foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--A Motorcycle-Riding Leftist Feminist Is Coming for Erdogan

But in Turkey she hasn ’ t gone unnoticed by her supporters or critics .
Kaftancioglu is widely recognized at home as a key factor in her party ’ s success battling President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
She is both a public iconoclast and a tireless behind-the-scenes worker—and at 48 years old , a symbol of generational change in a party traditionally dominated by older men .
Her style of politics is an implicit rejection of the nationalist faction of her own party , which is fiercely devoted to the founder of the republic , Mustafa Kemal Ataturk , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minorities and outwardly pious Muslims .
Kaftancioglu makes no apologies about opposing a mentality once dominating the party ’ s decision-making but now widely perceived as out of touch .
That boldness of thinking , which she later channeled into a conciliatory new electoral strategy , has fueled the CHP ’ s continued rise .
It has also made her the target of Erdogan ’ s ire .
Kaftancioglu went on to medical school in Istanbul , specializing in forensic medicine .
But she also became involved in politics during her studies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were forbidden to enter some universities , and writing her thesis on torture cases , widespread in Turkey at the time .
Later , she would dedicate herself to activism , first with the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey and later co-founding the Collective Memory Platform with families of victims of unsolved political killings .
Her father-in-law Umit Kaftancioglu , a writer and columnist for the secularist daily Cumhuriyet , was killed in 1980 by suspected ultranationalists .
“ She ’ s as much an activist as a politician .
Her work in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ground-breaking , ” said Aykan Erdemir , the director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington , and a former CHP member of parliament .
“ She ’ s almost like the exact opposite of the stereotypical CHP associated with the old era.
” Kaftancioglu started working for the CHP in Istanbul as head of press , culture , and communications in 2011 , then went on to become deputy chairperson for Istanbul in 2012 before being elected to her current position as the party ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s grassroots experience has always informed her activism in the CHP .
“ Canan Kaftancioglu represents the other , more genuinely democratic approach where you actually have to go out and persuade people that you have the right ideas.
” Since becoming Istanbul district head 2018 , she ’ s poured energy into teaming up with other opposition parties , mobilizing young professionals , and developing a new approach—grassroots in organization , conciliatory in tone—to win over segments of the population that had previously often been ignored by the party .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are still a number of people who feel this way , is that they have the right ideas and if the people don ’ t understand them , it ’ s the people who are at fault , ” said Ilter Turan , a political science professor at Istanbul ’ s Bilgi University .
“ I think Canan Kaftancioglu represents the other , more genuinely democratic approach where you actually have to go out and persuade people that you have the right ideas.
” Under Kaftancioglu ’ s guidance , Imamoglu and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dubbed the “ Radical Love ” strategy , which is the antithesis of Erdogan ’ s ferocious style of polarization and antagonism .
This involved making overtures to marginalized groups , using positive , inclusive language ( extremely rare in the vicious world of Turkish politics ) , and trying to heal the cultural fault lines that Erdogan has taken a jackhammer to .
Imamoglu ’ s positive slogan was “ Everything ’ s going to be OK , ” and he recited a prayer at a mosque—a rare move for a CHP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muslims .
The party reached out to government supporters frustrated with Turkey ’ s economic woes , minorities wary of the CHP ’ s nationalist wing , and religious conservatives who often see the secularist CHP as Islamophobic .
“ They were nonconfrontational and nonpolarizing .
They actually tried to reach out to [ demographics ] that CHP regulars would consider to be outside their constituencies , ” Turan said .
Furthermore , in stark contrast to the party ’ s major communications and technical blunders during the presidential elections in 2018 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ others the party ’ s Election Day strategy for last year ’ s municipal elections—which included a controversial rerun after the CHP was shown to have narrowly won in the first round—was tightly run .
Imamoglu was constantly on TV communicating clearly , and with fears of voter fraud running high , the party held a vigil to protect the counting of the ballots .
“ This is the first time I ’ ve seen the CHP this organized , ” said Nevsin Mengu , a columnist from a CHP background .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this.
” Kaftancioglu remains a popular but contentious figure .
She has expressed opinions that are extremely controversial within the party and indeed the country , acknowledging the Armenian genocide , calling the state a “ serial killer , ” and criticizing a popular Kemalist slogan for its militant language , tweeting “ I refuse to say we are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal , but we are his comrades.
” These opinions have made her the perfect boogeyman for the religious-conservative , nationalist AKP .
Within 48 hours of Kaftancioglu being elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a prosecutor opened a terrorism investigation into her ( she ’ s now appealing a 10-year jail sentence ) and Erdogan himself devoted 10 minutes to slamming her during an AKP meeting the next day , reading each of her tweets that he took issue with .
More recently , a criminal complaint and investigation were opened against Kaftancioglu after the CHP Istanbul municipality lodged a complaint against Erdogan ’ s powerful Communications Director Fahrettin Altun for allegedly building illegal constructions in Istanbul .
This is part of the government ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all opposition as an existential threat .
After CHP municipalities started a donations campaign to help those affected by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic , the central government blocked the funds , accusing the party of trying to form a parallel state .
“ The government , in accordance with its usual political mentality , is managing the crisis without transparency , cooperation , or common sense , ” Kaftancioglu said .
Being a woman makes her even more of a target for her detractors .
“ I ’ ve been subjected to hundreds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ threats , and it still goes on .
I knew that as a woman I was going to face this , but I never thought of taking a step back , ” Kaftancioglu wrote in her email .
She said the government ’ s strategy is to polarize society along cultural and political fault lines and find enemies everywhere : “ If [ the government ] can ’ t identify an enemy outsider , they create abstract enemies and pretend to be in a fight with them .
Sometimes they call it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secular people.
” Erdogan needs “ credible enemies ” to unite his party and supporters against through his polarizing tirades .
Selim Koru , an analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey , an Ankara-based think tank , said that Erdogan needs “ credible enemies ” to unite his party and supporters against through his polarizing tirades .
In many ways Kaftancioglu fulfills the role perfectly , not just for her political opinions , but also for her lifestyle , exemplified when she once retweeted her husband ’ s photo showing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ red line in Turkey even among most secular people .
“ What really makes her a juicy target is her flagrant absence of the ‘ yerli ve milli ’ [ local and national , a favorite phrase of the government ] , the national spirit .
She and the people around her … don ’ t just exist outside of the national spirit type of thing , they deny that kind of nationalism , ” Koru said .
“ Erdogan can get up and say , ‘ Look , this is being disrespectful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she hates what you are , and she wants to change you in the way that Kemalists wanted to change you , in the worst possible way.
’ ” Kaftancioglu ’ s opinions have also made her a controversial figure within her own party , particularly among the older generations .
“ They hate her .
They totally hate her , ” Mengu said .
“ They see her as an evil woman who came here to divide the CHP .
For them this change is terrible .
[ They think , ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s not .
It ’ s changing.
” But , as Turan , the political scientist , points out , just as Kaftancioglu ’ s approach turns many people off , it also caters to others who previously may have felt excluded , such as younger people , leftists , liberals , and religious and ethnic minorities .
“ A certain segment of the party … didn ’ t like her iconoclastic approach to politics , ” he said .
“ But it may also be that some other people who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party are now more interested for the same reason.
” Women in particular seem to feel inspired seeing a female politician achieve such success .
Mengu attended the CHP congress when Kaftancioglu was reelected .
“ There was excitement .
At least half the room was full of women , ” she said , one of whom told her , “ Every time she wins I feel like I won.
” The slogan of the congress was “ from Istanbul to Turkey , the only path forward is by coming to power , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasingly national ambitions .
The party hasn ’ t won an election since 1977 , but its most popular figure , Imamoglu , polls almost as high as Erdogan .
It ’ s far too early for the party to announce a presidential candidate , but two of the main contenders would likely be Imamoglu or Mansur Yavas , the popular mayor of the capital , Ankara .
Kaftancioglu will likely continue her behind-the-scenes role .
It ’ s anyone ’ s guess as to whether or not Erdogan would give up power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections , scheduled for 2023 .
Elections in Turkey are fought under incredibly unfair conditions favoring the ruling party .
Some governance experts no longer consider the country a democracy , but rather a competitive authoritarian system , especially after Erdogan was left with few limits on his power when the government was transformed into an “ executive presidential ” system following a referendum in 2017 , which Kaftancioglu describes as “ one-party rule transformed into one-man rule.
” It ’ s anyone ’ s guess as to whether or not Erdogan would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next presidential elections , scheduled for 2023 .
“ The question is , would the incumbent be willing to let go of this important position ?
And the answer is , of course he would be exceptionally reluctant to do so and will do everything in his power to subvert the electoral process to stay in power , ” Turan said , stressing this may not be the case if the challenger wins by a wide enough margin .
In any case , Mengu said there are once again high hopes in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first time in a long time people are talking about the CHP like it can realistically win national elections .
”

Last year, Turkey’s notoriously hapless and fragmented opposition finally got its act together and trounced the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in several major cities during local elections. Istanbul’s affable new mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, received the greatest share of attention and credit. But few in the international media took notice of the woman behind the man—the motorcycle-riding , leftist, feminist, pro-LGBTQ Canan Kaftancioglu, Istanbul district head for the Republican People’s Party (CHP).
Last year, Turkey’s notoriously hapless and fragmented opposition finally got its act together and trounced the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in several major cities during local elections. Istanbul’s affable new mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, received the greatest share of attention and credit. But few in the international media took notice of the woman behind the man—the motorcycle-riding, leftist, feminist, pro-LGBTQ Canan Kaftancioglu, Istanbul district head for the Republican People’s Party (CHP).
But in Turkey she hasn’t gone unnoticed by her supporters or critics. Kaftancioglu is widely recognized at home as a key factor in her party’s success battling President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. She is both a public iconoclast and a tireless behind-the-scenes worker—and at 48 years old, a symbol of generational change in a party traditionally dominated by older men. Her style of politics is an implicit rejection of the nationalist faction of her own party, which is fiercely devoted to the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but associated by many with hostility to both minorities and outwardly pious Muslims. Kaftancioglu makes no apologies about opposing a mentality once dominating the party’s decision-making but now widely perceived as out of touch.
That boldness of thinking, which she later channeled into a conciliatory new electoral strategy, has fueled the CHP’s continued rise. It has also made her the target of Erdogan’s ire.
Supporters of Kaftancioglu chant slogans during a rally outside a court in Istanbul where she was standing trial on July 18, 2019.
Kaftancioglu grew up in the 1970s and 1980s in the countryside of Turkey’s Ordu province along the Black Sea, the daughter of a housewife and teacher of modest means. “I am one of the hundreds of thousands of citizens of Turkey born in a village, growing up in poverty, but becoming who I am thanks to the equal opportunities provided by the republic,” she wrote in response to written questions from Foreign Policy.
Kaftancioglu went on to medical school in Istanbul, specializing in forensic medicine. But she also became involved in politics during her studies, defending the rights of veiled women who were forbidden to enter some universities, and writing her thesis on torture cases, widespread in Turkey at the time. Later, she would dedicate herself to activism, first with the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey and later co-founding the Collective Memory Platform with families of victims of unsolved political killings. Her father-in-law Umit Kaftancioglu, a writer and columnist for the secularist daily Cumhuriyet, was killed in 1980 by suspected ultranationalists.
“She’s as much an activist as a politician. Her work in civic activism has been so important and ground-breaking,” said Aykan Erdemir, the director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington, and a former CHP member of parliament. “She’s almost like the exact opposite of the stereotypical CHP associated with the old era.”
Kaftancioglu started working for the CHP in Istanbul as head of press, culture, and communications in 2011, then went on to become deputy chairperson for Istanbul in 2012 before being elected to her current position as the party’s Istanbul chair in 2018.
Kaftancioglu’s grassroots experience has always informed her activism in the CHP.
“Canan Kaftancioglu represents the other, more genuinely democratic approach where you actually have to go out and persuade people that you have the right ideas.”
Since becoming Istanbul district head 2018, she’s poured energy into teaming up with other opposition parties, mobilizing young professionals, and developing a new approach—grassroots in organization, conciliatory in tone—to win over segments of the population that had previously often been ignored by the party.
“The CHP’s previous approach, and there are still a number of people who feel this way, is that they have the right ideas and if the people don’t understand them, it’s the people who are at fault,” said Ilter Turan, a political science professor at Istanbul’s Bilgi University. “I think Canan Kaftancioglu represents the other, more genuinely democratic approach where you actually have to go out and persuade people that you have the right ideas.”
Under Kaftancioglu’s guidance, Imamoglu and other mayors took a new tack, dubbed the “Radical Love” strategy, which is the antithesis of Erdogan’s ferocious style of polarization and antagonism. This involved making overtures to marginalized groups, using positive, inclusive language (extremely rare in the vicious world of Turkish politics), and trying to heal the cultural fault lines that Erdogan has taken a jackhammer to. Imamoglu’s positive slogan was “Everything’s going to be OK,” and he recited a prayer at a mosque—a rare move for a CHP politician—as a form of outreach to pious Muslims.
The party reached out to government supporters frustrated with Turkey’s economic woes, minorities wary of the CHP’s nationalist wing, and religious conservatives who often see the secularist CHP as Islamophobic. “They were nonconfrontational and nonpolarizing. They actually tried to reach out to [demographics] that CHP regulars would consider to be outside their constituencies,” Turan said.
Furthermore, in stark contrast to the party’s major communications and technical blunders during the presidential elections in 2018, under the watchful eye of Kaftancioglu and others the party’s Election Day strategy for last year’s municipal elections—which included a controversial rerun after the CHP was shown to have narrowly won in the first round—was tightly run. Imamoglu was constantly on TV communicating clearly, and with fears of voter fraud running high, the party held a vigil to protect the counting of the ballots. “This is the first time I’ve seen the CHP this organized,” said Nevsin Mengu, a columnist from a CHP background. “Kaftancioglu has played an important role in this.”
Kaftancioglu remains a popular but contentious figure. She has expressed opinions that are extremely controversial within the party and indeed the country, acknowledging the Armenian genocide, calling the state a “serial killer,” and criticizing a popular Kemalist slogan for its militant language, tweeting “I refuse to say we are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal, but we are his comrades.”
These opinions have made her the perfect boogeyman for the religious-conservative, nationalist AKP. Within 48 hours of Kaftancioglu being elected the party head for Istanbul in 2018, a prosecutor opened a terrorism investigation into her (she’s now appealing a 10-year jail sentence) and Erdogan himself devoted 10 minutes to slamming her during an AKP meeting the next day, reading each of her tweets that he took issue with.
Kaftancioglu gestures from amid the crowd after her trial in Istanbul on Sept. 6, 2019.
More recently, a criminal complaint and investigation were opened against Kaftancioglu after the CHP Istanbul municipality lodged a complaint against Erdogan’s powerful Communications Director Fahrettin Altun for allegedly building illegal constructions in Istanbul.
This is part of the government’s wider antagonistic strategy of treating any and all opposition as an existential threat. After CHP municipalities started a donations campaign to help those affected by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the central government blocked the funds, accusing the party of trying to form a parallel state.
“The government, in accordance with its usual political mentality, is managing the crisis without transparency, cooperation, or common sense,” Kaftancioglu said.
Being a woman makes her even more of a target for her detractors. “I’ve been subjected to hundreds of sexist, nationalist, ultrareligious groups’ threats, and it still goes on. I knew that as a woman I was going to face this, but I never thought of taking a step back,” Kaftancioglu wrote in her email.
She said the government’s strategy is to polarize society along cultural and political fault lines and find enemies everywhere: “If [the government] can’t identify an enemy outsider, they create abstract enemies and pretend to be in a fight with them. Sometimes they call it foreign powers, sometimes terrorism, sometimes secular people.”
Erdogan needs “credible enemies” to unite his party and supporters against through his polarizing tirades.
Selim Koru, an analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, an Ankara-based think tank, said that Erdogan needs “credible enemies” to unite his party and supporters against through his polarizing tirades. In many ways Kaftancioglu fulfills the role perfectly, not just for her political opinions, but also for her lifestyle, exemplified when she once retweeted her husband’s photo showing he was eating pork, a major red line in Turkey even among most secular people.
“What really makes her a juicy target is her flagrant absence of the ‘yerli ve milli’ [local and national, a favorite phrase of the government], the national spirit. She and the people around her … don’t just exist outside of the national spirit type of thing, they deny that kind of nationalism,” Koru said. “Erdogan can get up and say, ‘Look, this is being disrespectful on purpose. She hates you, she hates what you are, and she wants to change you in the way that Kemalists wanted to change you, in the worst possible way.’”
Kaftancioglu’s opinions have also made her a controversial figure within her own party, particularly among the older generations. “They hate her. They totally hate her,” Mengu said. “They see her as an evil woman who came here to divide the CHP. For them this change is terrible. [They think,] ‘The CHP is falling apart.’ It’s not. It’s changing.”
But, as Turan, the political scientist, points out, just as Kaftancioglu’s approach turns many people off, it also caters to others who previously may have felt excluded, such as younger people, leftists, liberals, and religious and ethnic minorities. “A certain segment of the party … didn’t like her iconoclastic approach to politics,” he said. “But it may also be that some other people who previously [felt] alienated from the party are now more interested for the same reason.”
Kaftancioglu takes a selfie as Istanbul mayor-elect Ekrem Imamoglu poses after taking his post from the former Istanbul mayor during the handover ceremony at Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality building on April 17, 2019.
Women in particular seem to feel inspired seeing a female politician achieve such success. Mengu attended the CHP congress when Kaftancioglu was reelected. “There was excitement. At least half the room was full of women,” she said, one of whom told her, “Every time she wins I feel like I won.”
The slogan of the congress was “from Istanbul to Turkey, the only path forward is by coming to power,” hinting at the CHP’s increasingly national ambitions. The party hasn’t won an election since 1977, but its most popular figure, Imamoglu, polls almost as high as Erdogan. It’s far too early for the party to announce a presidential candidate, but two of the main contenders would likely be Imamoglu or Mansur Yavas, the popular mayor of the capital, Ankara. Kaftancioglu will likely continue her behind-the-scenes role.
It’s anyone’s guess as to whether or not Erdogan would give up power even if he lost the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2023.
Elections in Turkey are fought under incredibly unfair conditions favoring the ruling party. Some governance experts no longer consider the country a democracy, but rather a competitive authoritarian system, especially after Erdogan was left with few limits on his power when the government was transformed into an “executive presidential” system following a referendum in 2017, which Kaftancioglu describes as “one-party rule transformed into one-man rule.”
It’s anyone’s guess as to whether or not Erdogan would give up power even if he lost the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2023. “The question is, would the incumbent be willing to let go of this important position? And the answer is, of course he would be exceptionally reluctant to do so and will do everything in his power to subvert the electoral process to stay in power,” Turan said, stressing this may not be the case if the challenger wins by a wide enough margin.
In any case, Mengu said there are once again high hopes in previously forlorn opposition circles: “For the first time in a long time people are talking about the CHP like it can realistically win national elections.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--Trump Is Dangerously Predictable With China

As a candidate in 2016 , U.S. President Donald Trump offered a glimpse of his future foreign policy .
Even more than putting “ America first , ” his goal was for the United States to become unpredictable in world affairs .
“ We must as a nation be more unpredictable , ” Trump told his campaign audience .
“ We are totally predictable .
… We have to be unpredictable .
And we have to be unpredictable starting now.
” In many ways , Trump seems to have delivered on this promise , however ill-advised it was in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annihilate at least two countries , impetuously fired and hired senior officials , tweeted apparently classified imagery , and abruptly announced—and then reversed—troop movements .
These and many other steps might have startled even Richard Nixon , the president said to have pioneered the so-called madman theory in U.S. foreign policy .
At first glance , U.S. China policy under Trump fits this mold .
It has been variously described as “ topsy-turvy , ” “ impulsive , ” and “ erratic.
” After all , Trump during his time in office has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and concession .
Just as he engaged in an aggressive trade war with Beijing , for example , he spoke of deep admiration of and friendship with Chinese President Xi Jinping .
This year alone has been a rollercoaster in relations .
In January , Trump spoke of his “ love ” for Xi—only to subsequently fuel attacks on China by labeling the novel coronavirus the “ Chinese virus ” and calling for China to pay reparations for the pandemic .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions on China appear at the surface , an honest examination of his engagement with Beijing reveals not unpredictability but a dangerous steadfastness .
Trump has consistently placed his personal political interests over the national interest of the United States—even when the stakes couldn ’ t be higher .
Trump might have startled even Richard Nixon , the president who pioneered the so-called madman theory in U.S. foreign policy .
Take Trump ’ s approach to Xi in early 2020 , as the coronavirus was ravaging the central Chinese city of Wuhan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s borders .
During all that time , Trump was consistently fawning over the Chinese leader .
By one count , Trump publicly praised Xi—including his supposed transparency—15 times between January and March , even as the U.S. intelligence community and his own White House advisors were sounding dire warnings about the impending pandemic and China ’ s handling of it .
It has since become clear that Trump ’ s words were less about Xi ’ s coronavirus response—which Trump started to criticize only later—than about his interest in avoiding any risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , which was signed on Jan. 15 and implemented in mid-February .
Trump made little attempt to disguise where he put his priorities .
In late January , for example , when asked about concerns with China ’ s transparency regarding the rapidly spreading virus , Trump said he trusted Xi , touted their relationship , and immediately pivoted to describing “ probably the biggest deal ever made.
” The following month , after the outlines of China ’ s cover-up had emerged , Trump betrayed a similar state of mind when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We really don ’ t know .
… [ But ] we ’ re working together on a lot of different things , including trade .
… They ’ ll be spending $ 250 billion .
… We have a great trade deal.
” When dealing with China , Trump has consistently placed his personal political interests over the national interest .
Nor has Trump been shy about brandishing the trade deal as a pillar of his reelection campaign .
Just before its signing , Trump crowed about the deal—describing it as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ —at a campaign rally in the swing state of Ohio .
During the signing ceremony itself , he declared : “ It just doesn ’ t get any bigger than this.
” Trump ’ s campaign , moreover , was planning a series of television ads touting the deal , whose signing and implementation spanned the exact period when America ’ s coronavirus trajectory was taking shape .
It was precisely during this period when the dialogue between Washington and Beijing could have benefited from less fawning and more calls for transparency and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the trade deal and its political implications didn ’ t “ get any bigger , ” and not even public health concerns could push him to jeopardize his rapport with Xi to secure it .
Other developments in Trump ’ s relations with Beijing that seem erratic on the surface display the same predictable , one-track mindset .
This includes Trump ’ s protection of the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE against his own officials in the Department of Commerce .
In March 2017 , ZTE pleaded guilty in the United States to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea .
A year later , when the firm violated the settlement agreement with the U.S. court , the Department of Commerce banned American companies from providing ZTE with technology for seven years .
The ruling underscored the national security implications of ZTE ’ s original offenses , its disregard for the settlement agreement , and the company ’ s efforts to cover up that disregard .
Trump upended this course of action in May 2018 , when he abruptly tweeted about how he was working with Xi to get ZTE “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ t ] oo many jobs in China lost ” and directing the Commerce Department to “ get it done.
” The U.S. president ’ s focus on unemployed Chinese—after railing against Beijing ’ s unfair economic practices for years—raised eyebrows and sowed confusion even within his own administration.Much of the nation watched Trump obsequiously praise Beijing rather than prioritize the public health of the American people .
But in this case , too , Trump ’ s actions were entirely logical when viewed through the lens of his own political interests .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ had taken a hard line on the ZTE issue in the ongoing trade talks , demanding that U.S. penalties be relaxed .
Just as he did earlier this year , Trump went to extremes to protect his politically valuable deal .
In the ZTE case , he even dismissed his own administration ’ s national security concerns and rightfully imposed penalties .
Once again , we have seen that this is a president who does not hesitate to place his own interests ahead of the national interest—in public health or national security—when they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another prominent example : his willingness to mortgage U.S. national security in return for manufactured dirt on his domestic political opponent , a lurid tale exposed on national television over the course of weeks .
We haven ’ t yet had televised hearings , but in the case of China , Trump ’ s motivations have been on display more clearly than ever before , as much of the nation watched him obsequiously praise Beijing rather than prioritize the public health of the American people .
In another turn that seems erratic only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new efforts to deflect blame for the coronavirus pandemic onto Beijing , the World Health Organization , and other scapegoats suggests he very well recognizes the political peril he now faces .
For all this , Trump has so far escaped accountability .
That will have to change—otherwise , he is certain to place his own political interests ahead of those of the United States and its people .
Bleak data on China ’ s economic outlook counters claims by Trump officials that the U.S. economy can get quickly back on track when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington , governments have been muzzling scientists , inflating the success of their containment efforts , and discrediting valid reporting .
Citizens have to fight back .

As a candidate in 2016, U.S. President Donald Trump offered a glimpse of his future foreign policy. Even more than putting “America first,” his goal was for the United States to become unpredictable in world affairs. “We must as a nation be more unpredictable,” Trump told his campaign audience. “We are totally predictable. … We have to be unpredictable. And we have to be unpredictable starting now.”
As a candidate in 2016, U.S. President Donald Trump offered a glimpse of his future foreign policy. Even more than putting “America first,” his goal was for the United States to become unpredictable in world affairs. “We must as a nation be more unpredictable,” Trump told his campaign audience. “We are totally predictable. … We have to be unpredictable. And we have to be unpredictable starting now.”
In many ways, Trump seems to have delivered on this promise, however ill-advised it was in the first place. He has threatened to annihilate at least two countries, impetuously fired and hired senior officials, tweeted apparently classified imagery, and abruptly announced—and then reversed—troop movements. These and many other steps might have startled even Richard Nixon, the president said to have pioneered the so-called madman theory in U.S. foreign policy.
At first glance, U.S. China policy under Trump fits this mold. It has been variously described as “topsy-turvy,” “impulsive,” and “erratic.” After all, Trump during his time in office has engaged in a head-spinning routine of confrontation and concession. Just as he engaged in an aggressive trade war with Beijing, for example, he spoke of deep admiration of and friendship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This year alone has been a rollercoaster in relations. In January, Trump spoke of his “love” for Xi—only to subsequently fuel attacks on China by labeling the novel coronavirus the “Chinese virus” and calling for China to pay reparations for the pandemic.
However erratic Trump’s positions on China appear at the surface, an honest examination of his engagement with Beijing reveals not unpredictability but a dangerous steadfastness. Trump has consistently placed his personal political interests over the national interest of the United States—even when the stakes couldn’t be higher.
Take Trump’s approach to Xi in early 2020, as the coronavirus was ravaging the central Chinese city of Wuhan and starting to spread beyond the country’s borders. During all that time, Trump was consistently fawning over the Chinese leader. By one count, Trump publicly praised Xi—including his supposed transparency—15 times between January and March, even as the U.S. intelligence community and his own White House advisors were sounding dire warnings about the impending pandemic and China’s handling of it.
It has since become clear that Trump’s words were less about Xi’s coronavirus response—which Trump started to criticize only later—than about his interest in avoiding any risk to the so-called phase-one trade deal with China, which was signed on Jan. 15 and implemented in mid-February. Trump made little attempt to disguise where he put his priorities. In late January, for example, when asked about concerns with China’s transparency regarding the rapidly spreading virus, Trump said he trusted Xi, touted their relationship, and immediately pivoted to describing “probably the biggest deal ever made.” The following month, after the outlines of China’s cover-up had emerged, Trump betrayed a similar state of mind when asked about Beijing’s response: “We really don’t know. … [But] we’re working together on a lot of different things, including trade. … They’ll be spending $250 billion. … We have a great trade deal.”When dealing with China, Trump has consistently placed his personal political interests over the national interest.
Nor has Trump been shy about brandishing the trade deal as a pillar of his reelection campaign. Just before its signing, Trump crowed about the deal—describing it as a “big, beautiful monster”—at a campaign rally in the swing state of Ohio. During the signing ceremony itself, he declared: “It just doesn’t get any bigger than this.” Trump’s campaign, moreover, was planning a series of television ads touting the deal, whose signing and implementation spanned the exact period when America’s coronavirus trajectory was taking shape. It was precisely during this period when the dialogue between Washington and Beijing could have benefited from less fawning and more calls for transparency and international cooperation. But for Trump himself, the trade deal and its political implications didn’t “get any bigger,” and not even public health concerns could push him to jeopardize his rapport with Xi to secure it.
Other developments in Trump’s relations with Beijing that seem erratic on the surface display the same predictable, one-track mindset. This includes Trump’s protection of the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE against his own officials in the Department of Commerce. In March 2017, ZTE pleaded guilty in the United States to illegally exporting American technology to Iran and North Korea. A year later, when the firm violated the settlement agreement with the U.S. court, the Department of Commerce banned American companies from providing ZTE with technology for seven years. The ruling underscored the national security implications of ZTE’s original offenses, its disregard for the settlement agreement, and the company’s efforts to cover up that disregard.
Trump upended this course of action in May 2018, when he abruptly tweeted about how he was working with Xi to get ZTE “back into business,” citing “[t]oo many jobs in China lost” and directing the Commerce Department to “get it done.” The U.S. president’s focus on unemployed Chinese—after railing against Beijing’s unfair economic practices for years—raised eyebrows and sowed confusion even within his own administration.Much of the nation watched Trump obsequiously praise Beijing rather than prioritize the public health of the American people.
But in this case, too, Trump’s actions were entirely logical when viewed through the lens of his own political interests. News reports subsequently revealed that the Chinese had taken a hard line on the ZTE issue in the ongoing trade talks, demanding that U.S. penalties be relaxed. Just as he did earlier this year, Trump went to extremes to protect his politically valuable deal. In the ZTE case, he even dismissed his own administration’s national security concerns and rightfully imposed penalties.
Once again, we have seen that this is a president who does not hesitate to place his own interests ahead of the national interest—in public health or national security—when they diverge. Let’s not forget another prominent example: his willingness to mortgage U.S. national security in return for manufactured dirt on his domestic political opponent, a lurid tale exposed on national television over the course of weeks. We haven’t yet had televised hearings, but in the case of China, Trump’s motivations have been on display more clearly than ever before, as much of the nation watched him obsequiously praise Beijing rather than prioritize the public health of the American people. In another turn that seems erratic only on the surface, Trump’s new efforts to deflect blame for the coronavirus pandemic onto Beijing, the World Health Organization, and other scapegoats suggests he very well recognizes the political peril he now faces.
For all this, Trump has so far escaped accountability. That will have to change—otherwise, he is certain to place his own political interests ahead of those of the United States and its people.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--In Poland, Abortion Access Worsens Amid Pandemic

The woman was 21 weeks pregnant when she contacted Abortion Without Borders ( AWB ) , a network of activist groups that advises Polish women on how to access safe terminations .
Normally , it would have been relatively simple to book a flight to the United Kingdom , where she could legally access a second-trimester abortion .
But the coronavirus outbreak changed everything .
“ We got her an appointment , but travel was a different matter , ” said Mara Clarke , the founder of Abortion Support Network ( ASN ) , which is part of AWB and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed its borders and grounded all flights and cross-border public transportation on March 15 , meaning the woman would have had to travel to the German border , cross it , and take a train to one of Berlin ’ s airports .
While flights still run from Germany , they are regularly canceled with little notice , making it a gamble as to how long she would be waiting .
All in all , a journey that would usually take a few days would take at least a week , followed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Poland .
“ She had no one to watch her young child , and she was scared of getting trapped in another country if more borders closed , ” Clarke said .
“ Eventually she decided it was just impossible.
” Poland has one of the harshest abortion laws in Europe , a relic of its Catholic revival after the fall of communism .
Referred to as the “ abortion compromise , ” the law is a result of pressure from the Roman Catholic Church , which played a seminal role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held sway over those in power .
Termination is only allowed when the fetus is malformed , the health or life of the mother is endangered , or in the event of rape or incest .
Even in these cases , however , abortions can be difficult to obtain as medical professionals often invoke a controversial clause that allows for conscientious objection .
These natalist policies extend to a strong anti-abortion and anti-sex education movement .
Since 2017 , the law has required a prescription for emergency contraception .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic . ]
Officially , just over 1,000 terminations were carried out in Poland in 2018 .
But as many as 150,000 women find other ways to access abortion each year , according to Krystyna Kacpura , the executive director of the Federation for Women and Family Planning , known as Federa .
The majority either order medical abortion pills online early in their pregnancy or travel abroad for termination , which is legal in Poland .
Popular destination countries include Germany , which allows abortion up to 12 weeks , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abortion up to 24 weeks .
As activist networks have strengthened and expanded , illegal surgical abortions have become rarities in Poland .
But as the coronavirus closes borders and weakens supply chains , safe abortions are becoming harder to access .
The AWB helpline , which was launched in December 2019 , usually receives an average of 300 calls a month .
When Poland announced its border closures , it received 114 calls in the following two days .
“ People are usually worried when they contact us , but now the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you can literally feel it coming off an email , ” Clarke said .
Even if a woman can cross the border , hotel and Airbnb closures mean women often need to be hosted by volunteers .
That ’ s logistically complicated in the best of times but far more difficult at a moment when homes are meant to be off-limits to outsiders .
And as Germany has now introduced a 14-day quarantine on arrival that can be circumvented only for approved reasons , women must bring a doctor ’ s letter confirming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be translated into Polish so border guards can read it .
“ We guide everyone through these steps , but we can ’ t assume everyone who crosses the border for an abortion is in contact with activists , ” Clarke said .
“ It ’ s the women we don ’ t hear from that keep us up at night.
” Medical abortions , which can generally be done from home to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks , carry their own complications .
The pills aren ’ t sold in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abortion can result in a three-year jail term , so women need to order them independently from vetted Western organizations .
Typically , women would carry out the procedure at home in privacy .
For women who need to hide their abortions from family members for reasons of safety or mental well-being , having to carry them out in homes in which all are quarantined together comes with its own risk .
Meanwhile , women are having increasing difficulty accessing contraception .
Federa has reported pharmacies refusing to extend prescriptions for contraceptives or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a notice to the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspectorate last week urging it to address the situation .
A Polish Health Ministry spokesperson told Foreign Policy in an email that the national health service regional units are monitoring the situation and taking action whenever patients face difficulties accessing medical services and that the ministry “ hasn ’ t received any information about possible shortages of contraception.
” The many hurdles caused by the pandemic may lead to a surge in pregnancies , Kacpura warned , hitting the most vulnerable women hardest—those in smaller cities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without the means to travel overseas .
With recession just around the corner , “ families won ’ t be able to afford to bring another child into this world , ” Kacpura said .
She is concerned that some women will attempt to terminate unwanted pregnancies “ without any supervision , support , or help.
” Poland ’ s conservative government is not easing pressure on reproductive rights even during the pandemic .
This month , President Andrzej Duda , an ally of the ruling Law and Justice ( PiS ) party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizen ’ s bill that would ban abortion when the fetus is malformed—which accounts for most in-country terminations.The bill was written by the anti-abortion activist Kaja Godek , who called abortion a “ pandemic much worse than the coronavirus.
” Under the Polish Constitution , citizens can introduce new legislation if they gather at least 100,000 signatures .
Godek ’ s “ Stop Abortion ” project , which secured 830,000 signatures , first arrived in the lower house in 2017 .
It lay dormant in a parliamentary commission until the government brought it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Under Polish law , it would have needed to be voted on by May .
It was debated alongside a handful of other controversial citizen ’ s bills , including one criminalizing sex education.To the anger of many Poles , the vote came at a time when mass protests were impossible .
Activists made history in 2016 when thousands filled the streets , wielding black umbrellas , to protest another citizen ’ s bill seeking a complete abortion ban .
Back then , the PiS-led government gave into the pressure and stated the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thought.
” Amid the current restrictions , some activists still managed to make their voices heard .
Thousands protested online and by hanging up posters in the windows of their homes and cars .
Others circumvented the ban by cycling around or standing in lines outside grocery stores , maintaining 6 feet between one another , holding posters and carrying the now symbolic umbrellas .
But their ability to get their message across had been greatly diluted .
“ This is not the moment to discuss this topic , ” said Urszula , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institution and requested her surname be withheld for fear of reprisal .
“ When thousands of women are losing their jobs … and on top of that will be told to give birth to children that might not survive .
And if they do survive , their upbringing will cost much more than a healthy child.
” Although she sported a face mask and left home for what she deemed an everyday necessity , Urszula and other protesters are now facing fines of up to $ 7,000 for alleged breaches of social distancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public places.The bill wasn ’ t passed , but neither was it rejected outright .
Instead , the lower house , where PiS still has a narrow majority , sent it to a parliamentary commission for more work , where observers say it is likely to remain indefinitely .
A PiS spokesperson declined to comment for this article .
While Polish women are facing particularly tough obstacles while seeking abortions , they are not the only Europeans struggling with this at the moment .
This month , a coalition of 100 nongovernmental organizations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe to do more to ensure safe abortion access , warning that many women and nonbinary people across Europe are struggling to access reproductive services .
Clarke said ASN is receiving higher numbers of calls from all over Europe , including countries it doesn ’ t usually deal with such as Italy , where medical abortions are not allowed and hospitals are overwhelmed with coronavirus cases .
However , she also hopes the situation will lead politicians to liberalize abortion laws .
Already , Germany has allowed its mandatory pre-abortion counseling to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has allowed abortion pills to be taken at home .
“ These things that people said were not possible , well the crisis has shown that they are , ” she said .
Remote counseling , for instance , will make things easier for Polish women traveling for terminations in Germany once the lockdown lifts , as they will now need to travel only for the procedure and not the counseling .
“ The world is about to be plunged into a huge recession , so it ’ s going to be even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have children and how many they have .
And we also have to really think about what it means for some people to be in lockdown with their partners .
Not everybody gets to choose when they have sex or how they have sex or whether birth control is used .
”

The woman was 21 weeks pregnant when she contacted Abortion Without Borders (AWB), a network of activist groups that advises Polish women on how to access safe terminations. Normally, it would have been relatively simple to book a flight to the United Kingdom, where she could legally access a second-trimester abortion. But the coronavirus outbreak changed everything.
The woman was 21 weeks pregnant when she contacted Abortion Without Borders (AWB), a network of activist groups that advises Polish women on how to access safe terminations. Normally, it would have been relatively simple to book a flight to the United Kingdom, where she could legally access a second-trimester abortion. But the coronavirus outbreak changed everything.
“We got her an appointment, but travel was a different matter,” said Mara Clarke, the founder of Abortion Support Network (ASN), which is part of AWB and helps women obtain abortions overseas. Poland closed its borders and grounded all flights and cross-border public transportation on March 15, meaning the woman would have had to travel to the German border, cross it, and take a train to one of Berlin’s airports. While flights still run from Germany, they are regularly canceled with little notice, making it a gamble as to how long she would be waiting. All in all, a journey that would usually take a few days would take at least a week, followed by 14 days of quarantine on her return to Poland.
“She had no one to watch her young child, and she was scared of getting trapped in another country if more borders closed,” Clarke said. “Eventually she decided it was just impossible.”
Poland has one of the harshest abortion laws in Europe, a relic of its Catholic revival after the fall of communism. Referred to as the “abortion compromise,” the law is a result of pressure from the Roman Catholic Church, which played a seminal role in the fight against communism and has since held sway over those in power. Termination is only allowed when the fetus is malformed, the health or life of the mother is endangered, or in the event of rape or incest. Even in these cases, however, abortions can be difficult to obtain as medical professionals often invoke a controversial clause that allows for conscientious objection. These natalist policies extend to a strong anti-abortion and anti-sex education movement. Since 2017, the law has required a prescription for emergency contraception.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Officially, just over 1,000 terminations were carried out in Poland in 2018. But as many as 150,000 women find other ways to access abortion each year, according to Krystyna Kacpura, the executive director of the Federation for Women and Family Planning, known as Federa.
The majority either order medical abortion pills online early in their pregnancy or travel abroad for termination, which is legal in Poland. Popular destination countries include Germany, which allows abortion up to 12 weeks, and the Netherlands and the U.K., which permit abortion up to 24 weeks. As activist networks have strengthened and expanded, illegal surgical abortions have become rarities in Poland. But as the coronavirus closes borders and weakens supply chains, safe abortions are becoming harder to access.
The AWB helpline, which was launched in December 2019, usually receives an average of 300 calls a month. When Poland announced its border closures, it received 114 calls in the following two days. “People are usually worried when they contact us, but now the level of panic is so high, you can literally feel it coming off an email,” Clarke said.
Even if a woman can cross the border, hotel and Airbnb closures mean women often need to be hosted by volunteers. That’s logistically complicated in the best of times but far more difficult at a moment when homes are meant to be off-limits to outsiders. And as Germany has now introduced a 14-day quarantine on arrival that can be circumvented only for approved reasons, women must bring a doctor’s letter confirming they have a procedure, which needs to be translated into Polish so border guards can read it. “We guide everyone through these steps, but we can’t assume everyone who crosses the border for an abortion is in contact with activists,” Clarke said. “It’s the women we don’t hear from that keep us up at night.”
Medical abortions, which can generally be done from home to terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks, carry their own complications. The pills aren’t sold in Poland, as helping someone obtain an abortion can result in a three-year jail term, so women need to order them independently from vetted Western organizations. Typically, women would carry out the procedure at home in privacy. For women who need to hide their abortions from family members for reasons of safety or mental well-being, having to carry them out in homes in which all are quarantined together comes with its own risk.
Meanwhile, women are having increasing difficulty accessing contraception. Federa has reported pharmacies refusing to extend prescriptions for contraceptives or issue prescriptions for emergency contraception and sent a notice to the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspectorate last week urging it to address the situation.
A Polish Health Ministry spokesperson told Foreign Policy in an email that the national health service regional units are monitoring the situation and taking action whenever patients face difficulties accessing medical services and that the ministry “hasn’t received any information about possible shortages of contraception.”
The many hurdles caused by the pandemic may lead to a surge in pregnancies, Kacpura warned, hitting the most vulnerable women hardest—those in smaller cities, without access to the internet, and without the means to travel overseas. With recession just around the corner, “families won’t be able to afford to bring another child into this world,” Kacpura said. She is concerned that some women will attempt to terminate unwanted pregnancies “without any supervision, support, or help.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-02--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

The coronavirus pandemic has devastated North Korea ’ s economy , but the country ’ s isolation from the global economic system means it ’ s largely left to its own devices .
Meanwhile , a dispute over the removal of a Soviet statue in Prague has soured relations between the Czech Republic and Russia .
And the pandemic has opened new opportunities for foreign actors , including Russia , to interfere in the U.S. election .
1 .
The Coronavirus Has Pushed North Korea ’ s Economy to the Edge The pandemic has hit the North Korean economy hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weakness , which stems from its decadeslong self-imposed isolation and more recent international sanctions , Thomas Byrne writes .
2 .
As Putin Seeks to Reinvent History , Russia-Czech Relations Hit a New Low A decision by officials in Prague to remove a statue of a Soviet army marshal last fall has evolved into the worst diplomatic row between the Czech Republic and Russia since the end of the Cold War , Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon writes .
3 .
Here We Go Again : Russia Gears Up to Interfere in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already attempting to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election prior to the coronavirus outbreak , but the pandemic has created a more conducive environment for the spreading of disinformation , Spencer P. Boyer writes .
4 .
In the Mekong , a Confluence of Calamities Severe drought exacerbated by upstream hydropower dams has threatened the livelihoods of millions of people in Vietnam ’ s Mekong River Basin and upriver in Cambodia .
The coronavirus pandemic is compounding this situation , Courtney Weatherby and John Lichtefeld write .
The interventions that the U.S. Federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are unprecedentedly vast , but it must continue to take even greater action to prevent an economic disaster , Trevor Jackson writes .

The coronavirus pandemic has devastated North Korea’s economy, but the country’s isolation from the global economic system means it’s largely left to its own devices.
The coronavirus pandemic has devastated North Korea’s economy, but the country’s isolation from the global economic system means it’s largely left to its own devices.
Meanwhile, a dispute over the removal of a Soviet statue in Prague has soured relations between the Czech Republic and Russia.
And the pandemic has opened new opportunities for foreign actors, including Russia, to interfere in the U.S. election.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Customers look at makeup products in a store attached to a cosmetics factory in Pyongyang on July 28, 2018.
The pandemic has hit the North Korean economy hard, highlighting the country’s financial weakness, which stems from its decadeslong self-imposed isolation and more recent international sanctions, Thomas Byrne writes.
Workers load a statue of the controversial Soviet army marshal Ivan Konev onto a truck after it was removed from a Prague park on April 3.
A decision by officials in Prague to remove a statue of a Soviet army marshal last fall has evolved into the worst diplomatic row between the Czech Republic and Russia since the end of the Cold War, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon writes.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg speaks about data leaks and Russian disinformation during a U.S. Senate hearing in Washington, D.C., on April 10, 2018.
Russia was already attempting to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election prior to the coronavirus outbreak, but the pandemic has created a more conducive environment for the spreading of disinformation, Spencer P. Boyer writes.
Cambodians dry fish in a village along the Tonle Sap River in Phnom Penh in 2019, the year the country faced one of the worst droughts in modern history.
Severe drought exacerbated by upstream hydropower dams has threatened the livelihoods of millions of people in Vietnam’s Mekong River Basin and upriver in Cambodia. The coronavirus pandemic is compounding this situation, Courtney Weatherby and John Lichtefeld write.
"The White House," a digital animation by Jeon Joonho
The interventions that the U.S. Federal Reserve has made into the pandemic economy are unprecedentedly vast, but it must continue to take even greater action to prevent an economic disaster, Trevor Jackson writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-02--Why Herd Immunity Won’t Save India From COVID-19

India reported its first case of COVID-19 on Jan. 30 .
As of May 1 , while the country moves through its fifth week of an unprecedented national lockdown , a total of 25,148 cases have been confirmed with 1,152 deaths .
While these figures may seem relatively low compared with hot spots in Europe and North America , they may not be capturing the real picture .
So far , India has tested only 902,654 samples , which equates to around 694 tests per million people—one of the lowest rates in the world ; furthermore , testing figures vary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per 1,000 people , only 48,000 ventilators , and a population of 1.3 billion , many observers wonder how India can manage a crisis as severe as the coronavirus .
Pursuing herd immunity has been touted as a possible strategy in poor countries with young populations , such as India .
This controversial approach , which was recently discarded by the United Kingdom , relies on a majority of the population ( 60 percent to 80 percent ) gaining immunity or resistance to the virus by becoming infected and then recovering .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without a vaccine is a version of survival of the fittest .
While this is a common approach underlying mass vaccination campaigns for diseases like measles—which rely on safe and tested vaccines—trying it with a deadly , new , and untreatable disease is a massive risk .
In its cruelest form , it is a version of survival of the fittest .
There are three reasons why herd immunity may not work for India and could also be potentially dangerous—leading to increased hospitalizations that overwhelm the health system and eventually cause a high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t know a lot about COVID-19 immunity , especially how long immunity lasts , what kind of protection it offers , and whether reinfection is possible .
These are all questions that researchers around the world , including those at the World Health Organization , are still trying to figure out .
Experts don ’ t know a lot about COVID-19 immunity , especially how long immunity lasts , what kind of protection it offers , and whether reinfection is possible .
Second , herd immunity is being recommended for India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a large young population ( more than 80 percent fall below the age of 44 ) , many of these younger adults will not have a severe reaction to COVID-19 .
However , this assumption is problematic as scores of young Indian adults have dangerous underlying conditions and risk factors that could lead to severe complications and death if infected with COVID-19 .
Nearly 40 percent of Indian adults aged 45-54 and 22 percent of those aged 20-44 have hypertension ; nearly 4 percent of adults aged 15-44 years have reported Type @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rate of unreported cases ; and 2.1 million people are living with HIV , of whom 83 percent are between 15 and 45 years old .
Finally , the prevalence of chronic pulmonary disease and asthma among adults was reported as 4.2 and 3 percent , respectively , and nearly a third of adults use tobacco .
With such high rates of comorbidities and risk factors among the young population , letting the virus spread for the sake of an experimental strategy of herd immunity could lead to hundreds of thousands of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Furthermore , seeking herd immunity among younger populations would still require shielding older adults ( roughly 50 million Indians are over the age of 65 ) who are at higher risk .
This raises the question of how to isolate older Indians , many of whom live in multigenerational family homes , which is still the norm—especially in rural parts of the country .
Third , herd immunity can not be implemented as a lone strategy .
It will still have to be supplemented with ramping up health system capacity , increased cooperation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , increased testing , shielding high-risk populations , and implementing gradations of social distancing measures , such as mandatory use of face masks and banning large public gatherings and crowded spaces , which are commonplace in urban India .
Relying solely on a herd immunity strategy could also be dangerous as it may lower the risk perception among younger populations , affecting their compliance with much-needed social distancing measures .
It could also be viewed as an easy route out of the current lockdown and possibly lead to the easing of the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India needs is a strategic , devolved , and long-term approach .
First , the central and state governments will have to implement a nuanced testing strategy that moves from a targeted approach focusing on high-risk individuals toward mass community testing .
At the moment , the testing criteria include asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals with a travel history to high-risk areas—but travel as a criterion is irrelevant at this point as the country closed its international borders weeks ago .
It also includes asymptomatic , symptomatic , and high-risk close contacts of confirmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hospitalized patients with respiratory illness ; this criterion will need to be expanded to move toward mass testing ( to catch asymptomatic cases among those who are unaware they might be infected ) and repeat testing for health workers ( who are constantly at risk of new exposure even if they initially test negative ) .
The central government will need to swiftly address current bottlenecks that hinder widespread testing , including shortage of rapid testing kits and delay of government approval for domestic test kits , and also incentivize domestic biotech companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conduct testing .
Second , state governments should ramp up their contact-tracing efforts at the district and block levels .
This can be done by setting up , training , and supporting teams of contact-tracers including public health officials , police , front-line health workers , and community leaders and volunteers .
Contact tracing and monitoring through visits and phone calls by teams can be supplemented by mobile-based tracking applications .
However , several of these apps , including Aarogya Setu—a contact-tracing app launched by the central government in India that has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns , such as the possibility that the government could repurpose private information for reasons other than disease control .
These ethical issues will need to be addressed if the government wants to ensure public trust and compliance .
Third , states can implement nuanced treatment and isolation strategies , such as separating patients with mild , moderate , and severe symptoms in different settings to manage cases effectively .
This must be supplemented with staff management plans , such as splitting workforces into teams to ensure staff get rest and avoid attrition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large-scale temporary “ Fangcang ” hospitals to isolate and treat patients with mild to moderate symptoms .
Similarly , the southern Indian state of Kerala equipped isolation wards in medical colleges , general and district hospitals , hostels , educational institutions , and unoccupied buildings .
Private hospitals are struggling with low patient numbers and losses owing to the lockdown .
State governments should seize the opportunity to increase the number of designated private hospitals and clinics for testing and treatment of COVID-19 and incentivize them to share their capacity by entering public-private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case treated .
Fourth , India must invest and build the capacity of the public health system by addressing short-term needs like stockpiling of medicines , personal protective equipment , and ventilators , as well as long-term needs—such as hiring epidemiologists , data scientists , and immunologists—and strengthening health information systems .
Fifth , state governments should engage local communities by linking district and local health teams with community leaders and volunteers .
With adequate support and supervision , local communities can play a key role in contact tracing , monitoring social distancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people to seek treatment when they need it .
All of these strategies will require central government financing , which means India must add to its current allocation of a mere 0.8 percent of GDP to health care .
While central and state governments have announced cash and food transfers for low-income households , they can go a step further by integrating existing social welfare schemes , increasing cash transfers , and ensuring maximum coverage and transparency .
Furthermore , the government will need to identify sectors that are the lifelines of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transport , and offer stimulus packages such as credit , cash grants , and tax relief , as well as creating back-to-work protocols for different sectors .
India can not afford to remain in a prolonged lockdown , but letting the virus run rampant is certainly not the way out of this .
While a herd immunity strategy is a seemingly attractive and easy path , it is little more than a Darwinian roll of the dice , which could result in the deaths of millions of Indians .
If the Indian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then it will have to come out of the lockdown by expanding its testing , tracing , and treatment capacity , strengthening its public health system , and ensuring a socioeconomic safety net .

India reported its first case of COVID-19 on Jan. 30. As of May 1, while the country moves through its fifth week of an unprecedented national lockdown, a total of 25,148 cases have been confirmed with 1,152 deaths. While these figures may seem relatively low compared with hot spots in Europe and North America, they may not be capturing the real picture. So far, India has tested only 902,654 samples, which equates to around 694 tests per million people—one of the lowest rates in the world; furthermore, testing figures vary by state.
India reported its first case of COVID-19 on Jan. 30. As of May 1, while the country moves through its fifth week of an unprecedented national lockdown, a total of 25,148 cases have been confirmed with 1,152 deaths. While these figures may seem relatively low compared with hot spots in Europe and North America, they may not be capturing the real picture. So far, India has tested only 902,654 samples, which equates to around 694 tests per million people—one of the lowest rates in the world; furthermore, testing figures vary by state.
With 0.55 hospital beds per 1,000 people, only 48,000 ventilators, and a population of 1.3 billion, many observers wonder how India can manage a crisis as severe as the coronavirus.
Pursuing herd immunity has been touted as a possible strategy in poor countries with young populations, such as India. This controversial approach, which was recently discarded by the United Kingdom, relies on a majority of the population (60 percent to 80 percent) gaining immunity or resistance to the virus by becoming infected and then recovering.
While this is a common approach underlying mass vaccination campaigns for diseases like measles—which rely on safe and tested vaccines—trying it with a deadly, new, and untreatable disease is a massive risk. In its cruelest form, it is a version of survival of the fittest.
There are three reasons why herd immunity may not work for India and could also be potentially dangerous—leading to increased hospitalizations that overwhelm the health system and eventually cause a high number of deaths.
First, experts don’t know a lot about COVID-19 immunity, especially how long immunity lasts, what kind of protection it offers, and whether reinfection is possible. These are all questions that researchers around the world, including those at the World Health Organization, are still trying to figure out.
In its cruelest form, pursuing herd immunity without a vaccine is a version of survival of the fittest.
Second, herd immunity is being recommended for India on the assumption that since the country has a large young population (more than 80 percent fall below the age of 44), many of these younger adults will not have a severe reaction to COVID-19.
However, this assumption is problematic as scores of young Indian adults have dangerous underlying conditions and risk factors that could lead to severe complications and death if infected with COVID-19.
Nearly 40 percent of Indian adults aged 45-54 and 22 percent of those aged 20-44 have hypertension; nearly 4 percent of adults aged 15-44 years have reported Type 2 diabetes, along with a high rate of unreported cases; and 2.1 million people are living with HIV, of whom 83 percent are between 15 and 45 years old. Finally, the prevalence of chronic pulmonary disease and asthma among adults was reported as 4.2 and 3 percent, respectively, and nearly a third of adults use tobacco.
With such high rates of comorbidities and risk factors among the young population, letting the virus spread for the sake of an experimental strategy of herd immunity could lead to hundreds of thousands of people being hospitalized and requiring intensive care. Furthermore, seeking herd immunity among younger populations would still require shielding older adults (roughly 50 million Indians are over the age of 65) who are at higher risk.
This raises the question of how to isolate older Indians, many of whom live in multigenerational family homes, which is still the norm—especially in rural parts of the country.
Relying solely on a herd immunity strategy could also be dangerous as it may lower the risk perception among younger populations, affecting their compliance with much-needed social distancing measures.
Third, herd immunity cannot be implemented as a lone strategy. It will still have to be supplemented with ramping up health system capacity, increased cooperation between the public and private health sectors, increased testing, shielding high-risk populations, and implementing gradations of social distancing measures, such as mandatory use of face masks and banning large public gatherings and crowded spaces, which are commonplace in urban India.
Relying solely on a herd immunity strategy could also be dangerous as it may lower the risk perception among younger populations, affecting their compliance with much-needed social distancing measures. It could also be viewed as an easy route out of the current lockdown and possibly lead to the easing of the government’s current response measures.
What India needs is a strategic, devolved, and long-term approach.
First, the central and state governments will have to implement a nuanced testing strategy that moves from a targeted approach focusing on high-risk individuals toward mass community testing. At the moment, the testing criteria include asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals with a travel history to high-risk areas—but travel as a criterion is irrelevant at this point as the country closed its international borders weeks ago.
It also includes asymptomatic, symptomatic, and high-risk close contacts of confirmed cases, symptomatic health workers, and hospitalized patients with respiratory illness; this criterion will need to be expanded to move toward mass testing (to catch asymptomatic cases among those who are unaware they might be infected) and repeat testing for health workers (who are constantly at risk of new exposure even if they initially test negative).
The central government will need to swiftly address current bottlenecks that hinder widespread testing, including shortage of rapid testing kits and delay of government approval for domestic test kits, and also incentivize domestic biotech companies to produce kits and private laboratories to conduct testing.
Second, state governments should ramp up their contact-tracing efforts at the district and block levels. This can be done by setting up, training, and supporting teams of contact-tracers including public health officials, police, front-line health workers, and community leaders and volunteers. Contact tracing and monitoring through visits and phone calls by teams can be supplemented by mobile-based tracking applications.
However, several of these apps, including Aarogya Setu—a contact-tracing app launched by the central government in India that has been downloaded by 50 million people—have raised privacy concerns, such as the possibility that the government could repurpose private information for reasons other than disease control. These ethical issues will need to be addressed if the government wants to ensure public trust and compliance.
Third, states can implement nuanced treatment and isolation strategies, such as separating patients with mild, moderate, and severe symptoms in different settings to manage cases effectively. This must be supplemented with staff management plans, such as splitting workforces into teams to ensure staff get rest and avoid attrition. China converted existing public venues into large-scale temporary “Fangcang” hospitals to isolate and treat patients with mild to moderate symptoms.
Similarly, the southern Indian state of Kerala equipped isolation wards in medical colleges, general and district hospitals, hostels, educational institutions, and unoccupied buildings. Private hospitals are struggling with low patient numbers and losses owing to the lockdown. State governments should seize the opportunity to increase the number of designated private hospitals and clinics for testing and treatment of COVID-19 and incentivize them to share their capacity by entering public-private partnerships and reimbursing private facilities for each case treated.
Fourth, India must invest and build the capacity of the public health system by addressing short-term needs like stockpiling of medicines, personal protective equipment, and ventilators, as well as long-term needs—such as hiring epidemiologists, data scientists, and immunologists—and strengthening health information systems.
Fifth, state governments should engage local communities by linking district and local health teams with community leaders and volunteers. With adequate support and supervision, local communities can play a key role in contact tracing, monitoring social distancing, shielding the vulnerable, and encouraging people to seek treatment when they need it.
All of these strategies will require central government financing, which means India must add to its current allocation of a mere 0.8 percent of GDP to health care. While central and state governments have announced cash and food transfers for low-income households, they can go a step further by integrating existing social welfare schemes, increasing cash transfers, and ensuring maximum coverage and transparency. Furthermore, the government will need to identify sectors that are the lifelines of the economy, such as small businesses and transport, and offer stimulus packages such as credit, cash grants, and tax relief, as well as creating back-to-work protocols for different sectors.
India cannot afford to remain in a prolonged lockdown, but letting the virus run rampant is certainly not the way out of this. While a herd immunity strategy is a seemingly attractive and easy path, it is little more than a Darwinian roll of the dice, which could result in the deaths of millions of Indians.
If the Indian government wants to save lives and livelihoods, then it will have to come out of the lockdown by expanding its testing, tracing, and treatment capacity, strengthening its public health system, and ensuring a socioeconomic safety net.