foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Authoritarians Are Exploiting the Coronavirus. Democracies Must Not Follow Suit.

Authoritarians Are Exploiting the Coronavirus .
Democracies Must Not Follow Suit .
The world is facing an unprecedented and dangerous crisis , and the coronavirus pandemic shows no signs of abating .
The seemingly endless cascade of dire headlines has overwhelmed citizens globally , triggering inherent survival mechanisms and leading people to focus on the health and safety of those closest to us .
Into the void created by this uncertainty—in which fear has often trumped reason—stride the world ’ s authoritarian leaders .
Despotic officials on both ends of the political spectrum have grown stronger since the outbreak of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population clamors for quick , decisive leadership .
It is thus unsurprising that over the past several weeks the world has witnessed an unmistakable authoritarian surge , in which leaders around the globe have manipulated the coronavirus threat to consolidate their own political power and to run roughshod over democracy and human rights .
And despite the growing evidence that democracies—and in turn , democratic leaders—respond better to public health crises , there is a growing tolerance and troubling acceptance of anti-democratic responses.Despotic officials on both ends of the political spectrum have grown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Perhaps the most illustrative example to date is Hungary , where the country suddenly transformed an already struggling democracy into a full-blown dictatorship .
Despite courageous protests from local human rights groups , the country ’ s parliament voted to give Prime Minister Viktor Orban the power to rule by decree for as long as the crisis lasts .
With both parliament and popular elections now effectively suspended , Orban faces few , if any , checks on his already outsized authority .
Orban himself , of course , claims that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coronavirus , but they go well beyond the successful measures already enacted in neighboring European countries .
This latest , truly global assault on liberal democracy is especially dire because the avenues for organization , protest , and civic resistance—all key tactics in the activist ’ s toolkit—have already been curtailed ( and in some cases criminalized ) by the lockdown and quarantine measures .
Acts of civil disobedience in particular are now banned , replaced by a muzzled press and strictly imposed curfews .
Making matters worse , established Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up for beleaguered citizens living under repressive rule—have done little to object because they , too , are undertaking similar actions to deal with the coronavirus at home .
To be sure , civil liberties around the world have already been severely weakened by sustained attacks over the past few years , but the pandemic provides ample opportunity to accelerate an evident trend toward authoritarianism .
First are the emboldened dictators , those leaders who were already leading characteristically authoritarian regimes but who are now free to further advance their anti-democratic machinations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of authoritarian consolidation are underway in Russia and Rwanda .
Russian President Vladimir Putin is seizing the opportunity to expand the Kremlin ’ s already formidable apparatus of state repression in the form of thousands of facial recognition cameras that will enable the police to identify and target people participating in street demonstrations long after the coronavirus inevitably recedes .
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has carefully guided the country into a one-party dictatorship since taking power in 2000 and is now deploying security forces and soldiers across the country to enforce Africa ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to credible reports , several citizens have been shot dead for allegedly breaking curfew .
Instances like these are depressingly common in a country where brave activists , journalists , and opposition leaders have been routinely killed with impunity—apparently by Kagame ’ s own security forces .
The second major category are the opportunistic autocrats , those oppressors who had already moved toward authoritarianism but were facing mounting domestic opposition and have since used the pandemic to violently stifle their activities .
Uganda is a glaring example .
President Yoweri Museveni—who has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six successive U.S. presidential administrations—moved to ban opposition rallies well before the country had confirmed a single case of coronavirus.The pandemic provides ample opportunity to accelerate an evident trend toward authoritarianism .
Museveni is concerned about the growing support for opposition candidates such as the popular musician-turned-lawmaker Bobi Wine of the People Power movement , who has spearheaded his own pandemic response by educating Ugandans on how to combat the virus through popular music .
A prominent People Power colleague , Member of Parliament Francis Zaake—already a frequent target of the Museveni regime—was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , after being charged with attempted murder for ostensibly ignoring social distancing guidelines while handing out food to his constituents .
Those close to Museveni are also sending out feelers to test whether they can postpone elections scheduled for next year .
Meanwhile , Guinea ’ s burgeoning strongman , President Alpha Condé , plowed forward with a highly controversial referendum and local elections on March 22 , the results of which will allow him to further extend his 10-year rule , which has turned increasingly violent .
Voter turnout was understandably low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already volatile environment .
Nationwide opposition to Condé ’ s plans was repressed with excessive force , with dozens of Guineans losing their lives on the streets , including on the day of the referendum itself .
Beyond the clear public health risks involved , election conditions were inauspicious , as election observers refused to participate or otherwise lend their stamp of legitimacy .
Finally , there is a third category : the clueless authoritarians who appear to have little understanding of the inherent threats to public health that the coronavirus poses , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and global health writ large .
In Turkmenistan , for example , the country ’ s notoriously bizarre dictator , President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov , has reportedly told government officials not to even utter the word “ coronavirus , ” most likely because he wanted to reduce as much as possible any public hysteria in order to appear strong and in control of the situation ; he is even said to have offered local remedies to battle the virus from a book he supposedly wrote on medicinal plants .
This blanket denial of information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk , and reinforces Berdimuhamedov ’ s authoritarian rule in a country that has ranked at the bottom of every conceivable human rights and democracy index over the past decade .
Similarly , in repressive Madagascar , that country ’ s president last week launched a new herbal remedy that he claims can both prevent and cure the coronavirus—this , in a country that has a mere six ventilators for its estimated 27 million people .
And in Tanzania , President John Magufuli has refused to close crowded places of worship in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s where there is true healing .
Corona is the devil and it can not survive in the body of Jesus.
” Previously , the government had come under fire from the World Health Organization for mishandling and underreporting suspected Ebola cases .
Likewise , in Burundi , the country ’ s ruling party has cited “ God ’ s protection ” for its low number of reported cases , and plans remain in place for a presidential election next month .
Bars and restaurants in the country continue to bustle , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s soccer leagues remain in operation .
As these despots continue to extend their control , others will no doubt be encouraged to follow their lead , which not only marginalizes the few genuinely liberal democracies in the world but also further emboldens authoritarian powers such as China and Russia .
Even if they did , many of these governments would struggle to find the moral high ground , having imposed their own highly restrictive lockdowns and , in the case of the United Kingdom , postponed local elections until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of a fast-moving crisis—because it is the most effective form of government for dealing with pandemics .
A growing body of research shows that democratic practices , on the whole , benefit public health in the long term .
Governments that have traditionally stepped up—albeit inconsistently—to defend democracy worldwide are unable or unwilling to do so today .
Put simply , identifying and responding to public health concerns effectively requires the free flow of information , public accountability , and open dialogue between citizens and their elected leaders , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these important relationships and processes are strained at best , or altogether absent , in nondemocratic countries means that these countries are much less likely to respond in a timely and effective manner , costing lives and causing untold suffering in the process .
And notwithstanding the rightful criticisms of the slipshod responses by the United Kingdom and United States in particular , the available data has long suggested that democratic governments are best positioned to manage and mitigate emerging crises .
That ’ s because of the foundational qualities that their nondemocratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , their need to respond to public opinion to win elections , and their greater transparency .
It is indeed little wonder that the leaders receiving the highest grades for their coronavirus responses in New Zealand , Iceland , and Norway represent three of the top-performing democracies in the world according to the Economist Intelligence Unit .
( Perhaps uncoincidentally , all of these leaders also happen to be women . )
Indeed , it was sharp public criticism and a dogged press that forced the U.K. government to alter its initial laissez-faire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nature , the same can not be true in authoritarian states , where dissent and criticism are criminalized and the government ’ s strategy—regardless of how ineffective it may be—is allowed to go unchallenged .
The occasional anti-democratic regime may achieve laudable results , but many more underperform badly , costing innumerable lives in the process , because there are no mechanisms to self-correct when things inevitably go awry .
The prevailing assumption that there is a tension between liberal democratic values and effective , strong responses to national crises—whether public health-related or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an enduring myth that has no basis in reality .
The assumption that there is a tension between liberal democratic values and strong , effective responses to public health crises is profoundly dangerous .
It is only in democracies that the public can ensure that their leaders ultimately do the right thing and design policy solutions that best manage and mitigate crises for the benefit of their own populations and the world .
COVID-19 , like all infectious diseases , does not respect national boundaries , and mistakes in one country can and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no easy task , especially in today ’ s panicked world .
But democratic leaders around the globe need to find solutions to the pandemic that respect and maintain their commitment to protecting civil liberties and political rights .
In so doing , they must resist the temptation to adopt more authoritarian measures at home and push back , forcefully , against the building repressive winds abroad .
Democrats today can successfully fight the pandemic head-on while also protecting basic human rights—these tasks are not mutually exclusive , as the world ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Indeed , they are complementary and mutually reinforcing , and the long-term health of the world ’ s inhabitants depends on it .

The world is facing an unprecedented and dangerous crisis, and the coronavirus pandemic shows no signs of abating. The seemingly endless cascade of dire headlines has overwhelmed citizens globally, triggering inherent survival mechanisms and leading people to focus on the health and safety of those closest to us. Into the void created by this uncertainty—in which fear has often trumped reason—stride the world’s authoritarian leaders.
The world is facing an unprecedented and dangerous crisis, and the coronavirus pandemic shows no signs of abating. The seemingly endless cascade of dire headlines has overwhelmed citizens globally, triggering inherent survival mechanisms and leading people to focus on the health and safety of those closest to us. Into the void created by this uncertainty—in which fear has often trumped reason—stride the world’s authoritarian leaders.
Despotic officials on both ends of the political spectrum have grown stronger since the outbreak of the pandemic as the world’s population clamors for quick, decisive leadership. It is thus unsurprising that over the past several weeks the world has witnessed an unmistakable authoritarian surge, in which leaders around the globe have manipulated the coronavirus threat to consolidate their own political power and to run roughshod over democracy and human rights. And despite the growing evidence that democracies—and in turn, democratic leaders—respond better to public health crises, there is a growing tolerance and troubling acceptance of anti-democratic responses.
Perhaps the most illustrative example to date is Hungary, where the country suddenly transformed an already struggling democracy into a full-blown dictatorship. Despite courageous protests from local human rights groups, the country’s parliament voted to give Prime Minister Viktor Orban the power to rule by decree for as long as the crisis lasts. With both parliament and popular elections now effectively suspended, Orban faces few, if any, checks on his already outsized authority. Orban himself, of course, claims that the changes were necessary to limit the spread of the coronavirus, but they go well beyond the successful measures already enacted in neighboring European countries.
Despotic officials on both ends of the political spectrum have grown stronger since the outbreak of the pandemic.
This latest, truly global assault on liberal democracy is especially dire because the avenues for organization, protest, and civic resistance—all key tactics in the activist’s toolkit—have already been curtailed (and in some cases criminalized) by the lockdown and quarantine measures.
Acts of civil disobedience in particular are now banned, replaced by a muzzled press and strictly imposed curfews. Making matters worse, established Western democracies—those that have inconsistently but importantly stood up for beleaguered citizens living under repressive rule—have done little to object because they, too, are undertaking similar actions to deal with the coronavirus at home.
To be sure, civil liberties around the world have already been severely weakened by sustained attacks over the past few years, but the pandemic provides ample opportunity to accelerate an evident trend toward authoritarianism.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
To date, attempts to manipulate the coronavirus threat for authoritarian ends have fallen into three broad categories.
First are the emboldened dictators, those leaders who were already leading characteristically authoritarian regimes but who are now free to further advance their anti-democratic machinations. In addition to Hungary, similar processes of authoritarian consolidation are underway in Russia and Rwanda. Russian President Vladimir Putin is seizing the opportunity to expand the Kremlin’s already formidable apparatus of state repression in the form of thousands of facial recognition cameras that will enable the police to identify and target people participating in street demonstrations long after the coronavirus inevitably recedes.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has carefully guided the country into a one-party dictatorship since taking power in 2000 and is now deploying security forces and soldiers across the country to enforce Africa’s first nationwide lockdown. Already, according to credible reports, several citizens have been shot dead for allegedly breaking curfew. Instances like these are depressingly common in a country where brave activists, journalists, and opposition leaders have been routinely killed with impunity—apparently by Kagame’s own security forces.
The second major category are the opportunistic autocrats, those oppressors who had already moved toward authoritarianism but were facing mounting domestic opposition and have since used the pandemic to violently stifle their activities. Uganda is a glaring example. President Yoweri Museveni—who has been in power over the course of six successive U.S. presidential administrations—moved to ban opposition rallies well before the country had confirmed a single case of coronavirus.The pandemic provides ample opportunity to accelerate an evident trend toward authoritarianism.
Museveni is concerned about the growing support for opposition candidates such as the popular musician-turned-lawmaker Bobi Wine of the People Power movement, who has spearheaded his own pandemic response by educating Ugandans on how to combat the virus through popular music. A prominent People Power colleague, Member of Parliament Francis Zaake—already a frequent target of the Museveni regime—was arrested again last week and reportedly tortured, after being charged with attempted murder for ostensibly ignoring social distancing guidelines while handing out food to his constituents. Those close to Museveni are also sending out feelers to test whether they can postpone elections scheduled for next year.
Meanwhile, Guinea’s burgeoning strongman, President Alpha Condé, plowed forward with a highly controversial referendum and local elections on March 22, the results of which will allow him to further extend his 10-year rule, which has turned increasingly violent. Voter turnout was understandably low, and an internet shutdown compounded an already volatile environment. Nationwide opposition to Condé’s plans was repressed with excessive force, with dozens of Guineans losing their lives on the streets, including on the day of the referendum itself. Beyond the clear public health risks involved, election conditions were inauspicious, as election observers refused to participate or otherwise lend their stamp of legitimacy.
Finally, there is a third category: the clueless authoritarians who appear to have little understanding of the inherent threats to public health that the coronavirus poses, with likely disastrous consequences for their populations and global health writ large.
In Turkmenistan, for example, the country’s notoriously bizarre dictator, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, has reportedly told government officials not to even utter the word “coronavirus,” most likely because he wanted to reduce as much as possible any public hysteria in order to appear strong and in control of the situation; he is even said to have offered local remedies to battle the virus from a book he supposedly wrote on medicinal plants.
This blanket denial of information endangers citizens, including those most at risk, and reinforces Berdimuhamedov’s authoritarian rule in a country that has ranked at the bottom of every conceivable human rights and democracy index over the past decade. Similarly, in repressive Madagascar, that country’s president last week launched a new herbal remedy that he claims can both prevent and cure the coronavirus—this, in a country that has a mere six ventilators for its estimated 27 million people.
And in Tanzania, President John Magufuli has refused to close crowded places of worship in the country, saying: “That’s where there is true healing. Corona is the devil and it cannot survive in the body of Jesus.” Previously, the government had come under fire from the World Health Organization for mishandling and underreporting suspected Ebola cases. Likewise, in Burundi, the country’s ruling party has cited “God’s protection” for its low number of reported cases, and plans remain in place for a presidential election next month. Bars and restaurants in the country continue to bustle, as do its churches and mosques. Even the country’s soccer leagues remain in operation.
As these despots continue to extend their control, others will no doubt be encouraged to follow their lead, which not only marginalizes the few genuinely liberal democracies in the world but also further emboldens authoritarian powers such as China and Russia.
Governments that have traditionally stepped up—albeit inconsistently—to defend democracy worldwide are unable or unwilling to do so today. Western leaders currently seem to lack the bandwidth to engage in complex foreign-policy issues, and they also risk being punished by their electorates if they are not seen to be concentrating their efforts on the crisis at home.
Even if they did, many of these governments would struggle to find the moral high ground, having imposed their own highly restrictive lockdowns and, in the case of the United Kingdom, postponed local elections until 2021.
But democracy still matters—even in the face of a fast-moving crisis—because it is the most effective form of government for dealing with pandemics. A growing body of research shows that democratic practices, on the whole, benefit public health in the long term.
Governments that have traditionally stepped up—albeit inconsistently—to defend democracy worldwide are unable or unwilling to do so today.
Put simply, identifying and responding to public health concerns effectively requires the free flow of information, public accountability, and open dialogue between citizens and their elected leaders, as well as cooperation among global counterparts. That these important relationships and processes are strained at best, or altogether absent, in nondemocratic countries means that these countries are much less likely to respond in a timely and effective manner, costing lives and causing untold suffering in the process.
And notwithstanding the rightful criticisms of the slipshod responses by the United Kingdom and United States in particular, the available data has long suggested that democratic governments are best positioned to manage and mitigate emerging crises. That’s because of the foundational qualities that their nondemocratic counterparts lack—namely their free and robust press, their need to respond to public opinion to win elections, and their greater transparency.
It is indeed little wonder that the leaders receiving the highest grades for their coronavirus responses in New Zealand, Iceland, and Norway represent three of the top-performing democracies in the world according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. (Perhaps uncoincidentally, all of these leaders also happen to be women.)
Indeed, it was sharp public criticism and a dogged press that forced the U.K. government to alter its initial laissez-faire coronavirus response strategy. By their very nature, the same cannot be true in authoritarian states, where dissent and criticism are criminalized and the government’s strategy—regardless of how ineffective it may be—is allowed to go unchallenged. The occasional anti-democratic regime may achieve laudable results, but many more underperform badly, costing innumerable lives in the process, because there are no mechanisms to self-correct when things inevitably go awry.
The prevailing assumption that there is a tension between liberal democratic values and effective, strong responses to national crises—whether public health-related or otherwise—is profoundly dangerous, and it is an enduring myth that has no basis in reality.
The assumption that there is a tension between liberal democratic values and strong, effective responses to public health crises is profoundly dangerous.
It is only in democracies that the public can ensure that their leaders ultimately do the right thing and design policy solutions that best manage and mitigate crises for the benefit of their own populations and the world. COVID-19, like all infectious diseases, does not respect national boundaries, and mistakes in one country can and will inevitably affect others.
Resisting authoritarianism is no easy task, especially in today’s panicked world. But democratic leaders around the globe need to find solutions to the pandemic that respect and maintain their commitment to protecting civil liberties and political rights. In so doing, they must resist the temptation to adopt more authoritarian measures at home and push back, forcefully, against the building repressive winds abroad.
Democrats today can successfully fight the pandemic head-on while also protecting basic human rights—these tasks are not mutually exclusive, as the world’s authoritarians would like people to believe. Indeed, they are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and the long-term health of the world’s inhabitants depends on it.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--For Venezuelans, State-Enforced Self-Isolation Is Nothing New

For Venezuelans , State-Enforced Self-Isolation Is Nothing New If one were to ask people around the world today , “ Would you be willing to follow strict social distancing guidelines for a year if we were not living through a pandemic ?
” the obvious answer would be no .
All across the world , life as we know it has become paralyzed to save the lives of millions .
Venezuela is no exception , but it has been experiencing this situation for years now .
In Venezuela ’ s case , however , the cause is not a pathogen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of President Nicolás Maduro has progressively subjected Venezuela to increasingly irrational and undemocratic governance , forcing its citizens into an extreme form of social distancing in their livelihoods by denying them the rights to assembly and protest , and depriving them of access to education , travel , and the trade networks that people in other nations often take for granted .
By forcibly isolating Venezuelans , Maduro ’ s policies—which have led to a collapsed economy and a depleted health care system—are designed to suppress Venezuelans ’ freedoms in order to allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This has led to a mass emigration of approximately 17 percent of the country ’ s population .
At least 5 million people have left the country—an exodus second in scope only to the Syrian refugee crisis .
It is estimated that around 1 million children have been left behind , separating families across continents .
In 2014 , citizens took to the streets to protest a tragedy in the making .
Many Venezuelans were arrested for political reasons , including Leopoldo López , the leader of my party , Voluntad Popular .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as him , which forced me to go underground for 108 days and then into exile , keeping me apart from my family , my party , and my people .
The leadership of our party was persecuted .
Some were imprisoned , others exiled , forced into hiding , or driven to seek asylum in foreign embassies .
We have had to reinvent ourselves over the past six years .
Our meetings , even with local leaders , are now virtual .
This experience has also become the new normal for other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to an assembly report , more than 30 deputies have been exiled and five are currently in detention .
The regime ’ s persecution has not limited itself to the opposition leadership but has also spread across the entire society .
Journalists , judges , students , and even front-line responders have been persecuted for merely expressing their rightful opinion .
In fact , in Venezuela there are currently more than 30 political prisoners who are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment and prohibited from seeing the sun or speaking with their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been forced to work remotely for years .
Indeed , political actors in our movement have had to come together to lead a fight without looking each other in the eyes .
In a country with the worst Internet connections in the region and where severe power outages are commonplace , we ’ re able to communicate intermittently only through Zoom , Skype , and other online tools for group communications .
We have had to make complex decisions virtually , including the decision to swear in Juan Guaidó as interim president of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Venezuelans by an undemocratic regime has also produced visible effects in the economic sphere .
Policies including illegal expropriations that violate private property laws have paralyzed the economy .
Oil production plummeted from 3.2 million barrels per day in 2008 to less than 700 million per day in 2020 .
Shortages of goods and services are increasing .
Between 2013 and 2019 , Venezuela ’ s gross domestic product fell by half—a reduction worse than those suffered by the United States and Spain during the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at home has been the only available option for a while , given the shortage of jobs in the country .
Private companies have almost disappeared .
This level of economic destruction has thus far remained unseen in the countries currently affected by the coronavirus pandemic .
Venezuela ’ s isolation and economic collapse has also manifested itself in the education system .
At the beginning of the 2019-2020 school year , the dropout rate was 87 percent .
Parents do not send their children to school because they can not feed them—many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have closed down .
The crisis has resulted in a massive exodus of teachers .
One teacher reported having survived on water and sugar for two days before collapsing .
The country has been held incommunicado .
The airline sector in Venezuela contracted by 75 percent from 2013 to 2019 , further isolating Venezuelans from the world .
Domestically , despite having the world ’ s largest proven oil reserves , Maduro ’ s government has almost completely shut down all of the existing refineries in Venezuela .
Nevertheless , the regime continues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The country ’ s health system was rapidly deteriorating , even before the pandemic .
And Venezuela has the highest homicide rate on the continent , with 60 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants .
In our country , fear establishes a permanent curfew .
In short , isolation in Venezuela has only increased during this pandemic .
We currently face two plagues : the Maduro dictatorship and the coronavirus .
Both must be fought urgently and simultaneously .
Overcoming them will only be possible with robust international financial cooperation and assistance , and this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ establishes a national emergency government that implements a plan that leads to a credible and verifiable democratic transition .
The international community must reaffirm its commitment to support Venezuela ’ s people in this fight to end the devastating and undemocratic isolation that has led to poverty and tragedy .
In Venezuela , normalcy will not return when the pandemic is contained ; it will only come with freedom .

If one were to ask people around the world today, “Would you be willing to follow strict social distancing guidelines for a year if we were not living through a pandemic?” the obvious answer would be no.
If one were to ask people around the world today, “Would you be willing to follow strict social distancing guidelines for a year if we were not living through a pandemic?” the obvious answer would be no.
All across the world, life as we know it has become paralyzed to save the lives of millions. Venezuela is no exception, but it has been experiencing this situation for years now. In Venezuela’s case, however, the cause is not a pathogen, but a dictator.
The regime of President Nicolás Maduro has progressively subjected Venezuela to increasingly irrational and undemocratic governance, forcing its citizens into an extreme form of social distancing in their livelihoods by denying them the rights to assembly and protest, and depriving them of access to education, travel, and the trade networks that people in other nations often take for granted.
By forcibly isolating Venezuelans, Maduro’s policies—which have led to a collapsed economy and a depleted health care system—are designed to suppress Venezuelans’ freedoms in order to allow his regime to hold onto power. This has led to a mass emigration of approximately 17 percent of the country’s population. At least 5 million people have left the country—an exodus second in scope only to the Syrian refugee crisis. It is estimated that around 1 million children have been left behind, separating families across continents.
The regime of President Nicolás Maduro has progressively subjected Venezuela to increasingly irrational and undemocratic governance, forcing its citizens into an extreme form of social distancing.
In 2014, citizens took to the streets to protest a tragedy in the making. Many Venezuelans were arrested for political reasons, including Leopoldo López, the leader of my party, Voluntad Popular. I was charged in the same case as him, which forced me to go underground for 108 days and then into exile, keeping me apart from my family, my party, and my people.
The leadership of our party was persecuted. Some were imprisoned, others exiled, forced into hiding, or driven to seek asylum in foreign embassies. We have had to reinvent ourselves over the past six years. Our meetings, even with local leaders, are now virtual. This experience has also become the new normal for other political parties and the National Assembly; according to an assembly report, more than 30 deputies have been exiled and five are currently in detention.
The regime’s persecution has not limited itself to the opposition leadership but has also spread across the entire society. Journalists, judges, students, and even front-line responders have been persecuted for merely expressing their rightful opinion. In fact, in Venezuela there are currently more than 300 political prisoners who are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment and prohibited from seeing the sun or speaking with their families.
Read More Venezuela_support_4_0205 Venezuela_support_4_0205 Maduro vs. Guaidó: A Global Scorecard Support is waning for the Venezuelan president, but he still has Russia and China on his side. Infographic | Amy Mackinnon Relatives of patients in Venezuela Relatives of patients in Venezuela Venezuela’s Health Care Crisis Now Poses a Global Threat The collapsing medical system can’t handle a coronavirus outbreak on its own. It’s time for the international community to step in. Argument | Kathleen Page, Tamara Taraciuk Broner Venezuelans line up to cross into Cúcuta, Colombia, on June 8. Venezuelans line up to cross into Cúcuta, Colombia, on June 8. Don’t Let Venezuela’s Crisis Take Down Colombia Too Washington should do more to address the worsening humanitarian situation in the region. Shadow Government | Vali Nasr
My colleagues and I have been forced to work remotely for years. Indeed, political actors in our movement have had to come together to lead a fight without looking each other in the eyes. In a country with the worst Internet connections in the region and where severe power outages are commonplace, we’re able to communicate intermittently only through Zoom, Skype, and other online tools for group communications. We have had to make complex decisions virtually, including the decision to swear in Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela in 2019.
The forcible isolation of Venezuelans by an undemocratic regime has also produced visible effects in the economic sphere. Policies including illegal expropriations that violate private property laws have paralyzed the economy. Oil production plummeted from 3.2 million barrels per day in 2008 to less than 700,000 per day in 2020. Shortages of goods and services are increasing. Between 2013 and 2019, Venezuela’s gross domestic product fell by half—a reduction worse than those suffered by the United States and Spain during the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil War, respectively.
My colleagues and I have been forced to work remotely for years. Indeed, political actors in our movement have had to come together to lead a fight without looking each other in the eyes.
For many, staying at home has been the only available option for a while, given the shortage of jobs in the country. Private companies have almost disappeared. This level of economic destruction has thus far remained unseen in the countries currently affected by the coronavirus pandemic.
Venezuela’s isolation and economic collapse has also manifested itself in the education system. At the beginning of the 2019-2020 school year, the dropout rate was 87 percent. Parents do not send their children to school because they cannot feed them—many frequently faint in class—or because the schools have closed down. The crisis has resulted in a massive exodus of teachers. One teacher reported having survived on water and sugar for two days before collapsing.
The country has been held incommunicado. The airline sector in Venezuela contracted by 75 percent from 2013 to 2019, further isolating Venezuelans from the world. Domestically, despite having the world’s largest proven oil reserves, Maduro’s government has almost completely shut down all of the existing refineries in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the regime continues to send subsidized oil to Cuba.
The country’s health system was rapidly deteriorating, even before the pandemic. And Venezuela has the highest homicide rate on the continent, with 60 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In our country, fear establishes a permanent curfew.
In short, isolation in Venezuela has only increased during this pandemic. We currently face two plagues: the Maduro dictatorship and the coronavirus. Both must be fought urgently and simultaneously. Overcoming them will only be possible with robust international financial cooperation and assistance, and this will only be feasible if the country establishes a national emergency government that implements a plan that leads to a credible and verifiable democratic transition.
The international community must reaffirm its commitment to support Venezuela’s people in this fight to end the devastating and undemocratic isolation that has led to poverty and tragedy.
In Venezuela, normalcy will not return when the pandemic is contained; it will only come with freedom.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--India Cracks Down on Chinese Investment as Mood Turns Against Beijing

India Cracks Down on Chinese Investment as Mood Turns Against Beijing India has become the latest country to restrict Chinese investment , acting on fears that Chinese state-backed entities will swoop in to buy Indian companies weakened by the coronavirus pandemic .
According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce , tighter restrictions on Chinese FDI became necessary to prevent “ opportunistic takeovers ” of Indian companies .
Though the Indian economy has yet to be hit as hard as those of China and the developed West , a deeper slump seems inevitable .
Globally , the coronavirus pandemic has unleashed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Great Depression of the 1930s .
Worldwide trade is expected to fall between 13 and 32 percent in 2020 , the International Monetary Fund is predicting a global recession , and the United Nations estimates income losses around the world to total around $ 2 trillion .
As governments in Europe , North America , and elsewhere try to support businesses reeling under the financial pressure , they have also become more worried about China—with concerns surrounding Beijing ’ s trade practices , Chinese intellectual property theft , and global overdependence on Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ masks and medical ventilators .
Japan , for example , recently announced a $ 2 billion subsidy program to get Japanese companies to relocate production from China to Japan .
Earlier this month , the European Union ’ s competition chief , Margrethe Vestager , called on EU countries to consider buying stakes in their businesses to deflect the threat of Chinese takeovers .
India is no exception .
On April 17 , the government tightened its policy on foreign direct investment ( FDI ) to require investment from any country that shares @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through a government approval process .
Since the only neighbor with significant trade flows is China ( neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh already faced restrictions ) , the target of the new rule was abundantly clear .
According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce , tighter restrictions on Chinese investment became necessary in order to prevent “ opportunistic takeovers ” of Indian companies .
The trigger may have been the disclosure earlier this month of the People ’ s Bank of China—the Chinese central bank—buying a 1 percent stake in India ’ s largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its total holdings in the lender to 1.75 percent at the end of March .
China has protested against the revised rules , claiming a violation of the World Trade Organization ’ s free trade rules .
However , there are plenty of precedents for this kind of restriction .
Even before the coronavirus pandemic , European countries were increasingly modifying domestic economic policies to ensure greater scrutiny of Chinese investment—especially mergers and acquisitions—in order to protect domestic firms , in particular those in technology and manufacturing .
China ’ s stakes in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the protection of intellectual property rights , data privacy , censorship , and national security .
China today ranks among one of the top FDI sources in the world , with 74 percent of Chinese FDI going to Asian countries .
According to India ’ s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade , Chinese FDI from April 2000 to December 2019 totaled $ 2.3 billion .
This figure has been growing , but in recent years India still has ranked only 31st among destinations of FDI from China ; of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investments have only been 0.52 percent .
The biggest increase has been in the acquisition of shares in existing businesses , including pharmaceuticals companies—a source of concern during coronavirus-related medical supply chain fears .
Chinese investment has also been directed toward technology start-ups .
According to a study , 18 out of 30 Indian “ unicorn ” companies ( tech start-ups whose market capitalization has reached $ 1 billion or more ) have significant Chinese investment .
Indian companies such as payment app provider Paytm , online retailer Flipkart , and ride-hailing company @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Tencent among their investors .
India ’ s technology firms , which operate in a market that shares many structural similarities with China ’ s , have benefited not just from the capital inflow but also from the experience of Chinese firms .
However , China ’ s increasing stakes in Indian start-ups and other technology companies also raise major concerns over the protection of intellectual property rights , data privacy , and national security .
Alibaba , for example , is the single largest shareholder in Paytm , which handles the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Although this is ostensibly a private investment , India isn ’ t the only country concerned about the Chinese government ’ s influence over private technology companies ’ foreign activities , whether this concerns technology transfer , access to sensitive data , or the implementation of Chinese censorship policies .
The recent increase of Chinese investment in India may also represent a shift away from investment in the United States , where Chinese FDI faces growing suspicions and scrutiny .
Until the new regulation took effect , scrutiny of Chinese investments in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the way the telecommunications technology provider Huawei , for example , has been scrutinized in the United States and Europe .
One reason is that individual Chinese FDI transactions in India are small , rarely exceeding $ 100 million .
One of the reasons sentiment changed in India was that Chinese investments were increasingly focused on acquiring controlling stakes in India ’ s e-commerce and tech start-ups .
Under the new rules , regulators at the Ministry of Commerce can be expected to look much more closely at such transactions due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and due to the possibility of Chinese companies—and through them , the Chinese government—gaining access to sensitive information on millions of citizens .
With Chinese firms investing across sectors such as online payment portals , e-commerce , and ride-hailing services , they could potentially gain access to data that would allow the comprehensive profiling of a large share of Indian citizens .
Restricting foreign investment remains a double-edged sword in any country , but especially a developing one .
Indian start-ups rely heavily on overseas venture capital .
All start-ups with valuation over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , mainly from the United States and China .
Though India has a vibrant technology sector , it has yet to develop a deep domestic venture-capital industry that can nurture and sustain a start-up ecosystem without overreliance on foreign funding .
Lack of domestic venture capital and other investment financing is one of the reasons why India originally opened itself up to Chinese investment , and restricting foreign investment remains a double-edged sword in any country , but especially a developing one .
As part of its policy to deregulate and modernize its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from many other countries , such as the United States , Japan , and the members of the European Union .
But toward China , New Delhi has had a change of heart , with a growing consensus that greater reliance on China is not in India ’ s long-run economic interest .
This is especially true because China has been unresponsive to requests to address the huge trade deficit India has with China .
Recently , India ’ s dependence on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients ( India imports about 68 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impacted the production of hydroxychloroquine , the anti-malaria drug undergoing clinical trials for its possible effect on COVID-19 .
This was widely seen as a wake-up call for India to reduce its reliance on Chinese imports , and it may have played a role in the decision to protect Indian companies during a downturn that makes them more vulnerable to takeovers .
The step may also give New Delhi some bargaining power in future negotiations with Beijing , as India continues to be an attractive market for Chinese investments .
Importantly , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment but may be an opportunity for India to direct the investment to favored sectors and make Chinese investment more controlled and transparent .
Still , a more negative , less welcoming attitude in India toward Chinese investment is undeniable .
It builds on earlier skepticism toward Chinese investment , such as India ’ s rejection of participating in China ’ s Belt and Roads Initiative of transportation infrastructure investments .
The coronavirus crisis , in particular China ’ s mismanagement of the initial stages of the outbreak , has generated an intensely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many other countries around the world .
Indian policymakers , who had to carefully manage an already troubled bilateral relationship , will find the future trajectory even more turbulent .

India has become the latest country to restrict Chinese investment, acting on fears that Chinese state-backed entities will swoop in to buy Indian companies weakened by the coronavirus pandemic.
India has become the latest country to restrict Chinese investment, acting on fears that Chinese state-backed entities will swoop in to buy Indian companies weakened by the coronavirus pandemic.
Though the Indian economy has yet to be hit as hard as those of China and the developed West, a deeper slump seems inevitable. Globally, the coronavirus pandemic has unleashed an economic collapse not witnessed since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Worldwide trade is expected to fall between 13 and 32 percent in 2020, the International Monetary Fund is predicting a global recession, and the United Nations estimates income losses around the world to total around $2 trillion.
As governments in Europe, North America, and elsewhere try to support businesses reeling under the financial pressure, they have also become more worried about China—with concerns surrounding Beijing’s trade practices, Chinese intellectual property theft, and global overdependence on Chinese supply chains, not least for face masks and medical ventilators. Japan, for example, recently announced a $2 billion subsidy program to get Japanese companies to relocate production from China to Japan. Earlier this month, the European Union’s competition chief, Margrethe Vestager, called on EU countries to consider buying stakes in their businesses to deflect the threat of Chinese takeovers.
India is no exception. On April 17, the government tightened its policy on foreign direct investment (FDI) to require investment from any country that shares a land border with India to go through a government approval process. Since the only neighbor with significant trade flows is China (neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh already faced restrictions), the target of the new rule was abundantly clear.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce, tighter restrictions on Chinese investment became necessary in order to prevent “opportunistic takeovers” of Indian companies. The trigger may have been the disclosure earlier this month of the People’s Bank of China—the Chinese central bank—buying a 1 percent stake in India’s largest nonbanking mortgage provider HDFC Bank, bringing its total holdings in the lender to 1.75 percent at the end of March. China has protested against the revised rules, claiming a violation of the World Trade Organization’s free trade rules. However, there are plenty of precedents for this kind of restriction. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, European countries were increasingly modifying domestic economic policies to ensure greater scrutiny of Chinese investment—especially mergers and acquisitions—in order to protect domestic firms, in particular those in technology and manufacturing. China’s stakes in Indian technology companies also raise major concerns over the protection of intellectual property rights, data privacy, censorship, and national security.
China today ranks among one of the top FDI sources in the world, with 74 percent of Chinese FDI going to Asian countries. According to India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Chinese FDI from April 2000 to December 2019 totaled $2.3 billion. This figure has been growing, but in recent years India still has ranked only 31st among destinations of FDI from China; of all FDI inflows to India, Chinese investments have only been 0.52 percent. The biggest increase has been in the acquisition of shares in existing businesses, including pharmaceuticals companies—a source of concern during coronavirus-related medical supply chain fears. Chinese investment has also been directed toward technology start-ups. According to a study, 18 out of 30 Indian “unicorn” companies (tech start-ups whose market capitalization has reached $1 billion or more) have significant Chinese investment. Indian companies such as payment app provider Paytm, online retailer Flipkart, and ride-hailing company Ola Cabs count China’s Alibaba or Tencent among their investors. India’s technology firms, which operate in a market that shares many structural similarities with China’s, have benefited not just from the capital inflow but also from the experience of Chinese firms.
However, China’s increasing stakes in Indian start-ups and other technology companies also raise major concerns over the protection of intellectual property rights, data privacy, and national security. Alibaba, for example, is the single largest shareholder in Paytm, which handles the daily financial transactions of millions of Indians. Although this is ostensibly a private investment, India isn’t the only country concerned about the Chinese government’s influence over private technology companies’ foreign activities, whether this concerns technology transfer, access to sensitive data, or the implementation of Chinese censorship policies. The recent increase of Chinese investment in India may also represent a shift away from investment in the United States, where Chinese FDI faces growing suspicions and scrutiny.
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Until the new regulation took effect, scrutiny of Chinese investments in India had been rudimentary at best—nothing compared to the way the telecommunications technology provider Huawei, for example, has been scrutinized in the United States and Europe. One reason is that individual Chinese FDI transactions in India are small, rarely exceeding $100 million. One of the reasons sentiment changed in India was that Chinese investments were increasingly focused on acquiring controlling stakes in India’s e-commerce and tech start-ups. Under the new rules, regulators at the Ministry of Commerce can be expected to look much more closely at such transactions due to the sensitive nature of this industry, and due to the possibility of Chinese companies—and through them, the Chinese government—gaining access to sensitive information on millions of citizens. With Chinese firms investing across sectors such as online payment portals, e-commerce, and ride-hailing services, they could potentially gain access to data that would allow the comprehensive profiling of a large share of Indian citizens. Restricting foreign investment remains a double-edged sword in any country, but especially a developing one.
Indian start-ups rely heavily on overseas venture capital. All start-ups with valuation over $1 billion have significant foreign funding, mainly from the United States and China. Though India has a vibrant technology sector, it has yet to develop a deep domestic venture-capital industry that can nurture and sustain a start-up ecosystem without overreliance on foreign funding.
Lack of domestic venture capital and other investment financing is one of the reasons why India originally opened itself up to Chinese investment, and restricting foreign investment remains a double-edged sword in any country, but especially a developing one. As part of its policy to deregulate and modernize its economy, India remains open to FDI from many other countries, such as the United States, Japan, and the members of the European Union. But toward China, New Delhi has had a change of heart, with a growing consensus that greater reliance on China is not in India’s long-run economic interest. This is especially true because China has been unresponsive to requests to address the huge trade deficit India has with China.
Recently, India’s dependence on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients (India imports about 68 percent of its requirements from China) adversely impacted the production of hydroxychloroquine, the anti-malaria drug undergoing clinical trials for its possible effect on COVID-19. This was widely seen as a wake-up call for India to reduce its reliance on Chinese imports, and it may have played a role in the decision to protect Indian companies during a downturn that makes them more vulnerable to takeovers. The step may also give New Delhi some bargaining power in future negotiations with Beijing, as India continues to be an attractive market for Chinese investments. Importantly, the new FDI policy does not prohibit Chinese investment but may be an opportunity for India to direct the investment to favored sectors and make Chinese investment more controlled and transparent.
Still, a more negative, less welcoming attitude in India toward Chinese investment is undeniable. It builds on earlier skepticism toward Chinese investment, such as India’s rejection of participating in China’s Belt and Roads Initiative of transportation infrastructure investments. The coronavirus crisis, in particular China’s mismanagement of the initial stages of the outbreak, has generated an intensely negative public sentiment against Beijing—in India and many other countries around the world. Indian policymakers, who had to carefully manage an already troubled bilateral relationship, will find the future trajectory even more turbulent.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Trump’s Politicization of U.S. Intelligence Agencies Could End in Disaster

Trump ’ s Politicization of U.S. Intelligence Agencies Could End in Disaster The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred because the work of Soviet nuclear engineers—trained to analyze complex systems based on inferences drawn from objective facts—was politicized .
Instead of speaking the truth as they saw it , they were intimidated by their government to conceal the true dimensions of the catastrophe unfolding before them .
The result was the worst nuclear disaster in history .
Last week , U.S. Sen. Mark Warner , the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee , published an op-ed in the Washington Post @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the intelligence community .
Warner wrote : “ Efforts by this president to intimidate … U.S. intelligence services may be politically advantageous in the short term , but over time the consequences for our country will be disastrous.
” Analytical objectivity—intelligence officials writing and saying what they believe to be the truth without consideration for policy or politics—is fundamental to U.S. national security .
Simply put , good policy decisions require fact-based , objective , and rigorous analysis .
Politicized intelligence , by contrast , simply reinforces preexisting beliefs , depriving leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That is why intelligence analysts are trained , from the very outset of their careers , in presenting objective analysis , and why the intelligence community has institutional safeguards , including ombudsmen and inspectors general , to push back against pressure that leads to bias and politicization of intelligence analysis.Trump has repeatedly pressured the intelligence community to present analytic judgments consistent with his views .
Every president since the creation of the U.S. intelligence community after World War II has supported this principle—until Donald Trump .
Trump has repeatedly pressured the intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his views , rather than those of its expert analysts .
He has done this via public rebukes , as he did after the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment before Congress , attacking his team ’ s testimony that Iran , at that time , was living up to its commitments under the 2015 nuclear agreement and that North Korea was unlikely to ever give up its nuclear weapons .
His response was to tell his own intelligence experts to “ go back to school.
” He took the same tack in Helsinki in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putin over his own intelligence agencies on the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
And he has demonstrated this attitude through his actions .
Most significantly , as Warner noted , Trump has removed intelligence leaders for doing their jobs when it didn ’ t serve his political agenda .
Most recently , he fired the intelligence community ’ s chief watchdog , Inspector General Michael Atkinson , simply because Atkinson followed the law that required him to inform Congress of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president ’ s impeachment by the House of Representatives and the Senate trial that acquitted him ) .
The firing of Atkinson simply added to the growing number of intelligence officials who have been pushed out due to their perceived lack of loyalty to this president and their unwillingness to act on the basis of political pressure—a list that includes a director of national intelligence , an acting director of national intelligence , the principal deputy director of national intelligence , the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center , and many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact ; the intelligence community is becoming politicized .
We see it when intelligence leaders fail to protect their own personnel .
Not a single intelligence community leader said a word publicly when former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova attacked the whistleblower who prompted impeachment proceedings as a presidential assassin , the equivalent , he said , of John Wilkes Booth .
They presumably were fearful of a reaction from Trump , but their silence sent its own message to the intelligence workforce regarding their willingness to appease the president.The intelligence community is becoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence community leadership ’ s desire this year not to participate in the annual , unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress .
These sessions provide the American people with a direct account of analysis of security threats facing the United States and the work that the intelligence agencies are doing to mitigate those threats .
Today , these sessions also serve the purpose of making it difficult for policy officials to inaccurately portray the views of intelligence analysts when they speak publicly .
This is exactly why Trump does not want them to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we see it in what some members of Congress say are gaps between what intelligence officers tell Congress regarding key issues , such as Iran and election security—which they say is consistent with the principle of analytic objectivity—and what intelligence community leaders tell members of Congress , which more closely tracks with the president ’ s views .
This is worrisome , because it suggests that perhaps even in private , agency leaders may be pulling their punches .
This pattern of politicization is particularly concerning now , as the country confronts the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence questions—Did the coronavirus emerge from nature or escape from a Chinese lab ?
To what extent did the Chinese government misrepresent the scope and scale of the epidemic ?
—will have profound implications for the future of U.S. national security policy , especially concerning China .
We know Trump ’ s preferred answers to those questions .
What we don ’ t know is whether the career analysts in U.S. intelligence agencies will be allowed to speak the truth when they uncover it .
At the very end of the recent TV @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declares , “ Every lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth ; sooner or later the debt is paid.
” In the case of Chernobyl that meant a nuclear meltdown .
If Americans can not rely on the intelligence community to work objectively to uncover the threats they face , U.S. national security will suffer , perhaps catastrophically .

Michael Morell, Avril Haines and David S. Cohen

The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred because the work of Soviet nuclear engineers—trained to analyze complex systems based on inferences drawn from objective facts—was politicized. Instead of speaking the truth as they saw it, they were intimidated by their government to conceal the true dimensions of the catastrophe unfolding before them. The result was the worst nuclear disaster in history.
The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred because the work of Soviet nuclear engineers—trained to analyze complex systems based on inferences drawn from objective facts—was politicized. Instead of speaking the truth as they saw it, they were intimidated by their government to conceal the true dimensions of the catastrophe unfolding before them. The result was the worst nuclear disaster in history.
Last week, U.S. Sen. Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, published an op-ed in the Washington Post outlining his growing concern about the politicization of the intelligence community. Warner wrote: “Efforts by this president to intimidate … U.S. intelligence services may be politically advantageous in the short term, but over time the consequences for our country will be disastrous.”
We share Warner’s concerns.
Analytical objectivity—intelligence officials writing and saying what they believe to be the truth without consideration for policy or politics—is fundamental to U.S. national security. Simply put, good policy decisions require fact-based, objective, and rigorous analysis.
Politicized intelligence, by contrast, simply reinforces preexisting beliefs, depriving leaders of a foundation for developing sound policy. That is why intelligence analysts are trained, from the very outset of their careers, in presenting objective analysis, and why the intelligence community has institutional safeguards, including ombudsmen and inspectors general, to push back against pressure that leads to bias and politicization of intelligence analysis.Trump has repeatedly pressured the intelligence community to present analytic judgments consistent with his views.
Every president since the creation of the U.S. intelligence community after World War II has supported this principle—until Donald Trump. Trump has repeatedly pressured the intelligence community to present analytic judgments consistent with his views, rather than those of its expert analysts.
He has done this via public rebukes, as he did after the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment before Congress, attacking his team’s testimony that Iran, at that time, was living up to its commitments under the 2015 nuclear agreement and that North Korea was unlikely to ever give up its nuclear weapons. His response was to tell his own intelligence experts to “go back to school.” He took the same tack in Helsinki in 2018, when he told the world that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putin over his own intelligence agencies on the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
And he has demonstrated this attitude through his actions. Most significantly, as Warner noted, Trump has removed intelligence leaders for doing their jobs when it didn’t serve his political agenda. Most recently, he fired the intelligence community’s chief watchdog, Inspector General Michael Atkinson, simply because Atkinson followed the law that required him to inform Congress of a whistleblower complaint (that later led to the president’s impeachment by the House of Representatives and the Senate trial that acquitted him).
The firing of Atkinson simply added to the growing number of intelligence officials who have been pushed out due to their perceived lack of loyalty to this president and their unwillingness to act on the basis of political pressure—a list that includes a director of national intelligence, an acting director of national intelligence, the principal deputy director of national intelligence, the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and many others.
This pressure is having an impact; the intelligence community is becoming politicized.
We see it when intelligence leaders fail to protect their own personnel. Not a single intelligence community leader said a word publicly when former U.S. Attorney Joe diGenova attacked the whistleblower who prompted impeachment proceedings as a presidential assassin, the equivalent, he said, of John Wilkes Booth. They presumably were fearful of a reaction from Trump, but their silence sent its own message to the intelligence workforce regarding their willingness to appease the president.The intelligence community is becoming politicized.
We see it in the intelligence community leadership’s desire this year not to participate in the annual, unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress. These sessions provide the American people with a direct account of analysis of security threats facing the United States and the work that the intelligence agencies are doing to mitigate those threats. Today, these sessions also serve the purpose of making it difficult for policy officials to inaccurately portray the views of intelligence analysts when they speak publicly. This is exactly why Trump does not want them to participate in public events.
Finally, we see it in what some members of Congress say are gaps between what intelligence officers tell Congress regarding key issues, such as Iran and election security—which they say is consistent with the principle of analytic objectivity—and what intelligence community leaders tell members of Congress, which more closely tracks with the president’s views. This is worrisome, because it suggests that perhaps even in private, agency leaders may be pulling their punches.
This pattern of politicization is particularly concerning now, as the country confronts the coronavirus pandemic. The answers to key intelligence questions—Did the coronavirus emerge from nature or escape from a Chinese lab? To what extent did the Chinese government misrepresent the scope and scale of the epidemic?—will have profound implications for the future of U.S. national security policy, especially concerning China. We know Trump’s preferred answers to those questions. What we don’t know is whether the career analysts in U.S. intelligence agencies will be allowed to speak the truth when they uncover it.
At the very end of the recent TV miniseries on Chernobyl, the main character declares, “Every lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth; sooner or later the debt is paid.” In the case of Chernobyl that meant a nuclear meltdown. If Americans cannot rely on the intelligence community to work objectively to uncover the threats they face, U.S. national security will suffer, perhaps catastrophically.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--In the Mekong, a Confluence of Calamities

In the Mekong , a Confluence of Calamities Over the past year , severe drought exacerbated by upstream hydropower dams has throttled agricultural productivity , devastated fisheries , and threatened the livelihoods of millions of people in the Mekong River Basin .
The coronavirus pandemic is compounding this situation , disrupting supply chains and increasing price volatility for rice and other staples .
While Mekong governments have assured their populations of secure food supplies , concerns are growing around the affordability and accessibility of food for the region ’ s most vulnerable populations .
Nowhere are these risks of growing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For farmers and fishers throughout the Mekong River Basin , the coronavirus couldn ’ t have hit at a worse time .
In April 2019 , the region began suffering a prolonged and severe drought .
An El Niño weather pattern led to widespread water shortages , as the monsoon rains—which typically fall from May to October and usher in planting of the primary rice crop—failed to appear .
Reservoirs across the region began to run dry , and the waters of the lower Mekong dropped to historic lows .
Chinese dams @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s impact , restricting water from flowing downstream where it could have alleviated record dry conditions .
Agricultural communities have suffered greatly .
By July , Thailand declared an emergency in 12 provinces and asked farmers to delay planting rice crops to avoid using what little water was left for vulnerable households .
Reservoir levels remained low throughout the rainy season , and in early 2020 , Bangkok deployed the military to implement drought disaster mitigation in 43 provinces .
Preliminary estimates point to a sharp drop of between 40 percent and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off-season rice production .
Meanwhile in Laos , water levels on the Mekong River were recorded nearly 7 meters below normal in Vientiane .
Because of the arid conditions , farmers were able to plant rice only on around 40 percent of the country ’ s arable land , and the government estimated that production for the year would be 17,500 tons lower than in 2018 .
Vietnam has faced similar challenges but fared better .
With freshwater flows in the Mekong diminished , saline seawater pushed farther into the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hectares of rice fields .
The government moved quickly to work with farmers to shift rice-planting seasons and avoid risking the main crop , and as a result , the country ’ s production is anticipated to drop by only around 3 percent in 2020 .
Cambodia has been hit particularly hard by the drought .
By December , some 45,000 hectares of rice paddy had been damaged , and 16 of the country ’ s 25 provinces were facing freshwater shortages .
The government recommended that farmers forgo a second rice crop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began to share reports of farmers struggling under the debt burden of failed crops .
As a still developing nation , Cambodia remains heavily reliant on agriculture to sustain livelihoods and provide food .
Subsistence farming is common—the United Nations Development Program estimates that over 70 percent of Cambodian farms engage in some version of the practice—and the agriculture sector employs more than 30 percent of the population , contributing more than one-fifth of the national GDP .
The majority of farmed land is used for rice , and farmers regularly take out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary for their harvest .
For many , a poor or destroyed crop yield can mean financial ruin .
At the same time that the region ’ s agriculture has been starved of water , the country ’ s fish catch has collapsed .
The Mekong River system is the world ’ s largest freshwater fishery , typically producing more than 2.6 million tons of fish each year .
A quarter of this comes from Cambodia and most of that from the Tonle Sap Lake .
While heavy monsoons in 2018 led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in flow from hydropower dams and climate change , as well as overfishing , have led to steeply declining catches in recent years .
The Mekong River ’ s natural productivity is fueled by the rains : The influx of water from the monsoon causes the tributary linking the Tonle Sap and the Mekong to reverse course .
This reversal floods the Tonle Sap and carries juvenile fish into the surrounding forests and plains .
When the monsoon ends , the river changes course once again , and water and grown fish flood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater the flood , the more bountiful the fish catch .
This flood pulse largely failed in 2019 because of drought and upstream dam interference with water flow .
As early as October , fishermen living along the Tonle Sap Lake were reporting observed fish catches 60 to 70 percent below average .
As with rice , fish is a key source of sustenance for the country .
More than 2 million Cambodians work in fisheries , which account for between 10 percent and 18 percent of Cambodia ’ s GDP .
Fish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ animal protein consumed in Cambodia , so a significant reduction could lead to acute spikes in food insecurity .
In communities along the Tonle Sap , the drop in catch has contributed to an outmigration of labor and pushed families to take on loans to cover daily expenses .
The Economist Intelligence Unit ’ s Global Food Security Index lists Cambodia near the bottom of its rankings , at 90 out of 113 countries evaluated .
Cambodia ’ s relative food insecurity reflects its modest level of economic development , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an overreliance on rice and fish .
Even in a normal year , one-fifth of the population is food deprived , and undernutrition is widespread .
While the global market could normally provide substitutions for a drought year ’ s lost fish catch and diminished rice production , the coronavirus pandemic is leading to food shortages and price spikes where domestic supply chains have been disrupted .
Demand for staples like rice and flour has surged due to panic-buying .
In Cambodia , rice prices in Siem Reap rose 33 percent from March @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which has a significant national stockpile of rice , prices have risen more than 25 percent since the start of the year , hitting their highest levels in seven years .
After fish , pork is by far the most widely consumed protein source in Cambodia .
But successive outbreaks of African swine fever in China and neighboring Vietnam have limited regional supplies over the last year , driving prices up in impacted markets and in countries like Cambodia that rely on imports .
Rice stockpiles in Thailand and Vietnam appear more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ uncertainty around the extent to which the coronavirus will impact regional economies has translated into export bans to ensure domestic food security .
In March , Vietnam briefly banned the export of rice , only to replace the ban with an export cap in mid-April .
Analysts predict the country ’ s export volume will drop approximately 40 percent as a result .
While Thailand hopes to benefit from increasing rice exports , its government has asked the private sector for support in ensuring that domestic supplies remain robust and banned the export @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Cambodia has instituted its own measures , announcing an export ban on some types of rice on March 30 and on April 4 extending the ban to include fish exports .
Negotiators from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in early April to discuss rules for maintaining the open trade of agricultural goods but failed to reach a substantive agreement .
From its own assessment , Cambodia should have adequate food stocks to meet national demand ; however , the outlook for vulnerable indebted fishing and farming communities is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become increasingly critical issues as the crisis wears on and the economic impacts build .
The country ’ s export bans may provide localized short-term benefits but could also exacerbate supply chain disruptions and result in income loss for farmers and fishermen if not carefully managed .
While cities that house the country ’ s elites and burgeoning middle class should be able to take steps to ensure food availability at reasonable prices , rural communities scattered in villages throughout the countryside may find their local food systems less adaptable .
In normal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enable substitutions for shortages or price spikes impacting staple goods—but these are not normal times .
Poor Cambodians could be facing an unprecedented confluence of income loss , supply shortages , high food prices , and supply chain disruptions .
The government will need to carefully monitor this situation in the near term and should be taking steps to prepare interventions in the event that the country ’ s farming and fishing communities are unable to provide for themselves .
Once the acute crisis sparked by the coronavirus threat has passed , Cambodia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the long-term challenge of ensuring a sustainable and vibrant Mekong River system .
While anthropogenic climate change and naturally occurring weather patterns like El Niños are largely beyond policymakers ’ control , Mekong governments can act now to implement policies and protocols to mitigate the worst of their impacts in the future .
This should include engaging with Beijing to negotiate year-round data-sharing on the river ’ s level and the operations of China ’ s upstream dam cascade .
It should also include an exploration of alternatives to existing proposals for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tributaries in Laos , which if built would only worsen the already dwindling fish catch .
The coronavirus pandemic presents a difficult but hopefully short-term food security challenge for Cambodia ’ s most vulnerable .
However , droughts will be a recurring problem for the region that will require a focused response to ensure agricultural crises do not become the norm .
For Cambodia , which is so heavily reliant on the natural flood pulse for its food supply , preservation of the river ’ s natural flow to the Tonle Sap should @ @ @ @ @

Over the past year, severe drought exacerbated by upstream hydropower dams has throttled agricultural productivity, devastated fisheries, and threatened the livelihoods of millions of people in the Mekong River Basin. The coronavirus pandemic is compounding this situation, disrupting supply chains and increasing price volatility for rice and other staples. While Mekong governments have assured their populations of secure food supplies, concerns are growing around the affordability and accessibility of food for the region’s most vulnerable populations. Nowhere are these risks of growing food insecurity more evident than in Cambodia.
Over the past year, severe drought exacerbated by upstream hydropower dams has throttled agricultural productivity, devastated fisheries, and threatened the livelihoods of millions of people in the Mekong River Basin. The coronavirus pandemic is compounding this situation, disrupting supply chains and increasing price volatility for rice and other staples. While Mekong governments have assured their populations of secure food supplies, concerns are growing around the affordability and accessibility of food for the region’s most vulnerable populations. Nowhere are these risks of growing food insecurity more evident than in Cambodia.
For farmers and fishers throughout the Mekong River Basin, the coronavirus couldn’t have hit at a worse time. In April 2019, the region began suffering a prolonged and severe drought. An El Niño weather pattern led to widespread water shortages, as the monsoon rains—which typically fall from May to October and usher in planting of the primary rice crop—failed to appear. Reservoirs across the region began to run dry, and the waters of the lower Mekong dropped to historic lows. Chinese dams on the upper Mekong worsened the drought’s impact, restricting water from flowing downstream where it could have alleviated record dry conditions.
Agricultural communities have suffered greatly. By July, Thailand declared an emergency in 12 provinces and asked farmers to delay planting rice crops to avoid using what little water was left for vulnerable households. Reservoir levels remained low throughout the rainy season, and in early 2020, Bangkok deployed the military to implement drought disaster mitigation in 43 provinces. Preliminary estimates point to a sharp drop of between 40 percent and 54 percent for the country’s off-season rice production. Meanwhile in Laos, water levels on the Mekong River were recorded nearly 7 meters below normal in Vientiane. Because of the arid conditions, farmers were able to plant rice only on around 40 percent of the country’s arable land, and the government estimated that production for the year would be 17,500 tons lower than in 2018. Vietnam has faced similar challenges but fared better. With freshwater flows in the Mekong diminished, saline seawater pushed farther into the country’s delta heartland, eventually damaging over 30,000 hectares of rice fields. The government moved quickly to work with farmers to shift rice-planting seasons and avoid risking the main crop, and as a result, the country’s production is anticipated to drop by only around 3 percent in 2020.
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Cambodia has been hit particularly hard by the drought. By December, some 45,000 hectares of rice paddy had been damaged, and 16 of the country’s 25 provinces were facing freshwater shortages. The government recommended that farmers forgo a second rice crop to conserve water, and aid organizations began to share reports of farmers struggling under the debt burden of failed crops.
As a still developing nation, Cambodia remains heavily reliant on agriculture to sustain livelihoods and provide food. Subsistence farming is common—the United Nations Development Program estimates that over 70 percent of Cambodian farms engage in some version of the practice—and the agriculture sector employs more than 30 percent of the population, contributing more than one-fifth of the national GDP. The majority of farmed land is used for rice, and farmers regularly take out loans to cover the cost of supplies necessary for their harvest. For many, a poor or destroyed crop yield can mean financial ruin.
At the same time that the region’s agriculture has been starved of water, the country’s fish catch has collapsed. The Mekong River system is the world’s largest freshwater fishery, typically producing more than 2.6 million tons of fish each year. A quarter of this comes from Cambodia and most of that from the Tonle Sap Lake. While heavy monsoons in 2018 led to a larger than usual catch, changes in flow from hydropower dams and climate change, as well as overfishing, have led to steeply declining catches in recent years.
The Mekong River’s natural productivity is fueled by the rains: The influx of water from the monsoon causes the tributary linking the Tonle Sap and the Mekong to reverse course. This reversal floods the Tonle Sap and carries juvenile fish into the surrounding forests and plains. When the monsoon ends, the river changes course once again, and water and grown fish flood back into the Mekong mainstream. The greater the flood, the more bountiful the fish catch. This flood pulse largely failed in 2019 because of drought and upstream dam interference with water flow. As early as October, fishermen living along the Tonle Sap Lake were reporting observed fish catches 60 to 70 percent below average.
As with rice, fish is a key source of sustenance for the country. More than 2 million Cambodians work in fisheries, which account for between 10 percent and 18 percent of Cambodia’s GDP. Fish also provide approximately 70 percent of the animal protein consumed in Cambodia, so a significant reduction could lead to acute spikes in food insecurity. In communities along the Tonle Sap, the drop in catch has contributed to an outmigration of labor and pushed families to take on loans to cover daily expenses.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Food Security Index lists Cambodia near the bottom of its rankings, at 90 out of 113 countries evaluated. Cambodia’s relative food insecurity reflects its modest level of economic development, as well as its lack of dietary diversity due to an overreliance on rice and fish. Even in a normal year, one-fifth of the population is food deprived, and undernutrition is widespread.
While the global market could normally provide substitutions for a drought year’s lost fish catch and diminished rice production, the coronavirus pandemic is leading to food shortages and price spikes where domestic supply chains have been disrupted. Demand for staples like rice and flour has surged due to panic-buying. In Cambodia, rice prices in Siem Reap rose 33 percent from March to April. Even in Thailand, which has a significant national stockpile of rice, prices have risen more than 25 percent since the start of the year, hitting their highest levels in seven years. After fish, pork is by far the most widely consumed protein source in Cambodia. But successive outbreaks of African swine fever in China and neighboring Vietnam have limited regional supplies over the last year, driving prices up in impacted markets and in countries like Cambodia that rely on imports.
Rice stockpiles in Thailand and Vietnam appear more than sufficient to meet national needs, but uncertainty around the extent to which the coronavirus will impact regional economies has translated into export bans to ensure domestic food security. In March, Vietnam briefly banned the export of rice, only to replace the ban with an export cap in mid-April. Analysts predict the country’s export volume will drop approximately 40 percent as a result. While Thailand hopes to benefit from increasing rice exports, its government has asked the private sector for support in ensuring that domestic supplies remain robust and banned the export of eggs following reports of localized hoarding. Cambodia has instituted its own measures, announcing an export ban on some types of rice on March 30 and on April 4 extending the ban to include fish exports. Negotiators from members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in early April to discuss rules for maintaining the open trade of agricultural goods but failed to reach a substantive agreement.
From its own assessment, Cambodia should have adequate food stocks to meet national demand; however, the outlook for vulnerable indebted fishing and farming communities is less sanguine. Access and affordability will become increasingly critical issues as the crisis wears on and the economic impacts build. The country’s export bans may provide localized short-term benefits but could also exacerbate supply chain disruptions and result in income loss for farmers and fishermen if not carefully managed. While cities that house the country’s elites and burgeoning middle class should be able to take steps to ensure food availability at reasonable prices, rural communities scattered in villages throughout the countryside may find their local food systems less adaptable.
In normal times, market mechanisms and supply chains enable substitutions for shortages or price spikes impacting staple goods—but these are not normal times. Poor Cambodians could be facing an unprecedented confluence of income loss, supply shortages, high food prices, and supply chain disruptions. The government will need to carefully monitor this situation in the near term and should be taking steps to prepare interventions in the event that the country’s farming and fishing communities are unable to provide for themselves.
Once the acute crisis sparked by the coronavirus threat has passed, Cambodia and its neighbors will still be faced with the long-term challenge of ensuring a sustainable and vibrant Mekong River system. While anthropogenic climate change and naturally occurring weather patterns like El Niños are largely beyond policymakers’ control, Mekong governments can act now to implement policies and protocols to mitigate the worst of their impacts in the future. This should include engaging with Beijing to negotiate year-round data-sharing on the river’s level and the operations of China’s upstream dam cascade. It should also include an exploration of alternatives to existing proposals for new dams on the Mekong and its tributaries in Laos, which if built would only worsen the already dwindling fish catch.
The coronavirus pandemic presents a difficult but hopefully short-term food security challenge for Cambodia’s most vulnerable. However, droughts will be a recurring problem for the region that will require a focused response to ensure agricultural crises do not become the norm. For Cambodia, which is so heavily reliant on the natural flood pulse for its food supply, preservation of the river’s natural flow to the Tonle Sap should be a top priority.