foreignpolicy--2020-08-25--TikTok to Sue U.S. Government Over Trump’s Ban

TikTok to Sue U.S. Government Over Trump ’ s Ban Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : TikTok announces plans to sue the U.S. government , the Republican Party formally nominates Trump for president , and Ivory Coast ’ s president will seek a controversial third term .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The popular video-sharing platform TikTok said on Monday that it is suing the U.S. government over President Donald Trump ’ s recent executive orders banning the app in the United States , representing the latest development in the ongoing dispute between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The lawsuit is TikTok ’ s first direct challenge to Washington since the Trump administration introduced the ban earlier this month .
In its complaint , TikTok accused the government of failing to provide sufficient evidence to show that it poses a credible threat to U.S. national security , and that it didn ’ t allow TikTok to present evidence to defend itself .
It also claims that the White House ’ s use of emergency powers to issue the executive order was illegal .
Scoring political points .
The complaint took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accused Trump of using the ban to score political points against China , calling it a “ political decision ” aimed at boosting Trump ’ s efforts to “ campaign on an anti-China platform.
” It specifically cited his references to the coronavirus as the “ China virus ” and other labels that aim to pin the blame for the pandemic on Beijing which collectively demonstrate his anti-China tilt .
Taking aim at Beijing .
Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the consequent collapse of the U.S. economy , Trump has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of his reelection campaign .
In recent months , he has ramped up the pressure significantly , butting heads with Beijing over such issues as security , trade , diplomacy , and technology .
The TikTok ban was widely considered a part of this effort .
Originally set to begin on Sep. 15 , Trump recently extended the ban ’ s start date to Nov. 12 , meaning the lawsuit could drag on well into the upcoming campaign , setting up a major showdown between the two governments as Trump readies himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Republican Party nominates Trump .
On Monday , Trump was formally nominated by the Republican Party to stand as its candidate for president , kicking off the week-long Republican National Convention ( RNC ) .
Trump used the occasion to cast doubt over the electoral process , accusing Democrats of “ using Covid to steal the election ” and implying that the coronavirus lockdown has been engineered by his opponents to undermine his credibility .
Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh covered the first day of the convention , warning that Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groundwork for claiming victory in the election no matter the results .
Prior to the start of the convention , the Republican National Committee released its policy platform—which , unusually , didn ’ t contain any new policy positions but simply reaffirmed the party ’ s “ enthusiastic support ” for Trump .
The move gives further credence to the belief that the 2020 election will be a de facto referendum on Trump himself .
No resolution in Mali .
West African representatives and Mali ’ s coup leaders concluded a round of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , throwing the political future of the country into further doubt .
Leaders from West Africa were dispatched to the country in the hopes of reversing last week ’ s military coup and restoring civilian rule , though it soon became clear that deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita would not be part of this process .
One of the coup ’ s leaders , Col. Ismael Wague , rejected earlier reports that the junta sought a three-year transitional government composed primarily of military personnel , telling reporters that “ nothing has been decided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point have we talked about military-majority government.
” Bombing in the Philippines .
A pair of explosions rocked the Philippine city of Jolo on Monday , killing 14 and injuring 75 in an attack authorities have blamed on Islamist militants linked to the Abu Sayyaf group .
No group has taken responsibility for the attack , but the region has become a hotbed for Islamist militant activity in recent years .
Abu Sayyaf is a small but violent jihadist group active mostly in the southern Philippines , and several of its factions have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One of the group ’ s leaders was arrested in the south earlier this month , and security forces were on alert for possible reprisal attacks .
Kim Jong Un death rumors .
A South Korean analyst claimed on Monday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has likely been comatose since April , rekindling rumors about the health of the country ’ s dictator .
These assertions come days after South Korean intelligence reported that Kim had delegated significant authority to his sister Kim Yo Jong , concluding that she has now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The rumors about Kim ’ s health are probably inaccurate , but the perpetual uncertainty surrounding the North Korean regime makes working with it exceptionally difficult , as Jessica Lee wrote for Foreign Policy after the last wave of rumors of Kim ’ s death .
Ouattara will seek third term in the Ivory Coast .
Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara announced on Monday that he has filed the paperwork to run for a third term in the country ’ s October presidential elections , a move opponents say is a violation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitution .
Ouattara floated the possibility of seeking a third term earlier this year , but opted instead to endorse then-Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly after facing resistance .
But Coulibaly ’ s sudden death in July revived calls for Ouattara to run , and after his RHDP alliance nominated him as their candidate last month , Ouattara was thrust back into the conversation .
His supporters argue that because his presidency started before the current constitution was ratified in 2016 , the two-term limit doesn ’ t apply to him .
Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign rolled out a policy document outlining the administration ’ s agenda for its second term , stating its desire to establish a “ permanent manned presence on the moon.
” Similar to the Space Race between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War , Trump ’ s vision seems to have strong nationalistic undertones .
China has already expressed a desire to colonize space .
Trump officials have long called for the United States to return to the moon .
In 2018 , Vice President Mike Pence hinted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Johnson Space Center : “ While our sights are once again set on our lunar neighbor , ” he said , “ this time we ’ re not content with just leaving behind footprints .
Or even to leave at all.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: TikTok announces plans to sue the U.S. government, the Republican Party formally nominates Trump for president, and Ivory Coast's president will seek a controversial third term.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: TikTok announces plans to sue the U.S. government, the Republican Party formally nominates Trump for president, and Ivory Coast’s president will seek a controversial third term.
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TikTok Hits Back at Trump’s Ban
The popular video-sharing platform TikTok said on Monday that it is suing the U.S. government over President Donald Trump’s recent executive orders banning the app in the United States, representing the latest development in the ongoing dispute between the White House and Chinese tech companies.
The lawsuit is TikTok’s first direct challenge to Washington since the Trump administration introduced the ban earlier this month. In its complaint, TikTok accused the government of failing to provide sufficient evidence to show that it poses a credible threat to U.S. national security, and that it didn’t allow TikTok to present evidence to defend itself. It also claims that the White House’s use of emergency powers to issue the executive order was illegal.
Scoring political points. The complaint took a broader view as well. It accused Trump of using the ban to score political points against China, calling it a “political decision” aimed at boosting Trump’s efforts to “campaign on an anti-China platform.” It specifically cited his references to the coronavirus as the “China virus” and other labels that aim to pin the blame for the pandemic on Beijing which collectively demonstrate his anti-China tilt.
Taking aim at Beijing. Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the consequent collapse of the U.S. economy, Trump has made getting tough on China a core part of his reelection campaign. In recent months, he has ramped up the pressure significantly, butting heads with Beijing over such issues as security, trade, diplomacy, and technology.
The TikTok ban was widely considered a part of this effort. Originally set to begin on Sep. 15, Trump recently extended the ban’s start date to Nov. 12, meaning the lawsuit could drag on well into the upcoming campaign, setting up a major showdown between the two governments as Trump readies himself to take on Democratic nominee Joe Biden.
What We’re Following Today
Republican Party nominates Trump. On Monday, Trump was formally nominated by the Republican Party to stand as its candidate for president, kicking off the week-long Republican National Convention (RNC). Trump used the occasion to cast doubt over the electoral process, accusing Democrats of “using Covid to steal the election” and implying that the coronavirus lockdown has been engineered by his opponents to undermine his credibility. Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh covered the first day of the convention, warning that Trump will use the RNC to lay the groundwork for claiming victory in the election no matter the results.
Prior to the start of the convention, the Republican National Committee released its policy platform—which, unusually, didn’t contain any new policy positions but simply reaffirmed the party’s “enthusiastic support” for Trump. The move gives further credence to the belief that the 2020 election will be a de facto referendum on Trump himself.
No resolution in Mali. West African representatives and Mali’s coup leaders concluded a round of talks on Monday without reaching a resolution, throwing the political future of the country into further doubt. Leaders from West Africa were dispatched to the country in the hopes of reversing last week’s military coup and restoring civilian rule, though it soon became clear that deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita would not be part of this process.
One of the coup’s leaders, Col. Ismael Wague, rejected earlier reports that the junta sought a three-year transitional government composed primarily of military personnel, telling reporters that “nothing has been decided,” and that “at no point have we talked about military-majority government.”
Bombing in the Philippines. A pair of explosions rocked the Philippine city of Jolo on Monday, killing 14 and injuring 75 in an attack authorities have blamed on Islamist militants linked to the Abu Sayyaf group. No group has taken responsibility for the attack, but the region has become a hotbed for Islamist militant activity in recent years.
Abu Sayyaf is a small but violent jihadist group active mostly in the southern Philippines, and several of its factions have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. One of the group’s leaders was arrested in the south earlier this month, and security forces were on alert for possible reprisal attacks.
Keep an Eye On
Kim Jong Un death rumors. A South Korean analyst claimed on Monday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has likely been comatose since April, rekindling rumors about the health of the country’s dictator. These assertions come days after South Korean intelligence reported that Kim had delegated significant authority to his sister Kim Yo Jong, concluding that she has now effectively become the country’s second-in-command.
The rumors about Kim’s health are probably inaccurate, but the perpetual uncertainty surrounding the North Korean regime makes working with it exceptionally difficult, as Jessica Lee wrote for Foreign Policy after the last wave of rumors of Kim’s death.
Ouattara will seek third term in the Ivory Coast. Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara announced on Monday that he has filed the paperwork to run for a third term in the country’s October presidential elections, a move opponents say is a violation of the two-term limit set in the constitution. Ouattara floated the possibility of seeking a third term earlier this year, but opted instead to endorse then-Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly after facing resistance.
But Coulibaly’s sudden death in July revived calls for Ouattara to run, and after his RHDP alliance nominated him as their candidate last month, Ouattara was thrust back into the conversation. His supporters argue that because his presidency started before the current constitution was ratified in 2016, the two-term limit doesn’t apply to him.
Odds and Ends
Trump shoots for the moon. The Trump campaign rolled out a policy document outlining the administration’s agenda for its second term, stating its desire to establish a “permanent manned presence on the moon.” Similar to the Space Race between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, Trump’s vision seems to have strong nationalistic undertones. China has already expressed a desire to colonize space.
Trump officials have long called for the United States to return to the moon. In 2018, Vice President Mike Pence hinted at colonization in a speech at NASA’s Johnson Space Center: “While our sights are once again set on our lunar neighbor,” he said, “this time we’re not content with just leaving behind footprints. Or even to leave at all.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-25--Trump Can’t Have His Cake and Eat It Too on Iran Sanctions

Trump Can ’ t Have His Cake and Eat It Too on Iran Sanctions On Thursday , the United States delivered notification to the U.N. Security Council demanding a so-called snapback of all the previous U.N. sanctions against Iran under Resolution 2231 .
The Trump administration cited significant violations of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal , from which the United States withdrew in May 2018 .
All Security Council sanctions against the country were lifted under Resolution 2231 , which endorsed the nuclear deal .
Less than 24 hours after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo submitted the notice to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ council ’ s 15 permanent and nonpermanent members expressed opposition to U.S. efforts to reimpose the international sanctions against Tehran .
They stressed in their letters that because the Trump administration had withdrawn from the agreement , it had no right to invoke the deal to return the sanctions .
It is hard to believe that the U.S. administration has based its intention to trigger the mechanism on such a shallow and legally tenuous argument .
In a recent contribution to Foreign Policy , Richard Goldberg cited Resolution 2231 to justify the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s withdrawal from the deal .
In Goldberg ’ s opinion , the U.S. government retains a permanent right to invoke the resolution and use the snapback mechanism because the resolution does not say that a state that was once a participant in the nuclear deal can not use the dispute mechanism .
It is hard to believe that the U.S. administration has based its intention to trigger the mechanism on such a shallow and legally tenuous argument .
Without explaining the rights and duties of a participant , Goldberg cites the resolution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is still a participant in the nuclear deal .
The term “ participant ” is not a simple honorific title .
Participation in the nuclear deal , also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , includes participation in an agreement that started in 2015 and will continue until 2025 .
By no means is it acceptable for a country that withdrew from this participation in 2018 to remain a participant state .
The United States is either a participant in the deal and will remain in it until @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has withdrawn .
It is as simple as that .
The fact that the United States is no longer a participant has been admitted by key U.S. leaders and officials .
Indeed , upon the official announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal on May 8 , 2018 , under an executive order issued by President Donald Trump dubbed “ Ceasing U.S .
Participation in the JCPOA , ” the country officially announced that it had terminated its participation in the nuclear deal .
Trump mentioned ceasing U.S. participation in JCPOA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On May 11 , 2018 , the U.S. government—in a formal communication—officially informed all JCPOA participants that the United States would no longer participate in JCPOA-related meetings and activities .
Furthermore , Pompeo stated at the time that “ President Trump terminated the United States ’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
” The fact that the United States was described as a “ JCPOA participant ” in a paragraph of Resolution 2231 is purely descriptive ; it lists as a factual matter the participants at the time of the resolution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assuming that the United States is still a participant state , which it is not , Goldberg makes a second misleading argument related to the process of using the snapback mechanism .
He says the sanctions will automatically come back into force within 30 days after the U.S. government presents the U.N. Security Council with a notification .
A look at the text of the original resolution sheds light on this issue .
Paragraph 10 of Resolution 2231 explains how the countries participating in the JCPOA could use dispute resolution mechanisms ( discussed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal ) if Iran ’ s noncompliance were found to constitute “ significant non-performance.
” In fact , resorting to the snapback mechanism is the final stage of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism , which can restore previous U.N. resolutions that were suspended under Resolution 2231 .
A third flaw in Goldberg ’ s argument is his claim regarding a substantial breach of the international accord by Iran .
His argument is premised on the claim that Iran started breaching the accord before other parties ; he neglects to mention that the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States has blatantly violated the deal by reimposing various sanctions and imposing maximum pressure on Iran since it ceased its participation in 2018 , while Iran only gradually began to reduce its commitments exactly one year after the U.S. pullout in compliance with the mechanisms contained in the accord itself .
According to paragraph 36 of the deal , Iran can reduce its obligations , in full or in part , in the event of partial or substantial breach of obligations by other countries .
Even after Washington ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal for a full year as verified by 15 consecutive reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency .
Moreover , both John Bolton , Trump ’ s former national security advisor , and Brian Hook , the former U.S. special representative for Iran , have stressed that the United States has withdrawn from the JCPOA .
Finally , Goldberg ignores a general principle that exists in both Resolution 2231 and in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA : good faith in using dispute resolution mechanisms .
Good faith is a generally accepted principle in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Resorting to the snapback mechanism in line with the JCPOA and the resolution should only occur in order to resolve a dispute and to bring parties back to their obligations under the deal .
What the current U.S. administration has been doing and saying in relation to the JCPOA has suggested its intention to kill the deal rather than acting in good faith .
The Trump administration has not only refused to abide by its own commitments to the JCPOA , but it has also substantively prevented other parties to the deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from implementing their own commitments in accordance with the deal and Resolution 2231 since 2018 .
Far from ignoring multilateralism , as Goldberg contends , the other parties to the deal—Russia , China , and European governments—are upholding the principles of multilateralism while Washington practices an extreme form of unilateralism .

On Thursday, the United States delivered notification to the U.N. Security Council demanding a so-called snapback of all the previous U.N. sanctions against Iran under Resolution 2231. The Trump administration cited significant violations of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, from which the United States withdrew in May 2018. All Security Council sanctions against the country were lifted under Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal.
On Thursday, the United States delivered notification to the U.N. Security Council demanding a so-called snapback of all the previous U.N. sanctions against Iran under Resolution 2231. The Trump administration cited significant violations of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, from which the United States withdrew in May 2018. All Security Council sanctions against the country were lifted under Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal.
Less than 24 hours after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo submitted the notice to the Security Council, 13 of the council’s 15 permanent and nonpermanent members expressed opposition to U.S. efforts to reimpose the international sanctions against Tehran. They stressed in their letters that because the Trump administration had withdrawn from the agreement, it had no right to invoke the deal to return the sanctions.
It is hard to believe that the U.S. administration has based its intention to trigger the mechanism on such a shallow and legally tenuous argument.
In a recent contribution to Foreign Policy, Richard Goldberg cited Resolution 2231 to justify the U.S. call for snapback sanctions despite Washington’s withdrawal from the deal. In Goldberg’s opinion, the U.S. government retains a permanent right to invoke the resolution and use the snapback mechanism because the resolution does not say that a state that was once a participant in the nuclear deal cannot use the dispute mechanism.
It is hard to believe that the U.S. administration has based its intention to trigger the mechanism on such a shallow and legally tenuous argument.
Without explaining the rights and duties of a participant, Goldberg cites the resolution and wrongly argues that the United States is still a participant in the nuclear deal.
The term “participant” is not a simple honorific title. Participation in the nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), includes participation in an agreement that started in 2015 and will continue until 2025. By no means is it acceptable for a country that withdrew from this participation in 2018 to remain a participant state. The United States is either a participant in the deal and will remain in it until 2025 or it is not a participant and has withdrawn. It is as simple as that.
The fact that the United States is no longer a participant has been admitted by key U.S. leaders and officials. Indeed, upon the official announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal on May 8, 2018, under an executive order issued by President Donald Trump dubbed “Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA,” the country officially announced that it had terminated its participation in the nuclear deal. Trump mentioned ceasing U.S. participation in JCPOA four times in his executive order.
On May 11, 2018, the U.S. government—in a formal communication—officially informed all JCPOA participants that the United States would no longer participate in JCPOA-related meetings and activities.
Furthermore, Pompeo stated at the time that “President Trump terminated the United States’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”
The fact that the United States was described as a “JCPOA participant” in a paragraph of Resolution 2231 is purely descriptive; it lists as a factual matter the participants at the time of the resolution’s adoption in 2015.
Even assuming that the United States is still a participant state, which it is not, Goldberg makes a second misleading argument related to the process of using the snapback mechanism. He says the sanctions will automatically come back into force within 30 days after the U.S. government presents the U.N. Security Council with a notification.
A look at the text of the original resolution sheds light on this issue. Paragraph 10 of Resolution 2231 explains how the countries participating in the JCPOA could use dispute resolution mechanisms (discussed in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the deal) if Iran’s noncompliance were found to constitute “significant non-performance.”
In fact, resorting to the snapback mechanism is the final stage of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, which can restore previous U.N. resolutions that were suspended under Resolution 2231.
A third flaw in Goldberg’s argument is his claim regarding a substantial breach of the international accord by Iran. His argument is premised on the claim that Iran started breaching the accord before other parties; he neglects to mention that the United States violated the agreement first.
Indeed, the United States has blatantly violated the deal by reimposing various sanctions and imposing maximum pressure on Iran since it ceased its participation in 2018, while Iran only gradually began to reduce its commitments exactly one year after the U.S. pullout in compliance with the mechanisms contained in the accord itself.
According to paragraph 36 of the deal, Iran can reduce its obligations, in full or in part, in the event of partial or substantial breach of obligations by other countries. Even after Washington’s withdrawal, Tehran fully abided by the deal for a full year as verified by 15 consecutive reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Moreover, both John Bolton, Trump’s former national security advisor, and Brian Hook, the former U.S. special representative for Iran, have stressed that the United States has withdrawn from the JCPOA.
Finally, Goldberg ignores a general principle that exists in both Resolution 2231 and in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA: good faith in using dispute resolution mechanisms. Good faith is a generally accepted principle in the implementation of treaties and international agreements. Resorting to the snapback mechanism in line with the JCPOA and the resolution should only occur in order to resolve a dispute and to bring parties back to their obligations under the deal.
What the current U.S. administration has been doing and saying in relation to the JCPOA has suggested its intention to kill the deal rather than acting in good faith.
The Trump administration has not only refused to abide by its own commitments to the JCPOA, but it has also substantively prevented other parties to the deal as well as other U.N. member states from implementing their own commitments in accordance with the deal and Resolution 2231 since 2018.
Far from ignoring multilateralism, as Goldberg contends, the other parties to the deal—Russia, China, and European governments—are upholding the principles of multilateralism while Washington practices an extreme form of unilateralism.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-27--China Is Taking Advantage of India’s Intelligence Failures

In June , soldiers from India and China engaged in a violent skirmish along the two countries ’ unmarked border in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh .
At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed , along with an unspecified number of their Chinese counterparts , in what was the first such confrontation since 1975 that resulted in fatalities .
New Delhi and Beijing have now embarked on a fitful process of de-escalation .
But even as the two parties seek to restore some semblance of normalcy along their shared border , a critical question lingers : Why was India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ?
Local officials in Ladakh have in fact been sounding the alarm about Chinese forays into Indian territory for years , a fact that points to a complete breakdown in New Delhi ’ s intelligence gathering and risk assessment .
It wouldn ’ t be the first time .
And India doesn ’ t seem to be learning crucial lessons from previous security failures .
In the late 1950s , after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in minor clashes , China laid claim to significant tracts of territory along their disputed border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its so-called forward policy , sending in small contingents of lightly armed soldiers to assert India ’ s hold over the contested areas .
But without adequate firepower or logistical support , the policy had disastrous consequences : The strategy proved needlessly provocative in October 1962 , when the battle-hardened People ’ s Liberation Army attacked in force .
The Indian military , while displaying considerable valor , simply collapsed before the onslaught .
At its climax , the town of Tezpur in India ’ s northeast had to be evacuated in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t seem to be learning crucial lessons from previous security failures.The ease with which China overran Indian positions was also reflected in its seizure of the Galwan Valley in Ladakh .
Having demonstrated its ability to crush the Indian forces if needed , China announced a unilateral cease-fire the next month and withdrew from much of the Galwan Valley , among other locations .
But it retained much of the Aksai Chin plateau , an area of land roughly comparable in size to Switzerland .
How could India ’ s policymakers allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The failure stemmed from structural problems in India ’ s security apparatus : The Intelligence Bureau , the country ’ s apex intelligence organization , was simultaneously responsible for the collection , collation , and assessment of intelligence .
This was a flawed system because there was no meaningful external scrutiny of its conclusions that could detect weaknesses in their sourcing and analytic reasoning .
Worse still , there were no provisions for parliamentary oversight—a critical component common in many other countries .
The Intelligence Bureau was also starved of resources and mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And because the bureau was eager to support a policy that was designed to limit defense expenditures , it downplayed the imminent danger of Chinese aggression to policymakers , leading them to continue their forward policy and dismiss the mounting Chinese threats .
Not surprisingly , India found itself grossly unprepared to tackle China ’ s onslaught .
The military debacle of 1962 served as an important wake-up call for India .
New Delhi embarked on a significant military modernization program .
India authorized 10 new mountain warfare divisions as part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revamped its intelligence collection system by establishing a new Directorate General of Security focused on external intelligence .
As a result of these advances , India became better prepared to deal with new threats .
For example , when Pakistan sought to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir with special agents in 1965 , Indian forces were ready to respond with alacrity : The military sealed the disputed border , an action that took away Pakistan ’ s ability to subsequently surprise India when it launched its so-called Operation Grand Slam attack later that year to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commitment of forces to that operation , and its inability to break through the now well-fortified Indian lines , created an opening for India to counterattack across the international border in Punjab and at one point threaten the major Pakistani city of Lahore .
While the war eventually ended in a rough The military debacle of 1962 served as an important wake-up call for India.stalemate , this was still a far more impressive performance by Indian forces than in 1962 .
But India ’ s military didn ’ t keep up its pace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now sprawling Indian military was caught napping when Pakistan made significant incursions across the so-called Line of Control .
On May 3 of that year , an Indian shepherd notified local authorities that he had observed what seemed to be a cross-border intrusion .
But strangely , the military and intelligence authorities ignored this and several other local warnings , allowing Islamabad to consolidate its position .
Pakistan ’ s advances involved nearly 2,000 soldiers , who captured a 62-mile stretch of land as much as 6 miles deep within Indian territory .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Indian Army had to call in aerial support to dislodge the intruders from the commanding heights they had occupied .
But even the Air Force ’ s involvement was delayed : The Army took too long to share intelligence , which in turn slowed the eventual response .
After the conclusion of the conflict , the Kargil Review Committee was established to examine the war ’ s causes and India ’ s response to it .
Among its findings was that there was “ no institutional mechanism for co-ordination or objective-oriented interaction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consumers at different levels ” nor was there a mechanism “ for tasking the agencies , monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality.
” The feedback led to the establishment of two new intelligence bodies—the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Technical Research Organisation—to coordinate among various agencies .
However , a core problem identified in the Kargil report remains unaddressed to this day : the need for a rigorous central system for reconciling intelligence findings and providing consensus reports to policymakers at the pace mandated by often fast-moving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee and U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence are examples of such systems . )
The absence of such a central system in the Indian context leads to poor interagency information-sharing , the provision of improperly processed ( evaluated and contextualized ) intelligence to policymakers , and inadequate coordination of agencies to refocus on an emerging threat .
A disjointed Indian intelligence system appears to have permitted China the crucial time window to initially move forces into the contested areas of Ladakh .
India in fact holds a military advantage against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing with only one pathway to create a localized force advantage : through deception .
And so it was this year .
China ’ s army began a major military exercise near Indian border areas from January as a distraction , later diverting forces to Ladakh to begin its occupation .
Such significant Chinese activities should have merited exceptionally close monitoring and interagency evaluation by Indian intelligence services .
Individual agencies did in fact report suspicious Chinese movements toward Ladakh through February and March , but the intelligence clearly didn ’ t reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that conveyed enough urgency .
As a result of this lapse , Chinese forces moved in to hold areas of Ladakh , cutting off Indian border patrol posts from each other and blocking critical roads connecting the mountainous region .
By the time Indian forces received accurate intelligence regarding the Chinese incursions , their only realistic response involved rushing in troops from Leh , the regional capital .
Under a more effective national intelligence system , Indian forces would have received enough prior warning to be in position to block Chinese troops as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead had to play catch-up to halt further Chinese advances , with the invading forces also able to consolidate their presence on the ground they had gained .
These intelligence failures have persisted , as with other intractable issues in India ’ s national security system , due to the lack of votes to be won for implementing needed reforms .
Reports are commissioned following major intelligence failures , such as after the Kargil War or 2008 Mumbai attacks , but their reform recommendations have only ever been partly implemented .
In a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personalized attention of the prime minister , constructing a more centralized and rigorous intelligence system would entail the Prime Minister ’ s Office spending its limited time and energy on confronting the bureaucratic interests of the disparate intelligence agencies , for little political reward .
The question now is whether New Delhi will even admit it experienced an intelligence failure this year , especially given the Narendra Modi-led government ’ s desire to project itself as strong .
And even if India were to conduct an official review to determine the points of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would likely uncover the same recommendations that previous such studies have arrived at : to establish parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services , and thus improve their performance through scrutiny , and to create a director of national intelligence staff to ensure interagency development of timely intelligence products for political decision-makers .
In India ’ s prime minister-centric political system , however , both reforms will require political will—and the admission of weakness—from Modi .
Given that Modi ’ s early responses to the crisis were to deny any Chinese incursion had taken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s focus now moving toward the worsening Indian coronavirus epidemic , these intelligence reform outcomes are unlikely .

In June, soldiers from India and China engaged in a violent skirmish along the two countries’ unmarked border in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed, along with an unspecified number of their Chinese counterparts, in what was the first such confrontation since 1975 that resulted in fatalities.
In June, soldiers from India and China engaged in a violent skirmish along the two countries’ unmarked border in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed, along with an unspecified number of their Chinese counterparts, in what was the first such confrontation since 1975 that resulted in fatalities.
New Delhi and Beijing have now embarked on a fitful process of de-escalation. But even as the two parties seek to restore some semblance of normalcy along their shared border, a critical question lingers: Why was India’s security establishment seemingly blindsided by China? Local officials in Ladakh have in fact been sounding the alarm about Chinese forays into Indian territory for years, a fact that points to a complete breakdown in New Delhi’s intelligence gathering and risk assessment.
It wouldn’t be the first time. And India doesn’t seem to be learning crucial lessons from previous security failures.
In the late 1950s, after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in minor clashes, China laid claim to significant tracts of territory along their disputed border. In response, New Delhi adopted its so-called forward policy, sending in small contingents of lightly armed soldiers to assert India’s hold over the contested areas. But without adequate firepower or logistical support, the policy had disastrous consequences: The strategy proved needlessly provocative in October 1962, when the battle-hardened People’s Liberation Army attacked in force. The Indian military, while displaying considerable valor, simply collapsed before the onslaught. At its climax, the town of Tezpur in India’s northeast had to be evacuated in the face of advancing forces. India doesn’t seem to be learning crucial lessons from previous security failures.The ease with which China overran Indian positions was also reflected in its seizure of the Galwan Valley in Ladakh. Having demonstrated its ability to crush the Indian forces if needed, China announced a unilateral cease-fire the next month and withdrew from much of the Galwan Valley, among other locations. But it retained much of the Aksai Chin plateau, an area of land roughly comparable in size to Switzerland.
How could India’s policymakers allow such a colossal error of judgment? The failure stemmed from structural problems in India’s security apparatus: The Intelligence Bureau, the country’s apex intelligence organization, was simultaneously responsible for the collection, collation, and assessment of intelligence. This was a flawed system because there was no meaningful external scrutiny of its conclusions that could detect weaknesses in their sourcing and analytic reasoning. Worse still, there were no provisions for parliamentary oversight—a critical component common in many other countries. The Intelligence Bureau was also starved of resources and mostly marginalized from India’s policymaking process. And because the bureau was eager to support a policy that was designed to limit defense expenditures, it downplayed the imminent danger of Chinese aggression to policymakers, leading them to continue their forward policy and dismiss the mounting Chinese threats. Not surprisingly, India found itself grossly unprepared to tackle China’s onslaught.
The military debacle of 1962 served as an important wake-up call for India. New Delhi embarked on a significant military modernization program. India authorized 10 new mountain warfare divisions as part of an expansion of the Indian Army and revamped its intelligence collection system by establishing a new Directorate General of Security focused on external intelligence. As a result of these advances, India became better prepared to deal with new threats. For example, when Pakistan sought to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir with special agents in 1965, Indian forces were ready to respond with alacrity: The military sealed the disputed border, an action that took away Pakistan’s ability to subsequently surprise India when it launched its so-called Operation Grand Slam attack later that year to seize Indian territory. Pakistan’s commitment of forces to that operation, and its inability to break through the now well-fortified Indian lines, created an opening for India to counterattack across the international border in Punjab and at one point threaten the major Pakistani city of Lahore. While the war eventually ended in a rough The military debacle of 1962 served as an important wake-up call for India.stalemate, this was still a far more impressive performance by Indian forces than in 1962.
But India’s military didn’t keep up its pace of progress. In 1999, a now sprawling Indian military was caught napping when Pakistan made significant incursions across the so-called Line of Control. On May 3 of that year, an Indian shepherd notified local authorities that he had observed what seemed to be a cross-border intrusion. But strangely, the military and intelligence authorities ignored this and several other local warnings, allowing Islamabad to consolidate its position. Pakistan’s advances involved nearly 2,000 soldiers, who captured a 62-mile stretch of land as much as 6 miles deep within Indian territory. It was an incursion so extensive that the Indian Army had to call in aerial support to dislodge the intruders from the commanding heights they had occupied. But even the Air Force’s involvement was delayed: The Army took too long to share intelligence, which in turn slowed the eventual response.
After the conclusion of the conflict, the Kargil Review Committee was established to examine the war’s causes and India’s response to it. Among its findings was that there was “no institutional mechanism for co-ordination or objective-oriented interaction between the (intelligence) agencies and consumers at different levels” nor was there a mechanism “for tasking the agencies, monitoring their performance and reviewing their records to evaluate their quality.” The feedback led to the establishment of two new intelligence bodies—the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Technical Research Organisation—to coordinate among various agencies. However, a core problem identified in the Kargil report remains unaddressed to this day: the need for a rigorous central system for reconciling intelligence findings and providing consensus reports to policymakers at the pace mandated by often fast-moving crises. (The U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee and U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence are examples of such systems.) The absence of such a central system in the Indian context leads to poor interagency information-sharing, the provision of improperly processed (evaluated and contextualized) intelligence to policymakers, and inadequate coordination of agencies to refocus on an emerging threat.
A disjointed Indian intelligence system appears to have permitted China the crucial time window to initially move forces into the contested areas of Ladakh. India in fact holds a military advantage against China in its border areas, leaving Beijing with only one pathway to create a localized force advantage: through deception. And so it was this year. China’s army began a major military exercise near Indian border areas from January as a distraction, later diverting forces to Ladakh to begin its occupation. Such significant Chinese activities should have merited exceptionally close monitoring and interagency evaluation by Indian intelligence services.
Individual agencies did in fact report suspicious Chinese movements toward Ladakh through February and March, but the intelligence clearly didn’t reach top policymakers—at least not in a way that conveyed enough urgency. As a result of this lapse, Chinese forces moved in to hold areas of Ladakh, cutting off Indian border patrol posts from each other and blocking critical roads connecting the mountainous region. By the time Indian forces received accurate intelligence regarding the Chinese incursions, their only realistic response involved rushing in troops from Leh, the regional capital. Under a more effective national intelligence system, Indian forces would have received enough prior warning to be in position to block Chinese troops as they attempted to make incursions. They instead had to play catch-up to halt further Chinese advances, with the invading forces also able to consolidate their presence on the ground they had gained.
These intelligence failures have persisted, as with other intractable issues in India’s national security system, due to the lack of votes to be won for implementing needed reforms. Reports are commissioned following major intelligence failures, such as after the Kargil War or 2008 Mumbai attacks, but their reform recommendations have only ever been partly implemented. In a political system where little happens without the personalized attention of the prime minister, constructing a more centralized and rigorous intelligence system would entail the Prime Minister’s Office spending its limited time and energy on confronting the bureaucratic interests of the disparate intelligence agencies, for little political reward.
The question now is whether New Delhi will even admit it experienced an intelligence failure this year, especially given the Narendra Modi-led government’s desire to project itself as strong. And even if India were to conduct an official review to determine the points of failure in its intelligence system, it would likely uncover the same recommendations that previous such studies have arrived at: to establish parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services, and thus improve their performance through scrutiny, and to create a director of national intelligence staff to ensure interagency development of timely intelligence products for political decision-makers. In India’s prime minister-centric political system, however, both reforms will require political will—and the admission of weakness—from Modi. Given that Modi’s early responses to the crisis were to deny any Chinese incursion had taken place, and with the national media’s focus now moving toward the worsening Indian coronavirus epidemic, these intelligence reform outcomes are unlikely.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-27--Argentina’s Economy Crumbles as Buenos Aires Lockdown Continues

The Argentine government has taken a harsh approach to the coronavirus from the start—but the economic costs are now coming due , with disastrous consequences .
When most Latin American countries were just becoming aware of the looming threat , Argentina was already closing its doors .
On March 20 , with 128 active cases in the country and just three deaths , the Argentine government imposed one of the strictest quarantines the region has ever seen .
It was a desperate attempt to control the spread—and one that only partially succeeded .
But the fierceness of the measures , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years to come .
Phase one of the quarantine , which lasted until April 12 throughout the country and has recently been reinstated in areas seeing new waves of infection , demanded a near-total cessation of economic activity in the country .
Shops and banks closed their doors , as did educational and leisure centers , and the only businesses that were able to remain open were those providing essential services , such as supermarkets and drugstores .
These measures , even at the beginning , were highly criticized .
“ All the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , generated serious economic damage , ” said Victoria Giarrizzo , the director of the Center for Regional and Experimental Economics .
“ At first the industries were closed , then the businesses were closed , and in the end there were many people who were left without work , ” she added , referring mainly to the small businesses that had to close down and to the independent and informal workers .
Argentina , unlike other countries in the region , did not encounter massive layoffs of workers because the government imposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in the long run , would harm the country ’ s businesses .
These measures seemed to work at first .
One month after the introduction of the quarantine , Argentina had 3,031 infections and 142 deaths , and for a country of more than 40 million people , these figures were very encouraging .
This situation seemed promising compared with other countries in the region .
In Chile , for example , which has more than 18 million inhabitants , as of April 24 there were 12,306 cases and already 174 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s initial success , this scenario didn ’ t last .
After the attempt to gradually reopen the Buenos Aires metropolitan area—the area most affected by the pandemic—it became clear that the quarantine , which appeared to be a temporary measure , was there to stay .
But as of Aug. 26 , Argentina had 370,188 cases , most of them in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area , where over 13 million people live .
The number of infections and the rapid spread of the virus mean that even today more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population remains under strict quarantine .
In the rest of the country , with the exception of Jujuy province and some areas in other provinces , the situation seems to be improving .
“ The government understood that there was a good part of the country that did not have the same problem as the city of Buenos Aires and its surroundings , so the provinces began to enter other phases where there were more openings , ” said Ana Inés Navarro , the director of the economics department at Austral University .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given the critical role that the Buenos Aires metropolitan area plays economically , representing roughly 45 percent of the country ’ s GDP .
In April , Argentina ’ s economy fell by 26.4 percent from the year before , and even in May , when the strict measures began to be relaxed in the provinces , the economy still plummeted by 20.6 percent from the year before , rebounding thanks to the slight opening up of services and increased consumption there .
Raw GDP doesn ’ t bring home the scale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Municipal Bank Foundation estimates that for every point of decline in GDP , there is a point and a half of decline in formal wages .
“ If we talk about a 20 percent drop in the economy , it ’ s probably less , but it would be a 30 percent drop in the best salaries , ” said Navarro , who led the team that conducted the study .
This drop in wages , in addition to diminishing the quality of life of citizens , is hitting the most vulnerable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s also affecting productive sectors , limiting consumption capacity , which is essential for the economy to recover .
The long-term nature of the restrictions is having a particularly harsh effect .
“ Initially , the strict quarantine was justified as a way to prepare to improve the health infrastructure and prepare the population , ” said Enrique Szewach , a former director of Argentina ’ s Central Bank during the previous government .
“ Then the extension of the limitations to economic activity worsened the previous scenario , with the aggravating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ savings , all the compensatory measures were and are still being made by expanding public spending financed from the Central Bank , with the issuance and placement of debt in the financial system.
” But even before the pandemic started , Argentina ’ s economic situation was already fairly dire—leaving the country more exposed than most to the impact of lockdown .
In 2019 , Argentina ended the year with inflation of 53.8 percent , the second highest in Latin America after Venezuela .
Its debt , one of the largest in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Alberto Fernández government , which promised to eliminate $ 66 billion of this debt during its term , is still in negotiations with creditors , and the chances of the country defaulting again , as it did in 2001 , are high .
In 2019 , Argentina closed the year with Poverty is defined as not being able to afford a basic basket of goods defined by the government ; as the peso has been devalued , prices have risen , and wages have remained stagnant , driving more people into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have more kids , were living in poverty .
High levels of informal employment also made the poor even more vulnerable to lockdown .
“ Estimates put child poverty at 63 percent at the end of 2020 , affecting 8.3 million children and adolescents , ” said Sebastián Waisgrais , a monitoring and social inclusion specialist at UNICEF , adding that the increase in poverty is a direct consequence of the sharp drop in economic activity .
The government has tried to cover the worst-hit groups .
“ An emergency income was implemented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ although there are leaks and implementation errors were corrected , this system has been relatively effective , ” said Szewach , referring to the creation of the IFE ( emergency family income ) , which is a payment of 10,000 Argentine pesos ( about $ 141 ) whose main function has been to alleviate the economic situation of the most affected Argentine families .
This payment has been extended for the second time , reaching approximately 13 million people and 2.8 million children and adolescents .
“ Almost 60 percent of households with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transfer from the state , ” Waisgrais said .
The government also increased food plan allocations , provided extraordinary bonuses for different types of cases—from retirees to health workers—and imposed measures such as making it impossible for companies to invoke force majeure ( an exception to the country ’ s tight labor laws that allows companies to lay off workers due to situations that are not under their control ) to dismiss their workers until July 31 .
But there was one group these measures couldn ’ t reach .
“ The IFE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and many of these people were able to live even better than before the quarantine .
The problem is that there was another very large sector of low-income people who could not access the IFE , ” said Giarrizzo , noting that the high number of undocumented people in the country means that a significant sector of the population is left without this type of assistance .
Low-information communities , such as the people living in Argentina ’ s villas miseria ( a local term for slums constructed by the inhabitants themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ basic housing and health services—are also affected by this situation .
Reducing the impact on the most vulnerable needs targeted policies .
“ There are 4.2 million people who live in the 4,000 most populous neighborhoods throughout the country , where childhood poverty exceeds 90 percent , ” Waisgrais said .
“ In these neighborhoods , 98 percent do not have access to the sewage network , 64 percent do not have access to the electricity network , and 99 percent do not have access to the formal natural gas network .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that had been dragging on for years , have suffered from the lack of aid .
Small businesses , particularly those unable to benefit from e-commerce , are suffering most from this situation .
“ For these sectors , the aid was and is very partial and quite inefficient , and bankruptcies and closures are being generated that will not be easy to overcome , ” Szewach said .
For some eligible companies , the state covers 50 percent of employers ’ wages , with certain limits , and also freezes some rent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credit line was also set up to cover wages , which , Giarrizzo said , “ is very expensive for businesses.
” The lack of support , in addition to generating massive business closures , has a direct impact on the most vulnerable sectors of society .
“ The government has tried to stop companies from laying off workers—and seems to have succeeded—but the serious problem that Argentina has at the moment is the closure of companies , ” Navarro explained .
“ It ’ s the number of companies that have stopped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produce because they ’ re not yet operational , and that are unlikely to reopen after the quarantine .
Then you are going to find , after the quarantine , a very worrying landscape from the point of view of the generation that is looking for employment.
” “ If there is no support for businesses , the truth is that I can not imagine an economy eternally totally subsidized by the state , ” Giarrizzo said .
Because of the state ’ s fiscal deficit and lack of resources , the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cover the costs of the pandemic .
“ The government is going to have to lower the costs for the companies to make them profitable in a context where consumption is going to be lower , ” she added .
Argentina was able to recover relatively quickly from its last major economic crisis , in 2001 , thanks to a booming global economy .
That ’ s not happening today .
“ In the 2001 crisis , the government had a huge tailwind with the commodity boom , which had a very positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Navarro , adding that the foreign market no longer moves that way .
The inexperience of the government—which took office last year—and the lack of political agreements and implementation of contingency programs , such as anti-inflation plans , mean that the outlook for the future is not encouraging .
But the government ’ s inexperience may also prove a surprising advantage , making it more willing to take risky measures to save the economy of a country that has been in crisis for years .
The swift lockdown doubtless helped save @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steps , the economic crisis consuming the country ’ s poor will claim its own toll .

The Argentine government has taken a harsh approach to the coronavirus from the start—but the economic costs are now coming due, with disastrous consequences. When most Latin American countries were just becoming aware of the looming threat, Argentina was already closing its doors. On March 20, with 128 active cases in the country and just three deaths, the Argentine government imposed one of the strictest quarantines the region has ever seen. It was a desperate attempt to control the spread—and one that only partially succeeded. But the fierceness of the measures, experts warn, will have effects for years to come.
The Argentine government has taken a harsh approach to the coronavirus from the start—but the economic costs are now coming due, with disastrous consequences. When most Latin American countries were just becoming aware of the looming threat, Argentina was already closing its doors. On March 20, with 128 active cases in the country and just three deaths, the Argentine government imposed one of the strictest quarantines the region has ever seen. It was a desperate attempt to control the spread—and one that only partially succeeded. But the fierceness of the measures, experts warn, will have effects for years to come.
Phase one of the quarantine, which lasted until April 12 throughout the country and has recently been reinstated in areas seeing new waves of infection, demanded a near-total cessation of economic activity in the country.
Shops and banks closed their doors, as did educational and leisure centers, and the only businesses that were able to remain open were those providing essential services, such as supermarkets and drugstores. These measures, even at the beginning, were highly criticized. “All the closures, which were initially really extreme, generated serious economic damage,” said Victoria Giarrizzo, the director of the Center for Regional and Experimental Economics. “At first the industries were closed, then the businesses were closed, and in the end there were many people who were left without work,” she added, referring mainly to the small businesses that had to close down and to the independent and informal workers. Argentina, unlike other countries in the region, did not encounter massive layoffs of workers because the government imposed measures to prevent this from happening—measures that, in the long run, would harm the country’s businesses.
These measures seemed to work at first. One month after the introduction of the quarantine, Argentina had 3,031 infections and 142 deaths, and for a country of more than 40 million people, these figures were very encouraging. This situation seemed promising compared with other countries in the region. In Chile, for example, which has more than 18 million inhabitants, as of April 24 there were 12,306 cases and already 174 deaths from the virus. Beyond Argentina’s initial success, this scenario didn’t last. After the attempt to gradually reopen the Buenos Aires metropolitan area—the area most affected by the pandemic—it became clear that the quarantine, which appeared to be a temporary measure, was there to stay.
But as of Aug. 26, Argentina had 370,188 cases, most of them in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, where over 13 million people live. The number of infections and the rapid spread of the virus mean that even today more than 30 percent of the country’s population remains under strict quarantine. In the rest of the country, with the exception of Jujuy province and some areas in other provinces, the situation seems to be improving. “The government understood that there was a good part of the country that did not have the same problem as the city of Buenos Aires and its surroundings, so the provinces began to enter other phases where there were more openings,” said Ana Inés Navarro, the director of the economics department at Austral University. But that doesn’t help much, given the critical role that the Buenos Aires metropolitan area plays economically, representing roughly 45 percent of the country’s GDP.
In April, Argentina’s economy fell by 26.4 percent from the year before, and even in May, when the strict measures began to be relaxed in the provinces, the economy still plummeted by 20.6 percent from the year before, rebounding thanks to the slight opening up of services and increased consumption there.
Raw GDP doesn’t bring home the scale of the pain. A report by the Municipal Bank Foundation estimates that for every point of decline in GDP, there is a point and a half of decline in formal wages. “If we talk about a 20 percent drop in the economy, it’s probably less, but it would be a 30 percent drop in the best salaries,” said Navarro, who led the team that conducted the study.
This drop in wages, in addition to diminishing the quality of life of citizens, is hitting the most vulnerable sectors such as the unemployed. It’s also affecting productive sectors, limiting consumption capacity, which is essential for the economy to recover.
The long-term nature of the restrictions is having a particularly harsh effect. “Initially, the strict quarantine was justified as a way to prepare to improve the health infrastructure and prepare the population,” said Enrique Szewach, a former director of Argentina’s Central Bank during the previous government. “Then the extension of the limitations to economic activity worsened the previous scenario, with the aggravating factor that without access to debt or savings, all the compensatory measures were and are still being made by expanding public spending financed from the Central Bank, with the issuance and placement of debt in the financial system.”
But even before the pandemic started, Argentina’s economic situation was already fairly dire—leaving the country more exposed than most to the impact of lockdown. In 2019, Argentina ended the year with inflation of 53.8 percent, the second highest in Latin America after Venezuela. Its debt, one of the largest in the world, amounts to $323 billion. The Alberto Fernández government, which promised to eliminate $66 billion of this debt during its term, is still in negotiations with creditors, and the chances of the country defaulting again, as it did in 2001, are high.
In 2019, Argentina closed the year with 25.6 percent of the population, 9.9 million people, in poverty. Poverty is defined as not being able to afford a basic basket of goods defined by the government; as the peso has been devalued, prices have risen, and wages have remained stagnant, driving more people into poverty. Because poorer families tend to have more kids, 53 percent of children, around 7 million people, were living in poverty. High levels of informal employment also made the poor even more vulnerable to lockdown.
“Estimates put child poverty at 63 percent at the end of 2020, affecting 8.3 million children and adolescents,” said Sebastián Waisgrais, a monitoring and social inclusion specialist at UNICEF, adding that the increase in poverty is a direct consequence of the sharp drop in economic activity.
The government has tried to cover the worst-hit groups. “An emergency income was implemented to complement the preexisting subsidies, and although there are leaks and implementation errors were corrected, this system has been relatively effective,” said Szewach, referring to the creation of the IFE (emergency family income), which is a payment of 10,000 Argentine pesos (about $141) whose main function has been to alleviate the economic situation of the most affected Argentine families. This payment has been extended for the second time, reaching approximately 13 million people and 2.8 million children and adolescents. “Almost 60 percent of households with children are receiving some kind of cash transfer from the state,” Waisgrais said. The government also increased food plan allocations, provided extraordinary bonuses for different types of cases—from retirees to health workers—and imposed measures such as making it impossible for companies to invoke force majeure (an exception to the country’s tight labor laws that allows companies to lay off workers due to situations that are not under their control) to dismiss their workers until July 31.
But there was one group these measures couldn’t reach. “The IFE improved the situation of the lower sectors, and many of these people were able to live even better than before the quarantine. The problem is that there was another very large sector of low-income people who could not access the IFE,” said Giarrizzo, noting that the high number of undocumented people in the country means that a significant sector of the population is left without this type of assistance. Low-information communities, such as the people living in Argentina’s villas miseria (a local term for slums constructed by the inhabitants themselves)—in many cases without access to basic housing and health services—are also affected by this situation.
Reducing the impact on the most vulnerable needs targeted policies. “There are 4.2 million people who live in the 4,000 most populous neighborhoods throughout the country, where childhood poverty exceeds 90 percent,” Waisgrais said. “In these neighborhoods, 98 percent do not have access to the sewage network, 64 percent do not have access to the electricity network, and 99 percent do not have access to the formal natural gas network. “
Companies, already reeling from a crisis that had been dragging on for years, have suffered from the lack of aid. Small businesses, particularly those unable to benefit from e-commerce, are suffering most from this situation. “For these sectors, the aid was and is very partial and quite inefficient, and bankruptcies and closures are being generated that will not be easy to overcome,” Szewach said. For some eligible companies, the state covers 50 percent of employers’ wages, with certain limits, and also freezes some rent and bill payments. A 24 percent credit line was also set up to cover wages, which, Giarrizzo said, “is very expensive for businesses.”
The lack of support, in addition to generating massive business closures, has a direct impact on the most vulnerable sectors of society. “The government has tried to stop companies from laying off workers—and seems to have succeeded—but the serious problem that Argentina has at the moment is the closure of companies,” Navarro explained. “It’s the number of companies that have stopped producing, or that can’t produce because they’re not yet operational, and that are unlikely to reopen after the quarantine. Then you are going to find, after the quarantine, a very worrying landscape from the point of view of the generation that is looking for employment.”
“If there is no support for businesses, the truth is that I cannot imagine an economy eternally totally subsidized by the state,” Giarrizzo said. Because of the state’s fiscal deficit and lack of resources, the government temporarily resorted to printing more pesos to cover the costs of the pandemic. “The government is going to have to lower the costs for the companies to make them profitable in a context where consumption is going to be lower,” she added.
Argentina was able to recover relatively quickly from its last major economic crisis, in 2001, thanks to a booming global economy. That’s not happening today. “In the 2001 crisis, the government had a huge tailwind with the commodity boom, which had a very positive impact on all of Latin America,” said Navarro, adding that the foreign market no longer moves that way.
The inexperience of the government—which took office last year—and the lack of political agreements and implementation of contingency programs, such as anti-inflation plans, mean that the outlook for the future is not encouraging. But the government’s inexperience may also prove a surprising advantage, making it more willing to take risky measures to save the economy of a country that has been in crisis for years. The swift lockdown doubtless helped save lives—but unless the government can take bold steps, the economic crisis consuming the country’s poor will claim its own toll.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-27--Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism

Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism This spring , Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden agreed with his former primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders to form joint task forces on health care , criminal justice , climate change , the economy , education , and immigration .
It is clear from the reports of those bodies , issued earlier this summer , that under a President Biden U.S. domestic policy would shift well to the left of where it would have been under a President Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
But none of those committees covered foreign policy as traditionally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren , and then brought to a white heat by the Black Lives Matter movement , have barely touched foreign affairs , which is often isolated from domestic politics .
A Biden promise to return to the status quo ante would be a brain-dead response to a transformed world , but it would not be politically costly .
Yet the assumption that under a President Biden domestic policy would move left , but foreign policy would not , presupposes a distinction between the two that is itself an artifact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a Biden foreign policy would almost certainly move left as a dependent variable of domestic policy .
Biden uses the expression “ a foreign policy for the middle class ” to express the idea that trade and international economic policy must be guided by the benefits they will bring to average Americans—rather than to American multinationals .
For those of you keeping an ideological scorecard at home , that policy may be taken as the death knell of neoliberalism .
That term “ neoliberalism , ” which began as a neutral descriptor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ describes the faith that a lightly regulated global marketplace in which goods , services , capital , and firms moved across borders with minimal friction would unleash growth that would increase jobs and spread prosperity , especially in the United States , the engine room of globalization .
That was the guiding doctrine of the administration of President Bill Clinton .
Its high apostles , including Robert Rubin and Larry Summers , served as President Barack Obama ’ s senior economic advisors .
Some of the most interesting thinking at the edges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s pool of advisors and influences has to do with the shortcomings of that doctrine .
Jennifer Harris , an international economist who served in the State Department under Hillary Clinton , argues that from the time of its founding the United States , like all great powers , has used its economic power to advance its geopolitical standing—pursuing what she and others call “ geoeconomics.
” To that end , U.S. policymakers have adopted a sequence of economic models tailored to the circumstances of their time .
The neoliberal model @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reaped vast benefits from globalization—or at least seemed to .
That is no longer seen to be the case : Globalization is now blamed for widening inequality and hollowing out the middle class .
What ’ s more , at a time when China , an unabashed geoeconomics power , is wielding trade and economic relations as a diplomatic weapon , the United States can not simply repeat shibboleths about the free movement of capital and goods .
( Harris and Jake Sullivan , one of Biden ’ s key advisors , laid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an article in Foreign Policy . )
Harris asserts that the American trade officials who negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership had so thoroughly internalized neoliberal dogma that they simply took it for granted that increasing the pharmaceutical industry ’ s access to Asian markets was good for the United States—even if doing so created neither jobs nor tax revenue in the United States .
The war over just how “ free ” trade is , Harris said in an interview with Foreign Policy , has become sterile at a time when trade barriers are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump began jacking them back up .
So-called trade agreements are , in fact , the modern site of geoeconomic struggle—but aren ’ t being acknowledged as such .
“ There is a desire , ” said Harris , “ for some kind of economic engagement that improves the lived experience of middle-class Americans.
” That desire is now widespread .
Mainstream economists having increasingly accepted the evidence that competition with China has led to a net loss of jobs at home , a cost that must be weighed in the balance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Perriello , another progressive who served in the Obama administration , said in an interview that if you expressed doubts about the free market model among Obama economic officials , as he did , “ you were seen as having horns growing out of your head.
” Now , he added , if you repeated some of the old chestnuts , “ People would say , ‘ Are you cryogenically frozen ?
’ ” Once you accept that what is good for overall global growth or even for the stock market is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it becomes possible to envision a form of economic nationalism that guides U.S. behavior both at home and abroad .
This seems to be what Biden has in mind with his plan for a “ Made in All of America ” agenda .
The big investments he plans in infrastructure , education , health care , and research and development would be directed to U.S. firms to create jobs at home .
A “ pro-American worker tax and trade strategy ” would “ take aggressive trade enforcement actions against China ” but also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move operations overseas .
Biden has proposed an ambitious federal effort to bring back global supply chains in sensitive areas including medical supplies and pharmaceuticals , semiconductors , energy grid resilience , and the like .
This would entail rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity in those areas , including through use of the Defense Production Act ; making changes in the tax code to encourage domestic production of pharmaceuticals ; increasing federal stockpiles of sensitive products ; and establishing a new program to fund worker retraining in critical manufacturing fields .
Economic nationalism is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of China and a means of equipping the United States to win the economic struggle with China .
The new nationalism has a political as well as an economic dimension .
Foreign policy has traditionally been the province of experts who tell Americans where national interests lie rather than ask them where they think their own interests lie .
This has become increasingly unsustainable , both because deference to expertise is a thing of the past and because the United States no longer seems to be winning the global struggle for supremacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Peace set out to rectify this problem by sending scholars to three places very far from Washington—Ohio , Nebraska , and Colorado—to ask citizens how foreign policy affected their lives .
The study , titled “ U.S .
Foreign Policy for the Middle Class , ” was directed by Salman Ahmed , former head of strategic planning at the Obama National Security Council ; among the authors were Jennifer Harris and Jake Sullivan .
The project was authorized by Carnegie ’ s director , William Burns , a leading candidate for secretary of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few of the hundreds of people interviewed had anything to say about the liberal international order or Russia ’ s encroachments on Ukraine .
On such remote questions most offered stock responses that appeared to depend on what news channel they watched .
But they had a great deal to say about China , trade , jobs , and foreign investment .
The answers varied greatly both across and within states , but few of them sounded like Washington ’ s nightmare of a nationalistic heartland .
Even in hard-pressed Ohio manufacturing towns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ express strong support for free trade and accept that technological advances and other market forces will continue to transform employment in their area .
However , they insist on ‘ fair trade ’ and additional measures that would give them a ‘ fighting chance.
’ ” The answers were mildly encouraging , if not terribly surprising ; the most important aspect of the project may have been the decision to ask the question .
A sustainable foreign policy must be rooted in the real interests of the great mass of Americans .
When @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy .
Yet the very different currents of opinion within the Democratic Party mean that one can hardly expect a consensus to form around the question of what foreign policy best advances the interests of average Americans .
Biden is a foreign-policy traditionalist to whom the language of geoeconomics is alien ; the same is true of almost all the people around him .
Progressives hope they ’ ll move beyond those instincts .
Perriello , who like Harris has many ties to Biden ’ s team , would like to see global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and even minimum wages in order to prevent a race to the bottom .
An international embrace of America ’ s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , prohibiting the “ weaponized corruption ” practiced by nations like Russia , which uses its vast oil and gas wealth to pay off friends and blackmail enemies , would , he says , “ do a helluva lot more for free trade ” than current trade agreements would .
Any president who adopted so ambitious an agenda would face enormous resistance from America ’ s own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will not easily agree to a program of corporate-tax equalization ; export powers such as Germany will bridle at a confrontational policy towards China .
A program of global regulation might , in any case , prove too outré for Biden and his senior team .
Perriello , like Harris , places a great deal of hope in Sullivan , a liaison between the two camps who has , he says , “ taken the three years out of power to grapple authentically and deeply with the things they got wrong ” during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his neoliberal skin in a 2019 essay in Democracy in which he called for a “ new old Democratic platform ” focused—you will not be surprised to hear—on “ rescuing and rebuilding the American middle class.
” “ New old Democrat ” sounds like just the right hat for Joe Biden ’ s silver head .
Should he win in November , we will see if he is prepared to wear it .

This spring, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden agreed with his former primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders to form joint task forces on health care, criminal justice, climate change, the economy, education, and immigration. It is clear from the reports of those bodies, issued earlier this summer, that under a President Biden U.S. domestic policy would shift well to the left of where it would have been under a President Hillary Clinton in 2016.
This spring, Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden agreed with his former primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders to form joint task forces on health care, criminal justice, climate change, the economy, education, and immigration. It is clear from the reports of those bodies, issued earlier this summer, that under a President Biden U.S. domestic policy would shift well to the left of where it would have been under a President Hillary Clinton in 2016.
But none of those committees covered foreign policy as traditionally defined. The ideological flames fanned by Sanders and Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and then brought to a white heat by the Black Lives Matter movement, have barely touched foreign affairs, which is often isolated from domestic politics. A Biden promise to return to the status quo ante would be a brain-dead response to a transformed world, but it would not be politically costly.
Yet the assumption that under a President Biden domestic policy would move left, but foreign policy would not, presupposes a distinction between the two that is itself an artifact of an earlier era. Some elements of a Biden foreign policy would almost certainly move left as a dependent variable of domestic policy. Biden uses the expression “a foreign policy for the middle class” to express the idea that trade and international economic policy must be guided by the benefits they will bring to average Americans—rather than to American multinationals. For those of you keeping an ideological scorecard at home, that policy may be taken as the death knell of neoliberalism.
That term “neoliberalism,” which began as a neutral descriptor before turning pejorative in recent years, describes the faith that a lightly regulated global marketplace in which goods, services, capital, and firms moved across borders with minimal friction would unleash growth that would increase jobs and spread prosperity, especially in the United States, the engine room of globalization. That was the guiding doctrine of the administration of President Bill Clinton. Its high apostles, including Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, served as President Barack Obama’s senior economic advisors.
Some of the most interesting thinking at the edges, if not always the center, of Biden’s pool of advisors and influences has to do with the shortcomings of that doctrine. Jennifer Harris, an international economist who served in the State Department under Hillary Clinton, argues that from the time of its founding the United States, like all great powers, has used its economic power to advance its geopolitical standing—pursuing what she and others call “geoeconomics.” To that end, U.S. policymakers have adopted a sequence of economic models tailored to the circumstances of their time. The neoliberal model suited an era when the U.S. economy reaped vast benefits from globalization—or at least seemed to. That is no longer seen to be the case: Globalization is now blamed for widening inequality and hollowing out the middle class. What’s more, at a time when China, an unabashed geoeconomics power, is wielding trade and economic relations as a diplomatic weapon, the United States cannot simply repeat shibboleths about the free movement of capital and goods. (Harris and Jake Sullivan, one of Biden’s key advisors, laid out this argument earlier this year in an article in Foreign Policy.)
Harris asserts that the American trade officials who negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership had so thoroughly internalized neoliberal dogma that they simply took it for granted that increasing the pharmaceutical industry’s access to Asian markets was good for the United States—even if doing so created neither jobs nor tax revenue in the United States. The war over just how “free” trade is, Harris said in an interview with Foreign Policy, has become sterile at a time when trade barriers are already at historic lows—or were until President Donald Trump began jacking them back up. So-called trade agreements are, in fact, the modern site of geoeconomic struggle—but aren’t being acknowledged as such. “There is a desire,” said Harris, “for some kind of economic engagement that improves the lived experience of middle-class Americans.”
That desire is now widespread. Mainstream economists having increasingly accepted the evidence that competition with China has led to a net loss of jobs at home, a cost that must be weighed in the balance against cheap televisions and smartphones. Tom Perriello, another progressive who served in the Obama administration, said in an interview that if you expressed doubts about the free market model among Obama economic officials, as he did, “you were seen as having horns growing out of your head.” Now, he added, if you repeated some of the old chestnuts, “People would say, ‘Are you cryogenically frozen?’”
Once you accept that what is good for overall global growth or even for the stock market is not necessarily good for the American worker, it becomes possible to envision a form of economic nationalism that guides U.S. behavior both at home and abroad. This seems to be what Biden has in mind with his plan for a “Made in All of America” agenda. The big investments he plans in infrastructure, education, health care, and research and development would be directed to U.S. firms to create jobs at home. A “pro-American worker tax and trade strategy” would “take aggressive trade enforcement actions against China” but also eliminate tax incentives for U.S. firms to move operations overseas.
Biden has proposed an ambitious federal effort to bring back global supply chains in sensitive areas including medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, energy grid resilience, and the like. This would entail rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity in those areas, including through use of the Defense Production Act; making changes in the tax code to encourage domestic production of pharmaceuticals; increasing federal stockpiles of sensitive products; and establishing a new program to fund worker retraining in critical manufacturing fields. Economic nationalism is thus both a response to the rise of China and a means of equipping the United States to win the economic struggle with China.
The new nationalism has a political as well as an economic dimension. Foreign policy has traditionally been the province of experts who tell Americans where national interests lie rather than ask them where they think their own interests lie. This has become increasingly unsustainable, both because deference to expertise is a thing of the past and because the United States no longer seems to be winning the global struggle for supremacy. In 2018 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace set out to rectify this problem by sending scholars to three places very far from Washington—Ohio, Nebraska, and Colorado—to ask citizens how foreign policy affected their lives. The study, titled “U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class,” was directed by Salman Ahmed, former head of strategic planning at the Obama National Security Council; among the authors were Jennifer Harris and Jake Sullivan. The project was authorized by Carnegie’s director, William Burns, a leading candidate for secretary of state in a Biden administration.
Very few of the hundreds of people interviewed had anything to say about the liberal international order or Russia’s encroachments on Ukraine. On such remote questions most offered stock responses that appeared to depend on what news channel they watched. But they had a great deal to say about China, trade, jobs, and foreign investment. The answers varied greatly both across and within states, but few of them sounded like Washington’s nightmare of a nationalistic heartland. Even in hard-pressed Ohio manufacturing towns, the authors note, people “express strong support for free trade and accept that technological advances and other market forces will continue to transform employment in their area. However, they insist on ‘fair trade’ and additional measures that would give them a ‘fighting chance.’”
The answers were mildly encouraging, if not terribly surprising; the most important aspect of the project may have been the decision to ask the question. A sustainable foreign policy must be rooted in the real interests of the great mass of Americans. When those interests change, so must the policy.
Yet the very different currents of opinion within the Democratic Party mean that one can hardly expect a consensus to form around the question of what foreign policy best advances the interests of average Americans. Biden is a foreign-policy traditionalist to whom the language of geoeconomics is alien; the same is true of almost all the people around him. Progressives hope they’ll move beyond those instincts. Perriello, who like Harris has many ties to Biden’s team, would like to see global agreements on antitrust laws, corporate taxation, and even minimum wages in order to prevent a race to the bottom. An international embrace of America’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, prohibiting the “weaponized corruption” practiced by nations like Russia, which uses its vast oil and gas wealth to pay off friends and blackmail enemies, would, he says, “do a helluva lot more for free trade” than current trade agreements would.
Any president who adopted so ambitious an agenda would face enormous resistance from America’s own allies. Low-tax havens such as Ireland will not easily agree to a program of corporate-tax equalization; export powers such as Germany will bridle at a confrontational policy towards China. A program of global regulation might, in any case, prove too outré for Biden and his senior team. Perriello, like Harris, places a great deal of hope in Sullivan, a liaison between the two camps who has, he says, “taken the three years out of power to grapple authentically and deeply with the things they got wrong” during the Clinton campaign. Sullivan officially shed his neoliberal skin in a 2019 essay in Democracy in which he called for a “new old Democratic platform” focused—you will not be surprised to hear—on “rescuing and rebuilding the American middle class.”
“New old Democrat” sounds like just the right hat for Joe Biden’s silver head. Should he win in November, we will see if he is prepared to wear it.