foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--Trump Fixates on China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration

The Trump administration is increasingly set on trying to bring China into a key nuclear arms deal with Russia , according to documents obtained by Foreign Policy , amid fears by arms control experts that the effort is futile and the United States is running out of time to recommit to the Obama-era New START treaty .
For a year , the Trump administration has floated the idea of pursuing a three-way nuclear arms agreement to replace START , or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty , between the United States and Russia , which sets limits on each country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s newly appointed arms control envoy , Marshall Billingslea , is up against a tight timeline and facing new geopolitical headwinds from the global coronavirus pandemic .
The New START treaty is set to expire in February 2021 , and President Donald Trump faces a tough reelection battle against Democratic rival Joe Biden this November , which could mean a change in administrations just a month before that—two hard deadlines that Billingslea faces as he settles into his new role .
But according to a report by the State Department that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtained by Foreign Policy , the administration is focused broadly on beefing up U.S. nuclear security and “ has not yet made a decision regarding whether or how extension of the New START Treaty will be an element of that effort .
… This effort must account for changes in the strategic environment , broader concerns regarding Russia ’ s non-compliance with many of its international obligations and non-adherence to many of its commitments , and the expanding nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation and China.
” The report explicitly says that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of New START could impact a trilateral arms deal with China and Russia .
It also expresses concern that China ’ s nuclear stockpile will double if the current pact is extended , as it does not cover Beijing .
Arms control advocates say the proposal for a trilateral arms deal is too ambitious—perhaps even purposefully designed to sink a treaty that senior Trump administration officials never supported in the first place .
Furthermore , a surge in U.S.-China tensions over the pandemic , they say , will likely dash any hopes that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its nuclear weapons .
A spokesman for China ’ s foreign ministry said in February that Beijing has “ no intention ” of joining trilateral arms talks with Russia and the United States despite American entreaties .
China has never been party to a nuclear arms control agreement .
“ The demand that it should become an expanded trilateral treaty is either a poison pill or at best a delaying action , ” said Thomas Countryman , the State Department ’ s No .
2 arms control official until 2017 .
“ Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chance of concluding a trilateral treaty that includes topics never covered in any treaty in the next six months .
The chance is reduced from zero to below zero.
” Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen also said he favored a reauthorization of New START on a public call on Wednesday , saying the administration didn ’ t “ have time to renegotiate or negotiate a new treaty.
” Even merely reauthorizing the deal , experts said , would take dozens of meetings .
It took the administration of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ink New START with Russia in 2010 .
But proponents of Trump ’ s plan say the United States has to include China in future arms control negotiations .
After all , Beijing is Washington ’ s top geopolitical rival in the 21st century , and Moscow , despite its vast nuclear arsenal , is a declining power .
Current and former Trump administration officials also reject the charge that they proposed trilateral arms negotiations simply to sink the deal , and insist Beijing could be pushed to the negotiating table with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only thing that really makes this particularly worthwhile is bringing China to the table , ” said Tim Morrison , a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former top National Security Council official on Europe and arms control under Trump .
“ China is the greatest threat to American security , our way of life , in the world .
Russia is a third-world dictatorship , they are a mafia-run gas station with nuclear weapons , ” he added .
“ If arms control is going to be a tool of national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treaty that doesn ’ t include China , it doesn ’ t make any sense to me.
” Trump ’ s new arms control envoy , Billingslea , faces an uphill battle , especially as pandemic fears have halted regular diplomatic meetings .
Other former U.S. officials and arms control advocates have pushed for the administration to reauthorize the deal , amid warnings that the administration ’ s gamble to draw out the timeline to get increased leverage on adversaries could leave the United States with few checks on Russia ’ s nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compliance with the New START treaty , the State Department assessed in the February report obtained by Foreign Policy .
According to a September 2019 data exchange between the two countries , the United States has a combined total of 668 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers deployed , eclipsing Russia ’ s 513 with both nations under the limit of 700 weapons .
Though Russia has 1,426 warheads on those weapons to the U.S. ’ s 1,376 ( under the treaty limit of 1,550 ) , the United States has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s 757 , with both nations close to the restricted amount .
But even as the coronavirus pandemic has scuttled the United Nations ’ biggest arms control conference and bilateral engagements , the Trump administration has stuck to an insistence that Beijing should be part of a fresh deal .
Senior Pentagon officials have raised alarm about China ’ s future nuclear ambitions , even if its arsenal is significantly smaller than Russia ’ s .
“ With its announcement of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber , China soon will field its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrating China ’ s commitment to expanding the role and centrality of nuclear forces in Beijing ’ s military aspirations , ” said Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley , head of the Defense Intelligence Agency , at an event at the Hudson Institute in May 2019 .
“ While China ’ s overall arsenal is assessed to be much smaller than Russia ’ s , this does not make this trend any less concerning.
” Headlining the Trump administration ’ s concerns on Russia is a basket of five new nuclear systems announced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech that aren ’ t covered by New START .
The treaty only applies to systems that were deployed by both Moscow and Washington when the deal was signed in 2010 .
Putin said the new weapons could reach “ anywhere in the world , ” and that the United States would need to “ take account of a new reality.
” The new reality envisioned by Putin two years ago , U.S. officials fear , could include Russia deploying the nuclear-powered Skyfall cruise missile , which left at least seven people dead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reaction in the city of Nyonoksa ; a new air-launched ballistic missile ; and an underwater vehicle that boasts intercontinental ranges , outside of a fresh New START .
Putin said he was ready to reauthorize the 2010 pact during a Russian defense ministry meeting in Moscow late last year .
In addition , despite the potential risks of having no constraints on U.S. nuclear forces , according to the report , the administration is also concerned that re-upping the New START agreement could get in the way of its aims for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In January , the State Department ’ s top arms control envoy , Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford , traveled to Vienna to meet Russian counterparts , but the meeting ended without signs of progress on New START talks .
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment for this story .
A decision to exit the New START treaty would be another in a series of nixed arms control deals under the Trump administration that began with the move to leave the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump let the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—first established with Russia during the Reagan administration to ban short- and intermediate-range land-based projectiles—expire last year amid concerns over Russian violations .
The administration is considering letting the United States leave the Open Skies Treaty , which allows the Pentagon and the Kremlin to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over more than 30 countries , amid concerns over the impacts on national security despite objections from European allies .
But those decisions have also been complicated by personnel shuffles within the Trump administration .
Until this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without a top arms control official since Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson resigned in September 2019 , months following revelations that she previously had undisclosed ties to a Russian agent convicted of promoting Moscow ’ s interests during the 2016 election cycle .
Officials at the time said her departure had nothing to do with the controversy .
Trump announced he would tap Billingslea to be special presidential envoy for arms control on April 10 .
The president previously nominated Billingslea to be the administration ’ s top human rights official at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocked in the Senate by Democrats who questioned Billingslea ’ s role in advocating the use of torture while in the Pentagon during the Iraq War .
Democratic lawmakers lashed out at Trump over his appointment of Billingslea , arguing Trump circumvented constitutional requirements to appoint him as special envoy while leaving empty the undersecretary of state for arms control post .
The former post requires no Senate confirmation , while the latter does .
Billingslea , a fixture in conservative foreign-policy circles , previously held a senior post at the Treasury Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and NATO during the George W. Bush administration .
His advocates say Senate Democrats unfairly characterized his role in the Bush-era torture program and praise him as well suited to carry out his new job .

The Trump administration is increasingly set on trying to bring China into a key nuclear arms deal with Russia, according to documents obtained by Foreign Policy , amid fears by arms control experts that the effort is futile and the United States is running out of time to recommit to the Obama-era New START treaty.
The Trump administration is increasingly set on trying to bring China into a key nuclear arms deal with Russia, according to documents obtained by Foreign Policy, amid fears by arms control experts that the effort is futile and the United States is running out of time to recommit to the Obama-era New START treaty.
For a year, the Trump administration has floated the idea of pursuing a three-way nuclear arms agreement to replace START, or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, between the United States and Russia, which sets limits on each country’s long-range nuclear weapons. But the administration’s newly appointed arms control envoy, Marshall Billingslea, is up against a tight timeline and facing new geopolitical headwinds from the global coronavirus pandemic.
The New START treaty is set to expire in February 2021, and President Donald Trump faces a tough reelection battle against Democratic rival Joe Biden this November, which could mean a change in administrations just a month before that—two hard deadlines that Billingslea faces as he settles into his new role.
But according to a report by the State Department that was provided to Congress in February and obtained by Foreign Policy, the administration is focused broadly on beefing up U.S. nuclear security and “has not yet made a decision regarding whether or how extension of the New START Treaty will be an element of that effort. … This effort must account for changes in the strategic environment, broader concerns regarding Russia’s non-compliance with many of its international obligations and non-adherence to many of its commitments, and the expanding nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation and China.”
The report explicitly says that the administration is worried a potential reauthorization of New START could impact a trilateral arms deal with China and Russia. It also expresses concern that China’s nuclear stockpile will double if the current pact is extended, as it does not cover Beijing.
Arms control advocates say the proposal for a trilateral arms deal is too ambitious—perhaps even purposefully designed to sink a treaty that senior Trump administration officials never supported in the first place. Furthermore, a surge in U.S.-China tensions over the pandemic, they say, will likely dash any hopes that Beijing would be ready to negotiate on its nuclear weapons.
A spokesman for China’s foreign ministry said in February that Beijing has “no intention” of joining trilateral arms talks with Russia and the United States despite American entreaties. China has never been party to a nuclear arms control agreement.
“The demand that it should become an expanded trilateral treaty is either a poison pill or at best a delaying action,” said Thomas Countryman, the State Department’s No. 2 arms control official until 2017. “Even without COVID there would be no realistic chance of concluding a trilateral treaty that includes topics never covered in any treaty in the next six months. The chance is reduced from zero to below zero.”
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen also said he favored a reauthorization of New START on a public call on Wednesday, saying the administration didn’t “have time to renegotiate or negotiate a new treaty.” Even merely reauthorizing the deal, experts said, would take dozens of meetings. It took the administration of former President Barack Obama nine months to ink New START with Russia in 2010.
But proponents of Trump’s plan say the United States has to include China in future arms control negotiations. After all, Beijing is Washington’s top geopolitical rival in the 21st century, and Moscow, despite its vast nuclear arsenal, is a declining power. Current and former Trump administration officials also reject the charge that they proposed trilateral arms negotiations simply to sink the deal, and insist Beijing could be pushed to the negotiating table with the right amount of pressure.
“The only thing that really makes this particularly worthwhile is bringing China to the table,” said Tim Morrison, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former top National Security Council official on Europe and arms control under Trump. “China is the greatest threat to American security, our way of life, in the world. Russia is a third-world dictatorship, they are a mafia-run gas station with nuclear weapons,” he added.
“If arms control is going to be a tool of national security, the idea of negotiating another treaty that doesn’t include China, it doesn’t make any sense to me.”
Trump’s new arms control envoy, Billingslea, faces an uphill battle, especially as pandemic fears have halted regular diplomatic meetings. Other former U.S. officials and arms control advocates have pushed for the administration to reauthorize the deal, amid warnings that the administration’s gamble to draw out the timeline to get increased leverage on adversaries could leave the United States with few checks on Russia’s nuclear arsenal next February.
Russia remains in compliance with the New START treaty, the State Department assessed in the February report obtained by Foreign Policy. According to a September 2019 data exchange between the two countries, the United States has a combined total of 668 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers deployed, eclipsing Russia’s 513 with both nations under the limit of 700 weapons. Though Russia has 1,426 warheads on those weapons to the U.S.’s 1,376 (under the treaty limit of 1,550), the United States has 800 launchers and heavy bombers to Russia’s 757, with both nations close to the restricted amount.
But even as the coronavirus pandemic has scuttled the United Nations’ biggest arms control conference and bilateral engagements, the Trump administration has stuck to an insistence that Beijing should be part of a fresh deal.
Senior Pentagon officials have raised alarm about China’s future nuclear ambitions, even if its arsenal is significantly smaller than Russia’s. “With its announcement of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, China soon will field its own version of a nuclear triad, demonstrating China’s commitment to expanding the role and centrality of nuclear forces in Beijing’s military aspirations,” said Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, at an event at the Hudson Institute in May 2019. “While China’s overall arsenal is assessed to be much smaller than Russia’s, this does not make this trend any less concerning.”
Headlining the Trump administration’s concerns on Russia is a basket of five new nuclear systems announced by President Vladimir Putin in a March 2018 speech, some of which it says are not covered by New START. The treaty does not cover strategic weapons that don’t fit the definition of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or heavy bombers. (New START also limits warheads and launchers.) Putin said the new weapons could reach “anywhere in the world,” and that the United States would need to “take account of a new reality.”
The new reality envisioned by Putin two years ago, U.S. officials fear, could include Russia deploying the nuclear-powered Skyfall cruise missile, which left at least seven people dead after a botched test triggered a nuclear reaction in the city of Nyonoksa; a new air-launched ballistic missile; and an underwater vehicle that boasts intercontinental ranges, outside of a fresh New START. Putin said he was ready to reauthorize the 2010 pact during a Russian defense ministry meeting in Moscow late last year.
“Of these five systems, only the Avangard and Sarmat systems are, or will be, accountable under the terms of the New START treaty,” the State Department reported, pointing to a hypersonic glide vehicle and a new intercontinental ballistic missile.
In addition, despite the potential risks of having no constraints on U.S. nuclear forces, according to the report, the administration is also concerned that re-upping the New START agreement could get in the way of its aims for a more comprehensive pact that draws in China.
In January, the State Department’s top arms control envoy, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford, traveled to Vienna to meet Russian counterparts, but the meeting ended without signs of progress on New START talks.
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment for this story.
A decision to exit the New START treaty would be another in a series of nixed arms control deals under the Trump administration that began with the move to leave the Iran nuclear deal nearly two years ago. Trump let the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—first established with Russia during the Reagan administration to ban short- and intermediate-range land-based projectiles—expire last year amid concerns over Russian violations. The administration is considering letting the United States leave the Open Skies Treaty, which allows the Pentagon and the Kremlin to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over more than 30 countries, amid concerns over the impacts on national security despite objections from European allies.
But those decisions have also been complicated by personnel shuffles within the Trump administration.
Until this month, the Trump administration had been without a top arms control official since Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson resigned in September 2019, months following revelations that she previously had undisclosed ties to a Russian agent convicted of promoting Moscow’s interests during the 2016 election cycle. Officials at the time said her departure had nothing to do with the controversy.
Trump announced he would tap Billingslea to be special presidential envoy for arms control on April 10. The president previously nominated Billingslea to be the administration’s top human rights official at the State Department, but the nomination was blocked in the Senate by Democrats who questioned Billingslea’s role in advocating the use of torture while in the Pentagon during the Iraq War.
Democratic lawmakers lashed out at Trump over his appointment of Billingslea, arguing Trump circumvented constitutional requirements to appoint him as special envoy while leaving empty the undersecretary of state for arms control post. The former post requires no Senate confirmation, while the latter does.
Billingslea, a fixture in conservative foreign-policy circles, previously held a senior post at the Treasury Department under Trump and served in the Pentagon and NATO during the George W. Bush administration. His advocates say Senate Democrats unfairly characterized his role in the Bush-era torture program and praise him as well suited to carry out his new job.
Correction, May 1, 2020: A previous version of this story inaccurately stated that the Trump administration is concerned that five new Russian weapons systems are not covered by New START. The administration reported that two of those systems would be accountable under the terms of the arms control treaty.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--As Putin Seeks to Reinvent History, Russia-Czech Relations Hit a New Low

As Putin Seeks to Reinvent History , Russia-Czech Relations Hit a New Low A decision by officials in Prague to remove a statue of a Soviet army marshal from a local park last fall has evolved into a diplomatic dust-up that has only escalated since the sculpture was finally taken down in April , pushing tensions between the Czech Republic and Russia to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War .
The spat took a dark turn this week as Ondrej Kolar , the mayor of an affluent district in Prague , confirmed that he has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ target of a Russian assassination plot .
Over the weekend , an investigative reporter with the Czech magazine Respekt quoted unnamed security sources as saying that a Russian man traveling on a diplomatic passport flew into Prague three weeks ago carrying the deadly toxin ricin .
From there he was picked up and taken to the Russian Embassy .
The Russian Embassy in Prague has strongly denied the allegations .
News of the plot came as Moscow is also suspected of being behind a recent wave of cybersecurity attacks on Czech hospitals battling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has not dimmed the Kremlin ’ s desire to interfere in other countries and seek vengeance against those who cross it .
The dispute over the statue of Red Army Marshal Ivan Konev cuts to the heart of ongoing efforts by Central and Eastern European countries to reevaluate their history since the fall of the Berlin Wall , said Jiri Pehe , the director of New York University ’ s center in Prague .
“ The Czech Republic is just like some other East European countries .
Thirty years after the fall of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certain reinterpretation of certain events , ” he said .
The new tensions also reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s continuing efforts to glorify Russia ’ s role in World War II to bolster support for his own aggressive foreign policy while simultaneously airbrushing the authoritarian excesses of Soviet rule .
Three Czech officials have now confirmed that they have been placed under police protection in recent weeks , including Prague Mayor Zdenek Hrib , who backed efforts to rename the square in front of the Russian Embassy in Prague after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Pavel Novotny , another Prague district mayor .
Speaking to the Russian radio station Echo of Moscow on Monday , Hrib confirmed that he had been under police protection for several weeks but declined to comment on the nature of the threat against him .
Russians consider Konev to be a war hero , one widely credited with liberating much of Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II .
For Czechs , his legacy is more complicated , as the Red Army liberators would later become their oppressors .
Russian patriotism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviet Union in World War II runs deep , but critics have accused Putin of co-opting this for political gain and to boost his nationalist credentials .
The Russian leader is trying to “ exploit genuine national pride for his own short-term propaganda purposes , ” said the Russian democracy activist Vladimir Kara-Murza , who is the chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom .
Kara-Murza has been poisoned twice , first in 2015 and then in 2017 , and suffered multiple organ failure both times .
After the statue of Konev @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s Investigative Committee , which handles major cases , said it had opened an investigation into alleged “ defiling of symbols of Russia ’ s military glory.
” Two days after the statue was removed , the Czech Embassy in Moscow was attacked by a group of masked individuals who threw smoke bombs into the embassy compound and hung a sign on the fence that said “ Stop Fascism.
” “ The official Russian narrative is that if you are taking down a Konev statue , then you must be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the executive director of the Prague-based think tank European Values Center for Security Policy .
More than once , efforts to remove statues of Soviet soldiers have sparked fierce disputes between Russia and its former satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe .
“ Russia is a country of symbols , ” said Kara-Murza , noting that one of Putin ’ s first steps as president was to reinstate the use of the Soviet national anthem .
“ In the Putin regime , symbols were very quickly followed by substance.
” In 2007 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move a statue of a Red Army soldier from the center of the capital , Tallinn , the country was hit by a devastating cyberattack that took media outlets , government websites , and banks offline .
The attack , later attributed to Moscow , is regarded to be the first example of Russia ’ s use of cyberattacks as a tool of hybrid warfare—tactics that were later used against Georgia , Ukraine , and the United States .
This month , several Czech hospitals reported attempted attacks on their computer systems , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities also reported that it had thwarted an attempt to infiltrate its website .
The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency said the attacks were the work of a “ serious and advanced adversary ” but did not offer further details .
Czech internet security experts told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that they suspected Russia was behind the attacks .
In a briefing on April 23 , Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova described the allegations as “ ungrounded ” and part of an “ anti-Russian campaign devoid of any facts.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there would be “ stark consequences ” for the perpetrators of the attacks .
Asked about the attempted hacks , a spokesperson for the Czech Foreign Ministry said investigations were still ongoing .
Asked about the alleged assassination plots against Prague officials , the Czech Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed to Foreign Policy that a Russian diplomat returned to Prague a few weeks ago following a business trip and was collected at the airport by his colleagues .
The spokesperson declined to comment on reports that the man was carrying poison and referred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Foreign Policy reached out to the Czech domestic intelligence agency BIS for comment .
Relative to the size of the Czech Republic , Russia has long maintained a large diplomatic staff in its Prague embassy , prompting speculation that it may be used as a base of intelligence activity in the Czech Republic and other European countries .
“ Everyone knows at least half the staff are not diplomats , and god knows what they ’ re doing , ” said Pehe , who served as an advisor to former Czech President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , BIS noted that the Russian intelligence services were the most active in the country but that many Russian operatives had not been declared to the Czech authorities .
“ Such clandestine behavior concealing the affiliation to an intelligence services clearly signals activities threatening the security and other interests of the Czech Republic , ” the report said .

A decision by officials in Prague to remove a statue of a Soviet army marshal from a local park last fall has evolved into a diplomatic dust-up that has only escalated since the sculpture was finally taken down in April, pushing tensions between the Czech Republic and Russia to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War.
A decision by officials in Prague to remove a statue of a Soviet army marshal from a local park last fall has evolved into a diplomatic dust-up that has only escalated since the sculpture was finally taken down in April, pushing tensions between the Czech Republic and Russia to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War.
The spat took a dark turn this week as Ondrej Kolar, the mayor of an affluent district in Prague, confirmed that he has been placed under police protection after becoming the target of a Russian assassination plot. Over the weekend, an investigative reporter with the Czech magazine Respekt quoted unnamed security sources as saying that a Russian man traveling on a diplomatic passport flew into Prague three weeks ago carrying the deadly toxin ricin. From there he was picked up and taken to the Russian Embassy. The Russian Embassy in Prague has strongly denied the allegations.
News of the plot came as Moscow is also suspected of being behind a recent wave of cybersecurity attacks on Czech hospitals battling the coronavirus, suggesting that the pandemic has not dimmed the Kremlin’s desire to interfere in other countries and seek vengeance against those who cross it.
The dispute over the statue of Red Army Marshal Ivan Konev cuts to the heart of ongoing efforts by Central and Eastern European countries to reevaluate their history since the fall of the Berlin Wall, said Jiri Pehe, the director of New York University’s center in Prague. “The Czech Republic is just like some other East European countries. Thirty years after the fall of communism, it is going through a certain reinterpretation of certain events,” he said.
The new tensions also reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continuing efforts to glorify Russia’s role in World War II to bolster support for his own aggressive foreign policy while simultaneously airbrushing the authoritarian excesses of Soviet rule.
Three Czech officials have now confirmed that they have been placed under police protection in recent weeks, including Prague Mayor Zdenek Hrib, who backed efforts to rename the square in front of the Russian Embassy in Prague after the slain Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, and Pavel Novotny, another Prague district mayor. Speaking to the Russian radio station Echo of Moscow on Monday, Hrib confirmed that he had been under police protection for several weeks but declined to comment on the nature of the threat against him.
Russians consider Konev to be a war hero, one widely credited with liberating much of Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II. For Czechs, his legacy is more complicated, as the Red Army liberators would later become their oppressors.
Russian patriotism about the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in World War II runs deep, but critics have accused Putin of co-opting this for political gain and to boost his nationalist credentials. The Russian leader is trying to “exploit genuine national pride for his own short-term propaganda purposes,” said the Russian democracy activist Vladimir Kara-Murza, who is the chairman of the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom. Kara-Murza has been poisoned twice, first in 2015 and then in 2017, and suffered multiple organ failure both times.
After the statue of Konev was taken down on April 3, Russia’s Investigative Committee, which handles major cases, said it had opened an investigation into alleged “defiling of symbols of Russia’s military glory.” Two days after the statue was removed, the Czech Embassy in Moscow was attacked by a group of masked individuals who threw smoke bombs into the embassy compound and hung a sign on the fence that said “Stop Fascism.”
“The official Russian narrative is that if you are taking down a Konev statue, then you must be a fascist,” said Jakub Janda, the executive director of the Prague-based think tank European Values Center for Security Policy.
More than once, efforts to remove statues of Soviet soldiers have sparked fierce disputes between Russia and its former satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe. “Russia is a country of symbols,” said Kara-Murza, noting that one of Putin’s first steps as president was to reinstate the use of the Soviet national anthem. “In the Putin regime, symbols were very quickly followed by substance.”
In 2007, after the Estonian government decided to move a statue of a Red Army soldier from the center of the capital, Tallinn, the country was hit by a devastating cyberattack that took media outlets, government websites, and banks offline. The attack, later attributed to Moscow, is regarded to be the first example of Russia’s use of cyberattacks as a tool of hybrid warfare—tactics that were later used against Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States.
This month, several Czech hospitals reported attempted attacks on their computer systems, which were successfully blocked. Prague airport authorities also reported that it had thwarted an attempt to infiltrate its website. The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency said the attacks were the work of a “serious and advanced adversary” but did not offer further details. Czech internet security experts told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that they suspected Russia was behind the attacks. In a briefing on April 23, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova described the allegations as “ungrounded” and part of an “anti-Russian campaign devoid of any facts.”
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that there would be “stark consequences” for the perpetrators of the attacks. Asked about the attempted hacks, a spokesperson for the Czech Foreign Ministry said investigations were still ongoing.
Asked about the alleged assassination plots against Prague officials, the Czech Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed to Foreign Policy that a Russian diplomat returned to Prague a few weeks ago following a business trip and was collected at the airport by his colleagues. The spokesperson declined to comment on reports that the man was carrying poison and referred further questions to the Czech intelligence services. Foreign Policy reached out to the Czech domestic intelligence agency BIS for comment.
Relative to the size of the Czech Republic, Russia has long maintained a large diplomatic staff in its Prague embassy, prompting speculation that it may be used as a base of intelligence activity in the Czech Republic and other European countries. “Everyone knows at least half the staff are not diplomats, and god knows what they’re doing,” said Pehe, who served as an advisor to former Czech President Vaclav Havel.
In a 2015 report, BIS noted that the Russian intelligence services were the most active in the country but that many Russian operatives had not been declared to the Czech authorities. “Such clandestine behavior concealing the affiliation to an intelligence services clearly signals activities threatening the security and other interests of the Czech Republic,” the report said.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--What Comes Next for North Korea

What Comes Next for North Korea

What Comes Next for North Korea In recent days , the mysterious happenings in North Korea have grown slightly clearer—but potentially more serious .
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains out of sight .
He has missed two of the country ’ s most important political holidays , and state media has said nothing of his whereabouts since April 11 .
Late last week , Reuters reported that a delegation of Chinese medical professionals had flown to Pyongyang to attend to Kim .
Unless the trip is a ruse to confuse foreign observers , such movement suggests that Kim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 36 , is alive .
But if the leadership of the proudly self-isolated country reached beyond its borders for aid , his condition likely is grave .
If Kim dies or is permanently incapacitated , North Korea faces a daunting challenge .
His grandfather and father both nominated and promoted clear successors from among their many children , whereas the young dictator is unlikely to have designated an heir—and the oldest of his reputed three children is just about 10 .
There may be no worse political snake pit than Pyongyang , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader could cause a political vacuum .
The question of who could step in and take over is now paramount .
Leadership in North Korea has operated as a quasi-monarchy ever since Kim Il Sung sidetracked his brother and younger son to prepare his son Kim Jong Il to take over .
The transition began early as the leader moved his son up in the party to general secretary , where the latter was able to solidify his control .
On Kim Il Sung ’ s death , power appeared to pass smoothly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50s and had accumulated significant authority during his father ’ s life ; any conflicts were carefully hidden from view .
When his own father died in December 2011 , Kim Jong Un was in his late 20s .
While observers believed Kim might end up as the frontman for a collective leadership or a power behind the throne , he proved brutally efficient in eliminating potential threats .
That Kim and Kim alone would hold power became quickly apparent .
Although Kim efficiently consolidated power , there is no indication that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be too late for a dying Kim to anoint someone .
Students of pre-modern history are all too familiar with what this kind of succession crisis looks like .
The author Jieun Baek wrote in an article for the National Interest that it is essential for regime elites to rely on the sacred Mount Paektu bloodline : “ While possible , it is difficult to imagine that a collective leadership will take over the state in the long run in the absence of a successor who is from the Kim family .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state is derived from the mythical narrative that North Korea ’ s founding father Kim Il-sung is essentially a god , and his successors will continue to lead the Socialist revolution and protect the nation .
North Korea without a successor from the Kim family is like worshippers going to church without a deity to worship.
” Still , as machinations before and after the youngest Kim ’ s appointment suggest , the ruling elite is unlikely to believe or care about the Kims ’ extravagant claims .
One can imagine that many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rule .
Indeed , Kim Jong Un ’ s murderous ruthlessness provides a good reason to move beyond royal blood .
As for the North Korean people , how much popular legitimacy does the Kim name really provide ?
Poverty and starvation appear to have eroded belief in the regime .
Defectors aver that Kim Jong Il was less popular than Kim Il Sung , which is one reason Kim Jong Un modeled his appearance after his grandfather .
To rule effectively , solid control of the system ’ s coercive institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But who could take over ?
The family cupboard is bare .
Kim is believed to have three children , but all are too young .
And there could be no regency for them to come of age , as Kim ’ s wife , Ri Sol Ju , has no political role and is not blood family .
Kim has at least two nephews , sons of his half-brother Kim Jong Nam—whom he had assassinated in 2017 .
The oldest , Kim Han Sol , is about 25 .
Unknown in North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ son of an enemy , he is hardly an option .
Kim Jong Un has an older brother , Kim Jong Chol , who was passed over by their father for apparently lacking the toughness necessary to rule .
Kim Jong Chol holds an unimportant political position , has no public role , and is best known for attending Eric Clapton concerts .
Power will not be offered to him , nor is it likely that he could retain it if it were .
An uncle , Kim Pyong Il , was sent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korean ambassador to several Central and Eastern European countries .
Kim Pyong Il recently retired and returned to Pyongyang , where he has no public identity , no known ties with any powerful faction , and no political experience .
His best qualification is being 65 , which means his tenure likely would be short , allowing others ’ ambitions to flourish .
But he also is not going to rule .
The most likely family member , then , is Kim Jong Un ’ s sister , Kim Yo Jong .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Political power in North Korea has been overwhelmingly male , and society remains deeply patriarchal , even as the leaders sell themselves with maternal imagery of their “ loving care ” and the “ mother party.
” The only women with notable influence have been family members .
Kim Jong Un ’ s aunt , Kim Kyong Hui , was trusted by her brother Kim Jong Il .
His wife/consort , Kim Ok , used her position to achieve some influence , but she soon disappeared after his death .
Kim Yo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purely derivative , bestowed by her brother , and she lacks the extensive connections and relationships that would be crucial if she took power .
Kim elevated her within the party , dropped her from the politburo last year , and recently added her back as an alternate member .
That is not an impressive trajectory .
She is also the vice director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department , with no obvious leverage over security or military officials .
She might play a role in a collective leadership and be trotted out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unlikely to emerge as No .
1 , let alone the only one .
A better bet is Choe Ryong Hae , the head of the Supreme People ’ s Assembly and thus nominal head of state .
He is the unofficial No .
2 and apparently trusted by Kim Jong Un .
He is older , has broad experience , and is well tested in politics at the top .
He also benefits from Kim ’ s institutional rebalancing , shifting authority back from the military , which was favored by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reportedly , Choe was active in asserting party control over the armed forces , which may well oppose him for this reason .
There are a number of other contenders , longtime officials who have survived the political snake pit .
Nor can the State Security Department and armed services be counted out .
Their main disadvantage may be lack of unity among them , a conscious policy by the Kims to protect the dynasty .
Kim Jong Un has regularly rotated and replaced top officials and generals .
A special command oversees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the danger it poses to political control .
The best and most realistic option probably is some form of collective leadership .
It would be cautious , less provocative , and focused on ensuring regime stability and survival .
There would be no denuclearization , but there was not going to be denuclearization under Kim Jong Un .
A committee , as it were , would be unlikely to engage in dramatic and dangerous provocations .
But it also would be likely to continue present policy , including missile and nuclear development .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ early emergence of another strongman , whether an official frontman or back-room operator .
When Kim Il Sung died in 1994 , he was just a few weeks away from a summit with South Korean President Kim Young-sam .
After Pyongyang criticized Seoul for not showing proper respect for the deceased dictator , relations took a sharp downturn .
Another six years passed before successor Kim Jong Il met the next South Korean president , Kim Dae-jung .
Worse still would be a violent breakdown and power struggle .
Different security and military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council on Foreign Relations report from 2009 warned that “ a prolonged and potentially violent contest for supremacy in Pyongyang … would undoubtedly place immense stress on the rest of the country.
” A full-scale civil war could result .
Refugees and fighting might cross the Yalu River into China and perhaps penetrate the Demilitarized Zone into South Korea .
Nuclear , biological , and chemical weapons could emerge .
The defense analyst Bruce Bennett wrote a detailed report for the Rand Corp. that warned : “ There is a reasonable probability that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreseeable future , with the very strong likelihood that this end will be accompanied by considerable violence and upheaval.
” China , South Korea , and the United States all would be interested in the outcome .
The temptation to intervene would be strong .
The United States would wish to seize weapons of mass destruction , South Korea to initiate reunification , and China to preserve a pliant buffer state .
Absent adequate coordination , the three countries could end up in conflict with one another .
Many if not most North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Koreans could come at a very high cost to any country set to intervene .
Now would be a good moment for the three governments to talk about coordination should North Korea implode .
Of course , all the speculation might come to naught .
Kim has disappeared from public view before , for more than a month in 2014 , before reappearing .
He apparently had surgery on his foot .
The regime might currently delight in misleading and embarrassing the international media .
But despite South Korean government reassurances , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seriously ill .
He missed the celebration of his grandfather ’ s birthday on April 15 , the most sacred day on the North Korean calendar , and then the April 25 anniversary for the founding of the Korean People ’ s Revolutionary Army .
Nor has the regime taken the easy step of demonstrating his health and control .
Something is not right .
U.S.-North Korea talks weren ’ t likely to go anywhere anytime soon even before his apparent illness .
They almost certainly won ’ t be going anywhere now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at this time as the calm before North Korea ’ s political storm hits .

In recent days, the mysterious happenings in North Korea have grown slightly clearer—but potentially more serious. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains out of sight. He has missed two of the country’s most important political holidays, and state media has said nothing of his whereabouts since April 11. Late last week, Reuters reported that a delegation of Chinese medical professionals had flown to Pyongyang to attend to Kim.
In recent days, the mysterious happenings in North Korea have grown slightly clearer—but potentially more serious. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un remains out of sight. He has missed two of the country’s most important political holidays, and state media has said nothing of his whereabouts since April 11. Late last week, Reuters reported that a delegation of Chinese medical professionals had flown to Pyongyang to attend to Kim.
Unless the trip is a ruse to confuse foreign observers, such movement suggests that Kim, who is believed to be about 36, is alive. But if the leadership of the proudly self-isolated country reached beyond its borders for aid, his condition likely is grave.
If Kim dies or is permanently incapacitated, North Korea faces a daunting challenge. His grandfather and father both nominated and promoted clear successors from among their many children, whereas the young dictator is unlikely to have designated an heir—and the oldest of his reputed three children is just about 10. There may be no worse political snake pit than Pyongyang, and the sudden loss of Kim as supreme leader could cause a political vacuum. The question of who could step in and take over is now paramount.
Leadership in North Korea has operated as a quasi-monarchy ever since Kim Il Sung sidetracked his brother and younger son to prepare his son Kim Jong Il to take over. The transition began early as the leader moved his son up in the party to general secretary, where the latter was able to solidify his control. On Kim Il Sung’s death, power appeared to pass smoothly. Kim Jong Il was in his 50s and had accumulated significant authority during his father’s life; any conflicts were carefully hidden from view.
When his own father died in December 2011, Kim Jong Un was in his late 20s. While observers believed Kim might end up as the frontman for a collective leadership or a power behind the throne, he proved brutally efficient in eliminating potential threats. That Kim and Kim alone would hold power became quickly apparent.
Although Kim efficiently consolidated power, there is no indication that he designated an heir. And it would be too late for a dying Kim to anoint someone. Students of pre-modern history are all too familiar with what this kind of succession crisis looks like.
The author Jieun Baek wrote in an article for the National Interest that it is essential for regime elites to rely on the sacred Mount Paektu bloodline: “While possible, it is difficult to imagine that a collective leadership will take over the state in the long run in the absence of a successor who is from the Kim family. This is because the political legitimacy of the state is derived from the mythical narrative that North Korea’s founding father Kim Il-sung is essentially a god, and his successors will continue to lead the Socialist revolution and protect the nation. North Korea without a successor from the Kim family is like worshippers going to church without a deity to worship.”
Still, as machinations before and after the youngest Kim’s appointment suggest, the ruling elite is unlikely to believe or care about the Kims’ extravagant claims. One can imagine that many of them are ready for someone else to rule. Indeed, Kim Jong Un’s murderous ruthlessness provides a good reason to move beyond royal blood.
As for the North Korean people, how much popular legitimacy does the Kim name really provide? Poverty and starvation appear to have eroded belief in the regime. Defectors aver that Kim Jong Il was less popular than Kim Il Sung, which is one reason Kim Jong Un modeled his appearance after his grandfather. To rule effectively, solid control of the system’s coercive institutions is far more important than parentage.
But who could take over? The family cupboard is bare. Kim is believed to have three children, but all are too young. And there could be no regency for them to come of age, as Kim’s wife, Ri Sol Ju, has no political role and is not blood family. Kim has at least two nephews, sons of his half-brother Kim Jong Nam—whom he had assassinated in 2017. The oldest, Kim Han Sol, is about 25. Unknown in North Korea, in hiding, and the son of an enemy, he is hardly an option.
Kim Jong Un has an older brother, Kim Jong Chol, who was passed over by their father for apparently lacking the toughness necessary to rule. Kim Jong Chol holds an unimportant political position, has no public role, and is best known for attending Eric Clapton concerts. Power will not be offered to him, nor is it likely that he could retain it if it were. An uncle, Kim Pyong Il, was sent by his half-brother into comfortable semi-exile as North Korean ambassador to several Central and Eastern European countries. Kim Pyong Il recently retired and returned to Pyongyang, where he has no public identity, no known ties with any powerful faction, and no political experience. His best qualification is being 65, which means his tenure likely would be short, allowing others’ ambitions to flourish. But he also is not going to rule.
The most likely family member, then, is Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. But she too is an unlikely candidate. Political power in North Korea has been overwhelmingly male, and society remains deeply patriarchal, even as the leaders sell themselves with maternal imagery of their “loving care” and the “mother party.” The only women with notable influence have been family members. Kim Jong Un’s aunt, Kim Kyong Hui, was trusted by her brother Kim Jong Il. His wife/consort, Kim Ok, used her position to achieve some influence, but she soon disappeared after his death.
Kim Yo Jong’s power appears to be purely derivative, bestowed by her brother, and she lacks the extensive connections and relationships that would be crucial if she took power. Kim elevated her within the party, dropped her from the politburo last year, and recently added her back as an alternate member. That is not an impressive trajectory. She is also the vice director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, with no obvious leverage over security or military officials. She might play a role in a collective leadership and be trotted out publicly for appropriate events, but she is unlikely to emerge as No. 1, let alone the only one.
A better bet is Choe Ryong Hae, the head of the Supreme People’s Assembly and thus nominal head of state. He is the unofficial No. 2 and apparently trusted by Kim Jong Un. He is older, has broad experience, and is well tested in politics at the top. He also benefits from Kim’s institutional rebalancing, shifting authority back from the military, which was favored by his father, to the party. Reportedly, Choe was active in asserting party control over the armed forces, which may well oppose him for this reason.
There are a number of other contenders, longtime officials who have survived the political snake pit. Nor can the State Security Department and armed services be counted out. Their main disadvantage may be lack of unity among them, a conscious policy by the Kims to protect the dynasty. Kim Jong Un has regularly rotated and replaced top officials and generals. A special command oversees the loyalty of the military, given the danger it poses to political control.
The best and most realistic option probably is some form of collective leadership. It would be cautious, less provocative, and focused on ensuring regime stability and survival. There would be no denuclearization, but there was not going to be denuclearization under Kim Jong Un. A committee, as it were, would be unlikely to engage in dramatic and dangerous provocations. But it also would be likely to continue present policy, including missile and nuclear development.
A less promising alternative would be the early emergence of another strongman, whether an official frontman or back-room operator. When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, he was just a few weeks away from a summit with South Korean President Kim Young-sam. After Pyongyang criticized Seoul for not showing proper respect for the deceased dictator, relations took a sharp downturn. Another six years passed before successor Kim Jong Il met the next South Korean president, Kim Dae-jung.
Worse still would be a violent breakdown and power struggle. Different security and military units might take different sides. A Council on Foreign Relations report from 2009 warned that “a prolonged and potentially violent contest for supremacy in Pyongyang … would undoubtedly place immense stress on the rest of the country.” A full-scale civil war could result.
Refugees and fighting might cross the Yalu River into China and perhaps penetrate the Demilitarized Zone into South Korea. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons could emerge. The defense analyst Bruce Bennett wrote a detailed report for the Rand Corp. that warned: “There is a reasonable probability that North Korean totalitarianism will end in the foreseeable future, with the very strong likelihood that this end will be accompanied by considerable violence and upheaval.” China, South Korea, and the United States all would be interested in the outcome.
The temptation to intervene would be strong. The United States would wish to seize weapons of mass destruction, South Korea to initiate reunification, and China to preserve a pliant buffer state. Absent adequate coordination, the three countries could end up in conflict with one another. Many if not most North Koreans likely would resist. Freedom for North Koreans could come at a very high cost to any country set to intervene. Now would be a good moment for the three governments to talk about coordination should North Korea implode.
Of course, all the speculation might come to naught. Kim has disappeared from public view before, for more than a month in 2014, before reappearing. He apparently had surgery on his foot. The regime might currently delight in misleading and embarrassing the international media.
But despite South Korean government reassurances, it seems more likely that Kim is seriously ill. He missed the celebration of his grandfather’s birthday on April 15, the most sacred day on the North Korean calendar, and then the April 25 anniversary for the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army. Nor has the regime taken the easy step of demonstrating his health and control. Something is not right. U.S.-North Korea talks weren’t likely to go anywhere anytime soon even before his apparent illness. They almost certainly won’t be going anywhere now. And we might come to look at this time as the calm before North Korea’s political storm hits.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--Beijing Doubles Down on Diplomatic Aggression

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Chinese diplomats are responding to Western criticism with more threats , Beijing finally reschedules an annual political meeting , and the Uighur crackdown continues in Xinjiang as Ramadan begins .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
China ’ s rhetorical assaults on the West amid the coronavirus pandemic have continued this week , with Beijing ’ s ambassadors taking an increasingly undiplomatic tone—likely in response to pressure from home .
After Australia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus , the Chinese ambassador in Canberra made a thinly veiled threat of boycotting the Australian economy .
That ’ s not empty talk : China has a record of directing boycotts over what it sees as political slights by other countries , from South Korea ’ s 2017 decision to use a U.S. missile defense system to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident .
State media doubled down on criticism of Australia ’ s call for an investigation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calling Australia “ gum stuck to the bottom of China ’ s shoe.
” Performing patriotism .
The Netherlands was also in China ’ s firing line this week after it changed the name of its representative office in Taipei—it doesn ’ t have an embassy there—to a form that Beijing interpreted as being more supportive of Taiwanese independence .
The Netherlands also criticized the quality of coronavirus tests sold in Europe by Chinese companies .
In response , China made vague threats against the Dutch—likely to be backed up by future sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ driven in part by anti-foreign feeling at home and officials desperate to stand out by waving the flag .
Performative patriotism appears to be a necessity for political survival .
The U.S. bites back .
A recent profile of Matt Pottinger , a top Trump administration advisor on China issues , highlights the degree to which China hawks are ascendant in Washington .
But challenging Beijing appears less important to the White House than using anti-Chinese rhetoric as a deflection of the U.S. failure to handle the pandemic .
Attempts to engage with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic or to find common ground fight it—are being distorted by the political needs of the presidency .
The anti-Chinese political strategy was laid out in a recent Republican strategy memo—which faced criticism from the White House—that instructed candidates to attack China rather than defend Trump .
Anti-Chinese rhetoric has come at a direct cost to Asian Americans : Conservative media have targeted Chinese Americans such as former Washington Gov .
Gary Locke and New York Times reporter Ed Wong as supposed agents of Beijing .
Meanwhile , the Trump administration is setting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China over Taiwan ’ s status at the World Health Organization , as FP ’ s Colum Lynch reports .
Annual political meeting rescheduled .
In a sign of confidence about coronavirus containment , Beijing has set an official date—May 21—for the annual “ two sessions ” meeting of the rubber-stamp national parliament and its largely symbolic advisory body .
The meeting usually takes place in early March but was delayed due to the coronavirus .
The capital , along with the rest of northern China , has also eased travel restrictions to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country and return without facing quarantine .
Both decisions show that the government is reasonably certain it won ’ t face another outbreak in Beijing , even as everyday life still requires constant monitoring—from a compulsory tracking app to temperature checks .
Cultural genocide in Xinjiang .
The plight of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang region has been sidelined by the pandemic .
But as the holy month of Ramadan begins , Muslims in Xinjiang are still being forced to not fast during daylight hours , and mosques remain largely shuttered .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Uighurs has been the systematic and deliberate destruction of historical and religious sites , including graveyards containing mazar—the tombs of Islamic saints .
For example , new satellite imagery shows that the ancient graveyard in Hotan , destroyed last year , has been replaced with a parking lot .
Arrests in Hong Kong .
The detention of prominent democracy activists and dissidents in Hong Kong is a frightening sign of the city ’ s future .
Beijing seems determined to move toward complete control of the territory , especially with the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coronavirus pandemic .
That could backfire by further alienating residents , though it ’ s hard to see how Hong Kongers could be any more opposed to the mainland than they already are .
Don ’ t be surprised if the United States moves this year or next to strip away Hong Kong ’ s favorable trade and commerce status .
For years , Chinese economic growth has been consistently high—so consistent as to raise suspicions , even as it declined from an average of 8 percent a year to hover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the coronavirus , as shown below .
The plunge of 6.8 percent in the first quarter may still be an underestimate , but it shows the impact that the pandemic continues to have on China ’ s economy .
Foreign student fallout .
With Western universities expecting an 80 to 100 percent drop in the number of international students this year , the U.S. higher education system is facing a double crisis : the pandemic and the disappearance of the Chinese students it relies on for financial health .
Even if international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face increased pressure—both from the Chinese government and from Republican Party rhetoric—not to attend U.S. schools .
That could cause the situation that U.S .
Ambassador to China Terry Branstad has warned against : a financial crisis for lesser-known universities without large endowments .
Unemployment guesstimates .
Analysts from the brokerage Zhongtai Securities recently estimated that China ’ s real post-coronavirus unemployment rate is over 20 percent—far beyond the official 5.9 percent figure .
That tallies with informed guesses ( link in Chinese ) by other experts .
Under official pressure , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and conform to the government ’ s figures .
Despite a brief spike during the beginning of China ’ s outbreak , migrant wages now appear depressed and job prospects poor .
Millions of migrants are likely to return to their villages as a result .
That will cause a rise in rural poverty that is difficult to reconcile with the government ’ s poverty reduction goals and will likely be swept under the carpet .
Auto industry crashes .
China ’ s car sales were completely crushed in the first quarter of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which saw a 79 percent drop from the previous month .
The government is trying to prop up the industry with loans to firms and cash to buyers .
The trend contrasts with the SARS outbreak in 2003 , when fear of public transport prompted a rush in car sales .
Today , with the Chinese car market already near its saturation point and economic prospects bleak , families may prefer to brave the subway .
The airline industry , which benefited from big infrastructure investments over the last two decades , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The WHO , Trump , and the Failure of Global Diplomacy ” webinar at the Center for Global Policy This week , the Center for Global Policy assembled a panel—including me—to discuss China , the World Health Organization , and other international bodies in the time of coronavirus .
The discussion , which included past Foreign Policy contributors Azeem Ibrahim and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian , addresses a big question : How can an opaque , politically paranoid power be addressed by international bodies without it overwhelming them ?
That ’ s it for this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese diplomats are responding to Western criticism with more threats, Beijing finally reschedules an annual political meeting , and the Uighur crackdown continues in Xinjiang as Ramadan begins.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese diplomats are responding to Western criticism with more threats, Beijing finally reschedules an annual political meeting, and the Uighur crackdown continues in Xinjiang as Ramadan begins.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Chinese Diplomats Make Veiled Threats
China’s rhetorical assaults on the West amid the coronavirus pandemic have continued this week, with Beijing’s ambassadors taking an increasingly undiplomatic tone—likely in response to pressure from home. After Australia’s prime minister called for an international inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus, the Chinese ambassador in Canberra made a thinly veiled threat of boycotting the Australian economy.
That’s not empty talk: China has a record of directing boycotts over what it sees as political slights by other countries, from South Korea’s 2017 decision to use a U.S. missile defense system to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. State media doubled down on criticism of Australia’s call for an investigation, with the editor of the Global Times calling Australia “gum stuck to the bottom of China’s shoe.”
Performing patriotism. The Netherlands was also in China’s firing line this week after it changed the name of its representative office in Taipei—it doesn’t have an embassy there—to a form that Beijing interpreted as being more supportive of Taiwanese independence. The Netherlands also criticized the quality of coronavirus tests sold in Europe by Chinese companies. In response, China made vague threats against the Dutch—likely to be backed up by future sanctions. China’s fierce language is driven in part by anti-foreign feeling at home and officials desperate to stand out by waving the flag. Performative patriotism appears to be a necessity for political survival.
The U.S. bites back. A recent profile of Matt Pottinger, a top Trump administration advisor on China issues, highlights the degree to which China hawks are ascendant in Washington. But challenging Beijing appears less important to the White House than using anti-Chinese rhetoric as a deflection of the U.S. failure to handle the pandemic. Attempts to engage with China—either to criticize its handling of the pandemic or to find common ground fight it—are being distorted by the political needs of the presidency.
The anti-Chinese political strategy was laid out in a recent Republican strategy memo—which faced criticism from the White House—that instructed candidates to attack China rather than defend Trump. Anti-Chinese rhetoric has come at a direct cost to Asian Americans: Conservative media have targeted Chinese Americans such as former Washington Gov. Gary Locke and New York Times reporter Ed Wong as supposed agents of Beijing.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration is setting the stage for a fresh confrontation with China over Taiwan’s status at the World Health Organization, as FP’s Colum Lynch reports.
What We’re Following
Annual political meeting rescheduled. In a sign of confidence about coronavirus containment, Beijing has set an official date—May 21—for the annual “two sessions” meeting of the rubber-stamp national parliament and its largely symbolic advisory body. The meeting usually takes place in early March but was delayed due to the coronavirus. The capital, along with the rest of northern China, has also eased travel restrictions to allow residents to visit other parts of the country and return without facing quarantine. Both decisions show that the government is reasonably certain it won’t face another outbreak in Beijing, even as everyday life still requires constant monitoring—from a compulsory tracking app to temperature checks.
Cultural genocide in Xinjiang. The plight of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang region has been sidelined by the pandemic. But as the holy month of Ramadan begins, Muslims in Xinjiang are still being forced to not fast during daylight hours, and mosques remain largely shuttered. Part of China’s campaign against the Uighurs has been the systematic and deliberate destruction of historical and religious sites, including graveyards containing mazar—the tombs of Islamic saints. For example, new satellite imagery shows that the ancient graveyard in Hotan, destroyed last year, has been replaced with a parking lot.
Arrests in Hong Kong. The detention of prominent democracy activists and dissidents in Hong Kong is a frightening sign of the city’s future. Beijing seems determined to move toward complete control of the territory, especially with the city’s mass protests curtailed by fear of the coronavirus pandemic. That could backfire by further alienating residents, though it’s hard to see how Hong Kongers could be any more opposed to the mainland than they already are. Don’t be surprised if the United States moves this year or next to strip away Hong Kong’s favorable trade and commerce status.
The COVID-19 Crash
For years, Chinese economic growth has been consistently high—so consistent as to raise suspicions, even as it declined from an average of 8 percent a year to hover around 6 percent. That all changed with the coronavirus, as shown below. The plunge of 6.8 percent in the first quarter may still be an underestimate, but it shows the impact that the pandemic continues to have on China’s economy.
Tech and Business
Foreign student fallout. With Western universities expecting an 80 to 100 percent drop in the number of international students this year, the U.S. higher education system is facing a double crisis: the pandemic and the disappearance of the Chinese students it relies on for financial health. Even if international students eventually return, Chinese students may face increased pressure—both from the Chinese government and from Republican Party rhetoric—not to attend U.S. schools. That could cause the situation that U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad has warned against: a financial crisis for lesser-known universities without large endowments.
Unemployment guesstimates. Analysts from the brokerage Zhongtai Securities recently estimated that China’s real post-coronavirus unemployment rate is over 20 percent—far beyond the official 5.9 percent figure. That tallies with informed guesses (link in Chinese) by other experts. Under official pressure, the firm was forced to retract its report and conform to the government’s figures. Despite a brief spike during the beginning of China’s outbreak, migrant wages now appear depressed and job prospects poor. Millions of migrants are likely to return to their villages as a result. That will cause a rise in rural poverty that is difficult to reconcile with the government’s poverty reduction goals and will likely be swept under the carpet.
Auto industry crashes. China’s car sales were completely crushed in the first quarter of the year, especially in February, which saw a 79 percent drop from the previous month. The government is trying to prop up the industry with loans to firms and cash to buyers. The trend contrasts with the SARS outbreak in 2003, when fear of public transport prompted a rush in car sales. Today, with the Chinese car market already near its saturation point and economic prospects bleak, families may prefer to brave the subway. The airline industry, which benefited from big infrastructure investments over the last two decades, is also facing a major cull.
What We’re Watching
“The WHO, Trump, and the Failure of Global Diplomacy” webinar at the Center for Global Policy
This week, the Center for Global Policy assembled a panel—including me—to discuss China, the World Health Organization, and other international bodies in the time of coronavirus. The discussion, which included past Foreign Policy contributors Azeem Ibrahim and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, addresses a big question: How can an opaque, politically paranoid power be addressed by international bodies without it overwhelming them?
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.