foreignpolicy--2020-12-28--For Beijing and New Delhi, 2020 Was the Point of No Return

For Beijing and New Delhi , 2020 Was the Point of No Return In a year that challenged policymakers across the world , one development will perhaps have the most significant long-term impact in the Indo-Pacific—the ongoing standoff between India and China in the Himalayas .
Chinese forces have shown no inclination to back away from the positions they have occupied along the Line of Actual Control ( LAC ) , which divides India- and China-controlled territory in Ladakh region , since April .
Meanwhile , Indian troops have been amassing at the disputed border , with New Delhi demanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks have failed to yield any results , underlining the high stakes for both sides .
2020 may well be the year when romanticism about Sino-Indian ties finally died .
Many in New Delhi evinced a naive belief that , despite all the evidence to the contrary , India would be able to manage China diplomatically and that it was possible to keep the shadow of the border dispute from darkening the larger relationship .
Even after the 2017 standoff between the two militaries in Dolkam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the People ’ s Liberation Army razed stone bunkers that the Royal Bhutan Army had constructed , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried to build a personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping .
This was as much about the practical necessity of dealing with a much stronger neighbor as it was about shaping the bilateral engagement beyond disputes .
It worked for a while , but Beijing clearly had other plans .
In its attempt to unilaterally redraw the LAC this year in its favor , Beijing ended up disregarding the central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with India since 1993 to keep the border peaceful .
Its behavior will inevitably alter the trajectory of the Chinese-Indian relationship , which has been premised on an understanding that even as the boundary questions remain unresolved , the two nations can move forward on other areas of engagement—global , regional , and bilateral .
That fundamental tenet today stands seriously undermined .
In some ways , China ’ s assertiveness is understandable .
As long as China was the dominant party along the border , it could continue with the facade of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that was on its terms .
Indeed , it is India ’ s assertion of its interests in the region in the last few years that has emerged as the sticking point .
The militarization of the LAC is taking place at an unprecedented pace today partly because Indian infrastructure is in much better shape and Indian patrolling is far more effective—simply put , the Indian military now has presence in areas where the Chinese military was not used to seeing it .
India is also now ready to take Chinese aggression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more volatile border .
If a lasting solution to the border problem is not found , therefore , greater turbulence along the LAC will continue to be the new normal .
To be sure , China remains a significantly more powerful entity , and its infrastructure is in much better shape .
But Indian infrastructure development has reached a critical point .
And it is not without reason that the Chinese opposition to one project in particular is so vehement .
The 160-mile-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road—which will connect the Indian city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the historic trade route through the Karakoram mountain range that links Ladakh to China ’ s western regions—is India ’ s frontal challenge to China ’ s expansionist designs in the region .
Despite Chinese objections , India has continued to pursue this project .
China raising the temperature on the border is a further attempt to dissuade India from moving ahead .
Indian foreign policy has been at the front and center of challenging China ’ s global designs .
New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Road Initiative ( BRI ) at a time when almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing ’ s narrative that the project was meant to spur global infrastructure development rather than to enrich Chinese businesses .
Today , India ’ s framing of the BRI is widely accepted by most major global powers .
Given that the BRI is very much also a vanity project for Xi , India ’ s role in shaping the global opposition to it must be particularly galling .
India has also managed to shape @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is now working closely with like-minded regional players to give it operational heft .
And at a time when the Trump administration is attempting a process of trade and technology decoupling with China , Washington and New Delhi are closer than ever .
Chinese attempts to marginalize India on the global stage have not worked , and New Delhi ’ s cache has only increased .
And so China has opted for the blunt instrumentality of force , hoping that it would teach India a lesson .
The reality is that Chinese actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect .
Indian public opinion , which was already negative on China , has now become even more strongly anti-Chinese .
Those in India who have been talking about maintaining an equidistance from China and the United States today find it hard to sustain that position .
And New Delhi has become freer to make policy choices , both strategic and economic , that are anti-China .
From reducing trade dependence on China in key strategic sectors and walling off critical sectors from Chinese entry to galvanizing global support for the Indo-Pacific , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domains .
None of these options is cost-free for India .
But China ’ s actions have ensured that today India is ready to bear those costs .
India ’ s military and diplomatic responses to Chinese aggression have made it clear that New Delhi is neither without options nor is it reticent in choosing them .
It is now for China to make up its mind about whether it wants a permanent foe in India or a neighboring country with which it can do business .
Whatever the choice Beijing decides to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ landscape of the Indo-Pacific .

In a year that challenged policymakers across the world, one development will perhaps have the most significant long-term impact in the Indo-Pacific—the ongoing standoff between India and China in the Himalayas. Chinese forces have shown no inclination to back away from the positions they have occupied along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which divides India- and China-controlled territory in Ladakh region, since April. Meanwhile, Indian troops have been amassing at the disputed border, with New Delhi demanding comprehensive restoration of the status quo ante. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks have failed to yield any results, underlining the high stakes for both sides.
In a year that challenged policymakers across the world, one development will perhaps have the most significant long-term impact in the Indo-Pacific—the ongoing standoff between India and China in the Himalayas. Chinese forces have shown no inclination to back away from the positions they have occupied along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which divides India- and China-controlled territory in Ladakh region, since April. Meanwhile, Indian troops have been amassing at the disputed border, with New Delhi demanding comprehensive restoration of the status quo ante. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks have failed to yield any results, underlining the high stakes for both sides.
2020 may well be the year when romanticism about Sino-Indian ties finally died. Many in New Delhi evinced a naive belief that, despite all the evidence to the contrary, India would be able to manage China diplomatically and that it was possible to keep the shadow of the border dispute from darkening the larger relationship. Even after the 2017 standoff between the two militaries in Dolkam at the India-Bhutan-China border, in which the People’s Liberation Army razed stone bunkers that the Royal Bhutan Army had constructed, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried to build a personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. This was as much about the practical necessity of dealing with a much stronger neighbor as it was about shaping the bilateral engagement beyond disputes. It worked for a while, but Beijing clearly had other plans.
In its attempt to unilaterally redraw the LAC this year in its favor, Beijing ended up disregarding the central tenets of all pacts it has signed with India since 1993 to keep the border peaceful. Its behavior will inevitably alter the trajectory of the Chinese-Indian relationship, which has been premised on an understanding that even as the boundary questions remain unresolved, the two nations can move forward on other areas of engagement—global, regional, and bilateral. That fundamental tenet today stands seriously undermined.
In some ways, China’s assertiveness is understandable. As long as China was the dominant party along the border, it could continue with the facade of upholding peace and tranquility. After all, that was on its terms. Indeed, it is India’s assertion of its interests in the region in the last few years that has emerged as the sticking point. The militarization of the LAC is taking place at an unprecedented pace today partly because Indian infrastructure is in much better shape and Indian patrolling is far more effective—simply put, the Indian military now has presence in areas where the Chinese military was not used to seeing it. India is also now ready to take Chinese aggression head-on, thereby getting ready for a more volatile border. If a lasting solution to the border problem is not found, therefore, greater turbulence along the LAC will continue to be the new normal.
To be sure, China remains a significantly more powerful entity, and its infrastructure is in much better shape. But Indian infrastructure development has reached a critical point. And it is not without reason that the Chinese opposition to one project in particular is so vehement. The 160-mile-long strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road—which will connect the Indian city of Leh to the Karakoram Pass, the historic trade route through the Karakoram mountain range that links Ladakh to China’s western regions—is India’s frontal challenge to China’s expansionist designs in the region. Despite Chinese objections, India has continued to pursue this project. China raising the temperature on the border is a further attempt to dissuade India from moving ahead.
Indian foreign policy has been at the front and center of challenging China’s global designs. New Delhi was the first country to warn the world of the dangers of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at a time when almost every other country was willing to buy into Beijing’s narrative that the project was meant to spur global infrastructure development rather than to enrich Chinese businesses. Today, India’s framing of the BRI is widely accepted by most major global powers. Given that the BRI is very much also a vanity project for Xi, India’s role in shaping the global opposition to it must be particularly galling. India has also managed to shape the global discourse on the Indo-Pacific and is now working closely with like-minded regional players to give it operational heft. And at a time when the Trump administration is attempting a process of trade and technology decoupling with China, Washington and New Delhi are closer than ever. Chinese attempts to marginalize India on the global stage have not worked, and New Delhi’s cache has only increased.
And so China has opted for the blunt instrumentality of force, hoping that it would teach India a lesson. The reality is that Chinese actions have ended up producing exactly the opposite effect. Indian public opinion, which was already negative on China, has now become even more strongly anti-Chinese. Those in India who have been talking about maintaining an equidistance from China and the United States today find it hard to sustain that position. And New Delhi has become freer to make policy choices, both strategic and economic, that are anti-China. From reducing trade dependence on China in key strategic sectors and walling off critical sectors from Chinese entry to galvanizing global support for the Indo-Pacific, India’s response has been across domains.
None of these options is cost-free for India. But China’s actions have ensured that today India is ready to bear those costs. India’s military and diplomatic responses to Chinese aggression have made it clear that New Delhi is neither without options nor is it reticent in choosing them. It is now for China to make up its mind about whether it wants a permanent foe in India or a neighboring country with which it can do business. Whatever the choice Beijing decides to make, it will determine the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--East Asia Takes a Cautious Coronavirus Victory Lap

From Taiwan to Japan , East Asian states have managed to bring the coronavirus largely under control—thanks in part to experience dealing with the SARS outbreak in 2002 .
East Asian governments acted faster than the West , but they also benefited from publics that saw masks as a social good while Western experts were busy wrongly arguing that they had little value .
At the same time , though , the pandemic exposed various social fault lines in East Asia , such as Singapore ’ s prejudice against migrant workers and the role of religion in South Korea .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s best stories on the region and the pandemic .
One of the few clear winners to emerge from the pandemic was Taiwan , which acted before almost any other state and has effectively brought COVID-19 under control .
That ’ s largely because of the island ’ s experience with SARS , but also because of its innate mistrust of claims by the Chinese authorities .
Taiwanese authorities banned flights from Wuhan before any other country , and immediately turned factories over to mask production .
“ Taiwan has been tackling its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the World Health Organization ( WHO ) and continual bullying from China , ” Hilton Yip wrote in March .
“ In short , Taiwan has had to rely on itself to fight the coronavirus.
” Until a single local transmission emerged last week , Taiwan had managed 200 days without a single new coronavirus case among residents .
That ’ s given the country a significant boost on the world stage at a time when , thanks to ever-growing threats from its giant neighbor , it badly needs it .
One of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia was Japan ’ s .
The government ’ s initial response to COVID-19 was largely botched , littered with failed testing programs , indifferently enforced lockdowns , and a string of mistakes and false statements .
But for much of the year , coronavirus numbers stayed low anyway .
In a piece that was highly popular in Japan itself , long-term resident William Sposato wrote about how existing habits like mask-wearing and lack of close physical contact had helped the nation avoid the worst—despite government ineptitude .
But as Japan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrival of a highly transmissible strain of the virus from the U.K. , those good habits may not be enough—and other , less enviable ones may come to the fore .
“ In contrast to the celebrations for those on the front line elsewhere , nurses and other healthcare workers in Japan have complained of discrimination , bans on their children attending nursery schools , and general disdain from those worried that they are carriers of COVID-19 , ” Sposato noted .
3 .
Singapore Is Trying to Forget Migrant Workers Are People @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a model of how to beat the coronavirus early on .
The city-state went without lockdowns but mandated tight quarantines for travelers and deployed extensive testing and contact-tracing teams mixed with mandatory cell-phone apps .
That approach has largely held up , despite neighboring Malaysia—which had avoided large outbreaks in the spring—now experiencing a serious second wave .
But crisis erupted with a fresh outbreak in migrant workers ’ dorms in April .
Migrant workers are often overlooked or demonized by other Singaporeans , activist and journalist Kirsten Han wrote in May .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard , migrant labor-rights groups were urging the government to come up with measures to address conditions , such as overcrowding and sanitation issues , that leave workers vulnerable to outbreaks of disease , ” Han noted .
Singapore was able to keep its migrants locked away from the rest of the population , but the coronavirus numbers among them would eventually be revealed to be among the highest in the world : Nearly half became infected by the coronavirus .
As East Asian states ’ triumph over the coronavirus became clear , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credited “ Confucian values ” of obedience and community for national successes .
As the Korean American writer S. Nathan Park pointed out in April , coronavirus responses had only become the latest focal point of a long-running form of Western policy critique : claiming that East Asia ’ s successful policies work only because of its cultural makeup and supposedly homogenous populations .
“ It repeats the same mistake that allowed the rampant coronavirus outbreaks in the United States and Europe in the first place : the mistake of seeing Asia as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fundamentally different from the West that no knowledge or experience is transferable , ” Park wrote .
As the success of extremely un-Confucian nations like Australia and New Zealand—which acted quickly and learned from the East Asian experience—demonstrates , beating the pandemic is more about good governance and a willingness to learn from others than about cultural makeup .
South Korea ’ s coronavirus successes were some of the most remarkable , given that the country experienced multiple outbreaks in the early days of the virus—each of which was eventually brought under control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shincheonji , a new religious movement with Christian roots blamed by many for causing a serious outbreak in February .
But church members say they were unfairly targeted by mainstream Christian denominations , which are politically powerful institutions in South Korea .
While the outbreak started among the church , members claim they tried to cooperate with authorities and were falsely accused of lying .
In August , David Volodzko looked into the case , and found a story more tangled than the easy targeting of an outsider group .
“ [ Common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secretive Christian sect ended up making common cause with the LGBTQ community , through its support of South Korea ’ s anti-discrimination bill , ” Volodzko writes , pointing out the strange alliances forged in the pandemic era , when government intrusion into everyday life became the norm .

From Taiwan to Japan, East Asian states have managed to bring the coronavirus largely under control—thanks in part to experience dealing with the SARS outbreak in 2002. East Asian governments acted faster than the West, but they also benefited from publics that saw masks as a social good while Western experts were busy wrongly arguing that they had little value.
From Taiwan to Japan, East Asian states have managed to bring the coronavirus largely under control—thanks in part to experience dealing with the SARS outbreak in 2002. East Asian governments acted faster than the West, but they also benefited from publics that saw masks as a social good while Western experts were busy wrongly arguing that they had little value.
At the same time, though, the pandemic exposed various social fault lines in East Asia, such as Singapore’s prejudice against migrant workers and the role of religion in South Korea.
Here are five of Foreign Policy’s best stories on the region and the pandemic.
by Hilton Yip, March 16
One of the few clear winners to emerge from the pandemic was Taiwan, which acted before almost any other state and has effectively brought COVID-19 under control. That’s largely because of the island’s experience with SARS, but also because of its innate mistrust of claims by the Chinese authorities. Taiwanese authorities banned flights from Wuhan before any other country, and immediately turned factories over to mask production. “Taiwan has been tackling its coronavirus outbreak despite being frozen out of the World Health Organization (WHO) and continual bullying from China,” Hilton Yip wrote in March. “In short, Taiwan has had to rely on itself to fight the coronavirus.”
Until a single local transmission emerged last week, Taiwan had managed 200 days without a single new coronavirus case among residents. That’s given the country a significant boost on the world stage at a time when, thanks to ever-growing threats from its giant neighbor, it badly needs it.
by William Sposato, May 14
One of the most mysterious pandemic successes in East Asia was Japan’s. The government’s initial response to COVID-19 was largely botched, littered with failed testing programs, indifferently enforced lockdowns, and a string of mistakes and false statements. But for much of the year, coronavirus numbers stayed low anyway. In a piece that was highly popular in Japan itself, long-term resident William Sposato wrote about how existing habits like mask-wearing and lack of close physical contact had helped the nation avoid the worst—despite government ineptitude.
But as Japan’s COVID-19 caseloads rose this December following the arrival of a highly transmissible strain of the virus from the U.K., those good habits may not be enough—and other, less enviable ones may come to the fore. “In contrast to the celebrations for those on the front line elsewhere, nurses and other healthcare workers in Japan have complained of discrimination, bans on their children attending nursery schools, and general disdain from those worried that they are carriers of COVID-19,” Sposato noted.
Pastor Samuel Gift Stephen, the founder of the Alliance of Guest Workers Outreach, checks in with a security guard at a factory-converted dormitory as he distributes meals for Muslim migrant workers in Singapore on April 24.
by Kirsten Han, May 6
Singapore’s response was hailed as a model of how to beat the coronavirus early on. The city-state went without lockdowns but mandated tight quarantines for travelers and deployed extensive testing and contact-tracing teams mixed with mandatory cell-phone apps. That approach has largely held up, despite neighboring Malaysia—which had avoided large outbreaks in the spring—now experiencing a serious second wave. But crisis erupted with a fresh outbreak in migrant workers’ dorms in April. Migrant workers are often overlooked or demonized by other Singaporeans, activist and journalist Kirsten Han wrote in May.
“Even before COVID-19 hit the dormitories hard, migrant labor-rights groups were urging the government to come up with measures to address conditions, such as overcrowding and sanitation issues, that leave workers vulnerable to outbreaks of disease,” Han noted. Singapore was able to keep its migrants locked away from the rest of the population, but the coronavirus numbers among them would eventually be revealed to be among the highest in the world: Nearly half became infected by the coronavirus.
by S. Nathan Park, April 2
As East Asian states’ triumph over the coronavirus became clear, crude cultural explanations were put forward that credited “Confucian values” of obedience and community for national successes. As the Korean American writer S. Nathan Park pointed out in April, coronavirus responses had only become the latest focal point of a long-running form of Western policy critique: claiming that East Asia’s successful policies work only because of its cultural makeup and supposedly homogenous populations.
“It repeats the same mistake that allowed the rampant coronavirus outbreaks in the United States and Europe in the first place: the mistake of seeing Asia as an unrelatable other, a place so fundamentally different from the West that no knowledge or experience is transferable,” Park wrote. As the success of extremely un-Confucian nations like Australia and New Zealand—which acted quickly and learned from the East Asian experience—demonstrates, beating the pandemic is more about good governance and a willingness to learn from others than about cultural makeup.
by David Volodzko, Aug. 19
South Korea’s coronavirus successes were some of the most remarkable, given that the country experienced multiple outbreaks in the early days of the virus—each of which was eventually brought under control. One of the main culprits was Shincheonji, a new religious movement with Christian roots blamed by many for causing a serious outbreak in February. But church members say they were unfairly targeted by mainstream Christian denominations, which are politically powerful institutions in South Korea. While the outbreak started among the church, members claim they tried to cooperate with authorities and were falsely accused of lying.
In August, David Volodzko looked into the case, and found a story more tangled than the easy targeting of an outsider group. “[Common concern over privacy] is how the secretive Christian sect ended up making common cause with the LGBTQ community, through its support of South Korea’s anti-discrimination bill,” Volodzko writes, pointing out the strange alliances forged in the pandemic era, when government intrusion into everyday life became the norm.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--How China Fought the Pandemic—and Lied About It

How China Fought the Pandemic—and Lied About It At the start of the pandemic , it seemed like COVID-19 could become a serious threat to Communist Party legitimacy in China .
Today , it ’ s the United States and Europe that are struggling with second or third waves , while the Chinese gather in unmasked crowds across the country .
How did China get its outbreak—and a potential disaster for the Party ’ s image–under control ?
What role did Beijing ’ s initial cover-up of the virus play in spreading the disease globally ?
And where did the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Foreign Policy has been covering the outbreak since its very start : Here are five of the year ’ s best reads on it .
1 .
Just In Time For Lunar New Year , Another SARS-Like Epidemic Is Brewing in China During China ’ s cover-up of the initial spread of the coronavirus , there were still signs for canny observers—like pandemic expert Laurie Garrett—that something was badly amiss .
On Jan. 8 , weeks before the outbreak was officially confirmed , Garrett wrote one of the earliest pieces flagging the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese President Xi Jinping is doing itself no favors by handling outbreaks in such a brutal and secretive fashion , ” Garrett noted .
“ The Wuhan mystery illness could turn out to be something relatively benign , and all of the patients may heal and go home , no worse for wear .
But that doesn ’ t seem likely.
” Garrett pointed to the upcoming disaster of the Lunar New Year—when hundreds of millions of Chinese travel across the country to see family—as a possibly explosive vector for the disease .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the earliest to identify what COVID-19 could unleash around the world ; she has remained one of the sharpest predictors of its course .
As the coronavirus spread across China , racist myths about the coronavirus spread across Europe and the United States—part of a wave of anti-Asian racism .
At the time , the virus seemed like it might be chiefly a Chinese problem , not a global one .
One of the most persistent ideas was that the coronavirus might be the result of literally eating bats , a practice that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ picture of a young Chinese tourist eating bat soup in Palau , Micronesia was promptly relabeled online as an image from Wuhan .
For Foreign Policy , deputy editor James Palmer both debunked the false claim and dived into the realities of the Chinese food industry .
“ And when it comes to disease , it ’ s not what ’ s being eaten that matters as much as the conditions—such as the standards workers are trained to meet , the lack of barriers at markets , and the absence or bribing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus , after all , started not in any uncommon species , but in pigs.
” 3 .
How Virus Lockdown Orders Went From Xi Jinping to My Neighborhood Auntie A critical part of China ’ s success against the coronavirus was the scale and tightness of the national lockdown .
At the time , a full shutdown seemed authoritarian and alien to many outside the country , but it would soon become the norm in many other countries .
Yet China ’ s lockdown depended on resources that most countries lacked , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western scholar living in China—in February .
The article showed how tightly and intimately the authorities were enforcing the process , using the networks of neighborhood committees and local watchers already in place to maintain Communist Party rule .
“ In the end , it wasn ’ t Xi or the city or the coronavirus or even the property management company that kept us inside on Feb. 5—it was Mrs. W. The fear that traveled down the system eventually became her fear of trouble with the local authorities , and she made sure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we were asked.
” 4 .
How WHO Became China ’ s Coronavirus Accomplice The World Health Organization played a disastrous role in the early days of the coronavirus , accepting untruths from Chinese authorities about a lack of human-to-human transmissions , refusing , under Chinese pressure , to convene an emergency conference , and failing to give clear directives on mask and other life-saving techniques .
German health expert and journalist Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup dug into the organization ’ s failings in April , tracing how institutional pressure and Communist Party influence caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on other countries not to adopt measures it was using at home , such as border closures .
His analysis would be borne out by later events : “ Yet it is unclear whether the WHO experts who traveled to China sufficiently understood the situation on the ground .
For example , based on numbers from the South China province of Guangdong , WHO argued that undetected cases are rare.
” They turned out to be anything but rare in most of the world .
5 .
China ’ s Second Wave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dark side to China ’ s deployment of government power to control the pandemic : the heavy censorship , arrests of dissidents , and online propaganda used to squash any attempt to expose the state ’ s failures .
Initial cover-ups helped the virus spread in the first place , but admitting the problem didn ’ t mean allowing free or open coverage .
As mainland-born journalist Tracy Wen Liu wrote in July , Chinese press freedom is worse than ever , and any deviation from the government ’ s story is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalists to the family members of coronavirus victims trying to figure out how their loved ones died .
“ As life in China gradually goes back to normal , it has become more and more difficult to interview medical workers , patients , and their families , ” Liu wrote , highlighting how medical staff had received explicit warnings not to talk to outsiders and that even pro-government chat groups were being shut down .
The repression continues : On Dec. 28 , journalist Zhang Zhan was sentenced to four years for her @ @ @ @ @ @

At the start of the pandemic, it seemed like COVID-19 could become a serious threat to Communist Party legitimacy in China. Today, it’s the United States and Europe that are struggling with second or third waves, while the Chinese gather in unmasked crowds across the country.
At the start of the pandemic, it seemed like COVID-19 could become a serious threat to Communist Party legitimacy in China. Today, it’s the United States and Europe that are struggling with second or third waves, while the Chinese gather in unmasked crowds across the country. 2020 The Year In Review logo How did China get its outbreak—and a potential disaster for the Party’s image–under control? What role did Beijing’s initial cover-up of the virus play in spreading the disease globally? And where did the coronavirus come from in the first place? Foreign Policy has been covering the outbreak since its very start: Here are five of the year’s best reads on it.
By Laurie Garrett, Jan. 8
During China’s cover-up of the initial spread of the coronavirus, there were still signs for canny observers—like pandemic expert Laurie Garrett—that something was badly amiss. On Jan. 8, weeks before the outbreak was officially confirmed, Garrett wrote one of the earliest pieces flagging the looming disaster. “The government of Chinese President Xi Jinping is doing itself no favors by handling outbreaks in such a brutal and secretive fashion,” Garrett noted. “The Wuhan mystery illness could turn out to be something relatively benign, and all of the patients may heal and go home, no worse for wear. But that doesn’t seem likely.” Garrett pointed to the upcoming disaster of the Lunar New Year—when hundreds of millions of Chinese travel across the country to see family—as a possibly explosive vector for the disease. Garrett’s piece was one of the earliest to identify what COVID-19 could unleash around the world; she has remained one of the sharpest predictors of its course.
by James Palmer, Jan. 27
As the coronavirus spread across China, racist myths about the coronavirus spread across Europe and the United States—part of a wave of anti-Asian racism. At the time, the virus seemed like it might be chiefly a Chinese problem, not a global one. One of the most persistent ideas was that the coronavirus might be the result of literally eating bats, a practice that’s unknown in Wuhan. A picture of a young Chinese tourist eating bat soup in Palau, Micronesia was promptly relabeled online as an image from Wuhan. For Foreign Policy, deputy editor James Palmer both debunked the false claim and dived into the realities of the Chinese food industry. “And when it comes to disease, it’s not what’s being eaten that matters as much as the conditions—such as the standards workers are trained to meet, the lack of barriers at markets, and the absence or bribing of regulators and health inspectors. The H1N1 virus, after all, started not in any uncommon species, but in pigs.”
A woman wears a protective mask as she walks by Chinese flags during the Lunar New Year and Spring Festival holiday in Beijing on Jan. 28.
by Special Correspondent, Feb. 20
A critical part of China’s success against the coronavirus was the scale and tightness of the national lockdown. At the time, a full shutdown seemed authoritarian and alien to many outside the country, but it would soon become the norm in many other countries. Yet China’s lockdown depended on resources that most countries lacked, as described by an anonymous Special Correspondent—a Western scholar living in China—in February. The article showed how tightly and intimately the authorities were enforcing the process, using the networks of neighborhood committees and local watchers already in place to maintain Communist Party rule. “In the end, it wasn’t Xi or the city or the coronavirus or even the property management company that kept us inside on Feb. 5—it was Mrs. W. The fear that traveled down the system eventually became her fear of trouble with the local authorities, and she made sure that her children and I did what we were asked.”
by Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup, Apr. 2
The World Health Organization played a disastrous role in the early days of the coronavirus, accepting untruths from Chinese authorities about a lack of human-to-human transmissions, refusing, under Chinese pressure, to convene an emergency conference, and failing to give clear directives on mask and other life-saving techniques. German health expert and journalist Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup dug into the organization’s failings in April, tracing how institutional pressure and Communist Party influence caused critical mistakes, and how China put pressure on other countries not to adopt measures it was using at home, such as border closures. His analysis would be borne out by later events: “Yet it is unclear whether the WHO experts who traveled to China sufficiently understood the situation on the ground. For example, based on numbers from the South China province of Guangdong, WHO argued that undetected cases are rare.” They turned out to be anything but rare in most of the world.
by Tracy Wen Liu, Jul. 7
There was a dark side to China’s deployment of government power to control the pandemic: the heavy censorship, arrests of dissidents, and online propaganda used to squash any attempt to expose the state’s failures. Initial cover-ups helped the virus spread in the first place, but admitting the problem didn’t mean allowing free or open coverage. As mainland-born journalist Tracy Wen Liu wrote in July, Chinese press freedom is worse than ever, and any deviation from the government’s story is being fiercely stamped out, from unlicensed journalists to the family members of coronavirus victims trying to figure out how their loved ones died. “As life in China gradually goes back to normal, it has become more and more difficult to interview medical workers, patients, and their families,” Liu wrote, highlighting how medical staff had received explicit warnings not to talk to outsiders and that even pro-government chat groups were being shut down. The repression continues: On Dec. 28, journalist Zhang Zhan was sentenced to four years for her unauthorized early reporting on Wuhan.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--Vote on COVID Relief Checks Could Delay Senate Override of Trump NDAA Veto

Vote on COVID Relief Checks Could Delay Senate Override of Trump NDAA Veto Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. Senate considers overriding Trump ’ s defense budget veto , Argentina ’ s Senate takes up abortion legislation , and the world this week .
A note for our readers : Morning Brief is currently on a holiday schedule .
Morning Brief will next arrive in your inbox on Dec. 30 and resume the normal weekday schedule on Jan. 4 .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The U.S. Senate is set to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2017 in order to move forward the law authorizing the largest defense budget in U.S. history .
A vote to override Trump ’ s veto passed in the House by a 322-87 margin on Monday , exceeding the two-thirds supermajority needed to override the veto .
Trump has issued nine vetoes so far in office , including on Dec. 23 when he described the 2021 the National Defense Authorization Act as a “ gift ” to China and Russia while failing to respect U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military bases honoring losing confederate generals in the U.S. Civil War ) .
If supported by two-thirds of the Senate , it would be only the sixth veto override this century and the first since the chamber voted to overturn President Barack Obama ’ s block on legislation effectively allowing families of victims of the Sept. 11 , 2001 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia .
Not so fast .
Sen. Bernie Sanders is attempting to delay Senate business , including the veto override , in order to force a vote on whether to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Through procedural means , Sanders could stop the veto vote from happening until as late as New Year ’ s Day , both inconveniencing Senators eager to depart Washington and eating into the campaign time of Georgia Sens .
David Perdue and Kelly Loeffler ahead of crucial runoff elections on Jan. 5 .
How did we get here ?
Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch explains how a dispute about the influence of social media companies has led to the impasse over the $ 740 billion defense budget .
On Tuesday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first airline to fly passengers on the Boeing 737 MAX after two crashes linked to its to automated flight control system grounded the aircraft model in 2019 .
On Wednesday , Dec. 30 , the British parliament is recalled to vote on Boris Johnson ’ s trade deal with the European Union .
On Thursday , Dec. 31 , the executive order extending a “ pause ” on processing U.S. immigration visas is due to expire , although it could be extended again .
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol—setting a goal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gas emissions from 1990 levels—comes into force .
The Brexit transition period—as mandated in the October 2019 U.K.-EU Withdrawal Agreement—ends .
Portugal assumes the rotating presidency of the European Council until the end of June .
Argentina ’ s Senate considers abortion legislation .
Argentina ’ s Senate is to consider legislation today that would legalize abortion in the country at up to 14 weeks of gestation , making it only the third Latin American country to allow unmitigated access to the procedure .
A vote could come as soon as today but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the week .
According to the newspaper Clarín , 33 senators support the motion and 32 are opposed , with five undecided .
A similar bill was rejected by the Senate in 2018 by 38 votes to 31 , despite passing in the lower house .
China reacts to U.S. Taiwan and Tibet resolutions .
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said China was “ resolutely opposed ” to two new U.S. bills signed into law underlining U.S. support for Tibet and Taiwan .
The laws came into effect as part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Sunday .
The acts include calls for Taiwan ’ s participation in international organizations and sanctions against any Chinese officials who interfere with Tibet ’ s selection of a successor to the Dalai Lama .
“ The U.S. should never implement any bills or provisions targeting China , ” Zhao said .
Saudi rights activist sentenced .
A court in Saudi Arabia has sentenced women ’ s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul to more than five years in prison following an international campaign to grant her leniency .
Incoming U.S. National Security Adviser @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and troubling.
” Prosecuted under Saudi anti-terrorism laws , Hathloul ’ s charges included seeking to change the Saudi political system , attempting to apply for a United Nations job , and communicating with international rights groups and Saudi activists .
Hathloul could be eligible for a conditional release from prison as soon as March , although she remains banned from traveling for five years .
Rohingya refugee relocation continues .
Officials in Bangladesh started moving a second group of nearly 1,800 Rohingya refugees to Bhashan Char Island on Monday , despite outcry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the flood-prone artificial island .
Amnesty International has raised concerns that refugees are being forced to relocate and has called for an assessment of the island ’ s habitability to take place before any resettlement .
NATO intercepts increase .
NATO has reported “ an increased level of Russian military air activity ” along its borders in recent years as it released figures highlighting air policing activity .
NATO jets scrambled to intercept unknown aircraft approaching its airspace more than 400 times in 2020 , according to official figures , an increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that almost 90 percent of those missions were responding to Russian military flights .
China vs. Jack Ma .
Pan Gongsheng , the deputy governor of China ’ s central bank has ordered Chinese financial technology firm Ant to “ strictly rectify illegal credit , insurance and wealth management financial activities , ” and “ return to its origins ” as a payment services operator .
The move is the latest to target Jack Ma , the owner of Ant , which had spun off from parent company Alibaba .
Chinese regulators blocked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November after Ma publicly criticized them as outdated .
The battle has wiped over $ 10 billion off Ma ’ s total wealth , demoting him to China ’ s second richest man according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index .
India ’ s farmer protests .
Roughly 1,500 telephone towers have had cables cut and generators stolen across Punjab in recent days , officials said , as the Indian state becomes the epicenter of farmer protests against agriculture reforms .
Reliance , the company that operates the towers , is believed to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the changes to farming regulations .
Farm union leaders have denied any role in the vandalism of the towers .
Talks between the government and farm unions are to resume on Wednesday .
A Japanese forestry company is partnering with Kyoto University to engineer a solution to the growing problem of space debris : Wooden satellites .
Sumitomo Forestry will begin testing wood components that can withstand extreme environments in order to find a suitable candidate for orbit , although the exact materials are an “ R & D secret , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefit of using wood over traditional metal alloys comes when the satellites reach the end of their lives , researchers say .
Wooden components will safely burn in the atmosphere , rather than landing on earth or lingering in space .
The World Economic Forum estimates that 6,000 satellites currently orbiting the earth , nearly 60 percent can be classified as space junk .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections @ @ @ @ @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate considers overriding Trump’s defense budget veto, Argentina’s Senate takes up abortion legislation, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Senate considers overriding Trump’s defense budget veto, Argentina’s Senate takes up abortion legislation, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Senate Considers Override on Trump NDAA Veto
The U.S. Senate is set to override a presidential veto for the first time since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2017 in order to move forward the law authorizing the largest defense budget in U.S. history. A vote to override Trump’s veto passed in the House by a 322-87 margin on Monday, exceeding the two-thirds supermajority needed to override the veto.
Trump has issued nine vetoes so far in office, including on Dec. 23 when he described the 2021 the National Defense Authorization Act as a “gift” to China and Russia while failing to respect U.S. military history (the bill would rename military bases honoring losing confederate generals in the U.S. Civil War).
If supported by two-thirds of the Senate, it would be only the sixth veto override this century and the first since the chamber voted to overturn President Barack Obama’s block on legislation effectively allowing families of victims of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia.
Not so fast. Sen. Bernie Sanders is attempting to delay Senate business, including the veto override, in order to force a vote on whether to approve $2,000 stimulus checks for Americans. Through procedural means, Sanders could stop the veto vote from happening until as late as New Year’s Day, both inconveniencing Senators eager to depart Washington and eating into the campaign time of Georgia Sens. David Perdue and Kelly Loeffler ahead of crucial runoff elections on Jan. 5.
How did we get here? Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch explains how a dispute about the influence of social media companies has led to the impasse over the $740 billion defense budget.
The World This Week
On Tuesday, Dec. 29, American Airlines becomes the first airline to fly passengers on the Boeing 737 MAX after two crashes linked to its to automated flight control system grounded the aircraft model in 2019.
On Wednesday, Dec. 30, the British parliament is recalled to vote on Boris Johnson’s trade deal with the European Union.
On Thursday, Dec. 31, the executive order extending a “pause” on processing U.S. immigration visas is due to expire, although it could be extended again.
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol—setting a goal of an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels—comes into force.
The Brexit transition period—as mandated in the October 2019 U.K.-EU Withdrawal Agreement—ends.
On Friday, Jan. 1, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers his annual address.
Portugal assumes the rotating presidency of the European Council until the end of June.
What We’re Following Today
Argentina’s Senate considers abortion legislation. Argentina’s Senate is to consider legislation today that would legalize abortion in the country at up to 14 weeks of gestation, making it only the third Latin American country to allow unmitigated access to the procedure. A vote could come as soon as today but is likely to be taken later in the week.
According to the newspaper Clarín, 33 senators support the motion and 32 are opposed, with five undecided. A similar bill was rejected by the Senate in 2018 by 38 votes to 31, despite passing in the lower house.
China reacts to U.S. Taiwan and Tibet resolutions. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said China was “resolutely opposed” to two new U.S. bills signed into law underlining U.S. support for Tibet and Taiwan. The laws came into effect as part of the omnibus spending bill signed by President Trump on Sunday.
The acts include calls for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and sanctions against any Chinese officials who interfere with Tibet’s selection of a successor to the Dalai Lama. “The U.S. should never implement any bills or provisions targeting China,” Zhao said.
Saudi rights activist sentenced. A court in Saudi Arabia has sentenced women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul to more than five years in prison following an international campaign to grant her leniency. Incoming U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called the sentence “unjust and troubling.”
Prosecuted under Saudi anti-terrorism laws, Hathloul’s charges included seeking to change the Saudi political system, attempting to apply for a United Nations job, and communicating with international rights groups and Saudi activists. Hathloul could be eligible for a conditional release from prison as soon as March, although she remains banned from traveling for five years.
Rohingya refugee relocation continues. Officials in Bangladesh started moving a second group of nearly 1,800 Rohingya refugees to Bhashan Char Island on Monday, despite outcry from human rights organizations about the safety of the flood-prone artificial island.
Amnesty International has raised concerns that refugees are being forced to relocate and has called for an assessment of the island’s habitability to take place before any resettlement.
Keep an Eye On
NATO intercepts increase. NATO has reported “an increased level of Russian military air activity” along its borders in recent years as it released figures highlighting air policing activity. NATO jets scrambled to intercept unknown aircraft approaching its airspace more than 400 times in 2020, according to official figures, an increase on the previous year. NATO reported that almost 90 percent of those missions were responding to Russian military flights.
China vs. Jack Ma. Pan Gongsheng, the deputy governor of China’s central bank has ordered Chinese financial technology firm Ant to “strictly rectify illegal credit, insurance and wealth management financial activities,” and “return to its origins” as a payment services operator. The move is the latest to target Jack Ma, the owner of Ant, which had spun off from parent company Alibaba. Chinese regulators blocked Ant’s initial public offering in November after Ma publicly criticized them as outdated. The battle has wiped over $10 billion off Ma’s total wealth, demoting him to China’s second richest man according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
India’s farmer protests. Roughly 1,500 telephone towers have had cables cut and generators stolen across Punjab in recent days, officials said, as the Indian state becomes the epicenter of farmer protests against agriculture reforms. Reliance, the company that operates the towers, is believed to be one of the firms deemed to benefit from the changes to farming regulations. Farm union leaders have denied any role in the vandalism of the towers. Talks between the government and farm unions are to resume on Wednesday.
Odds and Ends
A Japanese forestry company is partnering with Kyoto University to engineer a solution to the growing problem of space debris: Wooden satellites. Sumitomo Forestry will begin testing wood components that can withstand extreme environments in order to find a suitable candidate for orbit, although the exact materials are an “R&D secret,” the company told the BBC.
The benefit of using wood over traditional metal alloys comes when the satellites reach the end of their lives, researchers say. Wooden components will safely burn in the atmosphere, rather than landing on earth or lingering in space. The World Economic Forum estimates that 6,000 satellites currently orbiting the earth, nearly 60 percent can be classified as space junk.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--Will COVID-19 Mutations Threaten Vaccines?

On Dec. 8 , the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus , with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may , in fact , be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe .
To date , COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide , harrowing numbers by any measure .
For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection , COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rather , in order to preserve it—it ’ s important not to abandon pandemic protocols like mask-wearing and physical distancing too soon : Just because we now have shots against COVID-19 hardly means it has disappeared .
In fact , the coronavirus has already begun to resurface in other forms—or mutations—and will continue to do so until it ’ s completely stamped out .
Vigilance has always been key , but it is all the more critical now .
SARS-CoV-2 , the virus that causes COVID-19 , is thought to have initially crossed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t a transaction that stopped once the pandemic reached humans a year ago : Since June , more than 200 human cases of COVID-19 have been traced to mink farms , indicating that the virus likely spread from humans to mink and then back again .
In November , Denmark reported 12 cases of a unique strain of the virus with a cluster of variants that had not been seen before .
Global concern about the outbreak prompted Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to order a cull of 17 million living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farming for the foreseeable future .
In response , many countries—fearing that the outbreak could spread beyond Denmark—imposed stricter border controls with the country .
Despite that foresight , Canada announced this month that eight people at a mink farm in British Columbia had contracted COVID-19 .
The farm sent its animals and staff into quarantine and adopted enhanced biosecurity measures to protect against further infection—to little avail .
Numerous U.S. states , including Oregon , have also reported outbreaks linked to mink farms .
This raises serious concerns about the possibility of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least contained—and becoming established in the wild .
If minks weren ’ t enough , attention has turned to a new strain of the virus that emerged in the United Kingdom , reported to be more transmissible than its counterparts .
B.1.1.7.
, as the mutation is known , has prompted global chaos reminiscent of mid-March and led more than 50 countries to ban travel with the U.K .
While B.1.1.7 .
is not reported to affect the severity of infection , it is much more transmissible than the standard variant of COVID-19—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southern England .
A different strain—which shares a mutation with the U.K. strain—appears to have evolved separately in South Africa , where it has similarly become dominant .
These developments come at a critical time : in the midst of a winter surge in cases and mass distribution of vaccines against the standard variant of SARS-CoV-2 .
To understand the implications of the mink strain , and the recently detected new strains of the coronavirus within the U.K. and South Africa , for public health—and policy—we need to understand how viruses mutate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact they can have .
Still , thousands of mutations have been identified in SARS-CoV-2 viruses across the globe .
Most are not a reason for concern : The vast majority of mutations are likely to be neutral , meaning they are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous for the virus .
Disadvantageous mutations are good news for public health : They can disrupt the virus ’ s functions , such as the ability to bind and enter human cells , and impair its ability to spread efficiently between humans .
Unfortunately , disadvantageous mutations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transmit less effectively .
The prospect of advantageous mutations , however , merits more concern .
Advantageous mutations can help the virus bind to human cells more efficiently or escape an immune response altogether .
In theory , advantageous mutations of a virus will be naturally selected over time , becoming the dominant strain in a community or population .
Neutral mutations can also spread widely across populations , a fact that can make it difficult to discern whether a specific mutation is common due to random spread or because it is advantageous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more copies of itself ; in that sense , it ’ s only natural that we ’ ll see more mutations of the coronavirus over time .
But when levels of viral transmission and replication are high , selection pressure can cause advantageous mutations to accumulate .
Selection pressures can arise when a virus adapts to a new species , faces a new treatment or immune response , or is thwarted by a vaccine .
SARS-CoV-2 appears to adapt quickly to new animal reservoirs ; in one study conducted in China , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , establishing a new animal reservoir .
Notably , the mutation that allowed the coronavirus to adapt to mice is a key component of the new strains spreading across the U.K. and South Africa .
This suggests that the viral adaptation of COVID-19—and the spread between species—can happen relatively easily .
Mutations matter because they affect whether we recognize the virus and how we ultimately deal with it .
Sometimes , tests—and our immune systems—can ’ t recognize a mutated virus .
Antigen tests based on one strain of virus may not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antibodies , and immune systems that have encountered a given viral strain may not recognize a new strain—which can make reinfection more likely .
Most important , this reality is cause for tempering the global vaccine euphoria : The emergence of mutations could reduce the protection offered by vaccines and antibody treatments , all of which have been based on the original strain of COVID-19 .
The immunity generated by vaccines usually produces a complex response to many components of the viral protein—making them generally resilient to a few mutations in the virus—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changes has the potential to escape immune responses directed against the original strain .
Most coronavirus vaccines work by generating an immune response to the spike protein , which is the part of the virus that binds to the ACE2 receptor on human cells .
ACE2 is an enzyme found in many of our tissues that has many important functions , including regulating our blood pressure .
At the same time , the prevalence of ACE2 receptors also provides ample opportunity for coronaviruses to enter our cells .
Since the binding of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step for infection , it was previously thought that mutations featuring changes in the spike protein would not lead to infection and , by consequence , spread .
But scientists have recently discovered several mutations in the spike protein that don ’ t reduce the ability of the virus to bind to receptors , flipping conventional wisdom on its head .
Overall , mutations in the spike protein have proved more resistant to neutralization by dominant-strain antibodies , raising concerns about their potential consequences—particularly as the standard variant of the coronavirus is greeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccines .
Whether that applies to the mink and U.K. variants is yet to be seen .
Preliminary analyses suggest the mink mutation is less likely to be susceptible to antibodies directed against the standard strain of SARS-CoV-2 .
To be sure , these studies were conducted in laboratories—and thus do not capture the full range of human immune responses .
But the possible implications for vaccine efficacy are worrying .
And though BioNTech CEO Ugur Sahin has assured the world of the high likelihood that his company ’ s vaccine offers immunity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.K. strain is thought to be an adaptation able to escape immune responses directed at the original strain .
Recently , an immunocompromised patient with COVID-19 developed a strain with the B.1.1.7 .
deletion during treatment with convalescent plasma , which contains antibodies from people who ’ ve recovered from the standard variant of the virus .
The new mutation appears to have allowed the virus to escape these antibodies , allowing it to survive even after treatment .
The solution is the same as it has been all throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that mitigate the spread of COVID-19 , whatever its form .
Since mutations occur through random processes and accumulate with uncontrolled spread of the virus as well as through adaptation to different selection pressures , mutations are less likely to threaten immune responses when transmission rates are lower , both among humans and other species .
We know what to do on the human front .
But to prevent new reservoirs of virus from emerging in other species , governments must urgently reform farming practices , enhance biosecurity measures , and actively keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus in humans and animals .
This data must be shared globally so outbreaks can be identified and controlled rapidly , before they spread across different regions .
The world has invested billions of dollars in coronavirus vaccine development .
Now that safe and effective vaccines are becoming available , it ’ s essential we protect these precious resources .
The best way to do this is to control virus transmission using the measures we know work—testing , tracing , isolating , mask-wearing , and physical distancing .
Vaccination is , of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this strategy , but must be rolled out alongside the tried and true methods .
Controlling the pandemic globally requires us to work together .
Only then can we be protected from the very real threat posed by virus mutations today—and in the future .

On Dec. 8, the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus, with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may, in fact, be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe. To date, COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide , harrowing numbers by any measure. For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection, COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its head.
On Dec. 8, the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus, with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may, in fact, be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe. To date, COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide, harrowing numbers by any measure. For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection, COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its head.
Yet despite that hope—or, rather, in order to preserve it—it’s important not to abandon pandemic protocols like mask-wearing and physical distancing too soon: Just because we now have shots against COVID-19 hardly means it has disappeared. In fact, the coronavirus has already begun to resurface in other forms—or mutations—and will continue to do so until it’s completely stamped out. Vigilance has always been key, but it is all the more critical now.
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is thought to have initially crossed into humans from animal reservoirs. That wasn’t a transaction that stopped once the pandemic reached humans a year ago: Since June, more than 200 human cases of COVID-19 have been traced to mink farms, indicating that the virus likely spread from humans to mink and then back again. In November, Denmark reported 12 cases of a unique strain of the virus with a cluster of variants that had not been seen before. Global concern about the outbreak prompted Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to order a cull of 17 million living mink and announce plans to end mink farming for the foreseeable future. In response, many countries—fearing that the outbreak could spread beyond Denmark—imposed stricter border controls with the country.
Despite that foresight, Canada announced this month that eight people at a mink farm in British Columbia had contracted COVID-19. The farm sent its animals and staff into quarantine and adopted enhanced biosecurity measures to protect against further infection—to little avail. Numerous U.S. states, including Oregon, have also reported outbreaks linked to mink farms. This raises serious concerns about the possibility of infections spreading outside farms—where they are at least contained—and becoming established in the wild.
If minks weren’t enough, attention has turned to a new strain of the virus that emerged in the United Kingdom, reported to be more transmissible than its counterparts. B.1.1.7., as the mutation is known, has prompted global chaos reminiscent of mid-March and led more than 50 countries to ban travel with the U.K. While B.1.1.7. is not reported to affect the severity of infection, it is much more transmissible than the standard variant of COVID-19—and has rapidly become the preeminent strain in southern England. A different strain—which shares a mutation with the U.K. strain—appears to have evolved separately in South Africa, where it has similarly become dominant.
These developments come at a critical time: in the midst of a winter surge in cases and mass distribution of vaccines against the standard variant of SARS-CoV-2. To understand the implications of the mink strain, and the recently detected new strains of the coronavirus within the U.K. and South Africa, for public health—and policy—we need to understand how viruses mutate, how these mutations spread, and what impact they can have.
SARS-CoV-2 is an RNA virus that has around 30,000 bases in its genetic sequence. Mutations—spontaneous changes that arise in the genetic sequence of the virus—are nothing out of the ordinary for RNA viruses. In fact, RNA viruses, such as influenza, mutate frequently during replication as the mechanism that copies the RNA is prone to errors. But mutations occur far less frequently in SARS-CoV-2, as its copying mechanism has a low error rate. That’s why the average case of SARS-CoV-2 contracted during the pandemic differs from the original Wuhan strain by only around 20 bases.
Still, thousands of mutations have been identified in SARS-CoV-2 viruses across the globe. Most are not a reason for concern: The vast majority of mutations are likely to be neutral, meaning they are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous for the virus. Disadvantageous mutations are good news for public health: They can disrupt the virus’s functions, such as the ability to bind and enter human cells, and impair its ability to spread efficiently between humans. Unfortunately, disadvantageous mutations usually get selected out, as they transmit less effectively.
The prospect of advantageous mutations, however, merits more concern. Advantageous mutations can help the virus bind to human cells more efficiently or escape an immune response altogether. In theory, advantageous mutations of a virus will be naturally selected over time, becoming the dominant strain in a community or population. Neutral mutations can also spread widely across populations, a fact that can make it difficult to discern whether a specific mutation is common due to random spread or because it is advantageous.
Mutations accumulate as the virus makes more copies of itself; in that sense, it’s only natural that we’ll see more mutations of the coronavirus over time. But when levels of viral transmission and replication are high, selection pressure can cause advantageous mutations to accumulate. Selection pressures can arise when a virus adapts to a new species, faces a new treatment or immune response, or is thwarted by a vaccine.
SARS-CoV-2 appears to adapt quickly to new animal reservoirs; in one study conducted in China, the virus mutated and rapidly adapted to mice, establishing a new animal reservoir. Notably, the mutation that allowed the coronavirus to adapt to mice is a key component of the new strains spreading across the U.K. and South Africa. This suggests that the viral adaptation of COVID-19—and the spread between species—can happen relatively easily.
Mutations matter because they affect whether we recognize the virus and how we ultimately deal with it. Sometimes, tests—and our immune systems—can’t recognize a mutated virus. Antigen tests based on one strain of virus may not be able to detect new virus lineages or antibodies, and immune systems that have encountered a given viral strain may not recognize a new strain—which can make reinfection more likely. Most important, this reality is cause for tempering the global vaccine euphoria: The emergence of mutations could reduce the protection offered by vaccines and antibody treatments, all of which have been based on the original strain of COVID-19. The immunity generated by vaccines usually produces a complex response to many components of the viral protein—making them generally resilient to a few mutations in the virus—but a strain with a large number of changes has the potential to escape immune responses directed against the original strain.
Most coronavirus vaccines work by generating an immune response to the spike protein, which is the part of the virus that binds to the ACE2 receptor on human cells. ACE2 is an enzyme found in many of our tissues that has many important functions, including regulating our blood pressure. At the same time, the prevalence of ACE2 receptors also provides ample opportunity for coronaviruses to enter our cells.
Since the binding of the virus with a receptor is a necessary step for infection, it was previously thought that mutations featuring changes in the spike protein would not lead to infection and, by consequence, spread. But scientists have recently discovered several mutations in the spike protein that don’t reduce the ability of the virus to bind to receptors, flipping conventional wisdom on its head. Overall, mutations in the spike protein have proved more resistant to neutralization by dominant-strain antibodies, raising concerns about their potential consequences—particularly as the standard variant of the coronavirus is greeted with a small squadron of highly effective vaccines.
All of this has immense real-world consequences. Just as the world is developing new coronavirus-related drugs, there are reports of people who’d been infected with an earlier strain of the virus becoming reinfected with a different variant. Thus, there is reason to be concerned that some mutations of the virus could escape immune responses generated by standard inoculation, such as the Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna vaccine.
Whether that applies to the mink and U.K. variants is yet to be seen. Preliminary analyses suggest the mink mutation is less likely to be susceptible to antibodies directed against the standard strain of SARS-CoV-2. To be sure, these studies were conducted in laboratories—and thus do not capture the full range of human immune responses. But the possible implications for vaccine efficacy are worrying.
And though BioNTech CEO Ugur Sahin has assured the world of the high likelihood that his company’s vaccine offers immunity against B.1.1.7., one of the deletions in the U.K. strain is thought to be an adaptation able to escape immune responses directed at the original strain. Recently, an immunocompromised patient with COVID-19 developed a strain with the B.1.1.7. deletion during treatment with convalescent plasma, which contains antibodies from people who’ve recovered from the standard variant of the virus. The new mutation appears to have allowed the virus to escape these antibodies, allowing it to survive even after treatment.
The solution is the same as it has been all throughout the pandemic: adhere to public health guidelines that mitigate the spread of COVID-19, whatever its form. Since mutations occur through random processes and accumulate with uncontrolled spread of the virus as well as through adaptation to different selection pressures, mutations are less likely to threaten immune responses when transmission rates are lower, both among humans and other species.
We know what to do on the human front. But to prevent new reservoirs of virus from emerging in other species, governments must urgently reform farming practices, enhance biosecurity measures, and actively keep tabs on COVID-19 by frequently sequencing the virus in humans and animals. This data must be shared globally so outbreaks can be identified and controlled rapidly, before they spread across different regions.
The world has invested billions of dollars in coronavirus vaccine development. Now that safe and effective vaccines are becoming available, it’s essential we protect these precious resources. The best way to do this is to control virus transmission using the measures we know work—testing, tracing, isolating, mask-wearing, and physical distancing. Vaccination is, of course, also a very important part of this strategy, but must be rolled out alongside the tried and true methods. Controlling the pandemic globally requires us to work together. Only then can we be protected from the very real threat posed by virus mutations today—and in the future.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--It’s Time to Use Eminent Domain on the Coronavirus Vaccines

It ’ s Time to Use Eminent Domain on the Coronavirus Vaccines Jonas Salk , the scientist who developed the first effective polio vaccine , when asked “ Who owns this patent ?
” , replied , “ Well , the people , I would say .
There is no patent .
Could you patent the sun ?
” In a world where private companies reap the fruits of developing vaccines , many now view this attitude as quaint .
But quite apart from the philosophical case , there are compelling practical reasons to adopt Salk ’ s attitude , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proved effective against COVID-19 , like the sun , as a global public good .
The easiest way to make vaccines truly available to all is to freely license every effective vaccine formula so that generic producers can manufacture the vaccine anywhere .
This approach would overcome the short-run limits on production , which come from intellectual-property restrictions that constrain production to specific firms .
Doing away with this barrier would ensure that the vaccines are produced and sold by many actors in a competitive marketplace , and made available to the public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefit of widespread access to vaccines , tests and treatments that can help to overcome the pandemic is potentially enormous , and dwarfs the cost of what is needed to compensate pharmaceutical companies for research and development , or for giving up monopoly privileges .
The losses to the global economy from the pandemic are in the trillions but the expenses incurred for research and development have been in mere billions .
Firms can be handsomely compensated for their innovative technology and , thereafter , it can be made available freely to all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well be more efficient producers .
Why then do we not pursue this approach ?
A central reason is that it is widely believed , especially by policy makers in rich countries , that “ intellectual property rights ” must be respected to provide adequate incentives for firms to engage in research and development .
This supposed justification doesn ’ t sustain scrutiny .
The COVID-19 vaccine developed by Pfizer and BioNTech offers an interesting example .
The technology was developed by BioNTech , and Pfizer ’ s role has been in administering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ producing the vaccine .
Pfizer , instrumental in bringing the innovative vaccine to the stage where it received emergency approval , is now poised to become the sole manufacturer .
But what if incentives and supports for innovation and manufacturing had been separated ?
If public incentives had been available on a sufficient scale to support and reward BioNTech ’ s research and development , then a temporary monopoly would not have been needed .
( Substantial public money was in fact given to BioNTech , and to other companies , without any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights . )
Clinical trials could also have been separately administered by public or private organizations with relevant expertise ( and indeed the trials would have likely benefited from increased credibility ) .
The resulting technology could then have been made available to generic producers and thereby to a global public .
This is a world that could exist , but does not .
Several vaccines have now come to an advanced stage of development on the expectation of sizable profit .
But it is not too late to share knowledge about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A consortium of governments can act in the global public interest to do just that .
Many countries already possess laws which permit governments to impose compulsory licensing on companies , or are in the process of creating them .
International trade law also provides for exceptions to intellectual property rights protections in the case of public health emergencies .
Governments can therefore use actual or potential legal provisions to force vaccine firms to the table to negotiate a price for giving up their existing “ intellectual property.
” This brings us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccine formula that has already been developed freely available for anyone to produce .
First , it could be argued that any steps taken to “ free ” such intellectual property will have adverse implications for future research and development .
Second , such a shift could be described as unfair , since considerable effort and expense have already been undertaken by firms , under expectations of reward through the patent system .
Both of these objections are , however , easily dealt with through a single measure : compensation for the firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in return for placing their technology in the public domain .
There are a number of possible ways of determining the appropriate level of compensation .
One way—a cost-based approach—would pay for the actual expenditure on research and development , and provide a substantial additional premium , to recognize the risks taken and to provide a signal that future research and development activity for other pharmaceuticals will also be rewarded at a level adequate to induce desired efforts .
The second—a profit-based approach—would pay for the foregone value to firms of their temporary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ straightforward to estimate this value , it is possible to infer it from proxy information such as the prior stock price impact of vaccine announcements .
Which of these approaches should be used by governments that want to “ free ” COVID-19 vaccines ?
Both .
A global commission informed by all affected interests could determine the amount to be provided to individual firms .
The commission would adopt a reasonable compromise between cost-based and profit-based approaches , and ensure that compensation is set at a level sufficient to reassure private firms that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsequent pandemic , will also be rewarded adequately – if necessary at a rate sufficient to compensate fully for lost profits – to encourage research and development .
This approach recognizes the importance of incentives for private firms but also does not impede the prospect that public initiatives could play a larger role in any future response .
Freeing the formula for a vaccine would be worth it , even if a firm were rewarded far more than the costs incurred to develop its vaccine .
Consider the example of Pfizer .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in compensation for lost profits—based on an estimated two billion people who might have been sold the vaccine by the company , at a price of $ 24 per person , with an estimated 80 percent profit rate applied to the resulting revenue ( Pfizer ’ s total revenue in 2019 was a bit more than $ 50 billion , and its gross profit was more than $ 40 billion ) —the deal would still create an enormous net benefit .
The International Monetary Fund forecasts a three percent difference in world GDP—amounting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a world nominal GDP of more than $ 80 trillion—between a baseline and more favorable global handling of the pandemic .
The IMF ’ s more favorable scenario does not assume a vaccine but simply better containment of the disease .
Widespread access to a vaccine would therefore presumably enlarge the positive impact associated with the more favorable scenario , with the economic gain over time likely to be a very large multiple of the cost of compensating pharmaceutical companies for making a vaccine formula freely available .
Using data from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries with the lowest annual incomes ( less than $ 1,050 in 2017 ) would incur costs totaling more than their entire current public health expenditure on all purposes if they were to vaccinate even two thirds of their population at the actual delivery price that has been reportedly agreed by at least one developing country for what is expected to be the cheapest vaccine available .
Even if these low-income countries receive some discounted or free vaccines , other “ lower middle income ” countries ( whose total government expenditure on all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than twice this vaccine cost per person ) are sure also to experience difficulties .
The WHO ’ s COVAX facility , which many low-and-middle income countries are relying on , initially only assures doses for twenty percent of their populations .
Short of steep discounts or massive increases in development assistance , the vaccines developed by major actors may not be easily affordable in many countries , at least in the short run , and because of advance contracts signed by developed countries , may not be accessible at any price .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is of still greater significance that supplies of the best available vaccines will not increase as rapidly as they would if licenses to produce them were freely provided to all producers .
If vaccine formulae were to be made freely available to all potential producers , how quickly could they “ scale up ” production ?
It is clear that separating production from drug development can relax the constraints that come from having a limited number of production sites tied to specific firms .
Broader pools of capital can be drawn upon , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employed , and more experimentation can be undertaken with quicker and cheaper production processes .
Although some of the vaccines recently developed employ pioneering technology ( e.g .
using mRNA delivery systems ) there is no reason that there can not be adequate oversight by the World Health Organization and by governments to ensure that high standards of production quality and safety are fulfilled .
The enforcement of intellectual property rights acts as an obstacle to using existing or potential capacity within the global pharmaceutical manufacturing sector to ramp up supplies of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obvious why the sophisticated generic manufacturers present in many countries , who are already responsible for a large portion of world drug supplies , would not be equal to the task , even if it requires some increase in their capabilities .
As the volume of vaccines that need to be manufactured in a short time is unprecedentedly large , it is clear that individual firms will not have the capacity to meet the current demand , and consequently , many of them have already announced that delivery will take time .
Enabling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in producing the vaccine can provide not only additional physical capacity but also management capacity needed to oversee production and distribution of vaccines across the globe .
It is vital—and not too late—to pursue a public alternative to private monopolies so as to ensure adequate production , efficient distribution and accessible pricing of a vaccine for COVID-19 .
This is essential not just to offer the world the fastest pathway out of the health , social and economic crisis caused by the current pandemic , but to offer it the best means out @ @ @ @ @

Jonas Salk, the scientist who developed the first effective polio vaccine, when asked “Who owns this patent?”, replied, “Well, the people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?” In a world where private companies reap the fruits of developing vaccines, many now view this attitude as quaint. But quite apart from the philosophical case, there are compelling practical reasons to adopt Salk’s attitude, and treat all vaccine formulas that have proved effective against COVID-19, like the sun, as a global public good.
Jonas Salk, the scientist who developed the first effective polio vaccine, when asked “Who owns this patent?”, replied, “Well, the people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?” In a world where private companies reap the fruits of developing vaccines, many now view this attitude as quaint. But quite apart from the philosophical case, there are compelling practical reasons to adopt Salk’s attitude, and treat all vaccine formulas that have proved effective against COVID-19, like the sun, as a global public good.
The easiest way to make vaccines truly available to all is to freely license every effective vaccine formula so that generic producers can manufacture the vaccine anywhere. This approach would overcome the short-run limits on production, which come from intellectual-property restrictions that constrain production to specific firms. Doing away with this barrier would ensure that the vaccines are produced and sold by many actors in a competitive marketplace, and made available to the public at the least cost.
The economic benefit of widespread access to vaccines, tests and treatments that can help to overcome the pandemic is potentially enormous, and dwarfs the cost of what is needed to compensate pharmaceutical companies for research and development, or for giving up monopoly privileges. The losses to the global economy from the pandemic are in the trillions but the expenses incurred for research and development have been in mere billions. Firms can be handsomely compensated for their innovative technology and, thereafter, it can be made available freely to all potential manufacturers, some of whom may well be more efficient producers.
Why then do we not pursue this approach? A central reason is that it is widely believed, especially by policy makers in rich countries, that “intellectual property rights” must be respected to provide adequate incentives for firms to engage in research and development. This supposed justification doesn’t withstand scrutiny.
Many existing public-interest vaccine initiatives, such as those that provide advance purchasing commitments to assure firms that there will be a market for their products, do not question the conventional wisdom that temporary monopolies are necessary to compensate firms for the sizable fixed costs of drug development. But if incentives could be provided for drug development directly, state-enforced temporary monopolies wouldn’t be necessary as a reward.
The COVID-19 vaccine developed by Pfizer and BioNTech offers an interesting example. The technology was developed by BioNTech, and Pfizer’s role has been in administering clinical trials, seeking regulatory approvals and producing the vaccine. Pfizer, instrumental in bringing the innovative vaccine to the stage where it received emergency approval, is now poised to become the sole manufacturer.
But what if incentives and supports for innovation and manufacturing had been separated? If public incentives had been available on a sufficient scale to support and reward BioNTech’s research and development, then a temporary monopoly would not have been needed. (Substantial public money was in fact given to BioNTech, and to other companies, without any apparent demand for concession of intellectual property rights.) Clinical trials could also have been separately administered by public or private organizations with relevant expertise (and indeed the trials would have likely benefited from increased credibility). The resulting technology could then have been made available to generic producers and thereby to a global public.
This is a world that could exist, but does not. Several vaccines have now come to an advanced stage of development on the expectation of sizable profit. But it is not too late to share knowledge about the vaccine with anyone interested in producing them. A consortium of governments can act in the global public interest to do just that.
Many countries already possess laws which permit governments to impose compulsory licensing on companies, or are in the process of creating them. International trade law also provides for exceptions to intellectual property rights protections in the case of public health emergencies. Governments can therefore use actual or potential legal provisions to force vaccine firms to the table to negotiate a price for giving up their existing “intellectual property.”
This brings us to the economic objections to making a vaccine formula that has already been developed freely available for anyone to produce. First, it could be argued that any steps taken to “free” such intellectual property will have adverse implications for future research and development. Second, such a shift could be described as unfair, since considerable effort and expense have already been undertaken by firms, under expectations of reward through the patent system.
Both of these objections are, however, easily dealt with through a single measure: compensation to the firms for their past research and development effort in return for placing their technology in the public domain. There are a number of possible ways of determining the appropriate level of compensation. One way—a cost-based approach—would pay for the actual expenditure on research and development, and provide a substantial additional premium, to recognize the risks taken and to provide a signal that future research and development activity for other pharmaceuticals will also be rewarded at a level adequate to induce desired efforts. The second—a profit-based approach—would pay for the foregone value to firms of their temporary monopoly rights. Although it is not straightforward to estimate this value, it is possible to infer it from proxy information such as the prior stock price impact of vaccine announcements.
Which of these approaches should be used by governments that want to “free” COVID-19 vaccines? Both. A global commission informed by all affected interests could determine the amount to be provided to individual firms. The commission would adopt a reasonable compromise between cost-based and profit-based approaches, and ensure that compensation is set at a level sufficient to reassure private firms that their future efforts, especially in any subsequent pandemic, will also be rewarded adequately – if necessary at a rate sufficient to compensate fully for lost profits – to encourage research and development. This approach recognizes the importance of incentives for private firms but also leaves open the prospect that public initiatives could play a larger role in any future response.
Freeing the formula for a vaccine would be worth it, even if a firm were rewarded far more than the costs incurred to develop its vaccine. Consider the example of Pfizer. If governments paid the company $40 billion in compensation for lost profits—based on an estimated two billion people who might have been sold the vaccine by the company, at a price of $24 per person, with an estimated 80 percent profit rate applied to the resulting revenue (Pfizer’s total revenue in 2019 was a bit more than $50 billion, and its gross profit was more than $40 billion)—the deal would still create an enormous net benefit. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a three percent difference in world GDP—amounting to around $2.5 trillion, based on a world nominal GDP of more than $80 trillion—between a baseline and more favorable global handling of the pandemic. The IMF’s more favorable scenario does not assume a vaccine but simply better containment of the disease. Widespread access to a vaccine would therefore presumably enlarge the positive impact associated with the more favorable scenario, with the economic gain over time likely to be a very large multiple of the cost of compensating pharmaceutical companies for making a vaccine formula freely available.
Using data from the World Bank we calculate that the 29 countries with the lowest annual incomes (less than $1,050 in 2017) would incur costs totaling more than their entire current public health expenditure on all purposes if they were to vaccinate even two thirds of their population at the actual delivery price that has been reportedly agreed by at least one developing country for what is expected to be the cheapest vaccine available. Even if these low-income countries receive some discounted or free vaccines, other “lower middle income” countries (whose total government expenditure on all aspects of health is on average less than twice this vaccine cost per person) are sure also to experience difficulties. The WHO’s COVAX facility, which many low-and-middle income countries are relying on, initially only assures doses for twenty percent of their populations. Short of steep discounts or massive increases in development assistance, the vaccines developed by major actors may not be easily affordable in many countries, at least in the short run, and because of advance contracts signed by developed countries, may not be accessible at any price.
Despite the importance of costs, it is of still greater significance that supplies of the best available vaccines will not increase as rapidly as they would if licenses to produce them were freely provided to all producers. If vaccine formulae were to be made freely available to all potential producers, how quickly could they “scale up” production? It is clear that separating production from drug development can relax the constraints that come from having a limited number of production sites tied to specific firms. Broader pools of capital can be drawn upon, local knowledge concerning distribution networks can be employed, and more experimentation can be undertaken with quicker and cheaper production processes. Although some of the vaccines recently developed employ pioneering technology (e.g. using mRNA delivery systems) there is no reason that there cannot be adequate oversight by the World Health Organization and by governments to ensure that high standards of production quality and safety are fulfilled.
The enforcement of intellectual property rights acts as an obstacle to using existing or potential capacity within the global pharmaceutical manufacturing sector to ramp up supplies of the vaccine. It is not at all obvious why the sophisticated generic manufacturers present in many countries, who are already responsible for a large portion of world drug supplies, would not be equal to the task, even if it requires some increase in their capabilities. As the volume of vaccines that needs to be manufactured in a short time is unprecedentedly large, it is clear that individual firms will not have the capacity to meet the current demand, and consequently, many of them have already announced that delivery will take time. Enabling a larger number of firms to participate in producing the vaccine can provide not only additional physical capacity but also management capacity needed to oversee production and distribution of vaccines across the globe.
It is vital—and not too late—to pursue a public alternative to private monopolies so as to ensure adequate production, efficient distribution and accessible pricing of a vaccine for COVID-19. This is essential not just to offer the world the fastest pathway out of the health, social and economic crisis caused by the current pandemic, but to offer it the best means out of future pandemics too.