foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--How Bibi’s Friends in the Settlements and in Washington Helped Scuttle His Annexation Move

How Bibi ’ s Friends in the Settlements and in Washington Helped Scuttle His Annexation Move TEL AVIV , Israel—Ever since Benjamin Netanyahu began a record fifth term as prime minister this year , July 1 was supposed to be an auspicious milestone for Israel ’ s center-right government : the beginning of the annexation of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank .
Instead , the date came and went Wednesday , with most Israelis still in the dark about the scope and timing of the move—and whether it will happen at all .
Netanyahu told Israeli diplomats this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out the details with the Trump administration .
But Defense Minister Benny Gantz , Netanyahu ’ s coalition partner ( and erstwhile rival ) , said Israel needs to focus on priorities like beating back a resurgence of COVID-19 .
So what ’ s really causing the delay ?
Bolstered by U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s Israel-friendly peace plan—a blueprint that allows Israel to keep 30 percent of the West Bank—Netanyahu seemed to be barreling ahead in recent weeks , with the potential to upend the relative stability in the West Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ erode Israel ’ s peace with Jordan .
The Israeli leader faced pushback from the Palestinians , Jordan , the Gulf Arabs , and Israeli ex-security chiefs .
But ultimately the move appears to have been scuttled—for now , anyway—by two of Netanyahu ’ s usually reliable constituencies : the White House and Jewish settler leaders .
In Washington , senior presidential advisor and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner has been quietly thwarting Netanyahu ’ s push for annexation out of concern that it could doom the prospects of the peace initiative he helped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home in Israel , leaders of the settler movement have been doing the same—lobbying against annexation as part of the Trump plan because the peace deal requires Israel to recognize Palestinian sovereignty over the other 70 percent of the West Bank .
“ The Trump administration and Netanyahu are no longer in perfect sync .
… Kushner has always seen this as a peace plan , and it ’ s become clear that Bibi sees it more like an annexation plan , ” said David Makovsky , a fellow at the Washington Institute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration is invested in other equities it would like to balance .
It would like to keep Gulf Arabs happy .
And it understands that there ’ s fierce criticism of this [ annexation ] plan , not just in the Arab world but in Europe and in the U.S. ” Netanyahu believes annexation would be an achievement for the history books , redrawing Israel ’ s border to incorporate hundreds of Jewish settlements that are considered illegal by most of the international community .
Israel captured the West Bank in the 1967 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held the territory under military occupation ever since .
Politically , annexation would allow him to draw attention away from his ongoing corruption trial .
Netanyahu also believes that the small window for annexation would close if Trump loses the election in November to presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden .
Biden opposes annexation , and some members of his party have suggested curtailing U.S. military aid if Israel moves ahead with it .
Talk of a unilateral move has already spurred Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to downgrade security coordination with the Israeli government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ damage to its peace treaty with Israel , and Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates to threaten to freeze normalization steps .
The Trump administration , seeking a less provocative move that will enable Arab allies to continue tentative support for the plan , has conditioned its blessing for an annexation on a consensus between Netanyahu and Gantz , who has taken a more moderate position on the issue .
Gantz heads the second-largest party in Netanyahu ’ s coalition and is slated to replace him as prime minister late next year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gantz has said he supports annexation if it ’ s coordinated with the international community but that he ’ ll oppose a move that jeopardizes ties with Jordan .
In an unusual bit of diplomacy , U.S .
Ambassador to Israel David Friedman has been mediating between Netanyahu and Gantz ( Friedman is thought to be more sympathetic to Netanyahu ’ s position ) but has failed to find common ground .
“ [ The administration ] wants to show that this is being done responsibly .
They want to minimize the blowback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ veto back to Gantz , which he didn ’ t get in the coalition agreement itself , ” said Dan Shapiro , a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies ( INSS ) at Tel Aviv University .
“ At the moment , there is not a compatibility among all the parties.
” Despite the delay , the annexation could still go forward at a later date .
Netanyahu appears to have the support he needs in parliament to pass an annexation bill even without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might give Netanyahu the green light if he believes it would help his reelection campaign .
But for now , other issues have pushed annexation down on the priority list .
Israel is experiencing a spike in COVID-19 cases after fumbling the reopening of its economy , and most public attention is focused on pocketbook issues .
Some experts believe Netanyahu himself is worried about the diplomatic consequences of annexation that Israel might face .
“ He doesn ’ t want the Palestinian issue back as an international issue , ” said Anshel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newspaper and the author of a biography of Netanyahu .
“ It ’ s been pushed off the agenda .
Why make it part of the agenda again ?
” Netanyahu has come under fire from his political base , religious nationalist ideologues who spearhead the settlers ’ umbrella movement , the Yesha Council .
They ’ ve rejected the argument of more pragmatic settlers that the Trump plan renders a Palestinian state a distant and highly unlikely probability .
According to the deal , Palestinians must fulfill a long list of preconditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a swiss cheese statelet .
Palestinian leaders have rejected the plan .
“ It ’ s not a debate about how much to grant the Palestinians but on the very principle that the Palestinians have a right to establish a state in Judea and Samaria , ” said Israel Harel , one of the founders of the settlement movement and a former Yesha Council chief , invoking a biblical term for the West Bank that is in common usage among Israelis .
Harel acknowledged that most settlers might be inclined to go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needed to stand on principle .
“ This is a spiritual movement .
The leaders of Yesha are first ideological , then practical .
Agreeing there should be another entity on this land other than a Jewish state is like agreeing to share one ’ s wife.
” Netanyahu should have been able to wrangle a deal that doesn ’ t include a Palestinian state , given Trump ’ s aversion to policy nitty-gritty and Kushner ’ s relative inexperience , Harel said .
Shira Efron , a fellow at INSS , said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status quo is preferable to the Trump deal .
“ The settler leadership thinks , ‘ We can ’ t take our chances and give in on the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state .
The status quo and situation on the ground serve us better for now , ’ ” she said .
The internal tension among Netanyahu ’ s base is highlighted by the dissonance in the prime minister ’ s messages to both constituencies .
In English , he told U.S. evangelicals this week that annexation will help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution .
But his political surrogates in Israel vow to oppose a Palestinian state .
“ You can ’ t have diplomats in Washington saying this about a more , you know , realistic Palestinian state and then have people in Israel saying [ there will ] never be a Palestinian state , ” Makovsky said .
“ Both can not be true .
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—Ever since Benjamin Netanyahu began a record fifth term as prime minister this year, July 1 was supposed to be an auspicious milestone for Israel’s center-right government: the beginning of the annexation of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank.
TEL AVIV, Israel—Ever since Benjamin Netanyahu began a record fifth term as prime minister this year, July 1 was supposed to be an auspicious milestone for Israel’s center-right government: the beginning of the annexation of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank.
Instead, the date came and went Wednesday, with most Israelis still in the dark about the scope and timing of the move—and whether it will happen at all.
Netanyahu told Israeli diplomats this week that the government was still working out the details with the Trump administration. But Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s coalition partner (and erstwhile rival), said Israel needs to focus on priorities like beating back a resurgence of COVID-19.
So what’s really causing the delay?
Bolstered by U.S. President Donald Trump’s Israel-friendly peace plan—a blueprint that allows Israel to keep 30 percent of the West Bank—Netanyahu seemed to be barreling ahead in recent weeks, with the potential to upend the relative stability in the West Bank, unravel the Palestinian Authority, and erode Israel’s peace with Jordan.
The Israeli leader faced pushback from the Palestinians, Jordan, the Gulf Arabs, and Israeli ex-security chiefs.
But ultimately the move appears to have been scuttled—for now, anyway—by two of Netanyahu’s usually reliable constituencies: the White House and Jewish settler leaders.
In Washington, senior presidential advisor and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner has been quietly thwarting Netanyahu’s push for annexation out of concern that it could doom the prospects of the peace initiative he helped draft, according to analysts.
At home in Israel, leaders of the settler movement have been doing the same—lobbying against annexation as part of the Trump plan because the peace deal requires Israel to recognize Palestinian sovereignty over the other 70 percent of the West Bank.
“The Trump administration and Netanyahu are no longer in perfect sync. … Kushner has always seen this as a peace plan, and it’s become clear that Bibi sees it more like an annexation plan,” said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
“The administration is invested in other equities it would like to balance. It would like to keep Gulf Arabs happy. And it understands that there’s fierce criticism of this [annexation] plan, not just in the Arab world but in Europe and in the U.S.”
Netanyahu believes annexation would be an achievement for the history books, redrawing Israel’s border to incorporate hundreds of Jewish settlements that are considered illegal by most of the international community. Israel captured the West Bank in the 1967 war with its Arab neighbors and has held the territory under military occupation ever since. Politically, annexation would allow him to draw attention away from his ongoing corruption trial.
Netanyahu also believes that the small window for annexation would close if Trump loses the election in November to presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden. Biden opposes annexation, and some members of his party have suggested curtailing U.S. military aid if Israel moves ahead with it.
Talk of a unilateral move has already spurred Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to downgrade security coordination with the Israeli government, the Jordanian monarchy to warn of damage to its peace treaty with Israel, and Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates to threaten to freeze normalization steps.
The Trump administration, seeking a less provocative move that will enable Arab allies to continue tentative support for the plan, has conditioned its blessing for an annexation on a consensus between Netanyahu and Gantz, who has taken a more moderate position on the issue. Gantz heads the second-largest party in Netanyahu’s coalition and is slated to replace him as prime minister late next year, according to their coalition deal.
Gantz has said he supports annexation if it’s coordinated with the international community but that he’ll oppose a move that jeopardizes ties with Jordan. In an unusual bit of diplomacy, U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman has been mediating between Netanyahu and Gantz (Friedman is thought to be more sympathetic to Netanyahu’s position) but has failed to find common ground.
“[The administration] wants to show that this is being done responsibly. They want to minimize the blowback from various parties. That gave a veto back to Gantz, which he didn’t get in the coalition agreement itself,” said Dan Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. “At the moment, there is not a compatibility among all the parties.”
Despite the delay, the annexation could still go forward at a later date. Netanyahu appears to have the support he needs in parliament to pass an annexation bill even without Gantz. And Shapiro speculated that Trump might give Netanyahu the green light if he believes it would help his reelection campaign.
But for now, other issues have pushed annexation down on the priority list. Israel is experiencing a spike in COVID-19 cases after fumbling the reopening of its economy, and most public attention is focused on pocketbook issues. Some experts believe Netanyahu himself is worried about the diplomatic consequences of annexation that Israel might face.
“He doesn’t want the Palestinian issue back as an international issue,” said Anshel Pfeffer, a journalist for the Haaretz newspaper and the author of a biography of Netanyahu. “It’s been pushed off the agenda. Why make it part of the agenda again?”
Netanyahu has come under fire from his political base, religious nationalist ideologues who spearhead the settlers’ umbrella movement, the Yesha Council. They’ve rejected the argument of more pragmatic settlers that the Trump plan renders a Palestinian state a distant and highly unlikely probability. According to the deal, Palestinians must fulfill a long list of preconditions before receiving full sovereignty over what would be a swiss cheese statelet. Palestinian leaders have rejected the plan.
“It’s not a debate about how much to grant the Palestinians but on the very principle that the Palestinians have a right to establish a state in Judea and Samaria,” said Israel Harel, one of the founders of the settlement movement and a former Yesha Council chief, invoking a biblical term for the West Bank that is in common usage among Israelis.
Harel acknowledged that most settlers might be inclined to go along with annexation but said the leadership needed to stand on principle.
“This is a spiritual movement. The leaders of Yesha are first ideological, then practical. Agreeing there should be another entity on this land other than a Jewish state is like agreeing to share one’s wife.”
Netanyahu should have been able to wrangle a deal that doesn’t include a Palestinian state, given Trump’s aversion to policy nitty-gritty and Kushner’s relative inexperience, Harel said.
Shira Efron, a fellow at INSS, said that for ideologues like Harel, the status quo is preferable to the Trump deal.
“The settler leadership thinks, ‘We can’t take our chances and give in on the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The status quo and situation on the ground serve us better for now,’” she said.
The internal tension among Netanyahu’s base is highlighted by the dissonance in the prime minister’s messages to both constituencies. In English, he told U.S. evangelicals this week that annexation will help bring about a “realistic” two-state solution. But his political surrogates in Israel vow to oppose a Palestinian state.
“You can’t have diplomats in Washington saying this about a more, you know, realistic Palestinian state and then have people in Israel saying [there will] never be a Palestinian state,” Makovsky said. “Both cannot be true.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System

Last month , Japan canceled its planned deployment of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense systems .
The news came as a surprise to many in the national security establishments of both Washington and Tokyo .
Japan ’ s decision is understandable—the effort was expensive and faced technical issues—but that does not negate the problems it could pose for Japanese security and its relationship with the United States .
Like past tensions the alliance has faced , however , this too will likely pass .
Whether the alliance is stronger or weaker because of it , though , remains to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who announced Tokyo ’ s initial decision to suspend the project , said Japan had two primary concerns : cost and technical issues .
Japan was not confident that it could prevent the rocket boosters from the interceptor missiles from hitting local communities after separation from the interceptor .
According to Kono , although software modifications could ensure correct booster separation , attempted modifications have not been successful , which means that the missile hardware would likely need to be redesigned .
Such efforts would , in turn , cost $ 1.8 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Considering the cost and time involved , Kono said , there was no choice but to suspend the plan , which the National Security Council eventually approved , effectively canceling the system .
It is true that the expense of the Aegis missile project had grown beyond what Japan had signed on to .
The system was initially estimated to cost $ 2.15 billion to purchase , operate , and maintain over its 30-year operating period , but the total had eventually ballooned to $ 4.1 billion—even before the $ 1.8 billion in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Japan ’ s defense budget will likely see cuts due to the government ’ s response to the COVID-19 pandemic , putting an extra premium on resources .
From that perspective , a quick exit strategy is understandable .
There were also political considerations , although these should not be overstated .
There has been opposition in the communities slated to host the two systems .
In Akita , for example , opposition was so strong over concerns of the health effects of electromagnetic waves emitted by the radar ( and anger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ select the hosting site was conducted ) that the Ministry of Defense was forced to abandon its preferred site in May and search for another .
Although there was opposition in Yamaguchi , too , it was never as strong .
It is possible that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to avoid further damage to his administration at a time of falling approval ratings .
This is relevant because , if the technological issues are as severe as Tokyo says and it had been leaked that the government knew of these dangers and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even steeper political price to pay .
These concerns , however , do not negate the still-relevant operational considerations that Japan had given for why the system was necessary in the first place .
Japan ’ s ballistic missile defense system consists of two layers .
The sea-based tier , managed by the Maritime Self-Defense Force , consists of seven—soon to be eight—Aegis-equipped destroyers with interceptors that can target incoming missiles .
The ground-based tier , managed by the Air Self-Defense Force , consists of fire units using the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missiles should they leak through the first layer of defense .
Aegis Ashore was meant to add support to the Aegis-equipped destroyers .
Under the plan agreed to in 2017 , Japan planned to buy two systems from the United States and deploy them by 2025 in Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures .
Beyond the boost to Japan ’ s defenses , the missile system was also designed to benefit the alliance .
It would have helped protect the over 50,000 U.S. armed forces personnel in Japan and enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers otherwise tied to defending Japan so they could be sent to other parts of the region , if needed , without degrading Japan ’ s defense .
The Abe administration argued that this new layer of defense was critical because of North Korea ’ s arsenal of several hundred ballistic missiles and because the current system severely stresses Japan ’ s Aegis destroyers .
Furthermore , rough seas or rough weather , as well as refueling or routine maintenance of the destroyers , meant that the Aegis-equipped destroyers were not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 24 hours a day , 365 days of the year .
Aegis Ashore would address the shortfalls .
All that remains true today , and one could argue that some things have gotten worse .
North Korea has become increasingly provocative .
As Japan ’ s 2019 Defense of Japan suggests , with North Korea possessing ballistic missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan , “ military trends in North Korea continue to pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan.
” And along with having to cope with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is struggling with low recruitment rates—and thus limited crew—which means that pressures on the Aegis-equipped destroyers are not easing .
Even if the force could recruit enough new sailors to fill more ships , at roughly $ 2 billion per ship , this is not a cheaper alternative .
Nor does it solve the coverage gaps problem .
The head of Japan ’ s Maritime Self-Defense Force , Adm. Hiroshi Yamamura , said that if the solution is not Aegis Ashore , it is still necessary to introduce some new ballistic missile defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weather and the climate .
Tokyo has thus far failed to clarify an alternative to Aegis Ashore ; instead , it has moved the discussion into a broader examination of Japan ’ s deterrent capabilities , including the ability to strike enemy bases readying missiles to strike Japan .
As important as it is to understand the factors driving Japan ’ s decision , it is also important to clarify what Tokyo ’ s cancellation does not represent .
Critics of Abe will likely argue that the cancellation of the project indicates a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and Japan , but the cancellation is better characterized as simply a different approach toward a shared objective .
Even if Japan seeks to acquire a different weapons system for its defensive needs , it has maintained a highly consistent North Korea policy , even as the United States ’ own policy has changed .
Similarly , Tokyo ’ s suspension is not a repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump .
Although it is true that Tokyo decided on the system in 2017 , Japan did not do so to accommodate Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the idea had been percolating in Tokyo long before Trump became president early that year .
Japan ’ s 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines , in reference to the country ’ s ballistic missile defense system , spoke of the need to “ enhance readiness , simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.
” This “ sustainable response capability ” referred to a ground-based tier of missile defense .
In turn , the Ministry of Defense began to research the Aegis Ashore and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Aegis Ashore since 2014 , after the United States began developing the capability for two sites in Europe .
By the time of Trump ’ s call to buy more American-made products and weapons , Japan had already decided .
Just because Japan ’ s decision may be understandable does not mean that the alliance will avoid damage .
If something as necessary as Aegis Ashore could fall apart , there are likely to be questions about Japan ’ s commitment to other systems it has declared an interest in acquiring .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ jets , Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles , and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles-Extreme Range , Japan has committed itself to developing a future fighter , disruptive capabilities in space and cybersecurity , and a host of standoff missile capabilities .
All of these are costly endeavors but ones that promise to modernize the alliance through new roles and missions .
If Japan could pull out of Aegis Ashore , despite how critical that system was supposed to be to Japan ’ s security , there could be concerns whether it will do the same for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are costly and will likely involve technological issues as well .
Meanwhile , Japan has already paid about $ 112 million of its contract for Aegis , but there will need to be discussions about what to do with unfulfilled contracts worth 70 percent of its estimated total cost procurements and whether Japan is liable for any of the remaining costs or penalized for breaking the contract .
The United States is unlikely to be in a generous mood .
Trump has already criticized Japan as being a free-rider that does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he reportedly wants Japan to quadruple the amount it pays for keeping U.S. soldiers on its territory .
The allies are left facing a challenging situation , but it may not be a proxy for the overall health of the alliance , because this one issue does not define it .
Bilateral disagreements are not new .
In the 1980s , trade and currency issues took center stage .
In the late 1980s and early 1990s , it was about the development of a future fighter , and it ’ s been about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boots on the ground ” and “ show the flag ” since the turn of the 21st century .
And for a good two-and-a-half decades , they have struggled with relocating the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma .
Aegis Ashore is yet another challenge , but it ’ s one that can be overcome as long as it does not consume the partners .
Perhaps the cancellation could not have come at a better time .
Whether it be burden-sharing discussions under Trump or the opportunity that a new U.S. administration could represent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may have a historic opportunity to discuss new ways to collaborate and explore new roles and missions that consider both the regional security environment and domestic realities .
This could include integrated air and missile defense or even ground-based intermediate-range missiles .
At a minimum , they could discuss ways to improve U.S. foreign military sales to Japan to prevent a similar situation from occurring again , something Kono is reportedly interested in .
The Aegis Ashore cancellation seems to be a challenge to the alliance , but it ’ s not a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s concerns seem understandable and the impacts on the alliance real , it is nothing the two countries can not overcome .

Last month, Japan canceled its planned deployment of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense systems. The news came as a surprise to many in the national security establishments of both Washington and Tokyo. Japan’s decision is understandable—the effort was expensive and faced technical issues—but that does not negate the problems it could pose for Japanese security and its relationship with the United States. Like past tensions the alliance has faced, however, this too will likely pass. Whether the alliance is stronger or weaker because of it, though, remains to be seen.
Last month, Japan canceled its planned deployment of two Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense systems. The news came as a surprise to many in the national security establishments of both Washington and Tokyo. Japan’s decision is understandable—the effort was expensive and faced technical issues—but that does not negate the problems it could pose for Japanese security and its relationship with the United States. Like past tensions the alliance has faced, however, this too will likely pass. Whether the alliance is stronger or weaker because of it, though, remains to be seen.
Defense Minister Taro Kono, who announced Tokyo’s initial decision to suspend the project, said Japan had two primary concerns: cost and technical issues. Japan was not confident that it could prevent the rocket boosters from the interceptor missiles from hitting local communities after separation from the interceptor. According to Kono, although software modifications could ensure correct booster separation, attempted modifications have not been successful, which means that the missile hardware would likely need to be redesigned. Such efforts would, in turn, cost $1.8 billion and take roughly a decade. Considering the cost and time involved, Kono said, there was no choice but to suspend the plan, which the National Security Council eventually approved, effectively canceling the system.
It is true that the expense of the Aegis missile project had grown beyond what Japan had signed on to. The system was initially estimated to cost $2.15 billion to purchase, operate, and maintain over its 30-year operating period, but the total had eventually ballooned to $4.1 billion—even before the $1.8 billion in additional costs. On top of that, Japan’s defense budget will likely see cuts due to the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, putting an extra premium on resources. From that perspective, a quick exit strategy is understandable.
There were also political considerations, although these should not be overstated. There has been opposition in the communities slated to host the two systems. In Akita, for example, opposition was so strong over concerns of the health effects of electromagnetic waves emitted by the radar (and anger at the way the geographical survey to select the hosting site was conducted) that the Ministry of Defense was forced to abandon its preferred site in May and search for another. Although there was opposition in Yamaguchi, too, it was never as strong. It is possible that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to avoid further damage to his administration at a time of falling approval ratings. This is relevant because, if the technological issues are as severe as Tokyo says and it had been leaked that the government knew of these dangers and did nothing, there would be an even steeper political price to pay.
These concerns, however, do not negate the still-relevant operational considerations that Japan had given for why the system was necessary in the first place. Japan’s ballistic missile defense system consists of two layers. The sea-based tier, managed by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, consists of seven—soon to be eight—Aegis-equipped destroyers with interceptors that can target incoming missiles. The ground-based tier, managed by the Air Self-Defense Force, consists of fire units using the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor dispersed throughout Japan, intended to destroy missiles should they leak through the first layer of defense.
Aegis Ashore was meant to add support to the Aegis-equipped destroyers. Under the plan agreed to in 2017, Japan planned to buy two systems from the United States and deploy them by 2025 in Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures. Beyond the boost to Japan’s defenses, the missile system was also designed to benefit the alliance. It would have helped protect the over 50,000 U.S. armed forces personnel in Japan and enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities. It also would have helped free up U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers otherwise tied to defending Japan so they could be sent to other parts of the region, if needed, without degrading Japan’s defense.
The Abe administration argued that this new layer of defense was critical because of North Korea’s arsenal of several hundred ballistic missiles and because the current system severely stresses Japan’s Aegis destroyers. Furthermore, rough seas or rough weather, as well as refueling or routine maintenance of the destroyers, meant that the Aegis-equipped destroyers were not able perform their ballistic missile defense functions 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year. Aegis Ashore would address the shortfalls.
All that remains true today, and one could argue that some things have gotten worse. North Korea has become increasingly provocative. As Japan’s 2019 Defense of Japan suggests, with North Korea possessing ballistic missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan, “military trends in North Korea continue to pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan.” And along with having to cope with tight budgets, the Maritime Self-Defense Force is struggling with low recruitment rates—and thus limited crew—which means that pressures on the Aegis-equipped destroyers are not easing. Even if the force could recruit enough new sailors to fill more ships, at roughly $2 billion per ship, this is not a cheaper alternative. Nor does it solve the coverage gaps problem. The head of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, Adm. Hiroshi Yamamura, said that if the solution is not Aegis Ashore, it is still necessary to introduce some new ballistic missile defense capability that is not influenced by the weather and the climate.
Tokyo has thus far failed to clarify an alternative to Aegis Ashore; instead, it has moved the discussion into a broader examination of Japan’s deterrent capabilities, including the ability to strike enemy bases readying missiles to strike Japan.
As important as it is to understand the factors driving Japan’s decision, it is also important to clarify what Tokyo’s cancellation does not represent. Critics of Abe will likely argue that the cancellation of the project indicates a divergence in strategic objectives between the United States and Japan, but the cancellation is better characterized as simply a different approach toward a shared objective. Even if Japan seeks to acquire a different weapons system for its defensive needs, it has maintained a highly consistent North Korea policy, even as the United States’ own policy has changed.
Similarly, Tokyo’s suspension is not a repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump. Although it is true that Tokyo decided on the system in 2017, Japan did not do so to accommodate Trump, as some have argued; rather, the idea had been percolating in Tokyo long before Trump became president early that year. Japan’s 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines, in reference to the country’s ballistic missile defense system, spoke of the need to “enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.” This “sustainable response capability” referred to a ground-based tier of missile defense. In turn, the Ministry of Defense began to research the Aegis Ashore and THAAD systems. Japan has been interested in Aegis Ashore since 2014, after the United States began developing the capability for two sites in Europe. By the time of Trump’s call to buy more American-made products and weapons, Japan had already decided.
Just because Japan’s decision may be understandable does not mean that the alliance will avoid damage. If something as necessary as Aegis Ashore could fall apart, there are likely to be questions about Japan’s commitment to other systems it has declared an interest in acquiring. In addition to purchasing U.S. F-35 fighter jets, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles-Extreme Range, Japan has committed itself to developing a future fighter, disruptive capabilities in space and cybersecurity, and a host of standoff missile capabilities. All of these are costly endeavors but ones that promise to modernize the alliance through new roles and missions. If Japan could pull out of Aegis Ashore, despite how critical that system was supposed to be to Japan’s security, there could be concerns whether it will do the same for any of these programs, particularly because they are costly and will likely involve technological issues as well.
Meanwhile, Japan has already paid about $112 million of its contract for Aegis, but there will need to be discussions about what to do with unfulfilled contracts worth 70 percent of its estimated total cost procurements and whether Japan is liable for any of the remaining costs or penalized for breaking the contract. The United States is unlikely to be in a generous mood. Trump has already criticized Japan as being a free-rider that does not contribute enough to the alliance, and he reportedly wants Japan to quadruple the amount it pays for keeping U.S. soldiers on its territory.
The allies are left facing a challenging situation, but it may not be a proxy for the overall health of the alliance, because this one issue does not define it. Bilateral disagreements are not new. In the 1980s, trade and currency issues took center stage. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was about the development of a future fighter, and it’s been about ways to get Japan to put “boots on the ground” and “show the flag” since the turn of the 21st century. And for a good two-and-a-half decades, they have struggled with relocating the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Aegis Ashore is yet another challenge, but it’s one that can be overcome as long as it does not consume the partners.
Perhaps the cancellation could not have come at a better time. Whether it be burden-sharing discussions under Trump or the opportunity that a new U.S. administration could represent after the upcoming election, the allies may have a historic opportunity to discuss new ways to collaborate and explore new roles and missions that consider both the regional security environment and domestic realities. This could include integrated air and missile defense or even ground-based intermediate-range missiles. At a minimum, they could discuss ways to improve U.S. foreign military sales to Japan to prevent a similar situation from occurring again, something Kono is reportedly interested in.
The Aegis Ashore cancellation seems to be a challenge to the alliance, but it’s not a mortal blow. As much as Japan’s concerns seem understandable and the impacts on the alliance real, it is nothing the two countries cannot overcome.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Why Is India Banning China’s TikTok?

Why Is India Banning China’s TikTok?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
This week : Why India banned 59 Chinese apps , South Asia records 1 million coronavirus cases , dangerous floods hit Bangladesh , and a review of the new novel A Burning .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
On Monday , India ’ s government announced it would block the use of 59 mobile apps because they were “ engaged in activities … prejudicial to [ the ] sovereignty and integrity of India.
” While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t mention Beijing by name , the list of 59 apps—each run by Chinese companies—made clear that it was the intended target .
The blocked software includes the video-sharing app TikTok , which has been downloaded an estimated 600 million times in India ; UC Browser , an internet browser that uses very little data and is popular among Indians using low-cost smartphones ; and other well-known apps such as Shareit , Baidu , Weibo , and WeChat .
India cited section 69A of its Information Technology Act in its explanation for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Indian law , it could have kept the decision confidential .
Taking a public stand against China was the point .
After last month ’ s deadly skirmish with Chinese troops , New Delhi has faced domestic pressure to come up with a robust response .
Its options on trade were limited and potentially self-defeating , while military options were even more dangerous .
China ’ s technological exports were a natural arena to turn to—and one in which India could actually impose some damage .
Monday ’ s decision is momentous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also likely spur tit-for-tat actions between the world ’ s two biggest internet markets in terms of users .
It may even set a precedent for other countries looking to regulate or ban Chinese tech firms .
The impact on China .
India is China ’ s biggest external market for apps such as TikTok and UC Browser .
While India represents a relatively small source of revenue for Chinese apps , it is still its fastest growing major market .
As Indians grow richer , average revenues per user will increase : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected to grow by 26 percent this year , CNN reports .
New Delhi ’ s actions close off this market .
There may be further action on other Chinese software and hardware , especially 5G products , as Indians become more aware of the potential security threats of Chinese technology .
Just this week , for example , the U.S. Federal Communications Commission officially designated Huawei and ZTE as national security threats , effectively barring U.S. internet providers from using federal subsidies to buy their equipment .
The impact on India .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indians , too .
While the move will please the country ’ s jingoistic media and those calling for revenge after last month ’ s border skirmish , banning TikTok will hurt thousands of Indian content creators who depend on the Chinese app for their livelihoods .
Even so , Indian companies such as Roposo , a local alternative to TikTok , may see a surge in interest and new users .
Chrome is still the most popular browser app in India , and companies such as Google may also benefit from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era of techno-nationalism ?
While the immediate impetus for India ’ s actions comes from the border clashes , the app ban itself is not that surprising given the broader trend of countries trying to safeguard their citizens ’ data .
As more Indians come online through cheap smartphones and low-cost data plans , personal data will become more valuable to tech firms and governments alike .
Given how intertwined China ’ s biggest companies are with the state , it was only a matter of time before countries such as India imposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , India may have left it too long , given the inroads made by apps such as TikTok , and the fact that the most popular smartphone brands in India are not just companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi , but also less Chinese-sounding brands such as Oppo , Vivo , and OnePlus .
( Vivo is the title sponsor of the popular Indian Premier League cricket series , a relationship that may well now be cut short before next year ’ s tournament . )
The question now is how Beijing might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s countries now have more than 1 million confirmed coronavirus cases between them .
India , Pakistan , and Bangladesh are among the top 20 countries in the world with the most cases , in fourth , 12th , and 18th places respectively .
As shown above , the region ’ s countries have been doubling their total cases between every 14 and 20 days .
And with testing rates still low , aggressive contact-tracing is next to impossible .
Nonetheless , the region is reopening for business , as leaders begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immunity may be the only solution for people who depend on daily labor .
Dangerous monsoon flooding in Bangladesh .
Thousands of hectares of farmland in Bangladesh lie submerged from floods triggered by monsoon rains .
A disaster management official told Reuters that the crisis could worsen , with more than 200,000 people marooned and more rainfall expected this week .
The crisis was exacerbated after the Brahmaputra River burst its banks in the neighboring Indian state of Assam last weekend , flooding thousands of villages in the area .
Russia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weekend that U.S. President Donald Trump may have received intelligence showing that a Russian spy unit was paying the Taliban bounties to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan , there has been fallout in Washington .
While Trump says he was not actually briefed on this intelligence , a growing number of voices on Capitol Hill are calling for action .
Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden said Trump ’ s failure to act was a “ dereliction of duty , ” while Trump ’ s former National Security Advisor John Bolton said the news @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s worth pointing out that that Russia ’ s involvement in Afghanistan should be no surprise .
Russian night vision scopes have previously been found in Taliban hands , and U.S. commanders in the region have long admitted that Moscow was arming the Taliban .
As Sajjan Gohel and Allison Bailey wrote for Foreign Policy this week , Russian President Vladimir Putin has worked to enhance ties with the Taliban for years , “ with the purpose of expanding its strategic interests in Afghanistan .
… Once NATO and U.S. forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an opportunity to step in.
” Turbulence ahead for PIA .
Pakistan International Airlines ( PIA ) has been banned from operating in the European Union for the next six months .
The decision came after Pakistan grounded 262 airline pilots from PIA and other domestic airlines with allegedly “ dubious ” licenses—a finding that emerged after an investigation into a deadly plane crash in Karachi last month .
Pakistan ’ s Prime Minister Imran Khan faced criticism this week for using the word “ martyred ” to describe the killing of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Megha Majumdar ’ s A Burning is one of the most talked-about novels this summer , and for good reason .
As I wrote in a review of the book , Majumdar ’ s compelling , timely , and propulsive book “ is soaring up the global bestseller lists thanks in part to its resonance with this summer of discontent and despair , a time when public trust in leadership and Big Tech is dwindling .
One reason why A Burning should appeal to readers unfamiliar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality.
” The former al Qaeda leader was killed in a U.S. raid in Pakistan in 2011 , a decade after he masterminded the 9/11 attacks .
Discussing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in a speech in parliament this week , Khan said , “ I will never forget how we Pakistanis were embarrassed when the Americans came into Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden , martyred him.
” Opposition leaders in parliament strongly objected to Khan ’ s remarks : One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” who “ destroyed ” Pakistan .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: Why India banned 59 Chinese apps , South Asia records 1 million coronavirus cases , dangerous floods hit Bangladesh , and a review of the new novel A Burning .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: Why India banned 59 Chinese apps, South Asia records 1 million coronavirus cases, dangerous floods hit Bangladesh, and a review of the new novel A Burning.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Why India Banned TikTok
On Monday, India’s government announced it would block the use of 59 mobile apps because they were “engaged in activities … prejudicial to [the] sovereignty and integrity of India.” While New Delhi’s press release didn’t mention Beijing by name, the list of 59 apps—each run by Chinese companies—made clear that it was the intended target.
The blocked software includes the video-sharing app TikTok, which has been downloaded an estimated 600 million times in India; UC Browser, an internet browser that uses very little data and is popular among Indians using low-cost smartphones; and other well-known apps such as Shareit, Baidu, Weibo, and WeChat.
India cited section 69A of its Information Technology Act in its explanation for why it took action. But according to Indian law, it could have kept the decision confidential. Taking a public stand against China was the point. After last month’s deadly skirmish with Chinese troops, New Delhi has faced domestic pressure to come up with a robust response. Its options on trade were limited and potentially self-defeating, while military options were even more dangerous. China’s technological exports were a natural arena to turn to—and one in which India could actually impose some damage.
Monday’s decision is momentous on its own, but it will also likely spur tit-for-tat actions between the world’s two biggest internet markets in terms of users. It may even set a precedent for other countries looking to regulate or ban Chinese tech firms.
The impact on China. India is China’s biggest external market for apps such as TikTok and UC Browser. While India represents a relatively small source of revenue for Chinese apps, it is still its fastest growing major market. As Indians grow richer, average revenues per user will increase: India’s digital advertising market is expected to grow by 26 percent this year, CNN reports. New Delhi’s actions close off this market. There may be further action on other Chinese software and hardware, especially 5G products, as Indians become more aware of the potential security threats of Chinese technology.
Just this week, for example, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission officially designated Huawei and ZTE as national security threats, effectively barring U.S. internet providers from using federal subsidies to buy their equipment.
The impact on India. New Delhi’s decision will hurt Indians, too. While the move will please the country’s jingoistic media and those calling for revenge after last month’s border skirmish, banning TikTok will hurt thousands of Indian content creators who depend on the Chinese app for their livelihoods. Even so, Indian companies such as Roposo, a local alternative to TikTok, may see a surge in interest and new users. Chrome is still the most popular browser app in India, and companies such as Google may also benefit from the blocking of UC Browser.
A new era of techno-nationalism? While the immediate impetus for India’s actions comes from the border clashes, the app ban itself is not that surprising given the broader trend of countries trying to safeguard their citizens’ data. As more Indians come online through cheap smartphones and low-cost data plans, personal data will become more valuable to tech firms and governments alike. Given how intertwined China’s biggest companies are with the state, it was only a matter of time before countries such as India imposed their own Great Firewalls.
If anything, India may have left it too long, given the inroads made by apps such as TikTok, and the fact that the most popular smartphone brands in India are not just companies such as Huawei and Xiaomi, but also less Chinese-sounding brands such as Oppo, Vivo, and OnePlus. (Vivo is the title sponsor of the popular Indian Premier League cricket series, a relationship that may well now be cut short before next year’s tournament.)
The question now is how Beijing might retaliate.
What We’re Following
Coronavirus update. South Asia’s countries now have more than 1 million confirmed coronavirus cases between them. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are among the top 20 countries in the world with the most cases, in fourth, 12th, and 18th places respectively. As shown above, the region’s countries have been doubling their total cases between every 14 and 20 days. And with testing rates still low, aggressive contact-tracing is next to impossible. Nonetheless, the region is reopening for business, as leaders begin to accept that some form of herd immunity may be the only solution for people who depend on daily labor.
Dangerous monsoon flooding in Bangladesh. Thousands of hectares of farmland in Bangladesh lie submerged from floods triggered by monsoon rains. A disaster management official told Reuters that the crisis could worsen, with more than 200,000 people marooned and more rainfall expected this week. The crisis was exacerbated after the Brahmaputra River burst its banks in the neighboring Indian state of Assam last weekend, flooding thousands of villages in the area.
Russia’s Afghanistan “bountygate.” After revelations last weekend that U.S. President Donald Trump may have received intelligence showing that a Russian spy unit was paying the Taliban bounties to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, there has been fallout in Washington. While Trump says he was not actually briefed on this intelligence, a growing number of voices on Capitol Hill are calling for action. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden said Trump’s failure to act was a “dereliction of duty,” while Trump’s former National Security Advisor John Bolton said the news merited “a very serious response.”
It’s worth pointing out that that Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan should be no surprise. Russian night vision scopes have previously been found in Taliban hands, and U.S. commanders in the region have long admitted that Moscow was arming the Taliban. As Sajjan Gohel and Allison Bailey wrote for Foreign Policy this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin has worked to enhance ties with the Taliban for years, “with the purpose of expanding its strategic interests in Afghanistan. … Once NATO and U.S. forces leave, Russia will once again have an opportunity to step in.”
Turbulence ahead for PIA. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) has been banned from operating in the European Union for the next six months. The decision came after Pakistan grounded 262 airline pilots from PIA and other domestic airlines with allegedly “dubious” licenses—a finding that emerged after an investigation into a deadly plane crash in Karachi last month.
Question of the Week
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan faced criticism this week for using the word “martyred” to describe the killing of a terrorist. Who was he referring to?
A) Osama bin Laden
B) Ayman al-Zawahiri
C) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
D) Baitullah Mehsud
Scroll down for the answer.
What We’re Reading A Burning, Megha Majumdar, Knopf, 304 pp., .95, June 2020
Megha Majumdar’s A Burning is one of the most talked-about novels this summer, and for good reason. As I wrote in a review of the book, Majumdar’s compelling, timely, and propulsive book “is soaring up the global bestseller lists thanks in part to its resonance with this summer of discontent and despair, a time when public trust in leadership and Big Tech is dwindling. One reason why A Burning should appeal to readers unfamiliar with India is that the novel is not just a critique of modern Indian society but a universal parable on inequality.”
Read the full review here.
And the Answer Is…
A) Osama bin Laden.
The former al Qaeda leader was killed in a U.S. raid in Pakistan in 2011, a decade after he masterminded the 9/11 attacks. Discussing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in a speech in parliament this week, Khan said, “I will never forget how we Pakistanis were embarrassed when the Americans came into Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden, martyred him.” Opposition leaders in parliament strongly objected to Khan’s remarks: One called bin Laden the “ultimate terrorist” who “destroyed” Pakistan.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--What’s in the $740 Billion U.S. Defense Bill?

What ’ s in the $ 740 Billion U.S. Defense Bill ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
We are wishing everyone a happy early Fourth of July ( and for our neighbors up north , a happy belated Canada Day ! )
.
What ’ s on tap today : Congress finishes marking up the Pentagon ’ s authorization bill , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists the Taliban is banishing al Qaeda amid the “ Bountygate ” story enveloping Washington , and the race to lead the House ’ s oversight of the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
It ’ s the most wonderful time of the year : when weary U.S. lawmakers and sleep-deprived congressional staffers hash out how to spend over $ 740 billion of taxpayer money in the annual defense authorization bill .
The House Armed Services committee approved its bill over Zoom just before midnight on Wednesday after a marathon 13 hours of deliberations .
The Senate is expected to take up the bill after the July 4 holiday weekend before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where it already faces a potential veto from President Donald Trump .
Among the National Defense Authorization Act provisions , we ’ re keeping an eye on : Stonewalled Jackson .
The bill gives the Defense Secretary Mark Esper and the chiefs of the services one year to rename U.S. military bases named after Confederate generals .
Trump is threatening to veto the legislation over this provision , setting up a showdown between the White House and Capitol Hill—despite widespread bipartisan support .
Toy story .
The House bill authorizes 79 new F-35 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new nuclear-powered Virginia class fast-attack submarine .
Hell no , we won ’ t go .
The House has opted to strip money from Trump ’ s announced withdrawal of 9,500 U.S. troops from Germany , which has met bipartisan opposition in Congress .
Show me the money .
The bill provides a billion-dollar fund for pandemic preparedness as coronavirus cases in the U.S. military have surged by nearly 3,000 since mid-June .
No , really , show me the money .
The House passed a 3 percent pay hike for U.S. troops @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 860 yearly raise for junior enlisted soldiers , $ 1,500 for senior enlisted and junior officers , and a cool $ 2,800 for more senior officers , Defense News reports .
Flight delay .
The committee adopted a measure that would fence in 25 percent of Esper ’ s travel budget until the Pentagon gives Congress a quarterly report of where U.S. troops are deployed around the world .
Talibanned .
The Russian bounty scandal continues to cast a shadow over Afghanistan , but Trump ’ s top diplomat has said the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still .
“ I spoke with the Taliban again just this week in an effort to further the peace negotiations to try and get them to the table with the Afghan government .
I think we ’ re closer than we were even just a couple weeks back , ” Pompeo said in a Fox News interview on Wednesday .
Pompeo said he has seen indications the Taliban is working to destroy al Qaeda , and there are only “ a couple of hundred active al-Qaeda fighters ” left in Afghanistan .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when top Obama administration officials assessed there were only around 100 al Qaeda fighters left in Afghanistan .
With friends like these .
The NATO alliance can ’ t afford another rift between its members , but it has one anyway .
This week , France announced it would temporarily suspending its role in a NATO operation patrolling the Mediterranean after an incident between French and Turkish warships in June .
NATO announced last month it would open an investigation into the matter .
French officials accused Turkish ships of targeting one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after it tried to inspect a ship off the Libyan coast suspected of smuggling arms .
Turkey denies the charges .
No unmasking .
The Defense Department ’ s new industrial policy chief—charged with ramping up production of masks and protective gear to fight coronavirus—started this week , as Foreign Policy reported last Friday .
George W. Bush administration veteran Jeffrey Nadaner took over as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy on Monday , replacing Jennifer Santos , who was fired and moved to a civilian job in the Navy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans to nominate Nadaner as the department ’ s Senate-confirmed assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs .
Meeks shall inherit the earth ?
New York Rep. Gregory Meeks appears to have an inside track to succeed Rep. Eliot Engel to become the next chairman of the House Foreign Affairs committee following Engel ’ s looming primary loss .
Behind the scenes , there is a heated race brewing in the Democratic caucus for the gavel with another top contender , Rep. Brad Sherman .
Meanwhile , Rep. Ted Deutch and Rep. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contender for Joe Biden , have told supporters they will not seek the chairmanship , current and former congressional aides told Foreign Policy .
A Turkish court begins the trial on Friday of 20 Saudi officials implicated in the murder of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi .
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador visits Washington to meet with Trump at the White House on Wednesday , July 8 .
Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley are scheduled to testify before the House Armed Services Committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brookings Institution hosts the ninth annual EU Defense Washington Forum with the EU Mission in Washington on July 8 and 9 .
The event will be an online discussion featuring speakers including Marshall Billingslea , the U.S. special presidential envoy for arms control , and German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , the German defense minister .
Not in my Marine Corps .
Pervasive sexual harassment and assault issues in the U.S. military were thrust into the spotlight yet again this week in the wake of the of Fort Hood soldier Vanessa Guillén .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Erin Kirk-Cuomo , a former photographer and Marines sergeant in the U.S. Marines , shares her experiences with sexual assault in the military .
Task and Purpose also has a new look into a sexual harassment case in an Army reserve unit that ’ s leading to a re-appraisal of how the military deals with the problem .
Treating the travel bug .
One Taiwanese airport has a novel fix for people itching to travel during the pandemic lockdown : a fake airport experience where you can check in , go through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not leave .
It ’ s the perfect solution for anyone who loves all the tedious aspects of air travel and hates the fun parts .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We are wishing everyone a happy early Fourth of July (and for our neighbors up north, a happy belated Canada Day!).
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We are wishing everyone a happy early Fourth of July (and for our neighbors up north, a happy belated Canada Day!).
What’s on tap today: Congress finishes marking up the Pentagon’s authorization bill, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insists the Taliban is banishing al Qaeda amid the “Bountygate” story enveloping Washington, and the race to lead the House’s oversight of the State Department heats up.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
New Defense Bill Sets Up Showdowns with Administration
It’s the most wonderful time of the year: when weary U.S. lawmakers and sleep-deprived congressional staffers hash out how to spend over $740 billion of taxpayer money in the annual defense authorization bill. The House Armed Services committee approved its bill over Zoom just before midnight on Wednesday after a marathon 13 hours of deliberations.
The Senate is expected to take up the bill after the July 4 holiday weekend before sending it to the White House, where it already faces a potential veto from President Donald Trump.
Among the National Defense Authorization Act provisions, we’re keeping an eye on:
Stonewalled Jackson. The bill gives the Defense Secretary Mark Esper and the chiefs of the services one year to rename U.S. military bases named after Confederate generals. Trump is threatening to veto the legislation over this provision, setting up a showdown between the White House and Capitol Hill—despite widespread bipartisan support.
Toy story. The House bill authorizes 79 new F-35 Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighters and a new nuclear-powered Virginia class fast-attack submarine.
Hell no, we won’t go. The House has opted to strip money from Trump’s announced withdrawal of 9,500 U.S. troops from Germany, which has met bipartisan opposition in Congress.
Show me the money. The bill provides a billion-dollar fund for pandemic preparedness as coronavirus cases in the U.S. military have surged by nearly 3,000 since mid-June.
No, really, show me the money. The House passed a 3 percent pay hike for U.S. troops, which would equal about an $860 yearly raise for junior enlisted soldiers, $1,500 for senior enlisted and junior officers, and a cool $2,800 for more senior officers, Defense News reports.
Flight delay. The committee adopted a measure that would fence in 25 percent of Esper’s travel budget until the Pentagon gives Congress a quarterly report of where U.S. troops are deployed around the world.
What We’re Watching
Talibanned. The Russian bounty scandal continues to cast a shadow over Afghanistan, but Trump’s top diplomat has said the administration’s deal with the Taliban is still. “I spoke with the Taliban again just this week in an effort to further the peace negotiations to try and get them to the table with the Afghan government. I think we’re closer than we were even just a couple weeks back,” Pompeo said in a Fox News interview on Wednesday.
Pompeo said he has seen indications the Taliban is working to destroy al Qaeda, and there are only “a couple of hundred active al-Qaeda fighters” left in Afghanistan. But recall what the government said in 2009, when top Obama administration officials assessed there were only around 100 al Qaeda fighters left in Afghanistan.
With friends like these. The NATO alliance can’t afford another rift between its members, but it has one anyway. This week, France announced it would temporarily suspending its role in a NATO operation patrolling the Mediterranean after an incident between French and Turkish warships in June. NATO announced last month it would open an investigation into the matter.
French officials accused Turkish ships of targeting one of its frigates with fire control radars after it tried to inspect a ship off the Libyan coast suspected of smuggling arms. Turkey denies the charges.
No unmasking. The Defense Department’s new industrial policy chief—charged with ramping up production of masks and protective gear to fight coronavirus—started this week, as Foreign Policy reported last Friday. George W. Bush administration veteran Jeffrey Nadaner took over as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for industrial policy on Monday, replacing Jennifer Santos, who was fired and moved to a civilian job in the Navy in May.
The Trump administration later plans to nominate Nadaner as the department’s Senate-confirmed assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
Meeks shall inherit the earth? New York Rep. Gregory Meeks appears to have an inside track to succeed Rep. Eliot Engel to become the next chairman of the House Foreign Affairs committee following Engel’s looming primary loss. Behind the scenes, there is a heated race brewing in the Democratic caucus for the gavel with another top contender, Rep. Brad Sherman. Meanwhile, Rep. Ted Deutch and Rep. Karen Bass, a longshot vice presidential contender for Joe Biden, have told supporters they will not seek the chairmanship, current and former congressional aides told Foreign Policy.
The Week Ahead
A Turkish court begins the trial on Friday of 20 Saudi officials implicated in the murder of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi.
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador visits Washington to meet with Trump at the White House on Wednesday, July 8.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley are scheduled to testify before the House Armed Services Committee on Thursday, July 9.
The Brookings Institution hosts the ninth annual EU Defense Washington Forum with the EU Mission in Washington on July 8 and 9. The event will be an online discussion featuring speakers including Marshall Billingslea, the U.S. special presidential envoy for arms control, and German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the German defense minister.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Not in my Marine Corps. Pervasive sexual harassment and assault issues in the U.S. military were thrust into the spotlight yet again this week in the wake of the disappearance of Fort Hood soldier Vanessa Guillén. In a moving account for Defense One, Erin Kirk-Cuomo, a former photographer and Marines sergeant in the U.S. Marines, shares her experiences with sexual assault in the military. Task and Purpose also has a new look into a sexual harassment case in an Army reserve unit that’s leading to a re-appraisal of how the military deals with the problem.
Odds and Ends
Treating the travel bug. One Taiwanese airport has a novel fix for people itching to travel during the pandemic lockdown: a fake airport experience where you can check in, go through security, and sit on a plane—but not leave. It’s the perfect solution for anyone who loves all the tedious aspects of air travel and hates the fun parts.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--White House Directed Hiring of Conspiracy Theorist Over Pentagon Objections

The White House directed Defense Department officials to hire a former National Security Council staffer fired for circulating a conspiratorial memo and known for Islamophobic tweets , people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
The move is part of an aggressive push to staff the Pentagon with figures loyal to U.S. President Donald Trump and with connections to ousted former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn that has been met with resistance across the river .
In late May , the White House Liaison Office instructed the Defense Department to hire Rich Higgins as a chief of staff to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Anthony Tata has been selected for the undersecretary role , but he has yet to have a Senate confirmation hearing .
Facing Pentagon pushback , the White House subsequently backed off , telling Pentagon officials not to hire Higgins until Tata is confirmed as the agency ’ s top policy official , but to get his paperwork ready .
Yet the White House reached out again about Higgins this week , a U.S. official told Foreign Policy , asking why the Pentagon had not begun the hiring process for him .
Higgins ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration of moderate Republicans and the appointment of a closely linked circle of acolytes of Flynn into the Pentagon , as Defense Secretary Mark Esper has lost sway with the president and has seen his influence over personnel decisions increasingly overtaken by the White House .
The people familiar with the decision said that the White House Presidential Personnel Office , led by Trump ’ s former personal aide and body man Johnny McEntee , was behind the move .
The Washington Post first reported Higgins was under consideration for a role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another hawkish Trump advisor who was first brought into the National Security Council ( NSC ) by Flynn , Ezra Cohen-Watnick , quietly joined the Pentagon as deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats .
Cohen-Watnick , like Higgins , was forced out of the NSC after Flynn ’ s ouster and subsequent FBI indictment .
Simone Ledeen , who has previously served at the Pentagon and Treasury and whose father co-wrote a 2016 book with Flynn , also recently joined the Defense Department as the agency ’ s top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Flynn-linked appointments to senior defense positions has coincided with the departure of several high-profile Pentagon officials questioned over their loyalty to Trump .
Last month , Kathryn Wheelbarger , who had been performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs , resigned from her job days after the White House selected a new nominee for a top Pentagon intelligence job she had previously been tapped for .
The impeachment inquiry into Trump over the White House ’ s withholding of military aid to Ukraine also led to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rood , who questioned the move to withhold aid , and the June resignation of the agency ’ s acting comptroller , Elaine McCusker , who saw the administration scuttle her nomination for the permanent post after opposing the hold .
“ It is natural that the White House would want to put some of its own thinking in these roles , ” said Mara Karlin , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Obama administration and now the director of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frankly is the background and the views of these individuals.
” Tata , the pick to take over Rood ’ s old job as the Pentagon ’ s top policy official , is already serving in the Pentagon as a senior advisor to Esper , Foreign Policy previously reported , a role he has used to acclimate to the national security portfolio as he awaits a Senate confirmation hearing .
Under rules put forward by the Pentagon ’ s general counsel , nominees can not “ undertake to hire , transfer , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future organization.
” The direction to hire Higgins raised concerns among some defense officials that Tata would appear to be presuming confirmation for the job he had only been nominated for .
Tata retired from the military in 2009 after the Army concluded he forged a court order in an adultery case from a past marriage .
In series of tweets in 2018 , he asserted conspiracy theories that a former CIA director was trying to have Trump assassinated , and he called former President Barack Obama a Muslim and a “ terrorist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate , Tata tried to walk back his comments in an apology letter to senior lawmakers last month obtained by Foreign Policy .
In 2017 , when Higgins was in the strategic planning office at the NSC , he wrote a memo titled “ POTUS & Political Warfare ” that included sweeping and conspiratorial accusations of the political threats facing the president .
Trump was facing public attacks because he posted “ an existential threat to cultural Marxist memes that dominate the prevailing cultural narrative , ” Higgins wrote in the NSC memo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy .
Among those who posed a threat to the president were “ ‘ deep state ’ actors , globalists , bankers , Islamists , and establishment Republicans , ” according to Higgins .
In the memo , he also accused the European Union , the United Nations , the OSCE , the Organization of Islamic Cooperation , and the International Muslim Brotherhood of spreading “ hate speech narratives , ” which he describes as “ escalations of cultural Marxist memes.
” Higgins , in contrast to Tata , has not disavowed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has since doubled down on them .
In his biography , Higgins says he was fired “ after warning of a deep state coup to remove the President.
” In recent weeks , Higgins has re-emerged as a peddler of conspiracy theories on Twitter , claiming that the Catholic Church and Democratic Party have been overrun by communists , appearing to refer to the QAnon theory as a psychological warfare program , and retweeting followers who misleadingly connect the Black Lives Matter movement to the Islamic State .
His recent Twitter missives have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and even former Trump administration officials , as communists and Marxists .
“ Obama establishing himself as the head of the counter state … unprecedented , ” Higgins tweeted on June 3 after Obama addressed the nation after the police killing of George Floyd .
“ Buy guns and ammo.
” On the same day , Higgins also claimed that former Defense Secretary James Mattis had joined the administration through a transition staffer who had met with Chinese and Vietnamese communists in Beijing .
Higgins did not respond to a request for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment .
Higgins , an Army veteran , had previously served as a career official in the Defense Department ’ s irregular warfare support office during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations , according to his bio .
The chief of staff job within the policy secretariat would give Higgins a powerful perch within the Pentagon that allows for significant outward-facing time with the White House and the National Security Council .
A former defense official , speaking on condition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usually held by a non-political appointee , drawing upon long-held institutional contacts within the Defense Department to shake loose stalled policy memos and control the flow of documents into the undersecretary ’ s office .
“ He ’ s very typical of this shitshow of an administration , ” the former official said .
“ The best you can hope is they don ’ t do any damage .
”

The White House directed Defense Department officials to hire a former National Security Council staffer fired for circulating a conspiratorial memo and known for Islamophobic tweets, people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy . The move is part of an aggressive push to staff the Pentagon with figures loyal to U.S. President Donald Trump and with connections to ousted former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn that has been met with resistance across the river.
The White House directed Defense Department officials to hire a former National Security Council staffer fired for circulating a conspiratorial memo and known for Islamophobic tweets, people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy. The move is part of an aggressive push to staff the Pentagon with figures loyal to U.S. President Donald Trump and with connections to ousted former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn that has been met with resistance across the river.
In late May, the White House Liaison Office instructed the Defense Department to hire Rich Higgins as a chief of staff to the undersecretary of defense for policy. Anthony Tata has been selected for the undersecretary role, but he has yet to have a Senate confirmation hearing.
Facing Pentagon pushback, the White House subsequently backed off, telling Pentagon officials not to hire Higgins until Tata is confirmed as the agency’s top policy official, but to get his paperwork ready. Yet the White House reached out again about Higgins this week, a U.S. official told Foreign Policy, asking why the Pentagon had not begun the hiring process for him.
Higgins’s selection comes amid purges in the Trump administration of moderate Republicans and the appointment of a closely linked circle of acolytes of Flynn into the Pentagon, as Defense Secretary Mark Esper has lost sway with the president and has seen his influence over personnel decisions increasingly overtaken by the White House. The people familiar with the decision said that the White House Presidential Personnel Office, led by Trump’s former personal aide and body man Johnny McEntee, was behind the move. The Washington Post first reported Higgins was under consideration for a role at the Pentagon.
In May, another hawkish Trump advisor who was first brought into the National Security Council (NSC) by Flynn, Ezra Cohen-Watnick, quietly joined the Pentagon as deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats. Cohen-Watnick, like Higgins, was forced out of the NSC after Flynn’s ouster and subsequent FBI indictment. Simone Ledeen, who has previously served at the Pentagon and Treasury and whose father co-wrote a 2016 book with Flynn, also recently joined the Defense Department as the agency’s top Middle East policy official.
The rise of Flynn-linked appointments to senior defense positions has coincided with the departure of several high-profile Pentagon officials questioned over their loyalty to Trump. Last month, Kathryn Wheelbarger, who had been performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, resigned from her job days after the White House selected a new nominee for a top Pentagon intelligence job she had previously been tapped for. The impeachment inquiry into Trump over the White House’s withholding of military aid to Ukraine also led to the February ouster of Pentagon policy chief John Rood, who questioned the move to withhold aid, and the June resignation of the agency’s acting comptroller, Elaine McCusker, who saw the administration scuttle her nomination for the permanent post after opposing the hold.
“It is natural that the White House would want to put some of its own thinking in these roles,” said Mara Karlin, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Obama administration and now the director of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “What is more anomalous frankly is the background and the views of these individuals.”
Tata, the pick to take over Rood’s old job as the Pentagon’s top policy official, is already serving in the Pentagon as a senior advisor to Esper, Foreign Policy previously reported, a role he has used to acclimate to the national security portfolio as he awaits a Senate confirmation hearing.
Under rules put forward by the Pentagon’s general counsel, nominees cannot “undertake to hire, transfer, or terminate” members of “a potential future organization.” The direction to hire Higgins raised concerns among some defense officials that Tata would appear to be presuming confirmation for the job he had only been nominated for.
Tata retired from the military in 2009 after the Army concluded he forged a court order in an adultery case from a past marriage. In series of tweets in 2018, he asserted conspiracy theories that a former CIA director was trying to have Trump assassinated, and he called former President Barack Obama a Muslim and a “terrorist leader.” Facing mounting opposition in the Senate, Tata tried to walk back his comments in an apology letter to senior lawmakers last month obtained by Foreign Policy.
In 2017, when Higgins was in the strategic planning office at the NSC, he wrote a memo titled “POTUS & Political Warfare” that included sweeping and conspiratorial accusations of the political threats facing the president. Trump was facing public attacks because he posted “an existential threat to cultural Marxist memes that dominate the prevailing cultural narrative,” Higgins wrote in the NSC memo, which was first published by Foreign Policy. Among those who posed a threat to the president were “‘deep state’ actors, globalists, bankers, Islamists, and establishment Republicans,” according to Higgins.
In the memo, he also accused the European Union, the United Nations, the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the International Muslim Brotherhood of spreading “hate speech narratives,” which he describes as “escalations of cultural Marxist memes.”
Higgins, in contrast to Tata, has not disavowed the contents of the notorious 2017 memo and has since doubled down on them. In his biography, Higgins says he was fired “after warning of a deep state coup to remove the President.”
In recent weeks, Higgins has re-emerged as a peddler of conspiracy theories on Twitter, claiming that the Catholic Church and Democratic Party have been overrun by communists, appearing to refer to the QAnon theory as a psychological warfare program, and retweeting followers who misleadingly connect the Black Lives Matter movement to the Islamic State.
His recent Twitter missives have attempted to label Trump’s opponents, and even former Trump administration officials, as communists and Marxists. “Obama establishing himself as the head of the counter state … unprecedented,” Higgins tweeted on June 3 after Obama addressed the nation after the police killing of George Floyd. “Buy guns and ammo.” On the same day, Higgins also claimed that former Defense Secretary James Mattis had joined the administration through a transition staffer who had met with Chinese and Vietnamese communists in Beijing.
Higgins did not respond to a request for comment. The White declined to comment, and the Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment.
Higgins, an Army veteran, had previously served as a career official in the Defense Department’s irregular warfare support office during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, according to his bio.
The chief of staff job within the policy secretariat would give Higgins a powerful perch within the Pentagon that allows for significant outward-facing time with the White House and the National Security Council.
A former defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the job is usually held by a non-political appointee, drawing upon long-held institutional contacts within the Defense Department to shake loose stalled policy memos and control the flow of documents into the undersecretary’s office.
“He’s very typical of this shitshow of an administration,” the former official said. “The best you can hope is they don’t do any damage.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Terrorism After the Pandemic

Terrorism After the Pandemic

“ Europe has now become the epicenter of the pandemic , ” Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared back in March .
The warning from the head of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) was stark , but not all countries in the continent reacted with urgency .
Some countries were yet to go into lockdown .
But an unlikely voice concurred with Tedros .
The Islamic State ’ s al-Naba newsletter warned supporters not to set foot in the “ land of the epidemic.
” That might seem like good news , but there are already plenty of Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideology—already living in the continent .
That means that the tempo of plots in Europe has remained relatively steady , even during the pandemic .
The most recent example occurred in the United Kingdom on June 20 .
Khairi Saadallah , who arrived from Libya as an asylum-seeker in 2012 , targeted civilians relaxing in a park in Reading , Berkshire .
Three people died and three more injured before Saadallah was restrained by a nearby police officer .
Thames Valley Police described Saadallah ’ s attack as a “ terrorist incident , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ men , suggesting there was a potential homophobic element .
Following the attack , British Home Secretary Priti Patel commented that “ it is clear that the threat posed by lone actors is growing.
” A new report from Europol confirmed that “ the greatest threat emanates from lone actors or small cells carrying out violence on their own accord without being directed by larger organisations.
” Indeed , radicalized individuals animated by a broader Islamist ideology show no sign of letting up or being deterred by the coronavirus .
In addition to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six additional plots targeting Europe since WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic on March 11 .
The first was actually not a lone attacker but a five-man Tajik cell based in Germany .
All were allegedly members of the Islamic State and received instructions from terrorist planners in Syria and Afghanistan .
The cell had acquired firearms and had scouted U.S. military bases in Germany as potential targets , along with an unnamed individual they deemed to be critical of Islam , before the authorities thwarted their suspected plans .
This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be disrupted in the coronavirus era so far .
Others were simpler , and some—like Saadallah ’ s—proved harder to stop .
Take the case of Abdallah Ahmed-Osman , who went on a stabbing rampage in Romans-sur-Isère , in southeastern France , in April .
The attack led to two deaths and five injuries .
He has since been charged in France with murder connected to a terrorist enterprise .
Ahmed-Osman had mentioned to investigators that being confined to his studio apartment as a consequence of the lockdown in France was an aggravating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ahmed-Osman struggled to cope with the isolation , and writings discovered at his home made reference to no longer being able to “ live in this land of disbelievers.
” That same month , a man identified in French media as “ Youssef T. ” injured two police officers in the Parisian suburb of Colombes via a vehicular attack .
Prior to striking , Youssef T. pledged allegiance to Abu Walid al-Sahraoui , the Islamic State ’ s emir in the Greater Sahara .
Days later , Danish authorities announced that there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ services had prevented a newly arrested lone actor with a “ militant Islamic motive ” from carrying out an attack .
The next threat presented itself in Barcelona , where a joint U.S.-Moroccan-Spanish security operation led to the arrest of an Islamic State-linked Moroccan who was suspected of planning an attack .
Then , shortly before Saadallah struck , a 14-year-old boy was charged with planning an Islamist attack in the United Kingdom .
These plots are noticeable for their simplicity and for being carried out by those seemingly planning to carry out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is already well established that such attacks require little planning and are extremely difficult to thwart .
They ’ ve been the main mode of attack in the last five years : Muhaydin Mire attempted to behead a commuter at a London Tube station ; Mahdi Mohamud stabbed two civilians and a police officer in Manchester ; Usman Khan stabbed two people to death and injured three others on London Bridge before being disrupted by nearby civilians and then being shot and killed by the police ; and Sudesh Amman stabbed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and killed by the police .
In other words , it seems unlikely that the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the nature of terrorism in Europe .
It does , however , present an opportunity for the acceleration of preexisting trends .
For example , a recent report by the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee warns that “ [ t ] he increase in the number of young people engaging in unsupervised Internet usage—particularly on gaming platforms—offers terrorist groups an opportunity to expose a greater number of people to their ideas.
” There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one , EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has warned of how extremists of all stripes could exploit the situation for their own ends : For example , the far-right might blame migrants or ethnic minorities for the spread of the virus .
There has already been reports of an increase in hate incidents against East Asians .
Or governments might be distracted from security issues , which would allow terrorists to regroup .
The U.N. counterterrorism report assessed that “ [ s ] ome Member States have already announced the reallocation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ planned withdrawal ) of foreign armed forces involved in operations against ISIL and Al-Qaida , and the relocation of armed forces to support domestic pandemic relief efforts.
” For its part , the Islamic State was reported as having expressed its hope that with Western countries focused on the pandemic , they would now stop “ meddling ” in Muslim-related issues .
Yet it is also very possible that terrorism in Europe will continue to look broadly how it does currently .
Flare-ups will occur from the far-left , far-right , and various @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to life will continue to be from Islamists , who now have been targeting Europe with some determination and some success for a quarter of a century .
They had been doing so with such success that Europeans were being warned that terrorism was simply the “ new normal ” they would have to learn to live with .
Of course , the same has been said about the coronavirus .
So as new coronavirus outbreaks emerge and fears of a second wave persist , and with terrorism an enduring problem , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ themselves to the specter of these two new normals grimly coexisting .
That is already a big ask for Europe , jolted as it has been in recent years by the eurozone crisis , a huge influx of asylum-seekers and economic migrants , and a string of electoral successes for nativist or populist political parties .
Add in the post-lockdown economic catastrophe that is widely believed to be imminent , and the tensions that have been brought to bear by the killing of George Floyd in the United States , there is no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the challenge .

“Europe has now become the epicenter of the pandemic,” Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared back in March. The warning from the head of the World Health Organization (WHO) was stark, but not all countries in the continent reacted with urgency. Some countries were yet to go into lockdown.
“Europe has now become the epicenter of the pandemic,” Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared back in March. The warning from the head of the World Health Organization (WHO) was stark, but not all countries in the continent reacted with urgency. Some countries were yet to go into lockdown.
But an unlikely voice concurred with Tedros. The Islamic State’s al-Naba newsletter warned supporters not to set foot in the “land of the epidemic.” That might seem like good news, but there are already plenty of Islamic State supporters—and those animated by a broader jihadi ideology—already living in the continent. That means that the tempo of plots in Europe has remained relatively steady, even during the pandemic.
The most recent example occurred in the United Kingdom on June 20. Khairi Saadallah, who arrived from Libya as an asylum-seeker in 2012, targeted civilians relaxing in a park in Reading, Berkshire. Three people died and three more injured before Saadallah was restrained by a nearby police officer. Thames Valley Police described Saadallah’s attack as a “terrorist incident,” and the victims were all gay men, suggesting there was a potential homophobic element.
Following the attack, British Home Secretary Priti Patel commented that “it is clear that the threat posed by lone actors is growing.” A new report from Europol confirmed that “the greatest threat emanates from lone actors or small cells carrying out violence on their own accord without being directed by larger organisations.”
Indeed, radicalized individuals animated by a broader Islamist ideology show no sign of letting up or being deterred by the coronavirus. In addition to Saadallah, there have been at least six additional plots targeting Europe since WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic on March 11.
The first was actually not a lone attacker but a five-man Tajik cell based in Germany. All were allegedly members of the Islamic State and received instructions from terrorist planners in Syria and Afghanistan. The cell had acquired firearms and had scouted U.S. military bases in Germany as potential targets, along with an unnamed individual they deemed to be critical of Islam, before the authorities thwarted their suspected plans.
This is the most ambitious plot in Europe to be disrupted in the coronavirus era so far. Others were simpler, and some—like Saadallah’s—proved harder to stop.
Take the case of Abdallah Ahmed-Osman, who went on a stabbing rampage in Romans-sur-Isère, in southeastern France, in April. The attack led to two deaths and five injuries. He has since been charged in France with murder connected to a terrorist enterprise. Ahmed-Osman had mentioned to investigators that being confined to his studio apartment as a consequence of the lockdown in France was an aggravating factor in his decision to act. Ahmed-Osman struggled to cope with the isolation, and writings discovered at his home made reference to no longer being able to “live in this land of disbelievers.”
That same month, a man identified in French media as “Youssef T.” injured two police officers in the Parisian suburb of Colombes via a vehicular attack. Prior to striking, Youssef T. pledged allegiance to Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, the Islamic State’s emir in the Greater Sahara. Days later, Danish authorities announced that there was “no doubt” that domestic intelligence services had prevented a newly arrested lone actor with a “militant Islamic motive” from carrying out an attack.
The next threat presented itself in Barcelona, where a joint U.S.-Moroccan-Spanish security operation led to the arrest of an Islamic State-linked Moroccan who was suspected of planning an attack. Then, shortly before Saadallah struck, a 14-year-old boy was charged with planning an Islamist attack in the United Kingdom.
These plots are noticeable for their simplicity and for being carried out by those seemingly planning to carry out their attack alone. That makes sense. It is already well established that such attacks require little planning and are extremely difficult to thwart. They’ve been the main mode of attack in the last five years: Muhaydin Mire attempted to behead a commuter at a London Tube station; Mahdi Mohamud stabbed two civilians and a police officer in Manchester; Usman Khan stabbed two people to death and injured three others on London Bridge before being disrupted by nearby civilians and then being shot and killed by the police; and Sudesh Amman stabbed two civilians in London before being shot and killed by the police.
In other words, it seems unlikely that the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the nature of terrorism in Europe. It does, however, present an opportunity for the acceleration of preexisting trends. For example, a recent report by the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee warns that “[t]he increase in the number of young people engaging in unsupervised Internet usage—particularly on gaming platforms—offers terrorist groups an opportunity to expose a greater number of people to their ideas.”
There are other potential negative consequences. For one, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove has warned of how extremists of all stripes could exploit the situation for their own ends: For example, the far-right might blame migrants or ethnic minorities for the spread of the virus. There has already been reports of an increase in hate incidents against East Asians. Or governments might be distracted from security issues, which would allow terrorists to regroup. The U.N. counterterrorism report assessed that “[s]ome Member States have already announced the reallocation of resources, including the withdrawal (or planned withdrawal) of foreign armed forces involved in operations against ISIL and Al-Qaida, and the relocation of armed forces to support domestic pandemic relief efforts.” For its part, the Islamic State was reported as having expressed its hope that with Western countries focused on the pandemic, they would now stop “meddling” in Muslim-related issues.
Yet it is also very possible that terrorism in Europe will continue to look broadly how it does currently. Flare-ups will occur from the far-left, far-right, and various other fringe ideologies. But the primary threat to life will continue to be from Islamists, who now have been targeting Europe with some determination and some success for a quarter of a century. They had been doing so with such success that Europeans were being warned that terrorism was simply the “new normal” they would have to learn to live with.
Of course, the same has been said about the coronavirus. So as new coronavirus outbreaks emerge and fears of a second wave persist, and with terrorism an enduring problem, Europeans will likely be asked to reconcile themselves to the specter of these two new normals grimly coexisting.
That is already a big ask for Europe, jolted as it has been in recent years by the eurozone crisis, a huge influx of asylum-seekers and economic migrants, and a string of electoral successes for nativist or populist political parties. Add in the post-lockdown economic catastrophe that is widely believed to be imminent, and the tensions that have been brought to bear by the killing of George Floyd in the United States, there is no guarantee that it stands ready to meet the challenge.