foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--An Epidemic of Wuhan Virus Misinformation Is Spreading Online

An Epidemic of Wuhan Virus Misinformation Is Spreading Online The outbreak of the new coronavirus , which originated in Wuhan , China , with all the misinformation and conspiracy that has followed it , has put the major social media companies to the test as they try to combat panic and paranoia .
The big U.S. companies have moved quickly to try to quell criticism that their platforms are turning into cesspools of bad information and fear .
So have their Chinese counterparts—which are also under considerable government pressure as Beijing faces its worst legitimacy crisis in years .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have played host to theories that the deadly virus is a lab-made bioweapon and that the streets of Wuhan are littered with thousands of dead bodies .
Some are responding better than others .
Twitter has been a significant vector for misinformation around the virus , but the company has taken steps to actually put reliable medical information in the hands of users .
Anyone searching for “ coronavirus ” or “ Wuhan ” on Twitter will be met with a message encouraging them to “ know the facts , ” with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the platform is prioritizing countries ’ health authorities in the search results .
Twitter has also moved to ban certain accounts spreading conspiracy theories—most prominently the long-running conspiracist site ZeroHedge .
Twitter said in a statement that there was no evidence of coordinated efforts to spread disinformation on the platform but added : “ [ W ] e will remain vigilant and have invested significantly in our proactive abilities to ensure trends , search , and other common areas of the service are protected from malicious behaviors.
” Google has taken a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ giant to look up information on the virus receive information from the World Health Organization , including details on how the virus is transmitted , as well as sensible precautions people can take , such as hand-washing tips .
Google is generally cagey about how and when it removes or deprioritizes search results from its service , but searches for various coronavirus conspiracy theories turn up news agencies debunking those claims ahead of unreliable sites like Infowars and ZeroHedge .
On Reddit , where several communities dedicated solely to the coronavirus have popped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The two largest virus-related subreddits , with about 50,000 users apiece , both have official rules asking users to use reliable information and to avoid sensationalism .
On r/China_Flu , which sprung out of the long-standing r/China subreddit , moderators have been judicious about ensuring those rules are followed .
On r/Coronavirus , the community is lousy with moderating posts stoking fears of a government-made biological weapon and making claims of a mass cover-up .
Another subreddit , r/Wuhan_Flu , was quarantined by the platform for trading in misinformation—meaning it isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes with warnings about the conspiratorial nature of the community .
What ’ s more , the company has put a banner ad on its homepage directing users to a megathread on r/AskScience where people can talk to real researchers and public health professionals .
Facebook has deployed its fact-checkers to rate information being shared in its news feed , limiting information deemed to be inaccurate or false .
It has also leveraged reliable public health information and provided free advertising credits to health agencies .
But a quick Facebook search shows the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two hits for the coronavirus on Facebook are private groups , which require approval to join .
The groups are rife with unverified videos , conspiracy theories , and general panic .
On joining one of those groups , you may be welcomed by a post asking : Is it true that the United States invented the coronavirus to destroy China ’ s economy ?
The top comment : “ True.
” ( Facebook did not respond to a request for comment . )
Chinese sites are following similar models to their Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Baidu , the country ’ s most frequently used search engine , bring up health information , official statistics , and other tidbits , while the site ’ s main banner links to a hub page on the topic .
( Baidu has gotten into hot water for promoting shady health information in the past . )
Many sites are partnering with Dingxiang Yuan , an online physician-orientated information site known for reliable information ; its tracker of virus numbers has reached 1.3 billion page views .
For Chinese sites , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but to remove supposedly false information—even if it ’ s just stories the government doesn ’ t like .
With around a third of personnel devoted to self-censoring content even in normal times , removing stories and links is par for the course .
Nevertheless , some scandalous stories have broken through , such as the death of a disabled child under quarantine , and some state-backed claims have seen significant and successful pushback .
Overseas Chinese groups on uncensored apps such as WhatsApp , however , are full of wild claims about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raises a difficult issue for Western social media apps—coping with misinformation in languages other than English .
Googling in languages other than English for the coronavirus , for instance , often doesn ’ t bring up the extra information .
Facebook , in particular , has a record of dealing poorly with the range of countries the site dominates , while WhatsApp has had significant problems with dangerous rumors in India and elsewhere .
Malaysia , the Philippines , and Indonesia are all seeing a flood of misinformation about the virus , much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens or visitors .
One particularly virulent conspiracy theory shows just how difficult stemming the flow of fake news can be—in any language .
On Jan. 31 , researchers from the Kusuma School of Biological Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi published an article noting an “ uncanny similarity ” between certain protein chains found within the coronavirus and those found in HIV .
The paper clearly explains that the “ exchange of genetic material among the viruses is well known ” and their preliminary discovery proved “ the need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families.
” The report was preliminary , meaning it was not peer-reviewed .
The scientific archive hosting the paper , bioRxiv , added a disclaimer warning that it “ should not be regarded as conclusive , guide clinical practice/health-related behavior , or be reported in news media as established information.
” The same day the paper went online , it was shared by the Indian author and columnist Anand Ranganathan , who tweeted that the authors “ hint at the possibility that this Chinese virus was designed.
” Later that day , after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delete the tweet .
Ranganathan ’ s original tweet , however , had already propelled the fringe study to go viral .
Amid concerns with the underlying science , the paper was even withdrawn .
It , however , still lives on the bioRxiv website—and has spread widely .
The social media analytics platform CrowdTangle reports that the paper has been shared thousands of times across Facebook , Twitter , Reddit , and Instagram in an array of different languages .
Many of the most popular shares are still live , save for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removed and a disclaimer has been added to the post , warning that the information came from an unconfirmed source .
The preliminary paper , however , found pickup on ZeroHedge , which has been known to peddle Russian propaganda .
On Saturday , the site ’ s pseudonymous manager , Tyler Durden—a group identity , one member of which is the former investment banker Daniel Ivandjiiski , according to Bloomberg—posted a link to the study , with the supposition that the coronavirus “ might have been genetically engineered for the purposes of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapon but the deadliest one of all.
” ( The post was updated to acknowledge that the paper was withdrawn , even as it continued advancing the conspiracy theory . )
It followed up with a post claiming to identify the Chinese researcher behind the virus .
The ZeroHedge posts racked up more than 15,000 shares on Facebook and have been shared extensively in the two most popular private groups dedicated to following the virus .
On Twitter , the articles earned ZeroHedge a ban from the platform—that didn ’ t stop the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , including from Infowars host David Knight .
( Infowars is also banned from the platform . )
The ZeroHedge posts were also shared , albeit not as widely , on Reddit and Instagram .
This most recent proliferation of fake news lays out just how tricky tackling misinformation can be online , but it also shows that certain strategies are more effective than others .
Facebook continues to be the most fertile ground for conspiracy theories and bad information , but Twitter continues to be a prime incubator for fledgling @ @ @

The outbreak of the new coronavirus, which originated in Wuhan, China, with all the misinformation and conspiracy that has followed it, has put the major social media companies to the test as they try to combat panic and paranoia.
The outbreak of the new coronavirus, which originated in Wuhan, China, with all the misinformation and conspiracy that has followed it, has put the major social media companies to the test as they try to combat panic and paranoia.
The big U.S. companies have moved quickly to try to quell criticism that their platforms are turning into cesspools of bad information and fear. So have their Chinese counterparts—which are also under considerable government pressure as Beijing faces its worst legitimacy crisis in years. As the virus has spread, their platforms have played host to theories that the deadly virus is a lab-made bioweapon and that the streets of Wuhan are littered with thousands of dead bodies.
Some are responding better than others.
Twitter has been a significant vector for misinformation around the virus, but the company has taken steps to actually put reliable medical information in the hands of users. Anyone searching for “coronavirus” or “Wuhan” on Twitter will be met with a message encouraging them to “know the facts,” with a link to a local health authority, and the platform is prioritizing countries’ health authorities in the search results.
Twitter has also moved to ban certain accounts spreading conspiracy theories—most prominently the long-running conspiracist site ZeroHedge. Twitter said in a statement that there was no evidence of coordinated efforts to spread disinformation on the platform but added: “[W]e will remain vigilant and have invested significantly in our proactive abilities to ensure trends, search, and other common areas of the service are protected from malicious behaviors.”
Google has taken a similar approach. Users using the search giant to look up information on the virus receive information from the World Health Organization, including details on how the virus is transmitted, as well as sensible precautions people can take, such as hand-washing tips. Google is generally cagey about how and when it removes or deprioritizes search results from its service, but searches for various coronavirus conspiracy theories turn up news agencies debunking those claims ahead of unreliable sites like Infowars and ZeroHedge.
On Reddit, where several communities dedicated solely to the coronavirus have popped up, there have been mixed results. The two largest virus-related subreddits, with about 50,000 users apiece, both have official rules asking users to use reliable information and to avoid sensationalism. On r/China_Flu, which sprung out of the long-standing r/China subreddit, moderators have been judicious about ensuring those rules are followed. On r/Coronavirus, the community is lousy with moderating posts stoking fears of a government-made biological weapon and making claims of a mass cover-up.
Another subreddit, r/Wuhan_Flu, was quarantined by the platform for trading in misinformation—meaning it isn’t discoverable by searching the platform and comes with warnings about the conspiratorial nature of the community. What’s more, the company has put a banner ad on its homepage directing users to a megathread on r/AskScience where people can talk to real researchers and public health professionals.
Facebook has deployed its fact-checkers to rate information being shared in its news feed, limiting information deemed to be inaccurate or false. It has also leveraged reliable public health information and provided free advertising credits to health agencies.
But a quick Facebook search shows the limits to that work.
The top two hits for the coronavirus on Facebook are private groups, which require approval to join. The groups are rife with unverified videos, conspiracy theories, and general panic.
On joining one of those groups, you may be welcomed by a post asking: Is it true that the United States invented the coronavirus to destroy China’s economy? The top comment: “True.” (Facebook did not respond to a request for comment.)
Chinese sites are following similar models to their Western counterparts. Searches for “coronavirus” on Baidu, the country’s most frequently used search engine, bring up health information, official statistics, and other tidbits, while the site’s main banner links to a hub page on the topic. (Baidu has gotten into hot water for promoting shady health information in the past.) Many sites are partnering with Dingxiang Yuan, an online physician-orientated information site known for reliable information; its tracker of virus numbers has reached 1.3 billion page views.
For Chinese sites, of course, there’s little choice but to remove supposedly false information—even if it’s just stories the government doesn’t like. With around a third of personnel devoted to self-censoring content even in normal times, removing stories and links is par for the course. Nevertheless, some scandalous stories have broken through, such as the death of a disabled child under quarantine, and some state-backed claims have seen significant and successful pushback. Overseas Chinese groups on uncensored apps such as WhatsApp, however, are full of wild claims about the extent of the virus.
That raises a difficult issue for Western social media apps—coping with misinformation in languages other than English. Googling in languages other than English for the coronavirus, for instance, often doesn’t bring up the extra information. Facebook, in particular, has a record of dealing poorly with the range of countries the site dominates, while WhatsApp has had significant problems with dangerous rumors in India and elsewhere. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia are all seeing a flood of misinformation about the virus, much of it directing hate at ethnic Chinese citizens or visitors.
One particularly virulent conspiracy theory shows just how difficult stemming the flow of fake news can be—in any language.
On Jan. 31, researchers from the Kusuma School of Biological Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi published an article noting an “uncanny similarity” between certain protein chains found within the coronavirus and those found in HIV. The paper clearly explains that the “exchange of genetic material among the viruses is well known” and their preliminary discovery proved “the need to investigate the relations between seemingly unrelated virus families.”
The report was preliminary, meaning it was not peer-reviewed. The scientific archive hosting the paper, bioRxiv, added a disclaimer warning that it “should not be regarded as conclusive, guide clinical practice/health-related behavior, or be reported in news media as established information.”
The same day the paper went online, it was shared by the Indian author and columnist Anand Ranganathan, who tweeted that the authors “hint at the possibility that this Chinese virus was designed.” Later that day, after checking with researchers, he opted to delete the tweet. Ranganathan’s original tweet, however, had already propelled the fringe study to go viral.
Amid concerns with the underlying science, the paper was even withdrawn. It, however, still lives on the bioRxiv website—and has spread widely.
The social media analytics platform CrowdTangle reports that the paper has been shared thousands of times across Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, and Instagram in an array of different languages. Many of the most popular shares are still live, save for Reddit, where the link has been removed and a disclaimer has been added to the post, warning that the information came from an unconfirmed source.
The preliminary paper, however, found pickup on ZeroHedge, which has been known to peddle Russian propaganda. On Saturday, the site’s pseudonymous manager, Tyler Durden—a group identity, one member of which is the former investment banker Daniel Ivandjiiski, according to Bloomberg—posted a link to the study, with the supposition that the coronavirus “might have been genetically engineered for the purposes of a weapon, and not just any weapon but the deadliest one of all.” (The post was updated to acknowledge that the paper was withdrawn, even as it continued advancing the conspiracy theory.) It followed up with a post claiming to identify the Chinese researcher behind the virus.
The ZeroHedge posts racked up more than 15,000 shares on Facebook and have been shared extensively in the two most popular private groups dedicated to following the virus. On Twitter, the articles earned ZeroHedge a ban from the platform—that didn’t stop the articles from being shared thousands of times, however, including from Infowars host David Knight. (Infowars is also banned from the platform.) The ZeroHedge posts were also shared, albeit not as widely, on Reddit and Instagram.
This most recent proliferation of fake news lays out just how tricky tackling misinformation can be online, but it also shows that certain strategies are more effective than others. Facebook continues to be the most fertile ground for conspiracy theories and bad information, but Twitter continues to be a prime incubator for fledgling conspiracy theories.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--War Movies After War

War Movies After War

The power goes out .
At first , people think it ’ s a momentary blip .
They light candles and enjoy their suddenly more atmospheric dinners .
But the power doesn ’ t return that evening or the next day .
Or for weeks after that .
A devastating Iranian cyberattack on the New York City power grid ?
No—a Swedish reality TV show called Nedslackt land ( “ Blackout Country ” ) .
The first season , which has just concluded , begins with a group of 10 people arriving for a mystery experiment at two remote houses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a simple cottage , the other five to a state-of-the-art vacation home .
They expect a typical reality TV group exercise , something along the lines of a classy Big Brother .
But the very first evening , the power goes out .
They react like most of us would , their lives interrupted by the inconvenience but also made a little more exciting .
But the cheer subsides as the Blackout Country participants realize that the lights are off for good .
The two houses ’ occupants are of different ages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , belong to a range of ethnicities , and speak with varied regional accents .
One of the men is outdoorsy , another has carpeting skills , but none has the foggiest idea of what to do during a sustained power cut .
The next morning , with the water pipes no longer working , a small group decides to go and collect water from a nearby brook for the toilet , cooking , and cleaning dishes .
Forget calling for help : The occupants soon learn that the power outage is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit by a solar flare—although it could just as well have been a massive cyberattack on the country ’ s power grid for all they know—and the whole country is without power .
They ’ re on their own .
The same feeling of isolation pervades another series , Occupied , a phenomenally successful Norwegian television drama now in its third season .
In it , Norway is taken over by a sinister alliance comprising Russia and the European Union .
There ’ s no invasion , just a gradual encroachment of Norwegian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , whose goals are unclear to the population : The aggression starts with a series of energy-related demands on the Norwegian government ( in the midst of a raging energy crisis , the visionary prime minister—Jesper Berg—had wanted to go green and end Norway ’ s oil production , thereby angering both Russia and the EU ) but escalates quickly to maneuverers seemingly designed only to wear down the country ’ s will to stand up for itself .
When Berg is kidnapped by Russian special forces and taken to a hideout , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from a senior EU official who demands that he reverse his decision .
Viewers are left with the nagging fear that this could happen in real life .
Henrik Mestad , who portrays the prime minister , is so convincing that you don ’ t just want to cast your vote for him but to free him from his captivity as well .
But how ?
Most Norwegians—in fact , most people around the world—would be at a loss for how to respond to the kinds of grayzone attacks seen in Occupied .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ underground fighters bedeviled the country ’ s Nazi occupiers , slowing their progress .
But how do you bedevil attackers below the threshold of war ?
In Occupied , some panic , some are paralyzed , and virtually all are clueless—the same scenario as Blackout Country .
And as different as the shows are , that fact joins them as pioneers of a new kind of portrayal of war .
This genre doesn ’ t relish in distant battles of the kinds that most people who are not in the armed forces will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a civilian-centric view on conflict .
Not relegated to crowd scenes or brief moments of pathos before they perish , in both shows average citizens are at the center of the plot .
In Occupied , soldiers make only occasional appearances .
As the battle between the Russians and Free Norway , a guerrilla group determined to win back Norway ’ s sovereignty , intensifies , journalists , bureaucrats , academics , and even children are forced to discern what each side stands for—and which one is the lesser evil .
Likewise , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the show ’ s participants to save themselves .
They aren ’ t caught up in any messy geopolitics .
Rather , their daily lives are chronicled as hygiene deteriorates , arguments break out , and survival of the fittest starts to prevail .
In one episode , the group tries to decide how to divide their last remaining food : Should everyone get equal amounts ?
Should it be distributed according to the person ’ s size ?
The women in the group argue that such a system would be unfair @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the participants growing desperate , one group decides to forage for edible items .
But where do you look ?
What ’ s edible ?
Which plants can be eaten raw ?
In their focus on disrupted normal lives , both shows stand in sharp contrast to traditional movies about war like War Machine , American Sniper , Inglourious Basterds , and Zero Dark Thirty .
Each year , moviegoers and TV watchers around the world can look forward to a menu of such entertainment covering every conceivable aspect of combat—real and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in that vein , 1917 , is entering the Oscars as the favorite , with 10 nominations .
There ’ s a reason such films are increasingly set in the past , though .
New forms of warfare are taking center stage in real life .
One country can bring another to its knees without deploying a single soldier .
It can , for example , target an electrical grid or the transportation network of a major city .
Or a bank .
Or an election .
A new study by the Federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a cyberattack against one of the United States ’ largest banks could cripple the entire U.S. financial system .
China , Russia , and North Korea already hack Western companies on a daily basis .
The U.S. electricity transmission company PJM Interconnection is subjected to 3,000-4,000 cyberattacks each month , its former CEO Terry Boston revealed .
Larger and more prominent companies are subjected to many millions of attacks every day .
Not all originate with hostile states or their proxies , but many do .
Last year , for example , Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least 20 U.S. utilities .
And Iranian hackers have further upped the game : A group known as Refined Kitten can now interfere with the control systems of power plants , factories , and refineries .
Increasingly , in other words , war may look like Blackout Country or Occupied—weeks without electricity or pressure on your government so subtle that it isn ’ t clear whether a coup or a war is even taking place .
And in these situations , the outcome of the battle increasingly comes down to the public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for homeland security affairs , notes in a report for Johns Hopkins University , adversaries may also “ use social media and other means to spread further disinformation and incite public panic as part of their attacks.
” And public panic is part of the point ; sowing it leads to anarchy .
And a weakened competitor is , of course , exactly what a grayzone attacker might want : victory without any of the expense or mess of conquering territory and then administering it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries know all this and are improving their defense against so-called grayzone warfare : U.S. Cyber Command regularly responds to cyberattacks , even if only to , in a tactic reminiscent of the horse head scene in The Godfather , indicate to potential attackers that they will be punished if they proceed .
In 2018 , Sweden ’ s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a brochure titled “ If Crisis or War Comes ” to all households in the country , instructing them what to do in situations such as that portrayed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point an attack will succeed .
All the better , then , that shows like Blackout Country and Occupied can give civilians a taste of what to expect .
The shows are phenomenal entertainment , of course , but they also demonstrate what it means when a city goes dark and nobody knows what ’ s happening , how long it will last , or who is behind it while a mysterious adversary uploads disinformation to social media feeds on people ’ s quickly fading smartphones or when any given decision by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coercion by another country .
That ’ s why , beyond entertaining , studios ’ modern-warfare oeuvres can also inform the public about how war looks today .
Most of us will never fly an attack helicopter or participate in infantry combat , but we are likely to encounter nonmilitary aggression .
Some of us already have , perhaps unknowingly .
Russia is believed to have influenced the results of both the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the Brexit referendum that year .
And recent reports indicated that Iranian government-linked hackers successfully attacked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
North Korean hackers have likewise targeted Western government officials , think tankers , and academics involved with nuclear nonproliferation .
There ’ s nothing positive about other countries threatening the public at large .
But now that the aggression is here , it can be used for the benefit of the entertainment industry , national security , and the wider public all at once .
And keeping your cool in a crisis is a useful skill even if the world ’ s nations suddenly agreed to universal peace : like the participants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Mother Nature could be the most fearsome grayzone adversary of all .

The power goes out. At first, people think it’s a momentary blip. They light candles and enjoy their suddenly more atmospheric dinners. But the power doesn’t return that evening or the next day. Or for weeks after that. A devastating Iranian cyberattack on the New York City power grid? No—a Swedish reality TV show called Nedslackt land (“Blackout Country”).
The power goes out. At first, people think it’s a momentary blip. They light candles and enjoy their suddenly more atmospheric dinners. But the power doesn’t return that evening or the next day. Or for weeks after that. A devastating Iranian cyberattack on the New York City power grid? No—a Swedish reality TV show called Nedslackt land (“Blackout Country”).
The first season, which has just concluded, begins with a group of 10 people arriving for a mystery experiment at two remote houses. Five of the participants are sent to a simple cottage, the other five to a state-of-the-art vacation home. They expect a typical reality TV group exercise, something along the lines of a classy Big Brother. But the very first evening, the power goes out. They react like most of us would, their lives interrupted by the inconvenience but also made a little more exciting. But the cheer subsides as the Blackout Country participants realize that the lights are off for good.
The two houses’ occupants are of different ages, have different educational and work backgrounds, belong to a range of ethnicities, and speak with varied regional accents. One of the men is outdoorsy, another has carpentry skills, but none has the foggiest idea of what to do during a sustained power cut. The next morning, with the water pipes no longer working, a small group decides to go and collect water from a nearby brook for the toilet, cooking, and cleaning dishes. Forget calling for help: The occupants soon learn that the power outage is not limited to them. Sweden has been hit by a solar flare—although it could just as well have been a massive cyberattack on the country’s power grid for all they know—and the whole country is without power. They’re on their own.
The same feeling of isolation pervades another series, Occupied, a phenomenally successful Norwegian television drama now in its third season. In it, Norway is taken over by a sinister alliance comprising Russia and the European Union. There’s no invasion, just a gradual encroachment of Norwegian sovereignty by the country’s enemies, whose goals are unclear to the population: The aggression starts with a series of energy-related demands on the Norwegian government (in the midst of a raging energy crisis, the visionary prime minister—Jesper Berg—had wanted to go green and end Norway’s oil production, thereby angering both Russia and the EU) but escalates quickly to maneuverers seemingly designed only to wear down the country’s will to stand up for itself.
When Berg is kidnapped by Russian special forces and taken to a hideout, for example, he receives a call from a senior EU official who demands that he reverse his decision. Viewers are left with the nagging fear that this could happen in real life. Henrik Mestad, who portrays the prime minister, is so convincing that you don’t just want to cast your vote for him but to free him from his captivity as well.
But how? Most Norwegians—in fact, most people around the world—would be at a loss for how to respond to the kinds of grayzone attacks seen in Occupied. During World War II, brave Norwegian underground fighters bedeviled the country’s Nazi occupiers, slowing their progress. But how do you bedevil attackers below the threshold of war? In Occupied, some panic, some are paralyzed, and virtually all are clueless—the same scenario as Blackout Country. And as different as the shows are, that fact joins them as pioneers of a new kind of portrayal of war. This genre doesn’t relish in distant battles of the kinds that most people who are not in the armed forces will never see. Instead, it offers a civilian-centric view on conflict.
Not relegated to crowd scenes or brief moments of pathos before they perish, in both shows average citizens are at the center of the plot. In Occupied, soldiers make only occasional appearances. As the battle between the Russians and Free Norway, a guerrilla group determined to win back Norway’s sovereignty, intensifies, journalists, bureaucrats, academics, and even children are forced to discern what each side stands for—and which one is the lesser evil.
Likewise, in Blackout Country, it is up to the show’s participants to save themselves. They aren’t caught up in any messy geopolitics. Rather, their daily lives are chronicled as hygiene deteriorates, arguments break out, and survival of the fittest starts to prevail. In one episode, the group tries to decide how to divide their last remaining food: Should everyone get equal amounts? Should it be distributed according to the person’s size? The women in the group argue that such a system would be unfair to them. At another point, with the participants growing desperate, one group decides to forage for edible items. But where do you look? What’s edible? Which plants can be eaten raw?
In their focus on disrupted normal lives, both shows stand in sharp contrast to traditional movies about war like War Machine, American Sniper, Inglourious Basterds, and Zero Dark Thirty. Each year, moviegoers and TV watchers around the world can look forward to a menu of such entertainment covering every conceivable aspect of combat—real and imagined. This year, another movie in that vein, 1917, is entering the Oscars as the favorite, with 10 nominations.
There’s a reason such films are increasingly set in the past, though. New forms of warfare are taking center stage in real life. One country can bring another to its knees without deploying a single soldier. It can, for example, target an electrical grid or the transportation network of a major city. Or a bank. Or an election. A new study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports that a cyberattack against one of the United States’ largest banks could cripple the entire U.S. financial system.
China, Russia, and North Korea already hack Western companies on a daily basis. The U.S. electricity transmission company PJM Interconnection is subjected to 3,000-4,000 cyberattacks each month, its former CEO Terry Boston revealed. Larger and more prominent companies are subjected to many millions of attacks every day. Not all originate with hostile states or their proxies, but many do. Last year, for example, Chinese government-linked hackers were found to have attacked at least 20 U.S. utilities. And Iranian hackers have further upped the game: A group known as Refined Kitten can now interfere with the control systems of power plants, factories, and refineries.
Increasingly, in other words, war may look like Blackout Country or Occupied—weeks without electricity or pressure on your government so subtle that it isn’t clear whether a coup or a war is even taking place. And in these situations, the outcome of the battle increasingly comes down to the public response. As Paul N. Stockton, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for homeland security affairs, notes in a report for Johns Hopkins University, adversaries may also “use social media and other means to spread further disinformation and incite public panic as part of their attacks.” And public panic is part of the point; sowing it leads to anarchy. And a weakened competitor is, of course, exactly what a grayzone attacker might want: victory without any of the expense or mess of conquering territory and then administering it.
Of course, the United States and other countries know all this and are improving their defense against so-called grayzone warfare: U.S. Cyber Command regularly responds to cyberattacks, even if only to, in a tactic reminiscent of the horse head scene in The Godfather, indicate to potential attackers that they will be punished if they proceed. In 2018, Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a brochure titled “If Crisis or War Comes” to all households in the country, instructing them what to do in situations such as that portrayed in Blackout Country. Nevertheless, at some point an attack will succeed. All the better, then, that shows like Blackout Country and Occupied can give civilians a taste of what to expect. The shows are phenomenal entertainment, of course, but they also demonstrate what it means when a city goes dark and nobody knows what’s happening, how long it will last, or who is behind it while a mysterious adversary uploads disinformation to social media feeds on people’s quickly fading smartphones or when any given decision by a prime minister may be the result of coercion by another country.
That’s why, beyond entertaining, studios’ modern-warfare oeuvres can also inform the public about how war looks today. Most of us will never fly an attack helicopter or participate in infantry combat, but we are likely to encounter nonmilitary aggression. Some of us already have, perhaps unknowingly. Russia is believed to have influenced the results of both the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the Brexit referendum that year. And recent reports indicated that Iranian government-linked hackers successfully attacked the U.S. government contractor Westat in January. North Korean hackers have likewise targeted Western government officials, think tankers, and academics involved with nuclear nonproliferation.
There’s nothing positive about other countries threatening the public at large. But now that the aggression is here, it can be used for the benefit of the entertainment industry, national security, and the wider public all at once. And keeping your cool in a crisis is a useful skill even if the world’s nations suddenly agreed to universal peace: Like the participants in Blackout Country, we may find that Mother Nature could be the most fearsome grayzone adversary of all.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--5 Foreign-Policy Takeaways from Trump’s State of the Union

5 Foreign-Policy Takeaways from Trump ’ s State of the Union One big factor that will likely weigh heavily in the 2020 vote is Trump ’ s foreign policy , from the alleged misconduct toward Ukraine that precipitated his impeachment to his ongoing trade wars with China and other nations to his incendiary confrontation with Iran .
But apart from declaring several times that , in his view , America ’ s prestige around the world was higher than ever , Trump spent relatively little time in his 78-minute speech on foreign policy—no doubt with an eye toward his reelection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the performance of the U.S. economy .
Trump didn ’ t mention Ukraine at all—though it has dominated headlines for the last several months—and referred only briefly to his policies toward China , Iran , and the war in Afghanistan .
On foreign policy as on domestic issues , the speech—in which Trump boasted , “ The state of our union is stronger than ever before ” —only deepened the already chasmic divides between Democrats and Republicans .
Arriving at the lectern , Trump turned away when Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pelosi burnished her own credentials as the Queen of Shade for her subtle digs at Trump .
Speakers of the house have historically introduced the president by saying , “ I have the high privilege and distinct honor of presenting to you the president of the United States.
” Pelosi omitted mention of “ high privilege and distinct honor.
” By the end of the speech she was ostentatiously ripping up her copy of the president ’ s remarks and flinging it on the podium .
Here are five foreign-policy takeaways from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t mentioned was just as telling as what was .
Most strikingly , Trump made no mention of the foreign-policy issue that has dominated Washington for the last several months : His treatment of Ukraine and the impeachment ordeal that ensued .
Democrats have charged him with abuse of power for allegedly holding U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and a White House meeting hostage to his demand that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announce an investigation of Trump ’ s 2020 rival Joe Biden .
The president has insisted throughout that his now-infamous telephone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump also made no mention of North Korea , where two years of high hopes , glitzy summits with Kim Jong Un , and grueling negotiations over denuclearization have stalled out .
After his first summit with the North Korean leader in 2018 , Trump declared , “ There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.
” He didn ’ t repeat that claim on Tuesday night .
Neither did Trump talk about Russia , Africa , or climate change , though he did make a single reference to planting trees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran , the country he nearly went to war with only a few weeks ago , the president made only a passing mention , saying , “ The Iranian regime must abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and needs to work for the good of its own people .
Because of our powerful sanctions , the Iranian economy is doing very poorly .
We can help them make a very good and short recovery .
It can all go quickly—let ’ s see which road they choose .
It is totally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boasts of a new high in American prestige , thanks entirely to him .
Several times during the speech the president spoke in superlatives of how admired his initiatives are around the world .
“ Our country is thriving and highly respected again , ” he said , touting the U.S. role as “ No .
1 producer of oil and gas anywhere in the world ” and calling the U.S. stock market “ something every country in the world is looking up to , they admire.
” Trump added : “ Our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power being unmatched anywhere in the world.
” But such descriptions are in contrast to a raft of surveys that show anti-Americanism is surging and Trump is deeply disliked and mistrusted around the world .
According to a 2019 Pew Research survey , a median of 64 percent of those surveyed said they don ’ t trust Trump to do the right thing in world affairs , and just 29 percent said they had confidence in the American leader .
Trump boasted about investments in the U.S. military and U.S. operations that put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A series of U.S. raids and airstrikes have killed Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ; a top Iranian military commander with extensive links to terrorist groups , Qassem Suleimani ; and reportedly the head of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula , Qasim al-Raymi .
Under Trump , the U.S.-led coalition has destroyed the Islamic State ’ s physical caliphate .
“ America ’ s enemies are on the run , ” he said .
But peace negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan have faltered , and the group now controls more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Trump ’ s presidency .
And the Islamic State is also still active and even rising again in Afghanistan and other countries .
Trump signaled a possible withdrawal from Afghanistan , saying “ peace talks are now underway ” but “ it is not our function to serve other nations as law enforcement agencies.
” Trump lauded the administration ’ s relationship with China amid a push to wind down the bilateral trade war .
“ We have perhaps the best relationship we have ever had with China , ” he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said , “ the Chinese Communist Party presents the central threat of our times.
” Trump also bragged of his recent trade deal with China , saying , “ I also promised citizens I would impose tariffs to confront China ’ s massive theft of America ’ s jobs .
Our strategy has worked .
Days ago , we signed a groundbreaking new agreement with China that will defend our workers , protect our intellectual property , bring billions of dollars into our treasury , and open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grown right here in the USA.
” But the deal fails to address the deeper structural issues that Trump had declared were the reason for the trade war .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Keith Johnson recently wrote , the deal is “ a truce , not a free trade deal .
… The United States began its tariff fight with China on the grounds of a so-called Section 301 investigation , which highlighted Beijing ’ s abuse of its state-led economic model , including via state-owned companies , industrial subsidies , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese promises to crack down on intellectual property theft ( more below ) , the deal just signed doesn ’ t address any of those core concerns that supposedly motivated the Trump administration in the first place.
” “ We are once again standing up for freedom in our hemisphere , ” the president said .
It soon became clear why a president who barely mentions democracy was doing so now : Among Trump ’ s guests watching from the gallery was the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó .
“ Here this evening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the hopes , dreams , and aspirations of all Venezuelans , ” said Trump as he introduced Guaidó , who was greeted with a rare moment of bipartisan applause .
In a bid to oust Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro , Guaidó declared himself interim president last year and is recognized by nearly 60 countries , including the United States , as the leader of Venezuela .
The Trump administration had begun to lose faith in Guaidó ’ s ability to dislodge the Maduro regime , according to Bloomberg , but his presence at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described him as the “ true and legitimate president of Venezuela ” would suggest that the Venezuelan leader maintains Trump ’ s confidence .

Michael Hirsh, Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer

U.S. President Donald Trump’s third State of the Union address was perhaps his most significant, coming a day after the chaotic Iowa caucuses inaugurated the 2020 election season and a day before his expected acquittal in an impeachment trial over issues that will undoubtedly resonate through to the election in November.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s third State of the Union address was perhaps his most significant, coming a day after the chaotic Iowa caucuses inaugurated the 2020 election season and a day before his expected acquittal in an impeachment trial over issues that will undoubtedly resonate through to the election in November.
One big factor that will likely weigh heavily in the 2020 vote is Trump’s foreign policy, from the alleged misconduct toward Ukraine that precipitated his impeachment to his ongoing trade wars with China and other nations to his incendiary confrontation with Iran.
But apart from declaring several times that, in his view, America’s prestige around the world was higher than ever, Trump spent relatively little time in his 78-minute speech on foreign policy—no doubt with an eye toward his reelection campaign, which will depend largely on the performance of the U.S. economy. Trump didn’t mention Ukraine at all—though it has dominated headlines for the last several months—and referred only briefly to his policies toward China, Iran, and the war in Afghanistan.
On foreign policy as on domestic issues, the speech—in which Trump boasted, “The state of our union is stronger than ever before”—only deepened the already chasmic divides between Democrats and Republicans. Arriving at the lectern, Trump turned away when Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi reached out to shake his hand. Pelosi burnished her own credentials as the Queen of Shade for her subtle digs at Trump. Speakers of the house have historically introduced the president by saying, “I have the high privilege and distinct honor of presenting to you the president of the United States.” Pelosi omitted mention of “high privilege and distinct honor.” By the end of the speech she was ostentatiously ripping up her copy of the president’s remarks and flinging it on the podium.
Here are five foreign-policy takeaways from the speech:
1. What wasn’t mentioned was just as telling as what was.
Most strikingly, Trump made no mention of the foreign-policy issue that has dominated Washington for the last several months: His treatment of Ukraine and the impeachment ordeal that ensued. Democrats have charged him with abuse of power for allegedly holding U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and a White House meeting hostage to his demand that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announce an investigation of Trump’s 2020 rival Joe Biden. The president has insisted throughout that his now-infamous telephone call with Zelensky was “perfect.”
Trump also made no mention of North Korea, where two years of high hopes, glitzy summits with Kim Jong Un, and grueling negotiations over denuclearization have stalled out. After his first summit with the North Korean leader in 2018, Trump declared, “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” He didn’t repeat that claim on Tuesday night. Neither did Trump talk about Russia, Africa, or climate change, though he did make a single reference to planting trees to help the environment. As for Iran, the country he nearly went to war with only a few weeks ago, the president made only a passing mention, saying, “The Iranian regime must abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and needs to work for the good of its own people. Because of our powerful sanctions, the Iranian economy is doing very poorly. We can help them make a very good and short recovery. It can all go quickly—let’s see which road they choose. It is totally up to them.”
2. Trump boasts of a new high in American prestige, thanks entirely to him.
Several times during the speech the president spoke in superlatives of how admired his initiatives are around the world. “Our country is thriving and highly respected again,” he said, touting the U.S. role as “No. 1 producer of oil and gas anywhere in the world” and calling the U.S. stock market “something every country in the world is looking up to, they admire.” Trump added: “Our military is completely rebuilt, with its power being unmatched anywhere in the world.”
But such descriptions are in contrast to a raft of surveys that show anti-Americanism is surging and Trump is deeply disliked and mistrusted around the world. According to a 2019 Pew Research survey, a median of 64 percent of those surveyed said they don’t trust Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, and just 29 percent said they had confidence in the American leader.
3. Trump touts military strength, but terrorist groups gain ground.
Trump boasted about investments in the U.S. military and U.S. operations that put terrorist groups on the back foot: A series of U.S. raids and airstrikes have killed Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; a top Iranian military commander with extensive links to terrorist groups, Qassem Suleimani; and reportedly the head of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Qasim al-Raymi. Under Trump, the U.S.-led coalition has destroyed the Islamic State’s physical caliphate. “America’s enemies are on the run,” he said.
But peace negotiations with the Taliban in Afghanistan have faltered, and the group now controls more territory than it did at the start of Trump’s presidency. And the Islamic State is also still active and even rising again in Afghanistan and other countries. Trump signaled a possible withdrawal from Afghanistan, saying “peace talks are now underway” but “it is not our function to serve other nations as law enforcement agencies.”
4. Which China policy?
Trump lauded the administration’s relationship with China amid a push to wind down the bilateral trade war. “We have perhaps the best relationship we have ever had with China,” he said. But less than a week ago, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “the Chinese Communist Party presents the central threat of our times.”
Trump also bragged of his recent trade deal with China, saying, “I also promised citizens I would impose tariffs to confront China’s massive theft of America’s jobs. Our strategy has worked. Days ago, we signed a groundbreaking new agreement with China that will defend our workers, protect our intellectual property, bring billions of dollars into our treasury, and open vast new markets for products made and grown right here in the USA.” But the deal fails to address the deeper structural issues that Trump had declared were the reason for the trade war. As Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson recently wrote, the deal is “a truce, not a free trade deal. … The United States began its tariff fight with China on the grounds of a so-called Section 301 investigation, which highlighted Beijing’s abuse of its state-led economic model, including via state-owned companies, industrial subsidies, and state-directed cyber-espionage. Other than some fresh Chinese promises to crack down on intellectual property theft (more below), the deal just signed doesn’t address any of those core concerns that supposedly motivated the Trump administration in the first place.”
5. Trump barely mentioned democracy and human rights, except for… Venezuela.
“We are once again standing up for freedom in our hemisphere,” the president said. It soon became clear why a president who barely mentions democracy was doing so now: Among Trump’s guests watching from the gallery was the Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó. “Here this evening is a man who carries with him the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of all Venezuelans,” said Trump as he introduced Guaidó, who was greeted with a rare moment of bipartisan applause. In a bid to oust Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Guaidó declared himself interim president last year and is recognized by nearly 60 countries, including the United States, as the leader of Venezuela. The Trump administration had begun to lose faith in Guaidó’s ability to dislodge the Maduro regime, according to Bloomberg, but his presence at the State of the Union where Trump described him as the “true and legitimate president of Venezuela” would suggest that the Venezuelan leader maintains Trump’s confidence.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--When the Line Between Terrorism and Death Wish Disappears

When the Line Between Terrorism and Death Wish Disappears Was Sudesh Amman , the 20-year-old who on Sunday stabbed two people in south London before being shot dead by police , a terrorist ?
He had previously been convicted under terrorism laws , and he was wearing a fake suicide vest when he was killed , so there is a strong case for thinking that he was .
But the botched and desperate nature of his attack , coupled with his obsession with martyrdom , suggest that while he may be classified as a terrorist , he is certainly not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is emblematic of a new and growing type of jihadi : the individual who embraces suicide not as a means to further a political cause but as an end in itself .
The the little we know about Amman is disturbing enough : He was released from prison about a week prior to his death after serving half of his sentence of three years and four months for terrorism-related offenses .
He was under active police surveillance at the time of the attack , suggesting that the authorities were not entirely serene about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for which Amman was convicted in 2018 did not relate to actual acts of terrorism , but they were serious : He had disseminated jihadi propaganda on WhatsApp and on social media , sent beheading videos to his girlfriend , and downloaded documents that contained information on how to make bombs .
And he had expressed a desire to die in a martyrdom operation .
What else do we know ?
We know that he had an infantile imagination , unmoored from any sense of reality .
In a notebook recovered by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ goals in life ” that the 18-year-old Amman had itemized , No .
3 was to “ have fun with all my hoor al-ayn.
” This was a reference to the shag-fest that some jihadis believe is in store for them once they have died and been admitted into paradise .
In No .
4 , Amman writes : “ Party with my brothers and my mother in jannah [ heaven ] .
” There is something tragically sad about wanting to die so as to rock out with your mom at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not befitting of a hardened jihadi .
What we don ’ t know is why Amman did what he did : Was his primary motive to kill , or was it to die ?
And why did he act when he did , at the precise moment he did ?
Why launch an attack in a suburb of London on a dreary Sunday in February ?
The fake suicide vest he had made and worn suggests that he wanted to die , knowing that the police would almost certainly kill him on discovering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
To advance the cause of jihad , as he saw it , or because he didn ’ t want to live anymore but had to theologically justify it as a martyrdom operation ?
( Suicide is a grave sin in Islam . )
Had he really wanted to kill , one would have expected that he would have done so—his two victims have been treated for their injuries—and with greater planning and lethality .
To the degree that there was any planning , it seems that most of it was invested in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jihadis lovingly don these vests in front of a mirror , in the manner of Travis Bickle , before they launch their operations ? )
The knife he used in the attack he had stolen from a store just seconds before putting it to work , which suggests that he hadn ’ t thought very hard about this aspect of his venture .
There was nothing really strategic about Amman ’ s attack .
It doesn ’ t seem that he wanted to coerce the British government into doing anything or to protest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further a particular , real-world grievance .
More likely , it seems that he was enacting some sort of psycho-religious drama of his own creation and for his own private purposes .
Perhaps his core aim was to theatrically stage his own death as a martyr to his faith .
Quite what led him to this is anyone ’ s guess right now .
In a on religious terrorism , Terror in the Mind of God , published nearly 20 years ago , the sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer suggested that much of what we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against civilians for ostensibly political purposes ) is rooted in humiliation , and that by engaging in public displays of violence terrorists shake off feelings of shame and impotence .
According to this view , terrorists are more fantasists than strategic masterminds , imagining themselves as righteous combatants in a “ cosmic war ” of good versus evil .
This doesn ’ t always speak to the leaders of terrorist groups or the professional foot-soldiers who have a vested interest in doing terrorism and prolonging violent conflicts .
But it does seem to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violent groups and those who feel a keen personal need to be heard and seen and , above all , validated .
It almost certainly applies to socially and morally isolated people like Sudesh Amman , who , when he was younger , had reportedly boasted how he wanted to become a terrorist .
Amman , who was already a disturbed fantasist prior to entering prison , would not have enjoyed cloudless mental health in lockdown and seems to have grown more resentful and unhinged as his time inside passed .
The British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about this .
What do we do about people like Sudesh Amman ?
There is a certain kind of who believes that if only we loved him more , brought him more closely into our world , and helped him feel better about himself , then he would come round to our way of thinking and be a productive citizen .
If only Amman had been given the opportunity to , say , develop his creative writing skills or to voice his truth then , perhaps , he would have stood a better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( as if he had no agency in the matter ) ; then , perhaps , we would be safer .
This is of course a dangerous delusion : a refusal to accept that some people are murderously opposed to liberal convictions on principle .
The harshest judgement against Amman will probably come from within the jihadi fold itself .
Amman ’ s actions , though generating publicity , did not create a spectacle worthy of veneration or awe .
But , more crucially , he didn ’ t kill anyone .
Sheikh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s most prominent Shiite cleric , that suicide attacks were legitimate “ provided that the greatest number of enemies would be killed by them.
” He did so to distinguish genuine acts of selfless martyrdom from self-centered suicide ; as the sociologist Diego Gambetta puts it , referring to this theological debate , “ In Fadlallah ’ s view the only evidence one can offer that one is not throwing one ’ s life away is the number of people one kills and the devastation one causes.
” No jihadi terrorist , of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : There must be a proper amount of destruction and pain administered against the enemy to make martyrdom genuine .
By this standard , Sudesh Amman ’ s violent acting-out of jihadi ideas was too personal to qualify as a martyr .
There will be no festivities for him in the hereafter—or by his more hardened and politicized fellow believers here on earth .

Was Sudesh Amman , the 20-year-old who on Sunday stabbed two people in south London before being shot dead by police, a terrorist? He had previously been convicted under terrorism laws, and he was wearing a fake suicide vest when he was killed, so there is a strong case for thinking that he was. But the botched and desperate nature of his attack, coupled with his obsession with martyrdom, suggest that while he may be classified as a terrorist, he is certainly not a conventional one. Instead, he is emblematic of a new and growing type of jihadi: the individual who embraces suicide not as a means to further a political cause but as an end in itself.
Was Sudesh Amman, the 20-year-old who on Sunday stabbed two people in south London before being shot dead by police, a terrorist? He had previously been convicted under terrorism laws, and he was wearing a fake suicide vest when he was killed, so there is a strong case for thinking that he was. But the botched and desperate nature of his attack, coupled with his obsession with martyrdom, suggest that while he may be classified as a terrorist, he is certainly not a conventional one. Instead, he is emblematic of a new and growing type of jihadi: the individual who embraces suicide not as a means to further a political cause but as an end in itself.
The the little we know about Amman is disturbing enough: He was released from prison about a week prior to his death after serving half of his sentence of three years and four months for terrorism-related offenses. He was under active police surveillance at the time of the attack, suggesting that the authorities were not entirely serene about his early release.
The terrorism offenses for which Amman was convicted in 2018 did not relate to actual acts of terrorism, but they were serious: He had disseminated jihadi propaganda on WhatsApp and on social media, sent beheading videos to his girlfriend, and downloaded documents that contained information on how to make bombs. And he had expressed a desire to die in a martyrdom operation.
What else do we know? We know that he had an infantile imagination, unmoored from any sense of reality. In a notebook recovered by the police in 2018, among the four “goals in life” that the 18-year-old Amman had itemized, No. 3 was to “have fun with all my hoor al-ayn.” This was a reference to the shag-fest that some jihadis believe is in store for them once they have died and been admitted into paradise. In No. 4, Amman writes: “Party with my brothers and my mother in jannah [heaven].” There is something tragically sad about wanting to die so as to rock out with your mom at a never-ending party: It is certainly not befitting of a hardened jihadi.
What we don’t know is why Amman did what he did: Was his primary motive to kill, or was it to die? And why did he act when he did, at the precise moment he did? Why launch an attack in a suburb of London on a dreary Sunday in February?
The fake suicide vest he had made and worn suggests that he wanted to die, knowing that the police would almost certainly kill him on discovering it—but why did he want to die? To advance the cause of jihad, as he saw it, or because he didn’t want to live anymore but had to theologically justify it as a martyrdom operation? (Suicide is a grave sin in Islam.) Had he really wanted to kill, one would have expected that he would have done so—his two victims have been treated for their injuries—and with greater planning and lethality. To the degree that there was any planning, it seems that most of it was invested in producing the fake vest. (Do jihadis lovingly don these vests in front of a mirror, in the manner of Travis Bickle, before they launch their operations?) The knife he used in the attack he had stolen from a store just seconds before putting it to work, which suggests that he hadn’t thought very hard about this aspect of his venture.
There was nothing really strategic about Amman’s attack. It doesn’t seem that he wanted to coerce the British government into doing anything or to protest against a recent British policy or to further a particular, real-world grievance. More likely, it seems that he was enacting some sort of psycho-religious drama of his own creation and for his own private purposes. Perhaps his core aim was to theatrically stage his own death as a martyr to his faith. Quite what led him to this is anyone’s guess right now.
In a book on religious terrorism, Terror in the Mind of God, published nearly 20 years ago, the sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer suggested that much of what we call terrorism (that is, violence against civilians for ostensibly political purposes) is rooted in humiliation, and that by engaging in public displays of violence terrorists shake off feelings of shame and impotence. According to this view, terrorists are more fantasists than strategic masterminds, imagining themselves as righteous combatants in a “cosmic war” of good versus evil.
This doesn’t always speak to the leaders of terrorist groups or the professional foot-soldiers who have a vested interest in doing terrorism and prolonging violent conflicts. But it does seem to apply to those on the periphery of violent groups and those who feel a keen personal need to be heard and seen and, above all, validated. It almost certainly applies to socially and morally isolated people like Sudesh Amman, who, when he was younger, had reportedly boasted how he wanted to become a terrorist. Amman, who was already a disturbed fantasist prior to entering prison, would not have enjoyed cloudless mental health in lockdown and seems to have grown more resentful and unhinged as his time inside passed. The British authorities were seemingly unable to do anything about this.
What do we do about people like Sudesh Amman? There is a certain kind of naive liberal who believes that if only we loved him more, brought him more closely into our world, and helped him feel better about himself, then he would come round to our way of thinking and be a productive citizen. If only Amman had been given the opportunity to, say, develop his creative writing skills or to voice his truth then, perhaps, he would have stood a better chance at resisting the lure of radicalization (as if he had no agency in the matter); then, perhaps, we would be safer. This is of course a dangerous delusion: a refusal to accept that some people are murderously opposed to liberal convictions on principle.
The harshest judgement against Amman will probably come from within the jihadi fold itself. Amman’s actions, though generating publicity, did not create a spectacle worthy of veneration or awe. But, more crucially, he didn’t kill anyone. Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah, who was Lebanon’s most prominent Shiite cleric, stipulated that suicide attacks were legitimate “provided that the greatest number of enemies would be killed by them.” He did so to distinguish genuine acts of selfless martyrdom from self-centered suicide; as the sociologist Diego Gambetta puts it, referring to this theological debate, “In Fadlallah’s view the only evidence one can offer that one is not throwing one’s life away is the number of people one kills and the devastation one causes.”
No jihadi terrorist, of whatever stripe, would justify self-immolation alone: There must be a proper amount of destruction and pain administered against the enemy to make martyrdom genuine.
By this standard, Sudesh Amman’s violent acting-out of jihadi ideas was too personal to qualify as a martyr. There will be no festivities for him in the hereafter—or by his more hardened and politicized fellow believers here on earth.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Berned Beyond Recognition: How Sanders’s Rise Changes U.S. Foreign Policy

Berned Beyond Recognition : How Sanders ’ s Rise Changes U.S. Foreign Policy It ’ s long past time for Democrats to stop pretending that Bernie Sanders is an aberration and his ultra-progressive brand of politics is going to go away .
That ’ s one lesson to take from the Vermont senator ’ s decisive conquest—messy though it was—of the Democratic Party ’ s standard-bearer , former Vice President Joe Biden , in the chaos of the Iowa caucuses this week as the 2020 campaign formally got underway .
We ’ ll talk in a moment about the insurgent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was vying with Sanders for victory in Iowa with only partial results announced Tuesday night , following a major failure in the tallying of votes on Monday .
But the powerful performance of Sanders and his fellow progressive , Sen. Elizabeth Warren , in Iowa—while Biden trailed well behind—was evidence that some things probably won ’ t be the same come November , no matter who wins the Oval Office .
One of those things is U.S. foreign policy .
We are in a new era for both parties : the post-post-Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Washington Consensus is mostly dead .
This is the Reaganomics-lite that a generation of Democratic centrists , beginning with Bill Clinton in 1992 , embraced and practiced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the debunking of command economics .
The Washington Consensus prescribed free trade , budget discipline , privatization , and deregulation .
But over the years economists who have endorsed this approach have come to admit that they badly underestimated the effects that “ hyperglobalization ” would have in devastating America ’ s industrial middle class .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ or independent voters who tend Democratic , felt ignored by their party as it facilely endorsed globalization and Wall Street deregulation with scant attention paid to middle-class support , education and job retraining , and other policies designed to ameliorate the loss of industry to overseas competition .
Many of these disaffected voters later supported Donald Trump .
“ Free trade has become toxic for both parties , and the Trump victory in 2016 brought that message home for those who hadn ’ t grasped it already , ” said David Autor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has documented the impact of the “ China shock ” on American workers .
“ The fact that blue-collar workers , union workers , manufacturing workers , have effectively switched parties tells you that the Democratic embrace of globalization and the ‘ bridge to the 21st century [ in Bill Clinton ’ s words ] was seemingly a bridge too far.
” Four years ago , this simmering anger within the traditional Democratic base yielded up a new star , Sanders , who for decades before had been seen by the party establishment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not even technically a Democrat ) who spoke to mostly empty rooms but who now found that his bold , uncompromising progressivism was resonating big time .
It still does .
So Democrats should finally learn the lesson that Hillary Clinton so abysmally failed to take on board in 2016 : To her everlasting regret , Clinton gave short shrift to Sanders ’ s influence and ideas in the general election—despite nearly losing to him in the primaries—and found herself stunned by Trump , who adopted some of the same ideas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forget that again , especially when it comes to trade .
One of the answers put forward by both Sanders and Warren is to launch their own brand of trade war , imposing tariffs on countries that don ’ t respect workers ’ rights or support measures to reduce climate change .
“ We need to fundamentally rethink our trade policies and move to fair trade rather than just unfettered free trade , ” Sanders told the Daily Beast in an 2018 interview in which he admitted that “ Trump is identifying a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called Trump ’ s trade war with China “ totally irrational , ” but he also told CNN that the use of tariffs “ is one tool that is available .
… You ’ re looking at somebody , by the way , who helped lead the effort against permanent normal trade relations with China and [ the North American Free Trade Agreement , or NAFTA ] .
” Sanders was also the only senator running in the 2020 race who voted against Trump ’ s NAFTA replacement , the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ USMCA will make climate change worse.
” Warren , who like Sanders voted against another major Barack Obama-era trade pact , the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) , has also supported the use of tariffs , telling CNN in 2018 that they “ are one part of reworking our trade policy overall.
” Buttigieg , the 38-year-old former mayor of South Bend , Indiana , has taken a more centrist position on trade than either Sanders or Warren , and he has far less of a track record , but even he has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy that would include the tariffs as leverage.
” Advisors to the centrist Democrats in the race , mainly Biden , say the party establishment has already adjusted its views .
In an interview , a senior Biden advisor pointed to the former vice president ’ s recent essay in Foreign Affairs , “ Why America Must Lead Again : Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump , ” in which Biden writes : “ As president , I will take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances , protect the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have America lead the world.
” Yet Biden ’ s approach rests largely on fixing the problems created by Trump—words like “ restore ” and “ reaffirm ” feature prominently in the essay—and there is little detail on what is new .
The Biden team disputes the notion that the 77-year-old candidate , who has served in Washington as senator and vice president for nearly 50 years ( since 1973 ) , doesn ’ t have new ideas .
“ There is plenty of fresh vision when it comes to putting the defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy , putting labor and environment leaders at the table from the start in negotiating trade agreements , or immediately convening a climate summit not just to rejoin Paris but to build on it , ” said one senior advisor to Biden .
Biden gets plaudits from some Democrats for fresh thinking , in particular his call for investment in research and development , education , and innovation as a way to out-compete China .
Many of Biden ’ s other ideas , however , are short on specifics .
In his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up the pieces will be an enormous task , ” but he doesn ’ t say much about the new puzzle they will fit into .
He makes a point of pledging that , in his first year in office , “ the United States will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world.
” But that idea began with Woodrow Wilson and has been a tenet of post-Cold War Democratic Party thinking since then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was inaugurated in Warsaw in 2000 .
The rise of Sanders in the Democratic Party—along with that of Warren—to some degree mirrors the rise of Trump inside the Republican Party .
Both are outsiders who brazenly called their party ’ s failures to account ; both found adherents who had come to believe that their political parties had betrayed them over free trade , and no longer represented them .
Trump spoke of getting “ better ” deals from the world ; Sanders , getting “ fairer ” deals .
Their messages resonated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paradigm of free trade and the Washington Consensus , which both mainstream Democrats and Republicans had endorsed to differing degrees in the aftermath of the Cold War , when no one questioned that capitalism reigned supreme .
Both candidates rejected traditional trade deals such as NAFTA and the TPP .
This alignment of views is also evident when it comes to the idea of aggressively promoting American values around the world ; neither the Trumpist neo-isolationists nor the Sanders anti-imperialists want anything to do with that since the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treat U.S. allies much better than Trump has , but it would be only a kinder , gentler neo-isolationism , with both candidates seeking to dramatically pare down the U.S. presence in the world and pull troops out from as many places as possible , especially Afghanistan and the Middle East .
Asked how a President Sanders would be different from that of Clinton or Obama , Sanders foreign-policy advisor Matt Duss told Foreign Policy : “ Bernie understands that if we really want to change the ingrained habits of the Washington foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endless wars , we need a movement that will pressure that establishment , and that ’ s what we ’ re working to build.
” Duss added that only Sanders “ has really diagnosed the main challenges to our democracy like rising authoritarianism and how authoritarianism feeds off of corruption , inequality , and oligarchy.
” Buttigieg , though he differs sharply from Sanders and Warren on domestic issues like health care , has taken a foreign-policy stance that tends to align more with them than with Biden on climate change , challenging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. workers .
Mieke Eoyang , the vice president for national security at Third Way , a centrist Democratic think tank , said both progressives and establishment stalwarts in the party are united when it comes to one transcendent goal : beating Trump .
“ I think that there ’ s tremendous consensus across the party that undoing the damage done by Trump with our allies and to our standing in the world is job number one , ” Eoyang said .
“ I think that ’ s why you see things like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department.
” But she said a deeper problem remains inside the party : the reliance on an old , established foreign-policy elite , as well as the lack of expertise by an up-and-coming generation .
“ To the extent candidates rely on people with expertise to build their foreign policies , those experts have succeeded in the existing systems , ” Eoyang said .
“ People who question the systems often don ’ t have the expertise to propose credible reforms and are thus dismissed as naive .
It ’ s not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people rushing to create a ‘ Department of Peace ’ or turn foreign policy over to a ‘ global grassroots movement , ’ as Sanders suggests.
” So the way forward remains vague , she said .
“ It ’ s just no one can articulate what that is , so there is no consensus for it .
”

It’s long past time for Democrats to stop pretending that Bernie Sanders is an aberration and his ultra-progressive brand of politics is going to go away. That’s one lesson to take from the Vermont senator’s decisive conquest—messy though it was—of the Democratic Party’s standard-bearer, former Vice President Joe Biden, in the chaos of the Iowa caucuses this week as the 2020 campaign formally got underway.
It’s long past time for Democrats to stop pretending that Bernie Sanders is an aberration and his ultra-progressive brand of politics is going to go away. That’s one lesson to take from the Vermont senator’s decisive conquest—messy though it was—of the Democratic Party’s standard-bearer, former Vice President Joe Biden, in the chaos of the Iowa caucuses this week as the 2020 campaign formally got underway.
We’ll talk in a moment about the insurgent Pete Buttigieg, the come-from-nowhere wunderkind who was vying with Sanders for victory in Iowa with only partial results announced Tuesday night, following a major failure in the tallying of votes on Monday. But the powerful performance of Sanders and his fellow progressive, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, in Iowa—while Biden trailed well behind—was evidence that some things probably won’t be the same come November, no matter who wins the Oval Office. One of those things is U.S. foreign policy. We are in a new era for both parties: the post-post-Cold War era.
What has changed? First, the Washington Consensus is mostly dead. This is the Reaganomics-lite that a generation of Democratic centrists, beginning with Bill Clinton in 1992, embraced and practiced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the debunking of command economics. The Washington Consensus prescribed free trade, budget discipline, privatization, and deregulation. But over the years economists who have endorsed this approach have come to admit that they badly underestimated the effects that “hyperglobalization” would have in devastating America’s industrial middle class.
The result was that many Democrats, or independent voters who tend Democratic, felt ignored by their party as it facilely endorsed globalization and Wall Street deregulation with scant attention paid to middle-class support, education and job retraining, and other policies designed to ameliorate the loss of industry to overseas competition. Many of these disaffected voters later supported Donald Trump.
“Free trade has become toxic for both parties, and the Trump victory in 2016 brought that message home for those who hadn’t grasped it already,” said David Autor, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist who has documented the impact of the “China shock” on American workers. “The fact that blue-collar workers, union workers, manufacturing workers, have effectively switched parties tells you that the Democratic embrace of globalization and the ‘bridge to the 21st century ’ [in Bill Clinton’s words] was seemingly a bridge too far.”
Four years ago, this simmering anger within the traditional Democratic base yielded up a new star, Sanders, who for decades before had been seen by the party establishment as a wild-haired fringe socialist (he’s not even technically a Democrat) who spoke to mostly empty rooms but who now found that his bold, uncompromising progressivism was resonating big time. It still does. So Democrats should finally learn the lesson that Hillary Clinton so abysmally failed to take on board in 2016: To her everlasting regret, Clinton gave short shrift to Sanders’s influence and ideas in the general election—despite nearly losing to him in the primaries—and found herself stunned by Trump, who adopted some of the same ideas. No Democratic front-runner can afford to forget that again, especially when it comes to trade.
One of the answers put forward by both Sanders and Warren is to launch their own brand of trade war, imposing tariffs on countries that don’t respect workers’ rights or support measures to reduce climate change. “We need to fundamentally rethink our trade policies and move to fair trade rather than just unfettered free trade,” Sanders told the Daily Beast in an 2018 interview in which he admitted that “Trump is identifying a problem.” Since then, Sanders has called Trump’s trade war with China “totally irrational,” but he also told CNN that the use of tariffs “is one tool that is available. … You’re looking at somebody, by the way, who helped lead the effort against permanent normal trade relations with China and [the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA].” Sanders was also the only senator running in the 2020 race who voted against Trump’s NAFTA replacement, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), saying, “USMCA will make climate change worse.” Warren, who like Sanders voted against another major Barack Obama-era trade pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has also supported the use of tariffs, telling CNN in 2018 that they “are one part of reworking our trade policy overall.”
Buttigieg, the 38-year-old former mayor of South Bend, Indiana, has taken a more centrist position on trade than either Sanders or Warren, and he has far less of a track record, but even he has suggested that he would use “a strategy that would include the tariffs as leverage.”
Advisors to the centrist Democrats in the race, mainly Biden, say the party establishment has already adjusted its views. In an interview, a senior Biden advisor pointed to the former vice president’s recent essay in Foreign Affairs, “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump,” in which Biden writes: “As president, I will take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances, protect the United States’ economic future, and once more have America lead the world.” Yet Biden’s approach rests largely on fixing the problems created by Trump—words like “restore” and “reaffirm” feature prominently in the essay—and there is little detail on what is new.
The Biden team disputes the notion that the 77-year-old candidate, who has served in Washington as senator and vice president for nearly 50 years (since 1973), doesn’t have new ideas. “There is plenty of fresh vision when it comes to putting the defense of democracy at the heart of our foreign policy, putting labor and environment leaders at the table from the start in negotiating trade agreements, or immediately convening a climate summit not just to rejoin Paris but to build on it,” said one senior advisor to Biden.
Biden gets plaudits from some Democrats for fresh thinking, in particular his call for investment in research and development, education, and innovation as a way to out-compete China. Many of Biden’s other ideas, however, are short on specifics. In his essay, Biden writes that “picking up the pieces will be an enormous task,” but he doesn’t say much about the new puzzle they will fit into. He makes a point of pledging that, in his first year in office, “the United States will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world.” But that idea began with Woodrow Wilson and has been a tenet of post-Cold War Democratic Party thinking since then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “Community of Democracies” was inaugurated in Warsaw in 2000.
The rise of Sanders in the Democratic Party—along with that of Warren—to some degree mirrors the rise of Trump inside the Republican Party. Both are outsiders who brazenly called their party’s failures to account; both found adherents who had come to believe that their political parties had betrayed them over free trade, and no longer represented them. Trump spoke of getting “better” deals from the world; Sanders, getting “fairer” deals. Their messages resonated with party bases that rejected the old paradigm of free trade and the Washington Consensus, which both mainstream Democrats and Republicans had endorsed to differing degrees in the aftermath of the Cold War, when no one questioned that capitalism reigned supreme. Both candidates rejected traditional trade deals such as NAFTA and the TPP.
This alignment of views is also evident when it comes to the idea of aggressively promoting American values around the world; neither the Trumpist neo-isolationists nor the Sanders anti-imperialists want anything to do with that since the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan. Sanders, like Warren, would treat U.S. allies much better than Trump has, but it would be only a kinder, gentler neo-isolationism, with both candidates seeking to dramatically pare down the U.S. presence in the world and pull troops out from as many places as possible, especially Afghanistan and the Middle East.
Asked how a President Sanders would be different from that of Clinton or Obama, Sanders foreign-policy advisor Matt Duss told Foreign Policy: “Bernie understands that if we really want to change the ingrained habits of the Washington foreign-policy establishment and bring an end to our endless wars, we need a movement that will pressure that establishment, and that’s what we’re working to build.” Duss added that only Sanders “has really diagnosed the main challenges to our democracy like rising authoritarianism and how authoritarianism feeds off of corruption, inequality, and oligarchy.”
Buttigieg, though he differs sharply from Sanders and Warren on domestic issues like health care, has taken a foreign-policy stance that tends to align more with them than with Biden on climate change, challenging authoritarianism, and bolstering the rights of U.S. workers.
Mieke Eoyang, the vice president for national security at Third Way, a centrist Democratic think tank, said both progressives and establishment stalwarts in the party are united when it comes to one transcendent goal: beating Trump. “I think that there’s tremendous consensus across the party that undoing the damage done by Trump with our allies and to our standing in the world is job number one,” Eoyang said. “I think that’s why you see things like Warren’s plan to reinvigorate the State Department.”
But she said a deeper problem remains inside the party: the reliance on an old, established foreign-policy elite, as well as the lack of expertise by an up-and-coming generation. “To the extent candidates rely on people with expertise to build their foreign policies, those experts have succeeded in the existing systems,” Eoyang said. “People who question the systems often don’t have the expertise to propose credible reforms and are thus dismissed as naive. It’s not like you’re going to see people rushing to create a ‘Department of Peace’ or turn foreign policy over to a ‘global grassroots movement,’ as Sanders suggests.”
So the way forward remains vague, she said. “It’s just no one can articulate what that is, so there is no consensus for it.”