foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--The Two-State Solution Is Dead. What Comes Next Is Worse.

The Two-State Solution Is Dead .
What Comes Next Is Worse .
On July 1 , Israel could move to annex parts of the occupied West Bank under the terms of a coalition agreement signed in April .
Palestinians , meanwhile , are left questioning their leadership and wondering how they became so far removed from their original goal of a Palestinian state .
As Israel slowly carved out parts of the West Bank over the years , its settlements swallowing hilltops and displacing Palestinians by destroying their homes , the Palestinian leadership cravenly chose its political dominance and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land accountable .
The Palestinian Authority ( PA ) has often resorted to empty threats : this time , opting not to lodge a war crimes case at the International Criminal Court over whether Israel is breaking Articles 47 and 49 of the Geneva Conventions , citing the looming annexation and the country ’ s long-standing practice of transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies .
And as the Trump administration proved willing to change decades of U.S. policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem , then the recognition of Israel ’ s annexation of the Golan Heights .
In January , Netanyahu renewed his vow to “ impose Israeli sovereignty on the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea.
” After three deadlocked elections , the coalition agreement cobbled together between Netanyahu ’ s camp and Benny Gantz ’ s Blue and White party allows Israel to formally annex some settlements in the West Bank and the strategic Jordan Valley—in what is known as Area C @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be brought before the cabinet for discussion as soon as July 1 .
This move is being taken in coordination with Washington .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s peace plan , released in January , lays out a scenario in which Palestinians can enjoy limited self-rule—should they accept 70 percent of the West Bank and meet strict conditions—as Israel annexes the remaining 30 percent .
Trump ’ s plan was summarily rejected by the Palestinian leadership , which rightly saw it as rigged in Israel ’ s favor .
Netanyahu , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan : He has indicated that he wants to gradually annex roughly half of Area C. But he has come up against internal pushback .
Some retired Israeli security officials see this as a potential trigger for Palestinian violence and deteriorating relations with Jordan and other countries , while some settlers who are satisfied with the status quo do not wish to see a Palestinian state of any configuration .
Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi—also of Blue and White—are opposed to sweeping annexation and say it should be implemented in coordination with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as Jordan and Egypt .
Gantz recently said that Israel won ’ t annex areas with large Palestinian populations , and in the annexed areas Palestinians will have full rights .
This would likely mean issuing Israeli residency cards—but not citizenship—to a small number of Palestinians living directly adjacent to Israeli settlements that will be annexed , giving them a similar status to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem .
Gantz also said that July 1 was not a “ sacred date ” and that Israelis had to address the coronavirus pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are also divisions within the Trump administration : U.S .
Ambassador to Israel David Friedman would like to see annexation move forward , while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has made it clear that what happens is up to Israel ’ s government .
Some Pentagon officials would like to see the United States step back from supporting annexation , as it threatens regional stability .
Outside the administration , support for annexation is weak : presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden opposes the move .
Democratic support for Israel has waned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Congress with a more sympathetic streak for the Palestinian cause .
Trump could support annexation entirely or call for a gradual or a less comprehensive move .
Either way , Netanyahu has a few options up his sleeve : He could decide to annex lands adjacent to settlements that are sparsely populated by Palestinians , to skirt the responsibility of giving the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in these areas legal residency or citizenship .
He could also begin by annexing one or two large settlement blocs .
Finally , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look into ways to begin the land grab .
For many Palestinians , annexation is not a new phenomenon .
For many Palestinians , annexation is not a new phenomenon : It has taken place informally in the West Bank for decades through settlement construction and other land expropriations .
Since 1967 , successive administrations in Washington have turned a blind eye to annexations in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights , accepting them as the status quo over time .
But the United States has always publicly maintained its opposition , keeping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and asserting that Israel did not have the right to annex territory outside of international negotiations , for which the United States—seen by Palestinians as a dishonest broker—would always set the rules .
What is new is “ that the Trump administration has gone beyond what any American administration has ever done , ” said Rashid Khalidi , a professor at Columbia University .
Until Trump entered into office , Israel was restrained in its efforts to absorb Palestinian territory .
For the first time , “ the Trump administration has openly endorsed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement of taking over all of Palestine , ” Khalidi said .
The Trump administration has also made clear that it endorses a subordinate existence for certain people under Israeli rule .
Israel enshrined its Jewishness in law in 2018 , formally downgrading the status of any non-Jewish citizen of Israel .
Washington did not lift a finger , even as the law stated that the right to self-determination was “ unique to the Jewish people ” —language at odds with both countries ’ democratic ideals .
Annexation will reveal that creating two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cover up land expropriation and informal annexation that have created a one-state reality on the ground .
Many observers say that annexation , which effectively institutionalizes a formal apartheid regime in which one ethnic group disenfranchises and rules over another , is a logical consequence of the 2018 nation-state law .
“ The idea of separation now is not a separation of two entities on territorial grounds—it ’ s based on ethnic grounds , ” said Raef Zreik , an associate professor of law at Ono Academic College and a co-director of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aviv University .
“ The Israeli nation-state law … and the annexation [ are ] not two separate plans , but two plans that feed on the same rationale , [ which ] is that between the river and the sea , there are two groups of people and there is a superiority of the Jewish people over the Palestinian people.
” The two-state solution is now dead , but what emerges in the short term will be far uglier : one state that cements Jewish supremacy over Palestinians .
It will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ envisioned but instead a codified form of apartheid in which Palestinian life is increasingly constrained , defined by high-tech restrictions and surveillance , such as phone monitoring and biometric data collection .
The spatial limitations of a future Palestinian state are now well-defined : the disconnected enclaves within the West Bank and a hermetically isolated Gaza .
Annexation is just the beginning of coming hardship for Palestinians—more laws will likely be codified , enshrining Israeli rights over Palestinian land and resources .
For example , Israeli annexation would have dire repercussions for Jericho—one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ granted limited Palestinian autonomy following the Oslo Accords , in 1994 .
Palestinians invested heavily in the ancient city , eyeing it as an economic hub for their future state .
For a time , the agreement transformed it into the liveliest city in the West Bank .
But the new annexation plans show the city surrounded by military outposts and settlements , completely isolated from other Palestinian cities .
“ Jericho will [ become an ] enclave within this new Israeli sovereign space , ” Zreik said .
“ So we are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West Bank .
This is a real blow to the continuity of the West Bank.
” Many Palestinians are looking to Europe , the United Nations , and the Arab states for a reaction—seeking collective responsibility to stop Israel from taking this dangerous step .
But they are also aware that their current leadership needs to play a prominent role .
It has so far proved incapable , given internal divisions and a lackluster effort on the international stage that have stopped it from taking stronger measures against the planned annexation .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the PA would no longer be bound by existing agreements with Israel .
But similar proclamations have been made by the Palestinian leadership during tough times in the past , only to fall by the wayside in favor of the status quo .
Threats by the PA over the years that it would stop Israeli security coordination or absolve itself from the Oslo Accords have never materialized .
These episodes have contributed to Palestinians ’ frustration : 63 percent now believe that a two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump administration .
“ The Palestinian Authority has rightly abandoned the Trump administration but has not abandoned the United States .
It should .
The U.S. is not an honest broker , ” said Noura Erakat , a human rights attorney and assistant professor at Rutgers University .
Likewise , Palestinians should not have high hopes for a possible Biden presidency .
The campaign ’ s positions follow a long history of pro-Israel stances by Biden , a self-described Zionist .
At best , Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-state solution and its associated pacts long endorsed by the Democratic Party .
The Democratic Party and its current leadership are as pro-Israel as the Republican Party .
But now more than ever , the Democratic base is more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause .
Palestinian civil society has made important inroads through Sen. Bernie Sanders ’ s presidential campaign and a younger generation of organizers and elected officials .
Palestinians need to take advantage of the slow but steady changes inside the Democratic Party , such as members of Congress endorsing boycotts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Such successes have made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a partisan issue .
If any Palestinian leadership decides it wants to negotiate—whether under a Trump or Biden administration—it can not enter into the same peace process that has been rigged in Israel ’ s favor .
In the absence of a leadership that the Palestinian people deserve , it ’ s incumbent upon Palestinian civil society to do some of the heavy lifting .
Sooner or later there will be a fully fledged Palestinian leadership that can step into the breach .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , save some procedural delay or political jockeying from within Israel .
This will start the process of forming a single binational state—but it will be a far cry from the democratic state for all citizens won through nonviolent sit-ins and marches envisioned by Palestinian activists .
Subjugation and the eventual refusal to be vanquished in one ’ s homeland will likely be a long , drawn-out , terrifying battle of attrition .

On July 1, Israel could move to annex parts of the occupied West Bank under the terms of a coalition agreement signed in April. Palestinians, meanwhile, are left questioning their leadership and wondering how they became so far removed from their original goal of a Palestinian state.
On July 1, Israel could move to annex parts of the occupied West Bank under the terms of a coalition agreement signed in April. Palestinians, meanwhile, are left questioning their leadership and wondering how they became so far removed from their original goal of a Palestinian state.
As Israel slowly carved out parts of the West Bank over the years, its settlements swallowing hilltops and displacing Palestinians by destroying their homes, the Palestinian leadership cravenly chose its political dominance and economic interests over holding the occupier of its land accountable. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has often resorted to empty threats: this time, opting not to lodge a war crimes case at the International Criminal Court over whether Israel is breaking Articles 47 and 49 of the Geneva Conventions, citing the looming annexation and the country’s long-standing practice of transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.
And as the Trump administration proved willing to change decades of U.S. policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has grown emboldened. First came the U.S. decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, then the recognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. In January, Netanyahu renewed his vow to “impose Israeli sovereignty on the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea.”
After three deadlocked elections, the coalition agreement cobbled together between Netanyahu’s camp and Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party allows Israel to formally annex some settlements in the West Bank and the strategic Jordan Valley—in what is known as Area C under the Oslo Accords. The plan could be brought before the cabinet for discussion as soon as July 1. This move is being taken in coordination with Washington. U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace plan, released in January, lays out a scenario in which Palestinians can enjoy limited self-rule—should they accept 70 percent of the West Bank and meet strict conditions—as Israel annexes the remaining 30 percent. Trump’s plan was summarily rejected by the Palestinian leadership, which rightly saw it as rigged in Israel’s favor.
Netanyahu, on the other hand, embraced the plan: He has indicated that he wants to gradually annex roughly half of Area C. But he has come up against internal pushback. Some retired Israeli security officials see this as a potential trigger for Palestinian violence and deteriorating relations with Jordan and other countries, while some settlers who are satisfied with the status quo do not wish to see a Palestinian state of any configuration.
Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi—also of Blue and White—are opposed to sweeping annexation and say it should be implemented in coordination with the affected parties: the Palestinians, as well as Jordan and Egypt. Gantz recently said that Israel won’t annex areas with large Palestinian populations, and in the annexed areas Palestinians will have full rights. This would likely mean issuing Israeli residency cards—but not citizenship—to a small number of Palestinians living directly adjacent to Israeli settlements that will be annexed, giving them a similar status to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem. Gantz also said that July 1 was not a “sacred date” and that Israelis had to address the coronavirus pandemic before moving forward—comments Netanyahu has dismissed.
There are also divisions within the Trump administration: U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman would like to see annexation move forward, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has made it clear that what happens is up to Israel’s government. Some Pentagon officials would like to see the United States step back from supporting annexation, as it threatens regional stability. Outside the administration, support for annexation is weak: presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden opposes the move. Democratic support for Israel has waned as its base changes to include members of Congress with a more sympathetic streak for the Palestinian cause.
Trump could support annexation entirely or call for a gradual or a less comprehensive move. Either way, Netanyahu has a few options up his sleeve: He could decide to annex lands adjacent to settlements that are sparsely populated by Palestinians, to skirt the responsibility of giving the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in these areas legal residency or citizenship. He could also begin by annexing one or two large settlement blocs. Finally, he could do nothing—and create a committee to look into ways to begin the land grab.
For many Palestinians, annexation is not a new phenomenon.
For many Palestinians, annexation is not a new phenomenon: It has taken place informally in the West Bank for decades through settlement construction and other land expropriations. Since 1967, successive administrations in Washington have turned a blind eye to annexations in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, accepting them as the status quo over time. But the United States has always publicly maintained its opposition, keeping up the fiction of a two-state solution and asserting that Israel did not have the right to annex territory outside of international negotiations, for which the United States—seen by Palestinians as a dishonest broker—would always set the rules.
What is new is “that the Trump administration has gone beyond what any American administration has ever done,” said Rashid Khalidi, a professor at Columbia University. Until Trump entered into office, Israel was restrained in its efforts to absorb Palestinian territory. For the first time, “the Trump administration has openly endorsed the long-standing maximalist objective of the Zionist movement of taking over all of Palestine,” Khalidi said.
The Trump administration has also made clear that it endorses a subordinate existence for certain people under Israeli rule. Israel enshrined its Jewishness in law in 2018, formally downgrading the status of any non-Jewish citizen of Israel. Washington did not lift a finger, even as the law stated that the right to self-determination was “unique to the Jewish people”—language at odds with both countries’ democratic ideals.
The concept of a greater Israel—its borders as outlined in scripture—holds a powerful place in the Israeli religious and political lexicon. For decades, the state has implemented the concept and its accompanying settlement movement. But annexation will have important implications for an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—which the international community has long claimed can only be attained through a two-state solution based on the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Annexation will reveal that creating two states has long been a charade to cover up land expropriation and informal annexation that have created a one-state reality on the ground. Many observers say that annexation, which effectively institutionalizes a formal apartheid regime in which one ethnic group disenfranchises and rules over another, is a logical consequence of the 2018 nation-state law.
“The idea of separation now is not a separation of two entities on territorial grounds—it’s based on ethnic grounds,” said Raef Zreik, an associate professor of law at Ono Academic College and a co-director of the Minerva Center for the Humanities at Tel Aviv University. “The Israeli nation-state law … and the annexation [are] not two separate plans, but two plans that feed on the same rationale, [which] is that between the river and the sea, there are two groups of people and there is a superiority of the Jewish people over the Palestinian people.”
The two-state solution is now dead, but what emerges in the short term will be far uglier: one state that cements Jewish supremacy over Palestinians. It will not be the binational state that many Palestinians envisioned but instead a codified form of apartheid in which Palestinian life is increasingly constrained, defined by high-tech restrictions and surveillance, such as phone monitoring and biometric data collection.
The spatial limitations of a future Palestinian state are now well-defined: the disconnected enclaves within the West Bank and a hermetically isolated Gaza. Annexation is just the beginning of coming hardship for Palestinians—more laws will likely be codified, enshrining Israeli rights over Palestinian land and resources.
For example, Israeli annexation would have dire repercussions for Jericho—one of the first two cities to be granted limited Palestinian autonomy following the Oslo Accords, in 1994. Palestinians invested heavily in the ancient city, eyeing it as an economic hub for their future state. For a time, the agreement transformed it into the liveliest city in the West Bank. But the new annexation plans show the city surrounded by military outposts and settlements, completely isolated from other Palestinian cities.
“Jericho will [become an] enclave within this new Israeli sovereign space,” Zreik said. “So we are speaking about something that completely fragments the West Bank. This is a real blow to the continuity of the West Bank.”
Annexation may also be a death knell for the PA and spell an end to what remains of the Oslo Accords. It will likely lead to a crisis in Israel’s relations with neighboring Jordan and fan the flames of violence that have resurged every few years since the Second Intifada.
Many Palestinians are looking to Europe, the United Nations, and the Arab states for a reaction—seeking collective responsibility to stop Israel from taking this dangerous step. But they are also aware that their current leadership needs to play a prominent role. It has so far proved incapable, given internal divisions and a lackluster effort on the international stage that have stopped it from taking stronger measures against the planned annexation.
On May 19, President Mahmoud Abbas said the PA would no longer be bound by existing agreements with Israel. But similar proclamations have been made by the Palestinian leadership during tough times in the past, only to fall by the wayside in favor of the status quo. Threats by the PA over the years that it would stop Israeli security coordination or absolve itself from the Oslo Accords have never materialized. These episodes have contributed to Palestinians’ frustration: 63 percent now believe that a two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible, while 69 percent are opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump administration.
“The Palestinian Authority has rightly abandoned the Trump administration but has not abandoned the United States. It should. The U.S. is not an honest broker,” said Noura Erakat, a human rights attorney and assistant professor at Rutgers University.
Likewise, Palestinians should not have high hopes for a possible Biden presidency. The campaign’s positions follow a long history of pro-Israel stances by Biden, a self-described Zionist. At best, Biden is expected to defend a defunct strategy—the two-state solution and its associated pacts long endorsed by the Democratic Party.
The Democratic Party and its current leadership are as pro-Israel as the Republican Party. But now more than ever, the Democratic base is more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Palestinian civil society has made important inroads through Sen. Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign and a younger generation of organizers and elected officials. Palestinians need to take advantage of the slow but steady changes inside the Democratic Party, such as members of Congress endorsing boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel. Such successes have made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a partisan issue.
If any Palestinian leadership decides it wants to negotiate—whether under a Trump or Biden administration—it cannot enter into the same peace process that has been rigged in Israel’s favor. In the absence of a leadership that the Palestinian people deserve, it’s incumbent upon Palestinian civil society to do some of the heavy lifting. Sooner or later there will be a fully fledged Palestinian leadership that can step into the breach.
In the meantime, annexation will likely go forward, save some procedural delay or political jockeying from within Israel. This will start the process of forming a single binational state—but it will be a far cry from the democratic state for all citizens won through nonviolent sit-ins and marches envisioned by Palestinian activists.
Subjugation and the eventual refusal to be vanquished in one’s homeland will likely be a long, drawn-out, terrifying battle of attrition.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--World Rebukes U.S. Over Iran

World Rebukes U.S. Over Iran

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Tuesday sought to reassert America ’ s waning influence on the world stage , challenging the U.N. Security Council to extend a U.N. arms embargo that is due to expire in October .
Instead , America ’ s top diplomat received a scolding from friends and foes alike in the 15-nation council , which roundly criticized Washington for withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal two years ago without a clear plan to limit Tehran ’ s nuclear activities .
On a day when the European Union pointedly excluded the United States from a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel to the 27-member bloc , the council ’ s chilly reception of Pompeo added to a portrait of an increasingly isolated United States and underscored how little deference other countries pay the Trump administration as it faces a grim reelection contest .
The U.N. debate came amid a sharpening blowback in Washington to revelations that the Trump administration failed to act on months of intelligence warnings that Russia offered Taliban fighters bounties to kill U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan .
The pointedly critical tone of the debate saw Germany accusing Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nuclear pact , while Berlin aligned itself with China ’ s claim that the United States has no right to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran .
Russia ’ s U.N. ambassador , Vassily Nebenzia , compared U.S. sanctions on Iran to the killing of George Floyd , saying they were akin to “ putting a knee to one ’ s neck.
” The dispute centered on the fate of the nearly moribund 2015 Iran nuclear deal , which capped Iran ’ s ability to develop a nuclear weapon but which the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties to the deal , like Iran , want to keep it alive ; the Trump administration wants to kill it before the election , lest any future Democratic administration bring it back to life .
The latest battleground is one provision of that deal , the planned expiry in October of a U.N. arms embargo on Iran—one of the sweeteners of the nuclear deal .
U.S. allies , including the security council ’ s five European states , share Washington ’ s concern about Iran ’ s arms trade , though Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to continue until 2023 regardless .
But they worry that extending the U.N. arms embargo , in clear violation of the pact signed in 2015 , would drive Tehran to kick out nuclear inspectors and set the stage for an even quicker development of its nuclear program .
“ The [ Iran nuclear pact ] , which is the result of compromise , can of course be seen as an instrument that can be improved , ” France ’ s U.N. ambassador , Nicolas de Rivière , told the council .
“ There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons , and its disappearance would improve neither the regional situation nor the security of our populations.
” Since President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the deal , Iran has violated key tenets of the accord by increasing its stockpiles of nuclear fuel and resuming its enrichment of uranium , according to assessments from the International Atomic Energy Agency .
At the opening of Tuesday ’ s virtual session , Rosemary DiCarlo , a former U.S. State Department official who serves as U.N. undersecretary-general for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a “ significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy and dialogue ” and expressed “ regret ” over the U.S. decision to withdraw , noting that Iran was in compliance with the pact before Trump ’ s abrupt decision to pull the plug .
But she also expressed regret that since July 2019 Iran has violated key provisions of the nuclear pact , surpassing limits on the size of its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium and engaging in prohibited nuclear research and development activities .
DiCarlo also flagged Iran ’ s role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia , as well as arms shipments to proxies in Yemen that appear to run afoul of the provisions of the key U.N. Security Council resolution that endorsed the nuclear deal .
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed claims that Iranian-made weapons were being transferred to Yemen and elsewhere in violation of U.N. sanctions .
“ The international community in general and the U.N. Security Council in particular are facing an important decision , ” Zarif told the council .
“ Do we maintain respect of the rule of law , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the jungle by surrendering to the whims of an outlaw bully ?
” The Trump administration this month circulated a draft resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran , but veto-wielding China and Russia signaled they would not support the U.S. plan .
European powers also reacted coolly to the resolution and are expected to introduce their own stopgap proposal to extend parts of the arms embargo for up to six months .
It is unclear if the United States would support their plan .
The Trump administration has charged Tehran with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East through its support of proxy terrorist groups in the region .
Pompeo said that if the United Nations did not extend the arms embargo , it would pave the way for Iran to procure advanced military hardware from Russia and China that would undercut regional stability and potentially threaten capitals in Europe and even South Asia—reiterating misleading claims he made last week about the operational range of high-end Russian and Chinese fighters .
“ If you fail to act , Iran will be free to purchase Russian-made fighter jets that can strike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cities like Riyadh , New Delhi , Rome , and Warsaw in Iranian crosshairs , ” Pompeo told the council during Tuesday ’ s virtual meeting .
“ Don ’ t just take it from the United States ; listen to countries in the region .
From Israel to the Gulf , countries in the Middle East—who are most exposed to Iran ’ s predations—are speaking with one voice : Extend the arms embargo , ” he said .

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Tuesday sought to reassert America’s waning influence on the world stage, challenging the U.N. Security Council to extend a U.N. arms embargo that is due to expire in October. Instead, America’s top diplomat received a scolding from friends and foes alike in the 15-nation council, which roundly criticized Washington for withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal two years ago without a clear plan to limit Tehran’s nuclear activities.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Tuesday sought to reassert America’s waning influence on the world stage, challenging the U.N. Security Council to extend a U.N. arms embargo that is due to expire in October. Instead, America’s top diplomat received a scolding from friends and foes alike in the 15-nation council, which roundly criticized Washington for withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal two years ago without a clear plan to limit Tehran’s nuclear activities.
On a day when the European Union pointedly excluded the United States from a “safe list” of countries permitted to travel to the 27-member bloc, the council’s chilly reception of Pompeo added to a portrait of an increasingly isolated United States and underscored how little deference other countries pay the Trump administration as it faces a grim reelection contest. The U.N. debate came amid a sharpening blowback in Washington to revelations that the Trump administration failed to act on months of intelligence warnings that Russia offered Taliban fighters bounties to kill U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan.
The pointedly critical tone of the debate saw Germany accusing Washington of violating international law by withdrawing from the nuclear pact, while Berlin aligned itself with China’s claim that the United States has no right to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran. Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, compared U.S. sanctions on Iran to the killing of George Floyd, saying they were akin to “putting a knee to one’s neck.”
The dispute centered on the fate of the nearly moribund 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which capped Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon but which the United States abandoned in May 2018. European parties to the deal, like Iran, want to keep it alive; the Trump administration wants to kill it before the election, lest any future Democratic administration bring it back to life.
The latest battleground is one provision of that deal, the planned expiry in October of a U.N. arms embargo on Iran—one of the sweeteners of the nuclear deal. U.S. allies, including the security council’s five European states, share Washington’s concern about Iran’s arms trade, though Europe’s own arms embargo is set to continue until 2023 regardless. But they worry that extending the U.N. arms embargo, in clear violation of the pact signed in 2015, would drive Tehran to kick out nuclear inspectors and set the stage for an even quicker development of its nuclear program.
“The [Iran nuclear pact], which is the result of compromise, can of course be seen as an instrument that can be improved,” France’s U.N. ambassador, Nicolas de Rivière, told the council. “There is as yet no serious alternative to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and its disappearance would improve neither the regional situation nor the security of our populations.”
Since President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the deal, Iran has violated key tenets of the accord by increasing its stockpiles of nuclear fuel and resuming its enrichment of uranium, according to assessments from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
At the opening of Tuesday’s virtual session, Rosemary DiCarlo, a former U.S. State Department official who serves as U.N. undersecretary-general for political affairs, praised the nuclear pact as a “significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy and dialogue” and expressed “regret” over the U.S. decision to withdraw, noting that Iran was in compliance with the pact before Trump’s abrupt decision to pull the plug.
But she also expressed regret that since July 2019 Iran has violated key provisions of the nuclear pact, surpassing limits on the size of its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium and engaging in prohibited nuclear research and development activities.
DiCarlo also flagged Iran’s role in missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, as well as arms shipments to proxies in Yemen that appear to run afoul of the provisions of the key U.N. Security Council resolution that endorsed the nuclear deal.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif dismissed claims that Iranian-made weapons were being transferred to Yemen and elsewhere in violation of U.N. sanctions.
“The international community in general and the U.N. Security Council in particular are facing an important decision,” Zarif told the council. “Do we maintain respect of the rule of law, or do we return to the law of the jungle by surrendering to the whims of an outlaw bully?”
The Trump administration this month circulated a draft resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran, but veto-wielding China and Russia signaled they would not support the U.S. plan. European powers also reacted coolly to the resolution and are expected to introduce their own stopgap proposal to extend parts of the arms embargo for up to six months. It is unclear if the United States would support their plan.
The Trump administration has charged Tehran with playing a destabilizing role in the Middle East through its support of proxy terrorist groups in the region. Pompeo said that if the United Nations did not extend the arms embargo, it would pave the way for Iran to procure advanced military hardware from Russia and China that would undercut regional stability and potentially threaten capitals in Europe and even South Asia—reiterating misleading claims he made last week about the operational range of high-end Russian and Chinese fighters.
“If you fail to act, Iran will be free to purchase Russian-made fighter jets that can strike up to a 3,000-kilometer radius, putting cities like Riyadh, New Delhi, Rome, and Warsaw in Iranian crosshairs,” Pompeo told the council during Tuesday’s virtual meeting.
“Don’t just take it from the United States; listen to countries in the region. From Israel to the Gulf, countries in the Middle East—who are most exposed to Iran’s predations—are speaking with one voice: Extend the arms embargo,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--House Democrats Jockey for Foreign Affairs Committee Gavel

House Democrats are jostling behind the scenes to see who will take over the powerful chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the current chairman , Rep. Eliot Engel , looks poised to lose his primary to a progressive challenger .
Publicly , Democrats on the committee say they are not making any decisions until the last absentee ballots are counted for Engel ’ s primary .
Privately , current and former congressional aides say that the race has narrowed down to two candidates : Rep. Brad Sherman , of California , and Rep. Gregory Meeks , of New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on how House Democrats are juggling competing pressures from the progressive and centrist wings of their party ahead of the 2020 elections , with starkly different agendas on foreign policy , trade , and other issues highlighting fissures in a party still smarting from successive bruising presidential primaries .
If Engel in fact loses , putting end to a 31-year congressional career , whoever is picked will set the agenda for Democrats on foreign-policy issues and could play a crucial role in oversight of Donald Trump ’ s foreign policy if the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past two years , the committee has been at the center of the impeachment investigation and led probes into allegations of mismanagement and politically motivated abuse of office at the State Department .
Engel , who vaulted to the committee ’ s senior ranks in the past decade , has refused to concede defeat to his primary challenger , progressive newcomer Jamaal Bowman , until absentee votes in that race are counted .
Both Sherman and Meeks have already cruised to primary victories in safe Democratic districts .
Sherman is considered more centrist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S.-Israel alliance .
He also has more committee leadership experience under his belt : He has served as a chairman or ranking member on a subcommittee for 17 years and has served in all six of the committee ’ s subcommittees .
But Meeks , another senior member of the committee who previously served as ranking member on the Europe and Eurasia subcommittee , has emerged as the likely front-runner in the race .
Nationwide protests on racial injustice have prompted many House Democrats to push for further diversity in leadership , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House , as expected , Meeks could be the first ever Black chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee .
Meeks also enjoys support from many in the Congressional Black Caucus , whose political arm he chairs .
The New York congressman is seen as holding more progressive views on foreign policy issues , including U.S.-Israel ties .
Both Sherman and Meeks signed a letter urging Israel not to move forward with expected plans to annex parts of the West Bank , initially slated for July 1 , signaling a shift on Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Affairs Committee if either becomes chairman—or ranking member , if the Democrats lose control of the House in the November elections .
( Notably , Engel , seen as one of the most vocal supporters of Israel in the Democratic Party , did not sign on to the letter . )
But Meeks has also faced past allegations of ethical violations—since dismissed—and some Democrats don ’ t see him as a strong voice on foreign policy ; several congressional aides noted Meeks has not introduced significant policy bills to the House Foreign Affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a phone interview declined to comment on the issue , as the results of Engel ’ s primary aren ’ t in yet .
“ Eliot Engel is a friend of mine , the ballots have not been counted .
We ’ ll see what happens there , and I think all of us on the committee are hoping that Eliot ultimately wins his primary , ” he said .
“ It ’ s too early to be commenting about a race that I hope never emerges.
” Meeks ’ s office did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Other contenders for the job have quietly removed themselves from consideration for the post , said current and former congressional aides familiar with the matter .
Florida Rep. Ted Deutch , the chairman of the foreign affairs panel ’ s subcommittee on the Middle East , will not seek the job , two sources said .
A Deutch aide told Foreign Policy that the five-term congressman will not weigh in on the race until Engel formally concedes .
Deutch ’ s decision to bow out of the race could help avoid one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who were divided over his long-standing support for Israel and his 2015 vote against the Obama administration ’ s Iran nuclear deal .
The progressive advocacy group Just Foreign Policy had already launched a petition against Deutch to head off a potential run , but a House aide told Foreign Policy that Deutch ’ s staff had signaled from the beginning that the congressman would not join the race for the gavel .
Progressive lawmakers and advocates are rallying for a more left-leaning chair—with Sherman ’ s past voting record , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal and a vote to defeat a ban on selling cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia mitigating against him .
“ After the damage inflicted by four years of the Trump Administration , we need a chairman who is 100 % committed to diplomacy-first foreign policy , ” said Andrew Albertson , the head of the advocacy group Foreign Policy for America .
“ That means passing authorizing legislation to revitalize the State Department , supporting ramped up investments in non-military tools for engaging the world , and defending agreements negotiated by our diplomats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the [ nuclear deal ] is simply disqualifying.
” A few potential hurdles loom for Meeks , though .
Ethics scandals almost a decade ago dogged him , even though the House Ethics Committee later dropped an investigation into his failure to disclose a questionable real estate deal .
Asked about Meeks ’ s past ethics record holding back his campaign , one House aide said those problems “ might become relevant but it ’ s pretty old at this point.
” Meeks also controversially developed a back-channel relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 2013 funeral as part of a delegation tapped by the Obama administration .
And some Democrats suggest he has been less focused on the Foreign Affairs Committee in favor of his role as a senior member of the Committee on Financial Services .
“ He did prioritize his other committee this Congress , ” the House aide told Foreign Policy .
“ But he wants it , and he has been active on foreign affairs issues in the past .
”

House Democrats are jostling behind the scenes to see who will take over the powerful chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the current chairman, Rep. Eliot Engel, looks poised to lose his primary to a progressive challenger.
House Democrats are jostling behind the scenes to see who will take over the powerful chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the current chairman, Rep. Eliot Engel, looks poised to lose his primary to a progressive challenger.
Publicly, Democrats on the committee say they are not making any decisions until the last absentee ballots are counted for Engel’s primary. Privately, current and former congressional aides say that the race has narrowed down to two candidates: Rep. Brad Sherman, of California, and Rep. Gregory Meeks, of New York.
The behind-the-scenes jockeying sheds light on how House Democrats are juggling competing pressures from the progressive and centrist wings of their party ahead of the 2020 elections, with starkly different agendas on foreign policy, trade, and other issues highlighting fissures in a party still smarting from successive bruising presidential primaries.
If Engel in fact loses, putting end to a 31-year congressional career, whoever is picked will set the agenda for Democrats on foreign-policy issues and could play a crucial role in oversight of Donald Trump’s foreign policy if the president wins a second term. In the past two years, the committee has been at the center of the impeachment investigation and led probes into allegations of mismanagement and politically motivated abuse of office at the State Department.
Engel, who vaulted to the committee’s senior ranks in the past decade, has refused to concede defeat to his primary challenger, progressive newcomer Jamaal Bowman, until absentee votes in that race are counted. Both Sherman and Meeks have already cruised to primary victories in safe Democratic districts.
Sherman is considered more centrist on foreign policy issues and supportive of the U.S.-Israel alliance. He also has more committee leadership experience under his belt: He has served as a chairman or ranking member on a subcommittee for 17 years and has served in all six of the committee’s subcommittees.
But Meeks, another senior member of the committee who previously served as ranking member on the Europe and Eurasia subcommittee, has emerged as the likely front-runner in the race. Nationwide protests on racial injustice have prompted many House Democrats to push for further diversity in leadership, and if Democrats retain control of the House, as expected, Meeks could be the first ever Black chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Meeks also enjoys support from many in the Congressional Black Caucus, whose political arm he chairs. The New York congressman is seen as holding more progressive views on foreign policy issues, including U.S.-Israel ties.
Both Sherman and Meeks signed a letter urging Israel not to move forward with expected plans to annex parts of the West Bank, initially slated for July 1, signaling a shift on Israel that would come in the House Foreign Affairs Committee if either becomes chairman—or ranking member, if the Democrats lose control of the House in the November elections. (Notably, Engel, seen as one of the most vocal supporters of Israel in the Democratic Party, did not sign on to the letter.)
But Meeks has also faced past allegations of ethical violations—since dismissed—and some Democrats don’t see him as a strong voice on foreign policy; several congressional aides noted Meeks has not introduced significant policy bills to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 10 years.
Sherman in a phone interview declined to comment on the issue, as the results of Engel’s primary aren’t in yet. “Eliot Engel is a friend of mine, the ballots have not been counted. We’ll see what happens there, and I think all of us on the committee are hoping that Eliot ultimately wins his primary,” he said. “It’s too early to be commenting about a race that I hope never emerges.”
Meeks’s office did not respond to several requests for comment.
Other contenders for the job have quietly removed themselves from consideration for the post, said current and former congressional aides familiar with the matter. Florida Rep. Ted Deutch, the chairman of the foreign affairs panel’s subcommittee on the Middle East, will not seek the job, two sources said. A Deutch aide told Foreign Policy that the five-term congressman will not weigh in on the race until Engel formally concedes.
Deutch’s decision to bow out of the race could help avoid one split between Democratic Party progressives and moderates, who were divided over his long-standing support for Israel and his 2015 vote against the Obama administration’s Iran nuclear deal. The progressive advocacy group Just Foreign Policy had already launched a petition against Deutch to head off a potential run, but a House aide told Foreign Policy that Deutch’s staff had signaled from the beginning that the congressman would not join the race for the gavel.
Progressive lawmakers and advocates are rallying for a more left-leaning chair—with Sherman’s past voting record, especially against President Barack Obama’s Iran deal and a vote to defeat a ban on selling cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia mitigating against him.
“After the damage inflicted by four years of the Trump Administration, we need a chairman who is 100% committed to diplomacy-first foreign policy,” said Andrew Albertson, the head of the advocacy group Foreign Policy for America. “That means passing authorizing legislation to revitalize the State Department, supporting ramped up investments in non-military tools for engaging the world, and defending agreements negotiated by our diplomats. In that context, voting against the [nuclear deal] is simply disqualifying.”
A few potential hurdles loom for Meeks, though. Ethics scandals almost a decade ago dogged him, even though the House Ethics Committee later dropped an investigation into his failure to disclose a questionable real estate deal. Asked about Meeks’s past ethics record holding back his campaign, one House aide said those problems “might become relevant but it’s pretty old at this point.”
Meeks also controversially developed a back-channel relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and attended the socialist leader’s 2013 funeral as part of a delegation tapped by the Obama administration. And some Democrats suggest he has been less focused on the Foreign Affairs Committee in favor of his role as a senior member of the Committee on Financial Services.
“He did prioritize his other committee this Congress,” the House aide told Foreign Policy. “But he wants it, and he has been active on foreign affairs issues in the past.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-30--The Chinese Communist Party Wants a Han Baby Boom That Isn’t Coming

During China ’ s latest meeting of its top legislative body , the whole world took note as China passed a new national security law , cracking down on Hong Kong ’ s protest movement .
But perhaps even more consequentially in the long run , this year ’ s legislative session saw unprecedented interest from China ’ s policymakers on family policy .
A new civil code made divorce harder while allowing remarried people to have more children , even as the government-affiliated outlet China Daily ran an op-ed calling for China to become explicitly pro-natalist .
The province @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steps to loosen its family planning policy and discourage divorce .
Such changes can give China watchers whiplash .
China did not formally end its one-child policy , which ( although it was sometimes patchily applied ) effectively criminalized many large families , until 2015 .
And yet here we are , just five years later , with public allies of the government writing in a party-owned news outlet calling for explicit childbearing subsidies .
How did the world ’ s most vociferously anti-natalist government suddenly become so explicitly pro-natalist ?
Where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reality is that the data coming out of China isn ’ t good enough to settle the question of how many babies women in China have .
Too many local governments have incentives to lie ( such as in order to maximize funding allocations for schools and hospitals , or , on the other hand , to appear to be highly compliant with fertility-limitation policies ) , civil registration data is too incomplete , and the government is too politically invested in fertility politics to allow data transparency .
And yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems more and more likely that those who think China ’ s birth rate is quite low ( perhaps as low as 1-1.3 children per woman ) may be correct .
The most compelling evidence of this is simply China ’ s recent policy changes .
The country suddenly awoke to its demographic malaise after the 2010 census results came in , and by 2016 the one-child policy was gone .
Yet removing the one-child policy failed to create a baby boom , a nasty shock to China ’ s policymakers , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low birth rates was their strict policymaking , despite similarly low birth rates in Hong Kong , Taiwan , Singapore , South Korea , Japan , and many other countries at similar developmental levels .
That the repeal of the one-child policy failed to produce a baby boom seems to have created a new sense of urgency among China ’ s policymakers : The birth rate must be increased .
Cue the rash of pro-natalist policies coming from the government .
Evidently , the top brass in China are very worried about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and trying hard to boost it .
Yet there are very real limits to what Beijing can achieve in terms of fertility , not least because Beijing ’ s security priorities are hard to reconcile with creating a family-friendly society for all of China ’ s people .
The long legacy of this propaganda can be vividly seen in the recent documentary film One Child Nation , which includes numerous interviews with families and officials who experienced the harshest years of the one-child policy .
To this day , even many parents forced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exposure will profess support for the one-child policy , justified by the official line that the alternative was mass starvation .
And yet the one-child policy was never uniformly applied .
From the earliest days , there were exemptions for a variety of circumstances , and by 2007 a majority of Chinese citizens could legally have two children .
The most common exemption was related to sex : Families whose first child was a daughter were often granted exemptions to have a second child .
Thus , while the one-child policy led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with far more boys born than daughters thanks to gender-selective abortion , it also led to a lopsided female-skewed gender ratio for firstborn children in families with more than one child .
Families who wanted to have a second child had to make sure their first child was a girl .
But there was another , perhaps even more politically significant exemption , provided for ethnic minorities .
The communist government tended to adopt the view that the progress of modernization ( and , hence , communism ) among ethnic minorities was on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese people .
This rhetoric presenting minorities as “ younger brothers ” of the Han Chinese ethnicity was doubtless condescending , but it did yield some material benefits : Many minority groups were explicitly exempted from the one-child policy .
Partly as a result of these exemptions , the 2000 census ( the latest census for which public microdata is available ) showed that Han Chinese women had about 0.5 to 1 fewer children per woman on average than women from ethnic minority groups .
This higher fertility among minorities , alongside greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people leading to hundreds of thousands emigrating abroad , has led to an inexorable rise in the non-Han share of China ’ s population .
As of 2000 , while 92 percent of those over 30 were Han Chinese , just 87 percent of newborns were .
But in recent years , even as China ’ s leaders have lifted restrictions on fertility that only really applied to urbanized Han Chinese people , the reproductive environment for minority families has deteriorated markedly .
Under President Xi Jinping , long-standing efforts to Sinicize minority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unprecedented scale .
While these efforts have been most prominent in Xinjiang , where perhaps 1 million or more people are held in concentration camps , minorities in other regions have felt the pressure too .
For example , Muslims in Ningxia have faced growing pressure to adopt less overtly religious public lives .
Tibet has been saddled with a new “ ethnic unity ” regulation .
And of course this campaign of minority repression extends to Hong Kong , where individuals identifying as ethnically Chinese make up a minority of the population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a majority .
In other words , China has relaxed the one-child policy and adopted a more pro-natalist stance for Han Chinese people , even while embarking on a wave of repression against minorities .
This repression includes a worsening position for fertility .
The figure below shows the change in the officially reported crude birth rate among Chinese regions between 1998 and 2018 , versus the non-Han Chinese population share in each region as measured in the 2000 census .
Many highly urbanized regions with very few minorities ( such as Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) have seen their birth rates rise slightly , while regions with more minorities ( such as Tibet , Xinjiang , Qinghai , and Yunnan ) have seen precipitous declines in birth rates .
( Hong Kong , not shown in this data , is no exception : Birth rates there have fallen significantly . )
Whereas once China ’ s policy was to limit Han Chinese fertility in the name of economic development , but allow ethnic minorities some flexibility , now China ’ s policy stance is evidently , “ Pro-natalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” : more support for Han parents , but increasing discrimination against minority groups .
The U.N. believes that “ high ” estimates of China ’ s birth rates ( around 1.7 children per women ) are basically correct , and even so shows that China ’ s peak manpower advantage over the United States came around 2000 .
Even if those relatively high birth rates remain stable over the next century , China ’ s manpower advantage over the United States and its allies in the Pacific will speedily decline over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if birth rates fall to lower levels ( about 1.2-1.3 children per woman ) , then by 2080 , China could actually have fewer men of fighting age than the United States ’ Pacific alliance network .
And if the United Nations is wrong about China ’ s historic fertility rates , if demographers arguing that China ’ s population is 100 million to 150 million lower than official tallies suggest are correct , then the date at which U.S. and allied potential conscripts outnumber their Chinese rivals could come as early as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ why China ’ s policymakers have made such a sudden about-face .
Had the policy regime of one-child limits for Han Chinese people with exemptions for minorities or firstborn girls continued , then the total number of men of fighting age would have declined at an extraordinary pace , and a rising share of those men would have been members of ethnic minorities that Chinese military planners may regard with suspicion when it comes to matters of national security .
Even aside from national security concerns , this plummeting population of young people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better , but still show a steep negative trend ) jeopardizes the “ China Dream ” promoted by China ’ s current leaders .
Rather than a thriving middle class robustly demonstrating the vitality of the Chinese model of governance , China is likely to see economic growth slow down in the middle-income range even as it runs out of workers to continue its labor-fueled growth model .
If birth rates in China have in fact been on the lower end of expert estimates for some time now , then China may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decline than official statistics have indicated .
Official statisticians might know this , but the main issue in Chinese statistics is with low quality of reporting at the local level , so even the government itself may not know the extent of the problem .
But military recruiters may have a better sense of the changing demography on the ground , especially among men of recruitment age in the poorer areas of the countryside that the military largely recruits from .
State-owned firms that hire hundreds of thousands of workers every year might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pulse of the nation .
These institutions have far more leverage with China ’ s policymakers than academic researchers .
If they were signaling a dire demographic scenario , it would trigger exactly the kind of policy response China is now implementing .
However , these measures are not likely to meet much success .
Thus far , China has only taken tentative steps in the direction of childbearing support and maternity leave , while making divorce harder .
Childc are remains difficult to find and expensive when available .
This is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ birth rates .
Writing for China Daily , other demographers have noted that a major reason Chinese young people do not have children is due to the high burdens of elder care associated with small families , but providing more generous social support to elderly people in China would cost the government an enormous amount of money .
Furthermore , the people in China who probably most want to have multiple children ( ethnic and religious minorities ) are seeing the hardest policy shift against their life choices , with churches and mosques @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditions suppressed .
Put simply , it will be difficult for China to achieve meaningfully higher birth rates without radically adjusting government spending toward more social welfare , especially for elders , and without easing up at least a bit on Sinicization initiatives .
But since both of these policy shifts are likely to threaten things China ’ s leaders see as core strategic concerns—the military budget and ethnic unity—neither is likely to occur .
As a result , China ’ s birth rate is unlikely to rise significantly , and its population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no matter how many regulations Beijing may put in place .

During China’s latest meeting of its top legislative body, the whole world took note as China passed a new national security law, cracking down on Hong Kong’s protest movement.
But perhaps even more consequentially in the long run, this year’s legislative session saw unprecedented interest from China’s policymakers on family policy. A new civil code made divorce harder while allowing remarried people to have more children, even as the government-affiliated outlet China Daily ran an op-ed calling for China to become explicitly pro-natalist. The province of Henan in particular has taken major steps to loosen its family planning policy and discourage divorce.
Such changes can give China watchers whiplash. China did not formally end its one-child policy, which (although it was sometimes patchily applied) effectively criminalized many large families, until 2015. And yet here we are, just five years later, with public allies of the government writing in a party-owned news outlet calling for explicit childbearing subsidies.
How did the world’s most vociferously anti-natalist government suddenly become so explicitly pro-natalist?
Chinese women hold plastic babies as they prepare for a class photo at a course to train to become qualified nannies, known in China as ayis, at the Ayi University in Beijing on Oct. 28, 2016.
Every discipline has its own issue that is very important to wider society, contentious among experts, and ultimately unresolvable. For demographers, it is China’s birth rate. Lack of transparent, reliable data in China has resulted in massive, public disagreement among demographers about China’s birth rate and, hence, its total population. Demographer Yi Fuxian has led the charge on this front, arguing that China’s population may be overstated by as much as 115 million people. The United Nations’ database of fertility statistics includes estimates of China’s birth rate ranging from 1.1 (from administrative data) to 1.7 (from hospital data), or from 1 (from a regular sample survey covering many topics) to 1.8 (from a 2017 family survey).
Where the truth lies is anyone’s guess. The reality is that the data coming out of China isn’t good enough to settle the question of how many babies women in China have. Too many local governments have incentives to lie (such as in order to maximize funding allocations for schools and hospitals, or, on the other hand, to appear to be highly compliant with fertility-limitation policies), civil registration data is too incomplete, and the government is too politically invested in fertility politics to allow data transparency.
And yet, with each passing year, it seems more and more likely that those who think China’s birth rate is quite low (perhaps as low as 1-1.3 children per woman) may be correct. The most compelling evidence of this is simply China’s recent policy changes. The country suddenly awoke to its demographic malaise after the 2010 census results came in, and by 2016 the one-child policy was gone. Yet removing the one-child policy failed to create a baby boom, a nasty shock to China’s policymakers, who had long believed that the reason for low birth rates was their strict policymaking, despite similarly low birth rates in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and many other countries at similar developmental levels. That the repeal of the one-child policy failed to produce a baby boom seems to have created a new sense of urgency among China’s policymakers: The birth rate must be increased. Cue the rash of pro-natalist policies coming from the government. Evidently, the top brass in China are very worried about the country’s low birth rate, and trying hard to boost it.
Yet there are very real limits to what Beijing can achieve in terms of fertility, not least because Beijing’s security priorities are hard to reconcile with creating a family-friendly society for all of China’s people.
A mural promotes the one-child policy in China’s Yunnan province.
The history of China’s family policy is more complex than Western commentators often realize. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, and especially before the famine of 1958-1962, the communist regime was overtly pro-natalist. But the experience of famine, as well as the “population bomb” worries of the 1970s, motivated the next generation of policymakers to adopt an anti-natalist position. Public propaganda explicitly linked the one-child policy to efforts to prevent famine and stoke economic modernization, a propaganda campaign which both served state interests by minimizing the extent to which famine was caused by state policies and also resonated with the local officials tasked with enforcing the program. Very small family sizes become tightly linked with official and public ideas about what modern life meant.
The long legacy of this propaganda can be vividly seen in the recent documentary film One Child Nation, which includes numerous interviews with families and officials who experienced the harshest years of the one-child policy. To this day, even many parents forced to abandon their children to death by exposure will profess support for the one-child policy, justified by the official line that the alternative was mass starvation.
And yet the one-child policy was never uniformly applied. From the earliest days, there were exemptions for a variety of circumstances, and by 2007 a majority of Chinese citizens could legally have two children. The most common exemption was related to sex: Families whose first child was a daughter were often granted exemptions to have a second child. Thus, while the one-child policy led to a huge gender imbalance in China, with far more boys born than daughters thanks to gender-selective abortion, it also led to a lopsided female-skewed gender ratio for firstborn children in families with more than one child. Families who wanted to have a second child had to make sure their first child was a girl.
But there was another, perhaps even more politically significant exemption, provided for ethnic minorities. The communist government tended to adopt the view that the progress of modernization (and, hence, communism) among ethnic minorities was on a different track than among ethnic Han Chinese people. This rhetoric presenting minorities as “younger brothers” of the Han Chinese ethnicity was doubtless condescending, but it did yield some material benefits: Many minority groups were explicitly exempted from the one-child policy. Partly as a result of these exemptions, the 2000 census (the latest census for which public microdata is available) showed that Han Chinese women had about 0.5 to 1 fewer children per woman on average than women from ethnic minority groups. This higher fertility among minorities, alongside greater urbanization and education rates among Han Chinese people leading to hundreds of thousands emigrating abroad, has led to an inexorable rise in the non-Han share of China’s population. As of 2000, while 92 percent of those over 30 were Han Chinese, just 87 percent of newborns were.
But in recent years, even as China’s leaders have lifted restrictions on fertility that only really applied to urbanized Han Chinese people, the reproductive environment for minority families has deteriorated markedly.
A Uighur woman holds her baby at a night market in Hotan, in China's western Xinjiang region on April 15, 2015.
The minority exemptions from the one-child policy had important effects, so much so that academic research has shown that when provinces made one-child rules stricter, more Han Chinese people would marry ethnic minorities, as a strategy for avoiding the rules. Today, exemptions for ethnic minorities remain the letter of the law in most cases, but the legal and social position of minorities is in speedy decline.
Under President Xi Jinping, long-standing efforts to Sinicize minority groups have been ramped up to an unprecedented scale. While these efforts have been most prominent in Xinjiang, where perhaps 1 million or more people are held in concentration camps, minorities in other regions have felt the pressure too. For example, Muslims in Ningxia have faced growing pressure to adopt less overtly religious public lives. Tibet has been saddled with a new “ethnic unity” regulation. And of course this campaign of minority repression extends to Hong Kong, where individuals identifying as ethnically Chinese make up a minority of the population while self-identified ethnic Hong Kongers make up a majority.
In other words, China has relaxed the one-child policy and adopted a more pro-natalist stance for Han Chinese people, even while embarking on a wave of repression against minorities. This repression includes a worsening position for fertility. The figure below shows the change in the officially reported crude birth rate among Chinese regions between 1998 and 2018, versus the non-Han Chinese population share in each region as measured in the 2000 census.
Many highly urbanized regions with very few minorities (such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, and Fujian) have seen their birth rates rise slightly, while regions with more minorities (such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Yunnan) have seen precipitous declines in birth rates. (Hong Kong, not shown in this data, is no exception: Birth rates there have fallen significantly.)
Whereas once China’s policy was to limit Han Chinese fertility in the name of economic development, but allow ethnic minorities some flexibility, now China’s policy stance is evidently, “Pro-natalism for me, but not for thee”: more support for Han parents, but increasing discrimination against minority groups.
The problem facing China’s strategic planners is a daunting one. The figure below presents the United Nations’ estimates and forecasts of the population of men of fighting age in China and several countries closely aligned with China, as well as in the United States and U.S. allies in the Western Pacific.
The U.N. believes that “high” estimates of China’s birth rates (around 1.7 children per women) are basically correct, and even so shows that China’s peak manpower advantage over the United States came around 2000. Even if those relatively high birth rates remain stable over the next century, China’s manpower advantage over the United States and its allies in the Pacific will speedily decline over the course of the 21st century. But if birth rates fall to lower levels (about 1.2-1.3 children per woman), then by 2080, China could actually have fewer men of fighting age than the United States’ Pacific alliance network. And if the United Nations is wrong about China’s historic fertility rates, if demographers arguing that China’s population is 100 million to 150 million lower than official tallies suggest are correct, then the date at which U.S. and allied potential conscripts outnumber their Chinese rivals could come as early as the 2050s.
This math helps illuminate why China’s policymakers have made such a sudden about-face. Had the policy regime of one-child limits for Han Chinese people with exemptions for minorities or firstborn girls continued, then the total number of men of fighting age would have declined at an extraordinary pace, and a rising share of those men would have been members of ethnic minorities that Chinese military planners may regard with suspicion when it comes to matters of national security.
Even aside from national security concerns, this plummeting population of young people (the trends for prime-age women are better, but still show a steep negative trend) jeopardizes the “China Dream” promoted by China’s current leaders. Rather than a thriving middle class robustly demonstrating the vitality of the Chinese model of governance, China is likely to see economic growth slow down in the middle-income range even as it runs out of workers to continue its labor-fueled growth model.
A family wearing face masks prepare to board a train at Nanjing Railway Station before the three-day Dragon Boat Festival holiday on June 24.
If birth rates in China have in fact been on the lower end of expert estimates for some time now, then China may be in a more advanced state of demographic decline than official statistics have indicated. Official statisticians might know this, but the main issue in Chinese statistics is with low quality of reporting at the local level, so even the government itself may not know the extent of the problem. But military recruiters may have a better sense of the changing demography on the ground, especially among men of recruitment age in the poorer areas of the countryside that the military largely recruits from. State-owned firms that hire hundreds of thousands of workers every year might also have their finger on the demographic pulse of the nation. These institutions have far more leverage with China’s policymakers than academic researchers. If they were signaling a dire demographic scenario, it would trigger exactly the kind of policy response China is now implementing.
However, these measures are not likely to meet much success. Thus far, China has only taken tentative steps in the direction of childbearing support and maternity leave, while making divorce harder. Childc are remains difficult to find and expensive when available. This is not a recipe for a large increase in birth rates.
Writing for China Daily, other demographers have noted that a major reason Chinese young people do not have children is due to the high burdens of elder care associated with small families, but providing more generous social support to elderly people in China would cost the government an enormous amount of money. Furthermore, the people in China who probably most want to have multiple children (ethnic and religious minorities) are seeing the hardest policy shift against their life choices, with churches and mosques being closed and minority languages and cultural traditions suppressed.
Put simply, it will be difficult for China to achieve meaningfully higher birth rates without radically adjusting government spending toward more social welfare, especially for elders, and without easing up at least a bit on Sinicization initiatives. But since both of these policy shifts are likely to threaten things China’s leaders see as core strategic concerns—the military budget and ethnic unity—neither is likely to occur. As a result, China’s birth rate is unlikely to rise significantly, and its population decline is likely to be precipitous, no matter how many regulations Beijing may put in place.