foreignpolicy--2020-02-07--Could Venezuela’s Loss Be Latin America’s Gain?

In recent years , more than 4.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country—most of them since 2018 .
The exodus from Venezuela registers only slightly behind that from Syria as the second-largest forced displacement crisis anywhere in the world today and will likely surpass the Syrian one by the end of this year .
The severity of the crisis in Venezuela is undeniable .
On top of ongoing political persecution of those who participate in protests and opposition activity against the country ’ s authoritarian government , Venezuela ’ s economy , once among the most prosperous in Latin America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million percent , and GDP has contracted by almost two-thirds over the past six years .
In this environment , malnutrition is widespread , and the health care system has collapsed ; hospitals now lack basic medical supplies such as gloves , syringes , and disinfectant .
Yet unlike many other displacement crises that have spawned mass migration to Europe or the United States , most Venezuelans who have fled are staying close to home , with some 80 percent of Venezuelan migrants within Latin America .
Those Venezuelans who have moved elsewhere—mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gradually over a period of several years , rather than in a single major migration surge , as with the Syrian and Afghan refugee flows to Europe in 2015-2016 and the Central American flows to the United States in 2014 and 2019 .
Today , almost every country in Latin America hosts tens of thousands of Venezuelan migrants , and a few , such as Colombia , Peru , Ecuador , Chile , Brazil , and Argentina , host between several hundred thousand and well over 1 million .
And so far , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Venezuelans fairly well , with limited international assistance .
This may be Latin America ’ s lesson to the world .
At a time when policymakers are throwing up barriers to migration , Latin American countries have largely opened their doors to those fleeing Venezuela , offered them access to basic education and health care , and tried to integrate them into their economies and local communities .
The response isn ’ t always perfect .
As a forthcoming Migration Policy Institute report shows , there are often hidden barriers to registering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ receiving medical care , or getting a professional degree recognized .
But overall the response has been much more flexible than in other places around the world .
And survey results indicate that most Venezuelan adults are working in the countries where they have moved .
The lack of a language barrier in countries other than Brazil and Guyana facilitates labor market integration , of course , but so does the simple fact that Venezuelans have been free to move wherever they want within countries , often with legal documents that allow them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stands in sharp contrast to the way humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world have usually been dealt with .
Normally , the international community declares a crisis and steps in early to designate those fleeing as refugees .
United Nations agencies build refugee camps and supply needed services , while host governments ( with a few notable exceptions ) restrict access to work and public schools .
Host governments fear being overwhelmed by massive inflows that can create a backlash from local populations .
Keeping incoming populations separated allows the international community to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and mitigates political fallout .
In contrast , the response in Latin America has been almost wholly developed by national governments , and most countries have emphasized self-reliance , short-term legal status , and integration over refugee protection .
Governments have largely treated Venezuelans as migrants instead of refugees , with the partial exceptions of Brazil and Mexico , which have granted asylum to more than 20,000 and more than 8,000 Venezuelans , respectively .
This is largely because many countries lack fully developed asylum systems , and they were also worried about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with some of the same poverty that Venezuelan migrants are facing .
Instead of refugee protection , Colombia has provided special temporary residency permits to almost 600,000 Venezuelans , while Peru has done the same for more than 400,000 people and Brazil for nearly 100,000 .
These permits are careful balancing acts , since they provide legal protection and the right to work , but also suggest that the government is providing only a short-term measure that will be lifted as soon as the Venezuelan crisis is over .
Colombia has now gone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for those with a job in the formal economy , and Ecuador has just launched a wide-ranging campaign to give temporary residence to many Venezuelans living in the country illegally .
In theory , most Venezuelan migrants in Latin America have far fewer rights than refugees elsewhere in the world—at best , they get temporary permits to stay and work in host countries , but in practice most have been able to find employment , housing , schools , and basic health care quickly .
They often start at the bottom rung of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into local communities rather than singled out as a population in need of help .
They may have fewer formal protections than migrants elsewhere in the world who are granted refugee protection , but in reality they may have a faster and easier pathway to setting up a new life .
The reasons for this welcoming stance are complex .
Most governments in the region had banded together to condemn the Venezuelan government ’ s authoritarian turn , so it marked an act of political literarity with the opposition to welcome those fleeing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act of solidarity with the Venezuelan people , who welcomed migrants and refugees from elsewhere in Latin America during better times in Venezuela .
Moreoever , there was a recognition that borders are porous in the region , and it is almost impossible to stop people from crossing them if they desperately want to .
Latin America has a history of regional mobility agreements and expansive refugee law , though this framework had not really been tested before .
And , of course , it was easier to offer short-term legal status or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status .
Studies now show that this migration , as large and unexpected as it was , is benefiting the receiving countries .
Chile ’ s Central Bank revised growth upward to reflect the inflow of more than 370,000 Venezuelans , who are expanding the labor force and contributing needed human capital .
Studies by the World Bank and the private bank BBVA have shown similar results for Peru , where more than 850,000 Venezuelans have settled .
In part , this is because the Venezuelan migrant population tends to be more highly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries .
In Chile , for example , just over 20 percent of the adult population had an advanced degree—either university studies or a technical certificate–in 2017 , while more than 50 percent of Venezuelan migrants did , according to one survey .
While 31 percent of Peru ’ s working-age population had an advanced degree in 2018 , 42 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population did .
Increasingly , countries in the region are trying to find ways to recognize professional credentials earned outside their borders in order to take advantage of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , nurses , teachers , engineers , and other professionals bring—skills that are often in short supply in host countries .
But this may not be the whole story .
Recent migrants also fill labor market niches where there is existing demand , such as coffee pickers in Colombia or food preparers in Peru .
And there is an extensive literature suggesting that immigrants are more likely to pursue entrepreneurship than native-born workers , including one recent study in Chile .
But while this migration flow may have large overall benefits for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generates significant strains on public services , creates a shortage of housing in some cities , and generates fears of job competition .
While studies do not yet exist showing the extent to which these fears are rooted in reality , the fears themselves are widespread .
It is very possible , for example , that this migration is bringing overall economic benefits to countries but depressing wages in specific sectors where there is a great deal of labor supply , such as construction .
And schools and emergency rooms that were already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only become more congested with the arrival of recent immigrants .
Polls show that citizens in some of the principal host countries are growing restless about the unending arrivals .
The lack of clarity about when this flow will end compounds the anxiety of the public and resulting political pressures on governments .
Responding to this changing mood , several governments have imposed entry restrictions on Venezuelans over the past year , and it is becoming harder in many countries to get even temporary legal status .
This has not necessarily slowed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many more Venezuelan migrants cross borders illegally and then live in the shadows .
A year ago , a majority of Venezuelans living in neighboring countries had obtained some form of legal status from their host government ; today , it ’ s probably just under half .
That may compound the root problem of inequality in host societies rather than fixing it , since migrants who lack legal documents tend to be willing to work for lower pay—but imposing restrictions helps the public feel its political leaders are restoring a sense of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latin American response so successful at the beginning—its local , almost spontaneous nature , with little presence or pressure from the international community—may actually be problematic going forward .
As the burden for providing education , health care , and housing to tens of thousands of new migrants increases—and as workers fear competition from growing numbers of Venezuelan immigrants—it will be increasingly important that the international community provide support to help these countries deal with their role in absorbing a vast exodus .
The U.N. system , international nongovernmental organizations , international development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ started to respond .
They have pledged over $ 384 million for international relief efforts , and hundreds of millions of dollars more in loans and concessional grants from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are now in the pipeline .
It ’ s only a part of what is needed , but it is an important start .
Rather than refugee camps and temporary schools , the countries in the region need to upgrade infrastructure for schools and medical facilities , implement measures to unleash investment for housing construction , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entrepreneurship , and job creation .
In most cases , national and local governments and local civil society organizations need to spearhead these efforts instead of international organizations .
To be politically viable and address overarching , systemic weaknesses , they must benefit both migrants and host communities equally .
Latin American countries have managed this crisis well so far , and most of the countries could see long-term benefits in labor market and economic growth as a result .
But international support will be crucial in helping them deal with the significant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them to maintain a degree of openness to those fleeing Venezuela .
Otherwise , this unique and encouraging approach to dealing with a regional displacement crisis could provoke a political crisis for well-meaning host governments .

In recent years, more than 4.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country—most of them since 2018. The exodus from Venezuela registers only slightly behind that from Syria as the second-largest forced displacement crisis anywhere in the world today and will likely surpass the Syrian one by the end of this year.
In recent years, more than 4.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country—most of them since 2018. The exodus from Venezuela registers only slightly behind that from Syria as the second-largest forced displacement crisis anywhere in the world today and will likely surpass the Syrian one by the end of this year.
The severity of the crisis in Venezuela is undeniable. On top of ongoing political persecution of those who participate in protests and opposition activity against the country’s authoritarian government, Venezuela’s economy, once among the most prosperous in Latin America, has imploded. Inflation exceeded 1 million percent, and GDP has contracted by almost two-thirds over the past six years. In this environment, malnutrition is widespread, and the health care system has collapsed; hospitals now lack basic medical supplies such as gloves, syringes, and disinfectant.
Yet unlike many other displacement crises that have spawned mass migration to Europe or the United States, most Venezuelans who have fled are staying close to home, with some 80 percent of Venezuelan migrants within Latin America. Those Venezuelans who have moved elsewhere—mostly to the United States or Spain—have moved gradually over a period of several years, rather than in a single major migration surge, as with the Syrian and Afghan refugee flows to Europe in 2015-2016 and the Central American flows to the United States in 2014 and 2019. Today, almost every country in Latin America hosts tens of thousands of Venezuelan migrants, and a few, such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, host between several hundred thousand and well over 1 million.
And so far, host governments have handled these large inflows of Venezuelans fairly well, with limited international assistance. This may be Latin America’s lesson to the world. At a time when policymakers are throwing up barriers to migration, Latin American countries have largely opened their doors to those fleeing Venezuela, offered them access to basic education and health care, and tried to integrate them into their economies and local communities.
The response isn’t always perfect. As a forthcoming Migration Policy Institute report shows, there are often hidden barriers to registering for school, getting a job, receiving medical care, or getting a professional degree recognized. But overall the response has been much more flexible than in other places around the world. And survey results indicate that most Venezuelan adults are working in the countries where they have moved. The lack of a language barrier in countries other than Brazil and Guyana facilitates labor market integration, of course, but so does the simple fact that Venezuelans have been free to move wherever they want within countries, often with legal documents that allow them to work.
The Latin American response stands in sharp contrast to the way humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world have usually been dealt with. Normally, the international community declares a crisis and steps in early to designate those fleeing as refugees. United Nations agencies build refugee camps and supply needed services, while host governments (with a few notable exceptions) restrict access to work and public schools. Host governments fear being overwhelmed by massive inflows that can create a backlash from local populations. Keeping incoming populations separated allows the international community to shoulder the costs of maintaining the refugees and mitigates political fallout.
In contrast, the response in Latin America has been almost wholly developed by national governments, and most countries have emphasized self-reliance, short-term legal status, and integration over refugee protection. Governments have largely treated Venezuelans as migrants instead of refugees, with the partial exceptions of Brazil and Mexico, which have granted asylum to more than 20,000 and more than 8,000 Venezuelans, respectively. This is largely because many countries lack fully developed asylum systems, and they were also worried about provoking a backlash from host communities struggling with some of the same poverty that Venezuelan migrants are facing.
Instead of refugee protection, Colombia has provided special temporary residency permits to almost 600,000 Venezuelans, while Peru has done the same for more than 400,000 people and Brazil for nearly 100,000. These permits are careful balancing acts, since they provide legal protection and the right to work, but also suggest that the government is providing only a short-term measure that will be lifted as soon as the Venezuelan crisis is over. Colombia has now gone further by creating a special employment-based permit for those with a job in the formal economy, and Ecuador has just launched a wide-ranging campaign to give temporary residence to many Venezuelans living in the country illegally.
In theory, most Venezuelan migrants in Latin America have far fewer rights than refugees elsewhere in the world—at best, they get temporary permits to stay and work in host countries, but in practice most have been able to find employment, housing, schools, and basic health care quickly. They often start at the bottom rung of the economy, but they are integrated into local communities rather than singled out as a population in need of help. They may have fewer formal protections than migrants elsewhere in the world who are granted refugee protection, but in reality they may have a faster and easier pathway to setting up a new life.
The reasons for this welcoming stance are complex. Most governments in the region had banded together to condemn the Venezuelan government’s authoritarian turn, so it marked an act of political literarity with the opposition to welcome those fleeing the regime. It was also an act of solidarity with the Venezuelan people, who welcomed migrants and refugees from elsewhere in Latin America during better times in Venezuela.
Moreoever, there was a recognition that borders are porous in the region, and it is almost impossible to stop people from crossing them if they desperately want to. Latin America has a history of regional mobility agreements and expansive refugee law, though this framework had not really been tested before. And, of course, it was easier to offer short-term legal status or employment-based visas rather than asylum or refugee status.
Studies now show that this migration, as large and unexpected as it was, is benefiting the receiving countries. Chile’s Central Bank revised growth upward to reflect the inflow of more than 370,000 Venezuelans, who are expanding the labor force and contributing needed human capital. Studies by the World Bank and the private bank BBVA have shown similar results for Peru, where more than 850,000 Venezuelans have settled.
In part, this is because the Venezuelan migrant population tends to be more highly educated than the native-born population in receiving countries. In Chile, for example, just over 20 percent of the adult population had an advanced degree—either university studies or a technical certificate–in 2017, while more than 50 percent of Venezuelan migrants did, according to one survey.
While 31 percent of Peru’s working-age population had an advanced degree in 2018, 42 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population did. Increasingly, countries in the region are trying to find ways to recognize professional credentials earned outside their borders in order to take advantage of the talent that Venezuelan doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, engineers, and other professionals bring—skills that are often in short supply in host countries.
But this may not be the whole story. Recent migrants also fill labor market niches where there is existing demand, such as coffee pickers in Colombia or food preparers in Peru. And there is an extensive literature suggesting that immigrants are more likely to pursue entrepreneurship than native-born workers, including one recent study in Chile.
But while this migration flow may have large overall benefits for the economies of host countries, it also generates significant strains on public services, creates a shortage of housing in some cities, and generates fears of job competition. While studies do not yet exist showing the extent to which these fears are rooted in reality, the fears themselves are widespread.
It is very possible, for example, that this migration is bringing overall economic benefits to countries but depressing wages in specific sectors where there is a great deal of labor supply, such as construction. And schools and emergency rooms that were already overcrowded in many Latin American cities have only become more congested with the arrival of recent immigrants. Polls show that citizens in some of the principal host countries are growing restless about the unending arrivals. The lack of clarity about when this flow will end compounds the anxiety of the public and resulting political pressures on governments.
Responding to this changing mood, several governments have imposed entry restrictions on Venezuelans over the past year, and it is becoming harder in many countries to get even temporary legal status. This has not necessarily slowed the outflow, but it has meant that many more Venezuelan migrants cross borders illegally and then live in the shadows.
A year ago, a majority of Venezuelans living in neighboring countries had obtained some form of legal status from their host government; today, it’s probably just under half. That may compound the root problem of inequality in host societies rather than fixing it, since migrants who lack legal documents tend to be willing to work for lower pay—but imposing restrictions helps the public feel its political leaders are restoring a sense of order.
Ironically, what made the Latin American response so successful at the beginning—its local, almost spontaneous nature, with little presence or pressure from the international community—may actually be problematic going forward. As the burden for providing education, health care, and housing to tens of thousands of new migrants increases—and as workers fear competition from growing numbers of Venezuelan immigrants—it will be increasingly important that the international community provide support to help these countries deal with their role in absorbing a vast exodus.
The U.N. system, international nongovernmental organizations, international development banks, and donor governments have now started to respond. They have pledged over $384 million for international relief efforts, and hundreds of millions of dollars more in loans and concessional grants from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are now in the pipeline. It’s only a part of what is needed, but it is an important start.
Rather than refugee camps and temporary schools, the countries in the region need to upgrade infrastructure for schools and medical facilities, implement measures to unleash investment for housing construction, and undertake efforts to strengthen financial access, entrepreneurship, and job creation. In most cases, national and local governments and local civil society organizations need to spearhead these efforts instead of international organizations. To be politically viable and address overarching, systemic weaknesses, they must benefit both migrants and host communities equally.
Latin American countries have managed this crisis well so far, and most of the countries could see long-term benefits in labor market and economic growth as a result. But international support will be crucial in helping them deal with the significant costs for services and infrastructure and helping them to maintain a degree of openness to those fleeing Venezuela. Otherwise, this unique and encouraging approach to dealing with a regional displacement crisis could provoke a political crisis for well-meaning host governments.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Tougher Sentencing Won’t Stop Terrorism

Tougher Sentencing Won’t Stop Terrorism

In the wake of Britain ’ s third terrorist incident in two months—a stabbing carried out by a recently released terrorist offender in the South London neighborhood of Streatham—the U.K. government is reaching for the most obvious legislation at hand to prevent such attacks and seeking to extend the detention of convicted terrorist offenders .
Drafting policy in the wake of a terrorist attack is always fraught with danger .
With emotions high , people will grasp at whatever flaw in the system seems obvious at that moment—police surveillance , parole leniency , sentencing laws—and use that as the basis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of such knee-jerk reactions can be far-reaching , and undoing the damage later can be complicated .
Most worryingly , quick fixes tend to overlook the real reasons behind the problem .
While some of the government ’ s proposed responses—such as increasing investment in probation—deserve to be applauded , the push to simply extend detention won ’ t address the issue at hand .
It is helpful to start by looking at the three recent cases in detail .
The first took place Nov. 29 , 2019 , when a released terrorist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vest to attack a rehabilitation conference he was attending , murdering two people before being shot by police on London Bridge .
On Jan. 9 , a convicted terrorist prisoner in the HMP Whitemoor prison in Cambridgeshire led an attack using bladed weapons and fake suicide vests against prison wardens .
And on Feb. 2 , a recently released terrorist offender was shot down as he sought to pursue an attack on shoppers in Streatham using a knife and a fake suicide vest .
Given these incidents happened within the span of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surface , they have been treated as a trend .
Yet a close examination reveals many differences .
While some of the government ’ s proposed responses—such as increasing investment in probation—deserve to be applauded , the push to simply extend detention won ’ t address the issue at hand .
All three cases involved individuals who had been convicted of terrorism offenses and had served or were serving time for them .
But when they launched their attacks , they were at very different stages of their sentences—in HMP Whitemoor , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go ( and now will doubtless have many more ) , while the London Bridge and Streatham attackers had been released on license .
The London Bridge attacker had been out of prison for about one year and had , during that time , participated in a deradicalization program .
He had stopped in the months prior to the attack ; the full story of what took place in the intervening months has not yet emerged .
In contrast , the Streatham attacker never engaged in any deradicalization programs while in prison and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decided to carry out an attack .
Evidence of his determination was clear after his initial arrest on May 17 , 2018 , following an investigation into his online activity .
Not only did police find voluminous amounts of extremist material that he had shared with his family and friends , but they also found notebooks full of expressions of his desire to be a martyr and bomb-making plans .
Following his arrest , he was interviewed 19 times , during which time he largely responded “ no comment ” to all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hearing on Dec. 17 , 2018 , the judge commented on his level of fanaticism , something also emphasized by the head of the U.K. counterterrorism command when he commented on him post-sentencing .
The three cases are therefore quite distinct : The HMP Whitemoor case involves an individual who is facing a long incarceration , the London Bridge attack concerns a man who started to engage with a deradicalization program and then stopped , and the Streatham attacker seemed very firmly set on a course toward committing a violent crime .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an issue in the London Bridge attack .
The attacker seemed to be on a positive path once out of prison but then veered off course for reasons that are still not clear .
Of the three , a longer prison sentence would be most clearly relevant in the Streatham case , though it is unclear that the additional year in prison he would have had to serve if he ’ d completed his full sentence would have been enough to deter him from carrying out an attack .
He had not shown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was of such concern to security services that they had maintained intense surveillance on him after his release .
It is hard to imagine that another year in prison would have done much to deradicalize him .
History actually shows that recidivism among convicted terrorist offenders in the U.K. is quite rare .
For the attacker in HMP Whitemoor , an already heavy sentence will now likely double .
Longer sentencing may not have much effect ( except to increase his eagerness to attack more guards ) .
In fact , reporting on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radicalizing other prisoners , leading ad hoc sharia courts , and causing problems for prison guards .
And beyond these three cases , it is important to remember that there is a large number of terrorist offenders in prisons , many of whom are due to be released soon .
These are the ones who might be affected by the government ’ s rushed policies .
Yet no evidence has been produced that they are all in the same bracket as either the Streatham or London Bridge attacker .
History actually shows that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.K. is quite rare .
According to my research , since 2013 , out of approximately 40 known plots , there have been just six plots involving people who had previously been charged with or convicted of terrorism offenses .
Two plots involved people who had been charged for prior extremist activity : a group from 2014 that wanted to stab a poppy seller during Remembrance Day and a group known as the Three Musketeers that was arrested in 2016 plotting a knife and bomb attack .
One of the three had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while the other two were part of a failed 2011 attempt to travel to a terrorist training camp in Pakistan .
According to Home Office figures , during the year ending June 2019 , 53 prisoners held for terrorism-related offenses were released .
Most , as far as authorities know , have not reoffended .
It is therefore clear that not every terrorist offender who is released from prison will behave like the Streatham attacker .
A more salient similarity among the three cases is the attackers ’ relative youth at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ London Bridge attacker ’ s house was first raided when he was 17 years old , the Streatham attacker was arrested for the offense for which he was jailed at 17 , and the HMP Whitemoor attacker was picked up for involvement in a terrorist plot when he was 18 .
While this is not a new phenomenon—two of the 2005 London bombers were 18 and 19 years old—there has recently been an increase in very young people becoming involved in active terrorist plotting .
One of the cases of concern in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anonymous boy who was arrested at the age of 14 for being involved in an Islamic State-linked plot to attack security officials in Australia and is due for release soon .
This growing cohort of young offenders suggests that the process of radicalization is taking place at a very young age , when people are more susceptible to negative influences .
In other contexts , young people who are drawn into violent or criminal activity are dealt with through criminal sanctions and engagement in rehabilitation programs , given that the young tend to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such young people are being radicalized , the government needs to reconsider how it is handling such cases .
Long prison sentences are undoubtedly justified in some cases , but the youth of the offender might mean that , in other cases , a more intensive rehabilitation program might help place them on a better path .
Finally , there is the question of copycat attacks .
It is clear that the three attacks were in part inspired by each other—the attackers all chose to use the same methodology of knives and fake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new innovation on the U.K. terrorist scene .
In the wake of five terrorist attacks in 2017 , Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu commented how the first attack using a car against tourists on Westminster Bridge and knives on police in front of Parliament had to some degree inspired the others .
As he put it , the March 2017 Westminster Bridge attacker “ gave fellow violent extremists the understanding that the U.K. was not such a hostile place to launch attacks and that by using this simple methodology you could succeed.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is how to stop attacks from inspiring other attacks .
The question is likely around coverage of incidents , rather than anything to do with the incidents themselves .
The vogue for knife attacks started in 2013 after two radicalized individuals murdered an off-duty soldier by running him down and then trying to decapitate him on a street in South London .
Covered in the victim ’ s blood , they then declaimed their radical message to bystanders ’ smartphones and the world , filling news broadcasts for weeks afterward and showing other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viral and grab the world ’ s attention .
The answers will not be found in prisons ; to effectively break these chains of attacks , governments and journalists need to think carefully about how terrorist incidents are covered and reported .
The questions of the effectiveness of deradicalization programs , occasional recidivism , very young offenders , and the inspirational effect of attacks will not be answered by a simple extension of sentencing .
While there may well be cases where offenders should be imprisoned for longer , it is not a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And it is counterproductive to publicize certain cases in the press when it is clear from history that the majority of individuals who have served sentences for terrorism offenses have not returned to terrorist activity .
Having their names and faces splashed in the press is unlikely to help with their rehabilitation and might leave them feeling ostracized and motivate them to return to terrorism .
Judicial and policy decisions must be objective and delivered without emotion .
If a government chooses to pass new legislation on terrorism at a moment when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unlikely to make sensible and dispassionate judgments .
There may well be gaps in legislation , but the British government must be careful to ensure that any new legislation addresses real problems , rather than simply pandering to the public ’ s fears .

In the wake of Britain’s third terrorist incident in two months—a stabbing carried out by a recently released terrorist offender in the South London neighborhood of Streatham—the U.K. government is reaching for the most obvious legislation at hand to prevent such attacks and seeking to extend the detention of convicted terrorist offenders.
In the wake of Britain’s third terrorist incident in two months—a stabbing carried out by a recently released terrorist offender in the South London neighborhood of Streatham—the U.K. government is reaching for the most obvious legislation at hand to prevent such attacks and seeking to extend the detention of convicted terrorist offenders.
Drafting policy in the wake of a terrorist attack is always fraught with danger. With emotions high, people will grasp at whatever flaw in the system seems obvious at that moment—police surveillance, parole leniency, sentencing laws—and use that as the basis for new policies. Yet the consequences of such knee-jerk reactions can be far-reaching, and undoing the damage later can be complicated. Most worryingly, quick fixes tend to overlook the real reasons behind the problem. While some of the government’s proposed responses—such as increasing investment in probation—deserve to be applauded, the push to simply extend detention won’t address the issue at hand.
It is helpful to start by looking at the three recent cases in detail. The first took place Nov. 29, 2019, when a released terrorist offender used knives and a fake suicide vest to attack a rehabilitation conference he was attending, murdering two people before being shot by police on London Bridge. On Jan. 9, a convicted terrorist prisoner in the HMP Whitemoor prison in Cambridgeshire led an attack using bladed weapons and fake suicide vests against prison wardens. And on Feb. 2, a recently released terrorist offender was shot down as he sought to pursue an attack on shoppers in Streatham using a knife and a fake suicide vest. Given these incidents happened within the span of a few months and appear similar on the surface, they have been treated as a trend. Yet a close examination reveals many differences.
While some of the government’s proposed responses—such as increasing investment in probation—deserve to be applauded, the push to simply extend detention won’t address the issue at hand.
All three cases involved individuals who had been convicted of terrorism offenses and had served or were serving time for them. But when they launched their attacks, they were at very different stages of their sentences—in HMP Whitemoor, the convicted terrorist offender still had years to go (and now will doubtless have many more), while the London Bridge and Streatham attackers had been released on license. The London Bridge attacker had been out of prison for about one year and had, during that time, participated in a deradicalization program. He had stopped in the months prior to the attack; the full story of what took place in the intervening months has not yet emerged.
In contrast, the Streatham attacker never engaged in any deradicalization programs while in prison and on release appears to have quite quickly decided to carry out an attack. Evidence of his determination was clear after his initial arrest on May 17, 2018, following an investigation into his online activity. Not only did police find voluminous amounts of extremist material that he had shared with his family and friends, but they also found notebooks full of expressions of his desire to be a martyr and bomb-making plans.
Following his arrest, he was interviewed 19 times, during which time he largely responded “no comment” to all of the questions posed. During his sentencing hearing on Dec. 17, 2018, the judge commented on his level of fanaticism, something also emphasized by the head of the U.K. counterterrorism command when he commented on him post-sentencing.
The three cases are therefore quite distinct: The HMP Whitemoor case involves an individual who is facing a long incarceration, the London Bridge attack concerns a man who started to engage with a deradicalization program and then stopped, and the Streatham attacker seemed very firmly set on a course toward committing a violent crime. A failure in deradicalization programs was only potentially an issue in the London Bridge attack. The attacker seemed to be on a positive path once out of prison but then veered off course for reasons that are still not clear.
Of the three, a longer prison sentence would be most clearly relevant in the Streatham case, though it is unclear that the additional year in prison he would have had to serve if he’d completed his full sentence would have been enough to deter him from carrying out an attack. He had not shown any evidence of abandoning his ideas and was of such concern to security services that they had maintained intense surveillance on him after his release. It is hard to imagine that another year in prison would have done much to deradicalize him.
History actually shows that recidivism among convicted terrorist offenders in the U.K. is quite rare.
For the attacker in HMP Whitemoor, an already heavy sentence will now likely double. Longer sentencing may not have much effect (except to increase his eagerness to attack more guards). In fact, reporting on the case suggests that he has been radicalizing other prisoners, leading ad hoc sharia courts, and causing problems for prison guards.
And beyond these three cases, it is important to remember that there is a large number of terrorist offenders in prisons, many of whom are due to be released soon. These are the ones who might be affected by the government’s rushed policies. Yet no evidence has been produced that they are all in the same bracket as either the Streatham or London Bridge attacker. History actually shows that recidivism among convicted terrorist offenders in the U.K. is quite rare.
According to my research, since 2013, out of approximately 40 known plots, there have been just six plots involving people who had previously been charged with or convicted of terrorism offenses. Two plots involved people who had been charged for prior extremist activity: a group from 2014 that wanted to stab a poppy seller during Remembrance Day and a group known as the Three Musketeers that was arrested in 2016 plotting a knife and bomb attack. One of the three had been previously arrested alongside the London Bridge attacker, while the other two were part of a failed 2011 attempt to travel to a terrorist training camp in Pakistan.
According to Home Office figures, during the year ending June 2019, 53 prisoners held for terrorism-related offenses were released. Most, as far as authorities know, have not reoffended. It is therefore clear that not every terrorist offender who is released from prison will behave like the Streatham attacker.
A more salient similarity among the three cases is the attackers’ relative youth at the moment of first being arrested. The London Bridge attacker’s house was first raided when he was 17 years old, the Streatham attacker was arrested for the offense for which he was jailed at 17, and the HMP Whitemoor attacker was picked up for involvement in a terrorist plot when he was 18.
While this is not a new phenomenon—two of the 2005 London bombers were 18 and 19 years old—there has recently been an increase in very young people becoming involved in active terrorist plotting. One of the cases of concern in the press at the moment is of an anonymous boy who was arrested at the age of 14 for being involved in an Islamic State-linked plot to attack security officials in Australia and is due for release soon.
This growing cohort of young offenders suggests that the process of radicalization is taking place at a very young age, when people are more susceptible to negative influences. In other contexts, young people who are drawn into violent or criminal activity are dealt with through criminal sanctions and engagement in rehabilitation programs, given that the young tend to be more susceptible to influencing. If such young people are being radicalized, the government needs to reconsider how it is handling such cases. Long prison sentences are undoubtedly justified in some cases, but the youth of the offender might mean that, in other cases, a more intensive rehabilitation program might help place them on a better path.
Finally, there is the question of copycat attacks. It is clear that the three attacks were in part inspired by each other—the attackers all chose to use the same methodology of knives and fake suicide vests, which is a relatively new innovation on the U.K. terrorist scene. In the wake of five terrorist attacks in 2017, Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu commented how the first attack using a car against tourists on Westminster Bridge and knives on police in front of Parliament had to some degree inspired the others. As he put it, the March 2017 Westminster Bridge attacker “gave fellow violent extremists the understanding that the U.K. was not such a hostile place to launch attacks and that by using this simple methodology you could succeed.”
The dilemma law enforcement officials face is how to stop attacks from inspiring other attacks. The question is likely around coverage of incidents, rather than anything to do with the incidents themselves. The vogue for knife attacks started in 2013 after two radicalized individuals murdered an off-duty soldier by running him down and then trying to decapitate him on a street in South London.
Covered in the victim’s blood, they then declaimed their radical message to bystanders’ smartphones and the world, filling news broadcasts for weeks afterward and showing other terrorists how easily successful attacks could go viral and grab the world’s attention. The answers will not be found in prisons; to effectively break these chains of attacks, governments and journalists need to think carefully about how terrorist incidents are covered and reported.
The questions of the effectiveness of deradicalization programs, occasional recidivism, very young offenders, and the inspirational effect of attacks will not be answered by a simple extension of sentencing. While there may well be cases where offenders should be imprisoned for longer, it is not a solution that is applicable to all. And it is counterproductive to publicize certain cases in the press when it is clear from history that the majority of individuals who have served sentences for terrorism offenses have not returned to terrorist activity. Having their names and faces splashed in the press is unlikely to help with their rehabilitation and might leave them feeling ostracized and motivate them to return to terrorism.
Judicial and policy decisions must be objective and delivered without emotion. If a government chooses to pass new legislation on terrorism at a moment when the country is reeling from attacks, it is unlikely to make sensible and dispassionate judgments. There may well be gaps in legislation, but the British government must be careful to ensure that any new legislation addresses real problems, rather than simply pandering to the public’s fears.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Ireland’s Sinn Fein Hopes to Form a Government

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Ireland ’ s nationalist Sinn Fein party sees a historic surge in weekend elections , Thailand reels from a mass shooting , the death toll of the new coronavirus surpasses the SARS outbreak in China , and what to watch in the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Ireland ’ s left-wing nationalist Sinn Fein party has demanded to be part of the next government after initial vote counts showed it winning 24.5 percent of first-preference votes in Saturday ’ s elections—more than any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fail .
On Sunday , Sinn Fein party leader Mary Lou McDonald called the results a “ revolution ” and pledged to seek a coalition government .
“ This is no longer a two-party system , ” she said .
Vote counts are still underway , but Saturday ’ s elections have thrown Ireland into political turmoil , with no party winning anything close to a majority .
Long held back by its past links to the paramilitary Irish Republican Army ( IRA ) , Sinn Fein is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of negotiations to form a coalition .
Exit polls show that Sinn Fein had a surge in support among younger voters concerned about lagging public services , housing , and infrastructure .
What happens now ?
Sinn Fein ran far fewer candidates than the other parties in Saturday ’ s election , and the ruling Fine Gael and Fianna Fail are expected to each win more seats in parliament .
That means it ’ s not yet clear which parties would be able to form a coalition , though Sinn Fein has floated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without the two major parties .
If the negotiations end in deadlock , another election could be called .
Prime Minister Leo Varadkar repeated on Sunday that a coalition between his Fine Gael party and Sinn Fein is “ not an option.
” Meanwhile , the leader of Fianna Fail did not rule out a coalition with the nationalist party .
What does this mean for Irish unity ?
If Sinn Fein does join a coalition , it would put the party in the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Brexit has already reopened the debate over Irish reunification , and the unity question will be paramount during the government formation process .
Sinn Fein has called for a unity referendum within the lifetime of the next government , FP ’ s Dan Haverty explains .
Thailand reels from mass shooting .
Thailand was shaken by its worst-ever mass shooting over the weekend , after a Thai soldier killed at least 29 people—most in a shopping mall—in the city of Nakhon Ratchasima ( Korat ) in the country ’ s northeast .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ rampage , and an overnight siege in the mall ended only when the attacker was killed by police .
While Thailand has a relatively high level of gun ownership , mass killings are rare .
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha told reporters on that the attack stemmed from a “ personal conflict ” over real estate .
Turkey sends reinforcements to Idlib .
Turkey has dispatched additional troops to Syria ’ s northwestern Idlib province , where Syrian government forces are waging an offensive against the country ’ s last remaining rebel enclaves .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Syrian Army has already recaptured dozens of towns and villages—more than 230 square miles of territory .
Concerned about hundreds of thousands of Syrians crossing its border , Turkey has urged Syria to back down from its offensive and an official said Sunday that Ankara is prepared to “ take action.
” While Turkish intervention can slow Assad ’ s forces down , it can ’ t stop the ongoing crisis in Idlib , Kareem Shaheen writes in FP .
Coronavirus tops SARS death toll .
The official number of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new coronavirus outbreak reached 910 on Monday , surpassing the death toll of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 .
Chinese officials have confirmed more than 40,000 cases of the virus .
People across China are returning to work after the extended Lunar New Year holiday , though many schools and offices remain closed , with employees working from home .
A team of experts led by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) experts arrives in Beijing today to assist with the response to the outbreak , potentially including some scientists from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
The coronavirus outbreak continues to put neighboring countries on edge , particularly Thailand—which sees millions of Chinese visitors annually .
The Thai government is trying to balance disease control with its relations with China , Tyler Roney reports for FP from Bangkok .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s official budget proposal will be released today , with the White House expected to propose a $ 4.8 trillion budget for the fiscal year 2021 , which begins Oct. 1 .
The budget , which must be approved by Congress , would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign aid .
It also includes a request for a significant increase in funding for immigration and border protection agencies , the Wall Street Journal reports .
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas speaks before the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday , hoping to build opposition against Trump ’ s Middle East peace plan .
Some countries are already feeling the pressure from Washington : Last Thursday , Tunisia abruptly fired its ambassador to the United Nations after he led negotiations on a Palestinian draft resolution declaring the peace plan in breach of international law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Robbie Gramer report .
U.S. election season continues as a second state votes to select a Democratic Party nominee .
New Hampshire goes to the polls on Tuesday , just over a week after the chaotic Iowa caucuses .
The New Hampshire race could be a showdown between the top two Democratic candidates in Iowa , Sen. Bernie Sanders and former Mayor Pete Buttigieg—though they don ’ t appear to be competing for the same types of voters in New Hampshire , the Washington Post reports .
Polls close at 8 p.m. EST @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is set to take effect on Friday , with China announcing last week that it will cut tariffs imposed last year on $ 75 billion of U.S. goods—and that it remains committed to the eventual removal of all tariffs on both sides .
The announcement came amid concerns that China would delay some of its commitments under the deal as it grapples with the coronavirus outbreak .
The two-day Munich Security Conference begins on Friday , with both U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper to attend alongside dozens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The conference kicks off a week-long trip for Pompeo , including his first official visit to sub-Saharan Africa .
Australia ’ s economy .
Australia has gone 28 years without a recession , but its economy could be tested after the devastating bushfires of the past two months , the Wall Street Journal reports .
While the Australian central bank predicts a quick recovery , economists aren ’ t so sure .
Before the fire season began , Australia ’ s economy was showing signs of slowing down amid global trade uncertainty and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The separatist Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front ( JKLF ) called for general strikes on Sunday and again on Tuesday in Indian-administered Kashmir .
The strikes coincide with anniversaries of the deaths of a Kashmiri separatist who attacked the Indian parliament in 2001 and the JKLF ’ s founder .
India ’ s government banned the JKLF last year amid its crackdown on the disputed region last year .
Communications in Kashmir remain restricted .
Myanmar nationalists .
Around 1,000 Myanmar nationalists marched in Yangon on Sunday , accusing Aung San Suu Kyi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the country ’ s Buddhist majority and in protest of proposed constitutional reforms that would reduce the military ’ s power .
Tensions between Aung San Suu Kyi ’ s party and the military are rising ahead of nationwide elections expected later this year .
The South Korean film Parasite won Best Picture at the Academy Awards on Sunday , becoming the first foreign-language film to take the academy ’ s top prize .
( It was also the first-ever movie from South Korea to be nominated for the award . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ any other film on Sunday—including International Feature and Best Director for filmmaker Bong Joon Ho , who previously called the Academy Awards a “ very local ” ceremony .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ireland’s nationalist Sinn Fein party sees a historic surge in weekend elections, Thailand reels from a mass shooting, the death toll of the new coronavirus surpasses the SARS outbreak in China, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ireland’s nationalist Sinn Fein party sees a historic surge in weekend elections, Thailand reels from a mass shooting, the death toll of the new coronavirus surpasses the SARS outbreak in China, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
What Happened in Ireland’s Elections?
Ireland’s left-wing nationalist Sinn Fein party has demanded to be part of the next government after initial vote counts showed it winning 24.5 percent of first-preference votes in Saturday’s elections—more than any other party, including the dominant centrist parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. On Sunday, Sinn Fein party leader Mary Lou McDonald called the results a “revolution” and pledged to seek a coalition government. “This is no longer a two-party system,” she said.
Vote counts are still underway, but Saturday’s elections have thrown Ireland into political turmoil, with no party winning anything close to a majority. Long held back by its past links to the paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA), Sinn Fein is now poised to be a key part of negotiations to form a coalition. Exit polls show that Sinn Fein had a surge in support among younger voters concerned about lagging public services, housing, and infrastructure.
What happens now? Sinn Fein ran far fewer candidates than the other parties in Saturday’s election, and the ruling Fine Gael and Fianna Fail are expected to each win more seats in parliament. That means it’s not yet clear which parties would be able to form a coalition, though Sinn Fein has floated the idea of forming a left-wing government without the two major parties. If the negotiations end in deadlock, another election could be called.
Prime Minister Leo Varadkar repeated on Sunday that a coalition between his Fine Gael party and Sinn Fein is “not an option.” Meanwhile, the leader of Fianna Fail did not rule out a coalition with the nationalist party.
What does this mean for Irish unity? If Sinn Fein does join a coalition, it would put the party in the governments of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland for the first time in history. Brexit has already reopened the debate over Irish reunification, and the unity question will be paramount during the government formation process. Sinn Fein has called for a unity referendum within the lifetime of the next government, FP’s Dan Haverty explains.
What We’re Following Today
Thailand reels from mass shooting. Thailand was shaken by its worst-ever mass shooting over the weekend, after a Thai soldier killed at least 29 people—most in a shopping mall—in the city of Nakhon Ratchasima (Korat) in the country’s northeast. Nearly 60 people were wounded in the rampage, and an overnight siege in the mall ended only when the attacker was killed by police. While Thailand has a relatively high level of gun ownership, mass killings are rare. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha told reporters on that the attack stemmed from a “personal conflict” over real estate.
Turkey sends reinforcements to Idlib. Turkey has dispatched additional troops to Syria’s northwestern Idlib province, where Syrian government forces are waging an offensive against the country’s last remaining rebel enclaves. In recent days, President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Army has already recaptured dozens of towns and villages—more than 230 square miles of territory. Concerned about hundreds of thousands of Syrians crossing its border, Turkey has urged Syria to back down from its offensive and an official said Sunday that Ankara is prepared to “take action.” While Turkish intervention can slow Assad’s forces down, it can’t stop the ongoing crisis in Idlib, Kareem Shaheen writes in FP.
Coronavirus tops SARS death toll. The official number of people who have died in China from the new coronavirus outbreak reached 910 on Monday, surpassing the death toll of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3. Chinese officials have confirmed more than 40,000 cases of the virus. People across China are returning to work after the extended Lunar New Year holiday, though many schools and offices remain closed, with employees working from home. A team of experts led by the World Health Organization (WHO) experts arrives in Beijing today to assist with the response to the outbreak, potentially including some scientists from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC).
The coronavirus outbreak continues to put neighboring countries on edge, particularly Thailand—which sees millions of Chinese visitors annually. The Thai government is trying to balance disease control with its relations with China, Tyler Roney reports for FP from Bangkok.
The World This Week
U.S. President Donald Trump’s official budget proposal will be released today, with the White House expected to propose a $4.8 trillion budget for the fiscal year 2021, which begins Oct. 1. The budget, which must be approved by Congress, would see a 21 percent cut in U.S. foreign aid. It also includes a request for a significant increase in funding for immigration and border protection agencies, the Wall Street Journal reports.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas speaks before the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday, hoping to build opposition against Trump’s Middle East peace plan. Some countries are already feeling the pressure from Washington: Last Thursday, Tunisia abruptly fired its ambassador to the United Nations after he led negotiations on a Palestinian draft resolution declaring the peace plan in breach of international law, FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report.
U.S. election season continues as a second state votes to select a Democratic Party nominee. New Hampshire goes to the polls on Tuesday, just over a week after the chaotic Iowa caucuses. The New Hampshire race could be a showdown between the top two Democratic candidates in Iowa, Sen. Bernie Sanders and former Mayor Pete Buttigieg—though they don’t appear to be competing for the same types of voters in New Hampshire, the Washington Post reports. Polls close at 8 p.m. EST.
The U.S.-China phase one trade deal is set to take effect on Friday, with China announcing last week that it will cut tariffs imposed last year on $75 billion of U.S. goods—and that it remains committed to the eventual removal of all tariffs on both sides. The announcement came amid concerns that China would delay some of its commitments under the deal as it grapples with the coronavirus outbreak.
The two-day Munich Security Conference begins on Friday, with both U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper to attend alongside dozens of other world and defense leaders. The conference kicks off a week-long trip for Pompeo, including his first official visit to sub-Saharan Africa.
Keep an Eye On
Australia’s economy. Australia has gone 28 years without a recession, but its economy could be tested after the devastating bushfires of the past two months, the Wall Street Journal reports. While the Australian central bank predicts a quick recovery, economists aren’t so sure. Before the fire season began, Australia’s economy was showing signs of slowing down amid global trade uncertainty and declining domestic consumption.
Strikes in Kashmir. The separatist Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) called for general strikes on Sunday and again on Tuesday in Indian-administered Kashmir. The strikes coincide with anniversaries of the deaths of a Kashmiri separatist who attacked the Indian parliament in 2001 and the JKLF’s founder. India’s government banned the JKLF last year amid its crackdown on the disputed region last year. Communications in Kashmir remain restricted.
Myanmar nationalists. Around 1,000 Myanmar nationalists marched in Yangon on Sunday, accusing Aung San Suu Kyi’s government of not sticking up for the country’s Buddhist majority and in protest of proposed constitutional reforms that would reduce the military’s power. Tensions between Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and the military are rising ahead of nationwide elections expected later this year.
Odds and Ends
The South Korean film Parasite won Best Picture at the Academy Awards on Sunday, becoming the first foreign-language film to take the academy’s top prize. (It was also the first-ever movie from South Korea to be nominated for the award.) Parasite won four Oscars in total—more than any other film on Sunday—including International Feature and Best Director for filmmaker Bong Joon Ho, who previously called the Academy Awards a “very local” ceremony.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Trump Seeks to Halve U.S. Funding for World Health Organization as Coronavirus Rages

Trump Seeks to Halve U.S. Funding for World Health Organization as Coronavirus Rages The Trump administration is eyeing steep cuts to global health funds in its 2021 budget proposal , slashing more than $ 3 billion in overall programs , including half of its annual funding to the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , which is leading the fight against the deadly coronavirus outbreak .
Lawmakers from the House and Senate appropriations committees pressed officials from the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) at a briefing on Feb. 7 previewing the budget to explain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spending at a time when the world is facing the threat of a deadly virus in China that has spread in limited numbers to other countries around the world , according to congressional aides familiar with the matter .
The cuts are part of a broader proposal by the Trump administration to cut more than 21 percent from the federal budget for foreign aid , proposing $ 44 billion for 2021 from the $ 55 billion Congress enacted in 2020 .
Top lawmakers quickly slapped down the budget proposal , indicating Congress could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cuts to foreign aid and the State Department as it has in years past on a bipartisan basis .
“ Like the President ’ s previous budgets , this year ’ s request is a waste of the paper it ’ s printed on , ” Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , said in a statement .
“ Proposing such reckless cuts to our critical foreign policy tools isn ’ t a serious proposal.
” Senior administration officials said they were allocating new resources to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worked around the clock to evacuate American citizens from the region of China hit by the deadly outbreak .
“ The budget protects against infectious disease threats at home and abroad , by bolstering country capacity to prevent , detect , and respond to outbreaks and to prevent epidemics from reaching our borders , ” Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun told reporters at a briefing on Monday .
“ It also allows us to provide the necessary flexibility to respond to emerging global health threats , such as the novel coronavirus and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evacuate Americans was due to the incredible men and women of the State Department and the resources provided by this budget , ” he said .
But experts and some on Capitol Hill say a small increase in funds doesn ’ t outweigh the steep proposed cuts to global health programs overall .
“ I ’ m pleased that the budget request has a small boost to USAID ’ s global health security account—but adding $ 15 million more to this account , while cutting more than $ 3 billion in overall global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for pandemic preparedness , ” Liz Schrayer , the president and CEO of the nonprofit organization U.S .
Global Leadership Coalition , told Foreign Policy in an email .
“ If there is anything the coronavirus reminds us , it ’ s that a global threat anywhere is a global threat everywhere.
” “ We ’ ve been down this road before , ” said one Senate aide , noting that the White House has been trying unsuccessfully for three years to impose steep cuts in global health programs that Congress supports .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn anything.
” The aide , who spoke on condition of anonymity , said officials from the State Department and USAID were asked at the briefing to explain how they could , on the one hand , say their budget “ asserts moral leadership through global health and humanitarian assistance ” when in reality it cuts funding for both .
The response , the aide said , was “ essentially silence .
There was no substantive explanation , but everyone knows they are simply carrying out the orders of the White House.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things to be doing in the midst of a global pandemic , you ’ re cutting funds for global health , ’ ” the aide added .
“ Their response was : ‘ We did what we could with the funds we were told we could spend.
’ ” The State Department did not respond to request for comment .
Congress authorized nearly $ 123 million in funding for fiscal year 2020 to the Geneva-based WHO , which is coordinating the international response to the coronavirus outbreak .
The Trump administration proposed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to just under $ 58 million for fiscal year 2021 .
The budget proposal also calls for slashing more than $ 3 billion from the more than $ 9 billion Congress approved for global health programs managed by the State Department and USAID .
“ This is precisely the wrong time to be cutting funds to the World Health Organization , which is on the front lines of tackling the coronavirus epidemic and trying to keep it from spreading wildly to other countries , ” Peter Yeo , the president of the Better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who expects the proposed cuts to be rejected by Congress .
“ It is out of synch with the front-line realities of our foreign policy and national security.
” The administration ’ s budget also includes steep cuts to fighting some of the world ’ s deadliest diseases .
It proposes a 58 percent cut to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS , Tuberculosis and Malaria , down to $ 658 million from $ 1.56 billion allocated in 2020 .
The administration proposed full funding for a program that immunizes children in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 1.16 billion over four years to the program , officially called Gavi , the Vaccine Alliance .
“ [ T ] he U.S. contribution will strengthen routine immunization against outbreak-prone diseases such as measles , and maintain global stockpiles of vaccines against Ebola , cholera , yellow fever , and meningitis , ” USAID Administrator Mark Green said in a statement .
The Trump administration ’ s proposed cuts to the State Department and foreign aid budget would hit the United Nations and other international organizations particularly hard , shaving off nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 500 million , of the almost $ 1.5 billion Congress enacted in 2020 .
It proposes a nearly $ 200 million cut in mandatory U.S. contributions to the U.N. ’ s administrative budget , as well as millions of dollars in additional cuts to international agencies that regulate international mail and telecommunications services , track global warming , fight cancer , and seek to contain the use of chemical weapons .
U.S. contributions to NATO would fall from more than $ 61 million to about $ 54 million , while $ 73 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cooperation and Development would be eliminated .
The administration would support a slight increase in funding to the International Civil Aviation Organization from its past budget proposals and the World Trade Organization , where the United States is engaged in a fierce competition for influence with China .
But it would sharply cut funding to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization—from under $ 109 million to $ 56 million—where a U.S.-backed Georgian national lost a bruising leadership battle to a former top Chinese agricultural official .
The United States also restored funding to @ @ @ @ @

The Trump administration is eyeing steep cuts to global health funds in its 2021 budget proposal, slashing more than $3 billion in overall programs, including half of its annual funding to the World Health Organization (WHO), which is leading the fight against the deadly coronavirus outbreak.
The Trump administration is eyeing steep cuts to global health funds in its 2021 budget proposal, slashing more than $3 billion in overall programs, including half of its annual funding to the World Health Organization (WHO), which is leading the fight against the deadly coronavirus outbreak.
Lawmakers from the House and Senate appropriations committees pressed officials from the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) at a briefing on Feb. 7 previewing the budget to explain why it made sense to scale back spending at a time when the world is facing the threat of a deadly virus in China that has spread in limited numbers to other countries around the world, according to congressional aides familiar with the matter.
The cuts are part of a broader proposal by the Trump administration to cut more than 21 percent from the federal budget for foreign aid, proposing $44 billion for 2021 from the $55 billion Congress enacted in 2020.
Top lawmakers quickly slapped down the budget proposal, indicating Congress could reject the Trump administration’s proposed cuts to foreign aid and the State Department as it has in years past on a bipartisan basis. “Like the President’s previous budgets, this year’s request is a waste of the paper it’s printed on,” Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement. “Proposing such reckless cuts to our critical foreign policy tools isn’t a serious proposal.”
Senior administration officials said they were allocating new resources, including an additional $15 million for the USAID Global Health Security Program, to fight the coronavirus, as government officials worked around the clock to evacuate American citizens from the region of China hit by the deadly outbreak. The budget proposal also includes a request for $25 million for a so-called Emergency Reserve Fund, which, according to a State Department spokesperson, “can be quickly deployed to respond to pandemic outbreaks.”
“The budget protects against infectious disease threats at home and abroad, by bolstering country capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks and to prevent epidemics from reaching our borders,” Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun told reporters at a briefing on Monday. “It also allows us to provide the necessary flexibility to respond to emerging global health threats, such as the novel coronavirus and Ebola.”
“Our ability to successfully evacuate Americans was due to the incredible men and women of the State Department and the resources provided by this budget,” he said.
But experts and some on Capitol Hill say a small increase in funds doesn’t outweigh the steep proposed cuts to global health programs overall.
“I’m pleased that the budget request has a small boost to USAID’s global health security account—but adding $15 million more to this account, while cutting more than $3 billion in overall global health programs, is not the answer for pandemic preparedness,” Liz Schrayer, the president and CEO of the nonprofit organization U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, told Foreign Policy in an email. “If there is anything the coronavirus reminds us, it’s that a global threat anywhere is a global threat everywhere.”
“We’ve been down this road before,” said one Senate aide, noting that the White House has been trying unsuccessfully for three years to impose steep cuts in global health programs that Congress supports. “They don’t seem to learn anything.”
The aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said officials from the State Department and USAID were asked at the briefing to explain how they could, on the one hand, say their budget “asserts moral leadership through global health and humanitarian assistance” when in reality it cuts funding for both. The response, the aide said, was “essentially silence. There was no substantive explanation, but everyone knows they are simply carrying out the orders of the White House.”
“We said, ‘Of all things to be doing in the midst of a global pandemic, you’re cutting funds for global health,’” the aide added. “Their response was: ‘We did what we could with the funds we were told we could spend.’”
The State Department spokesperson defended the administration’s response to global health, saying that State and USAID programs “are enhanced by other agencies’ pandemic preparedness and response-related efforts. Our programs build the capacity of countries to prevent, detect, and respond to emerging pandemic threats such as the coronavirus.”
“The U.S. is a proud leader in global health assistance, but we do look to other donors to contribute more,” the spokesperson added. “The $290 million requested for Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, advances these burden-sharing goals while continuing to advance U.S. leadership on a cost-effective, proven health intervention.”
Congress authorized nearly $123 million in funding for fiscal year 2020 to the Geneva-based WHO, which is coordinating the international response to the coronavirus outbreak. The Trump administration proposed that the U.S. commitment to WHO be reduced to just under $58 million for fiscal year 2021. The budget proposal also calls for slashing more than $3 billion from the more than $9 billion Congress approved for global health programs managed by the State Department and USAID.
“This is precisely the wrong time to be cutting funds to the World Health Organization, which is on the front lines of tackling the coronavirus epidemic and trying to keep it from spreading wildly to other countries,” Peter Yeo, the president of the Better World Campaign, told Foreign Policy, who expects the proposed cuts to be rejected by Congress. “It is out of synch with the front-line realities of our foreign policy and national security.”
The administration’s budget also includes steep cuts to fighting some of the world’s deadliest diseases. It proposes a 58 percent cut to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, down to $658 million from $1.56 billion allocated in 2020.
The administration proposed full funding for a program that immunizes children in the world’s poorest countries, committing $1.16 billion over four years to the program, officially called Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
“[T]he U.S. contribution will strengthen routine immunization against outbreak-prone diseases such as measles, and maintain global stockpiles of vaccines against Ebola, cholera, yellow fever, and meningitis,” USAID Administrator Mark Green said in a statement.
The Trump administration’s proposed cuts to the State Department and foreign aid budget would hit the United Nations and other international organizations particularly hard, shaving off nearly a third, or more than $500 million, of the almost $1.5 billion Congress enacted in 2020. It proposes a nearly $200 million cut in mandatory U.S. contributions to the U.N.’s administrative budget, as well as millions of dollars in additional cuts to international agencies that regulate international mail and telecommunications services, track global warming, fight cancer, and seek to contain the use of chemical weapons. U.S. contributions to NATO would fall from more than $61 million to about $54 million, while $73 million in funding to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development would be eliminated.
The administration would support a slight increase in funding to the International Civil Aviation Organization from its past budget proposals and the World Trade Organization, where the United States is engaged in a fierce competition for influence with China. But it would sharply cut funding to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization—from under $109 million to $56 million—where a U.S.-backed Georgian national lost a bruising leadership battle to a former top Chinese agricultural official. The United States also restored funding to the World Tourism Organization.