foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--Is Mexico Is The Next Coronavirus Epicenter?

Is Mexico Is The Next Coronavirus Epicenter ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Coronavirus cases spike in Mexico , peaceful protests against racism and police violence continue in the United States , and Cyclone Nisarga approaches Mumbai .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
On Tuesday Carissa Etienne , the World Health Organization ’ s regional director for the Americas warned that the coronavirus pandemic in the Western Hemisphere was only likely to get worse , as the effects of economic inequality exacerbate a public health crisis .
The number of coronavirus cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ account for over one-third of cases worldwide—has grabbed headlines , but it ’ s in Mexico where the pandemic could find its next epicenter .
On Tuesday , Mexico ’ s health ministry reported 3,891 new coronavirus cases , its highest daily number since the outbreak began .
A senior health official has sought to play down the increase .
“ The coronavirus epidemic is at its maximum level of intensity , ” Hugo Lopez-Gatell , Mexico ’ s assistant health secretary and a leader in the government response , said on Tuesday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of recorded deaths from coronavirus in Mexico is the third-highest in the Americas , behind United States and Brazil .
No testing , no data .
But what should be troubling for Mexico is the lack of necessary data to track the progress of the virus—it has one of the lowest testing rates in all of Latin America .
“ The Mexican government , unlike many and perhaps most governments , has declared that its epidemiological policy has no intention of counting each and every case , ” López-Gatell , told the Associated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in it , because it is useless , costly and not feasible to test everybody in the country.
” Mexico has instead focused on increasing the number of hospital beds available to treat patients when they fall ill. Mourning in Mexico .
In Foreign Policy , Maya Averbuch reported from the cemeteries and crematoriums of Mexico City and spoke with the grieving families who are still not being told whether their loved ones died of the coronavirus .
“ As a dispute has unfolded over Mexico ’ s management of the crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how many overall deaths there might be , but for closure in their specific cases , ” she writes .
Peaceful protests continue in U.S. , defying curfews .
Nationwide protests against police violence and systemic racism continued in cities across the United States on Tuesday and demonstrators are expected to return to the streets today .
In Washington D.C. , near the White House , there was a new addition : an 8-foot high steel fence separating protesters from police and other government personnel .
A 7 p.m. curfew in the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Some D.C. voters were forced to queue into the early hours of Wednesday morning to cast their ballots in the U.S. presidential primary .
Taliban denies reports of leader ’ s possible death .
A Taliban spokesman has denied a report by Foreign Policy suggesting Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada , the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban , may had died of COVID-19 .
The report , published on June 1 by Lynne O ’ Donnell and Mirwais Khan , quoted Moulawi Muhammad Ali Jan Ahmed , a senior Taliban official , as saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ recovering.
” The story also reported that the leader had not been seen in three months and that three other Taliban officials , speaking anonymously , believed the leader had died .
Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said Akhundzada was alive , and “ busy with his daily activities.
” Protests strain U.S.-Australia ties .
The Australian Embassy in Washington has been directed by its government to open an investigation into U.S. law enforcement officers assaulting an Australian journalist during Monday ’ s protests at the White House .
As FP ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show a journalist and cameraman from 7NEWS being attacked by U.S. Park Police in riot gear .
Australia ’ s ambassador in Washington , Arthur Sinodinos , said the embassy was “ in discussion with the State Department and they have offered assistance to identify where the complaint should be targeted.
” Cyclone Nisarga approaches Mumbai .
Indian authorities began evacuating residents around Mumbai on Tuesday in preparation for a cyclone due to make landfall today .
The India Meteorological Department ( IMD ) said on Tuesday that a depression in Arabian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into a cyclonic storm during next 12 hours , and further into a severe cyclonic storm during subsequent 12 hours.
” It ’ s the second major cyclone in two weeks to hit India after Cyclone Amphan made landfall in West Bengal and neighboring Bangladesh , killing over 100 people .
U.N. misses Yemen aid target .
The United Nations has fallen roughly $ 1 billion short of its target to help fund humanitarian operations in Yemen .
Overall , a pledging event hosted by Saudi Arabia raised $ 1.35 billion from international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that figure came from Saudi Arabia itself .
Speaking before the donor conference , Lise Grande , U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen said the UN ’ s operations would face “ catastrophic cutback ” if less than $ 1.6 billion was raised .
“ We won ’ t be able to provide the food people need to survive , or the health care they need or the water or sanitation or the nutrition support which helps to keep 2 million malnourished children from dying , ” she said .
Saudi Arabia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ date is believed to be at least $ 265 billion .
Libya cease-fire talks back on .
Cease-fire talks between Libya ’ s warring factions are set to resume , according to the U.N. Mission in Libya .
The two sides—the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army—will meet over videoconference due to coronavirus precautions .
The move comes as both Turkey and Russia appeared to increase air support for their respective sides in recent weeks .
The U.N. has not said when exactly talks will take place .
FP Insider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests and the global pandemic had on America ’ s security and its interests around the globe ?
On Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. EDT , join Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman in conversation with Jake Sullivan , a senior foreign-policy advisor to Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden , and Kori Schake , the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute , to find out .
Register here .
A popular anti-depressant drug , Zoloft , is in short supply as stocks diminish following a spike in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
The Food and Drug Administration moved the drug to a list of those facing shortages on Friday .
Overall Zoloft has seen a 12 percent increase in prescriptions—to 4.9 million—over the past year , Bloomberg reports .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Coronavirus cases spike in Mexico , peaceful protests against racism and police violence continue in the United States , and Cyclone Nisarga approaches Mumbai.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Coronavirus cases spike in Mexico, peaceful protests against racism and police violence continue in the United States, and Cyclone Nisarga approaches Mumbai.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Mexico Coronavirus Cases Spike, Suggesting an Underreported Outbreak
On Tuesday Carissa Etienne, the World Health Organization’s regional director for the Americas warned that the coronavirus pandemic in the Western Hemisphere was only likely to get worse, as the effects of economic inequality exacerbate a public health crisis. The number of coronavirus cases in the United States and Brazil—which together account for over one-third of cases worldwide—has grabbed headlines, but it’s in Mexico where the pandemic could find its next epicenter.
On Tuesday, Mexico’s health ministry reported 3,891 new coronavirus cases, its highest daily number since the outbreak began. A senior health official has sought to play down the increase. “The coronavirus epidemic is at its maximum level of intensity,” Hugo Lopez-Gatell, Mexico’s assistant health secretary and a leader in the government response, said on Tuesday. At over 10,000, the number of recorded deaths from coronavirus in Mexico is the third-highest in the Americas, behind United States and Brazil.
No testing, no data. But what should be troubling for Mexico is the lack of necessary data to track the progress of the virus—it has one of the lowest testing rates in all of Latin America. “The Mexican government, unlike many and perhaps most governments, has declared that its epidemiological policy has no intention of counting each and every case,” López-Gatell told the Associated Press. “We are not interested in it, because it is useless, costly and not feasible to test everybody in the country.” Mexico has instead focused on increasing the number of hospital beds available to treat patients when they fall ill.
Mourning in Mexico. In Foreign Policy, Maya Averbuch reported from the cemeteries and crematoriums of Mexico City and spoke with the grieving families who are still not being told whether their loved ones died of the coronavirus. “As a dispute has unfolded over Mexico’s management of the crisis, families are asking not for answers about how many overall deaths there might be, but for closure in their specific cases,” she writes.
What We’re Following Today
Peaceful protests continue in U.S., defying curfews. Nationwide protests against police violence and systemic racism continued in cities across the United States on Tuesday and demonstrators are expected to return to the streets today. In Washington D.C., near the White House, there was a new addition: an 8-foot high steel fence separating protesters from police and other government personnel. A 7 p.m. curfew in the city was undermined for an unexpected reason: Some D.C. voters were forced to queue into the early hours of Wednesday morning to cast their ballots in the U.S. presidential primary.
Taliban denies reports of leader’s possible death. A Taliban spokesman has denied a report by Foreign Policy suggesting Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban, may had died of COVID-19. The report, published on June 1 by Lynne O’Donnell and Mirwais Khan, quoted Moulawi Muhammad Ali Jan Ahmed, a senior Taliban official, as saying the leader was “sick” but “recovering.” The story also reported that the leader had not been seen in three months and that three other Taliban officials, speaking anonymously, believed the leader had died. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said Akhundzada was alive, and “busy with his daily activities.”
Protests strain U.S.-Australia ties. The Australian Embassy in Washington has been directed by its government to open an investigation into U.S. law enforcement officers assaulting an Australian journalist during Monday’s protests at the White House. As FP’s Robbie Gramer reports, live footage appeared to show a journalist and cameraman from 7NEWS being attacked by U.S. Park Police in riot gear. Australia’s ambassador in Washington, Arthur Sinodinos, said the embassy was “in discussion with the State Department and they have offered assistance to identify where the complaint should be targeted.”
Cyclone Nisarga approaches Mumbai. Indian authorities began evacuating residents around Mumbai on Tuesday in preparation for a cyclone due to make landfall today. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) said on Tuesday that a depression in Arabian Sea “is very likely to intensify into a cyclonic storm during next 12 hours, and further into a severe cyclonic storm during subsequent 12 hours.” It’s the second major cyclone in two weeks to hit India after Cyclone Amphan made landfall in West Bengal and neighboring Bangladesh, killing over 100 people.
Keep an Eye On
U.N. misses Yemen aid target. The United Nations has fallen roughly $1 billion short of its target to help fund humanitarian operations in Yemen. Overall, a pledging event hosted by Saudi Arabia raised $1.35 billion from international donors, although $500 million of that figure came from Saudi Arabia itself.
Speaking before the donor conference, Lise Grande, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen said the UN’s operations would face “catastrophic cutback” if less than $1.6 billion was raised. “We won’t be able to provide the food people need to survive, or the health care they need or the water or sanitation or the nutrition support which helps to keep 2 million malnourished children from dying,” she said. Saudi Arabia’s spending on waging war in Yemen to date is believed to be at least $265 billion.
Libya cease-fire talks back on. Cease-fire talks between Libya’s warring factions are set to resume, according to the U.N. Mission in Libya. The two sides—the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army—will meet over videoconference due to coronavirus precautions. The move comes as both Turkey and Russia appeared to increase air support for their respective sides in recent weeks. The U.N. has not said when exactly talks will take place.
FP Insider Conference Call—What impact have the recent nationwide protests and the global pandemic had on America’s security and its interests around the globe? On Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. EDT, join Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman in conversation with Jake Sullivan, a senior foreign-policy advisor to Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, and Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, to find out. Register here.
Odds and Ends The Abu Dhabi-based International Renewable Energy Agency has predicted that new solar farms will be cheaper to run than most coal plants by 2021. The agency said the comparison applies to coal plants with a capacity of 1,200 gigawatts versus large solar plants. It is not all rosy for the renewable energy sector; the Paris-based International Energy Agency has forecast a drop in wind and solar power production this year as coronavirus-related factory closures delay construction of new plants.
A popular anti-depressant drug, Zoloft, is in short supply as stocks diminish following a spike in mental health problems caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The Food and Drug Administration moved the drug to a list of those facing shortages on Friday. Overall Zoloft has seen a 12 percent increase in prescriptions—to 4.9 million—over the past year, Bloomberg reports.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--Netanyahu Could Be a Statesman, but He Prefers to Be a Provocateur

Netanyahu Could Be a Statesman , but He Prefers to Be a Provocateur For anyone who wants to get a sense of how Benjamin Netanyahu will lead Israel for at least the next year and a half , his remarks on his way into the courtroom on May 24 for the start of his criminal trial should be cause for alarm .
Surrounded by a masked phalanx of his most loyal ministers , Netanyahu made no pretense of proclaiming his innocence or his trust in the court to reach a fair verdict .
Instead , he launched a scathing attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , accusing it of nothing less than an “ attempted political coup.
” These are the same themes he has employed over the last few years as police investigations into bribery , fraud , and breach of trust closed in on him .
But their use last month adds a worrying new dimension .
Netanyahu is no longer dealing with police investigators or prosecuting attorneys .
He is in court facing a panel of three judges , who are supposed to be impartial and above partisan politics .
Yet he implied they were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In effect , the prime minister was saying a guilty verdict would be tantamount to a coup .
It didn ’ t have to be this way .
After all , even by the standards of mercurial politicians , Netanyahu always stood out as being remarkably Janus-faced .
He has been both good and bad for Israel .
One of his faces belongs to a strategic thinker and statesman when it comes to diplomacy and national security .
It ’ s the face of a skilled political operator at election time and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The other face is that of a demagogue , ready to ride roughshod over institutions and to fan hatreds and resentments when the need arises .
The two faces are very different , but they both reflect a deep cynicism , or at least a very Hobbesian view of the world , that Netanyahu has employed for good and for ill. Netanyahu ’ s positive side is often ignored by people outside Israel , who tend to dismiss him as a warmonger , racist , enemy of democratic institutions , and oppressor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlets have adopted much the same line .
The prime minister ’ s desperate campaign tactics and his attacks on the judicial system have given them plenty of fodder .
But it ’ s worth recalling Netanyahu ’ s accomplishments because they account for much of his political longevity and his remarkable ability to survive the taint of a criminal indictment .
Until the coronavirus struck , the Israeli economy had enjoyed nearly two decades of uninterrupted growth , much of it a legacy of Netanyahu ’ s term as finance minister in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sweeping structural reforms .
Before the coronavirus pandemic , unemployment had reached record lows , wages were rising , and consumers were spending .
Even lower-income Israelis , who are Netanyahu ’ s most reliable supporters , had fared well .
Not everyone will agree with Netanyahu ’ s foreign and defense policy , but measured by the cold standards of realpolitik , it has been an undeniable success .
Israel has successfully waged a cold war with Iran .
Netanyahu has developed a behind-the-scenes but very real partnership with the Gulf Arab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cultivated strong personal relationships with Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump .
He has leveraged Israel ’ s high-tech industry into closer trade and political ties with China and India .
Until the start of the trial , there was some , albeit slight , hope that Netanyahu the statesman would come to the fore .
Instead , it looks as if Israel is getting the provocateur .
Until the start of the trial , there was some , albeit slight , hope that this statesman would come to the fore .
After three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national unity government and had the premiership in his hands .
Under his management , Israel appears to have exited the coronavirus pandemic in relatively good shape .
Netanyahu is 70 years old and has been prime minister for more than a decade ( 14 years if you count his first stint in the 1990s ) .
Many leaders in his place , especially those with an inflated self-image , might be looking to transition to the role of elder statesman and concentrate on their legacy .
Instead , it looks as if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that means a lot more than an unbridled campaign against the judicial system .
The aggrieved and angry version of Netanyahu isn ’ t just mean-spirited ; he lacks strategic and pragmatic instincts—and thinks in terms of political survival .
The current uproar about annexation of the West Bank is a case in point .
For years , Netanyahu played Israeli settlers with almost perfect precision .
He regarded a Palestinian state as a security threat , but he had never shown the least interest in the settlers ’ religious claims to what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Thus , for Netanyahu , the status quo of the occupation was a perfectly good compromise that kept all but the most ideological settlers content without risking the diplomatic fallout of annexation .
Then , he suddenly uttered the word last April—just ahead of the first of Israel ’ s three back-to-back elections .
It became more than a campaign slogan after he embarrassingly tried to leapfrog over the Palestinian state part of the Trump peace plan and move ahead with annexing the settlements unilaterally .
Nowadays , if you take Netanyahu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to move ahead with the process starting in July .
Netanyahu the statesman wouldn ’ t be playing with this kind of fire .
It offers Israel no strategic benefits , but it does risk upsetting relations with its Arab neighbors and allies and angering a White House and Congress that may well come under control of the Democrats in November .
Even the Trump administration hasn ’ t fully endorsed the idea .
Worse still , annexation might even be the catalyst for a Third Intifada .
But Bibi the provocateur only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annexation process would turn him into Israel ’ s indispensable leader , the man who will bring it about in the face of opposition from a Democratic administration and his ostensibly leftist coalition partners .
It sets the stage for arousing the anger and worry of Israel ’ s right in the event of a guilty verdict .
Annexation isn ’ t in Israel ’ s interest , but it is an insurance policy against threats to Netanyahu ’ s continued rule—and that means the prime minister ’ s worst qualities will come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenges in coping with the economic fallout of the coronavirus ; it needs a statesman , not a leader whose modus operandi is divide and rule .

For anyone who wants to get a sense of how Benjamin Netanyahu will lead Israel for at least the next year and a half, his remarks on his way into the courtroom on May 24 for the start of his criminal trial should be cause for alarm. Surrounded by a masked phalanx of his most loyal ministers, Netanyahu made no pretense of proclaiming his innocence or his trust in the court to reach a fair verdict. Instead, he launched a scathing attack on the legal system and the media, accusing it of nothing less than an “attempted political coup.”
For anyone who wants to get a sense of how Benjamin Netanyahu will lead Israel for at least the next year and a half, his remarks on his way into the courtroom on May 24 for the start of his criminal trial should be cause for alarm. Surrounded by a masked phalanx of his most loyal ministers, Netanyahu made no pretense of proclaiming his innocence or his trust in the court to reach a fair verdict. Instead, he launched a scathing attack on the legal system and the media, accusing it of nothing less than an “attempted political coup.”
These are the same themes he has employed over the last few years as police investigations into bribery, fraud, and breach of trust closed in on him. But their use last month adds a worrying new dimension. Netanyahu is no longer dealing with police investigators or prosecuting attorneys. He is in court facing a panel of three judges, who are supposed to be impartial and above partisan politics. Yet he implied they were no less a part of the cabal. In effect, the prime minister was saying a guilty verdict would be tantamount to a coup.
It didn’t have to be this way. After all, even by the standards of mercurial politicians, Netanyahu always stood out as being remarkably Janus-faced. He has been both good and bad for Israel.
One of his faces belongs to a strategic thinker and statesman when it comes to diplomacy and national security. It’s the face of a skilled political operator at election time and a policy pragmatist when in power.
The other face is that of a demagogue, ready to ride roughshod over institutions and to fan hatreds and resentments when the need arises. The two faces are very different, but they both reflect a deep cynicism, or at least a very Hobbesian view of the world, that Netanyahu has employed for good and for ill.
Netanyahu’s positive side is often ignored by people outside Israel, who tend to dismiss him as a warmonger, racist, enemy of democratic institutions, and oppressor of Palestinians. Even in Israel, media outlets have adopted much the same line. The prime minister’s desperate campaign tactics and his attacks on the judicial system have given them plenty of fodder.
But it’s worth recalling Netanyahu’s accomplishments because they account for much of his political longevity and his remarkable ability to survive the taint of a criminal indictment.
Until the coronavirus struck, the Israeli economy had enjoyed nearly two decades of uninterrupted growth, much of it a legacy of Netanyahu’s term as finance minister in the early 2000s, when he undertook sweeping structural reforms. Before the coronavirus pandemic, unemployment had reached record lows, wages were rising, and consumers were spending. Even lower-income Israelis, who are Netanyahu’s most reliable supporters, had fared well.
Not everyone will agree with Netanyahu’s foreign and defense policy, but measured by the cold standards of realpolitik, it has been an undeniable success. Israel has successfully waged a cold war with Iran. Netanyahu has developed a behind-the-scenes but very real partnership with the Gulf Arab countries. Further afield, he has cultivated strong personal relationships with Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. He has leveraged Israel’s high-tech industry into closer trade and political ties with China and India.
Until the start of the trial, there was some, albeit slight, hope that Netanyahu the statesman would come to the fore. Instead, it looks as if Israel is getting the provocateur.
Until the start of the trial, there was some, albeit slight, hope that this statesman would come to the fore. After three inconclusive elections, he had engineered a national unity government and had the premiership in his hands. Under his management, Israel appears to have exited the coronavirus pandemic in relatively good shape. Netanyahu is 70 years old and has been prime minister for more than a decade (14 years if you count his first stint in the 1990s). Many leaders in his place, especially those with an inflated self-image, might be looking to transition to the role of elder statesman and concentrate on their legacy.
Instead, it looks as if Israel is getting the provocateur, and that means a lot more than an unbridled campaign against the judicial system. The aggrieved and angry version of Netanyahu isn’t just mean-spirited; he lacks strategic and pragmatic instincts—and thinks in terms of political survival. The current uproar about annexation of the West Bank is a case in point.
For years, Netanyahu played Israeli settlers with almost perfect precision. He regarded a Palestinian state as a security threat, but he had never shown the least interest in the settlers’ religious claims to what they call the Greater Land of Israel. Thus, for Netanyahu, the status quo of the occupation was a perfectly good compromise that kept all but the most ideological settlers content without risking the diplomatic fallout of annexation.
Then, he suddenly uttered the word last April—just ahead of the first of Israel’s three back-to-back elections. It became more than a campaign slogan after he embarrassingly tried to leapfrog over the Palestinian state part of the Trump peace plan and move ahead with annexing the settlements unilaterally. Nowadays, if you take Netanyahu at his word, Israel will begin to move ahead with the process starting in July.
Netanyahu the statesman wouldn’t be playing with this kind of fire. It offers Israel no strategic benefits, but it does risk upsetting relations with its Arab neighbors and allies and angering a White House and Congress that may well come under control of the Democrats in November. Even the Trump administration hasn’t fully endorsed the idea. Worse still, annexation might even be the catalyst for a Third Intifada.
But Bibi the provocateur only thinks about political survival. A drawn-out annexation process would turn him into Israel’s indispensable leader, the man who will bring it about in the face of opposition from a Democratic administration and his ostensibly leftist coalition partners. It sets the stage for arousing the anger and worry of Israel’s right in the event of a guilty verdict.
Annexation isn’t in Israel’s interest, but it is an insurance policy against threats to Netanyahu’s continued rule—and that means the prime minister’s worst qualities will come to the fore. Israel faces immense challenges in coping with the economic fallout of the coronavirus; it needs a statesman, not a leader whose modus operandi is divide and rule.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--How Dominic Cummings Made Himself Irrelevant

Until recently , Dominic Cummings , U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s chief advisor , had Britain at his feet .
His notional boss is uninterested in detail and therefore gave Cummings carte blanche to install allies in Downing Street .
The advisor effectively fired the then-chancellor of the exchequer , Sajid Javid , for trying to appoint his own advisors , and put in place his own plans to radically reshape Britain ’ s institutions in his own ostensibly techno-scientific image .
Then Cummings was discovered to have broken coronavirus lockdown rules by driving 260 miles to visit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he should have been self-isolating because he and his wife had the tell-tale symptoms of the virus .
He was then spotted out on another drive in spite of the lockdown , visiting a scenic castle 30 miles away .
Just weeks before , Neil Ferguson , the government ’ s main epidemiological advisor , and Catherine Calderwood , Scotland ’ s chief medical officer , had been forced to resign for far more trivial violations of the rules when they were no longer contagious .
Rather than bow out as other lesser @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t going .
He had cabinet ministers go on air to support him , before the newspapers published a second set of allegations that contradicted the talking points given to the politicians sent out to defend him .
The Conservative cabinet came out in defense of an unelected advisor because Cummings had given them something last achieved by Margaret Thatcher in 1987 : a solid parliamentary majority that freed them from the travails of previous Tory prime ministers , from John Major ’ s and David Cameron ’ s hounding by Euroskeptics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s quagmire imposed on her by both hard-line Brexiteers and committed pro-Europeans .
The majority also freed them from the need to agree on policies with Liberal Democrat coalition partners .
Cummings gave them the freedom to govern .
Until last week , thanks to Cummings , the government ’ s huge opinion poll leads allowed it to make decisions , such as refusing to extend the Brexit transition period , without fear of falling behind in the polls and coming under pressure from backbench members of Parliament , nervous about losing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a series of self-inflicted acts of arrogance , has thrown this lead away .
Indeed , there are now considerably fewer Conservative voters than there were a week ago .
By the middle of last week , the polls had moved as much as 9 points toward the opposition Labour Party , whose new leader , the understated former public prosecutor Keir Starmer , has had a good few weeks .
As the political optics got worse , Cummings was forced into holding a press conference from the Downing Street garden , dressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the height of formality : an oversized open-necked white shirt with the sleeves rolled up to expose his forearms .
There , he explained the reason for his second trip : Unsure of whether his personal optics were good enough to drive back to London , he decided to test his eyesight by driving , with his wife and 4-year-old son , to a nearby castle .
Sherlock Holmes ( who , like Cummings , has been played on screen by Benedict Cumberbatch ) may have said that when you eliminate the impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the British public don ’ t agree .
By the hallowed margin of 52 percent , the people were expressing their will clearly—except this time they were clamoring for his departure from Downing Street .
Indeed , 81 percent of those polled thought Cummings broke the rules , and fully 52 percent of Leave voters—a holy number in right-wing British politics—told pollsters that he should resign .
Indeed , by the same margin as in Cummings ’ s great victory as head of the Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 Brexit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will clearly—except this time they were clamoring for his departure from Downing Street .
This is a seismic change in British politics , where the government flips between immense strength and hopeless weakness depending on whether the prime minister will get his MPs reelected or not .
A powerful prime minister in Britain is like an elected monarch , who can appoint a court of advisors able to control the promotion and dismissal of elected politicians .
Members of Parliament , who can remove their party leader , largely put up with this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs safe .
A weak prime minister , as Theresa May found out , is at their mercy .
And this unenviable position of political weakness is where Cummings has now put his boss .
That ’ s because Cummings is not a Tory .
He ’ s never joined the party or stuffed leaflets into envelopes .
He doesn ’ t knock on doors to talk to voters , preferring to study them scientifically from afar through opinion research .
This objectivity helped him stir up conflict with great success to win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he misses out on the emotional texture of retail politics .
The political ground game—setting up stalls in town squares , getting to know your local community leaders and businesses , burnishing your reputation with the local newspaper , helping constituents deal with their personal and social problems—isn ’ t his thing .
Cummings is no Gen. George Patton , happy to share foxholes with his men ; he ’ s more of a Gen. Curtis LeMay , focused on the air war .
The coronavirus pandemic has put most of retail politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their inboxes , where they ’ re facing an avalanche of fury from people who ’ ve had to cope with homeschooling their children , watching their businesses collapse , and being unable to visit their dying parents .
They obeyed the rules , so why hasn ’ t Cummings ?
Cummings thinks this personal experience is irrelevant .
The central premise of his political doctrine is that most people don ’ t follow politics outside election campaigns .
Knowing this means you can be much more cavalier about public opinion than most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out bad headlines , awkward stories , and scandals , as long as you have a well-disciplined team presenting a consistently repeated case on the airwaves and social media .
It doesn ’ t matter much if the case is true , or even self-consistent .
Just that it ’ s clear .
He felt the 2019 election victory vindicated him .
That Johnson ’ s opponent was the ideologically repellent and electorally ineffective Jeremy Corbyn hasn ’ t taken away from Cummings ’ s own sense of superiority .
Unlike Cummings , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power to dismiss their leader and prime minister , genuinely care if the party is booted out of office when the next election is held .
Using the Tories ’ parliamentary majority of 80 , bought by promising to get Brexit done , he believed he could reform the civil service , muzzle judges , clip the wings of the BBC , and recast the state in his technology-focused image .
The MPs , wanting to climb the political ranks , would do as they were told .
Given all this , Cummings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just another bubble story that would blow over , like when he had a young woman—an advisor to then-Chancellor Javid—summarily fired and marched out of her office by armed police , or when he hired an advocate of eugenics to work in his self-proclaimed unit for “ weirdos and misfits.
” This time was different .
The lockdown affected everyone .
Millions of people have been cooped up in tiny flats and had to cope with child care emergencies ; tens if not hundreds of thousands have had to deal with the impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Every MP will put the most recent polls into the Electoral Calculus website , where they will see their rapidly disappearing majorities .
They are sharing fears of Black Wednesday in 1992 , when a currency crisis trashed the Tories ’ reputation , leading to a thundering defeat four and a half years later .
Cummings isn ’ t worried , because he isn ’ t a Tory .
By contrast , Conservative MPs , who retain the ultimate power to dismiss their leader and prime minister , genuinely care if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next election is held in four and a half years ’ time .
They read emails from their constituents .
As the lockdown is eased , they ’ ll start speaking to them again and will send one message back to their leadership : Be careful—we can ’ t afford to lose any more votes .
The days of daring radical moves by Cummings are numbered .
Next time he tries one—and he surely will , as long as he is in his post—worried Tory MPs will see it less as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reckless gamble .
Cummings won ’ t change his behavior , but the environment in which he operates has changed dramatically .
From now on , every new initiative will provoke a yellow warning light , to which Cummings ’ s long list of enemies will draw the prime minister ’ s attention .
Cummings ’ s grand schemes will succumb to the subtle triangulations and undignified sausage-making of everyday politics—arts at which he does not excel .
Cummings may have saved his job , but he has created the conditions for @ @ @ @

Until recently, Dominic Cummings, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s chief advisor, had Britain at his feet. His notional boss is uninterested in detail and therefore gave Cummings carte blanche to install allies in Downing Street. The advisor effectively fired the then-chancellor of the exchequer, Sajid Javid, for trying to appoint his own advisors, and put in place his own plans to radically reshape Britain’s institutions in his own ostensibly techno-scientific image.
Until recently, Dominic Cummings, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s chief advisor, had Britain at his feet. His notional boss is uninterested in detail and therefore gave Cummings carte blanche to install allies in Downing Street. The advisor effectively fired the then-chancellor of the exchequer, Sajid Javid, for trying to appoint his own advisors, and put in place his own plans to radically reshape Britain’s institutions in his own ostensibly techno-scientific image.
Then Cummings was discovered to have broken coronavirus lockdown rules by driving 260 miles to visit his family—supposedly for help with child care—while he should have been self-isolating because he and his wife had the tell-tale symptoms of the virus. He was then spotted out on another drive in spite of the lockdown, visiting a scenic castle 30 miles away. Just weeks before, Neil Ferguson, the government’s main epidemiological advisor, and Catherine Calderwood, Scotland’s chief medical officer, had been forced to resign for far more trivial violations of the rules when they were no longer contagious.
Rather than bow out as other lesser offenders had, Cummings insisted he wasn’t going. He had cabinet ministers go on air to support him, before the newspapers published a second set of allegations that contradicted the talking points given to the politicians sent out to defend him.
The Conservative cabinet came out in defense of an unelected advisor because Cummings had given them something last achieved by Margaret Thatcher in 1987: a solid parliamentary majority that freed them from the travails of previous Tory prime ministers, from John Major’s and David Cameron’s hounding by Euroskeptics on their own side to Theresa May’s quagmire imposed on her by both hard-line Brexiteers and committed pro-Europeans. The majority also freed them from the need to agree on policies with Liberal Democrat coalition partners. Cummings gave them the freedom to govern.
Until last week, thanks to Cummings, the government’s huge opinion poll leads allowed it to make decisions, such as refusing to extend the Brexit transition period, without fear of falling behind in the polls and coming under pressure from backbench members of Parliament, nervous about losing their seats. Now Cummings, in a series of self-inflicted acts of arrogance, has thrown this lead away.
Indeed, there are now considerably fewer Conservative voters than there were a week ago. By the middle of last week, the polls had moved as much as 9 points toward the opposition Labour Party, whose new leader, the understated former public prosecutor Keir Starmer, has had a good few weeks.
As the political optics got worse, Cummings was forced into holding a press conference from the Downing Street garden, dressed in what was, for him, the height of formality: an oversized open-necked white shirt with the sleeves rolled up to expose his forearms. There, he explained the reason for his second trip: Unsure of whether his personal optics were good enough to drive back to London, he decided to test his eyesight by driving, with his wife and 4-year-old son, to a nearby castle.
Sherlock Holmes (who, like Cummings, has been played on screen by Benedict Cumberbatch) may have said that when you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains—however improbable—must be the truth, but the British public don’t agree.
By the hallowed margin of 52 percent, the people were expressing their will clearly—except this time they were clamoring for his departure from Downing Street.
Indeed, 81 percent of those polled thought Cummings broke the rules, and fully 52 percent of Leave voters—a holy number in right-wing British politics—told pollsters that he should resign. Indeed, by the same margin as in Cummings’s great victory as head of the Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 Brexit referendum, the people were expressing their will clearly—except this time they were clamoring for his departure from Downing Street.
This is a seismic change in British politics, where the government flips between immense strength and hopeless weakness depending on whether the prime minister will get his MPs reelected or not.
A powerful prime minister in Britain is like an elected monarch, who can appoint a court of advisors able to control the promotion and dismissal of elected politicians. Members of Parliament, who can remove their party leader, largely put up with this indignity as long as it keeps their jobs safe. A weak prime minister, as Theresa May found out, is at their mercy. And this unenviable position of political weakness is where Cummings has now put his boss.
That’s because Cummings is not a Tory. He’s never joined the party or stuffed leaflets into envelopes. He doesn’t knock on doors to talk to voters, preferring to study them scientifically from afar through opinion research. This objectivity helped him stir up conflict with great success to win the Brexit referendum, but it means he misses out on the emotional texture of retail politics. The political ground game—setting up stalls in town squares, getting to know your local community leaders and businesses, burnishing your reputation with the local newspaper, helping constituents deal with their personal and social problems—isn’t his thing. Cummings is no Gen. George Patton, happy to share foxholes with his men; he’s more of a Gen. Curtis LeMay, focused on the air war.
The coronavirus pandemic has put most of retail politics on hold, but MPs are monitoring their inboxes, where they’re facing an avalanche of fury from people who’ve had to cope with homeschooling their children, watching their businesses collapse, and being unable to visit their dying parents. They obeyed the rules, so why hasn’t Cummings?
Cummings thinks this personal experience is irrelevant. The central premise of his political doctrine is that most people don’t follow politics outside election campaigns. Knowing this means you can be much more cavalier about public opinion than most timid politicians think. You can tough out bad headlines, awkward stories, and scandals, as long as you have a well-disciplined team presenting a consistently repeated case on the airwaves and social media. It doesn’t matter much if the case is true, or even self-consistent. Just that it’s clear.
He felt the 2019 election victory vindicated him. That Johnson’s opponent was the ideologically repellent and electorally ineffective Jeremy Corbyn hasn’t taken away from Cummings’s own sense of superiority.
Unlike Cummings, Conservative MPs, who retain the ultimate power to dismiss their leader and prime minister, genuinely care if the party is booted out of office when the next election is held.
Using the Tories’ parliamentary majority of 80, bought by promising to get Brexit done, he believed he could reform the civil service, muzzle judges, clip the wings of the BBC, and recast the state in his technology-focused image. The MPs, wanting to climb the political ranks, would do as they were told. Given all this, Cummings thought his breach of lockdown rules was just another bubble story that would blow over, like when he had a young woman—an advisor to then-Chancellor Javid—summarily fired and marched out of her office by armed police, or when he hired an advocate of eugenics to work in his self-proclaimed unit for “weirdos and misfits.”
This time was different. The lockdown affected everyone. Millions of people have been cooped up in tiny flats and had to cope with child care emergencies; tens if not hundreds of thousands have had to deal with the impossible pain of their loved ones dying alone. Every MP will put the most recent polls into the Electoral Calculus website, where they will see their rapidly disappearing majorities. They are sharing fears of Black Wednesday in 1992, when a currency crisis trashed the Tories’ reputation, leading to a thundering defeat four and a half years later. Cummings isn’t worried, because he isn’t a Tory.
By contrast, Conservative MPs, who retain the ultimate power to dismiss their leader and prime minister, genuinely care if the party is booted out of office when the next election is held in four and a half years’ time. They read emails from their constituents. As the lockdown is eased, they’ll start speaking to them again and will send one message back to their leadership: Be careful—we can’t afford to lose any more votes.
The days of daring radical moves by Cummings are numbered. Next time he tries one—and he surely will, as long as he is in his post—worried Tory MPs will see it less as an act of inspired genius and more like a reckless gamble.
Cummings won’t change his behavior, but the environment in which he operates has changed dramatically. From now on, every new initiative will provoke a yellow warning light, to which Cummings’s long list of enemies will draw the prime minister’s attention. Cummings’s grand schemes will succumb to the subtle triangulations and undignified sausage-making of everyday politics—arts at which he does not excel.
Cummings may have saved his job, but he has created the conditions for his own marginalization.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--How Is China Responding to the U.S. Protests?

How Is China Responding to the U.S .
Protests ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Chinese media responds to protests against police brutality in the United States , fallout from the new national security law in Hong Kong reverberates around the world , and a new report shows that Beijing obstructed the World Health Organization in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
In China , state and social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. police brutality this week—even if commentators can ’ t quite decide whose side they ’ re on .
The protests have divided some on Chinese social media : Conservative Chinese often support both U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping .
Some posts call attention to the U.S. oppression of African Americans , while others argue that the United States should recognize all protesters as rioters and back the crackdown in Hong Kong .
The most successful messages , such as this Singaporean cartoon that went viral in China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ call the same behavior by different names in different countries .
Chinese media have condemned the United States for deploying “ weapons of war ” against protesters—just ahead of June 4 , the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre .
Meanwhile , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Tiananmen survivors just after the administration used force to clear a peaceful crowd for a photo-op .
Easy propaganda .
Many conservative supporters of Hong Kong , such as U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton , who has praised the protesters abroad , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ material for Chinese media .
The Hong Kong protesters themselves are somewhat split .
Joshua Wong and other young pro-democracy leaders came out in support of Black Lives Matter , while Jimmy Lai , a 71-year-old entrepreneur and democratic activist , decried those pointing to similarities between the movements .
China ’ s anti-blackness .
Anti-blackness among parts of the Chinese American community filters back into mainland Chinese discourse , especially the belief that black Americans are coddled while Chinese Americans are persecuted—an idea that ties in with beliefs about the supposedly favorable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself .
Chinese American supporters of the protests have been condemned as “ white liberals ” by nationalist Chinese , even as they decried the U.S. government .
Hong Kong fallout .
Trump threatened to revoke Hong Kong ’ s special trade status last week , a move that could cost the territory ’ s economy dearly .
Beijing benefits from the continued recognition of Hong Kong as a separate territory .
Hong Kong has more favorable customs terms , and its goods haven ’ t been subject to trade-war tariffs .
Derecognition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kongers to come to the United States : The visa process is currently less arduous than for mainlanders .
The Chinese reaction has been mild so far , in part because—as is often the case with Trump—there may be a gap between rhetoric and implementation .
The United Kingdom , however , is moving fast .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has offered a route to citizenship for all 3 million Hong Kongers eligible for British Nationals ( Overseas ) status .
But there are complications involved , as Yuan Yi Zhu writes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard thing to give up , and the actual number of emigrants is likely to be small .
Beijing still strongly condemned the move , including threatening the unilateral cancellation of the treaties around the territory .
For young Hong Kongers , it feels like 2047—when the territory will officially be absorbed into the mainland—has already arrived .
Report reveals China obstructed WHO .
A new Associated Press report details how the World Health Organization struggled to get key information from China at critical moments during the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic—all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is a key dynamic in China ’ s power in international organizations , which comes not so much through money—before the United States pulled out , China was only WHO ’ s 16th-biggest funder—as through sheer obstinacy .
China ’ s size makes it impossible to ignore , and unless the rituals of abnegation that the Chinese Communist Party demands are performed , it simply won ’ t cooperate .
U.S. enacts grad student ban .
A U.S. proclamation issued last week cancels the visas of some Chinese graduate students .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousand students with direct ties to specific institutions , such as the “ Seven Sons of National Defense ” —prominent universities with close military links .
But it is written in a way that could allow larger scope for the refusal of visas : The civil-military fusion idea that the order singles out is a national strategy aimed at having Chinese technological development boost its military , not a specific program .
U.S. universities , already reeling from a drop in international students next semester , are seeking clarity .
What about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , it ’ s easy for some to forget that there is an ongoing pandemic .
China ’ s mass testing in Wuhan proved to be more concrete than analysts thought .
Although the plan to test everyone in the city in 10 days didn ’ t pan out , most of the population was tested in only 19 days , finding just 300 positive cases .
Widespread testing is building Chinese public confidence in going out and traveling , despite a smattering of cases in the north .
Kissing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses have come out in support of China ’ s new national security law .
The list includes Jardine Matheson and Swire , two of the territory ’ s oldest trading houses , and the now-British-based banking giant HSBC .
Behind the scenes , businesses face direct threats from the Chinese Communist Party—not just to themselves but to their workers .
They are making calculations that any pushback they face internationally or from the public is less costly than being on the wrong side of the authorities .
While they might be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moral one—the cost to Hong Kong of losing its reputation as a politically neutral , law-based , and transparent center of trade could be immense .
Foreign flights canceled .
China has capped foreign airlines at just one flight per week during the pandemic , while domestic carriers are limited to one weekly flight to one destination in each foreign country .
U.S. airlines have been pushing for more slots , and after being refused , the United States has retaliated by canceling Chinese carriers ’ bookings beginning on June 16 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ airline traffic remains miniscule—but it could be more painful as travel resumes .
Britain ’ s Huawei pushback .
The combination of the Hong Kong security law and the pandemic seems to have stiffened the spines of Britain ’ s ruling Conservative Party , who are now looking for alternatives to the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei as they build 5G networks .
The U.K. has even proposed forming an alliance of democratic nations to deal specifically with technology issues and break potential Chinese dominance in 5G .
The group would be based around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea , and India .
The People ’ s Republic of Amnesia , by Louisa Lim On the anniversary of Tiananmen , there ’ s only one book to recommend : Louisa Lim ’ s The People ’ s Republic of Amnesia .
Lim , who wrote the book from the mainland with extreme caution , details how the protests went far beyond just Beijing , how brutal the crackdown was across the country , and how much the state has done to make China forget the dead .
( For the truly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of documents from U.S. intelligence at the time . )
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese media responds to protests against police brutality in the United States, fallout from the new national security law in Hong Kong reverberates around the world, and a new report shows that Beijing obstructed the World Health Organization in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese media responds to protests against police brutality in the United States, fallout from the new national security law in Hong Kong reverberates around the world, and a new report shows that Beijing obstructed the World Health Organization in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
In U.S. Response to Protests, China Sees Hypocrisy
In China, state and social media are reveling in the widespread protests against U.S. police brutality this week—even if commentators can’t quite decide whose side they’re on.
The protests have divided some on Chinese social media: Conservative Chinese often support both U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Some posts call attention to the U.S. oppression of African Americans, while others argue that the United States should recognize all protesters as rioters and back the crackdown in Hong Kong. The most successful messages, such as this Singaporean cartoon that went viral in China, point out the hypocrisy of politicians who call the same behavior by different names in different countries.
Chinese media have condemned the United States for deploying “weapons of war” against protesters—just ahead of June 4, the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Tiananmen survivors just after the administration used force to clear a peaceful crowd for a photo-op.
(For me, a Washington resident and former Beijinger, the buzzing of helicopters overhead is new, but the level of police and military deployment is nowhere near that on the streets in China for routine annual events. In my old neighborhood, it seemed that every alleyway corner had a cop when I left in 2018.)
Easy propaganda. Many conservative supporters of Hong Kong, such as U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton, who has praised the protesters abroad, are calling for military action against Americans—providing easy material for Chinese media. The Hong Kong protesters themselves are somewhat split. Joshua Wong and other young pro-democracy leaders came out in support of Black Lives Matter, while Jimmy Lai, a 71-year-old entrepreneur and democratic activist, decried those pointing to similarities between the movements.
China’s anti-blackness. Anti-blackness among parts of the Chinese American community filters back into mainland Chinese discourse, especially the belief that black Americans are coddled while Chinese Americans are persecuted—an idea that ties in with beliefs about the supposedly favorable treatment given to ethnic minorities in China itself. Chinese American supporters of the protests have been condemned as “white liberals” by nationalist Chinese, even as they decried the U.S. government.
What We’re Following
Hong Kong fallout. Trump threatened to revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status last week, a move that could cost the territory’s economy dearly. Beijing benefits from the continued recognition of Hong Kong as a separate territory. Hong Kong has more favorable customs terms, and its goods haven’t been subject to trade-war tariffs. Derecognition would also make it trickier for Hong Kongers to come to the United States: The visa process is currently less arduous than for mainlanders.
The Chinese reaction has been mild so far, in part because—as is often the case with Trump—there may be a gap between rhetoric and implementation.
The United Kingdom, however, is moving fast. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has offered a route to citizenship for all 3 million Hong Kongers eligible for British Nationals (Overseas) status. But there are complications involved, as Yuan Yi Zhu writes in Foreign Policy. Home is a hard thing to give up, and the actual number of emigrants is likely to be small. Beijing still strongly condemned the move, including threatening the unilateral cancellation of the treaties around the territory. For young Hong Kongers, it feels like 2047—when the territory will officially be absorbed into the mainland—has already arrived.
Report reveals China obstructed WHO. A new Associated Press report details how the World Health Organization struggled to get key information from China at critical moments during the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic—all the while praising the government in public. This is a key dynamic in China’s power in international organizations, which comes not so much through money—before the United States pulled out, China was only WHO’s 16th-biggest funder—as through sheer obstinacy. China’s size makes it impossible to ignore, and unless the rituals of abnegation that the Chinese Communist Party demands are performed, it simply won’t cooperate.
U.S. enacts grad student ban. A U.S. proclamation issued last week cancels the visas of some Chinese graduate students. The order is only supposed to target several thousand students with direct ties to specific institutions, such as the “Seven Sons of National Defense”—prominent universities with close military links. But it is written in a way that could allow larger scope for the refusal of visas: The civil-military fusion idea that the order singles out is a national strategy aimed at having Chinese technological development boost its military, not a specific program. U.S. universities, already reeling from a drop in international students next semester, are seeking clarity.
What about the coronavirus? Amid the protests in the United States, it’s easy for some to forget that there is an ongoing pandemic. China’s mass testing in Wuhan proved to be more concrete than analysts thought. Although the plan to test everyone in the city in 10 days didn’t pan out, most of the population was tested in only 19 days, finding just 300 positive cases. Widespread testing is building Chinese public confidence in going out and traveling, despite a smattering of cases in the north.
Tech and Business
Kissing the boot. A string of Hong Kong businesses have come out in support of China’s new national security law. The list includes Jardine Matheson and Swire, two of the territory’s oldest trading houses, and the now-British-based banking giant HSBC. Behind the scenes, businesses face direct threats from the Chinese Communist Party—not just to themselves but to their workers. They are making calculations that any pushback they face internationally or from the public is less costly than being on the wrong side of the authorities.
While they might be the right—in a business sense, not a moral one—the cost to Hong Kong of losing its reputation as a politically neutral, law-based, and transparent center of trade could be immense.
Foreign flights canceled. China has capped foreign airlines at just one flight per week during the pandemic, while domestic carriers are limited to one weekly flight to one destination in each foreign country. U.S. airlines have been pushing for more slots, and after being refused, the United States has retaliated by canceling Chinese carriers’ bookings beginning on June 16. The move will be relatively insignificant while global airline traffic remains miniscule—but it could be more painful as travel resumes.
Britain’s Huawei pushback. The combination of the Hong Kong security law and the pandemic seems to have stiffened the spines of Britain’s ruling Conservative Party, who are now looking for alternatives to the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei as they build 5G networks. The U.K. has even proposed forming an alliance of democratic nations to deal specifically with technology issues and break potential Chinese dominance in 5G. The group would be based around the G-7, plus Australia, South Korea, and India.
What We’re Reading
The People’s Republic of Amnesia, by Louisa Lim
On the anniversary of Tiananmen, there’s only one book to recommend: Louisa Lim’s The People’s Republic of Amnesia. Lim, who wrote the book from the mainland with extreme caution, details how the protests went far beyond just Beijing, how brutal the crackdown was across the country, and how much the state has done to make China forget the dead. (For the truly assiduous, dip into these 4,500 pages of documents from U.S. intelligence at the time.)
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--Hong Kongers’ Route to Britishness Winds Through the Ruins of Empire

Hong Kongers ’ Route to Britishness Winds Through the Ruins of Empire In response to Beijing ’ s imposition of a much-hated national security law on Hong Kong , the British government recently announced that if the plans went ahead , Hong Kongers who have British National ( Overseas ) status would be allowed to live in the United Kingdom for 12 months , with a possible future pathway to U.K. citizenship .
Whilst acknowledging the radical nature of the proposals— “ one of the biggest changes in our visa system in British history ” , Boris Johnson said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was prepared to take , and “ take it willingly ” .
The decision to extend residency and possibly citizenship rights to an estimated 3 million people was welcomed by Conservative members of Parliament and pundits , even though opposition to mass immigration had been one of the flash points of the Brexit campaign .
That was balanced by a feeling that BN ( O ) s , as the overseas nationals are referred to , are British and that the U.K. has a legal and moral duty to protect them , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the eye of the increasingly unpopular Beijing government .
Polling has shown strong public support for the proposal , with 42 percent of the respondents surveyed by YouGov in favor against only 24 percent who oppose the move .
But the exact nature of the BN ( O ) status remains poorly understood .
At first , newspapers stated that only 300,000 people would be eligible , although the real number is , in fact , far higher .
The 300,000 figure represented the number of BN ( O ) passports in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are eligible for one .
Moreover , there is scant understanding of the difference between a British national and a British citizen .
At the core of the misunderstanding is a mix of imperial history and deliberate obfuscation .
Ironically , BN ( O ) s were given that status on the assumption that few would ever cross the world to settle in the U.K. in the first place , a belief that went out of the window thanks to Beijing ’ s recent crackdown .
To understand the origins of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the messy history of what it means to be British .
Originally , almost all inhabitants of the British Empire were British subjects without distinction of race .
Formally , an inhabitant of London whose ancestors came to Britain with William the Conqueror was as British , legally speaking , as an inhabitant of Punjab whose ancestors had never left India .
If one of the fishermen of Hong Kong made his way to England in 1843 , a year after the territory was taken as part of the empire , and bought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as free to vote as any wealthy male subject of the crown .
In practice , although many colonial British subjects came to the U.K. , and some achieved high office—the first Indian member of Parliament , Dadabhai Naoroji , took his seat in 1892—nonwhite colonial immigration to the U.K. was discouraged regardless of British subject status .
Dominions were allowed to impose their own restrictions , and countries such as Australia and Canada limited or banned nonwhite immigration until after World War II .
However , with decolonization and the increasing independence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complicated .
At first , there were attempts at preserving a common Commonwealth citizenship , which allowed for individual Commonwealth members to create their own citizenships , to be held concurrently with British subject status .
But increased nonwhite Commonwealth immigration quickly led to the introduction of restrictions on the right of Commonwealth citizens to come to the U.K. unless they had links to the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1962 .
Nine years later , the rules were relaxed to allow anyone who had a grandparent born in the British Isles to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restriction .
British citizenship as it exists today was only created in 1983 , the last step in the replacement of an imperial citizenship by a national one .
As a result , there are currently no fewer than six different types of British nationality , only one of which—straightforward British citizenship—entitles its holders to enter and live in the United Kingdom without any restriction , known as the right of abode .
The remainder have the right to a British passport and to enter the U.K. for short periods , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BN ( O ) s , those who still hold British nationality without corresponding British citizenship tend to be those who slipped through the cracks of decolonization , eligible neither for the citizenship of the country in which they lived at independence nor for British citizenship .
The most famous group in that situation were the Ugandan Asians , who were not automatically given Ugandan citizenship upon independence because they were seen as colonial interlopers , but were also denied British citizenship , because they lacked the requisite link to the U.K. Commonwealth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ owing to their historical links with Britain , such as the ability to vote in British elections if resident in the country .
In the case of Hong Kong , as a crown colony until the 1997 handover to China , most of its inhabitants were British subjects .
Many took advantage of this to move to Britain to work before their entry was curtailed in the 1960s .
In 1983 , most Hong Kongers of Chinese ancestry were automatically turned into British Overseas Territories citizens , who lacked most of the rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British counterparts , meanwhile , were given British citizenship as long as one of their grandparents had been born in the British Isles .
The same fate befell the inhabitants of other British Overseas Territories who lacked the statutory grandparent , although in the aftermath of the Falklands War the British government extended full British citizenship to Falkland Islanders .
Despite protests in Hong Kong and in London , the British government refused to change its position .
Even the pleas of successive governors fell on hard ears .
The best it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who applied a new status : British National ( Overseas ) .
At the same time , 50,000 households , mostly those belonging to those who worked for the crown colony ’ s government , were given British citizenship under an ad hoc scheme , though with the expectation that most of them would not leave the colony after the 1997 handover .
( Carrie Lam , Hong Kong ’ s current chief executive , was one of the beneficiaries . )
Compounding difficulties , the Chinese government naturally did not wish for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it insisted that any legal status granted by the British government to Hong Kongers would not be recognized in mainland China , although these passports could be used by their holders to travel abroad .
( To this day , China refuses to recognize the British citizenship of those who obtained it under the special scheme . )
The British government also agreed , as part of the Sino-British Joint Declaration , that BN ( O ) s would not have the right to abode .
All BN ( O ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government never intended for BN ( O ) s to come to the U.K. in large numbers .
Instead , it was viewed as a confidence measure for Hong Kongers , many of whom acquired foreign citizenship in the run-up to the handover to China .
A similar arrangement had been made three decades earlier for Chinese inhabitants of Malaysia , known as the “ Queen ’ s Chinese , ” without any major outflow to the U.K. , although some in that category are now caught in a legal limbo .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Hong Kong , the initial assumption—which was always dependent on Chinese compliance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration—looks increasingly shaky , hence the latest moves to increase the rights of BN ( O ) s. Britain ’ s willingness to welcome fleeing Hong Kongers stands in contrast to its historical reluctance to accept Ugandan Asians , most of whom had British passports , when they were expelled by Idi Amin in 1972 .
The expulsion came at a low point in British race relations , and the U.K. government made strenuous , though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refugees to Commonwealth countries and to British crown colonies .
( Only Canada and the Falkland Islands proved willing to receive them in large numbers . )
Plans to buy out the refugees ’ British nationality for 2,000 pounds were only shelved after it was pointed out that anti-immigration politicians would seek to extend the policy to nonwhite immigrants already in the U.K .
Ultimately , 27,000 Ugandan Asians were airlifted to Britain , though not after extensive political controversy .
That Britain is now willing to welcome so many more imperial refugees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in public attitudes since .
But that is not the end of the story .
Inevitably , some who wished to become BN ( O ) s missed the original application deadlines , while those who were born after July 1 , 1997—a category that includes many of those on the front lines of the Hong Kong protest movement—are not eligible for the status , which can not be inherited .
For the offer to become meaningful , BN ( O ) s will also have to be given the right of taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with them , further swelling the numbers of immigrants , although it is likely that only a small fraction of those eligible will choose to come to Britain rather than join established Hong Konger communities in places like Australia and Canada , the latter of which is home to half a million people of Hong Kong descent .
Taiwan , which has promised to introduce special measures to assist fleeing Hong Kongers , might also prove a more appealing destination due to its cultural and geographical proximity .
Once considered an undesirable presence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) s are now viewed as a potential bonanza to British economic life , as well as an opportunity to take a firm stand against the Chinese government ’ s encroachments in Hong Kong .
The starkest illustration of the shift in attitudes comes from the Conservative grandee Norman Tebbit , who in 1990 called an influx of immigrants from Hong Kong a “ destabilizing factor in society , ” and who infamously questioned the loyalty of immigrants by asking which cricket team they supported .
Last year , he was a signatory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson that called the decision to deprive BN ( O ) s of British citizenship a “ historic error.
” Such are the varied legacies of empire .

In response to Beijing’s imposition of a much-hated national security law on Hong Kong, the British government recently announced that if the plans went ahead, Hong Kongers who have British National (Overseas) status would be allowed to live in the United Kingdom for 12 months, with a possible future pathway to U.K. citizenship. Whilst acknowledging the radical nature of the proposals—“ one of the biggest changes in our visa system in British history”, Boris Johnson said that it was a step the British government was prepared to take, and “take it willingly”. The decision to extend residency and possibly citizenship rights to an estimated 3 million people was welcomed by Conservative members of Parliament and pundits, even though opposition to mass immigration had been one of the flash points of the Brexit campaign. That was balanced by a feeling that BN(O)s, as the overseas nationals are referred to, are British and that the U.K. has a legal and moral duty to protect them, as well as a desire to stick one in the eye of the increasingly unpopular Beijing government. Polling has shown strong public support for the proposal, with 42 percent of the respondents surveyed by YouGov in favor against only 24 percent who oppose the move.
In response to Beijing’s imposition of a much-hated national security law on Hong Kong, the British government recently announced that if the plans went ahead, Hong Kongers who have British National (Overseas) status would be allowed to live in the United Kingdom for 12 months, with a possible future pathway to U.K. citizenship. Whilst acknowledging the radical nature of the proposals—“ one of the biggest changes in our visa system in British history”, Boris Johnson said that it was a step the British government was prepared to take, and “take it willingly”. The decision to extend residency and possibly citizenship rights to an estimated 3 million people was welcomed by Conservative members of Parliament and pundits, even though opposition to mass immigration had been one of the flash points of the Brexit campaign. That was balanced by a feeling that BN(O)s, as the overseas nationals are referred to, are British and that the U.K. has a legal and moral duty to protect them, as well as a desire to stick one in the eye of the increasingly unpopular Beijing government. Polling has shown strong public support for the proposal, with 42 percent of the respondents surveyed by YouGov in favor against only 24 percent who oppose the move.
But the exact nature of the BN(O) status remains poorly understood. At first, newspapers stated that only 300,000 people would be eligible, although the real number is, in fact, far higher. The 300,000 figure represented the number of BN(O) passports in circulation, not the number of people who are eligible for one. Moreover, there is scant understanding of the difference between a British national and a British citizen. At the core of the misunderstanding is a mix of imperial history and deliberate obfuscation. Ironically, BN(O)s were given that status on the assumption that few would ever cross the world to settle in the U.K. in the first place, a belief that went out of the window thanks to Beijing’s recent crackdown. To understand the origins of the BN(O) status requires untangling the messy history of what it means to be British.
Originally, almost all inhabitants of the British Empire were British subjects without distinction of race. Formally, an inhabitant of London whose ancestors came to Britain with William the Conqueror was as British, legally speaking, as an inhabitant of Punjab whose ancestors had never left India. If one of the fishermen of Hong Kong made his way to England in 1843, a year after the territory was taken as part of the empire, and bought some property, he would have been as free to vote as any wealthy male subject of the crown. In practice, although many colonial British subjects came to the U.K., and some achieved high office—the first Indian member of Parliament, Dadabhai Naoroji, took his seat in 1892—nonwhite colonial immigration to the U.K. was discouraged regardless of British subject status. Dominions were allowed to impose their own restrictions, and countries such as Australia and Canada limited or banned nonwhite immigration until after World War II.
However, with decolonization and the increasing independence of British dominions, things rapidly became complicated. At first, there were attempts at preserving a common Commonwealth citizenship, which allowed for individual Commonwealth members to create their own citizenships, to be held concurrently with British subject status. But increased nonwhite Commonwealth immigration quickly led to the introduction of restrictions on the right of Commonwealth citizens to come to the U.K. unless they had links to the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1962. Nine years later, the rules were relaxed to allow anyone who had a grandparent born in the British Isles to enter the U.K. freely—effectively, a racial restriction. British citizenship as it exists today was only created in 1983, the last step in the replacement of an imperial citizenship by a national one.
As a result, there are currently no fewer than six different types of British nationality, only one of which—straightforward British citizenship—entitles its holders to enter and live in the United Kingdom without any restriction, known as the right of abode. The remainder have the right to a British passport and to enter the U.K. for short periods, but they are effectively second-class nationals.
Apart from BN(O)s, those who still hold British nationality without corresponding British citizenship tend to be those who slipped through the cracks of decolonization, eligible neither for the citizenship of the country in which they lived at independence nor for British citizenship. The most famous group in that situation were the Ugandan Asians, who were not automatically given Ugandan citizenship upon independence because they were seen as colonial interlopers, but were also denied British citizenship, because they lacked the requisite link to the U.K. Commonwealth and Irish citizens also possess various rights owing to their historical links with Britain, such as the ability to vote in British elections if resident in the country.
In the case of Hong Kong, as a crown colony until the 1997 handover to China, most of its inhabitants were British subjects. Many took advantage of this to move to Britain to work before their entry was curtailed in the 1960s. In 1983, most Hong Kongers of Chinese ancestry were automatically turned into British Overseas Territories citizens, who lacked most of the rights associated with British citizenship. Their ethnically British counterparts, meanwhile, were given British citizenship as long as one of their grandparents had been born in the British Isles. The same fate befell the inhabitants of other British Overseas Territories who lacked the statutory grandparent, although in the aftermath of the Falklands War the British government extended full British citizenship to Falkland Islanders.
Despite protests in Hong Kong and in London, the British government refused to change its position. Even the pleas of successive governors fell on hard ears. The best it would do was to give Chinese Hong Kongers who applied a new status: British National (Overseas). At the same time, 50,000 households, mostly those belonging to those who worked for the crown colony’s government, were given British citizenship under an ad hoc scheme, though with the expectation that most of them would not leave the colony after the 1997 handover. (Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s current chief executive, was one of the beneficiaries.)
Compounding difficulties, the Chinese government naturally did not wish for a brain drain from Hong Kong post-handover, and it insisted that any legal status granted by the British government to Hong Kongers would not be recognized in mainland China, although these passports could be used by their holders to travel abroad. (To this day, China refuses to recognize the British citizenship of those who obtained it under the special scheme.) The British government also agreed, as part of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, that BN(O)s would not have the right to abode. All BN(O)s remain Chinese citizens.
The British government never intended for BN(O)s to come to the U.K. in large numbers. Instead, it was viewed as a confidence measure for Hong Kongers, many of whom acquired foreign citizenship in the run-up to the handover to China. A similar arrangement had been made three decades earlier for Chinese inhabitants of Malaysia, known as the “Queen’s Chinese,” without any major outflow to the U.K., although some in that category are now caught in a legal limbo. Now, with the prospect of major upheaval in Hong Kong, the initial assumption—which was always dependent on Chinese compliance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration—looks increasingly shaky, hence the latest moves to increase the rights of BN(O)s.
Britain’s willingness to welcome fleeing Hong Kongers stands in contrast to its historical reluctance to accept Ugandan Asians, most of whom had British passports, when they were expelled by Idi Amin in 1972. The expulsion came at a low point in British race relations, and the U.K. government made strenuous, though mostly unsuccessful, efforts to redirect Ugandan refugees to Commonwealth countries and to British crown colonies. (Only Canada and the Falkland Islands proved willing to receive them in large numbers.) Plans to buy out the refugees’ British nationality for 2,000 pounds were only shelved after it was pointed out that anti-immigration politicians would seek to extend the policy to nonwhite immigrants already in the U.K. Ultimately, 27,000 Ugandan Asians were airlifted to Britain, though not after extensive political controversy. That Britain is now willing to welcome so many more imperial refugees is a stark illustration of the shift in public attitudes since.
But that is not the end of the story. Inevitably, some who wished to become BN(O)s missed the original application deadlines, while those who were born after July 1, 1997—a category that includes many of those on the front lines of the Hong Kong protest movement—are not eligible for the status, which cannot be inherited. For the offer to become meaningful, BN(O)s will also have to be given the right of taking their non-BN(O) family members with them, further swelling the numbers of immigrants, although it is likely that only a small fraction of those eligible will choose to come to Britain rather than join established Hong Konger communities in places like Australia and Canada, the latter of which is home to half a million people of Hong Kong descent. Taiwan, which has promised to introduce special measures to assist fleeing Hong Kongers, might also prove a more appealing destination due to its cultural and geographical proximity.
Once considered an undesirable presence by U.K. leaders, BN(O)s are now viewed as a potential bonanza to British economic life, as well as an opportunity to take a firm stand against the Chinese government’s encroachments in Hong Kong. The starkest illustration of the shift in attitudes comes from the Conservative grandee Norman Tebbit, who in 1990 called an influx of immigrants from Hong Kong a “destabilizing factor in society,” and who infamously questioned the loyalty of immigrants by asking which cricket team they supported. Last year, he was a signatory of a letter to Prime Minister Boris Johnson that called the decision to deprive BN(O)s of British citizenship a “historic error.” Such are the varied legacies of empire.