foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Boris Johnson’s Plan to Get Brexit Done and ‘Hang the Consequences’

Boris Johnson ’ s Plan to Get Brexit Done and ‘ Hang the Consequences ’ Britain ’ s messy exit from the European Union came crashing back into the headlines this week with an apparent head-on assault by U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the terms of the withdrawal agreement signed with Brussels earlier this year , an assault that could put in jeopardy any trade deal with Europe or the United States , and possibly even the integrity of the United Kingdom itself .
New legislation introduced Wednesday in Parliament seeks to unilaterally overturn one of the key provisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Brussels , a mandatory customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K. if no free trade deal is agreed between London and the EU at the end of this year .
Even Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted that the proposed new legislation breaks international law , if only in a “ specific and limited way , ” drawing fierce criticism from senior Conservatives , including former Prime Minister Theresa May , as well as Brussels .
The EU has given Britain until the end of the month to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Downing Street insiders say there ’ s method to Johnson ’ s apparent madness , and it ’ s driven by domestic , not international , politics .
Striking an even harder line with Brussels now is less about wrangling concessions from the EU and more about “ heading off a new revolt from Brexit ultras , ” said one senior civil servant who sees Johnson on a daily basis .
For Johnson , the risks of playing fast and loose with Britain ’ s global reputation by breaching an international treaty are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off the same kind of nightmare that May faced … a major revolt in the [ Conservative ] Party and the birth of a new UKIP , ” the senior civil servant said.Downing Street insiders say there ’ s method to Johnson ’ s apparent madness , and it ’ s driven by domestic , not international , politics .
The UK Independence Party , later superseded by the Brexit Party , was a single-issue political grouping that campaigned for a complete break from the EU , spearheading the 2016 campaign to leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 2019 was a major drain on Conservative support .
Johnson was able to win a landslide electoral victory last December by taking a far harder line on Brexit than May did , both crushing support for the Brexit Party and winning over former Labour voters in largely working-class areas who supported his tough stance against Brussels .
Nine months on , the prime minister ’ s political calculus remains the same : Cave to Brussels , even over things already agreed to , and Johnson ’ s political base caves with it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by David Frost , the U.K. ’ s point man on talks with Europe , that Britain would be fine leaving the EU with no free trade deal and falling back on less-favorable trade terms under the auspices of the World Trade Organization .
The problem is that the economic consequences of crashing out with no trade deal—including the suspension of Britain ’ s ability to ply financial services in European markets , long delays at ports , higher prices for imports , and less competitive exports—could also prove politically catastrophic .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faces just five weeks before a self-imposed deadline to thrash out the basics of a trade deal with the rest of the EU .
“ Boris ’ philosophy has always been having his cake and eating it—and he ’ s always managed to get away with saying one thing and doing another , ” said a source close to the Johnson family .
“ The problem is that the EU is very legalistic .
There comes a point when you can ’ t get away with fudges any more .
So it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ to EU law , or economic disaster and the breakup of the [ U.K. ] .
That ’ s Boris ’ choice .
Or maybe it ’ s already out of his hands .
They ’ ve wasted too much time.
” When the U.K. finally pushed through Brexit and set the clock ticking on its divorce from the EU , Johnson ’ s government insisted on negotiating a sweeping new relationship covering everything from fisheries to trade to state aid by this autumn .
But so far , stymied by unbridgeable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Britain can accept , the two sides have made little progress .
The EU ’ s top negotiator , Michel Barnier , who is in London this week in yet another effort to hash out some common ground , has already complained of a “ wasted summer.
” On the U.K. side , Frost and his team have complained that the EU has refused to proceed with negotiations until two key areas of contention—fisheries access and rules on state aid—are resolved .
Johnson and his team seem to be betting that the threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no-deal Brexit will be enough to focus minds in Brussels and force concessions .
“ It ’ s a game of political chicken , ” said the Downing Street insider , who noted that in past negotiations , the EU has shown more flexibility , such as allowing the Swiss some leeway on banking regulations , while still securing a trade deal .
“ So [ Frost ] isn ’ t making quite the kind of kamikaze dive that the press have been making out .
But the timing is getting very tight.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ voted to leave the EU , and nine months after divorce proceedings began in earnest , the dance remains what it ever was .
Johnson needs to secure sufficient concessions to claim he hasn ’ t betrayed Brexit , even as Europe has remained utterly steadfast in its demands .
Before his meeting with Barnier this week , Frost said the EU needs to show “ more realism … about our status as an independent country.
” Yet from the start , Brussels has repeatedly made clear that any trade deal will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with EU regulations on labor , food safety , state aid , and fisheries.Johnson and his team seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses will be enough to force concessions .
The original withdrawal agreement Johnson signed would establish a de facto customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain in the event of no free trade deal—key to assuaging European fears that Brexit could jeopardize a quarter-century-old landmark peace agreement .
From London ’ s perspective , leaving Northern Ireland in Europe ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promise of Brexit but also threatened to drive Northern Ireland closer to unification with the Republic of Ireland itself .
That ’ s not the only threat to British unity unleashed by Brexit .
Scotland is now pushing for a second referendum on independence from the U.K. , after the first one in 2014 narrowly failed .
Now , given the prospect of being locked out of Europe as part of Brexit Britain , Scottish nationalists seem to have the upper hand .
The whole point of this week ’ s legislation was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ de facto border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Britain .
But it predictably outraged Brussels—and Dublin .
Irish leader Micheal Martin told the Financial Times this week that there were now “ justifiable doubts ” as to whether the U.K. wanted to conclude trade negotiations at all .
“ Our colleagues in Europe , in particular those conducting the negotiations , are now wondering whether the will is there or not to arrive at a conclusion and get an agreement , ” Martin said .
Johnson ’ s planned abrogation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poorly in Washington .
Lawmakers in Congress have warned that any British move that imperils the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ending decades of violent conflict in Ireland will nix any prospect of a trade deal with the United States , a sentiment echoed by Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden .
But in Downing Street , the current mood is “ all about getting Brexit done , and hang the consequences , ” according to the senior civil servant .
Johnson ’ s senior advisors were all recruited from the Vote Leave campaign , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referendum .
“ Boris is surrounded with believers who think that [ Britain ] can go it alone , ” the Downing Street insider said .
As time runs out for a trade deal with Europe ( or the United States ) and threats of the dissolution of the United Kingdom mount , the only question is just how alone Britain will go it .

Britain’s messy exit from the European Union came crashing back into the headlines this week with an apparent head-on assault by U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the terms of the withdrawal agreement signed with Brussels earlier this year, an assault that could put in jeopardy any trade deal with Europe or the United States, and possibly even the integrity of the United Kingdom itself.
Britain’s messy exit from the European Union came crashing back into the headlines this week with an apparent head-on assault by U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the terms of the withdrawal agreement signed with Brussels earlier this year, an assault that could put in jeopardy any trade deal with Europe or the United States, and possibly even the integrity of the United Kingdom itself.
New legislation introduced Wednesday in Parliament seeks to unilaterally overturn one of the key provisions of the bilateral agreement reached in January with Brussels, a mandatory customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K. if no free trade deal is agreed between London and the EU at the end of this year. Even Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted that the proposed new legislation breaks international law, if only in a “specific and limited way,” drawing fierce criticism from senior Conservatives, including former Prime Minister Theresa May, as well as Brussels. The EU has given Britain until the end of the month to amend the newly introduced legislation.
But Downing Street insiders say there’s method to Johnson’s apparent madness, and it’s driven by domestic, not international, politics. Striking an even harder line with Brussels now is less about wrangling concessions from the EU and more about “heading off a new revolt from Brexit ultras,” said one senior civil servant who sees Johnson on a daily basis.
For Johnson, the risks of playing fast and loose with Britain’s global reputation by breaching an international treaty are outweighed by “the need to head off the same kind of nightmare that May faced … a major revolt in the [Conservative] Party and the birth of a new UKIP,” the senior civil servant said.Downing Street insiders say there’s method to Johnson’s apparent madness, and it’s driven by domestic, not international, politics.
The UK Independence Party, later superseded by the Brexit Party, was a single-issue political grouping that campaigned for a complete break from the EU, spearheading the 2016 campaign to leave Europe, and whose popularity from 2016 to 2019 was a major drain on Conservative support. Johnson was able to win a landslide electoral victory last December by taking a far harder line on Brexit than May did, both crushing support for the Brexit Party and winning over former Labour voters in largely working-class areas who supported his tough stance against Brussels.
Nine months on, the prime minister’s political calculus remains the same: Cave to Brussels, even over things already agreed to, and Johnson’s political base caves with it. Hence this week’s reiteration by David Frost, the U.K.’s point man on talks with Europe, that Britain would be fine leaving the EU with no free trade deal and falling back on less-favorable trade terms under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.
The problem is that the economic consequences of crashing out with no trade deal—including the suspension of Britain’s ability to ply financial services in European markets, long delays at ports, higher prices for imports, and less competitive exports—could also prove politically catastrophic. That’s the fundamental dilemma that Johnson faces just five weeks before a self-imposed deadline to thrash out the basics of a trade deal with the rest of the EU.
“Boris’ philosophy has always been having his cake and eating it—and he’s always managed to get away with saying one thing and doing another,” said a source close to the Johnson family. “The problem is that the EU is very legalistic. There comes a point when you can’t get away with fudges any more. So it’s a trade deal and ‘vassalage’ to EU law, or economic disaster and the breakup of the [U.K.]. That’s Boris’ choice. Or maybe it’s already out of his hands. They’ve wasted too much time.”
When the U.K. finally pushed through Brexit and set the clock ticking on its divorce from the EU, Johnson’s government insisted on negotiating a sweeping new relationship covering everything from fisheries to trade to state aid by this autumn. But so far, stymied by unbridgeable gaps between what Europe demands and what Britain can accept, the two sides have made little progress.
The EU’s top negotiator, Michel Barnier, who is in London this week in yet another effort to hash out some common ground, has already complained of a “wasted summer.” On the U.K. side, Frost and his team have complained that the EU has refused to proceed with negotiations until two key areas of contention—fisheries access and rules on state aid—are resolved.
Johnson and his team seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses from a no-deal Brexit will be enough to focus minds in Brussels and force concessions.
“It’s a game of political chicken,” said the Downing Street insider, who noted that in past negotiations, the EU has shown more flexibility, such as allowing the Swiss some leeway on banking regulations, while still securing a trade deal. “So [Frost] isn’t making quite the kind of kamikaze dive that the press have been making out. But the timing is getting very tight.”
More than four years after Britain voted to leave the EU, and nine months after divorce proceedings began in earnest, the dance remains what it ever was. Johnson needs to secure sufficient concessions to claim he hasn’t betrayed Brexit, even as Europe has remained utterly steadfast in its demands. Before his meeting with Barnier this week, Frost said the EU needs to show “more realism … about our status as an independent country.” Yet from the start, Brussels has repeatedly made clear that any trade deal will be contingent on Britain remaining in close alignment with EU regulations on labor, food safety, state aid, and fisheries.Johnson and his team seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses will be enough to force concessions.
The original withdrawal agreement Johnson signed would establish a de facto customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain in the event of no free trade deal—key to assuaging European fears that Brexit could jeopardize a quarter-century-old landmark peace agreement. From London’s perspective, leaving Northern Ireland in Europe’s economic sphere not only partially betrayed the promise of Brexit but also threatened to drive Northern Ireland closer to unification with the Republic of Ireland itself. That’s not the only threat to British unity unleashed by Brexit. Scotland is now pushing for a second referendum on independence from the U.K., after the first one in 2014 narrowly failed. Now, given the prospect of being locked out of Europe as part of Brexit Britain, Scottish nationalists seem to have the upper hand.
The whole point of this week’s legislation was to get around the imposition of a de facto border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Britain. But it predictably outraged Brussels—and Dublin. Irish leader Micheal Martin told the Financial Times this week that there were now “justifiable doubts” as to whether the U.K. wanted to conclude trade negotiations at all. “Our colleagues in Europe, in particular those conducting the negotiations, are now wondering whether the will is there or not to arrive at a conclusion and get an agreement,” Martin said.
Johnson’s planned abrogation of the withdrawal agreement has also gone down poorly in Washington. Lawmakers in Congress have warned that any British move that imperils the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ending decades of violent conflict in Ireland will nix any prospect of a trade deal with the United States, a sentiment echoed by Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden.
But in Downing Street, the current mood is “all about getting Brexit done, and hang the consequences,” according to the senior civil servant. Johnson’s senior advisors were all recruited from the Vote Leave campaign, which drove through Brexit during the 2016 referendum.
“Boris is surrounded with believers who think that [Britain] can go it alone,” the Downing Street insider said. As time runs out for a trade deal with Europe (or the United States) and threats of the dissolution of the United Kingdom mount, the only question is just how alone Britain will go it.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Will Trump’s Troop Drawdown Plans Destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan (Again)?

Will Trump ’ s Troop Drawdown Plans Destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan ( Again ) ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump announces troop drawdowns in both Iraq and Afghanistan ahead of elections , fallout from Woodward ’ s interviews with the president , a messy break-up between Washington and the World Health Organization , and more .
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U.S. President Donald Trump is finally coming closer to fulfilling his campaign pledge to end U.S. troop commitments overseas , just weeks before he faces an uphill fight for re-election .
On Wednesday , the top U.S. commander in the Middle East , Gen. Kenneth McKenzie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nearly half the remaining troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq .
The planned withdrawals would see U.S. forces in Afghanistan fall to 4,500 and to just 3,000 in Iraq .
The move–long sought by Trump–may also prove politically popular overseas , especially in especially in Iraq , where parliament urged the expulsion of U.S. forces after an American drone strike killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani in Baghdad in January .
A former U.S. official said in an interview that the U.S. drawdown would give new Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi more maneuvering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow him to make the case for Iran to pull out some of its own militia forces in exchange for the American withdrawal .
Yet both Afghanistan and Iraq have struggled to build up internal security forces strong enough to ward off insurgent groups like the Islamic State and the Taliban .
Mick Mulroy , the Pentagon ’ s former top Middle East policy official in the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst , said the move “ shows that we have confidence in Iraq ’ s security forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than in the past.
” But he added that the United States “ should be continuously assessing the situation to see if we have to slow down the withdrawal or even send troops back.
” Iraq ’ s elite counterterrorism service lost 40 percent of its combat power in the nine-month battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State that ended in 2017 , according to a Pentagon finding .
U.S. veterans torn on the plan .
Stars and Stripes interviewed a number of veterans on the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reactions were mixed , but the consensus is that they ’ re not sure what was accomplished .
“ That the soldier in question , alive or dead , did their job—they won the battle on the ground , as they were trained to do—there is comfort in that , ” Army Staff Sgt .
Séamus Fennessy said .
“ But simultaneously , there is a sense of bitterness against the politicians and bureaucrats for big-picture incompetence.
” Waiting on the NDAA .
The Pentagon ’ s yearly authorizing bill will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election , a top Republican lawmaker said on Wednesday .
Speaking at the Defense News conference , retiring Texas Rep. Mac Thornberry , the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee said a handful of differences between the House and Senate were causing the delay .
Trump has threatened to veto the bill for a provision that would rename bases honoring Confederate leaders , and the Senate has favored more money for military operations in the Asia-Pacific to counter China .
All the president ’ s tapes .
Journalist Bob Woodward conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his forthcoming book , ‘ Rage , ’ and , yet again , Washington is rocked by explosive revelations and controversial comments from the president .
Among the takeaways : The president knowingly downplayed the risks of the coronavirus in the early months of the outbreak , even while acknowledging in private that the virus was deadly and highly contagious .
Former Pentagon chief Jim Mattis and former director of National Intelligence Dan Coates thought of the president as “ dangerous ” to U.S. national security , and Coates wondered just what Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also reportedly disparaged top U.S. military brass in 2017 as “ a bunch of p*ssies ” who “ care more about their alliances than they do about trade deals.
” WHO , ya gon na call ?
Trump made clear he wants the United States out of the World Health Organization , blaming it for fumbling the response to the coronavirus pandemic and catering too much to China .
The State Department issued a sweeping directive to U.S. government personnel to curtail their contacts with WHO officials .
But at the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and plans to deliver tens of millions of dollars to the organization , given its important role in tackling other deadly diseases and viruses like polio or influenza .
U.S. diplomats and health experts say Trump ’ s grand plan to leave the world ’ s leading health organization in the midst of a pandemic is easier said than done .
Court shortlist .
President Trump said Wednesday he would consider naming three influential foreign-policy Republicans in Congress to the Supreme Court if he wins a second term : former 2016 presidential rival @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tom Cotton of Arkansas , and Josh Hawley of Missouri .
Cruz serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , while both Cotton and Hawley are members of the Senate Armed Services panel pursuing a more forceful U.S. policy toward China .
Medal of Honor .
Army Sgt .
Maj. Thomas “ Patrick ” Payne will receive the medal of honor from Trump at the White House on Friday for his role in rescuing 70 hostages from ISIS custody in a 2015 raid in northern Iraq .
Payne is the 19th U.S. service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the end of the Vietnam War , according to Military.com .
New Afghanistan envoy .
Trump is expected to nominate William Ruger , a foreign-policy expert who has advocated taking all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan , as the next ambassador to Kabul , the Wall Street Journal ’ s Rebecca Ballhaus reports .
Ruger is vice president for research and policy at the libertarian-oriented Charles Koch Institute .
“ I also believe that the deep and special friendship between us will work as a magical force that leads the progress of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim Jong Un to Trump , in one of the two leaders ’ 27 so-called “ love letters ” Bob Woodward obtained .
Military risks getting sucked into the 2020 maelstrom .
Peter Feaver writes for Foreign Policy on the risks of the U.S. military getting dragged further into the center of the heated election cycle , whether it wants to or not ( spoiler alert : it doesn ’ t . )
“ Of course , each new report of Trump mocking soldiers risks driving him to overcompensate in some other way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daily campaign gyre , ” Feaver writes .
“ The military ’ s revulsion reflex when it comes to partisan politics is healthy for U.S. democracy .
It should be allowed to quietly retreat from the campaign field while the civilians do the partisan fighting.
” Sept. 14 : Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party is set to hold a leadership election after longtime Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced plans to step down late last month .
Sept. 15 : Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaks in a virtual event hosted by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Institution defense experts are hosting a virtual panel on how the 2020 elections will shape U.S. defense policy .
Sept. 16 : Ursula von der Leyen , president of the European Commission , gives the annual State of the European Union address .
Blame it on the hackers .
China ’ s ambassador to the United Kingdom found himself in the news after he “ liked ” a pornographic tweet—or at least whoever is in charge of his official Twitter account did .
The Chinese embassy claimed it was a “ vicious attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Twitter to investigate .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

By Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump announces troop drawdowns in both Iraq and Afghanistan ahead of elections, fallout from Woodward’s interviews with the president, a messy break-up between Washington and the World Health Organization, and more.
Security Brief will soon be available only to Foreign Policy subscribers. After Oct. 1, readers who don’t have a Basic, Premium, or FP Insider subscription will no longer receive these mailings . Not a subscriber? Join us here. In addition to Security Brief, Premium and FP Insider subscribers can get email alerts as soon as FP publishes defense and security news. Not sure you’re a subscriber? Contact us at support@foreignpolicy.com.
A Troop Drawdown, Just in Time for Elections
U.S. President Donald Trump is finally coming closer to fulfilling his campaign pledge to end U.S. troop commitments overseas, just weeks before he faces an uphill fight for re-election. On Wednesday, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East, Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, said the Pentagon would bring home nearly half the remaining troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The planned withdrawals would see U.S. forces in Afghanistan fall to 4,500 and to just 3,000 in Iraq.
The move–long sought by Trump–may also prove politically popular overseas, especially in especially in Iraq, where parliament urged the expulsion of U.S. forces after an American drone strike killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani in Baghdad in January. A former U.S. official said in an interview that the U.S. drawdown would give new Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi more maneuvering room with political opponents. That could allow him to make the case for Iran to pull out some of its own militia forces in exchange for the American withdrawal.
Yet both Afghanistan and Iraq have struggled to build up internal security forces strong enough to ward off insurgent groups like the Islamic State and the Taliban. Mick Mulroy, the Pentagon’s former top Middle East policy official in the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst, said the move “shows that we have confidence in Iraq’s security forces and their ability to operate more independently than in the past.” But he added that the United States “should be continuously assessing the situation to see if we have to slow down the withdrawal or even send troops back.”
Iraq’s elite counterterrorism service lost 40 percent of its combat power in the nine-month battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State that ended in 2017, according to a Pentagon finding.
U.S. veterans torn on the plan. Stars and Stripes interviewed a number of veterans on the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of operations. The reactions were mixed, but the consensus is that they’re not sure what was accomplished. “That the soldier in question, alive or dead, did their job—they won the battle on the ground, as they were trained to do—there is comfort in that,” Army Staff Sgt. Séamus Fennessy said. “But simultaneously, there is a sense of bitterness against the politicians and bureaucrats for big-picture incompetence.”
What We’re Watching
Waiting on the NDAA. The Pentagon’s yearly authorizing bill will likely have to wait until after the election, a top Republican lawmaker said on Wednesday. Speaking at the Defense News conference, retiring Texas Rep. Mac Thornberry, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee said a handful of differences between the House and Senate were causing the delay. Trump has threatened to veto the bill for a provision that would rename bases honoring Confederate leaders, and the Senate has favored more money for military operations in the Asia-Pacific to counter China.
All the president’s tapes. Journalist Bob Woodward conducted 18 interviews with Trump as part of his forthcoming book, ‘Rage,’ and, yet again, Washington is rocked by explosive revelations and controversial comments from the president. Among the takeaways: The president knowingly downplayed the risks of the coronavirus in the early months of the outbreak, even while acknowledging in private that the virus was deadly and highly contagious. Former Pentagon chief Jim Mattis and former director of National Intelligence Dan Coates thought of the president as “dangerous” to U.S. national security, and Coates wondered just what Russia might have on the president. Trump also reportedly disparaged top U.S. military brass in 2017 as “a bunch of p*ssies” who “care more about their alliances than they do about trade deals.”
WHO, ya gonna call? Trump made clear he wants the United States out of the World Health Organization, blaming it for fumbling the response to the coronavirus pandemic and catering too much to China. The State Department issued a sweeping directive to U.S. government personnel to curtail their contacts with WHO officials. But at the same time, the administration is carving out exemptions and plans to deliver tens of millions of dollars to the organization, given its important role in tackling other deadly diseases and viruses like polio or influenza. U.S. diplomats and health experts say Trump’s grand plan to leave the world’s leading health organization in the midst of a pandemic is easier said than done.
Movers and Shakers
Court shortlist. President Trump said Wednesday he would consider naming three influential foreign-policy Republicans in Congress to the Supreme Court if he wins a second term: former 2016 presidential rival Sens. Ted Cruz of Texas, Tom Cotton of Arkansas, and Josh Hawley of Missouri. Cruz serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while both Cotton and Hawley are members of the Senate Armed Services panel pursuing a more forceful U.S. policy toward China.
Medal of Honor. Army Sgt. Maj. Thomas “Patrick” Payne will receive the medal of honor from Trump at the White House on Friday for his role in rescuing 70 hostages from ISIS custody in a 2015 raid in northern Iraq. Payne is the 19th U.S. service member to receive the highest military commendation since the end of the Vietnam War, according to Military.com.
New Afghanistan envoy. Trump is expected to nominate William Ruger, a foreign-policy expert who has advocated taking all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, as the next ambassador to Kabul, the Wall Street Journal’s Rebecca Ballhaus reports. Ruger is vice president for research and policy at the libertarian-oriented Charles Koch Institute.
Quote of the Week
“I also believe that the deep and special friendship between us will work as a magical force that leads the progress of the DPRK-US relations”—North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Trump, in one of the two leaders’ 27 so-called “love letters” Bob Woodward obtained.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Military risks getting sucked into the 2020 maelstrom. Peter Feaver writes for Foreign Policy on the risks of the U.S. military getting dragged further into the center of the heated election cycle, whether it wants to or not (spoiler alert: it doesn’t.) “Of course, each new report of Trump mocking soldiers risks driving him to overcompensate in some other way that further drags the military into the daily campaign gyre,” Feaver writes. “The military’s revulsion reflex when it comes to partisan politics is healthy for U.S. democracy. It should be allowed to quietly retreat from the campaign field while the civilians do the partisan fighting.”
The Week Ahead
Sept. 11: 9/11 World Trade Center Remembrance Ceremony
Sept. 14: Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party is set to hold a leadership election after longtime Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced plans to step down late last month.
Sept. 15: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaks in a virtual event hosted by the Atlantic Council.
Sept. 15: Brookings Institution defense experts are hosting a virtual panel on how the 2020 elections will shape U.S. defense policy.
Sept. 16: Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, gives the annual State of the European Union address.
Odds and Ends
Blame it on the hackers. China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom found himself in the news after he “liked” a pornographic tweet—or at least whoever is in charge of his official Twitter account did. The Chinese embassy claimed it was a “vicious attack” by anti-China hackers and are calling on Twitter to investigate.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--A Year After Rendering Millions Stateless, India Has Yet to Hear a Single Appeal

A Year After Rendering Millions Stateless , India Has Yet to Hear a Single Appeal Shahjahan loves teaching science to his students at a government school in the Morigaon district of India ’ s northeastern state of Assam .
But for the past year , the 28-year-old teacher has started each day feeling as though he ’ s living a lie .
Shahjahan , whose name has been changed at his request , hasn ’ t told anyone at his school that he was not included in the updated National Register of Citizens ( NRC ) that the Indian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the school authorities or his colleagues find out , they ’ ll discriminate against him .
“ I also fear that I may be suspended , as I heard of another government schoolteacher who was suspended after the NRC list excluded him , ” he said .
First prepared as part of independent India ’ s first census in 1951 , the NRC is the official register of Indian citizens in Assam , the northeastern Indian state that shares a 163-mile-long border with Bangladesh .
Over the years , the government claimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to identify and deport Bengali immigrants who ’ d illegally crossed the border from what started as East Pakistan and then became Bangladesh .
The updated list , released on Aug. 31 , 2019 , was created with a similar intention : It ’ s excluded 1.9 million people , primarily Bengalis—both Muslim and Hindu—leaving them potentially stateless until proven otherwise .
Yet proving one ’ s citizenship is not easy , and for the time being , it ’ s nearly impossible .
Even if an individual has the right documents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limbo , since the Indian government has delayed the appeals process for anyone excluded by the NRC .
Human rights activists say that this yearlong period of government inaction is politically motivated , perhaps even a way for the Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) , the ruling party of India , to lay the groundwork for yet another NRC that will exclude far more people—especially Muslims—than the nearly 2 million already affected .
In the state of Assam , the determination of citizenship has long been a contentious political issue that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divides between the Assamese and Bengalis .
In the 19th century , the British brought Bengalis into the state from the neighboring state of Bengal to work its paddy fields .
India ’ s partition in 1947 , followed by the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 , led to a mass movement of people across the border that ’ s only heightened tensions around identity and citizenship .
Today , some Assamese claim that foreigners , or Bengalis from Bangladesh , are occupying their land .
In the state of Assam , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contentious political issue.In 2013 , the government updated the 1951 NRC in Assam in order to deport those immigrants .
The massive undertaking , which started in 2015 , was completed last year .
It cost 12.2 billion rupees ( $ 166 million ) and required some 50,000 government officials to examine the documents of more than 32 million people .
For the people who didn ’ t make the cut , their only recourse is to appeal their case in a quasi-judicial court called the Foreigners Tribunal—or face detention or deportation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreigners Tribunal once they ’ ve received a slip from the NRC office stating the reason they were rejected from the register .
And more than a year after the final list was published , the government still hasn ’ t issued a single rejection slip .
This state of limbo has torn apart the lives and livelihoods of the nearly 2 million people excluded from the list , especially during the COVID-19 pandemic .
Many have spent their entire savings on legal aid as they ’ ve prepared to prove their citizenship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t been able to access government relief despite the lockdown and recent floods caused by the overflowing of the Brahmaputra River that have affected more than 3 million people in Assam .
Shahjahan , who has a 75-year-old father , a wife , and a toddler , has spent more than 95,000 rupees ( $ 1,300 ) on lawyers and documentation fees .
“ I have managed to get all my documents , including a land deed from 1930 and 1950 , ” he said .
“ I don ’ t want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent years , The BJP has turned an age-old regional identity issue over linguistic differences in Assam into a national issue over religion .
the BJP has turned an age-old regional identity issue over linguistic differences in Assam into a national issue over religion .
Many of the BJP ’ s actions have been anti-Muslim , including the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act , a law that fast-tracks nationality for only non-Muslim minorities from neighboring Pakistan , Bangladesh , and Afghanistan .
The government has also stated its intentions to pave the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in November 2019 , Amit Shah , India ’ s minister of home affairs , said in Parliament that an NRC will be created for every region in India—including a new one in Assam—which would presumably disproportionately affect Muslims .
The nationwide protests that followed have since pushed the Modi government to backtrack on the announcement .
Still , the delay in addressing last year ’ s NRC in Assam has led to fear and anxiety that the people of Assam may have to go through another similar process .
For now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dev Sarma , claims that the delay in starting the appeals process is due to legal and technical anomalies .
When asked for a timeline , Sarma told me over the phone that the government will issue rejection slips in phases that will likely start this October .
Jiyad Ali , a 65-year-old resident of Assam ’ s Barpeta district who carefully followed the government ’ s instructions for submitting all the required documents , doesn ’ t understand why he was rejected and is desperately waiting for his rejection slip in order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bengali Muslim , was born in the Barpeta district of Assam in 1965 , but his birth may not automatically make him an Indian citizen , in part because citizenship depends largely on the status of an individual ’ s ancestors on significant dates .
One such date is March 25 , 1971 , which marks the start of Bangladesh ’ s war of independence from Pakistan .
If Ali ’ s parents crossed over to India illegally on or after this date , he would not be considered a citizen .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Citizenship Act of 1955 , or the law that defines citizenship in India .
In the late 1960s , the All Assam Students ’ Union , a student organization in Assam , rallied around this date—the day before Pakistan launched an operation in then East Pakistan which kicked off the war of independence—as part of a six-year movement to oust immigrants , mostly Muslim , who had come from Bangladesh .
The movement culminated in the historic Assam Accord of 1985 , which set a March 25 , 1971 deadline for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi added an amendment to the Citizenship Act , which mandated that individuals living in Assam submit birth or legacy documents to establish family residence and ancestry .
Ali has such documents to prove that his family lived in India before the deadline—including an electoral roll and a land deed—and he said those brittle pages , now yellow-brown with age , are the only valuable things he now owns .
This year has been particularly hard for his family of four .
“ My house was destroyed by the floods in Assam .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the streets , ” said Ali , from his new house—made of mud and bamboo mats—by the roadside .
To make matters worse , Ali ’ s exclusion from the NRC prevented him from accessing public rations during the pandemic .
Wadud , the human rights lawyer , said that cases like Ali ’ s are few but unsurprising .
Yet “ there is nothing on paper that says that the state can curtail the rights of these people before they are declared foreigners by the Foreigner ’ s Tribunal , ” Wadud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to state their patrilineal legacy to prove their citizenship .
That ’ s what kept Lal Bhanu , whose husband , children , and two brothers were included on the updated NRC , off the list .
Bhanu has no legacy documents from her paternal side , and the NRC does not allow for citizenship through marriage .
Bhanu ’ s plight is only exacerbated by her financial circumstances .
Those who can afford it can try to acquire the right documentation or legal assistance , but the poor “ have no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoid this process , ” said Ashraful Hussain , a youth leader and social activist who has helped people with their documentation .
“ If [ the police ] come for me , I ’ ll tell my children to tell them I am dead , ” said Bhanu .
“ If I spend all this money on lawyer fees , how will I feed my family during coronavirus when no one has jobs ?
” As a “ dead ” person , Bhanu would not have to either be detained or go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her citizenship .
But it would also mean that she ’ d never be able to access government social programs again , which is a right of every citizen .
Despite the toll on Assam residents such as Bhanu , the government has chosen to milk the issue of citizenship for political gain instead of letting it die out , even though 35 years have passed since the Assam Accord .
“ These people will be stateless perennially , and they will become an issue not just in the upcoming state assembly election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Wadud , the human rights lawyer .
In order to address this issue , Wadud said that the government should not only give the 1.9 million people excluded from the NRC a chance to appeal , but also issue national ID cards to protect the 31 million who made the final list .
Shahjahan , meanwhile , hopes that his 1-year-old son who , thanks to the NRC , was born stateless , will not have to live his entire life proving to authorities why he is Indian .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ I have all my documents ready to appeal my case , ” Shahjahan said .
“ Give me the rejection slip , get the process started , so me and my family can live with dignity and with our identity restored .
”

Shahjahan loves teaching science to his students at a government school in the Morigaon district of India’s northeastern state of Assam. But for the past year, the 28-year-old teacher has started each day feeling as though he’s living a lie. Shahjahan, whose name has been changed at his request, hasn’t told anyone at his school that he was not included in the updated National Register of Citizens (NRC) that the Indian government published last year. He worries that if the school authorities or his colleagues find out, they’ll discriminate against him. “I also fear that I may be suspended, as I heard of another government schoolteacher who was suspended after the NRC list excluded him,” he said.
Shahjahan loves teaching science to his students at a government school in the Morigaon district of India’s northeastern state of Assam. But for the past year, the 28-year-old teacher has started each day feeling as though he’s living a lie. Shahjahan, whose name has been changed at his request, hasn’t told anyone at his school that he was not included in the updated National Register of Citizens (NRC) that the Indian government published last year. He worries that if the school authorities or his colleagues find out, they’ll discriminate against him. “I also fear that I may be suspended, as I heard of another government schoolteacher who was suspended after the NRC list excluded him,” he said.
First prepared as part of independent India’s first census in 1951, the NRC is the official register of Indian citizens in Assam, the northeastern Indian state that shares a 163-mile-long border with Bangladesh. Over the years, the government claimed that the NRC’s main purpose was to identify and deport Bengali immigrants who’d illegally crossed the border from what started as East Pakistan and then became Bangladesh. The updated list, released on Aug. 31, 2019, was created with a similar intention: It’s excluded 1.9 million people, primarily Bengalis—both Muslim and Hindu—leaving them potentially stateless until proven otherwise.
Yet proving one’s citizenship is not easy, and for the time being, it’s nearly impossible. Even if an individual has the right documents, they’re still stuck in limbo, since the Indian government has delayed the appeals process for anyone excluded by the NRC. Human rights activists say that this yearlong period of government inaction is politically motivated, perhaps even a way for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party of India, to lay the groundwork for yet another NRC that will exclude far more people—especially Muslims—than the nearly 2 million already affected.
In the state of Assam, the determination of citizenship has long been a contentious political issue that’s rooted in the linguistic and cultural divides between the Assamese and Bengalis. In the 19th century, the British brought Bengalis into the state from the neighboring state of Bengal to work its paddy fields. India’s partition in 1947, followed by the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, led to a mass movement of people across the border that’s only heightened tensions around identity and citizenship. Today, some Assamese claim that foreigners, or Bengalis from Bangladesh, are occupying their land.
In the state of Assam, the determination of citizenship has long been a contentious political issue.In 2013, the government updated the 1951 NRC in Assam in order to deport those immigrants. The massive undertaking, which started in 2015, was completed last year. It cost 12.2 billion rupees ($166 million) and required some 50,000 government officials to examine the documents of more than 32 million people. For the people who didn’t make the cut, their only recourse is to appeal their case in a quasi-judicial court called the Foreigners Tribunal—or face detention or deportation.
But people can only go to the Foreigners Tribunal once they’ve received a slip from the NRC office stating the reason they were rejected from the register. And more than a year after the final list was published, the government still hasn’t issued a single rejection slip.
This state of limbo has torn apart the lives and livelihoods of the nearly 2 million people excluded from the list, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many have spent their entire savings on legal aid as they’ve prepared to prove their citizenship to the tribunals. Some haven’t been able to access government relief despite the lockdown and recent floods caused by the overflowing of the Brahmaputra River that have affected more than 3 million people in Assam.
Shahjahan, who has a 75-year-old father, a wife, and a toddler, has spent more than 95,000 rupees ($1,300) on lawyers and documentation fees. “I have managed to get all my documents, including a land deed from 1930 and 1950,” he said. “I don’t want to live in fear every day.”
The government’s delay in issuing rejection slips is intentional, Aman Wadud, a human rights lawyer based in Guwahati, Assam’s largest city, told me over the phone last month. He’s been taking on citizenship cases pro bono. According to Wadud, the government has publicly revealed that it was discouraged by the fact that only 2 million people were excluded from the register, since it had hoped the NRC would affect millions more. “Since the numbers don’t match the [BJP] government’s propaganda …they don’t want to confirm this NRC list and instead want to conduct another NRC,” said Wadud.
In recent years, The BJP has turned an age-old regional identity issue over linguistic differences in Assam into a national issue over religion. the BJP has turned an age-old regional identity issue over linguistic differences in Assam into a national issue over religion. Many of the BJP’s actions have been anti-Muslim, including the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act, a law that fast-tracks nationality for only non-Muslim minorities from neighboring Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. The government has also stated its intentions to pave the way for a nationwide NRC.
Indeed, in November 2019, Amit Shah, India’s minister of home affairs, said in Parliament that an NRC will be created for every region in India—including a new one in Assam—which would presumably disproportionately affect Muslims. The nationwide protests that followed have since pushed the Modi government to backtrack on the announcement. Still, the delay in addressing last year’s NRC in Assam has led to fear and anxiety that the people of Assam may have to go through another similar process.
For now, the NRC state coordinator, Hitesh Dev Sarma, claims that the delay in starting the appeals process is due to legal and technical anomalies. When asked for a timeline, Sarma told me over the phone that the government will issue rejection slips in phases that will likely start this October.
Sarma’s promise, with no definitive timelines, is of little comfort to individuals caught in limbo.
Jiyad Ali, a 65-year-old resident of Assam’s Barpeta district who carefully followed the government’s instructions for submitting all the required documents, doesn’t understand why he was rejected and is desperately waiting for his rejection slip in order to appeal it.
Ali, a Bengali Muslim, was born in the Barpeta district of Assam in 1965, but his birth may not automatically make him an Indian citizen, in part because citizenship depends largely on the status of an individual’s ancestors on significant dates. One such date is March 25, 1971, which marks the start of Bangladesh’s war of independence from Pakistan. If Ali’s parents crossed over to India illegally on or after this date, he would not be considered a citizen.
This March 25 date informs the present-day NRC and the Citizenship Act of 1955, or the law that defines citizenship in India. In the late 1960s, the All Assam Students’ Union, a student organization in Assam, rallied around this date—the day before Pakistan launched an operation in then East Pakistan which kicked off the war of independence—as part of a six-year movement to oust immigrants, mostly Muslim, who had come from Bangladesh. The movement culminated in the historic Assam Accord of 1985, which set a March 25, 1971 deadline for citizenship. After the accord, New Delhi added an amendment to the Citizenship Act, which mandated that individuals living in Assam submit birth or legacy documents to establish family residence and ancestry.
Ali has such documents to prove that his family lived in India before the deadline—including an electoral roll and a land deed—and he said those brittle pages, now yellow-brown with age, are the only valuable things he now owns. This year has been particularly hard for his family of four. “My house was destroyed by the floods in Assam. My family was pushed to live on the streets,” said Ali, from his new house—made of mud and bamboo mats—by the roadside. To make matters worse, Ali’s exclusion from the NRC prevented him from accessing public rations during the pandemic.
Wadud, the human rights lawyer, said that cases like Ali’s are few but unsurprising. Yet “there is nothing on paper that says that the state can curtail the rights of these people before they are declared foreigners by the Foreigner’s Tribunal,” Wadud said.
Ethnic Bengalis may be the primary target of Assam’s NRC, but as with many such efforts, the effects of the NRC have disproportionately harmed women and the poorThe effects of the NRC have disproportionately harmed women and the poor.. In November 2019, Women Against Sexual Violence and State Repression, a grassroots effort by a nationwide network of women from diverse backgrounds, visited Assam and found that the burden of producing documentation was much harder for women, who have historically been denied entitlements of land and lineage.
For the NRC, individuals have to state their patrilineal legacy to prove their citizenship. That’s what kept Lal Bhanu, whose husband, children, and two brothers were included on the updated NRC, off the list. Bhanu has no legacy documents from her paternal side, and the NRC does not allow for citizenship through marriage.
Bhanu’s plight is only exacerbated by her financial circumstances. Those who can afford it can try to acquire the right documentation or legal assistance, but the poor “have no choice but to declare themselves dead to avoid this process,” said Ashraful Hussain, a youth leader and social activist who has helped people with their documentation.
“If [the police] come for me, I’ll tell my children to tell them I am dead,” said Bhanu. “If I spend all this money on lawyer fees, how will I feed my family during coronavirus when no one has jobs?” As a “dead” person, Bhanu would not have to either be detained or go through the rigmarole of trying to prove her citizenship. But it would also mean that she’d never be able to access government social programs again, which is a right of every citizen.
Despite the toll on Assam residents such as Bhanu, the government has chosen to milk the issue of citizenship for political gain instead of letting it die out, even though 35 years have passed since the Assam Accord. “These people will be stateless perennially, and they will become an issue not just in the upcoming state assembly election in April, but election after election,” said Wadud, the human rights lawyer.
In order to address this issue, Wadud said that the government should not only give the 1.9 million people excluded from the NRC a chance to appeal, but also issue national ID cards to protect the 31 million who made the final list.
Shahjahan, meanwhile, hopes that his 1-year-old son who, thanks to the NRC, was born stateless, will not have to live his entire life proving to authorities why he is Indian. He is determined to sort this out now. “I have all my documents ready to appeal my case,” Shahjahan said. “Give me the rejection slip, get the process started, so me and my family can live with dignity and with our identity restored.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Latin America Is Off the Global Stage, and That’s OK

Latin America Is Off the Global Stage , and That ’ s OK If you are not at the table , you are on the menu—or so the diplomatic saying goes .
And when the great powers sit down to dinner , Latin American countries are more likely to be food than guests .
Legend says they once considered giving Brazil a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council , but the invitation never arrived .
Today , Brazil will not sit there anytime soon , and although Argentina , Brazil , and Mexico take part in the G-20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ineffectual as the forum itself .
But there ’ s a long history of the great powers finding Latin America a tasty snack .
In the 19th century , Austria , Prussia , and Russia supported the restitution of Iberian rule ; the British blockaded almost every port on the Atlantic coast ; and the French invaded Mexico while the United States tried to enforce the Monroe Doctrine .
In the 20th century , when the Europeans took off , the United States became a better neighbor , but the Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the day , particularly after the Cuban Revolution .
But well into the 21st century , what if Latin America is so unimportant it isn ’ t even on the menu ?
Compare it with other decolonized , developing regions .
Today , Africa is home to a fifth of humanity , and demographic trends suggest it might become a serious driver of global economic growth in a couple of decades .
On the flipside , extreme poverty makes it a ticking bomb , with millions of people just a boat away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for better or worse , Africa is becoming increasingly geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the great powers .
This assessment applies even more clearly to Asia and the Middle East .
Asia is the current driver of global economic growth and hosts the only challenger to American hegemony , which is winding up in quarrels with all of its neighbors .
The Middle East has the largest energy reserves in the world and remains the epicenter of violent political conflict .
In contrast , Latin America is declining in both economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less promise and poses a smaller threat , and therefore is unlikely to be either courted or feared .
Yet , you may think , it could still be eaten .
What in Latin America could still make the great powers ’ mouth water ?
Early in the unipolar moment , the region was still relatively special to the United States thanks to the combination of energy , migration , and cocaine .
Oil from Venezuela , migrants from Mexico , and drugs from Colombia were the main concerns .
Today , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both energy and drugs , and Mexico is retaining not only its own population but Central American refugees as well .
Direct intervention has long become unnecessary .
Historically the United States has intervened , either overtly or covertly , to prevent extra-regional powers from meddling in the Western Hemisphere .
But this is not the case with China—and is unlikely to be .
In 2016 , one of us published a collective study showing how Beijing filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the region without threatening U.S. strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric about a “ troika of tyranny ” ( of Cuba , Nicaragua , and Venezuela ) backed by Beijing , or perhaps because of it , China has turned inward and backed off on its economic statecraft .
To be sure , nine Latin American countries have “ strategic partnerships ” with China , 19 have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative , and the U.S. Southern Command has recently identified telecommunication projects in 16 countries that could allow Beijing to spy on American activities .
But the contrast with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ huge strategic inroads—such as Africa , Central Asia , and Southeast Asia—is staggering .
Latin America and the Caribbean is still home to nine out of the 14 countries in the world that recognize Taiwan—including Nicaragua , a member of the troika .
When the Dominican Republic , El Salvador , and Panama switched recognition to China in recent years , the U.S. reaction was fierce enough to deter further defections .
Some close partners in the region , such as Bolivia and Ecuador , have started to turn their back on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economies , Argentina , Brazil , and Mexico , have been increasingly wary of engaging in closer relations if it comes at the expense of U.S. fondness .
If Venezuela remains the exception to this general realignment , its economic and humanitarian meltdown indicates to the Chinese that opportunities in Latin America are not worth the risk .
Toxic food , as it were , does not make for an attractive menu .
Of course , the bipolar world we are entering poses specific challenges , not the least of which being that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ food on Chinese tables and providing the raw material for the cutlery .
Mounting tensions with the United States shed a new light on the strategic importance of the region as a source of commodities—e.g.
, soybean , iron ore , or copper—and as a market for Chinese manufacturers .
After the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership , China was able to maintain free trade agreements with Chile , Costa Rica , and Peru , but negotiations with countries like Mexico and Panama stalled as trade became a battleground of great-power competition .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese investment has failed to keep up with that of the United States , China did become an important source of credit for Latin America in the past 20 years , its banks offering more loans to the region than the Word Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined—two traditional lenders through which Washington disciplined its so-called backyard in the past .
Yet things have changed lately , with China lending less and more strategically to its state-owned enterprises and energy and infrastructure projects , sometimes through the Inter-American Development Bank itself—whose funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s obdurate insistence in picking the new chief of the institution himself against the unwritten rule that established , at the foundation of the bank , that the president should be a Latin American citizen .
Latin America can still be internationally relevant in specific arenas , and particular cases may become problematic , but with a dwarfing economy and squarely under U.S. hegemony , the region may be less relevant globally than at any point in the past few centuries .
And yet , who said irrelevance is bad when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @

If you are not at the table, you are on the menu—or so the diplomatic saying goes. And when the great powers sit down to dinner, Latin American countries are more likely to be food than guests. Legend says they once considered giving Brazil a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, but the invitation never arrived. Today, Brazil will not sit there anytime soon, and although Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico take part in the G-20, their participation has been as uncoordinated and ineffectual as the forum itself.
If you are not at the table, you are on the menu—or so the diplomatic saying goes. And when the great powers sit down to dinner, Latin American countries are more likely to be food than guests. Legend says they once considered giving Brazil a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, but the invitation never arrived. Today, Brazil will not sit there anytime soon, and although Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico take part in the G-20, their participation has been as uncoordinated and ineffectual as the forum itself.
But there’s a long history of the great powers finding Latin America a tasty snack. In the 19th century, Austria, Prussia, and Russia supported the restitution of Iberian rule; the British blockaded almost every port on the Atlantic coast; and the French invaded Mexico while the United States tried to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. In the 20th century, when the Europeans took off, the United States became a better neighbor, but the Cold War soon reintroduced some hot Latin American dishes of the day, particularly after the Cuban Revolution.
But well into the 21st century, what if Latin America is so unimportant it isn’t even on the menu? Compare it with other decolonized, developing regions. Today, Africa is home to a fifth of humanity, and demographic trends suggest it might become a serious driver of global economic growth in a couple of decades. On the flipside, extreme poverty makes it a ticking bomb, with millions of people just a boat away from aging Europe. This means that, for better or worse, Africa is becoming increasingly geopolitically relevant in the eyes of the great powers.
This assessment applies even more clearly to Asia and the Middle East. Asia is the current driver of global economic growth and hosts the only challenger to American hegemony, which is winding up in quarrels with all of its neighbors. The Middle East has the largest energy reserves in the world and remains the epicenter of violent political conflict. In contrast, Latin America is declining in both economic weight and political relevance. It offers less promise and poses a smaller threat, and therefore is unlikely to be either courted or feared. Yet, you may think, it could still be eaten.
What in Latin America could still make the great powers’ mouth water? Early in the unipolar moment, the region was still relatively special to the United States thanks to the combination of energy, migration, and cocaine. Oil from Venezuela, migrants from Mexico, and drugs from Colombia were the main concerns. Today, the United States is close to self-sufficiency in both energy and drugs, and Mexico is retaining not only its own population but Central American refugees as well.
Direct intervention has long become unnecessary. Historically the United States has intervened, either overtly or covertly, to prevent extra-regional powers from meddling in the Western Hemisphere. But this is not the case with China—and is unlikely to be. In 2016, one of us published a collective study showing how Beijing filled the void left by a diminished U.S. presence in the region without threatening U.S. strategic interests. Since then, despite heightened rhetoric about a “troika of tyranny” (of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) backed by Beijing, or perhaps because of it, China has turned inward and backed off on its economic statecraft.
To be sure, nine Latin American countries have “strategic partnerships” with China, 19 have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, and the U.S. Southern Command has recently identified telecommunication projects in 16 countries that could allow Beijing to spy on American activities. But the contrast with other world regions where China has made huge strategic inroads—such as Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia—is staggering. Latin America and the Caribbean is still home to nine out of the 14 countries in the world that recognize Taiwan—including Nicaragua, a member of the troika.
When the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama switched recognition to China in recent years, the U.S. reaction was fierce enough to deter further defections. Some close partners in the region, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have started to turn their back on China, and the three largest Latin American economies, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have been increasingly wary of engaging in closer relations if it comes at the expense of U.S. fondness. If Venezuela remains the exception to this general realignment, its economic and humanitarian meltdown indicates to the Chinese that opportunities in Latin America are not worth the risk. Toxic food, as it were, does not make for an attractive menu.
Of course, the bipolar world we are entering poses specific challenges, not the least of which being that Latin America has been serving up the food on Chinese tables and providing the raw material for the cutlery. Mounting tensions with the United States shed a new light on the strategic importance of the region as a source of commodities—e.g., soybean, iron ore, or copper—and as a market for Chinese manufacturers. After the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China was able to maintain free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, but negotiations with countries like Mexico and Panama stalled as trade became a battleground of great-power competition.
Similar challenges are dawning financially. Although Chinese investment has failed to keep up with that of the United States, China did become an important source of credit for Latin America in the past 20 years, its banks offering more loans to the region than the Word Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined—two traditional lenders through which Washington disciplined its so-called backyard in the past. Yet things have changed lately, with China lending less and more strategically to its state-owned enterprises and energy and infrastructure projects, sometimes through the Inter-American Development Bank itself—whose funding increased fourfold. This might explain Trump’s obdurate insistence in picking the new chief of the institution himself against the unwritten rule that established, at the foundation of the bank, that the president should be a Latin American citizen.
Latin America can still be internationally relevant in specific arenas, and particular cases may become problematic, but with a dwarfing economy and squarely under U.S. hegemony, the region may be less relevant globally than at any point in the past few centuries.
And yet, who said irrelevance is bad when it means being scratched off the menu?


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--Under Biden, the Middle East Would Be Just Another Region

Under Biden , the Middle East Would Be Just Another Region The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die : democracy promotion , nation-building , counterinsurgency , humanitarian intervention , and the two-state solution .
In the aftermath of 9/11 , in his 2005 second inaugural address , President George W. Bush said that the “ survival of liberty ” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East , where “ resentment and tyranny ” had spawned global terrorism .
Today , the argument seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it is not the threat it was even five years ago ; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently .
The Middle East “ matters markedly less ” to the United States than it used to , to quote a much-discussed 2019 article by Tamara Cofman Wittes , a former State Department official under President Barack Obama , and Mara Karlin , a former Pentagon official under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they concluded , “ to put an end to wishful thinking ” about Washington ’ s ability to affect the internal dynamics or external calculations of regional actors .
This is the Middle East mission that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would inherit should he win in November .
He will be in a far better position to follow Wittes and Karlin ’ s suggestion to “ pivot ” away from the generational obsession with this intractable region than was Obama , who was pulled back in by the civil wars in Libya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic State ’ s so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq .
Biden is likely to take advantage of that opportunity , though probably not to a degree that would satisfy the realists and progressives who would like to see the United States liquidate its military presence in the region .
Biden is , by temperament , almost as immune to transcendent visions as was former President George H.W .
Bush .
On the great question that would ultimately define Obama ’ s foreign policy—the use of force in the Middle East—then-Vice President Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the fierce debates in the summer of 2009 over policy toward Afghanistan , as I mentioned in an earlier piece , Biden stood up to the generals when they argued for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy .
He didn ’ t think it would work , and he thought that a counterterrorism approach would satisfy America ’ s national security interests .
Biden also opposed the 2011 intervention in Libya .
“ He was skeptical of some of the grand ideas for transformation in the region , ” said Daniel Benaim , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East advisor and foreign-policy speechwriter during his second term as vice president , “ including our capacity to steer the outcomes of Arab revolutions.
” In the wake of the nuclear agreement with Iran , a former aide said , “ there was a gradient of idealism ” about whether Iran could be nudged to a less adversarial posture toward the West .
( The campaign didn ’ t allow this advisor to speak on the record . )
Biden , he said , “ didn ’ t invest big hopes.
” Should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under a Biden administration , brave liberal reformers would certainly enjoy more support than they have over the last four years under President Donald Trump , but Biden would greet them more warily than Obama did , or than a President Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren would .
Biden , in short , occupied the realist wing of the Obama administration on Middle East issues .
Trump might claim residence for himself in that wing , too .
But if a “ realist ” is guided by objective interests rather than ephemeral values @ @ @ @ @ @ @ value-free mercantilism in the region has emptied that term of all meaning .
He has truckled to brutal autocrats including Egypt ’ s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabia ’ s Mohammed bin Salman even as they have meddled in civil wars in Libya and Yemen in a way that plainly harms U.S. interests .
Biden would not hesitate to criticize their behavior both at home and abroad .
He has said : “ I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to Saudi Arabia , he warned , “ to change its approach.
” The same principle would apply to the United Arab Emirates , which , however , has withdrawn from the Yemen war , made quiet overtures to Iran , and , of course , agreed to open diplomatic relations with Israel .
Biden would strike a new , more distant , equilibrium .
The former aide said that he expects Biden to “ resist pressure from progressives to punish them.
” He would continue working with repressive regimes even as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local conflicts .
The Middle East would almost certainly be demoted under a President Biden—but how far ?
One senior advisor—who requested anonymity to speak candidly about the campaign—predicts that the Middle East would be “ a distant fourth ” in the order of priorities , after Europe , the Indo-Pacific , and Latin America .
Yet Biden has deep ties to the region , and he is unlikely as president to turn his back on leaders and states that he has worked with closely for years .
In 2009 , Obama assigned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Iraqi politics , keeping that country ’ s sectarian kingpins from tearing one another to shreds and taking the country with them .
Biden took on the job with a zeal , traveling to the region regularly and logging hundreds of hours on the phone .
At the time , as Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting Sunnis and guiding the country into the arms of Iran , Biden ’ s faith in endless palaver looked hollow .
Today , with Iraq still intact and the worldly Mustafa al-Kadhimi serving as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t seem quite so absurd .
While for both progressives and realists Iraq is the perfect example of a quagmire from which the United States needs to extricate itself altogether , Biden , according to his former aide , believes that Iraq “ has a chance to prevent a jihadist upsurge and be a harbinger of a less polarized and more pluralist Middle East , if they get it right.
” Biden would also fortify U.S. relations with moderate states like Jordan , which have been almost trampled underfoot in Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sheikdoms , above all Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
Most Middle East experts list thwarting terrorists , ensuring the global flow of oil , and containing Iran as the chief remaining U.S. interests in the region .
The Iran nuclear agreement was the Obama administration ’ s one notable accomplishment in the Middle East ; Trump ’ s unilateral abrogation of the pact has not only failed to rein in Iranian adventurism but has also caused Tehran to restart its nuclear program .
Biden has said that if Iran agrees to return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would do so as well “ as a starting point to work alongside our allies in Europe and other world powers to extend the deal ’ s nuclear constraints.
” That will not be easy : Iran has said that it will not return to the status quo ante—much less agree to extend the current terms—without significant concessions .
It ’ s not clear what kind of offer , if any , Biden would be prepared to make .
Trump has thrown in his lot with Israel as single-mindedly as he has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it clear that he would withdraw that blank check as well .
In a speech earlier this year to the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC , Biden said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s annexation plans in the West Bank—now in abeyance— “ are taking Israel further from its democratic values , undermining support for Israel in the United States , especially among young people in both political parties.
” That said , Biden has a long history of staunch support for Israel , including as vice president .
He would not threaten Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assistance to deter further settlement expansion .
Biden remains committed to a two-state solution .
Yet that long-sought goal has receded to a very remote horizon .
Biden could be the first U.S. president in a generation to devote little or no effort to this endlessly glimmering prospect , devoting himself instead to improving conditions for Palestinians and lowering tensions with Israel .
Perhaps the best way to think of Biden ’ s aspirations is to say that he would seek to normalize U.S. relations with the Middle East .
He would not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but he also would not tolerate as much as Trump has .
He would be unlikely either to raise expectations or to dash them .
He would not withdraw all American troops from Iraq or Syria or from the network of U.S. bases around the region , but he would be very wary of deploying them in the middle of a civil war .
He would , if lucky , fulfill the dream of many of his predecessors to give the region no more attention than it merits .

The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die: democracy promotion, nation-building, counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and the two-state solution. In the aftermath of 9/11, in his 2005 second inaugural address, President George W. Bush said that the “survival of liberty” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East, where “resentment and tyranny” had spawned global terrorism. Today, the argument seems fanciful. Terrorism has hardly vanished, but it is not the threat it was even five years ago; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently.
The Middle East is the place where U.S. foreign-policy ideals in the post-Cold War era have gone to die: democracy promotion, nation-building, counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, and the two-state solution. In the aftermath of 9/11, in his 2005 second inaugural address, President George W. Bush said that the “survival of liberty” at home depended on the flourishing of liberty in the Middle East, where “resentment and tyranny” had spawned global terrorism. Today, the argument seems fanciful. Terrorism has hardly vanished, but it is not the threat it was even five years ago; nor does the United States need to depend on regional autocrats to ensure the supply of oil or to temper public anger at Israel to the degree it did until quite recently.
The Middle East “matters markedly less” to the United States than it used to, to quote a much-discussed 2019 article by Tamara Cofman Wittes, a former State Department official under President Barack Obama, and Mara Karlin, a former Pentagon official under Obama. The time had come, they concluded, “to put an end to wishful thinking” about Washington’s ability to affect the internal dynamics or external calculations of regional actors.
This is the Middle East mission that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden would inherit should he win in November. He will be in a far better position to follow Wittes and Karlin’s suggestion to “pivot” away from the generational obsession with this intractable region than was Obama, who was pulled back in by the civil wars in Libya and Syria and the founding of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Biden is likely to take advantage of that opportunity, though probably not to a degree that would satisfy the realists and progressives who would like to see the United States liquidate its military presence in the region.
Biden is, by temperament, almost as immune to transcendent visions as was former President George H.W. Bush. On the great question that would ultimately define Obama’s foreign policy—the use of force in the Middle East—then-Vice President Biden played a cautionary and sometimes contrary role. In the fierce debates in the summer of 2009 over policy toward Afghanistan, as I mentioned in an earlier piece, Biden stood up to the generals when they argued for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy. He didn’t think it would work, and he thought that a counterterrorism approach would satisfy America’s national security interests.
Biden also opposed the 2011 intervention in Libya. “He was skeptical of some of the grand ideas for transformation in the region,” said Daniel Benaim, who served as Biden’s Middle East advisor and foreign-policy speechwriter during his second term as vice president, “including our capacity to steer the outcomes of Arab revolutions.” In the wake of the nuclear agreement with Iran, a former aide said, “there was a gradient of idealism” about whether Iran could be nudged to a less adversarial posture toward the West. (The campaign didn’t allow this advisor to speak on the record.) Biden, he said, “didn’t invest big hopes.” Should the Arab Spring flare back to life under a Biden administration, brave liberal reformers would certainly enjoy more support than they have over the last four years under President Donald Trump, but Biden would greet them more warily than Obama did, or than a President Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren would.
Biden, in short, occupied the realist wing of the Obama administration on Middle East issues. Trump might claim residence for himself in that wing, too. But if a “realist” is guided by objective interests rather than ephemeral values, then Trump’s crass and value-free mercantilism in the region has emptied that term of all meaning. He has truckled to brutal autocrats including Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman even as they have meddled in civil wars in Libya and Yemen in a way that plainly harms U.S. interests. Biden would not hesitate to criticize their behavior both at home and abroad. He has said: “I would end U.S. support for the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen and order a reassessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia.” It would be up to Saudi Arabia, he warned, “to change its approach.”
The same principle would apply to the United Arab Emirates, which, however, has withdrawn from the Yemen war, made quiet overtures to Iran, and, of course, agreed to open diplomatic relations with Israel. Biden would strike a new, more distant, equilibrium. The former aide said that he expects Biden to “resist pressure from progressives to punish them.” He would continue working with repressive regimes even as he sought to deter them from exacerbating local conflicts.
The Middle East would almost certainly be demoted under a President Biden—but how far? One senior advisor—who requested anonymity to speak candidly about the campaign—predicts that the Middle East would be “a distant fourth” in the order of priorities, after Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and Latin America. Yet Biden has deep ties to the region, and he is unlikely as president to turn his back on leaders and states that he has worked with closely for years. In 2009, Obama assigned him to act as a traffic cop of Iraqi politics, keeping that country’s sectarian kingpins from tearing one another to shreds and taking the country with them. Biden took on the job with a zeal, traveling to the region regularly and logging hundreds of hours on the phone. At the time, as Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persecuting Sunnis and guiding the country into the arms of Iran, Biden’s faith in endless palaver looked hollow. Today, with Iraq still intact and the worldly Mustafa al-Kadhimi serving as prime minister, his belief in diplomacy doesn’t seem quite so absurd.
While for both progressives and realists Iraq is the perfect example of a quagmire from which the United States needs to extricate itself altogether, Biden, according to his former aide, believes that Iraq “has a chance to prevent a jihadist upsurge and be a harbinger of a less polarized and more pluralist Middle East, if they get it right.” Biden would also fortify U.S. relations with moderate states like Jordan, which have been almost trampled underfoot in Trump’s rush to embrace wealthy Gulf sheikdoms, above all Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Most Middle East experts list thwarting terrorists, ensuring the global flow of oil, and containing Iran as the chief remaining U.S. interests in the region. The Iran nuclear agreement was the Obama administration’s one notable accomplishment in the Middle East; Trump’s unilateral abrogation of the pact has not only failed to rein in Iranian adventurism but has also caused Tehran to restart its nuclear program. Biden has said that if Iran agrees to return to the terms of the deal, he would do so as well “as a starting point to work alongside our allies in Europe and other world powers to extend the deal’s nuclear constraints.” That will not be easy: Iran has said that it will not return to the status quo ante—much less agree to extend the current terms—without significant concessions. It’s not clear what kind of offer, if any, Biden would be prepared to make.
Trump has thrown in his lot with Israel as single-mindedly as he has with Saudi Arabia. Biden has made it clear that he would withdraw that blank check as well. In a speech earlier this year to the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC, Biden said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans in the West Bank—now in abeyance—“are taking Israel further from its democratic values, undermining support for Israel in the United States, especially among young people in both political parties.”
That said, Biden has a long history of staunch support for Israel, including as vice president. He would not threaten Israel with, for example, reduced military assistance to deter further settlement expansion. Biden remains committed to a two-state solution. Yet that long-sought goal has receded to a very remote horizon. Biden could be the first U.S. president in a generation to devote little or no effort to this endlessly glimmering prospect, devoting himself instead to improving conditions for Palestinians and lowering tensions with Israel.
Perhaps the best way to think of Biden’s aspirations is to say that he would seek to normalize U.S. relations with the Middle East. He would not ask as much as Obama did, but he also would not tolerate as much as Trump has. He would be unlikely either to raise expectations or to dash them. He would not withdraw all American troops from Iraq or Syria or from the network of U.S. bases around the region, but he would be very wary of deploying them in the middle of a civil war. He would, if lucky, fulfill the dream of many of his predecessors to give the region no more attention than it merits.