foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--Tech Giants Are Giving China A Vital Edge in Espionage

This series , based on interviews with over three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence and national security officials , tells the story of China ’ s assault on U.S. personal data over the last decade—and its consequences .
Part 1 : China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe After China discovered extensive U.S. networks inside its own government , it struck back with a series of hacks that allowed it to expose CIA operatives in Africa and Europe—while upping domestic security at home to protect against further U.S. infiltration .
Part 2 : Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in China As Xi Jinping consolidated his power through purges at home , the loss of U.S. sources left the Obama administration struggling to grasp what was happening in China .
Meanwhile , intelligence agencies carried out enormous thefts of U.S. data—while the United States strived to do the same in China .
Beijing was giving China hawks in the United States plenty of ammunition .
That same year , hackers working for China ’ s People ’ s Liberation Army would mastermind a massive breach of Equifax , one of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The military-linked hackers absconded with a dizzying amount of personal data , including Social Security numbers , home addresses , birth dates , driver ’ s license numbers , and credit card information .
Roughly 145 million Americans had their personal data exposed by the hack .
The Trump administration ’ s China policies were probably the most antagonistic of any U.S. presidency since the height of the Cold War in the 1960s .
Still , even within the administration , key China advisors were divided .
“ In the first year [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Security Council , we were arguing and debating the direction [ of China policy ] , ” recalled Robert Spalding , who served as the council ’ s senior director for strategic planning until early 2018 .
The environment shifted in 2018 , Spalding said , after the advent of the administration ’ s National Security Strategy , its decision to escalate the trade war , and the departure of Susan Thornton , the State Department ’ s top Asia policy official , who Spalding says stymied attempts by the FBI and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggressive tack on China-related prosecutions .
( Thornton declined to comment . )
But for some critics , the administration ’ s shifting rationales undermined its credibility on China and technology issues .
A number of Trump administration officials emphasized the national security threats posed by Chinese tech giants , while others—most notably Trump himself—intimated that these companies ’ access to U.S. goods and markets were bargaining chips in the ongoing trade war .
ZTE , a major Chinese telecommunications firm , was almost driven out of business after the administration , citing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working with it—until Trump granted the company a reprieve , seemingly as part of trade-related negotiations with Chinese leader Xi Jinping .
“ President Xi of China , and I , are working together to give massive Chinese phone company , ZTE , a way to get back into business , fast .
Too many jobs in China lost .
Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done !
” Trump tweeted in May 2018 .
A full-court press by the administration on Huawei , the world ’ s largest telecom equipment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ floated dropping an extradition request against a Huawei executive arrested in Canada for sanctions evasion in exchange for trade relief .
Administration officials also shifted from hinting about the company ’ s current malicious activities on behalf of China ’ s spy services to emphasizing the threat it might pose in the future , once it had monopolized much of the world ’ s telecom infrastructure .
This was a fair worry .
Chinese industry has always been , to some extent , subordinated or intertwined with the party-state , although the origins @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The People ’ s Liberation Army was a dominant player in Chinese firms for decades , owning businesses from hospitals to condom factories ; the Chinese Communist Party has itself repeatedly attempted to force military divestiture to fight corruption .
But the embrace between China ’ s intelligence services and Chinese businesses has gotten tighter , U.S. officials say .
In 2017 , under Xi ’ s intensifying authoritarianism , Beijing promulgated a new national intelligence law that compels Chinese businesses to work with Chinese intelligence and security agencies whenever they are requested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what was pretty much what was going on for many years before , though corruption had tempered it ” previously , a former senior CIA official said .
Beijing ’ s access to , and ability to sift through , troves of pilfered and otherwise obtained data “ gives [ China ] vast opportunities to target people in foreign governments , private industries , and other sectors around the world—in order to collect additional information they want , such as research , technology , trade secrets , or classified information , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top counterintelligence official .
“ Chinese technology companies play a key role in processing this bulk data and making it useful for China ’ s intelligence services , ” he said .
In what amounts to intelligence tasking , China ’ s spy services order private Chinese companies with big-data analytics capabilities to “ condition ” —that is , work up or process—massive sets of information , including from hacks like the massive breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management ( OPM ) , that have intelligence value , according to current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promptly flows back to Chinese state entities , they say .
“ Just imagine on any given day , if NSA and CIA are collecting information , say , on the [ Chinese military ] , and we could bring back seven , eight , 10 , 15 petabytes of data , give it to Google or Amazon or Microsoft , and say , ‘ Hey , condition this on the weekend .
We want all these analytics ; get it back to us next week.
’ That ’ s what they do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Baidu .
We don ’ t have that , ” a current senior intelligence official said .
By co-opting Chinese companies ’ data-processing capabilities , U.S. officials say , Beijing ’ s spy agencies can rapidly sift through massive amounts of information to find key nuggets of intelligence value—for example , to help identify an undercover CIA operative by cross-checking real-time travel intelligence with other sources gathered by China ’ s Ministry of State Security ( MSS ) .
And by outsourcing these expensive data-processing functions to private companies , Chinese intelligence agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a scale they don ’ t possess themselves or don ’ t want to build in-house , officials say .
Alibaba and Baidu did not respond to multiple requests for comment .
The cooperation hasn ’ t always been frictionless .
“ The private companies are hostages to it , ” a former counterintelligence executive said .
“ Arguments ensue.
” Sometimes , U.S. intelligence officials would learn about “ pissed-off employees ” at Chinese companies upset about “ doing extra work ” on behalf of Chinese intelligence , the former executive said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ All the major Chinese firms have benefited from knowing , at various points , how to not be too big to fail the party , ” the former senior CIA official said .
The companies ’ at-times begrudging cooperation with Beijing ’ s intelligence agencies is still , in the end , a subordination to them .
Many Chinese tech firms “ probably want to be normal tech companies , and don ’ t want to deal with these ideological expectations , or the national security expectations , ” said Elsa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security .
“ Most Chinese tech companies are not that dissimilar to their counterparts in Silicon Valley .
The difference is they are trying to operate within a system where there are incentives and expectations to cultivate closer relations with the government , or the potential for retribution should they step out of line on some front.
” Chinese companies walk a tricky line when talking about such ties .
Publicly , and especially in English , they deny any links to Beijing ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which has faced a flood of accusations about these links , implausibly claims to be owned by its employees .
At home , though , the same companies repeatedly avow their loyalty to the party and willingness to assist the security services .
Some connections are more deep-seated .
For instance , the former senior CIA official said that , based on “ high-confidence reporting , ” the CIA concluded that the Chinese tech giant Tencent , which operates the ultrapopular WeChat messaging service , received funding from the Ministry of State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The organization , China ’ s chief civilian intelligence agency , provided a “ seed investment , ” this former official said , “ when they were trying to build out the Great Firewall and the monitoring technology.
” “ This is entirely false , ” Tencent said .
“ Our history as an entrepreneurial start-up is well known , funded first by our founders and then IDG and PCCW , and we ’ ve been a public company with transparent ownership for over 16 years.
” Cooperation picked up “ when WeChat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to them regarding monitoring things and shutting them down when necessary , ” said the former senior CIA official .
“ It ’ s not that Tencent or [ its founder ] Pony Ma are dancing to the tune of what the MSS says , but if at any point China ’ s security services need assistance , they are providing it.
” “ Tencent , like any other company operating in China , complies with [ Chinese ] law in a transparent way , ” Tencent said .
“ The allegations beyond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by China ’ s spy agencies has benefited mainland companies for many years , with data hacked or otherwise stolen by China ’ s intelligence services flowing toward the private sector to give Chinese firms a leg up against the competition .
While intellectual property theft is common—and often driven by the private sector—in China , the state has long played a key role in industrial espionage .
America ’ s firms , with their hefty government and military contracts , became juicy targets in the online era .
“ It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some flow of information from Chinese intelligence agencies to private sector entities , ” said Sean Kanuck , who served as the U.S. national intelligence officer for cyber issues from 2011 to 2016 .
As far back as 2000 , according to Steve Ryan , the former deputy director of the National Security Agency ’ s Threat Operations Center , U.S. officials observed Chinese cyberoperations aimed at piercing U.S. defense contractors—something that was occurring “ on a regular basis ” by around 2006 onward , Ryan said .
The Chinese were “ just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in certain areas , in certain technologies , ” he recalled .
“ And then we would just watch them form a company that would then put that U.S.-side interest out of business .
We saw that time and again.
” These cyber-incursions became ubiquitous , with Chinese state hackers successfully compromising the networks of contractors to the Pentagon ’ s U.S. Transportation Command 20 times in a single year , according to a 2014 Senate Armed Service Committee report .
In 2018 , Chinese operatives successfully hacked a U.S. Navy contractor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development of submarine missiles .
American officials stewed as China rolled out new fighter jets and other weapons systems copied from stolen U.S. designs .
Using their own technical spying capabilities , U.S. intelligence officials also observed hacked information being transferred from data centers controlled by Chinese intelligence agencies to quasi-private , quasi-public Chinese defense businesses .
Years ago , though , this purloined data would remain with Chinese companies for “ competitive uses , ” said a former senior NSA official .
It was like “ a gift to be used effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sector partners , this person recalled .
This earlier model of cooperation , however , was unidirectional , with data passed from China ’ s spies to its own industrial base , as part of Beijing ’ s race for technological parity with Washington .
But the use of private Chinese conglomerates to provide the know-how and data-processing firepower for China ’ s intelligence apparatus represents a new stage in this evolution , U.S. officials say .
“ The companies they are using are portraying themselves as large , legitimate , multinationals that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former Trump-era national security official .
“ These are not simply tiny little .
.
.
defense contractors working inside China .
They are major multinationals with footprints all over the world.
” China ’ s “ use of their private sector entities furthers not only their intelligence gathering , but processing , ” said Ryan , the former top NSA official .
Key legal restrictions and cultural norms mean American spy agencies can not induce U.S. firms to sift through the fruits of its own cyberspying ; they have had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , U.S. officials say .
And they can not , for example , commandeer private U.S. companies ’ data-processing power to help them create a composite picture of what the Chinese know about , say , U.S. government employees based on Beijing ’ s prior hacks .
But synthesizing these parallel databases has been a priority for U.S. officials , who have worked to mirror image at least some of what they believe the Chinese possess , according to three current and former senior officials .
This can be a laborious process .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” the data from the OPM breach , the current senior intelligence official said .
But when U.S. officials eventually analyzed all this data , the picture that emerged about what , in fact , the Chinese knew was not a pretty one .
U.S. intelligence reporting on the subject is “ sickening to your stomach , ” the senior intelligence official said .
“ Look at Equifax .
Add Anthem , the financial stuff , Marriott , there ’ s nothing they don ’ t know about us , ” said the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of breaches of U.S. firms perpetrated by Chinese hackers .
“ We are constantly trying to mimic what they do know ” about Americans who might be targets for Chinese spies , they said .
“ And then we marry that up with intelligence that we get about what their interests are .
Then we go back and give defensive briefs ” to these potential targets , the current senior official said .
“ That ’ s kind of the new business model we have right now.
” China might be testing out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well , Trump-era officials fear .
During the first few years of the Trump administration , conversations “ bounced around ” at the National Security Council and within U.S. intelligence agencies on how China ’ s hunt for security through data—through , for instance , synthesizing data from Marriot , Equifax , OPM , and other hacked organizations to identify U.S. spies—may have converged with its larger economic objectives , according to the former Trump-era national security official .
The thinking “ is still relatively immature ” in that area , this source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be leveraging stolen personal information to attempt to undermine the American economy , through putting companies under financial stress in strategically important business sectors , even if these companies don ’ t perform classified work .
These datasets might also be used to benefit Chinese businesses in other ways , officials say .
“ If I ’ m looking to expand a hotel chain or expand into the international travel market , having United Airlines , Marriot , or American Airlines customer records ” could provide Chinese firms clear potential advantages “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Kanuck , the former top U.S. cyber-focused intelligence official .
Likewise , Kanuck said , the hack of Anthem could give Chinese firms obvious insights into the U.S. health care market .
The massive data tranches could also be used as inputs to build better algorithms for artificial intelligence programs , officials say .
While some of this weaponized data could be derived from hacks , Trump-era officials also worried that attempted investments in U.S. firms by some Chinese businesses was aimed at gaining control over personal data in U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back to the Chinese intelligence services .
The Trump administration ’ s increased use of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States process—in which an interagency group reviews foreign purchases for national security threats—to block takeovers of some U.S. companies by Chinese firms was partially driven by these fears , officials say .
Navigating the U.S.-China relationship will be the most momentous foreign-policy challenge for the incoming Biden administration .
But in the vanishingly small world of bipartisan officialdom , the integrated threat posed by Beijing may represent the last great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Biden administration ’ s China strategy seems likely to be a difference in degree from its predecessor , not in kind .
For American national security officials , deep worries about the Chinese government ’ s relationships with its world-spanning private sector companies—including telecom giants like Huawei , massive e-commerce platforms like Alibaba , and social media behemoths like ByteDance , which operates the TikTok platform—will increasingly influence the U.S.-Beijing relationship .
China has already succeeded in isolating one out of every five humans on the planet from the global data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mirror image , U.S. policymakers are instituting more stringent controls aimed at segregating Americans ’ data from Chinese companies—and , by extension , Beijing ’ s formidable intelligence apparatus .
Driven by fears over internal instability and external threats to its rule , the Chinese Communist Party has determined that data security is tantamount to regime security .
But this strategy creates some internal tensions for Beijing .
“ The Chinese cybersecurity system today requires backdoors into every single company and individual in China , ” said a former senior intelligence analyst .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that these [ backdoors ] could enable attackers and may decrease the cybersecurity of the companies.
” This is a trade-off China ’ s leaders seem willing to make , at least for now—even though these policies may catalyze an economic decoupling with China ’ s most important trading partner , and even though this decoupling might itself drive domestic instability .
Meanwhile , the bear hug between Chinese intelligence and Chinese industry continues to squeeze together ever more tightly .
After all , said the former senior intelligence analyst , “ this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies.
” Editor ’ s Note : This is the third in a three-part series .
The first part covers how the data wars began between the two nations after CIA networks were uncovered in China .
The second part covers how U.S. sources in China went dark at a critical moment during Xi ’ s rise , while Beijing ’ s hacking continued .

In 2017, as U.S. President Donald Trump began his trade war with China, another battle raged behind the scenes. The simmering, decadelong conflict over data between Chinese and U.S. intelligence agencies was heating up, driven both by the ambitions of an increasingly confident Beijing and by the conviction of key players in the new administration in Washington that China was presenting an economic, political, and national security challenge on a scale the United States had not faced for decades—if ever.
In 2017, as U.S. President Donald Trump began his trade war with China, another battle raged behind the scenes. The simmering, decadelong conflict over data between Chinese and U.S. intelligence agencies was heating up, driven both by the ambitions of an increasingly confident Beijing and by the conviction of key players in the new administration in Washington that China was presenting an economic, political, and national security challenge on a scale the United States had not faced for decades—if ever.
This series, based on interviews with over three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence and national security officials, tells the story of China’s assault on U.S. personal data over the last decade—and its consequences. Part 1: China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe
After China discovered extensive U.S. networks inside its own government, it struck back with a series of hacks that allowed it to expose CIA operatives in Africa and Europe—while upping domestic security at home to protect against further U.S. infiltration. Part 2: Beijing Ransacked Data as U.S. Sources Went Dark in China
As Xi Jinping consolidated his power through purges at home, the loss of U.S. sources left the Obama administration struggling to grasp what was happening in China. Meanwhile, intelligence agencies carried out enormous thefts of U.S. data—while the United States strived to do the same in China.
Beijing was giving China hawks in the United States plenty of ammunition. That same year, hackers working for China’s People’s Liberation Army would mastermind a massive breach of Equifax, one of the United States’ largest credit reporting firms. The military-linked hackers absconded with a dizzying amount of personal data, including Social Security numbers, home addresses, birth dates, driver’s license numbers, and credit card information. Roughly 145 million Americans had their personal data exposed by the hack.
The Trump administration’s China policies were probably the most antagonistic of any U.S. presidency since the height of the Cold War in the 1960s. Still, even within the administration, key China advisors were divided. “In the first year [of the Trump era] at the National Security Council, we were arguing and debating the direction [of China policy],” recalled Robert Spalding, who served as the council’s senior director for strategic planning until early 2018. The environment shifted in 2018, Spalding said, after the advent of the administration’s National Security Strategy, its decision to escalate the trade war, and the departure of Susan Thornton, the State Department’s top Asia policy official, who Spalding says stymied attempts by the FBI and Department of Justice to take a more aggressive tack on China-related prosecutions. (Thornton declined to comment.)
But for some critics, the administration’s shifting rationales undermined its credibility on China and technology issues. A number of Trump administration officials emphasized the national security threats posed by Chinese tech giants, while others—most notably Trump himself—intimated that these companies’ access to U.S. goods and markets were bargaining chips in the ongoing trade war. ZTE, a major Chinese telecommunications firm, was almost driven out of business after the administration, citing national security, banned American suppliers from working with it—until Trump granted the company a reprieve, seemingly as part of trade-related negotiations with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. “President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into business, fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce Department has been instructed to get it done!” Trump tweeted in May 2018.
A full-court press by the administration on Huawei, the world’s largest telecom equipment firm, lost momentum after the president floated dropping an extradition request against a Huawei executive arrested in Canada for sanctions evasion in exchange for trade relief. Administration officials also shifted from hinting about the company’s current malicious activities on behalf of China’s spy services to emphasizing the threat it might pose in the future, once it had monopolized much of the world’s telecom infrastructure.
This was a fair worry. Chinese industry has always been, to some extent, subordinated or intertwined with the party-state, although the origins of these ties are often murky. The People’s Liberation Army was a dominant player in Chinese firms for decades, owning businesses from hospitals to condom factories; the Chinese Communist Party has itself repeatedly attempted to force military divestiture to fight corruption.
But the embrace between China’s intelligence services and Chinese businesses has gotten tighter, U.S. officials say. In 2017, under Xi’s intensifying authoritarianism, Beijing promulgated a new national intelligence law that compels Chinese businesses to work with Chinese intelligence and security agencies whenever they are requested to do so—a move that codified “what was pretty much what was going on for many years before, though corruption had tempered it” previously, a former senior CIA official said.
In the final years of the Obama administration, national security officials had directed U.S. spy agencies to step up their intelligence collection on the relationship between the Chinese state and China’s private industrial behemoths. By the advent of the Trump era, this effort had borne fruit, with the U.S. intelligence community piecing together voluminous evidence on coordination—including back-and-forth data transfers—between ostensibly private Chinese companies and that country’s intelligence services, according to current and former U.S. officials. There was evidence of close public-private cooperation occurring on “a daily basis,” according to a former Trump-era national security official. “Those commercial entities are the commercial wing of the party,” the source said. “They of course cooperate with intelligence services to achieve the party’s goals.”
“THOSE COMMERCIAL ENTITIES ARE THE COMMERCIAL WING OF THE PARTY,” THE SOURCE SAID. “THEY OF COURSE COOPERATE WITH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO ACHIEVE THE PARTY’S GOALS.”
Beijing’s access to, and ability to sift through, troves of pilfered and otherwise obtained data “gives [China] vast opportunities to target people in foreign governments, private industries, and other sectors around the world—in order to collect additional information they want, such as research, technology, trade secrets, or classified information,” said William Evanina, the United States’ top counterintelligence official. “Chinese technology companies play a key role in processing this bulk data and making it useful for China’s intelligence services,” he said.
In what amounts to intelligence tasking, China’s spy services order private Chinese companies with big-data analytics capabilities to “condition”—that is, work up or process—massive sets of information, including from hacks like the massive breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), that have intelligence value, according to current and former officials. This data then promptly flows back to Chinese state entities, they say.
“Just imagine on any given day, if NSA and CIA are collecting information, say, on the [Chinese military], and we could bring back seven, eight, 10, 15 petabytes of data, give it to Google or Amazon or Microsoft, and say, ‘Hey, condition this on the weekend. We want all these analytics; get it back to us next week.’ That’s what they do. They have Alibaba and they have Baidu. We don’t have that,” a current senior intelligence official said.
Market Value and Reach of Key Chinese Tech Companies
By co-opting Chinese companies’ data-processing capabilities, U.S. officials say, Beijing’s spy agencies can rapidly sift through massive amounts of information to find key nuggets of intelligence value—for example, to help identify an undercover CIA operative by cross-checking real-time travel intelligence with other sources gathered by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS). And by outsourcing these expensive data-processing functions to private companies, Chinese intelligence agencies can also exploit these commercial capabilities at a scale they don’t possess themselves or don’t want to build in-house, officials say. Alibaba and Baidu did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
The cooperation hasn’t always been frictionless. “The private companies are hostages to it,” a former counterintelligence executive said. “Arguments ensue.” Sometimes, U.S. intelligence officials would learn about “pissed-off employees” at Chinese companies upset about “doing extra work” on behalf of Chinese intelligence, the former executive said. But they were obligated to comply. “All the major Chinese firms have benefited from knowing, at various points, how to not be too big to fail the party,” the former senior CIA official said. The companies’ at-times begrudging cooperation with Beijing’s intelligence agencies is still, in the end, a subordination to them.
Many Chinese tech firms “probably want to be normal tech companies, and don’t want to deal with these ideological expectations, or the national security expectations,” said Elsa Kania, a China expert and adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “Most Chinese tech companies are not that dissimilar to their counterparts in Silicon Valley. The difference is they are trying to operate within a system where there are incentives and expectations to cultivate closer relations with the government, or the potential for retribution should they step out of line on some front.”
Chinese companies walk a tricky line when talking about such ties. Publicly, and especially in English, they deny any links to Beijing’s intelligence or military apparatus. Huawei, which has faced a flood of accusations about these links, implausibly claims to be owned by its employees. At home, though, the same companies repeatedly avow their loyalty to the party and willingness to assist the security services.
Some connections are more deep-seated. For instance, the former senior CIA official said that, based on “high-confidence reporting,” the CIA concluded that the Chinese tech giant Tencent, which operates the ultrapopular WeChat messaging service, received funding from the Ministry of State Security early on in its foundation. The organization, China’s chief civilian intelligence agency, provided a “seed investment,” this former official said, “when they were trying to build out the Great Firewall and the monitoring technology.”
“This is entirely false,” Tencent said. “Our history as an entrepreneurial start-up is well known, funded first by our founders and then IDG and PCCW, and we’ve been a public company with transparent ownership for over 16 years.”
Cooperation picked up “when WeChat became a thing; the MSS came to them regarding monitoring things and shutting them down when necessary,” said the former senior CIA official. “It’s not that Tencent or [its founder] Pony Ma are dancing to the tune of what the MSS says, but if at any point China’s security services need assistance, they are providing it.”
“Tencent, like any other company operating in China, complies with [Chinese] law in a transparent way,” Tencent said. “The allegations beyond this are completely false.”
China's President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump review the Chinese honor guards during a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2017.
Economic espionage by China’s spy agencies has benefited mainland companies for many years, with data hacked or otherwise stolen by China’s intelligence services flowing toward the private sector to give Chinese firms a leg up against the competition. While intellectual property theft is common—and often driven by the private sector—in China, the state has long played a key role in industrial espionage. America’s firms, with their hefty government and military contracts, became juicy targets in the online era. “It’s well understood that you’ve had some flow of information from Chinese intelligence agencies to private sector entities,” said Sean Kanuck, who served as the U.S. national intelligence officer for cyber issues from 2011 to 2016.
As far back as 2000, according to Steve Ryan, the former deputy director of the National Security Agency’s Threat Operations Center, U.S. officials observed Chinese cyberoperations aimed at piercing U.S. defense contractors—something that was occurring “on a regular basis” by around 2006 onward, Ryan said. The Chinese were “just robbing the defense industrial base blind, in certain areas, in certain technologies,” he recalled. “And then we would just watch them form a company that would then put that U.S.-side interest out of business. We saw that time and again.” These cyber-incursions became ubiquitous, with Chinese state hackers successfully compromising the networks of contractors to the Pentagon’s U.S. Transportation Command 20 times in a single year, according to a 2014 Senate Armed Service Committee report. In 2018, Chinese operatives successfully hacked a U.S. Navy contractor, pilfering highly sensitive information related to the development of submarine missiles.
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS ALSO OBSERVED HACKED INFORMATION BEING TRANSFERRED FROM DATA CENTERS CONTROLLED BY CHINESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO QUASI-PRIVATE, QUASI-PUBLIC CHINESE DEFENSE BUSINESSES.
American officials stewed as China rolled out new fighter jets and other weapons systems copied from stolen U.S. designs. Using their own technical spying capabilities, U.S. intelligence officials also observed hacked information being transferred from data centers controlled by Chinese intelligence agencies to quasi-private, quasi-public Chinese defense businesses. Years ago, though, this purloined data would remain with Chinese companies for “competitive uses,” said a former senior NSA official. It was like “a gift to be used effectively” from Chinese intelligence to its defense sector partners, this person recalled. This earlier model of cooperation, however, was unidirectional, with data passed from China’s spies to its own industrial base, as part of Beijing’s race for technological parity with Washington.
But the use of private Chinese conglomerates to provide the know-how and data-processing firepower for China’s intelligence apparatus represents a new stage in this evolution, U.S. officials say. “The companies they are using are portraying themselves as large, legitimate, multinationals that have footprints across jurisdictions,” said the former Trump-era national security official. “These are not simply tiny little . . . defense contractors working inside China. They are major multinationals with footprints all over the world.” China’s “use of their private sector entities furthers not only their intelligence gathering, but processing,” said Ryan, the former top NSA official.
Key legal restrictions and cultural norms mean American spy agencies cannot induce U.S. firms to sift through the fruits of its own cyberspying; they have had to build these data analysis capabilities for themselves, U.S. officials say. And they cannot, for example, commandeer private U.S. companies’ data-processing power to help them create a composite picture of what the Chinese know about, say, U.S. government employees based on Beijing’s prior hacks. But synthesizing these parallel databases has been a priority for U.S. officials, who have worked to mirror image at least some of what they believe the Chinese possess, according to three current and former senior officials. This can be a laborious process. “It took us forever to condition” the data from the OPM breach, the current senior intelligence official said.
But when U.S. officials eventually analyzed all this data, the picture that emerged about what, in fact, the Chinese knew was not a pretty one. U.S. intelligence reporting on the subject is “sickening to your stomach,” the senior intelligence official said.
“Look at Equifax. Add Anthem, the financial stuff, Marriott, there’s nothing they don’t know about us,” said the current official, referring to a series of breaches of U.S. firms perpetrated by Chinese hackers. “We are constantly trying to mimic what they do know” about Americans who might be targets for Chinese spies, they said. “And then we marry that up with intelligence that we get about what their interests are. Then we go back and give defensive briefs” to these potential targets, the current senior official said. “That’s kind of the new business model we have right now.”
China might be testing out a “new business model” as well, Trump-era officials fear. During the first few years of the Trump administration, conversations “bounced around” at the National Security Council and within U.S. intelligence agencies on how China’s hunt for security through data—through, for instance, synthesizing data from Marriot, Equifax, OPM, and other hacked organizations to identify U.S. spies—may have converged with its larger economic objectives, according to the former Trump-era national security official. The thinking “is still relatively immature” in that area, this source said. But U.S. officials believe China may be leveraging stolen personal information to attempt to undermine the American economy, through putting companies under financial stress in strategically important business sectors, even if these companies don’t perform classified work.
These datasets might also be used to benefit Chinese businesses in other ways, officials say. “If I’m looking to expand a hotel chain or expand into the international travel market, having United Airlines, Marriot, or American Airlines customer records” could provide Chinese firms clear potential advantages “for due diligence and market research purposes,” said Kanuck, the former top U.S. cyber-focused intelligence official. Likewise, Kanuck said, the hack of Anthem could give Chinese firms obvious insights into the U.S. health care market. The massive data tranches could also be used as inputs to build better algorithms for artificial intelligence programs, officials say.
While some of this weaponized data could be derived from hacks, Trump-era officials also worried that attempted investments in U.S. firms by some Chinese businesses was aimed at gaining control over personal data in U.S. companies’ possession—which could then be passed back to the Chinese intelligence services. The Trump administration’s increased use of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States process—in which an interagency group reviews foreign purchases for national security threats—to block takeovers of some U.S. companies by Chinese firms was partially driven by these fears, officials say.
Then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping invites then U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to view an honor guard during a welcome ceremony inside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Aug. 18, 2011. Lintao Zhang/Getty Images
Navigating the U.S.-China relationship will be the most momentous foreign-policy challenge for the incoming Biden administration. But in the vanishingly small world of bipartisan officialdom, the integrated threat posed by Beijing may represent the last great unifying issue in the national security sphere. The Biden administration’s China strategy seems likely to be a difference in degree from its predecessor, not in kind.
For American national security officials, deep worries about the Chinese government’s relationships with its world-spanning private sector companies—including telecom giants like Huawei, massive e-commerce platforms like Alibaba, and social media behemoths like ByteDance, which operates the TikTok platform—will increasingly influence the U.S.-Beijing relationship. China has already succeeded in isolating one out of every five humans on the planet from the global data ecosystem; now, in a defensive mirror image, U.S. policymakers are instituting more stringent controls aimed at segregating Americans’ data from Chinese companies—and, by extension, Beijing’s formidable intelligence apparatus.
DRIVEN BY FEARS OVER INTERNAL INSTABILITY AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO ITS RULE, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS DETERMINED THAT DATA SECURITY IS TANTAMOUNT TO REGIME SECURITY.
Driven by fears over internal instability and external threats to its rule, the Chinese Communist Party has determined that data security is tantamount to regime security. But this strategy creates some internal tensions for Beijing. “The Chinese cybersecurity system today requires backdoors into every single company and individual in China,” said a former senior intelligence analyst. “And they are willing to admit that these [backdoors] could enable attackers and may decrease the cybersecurity of the companies.”
This is a trade-off China’s leaders seem willing to make, at least for now—even though these policies may catalyze an economic decoupling with China’s most important trading partner, and even though this decoupling might itself drive domestic instability. Meanwhile, the bear hug between Chinese intelligence and Chinese industry continues to squeeze together ever more tightly. After all, said the former senior intelligence analyst, “this is a country with omnipresence in its companies.”
Editor’s Note: This is the third in a three-part series. The first part covers how the data wars began between the two nations after CIA networks were uncovered in China. The second part covers how U.S. sources in China went dark at a critical moment during Xi’s rise, while Beijing’s hacking continued.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--Forever’s Gonna Stop Tonight

Forever’s Gonna Stop Tonight

Eventually , thanks to a last-minute purge of Pentagon leadership , the United States appears poised , after nearly 20 years of war , to draw down to just 2,500 troops in Afghanistan , handing the incoming Biden administration a tiny footprint and a big problem .
Inside the Beltway and at U.S. military command centers around the world , skeptics are questioning whether the decision is coming too soon and if the White House risks giving up hard-fought gains .
Afghanistan is wracked by more Taliban violence than almost any time this century ; fragile gains in such areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and freedom of speech are all at risk as U.S. forces pull out , leaving a vacuum behind .
Meanwhile , the tortuous Afghan peace process grinds on , quarterbacked by Trump ’ s Afghan envoy , a man distrusted by many Afghans but who may yet endure .
Here are some of Foreign Policy ’ s best articles on a tumultuous year for Afghanistan .
1 .
Afghans Caught In the Crossfire While U.S .
Prepares to Clear Out The year began with the Trump administration scurrying to reach a peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the militant group reduce violence while the United States began pulling out troops , with the caveat that the withdrawal was contingent on Taliban compliance .
But seeing an opportunity for a political victory ahead of Election Day , the White House reportedly pushed for a faster withdrawal , even as violence spiked .
Taliban sieges in Kandahar and Helmand caused more bloodshed , and Afghans feared that they could be left stranded in a worsening war with U.S. troops getting out of the country .
President-elect Joe Biden has pledged to continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s unclear whether he would seek to surge more American troops into the country to do that , leaving Afghans uncertain about their future .
Trump couldn ’ t get out of Afghanistan through regular channels .
So , just over a week after firing Defense Secretary Mark Esper on Nov. 9 , after he had reportedly clashed with the White House over further troop cuts in Afghanistan , acting Pentagon chief Chris Miller announced that the United States would draw down to 2,500 troops in the country before Inauguration Day .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ about another Saigon moment , with the United States abandoning Afghanistan to its fate .
Now it will be up to the Biden administration to decide—under intense congressional pressure—whether and how hard to press the U.S. military presence .
Emboldened by the breakthrough in peace talks with the Trump administration , the Taliban began in 2020 to further assert their control over Afghanistan ’ s national highways and natural resources .
Local workers said that the Taliban ’ s taxes for passing checkpoints began to surge this year , alongside threats of violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countryside—even as threats against U.S. troops from the group appeared to subside .
The militant group also appears to be hitting it rich in the country ’ s plentiful mines , a fountain of wealth that the fledgling Afghan government has been unable to tap for the better part of two decades .
It ’ s yet another issue the incoming Biden administration will have to figure out how to prioritize with just a smattering of American forces left in the country .
The Trump administration ’ s Afghan peace envoy , Zalmay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties to the country , isn ’ t terribly popular in Afghanistan .
Still , many experts are arguing for Biden to keep him on the job for at least the early days of the incoming administration .
The move would be significant , indicating that the Biden administration might feel that it still has leverage to continue talks even as the Taliban have further consolidated their hold over the past year .
But the choice could be unpopular with Congress , which has threatened Khalilzad with a subpoena over a perceived lack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have mostly been negotiated in secret .
The Taliban may have been resurgent in 2020 , but they weren ’ t immune from the coronavirus either .
The virus tore through the militant group ’ s top ranks and caused fissures in the movement , even threatening a previously agreed prisoner swap with Kabul .
The year saw multiple contenders for the Taliban ’ s leadership fighting over whether to continue peace talks or side with U.S. adversaries like Iran .
The outcome of those tussles could determine whether the group opts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether the Taliban redoubles its opposition to Kabul and the new U.S. government .

One of U.S. President Donald Trump’s biggest 2016 campaign pledges was to end America’s so-called post-9/11 forever wars, which range from Afghanistan to Iraq and across Africa’s Sahel region. But throughout his tenure, Trump faced major opposition from military officials and from within his administration.
One of U.S. President Donald Trump’s biggest 2016 campaign pledges was to end America’s so-called post-9/11 forever wars, which range from Afghanistan to Iraq and across Africa’s Sahel region. But throughout his tenure, Trump faced major opposition from military officials and from within his administration.
Eventually, thanks to a last-minute purge of Pentagon leadership, the United States appears poised, after nearly 20 years of war, to draw down to just 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, handing the incoming Biden administration a tiny footprint and a big problem. Inside the Beltway and at U.S. military command centers around the world, skeptics are questioning whether the decision is coming too soon and if the White House risks giving up hard-fought gains.
Afghanistan is wracked by more Taliban violence than almost any time this century; fragile gains in such areas as women’s rights, democracy, and freedom of speech are all at risk as U.S. forces pull out, leaving a vacuum behind. Meanwhile, the tortuous Afghan peace process grinds on, quarterbacked by Trump’s Afghan envoy, a man distrusted by many Afghans but who may yet endure.
Here are some of Foreign Policy’s best articles on a tumultuous year for Afghanistan.
by Lynne O’Donnell, Nov. 10
The year began with the Trump administration scurrying to reach a peace deal with the Taliban that would see the militant group reduce violence while the United States began pulling out troops, with the caveat that the withdrawal was contingent on Taliban compliance. But seeing an opportunity for a political victory ahead of Election Day, the White House reportedly pushed for a faster withdrawal, even as violence spiked.
Taliban sieges in Kandahar and Helmand caused more bloodshed, and Afghans feared that they could be left stranded in a worsening war with U.S. troops getting out of the country. President-elect Joe Biden has pledged to continue counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, but it’s unclear whether he would seek to surge more American troops into the country to do that, leaving Afghans uncertain about their future.
by Jack Detsch, Nov. 17
Trump couldn’t get out of Afghanistan through regular channels. So, just over a week after firing Defense Secretary Mark Esper on Nov. 9, after he had reportedly clashed with the White House over further troop cuts in Afghanistan, acting Pentagon chief Chris Miller announced that the United States would draw down to 2,500 troops in the country before Inauguration Day.
The retreat has Republicans in Congress worried about another Saigon moment, with the United States abandoning Afghanistan to its fate. Now it will be up to the Biden administration to decide—under intense congressional pressure—whether and how hard to press the U.S. military presence.
A coal trader lifts bags at a coal distribution workshop in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, on Sept. 26.
by Hikmat Noori, Oct. 23
Emboldened by the breakthrough in peace talks with the Trump administration, the Taliban began in 2020 to further assert their control over Afghanistan’s national highways and natural resources. Local workers said that the Taliban’s taxes for passing checkpoints began to surge this year, alongside threats of violence against workers and contractors passing through the countryside—even as threats against U.S. troops from the group appeared to subside.
The militant group also appears to be hitting it rich in the country’s plentiful mines, a fountain of wealth that the fledgling Afghan government has been unable to tap for the better part of two decades. It’s yet another issue the incoming Biden administration will have to figure out how to prioritize with just a smattering of American forces left in the country.
by Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch, Nov. 18
The Trump administration’s Afghan peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, a Kabul-born diplomat with deep ties to the country, isn’t terribly popular in Afghanistan. Still, many experts are arguing for Biden to keep him on the job for at least the early days of the incoming administration. The move would be significant, indicating that the Biden administration might feel that it still has leverage to continue talks even as the Taliban have further consolidated their hold over the past year. But the choice could be unpopular with Congress, which has threatened Khalilzad with a subpoena over a perceived lack of transparency into the talks, which have mostly been negotiated in secret.
by Lynne O’Donnell and Mirwais Khan, June 9
The Taliban may have been resurgent in 2020, but they weren’t immune from the coronavirus either. The virus tore through the militant group’s top ranks and caused fissures in the movement, even threatening a previously agreed prisoner swap with Kabul. The year saw multiple contenders for the Taliban’s leadership fighting over whether to continue peace talks or side with U.S. adversaries like Iran. The outcome of those tussles could determine whether the group opts to extend peace talks with the Biden administration—or whether the Taliban redoubles its opposition to Kabul and the new U.S. government.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-23--A Cure for the Brexit Trade Blues

A Cure for the Brexit Trade Blues

On New Year ’ s Eve , Britain will finally leave the European Union , after more than four years of negotiations—talks that are still ongoing as the clock ticks down .
It is unclear what the conclusion of those negotiations will be , but one thing is for certain : The United Kingdom will need new alliances beyond its current relationships .
The options aren ’ t attractive .
The European Union is likely to feel irked by the U.K. ’ s animosity to the bloc and its aggressive negotiating stance for years to come .
U.S. President-elect Joe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brexit , publicly raising concerns about its implications for peace in Northern Ireland .
And London is also on a collision course with Beijing after offering asylum to millions of Hong Kongers and banning Chinese-owned Huawei from providing the infrastructure to build up a 5G network .
But there ’ s one underappreciated alternative : the Commonwealth .
The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent and equal countries , home to 2.4 billion people—almost a third of the world ’ s population—and over 10 percent of global GDP .
The Commonwealth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but any nation can apply to become a part of it .
Rwanda , which was never colonized by the British , joined as the association ’ s newest member in 2009 .
The group is based on shared values , like parliamentary democracy , as well as diplomatic , governmental , and commercial ties .
In short , it ’ s everything a power bloc needs .
The Commonwealth is often dismissed as a colonial hangover with no 21st-century purpose .
But it could be remade as a trade bloc .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is often dismissed as a colonial hangover with no 21st-century purpose .
But it could be remade as a trade bloc of countries with historical ties , long-established economic relations , similar administrative and legal systems , and facility with a shared language .
A focus on the Commonwealth as an entity would be far more effective than the piecemeal approach to bilateral trade deals that the United Kingdom has pursued so far .
A trade deal with non-Commonwealth member Japan , for example , signed in September , means that nearly all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free .
In return , British tariffs on Japanese cars will be lifted by 2026 .
Although the trade deal is forecast to boost trade between Japan and Britain by $ 20 billion , it is only expected to increase British GDP by 0.07 percent .
There will need to be dozens and dozens of such trade deals to make a dent in the loss of EU trade caused by Brexit .
More significant one-off trade deals ( for example with the United States ) could achieve the growth needed , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strain the coronavirus pandemic and recession have placed on the negotiating countries .
Meanwhile , although a U.S.-U.K. free trade deal has been the centerpiece of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s post-Brexit vision , the Irish American congressional lobby and the incoming Biden administration itself are more cool to the idea .
Biden has already warned Johnson that a trade deal with the United States is incompatible with his current Brexit strategy .
There are similar blocks to a deal with Brussels .
Europhiles see the United Kingdom as undermining the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now ?
A big free trade deal with the Commonwealth , though could be easier .
To be sure , there will be some skepticism toward the idea .
Economists such as Walter Isard believe that Commonwealth members do not make natural trade and commerce partners , owing to what is known as the “ gravity model —geographic distance has a negative impact on economic cooperation .
That may have been true a year ago , but in a tech-enabled “ work from anywhere ” post-pandemic world , geography matters less .
Another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too small to matter .
In an op-ed for the Express , Johnson pointed out that “ Today , the Commonwealth has a combined GDP of $ 10.5trillion , accounting for almost 14 per cent of the global economy.
” That is about half of the EU ’ s GDP .
But what the Commonwealth lacks in size , it more than makes up for in growth .
Over the past four decades , Commonwealth economies have grown at an average rate of above four percent , compared with the EU ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the type of growth to consider .
The EU has a chronic inability to produce tech “ unicorns ” : start-up companies with a value of over $ 1 billion .
Considering the easy access to venture capital and private equity in the major EU financial centers , not to mention the ubiquity of accelerator programs , the lack of big start-ups suggests a structural deficiency in the continent ’ s business and innovation culture , as well as the smaller home market .
But the next generation of unicorns could come from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backing them to preserve and increase their global standing .
If cross-border barriers are sufficiently reduced so that the Commonwealth effectively becomes one large single market , the market will be far larger than the United States or China .
The quality of the market is great from a growth and innovation perspective , too .
Such countries as Bangladesh , India , Malaysia , Nigeria , and Pakistan have young , skilled populations .
All they need is the investment and support .
Already , in many of these countries , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a subtle shift toward digital commerce , precisely the sector venture capitalists are attracted to .
For example , in Nigeria , a Commonwealth member and Africa ’ s largest economy , Klasha , a company that allows users to buy and sell items across Africa , has seen exponential growth since the pandemic and is tipped to become the African Stripe or PayPal .
Across the Commonwealth , there are dozens of tech start-ups with a revenue of $ 100 million to $ 200 million a year , and growing year-on-year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Their business models could easily be replicated at scale across the world .
London would be smart to improve access to the United Kingdom for this entrepreneurial talent by granting entrepreneur visas—a form of migration that has been inexplicably and self-defeatingly reduced or eliminated by the government in recent years .
It should also invest venture capital in these countries .
There is currently no viable visa that would allow the potential founders of these innovative start-ups access to the U.K. , and there is no targeted British Sovereign Wealth Fund that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be .
In 2018 , Ipsos Mori found that the Brexit referendum resulted in a net positive effect on the U.K. ’ s perceived attractiveness in the Commonwealth countries of India , South Africa , and others .
Even the most inward-looking and parochial of Brits should welcome entrepreneurs from those countries to their shores—as well as increasing economic partnership in general .
As Brexit ’ s final chapter closes , the Commonwealth , established in 1931 , may finally be coming of age nearly a century later .
As it does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its name for its billions of citizens—with the right investment .

On New Year’s Eve, Britain will finally leave the European Union, after more than four years of negotiations—talks that are still ongoing as the clock ticks down.
On New Year’s Eve, Britain will finally leave the European Union, after more than four years of negotiations—talks that are still ongoing as the clock ticks down.
It is unclear what the conclusion of those negotiations will be, but one thing is for certain: The United Kingdom will need new alliances beyond its current relationships.
The options aren’t attractive. The European Union is likely to feel irked by the U.K.’s animosity to the bloc and its aggressive negotiating stance for years to come. U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has been all but hostile to Brexit, publicly raising concerns about its implications for peace in Northern Ireland. And London is also on a collision course with Beijing after offering asylum to millions of Hong Kongers and banning Chinese-owned Huawei from providing the infrastructure to build up a 5G network.
But there’s one underappreciated alternative: the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 54 independent and equal countries, home to 2.4 billion people—almost a third of the world’s population—and over 10 percent of global GDP. The Commonwealth has its roots in the British Empire, but any nation can apply to become a part of it. Rwanda, which was never colonized by the British, joined as the association’s newest member in 2009. The group is based on shared values, like parliamentary democracy, as well as diplomatic, governmental, and commercial ties. In short, it’s everything a power bloc needs.
The Commonwealth is often dismissed as a colonial hangover with no 21st-century purpose. But it could be remade as a trade bloc.
Within the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth is often dismissed as a colonial hangover with no 21st-century purpose. But it could be remade as a trade bloc of countries with historical ties, long-established economic relations, similar administrative and legal systems, and facility with a shared language.
A focus on the Commonwealth as an entity would be far more effective than the piecemeal approach to bilateral trade deals that the United Kingdom has pursued so far. A trade deal with non-Commonwealth member Japan, for example, signed in September, means that nearly all U.K. exports to Japan will be tariff free. In return, British tariffs on Japanese cars will be lifted by 2026. Although the trade deal is forecast to boost trade between Japan and Britain by $20 billion, it is only expected to increase British GDP by 0.07 percent.
There will need to be dozens and dozens of such trade deals to make a dent in the loss of EU trade caused by Brexit. More significant one-off trade deals (for example with the United States) could achieve the growth needed, but they seem increasingly difficult, especially given the strain the coronavirus pandemic and recession have placed on the negotiating countries. Meanwhile, although a U.S.-U.K. free trade deal has been the centerpiece of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s post-Brexit vision, the Irish American congressional lobby and the incoming Biden administration itself are more cool to the idea. Biden has already warned Johnson that a trade deal with the United States is incompatible with his current Brexit strategy. There are similar blocks to a deal with Brussels. Europhiles see the United Kingdom as undermining the union. Why should it be rewarded now?
A big free trade deal with the Commonwealth, though could be easier. To be sure, there will be some skepticism toward the idea. Economists such as Walter Isard believe that Commonwealth members do not make natural trade and commerce partners, owing to what is known as the “gravity model ” —geographic distance has a negative impact on economic cooperation. That may have been true a year ago, but in a tech-enabled “work from anywhere” post-pandemic world, geography matters less.
Another argument is that the Commonwealth is simply too small to matter. In an op-ed for the Express, Johnson pointed out that “Today, the Commonwealth has a combined GDP of $10.5trillion, accounting for almost 14 per cent of the global economy.” That is about half of the EU’s GDP. But what the Commonwealth lacks in size, it more than makes up for in growth. Over the past four decades, Commonwealth economies have grown at an average rate of above four percent, compared with the EU’s 2 percent.
There’s also the type of growth to consider. The EU has a chronic inability to produce tech “unicorns”: start-up companies with a value of over $1 billion. Considering the easy access to venture capital and private equity in the major EU financial centers, not to mention the ubiquity of accelerator programs, the lack of big start-ups suggests a structural deficiency in the continent’s business and innovation culture, as well as the smaller home market.
But the next generation of unicorns could come from Commonwealth countries, especially with the U.K. backing them to preserve and increase their global standing. If cross-border barriers are sufficiently reduced so that the Commonwealth effectively becomes one large single market, the market will be far larger than the United States or China.
The quality of the market is great from a growth and innovation perspective, too. Such countries as Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan have young, skilled populations. All they need is the investment and support. Already, in many of these countries, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a catalyst for a subtle shift toward digital commerce, precisely the sector venture capitalists are attracted to.
For example, in Nigeria, a Commonwealth member and Africa’s largest economy, Klasha, a company that allows users to buy and sell items across Africa, has seen exponential growth since the pandemic and is tipped to become the African Stripe or PayPal. Across the Commonwealth, there are dozens of tech start-ups with a revenue of $100 million to $200 million a year, and growing year-on-year. The investment potential is far from realized. Their business models could easily be replicated at scale across the world.
London would be smart to improve access to the United Kingdom for this entrepreneurial talent by granting entrepreneur visas—a form of migration that has been inexplicably and self-defeatingly reduced or eliminated by the government in recent years. It should also invest venture capital in these countries. There is currently no viable visa that would allow the potential founders of these innovative start-ups access to the U.K., and there is no targeted British Sovereign Wealth Fund that can profit from their projects. There should be.
In 2018, Ipsos Mori found that the Brexit referendum resulted in a net positive effect on the U.K.’s perceived attractiveness in the Commonwealth countries of India, South Africa, and others. Even the most inward-looking and parochial of Brits should welcome entrepreneurs from those countries to their shores—as well as increasing economic partnership in general.
As Brexit’s final chapter closes, the Commonwealth, established in 1931, may finally be coming of age nearly a century later. As it does, it may also start to deliver on its name for its billions of citizens—with the right investment.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-22--The End of the Road for Bibi?

The End of the Road for Bibi?

The End of the Road for Bibi ?
TEL AVIV , Israel—The country is heading to a fourth general election in two years as parliament dissolved itself on Tuesday , triggering the collapse of a seven-month-old right-center government helmed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his chief rival , Defense Minister Benny Gantz .
The proximate cause was the government ’ s failure to pass a state budget , which by law triggers new elections ; an eleventh-hour extension was voted down in parliament late Monday with help from renegade members of Netanyahu ’ s own right-wing Likud party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White faction .
Election Day is tentatively scheduled for late March .
The real reason the government fell , according to analysts , was Netanyahu ’ s unwillingness to relinquish the premiership to Gantz in November 2021 , as stipulated in their coalition deal reached earlier this year .
Per the details of the agreement , the only path for Netanyahu to dissolve his partnership with Gantz and not forfeit the prime minister post was via non-passage of a budget .
Netanyahu is also widely believed to be seeking a new parliamentary majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the criminal proceedings against him in a slew of bribery and corruption charges .
The evidentiary phase of his trial is set to start in February .
“ Netanyahu ’ s goal is to remain in power throughout his trial , ” Yohanan Plesner , president of the Israel Democracy Institute , a nonpartisan think tank , told Foreign Policy .
“ The political crisis won ’ t end until Netanyahu is replaced or he succeeds [ in his bid to stop the trial ] .
” With the maneuver , Netanyahu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this year when forming the “ emergency government ” with Gantz , ostensibly to tackle the economic and health fallout from the coronavirus pandemic .
“ There won ’ t be tricks and there won ’ t be shticks , ” Netanyahu pledged last March during a televised plea to Gantz urging unity after a third inconclusive election in the space of 15 months .
“ I say the opposite : Millions of citizens are waiting on us , Benny .
They expect us to work together to save the State of Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater than all of our wars ’ casualties .
… I say this from the depth of my heart.
” Gantz accepted the offer , reneging on his core election promise not to join a government with Netanyahu .
But their partnership began unraveling quickly , with Netanyahu violating both the spirit and letter of the deal .
Senior Likud ministers discredited Gantz publicly and made clear he would not rotate into the prime minister ’ s office at the halfway point of the government ’ s term , no matter what was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief deputy , Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi , in the dark about key developments , including the normalization agreements concluded with several Arab states in recent months .
A coalition crisis over budget approval was narrowly averted—and with it early elections—in late summer only through a compromise that pushed off a decision for three months .
In remarks on Monday while meeting with U.S. presidential advisor Jared Kushner , Netanyahu blamed Gantz for undermining the government from within and leading Israel into “ needless elections ” in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of imposing a “ bureaucratic revolution ” on the country , a reference to the party ’ s defense of judicial authorities now prosecuting the prime minister .
“ We can ’ t allow leftist elements to trample our democracy , ” Netanyahu said , in what appeared to be a foreshadowing of his campaign message .
Netanyahu faces several challenges ahead of this fourth election since April 2019 , including his legal troubles , a less supportive president in the White House as of next month , and a deep recession due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli leader seemed to be projecting confidence .
In recent days he has touted the COVID-19 vaccines that Israel has begun administering and the “ four peace agreements in four months ” that the Trump administration shepherded .
Netanyahu has also portrayed himself as the only Israeli leader who can cope with the threat of Iran ’ s nuclear program .
His Likud party is leading in the polls , and he personally is still viewed as the most suitable candidate for prime minister .
But a rebellion in his own Likud party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to win this time , raising the possibility of an alternative governing coalition forming without him .
Gideon Saar , a popular politician and Netanyahu critic , broke off from Likud earlier this month and formed his own faction , New Hope , prompting several other defections .
Other erstwhile Netanyahu allies such as Naftali Bennett ( Yamina ) and Avigdor Liberman ( Yisrael Beiteinu ) , both former defense ministers , are also set to snipe at Likud from the right .
“ The right is fractured like never before , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the Netanyahu ‘ bloc ’ of parties [ except for the ultra-Orthodox ] doesn ’ t exist anymore , ” one senior opposition source told Foreign Policy .
Left and center voters are expected to punish Gantz ’ s Blue and White and the Labor Party for violating election promises and joining Netanyahu ’ s coalition .
But opposition leader Yair Lapid ’ s Yesh Atid party remains sturdy , leading the center-left camp , and could potentially join with right-wing factions to unseat Netanyahu .
“ The government that most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Saar , Liberman , and Bennett , ” the opposition source added .
“ They get along and work well together , they agree on many things and even on the things they don ’ t agree on they find ways to work around it.
” On the tricky question of who would lead such a government , the source indicated that the premiership would go to the head of the biggest party—contingent on there being a genuine gap in seats .
It will , however , take several weeks until the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out .
New figures entering the scene have been suggested , such as longtime Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai or Gadi Eisenkot , the recently retired army chief of staff .
The Joint List , an amalgamation of four Arab Israeli political factions , may split apart again after winning the third-largest number of seats in the outgoing Knesset .
It ’ s an open question whether Blue and White survives , and whether Gantz even continues in political life .
“ The map we see today will be very different than the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Walla News political correspondent Tal Shalev told Foreign Policy .
This is especially true regarding the center-left , she added .
“ It ’ s too early for depression on their part—the votes showing up in polls that are now parked with right-wing parties could come back [ to the left ] if it creates the right platforms.
” And of course , Netanyahu can not be ruled out .
“ The common wisdom is that Netanyahu is in trouble because of the current [ poll ] numbers and because of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But as prime minister he has complete control over the campaign agenda .
And what happened this past year [ with Gantz breaking his vow to never sit with Netanyahu ] should be a warning light ” regarding the promises made by Israeli politicians .
“ Here we go again , ” Netanyahu said jokingly at the start of his remarks on Monday with Kushner , referring to the prospect of yet another election .
The Israeli public has found the dysfunction and turmoil of the last two years less amusing , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government .
Pundits and opposition politicians have charged Israel ’ s longest-serving prime minister with , effectively , holding an entire country hostage to his political and personal whims .
As Plesner , from the Israel Democracy Institute , put it : “ No political imagination is enough to describe political reality .
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—The country is heading to a fourth general election in two years as parliament dissolved itself on Tuesday, triggering the collapse of a seven-month-old right-center government helmed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his chief rival, Defense Minister Benny Gantz.
TEL AVIV, Israel—The country is heading to a fourth general election in two years as parliament dissolved itself on Tuesday, triggering the collapse of a seven-month-old right-center government helmed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his chief rival, Defense Minister Benny Gantz.
The proximate cause was the government’s failure to pass a state budget, which by law triggers new elections; an eleventh-hour extension was voted down in parliament late Monday with help from renegade members of Netanyahu’s own right-wing Likud party and Gantz’s centrist Blue and White faction. Election Day is tentatively scheduled for late March.
The real reason the government fell, according to analysts, was Netanyahu’s unwillingness to relinquish the premiership to Gantz in November 2021, as stipulated in their coalition deal reached earlier this year. Per the details of the agreement, the only path for Netanyahu to dissolve his partnership with Gantz and not forfeit the prime minister post was via non-passage of a budget.
Netanyahu is also widely believed to be seeking a new parliamentary majority that will postpone, or altogether halt, the criminal proceedings against him in a slew of bribery and corruption charges. The evidentiary phase of his trial is set to start in February.
“Netanyahu’s goal is to remain in power throughout his trial,” Yohanan Plesner, president of the Israel Democracy Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, told Foreign Policy. “The political crisis won’t end until Netanyahu is replaced or he succeeds [in his bid to stop the trial].”
With the maneuver, Netanyahu appeared to backtrack on promises made earlier this year when forming the “emergency government” with Gantz, ostensibly to tackle the economic and health fallout from the coronavirus pandemic.
“There won’t be tricks and there won’t be shticks,” Netanyahu pledged last March during a televised plea to Gantz urging unity after a third inconclusive election in the space of 15 months. “I say the opposite: Millions of citizens are waiting on us, Benny. They expect us to work together to save the State of Israel from the biggest global crisis, possibly greater than all of our wars’ casualties. … I say this from the depth of my heart.”
Gantz accepted the offer, reneging on his core election promise not to join a government with Netanyahu. But their partnership began unraveling quickly, with Netanyahu violating both the spirit and letter of the deal.
Senior Likud ministers discredited Gantz publicly and made clear he would not rotate into the prime minister’s office at the halfway point of the government’s term, no matter what was agreed. Netanyahu kept Gantz and his chief deputy, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi, in the dark about key developments, including the normalization agreements concluded with several Arab states in recent months. A coalition crisis over budget approval was narrowly averted—and with it early elections—in late summer only through a compromise that pushed off a decision for three months.
In remarks on Monday while meeting with U.S. presidential advisor Jared Kushner, Netanyahu blamed Gantz for undermining the government from within and leading Israel into “needless elections” in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. Netanyahu also accused Blue and White of imposing a “bureaucratic revolution” on the country, a reference to the party’s defense of judicial authorities now prosecuting the prime minister. “We can’t allow leftist elements to trample our democracy,” Netanyahu said, in what appeared to be a foreshadowing of his campaign message.
Netanyahu faces several challenges ahead of this fourth election since April 2019, including his legal troubles, a less supportive president in the White House as of next month, and a deep recession due to ongoing coronavirus restrictions. Yet the Israeli leader seemed to be projecting confidence.
In recent days he has touted the COVID-19 vaccines that Israel has begun administering and the “four peace agreements in four months” that the Trump administration shepherded. Netanyahu has also portrayed himself as the only Israeli leader who can cope with the threat of Iran’s nuclear program. His Likud party is leading in the polls, and he personally is still viewed as the most suitable candidate for prime minister.
But a rebellion in his own Likud party will make it much harder for Netanyahu to win this time, raising the possibility of an alternative governing coalition forming without him.
Gideon Saar, a popular politician and Netanyahu critic, broke off from Likud earlier this month and formed his own faction, New Hope, prompting several other defections. Other erstwhile Netanyahu allies such as Naftali Bennett (Yamina) and Avigdor Liberman (Yisrael Beiteinu), both former defense ministers, are also set to snipe at Likud from the right.
“The right is fractured like never before, there’s complete chaos in the system, and the Netanyahu ‘bloc’ of parties [except for the ultra-Orthodox] doesn’t exist anymore,” one senior opposition source told Foreign Policy.
Left and center voters are expected to punish Gantz’s Blue and White and the Labor Party for violating election promises and joining Netanyahu’s coalition. But opposition leader Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid party remains sturdy, leading the center-left camp, and could potentially join with right-wing factions to unseat Netanyahu.
“The government that most people would want to see is Lapid, Saar, Liberman, and Bennett,” the opposition source added. “They get along and work well together, they agree on many things and even on the things they don’t agree on they find ways to work around it.” On the tricky question of who would lead such a government, the source indicated that the premiership would go to the head of the biggest party—contingent on there being a genuine gap in seats.
It will, however, take several weeks until the real alignments and orders of battle shake out.
New figures entering the scene have been suggested, such as longtime Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai or Gadi Eisenkot, the recently retired army chief of staff. The Joint List, an amalgamation of four Arab Israeli political factions, may split apart again after winning the third-largest number of seats in the outgoing Knesset. It’s an open question whether Blue and White survives, and whether Gantz even continues in political life.
“The map we see today will be very different than the one at the end of the election,” Walla News political correspondent Tal Shalev told Foreign Policy. This is especially true regarding the center-left, she added. “It’s too early for depression on their part—the votes showing up in polls that are now parked with right-wing parties could come back [to the left] if it creates the right platforms.”
And of course, Netanyahu cannot be ruled out.
“The common wisdom is that Netanyahu is in trouble because of the current [poll] numbers and because of Saar,” Shalev said. “But as prime minister he has complete control over the campaign agenda. And what happened this past year [with Gantz breaking his vow to never sit with Netanyahu] should be a warning light” regarding the promises made by Israeli politicians.
“Here we go again,” Netanyahu said jokingly at the start of his remarks on Monday with Kushner, referring to the prospect of yet another election.
The Israeli public has found the dysfunction and turmoil of the last two years less amusing, according to nearly every measure of trust in government. Pundits and opposition politicians have charged Israel’s longest-serving prime minister with, effectively, holding an entire country hostage to his political and personal whims. As Plesner, from the Israel Democracy Institute, put it: “No political imagination is enough to describe political reality.”