foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--Biden Can’t Stop America’s Democratic Decline

A few years ago I developed a moderately cheering theory about the effects of four years of U.S. President Donald Trump .
The thought came to me while I was covering the French presidential elections in 2017 .
Very few French voters seemed to be attracted to Emmanuel Macron ’ s Anglo-American brand of liberalism , but they voted for him in overwhelming numbers against Marine Le Pen because they felt called to defend so-called republican values against her populist nativism .
The French had a collective memory of their own brush with fascism during the Vichy era and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spanish , who kept their own right wing firmly in check .
Perhaps , I thought , Americans ’ own problem was historical complacency ; if so , Trump could provide a kind of homeopathic remedy which would inoculate them against the full-blown disease of authoritarianism without making them gravely ill .
I was wrong .
The democratic catharsis that I hoped this election would produce did not happen and is not happening .
I need not recite the evidence , as so many others have , including Foreign Policy ’ s editor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say that my medical metaphor got it backward : Trump exploited a preexisting condition of contempt for democratic norms and then made it vastly worse .
What is to be done ?
And by whom ?
President-elect Joe Biden has said all the right things about bringing Americans together , and I don ’ t doubt that he will continue saying those things , because he believes them .
As an old white guy , and a much-scarred , profoundly decent man , Biden may be a more suitable messenger than was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity as a Black man and Ivy League bearing ignited suspicion and resentment even as he issued passionate pleas for harmony .
But how much can presidential rhetoric , and even symbolic deeds , accomplish ?
In recent days , I ’ ve posed this and similar questions to a number of scholars of democracy , hoping for insights from other countries or eras .
They generally agreed that there are few prior examples of a mature democracy that has lost and then refound its way , though history furnishes any number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of democracies that have slipped their moorings and plunged into authoritarianism .
I found very little optimism .
Thomas Carothers , head of research at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading authority on democracy and governance , said that the United States has now sunk to “ the lower echelon of the well-established democracies ” and is more deeply polarized than any of the others .
“ You can ’ t de-polarize , ” he concluded .
“ You just try to manage this condition we have.
” Scholars have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deliver ” in order to become “ consolidated.
” It is now clear that the principle also applies to mature democracies at a moment when old underpinnings have given way .
U.S. democracy was not shaken during the Depression , as many European democracies were , because then President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a radical experiment in state intervention in order to alleviate poverty and restore faith in the system itself .
At a moment when the prevailing model of capitalism has once again led to stagnation , fear , and resentment even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a figure of the status quo , is called to begin shaping a new domestic order that might ultimately break the national fever .
But that , too , is probably not in the cards .
Biden will only be able to work around the edges so long as the Senate rests in the hands of Majority Leader Mitch McConnell , whose ideal of political success is making the other side fail .
A better outcome in the 2022 midterm elections might free up some political space for the large-scale changes in taxation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Nevertheless , an ambitious Democratic program will only deepen partisan fury , at least so long as Trump has something to say about it .
The delivery will be generational ; the backlash will be immediate .
Thinking about what can be done right now about the country ’ s long-gestating illness only leads to despair .
Perhaps , then , the answer lies in stepping back and thinking about long-term answers that provide less immediate gratification .
Most of the scholars I spoke to believed that the United States ’ political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and thus that they have to change those structures in order to find their way out .
Any such reforms might well be blocked by the same partisan resistance that a new tax-and-spending agenda would provoke ; they may , however , enjoy the slight advantage that comes of not intrinsically advantaging either side .
In any case , structural reform might well have to begin at the state level before percolating up to national politics .
Lee Drutman of the New America Foundation has argued that the two-party system has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have come to feel that “ you can ’ t give an inch or else you ’ re going to lose the entire war.
” In a recent book , Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop : The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America ( and in a piece in Foreign Policy ) , Drutman has called for a shift to a multiparty system .
Drutman has pointed out that in the 1980s , New Zealand , today ’ s global darling , was locked in dysfunctional governance until a national commission recommended a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed people to sort themselves out according to their actual views and afforded those views a new measure of political representation .
He suggested that a President Biden create just such a commission , with a mandate to produce recommendations for reform broad enough that neither party could be sure beforehand if it would win or lose .
( For an example of just such a document , see the admirably thorough and balanced report of the Commission on the Practice of Democratic Citizenship . )
But you can ’ t decree a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to change voting systems .
In a first-past-the-post-system such as the United States has , only the winner of the largest number of votes in any given constituency wins .
Third parties almost never muster enough votes to win .
Both Drutman and Larry Diamond , a scholar of democracy at the Hoover Institution , have argued for a system of proportional representation in multimember districts .
Voters would elect up to five candidates in an expanded constituency , thus allowing new parties to win seats .
Diamond is a devotee of ranked-choice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ master reform ” which would enable a host of other reforms .
Once voters can list a second or even third choice , major-party candidates will have an incentive to reach out beyond their base in order to win votes from those who favor another candidate .
Diamond has argued that this would both discourage major-party extremism and provide incentives for additional parties .
Both ranked-choice and proportional systems exist across the democratic world .
In the Netherlands , for example , parties are allotted seats in parliament according to the fraction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ makes it hard to cobble together a coalition government but ensures that all factions , even very small ones , enjoy representation .
The United States , however , has neither .
Maine has ranked-choice voting ; Diamond was discouraged to see that both Massachusetts and Alaska decisively voted down referendums to establish such a system .
The problem with voting reform is that you can ’ t sing it .
Ranked-choice voting and proportional voting may stir the soul of political scientists , but few citizens will march under that banner .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ experiments at the state and local level that show both the political class and ordinary Americans that these voting systems can be far more inclusive than is their current system .
My own preferred long-term solution is deliberative and participatory democracy , which appeals to something very deep in Americans and in the United States ’ political tradition .
It was the engagement of ordinary citizens in local office-holding and jury service that convinced Alexis de Tocqueville that democracy did not have to devolve into demagogy .
That small-town world in turn gave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ culture of big-city party clubs and machines , which served as vehicles for political involvement for generations of newcomers .
That era has largely vanished with the rise of a leviathan national state and an intensely nationalized politics .
New means have to be created for an era in which citizens widely express a sense of apathy and futility about their own role as citizens .
In 2019 Diamond and his colleague James Fishkin founded America In One Room , which brought together 526 citizens of all backgrounds and persuasions for a four-day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Few of the participants said they had changed their minds , but many felt that they had come to respect the sincerity and seriousness of those who thought otherwise .
That qualifies as a hopeful outcome .
Deliberative democracy is good in itself ; I hope many public-spirited billionaires agree to underwrite such experiments .
But debating without the hope of changing anything besides your neighbor ’ s mind gets you only so far .
Real participatory democracy , where citizens gain some measure of power over decision-making , can only happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their power .
In the United States , participatory democracy chiefly takes the form of referendums .
But these exercises involve almost no actual citizen participation , much less deliberation .
Many pit one giant interest against another with the victory going to the deeper pocket .
( See this chart of spending on California ’ s 12 measures this year . )
Advocates of real participatory democracy usually point to very modest experiments in which , for example , city councils allow a measure of neighborhood self-government .
In Europe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Though France has a vastly more centralized political culture than the United States , Macron reacted to the fury of the yellow vest protests over gasoline tax hikes by impaneling an assembly of 150 citizens chosen by lot to devise broadly acceptable climate change solutions .
In June , Macron formally embraced their report and agreed to spend an additional $ 18 billion on climate measures .
That , too , constitutes a hopeful outcome .
( For a more institutionalized version of the citizen assembly , see my article on Holland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ course , the United States needs top-down legislative solutions on climate change , the pandemic , infrastructure , health care , and so much else .
But none of them will stick—every one of them could be reversed—if one half of the country continues to regard democratic processes as a sinister means for empowering the other half .
There is no one solution to that problem ; and half the country might well resist absolutely anything endorsed by the other half .
But Americans can ’ t afford to wait until the fever @ @

A few years ago I developed a moderately cheering theory about the effects of four years of U.S. President Donald Trump. The thought came to me while I was covering the French presidential elections in 2017. Very few French voters seemed to be attracted to Emmanuel Macron’s Anglo-American brand of liberalism, but they voted for him in overwhelming numbers against Marine Le Pen because they felt called to defend so-called republican values against her populist nativism. The French had a collective memory of their own brush with fascism during the Vichy era and the 1930s. So, too, the Spanish, who kept their own right wing firmly in check. Perhaps, I thought, Americans’ own problem was historical complacency; if so, Trump could provide a kind of homeopathic remedy which would inoculate them against the full-blown disease of authoritarianism without making them gravely ill.
A few years ago I developed a moderately cheering theory about the effects of four years of U.S. President Donald Trump. The thought came to me while I was covering the French presidential elections in 2017. Very few French voters seemed to be attracted to Emmanuel Macron’s Anglo-American brand of liberalism, but they voted for him in overwhelming numbers against Marine Le Pen because they felt called to defend so-called republican values against her populist nativism. The French had a collective memory of their own brush with fascism during the Vichy era and the 1930s. So, too, the Spanish, who kept their own right wing firmly in check. Perhaps, I thought, Americans’ own problem was historical complacency; if so, Trump could provide a kind of homeopathic remedy which would inoculate them against the full-blown disease of authoritarianism without making them gravely ill.
I was wrong. The democratic catharsis that I hoped this election would produce did not happen and is not happening. I need not recite the evidence, as so many others have, including Foreign Policy’s editor, Jonathan Tepperman. It is enough to say that my medical metaphor got it backward: Trump exploited a preexisting condition of contempt for democratic norms and then made it vastly worse.
What is to be done? And by whom? President-elect Joe Biden has said all the right things about bringing Americans together, and I don’t doubt that he will continue saying those things, because he believes them. As an old white guy, and a much-scarred, profoundly decent man, Biden may be a more suitable messenger than was former President Barack Obama, whose very identity as a Black man and Ivy League bearing ignited suspicion and resentment even as he issued passionate pleas for harmony. But how much can presidential rhetoric, and even symbolic deeds, accomplish?
In recent days, I’ve posed this and similar questions to a number of scholars of democracy, hoping for insights from other countries or eras. They generally agreed that there are few prior examples of a mature democracy that has lost and then refound its way, though history furnishes any number of instances, such as Weimar Germany, of democracies that have slipped their moorings and plunged into authoritarianism. I found very little optimism. Thomas Carothers, head of research at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading authority on democracy and governance, said that the United States has now sunk to “the lower echelon of the well-established democracies” and is more deeply polarized than any of the others. “You can’t de-polarize,” he concluded. “You just try to manage this condition we have.”
Scholars have long argued that shaky democracies must “deliver” in order to become “consolidated.” It is now clear that the principle also applies to mature democracies at a moment when old underpinnings have given way. U.S. democracy was not shaken during the Depression, as many European democracies were, because then President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated a radical experiment in state intervention in order to alleviate poverty and restore faith in the system itself. At a moment when the prevailing model of capitalism has once again led to stagnation, fear, and resentment even amid great plenty, Biden, himself a figure of the status quo, is called to begin shaping a new domestic order that might ultimately break the national fever.
But that, too, is probably not in the cards. Biden will only be able to work around the edges so long as the Senate rests in the hands of Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, whose ideal of political success is making the other side fail. A better outcome in the 2022 midterm elections might free up some political space for the large-scale changes in taxation and spending to which Biden is committed. Nevertheless, an ambitious Democratic program will only deepen partisan fury, at least so long as Trump has something to say about it. The delivery will be generational; the backlash will be immediate.
Thinking about what can be done right now about the country’s long-gestating illness only leads to despair. Perhaps, then, the answer lies in stepping back and thinking about long-term answers that provide less immediate gratification. Most of the scholars I spoke to believed that the United States’ political structures have led Americans into a cul-de-sac, and thus that they have to change those structures in order to find their way out. Any such reforms might well be blocked by the same partisan resistance that a new tax-and-spending agenda would provoke; they may, however, enjoy the slight advantage that comes of not intrinsically advantaging either side. In any case, structural reform might well have to begin at the state level before percolating up to national politics.
Lee Drutman of the New America Foundation has argued that the two-party system has become a deadlocked machine in which both parties have come to feel that “you can’t give an inch or else you’re going to lose the entire war.” In a recent book, Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: The Case for Multiparty Democracy in America (and in a piece in Foreign Policy), Drutman has called for a shift to a multiparty system.
Drutman has pointed out that in the 1980s, New Zealand, today’s global darling, was locked in dysfunctional governance until a national commission recommended a switch to a German-style multiparty system that allowed people to sort themselves out according to their actual views and afforded those views a new measure of political representation. He suggested that a President Biden create just such a commission, with a mandate to produce recommendations for reform broad enough that neither party could be sure beforehand if it would win or lose. (For an example of just such a document, see the admirably thorough and balanced report of the Commission on the Practice of Democratic Citizenship.)
But you can’t decree a change in party structure; you have to change voting systems. In a first-past-the-post-system such as the United States has, only the winner of the largest number of votes in any given constituency wins. Third parties almost never muster enough votes to win. Both Drutman and Larry Diamond, a scholar of democracy at the Hoover Institution, have argued for a system of proportional representation in multimember districts. Voters would elect up to five candidates in an expanded constituency, thus allowing new parties to win seats. Diamond is a devotee of ranked-choice voting, which he has called the “master reform” which would enable a host of other reforms. Once voters can list a second or even third choice, major-party candidates will have an incentive to reach out beyond their base in order to win votes from those who favor another candidate. Diamond has argued that this would both discourage major-party extremism and provide incentives for additional parties.
Both ranked-choice and proportional systems exist across the democratic world. In the Netherlands, for example, parties are allotted seats in parliament according to the fraction of votes they win nationally, which makes it hard to cobble together a coalition government but ensures that all factions, even very small ones, enjoy representation. The United States, however, has neither. Maine has ranked-choice voting; Diamond was discouraged to see that both Massachusetts and Alaska decisively voted down referendums to establish such a system.
The problem with voting reform is that you can’t sing it. Ranked-choice voting and proportional voting may stir the soul of political scientists, but few citizens will march under that banner. They are likely to gain purchase through experiments at the state and local level that show both the political class and ordinary Americans that these voting systems can be far more inclusive than is their current system.
My own preferred long-term solution is deliberative and participatory democracy, which appeals to something very deep in Americans and in the United States’ political tradition. It was the engagement of ordinary citizens in local office-holding and jury service that convinced Alexis de Tocqueville that democracy did not have to devolve into demagogy. That small-town world in turn gave way to the more raucous and urbanized culture of big-city party clubs and machines, which served as vehicles for political involvement for generations of newcomers.
That era has largely vanished with the rise of a leviathan national state and an intensely nationalized politics. New means have to be created for an era in which citizens widely express a sense of apathy and futility about their own role as citizens. In 2019 Diamond and his colleague James Fishkin founded America In One Room, which brought together 526 citizens of all backgrounds and persuasions for a four-day discussion of incendiary topics such as immigration. Few of the participants said they had changed their minds, but many felt that they had come to respect the sincerity and seriousness of those who thought otherwise. That qualifies as a hopeful outcome.
Deliberative democracy is good in itself; I hope many public-spirited billionaires agree to underwrite such experiments. But debating without the hope of changing anything besides your neighbor’s mind gets you only so far. Real participatory democracy, where citizens gain some measure of power over decision-making, can only happen where current legislators agree to cede some of their power.
In the United States, participatory democracy chiefly takes the form of referendums. But these exercises involve almost no actual citizen participation, much less deliberation. Many pit one giant interest against another with the victory going to the deeper pocket. (See this chart of spending on California’s 12 measures this year.) Advocates of real participatory democracy usually point to very modest experiments in which, for example, city councils allow a measure of neighborhood self-government.
In Europe, however, citizen assemblies are gaining popularity. Though France has a vastly more centralized political culture than the United States, Macron reacted to the fury of the yellow vest protests over gasoline tax hikes by impaneling an assembly of 150 citizens chosen by lot to devise broadly acceptable climate change solutions. In June, Macron formally embraced their report and agreed to spend an additional $18 billion on climate measures. That, too, constitutes a hopeful outcome. (For a more institutionalized version of the citizen assembly, see my article on Holland’s polder deliberations:)
Of course, the United States needs top-down legislative solutions on climate change, the pandemic, infrastructure, health care, and so much else. But none of them will stick—every one of them could be reversed—if one half of the country continues to regard democratic processes as a sinister means for empowering the other half. There is no one solution to that problem; and half the country might well resist absolutely anything endorsed by the other half. But Americans can’t afford to wait until the fever breaks.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--As Vaccine Hopes Grow, Poorer Countries Are Last in Line

As Vaccine Hopes Grow , Poorer Countries Are Last in Line Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Hopes are rising for a second promising coronavirus vaccine candidate , Hong Kong ’ s pro-democracy opposition resigns , and Russia eyes a Sudan naval base .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Just as the news of a possible breakthrough coronavirus vaccine sent stock markets soaring earlier in the week , a second vaccine candidate may be about to post similar results .
A vaccine trial by U.S.-based Moderna has now reached the threshold number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preliminary analysis .
And just like the Pfizer/BioNtech trial , the rising number of coronavirus infections means that Moderna is likely to have more cases to test than they had initially planned for .
Will it work ?
Although it ’ s not yet known whether the trial ’ s results will be similar to the promising ones delivered by Pfizer/BioNtech , there is reason to believe it will .
This is because Moderna ’ s vaccine candidate uses the same delivery mechanism : messenger RNA ( mRNA ) .
Drew Weissman , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told Bloomberg that he expects “ similar results ” from the Moderna trial .
“ It is hard to imagine how it would be much different , ” he added .
If the preliminary results bring good news , it will allow the Trump administration to have a stronger case for taking credit .
Moderna , unlike Pfizer , has much closer ties to Operation Warp Speed , the White House ’ s public-private partnership formed to find a suitable vaccine .
Vaccine hoarding .
If one or both of the vaccines prove @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for wealthy countries but an anxious wait for the poorer ones .
A study by researchers at Duke University Global Health Innovation Center found that the European Union and five other countries have already bought up 2.2 billion doses of potential vaccines .
Canada , for example , has purchased enough vaccine doses to cover its population more than five times over .
Given that some vaccines may require two doses , it means some poorer countries may be waiting until 2024 before they receive a vaccine .
How cold can you go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ driving factor in vaccine delivery ; competence matters , too .
As Laurie Garrett wrote on Nov. 10 , even a country as wealthy as the United States may struggle to distribute a vaccine , especially if it comes with the unusual storage demands of one based on mRNA , which needs temperatures of -103 degrees Fahrenheit to remain stable .
And that ’ s before considering what level of public opposition there will be to a government approved vaccine if it does become available .
The Biden transition .
President-elect Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of staff in his incoming administration .
A longtime Democratic party operative , Klain served as an adviser on the Biden election campaign ; his most recent stint in government was as President Barack Obama ’ s Ebola epidemic coordinator .
Foreign Policy has rounded up the likely candidates for the top foreign-policy jobs in a future Biden cabinet .
Hong Kong democracy blow .
The pro-democracy grouping in the Hong Kong Legislative Council has resigned en masse after the ousting of four of their colleagues under new laws enacted by Beijing that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disloyal to the mainland .
In addition to the four representatives , a total of 15 elected officials resigned in protest .
Reacting to the news , U.S. National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien said the United States would “ continue to identify and sanction those responsible for extinguishing Hong Kong ’ s freedom.
” In FP ’ s weekly China Brief , James Palmer writes that the move means that “ more than ever , Hong Kong ’ s government is now a puppet of Beijing.
” Ivory Coast leaders start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ met with opposition leader Henri Konan Bedié in an attempt to calm tensions over the outcome of the Oct. 31 election .
Bedié , himself a former president , said he would continue to meet with Ouattara “ so that the country becomes what it was before.
” A key demand of Bedié and his associates is for Outtara ’ s government to drop criminal charges against opposition figures for forming a parallel government .
Ivory Coast has experienced sporadic violence both before and after the vote , in which at least 85 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa .
Russia is planning to build a naval base in Sudan , according to a draft agreement between the two countries .
The base would provide logistics support , ship repairs , and accommodate up to four warships .
If the deal is agreed , the base would give Russia a greater foothold in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait , where other military powers have already begun establishing bases .
Asia ’ s biggest trade deal .
After eight years of negotiations , countries representing roughly 30 percent of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economic Partnership ( RCEP ) trade deal on Sunday to cut tariffs and set rules for e-commerce and intellectual property across the Asia-Pacific region .
The 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) : Brunei , Cambodia , Indonesia , Laos , Malaysia , Myanmar , the Philippines , Singapore , Thailand , and Vietnam will sign on Sunday along with China , Japan , South Korea , Australia , and New Zealand .
Writing in November of last year , FP ’ s Keith Johnson explained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the RCEP a big deal .
Yemen ’ s famine risk .
United Nations officials have called for more funds to support aid operations in Yemen , or risk a famine taking hold .
Addressing the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday U.N. aid chief Mark Lowcock said that only half of the $ 3 billion humanitarian aid budget necessary in Yemen had so far been met .
“ When I think about what famine would mean , I am really at a loss to understand why more is not being done to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is a terrible , agonizing and humiliating death … Yemenis are not ‘ going hungry.
’ They are being starved.
” The Japanese town of Takikawa on the northern island of Hokkaido has found a novel solution to its growing bear problem : wolf robots .
More like mechanized scarecrows , the fake wolves come equipped with loudspeakers producing wolf howls once bears come within range .
Sightings of bears in Japan are at their highest levels in five years , and two fatal bear attacks have already taken place in 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encountered any more bears since the lupine sentinels were deployed .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Hopes are rising for a second promising coronavirus vaccine candidate, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy opposition resigns, and Russia eyes a Sudan naval base.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Will Trump Take Credit for Vaccine Breakthroughs?
Just as the news of a possible breakthrough coronavirus vaccine sent stock markets soaring earlier in the week, a second vaccine candidate may be about to post similar results.
A vaccine trial by U.S.-based Moderna has now reached the threshold number of infections that allow it to go to preliminary analysis. And just like the Pfizer/BioNtech trial, the rising number of coronavirus infections means that Moderna is likely to have more cases to test than they had initially planned for.
Will it work? Although it’s not yet known whether the trial’s results will be similar to the promising ones delivered by Pfizer/BioNtech, there is reason to believe it will. This is because Moderna’s vaccine candidate uses the same delivery mechanism: messenger RNA (mRNA). Drew Weissman, an immunologist at the University of Pennsylvania told Bloomberg that he expects “similar results” from the Moderna trial. “It is hard to imagine how it would be much different,” he added.
If the preliminary results bring good news, it will allow the Trump administration to have a stronger case for taking credit. Moderna, unlike Pfizer, has much closer ties to Operation Warp Speed, the White House’s public-private partnership formed to find a suitable vaccine.
Vaccine hoarding. If one or both of the vaccines prove effective, it will be good news for wealthy countries but an anxious wait for the poorer ones. A study by researchers at Duke University Global Health Innovation Center found that the European Union and five other countries have already bought up 2.2 billion doses of potential vaccines. Canada, for example, has purchased enough vaccine doses to cover its population more than five times over. Given that some vaccines may require two doses, it means some poorer countries may be waiting until 2024 before they receive a vaccine.
How cold can you go? Wealth isn’t the only driving factor in vaccine delivery; competence matters, too. As Laurie Garrett wrote on Nov. 10, even a country as wealthy as the United States may struggle to distribute a vaccine, especially if it comes with the unusual storage demands of one based on mRNA, which needs temperatures of -103 degrees Fahrenheit to remain stable. And that’s before considering what level of public opposition there will be to a government approved vaccine if it does become available.
What We’re Following Today
The Biden transition. President-elect Joe Biden has named Ron Klain as his chief of staff in his incoming administration. A longtime Democratic party operative, Klain served as an adviser on the Biden election campaign; his most recent stint in government was as President Barack Obama’s Ebola epidemic coordinator. Foreign Policy has rounded up the likely candidates for the top foreign-policy jobs in a future Biden cabinet.
Hong Kong democracy blow. The pro-democracy grouping in the Hong Kong Legislative Council has resigned en masse after the ousting of four of their colleagues under new laws enacted by Beijing that allow for the removal of lawmakers deemed disloyal to the mainland. In addition to the four representatives, a total of 15 elected officials resigned in protest. Reacting to the news, U.S. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said the United States would “continue to identify and sanction those responsible for extinguishing Hong Kong’s freedom.” In FP’s weekly China Brief, James Palmer writes that the move means that “more than ever, Hong Kong’s government is now a puppet of Beijing.”
Ivory Coast leaders start talking. Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara met with opposition leader Henri Konan Bedié in an attempt to calm tensions over the outcome of the Oct. 31 election. Bedié, himself a former president, said he would continue to meet with Ouattara “so that the country becomes what it was before.” A key demand of Bedié and his associates is for Outtara’s government to drop criminal charges against opposition figures for forming a parallel government. Ivory Coast has experienced sporadic violence both before and after the vote, in which at least 85 people have been killed.
Keep an Eye On
Russia in Africa. Russia is planning to build a naval base in Sudan, according to a draft agreement between the two countries. The base would provide logistics support, ship repairs, and accommodate up to four warships. If the deal is agreed, the base would give Russia a greater foothold in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where other military powers have already begun establishing bases.
Asia’s biggest trade deal. After eight years of negotiations, countries representing roughly 30 percent of the global economy will sign the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade deal on Sunday to cut tariffs and set rules for e-commerce and intellectual property across the Asia-Pacific region. The 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam will sign on Sunday along with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Writing in November of last year, FP’s Keith Johnson explained what (beyond its size) makes the RCEP a big deal.
Yemen’s famine risk. United Nations officials have called for more funds to support aid operations in Yemen, or risk a famine taking hold. Addressing the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday U.N. aid chief Mark Lowcock said that only half of the $3 billion humanitarian aid budget necessary in Yemen had so far been met. “When I think about what famine would mean, I am really at a loss to understand why more is not being done to prevent it,” Lowcock said. “It is a terrible, agonizing and humiliating death … Yemenis are not ‘going hungry.’ They are being starved.”
Odds and Ends
The Japanese town of Takikawa on the northern island of Hokkaido has found a novel solution to its growing bear problem: wolf robots. More like mechanized scarecrows, the fake wolves come equipped with loudspeakers producing wolf howls once bears come within range. Sightings of bears in Japan are at their highest levels in five years, and two fatal bear attacks have already taken place in 2020. Takikawa officials say they have not encountered any more bears since the lupine sentinels were deployed.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Image credit: Chandan Khanna/Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--Biden Must Restore America’s Reputation as a Beacon of Press Freedom

Biden Must Restore America ’ s Reputation as a Beacon of Press Freedom One of the many outrages of the Trump administration has been its assault on press freedom .
Enshrined in the First Amendment , the free press is a treasured constitutional principle , the subject of landmark Supreme Court decisions , and an underpinning of American civic life .
It also matters in U.S. foreign policy .
Although foreign policy was relegated to the margins of this fraught campaign season , press freedom is a critical building block of democracy globally—and the restoration of U.S. credibility on press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Biden administration ’ s planned drive to shore up democracy around the world .
Until four years ago , press freedom in the United States was mostly a back-burner issue with legal specialists , civil liberties groups , and media companies waging fights against government secrecy and to defend the line on issues like defamation and journalists ’ right to protect their sources .
That began to change in 2016 , as then candidate Donald Trump ramped up attacks on the press during his campaign , fomenting hostility toward journalists .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ document infringements on press freedom and attacks on journalists , details a staggering 771 press freedom violations since its creation in 2017 , including 147 arrests of journalists and 219 physical attacks .
While even the president ’ s most incendiary comments toward the press—calling journalists “ the enemy of the American people ” — constitute protected free speech , his threats and acts of retaliation directed toward journalists and commentators—including withdrawing White House press passes and security clearances—violate the First Amendment .
The Trump White House ’ s assault on press freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The president ’ s false lambasting of reputable news organizations as part of an anti-Trump cabal has undercut the American public ’ s faith in press freedom as a necessary pillar of democracy .
It has also fed a deep schism in information consumption , exacerbating political polarization and allowing disinformation to flourish among communities that have been taught to distrust credible journalism .
Around the world , the United States ’ high profile turnabout on press freedom has eased the way for similarly inclined leaders to constrain press freedoms .
Leaders around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abdel Fattah al-Sisi , Turkey ’ s Recep Tayyip Erdogan , the Philippines ’ Rodrigo Duterte , and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro have all parroted Trump ’ s cries of fake news , seeking to discredit critical media coverage .
Arrests and attacks on journalists by law enforcement during this year ’ s racial justice protests made international headlines , undercutting the United States ’ credibility in calling out similar excesses when they occur abroad .
All this has contributed to a slide in protections for the press globally .
Freedom House ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entitled “ A Downward Spiral ” and documented “ concerted attempts to throttle the independence of the media sector ” in democracies succumbing to populist overreach including India , Hungary , the Philippines , and Serbia , alongside tightening strictures in more traditional authoritarian settings including Russia , China , and Iran .
At least 250 journalists were imprisoned around the world at the end of 2019 .
The incoming Biden administration should move swiftly to back up candidate Biden ’ s commitment to press freedom with decisive action .
The change should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House .
Going beyond the basic respect for journalists that comes naturally to Biden , he should use the opportunity in speeches and statements to reinforce that his administration recognizes the media as a pillar of democracy .
The Trump White House has twice been ordered by a court to return journalists ’ hard passes that were improperly withheld in retaliation for unwanted questions or verbal tussles with White House aides .
A Biden administration should reboot its relationship with the press corps , name a highly respected press secretary , pare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules on credentialing , and ensure ample health and safety precautions that don ’ t impair access ( several journalists caught COVID-19 after being in proximity to unmasked Trump administration spokespeople in recent months . )
But simply turning back the Trump administration ’ s transgressions won ’ t be enough .
The Obama White House was faulted for its secrecy , prosecuting more government leakers under the 2017 Espionage Act than all other prior administrations combined , ensnaring journalists in several such investigations , and stonewalling open records requests .
As it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politicized by Trump and to boost the morale of scientists and other experts whose professional opinions were muzzled , a Biden administration should put a premium on openness and disclosure , requiring each cabinet secretary to identify ways to increase transparency , accessibility to the press , and public accountability .
Building outward from Washington , the racial justice protests in mid-2020 exposed glaring gaps in training and protocols regarding law enforcement respect for press freedom in the context of protests , making such demonstrations a dangerous environment for journalists .
A Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies to develop guidelines and primers that ensure that press freedom rights are respected amid public assemblies , and that police are held accountable for violating press freedom and First Amendment rights .
The consolidation of power in a single CEO eliminated guardrails that had allowed these outlets to stand in contrast with most state-controlled media outlets around the world .
A Biden administration should appoint a seasoned journalist to oversee these outlets in the near-term , publicly asserting their commitment to fact-based reporting .
Biden should also undertake a searching review of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ founded to fight propaganda during World War II and the Cold War , should play in the digital age and of how their integrity can best be protected .
Biden must also end the politicized tit-for-tat battles with foreign governments over the status of foreign journalists in the United States and around the world .
During the Trump administration , tensions over American journalists in China and representatives of Chinese state-controlled media in the United States have boiled over , curtailing the ability of leading news outlets including the New York Times , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to report from mainland China .
The United States needs to take a principled stand in favor of the ability of foreign correspondents to carry out their work without interference or threat .
Back in 2013 , Biden admonished the Chinese government over its threats to expel U.S. journalists , helping to resolve a stalemate and enable critical reporting to proceed .
Biden should prioritize restoring broader access for Western media organizations in his reboot of frayed relations with Beijing , even if it means , in return , rolling back some of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Chinese state news agencies .
Finally , a Biden administration can help safeguard press freedoms worldwide .
The U.S. Congress is contemplating measures to sharpen current targeted sanctions regimes applicable to individuals complicit in gross human rights abuses against journalists and to limit U.S. assistance to governments implicated in such abuses .
Such sanctions would become even more effective if the United States could convince more nations to follow its lead in implementing similar measures , constricting the ability of tormenters of journalists to travel and keep assets in multiple jurisdictions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ envoy or ambassador-at-large focused on press freedom could help ensure a sustained focus on these issues , catalyze action , and push greater support , including through training and development assistance , for journalists and media organizations worldwide that are on the frontlines of testing these freedoms .
As the United States confronts the monumental tasks of restoring trust at home and credibility abroad , principled leadership on press freedom is an essential starting point .

One of the many outrages of the Trump administration has been its assault on press freedom. Enshrined in the First Amendment, the free press is a treasured constitutional principle, the subject of landmark Supreme Court decisions, and an underpinning of American civic life. It also matters in U.S. foreign policy.
One of the many outrages of the Trump administration has been its assault on press freedom. Enshrined in the First Amendment, the free press is a treasured constitutional principle, the subject of landmark Supreme Court decisions, and an underpinning of American civic life. It also matters in U.S. foreign policy.
Although foreign policy was relegated to the margins of this fraught campaign season, press freedom is a critical building block of democracy globally—and the restoration of U.S. credibility on press freedom should therefore be a cornerstone of the Biden administration’s planned drive to shore up democracy around the world.
Until four years ago, press freedom in the United States was mostly a back-burner issue with legal specialists, civil liberties groups, and media companies waging fights against government secrecy and to defend the line on issues like defamation and journalists’ right to protect their sources. That began to change in 2016, as then candidate Donald Trump ramped up attacks on the press during his campaign, fomenting hostility toward journalists.
The U.S. Press Freedom Tracker, created to document infringements on press freedom and attacks on journalists, details a staggering 771 press freedom violations since its creation in 2017, including 147 arrests of journalists and 219 physical attacks. While even the president’s most incendiary comments toward the press—calling journalists “the enemy of the American people”— constitute protected free speech, his threats and acts of retaliation directed toward journalists and commentators—including withdrawing White House press passes and security clearances—violate the First Amendment.
The Trump White House’s assault on press freedom has resonated both nationally and globally. The president’s false lambasting of reputable news organizations as part of an anti-Trump cabal has undercut the American public’s faith in press freedom as a necessary pillar of democracy. It has also fed a deep schism in information consumption, exacerbating political polarization and allowing disinformation to flourish among communities that have been taught to distrust credible journalism.
Around the world, the United States’ high profile turnabout on press freedom has eased the way for similarly inclined leaders to constrain press freedoms. Leaders around the world, including Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro have all parroted Trump’s cries of fake news, seeking to discredit critical media coverage. Arrests and attacks on journalists by law enforcement during this year’s racial justice protests made international headlines, undercutting the United States’ credibility in calling out similar excesses when they occur abroad.
All this has contributed to a slide in protections for the press globally. Freedom House’s 2019 report on media freedom was entitled “A Downward Spiral” and documented “concerted attempts to throttle the independence of the media sector” in democracies succumbing to populist overreach including India, Hungary, the Philippines, and Serbia, alongside tightening strictures in more traditional authoritarian settings including Russia, China, and Iran. At least 250 journalists were imprisoned around the world at the end of 2019.
Trump’s campaign of vilification toward the press was an intentional and effective effort to lay the groundwork for future abuses of power by convincing his base of supporters to discount revelations of his misdeeds, including attacks on other facets of democracy such as anti-corruption safeguards and voting rights. By undercutting the role of the free press, leaders can shroud themselves in protective cover that makes self-dealing, manipulation, and even the dismantling of democracy possible with little accountability or oversight. The equivalent of snipping phone and internet cables before a burglary, stifling journalists is an early indication of a leader plotting to get away with something.
The incoming Biden administration should move swiftly to back up candidate Biden’s commitment to press freedom with decisive action. The change should begin at home, namely at the White House. Going beyond the basic respect for journalists that comes naturally to Biden, he should use the opportunity in speeches and statements to reinforce that his administration recognizes the media as a pillar of democracy.
The Trump White House has twice been ordered by a court to return journalists’ hard passes that were improperly withheld in retaliation for unwanted questions or verbal tussles with White House aides. A Biden administration should reboot its relationship with the press corps, name a highly respected press secretary, pare back the Trump administration’s tightened rules on credentialing, and ensure ample health and safety precautions that don’t impair access (several journalists caught COVID-19 after being in proximity to unmasked Trump administration spokespeople in recent months.)
But simply turning back the Trump administration’s transgressions won’t be enough. The Obama White House was faulted for its secrecy, prosecuting more government leakers under the 1917 Espionage Act than all other prior administrations combined, ensnaring journalists in several such investigations, and stonewalling open records requests.
As it seeks to restore trust in federal agencies politicized by Trump and to boost the morale of scientists and other experts whose professional opinions were muzzled, a Biden administration should put a premium on openness and disclosure, requiring each cabinet secretary to identify ways to increase transparency, accessibility to the press, and public accountability.
Building outward from Washington, the racial justice protests in mid-2020 exposed glaring gaps in training and protocols regarding law enforcement respect for press freedom in the context of protests, making such demonstrations a dangerous environment for journalists. A Biden Justice Department should work with law enforcement agencies to develop guidelines and primers that ensure that press freedom rights are respected amid public assemblies, and that police are held accountable for violating press freedom and First Amendment rights.
Outside the country, the first order of business should be reversing the damage done by the worst abuses of the Trump administration. Chief among those is the ravaging of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), under newly installed CEO Michael Pack, which turned the respected Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia into ideologically tainted mouthpieces for the Trump administration through leadership purges and heavy-handed editorial directives. The agency’s bipartisan governance mechanism was gutted as part of a misguided reform effort enshrined in a 2018 law that only came into force with Pack’s confirmation in June this year.
The consolidation of power in a single CEO eliminated guardrails that had allowed these outlets to stand in contrast with most state-controlled media outlets around the world. A Biden administration should appoint a seasoned journalist to oversee these outlets in the near-term, publicly asserting their commitment to fact-based reporting. Biden should also undertake a searching review of the role that these media organs, founded to fight propaganda during World War II and the Cold War, should play in the digital age and of how their integrity can best be protected.
Biden must also end the politicized tit-for-tat battles with foreign governments over the status of foreign journalists in the United States and around the world. During the Trump administration, tensions over American journalists in China and representatives of Chinese state-controlled media in the United States have boiled over, curtailing the ability of leading news outlets including the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal to report from mainland China. The United States needs to take a principled stand in favor of the ability of foreign correspondents to carry out their work without interference or threat.
Back in 2013, Biden admonished the Chinese government over its threats to expel U.S. journalists, helping to resolve a stalemate and enable critical reporting to proceed. Biden should prioritize restoring broader access for Western media organizations in his reboot of frayed relations with Beijing, even if it means, in return, rolling back some of the Trump administration’s countermeasures directed at Chinese state news agencies.
Finally, a Biden administration can help safeguard press freedoms worldwide. The U.S. Congress is contemplating measures to sharpen current targeted sanctions regimes applicable to individuals complicit in gross human rights abuses against journalists and to limit U.S. assistance to governments implicated in such abuses. Such sanctions would become even more effective if the United States could convince more nations to follow its lead in implementing similar measures, constricting the ability of tormenters of journalists to travel and keep assets in multiple jurisdictions.
The appointment of a special State Department envoy or ambassador-at-large focused on press freedom could help ensure a sustained focus on these issues, catalyze action, and push greater support, including through training and development assistance, for journalists and media organizations worldwide that are on the frontlines of testing these freedoms.
As the United States confronts the monumental tasks of restoring trust at home and credibility abroad, principled leadership on press freedom is an essential starting point.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--Trump May Have Lost, but Modi Is Still Winning

Trump May Have Lost , but Modi Is Still Winning Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
Today : Modi ’ s coalition wins a key state election in India , attacks on journalists increase in Afghanistan , Pakistan gets into a Twitter kerfuffle with the U.S. Embassy , and India enters a technical recession .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
With the coronavirus still raging in much of the world , 2020 is not a good year for incumbents to face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closely fought election in Bihar , India ’ s third-most populous state , a coalition including Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) returned to power on Wednesday , surprising pollsters and analysts .
Unlikely result ?
Bihar residents had several reasons to vote against the BJP and its local ally , incumbent Chief Minister Nitish Kumar ’ s Janata Dal ( United ) party .
Bihar is among India ’ s poorest states , with a weak health care system , and it has been hit hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young people in Bihar were unemployed last year—a rate almost twice as high as the national average .
When India announced a sudden lockdown in March , migrant workers in big cities rushed back to their homes in places such as Bihar , increasing pressure on the state ’ s resources .
Perhaps as a result , polls suggested a big win for 31-year-old opposition leader Tejashwi Prasad Yadav , the son of jailed former Chief Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav .
Modi ’ s mandate .
Polls seem to have underestimated Modi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India are increasingly seen as referendums on national parties and leaders .
In that sense , the vote represented the first big test for Modi since the start of the pandemic .
With more than 41 million votes cast , the result could be a thumbs-up for Modi ’ s continued authority—despite the fact that India has the second-most coronavirus cases in the world and has seen a dramatic fall in economic activity in 2020 .
Amid the fallout of a closer-than-expected election in the United States , the Bihar result underscores how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reflect voters ’ sentiments , especially in rural areas .
It also suggests that analysts are still underestimating the stickiness of leaders seen as strongmen .
Comparisons between Modi and other world leaders are often overwrought .
But with Trump ’ s showing last week , one could draw the conclusion that electorates are not judging leaders as harshly for the coronavirus as expected , perhaps because the pandemic is seen as more of a natural disaster than one worsened by human choices .
Afghan journalists targeted .
A radio journalist was killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday in a targeted bomb blast .
Elyas Dayee worked for Radio Free Afghanistan .
The attack follows one on another local journalist , Yama Siawash , who was killed last week in Kabul .
In both attacks , bombs were planted on the journalists ’ vehicles .
Patricia Gossman of Human Rights Watch tweeted that the bombing was “ part of an alarming pattern of increased threats and attacks on the media by the Taliban.
” U.S.-Pakistan Twitter incident .
On Tuesday , a Pakistani opposition leader shared a Washington Post headline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blow for the world ’ s demagogues and dictators ” with the comment , “ We have one in Pakistan too.
” The tweet , a reference to Prime Minister Imran Khan , was then retweeted by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad ’ s official account .
Within hours , # ApologiseUSembassy began trending in Pakistan .
By Wednesday , the embassy did just that , saying its account “ was accessed last night without authorization … We apologize for any confusion that may have resulted.
” Pakistan cricket landmark .
Alia Zafar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first woman to be appointed as an independent director on the Pakistan Cricket Board ( PCB ) , the national agency that organizes the country ’ s most popular sport .
In the Tuesday announcement , PCB chairman Ehsan Mani called Zafar ’ s appointment “ a giant step forward in enhancing the PCB ’ s governance structure.
” Coronavirus update .
The onset of winter is raising fears of a spike in coronavirus cases across South Asia .
In Bangladesh , the government has extended a closure of all educational institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is making coronavirus tests free of charge to encourage people to get tested .
And in India , there are increasing reports of hospitals running out of beds in cities such as New Delhi , which has also been grappling with hazardous air quality and a rise in lung health complaints .
As shown above , South Asia now has nearly 10 million coronavirus cases .
The real number is likely orders of magnitude higher , given generally low rates of testing .
Indian recession .
New data from India ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely entered its first-ever recession , the technical term for two consecutive quarters of decreasing economic activity .
According to Bloomberg , an estimate by the Reserve Bank of India suggests that gross domestic product fell by 8.6 percent in the quarter that ended in September .
The economy contracted by 24 percent in the previous quarter .
In an interview with the BBC ’ s Soutik Biswas , the economist and former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India needed to borrow its way out of its current crisis .
If it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restore livelihoods and boost economic growth , then it ’ s worth it , ” Singh said .
Censorship or regulation ?
India ’ s government has issued an order to regulate digital media , bringing online news portals , streaming video services , and social media under the authority of the country ’ s Information and Broadcasting Ministry .
The move raises fears that the government could expand its powers and potentially censor content it deems a threat .
I enjoyed reading Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie ’ s review of former U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Promised Land .
Adichie is tough on Obama at times : “ Often , in this book , Barack Obama does an Obama .
He is a man watching himself watch himself , curiously puritanical in his skepticism , turning to see every angle and possibly dissatisfied with all , and genetically incapable of being an ideologue , ” she writes .
Adichie picks out some choice quotes of Obama ’ s impressions of various world leaders .
It ’ s worth highlighting Obama ’ s take on Rahul Gandhi , the former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the scion of a long line of prime ministers .
Gandhi has “ a nervous , unformed quality about him , as if he were a student who ’ d done the coursework and was eager to impress the teacher but deep down lacked either the aptitude or the passion to master the subject , ” Adichie writes .
Ouch .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Modi’s coalition wins a key state election in India, attacks on journalists increase in Afghanistan, Pakistan gets into a Twitter kerfuffle with the U.S. Embassy, and India enters a technical recession .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Modi’s coalition wins a key state election in India, attacks on journalists increase in Afghanistan, Pakistan gets into a Twitter kerfuffle with the U.S. Embassy, and India enters a technical recession.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Modi’s Coronavirus Referendum
With the coronavirus still raging in much of the world, 2020 is not a good year for incumbents to face up to voters. But in a closely fought election in Bihar, India’s third-most populous state, a coalition including Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) returned to power on Wednesday, surprising pollsters and analysts.
Unlikely result? Bihar residents had several reasons to vote against the BJP and its local ally, incumbent Chief Minister Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) party. Bihar is among India’s poorest states, with a weak health care system, and it has been hit hard by the pandemic. Nearly one-third of young people in Bihar were unemployed last year—a rate almost twice as high as the national average.
When India announced a sudden lockdown in March, migrant workers in big cities rushed back to their homes in places such as Bihar, increasing pressure on the state’s resources. Perhaps as a result, polls suggested a big win for 31-year-old opposition leader Tejashwi Prasad Yadav, the son of jailed former Chief Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav.
Modi’s mandate. Polls seem to have underestimated Modi’s enduring popularity. State elections in India are increasingly seen as referendums on national parties and leaders. In that sense, the vote represented the first big test for Modi since the start of the pandemic. With more than 41 million votes cast, the result could be a thumbs-up for Modi’s continued authority—despite the fact that India has the second-most coronavirus cases in the world and has seen a dramatic fall in economic activity in 2020.
Amid the fallout of a closer-than-expected election in the United States, the Bihar result underscores how pollsters around the world are struggling to reflect voters’ sentiments, especially in rural areas. It also suggests that analysts are still underestimating the stickiness of leaders seen as strongmen.
Comparisons between Modi and other world leaders are often overwrought. But with Trump’s showing last week, one could draw the conclusion that electorates are not judging leaders as harshly for the coronavirus as expected, perhaps because the pandemic is seen as more of a natural disaster than one worsened by human choices.
What We’re Following
Afghan journalists targeted. A radio journalist was killed in Afghanistan’s Helmand province on Thursday in a targeted bomb blast. Elyas Dayee worked for Radio Free Afghanistan. The attack follows one on another local journalist, Yama Siawash, who was killed last week in Kabul. In both attacks, bombs were planted on the journalists’ vehicles.
Patricia Gossman of Human Rights Watch tweeted that the bombing was “part of an alarming pattern of increased threats and attacks on the media by the Taliban.”
U.S.-Pakistan Twitter incident. On Tuesday, a Pakistani opposition leader shared a Washington Post headline calling Trump’s defeat “a blow for the world’s demagogues and dictators” with the comment, “We have one in Pakistan too.” The tweet, a reference to Prime Minister Imran Khan, was then retweeted by the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad’s official account.
Within hours, #ApologiseUSembassy began trending in Pakistan. By Wednesday, the embassy did just that, saying its account “was accessed last night without authorization … We apologize for any confusion that may have resulted.”
Pakistan cricket landmark. Alia Zafar, a human-resources executive, has become the first woman to be appointed as an independent director on the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB), the national agency that organizes the country’s most popular sport. In the Tuesday announcement, PCB chairman Ehsan Mani called Zafar’s appointment “a giant step forward in enhancing the PCB’s governance structure.”
Coronavirus update. The onset of winter is raising fears of a spike in coronavirus cases across South Asia. In Bangladesh, the government has extended a closure of all educational institutions until Dec. 19. Nepal has announced it is making coronavirus tests free of charge to encourage people to get tested. And in India, there are increasing reports of hospitals running out of beds in cities such as New Delhi, which has also been grappling with hazardous air quality and a rise in lung health complaints.
As shown above, South Asia now has nearly 10 million coronavirus cases. The real number is likely orders of magnitude higher, given generally low rates of testing.
South Asia, Inc.
Indian recession. New data from India’s central bank shows that the country has likely entered its first-ever recession, the technical term for two consecutive quarters of decreasing economic activity. According to Bloomberg, an estimate by the Reserve Bank of India suggests that gross domestic product fell by 8.6 percent in the quarter that ended in September. The economy contracted by 24 percent in the previous quarter.
In an interview with the BBC’s Soutik Biswas, the economist and former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India needed to borrow its way out of its current crisis. If it “can save lives, borders, restore livelihoods and boost economic growth, then it’s worth it,” Singh said.
Censorship or regulation? India’s government has issued an order to regulate digital media, bringing online news portals, streaming video services, and social media under the authority of the country’s Information and Broadcasting Ministry. The move raises fears that the government could expand its powers and potentially censor content it deems a threat.
What We’re Reading
I enjoyed reading Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s review of former U.S. President Barack Obama’s new book A Promised Land. Adichie is tough on Obama at times: “Often, in this book, Barack Obama does an Obama. He is a man watching himself watch himself, curiously puritanical in his skepticism, turning to see every angle and possibly dissatisfied with all, and genetically incapable of being an ideologue,” she writes.
Adichie picks out some choice quotes of Obama’s impressions of various world leaders. It’s worth highlighting Obama’s take on Rahul Gandhi, the former leader of the Indian National Congress party and the scion of a long line of prime ministers. Gandhi has “a nervous, unformed quality about him, as if he were a student who’d done the coursework and was eager to impress the teacher but deep down lacked either the aptitude or the passion to master the subject,” Adichie writes. Ouch.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--Biden’s Priority in Africa Should be Debt Relief

Biden ’ s Priority in Africa Should be Debt Relief As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden starts to formulate his foreign policies , the list of regions and issues needing immediate attention is already long .
But one that should stand out is Africa ’ s debt .
Tipped into crisis territory by the economic knock-on effects of the COVID-19 pandemic , it threatens to push the region further into China ’ s hands .
Even before the pandemic hit , many African countries had enormous debt burdens , which grew heavier this spring when the value of their currencies fell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the debt was denominated .
At the same time , the income necessary to make regular interest payments on the debt dried up .
Commodity-dependent African economies like Angola and Nigeria rely on oil ; demand had already been slumping since 2015 , and the sectors were hit again this year as global demand plummeted because of the COVID-driven economic downturn .
Those more service-oriented African countries not dependent on commodities fared no better , since tourism and foreign remittances cratered as well .
Facing an untenable situation , in March , Ethiopian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter with a plea for help .
He called for a two-year moratorium on debt repayments : from all creditors ( bilateral , multilateral , and private ) and for all African countries ( not just the poorest ) .
With the continent spending about 2 percent of its GDP just servicing its debt , he pointed out , there was little funding left to direct toward the pandemic response , for which he also requested an additional $ 150 billion in emergency financial assistance .
In the run-up to this spring ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ picked up by European and African leaders .
But the initiative that emerged from the G20—the Debt Service Suspension Initiative ( DSSI ) —covered only bilateral debt ( not all debt ) , only through the end of 2020 ( not for two years ) , and only for the poorest African economies ( not all of them ) .
A proposal to grant IMF Special Drawing Rights , which would have given the countries access to additional financing , also faltered .
The United States , it appears , had blocked such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( SDRs ) would have been available to all countries—benefiting friend and foe alike including China , Iran , and Russia .
SDRs would have been game changing .
Last employed in response to the 2009 global financial crisis ( and backed by the Obama administration at that time ) , they offered far more in terms of fiscal breathing space—in the form of an injection of liquidity—than the DSSI , which just put a temporary hold on debt repayments .
Despite hopes that the DSSI would be extended for longer , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another six months .
G20 members sympathetic to Africa ’ s plight argue that the short time horizon is an attempt to improve the measure before locking it in over a longer period .
Namely , they want to secure the full participation of China and private creditors who between them hold two-thirds of Africa ’ s debt .
Failing to secure their buy-in risks relief intended for the pandemic response going instead to service Africa ’ s debt to China and private creditors .
In some ways , those figures represent a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , private credit .
Justifiably viewed as a hard-won achievement , private investment has opened up another major source of development financing .
Yet private debt falls outside of the DSSI , and some African countries , including Kenya , feared that accepting the agreement would lead private creditors to downgrade their credit ratings .
They have therefore opted out of the DSSI .
In the long run , they hope , doing so will preserve their access to private capital .
But in the short term , it represents a difficult fiscal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is China to consider .
To the extent that it , like the private sector , isn ’ t playing along fully with the DSSI , China is left with influence to try to renegotiate the debt it holds on its own terms .
And the question is not whether Beijing will renegotiate if asked .
The question is what it will want in return .
Arguably , it views advancing its global footprint as more valuable than immediate debt repayment .
The West should sit up and pay attention to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but rather because the debt issue has exposed in dramatic fashion the degree to which it has failed to create alternatives to China ’ s model merging state power and the private sector .
This represents both a geopolitical loss and a real loss for Western business who might otherwise want to invest on the continent .
So what can be done ?
For now , efforts are underway to improve the DSSI to include the private sector and increase Chinese transparency and full participation .
Failing that , the Western powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DSSI assistance on recipient countries entering an IMF program , which would give the IMF a say into how countries manage their debt obligations .
But entering an IMF program would also imperil African countries ’ future access to private credit markets , so it would serve as a stick of last resort .
This situation highlights the role that the West needs to play in providing alternatives to Africa in financing and investment .
Debt relief now is firefighting .
Financing and private investment is a longer-term readjustment of the asymmetry with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stirrings in this direction .
Working with the EU and others , France has called for a heads-of-state meeting slated for May 2021 , with the aim of generating alternative financing and private investment mechanisms for Africa .
President Emmanuel Macron has pointed out that the OECD rules have made Europe unable to compete in Africa on a level playing field against those—China—that do not abide by it .
In the United States , meanwhile , a Biden administration offers the opportunity to revisit the key SDR issue .
Already supported by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could correct Trump ’ s SDR veto and unlock a major source of relief .

As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden starts to formulate his foreign policies, the list of regions and issues needing immediate attention is already long. But one that should stand out is Africa’s debt. Tipped into crisis territory by the economic knock-on effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, it threatens to push the region further into China’s hands.
As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden starts to formulate his foreign policies, the list of regions and issues needing immediate attention is already long. But one that should stand out is Africa’s debt. Tipped into crisis territory by the economic knock-on effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, it threatens to push the region further into China’s hands.
Even before the pandemic hit, many African countries had enormous debt burdens, which grew heavier this spring when the value of their currencies fell relative to the foreign currencies in which the debt was denominated. At the same time, the income necessary to make regular interest payments on the debt dried up. Commodity-dependent African economies like Angola and Nigeria rely on oil; demand had already been slumping since 2015, and the sectors were hit again this year as global demand plummeted because of the COVID-driven economic downturn. Those more service-oriented African countries not dependent on commodities fared no better, since tourism and foreign remittances cratered as well.
Facing an untenable situation, in March, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed wrote an open letter with a plea for help. He called for a two-year moratorium on debt repayments: from all creditors (bilateral, multilateral, and private) and for all African countries (not just the poorest). With the continent spending about 2 percent of its GDP just servicing its debt, he pointed out, there was little funding left to direct toward the pandemic response, for which he also requested an additional $150 billion in emergency financial assistance.
In the run-up to this spring’s G-20 meeting, his call was picked up by European and African leaders. But the initiative that emerged from the G20—the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI)—covered only bilateral debt (not all debt), only through the end of 2020 (not for two years), and only for the poorest African economies (not all of them). A proposal to grant IMF Special Drawing Rights, which would have given the countries access to additional financing, also faltered. The United States, it appears, had blocked such a measure since the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) would have been available to all countries—benefiting friend and foe alike including China, Iran, and Russia. SDRs would have been game changing. Last employed in response to the 2009 global financial crisis (and backed by the Obama administration at that time), they offered far more in terms of fiscal breathing space—in the form of an injection of liquidity—than the DSSI, which just put a temporary hold on debt repayments.
Despite hopes that the DSSI would be extended for longer, in October it was renewed again for only another six months. G20 members sympathetic to Africa’s plight argue that the short time horizon is an attempt to improve the measure before locking it in over a longer period. Namely, they want to secure the full participation of China and private creditors who between them hold two-thirds of Africa’s debt. Failing to secure their buy-in risks relief intended for the pandemic response going instead to service Africa’s debt to China and private creditors.
Historically, African debt was principally held in the West. But today, China is a major player. At $143 billion, it has 20 percent of all African debt on its books. The remainder is split between the major multilateral international financial institutions, like the IMF and World Bank (which together hold 35 percent), and the private sector (32 percent).
In some ways, those figures represent a success—especially the diversification into that third sector, private credit. Justifiably viewed as a hard-won achievement, private investment has opened up another major source of development financing. Yet private debt falls outside of the DSSI, and some African countries, including Kenya, feared that accepting the agreement would lead private creditors to downgrade their credit ratings. They have therefore opted out of the DSSI. In the long run, they hope, doing so will preserve their access to private capital. But in the short term, it represents a difficult fiscal choice.
And then, of course, there is China to consider. To the extent that it, like the private sector, isn’t playing along fully with the DSSI, China is left with influence to try to renegotiate the debt it holds on its own terms. And the question is not whether Beijing will renegotiate if asked. The question is what it will want in return. Arguably, it views advancing its global footprint as more valuable than immediate debt repayment.
The West should sit up and pay attention to this issue. Not out of charity, but rather because the debt issue has exposed in dramatic fashion the degree to which it has failed to create alternatives to China’s model merging state power and the private sector. This represents both a geopolitical loss and a real loss for Western business who might otherwise want to invest on the continent.
So what can be done? For now, efforts are underway to improve the DSSI to include the private sector and increase Chinese transparency and full participation. Failing that, the Western powers could up the ante: condition further DSSI assistance on recipient countries entering an IMF program, which would give the IMF a say into how countries manage their debt obligations. But entering an IMF program would also imperil African countries’ future access to private credit markets, so it would serve as a stick of last resort.
This situation highlights the role that the West needs to play in providing alternatives to Africa in financing and investment. Debt relief now is firefighting. Financing and private investment is a longer-term readjustment of the asymmetry with China. In Europe, there are stirrings in this direction. Working with the EU and others, France has called for a heads-of-state meeting slated for May 2021, with the aim of generating alternative financing and private investment mechanisms for Africa. President Emmanuel Macron has pointed out that the OECD rules have made Europe unable to compete in Africa on a level playing field against those—China—that do not abide by it.
In the United States, meanwhile, a Biden administration offers the opportunity to revisit the key SDR issue. Already supported by the overwhelming majority of U.S. allies, Biden could correct Trump’s SDR veto and unlock a major source of relief.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-12--‘Sex With Stalin’ Is Surprisingly Dull

‘Sex With Stalin’ Is Surprisingly Dull

Sex With Stalin , a newly released game by the independent Russian developer Georgiy Kukhtenkov , is incredibly boring .
That ’ s too bad , because traveling back in time to seduce Joseph Stalin is a truly depraved idea .
It promises subversive heterodoxy and cutting satire .
Even just taking him for a spin through rooms that are most remarkable for their leather accessories promised at least some sort of excitement .
But , though the game holds itself out as a transgressive thrill , what you get instead is a PowerPoint presentation inviting you to invest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ timeshare .
It didn ’ t have to be this way .
As the British satirist Armando Iannucci so ably demonstrated , Stalin remains a fertile subject for reflective , meaningful , absurdist comedy .
And Stalin has long been an object of romantic and carnal fascination .
The Soviet archives contain thousands of letters from women to the dictator describing their fantasies about him .
Now in the digital age , an edited picture of a young , hot Stalin routinely resurfaces for fresh rounds of reluctant fans to comment on how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be so evil .
The specific scenario of sexual adventure is itself a tantalizing contrast to Stalin ’ s repressive paranoia .
Where revolutionary Bolsheviks had decriminalized homosexuality , Stalin leveraged accusations of homosexuality against his political enemies .
Where they railed against the corpulent excess of the Romanovs , Stalin tolerated Lavrentiy Beria ’ s sadism .
In Stalin ’ s own life , the unexplained suicide of his second wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva was surrounded by political and sexual rumor .
Even intimate life couldn ’ t escape Stalinism .
Partners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be fodder for political persecutions and that their pillow talk might be overheard or revealed .
Even in post-Stalinist times , local political committees often intervened in matters of intimacy , divorce , and abuse .
Though Sex With Stalin acknowledges the terror Stalin sowed , there ’ s no import to the references .
They pass by as , literally , screen wipes to indicate the passage of time : “ XXXX repressions later… ” The game itself is set as a tableau with the player , as time-traveling interlocutor , deposited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joseph Stalin .
Interrupted from his paranoid scheming , Stalin pours forth with stilted rants , insults , and monologues , while the player can only occasionally select a dialogue option between long bouts of mechanically clicking “ next.
” It doesn ’ t much matter , though , because the selections are alternatively so abstract , opaque , or generic as to make it impossible to intuit the result .
Click long enough and the game will eventually spit the player into an animated ending scene , likely featuring some sadistically profane @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of it is erotic , however .
Sex With Stalin promises shock and subversion .
Instead , the player is simply a time-traveling weirdo , deposited on a chair before the great tyrant Stalin to endure stultifying lectures about athleticism , economics , libertines , management principles , and whatever else boiled forth from the froth of the creator ’ s brain before some bizarre scene finally plays across the screen .
These ending scenes are barely connected to the dialogue preceding them , each other , or any cognizable commentary concerning the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or in the future .
The only moment of genuine emotion is one in which Stalin takes your hand as you destroy the world together , suggesting an element of volition otherwise entirely lacking in the mechanical click-through gameplay .
Admittedly , it is all modeled in remarkable detail , and the option for pixelation of Stalin ’ s genitals is a welcome concession by the creator .
The voice acting is also convincingly Stalin-esque , in that the heavy Russian accent and gravelly brusqueness sound like what someone might imagine Stalin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The player can even click through five different camera angles while waiting for the often mystifying dialogue to advance .
There ’ s no point to any of it , though .
Sex With Stalin hints at something radical but instead delivers Stalin speaking earnest corporatese on the subject of five-year plans : “ In the process we compare our actual progress with the plan and assess any deviations .
This is called the control .
Once we have fixed the deviations in the best way we can , we go back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We implement management based on these principles.
” Dialogue such as this makes it almost a relief to “ circle back around ” to the toneless digital sadomasochism .
To be sure , this is what Stalin often actually sounded like—a mixture of American management theory and communist jargon .
But while some other games , like the grim border guard simulation Papers , Please , make a moral point out of the monotony of dictatorship , this is just plain dull .
The monologues are also invariably pablum .
One possible ending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tone and tenor as the breathless email chains about an arrogant atheist professor who was totally owned by the facts , logic , and faith of a true Christian student .
It ’ s almost immediately clear that Stalin in the context of the game is at most an aesthetic .
His inclusion amounts to little else than a shock jock ’ s attempt at virality .
Rather than a conversation with the dictator—or seduction , as advertised—the game itself is a tedious exercise in thumbing through the creator ’ s personal journals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but even the grotesque ending scenes end up banal .
Yes , ok.
There ’ s Hitler and Stalin having sex .
Moscow ’ s remaining Communists were offended , but it ’ s not clear that anyone else should care .
The game is so edgy it lacks any point .
The problem may be that it appears to be the product of some inscrutable layering of weebdom ( a condition characterized by unhealthy obsession with Japanese culture ) , ironic radicalism for clout , and message board nihilism .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected to try to figure it out .
Presented differently , the graphic sexual masochism of the ending scenes could stand as a powerful reflection of the state Stalin built .
Deeply personal emotion excised as mechanical , impersonal cruelties .
Some scenes bring to mind the Kremlin caricatures that circulated during the relative calm before the Great Purge in 1937 .
One , dating from 1930 , depicted Nikolai Pavlovich Bryukhanov suspended from the ceiling by his testicles—a reference to his political difficulties as the people ’ s commissar for finance during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan .
Stalin weighed in with an apparently tongue-in-cheek note directing that Bryukhanov should “ hang … by his balls for all of his sins present and future .
If his balls hold , consider him acquitted by the tribunal .
If not , drown him in the river.
” Eight years later , Bryukhanov was executed during the Great Purge .
Could Sex With Stalin have convincingly addressed itself to the real cruelty of those histories ?
Ultimately , the game seems to be a product for the terminally irony-poisoned .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creator ’ s own description , but not a particularly enchanting one at that .
The player has no role to play , by the creator ’ s own intent .
It prompts no reflection and delivers no payoffs .
If you absolutely must see Joseph Stalin bench-pressing naked in all the gory detail that entails , spare yourself the trouble of playing the game and just look the scene up on YouTube .

Sex With Stalin, a newly released game by the independent Russian developer Georgiy Kukhtenkov, is incredibly boring. That’s too bad, because traveling back in time to seduce Joseph Stalin is a truly depraved idea. It promises subversive heterodoxy and cutting satire. Even just taking him for a spin through rooms that are most remarkable for their leather accessories promised at least some sort of excitement. But, though the game holds itself out as a transgressive thrill, what you get instead is a PowerPoint presentation inviting you to invest in the game creator’s incoherent ideological timeshare.
Sex With Stalin, a newly released game by the independent Russian developer Georgiy Kukhtenkov, is incredibly boring. That’s too bad, because traveling back in time to seduce Joseph Stalin is a truly depraved idea. It promises subversive heterodoxy and cutting satire. Even just taking him for a spin through rooms that are most remarkable for their leather accessories promised at least some sort of excitement. But, though the game holds itself out as a transgressive thrill, what you get instead is a PowerPoint presentation inviting you to invest in the game creator’s incoherent ideological timeshare.
It didn’t have to be this way. As the British satirist Armando Iannucci so ably demonstrated, Stalin remains a fertile subject for reflective, meaningful, absurdist comedy. And Stalin has long been an object of romantic and carnal fascination. The Soviet archives contain thousands of letters from women to the dictator describing their fantasies about him. Now in the digital age, an edited picture of a young, hot Stalin routinely resurfaces for fresh rounds of reluctant fans to comment on how incongruous it is that someone so hot could be so evil.
The specific scenario of sexual adventure is itself a tantalizing contrast to Stalin’s repressive paranoia. Where revolutionary Bolsheviks had decriminalized homosexuality, Stalin leveraged accusations of homosexuality against his political enemies. Where they railed against the corpulent excess of the Romanovs, Stalin tolerated Lavrentiy Beria’s sadism. In Stalin’s own life, the unexplained suicide of his second wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva was surrounded by political and sexual rumor.
Even intimate life couldn’t escape Stalinism. Partners lived in fear that their relationships might be fodder for political persecutions and that their pillow talk might be overheard or revealed. Even in post-Stalinist times, local political committees often intervened in matters of intimacy, divorce, and abuse. Though Sex With Stalin acknowledges the terror Stalin sowed, there’s no import to the references. They pass by as, literally, screen wipes to indicate the passage of time: “XXXX repressions later…”
The game itself is set as a tableau with the player, as time-traveling interlocutor, deposited across a desk from the tyrant, Joseph Stalin. Interrupted from his paranoid scheming, Stalin pours forth with stilted rants, insults, and monologues, while the player can only occasionally select a dialogue option between long bouts of mechanically clicking “next.”
It doesn’t much matter, though, because the selections are alternatively so abstract, opaque, or generic as to make it impossible to intuit the result. Click long enough and the game will eventually spit the player into an animated ending scene, likely featuring some sadistically profane sexual act.
Not a single moment of it is erotic, however. Sex With Stalin promises shock and subversion. Instead, the player is simply a time-traveling weirdo, deposited on a chair before the great tyrant Stalin to endure stultifying lectures about athleticism, economics, libertines, management principles, and whatever else boiled forth from the froth of the creator’s brain before some bizarre scene finally plays across the screen.
These ending scenes are barely connected to the dialogue preceding them, each other, or any cognizable commentary concerning the state of the world then, now, or in the future. The only moment of genuine emotion is one in which Stalin takes your hand as you destroy the world together, suggesting an element of volition otherwise entirely lacking in the mechanical click-through gameplay.
Admittedly, it is all modeled in remarkable detail, and the option for pixelation of Stalin’s genitals is a welcome concession by the creator. The voice acting is also convincingly Stalin-esque, in that the heavy Russian accent and gravelly brusqueness sound like what someone might imagine Stalin sounded like—his actually flexible Georgian accent aside. The player can even click through five different camera angles while waiting for the often mystifying dialogue to advance.
There’s no point to any of it, though. Sex With Stalin hints at something radical but instead delivers Stalin speaking earnest corporatese on the subject of five-year plans:
“In the process we compare our actual progress with the plan and assess any deviations. This is called the control. Once we have fixed the deviations in the best way we can, we go back to implementing the list of goals. We implement management based on these principles.”
Dialogue such as this makes it almost a relief to “circle back around” to the toneless digital sadomasochism. To be sure, this is what Stalin often actually sounded like—a mixture of American management theory and communist jargon. But while some other games, like the grim border guard simulation Papers, Please, make a moral point out of the monotony of dictatorship, this is just plain dull.
The monologues are also invariably pablum. One possible ending features an eye-rolling parable of the same tone and tenor as the breathless email chains about an arrogant atheist professor who was totally owned by the facts, logic, and faith of a true Christian student. It’s almost immediately clear that Stalin in the context of the game is at most an aesthetic. His inclusion amounts to little else than a shock jock’s attempt at virality. Rather than a conversation with the dictator—or seduction, as advertised—the game itself is a tedious exercise in thumbing through the creator’s personal journals.
Perhaps something was lost in translation, but even the grotesque ending scenes end up banal. Yes, ok. There’s Hitler and Stalin having sex. Moscow’s remaining Communists were offended, but it’s not clear that anyone else should care. The game is so edgy it lacks any point. The problem may be that it appears to be the product of some inscrutable layering of weebdom (a condition characterized by unhealthy obsession with Japanese culture), ironic radicalism for clout, and message board nihilism. The rest of us shan’t be expected to try to figure it out.
Presented differently, the graphic sexual masochism of the ending scenes could stand as a powerful reflection of the state Stalin built. Deeply personal emotion excised as mechanical, impersonal cruelties. Some scenes bring to mind the Kremlin caricatures that circulated during the relative calm before the Great Purge in 1937. One, dating from 1930, depicted Nikolai Pavlovich Bryukhanov suspended from the ceiling by his testicles—a reference to his political difficulties as the people’s commissar for finance during the Soviet Union’s first five-year plan.
Stalin weighed in with an apparently tongue-in-cheek note directing that Bryukhanov should “hang … by his balls for all of his sins present and future. If his balls hold, consider him acquitted by the tribunal. If not, drown him in the river.” Eight years later, Bryukhanov was executed during the Great Purge. Could Sex With Stalin have convincingly addressed itself to the real cruelty of those histories?
Ultimately, the game seems to be a product for the terminally irony-poisoned. It’s pure fantasy, by the creator’s own description, but not a particularly enchanting one at that. The player has no role to play, by the creator’s own intent. It prompts no reflection and delivers no payoffs. If you absolutely must see Joseph Stalin bench-pressing naked in all the gory detail that entails, spare yourself the trouble of playing the game and just look the scene up on YouTube.