foreignpolicy--2020-07-20--When the Numbers Don’t Add Up in China

When the Numbers Don’t Add Up in China

When the Numbers Don ’ t Add Up in China Successful book launches often depend on timing , as any writer facing this season of canceled book fairs and tours will tell you .
They have helplessly watched as their new releases languished , lost in the babble of pandemic press conferences and news headlines , competing for relevancy in a time of global human and economic disruption .
A few authors , however , have found themselves in the opposite circumstance .
Arunabh Ghosh could not have imagined how timely his book would be when he set out more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project .
But Making It Count , an academic work published by Princeton University Press examining the history of statistics in China , lands at a time when the world is wondering : How does Beijing collect data , and what did it know about COVID-19 and when ?
“ The information that we got at the front end of this thing wasn ’ t perfect , ” complained U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in March , when only about a dozen Americans had died from the disease .
“ It has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Communist Party to get our hands around the data set.
” That implies Beijing had the right numbers to begin with .
By U.S. intelligence agencies ’ own assessments , the Chinese central government struggled with facts on the ground in the early days of the outbreak , as municipal bureaucrats in the city of Wuhan and elsewhere downplayed infection rates and death counts .
Other reports simultaneously show that Beijing withheld critical medical information from the rest of the world , including to the World Health Organization .
But that—as Ghosh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the history of modern China : A government obsessed with numbers and information all too often lacked them in practice .
Numbers have become a world obsession .
We check the daily COVID-19 counts in our local cities and countries , tracing the lines along the charts which signify our progress or failure to flatten the curve .
They have become a political liability in countries from the United States to Brazil , a way for the public to hold leaders to account , even as presidents dispute the data .
And between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have become a tool in the global blame game , with U.S. diplomats pointing to the unbelievability of Wuhan ’ s death toll while Chinese diplomats point to the carnage in the United States as a reflection of rotten governance and superpower ineptitude .
Numbers , as Ghosh reflects , can “ obfuscate as much as they illuminate.
” His book begins before the founding of the People ’ s Republic of China in 1949 , and ends around the time of the disaster of the Great Leap Forward , when bad statistics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of ideologues who knew that the system couldn ’ t have failed , so the peasants must be stealing the food .
Measuring production was necessary for controlling it .
Size and scale were national obsessions , as a glance through state media from those years reveals .
That habit has lingered in modern Chinese journalism , where reporters will still relay a factory ’ s size in square meters , number of employees , and output per day as though readers cared to know every detail of the Third Tianjin Amalgamated Ironworks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ People ’ s Republic of China , statisticians toiled at their books , though in chapter after chapter they feel like the background hum as more dramatic historic events played out on the Chinese stage , driven by the charisma of a megalomanic ideologue .
Statisticians collected data on industry , agriculture , and many other outputs .
The experts debated methodology , with a consensus settling on “ exhaustive enumeration , ” which meant counting everything , similar to the way we conduct a census as opposed to some kind of sampling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many as 200,000 people , a number mentioned in government accounts , though Ghosh questions just how well trained this bunch could have been .
Yet getting statistics right was key for the new communist state , Ghosh explains , because it was “ a principal way to be modern , and to demonstrate one ’ s modernity to others.
” Communism was , in its own imagination , a scientific ideology , one that depended upon information and organization ; that it was often lacking either in practice was a mere speed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Possessing good data as a form of legitimacy resonates in contemporary China today .
The authoritarian state views itself as fact-based .
Compared to other closed societies , it is—Beijing does not deny climate change and actively works to combat it , for example , and officials ostensibly depend on data to formulate policy .
In practice , censorship and propaganda muddy what they know , with everything from official gross-domestic-product numbers to the population of the country suspect .
In an effort to overcome the problem , the government has embraced artificial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its citizens ’ digital footprints , an effort that has only accelerated with the pandemic .
That such aggressive incursions into people ’ s lives have still produced patchy information underscores the data challenge .
China also grapples with the added tension between leaders , who want access to as much information as possible while keeping that information away from the general public , and subordinate officials , who are determined to bend the numbers to their own best advantage .
To different degrees , all countries struggle with obtaining reliable data .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a count of cases and deaths which at first sounds straightforward ends up playing out in complex ways .
Do you tally asymptomatic cases ?
How do you determine who gets tested ?
Do you include antibody results ?
What is the cause of death for someone with other health complications ?
In Florida , the politicization of the count contributed to more chaos : The Department of Health fired one scientist who accused state officials of undercounting infections and overcounting the number of people tested to present a rosier picture .
China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weaponization of data to suit political agendas .
Even if a government makes good-faith efforts to collect information , Ghosh reminds us that statistics “ exist at the crossroads where mathematical certainty encounters the messiness of quantifying and categorizing the inherently imprecise characteristics of human existence and activity.
” We often think of China fiddling with numbers it ’ s unhappy with—that is , outright fraud .
But Ghosh points to how problems arise at the start of data collection , with wrong assumptions , sloppiness , and biases .
Perfect information , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available to make perfect decisions—and even if we do possess the right statistics , different interests will work to corrupt the message .
Two chapters particularly stand out in Ghosh ’ s work .
He spent time sifting through archives in India and China , and tells us about an interesting period from 1956 to 1959 when statisticians from the two great civilizations held exchanges .
These meetings included founder of the Indian Statistical Institute Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis , who met Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during Zhou ’ s visit to India .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the expert in large-scale random sampling accepted .
His visit came at time when some leading Chinese statisticians had lost confidence in their “ exhaustive enumeration ” approach and sought additional modes to count .
This dialogue fizzled in part with the arrival of the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent famine , the death toll of which is still debated by scholars , who estimate that anywhere from 25 to 35 million Chinese died .
The overzealous use of unreliable data contributed to the tragedy .
“ The outcome was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of generating copious amounts of facts , remained poorly informed , ” Ghosh writes .
But what his book also shows is that there have always been scholars trying to get the best information—then and now—even if political cadres disregarded and sometimes outright sabotaged it .

Successful book launches often depend on timing, as any writer facing this season of canceled book fairs and tours will tell you. They have helplessly watched as their new releases languished, lost in the babble of pandemic press conferences and news headlines, competing for relevancy in a time of global human and economic disruption. A few authors, however, have found themselves in the opposite circumstance. Arunabh Ghosh could not have imagined how timely his book would be when he set out more than a decade ago on his research project. But Making It Count , an academic work published by Princeton University Press examining the history of statistics in China, lands at a time when the world is wondering: How does Beijing collect data, and what did it know about COVID-19 and when?
Successful book launches often depend on timing, as any writer facing this season of canceled book fairs and tours will tell you. They have helplessly watched as their new releases languished, lost in the babble of pandemic press conferences and news headlines, competing for relevancy in a time of global human and economic disruption. A few authors, however, have found themselves in the opposite circumstance. Arunabh Ghosh could not have imagined how timely his book would be when he set out more than a decade ago on his research project. But Making It Count, an academic work published by Princeton University Press examining the history of statistics in China, lands at a time when the world is wondering: How does Beijing collect data, and what did it know about COVID-19 and when? Making It Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the Early People's Republic of China, Arunabh Ghosh, Princeton University Press, pp. 360, , Month 2020
“The information that we got at the front end of this thing wasn’t perfect,” complained U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in March, when only about a dozen Americans had died from the disease. “It has proven incredibly frustrating to work with the Chinese Communist Party to get our hands around the data set.”
That implies Beijing had the right numbers to begin with. By U.S. intelligence agencies’ own assessments, the Chinese central government struggled with facts on the ground in the early days of the outbreak, as municipal bureaucrats in the city of Wuhan and elsewhere downplayed infection rates and death counts. Other reports simultaneously show that Beijing withheld critical medical information from the rest of the world, including to the World Health Organization. But that—as Ghosh well illustrates—is a paradox often encountered in the history of modern China: A government obsessed with numbers and information all too often lacked them in practice.
Numbers have become a world obsession. We check the daily COVID-19 counts in our local cities and countries, tracing the lines along the charts which signify our progress or failure to flatten the curve. They have become a political liability in countries from the United States to Brazil, a way for the public to hold leaders to account, even as presidents dispute the data. And between the United States and China, numbers have become a tool in the global blame game, with U.S. diplomats pointing to the unbelievability of Wuhan’s death toll while Chinese diplomats point to the carnage in the United States as a reflection of rotten governance and superpower ineptitude. Numbers, as Ghosh reflects, can “obfuscate as much as they illuminate.”
His book begins before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and ends around the time of the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, when bad statistics became a deadly weapon in the arsenal of ideologues who knew that the system couldn’t have failed, so the peasants must be stealing the food. Measuring production was necessary for controlling it. Size and scale were national obsessions, as a glance through state media from those years reveals. That habit has lingered in modern Chinese journalism, where reporters will still relay a factory’s size in square meters, number of employees, and output per day as though readers cared to know every detail of the Third Tianjin Amalgamated Ironworks.
Throughout the first decade of the People’s Republic of China, statisticians toiled at their books, though in chapter after chapter they feel like the background hum as more dramatic historic events played out on the Chinese stage, driven by the charisma of a megalomanic ideologue. Statisticians collected data on industry, agriculture, and many other outputs. The experts debated methodology, with a consensus settling on “exhaustive enumeration,” which meant counting everything, similar to the way we conduct a census as opposed to some kind of sampling.
Carrying out this vision required as many as 200,000 people, a number mentioned in government accounts, though Ghosh questions just how well trained this bunch could have been. Yet getting statistics right was key for the new communist state, Ghosh explains, because it was “a principal way to be modern, and to demonstrate one’s modernity to others.” Communism was, in its own imagination, a scientific ideology, one that depended upon information and organization; that it was often lacking either in practice was a mere speed bump on the way to progress.
Possessing good data as a form of legitimacy resonates in contemporary China today. The authoritarian state views itself as fact-based. Compared to other closed societies, it is—Beijing does not deny climate change and actively works to combat it, for example, and officials ostensibly depend on data to formulate policy. In practice, censorship and propaganda muddy what they know, with everything from official gross-domestic-product numbers to the population of the country suspect. In an effort to overcome the problem, the government has embraced artificial intelligence and big data by hoovering up its citizens’ digital footprints, an effort that has only accelerated with the pandemic. That such aggressive incursions into people’s lives have still produced patchy information underscores the data challenge. China also grapples with the added tension between leaders, who want access to as much information as possible while keeping that information away from the general public, and subordinate officials, who are determined to bend the numbers to their own best advantage.
To different degrees, all countries struggle with obtaining reliable data. The pandemic has taught us that even a count of cases and deaths which at first sounds straightforward ends up playing out in complex ways. Do you tally asymptomatic cases? How do you determine who gets tested? Do you include antibody results? What is the cause of death for someone with other health complications? In Florida, the politicization of the count contributed to more chaos: The Department of Health fired one scientist who accused state officials of undercounting infections and overcounting the number of people tested to present a rosier picture. China does not own a monopoly on the weaponization of data to suit political agendas.
Even if a government makes good-faith efforts to collect information, Ghosh reminds us that statistics “exist at the crossroads where mathematical certainty encounters the messiness of quantifying and categorizing the inherently imprecise characteristics of human existence and activity.” We often think of China fiddling with numbers it’s unhappy with—that is, outright fraud. But Ghosh points to how problems arise at the start of data collection, with wrong assumptions, sloppiness, and biases. Perfect information, it turns out, will never be available to make perfect decisions—and even if we do possess the right statistics, different interests will work to corrupt the message.
Two chapters particularly stand out in Ghosh’s work. He spent time sifting through archives in India and China, and tells us about an interesting period from 1956 to 1959 when statisticians from the two great civilizations held exchanges. These meetings included founder of the Indian Statistical Institute Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, who met Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during Zhou’s visit to India. The Chinese leader invited Mahalanobis to Beijing, and the expert in large-scale random sampling accepted. His visit came at time when some leading Chinese statisticians had lost confidence in their “exhaustive enumeration” approach and sought additional modes to count.
This dialogue fizzled in part with the arrival of the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent famine, the death toll of which is still debated by scholars, who estimate that anywhere from 25 to 35 million Chinese died. The overzealous use of unreliable data contributed to the tragedy. “The outcome was a Chinese state that, in spite of generating copious amounts of facts, remained poorly informed,” Ghosh writes. But what his book also shows is that there have always been scholars trying to get the best information—then and now—even if political cadres disregarded and sometimes outright sabotaged it.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-21--Pompeo Checks In on Britain’s Anti-China Turn

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo begins his U.K. visit , the European Union agrees on a €1.82 trillion recovery and budget package , and Saudi King Salman is hospitalized .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in London today for talks with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab .
According to a State Department fact sheet they will discuss “ global priorities , including coordination on COVID-19 recovery and issues related to the People ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” It ’ s that final point that should grab the most attention , as quite rapidly the United Kingdom has edged away from its “ new golden era ” of relations with China to one of outright confrontation .
The past seven days provide a case in point : The U.K. has blocked the Chinese firm Huawei from any further involvement in the country ’ s 5G network , it suspended an extradition agreement with Hong Kong over the Beijing-imposed national security law , and accused Beijing of “ gross and egregious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its Uighur population .
This will all be music to Pompeo ’ s ears , as anti-China actions have become a centerpiece of the U.S. government ’ s geopolitical ( and at times plainly political ) strategy .
Pompeo ’ s first meeting will not be at 10 Downing Street , but with a group of Conservative Party members on the backbenches of parliament .
The hawks in the room .
As The Guardian ’ s Dan Sabbagh writes , the group has begun to wield outsize power .
“ It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy is being driven by the Conservative backbenchers—many looking for a grand cause after winning the Brexit argument—in alliance with an aggressive , trade-obsessed White House , ” Sabbagh writes .
After successfully extricating the U.K. from its relationship with Huawei , the group has allegedly set its sights on unwinding China from its nuclear power network .
Everything is Brexit .
As with the run-up to Brexit , David Hutt writes in Foreign Policy , the U.K. ’ s China policy is reflective of a civil war in the Conservative Party , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanted to have their cake and eat it too , ” Hutt writes .
“ The same desire for ‘ cakeism ’ is now on show with China .
As expressed by some Tory politicians , there is a sense that Britain can take a much tougher line on Beijing and , at the same time , keep all the economic benefits of trade and investment with China while not jeopardizing free trade negotiations with other partners.
” Europe united , for now .
“ Europe is united , Europe is present , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the end of a marathon five day summit where EU leaders appeared to have agreed on an economic recovery package alongside a seven-year budget deal .
Although the agreement now means the EU can raise common debt for the first time , the so-called frugal countries , led by the Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Rutte , appeared to have exacted the biggest compromises : reducing the proposed €500 billion in grants to €390 billion and decreasing their overall contributions to the EU budget .
Putin names new governor for restive region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sergei Furgal—the governor whose detention sparked mass protest in Russia ’ s far east Khabarovsk region—and named Mikhail Degtyaryov as his acting replacement .
The choice of Degtyaryov could be seen as a way to pacify citizens after ten straight days of protest , as he is a member of the same political party as Furgal .
King Salman hospitalized .
Saudi Arabia ’ s King Salman bin Abdulaziz has been admitted to hospital with gallbladder problems , state media reported on Monday .
The 84-year-old monarch is the second aging Gulf leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 91-year-old Kuwaiti ruler Emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah underwent surgery on Sunday for an as yet unnamed ailment .
White House to resume coronavirus briefings .
As cases surge in the United States , the White House has decided to resume daily coronavirus press briefings , on hiatus since April ( when daily cases were roughly half as high as they are today ) .
The resumption in public briefings is seen by White House officials as a way for U.S. President Donald Trump to portray an active response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reelection , according to reporting by CNN .
The briefings could resume as soon as 5 p.m. today in Washington .
Cases in Africa increase .
The World Health Organization ’ s emergencies chief Michael Ryan has warned of an “ acceleration ” of the spread coronavirus in Africa .
South Africa—which suffered one of the earliest outbreak on the continent—has been especially affected by the virus and reported the world ’ s fourth highest number of new cases on Monday .
“ South Africa may , unfortunately , be a precursor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will happen in the rest of Africa , ” Ryan said .
Denmark has offered dry land to the several thousand merchant sailors stranded on board Danish ships since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic .
In normal times , crews would rotate on different ships in order to make their way home .
But because of coronavirus restrictions , crews have had to stay put for months at a time .
In a scheme announced on Monday , Denmark—home to shipping giant Maersk—will provide temporary visas for sailors to transit through the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to isolate them upon arrival .
Bytedance , the parent company of the TikTok app , spent a company record $ 500,000 lobbying the U.S. government in the second quarter of 2020 , according to public lobbying disclosures .
TikTok is facing calls for an outright ban from U.S. lawmakers because of privacy concerns and alleged ties to the Chinese government .
Any ban would have to reckon with its popularity : The app has already been downloaded 165 million times in the United States .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo begins his U.K. visit, the European Union agrees on a €1.82 trillion recovery and budget package, and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz is hospitalized.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo begins his U.K. visit, the European Union agrees on a €1.82 trillion recovery and budget package, and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz is hospitalized.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Begins U.K. Visit With China Talks
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in London today for talks with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. According to a State Department fact sheet they will discuss “global priorities, including coordination on COVID-19 recovery and issues related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”
It’s that final point that should grab the most attention, as quite rapidly the United Kingdom has edged away from its “new golden era” of relations with China to one of outright confrontation.
The past seven days provide a case in point: The U.K. has blocked the Chinese firm Huawei from any further involvement in the country’s 5G network, it suspended an extradition agreement with Hong Kong over the Beijing-imposed national security law, and accused Beijing of “gross and egregious” human rights abuses over its treatment of its Uighur population.
This will all be music to Pompeo’s ears, as anti-China actions have become a centerpiece of the U.S. government’s geopolitical (and at times plainly political) strategy. Pompeo’s first meeting will not be at 10 Downing Street, but with a group of Conservative Party members on the backbenches of parliament.
The hawks in the room. As The Guardian’s Dan Sabbagh writes, the group has begun to wield outsize power. “It is hard to escape the conviction that China policy is being driven by the Conservative backbenchers—many looking for a grand cause after winning the Brexit argument—in alliance with an aggressive, trade-obsessed White House,” Sabbagh writes. After successfully extricating the U.K. from its relationship with Huawei, the group has allegedly set its sights on unwinding China from its nuclear power network.
Everything is Brexit. As with the run-up to Brexit, David Hutt writes in Foreign Policy, the U.K.’s China policy is reflective of a civil war in the Conservative Party, and as with Brexit “the Tories wanted to have their cake and eat it too,” Hutt writes. “The same desire for ‘cakeism’ is now on show with China. As expressed by some Tory politicians, there is a sense that Britain can take a much tougher line on Beijing and, at the same time, keep all the economic benefits of trade and investment with China while not jeopardizing free trade negotiations with other partners.”
What We’re Following Today
Europe united, for now. “Europe is united, Europe is present,” European Council President Charles Michel said at the end of a marathon five day summit where EU leaders appeared to have agreed on an economic recovery package alongside a seven-year budget deal. Although the agreement now means the EU can raise common debt for the first time, the so-called frugal countries, led by the Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Rutte, appeared to have exacted the biggest compromises: reducing the proposed €500 billion in grants to €390 billion and decreasing their overall contributions to the EU budget.
Putin names new governor for restive region. Russian President Vladimir Putin has formally removed Sergei Furgal—the governor whose detention sparked mass protest in Russia’s far east Khabarovsk region—and named Mikhail Degtyaryov as his acting replacement. The choice of Degtyaryov could be seen as a way to pacify citizens after ten straight days of protest, as he is a member of the same political party as Furgal.
King Salman hospitalized. Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz has been admitted to hospital with gallbladder problems, state media reported on Monday. The 84-year-old monarch is the second aging Gulf leader to seek medical attention recently, after 91-year-old Kuwaiti ruler Emir Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah underwent surgery on Sunday for an as yet unnamed ailment.
White House to resume coronavirus briefings. As cases surge in the United States, the White House has decided to resume daily coronavirus press briefings, on hiatus since April (when daily cases were roughly half as high as they are today). The resumption in public briefings is seen by White House officials as a way for U.S. President Donald Trump to portray an active response to the pandemic as flagging poll numbers threaten his reelection, according to reporting by CNN. The briefings could resume as soon as 5 p.m. today in Washington.
Keep an Eye On The race for a vaccine. A coronavirus vaccine developed by the University of Oxford and drug firm AstraZeneca has shown promising results in a trial of 1,077 people. Research published in medical journal The Lancet said the vaccine candidate boosted antibody responses and increased the number of protective T-cells in the trial group. Final testing will include two doses of the vaccine, potentially complicating widespread access should it prove successful.
Cases in Africa increase. The World Health Organization’s emergencies chief Michael Ryan has warned of an “acceleration” of the spread coronavirus in Africa. South Africa—which suffered one of the earliest outbreak on the continent—has been especially affected by the virus and reported the world’s fourth highest number of new cases on Monday. “South Africa may, unfortunately, be a precursor, it may be a warning for what will happen in the rest of Africa,” Ryan said.
Odds and Ends
Denmark has offered dry land to the several thousand merchant sailors stranded on board Danish ships since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. In normal times, crews would rotate on different ships in order to make their way home. But because of coronavirus restrictions, crews have had to stay put for months at a time. In a scheme announced on Monday, Denmark—home to shipping giant Maersk—will provide temporary visas for sailors to transit through the country as well as providing hotel accommodation to isolate them upon arrival.
Bytedance, the parent company of the TikTok app, spent a company record $500,000 lobbying the U.S. government in the second quarter of 2020, according to public lobbying disclosures. TikTok is facing calls for an outright ban from U.S. lawmakers because of privacy concerns and alleged ties to the Chinese government. Any ban would have to reckon with its popularity: The app has already been downloaded 165 million times in the United States.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-20--American Police Should Know Where Rome Went Wrong

Faced with civil unrest in almost every major American city , brought on by the collapse of police legitimacy as the result of a number of shocking videos of misconduct , Defense Secretary Mark Esper declared : “ We need to dominate the battlespace ” of U.S. cities , with military force .
President Donald Trump echoed this advice calling on governors to use the National Guard and even regular military to restore order , to achieve , in his words , “ total domination.
” “ If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States military and quickly solve the problem for them , ” he declared .
The theme of domination and threats of further escalation subsequently permeated administration rhetoric , even as more soldiers were called to the capital .
Threatening to send in the troops like this made for some tough-sounding bravado—even though it was rapidly walked back as the president claimed that he was actually talking about “ dominating the streets with compassion.
” As federal forces teargas moms in Portland , that language is returning , since the administration loves the tropes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thinks that all it needs to do at home is to “ dominate the battlespace , ” then it has misunderstood the role of armed force and fallen into a classic error in security thinking .
They have mistaken violence for power , a mistake that leaders have been making quite literally since the ancient world .
The philosopher Hannah Arendt expounded on the distinction between violence and power in her seminal 1972 essay “ On Violence.
” Violence , the ability of the state to coerce using armed force , is contrasted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to act in concert ” used by a leader only inasmuch as they are “ empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.
” The University of North Carolina military history professor Wayne Lee adds a third , intermediate category to this analysis : force .
Force in this sense includes violence but is extended to include also the threat of violence , including the threat implied by the mere existence of force without its application .
Consider the example of driving up to a red light .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ red light and were stopped by a police officer and arrested for your reckless driving , that is , in Arendt ’ s dichotomy , violence .
An armed agent of the state is actively compelling you to submit .
If instead , coming to the red light , you noticed the police car sitting there and so decided to stop because of it , that was force , in Lee ’ s thinking .
It was not violence , but the threat of violence and the knowledge of the presence of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stop .
But of course , there are far more red lights in any country than there are police officers .
Most of us know well that the chances of being pulled over for running our local stoplight are trivially low .
But we stop anyway .
We stop because we respect the majesty of the law , or because we believe in automotive safety , because it is polite to other drivers , or simply because it is what one does .
That is power at work ; we observe the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimacy as a group .
The Romans , ever forward-thinking , had a word for this sort of power when vested in a person or institution : auctoritas , from where we get the English word “ authority.
” In a proper , working state , the agents of the government guide the citizens using power , relying on their voluntary acquiescence to state directives .
This power lets the state raise force , by recruiting citizens and taxing citizen production to furnish and equip its soldiers and police .
Force , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the product of nonviolent state power .
How does all of this factor into keeping the peace in a civilian population ?
The Roman experience is instructive .
Whereas modern police forces , surveillance capabilities , and vast industrialized armies provide the tantalizing illusion of being able to control a domestic civilian populace by force alone , the Romans could have no such illusions .
Bruce Frier , a professor of Classics at the University of Michigan , estimates that the population of the Roman Empire in 14 A.D. was 45.5 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To control this vast empire , the Romans had about 300,000 soldiers , only half of them citizens .
( The remainder were auxilia , recruited from the many noncitizen subjects of the empire . )
While the Romans had acquired empire through shocking amounts of violence , ruling such a vast expanse by force alone was never an option .
Of course , as the experiences of revolution and decolonization for the last century have shown , in the utter absence of power , controlling a population through force alone is no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than it was for the Romans ; the relative poverty of ancient states merely removed the illusion .
This flies in the face of the popular conception of Roman rule , which tends to focus on the areas of Roman failure , such as the provinces of Britannia and Judaea .
Such failures make for compelling stories , in part because they have served as part of both religious and national mythology .
Roman violence was spectacular and frequently commemorated , both by the Romans themselves and by moderns looking back .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Tacitus , who had his Caledonian chieftain Calgacus upbraid the Romans for “ making a desert , and calling it peace.
” But these places were not typical .
Most Roman provinces had no significant military presence at all ; by the death of Augustus , the first emperor , Rome ’ s 25 legions were almost all stationed in a thin line along the frontier , along with their supporting auxilia .
Many of the most populous provinces had no legions stationed in them at all .
They couldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already stretched the budget to the breaking point .
This was not because the Romans were nice .
They most certainly were not—the Romans were capable of stunning brutality , such as the destruction of Carthage and the near-total destruction of the Helvetians .
More force was simply not practical .
Instead , Roman provincial administration focused on developing power , rather than deploying force , in most of the provinces .
This was not an intentional effort so much as the ad hoc development of standards of governance as Roman military commands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conquest to peacekeeping and then finally to administration , mostly driven not by a formal doctrine but by cultural norms within the Roman aristocracy .
Nevertheless , clear patterns of action emerged that enabled the Romans to effectively develop power in regions they had acquired through violence and force .
Roman authorities might resolve disputes between communities , or particularly difficult cases ( especially capital crimes ) , but the day-to-day administration of law and order was left to local leaders .
First , the Romans tended to avoid trying to act directly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this was simply utilitarian ; there were far too few Romans in most provinces to handle administration on the ground .
Roman governors preferred to work through city governments , tribal leaders , and local stakeholders whenever possible .
Roman authorities might resolve disputes between communities , or particularly difficult cases ( especially capital crimes ) , but the day-to-day administration of law and order was left to local leaders , who benefited from the legitimacy of long-standing tradition and deep social ties .
Rather than trying to replace the power these figures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their provincial administration as partners in Roman order , rewarding useful local notables with political advantage and even citizenship .
Second , the Romans took progressive steps to hold provincial governors accountable for corruption or brutality in pacified provinces .
Roman efforts on this front met mixed success , as prosecuting a powerful politician in Rome for actions taken miles away from the capital was always a risky endeavor .
Nevertheless , the Calpurnian Law on Extortion in 149 B.C .
established a permanent court to facilitate the recovery of damages by provincials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law was steadily strengthened by repeated further legislation that more narrowly defined legal conduct for governors and strengthened the penalties against them .
Later on , issues of fairness to provincials would be a topic of repeated imperial edicts , like the repeated imperial edicts and rescripts attempting to resolve or punish abuses of the vehiculatio , a right to requisition food and supplies for official business on the roads .
These were not laws about protecting the rights and property of Roman citizens , but rather the rights and property of recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at best , unevenly enforced , and they often became deeply political , these laws represented a real concern at Rome that provincial governors wielding Roman authority ought to behave fairly , even towards subjugated peoples , and there were high-profile convictions of important Roman politicians on those grounds .
Finally , through this , Roman authorities developed a reputation , particularly in the Greek East , of being relatively impartial outside mediators who could , more or less fairly , resolve disputes among the elites .
Most Roman governors served short terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , leaving them as outsiders to local politics .
The lack of local knowledge was less of an issue , because in most places Hellenized or Romanized elites could be relied upon to supply a self-interested measure of local knowledge .
At the same time , there was an expectation , admittedly not always followed , that a Roman governor ’ s decisions would be honored by his successors in the post .
And while , as noted , efforts to hold governors accountable were not always successful , the clear effort by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good governance clearly played into the reputation for impartiality and relative incorruptibility they enjoyed .
This isn ’ t a paean to Roman rule .
The standards for good governance were quite a bit lower in the ancient world than today .
Most Roman subjects seemed to have expected little more than that the taxes were not overly harsh and Roman armies kept armed threats far away .
Roman commanders and governors did sometimes act in ways that appalled contemporary sensibilities , much less modern ones .
Nevertheless , in the great majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in keeping the peace , it is not hard to see how their actions contributed to the accumulation of power that let them govern in the absence of force or violence .
That power was what made the empire possible in the first place .
The Roman failures are also instructive .
To take one example , the Roman province of Judaea ( now Israel , the Palestinian territories , and Jordan ) , the Romans initially governed the province through intermediate client kings , but when these proved unreliable , the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a province .
Roman governors , confounded by sharp religious differences between the local Jewish population and themselves , repeatedly attempted to use force in lieu of power , using soldiers to try to intimidate the population into submission .
The result was the steady erosion of Roman power in the province .
The loss of power led to the reversion to more force and eventually from force to violence , culminating in the catastrophic First Jewish Revolt of 66 A.D. , documented by the Jewish writer Josephus .
That revolt led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem and the famous siege of Masada .
And in the minds of many , this is where the story ends ; the Romans had “ made a desert and called it peace.
” That sense of finality and conclusion is no accident—it is part of Josephus ’ s narrative .
While Josephus started as a Jewish rebel himself , by the time he was writing he was a member of the victorious Roman Emperor Vespasian ’ s court ; it would not do to suggest the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Titus and Domitian , was anything less than perfect .
But it clearly was less than perfect .
While the Romans achieved momentary control of Judaea , in doing so they had actually damaged their power in the region .
The destruction of the temple removed one of the key local sources of authority in Judaea , the Sadducees , whose leaders had been both closely connected to the temple but also generally pro-Roman .
As it so often does , the application of violence had actively furthered the erosion of power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and violence are opposites ; where the one rules absolutely , the other is absent.
” The aftermath of the First Jewish Revolt thus laid the groundwork for further unrest , culminating in the Second Revolt in 132 , in which the Romans resorted to violence that likely amounted to genocide and were forced to replace the city of Jerusalem itself with a Roman colony to keep order .
This , it should be stressed , is a story of abject failure .
The Roman effort to rule first by force and then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The small region soaked up far greater Roman forces and produced far more Roman casualties than it was worth .
The Roman Empire was , after all , a tributary empire : The provinces were held so that the Romans could extract value from them .
Not only did the cost of holding Judaea exceed any possible value it had , but the Romans had also been forced to destroy the most productive part of the place—its people—in order to try to keep hold of it .
Like so many counterinsurgency operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too little on power , the Roman suppression of the Jewish revolts may have had tactical military successes , but they were strategic failures .
There is a lesson here for administrations that imagine that they can “ dominate ” problems that arise out of failures of power .
As Arendt writes , such “ domination of man over man by means of violence ” is the very opposite of power .
But power is not produced by violence ; it is destroyed by it .
“ Dominating the battlespace ” will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimacy that caused the current civil unrest go away .
All that soldiers in the street can do is exercise momentary control , to create a space for civil authorities to reestablish power .
They can not establish power by themselves .
Power can arise from many sources , as the Roman example shows .
It can arise out of strong cultural norms , out of a feeling of reciprocity with authority , out of a sense that those in power are accountable .
Very often a great deal of power is found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daily interactions in their own small sphere create a fertile space for the formation of this kind of influence .
It is not hard to see how state power and authority , that “ human ability to act in concert ” can be reestablished .
It starts with holding those who wield state violence accountable for their actions .
It works through local leaders whose own authority in their community is untarnished by the abuse of state violence .
Reestablishing power in this way is never easy , but it can be done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and no substitute for it .
If all the president can think to do is meet future street protests with state violence , he will not have resolved the issue , but rather , like those Roman governors in Judaea , merely delayed an ever-more-cataclysmic explosion .
He will have replaced power with violence and leadership with bravado .

Faced with civil unrest in almost every major American city, brought on by the collapse of police legitimacy as the result of a number of shocking videos of misconduct, Defense Secretary Mark Esper declared : “We need to dominate the battlespace” of U.S. cities, with military force. President Donald Trump echoed this advice calling on governors to use the National Guard and even regular military to restore order, to achieve, in his words, “total domination.” “If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary … then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them,” he declared. The theme of domination and threats of further escalation subsequently permeated administration rhetoric, even as more soldiers were called to the capital.
Faced with civil unrest in almost every major American city, brought on by the collapse of police legitimacy as the result of a number of shocking videos of misconduct, Defense Secretary Mark Esper declared: “We need to dominate the battlespace” of U.S. cities, with military force. President Donald Trump echoed this advice calling on governors to use the National Guard and even regular military to restore order, to achieve, in his words, “total domination.” “If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary … then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them,” he declared. The theme of domination and threats of further escalation subsequently permeated administration rhetoric, even as more soldiers were called to the capital.
Threatening to send in the troops like this made for some tough-sounding bravado—even though it was rapidly walked back as the president claimed that he was actually talking about “dominating the streets with compassion.” As federal forces teargas moms in Portland, that language is returning, since the administration loves the tropes of militarism. But if the administration thinks that all it needs to do at home is to “dominate the battlespace,” then it has misunderstood the role of armed force and fallen into a classic error in security thinking. They have mistaken violence for power, a mistake that leaders have been making quite literally since the ancient world.
The philosopher Hannah Arendt expounded on the distinction between violence and power in her seminal 1972 essay “On Violence.” Violence, the ability of the state to coerce using armed force, is contrasted with power, “the human ability to act in concert” used by a leader only inasmuch as they are “empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.” The University of North Carolina military history professor Wayne Lee adds a third, intermediate category to this analysis: force. Force in this sense includes violence but is extended to include also the threat of violence, including the threat implied by the mere existence of force without its application.
Consider the example of driving up to a red light. If you were to attempt to run the red light and were stopped by a police officer and arrested for your reckless driving, that is, in Arendt’s dichotomy, violence. An armed agent of the state is actively compelling you to submit. If instead, coming to the red light, you noticed the police car sitting there and so decided to stop because of it, that was force, in Lee’s thinking. It was not violence, but the threat of violence and the knowledge of the presence of the tools of violence, that caused you to stop.
But of course, there are far more red lights in any country than there are police officers. Most of us know well that the chances of being pulled over for running our local stoplight are trivially low. But we stop anyway. We stop because we respect the majesty of the law, or because we believe in automotive safety, because it is polite to other drivers, or simply because it is what one does. That is power at work; we observe the red light because we respect its fundamental legitimacy as a group. The Romans, ever forward-thinking, had a word for this sort of power when vested in a person or institution: auctoritas, from where we get the English word “authority.”
In a proper, working state, the agents of the government guide the citizens using power, relying on their voluntary acquiescence to state directives. This power lets the state raise force, by recruiting citizens and taxing citizen production to furnish and equip its soldiers and police. Force, and the violence that force can create, is the product of nonviolent state power.
How does all of this factor into keeping the peace in a civilian population? The Roman experience is instructive. Whereas modern police forces, surveillance capabilities, and vast industrialized armies provide the tantalizing illusion of being able to control a domestic civilian populace by force alone, the Romans could have no such illusions. Bruce Frier, a professor of Classics at the University of Michigan, estimates that the population of the Roman Empire in 14 A.D. was 45.5 million, stretched over 1,280,000 square miles.
To control this vast empire, the Romans had about 300,000 soldiers, only half of them citizens. (The remainder were auxilia, recruited from the many noncitizen subjects of the empire.) While the Romans had acquired empire through shocking amounts of violence, ruling such a vast expanse by force alone was never an option. Of course, as the experiences of revolution and decolonization for the last century have shown, in the utter absence of power, controlling a population through force alone is no more possible today in the long term than it was for the Romans; the relative poverty of ancient states merely removed the illusion.
This flies in the face of the popular conception of Roman rule, which tends to focus on the areas of Roman failure, such as the provinces of Britannia and Judaea. Such failures make for compelling stories, in part because they have served as part of both religious and national mythology. Roman violence was spectacular and frequently commemorated, both by the Romans themselves and by moderns looking back. It was also occasionally criticized by Roman moralists such as Tacitus, who had his Caledonian chieftain Calgacus upbraid the Romans for “making a desert, and calling it peace.”
But these places were not typical. Most Roman provinces had no significant military presence at all; by the death of Augustus, the first emperor, Rome’s 25 legions were almost all stationed in a thin line along the frontier, along with their supporting auxilia. Many of the most populous provinces had no legions stationed in them at all. They couldn’t have; Rome’s armies already stretched the budget to the breaking point. This was not because the Romans were nice. They most certainly were not—the Romans were capable of stunning brutality, such as the destruction of Carthage and the near-total destruction of the Helvetians. More force was simply not practical.
The Plough Driven Over the Site of Carthage from Cassell's Illustrated Universal History Vol. II—Rome, by Edmund Ollier, 1890.
Instead, Roman provincial administration focused on developing power, rather than deploying force, in most of the provinces. This was not an intentional effort so much as the ad hoc development of standards of governance as Roman military commands in different regions shifted from missions of conquest to peacekeeping and then finally to administration, mostly driven not by a formal doctrine but by cultural norms within the Roman aristocracy. Nevertheless, clear patterns of action emerged that enabled the Romans to effectively develop power in regions they had acquired through violence and force.
Roman authorities might resolve disputes between communities, or particularly difficult cases (especially capital crimes), but the day-to-day administration of law and order was left to local leaders.
First, the Romans tended to avoid trying to act directly on the local populace. In part this was simply utilitarian; there were far too few Romans in most provinces to handle administration on the ground. Roman governors preferred to work through city governments, tribal leaders, and local stakeholders whenever possible. Roman authorities might resolve disputes between communities, or particularly difficult cases (especially capital crimes), but the day-to-day administration of law and order was left to local leaders, who benefited from the legitimacy of long-standing tradition and deep social ties. Rather than trying to replace the power these figures wielded, Rome incorporated these stakeholders into their provincial administration as partners in Roman order, rewarding useful local notables with political advantage and even citizenship.
Second, the Romans took progressive steps to hold provincial governors accountable for corruption or brutality in pacified provinces. Roman efforts on this front met mixed success, as prosecuting a powerful politician in Rome for actions taken miles away from the capital was always a risky endeavor. Nevertheless, the Calpurnian Law on Extortion in 149 B.C. established a permanent court to facilitate the recovery of damages by provincials against badly behaved Roman governors. That law was steadily strengthened by repeated further legislation that more narrowly defined legal conduct for governors and strengthened the penalties against them.
Later on, issues of fairness to provincials would be a topic of repeated imperial edicts, like the repeated imperial edicts and rescripts attempting to resolve or punish abuses of the vehiculatio, a right to requisition food and supplies for official business on the roads. These were not laws about protecting the rights and property of Roman citizens, but rather the rights and property of recently conquered noncitizens. While they were, at best, unevenly enforced, and they often became deeply political, these laws represented a real concern at Rome that provincial governors wielding Roman authority ought to behave fairly, even towards subjugated peoples, and there were high-profile convictions of important Roman politicians on those grounds.
Finally, through this, Roman authorities developed a reputation, particularly in the Greek East, of being relatively impartial outside mediators who could, more or less fairly, resolve disputes among the elites. Most Roman governors served short terms in their provinces before returning to Rome, leaving them as outsiders to local politics. The lack of local knowledge was less of an issue, because in most places Hellenized or Romanized elites could be relied upon to supply a self-interested measure of local knowledge. At the same time, there was an expectation, admittedly not always followed, that a Roman governor’s decisions would be honored by his successors in the post. And while, as noted, efforts to hold governors accountable were not always successful, the clear effort by the Romans to afford some degree of good governance clearly played into the reputation for impartiality and relative incorruptibility they enjoyed.
This isn’t a paean to Roman rule. The standards for good governance were quite a bit lower in the ancient world than today. Most Roman subjects seemed to have expected little more than that the taxes were not overly harsh and Roman armies kept armed threats far away. Roman commanders and governors did sometimes act in ways that appalled contemporary sensibilities, much less modern ones. Nevertheless, in the great majority of provinces where the Romans largely succeeded in keeping the peace, it is not hard to see how their actions contributed to the accumulation of power that let them govern in the absence of force or violence. That power was what made the empire possible in the first place.
The Roman failures are also instructive. To take one example, the Roman province of Judaea (now Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan), the Romans initially governed the province through intermediate client kings, but when these proved unreliable, the region was brought directly under Roman rule as a province. Roman governors, confounded by sharp religious differences between the local Jewish population and themselves, repeatedly attempted to use force in lieu of power, using soldiers to try to intimidate the population into submission. The result was the steady erosion of Roman power in the province. The loss of power led to the reversion to more force and eventually from force to violence, culminating in the catastrophic First Jewish Revolt of 66 A.D., documented by the Jewish writer Josephus.
That revolt led to a brutal seven-year Roman crackdown that included the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem and the famous siege of Masada. And in the minds of many, this is where the story ends; the Romans had “made a desert and called it peace.” That sense of finality and conclusion is no accident—it is part of Josephus’s narrative. While Josephus started as a Jewish rebel himself, by the time he was writing he was a member of the victorious Roman Emperor Vespasian’s court; it would not do to suggest the victory won by Vespasian and his sons, Titus and Domitian, was anything less than perfect.
The Destruction of the Temples in Jerusalem by Titus by Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665).
But it clearly was less than perfect. While the Romans achieved momentary control of Judaea, in doing so they had actually damaged their power in the region. The destruction of the temple removed one of the key local sources of authority in Judaea, the Sadducees, whose leaders had been both closely connected to the temple but also generally pro-Roman. As it so often does, the application of violence had actively furthered the erosion of power. As Arendt notes, “power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent.” The aftermath of the First Jewish Revolt thus laid the groundwork for further unrest, culminating in the Second Revolt in 132, in which the Romans resorted to violence that likely amounted to genocide and were forced to replace the city of Jerusalem itself with a Roman colony to keep order.
This, it should be stressed, is a story of abject failure. The Roman effort to rule first by force and then by violence in Judaea was a catastrophe. The small region soaked up far greater Roman forces and produced far more Roman casualties than it was worth. The Roman Empire was, after all, a tributary empire: The provinces were held so that the Romans could extract value from them. Not only did the cost of holding Judaea exceed any possible value it had, but the Romans had also been forced to destroy the most productive part of the place—its people—in order to try to keep hold of it. Like so many counterinsurgency operations that focus too heavily on violence and too little on power, the Roman suppression of the Jewish revolts may have had tactical military successes, but they were strategic failures.
There is a lesson here for administrations that imagine that they can “dominate” problems that arise out of failures of power. As Arendt writes, such “domination of man over man by means of violence” is the very opposite of power. But power is not produced by violence; it is destroyed by it. “Dominating the battlespace” will not make the fundamental erosion of power and legitimacy that caused the current civil unrest go away. All that soldiers in the street can do is exercise momentary control, to create a space for civil authorities to reestablish power. They cannot establish power by themselves.
Power can arise from many sources, as the Roman example shows. It can arise out of strong cultural norms, out of a feeling of reciprocity with authority, out of a sense that those in power are accountable. Very often a great deal of power is found in local leaders and authorities, whose daily interactions in their own small sphere create a fertile space for the formation of this kind of influence. It is not hard to see how state power and authority, that “human ability to act in concert” can be reestablished. It starts with holding those who wield state violence accountable for their actions. It works through local leaders whose own authority in their community is untarnished by the abuse of state violence. Reestablishing power in this way is never easy, but it can be done. Violence provides no shortcut to power, and no substitute for it.
If all the president can think to do is meet future street protests with state violence, he will not have resolved the issue, but rather, like those Roman governors in Judaea, merely delayed an ever-more-cataclysmic explosion. He will have replaced power with violence and leadership with bravado.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-21--4 Key Takeaways From the British Report on Russian Interference

4 Key Takeaways From the British Report on Russian Interference On Tuesday , Britons got their first look at the long-anticipated Russia report from Parliament ’ s Intelligence and Security Committee , which oversees the work of U.K. intelligence agencies .
Four years after Britain voted to leave the European Union , a referendum long overshadowed by allegations of Russian meddling , the report is the first public examination by a parliamentary committee of Moscow ’ s efforts to use disinformation , malicious cyberactivity , and the influence of wealthy Russian expatriates to manipulate British politics .
The 47-page , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shelved for over a year , offers a damning assessment of the U.K. government ’ s failure to examine Russian attempts to influence the course of the Brexit vote and describes Russian interference in the country as “ the new normal.
” “ There has been no assessment of Russian interference in the EU referendum , and this goes back to nobody wanting to touch this issue with a 10-foot pole , ” said committee member Stewart Hosie of the Scottish National Party during a press conference , raising questions about the British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integrity of its elections .
Here are four key takeaways from the report .
While Russia has long honed its hacking and disinformation skills on neighboring countries in Eastern Europe , the report notes that Russia ’ s efforts to sway voters in Scotland ahead of the 2014 independence referendum marked the first known attempt to interfere in the democratic processes of a Western country .
Rachel Ellehuus , the deputy director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , said it was surprising that “ as far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the tactics of the Russians , they did not take more decisive steps.
” It was only after Russian operatives hacked and leaked internal emails from U.S. Democrats during the 2016 election that “ the Government belatedly realised the level of threat which Russia could pose in this area , ” the report states , a realization that came one month after the Brexit vote .
If an assessment had been conducted before the Brexit referendum , the report adds , “ it is inconceivable that they would not have reached the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which might then have led them to take action to protect the process.
” 2 .
It ’ s the not the British Mueller report The report makes it clear that the physical process of voting in the United Kingdom is largely secure due to the continued use of paper ballots .
But questions of what Russia may have done to try to influence the Brexit vote , and how effective its efforts were , remain unanswered—and most importantly , have not been examined by the British government , according to the report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us appeared to suggest that HMG [ Her Majesty ’ s Government ] had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election , for example influencing results , ” the report notes .
The committee also did not receive any U.K. government or intelligence assessments of the extent of Russia ’ s efforts to interfere in the Brexit vote .
“ This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence community assessment was produced within two months of the vote , with an unclassified summary being made public , ” the report states .
In Washington , congressional investigations , the Mueller report , intelligence community assessments , and criminal indictments have together painted a detailed and public picture of Moscow ’ s efforts to sow discord and tip the presidential election in favor of Donald Trump .
The two-year investigation led by special counsel Robert Mueller interviewed some 500 witnesses and issued over 2,800 subpoenas as part of its probe .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence and organized crime , said he hoped the committee report would be followed by a more granular , Mueller-style report .
“ You need to actually have a clear sense of what you ’ re addressing , and above all you need to have a strong political will , ” Galeotti said .
The report notes that the issue of protecting the integrity of British elections had become a “ hot potato ” with no one government ministry or intelligence agency taking the lead .
As such , it was at times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responsibility for what , ” the report found .
Intelligence agencies , loath to be seen as getting involved in democratic processes , did not see the defense of electoral integrity from foreign interference as their primary responsibility , suggesting that task instead lay with the Department for Digital , Culture , Media , and Sport and the Electoral Commission .
When asked by the committee about Russian disinformation efforts , Britain ’ s domestic intelligence agency , known as MI5 , initially responded with just “ six lines of text , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no secret that London is awash with Russian money , which has flowed into the city since the collapse of the Soviet Union .
A proliferation of lawyers , public relations firms , accountants , and real estate agents have enabled Russian oligarchs close to Russian President Vladimir Putin to launder their reputations and their money in the British capital .
The report stops short of naming names but notes that wealthy Russians with expansive patronage networks have now become a fixture of the London elite .
“ It is widely recognised that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” the report states , noting that any attempts to contain the influence of wealthy Russians are now more likely to take the form of damage control , rather than prevention .

On Tuesday, Britons got their first look at the long-anticipated Russia report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, which oversees the work of U.K. intelligence agencies. Four years after Britain voted to leave the European Union, a referendum long overshadowed by allegations of Russian meddling, the report is the first public examination by a parliamentary committee of Moscow’s efforts to use disinformation, malicious cyberactivity, and the influence of wealthy Russian expatriates to manipulate British politics.
On Tuesday, Britons got their first look at the long-anticipated Russia report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, which oversees the work of U.K. intelligence agencies. Four years after Britain voted to leave the European Union, a referendum long overshadowed by allegations of Russian meddling, the report is the first public examination by a parliamentary committee of Moscow’s efforts to use disinformation, malicious cyberactivity, and the influence of wealthy Russian expatriates to manipulate British politics.
The 47-page, highly readable report, which has been shelved for over a year, offers a damning assessment of the U.K. government’s failure to examine Russian attempts to influence the course of the Brexit vote and describes Russian interference in the country as “the new normal.”
“There has been no assessment of Russian interference in the EU referendum, and this goes back to nobody wanting to touch this issue with a 10-foot pole,” said committee member Stewart Hosie of the Scottish National Party during a press conference, raising questions about the British government’s efforts to protect the integrity of its elections.
Here are four key takeaways from the report.
1. Failure to heed early warning signs
While Russia has long honed its hacking and disinformation skills on neighboring countries in Eastern Europe, the report notes that Russia’s efforts to sway voters in Scotland ahead of the 2014 independence referendum marked the first known attempt to interfere in the democratic processes of a Western country. Rachel Ellehuus, the deputy director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said it was surprising that “as far back as 2014, knowing the objectives and the tactics of the Russians, they did not take more decisive steps.”
It was only after Russian operatives hacked and leaked internal emails from U.S. Democrats during the 2016 election that “the Government belatedly realised the level of threat which Russia could pose in this area,” the report states, a realization that came one month after the Brexit vote. If an assessment had been conducted before the Brexit referendum, the report adds, “it is inconceivable that they would not have reached the same conclusion as to Russian intent, which might then have led them to take action to protect the process.”
2. It’s the not the British Mueller report
The report makes it clear that the physical process of voting in the United Kingdom is largely secure due to the continued use of paper ballots. But questions of what Russia may have done to try to influence the Brexit vote, and how effective its efforts were, remain unanswered—and most importantly, have not been examined by the British government, according to the report.
“The written evidence provided to us appeared to suggest that HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes or any activity that has had a material impact on an election, for example influencing results,” the report notes.
The committee also did not receive any U.K. government or intelligence assessments of the extent of Russia’s efforts to interfere in the Brexit vote. “This situation is in stark contrast to the US handling of allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, where an intelligence community assessment was produced within two months of the vote, with an unclassified summary being made public,” the report states.
In Washington, congressional investigations, the Mueller report, intelligence community assessments, and criminal indictments have together painted a detailed and public picture of Moscow’s efforts to sow discord and tip the presidential election in favor of Donald Trump. The two-year investigation led by special counsel Robert Mueller interviewed some 500 witnesses and issued over 2,800 subpoenas as part of its probe.
Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian intelligence and organized crime, said he hoped the committee report would be followed by a more granular, Mueller-style report. “You need to actually have a clear sense of what you’re addressing, and above all you need to have a strong political will,” Galeotti said.
3. “Hot potato”
The report notes that the issue of protecting the integrity of British elections had become a “hot potato” with no one government ministry or intelligence agency taking the lead. As such, it was at times “surprisingly difficult to establish who has responsibility for what,” the report found.
Intelligence agencies, loath to be seen as getting involved in democratic processes, did not see the defense of electoral integrity from foreign interference as their primary responsibility, suggesting that task instead lay with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport and the Electoral Commission. When asked by the committee about Russian disinformation efforts, Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, known as MI5, initially responded with just “six lines of text,” the report states.
4. Londongrad
It’s no secret that London is awash with Russian money, which has flowed into the city since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A proliferation of lawyers, public relations firms, accountants, and real estate agents have enabled Russian oligarchs close to Russian President Vladimir Putin to launder their reputations and their money in the British capital. The report stops short of naming names but notes that wealthy Russians with expansive patronage networks have now become a fixture of the London elite.
“It is widely recognised that Russian intelligence and business are completely intertwined,” the report states, noting that any attempts to contain the influence of wealthy Russians are now more likely to take the form of damage control, rather than prevention.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-21--India’s Pivot to Australia

India’s Pivot to Australia

Will Australia join the Malabar exercises ?
For weeks , Indian media has reported with near certitude that New Delhi will be inviting Canberra to join its high-level naval exercises , which usually involve the navies of India , Japan , and the United States .
While strategic dialogue and informal cooperation has long existed between the four countries , known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , the exercises would mark the first time Australia would be part of this official joint military engagement .
For India , the decision to extend the invitation—a move it had so far held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major step .
Not only does New Delhi hope to strengthen its relations with its partners in the Indo-Pacific , but it intends to send a strong message to Beijing as border tensions mount : India ’ s military partnerships are growing stronger than ever , and Chinese intransigence will make them even more potent .
India-Australia relations have evolved rapidly over the past five years , and this development is a natural corollary .
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison held their first virtual bilateral meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a number of significant agreements .
The signed accords included the Mutual Logistics Sharing Agreement , allowing the two nations to use each other ’ s military bases for logistics support improving military partnership .
The two countries also agreed to elevate their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership , which is based on “ mutual understanding , trust , common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.
” This is symbolic of their commitment to strengthen their engagement in the Indo-Pacific for the promotion of an “ open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by inclusive global and regional institutions , ” as the two countries put it in a joint statement last month .
The timing of such accords couldn ’ t be better for two nations that have been at the receiving end of China ’ s aggressive actions .
Tensions between Australia and China have been high since Canberra in April called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 .
China responded by reportedly drawing up a list of Australian exports that could be subject to tariffs and stricter controls .
India , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tense standoff with China after border clashes last month resulted in the death of 20 Indian border troops and an unknown number from the Chinese side .
Although the two sides are now in the process of disengaging after diplomatic and military talks , tensions over the long undemarcated border , the Line of Actual Control , mark perhaps the worst Sino-Indian crisis since the 1960s .
Amid this rising assertiveness by China , Canberra stands to gain a partnership it has long desired .
For years , Australia has wanted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreeing to join in as an observer in 2017 .
But India , trying to tread cautiously vis-à-vis China , had not been enthusiastic .
Now , its calculations have changed .
The choice to join hands and develop a stronger stance against China with like-minded countries no longer seems radical .
For Australia and India , stronger defense partnership is essential to achieving a “ free and open ” Indo-Pacific .
Faced with an increasingly powerful and aggressive China , countries such as Australia , Japan , the United States , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) are all rethinking and remapping their China policies—particularly with regards to its incursions in the South China Sea .
ASEAN recently released a vision statement where it underlined the need for China to abide by international law and to finalize the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea .
The United States this month strongly condemned China ’ s actions in the South China Sea , calling its efforts “ completely unlawful.
” Australia recently announced its 2020 Defence Strategic Update—a wide ranging , 10-year defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 189 billion ) .
Defense partnerships are central to any effort to counter China .
Inviting Australia to the Malabar exercises would significantly strengthen the military quotient of the Quadrilateral grouping .
If Australia is given the go-ahead to join the exercise , it will be first time since 2007 that all four Quad members participate in a joint military drill .
The Quad went on hiatus from 2008 to 2017 , and while has been operational since 2017 , it only took off in a significant way after a meeting between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 .
Prior to the 2019 meeting , summits ended with each country issuing its own statement outlining its own priorities—rather than a joint one .
Quad members had been making very calculated statements when it came to China ’ s actions in the South China Sea , among other issues .
But with all four nations sharing an equal sense of urgency about China , priorities are now aligned .
Adding a military partnership element to the Quad is a logical step , given the serious security challenges emanating from China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Australia ’ s full induction into the Quad has implications for India ’ s broader approach to the Indo-Pacific as well .
Previously , given Chinese reservations , New Delhi was reluctant to term its Indo-Pacific policy as a strategy , and mostly referred to it as its “ vision ” of the Indo-Pacific .
The country was hesitant to even tie its own Indo-Pacific policy into that of the Quad , arguing that its own policy was more inclusive .
In his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Indo-Pacific stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to Oceania and stressed that “ India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
” But as the Quad starts to leverage its hard power , and as India ’ s relations with China deteriorate , New Delhi is likely to reshape its Indo-Pacific strategy alongside its partners .
Inviting Australia for the Malabar exercise is a natural first step .
Given China ’ s growing presence in the Indian Ocean—widely considered India ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sense in New Delhi that it ought to increase its presence and influence in the Western Pacific .
China ’ s growing encroachments in the South China Sea and East China Sea—an attempt to intimidate smaller neighbors—has made it imperative for states such as India to be more hands-on in maritime disputes .
Australia , Japan , and the United States are prominent players in the Western Pacific .
Australia has been lending support alongside the United States in freedom-of-navigation exercises and joint patrols in the disputed South China Sea .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eastern Indian Ocean and gain the trust of its Southeast Asian neighbors , New Delhi ’ s credibility as a serious strategic player in the wider region will be enhanced , which is important for the success of the Quad .
Besides the security connotations , the Quad remains critical as India seeks to build alternative supply chains , collaborate on COVID-19 treatments , and reduce its economic dependence on China—something which has been gathering pace over the past few months .
None of these developments will make China happy , and they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its vengeance .
Beijing has been against this informal grouping since 2007 , when the Quad was first conceived .
But given China ’ s aggressive actions , it is unlikely that its opinion will be a serious consideration for regional policymakers .
Their approach thus far—first , not moving past talks to operationalize the Quad , and then deliberately forestalling any use of its military dimension—hasn ’ t yielded any dividend to Quad members .
This is particularly true of India , where the ongoing boundary tussle with China has significantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two Asian giants .
By inviting Australia to the Malabar exercises , New Delhi is signaling that it might be willing not only to shed its past caution in standing up to Beijing , but to bear the costs that might come with such a decision .
However , whether it will be enough to deter China from its aggressive intentions remains far from clear .

Will Australia join the Malabar exercises? For weeks , Indian media has reported with near certitude that New Delhi will be inviting Canberra to join its high-level naval exercises, which usually involve the navies of India, Japan, and the United States. While strategic dialogue and informal cooperation has long existed between the four countries, known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the exercises would mark the first time Australia would be part of this official joint military engagement. For India, the decision to extend the invitation—a move it had so far held back on despite interest from Australia—marks a major step. Not only does New Delhi hope to strengthen its relations with its partners in the Indo-Pacific, but it intends to send a strong message to Beijing as border tensions mount: India’s military partnerships are growing stronger than ever, and Chinese intransigence will make them even more potent.
Will Australia join the Malabar exercises? For weeks, Indian media has reported with near certitude that New Delhi will be inviting Canberra to join its high-level naval exercises, which usually involve the navies of India, Japan, and the United States. While strategic dialogue and informal cooperation has long existed between the four countries, known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the exercises would mark the first time Australia would be part of this official joint military engagement. For India, the decision to extend the invitation—a move it had so far held back on despite interest from Australia—marks a major step. Not only does New Delhi hope to strengthen its relations with its partners in the Indo-Pacific, but it intends to send a strong message to Beijing as border tensions mount: India’s military partnerships are growing stronger than ever, and Chinese intransigence will make them even more potent.
India-Australia relations have evolved rapidly over the past five years, and this development is a natural corollary. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison held their first virtual bilateral meeting in June, the pair offered up a number of significant agreements. The signed accords included the Mutual Logistics Sharing Agreement, allowing the two nations to use each other’s military bases for logistics support improving military partnership. The two countries also agreed to elevate their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, which is based on “mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.” This is symbolic of their commitment to strengthen their engagement in the Indo-Pacific for the promotion of an “open, free, rules–based Indo-Pacific region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions,” as the two countries put it in a joint statement last month.
The timing of such accords couldn’t be better for two nations that have been at the receiving end of China’s aggressive actions. Tensions between Australia and China have been high since Canberra in April called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19. China responded by reportedly drawing up a list of Australian exports that could be subject to tariffs and stricter controls. India, for its part, has been facing a tense standoff with China after border clashes last month resulted in the death of 20 Indian border troops and an unknown number from the Chinese side. Although the two sides are now in the process of disengaging after diplomatic and military talks, tensions over the long undemarcated border, the Line of Actual Control, mark perhaps the worst Sino-Indian crisis since the 1960s.
Amid this rising assertiveness by China, Canberra stands to gain a partnership it has long desired. For years, Australia has wanted to be party to the exercises, even agreeing to join in as an observer in 2017. But India, trying to tread cautiously vis-à-vis China, had not been enthusiastic. Now, its calculations have changed. The choice to join hands and develop a stronger stance against China with like-minded countries no longer seems radical. For Australia and India, stronger defense partnership is essential to achieving a “free and open” Indo-Pacific.
Faced with an increasingly powerful and aggressive China, countries such as Australia, Japan, the United States, and even members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are all rethinking and remapping their China policies—particularly with regards to its incursions in the South China Sea. ASEAN recently released a vision statement where it underlined the need for China to abide by international law and to finalize the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The United States this month strongly condemned China’s actions in the South China Sea, calling its efforts “completely unlawful.” Australia recently announced its 2020 Defence Strategic Update—a wide ranging, 10-year defense plan of 270 billion Australian dollars ($189 billion).
Defense partnerships are central to any effort to counter China. Inviting Australia to the Malabar exercises would significantly strengthen the military quotient of the Quadrilateral grouping. If Australia is given the go-ahead to join the exercise, it will be first time since 2007 that all four Quad members participate in a joint military drill. The Quad went on hiatus from 2008 to 2017, and while has been operational since 2017, it only took off in a significant way after a meeting between the countries’ foreign ministers in September 2019. Prior to the 2019 meeting, summits ended with each country issuing its own statement outlining its own priorities—rather than a joint one. Quad members had been making very calculated statements when it came to China’s actions in the South China Sea, among other issues. But with all four nations sharing an equal sense of urgency about China, priorities are now aligned. Adding a military partnership element to the Quad is a logical step, given the serious security challenges emanating from China’s growing aggression toward the four powers.
Australia’s full induction into the Quad has implications for India’s broader approach to the Indo-Pacific as well. Previously, given Chinese reservations, New Delhi was reluctant to term its Indo-Pacific policy as a strategy, and mostly referred to it as its “vision” of the Indo-Pacific. The country was hesitant to even tie its own Indo-Pacific policy into that of the Quad, arguing that its own policy was more inclusive. In his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Modi noted that the geography of the Indo-Pacific stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to Oceania and stressed that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.” But as the Quad starts to leverage its hard power, and as India’s relations with China deteriorate, New Delhi is likely to reshape its Indo-Pacific strategy alongside its partners. Inviting Australia for the Malabar exercise is a natural first step.
Given China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean—widely considered India’s primary theater of interest—there has long been a sense in New Delhi that it ought to increase its presence and influence in the Western Pacific. China’s growing encroachments in the South China Sea and East China Sea—an attempt to intimidate smaller neighbors—has made it imperative for states such as India to be more hands-on in maritime disputes.
Australia, Japan, and the United States are prominent players in the Western Pacific. Australia has been lending support alongside the United States in freedom-of-navigation exercises and joint patrols in the disputed South China Sea. If India can grow its presence in the eastern Indian Ocean and gain the trust of its Southeast Asian neighbors, New Delhi’s credibility as a serious strategic player in the wider region will be enhanced, which is important for the success of the Quad. Besides the security connotations, the Quad remains critical as India seeks to build alternative supply chains, collaborate on COVID-19 treatments, and reduce its economic dependence on China—something which has been gathering pace over the past few months.
None of these developments will make China happy, and they risk making the countries involved the targets of its vengeance. Beijing has been against this informal grouping since 2007, when the Quad was first conceived. But given China’s aggressive actions, it is unlikely that its opinion will be a serious consideration for regional policymakers. Their approach thus far—first, not moving past talks to operationalize the Quad, and then deliberately forestalling any use of its military dimension—hasn’t yielded any dividend to Quad members. This is particularly true of India, where the ongoing boundary tussle with China has significantly eroded the remnants of trust between the two Asian giants. By inviting Australia to the Malabar exercises, New Delhi is signaling that it might be willing not only to shed its past caution in standing up to Beijing, but to bear the costs that might come with such a decision. However, whether it will be enough to deter China from its aggressive intentions remains far from clear.