foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Afghans Wonder: Is the Peace Deal Just for Americans?

Afghans Wonder : Is the Peace Deal Just for Americans ?
There ’ s a grim new joke going around parts of Afghanistan : If you want to be safe from attacks by the Taliban , move next to a U.S. air base .
“ I have never seen a dead American soldier , ” said Fatteh Sattar , a civil engineer from the northern province of Baghlan .
“ It ’ s Afghans killing Afghans , and I guess this will not stop so quickly.
” The Taliban , for their part , are now saying more clearly than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 29 in Doha , Qatar , after 18 months of negotiations applies only to a truce with U.S. forces , not to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces .
“ We signed an agreement with the Americans .
But our jihad is not over , ” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Foreign Policy this week .
“ The stooges who supported the invaders during the last two decades are our enemies .
This might change after additional talks but at the moment , we are still at war.
” Even before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among ordinary Afghans rose as they watched the elected government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—who is currently engaged in fight for legitimacy with his election rival , Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah—get left out of the negotiations between U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar .
Skepticism changed to outright fear and terror as the Taliban launched dozens of military operations against Afghan forces in the last few days , killing both armed soldiers and civilians , according to the Afghan Ministry of Interior .
But perhaps nothing has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their government—or made them feel so delegitimized—as much as the news of a 35-minute phone conversation between Baradar and Donald Trump on Tuesday , the first ever such contact between a U.S. president and a Taliban leader .
Afterward Trump told reporters : “ We had a good conversation .
We ’ ve agreed there ’ s no violence , we don ’ t want violence ; we ’ ll see what happens.
” According to Suhail Shaheen , a Taliban spokesman in Doha , during the call the U.S. president called the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described their cause as one of “ defending their country.
” The Taliban eagerly promoted news about the conversation .
Some observers suggested that Trump—who has a demonstrated habit of forming warm relations with autocrats who respond positively to him—might even be getting along better with the Taliban than with the current democratically elected government in Kabul .
“ If Trump really had a 35 minute conversation on a wide variety of issues with Mullah Baradar , after concluding a deal with him , is it too provocative to assert that the US @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better relations with the Taliban than it does with President Ghani ?
” tweeted Michael Kugelman , the deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center in Washington .
This is a touchy issue , since the peace agreement calls for the formation of a new “ post-settlement Afghan Islamic government ” and Trump has no relationship with Ghani , whose ascent to power came during the Obama administration .
“ I think that the formation of a new government will be one of the main issues of upcoming intra-Afghan talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and analyst Wahed Faqiri .
For ordinary Afghans , all this recalls an old and bitter history dating to when the Americans abandoned their country the last time after funding the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s , and the Taliban eventually emerged to seize power .
“ A friend of mine joined the Taliban .
I did not care about it , but he considers me and his other friends as enemies .
But now he is fine with the Americans ?
What kind of deal is that ?
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ali Hazara , a driver and mechanic from Baghlan , one of the most unstable provinces of the country .
The Taliban began launching new attacks after Ghani criticized the U.S.-Taliban deal and announced that he would not release 5,000 prisoners , one of the major pillars of the agreement .
After the deal was signed , Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai , who leads Taliban ’ s political office in Doha , claimed that there is no real government in Kabul and that the Taliban do not accept it anyway .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington could even lead to a strengthened Taliban movement .
“ When they meet , their mutual trust may grow , ” he said .
All this would be a strange historical irony for the Americans , since it was a previous Taliban government that harbored the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on Sept. 11 , 2001 .
Central to the new deal is a Taliban guarantee that they will not do so again and will cut all ties with al Qaeda as well as prevent the nation from becoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might plot against the United States .
In return , the United States will begin a significant drawdown of U.S. troops within the first 135 days and a total withdrawal within 14 months .
The Taliban also have to participate in upcoming intra-Afghan talks between various political factions , but the new round of peace talks may have a hard time getting underway in these conditions .
“ The deal between the Americans and the Taliban made us very optimistic .
But it does not make sense if such attacks continue , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Nadir Shah Kot district of Khost , where on Monday a bomb detonated near a soccer field in the district and killed three civilians .
No group claimed responsibility for the attack , and the Taliban declared they were not linked to it .
“ The mujahideen are not responsible for the attack in Khost .
We also don ’ t know who was behind it , but there are many other problems , like enmities among different tribes , and they have nothing to do with us , ” Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also raised the possibility that other groups such as Islamic State are seeking to further undermine the peace deal by renewing violence .
The United states says that for withdrawal to go forward , the Taliban must observe the conditions of the agreement .
On Wednesday , after more than a week-long reduction in violence , the U.S. military also conducted an airstrike against Taliban fighters in southern Helmand province to “ defend ” their partners within the Afghan military .
There were no reports of casualties .
That same day U.S. Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were making compliance with the deal difficult .
“ The results so far have been mixed , ” Esper told the Senate Armed Services Committee .
“ The Taliban are honoring their piece in terms of not attacking U.S. and [ Western ] coalition forces but not in terms of sustaining the reduction in violence.
” And so confusion reigns .
Ordinary Afghans , meanwhile , are starting to ask themselves what a new Afghan government joined by the Taliban would look like .
Many plainly fear another reign of terror like that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distanced themselves from their old regime and its practices .
If they are serious about that and respect our freedoms , it ’ s fine .
But if they don ’ t , I truly fear their return , ” said Nazifa Niazi , a retired army officer from Kabul .
Like many other Afghan women , she emphasized that going to work , school , or university must not be prohibited by the Taliban , who have made no such promise .
Other women share Niazi ’ s opinion—and her deepest fears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But I don ’ t think that the Taliban will respect us as women , ” said Fahima , who works as a civil servant in Kabul and didn ’ t want her last name used .
“ They oppressed us in the past , and they might continue to do so .
They attack girls ’ school and burn them .
They also use our young men as cannon fodder .
I do not welcome their return if they don ’ t change their attitude and behavior .
”

There’s a grim new joke going around parts of Afghanistan: If you want to be safe from Taliban attacks, move next to a U.S. air base. “I have never seen a dead American soldier,” said Fatteh Sattar, a civil engineer from the northern province of Baghlan. “It’s Afghans killing Afghans, and I guess this will not stop so quickly.”
There’s a grim new joke going around parts of Afghanistan: If you want to be safe from Taliban attacks, move next to a U.S. air base. “I have never seen a dead American soldier,” said Fatteh Sattar, a civil engineer from the northern province of Baghlan. “It’s Afghans killing Afghans, and I guess this will not stop so quickly.”
The Taliban, for their part, are now saying more clearly than ever that the peace deal signed Feb. 29 in Doha, Qatar, after 18 months of negotiations applies only to a truce with U.S. forces, not to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. “We signed an agreement with the Americans. But our jihad is not over,” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told Foreign Policy this week. “The stooges who supported the invaders during the last two decades are our enemies. This might change after additional talks but at the moment, we are still at war.”
Even before the deal in Doha was signed, skepticism among ordinary Afghans rose as they watched the elected government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—who is currently engaged in fight for legitimacy with his election rival, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah—get left out of the negotiations between U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Skepticism changed to outright fear and terror as the Taliban launched dozens of military operations against Afghan forces in the last few days, killing both armed soldiers and civilians, according to the Afghan Ministry of Interior.
But perhaps nothing has deepened the cynicism of Afghans who support their government—or made them feel so delegitimized—as much as the news of a 35-minute phone conversation between Baradar and Donald Trump on Tuesday, the first ever such contact between a U.S. president and a Taliban leader. Afterward Trump told reporters: “We had a good conversation. We’ve agreed there’s no violence, we don’t want violence; we’ll see what happens.” According to Suhail Shaheen, a Taliban spokesman in Doha, during the call the U.S. president called the Taliban “a tough people” and described their cause as one of “defending their country.” The Taliban eagerly promoted news about the conversation.
In remarks at the White House on Friday, Trump went a step further, suggesting he might stand aside if the Taliban took over the country again. “Countries have to take care of themselves,” he told reporters. “You can only hold someone’s hand for so long.” Asked if the Taliban might seize control of the government, Trump said it’s “not supposed to happen that way, but it possibly will.”
Some observers suggested that Trump—who has a demonstrated habit of forming warm relations with autocrats who respond positively to him—might even be getting along better with the Taliban than with the current democratically elected government in Kabul. “If Trump really had a 35 minute conversation on a wide variety of issues with Mullah Baradar, after concluding a deal with him, is it too provocative to assert that the US government at this moment in time has better relations with the Taliban than it does with President Ghani?” tweeted Michael Kugelman, the deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center in Washington.
This is a touchy issue, since the peace agreement calls for the formation of a new “post-settlement Afghan Islamic government” and Trump has no relationship with Ghani, whose ascent to power came during the Obama administration. “I think that the formation of a new government will be one of the main issues of upcoming intra-Afghan talks,” said the Afghan American writer and analyst Wahed Faqiri.
For ordinary Afghans, all this recalls an old and bitter history dating to when the Americans abandoned their country the last time after funding the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and the Taliban eventually emerged to seize power. “A friend of mine joined the Taliban. I did not care about it, but he considers me and his other friends as enemies. But now he is fine with the Americans? What kind of deal is that? It does not help us,” said Ali Hazara, a driver and mechanic from Baghlan, one of the most unstable provinces of the country.
The Taliban began launching new attacks after Ghani criticized the U.S.-Taliban deal and announced that he would not release 5,000 prisoners, one of the major pillars of the agreement. After the deal was signed, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, who leads Taliban’s political office in Doha, claimed that there is no real government in Kabul and that the Taliban do not accept it anyway. According to Faqiri, the new Taliban relationship with Washington could even lead to a strengthened Taliban movement. “When they meet, their mutual trust may grow,” he said.
All this would be a strange historical irony for the Americans, since it was a previous Taliban government that harbored the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. Central to the new deal is a Taliban guarantee that they will not do so again and will cut all ties with al Qaeda as well as prevent the nation from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups that might plot against the United States. In return, the United States will begin a significant drawdown of U.S. troops within the first 135 days and a total withdrawal within 14 months.
The Taliban also have to participate in upcoming intra-Afghan talks between various political factions, but the new round of peace talks may have a hard time getting underway in these conditions. “The deal between the Americans and the Taliban made us very optimistic. But it does not make sense if such attacks continue,” Shah Mohammad Takal, a resident of the Nadir Shah Kot district of Khost, told a journalist friend of mine, Mohammad Zaman. On Monday a bomb detonated near a soccer field in the district and killed three civilians.
No group claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Taliban declared they were not linked to it. “The mujahideen are not responsible for the attack in Khost. We also don’t know who was behind it, but there are many other problems, like enmities among different tribes, and they have nothing to do with us,” Taliban spokesman Mujahid said. But that explanation also raised the possibility that other groups such as Islamic State are seeking to further undermine the peace deal by renewing violence.
The United states says that for withdrawal to go forward, the Taliban must observe the conditions of the agreement. On Wednesday, after more than a week-long reduction in violence, the U.S. military also conducted an airstrike against Taliban fighters in southern Helmand province to “defend” their partners within the Afghan military. There were no reports of casualties.
That same day U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper complained that the Taliban were making compliance with the deal difficult. “The results so far have been mixed,” Esper told the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The Taliban are honoring their piece in terms of not attacking U.S. and [Western] coalition forces but not in terms of sustaining the reduction in violence.”
And so confusion reigns. Ordinary Afghans, meanwhile, are starting to ask themselves what a new Afghan government joined by the Taliban would look like. Many plainly fear another reign of terror like that in the 1990s. “The Taliban distanced themselves from their old regime and its practices. If they are serious about that and respect our freedoms, it’s fine. But if they don’t, I truly fear their return,” said Nazifa Niazi, a retired army officer from Kabul, in an interview with Abdul Rahman Lakanwal, a local journalist. Like many other Afghan women, she emphasized that going to work, school, or university must not be prohibited by the Taliban, who have made no such promise.
Other women share Niazi’s opinion—and her deepest fears. “I hope for peace. But I don’t think that the Taliban will respect us as women,” said Fahima, who works as a civil servant in Kabul and didn’t want her last name used. “They oppressed us in the past, and they might continue to do so. They attack girls’ school and burn them. They also use our young men as cannon fodder. I do not welcome their return if they don’t change their attitude and behavior.”
March 6: This story has been updated with Trump’s comments on Friday.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--ICC Authorizes Afghanistan War Crimes Inquiry

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The International Criminal Court tells prosecutors to begin a war crimes inquiry in Afghanistan , Israeli opposition parties try to force Netanyahu out , China predicts Wuhan will see zero new coronavirus infections by April , and experts and officials say South Sudan ’ s peace deal isn ’ t likely to work .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The International Criminal Court ( ICC ) has authorized prosecutors to investigate whether the Taliban , the Afghan military , and U.S. troops committed war crimes in Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paves the way for a complete investigation into crimes , including alleged mass killings of civilians and torture—despite angry opposition from the United States , which has never been a member of the ICC .
Afghanistan , which is a member , has said it would prefer local prosecution .
The move comes just days after the United States and the Taliban inked a deal that sets up a U.S. troop drawdown and peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government , though disputes remain .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is all the more reckless for this ruling to come just days after the United States signed a historic peace deal on Afghanistan—the best chance for peace in a generation , ” he said .
Is a trial viable ?
The ruling on Thursday by an appeals chamber reversed a lower court ’ s decision that stopped an investigation .
While the decision is the first by the ICC that could make U.S. forces defendants in a war crimes prosecution , the United States still does not recognize its jurisdiction .
The pre-trial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s request last year said the chances of success were low , given the U.S. and Afghan positions .
What about the peace deal ?
Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government are scheduled to begin next week , but there are already obstacles to peace .
President Ashraf Ghani has rejected the group ’ s demand to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners—though his main political rival , Abdullah Abdullah supports it .
The resumption of violence in Afghanistan is also threatening the peace deal , as Stefanie Glinski reports for FP .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ initially celebrating a “ great victory ” after his Likud party won 36 of 120 seats in the March 2 parliamentary election , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now facing serious obstacles to forming a governing coalition .
His right-wing bloc won just 58 seats in total—short of the 61 needed for a majority—and hawkish members of Benny Gantz ’ s Blue and White Party , which won 33 seats , announced in a reversal that they would accept support from the predominantly Arab Joint List , which won 15 .
Crucially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lieberman also appears amenable to such an arrangement .
His right-wing secular party , along with center-left parties , could give Gantz the numbers he needs to form a government—even if it is a short-lived one focused on prohibiting Netanyahu from leading the country while under indictment .
If Likud goes into opposition , a competition to succeed Netanyahu as party leader is likely ; party insiders seem confident that any Gantz-led coalition would be short-lived and a Likud party led by someone else could win the next election in a landslide .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ infections .
Chinese health experts said Thursday that the number of new coronavirus infections in Wuhan , the epicenter of the epidemic , could drop to zero by the end of the month .
Still , the city has reported new cases are currently on the rise—and Chinese officials are under increasing pressure to show that things are getting back to normal amid the outbreak , as FP ’ s James Palmer writes .
As the number of new cases in China falls overall , many cities fear reinfection and have now instituted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ severe outbreaks .
Will South Sudan ’ s peace deal collapse ?
On Feb. 22 , a coalition government between the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar was formed , supposedly to end the bloody civil war that began in 2013 .
Since the conflict broke out , there have been dozens of failed cease-fires and peace deals between the two men .
Despite publicly supporting it , officials and experts say that the latest deal backs the same power-sharing model that hasn ’ t worked before—and it isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Justin Lynch and FP ’ s Robbie Gramer report .
Russia , Turkey agree to Idlib cease-fire .
After six hours of talks in Moscow , Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to a cease-fire in Syria ’ s Idlib province on Thursday .
It ’ s not the first such agreement , but this time tensions had reached a breaking point between Russia and Turkey , which back different sides in the conflict .
The Syrian government offensive has also fueled a humanitarian crisis , displacing nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect at midnight local time .
Canada and the monarchy .
As Prince Harry and Meghan Markle , the Duchess of Sussex , prepare to leave their royal roles behind for Canada , republican-minded Canadians are again questioning why their country remains a constitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth as head of state .
But there seems to be little urgency to change the system—it would require rewriting Canada ’ s constitution , Stéphanie Fillion writes in FP .
Guyana ’ s political crisis .
The South American nation of Guyana held an election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get to manage a recent oil boom that has deepened ethnic tensions .
Before official results were released , both sides claimed victory .
Now , the country ’ s opposition leader has accused the elections commission of fraud after incumbent President David Granger was declared the winner .
In 2018 , Micah Maidenberg and Manuela Andreoni warned in Foreign Policy that “ Guyana ’ s oil windfall could easily convert the country ’ s dreams into a living nightmare , one that leaves it with greater inequality , more corruption , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Jair Bolsonaro is expected to meet U.S. President Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida on Saturday .
The meeting , which has been kept confidential by the Brazilian government , will be closed to the press .
Economics could be on the agenda : Numbers released this week showed Brazil ’ s economy growing at the slowest pace in three years .
The mayor of Easter Island is calling for vehicles to be restricted around its famous stone statues after a pickup truck crashed into one on Sunday .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has around 1,000 of the ancient figures—known as moai .
In recent years , the local community has fought to preserve the sacred structures .
The driver of the truck has been charged with damaging a national monument .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The International Criminal Court tells prosecutors to begin a war crimes inquiry in Afghanistan, Israeli opposition parties try to force Netanyahu out, China predicts Wuhan will see zero new coronavirus infections by April, and experts and officials say South Sudan’s peace deal isn’t likely to work.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The International Criminal Court tells prosecutors to begin a war crimes inquiry in Afghanistan, Israeli opposition parties try to force Netanyahu out, China predicts Wuhan will see zero new coronavirus infections by April, and experts and officials say South Sudan’s peace deal isn’t likely to work.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
ICC Gives Green Light to Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has authorized prosecutors to investigate whether the Taliban, the Afghan military, and U.S. troops committed war crimes in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. The move paves the way for a complete investigation into crimes, including alleged mass killings of civilians and torture—despite angry opposition from the United States, which has never been a member of the ICC. Afghanistan, which is a member, has said it would prefer local prosecution.
The move comes just days after the United States and the Taliban inked a deal that sets up a U.S. troop drawdown and peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government, though disputes remain. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned the decision. “It is all the more reckless for this ruling to come just days after the United States signed a historic peace deal on Afghanistan—the best chance for peace in a generation,” he said.
Is a trial viable? The ruling on Thursday by an appeals chamber reversed a lower court’s decision that stopped an investigation. While the decision is the first by the ICC that could make U.S. forces defendants in a war crimes prosecution, the United States still does not recognize its jurisdiction. The pre-trial panel that rejected Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s request last year said the chances of success were low, given the U.S. and Afghan positions.
What about the peace deal? Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government are scheduled to begin next week, but there are already obstacles to peace. President Ashraf Ghani has rejected the group’s demand to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners—though his main political rival, Abdullah Abdullah supports it. The resumption of violence in Afghanistan is also threatening the peace deal, as Stefanie Glinski reports for FP.
What We’re Following Today
Benjamin Netanyahu’s future. Despite initially celebrating a “great victory” after his Likud party won 36 of 120 seats in the March 2 parliamentary election, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now facing serious obstacles to forming a governing coalition. His right-wing bloc won just 58 seats in total—short of the 61 needed for a majority—and hawkish members of Benny Gantz’s Blue and White Party, which won 33 seats, announced in a reversal that they would accept support from the predominantly Arab Joint List, which won 15.
Crucially, Netanyahu’s onetime ally Avigdor Lieberman also appears amenable to such an arrangement. His right-wing secular party, along with center-left parties, could give Gantz the numbers he needs to form a government—even if it is a short-lived one focused on prohibiting Netanyahu from leading the country while under indictment. If Likud goes into opposition, a competition to succeed Netanyahu as party leader is likely; party insiders seem confident that any Gantz-led coalition would be short-lived and a Likud party led by someone else could win the next election in a landslide.
China says Wuhan will see zero new infections. Chinese health experts said Thursday that the number of new coronavirus infections in Wuhan, the epicenter of the epidemic, could drop to zero by the end of the month. Still, the city has reported new cases are currently on the rise—and Chinese officials are under increasing pressure to show that things are getting back to normal amid the outbreak, as FP’s James Palmer writes. As the number of new cases in China falls overall, many cities fear reinfection and have now instituted quarantines for people arriving from countries with severe outbreaks.
Will South Sudan’s peace deal collapse? On Feb. 22, a coalition government between the South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar was formed, supposedly to end the bloody civil war that began in 2013. Since the conflict broke out, there have been dozens of failed cease-fires and peace deals between the two men. Despite publicly supporting it, officials and experts say that the latest deal backs the same power-sharing model that hasn’t worked before—and it isn’t likely to work now, Justin Lynch and FP’s Robbie Gramer report.
Russia, Turkey agree to Idlib cease-fire. After six hours of talks in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to a cease-fire in Syria’s Idlib province on Thursday. It’s not the first such agreement, but this time tensions had reached a breaking point between Russia and Turkey, which back different sides in the conflict. The Syrian government offensive has also fueled a humanitarian crisis, displacing nearly 1 million Syrians. The cease-fire took effect at midnight local time.
Keep an Eye On
Canada and the monarchy. As Prince Harry and Meghan Markle, the Duchess of Sussex, prepare to leave their royal roles behind for Canada, republican-minded Canadians are again questioning why their country remains a constitutional monarchy with Queen Elizabeth as head of state. But there seems to be little urgency to change the system—it would require rewriting Canada’s constitution, Stéphanie Fillion writes in FP.
Guyana’s political crisis. The South American nation of Guyana held an election on Monday that will determine who will get to manage a recent oil boom that has deepened ethnic tensions. Before official results were released, both sides claimed victory. Now, the country’s opposition leader has accused the elections commission of fraud after incumbent President David Granger was declared the winner.
In 2018, Micah Maidenberg and Manuela Andreoni warned in Foreign Policy that “Guyana’s oil windfall could easily convert the country’s dreams into a living nightmare, one that leaves it with greater inequality, more corruption, and internal strife.”
Trump-Bolsonaro meeting. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is expected to meet U.S. President Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida on Saturday. The meeting, which has been kept confidential by the Brazilian government, will be closed to the press. Economics could be on the agenda: Numbers released this week showed Brazil’s economy growing at the slowest pace in three years.
Odds and Ends
The mayor of Easter Island is calling for vehicles to be restricted around its famous stone statues after a pickup truck crashed into one on Sunday. The Polynesian island, a Chilean territory, has around 1,000 of the ancient figures—known as moai. In recent years, the local community has fought to preserve the sacred structures. The driver of the truck has been charged with damaging a national monument.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--No Porn for Chinese Stuck Under Virus Lockdown

No Porn for Chinese Stuck Under Virus Lockdown Tens of millions of Chinese citizens remain quarantined to their homes , moving much of their daily lives online .
Yet teachers who have moved their classrooms to the virtual sphere find themselves navigating another state-imposed minefield : China ’ s heavily censored internet .
In February , a lecturer of nursing science complained on social media that her online session was hastily shut down when artificially intelligent censors flagged the livestream as “ internet pornography.
” As the dust-up went viral on Chinese social media , the lecturer explained that she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ birth .
A biology teacher from Wenzhou shared similar problems , this time during a livestreamed course on meiosis , the division of sex cells .
These tales reflect a long-standing crackdown .
In a country known for its widespread censorship of the Internet , the government ’ s stated goal of stamping out pornography—an industry known for ushering in Internet innovations , from affiliate links to virtual reality—has been especially intense .
State media has repeatedly referred to porn as a malignant “ tumor , ” on par with online fraud and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ web , Chinese culture , and the rule of law , jeopardizing the well being of the country ’ s youth .
Certainly , some of the government ’ s concern about porn is well intended .
China ’ s black-market porn industry potentially makes it easier for child sexual exploitation to proliferate , and sex work in China is often controlled by organized crime .
The inadequacy of sex education in China has made porn the only source of information for millions of young people .
At the same time , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blunt-force object than surgical scalpel .
When Titanic was rescreened in Chinese cinemas in 2012 , for instance , fans were surprised to no longer see the famous scene of Rose lying naked before Jack .
A regulatory agency ruled that the scene had to go , given viewers may , as the agency stated publicly , “ reach out their hands for a touch.
” The emphasis on prudish relationship norms dates back to the Maoist period , during which cultural icons were portrayed as living without sex and marriage .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such bans .
By placing porn at the center of debates about the Internet , the Chinese government lends a moral narrative to its censorship of the free web .
From clamping down on websites to cloud storage to livestreaming , the fight against pornography has long given the Chinese government a scapegoat to rein in the Internet at large .
Using artificial intelligence , Chinese Internet censors today are superb at detecting sexual images .
Tech companies such as Alibaba and Tuputech developed algorithms to trawl various online platforms , for pornographic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remarkable accuracy .
The search engine Baidu reported removing more than 53 billion pieces of “ harmful information ” using artificial intelligence in 2019 , almost half of which were pornographic .
The public security bureau squelched more than 43,000 pornographic websites last year alone .
This level of accuracy was not achieved overnight .
When adult entertainment shifted online in the 2000s , pornographic websites ballooned , even if it was difficult for many Chinese to find an opportunity to watch , given most Chinese were accessing the web in Internet cafes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Internet Project at University of California , Berkeley , said in 2006 , “ Outside of politics , China is as free as anywhere .
You can find porn just about anywhere on the Internet.
” At the time , human censors working for the government and Internet companies paid more attention to searches for “ Tiananmen Square protests ” and “ Falun Gong ” than to porn ; crackdowns were sporadic and ineffective , and banned websites soon popped up again under a different domain name .
In fact , mainland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s largest consumer markets for online porn .
Porn sites such as Caoliu and Erotica Juneday garnered more than half a million paid members and chalked up hundreds of millions of visits—at a time when only 9 percent of China ’ s population was using the Internet .
In nationwide surveys spanning from 2000 to 2015 , more than 70 percent of men aged 18 to 29 said they had watched porn in the past year .
The prevalence of porn sites in the early 2000s represented loopholes in China ’ s censored @ @ @ @ @ @ @ series of laws in 2000 which required Internet service providers to register their IP addresses and domain names , but not everyone complied .
Porn sites simply diverted to foreign servers and regularly changed their domain names and IP addresses to dodge detection .
As the decade went on , the government set out to fix these loopholes and intensified its purge against porn .
In 2006 , the police successfully squelched Erotica Juneday , the largest porn site at the time .
A court sentenced its owner to life in prison .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Internet ” campaign was rolled out in 2012 by the national agency responsible for censoring illegal publications , which has tracked down thousands of porn sites with irregular domain names and IP addresses every year .
Purges of porn have also been wielded as a tool to reign in foreign companies in China .
A year prior to Google ’ s coerced exit in 2010 , the Chinese government accused Google of spreading porn and demanded it to censor its search results .
Google gave in to Beijing ’ s request and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s “ positive attitude ” to eliminate porn .
Meanwhile , Beijing turned a blind eye to lurid content flooding Baidu , a domestic search engine that became a picked national champion .
U.S. analysts also claimed that the dirt on Google was potentially intended to divert Chinese public ’ s anger away from a controversial new mandate , which required every personal computer to use a censorship software called Green Dam .
The program was hailed as a filter to protect teens from porn , but as computer scientists at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocked both obscenities and political sensitivities .
Green Dam ended up a failed project—not least because it had major security vulnerabilities and large portions of its code were plagiarized from a Western source—but the goal remained to weed out politically undesirable content from the web .
As Rebecca MacKinnon , now director of the U.S.-based nonprofit Ranking Digital Rights , put it , “ The same mechanisms used to censor porn are used to censor anything else people want to censor.
” The most intense censorship campaign , called “ sweep porn and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xi Jinping ’ s government in 2014 .
The new attack not only promised to arrest website operators , it also banned the use of television satellite equipment that allowed access to foreign broadcasts , confiscated hundreds of thousands of illegal publications in print , and prosecuted what officials called “ fake journalists ” along the way .
The nimble porn industry is often the first to sneak onto new forms of media , and the anti-porn dragnet has extended to whichever emerging online channel the industry uses .
Officials argued that porn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular in the early 2010s was “ tainting young people ’ s minds , ” and in 2016 , five state agencies jointly announced a crackdown on online drives .
This led to a drastic decrease in service providers and forced the remaining ones to fortify censorship of data shared among users .
By mid-2016 , the number of active livestreaming users in China had grown to 314 million—nearly equivalent to the population of the United States .
Millions of young “ cam girls ” ( and a number of “ cam boys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profits .
Women who marketed themselves with the fewest boundaries were showered with the most clicks and cashable virtual gifts , until they finally crossed the line : In 2017 , a video of a woman performing sex acts with live swamp eels at the request of her “ bosses ” —as the VIP viewers were called—leaked out and sent shock waves across China ( the video was speedily deleted and the performer sentenced to a year and nine months in prison ) .
As state media lamented the overabundance of porn on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensued , strengthening licensing requirements and demanding streamers to provide their platform an official form of identification .
The new laws also demanded that platforms set up an editorial office responsible for auditing every publication related to news .
Yet again porn became an excuse for further crackdowns .
The Chinese government has long expressed its politics through public stances on sex : the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 70s rendered sex as distracting the proletariat from the Marxist cause .
The state urged contraception and even the sale of sex toys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 80s .
Similarly , its campaigns against pornography have more in mind than just regulating people ’ s sexual life .
Yet today , the Chinese government—armed with cutting-edge technologies—has the muscle to monitor and intrude on people ’ s private encounters in ways that no previous government could , and it has shown no hesitation in doing so .

Tens of millions of Chinese citizens remain quarantined to their homes, moving much of their daily lives online. Yet teachers who have moved their classrooms to the virtual sphere find themselves navigating another state-imposed minefield: China’s heavily censored internet.
Tens of millions of Chinese citizens remain quarantined to their homes, moving much of their daily lives online. Yet teachers who have moved their classrooms to the virtual sphere find themselves navigating another state-imposed minefield: China’s heavily censored internet.
In February, a lecturer of nursing science complained on social media that her online session was hastily shut down when artificially intelligent censors flagged the livestream as “internet pornography.” As the dust-up went viral on Chinese social media, the lecturer explained that she had been doing a class on human birth. A biology teacher from Wenzhou shared similar problems, this time during a livestreamed course on meiosis, the division of sex cells.
These tales reflect a long-standing crackdown. In a country known for its widespread censorship of the Internet, the government’s stated goal of stamping out pornography—an industry known for ushering in Internet innovations, from affiliate links to virtual reality—has been especially intense. State media has repeatedly referred to porn as a malignant “tumor,” on par with online fraud and gambling: an illness that contaminates the web, Chinese culture, and the rule of law, jeopardizing the well being of the country’s youth.
Certainly, some of the government’s concern about porn is well intended. China’s black-market porn industry potentially makes it easier for child sexual exploitation to proliferate, and sex work in China is often controlled by organized crime. The inadequacy of sex education in China has made porn the only source of information for millions of young people. At the same time, the government’s censorship can be a blunt-force object than surgical scalpel. When Titanic was rescreened in Chinese cinemas in 2012, for instance, fans were surprised to no longer see the famous scene of Rose lying naked before Jack. A regulatory agency ruled that the scene had to go, given viewers may, as the agency stated publicly, “reach out their hands for a touch.” The emphasis on prudish relationship norms dates back to the Maoist period, during which cultural icons were portrayed as living without sex and marriage.
But puritanism alone is not the purpose of such bans. By placing porn at the center of debates about the Internet, the Chinese government lends a moral narrative to its censorship of the free web. From clamping down on websites to cloud storage to livestreaming, the fight against pornography has long given the Chinese government a scapegoat to rein in the Internet at large.
Using artificial intelligence, Chinese Internet censors today are superb at detecting sexual images. Tech companies such as Alibaba and Tuputech developed algorithms to trawl various online platforms, for pornographic audio, photos, and videos with remarkable accuracy. The search engine Baidu reported removing more than 53 billion pieces of “harmful information” using artificial intelligence in 2019, almost half of which were pornographic. The public security bureau squelched more than 43,000 pornographic websites last year alone.
This level of accuracy was not achieved overnight. When adult entertainment shifted online in the 2000s, pornographic websites ballooned, even if it was difficult for many Chinese to find an opportunity to watch, given most Chinese were accessing the web in Internet cafes. Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project at University of California, Berkeley, said in 2006, “Outside of politics, China is as free as anywhere. You can find porn just about anywhere on the Internet.” At the time, human censors working for the government and Internet companies paid more attention to searches for “Tiananmen Square protests” and “Falun Gong” than to porn; crackdowns were sporadic and ineffective, and banned websites soon popped up again under a different domain name.
In fact, mainland China became one of the world’s largest consumer markets for online porn. Porn sites such as Caoliu and Erotica Juneday garnered more than half a million paid members and chalked up hundreds of millions of visits—at a time when only 9 percent of China’s population was using the Internet. In nationwide surveys spanning from 2000 to 2015, more than 70 percent of men aged 18 to 29 said they had watched porn in the past year.
The prevalence of porn sites in the early 2000s represented loopholes in China’s censored web. The state council passed a series of laws in 2000 which required Internet service providers to register their IP addresses and domain names, but not everyone complied. Porn sites simply diverted to foreign servers and regularly changed their domain names and IP addresses to dodge detection.
As the decade went on, the government set out to fix these loopholes and intensified its purge against porn. In 2006, the police successfully squelched Erotica Juneday, the largest porn site at the time. A court sentenced its owner to life in prison. This effort was systematized when “Clean the Internet” campaign was rolled out in 2012 by the national agency responsible for censoring illegal publications, which has tracked down thousands of porn sites with irregular domain names and IP addresses every year.
Purges of porn have also been wielded as a tool to reign in foreign companies in China. A year prior to Google’s coerced exit in 2010, the Chinese government accused Google of spreading porn and demanded it to censor its search results. Google gave in to Beijing’s request and the row ended with Beijing recognizing Google’s “positive attitude” to eliminate porn. Meanwhile, Beijing turned a blind eye to lurid content flooding Baidu, a domestic search engine that became a picked national champion.
U.S. analysts also claimed that the dirt on Google was potentially intended to divert Chinese public’s anger away from a controversial new mandate, which required every personal computer to use a censorship software called Green Dam. The program was hailed as a filter to protect teens from porn, but as computer scientists at the University of Michigan have found, it blocked both obscenities and political sensitivities. Green Dam ended up a failed project—not least because it had major security vulnerabilities and large portions of its code were plagiarized from a Western source—but the goal remained to weed out politically undesirable content from the web.
As Rebecca MacKinnon, now director of the U.S.-based nonprofit Ranking Digital Rights, put it, “The same mechanisms used to censor porn are used to censor anything else people want to censor.”
The most intense censorship campaign, called “sweep porn and attack rumors,” came under President Xi Jinping’s government in 2014. The new attack not only promised to arrest website operators, it also banned the use of television satellite equipment that allowed access to foreign broadcasts, confiscated hundreds of thousands of illegal publications in print, and prosecuted what officials called “fake journalists” along the way.
The nimble porn industry is often the first to sneak onto new forms of media, and the anti-porn dragnet has extended to whichever emerging online channel the industry uses. Officials argued that porn transferred on the cloud storage platforms becoming popular in the early 2010s was “tainting young people’s minds,” and in 2016, five state agencies jointly announced a crackdown on online drives. This led to a drastic decrease in service providers and forced the remaining ones to fortify censorship of data shared among users.
By mid-2016, the number of active livestreaming users in China had grown to 314 million—nearly equivalent to the population of the United States. Millions of young “cam girls” (and a number of “cam boys”) rushed into streaming for quick profits. Women who marketed themselves with the fewest boundaries were showered with the most clicks and cashable virtual gifts, until they finally crossed the line: In 2017, a video of a woman performing sex acts with live swamp eels at the request of her “bosses”—as the VIP viewers were called—leaked out and sent shock waves across China (the video was speedily deleted and the performer sentenced to a year and nine months in prison).
As state media lamented the overabundance of porn on livestreaming sites, a fusillade of crackdowns ensued, strengthening licensing requirements and demanding streamers to provide their platform an official form of identification. The new laws also demanded that platforms set up an editorial office responsible for auditing every publication related to news. Yet again porn became an excuse for further crackdowns.
The Chinese government has long expressed its politics through public stances on sex: the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 70s rendered sex as distracting the proletariat from the Marxist cause. The state urged contraception and even the sale of sex toys while implementing the one-child policy in the 80s. Similarly, its campaigns against pornography have more in mind than just regulating people’s sexual life. Yet today, the Chinese government—armed with cutting-edge technologies—has the muscle to monitor and intrude on people’s private encounters in ways that no previous government could, and it has shown no hesitation in doing so.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Fears Mount as Trump Administration Guts USAID’s Iraq Presence

The United States ’ top aid agency is dismantling its presence in Iraq , leaving a skeleton crew ill-equipped to oversee over $ 1 billion in aid programs aimed in part at staving off the return of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State , officials and lawmakers say .
An internal U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) document obtained by Foreign Policy confirms that major cuts in staffing were made late last year and highlights the stark difference between the agency ’ s footprint in Iraq and other countries that receive foreign aid funding : In fiscal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amount of U.S. foreign aid as Iraq , but it has more than seven times the number of staff to oversee it .
U.S. foreign aid programs in Iraq are meant to help stabilize the country as it emerges from years of warfare following the defeat of the Islamic State terrorist group ’ s caliphate .
They also support the Trump administration ’ s aims of countering Iranian influence in the country , officials say .
Those programs could be in jeopardy now without enough staff to conduct proper oversight , particularly in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and waste are rife .
A senior Democratic lawmaker told Foreign Policy he fears dismantling the U.S. aid agency ’ s presence in Iraq could pave the way for a comeback by the Islamic State .
“ The administration says getting Iraq back on its feet is a strategic priority , but slashing our USAID presence does the opposite , ” Sen. Chris Murphy , the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Middle Eastern issues , told Foreign Policy .
“ We need to make sure we have enough staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because without them Tehran ’ s presence will grow while at the same time creating the conditions for another ISIS resurgence , ” he added .
“ This is a huge mistake , and if we don ’ t reverse course fast , we will continue to see Iraq slide into political crisis , threatening our national security interests and objectives in the region.
” Congressional aides familiar with the matter say USAID has considered closing down awards for funding in Iraq early because there ’ s not enough staff to oversee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this , telling Foreign Policy the agency has “ not not considered ending any awards early because of our reduced footprint.
” “ USAID is experienced in programming in areas where we have limited direct access for American direct-hire staff .
We have systems in place to monitor and evaluate US-taxpayer funded activities , including those in Iraq and Syria , ” the spokesperson said .
After the Trump administration ordered a drawdown of U.S. diplomatic and aid personnel from the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Iraq last year , USAID had in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 14 foreign service nationals—to help oversee hundreds of millions of dollars ’ worth of U.S. foreign aid programs .
The United States doled out $ 1.2 billion in aid programs for Iraq in fiscal year 2018 , and over $ 500 million in aid in 2019 , according to USAID data .
USAID was forced to slash about 80 percent of its non-Iraqi staff last year amid an overall U.S. drawdown from Iraq , as ProPublica reported last November .
The internal USAID document adds additional context to this drawdown and sheds light @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff elsewhere in the world .
As the document shows , USAID ’ s footprint in Iraq stands in stark contrast to its presence other countries in the region with more political stability and potentially less direct need for U.S. foreign aid .
In Jordan , for example , USAID has 132 staff members—41 foreign service officers and 91 foreign service nationals—to oversee nearly $ 1.1 billion in foreign aid , a similar amount of money the 22 staff members in Iraq are tasked with overseeing .
In Egypt , 163 officers oversee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ times as many staff to oversee one-tenth of the funding for both aid and stabilization programs as in Iraq .
The document , below , submitted to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Jim Risch last month , shows data on USAID staffing as of November 2019 .
USAID did not respond to request for comment .
The State Department has also slashed its presence in Iraq .
In May 2019 , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ordered a partial evacuation of U.S. diplomatic personnel from Iraq as tensions shot up between Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the State Department submitted to the Senate its plan to make that partial evacuation permanent .
A government watchdog report issued last month to Congress cast doubt on how USAID would be able to responsibly manage the oversight of such a wide and complex portfolio of aid projects .
“ As of the end of January , it remained unclear where and how USAID would operate and provide oversight for its more than $ 1 billion stabilization and humanitarian assistance portfolio in Iraq , ” the report read .
“ USAID [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regarding the continued ability of the USAID Mission in Iraq to provide oversight and management of such large and complex awards with so few staff , ” it added .
“ Our staff are in regular communication with partners and third-party monitors to conduct oversight of programs in Iraq , ” the USAID spokesperson said .
“ USAID staff continue to deploy to Iraq to meet with partners and monitor program activities .
”

The United States’ top aid agency is dismantling its presence in Iraq, leaving a skeleton crew ill-equipped to oversee over $1 billion in aid programs aimed in part at staving off the return of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State, officials and lawmakers say.
The United States’ top aid agency is dismantling its presence in Iraq, leaving a skeleton crew ill-equipped to oversee over $1 billion in aid programs aimed in part at staving off the return of terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State, officials and lawmakers say.
An internal U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) document obtained by Foreign Policy confirms that major cuts in staffing were made late last year and highlights the stark difference between the agency’s footprint in Iraq and other countries that receive foreign aid funding: In fiscal 2019, Egypt received roughly one-fifth the amount of U.S. foreign aid as Iraq, but it has more than seven times the number of staff to oversee it.
U.S. foreign aid programs in Iraq are meant to help stabilize the country as it emerges from years of warfare following the defeat of the Islamic State terrorist group’s caliphate. They also support the Trump administration’s aims of countering Iranian influence in the country, officials say.
Those programs could be in jeopardy now without enough staff to conduct proper oversight, particularly in a country where corruption, fraud, and waste are rife.
A senior Democratic lawmaker told Foreign Policy he fears dismantling the U.S. aid agency’s presence in Iraq could pave the way for a comeback by the Islamic State. “The administration says getting Iraq back on its feet is a strategic priority, but slashing our USAID presence does the opposite,” Sen. Chris Murphy, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Middle Eastern issues, told Foreign Policy.
“We need to make sure we have enough staff to continue vital aid programs in Iraq, because without them Tehran’s presence will grow while at the same time creating the conditions for another ISIS resurgence,” he added. “This is a huge mistake, and if we don’t reverse course fast, we will continue to see Iraq slide into political crisis, threatening our national security interests and objectives in the region.”
Congressional aides familiar with the matter say USAID has considered closing down awards for funding in Iraq early because there’s not enough staff to oversee the programs. A USAID spokesperson disputed this, telling Foreign Policy the agency has “not not considered ending any awards early because of our reduced footprint.”
“USAID is experienced in programming in areas where we have limited direct access for American direct-hire staff. We have systems in place to monitor and evaluate US-taxpayer funded activities, including those in Iraq and Syria,” the spokesperson said.
After the Trump administration ordered a drawdown of U.S. diplomatic and aid personnel from the U.S. Embassy and consulates in Iraq last year, USAID had in place 22 officials—eight foreign service officers and 14 foreign service nationals—to help oversee hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of U.S. foreign aid programs. The United States doled out $1.2 billion in aid programs for Iraq in fiscal year 2018, and over $500 million in aid in 2019, according to USAID data.
USAID was forced to slash about 80 percent of its non-Iraqi staff last year amid an overall U.S. drawdown from Iraq, as ProPublica reported last November. The internal USAID document adds additional context to this drawdown and sheds light on how the aid agency allocates its staff elsewhere in the world.
As the document shows, USAID’s footprint in Iraq stands in stark contrast to its presence other countries in the region with more political stability and potentially less direct need for U.S. foreign aid. In Jordan, for example, USAID has 132 staff members—41 foreign service officers and 91 foreign service nationals—to oversee nearly $1.1 billion in foreign aid, a similar amount of money the 22 staff members in Iraq are tasked with overseeing. In Egypt, 163 officers oversee $110 million worth of aid—over seven times as many staff to oversee one-tenth of the funding for both aid and stabilization programs as in Iraq.
The document, below, submitted to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Jim Risch last month, shows data on USAID staffing as of November 2019. USAID did not respond to request for comment.
The State Department has also slashed its presence in Iraq. In May 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ordered a partial evacuation of U.S. diplomatic personnel from Iraq as tensions shot up between Iran and the United States. In December, the State Department submitted to the Senate its plan to make that partial evacuation permanent.
A government watchdog report issued last month to Congress cast doubt on how USAID would be able to responsibly manage the oversight of such a wide and complex portfolio of aid projects. “As of the end of January, it remained unclear where and how USAID would operate and provide oversight for its more than $1 billion stabilization and humanitarian assistance portfolio in Iraq,” the report read.
“USAID [Office of Inspector General] remains concerned regarding the continued ability of the USAID Mission in Iraq to provide oversight and management of such large and complex awards with so few staff,” it added.
“Our staff are in regular communication with partners and third-party monitors to conduct oversight of programs in Iraq,” the USAID spokesperson said. “USAID staff continue to deploy to Iraq to meet with partners and monitor program activities.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Big Ideas for NATO’s New Mission in Iraq

Big Ideas for NATO ’ s New Mission in Iraq Following U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s calls for America ’ s allies to “ get more involved in the Middle East , ” NATO defense ministers last month agreed to “ enhance ” the Atlantic alliance ’ s training mission in Iraq .
Although the parameters of NATO ’ s new role are still to be defined , Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has indicated it may include taking on some of the tasks currently being performed by U.S. forces in support of Iraqi military units focused on preventing a resurgence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , having America ’ s NATO allies—as well as other coalition partners from around the world—assume greater responsibility for preventing the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in Iraq makes sense .
Why , after all , should the United States shoulder the lion ’ s share of the burden for keeping terrorism at bay when the rest of the trans-Atlantic community is equally , if not more , threatened by it ?
Moreover , as U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has argued , deploying more European forces and military hardware to the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. presence there .
That in turn might allow the Pentagon to refocus precious resources and attention toward what the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies as its new top priority : great-power competition , in particular with China in the Indo-Pacific.As the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating , any attempt to outsource too much , too quickly risks becoming a path to failure .
For Iraqi leaders in Baghdad , having foreign forces operate under NATO ’ s banner might also prove more politically palatable , especially as they face pressure from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or limit its operations , following the U.S. drone strike on Jan. 3 that killed the longtime Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani .
All these arguments are indeed compelling .
Yet history also suggests that U.S. and NATO policymakers need to be cautious—and coldly realistic—about how much European partners , and NATO as an organization , can truly do on their own .
Particularly as the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating in Iraq and Syria , any attempt to outsource too much , too quickly to the Atlantic alliance risks becoming a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States has made this error before .
In the mid-2000s , the George W. Bush administration handed considerable responsibility for Afghanistan ’ s security to NATO .
Much as now in Iraq , it was considered safe to do so because the enemy—in that case the Taliban—was seen as having been largely defeated .
And , also like today , it was hoped that getting European governments to dispatch soldiers to Afghanistan would free up American troops , who were stretched thin by competing demands from the war in Iraq .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the present moment .
While many of America ’ s NATO allies stepped up in response to the Bush administration ’ s call for help , and though their forces served with courage and honor on the ground in Afghanistan , all too often these troops lacked essential enabling capabilities necessary for the battles into which they had been thrust .
In other cases , so-called national caveats undermined the effectiveness of coalition members by barring them from performing basic tasks , including , in the case of one country , conducting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States to compensate for its allies ’ material shortfalls and limitations stemming from national caveats .
In addition , NATO ’ s multinational command structure in Afghanistan proved cumbersome , stymying the development of a unified campaign plan against the Taliban at the exact moment that their insurgency was gaining momentum .
By the time leaders grasped what was happening , the security situation had severely deteriorated—prompting the United States to surge forces into Afghanistan and re-Americanize much of the war effort , at considerable cost .
The Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in mind as it pushes for a more robust NATO presence in Iraq .
To be sure , Washington can and should rally trans-Atlantic allies to increase their contributions to the mission there , including in roles as advisors to Iraqi units .
But ensuring these efforts actually strengthen the overall endeavor instead of merely complicating it will require careful judgment and discipline .
To start , it is important to recognize that Iraqi military commanders—who have been at war now for many years—no longer need much advice on how to carry out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They also understand the human and physical terrain in their country far better than foreign advisors ever will .
Rather , where Iraqis require assistance is in learning how to enable their military operations with high-end , high-tech capabilities , such as airborne intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance assets ( both manned and unmanned ) ; cyber operations ; precision strike air and ground assets ; and intelligence fusion .
Advisors without essential “ enablers ” will be of little to no value to their Iraqi counterparts or to the effort to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem is that the U.S. military possesses these capabilities in vastly greater numbers than all its possible partners put together .
In addition , American forces—in particular , special operations forces and specially configured Army units—have amassed considerable experience and skill since 9/11 in employing them .
This experience , by contrast , is much less prevalent among the NATO allies , with some notable exceptions .
But even those , such as France or the United Kingdom , that have developed autonomous capacities in these areas find them in very high demand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any commitment to Iraq with other priority theaters where they are already engaged , such as Mali or elsewhere in the Middle East beyond Iraq.U.S .
and NATO leadership should resist the temptation to accept forces that would not bring the necessary skills and experience for the mission in Iraq .
Consequently , while encouraging a greater contribution by NATO allies , U.S. and NATO leadership should resist the temptation to accept forces that would not bring the necessary skills , experience , and materiel needed for the advisor mission in Iraq .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ should insist on several further principles for any advisor elements under consideration for deployment to Iraq : • Advisors must be willing to live with the Iraqi units they advise 24 hours a day , seven days a week .
Advisors can not “ commute to the fight ” ; they need to be embedded with their partners persistently .
• Advisors should be required to serve at least 12-month tours on the ground .
Spending three or six months in Iraq is insufficient to develop the deep knowledge and close relationships necessary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advisors who have proved themselves in the tasks on which they will provide advice in Iraq should be accepted for the advisor mission .
For instance , NATO senior advisors to Iraqi battalions or brigades should , ideally , have commanded one of their own country ’ s battalions or brigades in peacetime , if not in combat .
They should also have employed ( at least in training ) the enabling capabilities that will be the most important contributions to the Iraqi units with which the advisors serve .
• Advisors , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undergo a minimum of three months of uninterrupted preparation for deployment , with no other responsibilities during this period .
This preparation should include a predeployment visit to the area where they will be operating , completion of a formal certification process ( without which they should not be allowed to deploy ) , demonstration of proficiency in a predeployment mission rehearsal exercise , and a phased assumption of duties .
The phased transition should include a lengthy “ passenger seat ” ride with the U.S. advisor element they are replacing before moving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” to provide advice as well as access to NATO capabilities .
These are admittedly high barriers .
It may mean that relatively few advisor candidates are initially qualified to deploy to Iraq under the NATO training mission .
If that ’ s the case , so be it .
It is far better for the alliance to underpromise and overdeliver than vice-versa .
Starting modestly and then gradually building up a NATO presence as concepts and missions become validated is much better than falling short .
The alternative—in which NATO agrees to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stumble—would serve neither the alliance , nor the Iraqis , nor the U.S. national interest in preventing the return of the Islamic state.It is far better for the alliance to underpromise and overdeliver than vice-versa .
This may be unwelcome advice for those eager to see a U.S. extrication from Iraq or the greater Middle East , by way of replacing U.S. forces with those from NATO or other partner countries .
But if there is one lesson that the Trump administration should draw from the experiences of its predecessors , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to success in the Land of Two Rivers .
To pretend otherwise is the road to tragedy .

Following U.S. President Donald Trump’s calls for America’s allies to “get more involved in the Middle East,” NATO defense ministers last month agreed to “enhance” the Atlantic alliance’s training mission in Iraq. Although the parameters of NATO’s new role are still to be defined, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has indicated it may include taking on some of the tasks currently being performed by U.S. forces in support of Iraqi military units focused on preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State.
Following U.S. President Donald Trump’s calls for America’s allies to “get more involved in the Middle East,” NATO defense ministers last month agreed to “enhance” the Atlantic alliance’s training mission in Iraq. Although the parameters of NATO’s new role are still to be defined, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has indicated it may include taking on some of the tasks currently being performed by U.S. forces in support of Iraqi military units focused on preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State.
In principle, having America’s NATO allies—as well as other coalition partners from around the world—assume greater responsibility for preventing the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in Iraq makes sense. Why, after all, should the United States shoulder the lion’s share of the burden for keeping terrorism at bay when the rest of the trans-Atlantic community is equally, if not more, threatened by it?
Moreover, as U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has argued, deploying more European forces and military hardware to the Middle East could enable Washington to reduce the U.S. presence there. That in turn might allow the Pentagon to refocus precious resources and attention toward what the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies as its new top priority: great-power competition, in particular with China in the Indo-Pacific.As the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating, any attempt to outsource too much, too quickly risks becoming a path to failure.
For Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, having foreign forces operate under NATO’s banner might also prove more politically palatable, especially as they face pressure from Iran to expel the U.S. military, or limit its operations, following the U.S. drone strike on Jan. 3 that killed the longtime Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani.
All these arguments are indeed compelling. Yet history also suggests that U.S. and NATO policymakers need to be cautious—and coldly realistic—about how much European partners, and NATO as an organization, can truly do on their own. Particularly as the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating in Iraq and Syria, any attempt to outsource too much, too quickly to the Atlantic alliance risks becoming a path to failure.
In fact, the United States has made this error before. In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush administration handed considerable responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to NATO. Much as now in Iraq, it was considered safe to do so because the enemy—in that case the Taliban—was seen as having been largely defeated. And, also like today, it was hoped that getting European governments to dispatch soldiers to Afghanistan would free up American troops, who were stretched thin by competing demands from the war in Iraq.
What happened instead is a cautionary tale for the present moment. While many of America’s NATO allies stepped up in response to the Bush administration’s call for help, and though their forces served with courage and honor on the ground in Afghanistan, all too often these troops lacked essential enabling capabilities necessary for the battles into which they had been thrust. In other cases, so-called national caveats undermined the effectiveness of coalition members by barring them from performing basic tasks, including, in the case of one country, conducting offensive operations. Inevitably, it fell to the United States to compensate for its allies’ material shortfalls and limitations stemming from national caveats.
In addition, NATO’s multinational command structure in Afghanistan proved cumbersome, stymying the development of a unified campaign plan against the Taliban at the exact moment that their insurgency was gaining momentum. By the time leaders grasped what was happening, the security situation had severely deteriorated—prompting the United States to surge forces into Afghanistan and re-Americanize much of the war effort, at considerable cost.
The Trump administration would be wise to keep this experience in mind as it pushes for a more robust NATO presence in Iraq. To be sure, Washington can and should rally trans-Atlantic allies to increase their contributions to the mission there, including in roles as advisors to Iraqi units. But ensuring these efforts actually strengthen the overall endeavor instead of merely complicating it will require careful judgment and discipline.
To start, it is important to recognize that Iraqi military commanders—who have been at war now for many years—no longer need much advice on how to carry out most tactical operations with their forces. They also understand the human and physical terrain in their country far better than foreign advisors ever will. Rather, where Iraqis require assistance is in learning how to enable their military operations with high-end, high-tech capabilities, such as airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (both manned and unmanned); cyber operations; precision strike air and ground assets; and intelligence fusion.
Advisors without essential “enablers” will be of little to no value to their Iraqi counterparts or to the effort to keep down the Islamic State.
The problem is that the U.S. military possesses these capabilities in vastly greater numbers than all its possible partners put together. In addition, American forces—in particular, special operations forces and specially configured Army units—have amassed considerable experience and skill since 9/11 in employing them. This experience, by contrast, is much less prevalent among the NATO allies, with some notable exceptions. But even those, such as France or the United Kingdom, that have developed autonomous capacities in these areas find them in very high demand, and will therefore need to balance any commitment to Iraq with other priority theaters where they are already engaged, such as Mali or elsewhere in the Middle East beyond Iraq.U.S. and NATO leadership should resist the temptation to accept forces that would not bring the necessary skills and experience for the mission in Iraq.
Consequently, while encouraging a greater contribution by NATO allies, U.S. and NATO leadership should resist the temptation to accept forces that would not bring the necessary skills, experience, and materiel needed for the advisor mission in Iraq. In addition, U.S. and NATO leaders should insist on several further principles for any advisor elements under consideration for deployment to Iraq:
Advisors must be willing to live with the Iraqi units they advise 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Advisors cannot “commute to the fight”; they need to be embedded with their partners persistently.
Advisors should be required to serve at least 12-month tours on the ground. Spending three or six months in Iraq is insufficient to develop the deep knowledge and close relationships necessary to be effective advisors.
Only advisors who have proved themselves in the tasks on which they will provide advice in Iraq should be accepted for the advisor mission. For instance, NATO senior advisors to Iraqi battalions or brigades should, ideally, have commanded one of their own country’s battalions or brigades in peacetime, if not in combat. They should also have employed (at least in training) the enabling capabilities that will be the most important contributions to the Iraqi units with which the advisors serve.
Advisors, together with their team members, should undergo a minimum of three months of uninterrupted preparation for deployment, with no other responsibilities during this period. This preparation should include a predeployment visit to the area where they will be operating, completion of a formal certification process (without which they should not be allowed to deploy), demonstration of proficiency in a predeployment mission rehearsal exercise, and a phased assumption of duties. The phased transition should include a lengthy “passenger seat” ride with the U.S. advisor element they are replacing before moving into the “driver’s seat” to provide advice as well as access to NATO capabilities.
These are admittedly high barriers. It may mean that relatively few advisor candidates are initially qualified to deploy to Iraq under the NATO training mission. If that’s the case, so be it. It is far better for the alliance to underpromise and overdeliver than vice-versa. Starting modestly and then gradually building up a NATO presence as concepts and missions become validated is much better than falling short.
The alternative—in which NATO agrees to a more expansive mandate, only to stumble—would serve neither the alliance, nor the Iraqis, nor the U.S. national interest in preventing the return of the Islamic state.It is far better for the alliance to underpromise and overdeliver than vice-versa.
This may be unwelcome advice for those eager to see a U.S. extrication from Iraq or the greater Middle East, by way of replacing U.S. forces with those from NATO or other partner countries. But if there is one lesson that the Trump administration should draw from the experiences of its predecessors, it is that there have never been any shortcuts to success in the Land of Two Rivers. To pretend otherwise is the road to tragedy.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-06--Syria Is Turkey’s Problem, Not America’s

Last week , Turkey went to war with Russia—sort of .
Ankara ’ s present military operations are in response to a Feb. 27 attack in Syria that killed 36 Turkish soldiers and wounded another 30 .
( Turkish authorities in Hatay province , which is closest to the area where the attack occurred , initially blamed Russia , but in Ankara officials placed responsibility with Syrian regime forces . )
Since then , the Turks have deployed the firepower of an advanced NATO military machine against Syrian targets , while the Russians have been forced to stand aside .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have said they want to de-escalate , which is precisely what they did in Moscow on Thursday when they agreed to a cease-fire .
With all the talk in Washington these days about “ great-power competition , ” events in Syria have taken place without much in the way of U.S. involvement .
And , guess what ?
The sun rose over the Potomac River in Washington anyway .
Throughout the post-World War II era , American officials and commentators have created the expectation—mostly among themselves—that the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ near and far , because everything was important to the strategic interests of a global power .
Yet this new Turkish phase of the conflict in Syria is just the latest example that undermines this idea .
At least in the Syrian case , Turkey seems to be doing just fine on its own .
Prior to the attack that killed the three dozen Turkish soldiers , there has been much freaking out in Ankara about the apparent lack of interest of the United States and the West in helping Turkey in Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but Turkey ’ s request for Patriot missile batteries went unheeded .
Then , as tit-for-tat attacks between Turkish and Syrian forces increased , Turkish commentators went into overdrive .
Sinan Ulgen , a well-respected analyst , tweeted that the West must step up to support Turkey so as not to alienate its NATO ally .
Fahrettin Altun , a spokesperson for Erdogan , also posted a long thread on Twitter critiquing the response from the West , calling it “ disheartening.
” Erdogan ’ s media toadies picked up on these rebukes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ howling about the righteousness of Turkey ’ s cause and attacked the United States and Europe for not standing by Ankara .
This is to be expected by now from Turkish intellectuals , officials , and journalistic ass-kissers alike , but it seems an odd waste of time and energy for at least two reasons .
First , it all seems so not self-aware .
The Turkish government has spent the better part of the last decade undercutting U.S. foreign policy , engaging in terrible anti-American rhetoric , and threatening or arresting Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but around 2011 and 2012 it was difficult to find a critic of Turkey , Erdogan , and the Justice and Development Party in Washington .
Now it is hard to find an ally of Ankara , though there are a credulous few in addition to the cynical who are just getting paid .
Perhaps only Erdogan ’ s bête noire , Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , has blown more Washington goodwill faster than the Turkish president .
As a result , inside the Beltway , there is not a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In fact , sentiment runs in the opposite direction : Let Erdogan figure out his own mess .
He has not been a partner , so why should the United States risk direct involvement in Syria ’ s conflict to help Ankara ?
With few advocates and a president who ran on making America great in part by getting it out of the Middle East , the Turks should not have expected much from Washington beyond well-worn words .
Second , and more importantly , the Turkish armed forces do not seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Operation Spring Shield , the Turks have done significant damage to Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad ’ s forces .
The Turkish military has sliced through much of Syria ’ s front-line forces , shooting down planes and helicopters , destroying artillery , and killing large numbers of personnel while suffering only modest losses of their own .
The United States may have unique military capabilities that could be helpful to Turkey , but the Turks do not seem to need them .
The same is true of Europe : While Erdogan has proved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by encouraging refugees to head for its borders , it ’ s unclear why he would expect any military contribution from Europe ’ s under-resourced militaries to benefit Turkey ’ s war in Syria .
Rather than whining about lack of U.S. and European support , Turkish officials could easily simply say , “ We got this.
” The problem for Turkey is not military proficiency—especially against Syrian forces that couldn ’ t knock over a 7-Eleven in Aleppo before the Russians intervened on their behalf in 2015 .
Rather , the problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plaguing Turkey ’ s Syria policy , and that of every other country outside of Russia and Iran .
Turkish officials have no idea how to bring the conflict to a definitive end and have proved themselves helpless to relieve the seemingly endless suffering of Syrians .
But this makes them no different than their European and American counterparts .
The United States and Europe have essentially conceded as much .
The United States simply sees no interests in Syria that it ’ s willing to defend with military force , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Washington shake their heads over the resulting carnage , there is little interest in providing humanitarian assistance in an active war zone .
For his part , Erdogan once imagined regime change in Damascus as an end game , but he realized he needed Putin ’ s forbearance to help keep Kurdish nationalism at bay .
That ’ s why Erdogan was compelled to sign a lopsided cease-fire agreement with Putin and the Iranians in September 2018 that imposed conditions—such as the disarmament of extremist groups in Syria—he had no hope of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credit , the agreement helped stave off disaster for a few years .
But by late 2019 the Russian military and Assad determined that it was time to take back the Syrian provinces near the Turkish border .
For Assad , Idlib was the last remaining province beyond his control .
The resulting scorched-earth military strategy produced the humanitarian disaster now unfolding in northwest Syria , in which almost a million people are caught between three armies .
The prospect of millions more desperate Syrians entering Turkey is what spurred Erdogan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been a war within a war—and a situation that American officials have , once again , signaled is not a high priority .
In any case , the cease-fire that Erdogan and Putin hammered out on March 5 underscores that the Turks are perfectly capable of handling the crisis without Washington holding their hands—at least in the short term .
In the longer term , the Turks do have a case for international assistance on Syria .
So long as the Syrians , Russians , and Iranians continue to spill an astonishing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face the potential crisis of caring for millions of refugees whose presence could prove destabilizing in Turkey .
But , while no one is going to stop the Turks from trying to stem this emergency ’ s root causes , no one is going to help them either—least of all the United States .

Last week, Turkey went to war with Russia—sort of. Ankara’s present military operations are in response to a Feb. 27 attack in Syria that killed 36 Turkish soldiers and wounded another 30. (Turkish authorities in Hatay province, which is closest to the area where the attack occurred, initially blamed Russia, but in Ankara officials placed responsibility with Syrian regime forces.) Since then, the Turks have deployed the firepower of an advanced NATO military machine against Syrian targets, while the Russians have been forced to stand aside. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have said they want to de-escalate, which is precisely what they did in Moscow on Thursday when they agreed to a cease-fire.
Last week, Turkey went to war with Russia—sort of. Ankara’s present military operations are in response to a Feb. 27 attack in Syria that killed 36 Turkish soldiers and wounded another 30. (Turkish authorities in Hatay province, which is closest to the area where the attack occurred, initially blamed Russia, but in Ankara officials placed responsibility with Syrian regime forces.) Since then, the Turks have deployed the firepower of an advanced NATO military machine against Syrian targets, while the Russians have been forced to stand aside. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have said they want to de-escalate, which is precisely what they did in Moscow on Thursday when they agreed to a cease-fire.
With all the talk in Washington these days about “great-power competition,” events in Syria have taken place without much in the way of U.S. involvement. And, guess what? The sun rose over the Potomac River in Washington anyway. Throughout the post-World War II era, American officials and commentators have created the expectation—mostly among themselves—that the United States was a necessary presence in places near and far, because everything was important to the strategic interests of a global power. Yet this new Turkish phase of the conflict in Syria is just the latest example that undermines this idea. At least in the Syrian case, Turkey seems to be doing just fine on its own.
Prior to the attack that killed the three dozen Turkish soldiers, there has been much freaking out in Ankara about the apparent lack of interest of the United States and the West in helping Turkey in Syria. NATO expressed words of support, but Turkey’s request for Patriot missile batteries went unheeded. Then, as tit-for-tat attacks between Turkish and Syrian forces increased, Turkish commentators went into overdrive. Sinan Ulgen, a well-respected analyst, tweeted that the West must step up to support Turkey so as not to alienate its NATO ally. Fahrettin Altun, a spokesperson for Erdogan, also posted a long thread on Twitter critiquing the response from the West, calling it “disheartening.” Erdogan’s media toadies picked up on these rebukes and, in turn, have been howling about the righteousness of Turkey’s cause and attacked the United States and Europe for not standing by Ankara.
This is to be expected by now from Turkish intellectuals, officials, and journalistic ass-kissers alike, but it seems an odd waste of time and energy for at least two reasons. First, it all seems so not self-aware. The Turkish government has spent the better part of the last decade undercutting U.S. foreign policy, engaging in terrible anti-American rhetoric, and threatening or arresting Americans. It is hard to remember, but around 2011 and 2012 it was difficult to find a critic of Turkey, Erdogan, and the Justice and Development Party in Washington. Now it is hard to find an ally of Ankara, though there are a credulous few in addition to the cynical who are just getting paid. Perhaps only Erdogan’s bête noire, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has blown more Washington goodwill faster than the Turkish president. As a result, inside the Beltway, there is not a lot of interest in helping Turkey these days. In fact, sentiment runs in the opposite direction: Let Erdogan figure out his own mess. He has not been a partner, so why should the United States risk direct involvement in Syria’s conflict to help Ankara? With few advocates and a president who ran on making America great in part by getting it out of the Middle East, the Turks should not have expected much from Washington beyond well-worn words.
Second, and more importantly, the Turkish armed forces do not seem to need much help. Since launching Operation Spring Shield, the Turks have done significant damage to Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Turkish military has sliced through much of Syria’s front-line forces, shooting down planes and helicopters, destroying artillery, and killing large numbers of personnel while suffering only modest losses of their own. The United States may have unique military capabilities that could be helpful to Turkey, but the Turks do not seem to need them. The same is true of Europe: While Erdogan has proved he can impose pain on the continent by encouraging refugees to head for its borders, it’s unclear why he would expect any military contribution from Europe’s under-resourced militaries to benefit Turkey’s war in Syria. Rather than whining about lack of U.S. and European support, Turkish officials could easily simply say, “We got this.”
The problem for Turkey is not military proficiency—especially against Syrian forces that couldn’t knock over a 7-Eleven in Aleppo before the Russians intervened on their behalf in 2015. Rather, the problem is the same one that has been plaguing Turkey’s Syria policy, and that of every other country outside of Russia and Iran. Turkish officials have no idea how to bring the conflict to a definitive end and have proved themselves helpless to relieve the seemingly endless suffering of Syrians. But this makes them no different than their European and American counterparts.
The United States and Europe have essentially conceded as much. The United States simply sees no interests in Syria that it’s willing to defend with military force, including the protection of civilian lives. While policymakers in Washington shake their heads over the resulting carnage, there is little interest in providing humanitarian assistance in an active war zone.
For his part, Erdogan once imagined regime change in Damascus as an end game, but he realized he needed Putin’s forbearance to help keep Kurdish nationalism at bay. That’s why Erdogan was compelled to sign a lopsided cease-fire agreement with Putin and the Iranians in September 2018 that imposed conditions—such as the disarmament of extremist groups in Syria—he had no hope of ever fulfilling. To Erdogan’s credit, the agreement helped stave off disaster for a few years.
But by late 2019 the Russian military and Assad determined that it was time to take back the Syrian provinces near the Turkish border. For Assad, Idlib was the last remaining province beyond his control. The resulting scorched-earth military strategy produced the humanitarian disaster now unfolding in northwest Syria, in which almost a million people are caught between three armies. The prospect of millions more desperate Syrians entering Turkey is what spurred Erdogan’s current military buildup there. The result has been a war within a war—and a situation that American officials have, once again, signaled is not a high priority. In any case, the cease-fire that Erdogan and Putin hammered out on March 5 underscores that the Turks are perfectly capable of handling the crisis without Washington holding their hands—at least in the short term.
In the longer term, the Turks do have a case for international assistance on Syria. So long as the Syrians, Russians, and Iranians continue to spill an astonishing amount of blood there, Ankara will face the potential crisis of caring for millions of refugees whose presence could prove destabilizing in Turkey. But, while no one is going to stop the Turks from trying to stem this emergency’s root causes, no one is going to help them either—least of all the United States.