foreignpolicy--2020-12-16--Cyberattacks Are on the Decline

Cyberattacks Are on the Decline

Cyberattacks Are on the Decline APT29 has struck again .
According to U.S. news sources , the Russian hacker collective known as Cozy Bear , believed to be affiliated to the country ’ s foreign intelligence service , the SVR , has successfully hacked the U.S. State , Treasury , Homeland Security , and Commerce departments , as well as other government agencies .
The hack is just the latest scalp for the group , which has been linked to the 2016 hack on the Democratic National Committee and attacks on the Norwegian government , COVID-19 vaccine outfits , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and allied governments , the conclusion must be that their countries need not just better cybersecurity but , crucially , more innovative ways of retaliating .
And they should be even more concerned about another aspect of cyber-aggression : cyber-weapon proliferation .
The four federal departments were just the last entries in a long list of ATP29 ’ s victims this year .
Others “ have included government , consulting , technology , telecom , and oil and gas companies in North America , Europe , Asia and the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Adding insult to injury , in the case of FireEye , APT29 stole the firm ’ s red-team tools , the tools with which a company or government agency impersonates attackers so as to improve its defense .
When highly sophisticated hackers attacked COVID-19 vaccine research organizations in the United States , the United Kingdom , and Canada earlier this year , the British government ’ s National Cyber Security Agency not only identified APT29 but also noted that the group is “ almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services.
” APT29 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrates a clear trend : With businesses and institutions getting better at cybersecurity , garden-variety cyberattacks are decreasing while sophisticated and targeted intrusion is on the rise .
According to the annual Cyber Readiness Report compiled by Hiscox , an insurer , in the last 12 months , the share of companies affected by a cybersecurity event fell from 61 percent to 39 percent .
At the same time , though , losses from successful attacks are skyrocketing .
The more targeted , large-scale aggression—sometimes used for disruption ; sometimes ( as in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for espionage purposes—features people with the skills of APT29 ’ s members and their colleagues in another Russian group , APT28 ( also known as Fancy Bear ) , which is thought to be affiliated with Russia ’ s military intelligence agency , the GRU .
In the past , GRU hackers have perpetrated catastrophic attacks such as NotPetya in 2017 , which infamously crippled Ukrainian hospitals , banks , airports , government agencies , and much more .
The group then went after global companies including Maersk , the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ giant Merck ; snack giant Mondelez ( think Oreo cookies ) ; and others , causing some $ 1 billion in damages and leading to a lawsuit between Mondelez and its insurer .
The insurer , Zurich American Insurance Company , rather logically argued that since Western governments had attributed NotPetya to the Russian government , the attack counted as an act of war and was thus exempt from insurance payout .
In a separate development , this October , the U.S. Department of Justice indicted six hackers , all GRU officers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ France , and the 2018 Olympic Winter Games .
As it changes form , cyber-aggression is becoming an increasingly dangerous national security threat .
A cyberattack can bring a country to its knees without a single soldier crossing a border .
Targeted aggression means that defenders will have to work much harder to protect important firms and government services .
Samu Konttinen , until last month CEO of Finnish cyber-security firm F-Secure and now chairman of the Finnish Information Security Cluster , said in a recent interview that “ cyberattacks have become more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directed against specific targets .
Opportunist attackers , the sort of attackers who used to dominate , don ’ t care who the target is .
They just want the money.
” But today ’ s top attackers don ’ t operate like that , Konttinen noted ; instead , they go about their mission in a military-like way : “ Armed forces are not opportunistic .
They want to attack a particular country , not just any country … They ’ re becoming so sophisticated that you can ’ t stop them.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ even spot them .
“ Today it can take 100 days for a company to realize it has been attacked , ” Konttinen said .
That seems to be what happened to SolarWinds , the firm through which the U.S. government agencies were targeted .
In a statement , the company said the virus may date back to May or June .
All this means that cyberdefense must include not just the better cybersecurity that businesses have for at least the past decade been told to focus on .
Especially in the case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society—energy utilities , airports , water companies , grocery chains , internet providers—defense alone is clearly not enough .
Some NATO member states already engage in offensive cyber , and last month the United States ’ Cyber Command was joined by the United Kingdom ’ s new National Cyber Force .
The question , as the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted in its final report , is how to build cyber-deterrence that credible , agile , and fast .
Call it the defender ’ s dilemma : In cyberwarfare , eye-for-eye can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ battle is between guns in a traditional war .
The U.S. government would not deploy U.S. cyberattackers to steal Russian vaccine research in response to NPT29 incursions into Western pharma firms .
The answer must instead be more asymmetry .
If hostile state hackers were to , say , cripple Walmart or Britain ’ s Tesco supermarket chain , not to mention the tech , telecom , and oil and gas companies already attacked by NPT29 this year , the government or any of its allies should retaliate with a painful but legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of course ) .
The British government ’ s response to the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal illustrates the options available : according to then-British National Security Advisor , the government responded by , among other things , “ tackling some of the illicit money flows out of Russia.
” As if the changing nature of the threat weren ’ t enough to deal with , there ’ s a potentially even more dangerous trend : proliferation .
Ever since nuclear weapons were invented , lots of countries have wanted them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them thanks to the shady world of proliferation .
The same reality is taking hold in the realm of cyberweaponry .
“ Sometimes the technology leaks to criminals , ” Konttinen noted .
“ It ’ s like nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of criminals .
It ’ s very alarming.
” In many ways , the prospect is even more dangerous because unlike nuclear weapons , digital mega-weapons are regularly handled by people outside a limited circle of government officials ; indeed , the nature of cyber-aggression is for hostile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t be linked to them .
What if someone got their hands on APT29 ’ s formidable technology and deployed it against countries less able to defend their IT infrastructure than the United States ?
By the 1960s , the majority of the world ’ s countries had become so concerned about nuclear proliferation that they agreed on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty .
In total , 191 countries joined the NPT , which came into force in 1970 .
Today various groupings of countries are valiantly trying to agree on norms for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ task is to stem cyberproliferation .
To be sure , cyberweapons lose some of their power once they have been used , but they remain potent enough to inflict enormous damage .
It ’ s in every country ’ s interest to limit cyber-weapons proliferation .
The burning question is how to do it .

APT29 has struck again. According to U.S. news sources, the Russian hacker collective known as Cozy Bear, believed to be affiliated to the country’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has successfully hacked the U.S. State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce departments, as well as other government agencies. The hack is just the latest scalp for the group, which has been linked to the 2016 hack on the Democratic National Committee and attacks on the Norwegian government, COVID-19 vaccine outfits , and the cybersecurity firm FireEye. For the United States and allied governments, the conclusion must be that their countries need not just better cybersecurity but, crucially, more innovative ways of retaliating. And they should be even more concerned about another aspect of cyber-aggression: cyber-weapon proliferation.
APT29 has struck again. According to U.S. news sources, the Russian hacker collective known as Cozy Bear, believed to be affiliated to the country’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has successfully hacked the U.S. State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce departments, as well as other government agencies. The hack is just the latest scalp for the group, which has been linked to the 2016 hack on the Democratic National Committee and attacks on the Norwegian government, COVID-19 vaccine outfits, and the cybersecurity firm FireEye. For the United States and allied governments, the conclusion must be that their countries need not just better cybersecurity but, crucially, more innovative ways of retaliating. And they should be even more concerned about another aspect of cyber-aggression: cyber-weapon proliferation.
The four federal departments were just the last entries in a long list of APT29’s victims this year. Others “have included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and oil and gas companies in North America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East,” the Washington Post reported. Adding insult to injury, in the case of FireEye, APT29 stole the firm’s red-team tools, the tools with which a company or government agency impersonates attackers so as to improve its defense. When highly sophisticated hackers attacked COVID-19 vaccine research organizations in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada earlier this year, the British government’s National Cyber Security Agency not only identified APT29 but also noted that the group is “almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services.”
APT29’s selection of targets this year demonstrates a clear trend: With businesses and institutions getting better at cybersecurity, garden-variety cyberattacks are decreasing while sophisticated and targeted intrusion is on the rise. According to the annual Cyber Readiness Report compiled by Hiscox, an insurer, in the last 12 months, the share of companies affected by a cybersecurity event fell from 61 percent to 39 percent. At the same time, though, losses from successful attacks are skyrocketing.
The more targeted, large-scale aggression—sometimes used for disruption; sometimes (as in the case of the SVR-linked hackers) for espionage purposes—features people with the skills of APT29’s members and their colleagues in another Russian group, APT28 (also known as Fancy Bear), which is thought to be affiliated with Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. In the past, GRU hackers have perpetrated catastrophic attacks such as NotPetya in 2017, which infamously crippled Ukrainian hospitals, banks, airports, government agencies, and much more. The group then went after global companies including Maersk, the world’s largest container-shipping company; the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck; snack giant Mondelez (think Oreo cookies); and others, causing some $1 billion in damages and leading to a lawsuit between Mondelez and its insurer. The insurer, Zurich American Insurance Company, rather logically argued that since Western governments had attributed NotPetya to the Russian government, the attack counted as an act of war and was thus exempt from insurance payout. In a separate development, this October, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted six hackers, all GRU officers, over NotPetya and cyberattacks on Georgia, France, and the 2018 Olympic Winter Games.
As it changes form, cyber-aggression is becoming an increasingly dangerous national security threat. A cyberattack can bring a country to its knees without a single soldier crossing a border. Targeted aggression means that defenders will have to work much harder to protect important firms and government services. Samu Konttinen, until last month CEO of Finnish cyber-security firm F-Secure and now chairman of the Finnish Information Security Cluster, said in a recent interview that “cyberattacks have become more sophisticated, and they’re being directed against specific targets. Opportunist attackers, the sort of attackers who used to dominate, don’t care who the target is. They just want the money.” But today’s top attackers don’t operate like that, Konttinen noted; instead, they go about their mission in a military-like way: “Armed forces are not opportunistic. They want to attack a particular country, not just any country … They’re becoming so sophisticated that you can’t stop them.” Indeed, you can’t even spot them. “Today it can take 100 days for a company to realize it has been attacked,” Konttinen said. That seems to be what happened to SolarWinds, the firm through which the U.S. government agencies were targeted. In a statement, the company said the virus may date back to May or June.
All this means that cyberdefense must include not just the better cybersecurity that businesses have for at least the past decade been told to focus on. Especially in the case of companies critical to the functioning of society—energy utilities, airports, water companies, grocery chains, internet providers—defense alone is clearly not enough. Some NATO member states already engage in offensive cyber, and last month the United States’ Cyber Command was joined by the United Kingdom’s new National Cyber Force. The question, as the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted in its final report, is how to build cyber-deterrence that credible, agile, and fast.
Call it the defender’s dilemma: In cyberwarfare, eye-for-eye can’t be used as easily in the battle is between guns in a traditional war. The U.S. government would not deploy U.S. cyberattackers to steal Russian vaccine research in response to NPT29 incursions into Western pharma firms. The answer must instead be more asymmetry. If hostile state hackers were to, say, cripple Walmart or Britain’s Tesco supermarket chain, not to mention the tech, telecom, and oil and gas companies already attacked by NPT29 this year, the government or any of its allies should retaliate with a painful but legal surprise move (without violating any laws, of course). The British government’s response to the poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal illustrates the options available: according to then-British National Security Advisor, the government responded by, among other things, “tackling some of the illicit money flows out of Russia.”
As if the changing nature of the threat weren’t enough to deal with, there’s a potentially even more dangerous trend: proliferation. Ever since nuclear weapons were invented, lots of countries have wanted them, and some been successful in obtaining them thanks to the shady world of proliferation. The same reality is taking hold in the realm of cyberweaponry. “Sometimes the technology leaks to criminals,” Konttinen noted. “It’s like nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of criminals. It’s very alarming.” In many ways, the prospect is even more dangerous because unlike nuclear weapons, digital mega-weapons are regularly handled by people outside a limited circle of government officials; indeed, the nature of cyber-aggression is for hostile governments to use proxies so attacks can’t be linked to them. What if someone got their hands on APT29’s formidable technology and deployed it against countries less able to defend their IT infrastructure than the United States?
By the 1960s, the majority of the world’s countries had become so concerned about nuclear proliferation that they agreed on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In total, 191 countries joined the NPT, which came into force in 1970. Today various groupings of countries are valiantly trying to agree on norms for cyberspace interaction. A much more urgent task is to stem cyberproliferation. To be sure, cyberweapons lose some of their power once they have been used, but they remain potent enough to inflict enormous damage. It’s in every country’s interest to limit cyber-weapons proliferation. The burning question is how to do it.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Arab Dignity Is Real. So Is Arab Failure.

Arab Dignity Is Real .
So Is Arab Failure .
On Dec. 17 , 2010 , Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid .
After lingering in a hospital for more than two weeks , he finally succumbed to his self-inflicted injuries .
While he lay dying , popular protests rolled toward the Tunisian capital , eventually overwhelming Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali ’ s fearsome 24-year iron-fisted and corrupt reign when he took flight to Saudi Arabia on Jan. 14 , 2011 .
Ben Ali was not supposed to fall .
Neither was Egypt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libya ’ s Muammar al-Qaddafi supposed to be run out of Tripoli .
Ali Abdullah Saleh was supposed to have mastered the art of dancing on the pin that was/is Yemeni politics .
The Assads were also supposed to have Syria wired .
The events of late 2010 and 2011 were so extraordinary and so unexpected—at least to most Westerners—that journalists , analysts , and officials began referring to them collectively as the Arab Spring .
The name was poetic , in a way , but it implicitly assumed an outcome that in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no matter how awe-inducing the uprisings may have been .
Now , a decade later , what was the meaning of the uprisings ?
There has been a bounty of articles about how the Arab Spring turned to winter , but perhaps it is too early to tell .
After all , the Prague Spring was crushed mercilessly , but Czechs and Slovaks threw off communist rule two decades later .
The idea that the uprisings in the Middle East have set the stage for future success has been a fallback position for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well be that the winter and spring of 2010-2011 was a prelude to change that will slowly , but inevitably , topple regional authoritarians , making way for democratic politics .
But then again , maybe not .
It is true that much has changed in the Middle East since Bouazizi ’ s self-immolation .
The uprisings altered the discourse in the region , demonstrated that centers of power are not invulnerable , and inspired promise for a better future .
These are factors that activists can leverage should a new opportunity to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of regimes have also undergone their own transformation .
For them , the terms of battle have changed .
They see the events that unfolded a decade ago as an aberration , a distortion of the natural order of things , and thus seem determined never to allow public , private , and virtual spaces to become spheres of dissent again .
It would be considerably more difficult for the “ We Are All Khaled Said ” Facebook page to be a mechanism of mass mobilization today given how much the Egyptian security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Still , Egypt ’ s present crop of officers and their counterparts in other parts of the region are no more omniscient than those who were responsible for the stability of their countries a decade ago .
The result is an odd dynamic in which activists who imagine just and open societies are in a race against those responsible for the reinstitutionalization of authoritarianism in Middle Eastern societies before their inevitable arrest .
The way observers think about what might come next in Arab countries is dependent on what they think happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on this there is less agreement than one might expect .
Were the uprisings revolutions ?
In an offhand way , they seem like revolutions .
People rose up and leaders fell , but revolutions are more complicated .
They require the overthrow of both the political system and the mutually reinforcing social order .
This is what happened in Iran in 1979 , but not in Arab countries in 2010-2011 .
Tunisia , which has progressed more than other countries , did not have a revolution .
It has undergone a transition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but by a series of negotiations and renegotiations among leaders in order to avoid or move beyond crises .
This is all a testament to Tunisia ’ s civic culture , but the old social order that buttressed Ben Ali ’ s rule remains .
In Egypt , only the romance surrounding the Jan. 25 uprising and Mubarak ’ s ignominious fall 18 days later makes what happened a “ revolution ” instead of what really happened : a coup .
If Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same is the case for Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in February 2011 .
In Egypt , there was a change in leadership , but the political order and the prevailing patterns of power in society remained unchanged .
Libya , perhaps , came closest to a revolution .
But , despite the best efforts of some political elites to forge a peaceful and democratic way forward , the social order did not disintegrate and put fragmentary pressure on the country .
People resorted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support in the chaotic aftermath of the Feb. 15 uprising .
That was hardly surprising given the importance of both during the Qaddafi era , but narrow political interests soon took over and cracked Libya , resulting in a dizzying array of militias , two governments , extremist groups , and a civil war that became a regional proxy struggle .
Syria never even got that far as Bashar al-Assad responded to peaceful demonstrators with bullets and torture .
Ten years later , Syria has been torn asunder in a conflict so cruel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dead and displaced people is almost pointless , if only because , as numbers , they seemingly don ’ t mean anything .
How is any of this a “ spring , ” and what can it tell anyone about the future ?
Intrinsic to the moniker “ Arab Spring ” was the assumption that from the thundering calls for “ bread , freedom , and social justice ” those good things would necessarily follow once leaders were forced from their palaces .
Yet looking back over the last decade , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to argue that the uprisings produced much more than sorrow .
That does not mean that the uprisings were a mistake—as if such unpredictable events could even be categorized as such .
Tunisians , Egyptians , Libyans , Syrians , Yemenis , Bahrainis , and others rose up in response to their bitter circumstances to demand a better future .
They were mostly crushed .
Does this make Middle Easterners exceptional ?
No .
Revolutions are rare , and transitions to democracy fail more often than they succeed .
And should activists somehow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again and fill the public spaces of Arab cities with demands for the end of their regimes , there is no guarantee that the outcome would be any different .
One can only hope .

On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. After lingering in a hospital for more than two weeks, he finally succumbed to his self-inflicted injuries. While he lay dying, popular protests rolled toward the Tunisian capital, eventually overwhelming Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s fearsome 24-year iron-fisted and corrupt reign when he took flight to Saudi Arabia on Jan. 14, 2011.
On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. After lingering in a hospital for more than two weeks, he finally succumbed to his self-inflicted injuries. While he lay dying, popular protests rolled toward the Tunisian capital, eventually overwhelming Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s fearsome 24-year iron-fisted and corrupt reign when he took flight to Saudi Arabia on Jan. 14, 2011.
Ben Ali was not supposed to fall. Neither was Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Nor was Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi supposed to be run out of Tripoli. Ali Abdullah Saleh was supposed to have mastered the art of dancing on the pin that was/is Yemeni politics. The Assads were also supposed to have Syria wired. The events of late 2010 and 2011 were so extraordinary and so unexpected—at least to most Westerners—that journalists, analysts, and officials began referring to them collectively as the Arab Spring. The name was poetic, in a way, but it implicitly assumed an outcome that in those early days was far from assured no matter how awe-inducing the uprisings may have been.
Now, a decade later, what was the meaning of the uprisings? There has been a bounty of articles about how the Arab Spring turned to winter, but perhaps it is too early to tell. After all, the Prague Spring was crushed mercilessly, but Czechs and Slovaks threw off communist rule two decades later. The idea that the uprisings in the Middle East have set the stage for future success has been a fallback position for activists and analysts alike. It may well be that the winter and spring of 2010-2011 was a prelude to change that will slowly, but inevitably, topple regional authoritarians, making way for democratic politics. But then again, maybe not.
It is true that much has changed in the Middle East since Bouazizi’s self-immolation. The uprisings altered the discourse in the region, demonstrated that centers of power are not invulnerable, and inspired promise for a better future. These are factors that activists can leverage should a new opportunity to challenge authority arise, yet the defenders of regimes have also undergone their own transformation. For them, the terms of battle have changed. They see the events that unfolded a decade ago as an aberration, a distortion of the natural order of things, and thus seem determined never to allow public, private, and virtual spaces to become spheres of dissent again.
It would be considerably more difficult for the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page to be a mechanism of mass mobilization today given how much the Egyptian security services have learned in the last decade. Still, Egypt’s present crop of officers and their counterparts in other parts of the region are no more omniscient than those who were responsible for the stability of their countries a decade ago. The result is an odd dynamic in which activists who imagine just and open societies are in a race against those responsible for the reinstitutionalization of authoritarianism in Middle Eastern societies before their inevitable arrest.
The way observers think about what might come next in Arab countries is dependent on what they think happened 10 winters and springs ago. And on this there is less agreement than one might expect. Were the uprisings revolutions? In an offhand way, they seem like revolutions. People rose up and leaders fell, but revolutions are more complicated. They require the overthrow of both the political system and the mutually reinforcing social order. This is what happened in Iran in 1979, but not in Arab countries in 2010-2011.
Tunisia, which has progressed more than other countries, did not have a revolution. It has undergone a transition, if not exactly by a pact, but by a series of negotiations and renegotiations among leaders in order to avoid or move beyond crises. This is all a testament to Tunisia’s civic culture, but the old social order that buttressed Ben Ali’s rule remains.
In Egypt, only the romance surrounding the Jan. 25 uprising and Mubarak’s ignominious fall 18 days later makes what happened a “revolution” instead of what really happened: a coup. If Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by way of a coup, then surely the same is the case for Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in February 2011. In Egypt, there was a change in leadership, but the political order and the prevailing patterns of power in society remained unchanged.
Libya, perhaps, came closest to a revolution. But, despite the best efforts of some political elites to forge a peaceful and democratic way forward, the social order did not disintegrate and put fragmentary pressure on the country. People resorted to tribe and region for succor and support in the chaotic aftermath of the Feb. 15 uprising. That was hardly surprising given the importance of both during the Qaddafi era, but narrow political interests soon took over and cracked Libya, resulting in a dizzying array of militias, two governments, extremist groups, and a civil war that became a regional proxy struggle. Syria never even got that far as Bashar al-Assad responded to peaceful demonstrators with bullets and torture. Ten years later, Syria has been torn asunder in a conflict so cruel and devastating that repeating the numbers of dead and displaced people is almost pointless, if only because, as numbers, they seemingly don’t mean anything.
How is any of this a “spring,” and what can it tell anyone about the future? Intrinsic to the moniker “Arab Spring” was the assumption that from the thundering calls for “bread, freedom, and social justice” those good things would necessarily follow once leaders were forced from their palaces. Yet looking back over the last decade, it is hard to fathom why anyone would venture to argue that the uprisings produced much more than sorrow. That does not mean that the uprisings were a mistake—as if such unpredictable events could even be categorized as such. Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans, Syrians, Yemenis, Bahrainis, and others rose up in response to their bitter circumstances to demand a better future. They were mostly crushed.
Does this make Middle Easterners exceptional? No. Revolutions are rare, and transitions to democracy fail more often than they succeed. And should activists somehow manage to capture lightning in a bottle again and fill the public spaces of Arab cities with demands for the end of their regimes, there is no guarantee that the outcome would be any different. One can only hope.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Obama’s Brutal Drone Legacy Will Haunt the Biden Administration

In 2017 , I met Kabir Aluzai , a tall man with big hands and facial features that reminded me of the late Sean Connery .
Aluzai described how his brother , Kareem , was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2013 while on his way to sell watermelons in Afghanistan ’ s Wardak province , near Kabul .
“ Nothing was left of him .
Even most of his bones were gone , ” Aluzai recalled .
Aluzai introduced some of the village children around him and added that all of them knew the sound of Predator drones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , helicopters , and fighter jets .
They know when to play outside and when not .
They are traumatized—we all are , ” he added .
Like many other rural parts of Afghanistan , Aluzai ’ s home district was controlled by the Taliban .
Most of the drones , however , did not kill the insurgents , but civilians : farmers , merchants , miners , or—most disturbingly—children .
Under the Obama administration , Afghanistan became the world ’ s most drone-bombed country .
President Barack Obama also expanded clandestine wars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not officially at war , such as Pakistan , Yemen , and Somalia .
In most of these countries , Obama ’ s drone wars fueled more extremism , militancy , and anti-American sentiment .
In 2015 , the United Nations reported that Obama ’ s drones had killed more civilians in Yemen that year than al Qaeda did .
In Pakistan ’ s tribal areas , adjacent to the porous border with Afghanistan , most drone strikes did not kill militants .
In 2014 , the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identified drone victims in Pakistan were actually militants affiliated with al Qaeda .
The cases of Obama ’ s many innocent victims remain unknown .
Tariq Aziz , a 16-year-old anti-drone activist from North Waziristan who was killed while driving a car , was one .
Momina Bibi , a grandmother torn to pieces by Obama ’ s drones in her backyard in front of her grandchildren , was another such case .
In Obama ’ s recently published memoir , A Promised Land , even readers who search extensively will be hard-pressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or feelings of remorse .
Instead , the former U.S. president prefers to defend and whitewash his drone campaign by solely describing those killed as “ dangerous.
” “ They were dangerous , these young men , often deliberately and casually cruel .
Still , in the aggregate , at least , I wanted somehow to save them—send them to school , give them a trade , drain them of the hate that had been filling their heads .
And yet the world they were a part of , and the machinery I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them instead , ” Obama wrote .
Obama ’ s self-righteous words do not reflect on-the-ground realities .
Leading human rights organizations from all over the world regularly criticized the effects of drone strikes and the massive civilian casualties they caused .
Contrary to the imagination of Obama and many other politicians and military officials , drones are not precise weapons that only kill arbitrarily defined “ bad guys.
” In fact , the vast majority of designated terrorists , like al Qaeda and Taliban leaders , were not killed .
Taliban supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the very first drone strike in U.S. history in late 2001 , was never killed by any of the Predators and Reapers that hunted him .
Many years later , in 2013 , he died of natural causes not too far from a U.S. military base in southern Afghanistan , with the rest of the world only finding out two years later .
It ’ s a similar story with other figures like Ayman al-Zawahiri of al Qaeda or Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Taliban .
Yet in his memoir Obama ignores these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nontraditional warfare ” and , “ unlike some on the left , ” as he writes , embracing parts of his predecessor George W. Bush ’ s controversial counterterrorism doctrine .
Compared to the Bush era , drone strikes in Pakistan , Somalia , and Yemen increased tenfold under Obama , while his “ kill list , ” which he personally signed off on each “ Terror Tuesday , ” became notorious .
As a former member of Obama ’ s administration , President-elect Joe Biden might be keen to carry on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too different from that of his onetime boss .
In Afghanistan , for example , Biden might continue outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s withdrawal plans , but it is hard to imagine that clandestine forces and Predators will stop operating and killing people there .
It ’ s also unrealistic to assume that America ’ s shadow wars in Africa , which increased heavily under both Obama and Trump , will decrease .
However , Biden should rethink the devastating counterterrorism policies of his predecessors .
In the eyes of many people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drone war has become a symbol of injustice , oppression , and impunity that led to both global and local radicalization of Muslim populations who are living with the consequences .
Extrajudicial drone strikes have also led to questioning of the rule of law itself and the notion of a presumption of innocence—something that did not exist for Kareem Aluzai and all the other countless drone victims .
The rule of law stands as a crowning achievement on which many Western societies pride themselves , but it is undermined by Western leaders championing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For those on the ground living beneath the drones , such lofty concepts provide little solace .
To the Predators , they are visible only as targets—and invisible to the world once they die .

In 2017, I met Kabir Aluzai, a tall man with big hands and facial features that reminded me of the late Sean Connery. Aluzai described how his brother, Kareem, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2013 while on his way to sell watermelons in Afghanistan’s Wardak province, near Kabul. “Nothing was left of him. Even most of his bones were gone,” Aluzai recalled.
In 2017, I met Kabir Aluzai, a tall man with big hands and facial features that reminded me of the late Sean Connery. Aluzai described how his brother, Kareem, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2013 while on his way to sell watermelons in Afghanistan’s Wardak province, near Kabul. “Nothing was left of him. Even most of his bones were gone,” Aluzai recalled.
Aluzai introduced some of the village children around him and added that all of them knew the sound of Predator drones. “They can distinguish between drones, helicopters, and fighter jets. They know when to play outside and when not. They are traumatized—we all are,” he added. Like many other rural parts of Afghanistan, Aluzai’s home district was controlled by the Taliban. Most of the drones, however, did not kill the insurgents, but civilians: farmers, merchants, miners, or—most disturbingly—children.
Under the Obama administration, Afghanistan became the world’s most drone-bombed country. President Barack Obama also expanded clandestine wars in countries where the United States was not officially at war, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. In most of these countries, Obama’s drone wars fueled more extremism, militancy, and anti-American sentiment.
In 2015, the United Nations reported that Obama’s drones had killed more civilians in Yemen that year than al Qaeda did. In Pakistan’s tribal areas, adjacent to the porous border with Afghanistan, most drone strikes did not kill militants. In 2014, the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that less than 4 percent of all identified drone victims in Pakistan were actually militants affiliated with al Qaeda. The cases of Obama’s many innocent victims remain unknown. Tariq Aziz, a 16-year-old anti-drone activist from North Waziristan who was killed while driving a car, was one. Momina Bibi, a grandmother torn to pieces by Obama’s drones in her backyard in front of her grandchildren, was another such case.
In Obama’s recently published memoir, A Promised Land, even readers who search extensively will be hard-pressed to find any mention of innocent victims or feelings of remorse. Instead, the former U.S. president prefers to defend and whitewash his drone campaign by solely describing those killed as “dangerous.”
“They were dangerous, these young men, often deliberately and casually cruel. Still, in the aggregate, at least, I wanted somehow to save them—send them to school, give them a trade, drain them of the hate that had been filling their heads. And yet the world they were a part of, and the machinery I commanded, more often had me killing them instead,” Obama wrote.
Obama’s self-righteous words do not reflect on-the-ground realities. Leading human rights organizations from all over the world regularly criticized the effects of drone strikes and the massive civilian casualties they caused. Contrary to the imagination of Obama and many other politicians and military officials, drones are not precise weapons that only kill arbitrarily defined “bad guys.” In fact, the vast majority of designated terrorists, like al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, were not killed.
Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, the target of the very first drone strike in U.S. history in late 2001, was never killed by any of the Predators and Reapers that hunted him. Many years later, in 2013, he died of natural causes not too far from a U.S. military base in southern Afghanistan, with the rest of the world only finding out two years later. It’s a similar story with other figures like Ayman al-Zawahiri of al Qaeda or Jalaluddin Haqqani of the Taliban.
Yet in his memoir Obama ignores these facts while praising “more targeted, nontraditional warfare” and, “unlike some on the left,” as he writes, embracing parts of his predecessor George W. Bush’s controversial counterterrorism doctrine. Compared to the Bush era, drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen increased tenfold under Obama, while his “kill list,” which he personally signed off on each “Terror Tuesday,” became notorious.
As a former member of Obama’s administration, President-elect Joe Biden might be keen to carry on the drone program, in a manner not too different from that of his onetime boss. In Afghanistan, for example, Biden might continue outgoing President Donald Trump’s withdrawal plans, but it is hard to imagine that clandestine forces and Predators will stop operating and killing people there. It’s also unrealistic to assume that America’s shadow wars in Africa, which increased heavily under both Obama and Trump, will decrease.
However, Biden should rethink the devastating counterterrorism policies of his predecessors. In the eyes of many people around the world, America’s drone war has become a symbol of injustice, oppression, and impunity that led to both global and local radicalization of Muslim populations who are living with the consequences.
Extrajudicial drone strikes have also led to questioning of the rule of law itself and the notion of a presumption of innocence—something that did not exist for Kareem Aluzai and all the other countless drone victims. The rule of law stands as a crowning achievement on which many Western societies pride themselves, but it is undermined by Western leaders championing the concept to justify their foreign misadventures.
For those on the ground living beneath the drones, such lofty concepts provide little solace. To the Predators, they are visible only as targets—and invisible to the world once they die.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Putin Faces the Press at the End of a Mixed Year

Putin Faces the Press at the End of a Mixed Year Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Russian President Vladimir Putin faces his end-of-year press conference , Brexit talks narrow down to fishing policy , and Sudan and Ethiopia border tensions increase .
A note to our readers : Morning Brief will be entering a holiday schedule for the next two weeks .
We will publish on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 , and then on Dec. 29 and Dec. 30 the following week .
We ’ ll resume normal service in 2021 .
We welcome your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Vladimir Putin hosts his annual end-of-year press conference today , a chance for Russian and international media to put one of the world ’ s most powerful men on the spot .
Like most world leaders in a pandemic year , Putin has had a mixed 2020 .
On the positive side of the ledger , he succeeded in making changes to Russia ’ s constitution—allowing him to run for two more terms as president if he so wishes .
Russia also continued its opportunistic foreign policy in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Other developments cast a shadow , however .
Falling oil prices depressed the country ’ s economy and could spell more trouble if global demand remains low .
Months of protests in Belarus against President Aleksandr Lukashenko showed the weakness of a key ally .
Closer to home , a challenge to Moscow ’ s leadership in the southeastern city of Khabarovsk over the summer revealed that all is not well on the country ’ s periphery .
Still out in the cold .
The poisoning of opposition figure Alexei Navalny , allegedly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won ’ t make it any easier for the West to accept Russia back into the fold .
International sanctions will likely persist .
Putin will also have to face up to a new U.S. president in Joe Biden , whose focus on rebuilding international ties may come at the expense of the Russian leader .
In an interview with 60 Minutes in October , Biden named Russia as “ the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances.
” Reset 2.0 ?
Olga Oliker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Central Asia Program at International Crisis Group , says another attempt to start anew with Putin is unlikely .
“ Biden ’ s team will be walking a careful line of sticking to values in places like Belarus , where there ’ s little room to actually do much ; trying to support Ukraine , which has and presents its own problems ; and finding a way to rationalize sanctions without looking weak—all while trying to move forward on arms control and lessen tension , ” Oliker told Foreign Policy .
Biden ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic issues , Oliker notes , meaning the Russia relationship may have to take a backseat to other priorities .
Writing in Foreign Policy , David J. Kramer doesn ’ t think Biden should overthink Russia policy .
“ As long as Putin remains in power , there is little point in spending precious U.S. diplomatic and presidential time and effort in trying to improve U.S.-Russian relations , ” Kramer writes .
Other than urgent nuclear arms control talks , Kramer sees a policy of containment as the most effective U.S. approach in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spoiler fish .
The debate over fishing rights remains an obstacle to a final deal in Brexit negotiations , EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament on Wednesday .
Von der Leyen added that the other outstanding issues of governance and the so-called level playing field have largely been resolved , meaning the emotional issue of access to Britain ’ s waters is all that remains .
Downing Street Press Secretary Allegra Stratton said that a no-deal Brexit was still the most likely outcome , although it was announced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christmas recess to ratify a deal should one be agreed .
Sudan-Ethiopia tensions .
Sudan reported that an unspecified number of its troops were killed by Ethiopian military and militia forces on Tuesday in a confrontation on the border between the two countries .
The news comes just three days after Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok met with his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa .
That trip was cut short to mere hours despite Sudan ’ s announcement that it would be a two-day visit .
Qatar boycott .
The Saudi-led boycott @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end as the rescheduling of an annual regional summit from December to January suggests rapprochement is at hand .
Reuters reports that the summit was moved to give time to settle the dispute so that the countries could present a united front in January .
January ’ s deal is unlikely to end tensions between Qatar and Gulf states immediately , but is expected to provide an off-ramp to a policy widely seen as ineffective since it was instituted in 2017 .
Hunger in the U.K. UNICEF is to fund relief operations in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its history , as roughly 2.4 million children face food insecurity in the country .
The U.N. agency will grant roughly $ 33,000 to a London-based food delivery charity that operates in the south of the city .
Children ’ s access to food in the United Kingdom was given new voice earlier this year by professional soccer player Marcus Rashford , whose campaign to reverse a government decision to end free school meals eventually led to the British government backing down .
Phrenology meets technology .
Chinese software giant Alibaba has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ website that said its software can be used to identify the faces of Uighurs and other minorities .
A report by IVPM found that Alibaba touted “ is it Uighur ?
” as a facial recognition option among other attributes like age , gender , and smile detection available on its Cloud Shield service .
When asked by the New York Times about the service , the company removed the posting from the website and claimed the feature was only ever considered in a testing environment , and not ever sold to customers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seek ways to boost their economies post-pandemic , a new report found that one oft-proposed solution will not help : tax cuts for the rich .
Researchers at the London School of Economics and King ’ s College London looked at 50 years of tax policy favoring the rich across 18 OECD countries and found that the benefits remained with the wealthy while poorer citizens saw little improvement in the form of jobs or economic growth .
“ Policymakers shouldn ’ t worry that raising taxes on the rich to fund the financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economies , ” David Hope , one of the report ’ s authors , told Bloomberg .
Pincer movement .
Having largely defeated the coronavirus , Australians are now feasting on lobster .
However , the reasons behind the popularity of the shellfish are a cause for concern down under .
Australian lobsters were effectively banned from the Chinese market in November after Canberra ’ s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus angered Beijing .
Normally , 90 percent of lobster exports would go to China , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faces a glut and a resulting price drop .
Australian supermarkets have even begun placing a limit on the number of lobsters shoppers can buy in order to manage stocks , the Washington Post reports .
Australia ’ s loss is a gain for the United States , where Boston lobster has largely made up the shortfall in the Chinese market .
The import ban could be seen as bad news for Chinese fishmongers , though : Boston lobster usually sells at a fraction of the price of its tougher , fishier Australian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian President Vladimir Putin faces his end-of-year press conference, Brexit talks narrow down to fishing policy, and Sudan and Ethiopia border tensions increase.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian President Vladimir Putin faces his end-of-year press conference, Brexit talks narrow down to fishing policy, and Sudan and Ethiopia border tensions increase.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Putin Faces Grilling After a Rough Year
Russian President Vladimir Putin hosts his annual end-of-year press conference today, a chance for Russian and international media to put one of the world’s most powerful men on the spot.
Like most world leaders in a pandemic year, Putin has had a mixed 2020. On the positive side of the ledger, he succeeded in making changes to Russia’s constitution—allowing him to run for two more terms as president if he so wishes. Russia also continued its opportunistic foreign policy in Libya and in Nagorno-Karabakh, proving kingmaker in the latter conflict.
Other developments cast a shadow, however. Falling oil prices depressed the country’s economy and could spell more trouble if global demand remains low. Months of protests in Belarus against President Aleksandr Lukashenko showed the weakness of a key ally. Closer to home, a challenge to Moscow’s leadership in the southeastern city of Khabarovsk over the summer revealed that all is not well on the country’s periphery.
Still out in the cold. The poisoning of opposition figure Alexei Navalny, allegedly carried out by Russian security forces, won’t make it any easier for the West to accept Russia back into the fold. International sanctions will likely persist.
Putin will also have to face up to a new U.S. president in Joe Biden, whose focus on rebuilding international ties may come at the expense of the Russian leader. In an interview with 60 Minutes in October, Biden named Russia as “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances.”
Reset 2.0? Olga Oliker, the director of the Europe and Central Asia Program at International Crisis Group, says another attempt to start anew with Putin is unlikely.
“Biden’s team will be walking a careful line of sticking to values in places like Belarus, where there’s little room to actually do much; trying to support Ukraine, which has and presents its own problems; and finding a way to rationalize sanctions without looking weak—all while trying to move forward on arms control and lessen tension,” Oliker told Foreign Policy.
Biden’s attention is likely to be on domestic issues, Oliker notes, meaning the Russia relationship may have to take a backseat to other priorities.
Writing in Foreign Policy, David J. Kramer doesn’t think Biden should overthink Russia policy. “As long as Putin remains in power, there is little point in spending precious U.S. diplomatic and presidential time and effort in trying to improve U.S.-Russian relations,” Kramer writes. Other than urgent nuclear arms control talks, Kramer sees a policy of containment as the most effective U.S. approach in dealing with Putin’s Russia.
What We’re Following Today
Spoiler fish. The debate over fishing rights remains an obstacle to a final deal in Brexit negotiations, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament on Wednesday.
Von der Leyen added that the other outstanding issues of governance and the so-called level playing field have largely been resolved, meaning the emotional issue of access to Britain’s waters is all that remains.
Downing Street Press Secretary Allegra Stratton said that a no-deal Brexit was still the most likely outcome, although it was announced that British Parliament would return from its Christmas recess to ratify a deal should one be agreed.
Sudan-Ethiopia tensions. Sudan reported that an unspecified number of its troops were killed by Ethiopian military and militia forces on Tuesday in a confrontation on the border between the two countries.
The news comes just three days after Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok met with his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa. That trip was cut short to mere hours despite Sudan’s announcement that it would be a two-day visit.
Qatar boycott. The Saudi-led boycott of Qatar by Gulf states may soon end as the rescheduling of an annual regional summit from December to January suggests rapprochement is at hand.
Reuters reports that the summit was moved to give time to settle the dispute so that the countries could present a united front in January. January’s deal is unlikely to end tensions between Qatar and Gulf states immediately, but is expected to provide an off-ramp to a policy widely seen as ineffective since it was instituted in 2017.
Keep an Eye On
Hunger in the U.K. UNICEF is to fund relief operations in the United Kingdom for the first time in its history, as roughly 2.4 million children face food insecurity in the country. The U.N. agency will grant roughly $33,000 to a London-based food delivery charity that operates in the south of the city.
Children’s access to food in the United Kingdom was given new voice earlier this year by professional soccer player Marcus Rashford, whose campaign to reverse a government decision to end free school meals eventually led to the British government backing down.
Phrenology meets technology. Chinese software giant Alibaba has backtracked from a claim on a company website that said its software can be used to identify the faces of Uighurs and other minorities. A report by IVPM found that Alibaba touted “is it Uighur?” as a facial recognition option among other attributes like age, gender, and smile detection available on its Cloud Shield service. When asked by the New York Times about the service, the company removed the posting from the website and claimed the feature was only ever considered in a testing environment, and not ever sold to customers.
Trickle up economics. As countries seek ways to boost their economies post-pandemic, a new report found that one oft-proposed solution will not help: tax cuts for the rich. Researchers at the London School of Economics and King’s College London looked at 50 years of tax policy favoring the rich across 18 OECD countries and found that the benefits remained with the wealthy while poorer citizens saw little improvement in the form of jobs or economic growth.
“Policymakers shouldn’t worry that raising taxes on the rich to fund the financial costs of the pandemic will harm their economies,” David Hope, one of the report’s authors, told Bloomberg.
Odds and Ends
Pincer movement. Having largely defeated the coronavirus, Australians are now feasting on lobster. However, the reasons behind the popularity of the shellfish are a cause for concern down under.
Australian lobsters were effectively banned from the Chinese market in November after Canberra’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus angered Beijing. Normally, 90 percent of lobster exports would go to China, but with exports slashed, the Australian market faces a glut and a resulting price drop. Australian supermarkets have even begun placing a limit on the number of lobsters shoppers can buy in order to manage stocks, the Washington Post reports.
Australia’s loss is a gain for the United States, where Boston lobster has largely made up the shortfall in the Chinese market. The import ban could be seen as bad news for Chinese fishmongers, though: Boston lobster usually sells at a fraction of the price of its tougher, fishier Australian cousin.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--2020 Was the Year of Indigenous Activism in Canada

2020 Was the Year of Indigenous Activism in Canada In late March , just after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic , a couple from Quebec , fearing the end was nigh , sold everything they owned and flew to the remote Indigenous community of Old Crow in the Yukon territory .
When the couple arrived in the fly-in-only village of about 250 people , they sought temporary accommodations and offered to work .
But they were astounded to discover the community didn ’ t have sufficient housing or jobs available for its own residents , let alone pandemic refugees from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forgotten as coronavirus cases spiked , but it speaks to the uneasy coexistence of two Canadas : one Indigenous , one not .
The non-Indigenous Quebecers were so ill-prepared for life in the Arctic , they were an immediate imposition , the village ’ s chief said .
The thoughtless couple put the entire community at risk of infection , since , like many Indigenous communities , Old Crow has no doctor or resources to handle a deadly outbreak .
The relative isolation of Indigenous communities has been both a blessing and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ customs the Canadian government once tried to eliminate , but it ’ s also kept the lived experiences of more than 1.6 million Indigenous people and the issues they face largely out of Canadians ’ sight and mind for most of the country ’ s history .
For all that was unexpected about 2020 , few analysts could have anticipated the wave of Indigenous-led protests that swept across Canada this year .
Since protests against the construction of a natural gas pipeline through Wetʼsuwetʼen territory began in January , demonstrations have erupted countrywide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from lobster fishing in New Brunswick to trophy hunting in Quebec wildlife reserves .
The largest and most significant since the Wet ’ suwet ’ en protests are the ongoing demonstrations over a residential subdivision proposed to be built on Indigenous territory in Southwestern Ontario .
The federal government needs to take a more active role in conflict resolution.In the past , Canadian prime ministers have too often relied on arm ’ s-length government agencies or provincial governments to address such complaints .
But as the protests have shown , the federal government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in conflict resolution .
Indigenous people may make up only about 5 percent of Canada ’ s population , but vast swathes of the country are 25 to 90 percent Indigenous .
And the Indigenous population is growing rapidly , at roughly four times the speed of the rest of the population .
Since more than 600 recognized Indigenous governments are spread out across the country , the Indigenous in Canada are hardly a homogenous voting bloc .
Yet while this may have made coordinated action hard in the past , their collective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making , have become increasingly difficult for Canada ’ s leaders to ignore .
Not only is Indigenous participation in federal elections increasing , but so has the number of Indigenous people elected to parliament in recent years .
In close races , the Indigenous vote may be the deciding factor .
Amid these shifts in Canadian politics , Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promoted himself as a pro-Indigenous candidate , but has , for the most part , shied away from direct federal government intervention in conflict resolution and failed to deliver on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have publicly committed to reconciliation , the sustained improvement of relations between Canada ’ s federal government and the country ’ s Indigenous communities based on the recommendations of Canada ’ s Truth and Reconciliation Commission .
It would be difficult for Trudeau to continue to sideline Indigenous issues.But despite this commitment—and his campaign sloganeering that promised a brighter day for Indigenous people in Canada—Trudeau has underdelivered .
He has failed to ratify the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( UNDRIP ) , a long-standing campaign promise , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a moribund oil and gas sector over Indigenous land rights .
That ’ s no longer enough for Canadians .
It would be difficult , if not inopportune , for Trudeau to continue to sideline Indigenous issues .
The prime minister , who built his political reputation as a centrist who can appeal to leftists and progressives—and doubtless more than a few Indigenous voters at one time or another—must become a more ardent defender of Indigenous interests .
The influence of the NDP on Trudeau is promising , but in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is facing isn ’ t so much Canada ’ s parliament , but rather the relationship between its federal and provincial governments .
Despite its history , provincial governments continue to routinely call upon the RCMP for Indigenous policing.One of the main reasons Trudeau ’ s government has not made sufficient progress on Indigenous affairs is because they often throw the federal government into conflict with provincial ones over jurisdictional power—and particularly over resource management .
In addition , the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ( RCMP ) is responsible for law enforcement in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provinces , where most Indigenous people live .
The RCMP is the direct descendant of the North-West Mounted Police , which was created in 1873 to police Indigenous peoples and force them from their land .
Thereafter , “ Mounties ” were used to remove Indigenous children from their parents and place them in Canada ’ s infamous residential schools , in a scandal that ’ s been called a cultural genocide .
More recently , the force has come under fire for its systemic inaction ( and in some cases possible involvement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , perhaps thousands , of Indigenous women and girls .
Despite its history , provincial governments continue to routinely call upon the RCMP for Indigenous policing .
Throughout 2020 , Trudeau ’ s strategy has been to not cross these jurisdictional lines , even when provincial governments have instigated crises or fumbled their responses .
Trudeau ’ s reluctance to act is at least partly due to the shadow of his father , former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau .
Because Pierre Trudeau promoted a strong central government , in some parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ synonymous with federal overreach .
And since Trudeau ’ s election in 2015 , several of the more powerful provinces have elected populist premiers who have vowed to protect provincial interests against a perceived return of “ Trudeauism.
” In practice , this has left Indigenous people caught between a rock and a hard place—their interests are often at odds with provinces keen to develop natural resources and too “ politically sensitive ” to warrant federal government assistance much of the time .
This dynamic played out amid the Wet ’ suwet ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partly what has left negotiations there so unsatisfying .
Indigenous communities across Canada responded with solidarity protests targeting key pieces of infrastructure—namely railways that were deliberately built through Indigenous territories so that they wouldn ’ t disrupt non-Indigenous communities .
These actions , in turn , sparked non-Indigenous solidarity protests in major cities across the country .
The Wet ’ suwet ’ en crisis exposed the public to the interconnectedness of several long-standing problems in Canada.The Wet ’ suwet ’ en crisis exposed the public , perhaps for the first time , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Canada , such as excessive force used by police against Indigenous people ; the government ’ s failure to consult with Indigenous communities over energy projects that are potentially harmful to the environmental sanctity of both their territory and the planet ; and the expansion of natural gas and oil pipelines despite global warming and Trudeau ’ s commitments to reaching Paris Accord carbon-reduction targets of net-zero emissions by 2050 .
As the blockades and street protests gained steam—and were accused of affecting the economy—Trudeau was forced to intervene .
Conservative politicians and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major energy projects , although proof of these claims was less than compelling .
Regardless , the national perception of political and economic instability was sufficient enough to merit direct federal intervention .
For now , the issue has been patched over : Though the pipeline remains controversial—and its construction is still opposed by Wet ’ suwet ’ en hereditary chiefs—after three days of negotiations in May between the chiefs , the provincial authorities , and the federal government , the Canadian government recognized land-title rights that set clear protocols to a court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hereditary chiefs and Indigenous councils are now recognized as parties who need to be consulted—which may avoid issues of Indigenous consent in the future—the decision is not retroactive to ongoing projects such as the Coastal GasLink pipeline project at the center of the dispute .
So while the negotiations were productive , the central tension in Wet ’ suwet ’ en remains : The hereditary chiefs are still opposed to the pipeline , while the British Columbia government is committed to seeing it completed .
And while both the pandemic and successful negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement , work on the pipeline slowed but never came to a full halt .
Protests recommenced in mid-October at the drill site as pipeline developer TC Energy resumed construction .
What sets this year apart is both the relative restraint of the police and provincial governments , and how widespread the protests have been .
It ’ s clear that it ’ s no longer politically tenable for provincial governments and their police forces to take a tough “ law and order ” approach to Indigenous concerns .
Now , more Canadians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by generations of Indigenous people for more than four centuries at the hands of French and British colonial officials , and then Canada ’ s federal , provincial , and territorial governments—as well as police forces and religious organizations .
Whether Trudeau ’ s election-season commitments were sincere or merely more lip service may not to matter anymore.Whether Trudeau ’ s election-season commitments—including implementing UNDRIP , bringing safe drinking water to all Indigenous reserves , and reducing the number of Indigenous children in foster care—were sincere or merely more lip service may not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and other forms of direct action secured negotiations with the government .
And , because of the protests this year , Canada ’ s non-Indigenous population may be slightly more aware of the systematic racism Indigenous communities face and have started to support them in their demands for change .
That Indigenous people in Canada can appeal to—and possibly count on—non-Indigenous support is a hopeful sign that Canada has passed an important milestone .
Now , official reconciliation efforts may not be limited to initiatives by the federal government alone .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Canada—such as the verbal and physical abuse recorded by an Atikamekw woman as she lay dying in a Quebec hospital in September—has pushed even the most obstinate of Canadians to reconsider their adamant belief that racism doesn ’ t exist in their country .
In some cases , major Canadian cities are even pushing forward on their own reconciliation initiatives , such as Montreal , when provincial or federal support is lacking .
Canada is a nation built on unceded Indigenous territory .
This historical truth is finally making its way into public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meetings or university lectures .
If Trudeau wishes to leave his mark as the prime minister who pushed the needle forward on reconciliation and raising Indigenous quality of life , he will have to accept this fully .
That means preparing himself—and the country he leads—to acknowledge that many of the nation ’ s future power brokers won ’ t be found in the skyscrapers of Montreal , Toronto , Vancouver , or Calgary , but in remote corners of the world ’ s second largest country .
Many will be women , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely won ’ t be too interested in building pipelines or logging old-growth forests .
Indigenous people in Canada have always been the rightful stewards of the land .
If Trudeau is serious about his commitment to reform a post-pandemic Canada into a greener , cleaner , and more equitable and just version of its former self , he ’ ll need to recognize that the balance of power is beginning to shift towards those who have been denied it for so long .

In late March, just after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, a couple from Quebec, fearing the end was nigh, sold everything they owned and flew to the remote Indigenous community of Old Crow in the Yukon territory. When the couple arrived in the fly-in-only village of about 250 people, they sought temporary accommodations and offered to work. But they were astounded to discover the community didn’t have sufficient housing or jobs available for its own residents, let alone pandemic refugees from Quebec.
In late March, just after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, a couple from Quebec, fearing the end was nigh, sold everything they owned and flew to the remote Indigenous community of Old Crow in the Yukon territory. When the couple arrived in the fly-in-only village of about 250 people, they sought temporary accommodations and offered to work. But they were astounded to discover the community didn’t have sufficient housing or jobs available for its own residents, let alone pandemic refugees from Quebec.
The peculiar story was quickly forgotten as coronavirus cases spiked, but it speaks to the uneasy coexistence of two Canadas: one Indigenous, one not. The non-Indigenous Quebecers were so ill-prepared for life in the Arctic, they were an immediate imposition, the village’s chief said. The thoughtless couple put the entire community at risk of infection, since, like many Indigenous communities, Old Crow has no doctor or resources to handle a deadly outbreak.
The relative isolation of Indigenous communities has been both a blessing and a curse. It has preserved languages and customs the Canadian government once tried to eliminate, but it’s also kept the lived experiences of more than 1.6 million Indigenous people and the issues they face largely out of Canadians’ sight and mind for most of the country’s history.
For all that was unexpected about 2020, few analysts could have anticipated the wave of Indigenous-led protests that swept across Canada this year. Since protests against the construction of a natural gas pipeline through Wetʼsuwetʼen territory began in January, demonstrations have erupted countrywide on a variety of Indigenous issues, from lobster fishing in New Brunswick to trophy hunting in Quebec wildlife reserves. The largest and most significant since the Wet’suwet’en protests are the ongoing demonstrations over a residential subdivision proposed to be built on Indigenous territory in Southwestern Ontario.
The federal government needs to take a more active role in conflict resolution.In the past, Canadian prime ministers have too often relied on arm’s-length government agencies or provincial governments to address such complaints. But as the protests have shown, the federal government needs to take a more active role in conflict resolution. Indigenous people may make up only about 5 percent of Canada’s population, but vast swathes of the country are 25 to 90 percent Indigenous. And the Indigenous population is growing rapidly, at roughly four times the speed of the rest of the population.
Since more than 600 recognized Indigenous governments are spread out across the country, the Indigenous in Canada are hardly a homogenous voting bloc. Yet while this may have made coordinated action hard in the past, their collective issues, over 150 years in the making, have become increasingly difficult for Canada’s leaders to ignore. Not only is Indigenous participation in federal elections increasing, but so has the number of Indigenous people elected to parliament in recent years. In close races, the Indigenous vote may be the deciding factor.
Amid these shifts in Canadian politics, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promoted himself as a pro-Indigenous candidate, but has, for the most part, shied away from direct federal government intervention in conflict resolution and failed to deliver on campaign promises. Trudeau and his government have publicly committed to reconciliation, the sustained improvement of relations between Canada’s federal government and the country’s Indigenous communities based on the recommendations of Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It would be difficult for Trudeau to continue to sideline Indigenous issues.But despite this commitment—and his campaign sloganeering that promised a brighter day for Indigenous people in Canada—Trudeau has underdelivered.
He has failed to ratify the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), a long-standing campaign promise, and has been accused of prioritizing the needs of a moribund oil and gas sector over Indigenous land rights. That’s no longer enough for Canadians. It would be difficult, if not inopportune, for Trudeau to continue to sideline Indigenous issues. The prime minister, who built his political reputation as a centrist who can appeal to leftists and progressives—and doubtless more than a few Indigenous voters at one time or another—must become a more ardent defender of Indigenous interests.
Solidarity with Indigenous communities is growing among voters, but it’s also a key platform of the New Democratic Party (NDP), whose support Trudeau desperately needs. Since Trudeau’s Liberal party became a minority government in 2019, Trudeau has generally needed to work with the NDP to pass legislation, such as annual budgets. Without the NDP, he’d lose the confidence of Canada’s parliament and Canadians would likely head back to the polls. Trudeau can reasonably depend on NDP support for the foreseeable future, especially through the pandemic, since it’s the major federal party that’s most closely aligned with the Liberals. But he’ll likely have to cater more to NDP desires, and NDP’s strong advocacy for Indigenous rights may finally push Trudeau from his middle-of-the-road approach.
The influence of the NDP on Trudeau is promising, but in order to enact change, the stumbling block Trudeau is facing isn’t so much Canada’s parliament, but rather the relationship between its federal and provincial governments.
Despite its history, provincial governments continue to routinely call upon the RCMP for Indigenous policing.One of the main reasons Trudeau’s government has not made sufficient progress on Indigenous affairs is because they often throw the federal government into conflict with provincial ones over jurisdictional power—and particularly over resource management. In addition, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is responsible for law enforcement in rural areas in seven out of ten provinces, where most Indigenous people live. The RCMP is the direct descendant of the North-West Mounted Police, which was created in 1873 to police Indigenous peoples and force them from their land.
Thereafter, “Mounties” were used to remove Indigenous children from their parents and place them in Canada’s infamous residential schools, in a scandal that’s been called a cultural genocide. More recently, the force has come under fire for its systemic inaction (and in some cases possible involvement) in the unsolved disappearances of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Indigenous women and girls. Despite its history, provincial governments continue to routinely call upon the RCMP for Indigenous policing. Throughout 2020, Trudeau’s strategy has been to not cross these jurisdictional lines, even when provincial governments have instigated crises or fumbled their responses.
Trudeau’s reluctance to act is at least partly due to the shadow of his father, former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Because Pierre Trudeau promoted a strong central government, in some parts of the country, the Trudeau name is synonymous with federal overreach. And since Trudeau’s election in 2015, several of the more powerful provinces have elected populist premiers who have vowed to protect provincial interests against a perceived return of “Trudeauism.”
In practice, this has left Indigenous people caught between a rock and a hard place—their interests are often at odds with provinces keen to develop natural resources and too “politically sensitive” to warrant federal government assistance much of the time. This dynamic played out amid the Wet’suwet’en protests, and it’s partly what has left negotiations there so unsatisfying.
Widespread protests began in in Wet’suwet’en Territory in January after the British Columbia government called on the RCMP to enforce a court injunction and dismantle a largely symbolic Indigenous barricade. Indigenous land defenders and water protectors from the Wetʼsuwetʼen First Nation hereditary government opposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline through their unceded territory, as they had not been consulted and have legitimate concerns about potential environmental degradation. Soon enough, photographs of heavily armed police in tactical gear pointing submachine guns at elderly protesters made the rounds. Those images, along with the detention and arrest of journalists, reminded the Canadian public of police brutality in the United States—even as Canadian politicians have been quick to dismiss police violence and systemic racism as an American problem.
Indigenous communities across Canada responded with solidarity protests targeting key pieces of infrastructure—namely railways that were deliberately built through Indigenous territories so that they wouldn’t disrupt non-Indigenous communities. These actions, in turn, sparked non-Indigenous solidarity protests in major cities across the country.
The Wet’suwet’en crisis exposed the public to the interconnectedness of several long-standing problems in Canada.The Wet’suwet’en crisis exposed the public, perhaps for the first time, to the interconnectedness of several long-standing problems in Canada, such as excessive force used by police against Indigenous people; the government’s failure to consult with Indigenous communities over energy projects that are potentially harmful to the environmental sanctity of both their territory and the planet; and the expansion of natural gas and oil pipelines despite global warming and Trudeau’s commitments to reaching Paris Accord carbon-reduction targets of net-zero emissions by 2050.
As the blockades and street protests gained steam—and were accused of affecting the economy—Trudeau was forced to intervene. Conservative politicians and pundits blamed the demonstrations for shuttering two major energy projects, although proof of these claims was less than compelling. Regardless, the national perception of political and economic instability was sufficient enough to merit direct federal intervention.
For now, the issue has been patched over: Though the pipeline remains controversial—and its construction is still opposed by Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs—after three days of negotiations in May between the chiefs, the provincial authorities, and the federal government, the Canadian government recognized land-title rights that set clear protocols to a court decision reached 23 years ago. Though hereditary chiefs and Indigenous councils are now recognized as parties who need to be consulted—which may avoid issues of Indigenous consent in the future—the decision is not retroactive to ongoing projects such as the Coastal GasLink pipeline project at the center of the dispute.
So while the negotiations were productive, the central tension in Wet’suwet’en remains: The hereditary chiefs are still opposed to the pipeline, while the British Columbia government is committed to seeing it completed. And while both the pandemic and successful negotiations in March and April curtailed the protest movement, work on the pipeline slowed but never came to a full halt. Protests recommenced in mid-October at the drill site as pipeline developer TC Energy resumed construction.
This year’s unrest is a far cry from the Indigenous protests of the 1990s, nearly all of which involved violent—and occasionally fatal—clashes instigated by the police. The Kanien’kehá:ka (Mohawk) resistance outside Montreal in July 1990, for instance, began with a botched Quebec provincial police raid over Mohawk protests about the planned expansion of a golf course into their territory, and continued throughout the summer with blocked bridges and anti-Indigenous counterprotests. A police officer was likely killed by friendly fire in the initial raid, and an elderly Indigenous man was struck and killed by a brick during an evacuation. The 78-day-long standoff culminated in the Canadian army’s occupation of Indigenous territory.
What sets this year apart is both the relative restraint of the police and provincial governments, and how widespread the protests have been. It’s clear that it’s no longer politically tenable for provincial governments and their police forces to take a tough “law and order” approach to Indigenous concerns. Now, more Canadians are refusing to ignore the abuse suffered by generations of Indigenous people for more than four centuries at the hands of French and British colonial officials, and then Canada’s federal, provincial, and territorial governments—as well as police forces and religious organizations.
Whether Trudeau’s election-season commitments were sincere or merely more lip service may not to matter anymore.Whether Trudeau’s election-season commitments—including implementing UNDRIP, bringing safe drinking water to all Indigenous reserves, and reducing the number of Indigenous children in foster care—were sincere or merely more lip service may not to matter anymore: Protests, blockades, and other forms of direct action secured negotiations with the government. And, because of the protests this year, Canada’s non-Indigenous population may be slightly more aware of the systematic racism Indigenous communities face and have started to support them in their demands for change.
That Indigenous people in Canada can appeal to—and possibly count on—non-Indigenous support is a hopeful sign that Canada has passed an important milestone. Now, official reconciliation efforts may not be limited to initiatives by the federal government alone. The clear racism suffered by Indigenous people in Canada—such as the verbal and physical abuse recorded by an Atikamekw woman as she lay dying in a Quebec hospital in September—has pushed even the most obstinate of Canadians to reconsider their adamant belief that racism doesn’t exist in their country. In some cases, major Canadian cities are even pushing forward on their own reconciliation initiatives, such as Montreal, when provincial or federal support is lacking.
Canada is a nation built on unceded Indigenous territory. This historical truth is finally making its way into public discourse—whether that’s in town hall meetings or university lectures. If Trudeau wishes to leave his mark as the prime minister who pushed the needle forward on reconciliation and raising Indigenous quality of life, he will have to accept this fully. That means preparing himself—and the country he leads—to acknowledge that many of the nation’s future power brokers won’t be found in the skyscrapers of Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, or Calgary, but in remote corners of the world’s second largest country.
Many will be women, some will be elders, and most likely won’t be too interested in building pipelines or logging old-growth forests. Indigenous people in Canada have always been the rightful stewards of the land. If Trudeau is serious about his commitment to reform a post-pandemic Canada into a greener, cleaner, and more equitable and just version of its former self, he’ll need to recognize that the balance of power is beginning to shift towards those who have been denied it for so long.