foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--The World’s Wild and Crazy Vaccine Ride Is Just Starting

The World ’ s Wild and Crazy Vaccine Ride Is Just Starting Wall Street investors , local health departments , and political leaders can all be excused if Monday ’ s Moderna coronavirus vaccine announcement has them feeling a bit whipsawed .
Buyer ’ s remorse has heads spinning from Pfizer ’ s SARS-CoV-2 vaccine to Moderna ’ s .
Get used to it .
With more than 200 vaccines in development , there will be months of confusion and tougher choices ahead .
Based on press releases—which is all the world has at this point to work with—the COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BioNTech , which uses mRNA as genetic code for the spike proteins that protrude from the surface of spherical viruses , offers more than 90 percent protection after recipients had two doses administered .
But the product is highly unstable , requiring storage and transport in freezers that can hold temperatures below minus 100 degrees Fahrenheit .
The Moderna vaccine , which is also an mRNA-based American-made products , was 94.5 percent protective for volunteers who received two doses but were tested for infection after two weeks .
And it is a more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in standard commercial deep freezers , at minus 4 degrees Fahrenheit .
It can even safely sit for up to 12 hours at room temperature , according to a Moderna press release .
“ To me the surprise is not that the efficacy looks great , but that the stability is better , which makes vaccination campaigns significantly easier , ” said Jaap Goudsmit of the Harvard T.H .
Chan School of Public Health .
Richard Hatchett , the CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations , echoed Goudsmit , saying Moderna @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as we could have hoped for .
… The fact that the vaccine shows stability when stored in a normal refrigerator for up to 30 days is also terrific news and will allow the vaccine to be distributed broadly , ” even in remote areas and poorer countries .
There are more vaccines in the pipeline , to be announced in similarly scant press releases before the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Joe Biden on Jan. 20 .
This leaves the challenge of sorting out the science and comparing the various products ’ safety @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Drug Administration ( FDA ) .
And immunization instructions to U.S. states and territories , including equipment purchasing and personnel hires , are left to an also lame-duck Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) leadership .
Both agencies are under pressure from President Donald Trump ’ s Operation Warp Speed mandates to rush emergency use authorizations for the vaccines and instructions to doctors and states at record speeds .
In his first public appearance since losing the Nov. 3 election , Trump on Friday in the White House Rose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , describing his personal vaccine efforts as “ unequaled and unrivaled.
” In a tweet on Monday , the president wrote , “ Another Vaccine just announced .
This time by Moderna , 95 % effective .
For those great ‘ historians ’ , please remember that these great discoveries , which will end the China Plague , all took place on my watch !
” Both Vice President Mike Pence and Trump ’ s son-in-law , Jared Kushner , claimed the vaccines as Trump triumphs .
As the conservative commentator Hugh Hewitt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be Trump ’ s legacy.
” On Wall Street , stocks soared with each vaccine announcement , with Moderna ’ s pushing stock values for Pfizer and its German vaccine partner , BioNTech , down .
Future vaccine announcements are likely to send jolts through the markets , as well .
Indeed , with the first two horses out of the gate running such strong races , said the immunologist John Moore , it ’ s “ a very good indicator that most , and perhaps all , of the Operation Warp @ @ @ @ @ @ @ valuable for curtailing the pandemic during the first half of 2021.
” There are 53 vaccine candidates in human clinical trials worldwide right now , and another 155 are further back in the research and development pipeline .
To put this in perspective , between January 2010 and June 2020 the FDA approved 21 new vaccines , which underwent a median of eight years of development and seven clinical trials , creating mountains of data on which to judge their safety and efficacy .
In contrast , less than 10 months of R @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fast clinical trials ’ worth of data are all the COVID-19 vaccines are bringing to the FDA for judgment .
Nearing completion of Phase 3 clinical trials are a protein vaccine from Novavax ; several viral vector products made by Johnson & Johnson , Britain ’ s AstraZeneca , China ’ s CanSino , and Russia ’ s Gamaleya Research Institute ; and whole inactivated SARS-CoV-2 viruses already being used in China , made by Sinovac .
As promising as the Moderna and Pfizer products seem to be , it is possible one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better .
There is much to smile about .
But wait , even Moderna ’ s own press release warns that the euphoria of the moment just might be a mirage : “ The forward-looking statements in this press release are neither promises nor guarantees , and you should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements because they involve known and unknown risks , uncertainties , and other factors , many of which are beyond Moderna ’ s control and which could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , warns Moderna , there ’ s plenty to give you pause because “ there has never been a commercial product utilizing mRNA technology approved for use ; the fact that the rapid response technology in use by Moderna is still being developed and implemented ; the fact that the safety and efficacy of mRNA-1273 has not yet been established ; despite having ongoing interactions with the FDA or other regulatory agencies , the FDA or such other regulatory agencies may not agree with the Company ’ s regulatory approval strategies , components @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trial designs , conduct and methodologies , or the sufficiency of data submitted ; potential adverse impacts due to the global COVID-19 pandemic such as delays in regulatory review , manufacturing and clinical trials , supply chain interruptions , adverse effects on healthcare systems and disruption of the global economy.
” Science by press release , versus peer-reviewed medical journal publication , is clearly unsatisfactory .
It is made more so when the corporate leaders touting their vaccine products sell off their company stocks to realize large personal fortunes— $ 5.6 million worth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50 million for Moderna ’ s chief medical officer .
It ’ s hard to accept press release claims when the statements spawn fortunes for the individuals in charge of the data .
Sorting out whether or not the Pfizer , Moderna , and forthcoming vaccines actually work as claimed in their respective press releases , are safe , and provide lasting protection against SARS-CoV-2 is the job of the FDA , where Stephen Hahn reigns as commissioner until Jan. 20—or until Trump fires him .
With other political appointees and a staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House officials for four years , Hahn will determine whether to grant emergency use authorizations to the products , granting legal temporary use in lieu of more exhaustive testing and licensure .
These decisions will be made in the coming weeks based on standards of approval created by the Trump administration , and the Biden team will have little or no say in a process that will saddle it with chosen products and billions of dollars in subsidy payments and already committed purchases .
Similarly , Robert Redfield and his CDC staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccines will be distributed , to whom , and with what equipment and talent pool required at the state level .
For the states , the stakes are high , as the CDC has promised only $ 340 million in assistance so far ; state health departments have asked for $ 8.4 billion , and even Redfield concedes that localities need at least $ 6 billion to pull off mass two-dose immunization of all U.S. residents .
Few states have the ability to track all of their citizenry , keeping count of who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who their second .
The cost difference for states between a refrigerated Moderna vaccine program versus a deep-frozen Pfizer one is substantial .
Governors not only want more money but clear guidance and advice from the federal government , little of which is forthcoming .
Here , too , the Biden team is denied access to the CDC and input into immunization decisions that could prove very costly to the states—and therefore difficult to alter should the Trump administration plans prove unsatisfactory .
As a go-around , sidestepping Trump ’ s intransigence , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ronald Klain ; and members of his COVID-19 task force are meeting directly with vaccine manufacturers .
Comparing the various vaccines will be difficult , as a great deal about the normal human immune response to SARS-CoV-2 infection remains mysterious , including which components of the immune system are pivotal , how long people may be protected by antibodies , and how commonly they may be reinfected .
Each one of the vaccine manufacturers is using its own criteria for measuring antibodies and other aspects of volunteers ’ immune responses .
The supposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccines , for example , are not significant , given the very small numbers of COVID-19 cases they represent .
Temperature sensitivity is a much more important issue and one that might swing the balance toward Moderna .
The key difference between the Moderna and Pfizer products is the liposome packaging the companies invented to carry their mRNA in vaccine form and get it inside living human cells .
In the Pfizer case , the liposomes must be kept frozen to prevent them from falling apart .
Moderna has invented a far superior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are a trade secret .
Even inside cloistered FDA meetings it will be difficult for agency scientists to garner and compare liposome details .
And similar issues will arise with the patented details behind every vaccine that comes to the FDA for an emergency use authorization or license approval .
America ’ s epidemic is completely out of control , with more than 11 million cumulative cases of COVID-19 and a quarter-million deaths as of Nov. 17 .
There is good reason to rush a vaccine to use , slowing the human carnage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy .
But the strategies and assessments are being made now by one administration and handed as faits accompli to another .
For example , according to Fox Business , the Trump administration has ordered 100 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine , worth $ 1.95 billion , with the option of buying 500 million more .
The European Union has ordered 200 million doses with the possibility of 100 million more , the U.K. 30 million doses , and Japan 120 million .
Now that the Moderna vaccine seems more stable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shopping spree at Pfizer might boil down to a buyer ’ s remorse headache that Biden and American taxpayers will be stuck with .
And the Moderna vaccine that looks so hot in mid-November could well be overshadowed by an even better product come December .
“ There are many , many questions still remaining about the duration of protection , the impact on severe disease , the impact on different subpopulations , especially the elderly , as well as the adverse effects beyond a certain period of time , ” warned Soumya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health Organization .
When you ’ re racing at warp speed , there are bound to be surprises ahead .
And much to the chagrin of Biden ’ s COVID-19 task force , the terms of Operation Warp Speed and the assessment of vaccine products are matters before the Trump administration—for which it ’ s all in the art of the deal , at taxpayers ’ expense .

Wall Street investors, local health departments, and political leaders can all be excused if Monday’s Moderna coronavirus vaccine announcement has them feeling a bit whipsawed. Buyer’s remorse has heads spinning from Pfizer’s SARS-CoV-2 vaccine to Moderna’s. Get used to it. With more than 200 vaccines in development, there will be months of confusion and tougher choices ahead.
Wall Street investors, local health departments, and political leaders can all be excused if Monday’s Moderna coronavirus vaccine announcement has them feeling a bit whipsawed. Buyer’s remorse has heads spinning from Pfizer’s SARS-CoV-2 vaccine to Moderna’s. Get used to it. With more than 200 vaccines in development, there will be months of confusion and tougher choices ahead.
Based on press releases—which is all the world has at this point to work with—the COVID-19 vaccine announced last week by Pfizer and BioNTech, which uses mRNA as genetic code for the spike proteins that protrude from the surface of spherical viruses, offers more than 90 percent protection after recipients had two doses administered. But the product is highly unstable, requiring storage and transport in freezers that can hold temperatures below minus 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
The Moderna vaccine, which is also an mRNA-based American-made products, was 94.5 percent protective for volunteers who received two doses but were tested for infection after two weeks. And it is a more stable product that can be safely stored in standard commercial deep freezers, at minus 4 degrees Fahrenheit. It can even safely sit for up to 12 hours at room temperature, according to a Moderna press release.
“To me the surprise is not that the efficacy looks great, but that the stability is better, which makes vaccination campaigns significantly easier,” said Jaap Goudsmit of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Richard Hatchett, the CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, echoed Goudsmit, saying Moderna’s results are “as good as we could have hoped for. … The fact that the vaccine shows stability when stored in a normal refrigerator for up to 30 days is also terrific news and will allow the vaccine to be distributed broadly,” even in remote areas and poorer countries.
There are more vaccines in the pipeline, to be announced in similarly scant press releases before the inauguration of U.S. President-elect Joe Biden on Jan. 20. This leaves the challenge of sorting out the science and comparing the various products’ safety and efficacy to a lame-duck U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). And immunization instructions to U.S. states and territories, including equipment purchasing and personnel hires, are left to an also lame-duck Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) leadership.
Both agencies are under pressure from President Donald Trump’s Operation Warp Speed mandates to rush emergency use authorizations for the vaccines and instructions to doctors and states at record speeds. In his first public appearance since losing the Nov. 3 election, Trump on Friday in the White House Rose Garden laid claim to the Pfizer breakthrough, describing his personal vaccine efforts as “unequaled and unrivaled.” In a tweet on Monday, the president wrote, “Another Vaccine just announced. This time by Moderna, 95% effective. For those great ‘historians’, please remember that these great discoveries, which will end the China Plague, all took place on my watch!” Both Vice President Mike Pence and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, claimed the vaccines as Trump triumphs. As the conservative commentator Hugh Hewitt put it, the “COVID-19 vaccine should be Trump’s legacy.”
On Wall Street, stocks soared with each vaccine announcement, with Moderna’s pushing stock values for Pfizer and its German vaccine partner, BioNTech, down. Future vaccine announcements are likely to send jolts through the markets, as well. Indeed, with the first two horses out of the gate running such strong races, said the immunologist John Moore, it’s “a very good indicator that most, and perhaps all, of the Operation Warp Speed vaccines will turn out to be valuable for curtailing the pandemic during the first half of 2021.”
There are 53 vaccine candidates in human clinical trials worldwide right now, and another 155 are further back in the research and development pipeline. To put this in perspective, between January 2010 and June 2020 the FDA approved 21 new vaccines, which underwent a median of eight years of development and seven clinical trials, creating mountains of data on which to judge their safety and efficacy. In contrast, less than 10 months of R&D and just two small, fast clinical trials’ worth of data are all the COVID-19 vaccines are bringing to the FDA for judgment. Nearing completion of Phase 3 clinical trials are a protein vaccine from Novavax; several viral vector products made by Johnson & Johnson, Britain’s AstraZeneca, China’s CanSino, and Russia’s Gamaleya Research Institute; and whole inactivated SARS-CoV-2 viruses already being used in China, made by Sinovac. As promising as the Moderna and Pfizer products seem to be, it is possible one of these 208 vaccines will prove even better.
There is much to smile about. But wait, even Moderna’s own press release warns that the euphoria of the moment just might be a mirage: “The forward-looking statements in this press release are neither promises nor guarantees, and you should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements because they involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors, many of which are beyond Moderna’s control and which could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements.”
Yes, warns Moderna, there’s plenty to give you pause because “there has never been a commercial product utilizing mRNA technology approved for use; the fact that the rapid response technology in use by Moderna is still being developed and implemented; the fact that the safety and efficacy of mRNA-1273 has not yet been established; despite having ongoing interactions with the FDA or other regulatory agencies, the FDA or such other regulatory agencies may not agree with the Company’s regulatory approval strategies, components of our filings, such as clinical trial designs, conduct and methodologies, or the sufficiency of data submitted; potential adverse impacts due to the global COVID-19 pandemic such as delays in regulatory review, manufacturing and clinical trials, supply chain interruptions, adverse effects on healthcare systems and disruption of the global economy.”
Science by press release, versus peer-reviewed medical journal publication, is clearly unsatisfactory. It is made more so when the corporate leaders touting their vaccine products sell off their company stocks to realize large personal fortunes—$5.6 million worth for Pfizer’s CEO and $50 million for Moderna’s chief medical officer. It’s hard to accept press release claims when the statements spawn fortunes for the individuals in charge of the data.
Sorting out whether or not the Pfizer, Moderna, and forthcoming vaccines actually work as claimed in their respective press releases, are safe, and provide lasting protection against SARS-CoV-2 is the job of the FDA, where Stephen Hahn reigns as commissioner until Jan. 20—or until Trump fires him. With other political appointees and a staff of scientists who have been denigrated by White House officials for four years, Hahn will determine whether to grant emergency use authorizations to the products, granting legal temporary use in lieu of more exhaustive testing and licensure. These decisions will be made in the coming weeks based on standards of approval created by the Trump administration, and the Biden team will have little or no say in a process that will saddle it with chosen products and billions of dollars in subsidy payments and already committed purchases.
Similarly, Robert Redfield and his CDC staff are making decisions now regarding how the vaccines will be distributed, to whom, and with what equipment and talent pool required at the state level. For the states, the stakes are high, as the CDC has promised only $340 million in assistance so far; state health departments have asked for $8.4 billion, and even Redfield concedes that localities need at least $6 billion to pull off mass two-dose immunization of all U.S. residents. Few states have the ability to track all of their citizenry, keeping count of who receives a first dose of vaccine and who their second. The cost difference for states between a refrigerated Moderna vaccine program versus a deep-frozen Pfizer one is substantial. Governors not only want more money but clear guidance and advice from the federal government, little of which is forthcoming.
Here, too, the Biden team is denied access to the CDC and input into immunization decisions that could prove very costly to the states—and therefore difficult to alter should the Trump administration plans prove unsatisfactory. As a go-around, sidestepping Trump’s intransigence, Biden; his chief of staff, Ronald Klain; and members of his COVID-19 task force are meeting directly with vaccine manufacturers.
Comparing the various vaccines will be difficult, as a great deal about the normal human immune response to SARS-CoV-2 infection remains mysterious, including which components of the immune system are pivotal, how long people may be protected by antibodies, and how commonly they may be reinfected. Each one of the vaccine manufacturers is using its own criteria for measuring antibodies and other aspects of volunteers’ immune responses.
The supposed efficacy differences between the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, for example, are not significant, given the very small numbers of COVID-19 cases they represent. Temperature sensitivity is a much more important issue and one that might swing the balance toward Moderna.
The key difference between the Moderna and Pfizer products is the liposome packaging the companies invented to carry their mRNA in vaccine form and get it inside living human cells. In the Pfizer case, the liposomes must be kept frozen to prevent them from falling apart. Moderna has invented a far superior type of liposome, but its details are a trade secret. Even inside cloistered FDA meetings it will be difficult for agency scientists to garner and compare liposome details. And similar issues will arise with the patented details behind every vaccine that comes to the FDA for an emergency use authorization or license approval.
America’s epidemic is completely out of control, with more than 11 million cumulative cases of COVID-19 and a quarter-million deaths as of Nov. 17. There is good reason to rush a vaccine to use, slowing the human carnage and allowing businesses to reopen, fueling the economy. But the strategies and assessments are being made now by one administration and handed as faits accompli to another. For example, according to Fox Business, the Trump administration has ordered 100 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine, worth $1.95 billion, with the option of buying 500 million more. The European Union has ordered 200 million doses with the possibility of 100 million more, the U.K. 30 million doses, and Japan 120 million. Now that the Moderna vaccine seems more stable, thus easier to use, the shopping spree at Pfizer might boil down to a buyer’s remorse headache that Biden and American taxpayers will be stuck with.
And the Moderna vaccine that looks so hot in mid-November could well be overshadowed by an even better product come December. “There are many, many questions still remaining about the duration of protection, the impact on severe disease, the impact on different subpopulations, especially the elderly, as well as the adverse effects beyond a certain period of time,” warned Soumya Swaminathan, chief scientist at the World Health Organization.
When you’re racing at warp speed, there are bound to be surprises ahead. And much to the chagrin of Biden’s COVID-19 task force, the terms of Operation Warp Speed and the assessment of vaccine products are matters before the Trump administration—for which it’s all in the art of the deal, at taxpayers’ expense.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--Trump’s Defeat Was World Historic

Trump’s Defeat Was World Historic

Lost in the commentary about this month ’ s U.S. presidential election is just how difficult it is to unseat authoritarian-leaning populists through the ballot box .
In fact , around the world , relatively few opposition parties manage to unseat such movements that way , at least in their first attempt .
That ’ s because the populists ’ willingness to break norms , drum up anger , and erode checks and balances typically is appealing and works to further institutionalize their power .
In Latin America , where autocratic populism has a long history , only two populist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 1990 and Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic in 2004 .
The rest have won popular votes , only abandoning power under military pressure , as in the case of Bolivia ’ s Evo Morales in 2019 ; societal pressure , as happened to Peru ’ s Alberto Fujimori in 2000 ; or because of constitutional limits to their reelection , as for Colombia ’ s Álvaro Uribe in 2010 .
In other words , even though the Democrats ’ margin of victory may not have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unseating of U.S. President Donald Trump was impressive—and not just for U.S. standards , where only three elected incumbent presidents since the 1930s have failed to secure reelection , but also around the world .
If anything , their success should serve as a message for other countries : It is possible to contain authoritarian-leaning populism , and that the way to do it is by relying on party work , voter mobilization , and a moderate amount of daringness .
It is important , meanwhile , not to overstate the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is true that , during the past four years , the country was able to maintain a strong judiciary , civil society , and press , all of which did their part in checking presidential abuses .
But it is also true that this style of populism works precisely by eroding those institutions , and under Trump , they eroded significantly .
For a good chunk of the population , meanwhile , Trump ’ s populist message still won the day—and it appears set to stick around , especially as the outgoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stolen from him and the Republican Party hesitates to disavow him .
Institutions , in other words , were never going to defeat Trump or Trumpism on their own .
They needed help during election time , and here is where other parties attempting to unseat authoritarian-leaning populists can draw some lessons .
The first lesson is the importance of party unity .
The biggest risk under autocratic populism is not that the opposition will dwindle but that it will fragment .
( In Venezuela , at one point in the 2000s , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populist authoritarian Hugo Chávez . )
In fact , these populists generally cause a surge—not a decline—in dissidence as more of the population becomes angry , maybe even desperate .
The problem is when the dissidents organize themselves into multiple factions—a risk that is particularly high with populist authoritarians .
That ’ s because populists , by claiming to want to break down the entire existing system , produce dissent from all ideological angles—from the left , right , and center .
To the extent that populism reshuffles the national political discourse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of views on how best to fight it : obstruction , containment , greater populism on the other side of the spectrum , and so on .
It isn ’ t easy to bring all the different ideologies and strategies into one big tent .
Yet the Democratic Party defeated Trump by doing just that .
It managed to hold onto its progressive wing while simultaneously welcoming moderate conservative leaders like John McCain-style Republicans , foreign-policy experts who worked for previous Republican administrations , and fiscal conservatives .
To be sure , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this task .
The Electoral College ’ s winner-take-all rules discourage the formation of new parties that have little chance of winning a majority .
But unity was also the result of strategic decisions ( remember the third-party candidates from the 2016 presidential election ) .
The most important of those decisions was to run a campaign of moderate daringness : avoiding extremes but trying to break the mold from the middle .
For example , the party chose a moderate , Joe Biden , as its candidate for president .
Biden chose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American woman and career politician , as his running mate .
The choice broke ground on race and gender , but it also signaled to voters that protecting existing institutions would be privileged over forming them anew .
Another way the party exercised moderate daringness was in its approach to social protest .
The Trump administration , like many similar movements , generated social unrest : first in the form of the # MeToo movement against the abuse of women and the alpha-male culture that Trump came to represent .
During Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lives Matter regained momentum against racialized police brutality and the culture of white nativism that the president never quite disavowed .
Social protest presents opposition parties with a dilemma .
It can sometimes help their cause , but it can also backfire .
Protest raises awareness of important issues that were less visible to voters and energizes and motivates people to act .
But protest can also give fodder to authoritarian-leaning populists , who run on campaigns of law and order—generally code for preserving the power of existing elites .
( In many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thwarting the rise of minorities . )
The Democratic Party managed to play its cards well .
It did not discourage social protest but focused on channeling anger into voter mobilization rather than into more protest , adopting populist rhetoric of its own , or assuming that anger would bring out the vote automatically .
For all his assaults on liberal democracy , Trump left the electoral route to his demise open , even if littered with hurdles .
And rather than reject such a route , the Democrats exploited it as fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Stacey Abrams in Georgia and Beto O ’ Rourke in Texas defined the strategy : Focus on new voters ( young citizens ) , low-propensity voters ( those feeling apathetic or defeated ) , and even sincere-regret moderates ( typically suburban voters who no longer supported Trump but were unsure about switching sides ) .
The opposition also encouraged voting early and voting by mail in response to the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic .
The strategy paid off .
According to exit polls , more new voters and moderate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The party improved its electoral performance in the suburbs by about 4.6 percentage points , suggesting some success with sincere-regret voters as well .
Democrats should therefore not assume that good governance and clean government—or even addressing people ’ s real economic needs—will be enough to counter the ideological appeal of Trump ’ s populism .
The best they can hope for is to stay electorally competitive .
This means ensuring their party remains a big tent with room for different ideologies , even if that means moderating some of the most impassioned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And , of course , the party should realize that voting and unity don ’ t happen on their own .
They need to be helped along .

Lost in the commentary about this month’s U.S. presidential election is just how difficult it is to unseat authoritarian-leaning populists through the ballot box.
Lost in the commentary about this month’s U.S. presidential election is just how difficult it is to unseat authoritarian-leaning populists through the ballot box.
In fact, around the world, relatively few opposition parties manage to unseat such movements that way, at least in their first attempt. That’s because the populists’ willingness to break norms, drum up anger, and erode checks and balances typically is appealing and works to further institutionalize their power. In Latin America, where autocratic populism has a long history, only two populist presidents have lost elections since the 1980s: Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 1990 and Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic in 2004. The rest have won popular votes, only abandoning power under military pressure, as in the case of Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2019; societal pressure, as happened to Peru’s Alberto Fujimori in 2000; or because of constitutional limits to their reelection, as for Colombia’s Álvaro Uribe in 2010.
In other words, even though the Democrats’ margin of victory may not have been as large as they wanted, their unseating of U.S. President Donald Trump was impressive—and not just for U.S. standards, where only three elected incumbent presidents since the 1930s have failed to secure reelection, but also around the world. If anything, their success should serve as a message for other countries: It is possible to contain authoritarian-leaning populism, and that the way to do it is by relying on party work, voter mobilization, and a moderate amount of daringness.
It is easy to downplay the results of the 2020 U.S. election by pointing out that the Democrats lost ground in the House of Representatives and did not gain as much as they wanted in the Senate, or by arguing that, in the United States, Trump’s brand of populism never stood a strong chance because its liberal democratic institutions are strong. But those two arguments cut against each other.
It is important, meanwhile, not to overstate the United States’ institutional protections against authoritarian-leaning populism. It is true that, during the past four years, the country was able to maintain a strong judiciary, civil society, and press, all of which did their part in checking presidential abuses. But it is also true that this style of populism works precisely by eroding those institutions, and under Trump, they eroded significantly. For a good chunk of the population, meanwhile, Trump’s populist message still won the day—and it appears set to stick around, especially as the outgoing president falsely claims that the election was stolen from him and the Republican Party hesitates to disavow him.
Institutions, in other words, were never going to defeat Trump or Trumpism on their own. They needed help during election time, and here is where other parties attempting to unseat authoritarian-leaning populists can draw some lessons.
The first lesson is the importance of party unity. The biggest risk under autocratic populism is not that the opposition will dwindle but that it will fragment. (In Venezuela, at one point in the 2000s, there were dozens of parties challenging the populist authoritarian Hugo Chávez.) In fact, these populists generally cause a surge—not a decline—in dissidence as more of the population becomes angry, maybe even desperate.
The problem is when the dissidents organize themselves into multiple factions—a risk that is particularly high with populist authoritarians. That’s because populists, by claiming to want to break down the entire existing system, produce dissent from all ideological angles—from the left, right, and center. To the extent that populism reshuffles the national political discourse, meanwhile, it also produces a multitude of views on how best to fight it: obstruction, containment, greater populism on the other side of the spectrum, and so on. It isn’t easy to bring all the different ideologies and strategies into one big tent.
Yet the Democratic Party defeated Trump by doing just that. It managed to hold onto its progressive wing while simultaneously welcoming moderate conservative leaders like John McCain-style Republicans, foreign-policy experts who worked for previous Republican administrations, and fiscal conservatives.
To be sure, the United States’ electoral rules helped in this task. The Electoral College’s winner-take-all rules discourage the formation of new parties that have little chance of winning a majority. But unity was also the result of strategic decisions (remember the third-party candidates from the 2016 presidential election).
The most important of those decisions was to run a campaign of moderate daringness: avoiding extremes but trying to break the mold from the middle. For example, the party chose a moderate, Joe Biden, as its candidate for president. Biden chose Kamala Harris, an Asian and Afro-Caribbean American woman and career politician, as his running mate. The choice broke ground on race and gender, but it also signaled to voters that protecting existing institutions would be privileged over forming them anew.
Another way the party exercised moderate daringness was in its approach to social protest. The Trump administration, like many similar movements, generated social unrest: first in the form of the #MeToo movement against the abuse of women and the alpha-male culture that Trump came to represent. During Trump’s last year in office, Black Lives Matter regained momentum against racialized police brutality and the culture of white nativism that the president never quite disavowed.
Social protest presents opposition parties with a dilemma. It can sometimes help their cause, but it can also backfire. Protest raises awareness of important issues that were less visible to voters and energizes and motivates people to act. But protest can also give fodder to authoritarian-leaning populists, who run on campaigns of law and order—generally code for preserving the power of existing elites. (In many ways, Trump ran his campaign on thwarting the rise of minorities.)
The Democratic Party managed to play its cards well. It did not discourage social protest but focused on channeling anger into voter mobilization rather than into more protest, adopting populist rhetoric of its own, or assuming that anger would bring out the vote automatically. For all his assaults on liberal democracy, Trump left the electoral route to his demise open, even if littered with hurdles. And rather than reject such a route, the Democrats exploited it as fully as possible. Democratic operatives and politicians such as Stacey Abrams in Georgia and Beto O’Rourke in Texas defined the strategy: Focus on new voters (young citizens), low-propensity voters (those feeling apathetic or defeated), and even sincere-regret moderates (typically suburban voters who no longer supported Trump but were unsure about switching sides). The opposition also encouraged voting early and voting by mail in response to the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic.
The strategy paid off. According to exit polls, more new voters and moderate voters went for the Democratic Party. The party improved its electoral performance in the suburbs by about 4.6 percentage points, suggesting some success with sincere-regret voters as well.
While it is important to recognize the significance of unseating Trump, it is also important to remember that the Democrats’ victory was not a complete one. Trumpism still hangs on. And this, too, was predictable. Once authoritarian populism becomes mainstream, as it has in the United States, it doesn’t quickly retreat—it lingers as a powerful opposition force waiting for its next opportunity, all the while propagating the viewpoint that the other side is dangerous.
Democrats should therefore not assume that good governance and clean government—or even addressing people’s real economic needs—will be enough to counter the ideological appeal of Trump’s populism. The best they can hope for is to stay electorally competitive. This means ensuring their party remains a big tent with room for different ideologies, even if that means moderating some of the most impassioned demands coming from within their coalition. And, of course, the party should realize that voting and unity don’t happen on their own. They need to be helped along.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--Crime Wave Further Rocks Confidence in Afghan Government

KABUL—As Afghanistan ’ s government was sitting down with the Taliban this fall to discuss an end to the war , urban residents already traumatized by an escalation in terrorist attacks were hit by a surge in violent crime that many believe was orchestrated by the insurgents .
Whether or not the Taliban did instigate the crime spree , they deftly exploited it by reminding Afghans of their own harsh anti-crime tactics as they maneuver to return to power as the United States accelerates its withdrawal of troops from the country .
Taliban leaflets appeared across the capital , promising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spate of muggings , kidnappings , and armed robberies , spurring an alarmed President Ashraf Ghani into belated action .
Senior Vice President Amrullah Saleh , a former spy chief , last month launched the “ Kabul Security Compact , ” which appears to have yielded fast results : Officials say incidents of crime are well down from a September peak in Kabul of hundreds a day .
The apparently successful crackdown—which Saleh aims to roll out to the rest of the country in coming weeks—comes at a critical time .
On Nov. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Geneva to renew foreign aid for Afghanistan .
But this year , many donors are suggesting big cuts to their aid budgets , amid ongoing concern about Afghan corruption and lingering doubts about the country ’ s ability to maintain progress on human rights after the end of the conflict .
Saleh ’ s crackdown has highlighted that much of the recent crime is linked to corruption , and he has set out to target warlords , mafia gangs , politicians , and businessmen whose criminality now jeopardizes that foreign aid , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s budget .
The U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said Ghani has only seriously tackled corruption when donor funding is on the line—and with the Afghan economy wracked due to the pandemic , and with U.S. forces bolting for the exits , the Afghan president needs donor support more than ever .
Antonio Giustozzi , an expert on terrorism and security in Afghanistan at the Royal United Services Institute , said the crackdown is unlikely to change the minds of donors who had already decided to cut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say how sustainable it might be .
“ The reason they want to cut funding is , in part , because they are decreasingly able to monitor projects .
This , of course , is only going to get worse , ” Giustozzi said .
Crime , corruption , nepotism , and a perceived lack of government regard for citizens ’ security are nothing new in Afghanistan .
But the massive fall crime wave , worst in Kabul but evident in other cities , only further undermined the unpopular government ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to some estimates , the government has control of little more than half the country .
In regions under Taliban control , their savage approach to crime—severing the hands of alleged thieves and stoning women to death for “ adultery ” —is often seen as preferable to the government ’ s judicial system , mired in patronage .
Since talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government began in Qatar in September , terrorist attacks have intensified across the country , killing hundreds of people in Kabul alone as the Taliban , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to gain an advantage that will speed their return to power .
That effort was compounded by the recent crime wave , which fueled even greater public frustration with government ineptitude and corruption .
Rasheed Hossaini ’ s experience was typical .
While walking with a friend one September evening , a white Toyota Corolla screeched to a halt beside them .
“ Two men with guns got out of the car and said , ‘ If you move , we will shoot you , ’ ” Hossaini , 35 , said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ phones , and money.
” He reported the incident to police , who showed him CCTV footage of the same men robbing a supermarket at gunpoint .
No arrests have been made .
Like many , he blamed the Taliban .
“ I think the Taliban are trying to make people afraid , to make Kabul insecure so they can say only the Taliban can offer security , ” Hossaini said .
An internal government analysis obtained by Foreign Policy acknowledged the public relations coup the crime wave handed the insurgents .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation by announcing that they will relieve Kabul citizens from growing insecurity by acting against criminals in the city , ” the report said .
This they did with notices handed out to residents , posted in mosques , and on social media .
Senior police and intelligence officers felt greater loyalty to power brokers and warlords than to the government , enabling the powerful to operate outside the law with impunity , the internal government analysis said , describing intelligence officials as “ oblivious to security threats in the city.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city , and lack of strong reaction from the government , has emboldened criminals to commit all sorts of crimes in plain daylight and sometimes at the proximity of police checkpoints without fearing any consequence , ” the document added .
The Kabul crime wave , though seemingly now under control , also has had a couple of knock-on effects that could harm Afghanistan ’ s future prospects , the government analysis found .
The internal report mentioned that the rash of kidnappings for ransom had driven many local businessmen and investors to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And it has undermined the Afghan government while in talks with the Taliban over the shape of post-conflict Afghanistan .
“ The level of crime in the city became unbearable to the citizens , and growing criticism in mainstream and social media weakened the position of the Afghan government ” in the talks in Qatar , the analysis found .
That ’ s why the Afghan government is so eager to tout any progress against the rash of terrorist attacks and the upsurge in crime .
Last weekend , Saleh announced the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nov. 2 attack on Kabul University , which killed at least 22 people according to government numbers—though other sources place the death toll higher .
Saleh said the suspect worked for a conglomerate of terrorist groups , including the Taliban , its offshoot the Haqqani network , and the Islamic State .
But the bigger question at this point is whether his crackdown on crime and corruption will pay dividends where it most matters : in terms of convincing international donors to keep propping up the country .
“ The crackdown does seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but how will crime adapt ?
It is possible that the current crime wave has its roots in efforts to professionalize the security services and eradicate links between police chiefs and crime gangs and bring the security forces back under government control , ” Giustozzi said .
“ The gangs might be trying to make a point that without them , security in Kabul can not be maintained .
But I suspect donors have stopped caring anyway , ” he added .

KABUL—As Afghanistan’s government was sitting down with the Taliban this fall to discuss an end to the war, urban residents already traumatized by an escalation in terrorist attacks were hit by a surge in violent crime that many believe was orchestrated by the insurgents. Whether or not the Taliban did instigate the crime spree, they deftly exploited it by reminding Afghans of their own harsh anti-crime tactics as they maneuver to return to power as the United States accelerates its withdrawal of troops from the country.
KABUL—As Afghanistan’s government was sitting down with the Taliban this fall to discuss an end to the war, urban residents already traumatized by an escalation in terrorist attacks were hit by a surge in violent crime that many believe was orchestrated by the insurgents. Whether or not the Taliban did instigate the crime spree, they deftly exploited it by reminding Afghans of their own harsh anti-crime tactics as they maneuver to return to power as the United States accelerates its withdrawal of troops from the country.
Taliban leaflets appeared across the capital, promising to make the streets safe from a spate of muggings, kidnappings, and armed robberies, spurring an alarmed President Ashraf Ghani into belated action. Senior Vice President Amrullah Saleh, a former spy chief, last month launched the “Kabul Security Compact,” which appears to have yielded fast results: Officials say incidents of crime are well down from a September peak in Kabul of hundreds a day.
The apparently successful crackdown—which Saleh aims to roll out to the rest of the country in coming weeks—comes at a critical time. On Nov. 23-24, international donors will meet in Geneva to renew foreign aid for Afghanistan. But this year, many donors are suggesting big cuts to their aid budgets, amid ongoing concern about Afghan corruption and lingering doubts about the country’s ability to maintain progress on human rights after the end of the conflict.
Saleh’s crackdown has highlighted that much of the recent crime is linked to corruption, and he has set out to target warlords, mafia gangs, politicians, and businessmen whose criminality now jeopardizes that foreign aid, which makes up about three-quarters of the government’s budget. The U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said Ghani has only seriously tackled corruption when donor funding is on the line—and with the Afghan economy wracked due to the pandemic, and with U.S. forces bolting for the exits, the Afghan president needs donor support more than ever.
Antonio Giustozzi, an expert on terrorism and security in Afghanistan at the Royal United Services Institute, said the crackdown is unlikely to change the minds of donors who had already decided to cut funding and that it is too early to say how sustainable it might be.
“The reason they want to cut funding is, in part, because they are decreasingly able to monitor projects. This, of course, is only going to get worse,” Giustozzi said.
Crime, corruption, nepotism, and a perceived lack of government regard for citizens’ security are nothing new in Afghanistan. But the massive fall crime wave, worst in Kabul but evident in other cities, only further undermined the unpopular government’s legitimacy and highlighted simmering security vulnerabilities.
According to some estimates, the government has control of little more than half the country. In regions under Taliban control, their savage approach to crime—severing the hands of alleged thieves and stoning women to death for “adultery”—is often seen as preferable to the government’s judicial system, mired in patronage.
Since talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government began in Qatar in September, terrorist attacks have intensified across the country, killing hundreds of people in Kabul alone as the Taliban, working with other terrorist groups, seek to gain an advantage that will speed their return to power.
That effort was compounded by the recent crime wave, which fueled even greater public frustration with government ineptitude and corruption. Rasheed Hossaini’s experience was typical. While walking with a friend one September evening, a white Toyota Corolla screeched to a halt beside them. “Two men with guns got out of the car and said, ‘If you move, we will shoot you,’” Hossaini, 35, said. “They stole our computers, mobile phones, and money.”
He reported the incident to police, who showed him CCTV footage of the same men robbing a supermarket at gunpoint. No arrests have been made. Like many, he blamed the Taliban. “I think the Taliban are trying to make people afraid, to make Kabul insecure so they can say only the Taliban can offer security,” Hossaini said.
An internal government analysis obtained by Foreign Policy acknowledged the public relations coup the crime wave handed the insurgents. “The Taliban reacted and took advantage of the situation by announcing that they will relieve Kabul citizens from growing insecurity by acting against criminals in the city,” the report said. This they did with notices handed out to residents, posted in mosques, and on social media.
Senior police and intelligence officers felt greater loyalty to power brokers and warlords than to the government, enabling the powerful to operate outside the law with impunity, the internal government analysis said, describing intelligence officials as “oblivious to security threats in the city.”
“The worsening security situation in the city, and lack of strong reaction from the government, has emboldened criminals to commit all sorts of crimes in plain daylight and sometimes at the proximity of police checkpoints without fearing any consequence,” the document added.
The Kabul crime wave, though seemingly now under control, also has had a couple of knock-on effects that could harm Afghanistan’s future prospects, the government analysis found. The internal report mentioned that the rash of kidnappings for ransom had driven many local businessmen and investors to take their money out of the country. And it has undermined the Afghan government while in talks with the Taliban over the shape of post-conflict Afghanistan.
“The level of crime in the city became unbearable to the citizens, and growing criticism in mainstream and social media weakened the position of the Afghan government” in the talks in Qatar, the analysis found.
That’s why the Afghan government is so eager to tout any progress against the rash of terrorist attacks and the upsurge in crime. Last weekend, Saleh announced the arrest of the alleged mastermind of the Nov. 2 attack on Kabul University, which killed at least 22 people according to government numbers—though other sources place the death toll higher. Saleh said the suspect worked for a conglomerate of terrorist groups, including the Taliban, its offshoot the Haqqani network, and the Islamic State.
But the bigger question at this point is whether his crackdown on crime and corruption will pay dividends where it most matters: in terms of convincing international donors to keep propping up the country.
“The crackdown does seem to have had a short-term effect, but how will crime adapt? It is possible that the current crime wave has its roots in efforts to professionalize the security services and eradicate links between police chiefs and crime gangs and bring the security forces back under government control,” Giustozzi said.
“The gangs might be trying to make a point that without them, security in Kabul cannot be maintained. But I suspect donors have stopped caring anyway,” he added.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--The National Security Risks of Trump’s Temper Tantrum

By refusing to accept the election results and blocking the normal work of a presidential transition , U.S. President Donald Trump is putting the United States at risk for no good purpose .
Even if he had a legal case that the election results might be overturned—which he assuredly does not—there would be no harm in letting President-elect Joe Biden ’ s team begin the transition work , which could always be halted in case Trump achieves the outcome he desires .
If anything , blocking the transition effort underscores how weak Trump knows his legal case to be .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ own personal weakness to a watching world .
But while this interruption creates real problems for the incoming Biden team , one shouldn ’ t exaggerate the damage .
The world ’ s collective nerves are frayed enough without compounding our worries about how delays in the U.S. presidential transition could lead to a domestic or international crisis .
For starters , the Biden team is well prepared to deal with some of the most direct and tangible problems Trump ’ s truculence throws its way .
Indeed , it is the best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of George H.W .
Bush , who had also served two terms as vice president , knew the ways of the White House and federal government , and brought with him a ready pool of experienced talent .
Because Trump ’ s director of the General Services Administration has delayed “ ascertainment , ” the technical step that sets the presidential transition in motion , the Biden team is currently denied roughly $ 10 million in transition funds , access to workspace , and access to U.S. State Department translators to facilitate congratulatory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of applying for security clearances has been put on hold , and the Trump team has instructed the federal bureaucracy not to communicate with Biden ’ s people in preparation for the transition .
Biden and his immediate team are also barred from accessing the President ’ s Daily Brief ( PDB ) , the intelligence report that would normally help the president-elect prepare for what he will be facing on day one .
The 9/11 Commission flagged eliminating such delays as an important lesson learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself has acknowledged that his campaign has the resources it needs .
In times of COVID-19 , most work is conducted online , not in government offices .
Sure , the State Department ’ s translators and note takers would help , but as Biden ’ s people have shown with their press notices on the calls with foreign leaders that have already taken place , they are professionals who can manage this on their own if necessary .
Not receiving the PDB is a bit more serious : For newly elected presidents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House level , this is an important training vehicle , especially because the PDB ’ s daily insights on national security give a cumulative view of threats and developments over time .
But Biden and his team have exceptional experience in national security and foreign policy and will be able to get up to speed very quickly .
These hindrances and harassments are symbolically important , not materially important .
Trump ’ s refusal to set the democratic transition in motion , however , has more pernicious effects .
For starters , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process of getting security clearances for Biden ’ s team .
Biden will not need a security clearance come Jan. 20 ; Vice President-elect Kamala Harris already has a security clearance through her position on the Senate Intelligence Committee .
Most of Biden ’ s likely incoming team will have had clearances in the past ; some of them may still be active .
But as George W. Bush ’ s team discovered , even when you are bringing in the A-team , there can be a delay in updating clearances .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an important lesson learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks .
There is no good reason why this crucial lesson should be ignored now .
But here , too , there is no reason to despair : With the exception of a few loyalists whom the Trump team appears to be trying to install in key posts , especially at the Defense Department , one can expect that the permanent civil service and career military staff will greet the incoming Biden administration with relief and facilitate a smoother start than other transition-delayed administrations faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example is Trump himself , who refused to properly prepare himself and his inner circle for the job ) .
Biden ’ s start on Jan. 20 will be closer to a welcome home party than a hostile takeover .
A second genuine concern is the delay in access to the detailed “ what we have been doing ” reports that the outgoing teams prepare for the incoming landing teams .
To be sure , incoming administrations usually read these reports with a great deal of skepticism , viewing them as exercises in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hype the legacy .
There will doubtlessly be lots of that , as evidenced by the strident reviews of Trump ’ s foreign-policy record by supporters of late .
Both the success of these covert and military operations and the security of the agents and soldiers involved depend on a seamless transition .
Nevertheless , the outgoing team reports have a special urgency this time around .
Given the chaotic ways of the Trump administration , it is very likely that the picture of what has actually been happening at the department and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and take longer than usual to sort out .
Part of the reason is that there has never been a White House with such a large gulf between a president ’ s public claims and the invisible actions of the rest of the administration .
As Trump ’ s outgoing Syria envoy , James Jeffrey , admitted , even many political appointees—let alone the civil servants—sought to hide the true policy from Trump for fear of how he might sabotage it with a tweet .
Biden ’ s people will know the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forged policies and communications strategies to repair the damage .
What the landing teams have been barred from learning by Trump ’ s delay is what has actually been transpiring at lower levels—out of view of the media and perhaps Trump himself .
A third genuine worry is that there are sensitive national security policies where the incoming team will need to assume immediate operational control on Jan. 20 .
This especially concerns ongoing covert intelligence actions and military special operations that will still be underway on Inauguration Day .
Both the success @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the agents and soldiers involved depend on a seamless transition .
For this , the Biden team needs to be briefed now .
Otherwise those missions—and the people involved—will be at risk .
Fourth , the Trump team may be considering last-minute legacy-chasing maneuvers that could lay yet more obstacles into Biden ’ s path .
That includes most obviously a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan ( regardless of how that could sabotage ongoing peace negotiations ) , but could produce other surprises , such as additional troop withdrawals from Germany or even a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exit NATO .
Biden ’ s team could not stop such grandstanding .
Even if Trump ’ s neoisolationist stance—especially on Afghanistan—intersects with the kind of pressure Biden will get from his own far-left flank , an effective transition would still be crucial for avoiding the problems that a rush to the exits would produce .
A normal transition would also help the Biden team learn in more detail which last-minute decisions could easily be walked back and how .
Trump ’ s people will be implementing his orders until Inauguration Day with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know better than anyone else how to fix what they are unraveling and could convey that to the incoming team .
That would enable Biden to spend his political capital on those cases where Trump ’ s damage is irreversible .
Finally , much has already been said about how Trump ’ s refusal to set the transition in motion damages the United States ’ credibility in the eyes of the world—especially as an exemplar of democracy .
There is a long-running debate in the democracy field over whether the United States should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries or should instead just be a model for other countries to choose to emulate .
Trump ’ s refusal to concede his loss and uphold a cornerstone of democracy—the peaceful transition of power—makes that debate moot for now .
He has sabotaged the United States ’ mission and besmirched its model to the world .
There is nothing good that comes from delaying the transition , and the bad ranges from annoying to dangerous .
If the Biden team were as shambolic as Trump ’ s was four years ago , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a genuine national security crisis .
Luckily , that isn ’ t the case , and if Americans keep calm and carry on , the country can make it through .
But the sooner that happens , the better .

By refusing to accept the election results and blocking the normal work of a presidential transition, U.S. President Donald Trump is putting the United States at risk for no good purpose. Even if he had a legal case that the election results might be overturned—which he assuredly does not—there would be no harm in letting President-elect Joe Biden’s team begin the transition work, which could always be halted in case Trump achieves the outcome he desires. If anything, blocking the transition effort underscores how weak Trump knows his legal case to be. Once again, he is displaying his own personal weakness to a watching world.
By refusing to accept the election results and blocking the normal work of a presidential transition, U.S. President Donald Trump is putting the United States at risk for no good purpose. Even if he had a legal case that the election results might be overturned—which he assuredly does not—there would be no harm in letting President-elect Joe Biden’s team begin the transition work, which could always be halted in case Trump achieves the outcome he desires. If anything, blocking the transition effort underscores how weak Trump knows his legal case to be. Once again, he is displaying his own personal weakness to a watching world.
But while this interruption creates real problems for the incoming Biden team, one shouldn’t exaggerate the damage. The world’s collective nerves are frayed enough without compounding our worries about how delays in the U.S. presidential transition could lead to a domestic or international crisis.
For starters, the Biden team is well prepared to deal with some of the most direct and tangible problems Trump’s truculence throws its way. Indeed, it is the best prepared for governing since the incoming administration of George H.W. Bush, who had also served two terms as vice president, knew the ways of the White House and federal government, and brought with him a ready pool of experienced talent.
Because Trump’s director of the General Services Administration has delayed “ascertainment,” the technical step that sets the presidential transition in motion, the Biden team is currently denied roughly $10 million in transition funds, access to workspace, and access to U.S. State Department translators to facilitate congratulatory calls from foreign leaders. The process of applying for security clearances has been put on hold, and the Trump team has instructed the federal bureaucracy not to communicate with Biden’s people in preparation for the transition. Biden and his immediate team are also barred from accessing the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the intelligence report that would normally help the president-elect prepare for what he will be facing on day one.
The 9/11 Commission flagged eliminating such delays as an important lesson learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
This is annoying but not devastating. Biden himself has acknowledged that his campaign has the resources it needs. In times of COVID-19, most work is conducted online, not in government offices. Sure, the State Department’s translators and note takers would help, but as Biden’s people have shown with their press notices on the calls with foreign leaders that have already taken place, they are professionals who can manage this on their own if necessary. Not receiving the PDB is a bit more serious: For newly elected presidents who have never worked at the White House level, this is an important training vehicle, especially because the PDB’s daily insights on national security give a cumulative view of threats and developments over time. But Biden and his team have exceptional experience in national security and foreign policy and will be able to get up to speed very quickly.
These hindrances and harassments are symbolically important, not materially important.
Trump’s refusal to set the democratic transition in motion, however, has more pernicious effects. For starters, it is delaying the already cumbersome and lengthy process of getting security clearances for Biden’s team. Biden will not need a security clearance come Jan. 20; Vice President-elect Kamala Harris already has a security clearance through her position on the Senate Intelligence Committee. Most of Biden’s likely incoming team will have had clearances in the past; some of them may still be active. But as George W. Bush’s team discovered, even when you are bringing in the A-team, there can be a delay in updating clearances. The 9/11 Commission flagged eliminating such delays as an important lesson learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There is no good reason why this crucial lesson should be ignored now.
But here, too, there is no reason to despair: With the exception of a few loyalists whom the Trump team appears to be trying to install in key posts, especially at the Defense Department, one can expect that the permanent civil service and career military staff will greet the incoming Biden administration with relief and facilitate a smoother start than other transition-delayed administrations faced (of which the most obvious recent example is Trump himself, who refused to properly prepare himself and his inner circle for the job). Biden’s start on Jan. 20 will be closer to a welcome home party than a hostile takeover.
A second genuine concern is the delay in access to the detailed “what we have been doing” reports that the outgoing teams prepare for the incoming landing teams. To be sure, incoming administrations usually read these reports with a great deal of skepticism, viewing them as exercises in self-justification and revisionist history that aim to hype the legacy. There will doubtlessly be lots of that, as evidenced by the strident reviews of Trump’s foreign-policy record by supporters of late.
Both the success of these covert and military operations and the security of the agents and soldiers involved depend on a seamless transition.
Nevertheless, the outgoing team reports have a special urgency this time around. Given the chaotic ways of the Trump administration, it is very likely that the picture of what has actually been happening at the department and agency level will be confused and contradictory and take longer than usual to sort out. Part of the reason is that there has never been a White House with such a large gulf between a president’s public claims and the invisible actions of the rest of the administration. As Trump’s outgoing Syria envoy, James Jeffrey, admitted, even many political appointees—let alone the civil servants—sought to hide the true policy from Trump for fear of how he might sabotage it with a tweet. Biden’s people will know the most damaging tweets by heart and have already forged policies and communications strategies to repair the damage. What the landing teams have been barred from learning by Trump’s delay is what has actually been transpiring at lower levels—out of view of the media and perhaps Trump himself.
A third genuine worry is that there are sensitive national security policies where the incoming team will need to assume immediate operational control on Jan. 20. This especially concerns ongoing covert intelligence actions and military special operations that will still be underway on Inauguration Day. Both the success of these operations and the security of the agents and soldiers involved depend on a seamless transition. For this, the Biden team needs to be briefed now. Otherwise those missions—and the people involved—will be at risk.
Fourth, the Trump team may be considering last-minute legacy-chasing maneuvers that could lay yet more obstacles into Biden’s path. That includes most obviously a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan (regardless of how that could sabotage ongoing peace negotiations), but could produce other surprises, such as additional troop withdrawals from Germany or even a last-minute declaration that the United States will exit NATO. Biden’s team could not stop such grandstanding. Even if Trump’s neoisolationist stance—especially on Afghanistan—intersects with the kind of pressure Biden will get from his own far-left flank, an effective transition would still be crucial for avoiding the problems that a rush to the exits would produce. A normal transition would also help the Biden team learn in more detail which last-minute decisions could easily be walked back and how.
Trump’s people will be implementing his orders until Inauguration Day with greater or lesser urgency. They will know better than anyone else how to fix what they are unraveling and could convey that to the incoming team. That would enable Biden to spend his political capital on those cases where Trump’s damage is irreversible.
Finally, much has already been said about how Trump’s refusal to set the transition in motion damages the United States’ credibility in the eyes of the world—especially as an exemplar of democracy. There is a long-running debate in the democracy field over whether the United States should have a mission of promoting democracy in other countries or should instead just be a model for other countries to choose to emulate. Trump’s refusal to concede his loss and uphold a cornerstone of democracy—the peaceful transition of power—makes that debate moot for now. He has sabotaged the United States’ mission and besmirched its model to the world.
There is nothing good that comes from delaying the transition, and the bad ranges from annoying to dangerous. If the Biden team were as shambolic as Trump’s was four years ago, the United States would be going through a genuine national security crisis. Luckily, that isn’t the case, and if Americans keep calm and carry on, the country can make it through. But the sooner that happens, the better.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--Democrats Urge Outgoing Trump to Be Flexible on Sanctions

Democrats Urge Outgoing Trump to Be Flexible on Sanctions This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Democrats on Capitol Hill are pushing back on the Trump administration ’ s plan to unveil stepped-up sanctions against Iran and other U.S. rivals , urging the outgoing president to show leniency and allow coronavirus aid to be sent .
In a letter to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” García and Sen. Elizabeth Warren , along with 73 other House and Senate Democrats , called on the Trump administration to issue a worldwide temporary general license that would cover testing kits , respirators , and personal protective equipment needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic .
“ The pandemic has laid bare the ways in which our broad application of sanctions is undermining public health systems , imposing sweeping economic penalties that restrict commerce in the material and equipment necessary to respond to the coronavirus and harming ordinary people , ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the flow of medical resources neither enables an effective outbreak response around the world , nor does it serve our national security interests.
” The incoming Biden administration would likely be able to quickly write exemptions to ease the flow of U.S. coronavirus assistance around the world , but the next few months are critical .
The pandemic is raging globally , and the Trump administration is seeking to use its final weeks in office to box in the next administration when it comes to U.S. financial warfare .
In coordination with Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of new Iran sanctions and several other moves , such as the pending terrorist designation of Yemen ’ s Iran-backed Houthi rebels , a move that aid groups fear could impede the flow of goods to fight the virus in the middle of one of the world ’ s worst humanitarian catastrophes .
President-elect Joe Biden has called on Trump to create licenses to allow goods to flow from pharmaceutical and medical device companies into Iran , and to create dedicated channels for banks and service firms to allow Iranians access to life-saving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Treasury Department ’ s Office of Foreign Assets Control , have been previously used by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to provide aid to Iran during devastating earthquakes over the past two decades .
“ It is bad enough that the Trump administration abandoned the Iran nuclear deal in favor of a ‘ maximum pressure ’ strategy that has badly backfired , encouraging Iran to become even more aggressive and restart its nuclear program , ” Biden wrote in a Medium post in April .
“ It makes no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to compound that failure with cruelty by inhibiting access to needed humanitarian assistance.
” On Monday , Biden called for the immediate passage of the HEROES Act , a coronavirus stimulus package approved by the House earlier this year that includes $ 10 billion in foreign coronavirus assistance .
García , the Democratic lawmaker , has also supported the use of International Monetary Fund special drawing rights to give financial relief to nations desperate to pay for much-needed medical imports .

Democrats on Capitol Hill are pushing back on the Trump administration’s plan to unveil stepped-up sanctions against Iran and other U.S. rivals, urging the outgoing president to show leniency and allow coronavirus aid to be sent.
Democrats on Capitol Hill are pushing back on the Trump administration’s plan to unveil stepped-up sanctions against Iran and other U.S. rivals, urging the outgoing president to show leniency and allow coronavirus aid to be sent.
In a letter to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo this week, Rep. Jesús “Chuy” García and Sen. Elizabeth Warren, along with 73 other House and Senate Democrats, called on the Trump administration to issue a worldwide temporary general license that would cover testing kits, respirators, and personal protective equipment needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.
“The pandemic has laid bare the ways in which our broad application of sanctions is undermining public health systems, imposing sweeping economic penalties that restrict commerce in the material and equipment necessary to respond to the coronavirus and harming ordinary people,” the lawmakers wrote. “Blocking or slowing the flow of medical resources neither enables an effective outbreak response around the world, nor does it serve our national security interests.”
The incoming Biden administration would likely be able to quickly write exemptions to ease the flow of U.S. coronavirus assistance around the world, but the next few months are critical. The pandemic is raging globally, and the Trump administration is seeking to use its final weeks in office to box in the next administration when it comes to U.S. financial warfare.
In coordination with Israel, the administration has planned a flurry of new Iran sanctions and several other moves, such as the pending terrorist designation of Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels, a move that aid groups fear could impede the flow of goods to fight the virus in the middle of one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes.
President-elect Joe Biden has called on Trump to create licenses to allow goods to flow from pharmaceutical and medical device companies into Iran, and to create dedicated channels for banks and service firms to allow Iranians access to life-saving medical treatment. Similar licenses, issued by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, have been previously used by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations to provide aid to Iran during devastating earthquakes over the past two decades.
“It is bad enough that the Trump administration abandoned the Iran nuclear deal in favor of a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy that has badly backfired, encouraging Iran to become even more aggressive and restart its nuclear program,” Biden wrote in a Medium post in April. “It makes no sense, in a global health crisis, to compound that failure with cruelty by inhibiting access to needed humanitarian assistance.”
On Monday, Biden called for the immediate passage of the HEROES Act, a coronavirus stimulus package approved by the House earlier this year that includes $10 billion in foreign coronavirus assistance. García, the Democratic lawmaker, has also supported the use of International Monetary Fund special drawing rights to give financial relief to nations desperate to pay for much-needed medical imports.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-17--The Coronavirus Is Now Another Risk of U.S. Migration

TLAPA DE COMONFORT , Mexico—When Claudio Ortega Maldonado was 17 , he left his home in the mountains of Guerrero , never to return .
Ortega knew what awaited him if he stayed : He grew up in poverty in a family of seasonal farmers and began working as a child .
He hoped to offer his parents and 11 siblings a better life with the money he sent home from New York City , and to build a house in Mexico that he could eventually return to .
After 13 years away , he wanted to surprise his family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Day this year .
Instead , Ortega died of the coronavirus on April 22 in a Brooklyn hospital at the age of 29 .
In New York , Ortega had quickly landed a job as a cook , though he was undocumented .
He worked 10-hour shifts six days a week , earning $ 3,000 a month—and sending $ 450 each month to his family .
He sent presents for his siblings such as clothes and shoes and kept a close eye on his parents ’ well-being .
Every payday , he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ buying his parents a house in Mexico City and returning home to sell produce .
Ortega , more than 2,100 miles away , was his family ’ s main provider .
Despite the ongoing health and economic crisis , Mexican workers in the United States have so far sent record remittances home this year .
In March , as the pandemic gathered force , they sent home around $ 4 billion—36 percent more than in the same period in 2019 .
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has estimated that total remittances to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end of the year , defying economists ’ forecasts .
The World Bank projects a drop in global remittances , in part because of weak economic growth and employment levels in immigrant-hosting countries .
As of June , more than 2,500 Mexicans in the United States , many of them essential workers , had died from COVID-19 , according to Mexico ’ s foreign ministry .
For people such as Ortega , the opportunity to break the cycle of poverty outweighs the dangers of crossing the border .
But the coronavirus pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hidden cost of migration for families who rely on relatives in the United States to put a roof over their head and food on the table .
As COVID-19 surges again , families in Mexico face the question of whether migration is worth it .
On both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border , migration to the United States is intertwined with myths , from the American dream to the idea that undocumented immigrants are coming to steal U.S. jobs .
In recent years , more migrants returned to Mexico from the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with their families—a trend that precedes the Trump administration .
Of course , the Trump administration has made it harder for immigrants and asylum-seekers to reach the United States .
Trump has succeeded in cutting both legal immigration and the number of immigrants that reach the U.S. southern border , with the help of Mexican authorities .
This year , the number of migrants arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border increased sharply amid the economic downturn in Mexico .
For most Mexicans , migration to the United States is still a privilege—even for those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Some people migrate to other parts of Mexico , driven by the lack of economic opportunities .
For them , the American dream remains a mirage .
Ortega ’ s hometown of Tlapa de Comonfort serves as a commercial hub for the remote towns in the surrounding mountains , home to predominantly Indigenous communities .
Guerrero is one of the most underdeveloped states in Mexico , and its mountain region has for decades been among the poorest .
Two-thirds of the population lives in poverty , with many relying on subsistence farming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and low wages .
Guerrero ranks low on access to health services , education , food security , and basic services—indicators that have remained stagnant or even declined over the last decade .
In the mountains , work is arduous and scarce .
Some turn to growing poppies—a lucrative business for cartels , but not for the small farmer .
Others come up with the money to pay for a smuggler to migrate to the United States , and those who do manage to cross the border shape the local economy in Tlapa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nike knockoffs , family-owned international delivery services , and even New York-style pizzerias dot the town ’ s streets .
The two-story cinderblock house that Ortega ’ s family built with his remittances sits on a hill overlooking Tlapa , a source of pride for the family .
Structures built with remittance money are a familiar symbol—they stand out like sore thumbs from the mountain ’ s green foliage .
It can take years for families to build a house : Immigrants must first pay off their debt to a smuggler , on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can start sending remittances to their families .
In the mountains , the money means farmers can afford fertilizer to work their land , children receive an education , and people get access to health care and basic services .
“ Remittances are the family ’ s fund with which they pay for medicine , fertilizers , school supplies , uniforms , ” said Abel Barrera , the founder of Tlachinollan , a human rights organization serving Guerrero ’ s mountain region .
“ There ’ s no paid labor in the communities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of opportunity and the absence of state policies to stimulate the region prompted Ortega to migrate , and they also kept him from coming back .
“ You can ’ t ask a migrant to develop the region with their remittances , ” Barrera said .
“ They send their $ 300 a month and that ’ s the extent of it .
The state needs to step in.
” Ortega ’ s labor in the United States was not enough to lift his family out of poverty , only to alleviate it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family couldn ’ t afford to pay for his funeral expenses .
It was only thanks to a co-worker and close friend of Ortega ’ s , Luis Santiago Reyes , that his remains weren ’ t buried in a mass grave in New York .
Ortega began to feel ill in early March and feared the worst .
He spoke with his parents a few times , but they didn ’ t think it could be COVID-19 .
Reyes urged him to go to the hospital , as he was diabetic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He didn ’ t want to go to the hospital because he didn ’ t want to die here , ” Reyes said .
By the time Ortega arrived at the hospital on April 5 , he had trouble breathing .
He fell into a coma and died two weeks later .
His ashes arrived on a Sunday at the end of October , along with his guitar , some clothes , and $ 820 that Reyes raised to help the family .
New York City is home to many immigrants from towns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rely heavily on them .
Throughout the pandemic , many have continued working in construction , agriculture , and the service industry .
As Mexico suffers its worst recession in nearly a century , their need to work to support their families puts them at higher risk of contracting COVID-19 .
The coronavirus has disproportionately affected Latinos in the United States—in part because of many Latinos ’ high-risk jobs , crowded living conditions , and limited access to health care .
Adjusted for age , the mortality rate among Latino residents of New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
These disparities set a worrisome precedent as the winter approaches and cases spike across the United States .
On Nov. 13 , new COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations reached a record high in the United States , and New York has imposed a new round of social distancing restrictions , closing gyms , bars , and restaurants at 10 p.m .
In Mexico , the pandemic has also had disproportionate effects in low-income communities and taken an economic toll .
More than 40 percent of Mexico ’ s population lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ live in extreme poverty .
The pandemic , which threatens to increase global extreme poverty by 2021 , further narrows people ’ s options .
Between the increasing challenges of migration to the United States and the dwindling opportunities in Mexico , families like Ortega ’ s find themselves between a rock and a hard place .
The family ’ s grief is now mixed with their anxiety about the future .
Juana and Dionicio are considering migrating again .
Their options are limited : They can either return to the fields in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or one of their older children can attempt to migrate to the United States .
Claudio would often tell his mother that the remittances were intended to ease the family ’ s suffering and keep them from laboring in the fields .
But Juana said she would give it all up to have him with them today .
“ Claudio ’ s death is the hardest thing we have gone through , ” she said .
“ He was our strength .
Now we have to live waiting for a call that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made possible with support from the National Geographic Foundation .

TLAPA DE COMONFORT, Mexico—When Claudio Ortega Maldonado was 17, he left his home in the mountains of Guerrero, never to return. Ortega knew what awaited him if he stayed: He grew up in poverty in a family of seasonal farmers and began working as a child. He hoped to offer his parents and 11 siblings a better life with the money he sent home from New York City, and to build a house in Mexico that he could eventually return to. After 13 years away, he wanted to surprise his family and come home on Mother’s Day this year. Instead, Ortega died of the coronavirus on April 22 in a Brooklyn hospital at the age of 29.
TLAPA DE COMONFORT, Mexico—When Claudio Ortega Maldonado was 17, he left his home in the mountains of Guerrero, never to return. Ortega knew what awaited him if he stayed: He grew up in poverty in a family of seasonal farmers and began working as a child. He hoped to offer his parents and 11 siblings a better life with the money he sent home from New York City, and to build a house in Mexico that he could eventually return to. After 13 years away, he wanted to surprise his family and come home on Mother’s Day this year. Instead, Ortega died of the coronavirus on April 22 in a Brooklyn hospital at the age of 29.
In New York, Ortega had quickly landed a job as a cook, though he was undocumented. He worked 10-hour shifts six days a week, earning $3,000 a month—and sending $450 each month to his family. He sent presents for his siblings such as clothes and shoes and kept a close eye on his parents’ well-being. Every payday, he would buy a lottery ticket, dreaming of buying his parents a house in Mexico City and returning home to sell produce. Ortega, more than 2,100 miles away, was his family’s main provider.
Despite the ongoing health and economic crisis, Mexican workers in the United States have so far sent record remittances home this year. In March, as the pandemic gathered force, they sent home around $4 billion—36 percent more than in the same period in 2019. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has estimated that total remittances to Mexico will reach $40 billion by the end of the year, defying economists’ forecasts. The World Bank projects a drop in global remittances, in part because of weak economic growth and employment levels in immigrant-hosting countries.
As of June, more than 2,500 Mexicans in the United States, many of them essential workers, had died from COVID-19, according to Mexico’s foreign ministry. For people such as Ortega, the opportunity to break the cycle of poverty outweighs the dangers of crossing the border. But the coronavirus pandemic has compounded these risks and exposed the hidden cost of migration for families who rely on relatives in the United States to put a roof over their head and food on the table. As COVID-19 surges again, families in Mexico face the question of whether migration is worth it.
On both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border, migration to the United States is intertwined with myths, from the American dream to the idea that undocumented immigrants are coming to steal U.S. jobs. In recent years, more migrants returned to Mexico from the United States than migrated there, largely to reunite with their families—a trend that precedes the Trump administration. Of course, the Trump administration has made it harder for immigrants and asylum-seekers to reach the United States. Trump has succeeded in cutting both legal immigration and the number of immigrants that reach the U.S. southern border, with the help of Mexican authorities. This year, the number of migrants arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border increased sharply amid the economic downturn in Mexico.
For most Mexicans, migration to the United States is still a privilege—even for those who endanger their lives in the journey. Some people migrate to other parts of Mexico, driven by the lack of economic opportunities. For them, the American dream remains a mirage.
Ortega’s hometown of Tlapa de Comonfort serves as a commercial hub for the remote towns in the surrounding mountains, home to predominantly Indigenous communities. Guerrero is one of the most underdeveloped states in Mexico, and its mountain region has for decades been among the poorest. Two-thirds of the population lives in poverty, with many relying on subsistence farming due to a lack of job opportunities and low wages. Guerrero ranks low on access to health services, education, food security, and basic services—indicators that have remained stagnant or even declined over the last decade.
Oswaldo Ortega Maldonado, 14, sits on Aug. 25 in the room that his father reserved for his brother Claudio to use when he returned to Tlapa from the United States. No one slept there for months, the family said.
In the mountains, work is arduous and scarce. Some turn to growing poppies—a lucrative business for cartels, but not for the small farmer. Others come up with the money to pay for a smuggler to migrate to the United States, and those who do manage to cross the border shape the local economy in Tlapa. Money transfer centers, stores with Nike knockoffs, family-owned international delivery services, and even New York-style pizzerias dot the town’s streets.
The two-story cinderblock house that Ortega’s family built with his remittances sits on a hill overlooking Tlapa, a source of pride for the family. Structures built with remittance money are a familiar symbol—they stand out like sore thumbs from the mountain’s green foliage. It can take years for families to build a house: Immigrants must first pay off their debt to a smuggler, on top of living expenses, before they can start sending remittances to their families.
In the mountains, the money means farmers can afford fertilizer to work their land, children receive an education, and people get access to health care and basic services. “Remittances are the family’s fund with which they pay for medicine, fertilizers, school supplies, uniforms,” said Abel Barrera, the founder of Tlachinollan, a human rights organization serving Guerrero’s mountain region. “There’s no paid labor in the communities, so people must leave.”
Lack of opportunity and the absence of state policies to stimulate the region prompted Ortega to migrate, and they also kept him from coming back. “You can’t ask a migrant to develop the region with their remittances,” Barrera said. “They send their $300 a month and that’s the extent of it. The state needs to step in.”
Ortega’s labor in the United States was not enough to lift his family out of poverty, only to alleviate it. When Ortega passed away, his family couldn’t afford to pay for his funeral expenses. It was only thanks to a co-worker and close friend of Ortega’s, Luis Santiago Reyes, that his remains weren’t buried in a mass grave in New York.
Juan Carlos Ruiz, the pastor of the Lutheran Church of the Good Shepherd, carries Claudio’s ashes in Tlapa on Sept. 27. The pastor carried Claudio’s remains from New York to Mexico to deliver them to Claudio’s family.
An altar for Claudio features his guitar and suitcase during a service for him in Tlapa on Sept. 27.
When Juana Maldonado found out her son had died, she couldn’t eat for days. They were particularly close and spoke on the phone every Tuesday. “I told him it was time for him to return and let us take care of him,” Juana said in her native Mixtec. But Ortega kept pushing back his return date. He wanted to return to the house he provided, but worried about what Tlapa couldn’t offer him.
Ortega began to feel ill in early March and feared the worst. He spoke with his parents a few times, but they didn’t think it could be COVID-19. Reyes urged him to go to the hospital, as he was diabetic and at elevated risk for complications. “He didn’t want to go to the hospital because he didn’t want to die here,” Reyes said. By the time Ortega arrived at the hospital on April 5, he had trouble breathing. He fell into a coma and died two weeks later. His ashes arrived on a Sunday at the end of October, along with his guitar, some clothes, and $820 that Reyes raised to help the family.
New York City is home to many immigrants from towns such as Tlapa, with families who rely heavily on them. Throughout the pandemic, many have continued working in construction, agriculture, and the service industry. As Mexico suffers its worst recession in nearly a century, their need to work to support their families puts them at higher risk of contracting COVID-19. The coronavirus has disproportionately affected Latinos in the United States—in part because of many Latinos’ high-risk jobs, crowded living conditions, and limited access to health care. Adjusted for age, the mortality rate among Latino residents of New York state is among the highest in the United States.
These disparities set a worrisome precedent as the winter approaches and cases spike across the United States. On Nov. 13, new COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations reached a record high in the United States, and New York has imposed a new round of social distancing restrictions, closing gyms, bars, and restaurants at 10 p.m.
In Mexico, the pandemic has also had disproportionate effects in low-income communities and taken an economic toll. More than 40 percent of Mexico’s population lives below the poverty line and 7 percent live in extreme poverty. The pandemic, which threatens to increase global extreme poverty by 2021, further narrows people’s options. Between the increasing challenges of migration to the United States and the dwindling opportunities in Mexico, families like Ortega’s find themselves between a rock and a hard place.
Claudio’s sister and nephews play on the roof of their cinderblock house in Tlapa on Aug. 29.
Ortega’s return was uncertain and the stakes were high, but his family always felt his absence strongly. The siblings he helped provide for grew up without him. They have found some peace in having Claudio’s remains back with them in Mexico, after a traditional funeral. His father, Dionicio Ortega, wants to keep his ashes in the room where his son intended to live one day.
The family’s grief is now mixed with their anxiety about the future. Juana and Dionicio are considering migrating again. Their options are limited: They can either return to the fields in northern Mexico with their children and grandchildren, or one of their older children can attempt to migrate to the United States.
Claudio would often tell his mother that the remittances were intended to ease the family’s suffering and keep them from laboring in the fields. But Juana said she would give it all up to have him with them today. “Claudio’s death is the hardest thing we have gone through,” she said. “He was our strength. Now we have to live waiting for a call that will never come.”
This story was made possible with support from the National Geographic Foundation.