foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong

Eleven massive dams straddle the mighty Mekong River before it leaves China and flows into Myanmar , Laos , Thailand , Cambodia , and on into Vietnam .
Yet I have long been skeptical that China could use those 11 upstream dams , massive as they are , to turn off the tap for the countries downstream .
Too many people ’ s livelihoods , including 20 percent of the world ’ s freshwater fish catch , are dependent on the monsoonal ebb and flow of the Mekong .
Yes , dams might store water for a time , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generators ’ spinning turbines or open floodgates .
Holding on to that water for leverage seemed like a diplomatic blunder .
Since China began building these dams in the early 1990s , the downstream countries have worried China could use its massive cascade of reservoirs—they have a capacity to store as much water as is in the Chesapeake Bay—to hold them hostage .
When I gave talks on my recent book , Last Days of the Mighty Mekong , I often felt audiences were disappointed that I avoided reflexively painting China as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries of Laos , Vietnam , Thailand , and Cambodia build dams and extract sand , fish , and water from the river can also harm a fragile system .
China considers water management data to be a state secret , and , barring new evidence , it has always been difficult to reach defensible conclusions about China ’ s management water levels in the Mekong River .
That is , until this month , when remarkable new data became public .
It shines a dramatic light on how much water China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries suffered through unprecedented drought .
Every year , the Mekong River rises and falls in cycle with the rainy season , when a massive pulse of water driven by monsoon rains and Himalayan snow melt flows downstream .
Yet along the Thai-Lao border between June and November of last year the mainstream of the Mekong ran dry , the river bed and shoals were exposed , and isolated pools of flopping fish were unable to reach their spawning grounds .
That July , as the mainstream ’ s level fell so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Thai government mobilized its army to conduct relief efforts .
In the fall , Tonle Sap Lake will typically fill with monsoon waters rushing in from the mainstream for five months , providing Cambodians with up to 70 percent of their protein .
Last year , the expansion of the lake , often described as the Mekong ’ s heartbeat , lasted just five weeks , and reports suggest it produced a fraction of the normal 500,000 tons of food .
Observers , myself included , initially concluded that the abysmally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to low precipitation in the broad Mekong Basin .
An El Niño weather pattern still today leaves most of the region suffering from its worst drought on record .
In Vietnam ’ s Mekong Delta , millions of people are currently without access to freshwater .
But a new study from the U.S-.based climate consultant Eyes on Earth provides us with a different reason : For six months in 2019 , China ’ s dams blocked an unprecedented amount of water from entering the lower Mekong .
The amount of water withheld was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time since modern records have been kept , there was no monsoon-driven rise in water levels just over the Chinese border in Chiang Saen , Thailand .
Eyes on Earth ’ s new data also shows that while an extreme drought persisted downstream , China ’ s section of the river , home to many of its massive dams , was wetter than usual .
Eyes on Earth ’ s data shows the upper reaches of the Mekong Basin received above-normal amounts of water—nearly all of which was held back .
My team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Google Earth Engine .
If China ’ s dams were not there to alter flow between the upstream and the downstream , then there would have been enough water in the mainstream to keep it at or above normal levels for most of the Thai-Lao border area .
In addition to the major finding that during the 2019 monsoon , China ’ s dams totally prevented the Mekong mainstream from filling itself along the Thai-Lao border , the study also reveals that China has been restricting more and more water over time—particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dam went online in stages between 2012 and 2014 .
Additionally , the study ’ s evidence explains the extreme floods that happen out of nowhere along the Thai-Lao border during the dry season , sometimes causing the river level to jump several meters overnight and delivering millions of dollars in damages to local riverside communities .
( My research team took a deep dive into these other findings here . )
These are important findings , not just for the results but the methodology .
For the first time , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of China to monitor the operations and impacts caused by China ’ s dams .
Eyes on Earth ’ s methods are easily replicated , relatively inexpensive , and have the capability to be monitored in near-real time .
Daily satellite imagery from private imaging firms also can clearly show what ’ s happening in those upstream reservoirs .
Still , China ’ s upstream actions are puzzling , particularly the 2019 decision to break the Mekong mainstream by restricting more water than ever before .
Is this the result of a coordinated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heel ?
Beijing might simply prefer to use the water before sending it downstream , but inducing record-low river levels and driving a potential food security crisis hardly seems like a rational method for improving Chinese diplomacy in its backyard .
Alternatively , perhaps competition or corruption networks between dam operators and the government are preventing accurate reservoir readings from making their way to the decision tables in Beijing where the Mekong diplomacy shots are called .
While Beijing prefers to keep transboundary river discourse inside a black box , we know that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a powerful impact on China ’ s closed politics .
In 2008 , as Beijing ’ s skies became increasingly polluted from industrial emissions and automobile exhaust , the U.S. Embassy in Beijing began publishing air quality readings to show just how dangerous Beijing ’ s air was to breathe .
While the Chinese government denied the data ’ s validity , the embassy numbers were increasingly embraced as common knowledge by Beijingers .
Eventually the Chinese authorities installed air quality monitoring systems throughout the country and embarked on an effective educational and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Many developing countries with high levels of air pollution also followed China ’ s example .
Eyes on Earth ’ s data , which is derived from peer-reviewed methods and has been described to me as “ beyond reproach ” by experienced hydrologists , is equally impeccable .
And as initially with the air quality data , China ’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has categorically rejected the Eyes on Earth study as a U.S. government-driven conspiracy—a claim made even before the U.S. government-funded study was published on Mekongwater.org , the official website @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Data Initiative .
But if the evidence continues to show the degree to which China is restricting water from the Mekong mainstream , perhaps Beijing will be compelled to make an about-face .
They could decide to share data with downstream countries from its numerous monitoring stations and reservoirs upstream , something China has been loath to do since the first dam was built three decades ago .
Given the fragile ecology of the downstream Mekong , ever-increasing drought , and the tens of millions of people who rely on the river to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s own best interests to cooperate with its neighbors .
Science has reduced my own reluctance to draw firm conclusions on the impact of China ’ s upstream dams .
It may change minds in Beijing and across Southeast Asia too .

Eleven massive dams straddle the mighty Mekong River before it leaves China and flows into Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and on into Vietnam. Yet I have long been skeptical that China could use those 11 upstream dams, massive as they are, to turn off the tap for the countries downstream. Too many people’s livelihoods, including 20 percent of the world’s freshwater fish catch, are dependent on the monsoonal ebb and flow of the Mekong. Yes, dams might store water for a time, but eventually that water must flow downstream through generators’ spinning turbines or open floodgates. Holding on to that water for leverage seemed like a diplomatic blunder.
Eleven massive dams straddle the mighty Mekong River before it leaves China and flows into Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and on into Vietnam. Yet I have long been skeptical that China could use those 11 upstream dams, massive as they are, to turn off the tap for the countries downstream. Too many people’s livelihoods, including 20 percent of the world’s freshwater fish catch, are dependent on the monsoonal ebb and flow of the Mekong. Yes, dams might store water for a time, but eventually that water must flow downstream through generators’ spinning turbines or open floodgates. Holding on to that water for leverage seemed like a diplomatic blunder.
Since China began building these dams in the early 1990s, the downstream countries have worried China could use its massive cascade of reservoirs—they have a capacity to store as much water as is in the Chesapeake Bay—to hold them hostage. When I gave talks on my recent book, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, I often felt audiences were disappointed that I avoided reflexively painting China as the upstream boogeyman. The way the downstream countries of Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia build dams and extract sand, fish, and water from the river can also harm a fragile system.
China considers water management data to be a state secret, and, barring new evidence, it has always been difficult to reach defensible conclusions about China’s management water levels in the Mekong River. That is, until this month, when remarkable new data became public. It shines a dramatic light on how much water China’s upstream dams have blocked—even as downstream countries suffered through unprecedented drought.
Every year, the Mekong River rises and falls in cycle with the rainy season, when a massive pulse of water driven by monsoon rains and Himalayan snow melt flows downstream. Yet along the Thai-Lao border between June and November of last year the mainstream of the Mekong ran dry, the river bed and shoals were exposed, and isolated pools of flopping fish were unable to reach their spawning grounds.
That July, as the mainstream’s level fell so far that irrigation pumps could not reach it, the Thai government mobilized its army to conduct relief efforts. In the fall, Tonle Sap Lake will typically fill with monsoon waters rushing in from the mainstream for five months, providing Cambodians with up to 70 percent of their protein. Last year, the expansion of the lake, often described as the Mekong’s heartbeat, lasted just five weeks, and reports suggest it produced a fraction of the normal 500,000 tons of food.
Impact of the Nuozhadu Dam on the Mekong River
Observers, myself included, initially concluded that the abysmally low levels in the mainstream were due to low precipitation in the broad Mekong Basin. An El Niño weather pattern still today leaves most of the region suffering from its worst drought on record. In Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, millions of people are currently without access to freshwater. But a new study from the U.S-.based climate consultant Eyes on Earth provides us with a different reason: For six months in 2019, China’s dams blocked an unprecedented amount of water from entering the lower Mekong. The amount of water withheld was so large that, for the first time since modern records have been kept, there was no monsoon-driven rise in water levels just over the Chinese border in Chiang Saen, Thailand.
Eyes on Earth’s new data also shows that while an extreme drought persisted downstream, China’s section of the river, home to many of its massive dams, was wetter than usual. Eyes on Earth’s data shows the upper reaches of the Mekong Basin received above-normal amounts of water—nearly all of which was held back. My team corroborated that evidence with remote sensing data from Google Earth Engine. If China’s dams were not there to alter flow between the upstream and the downstream, then there would have been enough water in the mainstream to keep it at or above normal levels for most of the Thai-Lao border area.
Comparing Water Levels on the Mekong
In addition to the major finding that during the 2019 monsoon, China’s dams totally prevented the Mekong mainstream from filling itself along the Thai-Lao border, the study also reveals that China has been restricting more and more water over time—particularly during the monsoon seasons—since its behemoth Nuozhadu Dam went online in stages between 2012 and 2014. Additionally, the study’s evidence explains the extreme floods that happen out of nowhere along the Thai-Lao border during the dry season, sometimes causing the river level to jump several meters overnight and delivering millions of dollars in damages to local riverside communities. (My research team took a deep dive into these other findings here.)
This monthly progression of satellite images taken of the reservoir above the Jinghong Dam on the Mekong in China shows the reservoir was mostly full for the 12 months from May 2019 to April 2020. This reservoir is the most downstream of China’s 11 megadams and its releases directly impact the gauge reading in Chiang Saen, Thailand. None of China’s 11 upstream Mekong reservoirs show evidence of increasingly low levels throughout the 2019 monsoon season.
Nuozhadu Dam: The monthly progression of satellite images taken of the reservoir above the Nuozhadu Dam on the Mekong in China shows the reservoir gradually filling as the monsoon season progresses and remaining full until April 2020. The reservoir of the dam is one of the largest in the world and to illustrate, can store about half of the water in the Chesapeake Bay.
These are important findings, not just for the results but the methodology. For the first time, it is possible for researchers and Mekong watchers outside of China to monitor the operations and impacts caused by China’s dams. Eyes on Earth’s methods are easily replicated, relatively inexpensive, and have the capability to be monitored in near-real time. Daily satellite imagery from private imaging firms also can clearly show what’s happening in those upstream reservoirs.
Still, China’s upstream actions are puzzling, particularly the 2019 decision to break the Mekong mainstream by restricting more water than ever before. Is this the result of a coordinated policy to bring the Mekong countries to heel? Beijing might simply prefer to use the water before sending it downstream, but inducing record-low river levels and driving a potential food security crisis hardly seems like a rational method for improving Chinese diplomacy in its backyard. Alternatively, perhaps competition or corruption networks between dam operators and the government are preventing accurate reservoir readings from making their way to the decision tables in Beijing where the Mekong diplomacy shots are called.
2019 Wet Season Precipitation in the Mekong Delta
While Beijing prefers to keep transboundary river discourse inside a black box, we know that evidence-based processes from outside sources can have a powerful impact on China’s closed politics. In 2008, as Beijing’s skies became increasingly polluted from industrial emissions and automobile exhaust, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing began publishing air quality readings to show just how dangerous Beijing’s air was to breathe. While the Chinese government denied the data’s validity, the embassy numbers were increasingly embraced as common knowledge by Beijingers. Eventually the Chinese authorities installed air quality monitoring systems throughout the country and embarked on an effective educational and policy campaign to curb air pollution. Many developing countries with high levels of air pollution also followed China’s example.
Eyes on Earth’s data, which is derived from peer-reviewed methods and has been described to me as “beyond reproach” by experienced hydrologists, is equally impeccable. And as initially with the air quality data, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has categorically rejected the Eyes on Earth study as a U.S. government-driven conspiracy—a claim made even before the U.S. government-funded study was published on Mekongwater.org, the official website of the U.S. State Department-led Mekong Water Data Initiative. But if the evidence continues to show the degree to which China is restricting water from the Mekong mainstream, perhaps Beijing will be compelled to make an about-face.
They could decide to share data with downstream countries from its numerous monitoring stations and reservoirs upstream, something China has been loath to do since the first dam was built three decades ago. Given the fragile ecology of the downstream Mekong, ever-increasing drought, and the tens of millions of people who rely on the river to survive, it is in China’s own best interests to cooperate with its neighbors.
Science has reduced my own reluctance to draw firm conclusions on the impact of China’s upstream dams. It may change minds in Beijing and across Southeast Asia too.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--North Macedonia’s Orthodox Church Could Become a Coronavirus Super-Spreader

Easter and religious holidays this year looked different than they have in previous years .
The Vatican decided to close the churches for Easter , and Pope Francis delivered his “ Urbi et Orbi ” message ( a blessing reserved for solemn occasions ) behind the closed doors of St. Peter ’ s Basilica .
Saudi Arabia banned prayers at mosques .
In Greece , the Greek Orthodox Church ’ s Holy Synod said all churches would remain closed during the Easter period , and it invited believers to pray at home .
Greece ’ s northern neighbor , North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ route .
The country ’ s government , which has otherwise closed down almost all nonessential businesses and even went as far as to forbid people from leaving their homes at various times , decided to allow churches to be open on the Orthodox Maundy Thursday and Good Friday ( April 16 and April 17 given that in Eastern Orthodox Christianity , Easter this year occurred one week after the Catholic Easter ) .
The Macedonian Orthodox Church , for its part , acted in line with what it had previously promised it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days to give communion to the people inside with shared spoons .
When the television station Telma asked Metropolitan Timothy , a spokesman for the Macedonian Orthodox Church , whether priests would keep using the same spoon to give communion to people given the worldwide pandemic , he said , “ Absolutely.
” “ Whoever is scared shouldn ’ t come , ” he added .
“ We aren ’ t going to change a centuries-old tradition.
” In response to this , the government of North Macedonia decided to turn a blind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Hassan Rouhani said mosques would be closed until at least May 4 , or the more moderate approach in Israel , which allowed outdoor prayer for up to 19 people , North Macedonia ’ s lawmakers did not even go as far as banning serving communion or ordering priests to do it using disposable plastic spoons .
Due to the government-imposed curfew , people weren ’ t allowed to leave their homes on the weekend ( during Holy Saturday or Easter Sunday ) , so the days the church promised to give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Good Friday .
Prime Minister Oliver Spasovski , the head of North Macedonia ’ s government , publicly stated that churches would be allowed to remain open for those two days .
“ We haven ’ t issued a decree for closing down religious objects nor for not practicing religion because those can ’ t be issued , ” Spasovski said last week .
“ Regardless of the state the country ’ s in , that ’ s a right that is inviolable.
” Article 8 of North Macedonia ’ s Law on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Communities , and Religious Groups says that “ the freedom to express one ’ s religion or belief can be limited by law only if such limitation is indispensable to the interests of public safety , public order , health or morals , or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
” The act of communion in the Eastern Orthodox Church involves priests placing bread into a wine-filled chalice .
The bread and the wine symbolize the body and blood of Christ .
As the bread soaks in the wine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to put a piece of the bread into the mouth of each believer .
At the end , the priest drinks whatever wine is left in the chalice .
In an interview with TV21 , Presbyter Boban Mitevski from the archbishop ’ s cabinet went so far as to blame nonbelievers .
“ They haven ’ t provided any facts that communion and using the same spoon could transmit any disease , ” he said .
Last Thursday and Friday , believers flocked to churches , lining up to be served communion by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , many believers used the time spent in church to kiss the same icons .
It is hard to pin down a number on how many people went to church services , but churches across the country were open .
The scary part is that these people might take up to two weeks to feel any symptoms and many may unwittingly infect people around them during that time .
The services drew comparisons to a soccer game hosted by Atalanta , a Bergamo-based team in Italy ’ s Serie A , which many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in that region , and the church meetings that spread it in South Korea .
These events happened in February .
Clearly , the world ’ s understanding of the virus has evolved greatly since then .
This decision to allow church services has led many to conclude that the same government that has closed businesses , imposed sanctions on people ’ s movement , and has overall taken the coronavirus issue very seriously decided to make an exception for religious groups for strictly populist reasons .
The Macedonian Orthodox Church is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the fact that it got special treatment is an exemplary case of a government acting irresponsibly in the face of a worldwide pandemic and impending domestic elections .
North Macedonia joined NATO on March 27 .
The country , which has long been striving for a NATO and EU membership invitation , was able to achieve the coveted feat after overcoming a decades-long naming dispute with Greece , which saw the country , in the end , add “ North ” in front of Macedonia .
( Both countries consider the name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their history and culture . )
Making the compromise , for the traditionally left-leaning political party in power that brokered the deal , came at a cost .
Internally , a sizable amount of the population opposed the deal and blamed the party for lack of patriotism and for selling off national interests .
Like in many other Balkan countries , in North Macedonia the idea of religious belonging goes hand in hand with ethnic pride in forming national identity .
The Macedonian Orthodox Church is the largest religious organization in the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rural areas .
So why , then , would the government suddenly allow for hundreds of people to put the same spoon in their mouths—when it is clear that doing so goes against all the recommendations of its own health minister and medical experts , who have been reiterating the importance of maintaining social distance and coughing in a tissue so as to not spread the virus through droplets of saliva ?
“ Naked political opportunism ” is what Goran Mihajlovski , one of the most famous Macedonian columnists , called it in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlet Sakam Da Kazam .
What makes the decision to allow churches to give communion with the same spoon that much more strange is that North Macedonia has otherwise imposed particularly stringent measures to stop the spread of the coronavirus .
The city of Debar , where the first cluster of cases appeared , has been under total quarantine since March 14 .
North Macedonia ’ s government decided to close down all schools on March 10 , several days before countries that were hit much harder by the virus , including France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Grocery stores face large fines if they don ’ t have a guard outside the store who sprays disinfectant and makes sure there are at least 6 feet in between customers .
Perhaps the most radical measure of all ?
For a few weeks now , residents—except for those carrying special permits , like doctors , certain pharmacy workers , soldiers , firefighters , police , and people who take care of the elderly—have not been allowed to leave their homes at all on weekends and between 4 p.m. and 5 a.m. on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s response to the threat is its health minister , Venko Filipce .
With his calm , clear , and concise press briefings , Filipce , a neurosurgeon by training , has become for Macedonians what Gov .
Andrew Cuomo is for New Yorkers—a voice of objectivity and comforting professionalism .
The health minister , aided by a number of virologists and epidemiologists , has led a wide-reaching campaign to explain the behavioral patterns people should implement in order to help flatten the curve .
So far , the government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new cases , so as to not overburden the country ’ s health system .
At 4 p.m. on Good Friday ( April 17 ) in North Macedonia , the longest quarantine in the country ’ s recent history began .
It was intended to last until 5 a.m. on Tuesday ( April 21 ) , a total of 85 hours .
The only people allowed to leave their homes during this time were people with special permits .
The rest stayed at home for more than three and a half days to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ someone outside their household .
There is no way of knowing , at least at the moment , how many people who took communion were carrying the virus , but it is a fact that any possible transmission in that setting could have been easily prevented by simply not allowing churches to serve communion with the same spoon .
North Macedonia was set to have early parliamentary elections on April 12 that were postponed due to the coronavirus .
The new date will not be decided until after the end of the state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has done well on the international stage but that has been marred internally by inefficiency , corruption at home , and an inability to meet its own promises of delivering the much-needed judicial reforms , it needs every vote it can get .
The largest opposition party , VMRO-DPMNE , a traditionally right-wing party that is usually the first one to criticize the government , was eerily silent on the issue of keeping the churches open and using the same spoon .
The opposition party ’ s president himself went to church on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party officials posted on social media .
The concept of appealing to religious voters isn ’ t a novelty invented by Macedonian politicians .
One of the more well-known examples of such populism is Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro , who deemed churches essential services , exempted them from coronavirus lockdowns , and called them “ the last shelter ” for many people .
Another one is the far-right Italian politician , and up until recently a deputy prime minister , Matteo Salvini , who called on churches to reopen for Easter .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religion going against common sense , and the government ’ s servility to its voting bloc , no matter the consequences .
For now , all that responsible Eastern Orthodox Christians , members of other religions , atheists , and agnostics across the country can do is pray or hope that this doesn ’ t end up causing an explosion in the numbers of infected people in the days and weeks to come .
The damage may already be done .

Easter and religious holidays this year looked different than they have in previous years.
The Vatican decided to close the churches for Easter, and Pope Francis delivered his “Urbi et Orbi” message (a blessing reserved for solemn occasions) behind the closed doors of St. Peter’s Basilica. Saudi Arabia banned prayers at mosques. In Greece, the Greek Orthodox Church’s Holy Synod said all churches would remain closed during the Easter period, and it invited believers to pray at home.
Greece’s northern neighbor, North Macedonia, however, took a different route.
The country’s government, which has otherwise closed down almost all nonessential businesses and even went as far as to forbid people from leaving their homes at various times, decided to allow churches to be open on the Orthodox Maundy Thursday and Good Friday (April 16 and April 17 given that in Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Easter this year occurred one week after the Catholic Easter). The Macedonian Orthodox Church, for its part, acted in line with what it had previously promised it intended to do: use the two days to give communion to the people inside with shared spoons.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
When the television station Telma asked Metropolitan Timothy, a spokesman for the Macedonian Orthodox Church, whether priests would keep using the same spoon to give communion to people given the worldwide pandemic, he said, “Absolutely.” “Whoever is scared shouldn’t come,” he added. “We aren’t going to change a centuries-old tradition.”
In response to this, the government of North Macedonia decided to turn a blind eye. Unlike in Iran, where President Hassan Rouhani said mosques would be closed until at least May 4, or the more moderate approach in Israel, which allowed outdoor prayer for up to 19 people, North Macedonia’s lawmakers did not even go as far as banning serving communion or ordering priests to do it using disposable plastic spoons.
Due to the government-imposed curfew, people weren’t allowed to leave their homes on the weekend (during Holy Saturday or Easter Sunday), so the days the church promised to give communion to believers were Maundy Thursday and Good Friday.
Last Thursday and Friday, believers flocked to churches, lining up to be served communion by the priests. Aside from taking communion, many believers used the time spent in church to kiss the same icons.
Prime Minister Oliver Spasovski, the head of North Macedonia’s government, publicly stated that churches would be allowed to remain open for those two days.
“We haven’t issued a decree for closing down religious objects nor for not practicing religion because those can’t be issued,” Spasovski said last week. “Regardless of the state the country’s in, that’s a right that is inviolable.”
Article 8 of North Macedonia’s Law on the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities, and Religious Groups says that “the freedom to express one’s religion or belief can be limited by law only if such limitation is indispensable to the interests of public safety, public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The act of communion in the Eastern Orthodox Church involves priests placing bread into a wine-filled chalice. The bread and the wine symbolize the body and blood of Christ. As the bread soaks in the wine, the priests use the same spoon to put a piece of the bread into the mouth of each believer. At the end, the priest drinks whatever wine is left in the chalice.
In an interview with TV21, Presbyter Boban Mitevski from the archbishop’s cabinet went so far as to blame nonbelievers. “They haven’t provided any facts that communion and using the same spoon could transmit any disease,” he said.
Last Thursday and Friday, believers flocked to churches, lining up to be served communion by the priests. Aside from taking communion, many believers used the time spent in church to kiss the same icons.
It is hard to pin down a number on how many people went to church services, but churches across the country were open. The scary part is that these people might take up to two weeks to feel any symptoms and many may unwittingly infect people around them during that time.
The services drew comparisons to a soccer game hosted by Atalanta, a Bergamo-based team in Italy’s Serie A, which many believe was significant in spreading the virus in that region, and the church meetings that spread it in South Korea. These events happened in February. Clearly, the world’s understanding of the virus has evolved greatly since then.
This decision to allow church services has led many to conclude that the same government that has closed businesses, imposed sanctions on people’s movement, and has overall taken the coronavirus issue very seriously decided to make an exception for religious groups for strictly populist reasons. The Macedonian Orthodox Church is an influential institution with plenty of followers, and the fact that it got special treatment is an exemplary case of a government acting irresponsibly in the face of a worldwide pandemic and impending domestic elections.
North Macedonia joined NATO on March 27. The country, which has long been striving for a NATO and EU membership invitation, was able to achieve the coveted feat after overcoming a decades-long naming dispute with Greece, which saw the country, in the end, add “North” in front of Macedonia. (Both countries consider the name Macedonia to be an indelible part of their history and culture.) Making the compromise, for the traditionally left-leaning political party in power that brokered the deal, came at a cost. Internally, a sizable amount of the population opposed the deal and blamed the party for lack of patriotism and for selling off national interests.
Like in many other Balkan countries, in North Macedonia the idea of religious belonging goes hand in hand with ethnic pride in forming national identity. The Macedonian Orthodox Church is the largest religious organization in the country and has followers in both urban and rural areas.
So why, then, would the government suddenly allow for hundreds of people to put the same spoon in their mouths—when it is clear that doing so goes against all the recommendations of its own health minister and medical experts, who have been reiterating the importance of maintaining social distance and coughing in a tissue so as to not spread the virus through droplets of saliva?
“Naked political opportunism” is what Goran Mihajlovski, one of the most famous Macedonian columnists, called it in his weekly column for the online news outlet Sakam Da Kazam.
What makes the decision to allow churches to give communion with the same spoon that much more strange is that North Macedonia has otherwise imposed particularly stringent measures to stop the spread of the coronavirus.
The city of Debar, where the first cluster of cases appeared, has been under total quarantine since March 14. North Macedonia’s government decided to close down all schools on March 10, several days before countries that were hit much harder by the virus, including France and the United Kingdom, did. Grocery stores face large fines if they don’t have a guard outside the store who sprays disinfectant and makes sure there are at least 6 feet in between customers.
Perhaps the most radical measure of all? For a few weeks now, residents—except for those carrying special permits, like doctors, certain pharmacy workers, soldiers, firefighters, police, and people who take care of the elderly—have not been allowed to leave their homes at all on weekends and between 4 p.m. and 5 a.m. on weekdays.
At the forefront of the country’s response to the threat is its health minister, Venko Filipce. With his calm, clear, and concise press briefings, Filipce, a neurosurgeon by training, has become for Macedonians what Gov. Andrew Cuomo is for New Yorkers—a voice of objectivity and comforting professionalism. The health minister, aided by a number of virologists and epidemiologists, has led a wide-reaching campaign to explain the behavioral patterns people should implement in order to help flatten the curve. So far, the government has been able to manage the number of new cases, so as to not overburden the country’s health system.
At 4 p.m. on Good Friday (April 17) in North Macedonia, the longest quarantine in the country’s recent history began. It was intended to last until 5 a.m. on Tuesday (April 21), a total of 85 hours. The only people allowed to leave their homes during this time were people with special permits.
The rest stayed at home for more than three and a half days to decrease the chances of closely interacting with someone outside their household. There is no way of knowing, at least at the moment, how many people who took communion were carrying the virus, but it is a fact that any possible transmission in that setting could have been easily prevented by simply not allowing churches to serve communion with the same spoon.
North Macedonia was set to have early parliamentary elections on April 12 that were postponed due to the coronavirus. The new date will not be decided until after the end of the state of emergency.
For a government that has done well on the international stage but that has been marred internally by inefficiency, corruption at home, and an inability to meet its own promises of delivering the much-needed judicial reforms, it needs every vote it can get.
The largest opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, a traditionally right-wing party that is usually the first one to criticize the government, was eerily silent on the issue of keeping the churches open and using the same spoon. The opposition party’s president himself went to church on Good Friday and took photos, which party officials posted on social media.
The concept of appealing to religious voters isn’t a novelty invented by Macedonian politicians. One of the more well-known examples of such populism is Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who deemed churches essential services, exempted them from coronavirus lockdowns, and called them “the last shelter” for many people. Another one is the far-right Italian politician, and up until recently a deputy prime minister, Matteo Salvini, who called on churches to reopen for Easter.
The Macedonian example illustrates the power of organized religion going against common sense, and the government’s servility to its voting bloc, no matter the consequences.
For now, all that responsible Eastern Orthodox Christians, members of other religions, atheists, and agnostics across the country can do is pray or hope that this doesn’t end up causing an explosion in the numbers of infected people in the days and weeks to come. The damage may already be done.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--The Pandemic Is Cover for a Crackdown in Hong Kong

The Pandemic Is Cover for a Crackdown in Hong Kong When COVID-19 broke out in China this year , Hong Kong was on the front lines .
It was not an unfamiliar place for the city that weathered the SARS epidemic in 2003 .
But with virus news now dominating headlines , it is easy to forget that it was only a few months ago that headlines in Hong Kong were dominated by the protests that consumed the city for seven months last year .
The Hong Kong community ’ s automatic avoidance of public gatherings in times of epidemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong essentially ended in January , yet support for the protests remains strong .
A poll conducted for Reuters by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute in late March showed that 58 percent of respondents remained in favor of the protests and only 28 percent against .
As a result , activism and dissent continue in Hong Kong , and while it has been taking a different form in the coronavirus era , the legacy of the 2019 protests continues to influence events in 2020 .
At the same time , Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin taking retribution for Hong Kong ’ s open defiance of China ’ s rule last year .
Recent weeks have seen bellicose rhetoric from Beijing and Hong Kong leaders , castigating pro-democracy legislators for filibustering the work of the legislature and reiterating the need for Hong Kong to introduce controversial anti-subversion legislation .
Last weekend , a sweeping mass arrest campaign saw 15 pro-democracy leaders detained for their part in last year ’ s protests , including such senior figures such as Martin Lee , the founder of the Democratic Party , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of that party .
The arrests have confirmed the main legacy of 2019 : the sense that the Hong Kong government is no longer acting in the best interests of its people .
The protest movement itself began with an example of this writ large : a proposed law that would have enabled the extradition of criminal suspects from Hong Kong to face trial in mainland Chinese courts .
The proposal was seen as a betrayal of the public trust , an act solely in the interests of Beijing and contrary to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty under the “ one country , two systems ” formula and Hong Kongers given a “ high degree of autonomy.
” However , recent years have seen that autonomy steadily eroded , and many saw the extradition bill as yet another attack on the integrity of “ one country , two systems.
” As the protests developed into a monthslong pro-democracy movement , and the government remained intransigent , Beijing mobilized various public institutions in Hong Kong to support the government line and oppose the protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MTR ( operator of the city ’ s subway system ) , from the Airport Authority and Hong Kong ’ s flag-carrier airline , Cathay Pacific , to the city ’ s largest bank , HSBC , all were pressed into service by Beijing and forced to publicly take a stand against the protests .
The result was a collapse of public trust in these institutions whose identity had hitherto been closely tied to that of the city and on which citizens relied in their day-to-day lives .
This destruction of institutional trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s management of the coronavirus and led to something of a paradoxical situation : Hong Kong has been among the world leaders in controlling the virus—Hong Kong , a city of over 7 million people , has recorded just over 1,000 cases and only four coronavirus-related deaths—yet Hong Kongers overwhelmingly credit themselves , rather than the government , with that victory .
A poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong for the South China Morning Post revealed that 72 percent of respondents agreed with the statement “ If Hong Kong avoids @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to the community response.
” Only 24 percent of respondents agreed that the government should take the credit .
It is true that one of the legacies of the SARS epidemic of 2003 was a high level of community awareness : Hong Kong has good public hygiene , face masks are de rigueur every flu season , and woe betide anyone who coughs on public transport .
But SARS also meant that the city ’ s health care administrators had a tried-and-tested playbook when the novel coronavirus reared its head .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus cases , and the government implemented vigorous testing , contract tracing , and quarantine arrangements , all of which have helped contain the spread of the virus .
But the administration ’ s notoriously poor communication skills meant that even this positive outcome became a public relations disaster .
The government mismanaged messaging around virus containment measures and mask-wearing .
Press conferences became a fiasco , with the public making a game of observing when Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her cabinet members failed to wear masks or donned them incorrectly .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ deferential to Beijing in managing the closure of the border with the mainland .
The virus also added fuel to the already smoldering anti-mainland sentiment , which on occasion has manifested in ugly xenophobia .
There were reports of Hong Kong restaurants refusing to serve customers speaking Mandarin Chinese—local Hong Kongers speak the Cantonese dialect—and calls for closure of the mainland border were often phrased in racist terms .
“ Save Hong Kong , ban Chinese tourists now ” and “ Say no to China locusts ” read some signs at a protest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The fraught issue of the mainland border became the center of a conflict in which the legacy of 2019 loomed large .
During the 2019 protests , general strikes were called on in an attempt to place pressure on the government .
While some of these strike actions were partially successful—a general strike on Aug. 5 , for example , succeeded in shutting down the city for a day—the strikes did not attract a critical mass .
The largest labor group in Hong Kong is the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Unions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not a mere Communist Party front like unions in the mainland , was nevertheless not going to support an anti-government strike .
This constraint did not escape the attention of activists .
In the months following the strike , a wave of new , independent unions were formed , not only to protect labor rights and worker welfare but also as a platform for resistance against the authorities .
One of those newly formed unions represented employees of the government ’ s Hospital Authority .
In February , in the early stages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance , called a strike demanding that the Hong Kong government close the borders with the mainland to prevent imported cases of infection .
The union said the strike was necessary to protect the health and safety of health care sector workers , but it also clearly had a political agenda in its attempt to put pressure on the government to change its policy .
If any test case was needed for Hong Kong ’ s new union movement , it quickly proved its effectiveness .
Shortly after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she would close down most ports of entry to the mainland and imposed a mandatory quarantine for any mainland arrivals .
The public remained convinced that the community had yet again come to Hong Kong ’ s rescue , forcing the government to act .
A call to arms that emerged during the 2019 protests— “ Save our own Hong Kong ” —encapsulates this self-help response of the Hong Kong community .
When the government has lost the public trust but there is no mechanism to vote it out , the community must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face of the coronavirus , it has been doing just that .
Political parties and other civil society groups have contributed to the effort : In the face of a surgical mask shortage in the early stages of the virus outbreak , the pro-democracy party Demosisto sourced 100,000 masks from the United States , which were distributed to those in need .
Local pro-democracy district councilors , elected in a landslide during council elections last November , have been conducting community education programs on the virus and distributing masks and other essential goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ robust civil society : a fiercely independent media , unafraid to hold public officials to account ; academic freedom , with leading academics offering public critiques of government policy ; and outspoken medical professionals actively sharing their advice and opinions directly with the community .
It is a civil society that Hong Kongers are justly proud of and that contrasts sharply with what they see when they look across the border at the fate of whistleblowing doctors and outspoken citizen journalists on the mainland .
Yet , with last weekend ’ s arrests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to come in connection with the 2019 protests as Beijing seeks to tighten its grip on Hong Kong , the gap between the “ two systems ” seems to be closing .
It is precisely this contrast driving the development of a distinct Hong Kong identity that lies at the heart of political protest in the city .
With public discontent still high and the legacy of 2019 continuing to breed new methods of resistance , after the coronavirus threat has passed , 2020 may see Hong Kong facing yet another summer of @ @

When COVID-19 broke out in China this year, Hong Kong was on the front lines. It was not an unfamiliar place for the city that weathered the SARS epidemic in 2003. But with virus news now dominating headlines, it is easy to forget that it was only a few months ago that headlines in Hong Kong were dominated by the protests that consumed the city for seven months last year.
When COVID-19 broke out in China this year, Hong Kong was on the front lines. It was not an unfamiliar place for the city that weathered the SARS epidemic in 2003. But with virus news now dominating headlines, it is easy to forget that it was only a few months ago that headlines in Hong Kong were dominated by the protests that consumed the city for seven months last year.
The Hong Kong community’s automatic avoidance of public gatherings in times of epidemic meant that major street protests in Hong Kong essentially ended in January, yet support for the protests remains strong. A poll conducted for Reuters by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute in late March showed that 58 percent of respondents remained in favor of the protests and only 28 percent against. As a result, activism and dissent continue in Hong Kong, and while it has been taking a different form in the coronavirus era, the legacy of the 2019 protests continues to influence events in 2020.
At the same time, Beijing has taken advantage of global distraction to begin taking retribution for Hong Kong’s open defiance of China’s rule last year. Recent weeks have seen bellicose rhetoric from Beijing and Hong Kong leaders, castigating pro-democracy legislators for filibustering the work of the legislature and reiterating the need for Hong Kong to introduce controversial anti-subversion legislation. Last weekend, a sweeping mass arrest campaign saw 15 pro-democracy leaders detained for their part in last year’s protests, including such senior figures such as Martin Lee, the founder of the Democratic Party, and Albert Ho, a former chair of that party.
The arrests have confirmed the main legacy of 2019: the sense that the Hong Kong government is no longer acting in the best interests of its people. The protest movement itself began with an example of this writ large: a proposed law that would have enabled the extradition of criminal suspects from Hong Kong to face trial in mainland Chinese courts. The proposal was seen as a betrayal of the public trust, an act solely in the interests of Beijing and contrary to the interests of the Hong Kong people. Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty under the “one country, two systems” formula and Hong Kongers given a “high degree of autonomy.” However, recent years have seen that autonomy steadily eroded, and many saw the extradition bill as yet another attack on the integrity of “one country, two systems.”
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
As the protests developed into a monthslong pro-democracy movement, and the government remained intransigent, Beijing mobilized various public institutions in Hong Kong to support the government line and oppose the protesters. From the police force to the MTR (operator of the city’s subway system), from the Airport Authority and Hong Kong’s flag-carrier airline, Cathay Pacific, to the city’s largest bank, HSBC, all were pressed into service by Beijing and forced to publicly take a stand against the protests. The result was a collapse of public trust in these institutions whose identity had hitherto been closely tied to that of the city and on which citizens relied in their day-to-day lives.
This destruction of institutional trust has colored reactions to the government’s management of the coronavirus and led to something of a paradoxical situation: Hong Kong has been among the world leaders in controlling the virus—Hong Kong, a city of over 7 million people, has recorded just over 1,000 cases and only four coronavirus-related deaths—yet Hong Kongers overwhelmingly credit themselves, rather than the government, with that victory. A poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong for the South China Morning Post revealed that 72 percent of respondents agreed with the statement “If Hong Kong avoids a large-scale epidemic, it will be due to the community response.” Only 24 percent of respondents agreed that the government should take the credit.
It is true that one of the legacies of the SARS epidemic of 2003 was a high level of community awareness: Hong Kong has good public hygiene, face masks are de rigueur every flu season, and woe betide anyone who coughs on public transport. But SARS also meant that the city’s health care administrators had a tried-and-tested playbook when the novel coronavirus reared its head. The hospital system was well prepared to handle virus cases, and the government implemented vigorous testing, contract tracing, and quarantine arrangements, all of which have helped contain the spread of the virus.
But the administration’s notoriously poor communication skills meant that even this positive outcome became a public relations disaster. The government mismanaged messaging around virus containment measures and mask-wearing. Press conferences became a fiasco, with the public making a game of observing when Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her cabinet members failed to wear masks or donned them incorrectly. Lam was also regarded as being overly deferential to Beijing in managing the closure of the border with the mainland.
The virus also added fuel to the already smoldering anti-mainland sentiment, which on occasion has manifested in ugly xenophobia. There were reports of Hong Kong restaurants refusing to serve customers speaking Mandarin Chinese—local Hong Kongers speak the Cantonese dialect—and calls for closure of the mainland border were often phrased in racist terms. “Save Hong Kong, ban Chinese tourists now” and “Say no to China locusts” read some signs at a protest in the central business district in February.
The fraught issue of the mainland border became the center of a conflict in which the legacy of 2019 loomed large. During the 2019 protests, general strikes were called on in an attempt to place pressure on the government. While some of these strike actions were partially successful—a general strike on Aug. 5, for example, succeeded in shutting down the city for a day—the strikes did not attract a critical mass.
The largest labor group in Hong Kong is the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, which, while a genuine labor organization and not a mere Communist Party front like unions in the mainland, was nevertheless not going to support an anti-government strike. This constraint did not escape the attention of activists. In the months following the strike, a wave of new, independent unions were formed, not only to protect labor rights and worker welfare but also as a platform for resistance against the authorities.
One of those newly formed unions represented employees of the government’s Hospital Authority. In February, in the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, that union, the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance, called a strike demanding that the Hong Kong government close the borders with the mainland to prevent imported cases of infection. The union said the strike was necessary to protect the health and safety of health care sector workers, but it also clearly had a political agenda in its attempt to put pressure on the government to change its policy.
If any test case was needed for Hong Kong’s new union movement, it quickly proved its effectiveness. Shortly after the strike began, Lam announced that she would close down most ports of entry to the mainland and imposed a mandatory quarantine for any mainland arrivals. The public remained convinced that the community had yet again come to Hong Kong’s rescue, forcing the government to act.
A call to arms that emerged during the 2019 protests—“Save our own Hong Kong”—encapsulates this self-help response of the Hong Kong community. When the government has lost the public trust but there is no mechanism to vote it out, the community must take action itself. And in the face of the coronavirus, it has been doing just that.
Political parties and other civil society groups have contributed to the effort: In the face of a surgical mask shortage in the early stages of the virus outbreak, the pro-democracy party Demosisto sourced 100,000 masks from the United States, which were distributed to those in need. Local pro-democracy district councilors, elected in a landslide during council elections last November, have been conducting community education programs on the virus and distributing masks and other essential goods to constituents.
Hong Kong has a robust civil society: a fiercely independent media, unafraid to hold public officials to account; academic freedom, with leading academics offering public critiques of government policy; and outspoken medical professionals actively sharing their advice and opinions directly with the community. It is a civil society that Hong Kongers are justly proud of and that contrasts sharply with what they see when they look across the border at the fate of whistleblowing doctors and outspoken citizen journalists on the mainland.
Yet, with last weekend’s arrests, and the prospect of more arrests to come in connection with the 2019 protests as Beijing seeks to tighten its grip on Hong Kong, the gap between the “two systems” seems to be closing.
It is precisely this contrast driving the development of a distinct Hong Kong identity that lies at the heart of political protest in the city. With public discontent still high and the legacy of 2019 continuing to breed new methods of resistance, after the coronavirus threat has passed, 2020 may see Hong Kong facing yet another summer of discontent.


Climate and Security

Politicization & Weaponization of Water by State and Above : A water vendor pushes a cart on April 30 , 2013 ahead of a military vehicle in Baga , Nigeria .
Water scarcity , in particular , remains a subject of economic and security concerns for national governments and key external stakeholders in the region , with events occurring in MENA foreshadowing the types of water-related conflicts and resource-management challenges that will increasingly apply to , and be instructive for , the rest of the world .
Notably , the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ( GERD ) project , started @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point and increasing source of tension for the last decade , given its potential to deprive or potentially cut off Egypt from its primary water source : 85 percent of Egypt ’ s water supply travels through Ethiopia ( 96 percent beyond Egypt ’ s borders generally ) , making the two countries highly interdependent and the stakes of resource negotiation and management exceedingly high .
Recent mediation talks between the two countries , hosted by the U.S. , failed to reach a consensus on how to fill the dam ’ s reservoir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as much water as Egypt currently absorbs annually .
At the same time , the dam promises economic revitalization in Ethiopia—including job creation and the potential to make it the largest electricity exporter in Africa , as it will nearly triple Ethiopia ’ s current capacity to generate energy .
However , restrictions on water use threaten the basic food and water security of countries downstream that have for years relied on outdated and non-binding agreements on water usage .
Domestically , the GERD is a symbol of national pride and unity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a flashpoint for growing tension and civil unrest due to its long construction delays and ever-growing budget .
The dam was initially scheduled to be finished in 2015 , and a previous shortfall in funding was met by civil servants donating their salaries , and a widespread fundraising campaign among Ethiopian residents and its large diaspora community .
This is not just a localized issue .
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ( FAO ) , as of 2020 , 60 percent of the world ’ s transboundary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , making them ripe for future international tension , and potential sites of exploitation by malicious actors .
The MENA region is just one among several regions grappling with cross-border tensions over shared water resources .
The Indus Waters Treaty , signed by India and Pakistan in 1960 , is perhaps the longest-standing water-sharing agreement in the world , and it has remained in place despite India and Pakistan ’ s long-running cold conflict and regular border disputes , particularly over the status of the Jammu and Kashmir regions , where a number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Analysts and diplomats would be remiss to take the treaty for granted and must continue to monitor the situation , with the aim of safeguarding the region ’ s water sources and managing their use to mitigate future cross-border tensions .
The Mekong river in China is another subject of concern , as China ’ s widespread hydroelectric power program threatens the volume of water the river and its tributaries bring downstream to Laos , Vietnam , and Cambodia .
In addition to exacerbating tensions between national governments , non-state actors are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their goals .
Most notably among them are the Islamic State ( IS ) and al-Shabaab .
Recent analysis by Dr. Marcus King of the George Washington University and the Center for Climate and Security highlights how in 2014 , the capture of the Mosul Dam by IS led directly to U.S. forces becoming more deeply involved in the fight against the terrorist group , and thus in the Syrian conflict .
The dam ’ s strategic position on the Tigris , upstream from the Green Zone in Baghdad , gave IS the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Baghdad , creating a situation in which American forces could only protect themselves by entering further into the fight against the terrorist group .
It has also been discovered that IS taxed residents in Raqqa for access to their water sources , enabling the group to fund its administration of its territory and to buy and produce weapons for its ongoing war .
More recently , in 2018 , al-Shabaab diverted water from the Juba River to disrupt the surveillance of American Green Berets and Kenyan forces in the area .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their route and enabled the insurgents to mount a successful ambush , resulting in the death of one American soldier , and a public-relations victory for the terrorist group .
These incidents demonstrate that weaponization of water works .
With the resource likely to be increasingly wielded as instrument of war , effective management is crucial to security .

Politicization & Weaponization of Water by State and Non-State Actors
Above: A water vendor pushes a cart on April 30, 2013 ahead of a military vehicle in Baga, Nigeria. IUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Water scarcity, in particular, remains a subject of economic and security concerns for national governments and key external stakeholders in the region, with events occurring in MENA foreshadowing the types of water-related conflicts and resource-management challenges that will increasingly apply to, and be instructive for, the rest of the world. Notably, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, started in 2010, has been a focal point and increasing source of tension for the last decade, given its potential to deprive or potentially cut off Egypt from its primary water source: 85 percent of Egypt’s water supply travels through Ethiopia (96 percent beyond Egypt’s borders generally), making the two countries highly interdependent and the stakes of resource negotiation and management exceedingly high. Recent mediation talks between the two countries, hosted by the U.S., failed to reach a consensus on how to fill the dam’s reservoir, which has the potential to hold as much water as Egypt currently absorbs annually. At the same time, the dam promises economic revitalization in Ethiopia—including job creation and the potential to make it the largest electricity exporter in Africa, as it will nearly triple Ethiopia’s current capacity to generate energy. However, restrictions on water use threaten the basic food and water security of countries downstream that have for years relied on outdated and non-binding agreements on water usage. Domestically, the GERD is a symbol of national pride and unity, but it has the potential to become a flashpoint for growing tension and civil unrest due to its long construction delays and ever-growing budget. The dam was initially scheduled to be finished in 2015, and a previous shortfall in funding was met by civil servants donating their salaries, and a widespread fundraising campaign among Ethiopian residents and its large diaspora community.
The Arab region contains 13 of the world’s 17 most water-stressed countries. Climate change in the Arab region threatens to reduce food and water productivity a further 20% by 2030. Source: World Resources Institute
This is not just a localized issue. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), as of 2020, 60 percent of the world’s transboundary river basins lack a cooperative management framework, making them ripe for future international tension, and potential sites of exploitation by malicious actors. The MENA region is just one among several regions grappling with cross-border tensions over shared water resources. The Indus Waters Treaty, signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, is perhaps the longest-standing water-sharing agreement in the world, and it has remained in place despite India and Pakistan’s long-running cold conflict and regular border disputes, particularly over the status of the Jammu and Kashmir regions, where a number of the subcontinent’s rivers begin. Analysts and diplomats would be remiss to take the treaty for granted and must continue to monitor the situation, with the aim of safeguarding the region’s water sources and managing their use to mitigate future cross-border tensions. The Mekong river in China is another subject of concern, as China’s widespread hydroelectric power program threatens the volume of water the river and its tributaries bring downstream to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
In addition to exacerbating tensions between national governments, non-state actors are increasingly weaponizing vital water resources to achieve their goals. Most notably among them are the Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab. Recent analysis by Dr. Marcus King of the George Washington University and the Center for Climate and Security highlights how in 2014, the capture of the Mosul Dam by IS led directly to U.S. forces becoming more deeply involved in the fight against the terrorist group, and thus in the Syrian conflict. The dam’s strategic position on the Tigris, upstream from the Green Zone in Baghdad, gave IS the ability to threaten the entire U.S. infrastructure in Baghdad, creating a situation in which American forces could only protect themselves by entering further into the fight against the terrorist group. It has also been discovered that IS taxed residents in Raqqa for access to their water sources, enabling the group to fund its administration of its territory and to buy and produce weapons for its ongoing war. More recently, in 2018, al-Shabaab diverted water from the Juba River to disrupt the surveillance of American Green Berets and Kenyan forces in the area. The sudden floodwaters forced the troops to change their route and enabled the insurgents to mount a successful ambush, resulting in the death of one American soldier, and a public-relations victory for the terrorist group. These incidents demonstrate that weaponization of water works. With the resource likely to be increasingly wielded as instrument of war, effective management is crucial to security.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--How Capital Markets Can Contain the Coronavirus

How Capital Markets Can Contain the Coronavirus Governments and central banks around the world are exhausting their policy toolkits to address the economic repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic , but monetary and fiscal stimulus alone may be insufficient to deal with the crisis .
On April 14 , the International Monetary Fund warned that global lockdowns would produce “ the worst recession since the Great Depression.
” Interest rates in the United States , the European Union , the United Kingdom , and Japan are already near zero , and sovereign debt is set to spike from hefty stimulus packages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce COVID-19 infections , to deliver a vaccine , and to keep businesses running .
That ’ s where capital markets can help .
Social bonds in particular have emerged as a way to mobilize private capital for the public good .
Like conventional bonds , social bonds offer fixed returns for investors but use proceeds exclusively for social causes—similar to green bonds that concentrate on the environment .
As fears rise around the world of dwindling central bank ammunition and ballooning debt-to-GDP ratios , social bonds are poised to play a crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its effects .
Social bonds are essential to containing the economic fallout of COVID-19 and building resilience against future shocks .
Their proceeds could waive health insurance costs , subsidize pharmaceuticals , and support small businesses to prevent insolvencies .
In developing countries with limited fiscal firepower to keep essential industries afloat , social bonds would be especially critical .
And unlike ordinary bonds , social bonds disclose exactly how their proceeds are used—an attractive prospect for institutional and millennial investors who want to know how their money is used .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by low liquidity levels , with global issuances totaling $ 13 billion last year—versus $ 257 billion for green bonds , according to the global research firm Sustainalytics .
Despite their value , social bonds fill a niche : addressing socioeconomic issues that other capital market mechanisms do not .
COVID-19 social bonds are generating significant investor interest , paving the way for more issuances .
Governments around the world have already lowered interest rates near zero and doled out massive stimulus packages .
The stage is now set for social bonds to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainstream one .
The first COVID-19 social bond , and the only one so far from a corporate bank , was issued by the Macao branch of Bank of China in late February .
The lender raised more than $ 600 million from its COVID-19 Impact Alleviation bond to support Macao ’ s small and medium enterprises .
The Chinese government has already announced a slew of fiscal and monetary actions to provide relief to and spur lending for small companies—but as in other countries , rising debt levels constrain the extent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s International Finance Corporation ( IFC ) has since March raised $ 1 billion from a social bond—its largest to date—that will boost production of medical supplies in emerging markets .
The IFC has also pledged $ 8 billion to existing clients in sectors directly affected by the pandemic , such as tourism and manufacturing .
In many developed countries , these industries are receiving accessible loans and grants from the government , but economists warn that the current measures—including the United States ’ $ 2 trillion relief fund—simply aren ’ t enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
The African Development Bank in March sold its Fight COVID-19 Social Bond for $ 3 billion , which it claimed was the largest-ever dollar-denominated social bond in international capital markets .
That sum will go toward essential infrastructure in Africa , such as water and food security—areas considered at risk as African countries face the effects of lockdown , declining tourism , and lower commodity prices , Emeka Anuforo , the bank ’ s communication officer , told Foreign Policy .
In the European Union , the Council of Europe Development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Italy ’ s Cassa Depositi e Prestiti bank have each announced COVID-19 social bonds focused on health care and direct lending for small businesses .
As it becomes clear that more funding is needed for economic recovery than even the strongest national efforts can provide , investors have a key role to play .
“ These social bonds could be both an early signal and a catalyst that will enable private investors to play a meaningful role in the pandemic recovery , ” said Robert de Jongh , a specialist leader of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Finance Facility for Immunisation ( IFFIm ) is credited with producing the world ’ s first social bond in 2006 , which increased the availability of vaccines for illnesses such as yellow fever and polio in developing countries .
The organization is considering a new bond to fund global research and deployment of a coronavirus vaccine , IFFIm board chair Cyrus Ardalan told Foreign Policy .
Low levels of corporate issuances have had limited growth in the social bond market for years , but the coronavirus could change that .
Governments , multilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the majority of issuers .
But for the sector to flourish , companies must participate so overall liquidity can increase .
Denise Odaro , the IFC ’ s head of investor relations , said on a recent podcast that the problem lies with the nature of social issues : Green bonds have benefited from the momentum around climate change , while investors view social causes more subjectively .
The COVID-19 response is a social cause that all market players can agree on .
But the COVID-19 response is a social cause that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Odaro said .
Just as green bonds have fast-tracked reductions in global carbon emissions through the financing of reforestation and renewable energy projects , social bonds can speed up the pace of economic recovery by industries affected by the pandemic and maintaining basic services .
While innovative finance has the potential to be leveraged across different economies , monitoring the scope of its impact is critical .
Until investors have a clear framework for measuring outcomes , they are likely to remain cautious .
The IFC recommends that social bond issuers examine impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of jobs saved or availability of COVID-19 tests .
But that ’ s hard to do in crisis situations , said Gayle Peterson , a specialist in social investing at the University of Oxford .
“ Coming up with targets for this pandemic can be difficult when you don ’ t have enough masks or ventilators for immediate use.
” Durreen Shahnaz , the CEO and founder of the Singapore-based Impact Investment Exchange , highlighted the importance for social bonds to include the perspective of their beneficiaries .
For example , the bulk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been carried out without an eye to its impact on the world ’ s most vulnerable community—women , ” she said .
“ Yet women are bearing the brunt of the pandemic due to their outsized role at the front lines of health care delivery and at the backbone of their families.
” Furthermore , complications arise when issuers mix social causes into other bonds .
Since February , scores of Chinese companies have sold so-called “ virus control bonds ” that commit a minimum of 10 percent of their proceeds to epidemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the funds are actually helping issuers avoid default—a concern that is beginning to extend globally as the ratings agency S & P warns of a 10 percent spike in U.S. corporate default rates over the next year .
The months ahead will likely see a wider range of sustainable financial initiatives dedicated to the COVID-19 response , including impact investment funds and pay-for-success ( PFS ) models .
In PFS models , investors are paid out by a third party only if agreed-on outcomes are achieved—making them far riskier than social bonds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PFS programs are for the current crisis since they need a clearly defined results metric that can be measured over the bond ’ s lifetime .
The coronavirus outbreak will likely motivate more governments , companies , and international bodies to lean toward social financing .
The Spanish bank BBVA estimates that global issuances of green , social , and sustainability bonds will reach $ 320 billion in 2020—a year over year increase of 28 percent—and the pandemic is set to accelerate that pace .
In the span of a year , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 40,000 jobs through a social bond it launched in April 2019 .
If private investors buy in , the same could happen with the current tranche of coronavirus bonds—giving capital markets a crucial role in recovery from the pandemic .

Governments and central banks around the world are exhausting their policy toolkits to address the economic repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic, but monetary and fiscal stimulus alone may be insufficient to deal with the crisis. On April 14, the International Monetary Fund warned that global lockdowns would produce “the worst recession since the Great Depression.” Interest rates in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan are already near zero, and sovereign debt is set to spike from hefty stimulus packages. Other funding solutions are needed to reduce COVID-19 infections, to deliver a vaccine, and to keep businesses running.
Governments and central banks around the world are exhausting their policy toolkits to address the economic repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic, but monetary and fiscal stimulus alone may be insufficient to deal with the crisis. On April 14, the International Monetary Fund warned that global lockdowns would produce “the worst recession since the Great Depression.” Interest rates in the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan are already near zero, and sovereign debt is set to spike from hefty stimulus packages. Other funding solutions are needed to reduce COVID-19 infections, to deliver a vaccine, and to keep businesses running.
That’s where capital markets can help. Social bonds in particular have emerged as a way to mobilize private capital for the public good. Like conventional bonds, social bonds offer fixed returns for investors but use proceeds exclusively for social causes—similar to green bonds that concentrate on the environment. As fears rise around the world of dwindling central bank ammunition and ballooning debt-to-GDP ratios, social bonds are poised to play a crucial role in the fight against the coronavirus and its effects.
Social bonds are essential to containing the economic fallout of COVID-19 and building resilience against future shocks. Their proceeds could waive health insurance costs, subsidize pharmaceuticals, and support small businesses to prevent insolvencies. In developing countries with limited fiscal firepower to keep essential industries afloat, social bonds would be especially critical. And unlike ordinary bonds, social bonds disclose exactly how their proceeds are used—an attractive prospect for institutional and millennial investors who want to know how their money is used.
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The social bond market has traditionally been stymied by low liquidity levels, with global issuances totaling $13 billion last year—versus $257 billion for green bonds, according to the global research firm Sustainalytics. Despite their value, social bonds fill a niche: addressing socioeconomic issues that other capital market mechanisms do not. COVID-19 social bonds are generating significant investor interest, paving the way for more issuances. Governments around the world have already lowered interest rates near zero and doled out massive stimulus packages. The stage is now set for social bonds to move from a niche solution to a mainstream one.
The first COVID-19 social bond, and the only one so far from a corporate bank, was issued by the Macao branch of Bank of China in late February. The lender raised more than $600 million from its COVID-19 Impact Alleviation bond to support Macao’s small and medium enterprises. The Chinese government has already announced a slew of fiscal and monetary actions to provide relief to and spur lending for small companies—but as in other countries, rising debt levels constrain the extent of this assistance.
The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) has since March raised $1 billion from a social bond—its largest to date—that will boost production of medical supplies in emerging markets. The IFC has also pledged $8 billion to existing clients in sectors directly affected by the pandemic, such as tourism and manufacturing. In many developed countries, these industries are receiving accessible loans and grants from the government, but economists warn that the current measures—including the United States’ $2 trillion relief fund—simply aren’t enough to cover the long-term damage of the pandemic.
The African Development Bank in March sold its Fight COVID-19 Social Bond for $3 billion, which it claimed was the largest-ever dollar-denominated social bond in international capital markets. That sum will go toward essential infrastructure in Africa, such as water and food security—areas considered at risk as African countries face the effects of lockdown, declining tourism, and lower commodity prices, Emeka Anuforo, the bank’s communication officer, told Foreign Policy.
In the European Union, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, and Italy’s Cassa Depositi e Prestiti bank have each announced COVID-19 social bonds focused on health care and direct lending for small businesses. As it becomes clear that more funding is needed for economic recovery than even the strongest national efforts can provide, investors have a key role to play. “These social bonds could be both an early signal and a catalyst that will enable private investors to play a meaningful role in the pandemic recovery,” said Robert de Jongh, a specialist leader of social finance at Deloitte.
The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) is credited with producing the world’s first social bond in 2006, which increased the availability of vaccines for illnesses such as yellow fever and polio in developing countries. The organization is considering a new bond to fund global research and deployment of a coronavirus vaccine, IFFIm board chair Cyrus Ardalan told Foreign Policy.
Low levels of corporate issuances have had limited growth in the social bond market for years, but the coronavirus could change that. Governments, multilateral organizations, and financial institutions typically account for the majority of issuers. But for the sector to flourish, companies must participate so overall liquidity can increase. Denise Odaro, the IFC’s head of investor relations, said on a recent podcast that the problem lies with the nature of social issues: Green bonds have benefited from the momentum around climate change, while investors view social causes more subjectively.
The COVID-19 response is a social cause that all market players can agree on.
But the COVID-19 response is a social cause that all market players can agree on, Odaro said. Just as green bonds have fast-tracked reductions in global carbon emissions through the financing of reforestation and renewable energy projects, social bonds can speed up the pace of economic recovery by industries affected by the pandemic and maintaining basic services.
While innovative finance has the potential to be leveraged across different economies, monitoring the scope of its impact is critical.
Until investors have a clear framework for measuring outcomes, they are likely to remain cautious. The IFC recommends that social bond issuers examine impact through qualitative indicators such as the number of jobs saved or availability of COVID-19 tests. But that’s hard to do in crisis situations, said Gayle Peterson, a specialist in social investing at the University of Oxford. “Coming up with targets for this pandemic can be difficult when you don’t have enough masks or ventilators for immediate use.”
Durreen Shahnaz, the CEO and founder of the Singapore-based Impact Investment Exchange, highlighted the importance for social bonds to include the perspective of their beneficiaries. For example, the bulk of COVID-19 responses across countries “have been carried out without an eye to its impact on the world’s most vulnerable community—women,” she said. “Yet women are bearing the brunt of the pandemic due to their outsized role at the front lines of health care delivery and at the backbone of their families.”
Furthermore, complications arise when issuers mix social causes into other bonds. Since February, scores of Chinese companies have sold so-called “virus control bonds” that commit a minimum of 10 percent of their proceeds to epidemic control efforts. But many experts worry that the funds are actually helping issuers avoid default—a concern that is beginning to extend globally as the ratings agency S&P warns of a 10 percent spike in U.S. corporate default rates over the next year.
The months ahead will likely see a wider range of sustainable financial initiatives dedicated to the COVID-19 response, including impact investment funds and pay-for-success (PFS) models. In PFS models, investors are paid out by a third party only if agreed-on outcomes are achieved—making them far riskier than social bonds. It’s unclear how appropriate PFS programs are for the current crisis since they need a clearly defined results metric that can be measured over the bond’s lifetime.
The coronavirus outbreak will likely motivate more governments, companies, and international bodies to lean toward social financing. The Spanish bank BBVA estimates that global issuances of green, social, and sustainability bonds will reach $320 billion in 2020—a year over year increase of 28 percent—and the pandemic is set to accelerate that pace. In the span of a year, the Council of Europe Development Bank preserved more than 40,000 jobs through a social bond it launched in April 2019. If private investors buy in, the same could happen with the current tranche of coronavirus bonds—giving capital markets a crucial role in recovery from the pandemic.