foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--The Future Is Asian—but Not Chinese

The Future Is Asian—but Not Chinese

The Future Is Asian—but Not Chinese What is the most salient fact about China ’ s response to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic ?
Is it the cover-up at the outset that delayed an effective response for as long as six weeks , and thus accelerated its spread across the globe ?
Or is it the astonishing marshaling of political , logistical , and industrial capacities in the aftermath that limited the death toll in China to a fraction of the per capita figures in the United States and Western Europe ( even if the true number is two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 4,600 or so deaths currently reported ) ?
Behind this question lies a struggle for global prestige .
Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump singled out China as the United States ’ public enemy No .
1 in the 2016 campaign , the world ’ s two great superpowers have seemed to be locked in a zero-sum contest for supremacy .
Convinced that China is stealing U.S. jobs and profits through unfair trade practices , the president has provoked a trade war that has harmed the economies of both countries .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the anti-globalist crowd that looks at China in Cold War terms : when Sen. Bernie Sanders was foolhardy enough to praise the Chinese for reducing poverty in in his debate with Joe Biden in mid-March , the former vice president jumped down his throat .
“ China is an authoritarian dictatorship , ” he cried .
Biden insisted that whatever increase in prosperity the regime had fostered was “ marginal , ” though he must have known perfectly well that China has lifted more people out of poverty over the past four decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The pandemic has inflamed this competition .
Trump persisted in calling it the “ Wuhan virus ” or the “ Chinese virus ” in order to make Americans feel that they are the innocent victim of Chinese failure , if not of a sinister plot .
But the rhetoric seems vaguely pitiful in the face of the rising death toll and the self-evident dysfunction in the United States at a time when China has reopened for business and ostentatiously donated protective equipment to nations in desperate need .
China ’ s victory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earned .
The pandemic has raised the stakes of the competition from a struggle for economic dominance to a contest between rival models .
Whose system is better designed to adapt to the global crises , whether of public health or the climate , that lie in our future ?
The United States fostered the liberal world order after World War II and has sustained it ever since .
That order has persisted not only because of U.S. military and economic predominance , but because it has promoted the interests of its leading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that era now drawing to a close ?
Does the arrow of the future point towards liberal democracy or free-market authoritarianism ?
I have just finished Has China Won ?
, by Kishore Mahbubani , the Singaporean diplomat and author who has made a career explicating “ Asian values ” to Western readers .
Mahbubani ( whom I have known for 30 years and consider a friend ) does not doubt the answer .
He notes that the United Nations has 193 members and asks , “ Which country is swimming in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” While he warns China against underestimating a nation as resilient as the United States , he notes that “ many thoughtful leaders and observers in strategically sensitive countries around the world have begun making preparations for a world where China may become number one.
” Mahbubani is hardly the first to make this claim .
In Destined For War , the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison described China as the quintessential rising power .
Mahbubani charts the graph both of China ’ s rise and the United States ’ decline .
History @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a corner ” from the epoch of Western hegemony—and the United States , like the Qing dynasty that oversaw China ’ s 19th-century collapse , has remained trapped by an anachronistic sense of superiority .
If one asks , as the philosopher John Rawls did , what kind of society you would wish to be born into if you did not know what advantages you would have , the rational choice would now be China rather than the United States .
In fact , he notes , the chances of a child born @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rising to the top fifth are significantly greater in China than in the United States .
Eat that , Biden .
Though Mahbubani criticizes China for needlessly alienating the U.S. business elite , and not just the Trumpian nationalists , through unfair trade practices and bellicose rhetoric on the South China Sea , he looks around the world and sees China ’ s model on the ascendant , and the U.S. one in eclipse .
“ The biggest fact of the last thirty years , ” he writes , sounding very much like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propagandist of illiberalism , “ is that many societies of the world that have tried Western liberal democratic systems have come to realize that it does not fit them.
” Mahbubani will lose some of his readers with his hyperbolic kiss-off to democracy , and even more with his apologies for Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s autocratic rule .
He attributes the mass demonstrations in Hong Kong wholly to poor housing and gets around to mentioning the treatment of the Uighurs only in the very last pages—and then in order to insist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assassination by drone has no standing to criticize China for terrorizing and incarcerating an entire population .
One has the unmistakable impression that the author does not want to spoil his welcome in Beijing .
There is a more serious shortcoming here .
It is one thing to say that China has won , and something else again to say that the Chinese model has won .
What is most central to that model , in Mahbubani ’ s telling , is rational , long-term decision-making , a commitment to good government , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a turbulent world and a realist restraint in international affairs .
But of course that model also includes the unquestioned dominance of the party in all affairs , and the equally unquestioned dominance of the party by Xi .
( Mahbubani argues that Xi suspended constitutional provisions limiting the leader to two terms not out of personal ambition but a legitimate concern for China ’ s future . )
And this brings us back to the coronavirus .
It was not technocratic failure but an authoritarian culture that led to the lapse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Wuhan on Dec. 8 and the lockdown on Jan. 23 .
The defining moment of the sequence came Jan. 1 , when eight doctors at a Wuhan hospital were reprimanded by local party authorities for seeking to inform national medical officials of the outbreak , as the country ’ s early-warning system required them to do .
The virus ’ genome was sequenced Jan. 11 .
By Jan. 14 , the head of China ’ s National Health Commission had reported on the virus in grim detail .
Still , nothing happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ give way before the political order .
Five million people were allowed to leave Wuhan during the Lunar New Year before the city was locked down , hastening the spread of the virus around the world .
What ’ s more , Chinese officials have undermined their own narrative by promoting an inane conspiracy theory blaming the coronavirus on the U.S. Army and by insisting on mortality figures at home widely considered implausibly low .
The country ’ s charm offensive was also damaged when many of the ventilators and other products it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to defects .
While Chinese authorities were desperately hiding the truth , officials in Taiwan , South Korea , and Hong Kong—and Singapore soon after—began screening at their borders and quarantining the sick , and then swiftly ramped up the production of protective gear and testing kits .
The first two are vibrant democracies that feature open elections , independent judiciaries , and untrammeled free enterprise .
( Singapore ’ s model is closest to China ’ s , though an independent civil service largely directs affairs of state . )
Together , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens and the state respect rather than fear one another .
Hong Kong has had four coronavirus deaths , Taiwan six , Singapore 12 , and South Korea 240 .
If some model has emerged as the winner of this dreadful sweepstakes , it is not China ’ s authoritarian one but rather that of the democracies that share China ’ s “ Asian values ” of collective discipline , deference to authority , and faith in the state .
( Mahbubani has pointed to the success of those states in a recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s more , the relative success of Germany and the quite remarkable success of Australia and New Zealand in driving down mortality rates show that classically liberal democracies can rise to the occasion if leaders defer to science and to public health officials and explain clearly and calmly to citizens the rationale for painful measures .
South Korean and Taiwanese citizens accept intrusions on their privacy that Western liberals might not .
The French , for example , have declined to adopt the Korean system of digital monitoring that compels those who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lets public health officials keep track of their whereabouts .
That may be a battle that the West will , in fact , find itself losing .
I have suggested elsewhere that we are entering an era in which our own private decisions , whether driving gas guzzlers or walking around without a mask , so plainly impinge on the well-being of others that we will have to constrain some of our personal liberty in the name of public good .
The Asian democracies show us that citizens can surrender some of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So yes , China has already “ won ” in the sense that Washington continues to dispute ; soon it will be absurd to question its economic and technocratic supremacy .
But it has not won in the sense that matters most , as a model for other nations .
Germany has something to teach its European neighbors .
Australia has something to teach the United States , its cultural near-twin .
South Korea and Taiwan have something to teach China about the application of “ Asian values.
” It would be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force nations to learn from their own failures .
Even the United States .
Even China .

What is the most salient fact about China’s response to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic? Is it the cover-up at the outset that delayed an effective response for as long as six weeks, and thus accelerated its spread across the globe? Or is it the astonishing marshaling of political, logistical, and industrial capacities in the aftermath that limited the death toll in China to a fraction of the per capita figures in the United States and Western Europe (even if the true number is two, three, four times greater than the 4,600 or so deaths currently reported)?
What is the most salient fact about China’s response to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic? Is it the cover-up at the outset that delayed an effective response for as long as six weeks, and thus accelerated its spread across the globe? Or is it the astonishing marshaling of political, logistical, and industrial capacities in the aftermath that limited the death toll in China to a fraction of the per capita figures in the United States and Western Europe (even if the true number is two, three, four times greater than the 4,600 or so deaths currently reported)?
Behind this question lies a struggle for global prestige. Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump singled out China as the United States’ public enemy No. 1 in the 2016 campaign, the world’s two great superpowers have seemed to be locked in a zero-sum contest for supremacy. Convinced that China is stealing U.S. jobs and profits through unfair trade practices, the president has provoked a trade war that has harmed the economies of both countries.
But it’s not just Trump and the anti-globalist crowd that looks at China in Cold War terms: When Sen. Bernie Sanders was foolhardy enough to praise the Chinese for reducing poverty in in his debate with Joe Biden in mid-March, the former vice president jumped down his throat. “China is an authoritarian dictatorship,” he cried. Biden insisted that whatever increase in prosperity the regime had fostered was “marginal,” though he must have known perfectly well that China has lifted more people out of poverty over the past four decades than any other nation in human history.
The pandemic has inflamed this competition. Trump persisted in calling it the “Wuhan virus” or the “Chinese virus” in order to make Americans feel that they are the innocent victim of Chinese failure, if not of a sinister plot. But the rhetoric seems vaguely pitiful in the face of the rising death toll and the self-evident dysfunction in the United States at a time when China has reopened for business and ostentatiously donated protective equipment to nations in desperate need. China’s victory lap galls; but it may be earned.
The pandemic has raised the stakes of the competition from a struggle for economic dominance to a contest between rival models. Whose system is better designed to adapt to the global crises, whether of public health or the climate, that lie in our future? The United States fostered the liberal world order after World War II and has sustained it ever since. That order has persisted not only because of U.S. military and economic predominance, but because it has promoted the interests of its leading members (including China). Is that era now drawing to a close? Does the arrow of the future point towards liberal democracy or free-market authoritarianism?
I have just finished Has China Won?, by Kishore Mahbubani, the Singaporean diplomat and author who has made a career explicating “Asian values” to Western readers. Mahbubani (whom I have known for 30 years and consider a friend) does not doubt the answer. He notes that the United Nations has 193 members and asks, “Which country is swimming in the same direction as the other 191?” While he warns China against underestimating a nation as resilient as the United States, he notes that “many thoughtful leaders and observers in strategically sensitive countries around the world have begun making preparations for a world where China may become number one.”
Mahbubani is hardly the first to make this claim. In Destined For War, the Harvard political scientist Graham Allison described China as the quintessential rising power. Mahbubani charts the graph both of China’s rise and the United States’ decline. History, he argues, has “turned a corner” from the epoch of Western hegemony—and the United States, like the Qing dynasty that oversaw China’s 19th-century collapse, has remained trapped by an anachronistic sense of superiority. If one asks, as the philosopher John Rawls did, what kind of society you would wish to be born into if you did not know what advantages you would have, the rational choice would now be China rather than the United States. In fact, he notes, the chances of a child born into the bottom fifth of income distribution rising to the top fifth are significantly greater in China than in the United States. Eat that, Biden.
Read More Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (center) is seen wearing a face mask alongside officials and military personnel during a visit to a military base in Tainan, southern Taiwan, on April 9. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen (center) is seen wearing a face mask alongside officials and military personnel during a visit to a military base in Tainan, southern Taiwan, on April 9. Taiwan Is Exporting Its Coronavirus Successes to the World Despite being shut out of WHO, Taiwan has largely succeeded in containing the coronavirus. Even as it faces a second wave of infections, it is helping other countries—and bolstering its soft power in the process. Dispatch | Nick Aspinwall Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia Beijing’s attempts to encircle New Delhi are being systematically reversed. Analysis | Derek Grossman Visitors to the Dobbins Outlook view the lights of Phoenix, which is now the fifth-largest city in the United States. Visitors to the Dobbins Outlook view the lights of Phoenix, which is now the fifth-largest city in the United States. Arizona Is Not Running Out of Water or Workers The state will remain a destination for foreign investment due to a skilled workforce, leadership in water conservation, and low tax burdens. Response | Danny Seiden
Though Mahbubani criticizes China for needlessly alienating the U.S. business elite, and not just the Trumpian nationalists, through unfair trade practices and bellicose rhetoric on the South China Sea, he looks around the world and sees China’s model on the ascendant, and the U.S. one in eclipse. “The biggest fact of the last thirty years,” he writes, sounding very much like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the propagandist of illiberalism, “is that many societies of the world that have tried Western liberal democratic systems have come to realize that it does not fit them.”
Mahbubani will lose some of his readers with his hyperbolic kiss-off to democracy, and even more with his apologies for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s autocratic rule. He attributes the mass demonstrations in Hong Kong wholly to poor housing and gets around to mentioning the treatment of the Uighurs only in the very last pages—and then in order to insist that a nation that targets Muslims for assassination by drone has no standing to criticize China for terrorizing and incarcerating an entire population. One has the unmistakable impression that the author does not want to spoil his welcome in Beijing.
There is a more serious shortcoming here. It is one thing to say that China has won, and something else again to say that the Chinese model has won. What is most central to that model, in Mahbubani’s telling, is rational, long-term decision-making, a commitment to good government, pragmatism, and suppleness in the face of a turbulent world and a realist restraint in international affairs. But of course that model also includes the unquestioned dominance of the party in all affairs, and the equally unquestioned dominance of the party by Xi. (Mahbubani argues that Xi suspended constitutional provisions limiting the leader to two terms not out of personal ambition but a legitimate concern for China’s future.)
And this brings us back to the coronavirus. It was not technocratic failure but an authoritarian culture that led to the lapse between the identification of the first case in Wuhan on Dec. 8 and the lockdown on Jan. 23. The defining moment of the sequence came Jan. 1, when eight doctors at a Wuhan hospital were reprimanded by local party authorities for seeking to inform national medical officials of the outbreak, as the country’s early-warning system required them to do. The virus’ genome was sequenced Jan. 11. By Jan. 14, the head of China’s National Health Commission had reported on the virus in grim detail. Still, nothing happened; the public health structure had to give way before the political order. Five million people were allowed to leave Wuhan during the Lunar New Year before the city was locked down, hastening the spread of the virus around the world.
What’s more, Chinese officials have undermined their own narrative by promoting an inane conspiracy theory blaming the coronavirus on the U.S. Army and by insisting on mortality figures at home widely considered implausibly low. The country’s charm offensive was also damaged when many of the ventilators and other products it shipped abroad had to be recalled owing to defects.
While Chinese authorities were desperately hiding the truth, officials in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong—and Singapore soon after—began screening at their borders and quarantining the sick, and then swiftly ramped up the production of protective gear and testing kits. The first two are vibrant democracies that feature open elections, independent judiciaries, and untrammeled free enterprise. (Singapore’s model is closest to China’s, though an independent civil service largely directs affairs of state.) Together, they have shown what is possible when citizens and the state respect rather than fear one another. Hong Kong has had four coronavirus deaths, Taiwan six, Singapore 12, and South Korea 240.
If some model has emerged as the winner of this dreadful sweepstakes, it is not China’s authoritarian one but rather that of the democracies that share China’s “Asian values” of collective discipline, deference to authority, and faith in the state. (Mahbubani has pointed to the success of those states in a recent piece in the Economist.) What’s more, the relative success of Germany and the quite remarkable success of Australia and New Zealand in driving down mortality rates show that classically liberal democracies can rise to the occasion if leaders defer to science and to public health officials and explain clearly and calmly to citizens the rationale for painful measures.
South Korean and Taiwanese citizens accept intrusions on their privacy that Western liberals might not. The French, for example, have declined to adopt the Korean system of digital monitoring that compels those who fall sick to install an app that lets public health officials keep track of their whereabouts. That may be a battle that the West will, in fact, find itself losing. I have suggested elsewhere that we are entering an era in which our own private decisions, whether driving gas guzzlers or walking around without a mask, so plainly impinge on the well-being of others that we will have to constrain some of our personal liberty in the name of public good. The Asian democracies show us that citizens can surrender some of that freedom without sacrificing fundamental political rights.
So yes, China has already “won” in the sense that Washington continues to dispute; soon it will be absurd to question its economic and technocratic supremacy. But it has not won in the sense that matters most, as a model for other nations. Germany has something to teach its European neighbors. Australia has something to teach the United States, its cultural near-twin. South Korea and Taiwan have something to teach China about the application of “Asian values.” It would be a fine thing if this global catastrophe could force nations to learn from their own failures. Even the United States. Even China.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--Brazil’s Bolsonaro Accused of Corruption Amid Justice Ministry Chaos

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces fresh allegations of corruption , a separatist group declares self-rule in Yemen , and South Korea says Kim Jong Un is “ alive and well.
” We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has postponed the appointment of a new justice minister after numerous news reports suggested Bolsonaro loyalist Jorge Oliveira would be the favorite for the role .
The decision follows an explosive few days at the top of Brazilian politics as allegations of presidential corruption mount and public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s coronavirus epidemic crumbles .
The latest episode began on Friday with the abrupt resignation of Justice Minister Sergio Moro , after Bolsonaro had fired the head of Brazil ’ s equivalent to the FBI , Maurício Valeixo .
In his resignation press conference , Moro alleged Bolsonaro had fired Valeixo for personal and political reasons relating to ongoing federal investigations into Bolsonaro ’ s children .
Immediately following Moro ’ s remarks , Brazil ’ s chief prosecutor asked the Supreme Court to authorize an investigation of Moro ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president ’ s sons .
Over the weekend , details of the president ’ s children ’ s actions began leaking out : Federal prosecutors have identified Carlos Bolsonaro as a key figure in a “ criminal fake news racket ” accused of threatening Brazilian authorities .
The Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo reports that another son , Eduardo , is also under investigation in the same case .
Furthermore , on Saturday , The Intercept reported that a third Bolsonaro son , Flavio—already the subject of a federal probe—profited from illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
President Jair Bolsonaro , who ran on an anti-corruption platform , is unlikely to see that reputation return any time soon .
His pick for federal police chief , Alexandre Ramagem , has already come under fire after pictures emerged of Ramagem at a New Year ’ s Eve party with Bolsonaro ’ s son Carlos .
Is impeachment next ?
According to a report by Bloomberg , Brazil ’ s Lower House Speaker , Rodrigo Maia , is unlikely to pursue impeachment immediately , citing the country ’ s coronavirus epidemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation .
Capitão Augusto , a member of Brazil ’ s conservative coalition , echoed Maia while speaking to Reuters : “ I think that after this pandemic , the first topic that will be debated will be the question of the impeachment of the president , ” he said .
Writing in FP last week , Eduardo Mello observed that Brazilian lawmakers will be loath to remove Bolsonaro if that risks empowering Vice President Hamilton Mourão , a retired four-star general .
“ While most in Congress know that Bolsonaro ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they also think that having a general with no links to the country ’ s political power brokers is a bigger risk at the moment , ” he wrote .
Separatists declare self-rule in southern Yemen .
The Southern Transitional Council ( STC ) , a Yemeni group that seized control of the city of Aden in 2018 and has held it intermittently since , has announced emergency rule in Aden and all southern governorates .
The move threatens to split the country in a return to its pre-1990 borders—a risk that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy article .
The foreign minister of Yemen ’ s internationally-recognized government , Mohammed al-Hadrami , called for Saudi Arabia to take “ decisive measures against the continuing rebellion of the so-called Transitional Council , ” a decision that is complicated by the United Arab Emirates ’ backing of the STC .
Hadrami further claimed that governors in Yemen ’ s other southern governorates had all rejected the STC ’ s declaration .
Spain sees death rate decline .
Spain recorded its lowest one-day death toll since March 20 on Sunday as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from coronavirus .
Fernando Simon , director of the Spanish Health Alert and Emergency Coordination Center , welcomed the news , “ Although it may be hard to give these statistics , it ’ s a figure which indicates a clear , positive direction in the evolution of the epidemic.
” Spain is gradually relaxing its strict lockdown measures : Children under 14 will be allowed outside once per day this week and a ban on outdoor exercise is expected to be lifted on May 2 .
South Korea says Kim Jong Un @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his demise rocketing through social media , South Korea maintains that the leader of its closest neighbor is doing fine .
“ Our government position is firm , ” Moon Chung-in , an advisor to South Korean President Moon Jae-in , told CNN .
“ Kim Jong Un is alive and well .
He has been staying in the Wonsan area since April 13 .
No suspicious movements have so far been detected.
” Satellite imagery analysis published over the weekend appeared to show that Kim ’ s personal train had arrived @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visiting the coastal resort .
Netanyahu confident of U.S. backing on annexation .
On Sunday , Benjamin Netanyahu told a pro-Israel Christian group , the European Commission for Israel , that he was confident the United States would give its blessing to a planned annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank in a matter of months .
A condition of Netanyahu ’ s newly formed coalition with Benny Gantz is that Washington must approve any annexation decision first .
Writing in Foreign Policy on April 23 , a trio of seasoned Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move .
Ami Ayalon ( a former chief of the Israeli Shin Bet security service ) , Tamir Pardo ( a former director of the Mossad ) , and Gadi Shamni ( a former commander of the Israel Defense Forces Central Command ) argued that annexation would undermine Israeli security and could spark a popular backlash in Jordan and Egypt—endangering hard-won peace treaties with those countries .
“ This irreversible step , once taken , is likely to trigger a chain reaction beyond Israel ’ s control , ” they wrote .
Chile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forward with a plan to issue “ release certificates ” to those who have recovered from the coronavirus .
The plan , according to Chile ’ s top health official , Jaime Manalich , would mean holders would be “ freed from all types of quarantine or restriction , specifically because they can help their communities enormously since they pose no risk.
” The World Health Organization has advised against countries issuing so-called coronavirus passports : “ There is currently no evidence that people who have recovered from COVID-19 and have antibodies are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it said .
The right to work from home .
German Labor and Social Affairs Minister Hubertus Heil has called to enshrine the right to work from home into German law , in a move that could become more common as advanced economies emerge from their coronavirus epidemics .
“ Anyone who wants to , and whose workplace allows it , should be able to work at home—even when the coronavirus pandemic is over , ” Heil told Bild am Sonntag .
On April 29 , the U.S. Department of Commerce will release @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Domestic Product for the first quarter of 2020 .
On Thursday , April 30 , the European Union will release its monthly unemployment figures .
However , due to collection methods the numbers will only show data as far as February 2020 , before lockdown measures were put in place .
Oil giants Chevron , Exxon , and BP will release their first quarter results this week .
BP will release theirs on Tuesday , April 28 and Chevron and Exxon will release theirs on Friday , May 1—the same day OPEC oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A rare bright spot in Ecuador ’ s struggle against the coronavirus emerged on Friday , when the family of Alba Murari received news that the 74-year-old was alive , weeks after health authorities had pronounced her dead and given the family what they believed to be her cremated remains .
Murari ’ s family was informed of her death on March 27 , after she had been admitted to hospital with coronavirus symptoms .
The mix-up began when family members misidentified a dead body as Maruri , blaming restrictions for not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close .
Alba awoke from a three-week coma last Thursday and informed doctors of her name , uncovering the case of mistaken identity .
“ An ambulance arrived with a doctor , a psychiatrist and the social worker .
They apologized , and they tell us ‘ Your sister is alive , ’ and we were in shock , ” Murari ’ s sister said .
“ It is a miracle of God what has happened.
” Health Minister Juan Carlos Zevallos said the case was under investigation .
For more from FP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces fresh allegations of corruption, a separatist group declares self-rule in Yemen , and South Korea says Kim Jong Un is "alive and well."
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces fresh allegations of corruption, a separatist group declares self-rule in Yemen, and South Korea says Kim Jong Un is “alive and well.”
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Bolsonaro Delays Justice Minister Pick After Outcry
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has postponed the appointment of a new justice minister after numerous news reports suggested Bolsonaro loyalist Jorge Oliveira would be the favorite for the role. The decision follows an explosive few days at the top of Brazilian politics as allegations of presidential corruption mount and public confidence in Bolsonaro’s handling of the country’s coronavirus epidemic crumbles.
The latest episode began on Friday with the abrupt resignation of Justice Minister Sergio Moro, after Bolsonaro had fired the head of Brazil’s equivalent to the FBI, Maurício Valeixo. In his resignation press conference, Moro alleged Bolsonaro had fired Valeixo for personal and political reasons relating to ongoing federal investigations into Bolsonaro’s children. Immediately following Moro’s remarks, Brazil’s chief prosecutor asked the Supreme Court to authorize an investigation of Moro’s accusations against Bolsonaro.
All the president’s sons. Over the weekend, details of the president’s children’s actions began leaking out: Federal prosecutors have identified Carlos Bolsonaro as a key figure in a “criminal fake news racket” accused of threatening Brazilian authorities. The Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo reports that another son, Eduardo, is also under investigation in the same case.
Furthermore, on Saturday, The Intercept reported that a third Bolsonaro son, Flavio—already the subject of a federal probe—profited from illegal construction by militia groups using public money.
President Jair Bolsonaro, who ran on an anti-corruption platform, is unlikely to see that reputation return any time soon. His pick for federal police chief, Alexandre Ramagem, has already come under fire after pictures emerged of Ramagem at a New Year’s Eve party with Bolsonaro’s son Carlos.
Is impeachment next? According to a report by Bloomberg, Brazil’s Lower House Speaker, Rodrigo Maia, is unlikely to pursue impeachment immediately, citing the country’s coronavirus epidemic and the need to conduct a full investigation. Capitão Augusto, a member of Brazil’s conservative coalition, echoed Maia while speaking to Reuters: “I think that after this pandemic, the first topic that will be debated will be the question of the impeachment of the president,” he said.
Writing in FP last week, Eduardo Mello observed that Brazilian lawmakers will be loath to remove Bolsonaro if that risks empowering Vice President Hamilton Mourão, a retired four-star general. “While most in Congress know that Bolsonaro’s populist rhetoric is a threat to them, they also think that having a general with no links to the country’s political power brokers is a bigger risk at the moment,” he wrote.
What We’re Following Today
Separatists declare self-rule in southern Yemen. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), a Yemeni group that seized control of the city of Aden in 2018 and has held it intermittently since, has announced emergency rule in Aden and all southern governorates. The move threatens to split the country in a return to its pre-1990 borders—a risk that Alexandra Stark discussed in an August 2019 Foreign Policy article.
The foreign minister of Yemen’s internationally-recognized government, Mohammed al-Hadrami, called for Saudi Arabia to take “decisive measures against the continuing rebellion of the so-called Transitional Council,” a decision that is complicated by the United Arab Emirates’ backing of the STC. Hadrami further claimed that governors in Yemen’s other southern governorates had all rejected the STC’s declaration.
Spain sees death rate decline. Spain recorded its lowest one-day death toll since March 20 on Sunday as its health ministry announced 288 more deaths from coronavirus. Fernando Simon, director of the Spanish Health Alert and Emergency Coordination Center, welcomed the news, “Although it may be hard to give these statistics, it’s a figure which indicates a clear, positive direction in the evolution of the epidemic.” Spain is gradually relaxing its strict lockdown measures: Children under 14 will be allowed outside once per day this week and a ban on outdoor exercise is expected to be lifted on May 2.
South Korea says Kim Jong Un “alive and well.” Despite reports of his demise rocketing through social media, South Korea maintains that the leader of its closest neighbor is doing fine. “Our government position is firm,” Moon Chung-in, an advisor to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told CNN. “Kim Jong Un is alive and well. He has been staying in the Wonsan area since April 13. No suspicious movements have so far been detected.” Satellite imagery analysis published over the weekend appeared to show that Kim’s personal train had arrived in Wonsan recently, suggesting he was visiting the coastal resort.
Keep an Eye On
Netanyahu confident of U.S. backing on annexation. On Sunday, Benjamin Netanyahu told a pro-Israel Christian group, the European Commission for Israel, that he was confident the United States would give its blessing to a planned annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank in a matter of months. A condition of Netanyahu’s newly formed coalition with Benny Gantz is that Washington must approve any annexation decision first.
Writing in Foreign Policy on April 23, a trio of seasoned Israeli military commanders warned Netanyahu against such a move. Ami Ayalon (a former chief of the Israeli Shin Bet security service), Tamir Pardo (a former director of the Mossad), and Gadi Shamni (a former commander of the Israel Defense Forces Central Command) argued that annexation would undermine Israeli security and could spark a popular backlash in Jordan and Egypt—endangering hard-won peace treaties with those countries. “This irreversible step, once taken, is likely to trigger a chain reaction beyond Israel’s control,” they wrote.
Chile plans coronavirus certificates. Chile is moving forward with a plan to issue “release certificates” to those who have recovered from the coronavirus. The plan, according to Chile’s top health official, Jaime Manalich, would mean holders would be “freed from all types of quarantine or restriction, specifically because they can help their communities enormously since they pose no risk.” The World Health Organization has advised against countries issuing so-called coronavirus passports: “There is currently no evidence that people who have recovered from COVID-19 and have antibodies are protected from a second infection,” it said.
The right to work from home. German Labor and Social Affairs Minister Hubertus Heil has called to enshrine the right to work from home into German law, in a move that could become more common as advanced economies emerge from their coronavirus epidemics. “Anyone who wants to, and whose workplace allows it, should be able to work at home—even when the coronavirus pandemic is over,” Heil told Bild am Sonntag.
The World This Week
On April 29, the U.S. Department of Commerce will release its early estimate for U.S. Gross Domestic Product for the first quarter of 2020.
On Thursday, April 30, the European Union will release its monthly unemployment figures. However, due to collection methods the numbers will only show data as far as February 2020, before lockdown measures were put in place.
Oil giants Chevron, Exxon, and BP will release their first quarter results this week. BP will release theirs on Tuesday, April 28 and Chevron and Exxon will release theirs on Friday, May 1—the same day OPEC oil production cuts are due to take effect.
Odds and Ends
A rare bright spot in Ecuador’s struggle against the coronavirus emerged on Friday, when the family of Alba Murari received news that the 74-year-old was alive, weeks after health authorities had pronounced her dead and given the family what they believed to be her cremated remains. Murari’s family was informed of her death on March 27, after she had been admitted to hospital with coronavirus symptoms.
The mix-up began when family members misidentified a dead body as Murari, blaming restrictions for not being able to see the body up close. Alba awoke from a three-week coma last Thursday and informed doctors of her name, uncovering the case of mistaken identity. “An ambulance arrived with a doctor, a psychiatrist and the social worker. They apologized, and they tell us ‘Your sister is alive,’ and we were in shock,” Murari’s sister said. “It is a miracle of God what has happened.” Health Minister Juan Carlos Zevallos said the case was under investigation.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--The Coronavirus Has Pushed North Korea’s Economy to the Edge

The Coronavirus Has Pushed North Korea ’ s Economy to the Edge As in much of the world , the coronavirus pandemic has shut down North Korea ’ s economy .
The country ’ s fiscal resources are overwhelmed , forcing Pyongyang to issue domestic bonds for the first time in 17 years .
The crisis highlights the country ’ s financial weakness , which stems from its decades-long self-imposed isolation and more recent international sanctions .
Before turning to debt , North Korea attempted to wring money from state factories and the country ’ s budding donju entrepreneur class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exemplify North Korea ’ s “ reform from below ” dynamic .
They rose from the collapse of the central plan and have a symbiotic relationship with a state officially hostile to capitalism , existing in a limbo with little political or legal protections , as contract law and property rights remain rudimentary .
The Minju Chosun , a powerful government-run newspaper in North Korea , called on factories and businesses to fulfill their tax obligations so that the state could meet its plans to grow the budget 4.2 percent this year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But recognizing the limits of squeezing revenue from a failing economy , the government now plans to issue domestic bonds for the first time since the small issuance of “ People ’ s Livelihood ” bonds in 2003 .
( North Korea has never issued international bonds . )
The debt issuance is notable because the governments of Kim Jong Un and his father , Kim Jong Il , ran tight fiscal ships , spending within their means and not resorting to inflationary financing .
For all its failings , North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as other isolated and badly run states like Zimbabwe and Venezuela did .
The aim of the debt issuance is to collect as much foreign currency circulating in the country as possible .
The issuance will be massive , reportedly covering 60 percent of the budget .
( In comparison , South Korea ’ s deficit financing will rise to only 16 percent of its expenditure in 2020 . )
The majority of the bonds will be issued to state-run firms , but 40 percent will be sold to the donju .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bonds to obtain business permits .
Without the coercion of withholding business licenses , the donju would be unwilling to swap hard-earned savings for government debt , knowing that the government has a very poor record of honoring its liabilities .
The donju hold bad memories of the currency redenomination in 2009 , which wiped out personal savings .
International efforts are probably not in the cards , although there is a prior example .
North Korea is no stranger to economic stress and has shunned engagement with the international community .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a devastating famine , it approached the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) in search of external financing .
At the time , the economy had still not recovered from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union , and there were no domestic savings to tap .
IMF staff conducted a fact-finding mission to Pyongyang led by the senior advisor of its Asia and Pacific Department in September of that year .
They concluded that “ a fundamental change in policies , along with large amounts of investment to restructure the economy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ balked at the level of transparency required to engage with the IMF and cut off discussions .
But now , after North Korea ’ s nuclear tests beginning in 2006 and the sanctions that followed , the country ’ s membership in the IMF is blocked by more than its unwillingness to open its books for inspection .
Membership will essentially require a diplomatic opening from Pyongyang to Washington , which has effective veto power in the IMF .
This could be done , and the Russian case is instructive .
Soviet leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the late 1980s as part of his perestroika ( restructuring ) and glasnost ( opening ) policy , although he faced skepticism from the West as well as intense internal opposition .
However , Soviet nonintervention in the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9 , 1989 , provided the diplomatic opening to the United States .
Subsequently , then-U.S. President George H.W .
Bush unilaterally announced that the IMF should establish a “ special association ” for the USSR as a preliminary step toward membership , recognizing Western European doubts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to accept the responsibilities of international financial community membership .
The IMF ’ s Executive Board approved a provisional special association in September 1991 and immediately staffed up to provide technical assistance .
In June 1992 , six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union , the new president , Boris Yeltsin , took the Russian Federation into the IMF .
There was a faint glimmer of possibility that North Korea would embark on a similar path when Kim Jong Un pivoted away from missile-rattling in early 2018 to sports diplomacy at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump later that year and into 2019 .
However , the failure of the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February 2019 dashed hope that Kim was ready to provide a diplomatic opening to the United States .
Moreover , North Korea has demonstrated no previous intention toward systemic reform , even during the Sunshine Policy era of South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun in the early 2000s , when South Korea invested significantly in the Kaesong Industrial Zone and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side of the 38th parallel border .
North Korea had sealed off both enclaves from its domestic economy , other than for manual labor .
Nuclear tests since 2006 have brought international sanctions that further isolate the country , banning 90 percent of North Korea ’ s exports in value terms by 2018 .
North Korea evaded sanctions with some effect but did not fully offset the loss .
But when North Korea closed its border with China early this year to stop the spread of the coronavirus , it effectively shut down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now North Korea is left to its own devices , facing the coronavirus pandemic without access to credit or emergency financing from the IMF , World Bank , Asian Development Bank , or other governments—let alone access to global capital markets .
Nevertheless , there are no indications from Pyongyang that it is ready to throw in the towel on Juche , its policy of self-reliance , and embark on reform and opening .
The same obstacles that prevented progress in 1997 prevail today , and nothing has changed institutionally in more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
North Korea admitted to its economic hardship in another recent Minju Chosun article , saying that Western imperialists are seeking to “ subjugate ” countries through aid .
North Korea does not want any scrutiny of or limits on its conduct , let alone the policy conditions that come with IMF or World Bank financial assistance .
Both communist China in 1978 and communist Vietnam in 1986 recognized that opening and reform were essential to lift their economies out of destitution and to improve prospects for political stability .
China tried to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , taking him on a tour to Shenzhen and Guangzhou in January 2006 that was reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping ’ s galvanizing 1992 tour of southern China , yet reform in North Korea did not follow .
If there is a silver lining in this cloud , it is that perhaps the pandemic will force Pyongyang to realize its untenable position , accept opening and reform , and reconsider engaging the international community .
International financial institutions are stepping up to provide substantial concessional financing for coronavirus pandemic relief for countries with urgent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Credit Facility with limited policy conditionality .
And the World Bank is setting up a new health emergency multidonor fund that will complement $ 160 billion of existing financing to help countries respond to the pandemic and bolster economic recovery .
But it is too late for North Korea this time .
In its international isolation , such aid is beyond Pyongyang ’ s reach .

As in much of the world, the coronavirus pandemic has shut down North Korea’s economy. The country’s fiscal resources are overwhelmed, forcing Pyongyang to issue domestic bonds for the first time in 17 years. The crisis highlights the country’s financial weakness, which stems from its decades-long self-imposed isolation and more recent international sanctions.
As in much of the world, the coronavirus pandemic has shut down North Korea’s economy. The country’s fiscal resources are overwhelmed, forcing Pyongyang to issue domestic bonds for the first time in 17 years. The crisis highlights the country’s financial weakness, which stems from its decades-long self-imposed isolation and more recent international sanctions.
Before turning to debt, North Korea attempted to wring money from state factories and the country’s budding donju entrepreneur class of merchants—and, increasingly, financiers—who best exemplify North Korea’s “reform from below” dynamic. They rose from the collapse of the central plan and have a symbiotic relationship with a state officially hostile to capitalism, existing in a limbo with little political or legal protections, as contract law and property rights remain rudimentary. The Minju Chosun, a powerful government-run newspaper in North Korea, called on factories and businesses to fulfill their tax obligations so that the state could meet its plans to grow the budget 4.2 percent this year. That seems an impossibility at this point.
But recognizing the limits of squeezing revenue from a failing economy, the government now plans to issue domestic bonds for the first time since the small issuance of “People’s Livelihood” bonds in 2003. (North Korea has never issued international bonds.) The debt issuance is notable because the governments of Kim Jong Un and his father, Kim Jong Il, ran tight fiscal ships, spending within their means and not resorting to inflationary financing. For all its failings, North Korea did not fall into the hyperinflation trap as other isolated and badly run states like Zimbabwe and Venezuela did.
The aim of the debt issuance is to collect as much foreign currency circulating in the country as possible. The issuance will be massive, reportedly covering 60 percent of the budget. (In comparison, South Korea’s deficit financing will rise to only 16 percent of its expenditure in 2020.) The majority of the bonds will be issued to state-run firms, but 40 percent will be sold to the donju. The latter will be required to purchase the bonds to obtain business permits. Without the coercion of withholding business licenses, the donju would be unwilling to swap hard-earned savings for government debt, knowing that the government has a very poor record of honoring its liabilities. The donju hold bad memories of the currency redenomination in 2009, which wiped out personal savings.
International efforts are probably not in the cards, although there is a prior example. North Korea is no stranger to economic stress and has shunned engagement with the international community. But in 1997, in the midst of a devastating famine, it approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in search of external financing. At the time, the economy had still not recovered from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, and there were no domestic savings to tap. IMF staff conducted a fact-finding mission to Pyongyang led by the senior advisor of its Asia and Pacific Department in September of that year. They concluded that “a fundamental change in policies, along with large amounts of investment to restructure the economy,” was necessary. The finance ministry balked at the level of transparency required to engage with the IMF and cut off discussions.
But now, after North Korea’s nuclear tests beginning in 2006 and the sanctions that followed, the country’s membership in the IMF is blocked by more than its unwillingness to open its books for inspection. Membership will essentially require a diplomatic opening from Pyongyang to Washington, which has effective veto power in the IMF. This could be done, and the Russian case is instructive. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought entry to the IMF in the late 1980s as part of his perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (opening) policy, although he faced skepticism from the West as well as intense internal opposition.
However, Soviet nonintervention in the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9, 1989, provided the diplomatic opening to the United States. Subsequently, then-U.S. President George H.W. Bush unilaterally announced that the IMF should establish a “special association” for the USSR as a preliminary step toward membership, recognizing Western European doubts on whether the Soviet Union was ready to accept the responsibilities of international financial community membership. The IMF’s Executive Board approved a provisional special association in September 1991 and immediately staffed up to provide technical assistance. In June 1992, six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new president, Boris Yeltsin, took the Russian Federation into the IMF.
There was a faint glimmer of possibility that North Korea would embark on a similar path when Kim Jong Un pivoted away from missile-rattling in early 2018 to sports diplomacy at the February Pyeongchang Olympics and to summit diplomacy with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump later that year and into 2019. However, the failure of the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi in February 2019 dashed hope that Kim was ready to provide a diplomatic opening to the United States. Moreover, North Korea has demonstrated no previous intention toward systemic reform, even during the Sunshine Policy era of South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun in the early 2000s, when South Korea invested significantly in the Kaesong Industrial Zone and Mount Kumgang tourist zone on the northern side of the 38th parallel border. North Korea had sealed off both enclaves from its domestic economy, other than for manual labor.
Nuclear tests since 2006 have brought international sanctions that further isolate the country, banning 90 percent of North Korea’s exports in value terms by 2018. North Korea evaded sanctions with some effect but did not fully offset the loss. But when North Korea closed its border with China early this year to stop the spread of the coronavirus, it effectively shut down all external trade and tourism.
So now North Korea is left to its own devices, facing the coronavirus pandemic without access to credit or emergency financing from the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or other governments—let alone access to global capital markets. Nevertheless, there are no indications from Pyongyang that it is ready to throw in the towel on Juche, its policy of self-reliance, and embark on reform and opening. The same obstacles that prevented progress in 1997 prevail today, and nothing has changed institutionally in more than two decades—except the addition of international sanctions. North Korea admitted to its economic hardship in another recent Minju Chosun article, saying that Western imperialists are seeking to “subjugate” countries through aid. North Korea does not want any scrutiny of or limits on its conduct, let alone the policy conditions that come with IMF or World Bank financial assistance.
Both communist China in 1978 and communist Vietnam in 1986 recognized that opening and reform were essential to lift their economies out of destitution and to improve prospects for political stability. China tried to open the mind of Kim Jong Il, taking him on a tour to Shenzhen and Guangzhou in January 2006 that was reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s galvanizing 1992 tour of southern China, yet reform in North Korea did not follow. If there is a silver lining in this cloud, it is that perhaps the pandemic will force Pyongyang to realize its untenable position, accept opening and reform, and reconsider engaging the international community.
International financial institutions are stepping up to provide substantial concessional financing for coronavirus pandemic relief for countries with urgent needs. The IMF has its Rapid Credit Facility with limited policy conditionality. And the World Bank is setting up a new health emergency multidonor fund that will complement $160 billion of existing financing to help countries respond to the pandemic and bolster economic recovery. But it is too late for North Korea this time. In its international isolation, such aid is beyond Pyongyang’s reach.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--3 Scenarios for Kim Jong Un’s Mysterious Absence

The recent spate of rumors and thinly sourced reports about Kim Jong Un ’ s status shows how the leader ’ s health is a wild card in the North Korean system .
Whenever one of the three generations of Kim leaders was not seen in public for a prolonged period , speculation has run rampant .
The current leader is only in his mid-30s but has visible health problems and has been out of sight for over two weeks .
Notably , for the first time since coming to power in 2011 , Kim missed national ceremonies on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime founder and eternal president Kim Il Sung .
Official sources in Pyongyang remain silent about Kim ’ s status , albeit not unusual for the secretive regime .
It may be that he is recovering from an illness or medical operation or is distancing himself from a coronavirus outbreak in North Korea .
The regime may be taking time to regroup from recent setbacks , strategizing after South Korea ’ s legislative election and before the presidential election in the United States , or simply looking to keep its rivals guessing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perhaps the propaganda department is struggling how to explain the unexplainable—a grievously ill , or even dead , Kim .
From a policy perspective , while it is important to be cautious about uncorroborated reports , it is necessary to prepare for major scenarios .
Kim might reappear sometime soon , apparently in control of North Korea .
He might remain out of sight , potentially incapacitated , for a prolonged period of time .
Or he might be confirmed dead or incapable of governing .
The challenges and expectations for allied responses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not mutually exclusive .
Whatever the fate of the North Korean leader , close cooperation between the United States and South Korea is essential .
One scenario is that after completing his recovery or other tasks out of the public eye , Kim visibly returns to the helm of the North Korean state .
In the face of North Korea ’ s policy continuity , Washington and Seoul still need to coordinate their strategic approach toward Pyongyang .
Enduring objectives would be to avoid military escalation , prevent the unraveling of sanctions enforcement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The challenge , however , will be to smooth over differences between Seoul ’ s priority of cross-border engagement and Washington ’ s priority of denuclearization .
U.S. President Donald Trump is preoccupied with his reelection campaign and the COVID-19 epidemic in the United States .
In contrast , South Korean President Moon Jae-in is determined to double down on inter-Korean cooperation after Seoul managed to flatten the curve of its COVID-19 epidemic and Moon ’ s party won a landslide victory in legislative elections .
For starters , Moon reiterated that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most urgent task during a meeting with his advisors on April 27 , the two-year anniversary of the inter-Korean summit ’ s Panmunjom Declaration .
While it makes sense for Seoul to test for opportunities to improve relations , it remains to be seen if Pyongyang will respond favorably to Seoul ’ s overtures .
But the U.S.-South Korea alliance could experience friction if cross-border projects require the easing of key sanctions or are perceived as diverging from a coordinated approach to incentivize denuclearization .
If the Koreas successfully cooperate on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kaesong and resume other cultural and humanitarian exchanges , these would be relatively uncontroversial .
Gradually resuming inter-Korean rail and road connection projects would then be diplomatically plausible as Seoul is likely to coordinate with United Nations bodies and consult with Washington .
However , if the Moon government attempted to restart larger economic projects—like tours to North Korea or the Kaesong Industrial Complex—those efforts could contradict significant U.N. and U.S. sanctions .
Washington will want Pyongyang to take credible denuclearization steps to justify the sanctions relief required .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same page in order for the alliance to effectively support meaningful diplomacy with Pyongyang and prevent North Korean wedge-driving and extortion tactics .
A second scenario is that Kim Jong Un remains out of sight and potentially incapacitated for an indefinite period of time , increasing uncertainty about the stability of North Korea , which , in turn , could raise the risks of miscalculation , miscommunication , and unintended escalation .
As Kim ’ s de facto chief of staff and closest confidante sharing the Mount Paektu bloodline , his sister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the acting leader .
Or a power struggle might ensue , as it is unprecedented for a woman in her early 30s to lead the North Korean regime .
The leadership structure will be highly uncertain until there is official confirmation from Pyongyang—and even then , the interim leader ’ s position may not be secure .
Neighboring countries will likely take a wait-and-see approach until there is concrete evidence on North Korea ’ s internal dynamics .
Seoul and Washington must closely share intelligence while responding together in a timely manner in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Pyongyang might turn inward but then test more missiles to reinforce domestic order as well as show strength internationally .
If Kim Yo Jong is at the helm , North Korea might continue with the current level of military exercises and missile tests ( short- and medium-range ) in line with her brother ’ s strategy ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November .
However , there might be competing voices as government elites jostle to establish themselves in the temporary order , producing pressure for a more hawkish weapons-testing agenda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provocative rhetoric toward South Korea , Japan , and the United States .
In this case , the alliance may be at a disadvantage owing to existing political strains and the currently reduced schedule of combined military exercises , particularly full-scale field exercises .
If the alliance looks weakened or underfunded , it will also lack credibility .
Washington and Seoul should thus swiftly conclude negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement to provide defense cost-sharing for hosting U.S. troops in South Korea .
And if Pyongyang ramps up missile launches , Japan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow smooth intelligence-sharing .
While the allies need to maintain readiness and deterrence , they must also be careful not to misinterpret shows of force that are aimed at rivals or the North Korean public , rather than at the United States , South Korea , and Japan .
Scenario 3 : Kim is dead or incapable of governing .
A third scenario is that North Korea confirms Kim Jong Un is dead or incapable of governing .
Who leads the country will first depend on whether Kim anointed someone to take over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have received his dying injunction for how the country should be governed .
The likelihood of an immediate regime collapse is slim because the North Korean state and even national identity have been institutionalized , with overlapping interests between the Kim family and North Korea ’ s political , economic , and military elites .
This scenario leaves more room for political power struggles among various domestic factions and the possibility that international actors may misread the situation inside North Korea .
Possible candidates jockeying for power besides Kim ’ s sister include @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite being effectively exiled for decades as an ambassador in European capitals , returned to North Korea last year and may have support among the elite of his generation .
A dark horse could emerge from the Kim lineage , Workers ’ Party officials , or military generals , especially if there were initially a collective leadership arrangement that narrowed over time .
Even if Kim ’ s sister were elevated , it would be unclear how long she would be able to maintain her grip on power .
Amid the pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not adequately prepared for another crisis .
Clarity about the facts on the ground needs to be established ( and mutually understood ) by all sides .
Beijing will likely respect North Korea ’ s decision on a leadership succession or transition without directly injecting itself to influence the outcome .
However , it would probably send humanitarian assistance and prevent a mass exodus of refugees across its border in the event of North Korean instability .
As Beijing could move quickly on a range of actions , Washington and Seoul need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Both allies would be well advised to send condolences to the Kim family and North Korean people , even if this sticks in the throat and provides ammunition to political rivals .
Washington should reaffirm its commitment to the 2018 Singapore vision shared by Trump and Kim on a new relationship , peace regime , and denuclearization .
South Korea should likewise reaffirm its commitment to inter-Korean agreements , and both allies ought to express hope for working with the new North Korean leadership to fulfill those goals .
An attempt to intervene @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be an exceedingly dangerous move that not only risks clashes with North Korean forces but a broader conflict between China and the U.S.-South Korea alliance .
U.S.-South Korea coordination at all levels of government must be ironclad , from the big political questions to the technical command and control issues .
Seoul and Washington will need to review and calibrate contingency plans , such as Operational Plan 5029 , for conducting joint military maneuvers in the event of instability or regime collapse , including efforts to secure North Korea ’ s strategic assets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an open question , and progressive South Korean governments tend to prefer avoiding conversations regarding a North Korean regime collapse .
The United States and South Korea have a working group on North Korea that will need to remain adequately staffed with officials from both sides who are empowered to coordinate policy .
Seoul and Washington would also need a unified message , setting expectations for China ’ s role and inviting Beijing , Tokyo , and Moscow to discuss and coordinate a range of contingency plans in advance .
Such coordination will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deterioration in U.S.-China relations with Beijing ’ s increased assertiveness , the trade war , and the ongoing coronavirus pandemic .
Beijing has historically refused discussing North Korean contingency plans with Washington and Seoul , but private consultations will be necessary to prevent miscalculation over possible dangers if there is a loss of control in Pyongyang , including the safety and security of weapons of mass destruction and fissile materials , weapons exports , and a refugee crisis across North Korea ’ s shared borders with China , Russia , and South Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent any instability or crisis in North Korea from escalating into a regional conflict .
The allies need the concerted will—despite all the political distractions—to coordinate very closely with Beijing , Tokyo , and Moscow in any emergency situation .
Intelligence cooperation will be particularly important between Washington and its allies , as well as between Seoul and Tokyo using their General Security of Military Information Agreement .
If a flow of U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula is necessary , U.S. bases in Japan will be indispensable .
Washington and Seoul will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. Security Council and various organizations that can provide humanitarian and financial assistance during a crisis .
The latest mystery behind Kim ’ s health and whereabouts will be solved with North Korea ’ s confirmation in due course .
If he is alive , this will not be the last time rumors fly regarding a premature death .
Still , this episode can serve as a wake-up call to the U.S.-South Korea alliance on the need for close and advance coordination on scenarios surrounding the health of the North Korean leader .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a photogenic royal family or an entertaining Korean drama .
It ’ s a matter of life and death for the North Korean people and how a human rights-abusing and nuclear missile-pursuing regime will persist or fall , with implications for peace and security in Asia and beyond .
If and when the time comes , the U.S.-South Korea alliance needs to be ready .

The recent spate of rumors and thinly sourced reports about Kim Jong Un’s status shows how the leader’s health is a wild card in the North Korean system. Whenever one of the three generations of Kim leaders was not seen in public for a prolonged period, speculation has run rampant. The current leader is only in his mid-30s but has visible health problems and has been out of sight for over two weeks. Notably, for the first time since coming to power in 2011 , Kim missed national ceremonies on the April 15 holiday memorializing his grandfather, regime founder and eternal president Kim Il Sung.
The recent spate of rumors and thinly sourced reports about Kim Jong Un’s status shows how the leader’s health is a wild card in the North Korean system. Whenever one of the three generations of Kim leaders was not seen in public for a prolonged period, speculation has run rampant. The current leader is only in his mid-30s but has visible health problems and has been out of sight for over two weeks. Notably, for the first time since coming to power in 2011, Kim missed national ceremonies on the April 15 holiday memorializing his grandfather, regime founder and eternal president Kim Il Sung.
Official sources in Pyongyang remain silent about Kim’s status, although this is not unusual for the secretive regime. It may be that he is recovering from an illness or medical operation or is distancing himself from a coronavirus outbreak in North Korea. The regime may be taking time to regroup from recent setbacks, strategizing after South Korea’s legislative election and before the presidential election in the United States, or simply looking to keep its rivals guessing to test how they will react. Or perhaps the propaganda department is struggling how to explain the unexplainable—a grievously ill, or even dead, Kim.
From a policy perspective, while it is important to be cautious about uncorroborated reports, it is necessary to prepare for major scenarios. Kim might reappear sometime soon, apparently in control of North Korea. He might remain out of sight, potentially incapacitated, for a prolonged period of time. Or he might be confirmed dead or incapable of governing. The challenges and expectations for allied responses to each of these three scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Whatever the fate of the North Korean leader, close cooperation between the United States and South Korea is essential.
Scenario 1: Kim reappears in full control.
One scenario is that after completing his recovery or other tasks out of the public eye, Kim visibly returns to the helm of the North Korean state. In the face of North Korea’s policy continuity, Washington and Seoul still need to coordinate their strategic approach toward Pyongyang. Enduring objectives would be to avoid military escalation, prevent the unraveling of sanctions enforcement, and seek opportunities to resume diplomacy.
The challenge, however, will be to smooth over differences between Seoul’s priority of cross-border engagement and Washington’s priority of denuclearization. U.S. President Donald Trump is preoccupied with his reelection campaign and the COVID-19 epidemic in the United States. In contrast, South Korean President Moon Jae-in is determined to double down on inter-Korean cooperation after Seoul managed to flatten the curve of its COVID-19 epidemic and Moon’s party won a landslide victory in legislative elections. For starters, Moon reiterated that public health cooperation with North Korea is the most urgent task during a meeting with his advisors on April 27, the two-year anniversary of the inter-Korean summit’s Panmunjom Declaration.
While it makes sense for Seoul to test for opportunities to improve relations, it remains to be seen if Pyongyang will respond favorably to Seoul’s overtures. But the U.S.-South Korea alliance could experience friction if cross-border projects require the easing of key sanctions or are perceived as diverging from a coordinated approach to incentivize denuclearization. If the Koreas successfully cooperate on a coronavirus response via a reopened liaison office in Kaesong and resume other cultural and humanitarian exchanges, these would be relatively uncontroversial. Gradually resuming inter-Korean rail and road connection projects would then be diplomatically plausible as Seoul is likely to coordinate with United Nations bodies and consult with Washington.
However, if the Moon government attempted to restart larger economic projects—like tours to North Korea or the Kaesong Industrial Complex—those efforts could contradict significant U.N. and U.S. sanctions. Washington will want Pyongyang to take credible denuclearization steps to justify the sanctions relief required. The United States and South Korea need to stay on the same page in order for the alliance to effectively support meaningful diplomacy with Pyongyang and prevent North Korean wedge-driving and extortion tactics.
Scenario 2: Kim remains unseen, potentially incapacitated.
A second scenario is that Kim Jong Un remains out of sight and potentially incapacitated for an indefinite period of time, increasing uncertainty about the stability of North Korea, which, in turn, could raise the risks of miscalculation, miscommunication, and unintended escalation. As Kim’s de facto chief of staff and closest confidante sharing the Mount Paektu bloodline, his sister Kim Yo Jong could step in as the acting leader. Or a power struggle might ensue, as it is unprecedented for a woman in her early 30s to lead the North Korean regime. The leadership structure will be highly uncertain until there is official confirmation from Pyongyang—and even then, the interim leader’s position may not be secure. Neighboring countries will likely take a wait-and-see approach until there is concrete evidence on North Korea’s internal dynamics.
Seoul and Washington must closely share intelligence while responding together in a timely manner in the event of any North Korean provocation. Pyongyang might turn inward but then test more missiles to reinforce domestic order as well as show strength internationally. If Kim Yo Jong is at the helm, North Korea might continue with the current level of military exercises and missile tests (short- and medium-range) in line with her brother’s strategy ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November. However, there might be competing voices as government elites jostle to establish themselves in the temporary order, producing pressure for a more hawkish weapons-testing agenda, more aggressive sanctions-busting, and more provocative rhetoric toward South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
In this case, the alliance may be at a disadvantage owing to existing political strains and the currently reduced schedule of combined military exercises, particularly full-scale field exercises. If the alliance looks weakened or underfunded, it will also lack credibility. Washington and Seoul should thus swiftly conclude negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement to provide defense cost-sharing for hosting U.S. troops in South Korea. And if Pyongyang ramps up missile launches, Japan and South Korea must overcome recent spats to allow smooth intelligence-sharing. While the allies need to maintain readiness and deterrence, they must also be careful not to misinterpret shows of force that are aimed at rivals or the North Korean public, rather than at the United States, South Korea, and Japan.
Scenario 3: Kim is dead or incapable of governing.
A third scenario is that North Korea confirms Kim Jong Un is dead or incapable of governing. Who leads the country will first depend on whether Kim anointed someone to take over or if someone can credibly claim to have received his dying injunction for how the country should be governed. The likelihood of an immediate regime collapse is slim because the North Korean state and even national identity have been institutionalized, with overlapping interests between the Kim family and North Korea’s political, economic, and military elites.
This scenario leaves more room for political power struggles among various domestic factions and the possibility that international actors may misread the situation inside North Korea. Possible candidates jockeying for power besides Kim’s sister include his uncle Kim Pyong Il, who despite being effectively exiled for decades as an ambassador in European capitals, returned to North Korea last year and may have support among the elite of his generation. A dark horse could emerge from the Kim lineage, Workers’ Party officials, or military generals, especially if there were initially a collective leadership arrangement that narrowed over time. Even if Kim’s sister were elevated, it would be unclear how long she would be able to maintain her grip on power.
Amid the pandemic, Washington, Seoul, and Beijing are not adequately prepared for another crisis. Clarity about the facts on the ground needs to be established (and mutually understood) by all sides. Beijing will likely respect North Korea’s decision on a leadership succession or transition without directly injecting itself to influence the outcome. However, it would probably send humanitarian assistance and prevent a mass exodus of refugees across its border in the event of North Korean instability. As Beijing could move quickly on a range of actions, Washington and Seoul need to be in close and constant consultation.
Both allies would be well advised to send condolences to the Kim family and North Korean people, even if this sticks in the throat and provides ammunition to political rivals. Washington should reaffirm its commitment to the 2018 Singapore vision shared by Trump and Kim on a new relationship, peace regime, and denuclearization. South Korea should likewise reaffirm its commitment to inter-Korean agreements, and both allies ought to express hope for working with the new North Korean leadership to fulfill those goals. An attempt to intervene in North Korea and force change would be an exceedingly dangerous move that not only risks clashes with North Korean forces but a broader conflict between China and the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
U.S.-South Korea coordination at all levels of government must be ironclad, from the big political questions to the technical command and control issues. Seoul and Washington will need to review and calibrate contingency plans, such as Operational Plan 5029, for conducting joint military maneuvers in the event of instability or regime collapse, including efforts to secure North Korea’s strategic assets. The feasibility of the plan remains an open question, and progressive South Korean governments tend to prefer avoiding conversations regarding a North Korean regime collapse. The United States and South Korea have a working group on North Korea that will need to remain adequately staffed with officials from both sides who are empowered to coordinate policy.
Seoul and Washington would also need a unified message, setting expectations for China’s role and inviting Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow to discuss and coordinate a range of contingency plans in advance. Such coordination will be more difficult because of the recent deterioration in U.S.-China relations with Beijing’s increased assertiveness, the trade war, and the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Beijing has historically refused discussing North Korean contingency plans with Washington and Seoul, but private consultations will be necessary to prevent miscalculation over possible dangers if there is a loss of control in Pyongyang, including the safety and security of weapons of mass destruction and fissile materials, weapons exports, and a refugee crisis across North Korea’s shared borders with China, Russia, and South Korea.
Regional coordination will be imperative to prevent any instability or crisis in North Korea from escalating into a regional conflict. The allies need the concerted will—despite all the political distractions—to coordinate very closely with Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow in any emergency situation. Intelligence cooperation will be particularly important between Washington and its allies, as well as between Seoul and Tokyo using their General Security of Military Information Agreement. If a flow of U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula is necessary, U.S. bases in Japan will be indispensable. Washington and Seoul will also need to work closely with the U.N. Security Council and various organizations that can provide humanitarian and financial assistance during a crisis.
The latest mystery behind Kim’s health and whereabouts will be solved with North Korea’s confirmation in due course. If he is alive, this will not be the last time rumors fly regarding a premature death. Still, this episode can serve as a wake-up call to the U.S.-South Korea alliance on the need for close and advance coordination on scenarios surrounding the health of the North Korean leader.
Kim palace intrigue is not gossip about a photogenic royal family or an entertaining Korean drama. It’s a matter of life and death for the North Korean people and how a human rights-abusing and nuclear weapons-pursuing regime will persist or fall, with implications for peace and security in Asia and beyond. If and when the time comes, the U.S.-South Korea alliance needs to be ready.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-27--Mohammed bin Salman’s Bloody Dream City of Neom

A few days after the Saudi Special Forces killed Abdulrahim al-Huwaiti on April 13 , the government put out a statement labeling him a “ wanted individual.
” Saudi authorities and online trolls referred to him as a “ terrorist.
” Hours before his death , the tribesman had posted a YouTube video predicting just such a demise .
It would be a setup , he explained in his video , punishment for protesting the government ’ s efforts to forcibly displace the Huwaitat tribe to make way for the futuristic Saudi city of Neom .
For hundreds of years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ towns , including a historical capital , Khuraybah , across the northwestern province of Tabuk .
Now , some 20,000 people are set to be pushed out to make room for Neom .
In 2017 , Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced his vision for a $ 500 billion high-tech dream city to be populated by global vacationers , technology start-ups , and rich investors .
The planned 10,230-square-mile city—33 times the size of New York City—is a cornerstone of the crown prince ’ s Vision 2030 plan to diversify the Saudi economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Officials promised the city would have more robots than humans , with mass facial recognition and surveillance to eliminate crime , drone-operated air taxis instead of roads , and a seaside luxury resort , cruise , and entertainment complex .
Neom would be a miniature country with its own laws .
The Huwaitat tribe would never fit into this glamorous cosmopolitan hub .
And so the government would pay them for their land and nudge them out .
But things have not gone as planned .
The killing of Huwaiti this month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to force the Huwaitat tribe to accept the terms of their displacement , is a microcosm of all that is wrong with the country ’ s reckless and ruthless authoritarian ruler .
Faced with the prospect of giving up their ancestral lands , where the tribe has lived for hundreds of years ( well before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 ) , protests have erupted over the past three months .
At least 10 people have been arrested , and some have fled the country .
Rather than consult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integrate them in the region ’ s ambitious plans , the government has treated its citizens like disposable objects to be replaced by shiny , new cosmopolitan settlers .
This is what happens when a thuggish ruler declares that he , and only he , will decide the future of his country ( advised and assisted by well-paid American consultants and lawyers thousands of miles away ) , while Saudi citizens who express their own views , particularly critical ones , are ignored , silenced , jailed , or exterminated .
The circumstances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the government ’ s statement raises more questions than it answers .
What ’ s clear is that Tabuk municipal authorities , overseen by the new National Program of Community Development , started issuing property confiscation orders in early January , according to local residents .
The authorities offered residents only vague , verbal promises of temporary apartments and unspecified compensation .
The residents told us there was no judicial process involved in reviewing the tribe ’ s objections to the development project , their forced displacement , or the terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vast majority of tribe members rejected the offer .
But Huwaiti in particular became a public face of discontent .
In January , he was part of a local group that met with a government representative to reject compensation and the tribe ’ s displacement .
On April 12 , a day before he was killed , Huwaiti posted a YouTube video on his personal channel showing his title to the land .
In another video posted that day , he insisted that he and others from his tribes wanted to stay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Neom ’ s development .
The government ’ s statement makes no mention of this dispute .
It claims that Huwaiti was armed and fired at security forces , and that they had no choice but to fire back and kill him .
As predicted by Huwaiti , the statement claims soldiers found a stash of weapons at his house .
Witnesses , however , dispute this account and say that he told the police on April 12 that he would not leave , and took photos of the police when they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against his will .
When special forces arrived the next day by the dozens in armored trucks , locals said they saw them surround the house and start shooting—and only then did he fire back .
Since his murder , social media abroad has dubbed al-Huwaiti “ the martyr of Neom , ” likening his killing to that of the country ’ s most famous dissident , Jamal Khashoggi .
Given the Saudi government ’ s nonexistent credibility in the wake of its persistent lies about Khashoggi , it ’ s unlikely the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government ’ s latest account .
Massive development projects that involve taking locals ’ property are never an easy process , but international law provides basic standards on how a government can respect the rights of local communities in the process .
The Saudi government has failed to employ even the most minimum standards on when and how states can expropriate property .
There is no evidence that the planned eviction of the Huwaitat tribe was a last resort as the law requires , and no fair process to determine whether the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land and personal property .
Saudi Arabia has no land law and the Law of Expropriation of Real Estate has no clear regulations on the process for resettling and compensating people who lose land to development projects .
The government clearly failed to consult with civil society and the affected communities .
Instead , the National Community Development Program summarily stated that residents will be given fair compensation , have access to social and economic support programs , and could share “ inquiries and comments ” at local centers .
There ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ examined how Neom would affect human rights and the environmental impact on the Huwaitat tribe , much less the climate impact of the energy-guzzling monster Neom promises to be .
The result , as expected , is conflict , and now , violence .
Whether the Neom project is even remotely viable , given the global financial collapse because of the coronavirus and rising Saudi debt amid historically low oil prices , is highly doubtful .
There ’ s no irony at all that to date , the only result we ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ city is the promised destruction of a historic community and the death of a Saudi protester , using archaic means with no room for modern notions of rights and justice .

A few days after the Saudi Special Forces killed Abdulrahim al-Huwaiti on April 13, the government put out a statement labeling him a “ wanted individual .” Saudi authorities and online trolls referred to him as a “terrorist.” Hours before his death, the tribesman had posted a YouTube video predicting just such a demise. It would be a setup, he explained in his video, punishment for protesting the government’s efforts to forcibly displace the Huwaitat tribe to make way for the futuristic Saudi city of Neom .
A few days after the Saudi Special Forces killed Abdulrahim al-Huwaiti on April 13, the government put out a statement labeling him a “wanted individual.” Saudi authorities and online trolls referred to him as a “terrorist.” Hours before his death, the tribesman had posted a YouTube video predicting just such a demise. It would be a setup, he explained in his video, punishment for protesting the government’s efforts to forcibly displace the Huwaitat tribe to make way for the futuristic Saudi city of Neom.
For hundreds of years, the tribe had occupied villages and towns, including a historical capital, Khuraybah, across the northwestern province of Tabuk. Now, some 20,000 people are set to be pushed out to make room for Neom.
In 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced his vision for a $500 billion high-tech dream city to be populated by global vacationers, technology start-ups, and rich investors. The planned 10,230-square-mile city—33 times the size of New York City—is a cornerstone of the crown prince’s Vision 2030 plan to diversify the Saudi economy away from reliance on oil revenues. Officials promised the city would have more robots than humans, with mass facial recognition and surveillance to eliminate crime, drone-operated air taxis instead of roads, and a seaside luxury resort, cruise, and entertainment complex. Neom would be a miniature country with its own laws. The Huwaitat tribe would never fit into this glamorous cosmopolitan hub. And so the government would pay them for their land and nudge them out.
But things have not gone as planned. The killing of Huwaiti this month, and the government’s heavy-handed effort to force the Huwaitat tribe to accept the terms of their displacement, is a microcosm of all that is wrong with the country’s reckless and ruthless authoritarian ruler. Faced with the prospect of giving up their ancestral lands, where the tribe has lived for hundreds of years (well before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932), protests have erupted over the past three months. At least 10 people have been arrested, and some have fled the country.
Rather than consult with the local community and seek to integrate them in the region’s ambitious plans, the government has treated its citizens like disposable objects to be replaced by shiny, new cosmopolitan settlers. This is what happens when a thuggish ruler declares that he, and only he, will decide the future of his country (advised and assisted by well-paid American consultants and lawyers thousands of miles away), while Saudi citizens who express their own views, particularly critical ones, are ignored, silenced, jailed, or exterminated.
The circumstances surrounding Huwaiti’s killing need investigation, and the government’s statement raises more questions than it answers. What’s clear is that Tabuk municipal authorities, overseen by the new National Program of Community Development, started issuing property confiscation orders in early January, according to local residents. The authorities offered residents only vague, verbal promises of temporary apartments and unspecified compensation. The residents told us there was no judicial process involved in reviewing the tribe’s objections to the development project, their forced displacement, or the terms of the compensation.
Local sources said the vast majority of tribe members rejected the offer. But Huwaiti in particular became a public face of discontent. In January, he was part of a local group that met with a government representative to reject compensation and the tribe’s displacement. On April 12, a day before he was killed, Huwaiti posted a YouTube video on his personal channel showing his title to the land. In another video posted that day, he insisted that he and others from his tribes wanted to stay in their historical lands and take part in Neom’s development.
The government’s statement makes no mention of this dispute. It claims that Huwaiti was armed and fired at security forces, and that they had no choice but to fire back and kill him. As predicted by Huwaiti, the statement claims soldiers found a stash of weapons at his house. Witnesses, however, dispute this account and say that he told the police on April 12 that he would not leave, and took photos of the police when they arrived to measure his land and house against his will. When special forces arrived the next day by the dozens in armored trucks, locals said they saw them surround the house and start shooting—and only then did he fire back. Since his murder, social media abroad has dubbed al-Huwaiti “the martyr of Neom,” likening his killing to that of the country’s most famous dissident, Jamal Khashoggi. Given the Saudi government’s nonexistent credibility in the wake of its persistent lies about Khashoggi, it’s unlikely the public at home or abroad will believe the government’s latest account.
Massive development projects that involve taking locals’ property are never an easy process, but international law provides basic standards on how a government can respect the rights of local communities in the process. The Saudi government has failed to employ even the most minimum standards on when and how states can expropriate property.
There is no evidence that the planned eviction of the Huwaitat tribe was a last resort as the law requires, and no fair process to determine whether the government offered them adequate compensation for their land and personal property. Saudi Arabia has no land law and the Law of Expropriation of Real Estate has no clear regulations on the process for resettling and compensating people who lose land to development projects. The government clearly failed to consult with civil society and the affected communities. Instead, the National Community Development Program summarily stated that residents will be given fair compensation, have access to social and economic support programs, and could share “inquiries and comments” at local centers.
There’s also nothing to indicate that the government examined how Neom would affect human rights and the environmental impact on the Huwaitat tribe, much less the climate impact of the energy-guzzling monster Neom promises to be. The result, as expected, is conflict, and now, violence.
Whether the Neom project is even remotely viable, given the global financial collapse because of the coronavirus and rising Saudi debt amid historically low oil prices, is highly doubtful. There’s no irony at all that to date, the only result we’ve seen from this vision for a futuristic city is the promised destruction of a historic community and the death of a Saudi protester, using archaic means with no room for modern notions of rights and justice.