foreignpolicy--2020-10-15--Forget Counterterrorism, the United States Needs a Counter-Disinformation Strategy

On Oct. 14 , Facebook and Twitter made the decision to remove a dubious New York Post story from their platforms—provoking heated debate in the internet ’ s various echo chambers .
The article in question purportedly revealed influence peddling by Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden ’ s son Hunter Biden , and the social media giants suspected that the uncorroborated claims were based on hacked or fabricated correspondences .
Weeks before the U.S. presidential election , Silicon Valley ’ s swift and decisive action in response to disinformation is a stark contrast to its handling of hacked emails from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years ago .
A week prior , on Oct. 7 , the U.S. Justice Department announced that it had seized nearly 100 websites linked to Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) .
These sites had been engaged in a global disinformation campaign , targeting audiences from the United States to Southeast Asia with pro-Iranian propaganda .
But it wasn ’ t just the government engaged in countering adversaries online : One day later , Facebook and Twitter reported that they had taken down more than a dozen disinformation networks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran , Russia , Cuba , Saudi Arabia , and Thailand .
In the grand scheme of things , the events of Oct. 7 and 14 were hardly noteworthy .
In recent years , private and public actors alike have had to ramp up their efforts against botnets , troll farms , and artificial intelligence systems that seek to manipulate the online information environment and advance certain strategic objectives .
These actors came under unprecedented scrutiny in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
The United States continues to rely on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success against Soviet propaganda operations .
But while cyberspace may be a new front in the fight against disinformation , disinformation in and of itself—as well as the societal discord it can sow—has been a national security concern for decades ; the Cold War was largely waged by propagating competing versions of the truth .
And much as the threat of “ fake news ” is nothing new , so too is the way policymakers deal with it—or try to .
Therein lies the real problem .
In countering disinformation emanating from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , and IRGC , among others , the United States continues to rely on the same dated playbook that led to success against Soviet propaganda operations , known as “ active measures , ” in the 1980s .
But this anti-disinformation strategy , like most else developed in the 1980s , has been rendered largely obsolete by an evolving media landscape and emerging technology .
Now , if the United States is going to have any hope of getting back on its front foot—and put a stop to adversaries ’ attempts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to have to seriously reconceive its old playbook .
But that can ’ t be done without Big Tech companies , which are the linchpin in the fight against disinformation .
Granted , some state-citizen reconciliation is needed to mend the fraught ties of the post-Snowden era .
In 2013 , the whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked documents exposing widespread cooperation between U.S. technology companies and the National Security Agency , triggering widespread backlash from technology companies and the public , who lamented the lack of personal privacy protections on the internet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Valley and the U.S. national security community has only widened—but there are signs that the tide may be shifting : Companies like Facebook , Twitter , and Google are increasingly working with U.S. defense agencies to educate future software engineers , cybersecurity experts , and scientists .
Eventually , once public-private trust is fully restored , the U.S. government and Silicon Valley can forge a united front in order to effectively take on fake news .
Disinformation crept onto the national security radar just as Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in early 1981 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the Church Committee hearings—which exposed the CIA ’ s controversial ( and in some cases illegal ) intelligence gathering and covert action against foreign leaders and U.S. citizens alike—Reagan recruited William Casey to revamp the agency .
On moving into his seventh-floor office at Langley , Casey , known to be a hawk , was dismayed to learn that the CIA was collecting almost no information on Soviet active measures—and doing even less to counter them .
Casey reorganized key offices within the CIA ’ s Directorate of Intelligence to focus on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Directorate of Operations to ramp up its collection of classified intelligence on Soviet propaganda .
By mid-1981 , the scale of the Soviets ’ efforts became clear .
In an August 1981 speech on Soviet disinformation campaigns against NATO , Reagan revealed that the Soviet Union had spent around $ 100 million to sow confusion in Western Europe after NATO developed the neutron warhead in 1979 .
Of Moscow ’ s latest efforts , Reagan said he didn ’ t “ know how much they ’ re spending now , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propaganda drive , ” which included funding front groups , manipulating media , engaging in forgery , and buying agents of influence .
In 1983 , for example , Patriot , a pro-Soviet Indian newspaper , released a story claiming that the U.S. military had created HIV and released it as a biological weapon .
Over the next four years , the story was republished dozens of times and rebroadcast in over 80 countries and 30 languages .
By 1982 , the CIA estimated that Moscow was spending $ 3 billion to $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Soviet Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party , which directed the active measures , made no major distinction between covert action and diplomacy ; to the Kremlin , disinformation was a tool to advance the strategic goals of the Soviet Union in its competition with the West .
With the nation fixated on Soviet propaganda , senior leaders from across the Reagan administration came together to form what came to be called the Active Measures Working Group .
Led by the State Department—and including representatives from the CIA , FBI @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Justice departments—the national security bureaucracy quickly went on the offensive .
Through the end of the Cold War , the group was effective not only in raising global awareness of Soviet propaganda efforts but also in undermining their efficacy .
In fact , U.S. anti-disinformation campaigns were so successful that Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 instructed the KGB to scale back its propaganda operations .
Clearly , those days are long gone .
In stark contrast to the triumphs of the 1980s , the United States since the turn of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigns by geostrategic competitors like Russia , China , and Iran .
The opening salvo of a new , digitized phase of state-level competition for influence occurred in 2014 , when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine .
As he moved troops to the strategic Black Sea outpost , Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly claimed that those forces occupying Crimea could not possibly be Russian special forces—lying outright to the global community .
In the years since , the Kremlin ’ s disinformation campaigns have increased in volume , velocity , and variety .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China , Cuba , Saudi Arabia , North Korea , and others employ armies of trolls and bots to flood the internet with false , misleading , or conspiratorial content to undermine Western democracy .
The United States ’ counter-disinformation playbook has been predicated on two unspoken assumptions , neither of which is valid today : first , that shining light on lies and disinformation through official government communications is an effective tactic ; and second , that Washington can keep up with the speed and scale of disinformation campaigns .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do little to discredit propaganda , and the volume of threats vastly exceeds the U.S. government ’ s ability to identify and counter them .
These inferences take U.S. credibility—and technological prowess—for granted , which is hardly inevitable .
Broadly speaking , three factors have changed the disinformation game since the 1980s—and rendered the assumptions that formed the bedrock of the United States ’ campaign against Soviet active measures obsolete .
First , the global media environment has become far more complex .
Whereas in the 1980s most citizens consumed their news from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlets , today , world events are covered instantaneously by a tapestry of outlets—including social media , cable news , and traditional news channels and publications .
Second , U.S. adversaries have relied on bots to amplify fringe content and employed trolls to generate fake content to advance their strategic objectives .
Finally , rising political polarization has accelerated consumers ’ drive toward partisan echo chambers while increasing their suspicion of government leaders and expert voices .
Against such a backdrop , the Active Measures Working Group—a relic of simpler times—can no longer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ early days of the coronavirus pandemic , U.S. efforts to stem Chinese disinformation about COVID-19 backfired ; Beijing ’ s disinformation campaigns accelerated between March and May .
By June , Twitter reported that it had removed 23,750 accounts created by the Chinese government to criticize protests in Hong Kong and to extol the CCP ’ s response to COVID-19 .
To complicate matters further , the one anti-disinformation campaign where the United States has been successful in recent years is hardly a generalizable case .
The U.S.-led Operation Gallant Phoenix , fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steadily erode the group ’ s legitimacy by undermining its propaganda machine .
From a multinational headquarters in Jordan , the coalition flooded the internet with anti-Islamic State content and hobbled the group ’ s ability to broadcast its message globally .
But a campaign against the Islamic State is far from a viable blueprint for countering Russian , Chinese , and Iranian disinformation campaigns .
The international community—private sector tech firms included—shares the broad consensus that the Islamic State must be defeated .
This sort of political harmony hardly exists , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to forcefully counter Chinese-led disinformation efforts related to COVID-19 .
It ’ s clear that the United States is losing the information wars , in part due to a lack of innovation among the key stakeholders in the executive branch .
But not all is lost .
The next administration can make the United States a viable competitor in the global information wars by developing a comprehensive counter-disinformation strategy that is predicated on three different pillars .
Before any decisive counter-disinformation strategy can be formulated , key constituencies will need to come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ethics .
A commission staffed by leaders from the executive branch and media organizations must first draft a set of first principles for how data should be treated in an open and fair society ; philosophical rifts like those between Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg over the role of speech need to be overcome .
Any effective campaign in pursuit of the truth requires a set of guiding principles to inform the types of speech should be permitted in digital town squares and when speech should be fact-checked—or , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Once first principles are established , the White House can erect a policy framework to guide defensive actions and appropriate resourcing to counter foreign disinformation campaigns .
In the spirit of the Active Measures Working Group , an effective counter-disinformation strategy will require a whole of government approach , likely anchored by the State Department and supported by the Pentagon , the intelligence community , and other key stakeholders .
Finally , though the U.S. government can and should do much more to counter disinformation campaigns , it should be clear-eyed about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information environment has eroded since the 1980s .
A comprehensive counter-disinformation strategy would be smart to recognize the limits of government action given the speed and scale with which information moves across social media today .
Thus , it ’ s important to nest government-led counter-disinformation activities within a broader set of actions driven by the private sector .
Playing the role of coordinator , the United States should encourage the creation of a fact-checking clearing house among social media platforms to rapidly counter suspected disinformation .
Indeed , Facebook and Twitter have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false or misleading posts—to the ire of Donald Trump .
This should be encouraged and expanded to operate at the speed and scale with which content is generated and disseminated across social media .
The government could also use innovative investment pathways such as the Defense Innovation Unit or Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to incubate the development of new AI technologies that media platforms could use to spot deepfake technology—which can be used to create fake videos , new images , and synthetic text—at work .
Deepfakes are rapidly becoming an inexpensive , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actors can wage irregular warfare against their adversaries .
Regardless of the precise form it takes , the future incarnation of the Active Measures Working Group should seek out Silicon Valley leaders to not only help co-lead the initiative but to also staff other key posts across the executive branch .
In the end , the pathway to U.S. preeminence requires mobilizing the country ’ s unique assets : its ability to innovate , marshal resources at scale , and to come together in times of distress—as after 9/11 .
Only a response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong partnerships with actors outside of it—can give the United States the reality check it desperately needs .

On Oct. 14, Facebook and Twitter made the decision to remove a dubious New York Post story from their platforms—provoking heated debate in the internet’s various echo chambers. The article in question purportedly revealed influence peddling by Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s son Hunter Biden, and the social media giants suspected that the uncorroborated claims were based on hacked or fabricated correspondences. Weeks before the U.S. presidential election, Silicon Valley’s swift and decisive action in response to disinformation is a stark contrast to its handling of hacked emails from Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign four years ago.
On Oct. 14, Facebook and Twitter made the decision to remove a dubious New York Post story from their platforms—provoking heated debate in the internet’s various echo chambers. The article in question purportedly revealed influence peddling by Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s son Hunter Biden, and the social media giants suspected that the uncorroborated claims were based on hacked or fabricated correspondences. Weeks before the U.S. presidential election, Silicon Valley’s swift and decisive action in response to disinformation is a stark contrast to its handling of hacked emails from Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign four years ago.
A week prior, on Oct. 7, the U.S. Justice Department announced that it had seized nearly 100 websites linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These sites had been engaged in a global disinformation campaign, targeting audiences from the United States to Southeast Asia with pro-Iranian propaganda. But it wasn’t just the government engaged in countering adversaries online: One day later, Facebook and Twitter reported that they had taken down more than a dozen disinformation networks used by political and state-backed groups in Iran, Russia, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.
In the grand scheme of things, the events of Oct. 7 and 14 were hardly noteworthy. In recent years, private and public actors alike have had to ramp up their efforts against botnets, troll farms, and artificial intelligence systems that seek to manipulate the online information environment and advance certain strategic objectives. These actors came under unprecedented scrutiny in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
The United States continues to rely on the same dated playbook that led to success against Soviet propaganda operations.
But while cyberspace may be a new front in the fight against disinformation, disinformation in and of itself—as well as the societal discord it can sow—has been a national security concern for decades; the Cold War was largely waged by propagating competing versions of the truth. And much as the threat of “fake news” is nothing new, so too is the way policymakers deal with it—or try to.
Therein lies the real problem. In countering disinformation emanating from the Kremlin, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and IRGC, among others, the United States continues to rely on the same dated playbook that led to success against Soviet propaganda operations, known as “active measures,” in the 1980s. But this anti-disinformation strategy, like most else developed in the 1980s, has been rendered largely obsolete by an evolving media landscape and emerging technology.
Now, if the United States is going to have any hope of getting back on its front foot—and put a stop to adversaries’ attempts to sow confusion and cynicism domestically—it’s going to have to seriously reconceive its old playbook. But that can’t be done without Big Tech companies, which are the linchpin in the fight against disinformation.
Granted, some state-citizen reconciliation is needed to mend the fraught ties of the post-Snowden era. In 2013, the whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked documents exposing widespread cooperation between U.S. technology companies and the National Security Agency, triggering widespread backlash from technology companies and the public, who lamented the lack of personal privacy protections on the internet.
Since then, the chasm between Silicon Valley and the U.S. national security community has only widened—but there are signs that the tide may be shifting: Companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google are increasingly working with U.S. defense agencies to educate future software engineers, cybersecurity experts, and scientists. Eventually, once public-private trust is fully restored, the U.S. government and Silicon Valley can forge a united front in order to effectively take on fake news.
Disinformation crept onto the national security radar just as Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in early 1981. After the CIA was publicly disgraced during the Church Committee hearings—which exposed the CIA’s controversial (and in some cases illegal) intelligence gathering and covert action against foreign leaders and U.S. citizens alike—Reagan recruited William Casey to revamp the agency. On moving into his seventh-floor office at Langley, Casey, known to be a hawk, was dismayed to learn that the CIA was collecting almost no information on Soviet active measures—and doing even less to counter them.
Casey reorganized key offices within the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence to focus on better understanding Soviet active measures and instructed the Directorate of Operations to ramp up its collection of classified intelligence on Soviet propaganda. By mid-1981, the scale of the Soviets’ efforts became clear. In an August 1981 speech on Soviet disinformation campaigns against NATO, Reagan revealed that the Soviet Union had spent around $100 million to sow confusion in Western Europe after NATO developed the neutron warhead in 1979.
Of Moscow’s latest efforts, Reagan said he didn’t “know how much they’re spending now, but they’re starting the same kind of propaganda drive,” which included funding front groups, manipulating media, engaging in forgery, and buying agents of influence. In 1983, for example, Patriot, a pro-Soviet Indian newspaper, released a story claiming that the U.S. military had created HIV and released it as a biological weapon. Over the next four years, the story was republished dozens of times and rebroadcast in over 80 countries and 30 languages.
By 1982, the CIA estimated that Moscow was spending $3 billion to $4 billion annually on global propaganda efforts. The Soviet Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party, which directed the active measures, made no major distinction between covert action and diplomacy; to the Kremlin, disinformation was a tool to advance the strategic goals of the Soviet Union in its competition with the West.
With the nation fixated on Soviet propaganda, senior leaders from across the Reagan administration came together to form what came to be called the Active Measures Working Group. Led by the State Department—and including representatives from the CIA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense and Justice departments—the national security bureaucracy quickly went on the offensive. Through the end of the Cold War, the group was effective not only in raising global awareness of Soviet propaganda efforts but also in undermining their efficacy. In fact, U.S. anti-disinformation campaigns were so successful that Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 instructed the KGB to scale back its propaganda operations.
Clearly, those days are long gone. In stark contrast to the triumphs of the 1980s, the United States since the turn of the century has largely failed to counter disinformation campaigns by geostrategic competitors like Russia, China, and Iran.
The opening salvo of a new, digitized phase of state-level competition for influence occurred in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine. As he moved troops to the strategic Black Sea outpost, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly claimed that those forces occupying Crimea could not possibly be Russian special forces—lying outright to the global community. In the years since, the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns have increased in volume, velocity, and variety. Today, state-level actors such as Russia, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and others employ armies of trolls and bots to flood the internet with false, misleading, or conspiratorial content to undermine Western democracy.
If Washington is still fighting the same enemy, then what went wrong?
The United States’ counter-disinformation playbook has been predicated on two unspoken assumptions, neither of which is valid today: first, that shining light on lies and disinformation through official government communications is an effective tactic; and second, that Washington can keep up with the speed and scale of disinformation campaigns. In fact, debunking efforts by government officials do little to discredit propaganda, and the volume of threats vastly exceeds the U.S. government’s ability to identify and counter them. These inferences take U.S. credibility—and technological prowess—for granted, which is hardly inevitable.
Broadly speaking, three factors have changed the disinformation game since the 1980s—and rendered the assumptions that formed the bedrock of the United States’ campaign against Soviet active measures obsolete. First, the global media environment has become far more complex. Whereas in the 1980s most citizens consumed their news from a handful of print and broadcast news outlets, today, world events are covered instantaneously by a tapestry of outlets—including social media, cable news, and traditional news channels and publications.
Second, U.S. adversaries have relied on bots to amplify fringe content and employed trolls to generate fake content to advance their strategic objectives. Finally, rising political polarization has accelerated consumers’ drive toward partisan echo chambers while increasing their suspicion of government leaders and expert voices. Against such a backdrop, the Active Measures Working Group—a relic of simpler times—can no longer be successful.
Indeed, in the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, U.S. efforts to stem Chinese disinformation about COVID-19 backfired; Beijing’s disinformation campaigns accelerated between March and May. By June, Twitter reported that it had removed 23,750 accounts created by the Chinese government to criticize protests in Hong Kong and to extol the CCP’s response to COVID-19.
To complicate matters further, the one anti-disinformation campaign where the United States has been successful in recent years is hardly a generalizable case. The U.S.-led Operation Gallant Phoenix, fighting the Islamic State, was able to steadily erode the group’s legitimacy by undermining its propaganda machine. From a multinational headquarters in Jordan, the coalition flooded the internet with anti-Islamic State content and hobbled the group’s ability to broadcast its message globally.
But a campaign against the Islamic State is far from a viable blueprint for countering Russian, Chinese, and Iranian disinformation campaigns. The international community—private sector tech firms included—shares the broad consensus that the Islamic State must be defeated. This sort of political harmony hardly exists, for example, on how, or whether, to forcefully counter Chinese-led disinformation efforts related to COVID-19.
It’s clear that the United States is losing the information wars, in part due to a lack of innovation among the key stakeholders in the executive branch. But not all is lost. The next administration can make the United States a viable competitor in the global information wars by developing a comprehensive counter-disinformation strategy that is predicated on three different pillars.
Before any decisive counter-disinformation strategy can be formulated, key constituencies will need to come to some sort of consensus about data ethics. A commission staffed by leaders from the executive branch and media organizations must first draft a set of first principles for how data should be treated in an open and fair society; philosophical rifts like those between Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg over the role of speech need to be overcome. Any effective campaign in pursuit of the truth requires a set of guiding principles to inform the types of speech should be permitted in digital town squares and when speech should be fact-checked—or, in extreme cases, removed entirely.
Once first principles are established, the White House can erect a policy framework to guide defensive actions and appropriate resourcing to counter foreign disinformation campaigns. In the spirit of the Active Measures Working Group, an effective counter-disinformation strategy will require a whole of government approach, likely anchored by the State Department and supported by the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and other key stakeholders.
Finally, though the U.S. government can and should do much more to counter disinformation campaigns, it should be clear-eyed about the fact that its ability to shape the information environment has eroded since the 1980s. A comprehensive counter-disinformation strategy would be smart to recognize the limits of government action given the speed and scale with which information moves across social media today.
Thus, it’s important to nest government-led counter-disinformation activities within a broader set of actions driven by the private sector. Playing the role of coordinator, the United States should encourage the creation of a fact-checking clearing house among social media platforms to rapidly counter suspected disinformation. Indeed, Facebook and Twitter have already begun adding fact-checked labels to potentially false or misleading posts—to the ire of Donald Trump. This should be encouraged and expanded to operate at the speed and scale with which content is generated and disseminated across social media.
The government could also use innovative investment pathways such as the Defense Innovation Unit or Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to incubate the development of new AI technologies that media platforms could use to spot deepfake technology—which can be used to create fake videos, new images, and synthetic text—at work. Deepfakes are rapidly becoming an inexpensive, fast, and effective means by which actors can wage irregular warfare against their adversaries.
Regardless of the precise form it takes, the future incarnation of the Active Measures Working Group should seek out Silicon Valley leaders to not only help co-lead the initiative but to also staff other key posts across the executive branch. In the end, the pathway to U.S. preeminence requires mobilizing the country’s unique assets: its ability to innovate, marshal resources at scale, and to come together in times of distress—as after 9/11. Only a response marked by bipartisanship within government—as well as strong partnerships with actors outside of it—can give the United States the reality check it desperately needs.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-15--Democrats Push for Foreign Aid in Coronavirus Stimulus Fight

It ’ s not just American families and businesses that are caught in the political crossfire as the Trump administration and Congress argue over the latest stimulus package to deal with the fallout of the coronavirus pandemic .
One influential House Democrat is worried that if the talks sputter , it could further harm U.S. prestige around the world that has already been damaged by the White House ’ s handling of the pandemic .
Texas Democratic Rep. Joaquin Castro , who heads up the oversight and investigations panel on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and is campaigning to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next Congress , told Foreign Policy that a proposal backed by Democrats to help distribute a coronavirus vaccine to allies and help with deepening poverty caused by the pandemic would show that the United States “ remains a North Star ” in fighting the virus after the Trump administration exited the World Health Organization and distanced itself from the European bloc ’ s effort to combat the disease .
“ The simple fact is that the world has started to move around us because of President [ Donald ] Trump ’ s poor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That can only go on for so long , before the world figures out that they don ’ t need you in the same way that they did before.
” This interview has been edited for length and clarity .
Foreign Policy : If a stimulus bill does go through , what does that mean for America ’ s global response to the virus ?
If it fails , what would we be missing ?
Joaquin Castro : I ’ ve been advocating for $ 20 billion in foreign assistance , and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Heroes Act in the House of Representatives , there was $ 10 billion that would have been appropriated .
In the Senate , there was about $ 4.4 billion in their version in July .
I think it ’ s important , because there ’ s a great need , not only in the United States , but across the world .
People are suffering and nations are reeling from the effects of COVID-19 .
And the United States for generations has been a leader among nations of the world in terms of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re able to successfully include foreign assistance , it would be important substantively because countries need the resources , and we need to be able to fund cooperation toward finding a vaccine , but also providing protective gear and other equipment in countries where those are scarce and also to help countries start getting back on their feet economically .
But it would also be a signal to the world that the United States , even through very difficult times in our own country , remains a North Star around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the long-term impacts of the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization , and do you have any concerns about the administration ’ s response to the pandemic on the international front ?
Has the administration given you or the House Foreign Affairs Committee any sense of what they ’ re doing on the global response ?
JC : Unfortunately , the Trump administration has not only failed the American people in its response to the coronavirus but also has failed to position the United States as a leader around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries .
Whether it ’ s withdrawn from the World Health Organization at the height of the pandemic , as you mentioned , the USA-EU Task Force , the lack of commitment so far on foreign assistance , all of these things represent a kind of failure .
But there ’ s longer-term damage to the standing of the United States , when it comes to our reputation and how nations perceive us .
And the simple fact is that the world has started to move around us because of President Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only go on for so long , before the world figures out that they don ’ t need you in the same way that they did before .
And they ’ re long-lasting consequences for the United States of that situation .
And really , I think damage to the world , because we do have a lot to offer .
We have a lot to offer in terms of our science and our research , our economy .
You know , the things that we have worked with the world on for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compromised by this administration .
FP : There is speculation that the White House is considering launching its own global pandemic response mechanism , while seemingly continuing to undermine the WHO from the outside .
Has Congress been briefed on what those plans might be ?
JC : In terms of what their plan is , I have not been briefed in any kind of comprehensive way .
There may have been a conversation here or there , but not briefed in a comprehensive way about what the administration ’ s strategy is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re going to work with the world to combat COVID-19 to find a vaccine , but also to provide relief in terms of PPE and equipment and hunger , because of the extreme poverty that we ’ re now seeing around the world .
I chair the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations , and we ’ re starting to take a closer look at the pandemic response .
It ’ s really a job that ’ s beyond a single committee in Congress , but we have talked about making sure that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holding them accountable , in conducting oversight .
That said , it ’ s also clear that [ the Trump administration has ] become less cooperative on many different inquiries across the board .
There ’ s a great part of me that thinks that they ’ re trying to simply wait out until the election to decide how much they ’ re going to cooperate and send witnesses from the administration in front of Congress .
I ’ m part of the Intelligence Committee , I ’ m part of the Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ve ] even seen it on Education and Labor .
[ There ’ s ] this lack of cooperation , [ a ] growing lack of cooperation from the administration .
FP : What are some of the top oversight questions you ’ d like to see the administration answer when it comes to the global U.S. response to the pandemic ?
JC : I ’ d like to know what cooperation they did engage with around the world .
We know they pulled out from the World Health Organization .
What kind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , you remember , a few months back now , there was reporting that the Trump administration was trying to find a vaccine in Germany for which the administration wanted the exclusive right to use for the United States .
So that ’ s an area that I think that we ’ ve not gotten to , that we should .
What kind of efforts [ have they ] made to either work with other countries or to lock out other countries ?
In a way , that ’ s uncharacteristic of how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long time .
Let ’ s imagine there ’ s a second Trump administration .
We ’ ve not been given a blueprint for how the Trump administration intends to approach the global coronavirus response really next week , or even next January .
Because for the most part , it ’ s been a policy of disengagement to this point .
So there ’ s just a lot of questions about what we ’ ve done so far , with respect to cooperation .
And then where are we going from @ @

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What Normalization?

Given the long trajectory of U.S. policy toward the Middle East , it is not surprising that , in the wake of Israel ’ s newly announced normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain , the actual reaction in Arab societies has been somewhat lost .
Since the deals were announced in mid-September , Bahrain ’ s Shiite opposition has harshly criticized them .
Dissenters have tweeted out a series of statements protesting the normalization decision , with the blunt hashtag “ Normalization is betrayal.
” Among the most prominent of these critics is the exiled Shiite cleric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement through the account of a moderate opposition group , al-Wefaq , which is banned by the government .
Qassim was a formidable leader in the uprising against the government during the 2011 Arab Spring and lives in exile because the government revoked his citizenship .
In his statement , Qassim called on the people to resist “ psychological defeat ” and work to overturn the normalization of relations with Israel , or at least place obstacles in its way .
In turn , in recent weeks , small but significant protests have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2 , for example , protesters took to the streets for what al-Wefaq dubbed the “ Friday of the Fall of the Treasonous Agreement.
” The small groups of protesters hoisted Palestinian flags and other signs , and stepped on images of the Israeli and American flags .
According to the Bahraini human rights activist Maryam Alkhawaja , riot police were “ out in full force ” as the protests started .
Since then , rallies have continued sporadically , mostly in villages rather than in the capital .
Other Shiite groups across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ normalization deals , too .
Hezbollah criticized the Bahraini decision in no uncertain terms , describing it as a “ great betrayal ” of the Palestinians and accusing Bahrain ’ s “ tyrannical regime ” of acting on U.S. orders .
Meanwhile , marches have erupted in Lebanon , Morocco , Tunisia , Yemen , and , of course , the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip .
The question , of course , is whether all this outrage will amount to change .
In many ways , the normalization agreements were primarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of all three countries—the UAE , Bahrain , and Israel—to counter the influence of Iran .
( Saudi Arabia has not yet joined the agreements , but Saudi influence likely played into the Bahraini government ’ s decision . )
In turn , the normalization has perturbed Tehran , whose foreign ministry called Bahrain ’ s decision “ shameful.
” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Bahrain would have to bear any “ consequences ” of the normalization , although it seems unlikely that Iran will actually intervene in any concrete way .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely succeed in their goal of further isolating Iran .
But as long as Gulf citizens are protesting , the deals have the potential to destabilize the Arab world .
It isn ’ t that Arab Shiite communities are opposed to normalization because they are aligned with or have loyalties to Iran .
In fact , Shiite communities across the Arab world broadly oppose the Iranian regime .
Among Shiites in Iraq , for example , polling data indicates that unfavorable views toward Iran have risen steadily in recent years .
While 86 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ view of Iran in 2014 , by 2019 that percentage had fallen to 41 percent , according to surveys conducted by the Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies .
In reality , Arab Shiite communities oppose normalization for two main reasons .
First , the deals will reduce pressure on Israel to end the Palestinian occupation and create a two-state solution .
Second , an economic and political alliance with Israel will empower Arab autocrats to further crack down on their domestic opposition by reducing the likelihood of backlash from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Their fears about a crackdown appear warranted .
For example , on Sept. 30 , Yossi Cohen—the director of Israel ’ s national intelligence agency—made his first official visit to Bahrain .
The following day , Bahraini authorities reportedly summoned a number of individuals and forced them to sign agreements promising not to take part in any protest—a pledge that did not prevent marches that same week .
The government ’ s response is in keeping with a long history of human rights violations .
According to Human Rights Watch , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Bahraini government ’ s repression of citizens has only worsened .
The authorities have “ imprisoned , exiled , or intimidated into silence anyone who criticizes the government.
” That protests are continuing anyway should give Gulf regimes , Israel , and the U.S. government pause .
With Gulf regimes already having been pushed to the brink by COVID-19 and related economic challenges , it is unclear whether they can withstand broad domestic blowback , especially if coupled with whatever external pressure Iran can muster .
Although protests have receded in recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Earlier this month , the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies released the results of a survey in which it asked individuals in 13 Arab states whether they would support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by their countries .
In all countries surveyed , a majority of respondents opposed the recognition of Israel ; in six countries , this figure was higher than 90 percent .
When it comes to normalization , then , the UAE and Bahrain may have lit a powder keg with a short fuse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab Spring approaches .
Since inking the normalization deals , the two states have signed a flurry of trade and economic agreements with Israel , while holding high-profile meetings on bilateral cooperation .
If they wish to preclude further unrest , the UAE , Bahrain , and Israel would be wise to tighten ties much more slowly .
Likewise , Arab states that are considering normalization agreements with Israel would be wise to pay particular attention to how their populations might respond .

Given the long trajectory of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it is not surprising that, in the wake of Israel’s newly announced normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the actual reaction in Arab societies has been somewhat lost.
Given the long trajectory of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it is not surprising that, in the wake of Israel’s newly announced normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the actual reaction in Arab societies has been somewhat lost.
Since the deals were announced in mid-September, Bahrain’s Shiite opposition has harshly criticized them.
Dissenters have tweeted out a series of statements protesting the normalization decision, with the blunt hashtag “Normalization is betrayal.” Among the most prominent of these critics is the exiled Shiite cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim, who issued a statement through the account of a moderate opposition group, al-Wefaq, which is banned by the government. Qassim was a formidable leader in the uprising against the government during the 2011 Arab Spring and lives in exile because the government revoked his citizenship. In his statement, Qassim called on the people to resist “psychological defeat” and work to overturn the normalization of relations with Israel, or at least place obstacles in its way.
In turn, in recent weeks, small but significant protests have popped up across Bahrain. On Oct. 2, for example, protesters took to the streets for what al-Wefaq dubbed the “Friday of the Fall of the Treasonous Agreement.” The small groups of protesters hoisted Palestinian flags and other signs, and stepped on images of the Israeli and American flags. According to the Bahraini human rights activist Maryam Alkhawaja, riot police were “out in full force” as the protests started. Since then, rallies have continued sporadically, mostly in villages rather than in the capital.
Other Shiite groups across the Arab region have criticized the Gulf normalization deals, too. Hezbollah criticized the Bahraini decision in no uncertain terms, describing it as a “great betrayal” of the Palestinians and accusing Bahrain’s “tyrannical regime” of acting on U.S. orders. Meanwhile, marches have erupted in Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, and, of course, the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The question, of course, is whether all this outrage will amount to change. In many ways, the normalization agreements were primarily motivated by a desire on the part of all three countries—the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel—to counter the influence of Iran. (Saudi Arabia has not yet joined the agreements, but Saudi influence likely played into the Bahraini government’s decision.)
In turn, the normalization has perturbed Tehran, whose foreign ministry called Bahrain’s decision “shameful.” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Bahrain would have to bear any “consequences” of the normalization, although it seems unlikely that Iran will actually intervene in any concrete way.
If anything, the normalization agreements will likely succeed in their goal of further isolating Iran. But as long as Gulf citizens are protesting, the deals have the potential to destabilize the Arab world.
It isn’t that Arab Shiite communities are opposed to normalization because they are aligned with or have loyalties to Iran. In fact, Shiite communities across the Arab world broadly oppose the Iranian regime. Among Shiites in Iraq, for example, polling data indicates that unfavorable views toward Iran have risen steadily in recent years. While 86 percent of Iraqi Shiites had a favorable view of Iran in 2014, by 2019 that percentage had fallen to 41 percent, according to surveys conducted by the Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies.
In reality, Arab Shiite communities oppose normalization for two main reasons. First, the deals will reduce pressure on Israel to end the Palestinian occupation and create a two-state solution. Second, an economic and political alliance with Israel will empower Arab autocrats to further crack down on their domestic opposition by reducing the likelihood of backlash from the United States and other international actors.
Their fears about a crackdown appear warranted. For example, on Sept. 30, Yossi Cohen—the director of Israel’s national intelligence agency—made his first official visit to Bahrain. The following day, Bahraini authorities reportedly summoned a number of individuals and forced them to sign agreements promising not to take part in any protest—a pledge that did not prevent marches that same week.
The government’s response is in keeping with a long history of human rights violations. According to Human Rights Watch, in the years since the 2011 uprising, the Bahraini government’s repression of citizens has only worsened. The authorities have “imprisoned, exiled, or intimidated into silence anyone who criticizes the government.”
That protests are continuing anyway should give Gulf regimes, Israel, and the U.S. government pause. With Gulf regimes already having been pushed to the brink by COVID-19 and related economic challenges, it is unclear whether they can withstand broad domestic blowback, especially if coupled with whatever external pressure Iran can muster.
Although protests have receded in recent days, opposition to normalization remains deep-rooted. Earlier this month, the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies released the results of a survey in which it asked individuals in 13 Arab states whether they would support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by their countries. In all countries surveyed, a majority of respondents opposed the recognition of Israel; in six countries, this figure was higher than 90 percent.
When it comes to normalization, then, the UAE and Bahrain may have lit a powder keg with a short fuse, just as the 10-year anniversary of the Arab Spring approaches. Since inking the normalization deals, the two states have signed a flurry of trade and economic agreements with Israel, while holding high-profile meetings on bilateral cooperation. If they wish to preclude further unrest, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel would be wise to tighten ties much more slowly. Likewise, Arab states that are considering normalization agreements with Israel would be wise to pay particular attention to how their populations might respond.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-15--Will the Real North Korea Policy Please Stand Up?

Will the Real North Korea Policy Please Stand Up ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : The Trump administration can ’ t keep its story straight on North Korea , a fresh Taliban offensive tests peace talks in Afghanistan , and major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan send a signal to Beijing .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
North Korea raised eyebrows around the world last weekend when it rolled out a massive new ballistic missile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launched off of trucks and carry multiple warheads as far as the United States .
But as usual , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s top national security aides didn ’ t have their story straight about the threat posed by the weapons , adding to a muted response from the administration .
How you see North Korea depends on where you sit .
Greeting the South Korean minister of defense at the Pentagon on Wednesday , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper called North Korea ’ s nuclear program a “ serious threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region and the world.
” But his colleague , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , didn ’ t seem to agree : When asked on Wednesday if Trump ’ s diplomacy reduced the threat from North Korea , Pompeo said yes , adding that North Korea “ did exactly zero ” intercontinental ballistic missile tests last year .
“ The agreement , the understandings , albeit not achieving our ultimate objective in North Korea , has certainly led to reduced risk from the United States vis where we would have been had we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration had engaged in , ” Pompeo said .
Not so fast , Mike .
Pompeo ’ s comments were lampooned by arms control advocates , who said that the Trump administration ’ s track record against the North Korean nuclear threat was worse than Obama ’ s .
“ So ridiculous from Pompeo , ” tweeted Kingston Reif , the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association .
“ North Korea conducted an ICBM test for the first time in 2017 .
Three of them actually.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a third summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have fallen on deaf ears , and recent State Department efforts to rekindle talks have stalled—unsurprisingly , given that the world is waiting to see whether Trump is reelected .
How would Biden handle Kim ?
Most experts agree that whether the United States and North Korea come back to the negotiating table hinges on who wins in November .
Biden hasn ’ t given many details on his potential North Korea policy but has suggested he would tighten sanctions on Pyongyang and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Some experts predict that if Biden wins , Kim could use the waning months of Trump ’ s lame-duck administration to test more advanced weapons systems and feel out how Biden would respond .
False START .
It ’ s not just North Korea that ’ s recently proven tough for Trump .
The New York Times reports that Trump thought he had a deal in hand with Russian President Vladimir Putin to extend the Obama-era New START treaty , which expires in February .
But the promise of a pre-election deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week : The lead U.S. negotiator Marshall Billingslea announced Tuesday that Trump and Putin had an “ agreement in principle , ” only for Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to contradict him hours later .
The Egyptian connection .
The Justice Department led a three-year investigation into whether Trump ’ s 2016 presidential campaign used money from an Egyptian state-owned bank to back up a contribution made by Trump himself , CNN reported on Wednesday .
While investigators were not able to prove that a bank transfer took place , the criminal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ auspices after Special Counsel Robert Mueller ’ s office shut down .
Prosecutors wanted to know whether Trump “ was supported by or indebted to a foreign power ” after an informant suggested an Egyptian bank backed Trump ’ s contribution of $ 10 million to his campaign ’ s coffers in the waning days of the 2016 race .
Double dealing .
The Trump administration is holding out hope for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban to wind down the war in Afghanistan , but the Taliban has other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an offensive on Lashkar Gah , the capital of Helmand province , cutting off the city from Afghan forces and putting thousands of civilians in danger .
The Taliban ’ s offensive raises questions about its commitment to the peace talks .
What happens next in Lashkar Gah could be a litmus test for how far the U.S. military will go to support Afghan allies and how much resolve Washington has to continue with the negotiations .
Zalmay Khalilzad , the top U.S. negotiator with the Taliban , said that the new attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a series of tweets today .
Taiwanna fight ?
The Trump administration gave Congress an informal heads-up this week that it plans to move ahead with three major arms sales to Taiwan , in a move that could spark further tensions between the United States and China .
While the cost of the sale—first reported by Reuters—was not disclosed , aides on Capitol Hill said the deals were for the so-called High Mobility Artillery Rocket System ( HIMARS ) launched from truck beds , F-16 fighter jet sensor pods , and precise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons systems are at various stages of the notification process , but risk angering Beijing .
On Tuesday , a spokesman from China ’ s foreign ministry urged the U.S. to cancel the sales .
Pompeo on the ‘ deep state.
’ In an interview with a Florida radio station on Thursday , the host pressed Pompeo on whether there is in fact a “ deep state ” in the State Department .
His response may rankle some of his own employees : “ There ’ s always people inside of every organization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on the team ’ s mission , ” Pompeo said .
“ When we identify them , we move them out of the way .
We get them to a different place , and we try to find people only who are committed to doing America ’ s mission , President Trump ’ s mission , on behalf of the United States.
” Dangerous liaisons .
The Trump administration shook up the Defense Department ’ s White House Liaison Office again by adding several young loyalists—a move that current and former officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump faithful in career positions that could undermine a possible Biden administration .
New NSC move .
The White House has named Josh Hodges , a former U.S. Agency for International Development official , to head up policy in the Americas on the National Security Council .
Leading the Western Hemisphere directorate , Hodges is expected to hone in on Venezuela , the COVID-19 crisis , and upcoming elections in Bolivia , according to Politico , which first reported the news .
State Department shake-ups .
Pompeo announced this week that Robert Destro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy , human rights , and labor , will serve as the U.S. special envoy for Tibetan issues .
In bureaucratic parlance , this means the envoy position is being downgraded from an under-secretary level to the assistant secretary level .
Meanwhile , Mark Pekkala , the senior-most career diplomat in the State Department ’ s international organization affairs , announced he would retire at the end of October .
Renaming the bases .
After protests against racial injustice this summer prompted calls for the Army to rename bases named after Confederate generals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Staff Mark Milley told Congress the moves would be “ political decisions ” and recommended a costly study .
The problem is the Army already did one , while Milley was the service ’ s top-ranking officer—but it kept it under wraps .
Task and Purpose reports that in 2017 , the Army Center of Military History found that the Army originally named the posts and it has the authority to rename them after all .
( President Trump objected to the move earlier this summer ) .
Milley “ has not yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reading it , ” his spokesperson said .
The U.N. embargo on arms sales to Iran is due to be lifted on Sunday , Oct. 18 .
Christopher Ford , the Trump administration ’ s top diplomat on international security and nonproliferation , will speak on diplomacy and cyberspace at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Monday , Oct. 19 .
The final U.S. presidential debate between Trump and Biden is scheduled to be held in-person in Nashville on Thursday , Oct. 22 .
The second debate was cancelled due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate Judiciary Committee votes on Amy Coney Barrett ’ s nomination to the Supreme Court on Thursday , Oct. 22 .
Let this be a lesson .
A tourist who stole artifacts from the ancient archeological site of Pompeii in Italy 15 years ago has returned them , saying the objects were cursed and brought years of bad luck to her life .
Note to self : Do not mess with ancient curses .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The Trump administration can’t keep its story straight on North Korea , a fresh Taliban offensive tests peace talks in Afghanistan, and major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan send a signal to Beijing.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The Trump administration can’t keep its story straight on North Korea, a fresh Taliban offensive tests peace talks in Afghanistan, and major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan send a signal to Beijing.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump’s North Korea Policy Is Still Confused
North Korea raised eyebrows around the world last weekend when it rolled out a massive new ballistic missile system, with projectiles that can be launched off of trucks and carry multiple warheads as far as the United States. But as usual, U.S. President Donald Trump’s top national security aides didn’t have their story straight about the threat posed by the weapons, adding to a muted response from the administration.
How you see North Korea depends on where you sit.
Greeting the South Korean minister of defense at the Pentagon on Wednesday, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper called North Korea’s nuclear program a “serious threat to the security and stability of the region and the world.” But his colleague, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, didn’t seem to agree: When asked on Wednesday if Trump’s diplomacy reduced the threat from North Korea, Pompeo said yes, adding that North Korea “did exactly zero” intercontinental ballistic missile tests last year.
“The agreement, the understandings, albeit not achieving our ultimate objective in North Korea, has certainly led to reduced risk from the United States vis where we would have been had we continued on the path that the previous administration had engaged in,” Pompeo said.
Not so fast, Mike. Pompeo’s comments were lampooned by arms control advocates, who said that the Trump administration’s track record against the North Korean nuclear threat was worse than Obama’s. “So ridiculous from Pompeo,” tweeted Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. “North Korea conducted an ICBM test for the first time in 2017. Three of them actually.”
Meanwhile, Trump’s overtures for a third summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have fallen on deaf ears, and recent State Department efforts to rekindle talks have stalled—unsurprisingly, given that the world is waiting to see whether Trump is reelected.
How would Biden handle Kim? Most experts agree that whether the United States and North Korea come back to the negotiating table hinges on who wins in November. Biden hasn’t given many details on his potential North Korea policy but has suggested he would tighten sanctions on Pyongyang and avoid high-profile, face-to-face summits with Kim.
Some experts predict that if Biden wins, Kim could use the waning months of Trump’s lame-duck administration to test more advanced weapons systems and feel out how Biden would respond.
What We’re Watching
False START. It’s not just North Korea that’s recently proven tough for Trump. The New York Times reports that Trump thought he had a deal in hand with Russian President Vladimir Putin to extend the Obama-era New START treaty, which expires in February. But the promise of a pre-election deal appeared to go out the window this week: The lead U.S. negotiator Marshall Billingslea announced Tuesday that Trump and Putin had an “agreement in principle,” only for Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to contradict him hours later.
The Egyptian connection. The Justice Department led a three-year investigation into whether Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign used money from an Egyptian state-owned bank to back up a contribution made by Trump himself, CNN reported on Wednesday. While investigators were not able to prove that a bank transfer took place, the criminal campaign finance probe continued under Justice Department auspices after Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s office shut down.
Prosecutors wanted to know whether Trump “was supported by or indebted to a foreign power” after an informant suggested an Egyptian bank backed Trump’s contribution of $10 million to his campaign’s coffers in the waning days of the 2016 race.
Double dealing. The Trump administration is holding out hope for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban to wind down the war in Afghanistan, but the Taliban has other plans. The militant group has launched an offensive on Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, cutting off the city from Afghan forces and putting thousands of civilians in danger. The Taliban’s offensive raises questions about its commitment to the peace talks.
What happens next in Lashkar Gah could be a litmus test for how far the U.S. military will go to support Afghan allies and how much resolve Washington has to continue with the negotiations. Zalmay Khalilzad, the top U.S. negotiator with the Taliban, said that the new attacks were “threatening the peace process” in a series of tweets today.
Taiwanna fight? The Trump administration gave Congress an informal heads-up this week that it plans to move ahead with three major arms sales to Taiwan, in a move that could spark further tensions between the United States and China. While the cost of the sale—first reported by Reuters—was not disclosed, aides on Capitol Hill said the deals were for the so-called High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launched from truck beds, F-16 fighter jet sensor pods, and precise air-to-ground missiles.
As many as seven weapons systems are at various stages of the notification process, but risk angering Beijing. On Tuesday, a spokesman from China’s foreign ministry urged the U.S. to cancel the sales.
Pompeo on the ‘deep state.’ In an interview with a Florida radio station on Thursday, the host pressed Pompeo on whether there is in fact a “deep state” in the State Department. His response may rankle some of his own employees: “There’s always people inside of every organization that aren’t fully on board, on the team’s mission,” Pompeo said.
“When we identify them, we move them out of the way. We get them to a different place, and we try to find people only who are committed to doing America’s mission, President Trump’s mission, on behalf of the United States.”
Movers and Shakers
Dangerous liaisons. The Trump administration shook up the Defense Department’s White House Liaison Office again by adding several young loyalists—a move that current and former officials worry may be aimed at entrenching the Trump faithful in career positions that could undermine a possible Biden administration.
New NSC move. The White House has named Josh Hodges, a former U.S. Agency for International Development official, to head up policy in the Americas on the National Security Council. Leading the Western Hemisphere directorate, Hodges is expected to hone in on Venezuela, the COVID-19 crisis, and upcoming elections in Bolivia, according to Politico, which first reported the news.
State Department shake-ups. Pompeo announced this week that Robert Destro, the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, will serve as the U.S. special envoy for Tibetan issues. In bureaucratic parlance, this means the envoy position is being downgraded from an under-secretary level to the assistant secretary level.
Meanwhile, Mark Pekkala, the senior-most career diplomat in the State Department’s international organization affairs, announced he would retire at the end of October.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Renaming the bases. After protests against racial injustice this summer prompted calls for the Army to rename bases named after Confederate generals, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley told Congress the moves would be “political decisions” and recommended a costly study. The problem is the Army already did one, while Milley was the service’s top-ranking officer—but it kept it under wraps.
Task and Purpose reports that in 2017, the Army Center of Military History found that the Army originally named the posts and it has the authority to rename them after all. (President Trump objected to the move earlier this summer). Milley “has not yet seen the report but looks forward to reading it,” his spokesperson said.
The Week Ahead
The U.N. embargo on arms sales to Iran is due to be lifted on Sunday, Oct. 18.
Christopher Ford, the Trump administration’s top diplomat on international security and nonproliferation, will speak on diplomacy and cyberspace at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Monday, Oct. 19.
The final U.S. presidential debate between Trump and Biden is scheduled to be held in-person in Nashville on Thursday, Oct. 22. The second debate was cancelled due to Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis.
The Senate Judiciary Committee votes on Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination to the Supreme Court on Thursday, Oct. 22.
Odds and Ends
Let this be a lesson. A tourist who stole artifacts from the ancient archeological site of Pompeii in Italy 15 years ago has returned them, saying the objects were cursed and brought years of bad luck to her life. Note to self: Do not mess with ancient curses.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--The United States Isn’t Doomed to Lose the Information Wars

The United States Isn ’ t Doomed to Lose the Information Wars The stakes in this year ’ s U.S. presidential election are arguably higher than they were in 2016 .
Yet fears about foreign interference in U.S. elections have only grown in the past four years .
Instead of traditional weapons , foreign adversaries are once again turning to social media in their attempts to undermine the upcoming election , and 2020 alone has seen a rash of disinformation about the coronavirus , political unrest , and election integrity .
According to a new Gallup/Knight Foundation study , 4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information will sway the vote in November .
This problem isn ’ t going unnoticed by the U.S. government .
In fact , the current U.S. National Security Strategy ( NSS ) and National Defense Strategy , which have traditionally focused on conventional military might , highlight the importance of information warfare in international conflicts and in undermining the legitimacy of elections .
Despite this , the United States still doesn ’ t have a clear strategy to combat information warfare .
Meanwhile , authoritarian states are ramping up their use of disinformation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s clear that China and Russia—the two countries that pose the gravest threats to the United States , according to the NSS—are using aggressive information warfare tactics to exploit the pandemic and to erode and undermine the liberal international order .
While the United States is slowly responding to the onslaught of propaganda , these efforts fall far short of what is necessary to compete effectively with China and Russia in the long term .
Disinformation , of course , is a critical component of this , but it ’ s far from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are actively experimenting with both defensive and offensive information campaigns as tools of both domestic control and , increasingly , foreign policy .
Defensive information warfare includes disinformation campaigns meant to discredit dissidents and the use of public data to , for instance , track and arrest journalists .
Offensive campaigns , on the other hand , undermine and disrupt other countries by using digital media platforms and artificial amplification through automated or fake accounts such as bots , trolls , and sock puppets , as well as syndicated media distribution .
Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigns as tools of both domestic control and , increasingly , foreign policy.While these campaigns are most often associated with Russia , the Chinese government has also been rapidly weaponizing public information and the cybersphere—especially during the pandemic .
Beijing has aggressively amplified false narratives about the origin of the coronavirus .
Zhao Lijian , a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs , has falsely claimed multiple times that the U.S. Army visited Wuhan in 2019 to spread the virus , and the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) has also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the outbreak .
In addition , it has actively promoted a perception of China as a responsible global leader through artificial amplification despite , for example , sending defective COVID-19 testing kits and masks to the Netherlands , Spain , and Turkey .
Meanwhile , Moscow has used coronavirus disinformation to amplify anti-European Union sentiment and movements throughout Western Europe .
This is consistent with Russia ’ s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and highlights its efforts to undermine the EU and the United States concurrently .
The problems are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them in the United States , the current policy debate around these information campaigns lacks clear—and necessary—long-term objectives .
In order to address the threats from both China and Russia , the United States needs to do three things .
First , the U.S. government should treat disinformation as it would any major threat to national security .
Disinformation mitigation in the form of deleting suspicious inorganic accounts and posts will never be agile enough to keep online agitators and unwitting disseminators at bay : The Kremlin and the CCP can manufacture or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than other governments or companies can remove them.The U.S. government should treat disinformation as it would any major threat to national security .
Along these lines , the U.S. government and civil society organizations should step back and target the entire ecosystem of disinformation propagation—including where it comes from , how it ’ s disseminated , and what effects it has .
They should focus especially on the automated mechanisms , such as bots and trolls , that amplify foreign regime-affiliated accounts and disinformation , as well as popular infiltration avenues , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accounts or websites .
( Washington has designated Chinese state-aligned media outlets , such as Xinhua , CGTN , China Radio , and the People ’ s Daily , as foreign agents of the CCP . )
Technological solutions , such as automation detection , will be key to identifying and targeting mass groups of accounts and content across digital media platforms .
Second , U.S. security stakeholders should expect disinformation from abroad to be a permanent feature of political and economic life throughout the pandemic .
Now that national security analysts are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should provide much more than just labeling and reactive fact-checking , which is what social media companies have started to do .
It should quickly develop and implement a widely available public portal that allows individuals and organizations to easily ascertain two things : where content originated ( and whether it ’ s from a reputable media outlet or from a known propaganda or conspiracy site ) and how content has reached a media platform or outlet .
These are crucial pieces of information , since a typical disinformation campaign begins at an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state-owned news outlet Sputnik ; becomes amplified in regime-owned social media ; infiltrates Western social media platforms ; and then occasionally gets picked up by larger U.S. media outlets .
U.S. security stakeholders should expect disinformation from abroad to be a permanent feature of political and economic life throughout the pandemic .
Third , both the public sector and business leaders should embrace and promote public and private partnerships .
Some of the best solutions to technological problems come from Silicon Valley .
It ’ s true that the U.S. government has set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Innovation Unit and National Security Innovation Network , under the Defense Innovation Board , to accelerate the use of emerging technologies that use artificial intelligence and data analytics .
Yet these initiatives are still hamstrung by complex bureaucracy and protracted contracting processes that aim to acquire commercially available algorithmic solutions—an organizational issue widely shared across democracies .
Ultimately , the United States needs to adopt a more holistic approach to the technostrategic race that defines the current nature of great-power competition with China and Russia .
Each government agency that ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustain an advisory council of think tanks and academic and private sector stakeholders .
The country has done it before , with , for example , the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence .
However , both commissions remain too narrowly focused to combat information warfare , which is famously hard to pin down .
Even the Defense Department has acknowledged the need for integrated information warfare that transcends the traditional divides between , among other things , cyberwarfare , psychological operations , and military deception .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ go even further .
One clear way of implementing the necessary steps would be to create a bipartisan , private-public commission on information warfare that cuts across current bureaucratic—and political—divides .
This council of experts should then convene regularly to discuss strategic challenges in the information environment and find real solutions to them .
This is not a novel concept .
Other major powers have similar institutions—for instance , China ’ s Central Military Commission runs a Science and Technology Commission .
The United States just has to follow suit .
The COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of disinformation by authoritarian regimes , but naming the problem is not enough .
China and Russia have weaponized the information environment for too long , and democratic countries need to find ways to preserve the principles of an open society and organic online discourse .
In the face of information warfare , the United States in particular has the dual advantages of technological innovation and an unparalleled national security apparatus .
It ’ s time to use them .

The stakes in this year’s U.S. presidential election are arguably higher than they were in 2016. Yet fears about foreign interference in U.S. elections have only grown in the past four years. Instead of traditional weapons, foreign adversaries are once again turning to social media in their attempts to undermine the upcoming election, and 2020 alone has seen a rash of disinformation about the coronavirus , political unrest , and election integrity . According to a new Gallup/Knight Foundation study , 4 in 5 Americans are concerned that false information will sway the vote in November.
The stakes in this year’s U.S. presidential election are arguably higher than they were in 2016. Yet fears about foreign interference in U.S. elections have only grown in the past four years. Instead of traditional weapons, foreign adversaries are once again turning to social media in their attempts to undermine the upcoming election, and 2020 alone has seen a rash of disinformation about the coronavirus, political unrest, and election integrity. According to a new Gallup/Knight Foundation study, 4 in 5 Americans are concerned that false information will sway the vote in November.
This problem isn’t going unnoticed by the U.S. government. In fact, the current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy, which have traditionally focused on conventional military might, highlight the importance of information warfare in international conflicts and in undermining the legitimacy of elections. Despite this, the United States still doesn’t have a clear strategy to combat information warfare.
Meanwhile, authoritarian states are ramping up their use of disinformation amid the COVID-19 pandemic. It’s clear that China and Russia—the two countries that pose the gravest threats to the United States, according to the NSS—are using aggressive information warfare tactics to exploit the pandemic and to erode and undermine the liberal international order. While the United States is slowly responding to the onslaught of propaganda, these efforts fall far short of what is necessary to compete effectively with China and Russia in the long term.
In the past couple of decades, the information environment has become one of the main battlegrounds of great-power competition. That’s because information warfare has the power to shape not only public opinion but also perceptions about how states are competing in key issue areas, such as public health and international development. In effect, major powers are using information warfare to sow domestic discord and distrust on their adversaries’ soil, rendering governments unable to focus on external threats.
Disinformation, of course, is a critical component of this, but it’s far from the only threat. Beijing and Moscow are actively experimenting with both defensive and offensive information campaigns as tools of both domestic control and, increasingly, foreign policy. Defensive information warfare includes disinformation campaigns meant to discredit dissidents and the use of public data to, for instance, track and arrest journalists. Offensive campaigns, on the other hand, undermine and disrupt other countries by using digital media platforms and artificial amplification through automated or fake accounts such as bots, trolls, and sock puppets, as well as syndicated media distribution.
Beijing and Moscow are actively experimenting with information campaigns as tools of both domestic control and, increasingly, foreign policy.While these campaigns are most often associated with Russia, the Chinese government has also been rapidly weaponizing public information and the cybersphere—especially during the pandemic. Beijing has aggressively amplified false narratives about the origin of the coronavirus.
Zhao Lijian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has falsely claimed multiple times that the U.S. Army visited Wuhan in 2019 to spread the virus, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also pushed disinformation that blames the United States for the outbreak. In addition, it has actively promoted a perception of China as a responsible global leader through artificial amplification despite, for example, sending defective COVID-19 testing kits and masks to the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey.
Meanwhile, Moscow has used coronavirus disinformation to amplify anti-European Union sentiment and movements throughout Western Europe. This is consistent with Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and highlights its efforts to undermine the EU and the United States concurrently.
The problems are far-reaching, and despite increased attention to them in the United States, the current policy debate around these information campaigns lacks clear—and necessary—long-term objectives. In order to address the threats from both China and Russia, the United States needs to do three things.
First, the U.S. government should treat disinformation as it would any major threat to national security. Disinformation mitigation in the form of deleting suspicious inorganic accounts and posts will never be agile enough to keep online agitators and unwitting disseminators at bay: The Kremlin and the CCP can manufacture or contract out more accounts and trolls faster than other governments or companies can remove them.The U.S. government should treat disinformation as it would any major threat to national security.
Along these lines, the U.S. government and civil society organizations should step back and target the entire ecosystem of disinformation propagation—including where it comes from, how it’s disseminated, and what effects it has.
They should focus especially on the automated mechanisms, such as bots and trolls, that amplify foreign regime-affiliated accounts and disinformation, as well as popular infiltration avenues, such as syndicated media outlets linked to regime-affiliated accounts or websites. (Washington has designated Chinese state-aligned media outlets, such as Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio, and the People’s Daily, as foreign agents of the CCP.) Technological solutions, such as automation detection, will be key to identifying and targeting mass groups of accounts and content across digital media platforms.
Second, U.S. security stakeholders should expect disinformation from abroad to be a permanent feature of political and economic life throughout the pandemic. Now that national security analysts are finally acknowledging this, the United States should provide much more than just labeling and reactive fact-checking, which is what social media companies have started to do.
It should quickly develop and implement a widely available public portal that allows individuals and organizations to easily ascertain two things: where content originated (and whether it’s from a reputable media outlet or from a known propaganda or conspiracy site) and how content has reached a media platform or outlet. These are crucial pieces of information, since a typical disinformation campaign begins at an unreliable source, such as the Russian state-owned news outlet Sputnik; becomes amplified in regime-owned social media; infiltrates Western social media platforms; and then occasionally gets picked up by larger U.S. media outlets.
U.S. security stakeholders should expect disinformation from abroad to be a permanent feature of political and economic life throughout the pandemic. Third, both the public sector and business leaders should embrace and promote public and private partnerships. Some of the best solutions to technological problems come from Silicon Valley. It’s true that the U.S. government has set up several such programs, including the Defense Innovation Unit and National Security Innovation Network, under the Defense Innovation Board, to accelerate the use of emerging technologies that use artificial intelligence and data analytics. Yet these initiatives are still hamstrung by complex bureaucracy and protracted contracting processes that aim to acquire commercially available algorithmic solutions—an organizational issue widely shared across democracies.
Ultimately, the United States needs to adopt a more holistic approach to the technostrategic race that defines the current nature of great-power competition with China and Russia. Each government agency that’s responsible for information operations should organize and sustain an advisory council of think tanks and academic and private sector stakeholders.
The country has done it before, with, for example, the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission and the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. However, both commissions remain too narrowly focused to combat information warfare, which is famously hard to pin down. Even the Defense Department has acknowledged the need for integrated information warfare that transcends the traditional divides between, among other things, cyberwarfare, psychological operations, and military deception.
Addressing the problem fully will be difficult, given the extent of political polarization in the United States—some of which was fomented by Russia itself—but it’s not impossible. One promising idea came from Michael Lumpkin and Mark Mitchell, both former assistant secretaries of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict, when they recently advocated for establishing a secretary of influence operations at the Pentagon.
But the United States would need to go even further. One clear way of implementing the necessary steps would be to create a bipartisan, private-public commission on information warfare that cuts across current bureaucratic—and political—divides. This council of experts should then convene regularly to discuss strategic challenges in the information environment and find real solutions to them. This is not a novel concept. Other major powers have similar institutions—for instance, China’s Central Military Commission runs a Science and Technology Commission. The United States just has to follow suit.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought long-overdue attention to the use of disinformation by authoritarian regimes, but naming the problem is not enough. China and Russia have weaponized the information environment for too long, and democratic countries need to find ways to preserve the principles of an open society and organic online discourse. In the face of information warfare, the United States in particular has the dual advantages of technological innovation and an unparalleled national security apparatus. It’s time to use them.