foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--Washington, Trump, and Cults of Personality

Anyone who reads the news is used to hearing that U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s behavior is unprecedented , after nearly four years of scandals and chaos .
Less remarked on is that his cult of personality actually has historical precedent .
Ironically , that ’ s even more reason to worry .
Americans like to think of themselves as the world ’ s most freedom-loving people , but they ’ ve fantasized about deliverance through a godlike leader—an “ I alone can fix it ” figure , as Trump boasted—at least once before .
Before Trump , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ came in 1783 , just after the country won independence from Britain .
The conventional wisdom at the time was that General George Washington , the hero of the Revolutionary War , was so popular that he could overthrow the weak national government if he wished to do so .
With the benefit of hindsight , it ’ s easy to dismiss a Washington dictatorship as an absurd counterfactual .
But it certainly didn ’ t seem far-fetched at the time .
While the founding generation fought for freedom and knew its opposite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ me liberty or give me death ” bravado co-existed with a powerful nostalgia for a more familiar , hierarchical kind of authority .
“ O Washington , how I do love thy name !
How have I often adored and blessed thy God , for creating and forming thee , the great ornament of humankind !
” exclaimed one breathless admirer the year the war ended .
And those weren ’ t the words of some 18th-century “ deplorable.
” The writer was Ezra Stiles , the president of Yale , and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sentiment found throughout the new country .
( Yale ’ s rival Harvard had set a high bar for flattery by giving Washington an honorary doctorate at the outset of the war , before his soldiers fired a single shot ) .
Washington worship ran wide and deep .
The first Black person to publish a book of poetry in the United States , an enslaved woman in Boston named Phillis Wheatley , described Washington in regal terms : “ A crown , a mansion , and a throne that shine / With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The former colonists sang “ God Save Great Washington ” to the melody of “ God Save the King.
” They named ships and children in his honor , and when the statues of George III came down , Washington went up in the despised monarch ’ s place .
In terms of popularity , he had contemporaries but no peers , even amongst his fellow Founding Fathers .
The power of that cult-like appeal was clear—as was the implicit risk that he might exploit it for personal gain .
When the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ republican ideals ?
Or would he reveal a lust for power and become an American Caesar or Cromwell ?
If he had , it would have disappointed many , pleased some , and surprised few .
Indeed , George III reportedly mused that Washington would be “ the greatest man in the world ” if he simply retired from leadership right after the war , though such conduct would have been contrary to the traditions of military victory .
Of course , that ’ s exactly what Washington did .
First , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contemplating a coup against the new government .
Then , after peace was struck with the British , he appeared before Congress to “ surrender into their hands the trust committed to me… I resign with satisfaction the appointment I accepted with diffidence—a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so arduous a task.
” His humility created the space for self-government .
The catch is that , unlike Trump—who has repeatedly raised questions about whether he would step down after losing an election and told a neofascist group to “ stand by ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against democracy .
His commitment to the “ Glorious Cause ” of American liberty was unshakable .
The risk in the 1780s flowed in the opposite direction : from the bottom up rather than the top down .
By exalting their hero in the symbols and language of monarchy , America ’ s former British subjects exposed their ambivalence about giving up a political order based on “ great ” men .
Their republicanism was imperfect .
So , apparently , is modern Americans ’ .
Trump ’ s betting that attacking his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermining the public ’ s confidence in mail-in voting during a pandemic , refusing to say that he ’ ll accept the results of November ’ s election , and blustering about staying in the White House past a second term will energize Republican voters who see each outrage as a step toward a national redemption that only he can bring .
When people put loyalty to a savior above common sense , they ’ re in the thrall of a personality cult .
Washington ’ s response to idolization was self-denial .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ difference could have profound consequences : There was nothing inevitable about the American people choosing democracy nearly two and a half centuries ago , and there ’ s nothing inevitable about keeping it today .

Anyone who reads the news is used to hearing that U.S. President Donald Trump’s behavior is unprecedented, after nearly four years of scandals and chaos. Less remarked on is that his cult of personality actually has historical precedent. Ironically, that’s even more reason to worry.
Anyone who reads the news is used to hearing that U.S. President Donald Trump’s behavior is unprecedented, after nearly four years of scandals and chaos. Less remarked on is that his cult of personality actually has historical precedent. Ironically, that’s even more reason to worry.
Americans like to think of themselves as the world’s most freedom-loving people, but they’ve fantasized about deliverance through a godlike leader—an “I alone can fix it” figure, as Trump boasted—at least once before. Before Trump, the United States’ closest brush with despotism came in 1783, just after the country won independence from Britain. The conventional wisdom at the time was that General George Washington, the hero of the Revolutionary War, was so popular that he could overthrow the weak national government if he wished to do so.
With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to dismiss a Washington dictatorship as an absurd counterfactual. But it certainly didn’t seem far-fetched at the time. While the founding generation fought for freedom and knew its opposite under British rule, their “give me liberty or give me death” bravado co-existed with a powerful nostalgia for a more familiar, hierarchical kind of authority. “O Washington, how I do love thy name! How have I often adored and blessed thy God, for creating and forming thee, the great ornament of humankind!” exclaimed one breathless admirer the year the war ended.
And those weren’t the words of some 18th-century “deplorable.” The writer was Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale, and his effusiveness was representative of the intense pro-Washington sentiment found throughout the new country. (Yale’s rival Harvard had set a high bar for flattery by giving Washington an honorary doctorate at the outset of the war, before his soldiers fired a single shot).
Washington worship ran wide and deep. The first Black person to publish a book of poetry in the United States, an enslaved woman in Boston named Phillis Wheatley, described Washington in regal terms: “A crown, a mansion, and a throne that shine / With gold unfading, Washington! Be thine.” The former colonists sang “God Save Great Washington” to the melody of “God Save the King.” They named ships and children in his honor, and when the statues of George III came down, Washington went up in the despised monarch’s place.
In terms of popularity, he had contemporaries but no peers, even amongst his fellow Founding Fathers. The power of that cult-like appeal was clear—as was the implicit risk that he might exploit it for personal gain. When the moment came, would Washington reaffirm his republican ideals? Or would he reveal a lust for power and become an American Caesar or Cromwell?
If he had, it would have disappointed many, pleased some, and surprised few. Indeed, George III reportedly mused that Washington would be “the greatest man in the world” if he simply retired from leadership right after the war, though such conduct would have been contrary to the traditions of military victory.
Of course, that’s exactly what Washington did. First, he shamed a group of his own officers contemplating a coup against the new government. Then, after peace was struck with the British, he appeared before Congress to “surrender into their hands the trust committed to me… I resign with satisfaction the appointment I accepted with diffidence—a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so arduous a task.” His humility created the space for self-government.
The catch is that, unlike Trump—who has repeatedly raised questions about whether he would step down after losing an election and told a neofascist group to “stand by” during the first presidential debate—Washington never conspired against democracy. His commitment to the “Glorious Cause” of American liberty was unshakable. The risk in the 1780s flowed in the opposite direction: from the bottom up rather than the top down. By exalting their hero in the symbols and language of monarchy, America’s former British subjects exposed their ambivalence about giving up a political order based on “great” men. Their republicanism was imperfect.
So, apparently, is modern Americans’. Trump’s betting that attacking his own civil servants, delegitimizing rivals, undermining the public’s confidence in mail-in voting during a pandemic, refusing to say that he’ll accept the results of November’s election, and blustering about staying in the White House past a second term will energize Republican voters who see each outrage as a step toward a national redemption that only he can bring. When people put loyalty to a savior above common sense, they’re in the thrall of a personality cult.
Washington’s response to idolization was self-denial. Trump’s is self-aggrandizement. That difference could have profound consequences: There was nothing inevitable about the American people choosing democracy nearly two and a half centuries ago, and there’s nothing inevitable about keeping it today.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--America Is About to Enter Its Years of Lead

America Is About to Enter Its Years of Lead “ Proud Boys , stand back and stand by , ” President Donald Trump told his supporters in the far-right street-fighting group from his podium at the first 2020 presidential debate .
“ Somebody ’ s got to do something about antifa and the left.
” Four years into the Trump era , Americans have struggled to habituate themselves to the persistent presence of armed paramilitaries at demonstrations and flashes of lethal political violence .
What do these hard men herald for our political life ?
Are they stormtroopers waiting for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transition from autocratic attempt to autocratic breakthrough and the final demise of American democracy , as some liberals fear ?
Or are they a sideshow of confused , lonely men acting out fantasies with semi-automatic rifles ?
Both hyperventilating over paramilitary fantasists and laughing off potential death squads miss the mark .
The whiff of putsch may be more pungent than feels comfortable at the moment , but the far-right ’ s window for an extra-legal takeover remains quite narrow , especially if polls hold and Biden wins by a healthy margin .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ really has been destabilized by political violence , overwhelmingly perpetrated by the extreme right .
But if the United States is heading into an era of fear and violence , it won ’ t be the first time this has happened in a democracy—or even the first time this has happened in America itself .
If proud boys and vigilantes can ’ t pull off a coordinated drive for power , they may opt for a time-honored approach in democratic politics : the “ strategy of tension.
” In a paper published this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clement and Vincenzo Scalia defined the strategy of tension as a political method of “ state crime , ” designed to produce “ a climate of fear within communities .
[ Strategies of tension ] employ deceit , threats , and acts of violence in order to maintain control across society through fear of the consequences of challenging the government of the day.
” The term was coined in Italy during the Years of Lead from the late 1960s to the 1980s , when political violence exploded , with bombings , kidnappings , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Under the strategy of tension , as the left grows more militant , influential , and strident in its demands , the right tries to inflame social tensions rather than defuse them .
The violence has a dual purpose , to both suppress and provoke .
The right ’ s aim is to cordon the left off from power by simultaneously intimidating them , eliciting escalation , getting the police to crack down , and using the chaos to manipulate public opinion and political alliances .
Virtually every member of the Western Alliance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not only Italy but Britain during The Troubles in Northern Ireland , France as it tried to cling to Algeria and was targeted by its own paramilitary terror campaign , South America in the years of Operation Condor , Mexico ’ s Dirty War , and so on .
America is no exception .
The country has been here several times before : Bleeding Kansas during the 1850s , when slave-owners and abolitionists faced off in murderous confrontations ; the birth of the first Klan after the Civil War to resist Radical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that accompanied the rise of the Third Klan during the civil rights movement .
Elements of the left from John Brown to the Italian Red Brigades have also pursued violent accelerationist campaigns in pursuit of social change .
But only the reactionaries have enjoyed approval from more mainstream sources of political power .
Often , they got logistical support as well as material and legal cover from security services .
Clement and Scalia described the strategy of tension as a vicious cycle .
State prevention of emancipatory politics leads to dissent , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further isolating social movements .
With no outlet for their demands , activists pursue more radical confrontations , leading their opponents to justify almost any violence in maintenance of the oppressive regime .
That dynamic is on display in the response to this year ’ s BLM protests .
Once initial police suppression was met with uprisings , the “ good guys with guns , ” “ patriots , ” and militias showed up .
Ostensibly there to protect businesses and support law enforcement , the armed right has instead brought Chekhov ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The inevitable exchanges of gunfire and vehicular assaults at protests demonstrate , as Christina Cauterucci recently wrote for Slate , the political ethos of “ own the libs ” has escalated into “ kill the libs.
” In the classic model , the strategy of tension was associated with Cold War covert action and CIA interference in our allies ’ domestic politics .
After World War II , Western intelligence agencies really did organize “ stay-behind networks ” with alumni of both fascist regimes and anti-communist resistance networks in preparation for a possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the east was only one strategic danger : The left , it was feared , could also rise to power in the West at the ballot box and through social movements .
The CIA did put its hands on the scale in the elections like Italy in 1948 , when left-wing parties were portrayed as Soviet puppets and systemically kept out of a coalition government .
In the late 1960s , the rise of the New Left was indeed met with covert violence , police terror , and a string of false @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , discredit , and isolate the young movement .
In turn , some on the left took up bombing and kidnapping as well , but this retaliation served the right ’ s ends by contributing to public fear and justifying red scares .
The actual degree of coordination between the stay-behind networks , Western intelligence , and the right-wing terrorists of the Years of Lead remains hotly contested .
But , as historians Leopoldo Nuti and Olav Riste wrote in an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe , “ clandestine networks sometimes overlapped , without clear demarcation lines as to missions and functions.
” By contrast , the latter-day American pursuit of the strategy of tension is carried out largely in the open .
The armed far-right doesn ’ t need a covert network to supply it with military equipment because America is awash in legal weapons .
Militias and vigilantes don ’ t have to maintain underground communication networks because social media platforms allow them to operate freely .
Police chat up the gunmen as they both eye @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Italian security services and political establishment ’ s relationship to right-wing violence didn ’ t fully emerge until police and parliament investigated in the 1990s , Republicans have publicly embraced figures like Kyle Rittenhouse , the alleged Kenosha shooter whom Fox News has transformed into a folk hero .
If Biden wins , as polling suggests is likely , it ’ s hard to imagine the likes of Patriot Prayer will surrender and disappear .
After all , Trump has cast the election as an apocalyptic fight for America ’ s soul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against communism .
Republicans portray Biden , however tendentiously , as a tool of Ilhan Omar , BLM , and antifa , and his potential victory as inherently illegitimate , recreating the fear of the left that led many in Europe during the Cold War to try to exclude Socialists and Communists from power .
Given the persistence of the 2020 racial justice movement , it ’ s hard to imagine that the resurgent left will shy away from making demands of newly empowered Democrats .
So to many on the armed far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work will have only just begun if Biden takes office .
They ’ ve got everything they need to continue operating as a domestic stay-behind network to antagonize , suppress and isolate the left—most valuable of all , permission from above .

“Proud Boys, stand back and stand by,” President Donald Trump told his supporters in the far-right street-fighting group from his podium at the first 2020 presidential debate. “Somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the left.” Four years into the Trump era, Americans have struggled to habituate themselves to the persistent presence of armed paramilitaries at demonstrations and flashes of lethal political violence. What do these hard men herald for our political life? Are they stormtroopers waiting for Trump’s signal to hasten the transition from autocratic attempt to autocratic breakthrough and the final demise of American democracy, as some liberals fear? Or are they a sideshow of confused, lonely men acting out fantasies with semi-automatic rifles?
“Proud Boys, stand back and stand by,” President Donald Trump told his supporters in the far-right street-fighting group from his podium at the first 2020 presidential debate. “Somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the left.” Four years into the Trump era, Americans have struggled to habituate themselves to the persistent presence of armed paramilitaries at demonstrations and flashes of lethal political violence. What do these hard men herald for our political life? Are they stormtroopers waiting for Trump’s signal to hasten the transition from autocratic attempt to autocratic breakthrough and the final demise of American democracy, as some liberals fear? Or are they a sideshow of confused, lonely men acting out fantasies with semi-automatic rifles?
Both hyperventilating over paramilitary fantasists and laughing off potential death squads miss the mark. The whiff of putsch may be more pungent than feels comfortable at the moment, but the far-right’s window for an extra-legal takeover remains quite narrow, especially if polls hold and Biden wins by a healthy margin. At the same time, American politics really has been destabilized by political violence, overwhelmingly perpetrated by the extreme right. But if the United States is heading into an era of fear and violence, it won’t be the first time this has happened in a democracy—or even the first time this has happened in America itself.
If proud boys and vigilantes can’t pull off a coordinated drive for power, they may opt for a time-honored approach in democratic politics: the “strategy of tension.” In a paper published this spring, University of Winchester criminologists Matt Clement and Vincenzo Scalia defined the strategy of tension as a political method of “state crime,” designed to produce “a climate of fear within communities. [Strategies of tension] employ deceit, threats, and acts of violence in order to maintain control across society through fear of the consequences of challenging the government of the day.”
The term was coined in Italy during the Years of Lead from the late 1960s to the 1980s, when political violence exploded, with bombings, kidnappings, and failed coups making weekly headlines. Under the strategy of tension, as the left grows more militant, influential, and strident in its demands, the right tries to inflame social tensions rather than defuse them. The violence has a dual purpose, to both suppress and provoke. The right’s aim is to cordon the left off from power by simultaneously intimidating them, eliciting escalation, getting the police to crack down, and using the chaos to manipulate public opinion and political alliances.
Virtually every member of the Western Alliance has had its own years of lead, not only Italy but Britain during The Troubles in Northern Ireland, France as it tried to cling to Algeria and was targeted by its own paramilitary terror campaign, South America in the years of Operation Condor, Mexico’s Dirty War, and so on. America is no exception. The country has been here several times before: Bleeding Kansas during the 1850s, when slave-owners and abolitionists faced off in murderous confrontations; the birth of the first Klan after the Civil War to resist Radical Reconstruction; and the wave of violence that accompanied the rise of the Third Klan during the civil rights movement. Elements of the left from John Brown to the Italian Red Brigades have also pursued violent accelerationist campaigns in pursuit of social change. But only the reactionaries have enjoyed approval from more mainstream sources of political power. Often, they got logistical support as well as material and legal cover from security services.
Clement and Scalia described the strategy of tension as a vicious cycle. State prevention of emancipatory politics leads to dissent, which is in turn repressed and delegitimized, further isolating social movements. With no outlet for their demands, activists pursue more radical confrontations, leading their opponents to justify almost any violence in maintenance of the oppressive regime.
That dynamic is on display in the response to this year’s BLM protests. Once initial police suppression was met with uprisings, the “good guys with guns,” “patriots,” and militias showed up. Ostensibly there to protect businesses and support law enforcement, the armed right has instead brought Chekhov’s AR-15 onto the political stage. The inevitable exchanges of gunfire and vehicular assaults at protests demonstrate, as Christina Cauterucci recently wrote for Slate, the political ethos of “own the libs” has escalated into “kill the libs.”
In the classic model, the strategy of tension was associated with Cold War covert action and CIA interference in our allies’ domestic politics. After World War II, Western intelligence agencies really did organize “stay-behind networks” with alumni of both fascist regimes and anti-communist resistance networks in preparation for a possible Soviet invasion.
And a military threat from the east was only one strategic danger: The left, it was feared, could also rise to power in the West at the ballot box and through social movements. The CIA did put its hands on the scale in the elections like Italy in 1948, when left-wing parties were portrayed as Soviet puppets and systemically kept out of a coalition government. In the late 1960s, the rise of the New Left was indeed met with covert violence, police terror, and a string of false flag attacks by neo-Fascists intended to suppress, discredit, and isolate the young movement. In turn, some on the left took up bombing and kidnapping as well, but this retaliation served the right’s ends by contributing to public fear and justifying red scares. The actual degree of coordination between the stay-behind networks, Western intelligence, and the right-wing terrorists of the Years of Lead remains hotly contested. But, as historians Leopoldo Nuti and Olav Riste wrote in an introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on the strategy of stay-behind in Cold War Europe, “clandestine networks sometimes overlapped, without clear demarcation lines as to missions and functions.”
By contrast, the latter-day American pursuit of the strategy of tension is carried out largely in the open. The armed far-right doesn’t need a covert network to supply it with military equipment because America is awash in legal weapons. Militias and vigilantes don’t have to maintain underground communication networks because social media platforms allow them to operate freely. Police chat up the gunmen as they both eye BLM protesters. While the revelations regarding the Italian security services and political establishment’s relationship to right-wing violence didn’t fully emerge until police and parliament investigated in the 1990s, Republicans have publicly embraced figures like Kyle Rittenhouse, the alleged Kenosha shooter whom Fox News has transformed into a folk hero.
If Biden wins, as polling suggests is likely, it’s hard to imagine the likes of Patriot Prayer will surrender and disappear. After all, Trump has cast the election as an apocalyptic fight for America’s soul with stakes as high as the fight against communism. Republicans portray Biden, however tendentiously, as a tool of Ilhan Omar, BLM, and antifa, and his potential victory as inherently illegitimate, recreating the fear of the left that led many in Europe during the Cold War to try to exclude Socialists and Communists from power.
Given the persistence of the 2020 racial justice movement, it’s hard to imagine that the resurgent left will shy away from making demands of newly empowered Democrats. So to many on the armed far right, it might appear that their work will have only just begun if Biden takes office. They’ve got everything they need to continue operating as a domestic stay-behind network to antagonize, suppress and isolate the left—most valuable of all, permission from above.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--Why the United States Shouldn’t Sell Jets to the UAE

Why the United States Shouldn ’ t Sell Jets to the UAE Last month , the United Arab Emirates became the third Arab country to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel .
This milestone , which was formalized through a White House signing ceremony earlier this month , was accompanied by discussions about the imminent sale of U.S. F-35 fighter jets to the UAE .
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed the country ’ s purchase of F-35s , but the Trump administration is working on a compromise that allows the U.S. government to sell the fifth-generation fighter jet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s qualitative military edge in the region .
The preservation of Israel ’ s qualitative military edge—its ability to deter aggression from regional adversaries through technological and tactical superiority—has been a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward the Middle East since the 1960s and a codified tenet of U.S. law since 2008 .
The prospective sale of F-35s to the UAE has faced pushback in the United States .
The UAE ’ s alleged war crimes in Libya , which include an attack on a refugee detention center near Tripoli and a drone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in January , as well as its oversight of torture facilities in Yemen , have raised ethical challenges to the deal .
The country ’ s tightening relationship with China has provided further grounds for criticism .
There are also concerns about the possibility of Russia and China supplying sophisticated military technology to Iran , in order to counteract the enhancements of the UAE ’ s aerial capabilities resulting from F-35 transfers .
While these countervailing factors are concerning enough , the UAE ’ s growing strategic partnership with Russia provides an equally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abu Dhabi .
Although the UAE is often described as the most trusted U.S. counterterrorism partner in the Arab world , Abu Dhabi has worked with Russia on bolstering Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s international legitimacy and enabling Libyan National Army chieftain Khalifa Haftar ’ s offensive against Tripoli .
This crisis-level military cooperation is intertwined with a broadly strengthening bilateral relationship .
In June 2018 , Russia and the UAE signed the first strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and a Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) country .
Russian President Vladimir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bin Zayed as an “ old friend ” ahead of his October 2019 visit to the UAE , which resulted in $ 1.3 billion in new commercial deals between the two countries .
In light of this growing partnership , the United States should refrain from exporting F-35s to the UAE until Abu Dhabi takes tangible steps toward decoupling from Russia .
The precedent of suspending F-35 sales to Turkey after it purchased Russia ’ s S-400 missile defense system and announced plans to cooperate with Russia on constructing the S-500 system should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UAE distances itself from Russia , there is an unacceptably high risk of inadvertent transfers of U.S. technology to Russia via Abu Dhabi and Russian missile defense systems becoming interoperable with F-35s .
Russia ’ s security partnership with the UAE is deeper than its relationship with Turkey , as it consists of arms sales , logistical cooperation , and active collaboration on weapons system development , so the risks associated with selling F-35s to Turkey are amplified in the UAE ’ s case .
In spite of tensions engendered by Abu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban and military support for separatist rebels in Chechnya during their 1994-96 war with Russia , the UAE was the fourth-largest purchaser of Russian weapons in the year 2000 .
The UAE ’ s purchases of Russian arms contrasted with Saudi Arabia ’ s refusal to buy weapons from Russia and created the foundations for a robust security partnership between Moscow and Abu Dhabi .
This partnership has continued to strengthen under U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s watch .
Since 2017 , the UAE has purchased Russian Pantsir S-1 missile defense systems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 million Kornet-E anti-tank missile system , which has been deployed to Yemen .
This indicates that the UAE could operate F-35s alongside Russian-made missile defense systems .
The United Nations reported earlier this month that waves of Russian and Emirati jets have illegally supplied arms to Haftar ’ s forces in Libya , which underscores their logistical coordination in that theater .
Russian Wagner Group private military contractors have conducted reconnaissance missions in support of Emirati drone strikes , and the UAE is involved in the recruitment of Chadian and Sudanese soldiers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia and the UAE are also regularly share intelligence on counterinsurgency operations in Syria , which strengthen Assad ’ s hold on power .
Russian-UAE joint operations could alert Russia to potential vulnerabilities within F-35s , which could allow Moscow to produce missile defense systems that can shoot down U.S. aircraft .
The frequency of Russia-UAE consultations on security issues could lead to a scenario where Emirati F-35s and Russian Pantsir S-1s or S-400s are used in tandem with each other .
These joint operations could alert Russia to potential vulnerabilities within F-35s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile defense systems that can shoot down U.S. aircraft .
In addition , Russia and the UAE are potentially primed to cooperate on fifth-generation fighter jet development .
In February 2017 , the Russian defense giant Rostec announced that it would work with the UAE Ministry of Defense on co-developing a fifth-generation light combat fighter jet .
This jet , which would be developed over a seven-to-eight-year period , would be more sophisticated than the MiG-29 jets that Russia currently uses .
These upgrades would increase the competitiveness of their pricing and quality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with U.S. defense companies .
While this joint project has initially been placed on hold , Russia also targeted the UAE as a partner in the production of Su-57 fighter jets in November 2019 .
Russia ’ s outreach came days after the UAE launched the Edge conglomerate to facilitate its development of its own military technology .
As Russia has invested considerably in the modernization of its air force since 2011 , it could leverage the UAE ’ s possession of F-35s to glean information that supports its own aircraft construction plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not unfold , the transfer of F-35s to the UAE will further erode the credibility of U.S. secondary sanctions linked to purchases of Russian weapons .
These sanctions are mandated by the Countering America ’ s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( CAATSA ) , which was ratified by the U.S. Congress in July 2017 .
The threat of CAATSA ’ s implementation has complicated India ’ s ability to purchase Russia ’ s flagship S-400 missile defense system , and Turkey and Egypt face prospective sanctions due to their purchase of the S-400 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UAE receives F-35s despite its purchases of Russian weaponry , the perceived allowance for political favoritism in U.S. sanctions policy could strain Washington ’ s relationships with countries at risk of CAATSA sanctions .
The erosion of CAATSA ’ s credibility and the resultant belief among Arab countries that recognition of Israel is an antidote against Russia-related sanctions creates a dangerous moral hazard .
Russia has historically viewed the UAE as a window to enter the Arabian Peninsula ’ s lucrative arms markets .
An F-35 transfer to the UAE could trigger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Gulf , as U.S.-aligned monarchies no longer see military cooperation with Russia as an impediment to receiving the most prized U.S. military technology .
Alternatively , if U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden ’ s desire to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and reengage with Iran engenders frictions between the United States and its Gulf partners , CAATSA ’ s damaged credibility could encourage Gulf countries to retaliate by purchasing Russian arms .
Diplomatic precedents and deals allowing for a rapid-fire series of Russian arms shipments to GCC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia agreed to purchase the S-400 during King Salman ’ s historic visit to Russia in October 2017 .
Riyadh ’ s interest in the S-400 peaked after U.S. Patriot systems were ineffective during the September 2019 attack on the Saudi oil company Aramco ’ s assets in Abqaiq .
Since the Saudi-led blockade began in June 2017 , Qatar has also periodically expressed interest in acquiring the S-400 .
Similarly , Bahrain views Russia as a crisis-proof arms vendor , as it supplied weapons to Manama after the United Kingdom and France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s aggression in the Persian Gulf increases and the United States does not come to the aid of its Arab partners , there is a very real risk of these countries following the UAE ’ s lead by purchasing Russian weaponry .
Due to the risks of perilous technology transfers and damage to the credibility of U.S. secondary sanctions , the United States should not sell F-35s to the UAE until it scales back its relationship with Russia .
Thus far , the Israel-UAE deal and Russia ’ s strident support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Iran have not diluted the strength of the Moscow-Abu Dhabi security partnership .
Flights to support Russian Wagner Group contractors in Libya averaged around 35 times a month in August .
As the UAE is reportedly involved in financing Russia ’ s military contractor deployments , there is no demonstrable change in the two governments ’ military cooperation .
The United States has already used Israel ’ s normalization with the UAE as a lever to pressure China , as it has encouraged joint Israeli and Emirati investments that compete with Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It should impose similar pressure on the UAE over its relationship with Russia .
By taking action on this issue , U.S. policymakers will also counter a strategic partnership that has played a significant role in undermining U.S. hegemony in the Middle East .
In the process , the United States might develop a healthier relationship with the UAE and end the climate of perceived impunity that allows Abu Dhabi to openly defy U.S. interests throughout the region .

Last month, the United Arab Emirates became the third Arab country to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. This milestone, which was formalized through a White House signing ceremony earlier this month, was accompanied by discussions about the imminent sale of U.S. F-35 fighter jets to the UAE. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed the country’s purchase of F-35s, but the Trump administration is working on a compromise that allows the U.S. government to sell the fifth-generation fighter jet to Abu Dhabi without eroding Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region. The preservation of Israel’s qualitative military edge—its ability to deter aggression from regional adversaries through technological and tactical superiority—has been a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward the Middle East since the 1960s and a codified tenet of U.S. law since 2008.
Last month, the United Arab Emirates became the third Arab country to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. This milestone, which was formalized through a White House signing ceremony earlier this month, was accompanied by discussions about the imminent sale of U.S. F-35 fighter jets to the UAE. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed the country’s purchase of F-35s, but the Trump administration is working on a compromise that allows the U.S. government to sell the fifth-generation fighter jet to Abu Dhabi without eroding Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region. The preservation of Israel’s qualitative military edge—its ability to deter aggression from regional adversaries through technological and tactical superiority—has been a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward the Middle East since the 1960s and a codified tenet of U.S. law since 2008.
The prospective sale of F-35s to the UAE has faced pushback in the United States. The UAE’s alleged war crimes in Libya, which include an attack on a refugee detention center near Tripoli and a drone strike that killed unarmed cadets in Tripoli in January, as well as its oversight of torture facilities in Yemen, have raised ethical challenges to the deal. The country’s tightening relationship with China has provided further grounds for criticism.
There are also concerns about the possibility of Russia and China supplying sophisticated military technology to Iran, in order to counteract the enhancements of the UAE’s aerial capabilities resulting from F-35 transfers. While these countervailing factors are concerning enough, the UAE’s growing strategic partnership with Russia provides an equally compelling rationale for shelving F-35 sales to Abu Dhabi.
Although the UAE is often described as the most trusted U.S. counterterrorism partner in the Arab world, Abu Dhabi has worked with Russia on bolstering Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s international legitimacy and enabling Libyan National Army chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli. This crisis-level military cooperation is intertwined with a broadly strengthening bilateral relationship. In June 2018, Russia and the UAE signed the first strategic partnership agreement between Moscow and a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country. Russian President Vladimir Putin described Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed as an “old friend” ahead of his October 2019 visit to the UAE, which resulted in $1.3 billion in new commercial deals between the two countries.
In light of this growing partnership, the United States should refrain from exporting F-35s to the UAE until Abu Dhabi takes tangible steps toward decoupling from Russia. The precedent of suspending F-35 sales to Turkey after it purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defense system and announced plans to cooperate with Russia on constructing the S-500 system should be applied to the UAE. Unless the UAE distances itself from Russia, there is an unacceptably high risk of inadvertent transfers of U.S. technology to Russia via Abu Dhabi and Russian missile defense systems becoming interoperable with F-35s.
Russia’s security partnership with the UAE is deeper than its relationship with Turkey, as it consists of arms sales, logistical cooperation, and active collaboration on weapons system development, so the risks associated with selling F-35s to Turkey are amplified in the UAE’s case. In spite of tensions engendered by Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic relations with the Taliban and military support for separatist rebels in Chechnya during their 1994-96 war with Russia, the UAE was the fourth-largest purchaser of Russian weapons in the year 2000.
The UAE’s purchases of Russian arms contrasted with Saudi Arabia’s refusal to buy weapons from Russia and created the foundations for a robust security partnership between Moscow and Abu Dhabi. This partnership has continued to strengthen under U.S. President Donald Trump’s watch. Since 2017, the UAE has purchased Russian Pantsir S-1 missile defense systems for use in Libya and the $40 million Kornet-E anti-tank missile system, which has been deployed to Yemen. This indicates that the UAE could operate F-35s alongside Russian-made missile defense systems.
Who Is Buying F-35s The global fighter jet program has grown to eight partner nations and six foreign military sales customers since its inception.
The United Nations reported earlier this month that waves of Russian and Emirati jets have illegally supplied arms to Haftar’s forces in Libya, which underscores their logistical coordination in that theater. Russian Wagner Group private military contractors have conducted reconnaissance missions in support of Emirati drone strikes, and the UAE is involved in the recruitment of Chadian and Sudanese soldiers to fight for the Wagner Group. Russia and the UAE are also regularly share intelligence on counterinsurgency operations in Syria, which strengthen Assad’s hold on power.
Russian-UAE joint operations could alert Russia to potential vulnerabilities within F-35s, which could allow Moscow to produce missile defense systems that can shoot down U.S. aircraft.
The frequency of Russia-UAE consultations on security issues could lead to a scenario where Emirati F-35s and Russian Pantsir S-1s or S-400s are used in tandem with each other. These joint operations could alert Russia to potential vulnerabilities within F-35s, which could allow Moscow to produce missile defense systems that can shoot down U.S. aircraft.
In addition, Russia and the UAE are potentially primed to cooperate on fifth-generation fighter jet development. In February 2017, the Russian defense giant Rostec announced that it would work with the UAE Ministry of Defense on co-developing a fifth-generation light combat fighter jet. This jet, which would be developed over a seven-to-eight-year period, would be more sophisticated than the MiG-29 jets that Russia currently uses. These upgrades would increase the competitiveness of their pricing and quality and allow Rostec to compete more effectively with U.S. defense companies.
While this joint project has initially been placed on hold, Russia also targeted the UAE as a partner in the production of Su-57 fighter jets in November 2019. Russia’s outreach came days after the UAE launched the Edge conglomerate to facilitate its development of its own military technology. As Russia has invested considerably in the modernization of its air force since 2011, it could leverage the UAE’s possession of F-35s to glean information that supports its own aircraft construction plans.
Even if this risky scenario does not unfold, the transfer of F-35s to the UAE will further erode the credibility of U.S. secondary sanctions linked to purchases of Russian weapons. These sanctions are mandated by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which was ratified by the U.S. Congress in July 2017. The threat of CAATSA’s implementation has complicated India’s ability to purchase Russia’s flagship S-400 missile defense system, and Turkey and Egypt face prospective sanctions due to their purchase of the S-400 and Su-35 jets, respectively. If the UAE receives F-35s despite its purchases of Russian weaponry, the perceived allowance for political favoritism in U.S. sanctions policy could strain Washington’s relationships with countries at risk of CAATSA sanctions.
The erosion of CAATSA’s credibility and the resultant belief among Arab countries that recognition of Israel is an antidote against Russia-related sanctions creates a dangerous moral hazard. Russia has historically viewed the UAE as a window to enter the Arabian Peninsula’s lucrative arms markets. An F-35 transfer to the UAE could trigger a spate of Russian arms sales across the Gulf, as U.S.-aligned monarchies no longer see military cooperation with Russia as an impediment to receiving the most prized U.S. military technology.
Alternatively, if U.S. presidential candidate Joe Biden’s desire to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and reengage with Iran engenders frictions between the United States and its Gulf partners, CAATSA’s damaged credibility could encourage Gulf countries to retaliate by purchasing Russian arms.
Diplomatic precedents and deals allowing for a rapid-fire series of Russian arms shipments to GCC countries are already in place. Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase the S-400 during King Salman’s historic visit to Russia in October 2017. Riyadh’s interest in the S-400 peaked after U.S. Patriot systems were ineffective during the September 2019 attack on the Saudi oil company Aramco’s assets in Abqaiq. Since the Saudi-led blockade began in June 2017, Qatar has also periodically expressed interest in acquiring the S-400. Similarly, Bahrain views Russia as a crisis-proof arms vendor, as it supplied weapons to Manama after the United Kingdom and France suspended sales in 2011. If Iran’s aggression in the Persian Gulf increases and the United States does not come to the aid of its Arab partners, there is a very real risk of these countries following the UAE’s lead by purchasing Russian weaponry.
Due to the risks of perilous technology transfers and damage to the credibility of U.S. secondary sanctions, the United States should not sell F-35s to the UAE until it scales back its relationship with Russia. Thus far, the Israel-UAE deal and Russia’s strident support for the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo against Iran have not diluted the strength of the Moscow-Abu Dhabi security partnership. Flights to support Russian Wagner Group contractors in Libya averaged around 35 times a month in August. As the UAE is reportedly involved in financing Russia’s military contractor deployments, there is no demonstrable change in the two governments’ military cooperation.
The United States has already used Israel’s normalization with the UAE as a lever to pressure China, as it has encouraged joint Israeli and Emirati investments that compete with Beijing’s port construction initiatives in Haifa. It should impose similar pressure on the UAE over its relationship with Russia. By taking action on this issue, U.S. policymakers will also counter a strategic partnership that has played a significant role in undermining U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. In the process, the United States might develop a healthier relationship with the UAE and end the climate of perceived impunity that allows Abu Dhabi to openly defy U.S. interests throughout the region.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--U.S. at Risk of Being Outpaced by China, a New Intel Committee Report Finds

U.S. at Risk of Being Outpaced by China , a New Intel Committee Report Finds Unless the U.S. intelligence community is overhauled to meet the complex threat posed by China , the United States is at risk of being unable to protect the nation ’ s health and security and compete with Beijing on the world stage , according to a new report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee .
The stark assessment comes amid a wider rebalancing of U.S. national security priorities to contend with renewed great-power competition with Russia and China , as well as ongoing threats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea .
But the report also stressed the need for U.S. intelligence officials to become more adept at analyzing nonmilitary threats , such as health , the economy , and climate change .
“ The Committee ’ s central finding of this report is that the United States ’ intelligence community has not sufficiently adapted to a changing geopolitical and technological environment increasingly shaped by a rising China and the growing importance of interlocking non-military transnational threats , such as global health , economic security , and climate change , ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committee began its review of U.S. intelligence capabilities with regards to China last spring out of concerns that the United States ’ laser focus on counterterrorism after 9/11 had let other intelligence capabilities atrophy and amid growing concerns that China poses a “ unique and growing strategic challenge to U.S. national security.
” “ After 9/11 , we reoriented towards a mission to protect the homeland and were very successful .
But after two decades , the [ intelligence community ’ s ] capacity to address hard targets like China has waned , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Absent a significant and immediate reprioritization and realignment of resources , we will be ill-prepared to compete with China—diplomatically , economically , and militarily—on the global stage for decades to come.
” The committee ’ s review found that intelligence agencies have not paid sufficient attention to “ soft ” threats such as infectious diseases and climate change and the knock-on economic effects that could undermine U.S. national security .
“ COVID-19 cropped up as a very real world example while we were drafting and finalizing this report .
At least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the nontraditional threats that can emanate out of China , ” said a Democratic intelligence committee official , speaking on background .
This year , the committee began another assessment looking specifically at how the intelligence community responded to the emergence of COVID-19 .
One problem : The intelligence community is biased toward using clandestine information , while the monitoring of pandemics and other soft threats is well suited to open-source analysis .
“ There ’ s going to need to be somewhat of a cultural shift there , ” a second @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the intelligence committee held a hearing on the national security implications of climate change , a sign of growing concern among lawmakers—and plenty of former military leaders—over the security risks of famine , mass migration , and resource competition .
“ These are things that we ’ re going to have to look at in far greater effort over the next few years , ” the second official said .
Another important finding in the report : China ’ s threat is multidimensional , using industrial espionage , predatory trade and lending practices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That requires an intelligence community that widens its lens beyond defense capabilities and can support the work of other agencies in the federal government involved in health monitoring , trade negotiations , or immigration policy , the report found .
It also recommended nurturing a future generation of China experts with expertise in public health , economics , and technology .
“ The stakes are enormous .
We must do everything possible to accurately predict and characterize Beijing ’ s intent , or we will continue to struggle to understand how and why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party ] makes decisions and fail to respond effectively , ” Schiff said .
The 37-page report released Wednesday is an executive summary of the full , 200-plus-page report , which contains more than 100 classified recommendations .
The report ’ s conclusions are based on committee staff reviews of thousands of analytical assessments , hundreds of hours of interviews with intelligence officers , and visits to facilities run by the more than dozen agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community .
The United States ’ intelligence-gathering capabilities in China were dealt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2010 , as Beijing systematically killed or imprisoned almost two dozen CIA sources in the country in what current and former U.S. officials told the New York Times was one of the worst intelligence breaches in decades .

Unless the U.S. intelligence community is overhauled to meet the complex threat posed by China, the United States is at risk of being unable to protect the nation’s health and security and compete with Beijing on the world stage, according to a new report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee.
Unless the U.S. intelligence community is overhauled to meet the complex threat posed by China, the United States is at risk of being unable to protect the nation’s health and security and compete with Beijing on the world stage, according to a new report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee.
The stark assessment comes amid a wider rebalancing of U.S. national security priorities to contend with renewed great-power competition with Russia and China, as well as ongoing threats from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. But the report also stressed the need for U.S. intelligence officials to become more adept at analyzing nonmilitary threats, such as health, the economy, and climate change.
“The Committee’s central finding of this report is that the United States’ intelligence community has not sufficiently adapted to a changing geopolitical and technological environment increasingly shaped by a rising China and the growing importance of interlocking non-military transnational threats, such as global health, economic security, and climate change,” the committee stated in the report.
The committee began its review of U.S. intelligence capabilities with regards to China last spring out of concerns that the United States’ laser focus on counterterrorism after 9/11 had let other intelligence capabilities atrophy and amid growing concerns that China poses a “unique and growing strategic challenge to U.S. national security.”
“After 9/11, we reoriented towards a mission to protect the homeland and were very successful. But after two decades, the [intelligence community’s] capacity to address hard targets like China has waned,” said committee Chairman Rep. Adam Schiff. “Absent a significant and immediate reprioritization and realignment of resources, we will be ill-prepared to compete with China—diplomatically, economically, and militarily—on the global stage for decades to come.”
The committee’s review found that intelligence agencies have not paid sufficient attention to “soft” threats such as infectious diseases and climate change and the knock-on economic effects that could undermine U.S. national security.
“COVID-19 cropped up as a very real world example while we were drafting and finalizing this report. At least for us it really does crystallize some of the nontraditional threats that can emanate out of China,” said a Democratic intelligence committee official, speaking on background.
This year, the committee began another assessment looking specifically at how the intelligence community responded to the emergence of COVID-19. One problem: The intelligence community is biased toward using clandestine information, while the monitoring of pandemics and other soft threats is well suited to open-source analysis. “There’s going to need to be somewhat of a cultural shift there,” a second committee official said.
Last year, the intelligence committee held a hearing on the national security implications of climate change, a sign of growing concern among lawmakers—and plenty of former military leaders—over the security risks of famine, mass migration, and resource competition. “These are things that we’re going to have to look at in far greater effort over the next few years,” the second official said.
Another important finding in the report: China’s threat is multidimensional, using industrial espionage, predatory trade and lending practices, and subtle overseas influence operations. That requires an intelligence community that widens its lens beyond defense capabilities and can support the work of other agencies in the federal government involved in health monitoring, trade negotiations, or immigration policy, the report found. It also recommended nurturing a future generation of China experts with expertise in public health, economics, and technology.
“The stakes are enormous. We must do everything possible to accurately predict and characterize Beijing’s intent, or we will continue to struggle to understand how and why the leadership of the [Chinese Communist Party] makes decisions and fail to respond effectively,” Schiff said.
The 37-page report released Wednesday is an executive summary of the full, 200-plus-page report, which contains more than 100 classified recommendations. The report’s conclusions are based on committee staff reviews of thousands of analytical assessments, hundreds of hours of interviews with intelligence officers, and visits to facilities run by the more than dozen agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community.
The United States’ intelligence-gathering capabilities in China were dealt a series of punishing blows starting in 2010, as Beijing systematically killed or imprisoned almost two dozen CIA sources in the country in what current and former U.S. officials told the New York Times was one of the worst intelligence breaches in decades.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--Trump USAID Appointee Takes Sudden Absence After Controversial Tenure

Pete Marocco , a controversial Trump political appointee at the U.S. Agency for International Development , informed the group ’ s senior management on Thursday that he intends to take leave through November , writing in an email that he wanted to spend more time with his family .
Marocco did not say whether he would resign from his post as the assistant to the USAID administrator .
But the move follows a rocky career for the loyalist to President Donald Trump in the federal government , who was forced out of senior jobs in the Department of Defense and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of several recent controversial appointments at USAID .
He has been accused of mismanagement and creating hostile work environments during his prior posts across the administration .
Politico first reported that Marocco had taken leave .
USAID officials had written a formal memo to the agency ’ s leadership chronicling their issues with Marocco ’ s management , particularly his running of the agency ’ s Office of Transition Initiatives ( OTI ) , which was established to make money available on short notice to help governments from Sudan to Ukraine succeed during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought advice from some of their colleagues at the State Department and Pentagon on how to get Marocco removed from his post , officials familiar with the matter said .
“ OTI ’ s core capacity to operate effectively is being rapidly degraded , as the Office becomes less field-driven , less flexible , less rapid , less trusted , and less efficient , and staff morale plummets , ” according to the memo , first obtained and reported by Politico .
In a briefing on Capitol Hill related to the cuts this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ congressional aides that Congress was not happy about Marocco ’ s stewardship of the brand-new bureau after the 13-page complaint leaked in the media .
Since joining the U.S. aid agency in July , Marocco has sought to overhaul the mandate of the agency ’ s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization and cut funding for programs at the bureau .
His efforts , including plans to withhold funding for programs on countering Russian influence in Ukraine and peace initiatives in Colombia , have put him at odds with USAID colleagues and officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Marocco of derailing routine work for the bureau by insisting he approve any new hires and sign off on thousands of USAID contracts that were already approved by USAID officials in the field .
But Congress chafed at plans to cut those programs , funded under the Global Fragility Act championed by powerful House Foreign Affairs Chairman Eliot Engel .
Jenny McGee , a retired Air Force officer and National Security Council veteran during the George W. Bush administration , was tapped in August as USAID ’ s associate administrator for relief , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to as R3 ) and assigned to spearhead that portfolio with Rob Jenkins , a highly regarded agency official whom Marocco has sought to sideline at multiple posts in the Trump administration .
Jenkins is expected to run Marocco ’ s bureau in his absence .
McGee also attended a high-level task force event at the U.S. Institute of Peace this week that would have previously been attended by Marocco .
USAID did not immediately respond to a request for comment .
In the past the agency has defended Marocco ’ s tenure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of experience serving in conflict zones ” and “ his leadership capabilities , as well as his experience in leading large scale rescue and resettlement operations for persecuted religious minorities.
” Marocco ’ s stewardship of the bureau has infuriated both senior and rank and file employees at the aid agency , leaving him with few powerful allies .
In her introductory town hall meeting with staff , McGee was confronted with a laundry list of concerns and complaints about the direction of the bureau under Marocco ’ s leadership .
Staffers wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to counter the department ’ s negative news coverage and to address the “ significant disruption ” to the department ’ s support for political transitions , caused by the new leadership ’ s micromanagement of field operations .
“ Ma ’ am , respectfully , there are serious morale and trust issues in components of R3 right now , ” wrote one USAID staffer , referring to the three branches of the Conflict Prevention and Stabilization bureau , which is under Marocco ’ s direction .
“ What will you do to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the R3 family right now , as evidenced by the fact that all questions so far have been anonymous ?
” “ Ma ’ am , CPS has seen several iterations of its mission statement in the first few months , and it is still unclear for many of us what the mission is , ” said another staffer .
“ What do you see as the mission for this nascent bureau ?
” The complaints were reminiscent of those raised at his previous posts at the State and Defense Departments , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Marocco was promoted twice while serving in the Trump administration .

Colum Lynch, Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer

Pete Marocco, a controversial Trump political appointee at the U.S. Agency for International Development, informed the group’s senior management on Thursday that he intends to take leave through November, writing in an email that he wanted to spend more time with his family.
Pete Marocco, a controversial Trump political appointee at the U.S. Agency for International Development, informed the group’s senior management on Thursday that he intends to take leave through November, writing in an email that he wanted to spend more time with his family.
Marocco did not say whether he would resign from his post as the assistant to the USAID administrator. But the move follows a rocky career for the loyalist to President Donald Trump in the federal government, who was forced out of senior jobs in the Department of Defense and the State Department.
Marocco is one of several recent controversial appointments at USAID. He has been accused of mismanagement and creating hostile work environments during his prior posts across the administration. Politico first reported that Marocco had taken leave.
USAID officials had written a formal memo to the agency’s leadership chronicling their issues with Marocco’s management, particularly his running of the agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which was established to make money available on short notice to help governments from Sudan to Ukraine succeed during critical transition periods.
Some had also sought advice from some of their colleagues at the State Department and Pentagon on how to get Marocco removed from his post, officials familiar with the matter said.
“OTI’s core capacity to operate effectively is being rapidly degraded, as the Office becomes less field-driven, less flexible, less rapid, less trusted, and less efficient, and staff morale plummets,” according to the memo, first obtained and reported by Politico. In a briefing on Capitol Hill related to the cuts this week, USAID staffers were told by congressional aides that Congress was not happy about Marocco’s stewardship of the brand-new bureau after the 13-page complaint leaked in the media.
Since joining the U.S. aid agency in July, Marocco has sought to overhaul the mandate of the agency’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization and cut funding for programs at the bureau. His efforts, including plans to withhold funding for programs on countering Russian influence in Ukraine and peace initiatives in Colombia, have put him at odds with USAID colleagues and officials in other agencies. USAID officials accused Marocco of derailing routine work for the bureau by insisting he approve any new hires and sign off on thousands of USAID contracts that were already approved by USAID officials in the field.
But Congress chafed at plans to cut those programs, funded under the Global Fragility Act championed by powerful House Foreign Affairs Chairman Eliot Engel. Jenny McGee, a retired Air Force officer and National Security Council veteran during the George W. Bush administration, was tapped in August as USAID’s associate administrator for relief, response, and resilience (sometimes referred to as R3) and assigned to spearhead that portfolio with Rob Jenkins, a highly regarded agency official whom Marocco has sought to sideline at multiple posts in the Trump administration. Jenkins is expected to run Marocco’s bureau in his absence. McGee also attended a high-level task force event at the U.S. Institute of Peace this week that would have previously been attended by Marocco.
USAID did not immediately respond to a request for comment. In the past the agency has defended Marocco’s tenure at USAID, touting his “decade of experience serving in conflict zones” and “his leadership capabilities, as well as his experience in leading large scale rescue and resettlement operations for persecuted religious minorities.”
Marocco’s stewardship of the bureau has infuriated both senior and rank and file employees at the aid agency, leaving him with few powerful allies.
In her introductory town hall meeting with staff, McGee was confronted with a laundry list of concerns and complaints about the direction of the bureau under Marocco’s leadership. Staffers wanted to know what she intended to do to counter the department’s negative news coverage and to address the “significant disruption” to the department’s support for political transitions, caused by the new leadership’s micromanagement of field operations.
“Ma’am, respectfully, there are serious morale and trust issues in components of R3 right now,” wrote one USAID staffer, referring to the three branches of the Conflict Prevention and Stabilization bureau, which is under Marocco’s direction. “What will you do to address the trust deficit that appeared endemic in the R3 family right now, as evidenced by the fact that all questions so far have been anonymous?”
“Ma’am, CPS has seen several iterations of its mission statement in the first few months, and it is still unclear for many of us what the mission is,” said another staffer. “What do you see as the mission for this nascent bureau?”
The complaints were reminiscent of those raised at his previous posts at the State and Defense Departments, his former colleagues said. And yet, Marocco was promoted twice while serving in the Trump administration.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--Pompeo’s Preelection Politicking Is Wearing Thin, Even With Allies

Pompeo ’ s Preelection Politicking Is Wearing Thin , Even With Allies Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has drawn fire at home for mixing politics with official State Department business , whether addressing the Republican National Convention from Israel or using the taxpayer dime to give policy speeches in battleground states .
Now , he ’ s exporting that controversy abroad , causing uproar overseas , where foreign officials have accused him of trying to drag their governments into the election battle between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Democratic rival , Joe Biden .
The problem was clearly on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit to the Vatican , where Pope Francis refused to meet with the secretary during his visit , with Vatican officials accusing the secretary of state of trying to drag the Holy See into the 2020 U.S. election by criticizing its relations with China .
Rome isn ’ t the only place reeling from Pompeo ’ s unprecedented breach of the State Department tradition of steering well clear of politics .
In Brazil , lawmakers are still trying to come to grips with the damage done by Pompeo ’ s September visit , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a common front against Venezuela but ultimately about Pompeo ’ s efforts to boost Trump ’ s standing with Latino voters in Florida and other battleground states .
While in the Brazilian city of Boa Vista on Sept. 18—home to 85,000 Venezuelans who have fled the regime of Nicolás Maduro—Pompeo railed against the embattled Venezuelan leader , reiterating U.S. hopes to see Maduro removed from power in favor of a democratic transition .
Accompanied by his Brazilian counterpart , Pompeo said , “ One day we may have Venezuela again.
” He described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime that is “ simply a wealth extraction scheme for personal benefit with a project to continue to simply destroy that country.
” The speech didn ’ t stray from the secretary ’ s usual talking points on Venezuela , after years of maximum pressure and minimal results , but some Brazilian lawmakers and former top diplomats bristled at the hawkish overtones , accusing the secretary of state of fueling new tensions between Brazil and Venezuela and using the trip to garner more support among Latin American diasporas in the swing state of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit , Brazilian House Speaker Rodrigo Maia released a letter noting that Brazil ’ s decision to host Pompeo less than 50 days before the U.S. presidential election “ does not go along with good international diplomacy practice and defies the traditions of autonomy and pride in our foreign and defense policies.
” A group of former senior Brazilian foreign-policy officials wrote an open letter condemning the motives behind Pompeo ’ s visit and showing support for Maia , the center-right lawmaker who has become one of the leading voices of the opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The letter , signed by one former president , five former foreign affairs ministers , a former ambassador to Washington , and a former strategic affairs official , condemned Pompeo for his hawkish speech that they said could exacerbate tensions between Brazil and Venezuela .
“ I ’ m the first one to criticize the situation in Venezuela , ” said Rubens Ricupero , a signatory who served as the Brazilian ambassador to the United States .
“ But we took it as an affront that the secretary of state came and used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no-man ’ s ] land to harass a neighboring country with which we never had any kind of conflict.
” One day after the letter was published , the Brazilian Senate Foreign Relations Commission called on the foreign affairs minister to testify on the motives behind Pompeo ’ s visit , halting the confirmation of more than 30 diplomats until the minister addressed the matter .
The U.S. State Department declined to comment on the matter .
Brazil ’ s foreign minister , Ernesto Araújo , shot back at Maia in a statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic tradition does not include ignoring our neighbors.
” When it comes to Venezuela , he said , indifference to the fate of the country would be “ immoral and would put at risk the security of Brazilian citizens.
” Pompeo ’ s visit to Brazil , like his trip to Rome , was representative of much of his recent diplomacy : a nominal effort to line up U.S. allies to support U.S. foreign-policy goals while preaching to the choir back home .
“ Pompeo used Brazilian soil as a campaign rally to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Hussein Kalout , another signatory of the letter who served as secretary of strategic affairs during the previous administration .
In Florida , one of the most important battleground states in the 2020 election , the number of Hispanics who are eligible to vote has nearly doubled since 2000—making up one-fifth of all eligible voters in 2018 .
Cuban Americans , by far the largest Hispanic group in South Florida , overwhelmingly prefer Trump over Biden , a recent poll showed .
The same holds true among Venezuelan Americans .
With Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump himself paid a visit to Miami on Friday .
Before heading to the state , the president spoke at a White House event honoring veterans of the botched 1961 Bay of Pigs operation meant to oust Fidel Castro from Cuba .
He boasted that his popularity had “ gone through the roof with the poll numbers from Hispanics , ” though recent polls show Trump significantly lagging behind Biden among Latino voters more broadly .
Pompeo ’ s tough rhetoric on Maduro “ communicates to both the Hispanic community in Florida but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Diego Area , the associate director for Venezuela at the Atlantic Council .
After Brazil , Pompeo and his ever present hard-line discourse made a stop in Colombia , which has welcomed more than one-third of all Venezuelan migrants and which has also gotten on board with the tougher U.S. line against Venezuela .
The Trump administration has nothing to show yet for almost four years of pressure on the Maduro regime , despite an escalating series of sanctions and attempts to rally regional allies to its side .
But Area @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very targeted—rhetoric in the weeks to come .
“ I don ’ t think this is the last political act we ’ re gon na be seeing from Trump ’ s government .
We ’ re going to see this increasingly happening as we get near the election , ” Area said .

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has drawn fire at home for mixing politics with official State Department business, whether addressing the Republican National Convention from Israel or using the taxpayer dime to give policy speeches in battleground states.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has drawn fire at home for mixing politics with official State Department business, whether addressing the Republican National Convention from Israel or using the taxpayer dime to give policy speeches in battleground states.
Now, he’s exporting that controversy abroad, causing uproar overseas, where foreign officials have accused him of trying to drag their governments into the election battle between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Democratic rival, Joe Biden.
The problem was clearly on display this week during Pompeo’s visit to the Vatican, where Pope Francis refused to meet with the secretary during his visit, with Vatican officials accusing the secretary of state of trying to drag the Holy See into the 2020 U.S. election by criticizing its relations with China.
Rome isn’t the only place reeling from Pompeo’s unprecedented breach of the State Department tradition of steering well clear of politics. In Brazil, lawmakers are still trying to come to grips with the damage done by Pompeo’s September visit, ostensibly meant to shore up support for a common front against Venezuela but ultimately about Pompeo’s efforts to boost Trump’s standing with Latino voters in Florida and other battleground states.
While in the Brazilian city of Boa Vista on Sept. 18—home to 85,000 Venezuelans who have fled the regime of Nicolás Maduro—Pompeo railed against the embattled Venezuelan leader, reiterating U.S. hopes to see Maduro removed from power in favor of a democratic transition. Accompanied by his Brazilian counterpart, Pompeo said, “One day we may have Venezuela again.”
He described Maduro’s government as a cynical regime that is “simply a wealth extraction scheme for personal benefit with a project to continue to simply destroy that country.”
The speech didn’t stray from the secretary’s usual talking points on Venezuela, after years of maximum pressure and minimal results, but some Brazilian lawmakers and former top diplomats bristled at the hawkish overtones, accusing the secretary of state of fueling new tensions between Brazil and Venezuela and using the trip to garner more support among Latin American diasporas in the swing state of Florida.
In the aftermath of the visit, Brazilian House Speaker Rodrigo Maia released a letter noting that Brazil’s decision to host Pompeo less than 50 days before the U.S. presidential election “does not go along with good international diplomacy practice and defies the traditions of autonomy and pride in our foreign and defense policies.”
A group of former senior Brazilian foreign-policy officials wrote an open letter condemning the motives behind Pompeo’s visit and showing support for Maia, the center-right lawmaker who has become one of the leading voices of the opposition in Brazil against President Jair Bolsonaro. The letter, signed by one former president, five former foreign affairs ministers, a former ambassador to Washington, and a former strategic affairs official, condemned Pompeo for his hawkish speech that they said could exacerbate tensions between Brazil and Venezuela.
“I’m the first one to criticize the situation in Venezuela,” said Rubens Ricupero, a signatory who served as the Brazilian ambassador to the United States. “But we took it as an affront that the secretary of state came and used Brazil as if it were [a no-man’s] land to harass a neighboring country with which we never had any kind of conflict.”
One day after the letter was published, the Brazilian Senate Foreign Relations Commission called on the foreign affairs minister to testify on the motives behind Pompeo’s visit, halting the confirmation of more than 30 diplomats until the minister addressed the matter.
The U.S. State Department declined to comment on the matter. Brazil’s foreign minister, Ernesto Araújo, shot back at Maia in a statement, saying that “Brazil’s diplomatic tradition does not include ignoring our neighbors.” When it comes to Venezuela, he said, indifference to the fate of the country would be “immoral and would put at risk the security of Brazilian citizens.”
Pompeo’s visit to Brazil, like his trip to Rome, was representative of much of his recent diplomacy: a nominal effort to line up U.S. allies to support U.S. foreign-policy goals while preaching to the choir back home.
“Pompeo used Brazilian soil as a campaign rally to appeal to Latinos in Florida,” said Hussein Kalout, another signatory of the letter who served as secretary of strategic affairs during the previous administration.
In Florida, one of the most important battleground states in the 2020 election, the number of Hispanics who are eligible to vote has nearly doubled since 2000—making up one-fifth of all eligible voters in 2018. Cuban Americans, by far the largest Hispanic group in South Florida, overwhelmingly prefer Trump over Biden, a recent poll showed. The same holds true among Venezuelan Americans.
With Biden neck and neck in Florida overall, Trump himself paid a visit to Miami on Friday. Before heading to the state, the president spoke at a White House event honoring veterans of the botched 1961 Bay of Pigs operation meant to oust Fidel Castro from Cuba. He boasted that his popularity had “gone through the roof with the poll numbers from Hispanics,” though recent polls show Trump significantly lagging behind Biden among Latino voters more broadly.
Pompeo’s tough rhetoric on Maduro “communicates to both the Hispanic community in Florida but also to international and regional stakeholders,” said Diego Area, the associate director for Venezuela at the Atlantic Council. After Brazil, Pompeo and his ever present hard-line discourse made a stop in Colombia, which has welcomed more than one-third of all Venezuelan migrants and which has also gotten on board with the tougher U.S. line against Venezuela.
The Trump administration has nothing to show yet for almost four years of pressure on the Maduro regime, despite an escalating series of sanctions and attempts to rally regional allies to its side. But Area said he expects to see more tough—and very targeted—rhetoric in the weeks to come.
“I don’t think this is the last political act we’re gonna be seeing from Trump’s government. We’re going to see this increasingly happening as we get near the election,” Area said.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--Is Trump Downplaying the Proud Boys Threat?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Homegrown right-wing militias fuel fears among the U.S. national security community , U.S. spies struggle to adapt to competition with China , and fresh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan upends the uneasy peace in the South Caucasus .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
In the bar brawl that was the first U.S. presidential debate , President Donald Trump drew fire for refusing to denounce white supremacist groups .
Top national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right-wing militias pose an increasing danger to the United States , particularly in the run-up to the November elections .
Asked point blank by the moderator , Chris Wallace , to condemn militia groups and discourage violence , Trump insisted that violence in U.S. cities was caused by left-wing factions .
“ Proud Boys , stand back and stand by , ” Trump said , naming an armed , far-right group that espouses racism , anti-Semitism , and Islamophobia .
“ But I ’ ll tell you what , somebody ’ s got @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left , ” the president added .
The comments caused an immediate firestorm .
White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Thursday that Trump has repeatedly denounced white supremacy groups and said that “ stand back ” is a synonym for “ stand down , ” which is what the president meant .
Trump ’ s failure to offer a clear rebuke of white supremacist groups comes as current and former administration officials sound alarm bells about the growing threat of right-wing extremism .
Raising further concerns , NBC News reported today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points directed law enforcement officials to make sympathetic comments toward Kyle Rittenhouse , the 17-year-old charged with killing two protesters in Kenosha , Wisconsin , last month .
Flashpoint .
A new FBI intelligence assessment leaked to the Nation warns about the growing threat of far-right militias in the United States , referring to the elections as “ a potential flashpoint.
” Last month , FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress that racially motivated violent extremism made up the bulk of domestic terror threats .
Acting Homeland Security Secretary and Trump loyalist Chad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later attacked Wray on Twitter for his testimony .
Other former top administration officials are also slamming the president amid nationwide protests—some of which have turned violent and deadly .
Speaking to the Atlantic , former National Security Advisor H.R .
McMaster said that condemning white supremacists “ should be a lay-up for any leader.
” Disinformation fodder .
Russia ’ s disinformation machine isn ’ t letting a good opportunity go to waste and trying to add fuel to the fire .
Ahead of the elections , a new report from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian operators created far-right websites and accounts with pro-Trump and anti-Biden content aimed at sowing division .
Wake-up call for spooks .
The US .
House Intelligence Committee issued a sober assessment warning that the intelligence community isn ’ t prepared to meet the threat from China without adaptations and reforms , Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon reports .
“ Absent a significant and immediate reprioritization and realignment of resources , we will be ill-prepared to compete with China—diplomatically , economically , and militarily—on the global stage for decades to come , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the committee , warns in the report .
Not-so-frozen conflict .
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have rebuffed international calls for a cease-fire in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory , where the worst fighting in decades has flared in the past week with reports of at least 100 people killed .
Russia , France , and the United States have called for an immediate cease-fire but Turkey , which backs Azerbaijan , has rejected those calls .
Meanwhile , a top Azerbaijani official says his country is using Israeli-supplied “ kamikaze drones ” in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from FP ’ s James Palmer about the long-festering dispute between the two former Soviet bloc countries in the South Caucasus , and how the situation could worsen if fighting continues .
Not quiet on the Western front .
The Trump administration ’ s proposals to reconfigure its military posture in Europe were met with unusually unified opposition on Capitol Hill this week , Military Times reports .
During a House Armed Services Committee hearing , lawmakers tore into a Pentagon plan to remove some 12,000 troops from Germany following Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Europe if NATO allies didn ’ t boost their defense spending .
“ I don ’ t think this plan was particularly well thought out and I worry about a number of aspects of its implementation , ” said Rep. Adam Smith , the chairman of the committee .
“ There needs to be an overall strategic plan that is coordinated with allies , rather than have a bunch of rationalizations after the fact , ” said Rep. Mac Thornberry , the top Republican on the committee .
Powerful group gets a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Association , a top trade association for the U.S. defense industry , has tapped Arnold Punaro as its new chairman of the board .
Punaro is a retired U.S. Marine Corps major general and was a long-time staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee .
Courting controversy .
The White House officially sent Amy Coney Barrett ’ s nomination to the Senate for the open seat in the U.S. Supreme Court .
She faces a grueling nomination process amid an even more heated election .
If confirmed , Coney would succeed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected to begin Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Oct. 12 .
Dino-mite .
Imagine hitting pause on your job as a city manager for a small California town to run a new Pentagon office .
Well , that ’ s what retired Col. Daniel “ Dino ” Pick did this week , when the Trump administration tapped the former Del Ray Oaks city official to become deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations policy and programs .
This time it ’ s personnel .
Trump has tapped Brian Davis to be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense for manpower and readiness affairs .
He is currently head of the Defense Personnel and Family Support Center .
Students , roommates , tourists , spies ?
A pair of University of Michigan college roommates from China were arrested on charges of spying when they visited Florida in January and ventured too close to a U.S. naval installation .
Were they confused tourists who got lost on a drive , or spies for Beijing ?
Read Eric Fish ’ s deep dive for Foreign Policy into the murky , muddled world of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-China global rivalry .
The United Nations hosts a high-level meeting on the situation in Libya Monday , Oct. 5 .
On Wednesday , Oct. 7 , Vice President Mike Pence and Sen. Kamala Harris clash in the only vice presidential debate of the election cycle in Salt Lake City , Utah .
Hey kids , it ’ s defense budget night .
Tired of having to constantly explain to your kids why China ’ s rise challenges the liberal international order and American strategic hegemony ?
Let them figure it out for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s favorite think tank , has released a new board game originally designed to teach military leaders how to deal with growing threats from Russia and China .
It is RAND ’ s first commercial release .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief.
What’s on tap today: Homegrown right-wing militias fuel fears among the U.S. national security community, U.S. spies struggle to adapt to competition with China, and fresh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan upends the uneasy peace in the South Caucasus.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Stand Back, Stand By, Brace for Impact
In the bar brawl that was the first U.S. presidential debate, President Donald Trump drew fire for refusing to denounce white supremacist groups. Top national security experts are now worried that homegrown right-wing militias pose an increasing danger to the United States, particularly in the run-up to the November elections.
Asked point blank by the moderator, Chris Wallace, to condemn militia groups and discourage violence, Trump insisted that violence in U.S. cities was caused by left-wing factions. “Proud Boys, stand back and stand by,” Trump said, naming an armed, far-right group that espouses racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia. “But I’ll tell you what, somebody’s got to do something about Antifa and the left,” the president added.
The comments caused an immediate firestorm. White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Thursday that Trump has repeatedly denounced white supremacy groups and said that “stand back” is a synonym for “stand down,” which is what the president meant.
Trump’s failure to offer a clear rebuke of white supremacist groups comes as current and former administration officials sound alarm bells about the growing threat of right-wing extremism. Raising further concerns, NBC News reported today that internal Department of Homeland Security talking points directed law enforcement officials to make sympathetic comments toward Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old charged with killing two protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, last month.
Flashpoint. A new FBI intelligence assessment leaked to the Nation warns about the growing threat of far-right militias in the United States, referring to the elections as “a potential flashpoint.” Last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress that racially motivated violent extremism made up the bulk of domestic terror threats. Acting Homeland Security Secretary and Trump loyalist Chad Wolf skipped the hearing, and Trump later attacked Wray on Twitter for his testimony.
Other former top administration officials are also slamming the president amid nationwide protests—some of which have turned violent and deadly. Speaking to the Atlantic, former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster said that condemning white supremacists “should be a lay-up for any leader.”
Disinformation fodder. Russia’s disinformation machine isn’t letting a good opportunity go to waste and trying to add fuel to the fire. Ahead of the elections, a new report from the social media analysis firm Graphika found that Russian operators created far-right websites and accounts with pro-Trump and anti-Biden content aimed at sowing division.
What We’re Watching
Wake-up call for spooks. The US. House Intelligence Committee issued a sober assessment warning that the intelligence community isn’t prepared to meet the threat from China without adaptations and reforms, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon reports. “Absent a significant and immediate reprioritization and realignment of resources, we will be ill-prepared to compete with China—diplomatically, economically, and militarily—on the global stage for decades to come,” Rep. Adam Schiff, the chairman of the committee, warns in the report.
Not-so-frozen conflict. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have rebuffed international calls for a cease-fire in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory, where the worst fighting in decades has flared in the past week with reports of at least 100 people killed. Russia, France, and the United States have called for an immediate cease-fire but Turkey, which backs Azerbaijan, has rejected those calls. Meanwhile, a top Azerbaijani official says his country is using Israeli-supplied “kamikaze drones” in clashes with Armenian forces.
Read more from FP’s James Palmer about the long-festering dispute between the two former Soviet bloc countries in the South Caucasus, and how the situation could worsen if fighting continues.
Not quiet on the Western front. The Trump administration’s proposals to reconfigure its military posture in Europe were met with unusually unified opposition on Capitol Hill this week, Military Times reports. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing, lawmakers tore into a Pentagon plan to remove some 12,000 troops from Germany following Trump’s threats to pare down the military footprint in Europe if NATO allies didn’t boost their defense spending.
“I don’t think this plan was particularly well thought out and I worry about a number of aspects of its implementation,” said Rep. Adam Smith, the chairman of the committee. “There needs to be an overall strategic plan that is coordinated with allies, rather than have a bunch of rationalizations after the fact,” said Rep. Mac Thornberry, the top Republican on the committee.
Movers and Shakers
Powerful group gets a new chair. The National Defense Industrial Association, a top trade association for the U.S. defense industry, has tapped Arnold Punaro as its new chairman of the board. Punaro is a retired U.S. Marine Corps major general and was a long-time staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Courting controversy. The White House officially sent Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination to the Senate for the open seat in the U.S. Supreme Court. She faces a grueling nomination process amid an even more heated election. If confirmed, Coney would succeed the late Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She is expected to begin Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Oct. 12.
Dino-mite. Imagine hitting pause on your job as a city manager for a small California town to run a new Pentagon office. Well, that’s what retired Col. Daniel “Dino” Pick did this week, when the Trump administration tapped the former Del Ray Oaks city official to become deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations policy and programs.
This time it’s personnel. Trump has tapped Brian Davis to be the Pentagon’s new assistant secretary of defense for manpower and readiness affairs. He is currently head of the Defense Personnel and Family Support Center.
What We’re Reading
Students, roommates, tourists, spies? A pair of University of Michigan college roommates from China were arrested on charges of spying when they visited Florida in January and ventured too close to a U.S. naval installation. Were they confused tourists who got lost on a drive, or spies for Beijing? Read Eric Fish’s deep dive for Foreign Policy into the murky, muddled world of espionage and counterintelligence in the age of U.S.-China global rivalry.
The Week Ahead
The United Nations hosts a high-level meeting on the situation in Libya Monday, Oct. 5.
On Wednesday, Oct. 7, Vice President Mike Pence and Sen. Kamala Harris clash in the only vice presidential debate of the election cycle in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Odds and Ends
Hey kids, it’s defense budget night. Tired of having to constantly explain to your kids why China’s rise challenges the liberal international order and American strategic hegemony? Let them figure it out for themselves. RAND Corporation, the Pentagon’s favorite think tank, has released a new board game originally designed to teach military leaders how to deal with growing threats from Russia and China. It is RAND’s first commercial release.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.