foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--Violence Hurts the Communities Protesters Want to Protect

Violence Hurts the Communities Protesters Want to Protect The gruesome killing of George Floyd under the knee of police officer Derek Chauvin has galvanized nationwide protests and reignited the ongoing debate of race relations in America .
Some peaceful protesters have been met with even more brutality , including two journalists who lost an eye from police firing rubber bullets and a 75-year-old man shoved to the ground by officers .
But violence has also deeply harmed the very marginalized communities that activists are trying to protect .
This year has seen steep rises in homicide numbers , after over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In Minnesota , the original center of the protests , local communities have been ravaged by looting , rioting , and property destruction .
Numerous Black-owned small businesses were destroyed , including Bole Ethiopian Cuisine , an ethnic restaurant burned and vandalized and Healing Path Wellness Services , a South Minneapolis minority-owned mental health clinic , which was burned and looted .
Go Get It Tobacco , a Black-owned tobacco store in St. Paul , Minnesota , was also vandalized and left in ruins .
Many cities have experienced a drop in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worsened .
In Portland , riots persisted for several weeks following the May 25 death of Floyd .
“ If you want to support Portland , stop the violence , ” police chief Chuck Lovell recently asserted in a public statement .
Several other cities across the country , such as Los Angeles , Omaha , Aurora , Austin , and Seattle have all witnessed resurging violence amidst the Trump administration ’ s deployment of federal officials in several high-crime zones .
Protests are an uncontroversial exercise of First Amendment rights which must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only exacerbates deep-rooted polarization and stunts any meaningful conversation on police reform and racial discrimination .
It must be condemned from the top down and not be justified by structural inequities .
Moreover , minority communities have disproportionately borne the brunt of property destruction and reckless violence scourging American cities .
As a result , racial inequalities have widened , creating more economic destabilization which will be harder for marginalized communities to recover from .
Rioters set fire to 90 percent of the small businesses along the Lake Street corridor , many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minnesota Star Tribune .
Korboi Falla , a Black firefighter , spent his life savings to open a bar , and looters burned it down .
Video of him breaking down in tears speaks volumes to the self-destruction of the riots .
Ironically , a $ 30 million affordable housing project designed to provide residence for many poor Black locals was burned .
Looters smashed a library and completely burned down the Migizi Communication , a 40-year-old Native youth organization .
The only minority-owned building on the block , Migizi executive director Kelly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ total loss , with damages nearing $ 2 million .
Small businesses across the country have been demolished .
In Dallas , Texas , Guns and Roses Boutique , launched by a Black female entrepreneur , was looted and left in ruins during riots .
Ihman ’ s Hair Studio , a Philadelphia hair salon , was ransacked and looted .
The disgruntled owner wrote : “ [ I ’ m ] hurt and angry that my people would vandalize and destroy a Black-owned business.
” Floyd ’ s girlfriend said the riots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his brother announced , “ Let ’ s switch it up .
Do this peacefully , please.
” He added : “ You all are doing nothing .
Because that ’ s not going to bring my brother back at all.
” Heartbreaking , first-hand narratives aside , riots cause long-lasting economic devastation .
In their 2004 study , The Labor Market Effects of the 1960s Riots , social scientists William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo found a 9 percent decline in median Black family income in cities that saw large-scale riots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see significant violence .
They also found correlations between the riots and the rise of African Americans living in high-poverty urban neighborhoods .
In a second paper , The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots : Evidence from Property Values , Collins and Margo found the riots of the 1960s “ depressed the median value of Black-owned property between 1960 and 1970 , with little or no rebound in the 1970s.
” The riots caused an estimated 10 percent loss in the total value of Black-owned residential property in American urban areas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Black Americans often shared the belief that the riots had hurt their own communities .
According to a Harris poll taken after the 1967 Detroit riots , 68 percent of African Americans surveyed characterized the looters as “ criminals.
” The same percentage felt that violence degraded the righteous cause of civil rights activism .
Riots of the recent past also have a visible impact today .
The crime journalist Zaid Jilani visited Baltimore three years after the post-Freddie-Gray riots .
Jilani notes there was little progress made in areas impacted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suffer from significant population loss and violent crime , with 2019 marking the city ’ s deadliest year in more than two decades .
Coleman Hughes , a contributing editor at City Journal , writes , “ Riots exacerbate the very economic circumstances that create them .
… Many businesses , some Black-owned , have still not returned to Ferguson to this day .
No one has purchased the property .
The buildings are just abandoned.
” Progressives have ( correctly ) critiqued conservatives who are more outraged by the destruction of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Floyd and the violence of police caught on camera numerous times in the last few months .
However , property destruction and economic costs aren ’ t the most egregious consequences of the riots .
Several people have been killed and dozens have been critically injured during the nationwide demonstrations .
As of June 8 , 17 people have died amid the protests , higher than the total number of unarmed Black people ( 14 ) killed in America last year .
A disproportionate number of homicide victims in the riots are Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American victims David Dorn , a retired St. Louis police chief who was guarding a friend ’ s pawnshop against looters , is a particularly grim case .
His bloodcurdling death was captured on Facebook Live after looters shot him in the torso , and he died bleeding on a sidewalk .
Other Black victims include Italia Marie Kelly , a 22-year-old woman who was shot in the back while trying to escape a protest that had turned into a riot in Davenport , Iowa , and Chris Beaty , an ex-Indiana football @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alley in Indianapolis after leaving a demonstration that had become violent .
In the past month , several additional people have died in incidents stemming from riots , including two teenagers who were shot in Seattle ’ s ( now disbanded ) semi-autonomous zone CHOP , and a recent shooting of BLM protestor Garrett Foster in Austin , Texas .
CHOP itself ended in a spree of violent clashes .
All this comes amid a wider crisis .
The American economy has cut 40 million jobs since the pandemic began , which will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inequalities have been amplified , with more than half of Black adults rendered jobless .
Black Americans report being furloughed and laid off at higher rates than whites , and dying of COVID-19 at higher rates than whites .
Emphatic condemnation of self-destructive riots is not to condone police brutality or discrimination .
It is to point to the glaring counterproductivity and wholly unnecessary cost of fighting against structural inequities in modern policing .
Unfortunately , high-ranking politicians and news commentators have cynically used structural inequities to justify mass violence and chronic unrest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has shifted away from policing and deviated to the destructive riots—and efforts to implement measured police reform and create more accountability have been hampered .

The gruesome killing of George Floyd under the knee of police officer Derek Chauvin has galvanized nationwide protests and reignited the ongoing debate of race relations in America. Some peaceful protesters have been met with even more brutality, including two journalists who lost an eye from police firing rubber bullets and a 75-year-old man shoved to the ground by officers.
The gruesome killing of George Floyd under the knee of police officer Derek Chauvin has galvanized nationwide protests and reignited the ongoing debate of race relations in America. Some peaceful protesters have been met with even more brutality, including two journalists who lost an eye from police firing rubber bullets and a 75-year-old man shoved to the ground by officers.
But violence has also deeply harmed the very marginalized communities that activists are trying to protect. This year has seen steep rises in homicide numbers, after over two decades of decline in violent crime. In Minnesota, the original center of the protests, local communities have been ravaged by looting, rioting, and property destruction. Numerous Black-owned small businesses were destroyed, including Bole Ethiopian Cuisine, an ethnic restaurant burned and vandalized and Healing Path Wellness Services, a South Minneapolis minority-owned mental health clinic, which was burned and looted. Go Get It Tobacco, a Black-owned tobacco store in St. Paul, Minnesota, was also vandalized and left in ruins.
Many cities have experienced a drop in riotous demonstrations, but others have only worsened. In Portland, riots persisted for several weeks following the May 25 death of Floyd. “If you want to support Portland, stop the violence,” police chief Chuck Lovell recently asserted in a public statement. Several other cities across the country, such as Los Angeles, Omaha, Aurora, Austin, and Seattle have all witnessed resurging violence amidst the Trump administration’s deployment of federal officials in several high-crime zones.
Protests are an uncontroversial exercise of First Amendment rights which must never be obstructed. However, violence only exacerbates deep-rooted polarization and stunts any meaningful conversation on police reform and racial discrimination. It must be condemned from the top down and not be justified by structural inequities. Moreover, minority communities have disproportionately borne the brunt of property destruction and reckless violence scourging American cities. As a result, racial inequalities have widened, creating more economic destabilization which will be harder for marginalized communities to recover from.
Rioters set fire to 90 percent of the small businesses along the Lake Street corridor, many of which are minority-owned, according to the Minnesota Star Tribune. Korboi Falla, a Black firefighter, spent his life savings to open a bar, and looters burned it down. Video of him breaking down in tears speaks volumes to the self-destruction of the riots. Ironically, a $30 million affordable housing project designed to provide residence for many poor Black locals was burned. Looters smashed a library and completely burned down the Migizi Communication, a 40-year-old Native youth organization. The only minority-owned building on the block, Migizi executive director Kelly Drummer, said it was deemed a total loss, with damages nearing $2 million.
Small businesses across the country have been demolished. In Dallas, Texas, Guns and Roses Boutique, launched by a Black female entrepreneur, was looted and left in ruins during riots. Ihman’s Hair Studio, a Philadelphia hair salon, was ransacked and looted. The disgruntled owner wrote: “[I’m] hurt and angry that my people would vandalize and destroy a Black-owned business.” Floyd’s girlfriend said the riots would “devastate” George, and his brother announced, “Let’s switch it up. Do this peacefully, please.” He added: “You all are doing nothing. Because that’s not going to bring my brother back at all.”
Heartbreaking, first-hand narratives aside, riots cause long-lasting economic devastation. In their 2004 study, The Labor Market Effects of the 1960s Riots, social scientists William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo found a 9 percent decline in median Black family income in cities that saw large-scale riots compared to those that didn’t see significant violence. They also found correlations between the riots and the rise of African Americans living in high-poverty urban neighborhoods.
In a second paper, The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots: Evidence from Property Values, Collins and Margo found the riots of the 1960s “depressed the median value of Black-owned property between 1960 and 1970, with little or no rebound in the 1970s.” The riots caused an estimated 10 percent loss in the total value of Black-owned residential property in American urban areas, widening the racial gap in property values. Black Americans often shared the belief that the riots had hurt their own communities. According to a Harris poll taken after the 1967 Detroit riots, 68 percent of African Americans surveyed characterized the looters as “criminals.” The same percentage felt that violence degraded the righteous cause of civil rights activism.
Riots of the recent past also have a visible impact today. The crime journalist Zaid Jilani visited Baltimore three years after the post-Freddie-Gray riots. Jilani notes there was little progress made in areas impacted by the destruction. The city has continued to suffer from significant population loss and violent crime, with 2019 marking the city’s deadliest year in more than two decades. Coleman Hughes, a contributing editor at City Journal, writes, “Riots exacerbate the very economic circumstances that create them. … Many businesses, some Black-owned, have still not returned to Ferguson to this day. No one has purchased the property. The buildings are just abandoned.”
Progressives have (correctly) critiqued conservatives who are more outraged by the destruction of inanimate property than the coldblooded murder of Floyd and the violence of police caught on camera numerous times in the last few months. However, property destruction and economic costs aren’t the most egregious consequences of the riots. Several people have been killed and dozens have been critically injured during the nationwide demonstrations.
As of June 8, 17 people have died amid the protests, higher than the total number of unarmed Black people (14) killed in America by police last year. A disproportionate number of homicide victims in the riots are Black. Out of at least five African American victims David Dorn, a retired St. Louis police chief who was guarding a friend’s pawnshop against looters, is a particularly grim case. His bloodcurdling death was captured on Facebook Live after looters shot him in the torso, and he died bleeding on a sidewalk.
Other Black victims include Italia Marie Kelly, a 22-year-old woman who was shot in the back while trying to escape a protest that had turned into a riot in Davenport, Iowa, and Chris Beaty, an ex-Indiana football player who was shot dead in an alley in Indianapolis after leaving a demonstration that had become violent. In the past month, several additional people have died in incidents stemming from riots, including two teenagers who were shot in Seattle’s (now disbanded) semi-autonomous zone CHOP, and a recent shooting of BLM protestor Garrett Foster in Austin, Texas. CHOP itself ended in a spree of violent clashes.
All this comes amid a wider crisis. The American economy has cut 40 million jobs since the pandemic began, which will disproportionately fall on the disenfranchised. Racial inequalities have been amplified, with more than half of Black adults rendered jobless. Black Americans report being furloughed and laid off at higher rates than whites, and dying of COVID-19 at higher rates than whites.
Emphatic condemnation of self-destructive riots is not to condone police brutality or discrimination. It is to point to the glaring counterproductivity and wholly unnecessary cost of fighting against structural inequities in modern policing. Unfortunately, high-ranking politicians and news commentators have cynically used structural inequities to justify mass violence and chronic unrest on the streets. The national focus has shifted away from policing and deviated to the destructive riots—and efforts to implement measured police reform and create more accountability have been hampered.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--Document of the Week: China’s See-No-Evil PR Blitz

It is hard to tell these days if the pandemic has turned China into a diplomatic winner or loser .
It seems undeniable that China ’ s heavy-handed lockdown of hundreds of millions of people has halted the spread of the coronavirus at home , making the Chinese Communist Party seem the more competent of the superpowers , as the United States leads the world with more than 170,000 deaths .
( Analysis by the New York Times suggests that the number is even higher , at more than 200,000 . )
And Beijing ’ s provision of masks and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pledge to make any future vaccine available to friendly countries , particularly participants in the Belt and Road Initiative , have earned it some favorable headlines .
But a lot of that gear has proved to be substandard and unusable , and few countries are likely to soon forget China ’ s sluggish , secretive initial response to a pandemic that got its start in the Chinese city of Wuhan and has since spread around the world , accounting for hundreds of thousands of deaths and a record-breaking economic collapse .
In recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backlash , particularly from Western countries , following the passage in June of a harsh new national security law that severely curtails civil rights in Hong Kong and reports of increasingly harsh tactics , including forced sterilization , to exert greater control over China ’ s Muslim Uighur population .
More than a million Uighurs have already been detained in labor and internment camps in Xinjiang .
The pressure seems to be getting to Beijing .
Last month , China ’ s U.N. mission distributed a 43-page booklet—titled “ What ’ s False @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rights in China ” —that seeks to counter 37 common claims of abusive behavior by the Chinese government in Hong Kong , Xinjiang , and against the coronavirus .
The booklet—which we are featuring as part of our Document of the Week series—takes issue with accusations that China has crushed basic freedoms in Hong Kong , covered up evidence of the coronavirus in the early days of the outbreak , and detained over 1 million Uighurs in concentration camps .
The Chinese strategy is to deny all abuses—no matter how well documented—and ask @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the slaughter of American Indians to the killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer .
The booklet begins by declaring “ false ” the statement that the national security law in Hong Kong “ will undermine the human rights and basic freedoms of Hong Kong residents.
” In response , the booklet declares “ true ” that “ rights and freedoms , including the freedoms of speech , of the press , of publication , of association , of assembly , of procession and of demonstration , ” are protected under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after police raided the offices of the popular pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily ; arrested its owner , Jimmy Lai ; and detained a 23-year-old pro-democracy activist , Agnes Chow , both on charges of colluding with a foreign power , according to a report in the Washington Post .
The booklet also countered charges that China has detained more than a million Uighurs in concentration camps and engaged in forced sterilization of Uighur women .
The camps , China claims , are “ vocational education and training centers , ” and China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population policy , ” leading to a spike in the Uighur population from 5.55 million in 1978 to 11.68 million in 2018 , according to the booklet .
“ To put things in perspective , let ’ s look at the situation in the United States , ” the booklet adds .
“ For nearly a century after its founding , the US was uprooting and killing American Indians in its Westward Movement .
”

It is hard to tell these days if the pandemic has turned China into a diplomatic winner or loser. It seems undeniable that China’s heavy-handed lockdown of hundreds of millions of people has halted the spread of the coronavirus at home, making the Chinese Communist Party seem the more competent of the superpowers, as the United States leads the world with more than 170,000 deaths. (Analysis by the New York Times suggests that the number is even higher, at more than 200,000.) And Beijing’s provision of masks and other protective gear to countries and its pledge to make any future vaccine available to friendly countries, particularly participants in the Belt and Road Initiative, have earned it some favorable headlines.
It is hard to tell these days if the pandemic has turned China into a diplomatic winner or loser. It seems undeniable that China’s heavy-handed lockdown of hundreds of millions of people has halted the spread of the coronavirus at home, making the Chinese Communist Party seem the more competent of the superpowers, as the United States leads the world with more than 170,000 deaths. (Analysis by the New York Times suggests that the number is even higher, at more than 200,000.) And Beijing’s provision of masks and other protective gear to countries and its pledge to make any future vaccine available to friendly countries, particularly participants in the Belt and Road Initiative, have earned it some favorable headlines.
But a lot of that gear has proved to be substandard and unusable, and few countries are likely to soon forget China’s sluggish, secretive initial response to a pandemic that got its start in the Chinese city of Wuhan and has since spread around the world, accounting for hundreds of thousands of deaths and a record-breaking economic collapse.
In recent weeks, China has triggered a diplomatic backlash, particularly from Western countries, following the passage in June of a harsh new national security law that severely curtails civil rights in Hong Kong and reports of increasingly harsh tactics, including forced sterilization, to exert greater control over China’s Muslim Uighur population. More than a million Uighurs have already been detained in labor and internment camps in Xinjiang.
The pressure seems to be getting to Beijing. Last month, China’s U.N. mission distributed a 43-page booklet—titled “What’s False & What’s True on Human Rights in China”—that seeks to counter 37 common claims of abusive behavior by the Chinese government in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and against the coronavirus. The booklet—which we are featuring as part of our Document of the Week series—takes issue with accusations that China has crushed basic freedoms in Hong Kong, covered up evidence of the coronavirus in the early days of the outbreak, and detained over 1 million Uighurs in concentration camps. The Chinese strategy is to deny all abuses—no matter how well documented—and ask delegates to consider American crimes, from the slaughter of American Indians to the killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer.
The booklet begins by declaring “false” the statement that the national security law in Hong Kong “will undermine the human rights and basic freedoms of Hong Kong residents.” In response, the booklet declares “true” that “rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration,” are protected under the new law. This claim comes after police raided the offices of the popular pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily; arrested its owner, Jimmy Lai; and detained a 23-year-old pro-democracy activist, Agnes Chow, both on charges of colluding with a foreign power, according to a report in the Washington Post.
The booklet also countered charges that China has detained more than a million Uighurs in concentration camps and engaged in forced sterilization of Uighur women. The camps, China claims, are “vocational education and training centers,” and China has for years granted the Uighurs “preferential population policy,” leading to a spike in the Uighur population from 5.55 million in 1978 to 11.68 million in 2018, according to the booklet. “To put things in perspective, let’s look at the situation in the United States,” the booklet adds. “For nearly a century after its founding, the US was uprooting and killing American Indians in its Westward Movement.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--Mozambique’s Growing Insurgency Takes Strategic Port

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Mozambique ’ s military is battling a growing Islamic State-linked insurgency , tensions escalate in Bolivia after another election delay , and Ethiopia ’ s prime minister may be resorting to repressive tactics to contain unrest .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up here .
Militants aligned with the Islamic State seized a key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after days of fighting .
The attack was the fourth assault on Mocimboa da Praia this year .
The Mozambican military , which suffers from low morale and a lack of resources , has struggled to contain a growing insurgency in the north that has killed almost 1,000 civilians since it began in 2017 , according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project ( ACLED ) .
The military reportedly ran out of ammunition while trying to push back the latest assault .
Analysts doubt that the militants will be able @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Defense Forces of Mozambique said operations to retake the area were ongoing but that their efforts were complicated by the militants ’ use of civilians as human shields .
The attacks underscore the insurgency ’ s growing sophistication as well as the security forces ’ inability to repel the militants from points of strategic infrastructure .
The attack on Mocimboa da Praia was “ the biggest congregation of insurgents that we ’ ve seen so far , ” said Jasmine Opperman , an Africa analyst with ACLED .
The port in Cabo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hub for a $ 23 billion natural gas project developed by the French energy company Total .
Under a deal struck in July , Mozambique will receive $ 14.9 billion in debt financing from Total , one of the largest single investment projects on the continent .
The project is one of several under development in the region after large natural gas fields were discovered off the coast .
Together , the projects are thought to be worth $ 60 billion and could revolutionize Mozambique ’ s $ 15 billion economy .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the poorest regions in Mozambique , has high rates of illiteracy , child malnutrition , and poverty .
The insurgency was originally fueled by local grievances , with the first attack taking place in October 2017 .
In 2019 , the Islamic State announced that the local militants were part of its Africa franchise , Islamic State Central Africa Province , which is also known to have a presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
“ The Islamic State is using its expansionary strategy , war of attrition , adjusted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hijack the local insurgency to their own benefit , ” Opperman said .
Evaluating the ISIS links .
In a briefing for reporters on Aug. 4 , Maj. Gen. Dagvin R.M .
Anderson , the head of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa , said the Islamic State had leveraged local grievances to expand its reach in Mozambique .
“ The reason we believe that is we have seen them over the last 12 to 18 months develop in their capabilities , become more aggressive , and use techniques and procedures that are common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East—that are associated with the Islamic State , ” he said .
Regional risk .
Mozambique shares borders with six other countries , making the rising violence a regional problem , as Tonderayi Mukeredzi wrote for Foreign Policy last month .
“ Northern Mozambique now risks becoming a regional center of Islamist extremism , and the security threat requires a coordinated response before it spills into the other SADC states , ” he wrote , referring to the Southern African Development Community , a regional economic bloc .
A mounting crisis in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week as the unelected caretaker government enacted a law mandating that presidential elections be held on Oct. 18 , despite calls from the opposition to move the date forward .
The government has twice delayed the vote , originally scheduled for May 3 , citing the coronavirus pandemic , but left-wing supporters of former President Evo Morales , who was ousted in November 2019 amid allegations of vote-rigging , fear that the delay is a bid to extend the power of interim President Jeanine Áñez , a conservative .
Protests broke out across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delay , with labor unions and Indigenous groups blocking some of Bolivia ’ s main highways , as well as carrying out strikes and marches .
Tensions intensified on Monday , when the Áñez administration opened an investigation into senior socialist leaders—among them presidential front-runner Luis Arce , a former Morales minister—for allegedly organizing the blockades .
Government Minister Arturo Murillo said the country is “ trying to avoid a civil war.
” A report published last month documented a “ surge ” in human rights violations since Áñez took office , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Movement for Socialism political party and the killings of 23 civilians , all Indigenous , by state forces .
“ These abuses create a climate where the possibility of free and fair elections is seriously undermined , ” said Thomas Becker , an international human rights attorney and co-author of the report .
Repression in Ethiopia .
Over 9,000 people have been detained in Ethiopia after the death of a popular singer in June sparked violent clashes , raising fears among rights groups that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is resorting to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa , whose music became the anthem of the protests that toppled the previous government in 2018 , sparked ethnic clashes that left over 178 people dead .
After coming to power in 2018 , Abiy released tens of thousands of political prisoners and began opening up the country after decades of political repression .
His reforms helped him win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 , but they have also lifted the lid on simmering local power struggles .
More powers to the Lebanese military .
Lebanon ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday that grants sweeping new powers to the country ’ s military , raising concerns about a crackdown on protesters who have taken to the streets in droves after last week ’ s deadly port explosion .
The blast has fueled public anger about government corruption and mismanagement and led to the resignation of the cabinet .
The move gives the military the power to impose curfews , ban mass gatherings , and curb press freedoms .
The measures will be in place until Aug. 21 but can be renewed .
Taliban prisoners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ releasing 400 “ hardcore ” Taliban fighters , a final precondition for peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government .
The decision was approved during a three-day meeting of Afghanistan ’ s grand assembly , known as the Loya Jirga .
Eighty fighters were released on Thursday , even as Afghan President Ashraf Ghani warned that they were a “ danger to the world.
” The Trump administration pushed Ghani ’ s government to release the fighters , the last of 5,000 to be freed , which was a condition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Afghan government was not party to the agreement .
Some of the fighters set to be released have been accused of orchestrating major attacks , including a 2017 truck bombing near the German Embassy in Kabul that killed over 150 people , the deadliest attack in the 19-year insurgency .
Former Colombian president detained .
Álvaro Uribe , the former president of Colombia , has been under house arrest since Wednesday after the Supreme Court last week ordered him to be detained amid an investigation into alleged acts of fraud , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a country still ruled by impunity .
Considered by some Colombia ’ s most powerful politician , the far-right former president gained prominence for his hard-line approach to the country ’ s armed conflict—although he is also reported to have ties to criminal groups .
Uribe , who could face up to eight years in prison if convicted , was placed under house arrest over concerns that he might try to manipulate witnesses in the case .
On Thursday , Colombian media reported that Uribe was self-isolating after being diagnosed with COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group Bellingcat published a mammoth investigation into the inner workings of the Wagner Group , Russia ’ s quasi-private military contractor bankrolled by Yevgeny Prigozhin , a close ally of President Vladimir Putin indicted for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
Leaked email archives from the network and an analysis of eight months of Prigozhin ’ s phone records reveal the group ’ s deep ties to the Russian Defense Ministry , further undermining the Kremlin ’ s efforts to maintain plausible deniability about Wagner ’ s operations .
Thirty-three Wagner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow claimed they were using the capital , Minsk , as a transit point to travel on to Africa or the Middle East .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: Mozambique’s military is battling a growing Islamic State-linked insurgency, tensions escalate in Bolivia after another election delay, and Ethiopia’s prime minister may be resorting to repressive tactics to contain unrest.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Fridays, please sign up here.
Islamic State-Linked Insurgency Surges in Mozambique
Militants aligned with the Islamic State seized a key port in gas-rich northern Mozambique on Wednesday after days of fighting. The attack was the fourth assault on Mocimboa da Praia this year. The Mozambican military, which suffers from low morale and a lack of resources, has struggled to contain a growing insurgency in the north that has killed almost 1,000 civilians since it began in 2017, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The military reportedly ran out of ammunition while trying to push back the latest assault.
Analysts doubt that the militants will be able to maintain control of the port. The Defense Forces of Mozambique said operations to retake the area were ongoing but that their efforts were complicated by the militants’ use of civilians as human shields. The attacks underscore the insurgency’s growing sophistication as well as the security forces’ inability to repel the militants from points of strategic infrastructure.
The attack on Mocimboa da Praia was “the biggest congregation of insurgents that we’ve seen so far,” said Jasmine Opperman, an Africa analyst with ACLED.
The port in Cabo Delgado province has served as a key hub for a $23 billion natural gas project developed by the French energy company Total. Under a deal struck in July, Mozambique will receive $14.9 billion in debt financing from Total, one of the largest single investment projects on the continent. The project is one of several under development in the region after large natural gas fields were discovered off the coast. Together, the projects are thought to be worth $60 billion and could revolutionize Mozambique’s $15 billion economy.
The predominantly Muslim Cabo Delgado province, one of the poorest regions in Mozambique, has high rates of illiteracy, child malnutrition, and poverty. The insurgency was originally fueled by local grievances, with the first attack taking place in October 2017. In 2019, the Islamic State announced that the local militants were part of its Africa franchise, Islamic State Central Africa Province, which is also known to have a presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. “The Islamic State is using its expansionary strategy, war of attrition, adjusted to local conditions in an attempt to hijack the local insurgency to their own benefit,” Opperman said.
Evaluating the ISIS links. In a briefing for reporters on Aug. 4, Maj. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, said the Islamic State had leveraged local grievances to expand its reach in Mozambique. “The reason we believe that is we have seen them over the last 12 to 18 months develop in their capabilities, become more aggressive, and use techniques and procedures that are common in other parts of the world—in the Middle East—that are associated with the Islamic State,” he said.
Regional risk. Mozambique shares borders with six other countries, making the rising violence a regional problem, as Tonderayi Mukeredzi wrote for Foreign Policy last month. “Northern Mozambique now risks becoming a regional center of Islamist extremism, and the security threat requires a coordinated response before it spills into the other SADC states,” he wrote, referring to the Southern African Development Community, a regional economic bloc.
What We’re Following
A mounting crisis in Bolivia. Tensions escalated in Bolivia this week as the unelected caretaker government enacted a law mandating that presidential elections be held on Oct. 18, despite calls from the opposition to move the date forward. The government has twice delayed the vote, originally scheduled for May 3, citing the coronavirus pandemic, but left-wing supporters of former President Evo Morales, who was ousted in November 2019 amid allegations of vote-rigging, fear that the delay is a bid to extend the power of interim President Jeanine Áñez, a conservative.
Protests broke out across the country in response to the new delay, with labor unions and Indigenous groups blocking some of Bolivia’s main highways, as well as carrying out strikes and marches. Tensions intensified on Monday, when the Áñez administration opened an investigation into senior socialist leaders—among them presidential front-runner Luis Arce, a former Morales minister—for allegedly organizing the blockades. Government Minister Arturo Murillo said the country is “trying to avoid a civil war.”
A report published last month documented a “surge” in human rights violations since Áñez took office, including the arrests of over 100 members of the Movement for Socialism political party and the killings of 23 civilians, all Indigenous, by state forces. “These abuses create a climate where the possibility of free and fair elections is seriously undermined,” said Thomas Becker, an international human rights attorney and co-author of the report.
Repression in Ethiopia. Over 9,000 people have been detained in Ethiopia after the death of a popular singer in June sparked violent clashes, raising fears among rights groups that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is resorting to the oppressive tactics of previous governments. The assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa, whose music became the anthem of the protests that toppled the previous government in 2018, sparked ethnic clashes that left over 178 people dead.
After coming to power in 2018, Abiy released tens of thousands of political prisoners and began opening up the country after decades of political repression. His reforms helped him win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, but they have also lifted the lid on simmering local power struggles.
Keep an Eye On
More powers to the Lebanese military. Lebanon’s parliament approved a state of emergency on Thursday that grants sweeping new powers to the country’s military, raising concerns about a crackdown on protesters who have taken to the streets in droves after last week’s deadly port explosion. The blast has fueled public anger about government corruption and mismanagement and led to the resignation of the cabinet. The move gives the military the power to impose curfews, ban mass gatherings, and curb press freedoms. The measures will be in place until Aug. 21 but can be renewed.
Taliban prisoners freed. Authorities in Afghanistan have begun releasing 400 “hardcore” Taliban fighters, a final precondition for peace talks between the militant group and the Afghan government. The decision was approved during a three-day meeting of Afghanistan’s grand assembly, known as the Loya Jirga. Eighty fighters were released on Thursday, even as Afghan President Ashraf Ghani warned that they were a “danger to the world.”
The Trump administration pushed Ghani’s government to release the fighters, the last of 5,000 to be freed, which was a condition of the U.S.-Taliban deal struck in February. The Afghan government was not party to the agreement. Some of the fighters set to be released have been accused of orchestrating major attacks, including a 2017 truck bombing near the German Embassy in Kabul that killed over 150 people, the deadliest attack in the 19-year insurgency.
Former Colombian president detained. Álvaro Uribe, the former president of Colombia, has been under house arrest since Wednesday after the Supreme Court last week ordered him to be detained amid an investigation into alleged acts of fraud, bribery, and witness tampering—a historic first in a country still ruled by impunity. Considered by some Colombia’s most powerful politician, the far-right former president gained prominence for his hard-line approach to the country’s armed conflict—although he is also reported to have ties to criminal groups.
Uribe, who could face up to eight years in prison if convicted, was placed under house arrest over concerns that he might try to manipulate witnesses in the case. On Thursday, Colombian media reported that Uribe was self-isolating after being diagnosed with COVID-19.
Foreign Policy Recommends
On Friday, the open-source investigative group Bellingcat published a mammoth investigation into the inner workings of the Wagner Group, Russia’s quasi-private military contractor bankrolled by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin indicted for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Leaked email archives from the network and an analysis of eight months of Prigozhin’s phone records reveal the group’s deep ties to the Russian Defense Ministry, further undermining the Kremlin’s efforts to maintain plausible deniability about Wagner’s operations. Thirty-three Wagner fighters were recently arrested in Belarus. Moscow claimed they were using the capital, Minsk, as a transit point to travel on to Africa or the Middle East.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.
Augusta Saraiva contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--WeChat Is a Trap for China’s Diaspora

WeChat Is a Trap for China’s Diaspora

On Aug. 6 , President Donald Trump released two executive orders barring U.S. transactions with the Chinese tech companies ByteDance , which owns TikTok , and Tencent , the owner of WeChat , related to those services .
It is unclear what exactly the bans will entail , but a ban on WeChat will likely create significant disruptions for communications and business transactions between people in China and the United States and possibly the rest of the world .
That has caused concern and upset—with good reason .
Yet while the political motivation behind Trump ’ s ban and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the threat WeChat poses should also be taken seriously .
WeChat isn ’ t just a tool for many users ; it ’ s a trap .
With monthly active users of over 1.2 billion worldwide , WeChat is a super-app that combines the functions of social media , messaging , financial services , travel , food delivery , ride-hailing , and other apps .
It is so convenient that for people in China it is as unimaginable not to have WeChat as not to have a smartphone .
That ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partially of deliberate policy .
The Chinese government shuts out foreign tech companies , puts up a Great Firewall to block websites that don ’ t comply with its censorship regime , and penalizes people who try to circumvent it .
At the same time , it nurtures a handful of domestic platforms like WeChat that censor and surveil their users on its behalf and hand over user data to the government when so-called sensitive information is discovered .
Authorities also directly embed cybersecurity police units in major internet companies .
WeChat has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in China lead their entire digital lives , and they are trapped in its controlled information environment without meaningful choice .
Anyone outside the country who wants to connect with people in China has to use what is available in China and thus also gets sucked into the Chinese government ’ s machinery of censorship and surveillance .
International WeChat users are estimated at between 100 million and 200 million ; there are an average of 19 million daily active users in the United States .
A recent study by Citizen Lab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to build up the database it uses to censor China-registered accounts .
As international users are governed by terms of service and privacy policies of Singapore , it is unclear whether WeChat shares this information with the Chinese government .
But it is essential to remember that all Chinese companies are subject to government control .
Those free speech implications don ’ t just apply inside China .
The centrality of WeChat in information acquisition and communication among the Chinese diaspora , especially first-generation immigrants from China , should be a source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past couple of years , I ’ ve been interviewing members of the Chinese diaspora around the world on the Chinese government ’ s activities undermining human rights abroad .
A reoccurring problem I run into is that some of my sources only wanted to use WeChat to communicate , mainly because they had not installed any other messaging apps .
For sure , some immigrants also have WhatsApp , and some use Telegram .
But everyone has WeChat , so , naturally , people congregate on WeChat .
The pull of WeChat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese immigrants is often exclusively done via the app .
Chinese law requires internet companies to store internet logs and relevant data for at least six months to assist law enforcement .
WeChat ’ s own privacy policy notes that it may need to “ retain , disclose and use ” user information in response to requests from the government .
Hence , the Chinese government can—if it wants—know a lot about the people who have left China , down to things like who is meeting whom , at what time , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ payment app as well , it can see to whom they send money or from whom they get it or even who pays for dinner .
WeChat is also where many members of the Chinese diaspora obtain information , including about the countries they immigrated to .
A survey of Mandarin speakers in Australia found that 60 percent of those polled identified WeChat as their primary source of news and information , while only 23 percent said they regularly accessed news from mainstream Australian media such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most popular publications catering to the diaspora originated on WeChat .
In order to attract readership , traditional Chinese-language media outlets now also publish through WeChat .
In this sense , news produced by a local Chinese-language outlet in New York goes through censors in Beijing before it reaches the Chinese-speaking community in New York .
People often ask me why Chinese immigrants still primarily read news from WeChat when other sources of information—uncensored by the Chinese government—are readily available .
First , it is the power of habit .
We all consume @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to .
Then there is the shared way of speaking and writing and common cultural and historical experiences that bind people who grow up in China .
Perhaps somewhat unique to mainland Chinese , growing up in an environment where information control is all encompassing , you are told that criticism of the Chinese government is the result of malicious intent by “ foreign forces , ” and hearing news and ideas contrary to what you were taught and believed in a one-party state can be jarring and can take a long time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of living online in WeChat ’ s ecosystem means that people outside China are subjected to the same censorship and propaganda , which shapes their worldview in ways more amenable to the Chinese government .
Even people who only use WeChat to communicate with people in China are generally aware of its censorship and surveillance capabilities and may self-censor , even unconsciously .
The effects can be insidious , as I remember firsthand from my own youth in China .
The government ’ s censorship rules are never clear , and enforcement is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ line is .
So to play it safe , you try to stay far away from sensitive issues .
When you can ’ t talk about something , you gradually learn to avoid thinking about it in the first place .
After self-censorship becomes a deeply ingrained behavior , shifting to live in a free environment doesn ’ t mean you can immediately shake off old habits .
It can take a lifetime .
The U.S. government should address WeChat ’ s specific threats to the human rights of people on its soil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lawful manner that respects the right to freedom of expression .
To mitigate WeChat ’ s harm , for example , the U.S. government should invest in open-source technologies that can enable people in China to more easily circumvent censorship and provide other channels of communication .
The U.S. government should also support independent Chinese-language media so Chinese-speaking people can have a variety of choices for uncensored news and information .
But most fundamentally , the United States should strengthen its own data protection laws .
If all companies were required to practice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , the risk of it being harvested by any actors , foreign or domestic , would be greatly reduced .

On Aug. 6, President Donald Trump released two executive orders barring U.S. transactions with the Chinese tech companies ByteDance, which owns TikTok, and Tencent, the owner of WeChat, related to those services.
On Aug. 6, President Donald Trump released two executive orders barring U.S. transactions with the Chinese tech companies ByteDance, which owns TikTok, and Tencent, the owner of WeChat, related to those services.
It is unclear what exactly the bans will entail, but a ban on WeChat will likely create significant disruptions for communications and business transactions between people in China and the United States and possibly the rest of the world. That has caused concern and upset—with good reason. Yet while the political motivation behind Trump’s ban and its free speech implications are reasons for concern, the threat WeChat poses should also be taken seriously. WeChat isn’t just a tool for many users; it’s a trap.
With monthly active users of over 1.2 billion worldwide, WeChat is a super-app that combines the functions of social media, messaging, financial services, travel, food delivery, ride-hailing, and other apps. It is so convenient that for people in China it is as unimaginable not to have WeChat as not to have a smartphone.
That’s partially a result of good programming and partially of deliberate policy. The Chinese government shuts out foreign tech companies, puts up a Great Firewall to block websites that don’t comply with its censorship regime, and penalizes people who try to circumvent it. At the same time, it nurtures a handful of domestic platforms like WeChat that censor and surveil their users on its behalf and hand over user data to the government when so-called sensitive information is discovered. Authorities also directly embed cybersecurity police units in major internet companies.
WeChat has thus become a complete digital ecosystem where people in China lead their entire digital lives, and they are trapped in its controlled information environment without meaningful choice.
Anyone outside the country who wants to connect with people in China has to use what is available in China and thus also gets sucked into the Chinese government’s machinery of censorship and surveillance. International WeChat users are estimated at between 100 million and 200 million; there are an average of 19 million daily active users in the United States. A recent study by Citizen Lab showed that WeChat surveils its users outside China to build up the database it uses to censor China-registered accounts. As international users are governed by terms of service and privacy policies of Singapore, it is unclear whether WeChat shares this information with the Chinese government. But it is essential to remember that all Chinese companies are subject to government control.
Those free speech implications don’t just apply inside China. The centrality of WeChat in information acquisition and communication among the Chinese diaspora, especially first-generation immigrants from China, should be a source of real concern elsewhere.
Over the past couple of years, I’ve been interviewing members of the Chinese diaspora around the world on the Chinese government’s activities undermining human rights abroad. A reoccurring problem I run into is that some of my sources only wanted to use WeChat to communicate, mainly because they had not installed any other messaging apps.
For sure, some immigrants also have WhatsApp, and some use Telegram. But everyone has WeChat, so, naturally, people congregate on WeChat. The pull of WeChat is so strong that communication among first-generation Chinese immigrants is often exclusively done via the app.
Chinese law requires internet companies to store internet logs and relevant data for at least six months to assist law enforcement. WeChat’s own privacy policy notes that it may need to “retain, disclose and use” user information in response to requests from the government. Hence, the Chinese government can—if it wants—know a lot about the people who have left China, down to things like who is meeting whom, at what time, and where. And because WeChat is a payment app as well, it can see to whom they send money or from whom they get it or even who pays for dinner.
WeChat is also where many members of the Chinese diaspora obtain information, including about the countries they immigrated to. A survey of Mandarin speakers in Australia found that 60 percent of those polled identified WeChat as their primary source of news and information, while only 23 percent said they regularly accessed news from mainstream Australian media such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the Sydney Morning Herald.
Some of the most popular publications catering to the diaspora originated on WeChat. In order to attract readership, traditional Chinese-language media outlets now also publish through WeChat. In this sense, news produced by a local Chinese-language outlet in New York goes through censors in Beijing before it reaches the Chinese-speaking community in New York.
People often ask me why Chinese immigrants still primarily read news from WeChat when other sources of information—uncensored by the Chinese government—are readily available. First, it is the power of habit. We all consume information from channels that we are used to. Then there is the shared way of speaking and writing and common cultural and historical experiences that bind people who grow up in China.
Perhaps somewhat unique to mainland Chinese, growing up in an environment where information control is all encompassing, you are told that criticism of the Chinese government is the result of malicious intent by “foreign forces,” and hearing news and ideas contrary to what you were taught and believed in a one-party state can be jarring and can take a long time to get accustomed to.
The impact of living online in WeChat’s ecosystem means that people outside China are subjected to the same censorship and propaganda, which shapes their worldview in ways more amenable to the Chinese government. Even people who only use WeChat to communicate with people in China are generally aware of its censorship and surveillance capabilities and may self-censor, even unconsciously. The effects can be insidious, as I remember firsthand from my own youth in China. The government’s censorship rules are never clear, and enforcement is consistent. Nobody knows where the red line is. So to play it safe, you try to stay far away from sensitive issues. When you can’t talk about something, you gradually learn to avoid thinking about it in the first place. After self-censorship becomes a deeply ingrained behavior, shifting to live in a free environment doesn’t mean you can immediately shake off old habits. It can take a lifetime.
The U.S. government should address WeChat’s specific threats to the human rights of people on its soil in a proportionate, transparent, and lawful manner that respects the right to freedom of expression. To mitigate WeChat’s harm, for example, the U.S. government should invest in open-source technologies that can enable people in China to more easily circumvent censorship and provide other channels of communication. The U.S. government should also support independent Chinese-language media so Chinese-speaking people can have a variety of choices for uncensored news and information. But most fundamentally, the United States should strengthen its own data protection laws. If all companies were required to practice data minimization for all users in the United States, the risk of it being harvested by any actors, foreign or domestic, would be greatly reduced.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--How Pakistan’s Military Lost Kashmir

How Pakistan’s Military Lost Kashmir

For over seven decades , Kashmir has been the major flash point in the conflict between Pakistan and India .
Since August 2019 , the region has been in crisis after India ’ s prime minister , Narendra Modi , scrapped the special designation the region once held , which recognized its unusual status as a Muslim-majority area .
New Delhi put the region under military lockdown , arrested Kashmiri local representatives , and blocked virtually all communication lines between the region and the outside world .
There are reports of the abuse of civilians and shortages of food and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voice has been louder than that of Pakistan , where Prime Minister Imran Khan has raised concerns of ethnic cleansing .
Given the Hindu supremacist administration in New Delhi , these are not unjustified .
Yet Pakistan is not without blame in what is going on in Kashmir at the moment .
And while Khan of Pakistan himself has acted in good faith , the military-intelligence state , the real power in Pakistan , has many questions to answer as to how it managed to be completely outmaneuvered on Kashmir—especially as it justifies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep Indian ambitions in Kashmir in check .
One of Pakistan ’ s greatest foreign-policy successes was its cooperation with the United States and the mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War ( 1979-1989 ) .
In this exercise , Pakistan proved itself indispensable to the United States ’ Cold War grand strategy , but it also achieved its own strategic objectives to escape encirclement from Soviet-aligned Afghanistan and Soviet-aligned India .
Once that war was comprehensively won , Pakistan found itself with a great deal of spare military and intelligence capacity , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups and leaders that it could now redirect toward its traditional foe , India .
Pakistan never stood a chance in a direct military conflict with India—and an all-out war between two nuclear powers was a terrifying possibility for everyone .
But Pakistan thought that it could now leverage those same tactics that succeeded in Afghanistan against the militarily superior Soviet Union to put pressure on India .
In the game-theoretical mindset of military and intelligence leaders , this seemed like a perfectly rational use of the available resources , especially since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kashmir , shared remarkable similarities with Afghanistan : a remote , mountainous region , with a Muslim and friendly population , where it was easy to fight an insurgency against a larger foreign force , with relatively much lower use of resources .
But India was no Soviet Union .
India was not entirely foreign to Kashmir linguistically and culturally , and the state was not being stretched to a breaking point economically and politically by maintaining its presence in the region .
Nor did Pakistan ’ s adventures in Kashmir have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free world .
In Afghanistan , Pakistan was a key lieutenant in a cover war sponsored by the world ’ s foremost superpower .
In Kashmir , Pakistan was waging its own war , alone .
And by sponsoring extreme militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed , Pakistan crowded out genuine Kashmiri movements of self-determination .
It also did little to endear itself to local Muslim sentiments : Mainstream Kashmiri Islam is much more deeply steeped in Sufi mysticism and is ideologically opposed to the kind of reactionary fundamentalism that drives the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was sponsoring .
To be sure , India did itself no favors in how it governed its half of Kashmir .
Ham-handed attempts at installing puppet governments in the state ’ s capital and constantly manipulating elections engendered genuine hostility toward New Delhi among Kashmiri locals .
This policy eventually gave an opening to pro-Pakistan militants in 1989 to create a reign of terror that drove out almost all Hindus from the valley , forcing India to militarize the whole region .
But then the broader geopolitical realities also changed from underneath the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ friend and ally from the Afghanistan campaign , Osama bin Laden , started waging a global campaign of terrorism against U.S. assets , culminating in the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil in 2001 .
At this point , the Pakistani military establishment faced a choice : Would they retain their loyalty to the United States that had underwritten the independence of Pakistan throughout the Cold War , or would they retain the alliances with the Islamist militants that were key to their strategic depth against India ?
Successive governments in Islamabad , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make that choice .
Nominally , they wished to retain their prized alliance with the United States , of course , but they were unwilling to forfeit the resources provided by the militants , which could be used against India—most notably in Kashmir .
Instead of making that unavoidable choice , they tried to play both sides and sidelined any civilian administration that spoke of dialogue or rapprochement with India .
This was the wrong strategy—and played directly into the hands of Indian hard-liners .
There is something remarkably stupid about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could deceive the United States and keep both Washington and the Islamists on board .
The United States had the foremost intelligence apparatus in the world .
And it had the ability to act near-unilaterally even in Pakistan itself , as was demonstrated when the United States finally located Osama bin Laden in hiding near Pakistan ’ s military headquarters in Abbottabad and executed the operation to kill him without bothering to consult Islamabad .
With that raid , the charade was over .
Pakistan had lost all credibility with the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties it enjoyed throughout the Cold War .
But the militants no longer had much reason left to believe that Pakistan could shelter them when push comes to shove .
After playing both sides , Pakistan lost the trust of both and the ability to influence either .
The United States continued its drone and ground campaigns against Islamists throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan as it saw fit .
And the Islamists started conducting terrorist attacks all over the world according to their own calculations , without taking instruction from Pakistan ’ s Inter-Services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occasion help Pakistani geopolitical designs , but they were just as ready to carry out attacks within Pakistan , with little regard for the interests of the Pakistani state .
Pakistan thus lost a great deal of control over former proxies in the region .
In Kashmir , this played directly into Modi ’ s hands .
As Islamabad could no longer be relied upon to keep the Islamists in Kashmir on a tight leash , Modi had sufficient pretext to abandon all restraint in the territory of Kashmir while rejecting any dialogue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pointless .
Meanwhile , the Trump administration has moved to make peace with the Taliban in Kabul .
If this comes to pass , that will once again release resources from Afghanistan for the regional Islamist networks .
And the so-called liberation of Kashmir is almost certainly the next focus of those networks .
Indian military chiefs would argue that Modi has been astute to move in on Kashmir before any such redeployment of resources could happen .
None of this is to defend the way in which New Delhi went about its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the humanitarian situation in Kashmir has only gotten worse .
Nor should we lose track of the significance of Kashmir to the ongoing war New Delhi is waging against its Muslim citizens .
A Hindu-supremacist Indian prime minister rolling out a military occupation into the only Muslim-majority state in India is cause for acute concern .
But looked at from the point of view of the history of India-Pakistan relations , Pakistan ’ s historical approach to Kashmir is just as responsible for enabling and facilitating this crisis as those Indians who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general elections .
Pakistan ’ s military-intelligence complex has only ever used Kashmir as pretext to increase its own power and to constantly attack India .
And the suffering brought by that foolishness is falling on the civilians , especially Muslims , trapped on the Indian side of the border .

For over seven decades, Kashmir has been the major flash point in the conflict between Pakistan and India. Since August 2019, the region has been in crisis after India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, scrapped the special designation the region once held, which recognized its unusual status as a Muslim-majority area. New Delhi put the region under military lockdown, arrested Kashmiri local representatives, and blocked virtually all communication lines between the region and the outside world. There are reports of the abuse of civilians and shortages of food and medicines. Amid worldwide criticism, no voice has been louder than that of Pakistan, where Prime Minister Imran Khan has raised concerns of ethnic cleansing. Given the Hindu supremacist administration in New Delhi, these are not unjustified.
For over seven decades, Kashmir has been the major flash point in the conflict between Pakistan and India. Since August 2019, the region has been in crisis after India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, scrapped the special designation the region once held, which recognized its unusual status as a Muslim-majority area. New Delhi put the region under military lockdown, arrested Kashmiri local representatives, and blocked virtually all communication lines between the region and the outside world. There are reports of the abuse of civilians and shortages of food and medicines. Amid worldwide criticism, no voice has been louder than that of Pakistan, where Prime Minister Imran Khan has raised concerns of ethnic cleansing. Given the Hindu supremacist administration in New Delhi, these are not unjustified.
Yet Pakistan is not without blame in what is going on in Kashmir at the moment. And while Khan of Pakistan himself has acted in good faith, the military-intelligence state, the real power in Pakistan, has many questions to answer as to how it managed to be completely outmaneuvered on Kashmir—especially as it justifies its bloated budgets by emphasizing the need to keep Indian ambitions in Kashmir in check.
One of Pakistan’s greatest foreign-policy successes was its cooperation with the United States and the mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). In this exercise, Pakistan proved itself indispensable to the United States’ Cold War grand strategy, but it also achieved its own strategic objectives to escape encirclement from Soviet-aligned Afghanistan and Soviet-aligned India.
Once that war was comprehensively won, Pakistan found itself with a great deal of spare military and intelligence capacity, as well as potentially useful relationships with militant groups and leaders that it could now redirect toward its traditional foe, India. Pakistan never stood a chance in a direct military conflict with India—and an all-out war between two nuclear powers was a terrifying possibility for everyone. But Pakistan thought that it could now leverage those same tactics that succeeded in Afghanistan against the militarily superior Soviet Union to put pressure on India. In the game-theoretical mindset of military and intelligence leaders, this seemed like a perfectly rational use of the available resources, especially since the key theater of conflict with India, Kashmir, shared remarkable similarities with Afghanistan: a remote, mountainous region, with a Muslim and friendly population, where it was easy to fight an insurgency against a larger foreign force, with relatively much lower use of resources.
But India was no Soviet Union. India was not entirely foreign to Kashmir linguistically and culturally, and the state was not being stretched to a breaking point economically and politically by maintaining its presence in the region. Nor did Pakistan’s adventures in Kashmir have the backing of the United States and the free world. In Afghanistan, Pakistan was a key lieutenant in a cover war sponsored by the world’s foremost superpower. In Kashmir, Pakistan was waging its own war, alone. And by sponsoring extreme militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Pakistan crowded out genuine Kashmiri movements of self-determination. It also did little to endear itself to local Muslim sentiments: Mainstream Kashmiri Islam is much more deeply steeped in Sufi mysticism and is ideologically opposed to the kind of reactionary fundamentalism that drives the majority of jihadi terrorist groups that Pakistan was sponsoring.
To be sure, India did itself no favors in how it governed its half of Kashmir. Ham-handed attempts at installing puppet governments in the state’s capital and constantly manipulating elections engendered genuine hostility toward New Delhi among Kashmiri locals. This policy eventually gave an opening to pro-Pakistan militants in 1989 to create a reign of terror that drove out almost all Hindus from the valley, forcing India to militarize the whole region.
But then the broader geopolitical realities also changed from underneath the Pakistani military establishment, when their old friend and ally from the Afghanistan campaign, Osama bin Laden, started waging a global campaign of terrorism against U.S. assets, culminating in the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil in 2001. At this point, the Pakistani military establishment faced a choice: Would they retain their loyalty to the United States that had underwritten the independence of Pakistan throughout the Cold War, or would they retain the alliances with the Islamist militants that were key to their strategic depth against India?
Successive governments in Islamabad, and especially the autonomous military-intelligence complex, refused to make that choice. Nominally, they wished to retain their prized alliance with the United States, of course, but they were unwilling to forfeit the resources provided by the militants, which could be used against India—most notably in Kashmir. Instead of making that unavoidable choice, they tried to play both sides and sidelined any civilian administration that spoke of dialogue or rapprochement with India. This was the wrong strategy—and played directly into the hands of Indian hard-liners.
There is something remarkably stupid about the calculation those military leaders made that they could deceive the United States and keep both Washington and the Islamists on board. The United States had the foremost intelligence apparatus in the world. And it had the ability to act near-unilaterally even in Pakistan itself, as was demonstrated when the United States finally located Osama bin Laden in hiding near Pakistan’s military headquarters in Abbottabad and executed the operation to kill him without bothering to consult Islamabad.
With that raid, the charade was over. Pakistan had lost all credibility with the United States, as well as the close security ties it enjoyed throughout the Cold War. But the militants no longer had much reason left to believe that Pakistan could shelter them when push comes to shove. After playing both sides, Pakistan lost the trust of both and the ability to influence either. The United States continued its drone and ground campaigns against Islamists throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan as it saw fit. And the Islamists started conducting terrorist attacks all over the world according to their own calculations, without taking instruction from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. Yes, they would on occasion help Pakistani geopolitical designs, but they were just as ready to carry out attacks within Pakistan, with little regard for the interests of the Pakistani state.
Pakistan thus lost a great deal of control over former proxies in the region. In Kashmir, this played directly into Modi’s hands. As Islamabad could no longer be relied upon to keep the Islamists in Kashmir on a tight leash, Modi had sufficient pretext to abandon all restraint in the territory of Kashmir while rejecting any dialogue with Pakistan’s civilian government as pointless.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has moved to make peace with the Taliban in Kabul. If this comes to pass, that will once again release resources from Afghanistan for the regional Islamist networks. And the so-called liberation of Kashmir is almost certainly the next focus of those networks. Indian military chiefs would argue that Modi has been astute to move in on Kashmir before any such redeployment of resources could happen.
None of this is to defend the way in which New Delhi went about its crackdown in Kashmir. One year on, the humanitarian situation in Kashmir has only gotten worse. Nor should we lose track of the significance of Kashmir to the ongoing war New Delhi is waging against its Muslim citizens. A Hindu-supremacist Indian prime minister rolling out a military occupation into the only Muslim-majority state in India is cause for acute concern.
But looked at from the point of view of the history of India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan’s historical approach to Kashmir is just as responsible for enabling and facilitating this crisis as those Indians who vote for Modi in India’s general elections. Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex has only ever used Kashmir as pretext to increase its own power and to constantly attack India. And the suffering brought by that foolishness is falling on the civilians, especially Muslims, trapped on the Indian side of the border.


China’s Soft-Power Grab

China this week ramped up its crackdown on the press and other pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong , handing the world a portrait of Beijing as a menacing and bullying superpower .
But at the United Nations headquarters , China is still viewed as a model country .
Beijing is investing tens of millions of dollars in international peacekeeping and mediation missions , increasing its diplomatic support for global health and sustainable development initiatives , and urging Chinese nationals to pursue a life of service at the U.N. and other international organizations .
In contrast to the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1 billion in unpaid dues , China pays its bills on time and in full .
With the Trump administration accelerating its retreat from U.N. and other multilateral bodies , the Chinese government is playing offense .
The pandemic has provided China with a rare opportunity to showcase the supposed benefits of authoritarian rule at a time when the world ’ s leading democratic nation is floundering , and U.S. President Donald Trump is beating a retreat from the international order that America built to manage the world .
But some believe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance its cause for global leadership through a secretive and ham-handed initial response to the virus , which originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan , and by using the pandemic as an opportunity to strengthen its grip on Hong Kong , flex its muscles in the South China Sea and on Taiwan , and clash with Indian forces on its border .
“ Beijing is under assault on the global stage , and the United Nations offers a safe haven , ” said Elizabeth Economy , an expert on China at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xinjiang to Hong Kong to Huawei , opinion within the advanced economies has turned against China.
” But inside the United Nations , China is still well regarded , Economy said—giving Beijing a brief window to burnish its credentials .
“ Given the absence of U.S. leadership in the United Nations , Beijing also has a relatively clear playing field , ” she said .
“ China will have to face the music eventually when the pandemic quiets down and the international investigation is launched .
So I imagine that it is working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ bona fides.
” For Beijing , the United Nations is a safe space : a highly bureaucratic , hierarchical culture , staffed by international civil servants who defer to powerful states , whether China , Saudi Arabia , or the United States—no matter how badly they behave .
At the height of the pandemic , the director-general of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , found time to deliver virtual commencement addresses to top American and Chinese universities , including President Xi Jinping ’ s alma mater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serving at the United Nations dwarfs that of Chinese nationals , Beijing is gaining ground , advocating for Chinese to be placed in both senior- and low-level posts .
Last summer , the Chinese outmaneuvered the United States in an election for the top job at the Food and Agriculture Organization ( FAO ) , looking to vote-rich regions , including Africa , to build an overwhelming advantage over a U.S.-backed candidate .
Last year , U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres shrugged off U.S. opposition to his appointment of a Chinese diplomat as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Africa , a rare high-level field appointment for a Chinese national .
China , meanwhile , has been looking to place Chinese nationals on the ground floor of international organizations .
In 2018 , more Chinese nationals , 612 , took up internships at the U.N. than any other country , according to a U.N. report on staff demographics .
The United States , which hosts the world body ’ s Manhattan headquarters , had only 460 .
That effort is not limited to the U.N .
In the past year , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 276 overseas diplomatic postings , three more than the United States , according to tracking by the Lowy Institute , an Australia-based think tank .
“ For the Chinese Communist Party , Donald Trump presented a historic opportunity : a leader of the free world who doesn ’ t believe in the free world and doesn ’ t want to lead it , ” said Michael Fullilove , the executive director of the Lowy Institute .
But China ’ s heavy-handed approach—whether in regions close to home , like the crackdown in Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as its imposition of trade prohibitions on Australia for proposing an international investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—has undermined its fleeting chance to take advantage of Trump ’ s abdication of American leadership .
“ China is squandering that opportunity—and in November , Americans are likely to send Mr. Trump back to Trump Tower , ” Fullilove said .
Since the end of the Cold War three decades ago , China has slowly expanded its role at the United Nations , dispatching soldiers to U.N. peacekeeping missions at a time when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participation .
Today , China has more U.N. blue helmets , more than 2,500 , than any of the other four permanent members of U.N. Security Council .
But it largely played a passive role until recently , leaving the United States and its European partners , particularly Britain and France , to set U.N. security priorities .
Under Xi , who came to power in 2012 , China has since sought to play a more assertive role .
In September 2015 , Xi pledged before the U.N. General Assembly to place 8,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to establish a $ 1 billion fund to support multilateralism and the U.N. peace and development programs .
China has wielded its veto power in the U.N. Security Council 10 times since 2011 , joining forces with Russia to block a series of resolutions on Syria .
It has taken on greater financial investment in the U.N. , surpassing Japan as the second-largest financial contributor , after the United States .
It has also been doling out voluntary funds .
Each year , China pours tens of millions of dollars into two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs and which has been led by a former Chinese diplomat for more than a decade , supports China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative alongside the U.N .
Sustainable Development Goals .
A second , run out of Guterres ’ s office , distributes more than $ 10 million a year to peacekeeping and mediation efforts , including more than $ 350,000 to the office of the special envoy of the Great Lakes region , led by a Chinese national .
The U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official to monitor the fund .
For years , Chinese nationals have been underrepresented at the U.N .
In 2017 , China had just over 1,100 staff working in the U.N. system , ranking the country 24th among all member states , and only about one-fifth of the number of American staffers .
But in 2016 , Xi vowed to strengthen “ China ’ s pool of international bureaucrats to support China ’ s participation in global governance , ” Courtney Fung and Shing-hon Lam , scholars at the University of Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Their research found that the number of Chinese nationals at U.N. agencies—including FAO , which is led by a Chinese national , and WHO , which has faced charges from Washington of being biased toward China—has at least doubled in the past decade .
In New York , the Department of Economic and Social Affairs is viewed by many Western delegates as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Chinese Foreign Ministry .
In an effort to boost Chinese representation at the U.N. and other international organizations , Chinese universities have promoted foreign language @ @ @ @ @ @ @ students interested in studying international organizations .
“ According to [ the ] Ministry of Education , these scholarship applicants should meet basic qualities and specific criteria to include patriotism to the Motherland , ” Fung and Lam wrote .
In May , the China Scholarship Council , which provides government-funded scholarships to students studying abroad , underscored its interest in expanding its support for Chinese nationals in U.N. bodies , stating in a paper that it had formed partnerships with nine U.N. agencies to employ interns and entry-level staffers .
China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in comparison with industrialized countries like Germany , Denmark , and France , which have supplied hundreds of junior professionals .
But the China Scholarship Council has set a target of 400 Chinese nationals in the programs , according to a diplomatic source .
“ China is late in the game about boosting its nationals ’ numbers through the ranks of the U.N. system , ” Fung and Lam wrote .
In many ways , China ’ s latest offensive , especially its courtship of votes in the developing world , is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the 1950s , when the nascent People ’ s Republic bought support of Asian and African governments to advance its agenda .
China ’ s direct investment in Africa , which accounts for 54 votes in the U.N. General Assembly , has grown dramatically over the past decade , from $ 75 million in 2003 to $ 5.4 billion in 2018 , surpassing the United States in 2014 .
“ Why are the Americans getting so outplayed ?
” said Bruce Jones , the director of the Project on International Order and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China exerts its influence not by funding the secretariat but because it is a major development partner with a majority of countries in Asia and Africa and Latin America .
They all recognize there is a bilateral cost if they oppose China.
” Europe , in particular , has heeded Washington ’ s warnings about China ’ s nefarious activities .
Britain banned the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from participating in its 5G network , and the European Union has both stepped up screening of Chinese investment and condemned China ’ s imposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curtailing freedoms in Hong Kong .
That might hearten China hawks in the Beltway—but the view from Africa and Asia is very different .
“ The hawks in the U.S. want to hear China is hurting itself , but it is more complicated , ” Jones said .
Even so , Beijing is counterpunching .
In July , the Chinese Mission to the U.N. published a 43-page booklet— “ What ’ s False and What ’ s True on China-related Human Rights Matters ” —to parry criticism of its conduct in Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xinjiang , and its role in suppressing information about the spread of the coronavirus .
“ China has launched an international counter-offensive , ” Michel Duclos , a former senior French diplomat with the Institut Montaigne , recently wrote .
“ It has capitalized on a quick exit from the health crisis to showcase its governance model abroad , with a blend of seduction and unabashed brutality.
” “ This forceful public diplomacy offensive could have mixed results , ” he added .
“ But what should hold our attention is China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of influence , or a juxtaposition of areas of clientelism : Africa , whole areas in Europe , some Middle Eastern states , Central Asia , [ and ] the Silk Road .
”

China this week ramped up its crackdown on the press and other pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong, handing the world a portrait of Beijing as a menacing and bullying superpower. But at the United Nations headquarters, China is still viewed as a model country.
China this week ramped up its crackdown on the press and other pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong, handing the world a portrait of Beijing as a menacing and bullying superpower. But at the United Nations headquarters, China is still viewed as a model country.
Beijing is investing tens of millions of dollars in international peacekeeping and mediation missions, increasing its diplomatic support for global health and sustainable development initiatives, and urging Chinese nationals to pursue a life of service at the U.N. and other international organizations. In contrast to the United States, which owes the U.N. more than $1 billion in unpaid dues, China pays its bills on time and in full. With the Trump administration accelerating its retreat from U.N. and other multilateral bodies, the Chinese government is playing offense.
The pandemic has provided China with a rare opportunity to showcase the supposed benefits of authoritarian rule at a time when the world’s leading democratic nation is floundering, and U.S. President Donald Trump is beating a retreat from the international order that America built to manage the world. But some believe that China has squandered a historic chance to advance its cause for global leadership through a secretive and ham-handed initial response to the virus, which originated in the Chinese city of Wuhan, and by using the pandemic as an opportunity to strengthen its grip on Hong Kong, flex its muscles in the South China Sea and on Taiwan, and clash with Indian forces on its border.
“Beijing is under assault on the global stage, and the United Nations offers a safe haven,” said Elizabeth Economy, an expert on China at the Council on Foreign Relations. “From Xinjiang to Hong Kong to Huawei, opinion within the advanced economies has turned against China.”
But inside the United Nations, China is still well regarded, Economy said—giving Beijing a brief window to burnish its credentials.
“Given the absence of U.S. leadership in the United Nations, Beijing also has a relatively clear playing field,” she said. “China will have to face the music eventually when the pandemic quiets down and the international investigation is launched. So I imagine that it is working overtime to demonstrate its ‘good actor’ bona fides.”
For Beijing, the United Nations is a safe space: a highly bureaucratic, hierarchical culture, staffed by international civil servants who defer to powerful states, whether China, Saudi Arabia, or the United States—no matter how badly they behave. At the height of the pandemic, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, found time to deliver virtual commencement addresses to top American and Chinese universities, including President Xi Jinping’s alma mater.
While the number of American nationals serving at the United Nations dwarfs that of Chinese nationals, Beijing is gaining ground, advocating for Chinese to be placed in both senior- and low-level posts.
Last summer, the Chinese outmaneuvered the United States in an election for the top job at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), looking to vote-rich regions, including Africa, to build an overwhelming advantage over a U.S.-backed candidate. Last year, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres shrugged off U.S. opposition to his appointment of a Chinese diplomat as the special representative for the Great Lakes region of Africa, a rare high-level field appointment for a Chinese national. China, meanwhile, has been looking to place Chinese nationals on the ground floor of international organizations. In 2018, more Chinese nationals, 612, took up internships at the U.N. than any other country, according to a U.N. report on staff demographics. The United States, which hosts the world body’s Manhattan headquarters, had only 460.
That effort is not limited to the U.N. In the past year, China has eclipsed the United States with 276 overseas diplomatic postings, three more than the United States, according to tracking by the Lowy Institute, an Australia-based think tank.
“For the Chinese Communist Party, Donald Trump presented a historic opportunity: a leader of the free world who doesn’t believe in the free world and doesn’t want to lead it,” said Michael Fullilove, the executive director of the Lowy Institute. But China’s heavy-handed approach—whether in regions close to home, like the crackdown in Hong Kong, or farther afield, such as its imposition of trade prohibitions on Australia for proposing an international investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—has undermined its fleeting chance to take advantage of Trump’s abdication of American leadership.
“China is squandering that opportunity—and in November, Americans are likely to send Mr. Trump back to Trump Tower,” Fullilove said.
Since the end of the Cold War three decades ago, China has slowly expanded its role at the United Nations, dispatching soldiers to U.N. peacekeeping missions at a time when the United States was reducing its own participation. Today, China has more U.N. blue helmets, more than 2,500, than any of the other four permanent members of U.N. Security Council. But it largely played a passive role until recently, leaving the United States and its European partners, particularly Britain and France, to set U.N. security priorities.
Under Xi, who came to power in 2012, China has since sought to play a more assertive role. In September 2015, Xi pledged before the U.N. General Assembly to place 8,000 Chinese troops on standby for U.N. peacekeeping and to establish a $1 billion fund to support multilateralism and the U.N. peace and development programs. China has wielded its veto power in the U.N. Security Council 10 times since 2011, joining forces with Russia to block a series of resolutions on Syria.
It has taken on greater financial investment in the U.N., surpassing Japan as the second-largest financial contributor, after the United States. It has also been doling out voluntary funds. Each year, China pours tens of millions of dollars into two funds. One, which is run out of the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs and which has been led by a former Chinese diplomat for more than a decade, supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative alongside the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. A second, run out of Guterres’s office, distributes more than $10 million a year to peacekeeping and mediation efforts, including more than $350,000 to the office of the special envoy of the Great Lakes region, led by a Chinese national. The U.N. has hired a former Chinese Foreign Ministry official to monitor the fund.
For years, Chinese nationals have been underrepresented at the U.N. In 2017, China had just over 1,100 staff working in the U.N. system, ranking the country 24th among all member states, and only about one-fifth of the number of American staffers. But in 2016, Xi vowed to strengthen “China’s pool of international bureaucrats to support China’s participation in global governance,” Courtney Fung and Shing-hon Lam, scholars at the University of Hong Kong, told Foreign Policy by email.
Their research found that the number of Chinese nationals at U.N. agencies—including FAO, which is led by a Chinese national, and WHO, which has faced charges from Washington of being biased toward China—has at least doubled in the past decade. In New York, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs is viewed by many Western delegates as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
In an effort to boost Chinese representation at the U.N. and other international organizations, Chinese universities have promoted foreign language classes and offered courses and scholarships for students interested in studying international organizations. “According to [the] Ministry of Education, these scholarship applicants should meet basic qualities and specific criteria to include patriotism to the Motherland,” Fung and Lam wrote.
In May, the China Scholarship Council, which provides government-funded scholarships to students studying abroad, underscored its interest in expanding its support for Chinese nationals in U.N. bodies, stating in a paper that it had formed partnerships with nine U.N. agencies to employ interns and entry-level staffers. China’s participation in the programs still pales in comparison with industrialized countries like Germany, Denmark, and France, which have supplied hundreds of junior professionals. But the China Scholarship Council has set a target of 400 Chinese nationals in the programs, according to a diplomatic source. “China is late in the game about boosting its nationals’ numbers through the ranks of the U.N. system,” Fung and Lam wrote.
In many ways, China’s latest offensive, especially its courtship of votes in the developing world, is a throwback to Mao Zedong’s strategy in the 1950s, when the nascent People’s Republic bought support of Asian and African governments to advance its agenda. China’s direct investment in Africa, which accounts for 54 votes in the U.N. General Assembly, has grown dramatically over the past decade, from $75 million in 2003 to $5.4 billion in 2018, surpassing the United States in 2014.
“Why are the Americans getting so outplayed?” said Bruce Jones, the director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. “China exerts its influence not by funding the secretariat but because it is a major development partner with a majority of countries in Asia and Africa and Latin America. They all recognize there is a bilateral cost if they oppose China.”
Europe, in particular, has heeded Washington’s warnings about China’s nefarious activities. Britain banned the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from participating in its 5G network, and the European Union has both stepped up screening of Chinese investment and condemned China’s imposition of a new national security law severely curtailing freedoms in Hong Kong. That might hearten China hawks in the Beltway—but the view from Africa and Asia is very different.
“The hawks in the U.S. want to hear China is hurting itself, but it is more complicated,” Jones said.
Even so, Beijing is counterpunching. In July, the Chinese Mission to the U.N. published a 43-page booklet—“What’s False and What’s True on China-related Human Rights Matters”—to parry criticism of its conduct in Hong Kong, its mass detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang, and its role in suppressing information about the spread of the coronavirus.
“China has launched an international counter-offensive,” Michel Duclos, a former senior French diplomat with the Institut Montaigne, recently wrote. “It has capitalized on a quick exit from the health crisis to showcase its governance model abroad, with a blend of seduction and unabashed brutality.”
“This forceful public diplomacy offensive could have mixed results,” he added. “But what should hold our attention is China’s patent intention to consolidate a zone of influence, or a juxtaposition of areas of clientelism: Africa, whole areas in Europe, some Middle Eastern states, Central Asia, [and] the Silk Road.”