foreignpolicy--2020-06-23--Targeting Foreign Workers, Trump Signs Sweeping Immigration Ban

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The United States extends sweeping immigration curbs , leaders from Russia , China , and India meet on border tensions , and Malawi reruns its 2019 presidential election .
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On Monday , U.S. President Donald Trump signed a new executive order that will cut U.S. immigration , albeit temporarily , on a scale not seen since he took office .
The order extends a freeze on green card applicants outside the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ temporary visas for seasonal workers and U.S. multinationals—especially tech firms .
In proclaiming the order , the White House cited a disputed claim , used often by the Trump administration , that foreign workers in the United States harm native workers .
“ We must remain mindful of the impact of foreign workers on the United States labor market , particularly in the current extraordinary environment of high domestic unemployment and depressed demand for labor , ” the proclamation said .
The decision faced immediate criticism within Trump ’ s own Republican Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , particularly work visas , are harmful to the American worker do not understand the American economy , ” Sen. Lindsey Graham wrote in a Twitter thread condemning the executive order .
Graham said the visa shutdown would likely create “ a drag on our economic recovery.
” Hundreds of thousands affected .
The decision has the potential to affect hundreds of thousands of foreign workers , as well as disrupt hiring processes for U.S. companies .
In 2018 , the most recent year for which there are complete figures , over 500,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already living in the United States .
U.S .
Citizenship and Immigration Services ( USCIS ) reported 2.2 million employment authorization applications in 2019 , and granted a further 500,000 visas for non-immigrant workers—who are now locked out due to the new executive order .
India worst hit .
The decision to halt H1-B visas—traditionally used by large U.S. tech companies to hire workers from abroad—will hit Indian workers the most : Three out of four H1-B visa holders are Indian , according to a USCIS report .
Tampering with a “ winning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Edward Alden wrote about how recent changes have made U.S. immigration hurdles go from “ tall to nearly impassable.
” If the United States is to keep pace with China on technological advancement , Alden argues , being a magnet for the world ’ s innovators is essential .
“ Unparalleled U.S. success in many areas of science and technology was built on attracting the world ’ s best talent , and then giving that talent the opportunity to build rewarding and often lucrative careers in the United States .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at its own peril .
Democratic foreign-policy leader on the ropes in New York .
The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Rep. Eliot Engel , is in danger of losing his seat in the U.S. Congress if today ’ s New York primary goes against him .
Polls show Engel neck and neck with his challenger Jamaal Bowman .
As Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch report in Foreign Policy , the primary reflects deep divisions with the Democratic Party : Sens .
Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren , along with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whereas Hillary Clinton , Sen. Chuck Schumer , and House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi have all endorsed Engel .
South Korea in second wave .
The director of South Korea ’ s Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention ( KCDC ) Jeong Eun-Kyeong has confirmed that the country is experiencing a second wave of coronavirus infections .
South Korea had largely banished the virus in April only to see a spike in cases in early May .
“ We originally predicted that the second wave would emerge in fall or winter , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out to be wrong .
As long as people have close contact with others , we believe that infections will continue.
” South Korea ’ s daily number of new cases is still relatively low : the KCDC reported 17 new cases on June 22 .
Saudi Arabia limits Hajj pilgrimage .
Saudi Arabia has said the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca will still take place this year , albeit with a reduced number of pilgrims allowed and a ban on foreign arrivals .
The Ministry for Hajj and Umrah said that numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from all nationalities residing in Saudi Arabia only , who are willing to perform Hajj.
” The Hajj pilgrimage—scheduled for the end of July—usually attracts roughly 2 million worshippers to Saudi Arabia each year .
Malawi decides .
Voters in Malawi head to the polls today for a rerun of the country ’ s 2019 presidential election .
Malawi ’ s constitutional court overturned last year ’ s election victory of incumbent Peter Mutharika , citing irregularities in the vote .
Trilateral talks .
Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , Chinese Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Sergey Lavrov meet today via videoconference to discuss Indian-Chinese border tensions .
The meeting is seen as another attempt to defuse tensions in the region following last week ’ s clashes in the Galwan valley between Indian and Chinese troops .
Ebola on the wane .
Congolese health authorities are expected to declare the end of the world ’ s second-deadliest Ebola outbreak this week , as the 42-day threshold since the last confirmed case approaches .
The outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo has lasted 23 months and killed 2,280 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first outbreak during which an Ebola vaccine was deployed from the beginning of the health crisis .
Cambodia ’ s next leader .
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen , who has led the country since 1985 , has hinted that his son—34-year-old Hun Manet—may be next in line , should he ever decide to cede power .
Hun Sen said that although his son is not the only person in consideration the role , “ I have to support my son and train him so that he is capable [ for this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be like his father , at least his capacity should match that of his father by 80 or 90 percent.
” Scholz promises drama-free ECB resolution .
German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz has said the clash between Germany ’ s constitutional court and the European Central Bank will soon see “ a resolution without drama.
” In early May , the German court had ordered an investigation into Germany ’ s participation in a European Union-wide 2.2 trillion euro bond buying program in order to show that the “ economic and fiscal policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bank ’ s remit .
Scholz said the impasse is likely to be resolved this week .
Verdant concert .
Barcelona ’ s Gran Teatre del Liceu opera house was reopened on Monday and filled to capacity for a special performance of the Uceli string quartet .
However , the only humans in attendance were the performers on stage ; 2,292 houseplants filled the seats instead .
The concert was the brainchild of conceptual artist Eugenio Ampudia , who came up with the idea after developing a closer relationship with his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ I think that all these plants somehow know in their inner being , in their cells , their photosynthesis that they have been at this concert , ” he said afterwards .
The plants will now be donated to local health workers .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States extends sweeping immigration curbs, leaders from Russia, China, and India meet on border tensions, and Malawi reruns its 2019 presidential election.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States extends sweeping immigration curbs, leaders from Russia, China, and India meet on border tensions, and Malawi reruns its 2019 presidential election.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
New U.S. Curbs Effectively Halt Immigration in Key Sectors
On Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a new executive order that will cut U.S. immigration, albeit temporarily, on a scale not seen since he took office. The order extends a freeze on green card applicants outside the United States and now includes a range of temporary visas for seasonal workers and U.S. multinationals—especially tech firms.
In proclaiming the order, the White House cited a disputed claim, used often by the Trump administration, that foreign workers in the United States harm native workers. “We must remain mindful of the impact of foreign workers on the United States labor market, particularly in the current extraordinary environment of high domestic unemployment and depressed demand for labor,” the proclamation said.
The decision faced immediate criticism within Trump’s own Republican Party. “Those who believe legal immigration, particularly work visas, are harmful to the American worker do not understand the American economy,” Sen. Lindsey Graham wrote in a Twitter thread condemning the executive order. Graham said the visa shutdown would likely create “a drag on our economic recovery.”
Hundreds of thousands affected. The decision has the potential to affect hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, as well as disrupt hiring processes for U.S. companies. In 2018, the most recent year for which there are complete figures, over 500,000 green cards were granted to applicants not already living in the United States. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) reported 2.2 million employment authorization applications in 2019, and granted a further 500,000 visas for non-immigrant workers—who are now locked out due to the new executive order.
India worst hit. The decision to halt H1-B visas—traditionally used by large U.S. tech companies to hire workers from abroad—will hit Indian workers the most: Three out of four H1-B visa holders are Indian, according to a USCIS report.
Tampering with a “winning formula.” On June 18, FP’s Edward Alden wrote about how recent changes have made U.S. immigration hurdles go from “tall to nearly impassable.” If the United States is to keep pace with China on technological advancement, Alden argues, being a magnet for the world’s innovators is essential. “Unparalleled U.S. success in many areas of science and technology was built on attracting the world’s best talent, and then giving that talent the opportunity to build rewarding and often lucrative careers in the United States. The United States tampers with that winning formula at its own peril.
What We’re Following Today
Democratic foreign-policy leader on the ropes in New York. The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Eliot Engel, is in danger of losing his seat in the U.S. Congress if today’s New York primary goes against him. Polls show Engel neck and neck with his challenger Jamaal Bowman. As Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch report in Foreign Policy, the primary reflects deep divisions with the Democratic Party: Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, along with Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez have endorsed Bowman, whereas Hillary Clinton, Sen. Chuck Schumer, and House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi have all endorsed Engel.
South Korea in second wave. The director of South Korea’s Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (KCDC) Jeong Eun-Kyeong has confirmed that the country is experiencing a second wave of coronavirus infections. South Korea had largely banished the virus in April only to see a spike in cases in early May. “We originally predicted that the second wave would emerge in fall or winter,” Jeong said. “Our forecast turned out to be wrong. As long as people have close contact with others, we believe that infections will continue.” South Korea’s daily number of new cases is still relatively low: the KCDC reported 17 new cases on June 22.
Saudi Arabia limits Hajj pilgrimage. Saudi Arabia has said the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca will still take place this year, albeit with a reduced number of pilgrims allowed and a ban on foreign arrivals. The Ministry for Hajj and Umrah said that numbers will be limited to the pilgrims “from all nationalities residing in Saudi Arabia only, who are willing to perform Hajj.” The Hajj pilgrimage—scheduled for the end of July—usually attracts roughly 2 million worshippers to Saudi Arabia each year.
Malawi decides. Voters in Malawi head to the polls today for a rerun of the country’s 2019 presidential election. Malawi’s constitutional court overturned last year’s election victory of incumbent Peter Mutharika, citing irregularities in the vote.
Trilateral talks. Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meet today via videoconference to discuss Indian-Chinese border tensions. The meeting is seen as another attempt to defuse tensions in the region following last week’s clashes in the Galwan valley between Indian and Chinese troops.
Keep an Eye On
Ebola on the wane. Congolese health authorities are expected to declare the end of the world’s second-deadliest Ebola outbreak this week, as the 42-day threshold since the last confirmed case approaches. The outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo has lasted 23 months and killed 2,280 people to date. It’s the first outbreak during which an Ebola vaccine was deployed from the beginning of the health crisis.
Cambodia’s next leader. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has led the country since 1985, has hinted that his son—34-year-old Hun Manet—may be next in line, should he ever decide to cede power. Hun Sen said that although his son is not the only person in consideration the role, “I have to support my son and train him so that he is capable [for this position]. If he cannot be like his father, at least his capacity should match that of his father by 80 or 90 percent.”
Scholz promises drama-free ECB resolution. German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz has said the clash between Germany’s constitutional court and the European Central Bank will soon see “a resolution without drama.” In early May, the German court had ordered an investigation into Germany’s participation in a European Union-wide 2.2 trillion euro bond buying program in order to show that the “economic and fiscal policy effects” of the program is within the bank’s remit. Scholz said the impasse is likely to be resolved this week.
Odds and Ends
Verdant concert. Barcelona’s Gran Teatre del Liceu opera house was reopened on Monday and filled to capacity for a special performance of the Uceli string quartet. However, the only humans in attendance were the performers on stage; 2,292 houseplants filled the seats instead. The concert was the brainchild of conceptual artist Eugenio Ampudia, who came up with the idea after developing a closer relationship with his own plants during Spain’s strict lockdown. “I think that all these plants somehow know in their inner being, in their cells, their photosynthesis that they have been at this concert,” he said afterwards. The plants will now be donated to local health workers.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-19--China Could Be in Reach of Hawaii After Kiribati Elects Pro-Beijing President

China Could Be in Reach of Hawaii After Kiribati Elects Pro-Beijing President A watershed moment in China ’ s expansion across the Pacific toward the Americas unfolded on June 22 when Kiribati , a country with only 110,000 inhabitants that controls a vast expanse of ocean , reelected a pro-China president instead of choosing a challenger pledged to recognize Taiwan .
Kiribati state media reported that incumbent President Taneti Maamau handily beat opposition leader Banuera Berina , an erstwhile Maamau ally who became his rival over the question of relations with Beijing .
China featured heavily in the election campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of bribery .
Maamau ’ s reelection gives China the possibility of gaining a foothold in Christmas Island , located just 1,300 miles south of Honolulu , home to the U.S. Pacific Command.Maamau ’ s reelection gives China the tantalizing possibility of gaining a foothold in Kiribati ’ s Christmas Island , the world ’ s biggest atoll with a land area of 150 square miles .
It ’ s located just 1,300 miles south of Honolulu , home to the U.S. Pacific Command .
Building port facilities on Christmas Island , ostensibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese warships , is a concern for the U.S. military .
For Taiwan , reversing Kiribati ’ s 2019 defection—which brought the number of countries worldwide that recognize its existence as a sovereign nation down to 15—would have been a significant victory for President Tsai Ing-wen .
When Maamau announced last September his decision to switch his country ’ s support to Beijing , even members of his own party were surprised .
In fact , Kiribati ’ s ambassador to the United Nations and United States , Teburoro Tito ( himself a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.N. secretary-general ’ s office arguing the case for Taiwan to attend meetings organized by the U.N. when he learned of the decision .
Maamau was elected in 2016 on a pledge to retain ties with Taiwan , which his predecessor , Anote Tong , had initiated in 2003 .
The sudden switch to Beijing in 2019 initially did not go down well in Kiribati .
Demonstrations were held with protesters waving Taiwanese flags and chanting , “ We love Taiwan , we hate China , we want peace.
” The leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accused the government of failing to consult the people .
The move also caused enough members of parliament from Maamau ’ s party , including its chairman , Berina , to bolt to the opposition and deprive Maamau of his previously comfortable majority when a new parliament was elected in April .
According to Kiribati sources , there were several reasons for Maamau ’ s switch from Taiwan to Beijing.Demonstrations were held with protesters waving Taiwanese flags and chanting , “ We love Taiwan , we hate China , we want peace.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ espoused multiple scientific studies that predict his country ’ s sand islands will gain elevation in tandem with a sea level expected to rise by 1 meter by century ’ s end—not drown within decades as prophesied by his predecessor , Tong .
So Maamau has embarked on an ambitious program to develop the country and lift his people out of poverty , leveraging tourism—mostly on Christmas Island—and the tuna fishery .
For that , the government decided it needed two long-range , 92-seat Embraer aircraft to link Tarawa , the capital island @ @ @ @ @ @ @ east—and to the world beyond .
It reportedly paid $ 60 million for one aircraft and asked Taiwan for a grant to buy the second one—a tall order given that Taiwan ’ s annual aid to Kiribati was around $ 10 million .
Taiwan demurred , in keeping with Tsai ’ s opposition to checkbook diplomacy .
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu , in his announcement of the diplomatic break , put it this way : “ Maamau has requested massive financial assistance from Taiwan to purchase commercial airplanes.
” Instead , Wu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preferential commercial loan , but it was rejected by Kiribati .
However , Berina—the former party leader , defector , and now Maamau ’ s challenger in Monday ’ s election—said in an interview that he was told that Taiwan had given Kiribati officials a very different story .
They allegedly offered Kiribati a grant covertly disguised as a loan : When its repayment came due , Taiwan would increase bilateral aid in proportion , so the loan reimbursement would be covered by Taiwan .
The claim could not be verified .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to government sources , is that the ruling party leadership feared that Taiwan would give money to the opponents of Maamau and his party in this year ’ s parliamentary and presidential elections .
Members of Maamau ’ s party , when they were in the opposition from 2003 to 2016 , often complained that Taiwan gave cash at election time to parliamentarians of then-President Tong ’ s party , and the leaders of Maamau ’ s party feared the old alliance would reemerge .
Under Kiribati law , there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to elected officials , and Kiribati is in the bottom third of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index .
A third reason , proffered by the pro-Taiwan opposition , is in line with complaints about Chinese bribery offers in small countries that suddenly found themselves in Beijing ’ s embrace , such as the Solomon Islands , which flipped allegiances four days before Kiribati .
There , Daniel Sudaini , premier of the Solomon ’ s largest island , Malaita , told an Australian 60 Minutes team that he was offered ( and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to back the switch .
He added on camera that he thought there were a lot of corrupt officials in his government.Kiribati officials have spoken of Chinese aid in the hundreds of millions of dollars , but they have not provided much detail .
The Australian crew , on a tour of the Pacific to investigate China ’ s expansion , had just traveled to Tarawa in Kiribati when it was placed under house arrest at its hotel upon arrival because , officials said , it lacked proper authorizations to film .
Before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out , the journalists were visited in their hotel by Ieremia Tabai , Kiribati ’ s first president who is now an opposition parliamentarian , and Tabane , the opposition leader .
The latter called their detention “ a sad day for democracy.
” A reporter quoted them as saying that China had “ doled out A $ 250,000 cash within weeks of Kiribati ’ s recognition of Beijing.
” ( Kiribati ’ s currency is the Australian dollar . )
In an interview with Foreign Policy , Berina , the opposition presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the switch and several parliamentarians protested that Taiwan was popular and they feared losing their seats as a result of the switch , Maamau told them not to worry “ because we will be getting campaign money from China.
” Berina added : “ I was shocked.
” Though government officials have spoken of Chinese aid in the hundreds of millions of dollars—which they swear will consist only of grants , not loans that would risk trapping Kiribati in debt it could not repay to China—they have not provided much detail .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Beijing , he signed a Belt and Road Memorandum of Understanding that involved only loans , according to Berina , who was still the ruling party ’ s chairman at the time .
His claim could not be verified immediately .
A vivid illustration of China ’ s interest in Christmas Island came in an official photograph of the signing ceremony showing Maamau facing Chinese President Xi Jinping , with the minister for the Line Islands , of which Christmas is a part , on his right .
Mikarite Temari , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kiribati politics but key to developing Christmas and its port infrastructure.Whether China continues its expansion across the Pacific to displace the United States and its allies may just have been decided by this tiny island nation .
Kiribati sources said the campaign ahead of the June 22 election focused largely on China : Would it use aid promises and bribes to flood the country with its workers to build white elephant projects , possibly bringing COVID-19 to one of the last nations devoid of it , as the opposition claims ?
Will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over Christmas just as China tried , within days of gaining recognition from the Solomons , to lease all of Tulagi Island , the former capital under British and Japanese rule with a perfect deep-water harbor ?
Or will the Maamau administration hold firm and take only grants that materially benefit the population , such as for adaptation measures against sea-level rise and tourism infrastructure to lure visitors from Hawaii , for whom pristine Christmas is the closest accessible tropical atoll ?
Tito , the U.N. and U.S. envoy , said that even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States remains popular for cultural and historical reasons , not least for having liberated what was then still a British protectorate from Japanese occupation in the 1943 Battle of Tarawa .
When Kiribati gained independence from Britain a little more than 40 years ago , it signed a friendship treaty with the United States under which no military installations can be built in Kiribati by other countries without Washington ’ s consent .
Though he found it hard to imagine , Tito said that the treaty ’ s abrogation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible.
” The global strategic significance of Maamau ’ s victory could therefore not be higher .
China ’ s continued expansion across the Pacific to displace the United States and its allies may very well have been decided by this tiny island nation .

A watershed moment in China’s expansion across the Pacific toward the Americas unfolded on June 22 when Kiribati, a country with only 110,000 inhabitants that controls a vast expanse of ocean, reelected a pro-China president instead of choosing a challenger pledged to recognize Taiwan.
A watershed moment in China’s expansion across the Pacific toward the Americas unfolded on June 22 when Kiribati, a country with only 110,000 inhabitants that controls a vast expanse of ocean, reelected a pro-China president instead of choosing a challenger pledged to recognize Taiwan.
Kiribati state media reported that incumbent President Taneti Maamau handily beat opposition leader Banuera Berina, an erstwhile Maamau ally who became his rival over the question of relations with Beijing. China featured heavily in the election campaign, including promises of aid and allegations of bribery.
Maamau’s reelection gives China the possibility of gaining a foothold in Christmas Island, located just 1,300 miles south of Honolulu, home to the U.S. Pacific Command.Maamau’s reelection gives China the tantalizing possibility of gaining a foothold in Kiribati’s Christmas Island, the world’s biggest atoll with a land area of 150 square miles. It’s located just 1,300 miles south of Honolulu, home to the U.S. Pacific Command. Building port facilities on Christmas Island, ostensibly for tourism but capable of use by Chinese warships, is a concern for the U.S. military.
For Taiwan, reversing Kiribati’s 2019 defection—which brought the number of countries worldwide that recognize its existence as a sovereign nation down to 15—would have been a significant victory for President Tsai Ing-wen.
When Maamau announced last September his decision to switch his country’s support to Beijing, even members of his own party were surprised. In fact, Kiribati’s ambassador to the United Nations and United States, Teburoro Tito (himself a former Kiribati president), was in the U.N. secretary-general’s office arguing the case for Taiwan to attend meetings organized by the U.N. when he learned of the decision. Maamau was elected in 2016 on a pledge to retain ties with Taiwan, which his predecessor, Anote Tong, had initiated in 2003.
The sudden switch to Beijing in 2019 initially did not go down well in Kiribati. Demonstrations were held with protesters waving Taiwanese flags and chanting, “We love Taiwan, we hate China, we want peace.” The leader of the opposition, Titabu Tabane, accused the government of failing to consult the people.
The move also caused enough members of parliament from Maamau’s party, including its chairman, Berina, to bolt to the opposition and deprive Maamau of his previously comfortable majority when a new parliament was elected in April.
According to Kiribati sources, there were several reasons for Maamau’s switch from Taiwan to Beijing.Demonstrations were held with protesters waving Taiwanese flags and chanting, “We love Taiwan, we hate China, we want peace.”
First, Maamau’s administration has espoused multiple scientific studies that predict his country’s sand islands will gain elevation in tandem with a sea level expected to rise by 1 meter by century’s end—not drown within decades as prophesied by his predecessor, Tong. So Maamau has embarked on an ambitious program to develop the country and lift his people out of poverty, leveraging tourism—mostly on Christmas Island—and the tuna fishery.
For that, the government decided it needed two long-range, 92-seat Embraer aircraft to link Tarawa, the capital island, to Christmas 2,000 miles to the east—and to the world beyond. It reportedly paid $60 million for one aircraft and asked Taiwan for a grant to buy the second one—a tall order given that Taiwan’s annual aid to Kiribati was around $10 million. Taiwan demurred, in keeping with Tsai’s opposition to checkbook diplomacy. Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, in his announcement of the diplomatic break, put it this way: “Maamau has requested massive financial assistance from Taiwan to purchase commercial airplanes.” Instead, Wu said, Taiwan offered to provide a preferential commercial loan, but it was rejected by Kiribati.
However, Berina—the former party leader, defector, and now Maamau’s challenger in Monday’s election—said in an interview that he was told that Taiwan had given Kiribati officials a very different story. They allegedly offered Kiribati a grant covertly disguised as a loan: When its repayment came due, Taiwan would increase bilateral aid in proportion, so the loan reimbursement would be covered by Taiwan. The claim could not be verified.
A second reason for the switch to Beijing, according to government sources, is that the ruling party leadership feared that Taiwan would give money to the opponents of Maamau and his party in this year’s parliamentary and presidential elections. Members of Maamau’s party, when they were in the opposition from 2003 to 2016, often complained that Taiwan gave cash at election time to parliamentarians of then-President Tong’s party, and the leaders of Maamau’s party feared the old alliance would reemerge. Under Kiribati law, there are no restrictions on who may give money to elected officials, and Kiribati is in the bottom third of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.
A third reason, proffered by the pro-Taiwan opposition, is in line with complaints about Chinese bribery offers in small countries that suddenly found themselves in Beijing’s embrace, such as the Solomon Islands, which flipped allegiances four days before Kiribati. There, Daniel Sudaini, premier of the Solomon’s largest island, Malaita, told an Australian 60 Minutes team that he was offered (and had turned down) $1 million to back the switch. He added on camera that he thought there were a lot of corrupt officials in his government.Kiribati officials have spoken of Chinese aid in the hundreds of millions of dollars, but they have not provided much detail.
The Australian crew, on a tour of the Pacific to investigate China’s expansion, had just traveled to Tarawa in Kiribati when it was placed under house arrest at its hotel upon arrival because, officials said, it lacked proper authorizations to film. Before they were expelled on the next plane out, the journalists were visited in their hotel by Ieremia Tabai, Kiribati’s first president who is now an opposition parliamentarian, and Tabane, the opposition leader. The latter called their detention “a sad day for democracy.” A reporter quoted them as saying that China had “doled out A$250,000 cash within weeks of Kiribati’s recognition of Beijing.” (Kiribati’s currency is the Australian dollar.)
In an interview with Foreign Policy, Berina, the opposition presidential candidate, said that when Maamau announced the switch and several parliamentarians protested that Taiwan was popular and they feared losing their seats as a result of the switch, Maamau told them not to worry “because we will be getting campaign money from China.” Berina added: “I was shocked.”
Though government officials have spoken of Chinese aid in the hundreds of millions of dollars—which they swear will consist only of grants, not loans that would risk trapping Kiribati in debt it could not repay to China—they have not provided much detail. But when Maamau made his first state visit to Beijing, he signed a Belt and Road Memorandum of Understanding that involved only loans, according to Berina, who was still the ruling party’s chairman at the time. His claim could not be verified immediately.
A vivid illustration of China’s interest in Christmas Island came in an official photograph of the signing ceremony showing Maamau facing Chinese President Xi Jinping, with the minister for the Line Islands, of which Christmas is a part, on his right. Mikarite Temari, the minister, is a relatively peripheral figure in Kiribati politics but key to developing Christmas and its port infrastructure.Whether China continues its expansion across the Pacific to displace the United States and its allies may just have been decided by this tiny island nation.
Kiribati sources said the campaign ahead of the June 22 election focused largely on China: Would it use aid promises and bribes to flood the country with its workers to build white elephant projects, possibly bringing COVID-19 to one of the last nations devoid of it, as the opposition claims? Will it press its expansionist agenda, taking over Christmas just as China tried, within days of gaining recognition from the Solomons, to lease all of Tulagi Island, the former capital under British and Japanese rule with a perfect deep-water harbor? Or will the Maamau administration hold firm and take only grants that materially benefit the population, such as for adaptation measures against sea-level rise and tourism infrastructure to lure visitors from Hawaii, for whom pristine Christmas is the closest accessible tropical atoll?
Tito, the U.N. and U.S. envoy, said that even though it gives no aid to Kiribati, the United States remains popular for cultural and historical reasons, not least for having liberated what was then still a British protectorate from Japanese occupation in the 1943 Battle of Tarawa. When Kiribati gained independence from Britain a little more than 40 years ago, it signed a friendship treaty with the United States under which no military installations can be built in Kiribati by other countries without Washington’s consent. Though he found it hard to imagine, Tito said that the treaty’s abrogation, with due six-month notice, was “possible.”
The global strategic significance of Maamau’s victory could therefore not be higher. China’s continued expansion across the Pacific to displace the United States and its allies may very well have been decided by this tiny island nation.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-23--Japan Radically Increased Immigration—and No One Protested

In the bustling Ueno neighborhood of central Tokyo , the streets smell of cumin lamb skewers , shish kebab , and kofte .
A storefront advertises financial services in more than 20 languages , and the shops sell Korean novelty snacks , Taiwanese bubble tea , and Punjabi curries .
At a nearby kissaten , a traditional Japanese diner , a group of young Senegalese men chat in Wolof .
Scenes like these may be familiar in New York or Hong Kong , but they are far less common in Tokyo , a city that is not traditionally known for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beginning to change .
While Ueno has been relatively multicultural compared to the rest of Tokyo since the 1980s , the entire capital is becoming increasingly diverse .
In the coming decades , similar neighborhoods will mushroom across Japan as the nation pushes ahead with radical immigration reforms .
But even as immigration grows in this traditionally homogenous country , Japan appears to be avoiding the organized far-right backlash that has coursed through the West in recent years .
In Europe and the United States , immigration and national identity seemingly consume all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reputation as closed-off , homogenous , and xenophobic , a large increase in immigration has mostly been met with a shrug .
While anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread , they do not run very deep , or so suggests the lack of substantial opposition .
This growth in immigration , in turn , is changing the image of Japan from ethnically homogenous to moderately diverse .
Today , nearly 3 million migrants live in Japan out of a population of 126 million .
That number is triple the figure in 1990 .
And as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and shrinking domestic workforce , it ’ s looking to increase that number further .
In April 2019 , Tokyo implemented historic immigration reform , expanding visa programs to allow more than 345,000 new workers to immigrate to Japan over the subsequent five years .
Low-skilled workers will be able to reside in Japan for five years , while foreign workers with specialized skills will be allowed to stay indefinitely , along with their family members—suggesting that many of these workers might stay for good .
Immigration to Japan and the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rising steadily since 2013 , when the government expanded a trainee programs to attract hundreds of thousands of temporary migrants .
In 2017 , Japan streamlined the immigration of skilled foreign workers with a new fast-track bill .
According to Naohiro Yashiro , a business professor at Showa Women ’ s University in Tokyo , foreign workers are estimated to make up 40 percent of the net increase among the highly skilled labor force in Japan in the coming five years .
This growth in immigration , in turn , is changing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moderately diverse .
Among Tokyo residents in their 20s , 1 in 10 is now foreign-born .
And Tokyo is no longer an outlier .
Much of the migration is happening in small industrial towns around the country , such as Shimukappu in central Hokkaido and Oizumi in Gunma prefecture , where migrant populations make up more than 15 percent of the local population .
In the mostly rural Mie prefecture , east of Osaka and Kyoto , foreign migration has reversed years of population loss .
Despite this expansion , however , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populist backlash in Europe or the United States , where political polarization is increasingly driven by differing opinions on immigration and national identity .
In fact , the latest immigration reform has faced little scrutiny by the media or in wider conversation .
“ In general , there has not been much controversy regarding the law , ” Yashiro said .
Much of that can be traced to the clear government messaging behind the reforms—and the messenger .
Conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has based his support for the changing immigration policy not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pragmatic , demographic arguments .
By 2050 , the world population is expected to increase by 2 billion people , according to the United Nations , but Japan ’ s population is expected to shrink by at least 20 million .
Meanwhile , the fertility rate in Japan has fallen to 1.4 children per woman , while 28 percent of the country is over 65 years old .
This means that the country ’ s population has been dropping by around 400,000 people a year .
With unemployment consistently below 3 percent in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , employers are increasingly raising alarms about labor shortages .
Last year , for the first time in Japan ’ s history , there were more jobs available than the number of job seekers in all of Japan ’ s 47 prefectures .
In a country long known for its restrictive borders , immigration is now seen as the most obvious solution to that demographic challenge .
Rather than simply relaxing immigration restrictions overall , however , Japan has developed a unique program of customized immigration , based on specific requests for workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of a la carte globalization .
It is a kind of a la carte globalization , where Japan custom-orders a labor force in the 14 sectors where they are most urgently needed , including nurses and care workers , shipbuilders , farm workers , car mechanics , and workers in the fishing and construction industries .
“ It ’ s important to understand that Abe ’ s government introduced these reforms not to change Japanese society , but to sustain Japanese society , ” said Eiji Oguma , a sociologist and historian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has spent most of his professional life researching and writing about immigration and Japanese identity .
But given that latest bill allows an easier pathway for skilled foreign workers to apply for permanent residency and , eventually , Japanese citizenship—it may do more than simply sustain society .
“ More workers will try to stay here permanently , ” Oguma said .
“ So even if the bill is not meant to change Japan , it certainly has the potential to change Japanese society in the long term.
” Whenever Japan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan ’ s long history as an isolated country closed off from the world soon follow .
Historians of Japanese politics have argued that the restrictive immigration policy and strict border controls have been shaped as much by postwar occupation as by a historical resentment toward foreigners .
The postwar U.S. occupation regime applied Cold War logic that required firm borders with Korea and China .
In Borderline Japan : Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era , the historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues that “ the framework of laws and institutions which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ created during the postwar Allied occupation of Japan.
” During the decades following the war , a new image of Japan emerged as “ a self-contained , unique and ethnically ‘ pure ’ nation , ” she writes .
Japan ranks moderately high on global indexes of acceptance and tolerance of immigrants .
Nationalist and xenophobic far-right voices protesting the new law have failed to gain momentum .
In fact , most of Japanese society supports the changing immigration policy .
In a recent survey by Nikkei , almost 70 percent of Japanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see more foreigners in the country .
“ The nationalist , anti-immigrant groups here only make up perhaps 1-2 percent of voters .
It ’ s not like Europe .
And they have not raised their voices about this so far , ” Oguma said .
It helps that the immigration reform was passed by Abe and his conservative government .
Abe has avoided describing the bill as an “ immigration policy , ” opting instead to market it as a pragmatic response to the demands of local business leaders .
A significant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bilateral agreements Japan has drafted with countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines , which will allow them to send tens of thousands of care workers to Japan annually .
Both countries see this as a win-win proposition .
Japan gets much-needed labor , the Philippines gets an increase in foreign remittances , and many workers will eventually return , having learned new valuable skills .
The strongest support for the bill came from the most conservative wing of parliament , and opposition has largely come from Abe ’ s left , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on employers , which they fear could lead to exploitation .
Many foreign workers are already forced to work overtime , receive less pay , and risk having their passports and travel documents confiscated by employers .
Maids and care workers from the Philippines regularly report being treated terribly by clients who spit on them , beat them , and use racist slurs .
And the activist group Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan observes that some factories in the mostly rural Gifu prefecture have implemented segregated bathrooms and locker rooms for domestic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treated badly in Japan for decades .
According to a recent Japan Times analysis of government data , the participants in Japan ’ s controversial trainee program are more than twice as likely to die from work-related causes as their Japanese counterparts .
Last year , Abe ’ s government promised the implementation of 100 consultation centers nationwide to deal with issues of workplace abuse for migrant workers and trainees .
Some of these issues were anticipated when the new immigration law passed in December 2018 .
The concerns raised in parliament were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ How do we prepare for their living ?
How do we protect their rights as workers ?
What about their social welfare ?
What about their housing ?
What about their Japanese-language education ?
None of these have been dealt with , ” wrote Akira Nagatsuma , of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan , in an op-ed .
This dynamic was common in the immigration debate in Europe and the United States in the 1980s and ’ 90s , when pro-business conservatives often pushed for more immigrants and guest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for workers ’ rights and downward pressure on wages .
Last year , I visited the home of a Japanese TV personality , his American wife , and their Filipina maid , Maria , in Tokyo ’ s prosperous Meguro neighborhood .
Maria , who asked not to share her last name , has worked for the family for the past decade , and she lives an hour away in Kanagawa .
In recent years , a small enclave of Filipino migrants have settled there , with many more to come , Maria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a game-changer for the Filipino community in Tokyo , she said .
“ I have four relatives who plan to move here now , to work , after they passed the new migration bill .
My niece is a registered nurse back home , but she ’ s been unemployed for years , so she ’ s also moving here this summer , ” Maria said .
“ Many people in the Philippines are very excited , because they know they can make so much more money here now.
” Over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mostly upbeat stories on the hundreds of nurses and care workers arriving to Japan from the Philippines .
Maria got her permanent residency two years ago and plans to stay here for good .
The legal process was long and expensive , with the family that employs her paying most of the legal fees .
With the new bill , the permanent residency application process is expected to be smoother .
Maria lives with her husband , a maintenance worker at an international school , and their daughter , who works at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ m beginning to feel that I belong here , ” she said .
“ I have been here for so long .
People are generally nice .
I experience bullying occasionally , but it ’ s mostly older people .
Never the young ones.
” The widespread xenophobia in Japan is hardly a myth .
In 2010 , the U.N. ’ s human rights experts called out Japan for racism , discrimination , and exploitation of migrant workers .
Increased immigration has not changed the country ’ s notoriously strict asylum policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were approved , out of around 10,000 applicants .
Most foreigners here can share plenty of anecdotes of casual racism .
Baye McNeil , an African American man who has lived in Tokyo for two decades , said he experiences racism pretty much every day , “ but it ’ s still not as bad as in America.
” A few years ago , McNeil wrote a viral blog post on what he called the “ gaijin seat.
” “ Gaijin ” means “ foreigner ” in Japanese , and McNeil wrote that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and there ’ s an open seat next to him , locals refuse to sit there .
“ Usually , I hear people say in Japanese that it ’ s too scary to sit next to a Black guy , ” McNeil said .
Still , he said he prefers the casual xenophobia of Japan to the structural racism of America .
“ The racism here is more like being hit in a pillow fight.
” The countless examples of workplace abuse and harassment point to a larger problem of social inclusion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationwide debate on what it means to be Japanese in the 21st century .
Few countries undergoing demographic shifts are able to avoid these challenges .
Neighboring nations leave room for pessimism .
When South Korea accepted 500 Yemeni refugees in 2018 , it created storms of protests , with street rallies demanding that the Yemenis be sent back , calling them “ fake refugees.
” The worldwide protests in support of the United States ’ anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement have gained traction in Japan .
In early June , thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Tokyo , which has contributed to a nationwide debate on harassment of migrants and foreigners—as well as race .
But the issue is far from resolved : When the Japanese tennis star Naomi Osaka , who is biracial , tweeted her support for the protests , she was met with a deluge of online harassment .
The business professor Yashiro said he expects a lot of “ social friction ” in Japan in coming years , as hundreds of thousands of new migrants arrive to a country not used to diversity .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is unlikely to see a nationalist backlash , let alone organized political insurgency .
If a xenophobic backlash eventually emerges , what will it look like ?
Most experts say that it ’ s unlikely to take an organized political form .
“ Xenophobic nationalists are generally irrelevant in politics .
If there is a backlash , it will most likely begin as a local uprising against Tokyo , a populist revolt against the central government , just as in the EU , ” Oguma said .
“ But I don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far-right here is too atomized , each faction want different things .
So I don ’ t really worry about an organized uprising.
” It is hard to speculate on the political aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic .
With massive stimulus spending and a robust , universal health care system , Japan has weathered the pandemic fairly well .
Unemployment in April was 2.5 percent .
While there has been some anecdotal evidence of increased racist harassment of foreign workers , coupled with an emerging skepticism toward globalization and migration , Japan at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries where resentment against immigrants is not the defining feature of politics .
Despite its reputation as isolated and xenophobic , Japan has become an outlier in global politics , showing that increased immigration is possible without a mass backlash .
Research for this article was funded in part by the Sweden-Japan Foundation .

In the bustling Ueno neighborhood of central Tokyo, the streets smell of cumin lamb skewers, shish kebab, and kofte. A storefront advertises financial services in more than 20 languages, and the shops sell Korean novelty snacks, Taiwanese bubble tea, and Punjabi curries. At a nearby kissaten, a traditional Japanese diner, a group of young Senegalese men chat in Wolof.
In the bustling Ueno neighborhood of central Tokyo, the streets smell of cumin lamb skewers, shish kebab, and kofte. A storefront advertises financial services in more than 20 languages, and the shops sell Korean novelty snacks, Taiwanese bubble tea, and Punjabi curries. At a nearby kissaten, a traditional Japanese diner, a group of young Senegalese men chat in Wolof.
Scenes like these may be familiar in New York or Hong Kong, but they are far less common in Tokyo, a city that is not traditionally known for its cosmopolitan diversity.
That’s beginning to change. While Ueno has been relatively multicultural compared to the rest of Tokyo since the 1980s, the entire capital is becoming increasingly diverse. In the coming decades, similar neighborhoods will mushroom across Japan as the nation pushes ahead with radical immigration reforms. But even as immigration grows in this traditionally homogenous country, Japan appears to be avoiding the organized far-right backlash that has coursed through the West in recent years.
In Europe and the United States, immigration and national identity seemingly consume all politics; in Japan, despite its reputation as closed-off, homogenous, and xenophobic, a large increase in immigration has mostly been met with a shrug. While anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread, they do not run very deep, or so suggests the lack of substantial opposition.
This growth in immigration, in turn, is changing the image of Japan from ethnically homogenous to moderately diverse. Today, nearly 3 million migrants live in Japan out of a population of 126 million. That number is triple the figure in 1990. And as Japan struggles with a rapidly aging population and shrinking domestic workforce, it’s looking to increase that number further. In April 2019, Tokyo implemented historic immigration reform, expanding visa programs to allow more than 345,000 new workers to immigrate to Japan over the subsequent five years. Low-skilled workers will be able to reside in Japan for five years, while foreign workers with specialized skills will be allowed to stay indefinitely, along with their family members—suggesting that many of these workers might stay for good.
Immigration to Japan and the number of foreign workers in the country have been rising steadily since 2013, when the government expanded a trainee programs to attract hundreds of thousands of temporary migrants. In 2017, Japan streamlined the immigration of skilled foreign workers with a new fast-track bill. According to Naohiro Yashiro, a business professor at Showa Women’s University in Tokyo, foreign workers are estimated to make up 40 percent of the net increase among the highly skilled labor force in Japan in the coming five years.
This growth in immigration, in turn, is changing the image of Japan from ethnically homogenous to moderately diverse. Among Tokyo residents in their 20s, 1 in 10 is now foreign-born. And Tokyo is no longer an outlier. Much of the migration is happening in small industrial towns around the country, such as Shimukappu in central Hokkaido and Oizumi in Gunma prefecture, where migrant populations make up more than 15 percent of the local population. In the mostly rural Mie prefecture, east of Osaka and Kyoto, foreign migration has reversed years of population loss.
Indonesian Factory Worker in Japan
Despite this expansion, however, Japan has not seen anything like the populist backlash in Europe or the United States, where political polarization is increasingly driven by differing opinions on immigration and national identity. In fact, the latest immigration reform has faced little scrutiny by the media or in wider conversation. “In general, there has not been much controversy regarding the law,” Yashiro said.
Much of that can be traced to the clear government messaging behind the reforms—and the messenger. Conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has based his support for the changing immigration policy not on any humanitarian concerns but rather on pragmatic, demographic arguments. By 2050, the world population is expected to increase by 2 billion people, according to the United Nations, but Japan’s population is expected to shrink by at least 20 million. Meanwhile, the fertility rate in Japan has fallen to 1.4 children per woman, while 28 percent of the country is over 65 years old. This means that the country’s population has been dropping by around 400,000 people a year.
With unemployment consistently below 3 percent in recent years, even after the pandemic, employers are increasingly raising alarms about labor shortages. Last year, for the first time in Japan’s history, there were more jobs available than the number of job seekers in all of Japan’s 47 prefectures. In a country long known for its restrictive borders, immigration is now seen as the most obvious solution to that demographic challenge.
Rather than simply relaxing immigration restrictions overall, however, Japan has developed a unique program of customized immigration, based on specific requests for workers from various countries. It is a kind of a la carte globalization. It is a kind of a la carte globalization, where Japan custom-orders a labor force in the 14 sectors where they are most urgently needed, including nurses and care workers, shipbuilders, farm workers, car mechanics, and workers in the fishing and construction industries.
“It’s important to understand that Abe’s government introduced these reforms not to change Japanese society, but to sustain Japanese society,” said Eiji Oguma, a sociologist and historian at Keio University in Tokyo, who has spent most of his professional life researching and writing about immigration and Japanese identity.
But given that latest bill allows an easier pathway for skilled foreign workers to apply for permanent residency and, eventually, Japanese citizenship—it may do more than simply sustain society.
“More workers will try to stay here permanently,” Oguma said. “So even if the bill is not meant to change Japan, it certainly has the potential to change Japanese society in the long term.”
Whenever Japan’s immigration policy is discussed, descriptions of Japan’s long history as an isolated country closed off from the world soon follow. Historians of Japanese politics have argued that the restrictive immigration policy and strict border controls have been shaped as much by postwar occupation as by a historical resentment toward foreigners.
The postwar U.S. occupation regime applied Cold War logic that required firm borders with Korea and China. In Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era, the historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues that “the framework of laws and institutions which restricts immigration to Japan today was actually created during the postwar Allied occupation of Japan.” During the decades following the war, a new image of Japan emerged as “a self-contained, unique and ethnically ‘pure’ nation,” she writes.
Japan ranks moderately high on global indexes of acceptance and tolerance of immigrants. Nationalist and xenophobic far-right voices protesting the new law have failed to gain momentum. In fact, most of Japanese society supports the changing immigration policy. In a recent survey by Nikkei, almost 70 percent of Japanese said it is “good” to see more foreigners in the country. “The nationalist, anti-immigrant groups here only make up perhaps 1-2 percent of voters. It’s not like Europe. And they have not raised their voices about this so far,” Oguma said.
It helps that the immigration reform was passed by Abe and his conservative government. Abe has avoided describing the bill as an “immigration policy,” opting instead to market it as a pragmatic response to the demands of local business leaders.
Portuguese Signs in Japan
A significant factor in the new immigration policy is the bilateral agreements Japan has drafted with countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which will allow them to send tens of thousands of care workers to Japan annually. Both countries see this as a win-win proposition. Japan gets much-needed labor, the Philippines gets an increase in foreign remittances, and many workers will eventually return, having learned new valuable skills.
The strongest support for the bill came from the most conservative wing of parliament, and opposition has largely come from Abe’s left, over concerns about a lack of regulation on employers, which they fear could lead to exploitation. Many foreign workers are already forced to work overtime, receive less pay, and risk having their passports and travel documents confiscated by employers. Maids and care workers from the Philippines regularly report being treated terribly by clients who spit on them, beat them, and use racist slurs. And the activist group Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan observes that some factories in the mostly rural Gifu prefecture have implemented segregated bathrooms and locker rooms for domestic and foreign workers.
Foreign workers have been treated badly in Japan for decades. According to a recent Japan Times analysis of government data, the participants in Japan’s controversial trainee program are more than twice as likely to die from work-related causes as their Japanese counterparts. Last year, Abe’s government promised the implementation of 100 consultation centers nationwide to deal with issues of workplace abuse for migrant workers and trainees.
Some of these issues were anticipated when the new immigration law passed in December 2018. The concerns raised in parliament were mostly about social inclusion and labor rights.
“How do we prepare for their living? How do we protect their rights as workers? What about their social welfare? What about their housing? What about their Japanese-language education? None of these have been dealt with,” wrote Akira Nagatsuma, of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, in an op-ed.
This dynamic was common in the immigration debate in Europe and the United States in the 1980s and ’90s, when pro-business conservatives often pushed for more immigrants and guest workers, while labor unions raised concerns for workers’ rights and downward pressure on wages.
Last year, I visited the home of a Japanese TV personality, his American wife, and their Filipina maid, Maria, in Tokyo’s prosperous Meguro neighborhood. Maria, who asked not to share her last name, has worked for the family for the past decade, and she lives an hour away in Kanagawa. In recent years, a small enclave of Filipino migrants have settled there, with many more to come, Maria predicts. The new immigration bill will be a game-changer for the Filipino community in Tokyo, she said.
“I have four relatives who plan to move here now, to work, after they passed the new migration bill. My niece is a registered nurse back home, but she’s been unemployed for years, so she’s also moving here this summer,” Maria said. “Many people in the Philippines are very excited, because they know they can make so much more money here now.”
Over the past year, Japanese newspapers have run mostly upbeat stories on the hundreds of nurses and care workers arriving to Japan from the Philippines. Maria got her permanent residency two years ago and plans to stay here for good. The legal process was long and expensive, with the family that employs her paying most of the legal fees. With the new bill, the permanent residency application process is expected to be smoother.
Maria lives with her husband, a maintenance worker at an international school, and their daughter, who works at a ramen factory. “I think I’m beginning to feel that I belong here,” she said. “I have been here for so long. People are generally nice. I experience bullying occasionally, but it’s mostly older people. Never the young ones.”
Refugee Job Seeker Japan
The widespread xenophobia in Japan is hardly a myth. In 2010, the U.N.’s human rights experts called out Japan for racism, discrimination, and exploitation of migrant workers. Increased immigration has not changed the country’s notoriously strict asylum policies. In 2018, only 42 asylum-seekers were approved, out of around 10,000 applicants.
Most foreigners here can share plenty of anecdotes of casual racism. Baye McNeil, an African American man who has lived in Tokyo for two decades, said he experiences racism pretty much every day, “but it’s still not as bad as in America.”
A few years ago, McNeil wrote a viral blog post on what he called the “gaijin seat.” “Gaijin” means “foreigner” in Japanese, and McNeil wrote that whenever he sits down on the subway and there’s an open seat next to him, locals refuse to sit there.
“Usually, I hear people say in Japanese that it’s too scary to sit next to a Black guy,” McNeil said.
Still, he said he prefers the casual xenophobia of Japan to the structural racism of America.
“The racism here is more like being hit in a pillow fight.”
The countless examples of workplace abuse and harassment point to a larger problem of social inclusion. Sooner or later, Japan may face nationwide debate on what it means to be Japanese in the 21st century. Few countries undergoing demographic shifts are able to avoid these challenges.
Neighboring nations leave room for pessimism. When South Korea accepted 500 Yemeni refugees in 2018, it created storms of protests, with street rallies demanding that the Yemenis be sent back, calling them “fake refugees.”
The worldwide protests in support of the United States’ anti-racist Black Lives Matter movement have gained traction in Japan. In early June, thousands of people participated in Black Lives Matter protests in Tokyo, which has contributed to a nationwide debate on harassment of migrants and foreigners—as well as race. But the issue is far from resolved: When the Japanese tennis star Naomi Osaka, who is biracial, tweeted her support for the protests, she was met with a deluge of online harassment.
The business professor Yashiro said he expects a lot of “social friction” in Japan in coming years, as hundreds of thousands of new migrants arrive to a country not used to diversity. But Oguma and other experts say Japan is unlikely to see a nationalist backlash, let alone organized political insurgency.
Indonesian Nurses Arrive in Tokyo
If a xenophobic backlash eventually emerges, what will it look like? Most experts say that it’s unlikely to take an organized political form. “Xenophobic nationalists are generally irrelevant in politics. If there is a backlash, it will most likely begin as a local uprising against Tokyo, a populist revolt against the central government, just as in the EU,” Oguma said. “But I don’t see it happening right now. The far-right here is too atomized, each faction want different things. So I don’t really worry about an organized uprising.”
It is hard to speculate on the political aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. With massive stimulus spending and a robust, universal health care system, Japan has weathered the pandemic fairly well. Unemployment in April was 2.5 percent.
While there has been some anecdotal evidence of increased racist harassment of foreign workers, coupled with an emerging skepticism toward globalization and migration, Japan at the moment is one of the few countries where resentment against immigrants is not the defining feature of politics.
Despite its reputation as isolated and xenophobic, Japan has become an outlier in global politics, showing that increased immigration is possible without a mass backlash.
Research for this article was funded in part by the Sweden-Japan Foundation.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-23--Britain Must Step Up to the Global Stage to Protect Hong Kong

Britain Must Step Up to the Global Stage to Protect Hong Kong The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was the brainchild of two formidable political leaders , China ’ s Deng Xiaoping and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher .
Since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997 , the international treaty has generally worked well for China , Hong Kong , and the rest of the world .
But from the beginning , Hong Kong ’ s Basic Law—the city ’ s de facto constitution—presented a serious conflict between the demands of Article 39 , which entrenched the International Covenant on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the requirement under Article 23 that introduced such charges as “ subversion , ” “ secession , ” and “ collusion with foreign political powers ” into local legislation .
This was the catalyst for major protests in 2003 and has made national security legislation a hot-button issue ever since .
The impasse in Hong Kong is a geopolitical watershed .
Alongside unrest over the extradition bill , China has moved to unilaterally enact national security legislation , a course of action that the British government and many of its international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Hong Kong ’ s Basic Law and the original treaty .
Hong Kong , once a bridge between East and West , could become a fresh fault line .
Given the speed at which the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to pass the law—no doubt in anticipation of another victory for pro-democracy candidates in Hong Kong ’ s Legislative Council elections in September—diplomatic avenues must be prioritized , as escalation is in no one ’ s interests .
The United Nations would be the obvious arena .
In the current session of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new mandate should be created for a U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in Hong Kong .
The creation of a U.N. special envoy for Hong Kong appointed by the secretary-general would also be a step forward , although it would need agreement from all sides on who that person is—realistically speaking , an unlikely prospect.Before escalating actions , or considering sanctions over Hong Kong , the issue must be brought to the U.N. Security Council .
Many countries with an interest in security issues related to Hong Kong are among the 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 15 members of the council .
They include Vietnam , Indonesia , Estonia , and South Africa , as well as Germany and Belgium .
Of course , China has a veto , and that is why the diplomatic case for finding a more informal forum is probably still preferable .
But the U.N. charter is clear over the role of the Security Council in the search for peaceful resolutions .
Negotiations held in private are already happening , but a formal international contact group has yet to be instituted .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Namibia to independence as well as achieve the Dayton Accords over Bosnia-Herzegovina .
I was among seven former U.K. foreign secretaries who recently argued that it would be appropriate in this context .
U.S. President Donald Trump has already invited India , South Korea , and Australia to Camp David , coinciding with the G-7 summit in Washington , during which Japan has agreed to take the lead on Hong Kong .
This could provide the basis for the establishment of such a contact group .
If Chinese President Xi Jinping continues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preserve the integrity of the joint declaration , he will set in motion a process going far beyond Hong Kong .
There appears to be a bipartisan consensus in the United States to take economic action over Hong Kong .
Whether it be through Trump or a future President Joe Biden , senators and congressmen from both parties , the Pentagon or the United States in NATO , or the U.S. State Department , there is a readiness to act .
The world has become alarmed by Xi ’ s apparent disregard for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maritime law , fishing rights , patents , privacy , or business conventions .
These mounting concerns have largely been kept private , but the joint statement by the G-7 foreign ministers last week shows that Hong Kong has brought all of these issues to a head .
Containment will now be the order of the day , but it can take many forms .
This is not the same situation that faced the democracies in 1946 .
When compared with the Soviet Union then , China is far more developed and better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continues to grow .
Prudence warns us that dangerous battles in the region , not at the negotiating table , may lie ahead in and around the South China Sea .
In this geopolitical context , the British government must continue to play a principal role in ensuring “ one country , two systems ” is upheld—not remotely connected to an old colonial role but to its commitments under the international treaty lodged at the United Nations .
This should not be an adversarial role .
The U.K. has commercial interests and friendships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many countries around the South China Sea and in the Pacific , but it also has obligations under international law and moral commitments to the people of Hong Kong .
The issue for Xi is an old one posed by Winston Churchill at a White House lunch in June 1954 .
There are many versions of the quote , but I prefer the tougher one , which might appeal to Xi : “ It is better to talk jaw-to-jaw than to have war .
”

The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration was the brainchild of two formidable political leaders, China’s Deng Xiaoping and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
Since the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, the international treaty has generally worked well for China, Hong Kong, and the rest of the world. But from the beginning, Hong Kong’s Basic Law—the city’s de facto constitution—presented a serious conflict between the demands of Article 39, which entrenched the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into local law, and the requirement under Article 23 that introduced such charges as “subversion,” “secession,” and “collusion with foreign political powers” into local legislation. This was the catalyst for major protests in 2003 and has made national security legislation a hot-button issue ever since.
The impasse in Hong Kong is a geopolitical watershed. Alongside unrest over the extradition bill, China has moved to unilaterally enact national security legislation, a course of action that the British government and many of its international counterparts consider to be in direct conflict with Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the original treaty. Hong Kong, once a bridge between East and West, could become a fresh fault line.
Given the speed at which the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to pass the law—no doubt in anticipation of another victory for pro-democracy candidates in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council elections in September—diplomatic avenues must be prioritized, as escalation is in no one’s interests.
The United Nations would be the obvious arena. In the current session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, a new mandate should be created for a U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in Hong Kong. The creation of a U.N. special envoy for Hong Kong appointed by the secretary-general would also be a step forward, although it would need agreement from all sides on who that person is—realistically speaking, an unlikely prospect.Before escalating actions, or considering sanctions over Hong Kong, the issue must be brought to the U.N. Security Council. Many countries with an interest in security issues related to Hong Kong are among the 10 nations—apart from the permanent five—that make up the 15 members of the council. They include Vietnam, Indonesia, Estonia, and South Africa, as well as Germany and Belgium. Of course, China has a veto, and that is why the diplomatic case for finding a more informal forum is probably still preferable. But the U.N. charter is clear over the role of the Security Council in the search for peaceful resolutions.
Negotiations held in private are already happening, but a formal international contact group has yet to be instituted. That contact group formula was used to bring Namibia to independence as well as achieve the Dayton Accords over Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was among seven former U.K. foreign secretaries who recently argued that it would be appropriate in this context. U.S. President Donald Trump has already invited India, South Korea, and Australia to Camp David, coinciding with the G-7 summit in Washington, during which Japan has agreed to take the lead on Hong Kong. This could provide the basis for the establishment of such a contact group.
If Chinese President Xi Jinping continues to refuse any dialogue or negotiation designed to preserve the integrity of the joint declaration, he will set in motion a process going far beyond Hong Kong. There appears to be a bipartisan consensus in the United States to take economic action over Hong Kong. Whether it be through Trump or a future President Joe Biden, senators and congressmen from both parties, the Pentagon or the United States in NATO, or the U.S. State Department, there is a readiness to act.
The world has become alarmed by Xi’s apparent disregard for international agreements, whether those be around maritime law, fishing rights, patents, privacy, or business conventions. These mounting concerns have largely been kept private, but the joint statement by the G-7 foreign ministers last week shows that Hong Kong has brought all of these issues to a head.
Containment will now be the order of the day, but it can take many forms. This is not the same situation that faced the democracies in 1946. When compared with the Soviet Union then, China is far more developed and better equipped technologically, and their military strength continues to grow. Prudence warns us that dangerous battles in the region, not at the negotiating table, may lie ahead in and around the South China Sea.
In this geopolitical context, the British government must continue to play a principal role in ensuring “one country, two systems” is upheld—not remotely connected to an old colonial role but to its commitments under the international treaty lodged at the United Nations. This should not be an adversarial role. The U.K. has commercial interests and friendships with China, as well as with many countries around the South China Sea and in the Pacific, but it also has obligations under international law and moral commitments to the people of Hong Kong. The issue for Xi is an old one posed by Winston Churchill at a White House lunch in June 1954. There are many versions of the quote, but I prefer the tougher one, which might appeal to Xi: “It is better to talk jaw-to-jaw than to have war.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-23--India Is Paying the Price for Neglecting its Neighbors

India Is Paying the Price for Neglecting its Neighbors As India manages the fallout from its deadly clash with China last week—the first border skirmish in which there were troop fatalities since 1975—it would do well to take a step back and assess its broader regional situation .
And if it does so , New Delhi would realize that its problems are by no means limited to Beijing : India ’ s relations with each of its neighbors are in shambles .
Things could so easily have been different .
In May 2014 , shortly after being elected to office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterparts from Afghanistan , Bangladesh , Bhutan , the Maldives , Nepal , Pakistan , and Sri Lanka—members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ) —to his inauguration .
It was a deft exercise in public diplomacy , as no previous prime minister had made such a grand gesture .
It was also in keeping with his Bharatiya Janata Party ’ s campaign manifesto , which had promised to improve ties with India ’ s neighbors .
Modi used the occasion to announce his “ neighborhood first ” initiative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with SAARC member states .
The project , had it come to fruition , would have given a much-needed boost to regional trade and investments and led the way in addressing geopolitical tensions .
It would have also provided a natural—and lasting—bulwark against China ’ s relentless attempts to expand its footprint across the region , especially with its Belt and Road Initiative .
Modi ’ s initial steps certainly signaled his commitment to this new policy .
In June 2014 , he picked the Himalayan India ’ s relations with each of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for his first foreign visit as prime minister .
The tour was in part a nod to Bhutan ’ s substantial role in helping India end sanctuaries for insurgents in the state of Assam .
But despite this very promising start for regional relations , New Delhi went on to somehow worsen relations across the board .
Consider the following : India nearly went to war with Pakistan in 2019 , and it has had frequent and high-profile border skirmishes that could easily get out of hand ; ties with Bangladesh , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are in the doldrums ; Nepal ’ s parliament has just approved a new map that includes land claimed by India , putting relations at their worst in years ; and Sri Lanka and the Maldives , both historically allied with India , are rapidly drifting into China ’ s orbit of influence .
Meanwhile , democracy in Afghanistan has been in crisis , with the Taliban continuing to rise in power and influence—a development that sets back decades of Indian investment and diplomacy .
The only country that still has a reasonably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but even this friendliness stems mostly from the tiny Himalayan country ’ s bid to gain support in its border dispute with China .
The question then is how a policy welcomed by most of India ’ s neighbors unraveled so completely since 2014 .
After all , Modi actually devoted—at least at the start of his first term—a considerable amount of time , attention , and energy to regional foreign-policy issues .
He undertook a spate of visits to international capitals and made much of his personal rapport with a variety of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of relations with Pakistan , one can trace the collapse of this well-meaning and ambitious policy to several failures on the part of the Modi government .
Flawed choices at critical moments eroded regional trust in New Delhi .
For example , in the wake of a devastating earthquake in Nepal in April 2015 , India acted with considerable speed in sending critical aid—efforts that generated much warmth and goodwill .
Those sentiments , however , would not last long .
Later the same year , Nepal was on the verge of adopting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ degree of domestic opposition , especially from an ethnic group known as Madhesis , who straddle the Nepal-India border .
They believed , with some justification , that their interests were not adequately represented in the new constitution .
Since some ethnic Madhesis also live in northern India , Modi ’ s government imposed an informal blockade on landlocked Nepal in an attempt to court their votes .
The consequences of the blockade were disastrous for the Nepalese economy : For example , the price of rice doubled , and a cylinder of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as expensive due to a severe drop in supplies .
Not surprisingly , the reservoir of goodwill for India that its disaster assistance had generated quickly evaporated .
Meanwhile , China took this golden opportunity to step into the breach , setting the stage for Nepal to reduce its dependency on India in the future .
Modi ’ s stance toward other small but significant neighbors has also frittered away the early gains from his first term in office .
For example , in 2015 , New Delhi successfully concluded a land boundary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue in bilateral relations that had existed since the creation of East Pakistan—now Bangladesh—in 1947 .
Yet again , the positive impacts would not last .
In 2019 , the Modi government set in motion its National Register of Citizens , a massive exercise in the northeastern border state of Assam designed to verify the citizenship of its inhabitants .
The government was embarking on this project because it had made illegal immigration from Bangladesh a key campaign issue in the 2019 national election .
To be sure , the matter of illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the Modi government used it mostly as a political cudgel to instill fear among India ’ s Muslim minority and to expel anyone who could not produce the requisite documents .
Bangladesh , which could be forced to accept many deportees , strongly objected to the National Register of Citizens .
Not surprisingly , relations with India have since become frosty .
This amounts to a real missed opportunity given that Bangladesh ’ s economy was thriving until the onset of the coronavirus pandemic .
And once again , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China has stepped in with much-needed medical supplies for Bangladesh.Six years on from Modi ’ s “ neighborhood first ” promises , there have been very few real advances .
India has also lost considerable ground in Sri Lanka .
The Modi government wholeheartedly backed the government of Maithripala Sirisena , but with strongman Gotabaya Rajapaksa ’ s electoral victory in November 2019 , New Delhi suddenly found itself on the backfoot—the Rajapaksa brothers , after all , have long built closer ties to Beijing .
Once again , India seems to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have positioned itself more strongly as an infrastructural investor in the country .
Finally , relations with arch-enemy Pakistan have plummeted dramatically .
On this front , in all fairness , the Modi government only shares a degree of blame .
Modi ’ s initial overture to Pakistan in 2014 was met with little reciprocity .
On the contrary , at least two major terrorist attacks—which could be traced to Pakistan—took place in 2016 and again in 2019 .
The second , on a paramilitary convoy along the India-Pakistan border , led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s first use of airpower across the so-called Line of Control since the 1971 war .
But while tensions eventually cooled , New Delhi ’ s rushed move in August 2019 to revoke the special status of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir led to a dramatic deterioration in India-Pakistan ties .
Pakistan withdrew its ambassador from New Delhi and expelled his counterpart from Islamabad .
Pakistan suspended trade ties with India .
And Prime Minister Imran Khan took the opportunity to criticize India on a global stage at the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western newspapers .
While the success of those moves was limited , ties have not recovered since .
And once again , China has taken advantage .
Beijing has made substantial investments in Pakistan as part of its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor , including new roads , power plants , and the deep sea port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea .
Six years on from Modi ’ s “ neighborhood first ” promises , there have been very few real advances—and relations with most neighbors have worsened .
As a result , New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gains : Trade and investment could have expanded , and countries could have united around common regional problems such as environmental degradation and food and water security .
Each of these developments , in concert , could have also limited China ’ s long march into the region .
There is little question that Modi ’ s initial move to try to boost relations with India ’ s neighbors was both commendable and timely ; it represented a clear shift from the failed policies of previous governments .
But a failure to follow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India worse off than before it conceived of a grand , flashy slogan for its neighbors , each of whom seems to now be following what we can now call a China-first policy .

As India manages the fallout from its deadly clash with China last week—the first border skirmish in which there were troop fatalities since 1975—it would do well to take a step back and assess its broader regional situation. And if it does so, New Delhi would realize that its problems are by no means limited to Beijing: India’s relations with each of its neighbors are in shambles.
As India manages the fallout from its deadly clash with China last week—the first border skirmish in which there were troop fatalities since 1975—it would do well to take a step back and assess its broader regional situation. And if it does so, New Delhi would realize that its problems are by no means limited to Beijing: India’s relations with each of its neighbors are in shambles.
Things could so easily have been different. In May 2014, shortly after being elected to office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited his counterparts from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—to his inauguration. It was a deft exercise in public diplomacy, as no previous prime minister had made such a grand gesture. It was also in keeping with his Bharatiya Janata Party’s campaign manifesto, which had promised to improve ties with India’s neighbors.
Modi used the occasion to announce his “neighborhood first” initiative, a new focus on prioritizing relations with SAARC member states. The project, had it come to fruition, would have given a much-needed boost to regional trade and investments and led the way in addressing geopolitical tensions. It would have also provided a natural—and lasting—bulwark against China’s relentless attempts to expand its footprint across the region, especially with its Belt and Road Initiative.
Modi’s initial steps certainly signaled his commitment to this new policy. In June 2014, he picked the Himalayan India’s relations with each of its neighbors are in shambles.kingdom of Bhutan for his first foreign visit as prime minister. The tour was in part a nod to Bhutan’s substantial role in helping India end sanctuaries for insurgents in the state of Assam. But despite this very promising start for regional relations, New Delhi went on to somehow worsen relations across the board. Consider the following: India nearly went to war with Pakistan in 2019, and it has had frequent and high-profile border skirmishes that could easily get out of hand; ties with Bangladesh, a country India helped birth into existence, are in the doldrums; Nepal’s parliament has just approved a new map that includes land claimed by India, putting relations at their worst in years; and Sri Lanka and the Maldives, both historically allied with India, are rapidly drifting into China’s orbit of influence. Meanwhile, democracy in Afghanistan has been in crisis, with the Taliban continuing to rise in power and influence—a development that sets back decades of Indian investment and diplomacy. The only country that still has a reasonably cordial relationship with India remains Bhutan, but even this friendliness stems mostly from the tiny Himalayan country’s bid to gain support in its border dispute with China.
The question then is how a policy welcomed by most of India’s neighbors unraveled so completely since 2014. After all, Modi actually devoted—at least at the start of his first term—a considerable amount of time, attention, and energy to regional foreign-policy issues. He undertook a spate of visits to international capitals and made much of his personal rapport with a variety of national leaders.
With the possible exception of relations with Pakistan, one can trace the collapse of this well-meaning and ambitious policy to several failures on the part of the Modi government. Flawed choices at critical moments eroded regional trust in New Delhi. For example, in the wake of a devastating earthquake in Nepal in April 2015, India acted with considerable speed in sending critical aid—efforts that generated much warmth and goodwill. Those sentiments, however, would not last long. Later the same year, Nepal was on the verge of adopting a new constitution. Kathmandu faced a degree of domestic opposition, especially from an ethnic group known as Madhesis, who straddle the Nepal-India border. They believed, with some justification, that their interests were not adequately represented in the new constitution. Since some ethnic Madhesis also live in northern India, Modi’s government imposed an informal blockade on landlocked Nepal in an attempt to court their votes. The consequences of the blockade were disastrous for the Nepalese economy: For example, the price of rice doubled, and a cylinder of cooking gas became at least five times as expensive due to a severe drop in supplies. Not surprisingly, the reservoir of goodwill for India that its disaster assistance had generated quickly evaporated. Meanwhile, China took this golden opportunity to step into the breach, setting the stage for Nepal to reduce its dependency on India in the future.
Modi’s stance toward other small but significant neighbors has also frittered away the early gains from his first term in office. For example, in 2015, New Delhi successfully concluded a land boundary agreement with Bangladesh, ending a contentious issue in bilateral relations that had existed since the creation of East Pakistan—now Bangladesh—in 1947. Yet again, the positive impacts would not last. In 2019, the Modi government set in motion its National Register of Citizens, a massive exercise in the northeastern border state of Assam designed to verify the citizenship of its inhabitants. The government was embarking on this project because it had made illegal immigration from Bangladesh a key campaign issue in the 2019 national election. To be sure, the matter of illegal immigration is a legitimate concern for India, but the Modi government used it mostly as a political cudgel to instill fear among India’s Muslim minority and to expel anyone who could not produce the requisite documents. Bangladesh, which could be forced to accept many deportees, strongly objected to the National Register of Citizens. Not surprisingly, relations with India have since become frosty. This amounts to a real missed opportunity given that Bangladesh’s economy was thriving until the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. And once again, in the wake of the ongoing health care crisis, China has stepped in with much-needed medical supplies for Bangladesh.Six years on from Modi’s “neighborhood first” promises, there have been very few real advances.
India has also lost considerable ground in Sri Lanka. The Modi government wholeheartedly backed the government of Maithripala Sirisena, but with strongman Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s electoral victory in November 2019, New Delhi suddenly found itself on the backfoot—the Rajapaksa brothers, after all, have long built closer ties to Beijing. Once again, India seems to have missed its chance: It could have positioned itself more strongly as an infrastructural investor in the country.
Finally, relations with arch-enemy Pakistan have plummeted dramatically. On this front, in all fairness, the Modi government only shares a degree of blame. Modi’s initial overture to Pakistan in 2014 was met with little reciprocity. On the contrary, at least two major terrorist attacks—which could be traced to Pakistan—took place in 2016 and again in 2019. The second, on a paramilitary convoy along the India-Pakistan border, led to a spiral of conflict culminating in India’s first use of airpower across the so-called Line of Control since the 1971 war. But while tensions eventually cooled, New Delhi’s rushed move in August 2019 to revoke the special status of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir led to a dramatic deterioration in India-Pakistan ties. Pakistan withdrew its ambassador from New Delhi and expelled his counterpart from Islamabad. Pakistan suspended trade ties with India. And Prime Minister Imran Khan took the opportunity to criticize India on a global stage at the United Nations and in the opinion pages of Western newspapers. While the success of those moves was limited, ties have not recovered since. And once again, China has taken advantage. Beijing has made substantial investments in Pakistan as part of its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, including new roads, power plants, and the deep sea port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.
Six years on from Modi’s “neighborhood first” promises, there have been very few real advances—and relations with most neighbors have worsened. As a result, New Delhi has missed out on several potential gains: Trade and investment could have expanded, and countries could have united around common regional problems such as environmental degradation and food and water security. Each of these developments, in concert, could have also limited China’s long march into the region. There is little question that Modi’s initial move to try to boost relations with India’s neighbors was both commendable and timely; it represented a clear shift from the failed policies of previous governments. But a failure to follow through with a sustained strategy has left India worse off than before it conceived of a grand, flashy slogan for its neighbors, each of whom seems to now be following what we can now call a China-first policy.