foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars

The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars Did the United States consider and reject the strategy of offshore balancing during the early years of the Cold War ?
Writing last month in the National Interest , Franz-Stefan Gady suggests that Republican Sen. Robert Taft was proposing something akin to offshore balancing in the run-up to the 1952 U.S. presidential election , only to have it dismissed in favor of a bipartisan strategy of onshore containment .
Indeed , he suggests that the possibility that Taft might win and implement his preferred approach helped convince Dwight D. Eisenhower @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reach the White House .
Gady ’ s article is an interesting historical narrative , and it reminds us that U.S. strategy in the early Cold War was not preordained .
But like other contemporary critics of offshore balancing , Gady does not fully grasp the underlying logic behind this strategy .
As a result , he mistakenly believes that Cold War containment was at odds with offshore balancing .
This is wrong : Containment during the Cold War was a clear application of offshore balancing ’ s central principles .
Gady ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a halfway house between true isolationism—the position long identified with Taft that he had abandoned by the early 1950s—and the policy of containment that the United States pursued throughout the Cold War .
This view is clearly reflected in his claim that “ [ a ] t the core , an offshore balancing strategy for the United States means maintaining regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere while maintaining a balance of power in Asia and Europe , chiefly through allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid , thus preventing any other great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ( my emphasis ) .
This description might sound correct at first glance , but Gady misses an essential feature of the strategy : Whether the United States can safely remain offshore depends on the configuration of power in the “ geo-strategically important region ” in question .
Although the United States may be able to rely on “ allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid ” in some circumstances , this policy is not possible if the states in the relevant region are too weak to balance a potential hegemon on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an offshore balancer must commit its own power—including its own military forces—in that key region to ensure that no single power is able to dominate and control it .
This principle explains why Britain—the original offshore balancer—sent its own troops onto the European continent against Napoleonic France , Wilhelmine Germany and its allies , Nazi Germany , and the Soviet Union .
The United States acted similarly in the two world wars and in the Cold War too .
This prescription follows directly from offshore balancing ’ s core logic .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favorable distribution of hard power ( economic capacity , scientific prowess , military strength , etc . )
as the primary source of U.S. national security .
Spreading democracy , building institutions , expanding trade , etc.
, may be worthy goals in their own right and can sometimes help at the margin , but at the end of the day U.S. security is determined largely by the balance of power in areas of critical strategic importance .
This belief was the basis for Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine , policies that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only great power in the Western Hemisphere .
By expanding across North America and driving the European powers out , the United States was able to keep dangerous adversaries at a distance , thereby maximizing its own security and freedom of action .
Every other major power has either been invaded or suffered sustained attacks at home on one or more occasions during the past 200 years—but not the United States .
Being the world ’ s only regional hegemon has not only made Americans safer .
It eventually made it possible for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worry much about defending their own soil .
Since becoming a great power , the United States has also sought to prevent any other great power from singlehandedly dominating Europe , East Asia , or the Persian Gulf .
These regions are important because Europe and East Asia are the key centers of industrial power , while the Gulf is the source of much of the oil and gas that fuels the world economy .
Were any single country able to dominate Europe or East Asia , it might eventually control greater economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to outpace it in an arms race .
That superpower might form alliances with other countries in the Western Hemisphere and bring its own power to bear close to the U.S. homeland .
Similarly , a hostile hegemon in the Persian Gulf ( or an outside great power that moved into and dominated that region ) might be able to manipulate oil supplies in ways that could damage the U.S. economy .
Preventing a hegemon from emerging in these key regions provides an additional benefit : It ensures that the major powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about each other than about the United States .
As a result , some of these states are usually eager for U.S. support and thus more willing to do Washington ’ s bidding .
For all of these reasons , it makes good sense for the United States to maintain a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere and help prevent another great power from establishing a similar position in its own neighborhood .
Several implications follow directly from this logic .
First , the proper role and size of the U.S. national security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the key regions .
If there is no potential hegemon in sight , there is little reason to deploy U.S. ground or air forces in distant areas and less need for a military establishment that far outstrips those of the other great powers .
The United States should still maintain a first-class military and keep a watchful eye on developments around the world , but it does not need to garrison much of the planet or use force to spread liberal principles far and wide .
If a potential hegemon does appear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local forces in the threatened region as the first line of defense , calibrating its support for these local actors with the level of the challenge and their own capabilities .
If these regional states can not contain a potential hegemon on their own , then the United States must commit its own military power to the region to make sure the potential hegemon can not overawe and dominate its neighbors while at the same time making sure that its local partners bear a fair share of the costs of containment .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of containment followed this basic logic perfectly .
U.S. leaders did not believe that the local powers in Europe or East Asia could stand up to the Soviet challenge on their own , which is why Washington deployed substantial U.S. forces to these critical regions in peacetime .
Of course , it might have been preferable in the abstract for the United States to pass the buck to others , but the distribution of power in Europe and Asia at the time made buck-passing infeasible .
There was no potential hegemon in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviet Union did not seriously threaten to invade that region during the Cold War .
Nevertheless , to maintain the local balance of power and limit Soviet influence , the United States relied on Britain ( until the mid-1960s ) and on local clients such as Iran .
After the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 and Iran became an adversary , Washington created the Rapid Deployment Force .
But it kept this force offshore and over the horizon and did not send significant forces into the region until Iraq seized Kuwait @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to the regional balance of power led the United States to organize a large coalition—in which its own forces played the predominant role—to expel Iraq from Kuwait .
This operation was fully consistent with offshore balancing : The first Gulf War was an occasion when it made sense for the United States to go “ onshore.
” Most importantly , whenever the United States has abandoned offshore balancing and pursued a different strategy , the results have invariably been disastrous .
The Vietnam War was not consistent with offshore balancing , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Walter Lippmann , Hans Morgenthau , and Kenneth Waltz emphasized , Indochina was not a vital strategic region and its fate could not alter the global balance of power in any meaningful way .
The Clinton administration ’ s adoption of “ dual containment ” in the Gulf and the recent U.S. wars in Iraq , Afghanistan , and Libya were also misguided departures from offshore balancing , as they had little to do with maintaining a favorable balance of power .
Indeed , in the case of Iraq , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gulf to the benefit of Iran .
What does offshore balancing prescribe today ?
As I and others have argued at length elsewhere , there is no potential hegemon in Europe , and we are not likely to see one emerge anytime soon .
The United States should gradually disengage , therefore , and let the Europeans provide for their own security .
As for the Persian Gulf , the region is as divided as it has ever been , and there is no potential hegemon on the horizon .
Moreover , its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world gradually weans itself off fossil fuels .
Thus , United States can return to the strategy it followed from 1945 to 1991 : keeping its own forces out of the region and letting the competing Middle Eastern powers balance each other .
The situation in Asia is dramatically different .
China is a potential hegemon in Asia , and it will remain one long after the COVID-19 pandemic is behind us .
Although Asia contains a number of capable medium-sized powers , such as Japan , South Korea , and India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them to form an effective balancing coalition .
In this case , the United States needs to coordinate this effort and commit its own forces .
Buck-passing will not work .
Although U.S. military forces will have to be onshore in a number of places in Asia , this policy is still fully consistent with the grand strategy of offshore balancing .
To be sure , preventing China from establishing regional hegemony in Asia can not stop Beijing from trying to build influence through its Belt and Road Initiative or stop it from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic reach .
But it would help limit Chinese influence by maintaining an active U.S. presence in Asia and forcing China to focus most of its attention closer to home .
By reducing the U.S. commitment to Europe and ending its costly military involvements in the Middle East , offshore balancing would also free up resources that will be needed to meet a future Chinese challenge , a problem that may be increasingly acute in the post-coronavirus fiscal environment .
Why is it a problem when people misrepresent offshore balancing ?
Because we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overdue debate about the proper grand strategy for the United States .
The stakes are high , as the many failures that flowed from liberal hegemony—the flawed grand strategy that U.S. leaders pursued during the unipolar moment—make clear .
Protagonists often try to win policy debates by distorting their opponents ’ views , by falsely associating their own recommendations with past successes , and by denying any responsibility for repeated failures .
Deciding which strategic options should guide U.S. policy in the future depends first and foremost on a proper understanding of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offshore balancing will reveal that it provided the foundation most of America ’ s foreign-policy successes , while departures from that strategy lie at the root of some of the country ’ s biggest missteps .

Did the United States consider and reject the strategy of offshore balancing during the early years of the Cold War? Writing last month in the National Interest, Franz-Stefan Gady suggests that Republican Sen. Robert Taft was proposing something akin to offshore balancing in the run-up to the 1952 U.S. presidential election, only to have it dismissed in favor of a bipartisan strategy of onshore containment. Indeed, he suggests that the possibility that Taft might win and implement his preferred approach helped convince Dwight D. Eisenhower to join the race and eventually to reach the White House.
Did the United States consider and reject the strategy of offshore balancing during the early years of the Cold War? Writing last month in the National Interest, Franz-Stefan Gady suggests that Republican Sen. Robert Taft was proposing something akin to offshore balancing in the run-up to the 1952 U.S. presidential election, only to have it dismissed in favor of a bipartisan strategy of onshore containment. Indeed, he suggests that the possibility that Taft might win and implement his preferred approach helped convince Dwight D. Eisenhower to join the race and eventually to reach the White House.
Gady’s article is an interesting historical narrative, and it reminds us that U.S. strategy in the early Cold War was not preordained. But like other contemporary critics of offshore balancing, Gady does not fully grasp the underlying logic behind this strategy. As a result, he mistakenly believes that Cold War containment was at odds with offshore balancing. This is wrong: Containment during the Cold War was a clear application of offshore balancing’s central principles.
Gady’s account portrays offshore balancing as something of a halfway house between true isolationism—the position long identified with Taft that he had abandoned by the early 1950s—and the policy of containment that the United States pursued throughout the Cold War. This view is clearly reflected in his claim that “[a]t the core, an offshore balancing strategy for the United States means maintaining regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere while maintaining a balance of power in Asia and Europe, chiefly through allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid, thus preventing any other great power from dominating these geo-strategically important regions” (my emphasis).
This description might sound correct at first glance, but Gady misses an essential feature of the strategy: Whether the United States can safely remain offshore depends on the configuration of power in the “geo-strategically important region” in question. Although the United States may be able to rely on “allied nations buoyed by U.S. military aid” in some circumstances, this policy is not possible if the states in the relevant region are too weak to balance a potential hegemon on their own. Under these conditions, an offshore balancer must commit its own power—including its own military forces—in that key region to ensure that no single power is able to dominate and control it. This principle explains why Britain—the original offshore balancer—sent its own troops onto the European continent against Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany and its allies, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. The United States acted similarly in the two world wars and in the Cold War too.
This prescription follows directly from offshore balancing’s core logic. It is a realist strategy, which views a favorable distribution of hard power (economic capacity, scientific prowess, military strength, etc.) as the primary source of U.S. national security. Spreading democracy, building institutions, expanding trade, etc., may be worthy goals in their own right and can sometimes help at the margin, but at the end of the day U.S. security is determined largely by the balance of power in areas of critical strategic importance.
This belief was the basis for Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine, policies that eventually established the United States as the only great power in the Western Hemisphere. By expanding across North America and driving the European powers out, the United States was able to keep dangerous adversaries at a distance, thereby maximizing its own security and freedom of action. Every other major power has either been invaded or suffered sustained attacks at home on one or more occasions during the past 200 years—but not the United States. Being the world’s only regional hegemon has not only made Americans safer. It eventually made it possible for them to intervene abroad without having to worry much about defending their own soil.
Since becoming a great power, the United States has also sought to prevent any other great power from singlehandedly dominating Europe, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf. These regions are important because Europe and East Asia are the key centers of industrial power, while the Gulf is the source of much of the oil and gas that fuels the world economy. Were any single country able to dominate Europe or East Asia, it might eventually control greater economic resources than the United States and be able to outpace it in an arms race. That superpower might form alliances with other countries in the Western Hemisphere and bring its own power to bear close to the U.S. homeland. Similarly, a hostile hegemon in the Persian Gulf (or an outside great power that moved into and dominated that region) might be able to manipulate oil supplies in ways that could damage the U.S. economy.
Preventing a hegemon from emerging in these key regions provides an additional benefit: It ensures that the major powers in Eurasia will tend to worry more about each other than about the United States. As a result, some of these states are usually eager for U.S. support and thus more willing to do Washington’s bidding. For all of these reasons, it makes good sense for the United States to maintain a dominant position in the Western Hemisphere and help prevent another great power from establishing a similar position in its own neighborhood.
Several implications follow directly from this logic.
First, the proper role and size of the U.S. national security establishment depend on the distribution of power in the key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight, there is little reason to deploy U.S. ground or air forces in distant areas and less need for a military establishment that far outstrips those of the other great powers. The United States should still maintain a first-class military and keep a watchful eye on developments around the world, but it does not need to garrison much of the planet or use force to spread liberal principles far and wide.
If a potential hegemon does appear, the United States should rely on local forces in the threatened region as the first line of defense, calibrating its support for these local actors with the level of the challenge and their own capabilities. If these regional states cannot contain a potential hegemon on their own, then the United States must commit its own military power to the region to make sure the potential hegemon cannot overawe and dominate its neighbors while at the same time making sure that its local partners bear a fair share of the costs of containment.
During the Cold War, the essential features of containment followed this basic logic perfectly. U.S. leaders did not believe that the local powers in Europe or East Asia could stand up to the Soviet challenge on their own, which is why Washington deployed substantial U.S. forces to these critical regions in peacetime. Of course, it might have been preferable in the abstract for the United States to pass the buck to others, but the distribution of power in Europe and Asia at the time made buck-passing infeasible.
There was no potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf, however, and the Soviet Union did not seriously threaten to invade that region during the Cold War. Nevertheless, to maintain the local balance of power and limit Soviet influence, the United States relied on Britain (until the mid-1960s) and on local clients such as Iran. After the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979 and Iran became an adversary, Washington created the Rapid Deployment Force. But it kept this force offshore and over the horizon and did not send significant forces into the region until Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990. This clear and obvious threat to the regional balance of power led the United States to organize a large coalition—in which its own forces played the predominant role—to expel Iraq from Kuwait. This operation was fully consistent with offshore balancing: The first Gulf War was an occasion when it made sense for the United States to go “onshore.”
Most importantly, whenever the United States has abandoned offshore balancing and pursued a different strategy, the results have invariably been disastrous. The Vietnam War was not consistent with offshore balancing, for example, because, as realist critics such as Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz emphasized, Indochina was not a vital strategic region and its fate could not alter the global balance of power in any meaningful way. The Clinton administration’s adoption of “dual containment” in the Gulf and the recent U.S. wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya were also misguided departures from offshore balancing, as they had little to do with maintaining a favorable balance of power. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, it shattered the local balance in the Persian Gulf to the benefit of Iran.
What does offshore balancing prescribe today? As I and others have argued at length elsewhere, there is no potential hegemon in Europe, and we are not likely to see one emerge anytime soon. The United States should gradually disengage, therefore, and let the Europeans provide for their own security. As for the Persian Gulf, the region is as divided as it has ever been, and there is no potential hegemon on the horizon. Moreover, its strategic importance is likely to decline as the world gradually weans itself off fossil fuels. Thus, United States can return to the strategy it followed from 1945 to 1991: keeping its own forces out of the region and letting the competing Middle Eastern powers balance each other.
The situation in Asia is dramatically different. China is a potential hegemon in Asia, and it will remain one long after the COVID-19 pandemic is behind us. Although Asia contains a number of capable medium-sized powers, such as Japan, South Korea, and India, it will not be easy for them to form an effective balancing coalition. In this case, the United States needs to coordinate this effort and commit its own forces. Buck-passing will not work. Although U.S. military forces will have to be onshore in a number of places in Asia, this policy is still fully consistent with the grand strategy of offshore balancing.
To be sure, preventing China from establishing regional hegemony in Asia cannot stop Beijing from trying to build influence through its Belt and Road Initiative or stop it from engaging in other efforts to expand its diplomatic reach. But it would help limit Chinese influence by maintaining an active U.S. presence in Asia and forcing China to focus most of its attention closer to home. By reducing the U.S. commitment to Europe and ending its costly military involvements in the Middle East, offshore balancing would also free up resources that will be needed to meet a future Chinese challenge, a problem that may be increasingly acute in the post-coronavirus fiscal environment.
Why is it a problem when people misrepresent offshore balancing? Because we are finally having a serious and long overdue debate about the proper grand strategy for the United States. The stakes are high, as the many failures that flowed from liberal hegemony—the flawed grand strategy that U.S. leaders pursued during the unipolar moment—make clear. Protagonists often try to win policy debates by distorting their opponents’ views, by falsely associating their own recommendations with past successes, and by denying any responsibility for repeated failures. Deciding which strategic options should guide U.S. policy in the future depends first and foremost on a proper understanding of the different alternatives. An accurate understanding of offshore balancing will reveal that it provided the foundation most of America’s foreign-policy successes, while departures from that strategy lie at the root of some of the country’s biggest missteps.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--The Fate of the WTO and Global Trade Hangs on Fish

The Fate of the WTO and Global Trade Hangs on Fish The World Trade Organization ( WTO ) is struggling to maintain its relevance .
Protectionism has been rising for more than a decade as a growing number of countries have openly flouted WTO rules .
Many are having second thoughts about the wisdom of allowing China into the organization , where it retains special developing-economy rights that help shield its domestic economy from foreign competition .
Recent trade agreements have been bilateral or regional , undermining the WTO ’ s purpose of maintaining a global trading order .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impediments to trade are only expected to grow .
At the root of the fisheries problem lies the WTO ’ s use of two different sets of trading rules—one for developed countries , the other for developing ones .
This sorry state of affairs in the global trading order is mirrored in the lack of progress in the only major global trade negotiations still actively underway—WTO talks intended to impose discipline on fisheries subsidies , which have led to depleted fish stocks in the world ’ s oceans .
These talks have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have missed yet another deadline , and seem to be in limbo .
The obstacle standing in the way of a meaningful agreement is not just the reluctance of countries to give up subsidies .
It also does not help that a deal requires unanimous approval of every clause and stipulation by all 164 WTO member countries—including landlocked ones without a marine fishing fleet , such as Hungary , Mongolia , and Mali .
At the root of the fisheries problem , however , lies the WTO ’ s own preferred negotiating approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to approach trade using two different sets of rules—one for developed countries , the other for developing ones—the fisheries talks are all but certain to continue to produce only irreconcilable conflict .
Fish do not respect territorial boundaries .
Overfishing , which continues to deplete fish stocks worldwide despite decades of attempts to make fishing sustainable , is by definition a global problem requiring a global solution .
An estimated 37 percent of all the seafood produced in the world is traded internationally—which makes the WTO the logical forum to take the lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3 billion people depend on fish and fish products—including shrimp and other seafood—for about 20 percent of their animal protein consumption .
Since the 1960s , global per-capita fish consumption has more than doubled , while the absolute total has more than quadrupled .
Many of the people most dependent on fish live in the poorest and least-developed nations .
At least 140 million people depend on fishing for their livelihood , and the demand for fish has been growing with a rising global population .
We now eat more fish than beef @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create overcapacity in fishing fleets , spur illegal fishing , and contribute to the degradation and depletion of wild fish stocks .
Total subsidies amount to $ 35 billion annually , or approximately 30 to 40 percent of the value of all fish landed by marine vessels worldwide .
The largest part of these subsidies—22 percent—consists of fuel subsidies , which make it cheaper for fishing vessels to range ever farther beyond their own coastal waters into the global commons of the high seas .
It ’ s not just fuel subsidies that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies to construct and purchase new vessels , free facilities to land fish , and subsidies to buy , transport , or store fishing equipment .
Each of these subsidies make it less costly and more profitable to fish , thereby encouraging more fishing than there would be without subsidies .
There is also another , more ambiguous category of subsidies which , if used properly , can help manage fish stocks , but which increase fishing in other contexts .
For example , when governments buy back fishing licenses , it can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service—but these subsidies are ineffective if the licenses are subsequently resold , or if the vessels taken out of service are only smaller , older ones with very little catch.China , in particular , has been under fire for illegal fishing practices , both with respect to other countries ’ exclusive economic zones as well as the open seas .
The Global Ocean Commission has estimated that 60 percent of all fisheries subsidies directly encourage “ unsustainable , destructive and even illegal fishing practices.
” Illegal fishing practices include fishing by unregistered vessels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic zone in violation of regulations , and in international waters when it breaks international agreements or the laws of the country under whose flag the vessel operates .
China , in particular , has been under fire for illegal fishing practices , both with respect to other countries ’ exclusive economic zones as well as the open seas .
Late last year , the WTO talks were inching toward success on a subset of the issues on the table—specifically , new rules to eliminate subsidies for illegal , unreported , and unregulated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies for fishing of stocks mutually recognized as being overfished , such as Atlantic cod , Alaska pollock , and Argentine hake .
However , subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing more generally—not focused on a small number of specific stocks—have been much more difficult to address , and remain the main obstacle to an agreement .
This is troubling because , as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has reported , “ the percentage of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10 percent in 1974 to 33.1 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this impasse are the five main providers of fisheries subsidies : China , the European Union , the United States , South Korea , and Japan .
These five WTO members account for 58 percent of all global fisheries subsidies .
If they can agree , then other members of the WTO will be much more likely to move toward the consensus needed for a global agreement .
Here as elsewhere on the WTO agenda , a key sticking point is a lack of consensus on how the rules under consideration should apply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The WTO has traditionally had two sets of rules for developed and developing countries , but the fisheries talks demonstrate exactly why this binary approach no longer works : A division into these two groups blurs large differences between various developing countries , and , by holding some countries to a lower standard than others , would reduce the overall benefit from any new rules .
In fisheries negotiations , as elsewhere in the WTO , China lies at the heart of the dispute , and perfectly illustrates how a blanket application @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for developing countries in trade no longer makes sense .
For instance , in 2016 , China ranked first in the world with just over 14 percent of the total share of world exports of fish and fish products .
Yet China remains one of the most ardent defenders of “ special and differential treatment ” for itself and all other developing countries , regardless of their stage of development.Progress on fisheries would be a sign that the world has a chance to preserve—and perhaps even strengthen—the global , multilateral trading order at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrayed against it .
Strong arguments can be made that small-scale , artisanal , and subsistence fishers in developing countries could safely be granted some subsidies .
The reality , however , is that nearly 85 percent of all fisheries subsidies including those paid by China and many other emerging countries , go to large-scale industrial fleets .
These fleets are the cause of virtually all overfishing , and are where fisheries subsidies must be cut—no matter whether the subsidies are granted by a developed or a developing country .
Reaching global agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ essential for preserving fisheries and the world ’ s marine fishing stocks .
Because it can only be resolved if one of the WTO ’ s core problems—its blanket distinction between two groups of countries—is addressed , it is also a crucial test for the future of the WTO .
Progress on fisheries would be a sign that the world has a chance to preserve—and perhaps even strengthen—the global , multilateral trading order at a time when so many forces are arrayed against it .

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is struggling to maintain its relevance. Protectionism has been rising for more than a decade as a growing number of countries have openly flouted WTO rules. Many are having second thoughts about the wisdom of allowing China into the organization, where it retains special developing-economy rights that help shield its domestic economy from foreign competition. Recent trade agreements have been bilateral or regional, undermining the WTO’s purpose of maintaining a global trading order. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, impediments to trade are only expected to grow. At the root of the fisheries problem lies the WTO’s use of two different sets of trading rules—one for developed countries, the other for developing ones.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is struggling to maintain its relevance. Protectionism has been rising for more than a decade as a growing number of countries have openly flouted WTO rules. Many are having second thoughts about the wisdom of allowing China into the organization, where it retains special developing-economy rights that help shield its domestic economy from foreign competition. Recent trade agreements have been bilateral or regional, undermining the WTO’s purpose of maintaining a global trading order. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, impediments to trade are only expected to grow. At the root of the fisheries problem lies the WTO’s use of two different sets of trading rules—one for developed countries, the other for developing ones.
This sorry state of affairs in the global trading order is mirrored in the lack of progress in the only major global trade negotiations still actively underway—WTO talks intended to impose discipline on fisheries subsidies, which have led to depleted fish stocks in the world’s oceans. These talks have been going on for nearly two decades, have missed yet another deadline, and seem to be in limbo.
The obstacle standing in the way of a meaningful agreement is not just the reluctance of countries to give up subsidies. It also does not help that a deal requires unanimous approval of every clause and stipulation by all 164 WTO member countries—including landlocked ones without a marine fishing fleet, such as Hungary, Mongolia, and Mali. At the root of the fisheries problem, however, lies the WTO’s own preferred negotiating approach: As long as the WTO continues to approach trade using two different sets of rules—one for developed countries, the other for developing ones—the fisheries talks are all but certain to continue to produce only irreconcilable conflict.
Fish do not respect territorial boundaries. Overfishing, which continues to deplete fish stocks worldwide despite decades of attempts to make fishing sustainable, is by definition a global problem requiring a global solution. An estimated 37 percent of all the seafood produced in the world is traded internationally—which makes the WTO the logical forum to take the lead in finding a solution.
More than 3 billion people depend on fish and fish products—including shrimp and other seafood—for about 20 percent of their animal protein consumption. Since the 1960s, global per-capita fish consumption has more than doubled, while the absolute total has more than quadrupled. Many of the people most dependent on fish live in the poorest and least-developed nations. At least 140 million people depend on fishing for their livelihood, and the demand for fish has been growing with a rising global population. We now eat more fish than beef.
But subsidies for fisheries continue to create overcapacity in fishing fleets, spur illegal fishing, and contribute to the degradation and depletion of wild fish stocks. Total subsidies amount to $35 billion annually, or approximately 30 to 40 percent of the value of all fish landed by marine vessels worldwide. The largest part of these subsidies—22 percent—consists of fuel subsidies, which make it cheaper for fishing vessels to range ever farther beyond their own coastal waters into the global commons of the high seas.
It’s not just fuel subsidies that encourage unsustainable fishing. Some countries provide subsidies to construct and purchase new vessels, free facilities to land fish, and subsidies to buy, transport, or store fishing equipment. Each of these subsidies make it less costly and more profitable to fish, thereby encouraging more fishing than there would be without subsidies. There is also another, more ambiguous category of subsidies which, if used properly, can help manage fish stocks, but which increase fishing in other contexts. For example, when governments buy back fishing licenses, it can reduce fishing by taking vessels out of service—but these subsidies are ineffective if the licenses are subsequently resold, or if the vessels taken out of service are only smaller, older ones with very little catch.China, in particular, has been under fire for illegal fishing practices, both with respect to other countries’ exclusive economic zones as well as the open seas.
The Global Ocean Commission has estimated that 60 percent of all fisheries subsidies directly encourage “unsustainable, destructive and even illegal fishing practices.” Illegal fishing practices include fishing by unregistered vessels, in another country’s exclusive economic zone in violation of regulations, and in international waters when it breaks international agreements or the laws of the country under whose flag the vessel operates. China, in particular, has been under fire for illegal fishing practices, both with respect to other countries’ exclusive economic zones as well as the open seas.
Late last year, the WTO talks were inching toward success on a subset of the issues on the table—specifically, new rules to eliminate subsidies for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and to prohibit certain other subsidies for fishing of stocks mutually recognized as being overfished, such as Atlantic cod, Alaska pollock, and Argentine hake. However, subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing more generally—not focused on a small number of specific stocks—have been much more difficult to address, and remain the main obstacle to an agreement. This is troubling because, as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has reported, “the percentage of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10 percent in 1974 to 33.1 percent in 2015.”
At the center of this impasse are the five main providers of fisheries subsidies: China, the European Union, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. These five WTO members account for 58 percent of all global fisheries subsidies. If they can agree, then other members of the WTO will be much more likely to move toward the consensus needed for a global agreement.
Here as elsewhere on the WTO agenda, a key sticking point is a lack of consensus on how the rules under consideration should apply to countries at different stages of development. The WTO has traditionally had two sets of rules for developed and developing countries, but the fisheries talks demonstrate exactly why this binary approach no longer works: A division into these two groups blurs large differences between various developing countries, and, by holding some countries to a lower standard than others, would reduce the overall benefit from any new rules.
In fisheries negotiations, as elsewhere in the WTO, China lies at the heart of the dispute, and perfectly illustrates how a blanket application of “special and differential treatment” for developing countries in trade no longer makes sense. For instance, in 2016, China ranked first in the world with just over 14 percent of the total share of world exports of fish and fish products. Yet China remains one of the most ardent defenders of “special and differential treatment” for itself and all other developing countries, regardless of their stage of development.Progress on fisheries would be a sign that the world has a chance to preserve—and perhaps even strengthen—the global, multilateral trading order at a time when so many forces are arrayed against it.
Strong arguments can be made that small-scale, artisanal, and subsistence fishers in developing countries could safely be granted some subsidies. The reality, however, is that nearly 85 percent of all fisheries subsidies , including those paid by China and many other emerging countries, go to large-scale industrial fleets. These fleets are the cause of virtually all overfishing, and are where fisheries subsidies must be cut—no matter whether the subsidies are granted by a developed or a developing country.
Reaching global agreement to limit fisheries subsidies is not just essential for preserving fisheries and the world’s marine fishing stocks. Because it can only be resolved if one of the WTO’s core problems—its blanket distinction between two groups of countries—is addressed, it is also a crucial test for the future of the WTO. Progress on fisheries would be a sign that the world has a chance to preserve—and perhaps even strengthen—the global, multilateral trading order at a time when so many forces are arrayed against it.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--Why Hassan Rouhani Ended Iran’s Lockdown

As businesses resume their activities in Iran at the behest of President Hassan Rouhani , many experts have criticized the government ’ s decision and warned of a second wave of the coronavirus outbreak .
Some even have accused Rouhani of favoring the economy over the health of the people .
According to the latest official figures , there are more than 95,000 confirmed coronavirus cases in Iran , and the death toll has exceeded 6,000 .
On April 22 , Rouhani described the reopening of businesses as “ a necessity for the country.
” To understand the reasons behind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision , one needs to look back at the Iranian economy ’ s condition before the coronavirus outbreak .
Iran ’ s economic growth rate was negative 7 percent .
Stagflation had put the economy into a serious crisis .
After the United States ’ 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal and reimposition of sanctions , Iran ’ s foreign trade and oil exports declined dramatically—and political tensions with Gulf neighbors spiked as the United States deepened the crisis .
In the meantime , the International Monetary Fund had predicted that Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , and according to the Central Bank of Iran , the annual inflation rate reached 41 percent , the highest level in 25 years .
The number of unemployed people had already reached about 3 million before the coronavirus crisis , and some estimates would suggest the number to be even higher .
Then came the coronavirus outbreak .
After the government ’ s decision to shut down businesses , at least half of Iran ’ s economy , which is dominated by service sector jobs , was seriously affected .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 7.3 million people became precarious as millions lost their jobs and others had their wages or hours cut .
The shutdown came at a time when many businesses were expecting almost 50 percent of their annual income during the last two months of the Iranian year before Nowruz , the Persian New Year , at the end of March .
Every year during the last Iranian month of Esfand ( beginning in February and ending in March ) and before the New Year people usually do most of their shopping .
Esfand is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , Farvardin ( March 20-April 19 ) , which is generally a month of holidays and tourism .
During Farvardin , many businesses—including restaurants , travel agencies , and hotels—tend to witness a boom , but this year their revenues reportedly fell by more than 90 percent .
Estimates suggest that Iran ’ s GDP has now decreased by about 15 percent as a result of the disruption to businesses , and that the economy will shrink further compared to last year .
Businesses have reduced their activities as well as their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 36,000 people are applying for unemployment insurance each day .
Government support could have eased the pain , but extending a safety net was not an option in Iran .
Although the increase in the unemployment rolls caused by coronavirus outbreak has not been officially announced yet , some estimates indicate that 1 million Iranians have lost their jobs during the crisis , while other figures put the number at 2 million .
Under such circumstances , government support could have eased the pain , but extending a safety net was not an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures were introduced all over the world to deal with the economic consequences of the coronavirus outbreak , Rouhani ’ s government could not afford to assist affected businesses due to a lack of financial resources , largely because U.S. sanctions have denied Iran access to its assets and money held in foreign banks .
The financial assistance amount that Rouhani has so far promised to support affected businesses is 100 trillion tomans ( $ 6.25 billion ) , most of which is supposed to be paid to businesses in the form of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ten rials .
Although the rial is the official currency , Iranians use the toman in everyday life . )
These loans have a three-year repayment term with a 12 percent interest rate .
In the event of a second coronavirus outbreak and a bad economic situation , the government will give these loans to businesses ; in normal times , bank loans would come with a higher 20 percent interest rate .
According to the Iranian economist Mohammad Hashem Botshekan , this economic package was more like a monetary policy than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were seriously considering an economic survival package , it would need to give interest-free loans to businesses , and it would provide free economic assistance to the people .
Furthermore , the amount spent by the government compared to the volume of Iran ’ s GDP was insignificant .
After all , the U.S. government ’ s package accounts for approximately 10 percent of the country ’ s total GDP , the German and Japanese support packages are equivalent to about 20 percent of their GDPs , while the economic packages of some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of their GDPs .
But the offered economic survival package from the Iranian government only equates to 2 percent of the country ’ s GDP .
Rouhani ’ s government also announced that it would give a 1 million-toman loan ( about $ 62 ) to low-income families—an interest-free loan that would be repaid in 24 monthly installments , sparking widespread criticisms .
This amount is equivalent to half of the minimum monthly salary of a laborer in Iran and would not do much to help people with their economic hardships .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have shrunk dramatically .
Since the coronavirus pandemic began , demand for oil has declined , pushing prices down .
Moreover , another source of revenue for the Iranian government—taxes—has been seriously eroded due to the closure of businesses .
Indeed , the government has stopped collecting taxes from some businesses that have been financially damaged as a result of the coronavirus pandemic—but it is the government that will decide which businesses receive a three-month deferment of tax payment .
In the end , Rouhani had only two options : Either he could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and government bodies until the virus is brought under control and the medical and health system of the country is restored to normal , or , due to the dire economic situation , he could allow the businesses and government offices to resume their activities .
He opted for the latter and reopened the markets and government offices on April 11 , a decision that sparked a great deal of criticism from medical experts as well as some high-ranking government officials such as the head of the judiciary , who criticized the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the people .
Rouhani ordered almost all economic sectors , including financial markets and shopping centers to fully resume their activities .
Some high-risk businesses such as sports clubs , big restaurants , and cinemas are not still allowed to reopen .
Even now , several weeks after the decision was implemented , Iranian health officials are still declaring their opposition to it .
Since the reopening of businesses and government bodies , social distancing measures in Iran have not been observed ; in a matter of few days , people began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was over and life had returned to normal .
In a matter of few days , people began to act as if the coronavirus crisis was over and life had returned to normal.Although the pace of coronavirus-related deaths has decreased recently , more than 1,200 new cases and about 100 deaths from the virus are still being reported each day .
According to health officials in some cities , such as Tehran , the number of people infected with the coronavirus is increasing .
Many doctors and officials in Iran ’ s health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s decision to lift social distancing restrictions may soon lead to a second wave of infections .
Indeed , a resurgence of the pandemic could have a much more devastating impact .
The illness and death of tens of thousands of people in a second wave would force businesses to close once again , and the Iranian health care system would come under immense pressure .
Under such circumstances , the government would barely be able to keep the economy alive and stable .
The government ’ s revenues would further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be able to support poor and low-income families .
In such a situation , millions of people could lose their jobs and a greater economic recession might put Iran ’ s economy at risk of collapse .
While Rouhani ’ s move could lead to a new outbreak with all the devastating consequences it brings , his unpopular decision has , for now , saved the economy from further deterioration and possible protests .
Rouhani ’ s decision was based on the view that Iran has passed through the first major wave of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on economic activity are no longer justifiable .
According to this view , an ongoing economic lockdown would have dangerous consequences for the country : The unemployment rate would rise sharply , many businesses would go bankrupt , and social unrest could follow .
While Rouhani is well aware that there is a risk of a second wave , the country can not keep the lockdown in place for another month or two because the government can not make up for the losses suffered by businesses , as wealthier governments in Europe and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ why he is insisting on bringing the economy and society back to normal as soon as possible .
While the country has yet to leave behind last November ’ s public protests against the substantial increase in the prices of gasoline , fear of reemergence of public protests and riots was evident in a letter sent to Rouhani by 50 economists on April 3 .
They cautioned him that the economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis could lead to unrest in the second half of the Persian Year 1399 , which has just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 1400 , would be a year of crisis .

As businesses resume their activities in Iran at the behest of President Hassan Rouhani, many experts have criticized the government’s decision and warned of a second wave of the coronavirus outbreak. Some even have accused Rouhani of favoring the economy over the health of the people.
As businesses resume their activities in Iran at the behest of President Hassan Rouhani, many experts have criticized the government’s decision and warned of a second wave of the coronavirus outbreak. Some even have accused Rouhani of favoring the economy over the health of the people.
According to the latest official figures, there are more than 95,000 confirmed coronavirus cases in Iran, and the death toll has exceeded 6,000.
On April 22, Rouhani described the reopening of businesses as “a necessity for the country.”
To understand the reasons behind Rouhani’s risky and possibly dangerous decision, one needs to look back at the Iranian economy’s condition before the coronavirus outbreak. Iran’s economic growth rate was negative 7 percent. Stagflation had put the economy into a serious crisis.
After the United States’ 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal and reimposition of sanctions, Iran’s foreign trade and oil exports declined dramatically—and political tensions with Gulf neighbors spiked as the United States deepened the crisis.
To understand the reasons behind Rouhani’s risky and possibly dangerous decision, one needs to look back at the Iranian economy’s condition before the coronavirus outbreak.
In the meantime, the International Monetary Fund had predicted that Iran’s economy would shrink 9.5 percent last year, and according to the Central Bank of Iran, the annual inflation rate reached 41 percent, the highest level in 25 years. The number of unemployed people had already reached about 3 million before the coronavirus crisis, and some estimates would suggest the number to be even higher.
Then came the coronavirus outbreak. After the government’s decision to shut down businesses, at least half of Iran’s economy, which is dominated by service sector jobs, was seriously affected. The living conditions and welfare of an estimated 7.3 million people became precarious as millions lost their jobs and others had their wages or hours cut.
The shutdown came at a time when many businesses were expecting almost 50 percent of their annual income during the last two months of the Iranian year before Nowruz, the Persian New Year, at the end of March.
Every year during the last Iranian month of Esfand (beginning in February and ending in March) and before the New Year people usually do most of their shopping. Esfand is followed by the first month of the year, Farvardin (March 20-April 19), which is generally a month of holidays and tourism. During Farvardin, many businesses—including restaurants, travel agencies, and hotels—tend to witness a boom, but this year their revenues reportedly fell by more than 90 percent.
Estimates suggest that Iran’s GDP has now decreased by about 15 percent as a result of the disruption to businesses, and that the economy will shrink further compared to last year. Businesses have reduced their activities as well as their workforce, and statistics show that about 36,000 people are applying for unemployment insurance each day.
Government support could have eased the pain, but extending a safety net was not an option in Iran.
Although the increase in the unemployment rolls caused by coronavirus outbreak has not been officially announced yet, some estimates indicate that 1 million Iranians have lost their jobs during the crisis, while other figures put the number at 2 million.
Under such circumstances, government support could have eased the pain, but extending a safety net was not an option in Iran. While income support measures were introduced all over the world to deal with the economic consequences of the coronavirus outbreak, Rouhani’s government could not afford to assist affected businesses due to a lack of financial resources, largely because U.S. sanctions have denied Iran access to its assets and money held in foreign banks.
The financial assistance amount that Rouhani has so far promised to support affected businesses is 100 trillion tomans ($6.25 billion), most of which is supposed to be paid to businesses in the form of loans. (One toman is equivalent to ten rials. Although the rial is the official currency, Iranians use the toman in everyday life.)
These loans have a three-year repayment term with a 12 percent interest rate. In the event of a second coronavirus outbreak and a bad economic situation, the government will give these loans to businesses; in normal times, bank loans would come with a higher 20 percent interest rate.
According to the Iranian economist Mohammad Hashem Botshekan, this economic package was more like a monetary policy than an economic stimulus; if the government were seriously considering an economic survival package, it would need to give interest-free loans to businesses, and it would provide free economic assistance to the people. Furthermore, the amount spent by the government compared to the volume of Iran’s GDP was insignificant.
After all, the U.S. government’s package accounts for approximately 10 percent of the country’s total GDP, the German and Japanese support packages are equivalent to about 20 percent of their GDPs, while the economic packages of some Persian Gulf countries accounts for about 30 percent of their GDPs. But the offered economic survival package from the Iranian government only equates to 2 percent of the country’s GDP.
Rouhani’s government also announced that it would give a 1 million-toman loan (about $62) to low-income families—an interest-free loan that would be repaid in 24 monthly installments, sparking widespread criticisms. This amount is equivalent to half of the minimum monthly salary of a laborer in Iran and would not do much to help people with their economic hardships.
But the Rouhani government’s revenues have shrunk dramatically. Since the coronavirus pandemic began, demand for oil has declined, pushing prices down. Moreover, another source of revenue for the Iranian government—taxes—has been seriously eroded due to the closure of businesses. Indeed, the government has stopped collecting taxes from some businesses that have been financially damaged as a result of the coronavirus pandemic—but it is the government that will decide which businesses receive a three-month deferment of tax payment.
In the end, Rouhani had only two options: Either he could go on with the shutdown of businesses and government bodies until the virus is brought under control and the medical and health system of the country is restored to normal, or, due to the dire economic situation, he could allow the businesses and government offices to resume their activities.
He opted for the latter and reopened the markets and government offices on April 11, a decision that sparked a great deal of criticism from medical experts as well as some high-ranking government officials such as the head of the judiciary, who criticized the government for prioritizing the economy over the health of the people.
Rouhani ordered almost all economic sectors, including financial markets and shopping centers to fully resume their activities. Some high-risk businesses such as sports clubs, big restaurants, and cinemas are not still allowed to reopen. Even now, several weeks after the decision was implemented, Iranian health officials are still declaring their opposition to it.
Since the reopening of businesses and government bodies, social distancing measures in Iran have not been observed; in a matter of few days, people began to act as if the coronavirus crisis was over and life had returned to normal.
In a matter of few days, people began to act as if the coronavirus crisis was over and life had returned to normal.Although the pace of coronavirus-related deaths has decreased recently, more than 1,200 new cases and about 100 deaths from the virus are still being reported each day. According to health officials in some cities, such as Tehran, the number of people infected with the coronavirus is increasing. Many doctors and officials in Iran’s health sector are scared, saying that the government’s decision to lift social distancing restrictions may soon lead to a second wave of infections.
Indeed, a resurgence of the pandemic could have a much more devastating impact. The illness and death of tens of thousands of people in a second wave would force businesses to close once again, and the Iranian health care system would come under immense pressure. Under such circumstances, the government would barely be able to keep the economy alive and stable. The government’s revenues would further shrink, and it would probably not be able to support poor and low-income families. In such a situation, millions of people could lose their jobs and a greater economic recession might put Iran’s economy at risk of collapse.
While Rouhani’s move could lead to a new outbreak with all the devastating consequences it brings, his unpopular decision has, for now, saved the economy from further deterioration and possible protests. Rouhani’s decision was based on the view that Iran has passed through the first major wave of the coronavirus outbreak and that continuing curbs on economic activity are no longer justifiable. According to this view, an ongoing economic lockdown would have dangerous consequences for the country: The unemployment rate would rise sharply, many businesses would go bankrupt, and social unrest could follow.
While Rouhani is well aware that there is a risk of a second wave, the country cannot keep the lockdown in place for another month or two because the government cannot make up for the losses suffered by businesses, as wealthier governments in Europe and North America have done. That is why he is insisting on bringing the economy and society back to normal as soon as possible.
While the country has yet to leave behind last November’s public protests against the substantial increase in the prices of gasoline, fear of reemergence of public protests and riots was evident in a letter sent to Rouhani by 50 economists on April 3. They cautioned him that the economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis could lead to unrest in the second half of the Persian Year 1399, which has just begun, and that the next year, 1400, would be a year of crisis.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--In Rural Afghanistan, Some Taliban Gingerly Welcome Girls Schools

In Rural Afghanistan , Some Taliban Gingerly Welcome Girls Schools BADIKHEL , Afghanistan—For the last year , Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan , which is largely dominated by the Taliban .
In a previous era , when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11 , that would have been impossible : The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls .
But things are different this time , villagers say .
Some of the girls at Rahman ’ s school are actually related to active @ @ @ @ @ @ @ villagers , the insurgents have assured them that they have no qualms with his girls school .
“ Some of my students are daughters , sisters , or nieces of Taliban fighters .
Mostly , all of these men are not living in our village , ” Rahman told Foreign Policy .
“ They are busy with fighting and hiding .
But they encouraged their relatives to visit my school and get educated.
” “ My brother is a Taliban fighter .
But he does not have any problems with the school .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ education , ” said Latifa Khostai , one of Rahman ’ s students .
Even as the fighting rages outside the village between the Taliban and Afghan national forces , despite a U.S.-orchestrated cease-fire , Rahman said he is cautiously hopeful that things won ’ t go back to the way they were before .
“ I ’ m proud of my work , and I know that it ’ s dismantling a lot of prejudices , ” said the teacher , who was himself educated in the capital of Kabul .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic religion .
The Taliban know that too , but it seems that they don ’ t have a clear stance on girls ’ education.
” When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s , they imposed a very extremist patriarchal rule and banned female education all over the country .
Additionally , women were not allowed to work and could not leave their homes without a close male relative .
But in fact , misogynist policies were already shaped before the Taliban were created .
After the mujahideen overran Kabul and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , hostility toward women in urban areas increased .
Also , the whole issue has always been exploited by both local governments and foreign powers that invaded the country .
When the Afghan communists staged a brutal coup in the late 1970s , they portrayed themselves as the liberators of Afghan women and underlined the importance of education .
Often , this happened through propaganda movies focusing on the alleged transition of Afghan society after the so-called revolution , as the communists viewed their coup , in 1978 .
In such movies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear depiction : miniskirts and alcohol .
But at the same time , many schools were shut down—the total number of them actually decreased throughout the country—while many female dissidents were tortured and killed in hidden dungeons .
When the Russians invaded Afghanistan , they introduced themselves as defenders of women ’ s rights against so-called barbaric Islamists , while many Afghan women supported the mujahideen rebels .
In 2001 , a déjà vu took place when the Americans and their Western allies entered Afghanistan and proclaimed women ’ s rights , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their chief purposes .
Since the Americans signed a peace deal with the Taliban in late February , it has become clear that , sooner or later , the insurgent group would somehow return to power in some form , at the very least in some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the government in Kabul .
In fact , large parts of Afghanistan are already under the Taliban ’ s control .
But especially in urban areas like Kabul and elsewhere , many Afghans still fear a regression toward the dark days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it comes to female education , some observers and activists believe that the Taliban would ban any kind of education for girls and young women again .
Both the Kabul government and the American negotiators made clear that such a regression would not take place , while the Taliban leadership preferred to stay vague and underlined the importance of Islamic norms in the context of women ’ s work and girls ’ education .
“ We are not against female education or work .
But we have Islamic norms .
This is still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abbas Stanikzai , the head of the Taliban office in Qatar , previously said in an interview .
The case of the girls school in Badikhel , however , shows that things are much more complex .
“ This is not surprising .
The Taliban were never able to have a clear position to even convince their own men about the validity of un-Islamic orders like closing girls schools , ” said Orzala Nemat , a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit , an independent research organization based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during Taliban ruling in the late 1990s , local officers made arrangements with local communities to keep the schools open .
“ This whole rule is one among a number of rules perhaps imposed on Taliban leadership by those who aimed to destroy the foundations of a progressive thinking in the country.
” The villagers in Badikhel have witnessed the Taliban ’ s discordant stance firsthand .
While some Taliban members sent their female relatives to Rahman ’ s school , which now has about 30 students , others sent threats .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , unknown militants demanded the closure of the school .
If not , Rahman would face “ consequences.
” Subsequently , the villagers reached out to the family members of the students .
“ After we talked with the Taliban members we knew , they became angry .
They said they would find out who threatened the school , and they took it personally since their own girls are visiting the school , ” Zaman said .
Rahman also faced other kinds of local resistance .
Often , families rejected giving the girls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to them .
Additionally , many still did not like the idea of sending their female relatives to any kind of school .
But , after some time and many efforts , Rahman managed to persuade most of his fellow villagers to allow him to continue the effort .
“ Striving for education has always been a problem for Afghan women .
But I ’ m optimistic that certain circumstances are changing slowly .
Personally , I ’ m happy to go to school and learn so many different things , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who declined to give her surname .
She described how some of her family members at first resisted her attending Rahman ’ s school .
But over time , all of them started supporting her and even encouraged their relatives to send their daughters and sisters and nieces to school too .
Also , Mahbuba wants to go to university one day .
“ We are a crucial part of Afghan society , but we need to be educated to serve our purposes in the best way , ” she told Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also did not give her surname , said her older brother encouraged her to go to Rahman ’ s school .
“ I hope that the situation improves and that we would be able to continue visiting school .
The worst thing would be a closure , ” she said .
Nor is the lack of education in Afghanistan ’ s rural areas solely tied to problems with the Taliban .
“ I wonder if the government even knows that I ’ m running a school in my own house in a village @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited resources .
He used his own savings and local donations to build up the school .
“ Mostly , people talk about schools and universities in Kabul .
But what about the villages ?
It ’ s as if we don ’ t exist , ” he said .
From 2002 , the U.S. government reportedly invested around $ 1 billion to build schools , staff classrooms , and flood provinces with textbooks .
But most of the money went into the gaping pockets of warlords and corrupt government officials , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 , at least 1,100 schools listed as active in 2011 by the Afghan Education Ministry were not at all operational .
Later , these places became famous as “ ghost schools.
” Also , girls were often overcounted by officials to accumulate more U.S. aid money .
The failure of the United States in Afghanistan was probably best , and most disturbingly , epitomized by the very existence of what are now known as ghost schools , where no female students actually exist .
Rahman knows he ’ ll be very much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially after the Americans leave .
“ Our school is very real .
But I doubt that those people in Western capitals or in the Kabul bubble will care about us .
”

BADIKHEL, Afghanistan—For the last year, Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan, which is largely dominated by the Taliban. In a previous era, when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11, that would have been impossible: The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls. But things are different this time, villagers say.
BADIKHEL, Afghanistan—For the last year, Habib-ur-Rahman has been running a small girls school in his own home in this remote area of rural Afghanistan, which is largely dominated by the Taliban. In a previous era, when the Taliban completely ruled the country before 9/11, that would have been impossible: The radical Islamist group forbade formal education for girls. But things are different this time, villagers say.
Some of the girls at Rahman’s school are actually related to active Taliban members, and according to the villagers, the insurgents have assured them that they have no qualms with his girls school. “Some of my students are daughters, sisters, or nieces of Taliban fighters. Mostly, all of these men are not living in our village,” Rahman told Foreign Policy. “They are busy with fighting and hiding. But they encouraged their relatives to visit my school and get educated.”
“My brother is a Taliban fighter. But he does not have any problems with the school. He wants me to seek wisdom and education,” said Latifa Khostai, one of Rahman’s students.
Even as the fighting rages outside the village between the Taliban and Afghan national forces, despite a U.S.-orchestrated cease-fire, Rahman said he is cautiously hopeful that things won’t go back to the way they were before. “I’m proud of my work, and I know that it’s dismantling a lot of prejudices,” said the teacher, who was himself educated in the capital of Kabul. “Education is an important part of the Islamic religion. The Taliban know that too, but it seems that they don’t have a clear stance on girls’ education.”
When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, they imposed a very extremist patriarchal rule and banned female education all over the country. Additionally, women were not allowed to work and could not leave their homes without a close male relative. But in fact, misogynist policies were already shaped before the Taliban were created. After the mujahideen overran Kabul and toppled the last communist government in 1992, hostility toward women in urban areas increased. Also, the whole issue has always been exploited by both local governments and foreign powers that invaded the country.
Some of ur-Rahman’s students on April 1. Several are related to Taliban members. "My brother is a Taliban fighter. He encouraged me to visit school," said Latifa (right).
When the Afghan communists staged a brutal coup in the late 1970s, they portrayed themselves as the liberators of Afghan women and underlined the importance of education. Often, this happened through propaganda movies focusing on the alleged transition of Afghan society after the so-called revolution, as the communists viewed their coup, in 1978. In such movies, the liberation of women had a very clear depiction: miniskirts and alcohol. But at the same time, many schools were shut down—the total number of them actually decreased throughout the country—while many female dissidents were tortured and killed in hidden dungeons. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, they introduced themselves as defenders of women’s rights against so-called barbaric Islamists, while many Afghan women supported the mujahideen rebels. In 2001, a déjà vu took place when the Americans and their Western allies entered Afghanistan and proclaimed women’s rights, and especially girls’ education, as one of their chief purposes.
Since the Americans signed a peace deal with the Taliban in late February, it has become clear that, sooner or later, the insurgent group would somehow return to power in some form, at the very least in some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the government in Kabul. In fact, large parts of Afghanistan are already under the Taliban’s control. But especially in urban areas like Kabul and elsewhere, many Afghans still fear a regression toward the dark days of the Taliban regime. Especially when it comes to female education, some observers and activists believe that the Taliban would ban any kind of education for girls and young women again. Both the Kabul government and the American negotiators made clear that such a regression would not take place, while the Taliban leadership preferred to stay vague and underlined the importance of Islamic norms in the context of women’s work and girls’ education. “We are not against female education or work. But we have Islamic norms. This is still not the West,” Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the head of the Taliban office in Qatar, previously said in an interview.
The case of the girls school in Badikhel, however, shows that things are much more complex. “This is not surprising. The Taliban were never able to have a clear position to even convince their own men about the validity of un-Islamic orders like closing girls schools,” said Orzala Nemat, a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research organization based in Kabul. She described how even during Taliban ruling in the late 1990s, local officers made arrangements with local communities to keep the schools open. “This whole rule is one among a number of rules perhaps imposed on Taliban leadership by those who aimed to destroy the foundations of a progressive thinking in the country.”
The villagers in Badikhel have witnessed the Taliban’s discordant stance firsthand. While some Taliban members sent their female relatives to Rahman’s school, which now has about 30 students, others sent threats. According to Akhtar Zaman, a local villager, unknown militants demanded the closure of the school. If not, Rahman would face “consequences.” Subsequently, the villagers reached out to the family members of the students. “After we talked with the Taliban members we knew, they became angry. They said they would find out who threatened the school, and they took it personally since their own girls are visiting the school,” Zaman said.
Rahman also faced other kinds of local resistance. Often, families rejected giving the girls into the custody of a man unrelated to them. Additionally, many still did not like the idea of sending their female relatives to any kind of school. But, after some time and many efforts, Rahman managed to persuade most of his fellow villagers to allow him to continue the effort.
Students at ur-Rahman's school on April 1.
“Striving for education has always been a problem for Afghan women. But I’m optimistic that certain circumstances are changing slowly. Personally, I’m happy to go to school and learn so many different things,” said Mahbuba, one of the schoolgirls, who declined to give her surname. She described how some of her family members at first resisted her attending Rahman’s school. But over time, all of them started supporting her and even encouraged their relatives to send their daughters and sisters and nieces to school too. Also, Mahbuba wants to go to university one day. “We are a crucial part of Afghan society, but we need to be educated to serve our purposes in the best way,” she told Foreign Policy.
Another student, Maryam, who also did not give her surname, said her older brother encouraged her to go to Rahman’s school. “I hope that the situation improves and that we would be able to continue visiting school. The worst thing would be a closure,” she said.
Nor is the lack of education in Afghanistan’s rural areas solely tied to problems with the Taliban. “I wonder if the government even knows that I’m running a school in my own house in a village,” Rahman said while underlining his limited resources. He used his own savings and local donations to build up the school. “Mostly, people talk about schools and universities in Kabul. But what about the villages? It’s as if we don’t exist,” he said.
From 2002, the U.S. government reportedly invested around $1 billion to build schools, staff classrooms, and flood provinces with textbooks. But most of the money went into the gaping pockets of warlords and corrupt government officials, leaving entire schools empty and decaying. By 2015, at least 1,100 schools listed as active in 2011 by the Afghan Education Ministry were not at all operational. Later, these places became famous as “ghost schools.” Also, girls were often overcounted by officials to accumulate more U.S. aid money. The failure of the United States in Afghanistan was probably best, and most disturbingly, epitomized by the very existence of what are now known as ghost schools, where no female students actually exist.
Rahman knows he’ll be very much on his own in the future, especially after the Americans leave. “Our school is very real. But I doubt that those people in Western capitals or in the Kabul bubble will care about us.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-04--U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies

U.S .
Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies On the face of it , the recent standoff along Malaysia ’ s Borneo coast was a robust response by the U.S. Navy to some cynically timed Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea , offering reassurance to wavering Southeast Asian countries that Washington still has their back in the midst of a global pandemic .
Unfortunately , few in the region are likely to view it that way .
For several days , starting on April 20 , the USS America—a small carrier equipped with a handful of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embarked force of U.S. Marines—patrolled , with its two escorts USS Bunker Hill and USS Barry , in close proximity to a Chinese survey ship , Haiyang Dizhi 8 , and its accompanying screen of coast guard vessels and fishing boats , the latter widely assumed to be part of China ’ s maritime militia .
Two Chinese navy destroyers and a frigate subsequently arrived on the scene .
The target of China ’ s motley but highly coordinated maritime force was the West Capella , a drillship working under charter to Petronas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It has been operating near the outer edge of Malaysia ’ s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) , off the state of Sarawak , since late 2019 .
Beijing ’ s apparent aim was to intimidate and disrupt Malaysia ’ s exploration activity , coercing it and other Southeast Asian littoral states into accepting joint development with China .
Beijing has repeatedly dispatched such expeditions , encroaching steadily southward , despite the fact that China has no basis under international law from which to claim jurisdiction , its nine-dash line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what ships were available from its coast guard equivalent and overstretched navy .
A Vietnamese vessel also joined the fray , somewhat ambivalently , because Hanoi disputes its maritime boundary with Malaysia yet finds common cause with Kuala Lumpur as a fellow victim of China ’ s intimidatory tactics .
The Chinese flotilla had earlier passed through Vietnam ’ s EEZ on its way toward Malaysian and Bruneian waters .
Such a powerful U.S. Navy assemblage operating in close proximity to the Chinese ships lent an escalatory geopolitical dimension to an already tense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an Australian frigate , HMAS Parramatta , joined in exercises with the Americans near the West Capella .
With COVID-19 having immobilized the USS Theodore Roosevelt , in Guam , and partially hamstrung another forward-based aircraft carrier , in Japan , the USS America ’ s grand sortie across the Western Pacific was a bold demonstration of the U.S. 7th Fleet ’ s ability to react , staring down the Chinese maritime forces in the act of intimidating its Southeast neighbors .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account , too.
” Australia ’ s Foreign Minister Marise Payne called on “ all parties [ to ] refrain from destabilizing activities and work to ease tensions so the international community can devote full attention to responding cooperatively to the COVID-19 pandemic.
” Here was the United States , alongside one of its closest allies , standing guard with Malaysia during its hour of need .
But the partner the United States was there to help had mixed feelings .
Malaysian Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affirming Malaysia ’ s commitment to safeguard its interests and rights in the South China Sea .
Characteristically , Hishammuddin sought to position Malaysia in between the United States and China .
Acknowledging that “ international law guarantees the freedom of navigation , ” he added that the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has “ the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace , security and stability in the region.
” Such equivocation , needless to say , did not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a few days , and without further incident , the USS America , its escorts , and the Australians quietly left the scene .
China ’ s warships withdrew around the same time .
On April 25 , one of the U.S. Navy ’ s much smaller , faster littoral combat ships , operating from Singapore , moved through the area around the West Capella but did not linger .
The rest of the world has since moved on , but from Malaysia ’ s perspective , the episode is anything but over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within Malaysia ’ s EEZ , guarded by four China Coast Guard vessels .
Many within Malaysia ’ s government are unimpressed .
“ I told you so ” is the refrain from the country ’ s foreign-policy establishment .
Some , including in Malaysia ’ s navy , would still like to see a closer defense and security relationship with the United States as a hedge against further Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea .
The abrupt end to Mahathir Mohamad ’ s second term as prime minister in February had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy .
The recent events have not helped their case .
Malaysia feels shortchanged , believing that the U.S. Navy arrived unannounced and uninvited , prompting the arrival of more Chinese assets and escalating the situation beyond its capacity to handle independently .
Critics will say this proves America ’ s lack of staying power : showing up with the cavalry , just long enough to make things worse .
If the objective was to deter China from continuing its survey activity within Malaysia ’ s EEZ , it appears to have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration ’ s hopeful assumption that Southeast Asian nations will rally to the anti-China cause once presented with a U.S. show of resolve .
China ’ s brash diplomacy during the current pandemic may be rapidly alienating many countries around the world , but most Southeast Asian elites are unlikely to pull back from Beijing ’ s economic embrace .
They are in too deep .
Once the West Capella finishes its current round of drilling , Malaysia could well be tempted to accept joint offshore energy development on China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Vietnam have protested China ’ s recent actions in the South China Sea , which have seen their own vessels targeted .
But the Trump administration is unlikely to win new regional converts given its shambolic domestic handling of the pandemic while trading shrill accusations and counter-accusations with Beijing .
To be fair , the U.S. Navy ’ s decision not to dwell around the West Capella may say more about basic arithmetic than Washington ’ s attitude .
It has fewer than 300 warships with which to maintain a worldwide presence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is responsible for covering a massive area in the Indo-Pacific , this task is toughest given the great distances it must cover and the fact that China ’ s navy is already the world ’ s largest in hull numbers .
U.S. submarines are active around the Western Pacific .
But their presence brings little reassurance for allies and partners seeking a visible U.S. commitment to regional security .
Operating in the South China Sea is particularly challenging for the U.S. Navy , as its closest bases are in Japan and Guam , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for littoral combat ships in Singapore .
The old American base at Subic Bay in the Philippines , shuttered in 1992 , must be sorely missed .
The base at Vietnam ’ s Cam Ranh Bay , too .
Meanwhile , China has vastly upgraded its bases in the Spratly Islands , giving it the ability to rapidly surge naval and paramilitary forces to the southern extremities of the South China Sea .
Competition in the South China Sea is an endurance game .
Like counterinsurgency , it requires stamina and benefits from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more important than firepower .
The USS America amphibious ready group was a show of strength , but such fleeting muscular demonstrations are largely ineffective at countering China ’ s suffocation strategy directed at Southeast Asian claimants .
The USS Barry , having since transited the Taiwan Strait and conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in the Paracel Islands , reveals how hard the 7th Fleet is being worked .
But trying to be everywhere at once can mean going around in circles .
The littoral combat ship has been the butt of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and reliability issues .
But it could still be a more appropriate platform than larger warships for this kind of littoral presence operation , being nimbler and less escalatory .
The ideal balance between agility , deterrence , and self-protection in the South China Sea probably looks more like a frigate .
The U.S. Navy has just committed to an Italian future frigate design , but it does not have a single frigate in its inventory , currently , and the first ship will not enter the water until 2026 .
The value @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent standoff was thus more than simply symbolic .
Yet Australia ’ s major naval bases lie even farther from the South China Sea than the 7th Fleet ’ s bases in Japan .
This puts the onus back on Southeast Asia .
If countries such as Malaysia , Brunei , the Philippines , and Vietnam , all in China ’ s firing line , really want the U.S. Navy to remain present in the South China Sea in ways that transcend short-term shows of resolve , they need to collectively come up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hosting it , as Singapore already does .
Southeast Asian countries with a direct stake in the South China Sea must additionally put aside their differences and be prepared to finally act in concert .
The most important lesson from the West Capella episode is that China won ’ t stop here .

On the face of it, the recent standoff along Malaysia’s Borneo coast was a robust response by the U.S. Navy to some cynically timed Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea, offering reassurance to wavering Southeast Asian countries that Washington still has their back in the midst of a global pandemic. Unfortunately, few in the region are likely to view it that way.
On the face of it, the recent standoff along Malaysia’s Borneo coast was a robust response by the U.S. Navy to some cynically timed Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea, offering reassurance to wavering Southeast Asian countries that Washington still has their back in the midst of a global pandemic. Unfortunately, few in the region are likely to view it that way.
For several days, starting on April 20, the USS America—a small carrier equipped with a handful of F-35 jets, helicopters, and an embarked force of U.S. Marines—patrolled, with its two escorts USS Bunker Hill and USS Barry, in close proximity to a Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, and its accompanying screen of coast guard vessels and fishing boats, the latter widely assumed to be part of China’s maritime militia. Two Chinese navy destroyers and a frigate subsequently arrived on the scene.
The target of China’s motley but highly coordinated maritime force was the West Capella, a drillship working under charter to Petronas, Malaysia’s state-owned energy company. It has been operating near the outer edge of Malaysia’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), off the state of Sarawak, since late 2019. Beijing’s apparent aim was to intimidate and disrupt Malaysia’s exploration activity, coercing it and other Southeast Asian littoral states into accepting joint development with China.
Beijing has repeatedly dispatched such expeditions, encroaching steadily southward, despite the fact that China has no basis under international law from which to claim jurisdiction, its nine-dash line long since universally discredited. Malaysia deployed what ships were available from its coast guard equivalent and overstretched navy. A Vietnamese vessel also joined the fray, somewhat ambivalently, because Hanoi disputes its maritime boundary with Malaysia yet finds common cause with Kuala Lumpur as a fellow victim of China’s intimidatory tactics. The Chinese flotilla had earlier passed through Vietnam’s EEZ on its way toward Malaysian and Bruneian waters.
Such a powerful U.S. Navy assemblage operating in close proximity to the Chinese ships lent an escalatory geopolitical dimension to an already tense situation. To complete the maritime melee, an Australian frigate, HMAS Parramatta, joined in exercises with the Americans near the West Capella. With COVID-19 having immobilized the USS Theodore Roosevelt, in Guam, and partially hamstrung another forward-based aircraft carrier, in Japan, the USS America’s grand sortie across the Western Pacific was a bold demonstration of the U.S. 7th Fleet’s ability to react, staring down the Chinese maritime forces in the act of intimidating its Southeast neighbors.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States “strongly opposes China’s bullying and we hope other nations will hold them to account, too.” Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne called on “all parties [to] refrain from destabilizing activities and work to ease tensions so the international community can devote full attention to responding cooperatively to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Here was the United States, alongside one of its closest allies, standing guard with Malaysia during its hour of need.
But the partner the United States was there to help had mixed feelings. Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein issued his own statement affirming Malaysia’s commitment to safeguard its interests and rights in the South China Sea. Characteristically, Hishammuddin sought to position Malaysia in between the United States and China. Acknowledging that “international law guarantees the freedom of navigation,” he added that the presence of warships and vessels in the South China Sea has “the potential to increase tensions that in turn may result in miscalculations which may affect peace, security and stability in the region.” Such equivocation, needless to say, did not go down well in Washington. Within a few days, and without further incident, the USS America, its escorts, and the Australians quietly left the scene. China’s warships withdrew around the same time. On April 25, one of the U.S. Navy’s much smaller, faster littoral combat ships, operating from Singapore, moved through the area around the West Capella but did not linger.
The rest of the world has since moved on, but from Malaysia’s perspective, the episode is anything but over. The Haiyang Dizhi 8 remains active within Malaysia’s EEZ, guarded by four China Coast Guard vessels. Many within Malaysia’s government are unimpressed. “I told you so” is the refrain from the country’s foreign-policy establishment. Some, including in Malaysia’s navy, would still like to see a closer defense and security relationship with the United States as a hedge against further Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. The abrupt end to Mahathir Mohamad’s second term as prime minister in February had promised an opening for a less anti-Western foreign policy.
The recent events have not helped their case. Malaysia feels shortchanged, believing that the U.S. Navy arrived unannounced and uninvited, prompting the arrival of more Chinese assets and escalating the situation beyond its capacity to handle independently. Critics will say this proves America’s lack of staying power: showing up with the cavalry, just long enough to make things worse. If the objective was to deter China from continuing its survey activity within Malaysia’s EEZ, it appears to have failed.
It also raises questions about the Trump administration’s hopeful assumption that Southeast Asian nations will rally to the anti-China cause once presented with a U.S. show of resolve. China’s brash diplomacy during the current pandemic may be rapidly alienating many countries around the world, but most Southeast Asian elites are unlikely to pull back from Beijing’s economic embrace. They are in too deep.
Once the West Capella finishes its current round of drilling, Malaysia could well be tempted to accept joint offshore energy development on China’s terms. Granted, the Philippines and Vietnam have protested China’s recent actions in the South China Sea, which have seen their own vessels targeted. But the Trump administration is unlikely to win new regional converts given its shambolic domestic handling of the pandemic while trading shrill accusations and counter-accusations with Beijing.
To be fair, the U.S. Navy’s decision not to dwell around the West Capella may say more about basic arithmetic than Washington’s attitude. It has fewer than 300 warships with which to maintain a worldwide presence. For the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for covering a massive area in the Indo-Pacific, this task is toughest given the great distances it must cover and the fact that China’s navy is already the world’s largest in hull numbers. U.S. submarines are active around the Western Pacific. But their presence brings little reassurance for allies and partners seeking a visible U.S. commitment to regional security. Operating in the South China Sea is particularly challenging for the U.S. Navy, as its closest bases are in Japan and Guam, plus a logistics command and berthing facilities for littoral combat ships in Singapore. The old American base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, shuttered in 1992, must be sorely missed. The base at Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay, too. Meanwhile, China has vastly upgraded its bases in the Spratly Islands, giving it the ability to rapidly surge naval and paramilitary forces to the southern extremities of the South China Sea.
Competition in the South China Sea is an endurance game. Like counterinsurgency, it requires stamina and benefits from the “indirect approach.” Presence is more important than firepower. The USS America amphibious ready group was a show of strength, but such fleeting muscular demonstrations are largely ineffective at countering China’s suffocation strategy directed at Southeast Asian claimants. The USS Barry, having since transited the Taiwan Strait and conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in the Paracel Islands, reveals how hard the 7th Fleet is being worked. But trying to be everywhere at once can mean going around in circles.
The littoral combat ship has been the butt of much criticism for its modest combat capability and reliability issues. But it could still be a more appropriate platform than larger warships for this kind of littoral presence operation, being nimbler and less escalatory. The ideal balance between agility, deterrence, and self-protection in the South China Sea probably looks more like a frigate. The U.S. Navy has just committed to an Italian future frigate design, but it does not have a single frigate in its inventory, currently, and the first ship will not enter the water until 2026. The value of the Australian naval contribution in the recent standoff was thus more than simply symbolic. Yet Australia’s major naval bases lie even farther from the South China Sea than the 7th Fleet’s bases in Japan.
This puts the onus back on Southeast Asia. If countries such as Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnam, all in China’s firing line, really want the U.S. Navy to remain present in the South China Sea in ways that transcend short-term shows of resolve, they need to collectively come up with ways to rotate the burden of hosting it, as Singapore already does. Southeast Asian countries with a direct stake in the South China Sea must additionally put aside their differences and be prepared to finally act in concert. The most important lesson from the West Capella episode is that China won’t stop here.