foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Lebanon Needs Transformation, Not Another Corrupt Unity Government

Lebanon Needs Transformation , Not Another Corrupt Unity Government The massive explosion in Beirut last Tuesday , killing at least 160 people and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless , triggered a political moment as another explosion did 15 years ago : the targeted blast that killed then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri .
Then , as now , grief quickly turned to anger .
In 2005 , the outraged Lebanese rose up to demand fundamental political change , not cosmetic reforms , and they are taking to the streets once again today .
But there is a key difference .
In 2005 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to play a nimble and ultimately effective role helping local activists translate raw emotion into new elections and a new government .
Yet today Washington is content with taking a back seat to an energetic but ambivalent French president—an arrangement that will almost certainly not produce the change most Lebanese yearn for .
The French are pushing for a reconciliation among all parties , with some kind of national unity government that would only maintain the status quo and offer a scapegoat—such as Hassan Diab ’ s government , which resigned en @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Lebanese need a more drastic solution .
The government ’ s resignation will not change the system as long as the same political elites maintain their power and control over other institutions .
France seems to be taking the lead for now , as illustrated by French President Emmanuel Macron ’ s symbolic visit to Beirut last week followed by his quick move to kick off Sunday ’ s international donor meeting .
Countries have already pledged over 250 million euros ( approximately $ 300 million ) .
As much as humanitarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand back on their feet , accountability is much more significant in the long term .
As other countries follow in France ’ s footsteps , it is worth keeping two things in mind : First , the Beirut port explosion was not a natural disaster , and it should not be treated as such .
Therefore , as much as humanitarian aid is vital to help the Lebanese stand back on their feet , accountability is much more significant in the long term , and this is exactly what Lebanese protesters in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Lebanese people no longer trust their government , whose incompetence was one of the possible causes of the explosion .
Therefore , assistance should not by any means go through government institutions or political organizations and charities .
The deeply corrupt political system will prevent aid from reaching the people who need it .
A number of local and international nongovernment organizations—such as the Lebanese Red Cross—have already been offering relief and assistance on the ground from day one .
They were the first responders and have a good infrastructure and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If aid goes through these organizations , the likelihood that it will reach the right beneficiaries is much higher .
If Lebanon ’ s government is asking for international assistance , then it should accept an international investigation .
The United States could take the lead on these two policy questions while coordinating with the French on a humanitarian initiative .
France has been trying to strike a difficult balance : mobilize the international community to support Lebanon while exerting pressure on Lebanese political leaders to implement reforms to allow more aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear in his press statement at the end of his Beirut visit that he would not craft a political solution for Lebanon and that it was up to the Lebanese to construct it , giving an opportunity for both the political elite to compromise and for the protest movement to reorganize and prepare for the next elections .
But the Lebanese elite won ’ t budge without pressure , and the authorities won ’ t hesitate to use violence to suppress the protests .
For many Lebanese , this is a Catch-22 situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities are pressured as they were in 2005—by a robust U.S. presence in the region and a very clear message from the United States to the Lebanese authorities—when the government was forced to resign and early elections were organized .
Unfortunately , there ’ s no sign of an international initiative in this direction .
Only an international investigation would achieve real accountability and justice .
Lebanese President Michel Aoun has already refused this suggestion , as expected .
Not only could an international investigative team hold many in the political establishment accountable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s control , presence , and storage facilities at the city ’ s port—even if the group had nothing to do with the 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate stockpiled at the port .
Although it is early to tell if the ammonium nitrate belonged to Hezbollah , there are many factors suggesting the group is responsible .
It has control over a major part of the port , including the area where the explosion took place and where Hezbollah had temporarily stored its missiles since approximately 2008 .
Not much has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to a 1987 CIA report on Lebanon ’ s ports , “ most operations in Lebanon ’ s ports are illegal and beyond the reach of the government.
” Although the report was focused on Palestinian factions during the Lebanese Civil War and the role of the Syrian regime , the dynamics of control have benefitted Hezbollah , which seems to have inherited both the Syrian regime ’ s and the Palestinian factions ’ control of Lebanon ’ s ports .
It ’ s not a secret that Hezbollah has access and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points of entry : the Syrian-Lebanese borders , the airport , and the port .
Nor is it a secret that Hezbollah has been smuggling weapons through the port to store in Lebanon and transfer to Syria .
And it ’ s no secret that Hezbollah and its allies have put their people in many of the port ’ s sensitive positions .
Indeed , in July 2019 , the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah security official Wafiq Safa for acting on behalf of the group .
The Treasury said Safa , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apparatus , “ has exploited Lebanon ’ s ports and border crossings to smuggle contraband and facilitate travel ” on behalf of the group .
According to the report , Hezbollah “ leveraged Safa to facilitate the passage of items , including illegal drugs and weapons , into the port of Beirut , Lebanon ” and “ specifically routed certain shipments through Safa to avoid scrutiny.
” There are many questions an impartial investigation could answer : Why were Dutch and French rescue teams kept away from the port for hours the second @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ammonium nitrate stored at the port ?
Who left it there for six years , despite warnings of the risk ?
What exactly caused the explosion ?
The Lebanese authorities will not be able to answer these questions on their own .
Hezbollah is clearly worried .
The party has accused state institutions and state employees rather than Israel this time .
Accordingly , Hezbollah and the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese government appear to have decided that to survive this , some employees will have to be sacrificed , including the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was appointed by Gebran Bassil , Hezbollah ’ s main ally in Parliament .
The Trump administration should take advantage of this situation .
Washington has lately been focused on applying maximum pressure on Iran ; therefore , it would make sense to recognize that the horror and tragedy of the Beirut blast presents an opportunity to trim the sails of Iran ’ s most effective regional proxy , Hezbollah .
There are many hard-power reasons for Washington to get more deeply involved in Lebanon right now : to burnish its regional leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russians to it , and to ensure supply lines into Syria .
But taking advantage of the moment to give the Lebanese a chance to create a new political system in which Hezbollah is cut down to size is certainly high on the list .
There are several things the U.S. government can do to achieve that objective .
First , it must grasp that this is a 2005 moment .
The old anti-Hezbollah March 14 coalition is not an alternative because corruption exists across both coalitions and the Lebanese protesters ’ demands—with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you means all of you ” —target every sectarian and corrupt politician no matter their political position on Hezbollah .
Lebanon ’ s people are demanding a total replacement of the system—a new kind of Taif Agreement—the accord negotiated in Saudi Arabia in September 1989 to provide “ the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon.
” Today , the tragedy in Lebanon requires a new agreement that would lead to real change and an end of the sectarian system .
Second , Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not go through any state institutions , including the Lebanese Armed Forces ( LAF ) .
The United States has been assisting the LAF since 2006 for clear security objectives , but the LAF in turn has used brutal force against protesters during the recent demonstrations .
Security assistance could continue , as long as the LAF does not use it to suppress protesters , but humanitarian assistance should go through local and international NGOs that are doing a much better job at relief efforts .
Third , the United States and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transparent investigation of Lebanon ’ s port explosion .
If the U.S. policy is to contain Iran and its proxies , then this is a golden opportunity .
Holding Hezbollah accountable for perhaps killing hundreds of Lebanese and injuring thousands could push the Lebanese people—and Western public opinion in general—to reject Hezbollah ’ s grip on the country .
Fourth , there must be an investigation into the LAF ’ s use of violence against protesters .
The 2005 Cedar Revolution happened because the army ’ s leadership took a decision to protect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The army today seems to have decided to protect the authorities and punish the victims .
The U.S. government needs to send a clear message to the LAF that if it does not protect the protesters as they did in 2005 , assistance will stop .
The U.S. government should take the lead in pushing for genuine change rather than following Macron ’ s lead.Finally , the U.S. government should take the lead in pushing for genuine change rather than following Macron ’ s lead .
The French president might be satisfied with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this idea reminds the Lebanese people of the first national unity government that was forced on the Lebanese after the events of May 2008 .
At the time , Hezbollah took over Beirut and the Druze mountains and used its weapons against the Lebanese people and pushed the March 14 coalition to effectively give up power to Hezbollah through the national unity government—launching a process that allowed the group to take over most political , military , and security institutions .
Another national unity government today would maintain Hezbollah ’ s power over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a new beginning—a new political and social contract that eliminates sectarianism and establishes accountability through judicial reforms .
This can only happen through a new electoral law that entails proper representation and an end to the confessional system , as well as early elections , which would produce a new parliament , a new government , and a new president .
Lebanon also needs the truth—and the accountability that follows—to overcome this tragedy .

The massive explosion in Beirut last Tuesday, killing at least 160 people and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless, triggered a political moment as another explosion did 15 years ago: the targeted blast that killed then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
The massive explosion in Beirut last Tuesday, killing at least 160 people and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless, triggered a political moment as another explosion did 15 years ago: the targeted blast that killed then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Then, as now, grief quickly turned to anger. In 2005, the outraged Lebanese rose up to demand fundamental political change, not cosmetic reforms, and they are taking to the streets once again today. But there is a key difference. In 2005, the White House was willing and able to play a nimble and ultimately effective role helping local activists translate raw emotion into new elections and a new government. Yet today Washington is content with taking a back seat to an energetic but ambivalent French president—an arrangement that will almost certainly not produce the change most Lebanese yearn for.
The French are pushing for a reconciliation among all parties, with some kind of national unity government that would only maintain the status quo and offer a scapegoat—such as Hassan Diab’s government, which resigned en masse yesterday—to calm the streets. Yet the Lebanese need a more drastic solution. The government’s resignation will not change the system as long as the same political elites maintain their power and control over other institutions.
Lebanon was already in the middle of an unprecedented economic and political crisis when the twin blasts hit. It’s a crisis so severe that it has already begun to trigger hyperinflation and hunger in country that weathered 15 years of civil war without experiencing such economic devastation. And it is being kept alive by the greed of a political class that refuses even the most modest reforms demanded by an International Monetary Fund that actually wants to give the country money.
France seems to be taking the lead for now, as illustrated by French President Emmanuel Macron’s symbolic visit to Beirut last week followed by his quick move to kick off Sunday’s international donor meeting. Countries have already pledged over 250 million euros (approximately $300 million).
As much as humanitarian aid is vital to help the Lebanese stand back on their feet, accountability is much more significant in the long term.
As other countries follow in France’s footsteps, it is worth keeping two things in mind: First, the Beirut port explosion was not a natural disaster, and it should not be treated as such. Therefore, as much as humanitarian aid is vital to help the Lebanese stand back on their feet, accountability is much more significant in the long term, and this is exactly what Lebanese protesters in the streets are calling for.
Second, the Lebanese people no longer trust their government, whose incompetence was one of the possible causes of the explosion. Therefore, assistance should not by any means go through government institutions or political organizations and charities.
The deeply corrupt political system will prevent aid from reaching the people who need it. A number of local and international nongovernment organizations—such as the Lebanese Red Cross—have already been offering relief and assistance on the ground from day one. They were the first responders and have a good infrastructure and knowledge of the situation on the ground. If aid goes through these organizations, the likelihood that it will reach the right beneficiaries is much higher.
If Lebanon’s government is asking for international assistance, then it should accept an international investigation. The United States could take the lead on these two policy questions while coordinating with the French on a humanitarian initiative.
France has been trying to strike a difficult balance: mobilize the international community to support Lebanon while exerting pressure on Lebanese political leaders to implement reforms to allow more aid to be sent.
But Macron made clear in his press statement at the end of his Beirut visit that he would not craft a political solution for Lebanon and that it was up to the Lebanese to construct it, giving an opportunity for both the political elite to compromise and for the protest movement to reorganize and prepare for the next elections.
But the Lebanese elite won’t budge without pressure, and the authorities won’t hesitate to use violence to suppress the protests. For many Lebanese, this is a Catch-22 situation that can only be overcome if the authorities are pressured as they were in 2005—by a robust U.S. presence in the region and a very clear message from the United States to the Lebanese authorities—when the government was forced to resign and early elections were organized. Unfortunately, there’s no sign of an international initiative in this direction.
Only an international investigation would achieve real accountability and justice. Lebanese President Michel Aoun has already refused this suggestion, as expected. Not only could an international investigative team hold many in the political establishment accountable, but it could also reveal Hezbollah’s control, presence, and storage facilities at the city’s port—even if the group had nothing to do with the 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate stockpiled at the port.
Although it is early to tell if the ammonium nitrate belonged to Hezbollah, there are many factors suggesting the group is responsible. It has control over a major part of the port, including the area where the explosion took place and where Hezbollah had temporarily stored its missiles since approximately 2008.
Not much has changed in the last four decades. According to a 1987 CIA report on Lebanon’s ports, “most operations in Lebanon’s ports are illegal and beyond the reach of the government.” Although the report was focused on Palestinian factions during the Lebanese Civil War and the role of the Syrian regime, the dynamics of control have benefitted Hezbollah, which seems to have inherited both the Syrian regime’s and the Palestinian factions’ control of Lebanon’s ports.
It’s not a secret that Hezbollah has access and control over all of Lebanon’s points of entry: the Syrian-Lebanese borders, the airport, and the port. Nor is it a secret that Hezbollah has been smuggling weapons through the port to store in Lebanon and transfer to Syria.
And it’s no secret that Hezbollah and its allies have put their people in many of the port’s sensitive positions. Indeed, in July 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah security official Wafiq Safa for acting on behalf of the group. The Treasury said Safa, as the head of Hezbollah’s security apparatus, “has exploited Lebanon’s ports and border crossings to smuggle contraband and facilitate travel” on behalf of the group. According to the report, Hezbollah “leveraged Safa to facilitate the passage of items, including illegal drugs and weapons, into the port of Beirut, Lebanon” and “specifically routed certain shipments through Safa to avoid scrutiny.”
There are many questions an impartial investigation could answer: Why were Dutch and French rescue teams kept away from the port for hours the second day after the explosion? Why was the ammonium nitrate stored at the port? Who left it there for six years, despite warnings of the risk? What exactly caused the explosion? The Lebanese authorities will not be able to answer these questions on their own.
In 2005, many Lebanese opposition parties rushed to accuse the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah for Hariri’s assassination. Back then, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah accused Israel and didn’t hesitate to thank the Syrian regime after its army withdrew from Lebanon, in a gesture that was understood as an act of defiance against the international community and local opposition. Fifteen years later, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is ready to announce its verdict on Aug. 18 against four Hezbollah members. Hariri’s accused killers will almost certainly be convicted in a few days, and that was only possible because the international community pushed for an international investigation and helped establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. As the events in Beirut develop, a similar opportunity presents itself today.
Hezbollah is clearly worried. The party has accused state institutions and state employees rather than Israel this time. Accordingly, Hezbollah and the Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese government appear to have decided that to survive this, some employees will have to be sacrificed, including the country’s customs chief, Badri Daher, who was appointed by Gebran Bassil, Hezbollah’s main ally in Parliament.
The Trump administration should take advantage of this situation. Washington has lately been focused on applying maximum pressure on Iran; therefore, it would make sense to recognize that the horror and tragedy of the Beirut blast presents an opportunity to trim the sails of Iran’s most effective regional proxy, Hezbollah.
There are many hard-power reasons for Washington to get more deeply involved in Lebanon right now: to burnish its regional leadership credentials, to beat the Chinese and Russians to it, and to ensure supply lines into Syria. But taking advantage of the moment to give the Lebanese a chance to create a new political system in which Hezbollah is cut down to size is certainly high on the list.
There are several things the U.S. government can do to achieve that objective.
First, it must grasp that this is a 2005 moment. The old anti-Hezbollah March 14 coalition is not an alternative because corruption exists across both coalitions and the Lebanese protesters’ demands—with their main slogan, “All of you means all of you”—target every sectarian and corrupt politician no matter their political position on Hezbollah.
Lebanon’s people are demanding a total replacement of the system—a new kind of Taif Agreement—the accord negotiated in Saudi Arabia in September 1989 to provide “the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon.” Today, the tragedy in Lebanon requires a new agreement that would lead to real change and an end of the sectarian system.
Second, Washington should make sure that humanitarian aid does not go through any state institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The United States has been assisting the LAF since 2006 for clear security objectives, but the LAF in turn has used brutal force against protesters during the recent demonstrations. Security assistance could continue, as long as the LAF does not use it to suppress protesters, but humanitarian assistance should go through local and international NGOs that are doing a much better job at relief efforts.
Third, the United States and its allies must push for an independent and transparent investigation of Lebanon’s port explosion. If the U.S. policy is to contain Iran and its proxies, then this is a golden opportunity. Holding Hezbollah accountable for perhaps killing hundreds of Lebanese and injuring thousands could push the Lebanese people—and Western public opinion in general—to reject Hezbollah’s grip on the country.
Fourth, there must be an investigation into the LAF’s use of violence against protesters. The 2005 Cedar Revolution happened because the army’s leadership took a decision to protect the protesters, who were peaceful. The army today seems to have decided to protect the authorities and punish the victims. The U.S. government needs to send a clear message to the LAF that if it does not protect the protesters as they did in 2005, assistance will stop.
The U.S. government should take the lead in pushing for genuine change rather than following Macron’s lead.Finally, the U.S. government should take the lead in pushing for genuine change rather than following Macron’s lead. The French president might be satisfied with a national unity government. However, this idea reminds the Lebanese people of the first national unity government that was forced on the Lebanese after the events of May 2008.
At the time, Hezbollah took over Beirut and the Druze mountains and used its weapons against the Lebanese people and pushed the March 14 coalition to effectively give up power to Hezbollah through the national unity government—launching a process that allowed the group to take over most political, military, and security institutions. Another national unity government today would maintain Hezbollah’s power over state institutions.
What Lebanon needs instead is a new beginning—a new political and social contract that eliminates sectarianism and establishes accountability through judicial reforms. This can only happen through a new electoral law that entails proper representation and an end to the confessional system, as well as early elections, which would produce a new parliament, a new government, and a new president.
Lebanon also needs the truth—and the accountability that follows—to overcome this tragedy.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--How to Tackle Coronavirus Corruption

How to Tackle Coronavirus Corruption

Latin America as a region has long had a problem with public corruption , and the coronavirus pandemic has made things worse .
As governments shovel public funds to fight the pandemic and its economic fallout , public officials are swindling millions , including in the graft-prone public health sector .
Fraud and corruption allegations have so far led to the arrest of Bolivia ’ s health minister for allegedly purchasing ventilators at inflated prices , charges against several Colombian mayors for mishandling the purchase of hospital equipment , and investigations into officeholders in several Brazilian states , including one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A pandemic is a tough time to advance reforms .
But action on corruption can not wait .
The cost of delay , measured in the loss of scarce public resources and the human cost of substandard medical equipment , is too high .
To address this urgently , more Latin American governments should strongly consider adopting a vital tool used to supervise federal spending in the United States : the inspector general .
Historically , Latin American countries have settled for using auditors to root out waste , fraud and abuse in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 22 Latin American and Caribbean nations had a version of Mexico ’ s Superior Auditor of the Federation or Brazil ’ s Federal Court of Accounts , a legislative agency that audits Brazil ’ s executive branch .
But auditors do only half the job .
They can be very good at examining documents and ledgers , and finding discrepancies that hint at deeper problems .
And they are great at catching the misuse of accounting practices , which can hide the misuse of public funds .
But auditors lack the power and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ search beyond available documents .
Good field investigators conduct interviews , cultivate sources , execute court-ordered search warrants , engage in undercover activities , and use subpoenas to secure testimony and documents .
A pandemic is a tough time to advance reforms .
But action on corruption can not wait .
To solve this problem , the U.S. Congress created the inspector general in the 1970s as part of a series of good-government reforms that followed the Watergate scandal .
Inspectors general—more than 70 of them at last count , each embedded inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff— spend part of their time performing routine audits , like traditional government auditors in Latin America .
But inspectors general also conduct field investigations that often result in civil lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice under the powerful False Claims Act and other statutes .
And in cases of fraud or corruption , inspectors general team up with federal and state prosecutors to file criminal charges .
In fiscal year 2017 , the last year for which statistics are available , inspector general investigations returned roughly $ 22 billion to federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ convictions and produced nearly 1,500 successful civil lawsuits against corrupt public officials .
And those funds are over and above cost savings yielded by regular audits conducted by inspectors general .
When compared to the total U.S. inspector general budget that year of approximately $ 2.5 billion , the return on investment is obvious .
Another powerful feature of inspectors general is their relationship with Congress .
Although appointed by the president and serving under an agency head , they are legally required to report to Congress every six months , and their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they uncover what the law calls “ particularly serious or flagrant problems , ” they must report them immediately to the agency head , who is required to transmit the information to Congress within seven days .
The power to expose wrongdoing through public reports to a separate branch of government can be highly effective in catalyzing systemic change .
Some might wonder why independent prosecutors—which exist in several countries in the region— don ’ t fulfill these goals .
The problem is that , no matter how independent and competent the prosecutor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team of investigators and auditors intimately familiar with the inner workings of a public agency to uncover the facts upon which prosecutions are built .
Prosecutors , after all , move from case to case , and handle a variety of crimes , whereas inspectors general specialize in sniffing out public corruption and government fraud .
The multidisciplinary team of specialized investigators and auditors collaborating with prosecutors has proven highly effective in the U.S. To complement auditors , some Latin American nations have created anti-corruption agencies in recent years , with mixed success @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Anti-corruption Office under the last administration made great strides in investigating corruption , increasing transparency and establishing anti-corruption guidelines for government contractors .
But it has been dogged by at least a perception of favoritism , both under the last president and again following last year ’ s election , when it dropped criminal complaints that implicate the new vice president and her family .
The U.S. inspector general system has been able to generally avoid the impression of partisanship .
Agency heads , for example , are prohibited from interfering with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress 30 days ’ notice before dismissing an inspector general .
However , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s recent removal of five inspectors general , at least one widely criticized as in retaliation for unflattering findings , has tested the resiliency of the system .
Although it remains fundamentally sound—and inspectors general are busy investigating COVID-19-related fraud—proposals are circulating that would better ensure the independence of these internal watchdogs .
These controversies , however , shouldn ’ t discourage Latin America .
Indeed , Latin American governments have a chance to model @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with greater autonomy .
So far , the closest analogue to an inspector general in the region is Colombia ’ s Procuraduría General de La Nación , which is focused on public officials and the use of public funds , and enjoys investigative and even disciplinary authority , which U.S. inspectors general lack .
But that model remains rare .
To improve upon the U.S. model , and address the concerns about the autonomy of inspectors general that arose after Trump ’ s recent actions , countries in the region should better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they create .
One way to do so would be to ensure that the inspector general , although part of the executive branch , has strong legislative reporting obligations and can not be removed without just cause and a public hearing .
That feature is missing from the U.S. system , which requires only that the president give Congress 30-days ’ notice and a reason for his action , which of late has been no more descriptive than a general loss of confidence .
Another improvement could be prescribing a five- or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president who makes that appointment , thus making clear that inspectors general are not beholden to any particular administration ’ s politics .
In much of the region , political elites have little appetite for strengthening anti-corruption tools .
Last year , Guatemala disbanded a popular United Nations-backed anti-corruption agency after it began investigating the president for alleged campaign finance violations .
Earlier this year , Honduras buried a similar anti-corruption unit backed by the Organization of American States .
Brazil ’ s justice minister recently resigned and accused the president of political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alleged corruption involving former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have slowed since her election as vice president last October .
( Just two days after her swearing in as vice president , courts dropped two federal indictments against Fernández de Kirchner , including charges of alleged bribery in public works contracts . )
But anti-corruption momentum in Latin America is not completely extinguished .
In Peru , for example , President Martín Vizcarra has been battling congress over anti-corruption measures and has remained popular with the public for doing so .
Colombia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economic Cooperation and Development , which requires strict transparency measures .
Last year , Mexico ’ s congress voted to sharply curtail the immunity previously enjoyed by presidents .
Meanwhile , the public in Latin America remains strongly committed to the cause .
In Ecuador , voters in 2018 approved a referendum that prohibited officials convicted of corruption from running for office again .
In all , 85 percent of Latin Americans consider corruption to be a major public policy challenge according to Transparency International ’ s Global Corruption Barometer survey , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highlighted corruption as the key issue informing their preferences .
Policymakers in Latin America should answer public demands to ramp up the fight against corruption , even during a crisis that has strained public finances .
Indeed , in light of the United States ’ experience of a more than tenfold return on its investment in inspectors general , budgetary constraints should not stand in the way of bold action .
As cases of coronavirus-related misconduct multiply , it is time for Latin American lawmakers to adopt a new approach to fight a @ @ @

Latin America as a region has long had a problem with public corruption, and the coronavirus pandemic has made things worse. As governments shovel public funds to fight the pandemic and its economic fallout, public officials are swindling millions, including in the graft-prone public health sector. Fraud and corruption allegations have so far led to the arrest of Bolivia’s health minister for allegedly purchasing ventilators at inflated prices, charges against several Colombian mayors for mishandling the purchase of hospital equipment, and investigations into officeholders in several Brazilian states, including one inquiry known as “Corona Jato.”
Latin America as a region has long had a problem with public corruption, and the coronavirus pandemic has made things worse. As governments shovel public funds to fight the pandemic and its economic fallout, public officials are swindling millions, including in the graft-prone public health sector. Fraud and corruption allegations have so far led to the arrest of Bolivia’s health minister for allegedly purchasing ventilators at inflated prices, charges against several Colombian mayors for mishandling the purchase of hospital equipment, and investigations into officeholders in several Brazilian states, including one inquiry known as “Corona Jato.”
A pandemic is a tough time to advance reforms. But action on corruption cannot wait. The cost of delay, measured in the loss of scarce public resources and the human cost of substandard medical equipment, is too high. To address this urgently, more Latin American governments should strongly consider adopting a vital tool used to supervise federal spending in the United States: the inspector general.
Historically, Latin American countries have settled for using auditors to root out waste, fraud and abuse in government programs. At last count, 22 Latin American and Caribbean nations had a version of Mexico’s Superior Auditor of the Federation or Brazil’s Federal Court of Accounts, a legislative agency that audits Brazil’s executive branch. But auditors do only half the job. They can be very good at examining documents and ledgers, and finding discrepancies that hint at deeper problems. And they are great at catching the misuse of accounting practices, which can hide the misuse of public funds.
But auditors lack the power and training of field investigators, who can search beyond available documents. Good field investigators conduct interviews, cultivate sources, execute court-ordered search warrants, engage in undercover activities, and use subpoenas to secure testimony and documents.
A pandemic is a tough time to advance reforms. But action on corruption cannot wait.
To solve this problem, the U.S. Congress created the inspector general in the 1970s as part of a series of good-government reforms that followed the Watergate scandal. Inspectors general—more than 70 of them at last count, each embedded inside a federal agency and directing their own staff— spend part of their time performing routine audits, like traditional government auditors in Latin America. But inspectors general also conduct field investigations that often result in civil lawsuits filed by the Department of Justice under the powerful False Claims Act and other statutes. And in cases of fraud or corruption, inspectors general team up with federal and state prosecutors to file criminal charges.
In fiscal year 2017, the last year for which statistics are available, inspector general investigations returned roughly $22 billion to federal coffers, yielded more than 4,000 criminal convictions and produced nearly 1,500 successful civil lawsuits against corrupt public officials. And those funds are over and above cost savings yielded by regular audits conducted by inspectors general. When compared to the total U.S. inspector general budget that year of approximately $2.5 billion, the return on investment is obvious.
Another powerful feature of inspectors general is their relationship with Congress. Although appointed by the president and serving under an agency head, they are legally required to report to Congress every six months, and their reports are typically made public. If they uncover what the law calls “particularly serious or flagrant problems,” they must report them immediately to the agency head, who is required to transmit the information to Congress within seven days. The power to expose wrongdoing through public reports to a separate branch of government can be highly effective in catalyzing systemic change.
Some might wonder why independent prosecutors—which exist in several countries in the region— don’t fulfill these goals. The problem is that, no matter how independent and competent the prosecutor, there is no substitute for a team of investigators and auditors intimately familiar with the inner workings of a public agency to uncover the facts upon which prosecutions are built. Prosecutors, after all, move from case to case, and handle a variety of crimes, whereas inspectors general specialize in sniffing out public corruption and government fraud. The multidisciplinary team of specialized investigators and auditors collaborating with prosecutors has proven highly effective in the U.S.
To complement auditors, some Latin American nations have created anti-corruption agencies in recent years, with mixed success. In Argentina, for example, the Anti-corruption Office under the last administration made great strides in investigating corruption, increasing transparency and establishing anti-corruption guidelines for government contractors. But it has been dogged by at least a perception of favoritism, both under the last president and again following last year’s election, when it dropped criminal complaints that implicate the new vice president and her family.
The U.S. inspector general system has been able to generally avoid the impression of partisanship. Agency heads, for example, are prohibited from interfering with investigations, and the president must give Congress 30 days’ notice before dismissing an inspector general. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent removal of five inspectors general, at least one widely criticized as in retaliation for unflattering findings, has tested the resiliency of the system. Although it remains fundamentally sound—and inspectors general are busy investigating COVID-19-related fraud—proposals are circulating that would better ensure the independence of these internal watchdogs.
These controversies, however, shouldn’t discourage Latin America. Indeed, Latin American governments have a chance to model a better version of the inspector general, with greater autonomy. So far, the closest analogue to an inspector general in the region is Colombia’s Procuraduría General de La Nación, which is focused on public officials and the use of public funds, and enjoys investigative and even disciplinary authority, which U.S. inspectors general lack. But that model remains rare.
To improve upon the U.S. model, and address the concerns about the autonomy of inspectors general that arose after Trump’s recent actions, countries in the region should better protect the independence of any similar watchdogs they create. One way to do so would be to ensure that the inspector general, although part of the executive branch, has strong legislative reporting obligations and cannot be removed without just cause and a public hearing. That feature is missing from the U.S. system, which requires only that the president give Congress 30-days’ notice and a reason for his action, which of late has been no more descriptive than a general loss of confidence. Another improvement could be prescribing a five- or even nine-year term, enough to outlast the president who makes that appointment, thus making clear that inspectors general are not beholden to any particular administration’s politics.
In much of the region, political elites have little appetite for strengthening anti-corruption tools. Last year, Guatemala disbanded a popular United Nations-backed anti-corruption agency after it began investigating the president for alleged campaign finance violations. Earlier this year, Honduras buried a similar anti-corruption unit backed by the Organization of American States. Brazil’s justice minister recently resigned and accused the president of political interference. In Argentina, investigations into alleged corruption involving former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner have slowed since her election as vice president last October. (Just two days after her swearing in as vice president, courts dropped two federal indictments against Fernández de Kirchner, including charges of alleged bribery in public works contracts.)
But anti-corruption momentum in Latin America is not completely extinguished. In Peru, for example, President Martín Vizcarra has been battling congress over anti-corruption measures and has remained popular with the public for doing so. Colombia and Costa Rica recently joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which requires strict transparency measures. Last year, Mexico’s congress voted to sharply curtail the immunity previously enjoyed by presidents. Meanwhile, the public in Latin America remains strongly committed to the cause. In Ecuador, voters in 2018 approved a referendum that prohibited officials convicted of corruption from running for office again. In all, 85 percent of Latin Americans consider corruption to be a major public policy challenge according to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey, and in many recent elections, voters have highlighted corruption as the key issue informing their preferences.
Policymakers in Latin America should answer public demands to ramp up the fight against corruption, even during a crisis that has strained public finances. Indeed, in light of the United States’ experience of a more than tenfold return on its investment in inspectors general, budgetary constraints should not stand in the way of bold action. As cases of coronavirus-related misconduct multiply, it is time for Latin American lawmakers to adopt a new approach to fight a longtime problem.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Biden Plans to Make Harris as Powerful a Veep as He Was Under Obama

Biden Plans to Make Harris as Powerful a Veep as He Was Under Obama If she is elected along with her running mate , Joe Biden , Kamala Harris will be no ordinary vice president—and that goes well beyond her historic selection as the first Black and South Asian American woman to back up a major party ticket .
On the contrary , Biden plans to model her role on the extraordinarily influential part he played himself for eight years as Barack Obama ’ s vice president , according to a senior Biden advisor .
The terms of the relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who took office in January 2009 , was a freshman senator with very little experience in foreign policy ; as a consequence , the new president deferred to Biden on a wide range of foreign-policy issues .
Biden told me in a 2010 interview that , to his continuing surprise , Obama decided to “ turn over big chunks ” of policy to him to handle on his own .
And “ he doesn ’ t check back , ” Biden added , whether it was a question of negotiating withdrawal from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Biden often used the phrase “ Barack and I ” without diffidence .
At an early meeting , Biden recalled in the interview , “ All of sudden , he stopped .
He said , ‘ Joe will do Iraq .
Joe knows more about Iraq than anyone.
’ … The Recovery Act , he just handed it over.
” ( Biden responded by getting three key Republican votes from his old Senate colleagues for the 2009 stimulus , earning Obama ’ s praise . )
Though Obama didn ’ t always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advice at first against a severely scaled-down presence in Afghanistan and his initial opposition to the raid on Osama bin Laden in 2011—Biden said in a campaign speech in 2012 : “ I literally get to be the last guy in the room with the president .
That ’ s our arrangement.
” That ’ s a significant factor in a town where power is measured in minutes of presidential face time .
Biden handled so many issues , according to various Obama administration sources , that when the national security team left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left alone chatting with Obama because he needed to be part of the discussion when the economic team arrived for its briefing .
Biden would also often sit down with Obama in the residence before an important National Security Council meeting .
Biden and Harris may have a lot more work to do in building trust than Obama and Biden did .
During a rocky primary season , Harris stung Biden by criticizing him harshly on issues related to his votes on racial segregation .
And in this case Harris is the inexperienced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five decades under his belt as a national figure .
But when asked whether a President Biden would try to give his own veep the same role he once had , a senior Biden advisor told Foreign Policy in an email : “ Unequivocally , yes.
” Biden , a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has vast experience on many foreign-policy fronts , has made a point of telling voters that he will focus much of his presidency on fixing the damage caused by President Donald Trump to America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He will also seek to rejoin the Iran nuclear pact and the Paris climate agreement that Trump rejected .
Thus , it is expected that Harris , a former California attorney general and prosecutor , might get a large domestic portfolio—especially when it comes to criminal justice and police reform and outreach to the African American community and to women .
There ’ s little question that her race and gender were key factors in her selection .
“ That division of labor strikes me as the most likely , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I do think that she , along with Elizabeth Warren , was the candidate most ready to step in as president if necessary .
Hence , I wouldn ’ t be surprised if Biden gave her one or two foreign policy ‘ franchises.
’ ” Elaine Kamarck , a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former close advisor to Vice President Al Gore , predicted Harris would have a “ large legislative portfolio as well as being put in charge of inequality , criminal justice reform , etc.
” “ But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ someone in his own mold .
She ’ s a moderate and well versed enough in foreign policy to take over.
” Another important factor is Biden ’ s age , 77 ; he has often described himself as a would-be transitional president , even suggesting he might serve for just one term .
Thus , the anointment of Harris , who is 55 , instantly puts her at the front of the Democratic Party ’ s potential successors , possibly as early as the 2024 race .
For most of U.S. history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States didn ’ t amount to much .
It was considered a sleepy , funeral-attending post devoid of most constitutional duties except to play tie breaker in the Senate .
Veeps were kept out of the loop , even from cabinet meetings ; their main job was to simply be there if the president died .
“ Gentlemen , I feel a great difficulty how to act .
I am Vice President .
In this I am nothing , but I may be everything , ” said John Adams , the nation ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bitterly described his job as “ the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived.
” Thomas Riley Marshall , Woodrow Wilson ’ s vice president , likened himself to a “ man in a cataleptic state ” who could not speak or move though he was “ perfectly conscious of everything that is going on around him.
” John Nance Garner , Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s equally slighted No .
2 , said the job wasn ’ t “ worth a bucket of warm piss.
” Often the veep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and then forgotten as governance got underway .
But recent vice presidents , starting with Gore under President Bill Clinton and then Dick Cheney under George W. Bush and finally Biden himself , changed the dynamic .
Cheney in particular was deemed to be extraordinarily powerful , especially after the 9/11 attacks , when he orchestrated the case for invading Iraq and prodded Bush to adopt controversial interrogation methods for terrorist suspects that most critics later deemed to be torture .
( Biden himself once described Cheney as “ the most dangerous vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ times , the vice presidency began to grow in stature , especially as the hair-trigger calculus of the Cold War required presidents to keep their putative replacements informed .
“ I ’ d place Biden equal to Gore in power and Cheney , first term , most powerful of all , ” Kamarck said .
Some analysts questioned whether Biden would follow through on his intention to give Harris a large policy role , in part because he has so much more national experience than she does on virtually every front .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate , ” Haltzel , the former Biden aide , said .
“ So it ’ s hard for me to see Biden delegating responsibility for major domestic issues/legislation.
” Obama and Biden had the opposite relationship : Long before he chose him as vice president , the freshman senator from Illinois solicited advice from Biden .
At a critical hearing with Gen. David Petraeus in the spring of 2008 , for example , it was Biden who counseled then-Sen. Obama to lower expectations for withdrawal from Iraq—an approach that shaped both of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When you have finite resources , you ’ ve got to define your goals tightly and modestly .
I ’ m not suggesting that we yank all our troops out all the way .
I ’ m trying to get to an endpoint , ” Obama said at the hearing , earning plaudits in the press .
Biden later told me that exact language was suggested , behind the scenes , by him : “ He asked for my advice.
” Biden ’ s long Senate tenure—he was first elected while the Vietnam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he developed across the aisle will also likely lead him to take a decisive role in legislative outreach .
But at a time of deep social unrest , much of it driven by identity politics , Biden clearly needs Harris for political reasons—in particular to help turn out the Black vote during the campaign and then later on to begin to heal the racial and social divisions in the country .
After all , Biden picked her , he tweeted , as a “ fearless fighter for the little guy .
”

If she is elected along with her running mate, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris will be no ordinary vice president—and that goes well beyond her historic selection as the first Black and South Asian American woman to back up a major party ticket. On the contrary, Biden plans to model her role on the extraordinarily influential part he played himself for eight years as Barack Obama’s vice president, according to a senior Biden advisor.
If she is elected along with her running mate, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris will be no ordinary vice president—and that goes well beyond her historic selection as the first Black and South Asian American woman to back up a major party ticket. On the contrary, Biden plans to model her role on the extraordinarily influential part he played himself for eight years as Barack Obama’s vice president, according to a senior Biden advisor.
The terms of the relationship will plainly be somewhat different. Obama, who took office in January 2009, was a freshman senator with very little experience in foreign policy; as a consequence, the new president deferred to Biden on a wide range of foreign-policy issues. Biden told me in a 2010 interview that, to his continuing surprise, Obama decided to “turn over big chunks” of policy to him to handle on his own. And “he doesn’t check back,” Biden added, whether it was a question of negotiating withdrawal from Iraq or overseeing the economic recovery act. Biden often used the phrase “Barack and I” without diffidence.
At an early meeting, Biden recalled in the interview, “All of sudden, he stopped. He said, ‘Joe will do Iraq. Joe knows more about Iraq than anyone.’ … The Recovery Act, he just handed it over.” (Biden responded by getting three key Republican votes from his old Senate colleagues for the 2009 stimulus, earning Obama’s praise.) Though Obama didn’t always listen to his veep—rejecting Biden’s advice at first against a severely scaled-down presence in Afghanistan and his initial opposition to the raid on Osama bin Laden in 2011—Biden said in a campaign speech in 2012: “I literally get to be the last guy in the room with the president. That’s our arrangement.”
That’s a significant factor in a town where power is measured in minutes of presidential face time. Biden handled so many issues, according to various Obama administration sources, that when the national security team left the Oval Office, he was often left alone chatting with Obama because he needed to be part of the discussion when the economic team arrived for its briefing. Biden would also often sit down with Obama in the residence before an important National Security Council meeting.
Biden and Harris may have a lot more work to do in building trust than Obama and Biden did. During a rocky primary season, Harris stung Biden by criticizing him harshly on issues related to his votes on racial segregation. And in this case Harris is the inexperienced first-term senator, while Biden has nearly five decades under his belt as a national figure. But when asked whether a President Biden would try to give his own veep the same role he once had, a senior Biden advisor told Foreign Policy in an email: “Unequivocally, yes.”
Biden, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has vast experience on many foreign-policy fronts, has made a point of telling voters that he will focus much of his presidency on fixing the damage caused by President Donald Trump to America’s alliances and to international institutions. He will also seek to rejoin the Iran nuclear pact and the Paris climate agreement that Trump rejected. Thus, it is expected that Harris, a former California attorney general and prosecutor, might get a large domestic portfolio—especially when it comes to criminal justice and police reform and outreach to the African American community and to women. There’s little question that her race and gender were key factors in her selection.
“That division of labor strikes me as the most likely,” said former senior Biden aide Michael Haltzel. “I do think that she, along with Elizabeth Warren, was the candidate most ready to step in as president if necessary. Hence, I wouldn’t be surprised if Biden gave her one or two foreign policy ‘franchises.’”
Elaine Kamarck, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former close advisor to Vice President Al Gore, predicted Harris would have a “large legislative portfolio as well as being put in charge of inequality, criminal justice reform, etc.”
“But of course a former VP would pick someone in his own mold. She’s a moderate and well versed enough in foreign policy to take over.”
Another important factor is Biden’s age, 77; he has often described himself as a would-be transitional president, even suggesting he might serve for just one term. Thus, the anointment of Harris, who is 55, instantly puts her at the front of the Democratic Party’s potential successors, possibly as early as the 2024 race.
For most of U.S. history, the vice presidency of the United States didn’t amount to much. It was considered a sleepy, funeral-attending post devoid of most constitutional duties except to play tie breaker in the Senate. Veeps were kept out of the loop, even from cabinet meetings; their main job was to simply be there if the president died.
“Gentlemen, I feel a great difficulty how to act. I am Vice President. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything,” said John Adams, the nation’s first vice president, who later bitterly described his job as “the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived.”
Thomas Riley Marshall, Woodrow Wilson’s vice president, likened himself to a “man in a cataleptic state” who could not speak or move though he was “perfectly conscious of everything that is going on around him.” John Nance Garner, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s equally slighted No. 2, said the job wasn’t “worth a bucket of warm piss.” Often the veep was chosen to balance a ticket demographically and then forgotten as governance got underway.
But recent vice presidents, starting with Gore under President Bill Clinton and then Dick Cheney under George W. Bush and finally Biden himself, changed the dynamic. Cheney in particular was deemed to be extraordinarily powerful, especially after the 9/11 attacks, when he orchestrated the case for invading Iraq and prodded Bush to adopt controversial interrogation methods for terrorist suspects that most critics later deemed to be torture. (Biden himself once described Cheney as “the most dangerous vice president in history.”)
In modern times, the vice presidency began to grow in stature, especially as the hair-trigger calculus of the Cold War required presidents to keep their putative replacements informed. “I’d place Biden equal to Gore in power and Cheney, first term, most powerful of all,” Kamarck said.
Some analysts questioned whether Biden would follow through on his intention to give Harris a large policy role, in part because he has so much more national experience than she does on virtually every front.
“Harris has very short experience in the Senate,” Haltzel, the former Biden aide, said. “So it’s hard for me to see Biden delegating responsibility for major domestic issues/legislation.”
Obama and Biden had the opposite relationship: Long before he chose him as vice president, the freshman senator from Illinois solicited advice from Biden. At a critical hearing with Gen. David Petraeus in the spring of 2008, for example, it was Biden who counseled then-Sen. Obama to lower expectations for withdrawal from Iraq—an approach that shaped both of their positions on the issue.
“When you have finite resources, you’ve got to define your goals tightly and modestly. I’m not suggesting that we yank all our troops out all the way. I’m trying to get to an endpoint,” Obama said at the hearing, earning plaudits in the press. Biden later told me that exact language was suggested, behind the scenes, by him: “He asked for my advice.”
Biden’s long Senate tenure—he was first elected while the Vietnam War was still raging—and the many relationships he developed across the aisle will also likely lead him to take a decisive role in legislative outreach.
But at a time of deep social unrest, much of it driven by identity politics, Biden clearly needs Harris for political reasons—in particular to help turn out the Black vote during the campaign and then later on to begin to heal the racial and social divisions in the country. After all, Biden picked her, he tweeted, as a “fearless fighter for the little guy.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--A Biden-Harris Ticket—and What It Means for the United States in November

A Biden-Harris Ticket—and What It Means for the United States in November In less than 90 days , presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden and California Sen. Kamala Harris will participate in one of the most pivotal elections in U.S. history .
In choosing Harris as his running mate , Biden is going after Democratic voters keen on domestic policies and excited about the prospect of a vice president who would be the first Black and South Asian American woman to hold the second highest office in the country .
It ’ s already clear that this election season is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden may only run for one term , compounding the importance of the selection of Harris ahead of 2024 .
Harris is also one of only three women ever chosen as running mate on a major ticket .
All of this comes as U.S. President Donald Trump warns that he may not accept election results and has flirted with the idea of delaying the election altogether .
Ahead of the Democratic National Convention , which begins Aug. 17 in Milwaukee , the two seasoned politicians now face the challenge of melding their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor of a hotly contested electorate .
Harris is slated to speak Thursday , Aug. 20 , the final day of the convention .
To explain Biden ’ s choice—and what a Biden administration might look like when it comes to foreign policy—we ’ ve gathered our top reads .
Biden ’ s years of experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , as well as eight years in the Obama White House , have shaped his approach to building his campaign team .
In an exclusive last month , Foreign Policy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Darcy Palder found that Biden ’ s campaign has established a foreign-policy team of over 2,000 strong to focus on issues from diversity in national security to defense , intelligence , and homeland security .
If Biden wins , many in this cohort are expected to jockey for high-ranking positions in the administration .
East Asia expert Ely Ratner and Middle East specialist Daniel Benaim , for instance , are likely to occupy senior posts in the Pentagon , State Department , or other agencies .
But his view of America ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be the perfect foil to Trump ’ s .
Colum Lynch in June wrote of Biden ’ s stubbornness in accommodating more progressive foreign-policy tenets , and how that may play against him in the voting booth .
As much as Biden has incorporated some ideas from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party , he drew the line at explicitly calling out Israel ’ s “ occupation ” of Palestinian territories , as Lynch reported—which could turn off some of the voters he is trying to reach .
Whether backing the resolution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remaining committed to waging an open-ended global war on terrorism , or showing a tough approach to China , “ Biden appears to be a man of the past : an unapologetic champion of American exceptionalism , ” wrote Lynch .
But among some disenchanted conservative voters , for whom “ the only thing worse than a second term for Trump would have been a first term for Sanders , ” Biden may prove to be a saving grace , John Hannah writes .
What ’ s more , his camp is attempting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic inequality that has bedeviled the country for a generation and may haunt the country for a generation more .
Robert Kuttner wrote in our Summer 2020 issue that the coronavirus crisis has cost the U.S. economy more than 25 million jobs , vindicating the need for a massive government role in the recovery .
That suggests that Biden would need to reach for something as bold as Lyndon B. Johnson ’ s Great Society or Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s New Deal .
But Biden has yet to reveal whether he could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in such a way , wrote Kuttner .
Beyond this deeper reckoning with domestic policies , Biden recognizes the need for a overhaul of how America has presented itself to the world under the Trump administration .
As former Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg put it , “ the next administration … faces a daunting task in rebuilding the United States ’ global alliances and partnerships and restoring trust and confidence in the country and its leadership.
” But banking on negative feelings about Trump to carry the day is “ a familiar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh wrote in July .
Already , the Trump campaign is hard at work prodding Democratic weak spots by exploiting fears that Biden is merely a tool for the extreme left who would “ hurt the Bible ” and “ hurt God ” if elected .
But with Trump trailing in the polls and his hopes for reelection looking shaky , he has little choice but to try to repeat the kind of ad hominem attacks that served him well four years ago .

In less than 90 days, presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden and California Sen. Kamala Harris will participate in one of the most pivotal elections in U.S. history. In choosing Harris as his running mate, Biden is going after Democratic voters keen on domestic policies and excited about the prospect of a vice president who would be the first Black and South Asian American woman to hold the second highest office in the country.
In less than 90 days, presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden and California Sen. Kamala Harris will participate in one of the most pivotal elections in U.S. history. In choosing Harris as his running mate, Biden is going after Democratic voters keen on domestic policies and excited about the prospect of a vice president who would be the first Black and South Asian American woman to hold the second highest office in the country.
It’s already clear that this election season is unlike others before it. For one, Biden may only run for one term, compounding the importance of the selection of Harris ahead of 2024. Harris is also one of only three women ever chosen as running mate on a major ticket. All of this comes as U.S. President Donald Trump warns that he may not accept election results and has flirted with the idea of delaying the election altogether.
Ahead of the Democratic National Convention, which begins Aug. 17 in Milwaukee, the two seasoned politicians now face the challenge of melding their agendas into one and jockeying for the favor of a hotly contested electorate. Harris is slated to speak Thursday, Aug. 20, the final day of the convention.
To explain Biden’s choice—and what a Biden administration might look like when it comes to foreign policy—we’ve gathered our top reads.
Biden’s years of experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as well as eight years in the Obama White House, have shaped his approach to building his campaign team. In an exclusive last month, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Darcy Palder found that Biden’s campaign has established a foreign-policy team of over 2,000 strong to focus on issues from diversity in national security to defense, intelligence, and homeland security. If Biden wins, many in this cohort are expected to jockey for high-ranking positions in the administration. East Asia expert Ely Ratner and Middle East specialist Daniel Benaim, for instance, are likely to occupy senior posts in the Pentagon, State Department, or other agencies.
But his view of America’s relations with the world may not be the perfect foil to Trump’s. Colum Lynch in June wrote of Biden’s stubbornness in accommodating more progressive foreign-policy tenets, and how that may play against him in the voting booth. As much as Biden has incorporated some ideas from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, he drew the line at explicitly calling out Israel’s “occupation” of Palestinian territories, as Lynch reported—which could turn off some of the voters he is trying to reach. Whether backing the resolution authorizing the Iraq War in 2002, remaining committed to waging an open-ended global war on terrorism, or showing a tough approach to China, “Biden appears to be a man of the past: an unapologetic champion of American exceptionalism,” wrote Lynch.
But among some disenchanted conservative voters, for whom “the only thing worse than a second term for Trump would have been a first term for Sanders,” Biden may prove to be a saving grace, John Hannah writes. What’s more, his camp is attempting to walk a fine line amid extreme economic inequality that has bedeviled the country for a generation and may haunt the country for a generation more. Robert Kuttner wrote in our Summer 2020 issue that the coronavirus crisis has cost the U.S. economy more than 25 million jobs, vindicating the need for a massive government role in the recovery. That suggests that Biden would need to reach for something as bold as Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society or Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. But Biden has yet to reveal whether he could wield the full force of the presidency in such a way, wrote Kuttner.
Beyond this deeper reckoning with domestic policies, Biden recognizes the need for a overhaul of how America has presented itself to the world under the Trump administration. As former Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg put it, “the next administration … faces a daunting task in rebuilding the United States’ global alliances and partnerships and restoring trust and confidence in the country and its leadership.”
But banking on negative feelings about Trump to carry the day is “a familiar danger zone for Democrats,” Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh wrote in July. Already, the Trump campaign is hard at work prodding Democratic weak spots by exploiting fears that Biden is merely a tool for the extreme left who would “hurt the Bible” and “hurt God” if elected. But with Trump trailing in the polls and his hopes for reelection looking shaky, he has little choice but to try to repeat the kind of ad hominem attacks that served him well four years ago.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Biden Picks Kamala Harris as Running Mate

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has chosen California Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate , ending months of speculation and potentially placing a foreign-policy novice second in line to the American presidency .
The announcement ended months of relentless speculation over the prospects of more than a dozen prominent women , from progressive powerhouses such as Stacey Abrams and Sen. Elizabeth Warren to national security heavyweights , including former National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Illinois Sen. Tammy Duckworth , a combat veteran of the Iraq War .
If the Democrats prevail in the November election , Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. vice president , as well as the first Black and South Asian American .
“ I have the great honor to announce that I ’ ve picked @ KamalaHarris — a fearless fighter for the little guy , and one of the country ’ s finest public servants — as my running mate , ” Biden tweeted .
Harris , the junior senator from California who came into office in 2017 , vaulted to the national stage during the contentious Senate hearings for Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh , and then later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primaries facing off against Biden .
Jarrett Blanc , a former State Department official during the Obama administration who advised Warren ’ s presidential campaign , told Foreign Policy that “ the fact that an African American woman born of immigrant parents from India and Jamaica and educated at a historically black university can be seen as a ‘ safe pick ’ for [ vice president ] is really heartening .
In foreign policy terms , it tells countries around the world that we haven ’ t given up , that despite the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. is still striving to live up to our ideals.
” President Donald Trump , meanwhile , launched an attack on Harris within minutes of the announcement , posting an ad on Twitter that characterized her as a “ phony ” and champion of the “ radical left ” who supported “ socialized medicine.
” The ad , which accused her of “ attacking Joe Biden for racist policies , ” also noted that Biden referred to himself as a “ transition candidate.
” “ He is handing over the reins to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left , ” the ad stated .
( In 2011 and 2013 , Trump donated $ 6,000 to Harris ’ s run for attorney general of California , and his daughter , Ivanka , donated $ 2,000 in 2014 , according to the Sacramento Bee .
Harris ’ s campaign later said in 2015 she donated Trump ’ s contributions to a civil and human rights non-profit group . )
It remains unclear whether Harris will play a significant role in foreign policy on the campaign trail .
In the final months of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already amassed a team of some 2,000 experts to advise the candidate on foreign-policy issues on a volunteer basis .
Biden retains a close coterie of top foreign-policy advisors , many veterans from the Obama administration , including former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken and former Deputy CIA Director Avril Haines .
While Harris doesn ’ t have the experience of Biden on foreign policy , she is “ no foreign-policy lightweight , ” said Rebecca Bill Chavez , a former Pentagon official who advised Harris on foreign policy during her primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from scratch .
During her primary campaign , she was advised by seasoned foreign-policy experts , including Chavez ; Matthew Spence , a former Pentagon official ; Philip Gordon , a prominent Middle East scholar and former White House Middle East coordinator ; and Matthew Olsen , the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center .
She has also served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , which oversees the United States ’ vast array of spy agencies and has played a key role in investigating Russia ’ s interference in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was a quick study with strong instincts on foreign policy who quickly got up to speed on the issues during the primaries .
“ She ’ s smart and she understands the complex national security challenges that we ’ re facing.
” During her presidential campaign , Harris called on the need to confront China over its “ abysmal ” human rights record and “ unfair trade practices , ” but stopped short of supporting President Donald Trump ’ s trade war .
Harris framed Russia as one of the United States ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and repeatedly condemned the Kremlin ’ s interference in the 2016 elections .
In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations , however , Harris said that she would seek to cooperate with China on a range of issues , including by seeking agreement on a path toward easing the environmental damage caused by global warming .
Characterizing climate change as an “ existential threat , ” she called for investing $ 10 trillion in public and private investments over the next decade to promote clean energy , setting a target of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a carbon-neutral electricity sector by 2030 .
Harris also weighed in on Venezuela , where the Trump administration ’ s efforts to oust longtime socialist leader Nicolás Maduro amid the country ’ s economic tailspin and political strife in favor of a democratic reformer have largely stalled .
She , along with two dozen other senators , wrote a letter to Trump earlier this year urging him to grant Venezuelan immigrants escaping the country ’ s chaos temporary protected status in the United States .
( The letter appeared to largely fell on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even before the pick was announced , Wendy Sherman , a key Biden advisor , began to prepare for the likely criticism of Biden ’ s selection on Twitter , cataloguing a list of likely attacks that will be leveled against her , including that her “ face , hair , posture , entourage will be subject of endless commentary.
” “ She will be called too ambitious , not a team player , too aggressive , hard to work for , too progressive , not progressive enough , ” Sherman wrote .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ she will be challenged as ‘ not really ’ or too radical ; will be called a token or merely a symbol who can ’ t deliver.
” The 55-year old senator has faced scrutiny from the progressive left for her record as California attorney general and San Francisco district attorney during her primary run .
Harris has been a vocal proponent of criminal justice reform , particularly in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in Minnesota that sparked a nationwide reckoning on racial injustice and criminal justice reform .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tenure as a prosecutor in California ’ s criminal justice system , which has disproportionately impacted the state ’ s African-American community , drew criticism from progressive voices calling for sweeping overhauls to the justice system to root out racial prejudice and bias .
Biden ’ s pick came after weeks of speculation in the so-called veepstakes , where the final candidates were winnowed down to Rice , who served as national security advisor under President Barack Obama , and California Rep. Karen Bass .
Rice seemed like a far-flung pick to some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clinton White House and State Department , Rice had not previously held elected office and was not perceived to have the same political clout on the domestic front as Harris .
In a statement released after Biden ’ s announcement , Rice applauded Harris as a “ tenacious and trailblazing leader ” and slammed Trump as “ corrupt and self-serving.
” Update , Aug. 11 , 2020 : This article was updated with more information on Harris ’ s foreign-policy views .

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has chosen California Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate, ending months of speculation and potentially placing a foreign-policy novice second in line to the American presidency.
Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has chosen California Sen. Kamala Harris as his running mate, ending months of speculation and potentially placing a foreign-policy novice second in line to the American presidency.
The announcement ended months of relentless speculation over the prospects of more than a dozen prominent women, from progressive powerhouses such as Stacey Abrams and Sen. Elizabeth Warren to national security heavyweights, including former National Security Advisor Susan Rice and Illinois Sen. Tammy Duckworth, a combat veteran of the Iraq War.
If the Democrats prevail in the November election, Harris would be the first woman elected as U.S. vice president, as well as the first Black and South Asian American.
“I have the great honor to announce that I’ve picked @KamalaHarris — a fearless fighter for the little guy, and one of the country’s finest public servants — as my running mate,” Biden tweeted.
Harris, the junior senator from California who came into office in 2017, vaulted to the national stage during the contentious Senate hearings for Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and then later as a presidential candidate during the Democratic primaries facing off against Biden.
Jarrett Blanc, a former State Department official during the Obama administration who advised Warren’s presidential campaign, told Foreign Policy that “the fact that an African American woman born of immigrant parents from India and Jamaica and educated at a historically black university can be seen as a ‘safe pick’ for [vice president] is really heartening. In foreign policy terms, it tells countries around the world that we haven’t given up, that despite the madness of the last four years, the U.S. is still striving to live up to our ideals.”
President Donald Trump, meanwhile, launched an attack on Harris within minutes of the announcement, posting an ad on Twitter that characterized her as a “phony” and champion of the “radical left” who supported “socialized medicine.” The ad, which accused her of “attacking Joe Biden for racist policies,” also noted that Biden referred to himself as a “transition candidate.”
“He is handing over the reins to Kamala while they jointly embrace the radical left,” the ad stated. (In 2011 and 2013, Trump donated $6,000 to Harris’s run for attorney general of California, and his daughter, Ivanka, donated $2,000 in 2014, according to the Sacramento Bee. Harris’s campaign later said in 2015 she donated Trump’s contributions to a civil and human rights non-profit group.)
It remains unclear whether Harris will play a significant role in foreign policy on the campaign trail. In the final months of the campaign, the Biden camp has already amassed a team of some 2,000 experts to advise the candidate on foreign-policy issues on a volunteer basis. Biden retains a close coterie of top foreign-policy advisors, many veterans from the Obama administration, including former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken and former Deputy CIA Director Avril Haines.
While Harris doesn’t have the experience of Biden on foreign policy, she is “no foreign-policy lightweight,” said Rebecca Bill Chavez, a former Pentagon official who advised Harris on foreign policy during her primary campaign.
Harris isn’t starting from scratch. During her primary campaign, she was advised by seasoned foreign-policy experts, including Chavez; Matthew Spence, a former Pentagon official; Philip Gordon, a prominent Middle East scholar and former White House Middle East coordinator; and Matthew Olsen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center. She has also served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which oversees the United States’ vast array of spy agencies and has played a key role in investigating Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential elections.
Chavez said Harris was a quick study with strong instincts on foreign policy who quickly got up to speed on the issues during the primaries. “She’s smart and she understands the complex national security challenges that we’re facing.”
During her presidential campaign, Harris called on the need to confront China over its “abysmal” human rights record and “unfair trade practices,” but stopped short of supporting President Donald Trump’s trade war. Harris framed Russia as one of the United States’ top foreign-policy challenges in her primary run and repeatedly condemned the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 elections.
In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, however, Harris said that she would seek to cooperate with China on a range of issues, including by seeking agreement on a path toward easing the environmental damage caused by global warming.
Characterizing climate change as an “existential threat,” she called for investing $10 trillion in public and private investments over the next decade to promote clean energy, setting a target of achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2045 and a carbon-neutral electricity sector by 2030.
Harris also weighed in on Venezuela, where the Trump administration’s efforts to oust longtime socialist leader Nicolás Maduro amid the country’s economic tailspin and political strife in favor of a democratic reformer have largely stalled. She, along with two dozen other senators, wrote a letter to Trump earlier this year urging him to grant Venezuelan immigrants escaping the country’s chaos temporary protected status in the United States. (The letter appeared to largely fell on deaf ears in the administration.)
Even before the pick was announced, Wendy Sherman, a key Biden advisor, began to prepare for the likely criticism of Biden’s selection on Twitter, cataloguing a list of likely attacks that will be leveled against her, including that her “face, hair, posture, entourage will be subject of endless commentary.”
“She will be called too ambitious, not a team player, too aggressive, hard to work for, too progressive, not progressive enough,” Sherman wrote. “If a woman of color, she will be challenged as ‘not really’ or too radical; will be called a token or merely a symbol who can’t deliver.”
The 55-year old senator has faced scrutiny from the progressive left for her record as California attorney general and San Francisco district attorney during her primary run. Harris has been a vocal proponent of criminal justice reform, particularly in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in Minnesota that sparked a nationwide reckoning on racial injustice and criminal justice reform. But Harris’s nearly three-decade long tenure as a prosecutor in California’s criminal justice system, which has disproportionately impacted the state’s African-American community, drew criticism from progressive voices calling for sweeping overhauls to the justice system to root out racial prejudice and bias.
Biden’s pick came after weeks of speculation in the so-called veepstakes, where the final candidates were winnowed down to Rice, who served as national security advisor under President Barack Obama, and California Rep. Karen Bass.
Rice seemed like a far-flung pick to some political analysts. A veteran of the Clinton White House and State Department, Rice had not previously held elected office and was not perceived to have the same political clout on the domestic front as Harris.
In a statement released after Biden’s announcement, Rice applauded Harris as a “tenacious and trailblazing leader” and slammed Trump as “corrupt and self-serving.”
Update, Aug. 11, 2020: This article was updated with more information on Harris’s foreign-policy views.