foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--Why Gulf States Are Backtracking on India

Why Gulf States Are Backtracking on India Over the last several years , especially under the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi , India had made significant strides in its relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf .
And it achieved those gains while also maintaining cordial ties with two of the principal antagonists in the region : Iran and Saudi Arabia .
For an unabashedly Hindu nationalist government , this was no minor accomplishment , especially since Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates were historical partners of India ’ s archrival , Pakistan .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the past five years—drawing on the efforts of the previous government—are now at substantial risk .
Domestic developments targeting its 200 million Muslims are beginning to unravel India ’ s diplomatic feat .
Official reports suggest that the coronavirus outbreak has only had a limited impact on India ’ s population—at least so far .
But despite the relatively low reported numbers of infections and deaths , India ’ s Muslim community has faced online and physical assaults during the coronavirus crisis—incidents in which members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks came in the wake of news that an Islamic sect , the Tablighi Jamaat , held a large annual meeting in New Delhi ’ s Nizamuddin district in early March , right as countries were beginning to restrict public gatherings to prevent the virus ’ s spread .
With nearly 3,000 pilgrims from over a dozen countries packed in cramped quarters , the coronavirus spread rapidly ; the assembly has now been identified as a major source of infections in India .
There is little question that holding this meeting—despite widespread knowledge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blatant abuse of India ’ s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi ’ s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East , and especially toward the Gulf states.The blatant abuse of India ’ s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi ’ s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East .
In a rare public move , Princess Hend al-Qassimi of the UAE has been expressing her dissatisfaction with a rising Islamophobia among Indians .
“ I miss the peaceful India , ” she tweeted on May 4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highlighted a tweet from an Indian living in the UAE as “ openly racist and discriminatory , ” reminding her followers that the punishment for hate speech could be a fine and even expulsion .
These statements have followed other expressions of concern over the BJP ’ s treatment of Indian Muslims from across the Islamic world , including from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation , which urged India to take urgent steps to protect the rights of its Muslim minority .
This last criticism is particularly damning , as India had actively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the group and had managed to be invited as guest of honor at the annual Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Abu Dhabi , United Arab Emirates , in March 2019 .
This turn of events must be of concern to the Modi government .
Through its so-called Think West policy , India had built robust bonds with the UAE and Saudi Arabia while maintaining its long-standing relationship with Iran and elevating ties with Israel .
In August 2015 , Modi became the first Indian prime minister in 34 years to travel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again in 2018 and 2019 .
During his last visit , he received the Order of Zayed , the UAE ’ s highest civil decoration , in recognition of his role in improving ties between the two countries .
Modi also traveled to Saudi Arabia , Qatar , Oman , Bahrain , and Iran in a calibrated outreach to the Gulf region ’ s powers .
All these trips were reciprocated by visits of Gulf dignitaries to New Delhi during the same time period .
The relationships fostered during Modi ’ s tenure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric to substantial deals and significant diplomatic benefits .
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become India ’ s fourth- and third-largest trade partners , respectively , as well as some of its largest sources of oil .
Over the last five years , the two countries have also pledged a combined total of $ 170 billion to help India develop its infrastructure in the energy and industrial sectors .
An important factor in the growing economic relations between India and the Gulf is the vast Indian diaspora in the region , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and around 3 million in the UAE , who respectively send $ 11.2 billion and $ 13.8 billion in remittances back home every year .
The diplomatic efforts of the last few years served to dilute Pakistan ’ s traditionally strong influence among the Gulf states .
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have effectively de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and no longer view ties with the two South Asian countries as a zero-sum game .
While both of these Gulf states maintain their political ties with Pakistan , they prioritize investments in India .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect , as both Gulf states have toned down their rhetoric condemning India on its policy toward Kashmir , a region disputed between India and Pakistan .
For example , the timing of the announcement of Saudi Aramco ’ s $ 15 billion investment in India in August 2019 , one week after New Delhi ’ s controversial move to revoke Kashmir ’ s special status , seemed like a gesture indicating that Saudi Arabia was no longer willing to let the Kashmir issue be an obstacle to better ties with India .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it viewed India ’ s Kashmir decision as “ an internal matter ” —New Delhi ’ s preferred language for its dispute with Islamabad.For the moment , India ’ s emergency diplomacy seems to have worked .
The Modi government ’ s active diplomatic outreach to the Gulf states and the increasing acknowledgment of India ’ s growing economic opportunities had , until recently , shielded India from official criticism over the discriminatory nature of India ’ s new citizenship law , as well as mounting reports of anti-Muslim violence following Modi ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blaming Muslims for the spread of the coronavirus in India seems to be a step too far for important actors in the Gulf—and could even upend its relations with the region .
One key factor is that India ’ s approach toward Muslims is no longer simply an internal matter if its citizens based in the Gulf also promote Islamophobic rhetoric .
Criticism from noted Arab commentators such as the UAE ’ s Qassimi has led India to launch a damage control campaign .
In a tweet in English on April 19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and international audiences , Modi wrote that the coronavirus “ does not see race , religion , colour , caste , creed , language or borders before striking.
” Online hate speech from Indians based in Gulf states also led to an unprecedented statement from the Indian ambassador to the UAE warning against discrimination .
Other Indian embassies also urged the Indian diaspora to remain vigilant against statements that could sow religious discord .
Recognizing the need to further placate rising concerns , Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , India ’ s minister for external affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ UAE , Qatar , Oman , and Saudi Arabia to reaffirm that India would continue to provide food supplies to Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan and would make available any medical treatment required to fight the pandemic .
For the moment , India ’ s emergency diplomacy seems to have worked .
Most Gulf states have noted and welcomed the clarifications that New Delhi has offered and have communicated their desire to maintain and deepen friendly ties .
The question is whether India can bottle up the mood of hate speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calm things domestically but also to prevent further diplomatic embarrassments .
If not , among many potential fallouts , it threatens to rend apart the deftly woven fabric of its ties with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia .

Over the last several years, especially under the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India had made significant strides in its relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf. And it achieved those gains while also maintaining cordial ties with two of the principal antagonists in the region: Iran and Saudi Arabia. For an unabashedly Hindu nationalist government, this was no minor accomplishment, especially since Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates were historical partners of India’s archrival, Pakistan. But the relationships that New Delhi so carefully crafted over the past five years—drawing on the efforts of the previous government—are now at substantial risk. Domestic developments targeting its 200 million Muslims are beginning to unravel India’s diplomatic feat.The blatant abuse of India’s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi’s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East.
Over the last several years, especially under the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India had made significant strides in its relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf. And it achieved those gains while also maintaining cordial ties with two of the principal antagonists in the region: Iran and Saudi Arabia. For an unabashedly Hindu nationalist government, this was no minor accomplishment, especially since Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates were historical partners of India’s archrival, Pakistan. But the relationships that New Delhi so carefully crafted over the past five years—drawing on the efforts of the previous government—are now at substantial risk. Domestic developments targeting its 200 million Muslims are beginning to unravel India’s diplomatic feat.The blatant abuse of India’s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi’s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East.
Official reports suggest that the coronavirus outbreak has only had a limited impact on India’s population—at least so far. But despite the relatively low reported numbers of infections and deaths, India’s Muslim community has faced online and physical assaults during the coronavirus crisis—incidents in which members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are also implicated. The attacks came in the wake of news that an Islamic sect, the Tablighi Jamaat, held a large annual meeting in New Delhi’s Nizamuddin district in early March, right as countries were beginning to restrict public gatherings to prevent the virus’s spread. With nearly 3,000 pilgrims from over a dozen countries packed in cramped quarters, the coronavirus spread rapidly; the assembly has now been identified as a major source of infections in India. There is little question that holding this meeting—despite widespread knowledge of the virus—was reckless. But the blatant abuse of India’s Muslim communities now places at risk New Delhi’s carefully tailored diplomatic approach to the Middle East, and especially toward the Gulf states.
In a rare public move, Princess Hend al-Qassimi of the UAE has been expressing her dissatisfaction with a rising Islamophobia among Indians. “I miss the peaceful India,” she tweeted on May 4. And that came after she directly highlighted a tweet from an Indian living in the UAE as “openly racist and discriminatory,” reminding her followers that the punishment for hate speech could be a fine and even expulsion. These statements have followed other expressions of concern over the BJP’s treatment of Indian Muslims from across the Islamic world, including from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which urged India to take urgent steps to protect the rights of its Muslim minority. This last criticism is particularly damning, as India had actively worked to repair its historically problematic ties with the group and had managed to be invited as guest of honor at the annual Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, in March 2019.
This turn of events must be of concern to the Modi government. Through its so-called Think West policy, India had built robust bonds with the UAE and Saudi Arabia while maintaining its long-standing relationship with Iran and elevating ties with Israel. In August 2015, Modi became the first Indian prime minister in 34 years to travel to the UAE and visited the Emirates again in 2018 and 2019. During his last visit, he received the Order of Zayed, the UAE’s highest civil decoration, in recognition of his role in improving ties between the two countries. Modi also traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Iran in a calibrated outreach to the Gulf region’s powers. All these trips were reciprocated by visits of Gulf dignitaries to New Delhi during the same time period.
The relationships fostered during Modi’s tenure have gone beyond symbolic visits and public rhetoric to substantial deals and significant diplomatic benefits. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become India’s fourth- and third-largest trade partners, respectively, as well as some of its largest sources of oil. Over the last five years, the two countries have also pledged a combined total of $170 billion to help India develop its infrastructure in the energy and industrial sectors. An important factor in the growing economic relations between India and the Gulf is the vast Indian diaspora in the region, with 2 million Indian expatriates in Saudi Arabia and around 3 million in the UAE, who respectively send $11.2 billion and $13.8 billion in remittances back home every year.
The diplomatic efforts of the last few years served to dilute Pakistan’s traditionally strong influence among the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have effectively de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and no longer view ties with the two South Asian countries as a zero-sum game. While both of these Gulf states maintain their political ties with Pakistan, they prioritize investments in India. This subtle shift has had a geopolitical effect, as both Gulf states have toned down their rhetoric condemning India on its policy toward Kashmir, a region disputed between India and Pakistan. For example, the timing of the announcement of Saudi Aramco’s $15 billion investment in India in August 2019, one week after New Delhi’s controversial move to revoke Kashmir’s special status, seemed like a gesture indicating that Saudi Arabia was no longer willing to let the Kashmir issue be an obstacle to better ties with India. Similarly, the UAE also announced that it viewed India’s Kashmir decision as “an internal matter”—New Delhi’s preferred language for its dispute with Islamabad.For the moment, India’s emergency diplomacy seems to have worked.
The Modi government’s active diplomatic outreach to the Gulf states and the increasing acknowledgment of India’s growing economic opportunities had, until recently, shielded India from official criticism over the discriminatory nature of India’s new citizenship law, as well as mounting reports of anti-Muslim violence following Modi’s reelection in May 2019. But blaming Muslims for the spread of the coronavirus in India seems to be a step too far for important actors in the Gulf—and could even upend its relations with the region. One key factor is that India’s approach toward Muslims is no longer simply an internal matter if its citizens based in the Gulf also promote Islamophobic rhetoric.
Criticism from noted Arab commentators such as the UAE’s Qassimi has led India to launch a damage control campaign. In a tweet in English on April 19, which was certainly directed toward both domestic and international audiences, Modi wrote that the coronavirus “does not see race, religion, colour, caste, creed, language or borders before striking.” Online hate speech from Indians based in Gulf states also led to an unprecedented statement from the Indian ambassador to the UAE warning against discrimination. Other Indian embassies also urged the Indian diaspora to remain vigilant against statements that could sow religious discord. Recognizing the need to further placate rising concerns, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s minister for external affairs, spoke to his counterparts in the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to reaffirm that India would continue to provide food supplies to Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan and would make available any medical treatment required to fight the pandemic.
For the moment, India’s emergency diplomacy seems to have worked. Most Gulf states have noted and welcomed the clarifications that New Delhi has offered and have communicated their desire to maintain and deepen friendly ties. The question is whether India can bottle up the mood of hate speech it seems to have unleashed—not only to calm things domestically but also to prevent further diplomatic embarrassments. If not, among many potential fallouts, it threatens to rend apart the deftly woven fabric of its ties with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--To Survive the Pandemic, Washington Needs to Learn How to Listen

To Survive the Pandemic , Washington Needs to Learn How to Listen Since the coronavirus pandemic began , public health officials across the globe have emerged as the most influential drivers of public policy .
In the United States , the most visible authorities are Anthony Fauci , the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , and Deborah Birx , the White House coronavirus response coordinator .
At the state level , governors such as New York ’ s Andrew Cuomo and California ’ s Gavin Newsom have stressed how their efforts are driven by science @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts .
In many respects , that is precisely as it should be during a pandemic .
But it also reveals a problem in how the United States has handled the crisis so far : A policy vacuum is being filled by one set of experts rather than a more comprehensive approach that balances risks and shifts when necessary .
The Cuban missile crisis is often held up as Exhibit A for how sound policy should be made .
For 13 fraught days in October 1962 , U.S. President John F. Kennedy huddled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assess the potential threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba and come up with a response that would simultaneously neutralize the threat without triggering an even more damaging war .
JFK heard from hard-line voices urging him to be more confrontational and from those suggesting a far more passive course .
Generals , Defense Department officials , diplomats , private citizens , and intelligence officers added their own distinct voices , each speaking from a perch of expertise .
Their positions were not always compatible .
The military officers , viewing the crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and years of scenario planning , advocated for different policies than the diplomats who were steeped in Soviet psychology and attuned to the shifting rhythms of the Kremlin .
In the end , JFK steered a narrow course between military confrontation and acquiescence .
Just how policy is made in the White House today is opaque , but between the deconstruction of the National Security Council staff and the apparent disinclination of the president to read his own intelligence briefings—or even attend regular meetings of the coronavirus task force—the process is clearly haphazard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worst .
The coronavirus task force headed by Vice President Mike Pence includes most cabinet officials , but it is unclear what that task force does other than react when pressure mounts .
And even then , it appears to do little besides offer vague guidelines and exhort states and the private sector to do more .
It would be as if JFK had managed the Cuban missile crisis via daily press briefings , leaving it to each agency and department to determine its own course , hoping that somehow it would all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failings of having little to no policy process have been long been obvious .
But the chaos in Washington amid the current crisis has a less noticed unintended consequence : Public health experts have largely filled the void , and thus national policy about both locking down and opening up , insofar as there is any , is being shaped almost entirely by their voices .
For sure , the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) only has the power to set guidelines , not enforce them .
But those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most large companies , for universities , for local businesses , and for many states .
Large companies , in particular , that have begun to plan for “ return to work ” have been following almost to the letter the CDC guidelines .
They have an incentive to do so based on possible legal liability if they do not , which is one reason Republicans in Congress are pushing for new laws to alleviate that legal burden if and when businesses resume .
Cuomo in his briefings has firmly grounded the path @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CDC guidelines , such as social distancing measures and rates of infection .
States including Ohio , Washington , and California have done much the same .
Yet something as central to all aspects of life as how to reopen economies needs more voices around the policy table .
Not having that would be as if the generals had been the primary drivers of how to prevent the Kremlin from installing nuclear missiles in Cuba .
JFK ’ s military advisors were the strongest advocates for using force .
During the crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to bomb Cuba before the missiles were operational—despite the fact that doing so would likely have pushed the United States and the Soviet Union into a war that might have gone nuclear .
JFK steered clear of that route thanks to a policy process that demanded input from multiple viewpoints .
President Donald Trump needs to do something similar today .
Public health officials must remain the preeminent voices .
These doctors and scientists have spent their whole careers preparing for precisely this moment .
They have gamed out scenarios , tested thousands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simulations .
They have prepared scripts for how to communicate to the public and precise plans for when to shut things down , how to shut things down , and when and how to start things up .
But one silo of expertise can not dictate all policy—regardless of the crisis .
The nature of expertise is not to see the big picture but to comprehend the particular as fully as possible .
If , in a vacuum , public health expertise is the only voice , it is as if the generals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and policy .
How might a more coherent process have altered the arc of the United States ’ lockdown decisions ?
There is , and likely will continue to be in the future , debate over whether the level and extent of lockdowns in the United States as well as Western Europe and India were the right response .
Already , there is the looming question of whether Sweden ’ s more hybrid response , relying on its high-trust culture to keep coronavirus numbers down , would have been a preferable path given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Even as Sweden will suffer economically and with higher mortality than its neighbors , it is not suffering the same level of societal ruptures that lockdowns generate .
Sweden is certainly being guided by public health wisdom , but in its case , a different path was chosen by those health officials .
In the United States , dissenting views within the public health profession do not seem evident , which suggests that there is no coherent process .
Until two months ago , there was a wider range of views about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ March , for instance , the World Health Organization ’ s guidelines , developed over years by experts in many countries , strongly advised against closing borders and halting travel , let alone societywide quarantines .
In a matter of weeks , many public health officials worldwide shifted gears , but as Sweden at least demonstrates , there were and are countervailing voices .
It is unclear if those voices are getting a hearing in the United States at the state or national level , but given the paucity of policy process , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Team B charged with assessing alternate courses .
Certainly , at the federal level , that would allow for weighing different options within the epidemiological and scientific community .
Without a better set of processes in the United States , it is unclear how minority and dissenting views within the public health community can or have gotten a fair hearing .
Even if policy driven by the public health playbook were in broad terms absolutely the right call , a process that involved a more coherent measuring of supply chain risks , health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have led to better policies that flattened the curve , did not eviscerate the economy , and maintained vital services more effectively .
For instance , the closing and emptying of hospitals was based on projections of overwhelmed systems .
For a period in March , it seemed as if that was a real risk , especially in New York .
But emptying out hospitals preemptively also has life-and-death costs that could have been better measured had there been coherent policy processes that weighed risks generated by halting everything at once and planned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organization come from Washington .
Or there could have been early recognition that food processing plants were susceptible to the spread of infections but also vital to keep open .
These policy failures are numerous and go far beyond the failings of testing and using the National Defense Act for supply production .
They speak to a larger inability to measure actions and consequences that public health officials can not and should not be expected to solve for .
As the United States moves forward , the country will need voices not bound @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into consideration the mounting problems that those scripts create .
It may be too late for a White House bereft of process to change course , but all of us—individually , in the private sector , in universities , in whatever public forums exist—can at least start listening to other voices , just as JFK listened to not just military experts but diplomats , economic advisors , and his own trusted councilors .
Is that a guarantee of good choices ?
Of course not , but it is the only path to them @

Since the coronavirus pandemic began, public health officials across the globe have emerged as the most influential drivers of public policy. In the United States, the most visible authorities are Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Deborah Birx, the White House coronavirus response coordinator. At the state level, governors such as New York’s Andrew Cuomo and California’s Gavin Newsom have stressed how their efforts are driven by science and by the counsel of public health experts.
Since the coronavirus pandemic began, public health officials across the globe have emerged as the most influential drivers of public policy. In the United States, the most visible authorities are Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Deborah Birx, the White House coronavirus response coordinator. At the state level, governors such as New York’s Andrew Cuomo and California’s Gavin Newsom have stressed how their efforts are driven by science and by the counsel of public health experts.
In many respects, that is precisely as it should be during a pandemic. But it also reveals a problem in how the United States has handled the crisis so far: A policy vacuum is being filled by one set of experts rather than a more comprehensive approach that balances risks and shifts when necessary.
The Cuban missile crisis is often held up as Exhibit A for how sound policy should be made. For 13 fraught days in October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy huddled with rotating groups of advisors in order to assess the potential threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba and come up with a response that would simultaneously neutralize the threat without triggering an even more damaging war. JFK heard from hard-line voices urging him to be more confrontational and from those suggesting a far more passive course. Generals, Defense Department officials, diplomats, private citizens, and intelligence officers added their own distinct voices, each speaking from a perch of expertise. Their positions were not always compatible. The military officers, viewing the crisis through the lens of missiles and casualties and years of scenario planning, advocated for different policies than the diplomats who were steeped in Soviet psychology and attuned to the shifting rhythms of the Kremlin. In the end, JFK steered a narrow course between military confrontation and acquiescence.
Just how policy is made in the White House today is opaque, but between the deconstruction of the National Security Council staff and the apparent disinclination of the president to read his own intelligence briefings—or even attend regular meetings of the coronavirus task force—the process is clearly haphazard at best and close to nonexistent at worst. The coronavirus task force headed by Vice President Mike Pence includes most cabinet officials, but it is unclear what that task force does other than react when pressure mounts. And even then, it appears to do little besides offer vague guidelines and exhort states and the private sector to do more. It would be as if JFK had managed the Cuban missile crisis via daily press briefings, leaving it to each agency and department to determine its own course, hoping that somehow it would all come out for the best.
The failings of having little to no policy process have been long been obvious. But the chaos in Washington amid the current crisis has a less noticed unintended consequence: Public health experts have largely filled the void, and thus national policy about both locking down and opening up, insofar as there is any, is being shaped almost entirely by their voices. For sure, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) only has the power to set guidelines, not enforce them. But those guidelines have become the governing strictures for most large companies, for universities, for local businesses, and for many states. Large companies, in particular, that have begun to plan for “return to work” have been following almost to the letter the CDC guidelines. They have an incentive to do so based on possible legal liability if they do not, which is one reason Republicans in Congress are pushing for new laws to alleviate that legal burden if and when businesses resume. Cuomo in his briefings has firmly grounded the path to the state’s reopening on CDC guidelines, such as social distancing measures and rates of infection. States including Ohio, Washington, and California have done much the same.
Yet something as central to all aspects of life as how to reopen economies needs more voices around the policy table. Not having that would be as if the generals had been the primary drivers of how to prevent the Kremlin from installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. JFK’s military advisors were the strongest advocates for using force. During the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged JFK to bomb Cuba before the missiles were operational—despite the fact that doing so would likely have pushed the United States and the Soviet Union into a war that might have gone nuclear.
JFK steered clear of that route thanks to a policy process that demanded input from multiple viewpoints. President Donald Trump needs to do something similar today. Public health officials must remain the preeminent voices. These doctors and scientists have spent their whole careers preparing for precisely this moment. They have gamed out scenarios, tested thousands of models, and run through numerous simulations. They have prepared scripts for how to communicate to the public and precise plans for when to shut things down, how to shut things down, and when and how to start things up.
But one silo of expertise cannot dictate all policy—regardless of the crisis. The nature of expertise is not to see the big picture but to comprehend the particular as fully as possible. If, in a vacuum, public health expertise is the only voice, it is as if the generals became the sole arbiters of military strategy and policy.
How might a more coherent process have altered the arc of the United States’ lockdown decisions? There is, and likely will continue to be in the future, debate over whether the level and extent of lockdowns in the United States as well as Western Europe and India were the right response. Already, there is the looming question of whether Sweden’s more hybrid response, relying on its high-trust culture to keep coronavirus numbers down, would have been a preferable path given the massive harms that a lockdown causes. Even as Sweden will suffer economically and with higher mortality than its neighbors, it is not suffering the same level of societal ruptures that lockdowns generate.
Sweden is certainly being guided by public health wisdom, but in its case, a different path was chosen by those health officials. In the United States, dissenting views within the public health profession do not seem evident, which suggests that there is no coherent process. Until two months ago, there was a wider range of views about the virtues of locking down. Until March, for instance, the World Health Organization’s guidelines, developed over years by experts in many countries, strongly advised against closing borders and halting travel, let alone societywide quarantines. In a matter of weeks, many public health officials worldwide shifted gears, but as Sweden at least demonstrates, there were and are countervailing voices. It is unclear if those voices are getting a hearing in the United States at the state or national level, but given the paucity of policy process, it is clear that there is no Team B charged with assessing alternate courses. Certainly, at the federal level, that would allow for weighing different options within the epidemiological and scientific community. Without a better set of processes in the United States, it is unclear how minority and dissenting views within the public health community can or have gotten a fair hearing.
Even if policy driven by the public health playbook were in broad terms absolutely the right call, a process that involved a more coherent measuring of supply chain risks, health care risks, and economic risks might have led to better policies that flattened the curve, did not eviscerate the economy, and maintained vital services more effectively.
For instance, the closing and emptying of hospitals was based on projections of overwhelmed systems. For a period in March, it seemed as if that was a real risk, especially in New York. But emptying out hospitals preemptively also has life-and-death costs that could have been better measured had there been coherent policy processes that weighed risks generated by halting everything at once and planned accordingly and had more coherent recommendations and organization come from Washington. Or there could have been early recognition that food processing plants were susceptible to the spread of infections but also vital to keep open. These policy failures are numerous and go far beyond the failings of testing and using the National Defense Act for supply production. They speak to a larger inability to measure actions and consequences that public health officials cannot and should not be expected to solve for.
As the United States moves forward, the country will need voices not bound entirely by pandemic scripts but that take into consideration the mounting problems that those scripts create. It may be too late for a White House bereft of process to change course, but all of us—individually, in the private sector, in universities, in whatever public forums exist—can at least start listening to other voices, just as JFK listened to not just military experts but diplomats, economic advisors, and his own trusted councilors. Is that a guarantee of good choices? Of course not, but it is the only path to them.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--The 2020 Oil Crash’s Unlikely Winner: Saudi Arabia

With 4 billion people around the world under lockdown as the coronavirus pandemic grows , demand for gasoline , jet fuel , and other petroleum products is in freefall , as are oil prices .
The price of a barrel of crude has been so low in the United States that sellers recently had to pay people to take it off their hands .
As a result , oil-dependent economies are reeling .
In the United States , the largest oil producer in the world , the number of rigs drilling for oil has plummeted 50 percent in just two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and gas producers could be insolvent within the year , and 220,000 oil workers are projected to lose their jobs .
Around the world , petrostates from Nigeria to Iraq to Kazakhstan are struggling and their currencies tanking .
Some , like Venezuela , face an economic and social abyss .
While 2020 will be remembered as a year of carnage for oil nations , however , at least one will most likely emerge from the pandemic stronger , both economically and geopolitically : Saudi Arabia .
First , Saudi Arabia is proving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as this .
Low oil prices are , of course , painful for a country that needs around $ 80 per barrel to balance its public budget , which is why Moody ’ s cut Saudi Arabia ’ s financial outlook last Friday .
Saudi Arabia ran a $ 9 billion deficit in the first quarter of 2020 .
Like other nations , the kingdom has also seen tax revenues fall as it imposes economic restrictions to halt the pandemic ’ s spread .
Last week , the Saudi finance minister said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ cut deeply ” and some parts of the kingdom ’ s Vision 2030 economic diversification plan would be delayed .
Yet unlike most other oil producers , Saudi Arabia has not only plump fiscal reserves but also the demonstrated capacity to borrow .
On April 22 , the finance minister announced the kingdom could borrow as much as $ 58 billion in 2020 .
Compared to most other economies , it has a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio : 24 percent as of the end of 2019 , although lately that figure has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Saudi Arabia would draw down up to $ 32 billion from its fiscal reserves .
With $ 474 billion held by the central bank in foreign exchange reserves , Saudi Arabia remains comfortably above the level of around $ 300 billion , which many consider the minimum to defend its currency , the riyal , which is pegged to the dollar .
Second , Saudi Arabia will end up with higher oil revenues and a bigger share of the oil market once the market stabilizes , thanks to production cuts and shutdowns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The current oil bust lays the groundwork for a price boom in the years ahead—and burgeoning revenues for Saudi Arabia .
While the outlook for future oil demand is highly uncertain , once you look beyond the immediate crisis , demand is likely to grow faster than supply.Saudi Arabia will end up with higher oil revenues and a bigger share of the oil market once the market stabilizes .
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects world oil demand to return to its pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2020 .
The International Energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demand to be only 2 to 3 percent below its 2019 average of 100 million barrels per day by the end of the year .
If measures to contain the pathogen last longer than expected or there is a second wave of the virus , the recovery will take longer , but most scenarios still expect demand to eventually recover .
Lifestyle changes could lower future oil demand , but the data suggests one should be skeptical of predictions of permanent shifts .
In China , for example , car travel and shipping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last year ’ s level , although air travel—which together with air freight accounts for 8 percent of world oil demand—remains down sharply .
Oil demand could actually get a boost if more people decide private cars make them feel safer than crowded mass transit .
Expectations that oil demand would be throttled by climate policy will likely be disappointed .
The economic distress imposed by the pandemic risks undermining environmental policy ambition , as does the current shift to isolationism and away from the kind of global cooperation required for effective climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , will take longer to return as shut-in production is lost , investment in new supply is scrapped , and the U.S. shale revolution slows .
With the oil glut pushing global oil storage to the limits—land-based storage will be full as soon as this month—an unprecedented number of producing oil wells will need to be shut off .
Doing so risks damaging the reservoirs .
Some of that supply will never come back , and some will take substantial time and investment to bring back online .
Energy Aspects , an oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day of supply could be at risk of semipermanent damage.Many U.S. companies struggling with uneconomical production only managed to stay afloat with infusions of cheap debt .
Major oil companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil have also slashed their capital expenditures in response to the price collapse .
Even without any growth in oil demand , around 6 million barrels per day of new oil supply must be brought online each year just to offset natural production declines .
Moreover , oil is already out of favor with investors concerned with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political and social pressures .
U.S. shale oil , in particular , will take years to return to its pre-coronavirus levels .
Depending on how long oil demand remains depressed , U.S. oil production is projected to decline by 30 percent from its pre-coronavirus peak of around 13 million barrels per day .
To be sure , recovering oil prices will raise U.S. production again .
Shale oil production remains economical , especially for the better-capitalized companies that will emerge once the assets of bankrupt companies change hands and the industry is consolidated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in recent years ( with production growing by about 1 million to 1.5 million barrels per day each year ) also reflected irrational exuberance in financial markets : Many U.S. companies struggling with uneconomical production only managed to stay afloat with infusions of cheap debt .
One-quarter of U.S. shale oil production may have been uneconomical even before prices crashed , according to Citigroup ’ s Ed Morse .
Without that froth , shale will grow more slowly , if at all .
Former Goldman Sachs analyst Arjun Murti estimates that even with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50 per barrel , annual U.S. output growth will be somewhere between zero and 500,000 barrels per day , a shadow of its former self .
Indeed , as COVID-19 sets the stage for tighter oil markets and higher prices , Saudi Arabia , along with a few other Gulf states and Russia , will not only benefit from higher prices but actually find opportunities to grow market share and sell more oil .
Even now , with prices severely depressed , Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are discussing bringing more oil to market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ border .
More economically vulnerable OPEC members may find it harder to invest in restarting and maintaining ( let alone increasing ) supply and will thus see output growth slow .
This is exactly what happened in Iran , Iraq , Nigeria , and Venezuela following the 1998-1999 oil crash .
By shoring up its alliance with the United States and reestablishing itself as the swing oil producer , Saudi Arabia has strengthened its geopolitical position .
Finally , by shoring up its fraying alliance with the United States and reestablishing itself as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ producer , Saudi Arabia has strengthened its geopolitical position .
As the major producers and consumers scrambled to prevent the oversupply of oil from overwhelming the world ’ s storage facilities , they finally turned to Saudi Arabia to lead OPEC and other key producers in a historic production cut .
For all the talk of oil production quotas in Texas or creating a new global oil cartel through the G-20 , calling Riyadh was the only real option available to policymakers at the end of the day—as it has long been .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ been the only country willing to hold , at significant cost , a meaningful amount of spare production capacity that allows it to add or subtract supply to or from the market quickly .
This singular position—which it just made plain once again to the world—gives the kingdom not only power over the global oil market but also significant geopolitical influence .
In a global market , that will remain true until nations use much less oil , which continues to be an important goal of climate policy .
By leading the effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi Arabia also reminded Moscow that Russia can not go it alone , as it attempted to do when it walked out of OPEC+ negotiations in March and set off the price war .
Moscow is more dependent on Riyadh in managing the oil market than vice versa , strengthening Saudi Arabia ’ s hand in their relationship—with likely repercussions in the Middle East , where Moscow has a growing military presence and cultivates allies including Syria and the Saudis ’ archenemy , Iran .
Additionally , Saudi Arabia has improved its standing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the White House and powerful senators , Saudi Arabia ’ s willingness to oblige by cutting production will reverse some of the damage done when Saudi Arabia was blamed for the oil crash after it surged production in March .
Saudi Arabia may also have undermined U.S. lawmakers ’ plans for anti-OPEC legislation—It ’ s difficult to argue OPEC is a harmful cartel when both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue just begged it to act like one.it ’ s difficult to argue OPEC is a harmful cartel when both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. vitriol will flare up again in the coming weeks , when a flotilla of Saudi tankers sent off during the price war two months ago will dump triple the normal level of deliveries onto an already saturated U.S. market .
But this only means that U.S. politicians will once again have to beseech Riyadh to extend or deepen supply cuts at the next OPEC+ meeting in June .
Only a few weeks ago , the outlook for Saudi Arabia seemed bleak .
But looking out a few years , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other than a strengthened position .
COVID-19 may end up doing what Saudi leaders failed to do once before , when they let oil prices crash in late 2014 in a misguided attempt to debilitate U.S. shale .
Beyond the immediate crisis , the pandemic will end up bolstering Saudi Arabia ’ s geopolitical position , reinforcing its pivotal role in oil markets , and sowing the seeds for higher market share and oil revenues in the years ahead .

With 4 billion people around the world under lockdown as the coronavirus pandemic grows, demand for gasoline, jet fuel, and other petroleum products is in freefall, as are oil prices. The price of a barrel of crude has been so low in the United States that sellers recently had to pay people to take it off their hands. As a result, oil-dependent economies are reeling . In the United States, the largest oil producer in the world, the number of rigs drilling for oil has plummeted 50 percent in just two months, almost 40 percent of oil and gas producers could be insolvent within the year, and 220,000 oil workers are projected to lose their jobs. Around the world, petrostates from Nigeria to Iraq to Kazakhstan are struggling and their currencies tanking. Some, like Venezuela, face an economic and social abyss.
With 4 billion people around the world under lockdown as the coronavirus pandemic grows, demand for gasoline, jet fuel, and other petroleum products is in freefall, as are oil prices. The price of a barrel of crude has been so low in the United States that sellers recently had to pay people to take it off their hands. As a result, oil-dependent economies are reeling. In the United States, the largest oil producer in the world, the number of rigs drilling for oil has plummeted 50 percent in just two months, almost 40 percent of oil and gas producers could be insolvent within the year, and 220,000 oil workers are projected to lose their jobs. Around the world, petrostates from Nigeria to Iraq to Kazakhstan are struggling and their currencies tanking. Some, like Venezuela, face an economic and social abyss.
While 2020 will be remembered as a year of carnage for oil nations, however, at least one will most likely emerge from the pandemic stronger, both economically and geopolitically: Saudi Arabia.
First, Saudi Arabia is proving that its finances can weather a storm such as this. Low oil prices are, of course, painful for a country that needs around $80 per barrel to balance its public budget, which is why Moody’s cut Saudi Arabia’s financial outlook last Friday. Saudi Arabia ran a $9 billion deficit in the first quarter of 2020. Like other nations, the kingdom has also seen tax revenues fall as it imposes economic restrictions to halt the pandemic’s spread. Last week, the Saudi finance minister said that government spending would need to be “cut deeply” and some parts of the kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic diversification plan would be delayed.
Yet unlike most other oil producers, Saudi Arabia has not only plump fiscal reserves but also the demonstrated capacity to borrow. On April 22, the finance minister announced the kingdom could borrow as much as $58 billion in 2020. Compared to most other economies, it has a relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio: 24 percent as of the end of 2019, although lately that figure has been rising. The finance minister also said Saudi Arabia would draw down up to $32 billion from its fiscal reserves. With $474 billion held by the central bank in foreign exchange reserves, Saudi Arabia remains comfortably above the level of around $300 billion, which many consider the minimum to defend its currency, the riyal, which is pegged to the dollar.
Second, Saudi Arabia will end up with higher oil revenues and a bigger share of the oil market once the market stabilizes, thanks to production cuts and shutdowns forced by the global economic collapse. The current oil bust lays the groundwork for a price boom in the years ahead—and burgeoning revenues for Saudi Arabia. While the outlook for future oil demand is highly uncertain, once you look beyond the immediate crisis, demand is likely to grow faster than supply.Saudi Arabia will end up with higher oil revenues and a bigger share of the oil market once the market stabilizes.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects world oil demand to return to its pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2020. The International Energy Agency is almost as optimistic, projecting demand to be only 2 to 3 percent below its 2019 average of 100 million barrels per day by the end of the year. If measures to contain the pathogen last longer than expected or there is a second wave of the virus, the recovery will take longer, but most scenarios still expect demand to eventually recover.
Lifestyle changes could lower future oil demand, but the data suggests one should be skeptical of predictions of permanent shifts. In China, for example, car travel and shipping by truck is already nearly back to last year’s level, although air travel—which together with air freight accounts for 8 percent of world oil demand—remains down sharply. Oil demand could actually get a boost if more people decide private cars make them feel safer than crowded mass transit. Expectations that oil demand would be throttled by climate policy will likely be disappointed. The economic distress imposed by the pandemic risks undermining environmental policy ambition, as does the current shift to isolationism and away from the kind of global cooperation required for effective climate policy.
Oil supply, by contrast, will take longer to return as shut-in production is lost, investment in new supply is scrapped, and the U.S. shale revolution slows. With the oil glut pushing global oil storage to the limits—land-based storage will be full as soon as this month—an unprecedented number of producing oil wells will need to be shut off. Doing so risks damaging the reservoirs. Some of that supply will never come back, and some will take substantial time and investment to bring back online. Energy Aspects, an oil consultancy, projects 4 million barrels per day of supply could be at risk of semipermanent damage.Many U.S. companies struggling with uneconomical production only managed to stay afloat with infusions of cheap debt.
Major oil companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil have also slashed their capital expenditures in response to the price collapse. Even without any growth in oil demand, around 6 million barrels per day of new oil supply must be brought online each year just to offset natural production declines. Moreover, oil is already out of favor with investors concerned with the industry’s poor returns and rising political and social pressures.
U.S. shale oil, in particular, will take years to return to its pre-coronavirus levels. Depending on how long oil demand remains depressed, U.S. oil production is projected to decline by 30 percent from its pre-coronavirus peak of around 13 million barrels per day. To be sure, recovering oil prices will raise U.S. production again. Shale oil production remains economical, especially for the better-capitalized companies that will emerge once the assets of bankrupt companies change hands and the industry is consolidated.
Yet shale’s heady growth in recent years (with production growing by about 1 million to 1.5 million barrels per day each year) also reflected irrational exuberance in financial markets: Many U.S. companies struggling with uneconomical production only managed to stay afloat with infusions of cheap debt. One-quarter of U.S. shale oil production may have been uneconomical even before prices crashed, according to Citigroup’s Ed Morse. Without that froth, shale will grow more slowly, if at all. Former Goldman Sachs analyst Arjun Murti estimates that even with U.S. oil prices recovering to around $50 per barrel, annual U.S. output growth will be somewhere between zero and 500,000 barrels per day, a shadow of its former self.
Indeed, as COVID-19 sets the stage for tighter oil markets and higher prices, Saudi Arabia, along with a few other Gulf states and Russia, will not only benefit from higher prices but actually find opportunities to grow market share and sell more oil. Even now, with prices severely depressed, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are discussing bringing more oil to market from a jointly held field straddling their border. More economically vulnerable OPEC members may find it harder to invest in restarting and maintaining (let alone increasing) supply and will thus see output growth slow. This is exactly what happened in Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela following the 1998-1999 oil crash. By shoring up its alliance with the United States and reestablishing itself as the swing oil producer, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its geopolitical position.
Finally, by shoring up its fraying alliance with the United States and reestablishing itself as the global oil market’s swing producer, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its geopolitical position. As the major producers and consumers scrambled to prevent the oversupply of oil from overwhelming the world’s storage facilities, they finally turned to Saudi Arabia to lead OPEC and other key producers in a historic production cut. For all the talk of oil production quotas in Texas or creating a new global oil cartel through the G-20, calling Riyadh was the only real option available to policymakers at the end of the day—as it has long been. That is because Saudi Arabia has long been the only country willing to hold, at significant cost, a meaningful amount of spare production capacity that allows it to add or subtract supply to or from the market quickly. This singular position—which it just made plain once again to the world—gives the kingdom not only power over the global oil market but also significant geopolitical influence. In a global market, that will remain true until nations use much less oil, which continues to be an important goal of climate policy.
By leading the effort to craft an OPEC+ production cut, Saudi Arabia also reminded Moscow that Russia cannot go it alone, as it attempted to do when it walked out of OPEC+ negotiations in March and set off the price war. Moscow is more dependent on Riyadh in managing the oil market than vice versa, strengthening Saudi Arabia’s hand in their relationship—with likely repercussions in the Middle East, where Moscow has a growing military presence and cultivates allies including Syria and the Saudis’ archenemy, Iran.
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has improved its standing in Washington. Following intense pressure from the White House and powerful senators, Saudi Arabia’s willingness to oblige by cutting production will reverse some of the damage done when Saudi Arabia was blamed for the oil crash after it surged production in March. Saudi Arabia may also have undermined U.S. lawmakers’ plans for anti-OPEC legislation—It’s difficult to argue OPEC is a harmful cartel when both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue just begged it to act like one.it’s difficult to argue OPEC is a harmful cartel when both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue just begged it to act like one. U.S. vitriol will flare up again in the coming weeks, when a flotilla of Saudi tankers sent off during the price war two months ago will dump triple the normal level of deliveries onto an already saturated U.S. market. But this only means that U.S. politicians will once again have to beseech Riyadh to extend or deepen supply cuts at the next OPEC+ meeting in June.
Only a few weeks ago, the outlook for Saudi Arabia seemed bleak. But looking out a few years, it’s difficult to see the kingdom in anything other than a strengthened position. COVID-19 may end up doing what Saudi leaders failed to do once before, when they let oil prices crash in late 2014 in a misguided attempt to debilitate U.S. shale. Beyond the immediate crisis, the pandemic will end up bolstering Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical position, reinforcing its pivotal role in oil markets, and sowing the seeds for higher market share and oil revenues in the years ahead.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-05--Senators Question Fitness of Trump’s Nominee for Intelligence Chief

Rep. John Ratcliffe , a Trump loyalist without intelligence experience nominated by the U.S. president to become the nation ’ s top intelligence chief , faced a deeply divided panel of U.S. senators on Tuesday .
Over the course of his Senate confirmation hearing , Democratic lawmakers questioned his fitness for the post in the wake of his fiery support for President Donald Trump during the impeachment trial and the president ’ s own chronic misrepresentation of facts that has put him at odds with the U.S. intelligence community in the past .
Ratcliffe , a Republican from Texas who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the job by some fellow Republicans as well as Democrats , sought to portray himself as a director of national intelligence who would leave politics at the door to deliver “ unvarnished ” truth to the president .
But some critics , wary of his lack of experience in the intelligence community , are worried that he ’ ll put political loyalty ahead of his responsibilities to deliver intelligence assessments to the president .
Ratcliffe withdrew himself from consideration for the post in August 2019 , after facing criticism that he lacked the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump resubmitted his nomination in February .
“ I think he is the most unqualified person ever formally nominated to this position , ” said Larry Pfeiffer , who spent 32 years in the U.S. intelligence community and served as chief of staff to CIA Director Michael Hayden .
Ratcliffe , if confirmed , would take the helm of the U.S. intelligence community as it faces unprecedented levels of political pressure from the president and his allies .
His rocky path to the nomination came in the wake of a hyperpartisan impeachment investigation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. intelligence official , as well as years of simmering discord between Trump and other senior officials inside the intelligence community .
Those tensions led to the firing or forced resignation of key senior intelligence officials in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence ( ODNI ) , leaving the office without a single Senate-confirmed official .
Ratcliffe became one of Trump ’ s fiercest defenders during the impeachment inquiry , accusing Democrats of helping write the whistleblower complaint when there was no evidence they had done so and misrepresenting other facts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigation in the House .
Veteran intelligence officials have voiced concerns over the health of the ODNI under Richard Grenell , Trump ’ s acting intelligence chief .
Grenell , a political loyalist with no prior experience in intelligence , has overseen a hiring freeze and reorganization of the office and engaged in high-profile Twitter spats with political rivals that former intelligence officials view as unbecoming of the office .
“ I think it ’ s best if the DNI has actually served in an intelligence position , preferably as an Agency director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ James Clapper , who served as director of national intelligence for nearly seven years .
Ratcliffe sought to allay concerns about his nomination during the hearing , held in a sparse hearing room on Capitol Hill on Tuesday to adhere to social distancing measures during the coronavirus pandemic .
( Senators rotated in and out of the room to question Ratcliffe to minimize the number of people in the room at a time . )
“ If confirmed as DNI , my top priority will be to present the president , senior policymakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence to better inform decisions about the future and safety of our great nation , ” he said .
“ As the president ’ s principal intelligence advisor I would ensure that all intelligence is collected , analyzed , and reported without bias , prejudice , or political influence.
” A lawyer by trade , Ratcliffe is a member of the House intelligence , judiciary , and ethics committees .
He formerly served as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Texas from 2007 to 2008 and mayor of Heath , Texas from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who reacted coolly to his initial nomination—have since expressed support for him , in part because they feel ODNI simply needs a Senate-confirmed leader as soon as possible to restore the office ’ s clout .
“ I know he ’ s ready to get to work leading the intelligence community , which has continued to do its vital work under increasingly difficult conditions , ” said Republican Sen. Richard Burr , the chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee .
“ We need to be able to count on a leader to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , serving only with the security and safety of the American people in mind , and I believe John Ratcliffe is the person to do that job , ” said Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn , who introduced Ratcliffe at the hearing .
If the senators fail to give their seal of approval to Ratcliffe , a law on government vacancies stipulates that the acting director of national intelligence can remain in the position for another seven months , effectively forcing lawmakers to choose between Ratcliffe and Grenell , who also has no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hearing also grilled Ratcliffe on his record during the impeachment investigation , intelligence on the origins of the coronavirus pandemic , foreign interference in the 2020 elections , and how he would protect the intelligence community and whistleblowers from political pressures .
Under questioning from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein , Ratcliffe pledged to protect whistleblowers if confirmed as director of national intelligence .
“ Every whistleblower , past , present , and future , will enjoy every protection under the law .
I don ’ t want to relitigate old issues of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said .
“ Whistleblowers are so important , a whistleblower doctor in China is one of the reasons we got an earlier warning , ” he added , referring to the initial coronavirus outbreak in the Chinese city of Wuhan .
Accountability advocates have long been skeptical about Ratcliffe ’ s commitment to whistleblowers .
“ I ’ m mostly concerned with his potential effect on whistleblowing , ” said Irvin McCullough , a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project , a nonprofit whistleblower protection organization .
Intelligence community employees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whistle on perceived wrongdoing due to the sensitivity of their work , leaving considerable power in the hands of the director of national intelligence to accept or reject complaints brought forward .
“ There ’ s certainly a chilling effect for intelligence community employees that would watch him become DNI , ” McCullough said .
When Trump first tapped Ratcliffe for the job in July 2019 , he said he did so to “ rein in ” the U.S. intelligence community .
“ We need somebody like that there , ” the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that can really rein it in , because , as I think you ’ ve all learned , the intelligence agencies have run amok .
They ’ ve run amok.
” “ I don ’ t think that the men and women of the intelligence community are running amok , ” Ratcliffe said Tuesday when pressed on the comments .
The intelligence committee was thrust into the spotlight during the impeachment investigation into Trump .
Ratcliffe emerged as one of the president ’ s most vocal defenders , downplaying evidence of a quid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and castigating the whistleblower whose complaint kickstarted the investigation .
As the House Judiciary Committee weighed articles of impeachment in December , Ratcliffe responded to a question about whether it was ever appropriate to a president to solicit foreign interference in an election , Ratcliffe said , “ The answer is yes .
It better be , we do it all the time.
” During the hearing , Ratcliffe also made clear his top priority as director of national intelligence would be China , with a focus of confirming how the pandemic spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed , the intelligence community will be laser-focused on getting all of the answers that we can regarding how this happened , when this happened , and I commit to providing [ you ] with as much transparency to you as the law will allow , ” he told lawmakers .
Trump has claimed he has intelligence indicating the new coronavirus emerged in a Chinese laboratory .
But intelligence circulated among the United States and its closest allies reportedly suggests this is “ highly unlikely , ” and the more likely scenario is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to humans—the latest example of the president disputing or contradicting U.S. intelligence assessments .
Some former intelligence officials say Ratcliffe ’ s record during the impeachment trial should prevent him from getting the job .
“ He is patently and aggressively a partisan extremist , he has difficulty with the truth and consorts with fringe , extremist , and conspiracy theorists , ” said John Sipher , a former member of the CIA ’ s Senior Intelligence Service .
Democratic Sen. Mark Warner , the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current state of the ODNI , which was initially established in 2004 to coordinate work across the various agencies in the intelligence community .
In the past year , senior ODNI officials were either sacked or forced to step down from their posts in the wake of the impeachment saga or for providing intelligence assessments that undercut the president ’ s own claims .
Among those removed from their posts were Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats , Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon , acting Director of National Intelligence Joseph @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Counterterrorism Center Russ Travers , and Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Michael Atkinson .
“ What we ’ ve seen over the last year has been especially dangerous : the systematic firing of anyone at the ODNI who has had the temerity to speak truth to power , ” Warner told Ratcliffe during the hearing .
“ Some have suggested that your main qualification for confirmation to this post is that you are not Ambassador Grenell , ” he added .
“ But frankly , that ’ s not enough .
”

Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon and Jack Detsch

Rep. John Ratcliffe, a Trump loyalist without intelligence experience nominated by the U.S. president to become the nation’s top intelligence chief, faced a deeply divided panel of U.S. senators on Tuesday. Over the course of his Senate confirmation hearing, Democratic lawmakers questioned his fitness for the post in the wake of his fiery support for President Donald Trump during the impeachment trial and the president’s own chronic misrepresentation of facts that has put him at odds with the U.S. intelligence community in the past.
Rep. John Ratcliffe, a Trump loyalist without intelligence experience nominated by the U.S. president to become the nation’s top intelligence chief, faced a deeply divided panel of U.S. senators on Tuesday. Over the course of his Senate confirmation hearing, Democratic lawmakers questioned his fitness for the post in the wake of his fiery support for President Donald Trump during the impeachment trial and the president’s own chronic misrepresentation of facts that has put him at odds with the U.S. intelligence community in the past.
Ratcliffe, a Republican from Texas who at one point was considered unqualified for the job by some fellow Republicans as well as Democrats, sought to portray himself as a director of national intelligence who would leave politics at the door to deliver “unvarnished” truth to the president.
But some critics, wary of his lack of experience in the intelligence community, are worried that he’ll put political loyalty ahead of his responsibilities to deliver intelligence assessments to the president. Ratcliffe withdrew himself from consideration for the post in August 2019, after facing criticism that he lacked the right qualifications and embellished his resume. Trump resubmitted his nomination in February.
“I think he is the most unqualified person ever formally nominated to this position,” said Larry Pfeiffer, who spent 32 years in the U.S. intelligence community and served as chief of staff to CIA Director Michael Hayden.
Ratcliffe, if confirmed, would take the helm of the U.S. intelligence community as it faces unprecedented levels of political pressure from the president and his allies. His rocky path to the nomination came in the wake of a hyperpartisan impeachment investigation started by a whistleblower complaint from a U.S. intelligence official, as well as years of simmering discord between Trump and other senior officials inside the intelligence community. Those tensions led to the firing or forced resignation of key senior intelligence officials in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), leaving the office without a single Senate-confirmed official.
Ratcliffe became one of Trump’s fiercest defenders during the impeachment inquiry, accusing Democrats of helping write the whistleblower complaint when there was no evidence they had done so and misrepresenting other facts and statements from witnesses throughout the Democratic-led investigation in the House.
Veteran intelligence officials have voiced concerns over the health of the ODNI under Richard Grenell, Trump’s acting intelligence chief. Grenell, a political loyalist with no prior experience in intelligence, has overseen a hiring freeze and reorganization of the office and engaged in high-profile Twitter spats with political rivals that former intelligence officials view as unbecoming of the office.
“I think it’s best if the DNI has actually served in an intelligence position, preferably as an Agency director, as a minimum,” said James Clapper, who served as director of national intelligence for nearly seven years.
Ratcliffe sought to allay concerns about his nomination during the hearing, held in a sparse hearing room on Capitol Hill on Tuesday to adhere to social distancing measures during the coronavirus pandemic. (Senators rotated in and out of the room to question Ratcliffe to minimize the number of people in the room at a time.)
“If confirmed as DNI, my top priority will be to present the president, senior policymakers in this committee with objective and timely intelligence to better inform decisions about the future and safety of our great nation,” he said. “As the president’s principal intelligence advisor I would ensure that all intelligence is collected, analyzed, and reported without bias, prejudice, or political influence.”
A lawyer by trade, Ratcliffe is a member of the House intelligence, judiciary, and ethics committees. He formerly served as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Texas from 2007 to 2008 and mayor of Heath, Texas from 2004 to 2012.
Republican senators—including those who reacted coolly to his initial nomination—have since expressed support for him, in part because they feel ODNI simply needs a Senate-confirmed leader as soon as possible to restore the office’s clout. “I know he’s ready to get to work leading the intelligence community, which has continued to do its vital work under increasingly difficult conditions,” said Republican Sen. Richard Burr, the chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee.
“We need to be able to count on a leader to operate free of personal or political motivation, serving only with the security and safety of the American people in mind, and I believe John Ratcliffe is the person to do that job,” said Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn, who introduced Ratcliffe at the hearing.
If the senators fail to give their seal of approval to Ratcliffe, a law on government vacancies stipulates that the acting director of national intelligence can remain in the position for another seven months, effectively forcing lawmakers to choose between Ratcliffe and Grenell, who also has no previous intelligence experience.
Senators in the hearing also grilled Ratcliffe on his record during the impeachment investigation, intelligence on the origins of the coronavirus pandemic, foreign interference in the 2020 elections, and how he would protect the intelligence community and whistleblowers from political pressures.
Under questioning from Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ratcliffe pledged to protect whistleblowers if confirmed as director of national intelligence. “Every whistleblower, past, present, and future, will enjoy every protection under the law. I don’t want to relitigate old issues of what happened during the impeachment inquiry,” he said.
“Whistleblowers are so important, a whistleblower doctor in China is one of the reasons we got an earlier warning,” he added, referring to the initial coronavirus outbreak in the Chinese city of Wuhan.
Accountability advocates have long been skeptical about Ratcliffe’s commitment to whistleblowers. “I’m mostly concerned with his potential effect on whistleblowing,” said Irvin McCullough, a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project, a nonprofit whistleblower protection organization.
Intelligence community employees have more restricted opportunities to blow the whistle on perceived wrongdoing due to the sensitivity of their work, leaving considerable power in the hands of the director of national intelligence to accept or reject complaints brought forward. “There’s certainly a chilling effect for intelligence community employees that would watch him become DNI,” McCullough said.
When Trump first tapped Ratcliffe for the job in July 2019, he said he did so to “rein in” the U.S. intelligence community. “We need somebody like that there,” the president said. “We need somebody strong that can really rein it in, because, as I think you’ve all learned, the intelligence agencies have run amok. They’ve run amok.”
“I don’t think that the men and women of the intelligence community are running amok,” Ratcliffe said Tuesday when pressed on the comments.
The intelligence committee was thrust into the spotlight during the impeachment investigation into Trump. Ratcliffe emerged as one of the president’s most vocal defenders, downplaying evidence of a quid pro quo over military aid to Ukraine and castigating the whistleblower whose complaint kickstarted the investigation. As the House Judiciary Committee weighed articles of impeachment in December, Ratcliffe responded to a question about whether it was ever appropriate to a president to solicit foreign interference in an election, Ratcliffe said, “The answer is yes. It better be, we do it all the time.”
During the hearing, Ratcliffe also made clear his top priority as director of national intelligence would be China, with a focus of confirming how the pandemic spread in the first place. “If confirmed, the intelligence community will be laser-focused on getting all of the answers that we can regarding how this happened, when this happened, and I commit to providing [you] with as much transparency to you as the law will allow,” he told lawmakers.
Trump has claimed he has intelligence indicating the new coronavirus emerged in a Chinese laboratory. But intelligence circulated among the United States and its closest allies reportedly suggests this is “highly unlikely,” and the more likely scenario is that the virus spread naturally from animals to humans—the latest example of the president disputing or contradicting U.S. intelligence assessments.
Some former intelligence officials say Ratcliffe’s record during the impeachment trial should prevent him from getting the job. “He is patently and aggressively a partisan extremist, he has difficulty with the truth and consorts with fringe, extremist, and conspiracy theorists,” said John Sipher, a former member of the CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service.
Democratic Sen. Mark Warner, the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also raised concerns over the current state of the ODNI, which was initially established in 2004 to coordinate work across the various agencies in the intelligence community. In the past year, senior ODNI officials were either sacked or forced to step down from their posts in the wake of the impeachment saga or for providing intelligence assessments that undercut the president’s own claims. Among those removed from their posts were Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon, acting Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire, acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Russ Travers, and Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Michael Atkinson.
“What we’ve seen over the last year has been especially dangerous: the systematic firing of anyone at the ODNI who has had the temerity to speak truth to power,” Warner told Ratcliffe during the hearing. “Some have suggested that your main qualification for confirmation to this post is that you are not Ambassador Grenell,” he added. “But frankly, that’s not enough.”