Rumkabu said .
“ Within one or two years , people who look like me will be a minority in Jayapura.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are also nonindigenous Papuans , she said , sometimes backed by murky resources from other islands .
And ever since the widespread 2019 protests , police banned mass rallies that could lead to “ anarchist acts ” in Papua , so there is almost no way to protest on the ground like Americans are doing over George Floyd .
This state of affairs , combined with overlapping COVID-19 social distancing orders , means that Papuan Lives Matter remains almost totally online for now .
And that , in turn , limits its reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service outside its major cities , especially in the highlands , remains spotty .
The work is just beginning , as nearly everyone involved in this new discourse agrees .
“ This conversation isn ’ t about us talking louder , ” Joaquin said , “ but about amplifying Papuan narratives and doing our best to hand over the mic to them .
”

In the indelible photograph of Obby Kogoya, the black Indonesian university student is flat on his stomach on the road; a policeman’s hand claws at his nostrils and another cups his chin while he screams in obvious pain. He is framed by a dense tangle of arms and legs of police who have ganged up to arrest him for participating in a peaceful protest. Even if you have never been to Indonesia, let alone the university town of Yogyakarta in Central Java where Kogoya went to school, the image of craven police brutality against a young black man will be familiar.
In the indelible photograph of Obby Kogoya, the black Indonesian university student is flat on his stomach on the road; a policeman’s hand claws at his nostrils and another cups his chin while he screams in obvious pain. He is framed by a dense tangle of arms and legs of police who have ganged up to arrest him for participating in a peaceful protest. Even if you have never been to Indonesia, let alone the university town of Yogyakarta in Central Java where Kogoya went to school, the image of craven police brutality against a young black man will be familiar.
The echoes with the plight of African Americans is not lost on Indonesians from Papua and West Papua, the country’s two easternmost provinces, which are populated mainly by dark-skinned Melanesians and home to a long-standing separatist struggle. Recently, Papuans have been juxtaposing the photo of Kogoya, who was arrested in 2016 at age 21, with George Floyd, the 46-year-old black man killed by Minneapolis police in late May.
“In Papua, we have a lot of names like George Floyd,” said Elvira Rumkabu, a Papuan international relations lecturer who lives in the regional capital of Jayapura. “It’s interesting to see just how much Papuans are relating to #BlackLivesMatter. Papuans share the anger of black Americans … and we are demanding now that people around the world, but especially Indonesians, realize we have same suffering here.”
That Black Lives Matter is proving so resonant halfway around the world should be no surprise. Over the past two weeks, countries from New Zealand to the U.K. have seen protests in solidarity with Floyd. But the case of Indonesia, and of Papua, is one of the movement’s most powerful ripple effects. Seven years after it started in the United States, Black Lives Matter’s framework for understanding systemic racism and violence against black people is providing a novel way to understand a little-known, little-reported, heavily militarized and racialized conflict in the world’s fourth-most populous country.The echoes with the plight of African Americans is not lost on Indonesians from Papua and West Papua.
Many foreigners don’t even realize there are black Indonesians, but they make up the majority of the 4.3 million people who live in Papua and West Papua. These are Indonesia’s easternmost provinces, on one end of New Guinea island, which is split between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The two provinces were annexed by the postcolonial Indonesian republic in 1963.
Today, Indonesian Papua is tightly patrolled by the Indonesian military, and it remains almost forbidden to both foreign journalists—who rarely get permits and when they do are heavily surveilled—and domestic ones, whose reports are subject to draconian anti-defamation laws. Papua is also home to the world’s largest gold mine, Grasberg, which was until recently operated by an American company, Freeport. Under an increasingly heavy-handed military presence, Papuans have faced sundry human rights abuses: police killings and beatings, the intimidation of indigenous leaders, forced conversions, and the detention of peaceful activists. And when Papuans go to other islands in Indonesia, they face racism, surveillance, and dormitory raids.
There is a complex mix of factors in play. On one hand, the militarized posture toward Papua is similar to many states’ attitudes toward separatism, which is typically quelled with extreme force—think of India-administered Kashmir or Catalonia in Spain. But it is enmeshed with broader racism, so Papuan identity is besieged from two sides. Colorism is pervasive in Indonesia and affects dark-skinned people not just from Papua but also from such eastern provinces as Flores and Maluku. The reasons for this include both the colonial hangover common to many Asian countries—Indonesia was under Dutch rule until 1945—and domestic majoritarianism coming from lighter-skinned ethnicities like the Javanese and Sundanese. Fairness creams and beauty products are ubiquitous, the vast majority of television and film actors are light-skinned, and black skin is heavily stigmatized.
Papuan students take part in a rally in Surabaya, Indonesia, on June 16, demanding that the Indonesian government free seven Papuan protesters who were charged with treason for their involvement in anti-racism protests in 2019.
“Yet, Papua is mainly thought of as a political issue, so we don’t always talk about racism, even though racism is of course at the root of the Papua conflict,” Rumkabu said. “Yes, yes, we are black people. Black is Papuan, Papuan is black.”
But Indonesia’s public sphere is now seeing nothing short of a sea change. On social media, ethnic Papuans, prominent non-Papuan activists, and thousands of Indonesian “netizens” are all suddenly talking about Papua, often tagging their discussions with the hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter. An issue that was once confined to local dissidents and niche activists suddenly has gone national.
“I have personally never witnessed so many people from my generation speak about Papua and with so much passion,” said Jordinna Joaquin, a 17-year-old who edits Kudeta magazine in Jakarta. On June 1, the publication posted a graphic saying “We need to talk about Papua” that immediately went viral. The editors were flooded with feedback, and the post, which collated reading material and talking points about the Papua conflict, got more than 12,000 likes and was shared widely. It echoed the millions of stylized posts that have flooded American social media in recent days with information about bailout funds, reading lists, talking scripts, and more. Joaquin noted that the COVID-19 quarantine made it possible for her team to both create these resources quickly and spend vastly more time on social media, “where all these conversations are taking place.”When Papuans go to other islands in Indonesia, they face racism, surveillance, and dormitory raids.
Papuan diaspora outside of Indonesia has been galvanized by #BlackLivesMatter, too. The prominent independence leader Benny Wenda, who resides in exile in Oxford, started tweeting with the hashtag May 31.
“The George Floyd case is opening the world’s opinion, and it’s helping us come together as a human family,” he told Foreign Policy. “This brutality is not only happening in the USA but the whole world.” In his decades of activism—many of his family members were freedom fighters—he said he has never seen human rights in Papua so connected to a global movement.
“The response has been really overwhelming,” said Veronica Koman, an Indonesian lawyer and veteran Papua rights activist who now lives in de facto exile in Australia. Koman’s advocacy has often felt lonely, and the Indonesian government has tried to arrest her for spreading what it claims are hoaxes. She said she had gotten used to Papua being a somewhat niche concern until this month.
“It actually started with social media, especially on Facebook, which most Papuans use, and they commented immediately on the George Floyd case and how they could relate to what was happening,” Koman said. They especially picked up on how it was filmed on a smartphone, which has become more prevalent in documenting police brutality in Papua, too, she said. “In both cases, this accumulation of [police] impunity exploded.”
The discourse also quickly spread to non-Papuan Indonesians, Koman said. While the Floyd protests captured world news headlines and attention, Indonesians started to speak out on police brutality against dark-skinned people in their own backyard.
Koman organized a livestreamed panel on June 1 on #BlackLivesMatter and Papua with two Papuan activists, Cisco Mofu and Mikael Kudiai, where they spoke for more than an hour about their everyday experiences with racism and discrimination, crude media portrayals of Papuans, and how their experiences with the police are similar to those of black Americans.
“George Floyd died like an animal,” Mofu said, and his death was recorded “second by second. … I think that’s not so different from what happened at the dorm in Surabaya in 2019.”
He was referring to an incident last year in the Javanese port city of Surabaya, where a university dorm of 43 Papuan students was attacked by Islamist militia groups for displaying Papuan flags; the local police then doubled down by tear-gassing the students and trapping them there overnight. At least five were injured. Photos and videos went viral across Indonesian-language media, leading to protests across Papua.
Papuan students take part in a rally in Surabaya, Indonesia, on June 16.
But American media has an easier time documenting and amplifying accounts of police brutality than Indonesian outlets do, said Mofu, which makes direct action in Indonesia much harder. Police brutality to Papuans living outside Papua, like Kogoya in Yogyakarta and the university students in Surabaya, is also much easier to report than brutality in the region itself. The countless violent incidents inside Papua, like the murder of activist Yawan Wayeni in 2010, are much harder to document or publicize. Although Indonesia has much stricter gun control laws than the United States, Indonesian police have killed Papuans with such tools as water cannons and by physical force.
Still, the 2019 protests after the Surabaya incident were a turning point for discussing racism against Papuans, Rumkabu said. “#BlackLivesMatter has been echoing around Papuan circles for a while, but now the time is just right because of last year’s widespread anti-racism protests,” she said. “That was a very important moment for us, and that’s why the Floyd protests are resonating so much now.”Something that unites Indonesian Papuans more broadly is their experience with racism.
Indonesian Papua is extremely diverse, comprising more than 250 tribes, and there are different factions of Papuans who advocate for different goals, from complete independence to more equitable and less militarized relations with Jakarta. But regardless of their political position on separatism, something that unites Indonesian Papuans more broadly is their experience with racism, and that, primarily, is what Black Lives Matter helps enunciate.
In Koman’s panel, Kudiai spoke at length about the pervasive, casual racism that Papuans face, beyond police brutality, including being called “monkeys,” which protesters have since used as a rallying cry. Mofu noted how media portrayals foreground physical attributes like dreadlocks and dark skin to otherize ethnic Papuans.
“Other Indonesians really don’t realize that everyday racism is such a big part of Papuans’ experience, and the fact that people are listening to them now is really a new development,” Koman said.
The George Floyd protests have reverberated worldwide after months of social distancing and sheltering in place because of the coronavirus. Thousands of people have marched in Paris and London, German footballers have called for justice, and solidarity protests have taken place as far away as Australia, where activists have used the moment as a chance to examine police brutality against indigenous citizens. Even the specific issue of Papuan black lives has taken on an international dimension; on June 3, protesters in The Hague, Netherlands, which is home to a large Indonesian community, held signs mentioning Papua and picturing Kogoya.
Indonesian American writer Teta Alim, who lives in Washington, D.C., recently posted to Instagram an infographic about human rights in Papua and recognized the unique parallels between where she lives today—America’s capital, which has seen thousands of protesters on the streets for days on end—and her home in Indonesia.
“Had I made this post last year, it might have not got the attention it did now, but this response has been completely overwhelming,” said Teta, who edits the magazine Buah on the Indonesian diaspora. The willingness of young Indonesians to educate themselves about human rights in Papua shows a desire to forge a diaspora identity “beyond batik and rendang,” said Teta, referring to the Javanese textile and Sumatran stewed meat dish, exported staples of mainstream Indonesian culture. “Indonesian identity also means thinking about social justice there.”
Of course, there are limits to the usefulness of a site-specific American movement and hashtag in a Southeast Asian archipelago. “Racism is one part of our fight,” Wenda said, “but not the only one. Being black, being Papuan, being Melanesian is really difficult. Indonesia is not only against us because we are black but also because we fight for independence.”Some feel that the newfound space for discussing human rights in Papua may have come too late.
Some feel that the newfound space for discussing human rights in Papua may have come too late, given the intense campaign of demographic transformation that Jakarta has applied to the region over the decades.
“Non-Papuan Indonesians are finally asking us how to support us, our quest for justice, our healing, and so on,” Rumkabu said. “And that’s great. But I find it hard to be hopeful in the long run. Because inside here, honestly, people are struggling even more than before.”
She took a gloomy view of Jayapura, whose population, she said, is so full of nonindigenous Papuans today that it “looks like Yogyakarta.”
Ever since annexing Papua in the sixties, Jakarta has tried to change the makeup of the provinces by transplanting workers and bureaucrats en masse from other islands, especially Java. There is even a phenomenon of “Papua dakwah,” or proselytization, where Islamic preachers have been energetically working to convert the majority-Christian Papuans to Islam.
“The goal is to ‘Indonesianize’ us, and after that, I feel there will be even less room to talk about race,” Rumkabu said. “Within one or two years, people who look like me will be a minority in Jayapura.” A growing number of elected officials are also nonindigenous Papuans, she said, sometimes backed by murky resources from other islands.
And ever since the widespread 2019 protests, police banned mass rallies that could lead to “anarchist acts” in Papua, so there is almost no way to protest on the ground like Americans are doing over George Floyd. This state of affairs, combined with overlapping COVID-19 social distancing orders, means that Papuan Lives Matter remains almost totally online for now. And that, in turn, limits its reach within Papua, where mobile and internet service outside its major cities, especially in the highlands, remains spotty.
The work is just beginning, as nearly everyone involved in this new discourse agrees.
“This conversation isn’t about us talking louder,” Joaquin said, “but about amplifying Papuan narratives and doing our best to hand over the mic to them.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Why Are India and China Fighting?

Why Are India and China Fighting?

Why Are India and China Fighting ?
In a major setback to recent measures to de-escalate tensions , India and China engaged in a deadly skirmish along their border on Monday night .
While details of the clash are still emerging , the incident marks the first combat deaths in the area since 1975 .
An Indian Army statement acknowledged the death of an officer and two soldiers , with subsequent reports attributed to officials confirming 17 other soldiers succumbed to injuries—reports that Foreign Policy has not independently verified .
Both sides confirm that Chinese soldiers were also killed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is traditionally reluctant to report casualty figures , and it erases some clashes from official history . )
Critically , neither side is reported so far to have fired actual weapons ; the deaths may have resulted from fistfights and possibly the use of rocks and iron rods .
It ’ s also possible , given the extreme heights involved—the fighting took place in Ladakh , literally “ the land of high passes ” —that some of those killed died due to falls .
What is the origin of the conflict ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , relations between India and China rapidly degenerated over the unresolved state of their Himalayan border .
The border lines , largely set by British surveyors , are unclear and heavily disputed—as was the status of Himalayan kingdoms such as Tibet , Sikkim , Bhutan , and Nepal .
That led to a short war in 1962 , won by China .
China also backs Pakistan in its own disputes with India , and China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative has stirred Indian fears , especially the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The current border is formally accepted by neither side but simply referred to as the Line of Actual Control .
In 2017 , an attempt by Chinese engineers to build a new road through disputed territory on the Bhutan-India-China border led to a 73-day standoff on the Doklam Plateau , including fistfights between Chinese and Indian soldiers .
Following Doklam , both countries built new military infrastructure along the border .
India , for example , constructed roads and bridges to improve its connectivity to the Line of Actual Control , dramatically improving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the event of a skirmish .
In early May this year , a huge fistfight along the border led to both sides boosting local units , and there have been numerous light skirmishes—with no deaths—since then .
Both sides have accused the other of deliberately crossing the border on numerous occasions .
Until Monday ’ s battle , however , diplomacy seemed to be slowly deescalating the crisis : The two sides had opened high-level diplomatic communications and appeared ready to find convenient off-ramps for each side to maintain face .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a virtual meeting next week .
[ For more analysis like this direct to your inbox , sign up for FP ’ s weekly newsletters South Asia Brief and China Brief . ]
Both countries also have a highly jingoistic media—state-run in China ’ s case , and mostly private in India ’ s—that can escalate conflicts and drum up a public mood for a fight .
Press jingoism , however , can also open strange opportunities for de-escalation : After an aerial dogfight between India and Pakistan in 2019 , media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for their respective countries , allowing their leaders to move on .
Compounding the problems is the physically shifting nature of the border , which represents the world ’ s longest unmarked boundary line ; snowfalls , rockslides , and melting can make it literally impossible to say just where the line is , especially as climate change wreaks havoc in the mountains .
It ’ s quite possible for two patrols to both be convinced they ’ re on their country ’ s side of the border .
Has there been similar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been no deaths—or shots fired—along the border since an Indian patrol was ambushed by a Chinese one in 1975 .
But China saw significant clashes with both India and the Soviet Union during the late 1960s , at the height of the Cultural Revolution .
In India ’ s case , that culminated in a brief but bloody clash on the Sikkim-Tibet border , with around hundreds of dead and injured on each side .
On the Soviet border , fighting along the Ussuri River saw similar numbers of dead , but tensions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading to fears of a full-blown war and a possible nuclear exchange that were only alleviated by the highest-level diplomacy .
In part , those clashes were driven by political needs on the Chinese side ; officers and soldiers alike felt the need to demonstrate their Maoist enthusiasm , leading to such actions as swimming across the river waving Mao Zedong ’ s Little Red Book .
What could happen next ?
India has announced that “ both sides ” are trying to de-escalate the situation , but it has accused China of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements made in recent talks between the two sides .
China ’ s response was more demanding , accusing India of “ deliberately initiating physical attacks ” in a territory—the Galwan Valley in Ladakh that is claimed by both sides—that has “ always been ours.
” Army officers are meeting to try to resolve the situation .
While the 2017 Doklam crisis was successfully defused—and was followed by a summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan , China—recent events could easily spiral out of control .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of deaths from Monday ’ s skirmish , pressure to react and exact revenge may build .
The coronavirus has produced heightened political uncertainty in China , leading to a newly aggressive form of “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy—named after a Rambo-esque film that was a blockbuster in China but a flop elsewhere .
Chinese officials are under considerable pressure to be performatively nationalist ; moderation and restraint are becoming increasingly dangerous for careers .
On the Indian side , there is increasing nervousness about how Beijing has encircled the subcontinent .
China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has growing stakes in Sri Lanka and Nepal , two countries that have drifted away from India in recent years ; and it has made huge infrastructure investments in Bangladesh .
Meanwhile , much has changed since the last time India and China had deadly clashes in the 1960s and ’ 70s , when the two countries had similarly sized economies ; today , China ’ s GDP is five times that of India , and it spends four times as much on defense .
There will likely be a business impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for example , have recently mobilized to boycott Chinese goods , as evidenced by a recent app “ Remove China Apps ” that briefly topped downloads on India ’ s Google Play Store before the Silicon Valley giant stepped in to ban the app .
Heightened tensions also put Indians in China at risk .
Although numbers are somewhat reduced due to the coronavirus crisis , there is a substantial business and student community in the country .
During the Doklam crisis , the Beijing police lightly monitored and made home visits to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis doesn ’ t necessarily mean a full-blown war .
It could mean months of skirmishes and angry exchanges along the border , likely with more accidental deaths .
But any one of those could explode into a real exchange of fire between the two militaries .
The conditions in the Himalayas themselves severely limit military action ; it takes up to two weeks for troops to acclimate to the altitude , logistics and provisioning are extremely limited , and air power is severely restrained .
( One worrying possibility for more deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one that killed a Nepalese minister last year . )
In the event of a serious military conflict , most analysts believe the Chinese military would have the advantage .
But unlike China , which hasn ’ t fought a war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam , India sees regular fighting with Pakistan and has an arguably more experienced military force .
China resolved its border squabbles with Russia and other Soviet successor states in the 1990s and 2000s through a serious diplomatic push on both sides and mass exchanges of territory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nonissue since then .
But although the area involved was much larger , the Himalayan territorial disputes are much more sensitive and harder to resolve .
For one thing , control of the heights along the borders gives a military advantage in future conflicts .
Resource issues , especially water , are critical : 1.4 billion people depend on water drawn from Himalayan-fed rivers .
And unlike the largely bilateral conflicts along the northern border , multiple parties are involved : Nepal , Bhutan , China , Pakistan , and , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of that China ’ s increasing power and nationalism , matched by jingoism on the Indian side , and the prospects of a long-term solution look small .

In a major setback to recent measures to de-escalate tensions, India and China engaged in a deadly skirmish along their border on Monday night. While details of the clash are still emerging, the incident marks the first combat deaths in the area since 1975 .
In a major setback to recent measures to de-escalate tensions, India and China engaged in a deadly skirmish along their border on Monday night. While details of the clash are still emerging, the incident marks the first combat deaths in the area since 1975.
An Indian Army statement acknowledged the death of an officer and two soldiers, with subsequent reports attributed to officials confirming 17 other soldiers succumbed to injuries—reports that Foreign Policy has not independently verified. Both sides confirm that Chinese soldiers were also killed, but the number is unknown. (China is traditionally reluctant to report casualty figures, and it erases some clashes from official history.) Critically, neither side is reported so far to have fired actual weapons, since both Chinese and Indian patrols in the area routinely go unarmed in order to avoid possible escalation; the deaths may have resulted from fistfights and possibly the use of rocks and iron rods. It’s also possible, given the extreme heights involved—the fighting took place in Ladakh, literally “the land of high passes”—that some of those killed died due to falls.
What is the origin of the conflict?
Despite their early friendship in the 1950s, relations between India and China rapidly degenerated over the unresolved state of their Himalayan border. The border lines, largely set by British surveyors, are unclear and heavily disputed—as was the status of Himalayan kingdoms such as Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. That led to a short war in 1962, won by China. China also backs Pakistan in its own disputes with India, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative has stirred Indian fears, especially the so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a collection of large infrastructure projects.
The current border is formally accepted by neither side but simply referred to as the Line of Actual Control. In 2017, an attempt by Chinese engineers to build a new road through disputed territory on the Bhutan-India-China border led to a 73-day standoff on the Doklam Plateau, including fistfights between Chinese and Indian soldiers. Following Doklam, both countries built new military infrastructure along the border. India, for example, constructed roads and bridges to improve its connectivity to the Line of Actual Control, dramatically improving its ability to bring in emergency reinforcements in the event of a skirmish. In early May this year, a huge fistfight along the border led to both sides boosting local units, and there have been numerous light skirmishes—with no deaths—since then. Both sides have accused the other of deliberately crossing the border on numerous occasions. Until Monday’s battle, however, diplomacy seemed to be slowly deescalating the crisis: The two sides had opened high-level diplomatic communications and appeared ready to find convenient off-ramps for each side to maintain face. And both countries’ foreign ministers were scheduled for a virtual meeting next week.
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Both countries also have a highly jingoistic media—state-run in China’s case, and mostly private in India’s—that can escalate conflicts and drum up a public mood for a fight. Press jingoism, however, can also open strange opportunities for de-escalation: After an aerial dogfight between India and Pakistan in 2019, media on both sides claimed victory of sorts for their respective countries, allowing their leaders to move on.
Compounding the problems is the physically shifting nature of the border, which represents the world’s longest unmarked boundary line; snowfalls, rockslides, and melting can make it literally impossible to say just where the line is, especially as climate change wreaks havoc in the mountains. It’s quite possible for two patrols to both be convinced they’re on their country’s side of the border.
Has there been similar violence in the past?
There have been no deaths—or shots fired—along the border since an Indian patrol was ambushed by a Chinese one in 1975. But China saw significant clashes with both India and the Soviet Union during the late 1960s, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. In India’s case, that culminated in a brief but bloody clash on the Sikkim-Tibet border, with around hundreds of dead and injured on each side. On the Soviet border, fighting along the Ussuri River saw similar numbers of dead, but tensions escalated far higher than with India, leading to fears of a full-blown war and a possible nuclear exchange that were only alleviated by the highest-level diplomacy. In part, those clashes were driven by political needs on the Chinese side; officers and soldiers alike felt the need to demonstrate their Maoist enthusiasm, leading to such actions as swimming across the river waving Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book.
What could happen next?
India has announced that “both sides” are trying to de-escalate the situation, but it has accused China of deliberately violating the border and reneging on agreements made in recent talks between the two sides. China’s response was more demanding, accusing India of “deliberately initiating physical attacks” in a territory—the Galwan Valley in Ladakh that is claimed by both sides—that has “always been ours.” Army officers are meeting to try to resolve the situation.
While the 2017 Doklam crisis was successfully defused—and was followed by a summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan, China—recent events could easily spiral out of control. If there are indeed a high number of deaths from Monday’s skirmish, pressure to react and exact revenge may build. The coronavirus has produced heightened political uncertainty in China, leading to a newly aggressive form of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy—named after a Rambo-esque film that was a blockbuster in China but a flop elsewhere. Chinese officials are under considerable pressure to be performatively nationalist; moderation and restraint are becoming increasingly dangerous for careers.
On the Indian side, there is increasing nervousness about how Beijing has encircled the subcontinent. China counts Pakistan as a key ally; it has growing stakes in Sri Lanka and Nepal, two countries that have drifted away from India in recent years; and it has made huge infrastructure investments in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, much has changed since the last time India and China had deadly clashes in the 1960s and ’70s, when the two countries had similarly sized economies; today, China’s GDP is five times that of India, and it spends four times as much on defense.
There will likely be a business impact following the latest clash. Indians, for example, have recently mobilized to boycott Chinese goods, as evidenced by a recent app “Remove China Apps” that briefly topped downloads on India’s Google Play Store before the Silicon Valley giant stepped in to ban the app.
Heightened tensions also put Indians in China at risk. Although numbers are somewhat reduced due to the coronavirus crisis, there is a substantial business and student community in the country. During the Doklam crisis, the Beijing police lightly monitored and made home visits to Indians in the city.
An escalated crisis doesn’t necessarily mean a full-blown war. It could mean months of skirmishes and angry exchanges along the border, likely with more accidental deaths. But any one of those could explode into a real exchange of fire between the two militaries. The conditions in the Himalayas themselves severely limit military action; it takes up to two weeks for troops to acclimate to the altitude, logistics and provisioning are extremely limited, and air power is severely restrained. (One worrying possibility for more deaths is helicopter crashes, such as the one that killed a Nepalese minister last year.)
In the event of a serious military conflict, most analysts believe the Chinese military would have the advantage. But unlike China, which hasn’t fought a war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, India sees regular fighting with Pakistan and has an arguably more experienced military force.
Is there a permanent solution?
China resolved its border squabbles with Russia and other Soviet successor states in the 1990s and 2000s through a serious diplomatic push on both sides and mass exchanges of territory, and they’ve been essentially a nonissue since then. But although the area involved was much larger, the Himalayan territorial disputes are much more sensitive and harder to resolve.
For one thing, control of the heights along the borders gives a military advantage in future conflicts. Resource issues, especially water, are critical: 1.4 billion people depend on water drawn from Himalayan-fed rivers. And unlike the largely bilateral conflicts along the northern border, multiple parties are involved: Nepal, Bhutan, China, Pakistan, and, of course, India. Add on top of that China’s increasing power and nationalism, matched by jingoism on the Indian side, and the prospects of a long-term solution look small.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--India Has Handed China a Way to Interfere in Kashmir

India Has Handed China a Way to Interfere in Kashmir The Kashmir Valley and its surrounding territory have been at the heart of nearly every conflict between India and Pakistan—including three wars in 1947 , 1965 , and 1999 .
Colonialism created the problem , but the great powers have had little interest in it , with Britain washing its hands of the issue as soon as it could .
But last year ’ s abolition of Article 370 , the guarantee of Kashmir ’ s quasi-autonomy , has allowed an old player to take a stronger role : China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become the subject of global concern after this week ’ s bloody clash with the Indian Army , but its involvement in Indian territory goes beyond its own borders .
Generations of Indian politicians have declared Kashmir a purely domestic issue .
The roots of the problem go back to the state ’ s origins , a Muslim-majority population with a Hindu ruler who , during the retreat of empire , initially tried to strike out on his own rather than being forced to pick sides between Indian and Pakistan .
But for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea that it was a homeland for Muslims , losing a Muslim-majority state would be catastrophic .
To India , the idea of a Muslim state with a Hindu leader would be an ideal feather in the cap—a nation founded on pluralism with a state perfectly exemplifying it .
The resulting war left the state in India ’ s control—but with a permanently unhappy population and an angry neighbor .
Despite India ’ s victory , the issue was far from resolved .
Despite the laments of Indian politicians , Kashmir has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Around 10 years after the first war was fought , in 1957 , Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ’ s right-hand man , V.K .
Krishna Menon , gave the longest speech in United Nations history on India ’ s position on Kashmir .
He argued that India had a legal claim to complete sovereignty of Kashmir and that international institutions like the International Court of Justice had no place adjudicating the question .
Menon ’ s speech , and the underlying ideals , were supported by much of India , and he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , once internationalized , rarely return to being solely domestic or even bilateral concerns .
The idea that Kashmir could be purely an Indian question was always a fantasy .
Yet Indian leaders were always keen to avoid the state turning into another Palestine .
Though they did not fully succeed in the sense that Kashmir is occasionally invoked at the U.N. , they did partially succeed in the sense that the issue was never as big as Palestine in much of the public and political conscience .
Pakistan , however , felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue .
The obvious ally was China , with which Pakistan has a long-standing friendly relationship .
In 1963 , the Sino-Pakistan Agreement , which was meant to address border issues between the two nations , successfully quelled certain disagreements between Islamabad and Beijing—but also drew China even further into the Kashmir question .
The agreement resulted in the two nations exchanging territory , and within the parcels given up by Pakistan was the Trans-Karakoram Tract .
The tract is famously inhospitable but is also disputed territory , and India argued that Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Chinese because India itself still claims it .
It was no surprise that Pakistan solidified relationships with China in 1963 .
India fought an ill-fated war with China the previous year that permanently damaged the idea of Sino-Indian brotherhood and Pakistan saw an opportunity to make common cause with an Asian ally .
Turning a bilateral dispute into a trilateral one , with two of the sides strongly allied , was an obvious move .
That decision has borne fruit , not least because of India ’ s own actions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir , has been a longtime goal for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in India , and the party won two successive landslide victories in 2014 and 2019 partially based on its stance on this issue .
In August 2019 , the Indian parliament voted to abrogate Article 370 .
That autonomy had always been somewhat illusory , but it was powerfully regarded within Kashmir—and India accompanied the change with a mass crackdown in the region , including cutting off the internet and arresting local politicians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there .
It also bifurcated the territory into two states—Jammu and Kashmir , and Ladakh—further cementing India ’ s control .
Pakistan erupted in anger .
Prime Minister Imran Khan denounced the action as an attack on minorities despite his and Pakistan ’ s own questionable record on this issue .
The Pakistani public has long been highly sympathetic to the oppression of Kashmiris , which receives massive coverage in the Pakistani press .
But integrating the Kashmir region further into India also presents issues from a military perspective—Kashmir existed as a buffer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two new union states might not .
That gave China a strong interest in the issue , too .
China agreed with its ally both for diplomatic reasons and for domestic ones .
Part of the new territory of Ladakh contains land that Pakistan gave to China in the agreement in 1963 .
China sees both the abrogation of the article and the formation of the new state as a kind of aggressiveness , which is one reason for its own assertive moves on the Chinese-Indian border in the last few weeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demanded in foreign-policy talks with India the revocation of the new legislation creating Ladakh .
This is a different way of objecting to the revocation of Article 370 as a whole , and the move benefits China on multiple fronts .
It allows it to strengthen its alliance with Pakistan at very little personal cost .
But , perhaps more importantly , it allows Beijing to seek a protective cover of sorts for its actions in Xinjiang .
China has faced criticism from around the world over its treatment of Uighur minorities in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several countries , including the United States , have passed legislation addressing this critical issue .
Xinjiang threatens to become a permanent stain on China ’ s image in the Muslim world .
Adopting Pakistan ’ s stance on Kashmir and Article 370 is a cynical way to address these anti-Muslim claims , allowing China to , to an extent , deflect from its domestic misdeeds .
By pointing to issues within India and New Delhi ’ s mistreatment of Muslims , China is able to divert scrutiny from its own crackdown on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parents , forced labor , and mass internment of minorities .
Its foothold in Kashmir issues has served as a useful distraction .
China ’ s outrage over Article 370 has nothing to do with Muslim rights and everything to do with an aggressive attempt to expand its influence and territory .
Pakistan and China both have horrific human rights records of their own , which suggests any criticism might be less than sincere .
That being said , the Indian government should be cautious of handing grenades to enemies who will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and throw them .

The Kashmir Valley and its surrounding territory have been at the heart of nearly every conflict between India and Pakistan—including three wars in 1947 , 1965 , and 1999 . Colonialism created the problem, but the great powers have had little interest in it, with Britain washing its hands of the issue as soon as it could. But last year’s abolition of Article 370, the guarantee of Kashmir’s quasi-autonomy, has allowed an old player to take a stronger role: China.
The Kashmir Valley and its surrounding territory have been at the heart of nearly every conflict between India and Pakistan—including three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1999. Colonialism created the problem, but the great powers have had little interest in it, with Britain washing its hands of the issue as soon as it could. But last year’s abolition of Article 370, the guarantee of Kashmir’s quasi-autonomy, has allowed an old player to take a stronger role: China.
China’s Himalayan ambitions have become the subject of global concern after this week’s bloody clash with the Indian Army, but its involvement in Indian territory goes beyond its own borders. Generations of Indian politicians have declared Kashmir a purely domestic issue. The roots of the problem go back to the state’s origins, a Muslim-majority population with a Hindu ruler who, during the retreat of empire, initially tried to strike out on his own rather than being forced to pick sides between Indian and Pakistan. But for Pakistan, a nation founded on the idea that it was a homeland for Muslims, losing a Muslim-majority state would be catastrophic. To India, the idea of a Muslim state with a Hindu leader would be an ideal feather in the cap—a nation founded on pluralism with a state perfectly exemplifying it. The resulting war left the state in India’s control—but with a permanently unhappy population and an angry neighbor.
Despite India’s victory, the issue was far from resolved. Despite the laments of Indian politicians, Kashmir has been an international issue almost since 1947. Around 10 years after the first war was fought, in 1957, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s right-hand man, V.K. Krishna Menon, gave the longest speech in United Nations history on India’s position on Kashmir. He argued that India had a legal claim to complete sovereignty of Kashmir and that international institutions like the International Court of Justice had no place adjudicating the question. Menon’s speech, and the underlying ideals, were supported by much of India, and he was dubbed the Hero of Kashmir.
Issues, once internationalized, rarely return to being solely domestic or even bilateral concerns. The idea that Kashmir could be purely an Indian question was always a fantasy. Yet Indian leaders were always keen to avoid the state turning into another Palestine. Though they did not fully succeed in the sense that Kashmir is occasionally invoked at the U.N., they did partially succeed in the sense that the issue was never as big as Palestine in much of the public and political conscience.
Pakistan, however, felt very differently—and was keen to internationalize the issue. The obvious ally was China, with which Pakistan has a long-standing friendly relationship. In 1963, the Sino-Pakistan Agreement, which was meant to address border issues between the two nations, successfully quelled certain disagreements between Islamabad and Beijing—but also drew China even further into the Kashmir question. The agreement resulted in the two nations exchanging territory, and within the parcels given up by Pakistan was the Trans-Karakoram Tract. The tract is famously inhospitable but is also disputed territory, and India argued that Pakistan had no right to give it up to the Chinese because India itself still claims it.
It was no surprise that Pakistan solidified relationships with China in 1963. India fought an ill-fated war with China the previous year that permanently damaged the idea of Sino-Indian brotherhood , and Pakistan saw an opportunity to make common cause with an Asian ally. Turning a bilateral dispute into a trilateral one, with two of the sides strongly allied, was an obvious move.
That decision has borne fruit, not least because of India’s own actions. Ending Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, on the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, has been a longtime goal for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in India, and the party won two successive landslide victories in 2014 and 2019 partially based on its stance on this issue. In August 2019, the Indian parliament voted to abrogate Article 370. That autonomy had always been somewhat illusory, but it was powerfully regarded within Kashmir—and India accompanied the change with a mass crackdown in the region, including cutting off the internet and arresting local politicians. The bill didn’t stop there. It also bifurcated the territory into two states—Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh—further cementing India’s control.
Pakistan erupted in anger. Prime Minister Imran Khan denounced the action as an attack on minorities despite his and Pakistan’s own questionable record on this issue. The Pakistani public has long been highly sympathetic to the oppression of Kashmiris, which receives massive coverage in the Pakistani press. But integrating the Kashmir region further into India also presents issues from a military perspective—Kashmir existed as a buffer zone of sorts in a way that the two new union states might not.
That gave China a strong interest in the issue, too. China agreed with its ally both for diplomatic reasons and for domestic ones. Part of the new territory of Ladakh contains land that Pakistan gave to China in the agreement in 1963. China sees both the abrogation of the article and the formation of the new state as a kind of aggressiveness, which is one reason for its own assertive moves on the Chinese-Indian border in the last few weeks.
In recent days, China has demanded in foreign-policy talks with India the revocation of the new legislation creating Ladakh. This is a different way of objecting to the revocation of Article 370 as a whole, and the move benefits China on multiple fronts. It allows it to strengthen its alliance with Pakistan at very little personal cost. But, perhaps more importantly, it allows Beijing to seek a protective cover of sorts for its actions in Xinjiang.
China has faced criticism from around the world over its treatment of Uighur minorities in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang, and several countries, including the United States, have passed legislation addressing this critical issue. Xinjiang threatens to become a permanent stain on China’s image in the Muslim world. Adopting Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir and Article 370 is a cynical way to address these anti-Muslim claims, allowing China to, to an extent, deflect from its domestic misdeeds. By pointing to issues within India and New Delhi’s mistreatment of Muslims, China is able to divert scrutiny from its own crackdown on religion, separation of children from their parents, forced labor, and mass internment of minorities. Its foothold in Kashmir issues has served as a useful distraction.
China’s outrage over Article 370 has nothing to do with Muslim rights and everything to do with an aggressive attempt to expand its influence and territory. Pakistan and China both have horrific human rights records of their own, which suggests any criticism might be less than sincere. That being said, the Indian government should be cautious of handing grenades to enemies who will be more than happy to pull the pin and throw them.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--India’s Islamophobia Creeps Into Nepal

India’s Islamophobia Creeps Into Nepal

KATHMANDU , Nepal—In Nepal , Muslims , who make up about 4 percent of the population , have lived peacefully alongside the majority Hindu population for centuries , arriving as immigrants from elsewhere but establishing strong communities .
Nepalis pride themselves on a history of religious tolerance , even in a region where faith has often had bloody consequences .
But India ’ s right-wingers are trying hard to change that .
India ’ s Hindu nationalist fundamentalists and its Islamophobic media are taking advantage of the coronavirus to push hatred to Nepal through popular Indian news channels and social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Narendra Modi , and his link to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organization and its Hindu nationalist ideology , has strengthened the New Delhi establishment to the remaking of Nepal as a Hindu country again .
In 2006 , Nepal became a secular country after it ousted the old constitutional monarchy , when a more secular Indian government helped push former Maoist rebels to a peace deal and into mainstream politics .
But it has been easy for Indian Islamophobia to spread to Nepal , thanks to the number of Hindi speakers there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available.India ’ s Hindu nationalist fundamentalists and its Islamophobic media are taking advantage of the coronavirus to push hatred to Nepal .
All this , mixed with yellow journalism in Nepal , has caused nasty rumors to spread fast .
On April 16 , a few rupee bills were found scattered in Janakpur , southern Nepal .
One man picked up a note and offhandedly told a shopkeeper that the bills might be tainted with the coronavirus .
A claim that two Muslim women had scattered the bills after spitting on them spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CCTV video that showed the bills dropping out of their pockets .
Islamophobic posts making claims such as that the women spat on the bills deliberately to spread the coronavirus went viral .
Meanwhile , the police tested the two women for COVID-19 , and the initial quick test produced a positive result from one of the women .
That sparked further hateful posts—but it later turned out that the test had been wrong and further testing gave negative results .
In reality , the two women had just returned from the bankand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police pleaded for the public not to spread further rumors—but this particular incident didn ’ t spring out of nowhere .
The groundwork had already been well laid .
A week earlier , on April 10 , India ’ s right-wing media , particularly Hindi news channels , circulated sensationalized news that Pakistan might have sent coronavirus-infected Muslim men to India via Nepal .
They coined a new term : “ corona-jihad.
” The claims were based on an unverified and largely unsourced report sent by the state of Bihar to the Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Jalim Miya , a Muslim politician in Nepal , was behind the supposed plot and that the group of men were taking paracetamol to suppress their fevers and pass undetected .
Miya explained exasperatedly that there was no such plot and was backed by Nepal ’ s central government .
It echoed earlier allegations and faked videos that Muslims traveling between the two countries were superspreaders .
The Nepal-India border was sealed on March 30 , and a large number of Nepalis and Indian migrants were quarantined at the border on April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hindu nationalist agenda pushed hard by its giant neighbor .
On the one hand , such cooked-up stories have damaged the image of Indian media in Nepal .
The hashtag # RIPIndianMedia trended in Nepal .
Yet even Nepali journalists , online news portals , and the public engaged in Islamophobic posts and tweets—resulting in # IslamophobiaInNepal going viral .
Hajji Abdullah Miya , a former member of the Hajj Committee of Nepal , told Foreign Policy : “ Especially after the rise of Modi , the attitude towards Muslims in India has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general tendency to portray Muslims negatively is old in India .
India used to spread rumors against the Muslims of Nepal to create animosity with the Indian Muslims .
Whether in the name of mosques and madrassas in the Terai border region or on other issues , India has always attacked Nepali Muslims.
” Nepal ’ s Muslims are worried about the rise in Islamophobia—but they hope their friends and neighbors will stop things getting worse .
They point to the failure of the 1992 riots around the destruction of the Babri Masjid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also revered by Hindus in Ayodhya , India , to spread over the border .
But there has been a steady rise in attacks against Nepali Muslims on social media .
The majority of Nepalis , however , continue to reject the attempts to whip up hatred , and there have been no reported physical assaults on Muslims .
India ’ s right-wing is well entrenched , as is its Islamophobia .
Nepal is likely to keep seeing the Hindu nationalist agenda pushed hard by its giant neighbor .
But even amid the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reject hatred as they have done in the past .

KATHMANDU, Nepal—In Nepal, Muslims, who make up about 4 percent of the population, have lived peacefully alongside the majority Hindu population for centuries, arriving as immigrants from elsewhere but establishing strong communities. Nepalis pride themselves on a history of religious tolerance, even in a region where faith has often had bloody consequences.
KATHMANDU, Nepal—In Nepal, Muslims, who make up about 4 percent of the population, have lived peacefully alongside the majority Hindu population for centuries, arriving as immigrants from elsewhere but establishing strong communities. Nepalis pride themselves on a history of religious tolerance, even in a region where faith has often had bloody consequences.
But India’s right-wingers are trying hard to change that.
India’s Hindu nationalist fundamentalists and its Islamophobic media are taking advantage of the coronavirus to push hatred to Nepal through popular Indian news channels and social media.
The rise of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and his link to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organization and its Hindu nationalist ideology, has strengthened the New Delhi establishment to the remaking of Nepal as a Hindu country again. In 2006, Nepal became a secular country after it ousted the old constitutional monarchy, when a more secular Indian government helped push former Maoist rebels to a peace deal and into mainstream politics. But it has been easy for Indian Islamophobia to spread to Nepal, thanks to the number of Hindi speakers there and the wide range of Indian TV available.India’s Hindu nationalist fundamentalists and its Islamophobic media are taking advantage of the coronavirus to push hatred to Nepal.
All this, mixed with yellow journalism in Nepal, has caused nasty rumors to spread fast. On April 16, a few rupee bills were found scattered in Janakpur, southern Nepal. One man picked up a note and offhandedly told a shopkeeper that the bills might be tainted with the coronavirus. A claim that two Muslim women had scattered the bills after spitting on them spread within no time, based on a CCTV video that showed the bills dropping out of their pockets. Islamophobic posts making claims such as that the women spat on the bills deliberately to spread the coronavirus went viral.
Meanwhile, the police tested the two women for COVID-19, and the initial quick test produced a positive result from one of the women. That sparked further hateful posts—but it later turned out that the test had been wrong and further testing gave negative results. In reality, the two women had just returned from the bankand had dropped the notes accidentally. The police pleaded for the public not to spread further rumors—but this particular incident didn’t spring out of nowhere. The groundwork had already been well laid.
A week earlier, on April 10, India’s right-wing media, particularly Hindi news channels, circulated sensationalized news that Pakistan might have sent coronavirus-infected Muslim men to India via Nepal. They coined a new term: “corona-jihad.” The claims were based on an unverified and largely unsourced report sent by the state of Bihar to the Indian Home Ministry, which included false claims that Jalim Miya, a Muslim politician in Nepal, was behind the supposed plot and that the group of men were taking paracetamol to suppress their fevers and pass undetected. Miya explained exasperatedly that there was no such plot and was backed by Nepal’s central government. It echoed earlier allegations and faked videos that Muslims traveling between the two countries were superspreaders. The Nepal-India border was sealed on March 30, and a large number of Nepalis and Indian migrants were quarantined at the border on April 2.Nepal is likely to keep seeing the Hindu nationalist agenda pushed hard by its giant neighbor.
On the one hand, such cooked-up stories have damaged the image of Indian media in Nepal. The hashtag #RIPIndianMedia trended in Nepal. Yet even Nepali journalists, online news portals, and the public engaged in Islamophobic posts and tweets—resulting in #IslamophobiaInNepal going viral.
Hajji Abdullah Miya, a former member of the Hajj Committee of Nepal, told Foreign Policy: “Especially after the rise of Modi, the attitude towards Muslims in India has changed. In any case, the general tendency to portray Muslims negatively is old in India. India used to spread rumors against the Muslims of Nepal to create animosity with the Indian Muslims. Whether in the name of mosques and madrassas in the Terai border region or on other issues, India has always attacked Nepali Muslims.”
Nepal’s Muslims are worried about the rise in Islamophobia—but they hope their friends and neighbors will stop things getting worse. They point to the failure of the 1992 riots around the destruction of the Babri Masjid, a mosque built on a site also revered by Hindus in Ayodhya, India, to spread over the border. But there has been a steady rise in attacks against Nepali Muslims on social media. The majority of Nepalis, however, continue to reject the attempts to whip up hatred, and there have been no reported physical assaults on Muslims.
India’s right-wing is well entrenched, as is its Islamophobia. Nepal is likely to keep seeing the Hindu nationalist agenda pushed hard by its giant neighbor. But even amid the pandemic, Nepalis can still choose to reject hatred as they have done in the past.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel to Break Up With China

Why the U.S. Can ’ t Get Israel to Break Up With China TEL AVIV , Israel—U.S .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s message to Israelis on a recent visit was blunt : Beware China .
After years of blooming Israeli-Chinese commercial relations and the awarding of a string of port and mass transit projects to Chinese building conglomerates , Israel must tread warily or risk cooperation with its most important ally , he said in an Israeli television interview last month .
“ We don ’ t want the Chinese Communist Party to have access to Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said , “ the kind of things that endanger the Israeli people and the ability of the U.S. to cooperate with Israel.
” Two weeks later , Israel ’ s government passed on a bid by the Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison to build a $ 1.5 billion water desalination plant .
But despite the bow to U.S. warnings , Israel appears to be pressing ahead on other deals—highlighting a substantial gap in the positions of the two countries on whether commerce with China poses a security threat .
Washington ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tensions even more acute .
“ Israel sees China as an opportunity , ” said Michael Oren , a former Israeli ambassador to Washington .
“ For the United States , China is a threat—a three-pronged threat that ’ s strategic , commercial , and technological.
” For Israel , the opportunities abound .
Chinese construction companies are expected to bid on upcoming infrastructure projects in Israel ranging from light rail to 5G telecommunications networks .
And Chinese venture capitalists are looking to invest billions of dollars in artificial intelligence start-ups in Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is building a new container port in Haifa , which some U.S. officials believe could be used to conduct surveillance on the U.S. 6th Fleet whenever it ports at a nearby Navy base .
Chinese companies are building another Israeli port in Ashdod and a light rail project through the greater Tel Aviv area , which will run a few hundred yards from the Israeli military headquarters .
Meanwhile , Chinese companies invested some $ 400 million in Israeli start-ups in 2018 and $ 243 million in 2019 , according to IVC Data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s concern about strategic threats has been more limited to foes in the region : namely , the so-called Shiite crescent that runs through Iran , Syria , and Lebanon .
Even though China supports Iran , Beijing has never been viewed as a factor in the Middle East that could weigh against Israeli security interests .
“ China has never been in Israeli threat assessments like Iran is .
China ’ s not in the neighborhood , and Israel isn ’ t an Asia-specific power , ” said Shira Efron , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security Studies at Tel Aviv University .
“ Israel doesn ’ t have the China experts here that are embedded in the system the way they are in the U.S. ” The United States and Israel first squabbled over ties to China two decades ago , when Washington pressed Israel to cancel a deal to sell Phalcon intelligence surveillance aircraft to Beijing .
Though Israel agreed to back off , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s state visit to Beijing in 2013 opened the door to more commerce .
The same year , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 130 million to Israel ’ s leading technology institute , Technion , for a collaboration that includes a joint campus at Shantou , a city of more than 5 million people located 230 miles northeast of Hong Kong .
“ We have been promiscuous in our attitude [ toward China on intellectual property ] .
For a couple hundred million dollars , the Chinese gained access to the Technion , ” Oren said .
The former ambassador recalls Obama administration officials warning Israel against giving the Haifa contract to the Chinese .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese build Haifa , they would not let the 6th Fleet come and visit.
” The port construction is part of China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative to establish a network of infrastructure projects internationally that will embed Beijing in the channels of global trade and economic development .
Unlike many developing nations that have partnered with Beijing for Belt and Road ventures , Israel is not taking Chinese loans to help finance the projects—sidestepping the debt trap that has ensnared other countries .
But Chinese companies have a reputation for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on time , making their bids hard to turn down ( though in the case of a recent water desalination plant tender , however , Israeli officials insisted that an Israeli-led bid was cheaper ) .
Under pressure from the United States , Israel announced late last year that it would form an oversight panel to scrutinize foreign investment into civilian companies—akin to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States , an American interagency body .
But scrutinizing foreign investment in Israeli technology start-ups was not included in the panel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s overall approach to the issue : widen trade with China when possible and indulge American demands when necessary .
Yitzhak Shichor , a political scientist at Hebrew University who was in Beijing in 1992 when Israel and China established diplomatic relations , said Israel ’ s promise to the United States not to sell military hardware to China already constitutes a concession that harms the commercial relationship .
Israel should convince the United States that China is not a strategic threat , he said .
“ For Israel , China is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the door to Israeli relations with other Asian countries , ” he said .
“ In my view , Israel can somehow provide a bridge between China and the United States.
” But with the U.S.-China trade war threatening to shift global commerce into two competing economic blocs , it will become increasingly harder for Israel to maneuver between them .
The United States remains Israel ’ s main strategic and trading partner .
But Netanyahu has sought for years to diversify commercial ties beyond the United States and European Union—which together account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s foreign trade .
“ It used to be you could do business with everybody , ” said David Rosenberg , an economics columnist and editor at the Haaretz newspaper .
“ The U.S. and China didn ’ t care .
It ’ s become obvious that there ’ s in fact a cold war on the global scene .
It ’ s like in the old Cold War , you couldn ’ t be friends with Russia and friends with America .
You had to choose sides.
” Though it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grab headlines—experts say they expose Israel to remote cyberstrikes from China—many others believe that Chinese investment in Israeli technology represents an even more serious concern .
The United States is increasingly trying to block China ’ s access to cyber-innovations , artificial intelligence , and digital health technologies .
“ This is going to be a new long-term feature of the U.S.-Israel relationship , ” said Daniel Shapiro , a former U.S. ambassador to Israel .
“ Israel adjusting to the strategic competitive relationship , while trying to sustain its close partnership and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel needs to adopt a more comprehensive policy to address both U.S. sensitivities and its own national security considerations , said Efron .
It would do well to look to U.S. allies like Canada and Australia , which have tightened their foreign investment oversight regimes .
“ From the U.S. perspective , you ’ re trying to prevent China from accessing certain types of technology .
But China is trying … to get it from your allies who happen to also have advanced technologies .
It ’ s closing the door but keeping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The problem is that for a long time Israel said , ‘ Okay , well , since we ’ ve not done anything that looks like defense , or something that looks like dual use with China , we ’ re in the clear zone.
’ But that has changed because the nature of competition between the U.S. and China is so much broader.
” If pushed , Israel would certainly prioritize its relationship with the United States over its commercial ties with China .
Israel gets billions of dollars in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , and the two allies share broad strategic , political , and cultural interests .
What ’ s more , analysts believe Israel could eventually come to view China as a threat to the region—much the way the United States views China around the world .
Beijing ’ s military already has a presence at the mouth of the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa country of Djibouti .
It also stands to play a role in filling the political vacuum in Syria .
“ We don ’ t see China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But in 10 years , that could change , he said .

TEL AVIV, Israel—U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s message to Israelis on a recent visit was blunt: Beware China.
After years of blooming Israeli-Chinese commercial relations and the awarding of a string of port and mass transit projects to Chinese building conglomerates, Israel must tread warily or risk cooperation with its most important ally, he said in an Israeli television interview last month.
“We don’t want the Chinese Communist Party to have access to Israeli infrastructure, Israeli communication networks,” he said, “the kind of things that endanger the Israeli people and the ability of the U.S. to cooperate with Israel.”
Two weeks later, Israel’s government passed on a bid by the Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison to build a $1.5 billion water desalination plant.
But despite the bow to U.S. warnings, Israel appears to be pressing ahead on other deals—highlighting a substantial gap in the positions of the two countries on whether commerce with China poses a security threat. Washington’s trade war with Beijing is making the tensions even more acute.
“Israel sees China as an opportunity,” said Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington. “For the United States, China is a threat—a three-pronged threat that’s strategic, commercial, and technological.”
For Israel, the opportunities abound. Chinese construction companies are expected to bid on upcoming infrastructure projects in Israel ranging from light rail to 5G telecommunications networks. And the Chinese are expected to invest billions of dollars in Israeli technology ventures in the coming years.
Already, Shanghai International Port Group is building a new container port in Haifa, which some U.S. officials believe could be used to conduct surveillance on the U.S. 6th Fleet whenever it ports at a nearby Navy base. Chinese companies are building another Israeli port in Ashdod and a light rail project through the greater Tel Aviv area, which will run a few hundred yards from the Israeli military headquarters. Meanwhile, Chinese companies invested some $400 million in Israeli start-ups in 2018 and $243 million in 2019, according to IVC Data and Insights.
So far, Israel’s concern about strategic threats has been more limited to foes in the region: namely, the so-called Shiite crescent that runs through Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Even though China supports Iran, Beijing has never been viewed as a factor in the Middle East that could weigh against Israeli security interests.
“China has never been in Israeli threat assessments like Iran is. China’s not in the neighborhood, and Israel isn’t an Asia-specific power,” said Shira Efron, a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. “Israel doesn’t have the China experts here that are embedded in the system the way they are in the U.S.”
The United States and Israel first squabbled over ties to China two decades ago, when Washington pressed Israel to cancel a deal to sell Phalcon intelligence surveillance aircraft to Beijing.
Though Israel agreed to back off, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s state visit to Beijing in 2013 opened the door to more commerce. The same year, the Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing contributed $130 million to Israel’s leading technology institute, Technion, for a collaboration that includes a joint campus at Shantou, a city of more than 5 million people located 230 miles northeast of Hong Kong.
“We have been promiscuous in our attitude [toward China on intellectual property]. For a couple hundred million dollars, the Chinese gained access to the Technion,” Oren said. The former ambassador recalls Obama administration officials warning Israel against giving the Haifa contract to the Chinese.
“They said to us, if the Chinese build Haifa, they would not let the 6th Fleet come and visit.”
The port construction is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative to establish a network of infrastructure projects internationally that will embed Beijing in the channels of global trade and economic development.
Unlike many developing nations that have partnered with Beijing for Belt and Road ventures, Israel is not taking Chinese loans to help finance the projects—sidestepping the debt trap that has ensnared other countries. But Chinese companies have a reputation for competitive pricing on infrastructure projects and finishing on time, making their bids hard to turn down (though in the case of a recent water desalination plant tender, however, Israeli officials insisted that an Israeli-led bid was cheaper).
Under pressure from the United States, Israel announced late last year that it would form an oversight panel to scrutinize foreign investment into civilian companies—akin to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an American interagency body.
But scrutinizing foreign investment in Israeli technology start-ups was not included in the panel’s mandate. That decision reflects Israel’s overall approach to the issue: widen trade with China when possible and indulge American demands when necessary.
Yitzhak Shichor, a political scientist at Hebrew University who was in Beijing in 1992 when Israel and China established diplomatic relations, said Israel’s promise to the United States not to sell military hardware to China already constitutes a concession that harms the commercial relationship. Israel should convince the United States that China is not a strategic threat, he said.
“For Israel, China is very important economically. And it opened the door to Israeli relations with other Asian countries,” he said. “In my view, Israel can somehow provide a bridge between China and the United States.”
But with the U.S.-China trade war threatening to shift global commerce into two competing economic blocs, it will become increasingly harder for Israel to maneuver between them.
The United States remains Israel’s main strategic and trading partner. But Netanyahu has sought for years to diversify commercial ties beyond the United States and European Union—which together account for about two-thirds of the country’s foreign trade.
“It used to be you could do business with everybody,” said David Rosenberg, an economics columnist and editor at the Haaretz newspaper. “The U.S. and China didn’t care. It’s become obvious that there’s in fact a cold war on the global scene. It’s like in the old Cold War, you couldn’t be friends with Russia and friends with America. You had to choose sides.”
Though it’s the Israel-China infrastructure projects that most often grab headlines—experts say they expose Israel to remote cyberstrikes from China—many others believe that Chinese investment in Israeli technology represents an even more serious concern. The United States is increasingly trying to block China’s access to cyber-innovations, artificial intelligence, and digital health technologies.
“This is going to be a new long-term feature of the U.S.-Israel relationship,” said Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. “Israel adjusting to the strategic competitive relationship, while trying to sustain its close partnership and take advantage of opportunities with China.”
Israel needs to adopt a more comprehensive policy to address both U.S. sensitivities and its own national security considerations, said Efron. It would do well to look to U.S. allies like Canada and Australia, which have tightened their foreign investment oversight regimes.
“From the U.S. perspective, you’re trying to prevent China from accessing certain types of technology. But China is trying … to get it from your allies who happen to also have advanced technologies. It’s closing the door but keeping the windows open,” Efron said.
“The problem is that for a long time Israel said, ‘Okay, well, since we’ve not done anything that looks like defense, or something that looks like dual use with China, we’re in the clear zone.’ But that has changed because the nature of competition between the U.S. and China is so much broader.”
If pushed, Israel would certainly prioritize its relationship with the United States over its commercial ties with China. Israel gets billions of dollars in military aid from the United States every year, and the two allies share broad strategic, political, and cultural interests.
What’s more, analysts believe Israel could eventually come to view China as a threat to the region—much the way the United States views China around the world. Beijing’s military already has a presence at the mouth of the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa country of Djibouti. It also stands to play a role in filling the political vacuum in Syria.
“We don’t see China as a threat—yet,” Oren said. But in 10 years, that could change, he said.
Correction, June 17, 2020: The Chinese are expected to invest billions of dollars in Israeli technology ventures in the coming years. A previous version of this article misstated the target of this planned investment.