foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Lebanon Is Paralyzed by Fear of Another Civil War

Lebanon Is Paralyzed by Fear of Another Civil War During the 30 years since Lebanon ’ s civil war , the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines , mirroring the country ’ s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system .
But this political edifice has been under challenge for months .
In October , Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders , whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite .
Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blew the lid off the country ’ s sectarian fault lines .
Lebanon ’ s various communities are more suspicious of each other than at any time in recent memory .
At the center of tensions , holding the key to both chaos and peace , is Hezbollah .
It ’ s not clear how these vitriolic sectarian tensions will be resolved .
No one wants the situation to escalate into another civil war .
At a coffee shop in Ouzai , a Shiite-dominated southern suburb of Beirut barely 3 kilometers from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests , a group of Hezbollah supporters accused the protestors of being foreign agents .
Abu Ali , the owner of the cafe in his mid-50s , claimed the protestors were a front for Israeli—and by extension , American—interests , and that they had crossed a red line when they hung a noose around the effigy of Hezbollah ’ s leader , Hassan Nasrallah , demanding the group give up its weapons .
Hezbollah ’ s weapons , he said , were necessary protection for the Shiites , traditionally Lebanon ’ s poorest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nation riven with sectarian divisions .
The Shiites ’ subordinate social position dates back centuries , and reflects the support traditionally given to Christians by Western powers , and the greater wealth and influence of Sunni Muslims , particularly under their coreligionist Ottoman overlords .
The rise of Hezbollah , feared by both of those other communities , is a matter of pride for many Shiites .
Abu Ali identified himself as a supporter , rather than member , of the group—Hezbollah ’ s fighters rarely speak to journalists and present themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ direct orders from leadership .
However , two hours into a contentious interview with Foreign Policy , he revealed his identity on the condition of anonymity , admitting that not only was he a fighter with the group who had fought in the 2006 war against Israel , but that his elder son also fought in the Syrian war alongside Hezbollah , whilst the younger was in training .
As evidence , he produced half a dozen photographs : of himself at the border in army fatigues with a Hezbollah flag fluttering near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian battlefield posing with an AK-47 and an M16 ; and of his younger , 13-year-old boy , lying on the ground with his finger on the trigger of a gun and taking aim from their home in southern Lebanon at invisible Israelis .
“ Of course he knows how to shoot .
He needs to be able to guard the house if my elder son and I are not at home , ” he said of his teenage son .
“ My sons and I fight against Israelis , and we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of these protestors are backed by Israel ’ s friends in Lebanon and are on the payroll of Western embassies.
” Abu Ali tried to back up his theory by pointing to the visible economic disparity between the largely middle-class protesters and relatively poorer Shiites who could neither afford the cosmopolitan lives of their neighbors nor buy laptops , some of which Hezbollah ’ s supporters stole—or as Abu Ali liked to put it , “ confiscated ” —from protestors .
“ They chant slogans against our Sheikh Nasrallah and then drink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor then how come they have laptops ?
” Lifestyle apart , he added , all is fair game if the protestors crossed Hezbollah ’ s red lines , “ There will be a price .
Red lines are red lines.
” Hezbollah has already clashed on several occasions with the protest movement .
Most analysts assume that protest leaders and opposition factions will not want to provoke it much further , unclear as to what price Hezbollah could extract .
Many Lebanese outside the Shiite community , and some within , want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but know from bitter experience that loud opposition to the group ’ s independent control of its weaponry comes with high personal risk .
Professor Nasser Yassin of the American University of Beirut said the group would not shy away from taking over the streets , as it did in 2008 , if attacked physically .
“ If , and that is a big if , some groups ( Sunni , Christian , or Druze ) carry arms against Hezbollah , and should the Lebanese Army be reluctant to crush them , then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to control the country , 2008-style.
” In 2008 , a Saudi-supported Sunni prime minister in the country dared to shut down Hezbollah ’ s communications , giving the group the provocation it needed to demonstrate its power on the streets .
Within days , Hezbollah ’ s supporters had flooded Beirut .
The Sunnis have since been on the back foot .
Ziad Allouki , a Sunni militia commander from the northern city of Tripoli , has fought in sectarian clashes in the past but said that now his political overlords were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw action when Syria ’ s civil war briefly spilled over into Tripoli between 2011-2014 , and his Sunni fighters took on members of the city ’ s small Alawite community , coreligionists with President Assad .
Alawites are generally regarded as an offshoot of Shiism .
After those clashes , he was arrested , along with hundreds of others , and only released on condition of a promise to keep the peace .
As his fighting force was enfeebled , the same happened to the leading Sunni Muslim party , the Tayyar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Even when a UN international tribunal last month found a senior Hezbollah member guilty of the 2005 assassination of the FM ’ s former prime minister , Rafik Hariri , men like Allouki could do nothing , even if they wanted .
“ Al Mustaqbal decided not to go down to the streets , to avoid clashes with Hezbollah , to avoid the possibility of a civil war , ” Mr Allouki said .
The general perception among Sunnis in Lebanon is that their leadership both in Lebanon and in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have abandoned them to the whims of Hezbollah and its patron , Iran .
“ The absence of armed activity is due to the concessions made by our leaders , ” Mr Allouki told Foreign Policy .
Bahaa Hariri , Rafik ’ s son and older brother of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri , said the party was not ready for confrontation .
“ We called for restraint because we said we don ’ t want any issues , ” said Hariri on the phone from the United Kingdom .
When asked how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both his father and brother failed to do , he answered : “ We need to get our act together.
” There are those in Lebanese society who would prefer the Western powers to somehow take responsibility for disarming the group .
“ What can we do against their arms ?
America has the power , not us , ” said a middle-aged lady in Gemmayze , one of the neighborhoods heavily damaged in the port blast .
She refused to give her name but identified herself as a supporter of the right-wing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This group , disempowered since the civil war , strongly aligns itself with America and is accused of wanting to make peace with Israel .
Over the last two months , the protest movement has both dwindled and , particularly since the explosion , become more sectarian in tone .
“ It would be best if the Christians got a separate country and Hezbollah got their own , ” the woman said , reflecting an increasingly common sentiment in Christian areas , even if one rarely spoken on a public stage .
Dozens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their movement to seek structural change and economic reform had been infiltrated by sectarian forces , including both Hezbollah and the Lebanese military .
Many protesters say the question of Hezbollah ’ s weapons has divided the public and that they preferred it be addressed nationally only when a new governing system was in place .
Gilbert Doumit , a civil society activist who stood in the last election and lost , blamed not just Hezbollah but all sectarian leaders for bringing Lebanon back to the edge of a cliff .
“ Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have imposed on citizens the same tradeoff : We protect you and in return , we steal from you , ” he said .
“ Any time you threaten our interests we provoke a civil war under the pretext of protecting the sect.
” Analysts say that while sectarian mistrust is increasing , there is no threat of a civil war just yet —unless Hezbollah decides it wants one .
Hezbollah and its main Shiite ally , the Amal Movement , have recently staged a number of their signature motorbike parades , waving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Imam Hussain .
Shiites are currently commemorating the holy day of Ashura , during which they mourn Hussain ’ s killing .
This might normally be seen as a harmless expression of religiosity , but most Beirutis nowadays see it as an assertion of Hezbollah ’ s power : a veiled message that its boys can , if they want , take over the streets again .
Back at the coffee shop , Abu Ali says that Hezbollah does not want a civil war and that its supporters are merely trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectarian tensions do not break out .
“ If there were civil warlike conditions , then Hezbollah would attack Israel .
It is the head of all those who want violence in the country , ” said Abu Ali .
Internal peace , however , comes at the cost of accepting the hegemony of Hezbollah and its allies .
That would trap Lebanon in the crippling status quo : a failed economy and ineffective sectarian politics .

During the 30 years since Lebanon’s civil war, the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines, mirroring the country’s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system. But this political edifice has been under challenge for months. In October, Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders, whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite. Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the dominantly Christian neighborhoods in ruins, it blew the lid off the country’s sectarian fault lines.
During the 30 years since Lebanon’s civil war, the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines, mirroring the country’s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system. But this political edifice has been under challenge for months. In October, Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders, whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite. Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the dominantly Christian neighborhoods in ruins, it blew the lid off the country’s sectarian fault lines.
Lebanon’s various communities are more suspicious of each other than at any time in recent memory. At the center of tensions, holding the key to both chaos and peace, is Hezbollah. It’s not clear how these vitriolic sectarian tensions will be resolved. No one wants the situation to escalate into another civil war.
At a coffee shop in Ouzai, a Shiite-dominated southern suburb of Beirut barely 3 kilometers from the downtown neighborhood at the epicenter of the protests, a group of Hezbollah supporters accused the protestors of being foreign agents. Abu Ali, the owner of the cafe in his mid-50s, claimed the protestors were a front for Israeli—and by extension, American—interests, and that they had crossed a red line when they hung a noose around the effigy of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, demanding the group give up its weapons.
Hezbollah’s weapons, he said, were necessary protection for the Shiites, traditionally Lebanon’s poorest community, both against Israel and in a nation riven with sectarian divisions. The Shiites’ subordinate social position dates back centuries, and reflects the support traditionally given to Christians by Western powers, and the greater wealth and influence of Sunni Muslims, particularly under their coreligionist Ottoman overlords. The rise of Hezbollah, feared by both of those other communities, is a matter of pride for many Shiites.
Abu Ali identified himself as a supporter, rather than member, of the group—Hezbollah’s fighters rarely speak to journalists and present themselves as civilian supporters rather than as taking direct orders from leadership. However, two hours into a contentious interview with Foreign Policy, he revealed his identity on the condition of anonymity, admitting that not only was he a fighter with the group who had fought in the 2006 war against Israel, but that his elder son also fought in the Syrian war alongside Hezbollah, whilst the younger was in training. As evidence, he produced half a dozen photographs: of himself at the border in army fatigues with a Hezbollah flag fluttering near him; of his 23-year-old in the Syrian battlefield posing with an AK-47 and an M16; and of his younger, 13-year-old boy, lying on the ground with his finger on the trigger of a gun and taking aim from their home in southern Lebanon at invisible Israelis.
“Of course he knows how to shoot. He needs to be able to guard the house if my elder son and I are not at home,” he said of his teenage son. “My sons and I fight against Israelis, and we can never make peace with them. But most of these protestors are backed by Israel’s friends in Lebanon and are on the payroll of Western embassies.”
Abu Ali tried to back up his theory by pointing to the visible economic disparity between the largely middle-class protesters and relatively poorer Shiites who could neither afford the cosmopolitan lives of their neighbors nor buy laptops, some of which Hezbollah’s supporters stole—or as Abu Ali liked to put it, “confiscated”—from protestors. “They chant slogans against our Sheikh Nasrallah and then drink whiskey and party. If they are poor then how come they have laptops?” Lifestyle apart, he added, all is fair game if the protestors crossed Hezbollah’s red lines, “There will be a price. Red lines are red lines.”
Hezbollah has already clashed on several occasions with the protest movement. Most analysts assume that protest leaders and opposition factions will not want to provoke it much further, unclear as to what price Hezbollah could extract. Many Lebanese outside the Shiite community, and some within, want Hezbollah to merge with the army, but know from bitter experience that loud opposition to the group’s independent control of its weaponry comes with high personal risk. Professor Nasser Yassin of the American University of Beirut said the group would not shy away from taking over the streets, as it did in 2008, if attacked physically. “If, and that is a big if, some groups (Sunni, Christian, or Druze) carry arms against Hezbollah, and should the Lebanese Army be reluctant to crush them, then the group will take a swift action to control the country, 2008-style.”
In 2008, a Saudi-supported Sunni prime minister in the country dared to shut down Hezbollah’s communications, giving the group the provocation it needed to demonstrate its power on the streets. Within days, Hezbollah’s supporters had flooded Beirut. The Sunnis have since been on the back foot. Ziad Allouki, a Sunni militia commander from the northern city of Tripoli, has fought in sectarian clashes in the past but said that now his political overlords were keen to avoid escalation. Allouki last saw action when Syria’s civil war briefly spilled over into Tripoli between 2011-2014, and his Sunni fighters took on members of the city’s small Alawite community, coreligionists with President Assad. Alawites are generally regarded as an offshoot of Shiism.
After those clashes, he was arrested, along with hundreds of others, and only released on condition of a promise to keep the peace. As his fighting force was enfeebled, the same happened to the leading Sunni Muslim party, the Tayyar Al Mustaqbal or Future Movement (FM). Even when a UN international tribunal last month found a senior Hezbollah member guilty of the 2005 assassination of the FM’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, men like Allouki could do nothing, even if they wanted.
“Al Mustaqbal decided not to go down to the streets, to avoid clashes with Hezbollah, to avoid the possibility of a civil war,” Mr Allouki said. The general perception among Sunnis in Lebanon is that their leadership both in Lebanon and in the region, led by the Saudis, have abandoned them to the whims of Hezbollah and its patron, Iran. “The absence of armed activity is due to the concessions made by our leaders,” Mr Allouki told Foreign Policy. Bahaa Hariri, Rafik’s son and older brother of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, said the party was not ready for confrontation. “We called for restraint because we said we don’t want any issues,” said Hariri on the phone from the United Kingdom. When asked how it intended to disarm Hezbollah, something both his father and brother failed to do, he answered: “We need to get our act together.”
There are those in Lebanese society who would prefer the Western powers to somehow take responsibility for disarming the group. “What can we do against their arms? America has the power, not us,” said a middle-aged lady in Gemmayze, one of the neighborhoods heavily damaged in the port blast. She refused to give her name but identified herself as a supporter of the right-wing Christian faction, the Lebanese Forces. This group, disempowered since the civil war, strongly aligns itself with America and is accused of wanting to make peace with Israel.
Over the last two months, the protest movement has both dwindled and, particularly since the explosion, become more sectarian in tone. “It would be best if the Christians got a separate country and Hezbollah got their own,” the woman said, reflecting an increasingly common sentiment in Christian areas, even if one rarely spoken on a public stage. Dozens of Lebanese protestors told Foreign Policy that their movement to seek structural change and economic reform had been infiltrated by sectarian forces, including both Hezbollah and the Lebanese military.
Many protesters say the question of Hezbollah’s weapons has divided the public and that they preferred it be addressed nationally only when a new governing system was in place. Gilbert Doumit, a civil society activist who stood in the last election and lost, blamed not just Hezbollah but all sectarian leaders for bringing Lebanon back to the edge of a cliff. “Since 1990, there have been warlords who have imposed on citizens the same tradeoff: We protect you and in return, we steal from you,” he said. “Any time you threaten our interests we provoke a civil war under the pretext of protecting the sect.”
Analysts say that while sectarian mistrust is increasing, there is no threat of a civil war just yet —unless Hezbollah decides it wants one. Hezbollah and its main Shiite ally, the Amal Movement, have recently staged a number of their signature motorbike parades, waving flags of Shiism’s founding father, Imam Hussain. Shiites are currently commemorating the holy day of Ashura, during which they mourn Hussain’s killing. This might normally be seen as a harmless expression of religiosity, but most Beirutis nowadays see it as an assertion of Hezbollah’s power: a veiled message that its boys can, if they want, take over the streets again.
Back at the coffee shop, Abu Ali says that Hezbollah does not want a civil war and that its supporters are merely trying to maintain law and order, and ensure sectarian tensions do not break out. “If there were civil warlike conditions, then Hezbollah would attack Israel. It is the head of all those who want violence in the country,” said Abu Ali.
Internal peace, however, comes at the cost of accepting the hegemony of Hezbollah and its allies. That would trap Lebanon in the crippling status quo: a failed economy and ineffective sectarian politics.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--The Trump Administration Has Gone AWOL on Belarus

The Trump Administration Has Gone AWOL on Belarus During the Republican National Convention last week , the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo got a lot of attention for using public resources to travel to Israel to give a convention speech he could have delivered from his living room .
The abuse of his position for party politics was an untoward , unprofessional , and unethical contravention of longstanding norms , if not the law .
Yet in the long run , less important than what Pompeo did last week is what he didn ’ t do : stand with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last month has been a seismic political moment in Belarus , replete with dramatic scenes recalling other historic European flashpoints—Prague in 1968 , Gdansk in 1980 .
Stunning mass protests erupted in the wake of the flagrantly rigged Aug. 9 elections in which incumbent Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko—in power for a quarter century and known as “ Europe ’ s last dictator ” —claimed victory despite widespread fraud and a likely loss to opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya .
Having stepped up in July after her husband was denied registration as a candidate and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a capable if unlikely politician , and she managed to consolidate the opposition and draw huge crowds at rallies in the weeks before the election .
After Lukashenko declared himself the winner , Tsikhanouskaya fled to Lithuania , fearing for her safety .
The official U.S. reaction to the rigged election and resulting protests has been weak , but the U.S. diplomatic response is even more disappointing .
On the day after the election , Pompeo issued the obligatory statement professing to be “ deeply concerned ” about the vote that was “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reaction .
Two days later , on Aug. 12 , he addressed the Czech parliament in Prague in a 14.5-minute speech called : “ Securing Freedom in the Heart of Europe.
” In his speech , Pompeo mentioned China , the Chinese government , and the Chinese Communist Party 20 times ; he never once said the word “ Belarus.
” There has been no formal statement from the White House .
Once more , we have to wonder whether President Donald Trump is more worried about ruffling feathers in Moscow than he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national security interests .
Putin sensed the United States and Europe were not coordinated , and decided to move forward with his own agenda .
It ’ s a missed opportunity .
A different president , whether Republican or Democratic , would have had long calls with German Chancellor Angela Merkel , French President Emmanuel Macron , and Russian President Vladimir Putin .
There would have been a clear , timely , and public rejection of the election as a farce and a call for Lukashenko to negotiate with protesters and the opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working the phones and conducting shuttle diplomacy , working with the Europeans to present a united position that Lukashenko must be given an off-ramp , while communicating with the Russians that the U.S. and European position is not a matter of geopolitics but of commitment to the rights and freedoms of the Belarusian people , and all the while reaffirming publicly that the future of Belarus is for Belarusians to decide .
Instead , Pompeo and Trump have been missing in action .
And while the Europeans have moved forward with a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support victims of the regime ’ s crackdown and independent media—when Washington is absent , there is no opportunity for U.S. leadership and no opportunity for a coordinated and cooperative U.S.-European approach .
Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun deserves credit for his effort at picking up the ball fumbled by Trump and Pompeo and doing his best to run with it .
He traveled to Vilnius and Vienna in the last 10 days to meet European colleagues and opposition candidate Tsikhanouskaya , and to support the Organization for Security and Cooperation in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to mediate a negotiated solution to the political crisis .
Biegun is a skilled diplomat , and has said the right things , including at an emergency meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council last weekend , when he called for an end to the crackdown on protestors , the release of political prisoners , and new elections in which the people of Belarus are “ provided the self-determination to choose their own leaders through a truly free and fair election under independent observation.
” Unfortunately , Biegun can not do this on his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oomph ” that can only come from the White House and the secretary of state .
Pompeo ’ s belated statement this week that the United States might sanction those responsible for human rights abuses in the election ’ s wake is welcome , but falls short of a real strategy .
And that ’ s heartbreaking , because Biegun ’ s efforts are a reminder of what could be—and of the opportunity that the United States , and with it the West , may be missing .
Much has been made of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; since the early days after the election , some have been predicting that Putin would rush in with troops to reinforce Lukashenko .
But Putin ’ s initial statement—like Pompeo ’ s—was tepid .
The Russians are certainly active covertly on the ground in Minsk , but , at least until this week , Putin appeared to be holding back .
Lukashenko has skillfully played the West and Moscow against each other in recent decades , cozying up to one in order to entice concessions from the other ; this has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lukashenko as a loser who makes other autocrats , like himself , look bad by association .
And no one in the region has a more acute paranoia about popular discontent than Putin .
He has seen the crowds of hundreds of thousands in the streets of Minsk in the wake of the election .
He knows that Lukashenko lost the election , and that if he remains in office , he remains as a corpse .
In the short term , that might be ok for Putin—he has experience turning corpses into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must sooner or later be replaced .
It ’ s clear that Putin wasn ’ t immediately ready to take action to secure Lukashenko ’ s grip on power .
It ’ s unclear what alternatives Putin might have seen as acceptable .
It ’ s possible that in the weeks after the election , Putin would have been open to some sort of negotiated solution that provided a face-saving exit for Lukashenko and a new chapter for the Belarusian people .
Perhaps he would still be open to such an outcome now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ call last Sunday to invite Lukashenko to Moscow—seems to suggest that he is moving out of his “ wait and see ” phase .
If so , the explanation is not that protests have ended—on Sept. 1 , high school and university students were beset by Lukashenko ’ s thuggish security forces with dramatic violence—but may be that Putin sensed the United States and Europe were not coordinated , and decided to move forward with his own agenda .
We should not accept the Trump administration ’ s failure as the Belarusian people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be time , but given Trump and Pompeo ’ s manifest failures on so many issues , there may not be hope .
Diplomatic wins on behalf of freedom are hard enough to come by when political leaders and skilled diplomats work in concert—but they are nigh impossible when those at the top are incompetent and unprincipled .
As with so much else in the Trump administration , it is not just that they do so much that is bad—the abuse of public office , the attacks on institutions , the rampant corruption—it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chances to do good .
We may never know how big of an opportunity was lost .
But we will know that the United States failed to do what it could for 10 million people who deserve—in Pompeo ’ s own words— “ freedom in the heart of Europe.
” This is not to say that we should accept the Trump administration ’ s failure as the Belarusian people ’ s fate .
For Americans wondering what political courage they might be called upon to muster in the face of an authoritarian sabotaging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus because they are unwilling to play the fools for Lukashenko ’ s farce have been an inspiring example .
As for Americans , they can not say that they believe in universal values like freedom and human dignity and not hear the call of the Belarusian people , and can not be champions of those values without making an effort to answer it .
The Belarusian people may yet achieve the end of the Lukashenko era , but it will be in spite of the United States ’ silence , rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

During the Republican National Convention last week, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo got a lot of attention for using public resources to travel to Israel to give a convention speech he could have delivered from his living room. The abuse of his position for party politics was an untoward, unprofessional, and unethical contravention of longstanding norms, if not the law. Yet in the long run, less important than what Pompeo did last week is what he didn’t do: stand with the courageous people of Belarus.
During the Republican National Convention last week, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo got a lot of attention for using public resources to travel to Israel to give a convention speech he could have delivered from his living room. The abuse of his position for party politics was an untoward, unprofessional, and unethical contravention of longstanding norms, if not the law. Yet in the long run, less important than what Pompeo did last week is what he didn’t do: stand with the courageous people of Belarus.
The last month has been a seismic political moment in Belarus, replete with dramatic scenes recalling other historic European flashpoints—Prague in 1968, Gdansk in 1980. Stunning mass protests erupted in the wake of the flagrantly rigged Aug. 9 elections in which incumbent Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko—in power for a quarter century and known as “Europe’s last dictator”—claimed victory despite widespread fraud and a likely loss to opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Having stepped up in July after her husband was denied registration as a candidate and arrested by the regime, she proved a capable if unlikely politician, and she managed to consolidate the opposition and draw huge crowds at rallies in the weeks before the election. After Lukashenko declared himself the winner, Tsikhanouskaya fled to Lithuania, fearing for her safety.
The official U.S. reaction to the rigged election and resulting protests has been weak, but the U.S. diplomatic response is even more disappointing. On the day after the election, Pompeo issued the obligatory statement professing to be “deeply concerned” about the vote that was “neither free nor fair”—an understated reaction. Two days later, on Aug. 12, he addressed the Czech parliament in Prague in a 14.5-minute speech called: “Securing Freedom in the Heart of Europe.” In his speech, Pompeo mentioned China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese Communist Party 20 times; he never once said the word “Belarus.” There has been no formal statement from the White House. Once more, we have to wonder whether President Donald Trump is more worried about ruffling feathers in Moscow than he is about advancing democratic values and U.S. national security interests.
Putin sensed the United States and Europe were not coordinated, and decided to move forward with his own agenda.
It’s a missed opportunity. A different president, whether Republican or Democratic, would have had long calls with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. There would have been a clear, timely, and public rejection of the election as a farce and a call for Lukashenko to negotiate with protesters and the opposition. The secretary of state would be working the phones and conducting shuttle diplomacy, working with the Europeans to present a united position that Lukashenko must be given an off-ramp, while communicating with the Russians that the U.S. and European position is not a matter of geopolitics but of commitment to the rights and freedoms of the Belarusian people, and all the while reaffirming publicly that the future of Belarus is for Belarusians to decide.
Instead, Pompeo and Trump have been missing in action. And while the Europeans have moved forward with a number of laudable steps—including allocating financial resources to support victims of the regime’s crackdown and independent media—when Washington is absent, there is no opportunity for U.S. leadership and no opportunity for a coordinated and cooperative U.S.-European approach.
Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun deserves credit for his effort at picking up the ball fumbled by Trump and Pompeo and doing his best to run with it. He traveled to Vilnius and Vienna in the last 10 days to meet European colleagues and opposition candidate Tsikhanouskaya, and to support the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in its efforts to mediate a negotiated solution to the political crisis. Biegun is a skilled diplomat, and has said the right things, including at an emergency meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council last weekend, when he called for an end to the crackdown on protestors, the release of political prisoners, and new elections in which the people of Belarus are “provided the self-determination to choose their own leaders through a truly free and fair election under independent observation.” Unfortunately, Biegun cannot do this on his own—this level of statecraft requires the “oomph” that can only come from the White House and the secretary of state. Pompeo’s belated statement this week that the United States might sanction those responsible for human rights abuses in the election’s wake is welcome, but falls short of a real strategy.
We should not accept the Trump administration’s failure as the Belarusian people’s fate.
And that’s heartbreaking, because Biegun’s efforts are a reminder of what could be—and of the opportunity that the United States, and with it the West, may be missing. Much has been made of Putin’s role in all this; since the early days after the election, some have been predicting that Putin would rush in with troops to reinforce Lukashenko. But Putin’s initial statement—like Pompeo’s—was tepid. The Russians are certainly active covertly on the ground in Minsk, but, at least until this week, Putin appeared to be holding back. Lukashenko has skillfully played the West and Moscow against each other in recent decades, cozying up to one in order to entice concessions from the other; this has not endeared him to Putin. Putin sees Lukashenko as a loser who makes other autocrats, like himself, look bad by association. And no one in the region has a more acute paranoia about popular discontent than Putin. He has seen the crowds of hundreds of thousands in the streets of Minsk in the wake of the election. He knows that Lukashenko lost the election, and that if he remains in office, he remains as a corpse. In the short term, that might be ok for Putin—he has experience turning corpses into puppets—but he knows that a political corpse must sooner or later be replaced. It’s clear that Putin wasn’t immediately ready to take action to secure Lukashenko’s grip on power. It’s unclear what alternatives Putin might have seen as acceptable.
It’s possible that in the weeks after the election, Putin would have been open to some sort of negotiated solution that provided a face-saving exit for Lukashenko and a new chapter for the Belarusian people. Perhaps he would still be open to such an outcome now. But his latest move—using a birthday call last Sunday to invite Lukashenko to Moscow—seems to suggest that he is moving out of his “wait and see” phase. If so, the explanation is not that protests have ended—on Sept. 1, high school and university students were beset by Lukashenko’s thuggish security forces with dramatic violence—but may be that Putin sensed the United States and Europe were not coordinated, and decided to move forward with his own agenda.
There may still be time, but given Trump and Pompeo’s manifest failures on so many issues, there may not be hope. Diplomatic wins on behalf of freedom are hard enough to come by when political leaders and skilled diplomats work in concert—but they are nigh impossible when those at the top are incompetent and unprincipled. As with so much else in the Trump administration, it is not just that they do so much that is bad—the abuse of public office, the attacks on institutions, the rampant corruption—it is also that they miss so many chances to do good. We may never know how big of an opportunity was lost. But we will know that the United States failed to do what it could for 10 million people who deserve—in Pompeo’s own words—“freedom in the heart of Europe.”
This is not to say that we should accept the Trump administration’s failure as the Belarusian people’s fate. For Americans wondering what political courage they might be called upon to muster in the face of an authoritarian sabotaging elections, the people defiantly protesting in Belarus because they are unwilling to play the fools for Lukashenko’s farce have been an inspiring example. As for Americans, they cannot say that they believe in universal values like freedom and human dignity and not hear the call of the Belarusian people, and cannot be champions of those values without making an effort to answer it. The Belarusian people may yet achieve the end of the Lukashenko era, but it will be in spite of the United States’ silence, rather than in harmony with its commitment to freedom.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Russian Prime Minister Visits Belarus as Crisis Deepens

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Russian prime minister travels to Belarus amid political crisis , U.S. slaps sanctions on International Criminal Court officials over war crimes probe , and Trump suspends aid to Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam project .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin travels to Belarus today amid the country ’ s still worsening political crisis .
Mass protests have gripped Belarus since longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed a landslide victory in the presidential election on Aug. 9 , despite facing massive opposition to his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since launched a brutal crackdown on protesters , and opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya was forced to flee to Lithuania .
Leaning on Russia .
After previously dismissing reports that he had offered Lukashenko military support , Russian President Vladimir Putin recently confirmed that a reserve police force was established and that he was prepared to send it to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it .
Russian troops later joined Belarusian forces in a series of military exercises in Brest along the border with Poland .
As Tomasz Grzywaczewski wrote in Foreign Policy , Belarusian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change over the previous few decades , making it ripe for the sweeping political demands being made in the streets right now .
Lukashenko is consequently finding himself in an increasingly untenable position , and it appears that he has come to the realization that he can only stay in power with the backing of Russian force .
Foreign interference .
The crackdown on the opposition has been criticized from across the international community , and EU foreign ministers met late last month to approve a list of Belarusian government officials to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But Brussels has been reluctant to act , in part due to the looming threat of a Russian intervention .
Before offering Lukashenko military aid , Putin warned German Chancellor Angela Merkel against foreign countries “ meddling ” in Belarus ’ s internal affairs .
On Wednesday , Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei said that Russia ’ s strong show of support was helping to keep outside influence out .
Today ’ s meeting will underline the Kremlin ’ s support for Lukashenko .
Future meetings .
Talks are expected to intensify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin will travel to Moscow on Friday , and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that Putin would host Lukashenko “ in the next couple of weeks.
” Navalny poisoned by Novichok .
On Wednesday , the German government announced that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok , the same chemical used in other poisonings that have been blamed on the Kremlin .
The announcement seems to confirm the suspicion that Navalny was targeted for assassination due to his opposition work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Putin , fell ill after campaigning in favor of opposition figures in the Siberian city of Tomsk .
Blame quickly fell on the Kremlin , but Russian officials have denied all involvement in the suspected attack .
Last month , Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon wrote that while the poisoning was likely the work of local politicians , Putin is not blameless because he has presided over a system in which the silencing of critics is commonplace .
U.S. sanctions ICC officials .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions on senior officials in the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) , including its chief prosecutor , Fatou Bensouda .
The move comes amid an ICC probe into the United States over possible war crimes and crimes against humanity it committed in Afghanistan .
Pompeo accused the court of “ illegitimate attempts to subject Americans to its jurisdiction.
” The ICC is charged with prosecuting war crimes , crimes against humanity , and cases of genocide .
One hundred and twenty-three countries have ratified its founding statute and therefore recognize the ICC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States is a notable exception and has long been critical of the body .
Intra-Afghan talks imminent .
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said on Wednesday that his government has met all pre-conditions for the start of talks with the Taliban , namely , the release of the last of the 5,000 Taliban prisoners required by the peace deal signed between the militant group and the United States in February .
Talks were due to begin last month , but progress was stalled after the Afghan government chose to withhold the remaining 320 “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anonymous government official speaking to AFP , the government has released 200 of those prisoners , and will continue to release the remaining 120 in the coming days .
U.S. suspends aid to Ethiopia .
The United States announced on Wednesday that it is cutting $ 100 million in aid to Ethiopia over its decision to begin filling the controversial Renaissance Dam on one of the main tributaries of the Nile River .
The move comes as Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan have been in sharp disagreement over how to manage the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African Union have so far been fruitless .
The Nile supplies fresh water to both Egypt and Sudan , but the Ethiopian government has argued that damming the river is vital for its own long-term economic development .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer reported last week , a decision by Washington to cut aid could negatively impact its relations with Ethiopia , one of its key security partners in the region , and for that reason the move will likely face stiff opposition in Congress .
Qatar committed to Palestinian statehood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bin Hamad al Thani told White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner during his visit to the country that his government continues to endorse the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , an implicit rebuke of both the recent Israeli-UAE peace deal and the Trump administration ’ s support for Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank .
Kushner ’ s current Middle East tour is in part an effort to promote moves toward diplomatic normalization with Israel , following the country ’ s historic deal with the United Arab Emirates last month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is still much support for Palestinian statehood among some Arab countries .
An especially uncomfortable episode seems to have taken place behind-the-scenes of the United States ’ historic summit with North Korea in Singapore in 2018 .
In a new book describing her tenure in the Trump administration , former White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders wrote that during a meeting between U.S. and North Korean leaders , North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appeared to nod and wink at her .
“ Kim winked at you ?
” Trump said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Are you telling me Kim Jong-un hit on you !
?
!
?
” Trump , she said , then joked that “ you ’ re going to North Korea and taking one for the team !
”

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian prime minister travels to Belarus amid political crisis, U.S. slaps sanctions on International Criminal Court officials over war crimes probe, and Trump suspends aid to Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam project.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian prime minister travels to Belarus amid political crisis, U.S. slaps sanctions on International Criminal Court officials over war crimes probe, and Trump suspends aid to Ethiopia over the Renaissance Dam project.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Russia Underlines Its Support for Belarus’s Embattled President
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin travels to Belarus today amid the country’s still worsening political crisis. Mass protests have gripped Belarus since longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed a landslide victory in the presidential election on Aug. 9, despite facing massive opposition to his 26-year presidency. The security forces have since launched a brutal crackdown on protesters, and opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya was forced to flee to Lithuania.
Leaning on Russia. After previously dismissing reports that he had offered Lukashenko military support, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently confirmed that a reserve police force was established and that he was prepared to send it to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it. Russian troops later joined Belarusian forces in a series of military exercises in Brest along the border with Poland.
As Tomasz Grzywaczewski wrote in Foreign Policy, Belarusian society has undergone immense social and economic change over the previous few decades, making it ripe for the sweeping political demands being made in the streets right now. Lukashenko is consequently finding himself in an increasingly untenable position, and it appears that he has come to the realization that he can only stay in power with the backing of Russian force.
Foreign interference. The crackdown on the opposition has been criticized from across the international community, and EU foreign ministers met late last month to approve a list of Belarusian government officials to be sanctioned over their involvement in election fraud. But Brussels has been reluctant to act, in part due to the looming threat of a Russian intervention.
Before offering Lukashenko military aid, Putin warned German Chancellor Angela Merkel against foreign countries “meddling” in Belarus’s internal affairs. On Wednesday, Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei said that Russia’s strong show of support was helping to keep outside influence out. Today’s meeting will underline the Kremlin’s support for Lukashenko.
Future meetings. Talks are expected to intensify in the coming days and weeks. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin will travel to Moscow on Friday, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that Putin would host Lukashenko “in the next couple of weeks.”
What We’re Following Today
Navalny poisoned by Novichok. On Wednesday, the German government announced that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with the nerve agent Novichok, the same chemical used in other poisonings that have been blamed on the Kremlin. The announcement seems to confirm the suspicion that Navalny was targeted for assassination due to his opposition work.
Navalny, a prominent critic of President Putin, fell ill after campaigning in favor of opposition figures in the Siberian city of Tomsk. Blame quickly fell on the Kremlin, but Russian officials have denied all involvement in the suspected attack. Last month, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon wrote that while the poisoning was likely the work of local politicians, Putin is not blameless because he has presided over a system in which the silencing of critics is commonplace.
U.S. sanctions ICC officials. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on Wednesday that the United States is imposing sanctions on senior officials in the International Criminal Court (ICC), including its chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda. The move comes amid an ICC probe into the United States over possible war crimes and crimes against humanity it committed in Afghanistan. Pompeo accused the court of “illegitimate attempts to subject Americans to its jurisdiction.”
The ICC is charged with prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and cases of genocide. One hundred and twenty-three countries have ratified its founding statute and therefore recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction, though the United States is a notable exception and has long been critical of the body.
Intra-Afghan talks imminent. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said on Wednesday that his government has met all pre-conditions for the start of talks with the Taliban, namely, the release of the last of the 5,000 Taliban prisoners required by the peace deal signed between the militant group and the United States in February.
Talks were due to begin last month, but progress was stalled after the Afghan government chose to withhold the remaining 320 “hardcore” prisoners. According to an anonymous government official speaking to AFP, the government has released 200 of those prisoners, and will continue to release the remaining 120 in the coming days.
Keep an Eye On
U.S. suspends aid to Ethiopia. The United States announced on Wednesday that it is cutting $100 million in aid to Ethiopia over its decision to begin filling the controversial Renaissance Dam on one of the main tributaries of the Nile River. The move comes as Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been in sharp disagreement over how to manage the dam, and talks led by the African Union have so far been fruitless. The Nile supplies fresh water to both Egypt and Sudan, but the Ethiopian government has argued that damming the river is vital for its own long-term economic development.
As Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer reported last week, a decision by Washington to cut aid could negatively impact its relations with Ethiopia, one of its key security partners in the region, and for that reason the move will likely face stiff opposition in Congress.
Qatar committed to Palestinian statehood. Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani told White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner during his visit to the country that his government continues to endorse the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an implicit rebuke of both the recent Israeli-UAE peace deal and the Trump administration’s support for Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.
Kushner’s current Middle East tour is in part an effort to promote moves toward diplomatic normalization with Israel, following the country’s historic deal with the United Arab Emirates last month. But Tamim’s remarks suggest there is still much support for Palestinian statehood among some Arab countries.
Odds and Ends
An especially uncomfortable episode seems to have taken place behind-the-scenes of the United States’ historic summit with North Korea in Singapore in 2018. In a new book describing her tenure in the Trump administration, former White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders wrote that during a meeting between U.S. and North Korean leaders, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un appeared to nod and wink at her.
“Kim winked at you?” Trump said when Sanders shared the incident with him. “Are you telling me Kim Jong-un hit on you!?!?” Trump, she said, then joked that “you’re going to North Korea and taking one for the team!”
That’s it for today.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Trump Has a Fix for Kosovo. He’s Ignoring It.

Trump Has a Fix for Kosovo .
He ’ s Ignoring It .
The White House is hosting the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo this week for what is billed as a major negotiation .
The outcome , however , is likely to be underwhelming .
Even if the Trump administration manages to broker a deal on mutual investment and economic cooperation , the heavy burden of convincing Serbia to normalize relations with its bitterly departed former province is left to the EU .
The current negotiation is essentially posturing : Serbia pretends to engage in earnest and Kosovo pretends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Much-needed economic growth , if it comes , will not alter that .
Without a course correction , the talks will ultimately devolve to the same question of “ compensating ” Belgrade for the loss of Kosovo that led to the destabilizing land swap the administration backed until last year .
Fortunately , a completely new approach is available , inspired by the recent UAE-Israel breakthrough .
In both situations , a common threat—Iran in the Middle East , and Russia , China , and Turkey in Europe —can convert an intractable problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s violations of sovereignty from the Baltics to the Balkans , from Ukraine to the United Kingdom , have turned the Kosovo case into a catalyst .
The alarming prospect of pro-Russian forces sharing power in a NATO ally , Montenegro , after this week ’ s stunning elections reinforces the urgency of finally breaking Moscow ’ s chokehold over Kosovo and the region .
A standing US-EU-NATO dialogue on sovereignty , territorial integrity , and human rights would strengthen international norms against secession , creating space for full recognition of Kosovo by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would open the door for Pristina ’ s accession to NATO , circumventing the Russo-Chinese UN Security Council veto and closing the Kosovo question .
Rather than grasp reality and create a pathway for Kosovo ’ s recognition , the Trump administration clings to the same religious belief in “ economic normalization ” that undergirded its failed so-called deal of the century .
No matter the scope of the administration ’ s economic deal unveiled this week , it will not transform relations between Serbia and Kosovo .
Unlike the UAE ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo ’ s economy is simply too small to matter to its larger neighbor .
Increased trade without increased competitiveness could actually make things worse for Kosovo , which runs the biggest trade deficit in the region .
While the administration ’ s infrastructure projects could create jobs in a region that desperately needs them , a massive infusion of funds could exacerbate the endemic corruption in the region .
In the end , the negotiating theatrics will continue as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic happily participates in economic projects while continuing to prolong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attracting investment is completing the rigorous accession process for NATO and EU membership .
Serbia can not enter the EU until it normalizes relations with Kosovo .
And Kosovo can neither begin the NATO or EU process , or fully enter the international system , until Serbia lifts its diplomatic blockade .
In other words , the political obstacle that the administration skirts – mutual recognition—is also the primary obstacle to economic growth .
Nor will the far-off promise of EU membership bring Serbia around to recognition anytime soon .
Belgrade has closed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , making a planned 2025 accession date even more implausible .
Under autocratic Vucic , trends are in the wrong direction .
For the first time since it opened EU negotiations in 2013 , Serbia has gone a full six months without opening a new chapter .
Besides , Vucic has declared that EU membership alone – the West ’ s biggest carrot — is not enough to convince Serbia to recognize Kosovo , a reminder of the persistent appeal of partition .
China and Russia are proving more congenial partners for Vucic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ strategic anchor ” for Beijing ’ s wider regional and European ambitions .
The relationship spans the economic , defense , and security sectors , effected mainly through Chinese loans .
And contrary to speculation in Belgrade about a supposed break with Moscow , the two capitals remain in close alignment on Kosovo .
In June , Vucic and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov each stated that any deal over Kosovo would have the consent of both Russia and Serbia .
In fact , the longstanding stalemate over Kosovo endures for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Serbia receives from Russia and China .
By staunchly blocking Kosovo ’ s UN membership , these two Security Council members sustain Belgrade ’ s rejectionism , ensuring that negotiations proceed on Serbian terms and revolve around seeking Belgrade ’ s assent .
The US and EU must create a completely new framework whereby Serbia can no longer deny Kosovo access to the international system .
The aim is not to punish Belgrade , but to finally enable the parties to negotiate on a level playing field .
In this new context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentive , with US and EU assistance , to negotiate protections of its permanent , legitimate interests in a sovereign , integral and equal Kosovo—not dictate its division .
Relieving Belgrade of the ability—and need—to deny Kosovo its ambitions would allow Pristina to make concessions , symbolic and practical , that would honor Serbia ’ s permanent connection to its former province .
The UAE shift—putting aside a futile negotiation in favor of third-party diplomatic recognition—achieves that aim .
Taking the UAE role are the four EU countries that do not yet recognize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Greece .
Cyprus , which also doesn ’ t recognize Kosovo , is unnecessary at this point .
Cyprus is not a member of NATO and , as Kosovo expert and ambassador Lulzim Peci has observed , the republic ’ s NATO accession is all that matters now .
NATO membership would provide Kosovo with what it needs most : security , stability , and international legitimacy , attained through a Euro-Atlantic perspective .
UN membership , as shown by three precedents , is not required to join NATO .
Accession @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steppingstone to fulfillment of the lengthier process of joining the EU , which also poses no UN membership requirement .
Even beginning the NATO track would be a signal of stability to foreign investors , more potent than anything the Trump administration is proposing .
Opening Kosovo ’ s pathway to NATO would infuriate Putin , but his options would be limited .
Moscow shrinks from direct military confrontation with NATO , particularly so far from the Russian border .
Instead , Moscow would likely boost its military relationship with Belgrade , supplying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Beijing , too , would likely step up military cooperation with Belgrade .
All this would leave Vucic with a dilemma .
Russian and Chinese armaments would do nothing to stop Kosovo ’ s growing international legitimacy , precisely what Belgrade fears most .
Any bid to spark anti- unrest by Kosovo Serbs against KFOR , the NATO peacekeeping force , would violate Belgrade ’ s commitments under the 1999 Kumanovo agreement , which ended NATO ’ s hostilities with Serbia .
On the other hand , freed from political dependence on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its strategic orientation .
The US conducts more joint military operations with Serbia than Russia does .
The US , EU , and NATO could assist Serbia in managing its concerns about the Presevo Valley , where Serbia has established its biggest military base and where about 50,000 ethnic Albanians live across the border from Kosovo .
Serbia ’ s arms industry would benefit from adopting NATO standards .
Relieved of the need to divide Kosovo , Belgrade could focus on a shared Western agenda to secure the standing of Kosovo Serbs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Serb experts have produced detailed , off-the-shelf plans , endorsed by EU officials , awaiting only the sides ’ agreement .
In other words , the most intractable , unsettling conflict in the Balkans could be resolved if four EU-NATO countries recognize Kosovo .
Geopolitical forces increasingly put Washington and Brussels into convergence with those non-recognizers .
Anxiety over separatism is what drives fears of a Kosovo parallel in Spain , Slovakia , and Romania .
Washington has no wish to see Catalan secede from Spain , or watch ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that matter ) —backed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban , the revanchist and Moscow ally—mount secessionist campaigns .
Nor does Washington want to witness other European countries fracture in Kremlin-supported divisiveness .
In the case of Scotland ’ s potential secession from the United Kingdom—a step that President Vladimir Putin promotes after supporting Brexit—there is a strong possibility that the U.K. ’ s nuclear deterrent could be lost .
The United States now has a strategic interest in keeping Europe—and individual European states—whole and free .
It ’ s time for Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individual cases and lead a trans-Atlantic effort to refine state sovereignty in a way that discourages secession while maintaining commitment to human rights .
The standing U.S.-EU-NATO Dialogue on Sovereignty , Territorial Integrity and Human Rights would produce a formal document setting out core principles and practical steps to define and promote the shared commitment to state order , and to the expression of self-determination within it , leaving secession for extreme cases .
This is entirely consistent with Kosovo ’ s independence .
The U.N. Charter favors territorial integrity and international law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ space for exceptions—which Kosovo easily fills .
Following Serbia ’ s request , the International Court of Justice ruled in 2010 that Kosovo ’ s declaration of independence violated neither international law nor the governing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 .
The Court said that its decision did not address the question of self-determination and remedial secession , clearly signaling that the case was not a precedent .
Ironically , it was Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic who conceded this point in the U.N. General Assembly , insisting that the court ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from serving as a deeply problematic precedent in any part of the globe where secessionist ambitions are harbored.
” There are at least a dozen elements in the drive for Kosovo ’ s independence that are glaringly absent from any current European secessionist movement , including years of state-sponsored repression and denial of political rights .
Unlike Catalonia , which this year played the key parliamentary role in forming Spain ’ s government , Kosovo has never been offered commensurate political representation in Serbia ’ s parliament .
While Belgrade did not consent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was hardly unilateral .
The United States and the majority of the EU strongly backed it , insisting on a constitution with strong protections for Kosovo ’ s Serbs .
No remotely similar experience exists in Europe to include Crimea , site of another specious parallel repeatedly drawn by Putin .
As the EU ’ s Foreign Minister Josep Borrell once stated when he fulfilled the same role for Spain , “ Catalonia is not a colony , it is not occupied , it is not a state like Kosovo .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Borrell could chair the Territorial Integrity and Human Rights Dialogue , sending a strong signal to Moscow , Madrid , and Barcelona that the trans-Atlantic community is firmly opposed to dismemberment of Spain or other European countries .
This powerful international alignment against ethno-territorial demands would be supplemented by diplomatic gestures .
Washington could help Athens obtain final agreement from Albania on maritime rights .
The United States and the EU could help Bucharest check illegal ethnic Hungarian paramilitary efforts , including the financing and planning of minor terrorist attacks , reportedly supported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Orban ’ s revanchist tactics could build confidence in both Bratislava and Bucharest .
In sum , the way for the EU-NATO four to isolate the Kosovo case is to accept it—underscoring its many convincing distinctions—while working with allies to strengthen and embrace the norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity .
Doing so would relieve the EU of the complication of having both its Foreign Minister , Borrell , and its Special Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo , Miroslav Lajcak of Slovakia , hail from non-recognizing states .
Like most governments , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Athens may flinch at taking political risk .
But unlike Abu Dhabi , they face no reprisals from Iran or Turkey , or potentially from jihadists .
Working with the United States and fellow EU and NATO members , these governments could rid themselves of a burden while liberating a country , stabilizing a region , and unifying a continent .

The White House is hosting the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo this week for what is billed as a major negotiation. The outcome, however, is likely to be underwhelming. Even if the Trump administration manages to broker a deal on mutual investment and economic cooperation, the heavy burden of convincing Serbia to normalize relations with its bitterly departed former province is left to the EU. The current negotiation is essentially posturing: Serbia pretends to engage in earnest and Kosovo pretends to have an avenue toward recognition. Much-needed economic growth, if it comes, will not alter that.
The White House is hosting the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo this week for what is billed as a major negotiation. The outcome, however, is likely to be underwhelming. Even if the Trump administration manages to broker a deal on mutual investment and economic cooperation, the heavy burden of convincing Serbia to normalize relations with its bitterly departed former province is left to the EU. The current negotiation is essentially posturing: Serbia pretends to engage in earnest and Kosovo pretends to have an avenue toward recognition. Much-needed economic growth, if it comes, will not alter that.
Without a course correction, the talks will ultimately devolve to the same question of “compensating” Belgrade for the loss of Kosovo that led to the destabilizing land swap the administration backed until last year. Fortunately, a completely new approach is available, inspired by the recent UAE-Israel breakthrough.
In both situations, a common threat—Iran in the Middle East, and Russia, China, and Turkey in Europe —can convert an intractable problem into a unifying solution. Moscow’s violations of sovereignty from the Baltics to the Balkans, from Ukraine to the United Kingdom, have turned the Kosovo case into a catalyst. The alarming prospect of pro-Russian forces sharing power in a NATO ally, Montenegro, after this week’s stunning elections reinforces the urgency of finally breaking Moscow’s chokehold over Kosovo and the region. A standing US-EU-NATO dialogue on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights would strengthen international norms against secession, creating space for full recognition of Kosovo by all EU and NATO members. This would open the door for Pristina’s accession to NATO, circumventing the Russo-Chinese UN Security Council veto and closing the Kosovo question.
Rather than grasp reality and create a pathway for Kosovo’s recognition, the Trump administration clings to the same religious belief in “economic normalization” that undergirded its failed so-called deal of the century. No matter the scope of the administration’s economic deal unveiled this week, it will not transform relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Unlike the UAE’s and Israel’s matched economies, Kosovo’s economy is simply too small to matter to its larger neighbor. Increased trade without increased competitiveness could actually make things worse for Kosovo, which runs the biggest trade deficit in the region. While the administration’s infrastructure projects could create jobs in a region that desperately needs them, a massive infusion of funds could exacerbate the endemic corruption in the region. In the end, the negotiating theatrics will continue as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic happily participates in economic projects while continuing to prolong the talks.
The proven method for attracting investment is completing the rigorous accession process for NATO and EU membership. Serbia cannot enter the EU until it normalizes relations with Kosovo. And Kosovo can neither begin the NATO or EU process, or fully enter the international system, until Serbia lifts its diplomatic blockade. In other words, the political obstacle that the administration skirts – mutual recognition—is also the primary obstacle to economic growth.
Nor will the far-off promise of EU membership bring Serbia around to recognition anytime soon. Belgrade has closed only two of 35 required reform chapters, making a planned 2025 accession date even more implausible. Under autocratic Vucic, trends are in the wrong direction. For the first time since it opened EU negotiations in 2013, Serbia has gone a full six months without opening a new chapter. Besides, Vucic has declared that EU membership alone – the West’s biggest carrot — is not enough to convince Serbia to recognize Kosovo, a reminder of the persistent appeal of partition.
China and Russia are proving more congenial partners for Vucic than the West. Serbia is now the “strategic anchor” for Beijing’s wider regional and European ambitions. The relationship spans the economic, defense, and security sectors, effected mainly through Chinese loans. And contrary to speculation in Belgrade about a supposed break with Moscow, the two capitals remain in close alignment on Kosovo. In June, Vucic and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov each stated that any deal over Kosovo would have the consent of both Russia and Serbia. In fact, the longstanding stalemate over Kosovo endures for only one reason: the diplomatic backing that Serbia receives from Russia and China. By staunchly blocking Kosovo’s UN membership, these two Security Council members sustain Belgrade’s rejectionism, ensuring that negotiations proceed on Serbian terms and revolve around seeking Belgrade’s assent.
The US and EU must create a completely new framework whereby Serbia can no longer deny Kosovo access to the international system. The aim is not to punish Belgrade, but to finally enable the parties to negotiate on a level playing field. In this new context, Serbia would have the ability and incentive, with US and EU assistance, to negotiate protections of its permanent, legitimate interests in a sovereign, integral and equal Kosovo—not dictate its division. Relieving Belgrade of the ability—and need—to deny Kosovo its ambitions would allow Pristina to make concessions, symbolic and practical, that would honor Serbia’s permanent connection to its former province.
The UAE shift—putting aside a futile negotiation in favor of third-party diplomatic recognition—achieves that aim. Taking the UAE role are the four EU countries that do not yet recognize Kosovo: Spain, Slovakia, Romania, and Greece. Cyprus, which also doesn’t recognize Kosovo, is unnecessary at this point. Cyprus is not a member of NATO and, as Kosovo expert and ambassador Lulzim Peci has observed, the republic’s NATO accession is all that matters now.
NATO membership would provide Kosovo with what it needs most: security, stability, and international legitimacy, attained through a Euro-Atlantic perspective. UN membership, as shown by three precedents, is not required to join NATO. Accession to the alliance has long been the steppingstone to fulfillment of the lengthier process of joining the EU, which also poses no UN membership requirement. Even beginning the NATO track would be a signal of stability to foreign investors, more potent than anything the Trump administration is proposing.
Opening Kosovo’s pathway to NATO would infuriate Putin, but his options would be limited. Moscow shrinks from direct military confrontation with NATO, particularly so far from the Russian border. Instead, Moscow would likely boost its military relationship with Belgrade, supplying more weapons and deploying more Russian troops. Beijing, too, would likely step up military cooperation with Belgrade.
All this would leave Vucic with a dilemma. Russian and Chinese armaments would do nothing to stop Kosovo’s growing international legitimacy, precisely what Belgrade fears most. Any bid to spark unrest by Kosovo Serbs against KFOR, the NATO peacekeeping force, would violate Belgrade’s commitments under the 1999 Kumanovo agreement, which ended NATO’s hostilities with Serbia.
On the other hand, freed from political dependence on Moscow and Beijing, Belgrade could reconsider its strategic orientation. The US conducts more joint military operations with Serbia than Russia does. The US, EU, and NATO could assist Serbia in managing its concerns about the Presevo Valley, where Serbia has established its biggest military base and where about 50,000 ethnic Albanians live across the border from Kosovo. Serbia’s arms industry would benefit from adopting NATO standards.
Relieved of the need to divide Kosovo, Belgrade could focus on a shared Western agenda to secure the standing of Kosovo Serbs and promote their return. Local Albanian and Serb experts have produced detailed, off-the-shelf plans, endorsed by EU officials, awaiting only the sides’ agreement.
In other words, the most intractable, unsettling conflict in the Balkans could be resolved if four EU-NATO countries recognize Kosovo. Geopolitical forces increasingly put Washington and Brussels into convergence with those non-recognizers. Anxiety over separatism is what drives fears of a Kosovo parallel in Spain, Slovakia, and Romania. Washington has no wish to see Catalan secede from Spain, or watch ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania (or Serbia, for that matter)—backed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the revanchist and Moscow ally—mount secessionist campaigns. Nor does Washington want to witness other European countries fracture in Kremlin-supported divisiveness. In the case of Scotland’s potential secession from the United Kingdom—a step that President Vladimir Putin promotes after supporting Brexit—there is a strong possibility that the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent could be lost.
The United States now has a strategic interest in keeping Europe—and individual European states—whole and free. It’s time for Washington to go beyond its unilateral opposition to individual cases and lead a trans-Atlantic effort to refine state sovereignty in a way that discourages secession while maintaining commitment to human rights. The standing U.S.-EU-NATO Dialogue on Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Human Rights would produce a formal document setting out core principles and practical steps to define and promote the shared commitment to state order, and to the expression of self-determination within it, leaving secession for extreme cases.
This is entirely consistent with Kosovo’s independence. The U.N. Charter favors territorial integrity and international law frowns on secession, creating very narrow space for exceptions—which Kosovo easily fills. Following Serbia’s request, the International Court of Justice ruled in 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated neither international law nor the governing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. The Court said that its decision did not address the question of self-determination and remedial secession, clearly signaling that the case was not a precedent. Ironically, it was Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic who conceded this point in the U.N. General Assembly, insisting that the court’s decision “would prevent the Kosovo crisis from serving as a deeply problematic precedent in any part of the globe where secessionist ambitions are harbored.”
There are at least a dozen elements in the drive for Kosovo’s independence that are glaringly absent from any current European secessionist movement, including years of state-sponsored repression and denial of political rights. Unlike Catalonia, which this year played the key parliamentary role in forming Spain’s government, Kosovo has never been offered commensurate political representation in Serbia’s parliament. While Belgrade did not consent to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it was hardly unilateral. The United States and the majority of the EU strongly backed it, insisting on a constitution with strong protections for Kosovo’s Serbs. No remotely similar experience exists in Europe to include Crimea, site of another specious parallel repeatedly drawn by Putin.
As the EU’s Foreign Minister Josep Borrell once stated when he fulfilled the same role for Spain, “Catalonia is not a colony, it is not occupied, it is not a state like Kosovo. It is not an occupied state.” Borrell could chair the Territorial Integrity and Human Rights Dialogue, sending a strong signal to Moscow, Madrid, and Barcelona that the trans-Atlantic community is firmly opposed to dismemberment of Spain or other European countries.
This powerful international alignment against ethno-territorial demands would be supplemented by diplomatic gestures. Washington could help Athens obtain final agreement from Albania on maritime rights. The United States and the EU could help Bucharest check illegal ethnic Hungarian paramilitary efforts, including the financing and planning of minor terrorist attacks, reportedly supported by Moscow and Budapest. Pushing back on Orban’s revanchist tactics could build confidence in both Bratislava and Bucharest.
In sum, the way for the EU-NATO four to isolate the Kosovo case is to accept it—underscoring its many convincing distinctions—while working with allies to strengthen and embrace the norm of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Doing so would relieve the EU of the complication of having both its Foreign Minister, Borrell, and its Special Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo, Miroslav Lajcak of Slovakia, hail from non-recognizing states.
Like most governments, Madrid, Bratislava, Bucharest, and Athens may flinch at taking political risk. But unlike Abu Dhabi, they face no reprisals from Iran or Turkey, or potentially from jihadists. Working with the United States and fellow EU and NATO members, these governments could rid themselves of a burden while liberating a country, stabilizing a region, and unifying a continent.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-04--Spending the Pandemic in an Iraqi Jail

Spending the Pandemic in an Iraqi Jail

Spending the Pandemic in an Iraqi Jail There has been a lot of international attention on prisons holding Islamic State-affiliated women in Syria , but not all of the terrorist group ’ s imprisoned adherents are located there .
For over three years , more than 800 foreign women have been held in Rusafa prison in Baghdad .
Their sentences range from 15 years to life .
Some have been handed death sentences .
The majority are serving their time alone , but in a few cases , several family members—mothers , daughters , sisters—are in jail together .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ camps , this one houses women of many different nationalities including Azerbaijani , Austrian , French , German , Jordanian , Russian , Saudi Arabian , Swedish , Syrian , Tajikistani , and Ukrainian .
There ’ s even a family from Trinidad and Tobago .
Although these women are currently in prison in Baghdad , they are not just an Iraqi problem .
They ’ ve been sentenced to crimes in Iraq , of course , but holding them there for life or executing them is also not a sustainable policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in pro-Islamic State sentiment but puts a heavy burden on Iraq , which is finding itself less able to manage the challenge of imprisoning Islamic State affiliates during the COVID-19 pandemic .
The female prisoners at Rusafa live about 40 people to one air-conditioned cell with a toilet and shower .
It is crowded , but not like when they first arrived .
According to one woman I interviewed over the phone in August , “ When we were moved here it was terrible .
Dirty , stinky mattresses on the floor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all night long .
Also everyone had kids with them , so instead of 40 people in one room we were 145 .
And many were wounded and in pain .
It was madness .
Now , we could not complain.
” Three years in , a majority of the children have been repatriated to their home countries , although some still remain with their mothers because their countries refuse to take them back .
“ It is terrible for kids here .
Mothers make them clothes from adult prison robes , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play with trash , like empty plastic water bottles or paper wrappers , ” said one women serving a life sentence .
“ They became so wild that they climb on the door and run around screaming .
The happiest moment in their life is when the cell door opens .
Once a cat entered a hallway and kids started throwing bread at it .
For many of them , it was the first time in their life they have seen a cat.
” There is not much for adults to do either @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be to secretly move to another cell for several days to have new people to talk to .
If they ’ re found out , though , everyone in the perpetrator ’ s cell has their walks taken away for a week .
Paper and pencils are prohibited , and the women get two walks in the prison yard per week .
The majority lie in bed and chat , but some spend their day studying Arabic or the Quran .
Religion is strictly observed by all the inmate women .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the inmates , who remained in the prison , performs the call the prayer five times a day .
Religious dress code is observed , and even inside their cells all women wear a hijab or abaya , because each cell has a security camera , and they are afraid that men see them through it .
The majority still support the Islamic State , but a small group of around 80 people declared takfir on it ( deeming it against Islam ) .
“ One time , guards tried to move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” recalled one of the women who still supports the Islamic State , “ but we blocked the door and did not allow that to happen.
” For the most part , the two groups try to ignore each other , but there have been riots along other fault lines .
For example , this year , two riots happened in quick succession .
First , women demanded to be allowed to meet with their embassies to ask for repatriation .
“ Everyone is very psychologically tired from being here , so it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said one of women I interviewed .
“ We knew perfectly well that it would not lead anywhere , because guards could not affect that decision.
” Several days later , there was another uprising when a group of Russian-speaking women tried to push their cell door open .
They did not succeed , and as punishment prison guards decided to move them to other cells .
Women disagreed with that and started fighting back .
After they hit a high-level member of the prison authority , a special force was called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ black , wearing protective gear and had sticks .
They did not hurt us , but they made a corridor and one by one dragged us outside to the prison yard , ” said one of the women involved in this riot .
A majority of the women I interviewed initially insisted that they do not care about their home country and that their “ ISIS brothers ” would liberate them .
But it became obvious quickly that they don ’ t believe that anymore .
Although they still celebrate Islamic State insurgency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expect the group to be strong enough to take control of Baghdad , where their prison is located .
Nor do they believe that the remaining Islamic State insurgents—mostly Iraqi now—would care about them as foreigners .
For now , most of the women are more concerned with getting home .
In a handwritten message a Trinidadian woman passed me to send to her government , she wrote , “ How many more years will our children have to remain in prison , when will help come ?
” Others , whose children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ optimistic that Iraq may soon deport them too .
Especially now , during the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic and amid huge economic problems , they believe that Iraq may try to offload them .
“ I do not think Iraq wants or could afford to feed and guard and house us for life , so I think we would eventually go home , ” said one of the interviewed women .
And that could happen soon .
Since the beginning of pandemic , judges have started openly talking to inmates about them being repatriated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even said that it would be done by the end of this year if their countries would agree to take them .
Although it would take time to reintegrate them into a civilian society back home , women are optimistic about their prospects .
“ We are so tired , ” one told me .
“ We just want to get out of here , and it does not even matter to where .
And if they [ her home government ] do not want me to even go outside my house , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , their kids are already home .
And they are particularly looking forward to reuniting with them .

There has been a lot of international attention on prisons holding Islamic State-affiliated women in Syria, but not all of the terrorist group’s imprisoned adherents are located there. For over three years, more than 800 foreign women have been held in Rusafa prison in Baghdad. Their sentences range from 15 years to life. Some have been handed death sentences. The majority are serving their time alone, but in a few cases, several family members—mothers, daughters, sisters—are in jail together. And as in other Islamic State prisons and camps, this one houses women of many different nationalities including Azerbaijani, Austrian, French, German, Jordanian, Russian, Saudi Arabian, Swedish, Syrian, Tajikistani, and Ukrainian. There’s even a family from Trinidad and Tobago.
There has been a lot of international attention on prisons holding Islamic State-affiliated women in Syria, but not all of the terrorist group’s imprisoned adherents are located there. For over three years, more than 800 foreign women have been held in Rusafa prison in Baghdad. Their sentences range from 15 years to life. Some have been handed death sentences. The majority are serving their time alone, but in a few cases, several family members—mothers, daughters, sisters—are in jail together. And as in other Islamic State prisons and camps, this one houses women of many different nationalities including Azerbaijani, Austrian, French, German, Jordanian, Russian, Saudi Arabian, Swedish, Syrian, Tajikistani, and Ukrainian. There’s even a family from Trinidad and Tobago.
Although these women are currently in prison in Baghdad, they are not just an Iraqi problem. They’ve been sentenced to crimes in Iraq, of course, but holding them there for life or executing them is also not a sustainable policy. It not only leads to an increase in pro-Islamic State sentiment but puts a heavy burden on Iraq, which is finding itself less able to manage the challenge of imprisoning Islamic State affiliates during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The female prisoners at Rusafa live about 40 people to one air-conditioned cell with a toilet and shower. It is crowded, but not like when they first arrived. According to one woman I interviewed over the phone in August, “When we were moved here it was terrible. Dirty, stinky mattresses on the floor, broken air conditioners, and bright light all night long. Also everyone had kids with them, so instead of 40 people in one room we were 145. And many were wounded and in pain. It was madness. Now, we could not complain.”
Three years in, a majority of the children have been repatriated to their home countries, although some still remain with their mothers because their countries refuse to take them back. “It is terrible for kids here. Mothers make them clothes from adult prison robes, and there are no toys, so they play with trash, like empty plastic water bottles or paper wrappers,” said one women serving a life sentence. “They became so wild that they climb on the door and run around screaming. The happiest moment in their life is when the cell door opens. Once a cat entered a hallway and kids started throwing bread at it. For many of them, it was the first time in their life they have seen a cat.”
There is not much for adults to do either. The main form of entertainment seems to be to secretly move to another cell for several days to have new people to talk to. If they’re found out, though, everyone in the perpetrator’s cell has their walks taken away for a week. Paper and pencils are prohibited, and the women get two walks in the prison yard per week. The majority lie in bed and chat, but some spend their day studying Arabic or the Quran.
Religion is strictly observed by all the inmate women. An older boy, the son of one of the inmates, who remained in the prison, performs the call the prayer five times a day. Religious dress code is observed, and even inside their cells all women wear a hijab or abaya, because each cell has a security camera, and they are afraid that men see them through it. The majority still support the Islamic State, but a small group of around 80 people declared takfir on it (deeming it against Islam). “One time, guards tried to move a takfiri girl into our cell,” recalled one of the women who still supports the Islamic State, “but we blocked the door and did not allow that to happen.”
For the most part, the two groups try to ignore each other, but there have been riots along other fault lines. For example, this year, two riots happened in quick succession. First, women demanded to be allowed to meet with their embassies to ask for repatriation. “Everyone is very psychologically tired from being here, so it was just a desperate emotional behavior,” said one of women I interviewed. “We knew perfectly well that it would not lead anywhere, because guards could not affect that decision.” Several days later, there was another uprising when a group of Russian-speaking women tried to push their cell door open. They did not succeed, and as punishment prison guards decided to move them to other cells. Women disagreed with that and started fighting back. After they hit a high-level member of the prison authority, a special force was called in. “They were in all black, wearing protective gear and had sticks. They did not hurt us, but they made a corridor and one by one dragged us outside to the prison yard,” said one of the women involved in this riot.
A majority of the women I interviewed initially insisted that they do not care about their home country and that their “ISIS brothers” would liberate them. But it became obvious quickly that they don’t believe that anymore. Although they still celebrate Islamic State insurgency victories in Iraq, they do not expect the group to be strong enough to take control of Baghdad, where their prison is located. Nor do they believe that the remaining Islamic State insurgents—mostly Iraqi now—would care about them as foreigners.
For now, most of the women are more concerned with getting home. In a handwritten message a Trinidadian woman passed me to send to her government, she wrote, “How many more years will our children have to remain in prison, when will help come?” Others, whose children have already been sent home, are optimistic that Iraq may soon deport them too. Especially now, during the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic and amid huge economic problems, they believe that Iraq may try to offload them. “I do not think Iraq wants or could afford to feed and guard and house us for life, so I think we would eventually go home,” said one of the interviewed women.
And that could happen soon. Since the beginning of pandemic, judges have started openly talking to inmates about them being repatriated to their home countries, and some even said that it would be done by the end of this year if their countries would agree to take them. Although it would take time to reintegrate them into a civilian society back home, women are optimistic about their prospects. “We are so tired,” one told me. “We just want to get out of here, and it does not even matter to where. And if they [her home government] do not want me to even go outside my house, I won’t.” For many, their kids are already home. And they are particularly looking forward to reuniting with them.