foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--How Italy Snatched Health From the Jaws of Death

How Italy Snatched Health From the Jaws of Death In January this year , COVID-19 struck Italy , the first European stop on the virus ’ s deadly journey around the world .
“ Italy ’ s Health Care System Groans Under Coronavirus , ” the New York Times wrote in March , while Germany ’ s Bild described macabre processions of military trucks delivering the COVID-19 dead to cemeteries .
The global shock over Italy ’ s tragic fate betrayed a sense of superiority : The disorganized Italians were mishandling the crisis , sure , but the rest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Half a year later , the Italians have not only managed to get their infection rate down to the level of Europe ’ s star performers like Germany and Finland , but have achieved low fatality rates comparable to the Germans and Finns too .
Transportation is just one sector in which Italy is overperforming .
Recently , Rome ’ s Fiumicino Airport was awarded the world ’ s first five-star COVID-19 airport cleanliness rating by Skytrax .
A trial in which passengers flying out of Fiumicino are tested at the airport , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flights , is also set to be expanded if it proves successful .
A number of other Italian airports , ports , and train stations already offer COVID-19 tests to arriving passengers , which a British member of Parliament pointed out to remonstrate U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson over the fact that travelers can get tested at Italian airports while “ in the U.K. there ’ s total chaos in the testing system.
” It isn ’ t just airports and train stations that the Italians are managing well .
This week , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ size of the country ’ s parliament with nearly two-thirds voter participation in some areas .
If anything , Italy ’ s performance during the pandemic should make the world rethink its condescension toward the country , which is often seen as both shambolic and overly bureaucratized at the same time .
To be sure , much of that criticism has a basis in fact .
As the Italian academic Roberto Orsi pointed out in a 2013 article , political mismanagement has left the country with debt far surpassing its GDP .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team calculated that , partially thanks to shoddy construction , an earthquake of the same magnitude would kill 3,000 people in Iran , 150 in Italy , and three in California .
But after earthquakes and now during COVID-19 , Italy has responded with surprising agility .
Indeed , the rest of the world could learn a thing or two from its response .
And so , by March 22 , the country had nearly 60,000 COVID-19 cases .
The government ordered factories shut .
Italian life was confined to hospitals , supermarkets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the misery continued .
On March 26 , 712 Italians died of COVID-19 ; the following day the virus claimed another 919 .
The world watched the suffering country with a not inconsiderable amount of prejudice .
“ We always wanted to be a bit like you .
So relaxed , so beautiful , so passionate .
We wanted to cook pasta like you , drink Campari soda like you , make amore like you , ” Bild opined .
The Sun and countless other international media outlets reported about a COVID-19 lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : it involved balconies ) in the lovers ’ hometown of Verona .
Meanwhile , the country ’ s allies failed to respond to its urgent pleas for medical supplies .
Instead , Russia and China swept in with dubious help—think sometimes-unusable Chinese personal protective equipment for purchase and Russian military teams basing themselves near NATO installations—and plenty of PR fanfare .
In an early April poll by the Italian pollster SWG , 52 percent of Italians called China a friendly country , up from 10 percent in 2019 .
Meanwhile , 32 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase , while 45 percent identified Germany as hostile .
Italy seemed stuck in a destructive descent , albeit one with the occasional balcony romance .
But half a year later , it has had a mere 34 COVID-19 infections per 100,000 residents in 14 days , a far lower figure than seen by Spain ( 311 ) and France ( 193 ) for the same period ; indeed , it was much closer to star performer Germany ’ s rate of 26 per 100,000 residents .
And that ’ s not all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the supposedly disorganized Italy has managed to organize dignified tribute to those whose lives COVID-19 has claimed .
In June , Bergamo—a city devastated by the coronavirus—put on a spectacular performance of Requiem by the 19th-century opera composer Gaetano Donizetti , a son of the city .
This month in Milan , the Duomo followed with a performance of Giuseppe Verdi ’ s famous Requiem .
Both concerts were attended by President Sergio Mattarella and a host of other officials .
Of course , other countries have remembered their victims and health care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as in Latvia ’ s capital , Riga ) or online church services ( as in Manchester , England ) .
Italy ’ s stunning musical memorials are in a league of their own .
There was , of course , something to mourn : To date , 35,738 Italians have lost their lives to the coronavirus .
But the fact that the country has managed to battle the virus into submission more effectively than many a supposedly better organized nation is remarkable .
With its low infection rate , Italy also looks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wave .
How did the Italians snatch health from the jaws of death in just a few short months ?
Lowe says both the government and the population adapted with surprising speed .
“ This was an emergency , and since Italy was the first European country to be hit there wasn ’ t a model that Italy could use , ” he pointed out .
“ The government implemented draconian measures , but it implemented them very well.
” Of course , many of those came too late and were too lenient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , since Italy ’ s health service is decentralized , too many regional officials and too many virologists made different decisions .
But we have to remember that this was uncharted territory , and the government did act courageously , ” he said .
That included its decision last month to mandate wearing of face masks in all open spaces where social distancing isn ’ t possible .
In the first few days , quite a few face mask refuseniks were fined .
Although not omnipotent , Italy ’ s central government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , say , the U.S. federal government .
But perhaps even more important than any government courage was the resilience of ordinary Italians .
It is true that Italian governance can be haphazard , retired Gen. Vincenzo Camporini , a former chief of the defense staff of Italy , told me .
“ But as a result , we developed a network of informal initiatives that eventually was more successful than what was done in countries that are better organized , ” he said .
Those informal initiatives included people shopping for elderly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local Carabinieri police stations did the same , with many even bringing pensions to elderly residents , who typically collect them at the post office .
Indeed , in many regions Italians used to calamities such as earthquakes were well placed to take on yet another crisis .
Italy ’ s culture of less-than-rigid organization may turn out to be an advantage not just during this pandemic but in future crises as well .
“ Since in our culture regulation is treated more as advice than as mandatory rules , once people grasped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rules became natural for them , ” Camporini said .
Giampaolo Roidi , a senior editor at Italy ’ s AGI news agency , agreed , telling me that “ from a health perspective the Italians showed that they immediately understood the seriousness of the situation.
” When people feel that they are following rules of their own volition , there is less temptation to disobey out of contempt for the authorities .
In some ways , that idea unites Italy ’ s and Sweden ’ s responses to the pandemic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on recommendations rather than rules .
Rather than imposing a lockdown , the authorities have asked the public to behave responsibly .
The strategy seems to have worked : Sweden had an early spike in fatalities , but its infection rate is now declining .
Craig Fugate , the administrator of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency for the duration of Barack Obama ’ s presidency , makes a similar point .
“ Embrace the chaos , ” he argued at a recent RUSI event , explaining that governments need to treat the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burden during crises .
And there will be more crises , whether caused by Mother Nature or by hostile states .
Much like teenagers , the public is more likely to play a productive role if it feels empowered rather than forced .
Italians , in the face of deep devastation , empowered themselves to rise above .
The question now is whether the public will act as stoically in trying to get the country ’ s shattered economy back on track—a herculean task even with the European Union ’ s 540 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ package for the member states worst hit by COVID-19 .
Of course , “ embrace the chaos ” would hardly be the label chosen by the Italian government for its coronavirus recovery strategy .
But doing so has been a source of resilience so far .
Call it grassroots crisis management .
That ’ s obviously not the entire answer to crises , but Italy ’ s performance shows that it is part of a complete response .

In January this year, COVID-19 struck Italy, the first European stop on the virus’s deadly journey around the world. “Italy’s Health Care System Groans Under Coronavirus,” the New York Times wrote in March, while Germany’s Bild described macabre processions of military trucks delivering the COVID-19 dead to cemeteries. The global shock over Italy’s tragic fate betrayed a sense of superiority: The disorganized Italians were mishandling the crisis, sure, but the rest of us would know what to do.
In January this year, COVID-19 struck Italy, the first European stop on the virus’s deadly journey around the world. “Italy’s Health Care System Groans Under Coronavirus,” the New York Times wrote in March, while Germany’s Bild described macabre processions of military trucks delivering the COVID-19 dead to cemeteries. The global shock over Italy’s tragic fate betrayed a sense of superiority: The disorganized Italians were mishandling the crisis, sure, but the rest of us would know what to do.
Half a year later, the Italians have not only managed to get their infection rate down to the level of Europe’s star performers like Germany and Finland, but have achieved low fatality rates comparable to the Germans and Finns too.
Transportation is just one sector in which Italy is overperforming. Recently, Rome’s Fiumicino Airport was awarded the world’s first five-star COVID-19 airport cleanliness rating by Skytrax. A trial in which passengers flying out of Fiumicino are tested at the airport, with results available before they board their flights, is also set to be expanded if it proves successful. A number of other Italian airports, ports, and train stations already offer COVID-19 tests to arriving passengers, which a British member of Parliament pointed out to remonstrate U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson over the fact that travelers can get tested at Italian airports while “in the U.K. there’s total chaos in the testing system.”
It isn’t just airports and train stations that the Italians are managing well. This week, Italy held a virus-safe referendum on the size of the country’s parliament with nearly two-thirds voter participation in some areas.
If anything, Italy’s performance during the pandemic should make the world rethink its condescension toward the country, which is often seen as both shambolic and overly bureaucratized at the same time. To be sure, much of that criticism has a basis in fact. As the Italian academic Roberto Orsi pointed out in a 2013 article, political mismanagement has left the country with debt far surpassing its GDP. And a 2010 article by a U.S. geological team calculated that, partially thanks to shoddy construction, an earthquake of the same magnitude would kill 3,000 people in Iran, 150 in Italy, and three in California. But after earthquakes and now during COVID-19, Italy has responded with surprising agility. Indeed, the rest of the world could learn a thing or two from its response.
The novel coronavirus is thought to have arrived in Italy in late January, after an infected traveler arrived from China. By Jan. 31, the country had two confirmed cases of COVID-19. Four and a half weeks later, with more than 3,000 confirmed cases, the government closed schools and universities. A few days later, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte announced a lockdown covering large parts of the country’s north. But it didn’t help. “When the lockdown of the north was announced, thousands of people went to the south,” said Mark Lowe, a British businessman who has lived in Italy for a quarter-century. “We would have needed a simultaneous lockdown of the whole country.”
And so, by March 22, the country had nearly 60,000 COVID-19 cases. The government ordered factories shut. Italian life was confined to hospitals, supermarkets, pharmacies, and homes. But the misery continued. On March 26, 712 Italians died of COVID-19; the following day the virus claimed another 919.
The world watched the suffering country with a not inconsiderable amount of prejudice. “We always wanted to be a bit like you. So relaxed, so beautiful, so passionate. We wanted to cook pasta like you, drink Campari soda like you, make amore like you,” Bild opined. The Sun and countless other international media outlets reported about a COVID-19 lockdown Romeo and Juliet-like love story (hint: it involved balconies) in the lovers’ hometown of Verona.
Meanwhile, the country’s allies failed to respond to its urgent pleas for medical supplies. Instead, Russia and China swept in with dubious help—think sometimes-unusable Chinese personal protective equipment for purchase and Russian military teams basing themselves near NATO installations—and plenty of PR fanfare. In an early April poll by the Italian pollster SWG, 52 percent of Italians called China a friendly country, up from 10 percent in 2019. Meanwhile, 32 percent called Russia friendly, a 17-percentage-point increase, while 45 percent identified Germany as hostile.
Italy seemed stuck in a destructive descent, albeit one with the occasional balcony romance. But half a year later, it has had a mere 34 COVID-19 infections per 100,000 residents in 14 days, a far lower figure than seen by Spain (311) and France (193) for the same period; indeed, it was much closer to star performer Germany’s rate of 26 per 100,000 residents.
And that’s not all. Unlike virtually every other country, the supposedly disorganized Italy has managed to organize dignified tribute to those whose lives COVID-19 has claimed. In June, Bergamo—a city devastated by the coronavirus—put on a spectacular performance of Requiem by the 19th-century opera composer Gaetano Donizetti, a son of the city. This month in Milan, the Duomo followed with a performance of Giuseppe Verdi’s famous Requiem. Both concerts were attended by President Sergio Mattarella and a host of other officials. Of course, other countries have remembered their victims and health care workers—mostly in the form of statues (as in Latvia’s capital, Riga) or online church services (as in Manchester, England). Italy’s stunning musical memorials are in a league of their own.
There was, of course, something to mourn: To date, 35,738 Italians have lost their lives to the coronavirus. But the fact that the country has managed to battle the virus into submission more effectively than many a supposedly better organized nation is remarkable. With its low infection rate, Italy also looks likely to hold off a devastating second wave.
How did the Italians snatch health from the jaws of death in just a few short months? Lowe says both the government and the population adapted with surprising speed. “This was an emergency, and since Italy was the first European country to be hit there wasn’t a model that Italy could use,” he pointed out. “The government implemented draconian measures, but it implemented them very well.” Of course, many of those came too late and were too lenient at first. “On top of that, since Italy’s health service is decentralized, too many regional officials and too many virologists made different decisions. But we have to remember that this was uncharted territory, and the government did act courageously,” he said. That included its decision last month to mandate wearing of face masks in all open spaces where social distancing isn’t possible. In the first few days, quite a few face mask refuseniks were fined.
Although not omnipotent, Italy’s central government has more power across the country than, say, the U.S. federal government. But perhaps even more important than any government courage was the resilience of ordinary Italians. It is true that Italian governance can be haphazard, retired Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, a former chief of the defense staff of Italy, told me. “But as a result, we developed a network of informal initiatives that eventually was more successful than what was done in countries that are better organized,” he said. Those informal initiatives included people shopping for elderly neighbors. On their own initiative, local Carabinieri police stations did the same, with many even bringing pensions to elderly residents, who typically collect them at the post office. Indeed, in many regions Italians used to calamities such as earthquakes were well placed to take on yet another crisis.
Italy’s culture of less-than-rigid organization may turn out to be an advantage not just during this pandemic but in future crises as well. “Since in our culture regulation is treated more as advice than as mandatory rules, once people grasped the severity of the problem adherence to the rules became natural for them,” Camporini said. Giampaolo Roidi, a senior editor at Italy’s AGI news agency, agreed, telling me that “from a health perspective the Italians showed that they immediately understood the seriousness of the situation.”
When people feel that they are following rules of their own volition, there is less temptation to disobey out of contempt for the authorities. In some ways, that idea unites Italy’s and Sweden’s responses to the pandemic. Sweden, like Italy, has relied on recommendations rather than rules. Rather than imposing a lockdown, the authorities have asked the public to behave responsibly. The strategy seems to have worked: Sweden had an early spike in fatalities, but its infection rate is now declining.
Craig Fugate, the administrator of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency for the duration of Barack Obama’s presidency, makes a similar point. “Embrace the chaos,” he argued at a recent RUSI event, explaining that governments need to treat the public as a resource rather than a burden during crises. And there will be more crises, whether caused by Mother Nature or by hostile states. Much like teenagers, the public is more likely to play a productive role if it feels empowered rather than forced.
Italians, in the face of deep devastation, empowered themselves to rise above. The question now is whether the public will act as stoically in trying to get the country’s shattered economy back on track—a herculean task even with the European Union’s 540 billion euro ($630 billion) aid package for the member states worst hit by COVID-19.
Of course, “embrace the chaos” would hardly be the label chosen by the Italian government for its coronavirus recovery strategy. But doing so has been a source of resilience so far.
Call it grassroots crisis management. That’s obviously not the entire answer to crises, but Italy’s performance shows that it is part of a complete response.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--Lukashenko Sworn in as Belarus President as EU Mulls Sanctions

Lukashenko Sworn in as Belarus President as EU Mulls Sanctions Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Aleksandr Lukashenko is inaugurated as Belarusian president in a secret ceremony , another country is set to sign a deal with Israel in the coming days , and China criticizes Oracle ’ s bid to buy TikTok .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Longtime Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko was sworn in to extend his 26-year rule at a secret ceremony in Minsk on Wednesday , emphasizing the embattled leader ’ s shrinking authority and increasingly precarious hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made regarding the ceremony , prompting thousands of protesters to flood the streets of Minsk to rally against Lukashenko once the news broke .
Opposition leaders , who have put immense pressure on Lukashenko since he claimed victory in a landslide on Aug. 9 amid widespread accusations of voter fraud , called the inaugural ceremony a “ thieves ’ meeting ” and a “ farce.
” Demanding action .
The Coordination Council , an opposition body formed in the wake of the protests against Lukashenko to lead the country ’ s transition , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lukashenko .
“ We call on the European Union , Great Britain , the USA , Canada , China , [ and ] Russia to take a clear position on recognising Lukashenko [ as ] illegitimate , ” it said in a statement .
U.S. taking note .
In a statement , a spokesperson of the U.S. State Department said that “ the United States can not consider [ Lukashenko ] the legitimately elected leader of Belarus.
” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said earlier this month that Washington is considering sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steps .
The European Union has already said it doesn ’ t recognize Lukashenko as president , and it has prepared a list of individuals to be sanctioned over last month ’ s election fraud .
But the bloc ’ s action on Belarus depends in large part on what happens between Greece , Cyprus , and Turkey in their dispute in the eastern Mediterranean .
Eyes on Cyprus .
During a meeting on Monday between EU foreign ministers , Cyprus blocked an attempt by the EU to sanction Belarus due to its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over its increasingly aggressive activity in the eastern Mediterranean .
On Tuesday , Turkish and Greek officials agreed to meet to discuss their unresolved dispute in Istanbul , a move that probably saved Turkey from EU sanctions , but which could now make it harder to convince Cyprus to approve of sanctions on Belarus .
EU leaders were supposed to meet again on Friday to vote on sanctioning Turkey , but they have postponed their meeting to next week and will determine a course of action then .
But as Michaël Tanchum wrote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are unwilling to antagonize Russia by taking too harsh of a stance on Turkey , meaning the EU will probably adopt only mild sanctions at best .
China balks at TikTok deal .
A Chinese state media outlet called the recent agreement between Oracle , Walmart , and ByteDance to restructure the U.S. operations of the popular video-sharing app TikTok in order to give the United States greater oversight “ dirty and unfair , ” echoing a similar sentiment expressed by other state media that could suggest Beijing won ’ t approve of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. President Donald Trump , the deal now needs sign-off from China in order to go into effect .
The deal was struck last week in a last-ditch effort to avoid Trump ’ s ban on TikTok in the United States , which was due to go into effect on Sept. 20 .
Initial reports suggested that ByteDance , which is a Chinese tech company , would retain 80 percent ownership in the new company that will operate TikTok , but conflicting reports have since emerged .
An Oracle executive said on Monday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
U.S. protests spread in response to Breonna Taylor case .
Police impunity is once again sparking protests across the United States .
Although a Kentucky grand jury charged one officer with reckless endangerment in the case of Breonna Taylor , a Black woman who was shot in her home in March , it decided not to file murder charges against the officers who killed Taylor during a botched raid .
Protesters took to the streets in Louisville after the decision was announced and police reported that two officers were shot .
Demonstrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chicago , Milwaukee , and Atlanta .
Thai royalists take to the streets .
Hundreds of pro-monarchy protesters swarmed the Thai parliament building on Wednesday as lawmakers convened to consider amending the constitution as a way of mollifying anti-monarchy protesters who have been demonstrating in the streets for months .
Warong Dechgitvigrom , a leading politician and the head of the prominent Thai Pakdee royalist group , said he organized a petition opposing constitutional change that garnered 130,000 signatures .
Protesters have defied strict laws against criticizing the monarchy to demand fresh elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the powers of the monarchy .
A charter outlining potential constitutional changes submitted to parliament will be reviewed over the coming days .
Anti-monarchy protests are expected to continue during the deliberations .
Israel could get another boost .
Kelly Craft , the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations , said on Wednesday that another country is going to sign a normalization deal with Israel “ in the next day or two , ” the latest in a major push by Washington to normalize relations between Arab states and Israel in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s regional ambitions .
“ Others are going to be following , ” she said .
Craft did not specify which country was close to a deal , but the United States has been working over the previous few weeks to entice Sudan to strike its own deal with Israel .
On Monday , it was reported that U.S. officials are offering to take Sudan off its state sponsors of terrorism list—which would be a significant boon to the country ’ s economy—in exchange for opening diplomatic relations with Israel .
Sudanese officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United Arab Emirates .
Political drama hits Malaysia .
Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim is set to make a bid to become the country ’ s next prime minister , claiming to have secured a majority in the country ’ s parliament against current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin .
Although Anwar claims to have the support of two-thirds of parliament , he has not disclosed specific numbers nor identified who supports his bid for power .
Yassin rejected Anwar ’ s claims and has insisted he remains in control .
Malaysia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ’ s government in February , after which Yassin took power with a tenuous majority .
Anwar , who has previously served as deputy prime minister , spent almost 10 years in prison for alleged corruption and sodomy , charges widely seen as politically-motivated .
More Brexit borders .
As Scottish nationalists inch ever closer to a second independence referendum and Irish nationalists amplify their calls for a unity referendum , it now looks like there could be a new border within England itself .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s minister for the Cabinet Office , truck drivers seeking to enter the county of Kent on their way to the European Union will need to present a special access permit before passing through , effectively setting up a de facto internal border around the county in order to prevent congestion and long lines of thousands of trucks waiting to enter the EU .
Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage , a native of Kent , might now have to cross a border inside the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in London .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Aleksandr Lukashenko is inaugurated as Belarusian president in a secret ceremony, another country is set to sign a deal with Israel in the coming days, and China criticizes Oracle’s bid to buy TikTok .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Aleksandr Lukashenko is inaugurated as Belarusian president in a secret ceremony, another country is set to sign a deal with Israel in the coming days, and China criticizes Oracle’s bid to buy TikTok.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Protests Reignite After News of Secret Belarus Inauguration
Longtime Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko was sworn in to extend his 26-year rule at a secret ceremony in Minsk on Wednesday, emphasizing the embattled leader’s shrinking authority and increasingly precarious hold on power. No prior announcement was made regarding the ceremony, prompting thousands of protesters to flood the streets of Minsk to rally against Lukashenko once the news broke.
Opposition leaders, who have put immense pressure on Lukashenko since he claimed victory in a landslide on Aug. 9 amid widespread accusations of voter fraud, called the inaugural ceremony a “thieves’ meeting” and a “farce.”
Demanding action. The Coordination Council, an opposition body formed in the wake of the protests against Lukashenko to lead the country’s transition, urged international powers to put pressure on Lukashenko. “We call on the European Union, Great Britain, the USA, Canada, China, [and] Russia to take a clear position on recognising Lukashenko [as] illegitimate,” it said in a statement.
U.S. taking note. In a statement, a spokesperson of the U.S. State Department said that “the United States cannot consider [Lukashenko] the legitimately elected leader of Belarus.” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said earlier this month that Washington is considering sanctions against Belarus.
EU’s next steps. The European Union has already said it doesn’t recognize Lukashenko as president, and it has prepared a list of individuals to be sanctioned over last month’s election fraud. But the bloc’s action on Belarus depends in large part on what happens between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey in their dispute in the eastern Mediterranean.
Eyes on Cyprus. During a meeting on Monday between EU foreign ministers, Cyprus blocked an attempt by the EU to sanction Belarus due to its refusal to impose similar measures on Turkey over its increasingly aggressive activity in the eastern Mediterranean. On Tuesday, Turkish and Greek officials agreed to meet to discuss their unresolved dispute in Istanbul, a move that probably saved Turkey from EU sanctions, but which could now make it harder to convince Cyprus to approve of sanctions on Belarus.
EU leaders were supposed to meet again on Friday to vote on sanctioning Turkey, but they have postponed their meeting to next week and will determine a course of action then. But as Michaël Tanchum wrote in Foreign Policy, Eastern European states are unwilling to antagonize Russia by taking too harsh of a stance on Turkey, meaning the EU will probably adopt only mild sanctions at best.
What We’re Following Today
China balks at TikTok deal. A Chinese state media outlet called the recent agreement between Oracle, Walmart, and ByteDance to restructure the U.S. operations of the popular video-sharing app TikTok in order to give the United States greater oversight “dirty and unfair,” echoing a similar sentiment expressed by other state media that could suggest Beijing won’t approve of the deal. After receiving approval from U.S. President Donald Trump, the deal now needs sign-off from China in order to go into effect.
The deal was struck last week in a last-ditch effort to avoid Trump’s ban on TikTok in the United States, which was due to go into effect on Sept. 20. Initial reports suggested that ByteDance, which is a Chinese tech company, would retain 80 percent ownership in the new company that will operate TikTok, but conflicting reports have since emerged. An Oracle executive said on Monday that ByteDance will retain no ownership stake.
U.S. protests spread in response to Breonna Taylor case. Police impunity is once again sparking protests across the United States. Although a Kentucky grand jury charged one officer with reckless endangerment in the case of Breonna Taylor, a Black woman who was shot in her home in March, it decided not to file murder charges against the officers who killed Taylor during a botched raid. Protesters took to the streets in Louisville after the decision was announced and police reported that two officers were shot. Demonstrations also took place in New York, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Atlanta.
Thai royalists take to the streets. Hundreds of pro-monarchy protesters swarmed the Thai parliament building on Wednesday as lawmakers convened to consider amending the constitution as a way of mollifying anti-monarchy protesters who have been demonstrating in the streets for months. Warong Dechgitvigrom, a leading politician and the head of the prominent Thai Pakdee royalist group, said he organized a petition opposing constitutional change that garnered 130,000 signatures.
Protesters have defied strict laws against criticizing the monarchy to demand fresh elections and a new constitution that would limit the powers of the monarchy. A charter outlining potential constitutional changes submitted to parliament will be reviewed over the coming days. Anti-monarchy protests are expected to continue during the deliberations.
Keep an Eye On
Israel could get another boost. Kelly Craft, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said on Wednesday that another country is going to sign a normalization deal with Israel “in the next day or two,” the latest in a major push by Washington to normalize relations between Arab states and Israel in order to coordinate a regional bulwark against Iran’s regional ambitions. “Others are going to be following,” she said.
Craft did not specify which country was close to a deal, but the United States has been working over the previous few weeks to entice Sudan to strike its own deal with Israel. On Monday, it was reported that U.S. officials are offering to take Sudan off its state sponsors of terrorism list—which would be a significant boon to the country’s economy—in exchange for opening diplomatic relations with Israel. Sudanese officials recently participated in talks with U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates.
Political drama hits Malaysia. Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim is set to make a bid to become the country’s next prime minister, claiming to have secured a majority in the country’s parliament against current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. Although Anwar claims to have the support of two-thirds of parliament, he has not disclosed specific numbers nor identified who supports his bid for power. Yassin rejected Anwar’s claims and has insisted he remains in control.
Malaysia has been plagued with political instability since the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s government in February, after which Yassin took power with a tenuous majority. Anwar, who has previously served as deputy prime minister, spent almost 10 years in prison for alleged corruption and sodomy, charges widely seen as politically-motivated.
Odds and Ends
More Brexit borders. As Scottish nationalists inch ever closer to a second independence referendum and Irish nationalists amplify their calls for a unity referendum, it now looks like there could be a new border within England itself.
According to Michael Gove, the United Kingdom’s minister for the Cabinet Office, truck drivers seeking to enter the county of Kent on their way to the European Union will need to present a special access permit before passing through, effectively setting up a de facto internal border around the county in order to prevent congestion and long lines of thousands of trucks waiting to enter the EU. Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage, a native of Kent, might now have to cross a border inside the United Kingdom just to get to work in London.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Photo credit: Maxim Guchek/Belta/AFP via Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--Israeli TV Spy Thriller ‘Tehran’ Flouts Stereotypes About Iran

When the Mossad spy and computer hacker Tamar Rabinyan slips into Iran on a mission to help demolish its nuclear program , she ’ s on familiar ground .
Chased in the Israeli television thriller Tehran through the Iranian capital ’ s gritty alleys and markets , the young agent ducks into a safe house that her bosses in Tel Aviv know nothing about .
Answering the door with a look of haunted shock is her old Aunt Arezoo , who had stayed behind in Tehran with a Muslim husband when the rest of her Jewish family fled the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plot twists that captivated Israelis this summer through the series ’ s eight episodes on the Israeli Public Broadcasting network , finding sanctuary with a long-lost Iranian relative may have been the most plausible .
Some 140,000 Israelis trace their roots to Iran , including an ex-president , a former army chief of staff , and a small constellation of pop stars .
Even today , as the two countries regard each other as mortal enemies , about 10,000 Jews live in Iran as an officially protected minority , down from 80,000 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across in Tehran during a kitchen scene when the Israeli spy , returning to her birthplace , confidently scoops luscious handfuls of minced lamb , scallions , rice , and mint leaves from a bowl .
Molding the mixture spiced with cardamom into perfect koofteh , or Persian meatballs , Rabinyan bonds over the family recipe with her deeply conflicted aunt and inadvertently exposes herself to scrutiny from the Iranian secret police , who have been tracking her from the day she landed at Imam Khomeini International Airport disguised as a flight attendant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Israel was in its flouting of stereotypes about life in a strict Islamic society .
The series , whose U.S. and international release on Apple TV+ is set for Sept. 25 , is built on such tender screw-ups .
Under the main story arc of an epic Israeli assault against Iran ’ s nuclear reactor , the television drama is animated by botched elements of basic spycraft , ill-advised romantic entanglements , and a mental chess game between the opposing intelligence agency chiefs .
Most of the dialogue is in Farsi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Stock aerial footage grounds the action inside the Iranian capital while scenes filmed by the Israeli production company in Athens present a rough approximation of downtown Tehran .
If the home audience in Israel wasn ’ t already intrigued , the TV series had some uncanny real-life echoes when it aired in July at the same time as a string of explosions rocked Iran ’ s assembly plant for nuclear centrifuges in Natanz and other sites across the country .
Israel is suspected to have been behind the blasts but has neither accepted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best modern spy tales , Tehran gets the viewer so close to current politics that the plot unfolding on the screen could—with a bit of imagination—be happening outside .
Much of Tehran ’ s appeal in Israel was in its flouting of stereotypes about life in a strict Islamic society and its suggestion that Iran ’ s rebellious youth culture is not unlike Israel ’ s own .
In a tightly wound performance by the Israeli actor Niv Sultan , Rabinyan infiltrates the underground scene by flirting on the dark web , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and fellow hacker named Milad .
Played with puppy-dog geekiness by the Iranian British actor Shervin Alenabi , he guides her through a methamphetamine-blurred world where counterrevolution is galvanized and sexual boundaries are crossed .
In turn , she manipulates him to help crack Iran ’ s aerial defense system and clear the way for an Israeli attack .
It ’ s often unclear who ’ s outsmarting whom .
Tehran is hardly the first television drama to focus on how Israel ’ s intelligence agencies operate in the Muslim world .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an immensely successful Hollywood ecosystem spawned by the Israeli producer Gideon Raff , who created Showtime ’ s Emmy-winning Homeland and the Israeli original on which it is loosely based .
Sacha Baron Cohen starred last year in The Spy , another Raff series co-produced by Netflix that tells the true-life story of the Egyptian-born Mossad agent Eli Cohen , who penetrated the highest echelons of the Syrian government before his 1965 public hanging in a Damascus square .
Tehran ’ s co-creator Moshe Zonder was previously head writer on Fauda , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza .
There is another , deeper reason that Tehran—with its nuanced , sometimes humorous , and often moving portrayal of Israeli-Iranian connections—has struck such a chord in Israel .
Never since the country ’ s founding in 1948 have so many Israelis sought to connect with their Muslim neighbors and vice versa .
Business , government , and personal ties are growing , and peace among historical enemies—or at least an unofficial normalization—is in the air .
Today ’ s Israelis are looking at their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which helps explain both the series ’ s success and why its nuanced take on Iran would have been unlikely just a few years ago.. Rapprochement also reflects generational change , an annoyance with the lingering hatreds of the past .
The sudden fascination even with an archenemy such as Iran is a true turnaround for Israeli society , whose national identity has long been wedded to the idea of being a civilized island of Western democracy in a savage Middle East .
Shaped by decades of war and hostility , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a part of the region also reflected the fact that the country ’ s founding elite of Ashkenazi Jews came largely from Europe .
Yet the largest ethnic group in Israel today is Mizrahi Jews , whose parents or grandparents fled from the Middle East or North Africa , just like the family of the main character in Tehran .
Though the series focuses attention on Persian Jews , other Jewish communities in Israel are examining their own past in the Muslim world .
And they ’ re increasingly finding that interest returned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens are taking tentative steps toward reestablishing connections .
Some , such as Egypt , Lebanon , and Tunisia , are resurrecting abandoned synagogues and seeking ways to promote Muslim-Jewish dialogue .
Other signs that boundaries are being torn down include the first flight of the Israeli airline El Al between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi—across Saudi Arabia no less—and a Saudi television series broadcast in April that explored the Arabian Peninsula ’ s Jewish heritage .
Rapprochement also reflects generational change , an annoyance with the lingering hatreds of the past .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and bitterness of fleeing Arab persecution die out , younger Israelis without the emotional baggage are developing relationships with their neighbors—often online but also through personal encounters in the youth hostels of Asia , Europe , and South America .
In parallel , young Emiratis and Saudis seem to be increasingly—and openly—asking why they need to carry an archaic hatred that their parents felt for Israel on behalf of the Palestinians .
To them , the Arab-Israeli wars are ancient history .
The tantalizing aroma of regional acceptance—perhaps even integration—is in the air @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Emirates agreed to normalize ties with Israel and develop what its leaders said would be a warm relationship .
The tiny oil-rich Persian Gulf state never had an indigenous Jewish population but has enthusiastically encouraged expatriate Jews to lay down roots , rebranding itself through a doctrine of tolerance .
The government has commissioned a monumental interfaith center in Abu Dhabi housing a mosque , church , and synagogue .
In nearby Qatar , the organizing committee for the 2022 FIFA World Cup has tapped a New York rabbi to ensure that kosher @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The series has given Israelis a taste of forbidden fruit—or , in this case , cardamom-infused meatballs .
Nuances don ’ t seem to exist in public dialogue between Israel and Iran .
Straight out of a Marvel comic book , leaders of both countries paint each other as diabolical founts of irredeemable evil .
Much like in the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War , Israeli children grow up with deep-seated fears that their country will be obliterated by Iranian missiles .
Iran ’ s leaders provide plenty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threats , parading laser-guided missiles through the streets of Tehran in the annual Quds Day rally and leading chants that promise to liberate Jerusalem from the Zionist enemy .
Still , the show ’ s Israeli broadcaster has put a version of Tehran with Farsi subtitles on its webpage aimed at viewers in Iran , where newspapers denounced the series as anti-Iranian even before it came out .
Yet the region ’ s realities are dramatically shifting , as the U.S.-brokered peace deal between Israel and the UAE aptly illustrates .
While Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for more than 40 years , the Tehran spy series pushes back against the idea that adversaries are destined to hate each other .
In emphasizing the similarities and connections between the two peoples , it has given Israelis a taste of forbidden fruit—or , in this case , cardamom-infused meatballs .
After a summer marked by the blurring of fiction and reality , the series offers a veiled nudge for Israelis to find common ground with a new generation in Iran .
To them , and to viewers in the rest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most unthinkable of alliances could lie somewhere on the horizon .

When the Mossad spy and computer hacker Tamar Rabinyan slips into Iran on a mission to help demolish its nuclear program, she’s on familiar ground. Chased in the Israeli television thriller Tehran through the Iranian capital’s gritty alleys and markets, the young agent ducks into a safe house that her bosses in Tel Aviv know nothing about. Answering the door with a look of haunted shock is her old Aunt Arezoo, who had stayed behind in Tehran with a Muslim husband when the rest of her Jewish family fled the country decades before.
When the Mossad spy and computer hacker Tamar Rabinyan slips into Iran on a mission to help demolish its nuclear program, she’s on familiar ground. Chased in the Israeli television thriller Tehran through the Iranian capital’s gritty alleys and markets, the young agent ducks into a safe house that her bosses in Tel Aviv know nothing about. Answering the door with a look of haunted shock is her old Aunt Arezoo, who had stayed behind in Tehran with a Muslim husband when the rest of her Jewish family fled the country decades before.
Of all the improbable plot twists that captivated Israelis this summer through the series’s eight episodes on the Israeli Public Broadcasting network, finding sanctuary with a long-lost Iranian relative may have been the most plausible. Some 140,000 Israelis trace their roots to Iran, including an ex-president, a former army chief of staff, and a small constellation of pop stars. Even today, as the two countries regard each other as mortal enemies, about 10,000 Jews live in Iran as an officially protected minority, down from 80,000 in the 1940s.
That visceral connection comes across in Tehran during a kitchen scene when the Israeli spy, returning to her birthplace, confidently scoops luscious handfuls of minced lamb, scallions, rice, and mint leaves from a bowl. Molding the mixture spiced with cardamom into perfect koofteh, or Persian meatballs, Rabinyan bonds over the family recipe with her deeply conflicted aunt and inadvertently exposes herself to scrutiny from the Iranian secret police, who have been tracking her from the day she landed at Imam Khomeini International Airport disguised as a flight attendant.
Much of Tehran’s appeal in Israel was in its flouting of stereotypes about life in a strict Islamic society.
The series, whose U.S. and international release on Apple TV+ is set for Sept. 25, is built on such tender screw-ups. Under the main story arc of an epic Israeli assault against Iran’s nuclear reactor, the television drama is animated by botched elements of basic spycraft, ill-advised romantic entanglements, and a mental chess game between the opposing intelligence agency chiefs. Most of the dialogue is in Farsi, with snippets in Hebrew and English. Stock aerial footage grounds the action inside the Iranian capital while scenes filmed by the Israeli production company in Athens present a rough approximation of downtown Tehran.
If the home audience in Israel wasn’t already intrigued, the TV series had some uncanny real-life echoes when it aired in July at the same time as a string of explosions rocked Iran’s assembly plant for nuclear centrifuges in Natanz and other sites across the country. Israel is suspected to have been behind the blasts but has neither accepted nor denied it. Like many of the best modern spy tales, Tehran gets the viewer so close to current politics that the plot unfolding on the screen could—with a bit of imagination—be happening outside.
Much of Tehran’s appeal in Israel was in its flouting of stereotypes about life in a strict Islamic society and its suggestion that Iran’s rebellious youth culture is not unlike Israel’s own. In a tightly wound performance by the Israeli actor Niv Sultan, Rabinyan infiltrates the underground scene by flirting on the dark web, where she engages with a student activist and fellow hacker named Milad. Played with puppy-dog geekiness by the Iranian British actor Shervin Alenabi, he guides her through a methamphetamine-blurred world where counterrevolution is galvanized and sexual boundaries are crossed. In turn, she manipulates him to help crack Iran’s aerial defense system and clear the way for an Israeli attack. It’s often unclear who’s outsmarting whom.
Tehran is hardly the first television drama to focus on how Israel’s intelligence agencies operate in the Muslim world. In fact, the series is the latest in an immensely successful Hollywood ecosystem spawned by the Israeli producer Gideon Raff, who created Showtime’s Emmy-winning Homeland and the Israeli original on which it is loosely based. Sacha Baron Cohen starred last year in The Spy, another Raff series co-produced by Netflix that tells the true-life story of the Egyptian-born Mossad agent Eli Cohen, who penetrated the highest echelons of the Syrian government before his 1965 public hanging in a Damascus square. Tehran’s co-creator Moshe Zonder was previously head writer on Fauda, the Netflix series about Israeli commandos posing as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
There is another, deeper reason that Tehran—with its nuanced, sometimes humorous, and often moving portrayal of Israeli-Iranian connections—has struck such a chord in Israel. Never since the country’s founding in 1948 have so many Israelis sought to connect with their Muslim neighbors and vice versa. Business, government, and personal ties are growing, and peace among historical enemies—or at least a growing normalization—is in the air. Today’s Israelis are looking at their region with fresh eyes and renewed interest, which helps explain both the series’s success and why its nuanced take on Iran would have been unlikely just a few years ago.
Rapprochement also reflects generational change, an annoyance with the lingering hatreds of the past.
The sudden fascination even with an archenemy such as Iran is a true turnaround for Israeli society, whose national identity has long been wedded to the idea of being a civilized island of Western democracy in a savage Middle East. Shaped by decades of war and hostility, this view that Israel isn’t really a part of the region also reflected the fact that the country’s founding elite of Ashkenazi Jews came largely from Europe. Yet the largest ethnic group in Israel today is Mizrahi Jews, whose parents or grandparents fled from the Middle East or North Africa, just like the family of the main character in Tehran.
Though the series focuses attention on Persian Jews, other Jewish communities in Israel are examining their own past in the Muslim world. And they’re increasingly finding that interest returned. Countries that once expelled their Jewish citizens are taking tentative steps toward reestablishing connections. Some, such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, are resurrecting abandoned synagogues and seeking ways to promote Muslim-Jewish dialogue. Other signs that boundaries are being torn down include the first flight of the Israeli airline El Al between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi—across Saudi Arabia no less—and a Saudi television series broadcast in April that explored the Arabian Peninsula’s Jewish heritage.
A scene from Tehran.
Rapprochement also reflects generational change, an annoyance with the lingering hatreds of the past. As their grandparents who bear the trauma and bitterness of fleeing Arab persecution die out, younger Israelis without the emotional baggage are developing relationships with their neighbors—often online but also through personal encounters in the youth hostels of Asia, Europe, and South America. In parallel, young Emiratis and Saudis seem to be increasingly—and openly—asking why they need to carry an archaic hatred that their parents felt for Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. To them, the Arab-Israeli wars are ancient history.
The tantalizing aroma of regional acceptance—perhaps even integration—is in the air. At a White House ceremony this month, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed normalization deals with Israel and agreed to develop what its leaders said would be a warm relationship. The UAE never had an indigenous Jewish population but has enthusiastically encouraged expatriate Jews to lay down roots, rebranding itself through a doctrine of tolerance. The government has commissioned a monumental interfaith center in Abu Dhabi housing a mosque, church, and synagogue. In nearby Qatar, the organizing committee for the 2022 FIFA World Cup has tapped a New York rabbi to ensure that kosher food is available for Jewish fans.
The series has given Israelis a taste of forbidden fruit—or, in this case, cardamom-infused meatballs.
Nuances don’t seem to exist in public dialogue between Israel and Iran. Straight out of a Marvel comic book, leaders of both countries paint each other as diabolical founts of irredeemable evil. Much like in the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Israeli children grow up with deep-seated fears that their country will be obliterated by Iranian missiles. Iran’s leaders provide plenty of material to make Israelis believe their threats, parading laser-guided missiles through the streets of Tehran in the annual Quds Day rally and leading chants that promise to liberate Jerusalem from the Zionist enemy. Still, the show’s Israeli broadcaster has put a version of Tehran with Farsi subtitles on its webpage aimed at viewers in Iran, where newspapers denounced the series as anti-Iranian even before it came out.
Yet the region’s realities are dramatically shifting, as the U.S.-brokered peace deals aptly illustrate. While Iran has been Israel’s implacable enemy for more than 40 years, the Tehran spy series pushes back against the idea that adversaries are destined to hate each other. In emphasizing the similarities and connections between the two peoples, it has given Israelis a taste of forbidden fruit—or, in this case, cardamom-infused meatballs. After a summer marked by the blurring of fiction and reality, the series offers a veiled nudge for Israelis to find common ground with a new generation in Iran. To them, and to viewers in the rest of the world, it suggests that even the most unthinkable of alliances could lie somewhere on the horizon.


Books in Brief

Isolationism : A History of America ’ s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s brand of “ America First ” isolationism has , over the past four years , repelled much of the foreign-policy establishment and horrified U.S. allies around the world .
Ahead of this year ’ s presidential election , many among them hope the Trump years will end up as a bizarre detour , with a future Joe Biden administration steering the United States back to the brand of liberal internationalism that served the country so well for 75 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Charles Kupchan , a former senior official in the Clinton and Obama administrations ( and sometime contributor to Foreign Policy ) , has two things to say .
First , Trump and his brand of isolationism are hardly aberrations ; rather , a mix of isolationism , unilateralism , economic protectionism , and racially tinged nativism is “ right out of the playbook that anchored foreign policy for most of American history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor , ” he writes .
Second , the postwar Pax Americana , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engaged all around the world , is dead .
“ A strategic retrenchment is coming ; the key question is whether it occurs by design or default , ” Kupchan writes .
Isolationism is a deeply researched , fascinating look at how an urge to keep the world at bay has largely defined the United States and its foreign policy since the country ’ s founding .
And with reason : George Washington ’ s famous warning to avoid foreign entanglements endured so long because a strategy of isolationism “ unquestionably served the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its history , the United States steered clear of the very kind of global engagement that now seems to be the norm .
The few departures—the Spanish-American War and the subsequent spurt of American imperialism , as well as the U.S. entry into World War I—soon prompted a backlash and a retreat behind the moat .
U.S. isolationism peaked during the Great Depression .
The America First Committee that urged the country to stay out of World War II—the namesake and inspiration for Trump ’ s own foreign policy—is what tarnished isolationism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The war , then the threats of the Cold War , created the glue to bind security-minded Republicans and partnership-minded Democrats to a unified foreign policy that endured for decades .
But with the end of the Cold War , that foreign-policy consensus began to crumble and is now gone .
And today , the same forces that drove isolationism in the past—especially economic anxiety , a need for nation building at home , and worries over social homogeneity—are again resounding , propelling both Trump and many of his progressive political rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overreached and needs to cut back its global commitments .
That ’ s why Kupchan argues that America will step back ; the only question is how .
Trump ’ s 19th-century brand of isolationism , while it worked well in its time , is hardly suitable for an era of economic interconnectedness and mounting transnational challenges such as climate change and pandemics , Kupchan argues .
Simply blowing up the international order—as Trump has sought to do—won ’ t re-create the prosperous , aloof security that defined much of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contends , Washington needs to chart a middle course between the crusading , activist foreign policy that has led to decades of endless wars and unmanageable global commitments and a precipitate retreat that would risk repeating the country ’ s abdication of the 1930s .
“ [ D ] angerous overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach , ” he warns .
Kupchan ’ s prescription for such a middle road—a retreat from peripheral areas such as the Middle East , a redoubling of international cooperation , and a return to spreading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gunpoint—sounds hopeful .
The problem , he as much as notes , is that the recipe sounds a lot like what former President Barack Obama tried to do with his “ liberal internationalism lite , ” which still failed to bridge the gap between “ the scope of the nation ’ s commitments abroad and the willingness of the body politic to uphold those commitments.
” The New Map : Energy , Climate , and the Clash of Nations Daniel Yergin , the author of The Prize and The Quest , is back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a trilogy dedicated to exploring how energy created the modern world—and will shape what awaits over the horizon .
The New Map is a kaleidoscopic survey of seemingly every geopolitical development in recent ( and not so recent ) history , all seen through the lens of energy , national rivalries , changing technologies , and the looming threat of climate change .
Much like The Quest , Yergin ’ s new book seeks to continue the oil-rich saga begun in The Prize , focusing on game-changing developments in the oil and gas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. shale revolution , which has turned the United States from a fuel beggar into an energy superpower .
And like The Quest , Yergin ’ s latest book also seeks to highlight the energy technologies jostling with fossil fuels—from electric cars to renewable energy ( notably , there ’ s almost no mention of nuclear power ) —all under the shadow of an accelerating climate emergency and a black swan pandemic .
Yergin , the vice chairman of the energy research powerhouse IHS Markit , is strongest when it comes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world ’ s energy supplies now and in the decades to come .
Even readers familiar with the U.S. “ shale gale ” will find new gems in his retelling of the pioneers who shattered shale to unleash a revolution .
Russia , today leveraging oil and gas the way it once wielded Marxist-Leninist ideas , also provides great grist for Yergin , as do China ’ s energy-driven forays into the South China Sea .
When it comes to the challenges and the challengers , Yergin is less sure-footed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ coming artificial intelligence revolution in automotive technology is fun to read but has been told before .
His coverage of climate change , and the scale of the lift needed to wrench the world ’ s energy system out of the old and into the new , moves little beyond what he outlined in The Quest .
The New Map is an admirable , well-researched , highly readable examination of all the changes that have turned the rock-solid certainties of the past into today ’ s dangerous combustibility .
But any book that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 18th-century development of coal coke to the Sykes-Picot partitions of the Middle East to the origins of China ’ s “ nine-dash line ” to Tesla ’ s foundation to this year ’ s oil price wars—will feel a little wider than it is deep .
The Emperor ’ s New Road : China and the Project of the Century China ’ s massive Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects in history , is invariably described as Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s signature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort to use its economic might to stretch its influence across Asia , Europe , and Africa .
It has sparked blowback from recipient nations as well as Brussels and Washington , which accuse Beijing of using debt-trap diplomacy to take over key bits of the world ’ s real estate .
But for all the ink spilled on the BRI , actually understanding what the initiative is—and isn ’ t—remains maddeningly difficult .
The Emperor ’ s New Road is a good remedy for that .
Written by Jonathan Hillman , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and International Studies and a former advisor to the Obama administration , the slim book lays bare the crude reality of the BRI , a hodgepodge of high-profile investments in ports , roads , railways , and power plants from Almaty , Kazakhstan , to Zeebrugge , Belgium .
Far from a well-crafted master plan to turn China ’ s economic might into geopolitical dominance , Hillman writes , the BRI is more of an uncoordinated scramble by Chinese firms to do deals few others would touch , leaving in its wake a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economically dubious projects .
“ Since leaving the station , China ’ s BRI has become a gravy train without a conductor , ” he writes .
The new Silk Road is less like the Marshall Plan , the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe , and more like the post-9/11 war on terrorism : “ poorly defined and ever expanding , ” Hillman writes .
Hillman explains that while the size and scope of the BRI may be new , great powers have been building infrastructure overseas to boost their geopolitical reach for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suez Canal to the British Empire ’ s “ All Red ” telegraph network .
One big difference is that China is essentially doing all of those things at once—or trying to .
And that ’ s what comes through clearest in Hillman ’ s telling : the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the BRI .
Whether it ’ s an empty cargo port in Gwadar , Pakistan , or a moribund logistics facility at the Khorgos Gateway on the Chinese-Kazakh border , China ’ s much-touted projects have in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anywhere close to living up to their promises .
For all the hype and hand-wringing over how the BRI could usher in the Chinese century , Hillman ’ s engaging mix of high-level analysis and fieldwork in more than a dozen countries paints a much more nuanced picture .
“ China is more constrained than its imperial predecessors were , ” he writes , “ and it will struggle to turn Xi ’ s grand vision into reality.
” This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue .

Read Foreign Policy staffers’ reviews of recent releases on U.S. isolationism, the future of energy, and China’s new Silk Road.
Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World
U.S. President Donald Trump’s brand of “America First” isolationism has, over the past four years, repelled much of the foreign-policy establishment and horrified U.S. allies around the world. Ahead of this year’s presidential election, many among them hope the Trump years will end up as a bizarre detour, with a future Joe Biden administration steering the United States back to the brand of liberal internationalism that served the country so well for 75 years after World War II.
To that, Charles Kupchan, a former senior official in the Clinton and Obama administrations (and sometime contributor to Foreign Policy), has two things to say. First, Trump and his brand of isolationism are hardly aberrations; rather, a mix of isolationism, unilateralism, economic protectionism, and racially tinged nativism is “right out of the playbook that anchored foreign policy for most of American history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,” he writes.
Second, the postwar Pax Americana, cemented by an activist United States deeply engaged all around the world, is dead. “A strategic retrenchment is coming; the key question is whether it occurs by design or default,” Kupchan writes.
Isolationism is a deeply researched, fascinating look at how an urge to keep the world at bay has largely defined the United States and its foreign policy since the country’s founding. And with reason: George Washington’s famous warning to avoid foreign entanglements endured so long because a strategy of isolationism “unquestionably served the nation’s interests.” For most of its history, the United States steered clear of the very kind of global engagement that now seems to be the norm.
The few departures—the Spanish-American War and the subsequent spurt of American imperialism, as well as the U.S. entry into World War I—soon prompted a backlash and a retreat behind the moat. U.S. isolationism peaked during the Great Depression. The America First Committee that urged the country to stay out of World War II—the namesake and inspiration for Trump’s own foreign policy—is what tarnished isolationism’s image, seemingly for good. The war, then the threats of the Cold War, created the glue to bind security-minded Republicans and partnership-minded Democrats to a unified foreign policy that endured for decades.
But with the end of the Cold War, that foreign-policy consensus began to crumble and is now gone. And today, the same forces that drove isolationism in the past—especially economic anxiety, a need for nation building at home, and worries over social homogeneity—are again resounding, propelling both Trump and many of his progressive political rivals to argue that the United States has overreached and needs to cut back its global commitments. That’s why Kupchan argues that America will step back; the only question is how.
Trump’s 19th-century brand of isolationism, while it worked well in its time, is hardly suitable for an era of economic interconnectedness and mounting transnational challenges such as climate change and pandemics, Kupchan argues. Simply blowing up the international order—as Trump has sought to do—won’t re-create the prosperous, aloof security that defined much of the United States’ early history.
Instead, Kupchan contends, Washington needs to chart a middle course between the crusading, activist foreign policy that has led to decades of endless wars and unmanageable global commitments and a precipitate retreat that would risk repeating the country’s abdication of the 1930s. “[D]angerous overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach,” he warns.
Kupchan’s prescription for such a middle road—a retreat from peripheral areas such as the Middle East, a redoubling of international cooperation, and a return to spreading American values by example rather than at gunpoint—sounds hopeful. The problem, he as much as notes, is that the recipe sounds a lot like what former President Barack Obama tried to do with his “liberal internationalism lite,” which still failed to bridge the gap between “the scope of the nation’s commitments abroad and the willingness of the body politic to uphold those commitments.”
The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations
Daniel Yergin, the author of The Prize and The Quest, is back with what is essentially the capstone of a trilogy dedicated to exploring how energy created the modern world—and will shape what awaits over the horizon.
The New Map is a kaleidoscopic survey of seemingly every geopolitical development in recent (and not so recent) history, all seen through the lens of energy, national rivalries, changing technologies, and the looming threat of climate change. Much like The Quest, Yergin’s new book seeks to continue the oil-rich saga begun in The Prize, focusing on game-changing developments in the oil and gas industry over the last decade, especially the U.S. shale revolution, which has turned the United States from a fuel beggar into an energy superpower. And like The Quest, Yergin’s latest book also seeks to highlight the energy technologies jostling with fossil fuels—from electric cars to renewable energy (notably, there’s almost no mention of nuclear power)—all under the shadow of an accelerating climate emergency and a black swan pandemic.
Yergin, the vice chairman of the energy research powerhouse IHS Markit, is strongest when it comes to oil and gas, still the mainstays of the world’s energy supplies now and in the decades to come. Even readers familiar with the U.S. “shale gale” will find new gems in his retelling of the pioneers who shattered shale to unleash a revolution. Russia, today leveraging oil and gas the way it once wielded Marxist-Leninist ideas, also provides great grist for Yergin, as do China’s energy-driven forays into the South China Sea.
When it comes to the challenges and the challengers, Yergin is less sure-footed. His account of electric cars and the coming artificial intelligence revolution in automotive technology is fun to read but has been told before. His coverage of climate change, and the scale of the lift needed to wrench the world’s energy system out of the old and into the new, moves little beyond what he outlined in The Quest.
The New Map is an admirable, well-researched, highly readable examination of all the changes that have turned the rock-solid certainties of the past into today’s dangerous combustibility. But any book that seeks to cover so much ground—from the 18th-century development of coal coke to the Sykes-Picot partitions of the Middle East to the origins of China’s “nine-dash line” to Tesla’s foundation to this year’s oil price wars—will feel a little wider than it is deep.
The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century
China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects in history, is invariably described as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature policy and cast as Beijing’s effort to use its economic might to stretch its influence across Asia, Europe, and Africa. It has sparked blowback from recipient nations as well as Brussels and Washington, which accuse Beijing of using debt-trap diplomacy to take over key bits of the world’s real estate. But for all the ink spilled on the BRI, actually understanding what the initiative is—and isn’t—remains maddeningly difficult.
The Emperor’s New Road is a good remedy for that. Written by Jonathan Hillman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former advisor to the Obama administration, the slim book lays bare the crude reality of the BRI, a hodgepodge of high-profile investments in ports, roads, railways, and power plants from Almaty, Kazakhstan, to Zeebrugge, Belgium. Far from a well-crafted master plan to turn China’s economic might into geopolitical dominance, Hillman writes, the BRI is more of an uncoordinated scramble by Chinese firms to do deals few others would touch, leaving in its wake a trail of corruption, debt, and economically dubious projects.
“Since leaving the station, China’s BRI has become a gravy train without a conductor,” he writes. The new Silk Road is less like the Marshall Plan, the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe, and more like the post-9/11 war on terrorism: “poorly defined and ever expanding,” Hillman writes.
Hillman explains that while the size and scope of the BRI may be new, great powers have been building infrastructure overseas to boost their geopolitical reach for centuries, from Roman roads to the Suez Canal to the British Empire’s “All Red” telegraph network. One big difference is that China is essentially doing all of those things at once—or trying to.
And that’s what comes through clearest in Hillman’s telling: the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the BRI. Whether it’s an empty cargo port in Gwadar, Pakistan, or a moribund logistics facility at the Khorgos Gateway on the Chinese-Kazakh border, China’s much-touted projects have in many cases failed to materialize or come anywhere close to living up to their promises.
For all the hype and hand-wringing over how the BRI could usher in the Chinese century, Hillman’s engaging mix of high-level analysis and fieldwork in more than a dozen countries paints a much more nuanced picture.
“China is more constrained than its imperial predecessors were,” he writes, “and it will struggle to turn Xi’s grand vision into reality.”
This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-24--U.S. Allies Worry Trump Administration Might Let Key Nuclear Treaty With Russia Die

U.S .
Allies Worry Trump Administration Might Let Key Nuclear Treaty With Russia Die U.S. allies are concerned about the repercussions of the looming expiration of the Obama-era New START arms control treaty between the United States and Russia , according to an internal administration report obtained by Foreign Policy .
Meanwhile , former officials and arms control experts worry the administration may be seeking to slow-walk the accord to death by making impossible demands of Russia just months before the treaty is slated to end .
The Trump administration faces a tight deadline to renew the 2010 New START @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of strategic launchers , such as intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers that both nations can deploy .
Unless both sides reach an agreement on an extension , it will end in February 2021 , leaving no meaningful treaty to stave off the threat of an arms race .
Top U.S. arms negotiator Marshall Billingslea appears to have temporarily set aside one condition already broadly dismissed as a nonstarter—adding China to the bilateral accord .
Still , he has insisted Beijing will have to be part of any agreement that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next treaty will have to be multilateral , it will have to include China , and the framework that we are articulating together as two great powers , us and the Russians , will be the framework going forward that China will be expected to join , ” Billingslea told reporters in a briefing last month .
In the meantime , U.S. officials have added other conditions : predicating a short-term extension of New START on expanded restrictions on Russia ’ s growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons .
So far , Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go along with such preconditions for negotiating an extension of the treaty .
As the clock winds down , U.S. allies in Europe and arms control experts fear New START might not be renewed .
In an internal State Department report for Congress , the Trump administration acknowledged that the United States ’ closest allies are hoping to constrain Russia ’ s and China ’ s weapons programs .
But the report also notes that allies are growing unnerved by the prospect of talks falling apart as Washington is distracted by a contested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the decade since New START was signed in 2010 , including the development and deployment of new Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities and the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russia ’ s longstanding violation and refusal to return to compliance , ” said the report , sent to Capitol Hill in July .
“ Allies and partners share these concerns , although they are also concerned about the potential repercussions to the international security environment should New START expire before its full term.
” Though Billingslea has tried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons inspections , there is concern among experts that the United States would also lose vital intelligence into Russian nuclear modernization if the deal lapses .
Given China ’ s rapid military modernization and its new place as America ’ s major strategic rival , the Trump administration sought to rope China into what was originally a bilateral accord .
China dismissed repeated efforts by Trump administration officials to begin discussions on the matter—including Billingslea posting a photo of empty seats with Chinese flags placed in front of them during negotiations with Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese officials .
Eventually , even U.S. President Donald Trump backed away from the insistence on including China in the renegotiated New START treaty by this summer , and Billingslea appeared to drop any such demands in his meeting with Russian counterparts in Vienna last month .
That initial insistence helped cause long delays in the treaty ’ s renewal , which has worried many U.S. allies .
“ Publicly , they will lament [ stalled negotiations ] heavily because their domestic politics demand it .
But they also recognize that , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absence from any meaningful nuclear arms control is a concern , ” said one U.S. official .
But even publicly , U.S. allies have said they ’ d like to see the deal renewed sooner rather than later , even if that means dealing with China at a later date .
“ In the absence of any agreement which includes China , I think the right thing will be to extend the existing New START agreement to provide the necessary time to find agreement—U.S.
, Russia , but hopefully also with China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a think tank forum in June .
“ We can not risk losing the New START agreement without having something else … to replace [ it ] , ” he added .
Last year ’ s demise ( over Russian violations ) of the Reagan-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty raised concerns in Europe .
But after three years of shifting objectives , maximalist demands , and minimal interagency cooperation , some in Washington are beginning to wonder if the administration is actually trying to save the deal after all .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy on condition of anonymity said that they had gotten minimal information on the Trump administration ’ s negotiating framework , and they worried the United States could still be positioning for an exit from the deal , given little coordinated interagency activity on forging a new agreement over the past three years .
They point to newly provided reports to Congress that raise questions about whether New START remains in U.S. interests—a seemingly politically charged departure from past findings—by pointing to Russian violations of other arms control treaties .
Billingslea , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States could reinstall launchers on ballistic missile submarines that were taken out of service to comply with the 2010 deal .
But while Trump has overseen the U.S. exit from plenty of international agreements—the Iran nuclear deal , the INF Treaty , and the Open Skies Treaty—and previously called New START “ another bad deal , ” it ’ s not clear he would bless the demise of New START now .
Many attribute the dropping of the demand to include China to the president himself .
“ The leash more or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said he wants to pursue a deal with Russia first , ” said Pranay Vaddi , a former State Department arms control official and now a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , referring to a White House press conference earlier this summer when Trump called for the pursuit of talks with Russia instead of a trilateral deal .
But then came fresh demands—and increasingly tough negotiating ploys from the U.S. team .
“ I suspect that after President Trump wins reelection , if Russia has not taken up our offer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as we would say in the U.S. , goes up , ” Billingslea told the Russian newspaper Kommersant in an interview on Monday .
Some critics see the new U.S. demands , such as for more U.S. inspections of Russian nuclear weapons and the expansion to cover tactical nuclear weapons , as moving the goal posts too close to the deadline .
“ This is an eleventh-hour offer at best here after three years of this administration being in office , ” said Kingston Reif , the director for disarmament and threat reduction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ This is coming extremely late in the game , all of which raises the ever-growing concern that this is about running out the clock.
” One concern is that , even if Trump himself is ready to dial back his initial demands and aim for a more limited renewal of the existing treaty with Russia , not everybody is on board .
“ [ Billingslea ] ’ s trying to seize failure from the grip of victory because he ultimately doesn ’ t like arms control , but he probably has a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

U.S. allies are concerned about the repercussions of the looming expiration of the Obama-era New START arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, according to an internal administration report obtained by Foreign Policy . Meanwhile, former officials and arms control experts worry the administration may be seeking to slow-walk the accord to death by making impossible demands of Russia just months before the treaty is slated to end.
U.S. allies are concerned about the repercussions of the looming expiration of the Obama-era New START arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, according to an internal administration report obtained by Foreign Policy. Meanwhile, former officials and arms control experts worry the administration may be seeking to slow-walk the accord to death by making impossible demands of Russia just months before the treaty is slated to end.
The Trump administration faces a tight deadline to renew the 2010 New START Treaty, which slaps limits on the number of strategic launchers, such as intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers that both nations can deploy. Unless both sides reach an agreement on an extension, it will end in February 2021, leaving no meaningful treaty to stave off the threat of an arms race. Top U.S. arms negotiator Marshall Billingslea appears to have temporarily set aside one condition already broadly dismissed as a nonstarter—adding China to the bilateral accord.
Still, he has insisted Beijing will have to be part of any agreement that would replace New START. “The next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China, and the framework that we are articulating together as two great powers, us and the Russians, will be the framework going forward that China will be expected to join,” Billingslea told reporters in a briefing last month.
In the meantime, U.S. officials have added other conditions: predicating a short-term extension of New START on expanded restrictions on Russia’s growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
So far, Russia hasn’t shown any inclination to go along with such preconditions for negotiating an extension of the treaty. As the clock winds down, U.S. allies in Europe and arms control experts fear New START might not be renewed.
In an internal State Department report for Congress, the Trump administration acknowledged that the United States’ closest allies are hoping to constrain Russia’s and China’s weapons programs. But the report also notes that allies are growing unnerved by the prospect of talks falling apart as Washington is distracted by a contested presidential election.
“Much has changed in the decade since New START was signed in 2010, including the development and deployment of new Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities and the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty due to Russia’s longstanding violation and refusal to return to compliance,” said the report, sent to Capitol Hill in July. “Allies and partners share these concerns, although they are also concerned about the potential repercussions to the international security environment should New START expire before its full term.”
Though Billingslea has tried to push the Russians to accept more weapons inspections, there is concern among experts that the United States would also lose vital intelligence into Russian nuclear modernization if the deal lapses.
Given China’s rapid military modernization and its new place as America’s major strategic rival, the Trump administration sought to rope China into what was originally a bilateral accord. China dismissed repeated efforts by Trump administration officials to begin discussions on the matter—including Billingslea posting a photo of empty seats with Chinese flags placed in front of them during negotiations with Russia that drew scorn from both Russian and Chinese officials.
Eventually, even U.S. President Donald Trump backed away from the insistence on including China in the renegotiated New START treaty by this summer, and Billingslea appeared to drop any such demands in his meeting with Russian counterparts in Vienna last month. That initial insistence helped cause long delays in the treaty’s renewal, which has worried many U.S. allies.
“Publicly, they will lament [stalled negotiations] heavily because their domestic politics demand it. But they also recognize that, in the long term, China’s absence from any meaningful nuclear arms control is a concern,” said one U.S. official.
But even publicly, U.S. allies have said they’d like to see the deal renewed sooner rather than later, even if that means dealing with China at a later date.
“In the absence of any agreement which includes China, I think the right thing will be to extend the existing New START agreement to provide the necessary time to find agreement—U.S., Russia, but hopefully also with China,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at a think tank forum in June. “We cannot risk losing the New START agreement without having something else … to replace [it],” he added. Last year’s demise (over Russian violations) of the Reagan-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty raised concerns in Europe.
But after three years of shifting objectives, maximalist demands, and minimal interagency cooperation, some in Washington are beginning to wonder if the administration is actually trying to save the deal after all.
Several House aides who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity said that they had gotten minimal information on the Trump administration’s negotiating framework, and they worried the United States could still be positioning for an exit from the deal, given little coordinated interagency activity on forging a new agreement over the past three years. They point to newly provided reports to Congress that raise questions about whether New START remains in U.S. interests—a seemingly politically charged departure from past findings—by pointing to Russian violations of other arms control treaties. Billingslea, for his part, has suggested that the United States could reinstall launchers on ballistic missile submarines that were taken out of service to comply with the 2010 deal.
But while Trump has overseen the U.S. exit from plenty of international agreements—the Iran nuclear deal, the INF Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty—and previously called New START “another bad deal,” it’s not clear he would bless the demise of New START now. Many attribute the dropping of the demand to include China to the president himself.
“The leash more or less got yanked in July when Trump said he wants to pursue a deal with Russia first,” said Pranay Vaddi, a former State Department arms control official and now a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, referring to a White House press conference earlier this summer when Trump called for the pursuit of talks with Russia instead of a trilateral deal.
But then came fresh demands—and increasingly tough negotiating ploys from the U.S. team.
“I suspect that after President Trump wins reelection, if Russia has not taken up our offer, that the price of admission, as we would say in the U.S., goes up,” Billingslea told the Russian newspaper Kommersant in an interview on Monday.
Some critics see the new U.S. demands, such as for more U.S. inspections of Russian nuclear weapons and the expansion to cover tactical nuclear weapons, as moving the goal posts too close to the deadline.
“This is an eleventh-hour offer at best here after three years of this administration being in office,” said Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. “This is coming extremely late in the game, all of which raises the ever-growing concern that this is about running out the clock.”
One concern is that, even if Trump himself is ready to dial back his initial demands and aim for a more limited renewal of the existing treaty with Russia, not everybody is on board.
“[Billingslea]’s trying to seize failure from the grip of victory because he ultimately doesn’t like arms control, but he probably has a boss who does,” Vaddi said.