foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--How Europe Fell Out of Love With China

How Europe Fell Out of Love With China

How Europe Fell Out of Love With China After years of courting closer economic ties with China , the European Union is ratcheting up its rhetoric against Beijing ’ s heavy-handed approach to the economy and human rights , with many officials describing what they once saw hopefully as a partnership as more of a rivalry .
Relations between Europe and China got frostier this week , after a long-delayed leaders ’ summit ended with no joint communique and prompted tough talk from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen .
For years , much as the United States did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to nudge China to make reforms in how it trades and does business but has nothing to show for it .
Now , European officials openly talk of China as a rival that needs to start making changes—or face increasing restrictions from Beijing ’ s biggest trading partner .
“ We are committed to making swift and substantial progress , ” said von der Leyen after the summit , ticking off a litany of unfulfilled Chinese promises on trade , investment , industrial subsidies , climate change , and human rights .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ match our level of ambition.
” This week ’ s summit , and the increasingly terse tone taken by top European leaders , follows a spate of new EU initiatives meant to curb Beijing ’ s worst excesses .
Last week , the EU unveiled a new scheme meant to fight back against China ’ s use of state subsidies to give its firms an unfair advantage against European rivals ; this fall , a long-planned investment screening mechanism meant to shield key European firms and industries from predatory acquisitions will finally be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at all non-EU countries , aim squarely at China .
Taken together , “ it gives the impression that the EU wants to show that it is time for a change , time for a recalibration of the relationship , and that it is time for China to give more , ” said Frans-Paul van der Putten , an expert on China at the Clingendael Institute , a think tank in the Netherlands .
If many of Europe ’ s complaints about China sound familiar to those levied by U.S. officials including President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s because they are .
But there ’ s one big difference , for now , in Europe ’ s reaction to China that still sets it apart from Trump ’ s scorched-earth approach .
“ Europe is much more concerned about China , and there is a much greater sense of urgency that something needs to happen , ” van der Putten said .
“ But there is still a very strong conviction in Europe that there is no future without China—we are not going to ‘ decouple ’ or have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t see that in the European mindset.
” For much of the past decade , Europe and China were growing increasingly intertwined economically .
Two-way trade in goods and services has grown over the last decade by about 60 percent , to more than half a trillion euros annually .
Britain , when it was still part of the EU , literally rolled out the red carpet for Chinese investment , and for the past five years sought to ingratiate itself with Beijing , until starting to reverse course this year .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment in ports , railroads , telecommunications , and the power grid offered countries like Greece , Italy , and Portugal much-needed investment—and China a measure of influence inside the now 27-nation bloc .
Italy even formally signed on to China ’ s trillion-dollar “ Belt and Road ” program of infrastructure investment and even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic has sought to deepen its relationship with Beijing .
But that very deepening of the economic ties between the two also bred suspicion and concern that China was snapping up some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Leaders in France and Germany , in particular , worried that Chinese acquisitions of key companies could undermine national security .
Countries across the EU have been torn over whether and how much to allow China ’ s Huawei to participate in the development of advanced , fifth-generation mobile phone networks .
The just-unveiled EU plan to treat foreign industrial subsidies with the same strict rules as the bloc applies internally for illegal state aid is just the latest sign that China ’ s state-led economic model has tried Europe ’ s patience @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t understand is that by launching national champions and throwing state money at them , that created a lot of hostility all over the world but in Europe in particular—German and French companies feel that they are facing some very unfair competition , ” said Philippe Le Corre , an expert on China and Europe at the Harvard Kennedy School .
The new anti-subsidies measure , he said , “ really says a lot about the shifts in the mood in Europe and the fact that the commission is translating that into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this week , it has been a long time stiffening .
Previous EU leaders , for example , launched the investment-screening measure to try to limit China ’ s ability to snap up critical European firms ; this fall , the new mechanism will finally be in place .
Likewise , Europe ’ s new foreign-policy chief , Josep Borrell , speaks unabashedly of China as a “ rival ” to Europe , sharpening the rhetorical confrontation with Beijing that has been steadily building in recent years .
“ The mood at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past five years or so to a more critical perception of China—now it ’ s much more visible , ” van der Putten said .
If China is encountering a lot more pushback in Europe , it can look in the mirror for reasons why .
Beijing ’ s insistence on abrogating an international treaty to erode Hong Kong ’ s guaranteed liberties through the introduction of a new security law that will essentially turn the island enclave into another Chinese city is just the latest hamfisted move that has alienated European leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump-style confrontation and coddling .
As von der Leyen detailed after the fizzled summit , the two sides are also at odds on a long-stalled investment treaty ; an unbalanced trade relationship with unequal access in China for European firms ; state subsidies ; forced technology transfers ; the reform of the World Trade Organization ; industrial overcapacity in sectors like steel ; climate change ; and , of course , the handling of the coronavirus pandemic .
“ There aren ’ t a lot of very positive points in the EU-China relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even as anti-China sentiment in the United States has gone mainstream and bipartisan , with tough trade tariffs , technology and visa restrictions , and an increasingly apparent desire among both Republicans and Democrats to file for divorce , Europe ’ s not there yet .
Von der Leyen harangued China over human rights and pleaded for Beijing to start making concessions on trade and the economy—but didn ’ t wield any big sticks .
That ’ s partly a reflection of the difficulty of herding 27 different member states into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States doesn ’ t have .
“ They don ’ t have the policy measures quite yet—I don ’ t see any sign yet of the EU trying to exert serious pressure on China in the sense that the United States has , ” van der Putten said .
The key to the future EU-China relationship could come from what happens in the U.S. election in November , where presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden holds a commanding lead in opinion polls over Trump , even in battleground states .
While Biden , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more hawkish line on China , he was also vice president during the Obama administration , when the United States still sought strategic engagement , not outright confrontation , with the world ’ s second-largest economy .
“ The current EU position is a lot like Obama ’ s : We need to work with China , but we need to move them in directions that are important to us , ” van der Putten said .
“ So if Biden goes back to that approach , this would create an interesting possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If not , a more confrontational U.S. stance would only embolden countries like France that have called for Europe to play a more independent role on the global stage so that it doesn ’ t have to choose between China and the United States , he said .

After years of courting closer economic ties with China, the European Union is ratcheting up its rhetoric against Beijing’s heavy-handed approach to the economy and human rights, with many officials describing what they once saw hopefully as a partnership as more of a rivalry.
After years of courting closer economic ties with China, the European Union is ratcheting up its rhetoric against Beijing’s heavy-handed approach to the economy and human rights, with many officials describing what they once saw hopefully as a partnership as more of a rivalry.
Relations between Europe and China got frostier this week, after a long-delayed leaders’ summit ended with no joint communique and prompted tough talk from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. For years, much as the United States did in the past, Europe has sought to nudge China to make reforms in how it trades and does business but has nothing to show for it. Now, European officials openly talk of China as a rival that needs to start making changes—or face increasing restrictions from Beijing’s biggest trading partner.
“We are committed to making swift and substantial progress,” said von der Leyen after the summit, ticking off a litany of unfulfilled Chinese promises on trade, investment, industrial subsidies, climate change, and human rights. “We count on the Chinese leadership to match our level of ambition.”
This week’s summit, and the increasingly terse tone taken by top European leaders, follows a spate of new EU initiatives meant to curb Beijing’s worst excesses. Last week, the EU unveiled a new scheme meant to fight back against China’s use of state subsidies to give its firms an unfair advantage against European rivals; this fall, a long-planned investment screening mechanism meant to shield key European firms and industries from predatory acquisitions will finally be implemented. Both, while nominally directed at all non-EU countries, aim squarely at China.
Taken together, “it gives the impression that the EU wants to show that it is time for a change, time for a recalibration of the relationship, and that it is time for China to give more,” said Frans-Paul van der Putten, an expert on China at the Clingendael Institute, a think tank in the Netherlands.
If many of Europe’s complaints about China sound familiar to those levied by U.S. officials including President Donald Trump in recent years, that’s because they are. But there’s one big difference, for now, in Europe’s reaction to China that still sets it apart from Trump’s scorched-earth approach.
“Europe is much more concerned about China, and there is a much greater sense of urgency that something needs to happen,” van der Putten said. “But there is still a very strong conviction in Europe that there is no future without China—we are not going to ‘decouple’ or have an economic disengagement. You don’t see that in the European mindset.”
For much of the past decade, Europe and China were growing increasingly intertwined economically. Two-way trade in goods and services has grown over the last decade by about 60 percent, to more than half a trillion euros annually. Britain, when it was still part of the EU, literally rolled out the red carpet for Chinese investment, and for the past five years sought to ingratiate itself with Beijing, until starting to reverse course this year. In other parts of Europe, big Chinese investment in ports, railroads, telecommunications, and the power grid offered countries like Greece, Italy, and Portugal much-needed investment—and China a measure of influence inside the now 27-nation bloc. Italy even formally signed on to China’s trillion-dollar “Belt and Road” program of infrastructure investment and even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic has sought to deepen its relationship with Beijing.
But that very deepening of the economic ties between the two also bred suspicion and concern that China was snapping up some of Europe’s crown jewels. Leaders in France and Germany, in particular, worried that Chinese acquisitions of key companies could undermine national security. Countries across the EU have been torn over whether and how much to allow China’s Huawei to participate in the development of advanced, fifth-generation mobile phone networks. The just-unveiled EU plan to treat foreign industrial subsidies with the same strict rules as the bloc applies internally for illegal state aid is just the latest sign that China’s state-led economic model has tried Europe’s patience too much.
“What China didn’t understand is that by launching national champions and throwing state money at them, that created a lot of hostility all over the world but in Europe in particular—German and French companies feel that they are facing some very unfair competition,” said Philippe Le Corre, an expert on China and Europe at the Harvard Kennedy School. The new anti-subsidies measure, he said, “really says a lot about the shifts in the mood in Europe and the fact that the commission is translating that into action.”
If Europe showed more spine this week, it has been a long time stiffening. Previous EU leaders, for example, launched the investment-screening measure to try to limit China’s ability to snap up critical European firms; this fall, the new mechanism will finally be in place. Likewise, Europe’s new foreign-policy chief, Josep Borrell, speaks unabashedly of China as a “rival” to Europe, sharpening the rhetorical confrontation with Beijing that has been steadily building in recent years.
“The mood at the European Commission had been changing over the past five years or so to a more critical perception of China—now it’s much more visible,” van der Putten said.
If China is encountering a lot more pushback in Europe, it can look in the mirror for reasons why. Beijing’s insistence on abrogating an international treaty to erode Hong Kong’s guaranteed liberties through the introduction of a new security law that will essentially turn the island enclave into another Chinese city is just the latest hamfisted move that has alienated European leaders eager to find a middle road between Trump-style confrontation and coddling.
As von der Leyen detailed after the fizzled summit, the two sides are also at odds on a long-stalled investment treaty; an unbalanced trade relationship with unequal access in China for European firms; state subsidies; forced technology transfers; the reform of the World Trade Organization; industrial overcapacity in sectors like steel; climate change; and, of course, the handling of the coronavirus pandemic.
“There aren’t a lot of very positive points in the EU-China relationship,” Le Corre said.
Still, even as anti-China sentiment in the United States has gone mainstream and bipartisan, with tough trade tariffs, technology and visa restrictions, and an increasingly apparent desire among both Republicans and Democrats to file for divorce, Europe’s not there yet. Von der Leyen harangued China over human rights and pleaded for Beijing to start making concessions on trade and the economy—but didn’t wield any big sticks. That’s partly a reflection of the difficulty of herding 27 different member states into a common foreign policy, a problem the United States doesn’t have.
“They don’t have the policy measures quite yet—I don’t see any sign yet of the EU trying to exert serious pressure on China in the sense that the United States has,” van der Putten said.
The key to the future EU-China relationship could come from what happens in the U.S. election in November, where presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden holds a commanding lead in opinion polls over Trump, even in battleground states. While Biden, like other Democrats, has taken a more hawkish line on China, he was also vice president during the Obama administration, when the United States still sought strategic engagement, not outright confrontation, with the world’s second-largest economy.
“The current EU position is a lot like Obama’s: We need to work with China, but we need to move them in directions that are important to us,” van der Putten said. “So if Biden goes back to that approach, this would create an interesting possibility of convergence with the United States.”
If not, a more confrontational U.S. stance would only embolden countries like France that have called for Europe to play a more independent role on the global stage so that it doesn’t have to choose between China and the United States, he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--Foreign Worker Visas Are the Tech Industry’s Dirty Secret

U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order this week that bars hundreds of thousands of foreigners from seeking employment in the United States by suspending new work visas .
The argument against the most significant of these visas , the H-1B , has always been that that they harm employment prospects for Americans and depress wages .
Some of the criticism is justified : The H-1B visa , which U.S. technology companies and outsourcing firms use to hire 85,000 new foreign specialists each year , is indeed problematic , because it puts both American and foreign workers at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tech industry ’ s dirty secret .
They tie the foreign workers to their jobs and allow the employer to pay them less than they could be earning—which drives down pay for American workers as well .
But the solution isn ’ t for government to lock the doors or try to control wages ; it is to let competition on the labor market do its magic .
The simple fix is to allow H-1B visa holders to work for any employer that pays them the highest wage or for the start-up that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the foreign workers to their jobs and allow the employer to pay them less than they could be earning—which drives down pay for American workers as well .
This is something I have written about a lot , including in a 2012 book titled The Immigrant Exodus : Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent .
I warned then about the deep flaws in U.S. immigration policies and predicted that China and India would greatly benefit from these flaws—and , unfortunately , that prediction was correct .
With help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States but couldn ’ t stay , both of those countries have built innovation capabilities that rival the United States ’ , and both now have many technology start-ups valued in the billions of dollars .
Here is the problem : For decades , the United States has been bringing in large numbers of workers on temporary visas such as the H-1B , but it never increased the numbers of permanent-resident visas ( “ green cards ” ) available for those who want to stay .
There are 140,000 green cards @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the law stipulates that each nationality may receive no more than 7 percent of the total number of employment-based green cards .
My research team documented in 2007 that this limitation had trapped more than 1 million skilled immigrants and their families in immigration limbo .
The Cato Institute found that number to be unchanged in 2020 and forecast that the backlog would increase to 2.4 million by 2030 .
Today , skilled Indian workers make up 75 percent of the employment-based backlog , and those who recently arrived face a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any H-1B worker can change jobs by filing a petition with the government , and some do take advantage of this rule .
But there is a catch : The H-1B visa allows a path to permanent residency only when an employer sponsors a worker .
And this is the carrot employers offer , one that most people coming to the United States want .
Once they accept this carrot , they are trapped in immigration limbo because they can only change sponsoring employers or take new jobs at their current companies if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ category and at the same level as the old one—otherwise they risk losing their status or having to reapply .
Most don ’ t take the risk .
Therefore , visa holders shun promotions and changes in their job description , leading to stagnating careers and lower salaries than they could otherwise make.Opponents of the H-1B visa are correct in claiming that the visa disadvantages American workers , who are effectively competing with bonded labor .
Opponents of the H-1B visa are correct in claiming that the visa disadvantages American workers , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To the would-be immigrants , this indentured servitude is compounded by the employment restrictions that their spouses now face once again : The H-4 visas that permit them employment have also been suspended by Trump .
The overall problem could be fixed if the number of permanent-resident visas available for skilled workers was increased and the wait times decreased dramatically .
But that is not going to happen in this era of pandemics and xenophobia .
The most realistic solution is to untether the visa holder from the hiring company .
In other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country on an H-1B visa and gets an offer of a higher salary to change jobs regardless of the status of his or her green-card application—without cumbersome additional paperwork .
This way there ’ s no cheap labor anymore , and market forces take over .
And , of course , the spouses of H-1B workers must not be prevented from working ; no civilized society can place such restrictions on a group that is mostly women .
Technology companies don ’ t propose such a fix because it would cause them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Politicians won ’ t propose such legislation because it is not what tech-industry lobbyists want .
Instead , we get a series of convoluted proposals that increase the role of government and disadvantage all workers , both American and foreign—and create the immigrant exodus.Attacking immigrants is the fastest way to destroy the United States ’ remaining competitive advantages—and prolong the recession .
Sadly , there is unemployment in the tech industry , and there are many heart-breaking cases of Americans being displaced by cheap foreign labor .
This is not an acceptable situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform would fix the salary disadvantage .
Having more highly skilled , job-creating immigrants will lead to more innovation and more jobs .
It will make the economic pie bigger for everyone .
The key to competitiveness is to allow the tech industry to hire the best talent , no matter where it comes from .
The economy thrives on competition of every form , including technology and skill .
Attacking immigrants and demanding that companies hire Americans over people who are more skilled , as Trump is doing , is the fastest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remaining competitive advantages—and prolong the recession .

U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order this week that bars hundreds of thousands of foreigners from seeking employment in the United States by suspending new work visas.
The argument against the most significant of these visas, the H-1B, has always been that that they harm employment prospects for Americans and depress wages. Some of the criticism is justified: The H-1B visa, which U.S. technology companies and outsourcing firms use to hire 85,000 new foreign specialists each year, is indeed problematic, because it puts both American and foreign workers at a disadvantage. These visas are the U.S. tech industry’s dirty secret. They tie the foreign workers to their jobs and allow the employer to pay them less than they could be earning—which drives down pay for American workers as well.
But the solution isn’t for government to lock the doors or try to control wages; it is to let competition on the labor market do its magic. The simple fix is to allow H-1B visa holders to work for any employer that pays them the highest wage or for the start-up that offers the most rewarding work.The visas tie the foreign workers to their jobs and allow the employer to pay them less than they could be earning—which drives down pay for American workers as well.
This is something I have written about a lot, including in a 2012 book titled The Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent. I warned then about the deep flaws in U.S. immigration policies and predicted that China and India would greatly benefit from these flaws—and, unfortunately, that prediction was correct. With help from workers who honed their skills in the United States but couldn’t stay, both of those countries have built innovation capabilities that rival the United States’, and both now have many technology start-ups valued in the billions of dollars.
Here is the problem: For decades, the United States has been bringing in large numbers of workers on temporary visas such as the H-1B, but it never increased the numbers of permanent-resident visas (“green cards”) available for those who want to stay. There are 140,000 green cards issued per year to employment-based visa holders, and the law stipulates that each nationality may receive no more than 7 percent of the total number of employment-based green cards. My research team documented in 2007 that this limitation had trapped more than 1 million skilled immigrants and their families in immigration limbo. The Cato Institute found that number to be unchanged in 2020 and forecast that the backlog would increase to 2.4 million by 2030. Today, skilled Indian workers make up 75 percent of the employment-based backlog, and those who recently arrived face a wait of 90 years.
Technically, any H-1B worker can change jobs by filing a petition with the government, and some do take advantage of this rule. But there is a catch: The H-1B visa allows a path to permanent residency only when an employer sponsors a worker. And this is the carrot employers offer, one that most people coming to the United States want. Once they accept this carrot, they are trapped in immigration limbo because they can only change sponsoring employers or take new jobs at their current companies if the new job is in the same category and at the same level as the old one—otherwise they risk losing their status or having to reapply. Most don’t take the risk. Therefore, visa holders shun promotions and changes in their job description, leading to stagnating careers and lower salaries than they could otherwise make.Opponents of the H-1B visa are correct in claiming that the visa disadvantages American workers, who are effectively competing with bonded labor.
Opponents of the H-1B visa are correct in claiming that the visa disadvantages American workers, who are effectively competing with bonded labor. To the would-be immigrants, this indentured servitude is compounded by the employment restrictions that their spouses now face once again: The H-4 visas that permit them employment have also been suspended by Trump.
The overall problem could be fixed if the number of permanent-resident visas available for skilled workers was increased and the wait times decreased dramatically. But that is not going to happen in this era of pandemics and xenophobia. The most realistic solution is to untether the visa holder from the hiring company. In other words, allow an employee who enters the country on an H-1B visa and gets an offer of a higher salary to change jobs regardless of the status of his or her green-card application—without cumbersome additional paperwork. This way there’s no cheap labor anymore, and market forces take over. And, of course, the spouses of H-1B workers must not be prevented from working; no civilized society can place such restrictions on a group that is mostly women.
Technology companies don’t propose such a fix because it would cause them to lose power over the employee. Politicians won’t propose such legislation because it is not what tech-industry lobbyists want. Instead, we get a series of convoluted proposals that increase the role of government and disadvantage all workers, both American and foreign—and create the immigrant exodus.Attacking immigrants is the fastest way to destroy the United States’ remaining competitive advantages—and prolong the recession.
Sadly, there is unemployment in the tech industry, and there are many heart-breaking cases of Americans being displaced by cheap foreign labor. This is not an acceptable situation, and it is why smart immigration reform would fix the salary disadvantage. Having more highly skilled, job-creating immigrants will lead to more innovation and more jobs. It will make the economic pie bigger for everyone.
The key to competitiveness is to allow the tech industry to hire the best talent, no matter where it comes from. The economy thrives on competition of every form, including technology and skill. Attacking immigrants and demanding that companies hire Americans over people who are more skilled, as Trump is doing, is the fastest way to destroy the United States’ remaining competitive advantages—and prolong the recession.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--Politicians Are Writing Off Disabled Lives Amid the Pandemic

Politicians Are Writing Off Disabled Lives Amid the Pandemic “ Herd immunity , protect the economy , and if that means some pensioners die , too bad.
” That ’ s what the U.K. government ’ s most influential—and most controversial—advisor , Dominic Cummings , saw as the best strategy to tackle the COVID-19 outbreak in February , according to an account published by the Sunday Times .
Downing Street has since issued an unusual on-the-record denunciation of this claim and denied that herd immunity—a strategy first mentioned by Sir Patrick Vallance , Britain ’ s chief scientific advisor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officer—was ever really in the cards .
But Cummings ’ s reported attitude hasn ’ t been an unusual one .
Throughout the crisis , global attitudes have been shaped by one clear and horrifying principle : Some lives matter more than others .
That thinking , whether it applied to pensioners , fat people , asthmatics , or many others with the range of preexisting conditions that make individuals more vulnerable to COVID-19 , runs deep .
It ’ s a form of what disability activists call ableism—the idea that non-disabled lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extreme form , it ’ s the murderous politics of the Nazis , who deemed people with disabilities “ life unworthy of life.
” During the pandemic , similar attitudes have been less intentional but sometimes equally deadly .
The idea that letting older and vulnerable people die was part of the specific government planning in the United Kingdom is shocking .
But it effectively pervades the American response too—at least as led by President Donald Trump and especially as the United States rushes toward reopening even as cases continue to grow in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposed benefits of reopening are judged against lives deemed less worthy .
Texas Lt. Gov .
Dan Patrick suggested in March that he believed “ lots of grandparents ” would rather die than let COVID-19 harm the U.S. economy , again working on the erroneous assumption that the virus only affects older individuals and pushing the narrative that these people are willing sacrifices .
Ableism has been part of the core of Trumpism since the start .
Trump ’ s own fear of physical weakness—evidenced in his recent defensiveness over the simple act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for people with disabilities have long been evident .
( To be sure , some of the mocking of Trump also ends up repeating the same prejudices . )
He infamously mocked a reporter ’ s disability during his original election campaign and has cut services to people with disabilities while in government .
Right-wing leaders globally have echoed the language of blame toward people with preexisting health conditions like heart disease and diabetes , such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil .
Even as the deaths have piled up in the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ searching for excuses for them—usually focusing on existing vulnerabilities .
The former New York Times reporter and author Alex Berenson has devoted much of his efforts on Twitter to denouncing the science around COVID-19 as false and pinpointing age and preexisting conditions as the sole reasons that someone might be at risk of the disease .
In one tweet , he mentioned that someone he knew had died but of a heart attack , branding him falsely as “ too young to die of # Covid.
” Berenson also delights in mocking people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus and in contesting death statistics .
He wrote : “ The best guess is that 95-97 % of them [ those who have died ] would have died anyway by year-end if # Sarscov2 had never existed.
” To Berenson and those who share his politics , the vulnerable are infinitely expendable .
Ableism wraps into other prejudices .
On May 17 , Trump ’ s health secretary , Alex Azar , told CNN that America “ unfortunately ” has a “ very diverse ” population and Black Americans and minorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underlying disease.
” Azar was essentially blaming people of color for their own deaths because he deems them to be unhealthy .
In both the U.K. and the United States , Black and ethnic minority people are at much higher risk of dying of the coronavirus in comparison with white individuals .
According to the British Office for National Statistics , Black people are 1.9 times as likely to die from COVID-19 as white people , Bangladeshi and Pakistani individuals 1.8 times as likely , and Indian people 1.5 times as likely .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ include factors such as living conditions , occupation , and health issues .
The Institute for Fiscal Studies now concludes that those from Black African backgrounds in England and Wales are now dying at more than three times the rate of white Britons .
In the U.K. , Black people are more likely to be overweight , while Asian and Black populations are at greater risk of developing diabetes and heart disease .
All of these conditions are linked to higher rates of death from the coronavirus .
These catastrophic health consequences are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and subsequently Type 2 diabetes , is particularly prevalent in disadvantaged groups , in both North America and Britain , and linked to poverty , unemployment , and lack of education .
These factors are inherently connected to systemic racism and discrimination against people of color .
Disability activists worry that the pandemic is entrenching old attitudes toward whose survival matters and who gets to participate in outside life .
The U.K.-based disability blogger Carrie-Ann Lightley told Foreign Policy : “ By using the term ‘ vulnerable ’ as a blanket descriptor for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and older people , I fear that we are seeing a resurgence in ableist attitudes .
Anyone can be vulnerable—depending on the context and circumstances—and by using this label to encourage millions of people to shield in their homes without any clear and safe plan to rejoin society , we now face more barriers to equality than ever before.
” Older people and those with preexisting conditions are the sacrificial lambs .
Trump is desperate for the economy to recover—at the expense of anyone who might be vulnerable .
Here and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is the resurgence of an old idea : that we should allow the weak to perish for the economic and social gain of everyone else .
Britain ’ s plan to put COVID-19 patients into care homes , where older and vulnerable people are residents , smacks of this same social cleansing—as did the rampant neglect in the first place .
On March 12 , official advice stated that : “ It is therefore very unlikely that anyone receiving care in a care home or the community will become infected.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suffer and die , with no block on visits , face coverings not worn , and no guidance on isolating sick residents .
More than 40 percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the U.K. have now been in care homes .
Even as lockdown begins to ease , particularly in the U.K. , disabled and vulnerable people will effectively be excluded from reaping the benefits of this even as the risk to their lives is increased .
The disability rights activist Charli Clement told Foreign Policy : “ I think that as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ awful to hear people talk about lives not as individuals but as just someone who had a preexisting condition—it causes an implication that their life wasn ’ t one of worth and almost says , ‘ They would have died anyway.
’ Businesses are being encouraged to reopen with social distancing measures in place , but we ’ re not seeing any concession to accessibility in these measures because it is expected that disabled people will simply stay at home.
” Every single death from the coronavirus is tragic and unnecessary .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States seem to place more importance on economic recovery than they do on human life , due to the framing of those most vulnerable to COVID-19 as weak , frail , and ultimately unimportant .
As Clement said , “ It has felt like a punch in the stomach , as I know the same would be said if I died from COVID-19 .
We shouldn ’ t be cast aside ; we shouldn ’ t be expendable in this situation .
Many of these deaths have been preventable regardless of preexisting conditions @ @

“Herd immunity, protect the economy, and if that means some pensioners die, too bad.” That’s what the U.K. government’s most influential—and most controversial—advisor, Dominic Cummings , saw as the best strategy to tackle the COVID-19 outbreak in February, according to an account published by the Sunday Times . Downing Street has since issued an unusual on-the-record denunciation of this claim and denied that herd immunity—a strategy first mentioned by Sir Patrick Vallance, Britain’s chief scientific advisor, and Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer—was ever really in the cards.
“Herd immunity, protect the economy, and if that means some pensioners die, too bad.” That’s what the U.K. government’s most influential—and most controversial—advisor, Dominic Cummings, saw as the best strategy to tackle the COVID-19 outbreak in February, according to an account published by the Sunday Times. Downing Street has since issued an unusual on-the-record denunciation of this claim and denied that herd immunity—a strategy first mentioned by Sir Patrick Vallance, Britain’s chief scientific advisor, and Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer—was ever really in the cards.
But Cummings’s reported attitude hasn’t been an unusual one. Throughout the crisis, global attitudes have been shaped by one clear and horrifying principle: Some lives matter more than others. That thinking, whether it applied to pensioners, fat people, asthmatics, or many others with the range of preexisting conditions that make individuals more vulnerable to COVID-19, runs deep. It’s a form of what disability activists call ableism—the idea that non-disabled lives are simply more important. In its extreme form, it’s the murderous politics of the Nazis, who deemed people with disabilities “life unworthy of life.” During the pandemic, similar attitudes have been less intentional but sometimes equally deadly.
The idea that letting older and vulnerable people die was part of the specific government planning in the United Kingdom is shocking. But it effectively pervades the American response too—at least as led by President Donald Trump and especially as the United States rushes toward reopening even as cases continue to grow in a number of new states. The supposed benefits of reopening are judged against lives deemed less worthy.
Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick suggested in March that he believed “lots of grandparents” would rather die than let COVID-19 harm the U.S. economy, again working on the erroneous assumption that the virus only affects older individuals and pushing the narrative that these people are willing sacrifices.
Ableism has been part of the core of Trumpism since the start. Trump’s own fear of physical weakness—evidenced in his recent defensiveness over the simple act of walking slowly down a plank—and disdain for people with disabilities have long been evident. (To be sure, some of the mocking of Trump also ends up repeating the same prejudices.) He infamously mocked a reporter’s disability during his original election campaign and has cut services to people with disabilities while in government. Right-wing leaders globally have echoed the language of blame toward people with preexisting health conditions like heart disease and diabetes, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.
Even as the deaths have piled up in the United States, Republicans and coronavirus deniers have gone searching for excuses for them—usually focusing on existing vulnerabilities. The former New York Times reporter and author Alex Berenson has devoted much of his efforts on Twitter to denouncing the science around COVID-19 as false and pinpointing age and preexisting conditions as the sole reasons that someone might be at risk of the disease.
In one tweet, he mentioned that someone he knew had died but of a heart attack, branding him falsely as “too young to die of #Covid.” Berenson also delights in mocking people who wear face coverings to protect from the virus and in contesting death statistics. He wrote: “The best guess is that 95-97% of them [those who have died] would have died anyway by year-end if #Sarscov2 had never existed.” To Berenson and those who share his politics, the vulnerable are infinitely expendable.
Ableism wraps into other prejudices. On May 17, Trump’s health secretary, Alex Azar, told CNN that America “unfortunately” has a “very diverse” population and Black Americans and minorities “in particular” have “significant underlying disease.” Azar was essentially blaming people of color for their own deaths because he deems them to be unhealthy.
In both the U.K. and the United States, Black and ethnic minority people are at much higher risk of dying of the coronavirus in comparison with white individuals. According to the British Office for National Statistics, Black people are 1.9 times as likely to die from COVID-19 as white people, Bangladeshi and Pakistani individuals 1.8 times as likely, and Indian people 1.5 times as likely.
The reasons for this are numerous and include factors such as living conditions, occupation, and health issues. The Institute for Fiscal Studies now concludes that those from Black African backgrounds in England and Wales are now dying at more than three times the rate of white Britons. In the U.K., Black people are more likely to be overweight, while Asian and Black populations are at greater risk of developing diabetes and heart disease. All of these conditions are linked to higher rates of death from the coronavirus.
These catastrophic health consequences are deeply linked to prejudice. Obesity, and subsequently Type 2 diabetes, is particularly prevalent in disadvantaged groups, in both North America and Britain, and linked to poverty, unemployment, and lack of education. These factors are inherently connected to systemic racism and discrimination against people of color.
Disability activists worry that the pandemic is entrenching old attitudes toward whose survival matters and who gets to participate in outside life. The U.K.-based disability blogger Carrie-Ann Lightley told Foreign Policy: “By using the term ‘vulnerable’ as a blanket descriptor for disabled people, those with medical conditions, and older people, I fear that we are seeing a resurgence in ableist attitudes. Anyone can be vulnerable—depending on the context and circumstances—and by using this label to encourage millions of people to shield in their homes without any clear and safe plan to rejoin society, we now face more barriers to equality than ever before.”
Older people and those with preexisting conditions are the sacrificial lambs. Trump is desperate for the economy to recover—at the expense of anyone who might be vulnerable. Here and in Britain’s discredited herd immunity whisperings, there is the resurgence of an old idea: that we should allow the weak to perish for the economic and social gain of everyone else.
Britain’s plan to put COVID-19 patients into care homes, where older and vulnerable people are residents, smacks of this same social cleansing—as did the rampant neglect in the first place. On March 12, official advice stated that: “It is therefore very unlikely that anyone receiving care in a care home or the community will become infected.” People in care homes were left to suffer and die, with no block on visits, face coverings not worn, and no guidance on isolating sick residents. More than 40 percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the U.K. have now been in care homes.
Even as lockdown begins to ease, particularly in the U.K., disabled and vulnerable people will effectively be excluded from reaping the benefits of this even as the risk to their lives is increased. The disability rights activist Charli Clement told Foreign Policy: “I think that as a young disabled person, it’s awful to hear people talk about lives not as individuals but as just someone who had a preexisting condition—it causes an implication that their life wasn’t one of worth and almost says, ‘They would have died anyway.’ Businesses are being encouraged to reopen with social distancing measures in place, but we’re not seeing any concession to accessibility in these measures because it is expected that disabled people will simply stay at home.”
Every single death from the coronavirus is tragic and unnecessary. But governments in both Britain and the United States seem to place more importance on economic recovery than they do on human life, due to the framing of those most vulnerable to COVID-19 as weak, frail, and ultimately unimportant.
As Clement said, “It has felt like a punch in the stomach, as I know the same would be said if I died from COVID-19. We shouldn’t be cast aside; we shouldn’t be expendable in this situation. Many of these deaths have been preventable regardless of preexisting conditions.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--Will Trump’s Plans to Withdraw Troops from Europe Go Forward?

Will Trump ’ s Plans to Withdraw Troops from Europe Go Forward ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump is shifting U.S. troops in Europe , the United States and Russia make progress in nuclear talks , and the U.S. campaign against Huawei heats up .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump is forging ahead with plans to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe , announcing that the United States will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubling down on plans to cut back the number of troops stationed in Germany .
Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Washington on Wednesday—the first foreign leader to set foot in the White House since March .
During the visit , Trump announced that he would send troops to Poland and said Warsaw had offered to foot the bill .
“ We ’ re going to be reducing our forces in Germany .
Some will be coming home , and some will be going to other places .
But Poland would be one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
On the face of it , it ’ s a win for Poland , which has been itching for a greater U.S. troop presence to bolster NATO deterrence against Russia—at one point even courting the president with a proposal to build a “ Fort Trump ” to host the troops .
What will the drawdown look like ?
Trump ’ s plan to withdraw thousands of U.S. troops from Germany comes after he hammered Berlin ’ s record on meeting defense spending pledges .
Poland currently meets the NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GDP on defense .
( Germany doesn ’ t , but it plans to by 2024 . )
The Pentagon is drawing up plans to redeploy about 9,500 troops from Germany , where 34,000 troops are permanently stationed .
Republicans in Congress have criticized the president ’ s proposal .
Former Pentagon officials and retired military brass say the move will undercut U.S. deterrence in Europe overall , even with the shift of some troops to Poland , as Defense One reports .
And behind closed doors , European diplomats say that while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remain uneasy about the knock-on effects of a drastically reduced U.S. footprint in Germany .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo addressed these concerns on Thursday , saying the United States remained committed to European security and “ the capacity to deter Russia or other adversaries isn ’ t determined any longer by just having a bunch of folks garrisoned some place.
” ( His full remarks are here . )
The knock-on effects .
The U.S. military footprint in Germany is important for troops and supplies going to and from the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launch point for many military exercises across Europe aimed at reminding Russia of NATO ’ s military power .
Germany hosts also U.S. Africa Command , and any reduced presence there could undercut AFRICOM ’ s posture and planning .
A fresh START ?
U.S. and Russian diplomats indicated they made progress in talks to replace a key nuclear arms reduction treaty , New START , which is set to expire next February .
The Trump administration wants to upgrade the agreement from a bilateral to trilateral one that includes China .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interest .
It was a no-show at the talks in Vienna this week—despite the Chinese flag making it to the negotiating table .
Even with this hurdle , Trump ’ s top arms envoy Marshall Billingslea said the U.S. and Russian sides agreed to establish technical working groups for next steps on negotiations , with a new round of talks planned for late July or August .
Our way or the Huawei .
The Trump administration said this week that it would help finance telecommunications infrastructure in other countries if they vowed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States sees Huawei as a national security threat and its 5G networks as a backdoor for Chinese surveillance .
The statement is the latest move in a campaign by the Trump administration to get its partners around the world to disavow Chinese investments seen as threatening to national security .
The administration made several other moves on this front this week : The State Department released a list of “ clean ” countries and carriers .
Meanwhile , the Pentagon on Thursday released a list of 20 top Chinese firms , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controlled by the Chinese military .
Eye on Pyongyang .
With the 70th anniversary of the Korean war marked today , North Korea has begun signaling its frustration with stalled talks with South Korea and the United States with some not-so-subtle diplomatic overtures .
Kim Yo Jong , a politician and the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , bashed South Korea ’ s president as “ insane ” and “ disgusting ” and threatened to scrap agreements aimed at reducing border tensions .
Experts say Pyongyang is trying to ratchet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so expect more provocations in the coming weeks .
Pentagon resignations pick up speed .
The revolving door of top officials at the Pentagon is spinning faster .
On Tuesday , the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering and his deputy both put forward their resignations and will return to the private sector .
Defense Secretary Mark Esper praised Mike Griffin and Lisa Porter for leaving behind a “ legacy of excellence ” on Pentagon modernization .
Defense News previously reported that Griffin clashed with top Air Force officials over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Griffin and Porter are leaving after Katie Wheelbarger , who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs , and acting comptroller Elaine McCusker , announced their resignations last week .
New moves at the State Department .
The State Department has a new deputy spokesperson , John “ J.T.
” Ice , a career foreign service officer who took up duties earlier this month after a posting as the embassy spokesperson in Ethiopia .
Cale Brown has been moved up to principal deputy State Department spokesperson .
EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brussels summit next Monday and Tuesday to discuss the future of Syria and how to pursue a nationwide cease-fire .
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will give an online lecture on Tuesday , June 30 , hosted by the German Institute for Global and Area Studies on the geopolitical implications of the coronavirus crisis .
The Israeli government can put forward proposals for annexation parts of the West Bank beginning on Wednesday , June 1 , according to the coalition deal between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Blue and White party leader Benny @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plane crash in Pakistan last month , the country ’ s aviation minister issued an unnerving pronouncement this week for frequent flyers : Over 30 percent of civilian pilots in the country have fake licenses and are unqualified to fly , according to an internal investigation .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump is shifting U.S. troops in Europe , the United States and Russia make progress in nuclear talks , and the U.S. campaign against Huawei heats up.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump is shifting U.S. troops in Europe, the United States and Russia make progress in nuclear talks, and the U.S. campaign against Huawei heats up.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump to Shift U.S. Troops from Germany to Poland
U.S. President Donald Trump is forging ahead with plans to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe, announcing that the United States will deploy 1,000 additional troops to Poland while doubling down on plans to cut back the number of troops stationed in Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Washington on Wednesday—the first foreign leader to set foot in the White House since March.
During the visit, Trump announced that he would send troops to Poland and said Warsaw had offered to foot the bill. “We’re going to be reducing our forces in Germany. Some will be coming home, and some will be going to other places. But Poland would be one of those other places—other places in Europe,” he said.
On the face of it, it’s a win for Poland, which has been itching for a greater U.S. troop presence to bolster NATO deterrence against Russia—at one point even courting the president with a proposal to build a “Fort Trump” to host the troops.
What will the drawdown look like? Trump’s plan to withdraw thousands of U.S. troops from Germany comes after he hammered Berlin’s record on meeting defense spending pledges. Poland currently meets the NATO benchmark of spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense. (Germany doesn’t, but it plans to by 2024.) The Pentagon is drawing up plans to redeploy about 9,500 troops from Germany, where 34,000 troops are permanently stationed.
Republicans in Congress have criticized the president’s proposal. Former Pentagon officials and retired military brass say the move will undercut U.S. deterrence in Europe overall, even with the shift of some troops to Poland, as Defense One reports. And behind closed doors, European diplomats say that while Polish officials welcome the announcement, they remain uneasy about the knock-on effects of a drastically reduced U.S. footprint in Germany.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo addressed these concerns on Thursday, saying the United States remained committed to European security and “the capacity to deter Russia or other adversaries isn’t determined any longer by just having a bunch of folks garrisoned some place.” (His full remarks are here.)
The knock-on effects. The U.S. military footprint in Germany is important for troops and supplies going to and from the Middle East and Afghanistan and serves as a launch point for many military exercises across Europe aimed at reminding Russia of NATO’s military power. Germany hosts also U.S. Africa Command, and any reduced presence there could undercut AFRICOM’s posture and planning.
What We’re Watching
A fresh START? U.S. and Russian diplomats indicated they made progress in talks to replace a key nuclear arms reduction treaty, New START, which is set to expire next February. The Trump administration wants to upgrade the agreement from a bilateral to trilateral one that includes China. But Beijing so far hasn’t shown interest. It was a no-show at the talks in Vienna this week—despite the Chinese flag making it to the negotiating table.
Even with this hurdle, Trump’s top arms envoy Marshall Billingslea said the U.S. and Russian sides agreed to establish technical working groups for next steps on negotiations, with a new round of talks planned for late July or August.
Our way or the Huawei. The Trump administration said this week that it would help finance telecommunications infrastructure in other countries if they vowed to cut out Chinese technology giants—namely Huawei. The United States sees Huawei as a national security threat and its 5G networks as a backdoor for Chinese surveillance. The statement is the latest move in a campaign by the Trump administration to get its partners around the world to disavow Chinese investments seen as threatening to national security.
The administration made several other moves on this front this week: The State Department released a list of “clean” countries and carriers. Meanwhile, the Pentagon on Thursday released a list of 20 top Chinese firms, including Huawei, that it says are controlled by the Chinese military.
Eye on Pyongyang. With the 70th anniversary of the Korean war marked today, North Korea has begun signaling its frustration with stalled talks with South Korea and the United States with some not-so-subtle diplomatic overtures. Kim Yo Jong, a politician and the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, bashed South Korea’s president as “insane” and “disgusting” and threatened to scrap agreements aimed at reducing border tensions. Experts say Pyongyang is trying to ratchet up tensions with Seoul and Washington again, so expect more provocations in the coming weeks.
Movers and Shakers
Pentagon resignations pick up speed. The revolving door of top officials at the Pentagon is spinning faster. On Tuesday, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering and his deputy both put forward their resignations and will return to the private sector. Defense Secretary Mark Esper praised Mike Griffin and Lisa Porter for leaving behind a “legacy of excellence” on Pentagon modernization.
Defense News previously reported that Griffin clashed with top Air Force officials over the creation of the Space Development Agency. Griffin and Porter are leaving after Katie Wheelbarger, who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and acting comptroller Elaine McCusker, announced their resignations last week.
New moves at the State Department. The State Department has a new deputy spokesperson, John “J.T.” Ice, a career foreign service officer who took up duties earlier this month after a posting as the embassy spokesperson in Ethiopia. Cale Brown has been moved up to principal deputy State Department spokesperson.
The Week Ahead
EU leaders are scheduled to hold a fourth Brussels summit next Monday and Tuesday to discuss the future of Syria and how to pursue a nationwide cease-fire.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg will give an online lecture on Tuesday, June 30, hosted by the German Institute for Global and Area Studies on the geopolitical implications of the coronavirus crisis.
The Israeli government can put forward proposals for annexation parts of the West Bank beginning on Wednesday, July 1, according to the coalition deal between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz.
Odds and Ends
Grounded. After a deadly plane crash in Pakistan last month, the country’s aviation minister issued an unnerving pronouncement this week for frequent flyers: Over 30 percent of civilian pilots in the country have fake licenses and are unqualified to fly, according to an internal investigation.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Correction, June 26, 2020: The Israeli government can put forward annexation proposals beginning on Wednesday, July 1. A previous version of this article misstated the date when the process can begin.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--Trump Mulls Ending Heads-Up to Congress on U.S. Weapons Sales

Trump Mulls Ending Heads-Up to Congress on U.S .
Weapons Sales The Trump administration is in discussions to end a decades-old practice of informally notifying Congress of major arms sales to foreign countries , in a move that reflects mounting tensions between the administration and Capitol Hill , officials and congressional aides tell Foreign Policy .
The proposal comes amid mounting frustration from senior administration officials over informal holds from lawmakers on arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates , two close U.S. partners in the Middle East .
Lawmakers have tried to block weapons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights issues and the prospect of civilian casualties , particularly with the Saudi-led coalition ’ s war against Iran-backed rebels in Yemen .
The proposal sets the stage for another potential showdown between the Trump administration and lawmakers .
It comes amid broader debates on Capitol Hill over the president ’ s ability to wage war without prior congressional approval—centered on U.S. military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen—and an ongoing congressional investigation into Trump ’ s firing of the State Department inspector general , who was probing the administration ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last year .
If the administration moves forward with the plan , officials and congressional aides said , it would still send formal notifications to Congress for review , giving lawmakers a legal avenue to block sales in a 30-day window of time by passing a joint resolution to oppose the arms sales .
( For close U.S. allies such as NATO members , Israel , Japan , or Australia , that window is 15 days . )
But it would eliminate a practice dating back to the 1970s of informally notifying Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so that lawmakers and congressional staffers , the State Department , and Pentagon officials can hash out concerns and disagreements about such sales behind closed doors .
“ Putting politics aside for a moment , both sides have a bone to pick , ” said Bilal Saab , a scholar at the Middle East Institute and former Pentagon official .
“ Congress doesn ’ t want to be boxed in with pre-cooked arms sales cases and the executive branch is sick and tired of holds that sometimes are made by [ congressional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on foreign policy and relationships with partners.
” The United States views foreign military sales as an important diplomatic tool beyond their military value , providing an avenue to deepen ties with foreign governments around the world .
President Donald Trump has also cast his efforts to boost U.S. arms sales abroad as a domestic economic boon , claiming at different points that arms sales to Saudi Arabia created anywhere from 450,000 to over “ a million ” jobs .
( An independent study from the Center for International Policy , a think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actual total to be 20,000 to 40,000 jobs . )
While congressional aides were not surprised by the proposed move , which they said the Trump administration has been considering as far back as two years , a decision to end the informal consultation would be seen as a major slight to Capitol Hill ’ s oversight authority .
“ That would be viewed as going nuclear , ” said Juan Pachón , the communications director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ’ s top Democrat , Sen. Bob Menendez .
Current and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has grown frustrated over lengthy informal congressional holds on arms sales he sees as important for U.S. national security and would support this plan .
Lower-ranking officials in the State Department and Office of the Secretary of Defense oppose the plan , these officials say , believing that it will worsen relations between the administration and Congress , and it could prompt lawmakers to enact new laws that would give them greater powers in approving arms sales .
When approached for comment , the Pentagon referred Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department declined to comment .
Some former U.S. officials are concerned doing away with the informal review would allow more American weapons to flood into the Gulf without proper checks and balances .
“ I ’ m concerned that this could facilitate the sale of weapons under less than ideal circumstances and could lead to an almost lackadaisical approach to selling weapons with destructive power around the world , ” said Andrew Miller , a former National Security Council director during the Obama administration and now deputy director for policy at the Project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re determined to continue flooding the Gulf with weapons.
” Other current and former officials point out that there are additional avenues for Congress to get advance notice about arms sales , including in classified briefings with administration officials and the so-called Javits Report , a State Department report issued to Congress annually that lists expected sales for the year .
Saab , of the Middle East Institute , said there are other opportunities for the administration and Congress to find compromise in their growing disagreements about foreign arms sales .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ review process but both sides commit to resolving mutual issues and grievances within that period with no holds afterwards , ” he said .
“ What it comes down to is this : this is a power play that is not inevitable .
It could have been rectified with better communication and transparency on both ends.
” The move comes as the administration has put pressure on Congress to deliver another round of precision-guided munitions to the Saudi Arabia , one congressional aide said , despite a lack of consensus on Capitol Hill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ They haven ’ t finished delivering the ones from last year , ” the aide said .
“ They ’ re not urgent operationally for the Saudis.
” But over the course of the past three years , the White House has become more intent on pushing through arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries , seen by the administration as an important check on its top rival in the region , Iran .
Just months into the Trump administration , then-Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker , a Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. weapons sales to the Gulf during the informal review period after a Saudi-led coalition of countries imposed a blockade of nearby Qatar .
Meanwhile , Saudi Arabia has pursued foreign-policy objectives that have anger both Democratic and Republican lawmakers .
This includes a destructive aerial campaign in Yemen that once relied upon American refueling support and the squelching of political dissent against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , after the CIA concluded the Saudi royal ordered the 2018 assassination of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi .
That administration ’ s frustrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a head last summer when the Trump administration declared an emergency to push ahead with 22 arms transfers to Saudi Arabia , the UAE , and Jordan , prompting a resolution of disapproval from Congress in a serious rebuke .
Democrats began pushing back on the sale in 2018 , and earlier this year they launched an investigation into the firing of the State Department inspector general , who was reviewing the emergency sale .
Heartburn in the executive branch over that informal review process , aides said , helped contribute to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force through the sale in an unprecedented move after attacks by Iranian forces and proxies on Saudi oil facilities and tankers in the Gulf of Oman last year .
Equally concerning to some lawmakers is that the administration is sometimes using channels to grease the wheels for arms sales that aren ’ t visible to authorizers on Capitol Hill , a congressional aide said , including by private communications between Trump ’ s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner and Mohammed bin Salman , the de-facto leader of the country .
“ That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” the aide said .
“ It was MBS ringing Kushner that really brought that stuff to a head last year .
”

The Trump administration is in discussions to end a decades-old practice of informally notifying Congress of major arms sales to foreign countries, in a move that reflects mounting tensions between the administration and Capitol Hill, officials and congressional aides tell Foreign Policy .
The Trump administration is in discussions to end a decades-old practice of informally notifying Congress of major arms sales to foreign countries, in a move that reflects mounting tensions between the administration and Capitol Hill, officials and congressional aides tell Foreign Policy.
The proposal comes amid mounting frustration from senior administration officials over informal holds from lawmakers on arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two close U.S. partners in the Middle East. Lawmakers have tried to block weapons sales to these countries over concerns about human rights issues and the prospect of civilian casualties, particularly with the Saudi-led coalition’s war against Iran-backed rebels in Yemen.
The proposal sets the stage for another potential showdown between the Trump administration and lawmakers. It comes amid broader debates on Capitol Hill over the president’s ability to wage war without prior congressional approval—centered on U.S. military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen—and an ongoing congressional investigation into Trump’s firing of the State Department inspector general, who was probing the administration’s emergency arms sale to Saudi Arabia last year.
If the administration moves forward with the plan, officials and congressional aides said, it would still send formal notifications to Congress for review, giving lawmakers a legal avenue to block sales in a 30-day window of time by passing a joint resolution to oppose the arms sales. (For close U.S. allies such as NATO members, Israel, Japan, or Australia, that window is 15 days.) But it would eliminate a practice dating back to the 1970s of informally notifying Congress of planned arms sales well in advance, so that lawmakers and congressional staffers, the State Department, and Pentagon officials can hash out concerns and disagreements about such sales behind closed doors.
“Putting politics aside for a moment, both sides have a bone to pick,” said Bilal Saab, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and former Pentagon official. “Congress doesn’t want to be boxed in with pre-cooked arms sales cases and the executive branch is sick and tired of holds that sometimes are made by [congressional] staffers … and have adverse effects on foreign policy and relationships with partners.”
The United States views foreign military sales as an important diplomatic tool beyond their military value, providing an avenue to deepen ties with foreign governments around the world. President Donald Trump has also cast his efforts to boost U.S. arms sales abroad as a domestic economic boon, claiming at different points that arms sales to Saudi Arabia created anywhere from 450,000 to over “a million” jobs. (An independent study from the Center for International Policy, a think tank, released in May estimated the actual total to be 20,000 to 40,000 jobs.)
While congressional aides were not surprised by the proposed move, which they said the Trump administration has been considering as far back as two years, a decision to end the informal consultation would be seen as a major slight to Capitol Hill’s oversight authority.
“That would be viewed as going nuclear,” said Juan Pachón, the communications director for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, Sen. Bob Menendez.
Current and former officials familiar with the matter say Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has grown frustrated over lengthy informal congressional holds on arms sales he sees as important for U.S. national security and would support this plan. Lower-ranking officials in the State Department and Office of the Secretary of Defense oppose the plan, these officials say, believing that it will worsen relations between the administration and Congress, and it could prompt lawmakers to enact new laws that would give them greater powers in approving arms sales.
When approached for comment, the Pentagon referred Foreign Policy to the State Department. The State Department declined to comment.
Some former U.S. officials are concerned doing away with the informal review would allow more American weapons to flood into the Gulf without proper checks and balances.
“I’m concerned that this could facilitate the sale of weapons under less than ideal circumstances and could lead to an almost lackadaisical approach to selling weapons with destructive power around the world,” said Andrew Miller, a former National Security Council director during the Obama administration and now deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy. “They’re determined to continue flooding the Gulf with weapons.”
Other current and former officials point out that there are additional avenues for Congress to get advance notice about arms sales, including in classified briefings with administration officials and the so-called Javits Report, a State Department report issued to Congress annually that lists expected sales for the year.
Saab, of the Middle East Institute, said there are other opportunities for the administration and Congress to find compromise in their growing disagreements about foreign arms sales. One compromise is to keep the 30-day peer review process but both sides commit to resolving mutual issues and grievances within that period with no holds afterwards,” he said.
“What it comes down to is this: this is a power play that is not inevitable. It could have been rectified with better communication and transparency on both ends.”
The move comes as the administration has put pressure on Congress to deliver another round of precision-guided munitions to the Saudi Arabia, one congressional aide said, despite a lack of consensus on Capitol Hill that Riyadh actually needs the weapons. “They haven’t finished delivering the ones from last year,” the aide said. “They’re not urgent operationally for the Saudis.”
But over the course of the past three years, the White House has become more intent on pushing through arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, seen by the administration as an important check on its top rival in the region, Iran.
Just months into the Trump administration, then-Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker, a Republican, placed a hold on further clearances of U.S. weapons sales to the Gulf during the informal review period after a Saudi-led coalition of countries imposed a blockade of nearby Qatar. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has pursued foreign-policy objectives that have anger both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. This includes a destructive aerial campaign in Yemen that once relied upon American refueling support and the squelching of political dissent against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, after the CIA concluded the Saudi royal ordered the 2018 assassination of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi.
That administration’s frustrations over perceived foot-dragging on Capitol Hill came to a head last summer when the Trump administration declared an emergency to push ahead with 22 arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, prompting a resolution of disapproval from Congress in a serious rebuke. Democrats began pushing back on the sale in 2018, and earlier this year they launched an investigation into the firing of the State Department inspector general, who was reviewing the emergency sale.
Heartburn in the executive branch over that informal review process, aides said, helped contribute to the Trump administration’s decision to force through the sale in an unprecedented move after attacks by Iranian forces and proxies on Saudi oil facilities and tankers in the Gulf of Oman last year.
Equally concerning to some lawmakers is that the administration is sometimes using channels to grease the wheels for arms sales that aren’t visible to authorizers on Capitol Hill, a congressional aide said, including by private communications between Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner and Mohammed bin Salman, the de-facto leader of the country.
“That operates in the background on these things,” the aide said. “It was MBS ringing Kushner that really brought that stuff to a head last year.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--Ex-Soviet Bioweapons Labs Are Fighting COVID-19. Moscow Doesn’t Like It.

Ex-Soviet Bioweapons Labs Are Fighting COVID-19 .
Moscow Doesn ’ t Like It .
A network of Soviet-era laboratories once used to track plague outbreaks and develop bioweapons during the Cold War is at the front line of the fight against the coronavirus pandemic in Central Asia and the Caucasus .
That hasn ’ t stopped Russia from instigating a propaganda and disinformation campaign against these labs , which were modernized and converted to civilian purposes long ago .
That ’ s because these disease-control labs , located in former fiefs of the Soviet empire , are a legacy of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy programs the United States has ever undertaken .
Back in an era of U.S. global leadership—before Washington turned its back on international cooperation—the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative in 1991 created a series of U.S. taxpayer-funded laboratories in former Soviet republics including Armenia , Azerbaijan , Georgia , Kazakhstan , and Uzbekistan .
The purpose of these labs , most of which started out as Soviet-era facilities , was to help scientists in former Soviet republics secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction , including nuclear weapons stocks and biowarfare capabilities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ benevolence is leading the way in enhanced disease monitoring , public health initiatives , and the training of biosecurity experts who are on the front lines of their nation ’ s coronavirus responses .
That expertise has been crucial in a region that sits at the crossroads of China , Russia , and Iran—three of the world ’ s worst-hit countries .
Georgia has contained the outbreak so far , boasting the lowest rate of COVID-19 fatalities in all of Europe and planning to reopen for tourism in July .
Neighboring Armenia hasn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now has the region ’ s highest infection and death rates , with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his family catching the coronavirus but emerging unscathed .
Kazakhstan is now experiencing a second wave of infections too ; former Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev , who still wields considerable power , has tested positive for the coronavirus , his press secretary announced on June 18.This artifact of U.S. multilateral benevolence is leading the way in enhanced disease monitoring , public health initiatives , and the training of biosecurity experts .
Most of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , created in the mid-20th century as a network of research institutes and field stations across the Soviet Union to study and prevent the spread of pathogens .
Some of these facilities were pulled into the Soviet bioweapons program in the 1960s and 1970s .
When the Soviet Union collapsed , all were left unsecured , underfunded , and in poor states of repair .
It was feared they would no longer be able to monitor and control disease outbreaks—and that someone might get their hands on a stock of killer pathogens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its authors in the U.S. Senate , Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn and Republican Sen. Richard Lugar , remedied that .
It helped the newly independent states dismantle the legacies of Soviet bioweapons programs and to secure and ultimately destroy the dangerous pathogens left behind by the Soviet Union ’ s collapse .
Some of the labs were merged , retrofitted , and enhanced with new capabilities to monitor disease outbreaks , turning several of them into state-of-the art public health facilities with U.S. support , spearheaded at the time by the Department of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by local experts under their countries ’ civilian ministries and funded by their national budgets .
They are proving well worth the investment in countries that have chosen to rely on the labs ’ expertise to fight the pandemic .
In Georgia , the U.S.-sponsored lab—now called the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health—is part of Georgia ’ s National Center for Disease Control and Public Health .
Having the lab proved fortuitous for Georgia , which activated its emergency response unit in January , well before the pandemic began spreading across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lab had developed its own testing capabilities , with results delivered within 24 hours .
Prompt recognition of the threat enabled Georgian public health officials to identify , quarantine , and treat patients—and to implement contact-tracing—early on in the crisis .
Although Georgia was the first country in the region to identify a COVID-19 patient in late February , it has been able to keep infection and death rates low , particularly in comparison to its neighbors .
The Lugar Center ’ s director , a Soviet-trained immunologist , has emerged as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic response and has been blunt in his criticism of the Georgian Orthodox Church ’ s lax attitude toward social distancing .
His science-based approach and ability to stay ahead of the pandemic ’ s curve has helped push the government to let medical professionals lead its pandemic response , which effectively depoliticized the crisis in a country with a history of deep polarization .
Kazakhstan ’ s lab from the U.S. program also facilitated a robust and timely response to the crisis .
Although Kazakhstan did not identify its first COVID-19 patient @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activated an emergency response team in January and tasked its scientists with monitoring the disease ’ s spread in Central Asia .
By late March , Kazakhstan had coronavirus tests capable of giving results within five hours .
Public health successes and saved lives have not deterred Russian efforts to condemn the labs because of their connection with the United States .
Senior Russian officials have promoted conspiracy theories claiming that the labs are part of a secret U.S. bioweapons infrastructure designed to spread deadly pathogens and infectious diseases.Senior Russian officials and propagandists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labs are part of a secret U.S. bioweapons infrastructure designed to spread deadly pathogens and infectious diseases .
This propaganda campaign has pointed to the labs as the alleged source of everything from the Zika virus and swine flu to invasive stink bugs infesting agricultural crops .
The Russian government has repeatedly asked for and received information about the laboratories , and Russian media have been given access to them .
( That hasn ’ t prevented a diplomatic dispute from brewing between Russia and Armenia over the latter ’ s lab .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ World Health Organization , the World Organization for Animal Health , and other bodies—a clear indication they are open and have nothing to hide .
They use the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System to share real-time data among themselves and with other foreign counterparts .
None of this has stopped Russian disinformation about the labs ’ alleged sinister activities .
In 2019 , a prominent Russian television talk-show host called on the Russian military to launch airstrikes on the Kazakhstan facility .
In January , Russian television began insinuating that Georgia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coronavirus , while Russian trolls have peddled similarly false stories on social media that the Kazakh lab also leaked the virus .
In June , a Russian newspaper attacked the Uzbek Institute of Virology with wildly false claims that American and British researchers at the facility leaked brucellosis into the general population .
Beijing has now joined the mix by pushing similar conspiracy theories about the U.S.-linked labs .
These disinformation campaigns have prompted harsh rebukes from governments of the region .
The benefits of U.S. foreign-policy programs are rarely felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That may be one reason that the U.S. public and the country ’ s leadership have turned away from the world , and against the United States ’ traditional global role .
But these laboratories that have their origins in a broad bipartisan effort in the U.S. Congress—another rarity today—are a reminder of the positive power of U.S. leadership and its capacity to improve so many lives around the world .

A network of Soviet-era laboratories once used to track plague outbreaks and develop bioweapons during the Cold War is at the front line of the fight against the coronavirus pandemic in Central Asia and the Caucasus. That hasn’t stopped Russia from instigating a propaganda and disinformation campaign against these labs, which were modernized and converted to civilian purposes long ago. That’s because these disease-control labs, located in former fiefs of the Soviet empire, are a legacy of one of the most successful and benevolent foreign-policy programs the United States has ever undertaken.
A network of Soviet-era laboratories once used to track plague outbreaks and develop bioweapons during the Cold War is at the front line of the fight against the coronavirus pandemic in Central Asia and the Caucasus. That hasn’t stopped Russia from instigating a propaganda and disinformation campaign against these labs, which were modernized and converted to civilian purposes long ago. That’s because these disease-control labs, located in former fiefs of the Soviet empire, are a legacy of one of the most successful and benevolent foreign-policy programs the United States has ever undertaken.
Back in an era of U.S. global leadership—before Washington turned its back on international cooperation—the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative in 1991 created a series of U.S. taxpayer-funded laboratories in former Soviet republics including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The purpose of these labs, most of which started out as Soviet-era facilities, was to help scientists in former Soviet republics secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons stocks and biowarfare capabilities.
Today, this artifact of U.S. multilateral benevolence is leading the way in enhanced disease monitoring, public health initiatives, and the training of biosecurity experts who are on the front lines of their nation’s coronavirus responses. That expertise has been crucial in a region that sits at the crossroads of China, Russia, and Iran—three of the world’s worst-hit countries. Georgia has contained the outbreak so far, boasting the lowest rate of COVID-19 fatalities in all of Europe and planning to reopen for tourism in July. Neighboring Armenia hasn’t been so lucky: It now has the region’s highest infection and death rates, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his family catching the coronavirus but emerging unscathed. Kazakhstan is now experiencing a second wave of infections too; former Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, who still wields considerable power, has tested positive for the coronavirus, his press secretary announced on June 18.This artifact of U.S. multilateral benevolence is leading the way in enhanced disease monitoring, public health initiatives, and the training of biosecurity experts.
Most of the labs were part of the Soviet anti-plague system, created in the mid-20th century as a network of research institutes and field stations across the Soviet Union to study and prevent the spread of pathogens. Some of these facilities were pulled into the Soviet bioweapons program in the 1960s and 1970s. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all were left unsecured, underfunded, and in poor states of repair. It was feared they would no longer be able to monitor and control disease outbreaks—and that someone might get their hands on a stock of killer pathogens.
The Nunn-Lugar program, named after its authors in the U.S. Senate, Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn and Republican Sen. Richard Lugar, remedied that. It helped the newly independent states dismantle the legacies of Soviet bioweapons programs and to secure and ultimately destroy the dangerous pathogens left behind by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Some of the labs were merged, retrofitted, and enhanced with new capabilities to monitor disease outbreaks, turning several of them into state-of-the art public health facilities with U.S. support, spearheaded at the time by the Department of Defense. Today, they are operated by local experts under their countries’ civilian ministries and funded by their national budgets. They are proving well worth the investment in countries that have chosen to rely on the labs’ expertise to fight the pandemic.
In Georgia, the U.S.-sponsored lab—now called the Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health—is part of Georgia’s National Center for Disease Control and Public Health. Having the lab proved fortuitous for Georgia, which activated its emergency response unit in January, well before the pandemic began spreading across Europe. By early February, the lab had developed its own testing capabilities, with results delivered within 24 hours. Prompt recognition of the threat enabled Georgian public health officials to identify, quarantine, and treat patients—and to implement contact-tracing—early on in the crisis.
Although Georgia was the first country in the region to identify a COVID-19 patient in late February, it has been able to keep infection and death rates low, particularly in comparison to its neighbors. The Lugar Center’s director, a Soviet-trained immunologist, has emerged as a major public face of Georgia’s pandemic response and has been blunt in his criticism of the Georgian Orthodox Church’s lax attitude toward social distancing. His science-based approach and ability to stay ahead of the pandemic’s curve has helped push the government to let medical professionals lead its pandemic response, which effectively depoliticized the crisis in a country with a history of deep polarization.
Kazakhstan’s lab from the U.S. program also facilitated a robust and timely response to the crisis. Although Kazakhstan did not identify its first COVID-19 patient until mid-March, the lab had already activated an emergency response team in January and tasked its scientists with monitoring the disease’s spread in Central Asia. By late March, Kazakhstan had coronavirus tests capable of giving results within five hours.
Public health successes and saved lives have not deterred Russian efforts to condemn the labs because of their connection with the United States. Senior Russian officials have promoted conspiracy theories claiming that the labs are part of a secret U.S. bioweapons infrastructure designed to spread deadly pathogens and infectious diseases.Senior Russian officials and propagandists have promoted conspiracy theories claiming that the labs are part of a secret U.S. bioweapons infrastructure designed to spread deadly pathogens and infectious diseases. This propaganda campaign has pointed to the labs as the alleged source of everything from the Zika virus and swine flu to invasive stink bugs infesting agricultural crops.
The Russian government has repeatedly asked for and received information about the laboratories, and Russian media have been given access to them. (That hasn’t prevented a diplomatic dispute from brewing between Russia and Armenia over the latter’s lab.) The labs also work with the World Health Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, and other bodies—a clear indication they are open and have nothing to hide. They use the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System to share real-time data among themselves and with other foreign counterparts.
None of this has stopped Russian disinformation about the labs’ alleged sinister activities. In 2019, a prominent Russian television talk-show host called on the Russian military to launch airstrikes on the Kazakhstan facility. In January, Russian television began insinuating that Georgia’s lab was somehow involved in the creation of the coronavirus, while Russian trolls have peddled similarly false stories on social media that the Kazakh lab also leaked the virus. In June, a Russian newspaper attacked the Uzbek Institute of Virology with wildly false claims that American and British researchers at the facility leaked brucellosis into the general population. Beijing has now joined the mix by pushing similar conspiracy theories about the U.S.-linked labs. These disinformation campaigns have prompted harsh rebukes from governments of the region.
The benefits of U.S. foreign-policy programs are rarely felt in the daily life of Americans. That may be one reason that the U.S. public and the country’s leadership have turned away from the world, and against the United States’ traditional global role. But these laboratories that have their origins in a broad bipartisan effort in the U.S. Congress—another rarity today—are a reminder of the positive power of U.S. leadership and its capacity to improve so many lives around the world.