foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Biden Needs to Play the Nationalism Card Right Now

Biden Needs to Play the Nationalism Card Right Now What does former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden have to do to get elected ?
Some observers say as little as possible : Just let President Donald Trump keep talking , tweeting , and blundering , and Biden can coast to the White House without doing much on his own .
I disagree , in part because the Electoral College helps Trump , but also because Trump has an important asset that the Democrats ignore at their peril : the power of nationalism .
It is the same power that U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country was founded , although the coming of the unipolar moment led elites to think that nationalism was a fading force .
Many believed that was all for the good , as it was widely considered a malign feature of both domestic and international politics .
This view is wrong .
Nationalism remains a remarkably powerful ideology , and the United States can not survive without it .
Indeed , much of Trump ’ s appeal to voters is due to his advocacy of U.S. nationalism .
If Biden wants to win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while reaffirming liberal values .
They are an election-winning combination .
In essence , he needs to talk less about “ partnership ” and “ leadership ” on the global stage , and more about patriotism and national unity .
In addition to building a rainbow coalition , Biden should wrap himself in the red , white , and blue .
These are mutually reinforcing goals .
The objective case for replacing Trump is overwhelming .
As president , he has bungled the most important task he faced—the COVID-19 pandemic—which is why the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world ’ s population but accounts for more than 20 percent of all fatalities , a total of more than 200,000 dead and counting .
This failure wasn ’ t just the result of Trump ’ s incompetence , though there was plenty of that ; it was also the result of a cynical act of deception .
We now know that Trump knew the virus was a deadly danger early in 2020 but refused to tell the American people the truth or encourage them to take preventive measures .
Instead , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act of wearing a cloth mask into a source of political controversy .
Trump has also mishandled the strong economy he inherited from former President Barack Obama .
Instead of seizing the opportunity of historically low interest rates to launch the infrastructure program he ’ d promised during his campaign , he gave himself and his rich friends a big tax cut .
The country ’ s richest 1 percent got richer and the middle and lower classes got the crumbs .
When the pandemic hit , the necessary emergency measures blew up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action by the Federal Reserve helped the stock market recover , but most Americans don ’ t own stock , and unemployment now stands at 8.4 percent .
Trump ’ s handling of foreign policy is no better .
His reality-show summits with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un led nowhere , and his decision to leave the nuclear deal with Iran has put Tehran back on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapon and isolated the United States from the deal ’ s other signatories , who openly scoff at U.S. efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nearly four years to end the “ forever wars ” in the Middle East and has yet to deliver .
Moreover , the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain merely acknowledges the de facto relations between those states , which had never been at war with each other , and does little to advance the broader goal of Middle East peace .
Trump has taken a harder line toward China , but his erratic approach toward Beijing has made efforts to alter its economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been .
Meanwhile , the United States ’ standing around the world has fallen to historic lows .
Trump ’ s three predecessors weren ’ t great at foreign policy either , but his record in office offers few reasons to reelect him .
Last and perhaps most importantly , Trump and his cronies pose an existential threat to the United States ’ democratic order .
It is hard to miss the warning signs of creeping authoritarianism : contempt for the rule of law , indifference to democratic norms , a refusal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willing to leave office if he loses , incorrigible lying , active efforts to discredit the press , and various forms of corrupt insider dealing , all of them aided and abetted by invertebrate Republican senators whose addiction to power and disregard for principle has turned them into the president ’ s lackeys .
Given all that , it ’ s hardly surprising Trump is trailing in the polls .
But his removal in November is far from guaranteed , not simply because he has a loyal base of support , but also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ College and the real possibility that Trump will declare the results invalid , refuse to transfer power , and call upon his supporters to defend him .
For this reason , Biden needs to do everything he can to make his own victory incontestable .
To do that , he needs to play the nationalism card .
To see why , you should start by reading John Mearsheimer ’ s speech upon receiving the American Political Science Association ’ s James Madison Award .
His talk—entitled “ Liberalism and Nationalism in Contemporary America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powerful political ideology on the planet and a critical source of identity for most human beings , including the vast majority of Americans .
In sharp contrast to liberalism , which conceives of society as made up of individuals with innate natural rights , nationalism sees human beings as social animals with a powerful sense of attachment to those who share the same culture and venerate the same territory .
Nations are the largest social group for whom such powerful attachments typically form , and the doctrine of nationalism—that is , the idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nation and that nations should govern themselves—has been the most powerful political ideology on the planet for the past 250 years .
Nationalism is the main reason the British , French , Dutch , Spanish , Ottoman , Austro-Hungarian , and Soviet empires eventually dissolved , and it explains why the United Nations has gone from roughly 50 members at its founding to nearly 200 members today .
To ignore nationalism is to ignore a huge part of international reality and a key part of the U.S. political landscape as well .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sells .
Thus , it is understandable that since the start of his political career he has consistently portrayed himself as a die-hard U.S. nationalist .
Consider his slogans : “ America First.
” “ Make America Great Again.
” “ Build the Wall.
” He is powerfully inclined to denounce foreigners—whether they are allies or not—and his first address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2017 was a full-throated invocation of basic nationalist ideas .
As he told the assembled heads of state : “ We do not expect diverse countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or even systems of government .
But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties : to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation.
” And even more revealingly : “ Our government ’ s first duty is to its people , to our citizens—to serve their needs , to ensure their safety , to preserve their rights , and to defend their values .
As president of the United States , I will always put America first , just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your countries , will always and should always put your countries first.
” This is not the language of globalism or liberal internationalism , with its emphasis on universal rights or its invocation of a “ global village.
” It is the language of nationalism , and it forms a significant part of Trump ’ s sometimes baffling appeal .
He may be a draft-dodging , philandering , incorrigibly dishonest , trust-fund plutocrat who feels only contempt for the “ losers ” he ’ s repeatedly bilked , but he speaks the us-versus-them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect .
As Mearsheimer made clear , since the end of the Cold War , many U.S. elites have become uncomfortable invoking this sort of particularistic rhetoric , which is at odds with the universalism that comes with liberalism .
Instead of doing everything in their power to improve lives for other Americans here at home , those elites wanted the United States to lead the world so that other nations could enjoy the same benefits that Americans supposedly had .
Instead of maintaining walls and preserving borders , they sought to tear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less relevant , so that goods , capital , and people could move freely around the world and all of humanity could one day live together in harmonious prosperity .
This outlook was common to Republicans during George W. Bush ’ s presidency and Democrats during Bill Clinton ’ s ; it was Condoleezza Rice ’ s worldview as much as it was Hillary Clinton ’ s or John Kerry ’ s during their respective tenures as secretary of state .
Great-power politics , so the argument went , was a thing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scrapheap of history , and the new objective was to downplay if not eliminate borders , not defend them .
Let individuals pursue their own interests and let markets distribute the gains , and we could stop worrying about the balance of power and concentrate on getting rich instead .
Where you were born didn ’ t matter : Just learn English and master a marketable skill and you could live in any number of “ global cities , ” eat fusion cuisine , and fill your Spotify playlist with opera , jazz @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soukous , or any other music you happened to enjoy .
I find this vision of a multicultural melting pot appealing , but it ’ s not the world that most people live in today or want to live in tomorrow .
As events in Russia , Hungary , Brazil , the United Kingdom , Turkey , Poland , and yes , even the United States , have shown , most people think of themselves as members of a particular nation , not as citizens of the world .
They privilege their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reproduces , and they worry that too many immigrants , distant bureaucrats , or an enemy occupier might take that way of life away .
And so they gravitate to leaders who tell them they are the real embodiment of the nation and who promise to defend them from whatever “ other ” has them most concerned .
Not surprisingly , unscrupulous leaders are quick to cement their citizens ’ loyalty by inventing “ others ” who barely exist and to exaggerate the dangers that they pose .
So , when Biden talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world , he would do well to speak in ways that put his country ’ s interests first and global interests second .
Instead of emphasizing what ’ s good for the wider world , he should stress why his policies are good for Americans .
The two goals will sometimes overlap , but it ’ s the latter he needs to emphasize in his campaign .
Instead of warning of the dangers of “ populism and nationalism ” ( as his campaign website currently does ) , he needs to embrace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flag .
Instead of describing a “ Plan for Central America ” ( a tab on his website ) , he should label it a “ Plan for Protecting America.
” Whenever he talks about foreign policy , in short , he needs to make it clear that his first priority is doing what is best for the American people , not only because that is ultimately his principal responsibility , but also because that is necessary to win votes .
The irony is that Biden himself is actually more patriotic—indeed , nationalistic—than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Trump has repeatedly disparaged the men and women have made great sacrifices on behalf of the nation .
He declined to attend a ceremony honoring World War I dead in 2018 ( in his defense , it was raining that day ) , and reportedly referred to the dead interred in the cemetery as “ losers ” and “ suckers ” who didn ’ t deserve presidential attention .
He repeatedly mocked the late Sen. John McCain for having been taken prisoner during the Vietnam War , and expressed undisguised contempt for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appoint to high positions .
He has been equally disdainful of the intelligence agencies , the FBI , and other institutions of government .
These organizations and the individuals who work in them should not be exempt from criticism , of course , but Trump ’ s disregard for those who have made genuine sacrifices for the country reveal a patriotism that is paper-thin .
In Trump ’ s world , narcissism beats nationalism almost every day .
Finally , Trump has given Biden a potent weapon that he can use to challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an ardent nationalist .
At its core , nationalism fosters a powerful sense of unity among a large body of people , the vast majority of whom have never met each other .
People are made to feel like they are all part of a nation with a common purpose , even though most of their fellow citizens are strangers .
In a world that can sometimes be very dangerous , sustaining that “ imagined community ” —to use Benedict Anderson ’ s famous phrase—is critical to national success and survival .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American motto : e pluribus unum .
Despite portraying himself as a nationalist , Trump has spent his four years in the White House dividing the nation , not bringing it together .
The country is more polarized now than when he took office , and there is no reason to think that situation is going to change if he gets reelected .
Trump specializes in casting blame and sowing division , which is the last thing the United States needs at this point .
Americans need national unity .
They need smart @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situated to aid his own cause by reminding them that they are far better off when they are united , and that forging a new sense of common purpose and identity will be his top priority .
Biden needs to focus laser-like on this message and constantly emphasize it in the weeks ahead .
With every speech and TV ad , he needs to make it clear that the United States ’ greatness depends on preserving a strong sense of national unity .
A more perfect union does not require Americans to agree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it does require them to stop seeing each other as the enemy and to turn their backs on a president whose political futures depend on dividing them further .
None of this is to say that Biden should abandon his equally deep commitment to traditional liberal values : democracy , the rule of law , free speech , and the like .
Indeed , he should do no such thing .
But he also needs to make it clear that he is an American patriot and that his primary commitment is to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surrendering a powerful weapon to Trump , who will use it for his advantage in 2020 , just as he did in 2016 .

What does former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden have to do to get elected? Some observers say as little as possible : Just let President Donald Trump keep talking, tweeting, and blundering, and Biden can coast to the White House without doing much on his own. I disagree, in part because the Electoral College helps Trump, but also because Trump has an important asset that the Democrats ignore at their peril: the power of nationalism. It is the same power that U.S. leaders have relied upon and nurtured since the country was founded, although the coming of the unipolar moment led elites to think that nationalism was a fading force. Many believed that was all for the good, as it was widely considered a malign feature of both domestic and international politics.
What does former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden have to do to get elected? Some observers say as little as possible: Just let President Donald Trump keep talking, tweeting, and blundering, and Biden can coast to the White House without doing much on his own. I disagree, in part because the Electoral College helps Trump, but also because Trump has an important asset that the Democrats ignore at their peril: the power of nationalism. It is the same power that U.S. leaders have relied upon and nurtured since the country was founded, although the coming of the unipolar moment led elites to think that nationalism was a fading force. Many believed that was all for the good, as it was widely considered a malign feature of both domestic and international politics.
This view is wrong. Nationalism remains a remarkably powerful ideology, and the United States cannot survive without it. Indeed, much of Trump’s appeal to voters is due to his advocacy of U.S. nationalism. If Biden wants to win in November, he should embrace nationalism while reaffirming liberal values. They are an election-winning combination. In essence, he needs to talk less about “partnership” and “leadership” on the global stage, and more about patriotism and national unity. In addition to building a rainbow coalition, Biden should wrap himself in the red, white, and blue. These are mutually reinforcing goals.
The objective case for replacing Trump is overwhelming. As president, he has bungled the most important task he faced—the COVID-19 pandemic—which is why the United States has only 4 percent of the world’s population but accounts for more than 20 percent of all fatalities, a total of more than 200,000 dead and counting. This failure wasn’t just the result of Trump’s incompetence, though there was plenty of that; it was also the result of a cynical act of deception. We now know that Trump knew the virus was a deadly danger early in 2020 but refused to tell the American people the truth or encourage them to take preventive measures. Instead, he helped turn the simple and painless act of wearing a cloth mask into a source of political controversy.
Trump has also mishandled the strong economy he inherited from former President Barack Obama. Instead of seizing the opportunity of historically low interest rates to launch the infrastructure program he’d promised during his campaign, he gave himself and his rich friends a big tax cut. The country’s richest 1 percent got richer and the middle and lower classes got the crumbs. When the pandemic hit, the necessary emergency measures blew up the federal deficit even more. Vigorous action by the Federal Reserve helped the stock market recover, but most Americans don’t own stock, and unemployment now stands at 8.4 percent.
Trump’s handling of foreign policy is no better. His reality-show summits with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un led nowhere, and his decision to leave the nuclear deal with Iran has put Tehran back on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapon and isolated the United States from the deal’s other signatories, who openly scoff at U.S. efforts to reimpose sanctions. Trump has had nearly four years to end the “forever wars” in the Middle East and has yet to deliver. Moreover, the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain merely acknowledges the de facto relations between those states, which had never been at war with each other, and does little to advance the broader goal of Middle East peace. Trump has taken a harder line toward China, but his erratic approach toward Beijing has made efforts to alter its economic practices far less effective than they could have been. Meanwhile, the United States’ standing around the world has fallen to historic lows. Trump’s three predecessors weren’t great at foreign policy either, but his record in office offers few reasons to reelect him.
Last and perhaps most importantly, Trump and his cronies pose an existential threat to the United States’ democratic order. It is hard to miss the warning signs of creeping authoritarianism: contempt for the rule of law, indifference to democratic norms, a refusal to state openly that he will be willing to leave office if he loses, incorrigible lying, active efforts to discredit the press, and various forms of corrupt insider dealing, all of them aided and abetted by invertebrate Republican senators whose addiction to power and disregard for principle has turned them into the president’s lackeys.
Given all that, it’s hardly surprising Trump is trailing in the polls. But his removal in November is far from guaranteed, not simply because he has a loyal base of support, but also because of the peculiarities of the Electoral College and the real possibility that Trump will declare the results invalid, refuse to transfer power, and call upon his supporters to defend him. For this reason, Biden needs to do everything he can to make his own victory incontestable.
To do that, he needs to play the nationalism card.
To see why, you should start by reading John Mearsheimer’s speech upon receiving the American Political Science Association’s James Madison Award. His talk—entitled “Liberalism and Nationalism in Contemporary America”—argued that nationalism remains the most powerful political ideology on the planet and a critical source of identity for most human beings, including the vast majority of Americans. In sharp contrast to liberalism, which conceives of society as made up of individuals with innate natural rights, nationalism sees human beings as social animals with a powerful sense of attachment to those who share the same culture and venerate the same territory. Nations are the largest social group for whom such powerful attachments typically form, and the doctrine of nationalism—that is, the idea that most humans are part of a nation and that nations should govern themselves—has been the most powerful political ideology on the planet for the past 250 years. Nationalism is the main reason the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Soviet empires eventually dissolved, and it explains why the United Nations has gone from roughly 50 members at its founding to nearly 200 members today. To ignore nationalism is to ignore a huge part of international reality and a key part of the U.S. political landscape as well.
There is little doubt that Trump knows what sells. Thus, it is understandable that since the start of his political career he has consistently portrayed himself as a die-hard U.S. nationalist. Consider his slogans: “America First.” “Make America Great Again.” “Build the Wall.” He is powerfully inclined to denounce foreigners—whether they are allies or not—and his first address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2017 was a full-throated invocation of basic nationalist ideas. As he told the assembled heads of state: “We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation.” And even more revealingly: “Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens—to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values. As president of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your countries first.”
This is not the language of globalism or liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on universal rights or its invocation of a “global village.” It is the language of nationalism, and it forms a significant part of Trump’s sometimes baffling appeal. He may be a draft-dodging, philandering, incorrigibly dishonest, trust-fund plutocrat who feels only contempt for the “losers” he’s repeatedly bilked, but he speaks the us-versus-them language of nationalism fluently and to great effect.
As Mearsheimer made clear, since the end of the Cold War, many U.S. elites have become uncomfortable invoking this sort of particularistic rhetoric, which is at odds with the universalism that comes with liberalism. Instead of doing everything in their power to improve lives for other Americans here at home, those elites wanted the United States to lead the world so that other nations could enjoy the same benefits that Americans supposedly had. Instead of maintaining walls and preserving borders, they sought to tear down the former and make the latter less relevant, so that goods, capital, and people could move freely around the world and all of humanity could one day live together in harmonious prosperity.
This outlook was common to Republicans during George W. Bush’s presidency and Democrats during Bill Clinton’s; it was Condoleezza Rice’s worldview as much as it was Hillary Clinton’s or John Kerry’s during their respective tenures as secretary of state. Great-power politics, so the argument went, was a thing of the past, realpolitik belonged on the scrapheap of history, and the new objective was to downplay if not eliminate borders, not defend them. Let individuals pursue their own interests and let markets distribute the gains, and we could stop worrying about the balance of power and concentrate on getting rich instead. Where you were born didn’t matter: Just learn English and master a marketable skill and you could live in any number of “global cities,” eat fusion cuisine, and fill your Spotify playlist with opera, jazz, rap, K-pop, reggae, soukous, or any other music you happened to enjoy.
I find this vision of a multicultural melting pot appealing, but it’s not the world that most people live in today or want to live in tomorrow. As events in Russia, Hungary, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland, and yes, even the United States, have shown, most people think of themselves as members of a particular nation, not as citizens of the world. They privilege their own culture and the ways of life it reproduces, and they worry that too many immigrants, distant bureaucrats, or an enemy occupier might take that way of life away. And so they gravitate to leaders who tell them they are the real embodiment of the nation and who promise to defend them from whatever “other” has them most concerned. Not surprisingly, unscrupulous leaders are quick to cement their citizens’ loyalty by inventing “others” who barely exist and to exaggerate the dangers that they pose.
So, when Biden talks about the United States’ role in the world, he would do well to speak in ways that put his country’s interests first and global interests second. Instead of emphasizing what’s good for the wider world, he should stress why his policies are good for Americans. The two goals will sometimes overlap, but it’s the latter he needs to emphasize in his campaign. Instead of warning of the dangers of “populism and nationalism” (as his campaign website currently does), he needs to embrace U.S. nationalism and wrap himself in the flag. Instead of describing a “Plan for Central America” (a tab on his website), he should label it a “Plan for Protecting America.” Whenever he talks about foreign policy, in short, he needs to make it clear that his first priority is doing what is best for the American people, not only because that is ultimately his principal responsibility, but also because that is necessary to win votes.
The irony is that Biden himself is actually more patriotic—indeed, nationalistic—than Trump. Consider, for example, that Trump has repeatedly disparaged the men and women have made great sacrifices on behalf of the nation. He declined to attend a ceremony honoring World War I dead in 2018 (in his defense, it was raining that day), and reportedly referred to the dead interred in the cemetery as “losers” and “suckers” who didn’t deserve presidential attention. He repeatedly mocked the late Sen. John McCain for having been taken prisoner during the Vietnam War, and expressed undisguised contempt for the retired generals that he chose to appoint to high positions. He has been equally disdainful of the intelligence agencies, the FBI, and other institutions of government. These organizations and the individuals who work in them should not be exempt from criticism, of course, but Trump’s disregard for those who have made genuine sacrifices for the country reveal a patriotism that is paper-thin. In Trump’s world, narcissism beats nationalism almost every day.
Finally, Trump has given Biden a potent weapon that he can use to challenge Trump’s portrayal of himself as an ardent nationalist. At its core, nationalism fosters a powerful sense of unity among a large body of people, the vast majority of whom have never met each other. People are made to feel like they are all part of a nation with a common purpose, even though most of their fellow citizens are strangers. In a world that can sometimes be very dangerous, sustaining that “imagined community”—to use Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase—is critical to national success and survival. It is the sentiment captured by the traditional American motto: e pluribus unum.
Despite portraying himself as a nationalist, Trump has spent his four years in the White House dividing the nation, not bringing it together. The country is more polarized now than when he took office, and there is no reason to think that situation is going to change if he gets reelected. Trump specializes in casting blame and sowing division, which is the last thing the United States needs at this point. Americans need national unity. They need smart nationalism. Thus, Biden is ideally situated to aid his own cause by reminding them that they are far better off when they are united, and that forging a new sense of common purpose and identity will be his top priority.
Biden needs to focus laser-like on this message and constantly emphasize it in the weeks ahead. With every speech and TV ad, he needs to make it clear that the United States’ greatness depends on preserving a strong sense of national unity. A more perfect union does not require Americans to agree about every issue confronting them, but it does require them to stop seeing each other as the enemy and to turn their backs on a president whose political futures depend on dividing them further.
None of this is to say that Biden should abandon his equally deep commitment to traditional liberal values: democracy, the rule of law, free speech, and the like. Indeed, he should do no such thing. But he also needs to make it clear that he is an American patriot and that his primary commitment is to the American people. Otherwise, he is surrendering a powerful weapon to Trump, who will use it for his advantage in 2020, just as he did in 2016.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--A World in Counterfeit

A World in Counterfeit

From the late 16th to the early 18th century , though , the princes of Europe were obsessed with it .
They , and their artisans , worked ivory to its limits , like the nested geometric solids in ivory shown here .
One of these pieces was produced by Egidius Lobenigk , a court turner to the Electors of Saxony in the 1580s .
Some of his works , more exuberant than the poised examples pictured , resemble something out of science fiction—they are deliberately warped and smeared , a form of early modern glitch art .
There was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrefait in French or contraffatto in Italian .
Literally , it means counterfeit , forgery , or imitation , suggesting the purpose of the art—to imitate the process of creation itself .
Princes could become creators in miniature , orderers of their own reality .
The geometric solids in Lobenigk ’ s work sent a deliberate message : The five Platonic solids—the dice-like images of mathematically satisfying forms , where each face is the same regular polygon and the same number of faces meet at each vertex—have been associated with the concept of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since ancient times , when Plato coined the term in the Timaeus .
In the late 16th century , the German astronomer Johannes Kepler found that the ratios among a set of spheres inscribed around the Platonic solids corresponded to the ratios among the orbits of the six then-known planets .
Crafting the Platonic solids was a sign of mastery over nature .
Turning ivory meant the imitation of God as creator with the shaping of a miniature cosmos in the form of a contrefait sphere .
There are two reasons why turning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : It entailed the triumph of technique over a valuable raw material , and it meant the imitation of God as creator with the shaping of a miniature cosmos in the form of a contrefait sphere .
As the architect Noam Andrews put it , “ These princely enterprises , as whimsical as they might appear today , were calculated rehearsals of the skills needed for just and successful rule.
” Ivory contrefaits asserted that the physical world was a world of laws .
But in my research into the 17th century , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of the term contrefait : in the deposition of a 17th-century lieutenant colonel in the Spanish army , from what is now Belgium .
His wife , by his account , had been cheating on him as they campaigned in the Low Countries and Switzerland .
( At the time , women would travel with their male partners in armies . )
He accused her of carrying “ her boyfriend ’ s cannterfert ” —literally , his image— “ with her at all times , except in Switzerland she went to Faci @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itty-bitty knife.
” Men were not supposed to know about this , he said .
In this context , cannterfert probably means fetus : I believe he was referring to a surgical abortion .
In the 1620s , this operation would have been performed with rudimentary anesthetics at best and with no antiseptics or artificial light .
The woman survived the alleged operation .
But the lieutenant colonel stabbed her 12 times in 1626 because , he said , she had slept with other men .
His statement came as he was on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obvious guilt , he was acquitted ; his colonel believed he was essential to the regiment .
At the same time as this woman ’ s supposed abortion , princes far above her were working their own counterfeits .
At least two contrefaits from this period combine nested ivory shapes and the human image : One piece has a tiny portrait within its complex fretted spheres and a mechanism that allows you to open and close its tiny inward cage .
The juxtaposition of well-ordered ideals and the cruel , painful , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability of early modern European heads of state to project power was comparatively limited .
Many of their laws were ineffective if not outright unworkable .
There was a term for them in German : Gesetze , die nicht durchgesetzt werden— “ rules that don ’ t rule , ” to keep the pun in English .
They projected an image of control more than actually changing anything .
Yet for early modern heads of state , promulgating laws was worthwhile in itself .
By mandating right and forbidding wrong , they proclaimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was carried out .
Like nested Platonic solids in ivory , these laws invoked an ordered cosmos of which the bloody , challenging world was only one element .
This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue .

Ivory is tough and strong. It glows like silk, it glows in rings, and it glows when held up to the light. It can be scraped to translucent thinness, but the machining processes of turning and carving push the material to its limits. If you go too far, it simply breaks.
Ivory is tough and strong. It glows like silk, it glows in rings, and it glows when held up to the light. It can be scraped to translucent thinness, but the machining processes of turning and carving push the material to its limits. If you go too far, it simply breaks.
From the late 16th to the early 18th century, though, the princes of Europe were obsessed with it. They, and their artisans, worked ivory to its limits, like the nested geometric solids in ivory shown here. One of these pieces was produced by Egidius Lobenigk, a court turner to the Electors of Saxony in the 1580s. Some of his works, more exuberant than the poised examples pictured, resemble something out of science fiction—they are deliberately warped and smeared, a form of early modern glitch art.
There was a particular term for these pieces: contrefait in French or contraffatto in Italian. Literally, it means counterfeit, forgery, or imitation, suggesting the purpose of the art—to imitate the process of creation itself. Princes could become creators in miniature, orderers of their own reality.
The geometric solids in Lobenigk’s work sent a deliberate message: The five Platonic solids—the dice-like images of mathematically satisfying forms, where each face is the same regular polygon and the same number of faces meet at each vertex—have been associated with the concept of the universe as a rationally ordered whole since ancient times, when Plato coined the term in the Timaeus. In the late 16th century, the German astronomer Johannes Kepler found that the ratios among a set of spheres inscribed around the Platonic solids corresponded to the ratios among the orbits of the six then-known planets. Crafting the Platonic solids was a sign of mastery over nature.
Turning ivory meant the imitation of God as creator with the shaping of a miniature cosmos in the form of a contrefait sphere.
There are two reasons why turning ivory became a suitable hobby for princes: It entailed the triumph of technique over a valuable raw material, and it meant the imitation of God as creator with the shaping of a miniature cosmos in the form of a contrefait sphere. As the architect Noam Andrews put it, “These princely enterprises, as whimsical as they might appear today, were calculated rehearsals of the skills needed for just and successful rule.” Ivory contrefaits asserted that the physical world was a world of laws.
But in my research into the 17th century, I found one other, much rarer use of the term contrefait: in the deposition of a 17th-century lieutenant colonel in the Spanish army, from what is now Belgium. His wife, by his account, had been cheating on him as they campaigned in the Low Countries and Switzerland. (At the time, women would travel with their male partners in armies.) He accused her of carrying “her boyfriend’s cannterfert”—literally, his image—“with her at all times, except in Switzerland she went to Faci … and scraped it out with an itty-bitty knife.” Men were not supposed to know about this, he said. In this context, cannterfert probably means fetus: I believe he was referring to a surgical abortion.
In the 1620s, this operation would have been performed with rudimentary anesthetics at best and with no antiseptics or artificial light. The woman survived the alleged operation. But the lieutenant colonel stabbed her 12 times in 1626 because, he said, she had slept with other men. His statement came as he was on trial for her murder. Despite his obvious guilt, he was acquitted; his colonel believed he was essential to the regiment.
At the same time as this woman’s supposed abortion, princes far above her were working their own counterfeits. At least two contrefaits from this period combine nested ivory shapes and the human image: One piece has a tiny portrait within its complex fretted spheres and a mechanism that allows you to open and close its tiny inward cage.
The juxtaposition of well-ordered ideals and the cruel, painful, and sordid is a familiar one. The ability of early modern European heads of state to project power was comparatively limited. Many of their laws were ineffective if not outright unworkable. There was a term for them in German: Gesetze, die nicht durchgesetzt werden—“rules that don’t rule,” to keep the pun in English. They projected an image of control more than actually changing anything.
Yet for early modern heads of state, promulgating laws was worthwhile in itself. By mandating right and forbidding wrong, they proclaimed good order—whether or not any of it was carried out. Like nested Platonic solids in ivory, these laws invoked an ordered cosmos of which the bloody, challenging world was only one element.
This story appears in the Fall 2020 print issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--State Department Misled Public, Congress About Revoking Journalist’s Award for Criticizing Trump

The Trump administration revoked a prestigious award to a Finnish journalist because she had written social media posts critical of the U.S. president , then lied to Congress and the press about the reasons for revoking her award , according to a new report from the State Department watchdog .
Jessikka Aro , a Finnish journalist who has faced online harassment campaigns and death threats for exposing Russia ’ s disinformation and propaganda machine , was told by U.S. diplomats in January 2019 that she would be honored with the State Department ’ s International Women of Courage Award .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and first lady Melania Trump .
Weeks later , before the ceremony , the department rescinded the award , telling Aro it was due to a “ regrettable error.
” It wasn ’ t an error .
Rather , State Department officials chose to nix her from the award ceremony for fear of falling afoul of thin-skinned agency and administration officials .
The new State Department Office of Inspector General report outlines how officials revoked Aro ’ s award after they reviewed her social media posts and found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
State Department officials subsequently gave false statements to both the press and Senate Foreign Relations Committee about why Aro ’ s award was rescinded , covering up the fact that it was based on her social media posts .
Foreign Policy first reported on the issue , which launched a probe by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and prompted the inspector general ’ s office to conduct its own investigation .
The new revelations are likely to worsen tensions between the State Department and Democratic lawmakers .
The top Democrat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sen. Bob Menendez , said in a statement on Friday that the report shows how department officials misled his staff and allowed “ fear and partisanship ” to permeate U.S. diplomacy .
“ Secretary [ Mike ] Pompeo should have honored a courageous journalist willing to stand up to Kremlin propaganda , ” Menendez said .
“ Instead , his department sought to stifle dissent to avoid upsetting a president who , day after day , tries to take pages out of Putin ’ s playbook .
The State Department owes Ms. Aro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spotlight on the State Department Office of Inspector General , which has found itself at the center of high-profile disputes between Congress and the administration after the agency ’ s top watchdog was fired while investigating Pompeo for alleged impropriety .
His temporary successor then resigned less than three months into the job .
After Aro was offered the award , officials at the State Department flagged tweets and Facebook posts from Aro that criticized Trump or highlighted the president ’ s dismissal of the media as “ fake news , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ office .
“ Trump constantly labels journalists as ‘ enemy ’ and ‘ fake news.
’ One Trump supporter made threatening calls to Boston Globe reporters and said he was shooting them in the head because they are ‘ enemies of the people ’ and ‘ fake news.
’ A search of the house found weapons and ammunition , ” read one of Aro ’ s tweets from September 2018 that officials in the State Department ’ s Office of Global Women ’ s Issues flagged .
Another of Aro ’ s tweets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : “ Russian troll factory organized pro-Trump protests in US soil .
In July Trump and Putin will meet in Helsinki , Finland , and Finnish people can protest them both .
Sweet.
” Trump ’ s ambassador to Finland , Robert Pence , during internal discussions on whether to revoke her award , said that “ although he appreciated Ms. Aro ’ s work , the risk of embarrassment to the First Lady and the Department was too great to have her appear on stage at the awards ceremony , ” according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the acting director of the Office of Global Women ’ s Issues at the time , cited past instances in which the award was revoked based on a nominee who allegedly made anti-Semitic remarks .
Aro was informed she would receive the award and was sent an official invitation from the State Department to attend the March 7 , 2019 , ceremony in Washington .
She was informed the award was revoked after she booked her travel to Washington .
“ In my heart I feel like an international woman of courage .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ take away from me , ” Aro said in an interview after the report ’ s release on Friday .
Publicly , the State Department did not acknowledge that her social media posts had anything to do with her award being rescinded .
At the time , a State Department spokesperson said : “ Due to a lack of coordination in communications with candidates and our embassies , a regrettable error was made and a candidate was incorrectly notified that she had been selected as a finalist.
” Other officials , including officers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pushed back on these justifications , arguing that Aro deserved the award and disagreeing with “ the comparison of ‘ legitimate political speech ’ to anti-Semitic remarks , ” according to the OIG report .
The decision to revoke Aro ’ s award left some officials fuming .
“ It created a shitstorm of getting her unceremoniously kicked off the list , ” one U.S. diplomatic source said at the time of the internal discussions .
“ I think it was absolutely the wrong decision on so many levels.
” The State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report , instead referring to a memorandum from the current ambassador-at-large for global women ’ s issues , Kelley Currie , that was included in the report .
The office “ shares the OIG ’ s concerns regarding the process and procedures of the 2019 International Women of Courage Award ( IWOC ) selection process , ” Currie wrote .
“ While there are no formal recommendations from the OIG , I have reinforced the Department of State Ethos in all aspects of [ the Global Women ’ s Issues office ] work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integrity of the IWOC Award but also the Department ’ s commitment to the sacred trust placed in this institution by the American people .
”

The Trump administration revoked a prestigious award to a Finnish journalist because she had written social media posts critical of the U.S. president, then lied to Congress and the press about the reasons for revoking her award, according to a new report from the State Department watchdog.
The Trump administration revoked a prestigious award to a Finnish journalist because she had written social media posts critical of the U.S. president, then lied to Congress and the press about the reasons for revoking her award, according to a new report from the State Department watchdog.
Jessikka Aro, a Finnish journalist who has faced online harassment campaigns and death threats for exposing Russia’s disinformation and propaganda machine, was told by U.S. diplomats in January 2019 that she would be honored with the State Department’s International Women of Courage Award. The awards were to be presented by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and first lady Melania Trump. Weeks later, before the ceremony, the department rescinded the award, telling Aro it was due to a “regrettable error.”
It wasn’t an error. Rather, State Department officials chose to nix her from the award ceremony for fear of falling afoul of thin-skinned agency and administration officials.
The new State Department Office of Inspector General report outlines how officials revoked Aro’s award after they reviewed her social media posts and found posts critical of U.S. President Donald Trump. State Department officials subsequently gave false statements to both the press and Senate Foreign Relations Committee about why Aro’s award was rescinded, covering up the fact that it was based on her social media posts.
Foreign Policy first reported on the issue, which launched a probe by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and prompted the inspector general’s office to conduct its own investigation.
The new revelations are likely to worsen tensions between the State Department and Democratic lawmakers. The top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Bob Menendez, said in a statement on Friday that the report shows how department officials misled his staff and allowed “fear and partisanship” to permeate U.S. diplomacy.
“Secretary [Mike] Pompeo should have honored a courageous journalist willing to stand up to Kremlin propaganda,” Menendez said. “Instead, his department sought to stifle dissent to avoid upsetting a president who, day after day, tries to take pages out of Putin’s playbook. The State Department owes Ms. Aro an apology.”
The report also shines a spotlight on the State Department Office of Inspector General, which has found itself at the center of high-profile disputes between Congress and the administration after the agency’s top watchdog was fired while investigating Pompeo for alleged impropriety. His temporary successor then resigned less than three months into the job.
After Aro was offered the award, officials at the State Department flagged tweets and Facebook posts from Aro that criticized Trump or highlighted the president’s dismissal of the media as “fake news,” according to the inspector general’s office.
“Trump constantly labels journalists as ‘enemy’ and ‘fake news.’ One Trump supporter made threatening calls to Boston Globe reporters and said he was shooting them in the head because they are ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘fake news.’ A search of the house found weapons and ammunition,” read one of Aro’s tweets from September 2018 that officials in the State Department’s Office of Global Women’s Issues flagged.
Another of Aro’s tweets flagged by State Dept. officials read: “Russian troll factory organized pro-Trump protests in US soil. In July Trump and Putin will meet in Helsinki, Finland, and Finnish people can protest them both. Sweet.”
Trump’s ambassador to Finland, Robert Pence, during internal discussions on whether to revoke her award, said that “although he appreciated Ms. Aro’s work, the risk of embarrassment to the First Lady and the Department was too great to have her appear on stage at the awards ceremony,” according to the report. Another official, the acting director of the Office of Global Women’s Issues at the time, cited past instances in which the award was revoked based on a nominee who allegedly made anti-Semitic remarks.
Aro was informed she would receive the award and was sent an official invitation from the State Department to attend the March 7, 2019, ceremony in Washington. She was informed the award was revoked after she booked her travel to Washington.
“In my heart I feel like an international woman of courage. That the Trump administration can’t take away from me,” Aro said in an interview after the report’s release on Friday.
Publicly, the State Department did not acknowledge that her social media posts had anything to do with her award being rescinded. At the time, a State Department spokesperson said: “Due to a lack of coordination in communications with candidates and our embassies, a regrettable error was made and a candidate was incorrectly notified that she had been selected as a finalist.”
Other officials, including officers at the U.S. embassy in Helsinki, pushed back on these justifications, arguing that Aro deserved the award and disagreeing with “the comparison of ‘legitimate political speech’ to anti-Semitic remarks,” according to the OIG report.
The decision to revoke Aro’s award left some officials fuming. “It created a shitstorm of getting her unceremoniously kicked off the list,” one U.S. diplomatic source said at the time of the internal discussions. “I think it was absolutely the wrong decision on so many levels.”
The State Department declined to comment on the inspector general report, instead referring to a memorandum from the current ambassador-at-large for global women’s issues, Kelley Currie, that was included in the report.
The office “shares the OIG’s concerns regarding the process and procedures of the 2019 International Women of Courage Award (IWOC) selection process,” Currie wrote.
“While there are no formal recommendations from the OIG, I have reinforced the Department of State Ethos in all aspects of [the Global Women’s Issues office] work to uphold not only the tradition and integrity of the IWOC Award but also the Department’s commitment to the sacred trust placed in this institution by the American people.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Building a Shared Worldview Among Democrats and Republicans Could Be More Dangerous Than Healing

Building a Shared Worldview Among Democrats and Republicans Could Be More Dangerous Than Healing For the past four years , the United States has been lurching from one political outrage to another .
Time after time , President Donald Trump ’ s administration has broken norms or laws , triggering dozens of hot takes and thousands of appalled tweets .
Now , as the United States rapidly approaches a presidential election , the attacks on its political process are accelerating ; most recently , Trump has declined to commit to a peaceful transition if he loses the vote in November @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tweets are not going to be enough , but finding another approach has been a struggle .
In an effort to propose a solution , many commenters have started pointing to the lack of a “ shared reality ” and the influence of media “ echo chambers , ” suggesting that a common understanding of facts and policy goals is needed to help the country out of its slump .
To be sure , these are important considerations—ideally , Americans would be less vulnerable to manipulation , something the country should be working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ single worldview that everyone shares is both unrealistic and dangerous .
Most of the times groups of people have gotten close to such a shared reality , they have used it to propagate destructive ideas .
To find examples , one doesn ’ t even need to risk running afoul of Godwin ’ s law , because there are so many to choose from .
The revisionist myth of the Lost Cause , for instance , offered a carefully cultivated shared reality that convinced generations of Americans that the Confederate cause was just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little to do with slavery .
It faced down historical evidence with cheap , new statues that appeared to be weighty historical monuments , military bases named after traitors , and , most perniciously , school textbooks .
Many people still practice patriotism for a pseudo-nation that barely existed 150 years ago as though they had grown up in it , because , in a way , they did : They grew up in the shared reality that reimagined it .
Rather than a shared worldview , what the United States can aim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is trying to go as a society .
Even this may seem like a stretch in 2020 , but fortunately the United States does have a guiding principle that everyone at least pretends to agree with , and it ’ s not patriotism , which has become so meaningless that it is no longer the last refuge of scoundrels but the first checkbox of the political consultant .
Patriotism is the essence of propaganda , a forced affirmation that can not be pinned down .
It is too amorphous to be useful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for holding government officials to account .
But there is another principle that is fundamental to U.S. national identity , one that supposedly everyone in public life in the United States should be committed to : democracy .
True , the word has been thrown around as a test of patriotism so often that it has been badly diluted .
But that ’ s all the more reason to reclaim it now .
Americans need to be saying without hesitation or qualification that voter suppression is undemocratic , that using disinformation as part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It isn ’ t enough to lament that those actions raise questions about the state of U.S. democracy , nor that they are the top of a slippery slope toward fascism .
They need to be called out as irrefutably undemocratic now .
If that brings to the fore long-standing undemocratic habits , so much the better .
Gerrymandering is undemocratic .
The District of Columbia not having representation in Congress is undemocratic .
Tradition or the difficulty of making changes should no longer be excuses for letting undemocratic practices slide .
Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and that term should be a yardstick for the upcoming election .
It needs to be clear that intimidating voters is undemocratic , that interfering in approved voting methods is undemocratic , that staying in office after losing an election is undemocratic .
Calling someone , or a policy , undemocratic will not immediately cause it to melt like a wicked witch doused with water .
But it is the first step toward starting to legally incorporate procedures to deal with the kinds of electoral and government malfeasance that the United States has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have generated outrage but not much else that could protect the American system .
Is that sad ?
Sure .
Does it mean democracy has failed ?
Not remotely .
It means that the particular configuration of democracy that the United States has developed is ( at best ) incomplete .
It means that the country has learned something about where the weaknesses in its system lie and how to fix them .
The American experiment has returned some results , and it ’ s time to tweak the parameters again .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us who are not constitutional lawyers , attorneys general , or congresspeople , demanding that the country ’ s leaders embrace democracy is a start .
It will be a move back toward meaning and substance .
Calling someone unpatriotic is an attack without meaning , because there is no way to prove love for country , and it ’ s a dubious concept in any case .
But calling someone undemocratic can be tied to specific actions and stated positions , and undemocratic behavior runs contrary to something everyone in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @

For the past four years, the United States has been lurching from one political outrage to another. Time after time, President Donald Trump’s administration has broken norms or laws, triggering dozens of hot takes and thousands of appalled tweets. Now, as the United States rapidly approaches a presidential election, the attacks on its political process are accelerating; most recently, Trump has declined to commit to a peaceful transition if he loses the vote in November. Morally outraged think pieces and apocalyptic tweets are not going to be enough, but finding another approach has been a struggle.
For the past four years, the United States has been lurching from one political outrage to another. Time after time, President Donald Trump’s administration has broken norms or laws, triggering dozens of hot takes and thousands of appalled tweets. Now, as the United States rapidly approaches a presidential election, the attacks on its political process are accelerating; most recently, Trump has declined to commit to a peaceful transition if he loses the vote in November. Morally outraged think pieces and apocalyptic tweets are not going to be enough, but finding another approach has been a struggle.
In an effort to propose a solution, many commenters have started pointing to the lack of a “shared reality” and the influence of media “echo chambers,” suggesting that a common understanding of facts and policy goals is needed to help the country out of its slump. To be sure, these are important considerations—ideally, Americans would be less vulnerable to manipulation, something the country should be working toward. But the idea of a single worldview that everyone shares is both unrealistic and dangerous. Most of the times groups of people have gotten close to such a shared reality, they have used it to propagate destructive ideas.
To find examples, one doesn’t even need to risk running afoul of Godwin’s law, because there are so many to choose from. The revisionist myth of the Lost Cause, for instance, offered a carefully cultivated shared reality that convinced generations of Americans that the Confederate cause was just, heroic, romantic, and had little to do with slavery. It faced down historical evidence with cheap, new statues that appeared to be weighty historical monuments, military bases named after traitors, and, most perniciously, school textbooks. Many people still practice patriotism for a pseudo-nation that barely existed 150 years ago as though they had grown up in it, because, in a way, they did: They grew up in the shared reality that reimagined it.
Rather than a shared worldview, what the United States can aim for is shared principles—some guidance for where it is trying to go as a society. Even this may seem like a stretch in 2020, but fortunately the United States does have a guiding principle that everyone at least pretends to agree with, and it’s not patriotism, which has become so meaningless that it is no longer the last refuge of scoundrels but the first checkbox of the political consultant. Patriotism is the essence of propaganda, a forced affirmation that cannot be pinned down. It is too amorphous to be useful as a path to compromise, or for holding government officials to account.
But there is another principle that is fundamental to U.S. national identity, one that supposedly everyone in public life in the United States should be committed to: democracy.
True, the word has been thrown around as a test of patriotism so often that it has been badly diluted. But that’s all the more reason to reclaim it now. Americans need to be saying without hesitation or qualification that voter suppression is undemocratic, that using disinformation as part of an election campaign is undemocratic. It isn’t enough to lament that those actions raise questions about the state of U.S. democracy, nor that they are the top of a slippery slope toward fascism. They need to be called out as irrefutably undemocratic now.
If that brings to the fore long-standing undemocratic habits, so much the better. Gerrymandering is undemocratic. The District of Columbia not having representation in Congress is undemocratic. Tradition or the difficulty of making changes should no longer be excuses for letting undemocratic practices slide. Americans need to reinstate undemocratic as unacceptable, and that term should be a yardstick for the upcoming election. It needs to be clear that intimidating voters is undemocratic, that interfering in approved voting methods is undemocratic, that staying in office after losing an election is undemocratic.
Calling someone, or a policy, undemocratic will not immediately cause it to melt like a wicked witch doused with water. But it is the first step toward starting to legally incorporate procedures to deal with the kinds of electoral and government malfeasance that the United States has seen over the past four years—crimes that have generated outrage but not much else that could protect the American system.
Is that sad? Sure. Does it mean democracy has failed? Not remotely. It means that the particular configuration of democracy that the United States has developed is (at best) incomplete. It means that the country has learned something about where the weaknesses in its system lie and how to fix them. The American experiment has returned some results, and it’s time to tweak the parameters again.
But in the meantime, for those of us who are not constitutional lawyers, attorneys general, or congresspeople, demanding that the country’s leaders embrace democracy is a start. It will be a move back toward meaning and substance. Calling someone unpatriotic is an attack without meaning, because there is no way to prove love for country, and it’s a dubious concept in any case. But calling someone undemocratic can be tied to specific actions and stated positions, and undemocratic behavior runs contrary to something everyone in the United States is supposed to believe in.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--How India Came Around to Talking to the Taliban

How India Came Around to Talking to the Taliban Since the Afghan peace process began two years ago , India ’ s role in it has been peripheral at best .
But that may be about to change ; Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ’ s presence at the opening ceremony of the intra-Afghan talks on Sept. 12 could hint at a gradual shift in the country ’ s approach .
At the historic inaugural session held in Doha , Jaishankar addressed the gathering remotely and reiterated India ’ s long-held support for an “ Afghan-led , Afghan-owned , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participation raised the possibility that India may agree to engage in direct talks with the Taliban at some point in the future , something it has not done thus far .
Although India has long chosen to refrain from putting boots on the ground in Afghanistan , the country has provided the Afghan security forces with critical operational training , limited military equipment , and capacity-building courses—assistance that was ramped up after the signing of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement in October 2011 .
The agreement , in addition to emphasizing cooperation in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and justice , also included a joint commitment to combating international terrorist and criminal networks in the region .
On the political front , India has been one of the oldest and strongest proponents of democratic governance in Kabul .
From the 2001 Bonn conference , which facilitated the formation of an interim government to take over from the Taliban , to the present day , India has maintained a broad-based approach in engaging with successive Afghan governments .
To that end , the country has provided billions of dollars in infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2001 .
Although New Delhi can not match the level of economic assistance provided by the West , India continues to be viewed as possibly the most reliable development partner in the region .
Even as India has held the line in advocating for a reconciliation process owned and negotiated by Afghans themselves , its approach toward the Taliban has subtly shifted over the years .
In the 1990s , India was vocal in its opposition to the Taliban regime and backed the Northern Alliance against it , a strategy also employed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By the late 2000s however , even as India continued to give more support to the elected Afghan government in its reconciliation efforts , it was no longer entirely averse to engaging more substantively with the Taliban .
And although a direct channel of communication between India and the Taliban never materialized , New Delhi ’ s assertion of its priorities in Afghanistan at the inaugural Doha session this month has indicated that its evolution on the Taliban continues .
The Taliban , for their part , are unlikely to emerge as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group has been signaling that it is not fundamentally inimical to working with the country either .
A few months ago , the Taliban refuted media reports that they had aligned with jihadi groups in Kashmir , declaring that they were not in favor of intervening in the internal matters of another country .
That represented a subtle overture to New Delhi and gives the country an opportunity to secure a seat at the high table .
The shifting dynamics between India and the Taliban come as the United States is preparing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mid-2021 .
The shifting dynamics between India and the Taliban come as the United States , as mandated by its February agreement with the Taliban , is preparing to withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan by mid-2021 .
Surely , the absence of American troops will further embolden Taliban aspirations for a bigger slice of the political pie .
The Taliban seem to have the upper hand on the battlefield , as well as in the negotiations , which they are arguably using as a legitimizing tool for when they come to power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ascendant Taliban , then , is important to watch for a number of reasons .
The first is simply because the Taliban are expected to constitute an integral part of the government in Kabul soon enough .
Second , establishing diplomatic contacts with a politically empowered Taliban will be crucial to safeguarding New Delhi ’ s existing and future economic interests in the country , including those linked with Central Asian energy markets and broader connectivity projects .
Third , an amicable relationship with the Taliban will provide India with some leverage over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will use to offset Pakistan ’ s efforts aimed at sabotaging Indian stakes in the country .
To be sure , India has a long road ahead of it .
Realistically , the only possible outcomes of the talks will likely be either a political apparatus dominated by the Taliban or continued lack of consensus and violence .
In either case , the Taliban will continue to remain preponderant , a challenge not only for Afghans but for the region at large .
For India , that challenge boils down mainly to Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghan reconciliation process .
In India ’ s outreach to the various Afghan players , it can not lose sight of the dangers that overwhelming Pakistani influence on Afghanistan could pose for India .
The biggest challenge there remains the threat of terrorism and extremism , and a purported Taliban victory will give a boost to such forces in the region .
The militant arm of the Taliban—the Haqqani network—continues to be staunchly anti-India and maintains close ties with Pakistan ’ s Inter-Services Intelligence , carrying out operations targeting Indian nationals in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department .
Another security threat has been the growing presence of the Islamic State-Khorasan in Afghanistan and surrounding areas , which may absorb splinter groups that emerge from a locally fractious Taliban and other groups .
Another regional power that shares India ’ s worry of instability in Afghanistan filtering into other countries in the neighborhood is China .
Beijing is wary of the geographical proximity between Afghanistan and its Uighur Muslim-dominated Xinjiang region .
China also has economic interests in Afghanistan , with several projects there tied to its ambitious Belt and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic outreach to Kabul while also cultivating closer ties to the Taliban , all with the promise of promoting greater trade and investment in the country , China is attempting to secure its place in an evolving Afghanistan .
This is yet another point of friction with India , whose relations with China are in a downward spiral .
The competition between India and China may push New Delhi closer to Moscow and Tehran , which share some of India ’ s goals in the region .
Although the Afghan government remains skeptical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Moscow ’ s involvement in the facilitation of past negotiations between various Afghan interlocutors is undeniable .
As for Iran , even though it can not reconcile with the Taliban ’ s anti-Shiite beliefs , Tehran has shown that it understands the importance of tactical engagement with the group .
Since New Delhi maintains its strategic ties with Moscow and seems determined to invest diplomatic capital in strengthening its relations with Tehran , a three-way joint effort in Afghanistan can not be ruled out .
The fact that India is possibly the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and Europe on the one hand , and Iran and Russia on the other , underscores its unique position to contribute to the Afghan peace process .
While each country seeks to align its engagement policy to its respective strategic objectives , the overarching goal for all is peace in Afghanistan .
A consensus among major international stakeholders about how to deal with the Taliban is of utmost importance—and India can help forge it and carry it out .

Since the Afghan peace process began two years ago, India’s role in it has been peripheral at best. But that may be about to change; Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s presence at the opening ceremony of the intra-Afghan talks on Sept. 12 could hint at a gradual shift in the country’s approach. At the historic inaugural session held in Doha, Jaishankar addressed the gathering remotely and reiterated India’s long-held support for an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled” peace process. His participation raised the possibility that India may agree to engage in direct talks with the Taliban at some point in the future, something it has not done thus far.
Since the Afghan peace process began two years ago, India’s role in it has been peripheral at best. But that may be about to change; Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s presence at the opening ceremony of the intra-Afghan talks on Sept. 12 could hint at a gradual shift in the country’s approach. At the historic inaugural session held in Doha, Jaishankar addressed the gathering remotely and reiterated India’s long-held support for an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled” peace process. His participation raised the possibility that India may agree to engage in direct talks with the Taliban at some point in the future, something it has not done thus far.
Although India has long chosen to refrain from putting boots on the ground in Afghanistan, the country has provided the Afghan security forces with critical operational training, limited military equipment, and capacity-building courses—assistance that was ramped up after the signing of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement in October 2011. The agreement, in addition to emphasizing cooperation in the areas of security, law enforcement, and justice, also included a joint commitment to combating international terrorist and criminal networks in the region.
On the political front, India has been one of the oldest and strongest proponents of democratic governance in Kabul. From the 2001 Bonn conference, which facilitated the formation of an interim government to take over from the Taliban, to the present day, India has maintained a broad-based approach in engaging with successive Afghan governments. To that end, the country has provided billions of dollars in infrastructure development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since 2001. Although New Delhi cannot match the level of economic assistance provided by the West, India continues to be viewed as possibly the most reliable development partner in the region.
Even as India has held the line in advocating for a reconciliation process owned and negotiated by Afghans themselves, its approach toward the Taliban has subtly shifted over the years. In the 1990s, India was vocal in its opposition to the Taliban regime and backed the Northern Alliance against it, a strategy also employed by Russia and Iran at the time. By the late 2000s however, even as India continued to give more support to the elected Afghan government in its reconciliation efforts, it was no longer entirely averse to engaging more substantively with the Taliban. And although a direct channel of communication between India and the Taliban never materialized, New Delhi’s assertion of its priorities in Afghanistan at the inaugural Doha session this month has indicated that its evolution on the Taliban continues.
The Taliban, for their part, are unlikely to emerge as a strong partner of India, but the group has been signaling that it is not fundamentally inimical to working with the country either. A few months ago, the Taliban refuted media reports that they had aligned with jihadi groups in Kashmir, declaring that they were not in favor of intervening in the internal matters of another country. That represented a subtle overture to New Delhi and gives the country an opportunity to secure a seat at the high table.
The shifting dynamics between India and the Taliban come as the United States is preparing to withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan by mid-2021.
The shifting dynamics between India and the Taliban come as the United States, as mandated by its February agreement with the Taliban, is preparing to withdraw all military forces from Afghanistan by mid-2021. Surely, the absence of American troops will further embolden Taliban aspirations for a bigger slice of the political pie. The Taliban seem to have the upper hand on the battlefield, as well as in the negotiations, which they are arguably using as a legitimizing tool for when they come to power.
India’s engagement with an ascendant Taliban, then, is important to watch for a number of reasons. The first is simply because the Taliban are expected to constitute an integral part of the government in Kabul soon enough. Second, establishing diplomatic contacts with a politically empowered Taliban will be crucial to safeguarding New Delhi’s existing and future economic interests in the country, including those linked with Central Asian energy markets and broader connectivity projects. Third, an amicable relationship with the Taliban will provide India with some leverage over Afghanistan’s future, which it will use to offset Pakistan’s efforts aimed at sabotaging Indian stakes in the country.
To be sure, India has a long road ahead of it. Realistically, the only possible outcomes of the talks will likely be either a political apparatus dominated by the Taliban or continued lack of consensus and violence. In either case, the Taliban will continue to remain preponderant, a challenge not only for Afghans but for the region at large. For India, that challenge boils down mainly to Pakistan, which has weaved itself into the Afghan reconciliation process. In India’s outreach to the various Afghan players, it cannot lose sight of the dangers that overwhelming Pakistani influence on Afghanistan could pose for India. The biggest challenge there remains the threat of terrorism and extremism, and a purported Taliban victory will give a boost to such forces in the region.
The militant arm of the Taliban—the Haqqani network—continues to be staunchly anti-India and maintains close ties with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, carrying out operations targeting Indian nationals in the region, according to the U.S. Defense Department. Another security threat has been the growing presence of the Islamic State-Khorasan in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, which may absorb splinter groups that emerge from a locally fractious Taliban and other groups.
Another regional power that shares India’s worry of instability in Afghanistan filtering into other countries in the neighborhood is China. Beijing is wary of the geographical proximity between Afghanistan and its Uighur Muslim-dominated Xinjiang region. China also has economic interests in Afghanistan, with several projects there tied to its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. By stepping up its diplomatic outreach to Kabul while also cultivating closer ties to the Taliban, all with the promise of promoting greater trade and investment in the country, China is attempting to secure its place in an evolving Afghanistan. This is yet another point of friction with India, whose relations with China are in a downward spiral.
The competition between India and China may push New Delhi closer to Moscow and Tehran, which share some of India’s goals in the region. Although the Afghan government remains skeptical of any Russian links with the Taliban, Moscow’s involvement in the facilitation of past negotiations between various Afghan interlocutors is undeniable. As for Iran, even though it cannot reconcile with the Taliban’s anti-Shiite beliefs, Tehran has shown that it understands the importance of tactical engagement with the group. Since New Delhi maintains its strategic ties with Moscow and seems determined to invest diplomatic capital in strengthening its relations with Tehran, a three-way joint effort in Afghanistan cannot be ruled out.
The fact that India is possibly the only country that can engage with the United States and Europe on the one hand, and Iran and Russia on the other, underscores its unique position to contribute to the Afghan peace process. While each country seeks to align its engagement policy to its respective strategic objectives, the overarching goal for all is peace in Afghanistan. A consensus among major international stakeholders about how to deal with the Taliban is of utmost importance—and India can help forge it and carry it out.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-25--Document of the Week: The Mighty U.N. Fighting Force That Never Was

Document of the Week : The Mighty U.N. Fighting Force That Never Was But that wasn ’ t always the case .
At the bloc ’ s founding in 1945 , the United States envisioned the U.N. ’ s five great powers committing huge numbers of ground , sea , and air forces to enforce world peace following the end of World War II .
The fledgling organization established a Military Staff Committee to coordinate joint military activities .
It was mandated to meet every 14 days .
The idea was not to establish a stand-alone military force under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set up standby military arrangements that would be coordinated by military advisors from the key veto-wielding powers .
“ Today the U.N. tends to focus on soft issues like development and cooperation , ” recalled Richard Gowan , the U.N. director for the International Crisis Group .
“ It is easy to forget that the organization was originally meant to rest on hard power .
The vision of the U.N. as a war-fighting or war-directing body has only flickered to life occasionally , as in Korea and the first Gulf War.
” As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Week series , we are highlighting a staff committee document that estimates how many forces the big powers were expected to supply .
The United States , for instance , would supply the largest military contingent , including 1,250 bombers , 2,250 fighters , 20 ground divisions , 84 destroyers , and 90 submarines .
Britain , the Republic of China ( later ousted by the Communists and driven to Taiwan ) , France , and the Soviet Union each were to provide significant forces .
In her book The U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Capacity , Alexandra Novosseloff recalled that the United States and other victors of the war envisioned the U.N. as an extension of the military alliance ( called the “ United Nations ” during the war ) that defeated the Axis Powers—Germany , Italy , and Japan .
Their ambition was to institutionalize a military alliance that could be called on to confront a future military challenge that threatened international peace and security .
The reference point , Novosseloff said , was World War II .
“ They didn ’ t have in mind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we are now accustomed to , ” she said .
But due to differences between the United States and the Soviet Union , which disagreed over the scope of the forces mandate , the standby force never came into existence .
The Military Staff Committee continued to hold its biweekly meeting , but its role in enforcing global peace and security became largely irrelevant .
“ Ultimately , the U.N. ’ s political credibility still rests on its ability to prevent major conflict .
It ’ s struggling with that now , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ m not sure anyone is going to be painting submarines light blue and offering them to Antonio Gutérres !
”

It has been years since the United States deployed troops in U.N. peacekeeping missions, leaving it mostly to developing countries —including Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda—to keep the peace for the United Nations in conflict areas around the world.
It has been years since the United States deployed troops in U.N. peacekeeping missions, leaving it mostly to developing countries—including Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda—to keep the peace for the United Nations in conflict areas around the world.
But that wasn’t always the case.
At the bloc’s founding in 1945, the United States envisioned the U.N.’s five great powers committing huge numbers of ground, sea, and air forces to enforce world peace following the end of World War II. The fledgling organization established a Military Staff Committee to coordinate joint military activities. It was mandated to meet every 14 days. The idea was not to establish a stand-alone military force under the command of the United Nations but to set up standby military arrangements that would be coordinated by military advisors from the key veto-wielding powers.
“Today the U.N. tends to focus on soft issues like development and cooperation,” recalled Richard Gowan, the U.N. director for the International Crisis Group. “It is easy to forget that the organization was originally meant to rest on hard power. The vision of the U.N. as a war-fighting or war-directing body has only flickered to life occasionally, as in Korea and the first Gulf War.”
As part of Foreign Policy’s Document of the Week series, we are highlighting a staff committee document that estimates how many forces the big powers were expected to supply. The United States, for instance, would supply the largest military contingent, including 1,250 bombers, 2,250 fighters, 20 ground divisions, 84 destroyers, and 90 submarines. Britain, the Republic of China (later ousted by the Communists and driven to Taiwan), France, and the Soviet Union each were to provide significant forces.
In her book The U.N. Military Staff Committee: Recreating a Missing Capacity, Alexandra Novosseloff recalled that the United States and other victors of the war envisioned the U.N. as an extension of the military alliance (called the “United Nations” during the war) that defeated the Axis Powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan. Their ambition was to institutionalize a military alliance that could be called on to confront a future military challenge that threatened international peace and security. The reference point, Novosseloff said, was World War II.
“They didn’t have in mind the kind of [peacekeeping] operations we are now accustomed to,” she said. But due to differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, which disagreed over the scope of the forces mandate, the standby force never came into existence. The Military Staff Committee continued to hold its biweekly meeting, but its role in enforcing global peace and security became largely irrelevant.
“Ultimately, the U.N.’s political credibility still rests on its ability to prevent major conflict. It’s struggling with that now,” Gowan said. “But I’m not sure anyone is going to be painting submarines light blue and offering them to Antonio Gutérres!”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-26--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

There ’ s a lot of talk these days about the lack of a shared truth in the U.S. political system—the alternate realities ( some realer than others ) inhabited by readers of Jacobin , the New York Times , and the president ’ s Twitter feed .
But an attempt to break down echo chambers and create a common reality could lead to the sort of harmful historical revisionism seen in the Lost Cause , where facts and honest reckoning were sacrificed to buttress a unifying tale .
Meanwhile , rumor has it that Sudan could be the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A deal would be a financial boon for Khartoum , which has struggled to cope with economic woes under decades-long U.S. sanctions .
And a look at the peculiar , religiously infused etymology of the word “ counterfeit.
” 1 .
Building a Shared Worldview Among Democrats and Republicans Could Be More Dangerous Than Healing Bridging the social and political fissures in American society won ’ t happen by negotiating truth and inviting revisionism .
Rather , Americans must rally around their proclaimed core values—and recognize that democracy , the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jeopardy , Malka Older writes .
2 .
The White House Wants Peace With Sudan .
Congress Wants Khartoum to Pay .
Sudan ’ s transitional government is eager to get off the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list .
An elusive normalization deal with Israel offers reprieve—if Congress is willing to hand Donald Trump the reins , Cameron Hudson writes .
The word “ counterfeit ” —now a staple adjective in any economist ’ s lexicon—has its roots in the 16th-century art scene , where European princes saw in turning ivory a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world , Lucian Staiano-Daniels writes .
4 .
How India Came Around to Talking to the Taliban The peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are mediated by the United States , but India is watching closely .
Once U.S. troops fully withdraw from Afghanistan in mid-2021 , it looks likely that New Delhi will establish strategic partnerships with the country , Harsh V. Pant and Shubhangi Pandey write .
The Pompeo State Department was all set to award the Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro the International Women of Courage Award .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump , they revoked it—and then lied about why , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer writes .

There’s a lot of talk these days about the lack of a shared truth in the U.S. political system—the alternate realities (some realer than others) inhabited by readers of Jacobin , the New York Times , and the president’s Twitter feed. But an attempt to break down echo chambers and create a common reality could lead to the sort of harmful historical revisionism seen in the Lost Cause, where facts and honest reckoning were sacrificed to buttress a unifying tale.
There’s a lot of talk these days about the lack of a shared truth in the U.S. political system—the alternate realities (some realer than others) inhabited by readers of Jacobin, the New York Times, and the president’s Twitter feed. But an attempt to break down echo chambers and create a common reality could lead to the sort of harmful historical revisionism seen in the Lost Cause, where facts and honest reckoning were sacrificed to buttress a unifying tale.
Meanwhile, rumor has it that Sudan could be the next Arab state to normalize ties with Israel. A deal would be a financial boon for Khartoum, which has struggled to cope with economic woes under decades-long U.S. sanctions.
And a look at the peculiar, religiously infused etymology of the word “counterfeit.”
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A protester carries a “Register to Vote” sign during a peaceful demonstration against police brutality in Los Angeles on June 6.
Bridging the social and political fissures in American society won’t happen by negotiating truth and inviting revisionism. Rather, Americans must rally around their proclaimed core values—and recognize that democracy, the United States’ central tenet, is in fatal jeopardy, Malka Older writes.
A Sudanese man holds bags to build a barricade amid flood waters in Tuti island, where the Blue and White Nile merge between the twin cities of Khartoum and Omdurman, on Sept. 3.
Sudan’s transitional government is eager to get off the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. An elusive normalization deal with Israel offers reprieve—if Congress is willing to hand Donald Trump the reins, Cameron Hudson writes.
Carved ivory polyhedra by Egidius Lobenigk (left) and Georg Wecker from the 16th century, part of the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden collection in Germany.
The word “counterfeit”—now a staple adjective in any economist’s lexicon—has its roots in the 16th-century art scene, where European princes saw in turning ivory a means to cement dominion over the natural world, Lucian Staiano-Daniels writes.
Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar speaks during the opening session of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Doha on Sept. 12.
The peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are mediated by the United States, but India is watching closely. Once U.S. troops fully withdraw from Afghanistan in mid-2021, it looks likely that New Delhi will establish strategic partnerships with the country, Harsh V. Pant and Shubhangi Pandey write.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaks during the 2019 International Women of Courage awards ceremony.
The Pompeo State Department was all set to award the Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro the International Women of Courage Award. Once they saw her tweets critical of Trump, they revoked it—and then lied about why, FP’s Robbie Gramer writes.