foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--U.S. Set to Finally Sanction Turkey for Buying Russian Arms

U.S. Set to Finally Sanction Turkey for Buying Russian Arms The Trump administration is set to impose sanctions against Turkey for acquiring a Russian air defense system more than a year ago , just as Congress readies a vote that would force the administration to impose those penalties that were long mandated by law .
Capitol Hill has long pushed for U.S. President Donald Trump to impose the mandatory sanctions after Turkey took delivery of the $ 2.5 billion Russian S-400 air defense system in July 2019 .
The United States quickly responded by kicking Turkey out of the F-35 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration stalled on imposing sanctions , while Trump allies such as Sen. Lindsey Graham called on the NATO ally not to activate the system .
The Pentagon has long warned that the S-400 would jeopardize the F-35 by using its radar to passively scan the jet , allowing the Russian system to more easily identify and shoot it down in combat .
The law—which calls on the U.S. president to impose a basket of five or more sanctions—gives Trump flexibility on how hard to crack down on Turkey for the sale , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making U.S. transactions , or stopping U.S. banks or international financial institutions from making loans , a move that could cause significant damage to the Turkish economy .
Two sources familiar with the discussions said that the sanctions , which the Trump administration mulled imposing in the months leading up to the lame duck session of Congress , will likely end up as a softer package of sanctions that include penalties against Turkey ’ s Presidency of Defense Industries but spare President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his family or harder retribution against Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s already weak economy and potentially send financial tremors further into Europe .
The Turkish lira has fallen in recent days over the provision in the U.S. Department of Defense ’ s annual authorization bill that would force the administration to impose sanctions .
Experts said the Trump administration may have finally been pushed into action by Turkey ’ s test in October of the Russian system—which drew condemnation from the Pentagon .
Trump had slapped sanctions on Turkish officials before—but only to secure the release of a jailed U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the congressionally mandated sanctions on Turkey for its purchase of Russian weapons , until Turkey ’ s brazen behavior made it impossible to ignore .
“ It ’ s really hard to put those S-400s away , ” said Aaron Stein , the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute .
“ As soon as those things showed up in Ankara , it ’ s like fuck , we ’ ve got a big problem here.
” Reuters first reported that the Trump administration would impose the penalties under the Countering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a 2017 law that threatens financial retribution against nations that purchase weapons from Russia and other U.S. antagonists .
Trump called the legislation “ seriously flawed.
” Turkey enjoyed a rapprochement with Russia since the November 2015 Turkish shootdown of a Russian jet in Syria , but relations have recently cooled , as the two countries have found themselves on opposite sides of proxy conflicts in Libya , Syria , and the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the South Caucasus .
The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act , which passed the House this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the sanctions if the bill becomes law .
( He has vowed to veto it . )
President-elect Joe Biden could also impose sanctions in January .
While experts said Erdogan isn ’ t likely to bend to American demands calling on Turkey to abandon the Russian system , even with the sanctions in place there are signs Ankara may be open to easing tensions with Washington , including the appointment of a new envoy to the United States .
“ I think it opens a blank page for President Biden so that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s not the bad cop , he ’ s the good cop , ” said Soner Cagaptay , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy .
“ So his job isn ’ t imposing sanctions , it ’ s talking about how he can move forward .
”

The Trump administration is set to impose sanctions against Turkey for acquiring a Russian air defense system more than a year ago, just as Congress readies a vote that would force the administration to impose those penalties that were long mandated by law.
The Trump administration is set to impose sanctions against Turkey for acquiring a Russian air defense system more than a year ago, just as Congress readies a vote that would force the administration to impose those penalties that were long mandated by law.
Capitol Hill has long pushed for U.S. President Donald Trump to impose the mandatory sanctions after Turkey took delivery of the $2.5 billion Russian S-400 air defense system in July 2019. The United States quickly responded by kicking Turkey out of the F-35 fighter jet program, but the Trump administration stalled on imposing sanctions, while Trump allies such as Sen. Lindsey Graham called on the NATO ally not to activate the system. The Pentagon has long warned that the S-400 would jeopardize the F-35 by using its radar to passively scan the jet, allowing the Russian system to more easily identify and shoot it down in combat.
The law—which calls on the U.S. president to impose a basket of five or more sanctions—gives Trump flexibility on how hard to crack down on Turkey for the sale, including blocking exports, barring certain officials from making U.S. transactions, or stopping U.S. banks or international financial institutions from making loans, a move that could cause significant damage to the Turkish economy.
Two sources familiar with the discussions said that the sanctions, which the Trump administration mulled imposing in the months leading up to the lame duck session of Congress, will likely end up as a softer package of sanctions that include penalties against Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries but spare President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his family or harder retribution against Turkish banks, which experts said could devastate the country’s already weak economy and potentially send financial tremors further into Europe. The Turkish lira has fallen in recent days over the provision in the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual authorization bill that would force the administration to impose sanctions.
Experts said the Trump administration may have finally been pushed into action by Turkey’s test in October of the Russian system—which drew condemnation from the Pentagon. Trump had slapped sanctions on Turkish officials before—but only to secure the release of a jailed U.S. pastor. He long refused to implement the congressionally mandated sanctions on Turkey for its purchase of Russian weapons, until Turkey’s brazen behavior made it impossible to ignore.
“It’s really hard to put those S-400s away,” said Aaron Stein, the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “As soon as those things showed up in Ankara, it’s like fuck, we’ve got a big problem here.”
Reuters first reported that the Trump administration would impose the penalties under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a 2017 law that threatens financial retribution against nations that purchase weapons from Russia and other U.S. antagonists. Trump called the legislation “seriously flawed.”
Turkey enjoyed a rapprochement with Russia since the November 2015 Turkish shootdown of a Russian jet in Syria, but relations have recently cooled, as the two countries have found themselves on opposite sides of proxy conflicts in Libya, Syria, and the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the South Caucasus.
The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which passed the House this week, would force Trump to impose the sanctions if the bill becomes law. (He has vowed to veto it.) President-elect Joe Biden could also impose sanctions in January. While experts said Erdogan isn’t likely to bend to American demands calling on Turkey to abandon the Russian system, even with the sanctions in place there are signs Ankara may be open to easing tensions with Washington, including the appointment of a new envoy to the United States.
“I think it opens a blank page for President Biden so that when he comes to power he’s not the bad cop, he’s the good cop,” said Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “So his job isn’t imposing sanctions, it’s talking about how he can move forward.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--2021 Could Be the Year of Free Trade

2021 Could Be the Year of Free Trade

2021 Could Be the Year of Free Trade In the Western Hemisphere , 1994 was the year of trade .
The United States , Mexico , and Canada integrated their economies by inking the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) , and the United States held the first Summit of the Americas with the objective of striking a hemisphere-spanning trade deal ( the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas ) .
Over a quarter century later , the recent U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement ( USMCA ) has modernized and replaced NAFTA , but the broader free trade agenda in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2021 , the United States will once again host the triennial Summit of the Americas—and it must put free trade squarely back on the agenda .
For Washington , it is not always obvious why the Americas ( aside from neighboring Canada and Mexico ) deserve its focus in matters of trade .
The region has struggled to grow at the rapid pace seen in other developing regions .
The GDPs of the other countries of the hemisphere , including Canada and Mexico , barely add up to one-third of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade negotiators has always been a large multilateral trade deal with Asia and , to a lesser extent , with Europe .
Yet those targets seem further and further off .
Even beyond the limitations of the Trump administration , a possible European trade deal will remain entangled in disagreements over defense spending and Europe ’ s recent propensity to aggressively regulate U.S. technology firms .
And in Asia , the United States forwent the opportunity for a grand bargain when the Trump administration scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) in just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if a Biden administration were to revive the TPP immediately—there may be too much water under the bridge for that to happen—the deal may be insufficient by itself to position the United States to compete with China , which is not a TPP signatory .
At best , the deal would allow the United States to match China ’ s recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP ) with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and many close U.S. allies , such as Australia and Japan .
From their inception @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and in many ways the United States would be returning to the scene too late .
That leaves the Americas to play a prominent role in U.S. grand trade strategy .
The United States draws invaluable strength from a prosperous , integrated , and largely democratic hemisphere .
But the country needs to deepen its engagement quickly to avoid potential ( and permanent ) defeat .
China is already the largest trading partner for many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean , lending it influence that extends well beyond trading relationships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prolifically with the United States as Mexico and Canada have been reluctant to follow the U.S. lead on Huawei , for example .
President-elect Joe Biden , therefore , needs to ( re ) assess the place of the Americas in U.S. grand strategy and consider the ways in which a broad free trade agreement would augment the relationship .
When the United States hosts the Summit of the Americas next year , there is reason to believe it can avoid the tragic errors and detours of its past engagement with Latin America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 2001 , the Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Lima , Peru , a high-minded agreement that declared that the “ peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.
” While free trade was supposed to be the natural follow-on to the ambitious agreement on democracy promotion in the region , other events intervened .
The expanding U.S. campaigns in the Middle East and Afghanistan were a powerful distraction , for example , and eventually even gave democracy promotion a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to resuscitate the spirit of previous engagement .
Conditions in the region are more amenable than ever .
In the early days of the millennium , strong voices against global trade pilloried the idea of a hemispheric free trade deal .
The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas was the target of vocal , frequent , and concerted protests .
Fatefully , Brazil positioned itself as the ringleader of countries opposed to the proposal ; American unilateralism in other parts of the world did not help , raising suspicions of U.S. maximalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latin American countries displayed little desire to play ball with the United States , and the Americas began to look toward Asia and Europe .
However , changing dynamics in world trade and shifting geopolitics make a hemispheric free trade agreement less of a far-fetched possibility than in the previous era .
The Biden administration should appreciate that Brazil , principle adversary to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas , has shifted its stance dramatically .
There is much to lament about how Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro conducts policy , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to open Brazil ’ s economy and integrate it with the world .
An approach that focuses solely on punishing Bolsonaro for his poor environmental policies and a problematic record on human rights risks missing a critical opportunity for the entire hemisphere .
Further , the USMCA demonstrates that the United States can push for free trade with a populist leader—in this case , Mexico ’ s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador—while simultaneously earning enforceable guarantees on environmental protections and stricter labor standards , which Biden ’ s Democratic Party would look to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moving forward will likely include strenuous provisions on labor and the environment , allowing trade specialists to become agenda-setters in policy areas that were largely foreclosed to them in previous eras of trade negotiations .
Meanwhile , for climate policy advocates , nothing can amplify their concerns like the force of multilateral trade agreements that embed environmental agendas in actual practice .
If Ottawa and Mexico City would welcome greater integration with other regional economies to balance the United States , and if Brasília is newly open to joining in , many other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the party .
Chile , already a member of the TPP ’ s successor agreement and a country undergoing its most concerning political instability in decades , could champion any initiative that upholds its trajectory of hemispheric and global integration .
The other Pacific Alliance members , Colombia and Peru , could also welcome an initiative that realizes their cooperative ambitions , ones increasingly shared by their neighbor Ecuador and by Uruguay .
If conceived comprehensively , the trade negotiations could also draw other countries with democratic yet less U.S.-friendly governments into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while headlines have screamed of trade wars and isolationism , Americans have come to appreciate anew the benefits of U.S. engagement with the world .
According to Gallup , there is a sizable , growing constituency for trade amongst the American public .
While by themselves such numbers do not dictate U.S. policy , they should certainly guide it .
For the rest of the Americas , meanwhile , the attraction is clear .
A free trade deal would be a chance to piggyback on what remains the world ’ s most potent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integration will be critical to Latin America and the Caribbean ’ s own post-pandemic revitalization , given the profundity of its expected economic contraction .
Beyond this , integration provides the Americas with an opportunity to make their concerns heard by the United States .
In the first two decades of the 21st century , hemispheric free trade has lacked the salience of America ’ s long wars in the Middle East , or even attempts at trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade agreements .
This should change dramatically under a Biden administration .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is serious about hemispheric free trade will be whether it leverages the upcoming Summit of the Americas to place the issue at the center of the agenda .
Another signal would be a clear call for Congress to extend the administration ’ s Trade Promotion Authority , which allows the president to pursue trade agreements , beyond its current expiry date in mid-2021 .
Ignoring trade in the Americas would be a fateful error , especially when the United States is contemplating the prospects of partial economic decoupling from China .
The Americas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambition for greater economic integration—and that these ambitions remain , at the very least , hemispheric .

In the Western Hemisphere, 1994 was the year of trade. The United States, Mexico, and Canada integrated their economies by inking the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the United States held the first Summit of the Americas with the objective of striking a hemisphere-spanning trade deal (the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas). Over a quarter century later, the recent U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) has modernized and replaced NAFTA, but the broader free trade agenda in the Western Hemisphere has stalled. In 2021, the United States will once again host the triennial Summit of the Americas—and it must put free trade squarely back on the agenda.
In the Western Hemisphere, 1994 was the year of trade. The United States, Mexico, and Canada integrated their economies by inking the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the United States held the first Summit of the Americas with the objective of striking a hemisphere-spanning trade deal (the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas). Over a quarter century later, the recent U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) has modernized and replaced NAFTA, but the broader free trade agenda in the Western Hemisphere has stalled. In 2021, the United States will once again host the triennial Summit of the Americas—and it must put free trade squarely back on the agenda.
For Washington, it is not always obvious why the Americas (aside from neighboring Canada and Mexico) deserve its focus in matters of trade. The region has struggled to grow at the rapid pace seen in other developing regions. The GDPs of the other countries of the hemisphere, including Canada and Mexico, barely add up to one-third of the United States’. The grand prize for U.S. trade negotiators has always been a large multilateral trade deal with Asia and, to a lesser extent, with Europe.
Yet those targets seem further and further off. Even beyond the limitations of the Trump administration, a possible European trade deal will remain entangled in disagreements over defense spending and Europe’s recent propensity to aggressively regulate U.S. technology firms. And in Asia, the United States forwent the opportunity for a grand bargain when the Trump administration scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in just its first weeks in power. Even if a Biden administration were to revive the TPP immediately—there may be too much water under the bridge for that to happen—the deal may be insufficient by itself to position the United States to compete with China, which is not a TPP signatory. At best, the deal would allow the United States to match China’s recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and many close U.S. allies, such as Australia and Japan. From their inception, the TPP and RCEP were rivals, and in many ways the United States would be returning to the scene too late.
The United States needs to deepen its engagement quickly to avoid potential (and permanent) defeat.
That leaves the Americas to play a prominent role in U.S. grand trade strategy. The United States draws invaluable strength from a prosperous, integrated, and largely democratic hemisphere. But the country needs to deepen its engagement quickly to avoid potential (and permanent) defeat. China is already the largest trading partner for many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, lending it influence that extends well beyond trading relationships. Even two countries that trade as prolifically with the United States as Mexico and Canada have been reluctant to follow the U.S. lead on Huawei, for example. President-elect Joe Biden, therefore, needs to (re)assess the place of the Americas in U.S. grand strategy and consider the ways in which a broad free trade agreement would augment the relationship.
When the United States hosts the Summit of the Americas next year, there is reason to believe it can avoid the tragic errors and detours of its past engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. On Sept. 11, 2001, the Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Lima, Peru, a high-minded agreement that declared that the “peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” While free trade was supposed to be the natural follow-on to the ambitious agreement on democracy promotion in the region, other events intervened. The expanding U.S. campaigns in the Middle East and Afghanistan were a powerful distraction, for example, and eventually even gave democracy promotion a bad reputation. But it is time to resuscitate the spirit of previous engagement.
Conditions in the region are more amenable than ever. In the early days of the millennium, strong voices against global trade pilloried the idea of a hemispheric free trade deal. The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas was the target of vocal, frequent, and concerted protests. Fatefully, Brazil positioned itself as the ringleader of countries opposed to the proposal; American unilateralism in other parts of the world did not help, raising suspicions of U.S. maximalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin American countries displayed little desire to play ball with the United States, and the Americas began to look toward Asia and Europe.
However, changing dynamics in world trade and shifting geopolitics make a hemispheric free trade agreement less of a far-fetched possibility than in the previous era. The Biden administration should appreciate that Brazil, principle adversary to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, has shifted its stance dramatically. There is much to lament about how Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro conducts policy, but it is clear that his administration wants to open Brazil’s economy and integrate it with the world. An approach that focuses solely on punishing Bolsonaro for his poor environmental policies and a problematic record on human rights risks missing a critical opportunity for the entire hemisphere.
Further, the USMCA demonstrates that the United States can push for free trade with a populist leader—in this case, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador—while simultaneously earning enforceable guarantees on environmental protections and stricter labor standards, which Biden’s Democratic Party would look to secure. Indeed, free trade deals moving forward will likely include strenuous provisions on labor and the environment, allowing trade specialists to become agenda-setters in policy areas that were largely foreclosed to them in previous eras of trade negotiations. Meanwhile, for climate policy advocates, nothing can amplify their concerns like the force of multilateral trade agreements that embed environmental agendas in actual practice.
If Ottawa and Mexico City would welcome greater integration with other regional economies to balance the United States, and if Brasília is newly open to joining in, many other capitals would have good reasons to come to the party. Chile, already a member of the TPP’s successor agreement and a country undergoing its most concerning political instability in decades, could champion any initiative that upholds its trajectory of hemispheric and global integration. The other Pacific Alliance members, Colombia and Peru, could also welcome an initiative that realizes their cooperative ambitions, ones increasingly shared by their neighbor Ecuador and by Uruguay. If conceived comprehensively, the trade negotiations could also draw other countries with democratic yet less U.S.-friendly governments into the conversation.
Although a comprehensive Asian trade deal may remain the biggest prize, one of the most foundational deals for U.S. grand strategy would be an agreement in its own shared neighborhood. The United States can curtail the influence of strategic rivals in its own hemisphere while also charting a course that “nearshores” supply chains and firms up regional trade. Further, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean do not wish for the kind of military engagement with the United States that is commonplace in East Asia, the Middle East, or even Europe. In a post-pandemic era of likely reduced defense budgets, Washington should see the attraction in that.
In recent years, while headlines have screamed of trade wars and isolationism, Americans have come to appreciate anew the benefits of U.S. engagement with the world. According to Gallup, there is a sizable, growing constituency for trade amongst the American public. While by themselves such numbers do not dictate U.S. policy, they should certainly guide it.
For the rest of the Americas, meanwhile, the attraction is clear. A free trade deal would be a chance to piggyback on what remains the world’s most potent and versatile economy. Nearshoring and supply-chain integration will be critical to Latin America and the Caribbean’s own post-pandemic revitalization, given the profundity of its expected economic contraction. Beyond this, integration provides the Americas with an opportunity to make their concerns heard by the United States.
In the first two decades of the 21st century, hemispheric free trade has lacked the salience of America’s long wars in the Middle East, or even attempts at trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade agreements. This should change dramatically under a Biden administration. The first sign of whether the new administration is serious about hemispheric free trade will be whether it leverages the upcoming Summit of the Americas to place the issue at the center of the agenda. Another signal would be a clear call for Congress to extend the administration’s Trade Promotion Authority, which allows the president to pursue trade agreements, beyond its current expiry date in mid-2021.
Ignoring trade in the Americas would be a fateful error, especially when the United States is contemplating the prospects of partial economic decoupling from China. The Americas should demonstrate that the region retains an ambition for greater economic integration—and that these ambitions remain, at the very least, hemispheric.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--Biden’s First Foreign-Policy Crisis Is Already Here

Biden ’ s First Foreign-Policy Crisis Is Already Here President-elect Joe Biden has long known that he would face multiple crises upon taking office .
America is dealing with terrible challenges at home , from ending the pandemic to healing a fractured civil society .
But even in 2020 , Biden may not have expected his first foreign-policy crisis quite so soon .
On the campaign trail , Biden and his advisors promised that they would restore the country ’ s standing in the world , rebuild shattered alliances , and restore international trust in the strength of U.S. diplomacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s election , Beijing took concerted action to subvert these aims .
This attempt to undermine the American alliance system demands a firm response from Biden as soon as he comes to power .
China ’ s challenge has come first in Australia .
Shocked by Communist Party interference in Australian society and alarmed by the scope of Chinese geopolitical ambitions , two successive Australian governments have worked closely with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners to build up one of the world ’ s most robust responses to Beijing ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In addition to close cooperation with American military services and intelligence agencies , as well as participation in regional security exercises and military agreements , Canberra has called out Chinese cyberattacks on Australian soil , rejected Chinese claims in the South China Sea , passed a suite of laws aiming to limit the scope of communist infiltration and bribery on Australian shores , and worked to diversify its economy away from dependence on China .
But with a third of Australian exports going to China—the main fuel for the country ’ s decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited , and the Australian economy remains dangerously reliant on China .
Two days after the American elections , Beijing announced that it was weaponizing this dependence .
Australian copper , coal , timber , sugar , wine , and lobster would no long be cleared through Chinese customs .
This trade accounts for a little more than $ 6 billion USD—an estimated 5 percent drop in Australian exports to the People ’ s Republic .
The following week , the Chinese embassy in Canberra delivered a 14-point list of grievances to Australian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not directed at the government at all , including “ unfriendly ” reporting in the Australian media and “ untrue reports ” published by the “ anti-China think tank ” ASPI .
Other complaints included Canberra ’ s decision to ban Huawei , publicize Chinese cyberattacks , pass counter-foreign interference legislation , openly acknowledge the results of the 2016 South China Sea tribunal , condemn Party concentration camps and crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong , and “ sid [ ing ] with the United States ’ anti-China campaign.
” Along with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is angry .
If you make China the enemy , China will be the enemy.
” On the other hand , if the Australian people were to cease these causes of grievance , this “ would be conducive to a better atmosphere ” and normal trade might continue .
These events have sent chills through foreign ministries across the globe .
Any country tied up in Chinese trade knows that the health of their economy is now a hostage to Beijing ’ s whims .
Reduce your dependence on Chinese investment , secure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scope of Chinese bribery , intimidation , surveillance , and other forms of interference in your civil society , or condemn Chinese human-rights abuses , and your country will suffer the same fate as Australia .
Even briefs from think tanks and reporting of journalists might trigger a Chinese attack on your economy .
Get your society in line with our authoritarian vision or pay the consequences .
That was the grim warning China just sent out to the world ’ s democracies .
But Beijing ’ s actions were also a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Chinese specifically timed their economic coercion campaign to begin when America was caught up in election dissensions .
They aim to savage Australia while the United States , the one world power with the economic heft to fight back against Chinese bullying , is too distracted with internal squabbles to care about communist plots half a world away .
They count on a Biden administration being forced to put China problems on the back burner while it handles domestic crises first .
The Chinese will then be positioned to remind that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ errors was to “ side with the United States.
” The costs of American alliance will be painfully clear , while the benefits of American friendship will be demonstrated to be more a matter of rhetoric than reality .
This clever strategy benefits from a structural disadvantage faced by the world ’ s democracies when they try to stand up against Chinese aggression .
The democracies of Europe , North America , Oceania , and Asia are bound together through shared history and values .
The combined economic , technological , and military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national power ” —of these countries far outweighs that of the PRC .
However , international relations are usually a bilateral affair .
When lined up with China one-to-one , none of these countries save the United States has the “ comprehensive national power ” needed to go toe-to-toe with Beijing .
China ’ s communist leadership does not hesitate to use this asymmetry to America ’ s disadvantage .
In response to “ provocations , ” Beijing will launch a sudden , crippling attacks on national industries key to the economy of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response to a Chinese dissident being given the Nobel Prize , the Chinese party-state blocked Chinese chains from importing Norwegian salmon .
After Japan nationalized its control over the Senkaku islands—a move intended to forestall a more aggressive acquisition by an ultra-nationalist Tokyo mayor—China banned the export of rare-earth minerals to Japan , barred Japanese films from Chinese theaters , and allowed riots to target Japanese businesses .
The most egregious example of Chinese economic coercion came in 2016 , shortly after the deployment of an American missile defense system in South Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Korean dramas were scrubbed from Chinese streaming video sites , K-pop concerts were canceled , and the South Korean chain Lotte was forced to close 112 outlets .
Economic coercion of this sort is not usually aimed at changing the behavior of the government targeted—at least , not immediately .
Like economic sanctions , punitive boycotts , and trade embargos are perceived as an attack on the honor and strength of both the targeted government and their people .
Leaders targeted by economic coercion do not want to appear weak in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not back down in the face of Chinese pressure .
Thus the Nobel committee did not withdraw their award , the Japanese did not denationalize their islands , and the South Koreans did not send the THAAD batteries packing .
But Beijing did not expect them to .
Attacks like these are were never intended to change “ offensive ” policies in Oslo , Tokyo , or Seoul .
They were intended to prevent future offenses .
Future threats carry greater weight when backed by a history of punishments delivered .
The PRC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All are marked by what Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson have called asymmetric interdependence .
Both the South Korean tourist industry and Lotte , for example , had an asymmetric relationship with Chinese consumers .
Travel agents barred from setting up group packages to Korea can put together new packages at low cost ; there is nothing Lotte shoppers in China could not buy at another supermarket .
In contrast , it was not possible for the South Korean tourist industry to suddenly replace the 4.5 million Chinese tourists expected in 2017 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invested in China were unrecoverable sunk costs .
The Chinese economy suffered a little ; specific sectors of South Korean economy suffered a lot .
Because of the broader economic asymmetry between the two countries , Seoul had little room for retaliation in other spheres .
Washington ’ s response to the crisis only deepened Seoul ’ s problems .
After allowing the press secretaries and spokespeople for various federal departments to condemn Beijing ’ s moves , outgoing President Donald Trump proclaimed that unless Seoul paid the full $ 1 billion cost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he would move to scrap the U.S.-Korea free-trade agreement .
The free-trade agreement , which was signed in 2012 , and the American commitment to partially subsidize the battery operations of the missile defense system China objected to , which was agreed on before the battery was deployed , had been negotiated before Trump came to office .
By taking his “ America First ” wrecking ball to these agreements just after Beijing began its attack on the Korean economy , Trump confirmed the message Beijing was hoping their attack would convey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force us to hurt you , and when we do , your American “ allies ” will be nowhere to be seen .
The Australians will be dealing with not a Trump , but a Biden administration .
They do not have to worry about this new administration levying new tariffs or cancelling trade agreements at the same time China puts their economy in a vice .
But they are right to be worry that they will be left to tackle the Chinese on their own .
Thus far every country that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faced it alone .
No mechanisms exist for a collective response to Chinese exploitation , and America has been all too happy to let the Chinese abuse our allies on the side in search of broader bilateral gains with the Chinese elsewhere .
If the American system of alliances is to persist in an age of growing Chinese economic power , this must end .
This was the fundamental insight behind the founding of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China ( IPAC ) , a transnational group of legislators from a dozen countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its ranks .
IPAC “ has been created to promote a coordinated response between democratic states to challenges posed by the present conduct and future ambitions of the People ’ s Republic of China , ” these legislators declare , noting that : “ When countries have stood up to Beijing , they have done so alone .
Rather than mounting a common defense of shared principles , countries have instead been mindful of their own national interests , which are increasingly dependent on the People ’ s Republic of China for crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ No country should have to bear the burden of standing up for fundamental liberties and the integrity of the international order by itself.
” The members of IPAC understand that any sustainable response to Chinese economic coercion must be a transnational affair .
Only when picking on a small state means confronting all of the liberal states will the Chinese be deterred .
But foreign policy , especially in the American system , is not centered on legislative committee .
Responsibility for diplomacy lies with the executive and his foreign-policy bureaucracy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ coercion is to be built , it will be built not by American senators in IPAC , but through the efforts of the new president .
In the short term , America should work with its allies in Europe and the Pacific to identify key industries marked by “ asymmetric interdependence.
” They should focus on those that they , as a collective , have economic escalation dominance over vis a vis Beijing .
This coalition should then impose restrictions on the target Chinese industries until Beijing eases its own attack on Australia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficult .
It will require intense diplomacy .
It can not be done without regaining lost trust with American allies .
But regaining this trust is exactly what Biden promised he would do on the campaign .
This is the sort of foreign policy the American people just elected .
The Biden foreign policy team has often expressed its admiration and respect for the system of military alliances built up at the end of the Second World War .
Those alliances were created by “ the wise men ” who had guided America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only through collective solidarity would the smaller democracies of the West be able to withstand military coercion from the Soviet bloc .
Today the prime weapons in great power competition are not nuclear warheads or tank divisions , but tariffs , boycotts , other tools of economic warfare .
Perhaps to face this threat , the United States will one day have an economic defense treaty that acts as the commercial counterpart to NATO .
Creating such an agreement is a legacy worth chasing .
However , the crisis forced upon the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month require more immediate solutions .
A coalition must be built .
Australia must be bolstered .
The Chinese are testing this new administration ’ s commitment to its allies on its very first month in office .
The United States must show the world that Biden means what he says : The American people are willing to stand with their friends when it matters .

President-elect Joe Biden has long known that he would face multiple crises upon taking office. America is dealing with terrible challenges at home, from ending the pandemic to healing a fractured civil society. But even in 2020, Biden may not have expected his first foreign-policy crisis quite so soon. On the campaign trail, Biden and his advisors promised that they would restore the country’s standing in the world, rebuild shattered alliances, and restore international trust in the strength of U.S. diplomacy. Yet just days after Biden’s election, Beijing took concerted action to subvert these aims. This attempt to undermine the American alliance system demands a firm response from Biden as soon as he comes to power.
President-elect Joe Biden has long known that he would face multiple crises upon taking office. America is dealing with terrible challenges at home, from ending the pandemic to healing a fractured civil society. But even in 2020, Biden may not have expected his first foreign-policy crisis quite so soon. On the campaign trail, Biden and his advisors promised that they would restore the country’s standing in the world, rebuild shattered alliances, and restore international trust in the strength of U.S. diplomacy. Yet just days after Biden’s election, Beijing took concerted action to subvert these aims. This attempt to undermine the American alliance system demands a firm response from Biden as soon as he comes to power.
China’s challenge has come first in Australia. Shocked by Communist Party interference in Australian society and alarmed by the scope of Chinese geopolitical ambitions, two successive Australian governments have worked closely with the United States and other Indo-Pacific partners to build up one of the world’s most robust responses to Beijing’s designs for a new global order. In addition to close cooperation with American military services and intelligence agencies, as well as participation in regional security exercises and military agreements, Canberra has called out Chinese cyberattacks on Australian soil, rejected Chinese claims in the South China Sea, passed a suite of laws aiming to limit the scope of communist infiltration and bribery on Australian shores, and worked to diversify its economy away from dependence on China.
But with a third of Australian exports going to China—the main fuel for the country’s decades of economic growth—that last measure was necessarily limited, and the Australian economy remains dangerously reliant on China. Two days after the American elections, Beijing announced that it was weaponizing this dependence. Australian copper, coal, timber, sugar, wine, and lobster would no long be cleared through Chinese customs. This trade accounts for a little more than $6 billion USD—an estimated 5 percent drop in Australian exports to the People’s Republic.
The following week, the Chinese embassy in Canberra delivered a 14-point list of grievances to Australian media. Some of these grievances were not directed at the government at all, including “unfriendly” reporting in the Australian media and “untrue reports” published by the “anti-China think tank” ASPI. Other complaints included Canberra’s decision to ban Huawei, publicize Chinese cyberattacks, pass counter-foreign interference legislation, openly acknowledge the results of the 2016 South China Sea tribunal, condemn Party concentration camps and crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and “sid[ing] with the United States’ anti-China campaign.” Along with the list came an ultimatum: “China is angry. If you make China the enemy, China will be the enemy.” On the other hand, if the Australian people were to cease these causes of grievance, this “would be conducive to a better atmosphere” and normal trade might continue.
These events have sent chills through foreign ministries across the globe. Any country tied up in Chinese trade knows that the health of their economy is now a hostage to Beijing’s whims. Reduce your dependence on Chinese investment, secure communication platforms from Chinese control, limit the scope of Chinese bribery, intimidation, surveillance, and other forms of interference in your civil society, or condemn Chinese human-rights abuses, and your country will suffer the same fate as Australia. Even briefs from think tanks and reporting of journalists might trigger a Chinese attack on your economy. Get your society in line with our authoritarian vision or pay the consequences. That was the grim warning China just sent out to the world’s democracies.
But Beijing’s actions were also a direct challenge to the American alliance system. The Chinese specifically timed their economic coercion campaign to begin when America was caught up in election dissensions. They aim to savage Australia while the United States, the one world power with the economic heft to fight back against Chinese bullying, is too distracted with internal squabbles to care about communist plots half a world away. They count on a Biden administration being forced to put China problems on the back burner while it handles domestic crises first. The Chinese will then be positioned to remind that world that one of Australia’s errors was to “side with the United States.” The costs of American alliance will be painfully clear, while the benefits of American friendship will be demonstrated to be more a matter of rhetoric than reality.
This clever strategy benefits from a structural disadvantage faced by the world’s democracies when they try to stand up against Chinese aggression. The democracies of Europe, North America, Oceania, and Asia are bound together through shared history and values. The combined economic, technological, and military strength—what the Chinese often call “comprehensive national power”—of these countries far outweighs that of the PRC. However, international relations are usually a bilateral affair. When lined up with China one-to-one, none of these countries save the United States has the “comprehensive national power” needed to go toe-to-toe with Beijing.
China’s communist leadership does not hesitate to use this asymmetry to America’s disadvantage. In response to “provocations,” Beijing will launch a sudden, crippling attacks on national industries key to the economy of a specific American ally. Thus in response to a Chinese dissident being given the Nobel Prize, the Chinese party-state blocked Chinese chains from importing Norwegian salmon. After Japan nationalized its control over the Senkaku islands—a move intended to forestall a more aggressive acquisition by an ultra-nationalist Tokyo mayor—China banned the export of rare-earth minerals to Japan, barred Japanese films from Chinese theaters, and allowed riots to target Japanese businesses. The most egregious example of Chinese economic coercion came in 2016, shortly after the deployment of an American missile defense system in South Korea. Group tours to South Korea ceased, Korean dramas were scrubbed from Chinese streaming video sites, K-pop concerts were canceled, and the South Korean chain Lotte was forced to close 112 outlets.
Economic coercion of this sort is not usually aimed at changing the behavior of the government targeted—at least, not immediately. Like economic sanctions, punitive boycotts, and trade embargos are perceived as an attack on the honor and strength of both the targeted government and their people. Leaders targeted by economic coercion do not want to appear weak in the face of foreign aggression. They do not back down in the face of Chinese pressure. Thus the Nobel committee did not withdraw their award, the Japanese did not denationalize their islands, and the South Koreans did not send the THAAD batteries packing. But Beijing did not expect them to. Attacks like these are were never intended to change “offensive” policies in Oslo, Tokyo, or Seoul. They were intended to prevent future offenses. Future threats carry greater weight when backed by a history of punishments delivered.
The PRC carefully targets which industries to coerce. All are marked by what Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson have called asymmetric interdependence. Both the South Korean tourist industry and Lotte, for example, had an asymmetric relationship with Chinese consumers. Travel agents barred from setting up group packages to Korea can put together new packages at low cost; there is nothing Lotte shoppers in China could not buy at another supermarket. In contrast, it was not possible for the South Korean tourist industry to suddenly replace the 4.5 million Chinese tourists expected in 2017, and the $9 billion Lotte had invested in China were unrecoverable sunk costs. The Chinese economy suffered a little; specific sectors of South Korean economy suffered a lot. Because of the broader economic asymmetry between the two countries, Seoul had little room for retaliation in other spheres.
Washington’s response to the crisis only deepened Seoul’s problems. After allowing the press secretaries and spokespeople for various federal departments to condemn Beijing’s moves, outgoing President Donald Trump proclaimed that unless Seoul paid the full $1 billion cost of installing and operating the THADD battery, he would move to scrap the U.S.-Korea free-trade agreement. The free-trade agreement, which was signed in 2012, and the American commitment to partially subsidize the battery operations of the missile defense system China objected to, which was agreed on before the battery was deployed, had been negotiated before Trump came to office. By taking his “America First” wrecking ball to these agreements just after Beijing began its attack on the Korean economy, Trump confirmed the message Beijing was hoping their attack would convey: Your alliance with the Americans will force us to hurt you, and when we do, your American “allies” will be nowhere to be seen.
The Australians will be dealing with not a Trump, but a Biden administration. They do not have to worry about this new administration levying new tariffs or cancelling trade agreements at the same time China puts their economy in a vice. But they are right to be worry that they will be left to tackle the Chinese on their own. Thus far every country that has been targeted by Chinese economic coercion has faced it alone. No mechanisms exist for a collective response to Chinese exploitation, and America has been all too happy to let the Chinese abuse our allies on the side in search of broader bilateral gains with the Chinese elsewhere. If the American system of alliances is to persist in an age of growing Chinese economic power, this must end.
This was the fundamental insight behind the founding of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a transnational group of legislators from a dozen countries, including both Democrat and Republican senators in its ranks. IPAC “has been created to promote a coordinated response between democratic states to challenges posed by the present conduct and future ambitions of the People’s Republic of China,” these legislators declare, noting that:
“When countries have stood up to Beijing, they have done so alone. Rather than mounting a common defense of shared principles, countries have instead been mindful of their own national interests, which are increasingly dependent on the People’s Republic of China for crucial minerals, components, and products.
“No country should have to bear the burden of standing up for fundamental liberties and the integrity of the international order by itself.”
The members of IPAC understand that any sustainable response to Chinese economic coercion must be a transnational affair. Only when picking on a small state means confronting all of the liberal states will the Chinese be deterred.
But foreign policy, especially in the American system, is not centered on legislative committee. Responsibility for diplomacy lies with the executive and his foreign-policy bureaucracy. If a united front against Chinese economic coercion is to be built, it will be built not by American senators in IPAC, but through the efforts of the new president.
In the short term, America should work with its allies in Europe and the Pacific to identify key industries marked by “asymmetric interdependence.” They should focus on those that they, as a collective, have economic escalation dominance over vis a vis Beijing. This coalition should then impose restrictions on the target Chinese industries until Beijing eases its own attack on Australia. Building such a coalition will be difficult. It will require intense diplomacy. It cannot be done without regaining lost trust with American allies. But regaining this trust is exactly what Biden promised he would do on the campaign. This is the sort of foreign policy the American people just elected.
The Biden foreign policy team has often expressed its admiration and respect for the system of military alliances built up at the end of the Second World War. Those alliances were created by “the wise men” who had guided America through the war, and who realized only through collective solidarity would the smaller democracies of the West be able to withstand military coercion from the Soviet bloc. Today the prime weapons in great power competition are not nuclear warheads or tank divisions, but tariffs, boycotts, other tools of economic warfare. Perhaps to face this threat, the United States will one day have an economic defense treaty that acts as the commercial counterpart to NATO. Creating such an agreement is a legacy worth chasing.
However, the crisis forced upon the United States by China’s actions last month require more immediate solutions. A coalition must be built. Australia must be bolstered. The Chinese are testing this new administration’s commitment to its allies on its very first month in office. The United States must show the world that Biden means what he says: The American people are willing to stand with their friends when it matters.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--The Kafkaesque World of Sudanese Refugees in Israel

The Kafkaesque World of Sudanese Refugees in Israel On Oct. 23 , U.S. President Donald Trump announced from his office in the White House a normalization agreement between Israel and Sudan .
It came five weeks after similar agreements were announced between Israel and two other Arab countries , the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain .
Tweeting about the agreement , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated the reversal from the 1967 Arab League summit in the Sudanese capital , Khartoum , where Arab leaders declared their infamous Three Noes : no to peace with Israel , no to recognition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Israel .
“ And today Khartoum says – yes to peace with Israel , yes to recognition of Israel and yes to normalization with Israel , ” Netanyahu wrote , adding , “ Delegations from Israel and Sudan will meet soon to discuss cooperation in many areas , including agriculture , trade and other areas important to our citizens.
” Critics point to the timing of the announcement around Trump ’ s reelection campaign and Sudan ’ s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism as an apparent condition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ absent from the public discussion of the normalization thus far is the future of around 6,200 Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel who are worried that Israeli authorities will now aggressively try to deport them , as they did with South Sudanese refugees following South Sudan ’ s independence in 2011 .
Many Sudanese in Israel are convinced that they have become a scapegoat in domestic Israeli politics , as Netanyahu—who also faces a likely election while embroiled in multiple political scandals—has repeatedly promised his right-wing political base over the years to expel them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so you can go back to your country , ” Member of Parliament May Golan , of Netanyahu ’ s Likud party , told a Sudanese asylum-seeker in an exchange recorded on video that went viral in Israel .
She also tweeted : “ Nothing will deter me in the struggle to establish an immigration policy and to expel all infiltrators from Israel and return them to their countries of origin !
” But for Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel today , there are still concerns about returning to their home country .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Omar al-Bashir ’ s authoritarian government in 2019 following a popular uprising , a peace agreement between the transitional government and some rebel groups , and steps toward the normalization of relations between Israel and Sudan , violence hasn ’ t ceased in some areas in Sudan .
Dozens of people have been killed .
“ Our areas are still not safe , ” said Adam Ahmed Yahya , an asylum-seeker from the war-torn region of Darfur living in Tel Aviv .
“ Our families are still in refugee camps.
” Yahya is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the head of the Sudanese transition government , and his deputy , Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo , better known as Hemeti , are both military officers alleged to be responsible for war crimes in Darfur .
“ We know what happened in Darfur , ” Yahya said .
“ We know who they are.
” The ironies of Israel , which sees itself as a “ light unto the nations , ” both attracting and rejecting Sudanese refugees are hard to miss .
The ironies of Israel—which sees itself as a “ light unto @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sudanese refugees are hard to miss .
For decades , both Sudan and Israel officially categorized each other as enemy states .
Africa and the Arab world ’ s largest country by area before the secession of South Sudan in 2011 , Sudan has struggled to find peace since its independence in 1956 .
A multiethnic state dominated by politicians from its north and center , it has alternated several times between civilian and military rule .
Wars have erupted in the country ’ s peripheral regions , which complain of political , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebellion broke out in the country ’ s southern region for the second time in 1983 and intensified after Sudan ’ s Islamists gained power in 1989 in a military coup led by Bashir and supported by the late Hassan al-Turabi , a hard-line ideologue .
The spread of discontent and conflict to other parts of the country , along with aggressive Arabization and Islamization policies against Sudan ’ s ethnic and religious minorities , pushed tens of thousands of people to seek refuge abroad .
Human rights groups accused Bashir ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crimes , ethnic cleansing , and genocide , especially in the regions of southern Sudan , the Nuba Mountains , Blue Nile , and Darfur .
Many Sudanese fled to neighboring countries , including Egypt , where they had hopes of being relocated to Europe , North America , or Australia .
In 2005 , the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR ) in Cairo , however , stopped accepting Sudanese refugee applications following a peace agreement between the Khartoum government and southern rebels , even though Sudan was still a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Frustrated Sudanese refugee activists started a sit-in across from UNHCR offices in Cairo in September 2005 .
Three months later , Egyptian police broke up the sit-in violently , killing dozens .
Losing hope that they would make it to their original destination , some Sudanese , followed later by other Africans , started to make the trek through the Sinai Desert to Israel .
In the beginning , many Israeli officials and ordinary citizens showed a degree of empathy—even though the refugees came from an enemy state .
As their numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , many Israelis—especially those on the political far-right—began to object to their presence .
With many Sudanese living in south Tel Aviv ’ s working-class neighborhoods , the new arrivals were depicted as criminals allegedly spreading diseases and a demographic threat to Israel ’ s Jewish majority .
Member of Parliament Miri Regev described Sudanese refugees as a “ cancer.
” Critics called the reaction anti-black racism .
The Sudanese refugees ’ stay in Israel became a contentious political and legal topic that has , for several years now , divided public opinion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and solidarity protests .
While human rights groups consider most Sudanese asylum-seekers to have legitimate cases , politicians in Netanyahu ’ s right-wing coalition have refused to view them as refugees , considering them economic migrants fleeing poverty—and refer to them as “ infiltrators , ” a term once used to describe Palestinian militants .
Until the recent normalization agreement between the two countries , refugees deported back to Sudan could have faced imprisonment , torture , or even death for illegally traveling to an enemy state .
For years , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vague policy of “ temporary protection ” or “ delay of deportation , ” which has kept the Israeli government in compliance with international law prohibiting the deportation of refugees .
But it has left Sudanese in Israel in limbo .
According to the Israeli group Hotline for Refugees and Migrants , Israel has only approved asylum for 200 non-Jewish refugees since signing the U.N .
Refugee Convention almost 60 years ago—a rate lower than 1 percent of asylum applications compared to between 10 and 50 percent in many developed countries .
To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Israel erected a security fence along its southern border in 2013 , and it opened the Holot detention center near the Egyptian border for those who did manage to cross .
In early 2018 , Israel planned to forcefully deport the detainees to Uganda and Rwanda or to move them to Israeli prisons , but that sparked an international outcry .
The government then announced it had reached an agreement with the United Nations to resettle them as recognized refugees in Israel and Europe , only to back away from that plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel .
“ Successive Israeli governments sought to mobilize popular support , first , through scaremongering about the dangers this population represents to the Jewish identity of the Israeli state , its economy and security , and second , through the introduction of often illegal measures that sought to remove this population from Israel , ” said Yotam Gidron , a researcher at Durham University in the United Kingdom .
Today , according to refugee rights activists , most Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel live in the country without any official residency status , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sudanese arrived .
The Israeli government has denied most of them the ability to apply for asylum and has prevented them from access to adequate health care , welfare payments , and other social services—a situation made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic , as many lost whatever work they might have had because of lockdown restrictions and the economic downturn .
Israel has only approved asylum for 200 non-Jewish refugees since signing the U.N .
Refugee Convention almost 60 years ago .
In those cases where Sudanese have been able to apply for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities discriminate depending on ethnic background , sometimes offering some rights such as work permits and access to health care and social services to a limited number of non-Arab applicants from Darfur , the Nuba Mountains , and Blue Nile state—while rejecting the applications of Arab Sudanese .
By the end of last year , only one Sudanese asylum-seeker had been offered full refugee rights .
At the peak in 2012 , there were 15,000 Sudanese in Israel , but thousands have been coerced to return .
Sigal Rozen , a public policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , says that limited successes for some refugees doesn ’ t mean that Netanyahu ’ s government has a heart for them .
“ There is heavy pressure from Jewish groups in the U.S. , ” regarding Darfuris , she said , because they are fleeing the site of a genocide and because U.S. Jewish groups such as the American Jewish World Service were instrumental in bringing attention to the atrocities in Darfur .
In September , the Israeli Supreme Court gave government officials until January to clarify their position on Sudanese asylum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The status of the Sudanese asylum-seekers ’ applications at the moment is that the Israeli Ministry of Interior isn ’ t processing them , ” said Michal Pomerantz , a civil rights attorney who represents asylum-seekers .
“ They have frozen the examination of the application because of the political change in Sudan ; they claim they can ’ t process them due to the uncertainty of the situation.
” A group of Israeli refugee assistance organizations helping the Sudanese argued in an October report that “ Israel must examine asylum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status to those who are entitled to it , regardless of the diplomatic relations with the country from which they fled.
” Many Sudanese asylum-seekers say they would leave if circumstances in Sudan allowed .
“ The moment Sudan is safe for us , Israel won ’ t have to deport anyone—we ’ ll return home on our own , ” said Usumain Baraka , a refugee from Darfur and the CEO of the African Students Organization in Israel .
“ Most Sudanese here in Israel are very updated on what ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ friends in refugee and [ internally displaced persons ] camps , ” he said .
“ The situation there is incredibly dangerous , and we know better than to return to a home that isn ’ t safe for us.
” In the meantime , how Israeli authorities will handle their cases remains to be seen .
“ Israel has had years to demonstrate that it regards the Sudanese people and cares for their future and well-being by treating refugees with dignity and with logic as human beings in a unique situation that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Inbal Ben Yehuda , a researcher at the Forum for Regional Thinking , an Israeli think tank .
“ But it failed the test and failed the refugee community over and over again.
” It ’ s no surprise , then , that Israel ’ s Sudanese refugees have learned to worry when they hear the words “ peace agreement.
” Reporting for this article was supported by a grant from the Pulitzer Center .

On Oct. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump announced from his office in the White House a normalization agreement between Israel and Sudan. It came five weeks after similar agreements were announced between Israel and two other Arab countries, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Tweeting about the agreement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated the reversal from the 1967 Arab League summit in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, where Arab leaders declared their infamous Three Noes: no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, and no to negotiations with Israel. “And today Khartoum says - yes to peace with Israel, yes to recognition of Israel and yes to normalization with Israel,” Netanyahu wrote, adding, “Delegations from Israel and Sudan will meet soon to discuss cooperation in many areas, including agriculture, trade and other areas important to our citizens.”
On Oct. 23, U.S. President Donald Trump announced from his office in the White House a normalization agreement between Israel and Sudan. It came five weeks after similar agreements were announced between Israel and two other Arab countries, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Tweeting about the agreement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated the reversal from the 1967 Arab League summit in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, where Arab leaders declared their infamous Three Noes: no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, and no to negotiations with Israel. “And today Khartoum says – yes to peace with Israel, yes to recognition of Israel and yes to normalization with Israel,” Netanyahu wrote, adding, “Delegations from Israel and Sudan will meet soon to discuss cooperation in many areas, including agriculture, trade and other areas important to our citizens.”
Critics point to the timing of the announcement around Trump’s reelection campaign and Sudan’s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism as an apparent condition to make it happen. But largely absent from the public discussion of the normalization thus far is the future of around 6,200 Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel who are worried that Israeli authorities will now aggressively try to deport them, as they did with South Sudanese refugees following South Sudan’s independence in 2011. Many Sudanese in Israel are convinced that they have become a scapegoat in domestic Israeli politics, as Netanyahu—who also faces a likely election while embroiled in multiple political scandals—has repeatedly promised his right-wing political base over the years to expel them.
“There is peace in Sudan now, so you can go back to your country,” Member of Parliament May Golan, of Netanyahu’s Likud party, told a Sudanese asylum-seeker in an exchange recorded on video that went viral in Israel. She also tweeted: “Nothing will deter me in the struggle to establish an immigration policy and to expel all infiltrators from Israel and return them to their countries of origin!”
But for Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel today, there are still concerns about returning to their home country. Despite the fall of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s authoritarian government in 2019 following a popular uprising, a peace agreement between the transitional government and some rebel groups, and steps toward the normalization of relations between Israel and Sudan, violence hasn’t ceased in some areas in Sudan. Dozens of people have been killed.
“Our areas are still not safe,” said Adam Ahmed Yahya, an asylum-seeker from the war-torn region of Darfur living in Tel Aviv. “Our families are still in refugee camps.” Yahya is particularly worried that Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese transition government, and his deputy, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti, are both military officers alleged to be responsible for war crimes in Darfur. “We know what happened in Darfur,” Yahya said. “We know who they are.”
The ironies of Israel, which sees itself as a “light unto the nations,” both attracting and rejecting Sudanese refugees are hard to miss.
The ironies of Israel—which sees itself as a “light unto the nations”—both attracting and rejecting Sudanese refugees are hard to miss. For decades, both Sudan and Israel officially categorized each other as enemy states. Africa and the Arab world’s largest country by area before the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan has struggled to find peace since its independence in 1956. A multiethnic state dominated by politicians from its north and center, it has alternated several times between civilian and military rule. Wars have erupted in the country’s peripheral regions, which complain of political, economic, and cultural marginalization. A rebellion broke out in the country’s southern region for the second time in 1983 and intensified after Sudan’s Islamists gained power in 1989 in a military coup led by Bashir and supported by the late Hassan al-Turabi, a hard-line ideologue. The spread of discontent and conflict to other parts of the country, along with aggressive Arabization and Islamization policies against Sudan’s ethnic and religious minorities, pushed tens of thousands of people to seek refuge abroad. Human rights groups accused Bashir’s government of abuses including slavery, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, especially in the regions of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Darfur.
Many Sudanese fled to neighboring countries, including Egypt, where they had hopes of being relocated to Europe, North America, or Australia. In 2005, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cairo, however, stopped accepting Sudanese refugee applications following a peace agreement between the Khartoum government and southern rebels, even though Sudan was still a dictatorship and wars continued in other regions. Frustrated Sudanese refugee activists started a sit-in across from UNHCR offices in Cairo in September 2005. Three months later, Egyptian police broke up the sit-in violently, killing dozens. Losing hope that they would make it to their original destination, some Sudanese, followed later by other Africans, started to make the trek through the Sinai Desert to Israel.
In the beginning, many Israeli officials and ordinary citizens showed a degree of empathy—even though the refugees came from an enemy state. As their numbers increased in the following years, however, many Israelis—especially those on the political far-right—began to object to their presence. With many Sudanese living in south Tel Aviv’s working-class neighborhoods, the new arrivals were depicted as criminals allegedly spreading diseases and a demographic threat to Israel’s Jewish majority. Member of Parliament Miri Regev described Sudanese refugees as a “cancer.” Critics called the reaction anti-black racism.
The Sudanese refugees’ stay in Israel became a contentious political and legal topic that has, for several years now, divided public opinion and ignited court battles, racist rhetoric, and solidarity protests. While human rights groups consider most Sudanese asylum-seekers to have legitimate cases, politicians in Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition have refused to view them as refugees, considering them economic migrants fleeing poverty—and refer to them as “infiltrators,” a term once used to describe Palestinian militants. (The United Nations defines legitimate refugees as those “who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection.”) Until the recent normalization agreement between the two countries, refugees deported back to Sudan could have faced imprisonment, torture, or even death for illegally traveling to an enemy state. For years, they have been condoned in Israel under a vague policy of “temporary protection” or “delay of deportation,” which has kept the Israeli government in compliance with international law prohibiting the deportation of refugees. But it has left Sudanese in Israel in limbo.
According to the Israeli group Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Israel has only approved asylum for 200 non-Jewish refugees since signing the U.N. Refugee Convention almost 60 years ago—a rate lower than 1 percent of asylum applications compared to between 10 and 50 percent in many developed countries.
To keep more Africans from crossing the border, Israel erected a security fence along its southern border in 2013, and it opened the Holot detention center near the Egyptian border for those who did manage to cross. In early 2018, Israel planned to forcefully deport the detainees to Uganda and Rwanda or to move them to Israeli prisons, but that sparked an international outcry. The government then announced it had reached an agreement with the United Nations to resettle them as recognized refugees in Israel and Europe, only to back away from that plan the next day after an outcry in Israel.
“Successive Israeli governments sought to mobilize popular support, first, through scaremongering about the dangers this population represents to the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, its economy and security, and second, through the introduction of often illegal measures that sought to remove this population from Israel,” said Yotam Gidron, a researcher at Durham University in the United Kingdom.
Today, according to refugee rights activists, most Sudanese asylum-seekers in Israel live in the country without any official residency status, or other rights—15 years after the first Sudanese arrived. The Israeli government has denied most of them the ability to apply for asylum and has prevented them from access to adequate health care, welfare payments, and other social services—a situation made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic, as many lost whatever work they might have had because of lockdown restrictions and the economic downturn.
Israel has only approved asylum for 200 non-Jewish refugees since signing the U.N. Refugee Convention almost 60 years ago.
In those cases where Sudanese have been able to apply for asylum, activists say that Israeli immigration authorities discriminate depending on ethnic background, sometimes offering some rights such as work permits and access to health care and social services to a limited number of non-Arab applicants from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile state—while rejecting the applications of Arab Sudanese. By the end of last year, only one Sudanese asylum-seeker had been offered full refugee rights. At the peak in 2012, there were 15,000 Sudanese in Israel, but thousands have been coerced to return.
Sigal Rozen, a public policy coordinator at Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, says that limited successes for some refugees doesn’t mean that Netanyahu’s government has a heart for them. “There is heavy pressure from Jewish groups in the U.S.,” regarding Darfuris, she said, because they are fleeing the site of a genocide and because U.S. Jewish groups such as the American Jewish World Service were instrumental in bringing attention to the atrocities in Darfur.
In September, the Israeli Supreme Court gave government officials until January to clarify their position on Sudanese asylum applications that have been pending for years. “The status of the Sudanese asylum-seekers’ applications at the moment is that the Israeli Ministry of Interior isn’t processing them,” said Michal Pomerantz, a civil rights attorney who represents asylum-seekers. “They have frozen the examination of the application because of the political change in Sudan; they claim they can’t process them due to the uncertainty of the situation.”
A group of Israeli refugee assistance organizations helping the Sudanese argued in an October report that “Israel must examine asylum applications under the Refugee Convention and grant status to those who are entitled to it, regardless of the diplomatic relations with the country from which they fled.”
Many Sudanese asylum-seekers say they would leave if circumstances in Sudan allowed. “The moment Sudan is safe for us, Israel won’t have to deport anyone—we’ll return home on our own,” said Usumain Baraka, a refugee from Darfur and the CEO of the African Students Organization in Israel.
“Most Sudanese here in Israel are very updated on what’s going on in Sudan, through our friends in refugee and [internally displaced persons] camps,” he said. “The situation there is incredibly dangerous, and we know better than to return to a home that isn’t safe for us.”
In the meantime, how Israeli authorities will handle their cases remains to be seen. “Israel has had years to demonstrate that it regards the Sudanese people and cares for their future and well-being by treating refugees with dignity and with logic as human beings in a unique situation that grants them protection and rights,” said Inbal Ben Yehuda, a researcher at the Forum for Regional Thinking, an Israeli think tank. “But it failed the test and failed the refugee community over and over again.”
It’s no surprise, then, that Israel’s Sudanese refugees have learned to worry when they hear the words “peace agreement.”
Reporting for this article was supported by a grant from the Pulitzer Center.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--What to Watch for as Biden Staffs Up

What to Watch for as Biden Staffs Up

What to Watch for as Biden Staffs Up Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : What to make of the Biden administration ’ s personnel picks for defense and diplomatic posts , the Pentagon considers cutting support for the CIA ’ s counterterrorism operations , and U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s outgoing Syria envoy unloads his frustrations .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
BREAKING : Morocco and Israel have agreed to normalize diplomatic ties , Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fourth Arab country to do so , following the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Sudan .
In exchange , Trump will agree to recognize the disputed Western Sahara as Moroccan sovereign territory .
This is a developing story .
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has already announced many of his most important cabinet-level posts , including the secretaries of defense and state .
But Beltway insiders are closely monitoring who will be tapped to fill other administration leadership roles below the senior level—ones that often don ’ t make the headlines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy .
Team Biden hasn ’ t started announcing those picks yet , but here are the ones we ’ re watching most closely .
Deputy secretary of state .
Traditionally , the deputy secretary of state has overseen much of the internal management of the State Department .
Whoever Biden picks will need to help reform and overhaul a dispirited diplomatic corps .
For four years , diplomats have sounded alarm bells on the Trump administration ’ s mismanagement of the foreign service .
During the impeachment saga , career diplomats also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies with no public support from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Some of Biden ’ s top campaign advisors on foreign policy have called for the incoming administration to reform the department to strengthen U.S. diplomacy amid new great power competition from China .
That responsibility could largely fall on the shoulders of whoever is deputy secretary .
Undersecretary of defense for policy .
During Ret .
Gen. Jim Mattis ’ tenure as defense secretary , civilian officials said they were boxed out of critical policy decisions by the Joint Staff , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mattis , himself a retired Marine commander .
The office hasn ’ t had a Senate-confirmed chief for nearly a year and has recently been stocked with Trump loyalists .
After selecting another recently retired general , Lloyd Austin , to lead the Pentagon , Biden ’ s team will be under pressure to nominate a strong civilian policy chief to rehabilitate this office , which has struggled with attrition since the late Obama years .
NSC senior director for Asia .
Matt Pottinger , the Mandarin-speaking former Wall Street Journal reporter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scenes .
His successor may also play hawk to China—and could be just as influential by playing a key role in designing a Biden-era National Security Strategy .
One dynamic to watch : The Biden team already appears to be enhancing functional portfolios on the NSC .
Incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has pledged to reprioritize public health to deal with the coronavirus pandemic , and Biden has tapped former Secretary of State John Kerry to serve as a special envoy for climate change with a principal role on the NSC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director to deflect Republican concerns that his cabinet picks don ’ t have enough experience with China .
Undersecretary of state for arms control and international security .
Biden will quickly be faced with salvaging the last arms control agreement with Russia before it expires .
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ( New START ) , which limits U.S. and Russian arsenals of strategic nuclear arms , is set to expire in February .
Top Trump administration arms negotiators failed to make headway on extending or altering the treaty , leaving a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If they can negotiate an interim extension , whoever Biden picks to be his top State Department arms control envoy will play a crucial role in recrafting New START , as well as determining whether to revive other arms treaties with Russia—such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty with Russia that Trump withdrew from in 2019—or try to forge new ones with China .
Undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and intel .
Financial wonks at the Treasury Department have become the sharp end of the spear in many of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , human rights abusers , and top officials in Russia and China .
The use of targeted sanctions as a tool of American foreign policy has exploded in recent years and remains—for better or worse—one of the swiftest ways to lash out at adversaries .
The undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence takes the lead in this job , which is expected to be an essential tool of Biden ’ s foreign policy as it was under Trump .
Under further review .
The Defense Department is threatening to curtail its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the waning days of the Trump administration , Defense One reports , thanks to a political appointee who is seen as a loyalist to the president .
The review , led by Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Ezra Cohen-Watnick , will determine whether U.S. troops detailed to CIA missions should be repurposed to help counter China and Russia , the Pentagon ’ s top two priorities .
Former officials fear the move could pull the rug out from under CIA officials performing sensitive missions in combat zones such as Afghanistan .
Weak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across party lines for cabinet picks who are seen as less experienced on Asia , despite the national security strategy framing China as the key U.S. national security rival .
Biden did not mention China once in his op-ed in the Atlantic or his speech in Wilmington , Del.
, yesterday defending the choice of Austin as defense secretary .
Former presidential contender and South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg , another Asia novice , is seen as a leading contender to become U.S. ambassador to China .
“ For weeks , my conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to argue Biden will be weak on China , ” Oriana Skylar Mastro , a fellow at Stanford ’ s Freeman Spogli Institute and the American Enterprise Institute , wrote in the Washington Post today .
“ As a strong supporter of Biden , I am reluctant to give them any fodder .
But the nomination of Austin suggests that they may be right on this one.
” Biden ’ s secretary for veterans affairs .
Biden is expected to announce Obama ’ s former White House chief of staff and deputy national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ run the Department of Veterans Affairs , Politico reports .
If selected and confirmed by the Senate , McDonough will take over a vast federal agency riven with management issues and tasked with distributing coronavirus vaccines to millions of U.S. veterans .
Rice , Rice baby .
Susan Rice , the former Obama administration national security advisor who was a recent contender for secretary of state , has been tapped by Biden to lead the White House Domestic Policy Council , the Associated Press reports .
Rice—who is also a veteran of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department—has spent nearly her entire career working on foreign policy issues .
Trading places .
Biden is expected to tap Katherine Tai , the top trade lawyer for the powerful House Ways and Means Committee , to be the next U.S. trade representative .
If confirmed , Tai will take the job after Trump pushed through protectionist trade policies and sought to tear down the international trading order .
Marocc-in , Marocc-out .
The return of Pete Marocco , a controversial Trump appointee at the U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s programs , lasted less than a week .
Marocco was forced to take leave in October after trying to scale back funding for the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization .
He was placed back on leave on Tuesday , after just six days back at the agency .
John Anderson , a top USAID religious advisor , will take over Marocco ’ s job on an acting basis .
It was not immediately clear why the move was made .
“ This was CENTCOM out of control .
This was the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here to fight terrorists , let the f—heads in State Department take care of Turkey , and we can say or do anything we want that pleases us and pleases our little allies , and it doesn ’ t matter.
’ ” —James Jeffrey , the State Department ’ s outgoing Syria envoy , unloading on the Pentagon and other administration officials in a markedly candid interview with Al Monitor Double standard ?
While no one doubts the historic nature of Biden ’ s choice for Pentagon chief , it is raising questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top female candidate once again passed over for the job—about whether there ’ s a gender imbalance when it comes to scrutiny over defense industry ties , Military.com ’ s Oriana Pawlyk reports .
While Michèle Flournoy , a former Pentagon policy chief once seen as a frontrunner for the top job , was scrutinized for her ties to Booz Allen Hamilton and WestExec advisors , critics said that Austin—who could make history as the first Black defense secretary—received more deference even though he sits on the board of Raytheon , a major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Britain , and France will host a global climate summit on Saturday , Dec. 12 , to mark the fifth anniversary of the Paris climate accords .
U.S. distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine is set to begin from Dec. 13 to 18 .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief.
What’s on tap today: What to make of the Biden administration’s personnel picks for defense and diplomatic posts, the Pentagon considers cutting support for the CIA’s counterterrorism operations, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s outgoing Syria envoy unloads his frustrations.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
BREAKING: Morocco and Israel have agreed to normalize diplomatic ties, Trump announced on Twitter. Morocco will become the fourth Arab country to do so, following the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan. In exchange, Trump will agree to recognize the disputed Western Sahara as Moroccan sovereign territory. This is a developing story.
Who Will Drive Biden’s Foreign Policy Behind the Scenes?
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has already announced many of his most important cabinet-level posts, including the secretaries of defense and state. But Beltway insiders are closely monitoring who will be tapped to fill other administration leadership roles below the senior level—ones that often don’t make the headlines but carry out the spadework of foreign policy. Team Biden hasn’t started announcing those picks yet, but here are the ones we’re watching most closely.
Deputy secretary of state. Traditionally, the deputy secretary of state has overseen much of the internal management of the State Department. Whoever Biden picks will need to help reform and overhaul a dispirited diplomatic corps. For four years, diplomats have sounded alarm bells on the Trump administration’s mismanagement of the foreign service. During the impeachment saga, career diplomats also faced heated political attacks from top Trump allies with no public support from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Some of Biden’s top campaign advisors on foreign policy have called for the incoming administration to reform the department to strengthen U.S. diplomacy amid new great power competition from China. That responsibility could largely fall on the shoulders of whoever is deputy secretary.
Undersecretary of defense for policy. During Ret. Gen. Jim Mattis’ tenure as defense secretary, civilian officials said they were boxed out of critical policy decisions by the Joint Staff, led by Marine Gen. Joe Dunford and Mattis, himself a retired Marine commander. The office hasn’t had a Senate-confirmed chief for nearly a year and has recently been stocked with Trump loyalists. After selecting another recently retired general, Lloyd Austin, to lead the Pentagon, Biden’s team will be under pressure to nominate a strong civilian policy chief to rehabilitate this office, which has struggled with attrition since the late Obama years.
NSC senior director for Asia. Matt Pottinger, the Mandarin-speaking former Wall Street Journal reporter, was incredibly influential in this position behind the scenes. His successor may also play hawk to China—and could be just as influential by playing a key role in designing a Biden-era National Security Strategy.
One dynamic to watch: The Biden team already appears to be enhancing functional portfolios on the NSC. Incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has pledged to reprioritize public health to deal with the coronavirus pandemic, and Biden has tapped former Secretary of State John Kerry to serve as a special envoy for climate change with a principal role on the NSC. Biden will need an influential Asia director to deflect Republican concerns that his cabinet picks don’t have enough experience with China.
Undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. Biden will quickly be faced with salvaging the last arms control agreement with Russia before it expires. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits U.S. and Russian arsenals of strategic nuclear arms, is set to expire in February. Top Trump administration arms negotiators failed to make headway on extending or altering the treaty, leaving a last-minute scramble for Biden’s negotiators.
If they can negotiate an interim extension, whoever Biden picks to be his top State Department arms control envoy will play a crucial role in recrafting New START, as well as determining whether to revive other arms treaties with Russia—such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty with Russia that Trump withdrew from in 2019—or try to forge new ones with China.
Undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and intel. Financial wonks at the Treasury Department have become the sharp end of the spear in many of the United States’ most ambitious offensives against terrorist organizations, human rights abusers, and top officials in Russia and China. The use of targeted sanctions as a tool of American foreign policy has exploded in recent years and remains—for better or worse—one of the swiftest ways to lash out at adversaries.
The undersecretary of treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence takes the lead in this job, which is expected to be an essential tool of Biden’s foreign policy as it was under Trump.
What We’re Watching
Under further review. The Defense Department is threatening to curtail its support for clandestine CIA counterterrorism operations in the waning days of the Trump administration, Defense One reports, thanks to a political appointee who is seen as a loyalist to the president. The review, led by Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Ezra Cohen-Watnick, will determine whether U.S. troops detailed to CIA missions should be repurposed to help counter China and Russia, the Pentagon’s top two priorities.
Former officials fear the move could pull the rug out from under CIA officials performing sensitive missions in combat zones such as Afghanistan.
Weak on China? Biden is taking heat across party lines for cabinet picks who are seen as less experienced on Asia, despite the national security strategy framing China as the key U.S. national security rival. Biden did not mention China once in his op-ed in the Atlantic or his speech in Wilmington, Del., yesterday defending the choice of Austin as defense secretary. Former presidential contender and South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg, another Asia novice, is seen as a leading contender to become U.S. ambassador to China.
“For weeks, my conservative colleagues have been taking to the airwaves to argue Biden will be weak on China,” Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute and the American Enterprise Institute, wrote in the Washington Post today. “As a strong supporter of Biden, I am reluctant to give them any fodder. But the nomination of Austin suggests that they may be right on this one.”
Movers and Shakers
Biden’s secretary for veterans affairs. Biden is expected to announce Obama’s former White House chief of staff and deputy national security advisor, Denis McDonough, to run the Department of Veterans Affairs, Politico reports. If selected and confirmed by the Senate, McDonough will take over a vast federal agency riven with management issues and tasked with distributing coronavirus vaccines to millions of U.S. veterans.
Rice, Rice baby. Susan Rice, the former Obama administration national security advisor who was a recent contender for secretary of state, has been tapped by Biden to lead the White House Domestic Policy Council, the Associated Press reports. Rice—who is also a veteran of the Clinton administration National Security Council and State Department—has spent nearly her entire career working on foreign policy issues.
Trading places. Biden is expected to tap Katherine Tai, the top trade lawyer for the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, to be the next U.S. trade representative. If confirmed, Tai will take the job after Trump pushed through protectionist trade policies and sought to tear down the international trading order.
Marocc-in, Marocc-out. The return of Pete Marocco, a controversial Trump appointee at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who sought to remake the agency’s programs, lasted less than a week. Marocco was forced to take leave in October after trying to scale back funding for the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization. He was placed back on leave on Tuesday, after just six days back at the agency.
John Anderson, a top USAID religious advisor, will take over Marocco’s job on an acting basis. It was not immediately clear why the move was made.
Quote of the Week
“This was CENTCOM out of control. This was the classic, ‘We’re just here to fight terrorists, let the f—heads in State Department take care of Turkey, and we can say or do anything we want that pleases us and pleases our little allies, and it doesn’t matter.’”
—James Jeffrey, the State Department’s outgoing Syria envoy, unloading on the Pentagon and other administration officials in a markedly candid interview with Al Monitor
Foreign Policy Recommends
Double standard? While no one doubts the historic nature of Biden’s choice for Pentagon chief, it is raising questions among women in national security—who saw a top female candidate once again passed over for the job—about whether there’s a gender imbalance when it comes to scrutiny over defense industry ties, Military.com’s Oriana Pawlyk reports.
While Michèle Flournoy, a former Pentagon policy chief once seen as a frontrunner for the top job, was scrutinized for her ties to Booz Allen Hamilton and WestExec advisors, critics said that Austin—who could make history as the first Black defense secretary—received more deference even though he sits on the board of Raytheon, a major arms maker.
The Week Ahead
The United Nations, Britain, and France will host a global climate summit on Saturday, Dec. 12, to mark the fifth anniversary of the Paris climate accords.
U.S. distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine is set to begin from Dec. 13 to 18.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.