foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--How Is China Handling the Wuhan Virus Outbreak?

How Is China Handling the Wuhan Virus Outbreak ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Chinese officials put emergency measures against the Wuhan virus outbreak into place , Hong Kong ’ s protests simmer amid fears of contagion , and how the prolonged crisis is bad for the Chinese economy .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
The effects of the Wuhan coronavirus are cascading through China .
As of Wednesday morning , Chinese officials had confirmed [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over 9,000 suspected cases , and 132 deaths .
The figures are likely an understatement : Researchers in Hong Kong estimate that 44,000 people are already infected in Wuhan alone .
A large part of Hubei , the central Chinese province where the epidemic started , is now quarantined .
Every Chinese city has taken precautionary measures , and no province or region remains untouched by the virus .
Cases have now been reported in numerous foreign countries , including underdeveloped ones such as Cambodia .
That ’ s a particular concern , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infrastructure is difficult , increasing the potential for further outbreaks .
Elsewhere , cases have so far been detected and contained , but major outbreaks seem likely in more Chinese cities .
Many international airlines are suspending some flights to China , out of concern for safety and business .
Wider travel bans seem likely .
Holiday extension .
China ’ s Lunar New Year holiday period was set to end tomorrow , but it is officially extended to Feb. 3 .
It seems likely that further extensions will be put in place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of hundreds of millions of people heading home .
But the Chinese economy , already facing a serious hit from the virus , needs its workers back in factories and offices .
The state put out a notice that workers must be paid throughout the extended holiday , but those who operate on a piecework basis or who switch jobs in the new year , as is common , will be hurting .
Emergency measures .
It ’ s still hard to judge how the Chinese government is handling the crisis .
People @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they haven ’ t materialized .
One major concern is the lack of diagnostic kits and medics on the front lines in Wuhan , which may be delaying diagnosis .
Chinese media has emphasized the construction of emergency hospitals , including some fake photographs .
In reality , the hospitals , constructed by the military , will use prefabricated modules in the style of army field hospitals .
Personnel and sanitation plans for the hospitals remain unclear .
Barriers and prejudice .
There are reports of villages sealing themselves off against the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strangers .
Travelers from Wuhan or people with Hubei identity cards are being put into improvised quarantine facilities , often without medical supervision .
Villages designated as official quarantine sites , in turn , are clashing with police .
In the cities , temperature checks have become routine , with people turned away from hotels , restaurants , or other public sites .
Good news ?
It ’ s still early , but the mortality rate of the Wuhan virus appears relatively low .
While a big concern was that people could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is speculative .
Moreover , people with very mild infections of the virus may not even know they are symptomatic .
The infection rate for children is very low , as Annie Sparrow explains in FP , suggesting that certain vaccines may provide greater immunity .
Hong Kong simmers .
Virus fears are keeping people away from street protests in Hong Kong , but the outbreak has dealt yet another blow to the city government ’ s credibility .
Some border crossings with mainland China are now closed , but Chief Executive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acting earlier .
( Practically speaking , it ’ s hard to imagine how Hong Kong could isolate itself from Shenzhen , its mainland sister city , without taking extreme measures . )
Virus fears have also bought out prejudices , with restaurants turning away Mandarin speakers , for example .
A planned quarantine site was vandalized by protesters over the weekend .
Hong Kong residents fear a recession would follow an outbreak , as with SARS in 2003 .
With reduced tourism due to the unrest , the city is already facing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cover-up .
In an essay for the China Media Project , a Wuhan journalist using a pseudonym describes how the new coronavirus was initially played down by the government .
The instincts of the party-state under President Xi Jinping are to conceal information from the public .
Even without deliberate conspiracy , it ’ s easy to see how knowledge of the crisis could be covered up .
That raises the question : How much is still obscured ?
A cursed year .
Retired NBA star Kobe Bryant ’ s death on Sunday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bryant was a hero in China , where he committed himself to public service work and was an enthusiastic friend to his Chinese fans .
He bridged the gap between Chinese basketball—popular for over a century—and the modern NBA .
Some on the Chinese internet took the basketball player ’ s death as another imminent sign—in addition to the Wuhan virus—of the end of the world .
Box-office zero .
Lunar New Year is usually a bonanza for the Chinese box office , with major movie releases timed to coincide with the holiday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this year : Cinemas have closed across the country , and the release of potential blockbusters has been delayed—with some going straight to streaming platforms .
The crisis is a blow to studios that counted on the holiday revenue , and there ’ s no sign of when people will again feel comfortable congregating in public .
Other forms of entertainment also face potentially devastating losses , from Shanghai ’ s Disneyland ( closed ) to the numerous small restaurants that depended on the New Year holiday for a significant part of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peril .
The U.S. commerce secretary ’ s potential trip to confirm the details of the phase one trade agreement between the United States and China has been called off due to the Wuhan virus .
The outbreak may cause China serious problems in keeping its agreement to purchase $ 200 billion of U.S. agricultural products .
There is a natural disasters clause in the agreement , but it ’ s not clear if the Trump administration will be inclined toward understanding or generosity .
Supply chain fears .
The extended holiday and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some productivity issues for Chinese manufacturing .
Western firms accounted for the usual Lunar New Year shutdown , but they haven ’ t made provisions for large-scale disruption .
Some municipalities have already extended the holiday to Feb. 9 , and that might not be the end of it .
Plus , fears of migrant workers , especially those from Hubei , are growing .
The trade war has already pushed some industries to find suppliers outside China , but many others are likely to be hit by the effects of the Wuhan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Model Chinese Citizens .
It Didn ’ t Matter , ” by Sarah A. Topol , the New York Times Magazine This deeply moving piece in the New York Times Magazine follows the endeavors of Zulhumar Isaac , a successful young Uighur woman , to find her parents after they were seized by the Chinese state in Xinjiang .
( Also listen also to Zulhumar ’ s interview on FP ’ s First Person podcast from March 2019 , and read another Uighur ’ s testimony here . )
There are plenty of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discrimination against ethnic minorities and the shaming of unmarried women .
But one of the most persistent in modern times is the bizarre contempt for the Henanese , the inhabitants of China ’ s most populous province and the birthplace of ancient Chinese civilization—widely derided as cheats and liars .
So where does this bias come from ?
The answer is tragically simple : The Henanese were the main victims of China ’ s wartime disasters , including the decision to break the dam of the Yellow River in 1938 to slow the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over 1 million deaths .
The flood and the Japanese invasion caused a refugee crisis , with desperate Henanese fleeing to other regions and forming communities .
Some still exist today , as does the bias against them .
Read Micah Muscolino ’ s The Ecology of War in China for more .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese officials put emergency measures against the Wuhan virus outbreak into place, Hong Kong ’s protests simmer amid fears of contagion, and how the prolonged crisis is bad for the Chinese economy .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Chinese officials put emergency measures against the Wuhan virus outbreak into place, Hong Kong’s protests simmer amid fears of contagion, and how the prolonged crisis is bad for the Chinese economy.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Are China’s Emergency Measures Working?
The effects of the Wuhan coronavirus are cascading through China. As of Wednesday morning, Chinese officials had confirmed [link in Chinese] 6,095 cases, over 9,000 suspected cases, and 132 deaths. The figures are likely an understatement: Researchers in Hong Kong estimate that 44,000 people are already infected in Wuhan alone. A large part of Hubei, the central Chinese province where the epidemic started, is now quarantined. Every Chinese city has taken precautionary measures, and no province or region remains untouched by the virus.
Cases have now been reported in numerous foreign countries, including underdeveloped ones such as Cambodia. That’s a particular concern, because detection in countries with weak medical infrastructure is difficult, increasing the potential for further outbreaks. Elsewhere, cases have so far been detected and contained, but major outbreaks seem likely in more Chinese cities. Many international airlines are suspending some flights to China, out of concern for safety and business. Wider travel bans seem likely.
Holiday extension. China’s Lunar New Year holiday period was set to end tomorrow, but it is officially extended to Feb. 3. It seems likely that further extensions will be put in place as authorities struggle with the potential impact of hundreds of millions of people heading home. But the Chinese economy, already facing a serious hit from the virus, needs its workers back in factories and offices. The state put out a notice that workers must be paid throughout the extended holiday, but those who operate on a piecework basis or who switch jobs in the new year, as is common, will be hurting.
Emergency measures. It’s still hard to judge how the Chinese government is handling the crisis. People are concerned about food shortages, but they haven’t materialized. One major concern is the lack of diagnostic kits and medics on the front lines in Wuhan, which may be delaying diagnosis. Chinese media has emphasized the construction of emergency hospitals, including some fake photographs. In reality, the hospitals, constructed by the military, will use prefabricated modules in the style of army field hospitals. Personnel and sanitation plans for the hospitals remain unclear.
Barriers and prejudice. There are reports of villages sealing themselves off against the virus by putting up barricades and turning away strangers. Travelers from Wuhan or people with Hubei identity cards are being put into improvised quarantine facilities, often without medical supervision. Villages designated as official quarantine sites, in turn, are clashing with police. In the cities, temperature checks have become routine, with people turned away from hotels, restaurants, or other public sites.
Good news? It’s still early, but the mortality rate of the Wuhan virus appears relatively low. While a big concern was that people could be infectious while asymptomatic, scientists now say that is speculative. Moreover, people with very mild infections of the virus may not even know they are symptomatic. The infection rate for children is very low, as Annie Sparrow explains in FP, suggesting that certain vaccines may provide greater immunity.
What We’re Following
Hong Kong simmers. Virus fears are keeping people away from street protests in Hong Kong, but the outbreak has dealt yet another blow to the city government’s credibility. Some border crossings with mainland China are now closed, but Chief Executive Carrie Lam is under fire for not acting earlier. (Practically speaking, it’s hard to imagine how Hong Kong could isolate itself from Shenzhen, its mainland sister city, without taking extreme measures.) Virus fears have also bought out prejudices, with restaurants turning away Mandarin speakers, for example. A planned quarantine site was vandalized by protesters over the weekend.
Hong Kong residents fear a recession would follow an outbreak, as with SARS in 2003. With reduced tourism due to the unrest, the city is already facing bleak 2020 financially.
China’s cover-up. In an essay for the China Media Project, a Wuhan journalist using a pseudonym describes how the new coronavirus was initially played down by the government. The instincts of the party-state under President Xi Jinping are to conceal information from the public. Even without deliberate conspiracy, it’s easy to see how knowledge of the crisis could be covered up. That raises the question: How much is still obscured?
A cursed year. Retired NBA star Kobe Bryant’s death on Sunday brought many Chinese fans to tears. Bryant was a hero in China, where he committed himself to public service work and was an enthusiastic friend to his Chinese fans. He bridged the gap between Chinese basketball—popular for over a century—and the modern NBA. Some on the Chinese internet took the basketball player’s death as another imminent sign—in addition to the Wuhan virus—of the end of the world.
Tech and Business
Box-office zero. Lunar New Year is usually a bonanza for the Chinese box office, with major movie releases timed to coincide with the holiday period. That’s a bust this year: Cinemas have closed across the country, and the release of potential blockbusters has been delayed—with some going straight to streaming platforms. The crisis is a blow to studios that counted on the holiday revenue, and there’s no sign of when people will again feel comfortable congregating in public. Other forms of entertainment also face potentially devastating losses, from Shanghai’s Disneyland (closed) to the numerous small restaurants that depended on the New Year holiday for a significant part of their annual earnings.
U.S.-China trade deal in peril. The U.S. commerce secretary’s potential trip to confirm the details of the phase one trade agreement between the United States and China has been called off due to the Wuhan virus. The outbreak may cause China serious problems in keeping its agreement to purchase $200 billion of U.S. agricultural products. There is a natural disasters clause in the agreement, but it’s not clear if the Trump administration will be inclined toward understanding or generosity.
Supply chain fears. The extended holiday and countrywide travel restrictions are likely to cause some productivity issues for Chinese manufacturing. Western firms accounted for the usual Lunar New Year shutdown, but they haven’t made provisions for large-scale disruption. Some municipalities have already extended the holiday to Feb. 9, and that might not be the end of it. Plus, fears of migrant workers, especially those from Hubei, are growing. The trade war has already pushed some industries to find suppliers outside China, but many others are likely to be hit by the effects of the Wuhan virus.
What We’re Reading
“Her Uighur Parents Were Model Chinese Citizens. It Didn’t Matter,” by Sarah A. Topol, the New York Times Magazine
This deeply moving piece in the New York Times Magazine follows the endeavors of Zulhumar Isaac, a successful young Uighur woman, to find her parents after they were seized by the Chinese state in Xinjiang. (Also listen also to Zulhumar’s interview on FP’s First Person podcast from March 2019, and read another Uighur’s testimony here.)
A Moment in History
The Henan Refugee Crisis (1938-1945)
There are plenty of forms of prejudice in China, including discrimination against ethnic minorities and the shaming of unmarried women. But one of the most persistent in modern times is the bizarre contempt for the Henanese, the inhabitants of China’s most populous province and the birthplace of ancient Chinese civilization—widely derided as cheats and liars.
So where does this bias come from? The answer is tragically simple: The Henanese were the main victims of China’s wartime disasters, including the decision to break the dam of the Yellow River in 1938 to slow the Imperial Japanese Army, which resulted in over 1 million deaths. The flood and the Japanese invasion caused a refugee crisis, with desperate Henanese fleeing to other regions and forming communities. Some still exist today, as does the bias against them. Read Micah Muscolino’s The Ecology of War in China for more.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


Occam’s Iran Strategy

I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons , daily Nightline updates , and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States .
People actually walked around with “ Fuck Iran ” buttons on their jackets , and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “ Ayatollah ” —to the tune of the Knack ’ s “ My Sharona ” —that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation .
It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Yankees , and Wonderama .
The subject hasn ’ t gotten any less confusing since .
In the past 40 years , U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy : What should the United States do about Iran ?
The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics .
The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose , others credulously dovish , and the remaining wary of both in search @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to modify Iran ’ s behavior .
But the central question has now taken on a new urgency .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran .
It ’ s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately , there ’ s a good answer available , even if it ’ s not satisfying for anyone in Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the current U.S. approach needs improvement .
Despite his hit on Suleimani , it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran .
He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “ maximum pressure ” policy that until recently did not employ military force .
Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking , the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama administration , which set limits on Iran ’ s nuclear program .
This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary , in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement ( Joe Biden , Pete Buttigieg , Elizabeth Warren ) —or , in the case of Bernie Sanders , without any conditions at all .
Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran relations have imposed a binary choice on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not mean that there are no other possibilities .
The U.S. government could pursue , for example , a “ grand bargain ” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably , the nuclear program , Iran ’ s use of proxies to meddle in the region , and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries .
Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington : containment .
Consider the other potential strategies in turn .
Regime change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq , but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it .
It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran , but it would be costly , requiring the United States to provide far more military , political , and financial resources to Iran ’ s opponents around the region than current policy .
This seems an unlikely scenario for two important reasons : 1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is high , and 2 ) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers , sailors , and airmen in the Persian Gulf .
Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example , the failure to set limits on Iran ’ s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington ’ s Iran debate .
Reviving the JCPOA would mean acceptance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear technology , sanctions relief , and the normalization of Tehran ’ s commercial ties with the world .
It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran ’ s role in the region , especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria .
The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran ’ s missile program , for example , are similar to the one ’ s the Obama administration encountered , including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington determined to scuttle a deal , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018 .
The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence .
There are also constraints on the U.S. side : In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work , it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom .
This would be a hard sell—not only because the Israelis , Emiratis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem , Abu Dhabi , and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur .
This is especially the case after the Trump administration ’ s halfhearted response to Iran ’ s provocations during the summer of 2019 , culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities .
A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics as the original deal , in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overlook violations or other related problems , such as Iran ’ s irredentist approach to the region .
This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own , thus further destabilizing the region .
The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain .
In this scenario , Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country ’ s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules of the road .
The underlying assumption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ’ s demands for a seat at the table are recognized , it will end its malevolent activities around the region .
It ’ s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic , given the utter absence of trust in the region .
The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran ’ s support for allies around the region , restrictions on its military , and a clear statement from Tehran renouncing territorial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Iranians , who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name .
The United States , of course , could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel , Saudi Arabia , and the UAE to accept a grand bargain .
But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain .
In other words , a grand bargain would likely meet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0 .
That leaves the United States with the most realistic option : containment .
The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States can not change Iran ’ s behavior through either coercion or incentive .
And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region .
Under these circumstances , anything that ’ s possible is better than aspirations that bear little resemblance to reality—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Containment , which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War , is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region .
The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s .
Sure , there were problems with Tehran at the time , but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were less likely .
That is because the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises .
Containment requires U.S. forces in the region , and possibly the application of violence , in order to demonstrate what is acceptable .
It is not risk-free for the United States .
But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option .
With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a flawed nuclear deal taken off the table @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be demonstrably lower , thereby stabilizing Gulf .
This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement .
But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces .
Indeed , that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea .
Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome , but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it ’ s hard to understand why it should be anathema when it comes to Iran .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region .
The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance , but that shouldn ’ t be a deal breaker for containment , given the other available policy options .
Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it , given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior .
It would also provide the United States some much needed diplomatic room to help manage regional crises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way .
Most important , containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear .
It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna .
It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed , maimed , and killed Americans .
Containment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simultaneously reduces the risk of war , protects Americans , and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive .
It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it .

I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “ Ayatollah ”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama .
I trace my interest in the Middle East back to the Iranian hostage crisis—those 444 days of yellow ribbons, daily Nightline updates, and an unrelenting wave of anger that swept through the United States. People actually walked around with “Fuck Iran” buttons on their jackets, and a comedian named Steve Dahl wrote a song called “Ayatollah”—to the tune of the Knack’s “My Sharona”—that threatened the Iranians with nuclear annihilation. It was a confusing moment for a little kid who was just waking up to the world beyond soccer practice, the New York Yankees, and Wonderama.
The subject hasn’t gotten any less confusing since. In the past 40 years, U.S. policymakers have endlessly debated a central issue in U.S.-Middle East policy: What should the United States do about Iran? The answer has often proved to be elusive in large part because of domestic politics. The traumas of the late 1970s and early 1980s have rendered parts of the U.S. policy community needlessly bellicose, others credulously dovish, and the remaining wary of both in search of a “just right” strategy to modify Iran’s behavior.
But the central question has now taken on a new urgency. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to kill Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a drone strike on Jan. 3 has raised fears of violent escalation—even war—between the United States and Iran. It’s time to directly address the question of what exactly the United States can do about Iran—and fortunately, there’s a good answer available, even if it’s not satisfying for anyone in Washington.
What’s already clear is that the current U.S. approach needs improvement. Despite his hit on Suleimani, it is not at all clear what the president wants to achieve regarding Iran. He has combined hawkish rhetoric with periodic offers to negotiate with Tehran while pursuing a “maximum pressure” policy that until recently did not employ military force. Depending on whom one asks or who is doing the asking, the administration is seeking either full-scale regime change or simply a more robust nuclear deal than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the agreement negotiated by the Obama administration, which set limits on Iran’s nuclear program. This confusion comes against the backdrop of the Democratic presidential primary, in which all the leading candidates have declared their intention to return to the JCPOA so long as Iran maintains its commitment to the agreement (Joe Biden, Pete Buttigieg, Elizabeth Warren)—or, in the case of Bernie Sanders, without any conditions at all.
Yet just because the Trump administration and the politics of U.S.-Iran relations have imposed a binary choice on policymakers—regime change or the existing nuclear agreement—does not mean that there are no other possibilities. The U.S. government could pursue, for example, a “grand bargain” with Iran that would settle all the outstanding issues—notably, the nuclear program, Iran’s use of proxies to meddle in the region, and the release of Americans held in Tehran—between the two countries. Yet the most rational option under the present circumstances is another strategy that no longer goes mentioned in Washington: containment.
Consider the other potential strategies in turn. Regime change has, for obvious reasons, become a scary term and a policy one would think officials and analysts would want to avoid given the U.S. experience in Iraq, but it remains an option if only because influential people continue to advocate for it. It would not necessarily require a march on Tehran, but it would be costly, requiring the United States to provide far more military, political, and financial resources to Iran’s opponents around the region than current policy. This seems an unlikely scenario for two important reasons: 1) The potential for further regional chaos is high, and 2) the American people and Congress would likely be reluctant to support policies that would undoubtedly include augmenting the already sizable deployment of almost 45,000 American soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Persian Gulf.
Returning to the JCPOA or negotiating a new nuclear deal that addresses some of the defects in the original agreement—for example, the failure to set limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program—is the flip side of Washington’s Iran debate. Reviving the JCPOA would mean acceptance of Iran’s alleged right to develop nuclear technology, sanctions relief, and the normalization of Tehran’s commercial ties with the world. It would also require implicit acceptance of Iran’s role in the region, especially its influential positions in Lebanon and Syria.
The problems with returning to the JCPOA or an enhanced agreement that addresses Iran’s missile program, for example, are similar to the one’s the Obama administration encountered, including opposition from regional allies and hawks in Washington determined to scuttle a deal, with one additional, notable challenge: Iran’s leaders would likely be reluctant to enter an agreement with the United States after the Trump administration breached the JCPOA in May 2018. The Iranians would also resist limits on their ballistic missiles given their reliance on those weapons for regional deterrence. There are also constraints on the U.S. side: In order for the Trump administration to make a new agreement work, it would need to convince its regional allies of its wisdom.
This would be a hard sell—not only because the Israelis, Emiratis, and Saudis continue to have zero trust that the Iranians would uphold their commitments in a deal but because leaders in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh are no longer confident that Trump would hold Tehran accountable for whatever violations might occur. This is especially the case after the Trump administration’s halfhearted response to Iran’s provocations during the summer of 2019, culminating with the attack on Saudi oil processing facilities. A return to the nuclear agreement or a new JCPOA would create the same dynamics as the original deal, in which the authors and signatories have incentive to overlook violations or other related problems, such as Iran’s irredentist approach to the region. This gives other regional powers incentive to push back on their own, thus further destabilizing the region.
The inadequacy of an updated and expanded JCPOA raises the possibility of a grand bargain. In this scenario, Iran would relinquish its nuclear capabilities for an explicit U.S. recognition of the country’s role as a regional leader and a partner in developing the regional rules of the road. The underlying assumption of a grand bargain is that once Iran’s demands for a seat at the table are recognized, it will end its malevolent activities around the region. It’s a tempting thought—but entirely unrealistic, given the utter absence of trust in the region. The safeguards that would be needed to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates of the wisdom of such a deal—including an end to Iran’s support for allies around the region, restrictions on its military, and a clear statement from Tehran renouncing territorial claims on its neighbors—would render it anathema to the Iranians, who would likely view it as little more than regime change by another name. The United States, of course, could forgo restrictions on Iran that would satisfy its allies and instead pressure Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to accept a grand bargain. But that would not diminish the ability of U.S. allies to leverage their political clout in Washington and make mischief regionally in an effort to undermine a grand bargain. In other words, a grand bargain would likely meet the same fate as the Obama administration’s JCPOA or a JCPOA 2.0.
That leaves the United States with the most realistic option: containment. The record over the last four decades indicates that the United States cannot change Iran’s behavior through either coercion or incentive. And it does not have the kind of influence to force other countries in the region to alter their own approaches to Iran and the broader region. Under these circumstances, anything that’s possible is better than aspirations that bear little resemblance to reality—and what’s possible is containment. Containment, which guided Washington in its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is a way in which the United States can restrain Iran and its effort to undermine U.S. policies and goals in the region. The Clinton administration pursued this policy—along with containment of Iraq—with success in the 1990s. Sure, there were problems with Tehran at the time, but the relationship between the United States and Iran was more stable in that outright conflict and escalation were less likely. That is because the United States and Iran established an equilibrium of sorts in which everyone understood some basic rules of the game that made it possible to manage crises. Containment requires U.S. forces in the region, and possibly the application of violence, in order to demonstrate what is acceptable. It is not risk-free for the United States. But the approach does reduce the possibility of escalation because U.S. policymakers would cease to consider regime change an option.
With both the idea of regime change and the necessity of defending a flawed nuclear deal taken off the table, the stakes for the U.S.-Iranian relationship will be demonstrably lower, thereby stabilizing Gulf. This leaves the gnarly issue of what to do about an Iranian nuclear program unfettered by any international agreement. But containment is capable of handling any outcome that produces. Indeed, that is precisely what U.S. policy has been toward nuclear-armed North Korea. Nobody would argue that this has been an ideal outcome, but it has been better than any easily identifiable alternatives—and it’s hard to understand why it should be anathema when it comes to Iran. Indeed, the Gulf states are less worried about Iranian nukes and more concerned about its desire to extend its influence around the region. The Israelis would eventually need more security assistance, but that shouldn’t be a deal breaker for containment, given the other available policy options.
Containment would not preclude dialogue between Iran and the United States and may even improve it, given the way it would produce implicit but well-understood rules for behavior. It would also provide the United States some much needed diplomatic room to help manage regional crises like Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. The Iranians are more apt to press their advantages in these places so long as they believe the United States might end their regime or look the other way. Most important, containing Iran represents the most realistic assessment of what either U.S. or Iranian politics can bear.
It is not as romantic as the idea of secret meetings in Oman or long negotiation sessions in Vienna. It lacks the bravado of bringing down leaders of a system that has vexed, maimed, and killed Americans. Containment is nevertheless the best option. It simultaneously reduces the risk of war, protects Americans, and renders the U.S. presence in the region less expensive. It would be foreign-policy malpractice not to embrace it.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--How to Broaden the Coalition Against Climate Change

How to Broaden the Coalition Against Climate Change Against the backdrop of Australian and Californian wildfires , extreme weather , record-setting temperatures , and activist pressure , business leaders are ratcheting up their promises to take on climate change .
Although stronger climate action is most welcome , to truly make a dent in global carbon emissions , both corporations and activists need to shift their focus to engage a much broader set of politicians and businesspeople who have the most potential to curb emissions .
The rallying of finance and corporate titans to the climate cause was on display @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland , last week .
Previously relegated to the sidelines , this year , climate change discussions permeated nearly all panels and meetings .
Among numerous corporate pledges , the investment management company Blackrock said it would prioritize climate change in its investment strategy ; Microsoft issued a major announcement that it would not only be going carbon negative but also working to mitigate its historical emissions ; other business and government leaders promised to plant a trillion trees .
Even the oil and gas chiefs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the role of the industry in decarbonization , how to respond to rising social pressure , and whether to expand their emission targets to include not only carbon dioxide resulting from production but also from the use of their products .
Meanwhile , climate activists , notably Greta Thunberg , Time magazine ’ s 2019 Person of the Year , demanded an immediate halt to all fossil fuel investments , exploration , and extraction .
“ We don ’ t want these things done by 2050 , 2030 , or even 2021 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she said .
( For his part , U.S. President Donald Trump attacked such climate activists as “ perennial prophets of doom ” even as he crowed about the United States ’ energy boom . )
The pledges from corporate leaders at Davos are welcome but still fail to address the root of the problem .
There is a limit to what any one company can do when it operates within a system in which oil , gas , and even coal use are still rising globally—even as the availability of renewable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s particularly true when policymakers ’ rhetoric outpaces their action to actually change the economic incentives that affect myriad individual and firm decisions about how to produce and consume energy .
And it ’ s not just that Trump withdrew from the Paris agreement on climate change ; almost no country is on track to meet its Paris commitments .
Company commitments are voluntary and individual , and they do not change the underlying systemic issues with how energy is used in the U.S. economy .
A company may want to “ go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the cement and steel for its new office building are made or what fuel is used to ship its goods or transport its people around the world .
Even those emissions it can control may just lead to offsetting increases elsewhere , absent systemic reform .
If companies really wanted to lead on climate change , they should be allocating far more political and financial capital to advocating for stronger climate policies around the world For their part , meanwhile , the activists at Davos were targeting only a narrow sliver of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transition .
The oil majors , seven large integrated oil and gas companies , are at the center of rising public and shareholder pressure to shift investments away from oil and gas , yet they represent only 15 percent of world oil and gas production .
Similarly , large European and American financial institutions are under pressure to divest from fossil fuels , but there is no lack of other private capital available to energy companies in the world .
The reality is that investment by highly visible firms would just be replaced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , the Middle East , or elsewhere ; privately held companies ; or private equity firms .
The focus on U.S. and European firms also ignores the parts of the world where emissions are rising fastest , such as China , India , and the rest of South Asia .
Europe constitutes only 9 percent of global emissions .
In particular , there needs to be greater focus on phasing out coal in emerging markets .
Coal remains responsible for around 30 percent of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions—and its use is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coal plants in the United States and Europe have retired , the average age of coal plants in Asia is only 12 years old .
Even if Asian countries never build another new one , the world will miss its climate targets if the existing fleet operates until the end of its normal life .
Serious global climate action must prioritize policy and financial strategies to retire these plants early .
Corporate pledges and activist pressure must also acknowledge the full suite of technologies that will be needed to deliver deep decarbonization .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ renewables mostly provide electricity , which represents only 20 percent of final energy consumption .
Converting all cars to run on electricity is not enough .
Hard-to-abate sectors such as industry , heating , shipping , aviation , and trucking will require solutions that are not visible or at least cost-competitive today , such as carbon capture , carbon removal , hydrogen , biogas , biofuels , and more .
The oil and gas companies under fire from activists have the engineering , financial , and project management capabilities to develop and scale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technologies and scale of investment needed to accelerate a clean energy transition , rebuilding some measure of common ground and trust between the climate community and oil and gas community is an important—and daunting—challenge .
It will require concerted work by the companies , greater transparency about the results of their actions , and a cooperative spirit in civil society .
That is especially challenging when oil majors are still investing to meet rising oil and gas demand , particularly in lower-income parts of the world that currently consume a fraction of per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do .
Oil companies also risk being penalized in their share price if they move too quickly into renewable energy , because they can ’ t earn the same returns as they can in oil and gas .
Yet investment by oil and gas companies in lower-carbon forms of energy must ramp up quickly to realize a clean energy transition .
Despite the world ’ s growing need for affordable energy , continued growth in emissions from hydrocarbons is incompatible with climate goals .
At current emission rates , the carbon budget to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ target will be used up in around 15 years .
For oil and gas firms to survive , and even thrive , in an energy transition will require that they not only reduce their own emissions , such as from flaring and methane leaks , and invest in low-carbon technologies , but that they also advocate for stronger climate policy—and certainly do not stymie it .
Otherwise they will continue to face rising social pressure to shift their capital investments away from oil and gas faster than consumer demand itself shifts , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dent in emissions , especially if capital investment and production just shift to other firms less susceptible to social or investor pressures .
The dramatic increase in urgency and attention to the issue of climate change last week at Davos was very welcome , but turning ambition into action will require that corporate and activist leaders alike increasingly advocate for policy change , focus on the regions and energy sectors driving emissions growth , and find common ground on the best role for the energy industry to play in delivering decarbonization solutions @

Against the backdrop of Australian and Californian wildfires, extreme weather, record-setting temperatures, and activist pressure, business leaders are ratcheting up their promises to take on climate change. Although stronger climate action is most welcome, to truly make a dent in global carbon emissions, both corporations and activists need to shift their focus to engage a much broader set of politicians and businesspeople who have the most potential to curb emissions.
Against the backdrop of Australian and Californian wildfires, extreme weather, record-setting temperatures, and activist pressure, business leaders are ratcheting up their promises to take on climate change. Although stronger climate action is most welcome, to truly make a dent in global carbon emissions, both corporations and activists need to shift their focus to engage a much broader set of politicians and businesspeople who have the most potential to curb emissions.
The rallying of finance and corporate titans to the climate cause was on display when I attended the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, last week. Previously relegated to the sidelines, this year, climate change discussions permeated nearly all panels and meetings. Among numerous corporate pledges, the investment management company Blackrock said it would prioritize climate change in its investment strategy; Microsoft issued a major announcement that it would not only be going carbon negative but also working to mitigate its historical emissions; other business and government leaders promised to plant a trillion trees. Even the oil and gas chiefs at the meeting spent their time talking about the role of the industry in decarbonization, how to respond to rising social pressure, and whether to expand their emission targets to include not only carbon dioxide resulting from production but also from the use of their products.
Meanwhile, climate activists, notably Greta Thunberg, Time magazine’s 2019 Person of the Year, demanded an immediate halt to all fossil fuel investments, exploration, and extraction. “We don’t want these things done by 2050, 2030, or even 2021. We want this done now,” she said. (For his part, U.S. President Donald Trump attacked such climate activists as “perennial prophets of doom” even as he crowed about the United States’ energy boom.)
The pledges from corporate leaders at Davos are welcome but still fail to address the root of the problem. There is a limit to what any one company can do when it operates within a system in which oil, gas, and even coal use are still rising globally—even as the availability of renewable energy sources grows dramatically. That’s particularly true when policymakers’ rhetoric outpaces their action to actually change the economic incentives that affect myriad individual and firm decisions about how to produce and consume energy. And it’s not just that Trump withdrew from the Paris agreement on climate change; almost no country is on track to meet its Paris commitments.
Company commitments are voluntary and individual, and they do not change the underlying systemic issues with how energy is used in the U.S. economy. A company may want to “go green” but not directly control how the cement and steel for its new office building are made or what fuel is used to ship its goods or transport its people around the world. Even those emissions it can control may just lead to offsetting increases elsewhere, absent systemic reform. If companies really wanted to lead on climate change, they should be allocating far more political and financial capital to advocating for stronger climate policies around the world
For their part, meanwhile, the activists at Davos were targeting only a narrow sliver of the firms needed to deliver a clean energy transition. The oil majors, seven large integrated oil and gas companies, are at the center of rising public and shareholder pressure to shift investments away from oil and gas, yet they represent only 15 percent of world oil and gas production. Similarly, large European and American financial institutions are under pressure to divest from fossil fuels, but there is no lack of other private capital available to energy companies in the world. The reality is that investment by highly visible firms would just be replaced by investment from national oil companies in Russia, the Middle East, or elsewhere; privately held companies; or private equity firms.
The focus on U.S. and European firms also ignores the parts of the world where emissions are rising fastest, such as China, India, and the rest of South Asia. Europe constitutes only 9 percent of global emissions. In particular, there needs to be greater focus on phasing out coal in emerging markets. Coal remains responsible for around 30 percent of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions—and its use is projected to remain stable. Although old coal plants in the United States and Europe have retired, the average age of coal plants in Asia is only 12 years old. Even if Asian countries never build another new one, the world will miss its climate targets if the existing fleet operates until the end of its normal life. Serious global climate action must prioritize policy and financial strategies to retire these plants early.
Corporate pledges and activist pressure must also acknowledge the full suite of technologies that will be needed to deliver deep decarbonization. Renewable energy costs have plummeted, but renewables mostly provide electricity, which represents only 20 percent of final energy consumption. Converting all cars to run on electricity is not enough. Hard-to-abate sectors such as industry, heating, shipping, aviation, and trucking will require solutions that are not visible or at least cost-competitive today, such as carbon capture, carbon removal, hydrogen, biogas, biofuels, and more.
The oil and gas companies under fire from activists have the engineering, financial, and project management capabilities to develop and scale such technologies. Given the range of technologies and scale of investment needed to accelerate a clean energy transition, rebuilding some measure of common ground and trust between the climate community and oil and gas community is an important—and daunting—challenge. It will require concerted work by the companies, greater transparency about the results of their actions, and a cooperative spirit in civil society.
That is especially challenging when oil majors are still investing to meet rising oil and gas demand, particularly in lower-income parts of the world that currently consume a fraction of per capita energy consumption levels that industrialized nations do. Oil companies also risk being penalized in their share price if they move too quickly into renewable energy, because they can’t earn the same returns as they can in oil and gas.
Yet investment by oil and gas companies in lower-carbon forms of energy must ramp up quickly to realize a clean energy transition. Despite the world’s growing need for affordable energy, continued growth in emissions from hydrocarbons is incompatible with climate goals. At current emission rates, the carbon budget to limit warming to a 1.5 degree Celsius target will be used up in around 15 years.
For oil and gas firms to survive, and even thrive, in an energy transition will require that they not only reduce their own emissions, such as from flaring and methane leaks, and invest in low-carbon technologies, but that they also advocate for stronger climate policy—and certainly do not stymie it. Otherwise they will continue to face rising social pressure to shift their capital investments away from oil and gas faster than consumer demand itself shifts, which will neither be economically viable nor make a dent in emissions, especially if capital investment and production just shift to other firms less susceptible to social or investor pressures.
The dramatic increase in urgency and attention to the issue of climate change last week at Davos was very welcome, but turning ambition into action will require that corporate and activist leaders alike increasingly advocate for policy change, focus on the regions and energy sectors driving emissions growth, and find common ground on the best role for the energy industry to play in delivering decarbonization solutions.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-29--Behind Pompeo’s Big ‘We Care’ Trip to Ukraine

Shadowed by an impeachment trial that has raised key questions about U.S. policy toward Ukraine , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Kyiv on Thursday as part of a five-nation tour in which he faces the tricky task of explaining what often appears to be a two-faced Trump administration approach to Eastern Europe and Central Asia .
The rescheduled trip—which was originally set to take place after the New Year but was postponed due to tensions with Iran—will see Pompeo visit Ukraine , Belarus , Kazakhstan , and Uzbekistan after a stop in the United Kingdom .
Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on promoting human rights , energy independence , and economic reform throughout the former Soviet nations that he will visit in a part of the world that Moscow views as its backyard and that has often looked to the United States as a counterweight to its larger neighbors , including China .
The Trump administration ’ s policy toward Russia and its neighbors across Eurasia has been criticized for its contradictory messages due to President Donald Trump ’ s conciliatory rhetoric toward Russia and its leader , Vladimir Putin , and his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views Beijing and Moscow as Washington ’ s global rivals .
As Pompeo sets out on his Eurasian tour , the secretary of state will be looking to dispel any notions of a policy disconnect from the Trump administration for engaging with Russia and its neighbors—especially in the wake of an explosive interview with NPR in which he was quoted as saying : “ Do you think Americans care about Ukraine ?
” It could be a hard sell , according to several current and former U.S. officials .
“ This has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Congress has another , the defense and intelligence community has another , and the State Department waxes and wanes on it , ” said Heather Conley , a former State Department official and Europe expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
While Trump has lavished praise on Putin—at times siding with him over Trump ’ s own intelligence community—his administration has taken a hard-line approach , ramping up defense spending for forces in Europe and expelling Russian diplomats as West-Russia ties worsen .
Meanwhile , both the administration and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions and fought tooth and nail to halt the construction of a key Russian pipeline project , Nord Stream 2 , into Europe .
On Ukraine , the Trump administration greenlighted lethal weapons sales to Ukraine ’ s military—something the Obama administration balked at—even as the president himself cast doubt on whether supporting Ukraine was worth U.S. investments and withheld military aid from Ukraine , an issue at the heart of the impeachment trial .
On Belarus , the administration has engaged in a quiet and careful yearslong effort to normalize relations with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ autocratic President Alexander Lukashenko for the last 25 years , pushing to normalize diplomatic ties and draw Minsk out from Russia ’ s orbit—but sent an unusual diplomatic slight by considering adding Belarus to the so-called “ travel ban ” list of countries facing U.S. visa restrictions .
Despite his administration ’ s hard-line policies on Russia , Trump can ’ t seem to escape the narrative that he is too cozy with Moscow , potentially making Pompeo ’ s job tougher .
“ Because the Trump administration has been criticized for being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s important for [ Pompeo ] to show that there is a Eurasia policy , not simply a Russia policy , ” said William Courtney , who served as U.S. ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan and is currently an adjunct senior fellow at the Rand Corp. “ A key part of that is supporting reforms in Ukraine .
It isn ’ t a model yet , but everyone in the region is watching if it can succeed .
If it can , Ukraine could be the cradle of the former Soviet space.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sidelined by U.S. domestic politics during his diplomatic efforts may also prove tough for Pompeo as he sets foot in Ukraine , which is at the heart of Trump ’ s impeachment .
Pompeo himself was pulled into the spotlight last week during a tense interview and ensuing confrontation with NPR ’ s Mary Louise Kelly about Ukraine and former ambassador Marie Yovanovitch , who was dismissed after Trump ’ s personal attorney , Rudy Giuliani , made unsubstantiated allegations against her .
Following the NPR interview , Pompeo reportedly cursed at Kelly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a map , and asked : “ Do you think Americans care about Ukraine ?
” “ Expectations are quite modest from the Ukrainian side for [ Pompeo ] .
The main hope is that this is about reaffirming support for Ukraine as America ’ s ally and not a reelection mission for Trump , ” said Alyona Getmanchuk , the director of the New Europe Center , a think tank based in Kyiv .
Ukraine has been fighting with Russian-backed forces in its eastern Donbass region in a war that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , following Moscow ’ s annexation of Crimea .
This coincided with Western economic sanctions against Russia and a mounting standoff with Moscow that has seen U.S.-Russia relations reach their lowest point .
The war in Ukraine also changed the foreign-policy dynamics across the wider former Soviet world .
Many of Russia ’ s smaller neighbors , wary of its intentions , have looked to build ties with other powers in the hope of gaining more room to maneuver with Moscow .
The United States has traditionally been keen to play this role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1991 , but a rising China has become a major economic—and increasingly political—player across Eurasia , forming stronger ties with many former Soviet countries , including Russia , and upending Washington ’ s calculus for the region .
On Central Asia , “ there is lots of activity—Chinese activity , Russian activity—and a set of countries that want to be sovereign and independent , and America has the important opportunity to help them achieve that , ” Pompeo told reporters en route to the region .
This shift has been amplified by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turnover of officials overseeing foreign policy and national security in the Trump administration .
While the United States , along with the European Union , has been a key supporter of Ukraine , the Eastern European country of 42 million has been dragged into internal U.S. politics in recent years .
Trump has pedaled a debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine , not Russia , interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and has reportedly called Ukrainians “ terrible people.
” Ukraine and its nascent efforts to reform its economy and combat corruption have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where Trump faces charges of abuse of office and obstruction of Congress tied to his Ukraine policy .
In July 2019 , Trump triggered a whistleblower complaint that led to his impeachment after a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky , during which he asked the Ukrainian leader for a “ favor , ” suggesting that he wanted Kyiv to announce an investigation into former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden ’ s son in return for releasing critical military aid to Ukraine .
In his meetings with Zelensky and other officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Washington supports it in its war in the east and has a consistent policy beyond the partisan fray of Beltway politics .
His visit will include meetings with Zelensky , Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko , and Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk .
The aim of the trip is “ to highlight U.S. support for Ukraine ’ s sovereignty and territorial integrity , ” according to a statement from State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus .
“ There is a paradoxical U.S. policy towards Ukraine .
On one hand , it ’ s clear that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and him pushing politically motivated investigations hurts [ Ukraine ’ s ] own reform policy , ” Getmanchuk said .
“ But at the same time , we have received Javelin missiles and other practical steps that were never done under the Obama administration.
” Other stops on Pompeo ’ s upcoming tour look to be beyond the ongoing impeachment drama in Washington but could present geopolitical obstacles of their own .
In Minsk , Pompeo will meet with the 65-year-old Lukashenko , along with Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two countries .
Lukashenko has found himself under increasing pressure from Moscow in recent months to push ahead with a treaty that could see Belarus integrated into Russia .
In search of more room to breathe , Minsk has rekindled previously broken ties with Washington .
In August 2019 , then-U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton visited Belarus , and in September of that year , Washington and Minsk announced they would exchange ambassadors after a decadelong break in diplomatic relations .
But Lukashenko has also forged a strong relationship with Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategic location for China ’ s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative and increasingly relying on Chinese loans and lines of credit to wean itself off Russian subsidies .
The deepening partnership with Beijing is also appealing for Belarus as closer ties with China don ’ t provoke the same anxiety out of Moscow as turning to the West does .
“ That ’ s the conundrum for Belarus : How do you have good relations with the West and not provoke Russia ?
” said Katsiaryna Shmatsina , an analyst at the Belarusian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think tank .
“ It puts limits on how close Minsk can come to the West , and it means that they need to lean even further towards China when Russia pushes back.
” China ’ s and Russia ’ s evolving dynamic in Eurasia will follow Pompeo as he heads to Central Asia .
Beijing has issued hundreds of billions of dollars in loans under the auspices of its Belt and Road Initiative and pushed west across Central Asia , making it the region ’ s top investor .
Similarly , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Kyrgyzstan , Tajikistan , Turkmenistan , and Uzbekistan all find themselves increasingly integrated into China ’ s technological , financial , and political norms .
While this shift has unnerved Moscow , Russia appears to be adjusting to China ’ s role in the region and accepted its growing dominance .
Pompeo will meet with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the capital of Nur-Sultan and then will conclude his trip in Tashkent , the capital of Uzbekistan , where he will meet with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and then with the foreign ministers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the auspices of the “ C5+1 , ” a U.S.-designed diplomatic format .
Pompeo will continue to press for market and human rights reforms in both authoritarian countries , several officials say , and offer Washington as a political and economic counterweight to Beijing and Moscow in the region .
Analysts , however , caution about how far the United States ’ appeal can extend amid Russia ’ s historical and cultural links to Central Asia and China ’ s deep pockets .
“ Local leaders want the West as an alternative , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Western ability to project power in this region is limited , ” said Alexander Gabuev , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center .
“ Central Asia understands there are two big animals in this forest : China and Russia .
”

Shadowed by an impeachment trial that has raised key questions about U.S. policy toward Ukraine, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Kyiv on Thursday as part of a five-nation tour in which he faces the tricky task of explaining what often appears to be a two-faced Trump administration approach to Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Shadowed by an impeachment trial that has raised key questions about U.S. policy toward Ukraine, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Kyiv on Thursday as part of a five-nation tour in which he faces the tricky task of explaining what often appears to be a two-faced Trump administration approach to Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
The rescheduled trip—which was originally set to take place after the New Year but was postponed due to tensions with Iran—will see Pompeo visit Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan after a stop in the United Kingdom. Pompeo’s agenda is said to focus on promoting human rights, energy independence, and economic reform throughout the former Soviet nations that he will visit in a part of the world that Moscow views as its backyard and that has often looked to the United States as a counterweight to its larger neighbors, including China. The Trump administration’s policy toward Russia and its neighbors across Eurasia has been criticized for its contradictory messages due to President Donald Trump’s conciliatory rhetoric toward Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, and his own government’s National Security Strategy that views Beijing and Moscow as Washington’s global rivals.
As Pompeo sets out on his Eurasian tour, the secretary of state will be looking to dispel any notions of a policy disconnect from the Trump administration for engaging with Russia and its neighbors—especially in the wake of an explosive interview with NPR in which he was quoted as saying: “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?”
It could be a hard sell, according to several current and former U.S. officials. “This has been consistent: The president has one policy, Congress has another, the defense and intelligence community has another, and the State Department waxes and wanes on it,” said Heather Conley, a former State Department official and Europe expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
While Trump has lavished praise on Putin—at times siding with him over Trump’s own intelligence community—his administration has taken a hard-line approach, ramping up defense spending for forces in Europe and expelling Russian diplomats as West-Russia ties worsen. Meanwhile, both the administration and Congress have blanketed Russia with crippling economic sanctions and fought tooth and nail to halt the construction of a key Russian pipeline project, Nord Stream 2, into Europe.
On Ukraine, the Trump administration greenlighted lethal weapons sales to Ukraine’s military—something the Obama administration balked at—even as the president himself cast doubt on whether supporting Ukraine was worth U.S. investments and withheld military aid from Ukraine, an issue at the heart of the impeachment trial.
On Belarus, the administration has engaged in a quiet and careful yearslong effort to normalize relations with a country that has been ruled by autocratic President Alexander Lukashenko for the last 25 years, pushing to normalize diplomatic ties and draw Minsk out from Russia’s orbit—but sent an unusual diplomatic slight by considering adding Belarus to the so-called “travel ban” list of countries facing U.S. visa restrictions.
Despite his administration’s hard-line policies on Russia, Trump can’t seem to escape the narrative that he is too cozy with Moscow, potentially making Pompeo’s job tougher.
“Because the Trump administration has been criticized for being too friendly with Russia, it’s important for [Pompeo] to show that there is a Eurasia policy, not simply a Russia policy,” said William Courtney, who served as U.S. ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan and is currently an adjunct senior fellow at the Rand Corp. “A key part of that is supporting reforms in Ukraine. It isn’t a model yet, but everyone in the region is watching if it can succeed. If it can, Ukraine could be the cradle of the former Soviet space.”
Holding a policy line and avoiding being sidelined by U.S. domestic politics during his diplomatic efforts may also prove tough for Pompeo as he sets foot in Ukraine, which is at the heart of Trump’s impeachment. Pompeo himself was pulled into the spotlight last week during a tense interview and ensuing confrontation with NPR’s Mary Louise Kelly about Ukraine and former ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who was dismissed after Trump’s personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, made unsubstantiated allegations against her. Following the NPR interview, Pompeo reportedly cursed at Kelly, challenged her to find the country on a map, and asked: “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?”
“Expectations are quite modest from the Ukrainian side for [Pompeo]. The main hope is that this is about reaffirming support for Ukraine as America’s ally and not a reelection mission for Trump,” said Alyona Getmanchuk, the director of the New Europe Center, a think tank based in Kyiv.
Ukraine has been fighting with Russian-backed forces in its eastern Donbass region in a war that has claimed at least 14,000 lives since 2014, following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. This coincided with Western economic sanctions against Russia and a mounting standoff with Moscow that has seen U.S.-Russia relations reach their lowest point. The war in Ukraine also changed the foreign-policy dynamics across the wider former Soviet world. Many of Russia’s smaller neighbors, wary of its intentions, have looked to build ties with other powers in the hope of gaining more room to maneuver with Moscow. The United States has traditionally been keen to play this role since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but a rising China has become a major economic—and increasingly political—player across Eurasia, forming stronger ties with many former Soviet countries, including Russia, and upending Washington’s calculus for the region.
On Central Asia, “there is lots of activity—Chinese activity, Russian activity—and a set of countries that want to be sovereign and independent, and America has the important opportunity to help them achieve that,” Pompeo told reporters en route to the region.
This shift has been amplified by scandals, dysfunction, and a massive turnover of officials overseeing foreign policy and national security in the Trump administration. While the United States, along with the European Union, has been a key supporter of Ukraine, the Eastern European country of 42 million has been dragged into internal U.S. politics in recent years. Trump has pedaled a debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and has reportedly called Ukrainians “terrible people.” Ukraine and its nascent efforts to reform its economy and combat corruption have become entangled in the ongoing impeachment trial, where Trump faces charges of abuse of office and obstruction of Congress tied to his Ukraine policy. In July 2019, Trump triggered a whistleblower complaint that led to his impeachment after a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which he asked the Ukrainian leader for a “favor,” suggesting that he wanted Kyiv to announce an investigation into former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s son in return for releasing critical military aid to Ukraine.
In his meetings with Zelensky and other officials, Pompeo will look to remind Kyiv that Washington supports it in its war in the east and has a consistent policy beyond the partisan fray of Beltway politics. His visit will include meetings with Zelensky, Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko, and Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk. The aim of the trip is “to highlight U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” according to a statement from State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus.
“There is a paradoxical U.S. policy towards Ukraine. On one hand, it’s clear that Trump doesn’t care about Ukraine, and him pushing politically motivated investigations hurts [Ukraine’s] own reform policy,” Getmanchuk said. “But at the same time, we have received Javelin missiles and other practical steps that were never done under the Obama administration.”
Other stops on Pompeo’s upcoming tour look to be beyond the ongoing impeachment drama in Washington but could present geopolitical obstacles of their own.
In Minsk, Pompeo will meet with the 65-year-old Lukashenko, along with Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, to discuss an ongoing thaw in relations between the two countries. Lukashenko has found himself under increasing pressure from Moscow in recent months to push ahead with a treaty that could see Belarus integrated into Russia. In search of more room to breathe, Minsk has rekindled previously broken ties with Washington. In August 2019, then-U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton visited Belarus, and in September of that year, Washington and Minsk announced they would exchange ambassadors after a decadelong break in diplomatic relations.
But Lukashenko has also forged a strong relationship with Beijing, with Belarus offering itself as a strategic location for China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative and increasingly relying on Chinese loans and lines of credit to wean itself off Russian subsidies. The deepening partnership with Beijing is also appealing for Belarus as closer ties with China don’t provoke the same anxiety out of Moscow as turning to the West does.
“That’s the conundrum for Belarus: How do you have good relations with the West and not provoke Russia?” said Katsiaryna Shmatsina, an analyst at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, a Minsk-based think tank. “It puts limits on how close Minsk can come to the West, and it means that they need to lean even further towards China when Russia pushes back.”
China’s and Russia’s evolving dynamic in Eurasia will follow Pompeo as he heads to Central Asia. Beijing has issued hundreds of billions of dollars in loans under the auspices of its Belt and Road Initiative and pushed west across Central Asia, making it the region’s top investor. Similarly, the former Soviet Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all find themselves increasingly integrated into China’s technological, financial, and political norms. While this shift has unnerved Moscow, Russia appears to be adjusting to China’s role in the region and accepted its growing dominance.
Pompeo will meet with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the capital of Nur-Sultan and then will conclude his trip in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, where he will meet with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and then with the foreign ministers of all five Central Asian states under the auspices of the “C5+1,” a U.S.-designed diplomatic format.
Pompeo will continue to press for market and human rights reforms in both authoritarian countries, several officials say, and offer Washington as a political and economic counterweight to Beijing and Moscow in the region. Analysts, however, caution about how far the United States’ appeal can extend amid Russia’s historical and cultural links to Central Asia and China’s deep pockets.
“Local leaders want the West as an alternative, but deep down the leaders understand that the Western ability to project power in this region is limited,” said Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Central Asia understands there are two big animals in this forest: China and Russia.”