foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--China Won’t Rescue Iran

China Won’t Rescue Iran

In June 2020 , a draft of the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was leaked to the media by an Iranian source .
In this purported deal , which ostensibly covers bilateral cooperation in economic , political , cultural , and military spheres for the next 25 years , China pledged a maximum investment of $ 400 billion to improve Iran ’ s oil , gas , and transportation infrastructure .
Some observers were quick to point out that this groundbreaking deal not only demonstrates China ’ s unrelenting ambition to succeed globally , but also shows the failure of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign against Iran , which instead has pushed Iran into China ’ s orbit .
Others noted that should President-elect Joe Biden try to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , the China-Iran deal would potentially harden Iran ’ s bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States .
These commentators all regard the deal as a fait accompli , as if it has already been signed—but they are exaggerating China ’ s will and capacity to aid Iran in defiance of the United States .
China ’ s silence on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understands that to sustain its own economic growth , it must manage hostilities and continue its modus vivendi with the United States .
Although China has been Iran ’ s largest trading partner since 2009 , Iran has remained a minor one for China .
Even in the Middle East , Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates outperform Iran when it comes to trading with China .
According to China ’ s Ministry of Commerce , at its peak in 2014 , Chinese-Iranian trade was $ 51.85 billion , or 1.2 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ volume—and it has plummeted since then .
That same year , China ’ s trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE were $ 69.15 billion and $ 54.8 billion , respectively .
In contrast , the volume of Chinese-U.S. trade that year was $ 555 billion , or 12.9 percent of China ’ s total foreign trade .
Geopolitically , infrastructure projects mentioned in the purported deal , such as Jask and Chabahar ports as well as railroad projects connecting Central Asia , if they materialize , would provide unique advantages to Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and geopolitical realities dictate that Iran does not occupy an irreplaceable position in China ’ s strategic calculations but is just one of the relationships Beijing needs to manage in the region .
While China should be a factor in an effective U.S. strategy towards Iran , it would be unwise to assume that Beijing-Tehran ties have disproportionate importance .
Indeed , following Xi ’ s visit , many large-scale Chinese companies arrived in Iran , optimistically expecting to explore new opportunities .
Around this time , I was studying Persian in Tehran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modern Iranian history .
I was able to mingle and interact with many Chinese businessmen representing large state-owned enterprises through my social circles and witness firsthand the commercial dynamics between the two countries .
Despite initial optimism , Chinese commercial interests met a lukewarm reception and the preferential treatment for which China hoped fell short of expectations .
Shortly after the implementation of the nuclear deal , many foreign companies suddenly started exploring Iranian markets .
With potentially a wide range of alternative products and services becoming available thanks to the relaxation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suddenly made increasing demands on Chinese businesses .
Iranians have long had a clear preference for all things Western .
They also tend to be prejudiced against Chinese products and services , even when they are comparable in quality and lower in price than Western equivalents .
Even Iranian state media was known for subtly insinuating the inferiority of Chinese-made goods and promoting other cultural and political biases toward China .
Chinese businessmen complained that , to their frustration , their Iranian partners often wanted a higher amount of Chinese investment but a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and technologies in joint projects .
Iran strongly prefers to partner with Western companies when possible , presumably due to a cultural reflex and a strategic consideration : It is politically and economically safer to cooperate with multiple partners than with just one .
For example , even though China has long coveted South Pars , the world ’ s largest oil and gas field , Iran did not hesitate to give the South Pars Phase 11 project to the French oil and gas giant Total , making it the majority shareholder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China National Petroleum Corporation ( CNPC ) the second-largest shareholder in the project after Total .
After the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions against the Islamic Republic , many Chinese businesses also suspended their projects or left Iran just as their Western counterparts did , due to the blockage of payment channels and increased financial risks in investing in the Iranian market because of U.S. secondary sanctions .
Although at the height of U.S. sanctions after 2018 , China remained the biggest buyer of Iranian oil—with a steep discount @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dictate prices—Chinese payments for Iranian oil are not being remitted back to Iran in the form of much-needed foreign exchange .
They are being used instead to pay down Iranian debts owed to Chinese oil companies for work done in Iran or held in China ’ s Bank of Kunlun , the sole Chinese bank handling oil-related transactions with Iran , only for “ humanitarian transactions ” of food and medicines .
It reportedly costs the Iranian regime a fortune—at least 12 percent of the amount—to transfer , through illicit channels , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are also finding it increasingly difficult to carry out business transactions in China after the reimposition of sanctions by the United States .
As the Chinese-Iranian strategic deal became news this summer , an Iranian businessman who had been dealing with China questioned the media reports sarcastically .
He pointed out in the Iranian press that Chinese banks were refusing to deal with Iran and closing the bank accounts of Iranian students and businesses in China because of pressure from U.S. sanctions , right at the time when Tehran was touting a deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crushing U.S. sanctions .
The claim that the Chinese-Iranian partnership would include significant cooperation in the military sphere , especially China maintaining a military base on Iran ’ s Kish island , is also doubtful .
The Iranian popular wariness of foreign military presence on its territory notwithstanding , China has been careful not to bring Iran too close in its security sphere .
Since 2008 , Iran has been eager to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ( SCO ) —a Eurasian security and economic alliance effectively led by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explicit support , China has not allowed Iran to become a full member of the organization .
Beijing will likely continue blocking Iranian membership in the SCO in the foreseeable future , since maintaining a balance of power among regional actors in the Middle East by not taking sides is clearly in China ’ s interest , and challenging a regional order adjudicated by the United States through bolstering Iran in a security alliance is obviously undesirable for China .
Given Beijing ’ s aloofness , any permanent and close military cooperation with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s perspective , the news of the deal was badly timed .
It confirmed and aggravated the sense of a Chinese peril in the United States , at a time when U.S. policymakers from both sides of the aisle have serious concerns about China ’ s rise and apparent global ambitions—epitomized in its Belt and Road Initiative .
Beijing has been trying to mitigate anti-Chinese sentiment and rhetoric in the United States and was probably not pleased by such high-profile media stories about China cementing a deal with America ’ s archenemy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until now remained reticent about the deal .
No Chinese media outlets have reported or analyzed the deal based on Chinese sources .
When asked by reporters , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople twice avoided making any comments .
China ’ s silence on the matter is telling .
Beijing understands that to sustain its own economic growth , it must manage hostilities and continue its modus vivendi with the United States .
It should be apparent to Beijing that if China opts to closely cooperate with Iran , any future escalation of U.S.-Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would also further strain already delicate relations between Beijing and Washington .
Consequently , if the United States plays its cards carefully , China is unlikely to stand by Iran .
It is worth remembering that in December 2018 , only a month after U.S. sanctions against Iran ’ s oil and gas sector had gone into effect , in the midst the U.S.-China trade dispute , CNPC suspended its investment in Iran ’ s South Pars gas field project , which it had just taken over from France ’ s Total in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the project .
Due to U.S. pressure , by October 2019 CNPC had completely pulled out from the project .
This does not mean Iran and China will not have limited cooperation , much like Iran ’ s relations with other Asian powers like India .
Major economies such as China and India would like to diversify their oil supplies for energy security and have access through Iran ’ s transportation network to a broader international market .
If Beijing is indeed negotiating the deal with Tehran , it will at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incoming Biden administration ’ s foreign policy has taken shape before deciding whether to formally commit itself to an approach that could anger Washington .
China ’ s paramount foreign policy goal in the coming years will be to repair its relations with the United States .
Any potential deal with Iran will only be subordinate to this larger imperative .
China ’ s interests in Iran would be best served by a situation of manageable tension between Iran and the United States—when there are sufficient sanctions to keep major international competitors away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ markets , but not too much hostility or strong enough sanctions to stop the flow of capital .
According to a recent interview with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with a Chinese media outlet , Tehran is clearly expecting some kind of sanctions relief from the United States under the Biden administration .
Zarif shared his belief that the China-Iran deal will be signed soon if the U.S. sanctions are eased .
This means that if the Biden administration offers political and financial concessions to Iran too soon , it will create @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
In such a scenario , Beijing could sign the deal or a modified version of it , and the China-has-got-Iran ’ s-back story would become a self-fulfilling prophecy .
Judging from the current situation , however , if the United States decides to engage China as it crafts a new U.S. strategy toward Iran , China may well abandon Iran by delaying and remaining noncommittal about the bilateral deal as it works to ameliorate its relations with the United States .
After all , China and the United States are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran is more than a mere pawn , in Beijing ’ s view it is ultimately dispensable .

In June 2020, a draft of the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was leaked to the media by an Iranian source. In this purported deal, which ostensibly covers bilateral cooperation in economic, political, cultural, and military spheres for the next 25 years, China pledged a maximum investment of $400 billion to improve Iran’s oil, gas, and transportation infrastructure.
In June 2020, a draft of the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was leaked to the media by an Iranian source. In this purported deal, which ostensibly covers bilateral cooperation in economic, political, cultural, and military spheres for the next 25 years, China pledged a maximum investment of $400 billion to improve Iran’s oil, gas, and transportation infrastructure.
Some observers were quick to point out that this groundbreaking deal not only demonstrates China’s unrelenting ambition to succeed globally, but also shows the failure of the Trump administration’s so-called maximum pressure campaign against Iran, which instead has pushed Iran into China’s orbit. Others noted that should President-elect Joe Biden try to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the China-Iran deal would potentially harden Iran’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States. These commentators all regard the deal as a fait accompli, as if it has already been signed—but they are exaggerating China’s will and capacity to aid Iran in defiance of the United States.
Although China has been Iran’s largest trading partner since 2009, Iran has remained a minor one for China. Even in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates outperform Iran when it comes to trading with China. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, at its peak in 2014, Chinese-Iranian trade was $51.85 billion, or 1.2 percent of China’s total foreign trade volume—and it has plummeted since then. That same year, China’s trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE were $69.15 billion and $54.8 billion, respectively. In contrast, the volume of Chinese-U.S. trade that year was $555 billion, or 12.9 percent of China’s total foreign trade.
Geopolitically, infrastructure projects mentioned in the purported deal, such as Jask and Chabahar ports as well as railroad projects connecting Central Asia, if they materialize, would provide unique advantages to Iran rather than to China. These economic and geopolitical realities dictate that Iran does not occupy an irreplaceable position in China’s strategic calculations but is just one of the relationships Beijing needs to manage in the region. While China should be a factor in an effective U.S. strategy towards Iran, it would be unwise to assume that Beijing-Tehran ties have disproportionate importance.
The idea of the Chinese-Iranian comprehensive deal was proposed in early 2016 by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his state visit in Iran after the implementation of the JCPOA. Mindful of China’s unique role in engaging with Iran through the difficult period of sanctions before the nuclear deal, Xi hoped to expand Chinese-Iranian cooperation and apparently expected some kind of preferential treatment for Chinese commercial interests in Iran under the auspices of the JCPOA.
Indeed, following Xi’s visit, many large-scale Chinese companies arrived in Iran, optimistically expecting to explore new opportunities. Around this time, I was studying Persian in Tehran and conducting research for my dissertation on modern Iranian history. I was able to mingle and interact with many Chinese businessmen representing large state-owned enterprises through my social circles and witness firsthand the commercial dynamics between the two countries.
Despite initial optimism, Chinese commercial interests met a lukewarm reception and the preferential treatment for which China hoped fell short of expectations. Shortly after the implementation of the nuclear deal, many foreign companies suddenly started exploring Iranian markets. With potentially a wide range of alternative products and services becoming available thanks to the relaxation of sanctions, Iran’s business community suddenly made increasing demands on Chinese businesses.
Iranians have long had a clear preference for all things Western. They also tend to be prejudiced against Chinese products and services, even when they are comparable in quality and lower in price than Western equivalents. Even Iranian state media was known for subtly insinuating the inferiority of Chinese-made goods and promoting other cultural and political biases toward China.
Chinese businessmen complained that, to their frustration, their Iranian partners often wanted a higher amount of Chinese investment but a lower proportion of Chinese products, services, and technologies in joint projects. Iran strongly prefers to partner with Western companies when possible, presumably due to a cultural reflex and a strategic consideration: It is politically and economically safer to cooperate with multiple partners than with just one. For example, even though China has long coveted South Pars, the world’s largest oil and gas field, Iran did not hesitate to give the South Pars Phase 11 project to the French oil and gas giant Total, making it the majority shareholder of the joint venture, with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) the second-largest shareholder in the project after Total.
After the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions against the Islamic Republic, many Chinese businesses also suspended their projects or left Iran just as their Western counterparts did, due to the blockage of payment channels and increased financial risks in investing in the Iranian market because of U.S. secondary sanctions.
Although at the height of U.S. sanctions after 2018, China remained the biggest buyer of Iranian oil—with a steep discount since Iran is not in a position to dictate prices—Chinese payments for Iranian oil are not being remitted back to Iran in the form of much-needed foreign exchange. They are being used instead to pay down Iranian debts owed to Chinese oil companies for work done in Iran or held in China’s Bank of Kunlun, the sole Chinese bank handling oil-related transactions with Iran, only for “humanitarian transactions” of food and medicines. It reportedly costs the Iranian regime a fortune—at least 12 percent of the amount—to transfer, through illicit channels, some of these funds.
Iranian businesses are also finding it increasingly difficult to carry out business transactions in China after the reimposition of sanctions by the United States. As the Chinese-Iranian strategic deal became news this summer, an Iranian businessman who had been dealing with China questioned the media reports sarcastically. He pointed out in the Iranian press that Chinese banks were refusing to deal with Iran and closing the bank accounts of Iranian students and businesses in China because of pressure from U.S. sanctions, right at the time when Tehran was touting a deal that was supposed to save Iran from crushing U.S. sanctions.
The claim that the Chinese-Iranian partnership would include significant cooperation in the military sphere, especially China maintaining a military base on Iran’s Kish island, is also doubtful. The Iranian popular wariness of foreign military presence on its territory notwithstanding, China has been careful not to bring Iran too close in its security sphere. Since 2008, Iran has been eager to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—a Eurasian security and economic alliance effectively led by China.
Despite Russia’s recent explicit support, China has not allowed Iran to become a full member of the organization. Beijing will likely continue blocking Iranian membership in the SCO in the foreseeable future, since maintaining a balance of power among regional actors in the Middle East by not taking sides is clearly in China’s interest, and challenging a regional order adjudicated by the United States through bolstering Iran in a security alliance is obviously undesirable for China. Given Beijing’s aloofness, any permanent and close military cooperation with Iran appears improbable.
The purported deal is mostly an Iranian gambit at China’s expense and appears to be an Iranian public-relations ploy. Tehran is seeking to appease domestic discontent over the grim economic situation caused by the regime’s “maximum resistance” policy, by suggesting that China has Iran’s back. It also allows Iran to flaunt its so-called China alternative. News of the deal benefited only Tehran, as it exacerbated the heated U.S. debate on the efficacy of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign and implied that the policy has failed.
From China’s perspective, the news of the deal was badly timed. It confirmed and aggravated the sense of a Chinese peril in the United States, at a time when U.S. policymakers from both sides of the aisle have serious concerns about China’s rise and apparent global ambitions—epitomized in its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has been trying to mitigate anti-Chinese sentiment and rhetoric in the United States and was probably not pleased by such high-profile media stories about China cementing a deal with America’s archenemy, Iran.
In fact, China has until now remained reticent about the deal. No Chinese media outlets have reported or analyzed the deal based on Chinese sources. When asked by reporters, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople twice avoided making any comments. China’s silence on the matter is telling. Beijing understands that to sustain its own economic growth, it must manage hostilities and continue its modus vivendi with the United States. It should be apparent to Beijing that if China opts to closely cooperate with Iran, any future escalation of U.S.-Iranian tensions (which could easily happen) would also further strain already delicate relations between Beijing and Washington. Consequently, if the United States plays its cards carefully, China is unlikely to stand by Iran.
While China is and will be a formidable challenger in a U.S.-dominated world order, China’s determination and capability to act as Iran’s “economic alternative” in the face of U.S. sanctions should not be exaggerated. When Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing Chief Executive Carrie Lam has been left without a bank account, her salary having to be paid in cash due to U.S. sanctions—even in China’s own special administrative territory—one should question to what extent China can actually defy U.S. sanctions, if the United States is determined to enforce them, and economically support Iran without suffering some serious blowback.
It is worth remembering that in December 2018, only a month after U.S. sanctions against Iran’s oil and gas sector had gone into effect, in the midst the U.S.-China trade dispute, CNPC suspended its investment in Iran’s South Pars gas field project, which it had just taken over from France’s Total in August after the latter announced its withdrawal from the project. Due to U.S. pressure, by October 2019 CNPC had completely pulled out from the project.
This does not mean Iran and China will not have limited cooperation, much like Iran’s relations with other Asian powers like India. Major economies such as China and India would like to diversify their oil supplies for energy security and have access through Iran’s transportation network to a broader international market. If Beijing is indeed negotiating the deal with Tehran, it will at least want to assess its options after the incoming Biden administration’s foreign policy has taken shape before deciding whether to formally commit itself to an approach that could anger Washington. China’s paramount foreign policy goal in the coming years will be to repair its relations with the United States. Any potential deal with Iran will only be subordinate to this larger imperative.
China’s interests in Iran would be best served by a situation of manageable tension between Iran and the United States—when there are sufficient sanctions to keep major international competitors away so that Chinese businesses can dominate Iranian markets, but not too much hostility or strong enough sanctions to stop the flow of capital. According to a recent interview with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with a Chinese media outlet, Tehran is clearly expecting some kind of sanctions relief from the United States under the Biden administration.
Zarif shared his belief that the China-Iran deal will be signed soon if the U.S. sanctions are eased. This means that if the Biden administration offers political and financial concessions to Iran too soon, it will create a welcoming environment for Chinese investment in Iran. In such a scenario, Beijing could sign the deal or a modified version of it, and the China-has-got-Iran’s-back story would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Judging from the current situation, however, if the United States decides to engage China as it crafts a new U.S. strategy toward Iran, China may well abandon Iran by delaying and remaining noncommittal about the bilateral deal as it works to ameliorate its relations with the United States. After all, China and the United States are the superpowers on the geopolitical chessboard—and even if Iran is more than a mere pawn, in Beijing’s view it is ultimately dispensable.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--The War in Tigray Is a Fight Over Ethiopia’s Past—and Future

The War in Tigray Is a Fight Over Ethiopia ’ s Past—and Future It has come as a shock to many that a civil war is raging in Ethiopia , with the Ethiopian government waging what it startlingly called a “ law enforcement operation ” in the Tigray region , branding the former ruling party in Ethiopia—the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) —a criminal organization and vowing to destroy it .
The conflict , which has already claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands , has caused trepidation in foreign capitals that it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collapses in modern history , with significant implications for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond .
Despite the government ’ s declaration that it has already concluded the operation , it is far from certain that the capture of Tigray ’ s capital , Mekelle , by government forces will bring the conflict to an end any time soon—with the TPLF retreating to the mountains and , in all likelihood , positioning its fighting forces for a costly and drawn-out guerrilla war .
There is a palpable fear that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rules of war to actively engage in the conflict , and this could lead to a dire human tragedy .
Evidence is emerging that the recent massacre in Mai-Kadra in Tigray state was perpetrated by vigilante groups—the Amhara group Fano and the Samri youth organization—with loose connections to their respective regional governments , the Amhara and Tigray states .
Ironically , the international community—which neglected many serious misgivings from credible corners about the suitability of the untested Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia ’ s prime minister and welcomed ( and likely enabled ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coveted Peace Prize to Abiy—was reduced to trying to persuade the peace laureate to refrain from escalating the conflict .
The African Union , the European Union , the United Nations Security Council , and leaders of several countries have expressed their angst about the looming disaster and are appealing to the warring parties to resolve their political differences through dialogue .
Abiy has rejected peace talks with the TPLF until “ the rule of law is restored , ” and his ally and predecessor , Hailemariam Desalegn , faults those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an “ attitude of false balance and bothsidesism.
” Desalegn argues that a power-sharing arrangement that may be brokered through dialogue is unsustainable , as that would absolve the TPLF of the crimes it has committed .
However , it is difficult to take the self-serving bias of these arguments as anything more than a not-so-subtle justification for war , which the international community is trying to avert .
As recently as two years ago , Ethiopia ’ s economy was being touted as one of the fastest-growing in the world , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
How is it that a country that is still considered by powerful Western powers as the bulwark of their security policies in the Horn of Africa is suddenly facing an existential threat ?
Those who promote a strong central government maintain that Ethiopia is an exceptional state that ought to be preserved at any cost ( this includes Abiy and his supporters ) , while those in the opposing camp—notably the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front ( OLF ) —highlight the imperial legacy of the country , portraying it as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ought to be significantly reformed or dismantled .
The modern Ethiopian state was founded by the Amhara ruling class as an empire state toward the end of the 19th century .
This state formation process coincided with and was partly facilitated by the so-called Scramble for Africa by the European colonial powers , with Emperor Menelik II ( who ruled from 1889 to 1913 ) expanding his kingdom into what is today the southern half of the country , conquering the Oromos ( the demographic plurality of the country ) , the Somalis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently making up Ethiopia .
Menelik identified himself as a member of the Amhara , a national group whose kings ruled over Abyssinia ( Northern Ethiopia ) for centuries , outmaneuvering the other key Abyssinian group , the Tigraway .
The establishment of the modern Ethiopian state through conquest has been a source of serious contestation , leading to countless resistance movements , with the conquered populations fighting to keep their identities , cultures , and languages—and with the unitarist camp justifying the wars of conquest as necessary campaigns to reunify territories that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ empire .
In particular , the Oromo , the Wolaita , and the Kafficho resisted Menelik ’ s advancing army , but they were outgunned and defeated , submitting to Menelik ’ s dominion over their territories .
The other notable resistance movements against the Ethiopian state came during Haile Selassie ’ s regime in the mid-1900s , in the form of the first Woyane rebellion of 1943 in Tigray ( which opposed the reorganization of the country into 14 provinces , as a measure to consolidate power at the center ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1960s ( which sought to prevent the government ’ s policy of settling the Amhara in the Oromo province of Bale ) .
Both rebellions were defeated by the well-organized imperial army of Ethiopia , which used superior firepower against civilian populations .
The Ethiopian student movement of the late 1960s and the early 1970s—which was instrumental in overthrowing the imperial regime , and whose leaders represented the entire cross-section of the Ethiopian society—had as one of its key missions the transformation of the Ethiopian state from a hegemonic empire to a democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various nations and nationalities making up the country .
Initially , the Derg—a committee of military personnel who took over the reins from Emperor Selassie—appeared ready to address plights of the nationalities neglected during imperial rule .
However , the project was upended when the Derg adopted oppressive tactics and became a centralist authoritarian regime , leading to the formation of armed liberation movements , including the TPLF and the OLF .
It was hoped that the defeat of the Derg by the liberation forces in 1991 and the subsequent reorganization of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ destructive center-periphery disputes in the country .
However , the TPLF-led Ethiopian government—while recognizing the cultural and linguistic rights of the subjugated nationalities—continued to utilize imperial tactics to suppress dissenting voices by non-Tigrayans , and this contributed substantially to its downfall in 2018 .
Depending on which perspective one subscribes to , these wars were fought to either maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the ancient Ethiopian state or to remake or dismantle an empire and free the nations it has imprisoned .
The war can be viewed as a continuation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ army and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia , the largest regional state in the country .
Despite Abiy ’ s self-identification as an Oromo , Oromia has been a hotbed of opposition to his agenda of putting Ethiopia first at any cost—which he has framed as “ medemer , ” a concept that some have translated as “ synergy.
” Meanwhile , the Ethiopian army has been accused by credible human rights organizations of committing atrocities in the region in what appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Oromo Liberation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in this conflict is the role of external forces , which fail to understand the deep historical roots of the current divisions in society .
Whereas the conflicts in Ethiopia have causes that are structural and historical and require impartial assessments and patient , long-term approaches to resolve , Western foreign policies toward the country have been geared toward short-term solutions that disregard the underlying problems .
A strand of political economy theory posits that the structure of policymaking in democratic countries may induce politicians to opt for maximizing their own interests at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading them to choose policies that are suboptimal .
With politicians in office focusing on winning the next election cycle , their foreign policies might be constrained by their short-term political goals , as opposed to providing the necessary leadership in global affairs .
Ethiopia is a case study demonstrating how the short-term political objectives of politicians in powerful nations have constrained the desirable goal of seeking long-lasting solutions for the structural problems bedeviling the country .
For instance , former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice ’ s misguided public eulogizing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is partly responsible for the current mess in the country—as “ uncommonly wise , able to see the big picture and the long game , ” and someone with “ little patience for fools , or idiots ” is indicative of what is considered mainstream in the foreign-policy discourse on Ethiopia in the United States .
Exploiting this , the unelected rulers of Ethiopia have for centuries used the narrative of Ethiopian exceptionalism in seeking and somehow acquiring advice , material assistance , and legitimacy from powerful states , and this has contributed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
Moreover , given the perceived fear that the federalist bloc ’ s agenda of remaking the country is fraught with risks that may lead to a chaotic disintegration of the Ethiopian state , the U.S. government has shown significant deference to the unitarist camp and its political objectives , but this has only complicated the core contradictions of the Ethiopian state , deepening the chasm between the unitarist and federalist forces in the country .
Whatever the reasons might be , a U.S. foreign policy that enables the totalizing tendencies of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its logical conclusion .
Therefore , the United States should use this historical opening to rebalance its foreign policy toward the country , with the view of serving as an impartial arbiter of the conflicts between the two sides .
It can wisely use its vast financial and diplomatic assets as leverage to induce the two sides in the conflict—the Ethiopian government and Amhara political forces on the one hand , and federalist forces ( particularly the TPLF and the OLF ) on the other—to sit down and hammer out a lasting solution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Biden and his exceptionally qualified foreign-policy team must now tackle the current Ethiopian conflict with the attention , knowledge , and commitment it demands—not with short-sighted policies that may compound the conflict .
The U.N. , the EU , and the AU can assist U.S. diplomats in devising—with significant inputs from the warring parties—a credible mechanism that could defuse the conflict and put the country on a different course .
There are models from around the world that could be adopted with some tweaks to hold Ethiopia together in some form—including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Canadian model , and the EU model—but this should come out of serious discussions with the stakeholders , including the relevant nongovernmental organizations .
A political formula that recognizes the essential diversity and similarity of the Ethiopian public will serve the cause of justice and peace and have a lasting positive legacy on U.S.-Ethiopian relations .
During his time as a senator , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden showed that he can take positions at odds with the conventional wisdom of Washington ’ s foreign-policy establishment .
Biden and his exceptionally qualified foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict with the attention , knowledge , and commitment it demands—not with short-sighted policies that may compound the conflict .
It might seem unfair to expect the incoming Biden administration—which will be preoccupied with other urgent priorities of the country it has been elected to lead , including dealing with the mounting economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic—to rectify a foreign-policy problem that has been in the making for many decades .
It is , however , vitally important for the newly minted U.S. foreign-policy team to rigorously reexamine the United States ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aims to avoid a Yugoslavia-type disaster in the Horn of Africa .

It has come as a shock to many that a civil war is raging in Ethiopia, with the Ethiopian government waging what it startlingly called a “ law enforcement operation ” in the Tigray region, branding the former ruling party in Ethiopia—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—a criminal organization and vowing to destroy it. The conflict, which has already claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands , has caused trepidation in foreign capitals that it could lead to one of the largest state collapses in modern history , with significant implications for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
It has come as a shock to many that a civil war is raging in Ethiopia, with the Ethiopian government waging what it startlingly called a “law enforcement operation” in the Tigray region, branding the former ruling party in Ethiopia—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—a criminal organization and vowing to destroy it. The conflict, which has already claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands, has caused trepidation in foreign capitals that it could lead to one of the largest state collapses in modern history, with significant implications for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Despite the government’s declaration that it has already concluded the operation, it is far from certain that the capture of Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, by government forces will bring the conflict to an end any time soon—with the TPLF retreating to the mountains and, in all likelihood, positioning its fighting forces for a costly and drawn-out guerrilla war. There is a palpable fear that the war might induce civilians unfamiliar with the rules of war to actively engage in the conflict, and this could lead to a dire human tragedy. Evidence is emerging that the recent massacre in Mai-Kadra in Tigray state was perpetrated by vigilante groups—the Amhara group Fano and the Samri youth organization—with loose connections to their respective regional governments, the Amhara and Tigray states.
Ironically, the international community—which neglected many serious misgivings from credible corners about the suitability of the untested Abiy Ahmed as Ethiopia’s prime minister and welcomed (and likely enabled) the Nobel Committee’s imprudent awarding of the coveted Peace Prize to Abiy—was reduced to trying to persuade the peace laureate to refrain from escalating the conflict.
The African Union, the European Union, the United Nations Security Council, and leaders of several countries have expressed their angst about the looming disaster and are appealing to the warring parties to resolve their political differences through dialogue. Abiy has rejected peace talks with the TPLF until “the rule of law is restored,” and his ally and predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, faults those calling for dialogue as naive do-gooders with an “attitude of false balance and bothsidesism.” Desalegn argues that a power-sharing arrangement that may be brokered through dialogue is unsustainable, as that would absolve the TPLF of the crimes it has committed. However, it is difficult to take the self-serving bias of these arguments as anything more than a not-so-subtle justification for war, which the international community is trying to avert.
As recently as two years ago, Ethiopia’s economy was being touted as one of the fastest-growing in the world, with tremendous potential for further growth and development. How is it that a country that is still considered by powerful Western powers as the bulwark of their security policies in the Horn of Africa is suddenly facing an existential threat?
The current conflict in Ethiopia is a manifestation of the long-running clash between two opposing visions for the country. One camp fosters the view that a strong central government is the only guarantee for the unity and territorial integrity of the country; the other advances the idea that political power should be devolved from the center to the peripheries in a federal system granting regions significant autonomy. The clashing visions are essentially contestations over history and memory.
Those who promote a strong central government maintain that Ethiopia is an exceptional state that ought to be preserved at any cost (this includes Abiy and his supporters), while those in the opposing camp—notably the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)—highlight the imperial legacy of the country, portraying it as a so-called prison of nations and nationalities that ought to be significantly reformed or dismantled.
The modern Ethiopian state was founded by the Amhara ruling class as an empire state toward the end of the 19th century. This state formation process coincided with and was partly facilitated by the so-called Scramble for Africa by the European colonial powers, with Emperor Menelik II (who ruled from 1889 to 1913) expanding his kingdom into what is today the southern half of the country, conquering the Oromos (the demographic plurality of the country), the Somalis, and dozens of other ethnic groups currently making up Ethiopia. Menelik identified himself as a member of the Amhara, a national group whose kings ruled over Abyssinia (Northern Ethiopia) for centuries, outmaneuvering the other key Abyssinian group, the Tigraway.
The establishment of the modern Ethiopian state through conquest has been a source of serious contestation, leading to countless resistance movements.
The establishment of the modern Ethiopian state through conquest has been a source of serious contestation, leading to countless resistance movements, with the conquered populations fighting to keep their identities, cultures, and languages—and with the unitarist camp justifying the wars of conquest as necessary campaigns to reunify territories that had been part of the ancient Ethiopian empire.
In particular, the Oromo, the Wolaita, and the Kafficho resisted Menelik’s advancing army, but they were outgunned and defeated, submitting to Menelik’s dominion over their territories. The other notable resistance movements against the Ethiopian state came during Haile Selassie’s regime in the mid-1900s, in the form of the first Woyane rebellion of 1943 in Tigray (which opposed the reorganization of the country into 14 provinces, as a measure to consolidate power at the center) and the Bale Oromo uprising in the early 1960s (which sought to prevent the government’s policy of settling the Amhara in the Oromo province of Bale). Both rebellions were defeated by the well-organized imperial army of Ethiopia, which used superior firepower against civilian populations.
The Ethiopian student movement of the late 1960s and the early 1970s—which was instrumental in overthrowing the imperial regime, and whose leaders represented the entire cross-section of the Ethiopian society—had as one of its key missions the transformation of the Ethiopian state from a hegemonic empire to a democratic polity that respected the rights of the various nations and nationalities making up the country.
Initially, the Derg—a committee of military personnel who took over the reins from Emperor Selassie—appeared ready to address plights of the nationalities neglected during imperial rule. However, the project was upended when the Derg adopted oppressive tactics and became a centralist authoritarian regime, leading to the formation of armed liberation movements, including the TPLF and the OLF.
It was hoped that the defeat of the Derg by the liberation forces in 1991 and the subsequent reorganization of the country along ethnonational lines would settle the destructive center-periphery disputes in the country. However, the TPLF-led Ethiopian government—while recognizing the cultural and linguistic rights of the subjugated nationalities—continued to utilize imperial tactics to suppress dissenting voices by non-Tigrayans, and this contributed substantially to its downfall in 2018.
Depending on which perspective one subscribes to, these wars were fought to either maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the ancient Ethiopian state or to remake or dismantle an empire and free the nations it has imprisoned.
By and large, the Tigray war is part of the same debate that has plagued Ethiopia since its foundation as an empire state: whether Ethiopia is an exceptional country that ought to be governed in a more centralized manner or one that needs to be ruled as a decentralized polity.
The war can be viewed as a continuation of the ongoing undeclared conflict between the Ethiopian army and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia, the largest regional state in the country. Despite Abiy’s self-identification as an Oromo, Oromia has been a hotbed of opposition to his agenda of putting Ethiopia first at any cost—which he has framed as “medemer,” a concept that some have translated as “synergy.” Meanwhile, the Ethiopian army has been accused by credible human rights organizations of committing atrocities in the region in what appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Oromo Liberation Army.
The other major complicating factor in this conflict is the role of external forces, which fail to understand the deep historical roots of the current divisions in society. Whereas the conflicts in Ethiopia have causes that are structural and historical and require impartial assessments and patient, long-term approaches to resolve, Western foreign policies toward the country have been geared toward short-term solutions that disregard the underlying problems.
A strand of political economy theory posits that the structure of policymaking in democratic countries may induce politicians to opt for maximizing their own interests at the expense of broader social welfare, leading them to choose policies that are suboptimal. With politicians in office focusing on winning the next election cycle, their foreign policies might be constrained by their short-term political goals, as opposed to providing the necessary leadership in global affairs.
Ethiopia is a case study demonstrating how the short-term political objectives of politicians in powerful nations have constrained the desirable goal of seeking long-lasting solutions for the structural problems bedeviling the country. For instance, former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s misguided public eulogizing of Meles Zenawi—Ethiopia’s former strongman who is partly responsible for the current mess in the country—as “uncommonly wise, able to see the big picture and the long game,” and someone with “little patience for fools, or idiots” is indicative of what is considered mainstream in the foreign-policy discourse on Ethiopia in the United States.
Exploiting this, the unelected rulers of Ethiopia have for centuries used the narrative of Ethiopian exceptionalism in seeking and somehow acquiring advice, material assistance, and legitimacy from powerful states, and this has contributed to the perpetuation of conflicts in the country. Moreover, given the perceived fear that the federalist bloc’s agenda of remaking the country is fraught with risks that may lead to a chaotic disintegration of the Ethiopian state, the U.S. government has shown significant deference to the unitarist camp and its political objectives, but this has only complicated the core contradictions of the Ethiopian state, deepening the chasm between the unitarist and federalist forces in the country.
Whatever the reasons might be, a U.S. foreign policy that enables the totalizing tendencies of the unitary camp appears to have reached its logical conclusion. Therefore, the United States should use this historical opening to rebalance its foreign policy toward the country, with the view of serving as an impartial arbiter of the conflicts between the two sides. It can wisely use its vast financial and diplomatic assets as leverage to induce the two sides in the conflict—the Ethiopian government and Amhara political forces on the one hand, and federalist forces (particularly the TPLF and the OLF) on the other—to sit down and hammer out a lasting solution to the country’s long-standing problems.
Biden and his exceptionally qualified foreign-policy team must now tackle the current Ethiopian conflict with the attention, knowledge, and commitment it demands.
The U.N., the EU, and the AU can assist U.S. diplomats in devising—with significant inputs from the warring parties—a credible mechanism that could defuse the conflict and put the country on a different course. There are models from around the world that could be adopted with some tweaks to hold Ethiopia together in some form—including the Belgian model, the Swiss model, the Canadian model, and the EU model—but this should come out of serious discussions with the stakeholders, including the relevant nongovernmental organizations. A political formula that recognizes the essential diversity and similarity of the Ethiopian public will serve the cause of justice and peace and have a lasting positive legacy on U.S.-Ethiopian relations.
During his time as a senator, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden showed that he can take positions at odds with the conventional wisdom of Washington’s foreign-policy establishment. Biden and his exceptionally qualified foreign-policy team must now tackle the current Ethiopian conflict with the attention, knowledge, and commitment it demands—not with short-sighted policies that may compound the conflict.
It might seem unfair to expect the incoming Biden administration—which will be preoccupied with other urgent priorities of the country it has been elected to lead, including dealing with the mounting economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic—to rectify a foreign-policy problem that has been in the making for many decades. It is, however, vitally important for the newly minted U.S. foreign-policy team to rigorously reexamine the United States’ long-standing foreign policy toward Ethiopia if it aims to avoid a Yugoslavia-type disaster in the Horn of Africa.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Russia’s Alleged Hack Could Be Worst in U.S. History

Russia ’ s Alleged Hack Could Be Worst in U.S. History Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : A cyberattack on the U.S. government appears to be the worst ever , Nigerian schoolchildren released , and Germany plans to begin its vaccination program on Dec. 27 as coronavirus cases climb .
A note to our readers : Morning Brief will be entering a holiday schedule for the next two weeks .
We will publish on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 , and then on Dec. 29 and Dec. 30 the following week .
We ’ ll resume normal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
As more details are revealed about Russia ’ s alleged hack of the U.S. government , it ’ s becoming clear that the breach is much worse than previously thought .
On Thursday , the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned that is “ poses a grave risk ” to federal , state , and local governments as well as private companies and organizations .
Who ’ s been hacked ?
There is a growing list of reported victims : the Centers for Disease Control , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Commerce Department , Department of Homeland Security , Treasury Department , the U.S .
Postal Service , the National Institutes of Health , and the Department of Energy were all affected .
The DOE says the hack poses no threat to its national security operations—including the National Nuclear Security Administration—but did impact its business networks .
How bad is it ?
“ This is , I think , appears to be at this point the most serious cyberattack this country has ever endured , ” Sen. Angus King , I-Maine said on NPR @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond to the hack , noted that “ the attack unfortunately represents a broad and successful espionage-based assault on both the confidential information of the U.S. Government and the tech tools used by firms to protect them … ongoing investigations reveal an attack that is remarkable for its scope , sophistication and impact.
” Biden issues statement ; Trump stays silent .
President-elect Joe Biden responded by promising to focus on cyberthreats.
“ I want to be clear : My administration will make cybersecurity a top priority at every level of government—and we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top priority from the moment we take office , ” he said .
President Donald Trump , who recently fired a top government cybersecurity official has not made an official statement .
He is taking heat from both sides of the aisle for his silence .
Republican Sen. Mitt Romney compared the breach to “ Russian bombers … repeatedly flying over our entire country , ” and denounced the “ inexcusable silence and inaction from the White House.
” As Elisabeth Braw argues in FP , cyberattacks may be declining in number but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever .
“ With businesses and institutions getting better at cybersecurity , garden-variety cyberattacks are decreasing while sophisticated and targeted intrusion is on the rise , ” she wrote .
Bobi Wine court hearing .
Ugandan opposition figure Bobi Wine is set to appear in court today on charges of violating coronavirus restrictions by holding political rallies .
Human Rights Watch has accused Ugandan authorities of weaponizing COVID-19 to suppress dissent ahead of Uganda ’ s Jan. 14 presidential election , in which Wine is seeking to end the 34-year-reign of President Yoweri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ugandan government asked Google to take down 14 YouTube channels linked to the opposition ; Wine , a pop star , enjoys a large online following .
Nigerian schoolboys released .
Suspected Boko Haram militants in Nigeria have released over 300 boys kidnapped last week .
It is unclear how the government negotiated their release ; authorities claim they did not pay a ransom but Boko Haram group seemed to suggest money was involved by sharing a video showing an abducted boy telling the army not to intervene and saying “ You have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ getting vaccine today .
U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and his wife Karen will receive a coronavirus vaccination today .
Pence , who leads the White House Coronavirus Task Force , plans to televise his inoculation to build “ vaccine confidence.
” Pence and his team ’ s approach to the pandemic has been controversial .
The United States is seeing record coronavirus caseloads and hospitalizations , and recently surpassed 300,000 COVID-19 deaths .
Germany plans vaccine rollout .
In Germany , where the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine was developed , pressure is mounting to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health Minister Jens Spahn is expected to announce a vaccination priority list at a press conference today , alongside plans to begin mass vaccinations on Dec. 27 .
The Pfizer vaccine has not yet been given a green light by EU regulators , though Brussels recently caved to public demands and moved its assessment date up to Dec. 21 from Dec. 29 .
Germany is facing record daily case counts of over 30,000 , and recently ditched it ’ s “ lockdown-lite ” for a full lockdown after the partial closure failed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s free jabs .
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced that her government will offer free vaccines to neighboring countries that ask for them—including Tokelau , the Cook Islands , Niue , Samoa , Tonga , and Tuvalu .
Ardern said in a press conference that “ Never before has the entire globe sought to vaccinate the entire population at the same time … This will be a sustained rollout over months , not weeks , but our pre-purchase agreements means New Zealand is well positioned to get on with it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do so.
” COVID ’ s effects on migrants .
To coincide with International Migrant ’ s Day , the World Health Organization will release findings today from a new study on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on refugees and migrants .
An earlier OECD study found that “ The few data available by origin usually show a significant over-representation of immigrants in the incidence of COVID‑19 , ” noting higher infection rates in Norway , Sweden , Portugal , and Canada compared to native-born populations .
The higher rates have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and work conditions .
As Shelly Culbertson argues in Foreign Policy , migrants are often “ caught in a Catch-22 of not being allowed to work while not receiving enough aid to survive , refugees often work under the table , under minimum wage , and without social protections.
” Tensions grow between Kenya and Somalia .
Somalia cut diplomatic ties with Kenya on Tuesday after accusing its neighbor of meddling in an internal election and a day after Kenya ’ s president hosted the leader of Somaliland , a region within Somalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic spat comes just after Washington announced it would with withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia—leading to fears that the al-Shabab militant group could step up attacks throughout the Horn of Africa .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A cyberattack on the U.S. government appears to be the worst ever, Nigerian schoolchildren released, and Germany plans to begin its vaccination program on Dec. 27 as coronavirus cases climb.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A cyberattack on the U.S. government appears to be the worst ever, Nigerian schoolchildren released, and Germany plans to begin its vaccination program on Dec. 27 as coronavirus cases climb.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Suspected Russian Cyberattack Strikes at Heart of U.S. Government
As more details are revealed about Russia’s alleged hack of the U.S. government, it’s becoming clear that the breach is much worse than previously thought. On Thursday, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned that is “poses a grave risk” to federal, state, and local governments as well as private companies and organizations.
Who’s been hacked? There is a growing list of reported victims: the Centers for Disease Control, the Defense Department, State Department, Commerce Department, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury Department, the U.S. Postal Service, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Energy were all affected. The DOE says the hack poses no threat to its national security operations—including the National Nuclear Security Administration—but did impact its business networks.
How bad is it? “This is, I think, appears to be at this point the most serious cyberattack this country has ever endured,” Sen. Angus King, I-Maine said on NPR. Microsoft, which is helping to respond to the hack, noted that “the attack unfortunately represents a broad and successful espionage-based assault on both the confidential information of the U.S. Government and the tech tools used by firms to protect them … ongoing investigations reveal an attack that is remarkable for its scope, sophistication and impact.”
Biden issues statement; Trump stays silent. President-elect Joe Biden responded by promising to focus on cyberthreats.“I want to be clear: My administration will make cybersecurity a top priority at every level of government—and we will make dealing with this breach a top priority from the moment we take office,” he said. President Donald Trump, who recently fired a top government cybersecurity official has not made an official statement. He is taking heat from both sides of the aisle for his silence. Republican Sen. Mitt Romney compared the breach to “Russian bombers … repeatedly flying over our entire country,” and denounced the “inexcusable silence and inaction from the White House.”
As Elisabeth Braw argues in FP, cyberattacks may be declining in number but the damage they cause is greater than ever. “With businesses and institutions getting better at cybersecurity, garden-variety cyberattacks are decreasing while sophisticated and targeted intrusion is on the rise,” she wrote.
What We’re Following Today Bobi Wine court hearing. Ugandan opposition figure Bobi Wine is set to appear in court today on charges of violating coronavirus restrictions by holding political rallies. Human Rights Watch has accused Ugandan authorities of weaponizing COVID-19 to suppress dissent ahead of Uganda’s Jan. 14 presidential election, in which Wine is seeking to end the 34-year-reign of President Yoweri Museveni. Earlier this week, the Ugandan government asked Google to take down 14 YouTube channels linked to the opposition; Wine, a pop star, enjoys a large online following. Nigerian schoolboys released. Suspected Boko Haram militants in Nigeria have released over 300 boys kidnapped last week. It is unclear how the government negotiated their release; authorities claim they did not pay a ransom but Boko Haram group seemed to suggest money was involved by sharing a video showing an abducted boy telling the army not to intervene and saying “You have to send them the money.” Pence getting vaccine today. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and his wife Karen will receive a coronavirus vaccination today. Pence, who leads the White House Coronavirus Task Force, plans to televise his inoculation to build “vaccine confidence.” Pence and his team’s approach to the pandemic has been controversial. The United States is seeing record coronavirus caseloads and hospitalizations, and recently surpassed 300,000 COVID-19 deaths.
Keep an Eye On
Germany plans vaccine rollout. In Germany, where the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine was developed, pressure is mounting to approve the drug for use. German Health Minister Jens Spahn is expected to announce a vaccination priority list at a press conference today, alongside plans to begin mass vaccinations on Dec. 27. The Pfizer vaccine has not yet been given a green light by EU regulators, though Brussels recently caved to public demands and moved its assessment date up to Dec. 21 from Dec. 29.
Germany is facing record daily case counts of over 30,000, and recently ditched it’s “lockdown-lite” for a full lockdown after the partial closure failed to slow the spread of COVID-19.
Jacinda’s free jabs. New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced that her government will offer free vaccines to neighboring countries that ask for them—including Tokelau, the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Ardern said in a press conference that “never before has the entire globe sought to vaccinate the entire population at the same time … This will be a sustained rollout over months, not weeks, but our pre-purchase agreements means New Zealand is well positioned to get on with it as soon as it is proven safe to do so.”
COVID’s effects on migrants. To coincide with International Migrant’s Day, the World Health Organization will release findings today from a new study on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on refugees and migrants. An earlier OECD study found that the “few data available by origin usually show a significant over-representation of immigrants in the incidence of COVID‑19,” noting higher infection rates in Norway, Sweden, Portugal, and Canada compared to native-born populations. The higher rates have been linked to poverty, poor housing and work conditions.
As Shelly Culbertson argues in Foreign Policy, migrants are often “caught in a Catch-22 of not being allowed to work while not receiving enough aid to survive, refugees often work under the table, under minimum wage, and without social protections.”
Tensions grow between Kenya and Somalia. Somalia cut diplomatic ties with Kenya on Tuesday after accusing its neighbor of meddling in an internal election and a day after Kenya’s president hosted the leader of Somaliland, a region within Somalia that declared independence in 1991. The diplomatic spat comes just after Washington announced it would with withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia—leading to fears that the al-Shabab militant group could step up attacks throughout the Horn of Africa.
Odds and Ends Tearing down Trump’s legacy. The Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino was once a fixture in the gambling destination of Atlantic City, New Jersey. Although the casino went bankrupt and shut in 2014, it has remained standing—apart from occasional pieces of the crumbling structure that have fallen into surrounding streets. City officials have long urged demolition of the building; now they are auctioning off the right to raze it for charity. Bidding for the privilege of dynamiting the 39-story building began on Thursday.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Why India’s Farmers Won’t Stop Protesting

Since late November , tens of thousands of Indian farmers have marched to New Delhi and blocked the highways leading into the city , protesting against three bills that passed in both houses of India ’ s Parliament in September .
The demonstrations have since spread to other parts of the country with farmers blocking roads and railway tracks , and limiting the movement of people and goods , including farm produce .
What are the bills in question ?
Listing them may feel cumbersome , but in the interest of understanding their value—and the immense scale of the protests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Farmers ( Empowerment and Protection ) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act ; 2 ) the Farmers ’ Produce Trade and Commerce ( Promotion and Facilitation ) Act ; and 3 ) the Essential Commodities ( Amendment ) Act .
The first two laws expand the marketing infrastructure provided by India ’ s state-level governments and allow direct marketing of farm products to processors , aggregators , wholesalers , large retailers , and exporters .
The third law seeks to facilitate the production , movement , and distribution of farm produce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economists have long acknowledged the need for agricultural reforms in India , the ongoing protests likely have more to do with how the new laws were rolled out : The bills were all passed using the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ’ s parliamentary majority , and without suitable consultation with key stakeholders such as farmer unions .
The passage of the legislation also displayed all the hallmarks that have come to characterize Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s key decisions , ranging from a botched policy of demonetization in 2016 , a hasty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2017 , and then a nationwide lockdown with four hours ’ notice this year to contain the spread of the coronavirus .
India ’ s farm policy architecture is a holdover from the 1960s when the country was poor and food insecure .
Policies were put in place with food security as the primary goal .
While this set of laws allowed India to achieve advances in food production by the 1980s , the farm sector has suffered a decline in public investment , a lack of marketing alternatives , and stagnant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farmers , agree that India ’ s farm policies need to change ; however , there is little agreement on the details of those reforms .
In the early 2000s , the government at the time encouraged Indian states to design and enact reforms , but predictably every state adopted only piecemeal policy changes that did not hurt key interests within the state .
As a result , there is no uniformity in policies and laws across the country.While economists have long acknowledged the need for agricultural reforms in India , the ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how the new laws were rolled out .
Ostensibly , the laws that the Indian Parliament enacted in September were designed to reduce regulatory interference from the government and to fix that lack of uniformity and create a national policy .
The intention was to make it easier to bring private investment—both domestic and foreign—into India ’ s farm sector .
The laws promise to provide more freedom to farmers to trade outside state-designated markets and to private traders to move , distribute , and export farm produce .
However , the farmers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more than 85 percent of India ’ s farmers own farms smaller than three acres .
These farmers mostly engage in subsistence farming and sell their surpluses , when available , to private traders .
The average income of farmers has remained low , at just over $ 1,000 a year , making them highly sensitive to fears over market fluctuations .
And while there is a great deal of variation within this group of farmers , they are not likely to benefit from the legislation the government has announced .
Past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has shown that small farmers are likely to gain only from well-considered reforms of existing infrastructure—not a complete deregulation that the new laws propose .
The government-appointed Dalwai Committee , which published its final report in 2018 , recommended that the government should radically change India ’ s farming policy ecosystem from a supply-focused , government-led one-to-one that would be demand-focused and market-based .
Such a retreat would further reduce public investment into the farm sector .
These farmers are also afraid that this changing policy environment and rising corporate power would result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ livelihood .
Another concern about the new laws comes from farmers who sell their produce either to the government or to private traders but who enjoy the security of floor prices guaranteed by the government—officially referred to as the minimum support price .
Despite assurances built into the new laws , most farmers deem them to be vague and are less than confident enough to rely on them .
Farmers fear that the new legislation will weaken government-designated markets in which most transactions have taken place in past decades .
While many lament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yards have had over farmers , the existence of these markets and the traders within them offered the advantage of a minimum support price—a floor farmers are afraid they could lose .
They see the weakening of the markets as a reflection of the government ’ s increasing retreat from the farm sector .
After all , while the farm sector provides livelihoods to more than half the population of India , its contribution to the Indian GDP has been declining : During the past two decades the percentage of the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declined from 23 percent to 16 percent .
Part of the problem lies in the fact that many of the farms are small and thereby can not benefit from economies of scale .
Yet this is the source of livelihood for many farmers who fear that without government intervention they will soon be left to the mercies of the emerging agri-business sector in India .
Almost everyone , including farmers , agree that India ’ s farm policies need to change ; however , there is little agreement on the details of those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gone through a period where the population is dependent on a declining farming sector even as the strength of manufacturing grows , absorbing labor .
But in India , the manufacturing sector has not been able to create much employment .
Indeed , for a variety of complex reasons , India appears to have almost entirely skipped this particular stage of economic evolution .
Instead , the country focused on service industries and most notably the information technology sector , which almost by design can only absorb a miniscule segment of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributes as much as 8 percent of the country ’ s GDP , it employs a mere 3.9 million individuals , or less than a third of 1 percent of the population .
Consequently , farm employment is expected to remain a mainstay of the Indian economy—at least in terms of employment—for decades .
In an economy that has cratered virtually across the board since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic , the farming sector has provided a much-needed buffer to those who have had to return to their villages .
Preserving the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to deliver high incomes , has been an entirely understandable rallying cry across much of India , and especially in its breadbasket in the northwest of the country .
Even if one assumes that the government ’ s intent in pushing through agricultural reforms was well-meaning , the abrupt passage of such sweeping legislation , without adequate consultation , has led to a seeming impasse with a range of farming organizations .
Despite several rounds of talks , a deadlock persists .
The government may believe that a firm stance toward the farmers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will ensure the protests dissipate before long .
But those hopes may underestimate the enduring importance of farming for India ’ s labor market , especially amid the tumult of the pandemic .

Since late November, tens of thousands of Indian farmers have marched to New Delhi and blocked the highways leading into the city, protesting against three bills that passed in both houses of India’s Parliament in September. The demonstrations have since spread to other parts of the country with farmers blocking roads and railway tracks, and limiting the movement of people and goods, including farm produce.
Since late November, tens of thousands of Indian farmers have marched to New Delhi and blocked the highways leading into the city, protesting against three bills that passed in both houses of India’s Parliament in September. The demonstrations have since spread to other parts of the country with farmers blocking roads and railway tracks, and limiting the movement of people and goods, including farm produce.
What are the bills in question? Listing them may feel cumbersome, but in the interest of understanding their value—and the immense scale of the protests against them—they are: 1) the Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act; 2) the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act; and 3) the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act.
The first two laws expand the marketing infrastructure provided by India’s state-level governments and allow direct marketing of farm products to processors, aggregators, wholesalers, large retailers, and exporters. The third law seeks to facilitate the production, movement, and distribution of farm produce by removing existing regulatory barriers.
While economists have long acknowledged the need for agricultural reforms in India, the ongoing protests likely have more to do with how the new laws were rolled out: The bills were all passed using the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s parliamentary majority, and without suitable consultation with key stakeholders such as farmer unions. The passage of the legislation also displayed all the hallmarks that have come to characterize Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s key decisions, ranging from a botched policy of demonetization in 2016, a hasty rollout of a goods and services tax in 2017, and then a nationwide lockdown with four hours’ notice this year to contain the spread of the coronavirus.
India’s farm policy architecture is a holdover from the 1960s when the country was poor and food insecure. Policies were put in place with food security as the primary goal. While this set of laws allowed India to achieve advances in food production by the 1980s, the farm sector has suffered a decline in public investment, a lack of marketing alternatives, and stagnant rural incomes. Almost everyone, including farmers, agree that India’s farm policies need to change; however, there is little agreement on the details of those reforms. In the early 2000s, the government at the time encouraged Indian states to design and enact reforms, but predictably every state adopted only piecemeal policy changes that did not hurt key interests within the state. As a result, there is no uniformity in policies and laws across the country.While economists have long acknowledged the need for agricultural reforms in India, the ongoing protests likely have more to do with how the new laws were rolled out.
Ostensibly, the laws that the Indian Parliament enacted in September were designed to reduce regulatory interference from the government and to fix that lack of uniformity and create a national policy. The intention was to make it easier to bring private investment—both domestic and foreign—into India’s farm sector. The laws promise to provide more freedom to farmers to trade outside state-designated markets and to private traders to move, distribute, and export farm produce. However, the farmers are apprehensive for several reasons. First, more than 85 percent of India’s farmers own farms smaller than three acres. These farmers mostly engage in subsistence farming and sell their surpluses, when available, to private traders. The average income of farmers has remained low, at just over $1,000 a year, making them highly sensitive to fears over market fluctuations. And while there is a great deal of variation within this group of farmers, they are not likely to benefit from the legislation the government has announced. Past experience with marketing reform from Indian states has shown that small farmers are likely to gain only from well-considered reforms of existing infrastructure—not a complete deregulation that the new laws propose.
The government-appointed Dalwai Committee, which published its final report in 2018, recommended that the government should radically change India’s farming policy ecosystem from a supply-focused, government-led one-to-one that would be demand-focused and market-based. Such a retreat would further reduce public investment into the farm sector. These farmers are also afraid that this changing policy environment and rising corporate power would result in a loss of both land and livelihood.
Another concern about the new laws comes from farmers who sell their produce either to the government or to private traders but who enjoy the security of floor prices guaranteed by the government—officially referred to as the minimum support price. Despite assurances built into the new laws, most farmers deem them to be vague and are less than confident enough to rely on them.
Farmers fear that the new legislation will weaken government-designated markets in which most transactions have taken place in past decades. While many lament the stranglehold the aggregators at these market yards have had over farmers, the existence of these markets and the traders within them offered the advantage of a minimum support price—a floor farmers are afraid they could lose. They see the weakening of the markets as a reflection of the government’s increasing retreat from the farm sector. After all, while the farm sector provides livelihoods to more than half the population of India, its contribution to the Indian GDP has been declining: During the past two decades the percentage of the country’s GDP from the farm sector has declined from 23 percent to 16 percent. Part of the problem lies in the fact that many of the farms are small and thereby cannot benefit from economies of scale. Yet this is the source of livelihood for many farmers who fear that without government intervention they will soon be left to the mercies of the emerging agri-business sector in India.
Almost everyone, including farmers, agree that India’s farm policies need to change; however, there is little agreement on the details of those reforms.
Most contemporary developed economies have gone through a period where the population is dependent on a declining farming sector even as the strength of manufacturing grows, absorbing labor. But in India, the manufacturing sector has not been able to create much employment. Indeed, for a variety of complex reasons, India appears to have almost entirely skipped this particular stage of economic evolution. Instead, the country focused on service industries and most notably the information technology sector, which almost by design can only absorb a miniscule segment of the country’s burgeoning population. Though technology contributes as much as 8 percent of the country’s GDP, it employs a mere 3.9 million individuals, or less than a third of 1 percent of the population.
Consequently, farm employment is expected to remain a mainstay of the Indian economy—at least in terms of employment—for decades. In an economy that has cratered virtually across the board since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, the farming sector has provided a much-needed buffer to those who have had to return to their villages. Preserving the agricultural sector, even as it fails to deliver high incomes, has been an entirely understandable rallying cry across much of India, and especially in its breadbasket in the northwest of the country.
Even if one assumes that the government’s intent in pushing through agricultural reforms was well-meaning, the abrupt passage of such sweeping legislation, without adequate consultation, has led to a seeming impasse with a range of farming organizations. Despite several rounds of talks, a deadlock persists. The government may believe that a firm stance toward the farmers, along with some cosmetic gestures, will ensure the protests dissipate before long. But those hopes may underestimate the enduring importance of farming for India’s labor market, especially amid the tumult of the pandemic.