foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--The Secret History of How a Downed Airplane Rekindled U.S.-Iranian Ties

The Secret History of How a Downed Airplane Rekindled U.S.-Iranian Ties In the aftermath of the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani and Tehran ’ s retaliation , the prospects for diplomacy between the United States and Iran look grim .
U.S. President Donald Trump is committed to his campaign of “ maximum pressure ” against Iran in an election year , while Tehran is defiant in the face of the assassination and severe economic constraints .
While there is little promise for U.S.-Iran talks in 2020 , some observers have suggested that the diplomatic deep freeze could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the analyst Barbara Slavin wrote : “ Any chances for American diplomacy with Iran are dead for the duration of the Trump presidency — if not longer.
” Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Trump had “ abandoned the possibilities of diplomacy , ” and former Obama administration officials William Burns and Jake Sullivan argued that the Suleimani assassination meant the “ death ” of “ the whole notion of diplomacy with the Great Satan.
” But the history of relations between the United States and Iran provides reason to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pragmatism on both sides can lead to a rapid resumption of diplomacy even after catastrophe .
Leaders and candidates in both countries should note the precedent for a quick turnabout in relations—and be prepared to move beyond decades of animus when opportunities arise .
This month ’ s conflict was dramatic but was neither unprecedented nor even the bloodiest engagement between the United States and Iran over the past 40 years .
The closest parallel is the events of April through July 1988 , at the tail end of the Iran-Iraq War .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Iranian armed forces clashed directly , and more than 330 Iranians were killed .
On April 14 , 1988 , a U.S. warship deployed to the Persian Gulf struck an Iranian mine , severely damaging the vessel .
The ship was part of an American naval mission in the Gulf to protect commercial shipping that had come under attack by Iran .
The United States confronted the Iranian navy four days later , destroying or disabling half of its vessels , killing 77 Iranian sailors and Revolutionary Guards , and wounding more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1988 , a U.S. warship pursuing Iranian vessels accidentally shot down an Iranian passenger plane , killing 290 on board ( 254 of whom were Iranian ) , a tragic mistake similar to the one Tehran itself committed this month .
Many analysts remember the end result of these clashes : Iran concluded that the United States had decisively entered the war on Iraq ’ s side and decided to seek a cease-fire .
But few recall that less than two years later , the two sides began negotiating .
Under the presidencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hashemi Rafsanjani , the U.S.-Iran relationship shifted from confrontation toward cooperation and , haltingly , detente .
Bush made the first move in his inaugural address in January 1989 , imploring Iranian leaders to free U.S. hostages in Lebanon and promising that “ good will begets good will.
” He authorized direct and indirect negotiations with Tehran and ordered his administration to “ be prepared for a normal relationship with Iran.
” The change in U.S. tone resonated in Iran , which was squarely focused on postwar reconstruction .
Rafsanjani accepted Bush ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he “ would like to put the past behind [ them ] and work out the future.
” Between April 1990 and December 1991 , Iran facilitated the release of eight American hostages in Lebanon—the Bush administration ’ s paramount demand .
After Iraq invaded Kuwait , Iran also provided significant assistance to the U.S.-led coalition .
The conflict placed the United States and Iran on the same side , and Iran committed to quietly help the eventual U.S. war effort .
Rafsanjani agreed to enforce U.N. sanctions , impound Iraqi aircraft , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jet and cruise missile flights over Iranian territory .
While Iran ’ s options were admittedly limited because the world ’ s most powerful military was flexing its muscle right next door , the Bush administration still saw and pursued an opening for further diplomacy .
The United States ended the embargo on importing Iranian oil in late 1990 , increasing U.S. purchases of Iranian oil from $ 7 million per year to $ 265 million .
Washington also supported a $ 250 million World Bank loan to Iran—its first since the revolution—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a separate settlement .
In addition to economic benefits , the United States helped Iran achieve a major diplomatic victory : a formal U.N. conclusion that Iraq deserves full blame for starting the eight-year war with Iran .
To build on these moves , the White House began a comprehensive , secret review of its policy toward Iran .
Ultimately , the period of diplomacy was short-lived .
The Bush administration was alarmed that while Iran cooperated with Washington on hostages and in the Gulf War , it was simultaneously expanding its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went on a nuclear spending spree , attempting to acquire technology and assistance from China , India , Argentina , Germany , and Russia .
Iran ’ s purchases had plausible civilian purposes , although the Bush administration was concerned that they were also important to a nuclear weapons program .
The United States also considered Iran responsible for the March 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina that killed 29 civilians and injured more than 240 .
The attack was allegedly carried out by Lebanese Hezbollah , with Iranian support , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Hezbollah chief the month prior .
It is unlikely that Rafsanjani or forces within Iran were intentionally seeking to sabotage the improvement of relations with Washington , but the effect was the same : The Bush administration decided by April 1992 that the warming with Iran was a mistake .
Although it ended without a lasting detente , the relaxation of tension from 1990 to 1992 was real and significant .
It suggests that even in the aftermath of crisis and tragedy , it is possible for pragmatic leaders to chart a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and take reciprocal measures to build confidence .
This could apply even if Trump is reelected .
It is true that the change of administration in 1989 , from Ronald Reagan to Bush , was a spark to negotiations : Bush was a strong proponent of diplomacy , not just with Iran but also the Soviet Union , Germany , and with Arabs and Israelis .
But , for Iran , Bush was not necessarily a breath of fresh air .
One month after the airline shootdown in 1988 , Bush said in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ll never apologize for the United States of America , ever , I don ’ t care what the facts are.
” Bush was talking about the U.S. role in defending freedom in Poland and elsewhere , but many Iranians to this day consider Bush ’ s comments a disdainful reference to the shootdown .
Nevertheless , economic necessity drove Iran to compromise—as could well happen if Trump is reelected .
Regardless of the president , the core diplomatic challenge is that Washington and Tehran can not simply reenter the nuclear agreement—the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violations—and call it a day .
Key limits on Iran will begin to expire before the 2024 U.S. presidential election , and the most significant restrictions begin lapsing in 2026 .
For its part , Iran complained that existing U.S. sanctions meant it never received the economic windfall it expected ; more concessions from the United States will be required .
The United States , Iran , and other world powers would need to embark on a multiyear negotiations effort to refine just the nuclear agreement , let alone discuss ballistic missiles , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as the collapse of the 1990-1992 rapprochement showed , external factors can easily get in the way .
The comparison between 2020 and the early 1990s is not perfect .
Iranian domestic politics shifted dramatically between the 1988 clashes and the 1990-1992 period .
The revolution ’ s founder , Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini , died .
His successor , current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , was new to the job , as was Rafsanjani .
Moreover , the intervening 30 years have added grievances to both sides , and Iranians may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a much more dramatic offense than the clashes at sea in 1988 .
And while Trump professes an interest in negotiations , his administration ’ s actions suggest otherwise .
Still , the lesson of the 1988 crisis followed by cooperation should not be ignored .
Regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election in November , the president should not assume that the actions of January 2020 have put a permanent deep freeze on the prospect for U.S.-Iran negotiations , provided that he or she is willing to embrace diplomacy and @ @ @ @

In the aftermath of the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani and Tehran’s retaliation, the prospects for diplomacy between the United States and Iran look grim. U.S. President Donald Trump is committed to his campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran in an election year, while Tehran is defiant in the face of the assassination and severe economic constraints.
In the aftermath of the killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani and Tehran’s retaliation, the prospects for diplomacy between the United States and Iran look grim. U.S. President Donald Trump is committed to his campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran in an election year, while Tehran is defiant in the face of the assassination and severe economic constraints.
While there is little promise for U.S.-Iran talks in 2020, some observers have suggested that the diplomatic deep freeze could last much longer. For example, the analyst Barbara Slavin wrote: “Any chances for American diplomacy with Iran are dead for the duration of the Trump presidency — if not longer.” Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said Trump had “abandoned the possibilities of diplomacy,” and former Obama administration officials William Burns and Jake Sullivan argued that the Suleimani assassination meant the “death” of “the whole notion of diplomacy with the Great Satan.”
But the history of relations between the United States and Iran provides reason to be sanguine, if not optimistic, that pragmatism on both sides can lead to a rapid resumption of diplomacy even after catastrophe. Leaders and candidates in both countries should note the precedent for a quick turnabout in relations—and be prepared to move beyond decades of animus when opportunities arise.
This month’s conflict was dramatic but was neither unprecedented nor even the bloodiest engagement between the United States and Iran over the past 40 years. The closest parallel is the events of April through July 1988, at the tail end of the Iran-Iraq War. In a short period, the U.S. and Iranian armed forces clashed directly, and more than 330 Iranians were killed.
On April 14, 1988, a U.S. warship deployed to the Persian Gulf struck an Iranian mine, severely damaging the vessel. The ship was part of an American naval mission in the Gulf to protect commercial shipping that had come under attack by Iran. The United States confronted the Iranian navy four days later, destroying or disabling half of its vessels, killing 77 Iranian sailors and Revolutionary Guards, and wounding more than 100. Then, in July 1988, a U.S. warship pursuing Iranian vessels accidentally shot down an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 on board (254 of whom were Iranian), a tragic mistake similar to the one Tehran itself committed this month.
Many analysts remember the end result of these clashes: Iran concluded that the United States had decisively entered the war on Iraq’s side and decided to seek a cease-fire. But few recall that less than two years later, the two sides began negotiating.
Under the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the U.S.-Iran relationship shifted from confrontation toward cooperation and, haltingly, detente. Bush made the first move in his inaugural address in January 1989, imploring Iranian leaders to free U.S. hostages in Lebanon and promising that “good will begets good will.” He authorized direct and indirect negotiations with Tehran and ordered his administration to “be prepared for a normal relationship with Iran.” The change in U.S. tone resonated in Iran, which was squarely focused on postwar reconstruction. Rafsanjani accepted Bush’s offer, telling an intermediary that he “would like to put the past behind [them] and work out the future.”
Between April 1990 and December 1991, Iran facilitated the release of eight American hostages in Lebanon—the Bush administration’s paramount demand. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iran also provided significant assistance to the U.S.-led coalition. The conflict placed the United States and Iran on the same side, and Iran committed to quietly help the eventual U.S. war effort. Rafsanjani agreed to enforce U.N. sanctions, impound Iraqi aircraft, rescue downed pilots, and ignore fighter jet and cruise missile flights over Iranian territory. While Iran’s options were admittedly limited because the world’s most powerful military was flexing its muscle right next door, the Bush administration still saw and pursued an opening for further diplomacy.
The United States ended the embargo on importing Iranian oil in late 1990, increasing U.S. purchases of Iranian oil from $7 million per year to $265 million. Washington also supported a $250 million World Bank loan to Iran—its first since the revolution—and agreed to pay Iran $278 million in a separate settlement. In addition to economic benefits, the United States helped Iran achieve a major diplomatic victory: a formal U.N. conclusion that Iraq deserves full blame for starting the eight-year war with Iran. To build on these moves, the White House began a comprehensive, secret review of its policy toward Iran.
Ultimately, the period of diplomacy was short-lived. The Bush administration was alarmed that while Iran cooperated with Washington on hostages and in the Gulf War, it was simultaneously expanding its nuclear program and terrorist activities. Tehran went on a nuclear spending spree, attempting to acquire technology and assistance from China, India, Argentina, Germany, and Russia. Iran’s purchases had plausible civilian purposes, although the Bush administration was concerned that they were also important to a nuclear weapons program.
The United States also considered Iran responsible for the March 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina that killed 29 civilians and injured more than 240. The attack was allegedly carried out by Lebanese Hezbollah, with Iranian support, in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of the Hezbollah chief the month prior. It is unlikely that Rafsanjani or forces within Iran were intentionally seeking to sabotage the improvement of relations with Washington, but the effect was the same: The Bush administration decided by April 1992 that the warming with Iran was a mistake.
Although it ended without a lasting detente, the relaxation of tension from 1990 to 1992 was real and significant. It suggests that even in the aftermath of crisis and tragedy, it is possible for pragmatic leaders to chart a path forward if they abandon maximalist demands and take reciprocal measures to build confidence.
This could apply even if Trump is reelected. It is true that the change of administration in 1989, from Ronald Reagan to Bush, was a spark to negotiations: Bush was a strong proponent of diplomacy, not just with Iran but also the Soviet Union, Germany, and with Arabs and Israelis. But, for Iran, Bush was not necessarily a breath of fresh air. One month after the airline shootdown in 1988, Bush said in a campaign event: “I’ll never apologize for the United States of America, ever, I don’t care what the facts are.” Bush was talking about the U.S. role in defending freedom in Poland and elsewhere, but many Iranians to this day consider Bush’s comments a disdainful reference to the shootdown. Nevertheless, economic necessity drove Iran to compromise—as could well happen if Trump is reelected.
Regardless of the president, the core diplomatic challenge is that Washington and Tehran cannot simply reenter the nuclear agreement—the United States removes sanctions, Iran ends nuclear violations—and call it a day. Key limits on Iran will begin to expire before the 2024 U.S. presidential election, and the most significant restrictions begin lapsing in 2026. For its part, Iran complained that existing U.S. sanctions meant it never received the economic windfall it expected; more concessions from the United States will be required. The United States, Iran, and other world powers would need to embark on a multiyear negotiations effort to refine just the nuclear agreement, let alone discuss ballistic missiles, terrorism, and regional activity. And, as the collapse of the 1990-1992 rapprochement showed, external factors can easily get in the way.
The comparison between 2020 and the early 1990s is not perfect. Iranian domestic politics shifted dramatically between the 1988 clashes and the 1990-1992 period. The revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died. His successor, current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was new to the job, as was Rafsanjani.
Moreover, the intervening 30 years have added grievances to both sides, and Iranians may well consider the assassination of Suleimani to be a much more dramatic offense than the clashes at sea in 1988. And while Trump professes an interest in negotiations, his administration’s actions suggest otherwise.
Still, the lesson of the 1988 crisis followed by cooperation should not be ignored. Regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election in November, the president should not assume that the actions of January 2020 have put a permanent deep freeze on the prospect for U.S.-Iran negotiations, provided that he or she is willing to embrace diplomacy and prioritize future relations.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-17--Germany Seeks to Broker Cease-Fire in Libya

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Germany prepares to host a U.N.-backed summit on peace efforts in Libya , Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gives a rare Friday sermon , and U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial has begun .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every day , please sign up here .
Germany hosts a conference on Sunday to discuss peace efforts in Libya , after nine months of conflict—with the Libyan National Army ( LNA ) of Gen. Khalifa Haftar seeking to take Tripoli , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Accord ( GNA ) .
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas traveled to Benghazi , Libya , on Thursday to persuade Haftar to attend , and he said that Haftar is committed to a cease-fire agreement .
Sunday ’ s summit comes after a failed push by Russia and Turkey to get Haftar to agree to a cease-fire this week in Moscow .
Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj , who leads the GNA , signed a draft cease-fire agreement there while Haftar did not .
Both Russia and Turkey have become increasingly involved in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mercenaries aiding the LNA and Turkish troops now supporting the government in Tripoli .
Who will be in Berlin ?
Germany has invited the United States , Russia , Turkey , France , Egypt , Britain , and others to the Libya summit .
Both British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will attend .
“ I hope that the parties will take this opportunity to put the future of Libya back in Libyan hands , ” Maas said .
Potential roadblock .
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Berlin unless Turkey and the GNA abandon a maritime border agreement that disregards Greek sea rights in waters that could have significant natural gas deposits .
Greece , an EU member , was not invited to attend the conference in Berlin .
Late on Thursday , Haftar traveled to Athens unannounced and met Greece ’ s foreign minister .
He is expected to meet Mitsotakis today .
Iran ’ s supreme leader delivers rare sermon .
After a two-week standoff with the United States and days of domestic protests , Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prayers in Tehran this week for the first time in eight years .
The rare sermon came at a moment of extreme tension , following the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and the accidental Iranian downing of a Ukrainian airliner in Tehran .
Iran ’ s delayed admission that it shot down the jet prompted angry protests .
Khamenei showed no sign of compromise , however , branding the United States an “ arrogant power , ” calling U.S. President Donald Trump a “ clown , ” and telling tens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was able to “ slap the face ” of the United States with God ’ s backing .
Trump ’ s impeachment trial has begun .
On Thursday , the U.S. Senate formally opened President Trump ’ s impeachment trial—just the third against a president in U.S. history .
The solemn ceremony begins what will be a partisan and unpredictable trial—though almost certain to end in Trump ’ s acquittal .
As the trial begins , new evidence has emerged that appears to show that associates of Trump ’ s personal lawyer surveilled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Diplomats are disturbed by the new revelations—as well as by Pompeo ’ s refusal to defend Yovanovitch , former career diplomat Nicholas Burns tells FP ’ s Robbie Gramer .
Meanwhile , Ukraine has opened its own investigation into the alleged illegal surveillance .
Lebanon could form a government .
Lebanon ’ s interim finance minister said on Thursday that it is close to forming a new government amid a political crisis , after protests against the country ’ s ruling elite began in October .
Pressure is growing on politicians to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as reports emerged of the governor of the central bank seeking to delay some bond repayments .
Protesters returned to the streets en masse this week , with some vandalizing banks and ATMs—leading to a violent crackdown by the police .
The French far-right .
On Thursday , French far-right leader Marine Le Pen announced that she would run for president in 2022—her third consecutive attempt at the presidency .
( In 2017 , she lost in the runoff to Emmanuel Macron by a margin of 66 to 34 percent—nearly double the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ managed in the 2002 election . )
Le Pen ’ s rebranded National Rally party has been aggressively campaigning to win control of more cities in France ’ s March municipal elections .
Winning control of city halls , and proving the party can govern effectively , is central to Le Pen ’ s strategy , as Karina Piser reported for FP .
Germany ’ s fight against climate change .
Germany plans to pay its utility companies billions of euros in order to accelerate the shutdown of coal-fired power plants—a major obstacle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris agreement .
Germany is also in the process of reducing atomic power plants , meaning it will need a big expansion in wind and solar in the coming decades .
Xi ’ s trip to Myanmar .
Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Myanmar today—the first such trip by a Chinese leader in 19 years .
There , he is expected to sign major infrastructure deals and cement China ’ s influence in a country with weakening ties to the West amid genocide accusations .
Xi will meet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suu Kyi , and army chief Min Aung Hlaing .
For more news and analysis on stories like this , sign up for China Brief , delivered on Wednesdays .
Australian firefighters have saved the world ’ s only remaining cluster of prehistoric Wollemi pine trees from a bush fire , according to officials .
The Wollemi pine was thought to be extinct before the grove of 200 trees was discovered west of Sydney in 1994 , and its precise location remains a secret for protection .
The trees ’ survival was welcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which have burned more than 25.5 million acres .
South Koreans say no to facial hair .
Social media users in South Korea have launched a campaign against U.S .
Ambassador Harry Harris ’ s mustache , accusing him of insulting his host country by sporting a look that , according to the Guardian , “ reminds many South Koreans of the days of Japanese colonial rule , ” when several Japanese governors had mustaches .
The Korea Times suggested that his facial hair “ has become associated with the latest U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward Korea.
” Harris , who is Japanese-American , has dismissed such concerns , telling local journalists , “ I ’ m the American ambassador to Korea , not the Japanese American ambassador to Korea.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Germany prepares to host a U.N.-backed summit on peace efforts in Libya , Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gives a rare Friday sermon, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial has begun.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Germany prepares to host a U.N.-backed summit on peace efforts in Libya, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gives a rare Friday sermon, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial has begun.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every day, please sign up here.
Germany Hosts Libya Peace Summit
Germany hosts a conference on Sunday to discuss peace efforts in Libya, after nine months of conflict—with the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Gen. Khalifa Haftar seeking to take Tripoli, held by the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas traveled to Benghazi, Libya, on Thursday to persuade Haftar to attend, and he said that Haftar is committed to a cease-fire agreement.
Sunday’s summit comes after a failed push by Russia and Turkey to get Haftar to agree to a cease-fire this week in Moscow. Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, who leads the GNA, signed a draft cease-fire agreement there while Haftar did not. Both Russia and Turkey have become increasingly involved in Libya’s conflict, with Russian mercenaries aiding the LNA and Turkish troops now supporting the government in Tripoli.
Who will be in Berlin? Germany has invited the United States, Russia, Turkey, France, Egypt, Britain, and others to the Libya summit. Both British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will attend. “I hope that the parties will take this opportunity to put the future of Libya back in Libyan hands,” Maas said.
Potential roadblock. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has threatened to block any cease-fire agreed in Berlin unless Turkey and the GNA abandon a maritime border agreement that disregards Greek sea rights in waters that could have significant natural gas deposits. Greece, an EU member, was not invited to attend the conference in Berlin.
Late on Thursday, Haftar traveled to Athens unannounced and met Greece’s foreign minister. He is expected to meet Mitsotakis today.
What We’re Following Today
Iran’s supreme leader delivers rare sermon. After a two-week standoff with the United States and days of domestic protests, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led Friday prayers in Tehran this week for the first time in eight years. The rare sermon came at a moment of extreme tension, following the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and the accidental Iranian downing of a Ukrainian airliner in Tehran. Iran’s delayed admission that it shot down the jet prompted angry protests.
Khamenei showed no sign of compromise, however, branding the United States an “arrogant power,” calling U.S. President Donald Trump a “clown,” and telling tens of thousands of chanting worshipers that Iran was able to “slap the face” of the United States with God’s backing.
Trump’s impeachment trial has begun. On Thursday, the U.S. Senate formally opened President Trump’s impeachment trial—just the third against a president in U.S. history. The solemn ceremony begins what will be a partisan and unpredictable trial—though almost certain to end in Trump’s acquittal. As the trial begins, new evidence has emerged that appears to show that associates of Trump’s personal lawyer surveilled then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch.
Diplomats are disturbed by the new revelations—as well as by Pompeo’s refusal to defend Yovanovitch, former career diplomat Nicholas Burns tells FP’s Robbie Gramer. Meanwhile, Ukraine has opened its own investigation into the alleged illegal surveillance.
Lebanon could form a government. Lebanon’s interim finance minister said on Thursday that it is close to forming a new government amid a political crisis, after protests against the country’s ruling elite began in October. Pressure is growing on politicians to lead the country out of economic turmoil, as reports emerged of the governor of the central bank seeking to delay some bond repayments. Protesters returned to the streets en masse this week, with some vandalizing banks and ATMs—leading to a violent crackdown by the police.
Keep an Eye On
The French far-right. On Thursday, French far-right leader Marine Le Pen announced that she would run for president in 2022—her third consecutive attempt at the presidency. (In 2017, she lost in the runoff to Emmanuel Macron by a margin of 66 to 34 percent—nearly double the 18 percent showing that her father Jean-Marie managed in the 2002 election.) Le Pen’s rebranded National Rally party has been aggressively campaigning to win control of more cities in France’s March municipal elections. Winning control of city halls, and proving the party can govern effectively, is central to Le Pen’s strategy, as Karina Piser reported for FP.
Germany’s fight against climate change. Germany plans to pay its utility companies billions of euros in order to accelerate the shutdown of coal-fired power plants—a major obstacle to Berlin’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris agreement. Germany is also in the process of reducing atomic power plants, meaning it will need a big expansion in wind and solar in the coming decades.
Xi’s trip to Myanmar. Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Myanmar today—the first such trip by a Chinese leader in 19 years. There, he is expected to sign major infrastructure deals and cement China’s influence in a country with weakening ties to the West amid genocide accusations. Xi will meet Myanmar’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and army chief Min Aung Hlaing.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for China Brief, delivered on Wednesdays.
Odds and Ends
Australian firefighters have saved the world’s only remaining cluster of prehistoric Wollemi pine trees from a bush fire, according to officials. The Wollemi pine was thought to be extinct before the grove of 200 trees was discovered west of Sydney in 1994, and its precise location remains a secret for protection. The trees’ survival was welcome news in Australia amid the devastating fires, which have burned more than 25.5 million acres.
South Koreans say no to facial hair. Social media users in South Korea have launched a campaign against U.S. Ambassador Harry Harris’s mustache, accusing him of insulting his host country by sporting a look that, according to the Guardian, “reminds many South Koreans of the days of Japanese colonial rule,” when several Japanese governors had mustaches.
The Korea Times suggested that his facial hair “has become associated with the latest U.S. image of being disrespectful and even coercive toward Korea.” Harris, who is Japanese-American, has dismissed such concerns, telling local journalists, “I’m the American ambassador to Korea, not the Japanese American ambassador to Korea.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Europe Is Running Out of Time to Save the Iran Deal

Europe Is Running Out of Time to Save the Iran Deal Iran is growing frustrated with European leaders ’ inability to reciprocate its nuclear concessions in the face of U.S. obstructionism .
Hassan Rouhani continues to urge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to grant more time for negotiations with France , Britain , and Germany that Khamenei believes are futile .
Washington ’ s maximalist policy of seeking zero uranium enrichment capacity in Iran has thwarted an even minimal chance of a diplomatic breakthrough .
The story may sound familiar , but all of that happened in 2005 .
Iran had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hope that Europe would offer it some tangible economic incentives ; at the time , Rouhani—now Iran ’ s president—was Tehran ’ s chief nuclear negotiator .
But John Bolton , then serving at the U.S. State Department , impeded the Europeans ’ efforts .
Iran ultimately broke the seals on its nuclear program , significantly ramped it up , and triggered a perilous , nearly decadelong race pitting sanctions against centrifuges .
Fifteen years later , history is repeating itself .
The Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—negotiated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ France , Britain , Germany , the European Union , Russia , and China—in May 2018 .
Pursuing a policy of maximum pressure , the administration imposed stifling sanctions on Iran , inflicting grave harm on the country ’ s economy and its people .
Once again , Europe tried to salvage the agreement .
It promised to maintain and expand economic cooperation with Iran in areas such as energy , transportation , investments , and banking—the dividends envisioned by the nuclear deal in return for Iran muzzling its nuclear program .
Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trade figures for the period between January and August 2019 showed a drop of 94 percent in Iranian exports to Europe compared to the same period in 2018 , while imports more than halved .
In an effort to offset the impact of U.S. sanctions , the European powers jointly unveiled a special-purpose vehicle , the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges ( Instex ) , in January 2019 to encourage companies to do business with Iran , with an emphasis “ on the sectors most essential to the Iranian population—such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Getting the mechanism up and running , however , has been a halting exercise .
While six more European countries signed on to Instex as shareholders in November 2019 , the first batch of transactions has yet to come through .
Other European efforts , too , came to naught .
The European Commission mandated that the EU ’ s main investment bank invest in Iran , but the latter refused to do so out of fear of losing access to U.S. capital markets due to U.S. sanctions .
In 2018 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European companies from complying with such secondary U.S. sanctions .
But there have only been a handful of cases in Europe where courts enforced blocking regulations to restore trade with Iran , and the law ’ s application remains rare and inconsistent .
The experience of negotiating a nuclear accord may also leave Iran with the impression that Europe , keen to hail the deal but doing little in practice to save it , is strategically feckless .
To compel Europe to do more and throw Iran an economic lifeline , Tehran started @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal commitments in May 2019 , while at every step reminding the EU that it was willing to return to full compliance as long as European governments delivered the promised financial dividends .
Five 60-day ultimatums later , after Iran shed all the deal ’ s restrictions on its enrichment capacity , on Jan. 14 , European leaders did the opposite of what Tehran had hoped for : They triggered the agreement ’ s dispute resolution mechanism .
This could result in the return of U.N. sanctions on Iran within 65 days .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials are at pains to claim that this is not a first step toward reimposition of U.N. sanctions , failure to resolve the dispute in the allotted time would make such an outcome increasingly inevitable .
The United States seems keen to accelerate this outcome , with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin asserting on Wednesday that “ we look forward to working with [ those three countries ] quickly and would expect that the U.N. sanctions will snap back into place.
” This would spell the demise of the nuclear deal .
Indeed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.N. sanctions , which would recategorize Iran as a threat to international peace and security under the U.N. Charter ’ s Chapter XII , would constitute a red line , prompting it to withdraw from not just the nuclear deal but also the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—blinding inspections , reviving talk of U.S. or Israeli military strikes , and moving the baseline for future negotiations .
For Tehran , distrust of the U.S. government is a long-standing dictum .
But the experience of negotiating a nuclear accord may also leave Iran with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deal but doing little in practice to save it , is strategically feckless .
The European focus on punishing Iran for its noncompliance , while only expressing regret over the original sin of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal , could have long-term adverse consequences for Iran ’ s relations with Europe .
Khamenei , an ardent foe of the United States , has adopted a harsh tone about the Europeans , characterizing them as unreliable at best and a good cop to Washington ’ s bad cop at worst .
Such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials within Iran most eager for engagement with the West to make their case and instead prompted them to lament Europe ’ s dithering—or worse .
Western-educated Iranian officials now increasingly sound like hard-liners .
Rouhani , the Scottish-educated Iranian president , implicitly threatened European troops in the region in case of further escalation .
Iran ’ s U.S.-educated foreign minister , Mohammad Javad Zarif , scolded Europe on Twitter for allowing the United States to bully it .
Ali Akbar Salehi , the Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate who heads the Atomic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has more sovereignty than the 28 European Union member states combined .
Undoubtedly , this has domestic political implications .
Iran has parliamentary elections scheduled for Feb. 21 .
None of the pro-engagement Iranian politicians stand a real chance of either surviving the system ’ s vetting process or being elected in the face of the hard-liners , who have been proven right in being skeptical of the West and its intentions and are now advocating a much more confrontational policy .
With the parliament lost to the hard-liners , Rouhani will likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This , too , is déjà vu .
The more moderate forces in Iranian politics lost the parliamentary elections to the hard-liners in 2004 , paving the way for the hard-line presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , who presided over one of the worst periods in Iran ’ s relations with Europe .
All of this could still be avoided if Europe uses the time and space created by the dispute resolution mechanism to find ways to either provide Iran with meaningful economic relief , even if that provokes Washington ’ s ire , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to de-escalate tensions .
The alternative is the poisoning of Iran ’ s relations with Europe—and the collapse of an agreement that Europe hails as a diplomatic achievement but has failed to salvage .

Iran is growing frustrated with European leaders’ inability to reciprocate its nuclear concessions in the face of U.S. obstructionism. Hassan Rouhani continues to urge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to grant more time for negotiations with France, Britain, and Germany that Khamenei believes are futile. Washington’s maximalist policy of seeking zero uranium enrichment capacity in Iran has thwarted an even minimal chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
Iran is growing frustrated with European leaders’ inability to reciprocate its nuclear concessions in the face of U.S. obstructionism. Hassan Rouhani continues to urge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to grant more time for negotiations with France, Britain, and Germany that Khamenei believes are futile. Washington’s maximalist policy of seeking zero uranium enrichment capacity in Iran has thwarted an even minimal chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
The story may sound familiar, but all of that happened in 2005.
Iran had suspended its uranium enrichment program in the hope that Europe would offer it some tangible economic incentives; at the time, Rouhani—now Iran’s president—was Tehran’s chief nuclear negotiator. But John Bolton, then serving at the U.S. State Department, impeded the Europeans’ efforts. Iran ultimately broke the seals on its nuclear program, significantly ramped it up, and triggered a perilous, nearly decadelong race pitting sanctions against centrifuges.
Fifteen years later, history is repeating itself.
The Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—negotiated by Obama administration diplomats along with Iran, France, Britain, Germany, the European Union, Russia, and China—in May 2018. Pursuing a policy of maximum pressure, the administration imposed stifling sanctions on Iran, inflicting grave harm on the country’s economy and its people.
Once again, Europe tried to salvage the agreement. It promised to maintain and expand economic cooperation with Iran in areas such as energy, transportation, investments, and banking—the dividends envisioned by the nuclear deal in return for Iran muzzling its nuclear program.
Yet trade between Iran and Europe fell substantially. Trade figures for the period between January and August 2019 showed a drop of 94 percent in Iranian exports to Europe compared to the same period in 2018, while imports more than halved.
In an effort to offset the impact of U.S. sanctions, the European powers jointly unveiled a special-purpose vehicle, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (Instex), in January 2019 to encourage companies to do business with Iran, with an emphasis “on the sectors most essential to the Iranian population—such as pharmaceutical, medical devices and agri-food goods.” Getting the mechanism up and running, however, has been a halting exercise. While six more European countries signed on to Instex as shareholders in November 2019, the first batch of transactions has yet to come through.
Other European efforts, too, came to naught. The European Commission mandated that the EU’s main investment bank invest in Iran, but the latter refused to do so out of fear of losing access to U.S. capital markets due to U.S. sanctions. In 2018, the EU also reinstated its blocking statute—prohibiting European companies from complying with such secondary U.S. sanctions. But there have only been a handful of cases in Europe where courts enforced blocking regulations to restore trade with Iran, and the law’s application remains rare and inconsistent.
The experience of negotiating a nuclear accord may also leave Iran with the impression that Europe, keen to hail the deal but doing little in practice to save it, is strategically feckless.
To compel Europe to do more and throw Iran an economic lifeline, Tehran started a staggered process of loosening its nuclear deal commitments in May 2019, while at every step reminding the EU that it was willing to return to full compliance as long as European governments delivered the promised financial dividends. Five 60-day ultimatums later, after Iran shed all the deal’s restrictions on its enrichment capacity, on Jan. 14, European leaders did the opposite of what Tehran had hoped for: They triggered the agreement’s dispute resolution mechanism.
This could result in the return of U.N. sanctions on Iran within 65 days. While British, French, and German officials are at pains to claim that this is not a first step toward reimposition of U.N. sanctions, failure to resolve the dispute in the allotted time would make such an outcome increasingly inevitable. The United States seems keen to accelerate this outcome, with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin asserting on Wednesday that “we look forward to working with [those three countries] quickly and would expect that the U.N. sanctions will snap back into place.”
This would spell the demise of the nuclear deal. Indeed, Iran has warned that the so-called snapback of U.N. sanctions, which would recategorize Iran as a threat to international peace and security under the U.N. Charter’s Chapter XII, would constitute a red line, prompting it to withdraw from not just the nuclear deal but also the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—blinding inspections, reviving talk of U.S. or Israeli military strikes, and moving the baseline for future negotiations.
For Tehran, distrust of the U.S. government is a long-standing dictum. But the experience of negotiating a nuclear accord may also leave Iran with the impression that Europe, keen to hail the deal but doing little in practice to save it, is strategically feckless. The European focus on punishing Iran for its noncompliance, while only expressing regret over the original sin of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, could have long-term adverse consequences for Iran’s relations with Europe.
Western-educated Iranian officials now increasingly sound like hard-liners.
Khamenei, an ardent foe of the United States, has adopted a harsh tone about the Europeans, characterizing them as unreliable at best and a good cop to Washington’s bad cop at worst. Such rhetoric has rendered it difficult for those officials within Iran most eager for engagement with the West to make their case and instead prompted them to lament Europe’s dithering—or worse.
Western-educated Iranian officials now increasingly sound like hard-liners. Rouhani, the Scottish-educated Iranian president, implicitly threatened European troops in the region in case of further escalation. Iran’s U.S.-educated foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, scolded Europe on Twitter for allowing the United States to bully it. Ali Akbar Salehi, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate who heads the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said California has more sovereignty than the 28 European Union member states combined.
Undoubtedly, this has domestic political implications. Iran has parliamentary elections scheduled for Feb. 21. None of the pro-engagement Iranian politicians stand a real chance of either surviving the system’s vetting process or being elected in the face of the hard-liners, who have been proven right in being skeptical of the West and its intentions and are now advocating a much more confrontational policy. With the parliament lost to the hard-liners, Rouhani will likely become a lame duck president prematurely.
This, too, is déjà vu. The more moderate forces in Iranian politics lost the parliamentary elections to the hard-liners in 2004, paving the way for the hard-line presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who presided over one of the worst periods in Iran’s relations with Europe.
All of this could still be avoided if Europe uses the time and space created by the dispute resolution mechanism to find ways to either provide Iran with meaningful economic relief, even if that provokes Washington’s ire, or to mediate between Tehran and Washington to de-escalate tensions. The alternative is the poisoning of Iran’s relations with Europe—and the collapse of an agreement that Europe hails as a diplomatic achievement but has failed to salvage.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--NAFTA’s Replacement Gives Labor Some Shelter From Globalization’s Storms

NAFTA ’ s Replacement Gives Labor Some Shelter From Globalization ’ s Storms The Senate on Thursday approved the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement by the extraordinary margin of 89 to 10 .
The USMCA deal is the replacement for the original North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) of 1994 , and its passage in both houses of the U.S. legislature brings to a close the U.S. effort to rewrite North American trade rules .
After three years of tough negotiations , USMCA now enjoys a strong , bipartisan coalition of supporters .
The NAFTA renegotiation started off as U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fulfill a campaign promise to fix the deal or rip it up .
But USMCA ’ s political momentum in Congress is due largely to labor rights provisions crafted by Senate and House Democrats .
Labor rights have long been a precondition for broad Democratic support of America ’ s regional trade deals .
In addition to the original NAFTA , agreements with Colombia and Central America faced staunch opposition from Democrats concerned that trade treaties fail to protect average workers .
Trade skeptics have had a right to be worried .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it comes to building labor rights into its trade deals—a step many other countries have been reluctant to take .
But it ’ s one thing to have the rules on the books and another to enforce them .
Even the United States—the champion of enforceable labor rules in trade agreements—has only brought one such dispute , which it lost .
Organized labor groups argue that trade deals have so far failed to produce results .
The hope is that the new USMCA will be a different story .
That ’ s why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fellow Democrats would only support a deal that was “ enforceable for America ’ s workers.
” Hence , the revised labor provisions announced this past December .
The most significant change is a unique enforcement mechanism that will allow the parties to work jointly to try to ensure that Mexicans enjoy real collective bargaining rights .
The mechanism is unique both in its speed ( months rather than years ) and in the fact that it focuses on the factories themselves where the violations occur .
Instead of having to sue Mexico @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States can instead partner with Mexico to address on-site violations .
These changes satisfied some of USMCA ’ s major critics , including the United States ’ largest organized labor federation , the AFL-CIO .
After opposing the deal as negotiated by the Trump administration , AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka welcomed the revised version and said that “ working people can proudly support ” the amended agreement .
And these provisions don ’ t come at the expense of a sizable number of Republican votes .
In the Senate , only one Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been broad bipartisan support for enforceable labor and environmental rules in these agreements for many years .
Republicans have recognized the need to mitigate the incentive within the international trade system to create an unfair advantage by suppressing labor and environmental standards .
As with the Senate , USMCA sailed through a floor vote in the House last month by a margin of 385 votes to 41 .
That included support from 84 percent of Democrats , breaking from the average of 36 percent support for the last 10 such deals .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Jordan in 2001 , which passed through both chambers via simple voice vote , received so much support from the left .
But despite these improvements , there ’ s more to be done .
Mexico ’ s acceptance of stronger labor provisions wasn ’ t a foregone conclusion .
It ’ s true that Mexico passed new domestic standards last year .
However , Mexican officials previously opposed deeper commitments on labor , with Mexico ’ s Undersecretary to North America Jesús Seade stating that USMCA ’ s labor provisions “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nothing else you may want.
” And , Mexico ’ s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador complained about some U.S. demands on the grounds that they would purportedly amount to allowing U.S. inspectors into Mexico ’ s factories .
As a result , suspicions of imperfect implementation remain .
Mexico ’ s resistance is more easily understood in a broader context .
Many countries pay lip service to the obligations they ’ ve signed up to at the International Labor Organization , which include rights outlined in the new NAFTA .
The difficulty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s why the United States for over a decade has chosen to make those rules enforceable through its bilateral and regional trade deals .
But these deals can ’ t eliminate exposure to competitive pressures in a globalized economy .
If labor laws are enforced in Mexico , Mexican factories will experience higher labor costs .
That is good , given the historic problems of suppressed wage growth in Mexico .
But it also means Mexican factories will face more pressure from low-cost producers elsewhere in world markets .
China is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tremendously from a race to the bottom on labor rights ( and environmental rules ) allowed by—if not encouraged by—a global trading system that imposes no labor obligations on its participants .
Labor isn ’ t even on the table in the Trump administration ’ s negotiations with China .
Labor arbitrage isn ’ t a new problem .
It is precisely because labor is a condition of competition , subject to exploitation , that the founders of the global trading system sought to include enforceable labor rights in the original global trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tariffs and Trade .
That didn ’ t happen , and the agreement ’ s successor , the World Trade Organization , continues to suffer from the same shortcoming—remaining silent on labor obligations across its members .
The WTO ’ s omission of labor protections means that Mexico must enforce its labor commitments while its chief competitors are not similarly bound .
As a result , Mexico faces diverging incentives .
It is obliged to honor USMCA ’ s standards while , at the same time , it faces pressure to compete with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet amid all the discussion of WTO reforms , including dispute settlement and subsidy disciplines , there is a near-total failure to discuss labor rules .
Even the United States has been mum .
This , in the face of backlash against globalization driven at least in part by income inequality .
Ultimately , the WTO ’ s failure to address these systemic issues is the one of the drivers of the broader turn away from multilateralism .
It encourages countries to find solutions , even imperfect ones , outside of the global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we arrive at different groups of countries having their own sets of commitments .
That ’ s a problem .
There isn ’ t an overarching umbrella shielding workers from the rain .
Instead , labor is too often left exposed to the elements .
Saving the dispute settlement system won ’ t be enough to save multilateralism .
The rules themselves have to change .

The Senate on Thursday approved the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement by the extraordinary margin of 89 to 10. The USMCA deal is the replacement for the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994, and its passage in both houses of the U.S. legislature brings to a close the U.S. effort to rewrite North American trade rules. After three years of tough negotiations, USMCA now enjoys a strong, bipartisan coalition of supporters.
The Senate on Thursday approved the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement by the extraordinary margin of 89 to 10. The USMCA deal is the replacement for the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994, and its passage in both houses of the U.S. legislature brings to a close the U.S. effort to rewrite North American trade rules. After three years of tough negotiations, USMCA now enjoys a strong, bipartisan coalition of supporters.
The NAFTA renegotiation started off as U.S. President Donald Trump’s effort to fulfill a campaign promise to fix the deal or rip it up. But USMCA’s political momentum in Congress is due largely to labor rights provisions crafted by Senate and House Democrats. Labor rights have long been a precondition for broad Democratic support of America’s regional trade deals. In addition to the original NAFTA, agreements with Colombia and Central America faced staunch opposition from Democrats concerned that trade treaties fail to protect average workers.
Trade skeptics have had a right to be worried. The United States has taken the lead when it comes to building labor rights into its trade deals—a step many other countries have been reluctant to take. But it’s one thing to have the rules on the books and another to enforce them. Even the United States—the champion of enforceable labor rules in trade agreements—has only brought one such dispute, which it lost. Organized labor groups argue that trade deals have so far failed to produce results.
The hope is that the new USMCA will be a different story. That’s why House Speaker Nancy Pelosi insisted that her fellow Democrats would only support a deal that was “enforceable for America’s workers.” Hence, the revised labor provisions announced this past December. The most significant change is a unique enforcement mechanism that will allow the parties to work jointly to try to ensure that Mexicans enjoy real collective bargaining rights. The mechanism is unique both in its speed (months rather than years) and in the fact that it focuses on the factories themselves where the violations occur. Instead of having to sue Mexico for breaching its obligations, the United States can instead partner with Mexico to address on-site violations.
These changes satisfied some of USMCA’s major critics, including the United States’ largest organized labor federation, the AFL-CIO. After opposing the deal as negotiated by the Trump administration, AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka welcomed the revised version and said that “working people can proudly support” the amended agreement.
And these provisions don’t come at the expense of a sizable number of Republican votes. In the Senate, only one Republican voted against it. Indeed, there has been broad bipartisan support for enforceable labor and environmental rules in these agreements for many years. Republicans have recognized the need to mitigate the incentive within the international trade system to create an unfair advantage by suppressing labor and environmental standards.
As with the Senate, USMCA sailed through a floor vote in the House last month by a margin of 385 votes to 41. That included support from 84 percent of Democrats, breaking from the average of 36 percent support for the last 10 such deals. In fact, only the U.S. agreement with Jordan in 2001, which passed through both chambers via simple voice vote, received so much support from the left.
But despite these improvements, there’s more to be done. Mexico’s acceptance of stronger labor provisions wasn’t a foregone conclusion. It’s true that Mexico passed new domestic standards last year. However, Mexican officials previously opposed deeper commitments on labor, with Mexico’s Undersecretary to North America Jesús Seade stating that USMCA’s labor provisions “are very far-reaching. … There is nothing else you may want.” And, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador complained about some U.S. demands on the grounds that they would purportedly amount to allowing U.S. inspectors into Mexico’s factories. As a result, suspicions of imperfect implementation remain.
Mexico’s resistance is more easily understood in a broader context. Many countries pay lip service to the obligations they’ve signed up to at the International Labor Organization, which include rights outlined in the new NAFTA. The difficulty lies in enforcing those obligations. That’s why the United States for over a decade has chosen to make those rules enforceable through its bilateral and regional trade deals.
But these deals can’t eliminate exposure to competitive pressures in a globalized economy. If labor laws are enforced in Mexico, Mexican factories will experience higher labor costs. That is good, given the historic problems of suppressed wage growth in Mexico. But it also means Mexican factories will face more pressure from low-cost producers elsewhere in world markets. China is a case in point: It has benefited tremendously from a race to the bottom on labor rights (and environmental rules) allowed by—if not encouraged by—a global trading system that imposes no labor obligations on its participants. Labor isn’t even on the table in the Trump administration’s negotiations with China.
Labor arbitrage isn’t a new problem. It is precisely because labor is a condition of competition, subject to exploitation, that the founders of the global trading system sought to include enforceable labor rights in the original global trade regime embodied by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. That didn’t happen, and the agreement’s successor, the World Trade Organization, continues to suffer from the same shortcoming—remaining silent on labor obligations across its members.
The WTO’s omission of labor protections means that Mexico must enforce its labor commitments while its chief competitors are not similarly bound. As a result, Mexico faces diverging incentives. It is obliged to honor USMCA’s standards while, at the same time, it faces pressure to compete with producers that can dodge these rules.
Yet amid all the discussion of WTO reforms, including dispute settlement and subsidy disciplines, there is a near-total failure to discuss labor rules. Even the United States has been mum. This, in the face of backlash against globalization driven at least in part by income inequality.
Ultimately, the WTO’s failure to address these systemic issues is the one of the drivers of the broader turn away from multilateralism. It encourages countries to find solutions, even imperfect ones, outside of the global trade regime. It’s how we arrive at different groups of countries having their own sets of commitments. That’s a problem. There isn’t an overarching umbrella shielding workers from the rain. Instead, labor is too often left exposed to the elements.
Saving the dispute settlement system won’t be enough to save multilateralism. The rules themselves have to change.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Trump’s Growing European Base

Trump’s Growing European Base

Over the last year , European anti-Americanism has ebbed somewhat , thanks in large part to the sentiments of right-wing populists enamored with U.S. President Donald Trump .
Their fond feelings have created a surprising opportunity for Washington to repair the trans-Atlantic relationship that it has recently done so much to dismantle .
If there is one unifying sentiment among supporters of the Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) , Italy ’ s Lega Nord , the Sweden Democrats , the National Rally in France , and the UK Independence Party ( UKIP ) , it is that they all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s rooted in the extreme right ’ s soft spot for authoritarians and Trump ’ s own anti-immigrant stance .
To be sure , among the general public , Trump is still extremely unpopular in most of Europe .
Just 13 percent of Germans , 18 percent of Swedes , and 20 percent of the French have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs , according to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center .
These numbers are a fraction of Europeans ’ support for U.S. President Barack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Poland do half of those surveyed back Trump .
Overall antipathy to the U.S. president has been prevalent since Trump was elected .
As a senior German official told me in 2017 : “ It took George Bush eight years to become this unpopular .
It took Donald Trump four months !
” Even so , the same poll shows that support for Trump is up 11 percentage points in France , 14 points in Spain , and 16 points in Poland from 2018 .
( The most recent survey was conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan .
3 . )
And that boost is largely due to a rise in Trump ’ s approval by supporters of right-wing populist parties .
Over 40 percent of Marine Le Pen ’ s National Rally supporters in France have confidence in Trump , more than three times the approval given by those who don ’ t support the party .
Trump ’ s backing among the National Rally is up 15 points in just a year .
Similarly , in Germany , AfD adherents are four times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do the right thing than others ( 37 percent compared with 9 percent ) , and their confidence in Trump is up 12 points over last year .
Meanwhile , 45 percent of Sweden Democrats voice confidence in Trump , more than five times the level expressed by everyone else in Sweden .
That approval rate is up 13 points .
When it comes to their reasons for backing Trump , half to two-thirds of supporters of right-wing parties in Europe approve of the administration ’ s efforts to limit immigration .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European public supports such constraints . )
Support for Trump ’ s anti-immigrant stance among right-wing populists is particularly prevalent in France and Germany , where it is three times higher than found among the rest of the public .
Trump ’ s European support may stem from the appeal of his authoritarianism .
In a 2017 Pew survey , 41 percent of Italians who self-identified as being on the right of the political spectrum said they preferred a political system in which a strong leader could make decisions without interference from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 29 percent of those on the right in the United Kingdom and 13 percent in Germany .
( Notably , 27 percent of right-wing Americans also yearned for a strong leader , which may help explain much of Trump ’ s backing at home . )
Across the continent , the right ’ s enthusiasm for Trump has helped boost European support for the United States overall , which is up from historic lows .
Annual European surveys over the last two decades by both the German Marshall Fund of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States are , in large part , driven by public sentiment about the U.S. president .
It is thus not surprising that as pro-Trump sentiment has grown , the United States ’ favorability has improved in Europe : up 10 points in France , Italy , and Spain and up 9 points in Germany .
Rising support is again largely driven by the right .
About 80 percent of UKIP supporters hold a favorable view of the United States , up 20 points since 2018 .
Around 70 percent of Lega @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favorably disposed toward the United States , up 11 and 16 points respectively .
For Trump , this is an opportunity ; the rise of right-wing populist parties and their growing parliamentary strength in Italy , Germany , and Sweden means that many European governments can ill-afford or politically sustain prolonged confrontations with Washington .
He may use the changing circumstances to begin to repair trans-Atlantic relations after a disastrous three years marked by growing tensions over trade , defense spending , Iran , and climate change .
The problem is that while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ show some approval of Trump ’ s tariff policy—and those on the right are more supportive than the general public of his announced withdrawal from the Paris climate accord—most Europeans oppose such initiatives .
Around 80 percent disapprove of his climate stance , and two-thirds oppose his trade policy .
So using the president ’ s appeal among right-wing populists in Europe as the basis for reviving trans-Atlantic relations in general will require moderation of some , but not necessarily all , of Trump ’ s foundational policy initiatives .
But this would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ base.
” To date , the president has shown no such inclination .
And it would require the skills of a much more subtle politician .
Yet it is an opportunity that his successor ( or he in his second term ) may wish he had seized .

Over the last year, European anti-Americanism has ebbed somewhat, thanks in large part to the sentiments of right-wing populists enamored with U.S. President Donald Trump. Their fond feelings have created a surprising opportunity for Washington to repair the trans-Atlantic relationship that it has recently done so much to dismantle.
Over the last year, European anti-Americanism has ebbed somewhat, thanks in large part to the sentiments of right-wing populists enamored with U.S. President Donald Trump. Their fond feelings have created a surprising opportunity for Washington to repair the trans-Atlantic relationship that it has recently done so much to dismantle.
If there is one unifying sentiment among supporters of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Italy’s Lega Nord, the Sweden Democrats, the National Rally in France, and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), it is that they all increasingly approve of Trump. That’s rooted in the extreme right’s soft spot for authoritarians and Trump’s own anti-immigrant stance.
To be sure, among the general public, Trump is still extremely unpopular in most of Europe. Just 13 percent of Germans, 18 percent of Swedes, and 20 percent of the French have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs, according to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center. These numbers are a fraction of Europeans’ support for U.S. President Barack Obama in his last year. Only in Poland do half of those surveyed back Trump. Overall antipathy to the U.S. president has been prevalent since Trump was elected. As a senior German official told me in 2017: “It took George Bush eight years to become this unpopular. It took Donald Trump four months!”
Even so, the same poll shows that support for Trump is up 11 percentage points in France, 14 points in Spain, and 16 points in Poland from 2018. (The most recent survey was conducted before the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3.) And that boost is largely due to a rise in Trump’s approval by supporters of right-wing populist parties.
Over 40 percent of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally supporters in France have confidence in Trump, more than three times the approval given by those who don’t support the party. Trump’s backing among the National Rally is up 15 points in just a year.
Similarly, in Germany, AfD adherents are four times more confident that the U.S. president will do the right thing than others (37 percent compared with 9 percent), and their confidence in Trump is up 12 points over last year. Meanwhile, 45 percent of Sweden Democrats voice confidence in Trump, more than five times the level expressed by everyone else in Sweden. That approval rate is up 13 points.
When it comes to their reasons for backing Trump, half to two-thirds of supporters of right-wing parties in Europe approve of the administration’s efforts to limit immigration. (Only a fraction of the rest of the European public supports such constraints.) Support for Trump’s anti-immigrant stance among right-wing populists is particularly prevalent in France and Germany, where it is three times higher than found among the rest of the public.
Trump’s European support may stem from the appeal of his authoritarianism. In a 2017 Pew survey, 41 percent of Italians who self-identified as being on the right of the political spectrum said they preferred a political system in which a strong leader could make decisions without interference from parliament or the courts, as did 29 percent of those on the right in the United Kingdom and 13 percent in Germany. (Notably, 27 percent of right-wing Americans also yearned for a strong leader, which may help explain much of Trump’s backing at home.)
Across the continent, the right’s enthusiasm for Trump has helped boost European support for the United States overall, which is up from historic lows.
Annual European surveys over the last two decades by both the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Pew suggest that European views of the United States are, in large part, driven by public sentiment about the U.S. president. It is thus not surprising that as pro-Trump sentiment has grown, the United States’ favorability has improved in Europe: up 10 points in France, Italy, and Spain and up 9 points in Germany.
Rising support is again largely driven by the right. About 80 percent of UKIP supporters hold a favorable view of the United States, up 20 points since 2018. Around 70 percent of Lega backers and Sweden Democrat adherents are also favorably disposed toward the United States, up 11 and 16 points respectively.
For Trump, this is an opportunity; the rise of right-wing populist parties and their growing parliamentary strength in Italy, Germany, and Sweden means that many European governments can ill-afford or politically sustain prolonged confrontations with Washington. He may use the changing circumstances to begin to repair trans-Atlantic relations after a disastrous three years marked by growing tensions over trade, defense spending, Iran, and climate change. The problem is that while supporters of right-wing populist parties in Europe show some approval of Trump’s tariff policy—and those on the right are more supportive than the general public of his announced withdrawal from the Paris climate accord—most Europeans oppose such initiatives. Around 80 percent disapprove of his climate stance, and two-thirds oppose his trade policy.
So using the president’s appeal among right-wing populists in Europe as the basis for reviving trans-Atlantic relations in general will require moderation of some, but not necessarily all, of Trump’s foundational policy initiatives. But this would risk undermining support among his “European base.” To date, the president has shown no such inclination. And it would require the skills of a much more subtle politician. Yet it is an opportunity that his successor (or he in his second term) may wish he had seized.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Pompeo’s Silence Creates a ‘Crisis of Morale’ at State Department

Lawmakers released documents and messages this week that appear to show associates of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s personal lawyer surveilling the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine , Marie “ Masha ” Yovanovitch , amid a campaign to oust her from her job .
They are the latest documents at the center of the impeachment investigation into Trump ’ s efforts to pressure Ukraine into investigating former Vice President Joe Biden , a Democratic presidential rival .
It ’ s unclear whether the new revelations from these associates , including Lev Parnas , a Ukrainian-born American who worked for Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has since been indicted , were outlandish claims or have real merit .
But the allegations have ramped up pressure on Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to publicly defend the former ambassador and other career State Department employees ensnared in the political upheaval .
So far , Pompeo and the State Department have remained silent .
Foreign Policy spoke to Nicholas Burns , a former career diplomat , about what the latest news means for Pompeo and America ’ s diplomatic corps .
Burns serves as an unpaid advisor to Biden ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as U.S. ambassador to NATO and undersecretary of state for political affairs during George W. Bush ’ s administration .
From 1995 to 1997 , he was the State Department ’ s spokesperson .
He is currently a professor of diplomacy at Harvard University .
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment for this interview .
Foreign Policy : What was your reaction to the latest documents Congress released that included messages from associates of Trump ?
Nicholas Burns : I think it answers the questions that Congress should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the impeachment inquiry about the effective hijacking of American policy towards Ukraine by Rudy Giuliani and his associates .
I can not remember a similar incident over the last four decades where a private individual had so much influence over our policy towards a very important country in the world .
It should be part of at least the questions that are being asked in the impeachment inquiry so that senators , when they vote , have a better sense of what was happening .
From a foreign service and State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troubling .
Now , obviously , it remains to be seen if these are entirely true stories that he is telling .
But that means there has to be an investigation , and it has to be done in a methodical manner by the House and Senate .
It would be unprecedented in my experience for an American ambassador to be put under surveillance by people representing the president .
FP : Ukraine agreed today to investigate those claims that Yovanovitch might have been surveilled .
NB : This might be the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , Ukraine , has rushed to the defense of an American ambassador who was being targeted for surveillance by [ associates ] of the president of the United States .
And as all this was being revealed , the secretary of state over the last 36 hours has said nothing to defend [ Yovanovitch ] .
This is an unprecedented situation .
From the perspective of the foreign service and the State Department , those who are dedicated to the institution of our career diplomats , it is indefensible not to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Any other secretary of state would have said those things .
FP : But Pompeo has already repeatedly said he ’ ll comply with the letter of the law and criticized the impeachment investigation as unfounded .
Do you think that these new revelations will change anything or prompt Pompeo to speak out publicly on this further ?
NB : Well , I think it ’ s going to put additional pressure on him .
His tenure is going to be known for many things .
But one big thing [ will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the career foreign service when it was attacked unfairly .
Masha Yovanovitch , [ former acting Ambassador to Ukraine ] Bill Taylor , [ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State ] George Kent , all of the others who testified .
He ’ s the leader .
I can ’ t imagine any prior secretary of state who would be silent when all this was happening .
There should be calls for Secretary Pompeo to stand up and support her and support the security of an American ambassador .
There ’ s nothing more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as ambassadors , as foreign service officers , to be sometimes surveilled or harassed by authoritarian governments .
It is completely unprecedented for representatives of the president , representatives of Rudy Giuliani , to even consider for one moment putting an American ambassador under surveillance .
Completely unprecedented .
And it ’ s wrong , and it ’ s indefensible that they would consider it .
FP : But often the State Department is restricted , for security and legal reasons , in what it can publicly disclose with allegations of wrongdoing or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in question .
You were at one point the State Department ’ s spokesperson .
Walk us through some of the restrictions of what a spokesperson might be able to say or not say publicly in this type of scenario .
NB : The first thing you want to do on a really big story is decide what you ’ re going to say .
To have the State Department be , if not ahead of the story , at least responding very early in the process so that people know what the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think .
And it ’ s the job of the spokesperson—and I was in this job for two and a half years for Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright of the Clinton administration—to go to the secretary of state and make a recommendation : “ Mr .
or Madam Secretary , we ’ ve got a major problem right now , and here ’ s what I think we should say , ” and ask the secretary of state to approve it .
That ’ s the process .
The cardinal sin of diplomacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because then your opponents of course hold sway and they define the story .
And I think it would be completely understandable if in the present circumstances , the first thing the statement might say this week would be : “ We don ’ t know if this story is true .
It comes from someone under indictment .
But nonetheless , it is so serious and the matter is so grave that we ’ re going to investigate .
And once we finish that investigation , we will brief the Congress and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an entirely defensible thing to say .
And of course , they should say in that statement : “ We defend the security of all of our ambassadors , and we defend the security of Ambassador Yovanovitch.
” They didn ’ t say anything .
That would ’ ve been the minimum .
And so I think in terms of public diplomacy , what a spokesperson and secretary of state should think about is actually responding to a major story .
They haven ’ t done that , which I find inexcusable .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ were under investigation , some of this would need to remain private or even classified .
The State Department ’ s Bureau of Diplomatic Security obviously doesn ’ t publicly talk about investigations that may or may not be running .
Given that , is it fair to criticize the department for not speaking publicly about this ?
NB : Not after this morning , when the Ukrainian government said publicly that they were launching an investigation .
The State Department did not even say : “ We will participate in this investigation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Thank you to the Ukrainian government for launching this investigation .
We agree the security of our ambassador is paramount.
” It ’ s inexcusable that the Ukrainian government is showing greater concern for the security of an American ambassador than the United States government .
There is no defense here .
They have no option .
If they want to do the right thing , they have no option but to get behind this Ukrainian government investigation , say they ’ ll comply with it , and to say that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in this case Ambassador Yovanovitch .
FP : Given the fraught political situation the State Department finds itself in now , what else would you recommend to Secretary Pompeo if you were still in the department now ?
NB : I would recommend the secretary of state send a message to the entire workforce , 70,000-plus people around the world , saying security is paramount .
We always defend our ambassadors and any other person working for us , and we ’ ll do it in this case .
Because the elephant in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ morale .
And when the secretary of state is silent on an elementary issue , like the security of an ambassador , it further weakens morale .
And there ’ s a very widespread belief that this administration has been the weakest administration in supporting the career foreign and civil service in our memory .
And there ’ s a crisis .
The rank and file are very disturbed by the inability , the refusal , of the secretary of state to defend his own people .

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