foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--After the Coronavirus, Don’t Repeat 9/11’s Mistakes

America last overhauled its national security paradigm in the wake of 9/11 .
In the months and years that followed the attacks , government officials attempted to eradicate the threat of terrorism , fundamentally transforming both domestic and international policy for the worse .
Nearly 20 years later , Americans still live with the consequences of those choices , from unending warfare to increasing global instability to ever diminishing U.S. influence .
The destruction caused by COVID-19 could , and should , force the United States finally to move out of 9/11 ’ s shadow .
Worryingly , however , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the novel coronavirus echo many of the overreaching policies of the post-9/11 era .
But policy responses are not foreordained .
A global war on terrorism wasn ’ t an inevitable consequence of the 9/11 attacks , and the coronavirus response has just begun .
If this is truly to become the closing salvo to the post-9/11 era , and the start of a new security paradigm , policymakers must remember the lessons of the chapter they wish to close so they do not repeat them .
Americans are acutely aware of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of keeping them safe .
Public weariness with U.S. foreign policy ’ s indefinite pursuit of indeterminate goals crosses party lines and spans generational divides .
The veterans who experienced the consequences of adventurism firsthand are turning against it too ; a majority now wish the United States were less engaged in military conflicts overseas .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
Many in the foreign–policy community have also called for a reckoning .
The massive post-9/11 security apparatus failed to protect the public from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of bodies packed in freezer trucks and buried in mass graves in New York make stark the inadequacy of Washington ’ s shortsighted policy choices .
Given this growing determination to right the wrongs of the previous two decades , it is disquieting to watch policymakers advocate for all-too-familiar solutions to deal with the current pandemic .
Despite the clear need for a new approach , the search for safety from the coronavirus has once again led policymakers to call on the four-headed monster of militarism , xenophobia , surveillance , and anti-democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are no perfect parallels , and any attempt at historical analogizing can conceal while it reveals .
The national security community is in a different place than it was in 2001 , even if many of its key players remain the same .
But the troubling similarities between the decisions made then and now should make clear the need for rethinking the threats America faces and the ways policymakers choose to meet them .
The first areas of disturbing commonality are in the overriding militarism and xenophobia of the responses .
The militarism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began with rhetoric and found its ultimate policy expression in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq .
Today , political leaders again deploy war rhetoric to describe the threat and similarly risk a cascade of aggressive policy responses that would do more to create than respond to a wartime environment .
In 2001 and today , declaring war has proved politically expedient .
In 2001 and today , declaring war has proved politically expedient , as , amid a climate of fear , war rallies the public and diverts frustration from domestic failures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on terrorism framing shrunk the space for domestic dissent and committed U.S. service members to fighting an open-ended war against an amorphous foe .
President Donald Trump ’ s self-declared war on the coronavirus similarly attempts to deflect responsibility ( though less successfully than in 2001 ) and—if medical professionals are correct that the virus is unlikely to be eradicated soon—may also be committing the United States to another unwinnable conflict and another period where rolling back securitized measures remains difficult .
When it comes to the use of the military in these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and coronavirus look quite different .
Instead of invading countries , U.S. armed forces are supplying manpower and hospital ships ( even if the much-heralded USNS Comfort has treated fewer than 200 patients in virus-ravaged New York City ) .
But one of the key lessons of the 9/11 period is the ease of viewing the military as the tool of first resort , despite its powerlessness in solving political or humanitarian problems .
In addressing the coronavirus , policymakers should continue to use the military ’ s capacity in service of public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that neither the pandemic nor its geopolitical symptoms can be cured militarily .
Increasing the remit of the military could lead to hawkish requitals—which , in turn , could give rise to further security threats .
In declaring their wars , the policymakers of 2001 and 2020 designated an enemy .
And while both terrorism and the coronavirus are themselves nonhuman entities , their invocation as foes has fueled dangerous xenophobia with very human consequences .
Former President George W. Bush explicitly stated that the United States was not at war with Islam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of civilizations narrative , and the ensuing war on “ Islamic terrorism ” enabled and perpetuated Islamophobia at home and abroad .
Internationally , the United States alienated governments and ordinary people alike .
Domestically , hate crimes against Muslims jumped massively from 2000 to 2001 , and they have still not returned to pre-2001 levels .
Where Bush publicly repudiated racism , the Trump administration blows harder into the dog whistles of racial rhetoric , with similar impacts .
Internationally , the approach has brought U.S.-China relations , at both official and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( from an already low point ) right at the moment when China has the medical manufacturing capacity the United States depends on .
It has also weakened America ’ s ability to cooperate on pandemic responses with even its closest allies .
At home , discrimination against Asian Americans has spiked , with one center fielding reports of over 1,100 incidents in two weeks .
Of course , neither the coronavirus response nor the war on terrorism created xenophobia ; rather , they exacerbated existing prejudices and inequities .
As the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ameliorate these ills , not worsen them .
As militarism and xenophobia so often go hand in hand , so do another pair of post-9/11 measures that are once again on the table : an increase in what the government knows about the public and a decrease in what the public knows about the government .
In the weeks after 9/11 , a panicked Congress passed legislation to ensure there would never be such an intelligence lapse again .
The Patriot Act did patch some critical holes in the government ’ s ability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scope also led to major surveillance abuses .
In the coronavirus era , other governments are replicating this approach , as China doubles down on facial recognition and Israel greenlights a program usually used for counterterrorism to track citizens ’ phones .
The pandemic has ignited calls for steps that deeply concern privacy advocates .
U.S. policymakers have not implemented such intrusive measures , but the pandemic has ignited calls for steps that deeply concern privacy advocates .
Data-mining firms like Palantir already have contracts in place with the Centers for Disease Control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health .
Some U.S. analysts argue that the coronavirus vindicates the highly surveilled Chinese internet .
Others have urged the adoption of tracking methods similar to those used by the government of Singapore , pointing out that U.S. governors can use post-9/11 legislation to force citizens to comply .
These debates are difficult , as containing this disease will require robust tracking and tracing .
However , the 9/11 era showed that government surveillance—especially when implemented hastily—has the tendency to expand inertially .
The Patriot Act ’ s scope grew in the years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass collection of millions of Americans ’ metadata ( which a government oversight board later deemed not only illegal but also of minimal effectiveness in fighting terrorism ) .
That law has also been applied well beyond its initial counterterrorism intent , including in cases of mortgage and food-stamp fraud .
The United States needs to collect more data to contain the coronavirus , but it needs to do so while taking seriously the potential for expansion and abuse—as well as understanding that while technology can be part of the solution , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Addressing COVID-19 requires rapidly expanding contact tracing while instituting clear privacy and data protection regulations ; it does not require—and should not permit—covertly scraping data ( or allowing private companies to do so ) without the knowledge or consent of the American people .
Taking on the coronavirus also requires the public to trust the accountability of the government .
And when it comes to issues of transparency , the parallels between 9/11 and now move from the speculative to the immediate .
The post-9/11 era was rife with anti-democratic secrecy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again claiming emergency powers to evade accountability .
Trump used the coronavirus as a pretext for suspending immigration—not for health reasons but , he claimed , to prevent competition from immigrant labor .
He also decapitated the watchdog panel tasked with overseeing $ 2.2 trillion in economic relief and named a partisan ally to fill a critical inspector general role .
In a haunting echo of the post-9/11 era ’ s habeas corpus debates , last month the Justice Department requested authorization from Congress to be able to detain Americans indefinitely during a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Just as “ terrorism wins ” when it prompts Americans to abandon rights and liberties , so too does the tragedy of the coronavirus compound when leaders respond to it by squelching precisely the democratic values that should make the United States more effective than authoritarian states in responding to the virus .
Free flows of news and information create political pressure to make smart and life-saving decisions .
Policymakers avoid corruption if they know their constituents are watching .
By clamping down on hallmarks of democratic accountability , post-9/11 policies curtailed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less safe .
Future decisions to combat the coronavirus must avoid reviving similar actions .
The coronavirus demands real foreign-policy innovation , not a slide back into the familiar and flawed .
It demands an honest appraisal of the self-defeating consequences of militarism , xenophobia , surveillance , and secrecy .
Without this reevaluation , the United States will march forward into a new moment weighted down by old and deficient tools .
America ’ s foreign-policy makers face an opportunity to reject the destruction of the post-9/11 paradigm .
They should seize @ @

America last overhauled its national security paradigm in the wake of 9/11. In the months and years that followed the attacks, government officials attempted to eradicate the threat of terrorism, fundamentally transforming both domestic and international policy for the worse. Nearly 20 years later, Americans still live with the consequences of those choices, from unending warfare to increasing global instability to ever diminishing U.S. influence.
America last overhauled its national security paradigm in the wake of 9/11. In the months and years that followed the attacks, government officials attempted to eradicate the threat of terrorism, fundamentally transforming both domestic and international policy for the worse. Nearly 20 years later, Americans still live with the consequences of those choices, from unending warfare to increasing global instability to ever diminishing U.S. influence.
The destruction caused by COVID-19 could, and should, force the United States finally to move out of 9/11’s shadow. Worryingly, however, Washington’s early choices in responding to the novel coronavirus echo many of the overreaching policies of the post-9/11 era.
But policy responses are not foreordained. A global war on terrorism wasn’t an inevitable consequence of the 9/11 attacks, and the coronavirus response has just begun. If this is truly to become the closing salvo to the post-9/11 era, and the start of a new security paradigm, policymakers must remember the lessons of the chapter they wish to close so they do not repeat them.
Americans are acutely aware of the post-9/11 abuses committed in the name of keeping them safe. Public weariness with U.S. foreign policy’s indefinite pursuit of indeterminate goals crosses party lines and spans generational divides. The veterans who experienced the consequences of adventurism firsthand are turning against it too; a majority now wish the United States were less engaged in military conflicts overseas.
Many in the foreign–policy community have also called for a reckoning. The massive post-9/11 security apparatus failed to protect the public from the coronavirus outbreak, and tragic images of bodies packed in freezer trucks and buried in mass graves in New York make stark the inadequacy of Washington’s shortsighted policy choices.
Given this growing determination to right the wrongs of the previous two decades, it is disquieting to watch policymakers advocate for all-too-familiar solutions to deal with the current pandemic. Despite the clear need for a new approach, the search for safety from the coronavirus has once again led policymakers to call on the four-headed monster of militarism, xenophobia, surveillance, and anti-democratic opacity.
To be sure, there are no perfect parallels, and any attempt at historical analogizing can conceal while it reveals. The national security community is in a different place than it was in 2001, even if many of its key players remain the same. But the troubling similarities between the decisions made then and now should make clear the need for rethinking the threats America faces and the ways policymakers choose to meet them.
The first areas of disturbing commonality are in the overriding militarism and xenophobia of the responses. The militarism of the reaction to the 9/11 attacks began with rhetoric and found its ultimate policy expression in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, political leaders again deploy war rhetoric to describe the threat and similarly risk a cascade of aggressive policy responses that would do more to create than respond to a wartime environment.
In 2001 and today, declaring war has proved politically expedient.
In 2001 and today, declaring war has proved politically expedient, as, amid a climate of fear, war rallies the public and diverts frustration from domestic failures toward an external enemy. The war on terrorism framing shrunk the space for domestic dissent and committed U.S. service members to fighting an open-ended war against an amorphous foe. President Donald Trump’s self-declared war on the coronavirus similarly attempts to deflect responsibility (though less successfully than in 2001) and—if medical professionals are correct that the virus is unlikely to be eradicated soon—may also be committing the United States to another unwinnable conflict and another period where rolling back securitized measures remains difficult.
When it comes to the use of the military in these wars, fortunately the responses to terrorism and coronavirus look quite different. Instead of invading countries, U.S. armed forces are supplying manpower and hospital ships (even if the much-heralded USNS Comfort has treated fewer than 200 patients in virus-ravaged New York City). But one of the key lessons of the 9/11 period is the ease of viewing the military as the tool of first resort, despite its powerlessness in solving political or humanitarian problems. In addressing the coronavirus, policymakers should continue to use the military’s capacity in service of public health, but they should also recognize that neither the pandemic nor its geopolitical symptoms can be cured militarily. Increasing the remit of the military could lead to hawkish requitals—which, in turn, could give rise to further security threats.
In declaring their wars, the policymakers of 2001 and 2020 designated an enemy. And while both terrorism and the coronavirus are themselves nonhuman entities, their invocation as foes has fueled dangerous xenophobia with very human consequences.
Former President George W. Bush explicitly stated that the United States was not at war with Islam, but nativist voices embraced the clash of civilizations narrative, and the ensuing war on “Islamic terrorism” enabled and perpetuated Islamophobia at home and abroad. Internationally, the United States alienated governments and ordinary people alike. Domestically, hate crimes against Muslims jumped massively from 2000 to 2001, and they have still not returned to pre-2001 levels.
Where Bush publicly repudiated racism, the Trump administration blows harder into the dog whistles of racial rhetoric, with similar impacts. Internationally, the approach has brought U.S.-China relations, at both official and public levels, to a new low (from an already low point) right at the moment when China has the medical manufacturing capacity the United States depends on. It has also weakened America’s ability to cooperate on pandemic responses with even its closest allies. At home, discrimination against Asian Americans has spiked, with one center fielding reports of over 1,100 incidents in two weeks. Of course, neither the coronavirus response nor the war on terrorism created xenophobia; rather, they exacerbated existing prejudices and inequities. As the coronavirus response develops, policymakers must work to ameliorate these ills, not worsen them.
As militarism and xenophobia so often go hand in hand, so do another pair of post-9/11 measures that are once again on the table: an increase in what the government knows about the public and a decrease in what the public knows about the government.
In the weeks after 9/11, a panicked Congress passed legislation to ensure there would never be such an intelligence lapse again. The Patriot Act did patch some critical holes in the government’s ability to track terrorists, but its sprawling scope also led to major surveillance abuses. In the coronavirus era, other governments are replicating this approach, as China doubles down on facial recognition and Israel greenlights a program usually used for counterterrorism to track citizens’ phones.
The pandemic has ignited calls for steps that deeply concern privacy advocates.
U.S. policymakers have not implemented such intrusive measures, but the pandemic has ignited calls for steps that deeply concern privacy advocates. Data-mining firms like Palantir already have contracts in place with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. Some U.S. analysts argue that the coronavirus vindicates the highly surveilled Chinese internet. Others have urged the adoption of tracking methods similar to those used by the government of Singapore, pointing out that U.S. governors can use post-9/11 legislation to force citizens to comply.
These debates are difficult, as containing this disease will require robust tracking and tracing. However, the 9/11 era showed that government surveillance—especially when implemented hastily—has the tendency to expand inertially. The Patriot Act’s scope grew in the years after its adoption, resulting in the mass collection of millions of Americans’ metadata (which a government oversight board later deemed not only illegal but also of minimal effectiveness in fighting terrorism). That law has also been applied well beyond its initial counterterrorism intent, including in cases of mortgage and food-stamp fraud.
The United States needs to collect more data to contain the coronavirus, but it needs to do so while taking seriously the potential for expansion and abuse—as well as understanding that while technology can be part of the solution, it won’t be a silver-bullet fix. Addressing COVID-19 requires rapidly expanding contact tracing while instituting clear privacy and data protection regulations; it does not require—and should not permit—covertly scraping data (or allowing private companies to do so) without the knowledge or consent of the American people.
Taking on the coronavirus also requires the public to trust the accountability of the government. And when it comes to issues of transparency, the parallels between 9/11 and now move from the speculative to the immediate. The post-9/11 era was rife with anti-democratic secrecy, and today, the executive branch is again claiming emergency powers to evade accountability. Trump used the coronavirus as a pretext for suspending immigration—not for health reasons but, he claimed, to prevent competition from immigrant labor. He also decapitated the watchdog panel tasked with overseeing $2.2 trillion in economic relief and named a partisan ally to fill a critical inspector general role. In a haunting echo of the post-9/11 era’s habeas corpus debates, last month the Justice Department requested authorization from Congress to be able to detain Americans indefinitely during a state of emergency such as a pandemic.
Just as “terrorism wins” when it prompts Americans to abandon rights and liberties, so too does the tragedy of the coronavirus compound when leaders respond to it by squelching precisely the democratic values that should make the United States more effective than authoritarian states in responding to the virus. Free flows of news and information create political pressure to make smart and life-saving decisions. Policymakers avoid corruption if they know their constituents are watching. By clamping down on hallmarks of democratic accountability, post-9/11 policies curtailed valuable liberties while making the United States less safe. Future decisions to combat the coronavirus must avoid reviving similar actions.
The coronavirus demands real foreign-policy innovation, not a slide back into the familiar and flawed. It demands an honest appraisal of the self-defeating consequences of militarism, xenophobia, surveillance, and secrecy. Without this reevaluation, the United States will march forward into a new moment weighted down by old and deficient tools.
America’s foreign-policy makers face an opportunity to reject the destruction of the post-9/11 paradigm. They should seize it.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--Can A Small Lebanese Town Become a Model for Conquering COVID-19?

Can A Small Lebanese Town Become a Model for Conquering COVID-19 ?
BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn ’ t usually make national headlines , but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight .
“ Today marks seven days since we ’ ve closed off Bsharri , ” Mayor Freddy Keyrouz said in a phone interview with Foreign Policy on April 17 .
“ We are on the offensive against this virus.
” The municipality ’ s decision to close off the small mountainous town raised eyebrows across Lebanon , followed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreak would be imminent in Bsharri , and ultimately across the country .
Apart from a nighttime curfew and travel restrictions to minimize traffic , Lebanon ’ s national government has yet to close off towns from each other .
With an estimated 5,000 residents , Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands , like Zahara de la Sierra in southern Spain .
And much like the Spanish hilltop town , both geographically and functionally , Bsharri has primarily relied on its local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the national government struggles to secure financial and medical aid .
The town ’ s first reported coronavirus case was a doctor at a hospital earlier this month , which gave the local government the green light to implement its strict measures .
“ We already had a preemptive strategy well before the first case hit the Bsharri or Lebanon , ” Keyrouz added.Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands .
The director of Bsharri ’ s government hospital , Eddie Lazem , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was allocated for coronavirus patients , while a floor in an unfinished hospital building was set up as a quarantine facility .
“ We set up a response team preemptively , ” Lazem told Foreign Policy by phone—reporting locally was made impossible after the town was sealed off .
“ And despite financial limitations we took the strictest measures possible for our facilities—sanitization , masks , everything.
” Critical cases are sent to Beirut ’ s government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital or to a hospital in the northern city of Tripoli .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bsharri has at least 70 confirmed cases , over 10 percent of confirmed cases across the entire country .
But at the same time , Bsharri has administered a significantly greater number of tests per capita compared to other municipalities in Lebanon .
“ We did 400 tests just this week so we can see where to take things going forward , ” Keyrouz said .
Mass testing has since become part of the global consensus on how to best respond to the coronavirus pandemic .
Medical workers in Brazil , where President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a little flu , ” have said the underreporting of coronavirus cases ignores a “ mountain of other deaths.
” Keyrouz echoed these sentiments .
“ The high numbers isn ’ t because we have a bad situation—it ’ s because we ’ re testing widely .
… We started testing in places where lots of human interactions take place : gas stations , stores , pharmacies , and so on , ” he said .
Lebanon ’ s Health Ministry has documented over 720 coronavirus cases and 24 related deaths thus far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practitioners , however , have called for at least 2,500 tests per day , and to be more inclusive of patients in rural areas and refugee camps .
Those calls appear to have been in vain , however .
Following the first confirmed case on April 21 in Lebanon ’ s Jalil Palestinian refugee camp—one of 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency—a series of tests the following day revealed that there were at least four other positive cases there .
An overreliance on private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only provided a minimal response has also placed a huge burden on the underfunded government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital in Beirut to lead the country ’ s response to the pandemic .
One of the most indebted countries in the world , Lebanon eventually defaulted on its enormous foreign debt in March .
Factor in state budget cuts , including a 7 percent cut to health care , and it couldn ’ t be a worse time for Lebanon to deal with a pandemic .
Though Lebanon has high-quality private health care facilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative approach to the situation ; hospitals that want to take in COVID-19 patients can only allocate up to 20 beds per facility .
Despite a recent United States government donation of $ 5.3 million to private hospitals to help “ mitigate ” the virus , it is unclear whether that will incentivize them to take in more patients .
( The government ’ s requests that they do so are nonbinding . )
To further bolster its patchwork response , Lebanon has received aid from UNICEF and the French government , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World Bank to reallocate $ 40 million in loans to be used for the COVID-19 effort .
The country has also been struggling to implement reforms mandatory to unlock a pledged $ 11.1 billion in loans from the international community in April 2018 .
It has also reached out to the International Monetary Fund for emergency aid but has been unsuccessful so far .
Crucially , in economically depressed Lebanon , mass government borrowing to extend the social safety net isn ’ t an option .
There are no grants to small businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ payment exemptions to prevent further layoffs as is the case in France—about half of Lebanon ’ s population is unemployed .
There certainly aren ’ t any grants for freelance workers and others in the gig economy , like those offered in Germany .
About 40,000 Lebanese families , however , were set to benefit from a one-time payment of roughly $ 133 .
But this aid was postponed due to “ errors , ” which the army has now been tasked with remedying .
Parliament was set to vote on a wider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses and workers , but to no avail ; with too few members of parliament present to establish a quorum , the session ended early with no vote on the matter .
Back in Bsharri , Ghiwa Fakhry isn ’ t getting used to working from home ; she ’ s part of a community initiative called the Bsharri Crisis Team .
Though politically unaffiliated , this collective has reached out to everyone for collaboration .
Fakhry and her colleagues are among many people in Bsharri who quickly set up community groups to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable families—now more in need than ever as a result of the pandemic .
“ We ’ ve been in contact with the local government , priests , MPs , and other stakeholders in the community—and the majority were supportive and cooperative , ” Fakhry told Foreign Policy .
“ Our goal is to make sure that everyone in need‚ with no exceptions , gets their fair share of support and to do this in an organized and transparent way.
” But as in the rest of Lebanon , where state-funded social services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the country ’ s wide patronage networks of political parties , warlords , and business magnates that have filled the state ’ s gap for decades .
For example , Iran-backed Hezbollah , known for its sophisticated welfare and services , has allocated about $ 1.75 million to fund their efforts against the coronavirus , with a team of 24,500 medical workers .
A key political stronghold for the Lebanese Forces , a prominent Christian party and key ally of the United States and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon , Bsharri is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader , Samir Geagea , and his spouse , Bsharri MP Sethrida Geagea .
“ The Lebanese Forces helped upscale the hospital and provided testing [ kits ] , ” Hany Rahme , an activist with the party , said .
“ And also 1,500 food packages.
” Among the party ’ s donors is a former health minister , the Lebanese British businessman Ghassan Hasbani , who donated 100 test kits .
Just days after the first case was confirmed in Bsharri , its hospital announced that it received 800 testing kits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia and 500 from the office of William Tawk—a rival of the Lebanese Forces .
Political parties across the country have undertaken similar initiatives , including billionaires and ex-Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati , and political rivals Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement across their constituencies—but these top-down efforts haven ’ t matched Bsharri ’ s targeted community-driven mobilizations .
“ I encourage all the capitalists and businessmen to donate to the efforts of their hometowns , ” Keyrouz , Bsharri ’ s mayor , said , emphasizing the need for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a better understanding of the situation in Lebanon that way.
” He compared his town ’ s response to Germany ’ s and South Korea ’ s , which included implementing wider testing and tracking the whereabouts of positive cases .
And while this resulted in skyrocketing documented cases due to the high rate of testing , Germany and South Korea had significantly lower mortality rates .
Large-scale testing and effective aid distribution is a far cry from what the rest of Lebanon has witnessed thus far .
The number of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dwindling in Bsharri , as all positive cases were quarantined and their whereabouts were tracked to test other potential cases .
Fakhry , the Bsharri community activist , believes that this tells a story about what an adequate response to the outbreak should look like for the rest of the country—and perhaps elsewhere .
“ There is no other way than to implement wider testing , ” she said .
“ The vast majority of the cases here were asymptomatic , including the elderly .
You ’ re putting people at risk.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy is on life-support , ought to have implemented a preemptive and holistic strategy prior to its first case in late February .
“ For such a small country , I think we could have implemented these kinds of procedures within two weeks , ” she said .
“ We ’ d have been in a more comfortable situation with less pressure on the hospitals.
” Slovakia , a country of similar size , was ahead of the curve in implementing border closures and social distancing measures—despite its reliance on the European market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road.In Bsharri there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes .
As Lebanon continues to slash public spending , it ’ s unlikely that an increase in spending on social services is imminent .
And now with the spotlight on Bsharri , it was unsurprising that some speculation came about that the town was trying to score points against Health Minister Hamad Hassan of Hezbollah , a Lebanese Forces rival .
Lazem , the Bsharri hospital director , said that there is no tension .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was very supportive , ” Lazem said .
“ His visit was in good faith , despite political differences.
” Meanwhile in Bsharri , closed off from the rest of the country , there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes .
There was a sense of urgency to put people ’ s immediate health and economic needs at the forefront , especially at a time where popular protests swept across Lebanon calling for the downfall of its ruling political parties .
“ We united @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Bsharri love each other—whether it ’ s civil society or Lebanese Forces such as myself , ” Rahme told Foreign Policy .
But whether everyone feels the same way is questionable .
Renewed protests and riots across Lebanon over the economic crisis continue to target the country ’ s ruling elite—including the Lebanese Forces and their allies—as a seething population demands change .
As Bsharri ’ s case numbers go down , numerous towns and cities in Lebanon have been protesting over the past week , now over lack of economic compensation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to greater demand for medical resources , and it ’ s clear that the situation in Lebanon as a whole is far from under control .
While acknowledging the positive trajectory in Bsharri , Lazem insisted that people must stay vigilant , even in his town .
“ Now we ’ re fine , ” he said .
“ Tomorrow morning , who knows ?
”

BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn’t usually make national headlines, but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight.
BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn’t usually make national headlines, but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight.
“Today marks seven days since we’ve closed off Bsharri,” Mayor Freddy Keyrouz said in a phone interview with Foreign Policy on April 17. “We are on the offensive against this virus.”
The municipality’s decision to close off the small mountainous town raised eyebrows across Lebanon, followed by a media frenzy over whether a devastating outbreak would be imminent in Bsharri, and ultimately across the country. Apart from a nighttime curfew and travel restrictions to minimize traffic, Lebanon’s national government has yet to close off towns from each other.
With an estimated 5,000 residents, Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands, like Zahara de la Sierra in southern Spain. And much like the Spanish hilltop town, both geographically and functionally, Bsharri has primarily relied on its local community to contain the situation, while the national government struggles to secure financial and medical aid.
The town’s first reported coronavirus case was a doctor at a hospital earlier this month, which gave the local government the green light to implement its strict measures. “We already had a preemptive strategy well before the first case hit the Bsharri or Lebanon,” Keyrouz added.
The director of Bsharri’s government hospital, Eddie Lazem, said that a floor of the hospital was allocated for coronavirus patients, while a floor in an unfinished hospital building was set up as a quarantine facility. “We set up a response team preemptively,” Lazem told Foreign Policy by phone—reporting locally was made impossible after the town was sealed off. “And despite financial limitations we took the strictest measures possible for our facilities—sanitization, masks, everything.”
Critical cases are sent to Beirut’s government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital or to a hospital in the northern city of Tripoli.
Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands.
One month since its first positive case, Bsharri has at least 70 confirmed cases, over 10 percent of confirmed cases across the entire country. But at the same time, Bsharri has administered a significantly greater number of tests per capita compared to other municipalities in Lebanon.
“We did 400 tests just this week so we can see where to take things going forward,” Keyrouz said. Mass testing has since become part of the global consensus on how to best respond to the coronavirus pandemic. Medical workers in Brazil, where President Jair Bolsonaro downplayed the pandemic as “a little flu,” have said the underreporting of coronavirus cases ignores a “mountain of other deaths.” Keyrouz echoed these sentiments.
“The high numbers isn’t because we have a bad situation—it’s because we’re testing widely. … We started testing in places where lots of human interactions take place: gas stations, stores, pharmacies, and so on,” he said.
Lebanon’s Health Ministry has documented over 720 coronavirus cases and 24 related deaths thus far with roughly 1,000 daily tests; medical practitioners, however, have called for at least 2,500 tests per day, and to be more inclusive of patients in rural areas and refugee camps. Those calls appear to have been in vain, however.
Following the first confirmed case on April 21 in Lebanon’s Jalil Palestinian refugee camp—one of 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency—a series of tests the following day revealed that there were at least four other positive cases there. An overreliance on private health care facilities that have thus far only provided a minimal response has also placed a huge burden on the underfunded government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital in Beirut to lead the country’s response to the pandemic.
The coronavirus hit Lebanon just as the country was going through what is arguably the worst fiscal crisis in its history. The local currency, the Lebanese pound, officially pegged to the U.S. dollar, has lost half of its value on the black market in just six months, and a shortage of U.S. dollars means the country has struggled to import essential food items, fuel, medical equipment, and life-saving medicines.
One of the most indebted countries in the world, Lebanon eventually defaulted on its enormous foreign debt in March. Factor in state budget cuts, including a 7 percent cut to health care, and it couldn’t be a worse time for Lebanon to deal with a pandemic.
Though Lebanon has high-quality private health care facilities, they’ve taken a very conservative approach to the situation; hospitals that want to take in COVID-19 patients can only allocate up to 20 beds per facility. Despite a recent United States government donation of $5.3 million to private hospitals to help “mitigate” the virus, it is unclear whether that will incentivize them to take in more patients. (The government’s requests that they do so are nonbinding.)
To further bolster its patchwork response, Lebanon has received aid from UNICEF and the French government, and it has won the approval of the World Bank to reallocate $40 million in loans to be used for the COVID-19 effort. The country has also been struggling to implement reforms mandatory to unlock a pledged $11.1 billion in loans from the international community in April 2018. It has also reached out to the International Monetary Fund for emergency aid but has been unsuccessful so far.
Crucially, in economically depressed Lebanon, mass government borrowing to extend the social safety net isn’t an option. There are no grants to small businesses, nor are there rent and utility payment exemptions to prevent further layoffs as is the case in France—about half of Lebanon’s population is unemployed. There certainly aren’t any grants for freelance workers and others in the gig economy, like those offered in Germany.
About 40,000 Lebanese families, however, were set to benefit from a one-time payment of roughly $133. But this aid was postponed due to “errors,” which the army has now been tasked with remedying. Parliament was set to vote on a wider proposal to include zero-interest loans to small businesses and workers, but to no avail; with too few members of parliament present to establish a quorum, the session ended early with no vote on the matter.
Back in Bsharri, Ghiwa Fakhry isn’t getting used to working from home; she’s part of a community initiative called the Bsharri Crisis Team. Though politically unaffiliated, this collective has reached out to everyone for collaboration. Fakhry and her colleagues are among many people in Bsharri who quickly set up community groups to coordinate effective aid efforts and distribution for vulnerable families—now more in need than ever as a result of the pandemic.
“We’ve been in contact with the local government, priests, MPs, and other stakeholders in the community—and the majority were supportive and cooperative,” Fakhry told Foreign Policy. “Our goal is to make sure that everyone in need‚ with no exceptions, gets their fair share of support and to do this in an organized and transparent way.”
But as in the rest of Lebanon, where state-funded social services are minimal, Bsharri residents also rely on the country’s wide patronage networks of political parties, warlords, and business magnates that have filled the state’s gap for decades. For example, Iran-backed Hezbollah, known for its sophisticated welfare and services, has allocated about $1.75 million to fund their efforts against the coronavirus, with a team of 24,500 medical workers.
A key political stronghold for the Lebanese Forces, a prominent Christian party and key ally of the United States and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, Bsharri is the hometown of both the party’s leader, Samir Geagea, and his spouse, Bsharri MP Sethrida Geagea.
“The Lebanese Forces helped upscale the hospital and provided testing [kits],” Hany Rahme, an activist with the party, said. “And also 1,500 food packages.”
Among the party’s donors is a former health minister, the Lebanese British businessman Ghassan Hasbani, who donated 100 test kits. Just days after the first case was confirmed in Bsharri, its hospital announced that it received 800 testing kits: 300 from the Lebanese diaspora in Australia and 500 from the office of William Tawk—a rival of the Lebanese Forces.
Political parties across the country have undertaken similar initiatives, including billionaires and ex-Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati, and political rivals Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement across their constituencies—but these top-down efforts haven’t matched Bsharri’s targeted community-driven mobilizations.
“I encourage all the capitalists and businessmen to donate to the efforts of their hometowns,” Keyrouz, Bsharri’s mayor, said, emphasizing the need for wider tests. “We’d have a better understanding of the situation in Lebanon that way.”
He compared his town’s response to Germany’s and South Korea’s, which included implementing wider testing and tracking the whereabouts of positive cases. And while this resulted in skyrocketing documented cases due to the high rate of testing, Germany and South Korea had significantly lower mortality rates. Large-scale testing and effective aid distribution is a far cry from what the rest of Lebanon has witnessed thus far.
The number of people testing positive for the coronavirus has started dwindling in Bsharri, as all positive cases were quarantined and their whereabouts were tracked to test other potential cases. Fakhry, the Bsharri community activist, believes that this tells a story about what an adequate response to the outbreak should look like for the rest of the country—and perhaps elsewhere.
“There is no other way than to implement wider testing,” she said. “The vast majority of the cases here were asymptomatic, including the elderly. You’re putting people at risk.”
Fakhry added that Lebanon, though its economy is on life-support, ought to have implemented a preemptive and holistic strategy prior to its first case in late February. “For such a small country, I think we could have implemented these kinds of procedures within two weeks,” she said. “We’d have been in a more comfortable situation with less pressure on the hospitals.” Slovakia, a country of similar size, was ahead of the curve in implementing border closures and social distancing measures—despite its reliance on the European market and the potential economic consequences down the road.In Bsharri there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes.
As Lebanon continues to slash public spending, it’s unlikely that an increase in spending on social services is imminent.
And now with the spotlight on Bsharri, it was unsurprising that some speculation came about that the town was trying to score points against Health Minister Hamad Hassan of Hezbollah, a Lebanese Forces rival.
Lazem, the Bsharri hospital director, said that there is no tension. “The health minister visited Bsharri, and he was very supportive,” Lazem said. “His visit was in good faith, despite political differences.”
Meanwhile in Bsharri, closed off from the rest of the country, there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes. There was a sense of urgency to put people’s immediate health and economic needs at the forefront, especially at a time where popular protests swept across Lebanon calling for the downfall of its ruling political parties.
“We united at this difficult time because the people of Bsharri love each other—whether it’s civil society or Lebanese Forces such as myself,” Rahme told Foreign Policy.
But whether everyone feels the same way is questionable. Renewed protests and riots across Lebanon over the economic crisis continue to target the country’s ruling elite—including the Lebanese Forces and their allies—as a seething population demands change.
As Bsharri’s case numbers go down, numerous towns and cities in Lebanon have been protesting over the past week, now over lack of economic compensation and skyrocketing food prices. This could lead to greater demand for medical resources, and it’s clear that the situation in Lebanon as a whole is far from under control.
While acknowledging the positive trajectory in Bsharri, Lazem insisted that people must stay vigilant, even in his town. “Now we’re fine,” he said. “Tomorrow morning, who knows?”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--Does Remdesivir Deserve The Hype?

Does Remdesivir Deserve The Hype?

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. to fast track coronavirus treatment , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urges U.N. to continue Iran arms embargo , and South Korea reports zero new coronavirus cases in 24-hour period .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is set to announce an emergency-use authorization for a drug to treat COVID-19 after it showed promising results in an international trial .
The drug , remdesivir , was originally developed by Gilead Sciences to treat the Ebola virus .
The trial , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( NIH ) , was conducted on over 1,000 people and showed that patients receiving the drug recovered up to four days faster than patients taking a placebo .
Anthony Fauci , the head of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , described the trial ’ s results as “ very optimistic.
” “ The data shows that remdesivir has a clear-cut , significant , positive effect in diminishing the time to recovery , ” he said during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump .
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ministry would also fast track approval for the drug .
But it ’ s not that simple .
On Wednesday , the British medical journal The Lancet published the results of a separate remdesivir study conducted on 237 patients across 10 hospitals in China ’ s Hubei province .
The authors of that study found remdesivir “ was not associated with statistically significant clinical benefits.
” However , the Chinese trial did find that the drug reduced the time required for a patient ’ s condition to improve among those showing symptoms for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authors to recommend further study .
The WHO is being cautious .
The World Health Organization cautioned that relying on any single study is unlikely to be the solution in finding an effective treatment for the coronavirus .
“ Typically , you don ’ t have one study that will come out that will be a game changer , ” said Maria Van Kerkhove , who is leading the WHO ’ s technical response to the coronavirus pandemic .
“ Once we look at all of the studies , and we judge them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some kind of a conclusion of ‘ yes we see an effect ’ or ‘ no we don ’ t , ’ ” she said .
How much remdesivir is available now ?
In an interview with STAT on Wednesday , Gilead CEO Daniel O ’ Day said the company began ramping up production of the drug in January in the hope that it would be effective .
He said the company had produced 50,000 treatment courses to date , and expected that number to increase to 140,000 treatment courses between now and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gilead ’ s stock price rose 5.68 percent after news of the NIH study broke , and as with any private company faced with a desperate public , there is a worry that Gilead could seek to profiteer .
O ’ Day said there would be “ no obstacles ” to accessing the drug if it ’ s proven effective .
“ Gilead will continue to take its responsibility very seriously here and make sure that whatever model we come up with will ensure access around the globe , and that patients are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is the United States still a party to the Iran nuclear deal ?
When Washington wants to sanction Iran , it seems to think it is .
The Trump administration is looking to its fellow members of the United Nations security council to support the United States in extending an arms embargo against Iran , due to be lifted on October 23 .
Under the terms of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 , the resolution that endorsed the Iran deal , any country can reimpose sanctions if parties are believed to be in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State Mike Pompeo has pushed back against the idea that just because the United States withdrew from the agreement it is excluded from enforcing parts of it .
“ Someone suggested this is fancy lawyering .
It ’ s just reading , ” he told a State Department press briefing .
Pompeo also called on the European nations who were parties to the Iran deal to join the United States in extending the arms embargo .
“ Does anybody think that the nation that today is conducting terror campaigns by Lebanese Hezbollah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missiles into the air ought to be permitted to purchase conventional weapons systems in just a few months ?
I think the world realizes that ’ s a mistake , ” he added .
Bolsonaro appointee blocked .
Brazil ’ s Supreme Court has blocked the appointment of Alexandre Ramagem as Brazil ’ s new chief of federal police , saying that Ramagem ’ s close relationship with the Bolsonaro family put him in a compromising position .
Bolsonaro had already been criticized for the appointment by Sergio Moro , who recently resigned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolsonaro had interfered with federal police investigations prior to stepping down .
The high-profile departures of Brazil ’ s health and justice ministers from Bolsonaro ’ s cabinet have increased pressure on the president , whose handling of the country ’ s coronavirus crisis has been deemed ineffective by a majority of Brazilians .
On Tuesday , Brazilian reporters asked Bolsonaro for his opinion on the record number of deaths recorded that day .
“ So what ?
” Bolsonaro replied .
“ I ’ m sorry .
What do you want me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more coronavirus cases .
The Southern Transitional Council ( STC ) , a separatist group that declared self-rule over southern Yemen reported five more cases of coronavirus yesterday , adding to the single case that had been reported previously .
The authorities announced a three-day , 24-hour curfew in response to the news .
On Tuesday , the United Nations warned of “ a very real probability ” that the coronavirus was spreading unchecked in the country due to its already war-ravaged health infrastructure .
War crimes in Myanmar .
The outgoing U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , called for an investigation into allegations of war crimes in the states of Rakhine and Chin , highlighting offenses by both government and nonstate actors .
“ While the world is occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic , the Myanmar military continues to escalate its assault in Rakhine State , targeting the civilian population , ” she said .
“ Its conduct against the civilian population of Rakhine and Chin States may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
” She called on the U.N. to step in to avoid “ another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Myanmar military ’ s deadly crackdown on the Rohingya community .
Civilian deaths have increased in Rakhine state over the past year as government forces clashed with the Arakan Army , an ethnic Rakhine rebel group seeking greater autonomy from the central government .
South Korea reports no new domestic coronavirus cases .
South Korea reached a key milestone in its much-lauded battle with the coronavirus as it recorded no new domestic cases over a 24-hour period for the first time since February .
The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , although all of them involved people entering the country from abroad .
Authorities in the Swedish city of Lund have devised a novel way to ward off crowds for an upcoming day of national celebration : chicken manure .
The Walpurgis festival is usually an all-day , alcohol-fueled party to celebrate the coming of spring , with mass gatherings and bonfires part of the fun .
With no formal lockdowns in place across Sweden , Lund ’ s municipal workers will spread a ton of chicken manure in its central park @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get the opportunity to fertilize the lawns , and at the same time it will stink and so it may not be so nice to sit and drink beer.
” Gustav Lundblad , chairman of the local council ’ s environment committee , told the Sydsvenskan newspaper .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. to fast track coronavirus treatment , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urges U.N. to continue Iran arms embargo, and South Korea reports zero new coronavirus cases in 24-hour period.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. to fast track coronavirus treatment, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urges U.N. to continue Iran arms embargo, and South Korea reports zero new coronavirus cases in 24-hour period.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. to Rush Approval For Coronavirus Treatment After Promising Trial Results
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is set to announce an emergency-use authorization for a drug to treat COVID-19 after it showed promising results in an international trial. The drug, remdesivir, was originally developed by Gilead Sciences to treat the Ebola virus.
The trial, sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), was conducted on over 1,000 people and showed that patients receiving the drug recovered up to four days faster than patients taking a placebo.
Anthony Fauci, the head of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, described the trial’s results as “very optimistic.”
“The data shows that remdesivir has a clear-cut, significant, positive effect in diminishing the time to recovery,” he said during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that Japan’s health ministry would also fast track approval for the drug.
But it’s not that simple. On Wednesday, the British medical journal The Lancet published the results of a separate remdesivir study conducted on 237 patients across 10 hospitals in China’s Hubei province. The authors of that study found remdesivir “was not associated with statistically significant clinical benefits.” However, the Chinese trial did find that the drug reduced the time required for a patient’s condition to improve among those showing symptoms for 10 days or less, prompting the authors to recommend further study.
The WHO is being cautious. The World Health Organization cautioned that relying on any single study is unlikely to be the solution in finding an effective treatment for the coronavirus. “Typically, you don’t have one study that will come out that will be a game changer,” said Maria Van Kerkhove, who is leading the WHO’s technical response to the coronavirus pandemic. “Once we look at all of the studies, and we judge them collectively, we can come away with some kind of a conclusion of ‘yes we see an effect’ or ‘no we don’t,’” she said.
How much remdesivir is available now? In an interview with STAT on Wednesday, Gilead CEO Daniel O’Day said the company began ramping up production of the drug in January in the hope that it would be effective. He said the company had produced 50,000 treatment courses to date, and expected that number to increase to 140,000 treatment courses between now and July.
What about the cost? Gilead’s stock price rose 5.68 percent after news of the NIH study broke, and as with any private company faced with a desperate public, there is a worry that Gilead could seek to profiteer. O’Day said there would be “no obstacles” to accessing the drug if it’s proven effective. “Gilead will continue to take its responsibility very seriously here and make sure that whatever model we come up with will ensure access around the globe, and that patients are put first,” he said.
What We’re Following Today
Is the United States still a party to the Iran nuclear deal? When Washington wants to sanction Iran, it seems to think it is. The Trump administration is looking to its fellow members of the United Nations security council to support the United States in extending an arms embargo against Iran, due to be lifted on October 23. Under the terms of U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, the resolution that endorsed the Iran deal, any country can reimpose sanctions if parties are believed to be in breach of the deal.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has pushed back against the idea that just because the United States withdrew from the agreement it is excluded from enforcing parts of it. “Someone suggested this is fancy lawyering. It’s just reading,” he told a State Department press briefing.
Pompeo also called on the European nations who were parties to the Iran deal to join the United States in extending the arms embargo. “Does anybody think that the nation that today is conducting terror campaigns by Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraqi Shia movements or firing military missiles into the air ought to be permitted to purchase conventional weapons systems in just a few months? I think the world realizes that’s a mistake,” he added.
Bolsonaro appointee blocked. Brazil’s Supreme Court has blocked the appointment of Alexandre Ramagem as Brazil’s new chief of federal police, saying that Ramagem’s close relationship with the Bolsonaro family put him in a compromising position. Bolsonaro had already been criticized for the appointment by Sergio Moro, who recently resigned as justice minister. Moro alleged that Bolsonaro had interfered with federal police investigations prior to stepping down.
The high-profile departures of Brazil’s health and justice ministers from Bolsonaro’s cabinet have increased pressure on the president, whose handling of the country’s coronavirus crisis has been deemed ineffective by a majority of Brazilians. On Tuesday, Brazilian reporters asked Bolsonaro for his opinion on the record number of deaths recorded that day. “So what?” Bolsonaro replied. “I’m sorry. What do you want me to do?”
Yemen records five more coronavirus cases. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group that declared self-rule over southern Yemen reported five more cases of coronavirus yesterday, adding to the single case that had been reported previously. The authorities announced a three-day, 24-hour curfew in response to the news.
On Tuesday, the United Nations warned of “a very real probability” that the coronavirus was spreading unchecked in the country due to its already war-ravaged health infrastructure.
Keep an Eye On
War crimes in Myanmar. The outgoing U.N. special rapporteur on Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, called for an investigation into allegations of war crimes in the states of Rakhine and Chin, highlighting offenses by both government and nonstate actors. “While the world is occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Myanmar military continues to escalate its assault in Rakhine State, targeting the civilian population,” she said. “Its conduct against the civilian population of Rakhine and Chin States may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
She called on the U.N. to step in to avoid “another systemic failure,” a reference to the Myanmar military’s deadly crackdown on the Rohingya community. Civilian deaths have increased in Rakhine state over the past year as government forces clashed with the Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine rebel group seeking greater autonomy from the central government.
South Korea reports no new domestic coronavirus cases. South Korea reached a key milestone in its much-lauded battle with the coronavirus as it recorded no new domestic cases over a 24-hour period for the first time since February. The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) did report four new cases, although all of them involved people entering the country from abroad.
Odds and Ends
Authorities in the Swedish city of Lund have devised a novel way to ward off crowds for an upcoming day of national celebration: chicken manure. The Walpurgis festival is usually an all-day, alcohol-fueled party to celebrate the coming of spring, with mass gatherings and bonfires part of the fun. With no formal lockdowns in place across Sweden, Lund’s municipal workers will spread a ton of chicken manure in its central park to deter such revelry.
“We get the opportunity to fertilize the lawns, and at the same time it will stink and so it may not be so nice to sit and drink beer.” Gustav Lundblad, chairman of the local council’s environment committee, told the Sydsvenskan newspaper.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--A Coronavirus Mystery: Why Are There So Few Cases in South Asia?

A Coronavirus Mystery : Why Are There So Few Cases in South Asia ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
Today , we attempt to explain why there are so few coronavirus cases across the region .
Plus : Another deadly attack rocks Afghanistan , a constitutional crisis brews in Sri Lanka , and the death of two Bollywood legends .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Let ’ s face it : Everyone expected worse .
More than three months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus in South Asia , the region has only around 60,000 confirmed infections .
By comparison , the United States has more than 1 million , while Spain and Italy both have confirmed more than 200,000 .
Put another way , South Asia ’ s countries account for one-quarter of the world ’ s population but only 2 percent of its coronavirus infections .
Why ?
Parsing the numbers .
South Asia ’ s relatively low case numbers are a bit of a puzzle , especially given high population density and poor health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immediate reaction is to call into question its testing capacity .
India has so far conducted only 830,201 tests , or 614 for every 1 million people—among the lowest rates of testing in the world .
But if India ’ s low rate of testing were hiding a massive outbreak , it would show up in other ways .
Only 4 percent of India ’ s coronavirus tests have returned positive , compared with around 17 percent in the United States , implying that the virus is less widespread in India .
Another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of deaths .
But here the data also shows South Asia in a favorable light .
While the United States has recorded more than 60,000 deaths from COVID-19 , India counts only 1,079 so far .
Those numbers are likely higher—only one-fifth of deaths in India tend to be medically certified—but it is not as if there has been a massive surge in hospital admissions .
Using India ’ s data as a proxy for the region , the likely takeaway would be that South Asian countries have either succeeded in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are still in the early stages of their outbreaks .
If it ’ s the latter , then the current state of lockdown ensures the coronavirus won ’ t spread too rapidly .
Successful approach ?
Has South Asia succeeded where Western countries have failed ?
Countries such as India and Bangladesh have imposed stricter lockdowns than the West—and earlier in their respective outbreaks .
In that sense , South Asian economies should be commended for moving quickly in response to the shutdowns in other countries .
With the exception of Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to China , most of the region ’ s countries imposed strict restrictions on international and domestic travel .
Even that doesn ’ t completely explain the low number of cases .
After all , even after closing the borders , the number of cases rose internally .
And many South Asian countries made vital errors .
India announced its nationwide lockdown with no prior notice , leaving millions of migrant workers displaced and vulnerable .
Across the region , gatherings of religious groups took place in early March , leading to coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem to have had some success in contact tracing and imposing quarantines .
One theory goes that the region ’ s youthful demographics give it an advantage .
India , for example , has a median age of 28 , compared with 38 in the United States .
( The median ages in Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan are 18 , 26 , and 24 , respectively . )
But even here , if there are many asymptomatic cases among young people , then those may eventually show up in infections among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recorded .
Other theories are more tenuous .
For example , the World Health Organization says there is no evidence that the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin vaccine—widely deployed in South Asia to fight tuberculosis—provides protection from the coronavirus .
Nor is there proof that warmer weather slows the spread of the coronavirus .
Summer strategy .
There is no real end to the pandemic unless the world can develop a vaccine .
That means it ’ s too soon to declare any country ’ s approach a success .
And there lies the real problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ easing some of their early restrictions .
India ’ s government has allowed the opening of neighborhood shops , as well as some work in construction , agriculture , and manufacturing .
Pakistan has allowed mosques to open for Ramadan prayers .
Bangladesh is reopening some of its garment factories , a vital part of its economy .
These reversals could lead to spikes in rates of infections .
Lawmakers will have to weigh the dangers of further outbreaks against a growing restlessness among their populations .
In Surat , India , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throwing stones at glass windows at a construction site and damaging vehicles .
They want to work or go home to their villages , and something has to give .
But there are no perfect choices .
Sri Lanka ’ s constitutional crisis .
Sri Lanka ’ s opposition says state spending will become illegal beginning on Friday unless the government urgently recalls Parliament .
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa used his constitutional powers to dissolve Parliament last month in a bid to call for elections six months ahead of schedule .
Before he did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the state until April 30 .
Given the national lockdown , however , it is now unclear when Sri Lanka will be able to conduct a viable national vote .
Suicide bombing in Afghanistan .
Despite the ongoing U.S.-led peace talks and the start of the holy month of Ramadan , a suicide bombing near Kabul on Wednesday killed three people and wounded at least a dozen others .
No one has claimed responsibility for the attack .
The bombing took place the day after a Taliban attack on checkpoints in Semangan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Meanwhile , as Stefanie Glinski reports for Foreign Policy , the coronavirus lockdown presents most Afghans with an impossible choice : get sick or go hungry .
Religious freedom in India .
A top religious freedom watchdog is urging the U.S. State Department to designate India as a “ country of particular concern.
” In its annual report , the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom called India ’ s treatment of religious minorities “ troublesome.
” An Indian government spokesperson called the report “ biased and tendentious.
” But criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Several Gulf states have expressed outrage over hateful social media posts , as Al Jazeera reports .
As if the coronavirus pandemic were not enough , Indian officials report that farms across the region face a new threat this summer that could endanger food security .
What is the threat ?
A ) Locusts B ) Too little rainfall C ) Too much rainfall D ) Labor shortages Scroll down for the answer .
Bollywood deaths .
In 24 hours , Bollywood lost two major stars—but neither to COVID-19 .
Irrfan Khan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pi , Slumdog Millionaire , The Lunchbox , and several Bollywood hits , died at 53 in Mumbai on Tuesday of infections related to a rare cancer .
Just a few hours later , the actor Rishi Kapoor succumbed to leukemia , also in Mumbai .
Kapoor , the star of films such as Bobby ( 1973 ) and Om Shanti Om ( 1980 ) , was 67 .
A giant locust storm from the Horn of Africa could be headed toward South Asia this summer , according to the Hindu .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Iran or pass over the Indian Ocean and attack farms in peninsular India .
Locusts can consume an alarming amount of food : A one square kilometer swarm can eat as much food in one day as 35,000 people .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. Today, we attempt to explain why there are so few coronavirus cases across the region. Plus: Another deadly attack rocks Afghanistan , a constitutional crisis brews in Sri Lanka , and the death of two Bollywood legends .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. Today, we attempt to explain why there are so few coronavirus cases across the region. Plus: Another deadly attack rocks Afghanistan, a constitutional crisis brews in Sri Lanka, and the death of two Bollywood legends.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Why Aren’t There More Coronavirus Cases in South Asia?
Let’s face it: Everyone expected worse. More than three months after the first recorded case of the coronavirus in South Asia, the region has only around 60,000 confirmed infections. By comparison, the United States has more than 1 million, while Spain and Italy both have confirmed more than 200,000. Put another way, South Asia’s countries account for one-quarter of the world’s population but only 2 percent of its coronavirus infections. Why?
Parsing the numbers. South Asia’s relatively low case numbers are a bit of a puzzle, especially given high population density and poor health care systems across the region. An immediate reaction is to call into question its testing capacity. India has so far conducted only 830,201 tests, or 614 for every 1 million people—among the lowest rates of testing in the world. But if India’s low rate of testing were hiding a massive outbreak, it would show up in other ways. Only 4 percent of India’s coronavirus tests have returned positive, compared with around 17 percent in the United States, implying that the virus is less widespread in India.
Another indicator of a larger outbreak would be the number of deaths. But here the data also shows South Asia in a favorable light. While the United States has recorded more than 60,000 deaths from COVID-19, India counts only 1,079 so far. Those numbers are likely higher—only one-fifth of deaths in India tend to be medically certified—but it is not as if there has been a massive surge in hospital admissions.
Using India’s data as a proxy for the region, the likely takeaway would be that South Asian countries have either succeeded in flattening their curves for now or that they are still in the early stages of their outbreaks. If it’s the latter, then the current state of lockdown ensures the coronavirus won’t spread too rapidly.
Successful approach? Has South Asia succeeded where Western countries have failed? Countries such as India and Bangladesh have imposed stricter lockdowns than the West—and earlier in their respective outbreaks. In that sense, South Asian economies should be commended for moving quickly in response to the shutdowns in other countries. With the exception of Pakistan, which for a while allowed flights to China, most of the region’s countries imposed strict restrictions on international and domestic travel.
Even that doesn’t completely explain the low number of cases. After all, even after closing the borders, the number of cases rose internally. And many South Asian countries made vital errors. India announced its nationwide lockdown with no prior notice, leaving millions of migrant workers displaced and vulnerable. Across the region, gatherings of religious groups took place in early March, leading to coronavirus clusters.
To their credit, authorities seem to have had some success in contact tracing and imposing quarantines. One theory goes that the region’s youthful demographics give it an advantage. India, for example, has a median age of 28, compared with 38 in the United States. (The median ages in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are 18, 26, and 24, respectively.) But even here, if there are many asymptomatic cases among young people, then those may eventually show up in infections among elderly populations—and that has yet to be recorded.
Other theories are more tenuous. For example, the World Health Organization says there is no evidence that the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin vaccine—widely deployed in South Asia to fight tuberculosis—provides protection from the coronavirus. Nor is there proof that warmer weather slows the spread of the coronavirus.
Summer strategy. There is no real end to the pandemic unless the world can develop a vaccine. That means it’s too soon to declare any country’s approach a success. And there lies the real problem for South Asia. Countries are already easing some of their early restrictions. India’s government has allowed the opening of neighborhood shops, as well as some work in construction, agriculture, and manufacturing. Pakistan has allowed mosques to open for Ramadan prayers. Bangladesh is reopening some of its garment factories, a vital part of its economy. These reversals could lead to spikes in rates of infections.
Lawmakers will have to weigh the dangers of further outbreaks against a growing restlessness among their populations. In Surat, India, a crowd of migrant workers turned violent, throwing stones at glass windows at a construction site and damaging vehicles. They want to work or go home to their villages, and something has to give. But there are no perfect choices.
What We’re Following
Sri Lanka’s constitutional crisis. Sri Lanka’s opposition says state spending will become illegal beginning on Friday unless the government urgently recalls Parliament. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa used his constitutional powers to dissolve Parliament last month in a bid to call for elections six months ahead of schedule. Before he did so, legislators voted to allow spending by the state until April 30. Given the national lockdown, however, it is now unclear when Sri Lanka will be able to conduct a viable national vote.
Suicide bombing in Afghanistan. Despite the ongoing U.S.-led peace talks and the start of the holy month of Ramadan, a suicide bombing near Kabul on Wednesday killed three people and wounded at least a dozen others. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack. The bombing took place the day after a Taliban attack on checkpoints in Semangan province that killed nine Afghan security officials. Meanwhile, as Stefanie Glinski reports for Foreign Policy, the coronavirus lockdown presents most Afghans with an impossible choice: get sick or go hungry.
Religious freedom in India. A top religious freedom watchdog is urging the U.S. State Department to designate India as a “country of particular concern.” In its annual report, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom called India’s treatment of religious minorities “troublesome.” An Indian government spokesperson called the report “biased and tendentious.” But criticism of India is now quite widespread: Several Gulf states have expressed outrage over hateful social media posts, as Al Jazeera reports.
Question of the Week
As if the coronavirus pandemic were not enough, Indian officials report that farms across the region face a new threat this summer that could endanger food security. What is the threat?
A) Locusts
B) Too little rainfall
C) Too much rainfall
D) Labor shortages
Scroll down for the answer.
Odds and Ends
Irrfan Khan attends a photocall during the annual Dubai International Film Festival on Dec. 8, 2017 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Bollywood deaths. In 24 hours, Bollywood lost two major stars—but neither to COVID-19. Irrfan Khan, renowned for his roles in Life of Pi, Slumdog Millionaire, The Lunchbox, and several Bollywood hits, died at 53 in Mumbai on Tuesday of infections related to a rare cancer. Just a few hours later, the actor Rishi Kapoor succumbed to leukemia, also in Mumbai. Kapoor, the star of films such as Bobby (1973) and Om Shanti Om (1980), was 67.
And the Answer Is…
A) Locusts.
A giant locust storm from the Horn of Africa could be headed toward South Asia this summer, according to the Hindu. The locusts could travel over a land corridor from Iran or pass over the Indian Ocean and attack farms in peninsular India. Locusts can consume an alarming amount of food: A one square kilometer swarm can eat as much food in one day as 35,000 people.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--Here We Go Again: Russia Gears Up to Interfere in 2020 Election With Coronavirus Disinformation

Here We Go Again : Russia Gears Up to Interfere in 2020 Election With Coronavirus Disinformation The public debate over COVID-19 has been dominated , understandably , by the pandemic ’ s impact on public health and the economy .
However , there is a third impact that is dramatically underappreciated : the danger to democracy posed by pandemic-related disinformation , whether it is used to weaken democratic checks on power or interfere with elections .
Disinformation—including by foreign state actors such as Russia—threatens to interfere with elections scheduled to take place in 2020 in Europe and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trans-Atlantic policy and intelligence cooperation .
U.S. President Donald Trump should abandon his dysfunctional approach to Europe and let the career professionals do their work.We know that Russia was already attempting to influence the 2020 election prior to the coronavirus pandemic by causing confusion and division .
In the United States , voters are understandably concerned about the health risk of entering crowded public polling stations .
Election workers , many of whom are elderly volunteers , are rightly reluctant to perform their important responsibilities .
Many U.S. states have postponed their presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the coronavirus danger will have subsided by then .
States that have barreled ahead with primary contests , such as Wisconsin , have experienced political , logistical , and legal chaos .
In Europe , various elections in France , Italy , Spain , the United Kingdom , North Macedonia , and elsewhere have been postponed because of the threat of infection .
Other political contests in Iceland , Belarus , Austria , Bosnia , the Czech Republic , Ukraine , and other countries that are set to occur later this year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has not significantly receded .
Poland , which intends to move forward with a presidential election in May , is one of the few countries defying calls to postpone business as usual .
( Postponing elections is not to be done lightly , of course , and in some cases—such as the U.S. presidential election—they can not be moved at all . )
This emergency situation has created an inviting environment for the spread of both misinformation , which is simply inaccurate information , and disinformation , which is deliberately false and intended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suppress the vote .
The pandemic feeds into the existing threat to Western democracies from foreign actors , notably Russia .
For many years now , the Kremlin has been actively interfering in democratic elections around the world .
Its techniques include hacking political targets to steal sensitive information , selectively releasing that information to the public , supporting preferred candidates , and propping up destabilizing or extremist political movements .
And , of course , it has spread disinformation through a combination of state-run propaganda outlets and fake online personas on social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three-year review by the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously found that the U.S. intelligence community ’ s joint assessment of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election was sound and apolitical .
We know that Russia was already attempting to influence the 2020 election prior to the coronavirus pandemic by causing confusion and division .
The latest Kremlin efforts have included hacking targets related to presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden , advancing conspiracy theories to counter established facts regarding Russian meddling in the 2016 election , and even providing support to far-right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationalist violence in the United States .
In the fall of 2019 , posts on Instagram appeared using strategies and tactics very similar to those of the Internet Research Agency , a Russia-based purveyor of online influence operations that has been linked to the Kremlin , and which was a key disinformation player in 2016 .
Facebook , which played a key role in enabling Russian disinformation in 2016 , subsequently announced that it had taken down tens of thousands of posts across 50 IRA-linked accounts from Facebook and Instagram .
On top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s External Action Service , which investigates and combats disinformation online , has documented numerous cases of disinformation about the coronavirus pandemic linked to pro-Kremlin media , and it found that a significant disinformation campaign by Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets is ongoing.The European Union ’ s External Action Service has found a significant , ongoing disinformation campaign by Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets .
The U.S. State Department ’ s Global Engagement Center has issued similar warnings .
According to the U.S. Department of Justice , China has also been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of the objectives of Russia and China might differ—the Kremlin is focused on undermining confidence in Western governments and institutions , while China seems to be more concerned with reshaping the narrative about its role in the pandemic—both countries ’ efforts could have a negative impact on Western democracy .
Furthermore , China has learned a great deal from the Kremlin ’ s tactics .
Both countries have been pressuring the West to soften its criticism of disinformation , often by claiming a false equivalence between Western media reporting and targeted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Facebook and Twitter have , of course , increased the scale of these problems by providing poorly controlled and easily manipulated platforms , and they should be more active in solving them .
But to mount a true defense , governments must be active players .
There are three steps the Trump administration should immediately take to help protect the 2020 U.S. elections from disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic .
First , in order to ensure widespread participation in the elections , the administration should work with the U.S. Congress to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts about voting during the pandemic .
Russia will be seeking to exploit fears and confusion around the voting process , as it did in 2016 with social media posts falsely telling people they could text in their vote .
Voter education campaigns in multiple languages should inform citizens about the steps that have been taken to ensure public health during the election process , best practices for safe and healthy voting , relevant rule changes , and the availability of mail-in and absentee voting .
This will go a long way in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote .
Second , Trump needs to stop issuing misleading and overly optimistic assessments about the disease .
In any crisis , one of the most important services a government can provide is a steady stream of reliable and trusted information .
This is even more critical when foreign adversaries are seeking to exploit weaknesses and undermine trust .
If citizens believe the head of state is manipulating information for political advantage , it creates a dangerous level of distrust that can be exploited .
Third , the president needs to change completely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a time when the trans-Atlantic relationship should be a source of strength in combating the coronavirus—especially through ramped-up information-sharing and the coordinated development of treatments and vaccines—the administration ’ s tendency to go it alone on global affairs and treat the European Union and key members such as Germany with hostility has weakened collective defenses against pandemic-driven falsehoods.Trump ’ s tendency to treat the European Union and key members such as Germany with hostility has weakened collective defenses against pandemic-driven falsehoods .
Trump ’ s initial move to cut off travel from Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with U.S. allies ( as generations of presidents would have done before him ) , and without evidence that such a ban would be effective , was just one example of his reflexively anti-EU approach , even in the middle of a catastrophic public health crisis .
The United States must be a driver of cooperation within NATO , and between NATO and the EU , on these new threats that Western democracies are jointly facing .
Better cooperation , including the sharing of best practices between the U.S. government and the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar agencies at the national level in Europe ) , will be critical for staying ahead of Russian disinformation efforts now seeking to use COVID-19 to undermine and influence elections .

The public debate over COVID-19 has been dominated, understandably, by the pandemic’s impact on public health and the economy. However, there is a third impact that is dramatically underappreciated: the danger to democracy posed by pandemic-related disinformation, whether it is used to weaken democratic checks on power or interfere with elections. Disinformation—including by foreign state actors such as Russia—threatens to interfere with elections scheduled to take place in 2020 in Europe and the United States. Effectively countering these attempts requires strong trans-Atlantic policy and intelligence cooperation. U.S. President Donald Trump should abandon his dysfunctional approach to Europe and let the career professionals do their work.
The public debate over COVID-19 has been dominated, understandably, by the pandemic’s impact on public health and the economy. However, there is a third impact that is dramatically underappreciated: the danger to democracy posed by pandemic-related disinformation, whether it is used to weaken democratic checks on power or interfere with elections. Disinformation—including by foreign state actors such as Russia—threatens to interfere with elections scheduled to take place in 2020 in Europe and the United States. Effectively countering these attempts requires strong trans-Atlantic policy and intelligence cooperation. U.S. President Donald Trump should abandon his dysfunctional approach to Europe and let the career professionals do their work.
In the United States, voters are understandably concerned about the health risk of entering crowded public polling stations. Election workers, many of whom are elderly volunteers, are rightly reluctant to perform their important responsibilities. Many U.S. states have postponed their presidential primaries until May and June, hoping that the coronavirus danger will have subsided by then. States that have barreled ahead with primary contests, such as Wisconsin, have experienced political, logistical, and legal chaos.
In Europe, various elections in France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, North Macedonia, and elsewhere have been postponed because of the threat of infection. Other political contests in Iceland, Belarus, Austria, Bosnia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and other countries that are set to occur later this year could also be impacted if the pandemic has not significantly receded. Poland, which intends to move forward with a presidential election in May, is one of the few countries defying calls to postpone business as usual. (Postponing elections is not to be done lightly, of course, and in some cases—such as the U.S. presidential election—they cannot be moved at all.)
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic]
This emergency situation has created an inviting environment for the spread of both misinformation, which is simply inaccurate information, and disinformation, which is deliberately false and intended to disrupt, cause confusion, and suppress the vote.
We know that Russia was already attempting to influence the 2020 election prior to the coronavirus pandemic by causing confusion and division.
The pandemic feeds into the existing threat to Western democracies from foreign actors, notably Russia. For many years now, the Kremlin has been actively interfering in democratic elections around the world. Its techniques include hacking political targets to steal sensitive information, selectively releasing that information to the public, supporting preferred candidates, and propping up destabilizing or extremist political movements. And, of course, it has spread disinformation through a combination of state-run propaganda outlets and fake online personas on social media as well. A recently released three-year review by the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee unanimously found that the U.S. intelligence community’s joint assessment of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election was sound and apolitical.
We know that Russia was already attempting to influence the 2020 election prior to the coronavirus pandemic by causing confusion and division. The latest Kremlin efforts have included hacking targets related to presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden, advancing conspiracy theories to counter established facts regarding Russian meddling in the 2016 election, and even providing support to far-right organizations in an effort to incite white nationalist violence in the United States. In the fall of 2019, posts on Instagram appeared using strategies and tactics very similar to those of the Internet Research Agency, a Russia-based purveyor of online influence operations that has been linked to the Kremlin, and which was a key disinformation player in 2016. Facebook, which played a key role in enabling Russian disinformation in 2016, subsequently announced that it had taken down tens of thousands of posts across 50 IRA-linked accounts from Facebook and Instagram.
On top of that, the European Union’s External Action Service, which investigates and combats disinformation online, has documented numerous cases of disinformation about the coronavirus pandemic linked to pro-Kremlin media, and it found that a significant disinformation campaign by Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets is ongoing.The European Union’s External Action Service has found a significant, ongoing disinformation campaign by Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets. The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center has issued similar warnings.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, China has also been in the coronavirus disinformation game. While some of the objectives of Russia and China might differ—the Kremlin is focused on undermining confidence in Western governments and institutions, while China seems to be more concerned with reshaping the narrative about its role in the pandemic—both countries’ efforts could have a negative impact on Western democracy. Furthermore, China has learned a great deal from the Kremlin’s tactics. Both countries have been pressuring the West to soften its criticism of disinformation, often by claiming a false equivalence between Western media reporting and targeted, state-sponsored influence campaigns.
Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have, of course, increased the scale of these problems by providing poorly controlled and easily manipulated platforms, and they should be more active in solving them. But to mount a true defense, governments must be active players.
There are three steps the Trump administration should immediately take to help protect the 2020 U.S. elections from disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.
First, in order to ensure widespread participation in the elections, the administration should work with the U.S. Congress to provide funding for state and local education efforts about voting during the pandemic. Russia will be seeking to exploit fears and confusion around the voting process, as it did in 2016 with social media posts falsely telling people they could text in their vote. Voter education campaigns in multiple languages should inform citizens about the steps that have been taken to ensure public health during the election process, best practices for safe and healthy voting, relevant rule changes, and the availability of mail-in and absentee voting. This will go a long way in ensuring the security of America’s vote.
Second, Trump needs to stop issuing misleading and overly optimistic assessments about the disease. In any crisis, one of the most important services a government can provide is a steady stream of reliable and trusted information. This is even more critical when foreign adversaries are seeking to exploit weaknesses and undermine trust. If citizens believe the head of state is manipulating information for political advantage, it creates a dangerous level of distrust that can be exploited.
Third, the president needs to change completely his uncooperative attitude toward Europe. At a time when the trans-Atlantic relationship should be a source of strength in combating the coronavirus—especially through ramped-up information-sharing and the coordinated development of treatments and vaccines—the administration’s tendency to go it alone on global affairs and treat the European Union and key members such as Germany with hostility has weakened collective defenses against pandemic-driven falsehoods.Trump’s tendency to treat the European Union and key members such as Germany with hostility has weakened collective defenses against pandemic-driven falsehoods. Trump’s initial move to cut off travel from Europe to the United States without even consulting with U.S. allies (as generations of presidents would have done before him), and without evidence that such a ban would be effective, was just one example of his reflexively anti-EU approach, even in the middle of a catastrophic public health crisis.
The United States must be a driver of cooperation within NATO, and between NATO and the EU, on these new threats that Western democracies are jointly facing. Better cooperation, including the sharing of best practices between the U.S. government and the EU’s External Action Service (and similar agencies at the national level in Europe), will be critical for staying ahead of Russian disinformation efforts now seeking to use COVID-19 to undermine and influence elections.