foreignpolicy--2020-11-11--While Biden Calls the Real World, Trump and Allies Create Another

While Biden Calls the Real World , Trump and Allies Create Another Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refuses to acknowledge Biden ’ s victory , Ethiopia ’ s Tigray conflict leads to refugee exodus , and U.S. COVID-19 hospitalizations at a record high .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
One week after an election that confirmed Donald Trump as a one-term president , he and his allies continue to operate as if his next four years in office are right around the corner .
Asked on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin cooperating with the Biden transition team , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo deflected , saying “ there will be a smooth transition to a second Trump administration.
” Although delivered with the hint of a smile , it wasn ’ t immediately clear whether the secretary meant the comment as a joke , and a State Department spokesperson declined to clarify afterward .
In interviews with conservative news outlets following the press conference , Pompeo seemed more willing to acknowledge that a Biden presidency was within the realm of possibility , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way .
Even as Trump ’ s better-than-expected election performance means Trumpism is here to stay , a majority of Americans think it is time for him to go .
A Reuters/Ipsos poll released on Tuesday found that 79 percent of Americans believe Joe Biden won last Tuesday ’ s election , 18 percent are either undecided or don ’ t know , and 3 percent believe that Trump was the winner .
UN-ambiguous .
Despite Biden ’ s victory and the flood of congratulations Biden has received from most ( but not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a nervous air of confusion persists .
A spokesperson for U.N. Secretary General António Guterres was forced to explain a tweet sent from Guterres ’ s account congratulating “ the President-elect & Vice President-elect ” in the U.S. election—without naming any names—was indeed meant for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris .
Boris on board .
On Tuesday , Biden continued a president-elect tradition : speaking directly with world leaders over the phone .
Having first spoken with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau , Biden then spoke with German Chancellor Angela Merkel , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Micheál Martin , and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson .
Although the Biden campaign declined to announce the order in which each leader was called , the very fact of the Johnson call , FP ’ s Chloe Hadavas writes , means that not all Trump allies are willing to live in the fantasy world the current president is creating .
Long considered a shelter from war—and taxes—Switzerland is clearly not a safe haven from COVID-19 .
The country has overtaken Belgium and is set to leapfrog the Czech Republic as Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As the graphic above illustrates , new research by Oxford University ’ s Blavatnik School of Government shows that Switzerland ’ s anti-coronavirus measures are still “ much looser than in the rest of Europe and the United States—and only slightly more restrictive than in Sweden.
” For more on how Switzerland has approached its coronavirus response , read the Joseph de Weck ’ s recent article “ Switzerland is Choosing Austerity Over Life.
” Ethiopia ’ s civil conflict continues .
At least 2,500 Ethiopians have fled into neighboring Sudan , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict in the Tigray region continues .
Ethiopian state-affiliated media reported that federal forces have killed 550 Tigray “ extremists ” in fighting that included air strikes from the country ’ s air force .
On Tuesday , Tigray regional leader Debretsion Gebremichael said that Eritrean forces had moved into Tigray on the side of Ethiopian federal troops , a claim Eritrea ’ s foreign minister has denied .
Record COVID hospitalizations .
The United States is dealing with a record number of coronavirus-related hospitalizations as cases surge across the country .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Project , just under 62,000 people are currently in hospital receiving treatment for COVID-19 .
The United States has seen an explosion in the number of cases for the month of November so far , with more than 100,000 new cases reported daily on all but the first three days of the month .
Brazil ends Chinese vaccine trial .
Politics appears to be getting in the way of Brazil ’ s coronavirus vaccine trials , after the country ’ s health authority suspended testing of a Chinese-made vaccine citing a “ serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim being disputed by the vaccine ’ s research team .
The trial ’ s abrupt end appears to be related to a feud between Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Sao Paulo Governor João Doria , who is expected to run against the president in the 2022 elections .
Doria has backed the Chinese-made vaccine to be used in his state , while Bolsonaro favors one being developed by Oxford University and AstraZeneca .
“ Death , disablement , anomalies … this is the vaccine that Doria wants to force people in São @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a Facebook post .
Generation COVID .
A report from the British school inspection agency found that children had suffered from being outside the regular school system during lockdown , with some younger children regressing from being potty-trained back to diapers and older children showing reduced reading stamina .
The chief inspector for schools found that the children experiencing the worst effects were those whose parents ’ employment did not allow for flexible or at-home working .
Britain ’ s border problem with Biden .
During a his first call with British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President-elect , Joe Biden underlined the importance of upholding the Good Friday peace agreement in any Brexit deal , foreshadowing possible friction ahead in any future U.S.-U.K trade deal .
Biden ’ s mention of the Good Friday Agreement , which didn ’ t figure on the initial readout published by the British side , was later confirmed by a Downing Street spokesperson .
Biden has already upset some British conservatives after he joked with a BBC reporter that his Irish heritage prevented him from speaking with the British broadcaster .
Iran sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t intend to give up its “ maximum pressure ” campaign on Iran just because it lost an election .
On Tuesday , the U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions on six companies and four people accused of supplying components to Iran Communication Industries , a company run by the Iranian military that is already under U.S. and EU sanctions .
Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said the United States would continue to take action against those that support Iran ’ s “ militarization and proliferation efforts.
” Those looking for a V-shaped economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pore over once Singles ’ Day , happening today , concludes .
A Chinese version of the U.S. Black Friday , the event is considered the biggest shopping day in the world and E-commerce giant Alibaba has reported over $ 56 billion in orders as of Wednesday morning .
It ’ s not clear whether it will be enough to jumpstart China ’ s lagging retail figures : Although China ’ s GDP growth is returning to normal levels , retail sales are down 7 percent overall from the same period last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refuses to acknowledge Biden's victory, Ethiopia's Tigray conflict leads to refugee exodus, and U.S. COVID-19 hospitalizations at a record high.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo refuses to acknowledge Biden’s victory, Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict leads to refugee exodus, and U.S. COVID-19 hospitalizations at a record high.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Adds to Myth That Trump Is Staying Put
One week after an election that confirmed Donald Trump as a one-term president, he and his allies continue to operate as if his next four years in office are right around the corner.
Asked on Tuesday about when the State Department would begin cooperating with the Biden transition team, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo deflected, saying “there will be a smooth transition to a second Trump administration.”
Although delivered with the hint of a smile, it wasn’t immediately clear whether the secretary meant the comment as a joke, and a State Department spokesperson declined to clarify afterward. In interviews with conservative news outlets following the press conference, Pompeo seemed more willing to acknowledge that a Biden presidency was within the realm of possibility, while still not confirming his position either way.
Even as Trump’s better-than-expected election performance means Trumpism is here to stay, a majority of Americans think it is time for him to go. A Reuters/Ipsos poll released on Tuesday found that 79 percent of Americans believe Joe Biden won last Tuesday’s election, 18 percent are either undecided or don’t know, and 3 percent believe that Trump was the winner.
UN-ambiguous. Despite Biden’s victory and the flood of congratulations Biden has received from most (but not all) world leaders in recent days, a nervous air of confusion persists. A spokesperson for U.N. Secretary General António Guterres was forced to explain a tweet sent from Guterres’s account congratulating “the President-elect & Vice President-elect” in the U.S. election—without naming any names—was indeed meant for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris.
Boris on board. On Tuesday, Biden continued a president-elect tradition: speaking directly with world leaders over the phone. Having first spoken with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Biden then spoke with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Although the Biden campaign declined to announce the order in which each leader was called, the very fact of the Johnson call, FP’s Chloe Hadavas writes, means that not all Trump allies are willing to live in the fantasy world the current president is creating.
Switzerland’s COVID Resurgence
Long considered a shelter from war—and taxes—Switzerland is clearly not a safe haven from COVID-19. The country has overtaken Belgium and is set to leapfrog the Czech Republic as Europe’s top coronavirus hot spot. As the graphic above illustrates, new research by Oxford University’s Blavatnik School of Government shows that Switzerland’s anti-coronavirus measures are still “much looser than in the rest of Europe and the United States—and only slightly more restrictive than in Sweden.” For more on how Switzerland has approached its coronavirus response, read the Joseph de Weck’s recent article “Switzerland is Choosing Austerity Over Life.”
What We’re Following Today
Ethiopia’s civil conflict continues. At least 2,500 Ethiopians have fled into neighboring Sudan, with thousands more expected to follow, as conflict in the Tigray region continues. Ethiopian state-affiliated media reported that federal forces have killed 550 Tigray “extremists” in fighting that included air strikes from the country’s air force. On Tuesday, Tigray regional leader Debretsion Gebremichael said that Eritrean forces had moved into Tigray on the side of Ethiopian federal troops, a claim Eritrea’s foreign minister has denied.
Record COVID hospitalizations. The United States is dealing with a record number of coronavirus-related hospitalizations as cases surge across the country. According to figures compiled by the COVID Tracking Project, just under 62,000 people are currently in hospital receiving treatment for COVID-19. The United States has seen an explosion in the number of cases for the month of November so far, with more than 100,000 new cases reported daily on all but the first three days of the month.
Brazil ends Chinese vaccine trial. Politics appears to be getting in the way of Brazil’s coronavirus vaccine trials, after the country’s health authority suspended testing of a Chinese-made vaccine citing a “serious adverse event,” despite such a claim being disputed by the vaccine’s research team.
The trial’s abrupt end appears to be related to a feud between Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Sao Paulo Governor João Doria, who is expected to run against the president in the 2022 elections. Doria has backed the Chinese-made vaccine to be used in his state, while Bolsonaro favors one being developed by Oxford University and AstraZeneca. “Death, disablement, anomalies … this is the vaccine that Doria wants to force people in São Paulo to take,” Bolsonaro wrote in a Facebook post.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-11--Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?

Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?

Technology transcends national borders , so it shouldn ’ t be surprising that , in 2020 , private technology and telecommunication companies control more data on the average person than governments do .
And it ’ s not just data ownership : Policymakers similarly fall behind in understanding the power of data .
That ’ s a problem , particularly as social media platforms are able to influence political outcomes with few to no repercussions and geopolitics becomes a duopoly of technological trailblazers like the United States and China , with the rest of the world looking on as spectators—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moved many people ’ s lives online and demonstrated the revolutionary power of technology in driving economic growth despite physical stasis—whether in e-commerce , continuing employment for those able to work digitally , or virtual schooling .
This dramatic shift wouldn ’ t have been possible without artificial intelligence ( AI ) embedded within now-essential services like Alexa , Siri , and Zoom .
Artificial intelligence is usually talked about in sensationalist terms .
But hyperbolic language can mask simple business truths : AI capabilities—understanding everything from shopping habits to future careers or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good as the datasets that feed them and , without diverse data sets , the ability to innovate and enhance existing AI functionalities is limited .
The de facto U.S.-China AI duopoly doesn ’ t accurately represent the cross-cutting , global consumer bases tech companies serve ; for the game to go on , spectators need to pitch in—lest they lose their pastime .
It is against this backdrop—a thirst for new data to keep the AI engine chugging—that colonialism has morphed into its latest form : data colonialism .
Data colonialism is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a proxy for the control of people and is quickly becoming the reality faced by many emerging economies today .
Far from decolonized , these countries are subject to the whims of Big Tech ’ s unfettered rise ; vulnerable peoples ’ data is used to enhance companies ’ innovations , entrench their economic and political might , and , in effect , occupy the daily lives of billions of people .
Data extraction , monopolization , and monetization are data colonialism ’ s core tenets .
Africa is ground zero for data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the largest number of countries ; most cultural , linguistic and racial diversity ; least connected nations ; and its data protection regulations range from limited to nonexistent .
Africa has always been a continent rich in natural resources , and , today , the diversity of the continent ’ s population renders it equally rich in data resources .
But Big Tech ’ s exploitation of this diversity—heralded under the guise of internet-for-all initiatives—actually undermines the data sovereignty of African nations and impedes their ability to develop their own digital economies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ lifts all boats .
When it comes to obtaining this data , the latest figures from the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development highlight just how vulnerable Africa is in comparison to its European counterparts .
In Europe , 96 percent of countries currently have data protection laws in place—versus only 50 percent in Africa .
Globally , only 43 percent of the U.N. ’ s designated Least Developed Countries ( LDCs ) have such laws ; 33 out of the 47 LDCs are in Africa .
As well as the unrivaled , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the continent ’ s relative absence of data protection policies—and a limited understanding of how valuable and influential data can be—is a central causal factor behind its vulnerability to data colonialism .
There are myriad reasons for this vacuum in regulation on the continent , including a general lack of capacity , conflicting priorities , and political instability .
Data colonialism is at times conflated with humanitarian efforts—after all , who can object to expanding digital access , which nearly all agree is crucial for economic growth ?
But corporations ’ support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sword , as data extraction undermines African nations ’ abilities to develop indigenous digital economies that can enhance their own capabilities .
It ’ s farcical to assume corporations ’ forays in Africa are chiefly compelled by goodwill : Corporations are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and driven by their bottom lines .
That comes at a cost , of which Africa bears the brunt .
Both Chinese and U.S. tech giants adopt a humanitarian framing in marketing digital infrastructure projects , but approach the ulterior motive of data extraction differently .
Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s controversial Belt and Road Initiative to secure contracts with African governments , whereby AI and other technology solutions are provided in exchange for access to local citizens ’ data—like the deal between CloudWalk , a Chinese developer of facial recognition software , and the Zimbabwean government .
Firms are relatively transparent about their goals , with little to no checks or accountability on how the information they receive will be used .
Western corporations , by contrast , adopt a more covert approach , establishing digital hubs and offering free internet access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Balloons and Facebook ’ s Undersea Cable , which encourage more Africans to get online , use their services , and , by convenient coincidence , relinquish their data in the process .
Data colonialism hinders Africans ’ abilities to develop their own technological innovations based on their indigenous datasets .
Beyond ostensible humanitarian efforts , tech giants ’ expansion of digital infrastructure also serves to skirt and undercut regulatory activity .
That ’ s because , while there is little to no data protection or privacy regulations in Africa , nearly every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In some ways , this is understandable : The penetration rate of mobile phones on the continent is 77 percent , while only 26 percent of Africans use the internet .
While telecommunications companies are able to collect data on a far greater number of Africans than are tech companies , the depth or value of the data they collect pales in comparison to that mined by technology platforms .
This is because mobile phone operators have access to data that is comparatively limited : subscribers ’ identities , addresses and banking details @ @ @ @ @ @ @ logs , and other technical data .
Tech platforms , by contrast , can access more granular information about their users—from political views , relationship status , friendship network , and travel preferences , to mental and physical health characteristics .
Consequently , while telecommunications companies can use their data to inform basic research and development efforts , tech platforms ’ data not only informs what types of products to develop , but also how to market those products directly to consumers .
In fact , telecommunications companies are often held to ransom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or administrative delay should they fail to meet regulators ’ demands—from paying higher licensing fees to rolling out infrastructure in rural areas .
Technology platforms , by contrast , have little to no barriers to entry—and also no regulator to hold them accountable .
For this reason , tech platforms seek to minimize their dependence on telecommunications companies by developing initiatives that provide internet access directly to end-users without a need for mobile subscription .
After all , if people can connect directly to the internet through a Balloon or fiber optic connection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will decrease—particularly given the ubiquity of services such like WhatsApp , which has over 2 billion monthly users .
When it comes to empowering indigenous digital economies—or not—chronic avoidance of telecommunications doesn ’ t help .
Telecommunications companies are often registered corporate entities in the jurisdictions in which they operate—contributing to taxes , employing local staff , and contributing expertise and capacity-building .
The same can ’ t be said for technology companies in Africa—which often import their own staff from overseas for any local activities or fail to set-up a local entity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to equalize this would be to regulate Africa ’ s tech sector by holding tech companies to the same standards as telecommunications operators .
African governments need to improve their understanding of data and its power—and educate the public about the advantages and pitfalls that come along with it .
Much like within the European Union , equal efforts should be given to developing national , regional , and pan-African data protection and privacy laws .
Some governments are already trying to fight data colonialism through regulation .
Nigeria , Rwanda , Kenya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data localization , which requires all data collected on their citizens and in their countries be kept on servers where they are collected—rather than far away in California or Guangdong .
This is a good and a forceful first step , but cross-border data flows are crucial to the modern economy—and data localization laws are generally short-sighted tools that can stifle , rather than foster , indigenous digital ecosystems .
Instead , African policymakers should develop a pan-African approach to cross-border data flows—possibly within the African Union—by understanding that data is a commodity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ levels , and perhaps even under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement .
African governments do not need to replicate the European Union ’ s General Data Protection Regulation , but they should design and implement an indigenous data protection framework that suits the continent ’ s context and capabilities through public-private cooperation .
More than anything , Africa requires transparency .
If leaders don ’ t act swiftly and proactively to address data colonialism , Big Tech could compound the effects of traditional colonialism and limit Africa ’ s ability to harness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lag behind the rest of the world forever .

Technology transcends national borders, so it shouldn’t be surprising that, in 2020, private technology and telecommunication companies control more data on the average person than governments do. And it’s not just data ownership: Policymakers similarly fall behind in understanding the power of data. That’s a problem, particularly as social media platforms are able to influence political outcomes with few to no repercussions and geopolitics becomes a duopoly of technological trailblazers like the United States and China, with the rest of the world looking on as spectators—and reluctant participants.
Technology transcends national borders, so it shouldn’t be surprising that, in 2020, private technology and telecommunication companies control more data on the average person than governments do. And it’s not just data ownership: Policymakers similarly fall behind in understanding the power of data. That’s a problem, particularly as social media platforms are able to influence political outcomes with few to no repercussions and geopolitics becomes a duopoly of technological trailblazers like the United States and China, with the rest of the world looking on as spectators—and reluctant participants.
The coronavirus pandemic has moved many people’s lives online and demonstrated the revolutionary power of technology in driving economic growth despite physical stasis—whether in e-commerce, continuing employment for those able to work digitally, or virtual schooling. This dramatic shift wouldn’t have been possible without artificial intelligence (AI) embedded within now-essential services like Alexa, Siri, and Zoom.
Artificial intelligence is usually talked about in sensationalist terms. But hyperbolic language can mask simple business truths: AI capabilities—understanding everything from shopping habits to future careers or propensity for criminality—will only ever be as good as the datasets that feed them and, without diverse data sets, the ability to innovate and enhance existing AI functionalities is limited. The de facto U.S.-China AI duopoly doesn’t accurately represent the cross-cutting, global consumer bases tech companies serve; for the game to go on, spectators need to pitch in—lest they lose their pastime.
It is against this backdrop—a thirst for new data to keep the AI engine chugging—that colonialism has morphed into its latest form: data colonialism. Data colonialism is driven by the control of data as a proxy for the control of people and is quickly becoming the reality faced by many emerging economies today. Far from decolonized, these countries are subject to the whims of Big Tech’s unfettered rise; vulnerable peoples’ data is used to enhance companies’ innovations, entrench their economic and political might, and, in effect, occupy the daily lives of billions of people. Data extraction, monopolization, and monetization are data colonialism’s core tenets.
Africa is ground zero for data colonialism. It is the continent with the largest number of countries; most cultural, linguistic and racial diversity; least connected nations; and its data protection regulations range from limited to nonexistent. Africa has always been a continent rich in natural resources, and, today, the diversity of the continent’s population renders it equally rich in data resources. But Big Tech’s exploitation of this diversity—heralded under the guise of internet-for-all initiatives—actually undermines the data sovereignty of African nations and impedes their ability to develop their own digital economies. That’s hardly a tide that lifts all boats.
In 2017, data overtook oil to become the world’s most valuable commodity, but it remains hard to define. At its most basic level, data is us—humans—in digital form: how we look; the languages we speak; our viewing preferences, medical records, voices, learning habits, and music preferences. For AI, all data is valuable fodder—enhancing algorithms’ capabilities and generating revenue for the companies that collect it.
When it comes to obtaining this data, the latest figures from the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development highlight just how vulnerable Africa is in comparison to its European counterparts. In Europe, 96 percent of countries currently have data protection laws in place—versus only 50 percent in Africa. Globally, only 43 percent of the U.N.’s designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have such laws; 33 out of the 47 LDCs are in Africa.
As well as the unrivaled, diverse datasets that Africa offers tech companies, the continent’s relative absence of data protection policies—and a limited understanding of how valuable and influential data can be—is a central causal factor behind its vulnerability to data colonialism. There are myriad reasons for this vacuum in regulation on the continent, including a general lack of capacity, conflicting priorities, and political instability.
Data colonialism is at times conflated with humanitarian efforts—after all, who can object to expanding digital access, which nearly all agree is crucial for economic growth? But corporations’ support for emerging economies may be a double-edged sword, as data extraction undermines African nations’ abilities to develop indigenous digital economies that can enhance their own capabilities.
It’s farcical to assume corporations’ forays in Africa are chiefly compelled by goodwill: Corporations are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and driven by their bottom lines. That comes at a cost, of which Africa bears the brunt.
Both Chinese and U.S. tech giants adopt a humanitarian framing in marketing digital infrastructure projects, but approach the ulterior motive of data extraction differently. Chinese corporations leverage political initiatives like Beijing’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative to secure contracts with African governments, whereby AI and other technology solutions are provided in exchange for access to local citizens’ data—like the deal between CloudWalk, a Chinese developer of facial recognition software, and the Zimbabwean government. Firms are relatively transparent about their goals, with little to no checks or accountability on how the information they receive will be used.
Western corporations, by contrast, adopt a more covert approach, establishing digital hubs and offering free internet access. These include Google’s Internet Balloons and Facebook’s Undersea Cable, which encourage more Africans to get online, use their services, and, by convenient coincidence, relinquish their data in the process.
Data colonialism hinders Africans’ abilities to develop their own technological innovations based on their indigenous datasets, which have already been exploited by the more established hegemons of the tech world. Moreover, it relegates African nations to forever being consumers of foreign tech innovations that are developed using their own data and then sold back to them. This is akin to traditional colonialist practices that seized raw materials from the African continent, refined and manufactured them into goods in the West, and sold these goods back to the same nations from which they were stolen—leaving them unable to develop their own manufacturing capabilities. They became eternal consumers with underdeveloped economies as a result.
Data colonialism hinders Africans’ abilities to develop their own technological innovations based on their indigenous datasets.
Beyond ostensible humanitarian efforts, tech giants’ expansion of digital infrastructure also serves to skirt and undercut regulatory activity. That’s because, while there is little to no data protection or privacy regulations in Africa, nearly every African nation has a telecommunications regulator. In some ways, this is understandable: The penetration rate of mobile phones on the continent is 77 percent, while only 26 percent of Africans use the internet.
While telecommunications companies are able to collect data on a far greater number of Africans than are tech companies, the depth or value of the data they collect pales in comparison to that mined by technology platforms. This is because mobile phone operators have access to data that is comparatively limited: subscribers’ identities, addresses and banking details, cell site or geolocation, call logs, and other technical data. Tech platforms, by contrast, can access more granular information about their users—from political views, relationship status, friendship network, and travel preferences, to mental and physical health characteristics. Consequently, while telecommunications companies can use their data to inform basic research and development efforts, tech platforms’ data not only informs what types of products to develop, but also how to market those products directly to consumers.
In fact, telecommunications companies are often held to ransom by their regulators—with threats of license revocation or administrative delay should they fail to meet regulators’ demands—from paying higher licensing fees to rolling out infrastructure in rural areas. Technology platforms, by contrast, have little to no barriers to entry—and also no regulator to hold them accountable. For this reason, tech platforms seek to minimize their dependence on telecommunications companies by developing initiatives that provide internet access directly to end-users without a need for mobile subscription. After all, if people can connect directly to the internet through a Balloon or fiber optic connection, the need for mobile phone subscriptions will decrease—particularly given the ubiquity of services such like WhatsApp, which has over 2 billion monthly users.
When it comes to empowering indigenous digital economies—or not—chronic avoidance of telecommunications doesn’t help. Telecommunications companies are often registered corporate entities in the jurisdictions in which they operate—contributing to taxes, employing local staff, and contributing expertise and capacity-building. The same can’t be said for technology companies in Africa—which often import their own staff from overseas for any local activities or fail to set-up a local entity to provide their services.
One way to equalize this would be to regulate Africa’s tech sector by holding tech companies to the same standards as telecommunications operators. African governments need to improve their understanding of data and its power—and educate the public about the advantages and pitfalls that come along with it. Much like within the European Union, equal efforts should be given to developing national, regional, and pan-African data protection and privacy laws.
Some governments are already trying to fight data colonialism through regulation. Nigeria, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa have advocated for data localization, which requires all data collected on their citizens and in their countries be kept on servers where they are collected—rather than far away in California or Guangdong. This is a good and a forceful first step, but cross-border data flows are crucial to the modern economy—and data localization laws are generally short-sighted tools that can stifle, rather than foster, indigenous digital ecosystems.
Instead, African policymakers should develop a pan-African approach to cross-border data flows—possibly within the African Union—by understanding that data is a commodity worthy of protection at national and regional levels, and perhaps even under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.
African governments do not need to replicate the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, but they should design and implement an indigenous data protection framework that suits the continent’s context and capabilities through public-private cooperation.
More than anything, Africa requires transparency. If leaders don’t act swiftly and proactively to address data colonialism, Big Tech could compound the effects of traditional colonialism and limit Africa’s ability to harness technology on its own—forcing the continent to lag behind the rest of the world forever.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-11--Forget U.N. Peacekeepers: Send in the Gendarmes

“ We believe that both parties should accept Scandinavian peacekeepers and we ’ re working with Scandinavian governments to put together a peacekeeping force that could deployed into the region to keep a ceasefire , ” U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien said last month , referring to fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave .
It didn ’ t take long for Russia to respond—by brokering a peace deal and sending in peacekeepers of its own .
Until the recent outbreak of all-out war in Nagorno-Karabakh , the situation in the disputed region was regarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but not quite peace .
This is becoming the norm ; indeed , all over the world , the gray zone between war and peace is growing .
But there ’ s good news .
A model thought up by Napoleon more than two centuries ago may be the perfect answer to not-quite-war conflicts .
In 1939 and 1940 , when Nazi Germany was invading virtually all of its neighbors , Switzerland ’ s Defense Minister , Rudolf Minger , kept a note attached to the doorbell of his home : “ In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Today , it would be impossible to know when to ring twice .
Consider what happened six and a half years ago , when so-called little green men who looked Russian but bore no insignia appeared eastern Ukraine .
Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO , the alliance didn ’ t have to decide whether to invoke its famous Article 5 that guarantees all members will come to the aid of any ally under attack .
But Ukraine won ’ t be the last country to find itself in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the South China Sea , China has illegally built islands that now mark China ’ s presence in the strategic waters ; it has even turned its man-made presence into a military installation .
Although the U.S. election last week proceeded without major meddling by foreign powers , today virtually every Western country finds itself the target of disinformation , cyberattacks , and subversive behavior directed by hostile governments .
“ Hybrid threats are deliberately designed to stay below the threshold of a conventional military response , but at the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Ewan Lawson , a former Royal Air Force officer now affiliated with the Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI ) , a London defense and security think tank .
“ Information campaigns designed to stir up discontent between groups within a society for example can cause physical as well as psychological harm if the impact of those campaigns results in violence between groups .
Likewise cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could lead to incidents of public disorder , ” he warned .
The gray zone creates myriad options for attackers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dock in a British port was hijacked , apparently by criminals .
The police responded , assisted by the Coast Guard .
But what would happen in a case of multiple hijackings where the perpetrators may or may not be acting on behalf of a hostile government ?
And what to do if a country finds itself confronted with a string of such incidents ?
In today ’ s and tomorrow ’ s gray zone situations , a military response may be too heavy-handed or ill-suited for the task .
The fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the gray zone between war and peace is , of course , precisely the reason why other countries are now targeting it .
Western leaders would do well to turn to Napoleon for advice .
After the French Revolution , Napoleon professionalized an existing royal police force and tasked the new Gendarmerie with maintaining order not just in the republic but in its far-flung territories as well .
Soon the Gendarmerie had been adopted in Spain , the Netherlands , and the country that ’ s now Italy .
It was a completely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ French Gendarmes policing colonies that had hadn ’ t been consulted as to whether they , in fact , wanted to be colonies .
But today Gendarmerie forces , with their unique blend of policing and military expertise , may be a perfect answer to the troubles facing countries today .
To be sure , police departments respond to unrest in their area—but they ’ re not set up for large or complex crises , and they ’ re local .
“ Gendarmerie-type forces can be a valuable asset in such a situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the national level and therefore able to be deployed to trouble spots to reinforce local police services , ” Lawson said .
The fact that Gendarmes have both policing and soldiering expertise ( “ blue and green ” ) and typically serve under both the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry also makes them perfectly positioned to tackle violence of an unclear nature .
To protect itself against blended violence , Western countries need blended defense .
Among NATO members , France , Italy , Spain , the Netherlands , and more recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equipped than their allies for whichever sub-Article 5 tricks a hostile country might try .
Italy ’ s Carabinieri , for example , already train for internal disturbances and a variety of terrorist attacks , and for the past three years they ’ ve also been training companies in terrorism response .
Airport managers , manufacturing executives , and arms manufacturers—a cross section of Italian industry—have been trained in how to spot and identify an attack , how to react to it , and how to limit the risk to innocent bystanders .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to set up a net of ‘ watchers ’ who are able to spot reconnaissance terrorist activity and to stop a terrorist attack in its earliest phase , ” Maj. Paolo Volonté , one of the officers in charge of the training , told me .
That training could easily be expanded to include hostile-state attacks , including foreign attacks masquerading as domestic violence or terrorist acts .
There is a challenge , however : In countries whose policing wasn ’ t influenced by Napoleon two centuries ago , blue-and-green forces are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home ; the armed forces fight hostile countries .
Many Nordic , Baltic , and Central and Eastern European countries , meanwhile , have Home Guards that function as a citizen reserve for all manner of contingencies .
But while Home Guards are useful , they lack the expertise of Gendarmes .
Indeed , police departments and armed forces from lots of countries could add expertise by studying the Gendarmes , the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee , the Guarda Nacional Republicana of Portugal , the Spanish Guardia Civil , and the Carabinieri .
Their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team up with police agencies for gray-zone exercises that could also include businesses , as I proposed in a recent paper .
Around the world , there ’ s an increasing need for men and women better trained and equipped than regular constables but who are not quite soldiers .
In places like Kosovo , Afghanistan , Iraq , Lebanon , and Bosnia-Herzegovina , Gendarmes are constantly called upon to fix the so-called security gap—where the lack of peace creates lawlessness that no tank can solve and which police officers are incapable of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a constant shortcoming of U.N. peacekeeping : The blue helmets are of little value if there ’ s no peace to keep .
If Scandinavian peacekeepers had been sent to Nagorno-Karabakh , would they have been able to handle a chaotic and potentially violent reality on the ground ?
As things stand , the Russian peacekeepers are likely to be effective in tackling violence but hardly in creating stability and advancing the rule of law .
That illustrates why the West needs to have a credible alternative on offer .
The need for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear during the highly complex Kosovo conflict in the early 1990s .
“ It wasn ’ t war , but it wasn ’ t peace either , ” Gen. Mike Jackson told me .
“ It was a really difficult situation , especially since the police , who were Serbs , had left .
Having a third-force contingent , in this case Carabinieri , was very useful.
” Jackson , the British general who commanded the NATO-led Implementation Force ( IFOR ) charged with creating stability in Kosovo , recalled when IFOR ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the colonel commanding it came to see him .
“ I said , ‘ It ’ s like a mafia here.
’ He said , ‘ Mafia ?
I can do mafia.
’ ” There has , in fact , been Gendarme-inspired innovation in recent years : the Italian town of Vicenza now hosts not one but three relatively new outfits dedicated to keeping order in struggling countries : the European Gendarmerie Force deploys gendarmes to countries including Afghanistan , Haiti , Libya , Mali , Ukraine , and Bosnia-Herzegovina .
The Center @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primarily by the U.S. State Department , and with a U.S. Army colonel as its deputy director—trains police officers and soldiers from developing nations in so-called peace support operations .
And the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence serves as NATO ’ s think tank focusing on so-called stability policing , the task of fixing the security gap that now typically falls to Gendarmes .
Thanks to Napoleon , a few Western countries are finding themselves with a surprisingly useful tool .
While not many other countries want to launch a Gendarmerie , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ core skill of keeping order in the gray zone , both at home and in international hotspots .
To succeed , the centers in Vicenza will have to train many more students .
The world can ’ t expect Italy—the long-standing leader in Gendarme deployments—to always take the lead in attending to a world of proliferating security gaps .

“We believe that both parties should accept Scandinavian peacekeepers and we're working with Scandinavian governments to put together a peacekeeping force that could deployed into the region to keep a ceasefire,” U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said last month, referring to fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. It didn’t take long for Russia to respond—by brokering a peace deal and sending in peacekeepers of its own.
“We believe that both parties should accept Scandinavian peacekeepers and we’re working with Scandinavian governments to put together a peacekeeping force that could deployed into the region to keep a ceasefire,” U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien said last month, referring to fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. It didn’t take long for Russia to respond—by brokering a peace deal and sending in peacekeepers of its own.
Until the recent outbreak of all-out war in Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation in the disputed region was regarded as a so-called frozen conflict—not quite war but not quite peace. This is becoming the norm; indeed, all over the world, the gray zone between war and peace is growing. But there’s good news. A model thought up by Napoleon more than two centuries ago may be the perfect answer to not-quite-war conflicts.
In 1939 and 1940, when Nazi Germany was invading virtually all of its neighbors, Switzerland’s Defense Minister, Rudolf Minger, kept a note attached to the doorbell of his home: “In case of war, please ring twice.” Today, it would be impossible to know when to ring twice. Consider what happened six and a half years ago, when so-called little green men who looked Russian but bore no insignia appeared eastern Ukraine.
Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the alliance didn’t have to decide whether to invoke its famous Article 5 that guarantees all members will come to the aid of any ally under attack. But Ukraine won’t be the last country to find itself in a confusing state between peace and war. In the South China Sea, China has illegally built islands that now mark China’s presence in the strategic waters; it has even turned its man-made presence into a military installation.
Although the U.S. election last week proceeded without major meddling by foreign powers, today virtually every Western country finds itself the target of disinformation, cyberattacks, and subversive behavior directed by hostile governments. “Hybrid threats are deliberately designed to stay below the threshold of a conventional military response, but at the same time they include activities that risk civilian harm,” said Ewan Lawson, a former Royal Air Force officer now affiliated with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London defense and security think tank. “Information campaigns designed to stir up discontent between groups within a society for example can cause physical as well as psychological harm if the impact of those campaigns results in violence between groups. Likewise cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could lead to incidents of public disorder,” he warned.
The gray zone creates myriad options for attackers. In October, an oil tanker waiting to dock in a British port was hijacked, apparently by criminals. The police responded, assisted by the Coast Guard. But what would happen in a case of multiple hijackings where the perpetrators may or may not be acting on behalf of a hostile government? And what to do if a country finds itself confronted with a string of such incidents? In today’s and tomorrow’s gray zone situations, a military response may be too heavy-handed or ill-suited for the task. The fact that most countries lack real defense in the gray zone between war and peace is, of course, precisely the reason why other countries are now targeting it.
Western leaders would do well to turn to Napoleon for advice. After the French Revolution, Napoleon professionalized an existing royal police force and tasked the new Gendarmerie with maintaining order not just in the republic but in its far-flung territories as well. Soon the Gendarmerie had been adopted in Spain, the Netherlands, and the country that’s now Italy. It was a completely different world, of course, with French Gendarmes policing colonies that had hadn’t been consulted as to whether they, in fact, wanted to be colonies. But today Gendarmerie forces, with their unique blend of policing and military expertise, may be a perfect answer to the troubles facing countries today.
To be sure, police departments respond to unrest in their area—but they’re not set up for large or complex crises, and they’re local. “Gendarmerie-type forces can be a valuable asset in such a situation, generally being funded and controlled at the national level and therefore able to be deployed to trouble spots to reinforce local police services,” Lawson said. The fact that Gendarmes have both policing and soldiering expertise (“blue and green”) and typically serve under both the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry also makes them perfectly positioned to tackle violence of an unclear nature. To protect itself against blended violence, Western countries need blended defense.
Among NATO members, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and more recent joiners such as Portugal find themselves better equipped than their allies for whichever sub-Article 5 tricks a hostile country might try. Italy’s Carabinieri, for example, already train for internal disturbances and a variety of terrorist attacks, and for the past three years they’ve also been training companies in terrorism response.
Airport managers, manufacturing executives, and arms manufacturers—a cross section of Italian industry—have been trained in how to spot and identify an attack, how to react to it, and how to limit the risk to innocent bystanders. “The main goal of this activity is to set up a net of ‘watchers’ who are able to spot reconnaissance terrorist activity and to stop a terrorist attack in its earliest phase,” Maj. Paolo Volonté, one of the officers in charge of the training, told me. That training could easily be expanded to include hostile-state attacks, including foreign attacks masquerading as domestic violence or terrorist acts.
There is a challenge, however: In countries whose policing wasn’t influenced by Napoleon two centuries ago, blue-and-green forces are anathema. The police maintain order at home; the armed forces fight hostile countries. Many Nordic, Baltic, and Central and Eastern European countries, meanwhile, have Home Guards that function as a citizen reserve for all manner of contingencies. But while Home Guards are useful, they lack the expertise of Gendarmes.
Indeed, police departments and armed forces from lots of countries could add expertise by studying the Gendarmes, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the Guarda Nacional Republicana of Portugal, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Carabinieri. Their armed forces including Home Guards could also team up with police agencies for gray-zone exercises that could also include businesses, as I proposed in a recent paper.
Around the world, there’s an increasing need for men and women better trained and equipped than regular constables but who are not quite soldiers. In places like Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gendarmes are constantly called upon to fix the so-called security gap—where the lack of peace creates lawlessness that no tank can solve and which police officers are incapable of tackling.
Gendarmes’ capabilities also highlight a constant shortcoming of U.N. peacekeeping: The blue helmets are of little value if there’s no peace to keep. If Scandinavian peacekeepers had been sent to Nagorno-Karabakh, would they have been able to handle a chaotic and potentially violent reality on the ground? As things stand, the Russian peacekeepers are likely to be effective in tackling violence but hardly in creating stability and advancing the rule of law. That illustrates why the West needs to have a credible alternative on offer.
The need for Gendarmerie skills in modern conflicts first became clear during the highly complex Kosovo conflict in the early 1990s. “It wasn’t war, but it wasn’t peace either,” Gen. Mike Jackson told me. “It was a really difficult situation, especially since the police, who were Serbs, had left. Having a third-force contingent, in this case Carabinieri, was very useful.” Jackson, the British general who commanded the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) charged with creating stability in Kosovo, recalled when IFOR’s Carabinieri unit arrived in Kosovo and the colonel commanding it came to see him. “I said, ‘It’s like a mafia here.’ He said, ‘Mafia? I can do mafia.’”
There has, in fact, been Gendarme-inspired innovation in recent years: the Italian town of Vicenza now hosts not one but three relatively new outfits dedicated to keeping order in struggling countries: the European Gendarmerie Force deploys gendarmes to countries including Afghanistan, Haiti, Libya, Mali, Ukraine, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units—paid for primarily by the U.S. State Department, and with a U.S. Army colonel as its deputy director—trains police officers and soldiers from developing nations in so-called peace support operations. And the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence serves as NATO’s think tank focusing on so-called stability policing, the task of fixing the security gap that now typically falls to Gendarmes.
Thanks to Napoleon, a few Western countries are finding themselves with a surprisingly useful tool. While not many other countries want to launch a Gendarmerie, all would benefit from mastering the Gendarmes’ core skill of keeping order in the gray zone, both at home and in international hotspots. To succeed, the centers in Vicenza will have to train many more students. The world can’t expect Italy—the long-standing leader in Gendarme deployments—to always take the lead in attending to a world of proliferating security gaps.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-11--Austria, Not France, Is the Model for Europe’s Crackdown on Islamists

Austria , Not France , Is the Model for Europe ’ s Crackdown on Islamists As tragic as it was , the terrorist attack in Vienna on Nov. 2 was not a major surprise for Europe ’ s counterterrorism experts .
The events in Vienna and , a week earlier , in the French city of Nice have only brought back onto the radar of the general public a phenomenon that the European counterterrorism community knows well : The threat has never disappeared .
The terrorist threat is certainly less acute than it was in the years 2014-2017 , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic State , European jihadis struck the continent regularly and sometimes with devastating attacks .
But the European jihadi scene has certainly not evaporated .
The threat is multifaceted : There are lone wolves as well as small cells of self-radicalized sympathizers and jihadis who come from outside Europe to strike .
( The Vienna attacker was a mix of the two dynamics , as he came from a transnational milieu of Islamic State sympathizers but acted alone when he carried out the attack . )
In the case of Vienna , an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughout Europe over the years also seems to be at play .
The perpetrator had recently been convicted in Austria of trying to join the Islamic State , served only part of a short sentence , and was released early .
His early release and obviously loose post-release monitoring will unquestionably be scrutinized in the weeks to come ( and have already led to the head of Austrian intelligence stepping down ) .
But they are symptomatic of the difficulties European authorities experience in keeping tabs on radicalized and potentially dangerous individuals due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the many legal and bureaucratic challenges that constrain them .
It is also not overly surprising that Austria has been hit .
Beyond the cliché images of a placid Alpine country with a capital that regularly ranks first in the world ’ s quality of life rankings , in recent years Austria has faced high levels of jihadi radicalization .
Tellingly , the number of foreign fighters who left Austria to join the Islamic State ( as many as 300 ) is one of the highest per capita in Europe .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jihadi scene , historically created by Arab militants who have found refuge in Austria since the 1980s .
A prominent product of this scene was Mohamed Mahmoud , the son of an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood refugee in Vienna who started some of the first online jihadi platforms in German before joining the Islamic State in Syria and dying in a U.S. airstrike .
Over time , reflecting Austrian migratory flows , militants from the Balkans and Chechnya have come to dominate the country ’ s jihadi scene .
In Graz , Austria ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in other Austrian cities , a Salafi scene dominated by Bosnians , Kosovars , Albanians , and Macedonians has worried authorities for years and has produced a high number of radicalized individuals .
The flow between Austria and the Balkans is constant and involves militants , radical preachers , extremist literature , funds , and weapons ; there are also frequently ties to Albanian organized crime networks .
Equally concerning is the problem of radicalization of some segments of the Chechen diaspora , with ample connections to both organized crime and mixed martial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chechen youth who beheaded the French teacher Samuel Paty in October ) .
Austrian counterterrorism policy , despite some notable successes , has historically been quite toothless in facing this relatively large and sophisticated threat .
Problems include limited staff resources , legal difficulties in deporting foreign militants and dissolving extremist organizations , and , as the case of the Vienna attacker showed , very short sentences for convicted terrorist group members .
That is not to say that the current Austrian government , led by Chancellor Sebastian Kurz , has not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and , more broadly , Islamism .
To the contrary , over the last few years Kurz and his party have made confronting Islamism , in both its violent and nonviolent manifestations—which they see as strictly interlinked—one of their policy priorities .
In many ways , Kurz was a precursor to French President Emmanuel Macron .
Kurz has been proclaiming for years what the French president has been attracting attention for saying about “ Islamist separatism ” in recent months .
From the general vision of Islamism as a mortal threat to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ social cohesion of the country , down to specific concerns about foreign funding of domestic Islamist networks and the influence of Islamists in the education system , Macron and Kurz sing from the same hymn sheet .
The difference is that Kurz , having been in power longer , has already enacted some tangible measures .
In 2015 , for example , Austria passed important revisions to the Islamgesetz , the 1912 law that regulates the relationship between the Austrian state and the Muslim community .
The text , drafted largely by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Affairs , over which Kurz presided at the time , reorganized the criteria for the appointment of imams and forbade foreign funding of Islamic institutions .
Under Kurz ’ s leadership , Austria introduced a law banning the symbols of the Muslim Brotherhood , began procedures to shut down several extremist mosques and expel various imams , and created a permanent Observatory on Political Islam .
It is against this backdrop that , in the wee hours of Monday morning , Austrian security services conducted a large-scale operation against more than 70 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Muslim Brotherhood in the country .
In this operation , which is not connected to the Vienna attack , Austrian authorities are going after the bulk of the Islamist infrastructure in the country , alleging a series of wrongdoings that range from financial irregularities to terrorism support .
Ordinary Muslims might perceive the words of Kurz and Macron as being not against jihadism and Islamism , as the two leaders insist they are , but , rather , against Islam and their Muslim identity .
Austrian authorities , like Macron , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islam , which they see as two problematic but distinct phenomena .
But , at the same time , the proposition that the latter , with its polarizing and victimhood-focused narrative , creates a fertile environment for the former is increasingly accepted by policymakers and practitioners in both countries .
The attack in Vienna shocked Austrians , who have not become accustomed to brutal terrorist attacks like the French sadly have .
But it is likely that the events in Vienna and France will only strengthen the resolve of both countries ’ leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the backlash that this inevitably triggers .
Yet this is the biggest obstacle both Kurz and Macron face moving forward .
Their aggressive posture has received widespread and cross-party support in their countries , and other European leaders are increasingly looking at them with interest .
But , predictably , they have also attracted criticism .
Some objections , coming from known Islamist actors and supporters , can be fairly easily dismissed .
But there are broader and more justified concerns that ordinary Muslims , in Austria as in France , might perceive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being not against jihadism and Islamism , as the two leaders insist they are , but , rather , against Islam and their Muslim identity .
The goal of undermining extremists—whether violent or not—can only be achieved if the silent majority of Muslims support the effort and do not see themselves as targets .

As tragic as it was, the terrorist attack in Vienna on Nov. 2 was not a major surprise for Europe’s counterterrorism experts. The events in Vienna and, a week earlier, in the French city of Nice have only brought back onto the radar of the general public a phenomenon that the European counterterrorism community knows well: The threat has never disappeared.
As tragic as it was, the terrorist attack in Vienna on Nov. 2 was not a major surprise for Europe’s counterterrorism experts. The events in Vienna and, a week earlier, in the French city of Nice have only brought back onto the radar of the general public a phenomenon that the European counterterrorism community knows well: The threat has never disappeared.
The terrorist threat is certainly less acute than it was in the years 2014-2017, when, spurred by the sirens of the Islamic State, European jihadis struck the continent regularly and sometimes with devastating attacks. But the European jihadi scene has certainly not evaporated.
The threat is multifaceted: There are lone wolves as well as small cells of self-radicalized sympathizers and jihadis who come from outside Europe to strike. (The Vienna attacker was a mix of the two dynamics, as he came from a transnational milieu of Islamic State sympathizers but acted alone when he carried out the attack.)
In the case of Vienna, an additional frustrating dynamic seen time and again throughout Europe over the years also seems to be at play. The perpetrator had recently been convicted in Austria of trying to join the Islamic State, served only part of a short sentence, and was released early. His early release and obviously loose post-release monitoring will unquestionably be scrutinized in the weeks to come (and have already led to the head of Austrian intelligence stepping down). But they are symptomatic of the difficulties European authorities experience in keeping tabs on radicalized and potentially dangerous individuals due to both the large number of suspects and the many legal and bureaucratic challenges that constrain them.
It is also not overly surprising that Austria has been hit. Beyond the cliché images of a placid Alpine country with a capital that regularly ranks first in the world’s quality of life rankings, in recent years Austria has faced high levels of jihadi radicalization. Tellingly, the number of foreign fighters who left Austria to join the Islamic State (as many as 300) is one of the highest per capita in Europe. It is home to a large and sophisticated jihadi scene, historically created by Arab militants who have found refuge in Austria since the 1980s. A prominent product of this scene was Mohamed Mahmoud, the son of an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood refugee in Vienna who started some of the first online jihadi platforms in German before joining the Islamic State in Syria and dying in a U.S. airstrike.
Over time, reflecting Austrian migratory flows, militants from the Balkans and Chechnya have come to dominate the country’s jihadi scene. In Graz, Austria’s gateway to Eastern Europe, and in other Austrian cities, a Salafi scene dominated by Bosnians, Kosovars, Albanians, and Macedonians has worried authorities for years and has produced a high number of radicalized individuals.
The flow between Austria and the Balkans is constant and involves militants, radical preachers, extremist literature, funds, and weapons; there are also frequently ties to Albanian organized crime networks. Equally concerning is the problem of radicalization of some segments of the Chechen diaspora, with ample connections to both organized crime and mixed martial arts gyms (a passion shared by the Chechen youth who beheaded the French teacher Samuel Paty in October).
Austrian counterterrorism policy, despite some notable successes, has historically been quite toothless in facing this relatively large and sophisticated threat. Problems include limited staff resources, legal difficulties in deporting foreign militants and dissolving extremist organizations, and, as the case of the Vienna attacker showed, very short sentences for convicted terrorist group members.
That is not to say that the current Austrian government, led by Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, has not been aware of the problem of radicalization and, more broadly, Islamism. To the contrary, over the last few years Kurz and his party have made confronting Islamism, in both its violent and nonviolent manifestations—which they see as strictly interlinked—one of their policy priorities.
In many ways, Kurz was a precursor to French President Emmanuel Macron. Kurz has been proclaiming for years what the French president has been attracting attention for saying about “Islamist separatism” in recent months. From the general vision of Islamism as a mortal threat to the democratic life, integration, and the social cohesion of the country, down to specific concerns about foreign funding of domestic Islamist networks and the influence of Islamists in the education system, Macron and Kurz sing from the same hymn sheet. The difference is that Kurz, having been in power longer, has already enacted some tangible measures.
In 2015, for example, Austria passed important revisions to the Islamgesetz, the 1912 law that regulates the relationship between the Austrian state and the Muslim community. The text, drafted largely by the Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs, over which Kurz presided at the time, reorganized the criteria for the appointment of imams and forbade foreign funding of Islamic institutions. Under Kurz’s leadership, Austria introduced a law banning the symbols of the Muslim Brotherhood, began procedures to shut down several extremist mosques and expel various imams, and created a permanent Observatory on Political Islam.
It is against this backdrop that, in the wee hours of Monday morning, Austrian security services conducted a large-scale operation against more than 70 individuals and several organizations allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in the country. In this operation, which is not connected to the Vienna attack, Austrian authorities are going after the bulk of the Islamist infrastructure in the country, alleging a series of wrongdoings that range from financial irregularities to terrorism support.
Ordinary Muslims might perceive the words of Kurz and Macron as being not against jihadism and Islamism, as the two leaders insist they are, but, rather, against Islam and their Muslim identity.
Austrian authorities, like Macron, are clear in distinguishing between jihadism and political Islam, which they see as two problematic but distinct phenomena. But, at the same time, the proposition that the latter, with its polarizing and victimhood-focused narrative, creates a fertile environment for the former is increasingly accepted by policymakers and practitioners in both countries.
The attack in Vienna shocked Austrians, who have not become accustomed to brutal terrorist attacks like the French sadly have. But it is likely that the events in Vienna and France will only strengthen the resolve of both countries’ leaders to challenge all forms of Islamism—irrespective of the backlash that this inevitably triggers. Yet this is the biggest obstacle both Kurz and Macron face moving forward. Their aggressive posture has received widespread and cross-party support in their countries, and other European leaders are increasingly looking at them with interest. But, predictably, they have also attracted criticism.
Some objections, coming from known Islamist actors and supporters, can be fairly easily dismissed. But there are broader and more justified concerns that ordinary Muslims, in Austria as in France, might perceive the words of Kurz and Macron as being not against jihadism and Islamism, as the two leaders insist they are, but, rather, against Islam and their Muslim identity.
The goal of undermining extremists—whether violent or not—can only be achieved if the silent majority of Muslims support the effort and do not see themselves as targets.


The Power Delusion

A week after voting concluded , the United States still seems more polarized than at any time in recent history .
Yet one area of bipartisan consensus seems to be the need for a more competitive approach to China .
Indeed , in their final presidential debate , Donald Trump and Joe Biden sparred over who would be tougher on Beijing .
As the U.S.-China competition heats up , one key question is whether this rivalry is primarily about power or ideology .
Some prominent thinkers , like Robert Kaplan and Elbridge Colby , have argued that China poses a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it would be a “ catastrophic mistake ” to view this competition primarily through an ideological lens .
They contend that the United States would be worried about China ’ s rise even if it were a democracy and that a focus on the ideological dimension of the challenge complicates Washington ’ s ability to court nondemocratic allies and paints the rivalry in unnecessary absolutist terms .
They conclude that an “ insistence on ideological concordance or total victory is a fool ’ s errand—and quite possibly an invitation to disaster.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home .
But it would also be an invitation to disaster if Washington were to overlook the important ideological element of this challenge .
This is not a competition with a generic China but with the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
The differences in governing systems between a democratic United States and an autocratic China matter not just for idealistic reasons like defending democracy and human rights ( though they are important ) but also for practical , hard-power concerns .
That ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poses abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home .
Moreover , formulating the best U.S. and allied strategy for addressing the challenge requires a clear-eyed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of autocratic versus democratic systems .
An “ either-or ” framing makes for good debate , but both power and ideology matter when it comes to U.S.-China competition .
But what China does with its great power—and , therefore , the threat that it poses—is heavily shaped by its domestic political system .
Contrary to the power-centric argument , the foremost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing wealthy but that it is systematically preying on the global economic system .
The CCP engages in unfair trading practices , including intellectual property theft , state subsidies to Chinese firms , and restrictions on foreign firms operating in China .
This is not just normal great-power politics but behavior peculiar to an autocratic nation .
Economists have shown that open markets and free politics tend to go hand in hand .
Further , political scientists have found that democracies are more likely to make and abide by international economic agreements .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trade Organization were set up by a club of democracies that , for the most part , play by the rules and expect other countries to do the same .
But the CCP has not done so .
Instead , it systematically violates the rules to achieve an unfair advantage .
Indeed , it will be difficult for China ever to come into full compliance with global trading standards without fundamentally altering its domestic political and economic model .
The same is true of the military threat .
China is currently involved in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its neighbors , including Taiwan , India , Japan , the Philippines , and others .
Beijing is employing military coercion in these disputes , and all are possible flash points for armed conflict .
It is unlikely that a liberal democratic China would behave in this way .
Lacking institutionalized sources of legitimacy , the CCP stokes nationalist sentiment to maintain domestic support , giving assertions of territorial claims against foreign enemies an outsized role in Chinese foreign policy .
There is a real risk that China ’ s disputes with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing is governed by the CCP .
It should go without saying , but it is hard to imagine that a liberal democratic China would engage in the ethnic cleansing of its minority populations , develop 21st-century tools of autocratic control that it exports to other dictators , or employ economic coercion and disinformation in an attempt to undermine democratic practices in the free world .
Unfortunately , as Chinese power has grown , freedom has retreated , with the number of democracies globally declining in each of the past 14 years .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including by silencing free speech critical of China in the United States and other established democracies .
This is a problem .
The United States defends democracy at home and abroad because it believes that all people have a right to these universal values—but also because it advances its core interests .
To recognize that the growing Chinese military , economic , and governance threat is heavily shaped by Beijing ’ s autocratic political system is not to engage in abstract moralizing but , rather , is essential for a clear-eyed understanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to focus on power , but it would simply be unrealistic to ignore the ideological component of the China threat .
As I argue in a recent book , America ’ s democratic system provides it with many advantages in this competition , just as China ’ s autocratic form of government hinders its effectiveness in this competition .
To be sure , there are autocratic strengths and democratic weaknesses , as well , and the drawbacks of the U.S. political system are on full display this week .
A chaotic election , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership transition , is reducing the credibility of the U.S. model in the world ’ s eyes and providing an opening for authoritarians to critique it .
But the U.S. system ’ s special ability to generate enormous wealth , power , and influence on the global stage more than outweighs these liabilities .
Democratic systems tend to produce sound economic institutions that spark innovation and generate high , long-run rates of economic growth .
America has been the world ’ s largest economy since the 1890s and its innovation leader since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Wall Street and U.S. Treasurys remain the world ’ s safest investments , placing the United States at the center of the global financial system .
Democracies are better at building alliances and partnerships , and America ’ s global network of friends , including 29 other members of NATO , Japan , South Korea , Australia , and others , combine to make up 59 percent of global GDP .
Democracies also tend to win the wars they fight , and the United States remains the world ’ s only military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same time , the CCP is undermining China ’ s effectiveness .
Dictators prioritize economic control over economic performance .
President Xi Jinping is renationalizing parts of the Chinese economy and backtracking on Beijing ’ s promised economic reforms , even though this stalls China ’ s growth .
Dictators like Xi struggle to forge enduring international friendships , and unfavorable views of China have reached all-time highs around the world .
Finally , autocracies ’ greatest weakness is domestic insecurity .
China spends more on internal repression than on its military .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ CCP is more afraid of Uighurs and protesters in Hong Kong than of the Pentagon .
These U.S. and allied strengths and Chinese weaknesses should be exploited in any successful competitive strategy .
But ignoring these ideological differences would cause the West to overlook its significant competitive advantages with potentially disastrous consequences .
They claim that Washington will need to work with autocratic countries , like Vietnam and Singapore , whose interests are also threatened by China ’ s assertive behavior but that the United States will alienate them if it emphasizes China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also a false choice .
Washington can recognize the ideological dimension of this challenge and emphasize it to rally the free world even as it maintains pragmatic security partnerships with friendly autocratic governments .
Indeed , U.S. foreign policy has followed just such an approach for decades with great success , including its current policy of aligning with nondemocratic Gulf states , like the United Arab Emirates , against Iran .
Those who minimize the threat of CCP ideology also claim that an ideological competition requires that Washington pursue maximalist goals like dismantling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow .
The United States and its allies and partners can recognize and exploit the ideological dimensions of this competition even as they set modest goals .
Indeed , the goal of great-power competition should be to change the minds of China ’ s leaders and encourage them to follow a more cooperative approach , regardless of whether they stand behind the CCP banner in the years to come .
Finally , critics charge that taking ideology seriously requires believing that overthrowing the CCP and spreading liberal democracy throughout the world will end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is also a non sequitur .
Conflicts of interest would certainly remain between a democratic China and the United States , but they would be different , and likely less severe , than those that exist today .
The resulting relationship would be more akin to present U.S. frustrations with India or the European Union than to a global death match .
There is an undeniable ideological dimension to U.S.-China competition , and Washington should embrace it .
If these were just morally equivalent great powers jockeying for position , then other nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , would be reluctant to choose a side .
The United States and China are not morally equivalent .
The United States is the leader of the free world and the principal architect of a rules-based international system that has brought the world 75 years of unprecedented peace , prosperity , and freedom .
China under the CCP is a revisionist autocracy vying to disrupt and displace this system .
If it succeeds , the consequences could include increased conflict and decreased standards of living and human rights within the CCP ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , globally .
This competition is about more than power politics—and freedom-loving people worldwide should recognize they have a direct stake in its outcome .

A week after voting concluded, the United States still seems more polarized than at any time in recent history. Yet one area of bipartisan consensus seems to be the need for a more competitive approach to China. Indeed, in their final presidential debate, Donald Trump and Joe Biden sparred over who would be tougher on Beijing.
A week after voting concluded, the United States still seems more polarized than at any time in recent history. Yet one area of bipartisan consensus seems to be the need for a more competitive approach to China. Indeed, in their final presidential debate, Donald Trump and Joe Biden sparred over who would be tougher on Beijing.
As the U.S.-China competition heats up, one key question is whether this rivalry is primarily about power or ideology. Some prominent thinkers, like Robert Kaplan and Elbridge Colby, have argued that China poses a threat because of its growing power and that it would be a “catastrophic mistake” to view this competition primarily through an ideological lens.
They contend that the United States would be worried about China’s rise even if it were a democracy and that a focus on the ideological dimension of the challenge complicates Washington’s ability to court nondemocratic allies and paints the rivalry in unnecessary absolutist terms. They conclude that an “insistence on ideological concordance or total victory is a fool’s errand—and quite possibly an invitation to disaster.”
The nature of the threat China poses abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home.
But it would also be an invitation to disaster if Washington were to overlook the important ideological element of this challenge. This is not a competition with a generic China but with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The differences in governing systems between a democratic United States and an autocratic China matter not just for idealistic reasons like defending democracy and human rights (though they are important) but also for practical, hard-power concerns.
That’s because the nature of the threat China poses abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home. Moreover, formulating the best U.S. and allied strategy for addressing the challenge requires a clear-eyed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of autocratic versus democratic systems.
An “either-or” framing makes for good debate, but both power and ideology matter when it comes to U.S.-China competition.
The China challenge is to a large degree about power. China possesses the world’s second-largest economy, and it could surpass the United States to take the top spot in the coming decade. Its military investments have shifted the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, leading former U.S. defense officials to warn that a World War III pitting the United States against China is possible and that the United States might very well lose. These threats are not primarily about ideology. After all, many autocratic countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have poor human rights records, but they are not Washington’s top priority because they are not openly hostile, nor are they great powers.
But what China does with its great power—and, therefore, the threat that it poses—is heavily shaped by its domestic political system. Contrary to the power-centric argument, the foremost economic concern is not that China is growing wealthy but that it is systematically preying on the global economic system.
The CCP engages in unfair trading practices, including intellectual property theft, state subsidies to Chinese firms, and restrictions on foreign firms operating in China. This is not just normal great-power politics but behavior peculiar to an autocratic nation. Economists have shown that open markets and free politics tend to go hand in hand. Further, political scientists have found that democracies are more likely to make and abide by international economic agreements.
The global economic system and the World Trade Organization were set up by a club of democracies that, for the most part, play by the rules and expect other countries to do the same. But the CCP has not done so. Instead, it systematically violates the rules to achieve an unfair advantage. Indeed, it will be difficult for China ever to come into full compliance with global trading standards without fundamentally altering its domestic political and economic model.
The same is true of the military threat. China is currently involved in territorial and maritime disputes with several of its neighbors, including Taiwan, India, Japan, the Philippines, and others. Beijing is employing military coercion in these disputes, and all are possible flash points for armed conflict. It is unlikely that a liberal democratic China would behave in this way. Lacking institutionalized sources of legitimacy, the CCP stokes nationalist sentiment to maintain domestic support, giving assertions of territorial claims against foreign enemies an outsized role in Chinese foreign policy. There is a real risk that China’s disputes with its democratic neighbors will turn violent largely because Beijing is governed by the CCP.
It should go without saying, but it is hard to imagine that a liberal democratic China would engage in the ethnic cleansing of its minority populations, develop 21st-century tools of autocratic control that it exports to other dictators, or employ economic coercion and disinformation in an attempt to undermine democratic practices in the free world.
Unfortunately, as Chinese power has grown, freedom has retreated, with the number of democracies globally declining in each of the past 14 years. China’s sharp-power practices are working, including by silencing free speech critical of China in the United States and other established democracies. This is a problem. The United States defends democracy at home and abroad because it believes that all people have a right to these universal values—but also because it advances its core interests.
To recognize that the growing Chinese military, economic, and governance threat is heavily shaped by Beijing’s autocratic political system is not to engage in abstract moralizing but, rather, is essential for a clear-eyed understanding of the challenge. Realists urge scholars to focus on power, but it would simply be unrealistic to ignore the ideological component of the China threat.
Understanding the ideological dimension of this competition is also necessary for developing a sound strategy. The U.S. national security community often obsesses over an enemy’s strengths and Washington’s weaknesses, but good strategy often begins by leveraging one’s own strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses.
As I argue in a recent book, America’s democratic system provides it with many advantages in this competition, just as China’s autocratic form of government hinders its effectiveness in this competition. To be sure, there are autocratic strengths and democratic weaknesses, as well, and the drawbacks of the U.S. political system are on full display this week.
A chaotic election, complete with legal machinations and a stalled leadership transition, is reducing the credibility of the U.S. model in the world’s eyes and providing an opening for authoritarians to critique it. But the U.S. system’s special ability to generate enormous wealth, power, and influence on the global stage more than outweighs these liabilities.
Democratic systems tend to produce sound economic institutions that spark innovation and generate high, long-run rates of economic growth. America has been the world’s largest economy since the 1890s and its innovation leader since the time of Thomas Edison. Companies listed on Wall Street and U.S. Treasurys remain the world’s safest investments, placing the United States at the center of the global financial system.
Democracies are better at building alliances and partnerships, and America’s global network of friends, including 29 other members of NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others, combine to make up 59 percent of global GDP. Democracies also tend to win the wars they fight, and the United States remains the world’s only military superpower with global power-projecting capabilities
At the same time, the CCP is undermining China’s effectiveness. Dictators prioritize economic control over economic performance. President Xi Jinping is renationalizing parts of the Chinese economy and backtracking on Beijing’s promised economic reforms, even though this stalls China’s growth.
Dictators like Xi struggle to forge enduring international friendships, and unfavorable views of China have reached all-time highs around the world. Finally, autocracies’ greatest weakness is domestic insecurity. China spends more on internal repression than on its military. If you follow the money, the CCP is more afraid of Uighurs and protesters in Hong Kong than of the Pentagon.
These U.S. and allied strengths and Chinese weaknesses should be exploited in any successful competitive strategy. But ignoring these ideological differences would cause the West to overlook its significant competitive advantages with potentially disastrous consequences.
Those who dismiss the ideological nature of this challenge argue that viewing China through an ideological lens would undermine the U.S. strategy in a variety of ways, but they are mistaken.
They claim that Washington will need to work with autocratic countries, like Vietnam and Singapore, whose interests are also threatened by China’s assertive behavior but that the United States will alienate them if it emphasizes China’s autocratic politics. This is also a false choice.
Washington can recognize the ideological dimension of this challenge and emphasize it to rally the free world even as it maintains pragmatic security partnerships with friendly autocratic governments. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy has followed just such an approach for decades with great success, including its current policy of aligning with nondemocratic Gulf states, like the United Arab Emirates, against Iran.
Those who minimize the threat of CCP ideology also claim that an ideological competition requires that Washington pursue maximalist goals like dismantling the CCP, but this does not follow. The United States and its allies and partners can recognize and exploit the ideological dimensions of this competition even as they set modest goals. Indeed, the goal of great-power competition should be to change the minds of China’s leaders and encourage them to follow a more cooperative approach, regardless of whether they stand behind the CCP banner in the years to come.
Finally, critics charge that taking ideology seriously requires believing that overthrowing the CCP and spreading liberal democracy throughout the world will end all of our problems. But this is also a non sequitur. Conflicts of interest would certainly remain between a democratic China and the United States, but they would be different, and likely less severe, than those that exist today. The resulting relationship would be more akin to present U.S. frustrations with India or the European Union than to a global death match.
There is an undeniable ideological dimension to U.S.-China competition, and Washington should embrace it. If these were just morally equivalent great powers jockeying for position, then other nations, even traditional U.S. allies in Europe, would be reluctant to choose a side.
The United States and China are not morally equivalent. The United States is the leader of the free world and the principal architect of a rules-based international system that has brought the world 75 years of unprecedented peace, prosperity, and freedom. China under the CCP is a revisionist autocracy vying to disrupt and displace this system.
If it succeeds, the consequences could include increased conflict and decreased standards of living and human rights within the CCP’s sphere of influence and, over time, globally. This competition is about more than power politics—and freedom-loving people worldwide should recognize they have a direct stake in its outcome.