foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Is the Cyberattack Big News—or Just a Footnote In a Year Like No Other?

Is the Cyberattack Big News—or Just a Footnote In a Year Like No Other ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma !
I ’ m sorry I ’ m late .
I was speaking on a panel to release my new major report on an allied strategy for China .
But now I ’ m ready to go—is this our last column of the year ?
Emma Ashford : It is , and thank goodness you ’ re here .
I have a problem .
Foreign Policy just published an article by President Donald Trump ’ s former National Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This has never happened before .
MK : Never ?
Not even when he bashed Trump in his memoir ?
Why do you agree with him now ?
EA : I didn ’ t want to pay to read the memoir .
But seriously , Bolton wrote an article arguing that the Trump administration ’ s new deal with Morocco is a bad idea .
The deal recognizes the disputed territory of Western Sahara as a part of Morocco in exchange for Morocco improving its relations with Israel .
And Bolton argues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel already had good tacit relations , and that it violates a commitment to take the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara seriously .
MK : Well , I often agree with Bolton and I think I do on this issue as well .
Foreign policy is about making difficult trade-offs , and there are real benefits to convincing majority-Muslim countries to formally recognize Israel , so that is an upside to this deal .
But the cost—undermining the international process for resolving the territorial dispute in Western Sahara through a referendum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aide to then-Secretary of State James Baker in the early 1990s—may have been too great .
EA : It reminds me of our earlier discussion about Trump and his strange willingness to ignore U.S. foreign-policy needs to hand Israel ’ s Benjamin Netanyahu political wins , whether in Sudan , Kosovo , or elsewhere .
We ’ ll have to see whether this decision outlives the end of the Trump presidency .
In more important news , the U.S. government has been hit by a potentially massive cyberattack , with at least three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compromised through use of software made by a third-party company known as SolarWinds .
What do you think ?
MK : This is a real problem , and what is worrying is what we don ’ t know .
In addition to the agencies hit , some fear that departments dealing directly with international security—like the Defense Department or the intelligence community—might have also been compromised .
Cyberspace is becoming among the most contested domains of international security .
Shame on the United States for not having better cyber-defenses in place .
EA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you asked people about the biggest cyberattacks in history , they ’ d probably name Stuxnet in Iran or Russian attacks on Ukraine ’ s power grid , or other big , showy incidents .
But in reality , one of the biggest and most consequential incidents was the ( likely ) Chinese hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management a few years back , where hackers stole a huge amount of personal and security clearance information .
This incident falls into that same category , and it ’ s an important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argued—that cyber-tools are typically used for espionage rather than anything more destructive .
MK : I was going to make the pedantic point that cyberespionage is not technically an “ attack , ” but the more substantive point is that we shouldn ’ t treat cyberspace as a special domain .
If Russian commandos physically broke into the Commerce Department and stole files , then how would the U.S. government respond ?
That is how we should respond in this case .
EA : Really ?
Let ’ s say , just hypothetically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new embassy in Moscow .
And say the Russians had discovered a way to make the concrete it was constructed from vibrate so that they could hear conversations inside even without bugging it .
Would that be an “ attack ” ?
Because it actually happened during the Cold War , and Washington considered it a normal part of state-on-state espionage operations .
MK : If commandos broke into the Commerce Department , U.S. diplomats would raise it in public and private diplomacy with Russia—and hold those personally involved responsible .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this case .
EA : Fair enough .
Expel some Russian diplomats once officials are reasonably sure they can attribute it to Moscow .
But don ’ t act as if this is some violation of norms .
As my colleague Erica Borghard reminded me this morning , after the OPM hack , James Clapper , the director of national intelligence , actually went on the record saying “ You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did .
If we had the opportunity to do that , I don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a minute.
” The scope of the SolarWinds attack remains unknown .
But I don ’ t think there is a lot that U.S. officials can or should do about it , other than reinforcing U.S. defenses—at least not if Americans want to keep these tools of espionage for their own use .
MK : So , it doesn ’ t sound like you would class this as one of the biggest foreign-policy events of the year ?
EA : No .
It might turn out to have low-level impact in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so much else going on this year that I doubt this will make the top 10 .
Since it ’ s our last column of 2020 , do you want to suggest some of your top trends and events from the year ?
MK : It was an eventful year !
And there are many candidates for the most significant event , from the killing of Qassem Suleimani in January to the conclusion of the U.S. presidential election with the Electoral College vote earlier this week .
But , the most significant event @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
It killed more people than most wars and changed the way we all worked and lived , perhaps forever .
I do think the more important long-term trend , however , may be the deterioration in U.S.-China relations and the return of great-power rivalry .
With any luck , vaccinations will be successful and COVID-19 will soon be behind us .
But I fear that competition with China will be with us for a generation or more .
EA : Yeah , 2020 has been… something .
More than 300,000 Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50,000 will pass away before the end of the year .
It ’ s almost enough to make you forget that the United States almost started a war with Iran in January , and maybe sponsored a coup attempt in Venezuela in May .
Interestingly , though , it really does look like the biggest long-term foreign-policy implications of COVID-19 will be the increased U.S.-China rivalry .
As I recently wrote , U.S. structural power seems fairly unaffected , other than perhaps an increased deficit .
U.S. military readiness is also mostly unaffected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Trump ’ s terrible response to the virus are probably outweighed by the fact that U.S. companies like Moderna were among the first to respond , creating and distributing a vaccine in less than a year .
MK : Oh no .
It sounds like we agree almost completely .
I can , however , raise a possible point of disagreement : Looking back on 2020 , the biggest thing many analysts got wrong was that Trump was a dictator in waiting , undermining the rule of law and destroying U.S. influence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forget , the impeachment hearings also happened in 2020 .
In the end , however , we have seen that the American democratic system and its international position are much more resilient than many appreciated .
All it took was a Democrat to be elected president for the Twittersphere to regain its confidence in the country .
EA : Oh , God .
It says something about this year that I literally forgot the impeachment .
But I think you ’ re overstating it .
Just because the U.S. system was resilient to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean that there hasn ’ t been damage to the system—and to norms overall .
The president of the United States is still ranting on Twitter that the election was rigged after the Electoral College voted .
His party continues to partly support him .
If this election had been closer , we might be in serious trouble .
Can we shift back outside the United States , though ?
I want to get back to the China question .
In addition to the coronavirus pandemic , 2020 was also the year we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a growing body of evidence about their terrible treatment of the Uighurs .
It seems to me that Washington has really flubbed the response to these developments , with the Trump administration being simultaneously too confrontational toward Beijing while ignoring these human rights developments .
MK : I disagree .
A more confrontational approach was needed .
And Mike Pompeo ’ s State Department made China ’ s human rights practices a priority with a number of measures , including sanctions on the Chinese Communist Party officials involved .
And there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focused on the Chinese military threat , but they do care about human rights .
The United States is building a counterbalancing coalition against Beijing thanks largely to the egregious actions of the CCP .
EA : Yeah , but when the president simultaneously tells Xi Jinping that it ’ s fine to build camps for the Uighurs , you can see why they ’ re getting mixed messages .
Here ’ s an interesting factoid : As the impacts of COVID-19 fade , trade is coming back , and so is support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a place where Trump ’ s legacy is already disappearing .
MK : I suspect the uptick in trade with China is temporary and that there will be a continued decoupling of the two economies—the strategic rationale for doing so is simply too great .
EA : Well , the American people evidently don ’ t think so .
Trapped at home during the pandemic , they have actually been ordering more stuff from China !
Maybe it will be short-lived , but it ’ s notable that COVID-19 didn ’ t actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggested they would .
I continue to think Trump ’ s trade legacy is ephemeral .
Any thoughts on his foreign-policy legacy ?
MK : Many are asking about the future of Republican foreign policy and whether Trumpism continues after Trump .
I am of the view that it won ’ t .
Trump has long been a worldwide celebrity with a unique personality .
That is a large part of his appeal .
There is no one—certainly not any career politician—who can easily adopt his persona and pick up that mantle .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ his foreign-policy positions .
Political scientists have repeatedly shown that , unlike with domestic policy or culture war issues , the American public does not know much about , or have strong opinions on , foreign policy .
Politicians , therefore , have a lot of running room in this area .
I suspect , therefore , that we will see a return to a more traditional Republican foreign policy in the near future .
EA : Probably a topic for a longer discussion , but I think you ’ re partly right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in support of traditional U.S. partnerships and hostility to dictators—is probably coming back .
But it ’ s going to be shaped by Trump , and in particular by the notions of those who attempted to turn his foreign-policy foibles into policy .
After all , the Republican foreign-policy elite is no longer Bill Kristol and the neoconservatives .
Today it ’ s people like James Mattis , H.R .
McMaster , and Bolton , people who offer a more coherent version of Trumpism : hawkish , nationalistic , and unilateralist foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the post-Trump direction of the Republican Party over the next few years .
MK : It is our last column of 2020 .
What do you predict we will be talking about this time next year ?
What is the biggest story of 2021 ?
After all , I ’ m sure we would have correctly predicted a once-in-a-century pandemic if only given the opportunity .
EA : I would have preferred to predict it at the bookies , not in this column !
As 2020 proved , predictions are notoriously hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some things with pretty good accuracy .
The Biden administration will return to the Iran nuclear deal , struggle to put together a coherent set of invitees to its “ summit of democracies , ” and see internal conflict between President-elect Joe Biden and his own advisors over issues like Afghanistan , Syria , and Russia .
MK : I would add that we will see a return to a post-pandemic new normal , the U.S.-China rivalry will intensify , North Korea will continue to expand its nuclear and missile program… EA : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea will test missiles is like predicting that I am going to eat too much Christmas cake over the holiday period !
But that reminds me .
You know what else is finally guaranteed to happen in 2021 ?
Brexit !
Come Jan. 1 , one way or the other , Britain will no longer be a member of the European Union .
Of course , that ’ s where the certainty ends .
Trade may grind to a halt , there might be tensions on the Irish border , and Scotland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sounds like we ’ ll be coming back to Brexit in the New Year ?
MK : There will certainly be plenty to debate .
Until then , have a happy holiday and New Year .
EA : But I thought we had to say “ merry Christmas ” until Trump leaves office ?
MK : Well then , I hope that those who are celebrating it have a merry Christmas and that everyone can enjoy a much-deserved break after a year most people would rather forget .

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I’m sorry I’m late. I was speaking on a panel to release my new major report on an allied strategy for China. But now I’m ready to go—is this our last column of the year?
Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I’m sorry I’m late. I was speaking on a panel to release my new major report on an allied strategy for China. But now I’m ready to go—is this our last column of the year?
Emma Ashford: It is, and thank goodness you’re here. I have a problem. Foreign Policy just published an article by President Donald Trump’s former National Security Advisor-turned-critic John Bolton—and I agree with him. This has never happened before.
MK: Never? Not even when he bashed Trump in his memoir? Why do you agree with him now?
EA: I didn’t want to pay to read the memoir. But seriously, Bolton wrote an article arguing that the Trump administration’s new deal with Morocco is a bad idea. The deal recognizes the disputed territory of Western Sahara as a part of Morocco in exchange for Morocco improving its relations with Israel. And Bolton argues that this is ridiculous: Morocco and Israel already had good tacit relations, and that it violates a commitment to take the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara seriously.
He’s right!
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: Well, I often agree with Bolton and I think I do on this issue as well. Foreign policy is about making difficult trade-offs, and there are real benefits to convincing majority-Muslim countries to formally recognize Israel, so that is an upside to this deal.
But the cost—undermining the international process for resolving the territorial dispute in Western Sahara through a referendum, which Bolton helped craft as an aide to then-Secretary of State James Baker in the early 1990s—may have been too great.
EA: It reminds me of our earlier discussion about Trump and his strange willingness to ignore U.S. foreign-policy needs to hand Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu political wins, whether in Sudan, Kosovo, or elsewhere. We’ll have to see whether this decision outlives the end of the Trump presidency.
In more important news, the U.S. government has been hit by a potentially massive cyberattack, with at least three agencies confirming that their systems have been compromised through use of software made by a third-party company known as SolarWinds. What do you think?
MK: This is a real problem, and what is worrying is what we don’t know. In addition to the agencies hit, some fear that departments dealing directly with international security—like the Defense Department or the intelligence community—might have also been compromised. Cyberspace is becoming among the most contested domains of international security. Shame on the United States for not having better cyber-defenses in place.
EA: It’s funny. If you asked people about the biggest cyberattacks in history, they’d probably name Stuxnet in Iran or Russian attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, or other big, showy incidents. But in reality, one of the biggest and most consequential incidents was the (likely) Chinese hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management a few years back, where hackers stole a huge amount of personal and security clearance information.
This incident falls into that same category, and it’s an important reminder—as Joshua Rovner of American University has argued—that cyber-tools are typically used for espionage rather than anything more destructive.
MK: I was going to make the pedantic point that cyberespionage is not technically an “attack,” but the more substantive point is that we shouldn’t treat cyberspace as a special domain. If Russian commandos physically broke into the Commerce Department and stole files, then how would the U.S. government respond? That is how we should respond in this case.
EA: Really? Let’s say, just hypothetically, that the United States was building a new embassy in Moscow. And say the Russians had discovered a way to make the concrete it was constructed from vibrate so that they could hear conversations inside even without bugging it. Would that be an “attack”?
Because it actually happened during the Cold War, and Washington considered it a normal part of state-on-state espionage operations.
MK: If commandos broke into the Commerce Department, U.S. diplomats would raise it in public and private diplomacy with Russia—and hold those personally involved responsible. The U.S. government should do the same in this case.
EA: Fair enough. Expel some Russian diplomats once officials are reasonably sure they can attribute it to Moscow. But don’t act as if this is some violation of norms. As my colleague Erica Borghard reminded me this morning, after the OPM hack, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, actually went on the record saying “You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did. If we had the opportunity to do that, I don’t think we’d hesitate for a minute.”
The scope of the SolarWinds attack remains unknown. But I don’t think there is a lot that U.S. officials can or should do about it, other than reinforcing U.S. defenses—at least not if Americans want to keep these tools of espionage for their own use.
MK: So, it doesn’t sound like you would class this as one of the biggest foreign-policy events of the year?
EA: No. It might turn out to have low-level impact in the long run, but there’s so much else going on this year that I doubt this will make the top 10. Since it’s our last column of 2020, do you want to suggest some of your top trends and events from the year?
MK: It was an eventful year! And there are many candidates for the most significant event, from the killing of Qassem Suleimani in January to the conclusion of the U.S. presidential election with the Electoral College vote earlier this week.
But, the most significant event of the year was certainly the COVID-19 pandemic. It killed more people than most wars and changed the way we all worked and lived, perhaps forever.
I do think the more important long-term trend, however, may be the deterioration in U.S.-China relations and the return of great-power rivalry. With any luck, vaccinations will be successful and COVID-19 will soon be behind us. But I fear that competition with China will be with us for a generation or more.
EA: Yeah, 2020 has been… something. More than 300,000 Americans dead of COVID-19, and perhaps another 50,000 will pass away before the end of the year. It’s almost enough to make you forget that the United States almost started a war with Iran in January, and maybe sponsored a coup attempt in Venezuela in May.
Interestingly, though, it really does look like the biggest long-term foreign-policy implications of COVID-19 will be the increased U.S.-China rivalry. As I recently wrote, U.S. structural power seems fairly unaffected, other than perhaps an increased deficit. U.S. military readiness is also mostly unaffected.
And the negative soft power effects of Trump’s terrible response to the virus are probably outweighed by the fact that U.S. companies like Moderna were among the first to respond, creating and distributing a vaccine in less than a year.
MK: Oh no. It sounds like we agree almost completely. I can, however, raise a possible point of disagreement: Looking back on 2020, the biggest thing many analysts got wrong was that Trump was a dictator in waiting, undermining the rule of law and destroying U.S. influence and the rules-based system. Lest we forget, the impeachment hearings also happened in 2020.
In the end, however, we have seen that the American democratic system and its international position are much more resilient than many appreciated. All it took was a Democrat to be elected president for the Twittersphere to regain its confidence in the country.
EA: Oh, God. It says something about this year that I literally forgot the impeachment.
But I think you’re overstating it. Just because the U.S. system was resilient to Trump in this case doesn’t mean that there hasn’t been damage to the system—and to norms overall. The president of the United States is still ranting on Twitter that the election was rigged after the Electoral College voted. His party continues to partly support him. If this election had been closer, we might be in serious trouble.
Can we shift back outside the United States, though? I want to get back to the China question. In addition to the coronavirus pandemic, 2020 was also the year we saw Chinese crackdowns in Hong Kong, and a growing body of evidence about their terrible treatment of the Uighurs.
It seems to me that Washington has really flubbed the response to these developments, with the Trump administration being simultaneously too confrontational toward Beijing while ignoring these human rights developments.
MK: I disagree. A more confrontational approach was needed. And Mike Pompeo’s State Department made China’s human rights practices a priority with a number of measures, including sanctions on the Chinese Communist Party officials involved.
And there is growing international concern: Europeans are not focused on the Chinese military threat, but they do care about human rights. The United States is building a counterbalancing coalition against Beijing thanks largely to the egregious actions of the CCP.
EA: Yeah, but when the president simultaneously tells Xi Jinping that it’s fine to build camps for the Uighurs, you can see why they’re getting mixed messages.
Here’s an interesting factoid: As the impacts of COVID-19 fade, trade is coming back, and so is support for free trade. That’s a place where Trump’s legacy is already disappearing.
MK: I suspect the uptick in trade with China is temporary and that there will be a continued decoupling of the two economies—the strategic rationale for doing so is simply too great.
EA: Well, the American people evidently don’t think so. Trapped at home during the pandemic, they have actually been ordering more stuff from China! Maybe it will be short-lived, but it’s notable that COVID-19 didn’t actually snip the supply chains the way some suggested they would. I continue to think Trump’s trade legacy is ephemeral.
Any thoughts on his foreign-policy legacy?
MK: Many are asking about the future of Republican foreign policy and whether Trumpism continues after Trump. I am of the view that it won’t. Trump has long been a worldwide celebrity with a unique personality. That is a large part of his appeal. There is no one—certainly not any career politician—who can easily adopt his persona and pick up that mantle.
His support was certainly not due to his foreign-policy positions. Political scientists have repeatedly shown that, unlike with domestic policy or culture war issues, the American public does not know much about, or have strong opinions on, foreign policy. Politicians, therefore, have a lot of running room in this area.
I suspect, therefore, that we will see a return to a more traditional Republican foreign policy in the near future.
EA: Probably a topic for a longer discussion, but I think you’re partly right. A traditional Republican foreign policy—most notably in support of traditional U.S. partnerships and hostility to dictators—is probably coming back. But it’s going to be shaped by Trump, and in particular by the notions of those who attempted to turn his foreign-policy foibles into policy.
After all, the Republican foreign-policy elite is no longer Bill Kristol and the neoconservatives. Today it’s people like James Mattis, H.R. McMaster, and Bolton, people who offer a more coherent version of Trumpism: hawkish, nationalistic, and unilateralist foreign policy.
We’ll probably learn more about the post-Trump direction of the Republican Party over the next few years.
MK: It is our last column of 2020. What do you predict we will be talking about this time next year? What is the biggest story of 2021? After all, I’m sure we would have correctly predicted a once-in-a-century pandemic if only given the opportunity.
EA: I would have preferred to predict it at the bookies, not in this column! As 2020 proved, predictions are notoriously hard. But I think we can predict some things with pretty good accuracy. The Biden administration will return to the Iran nuclear deal, struggle to put together a coherent set of invitees to its “summit of democracies,” and see internal conflict between President-elect Joe Biden and his own advisors over issues like Afghanistan, Syria, and Russia.
Your predictions?
MK: I would add that we will see a return to a post-pandemic new normal, the U.S.-China rivalry will intensify, North Korea will continue to expand its nuclear and missile program…
EA: Oh, come on. Predicting that North Korea will test missiles is like predicting that I am going to eat too much Christmas cake over the holiday period!
But that reminds me. You know what else is finally guaranteed to happen in 2021? Brexit! Come Jan. 1, one way or the other, Britain will no longer be a member of the European Union. Of course, that’s where the certainty ends. Trade may grind to a halt, there might be tensions on the Irish border, and Scotland might try for another independence referendum. Sounds like we’ll be coming back to Brexit in the New Year?
MK: There will certainly be plenty to debate. Until then, have a happy holiday and New Year.
EA: But I thought we had to say “merry Christmas” until Trump leaves office?
MK: Well then, I hope that those who are celebrating it have a merry Christmas and that everyone can enjoy a much-deserved break after a year most people would rather forget.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Trump Leaves Biden Administration a Parting Gift in Currency Wars

The U.S. Treasury Department ’ s decision this week to label both Vietnam and Switzerland currency manipulators lacked precedent and raised plenty of eyebrows .
Labeling even one country a manipulator is a rare and headline-grabbing event .
Until now , the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had named only one country , China , a currency manipulator—only to remove it later .
Never had the Treasury designated two countries in one fell swoop .
You could be forgiven for having expected a more vigorous overhaul of U.S. policies on currency manipulation during the Trump administration .
After all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ name China a currency manipulator on his first day in the Oval Office .
As president , he launched accusations of currency manipulation on Twitter .
Decrying the United States ’ trade deficits , he overhauled decades of official U.S. policy on trade .
And if one ’ s goal is to reduce the overall trade deficit , the natural complement to trade policy becomes currency policy .
Still , given the lack of real follow-through to official changes to U.S. currency policy , it would be tempting to interpret this week ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disruption by a lame-duck administration .
To the contrary , this action underscores the continuity of currency manipulation policy under Trump , which underwent only minor tweaks of the Treasury Department rules formulated under the administration of former President Barack Obama .
This action underscores the continuity of currency manipulation policy under Trump.So why label Switzerland and Vietnam—and only those two countries—as currency manipulators now ?
For starters , the Treasury Department ’ s hands were tied in a way that , like the announcement itself , lacked precedent .
Since the 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ criteria for identifying currency manipulation came into effect , Switzerland and Vietnam are the only two countries ever to meet all three of the Treasury ’ s criteria : running a big trade surplus with the United States , running a large current account surplus , and intervening heavily in foreign-exchange markets to artificially weaken a currency .
For context , China was labeled a currency manipulator after meeting only one of the three .
If the Treasury declined to name Vietnam and Switzerland manipulators now , after they met all three conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mockery of its own currency manipulation regime .
Technically , one might even argue that the Treasury would run afoul of the law if it did not label countries manipulators once they meet all of its own criteria .
( A handful of other countries that met two of the three conditions—including Germany , Japan , and South Korea—are on a watchlist , according to the Treasury . )
Two of the Treasury ’ s three criteria address the types of trade imbalances that can emerge for any number of reasons and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have met these criteria before : that , in the past 12 months , the country have run a bilateral trade surplus in goods with the United States of at least $ 20 billion and that it have an overall current account surplus of 2 percent of its gross domestic product .
But it was the third criterion that nailed Vietnam and Switzerland .
If a country undertakes “ persistent , one-sided intervention ” to weaken its currency by at least 2 percent of GDP over a 13-month period and already meets the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then has to label it a currency manipulator .
Both Switzerland and Vietnam recently differentiated themselves from the pack in this regard .
Between July 2019 and June 2020 , the time frame considered in the latest report , the Treasury estimates that Switzerland ’ s intervention in the foreign exchange market , to the tune of $ 103 billion , amounted to a whopping 14 percent of its GDP .
Vietnam ’ s $ 16.8 billion intervention was equivalent to 5.1 percent of its GDP .
( If an economy the size @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currency markets on that scale , it would mean interventions on the order of $ 1 trillion to $ 2.9 trillion . )
Why were they now trying so hard to push their own currencies down ?
Vietnam , a rising export power , has a history of undervaluing its currency , as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative recently alleged in opening a Section 301 investigation into the country .
A cheaper currency means more competitive exports .
Partly due to the Trump administration ’ s tariffs on Chinese goods , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment.But , partly due to the Trump administration ’ s tariffs on Chinese goods , Vietnam has seen a surge in foreign investment , since Vietnamese factories can still ship goods to the United States tariff-free .
An influx of foreign investment would tend to drive up the value of Vietnam ’ s currency , which would make those newfound exports that much less competitive .
Vietnamese authorities , fearing the pace of currency appreciation , seem to have wanted to mitigate that through large-scale interventions , thus running afoul of the Treasury @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the global carnage and disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic played to the Swiss franc ’ s reputation as a safe haven , inducing sharp upward pressure on the currency .
But a stronger franc would mean lower prices in Switzerland , threatening to turn negligible Swiss inflation , already less than half of 1 percent in 2019 , negative .
And negative inflation—deflation—triggers a vicious cycle of economic contraction .
Inflation may induce anxiety on Wall Street , but deflationary spirals are ( and were ) the stuff of great depressions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do feel empathetic toward Switzerland ’ s plight .
The Treasury ’ s own report acknowledges the Swiss currency interventions as a response to “ persistent deflationary risks ” at home and an attempt to avoid “ negative impacts on inflation and domestic growth.
” But empathy for a foreign central bank does not exonerate its behavior from judgment by the U.S. Treasury Department , if that behavior is at least in part for “ purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments.
” And there are other potential pitfalls that may come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Switzerland ’ s legitimate growth and inflation concerns , the report said that Swiss authorities can reduce the need for unconventional monetary policy “ by raising labor force participation rates and productivity growth.
” But faulting other countries for relying on monetary policy to shore up deficiencies elsewhere may soon come back to bite Washington .
For instance , the United States faced complaints of currency manipulation from countries such as Brazil in response to the Federal Reserve ’ s quantitative easing program , which helped shore up a tottering U.S. economy but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Today , the dollar is again weakening as the Federal Reserve undertakes unconventional measures to help a U.S. economy in a crisis .
The United States , then , may soon find itself hearing the Treasury ’ s critique of Switzerland turned back on itself .
The United States may soon find itself hearing the Treasury ’ s critique of Switzerland turned back on itself.So what happens next between the United States and these two countries ?
The only certainty is that the Treasury will conduct “ enhanced bilateral engagement ” with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the development of a plan with specific policy actions to address the underlying causes ” of external imbalances .
But there is little chance that either country addresses those “ underlying causes , ” even if the United States were to threaten more than loss of access to government procurement programs .
In undervaluing its currency , Vietnam ’ s authoritarian government is choosing to decrease how much stuff every Vietnamese citizen can buy in order to have fewer unemployed .
In Switzerland , the national government tends not to issue bonds because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This is one reason the Swiss central bank turns to currency interventions , rather than purchases of government bonds , to try to save its economy from deflation .
In both countries , the external imbalances have deep roots in the foundations of domestic governance .
They ’ re unlikely to change due to a semiannual Treasury report .
Instead , the most likely legacy of this announcement likely lies in its effect on government in the United States .
Inheriting these “ enhanced bilateral engagements , ” the likely next Treasury @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colleagues may well choose to continue them .
In that case , the Treasury starts off with the gift of an existing bilateral forum in which to press Switzerland and Vietnam even on issues unrelated to currencies per se .
If , however , the Biden administration symbolically delists the countries without extracting any concessions right away , they ’ ll start off by making a mockery of the Treasury ’ s existing currency manipulation regime .
Either way , the clock on Biden ’ s first shot at currency policy is shorter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind a situation that could embarrass any Biden administration eager to soften U.S. policy on currency manipulation .
After the past four years and the flurry of last-minute announcements , it ’ s tempting to presume that all disruptions from U.S. policy are due to disruptions to that policy .
But the Treasury ’ s criteria on currency manipulators—despite all that has changed about U.S. international economic policy—are largely unchanged from the Obama administration and will continue at least into the Biden administration ’ s opening days .
Sometimes , the continuity of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stands still is the real source of surprise .

The U.S. Treasury Department's decision this week to label both Vietnam and Switzerland currency manipulators lacked precedent and raised plenty of eyebrows. Labeling even one country a manipulator is a rare and headline-grabbing event. Until now, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had named only one country, China, a currency manipulator—only to remove it later. Never had the Treasury designated two countries in one fell swoop.
The U.S. Treasury Department’s decision this week to label both Vietnam and Switzerland currency manipulators lacked precedent and raised plenty of eyebrows. Labeling even one country a manipulator is a rare and headline-grabbing event. Until now, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump had named only one country, China, a currency manipulator—only to remove it later. Never had the Treasury designated two countries in one fell swoop.
You could be forgiven for having expected a more vigorous overhaul of U.S. policies on currency manipulation during the Trump administration. After all, in 2015, Trump vowed to name China a currency manipulator on his first day in the Oval Office. As president, he launched accusations of currency manipulation on Twitter. Decrying the United States’ trade deficits, he overhauled decades of official U.S. policy on trade. And if one’s goal is to reduce the overall trade deficit, the natural complement to trade policy becomes currency policy.
Still, given the lack of real follow-through to official changes to U.S. currency policy, it would be tempting to interpret this week’s designations as a last-ditch quack of disruption by a lame-duck administration. To the contrary, this action underscores the continuity of currency manipulation policy under Trump, which underwent only minor tweaks of the Treasury Department rules formulated under the administration of former President Barack Obama.
This action underscores the continuity of currency manipulation policy under Trump.So why label Switzerland and Vietnam—and only those two countries—as currency manipulators now? For starters, the Treasury Department’s hands were tied in a way that, like the announcement itself, lacked precedent. Since the 2015 legislation requiring the Treasury to promulgate specific criteria for identifying currency manipulation came into effect, Switzerland and Vietnam are the only two countries ever to meet all three of the Treasury’s criteria: running a big trade surplus with the United States, running a large current account surplus, and intervening heavily in foreign-exchange markets to artificially weaken a currency. For context, China was labeled a currency manipulator after meeting only one of the three.
If the Treasury declined to name Vietnam and Switzerland manipulators now, after they met all three conditions, it’d be making a mockery of its own currency manipulation regime. Technically, one might even argue that the Treasury would run afoul of the law if it did not label countries manipulators once they meet all of its own criteria. (A handful of other countries that met two of the three conditions—including Germany, Japan, and South Korea—are on a watchlist, according to the Treasury.)
Two of the Treasury’s three criteria address the types of trade imbalances that can emerge for any number of reasons and in lots of countries. Vietnam and Switzerland have met these criteria before: that, in the past 12 months, the country have run a bilateral trade surplus in goods with the United States of at least $20 billion and that it have an overall current account surplus of 2 percent of its gross domestic product.
But it was the third criterion that nailed Vietnam and Switzerland. If a country undertakes “persistent, one-sided intervention” to weaken its currency by at least 2 percent of GDP over a 13-month period and already meets the other two conditions, the Treasury effectively then has to label it a currency manipulator.
Both Switzerland and Vietnam recently differentiated themselves from the pack in this regard. Between July 2019 and June 2020, the time frame considered in the latest report, the Treasury estimates that Switzerland’s intervention in the foreign exchange market, to the tune of $103 billion, amounted to a whopping 14 percent of its GDP. Vietnam’s $16.8 billion intervention was equivalent to 5.1 percent of its GDP. (If an economy the size of the United States had fiddled in currency markets on that scale, it would mean interventions on the order of $1 trillion to $2.9 trillion.)
Why were they now trying so hard to push their own currencies down? Vietnam, a rising export power, has a history of undervaluing its currency, as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative recently alleged in opening a Section 301 investigation into the country. A cheaper currency means more competitive exports.
Partly due to the Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods, Vietnam has seen a surge in foreign investment.But, partly due to the Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods, Vietnam has seen a surge in foreign investment, since Vietnamese factories can still ship goods to the United States tariff-free. An influx of foreign investment would tend to drive up the value of Vietnam’s currency, which would make those newfound exports that much less competitive. Vietnamese authorities, fearing the pace of currency appreciation, seem to have wanted to mitigate that through large-scale interventions, thus running afoul of the Treasury.
In the case of Switzerland, all the global carnage and disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic played to the Swiss franc’s reputation as a safe haven, inducing sharp upward pressure on the currency. But a stronger franc would mean lower prices in Switzerland, threatening to turn negligible Swiss inflation, already less than half of 1 percent in 2019, negative. And negative inflation—deflation—triggers a vicious cycle of economic contraction. Inflation may induce anxiety on Wall Street, but deflationary spirals are (and were) the stuff of great depressions.
U.S. policymakers, it seems, do feel empathetic toward Switzerland’s plight. The Treasury’s own report acknowledges the Swiss currency interventions as a response to “persistent deflationary risks” at home and an attempt to avoid “negative impacts on inflation and domestic growth.” But empathy for a foreign central bank does not exonerate its behavior from judgment by the U.S. Treasury Department, if that behavior is at least in part for “purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments.”
And there are other potential pitfalls that may come from the Treasury report. While acknowledging Switzerland’s legitimate growth and inflation concerns, the report said that Swiss authorities can reduce the need for unconventional monetary policy “by raising labor force participation rates and productivity growth.” But faulting other countries for relying on monetary policy to shore up deficiencies elsewhere may soon come back to bite Washington. For instance, the United States faced complaints of currency manipulation from countries such as Brazil in response to the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program, which helped shore up a tottering U.S. economy but had the effect of weakening the dollar. Today, the dollar is again weakening as the Federal Reserve undertakes unconventional measures to help a U.S. economy in a crisis. The United States, then, may soon find itself hearing the Treasury’s critique of Switzerland turned back on itself.
The United States may soon find itself hearing the Treasury’s critique of Switzerland turned back on itself.So what happens next between the United States and these two countries? The only certainty is that the Treasury will conduct “enhanced bilateral engagement” with each country that “will include urging the development of a plan with specific policy actions to address the underlying causes” of external imbalances.
But there is little chance that either country addresses those “underlying causes,” even if the United States were to threaten more than loss of access to government procurement programs. In undervaluing its currency, Vietnam’s authoritarian government is choosing to decrease how much stuff every Vietnamese citizen can buy in order to have fewer unemployed. In Switzerland, the national government tends not to issue bonds because it eschews budget deficits that need financing. This is one reason the Swiss central bank turns to currency interventions, rather than purchases of government bonds, to try to save its economy from deflation. In both countries, the external imbalances have deep roots in the foundations of domestic governance. They’re unlikely to change due to a semiannual Treasury report.
Instead, the most likely legacy of this announcement likely lies in its effect on government in the United States. Inheriting these “enhanced bilateral engagements,” the likely next Treasury secretary, Janet Yellen, and her colleagues may well choose to continue them. In that case, the Treasury starts off with the gift of an existing bilateral forum in which to press Switzerland and Vietnam even on issues unrelated to currencies per se. If, however, the Biden administration symbolically delists the countries without extracting any concessions right away, they’ll start off by making a mockery of the Treasury’s existing currency manipulation regime. Either way, the clock on Biden’s first shot at currency policy is shorter. But the Trump administration now leaves behind a situation that could embarrass any Biden administration eager to soften U.S. policy on currency manipulation.
After the past four years and the flurry of last-minute announcements, it’s tempting to presume that all disruptions from U.S. policy are due to disruptions to that policy. But the Treasury’s criteria on currency manipulators—despite all that has changed about U.S. international economic policy—are largely unchanged from the Obama administration and will continue at least into the Biden administration’s opening days.
Sometimes, the continuity of U.S. policy in a world that never stands still is the real source of surprise.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Sweden’s Second Wave Is a Failure of Government—and Guidance

Sweden ’ s Second Wave Is a Failure of Government—and Guidance In late November , the Swedish government finally caved .
The country had attracted attention worldwide earlier this year for ignoring calls to implement a lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic ’ s first peak , as the government favored recommendations to hard regulation .
But at long last , facing a perilous second wave of coronavirus cases , the Swedish government introduced its very first commercial ban : Bars and restaurants would close after 10:30 p.m. After watching Sweden with confusion—and sometimes horror—many onlookers from abroad saw the move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should implement bans or just recommendations as the pandemic rages on .
Even Swedes , they thought , were finally being told what to do .
Admittedly , foreigners ’ disdain for the country ’ s approach hasn ’ t been unwarranted : My fellow Swedes have been ignoring the government ’ s loose guidelines this whole time .
Without bans , they ’ re still huddling together in malls and sitting knee to knee in bars ( now before 10:30 p.m. ) as the death toll has risen to nearly 8,000 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than that of all its neighboring countries combined .
Criticism of the authorities is mounting from within the country as well .
Here , however , the conversation is more nuanced .
What people are calling for isn ’ t more restrictions or a lockdown but simply what the Swedish government promised from the outset : clarity .
When Sweden braced for its first COVID-19 outbreak in February , the Public Health Agency , spearheaded by state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell , emphasized the importance of giving clear instructions to the public .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Swedes to make responsible choices while still being able to go about their daily lives—and to keep the economy going—while the Public Health Agency adjusted the recommendations as the situation developed .
Criticism of the authorities is mounting from within the country as well.Of course , a lack of clarity in the national response has become the norm instead , and what was labeled a “ trust-based ” approach by the health authorities has become a source of confusion .
Two things in particular have caused dysfunction and made it all too easy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ First , there are too many guidelines—ranging from how to shop and eat out to how to attend church—which vary between the country ’ s 21 regions .
And second , there is a growing disconnect between the recommendations of the ruling party and those of the Public Health Agency , which by constitutional law acts independently of the government .
The best example of how confusing Sweden ’ s guidelines have been is the debate over masks .
Whether to wear masks has been a perpetual issue since the pandemic began : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general ” mask use but maintained that masks “ could ” be useful in certain places such as on public transportation—with the caveat that masks could also be counterproductive as they may grant people a “ false sense of security.
” Throughout the pandemic , Tegnell in particular has stressed that there is a lack of evidence for the effectiveness of masks and warned Swedes about the supposed risks of people wearing masks the wrong way .
Eventually , on Dec. 18 , the Public Health Agency announced that the updated guidelines will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transportation during peak hours .
It ’ s true that scientists and policymakers ’ understanding of how to craft mask mandates has been evolving , and policies around the world have changed over the course of the pandemic .
But Sweden could still have benefited from firmer recommendations at an earlier stage .
By August , 4 out of 10 wanted masks to be obligatory on public transportation , compared to 3 in 10 back in May .
But authorities didn ’ t yield .
In Stockholm—where buses have been full due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in sick ) —commuters were still not advised to wear a mask .
Instead , they were encouraged to “ avoid crowded places.
” This is obviously unrealistic for people who commute to work , and it raises the question : If the issue all along was improper use of masks , why not issue a nationwide recommendation to wear masks on public transport , combined with clear instructions on how to use them properly ?
Sweden could have benefited from firmer recommendations at an earlier stage.Tegnell fended off criticism by saying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mask.
” That may be , but the individual decision to wear a mask is just at the top of a long laundry list of other choices Swedes have to make on a given day .
That list includes if and how to shop for nonessential goods ( the city of Malmo ’ s largest mall had to temporarily shut down as shoppers neglected national social distancing guidelines on Black Friday ) , whether to visit loved ones in nursing homes ( regulations and/or recommendations depend on region and/or relationship ) , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Stefan Lofven says to stay at home , while Tegnell approves of eating Christmas buffets in restaurants as long as guidelines are followed ) .
Mixed messaging , especially between Lofven and Tegnell , has only further confused the public .
When the pandemic began , the Public Health Agency called the shots under Tegnell .
But as opposition parties have now lashed out at the ruling center-left coalition and accused it of botching the pandemic response , that coalition has started to take action without consulting the Public Health Agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a unilateral decision for the first time to ban gatherings of more than eight people .
When asked about the rationale behind this policy , Tegnell answered that it was a government move , and that it “ certainly isn ’ t the Public Health Agency putting its foot down.
” After the announcement , businesses were left without a clear directive .
For example , Sweden ’ s largest movie theater chain , Filmstaden , said it would close temporarily , but it scrapped the decision later that day because Tegnell said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movie theaters .
It was then reinstated a few days later after the government announced that “ Tegnell is wrong.
” It ’ s no coincidence that Lofven wants to step out of Tegnell ’ s shadow at this precise moment .
A recent poll showed that people expressing “ high confidence ” in the Public Health Agency have fallen from 68 percent of the population in October to 52 percent in December .
Meanwhile , the government faces fresh criticism because a special coronavirus commission recently concluded that the many deaths in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to long-standing government neglect .
( Nearly 90 percent of the country ’ s coronavirus deaths have been among people 70 and older , and half of those were in nursing homes . )
Lofven has now conceded that his government is partly to blame , but he also continues to stress that health care is primarily the responsibility of regional authorities .
Yet his explanations haven ’ t appeased a population that increasingly feels as though it ’ s part of a failing experiment .
If the strategy isn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t the people in power changed it ?
And yet the reality is that even if the ruling party wished to roll out stricter regulations , its powers are fairly limited .
During the peak of the first coronavirus wave in April , parliament granted the government a temporary license to shut down restaurants , malls , gyms , and public transport , should the pandemic worsen .
However , the law was never used , and after its expiration at the end of June , the government failed to extend the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forecast that herd immunity would protect Swedes from a large-scale second wave .
Of course , the prediction proved gravely wrong , and Sweden now has one of the highest per-capita death rates in Europe .
Even though the government is drafting new emergency legislation , it ’ s not expected to come into force until March 2021 at the earliest—two months after vaccinations are expected to arrive in the country .
By now , it ’ s hard to imagine that the world will remember Sweden ’ s handling of the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But beyond the many lives lost , there ’ s an added layer of tragedy in that the Swedish voluntary model could have been at least a partial blueprint for other countries if the authorities had not fumbled it so greatly .
Sweden could have managed without a lockdown had the government , for instance , fully closed nursing homes to visitors before the virus started to spread .
The ruling party could also have better prepared—and braced the Swedish people—for a second wave , even as health authorities deemed another large-scale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messed up was its execution .
The model was designed to protect the old , but the authorities didn ’ t take into account that nursing homes would reel from decades of neglect and lack of resources ; the plan was to give people freedom in exchange for responsibility , but authorities failed to deliver clear enough guidance for people to even be responsible .
If the government had prized clarity—and if it had put aside its political squabbles to present a unified response—the criticism heaped upon Sweden might instead have become praise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

In late November, the Swedish government finally caved. The country had attracted attention worldwide earlier this year for ignoring calls to implement a lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic’s first peak, as the government favored recommendations to hard regulation. But at long last, facing a perilous second wave of coronavirus cases, the Swedish government introduced its very first commercial ban: Bars and restaurants would close after 10:30 p.m.
In late November, the Swedish government finally caved. The country had attracted attention worldwide earlier this year for ignoring calls to implement a lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic’s first peak, as the government favored recommendations to hard regulation. But at long last, facing a perilous second wave of coronavirus cases, the Swedish government introduced its very first commercial ban: Bars and restaurants would close after 10:30 p.m.
After watching Sweden with confusion—and sometimes horror—many onlookers from abroad saw the move as the final verdict on whether governments should implement bans or just recommendations as the pandemic rages on. Even Swedes, they thought, were finally being told what to do. Admittedly, foreigners’ disdain for the country’s approach hasn’t been unwarranted: My fellow Swedes have been ignoring the government’s loose guidelines this whole time. Without bans, they’re still huddling together in malls and sitting knee to knee in bars (now before 10:30 p.m.) as the death toll has risen to nearly 8,000 in a nation of 10 million—a figure higher than that of all its neighboring countries combined.
Criticism of the authorities is mounting from within the country as well. Here, however, the conversation is more nuanced. What people are calling for isn’t more restrictions or a lockdown but simply what the Swedish government promised from the outset: clarity. When Sweden braced for its first COVID-19 outbreak in February, the Public Health Agency, spearheaded by state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, emphasized the importance of giving clear instructions to the public. The plan was for these guidelines to allow Swedes to make responsible choices while still being able to go about their daily lives—and to keep the economy going—while the Public Health Agency adjusted the recommendations as the situation developed.
Criticism of the authorities is mounting from within the country as well.Of course, a lack of clarity in the national response has become the norm instead, and what was labeled a “trust-based” approach by the health authorities has become a source of confusion. Two things in particular have caused dysfunction and made it all too easy for Swedes to ignore official recommendations: First, there are too many guidelines—ranging from how to shop and eat out to how to attend church—which vary between the country’s 21 regions. And second, there is a growing disconnect between the recommendations of the ruling party and those of the Public Health Agency, which by constitutional law acts independently of the government.
The best example of how confusing Sweden’s guidelines have been is the debate over masks. Whether to wear masks has been a perpetual issue since the pandemic began: The Public Health Agency advised against “general” mask use but maintained that masks “could” be useful in certain places such as on public transportation—with the caveat that masks could also be counterproductive as they may grant people a “false sense of security.” Throughout the pandemic, Tegnell in particular has stressed that there is a lack of evidence for the effectiveness of masks and warned Swedes about the supposed risks of people wearing masks the wrong way. Eventually, on Dec. 18, the Public Health Agency announced that the updated guidelines will in fact include wearing masks on public transportation during peak hours.
It’s true that scientists and policymakers’ understanding of how to craft mask mandates has been evolving, and policies around the world have changed over the course of the pandemic. But Sweden could still have benefited from firmer recommendations at an earlier stage. By August, 4 out of 10 wanted masks to be obligatory on public transportation, compared to 3 in 10 back in May. But authorities didn’t yield. In Stockholm—where buses have been full due to reduced public transport (and drivers calling in sick)—commuters were still not advised to wear a mask. Instead, they were encouraged to “avoid crowded places.” This is obviously unrealistic for people who commute to work, and it raises the question: If the issue all along was improper use of masks, why not issue a nationwide recommendation to wear masks on public transport, combined with clear instructions on how to use them properly?
Sweden could have benefited from firmer recommendations at an earlier stage.Tegnell fended off criticism by saying that “whoever wants to can wear a mask.” That may be, but the individual decision to wear a mask is just at the top of a long laundry list of other choices Swedes have to make on a given day. That list includes if and how to shop for nonessential goods (the city of Malmo’s largest mall had to temporarily shut down as shoppers neglected national social distancing guidelines on Black Friday), whether to visit loved ones in nursing homes (regulations and/or recommendations depend on region and/or relationship), and whether to eat out at restaurants (Prime Minister Stefan Lofven says to stay at home, while Tegnell approves of eating Christmas buffets in restaurants as long as guidelines are followed).
Mixed messaging, especially between Lofven and Tegnell, has only further confused the public. When the pandemic began, the Public Health Agency called the shots under Tegnell. But as opposition parties have now lashed out at the ruling center-left coalition and accused it of botching the pandemic response, that coalition has started to take action without consulting the Public Health Agency.
In late November, it made a unilateral decision for the first time to ban gatherings of more than eight people. When asked about the rationale behind this policy, Tegnell answered that it was a government move, and that it “certainly isn’t the Public Health Agency putting its foot down.” After the announcement, businesses were left without a clear directive. For example, Sweden’s largest movie theater chain, Filmstaden, said it would close temporarily, but it scrapped the decision later that day because Tegnell said the ban didn’t apply to movie theaters. It was then reinstated a few days later after the government announced that “Tegnell is wrong.”
It’s no coincidence that Lofven wants to step out of Tegnell’s shadow at this precise moment. A recent poll showed that people expressing “high confidence” in the Public Health Agency have fallen from 68 percent of the population in October to 52 percent in December. Meanwhile, the government faces fresh criticism because a special coronavirus commission recently concluded that the many deaths in the country’s nursing homes were due to long-standing government neglect. (Nearly 90 percent of the country’s coronavirus deaths have been among people 70 and older, and half of those were in nursing homes.)
Lofven has now conceded that his government is partly to blame, but he also continues to stress that health care is primarily the responsibility of regional authorities. Yet his explanations haven’t appeased a population that increasingly feels as though it’s part of a failing experiment. If the strategy isn’t working, Swedes ask, why haven’t the people in power changed it?
And yet the reality is that even if the ruling party wished to roll out stricter regulations, its powers are fairly limited. During the peak of the first coronavirus wave in April, parliament granted the government a temporary license to shut down restaurants, malls, gyms, and public transport, should the pandemic worsen. However, the law was never used, and after its expiration at the end of June, the government failed to extend the emergency legislation, because the health authorities forecast that herd immunity would protect Swedes from a large-scale second wave.
Of course, the prediction proved gravely wrong, and Sweden now has one of the highest per-capita death rates in Europe. Even though the government is drafting new emergency legislation, it’s not expected to come into force until March 2021 at the earliest—two months after vaccinations are expected to arrive in the country.
By now, it’s hard to imagine that the world will remember Sweden’s handling of the pandemic as anything other than a deadly blunder. But beyond the many lives lost, there’s an added layer of tragedy in that the Swedish voluntary model could have been at least a partial blueprint for other countries if the authorities had not fumbled it so greatly. Sweden could have managed without a lockdown had the government, for instance, fully closed nursing homes to visitors before the virus started to spread. The ruling party could also have better prepared—and braced the Swedish people—for a second wave, even as health authorities deemed another large-scale outbreak unlikely.
Indeed, where Sweden messed up was its execution. The model was designed to protect the old, but the authorities didn’t take into account that nursing homes would reel from decades of neglect and lack of resources; the plan was to give people freedom in exchange for responsibility, but authorities failed to deliver clear enough guidance for people to even be responsible. If the government had prized clarity—and if it had put aside its political squabbles to present a unified response—the criticism heaped upon Sweden might instead have become praise for not buckling under misplaced international condemnation.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Your Digital Footprint Is Worryingly Easy to Match to Reality

Your Digital Footprint Is Worryingly Easy to Match to Reality As a person who helps other people manage their digital footprint , I actually dislike the phrase “ manage your digital footprint ” —it sounds corporatist , bland , and frankly neurotic .
But it ’ s also pretty serious .
Your digital footprint is not just about an embarrassing “ that ’ s what she said ” tweet you posted that one time at 2 a.m .
In fact , the information we reveal online can be a personal and/or operational security risk .
If you need proof , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ singer who was assaulted after a stalker figured out her location by zooming in on the reflection in her eyes .
Whether you have a sensitive job , are going through a difficult divorce , believe you may be being stalked online—or , God forbid , all of the above—the impact of inadvertently revealing too much on the internet can be tremendous .
Even when life is relatively calm , it ’ s always good to keep a handle on how what you reveal could end up being used , and by whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Foreign Policy readers , you work in government , diplomacy , or other sensitive areas , then it ’ s not just your own life that ’ s affected .
So what are some basic steps you can take to get a better grip on what you are posting online ?
First of all , don ’ t be paranoid .
I know this sounds like a tall order in the year 2020 , but paranoia simply saps us of energy .
It ’ s not productive .
Instead , assess the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Maria Farrell and my former colleagues at the Conversationalist , which essentially argues that we have an abusive relationship with our technology right now .
We love our gadgets , but we can ’ t entirely trust them .
For that , we need better legislation on tech and a better mindset .
But there are ways to improve the relationship we have with technology—and with other people through it .
One of the first ways to do that is to understand how the rules online are always changing .
What seemed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may not be so safe today .
In a world that has Google Street View and apps like the beer rating service Untappd or the fitness tracker Strava that give away far more about us than we might otherwise think , our location is usually easier to figure out than we believe .
These changes won ’ t be the last ones ; the possibility of bleeding our information into the internet only increases with time .
Malicious actors , be they creepy stalkers or foreign intelligence operatives , can and do cross-reference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you have your location posted on your public Twitter account , and you frequently post cropped but nevertheless distinctive photos from your city block , you ’ ve already given someone the tools they need to narrow down the options as to where you live .
Geolocation is merely the process of elimination .
Give people enough data points—a distinctive curb , a prominent background landmark , and so on—and they ’ ll be able to find you .
Here ’ s just one personal example of how it can work , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I was based on a single photo .
Because I ’ d previously alerted my subscribers to the fact that I was traveling in Virginia , they found me despite the fact that the picture I posted seemed random .
When you post pictures matters a lot too .
When I was dealing with a stalker , I avoided giving away my location in real time .
Who wants to post , “ Just sat down to dinner at [ insert my favorite D.C. restaurant ] , ” only to potentially have an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dessert ?
It ’ s equally fine to ask others to refrain from tagging you in public posts , or to ask them to tag you later , or to otherwise respect your right to privacy .
This is the 21st century ; tagging people only with their permission is simply good manners now .
Last winter , on a chilly night in Boston , I ’ d snapped a picture of the skyline , only to have the man I was with ask me to please not tag him in it—he didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exes to , as he put it , “ creep on us.
” I laughed and told him that I would never just tag without asking , but I was upset to learn that many other people in his life not only didn ’ t ask but would actively go against his wishes when tagging him online , exposing his personal life in ways that made him feel increasingly uncomfortable .
You don ’ t have to have safety concerns to opt out of being featured in other people ’ s posts .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nosy ex , and , let ’ s face it , life is stressful enough without worrying about those people .
Apps like Facebook that actively encourage tagging don ’ t help when it comes to normalizing a process too often done without other people ’ s consent .
When it comes to public posts , it ’ s also helpful to familiarize yourself with topics such as EXIF data , which gives us details about how and where a picture was taken , and how it can work across different platforms and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ metadata on any files you may publicly upload—this is especially important if you manage your own website .
There are pockets of information in the work that you are showcasing , and that information can and does get exploited .
Meanwhile , tools in photo editing apps can be a godsend for when you want to tweet a photo or post it to Facebook but don ’ t really want it to give too much away .
For some reason , a lot of the people I talk to—older men especially , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military and politics—still think that photo editing apps are there for a younger woman to get rid of an annoying zit in a picture .
They don ’ t realize how useful these apps are for blurring a distinctive background , a vehicle license plate , or , say , a document that ’ s on your desk .
A lot of people ask me if they should stop posting pictures altogether , but I think that all depends on what you do and your own comfort level .
The one thing I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to post the view from their home windows—even if there is an adorable cat perched on the windowsill .
Speaking of our pets , you ’ ll be surprised how many people will post a picture of an animal while its tag , which gives away sensitive information like the owner ’ s phone number , is fully visible .
The ability to zoom , zoom , zoom as seen in Hollywood movies may not exist , but a lot more can be picked out of a clear shot than you might think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you are holding your mail .
And don ’ t even get me started on military personnel who think they ’ re being “ anonymous ” while forgetting to blur out name tapes and , sometimes , even dog tags .
Again , a simple blurring tool can save you a lot of trouble when it comes to pictures like that .
Yet at the same time , when it comes to anonymity , our safest bet is to never count on it .
People who believe in anonymity online tend to find @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are—especially if they ’ re , say , trolling public officials on Twitter or conducting an affair .
I ’ m not saying Foreign Policy readers , a very sober and clean-living bunch , would ever do such things , but it ’ s always better to just assume that your business is more public than it is private .
Again , this simply cuts down on trouble .
If all of this is overwhelming and stressful , consider the fact that , at the same time , there is a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A lot of what we do online drowns in that white noise .
Meanwhile , scandals involving say , leaked nude photos , are becoming so common that public standards will shift on them eventually .
This may be an uncomfortable topic for some , but most women my age and younger have sent nudes .
Men do it without even asking if the recipient is interested .
Publicly posted information doesn ’ t exist in a vacuum—it exists at an intersection of political and social mores .
Those change over time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2040 , a leaked pic from a vengeful ex hopefully won ’ t matter—but a statement that might have passed as edgy in 2020 could seem outright bigoted .
Changes mean that none of us is ever fully in control of our digital footprint , or of life in general .
And that ’ s OK .
The best thing we can do is play along and be as conscientious and as kind to others as we can .
If infosec in 2020 taught me anything , it taught me this .

As a person who helps other people manage their digital footprint, I actually dislike the phrase “manage your digital footprint”—it sounds corporatist, bland, and frankly neurotic.
But it’s also pretty serious. Your digital footprint is not just about an embarrassing “that’s what she said” tweet you posted that one time at 2 a.m.
In fact, the information we reveal online can be a personal and/or operational security risk. If you need proof, please consider the case of the Japanese singer who was assaulted after a stalker figured out her location by zooming in on the reflection in her eyes.
Whether you have a sensitive job, are going through a difficult divorce, believe you may be being stalked online—or, God forbid, all of the above—the impact of inadvertently revealing too much on the internet can be tremendous. Even when life is relatively calm, it’s always good to keep a handle on how what you reveal could end up being used, and by whom. And if, like a lot of Foreign Policy readers, you work in government, diplomacy, or other sensitive areas, then it’s not just your own life that’s affected.
So what are some basic steps you can take to get a better grip on what you are posting online?
First of all, don’t be paranoid. I know this sounds like a tall order in the year 2020, but paranoia simply saps us of energy. It’s not productive.
Instead, assess the situation soberly. I like this piece from Maria Farrell and my former colleagues at the Conversationalist, which essentially argues that we have an abusive relationship with our technology right now. We love our gadgets, but we can’t entirely trust them. For that, we need better legislation on tech and a better mindset.
But there are ways to improve the relationship we have with technology—and with other people through it.
One of the first ways to do that is to understand how the rules online are always changing. What seemed “safe” a few years ago may not be so safe today. In a world that has Google Street View and apps like the beer rating service Untappd or the fitness tracker Strava that give away far more about us than we might otherwise think, our location is usually easier to figure out than we believe. These changes won’t be the last ones; the possibility of bleeding our information into the internet only increases with time.
Malicious actors, be they creepy stalkers or foreign intelligence operatives, can and do cross-reference our information. For example, if you have your location posted on your public Twitter account, and you frequently post cropped but nevertheless distinctive photos from your city block, you’ve already given someone the tools they need to narrow down the options as to where you live.
Geolocation is merely the process of elimination. Give people enough data points—a distinctive curb, a prominent background landmark, and so on—and they’ll be able to find you. Here’s just one personal example of how it can work, in which I challenged people to guess where I was based on a single photo. Because I’d previously alerted my subscribers to the fact that I was traveling in Virginia, they found me despite the fact that the picture I posted seemed random.
When you post pictures matters a lot too. When I was dealing with a stalker, I avoided giving away my location in real time. Who wants to post, “Just sat down to dinner at [insert my favorite D.C. restaurant],” only to potentially have an unstable person show up along with the dessert?
It’s equally fine to ask others to refrain from tagging you in public posts, or to ask them to tag you later, or to otherwise respect your right to privacy. This is the 21st century; tagging people only with their permission is simply good manners now. Last winter, on a chilly night in Boston, I’d snapped a picture of the skyline, only to have the man I was with ask me to please not tag him in it—he didn’t want either one of our exes to, as he put it, “creep on us.”
I laughed and told him that I would never just tag without asking, but I was upset to learn that many other people in his life not only didn’t ask but would actively go against his wishes when tagging him online, exposing his personal life in ways that made him feel increasingly uncomfortable. You don’t have to have safety concerns to opt out of being featured in other people’s posts. Sometimes all it takes is an unpleasantly nosy ex, and, let’s face it, life is stressful enough without worrying about those people. Apps like Facebook that actively encourage tagging don’t help when it comes to normalizing a process too often done without other people’s consent.
When it comes to public posts, it’s also helpful to familiarize yourself with topics such as EXIF data, which gives us details about how and where a picture was taken, and how it can work across different platforms and websites. The same goes for the metadata on any files you may publicly upload—this is especially important if you manage your own website. There are pockets of information in the work that you are showcasing, and that information can and does get exploited.
Meanwhile, tools in photo editing apps can be a godsend for when you want to tweet a photo or post it to Facebook but don’t really want it to give too much away. For some reason, a lot of the people I talk to—older men especially, some of whom hold leadership positions in the military and politics—still think that photo editing apps are there for a younger woman to get rid of an annoying zit in a picture. They don’t realize how useful these apps are for blurring a distinctive background, a vehicle license plate, or, say, a document that’s on your desk.
A lot of people ask me if they should stop posting pictures altogether, but I think that all depends on what you do and your own comfort level. The one thing I absolutely ask people not to do is to post the view from their home windows—even if there is an adorable cat perched on the windowsill.
Speaking of our pets, you’ll be surprised how many people will post a picture of an animal while its tag, which gives away sensitive information like the owner’s phone number, is fully visible. The ability to zoom, zoom, zoom as seen in Hollywood movies may not exist, but a lot more can be picked out of a clear shot than you might think. Same goes for pictures in which you are holding your mail. And don’t even get me started on military personnel who think they’re being “anonymous” while forgetting to blur out name tapes and, sometimes, even dog tags. Again, a simple blurring tool can save you a lot of trouble when it comes to pictures like that.
Yet at the same time, when it comes to anonymity, our safest bet is to never count on it. People who believe in anonymity online tend to find out the hard way just how wrong they are—especially if they’re, say, trolling public officials on Twitter or conducting an affair. I’m not saying Foreign Policy readers, a very sober and clean-living bunch, would ever do such things, but it’s always better to just assume that your business is more public than it is private. Again, this simply cuts down on trouble.
If all of this is overwhelming and stressful, consider the fact that, at the same time, there is a lot of white noise on the internet. A lot of what we do online drowns in that white noise. Meanwhile, scandals involving say, leaked nude photos, are becoming so common that public standards will shift on them eventually. This may be an uncomfortable topic for some, but most women my age and younger have sent nudes. Men do it without even asking if the recipient is interested. Publicly posted information doesn’t exist in a vacuum—it exists at an intersection of political and social mores. Those change over time. When it comes to the politicians of 2040, a leaked pic from a vengeful ex hopefully won’t matter—but a statement that might have passed as edgy in 2020 could seem outright bigoted.
Changes mean that none of us is ever fully in control of our digital footprint, or of life in general. And that’s OK. The best thing we can do is play along and be as conscientious and as kind to others as we can. If infosec in 2020 taught me anything, it taught me this.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Personnel Cuts Leave USAID With Skeleton Crew to Monitor Nearly $1 Billion of Aid Programs in Iraq

Personnel Cuts Leave USAID With Skeleton Crew to Monitor Nearly $ 1 Billion of Aid Programs in Iraq An eleventh-hour drawdown of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Iraq is leaving a skeleton crew of full-time American aid officials , in addition to locally hired staff , to monitor nearly $ 1 billion worth of foreign aid programs , current and former officials told Foreign Policy .
Earlier this month , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moved forward with plans to withdraw dozens of diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad , officials and congressional aides said , a preemptive safety measure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one-year anniversary of the U.S. killing of a top Iranian military commander last January .
The decision roughly halved both the number of U.S. diplomats and also that of full-time U.S. foreign aid officials at the embassy , current and former officials as well as congressional aides familiar with the matter said .
The move , they said , will leave only four full-time U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) staffers in place , in addition to locally hired employees , at the embassy to monitor hundreds of millions of taxpayer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Former officials and humanitarian workers , speaking on condition of anonymity , said it would be difficult , if not impossible , for such a limited staff to ensure so much aid funding is properly implemented without mismanagement or graft .
While some described the decision as quickly reversible , it comes amid a broader , last-minute drawdown of military and diplomatic personnel from Iraq in the final weeks of Donald Trump ’ s presidency that some in Congress fear could undermine Iraq ’ s stability and open a vacuum for Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence in the country .
“ If Iran wants us out of Iraq and we are leaving under pressure , we are giving them just what they want , ” said a Senate aide familiar with the matter .
The drawdown also reflected mounting frustration in Congress over the administration ’ s handling of the Middle East .
Members and staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee had been requesting briefings on staffing levels at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since September and October .
Administration officials did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the news was published in advance , in stories from Politico and the Washington Post , according to several congressional aides familiar with the matter .
In a statement to Foreign Policy , acting USAID spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala would not comment on staff numbers , citing security concerns , but said that the agency “ continually adjusts its posture at Embassies and Consulates throughout the world ” depending on the mission , local security , and holidays .
Jhunjhunwala said the relocation of USAID staff would not impact local Iraqi employees , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The agency has also brought in third-party monitors on contract to attempt to ensure accountability for its projects .
“ The proper oversight of U.S. taxpayer funds spent on foreign development is paramount to [ USAID ] , ” she added .
A State Department spokesperson also declined to comment specifically on the movement of staff and did not address questions on the criticisms from Capitol Hill .
The spokesperson said that ensuring the safety and security of U.S. citizens , government personnel , and facilities “ remains our highest priority.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iraq , Matthew Tueller , remains in Iraq and the embassy in Baghdad continues to operate .
Democrats in Congress said the move is another parting shot from the Trump administration that could make life more difficult for President-elect Joe Biden .
“ This drawdown is another example of President Trump ’ s reckless foreign policy that undermines our diplomatic and humanitarian engagement with the world and creates unintended consequences that the next administration will have to address , ” Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch , who chairs the Middle East subpanel on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy in a statement .
“ The Iraqi people face an array of challenges , and a fully staffed and appropriately protected , American mission is vital to assist efforts to counter ISIS and other forms of malign influence , and help Iraq become a more resilient , independent , and democratic country.
” When State Department officials did brief lawmakers on the issue in early December , they described the departures from the embassy as a “ temporary and readily reversible ” decision , linked to heightened threats to U.S. government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to the Senate aide .
This is the second wave of personnel drawdowns at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in the past year .
The Trump administration ordered the departure of diplomatic and aid personnel last year that dramatically reduced the size of the staff and left in place less than two dozen USAID officials .
According to a Senate aide familiar with the matter , the new order will leave less 100 full time employees .
“ USAID plays a valuable role in the overall U.S. missions in Syria and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population brings goodwill toward the United States , and our continued presence there , ” said Mick Mulroy , a former top Middle East official at the Pentagon during the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst .
“ I do not know if the reports of a departure or draw down of USAID are true , [ but ] I hope that our ambassador , country team , and the commander of [ the U.S.-led mission against the Islamic State ] can weigh in on this decision and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The United States earmarked about $ 960 million worth of aid to Iraq in fiscal year 2019 and $ 197 million in fiscal year 2020 so far , according to data from USAID .
The diplomatic and aid shrinkage in Iraq coincides with a last-minute military pullback from the region .
During Trump ’ s last weeks in office , the outgoing administration appears to be attempting to downshift its campaign to counter the Islamic State , with the Defense Department reducing U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and the departure of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a presidential directive , the U.S. military will cut the number of troops in Iraq from 3,000 to 2,500 by Jan. 15—five days before Biden will be inaugurated .
The response to the situation in Iraq has also been hampered by personnel turnover and the White House ’ s desire to declare the Islamic State defeated , even as the group ’ s attacks continue .
Christopher Maier , an Obama administration holdover who led the anti-Islamic State task force at the Pentagon , was ousted weeks ago after losing trust with Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s powerful policy shop .
The special envoy for Syria and the anti-Islamic State coalition , Jim Jeffrey , also left the administration last month .
But the fall of the Islamic State ’ s territorial empire , which spanned 34,000 square miles into Syria and included about 40 percent of Iraq during the height of the self-declared caliphate , has done little to lessen Iraq ’ s crushing bills to rebuild the country , embroiled in near-constant upheaval since the 2003 U.S. invasion that led to the ouster of dictator Saddam Hussein @ @ @ @ @ @ @ internally displaced and 4.1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Iraq , according to the United Nations , which remains nearly $ 60 million short of funding for the humanitarian response in the country .
The embattled Iraqi government , which faced anti-corruption protests last year that forced the ouster of then-Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi , has pledged to devalue the nation ’ s currency in a draft budget that leaked this week , raising concern from workers who will now have to make do with even less .

An eleventh-hour drawdown of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Iraq is leaving a skeleton crew of full-time American aid officials, in addition to locally hired staff, to monitor nearly $1 billion worth of foreign aid programs, current and former officials told Foreign Policy .
An eleventh-hour drawdown of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Iraq is leaving a skeleton crew of full-time American aid officials, in addition to locally hired staff, to monitor nearly $1 billion worth of foreign aid programs, current and former officials told Foreign Policy.
Earlier this month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moved forward with plans to withdraw dozens of diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, officials and congressional aides said, a preemptive safety measure amid potential security threats tied to the one-year anniversary of the U.S. killing of a top Iranian military commander last January.
The decision roughly halved both the number of U.S. diplomats and also that of full-time U.S. foreign aid officials at the embassy, current and former officials as well as congressional aides familiar with the matter said. The move, they said, will leave only four full-time U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staffers in place, in addition to locally hired employees, at the embassy to monitor hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars’ worth of foreign aid programs.
Former officials and humanitarian workers, speaking on condition of anonymity, said it would be difficult, if not impossible, for such a limited staff to ensure so much aid funding is properly implemented without mismanagement or graft. While some described the decision as quickly reversible, it comes amid a broader, last-minute drawdown of military and diplomatic personnel from Iraq in the final weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency that some in Congress fear could undermine Iraq’s stability and open a vacuum for Iran and its proxies to gain even more influence in the country.
“If Iran wants us out of Iraq and we are leaving under pressure, we are giving them just what they want,” said a Senate aide familiar with the matter.
The drawdown also reflected mounting frustration in Congress over the administration’s handling of the Middle East. Members and staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee had been requesting briefings on staffing levels at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since September and October. Administration officials did not inform Congress about the decision before the news was published in advance, in stories from Politico and the Washington Post, according to several congressional aides familiar with the matter.
In a statement to Foreign Policy, acting USAID spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala would not comment on staff numbers, citing security concerns, but said that the agency “continually adjusts its posture at Embassies and Consulates throughout the world” depending on the mission, local security, and holidays. Jhunjhunwala said the relocation of USAID staff would not impact local Iraqi employees, who are on telework during the COVID-19 pandemic. The agency has also brought in third-party monitors on contract to attempt to ensure accountability for its projects. “The proper oversight of U.S. taxpayer funds spent on foreign development is paramount to [USAID],” she added.
A State Department spokesperson also declined to comment specifically on the movement of staff and did not address questions on the criticisms from Capitol Hill. The spokesperson said that ensuring the safety and security of U.S. citizens, government personnel, and facilities “remains our highest priority.” The spokesperson added that the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Matthew Tueller, remains in Iraq and the embassy in Baghdad continues to operate.
Democrats in Congress said the move is another parting shot from the Trump administration that could make life more difficult for President-elect Joe Biden.
“This drawdown is another example of President Trump’s reckless foreign policy that undermines our diplomatic and humanitarian engagement with the world and creates unintended consequences that the next administration will have to address,” Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch, who chairs the Middle East subpanel on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told Foreign Policy in a statement. “The Iraqi people face an array of challenges, and a fully staffed and appropriately protected, American mission is vital to assist efforts to counter ISIS and other forms of malign influence, and help Iraq become a more resilient, independent, and democratic country.”
When State Department officials did brief lawmakers on the issue in early December, they described the departures from the embassy as a “temporary and readily reversible” decision, linked to heightened threats to U.S. government personnel and troops in Iraq from Iran, according to the Senate aide.
This is the second wave of personnel drawdowns at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in the past year. The Trump administration ordered the departure of diplomatic and aid personnel last year that dramatically reduced the size of the staff and left in place less than two dozen USAID officials.
According to a Senate aide familiar with the matter, the new order will leave less 100 full time employees.
“USAID plays a valuable role in the overall U.S. missions in Syria and Iraq. Their support to the local population brings goodwill toward the United States, and our continued presence there,” said Mick Mulroy, a former top Middle East official at the Pentagon during the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst. “I do not know if the reports of a departure or draw down of USAID are true, [but] I hope that our ambassador, country team, and the commander of [the U.S.-led mission against the Islamic State] can weigh in on this decision and the impact it may have on their operations.”
The United States earmarked about $960 million worth of aid to Iraq in fiscal year 2019 and $197 million in fiscal year 2020 so far, according to data from USAID.
The diplomatic and aid shrinkage in Iraq coincides with a last-minute military pullback from the region. During Trump’s last weeks in office, the outgoing administration appears to be attempting to downshift its campaign to counter the Islamic State, with the Defense Department reducing U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and the departure of top officials coordinating those campaigns. Following a presidential directive, the U.S. military will cut the number of troops in Iraq from 3,000 to 2,500 by Jan. 15—five days before Biden will be inaugurated.
The response to the situation in Iraq has also been hampered by personnel turnover and the White House’s desire to declare the Islamic State defeated, even as the group’s attacks continue. Christopher Maier, an Obama administration holdover who led the anti-Islamic State task force at the Pentagon, was ousted weeks ago after losing trust with Trump allies who now dominate the agency’s powerful policy shop. The special envoy for Syria and the anti-Islamic State coalition, Jim Jeffrey, also left the administration last month.
But the fall of the Islamic State’s territorial empire, which spanned 34,000 square miles into Syria and included about 40 percent of Iraq during the height of the self-declared caliphate, has done little to lessen Iraq’s crushing bills to rebuild the country, embroiled in near-constant upheaval since the 2003 U.S. invasion that led to the ouster of dictator Saddam Hussein.
There are 1.4 million people still internally displaced and 4.1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Iraq, according to the United Nations, which remains nearly $60 million short of funding for the humanitarian response in the country.
The embattled Iraqi government, which faced anti-corruption protests last year that forced the ouster of then-Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, has pledged to devalue the nation’s currency in a draft budget that leaked this week, raising concern from workers who will now have to make do with even less.
Senior diplomatic correspondent Colum Lynch contributed to this report.