foreignpolicy--2020-05-13--Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?

By many measures , 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades .
We ’ re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives , sickened millions of people , and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends .
The world economy is in free fall , with unemployment rising dramatically , trade and output plummeting , and no hopeful end in sight .
A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa , and last week we learned about murderous killer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States .
Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors .
Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won ’ t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change .
Given all that , what could possibly make things worse ?
Here ’ s one possibility : war .
It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely .
What does history and theory tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible .
World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world , but that pandemic didn ’ t stop the Russian Civil War , the Russo-Polish War , or several other serious conflicts .
The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn ’ t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931 , and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely .
So if you think major war simply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the accompanying global recession , think again .
But war could still be much less likely .
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology ’ s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war , and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead .
He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely , which means it isn ’ t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable .
Instead , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their short- to medium-term prospects .
Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence ( however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be ) , pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace .
Moreover , by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps , military bases , mobilization areas , ships at sea , etc.—and that ’ s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic .
For the moment at least , beleaguered governments of all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease .
Taken together , these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia ’ s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen .
Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term .
Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development , but he points out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede .
For these reasons , the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace .
But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war ?
Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes ?
Are the other paths by which a deep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global conflict more likely ?
One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary ( or “ scapegoat ” ) theory of war .
It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it .
Drawing on this logic , some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This outcome strikes me as unlikely , even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself .
War is always a gamble , and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump ’ s declining fortunes .
Moreover , none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security , and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home .
Even a successful military action won ’ t put Americans back to work , create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already , or hasten the development of a vaccine .
The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too .
Another familiar folk theory is “ military Keynesianism.
” War generates a lot of economic demand , and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is World War II , which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression .
Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business ( or the arms industry ) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument , and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure .
I doubt it .
It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus , and it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring .
More importantly , there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending , unemployment insurance , even “ helicopter payments ” —and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available .
The threat of war usually spooks investors too , which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do .
Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value .
Saddam Hussein ’ s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly : The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran ; unemployment was threatening Saddam ’ s domestic position ; Kuwait ’ s vast oil riches were a considerable prize ; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do .
Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money , and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iraq ’ s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely .
Yet I can not think of any country in similar circumstances today .
Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan , because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits .
Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn ’ t look attractive when there ’ s a vast glut on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine , but that scenario is not even remotely possible .
If one takes a longer-term perspective , however , a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements , fueling protectionism and hypernationalism , and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other .
The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead , although the economic effects of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s .
Nationalism , xenophobia , and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck , but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished .
On balance , however , I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war .
Why ?
First of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cause of war , there would be a lot more of the latter .
To take one example , the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded , yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars , most of them unrelated to the state of the economy .
To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson ’ s famous quip about the stock market , if recessions were a powerful cause of war , they would have predicted “ nine out of the last five ( or fewer ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory .
As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence , national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long , bloody , costly , and uncertain .
To choose war , political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick , cheap , and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost .
Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible .
Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat , and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short , successful , and pay for itself .
The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point : No matter what a country ’ s economic condition might be , its leaders will not go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do so quickly , cheaply , and with a reasonable probability of success .
Third , and most important , the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security , not economic gain .
For this reason , the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them , when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and can not be accommodated , and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once observed that “ every war between Great Powers [ between 1848 and 1918 ] … started as a preventive war , not as a war of conquest , ” and that remains true of most wars fought since then .
The bottom line : Economic conditions ( i.e.
, a depression ) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made , but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant .
Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large , lasting , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much , especially in the short term .
To be sure , I can ’ t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days .
So there is no guarantee that we won ’ t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting .
But given that it ’ s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history , I ’ m going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one .

By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall , with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa , and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change.
By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall, with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa, and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change.
Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question?
For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or several other serious conflicts. The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again.
But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.
Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.
Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede.
For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?
One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.
This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.
Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.
I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.
Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely.
Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.
If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished.
On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.
The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.
Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.
The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.
To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--Trump’s State Department Doesn’t Appear to Share His Optimism on Reopening

Trump ’ s State Department Doesn ’ t Appear to Share His Optimism on Reopening As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown , his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach , even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips .
The State Department this month rolled out a phased plan to bring diplomats back to work , dubbed “ Diplomacy Strong , ” which has built-in plans for potential second waves of the coronavirus outbreak in the United States and posts around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ documents obtained by Foreign Policy .
In recent weeks , senior U.S. officials have briefed various State Department bureaus on the plan to incrementally bring officials back to work while cautioning that the process could drag on for months—even in the United States—and even reverse if infections spike again .
The plan highlights how federal agencies are much less sanguine about bringing employees back to work than the president himself , who has pushed states and businesses to reopen to quickly reverse a sharp recession fueled by the coronavirus lockdown .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said at a news conference on Monday afternoon .
“ I want it open safely , but I want it open.
” [ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
A State Department spokeswoman , however , insisted there was no daylight between the White House and State Department .
“ Diplomacy Strong aligns with [ Centers for Disease Control ] and White House guidelines , allows for flexibility to adjust among the phases , accounts for different environments , and easily incorporates updated information as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Some State employees feel that while Pompeo has been leading the administration ’ s diplomatic offensive on China , he has been virtually silent on internal communications to lead the diplomatic corps through the crisis .
Most internal management for the crisis has come from Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao , officials say .
Some current and former officials also knocked Pompeo for pushing international travel before the heightened pandemic risk had subsided .
Pompeo on Tuesday departed for a short trip to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz , the speaker of the Knesset , as Israel eyes plans to potentially annex parts of the West Bank .
“ Pompeo is personally pushing people to get back to work .
The secretary ’ s trip to Israel reflects the brazen disregard for the health of his team , ” said Brett Bruen , the head of the consulting firm Global Situation Room and a former career U.S. diplomat .
“ There ’ s just no need to get on a plane at this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of swagger over safety.
” The pandemic has forced the State Department ’ s notoriously sclerotic bureaucracy to swiftly adapt to a new era of lockdowns .
After a very rocky start , the department had to scramble to help repatriate tens of thousands of Americans abroad , and leaders had to rapidly shift diplomats to work from home—a situation that is anathema to the tradecraft of diplomacy , which is reliant on face-to-face meetings and secret government communication channels that can ’ t be accessed from insecure houses and apartments .
Six @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy on condition of anonymity said they were wary of returning to the office prematurely but praised the department for issuing a plan that allows flexibility for those based in Washington and abroad .
“ There ’ s an awareness that the White House would like to move toward reopening , but I think , with the guidance that ’ s been issued , the plan is pretty clear that it has to be based on local conditions , ” said one senior U.S. diplomat , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would not warrant by any means bringing more people back in now.
” The State Department has also taken actions to correct controversial missteps in the early phase of the crisis .
The department now has a small fleet of around half a dozen planes prepositioned around the world on standby in case U.S. officials posted abroad need medical evacuations , according to one senior diplomat , speaking on condition of anonymity .
Following backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats , the department has also agreed to virtually bring onboard a new class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to two officials .
The new class of foreign service officers were initially told in late March that their onboarding was indefinitely postponed without access to benefits or pay , until backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats prompted the State Department to change course .
Others say diplomacy—including Pompeo ’ s routine trips abroad—needs to get back on track despite the risk from the virus .
The State Department insists the secretary ’ s trip to Israel , which came at the request of the Israeli government , was planned with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ This is a tightly controlled movement in a highly screened environment that we feel is very , very safe , ” William Walters , a top medical official at the State Department , told reporters in a briefing last week .
The department ’ s overall plan to return diplomats to the field , obtained by Foreign Policy , makes clear that there ’ s no across-the-board timeline for reopening U.S. embassies and consulates abroad and that going back to a normal work routine depends on the individual country .
Axios and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan .
It divides recovery into four incremental phases—Phase 0 , 1 , 2 , and 3—of bringing officials back to work , based on two-week blocks of monitoring downward trends in infection rates .
If infection rates spike , the State Department will have its employees return to a previous phase , where fewer workers will come into the office and those who come in will adhere to stricter social distancing and hygiene measures .
“ This guidance provides senior leaders at domestic offices and overseas posts the framework they need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workforce , mitigate risks , and continue to achieve our diplomatic mission , ” the State Department spokeswoman said .
“ We could sit in Phase 2 for quite a while .
We could sit in Phase 1 for quite a while .
If the situation gets worse , if we have any kind of second bounce or peak on this , we could go from Phase 2 to Phase 1 , we could go from Phase 1 to Phase 0 , ” one State Department official said in a conference call briefing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an account of the briefing from employees on the call provided to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity .
“ This is not a linear progression at all.
” The official also said the State Department was waiting to see how other federal agencies would handle their reopening first .
“ We are not looking to be the absolute first movers in coming back to work .
We are looking to learn the lessons from other departments , other agencies , and move back when it ’ s more safe to do so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the account .
Update , May 13 , 2020 : This article was updated with comments from a State Department spokeswoman .

As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown, his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach, even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips.
As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown, his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach, even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips.
The State Department this month rolled out a phased plan to bring diplomats back to work, dubbed “Diplomacy Strong,” which has built-in plans for potential second waves of the coronavirus outbreak in the United States and posts around the world, according to interviews with officials and documents obtained by Foreign Policy.
In recent weeks, senior U.S. officials have briefed various State Department bureaus on the plan to incrementally bring officials back to work while cautioning that the process could drag on for months—even in the United States—and even reverse if infections spike again.
The plan highlights how federal agencies are much less sanguine about bringing employees back to work than the president himself, who has pushed states and businesses to reopen to quickly reverse a sharp recession fueled by the coronavirus lockdown. “I want our country open,” Trump said at a news conference on Monday afternoon. “I want it open safely, but I want it open.”
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
A State Department spokeswoman, however, insisted there was no daylight between the White House and State Department. “Diplomacy Strong aligns with [Centers for Disease Control] and White House guidelines, allows for flexibility to adjust among the phases, accounts for different environments, and easily incorporates updated information as it becomes available,” the spokeswoman said.
Some State employees feel that while Pompeo has been leading the administration’s diplomatic offensive on China, he has been virtually silent on internal communications to lead the diplomatic corps through the crisis. Most internal management for the crisis has come from Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao, officials say.
Some current and former officials also knocked Pompeo for pushing international travel before the heightened pandemic risk had subsided. Pompeo on Tuesday departed for a short trip to Israel to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz, the speaker of the Knesset, as Israel eyes plans to potentially annex parts of the West Bank.
“Pompeo is personally pushing people to get back to work. The secretary’s trip to Israel reflects the brazen disregard for the health of his team,” said Brett Bruen, the head of the consulting firm Global Situation Room and a former career U.S. diplomat. “There’s just no need to get on a plane at this point. It’s a case of swagger over safety.”
The pandemic has forced the State Department’s notoriously sclerotic bureaucracy to swiftly adapt to a new era of lockdowns. After a very rocky start, the department had to scramble to help repatriate tens of thousands of Americans abroad, and leaders had to rapidly shift diplomats to work from home—a situation that is anathema to the tradecraft of diplomacy, which is reliant on face-to-face meetings and secret government communication channels that can’t be accessed from insecure houses and apartments.
Six State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity said they were wary of returning to the office prematurely but praised the department for issuing a plan that allows flexibility for those based in Washington and abroad.
“There’s an awareness that the White House would like to move toward reopening, but I think, with the guidance that’s been issued, the plan is pretty clear that it has to be based on local conditions,” said one senior U.S. diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. “And local conditions [in Washington] would not warrant by any means bringing more people back in now.”
The State Department has also taken actions to correct controversial missteps in the early phase of the crisis. The department now has a small fleet of around half a dozen planes prepositioned around the world on standby in case U.S. officials posted abroad need medical evacuations, according to one senior diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. Following backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats, the department has also agreed to virtually bring onboard a new class of diplomats for training later this month, according to two officials. The new class of foreign service officers were initially told in late March that their onboarding was indefinitely postponed without access to benefits or pay, until backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats prompted the State Department to change course.
Others say diplomacy—including Pompeo’s routine trips abroad—needs to get back on track despite the risk from the virus. The State Department insists the secretary’s trip to Israel, which came at the request of the Israeli government, was planned with all the proper precautions in place. “This is a tightly controlled movement in a highly screened environment that we feel is very, very safe,” William Walters, a top medical official at the State Department, told reporters in a briefing last week.
The department’s overall plan to return diplomats to the field, obtained by Foreign Policy, makes clear that there’s no across-the-board timeline for reopening U.S. embassies and consulates abroad and that going back to a normal work routine depends on the individual country. Axios and other media outlets first reported on the plan. It divides recovery into four incremental phases—Phase 0, 1, 2, and 3—of bringing officials back to work, based on two-week blocks of monitoring downward trends in infection rates. If infection rates spike, the State Department will have its employees return to a previous phase, where fewer workers will come into the office and those who come in will adhere to stricter social distancing and hygiene measures.
“This guidance provides senior leaders at domestic offices and overseas posts the framework they need to prioritize the health and safety of our workforce, mitigate risks, and continue to achieve our diplomatic mission,” the State Department spokeswoman said.
Read the full plan here:
“We could sit in Phase 2 for quite a while. We could sit in Phase 1 for quite a while. If the situation gets worse, if we have any kind of second bounce or peak on this, we could go from Phase 2 to Phase 1, we could go from Phase 1 to Phase 0,” one State Department official said in a conference call briefing to others this month, according to an account of the briefing from employees on the call provided to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. “This is not a linear progression at all.”
The official also said the State Department was waiting to see how other federal agencies would handle their reopening first. “We are not looking to be the absolute first movers in coming back to work. We are looking to learn the lessons from other departments, other agencies, and move back when it’s more safe to do so,” the official said, according to the account.
Update, May 13, 2020: This article was updated with comments from a State Department spokeswoman.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Stop Blaming Trump—the U.S. Coronavirus Health Care Crisis Runs So Much Deeper

Stop Blaming Trump—the U.S. Coronavirus Health Care Crisis Runs So Much Deeper One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus in the United States will be that of the mass graves dug for many of the victims of COVID-19 in New York City .
The visual shock of stacked low-cost coffins in the city that people the world over see as symbolic of the United States rippled across the global media.One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus will be that of the mass graves dug for COVID-19 victims in New York City .
Much of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus pandemic in the United States and the train wreck hitting the U.S. economy over the months to come focuses on U.S. President Donald Trump , personally , and his handling of the crisis .
But this focus on Trump is too limiting and ignores the fact that Trump ’ s policies play out within the U.S. institutional and cultural context—one that would be there under any other president as well .
This is not to excuse Trump or his administration .
Rather , the point is to recognize that if Trump were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would not at solve the most critical flaw in American ’ s growth model : its health care system .
The basic problem all governments face is how to enable their health care systems to cope with a prolonged pandemic without crushing all economic activity .
But the nature of the U.S. health care system makes this problem much more pernicious than in other advanced economies .
Unlike other rich countries , the United States went into this crisis with 27.5 million uninsured adults .
Across the labor market—around 164 million people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but even within this pool some 34 million people have no paid sick leave .
Now consider those who have lost , and are in the process of losing , their health insurance because of coronavirus-related unemployment , and you can easily get up to a third of the working population of the country losing insurance by midsummer , a figure that would be compensated only partially by other programs such as Medicaid or by people going on a working spouse ’ s insurance plan .
Compounding this is that U.S. hospitals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firing nurses and doctors in the middle of a pandemic .
The U.S. hospital system as a whole faces a liquidity crisis of epic proportions ; Boston Consulting Group estimates that almost two-thirds of all hospitals and health systems face material financial risk .
Even with bailout money , many hospitals seem to be running on fumes , financially speaking , due to the cancellation of profitable elective procedures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus and prioritize medical resources .
Other advanced economies also have private hospitals , but because their share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lower and labor laws often make it much more difficult to fire staff , they have not experienced such layoffs .
Furthermore , a mainly private health insurance system like the United States ’ is premised upon insurers minimizing the risks that they cover while maximizing the revenues they receive from employers and employees .
If one were to design a system that would collapse when the income streams from payees stop coming in , this would be it .
But if insurers go bust , who will fund hospitals when possible subsequent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testing is required ?
Meanwhile , the doctors and nurses who treated the first wave of COVID-19 patients are not just exhausted and often ill from their experiences .
Many will also face long-term traumatic effects such as post-traumatic stress disorder , reducing the capacity of the system still further .
And on top of all of this , a majority of U.S. states , which fund local health care , are required by law to balance their budgets .
So with falling tax revenue , they are also cutting spending while trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a system , the lifting of lockdowns can only last until hospitals once again fill up with cases until their intensive care units are full , testing operations face drastic shortages , and there is no more cash for health facilities to operate .
To get out of this mess , the United States needs to address three distinct challenges .
If it does not , any return to normal will be fleeting , dangerous , and ultimately abandoned .
The first is for the federal government to commission a permanent expansion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacities on a scale resembling war economy planning .
To reach Germany ’ s capacity to deal with the pandemic , for example , the United States should triple the number of intensive care beds , with federal funding covering the costs .
Rather than relying on pre-coronavirus just-in-time supply chains , hospitals need to construct large storage facilities to prepare to deal with situations such as the current one .
COVID-19 is not going to be a one-off event .
All of this means a federally funded effort .
The second problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccine and supply expanded hospitals with a ratio of ventilators per million people that , for example , Germany was able to marshal in order to contain mortality rates .
This requires large volumes of low-tech and medium-tech supplies .
The United States can and should do better .
Contrary to the free market legend , the United States has developed one of the world ’ s most capable entrepreneurial states , which needs to be retooled to substitute imported medical equipment while innovating a vaccine in a matter of months , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of political will , not a lack of skill .
Doing so means forcing U.S.-based manufacturers of ventilators , drugs , and tracing apps to forget about technology profits , share their templates with downstream companies , and mass-manufacture these devices in the numbers needed .
It means a reliance on centralized effort and federal-state coordination , instead of market competition , to come up with the goods .
It is a damning indictment of what U.S. capitalism has become when the same economy that was able to quickly convert its manufacturing sector @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan during World War II can ’ t make enough ventilators , testing swabs , reagents , and personal protective equipment for the medical staff on its front lines in the fight against the coronavirus .
These should be the supply problems of a developing country , not of the world ’ s economic and military superpower .
The third problem is of course the big one : getting back to work .
Given how little we know about infection and reinfection rates , getting the economy moving again requires effective nationwide mass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lifting lockdowns and returning to some semblance of normal life .
Here , the problems are not just supply-related .
They expose how the capacity of the U.S. government to manage a crisis over the long term has been hollowed out over the past 40 years by successive administrations .
Even with the entire U.S. pharmaceuticals , biotech , and medical sectors in emergency mode , testing capacity still hasn ’ t caught up to the German level .
Critically , this being a public health issue , the funding needs must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger scale .
The Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Romer estimated that the real cost of restarting the economy will be 22 million tests a day .
In a worst-case scenario of poorly targeted testing , Harvard ’ s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics estimates the total cost of mass testing to reach $ 500 billion .
That is expensive—but so is the GDP lost from lockdowns and social distancing .
It would require a federal stimulus program for testing run by a federal agency , a program that could fight future pandemics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass testing will require fast decentralization , more competence at the federal level , and a “ bazooka ” option for funding the whole endeavor.If Americans disagree over the details of health care reform , they should at least shore up what they already have so that it fits the purpose of fighting a pandemic .
Finally , to generate usable results , mass testing should be accompanied by systematic contact tracing .
This would entail Americans agreeing to use tracing apps of the type being developed by Google and Apple to geotrack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to infected individuals .
While this approach has proved highly effective in South Korea and is being embraced by European agencies , in the United States and elsewhere this is considered by many to be an invasion of privacy and a violation of rights .
A majority of those surveyed in an April poll , 70 percent of self-identified Republicans and 46 percent of Democrats , are firmly against it .
The mandatory use of tracing apps may also not be constitutional .
A way around both popular distrust and legal limits could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the apps could collect limited data that Google would promise to delete after a set period , as demonstrated by Germany ’ s development of a contact-tracing app designed to avoid both privacy breaches and the risk of having data used after the end of the pandemic .
Other European countries have done the same , and the European Commission has provided common guidelines .
But given the lack of trust in experts and technology surrounding COVID-19 , such safeguards are likely to be insufficient .
Given the peculiar structure of the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on track to destroy more livelihoods and economic capacity in the United States than all the major economic crises of the 20th century .
If Americans disagree over the details of health care reform , they should at least shore up what they already have so that it fits the purpose of fighting a pandemic .
Neglecting to do that will ensure that any attempt to get back to work fails and fails again .
Blaming it all on Trump might make some people feel better , but it will do nothing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and public health .

One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus in the United States will be that of the mass graves dug for many of the victims of COVID-19 in New York City. The visual shock of stacked low-cost coffins in the city that people the world over see as symbolic of the United States rippled across the global media.One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus will be that of the mass graves dug for COVID-19 victims in New York City.
One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus in the United States will be that of the mass graves dug for many of the victims of COVID-19 in New York City. The visual shock of stacked low-cost coffins in the city that people the world over see as symbolic of the United States rippled across the global media.One of the emblematic images left behind by the coronavirus will be that of the mass graves dug for COVID-19 victims in New York City.
Much of the commentary on the handling of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States and the train wreck hitting the U.S. economy over the months to come focuses on U.S. President Donald Trump, personally, and his handling of the crisis. But this focus on Trump is too limiting and ignores the fact that Trump’s policies play out within the U.S. institutional and cultural context—one that would be there under any other president as well. This is not to excuse Trump or his administration. Rather, the point is to recognize that if Trump were to lose in the November election, it would not at solve the most critical flaw in American’s growth model: its health care system.
The basic problem all governments face is how to enable their health care systems to cope with a prolonged pandemic without crushing all economic activity. But the nature of the U.S. health care system makes this problem much more pernicious than in other advanced economies.
Unlike other rich countries, the United States went into this crisis with 27.5 million uninsured adults. Across the labor market—around 164 million people in total—health coverage is tied to employment, but even within this pool some 34 million people have no paid sick leave. Now consider those who have lost, and are in the process of losing, their health insurance because of coronavirus-related unemployment, and you can easily get up to a third of the working population of the country losing insurance by midsummer, a figure that would be compensated only partially by other programs such as Medicaid or by people going on a working spouse’s insurance plan.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Compounding this is that U.S. hospitals find themselves in the bizarre position of firing nurses and doctors in the middle of a pandemic. The U.S. hospital system as a whole faces a liquidity crisis of epic proportions; Boston Consulting Group estimates that almost two-thirds of all hospitals and health systems face material financial risk. Even with bailout money, many hospitals seem to be running on fumes, financially speaking, due to the cancellation of profitable elective procedures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus and prioritize medical resources. Other advanced economies also have private hospitals, but because their share of privately owned hospitals is usually much lower and labor laws often make it much more difficult to fire staff, they have not experienced such layoffs.
Furthermore, a mainly private health insurance system like the United States’ is premised upon insurers minimizing the risks that they cover while maximizing the revenues they receive from employers and employees. If one were to design a system that would collapse when the income streams from payees stop coming in, this would be it. But if insurers go bust, who will fund hospitals when possible subsequent waves of the virus hit and intensive testing is required? Meanwhile, the doctors and nurses who treated the first wave of COVID-19 patients are not just exhausted and often ill from their experiences. Many will also face long-term traumatic effects such as post-traumatic stress disorder, reducing the capacity of the system still further. And on top of all of this, a majority of U.S. states, which fund local health care, are required by law to balance their budgets. So with falling tax revenue, they are also cutting spending while trying to respond to a pandemic.
Within such a system, the lifting of lockdowns can only last until hospitals once again fill up with cases until their intensive care units are full, testing operations face drastic shortages, and there is no more cash for health facilities to operate. To get out of this mess, the United States needs to address three distinct challenges. If it does not, any return to normal will be fleeting, dangerous, and ultimately abandoned.
The first is for the federal government to commission a permanent expansion of intensive care and infectious disease treatment capacities on a scale resembling war economy planning. To reach Germany’s capacity to deal with the pandemic, for example, the United States should triple the number of intensive care beds, with federal funding covering the costs. Rather than relying on pre-coronavirus just-in-time supply chains, hospitals need to construct large storage facilities to prepare to deal with situations such as the current one. COVID-19 is not going to be a one-off event. All of this means a federally funded effort.
Read More Beds are lined up in a tent as volunteers from the international Christian relief organization Samaritan's Purse set up an emergency field hospital for patients with the coronavirus in Central Park in New York on March 30. Beds are lined up in a tent as volunteers from the international Christian relief organization Samaritan's Purse set up an emergency field hospital for patients with the coronavirus in Central Park in New York on March 30. Why the U.S. Health Care System Failed the Coronavirus Test America needs a medical microgrid focused on treating patients where they are. Without locally focused care, doctors will continue to fail those who need them most. Argument | Prabhjot Singh U.S. President Donald Trump and his former White House physician, Ronny Jackson, listen to a presentation about new technology used by the Department of Veterans Affairs during an event at the White House on Aug. 3, 2017. U.S. President Donald Trump and his former White House physician, Ronny Jackson, listen to a presentation about new technology used by the Department of Veterans Affairs during an event at the White House on Aug. 3, 2017. Trump Has Sabotaged America’s Coronavirus Response As it improvises its way through a public health crisis, the United States has never been less prepared for a pandemic. Voice | Laurie Garrett Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia Beijing’s attempts to encircle New Delhi are being systematically reversed. Analysis | Derek Grossman
The second problem is how to come up with a vaccine and supply expanded hospitals with a ratio of ventilators per million people that, for example, Germany was able to marshal in order to contain mortality rates. This requires large volumes of low-tech and medium-tech supplies. The United States can and should do better.
Contrary to the free market legend, the United States has developed one of the world’s most capable entrepreneurial states, which needs to be retooled to substitute imported medical equipment while innovating a vaccine in a matter of months, not years. It’s a matter of political will, not a lack of skill. Doing so means forcing U.S.-based manufacturers of ventilators, drugs, and tracing apps to forget about technology profits, share their templates with downstream companies, and mass-manufacture these devices in the numbers needed. It means a reliance on centralized effort and federal-state coordination, instead of market competition, to come up with the goods.
It is a damning indictment of what U.S. capitalism has become when the same economy that was able to quickly convert its manufacturing sector to technologically dominate both Nazi Germany and Japan during World War II can’t make enough ventilators, testing swabs, reagents, and personal protective equipment for the medical staff on its front lines in the fight against the coronavirus. These should be the supply problems of a developing country, not of the world’s economic and military superpower.
The third problem is of course the big one: getting back to work. Given how little we know about infection and reinfection rates, getting the economy moving again requires effective nationwide mass testing. It is the prerequisite for lifting lockdowns and returning to some semblance of normal life. Here, the problems are not just supply-related. They expose how the capacity of the U.S. government to manage a crisis over the long term has been hollowed out over the past 40 years by successive administrations.
Even with the entire U.S. pharmaceuticals, biotech, and medical sectors in emergency mode, testing capacity still hasn’t caught up to the German level. Critically, this being a public health issue, the funding needs must be addressed by the government on a much larger scale. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Romer estimated that the real cost of restarting the economy will be 22 million tests a day. In a worst-case scenario of poorly targeted testing, Harvard’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics estimates the total cost of mass testing to reach $500 billion. That is expensive—but so is the GDP lost from lockdowns and social distancing. It would require a federal stimulus program for testing run by a federal agency, a program that could fight future pandemics as well. In short, effective mass testing will require fast decentralization, more competence at the federal level, and a “bazooka” option for funding the whole endeavor.If Americans disagree over the details of health care reform, they should at least shore up what they already have so that it fits the purpose of fighting a pandemic.
Finally, to generate usable results, mass testing should be accompanied by systematic contact tracing. This would entail Americans agreeing to use tracing apps of the type being developed by Google and Apple to geotrack all movements and warn Americans of exposure to infected individuals. While this approach has proved highly effective in South Korea and is being embraced by European agencies, in the United States and elsewhere this is considered by many to be an invasion of privacy and a violation of rights. A majority of those surveyed in an April poll, 70 percent of self-identified Republicans and 46 percent of Democrats, are firmly against it. The mandatory use of tracing apps may also not be constitutional. A way around both popular distrust and legal limits could be sunset clauses. That is, the apps could collect limited data that Google would promise to delete after a set period, as demonstrated by Germany’s development of a contact-tracing app designed to avoid both privacy breaches and the risk of having data used after the end of the pandemic. Other European countries have done the same, and the European Commission has provided common guidelines. But given the lack of trust in experts and technology surrounding COVID-19, such safeguards are likely to be insufficient.
Given the peculiar structure of the U.S. health care system, the coronavirus is on track to destroy more livelihoods and economic capacity in the United States than all the major economic crises of the 20th century. If Americans disagree over the details of health care reform, they should at least shore up what they already have so that it fits the purpose of fighting a pandemic. Neglecting to do that will ensure that any attempt to get back to work fails and fails again. Blaming it all on Trump might make some people feel better, but it will do nothing to fundamentally help the nation’s economy and public health.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Powell Warns Central Banks Can’t Stop Recessions on Their Own

Powell Warns Central Banks Can ’ t Stop Recessions on Their Own Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell calls for more action to avert a deep recession , fears of a coronavirus return grow in Wuhan , and Niger mounts an anti-Boko Haram operation , killing 75 fighters .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
On Wednesday , U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell warned that the U.S. Congress should use its power of the purse or risk plunging the United States into an even deeper recession .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Institute for International Economics , Powell underlined how knock-on effects from mass unemployment could lead to an even slower recovery .
Powell made that point clearer by highlighting a Fed survey that shows 40 percent of households earning $ 40,000 or less lost a job in March .
At least 20.5 million jobs have been lost so far in the United States according to official figures .
“ Additional fiscal support could be costly but worth it if it helps avoid long-term economic damage and leaves us with a stronger recovery , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Congress ’ s attempt to avert mass unemployment has mostly been in the form of the Paycheck Protection Program ( PPP ) , a $ 660 billion forgivable loan program for businesses to cover employee wages and other expenses .
The PPP was replenished with $ 310 billion in late April after rapid uptake from businesses , but last week the Wall Street Journal reported that 40 percent of the funds were still unclaimed .
House Democrats have attempted to provide the stimulus Powell has called for by unveiling a $ 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tuesday .
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has already declared it dead on arrival , arguing that the bill does not “ deal with reality.
” “ This is not a time for aspirational legislation , this is a time for practical response to the coronavirus pandemic , ” McConnell said .
Don ’ t just protect paychecks , write the checks .
A practical response to unemployment is available and has proved successful in Europe : a government-backed wage guarantee for the duration of the crisis .
( For an in-depth comparison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model , read the comparison—by FP ’ s Michael Hirsh and Keith Johnson—here . )
According to Politico , Congressional Progressive Caucus leader Pramila Jayapal pushed for a “ Paycheck Guarantee ” program akin to what countries in Europe have implemented but was rejected by senior Democrats , who wanted to focus more on expanding existing tax credits .
Hamilton Nolan , a labor reporter with In These Times , summed up the frustration among progressives .
“ The Great Depression was not staved off by a few targeted tax credits , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their teeth ?
On Wednesday , FP columnist Adam Tooze gave a comprehensive overview of how central banks have morphed from guardians of inflation into the guarantors of basic economic functioning .
“ Central banks , with the Fed leading the way , have taken it on themselves to act as a comprehensive backstop to the financial system , ” Tooze wrote .
“ First in 1987 following the global stock market crash , then after the dot-com crash of the 1990s , even more dramatically in 2008 , and now on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Liquidity provision is the slogan under which central banks now backstop the entire financial system on a near-permanent basis.
” Mass testing ordered in Wuhan amid fears of seconnd wave .
Roughly 1,000 residents in the Qiaokou district of Wuhan are to be tested for the coronavirus as city officials fear the virus could be returning only a month after Hubei province relaxed lockdown protocols .
There are conflicting reports in Chinese media surrounding how much more new testing will be done in the city , with some outlets reporting that all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next 10 days .
District officials confirmed to the Associated Press that Wuhan ’ s coronavirus task force has put in mass orders for testing kits .
WHO says virus may never go away .
The World Health Organization has warned that the coronavirus may never fully be eradicated , and instead become endemic , like HIV and measles .
Michael Ryan , the executive director of the WHO Health Emergencies Program , made the remarks as part of online briefing on Wednesday .
“ I think it is important we are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone can predict when this disease will disappear , ” Ryan said .
“ I think there are no promises in this and there are no dates .
This disease may settle into a long problem , or it may not be.
” Ryan added that even if a vaccine is found it may not spell the end for the coronavirus , citing the measles vaccine and the continued presence of measles worldwide .
Niger says 75 Boko Haram fighters killed .
Niger ’ s defense ministry said it had killed 75 Boko @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the week in the border region between Niger , Nigeria , and Chad .
Niger ’ s military said the assault was in retaliation for Boko Haram attacks on military positions near the town of Diffa in the country ’ s southeast .
On Tuesday , Babar Baloch , a spokesperson for the United Nations ’ Refugee Agency , said that violence across the border in Nigeria had forced 23,000 refugees to flee to Niger in April alone .
It brings the total number of Nigerians taking refuge in Niger to over 60,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defied coronavirus restrictions and filled almost a dozen shopping malls across Hong Kong on Wednesday to demonstrate against the government , in a sign its protest movement is gathering steam after a pandemic-induced lull .
Many of the protests , made to coincide with the birthday of Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam , were broken up by police using pepper spray , some of which hit nearby journalists .
The protests follow major mall demonstrations on Sunday , when roughly 200 people were arrested for unlawful assembly .
The protests come as Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new coronavirus cases , as a 66-year-old woman from the Tsuen Wan neighborhood with no recent travel history was diagnosed with COVID-19 on Wednesday .
The case is unrelated to the mass gatherings , as the woman had come down with a fever last Friday .
Coronavirus antibodies found in few Spaniards .
Spain ’ s health ministry gave preliminary results in a nationwide coronavirus anti-body test that suggests around one in twenty citizens have antibodies in their system .
If accurate , it would mean 2.3 million people have been exposed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already reported .
“ We have not been surprised ” by the results of the study , Health Minister Salvador Illa said .
“ There is no herd immunity in Spain.
” The study , which tested 60,000 people , showed that 11.3 percent of the population Madrid had antibodies , more than twice the national average .
As one of the jurisdictions worst affected by the coronavirus pandemic globally , the city of New York has had more than its fair share of bad news over the past few weeks .
Lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news though : New York has not had a single pedestrian death for the longest period since 1983 ( when records began ) .
Polly Trottenberg , the New York City transportation commissioner , said the city has now gone 58 days without a pedestrian dying from being struck by a vehicle .
New York Mayor Bill de Blasio is looking to make the empty streets that have produced this statistic permanent , with a plan to free up 100 miles of New York city ’ s roadways to bicycles and pedestrians to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cramped city .
The move follows a trend of cities increasing space for bicycles and pedestrians already announced in Berlin , Paris , and London .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell calls for more action to avert a deep recession, fears of a coronavirus return grow in Wuhan, and Niger mounts an anti-Boko Haram operation , killing 75 fighters.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell calls for more action to avert a deep recession, fears of a coronavirus return grow in Wuhan, and Niger mounts an anti-Boko Haram operation, killing 75 fighters.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Fed Chair Calls Warns of Deep Recession Without More Stimulus From Congress
On Wednesday, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell warned that the U.S. Congress should use its power of the purse or risk plunging the United States into an even deeper recession. During a speech hosted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Powell underlined how knock-on effects from mass unemployment could lead to an even slower recovery.
Powell made that point clearer by highlighting a Fed survey that shows 40 percent of households earning $40,000 or less lost a job in March. At least 20.5 million jobs have been lost so far in the United States according to official figures.
“Additional fiscal support could be costly but worth it if it helps avoid long-term economic damage and leaves us with a stronger recovery,” he said.
What is Congress doing? Congress’s attempt to avert mass unemployment has mostly been in the form of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a $660 billion forgivable loan program for businesses to cover employee wages and other expenses. The PPP was replenished with $310 billion in late April after rapid uptake from businesses, but last week the Wall Street Journal reported that 40 percent of the funds were still unclaimed.
House Democrats have attempted to provide the stimulus Powell has called for by unveiling a $3 trillion bill for further economic relief on Tuesday. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has already declared it dead on arrival, arguing that the bill does not “deal with reality.”
“This is not a time for aspirational legislation, this is a time for practical response to the coronavirus pandemic,” McConnell said.
Don’t just protect paychecks, write the checks. A practical response to unemployment is available and has proved successful in Europe: a government-backed wage guarantee for the duration of the crisis. (For an in-depth comparison of the European model and the U.S. model, read the comparison—by FP’s Michael Hirsh and Keith Johnson—here.)
According to Politico, Congressional Progressive Caucus leader Pramila Jayapal pushed for a “Paycheck Guarantee” program akin to what countries in Europe have implemented but was rejected by senior Democrats, who wanted to focus more on expanding existing tax credits. Hamilton Nolan, a labor reporter with In These Times, summed up the frustration among progressives. “The Great Depression was not staved off by a few targeted tax credits,” he wrote.
How central banks got their teeth? On Wednesday, FP columnist Adam Tooze gave a comprehensive overview of how central banks have morphed from guardians of inflation into the guarantors of basic economic functioning. “Central banks, with the Fed leading the way, have taken it on themselves to act as a comprehensive backstop to the financial system,” Tooze wrote. “First in 1987 following the global stock market crash, then after the dot-com crash of the 1990s, even more dramatically in 2008, and now on a truly unprecedented scale in response to COVID-19. Liquidity provision is the slogan under which central banks now backstop the entire financial system on a near-permanent basis.”
What We’re Following Today
Mass testing ordered in Wuhan amid fears of second wave. Roughly 1,000 residents in the Qiaokou district of Wuhan are to be tested for the coronavirus as city officials fear the virus could be returning only a month after Hubei province relaxed lockdown protocols.
There are conflicting reports in Chinese media surrounding how much more new testing will be done in the city, with some outlets reporting that all residents would need to be tested in the next 10 days. District officials confirmed to the Associated Press that Wuhan’s coronavirus task force has put in mass orders for testing kits.
WHO says virus may never go away. The World Health Organization has warned that the coronavirus may never fully be eradicated, and instead become endemic, like HIV and measles. Michael Ryan, the executive director of the WHO Health Emergencies Program, made the remarks as part of online briefing on Wednesday.
“I think it is important we are realistic and I don’t think anyone can predict when this disease will disappear,” Ryan said. “I think there are no promises in this and there are no dates. This disease may settle into a long problem, or it may not be.” Ryan added that even if a vaccine is found it may not spell the end for the coronavirus, citing the measles vaccine and the continued presence of measles worldwide.
Niger says 75 Boko Haram fighters killed. Niger’s defense ministry said it had killed 75 Boko Haram insurgents during operations conducted earlier in the week in the border region between Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. Niger’s military said the assault was in retaliation for Boko Haram attacks on military positions near the town of Diffa in the country’s southeast. On Tuesday, Babar Baloch, a spokesperson for the United Nations’ Refugee Agency, said that violence across the border in Nigeria had forced 23,000 refugees to flee to Niger in April alone. It brings the total number of Nigerians taking refuge in Niger to over 60,000.
Keep an Eye On
Renewed Hong Kong protests. Protesters defied coronavirus restrictions and filled almost a dozen shopping malls across Hong Kong on Wednesday to demonstrate against the government, in a sign its protest movement is gathering steam after a pandemic-induced lull. Many of the protests, made to coincide with the birthday of Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam, were broken up by police using pepper spray, some of which hit nearby journalists. The protests follow major mall demonstrations on Sunday, when roughly 200 people were arrested for unlawful assembly.
The protests come as Hong Kong ended a 23-day run of no new coronavirus cases, as a 66-year-old woman from the Tsuen Wan neighborhood with no recent travel history was diagnosed with COVID-19 on Wednesday. The case is unrelated to the mass gatherings, as the woman had come down with a fever last Friday.
Coronavirus antibodies found in few Spaniards. Spain’s health ministry gave preliminary results in a nationwide coronavirus anti-body test that suggests around one in twenty citizens have antibodies in their system. If accurate, it would mean 2.3 million people have been exposed to the virus, rather than the 230,000 already reported. “We have not been surprised” by the results of the study, Health Minister Salvador Illa said. “There is no herd immunity in Spain.” The study, which tested 60,000 people, showed that 11.3 percent of the population Madrid had antibodies, more than twice the national average.
Odds and Ends
As one of the jurisdictions worst affected by the coronavirus pandemic globally, the city of New York has had more than its fair share of bad news over the past few weeks. Lockdown measures have produced one sliver of good news though: New York has not had a single pedestrian death for the longest period since 1983 (when records began). Polly Trottenberg, the New York City transportation commissioner, said the city has now gone 58 days without a pedestrian dying from being struck by a vehicle.
New York Mayor Bill de Blasio is looking to make the empty streets that have produced this statistic permanent, with a plan to free up 100 miles of New York city’s roadways to bicycles and pedestrians to create space for social distancing in the cramped city. The move follows a trend of cities increasing space for bicycles and pedestrians already announced in Berlin, Paris, and London.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.