foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Russia Wants to Keep Mongolia in Its Place

Russia Wants to Keep Mongolia in Its Place On June 24 , Russia held a massive military parade , technically to mark the 75th anniversary of Victory in Europe ( V-E ) Day—delayed for over a month due to COVID-19—but also to provide a suitably militaristic backdrop for voting in the constitutional referendum that will conclude next week , paving the way for the extension of Vladimir Putin ’ s presidency until at least 2036 .
On the same day , Mongolia held its regular , democratic parliamentary elections .
Now these two unrelated events have triggered an uncharacteristic diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s self-defeating propensity to bully its neighbors and Mongolia ’ s rapidly shrinking room for maneuver as it faces pressure from both Moscow and Beijing .
Mongolia , a robust democracy in a deeply authoritarian neighborhood , faces a difficult future as its two giant neighbors and former imperial overlords , China and Russia , seek to reorder Eurasia in their image .
The latest row erupted when the Mongolian National Broadcaster ( MNB ) scrapped plans to air the Russian parade in a live broadcast .
It had originally planned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Mongolian government resolved to send a small detachment of soldiers to march in the spectacle in a gesture of respect for Russia .
But realizing that the rescheduled parade would coincide with the Mongolian election , MNB decided to pull the broadcast , citing concerns over perceptions of election day bias .
The Russian Embassy in Ulaanbaatar lashed out against this decision in a mean-tempered public post on its Facebook page , accusing MNB of an “ aberration of vision ” and even subservience to Western interests : “ Perhaps the MNB @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whole campaign of accusing Russia of electoral interference nearly everywhere in the world ?
” The remarks caused a storm of controversy .
In a letter sent to Russian Ambassador Iskander Azizov , MNB Director Luvsandashiin Ninjjamts called the embassy ’ s remarks “ clearly insulting ” and demanded an official apology .
Former Mongolian Prime Minister Sanjaagiin Bayar , who had also served in Russia as Mongolia ’ s ambassador , likened the embassy ’ s outburst to the old practice of Soviet ambassadors dictating to their host governments what they should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a thing or two about Soviet interference .
The country became a Soviet satellite 20 years before the same fate befell the countries of Central and Eastern Europe .
In the 1930s , the Soviets—and their Mongolian puppets , the Mongolian People ’ s Revolutionary Party—slaughtered tens of thousands of people in anti-religious campaigns and waves of political repression .
Among the victims was Mongolian Prime Minister Peljidiin Genden , who had the nerve to quarrel with Joseph Stalin .
( He is rumored to have smashed the Soviet dictator ’ s pipe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) He was sent to Moscow and executed by the Soviets in 1937 .
His successor , Anandyn Amar , suffered a similar fate .
He was arrested , sent to the Soviet Union , and executed there in 1941 .
This bloodbath led to the premiership of Khorloogiin Choibalsan , also known as Mongolia ’ s Stalin , who lent himself to serving Soviet aims in Asia and was closely supervised by Ivan Ivanov , the then-Soviet plenipotentiary in Mongolia .
It was on Choibalsan ’ s and Ivanov ’ s watch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war effort during the 1940s , sending nearly half a million horses ( which proved their resilience on the front line ) and sponsoring a tank brigade .
Mongolia also joined the Soviets in fighting the Japanese in Manchuria in August 1945 .
Choibalsan ’ s successor , Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal , was even more anxious to endear himself to his Soviet overlords , repeatedly requesting Mongolia ’ s annexation by the Soviet Union .
( To their credit , the Soviets refused . )
Tsedenbal also fought Moscow ’ s case tirelessly during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1962 , his ardent defense of Soviet policies in a conversation with the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai got so heated that the two nearly came to blows .
Ironically , it was the Soviets who ultimately decided to remove Tsedenbal from power in 1984 , sending him to peaceful retirement in Moscow .
The move was choreographed by then-up-and-coming Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev ( reportedly , in part because Tsedenbal ’ s anti-Chinese views undercut Moscow ’ s interest in improving relations with Beijing ) .
Mongolia only shed its status as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Sandwiched uncomfortably between two former empires , the country embraced its so-called “ third neighbor policy , ” seeking actively to develop relations with the West as a counterbalance .
Mongolia also developed a robust system of democratic governance , holding regular elections ( in what has become largely a two-party system ) and enjoying freedoms of speech , assembly , and association in stark contrast to its two authoritarian neighbors .
For years , Ulaanbaatar has played China against Russia , Russia against China , and both against the West in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becoming difficult to sustain .
Closer relations between Beijing and Moscow in recent years have constrained Mongolia .
The landlocked country ’ s utter economic dependence on its two larger neighbors accentuates its impossible dilemma .
Mongolia ’ s current president , Khaltmaagiin Battulga , campaigned on a Russia-friendly platform , projecting himself as Putin ’ s friend .
He had also made overtures to China ( most recently , by inexplicably donating 30,000 sheep as Mongolia ’ s contribution to China ’ s anti-coronavirus effort ) and even floated the prospect of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , largely run by China and Russia .
When Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj , Battulga ’ s predecessor as president , first agreed to contribute Mongolian troops to march in the V-E parade—in 2015 , for the 70th anniversary—it served as an indicator of a careful pivot in Russia ’ s direction .
It was a move that had some support in Mongolian policy circles : Better the Russians than the Chinese , their thinking went .
But , as the Russian Embassy ’ s intervention demonstrates , Mongolia ’ s independence is not yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , clearly , is that the Mongolians ultimately have no recourse : They have to swallow their pride and do as they are told because , if they don ’ t , let them see if they can get better treatment with China .
The embassy ’ s outrageous Facebook post is a part of an emerging pattern .
In recent years , the Russian Foreign Ministry has pursued a much more assertive social media policy .
Russian embassies have played an active part in disgraceful propaganda and trolling , in particular related @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This includes , for instance , posts that blame Poland for the outbreak of the war ( by the Russian Embassy in Warsaw ) and posts by the Russian Embassy in Tallinn praising the joys of life in Soviet-occupied Estonia .
While the purpose of these aggressive and deliberately offensive social media campaigns is far from clear , its effects are obvious : enraging the populace of the target countries and helping to foster Russia ’ s image as an unrepentant , aggressive , neoimperialist power .
That is certainly the image @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unfortunately , unlike the European countries that can laugh off Russia ’ s trolling or perhaps take it seriously and rally in defiance of Putin ’ s regime , Mongolia has limited options .
Moscow senses this vulnerability and will , of course , exploit it .
In the long term , the very existence of an open , democratic Mongolia poses a challenge to China and Russia , and for this reason the survival of democracy in the country is an open question .
Despite the row over MNB ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops did march on Red Square , a sign of Ulaanbaatar ’ s commitment to keeping its difficult northern neighbor appeased .
Whether or not the embassy apologizes for the scandalous post ( and it won ’ t ) , the passions will probably fizzle out in the days ahead , leaving just the bitter aftertaste—a reminder for ordinary Mongolians that in Russia ’ s zero-sum world , you march in unison and never , ever smash Stalin ’ s pipe .

On June 24, Russia held a massive military parade, technically to mark the 75th anniversary of Victory in Europe (V-E) Day—delayed for over a month due to COVID-19—but also to provide a suitably militaristic backdrop for voting in the constitutional referendum that will conclude next week, paving the way for the extension of Vladimir Putin’s presidency until at least 2036.
On June 24, Russia held a massive military parade, technically to mark the 75th anniversary of Victory in Europe (V-E) Day—delayed for over a month due to COVID-19—but also to provide a suitably militaristic backdrop for voting in the constitutional referendum that will conclude next week, paving the way for the extension of Vladimir Putin’s presidency until at least 2036.
On the same day, Mongolia held its regular, democratic parliamentary elections.
Now these two unrelated events have triggered an uncharacteristic diplomatic row between Moscow and Ulaanbaatar that highlights Russia’s self-defeating propensity to bully its neighbors and Mongolia’s rapidly shrinking room for maneuver as it faces pressure from both Moscow and Beijing. Mongolia, a robust democracy in a deeply authoritarian neighborhood, faces a difficult future as its two giant neighbors and former imperial overlords, China and Russia, seek to reorder Eurasia in their image.
The latest row erupted when the Mongolian National Broadcaster (MNB) scrapped plans to air the Russian parade in a live broadcast. It had originally planned to show the parade, partly because the Mongolian government resolved to send a small detachment of soldiers to march in the spectacle in a gesture of respect for Russia. But realizing that the rescheduled parade would coincide with the Mongolian election, MNB decided to pull the broadcast, citing concerns over perceptions of election day bias.
The Russian Embassy in Ulaanbaatar lashed out against this decision in a mean-tempered public post on its Facebook page, accusing MNB of an “aberration of vision” and even subservience to Western interests: “Perhaps the MNB board of directors inadvertently joined … a whole campaign of accusing Russia of electoral interference nearly everywhere in the world?”
The remarks caused a storm of controversy. In a letter sent to Russian Ambassador Iskander Azizov, MNB Director Luvsandashiin Ninjjamts called the embassy’s remarks “clearly insulting” and demanded an official apology. Former Mongolian Prime Minister Sanjaagiin Bayar, who had also served in Russia as Mongolia’s ambassador, likened the embassy’s outburst to the old practice of Soviet ambassadors dictating to their host governments what they should and should not do.
Mongolians know a thing or two about Soviet interference. The country became a Soviet satellite 20 years before the same fate befell the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1930s, the Soviets—and their Mongolian puppets, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party—slaughtered tens of thousands of people in anti-religious campaigns and waves of political repression.
Among the victims was Mongolian Prime Minister Peljidiin Genden, who had the nerve to quarrel with Joseph Stalin. (He is rumored to have smashed the Soviet dictator’s pipe to pieces in one nasty altercation.) He was sent to Moscow and executed by the Soviets in 1937. His successor, Anandyn Amar, suffered a similar fate. He was arrested, sent to the Soviet Union, and executed there in 1941.
This bloodbath led to the premiership of Khorloogiin Choibalsan, also known as Mongolia’s Stalin, who lent himself to serving Soviet aims in Asia and was closely supervised by Ivan Ivanov, the then-Soviet plenipotentiary in Mongolia. It was on Choibalsan’s and Ivanov’s watch that Mongolia got involved in the Soviet war effort during the 1940s, sending nearly half a million horses (which proved their resilience on the front line) and sponsoring a tank brigade. Mongolia also joined the Soviets in fighting the Japanese in Manchuria in August 1945.
Choibalsan’s successor, Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, was even more anxious to endear himself to his Soviet overlords, repeatedly requesting Mongolia’s annexation by the Soviet Union. (To their credit, the Soviets refused.) Tsedenbal also fought Moscow’s case tirelessly during the unfolding Sino-Soviet split. In December 1962, his ardent defense of Soviet policies in a conversation with the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai got so heated that the two nearly came to blows.
Ironically, it was the Soviets who ultimately decided to remove Tsedenbal from power in 1984, sending him to peaceful retirement in Moscow. The move was choreographed by then-up-and-coming Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (reportedly, in part because Tsedenbal’s anti-Chinese views undercut Moscow’s interest in improving relations with Beijing).
Mongolia only shed its status as a Soviet satellite in the late 1980s. Sandwiched uncomfortably between two former empires, the country embraced its so-called “third neighbor policy,” seeking actively to develop relations with the West as a counterbalance. Mongolia also developed a robust system of democratic governance, holding regular elections (in what has become largely a two-party system) and enjoying freedoms of speech, assembly, and association in stark contrast to its two authoritarian neighbors.
For years, Ulaanbaatar has played China against Russia, Russia against China, and both against the West in a skillful balancing act that is now becoming difficult to sustain. Closer relations between Beijing and Moscow in recent years have constrained Mongolia. The landlocked country’s utter economic dependence on its two larger neighbors accentuates its impossible dilemma.
Mongolia’s current president, Khaltmaagiin Battulga, campaigned on a Russia-friendly platform, projecting himself as Putin’s friend. He had also made overtures to China (most recently, by inexplicably donating 30,000 sheep as Mongolia’s contribution to China’s anti-coronavirus effort) and even floated the prospect of his country joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, largely run by China and Russia.
When Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, Battulga’s predecessor as president, first agreed to contribute Mongolian troops to march in the V-E parade—in 2015, for the 70th anniversary—it served as an indicator of a careful pivot in Russia’s direction. It was a move that had some support in Mongolian policy circles: Better the Russians than the Chinese, their thinking went.
But, as the Russian Embassy’s intervention demonstrates, Mongolia’s independence is not yet fully accepted in Moscow. The expectation, clearly, is that the Mongolians ultimately have no recourse: They have to swallow their pride and do as they are told because, if they don’t, let them see if they can get better treatment with China.
The embassy’s outrageous Facebook post is a part of an emerging pattern. In recent years, the Russian Foreign Ministry has pursued a much more assertive social media policy. Russian embassies have played an active part in disgraceful propaganda and trolling, in particular related to the history of World War II. This includes, for instance, posts that blame Poland for the outbreak of the war (by the Russian Embassy in Warsaw) and posts by the Russian Embassy in Tallinn praising the joys of life in Soviet-occupied Estonia.
While the purpose of these aggressive and deliberately offensive social media campaigns is far from clear, its effects are obvious: enraging the populace of the target countries and helping to foster Russia’s image as an unrepentant, aggressive, neoimperialist power. That is certainly the image the Russian Embassy has projected in Mongolia.
Unfortunately, unlike the European countries that can laugh off Russia’s trolling or perhaps take it seriously and rally in defiance of Putin’s regime, Mongolia has limited options. Moscow senses this vulnerability and will, of course, exploit it. In the long term, the very existence of an open, democratic Mongolia poses a challenge to China and Russia, and for this reason the survival of democracy in the country is an open question.
Despite the row over MNB’s refusal to broadcast the parade, Mongolian troops did march on Red Square, a sign of Ulaanbaatar’s commitment to keeping its difficult northern neighbor appeased. Whether or not the embassy apologizes for the scandalous post (and it won’t), the passions will probably fizzle out in the days ahead, leaving just the bitter aftertaste—a reminder for ordinary Mongolians that in Russia’s zero-sum world, you march in unison and never, ever smash Stalin’s pipe.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Latin America’s Wave of Protests Was Historic—Then the Pandemic Arrived

Latin America ’ s Wave of Protests Was Historic—Then the Pandemic Arrived Late last year , several Latin American countries experienced a wave of unprecedented mobilizations , and there was a cautious optimism that the region was on the verge of correcting its long-standing inequality problems .
In October and November , protesters in Chile demanded an end to neoliberal economic policies , eventually securing major concessions from the government , including a promised referendum on amending the dictatorship-era constitution .
In Colombia , protesters filled streets across the country in November calling for an overhaul of the pension system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While talk at the time of a “ Latin American Spring ” may have been a stretch , the sense that the winds were shifting toward an incrementally more socially just region , with governments more responsive to all citizens , was palpable .
Now , in the face of the coronavirus pandemic , that generational protest movement is at a crossroads .
The Chilean constitution referendum , for instance , has been pushed from April to October in light of the ongoing crisis .
In Bolivia , where leftist Evo Morales @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the interim right-wing government led by Jeanine Añez has cracked down on subsequent dissent .
Añez is now a candidate in the elections that have been called to solve the political impasse—elections that have been delayed in light of the national lockdown .
As the protest movements lose momentum , the concessions they eked from their governments—including promises to address inequality—are in danger of getting lost , precisely at a time when the economically vulnerable are at risk of being ravaged by the pandemic .
That ’ s a recipe for long-term instability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the risk of unrest in the short term , we think that in the coming months and years we ’ ll see that the economic crises brought about by the coronavirus will just heighten these pressures and create the potential for even greater instability and even more social unrest , ” said Fiona Mackie , the Americas director at the Economist Intelligence Unit , who added that she predicts a massive drop in the gross domestic product across the region .
“ These issues that we saw around access to public services and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that have been prevalent in Latin America , like corruption , high youth unemployment , crime—all of these persist and will emerge again as problems.
” Although the virus was comparatively late to emerge in Latin America—the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Sao Paulo on Feb. 26 , nearly a month after the World Health Organization declared the virus an international public health emergency—the region now seems set to become one of the hardest-hit areas of the world .
Late last month , the director of the Pan American Health Organization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epicenter of the pandemic , as the number of new cases reported daily surged past totals from the United States and Europe .
Remote indigenous tribes in Brazil have reported cases—a development that could wipe out entire communities , which are less able to receive medical attention due to their isolation .
In Manaus , Brazil ’ s Amazon capital , workers have been hurriedly digging mass graves in the face of a surge in coronavirus deaths .
In Peru , sprawling food markets have become hot spots for the contagion .
Seventy-nine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largest wholesale market tested positive for COVID-19 in mid-May , during the height of the country ’ s strictly enforced quarantine .
Peru and Chile are reporting some of the highest infection rates globally and remain under significant restrictions , as do other countries including Colombia .
However , Mexico and Brazil , despite rising outbreaks , have begun partial reopening .
The initial effects of the lockdowns are already visible .
A recent survey from the Inter-American Development Bank found that the virus is exacerbating inequality in the region , with greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people are not only more likely to remain employed but also have greater food stockpiles at home and higher savings .
This trend , replicated globally , is likely to be particularly brutal in Latin America .
A 2018 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found that earnings from the “ informal economy ” represented 40 percent of the GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2010 to 2014 .
Those informal workers are often street vendors selling chewing gum and individual cigarettes at stoplights or domestic workers cleaning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ classes .
Forced to stay at home on lockdown , many have struggled to make ends meet .
Many do not have bank accounts , a hurdle to receiving government relief money .
In the past few months , local and federal governments have responded in very different ways .
Following protests over the lack of guarantees for informal workers , Claudia López , Bogotá ’ s newly elected and progressive mayor , punted the issue of state-sponsored relief to the national government and announced a charity drive—dubbed “ Solidarity at Home ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help those on the bread line .
Officials say they have raised $ 13.7 million , while the national government claims to have allocated $ 120 million to help up to 3 million informal workers .
In Brazil , where the response out of Brasilia continues to meet fierce criticism , the government did create a self-professed “ war budget ” against the pandemic , equivalent to nearly 3 percent of the country ’ s GDP .
However , in Brazil ’ s favelas , communities and charities have picked up the slack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in need .
In Argentina , the government has announced that low-income workers will receive one-off handouts of $ 147 , while Chile is organizing emergency cash transfers for 4.5 million people ; the Dominican Republic is doing the same for 1.5 million people .
Utility shut-offs have been banned in Colombia , Argentina , and Ecuador , while Peru ’ s government has told low-income citizens that they can postpone their utility bill payments .
In Mexico , President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has made only around 0.7 percent of GDP available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ renewed opposition from state governors who have gone further with economic stimulus measures .
However , those out of work , particularly in the informal economy , are likely in for a sustained downturn with little government aid as the pandemic continues .
“ Unfortunately , Latin America ’ s most vulnerable populations will be disadvantaged by this pandemic and likely emerge in even more fragile conditions , ” said Benjamin Gedan , the deputy director of the Wilson Center ’ s Latin America program .
“ Then there ’ s the inability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these communities .
You can ’ t provide a payroll tax holiday to informal workers who are by definition outside the system .
The region ’ s inequalities will be deepened by this pandemic.
” “ Unfortunately , Latin America ’ s most vulnerable populations will be disadvantaged by this pandemic and likely emerge in even more fragile conditions.
” With government coffers stretched , civil society across the continent is attempting to fill the void , at least temporarily .
In Colombia , Mafe Carrascal , a Bogotá-based anti-corruption activist , says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society has shifted online .
“ Activism has always been online as much as in the streets , and that ’ s even more the case when public health is such a consideration , ” Carrascal said .
Activists across the continent have echoed similar sentiments .
Despite the grim prognosis for Latin America , those who participated in protests last year still envisage a chance for achieving political change .
Jennifer Pedraza , a student activist in Bogotá who took to the streets from November until the quarantine took hold in March @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for reforms has only been reinforced by the pandemic .
“ Of course , we can ’ t protest during this period of social isolation , and in fact , we are campaigning remotely for the continuation of lockdown measures , ” she said .
“ But the fight continues one way or another.
” While most in-person protests are on hold until the pandemic is under control , some demonstrations have taken place .
In Chile in May , protests flared up on the outskirts of Santiago over inadequate food relief for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ residents in Sao Paulo ’ s favelas marched to the state governor ’ s mansion to demand aid .
In countries across the region , residents are banging pots and pans from their windows , a common form of protest .
Although a pronounced recession seems guaranteed for the region as a whole , the policy response to the virus may affect which governments enjoy renewed support and which see new or further unrest in the next few years .
Despite the immediate economic downturn , several governments that were previously unpopular have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ spread and have seen a boon in overall popularity .
In Peru , which for years has faced a series of political crises stemming from corruption cases , citizens have embraced President Martín Vizcarra ’ s strict quarantine measures , which have been enforced by the military .
Colombia ’ s Iván Duque , whose tenure since 2018 has been marked by legislative stasis and a deterioration in the implementation of the peace process , received tempered plaudits for resisting calls from the financial sector to open up the country .
Argentina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , also continues to show his administrative chops , combining strident lockdowns with a recognition of the need for socioeconomic change and comprehensive relief packages for informal workers .
That has allowed him to step from the shadow of his vice president , former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner , a controversial stalwart of the country ’ s left .
The pressure to provide long-standing solutions for the region ’ s most vulnerable citizens persists , but the immediacy and strictness of these governments ’ responses to the pandemic have given them breathing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico , the two largest countries and economies in the region , the heads of state are paying heavy political penalties for a slow-walked and denialist response .
In Brazil , President Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly downplayed the virus , leading former allies to break with him .
As Brazil ’ s daily death toll surpasses that of the United States , the Trump administration has barred travel from Brazil .
Mexico ’ s López Obrador continued to hold rallies while confirmed cases of COVID-19 mounted ; his personal leadership has continued to attract @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undercounting deaths .
“ Their responses have been so reckless and irresponsible that it ’ s hard to imagine them fully and rapidly repairing their images , ” said Gedan , referring to Bolsonaro and López Obrador .
“ Particularly because in the short term at least , the public health consequences of their approach to the pandemic will be universally experienced and devastating , and the medium-term economic consequences will be even more severe once they come to the inevitable conclusion that you have to take this public health risk seriously .
@

Late last year, several Latin American countries experienced a wave of unprecedented mobilizations, and there was a cautious optimism that the region was on the verge of correcting its long-standing inequality problems. In October and November, protesters in Chile demanded an end to neoliberal economic policies, eventually securing major concessions from the government, including a promised referendum on amending the dictatorship-era constitution. In Colombia, protesters filled streets across the country in November calling for an overhaul of the pension system and better protections for those most vulnerable. While talk at the time of a “Latin American Spring” may have been a stretch, the sense that the winds were shifting toward an incrementally more socially just region, with governments more responsive to all citizens, was palpable.
Late last year, several Latin American countries experienced a wave of unprecedented mobilizations, and there was a cautious optimism that the region was on the verge of correcting its long-standing inequality problems. In October and November, protesters in Chile demanded an end to neoliberal economic policies, eventually securing major concessions from the government, including a promised referendum on amending the dictatorship-era constitution. In Colombia, protesters filled streets across the country in November calling for an overhaul of the pension system and better protections for those most vulnerable. While talk at the time of a “Latin American Spring” may have been a stretch, the sense that the winds were shifting toward an incrementally more socially just region, with governments more responsive to all citizens, was palpable.
Now, in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, that generational protest movement is at a crossroads. The Chilean constitution referendum, for instance, has been pushed from April to October in light of the ongoing crisis. In Bolivia, where leftist Evo Morales resigned under pressure from the military, the interim right-wing government led by Jeanine Añez has cracked down on subsequent dissent. Añez is now a candidate in the elections that have been called to solve the political impasse—elections that have been delayed in light of the national lockdown. As the protest movements lose momentum, the concessions they eked from their governments—including promises to address inequality—are in danger of getting lost, precisely at a time when the economically vulnerable are at risk of being ravaged by the pandemic. That’s a recipe for long-term instability.
“Although the coronavirus has dampened the risk of unrest in the short term, we think that in the coming months and years we’ll see that the economic crises brought about by the coronavirus will just heighten these pressures and create the potential for even greater instability and even more social unrest,” said Fiona Mackie, the Americas director at the Economist Intelligence Unit, who added that she predicts a massive drop in the gross domestic product across the region. “These issues that we saw around access to public services and income inequality, along with other issues that have been prevalent in Latin America, like corruption, high youth unemployment, crime—all of these persist and will emerge again as problems.”
Although the virus was comparatively late to emerge in Latin America—the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Sao Paulo on Feb. 26, nearly a month after the World Health Organization declared the virus an international public health emergency—the region now seems set to become one of the hardest-hit areas of the world. Late last month, the director of the Pan American Health Organization said the region had become the new epicenter of the pandemic, as the number of new cases reported daily surged past totals from the United States and Europe.
Remote indigenous tribes in Brazil have reported cases—a development that could wipe out entire communities, which are less able to receive medical attention due to their isolation. In Manaus, Brazil’s Amazon capital, workers have been hurriedly digging mass graves in the face of a surge in coronavirus deaths. In Peru, sprawling food markets have become hot spots for the contagion. Seventy-nine percent of vendors at Lima’s largest wholesale market tested positive for COVID-19 in mid-May, during the height of the country’s strictly enforced quarantine. Peru and Chile are reporting some of the highest infection rates globally and remain under significant restrictions, as do other countries including Colombia. However, Mexico and Brazil, despite rising outbreaks, have begun partial reopening.
The initial effects of the lockdowns are already visible. A recent survey from the Inter-American Development Bank found that the virus is exacerbating inequality in the region, with greater job losses among lower-income respondents while wealthier people are not only more likely to remain employed but also have greater food stockpiles at home and higher savings. This trend, replicated globally, is likely to be particularly brutal in Latin America. A 2018 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found that earnings from the “informal economy” represented 40 percent of the GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2010 to 2014. Those informal workers are often street vendors selling chewing gum and individual cigarettes at stoplights or domestic workers cleaning the condominiums of the middle and upper classes. Forced to stay at home on lockdown, many have struggled to make ends meet. Many do not have bank accounts, a hurdle to receiving government relief money.
In the past few months, local and federal governments have responded in very different ways. Following protests over the lack of guarantees for informal workers, Claudia López, Bogotá’s newly elected and progressive mayor, punted the issue of state-sponsored relief to the national government and announced a charity drive—dubbed “Solidarity at Home”—in which locals can contribute funds to help those on the bread line. Officials say they have raised $13.7 million, while the national government claims to have allocated $120 million to help up to 3 million informal workers. In Brazil, where the response out of Brasilia continues to meet fierce criticism, the government did create a self-professed “war budget” against the pandemic, equivalent to nearly 3 percent of the country’s GDP. However, in Brazil’s favelas, communities and charities have picked up the slack, ensuring food deliveries for those most in need. In Argentina, the government has announced that low-income workers will receive one-off handouts of $147, while Chile is organizing emergency cash transfers for 4.5 million people; the Dominican Republic is doing the same for 1.5 million people. Utility shut-offs have been banned in Colombia, Argentina, and Ecuador, while Peru’s government has told low-income citizens that they can postpone their utility bill payments. In Mexico, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has made only around 0.7 percent of GDP available in response to the outbreak and faces renewed opposition from state governors who have gone further with economic stimulus measures.
However, those out of work, particularly in the informal economy, are likely in for a sustained downturn with little government aid as the pandemic continues. “Unfortunately, Latin America’s most vulnerable populations will be disadvantaged by this pandemic and likely emerge in even more fragile conditions,” said Benjamin Gedan, the deputy director of the Wilson Center’s Latin America program. “Then there’s the inability of the government to provide support for these communities. You can’t provide a payroll tax holiday to informal workers who are by definition outside the system. The region’s inequalities will be deepened by this pandemic.”
“Unfortunately, Latin America’s most vulnerable populations will be disadvantaged by this pandemic and likely emerge in even more fragile conditions.”
With government coffers stretched, civil society across the continent is attempting to fill the void, at least temporarily. In Colombia, Mafe Carrascal, a Bogotá-based anti-corruption activist, says that the battle for a more equal society has shifted online. “Activism has always been online as much as in the streets, and that’s even more the case when public health is such a consideration,” Carrascal said. Activists across the continent have echoed similar sentiments.
Despite the grim prognosis for Latin America, those who participated in protests last year still envisage a chance for achieving political change. Jennifer Pedraza, a student activist in Bogotá who took to the streets from November until the quarantine took hold in March, said that the appetite among society for reforms has only been reinforced by the pandemic. “Of course, we can’t protest during this period of social isolation, and in fact, we are campaigning remotely for the continuation of lockdown measures,” she said. “But the fight continues one way or another.”
While most in-person protests are on hold until the pandemic is under control, some demonstrations have taken place. In Chile in May, protests flared up on the outskirts of Santiago over inadequate food relief for those most vulnerable. In Brazil, residents in Sao Paulo’s favelas marched to the state governor’s mansion to demand aid. In countries across the region, residents are banging pots and pans from their windows, a common form of protest.
Although a pronounced recession seems guaranteed for the region as a whole, the policy response to the virus may affect which governments enjoy renewed support and which see new or further unrest in the next few years.
Despite the immediate economic downturn, several governments that were previously unpopular have taken strident steps to curtail the virus’ spread and have seen a boon in overall popularity. In Peru, which for years has faced a series of political crises stemming from corruption cases, citizens have embraced President Martín Vizcarra’s strict quarantine measures, which have been enforced by the military. Colombia’s Iván Duque, whose tenure since 2018 has been marked by legislative stasis and a deterioration in the implementation of the peace process, received tempered plaudits for resisting calls from the financial sector to open up the country. Argentina’s new president, Alberto Fernández, also continues to show his administrative chops, combining strident lockdowns with a recognition of the need for socioeconomic change and comprehensive relief packages for informal workers. That has allowed him to step from the shadow of his vice president, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, a controversial stalwart of the country’s left. The pressure to provide long-standing solutions for the region’s most vulnerable citizens persists, but the immediacy and strictness of these governments’ responses to the pandemic have given them breathing room.
However, in Brazil and Mexico, the two largest countries and economies in the region, the heads of state are paying heavy political penalties for a slow-walked and denialist response. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly downplayed the virus, leading former allies to break with him. As Brazil’s daily death toll surpasses that of the United States, the Trump administration has barred travel from Brazil. Mexico’s López Obrador continued to hold rallies while confirmed cases of COVID-19 mounted; his personal leadership has continued to attract criticism amid accusations that the country is undercounting deaths.
“Their responses have been so reckless and irresponsible that it’s hard to imagine them fully and rapidly repairing their images,” said Gedan, referring to Bolsonaro and López Obrador. “Particularly because in the short term at least, the public health consequences of their approach to the pandemic will be universally experienced and devastating, and the medium-term economic consequences will be even more severe once they come to the inevitable conclusion that you have to take this public health risk seriously.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Greece’s Forgotten Child Refugees

Greece’s Forgotten Child Refugees

Ehsaan , a 16-year-old Pakistani , arrived in Athens in February with no place to stay .
“ I used to spend all night sitting on the bus while it drove around the city , ” said Ehsaan , whose name has been changed to protect his identity , recalling his initial weeks in Greece .
“ When I called my family , I told them everything was fine , but in truth , I was too afraid to fall asleep at night.
” Only weeks after Ehsaan ’ s arrival , the coronavirus pandemic hit and bus services were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outdoors in Victoria Square , less than a mile from two children ’ s shelters where he was wait-listed .
Without any kind of home , Ehsaan was vulnerable to robbery , police harassment , and even detention if he was caught without his asylum application card .
As the coronavirus lockdown cut off refugees from the few resources they had in Greece , European governments committed to relocating 1,600 unaccompanied children from the Greek islands .
Little attention has been paid , however , to boys like Ehsaan who are on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit an already struggling Greek economy , the scant youth spaces , food distribution sites , and hygiene facilities available to unaccompanied children on the mainland have scaled back .
Even prior to the pandemic , many unaccompanied children relied on the smugglers who brought them to Greece to connect them with undocumented labor opportunities and unregistered accommodations to stave off homelessness .
Coronavirus prevention measures have increased this dependence by reducing their access to shelters provided by nongovernmental organizations ( NGOs ) and child-protection programming .
That , in turn , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hands of adult migrants and Greek locals offering to pay for undocumented labor or sexual activities .
Ehsaan is one of thousands of unaccompanied refugee children who entered Greece by crossing its land borders with Turkey or Bulgaria .
Prior to the 2015-2016 surge in migration , these land borders had been the primary route through which refugees from Asia entered Greece .
Since 2015 , however , policymakers and humanitarian organizations have concentrated their attention on refugees who enter Greece by sea and then find themselves stranded on the Aegean islands .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ land borders has been relatively limited , creating disparities in access to services between unaccompanied children on the islands and those who cross by land .
While children on the islands are taken to camps , registered with NGOs , and referred to children ’ s shelters , children crossing the land borders typically make their way to Athens without any documentation or humanitarian assistance .
They often remain connected with smuggling networks and are introduced to codependent informal economies , such as agricultural labor , construction , and illicit drug trades—ways to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status and Greece ’ s laws against child labor .
Many children who cross the land borders work on farms before coming to Athens , while others leave Athens for undocumented labor opportunities .
In Athens , these children are often homeless or informally housed until they can be placed in a children ’ s shelter .
As of February , Greece had shelter spaces for only 30 percent of its estimated 5,379 unaccompanied refugee children .
As a result , wait times of six months or more were common .
The Network @ @ @ @ @ @ @ child-protection agency in Athens that refers unaccompanied children to shelters and provides case management services while they are wait-listed .
The vast majority of unaccompanied children it works with are boys who crossed through Greece ’ s land borders .
Because of the pandemic , it , like most Greek organizations , has dramatically scaled back its operations .
“ All I could do for them is online referrals , nothing more , ” said Rizwan Muhammad , a cultural mediator with the Network for Children ’ s Rights , referring to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s lockdown in March and April .
During that time , children ’ s shelters had stopped accepting new residents , forcing wait-listed children to remain on the streets even when there were beds available .
“ The ones who are homeless , they were completely on their own , ” Muhammad said .
Since Greece ’ s lockdown officially ended May 4 , child-protection services have resumed in accordance with ongoing social distancing measures .
“ We meet clients at the office , we escort them to medical appointments , ” Muhammad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holding any workshops for the children.
” Youth centers that offered safe spaces for dozens of homeless children are now offering only essential services like showers and laundry for four to five boys per day .
To contain the spread of the coronavirus , most organizations are limiting the number of people who can be in the office at one time .
Unaccompanied children who are not established clients are typically barred from entering offices and told to contact staff members online .
This poses additional barriers for children who do not have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most immediate need for Greece ’ s estimated 3,800 permanently or occasionally homeless children is food .
Youth centers that typically provided homeless unaccompanied children with meals have shut down .
Cafes have closed their doors , making it virtually impossible to buy a snack or a meal even if children can get spare change .
“ They called us to ask for simple , basic things .
Food and water , ” said Tassos Smetopoulos , founder of STEPS , an organization supporting the homeless in Athens .
“ Everything was shut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chance to earn any money.
” Since the pandemic began , STEPS has transformed its operations , which typically consisted of a food distribution center , a free medical clinic , and laundry services for anyone in need .
In collaboration with other local nonprofit organizations in similar circumstances , the group now delivers meal packs to vulnerable people at drop-off points throughout the city .
“ We tell people to meet us in different places at different times , ” Smetopoulos said .
“ We have three cars that drive through Athens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last 40 days , we have delivered more than 15,000 meals .
But it is not enough.
” The Khora collective , which similarly began delivering meals when it stopped its other operations , is able to provide only 1,000 to 2,000 meals a day , whereas it receives requests for more than 5,000 .
Many children remain hungry .
Without institutional support , many unaccompanied children have little choice but to turn to black-market jobs and housing to survive .
Children who are dependent on farm work for survival have been rendered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic brought much of the country ’ s agricultural industry to a halt .
With little available work , unaccompanied children on the farms have had to take out loans from their subcontractors to continue living in their overcrowded rural accommodations and buy food .
By the time the pandemic ends , many of these children will be indebted to their subcontractors and may not be able to leave the farms even if they are accepted by a children ’ s shelter .
“ I talked to a child today who was living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adults and minors packed together , ” Muhammad said .
“ In situations like that , there is always risk for sexual exploitation .
Subcontractors in particular are often perpetrators of sexual violence , because they have so much power over the boys.
” Ehsaan himself fled a job in the fields when an older laborer tried to molest him .
Unaccompanied children who have access to some cash , whether through their own earnings or from money transfers sent by family members living abroad , turn to smugglers when they don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Greece , smugglers manage safe houses where refugees—men and children alike—can stay for 10 euros a night .
These are usually in decrepit apartments with limited hygiene facilities and upward of 20 people in one room .
Umed , now 19 , recalls staying in a safe house when he was a minor .
“ There were so many people who did illegal things , ” he said .
“ I didn ’ t feel safe .
The police would often check on the house , too , and then we would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increased humanitarian support from Greek and European authorities , unaccompanied children on the mainland remain forced to turn to traffickers and labor brokers to try to survive in Greece or to migrate on to other European countries .
As long as child-protection programs are insufficient to meet unaccompanied children ’ s needs , black-market economies will outcompete them , offering children accommodations and wages in return for risky work .
This will not only put children at increased risk for sexual and labor exploitation but will draw cash out of local Greek economies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Muhammad said the Network for Children ’ s Rights could help identify homeless unaccompanied children if anyone was interested in relocating them during the crisis .
“ We know which of our clients face the greatest risks , but no one asks us about them , ” Muhammad said .
“ It ’ s great that they are helping the minors on the island , but our clients need help , too .
”

Ehsaan, a 16-year-old Pakistani, arrived in Athens in February with no place to stay. “I used to spend all night sitting on the bus while it drove around the city,” said Ehsaan, whose name has been changed to protect his identity, recalling his initial weeks in Greece. “When I called my family, I told them everything was fine, but in truth, I was too afraid to fall asleep at night.”
Ehsaan, a 16-year-old Pakistani, arrived in Athens in February with no place to stay. “I used to spend all night sitting on the bus while it drove around the city,” said Ehsaan, whose name has been changed to protect his identity, recalling his initial weeks in Greece. “When I called my family, I told them everything was fine, but in truth, I was too afraid to fall asleep at night.”
Only weeks after Ehsaan’s arrival, the coronavirus pandemic hit and bus services were restricted. He began spending his nights outdoors in Victoria Square, less than a mile from two children’s shelters where he was wait-listed. Without any kind of home, Ehsaan was vulnerable to robbery, police harassment, and even detention if he was caught without his asylum application card.
As the coronavirus lockdown cut off refugees from the few resources they had in Greece, European governments committed to relocating 1,600 unaccompanied children from the Greek islands. Little attention has been paid, however, to boys like Ehsaan who are on the Greek mainland. As the coronavirus lockdown hit an already struggling Greek economy, the scant youth spaces, food distribution sites, and hygiene facilities available to unaccompanied children on the mainland have scaled back. Even prior to the pandemic, many unaccompanied children relied on the smugglers who brought them to Greece to connect them with undocumented labor opportunities and unregistered accommodations to stave off homelessness. Coronavirus prevention measures have increased this dependence by reducing their access to shelters provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and child-protection programming. That, in turn, has increased their exposure to exploitation at the hands of adult migrants and Greek locals offering to pay for undocumented labor or sexual activities.
Ehsaan is one of thousands of unaccompanied refugee children who entered Greece by crossing its land borders with Turkey or Bulgaria. Prior to the 2015-2016 surge in migration, these land borders had been the primary route through which refugees from Asia entered Greece. Since 2015, however, policymakers and humanitarian organizations have concentrated their attention on refugees who enter Greece by sea and then find themselves stranded on the Aegean islands. Global awareness of children entering through the land borders has been relatively limited, creating disparities in access to services between unaccompanied children on the islands and those who cross by land. While children on the islands are taken to camps, registered with NGOs, and referred to children’s shelters, children crossing the land borders typically make their way to Athens without any documentation or humanitarian assistance. They often remain connected with smuggling networks and are introduced to codependent informal economies, such as agricultural labor, construction, and illicit drug trades—ways to make money in spite of their undocumented status and Greece’s laws against child labor. Many children who cross the land borders work on farms before coming to Athens, while others leave Athens for undocumented labor opportunities.
In Athens, these children are often homeless or informally housed until they can be placed in a children’s shelter. As of February, Greece had shelter spaces for only 30 percent of its estimated 5,379 unaccompanied refugee children. As a result, wait times of six months or more were common.
The Network for Children’s Rights is a child-protection agency in Athens that refers unaccompanied children to shelters and provides case management services while they are wait-listed. The vast majority of unaccompanied children it works with are boys who crossed through Greece’s land borders. Because of the pandemic, it, like most Greek organizations, has dramatically scaled back its operations.
“All I could do for them is online referrals, nothing more,” said Rizwan Muhammad, a cultural mediator with the Network for Children’s Rights, referring to the drastic reduction of services during Greece’s lockdown in March and April. During that time, children’s shelters had stopped accepting new residents, forcing wait-listed children to remain on the streets even when there were beds available. “The ones who are homeless, they were completely on their own,” Muhammad said.
Since Greece’s lockdown officially ended May 4, child-protection services have resumed in accordance with ongoing social distancing measures. “We meet clients at the office, we escort them to medical appointments,” Muhammad said, “but we are not holding any workshops for the children.” Youth centers that offered safe spaces for dozens of homeless children are now offering only essential services like showers and laundry for four to five boys per day. To contain the spread of the coronavirus, most organizations are limiting the number of people who can be in the office at one time. Unaccompanied children who are not established clients are typically barred from entering offices and told to contact staff members online. This poses additional barriers for children who do not have access to phones or computers.
The most immediate need for Greece’s estimated 3,800 permanently or occasionally homeless children is food. Youth centers that typically provided homeless unaccompanied children with meals have shut down. Cafes have closed their doors, making it virtually impossible to buy a snack or a meal even if children can get spare change.
“They called us to ask for simple, basic things. Food and water,” said Tassos Smetopoulos, founder of STEPS, an organization supporting the homeless in Athens. “Everything was shut down, and these people have no chance to earn any money.”
Since the pandemic began, STEPS has transformed its operations, which typically consisted of a food distribution center, a free medical clinic, and laundry services for anyone in need. In collaboration with other local nonprofit organizations in similar circumstances, the group now delivers meal packs to vulnerable people at drop-off points throughout the city.
“We tell people to meet us in different places at different times,” Smetopoulos said. “We have three cars that drive through Athens and Piraeus every night. In the last 40 days, we have delivered more than 15,000 meals. But it is not enough.”
The Khora collective, which similarly began delivering meals when it stopped its other operations, is able to provide only 1,000 to 2,000 meals a day, whereas it receives requests for more than 5,000. Many children remain hungry.
Without institutional support, many unaccompanied children have little choice but to turn to black-market jobs and housing to survive. Children who are dependent on farm work for survival have been rendered especially vulnerable by COVID-19, as the pandemic brought much of the country’s agricultural industry to a halt. With little available work, unaccompanied children on the farms have had to take out loans from their subcontractors to continue living in their overcrowded rural accommodations and buy food. By the time the pandemic ends, many of these children will be indebted to their subcontractors and may not be able to leave the farms even if they are accepted by a children’s shelter.
“I talked to a child today who was living in a shed with 50 people, adults and minors packed together,” Muhammad said. “In situations like that, there is always risk for sexual exploitation. Subcontractors in particular are often perpetrators of sexual violence, because they have so much power over the boys.” Ehsaan himself fled a job in the fields when an older laborer tried to molest him.
Unaccompanied children who have access to some cash, whether through their own earnings or from money transfers sent by family members living abroad, turn to smugglers when they don’t have access to accommodations. Throughout Greece, smugglers manage safe houses where refugees—men and children alike—can stay for 10 euros a night. These are usually in decrepit apartments with limited hygiene facilities and upward of 20 people in one room.
Umed, now 19, recalls staying in a safe house when he was a minor. “There were so many people who did illegal things,” he said. “I didn’t feel safe. The police would often check on the house, too, and then we would have to escape through the windows.”
Without increased humanitarian support from Greek and European authorities, unaccompanied children on the mainland remain forced to turn to traffickers and labor brokers to try to survive in Greece or to migrate on to other European countries. As long as child-protection programs are insufficient to meet unaccompanied children’s needs, black-market economies will outcompete them, offering children accommodations and wages in return for risky work. This will not only put children at increased risk for sexual and labor exploitation but will draw cash out of local Greek economies and bolster illegal activities and organized crime.
Muhammad said the Network for Children’s Rights could help identify homeless unaccompanied children if anyone was interested in relocating them during the crisis. “We know which of our clients face the greatest risks, but no one asks us about them,” Muhammad said. “It’s great that they are helping the minors on the island, but our clients need help, too.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Pentagon Selects New Industrial Policy Chief

The Trump administration is set to tap a new industrial policy chief at the Defense Department next week who will supervise the Pentagon ’ s ongoing efforts to speed up manufacturing of masks and protective gear for the coronavirus pandemic , Foreign Policy has learned .
Jeffrey Nadaner , who served in the Defense and the State Departments during the George W. Bush administration , will begin as deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy , a U.S. official told Foreign Policy .
Nadaner will start the job next week .
The move comes a little over a month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the position and assigned to a civilian role in the Navy .
Politico first reported the news of Santos ’ s firing .
The role does not require Senate confirmation .
The White House plans to later nominate Nadaner , well-regarded by both the Pentagon and the powerful Presidential Personnel Office , to become the department ’ s Senate-confirmed assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs , the official said , conceding that there is little chance for a hearing this year with a full Senate calendar .
The job oversees Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Middle East .
Kathryn Wheelbarger served in that role as an acting official before resigning last week , just days after the White House reversed course on her nomination for a top Defense Department intelligence job over her ties to the late Sen. John McCain and former Defense Secretary James Mattis .
Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Rath Hoffman told Foreign Policy that he had no personnel announcements regarding the move and said the White House would make announcement of any nomination .
Nadaner is currently a vice president and senior fellow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lobbying shop Jewish Institute for National Security of America , known for inviting former senior Pentagon leaders to Israel for meetings with top officials there .
Nadaner will take the role from former Air Force official Scott Baum , who served on an interim basis after Santos ’ s dismissal .
He is entering the role at a time when Democrats have accused President Donald Trump and the Defense Department of acting too slowly to help contain the coronavirus pandemic , including by failing to fully invoke the Defense Production Act that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States twice broke the record for single-day coronavirus infection spikes this week , with 39,327 new cases reported on Thursday alone .
With the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act passing on Thursday , Congress is set to inject more money into the Pentagon ’ s response to the coronavirus .
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith , a Washington Democrat , proposed adding $ 1 billion for the response to the virus .
But some on Capitol Hill are worried that lax oversight of the Defense Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of public information on orders of protective gear and ventilators under the law by the Trump administration , won ’ t be addressed in the new bill .
California Rep. Katie Porter , a Democrat , has called for the Trump administration to list all contracts for coronavirus under the Defense Production Act , a request that has gone unheeded by the White House .
The House Armed Services Committee “ has a golden opportunity right now to fix transparency issues with the [ Defense Production Act ] and COVID , ” a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It would be a mistake to pass NDAA without addressing that issue.
” Defense Secretary Mark Esper had pledged to send 5 million masks and 2,000 ventilators to help states fighting the coronavirus in March , but the equipment was delayed getting out because the Pentagon was not directed on where to send it .
But the Pentagon insisted at the time of Santos ’ s firing that it would not get in the way of the efforts to combat the pandemic .
“ The department ’ s commitment to closely partnering with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we will continue to identify and mitigate impacts from the COVID-19 national emergency to ensure readiness and modernization , ” Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Mike Andrews said at the time of Santos ’ s ouster .
Nadaner had been previously selected by Trump to serve as a senior official overseeing export enforcement at the Commerce Department in 2018 , but that nomination stalled and was withdrawn over a year later .
He was also a vice president of engineering and technology at Lockheed Martin for six years .
Once a senior speechwriter to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a deputy assistant secretary of defense for partnership strategy and stability operations at the Pentagon under Defense Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates , Nadaner worked on expanding the Defense Department ’ s authority to train and equip foreign forces for counterterrorism and stability missions , according to his biography on the Marine Corps University website and his LinkedIn profile .
But though he is taking a role at the center of the Pentagon ’ s coronavirus fight , Nadaner is notably linked to a brand of foreign-policy thinking more closely associated with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s “ America first ” way of doing business .
Nadaner was considered in line with neoconservatives during the Bush administration , according to a former defense official who worked with him .
“ He ’ s considered to be kind of ideological , ” the former official said .
“ I don ’ t think he ’ s dishonest or shady , but he definitely comes from a certain strain of the Republican Party.
” Nadaner , the former official said , often worked long hours in the office , where he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon ’ s current top official for Russia , Ukraine , and Eurasia who testified during the House impeachment inquiry into Trump .
The industrial policy office is also charged with investigating foreign investments in the defense industry under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States .

The Trump administration is set to tap a new industrial policy chief at the Defense Department next week who will supervise the Pentagon’s ongoing efforts to speed up manufacturing of masks and protective gear for the coronavirus pandemic, Foreign Policy has learned.
The Trump administration is set to tap a new industrial policy chief at the Defense Department next week who will supervise the Pentagon’s ongoing efforts to speed up manufacturing of masks and protective gear for the coronavirus pandemic, Foreign Policy has learned.
Jeffrey Nadaner, who served in the Defense and the State Departments during the George W. Bush administration, will begin as deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy, a U.S. official told Foreign Policy. Nadaner will start the job next week.
The move comes a little over a month after Jennifer Santos was abruptly dismissed from the position and assigned to a civilian role in the Navy. Politico first reported the news of Santos’s firing. The role does not require Senate confirmation.
The White House plans to later nominate Nadaner, well-regarded by both the Pentagon and the powerful Presidential Personnel Office, to become the department’s Senate-confirmed assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, the official said, conceding that there is little chance for a hearing this year with a full Senate calendar. The job oversees Defense Department policy in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
Kathryn Wheelbarger served in that role as an acting official before resigning last week, just days after the White House reversed course on her nomination for a top Defense Department intelligence job over her ties to the late Sen. John McCain and former Defense Secretary James Mattis.
Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Rath Hoffman told Foreign Policy that he had no personnel announcements regarding the move and said the White House would make announcement of any nomination.
Nadaner is currently a vice president and senior fellow at the neoconservative pro-Israeli think tank and lobbying shop Jewish Institute for National Security of America, known for inviting former senior Pentagon leaders to Israel for meetings with top officials there.
Nadaner will take the role from former Air Force official Scott Baum, who served on an interim basis after Santos’s dismissal. He is entering the role at a time when Democrats have accused President Donald Trump and the Defense Department of acting too slowly to help contain the coronavirus pandemic, including by failing to fully invoke the Defense Production Act that is overseen by the industrial policy office. The United States twice broke the record for single-day coronavirus infection spikes this week, with 39,327 new cases reported on Thursday alone.
With the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act passing on Thursday, Congress is set to inject more money into the Pentagon’s response to the coronavirus. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, a Washington Democrat, proposed adding $1 billion for the response to the virus.
But some on Capitol Hill are worried that lax oversight of the Defense Department’s response, including a lack of public information on orders of protective gear and ventilators under the law by the Trump administration, won’t be addressed in the new bill. California Rep. Katie Porter, a Democrat, has called for the Trump administration to list all contracts for coronavirus under the Defense Production Act, a request that has gone unheeded by the White House.
The House Armed Services Committee “has a golden opportunity right now to fix transparency issues with the [Defense Production Act] and COVID,” a congressional aide told Foreign Policy. “It would be a mistake to pass NDAA without addressing that issue.”
Defense Secretary Mark Esper had pledged to send 5 million masks and 2,000 ventilators to help states fighting the coronavirus in March, but the equipment was delayed getting out because the Pentagon was not directed on where to send it.
But the Pentagon insisted at the time of Santos’s firing that it would not get in the way of the efforts to combat the pandemic. “The department’s commitment to closely partnering with the defense industry remains unwavering, and we will continue to identify and mitigate impacts from the COVID-19 national emergency to ensure readiness and modernization,” Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Mike Andrews said at the time of Santos’s ouster.
Nadaner had been previously selected by Trump to serve as a senior official overseeing export enforcement at the Commerce Department in 2018, but that nomination stalled and was withdrawn over a year later. He was also a vice president of engineering and technology at Lockheed Martin for six years.
Once a senior speechwriter to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and later a deputy assistant secretary of defense for partnership strategy and stability operations at the Pentagon under Defense Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, Nadaner worked on expanding the Defense Department’s authority to train and equip foreign forces for counterterrorism and stability missions, according to his biography on the Marine Corps University website and his LinkedIn profile.
But though he is taking a role at the center of the Pentagon’s coronavirus fight, Nadaner is notably linked to a brand of foreign-policy thinking more closely associated with the Bush administration than to Trump’s “America first” way of doing business.
Nadaner was considered in line with neoconservatives during the Bush administration, according to a former defense official who worked with him. “He’s considered to be kind of ideological,” the former official said. “I don’t think he’s dishonest or shady, but he definitely comes from a certain strain of the Republican Party.”
Nadaner, the former official said, often worked long hours in the office, where he was a boss to Laura Cooper, the Pentagon’s current top official for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia who testified during the House impeachment inquiry into Trump.
The industrial policy office is also charged with investigating foreign investments in the defense industry under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--The Clock Is Ticking on Ethiopia’s Dam Dispute

The Clock Is Ticking on Ethiopia ’ s Dam Dispute Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Tensions over Ethiopia ’ s controversial dam project reach a breaking point , China makes an effort to woo foreign journalists , and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ’ s Ebola outbreak is declared over .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Monday to discuss spiraling tensions over Ethiopia ’ s plans to begin filling its new hydroelectric dam , the largest in Africa , after almost 10 years of construction .
Sudan and Egypt , which are downstream from the dam on the Blue Nile River , fear that it could seriously disrupt their water access .
Years of negotiations over the dam ’ s operations have not led to a deal , and last week the latest round of talks again ended in deadlock .
Now , time is running out : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dam next month as the rainy season begins—regardless of whether a deal is reached .
On Thursday , Sudan sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council cautioning that millions of lives could be put at risk because of flooding if Ethiopia moves ahead with plans to fill the dam before agreement is reached .
On Saturday , Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said that Cairo asked the Security Council to intervene in the hopes of restarting talks .
“ We are always keen to take the diplomatic and political path until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Existential threat .
The construction of the $ 4 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was announced in early 2011 .
With a projected capacity of 6,000 megawatts , the project is central to the country ’ s efforts to become the continent ’ s biggest energy exporter .
The dam wouldn ’ t change Ethiopia ’ s water consumption , but it would affect the flow of water downstream .
Egypt relies on the Nile , which the Blue Nile feeds into , for 90 percent of its water and views the project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caught in the middle in the dispute : It could benefit from cheap electricity , and controlled water flows could help to prevent flooding .
But Khartoum fears that a lack of coordination could lead to its own Roseires Dam becoming overwhelmed , increasing the flood risk for millions downstream .
Stumbling blocks .
Two key obstacles remain .
The first is disagreement over how to manage a multiyear drought .
Egypt has asked Ethiopia to commit to releasing extra water during prolonged drought , but officials in Addis Ababa object over concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The second point of contention is how to resolve future disputes brought about by the dam that may arise between the countries .
Egypt has called for disagreements to be resolved through binding international arbitration , while Ethiopia wants the three countries to resolve issues among themselves .
Forced disappearances in Venezuela .
The Venezuelan government is detaining its critics in secret in a bid to quiet opposition and sow fear , according to a joint report released last Friday by the Venezuelan group Foro Penal and the Washington-based Robert F. Kennedy Human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rise in 2019 in the number of people detained for at least 48 hours with no information being provided about their whereabouts .
Under international law , detentions of this nature are considered forcible disappearances .
The report found 524 such cases last year , with people being disappeared for an average of five days .
More than 20 percent of the victims reported being tortured while in captivity .
Say what ?
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has drawn sharp criticism after describing 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden as a martyr during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday , implying that the former al Qaeda leader was killed for his religious beliefs and not his role in the terrorist attacks .
“ The Americans came to Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden , martyred him , ” Khan said , describing the U.S. special forces raid in 2011 .
Islamic militant groups remain a potent force in Pakistan , and the Pakistani military—with which Khan is closely aligned—relies on them as proxy forces .
Analysts noted that Khan ’ s choice of words may have been an attempt to placate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Thursday , the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared an end to an Ebola epidemic in the country ’ s northeast—which had claimed 2,277 lives since it began in August 2018 .
The country drew upon 16,000 front-line workers , technological innovation , and an experimental new vaccine given to more than 300,000 people to battle the virus .
Ebola has a 50 percent fatality rate , and the outbreak was the second most deadly after the 2014-2016 West Africa epidemic that killed over 11,000 people .
“ We should celebrate this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , the director-general of the World Health Organization .
“ Viruses do not take breaks .
Ultimately , the best defense against any outbreak is investing in a stronger health system as the foundation for universal health coverage.
” Congo is still fighting a smaller outbreak of the disease , which is transmitted through contact with people or animals carrying the virus , in the northwestern city of Mbandaka .
China ’ s global influence .
Beijing is increasingly looking to curry favorable media coverage abroad by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ providing pro-regime content , according to a report released this week by the International Federation of Journalists .
The group surveyed 58 journalism unions around the world , and journalists from 29 countries reported going on trips to China .
Over a third of the unions said that content-sharing agreements were in place between media organizations in their countries and Chinese state outlets .
Groups of journalists from Muslim-majority countries have been taken on tightly controlled tours of the Xinjiang region in a bid to defuse criticism over Beijing ’ s mass incarceration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Belgium ’ s racist legacy .
Five women born in the Belgian Congo in the 1940s are suing the Belgian government for crimes against humanity .
They and thousands of other biracial children were kidnapped from their mothers and placed in Catholic institutions during Belgium ’ s decadeslong colonial rule .
Strict segregation policies removed children born to Congolese mothers and white fathers from their parents and separated them from the rest of the country ’ s Black population .
The plaintiffs , who now live in Belgium and France , filed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the church of abandoning the children at independence in 1960 , when many were abused and raped by militia fighters .
The Arctic is burning .
Temperatures in the Russian Arctic town of Verkhoyansk hit a record 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit on Saturday .
The U.N. World Meteorological Organization ( WMO ) said on Tuesday that it ’ s looking to verify the claim .
Temperatures of above 85 degrees in the area are not unusual—but if confirmed , 100.4 would be “ exceptional , ” a WMO spokesperson said in a briefing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ year at 14 degrees Fahrenheit higher than average , according to the nonprofit Berkley Earth .
Earlier this month , melting permafrost caused an oil storage tanker to collapse , spilling over 20,000 tons of oil into the surrounding area .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: Tensions over Ethiopia’s controversial dam project reach a breaking point, China makes an effort to woo foreign journalists, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Ebola outbreak is declared over.
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Deadlock Over Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Dam
The U.N. Security Council will meet on Monday to discuss spiraling tensions over Ethiopia’s plans to begin filling its new hydroelectric dam, the largest in Africa, after almost 10 years of construction. Sudan and Egypt, which are downstream from the dam on the Blue Nile River, fear that it could seriously disrupt their water access. Years of negotiations over the dam’s operations have not led to a deal, and last week the latest round of talks again ended in deadlock.
Now, time is running out: Ethiopia has vowed to begin filling the dam next month as the rainy season begins—regardless of whether a deal is reached. On Thursday, Sudan sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council cautioning that millions of lives could be put at risk because of flooding if Ethiopia moves ahead with plans to fill the dam before agreement is reached. On Saturday, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said that Cairo asked the Security Council to intervene in the hopes of restarting talks. “We are always keen to take the diplomatic and political path until its end,” he said.
Existential threat. The construction of the $4 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was announced in early 2011. With a projected capacity of 6,000 megawatts, the project is central to the country’s efforts to become the continent’s biggest energy exporter. The dam wouldn’t change Ethiopia’s water consumption, but it would affect the flow of water downstream.
Egypt relies on the Nile, which the Blue Nile feeds into, for 90 percent of its water and views the project as an existential threat. Sudan is caught in the middle in the dispute: It could benefit from cheap electricity, and controlled water flows could help to prevent flooding. But Khartoum fears that a lack of coordination could lead to its own Roseires Dam becoming overwhelmed, increasing the flood risk for millions downstream.
Stumbling blocks. Two key obstacles remain. The first is disagreement over how to manage a multiyear drought. Egypt has asked Ethiopia to commit to releasing extra water during prolonged drought, but officials in Addis Ababa object over concerns that it would undermine energy generation. The second point of contention is how to resolve future disputes brought about by the dam that may arise between the countries. Egypt has called for disagreements to be resolved through binding international arbitration, while Ethiopia wants the three countries to resolve issues among themselves.
What We’re Following
Forced disappearances in Venezuela. The Venezuelan government is detaining its critics in secret in a bid to quiet opposition and sow fear, according to a joint report released last Friday by the Venezuelan group Foro Penal and the Washington-based Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights. The groups documented a sharp rise in 2019 in the number of people detained for at least 48 hours with no information being provided about their whereabouts.
Under international law, detentions of this nature are considered forcible disappearances. The report found 524 such cases last year, with people being disappeared for an average of five days. More than 20 percent of the victims reported being tortured while in captivity.
Say what? Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has drawn sharp criticism after describing 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden as a martyr during a speech to the National Assembly on Thursday, implying that the former al Qaeda leader was killed for his religious beliefs and not his role in the terrorist attacks. “The Americans came to Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden, martyred him,” Khan said, describing the U.S. special forces raid in 2011.
Islamic militant groups remain a potent force in Pakistan, and the Pakistani military—with which Khan is closely aligned—relies on them as proxy forces. Analysts noted that Khan’s choice of words may have been an attempt to placate the groups.
Cause for celebration. On Thursday, the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared an end to an Ebola epidemic in the country’s northeast—which had claimed 2,277 lives since it began in August 2018. The country drew upon 16,000 front-line workers, technological innovation, and an experimental new vaccine given to more than 300,000 people to battle the virus. Ebola has a 50 percent fatality rate, and the outbreak was the second most deadly after the 2014-2016 West Africa epidemic that killed over 11,000 people.
“We should celebrate this moment, but we must resist complacency,” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization. “Viruses do not take breaks. Ultimately, the best defense against any outbreak is investing in a stronger health system as the foundation for universal health coverage.” Congo is still fighting a smaller outbreak of the disease, which is transmitted through contact with people or animals carrying the virus, in the northwestern city of Mbandaka.
Keep an Eye On
China’s global influence. Beijing is increasingly looking to curry favorable media coverage abroad by wooing foreign journalists with study tours and providing pro-regime content, according to a report released this week by the International Federation of Journalists. The group surveyed 58 journalism unions around the world, and journalists from 29 countries reported going on trips to China. Over a third of the unions said that content-sharing agreements were in place between media organizations in their countries and Chinese state outlets.
Groups of journalists from Muslim-majority countries have been taken on tightly controlled tours of the Xinjiang region in a bid to defuse criticism over Beijing’s mass incarceration of millions of Uighurs and other Muslims.
Belgium’s racist legacy. Five women born in the Belgian Congo in the 1940s are suing the Belgian government for crimes against humanity. They and thousands of other biracial children were kidnapped from their mothers and placed in Catholic institutions during Belgium’s decadeslong colonial rule. Strict segregation policies removed children born to Congolese mothers and white fathers from their parents and separated them from the rest of the country’s Black population.
The plaintiffs, who now live in Belgium and France, filed their complaint this week accusing Belgium and the church of abandoning the children at independence in 1960, when many were abused and raped by militia fighters.
The Arctic is burning. Temperatures in the Russian Arctic town of Verkhoyansk hit a record 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit on Saturday. The U.N. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said on Tuesday that it’s looking to verify the claim. Temperatures of above 85 degrees in the area are not unusual—but if confirmed, 100.4 would be “exceptional,” a WMO spokesperson said in a briefing. Siberia has seen unseasonably warm temperatures this year at 14 degrees Fahrenheit higher than average, according to the nonprofit Berkley Earth. Earlier this month, melting permafrost caused an oil storage tanker to collapse, spilling over 20,000 tons of oil into the surrounding area.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.