foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--How to Ruin a Superpower

How to Ruin a Superpower

Over the past 35 years or so , warnings of imminent American decline have fared poorly .
Paul Kennedy ’ s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers suggested that “ imperial overstretch ” might cause the United States to follow Great Britain ’ s downward path , a gloomy forecast that proved to be at best premature .
Other prominent scholars suggested that America was becoming an “ ordinary country , ” heading for a world “ after hegemony , ” only to be surprised when it was the Soviet Union that collapsed and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ideal conditions , it turned out , for a dangerous combination of hubris and complacency .
By the mid-1990s , the United States found itself in a position of primacy unmatched in modern history .
Its combination of economic , military , and soft power dwarfed all others , and scholars such as William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks offered sophisticated and well-reasoned arguments for why the unipolar era might last as long or longer than the bipolar era that preceded it .
What these optimists did not anticipate , alas , was the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States would suffer in the years that followed , a train wreck of recurring blunders that has accelerated and worsened under Donald Trump .
In particular , Trump ’ s egregious mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic is producing debilitating long-term effects that will further accelerate America ’ s decline .
Even if he is defeated in November and a Joe Biden administration does nearly everything right , the consequences of Trump ’ s reign of error will be with us for many years to come .
Before Trump , the mistakes of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The first error was adopting a grand strategy of liberal hegemony , which sought to spread democracy , markets , and other liberal values far and wide and to bring the whole world into a liberal order that was designed and led by the United States .
This vastly ambitious strategy provoked a strong backlash from a variety of quarters , led to unnecessary and costly wars that squandered trillions of dollars , and undermined key sectors of the U.S. economy .
The second mistake was to allow public institutions to deteriorate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then blaming them for all our problems .
Republican leaders pushed tax cuts with scant regard for the fiscal consequences , while the IRS was defunded to the point that it could no longer deter or detect widespread evasion and fraud .
Like the Prussian Junkers or the pre-revolutionary French aristocrats , wealthy Americans—including Trump—found countless new ways to avoid contributing enough to public coffers and with less and less fear that they might get caught .
Instead of creating and funding robust , competent , and respected public institutions—the sort of administrative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a pandemic and that some other countries have—Americans decided they didn ’ t need them .
The third misstep was the weaponization of partisan politics that began with the Newt Gingrich revolution in the U.S. Congress .
As Julian Zelizer documents in a fascinating but disturbing new book , Gingrich ’ s decision to take down House Leader Jim Wright began a process that turned American politics into a blood sport where gaining and retaining power mattered more than advancing the public interest .
Aided by talk radio hate-mongers like Rush Limbaugh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Weekly Standard and Fox News , conspiracy theories , slander , and the steady erosion of the “ soft guardrails ” of democracy replaced respectful debate , discussion , and compromise .
Unfortunately , these three trends were also sharply at odds with each other .
Remaking the world in America ’ s image is an enormous undertaking ; if you were serious about it , you ’ d need a large , well-funded , and highly competent state to do it .
Not only would running the world require a strong military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large , highly professional diplomatic corps to manage the political fallout abroad , a vast army of well-trained development experts , and lots of safety-net programs back home to deal with the destabilizing consequences of economic globalization .
In this way , the grand strategy of liberal hegemony was fundamentally at odds with the endless demand for tax cuts and the concomitant desire to shrink the state .
Liberal hegemony ’ s defenders got around this problem by assuming that the tides of history were running their way and that creating a global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As Fareed Zakaria noted back in 1998 , the result was a “ hollow hegemony , ” as the United States tried in vain to manage the world on the cheap .
Moreover , if a single country hopes to mold local politics in lots of very different places , it damn well better be politically united at home .
Running the world entails substantial sacrifices , and doing it effectively requires a powerful bipartisan consensus and robust public support .
Needless to say , a poisonous atmosphere of relentless partisanship , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made-up scandals ( remember those endless congressional hearings about Benghazi ? )
, is antithetical to the forging of national unity .
Endless gridlock also made American democracy a less appealing model for other societies .
To be clear : I don ’ t think liberal hegemony would have worked even if the United States decided to pursue it in a more serious and sophisticated fashion .
But doing it in the half-assed way America did made failure inevitable and at no small cost .
The consequences of these three errors provided the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ narcissistic charlatan like Trump to reach the White House .
Since then , he has managed to drive America ’ s image around the world to record lows , bungled the trade war with China , pushed Iran closer to a nuclear bomb , and lavished praise on a number of murderous dictators ( some of whom are openly hostile to the United States ) .
His only significant foreign-policy achievement to date is getting Britain to decide not to use Huawei technology for its new 5G digital network , but that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four years in office .
Apart from appointing a lot of conservative judges , Trump ’ s major achievement as 2020 dawned was not screwing up the economic recovery that Barack Obama had bequeathed to him .
The administration ’ s disastrous mishandling of the pandemic has been well documented elsewhere , and there ’ s no need to rehearse that depressing story once more .
Instead , I want to highlight what the long-term consequences for America ’ s global position are likely to be .
Spoiler alert : It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as I ’ ve argued before , Trump ’ s attempt to wish away the problem ( along with the rest of his administration ’ s incompetent response ) has tarnished America ’ s dwindling reputation as a society that knows how to get things done effectively .
When countries all over the world are barring Americans from their territory due to legitimate fears that they will spread the disease , while looking on with a combination of shock and pity , you know something has gone badly wrong .
Consider this : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all welcome to visit Europe this summer .
Americans aren ’ t .
Second , the economic depression caused by the pandemic will leave deep scars on the U.S. economy , and the damage increases the longer the crisis occurs .
Jobs won ’ t suddenly reemerge once a lot of businesses have gone under , and bankruptcies and layoffs will continue until we get the virus under control .
The U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress have provided emergency funds to cushion the blow temporarily , but these measures have ballooned the federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ longer the crisis continues , the bigger the pile of debt will be .
Here ’ s the key takeaway : Although the pandemic has harmed every economy in the world , other countries have got it under control , can begin to reopen safely , and will suffer less long-term damage as a result .
That ’ s why Trump ’ s failure is so disastrous : By prolonging the period where the United States has to maintain lockdowns and other restrictive measures , he has guaranteed that a subsequent recovery—whenever it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Third , the lockdown has exacerbated both intimate partner abuse and child abuse while making it harder to detect both .
Schoolteachers often spot and report signs of child abuse , for example , but that is less likely to happen when kids aren ’ t physically in class .
Chronic abuse has serious emotional consequences for its victims , and the longer the pandemic continues , the worse such problems will be .
The result : The United States will have a higher-than-expected incidence of mental health problems in the future @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the victims and a further drain on U.S. power .
Fourth , although keeping public schools closed is necessary to get the virus under control , it will inevitably have a negative effect on learning and put American kids even further behind their foreign counterparts in terms of educational achievement .
Once again , education everywhere has suffered as a result of COVID-19 , but the damage will be greatest in countries that didn ’ t deal with it successfully and are still facing an escalating spiral of new cases .
Sad to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of those countries .
Fifth , higher education will take a big hit , too .
America ’ s colleges and universities have been the world ’ s best for decades and a huge driver of innovation for the U.S. economy .
They are suffering from the shutdown and especially from the loss of foreign students , who have been both a source of revenue and in the past a further engine of technological advancement .
Although the Trump administration has reversed its ill-advised attempt to ban foreign students receiving only online education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the pandemic will lead some of the foreign students who used to come to the United States to pursue educational opportunities in countries where their health is not at risk and universities are open for normal operations .
America has long benefited from so-called “ brain gain ” ( i.e.
, talented foreigners who arrived in the country for college or graduate school and chose to remain , lending their talents to innovative U.S. companies ) ; that benefit is likely to be smaller in the future .
The longer America trails @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the more damage it will suffer on this front as well .
Last but not least , the pandemic has not stopped women from bearing children , but many are now doing so in an atmosphere of enormous economic uncertainty and coronavirus-related stress .
A growing body of research shows that maternal stress of all kinds has deleterious effects on fetal and early childhood development , with long-term consequences for a child ’ s physical well-being , cognitive abilities , emotional maturity , and overall life chances .
Once again : These harmful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where the coronavirus has spread , but the damage will be greatest in countries where the virus has yet to be brought under control .
That ’ s America .
The United States still has a number of important advantages compared with other major powers , including abundant natural resources , a still innovative economy , temperate climate ( at least so far ) , and an extremely favorable geopolitical location .
Those qualities make long-term success more likely but do not guarantee it .
The country also faces a number of serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades suggest that Americans remain their own worst enemy .
Trump didn ’ t deliberately and consciously set out to ruin the United States—and torpedo his own chances for reelection—he just couldn ’ t help himself .
It is the rest of us—and especially our children and grandchildren—who will suffer the consequences .

Over the past 35 years or so, warnings of imminent American decline have fared poorly. Paul Kennedy’s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers suggested that “imperial overstretch” might cause the United States to follow Great Britain’s downward path, a gloomy forecast that proved to be at best premature. Other prominent scholars suggested that America was becoming an “ ordinary country ,” heading for a world “ after hegemony ,” only to be surprised when it was the Soviet Union that collapsed and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Ideal conditions, it turned out, for a dangerous combination of hubris and complacency.
Over the past 35 years or so, warnings of imminent American decline have fared poorly. Paul Kennedy’s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers suggested that “imperial overstretch” might cause the United States to follow Great Britain’s downward path, a gloomy forecast that proved to be at best premature. Other prominent scholars suggested that America was becoming an “ordinary country,” heading for a world “after hegemony,” only to be surprised when it was the Soviet Union that collapsed and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Ideal conditions, it turned out, for a dangerous combination of hubris and complacency.
By the mid-1990s, the United States found itself in a position of primacy unmatched in modern history. Its combination of economic, military, and soft power dwarfed all others, and scholars such as William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks offered sophisticated and well-reasoned arguments for why the unipolar era might last as long or longer than the bipolar era that preceded it. What these optimists did not anticipate, alas, was the series of self-inflicted wounds that the United States would suffer in the years that followed, a train wreck of recurring blunders that has accelerated and worsened under Donald Trump. In particular, Trump’s egregious mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic is producing debilitating long-term effects that will further accelerate America’s decline. Even if he is defeated in November and a Joe Biden administration does nearly everything right, the consequences of Trump’s reign of error will be with us for many years to come.
Before Trump, the mistakes of the unipolar era fell under three main headings. The first error was adopting a grand strategy of liberal hegemony, which sought to spread democracy, markets, and other liberal values far and wide and to bring the whole world into a liberal order that was designed and led by the United States. This vastly ambitious strategy provoked a strong backlash from a variety of quarters, led to unnecessary and costly wars that squandered trillions of dollars, and undermined key sectors of the U.S. economy.
The second mistake was to allow public institutions to deteriorate, by starving them of resources and then blaming them for all our problems. Republican leaders pushed tax cuts with scant regard for the fiscal consequences, while the IRS was defunded to the point that it could no longer deter or detect widespread evasion and fraud. Like the Prussian Junkers or the pre-revolutionary French aristocrats, wealthy Americans—including Trump—found countless new ways to avoid contributing enough to public coffers and with less and less fear that they might get caught. Instead of creating and funding robust, competent, and respected public institutions—the sort of administrative and managerial capacity that would be invaluable in a pandemic and that some other countries have—Americans decided they didn’t need them.
The third misstep was the weaponization of partisan politics that began with the Newt Gingrich revolution in the U.S. Congress. As Julian Zelizer documents in a fascinating but disturbing new book, Gingrich’s decision to take down House Leader Jim Wright began a process that turned American politics into a blood sport where gaining and retaining power mattered more than advancing the public interest. Aided by talk radio hate-mongers like Rush Limbaugh and the factually challenged propagandists at the Weekly Standard and Fox News, conspiracy theories, slander, and the steady erosion of the “soft guardrails” of democracy replaced respectful debate, discussion, and compromise.
Unfortunately, these three trends were also sharply at odds with each other. Remaking the world in America’s image is an enormous undertaking; if you were serious about it, you’d need a large, well-funded, and highly competent state to do it. Not only would running the world require a strong military, but it would also take a large, highly professional diplomatic corps to manage the political fallout abroad, a vast army of well-trained development experts, and lots of safety-net programs back home to deal with the destabilizing consequences of economic globalization. In this way, the grand strategy of liberal hegemony was fundamentally at odds with the endless demand for tax cuts and the concomitant desire to shrink the state. Liberal hegemony’s defenders got around this problem by assuming that the tides of history were running their way and that creating a global liberal order would be relatively easy. As Fareed Zakaria noted back in 1998, the result was a “hollow hegemony,” as the United States tried in vain to manage the world on the cheap.
Moreover, if a single country hopes to mold local politics in lots of very different places, it damn well better be politically united at home. Running the world entails substantial sacrifices, and doing it effectively requires a powerful bipartisan consensus and robust public support. Needless to say, a poisonous atmosphere of relentless partisanship, where politicians on the make repeatedly grandstand over made-up scandals (remember those endless congressional hearings about Benghazi?), is antithetical to the forging of national unity. Endless gridlock also made American democracy a less appealing model for other societies.
To be clear: I don’t think liberal hegemony would have worked even if the United States decided to pursue it in a more serious and sophisticated fashion. But doing it in the half-assed way America did made failure inevitable and at no small cost.
The consequences of these three errors provided the toxic brew that allowed an incompetent and narcissistic charlatan like Trump to reach the White House. Since then, he has managed to drive America’s image around the world to record lows, bungled the trade war with China, pushed Iran closer to a nuclear bomb, and lavished praise on a number of murderous dictators (some of whom are openly hostile to the United States). His only significant foreign-policy achievement to date is getting Britain to decide not to use Huawei technology for its new 5G digital network, but that’s not much to show for nearly four years in office. Apart from appointing a lot of conservative judges, Trump’s major achievement as 2020 dawned was not screwing up the economic recovery that Barack Obama had bequeathed to him.
Then came COVID-19.
The administration’s disastrous mishandling of the pandemic has been well documented elsewhere, and there’s no need to rehearse that depressing story once more. Instead, I want to highlight what the long-term consequences for America’s global position are likely to be. Spoiler alert: It’s not a pretty picture.
First, as I’ve argued before, Trump’s attempt to wish away the problem (along with the rest of his administration’s incompetent response) has tarnished America’s dwindling reputation as a society that knows how to get things done effectively. When countries all over the world are barring Americans from their territory due to legitimate fears that they will spread the disease, while looking on with a combination of shock and pity, you know something has gone badly wrong. Consider this: Rwandans, Uruguayans, and Algerians are all welcome to visit Europe this summer. Americans aren’t.
Second, the economic depression caused by the pandemic will leave deep scars on the U.S. economy, and the damage increases the longer the crisis occurs. Jobs won’t suddenly reemerge once a lot of businesses have gone under, and bankruptcies and layoffs will continue until we get the virus under control. The U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress have provided emergency funds to cushion the blow temporarily, but these measures have ballooned the federal deficit to historically high levels. The longer the crisis continues, the bigger the pile of debt will be.
Here’s the key takeaway: Although the pandemic has harmed every economy in the world, other countries have got it under control, can begin to reopen safely, and will suffer less long-term damage as a result. That’s why Trump’s failure is so disastrous: By prolonging the period where the United States has to maintain lockdowns and other restrictive measures, he has guaranteed that a subsequent recovery—whenever it finally occurs—will be slower and less vigorous.
Third, the lockdown has exacerbated both intimate partner abuse and child abuse while making it harder to detect both. Schoolteachers often spot and report signs of child abuse, for example, but that is less likely to happen when kids aren’t physically in class. Chronic abuse has serious emotional consequences for its victims, and the longer the pandemic continues, the worse such problems will be. The result: The United States will have a higher-than-expected incidence of mental health problems in the future, which is both a tragedy for the victims and a further drain on U.S. power.
Fourth, although keeping public schools closed is necessary to get the virus under control, it will inevitably have a negative effect on learning and put American kids even further behind their foreign counterparts in terms of educational achievement. Once again, education everywhere has suffered as a result of COVID-19, but the damage will be greatest in countries that didn’t deal with it successfully and are still facing an escalating spiral of new cases. Sad to say, the United States is one of those countries.
Fifth, higher education will take a big hit, too. America’s colleges and universities have been the world’s best for decades and a huge driver of innovation for the U.S. economy. They are suffering from the shutdown and especially from the loss of foreign students, who have been both a source of revenue and in the past a further engine of technological advancement. Although the Trump administration has reversed its ill-advised attempt to ban foreign students receiving only online education this fall, the poor U.S. response to the pandemic will lead some of the foreign students who used to come to the United States to pursue educational opportunities in countries where their health is not at risk and universities are open for normal operations. America has long benefited from so-called “brain gain” (i.e., talented foreigners who arrived in the country for college or graduate school and chose to remain, lending their talents to innovative U.S. companies); that benefit is likely to be smaller in the future. The longer America trails the world in dealing with COVID-19, the more damage it will suffer on this front as well.
Last but not least, the pandemic has not stopped women from bearing children, but many are now doing so in an atmosphere of enormous economic uncertainty and coronavirus-related stress. A growing body of research shows that maternal stress of all kinds has deleterious effects on fetal and early childhood development, with long-term consequences for a child’s physical well-being, cognitive abilities, emotional maturity, and overall life chances. Once again: These harmful effects are undoubtedly present in every country where the coronavirus has spread, but the damage will be greatest in countries where the virus has yet to be brought under control. That’s America.
The United States still has a number of important advantages compared with other major powers, including abundant natural resources, a still innovative economy, temperate climate (at least so far), and an extremely favorable geopolitical location. Those qualities make long-term success more likely but do not guarantee it. The country also faces a number of serious rivals—most notably a still rising China—but recent decades suggest that Americans remain their own worst enemy. Trump didn’t deliberately and consciously set out to ruin the United States—and torpedo his own chances for reelection—he just couldn’t help himself. It is the rest of us—and especially our children and grandchildren—who will suffer the consequences.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--Offline and Out of School

Offline and Out of School

For the past few months , 10-year-old Prachi Kadian ’ s ability to attend school has hinged on a seemingly small piece of fortune : Her father has a smartphone .
That means Prachi can watch and read the lessons that her schoolteacher sends via WhatsApp each day .
Shyamvir Kadian , a farm laborer in the Indian state of Haryana , is the only one in his family with a phone .
Before he heads out for work each morning , he passes it to his daughter to look up her assignments .
When he returns in the evening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and messages them to the teacher , sometimes speaking to her on the phone to go over particularly tricky lessons .
Prachi hasn ’ t met or spoken to a single friend since educational institutions closed across India in March in the face of the pandemic , and she misses school desperately .
But because she is able to access her father ’ s phone , Prachi is one of India ’ s luckier students .
Even as India lifted its countrywide lockdown last month despite the surging coronavirus pandemic—only the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet to physically reopen .
The central government has said that remote learning will continue until at least August—though many schools are likely to stay closed for much longer—and has pinned its hopes on technology .
Since the start of the pandemic , the government has been updating its existing e-learning platforms with content and QR-coded textbooks for multiple languages , classes , and states .
EdTech companies are reporting record increases in user registrations , engagement , and revenue during lockdown .
But despite all the bustling plans , there is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ digital disparity .
While internet penetration has grown across India , thanks to the ubiquity of cheap , mobile phones , rural users lag behind their urban peers—who are more likely to be English speakers and relatively economically advantaged .
About 30 percent of the rural population has internet access , compared with more than half of urbanites , according to the latest data from IAMAI-Nielsen .
In large cities , that figure rises to 65 percent .
Cutting through these axes is a marked gender divide .
Among all internet users , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ digital disparity mirrors other challenges girls face in accessing education .
( According to the last census in 2011 , India has a female literacy rate of 65 percent compared with a male literacy rate of 82 percent . )
India has among the world ’ s highest gender gap in access to technology .
Only 21 percent of women in India are mobile internet users , according to GSMA ’ s 2020 mobile gender gap report , while 42 percent of men have access .
While there are economic barriers to girls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , cultural and social norms also play a major part .
The male-female gap in mobile use often exacerbates other inequalities for women , including access to information , economic opportunities , and networking .
In states like Haryana , where mobile and internet usage is relatively high , teachers have had to make a special effort to ensure that girls are allowed to access online classes .
Some parents fear mobile phones can pose a risk to a girl ’ s reputation or view the internet as a potential distraction from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Priyanka , a government teacher who goes by one name , it took multiple conversations with parents like Prachi ’ s and community leaders before she was able to convince them that daughters should be permitted to use phones to study .
It meant convincing some parents—primarily cellphone-owning fathers—to allow their daughters ’ friends to use their phone as well , to schedule follow-up phone calls with the teacher , often at nights after they have returned home from work .
Every day , Priyanka spends hours on Sampark Baithak—an app launched by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foundation .
She studies their educational content and commentary from other teachers and tries to figure out ways to teach efficiently over the phone , to students with and without the internet .
“ These are girls who do not get as much freedom , but they are striving hard to get ahead in life , ” she said .
“ With some additional effort it ’ s possible to keep them from dropping out.
” But as online classes become more entrenched , it ’ s apparent that superhuman efforts by individual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be enough .
When a think tank carried out a telephone survey on online school access in the eastern state of Bihar , more than half the schoolgirls were unreachable to begin with .
Among those that it did reach , about half said their families weren ’ t in a position to afford internet packages or use the phone to study .
Some 36 percent of boys said they had phone access compared with 28 percent of girls .
That stands to worsen the gender gap in Indian schools .
While 99 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compared with 97 percent of boys , the gap widens as students grow older .
Family constraints , distance to school and physical safety threats , insufficient access to menstrual hygiene , and gendered expectations around housework have left girls lagging behind on educational opportunities .
Compared with 35 percent of boys , nearly 40 percent of adolescent girls in India are not enrolled in any education institution .
These trends solidify later in employment : At 24 percent , India has one of the lowest global rates of women in the workforce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worst affected by the shift to online schooling , some educators have pushed back at the government ’ s initial grand technological efforts .
Activists like Nishant Baghel , who leads digital initiatives at the education nonprofit Pratham , are urging the government to use so-called outdated technology like radio , SMS , and television as it draws up its ambitious coronavirus schooling plans .
If internet coverage is out of reach to many in rural India , television is a more widely available medium .
About half of rural households and more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a TV .
Unlike phones , which are usually owned by male heads of households and carried along to work daily—limiting their availability—TV sets remain at home .
These classes allow students to view high quality , visual content which can be easier to consume and retain .
And , most importantly , such classes can be viewed by multiple students at once .
But even within TV-focused education programs , students have struggled with access .
In Kerala , education officials estimated at the start of the June term that about 250,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or television .
The same month , a 15-year-old scholarship student whose parents lacked a phone and couldn ’ t afford to repair their television died by suicide .
Local media claimed she was upset about falling behind on her schoolwork .
The high-profile tragedy resulted in a statewide mobilization by the government , political parties , business owners , private institutions , and citizens who contributed smartphones , computers , and televisions .
The state government has started rolling out “ neighborhood learning centers ” with TV sets set up in common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can gather to attend the virtual lessons .
Kudumbashree , Kerala ’ s poverty eradication and women empowerment program which has more than 4 million members , came up with a scheme to provide subsidized laptops to students that can be paid for in installments .
Governments and educators have also considered radio , an even more widely available medium .
Community radio stations have played a critical role in raising coronavirus awareness in far-flung and underdeveloped areas , and audio lessons are also following suit .
The government announced in May that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 289 community radio stations to provide school education .
All India Radio , the state-owned public radio service , is providing daily lessons in several parts of the country , including the hilly areas of Jammu and Kashmir , where the government has banned high-speed internet .
In Nagpur district of Maharashtra , students can tune in to 15-minute long radio broadcasts twice a week which include educational activities and topics of discussions for their parents .
The goal is to keep children engaged in learning , even in the absence of textbooks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighborhoods .
A sample lesson might explain a science concept using their village surroundings or encourage something like counting the number of rotis being cooked for a meal , and mothers usually facilitate the teaching .
These lessons are done in conjunction with basic mobile phones to ensure retention .
The education NGO Pratham sends reading material via SMS ahead of each lesson and offers a follow-up call after to ensure that children have understood the explained concepts .
In some communities , educators have taken it upon themselves to offer truly offline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Jharkhand , several villages now provide lessons over loudspeakers .
Teachers run classes as they normally would , except they sit inside a room on their own , a microphone in hand , as students gather in a designated spot with their notebooks to learn .
Some teachers and village heads broadcast audio content created by education nonprofits to supplement these classes .
These efforts show just how steep the obstacles are to universal schooling .
With the world ’ s second largest internet user base and the biggest presence on social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world ’ s most important digital markets .
But this isn ’ t a uniform trend across the subcontinent : Digital access has yet to become a reality for many of its residents .
Google just announced a $ 10 billion investment to digitize India , promising affordable internet access in different languages .
The tech giant already has an ongoing program in the country that aims to provide digital literacy to rural women and claims to have reached 26 million of them .
In the past , states have launched schemes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ households below the poverty line , and to college students , with the promise of increased connectivity and benefits .
But as communities across the country begin their new , remote terms with no small amount of trial and error , it ’ s apparent that such initiatives fall short of need .
The pandemic has exacerbated inequalities and challenges that already existed for girls in India .
If the government hopes to save them from falling irretrievably behind , it must focus on foundational skills and literacy , stressed Baghel of Pratham @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the academic year as schools remain shut .
During these unprecedented times , it is imperative to keep the students engaged in learning and development so they are well equipped when schools do reopen .

For the past few months, 10-year-old Prachi Kadian’s ability to attend school has hinged on a seemingly small piece of fortune: Her father has a smartphone. That means Prachi can watch and read the lessons that her schoolteacher sends via WhatsApp each day. Shyamvir Kadian, a farm laborer in the Indian state of Haryana, is the only one in his family with a phone. Before he heads out for work each morning, he passes it to his daughter to look up her assignments. When he returns in the evening, she photographs pages of completed work and messages them to the teacher, sometimes speaking to her on the phone to go over particularly tricky lessons.
For the past few months, 10-year-old Prachi Kadian’s ability to attend school has hinged on a seemingly small piece of fortune: Her father has a smartphone. That means Prachi can watch and read the lessons that her schoolteacher sends via WhatsApp each day. Shyamvir Kadian, a farm laborer in the Indian state of Haryana, is the only one in his family with a phone. Before he heads out for work each morning, he passes it to his daughter to look up her assignments. When he returns in the evening, she photographs pages of completed work and messages them to the teacher, sometimes speaking to her on the phone to go over particularly tricky lessons.
Prachi hasn’t met or spoken to a single friend since educational institutions closed across India in March in the face of the pandemic, and she misses school desperately. But because she is able to access her father’s phone, Prachi is one of India’s luckier students.
Even as India lifted its countrywide lockdown last month despite the surging coronavirus pandemic—only the United States and Brazil have recorded more cases—schools have yet to physically reopen. The central government has said that remote learning will continue until at least August—though many schools are likely to stay closed for much longer—and has pinned its hopes on technology. Since the start of the pandemic, the government has been updating its existing e-learning platforms with content and QR-coded textbooks for multiple languages, classes, and states. EdTech companies are reporting record increases in user registrations, engagement, and revenue during lockdown. But despite all the bustling plans, there is a looming problem: India has a massive digital disparity.
While internet penetration has grown across India, thanks to the ubiquity of cheap, mobile phones, rural users lag behind their urban peers—who are more likely to be English speakers and relatively economically advantaged. About 30 percent of the rural population has internet access, compared with more than half of urbanites, according to the latest data from IAMAI-Nielsen. In large cities, that figure rises to 65 percent. Cutting through these axes is a marked gender divide. Among all internet users, just 35 percent are women. This digital disparity mirrors other challenges girls face in accessing education. (According to the last census in 2011, India has a female literacy rate of 65 percent compared with a male literacy rate of 82 percent.)
A student carries a laptop to download study materials as others line up to collect textbooks before a telelearning class at their home in Chennai on July 15.
India has among the world’s highest gender gap in access to technology. Only 21 percent of women in India are mobile internet users, according to GSMA’s 2020 mobile gender gap report, while 42 percent of men have access. While there are economic barriers to girls’ owning a mobile phone or laptop, cultural and social norms also play a major part. The male-female gap in mobile use often exacerbates other inequalities for women, including access to information, economic opportunities, and networking.
In states like Haryana, where mobile and internet usage is relatively high, teachers have had to make a special effort to ensure that girls are allowed to access online classes. Some parents fear mobile phones can pose a risk to a girl’s reputation or view the internet as a potential distraction from a daughter’s daily chores. For Priyanka, a government teacher who goes by one name, it took multiple conversations with parents like Prachi’s and community leaders before she was able to convince them that daughters should be permitted to use phones to study. It meant convincing some parents—primarily cellphone-owning fathers—to allow their daughters’ friends to use their phone as well, to schedule follow-up phone calls with the teacher, often at nights after they have returned home from work.
Every day, Priyanka spends hours on Sampark Baithak—an app launched by the Haryana government alongside the nonprofit Sampark Foundation. She studies their educational content and commentary from other teachers and tries to figure out ways to teach efficiently over the phone, to students with and without the internet. “These are girls who do not get as much freedom, but they are striving hard to get ahead in life,” she said. “With some additional effort it’s possible to keep them from dropping out.”
A teacher gives a live-streaming online class at a government school in Chennai on June 3.
But as online classes become more entrenched, it’s apparent that superhuman efforts by individual teachers and content-rich apps won’t be enough. When a think tank carried out a telephone survey on online school access in the eastern state of Bihar, more than half the schoolgirls were unreachable to begin with. Among those that it did reach, about half said their families weren’t in a position to afford internet packages or use the phone to study. Some 36 percent of boys said they had phone access compared with 28 percent of girls.
That stands to worsen the gender gap in Indian schools. While 99 percent of girls enroll in primary school compared with 97 percent of boys, the gap widens as students grow older. Family constraints, distance to school and physical safety threats, insufficient access to menstrual hygiene, and gendered expectations around housework have left girls lagging behind on educational opportunities. Compared with 35 percent of boys, nearly 40 percent of adolescent girls in India are not enrolled in any education institution. These trends solidify later in employment: At 24 percent, India has one of the lowest global rates of women in the workforce.
With girls standing to be the worst affected by the shift to online schooling, some educators have pushed back at the government’s initial grand technological efforts. Activists like Nishant Baghel, who leads digital initiatives at the education nonprofit Pratham, are urging the government to use so-called outdated technology like radio, SMS, and television as it draws up its ambitious coronavirus schooling plans. If internet coverage is out of reach to many in rural India, television is a more widely available medium. About half of rural households and more than two thirds of urban households own a TV. Unlike phones, which are usually owned by male heads of households and carried along to work daily—limiting their availability—TV sets remain at home. These classes allow students to view high quality, visual content which can be easier to consume and retain. And, most importantly, such classes can be viewed by multiple students at once.
A college student teacher conducts open-air classes in a slum for underprivileged students who lack electronic devices to attend online classes as schools remain closed in New Delhi on July 20.
But even within TV-focused education programs, students have struggled with access. In Kerala, education officials estimated at the start of the June term that about 250,000 students had no access to the internet or television. The same month, a 15-year-old scholarship student whose parents lacked a phone and couldn’t afford to repair their television died by suicide. Local media claimed she was upset about falling behind on her schoolwork.
The high-profile tragedy resulted in a statewide mobilization by the government, political parties, business owners, private institutions, and citizens who contributed smartphones, computers, and televisions. The state government has started rolling out “neighborhood learning centers” with TV sets set up in common spaces—such as libraries and childcare centers—where students can gather to attend the virtual lessons. Kudumbashree, Kerala’s poverty eradication and women empowerment program which has more than 4 million members, came up with a scheme to provide subsidized laptops to students that can be paid for in installments.
Governments and educators have also considered radio, an even more widely available medium. Community radio stations have played a critical role in raising coronavirus awareness in far-flung and underdeveloped areas, and audio lessons are also following suit. The government announced in May that it would attempt to use an estimated 289 community radio stations to provide school education. All India Radio, the state-owned public radio service, is providing daily lessons in several parts of the country, including the hilly areas of Jammu and Kashmir, where the government has banned high-speed internet. In Nagpur district of Maharashtra, students can tune in to 15-minute long radio broadcasts twice a week which include educational activities and topics of discussions for their parents.
Students wear free facemasks amid concerns over the spread of the coronavirus at the Footpath School in Ahmedabad, India, on March 19, early in the pandemic.
The goal is to keep children engaged in learning, even in the absence of textbooks and without the need to leave their neighborhoods. A sample lesson might explain a science concept using their village surroundings or encourage something like counting the number of rotis being cooked for a meal, and mothers usually facilitate the teaching. These lessons are done in conjunction with basic mobile phones to ensure retention. The education NGO Pratham sends reading material via SMS ahead of each lesson and offers a follow-up call after to ensure that children have understood the explained concepts.
In some communities, educators have taken it upon themselves to offer truly offline alternatives. In the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, several villages now provide lessons over loudspeakers. Teachers run classes as they normally would, except they sit inside a room on their own, a microphone in hand, as students gather in a designated spot with their notebooks to learn. Some teachers and village heads broadcast audio content created by education nonprofits to supplement these classes.
These efforts show just how steep the obstacles are to universal schooling. With the world’s second largest internet user base and the biggest presence on social media sites, India is one of the world’s most important digital markets. But this isn’t a uniform trend across the subcontinent: Digital access has yet to become a reality for many of its residents. Google just announced a $10 billion investment to digitize India, promising affordable internet access in different languages. The tech giant already has an ongoing program in the country that aims to provide digital literacy to rural women and claims to have reached 26 million of them. In the past, states have launched schemes that provided mobile phones to women in households below the poverty line, and to college students, with the promise of increased connectivity and benefits. But as communities across the country begin their new, remote terms with no small amount of trial and error, it’s apparent that such initiatives fall short of need. The pandemic has exacerbated inequalities and challenges that already existed for girls in India. If the government hopes to save them from falling irretrievably behind, it must focus on foundational skills and literacy, stressed Baghel of Pratham, and not try to achieve curriculum for the academic year as schools remain shut. During these unprecedented times, it is imperative to keep the students engaged in learning and development so they are well equipped when schools do reopen.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--In Portland, the Baby Fascists Have Shown Their Face

In Portland , the Baby Fascists Have Shown Their Face Fascism was never about actual people and their predicaments but about a glorious imaginary collective that had died but would be reborn .
In the 1920s and 1930s , the idea was everywhere the same : At some point in the past , the nation or the race had been greater , purer , more beautiful .
That ancient perfection could be seen in ruins , poems , monuments .
Then , so the story went , another group , some inferior race , some cabal had come along and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If only that group could be removed , then the race could be restored , made great again .
In U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s adoration of Confederate statues and in his mobilization of state power to protect monuments , it is easy to see a similar style .
The specifics of the present , the plights of individual Americans , are irrelevant , beside the point .
The death of George Floyd matters only insofar as it can trigger a desire to dominate .
It is a prompt to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end , white Americans are the true victims and the U.S. president is the greatest victim of all .
The deaths of tens of thousands of Americans from the coronavirus is neither here nor there .
Here too the president is victim-in-chief , with a mandate to lead the people into myth .
What matters is Americans ’ ability , through the medium of metal and concrete , to see their way back to a past when they were great .
Consider what would have happened had the president expressed as much concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for statues in June and July .
There was no call earlier this year for haste , for sudden action , for interagency cooperation , for an expansion of the role of the federal government to defeat a pandemic .
On the contrary : The states were told to deal with the coronavirus themselves , and individuals were left to sort through the confusion and contradictions of statements from the White House .
But when statues are threatened , then , it seems , exceptional action is called for .
What if all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are nearly always men ) swinging batons now had been passing out masks a few months ago ?
The men in mismatched shoes and ill-fitting uniforms lack identification and insignia recall virtually every authoritarian regime .
Who are the miniature stormtroopers now appearing in Portland and soon in other cities ?
That the men in mismatched shoes and ill-fitting uniforms lack identification and insignia recalls virtually every authoritarian regime .
It is a basic feature of a state under the rule of law that a citizen can recognize legal authority and tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the nightmare moment of repression to be seized by unknown men .
When the government itself elides the distinction between those who protect the law and those who break it , when it makes itself into a paramilitary wearing the wrong kind of camouflage , it invites others to do the same .
It is not so hard , after all , to rent a van , play dress up , and start hurting people .
When citizens do not know whether they are being intimidated by governmental or nongovernmental forces , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of escalation that fascists liked .
Fascists thrived in crises and indeed sought them out .
The unforgettable example is the Reichstag fire , which Adolf Hitler recognized right away as his great opportunity .
As the German parliament burned , the Nazis mischaracterized the event , speaking of a vast left-wing conspiracy to destroy the country , the race , and so on .
Something not so dissimilar is taking place now , as Attorney General William Barr and acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf rationalize the use of force against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fairy tale about what the protests mean .
The Nazis claimed that their main rival , the Social Democrats , were ultimately to be blamed for a terrorist act ; Trump ’ s fundraising messages say the same about his own political rivals .
By deliberately provoking protesters , Trump and his allies are working to create their own Reichstag moment .
The difference this time , of course , is that everyone knows that this is what is going on .
After the Reichstag fire , the Nazis began to establish concentration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for migrants , they were based on the premise that a territorial space could be excluded from the rule of law .
The very first assignment of the SS was to serve as guards in the new concentration camps .
This was the formative experience that made what followed possible .
When Americans consider their own detention centers , which hold more people than the Nazi concentration camp system in the 1930s , they should pay special attention to the people these centers employ .
It appears that some of the men taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” in Portland come from U.S. Border Patrol .
It would be interesting to know how many of them already served inside detention centers .
When we use German terms for Nazi history , events and people seem dark and distant .
Einsatzgruppen summons a notion of pure evil or perhaps an image of a death pit .
But the term just means “ deployment groups ” ; indeed the structure of these units in certain ways recalls that of the special response teams .
The Einsatzgruppen were drawn from various units , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to perform special tasks .
Like the special response teams , the Einsatzgruppen had an unclear legal status .
Their chain of command led through an ideological and party leadership that melded loosely , and only at the top , with the state .
It is an awkward similarity that the Department of Homeland Security is directed by a myth-besotted ideologue who was never confirmed by the U.S. Senate .
The people beating Americans are unaccountable to them .
Americans have been wrong to think themselves exceptional , and have much to learn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have fought harder and longer .
All of this is a dry run for November .
Republics do not usually collapse because one day one man declares a revolution .
They collapse because men inside the regime look for loopholes in the law—as can be seen very clearly in the formation of these deployment groups—and then seek to expand the loopholes until the law itself has no meaning .
A crisis is found and expanded until the leader ( which is all the word Führer means ) can claim that a state of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judges find some provision of some law that seems to justify this , making the idea of law itself all the less credible .
The men who have already learned by running the camps that exception is now the rule thrive as agents of chaos .
Elections are of course held , as they were in Nazi Germany , but with the violent men in the mismatched uniforms standing by .
The outcome is known in advance .
It can happen in the United States , and some of it has already happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not .
Major elements of the state , such as the armed forces , can not be expected to follow Trump , Barr , and Wolf into their half-grown fascism .
Hitler had the armed forces tamed within four years ; Trump can not say the same .
Even if some police officers do seem primed for the kind of racial war that the Nazis saw as their task , most find such an idea abhorrent , and the institution is highly decentralized and not under Trump ’ s control .
Unlike Hitler @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with institutions .
He is at Hitler ’ s level in the imaginative use of language to create enemies .
Yet he has no grand violent project for America ; the state is weaker than it was four years ago , both at home and abroad .
Everyone around the world knows that the United States is weaker , and some Americans have grasped this as well .
This is a profound difference with fascism : Italy and Germany radiated strength and indeed seemed stronger than they were .
Trump can not take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has any virtues but because he has too many vices .
He is highly skilled at creating division , as the fascists were , but less good at supplying an ideal for which risks are to be taken and sacrifices made .
His ultimate idea is not racial struggle but personal fulfilment .
His administration needs enough fascism to get by , enough to weaken the state and society so that the people Trump admires , be they in the Kremlin or in his circle , can stay out of prison and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good at destroying democracies but not at imagining or building anything new .
There is easily enough malice and neglect in the Trump administration to pervert a republic but not enough energy and purpose to build a fascist empire .
Trump has some true believers , but a true believer in a theatrical performer such as Trump must also be a cynic , and cynics do not go down fighting .
Unlike fascists , Trump does not pretend to love his people better than others : He loves foreign dictators and oligarchs more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bottom of his own ideology is the baby ’ s cry for attention .
Americans will hear that peal in November , and some will no doubt respond , the official and unofficial paramilitaries among them .
There will likely be a fight in November , of the sort that Americans have never seen before , but it is a winnable fight .
On the other side , though , are the people and their predicaments .
Most Americans understand that there was no need for 150,000 of them and counting to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to understand that the country ’ s history of racism should not be a plaything of rich white men .
As it turns out , Americans and their institutions were far more vulnerable to fascist rhetoric and oligarchical rot than many wanted to believe in 2016 and 2017 .
Yet to learn from the history of fascism is to understand something painful : Americans have been wrong to think themselves exceptional , and have much to learn about democracy , including from others who have fought harder and longer .
When we look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reflection of ourselves , and that is the moment we react and grow .
There will likely be a fight in November , of the sort that Americans have never seen before , but it is a winnable fight .
It is right to see fascism and call it by its name .
It is also right to mock it , resist it , and overcome it .

Fascism was never about actual people and their predicaments but about a glorious imaginary collective that had died but would be reborn. In the 1920s and 1930s, the idea was everywhere the same: At some point in the past, the nation or the race had been greater, purer, more beautiful. That ancient perfection could be seen in ruins, poems, monuments. Then, so the story went, another group, some inferior race, some cabal had come along and inexplicably ruined the people’s destiny. If only that group could be removed, then the race could be restored, made great again.
Fascism was never about actual people and their predicaments but about a glorious imaginary collective that had died but would be reborn. In the 1920s and 1930s, the idea was everywhere the same: At some point in the past, the nation or the race had been greater, purer, more beautiful. That ancient perfection could be seen in ruins, poems, monuments. Then, so the story went, another group, some inferior race, some cabal had come along and inexplicably ruined the people’s destiny. If only that group could be removed, then the race could be restored, made great again.
In U.S. President Donald Trump’s adoration of Confederate statues and in his mobilization of state power to protect monuments, it is easy to see a similar style. The specifics of the present, the plights of individual Americans, are irrelevant, beside the point. The death of George Floyd matters only insofar as it can trigger a desire to dominate. It is a prompt to a certain narrative in which, in the end, white Americans are the true victims and the U.S. president is the greatest victim of all. The deaths of tens of thousands of Americans from the coronavirus is neither here nor there. Here too the president is victim-in-chief, with a mandate to lead the people into myth. What matters is Americans’ ability, through the medium of metal and concrete, to see their way back to a past when they were great.
Consider what would have happened had the president expressed as much concern for people in February and March as for statues in June and July. There was no call earlier this year for haste, for sudden action, for interagency cooperation, for an expansion of the role of the federal government to defeat a pandemic. On the contrary: The states were told to deal with the coronavirus themselves, and individuals were left to sort through the confusion and contradictions of statements from the White House. But when statues are threatened, then, it seems, exceptional action is called for. What if all the men (and, yes, they are nearly always men) swinging batons now had been passing out masks a few months ago?
The men in mismatched shoes and ill-fitting uniforms lack identification and insignia recall virtually every authoritarian regime.
Who are the miniature stormtroopers now appearing in Portland and soon in other cities? That the men in mismatched shoes and ill-fitting uniforms lack identification and insignia recalls virtually every authoritarian regime. It is a basic feature of a state under the rule of law that a citizen can recognize legal authority and tell the police from the thugs. It is the nightmare moment of repression to be seized by unknown men. When the government itself elides the distinction between those who protect the law and those who break it, when it makes itself into a paramilitary wearing the wrong kind of camouflage, it invites others to do the same. It is not so hard, after all, to rent a van, play dress up, and start hurting people. When citizens do not know whether they are being intimidated by governmental or nongovernmental forces, the situation is rife for the kind of escalation that fascists liked.
Fascists thrived in crises and indeed sought them out. The unforgettable example is the Reichstag fire, which Adolf Hitler recognized right away as his great opportunity. As the German parliament burned, the Nazis mischaracterized the event, speaking of a vast left-wing conspiracy to destroy the country, the race, and so on. Something not so dissimilar is taking place now, as Attorney General William Barr and acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf rationalize the use of force against Americans on the basis of a dark fairy tale about what the protests mean. The Nazis claimed that their main rival, the Social Democrats, were ultimately to be blamed for a terrorist act; Trump’s fundraising messages say the same about his own political rivals. By deliberately provoking protesters, Trump and his allies are working to create their own Reichstag moment. The difference this time, of course, is that everyone knows that this is what is going on.
After the Reichstag fire, the Nazis began to establish concentration camps. Like the U.S. detention centers for migrants, they were based on the premise that a territorial space could be excluded from the rule of law. The very first assignment of the SS was to serve as guards in the new concentration camps. This was the formative experience that made what followed possible. When Americans consider their own detention centers, which hold more people than the Nazi concentration camp system in the 1930s, they should pay special attention to the people these centers employ. It appears that some of the men taking part in the “special response teams” in Portland come from U.S. Border Patrol. It would be interesting to know how many of them already served inside detention centers.
When we use German terms for Nazi history, events and people seem dark and distant. Einsatzgruppen summons a notion of pure evil or perhaps an image of a death pit. But the term just means “deployment groups”; indeed the structure of these units in certain ways recalls that of the special response teams. The Einsatzgruppen were drawn from various units, deployed far from home, and asked to perform special tasks. Like the special response teams, the Einsatzgruppen had an unclear legal status. Their chain of command led through an ideological and party leadership that melded loosely, and only at the top, with the state. It is an awkward similarity that the Department of Homeland Security is directed by a myth-besotted ideologue who was never confirmed by the U.S. Senate. The people beating Americans are unaccountable to them.
Americans have been wrong to think themselves exceptional, and have much to learn about democracy, including from others who have fought harder and longer.
All of this is a dry run for November. Republics do not usually collapse because one day one man declares a revolution. They collapse because men inside the regime look for loopholes in the law—as can be seen very clearly in the formation of these deployment groups—and then seek to expand the loopholes until the law itself has no meaning. A crisis is found and expanded until the leader (which is all the word Führer means) can claim that a state of emergency is necessary. Friendly lawyers and judges find some provision of some law that seems to justify this, making the idea of law itself all the less credible. The men who have already learned by running the camps that exception is now the rule thrive as agents of chaos. Elections are of course held, as they were in Nazi Germany, but with the violent men in the mismatched uniforms standing by. The outcome is known in advance.
It can happen in the United States, and some of it has already happened, but the rest of it need not. Major elements of the state, such as the armed forces, cannot be expected to follow Trump, Barr, and Wolf into their half-grown fascism. Hitler had the armed forces tamed within four years; Trump cannot say the same. Even if some police officers do seem primed for the kind of racial war that the Nazis saw as their task, most find such an idea abhorrent, and the institution is highly decentralized and not under Trump’s control. Unlike Hitler, Trump is personally lazy and careless with institutions. He is at Hitler’s level in the imaginative use of language to create enemies. Yet he has no grand violent project for America; the state is weaker than it was four years ago, both at home and abroad. Everyone around the world knows that the United States is weaker, and some Americans have grasped this as well. This is a profound difference with fascism: Italy and Germany radiated strength and indeed seemed stronger than they were.
Trump cannot take fascism all the way, not because he has any virtues but because he has too many vices. He is highly skilled at creating division, as the fascists were, but less good at supplying an ideal for which risks are to be taken and sacrifices made. His ultimate idea is not racial struggle but personal fulfilment. His administration needs enough fascism to get by, enough to weaken the state and society so that the people Trump admires, be they in the Kremlin or in his circle, can stay out of prison and do well for themselves. Oligarchs are good at destroying democracies but not at imagining or building anything new. There is easily enough malice and neglect in the Trump administration to pervert a republic but not enough energy and purpose to build a fascist empire.
Trump has some true believers, but a true believer in a theatrical performer such as Trump must also be a cynic, and cynics do not go down fighting. Unlike fascists, Trump does not pretend to love his people better than others: He loves foreign dictators and oligarchs more and himself most of all. At the bottom of his own ideology is the baby’s cry for attention. Americans will hear that peal in November, and some will no doubt respond, the official and unofficial paramilitaries among them.
There will likely be a fight in November, of the sort that Americans have never seen before, but it is a winnable fight.
On the other side, though, are the people and their predicaments. Most Americans understand that there was no need for 150,000 of them and counting to die of COVID-19. Most Americans seem to understand that the country’s history of racism should not be a plaything of rich white men.
As it turns out, Americans and their institutions were far more vulnerable to fascist rhetoric and oligarchical rot than many wanted to believe in 2016 and 2017. Yet to learn from the history of fascism is to understand something painful: Americans have been wrong to think themselves exceptional, and have much to learn about democracy, including from others who have fought harder and longer.
When we look evil in the eye, we see a reflection of ourselves, and that is the moment we react and grow. There will likely be a fight in November, of the sort that Americans have never seen before, but it is a winnable fight. It is right to see fascism and call it by its name. It is also right to mock it, resist it, and overcome it.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--Human Rights Are in Recession. Can That Be Reversed?

Human Rights Are in Recession .
Can That Be Reversed ?
The human rights project is in recession .
For the last 14 years , political rights and civil liberties have declined around the world .
Authoritarian states such as China are increasingly successful in arguing across Asia , Africa , and the Middle East that stability and economic progress depend on significantly curtailing basic liberties such as the freedom of expression and due process .
International institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court have lost credibility through their ineffectiveness , appearance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Meanwhile , half the world ’ s population—4 billion people—lives in countries where their basic rights are either systematically denied or compromised by weak government or violent conflict .
Despite these setbacks , the human rights field operates as if it were still the heyday of human rights , before the world became multipolar and Western-dominated institutions and ideas began to lose force in many parts of the world .
Human rights advocates have tried to broaden the scope of issues covered by human rights while simultaneously narrowing the room for differences in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of rights , and rights claims , has grown and grown as advocates have become more strident in how these rights are prioritized and interpreted .
This approach hampers peacemaking by overemphasizing retributive justice , stirs resentment by focusing on issues that lack local support , and reduces the local ownership of rights that is essential to safeguarding them in the long term .
Recognizing the severity of this human rights recession , and the unique role the United States has played in promoting human rights , the U.S. State Department established @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Its mandate was narrow : to review the “ nation ’ s founding principles and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights , ” or UDHR , in order to advise on how to promote human rights through U.S. foreign policy .
There would be no policymaking—only an attempt to review the lessons of history and establish a broad and flexible framework to guide the United States .
The announcement of the commission immediately drew opposition from human rights proponents , interest groups , and news organizations .
The underlying assumption was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State Mike Pompeo ’ s political aspirations and religious beliefs in ways that hurt the interests of women ’ s and LGBT rights around the world .
More than 160 organizations wrote a joint letter to the commission in May to express concern about the work and any “ potential report or output that undermines the international human rights system.
” The group warned against prioritizing religious freedom “ as a cloak to permit violations of the human rights ” of women , girls , and LGBT people .
A number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the State Department on the grounds that the commission was biased in its makeup and operations—and thus in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act under which it was created .
But this pushback may have been driven more by fear than facts , given the commission ’ s narrow mandate and scant public pronouncements .
Certain advocates are concerned they will lose their privileged positions as gatekeepers for the field : Today they act as both legislator and judge , determining what rights matter and who is violating them .
While human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and incorporate diverse views—as did the Universal Declaration—an industry of advocacy organizations , lobbyists , academics , and journalists has emerged that shares a remarkably similar interpretation of rights based on the idea that individual autonomy should be prioritized above all else—an idea echoed by the open letter .
But the assertion that privacy and autonomy are “ core ” values is not evident in major international human rights treaties and reflects a uniquely Western understanding of personhood .
The Commission on Unalienable Rights released its draft report on July 16 , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knew what it would say .
As mandated by its charter , it has not tackled contemporary controversies on rights—the greatest concern of critics .
Instead , it offers a constructive set of ideas for how the United States can reclaim the moral high ground and reinvigorate the human rights project .
While it won ’ t be the final word on how to reform human rights , the report sets a high bar for subsequent debate and will hopefully lead to real change in how rights are promoted .
First , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing the field—something that anyone who cares about human rights should do .
It correctly states that “ in today ’ s multipolar world… it is plain to see that the ambitious human rights project of the past century is in crisis .
The broad consensus that once supported the UDHR ’ s principles is more fragile than ever , even as gross violations of human rights and dignity continue apace.
” Unless a change in direction is forthcoming , the field risks becoming ever less relevant in many parts of the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ body established by the Trump administration—which has often prioritized economic and geopolitical concerns over human rights—the report argues that “ it is urgent to vigorously champion human rights in foreign policy.
” It makes a forceful case for why the United States should take the lead in seeking reform of the human rights system “ in this hour of need , ” due to the role rights have always played in the U.S. Constitution , culture , and international commitments .
Third , the report is modest and evenhanded .
It repeatedly touches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to live up to its own ideals , arguing that “ the American model will serve as an inspiration to others only so long as we ourselves recognize the gap between our principles and the imperfections of our politics and can demonstrate , as we ask of others , tangible efforts at improvements.
” While “ America must pursue … [ human rights ] with renewed vigor , ” a “ humility born of the awareness of her own ‘ shortcomings and imperfections ’ and of the complexities of world politics ” is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the best messenger , given how divisive the president has been , this humility is a welcome departure from how human rights are often promoted .
The report emphasizes the importance of both maintaining a global consensus on core human rights and accommodating diversity in cross-cultural implementation .
Core rights include the handful prioritized and given little scope for flexibility by the drafters of the Universal Declaration , including protections against genocide , slavery , torture , inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , deportation or forcible transfer of population , discrimination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and religion .
This is not an easy balance , but it reflects the hard-won lessons of international negotiations on the UDHR and other major treaties , as well as recent criticism from people within the field as well as beyond it .
The report emphasizes the need for subsidiarity , democratic accountability , and a margin of legitimate pluralism in how countries prioritize and implement rights .
The “ interplay between universal principles of human rights and the variety of human realities in which they must be honored is at the heart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective , ” it says .
The commission also attempts to correct the misconception that individual rights can stand independent of other rights and responsibilities .
It instead stresses that rights are indivisible , interrelated , and interdependent—and to act otherwise is to undermine the consensus that forms the basis of the UDHR and other international agreements .
Finally , the report makes a sharp distinction between unalienable and positive rights , in line with the U.S. constitutional tradition and international human rights documents .
Whereas unalienable rights are universal and pre-political , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the product of custom , tradition , and civil society established through politics , and may change over time .
The commission makes clear that both are important and can be closely linked but that their roles are different .
For example , even though there is no global consensus on elderly rights , Singapore has mandated since 1995 that anyone over 60 years old is entitled to financial support from their children if they need it .
The report emphasizes the importance of the UDHR , both as a rights framework @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international consensus around rights can be built .
Without these , human rights can never gain global influence .
It recognizes the need for the human rights field to return to basics—to the core elements that made the post-World War II human rights project possible .
As the commission ’ s report points out , the revolution spawned by the UDHR was very much due to the ambitious modesty of its authors : Only a small number of rights were incorporated because only those that could attain a “ near-universal consensus among the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the rights were left open-ended to enable flexible interpretations and implementation .
The UDHR was intentionally created as a political and moral document , “ not as a legal instrument creating formal law.
” This modesty was essential to gaining consensus and to giving the document the power it had in the decades that followed .
The report could have better emphasized how institution building in weak states is critical to securing rights—an issue rarely addressed by the field despite the impossibility of securing rights without robust and accountable government .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong enough to play a constructive role in people ’ s lives because of weak capacity , corruption , and limited resources .
Even if these countries have leaders who want to improve the human rights of their citizens , they lack the institutional capacity to do so .
The rising influence of China , Russia , and other authoritarian regimes marks the first time since the 1970s that liberal democracy is challenged globally by an alternative political framework .
This makes the work of the Commission on Unalienable Rights more essential than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a broader recalibration of U.S. policies intended to better confront the challenges posed by these states .
And just as the Helsinki Accords played an important role in undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies , this report can hopefully contribute to ending the impunity with which certain regimes violate human rights today .
While the field will likely find fault in the commission ’ s work , the criticism could say more about the shortcomings of the field than those of the report .
If human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we need to return to the movement ’ s roots : to a more modest idea of universalism , a more pluralistic and integrated understanding of how rights work , and a greater emphasis on cultivating the seeds of rights in every society .

The human rights project is in recession. For the last 14 years, political rights and civil liberties have declined around the world. Authoritarian states such as China are increasingly successful in arguing across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that stability and economic progress depend on significantly curtailing basic liberties such as the freedom of expression and due process. International institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court have lost credibility through their ineffectiveness, appearance of bias, and lack of accountability. Meanwhile, half the world’s population —4 billion people—lives in countries where their basic rights are either systematically denied or compromised by weak government or violent conflict .
The human rights project is in recession. For the last 14 years, political rights and civil liberties have declined around the world. Authoritarian states such as China are increasingly successful in arguing across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that stability and economic progress depend on significantly curtailing basic liberties such as the freedom of expression and due process. International institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court have lost credibility through their ineffectiveness, appearance of bias, and lack of accountability. Meanwhile, half the world’s population—4 billion people—lives in countries where their basic rights are either systematically denied or compromised by weak government or violent conflict.
Despite these setbacks, the human rights field operates as if it were still the heyday of human rights, before the world became multipolar and Western-dominated institutions and ideas began to lose force in many parts of the world. Human rights advocates have tried to broaden the scope of issues covered by human rights while simultaneously narrowing the room for differences in bringing those rights to life. The number of rights, and rights claims, has grown and grown as advocates have become more strident in how these rights are prioritized and interpreted. This approach hampers peacemaking by overemphasizing retributive justice, stirs resentment by focusing on issues that lack local support, and reduces the local ownership of rights that is essential to safeguarding them in the long term.
Recognizing the severity of this human rights recession, and the unique role the United States has played in promoting human rights, the U.S. State Department established the Commission on Unalienable Rights in 2019. Its mandate was narrow: to review the “nation’s founding principles and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” or UDHR, in order to advise on how to promote human rights through U.S. foreign policy. There would be no policymaking—only an attempt to review the lessons of history and establish a broad and flexible framework to guide the United States.
The announcement of the commission immediately drew opposition from human rights proponents, interest groups, and news organizations. The underlying assumption was that the commission sought to advance Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s political aspirations and religious beliefs in ways that hurt the interests of women’s and LGBT rights around the world. More than 160 organizations wrote a joint letter to the commission in May to express concern about the work and any “potential report or output that undermines the international human rights system.” The group warned against prioritizing religious freedom “as a cloak to permit violations of the human rights” of women, girls, and LGBT people. A number of organizations filed a lawsuit against Pompeo and the State Department on the grounds that the commission was biased in its makeup and operations—and thus in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act under which it was created.
But this pushback may have been driven more by fear than facts, given the commission’s narrow mandate and scant public pronouncements. Certain advocates are concerned they will lose their privileged positions as gatekeepers for the field: Today they act as both legislator and judge, determining what rights matter and who is violating them. While human rights are meant to reflect universal aspirations and incorporate diverse views—as did the Universal Declaration—an industry of advocacy organizations, lobbyists, academics, and journalists has emerged that shares a remarkably similar interpretation of rights based on the idea that individual autonomy should be prioritized above all else—an idea echoed by the open letter. But the assertion that privacy and autonomy are “core” values is not evident in major international human rights treaties and reflects a uniquely Western understanding of personhood.
The Commission on Unalienable Rights released its draft report on July 16, and it has confounded critics who thought they knew what it would say. As mandated by its charter, it has not tackled contemporary controversies on rights—the greatest concern of critics. Instead, it offers a constructive set of ideas for how the United States can reclaim the moral high ground and reinvigorate the human rights project. While it won’t be the final word on how to reform human rights, the report sets a high bar for subsequent debate and will hopefully lead to real change in how rights are promoted.
First, the report acknowledges the depth of the problems facing the field—something that anyone who cares about human rights should do. It correctly states that “in today’s multipolar world… it is plain to see that the ambitious human rights project of the past century is in crisis. The broad consensus that once supported the UDHR’s principles is more fragile than ever, even as gross violations of human rights and dignity continue apace.” Unless a change in direction is forthcoming, the field risks becoming ever less relevant in many parts of the world.
Second, perhaps surprisingly for a body established by the Trump administration—which has often prioritized economic and geopolitical concerns over human rights—the report argues that “it is urgent to vigorously champion human rights in foreign policy.” It makes a forceful case for why the United States should take the lead in seeking reform of the human rights system “in this hour of need,” due to the role rights have always played in the U.S. Constitution, culture, and international commitments.
Third, the report is modest and evenhanded. It repeatedly touches upon the failure of the United States to live up to its own ideals, arguing that “the American model will serve as an inspiration to others only so long as we ourselves recognize the gap between our principles and the imperfections of our politics and can demonstrate, as we ask of others, tangible efforts at improvements.” While “America must pursue … [human rights] with renewed vigor,” a “humility born of the awareness of her own ‘shortcomings and imperfections’ and of the complexities of world politics” is essential. Even though the administration is not the best messenger, given how divisive the president has been, this humility is a welcome departure from how human rights are often promoted.
The report emphasizes the importance of both maintaining a global consensus on core human rights and accommodating diversity in cross-cultural implementation. Core rights include the handful prioritized and given little scope for flexibility by the drafters of the Universal Declaration, including protections against genocide, slavery, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, deportation or forcible transfer of population, discrimination, and protection for freedom of conscience and religion.
This is not an easy balance, but it reflects the hard-won lessons of international negotiations on the UDHR and other major treaties, as well as recent criticism from people within the field as well as beyond it. The report emphasizes the need for subsidiarity, democratic accountability, and a margin of legitimate pluralism in how countries prioritize and implement rights. The “interplay between universal principles of human rights and the variety of human realities in which they must be honored is at the heart of the challenge of making human rights effective,” it says.
The commission also attempts to correct the misconception that individual rights can stand independent of other rights and responsibilities. It instead stresses that rights are indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent—and to act otherwise is to undermine the consensus that forms the basis of the UDHR and other international agreements.
Finally, the report makes a sharp distinction between unalienable and positive rights, in line with the U.S. constitutional tradition and international human rights documents. Whereas unalienable rights are universal and pre-political, positive rights depend on context: They are the product of custom, tradition, and civil society established through politics, and may change over time. The commission makes clear that both are important and can be closely linked but that their roles are different. For example, even though there is no global consensus on elderly rights, Singapore has mandated since 1995 that anyone over 60 years old is entitled to financial support from their children if they need it.
The report emphasizes the importance of the UDHR, both as a rights framework and as an example of how an international consensus around rights can be built. Without these, human rights can never gain global influence. It recognizes the need for the human rights field to return to basics—to the core elements that made the post-World War II human rights project possible.
As the commission’s report points out, the revolution spawned by the UDHR was very much due to the ambitious modesty of its authors: Only a small number of rights were incorporated because only those that could attain a “near-universal consensus among the diverse nations” were included. Many of the rights were left open-ended to enable flexible interpretations and implementation. The UDHR was intentionally created as a political and moral document, “not as a legal instrument creating formal law.” This modesty was essential to gaining consensus and to giving the document the power it had in the decades that followed.
The report could have better emphasized how institution building in weak states is critical to securing rights—an issue rarely addressed by the field despite the impossibility of securing rights without robust and accountable government. In many countries, the state is not strong enough to play a constructive role in people’s lives because of weak capacity, corruption, and limited resources. Even if these countries have leaders who want to improve the human rights of their citizens, they lack the institutional capacity to do so.
The rising influence of China, Russia, and other authoritarian regimes marks the first time since the 1970s that liberal democracy is challenged globally by an alternative political framework. This makes the work of the Commission on Unalienable Rights more essential than ever. It is just one element in a broader recalibration of U.S. policies intended to better confront the challenges posed by these states. And just as the Helsinki Accords played an important role in undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, this report can hopefully contribute to ending the impunity with which certain regimes violate human rights today.
While the field will likely find fault in the commission’s work, the criticism could say more about the shortcomings of the field than those of the report. If human rights proponents want to end the recession, we need to return to the movement’s roots: to a more modest idea of universalism, a more pluralistic and integrated understanding of how rights work, and a greater emphasis on cultivating the seeds of rights in every society.