foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--America’s Crumbling Strategy Needs (Literally) Machiavellian Answers

Niccolò Machiavelli ( 1469-1527 ) has been called the father of modern political philosophy .
If Americans remember him at all , though , it is more likely as the Father of Lies : the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to The Prince , his manual of amoral advice to rulers .
That ’ s unfortunate because Machiavelli is uncannily relevant today—and not because his maxims make easy fodder for books about office politics .
His writings go far beyond the book he became infamous for and speak to us directly about the sorts of problems we confront @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an interstitial age .
For him , it was a world that was no longer medieval but not quite yet modern , either .
For us , it is clear that the post-industrial 20th century is over , but we ’ re not exactly sure what comes next .
Both were marked by the crumbling of old institutions without new ones to take their place , and by a growing sense of inadequacy and dread .
We typically mark the beginning of the modern state system with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereignty and territorial integrity that serve as its foundations to this day .
Machiavelli called for similar reforms nearly a century and a half earlier —anticipating the need for a restructuring of a political order that was then already falling apart .
In the posthumously published Discourses on Livy , Machiavelli reflects deeply on the concept of ordino—a word that means something like “ the normal way of doing things , ” but that he used in reference to institutional structures and the ethical assumptions underlying them .
An ordino is very much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they say liberal world order .
Late medieval society wasn ’ t divided by clean geographic boundaries .
Feudal princes depended on personal obligations to govern overlapping networks : each relationship fixed to an individual and thus impermanent .
Marital alliances and hereditary titles created further patchworks of loyalties in distant lands .
By Machiavelli ’ s time , this arrangement had grown into a convoluted tangle of acquisitive princes striving against one another .
His native Italy was a favored arena , hosting the bloody feuds of Kings , Popes , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swiftly rose and precipitously fell as the balance of that power continuously shifted .
Machiavelli ’ s own Florence had a particularly checkered recent history of revolutions and counterrevolutions .
In general , it was a time characterized by endemic warfare , disease , and hunger .
As ever , it was regular people who suffered the most .
Machiavelli argued that the medieval world order was dying and a new one was struggling to be born , and he wanted to help midwife it .
He seems to have intuitively grasped that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use to protect and advance their shared interests .
He argued that the feudal principalities that composed the ordino of his day were obsolete and advocated for the creation of a new , post-feudal political structure better able to solve the strategic problems Florence faced .
Machiavelli was staunchly republican and a devoted supporter of Florence ’ s relatively open republic where he served as secretary to the Council of War—the body that in practice oversaw almost all diplomatic and military matters .
Despite being well aware of the corruption inside the system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reforming .
Despite being well aware of the corruption inside the system , Machiavelli believed it well worth defending—and reforming .
Understanding that republics were fragile to begin with , he knew that those who allowed their institutions to atrophy and grow outdated were more fragile still—and thus likelier to fail .
He believed Florence had to adopt systemic administrative reforms to modernize its apparatus of government .
It needed , he argued , a professional cadre to serve as permanent ambassadors to represent the republic ’ s interest abroad .
It needed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial interests of a modern city-state .
It needed strong , independent institutions that ensured continuity of long-term policies between successive rulers and that could cement alliances that would outlast an individual ’ s whim .
He realized , in other words , that Florence needed a modern state .
But Machiavelli didn ’ t just conceive of changes on a political level .
Machiavelli lived in a time of military revolution—a period of sharp , discontinuous change in military affairs , where , as he put it “ our previous methods of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one has yet been able to create new ones.
” This revolution spurred principalities to adopt new ways of war and leave the old ones behind .
One by one , for example , the ancient fortifications of Italian cities were being blasted to rubble by the power of modern artillery .
Machiavelli understood that Florence was practically defenseless against the new bronze cannons of powerful kingdoms like France .
“ No wall is found , however thick , ” he wrote , that the new artillery would not “ knock down in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the condottieri ( contractor ) armies that Florentines relied upon to fight their wars were unreliable and even when loyal , subversive to the republic ’ s legitimacy .
They prey “ as much upon him who has led them as against whom they are led.
” But while those around him remained enamored with traditional structures that were ( in this case quite literally ) crumbling before their eyes , he sought to build new ones that would better serve the republic ’ s security needs .
For Machiavelli , strongpoints @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessary evil ; they served as symbols of authority but were increasingly vulnerable and could easily undermine a principality that did not broaden its defense to the countryside where people lived .
He essentially advised what we might call an area defense given the fragility of point defenses and the tendency of long sieges to undermine state legitimacy .
To remedy the problem of mercenaries , Machiavelli called for the creation of a permanent body of citizen-soldiers .
It ’ s difficult to exaggerate just how revolutionary this idea was in the 16th-century @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outsourced to contractors .
Machiavelli coined the argument that ’ s now commonplace : that a volunteer militia would be far more reliable than soldiers of fortune because they would be fighting for their families and neighbors , not for fame or profit .
Machiavelli put his radical idea into action when given the opportunity .
After years of frustrating stalemate in its war to subjugate Pisa , Florence finally authorized him to personally muster , drill , and lead a force of Florentine volunteers , a force he eventually led to victory—the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can rub those in power the wrong way , and Machiavelli was no different .
For all his genius , his ideas were largely ignored after the period of brief experimentation during the war with Pisa—tragically for Florence , as it turned out .
Florence did not become the administratively modern republican state Machiavelli had envisioned .
Instead , its liberty was snuffed out in 1533 , just six years after Machiavelli himself died in disgrace .
Machiavelli had been dismissed from the civil service when the plutocratic Medici regained power in 1512 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and tortured on suspicion he might attempt to overthrow the new authoritarian regime .
It was only after his release , with his career abruptly ended , that he sat down to write The Prince , the slim treatise that would earn him permanent infamy .
That book remains the subject of vigorous debate .
Like authoritarianism , The Prince is quick , easy , and full of what seems to be common sense .
The Discourses , on the other hand , are like republicanism—long , forbidding , and often difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Prince to get back into the new government ’ s good graces ; essentially a job application submitted by a broken man .
Others suggest it was a satire , a joke on those who had treated him so poorly .
More interestingly , some even argue that Machiavelli wrote The Prince as a sort of 16th-century application of information warfare , that he intentionally crafted it for the baleful Lorenzo di Piero de ’ Medici because he believed that any ruler who put its sinister advice into practice would soon be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doctrine , ” Machiavelli ’ s first and greatest detractor later wrote , was “ to act like a drug that causes princes to go mad.
” Machiavelli ’ s influence in life was short-lived , subject to the whims of the very class of individual rulers he sought to constrain .
He probably wasn ’ t surprised , though .
Machiavelli was a dedicated student of history , noting , like Thucydides , that “ anyone comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in all cities and in all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and passions that have always prevailed.
” For this reason , he thought it was easy to judge events unfolding in his own republic , for they had done so in the past .
He advised the Florentines to “ apply such remedies as they ancients used.
” And when encountering problems , the ancients had not ?
“ Strike out new ones.
” We would be wise to study the works Machiavelli left behind and to consider the remedies he offered as our ordino collapses and another has not yet taken shape @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are found wanting ?
We , too , should strike out new ones .

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been called the father of modern political philosophy. If Americans remember him at all, though, it is more likely as the Father of Lies : the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to The Prince, his manual of amoral advice to rulers. That’s unfortunate because Machiavelli is uncannily relevant today—and not because his maxims make easy fodder for books about office politics. His writings go far beyond the book he became infamous for and speak to us directly about the sorts of problems we confront today.
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been called the father of modern political philosophy. If Americans remember him at all, though, it is more likely as the Father of Lies: the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to The Prince, his manual of amoral advice to rulers. That’s unfortunate because Machiavelli is uncannily relevant today—and not because his maxims make easy fodder for books about office politics. His writings go far beyond the book he became infamous for and speak to us directly about the sorts of problems we confront today.
Like us, Machiavelli lived in an interstitial age. For him, it was a world that was no longer medieval but not quite yet modern, either. For us, it is clear that the post-industrial 20th century is over, but we’re not exactly sure what comes next. Both were marked by the crumbling of old institutions without new ones to take their place, and by a growing sense of inadequacy and dread.
We typically mark the beginning of the modern state system with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Those treaties ratified the ideas of sovereignty and territorial integrity that serve as its foundations to this day. Machiavelli called for similar reforms nearly a century and a half earlier —anticipating the need for a restructuring of a political order that was then already falling apart.
In the posthumously published Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli reflects deeply on the concept of ordino—a word that means something like “the normal way of doing things,” but that he used in reference to institutional structures and the ethical assumptions underlying them. An ordino is very much like what international relations theorists mean when they say liberal world order.
Late medieval society wasn’t divided by clean geographic boundaries. Feudal princes depended on personal obligations to govern overlapping networks: each relationship fixed to an individual and thus impermanent. Marital alliances and hereditary titles created further patchworks of loyalties in distant lands.
By Machiavelli’s time, this arrangement had grown into a convoluted tangle of acquisitive princes striving against one another. His native Italy was a favored arena, hosting the bloody feuds of Kings, Popes, and Emperors vying for power. Italian regimes swiftly rose and precipitously fell as the balance of that power continuously shifted. Machiavelli’s own Florence had a particularly checkered recent history of revolutions and counterrevolutions. In general, it was a time characterized by endemic warfare, disease, and hunger. As ever, it was regular people who suffered the most.
Machiavelli argued that the medieval world order was dying and a new one was struggling to be born, and he wanted to help midwife it. He seems to have intuitively grasped that states were technologies that security communities could use to protect and advance their shared interests. He argued that the feudal principalities that composed the ordino of his day were obsolete and advocated for the creation of a new, post-feudal political structure better able to solve the strategic problems Florence faced.
Machiavelli was staunchly republican and a devoted supporter of Florence’s relatively open republic where he served as secretary to the Council of War—the body that in practice oversaw almost all diplomatic and military matters. Despite being well aware of the corruption inside the system, he believed it well worth defending—and reforming.
Despite being well aware of the corruption inside the system, Machiavelli believed it well worth defending—and reforming.
Understanding that republics were fragile to begin with, he knew that those who allowed their institutions to atrophy and grow outdated were more fragile still—and thus likelier to fail. He believed Florence had to adopt systemic administrative reforms to modernize its apparatus of government. It needed, he argued, a professional cadre to serve as permanent ambassadors to represent the republic’s interest abroad. It needed educated officials who could manage the complex financial interests of a modern city-state. It needed strong, independent institutions that ensured continuity of long-term policies between successive rulers and that could cement alliances that would outlast an individual’s whim.
He realized, in other words, that Florence needed a modern state.
But Machiavelli didn’t just conceive of changes on a political level. Machiavelli lived in a time of military revolution—a period of sharp, discontinuous change in military affairs, where, as he put it “our previous methods of war have become outmoded, and no one has yet been able to create new ones.”
This revolution spurred principalities to adopt new ways of war and leave the old ones behind. One by one, for example, the ancient fortifications of Italian cities were being blasted to rubble by the power of modern artillery. Machiavelli understood that Florence was practically defenseless against the new bronze cannons of powerful kingdoms like France. “No wall is found, however thick,” he wrote, that the new artillery would not “knock down in a few days.”
He also realized that the condottieri (contractor) armies that Florentines relied upon to fight their wars were unreliable and even when loyal, subversive to the republic’s legitimacy. They prey “as much upon him who has led them as against whom they are led.”
But while those around him remained enamored with traditional structures that were (in this case quite literally) crumbling before their eyes, he sought to build new ones that would better serve the republic’s security needs.
For Machiavelli, strongpoints and walls were in many ways a necessary evil; they served as symbols of authority but were increasingly vulnerable and could easily undermine a principality that did not broaden its defense to the countryside where people lived. He essentially advised what we might call an area defense given the fragility of point defenses and the tendency of long sieges to undermine state legitimacy.
To remedy the problem of mercenaries, Machiavelli called for the creation of a permanent body of citizen-soldiers. It’s difficult to exaggerate just how revolutionary this idea was in the 16th-century when almost every aspect of warfare was outsourced to contractors. Machiavelli coined the argument that’s now commonplace: that a volunteer militia would be far more reliable than soldiers of fortune because they would be fighting for their families and neighbors, not for fame or profit.
Machiavelli put his radical idea into action when given the opportunity. After years of frustrating stalemate in its war to subjugate Pisa, Florence finally authorized him to personally muster, drill, and lead a force of Florentine volunteers, a force he eventually led to victory—the apogee of his political career.
Innovators can rub those in power the wrong way, and Machiavelli was no different. For all his genius, his ideas were largely ignored after the period of brief experimentation during the war with Pisa—tragically for Florence, as it turned out.
Florence did not become the administratively modern republican state Machiavelli had envisioned. Instead, its liberty was snuffed out in 1533, just six years after Machiavelli himself died in disgrace.
Machiavelli had been dismissed from the civil service when the plutocratic Medici regained power in 1512. The next year he was imprisoned and tortured on suspicion he might attempt to overthrow the new authoritarian regime.
It was only after his release, with his career abruptly ended, that he sat down to write The Prince, the slim treatise that would earn him permanent infamy.
That book remains the subject of vigorous debate. Like authoritarianism, The Prince is quick, easy, and full of what seems to be common sense. The Discourses, on the other hand, are like republicanism—long, forbidding, and often difficult to get through.
Some believe Machiavelli wrote The Prince to get back into the new government’s good graces; essentially a job application submitted by a broken man. Others suggest it was a satire, a joke on those who had treated him so poorly. More interestingly, some even argue that Machiavelli wrote The Prince as a sort of 16th-century application of information warfare, that he intentionally crafted it for the baleful Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici because he believed that any ruler who put its sinister advice into practice would soon be overthrown. “The aim of his doctrine,” Machiavelli’s first and greatest detractor later wrote, was “to act like a drug that causes princes to go mad.”
Machiavelli’s influence in life was short-lived, subject to the whims of the very class of individual rulers he sought to constrain. He probably wasn’t surprised, though. Machiavelli was a dedicated student of history, noting, like Thucydides, that “anyone comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in all cities and in all nations, there prevail the same desires and passions that have always prevailed.” For this reason, he thought it was easy to judge events unfolding in his own republic, for they had done so in the past. He advised the Florentines to “apply such remedies as they ancients used.” And when encountering problems, the ancients had not? “Strike out new ones.”
We would be wise to study the works Machiavelli left behind and to consider the remedies he offered as our ordino collapses and another has not yet taken shape. And when Machiavelli’s remedies are found wanting? We, too, should strike out new ones.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--The Bubonic Plague Killed Feudalism. COVID-19 Will Entrench It.

The Bubonic Plague Killed Feudalism .
COVID-19 Will Entrench It .
In a year already defined by an unprecedented pandemic , this week California confirmed a case of the bubonic plague—the horrific infectious disease that devastated Europe for centuries .
To be sure , this is not the start of a new calamity .
Every year , there are a few hundred cases across the world—most recently in Inner Mongolia .
And unlike in the past ( and unlike the COVID-19 pandemic today ) , bubonic plague is a well-understood disease that can be effectively treated with antibiotics when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surrounding the news offers a useful opportunity to reflect on some of the lesser understood effects of disease outbreaks—now and in history .
One of those effects is that disasters like pandemics have typically led to a reduction of inequality .
Rising inequality is widely regarded as the defining economic challenge of our time .
Yet while today ’ s level of income inequality is alarming , it is hardly exceptional by historical standards .
In the United States , for example , income inequality is just as high now as it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1929 stock market crash .
Going further back in history—from pharaonic Egypt to tsarist Russia , Victorian England , the Ottoman Empire , and China under the Qing dynasty—the pattern has been the same : Wealth tends to concentrate in the hands of a privileged elite .
Although inequality has been a persistent feature of civilization , it has not been constant .
Long stretches of high inequality have typically been followed by bursts of violent compression , owing to cataclysmic events like wars , revolutions , natural disasters , and , yes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , viruses , bacteria , and germs are perfect equalizers .
Whereas in a war , there are political and military hierarchies that determine the likelihood of being deployed to the battlefield and so the probability of dying in combat , killer pathogens have been blind to wealth , class , age , gender , and race .
The standard historical case in point is the bubonic plague , given the disease ’ s horrifying symptoms and its continuous recurrence over the last 1,500 years .
Epidemics usually emanated from Africa or Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the help of globe-trotting merchants .
Recurring epidemic waves lasted for decades or even centuries .
But the most devastating one was , with no doubt , the Black Death .
That pandemic wiped out an estimated one-third of the European population between 1347 and 1351 , causing the richest 10 percent of the population to lose their grip on between 15 percent and 20 percent of overall wealth .
As others have pointed out , further pandemics , revolutions , and wars have been the main cause whenever inequality has fallen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great exception to the well-established historical pattern .
If anything , the current pandemic is exacerbating inequality .
In their attempt to flatten epidemiological curves , governments across the world have upended the livelihoods of the least advantaged .
In March , the U.S. economy lost more jobs than over the entire Great Recession , with workers with less than college education taking the largest hit .
To add insult to injury , in June American billionaires were 20 percent richer than at the start of the shutdown in the United States in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different ?
Although cycles of plague were a common feature of life in late medieval Europe , the impact of the Black Death on the labor market was so devastating that it spelled the end of feudalism , the defining institutional system of the Middle Ages .
Before the feudal system ’ s collapse , most of the rural population was essentially servile , owing rent and services to aristocratic landowners in exchange for the use of their land .
In the wake of the Black Death , however , the shortage of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peasants to the detriment of the lords .
This was especially true in the case of England .
In 1351 , King Edward III introduced the Statute of Labourers as a response to the labor shortage caused by the pestilence .
The aim of the statute was to regulate the labor force by prohibiting requests or offers of wages higher than pre-plague standards and to limit movement in search of better conditions .
But these attempts failed to dilute the negotiating power of the lower classes .
Eventually , a new socioeconomic class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land and sold its fruits on the market for a profit .
For a pandemic to help equalize people , it requires a nearly unimaginable degree of human suffering .
The economic mechanism behind COVID-19 is quite different .
Its case fatality ratio , which seems to be around 2 percent , is relatively low .
Moreover , with older people being the most vulnerable to its most lethal effects , the size of the workforce is roughly unaffected .
In turn , unlike during the plague , the recession triggered by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a shortage—of workers that over time will push wages down—not up .
Meanwhile , social distancing measures are likely to remain in place for a while , hindering recovery in labor-intensive industries like restaurants , retail , and hotels , which will prevent the least skilled from regaining their livelihoods even when the economic recovery is in full swing .
In that way , the distributive effects of the pandemic ’ s temporary shock to the economy risk becoming permanent .
In other words , for a pandemic to help equalize people , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human suffering .
“ Its poison is so rapid , ” as recounted one plague chronicler in a 17th century book , “ and it slips so subtly into the body , that it is one and the same to feel oneself affected and to see oneself placed in the tomb.
” It is a mercy that the world has avoided as much this time .
Available evidence suggests that the risk of falling seriously ill from COVID-19 in the West is higher among individuals with lower income and lower levels of education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suffer from the underlying health conditions ( for example , diabetes , obesity , cardiovascular disease , and respiratory disease ) that elevate risks of severe illness and mortality from COVID-19 .
Given overlapping racial and economic divides , particularly in the United States , there are racial disparities in the effects of the pandemic as well .
According to APM Research Lab , Black , Indigenous , Pacific Islander , and Latino Americans all have COVID-19 death rates of roughly triple or more that of white Americans .
Equally , seven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable to the plague as a result of recurrent famines that worsened their health .
Large chunks of the population likely experienced severe malnutrition before the Black Death , which probably made it harder for them to fight off the disease .
According to findings from ancient cemeteries , around 30 percent of wealthy English landowners likely succumbed to the plague , whereas the mortality rate for rural tenant farmers was between 40 percent and 70 percent .
Beyond their health advantages , the rich can also more easily limit exposure in other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States analyzed by the New York Times shows that the wealthy limited their mobility sooner and more drastically than the bottom 10 percent , thus reducing their exposure to potential infections .
Meanwhile , some of the wealthiest neighborhoods in New York emptied out during the early phase of the lockdown as many who were able left for less affected areas .
While millions of white-collar workers are typing on their computers from their homes or from temporary residences , essential workers like cashiers , bus drivers , and street cleaners have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar fashion , at the time of the Black Death , anti-pestilence measures forced the poor to confine themselves in crowded and unhygienic places , thus increasing their exposure to infections , while the rich could enjoy their quarantine in large and isolated spaces .
The term villeggiatura ( spending time in a villa ) was coined in Florence immediately after the Black Death .
When a new wave of plague broke out , rich people simply withdrew from the city to a country farm and waited for the epidemic to subside .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are spread across Tuscany ’ s Chianti region were built precisely for that reason .
As the Italian plague chronicler Giovanni Boccaccio wrote , the very wealthiest deserted their neighborhoods altogether “ as though the plague was meant to harry only those remaining within their city walls.
” As people around the world privileged enough to do so wait at home for the pandemic to be over , it is clear that COVID-19 is not going to be the next great equalizer .
And in some ways , that is a good thing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through the Black Death .
Governments should find less brutal ways to bring more fairness into society through redistributive and educational policies , and they should invest more resources in the health of the poorest while making sure that the societal value of the tasks performed by essential workers is matched with the income they generate .
Only by empowering the most vulnerable can Western societies hope to bring some equality in the face of calamity .

In a year already defined by an unprecedented pandemic, this week California confirmed a case of the bubonic plague—the horrific infectious disease that devastated Europe for centuries.
To be sure, this is not the start of a new calamity. Every year, there are a few hundred cases across the world—most recently in Inner Mongolia. And unlike in the past (and unlike the COVID-19 pandemic today), bubonic plague is a well-understood disease that can be effectively treated with antibiotics when it is contracted.
Still, the worry surrounding the news offers a useful opportunity to reflect on some of the lesser understood effects of disease outbreaks—now and in history.
One of those effects is that disasters like pandemics have typically led to a reduction of inequality. Rising inequality is widely regarded as the defining economic challenge of our time. Yet while today’s level of income inequality is alarming, it is hardly exceptional by historical standards. In the United States, for example, income inequality is just as high now as it was in the years leading up to the 1929 stock market crash. Going further back in history—from pharaonic Egypt to tsarist Russia, Victorian England, the Ottoman Empire, and China under the Qing dynasty—the pattern has been the same: Wealth tends to concentrate in the hands of a privileged elite.
Although inequality has been a persistent feature of civilization, it has not been constant. Long stretches of high inequality have typically been followed by bursts of violent compression, owing to cataclysmic events like wars, revolutions, natural disasters, and, yes, pandemics. At least in theory, viruses, bacteria, and germs are perfect equalizers. Whereas in a war, there are political and military hierarchies that determine the likelihood of being deployed to the battlefield and so the probability of dying in combat, killer pathogens have been blind to wealth, class, age, gender, and race.
The standard historical case in point is the bubonic plague, given the disease’s horrifying symptoms and its continuous recurrence over the last 1,500 years. Epidemics usually emanated from Africa or Asia and then spread to Europe and America with the help of globe-trotting merchants. Recurring epidemic waves lasted for decades or even centuries. But the most devastating one was, with no doubt, the Black Death. That pandemic wiped out an estimated one-third of the European population between 1347 and 1351, causing the richest 10 percent of the population to lose their grip on between 15 percent and 20 percent of overall wealth. As others have pointed out, further pandemics, revolutions, and wars have been the main cause whenever inequality has fallen since.
Yet COVID-19 looks like the great exception to the well-established historical pattern. If anything, the current pandemic is exacerbating inequality. In their attempt to flatten epidemiological curves, governments across the world have upended the livelihoods of the least advantaged. In March, the U.S. economy lost more jobs than over the entire Great Recession, with workers with less than college education taking the largest hit. To add insult to injury, in June American billionaires were 20 percent richer than at the start of the shutdown in the United States in mid-March. So why is this time different?
To understand why COVID-19 is entrenching rather than easing inequality, a look at the epidemiological features of this coronavirus and the plague is useful. The plague used to kill between 30 percent and 60 percent of those infected, targeting primarily adults in the prime of life who left behind widows and orphans. A decimated workforce created upward pressures on wages. Meanwhile, a shortage of workers implied a shortage of consumers as well, which depressed the value of land, whose output was now sold on smaller markets. Resulting higher wages for laborers and lower rents for landowners dragged down inequality.
Although cycles of plague were a common feature of life in late medieval Europe, the impact of the Black Death on the labor market was so devastating that it spelled the end of feudalism, the defining institutional system of the Middle Ages. Before the feudal system’s collapse, most of the rural population was essentially servile, owing rent and services to aristocratic landowners in exchange for the use of their land. In the wake of the Black Death, however, the shortage of labor and the abundance of land empowered peasants to the detriment of the lords.
This was especially true in the case of England. In 1351, King Edward III introduced the Statute of Labourers as a response to the labor shortage caused by the pestilence. The aim of the statute was to regulate the labor force by prohibiting requests or offers of wages higher than pre-plague standards and to limit movement in search of better conditions. But these attempts failed to dilute the negotiating power of the lower classes. Eventually, a new socioeconomic class emerged as some former peasants gradually acquired land and sold its fruits on the market for a profit.
For a pandemic to help equalize people, it requires a nearly unimaginable degree of human suffering.
The economic mechanism behind COVID-19 is quite different. Its case fatality ratio, which seems to be around 2 percent, is relatively low. Moreover, with older people being the most vulnerable to its most lethal effects, the size of the workforce is roughly unaffected. In turn, unlike during the plague, the recession triggered by the current health crisis has created an oversupply—not a shortage—of workers that over time will push wages down—not up. Meanwhile, social distancing measures are likely to remain in place for a while, hindering recovery in labor-intensive industries like restaurants, retail, and hotels, which will prevent the least skilled from regaining their livelihoods even when the economic recovery is in full swing. In that way, the distributive effects of the pandemic’s temporary shock to the economy risk becoming permanent.
In other words, for a pandemic to help equalize people, it requires a nearly unimaginable degree of human suffering. “Its poison is so rapid,” as recounted one plague chronicler in a 17th century book, “and it slips so subtly into the body, that it is one and the same to feel oneself affected and to see oneself placed in the tomb.” It is a mercy that the world has avoided as much this time.
However, there are some things about the current pandemic that do recall the past. During an epidemic, the poor suffer more than the rich. Killer pathogens might be blind to wealth, but wealth can erect high barriers to stem them off.
Available evidence suggests that the risk of falling seriously ill from COVID-19 in the West is higher among individuals with lower income and lower levels of education. The poorest are also more likely to suffer from the underlying health conditions (for example, diabetes, obesity, cardiovascular disease, and respiratory disease) that elevate risks of severe illness and mortality from COVID-19. Given overlapping racial and economic divides, particularly in the United States, there are racial disparities in the effects of the pandemic as well. According to APM Research Lab, Black, Indigenous, Pacific Islander, and Latino Americans all have COVID-19 death rates of roughly triple or more that of white Americans.
Equally, seven centuries ago, poorer households were more vulnerable to the plague as a result of recurrent famines that worsened their health. Large chunks of the population likely experienced severe malnutrition before the Black Death, which probably made it harder for them to fight off the disease. According to findings from ancient cemeteries, around 30 percent of wealthy English landowners likely succumbed to the plague, whereas the mortality rate for rural tenant farmers was between 40 percent and 70 percent.
Beyond their health advantages, the rich can also more easily limit exposure in other ways. Mobility data for the United States analyzed by the New York Times shows that the wealthy limited their mobility sooner and more drastically than the bottom 10 percent, thus reducing their exposure to potential infections. Meanwhile, some of the wealthiest neighborhoods in New York emptied out during the early phase of the lockdown as many who were able left for less affected areas. While millions of white-collar workers are typing on their computers from their homes or from temporary residences, essential workers like cashiers, bus drivers, and street cleaners have to show up at work.
In a similar fashion, at the time of the Black Death, anti-pestilence measures forced the poor to confine themselves in crowded and unhygienic places, thus increasing their exposure to infections, while the rich could enjoy their quarantine in large and isolated spaces. The term villeggiatura (spending time in a villa) was coined in Florence immediately after the Black Death. When a new wave of plague broke out, rich people simply withdrew from the city to a country farm and waited for the epidemic to subside. The villas of the Medici family that are spread across Tuscany’s Chianti region were built precisely for that reason. As the Italian plague chronicler Giovanni Boccaccio wrote, the very wealthiest deserted their neighborhoods altogether “as though the plague was meant to harry only those remaining within their city walls.”
As people around the world privileged enough to do so wait at home for the pandemic to be over, it is clear that COVID-19 is not going to be the next great equalizer. And in some ways, that is a good thing. No one should want to live through the Black Death. Governments should find less brutal ways to bring more fairness into society through redistributive and educational policies, and they should invest more resources in the health of the poorest while making sure that the societal value of the tasks performed by essential workers is matched with the income they generate. Only by empowering the most vulnerable can Western societies hope to bring some equality in the face of calamity.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--The Democrats Just Stole the Republicans’ Turf

The Democrats Just Stole the Republicans ’ Turf Much conventional wisdom after the 2016 U.S. presidential election held that Democrats needed to dedicate their time and efforts to winning over voters in swing states who had defected from the party .
These voters , we were told , were plagued by economic anxieties and turned off by what has been derided as “ identity politics ” —in essence , anything that acknowledged the existence of groups that have historically been excluded from accessing the opportunities and protections offered to straight , white , Christian men .
And so , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution to their woes to an inveterate conman .
This week ’ s Democratic National Convention has been a decisive rejection of that strand of conventional wisdom .
It rejected the false premise that in order to run a politically viable campaign , Democrats needed to abandon the party ’ s focus on fairness .
Democrats chose to position the party to speak for all Americans , rather than obsessing about how to speak to particular Americans .
If there has been a consistent thread in the erratic administration of U.S. President Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ white nationalism with plutocracy .
His populist political trick—from that first speech after descending the escalator in Trump Tower to announce his candidacy—has been to blame Black and brown people for the economic and social dislocations that were , in fact , the product of Reaganite economic policies and the costs of a misbegotten war .
Trump and his accomplices in the U.S. Congress have deployed this populist scapegoating ( a tired old trick ) to distract from their use of the federal government to serve the short-term interests of corporations and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that hamstrings the country ’ s future .
Much has been said about the evils of this approach to governing , but what Democrats ( and a very few Republicans ) have realized is that in choosing to plant his own and his party ’ s flag in a moral abyss , Trump ceded all higher ground .
What was less predictable was the way that Democrats have leaned into—even doubled down on—issues of racial , social , and environmental justice .
Democrats are rushing in .
The convention speeches of party leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families and individuals to lift up and give life to so-called kitchen table issues such as creating jobs , supporting farmers and small businesses , and securing affordable health care and education .
Former Vice President Joe Biden ’ s commitment to stewarding a recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and its attendant economic devastation and to “ build back better ” is a consistent theme of his presidential campaign .
Tuesday evening ’ s segment with testimonials from national security leaders featured a former Republican senator and secretary of defense , the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the former deputy secretary-general of NATO , and career diplomats who have served in multiple Republican and Democratic administrations .
This part of the Democrats ’ message was clear and predictable : Trump has abandoned the core responsibilities—foreign and domestic—of governing .
Biden is promising to bring a lifetime ’ s experience , a competent team , and seriousness of purpose to the work that drives the country ’ s prosperity and security .
What was less predictable was the way that Democrats have leaned into—even doubled down on—issues of racial , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speakers talked about the divisions in the United States and the need to invest in unity in order to bring Americans together .
And as they did so , they didn ’ t suggest that the path to unity involved sidestepping issues of racial or social justice in order to arrive at some kind of lowest common denominator .
Rather , they made an argument that addressing the country ’ s shortcomings on racial and economic justice was itself a cause around which Americans ought to unify—and raise their expectations of the future @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Black lives matter , that gun violence is an epidemic , that climate change is an existential crisis , or that caregivers deserve a living wage—they effectively married those progressive priorities to the broader promise of an American renewal .
And that broader promise is at once expansive and essentially conservative—as exemplified by former President Barack Obama ’ s speech on Wednesday evening .
He spoke from Philadelphia , the birthplace of the U.S. Constitution , and began his speech invoking that document .
His remarks were a paean to Americans ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their democracy , a pep talk to the downtrodden , a corrective to the cynic .
He marshaled the full force of his ( almost surreal ) oratorical talents to deliver a patriot ’ s plea to believe once more in the promise of a more perfect union .
In the end , instead of fashioning a narrow argument tailored for swing-state voters , the Democrats argued for recommitting to making the reality of America match its ideal .
They planted their flag on the moral cause that inspired the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that cause to deliver for the white unemployed factory worker in the Midwest just as much as for the Black front-line worker in a coastal city .
In response to a current president who has so damaged the United States ’ institutions and reputation , the Democrats have said : Let ’ s go back to the foundations and trust that if we purposefully build an America that is fairer for everyone , it ’ ll work better too—and gain broad popular support .
And that is also the America that engenders the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sometimes begrudging .
It is the America that dictators and populists fear for the way it exposes the lies that underwrite their power .
For when Americans show what they can do with the institutions and values of which Obama spoke , they animate the promise of pluralistic liberal democracy for all the world to see .
If one issue ’ s treatment has been most striking at the convention , it is arguably the consistent embrace of immigrants .
After all , this is perhaps the issue on which the purveyors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most caution .
We know that it is central to what Trump believes makes his own candidacy attractive : From the racist anti-immigrant rhetoric of his 2015 announcement speech , to his unfulfilled promise to build a wall on the southern U.S. border , to the scaremongering about a so-called migrant caravan that he deployed in an attempt to sway the 2018 midterm elections , Trump has bet big on anti-immigrant sentiment .
The Democrats took the people whom Trump has tried to dehumanize and portray as monsters and instead projected their humanity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a focus of the convention .
They have been featured prominently , not just in vignettes about immigration reform but also in segments about small business and health care .
They appeared as eloquent spokespeople for their home states in the genuinely delightful roll-call vote on Tuesday night .
And U.S. Sen. Kamala Harris , Biden ’ s running mate , introduced herself at the convention not only as a Black woman but as the daughter of two immigrants .
The Democrats took the people whom Trump has tried to dehumanize and portray @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And , as with other issues , they linked this embrace of immigrants and refugees to a recommitment to the founding ideals of their country .
Nearly 32 years ago , as he closed his oft-quoted farewell address in the Oval Office , then-President Ronald Reagan shared his own paean to the United States , invoking 17th-century Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop ’ s vision of America as a “ shining city on a hill ” : “ And how stands the city on this winter night ?
… After 200 years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and true on the granite ridge , and her glow has held steady no matter what storm .
And she ’ s still a beacon , still a magnet for all who must have freedom , for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness , toward home.
” That last sentence is a stunningly beautiful line .
And at this week ’ s convention , Democrats have shown that they are the party that still believes it .

Much conventional wisdom after the 2016 U.S. presidential election held that Democrats needed to dedicate their time and efforts to winning over voters in swing states who had defected from the party. These voters, we were told, were plagued by economic anxieties and turned off by what has been derided as “identity politics”—in essence, anything that acknowledged the existence of groups that have historically been excluded from accessing the opportunities and protections offered to straight, white, Christian men. And so, the story goes, these voters entrusted the solution to their woes to an inveterate conman.
Much conventional wisdom after the 2016 U.S. presidential election held that Democrats needed to dedicate their time and efforts to winning over voters in swing states who had defected from the party. These voters, we were told, were plagued by economic anxieties and turned off by what has been derided as “identity politics”—in essence, anything that acknowledged the existence of groups that have historically been excluded from accessing the opportunities and protections offered to straight, white, Christian men. And so, the story goes, these voters entrusted the solution to their woes to an inveterate conman.
This week’s Democratic National Convention has been a decisive rejection of that strand of conventional wisdom. It rejected the false premise that in order to run a politically viable campaign, Democrats needed to abandon the party’s focus on fairness. Democrats chose to position the party to speak for all Americans, rather than obsessing about how to speak to particular Americans.
If there has been a consistent thread in the erratic administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, it is the marriage of white nationalism with plutocracy. His populist political trick—from that first speech after descending the escalator in Trump Tower to announce his candidacy—has been to blame Black and brown people for the economic and social dislocations that were, in fact, the product of Reaganite economic policies and the costs of a misbegotten war. Trump and his accomplices in the U.S. Congress have deployed this populist scapegoating (a tired old trick) to distract from their use of the federal government to serve the short-term interests of corporations and the superrich, further exacerbating the economic inequality that hamstrings the country’s future. Much has been said about the evils of this approach to governing, but what Democrats (and a very few Republicans) have realized is that in choosing to plant his own and his party’s flag in a moral abyss, Trump ceded all higher ground.
What was less predictable was the way that Democrats have leaned into—even doubled down on—issues of racial, social, and environmental justice.
Democrats are rushing in. The convention speeches of party leaders have been complemented by poignant vignettes of families and individuals to lift up and give life to so-called kitchen table issues such as creating jobs, supporting farmers and small businesses, and securing affordable health care and education. Former Vice President Joe Biden’s commitment to stewarding a recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and its attendant economic devastation and to “build back better” is a consistent theme of his presidential campaign. Tuesday evening’s segment with testimonials from national security leaders featured a former Republican senator and secretary of defense, the U.S. point person for the anti-Islamic State coalition, the former deputy secretary-general of NATO, and career diplomats who have served in multiple Republican and Democratic administrations.
This part of the Democrats’ message was clear and predictable: Trump has abandoned the core responsibilities—foreign and domestic—of governing. Biden is promising to bring a lifetime’s experience, a competent team, and seriousness of purpose to the work that drives the country’s prosperity and security.
What was less predictable was the way that Democrats have leaned into—even doubled down on—issues of racial, social, and environmental justice. Most speakers talked about the divisions in the United States and the need to invest in unity in order to bring Americans together. And as they did so, they didn’t suggest that the path to unity involved sidestepping issues of racial or social justice in order to arrive at some kind of lowest common denominator. Rather, they made an argument that addressing the country’s shortcomings on racial and economic justice was itself a cause around which Americans ought to unify—and raise their expectations of the future. Democrats didn’t just reaffirm that Black lives matter, that gun violence is an epidemic, that climate change is an existential crisis, or that caregivers deserve a living wage—they effectively married those progressive priorities to the broader promise of an American renewal.
And that broader promise is at once expansive and essentially conservative—as exemplified by former President Barack Obama’s speech on Wednesday evening. He spoke from Philadelphia, the birthplace of the U.S. Constitution, and began his speech invoking that document. His remarks were a paean to Americans’ founding values and to the potential of their democracy, a pep talk to the downtrodden, a corrective to the cynic. He marshaled the full force of his (almost surreal) oratorical talents to deliver a patriot’s plea to believe once more in the promise of a more perfect union.
In the end, instead of fashioning a narrow argument tailored for swing-state voters, the Democrats argued for recommitting to making the reality of America match its ideal. They planted their flag on the moral cause that inspired the country’s founding and confidently asserted the capacity of that cause to deliver for the white unemployed factory worker in the Midwest just as much as for the Black front-line worker in a coastal city. In response to a current president who has so damaged the United States’ institutions and reputation, the Democrats have said: Let’s go back to the foundations and trust that if we purposefully build an America that is fairer for everyone, it’ll work better too—and gain broad popular support.
And that is also the America that engenders the world’s respect—sometimes hopeful and admiring, sometimes begrudging. It is the America that dictators and populists fear for the way it exposes the lies that underwrite their power. For when Americans show what they can do with the institutions and values of which Obama spoke, they animate the promise of pluralistic liberal democracy for all the world to see.
If one issue’s treatment has been most striking at the convention, it is arguably the consistent embrace of immigrants. After all, this is perhaps the issue on which the purveyors of conventional wisdom would have urged the most caution. We know that it is central to what Trump believes makes his own candidacy attractive: From the racist anti-immigrant rhetoric of his 2015 announcement speech, to his unfulfilled promise to build a wall on the southern U.S. border, to the scaremongering about a so-called migrant caravan that he deployed in an attempt to sway the 2018 midterm elections, Trump has bet big on anti-immigrant sentiment.
The Democrats took the people whom Trump has tried to dehumanize and portray as monsters and instead projected their humanity.
In response, Democrats made immigrants a focus of the convention. They have been featured prominently, not just in vignettes about immigration reform but also in segments about small business and health care. They appeared as eloquent spokespeople for their home states in the genuinely delightful roll-call vote on Tuesday night. And U.S. Sen. Kamala Harris, Biden’s running mate, introduced herself at the convention not only as a Black woman but as the daughter of two immigrants.
The Democrats took the people whom Trump has tried to dehumanize and portray as monsters and instead projected their humanity. And, as with other issues, they linked this embrace of immigrants and refugees to a recommitment to the founding ideals of their country.
Nearly 32 years ago, as he closed his oft-quoted farewell address in the Oval Office, then-President Ronald Reagan shared his own paean to the United States, invoking 17th-century Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop’s vision of America as a “shining city on a hill”:
“And how stands the city on this winter night? … After 200 years, two centuries, she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow has held steady no matter what storm. And she’s still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home.”
That last sentence is a stunningly beautiful line. And at this week’s convention, Democrats have shown that they are the party that still believes it.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Reciprocity Is a Tool, Not a Strategy, Against China

Reciprocity Is a Tool , Not a Strategy , Against China Since the outset of the U.S.-China trade war , critics have castigated the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump for its capricious approach to relations with Beijing .
They have found fault in particular with Trump ’ s flip-flopping on sanctioning ZTE , banning U.S. companies from selling to Huawei and then reversing course , and refusing to censure China for its abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong in order to preserve trade negotiations .
Recently , however , Trump ’ s China doctrine has attracted praise for its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy article , the Hoover Institution ’ s Michael Auslin argued that the Trump administration ’ s disorganized and seemingly contradictory approach to China is actually “ a fairly measured realist policy ” that is “ based on reciprocity.
” While Auslin acknowledged that , for the most part , reciprocity—loosely defined as “ a measured balance toward Beijing ’ s actions ” to create a “ level playing field ” —has yet to be fully road-tested , he nevertheless hails it as “ a prudent attempt to make policy fit real conditions.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ its policy , however , Auslin glossed over a central contradiction plaguing what he terms Trump ’ s strategy : that in prioritizing reciprocity , the United States is ironically coming to resemble China in several important ways .
Indeed , he brushes aside concerns about the United States ’ insular , illiberal drift under Trump , describing the issue in just one sentence : “ [ Reciprocity ] will call into question liberal values deeper than just free trade , such as the open society that Westerners take for granted.
” This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ essential to any solid assessment of U.S. policy , namely , whether Trump ’ s means of competing with China justify the ends and minimize the practical damage caused to U.S. interests .
As an indicator of the policy ’ s possible future success in balancing bilateral ties , Auslin points to the administration ’ s victory in convincing Beijing to allow U.S. airlines to fly to China , accomplished by threatening to ban Chinese passenger flights to the United States after China did the same to many U.S. airlines .
In this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to mirror Chinese policies appears to have led Beijing to relent .
Auslin mentions this preliminary success twice as the model example .
A close examination of other U.S. acts of reciprocity , however , reveals few triumphs and many damaging races to the bottom , where the cycle of continuous retaliations has hurt both countries .
The Trump administration has long been motivated by the idea of achieving reciprocity , a goal that seems well suited to Trump ’ s love of getting even .
Its 2017 National Security Strategy and 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States ’ desire to create reciprocal trade relationships , and reciprocity features prominently in two recent and noteworthy statements of policy : Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum and the “ United States Strategic Approach to the People ’ s Republic of China.
” In both , reciprocity is usually accompanied by the word “ fairness.
” The idea seems to be that an even score card of actions and counteractions between the U.S. and China would serve U.S. interests .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ fairness , however , do not always advantage the United States .
With regard to the trade war , reciprocal policies have failed to achieve the key goals the administration originally set : fairer trade relations and a transformation of China ’ s mercantilist economic model .
On June 15 , 2018 , Trump announced tariffs on $ 34 billion of Chinese goods .
The Trump administration argued that the action was in response to Beijing ’ s “ unfair trade practices.
” That same day , Beijing retaliated , announcing equivalent tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the following year , Beijing continued to proportionately respond to Washington ’ s successive rounds of tariffs .
The outcome of this is a tit-for-tat bonanza and an extremely limited “ phase one ” trade deal based on massive purchases that does very little to bring about structural economic change .
During the signing ceremony , Trump lauded the deal as “ a momentous step … toward a future of fair and reciprocal trade.
” In reality , however , the agreement did little to achieve “ reciprocal trade.
” In May @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which so bothers Trump , was the largest it had been since December 2018 .
More significantly , the deal compelled Beijing to order its state-owned enterprises to increase their purchase of U.S. exports , abandoning market forces and reinforcing the Chinese Communist Party ’ s hand in economic decision-making .
Furthermore , Beijing has begun diversifying imports away from the United States , damaging U.S. industry .
Both countries have also expelled each other ’ s journalists in the name of reciprocity .
In February three Wall Street Journal reporters were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an op-ed the paper ran titled “ China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.
” In response , Assistant Secretary of State David R. Stilwell , supported by Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger , proposed limiting the number of Chinese journalists working at those companies in the United States .
Beijing responded in kind , expelling more Wall Street Journal journalists , as well as many at The New York Times and The Washington Post , and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said those affected would not be permitted to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further restrictions , limiting each Chinese journalist ’ s visa to 90 days and designating four more Chinese media agencies as foreign missions .
Beijing responded again , demanding that the Associated Press , Columbia Broadcasting System , National Public Radio , and United Press International provide details on their China-based employees and finances , as well as real estate and operations .
Reciprocity , in this instance , may have created a more “ balanced ” relationship , but mostly to the detriment of the United States .
The policy has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only further impaired the world ’ s ability to learn about what ’ s going on inside China .
The value of having journalists in China , a country that ranks 177th out of 180 on the World Press Freedom Index , far outweighs the negatives of having Chinese media companies operating in the United States .
Beijing can learn about U.S. developments through countless media organizations , but the same can not be said for the United States with regard to China .
The fewer foreign reporters in China , the more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world .
That is not the case for the United States , no matter how few China Daily or Global Times reporters work in the country .
Last October , Washington implemented a policy requiring Chinese diplomats operating in the United States to notify the State Department before meeting with U.S. officials or traveling to educational and research institutes .
The policy was meant to coax Beijing to loosen restrictions preventing U.S. diplomats from freely traveling through China and interacting with Chinese citizens .
Nearly a year later , the U.S. policy has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomats in China .
Furthermore , the recently passed bill restricting visas for Chinese officials involved in limiting U.S. citizens ’ travel to Tibet will do nothing to open the autonomous region to travel .
Though these policies seek to equalize freedom of travel and access , thus far they have fallen short of achieving the United States ’ actual goals—namely , increased travel and access—and , like the restrictions on journalists , they risk an escalatory spiral that could well result in even less access for Americans .
Alternatively , bills such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 2020 , which would require the administration to compile a report detailing “ obstacles that United States diplomats and other officials , journalists , and businesses encounter when attempting to work in the People ’ s Republic of China , ” is a more productive approach .
It does not require the United States to mirror China ’ s policies in this regard , but it outlines the scope of the issue and allows space for alternative solutions that might ultimately be more effective .
Critiquing the Trump administration ’ s China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s bad behavior .
Nor is it to say that reciprocity can not be an effective tool in certain situations , such as those where it can rectify bilateral inequities without causing a downward spiral .
Rather , the shortcomings of a U.S. strategy based primarily on reciprocity lie with its failure to redress structural issues in the bilateral relationship and to the ways it undermines U.S. interests as much as , if not more than , Chinese ones .
Reciprocity should be one of many tools—including diplomacy , multilateralism , and alliance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , part of a broader strategy that allows space for U.S.-China cooperation on issues of mutual concern .
While past U.S. policy under the rubric of “ engagement ” may have failed to lead China to adopt liberal policies , basing U.S. policy on reciprocity threatens to make the United States a more closed society without convincing Beijing to open up .
For this reason , even if reciprocity works as intended , it does not necessarily help the United States either in its competition with China or in its broader engagement with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” relations with China , but it does so in a manner that deprives the United States of key sources of strength to deal with some of China ’ s most problematic policies .
There is a difference between creating a reciprocal relationship on the United States ’ versus on China ’ s terms .
So far , we ’ ve only managed to achieve the latter .
Alarmingly , Trump ’ s reciprocity further degrades the United States ’ already seriously battered reputation as a bastion of liberalism .
Who is Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or limiting access to foreign journalists ?
Such behavior also negatively affects the United States ’ alliances with other democracies and its ability to work with them to counteract malign Chinese actions .
Moreover , the abandonment of liberal principles will further encourage autocrats around the world to behave with impunity , a horrible , avoidable consequence of achieving a more reciprocal relationship with China .
As Jessica Chen Weiss recently argued , policymakers “ must be very careful about the risks of a ‘ Pyrrhic victory ’ —an overreaction that imperils openness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and practical cooperation abroad.
” Finally , and perhaps most importantly , reciprocity can be loosely defined and applied to nearly any situation .
This is intentional , as it allows the administration substantial wiggle room to deem any action reciprocal .
Indeed , Pompeo , who uses the term most frequently , has pushed for a wide range of hawkish policies .
While some actions genuinely respond reciprocally to Chinese activities , others go further .
Pompeo , without providing evidence , claimed it was necessary to shut down China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hub of spying and intellectual-property theft.
” The United States has taken what could be considered reciprocal action against Chinese espionage and intellectual-property theft before , sanctioning companies and introducing legislation that would further punish malign actors .
It has never before , however , taken the drastic step of shuttering a Chinese consulate , as this is clearly not an act that levels the playing field .
It seems as though Pompeo , in repeatedly stressing the need for reciprocity , is setting up a situation where all retaliations fall under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be dangerous , as it would unleash the administration to respond asymmetrically to Chinese actions , further imperiling bilateral relations .
The administration has repeatedly demonstrated that reciprocity is not a means to resolving issues , but rather fosters an environment where hostility and distrust are the norm .
More often than not , Washington contributes to the original problems rather than providing a solution , likely as part of the administration ’ s strategy to force the United States and China ’ s decoupling .
Time and again , actions taken under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing to dig in its heels and double down on its own problematic policies rather than find common ground , airline travel notwithstanding .
This piece was originally published at ChinaFile .

Since the outset of the U.S.-China trade war , critics have castigated the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump for its capricious approach to relations with Beijing. They have found fault in particular with Trump’s flip-flopping on sanctioning ZTE , banning U.S. companies from selling to Huawei and then reversing course , and refusing to censure China for its abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong in order to preserve trade negotiations.
Since the outset of the U.S.-China trade war, critics have castigated the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump for its capricious approach to relations with Beijing. They have found fault in particular with Trump’s flip-flopping on sanctioning ZTE, banning U.S. companies from selling to Huawei and then reversing course, and refusing to censure China for its abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong in order to preserve trade negotiations.
Recently, however, Trump’s China doctrine has attracted praise for its “realism.” In a recent Foreign Policy article, the Hoover Institution’s Michael Auslin argued that the Trump administration’s disorganized and seemingly contradictory approach to China is actually “a fairly measured realist policy” that is “based on reciprocity.” While Auslin acknowledged that, for the most part, reciprocity—loosely defined as “a measured balance toward Beijing’s actions” to create a “level playing field”—has yet to be fully road-tested, he nevertheless hails it as “a prudent attempt to make policy fit real conditions.”
In giving the administration credit for its policy, however, Auslin glossed over a central contradiction plaguing what he terms Trump’s strategy: that in prioritizing reciprocity, the United States is ironically coming to resemble China in several important ways. Indeed, he brushes aside concerns about the United States’ insular, illiberal drift under Trump, describing the issue in just one sentence: “[Reciprocity] will call into question liberal values deeper than just free trade, such as the open society that Westerners take for granted.” This claim overlooks a fundamental question that is essential to any solid assessment of U.S. policy, namely, whether Trump’s means of competing with China justify the ends and minimize the practical damage caused to U.S. interests.
As an indicator of the policy’s possible future success in balancing bilateral ties, Auslin points to the administration’s victory in convincing Beijing to allow U.S. airlines to fly to China, accomplished by threatening to ban Chinese passenger flights to the United States after China did the same to many U.S. airlines. In this case, the administration’s willingness to mirror Chinese policies appears to have led Beijing to relent. Auslin mentions this preliminary success twice as the model example. A close examination of other U.S. acts of reciprocity, however, reveals few triumphs and many damaging races to the bottom, where the cycle of continuous retaliations has hurt both countries.
The Trump administration has long been motivated by the idea of achieving reciprocity, a goal that seems well suited to Trump’s love of getting even. Its 2017 National Security Strategy and 2019 vision for the Indo-Pacific region both articulate the United States’ desire to create reciprocal trade relationships, and reciprocity features prominently in two recent and noteworthy statements of policy: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum and the “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.” In both, reciprocity is usually accompanied by the word “fairness.” The idea seems to be that an even score card of actions and counteractions between the U.S. and China would serve U.S. interests. Reciprocal actions that aim to establish such fairness, however, do not always advantage the United States.
With regard to the trade war, reciprocal policies have failed to achieve the key goals the administration originally set: fairer trade relations and a transformation of China’s mercantilist economic model. On June 15, 2018, Trump announced tariffs on $34 billion of Chinese goods. The Trump administration argued that the action was in response to Beijing’s “unfair trade practices.” That same day, Beijing retaliated, announcing equivalent tariffs on U.S. exports. Over the course of the following year, Beijing continued to proportionately respond to Washington’s successive rounds of tariffs. The outcome of this is a tit-for-tat bonanza and an extremely limited “phase one” trade deal based on massive purchases that does very little to bring about structural economic change.
During the signing ceremony, Trump lauded the deal as “a momentous step … toward a future of fair and reciprocal trade.” In reality, however, the agreement did little to achieve “reciprocal trade.” In May 2020, the U.S. total trade deficit, which so bothers Trump, was the largest it had been since December 2018. More significantly, the deal compelled Beijing to order its state-owned enterprises to increase their purchase of U.S. exports, abandoning market forces and reinforcing the Chinese Communist Party’s hand in economic decision-making. Furthermore, Beijing has begun diversifying imports away from the United States, damaging U.S. industry.
Both countries have also expelled each other’s journalists in the name of reciprocity. In February three Wall Street Journal reporters were kicked out of China, ostensibly for an op-ed the paper ran titled “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.” In response, Assistant Secretary of State David R. Stilwell, supported by Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger, proposed limiting the number of Chinese journalists working at those companies in the United States. Beijing responded in kind, expelling more Wall Street Journal journalists, as well as many at The New York Times and The Washington Post, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said those affected would not be permitted to work in Hong Kong. Washington then imposed further restrictions, limiting each Chinese journalist’s visa to 90 days and designating four more Chinese media agencies as foreign missions. Beijing responded again, demanding that the Associated Press, Columbia Broadcasting System, National Public Radio, and United Press International provide details on their China-based employees and finances, as well as real estate and operations.
Reciprocity, in this instance, may have created a more “balanced” relationship, but mostly to the detriment of the United States. The policy has not increased open exchanges of information and has only further impaired the world’s ability to learn about what’s going on inside China. The value of having journalists in China, a country that ranks 177th out of 180 on the World Press Freedom Index, far outweighs the negatives of having Chinese media companies operating in the United States. Beijing can learn about U.S. developments through countless media organizations, but the same cannot be said for the United States with regard to China. The fewer foreign reporters in China, the more opaque the country becomes to the outside world. That is not the case for the United States, no matter how few China Daily or Global Times reporters work in the country.
Last October, Washington implemented a policy requiring Chinese diplomats operating in the United States to notify the State Department before meeting with U.S. officials or traveling to educational and research institutes. The policy was meant to coax Beijing to loosen restrictions preventing U.S. diplomats from freely traveling through China and interacting with Chinese citizens. Nearly a year later, the U.S. policy has done nothing to ease restrictions on U.S. diplomats in China. Furthermore, the recently passed bill restricting visas for Chinese officials involved in limiting U.S. citizens’ travel to Tibet will do nothing to open the autonomous region to travel. Though these policies seek to equalize freedom of travel and access, thus far they have fallen short of achieving the United States’ actual goals—namely, increased travel and access—and, like the restrictions on journalists, they risk an escalatory spiral that could well result in even less access for Americans.
Alternatively, bills such as the recently introduced True Reciprocity Act of 2020, which would require the administration to compile a report detailing “obstacles that United States diplomats and other officials, journalists, and businesses encounter when attempting to work in the People’s Republic of China,” is a more productive approach. It does not require the United States to mirror China’s policies in this regard, but it outlines the scope of the issue and allows space for alternative solutions that might ultimately be more effective.
Critiquing the Trump administration’s China strategy doesn’t excuse Beijing’s bad behavior. Nor is it to say that reciprocity cannot be an effective tool in certain situations, such as those where it can rectify bilateral inequities without causing a downward spiral. Rather, the shortcomings of a U.S. strategy based primarily on reciprocity lie with its failure to redress structural issues in the bilateral relationship and to the ways it undermines U.S. interests as much as, if not more than, Chinese ones.
Reciprocity should be one of many tools—including diplomacy, multilateralism, and alliance coordination—in the United States’ foreign-policy toolkit, part of a broader strategy that allows space for U.S.-China cooperation on issues of mutual concern. While past U.S. policy under the rubric of “engagement” may have failed to lead China to adopt liberal policies, basing U.S. policy on reciprocity threatens to make the United States a more closed society without convincing Beijing to open up. For this reason, even if reciprocity works as intended, it does not necessarily help the United States either in its competition with China or in its broader engagement with the world. It may “balance” relations with China, but it does so in a manner that deprives the United States of key sources of strength to deal with some of China’s most problematic policies. There is a difference between creating a reciprocal relationship on the United States’ versus on China’s terms. So far, we’ve only managed to achieve the latter.
Alarmingly, Trump’s reciprocity further degrades the United States’ already seriously battered reputation as a bastion of liberalism. Who is Washington to scold countries engaging in economic protectionism or limiting access to foreign journalists? Such behavior also negatively affects the United States’ alliances with other democracies and its ability to work with them to counteract malign Chinese actions. Moreover, the abandonment of liberal principles will further encourage autocrats around the world to behave with impunity, a horrible, avoidable consequence of achieving a more reciprocal relationship with China. As Jessica Chen Weiss recently argued, policymakers “must be very careful about the risks of a ‘Pyrrhic victory’—an overreaction that imperils openness, inclusiveness, and vitality at home and practical cooperation abroad.”
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reciprocity can be loosely defined and applied to nearly any situation. This is intentional, as it allows the administration substantial wiggle room to deem any action reciprocal. Indeed, Pompeo, who uses the term most frequently, has pushed for a wide range of hawkish policies. While some actions genuinely respond reciprocally to Chinese activities, others go further. Pompeo, without providing evidence, claimed it was necessary to shut down China’s Houston consulate because it was “a hub of spying and intellectual-property theft.” The United States has taken what could be considered reciprocal action against Chinese espionage and intellectual-property theft before, sanctioning companies and introducing legislation that would further punish malign actors. It has never before, however, taken the drastic step of shuttering a Chinese consulate, as this is clearly not an act that levels the playing field. It seems as though Pompeo, in repeatedly stressing the need for reciprocity, is setting up a situation where all retaliations fall under the reciprocity umbrella. Such an outcome would be dangerous, as it would unleash the administration to respond asymmetrically to Chinese actions, further imperiling bilateral relations.
The administration has repeatedly demonstrated that reciprocity is not a means to resolving issues, but rather fosters an environment where hostility and distrust are the norm. More often than not, Washington contributes to the original problems rather than providing a solution, likely as part of the administration’s strategy to force the United States and China’s decoupling. Time and again, actions taken under the guise of reciprocity have only led Beijing to dig in its heels and double down on its own problematic policies rather than find common ground, airline travel notwithstanding.
This piece was originally published at ChinaFile.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Humanitarian Groups Demand Trump Reverse Yemen Aid Freeze

Top humanitarian groups are pressuring the Trump administration to drop a monthslong aid suspension in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen , according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy , as the spread of coronavirus has again left the war-torn nation teetering on famine and economic collapse .
The U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) halted programs in northern Yemen in March , just days after Foreign Policy reported that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pressured the United Nations to scale back vital aid over concerns that the Houthi rebels—who receive backing from Iran—were maintaining heavy-handed control of aid and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move has left them unable to provide critical lifesaving services as the situation on the ground deteriorates .
“ In such dire circumstances , it is not justifiable to withhold funding for some humanitarian activities in order to leverage improved operating conditions for others , ” says the letter to acting USAID Administrator John Barsa , signed by the leaders of the International Rescue Committee , the Norwegian Refugee Council , Oxfam America , CARE , Save the Children USA , and Mercy Corps .
“ We urge you to abandon the suspension @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operate in a principled manner.
” The demands from aid groups come as Yemen reels from a COVID-19 outbreak that looks to be one of the worst in the world , according to the letter .
“ We ’ re in a situation where we have crisis , layered on top of crisis , layered on top of crisis .
And the layering has been happening for so long that it ’ s actually difficult to keep track of what the biggest drivers and threats to Yemeni communities are , ” Scott Paul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy .
“ The COVID crisis has introduced another massive layer of fear , confusion , and death into this mix.
” The U.N. predicts that the number of Yemenis experiencing acute food insecurity will jump to 3.2 million by the end of this year .
The U.S. suspension , designed to force the Houthis to lift aid restrictions , has compounded funding gaps .
Financial woes will cut the U.N. ’ s ability to feed Yemenis by more than 60 percent .
Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort is “ frankly on the verge of collapse.
” The U.N. has called for $ 3.4 billion in funding to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen this year .
But so far , it has only received about $ 714 million of that amount from donor countries and organizations , leaving a $ 2.7 billion funding gap .
Though the United States injected $ 225 million in aid to help stabilize the World Food Program ’ s efforts in the country in May , the new letter ’ s signatories said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of needed aid pledges , even as food prices have soared and bombings doubled in the first half of the year compared to the previous six months .
Though Saudi Arabia surpassed its 2019 pledge of $ 750 million at a recent conference , both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait fell drastically short of their respective pledges from last year .
Even the less lofty pledges aren ’ t being fully implemented on the ground : Saudi Arabia has sent only $ 22.8 million in humanitarian assistance to Yemen in 2020 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million .
Meanwhile , the UAE and Kuwait have virtually abandoned the cause , pledging no money at all to Yemen .
Aid groups have also battled the Trump administration over what they perceive as arbitrary cutouts to the aid freeze , pointing out that USAID has allowed organizations to treat severe malnutrition , while preventing assistance to community health workers , hygiene and sanitation , and the provision of clean water .
The increasingly deadly conditions on the ground have prompted aid organizations to push for a complete end to the policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tens of millions of Yemenis , ” the signatories wrote to Barsa .
“ As we do in challenging environments all over the world , humanitarians have stayed and delivered in Yemen in the midst of complex crises .
But our ability to do so now is jeopardized unless the U.S. changes course.
” The Trump administration cut off refueling support to the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen after facing harsh criticism and threats from Congress to legally bar U.S. military support—though lawmakers were unable to overcome a White House veto .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. aid dollars has been compounded by a U.N.-backed peace process that has failed to generate momentum lately .
In July , the world body ’ s Yemen envoy , Martin Griffiths , warned of a “ real risk ” that negotiations between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen could slip away .
The so-called Riyadh agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Emirati-backed southern separatists last year has yet to yield a joint technocratic government .
“ They [ Saudi Arabia ] can work on a couple of things at best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involved in the talks told Foreign Policy .
“ The problem is not intention , they only have a few people who are capable.
” Efforts to move the peace process forward , the person said , are “ forever at the 5-yard line.
” The United States has sought to limit aid to Houthi-controlled areas , fearing that the Iran-linked group could give Tehran another launching pad to fire rockets at Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries .
The Trump administration has considered designating the Houthis a terrorist organization , the Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deny the movement international financing but could deepen the food crisis in areas controlled by the group .
Ten new front lines were added to Yemen ’ s battlefield between January and July—leaving more parts of the country increasingly vulnerable to hunger .
“ The biggest risk is how far the U.S. is willing to go to show it ’ s tough on Iran and the impact it would have on vulnerable families in Yemen , ” said one humanitarian aid worker , who spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as purely a U.S. decision to punish the Houthis , the more that puts the optics on U.S. NGOs as pawns in that broader game .
”

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Allison Meakem

Top humanitarian groups are pressuring the Trump administration to drop a monthslong aid suspension in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen, according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy , as the spread of coronavirus has again left the war-torn nation teetering on famine and economic collapse.
Top humanitarian groups are pressuring the Trump administration to drop a monthslong aid suspension in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen, according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy, as the spread of coronavirus has again left the war-torn nation teetering on famine and economic collapse.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) halted programs in northern Yemen in March, just days after Foreign Policy reported that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pressured the United Nations to scale back vital aid over concerns that the Houthi rebels—who receive backing from Iran—were maintaining heavy-handed control of aid and obstructing distribution. Aid groups said the move has left them unable to provide critical lifesaving services as the situation on the ground deteriorates.
“In such dire circumstances, it is not justifiable to withhold funding for some humanitarian activities in order to leverage improved operating conditions for others,” says the letter to acting USAID Administrator John Barsa, signed by the leaders of the International Rescue Committee, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam America, CARE, Save the Children USA, and Mercy Corps.
“We urge you to abandon the suspension and restore USAID funding wherever partners can operate in a principled manner.”
The demands from aid groups come as Yemen reels from a COVID-19 outbreak that looks to be one of the worst in the world, according to the letter. “We’re in a situation where we have crisis, layered on top of crisis, layered on top of crisis. And the layering has been happening for so long that it’s actually difficult to keep track of what the biggest drivers and threats to Yemeni communities are,” Scott Paul of the humanitarian organization Oxfam America told Foreign Policy. “The COVID crisis has introduced another massive layer of fear, confusion, and death into this mix.”
The U.N. predicts that the number of Yemenis experiencing acute food insecurity will jump to 3.2 million by the end of this year. The U.S. suspension, designed to force the Houthis to lift aid restrictions, has compounded funding gaps.
Financial woes will cut the U.N.’s ability to feed Yemenis by more than 60 percent. Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock conceded last month that the aid effort is “frankly on the verge of collapse.”
The U.N. has called for $3.4 billion in funding to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen this year. But so far, it has only received about $714 million of that amount from donor countries and organizations, leaving a $2.7 billion funding gap.
Though the United States injected $225 million in aid to help stabilize the World Food Program’s efforts in the country in May, the new letter’s signatories said that Yemen has received barely over a fifth of needed aid pledges, even as food prices have soared and bombings doubled in the first half of the year compared to the previous six months. Though Saudi Arabia surpassed its 2019 pledge of $750 million at a recent conference, both the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait fell drastically short of their respective pledges from last year. Even the less lofty pledges aren’t being fully implemented on the ground: Saudi Arabia has sent only $22.8 million in humanitarian assistance to Yemen in 2020, a fraction of its earmarked $500 million. Meanwhile, the UAE and Kuwait have virtually abandoned the cause, pledging no money at all to Yemen.
Aid groups have also battled the Trump administration over what they perceive as arbitrary cutouts to the aid freeze, pointing out that USAID has allowed organizations to treat severe malnutrition, while preventing assistance to community health workers, hygiene and sanitation, and the provision of clean water. The increasingly deadly conditions on the ground have prompted aid organizations to push for a complete end to the policy.
“Time is running out for tens of millions of Yemenis,” the signatories wrote to Barsa. “As we do in challenging environments all over the world, humanitarians have stayed and delivered in Yemen in the midst of complex crises. But our ability to do so now is jeopardized unless the U.S. changes course.”
The Trump administration cut off refueling support to the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen after facing harsh criticism and threats from Congress to legally bar U.S. military support—though lawmakers were unable to overcome a White House veto.
The challenges faced by organizations cut off from U.S. aid dollars has been compounded by a U.N.-backed peace process that has failed to generate momentum lately. In July, the world body’s Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, warned of a “real risk” that negotiations between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen could slip away. The so-called Riyadh agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Emirati-backed southern separatists last year has yet to yield a joint technocratic government. “They [Saudi Arabia] can work on a couple of things at best,” a former U.S. official familiar involved in the talks told Foreign Policy. “The problem is not intention, they only have a few people who are capable.” Efforts to move the peace process forward, the person said, are “forever at the 5-yard line.”
The United States has sought to limit aid to Houthi-controlled areas, fearing that the Iran-linked group could give Tehran another launching pad to fire rockets at Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. The Trump administration has considered designating the Houthis a terrorist organization, the Washington Post reported. The move would potentially deny the movement international financing but could deepen the food crisis in areas controlled by the group. Ten new front lines were added to Yemen’s battlefield between January and July—leaving more parts of the country increasingly vulnerable to hunger.
“The biggest risk is how far the U.S. is willing to go to show it’s tough on Iran and the impact it would have on vulnerable families in Yemen,” said one humanitarian aid worker, who spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity.
“The more this is seen as purely a U.S. decision to punish the Houthis, the more that puts the optics on U.S. NGOs as pawns in that broader game.”