foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Foreign Aid Is Caught in the Crossfire of Trump’s Stimulus Battle

Foreign Aid Is Caught in the Crossfire of Trump ’ s Stimulus Battle Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : U.S. President Donald Trump derails foreign aid by ending stimulus talks , the only vice presidential debate of the election veers into foreign policy , and the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom is in hot water again .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s abrupt decision to end talks on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just have implications at home .
It is also fueling concerns that the United States will surrender influence on the world stage .
Trump , heavily medicated for COVID-19 , changed his position on the talks for the third time on Tuesday .
The president is now advocating a piecemeal stimulus package with a new round of checks for Americans and a bailout for the flagging airline industry .
But the move leaves significant doubt about the future of the U.S. global response to the coronavirus pandemic—both in developing and distributing a vaccine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic , such as increased hunger and poverty around the world .
As late as this summer , congressional Democrats and Republicans were pushing for the stimulus package to include at least $ 3 billion for Gavi , the international vaccine alliance .
The HEROES Act championed by House Democrats took those plans a step further , calling for more than $ 9 billion in foreign aid funding , including $ 3.5 billion for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS , Tuberculosis , and Malaria ; another $ 1 billion for emergency AIDS @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.N. World Food Programme ( WFP ) .
With Trump appearing to call off the stimulus talks—the president initially said that confirming Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett was the priority instead—the aid funding is now in limbo .
Humanitarian groups warn that the cost of inaction is high .
The WFP indicated in April that the pandemic could lead to a surge in the number of people around the world facing acute hunger—from 130 million to 265 million .
The World Bank estimated this week that the pandemic has put as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poverty , a figure that could rise in 2021 .
Despite these dire warnings , the Trump administration has pared back its efforts to battle the pandemic abroad .
In September , the U.S. Agency for International Development shut down its coronavirus task force , spurring fears about coordination of the agency ’ s efforts , which have included distributing aid and ventilators to U.S. partners and allies .
Contagion hits top military brass .
Gen. Gary Thomas , the U.S. Marine Corps ’ number 2 general , tested positive for COVID-19 on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dozen top U.S. military officers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff now in quarantine after a senior Coast Guard admiral tested positive earlier this week .
Most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , including the chairman Mike Milley , attended a White House event to honor Gold Star families on Sept. 27 , raising concerns that it may have been a superspreader event .
Ankara ’ s away ?
Unconfirmed reports that Turkey trained its Russian-made S-400 air defense system on Greek F-16 fighter jets have sparked a renewed push in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions on its NATO ally .
Several officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy that the reports were false , but lawmakers on Capitol Hill are demanding answers .
In a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday , Sens .
Chris Van Hollen and James Lankford called for sanctions on Ankara mandated by the delivery of the $ 2.5 billion Russian system last year .
The S-400 has become one of the biggest—but by no means only—thorn in the side of Turkey ’ s relationship with Washington and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Vice President Mike Pence and Sen. Kamala Harris clashed over foreign policy and other issues during the only vice-presidential debate of the election on Wednesday , Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh reports .
Unlike the “ mudslinging madhouse ” that was the first Trump-Biden debate , Harris and Pence both engaged on policy issues—albeit while rarely directly answering a question from the moderator .
Neither candidate explicitly answered whether they saw China as a competitor or outright adversary .
Pence defended the Trump administration ’ s foreign-policy record , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bakr al-Baghdadi and top Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani .
They also discussed climate change , with Pence saying the administration “ listen [ s ] to the science ” —though it has blocked government scientists ’ congressional testimonies on the issue .
On the company dime .
U.S .
Ambassador to the United Kingdom Woody Johnson , a billionaire Trump donor and the owner of the New York Jets , is again in hot water for a spending binge at the president ’ s Turnberry golf course in Scotland on the taxpayer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reviewed by The Scotsman .
Johnson had already ruffled feathers among U.S. diplomats by forcing out career officials and was investigated by the State Department inspector general for making sexist and racist comments .
Race for top WTO spot .
The next chief of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) has been narrowed down to two candidates : Nigeria ’ s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and South Korea ’ s Yoo Myung-hee , Bloomberg reports .
Whoever is tapped for the job will be the first woman to lead the WTO .
Senior diplomat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ career foreign service officer and most recently U.S. ambassador to Pakistan , has joined Raytheon Technologies as senior vice president for international government relations .
New USIP president .
Lise Grande , the head of U.N. humanitarian and development operations in Yemen , has been named the new president and CEO of the U.S. Institute for Peace .
“ Asked about the tweet , a senior U.S. military official was silent for a moment before saying , ‘ Oh my God.
’ ” —From an Oct. 7 New York Times report on Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan by Christmas , contradicting his national security advisor ’ s timeline .
Reseeded .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is on a drive to push Islamic nationalism into the forefront of the country ’ s political life , including converting Istanbul ’ s Byzantine-era Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque this summer .
Now , British archaeologists appear to be in the crosshairs .
Al-Monitor ’ s Amberin Zaman covers this latest incident , in which Turkish authorities took control of ancient and modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ankara last month .
Making sense of the war in Yemen .
The war in Yemen , now in its sixth year , is as convoluted as it is devastating .
With over 80 percent of the population forced to rely on humanitarian aid , Yemen ’ s conflict has become a complex web of rival factions and proxy powers vying for influence and control .
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has released a new report that untangles all the various overlapping relationships and rivalries that define the conflict .
Confirmations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Supreme Court nominee , are set to begin in the Senate Judiciary Committee on Monday , Oct. 12 .
The second presidential debate was scheduled to be held in Miami , Florida , on Thursday , Oct. 15 , with the candidates tuning in virtually .
But Trump now refuses to participate , saying he will hold a rally instead .
Democratic nominee Joe Biden said he will take questions from voters in his own event .
Stress test .
The Defense Department ’ s Office of Net Assessment—known as the Pentagon ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dropped a treasure trove of rarely seen studies on its Freedom of Information Act website .
One of the highlights , pointed out by Defense News ’ s Aaron Mehta : a study on the impacts of stress on U.S. presidents including Lyndon B. Johnson , Harry Truman , and William Howard Taft .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief.
What’s on tap today: U.S. President Donald Trump derails foreign aid by ending stimulus talks, the only vice presidential debate of the election veers into foreign policy, and the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom is in hot water again.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump’s Stimulus Move Threatens Foreign Aid
U.S. President Donald Trump’s abrupt decision to end talks on a fresh economic stimulus package won’t just have implications at home. It is also fueling concerns that the United States will surrender influence on the world stage. Trump, heavily medicated for COVID-19, changed his position on the talks for the third time on Tuesday. The president is now advocating a piecemeal stimulus package with a new round of checks for Americans and a bailout for the flagging airline industry.
But the move leaves significant doubt about the future of the U.S. global response to the coronavirus pandemic—both in developing and distributing a vaccine and dealing with knock-on effects of the pandemic, such as increased hunger and poverty around the world.
As late as this summer, congressional Democrats and Republicans were pushing for the stimulus package to include at least $3 billion for Gavi, the international vaccine alliance. The HEROES Act championed by House Democrats took those plans a step further, calling for more than $9 billion in foreign aid funding, including $3.5 billion for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; another $1 billion for emergency AIDS relief; and $750 million for the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP).
With Trump appearing to call off the stimulus talks—the president initially said that confirming Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett was the priority instead—the aid funding is now in limbo.
Humanitarian groups warn that the cost of inaction is high. The WFP indicated in April that the pandemic could lead to a surge in the number of people around the world facing acute hunger—from 130 million to 265 million. The World Bank estimated this week that the pandemic has put as many as 114 million people into extreme poverty, a figure that could rise in 2021.
Despite these dire warnings, the Trump administration has pared back its efforts to battle the pandemic abroad. In September, the U.S. Agency for International Development shut down its coronavirus task force, spurring fears about coordination of the agency’s efforts, which have included distributing aid and ventilators to U.S. partners and allies.
What We’re Watching
Contagion hits top military brass. Gen. Gary Thomas, the U.S. Marine Corps’ number 2 general, tested positive for COVID-19 on Wednesday. Thomas is one of nearly a dozen top U.S. military officers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff now in quarantine after a senior Coast Guard admiral tested positive earlier this week. Most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the chairman Mike Milley, attended a White House event to honor Gold Star families on Sept. 27, raising concerns that it may have been a superspreader event.
Ankara’s away? Unconfirmed reports that Turkey trained its Russian-made S-400 air defense system on Greek F-16 fighter jets have sparked a renewed push in Congress for the Trump administration to slap sanctions on its NATO ally. Several officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy that the reports were false, but lawmakers on Capitol Hill are demanding answers.
In a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday, Sens. Chris Van Hollen and James Lankford called for sanctions on Ankara mandated by the delivery of the $2.5 billion Russian system last year. The S-400 has become one of the biggest—but by no means only—thorn in the side of Turkey’s relationship with Washington and other NATO members.
Clash of the vice-Titans. Vice President Mike Pence and Sen. Kamala Harris clashed over foreign policy and other issues during the only vice-presidential debate of the election on Wednesday, Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh reports. Unlike the “mudslinging madhouse” that was the first Trump-Biden debate, Harris and Pence both engaged on policy issues—albeit while rarely directly answering a question from the moderator.
Neither candidate explicitly answered whether they saw China as a competitor or outright adversary. Pence defended the Trump administration’s foreign-policy record, including the strikes that killed Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and top Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani. They also discussed climate change, with Pence saying the administration “listen[s] to the science”—though it has blocked government scientists’ congressional testimonies on the issue.
On the company dime. U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Woody Johnson, a billionaire Trump donor and the owner of the New York Jets, is again in hot water for a spending binge at the president’s Turnberry golf course in Scotland on the taxpayer’s dime, according to receipts reviewed by The Scotsman. Johnson had already ruffled feathers among U.S. diplomats by forcing out career officials and was investigated by the State Department inspector general for making sexist and racist comments.
Movers and Shakers
Race for top WTO spot. The next chief of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been narrowed down to two candidates: Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and South Korea’s Yoo Myung-hee, Bloomberg reports. Whoever is tapped for the job will be the first woman to lead the WTO.
Senior diplomat to Raytheon. Paul Jones, a career foreign service officer and most recently U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, has joined Raytheon Technologies as senior vice president for international government relations.
New USIP president. Lise Grande, the head of U.N. humanitarian and development operations in Yemen, has been named the new president and CEO of the U.S. Institute for Peace.
Quote of the Week
“Asked about the tweet, a senior U.S. military official was silent for a moment before saying, ‘Oh my God.’”
—From an Oct. 7 New York Times report on Trump tweeting that the United States will cut the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan by Christmas, contradicting his national security advisor’s timeline.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Reseeded. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is on a drive to push Islamic nationalism into the forefront of the country’s political life, including converting Istanbul’s Byzantine-era Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque this summer. Now, British archaeologists appear to be in the crosshairs.
Al-Monitor’s Amberin Zaman covers this latest incident, in which Turkish authorities took control of ancient and modern seed collections from the British Institute in Ankara last month.
Making sense of the war in Yemen. The war in Yemen, now in its sixth year, is as convoluted as it is devastating. With over 80 percent of the population forced to rely on humanitarian aid, Yemen’s conflict has become a complex web of rival factions and proxy powers vying for influence and control.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has released a new report that untangles all the various overlapping relationships and rivalries that define the conflict.
The Week Ahead
Confirmations hearings for Amy Coney Barrett, the Supreme Court nominee, are set to begin in the Senate Judiciary Committee on Monday, Oct. 12.
The second presidential debate was scheduled to be held in Miami, Florida, on Thursday, Oct. 15, with the candidates tuning in virtually. But Trump now refuses to participate, saying he will hold a rally instead. Democratic nominee Joe Biden said he will take questions from voters in his own event.
Odds and Ends
Stress test. The Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment—known as the Pentagon’s in-house “think tank” —has dropped a treasure trove of rarely seen studies on its Freedom of Information Act website. One of the highlights, pointed out by Defense News’s Aaron Mehta: a study on the impacts of stress on U.S. presidents including Lyndon B. Johnson, Harry Truman, and William Howard Taft.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--How Not to Kill People With Spreadsheets

How Not to Kill People With Spreadsheets Imagine that you ’ re working in a government subdepartment that tracks coronavirus infections and traces the patients ’ contacts .
You ’ ve just discovered that nearly 16,000 positive tests didn ’ t get into the system for a week .
The people with the coronavirus know they have it , but their contacts don ’ t know .
What do you do ?
We don ’ t have to imagine it .
In the United Kingdom , 15,841 people with coronavirus infections went unreported to Serco Test and Trace , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus tracing program , in the week from Sept. 25 to Oct. 2 , with 48,000 of their possible contacts not warned—because of errors in a data import .
Patients were told they had tested positive , but their details weren ’ t passed to contact tracers until 1 a.m. U.K. time on Oct. 3 , and the cases were not added to official totals until Oct. 5 .
The cause was simple : a mistake between different formats of Excel files .
The U.K. ’ s response to COVID-19 is widely regarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did they get here ?
Excel is a top-of-the-line spreadsheet tool .
A spreadsheet is good for quickly modeling a problem—but too often , organizations cut corners and press the cardboard-and-string mock-up into production , instead of building a robust and unique system based on the Excel proof of concept .
Excel is almost universally misused for complex data processing , as in this case—because it ’ s already present on your work computer and you don ’ t have to spend months procuring new software .
So almost every business has at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a years-old spreadsheet set up by past staff members that nobody left at the company understands .
That ’ s how the U.K. went wrong .
An automated process at Public Health England ( PHE ) transformed the incoming private laboratory test data ( which was in text-based CSV files ) into Excel-format files , to pass to the Serco Test and Trace teams ’ dashboards .
Unfortunately , the process produced XLS files—an outdated Excel format that went extinct in 2003—which had a limit of 65,536 rows , rather than the around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ XLSX format .
With several lines of data per patient , this meant a sheet could only hold 1,400 cases .
Further cases just fell off the end .
Technicians at PHE monitoring the dashboards noticed on Oct. 2 that not all data that had been sent in was making it out the other end .
The data was corrected the next day , and PHE announced the issue the day after .
It ’ s not clear if the software at PHE was an Excel spreadsheet or an in-house program using the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explain why PHE stated that replacing it might take months—but the XLS format would have been used on the assumption that Excel was universal .
And even then , a system based on Excel-format files would have been an improvement over earlier systems—the system for keeping a count of COVID-19 cases in the U.K. was , as of May , still based on data handwritten on cards .
PHE was initially blamed for the data disaster .
But the question to ask when a procedure leads to disaster is : What problem was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first place ?
PHE ’ s process was broken in multiple ways ; why did it exist at all ?
The process that went wrong was a workaround for a contract issue : The government ’ s contract with Deloitte to run the testing explicitly stipulated that the company did not have to report “ Pillar 2 ” ( general public testing ) positive cases to PHE at all .
Since a test-and-trace system is not possible without this data , PHE set up feeds for the data anyway , as CSV text @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The data was then put into this system—the single system that serves as the bridge between testing and tracing , for all of England .
PHE had to put in place technological duct tape to make a system of life-or-death importance work at all .
Right now , Public Health England has worked around the present problem : Serco Test and Trace still takes an Excel 2003-formatted XLS spreadsheet as part of the data pipeline—but the process now uses multiple sheets , so the files don ’ t overflow again .
The U.K. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private sector to build a COVID-19 response system quickly .
But outsourcing is fraught with hazards of exactly this kind , where faulty systems are created to get around regulatory problems or cut corners A shortage of home testing kits led to the government worrying that people would request multiple kits .
Identity verification was outsourced to the credit agency TransUnion—which implemented it by running credit checks .
People who couldn ’ t pass TransUnion ’ s particular credit checks were refused tests , including many who had bank accounts and were on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been entirely verifiable as being real people .
There are 5.8 million U.K. residents who have bad credit histories and so could be refused a test kit , which disproportionately impacts the already poor and disadvantaged—with obvious implications for public health .
Many of those rejected by the credit check were told to visit testing centers at the other end of the country , such as London residents being told to go to Scotland for a test .
One London resident was advised by staff at a testing center to say she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her a test in London .
The Brookings Institution report Doomed : Challenges and solutions to government IT projects lists factors to consider when outsourcing government information technology .
The outsourcing of tracking and tracing is an example where the government has assumed all of the risk , and the contractor assumes all of the profit .
PHE did one thing that you should never do : It outsourced a core function .
Running a call center or the office canteen ?
You can outsource it .
Tracing a pandemic ?
You must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside expertise for a core function , use contractors working within a department .
Competing with the private sector on pay can be an issue , but a meaningful project can be a powerful incentive .
This sort of error doesn ’ t have to happen .
There ’ s a set of basic principles to apply for vital functions when you ’ re working within an unreliable organization .
Site Reliability Engineering principles are lifesavers when you ’ re short on both human and technical resources .
The first step is fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need .
Document whether you can get it or not .
Set explicit priorities , and get signoff .
Document when there are requests to drop a priority because of lack of resources .
If the data import from the labs had been checked daily , the problem would have been noticed and solved immediately .
Are you cross-checking your numbers ?
Do you have a list of the numbers that need to be verified—and do you know what “ normal ” numbers look like ?
If you can ’ t get the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , have you documented the refusal ?
Consider your software support .
In the U.K. , the Government Digital Service , part of the Cabinet Office , uses LibreOffice , the current version of the old OpenOffice .
LibreOffice is free , though you can buy support easily .
The Government Digital Service is on the advisory board of the Document Foundation , the nonprofit behind LibreOffice .
The LibreOffice spreadsheet also automatically corrects math bugs in Excel—a function that gives the same wrong answer as Excel will have a corresponding function that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ duct tape stopgap solutions .
Document and request the support that you need to do the job robustly—and document it being refused .
If spreadsheets are all you have , send your staff on training courses .
Training and caution are much cheaper than a widely publicized disaster .
Particularly when lives hang in the balance .

Imagine that you’re working in a government subdepartment that tracks coronavirus infections and traces the patients’ contacts. You’ve just discovered that nearly 16,000 positive tests didn’t get into the system for a week. The people with the coronavirus know they have it, but their contacts don’t know. What do you do?
Imagine that you’re working in a government subdepartment that tracks coronavirus infections and traces the patients’ contacts. You’ve just discovered that nearly 16,000 positive tests didn’t get into the system for a week. The people with the coronavirus know they have it, but their contacts don’t know. What do you do?
We don’t have to imagine it. In the United Kingdom, 15,841 people with coronavirus infections went unreported to Serco Test and Trace, the company running the U.K. government’s coronavirus tracing program, in the week from Sept. 25 to Oct. 2, with 48,000 of their possible contacts not warned—because of errors in a data import.
Patients were told they had tested positive, but their details weren’t passed to contact tracers until 1 a.m. U.K. time on Oct. 3, and the cases were not added to official totals until Oct. 5. The cause was simple: a mistake between different formats of Excel files. The U.K.’s response to COVID-19 is widely regarded as scattershot and haphazard. So how did they get here?
Excel is a top-of-the-line spreadsheet tool. A spreadsheet is good for quickly modeling a problem—but too often, organizations cut corners and press the cardboard-and-string mock-up into production, instead of building a robust and unique system based on the Excel proof of concept.
Excel is almost universally misused for complex data processing, as in this case—because it’s already present on your work computer and you don’t have to spend months procuring new software. So almost every business has at least one critical process that relies on a years-old spreadsheet set up by past staff members that nobody left at the company understands.
That’s how the U.K. went wrong. An automated process at Public Health England (PHE) transformed the incoming private laboratory test data (which was in text-based CSV files) into Excel-format files, to pass to the Serco Test and Trace teams’ dashboards.
Unfortunately, the process produced XLS files—an outdated Excel format that went extinct in 2003—which had a limit of 65,536 rows, rather than the around 1 million-row limit in the more recent XLSX format. With several lines of data per patient, this meant a sheet could only hold 1,400 cases. Further cases just fell off the end.
Technicians at PHE monitoring the dashboards noticed on Oct. 2 that not all data that had been sent in was making it out the other end. The data was corrected the next day, and PHE announced the issue the day after.
It’s not clear if the software at PHE was an Excel spreadsheet or an in-house program using the XLS format for data interchange—the latter would explain why PHE stated that replacing it might take months—but the XLS format would have been used on the assumption that Excel was universal.
And even then, a system based on Excel-format files would have been an improvement over earlier systems—the system for keeping a count of COVID-19 cases in the U.K. was, as of May, still based on data handwritten on cards.
PHE was initially blamed for the data disaster. But the question to ask when a procedure leads to disaster is: What problem was the procedure supposed to solve in the first place? PHE’s process was broken in multiple ways; why did it exist at all?
The process that went wrong was a workaround for a contract issue: The government’s contract with Deloitte to run the testing explicitly stipulated that the company did not have to report “Pillar 2” (general public testing) positive cases to PHE at all.
Since a test-and-trace system is not possible without this data, PHE set up feeds for the data anyway, as CSV text files directly from the testing labs. The data was then put into this system—the single system that serves as the bridge between testing and tracing, for all of England. PHE had to put in place technological duct tape to make a system of life-or-death importance work at all.
Right now, Public Health England has worked around the present problem: Serco Test and Trace still takes an Excel 2003-formatted XLS spreadsheet as part of the data pipeline—but the process now uses multiple sheets, so the files don’t overflow again.
The U.K. government has used wide-ranging outsourcing to the private sector to build a COVID-19 response system quickly. But outsourcing is fraught with hazards of exactly this kind, where faulty systems are created to get around regulatory problems or cut corners
A shortage of home testing kits led to the government worrying that people would request multiple kits. Identity verification was outsourced to the credit agency TransUnion—which implemented it by running credit checks. People who couldn’t pass TransUnion’s particular credit checks were refused tests, including many who had bank accounts and were on the electoral roll, and so should have been entirely verifiable as being real people. There are 5.8 million U.K. residents who have bad credit histories and so could be refused a test kit, which disproportionately impacts the already poor and disadvantaged—with obvious implications for public health.
Many of those rejected by the credit check were told to visit testing centers at the other end of the country, such as London residents being told to go to Scotland for a test. One London resident was advised by staff at a testing center to say she lived in Aberdeen, Scotland—and this got her a test in London.
The Brookings Institution report Doomed: Challenges and solutions to government IT projects lists factors to consider when outsourcing government information technology. The outsourcing of tracking and tracing is an example where the government has assumed all of the risk, and the contractor assumes all of the profit. PHE did one thing that you should never do: It outsourced a core function. Running a call center or the office canteen? You can outsource it. Tracing a pandemic? You must run it in-house.
If you need outside expertise for a core function, use contractors working within a department. Competing with the private sector on pay can be an issue, but a meaningful project can be a powerful incentive.
This sort of error doesn’t have to happen. There’s a set of basic principles to apply for vital functions when you’re working within an unreliable organization. Site Reliability Engineering principles are lifesavers when you’re short on both human and technical resources.
The first step is fully understanding your task. Document what you need. Document whether you can get it or not. Set explicit priorities, and get signoff. Document when there are requests to drop a priority because of lack of resources.
If the data import from the labs had been checked daily, the problem would have been noticed and solved immediately. Are you cross-checking your numbers? Do you have a list of the numbers that need to be verified—and do you know what “normal” numbers look like? If you can’t get the people you need to do this work, have you documented the refusal?
Consider your software support. In the U.K., the Government Digital Service, part of the Cabinet Office, uses LibreOffice, the current version of the old OpenOffice. LibreOffice is free, though you can buy support easily. The Government Digital Service is on the advisory board of the Document Foundation, the nonprofit behind LibreOffice. The LibreOffice spreadsheet also automatically corrects math bugs in Excel—a function that gives the same wrong answer as Excel will have a corresponding function that gives the correct answer.
Document your duct tape stopgap solutions. Document and request the support that you need to do the job robustly—and document it being refused. If spreadsheets are all you have, send your staff on training courses. Training and caution are much cheaper than a widely publicized disaster. Particularly when lives hang in the balance.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-08--Coronavirus Is Pushing Lebanon Over the Brink

Coronavirus Is Pushing Lebanon Over the Brink In February , days after the first case of the coronavirus was confirmed in Lebanon , businesses proactively shut shops .
When a lockdown was imposed mid-March , people seemed willing to obey the rules .
A political uprising was underway but even protesters halted their demonstrations , realizing that if the virus spread they could not rely on a state they believed to be inefficient and corrupt .
One of the problems that had ignited the protests in the first place was a clientelistic health care system in urgent need of reform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remedy .
The blast , however , forced people to throw caution to the wind .
It left entire neighborhoods in ruins and required an emergency response .
The government was characteristically absent from relief efforts and so people poured in from different parts of the country to help pull the living from under the rubble , attend funerals , and sweep the streets .
It was almost as if the catastrophe had caused collective amnesia , and people forgot about the threat wielded by COVID-19 .
Lebanon has witnessed a 220 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The total number of infections has crossed 45,000 and more than 400 people have died .
Compared to other countries where many more have perished these figures may seem small , but for a country of just 4 million , teetering on the edge of chaos , they are an existential threat .
“ Coming days and weeks will be tough , ” warned Firass Abiad , a surgeon and manager of Rafik Hariri Hospital , the government ’ s main health care center for coronavirus patients .
Three doctors at three separate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ line said that their hospitals were now at capacity .
They are worried that patients will soon outnumber beds and that the death rate will inevitably spike .
They added that a steady infection rate of a 1,000-plus a day crossed a crucial epidemiological benchmark , and revealed that containment efforts were failing .
Moreover , many doctors and nurses who are paid in Lebanese pounds felt poorly compensated as the currency devalued by 80 percent over the past year , sending prices but not wages shooting higher .
Some are now planning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gulf where the remuneration is substantially higher .
The fact that impoverished Lebanese from the other end of the social spectrum last month are now trying to flee the country , taking migrant boats to Cyprus , received broad publicity last month when several people ( including two toddlers ) died on a fishing vessel found floating out to sea .
The incident reflected growing desperation in Lebanese society , which has not excluded those in the higher social brackets like healthcare workers .
“ The blast did it for me , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specialist at one the most prestigious hospitals in Beirut , who is caring for patients fighting the coronavirus .
“ My salary was reduced to 20 percent of what I was paid before , but when my daughters got caught in the blast it made me ask , ‘ What is important to me ?
’ That is when we decided to leave for the U.S. ” Abiad was most concerned about the flight of trained nurses and deemed it the biggest challenge in the battle against the pandemic .
“ We do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and we have heard that many of those we have are planning to leave because their salaries have depreciated significantly , ” he said .
“ I think a lack of trained professionals is going to be the biggest problem as the infections increase , which appears imminent.
” The blast rendered at least three hospitals inoperable and damaged three more , further straining the provision of essential services .
Lebanon ’ s government has reportedly tried to strike a deal with some private hospitals to make beds available to cater to an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts said all efforts would fall short if the people failed to emulate the behavior of compliance to containment rules they exhibited back in March .
This week Lebanon ’ s government imposed a local lockdown in 111 villages and towns .
This step is meant to let most people continue to earn their living while also attempting to reduce the chances of an all-out coronavirus disaster .
But it is uncertain whether it will work .
John Anton , a cafe owner in Gemmayzeh , which is not under a lockdown yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explosion , said he didn ’ t feel any safer in partial lockdown .
“ Someone from within one of those 100 locked areas can come here , how will it protect us ?
” he said .
“ And the workers here , hardly anyone wears a mark.
” Only 50 percent of Lebanese are believed to be wearing masks , according to Abiad .
The Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants , Cafes , Night-clubs & Pastries in Lebanon called for a lockdown in February even before the government , and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an industry that was already in distress .
But the damage caused by the blast weakened their resolve .
The Syndicate estimated that the reconstruction of the restaurant sector will cost no less than $ 1 billion ( in U.S. dollars ) .
In August , they refused outright to follow a new two-week government lockdown order .
“ It was because other sectors remained open , ” said Maya Bekhazi of the syndicate .
When asked if the syndicate will obey the latest instructions she first seemed uncertain but later backed them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of cases , we have to abide by the lockdown measures and allow for the coronavirus committee to do its work properly.
” Mired in a multitude of crises , the miseries of the Lebanese have been compounded by the surge in coronavirus cases .
Nabil Haddad ’ s art deco building in the heart of Gemmayzeh used to be a sought-after address in the neighborhood , until the blast .
Now full of debris , the building needs expensive refurbishment that may cost half a million dollars .
The state has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more irked by the current capital controls—his bank does not let him withdraw more than $ 2,500 a month .
“ Wood , glass , tiles , paints , concrete are all scarce and must be paid for in USD cash , ” he said .
“ So far I have not been offered or received help from any side.
” On top of the burden of procuring the material , and in his mid-seventies , Haddad has now tested positive for the coronavirus .
The Beirut port explosion did not just inflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more importantly has crushed the famous Lebanese sense of resilience .
Many talk of a loss of hope .
It is almost as if the Lebanese have reached an undetermined threshold of suffering and crossed over to despair .
In truth , there is no end in sight to their plight , as the political elite remain reluctant to usher in reforms , a precondition for an international financial bailout .
The prime minister and the replacement prime minister-designate have both resigned since the blast and yet the political overlords , warlords from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cling to power and carry on their sect-based politics with little seeming compunction .
Abdul Rahman Bizri , an infectious disease specialist and member of the emergency committee on coronavirus , said the government reopened the country mid-summer in an erratic way instead of coming up with a multidisciplinary action plan .
But as the economic situation worsened , “ the question was what to prioritize—business or health ?
” he said .
Between putting food on the table for their loved ones and the possibility of getting infected with COVID-19 , more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the virus .

Lebanon surprised the world earlier this year when, despite being in the midst of a political and economic crisis, it seemed to have warded off the mayhem coronavirus was unleashing elsewhere. But since the explosion at Beirut’s port ripped through the city two months ago and plunged hundreds of thousands more people into extreme poverty, the virus has made a comeback. And this time around—with health care infrastructure already on the verge of being overwhelmed, and a broader political crisis that has doctors and nurses pondering whether to leave the country entirely—it will be much harder to control the contagion.
Lebanon surprised the world earlier this year when, despite being in the midst of a political and economic crisis, it seemed to have warded off the mayhem coronavirus was unleashing elsewhere. But since the explosion at Beirut’s port ripped through the city two months ago and plunged hundreds of thousands more people into extreme poverty, the virus has made a comeback. And this time around—with health care infrastructure already on the verge of being overwhelmed, and a broader political crisis that has doctors and nurses pondering whether to leave the country entirely—it will be much harder to control the contagion.
In February, days after the first case of the coronavirus was confirmed in Lebanon, businesses proactively shut shops. When a lockdown was imposed mid-March, people seemed willing to obey the rules. A political uprising was underway but even protesters halted their demonstrations, realizing that if the virus spread they could not rely on a state they believed to be inefficient and corrupt. One of the problems that had ignited the protests in the first place was a clientelistic health care system in urgent need of reform. Self-discipline was seen as the only remedy.
The blast, however, forced people to throw caution to the wind. It left entire neighborhoods in ruins and required an emergency response. The government was characteristically absent from relief efforts and so people poured in from different parts of the country to help pull the living from under the rubble, attend funerals, and sweep the streets. It was almost as if the catastrophe had caused collective amnesia, and people forgot about the threat wielded by COVID-19.
Lebanon has witnessed a 220 percent increase in coronavirus cases ever since. The total number of infections has crossed 45,000 and more than 400 people have died. Compared to other countries where many more have perished these figures may seem small, but for a country of just 4 million, teetering on the edge of chaos, they are an existential threat. “Coming days and weeks will be tough,” warned Firass Abiad, a surgeon and manager of Rafik Hariri Hospital, the government’s main health care center for coronavirus patients.
Three doctors at three separate hospitals providing COVID-19 care on the front line said that their hospitals were now at capacity. They are worried that patients will soon outnumber beds and that the death rate will inevitably spike. They added that a steady infection rate of a 1,000-plus a day crossed a crucial epidemiological benchmark, and revealed that containment efforts were failing.
Moreover, many doctors and nurses who are paid in Lebanese pounds felt poorly compensated as the currency devalued by 80 percent over the past year, sending prices but not wages shooting higher. Some are now planning to relocate to the West or the Gulf where the remuneration is substantially higher. The fact that impoverished Lebanese from the other end of the social spectrum last month are now trying to flee the country, taking migrant boats to Cyprus, received broad publicity last month when several people (including two toddlers) died on a fishing vessel found floating out to sea. The incident reflected growing desperation in Lebanese society, which has not excluded those in the higher social brackets like healthcare workers.
“The blast did it for me,” said a leading pulmonary and critical care specialist at one the most prestigious hospitals in Beirut, who is caring for patients fighting the coronavirus. “My salary was reduced to 20 percent of what I was paid before, but when my daughters got caught in the blast it made me ask, ‘What is important to me?’ That is when we decided to leave for the U.S.”
Abiad was most concerned about the flight of trained nurses and deemed it the biggest challenge in the battle against the pandemic. “We do not have many well-trained nurses in Lebanon and we have heard that many of those we have are planning to leave because their salaries have depreciated significantly,” he said. “I think a lack of trained professionals is going to be the biggest problem as the infections increase, which appears imminent.”
The blast rendered at least three hospitals inoperable and damaged three more, further straining the provision of essential services. Lebanon’s government has reportedly tried to strike a deal with some private hospitals to make beds available to cater to an increasing number of cases. But health experts said all efforts would fall short if the people failed to emulate the behavior of compliance to containment rules they exhibited back in March.
This week Lebanon’s government imposed a local lockdown in 111 villages and towns. This step is meant to let most people continue to earn their living while also attempting to reduce the chances of an all-out coronavirus disaster. But it is uncertain whether it will work. John Anton, a cafe owner in Gemmayzeh, which is not under a lockdown yet because it was fatally damaged in the explosion, said he didn’t feel any safer in partial lockdown. “Someone from within one of those 100 locked areas can come here, how will it protect us?” he said. “And the workers here, hardly anyone wears a mark.” Only 50 percent of Lebanese are believed to be wearing masks, according to Abiad.
The Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Night-clubs & Pastries in Lebanon called for a lockdown in February even before the government, and even though it meant incurring heavy losses for an industry that was already in distress. But the damage caused by the blast weakened their resolve. The Syndicate estimated that the reconstruction of the restaurant sector will cost no less than $1 billion (in U.S. dollars). In August, they refused outright to follow a new two-week government lockdown order. “It was because other sectors remained open,” said Maya Bekhazi of the syndicate. When asked if the syndicate will obey the latest instructions she first seemed uncertain but later backed them. “In view of the increasing number of cases, we have to abide by the lockdown measures and allow for the coronavirus committee to do its work properly.”
Mired in a multitude of crises, the miseries of the Lebanese have been compounded by the surge in coronavirus cases. Nabil Haddad’s art deco building in the heart of Gemmayzeh used to be a sought-after address in the neighborhood, until the blast. Now full of debris, the building needs expensive refurbishment that may cost half a million dollars. The state has not offered him help but he is more irked by the current capital controls—his bank does not let him withdraw more than $2,500 a month. “Wood, glass, tiles, paints, concrete are all scarce and must be paid for in USD cash,” he said. “So far I have not been offered or received help from any side.” On top of the burden of procuring the material, and in his mid-seventies, Haddad has now tested positive for the coronavirus.
The Beirut port explosion did not just inflict financial costs, but also and perhaps more importantly has crushed the famous Lebanese sense of resilience. Many talk of a loss of hope. It is almost as if the Lebanese have reached an undetermined threshold of suffering and crossed over to despair. In truth, there is no end in sight to their plight, as the political elite remain reluctant to usher in reforms, a precondition for an international financial bailout. The prime minister and the replacement prime minister-designate have both resigned since the blast and yet the political overlords, warlords from the civil war era, continue to cling to power and carry on their sect-based politics with little seeming compunction.
Abdul Rahman Bizri, an infectious disease specialist and member of the emergency committee on coronavirus, said the government reopened the country mid-summer in an erratic way instead of coming up with a multidisciplinary action plan. But as the economic situation worsened, “the question was what to prioritize—business or health?” he said. Between putting food on the table for their loved ones and the possibility of getting infected with COVID-19, more Lebanese seem to be taking their chances with the virus.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--COVID-19 Might Not Change the World

COVID-19 Might Not Change the World

COVID-19 Might Not Change the World How will the COVID-19 pandemic reshape the world order ?
The honest answer is that no one knows .
There are many possible futures at this point .
The best policymakers can do is to avoid myths that obstruct their thinking and examine alternatives that help them focus on the most important questions .
Sometimes estimates are wrong , but it is useful to structure policy thinking in a way that allows leaders to learn from mistakes as well as successes .
In estimating the effects of the current pandemic , one must begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not known .
This coronavirus is new , and scientists are still trying to understand its biology and epidemiology .
No one knows how long it will persist nor when or in what forms it might recur .
Nor is it clear which , if any , vaccines will be effective—or for how long—or how they will be distributed globally .
The extent and duration of the economic dislocations that the pandemic is causing are unknown , but the effects on the global economy may be prolonged .
A deep depression is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but any estimates of the timing of economic revival are complicated by the dependence of economies on our uncertain human effectiveness in controlling the virus .
History can be a useful guide , but it can also be misleading .
It is a common refrain that prior pandemics have been turning points .
Historians point out that Periclean Athens was so severely weakened by a plague that it lost to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War or that the 14th-century pandemic that killed at least a third of Europe ’ s population contributed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ century ago , the Great Influenza killed an estimated 50 million people ( including 600,000 Americans ) —more than twice the number of fatalities caused by World War I .
Viral mutations of that pandemic persist to this day , but most historians attribute the important geopolitical changes of the ensuing decades—such as the rise of communism and fascism—to the war and its aftermath , rather than the pandemic .
The Great Influenza probably contributed to cultural changes such as increased nihilism in the 1920s , but soldiers fighting and dying in French @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even though the pandemic killed more people , its effects were overshadowed by the impact of the war , including governments ’ wartime censorship of pandemic deaths .
It is therefore essential to dispose of certain myths about the current pandemic .
And even if the pandemic has major effects domestically in the United States , not all those effects will cause geopolitical change .
The coronavirus has already had a profound impact on how we live , work , and move about .
It is likely to have lasting effects on employment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ education , and social attitudes .
It has exposed the inadequacy of health care systems and the inequality of its effects .
If these social changes increase political polarization , chaos , or paralysis , they may affect U.S. foreign policy and geopolitics , but they may also lead to domestic political reforms without changing foreign policy at all .
A second myth that can obstruct careful analysis is the oft-expressed view that COVID-19 will spell the end of the era of globalization that followed World War II .
Globalization—or interdependence across continents—results @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communications technology that are unlikely to cease .
The types of travel and communication may alter , but they will not stop .
Air travel may decline , but the world will not become virtual .
Some aspects of economic globalization such as trade may be curtailed , while others such as financial flows may be less so .
And it is important to distinguish economic from ecological globalization .
While economic globalization is influenced by the laws of governments , ecological aspects of globalization , such as climate change , are determined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Walls , weapons , and tariffs do not stop transnational ecological effects , though barriers to travel and persistent economic stagnation might slow them down .
The effects of the pandemic on social globalization are also unclear .
Legal immigration may slow in the aftermath of the pandemic , but illegal immigration across the Mediterranean , for example , may depend more on climate change in the Sahel than on the COVID-19 pandemic .
Even with stringent border controls , illegal flows of people will increase if their home countries become uninhabitable .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that some economic supply chains related to national security will become more regionalized and security concerns may lead companies and governments to think of structuring some inventories more for “ just in case ” rather than “ just in time.
” But short of war , these security adjustments are unlikely to disrupt all global supply chains or international trade , and even if they did , they would not end global ecological interdependence or stop a surge of climate refugees in the case of a natural disaster .
A third myth is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of liberal democracy and the rise to dominance of an authoritarian political model that is able to impose draconian measures related to testing , quarantine , and isolation .
Sometimes this is reinforced by the example of China ’ s success in controlling the spread of the virus—after a disastrous beginning—compared with the United States ’ failure to do so .
But one should not generalize from two countries with highly idiosyncratic leaders .
Democracies such as Germany and New Zealand performed better than autocracies like Russia .
And among democracies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Angela Merkel did better than countries led by politicians with authoritarian tendencies like Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro .
It is true that illiberal populists like Viktor Orban in Hungary have used the public health crisis to strengthen their authoritarian control , but if not the coronavirus , they likely would have found another pretext .
Similarly , while privacy experts worry that contract tracing apps could further the rise of the surveillance state , the threats to privacy that they rightly fear existed before the pandemic and will continue after it .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ existing trend .
On the other hand , prolonged economic disruption in some emerging economies may set back their conditions for democratic governance .
African countries like Ethiopia and Burundi have already used COVID-19 as an excuse to delay or distort scheduled elections .
The trend toward a reduction in the number of democracies that was already underway before COVID-19 may be enhanced somewhat by the pandemic .
A fourth myth is that the pandemic has given China a long-term advantage in soft power over the United States .
Some people believe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy to a positive 2.5 percent growth rate for 2020—while the United States ’ economic performance is likely to be negative 4 percent—and its soft power offensive of constructing a positive narrative through economic and health aid to other countries have tipped the reputational balance for the coming decade .
However , in estimating the balance in 2030 , one must be careful not to simply project short-term trends .
It is not surprising that global public opinion polls rank China low in soft power .
It ’ s difficult to combine benign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wolf warrior diplomacy ” and repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong at the same time .
The incompetent U.S. response certainly hurt American soft power , which polls showed already declining under the Trump administration after 2017 .
The president ’ s inconsistent pandemic policies , both before and after becoming infected with the virus , only added to the decline .
But such trends have reversed in the past .
For example , the United States recovered its soft power in the decades that followed a low point in the Vietnam War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statistics for political reasons , and engaged in vigorous propaganda—all in an attempt to obscure its early failures and depict its response to the pandemic as benign .
However , when it comes to soft power , China starts from a weak position .
Beijing has created its own obstacles by exacerbating territorial disputes with neighboring countries and by its insistence on repressive party control , which prevents the full talents of civil society from being unleashed in the way that happens in democracies .
China ’ s censorship of doctors early in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home and abroad .
It is not surprising that global public opinion polls rank China low in soft power .
It is difficult to combine benign “ face mask diplomacy ” with a nationalistic “ wolf warrior diplomacy ” and repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong at the same time .
Clearing away these myths does not prove there is a high probability of geopolitical continuity .
Wars , the collapse of democracy in certain countries , or another more serious pandemic could all have overwhelming effects .
History is rife with policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the great powers expected a third Balkan war from which the troops would be home by Christmas but instead saw four years of horror and the collapse of four empires .
If a continuity hypothesis turns out to be wrong , that outcome seems at this point unlikely to be caused by the COVID-19 pandemic any more than the disasters of the 1930s were caused by the Great Influenza .
In geopolitics , some big causes—no matter how unpleasant—may not always produce big effects .

How will the COVID-19 pandemic reshape the world order? The honest answer is that no one knows. There are many possible futures at this point. The best policymakers can do is to avoid myths that obstruct their thinking and examine alternatives that help them focus on the most important questions. Sometimes estimates are wrong, but it is useful to structure policy thinking in a way that allows leaders to learn from mistakes as well as successes.
How will the COVID-19 pandemic reshape the world order? The honest answer is that no one knows. There are many possible futures at this point. The best policymakers can do is to avoid myths that obstruct their thinking and examine alternatives that help them focus on the most important questions. Sometimes estimates are wrong, but it is useful to structure policy thinking in a way that allows leaders to learn from mistakes as well as successes.
In estimating the effects of the current pandemic, one must begin with humility about the extent of what is not known. This coronavirus is new, and scientists are still trying to understand its biology and epidemiology. No one knows how long it will persist nor when or in what forms it might recur. Nor is it clear which, if any, vaccines will be effective—or for how long—or how they will be distributed globally.
The extent and duration of the economic dislocations that the pandemic is causing are unknown, but the effects on the global economy may be prolonged. A deep depression is likely to have significant political effects, but any estimates of the timing of economic revival are complicated by the dependence of economies on our uncertain human effectiveness in controlling the virus.
History can be a useful guide, but it can also be misleading. It is a common refrain that prior pandemics have been turning points. Historians point out that Periclean Athens was so severely weakened by a plague that it lost to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War or that the 14th-century pandemic that killed at least a third of Europe’s population contributed to the end of feudalism.
But a century ago, the Great Influenza killed an estimated 50 million people (including 600,000 Americans)—more than twice the number of fatalities caused by World War I. Viral mutations of that pandemic persist to this day, but most historians attribute the important geopolitical changes of the ensuing decades—such as the rise of communism and fascism—to the war and its aftermath, rather than the pandemic.
The Great Influenza probably contributed to cultural changes such as increased nihilism in the 1920s, but soldiers fighting and dying in French trenches may have been more important. Even though the pandemic killed more people, its effects were overshadowed by the impact of the war, including governments’ wartime censorship of pandemic deaths. It is therefore essential to dispose of certain myths about the current pandemic.
The first myth to avoid is the notion that pandemics are always transformative historical turning points. Sometimes they are, sometimes not. People have a tendency to assume that big causes must have big effects. But the example of 1918 shows that this is too simple. COVID-19 is a very big cause, but that does not reveal what the magnitude or nature of its effects will be.
And even if the pandemic has major effects domestically in the United States, not all those effects will cause geopolitical change. The coronavirus has already had a profound impact on how we live, work, and move about. It is likely to have lasting effects on employment, the location of economic activity, education, and social attitudes. It has exposed the inadequacy of health care systems and the inequality of its effects. If these social changes increase political polarization, chaos, or paralysis, they may affect U.S. foreign policy and geopolitics, but they may also lead to domestic political reforms without changing foreign policy at all.
A second myth that can obstruct careful analysis is the oft-expressed view that COVID-19 will spell the end of the era of globalization that followed World War II. Globalization—or interdependence across continents—results in part from changes in transportation and communications technology that are unlikely to cease. The types of travel and communication may alter, but they will not stop. Air travel may decline, but the world will not become virtual.
Some aspects of economic globalization such as trade may be curtailed, while others such as financial flows may be less so. And it is important to distinguish economic from ecological globalization. While economic globalization is influenced by the laws of governments, ecological aspects of globalization, such as climate change, are determined more by the laws of physics.
Walls, weapons, and tariffs do not stop transnational ecological effects, though barriers to travel and persistent economic stagnation might slow them down. The effects of the pandemic on social globalization are also unclear. Legal immigration may slow in the aftermath of the pandemic, but illegal immigration across the Mediterranean, for example, may depend more on climate change in the Sahel than on the COVID-19 pandemic. Even with stringent border controls, illegal flows of people will increase if their home countries become uninhabitable.
What seems likely at this point is that some economic supply chains related to national security will become more regionalized and security concerns may lead companies and governments to think of structuring some inventories more for “just in case” rather than “just in time.” But short of war, these security adjustments are unlikely to disrupt all global supply chains or international trade, and even if they did, they would not end global ecological interdependence or stop a surge of climate refugees in the case of a natural disaster.
A third myth is the widespread view that COVID-19 spells the end of liberal democracy and the rise to dominance of an authoritarian political model that is able to impose draconian measures related to testing, quarantine, and isolation. Sometimes this is reinforced by the example of China’s success in controlling the spread of the virus—after a disastrous beginning—compared with the United States’ failure to do so. But one should not generalize from two countries with highly idiosyncratic leaders.
Democracies such as Germany and New Zealand performed better than autocracies like Russia. And among democracies, countries with pragmatic leaders like Germany under Angela Merkel did better than countries led by politicians with authoritarian tendencies like Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro.
It is true that illiberal populists like Viktor Orban in Hungary have used the public health crisis to strengthen their authoritarian control, but if not the coronavirus, they likely would have found another pretext. Similarly, while privacy experts worry that contract tracing apps could further the rise of the surveillance state, the threats to privacy that they rightly fear existed before the pandemic and will continue after it. At most, the pandemic may accentuate an existing trend.
On the other hand, prolonged economic disruption in some emerging economies may set back their conditions for democratic governance. African countries like Ethiopia and Burundi have already used COVID-19 as an excuse to delay or distort scheduled elections. The trend toward a reduction in the number of democracies that was already underway before COVID-19 may be enhanced somewhat by the pandemic.
A fourth myth is that the pandemic has given China a long-term advantage in soft power over the United States. Some people believe that China’s competence in restoring its economy to a positive 2.5 percent growth rate for 2020—while the United States’ economic performance is likely to be negative 4 percent—and its soft power offensive of constructing a positive narrative through economic and health aid to other countries have tipped the reputational balance for the coming decade. However, in estimating the balance in 2030, one must be careful not to simply project short-term trends.
It is not surprising that global public opinion polls rank China low in soft power. It’s difficult to combine benign “face mask diplomacy” with “wolf warrior diplomacy” and repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong at the same time.
The incompetent U.S. response certainly hurt American soft power, which polls showed already declining under the Trump administration after 2017. The president’s inconsistent pandemic policies, both before and after becoming infected with the virus, only added to the decline. But such trends have reversed in the past. For example, the United States recovered its soft power in the decades that followed a low point in the Vietnam War. China has provided aid, manipulated statistics for political reasons, and engaged in vigorous propaganda—all in an attempt to obscure its early failures and depict its response to the pandemic as benign.
However, when it comes to soft power, China starts from a weak position. Beijing has created its own obstacles by exacerbating territorial disputes with neighboring countries and by its insistence on repressive party control, which prevents the full talents of civil society from being unleashed in the way that happens in democracies. China’s censorship of doctors early in the coronavirus outbreak is remembered both at home and abroad. It is not surprising that global public opinion polls rank China low in soft power. It is difficult to combine benign “face mask diplomacy” with a nationalistic “wolf warrior diplomacy” and repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong at the same time.
Clearing away these myths does not prove there is a high probability of geopolitical continuity. Wars, the collapse of democracy in certain countries, or another more serious pandemic could all have overwhelming effects. History is rife with policy miscalculations and surprises—witness August 1914, when the great powers expected a third Balkan war from which the troops would be home by Christmas but instead saw four years of horror and the collapse of four empires.
If a continuity hypothesis turns out to be wrong, that outcome seems at this point unlikely to be caused by the COVID-19 pandemic any more than the disasters of the 1930s were caused by the Great Influenza. In geopolitics, some big causes—no matter how unpleasant—may not always produce big effects.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-09--U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran as U.N. Arms Embargo Set to Expire

U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran as U.N. Arms Embargo Set to Expire Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.N. arms embargo on Iran is set to expire , Michigan ’ s governor targeted in a kidnapping plot , and Turkey and Greece agree to talks over their eastern Mediterranean dispute .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The U.N. arms embargo on Iran is set to expire on Sunday despite repeated efforts by the United States to extend the moratorium as part of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s maximum pressure strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States was determined to ensure Iran couldn ’ t buy and sell weapons .
As the end of the arms embargo began to loom in August , Washington tried to push a resolution through the U.N. Security Council that would have extended it indefinitely .
The resolution was opposed by China and Russia , while France , Germany , and the United Kingdom abstained from the vote , isolating the United States and highlighting its marginal position on Iran .
More sanctions .
But the Trump administration has been working to preempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unleashing a new round of sanctions on Tehran .
On Thursday , the U.S. Treasury Department slapped punishing sanctions on 18 banks due to their links to Iran and the Iranian military .
“ Our sanctions programs will continue until Iran stops its support of terrorist activities and ends its nuclear programs , ” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement .
This follows a move by Washington late last month to impose sanctions on the Iranian defense ministry and others involved in the country ’ s nuclear and weapons programs , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or sell Iranian weapons .
The White House used that round of sanctions to argue that the arms embargo , in effect , had been restored .
Russia taking an interest .
Despite the introduction of new U.S. sanctions , the end of the arms embargo could open new opportunities for Iran to develop stronger ties with Russia .
In 2019 , the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that Iran would begin buying high-grade military equipment from Russia , and on Monday , Levan Jagarian , Russia ’ s ambassador to Iran , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its advanced S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran .
Michigan governor under threat .
The FBI and local authorities in Michigan have charged 13 individuals under anti-terrorism legislation over an attempt to kidnap state Governor Gretchen Whitmer , a shocking case of attempted political violence that comes as the United States is grappling with a surge of extremist activity .
Some of those charged were members of the “ Wolverine Watchmen ” militia group .
The suspects “ made threats of violence intended to instigate a civil war , and engaged in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack the capitol building of Michigan and to kidnap government officials , including the governor of Michigan , ” an official said at a press conference .
The news comes a week after U.S. President Donald Trump refused to explicitly condemn white supremacist groups during the first presidential debate , telling the Proud Boys militia group to “ stand back and stand by.
” History at the WTO .
Nigeria ’ s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and South Korea ’ s Yoo Myung-hee are the only remaining candidates to serve as the next director-general of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ body will be led by a woman for the first time in its history .
The position was narrowed down to those two after candidates from Kenya , Saudi Arabia , and the United Kingdom were eliminated .
Okonjo-Iweala is considered the favorite , and a victory would also make her the first WTO head from Africa .
She previously served as Nigeria ’ s minister of finance and spent more than two decades working at the World Bank .
The new director-general will be announced in early November .
Duque wants FARC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wants to expel two former commanders of the paramilitary Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC ) from the country ’ s congress after they admitted to being responsible for the assassination of a presidential candidate in 1995 .
Several former members of the FARC signed a letter to the Justice for Peace court last week taking responsibility for the killing .
Two signatories of the letter , Julian Gallo and Pablo Catatumbo , are current members of congress , owing to the terms laid out in the 2016 peace deal between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vehement critic of the peace agreement , and he said that the two lawmakers “ should immediately lose the connotation of being a member of Congress.
” Otherwise , he expressed hope that the justice system would deal with them .
Turkey and Greece agree to talk .
Turkey and Greece have agreed to hold exploratory talks sometime in the near future aimed at resolving their ongoing dispute in the eastern Mediterranean .
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said Turkey would host the first round of talks , but both governments were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tensions boiled over earlier this summer after Turkey sent a research vessel to survey possible oil and gas reserves in the region , where both Ankara and Athens have overlapping maritime claims .
The vessel was accompanied by a Turkish naval ship , angering Greece and sparking a tense standoff that saw both sides flex their military muscle in the area .
Although it is unclear what the outcome of the planned talks could be , there is good reason to be optimistic .
As Michaël Tanchum wrote in Foreign Policy in August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of the parties in the region and the European Union to contain the current escalation and find an off-ramp to the crisis.
” “ Home by Christmas.
” Trump said in a tweet late on Wednesday that the remaining U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan should return to the United States by Christmas , hours after National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien said the United States would reduce its troop presence in Afghanistan to 2,500 by early next year .
“ We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christmas !
” Trump said .
The phrasing of the tweet was somewhat ambiguous , but it was in line with Trump ’ s long-held goal of pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and ending the near two-decade-long war in the country .
The agreement signed with the Taliban in February committed the United States to withdrawing from the country by May 2021 .
But as the end of the U.S. involvement looms , Emran Feroz wrote in Foreign Policy that “ the war on terrorism in Afghanistan promised reconstruction , women ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the 9/11 attacks , and democracy .
All have fallen flat.
” U.S .
Senator Mike Lee , who tested positive for COVID-19 last week , published a controversial post on Twitter on Thursday in which he challenged the notion that democracy is an “ objective ” of the American political system ( he also misspelled the word “ prosperity ” in the process . )
“ Democracy isn ’ t the objective ; ” he wrote , “ liberty , peace , and prospefity [ sic ] are .
We want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy can thwart that.
” The tweet invited a torrent of criticism , with some detractors accusing Lee of closet authoritarianism .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. arms embarg o on Iran is set to expire, Michigan’s governor targeted in a kidnapping plot, and Turkey and Greece agree to talks over their eastern Mediterranean dispute .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.N. arms embargo on Iran is set to expire, Michigan’s governor targeted in a kidnapping plot, and Turkey and Greece agree to talks over their eastern Mediterranean dispute.
If you would like receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
The End of the Embargo Could Cause Iran to Turn Toward Russia
The U.N. arms embargo on Iran is set to expire on Sunday despite repeated efforts by the United States to extend the moratorium as part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s maximum pressure strategy against Tehran.
America alone. The United States was determined to ensure Iran couldn’t buy and sell weapons. As the end of the arms embargo began to loom in August, Washington tried to push a resolution through the U.N. Security Council that would have extended it indefinitely. The resolution was opposed by China and Russia, while France, Germany, and the United Kingdom abstained from the vote, isolating the United States and highlighting its marginal position on Iran.
More sanctions. But the Trump administration has been working to preempt the end of the arms embargo by unleashing a new round of sanctions on Tehran. On Thursday, the U.S. Treasury Department slapped punishing sanctions on 18 banks due to their links to Iran and the Iranian military. “Our sanctions programs will continue until Iran stops its support of terrorist activities and ends its nuclear programs,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement.
This follows a move by Washington late last month to impose sanctions on the Iranian defense ministry and others involved in the country’s nuclear and weapons programs, and included action against those who buy or sell Iranian weapons. The White House used that round of sanctions to argue that the arms embargo, in effect, had been restored.
Russia taking an interest. Despite the introduction of new U.S. sanctions, the end of the arms embargo could open new opportunities for Iran to develop stronger ties with Russia. In 2019, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that Iran would begin buying high-grade military equipment from Russia, and on Monday, Levan Jagarian, Russia’s ambassador to Iran, said his government will consider selling one of its advanced S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran.
What We’re Following Today
Michigan governor under threat. The FBI and local authorities in Michigan have charged 13 individuals under anti-terrorism legislation over an attempt to kidnap state Governor Gretchen Whitmer, a shocking case of attempted political violence that comes as the United States is grappling with a surge of extremist activity. Some of those charged were members of the “Wolverine Watchmen” militia group.
The suspects “made threats of violence intended to instigate a civil war, and engaged in planning and training for an operation to attack the capitol building of Michigan and to kidnap government officials, including the governor of Michigan,” an official said at a press conference.
The news comes a week after U.S. President Donald Trump refused to explicitly condemn white supremacist groups during the first presidential debate, telling the Proud Boys militia group to “stand back and stand by.”
History at the WTO. Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and South Korea’s Yoo Myung-hee are the only remaining candidates to serve as the next director-general of the World Trade Organization, meaning the body will be led by a woman for the first time in its history. The position was narrowed down to those two after candidates from Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom were eliminated. Okonjo-Iweala is considered the favorite, and a victory would also make her the first WTO head from Africa. She previously served as Nigeria’s minister of finance and spent more than two decades working at the World Bank. The new director-general will be announced in early November.
Duque wants FARC lawmakers out. Colombian President Ivan Duque wants to expel two former commanders of the paramilitary Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) from the country’s congress after they admitted to being responsible for the assassination of a presidential candidate in 1995. Several former members of the FARC signed a letter to the Justice for Peace court last week taking responsibility for the killing. Two signatories of the letter, Julian Gallo and Pablo Catatumbo, are current members of congress, owing to the terms laid out in the 2016 peace deal between the government and the FARC.
Duque is a vehement critic of the peace agreement, and he said that the two lawmakers “should immediately lose the connotation of being a member of Congress.” Otherwise, he expressed hope that the justice system would deal with them.
Keep an Eye On
Turkey and Greece agree to talk. Turkey and Greece have agreed to hold exploratory talks sometime in the near future aimed at resolving their ongoing dispute in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said Turkey would host the first round of talks, but both governments were still working on setting a date.
Tensions boiled over earlier this summer after Turkey sent a research vessel to survey possible oil and gas reserves in the region, where both Ankara and Athens have overlapping maritime claims. The vessel was accompanied by a Turkish naval ship, angering Greece and sparking a tense standoff that saw both sides flex their military muscle in the area. Although it is unclear what the outcome of the planned talks could be, there is good reason to be optimistic. As Michaël Tanchum wrote in Foreign Policy in August, “there are strong incentives for most of the parties in the region and the European Union to contain the current escalation and find an off-ramp to the crisis.”
“Home by Christmas.” Trump said in a tweet late on Wednesday that the remaining U.S. troops serving in Afghanistan should return to the United States by Christmas, hours after National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said the United States would reduce its troop presence in Afghanistan to 2,500 by early next year. “We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!” Trump said.
The phrasing of the tweet was somewhat ambiguous, but it was in line with Trump’s long-held goal of pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan and ending the near two-decade-long war in the country. The agreement signed with the Taliban in February committed the United States to withdrawing from the country by May 2021. But as the end of the U.S. involvement looms, Emran Feroz wrote in Foreign Policy that “the war on terrorism in Afghanistan promised reconstruction, women’s rights, economic dynamism, justice for the 9/11 attacks, and democracy. All have fallen flat.”
Odds and Ends
U.S. Senator Mike Lee, who tested positive for COVID-19 last week, published a controversial post on Twitter on Thursday in which he challenged the notion that democracy is an “objective” of the American political system (he also misspelled the word “prosperity” in the process.) “Democracy isn’t the objective;” he wrote, “liberty, peace, and prospefity [sic] are. We want the human condition to flourish. Rank democracy can thwart that.” The tweet invited a torrent of criticism, with some detractors accusing Lee of closet authoritarianism.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.