foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--Trump’s Defense Secretary Finds His Voice in Iran Crisis

In the days after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the killing of the most powerful Iranian commander in a drone strike on Iraqi soil , it was the secretary of state , Mike Pompeo , who blitzed the airwaves .
His counterpart in the Pentagon , Defense Secretary Mark Esper , was notably silent .
But since the U.S. military began bracing for retaliation from Tehran , which came Tuesday night in the form of a widespread missile attack on U.S. and coalition targets across Iraq , Esper has made his presence known .
The defense secretary—who served in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on CNN and in the Pentagon briefing room in the hours before the attack ; the next day , he briefed the full House and Senate before huddling with reporters back at the Pentagon .
Esper ’ s relative silence in the days after the strike on Iran ’ s Qassem Suleimani raised eyebrows in some circles in Washington , prompting criticism that he was ceding power to longtime Iran hawk Pompeo at a crucial moment when many feared all-out war .
Indeed , experts noted that Pompeo has the incumbent ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an already established relationship with the president .
And , as the senior cabinet member , technically Pompeo outranks his former West Point classmate .
But former and current officials say that just because Esper—who spent the first two years of the Trump administration as Army secretary—is not a familiar face on cable news does not mean he is not engaged in decision-making .
Since last spring when Iran began lashing out in response to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign , Esper has ordered tens of thousands of additional forces to the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division .
Esper has come out forcefully in recent days as the face of the administration ’ s Iran policy , urging the regime to negotiate but stressing that the United States is prepared to defend itself .
“ The United States is not seeking a war with Iran , but we are prepared to finish one , ” Esper said Jan. 7 .
“ We are seeking a diplomatic solution , but first this will require Iran to de-escalate.
” Behind closed doors , sources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s trust .
On average , the two talk on the phone nearly daily—and in recent days the defense secretary has quarterbacked the rapid response to Iranian threats , defense officials said .
In photos the White House released on Wednesday , Esper could be seen seated directly to Trump ’ s left in the Situation Room as the president ’ s national security team watched the incoming attack .
Pompeo , by contrast , was two seats down from the president on the opposite side of the table .
As it became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. troops in the region , Esper made a deliberate effort to appear on camera to send a message of reassurance , one defense official said .
“ He wanted to send a message to the force who were worried about attacks , ” the defense official said .
Esper has earned Trump ’ s trust particularly by coming into the job without an agenda and striving to present options that meet the president ’ s goals , the defense official added .
Defense officials say the decision to have Pompeo , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after the strike on Suleimani was a deliberate one designed to ratchet down tensions as the region reeled from the attack .
“ After a defensive strike , the right person to put out there is the nation ’ s top diplomat , ” said a second defense official .
Others noted that it is traditionally the job of the secretary of state , not the defense secretary , to represent the United States on the world stage—perhaps most of all in times of conflict .
“ My personal view has always been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Department of Defense should keep a low profile , ” said Arnold Punaro , a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a retired Marine general who has assisted with defense secretary transitions for years .
“ Their job is to execute , their job is to be worried about the troops , their job is to be ready for unexpected consequences.
” Dana White , former chief Pentagon spokesperson under previous Defense Secretary James Mattis , said that in most previous administrations , even during military strikes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messaging—though she noted that the dynamic between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell under former President George W. Bush ’ s administration was an exception .
“ The secretary of state has always been more prominent than the secretary of defense , ” White said , pointing to a range of former leaders from the prolific former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to a series of “ policy wonk ” defense secretaries under Obama—Leon Panetta and Ash Carter in particular .
“ In some ways , maybe this could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she said .
Since he took the reins of the Defense Department in July 2019 , Esper has kept a notably low profile .
In his nearly six months as Pentagon chief , he has toed the administration ’ s line and avoided contradicting the president .
He has focused his efforts inward rather than outward , making reforming the Pentagon and cutting budgets his top priorities .
Rather than driving a particular agenda in the Middle East—an accusation leveled at Pompeo and John Bolton , Trump ’ s former national security advisor—Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus to the Pacific .
There is also a clear personality difference between Esper and Pompeo .
A former congressman , the secretary of state is bombastic and sometimes abrasive .
Esper , by contrast , is very much an Army infantry officer in his presentation : stolid and direct , choosing his words carefully .
This dynamic has caused some concern in the Pentagon and beyond that Esper views the role of the defense secretary too narrowly and is not asserting himself in foreign-policy discussions out of deference to Pompeo , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Robert O ’ Brien , the national security advisor .
“ It ’ s not that he ’ s being pushed around—it ’ s that he doesn ’ t even push back .
That ’ s not his approach , and some people find that very frustrating , ” said one former senior defense official , noting that Esper leans on his military counterparts , particularly Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , for advice .
“ Esper is seen as an excellent manager , [ but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is not a change agent.
” The former senior official also noted that compared to many former Pentagon chiefs , Esper has relatively limited foreign-policy chops .
He has a range of experience in the military , the Pentagon , and on Capitol Hill , but all at a more junior level , the former official said , citing his time as a congressional staffer , deputy assistant secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration , and Army secretary under Trump .
“ I think Pompeo is definitely the dominant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one administration official .
“ Esper is focused on details and Pompeo on big picture.
” But those who know him say Esper does not shrink from contradicting the president .
After Trump drew criticism for threatening to strike cultural sites in Iran , Esper pushed back , noting that targeting cultural sites is against international law and that the Pentagon “ will follow the laws of armed conflict.
” Other experts pushed back on the notion that Esper is playing second fiddle to Pompeo .
“ I know his style and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violet , ” said Punaro , adding that Esper has a “ backbone of steel.
” “ The notion that somehow he is a get along , go along kind of guy—that ’ s not Mark Esper .
”

In the days after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the killing of the most powerful Iranian commander in a drone strike on Iraqi soil, it was the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, who blitzed the airwaves. His counterpart in the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, was notably silent.
In the days after U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the killing of the most powerful Iranian commander in a drone strike on Iraqi soil, it was the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, who blitzed the airwaves. His counterpart in the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, was notably silent.
But since the U.S. military began bracing for retaliation from Tehran, which came Tuesday night in the form of a widespread missile attack on U.S. and coalition targets across Iraq, Esper has made his presence known. The defense secretary—who served in the 101st Airborne Division in the Gulf War—appeared on CNN and in the Pentagon briefing room in the hours before the attack; the next day, he briefed the full House and Senate before huddling with reporters back at the Pentagon.
Esper’s relative silence in the days after the strike on Iran’s Qassem Suleimani raised eyebrows in some circles in Washington, prompting criticism that he was ceding power to longtime Iran hawk Pompeo at a crucial moment when many feared all-out war. Indeed, experts noted that Pompeo has the incumbent’s advantage in the Trump administration, enjoying an already established relationship with the president. And, as the senior cabinet member, technically Pompeo outranks his former West Point classmate.
But former and current officials say that just because Esper—who spent the first two years of the Trump administration as Army secretary—is not a familiar face on cable news does not mean he is not engaged in decision-making. Since last spring when Iran began lashing out in response to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, Esper has ordered tens of thousands of additional forces to the region, including missile defense systems, warships, and paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division.
Esper has come out forcefully in recent days as the face of the administration’s Iran policy, urging the regime to negotiate but stressing that the United States is prepared to defend itself.
“The United States is not seeking a war with Iran, but we are prepared to finish one,” Esper said Jan. 7. “We are seeking a diplomatic solution, but first this will require Iran to de-escalate.”
Behind closed doors, sources say Esper has earned the president’s trust. On average, the two talk on the phone nearly daily—and in recent days the defense secretary has quarterbacked the rapid response to Iranian threats, defense officials said. In photos the White House released on Wednesday, Esper could be seen seated directly to Trump’s left in the Situation Room as the president’s national security team watched the incoming attack. Pompeo, by contrast, was two seats down from the president on the opposite side of the table.
As it became clear that Iran was preparing to attack U.S. troops in the region, Esper made a deliberate effort to appear on camera to send a message of reassurance, one defense official said. “He wanted to send a message to the force who were worried about attacks,” the defense official said.
Esper has earned Trump’s trust particularly by coming into the job without an agenda and striving to present options that meet the president’s goals, the defense official added.
Defense officials say the decision to have Pompeo, not Esper, appear on the morning shows after the strike on Suleimani was a deliberate one designed to ratchet down tensions as the region reeled from the attack.
“After a defensive strike, the right person to put out there is the nation’s top diplomat,” said a second defense official.
Others noted that it is traditionally the job of the secretary of state, not the defense secretary, to represent the United States on the world stage—perhaps most of all in times of conflict.
“My personal view has always been when it comes to military action, the Department of Defense should keep a low profile,” said Arnold Punaro, a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a retired Marine general who has assisted with defense secretary transitions for years. “Their job is to execute, their job is to be worried about the troops, their job is to be ready for unexpected consequences.”
Dana White, former chief Pentagon spokesperson under previous Defense Secretary James Mattis, said that in most previous administrations, even during military strikes, the State Department has taken point on messaging—though she noted that the dynamic between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell under former President George W. Bush’s administration was an exception.
“The secretary of state has always been more prominent than the secretary of defense,” White said, pointing to a range of former leaders from the prolific former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to a series of “policy wonk” defense secretaries under Obama—Leon Panetta and Ash Carter in particular.
“In some ways, maybe this could be a return to normal,” she said.
Since he took the reins of the Defense Department in July 2019, Esper has kept a notably low profile. In his nearly six months as Pentagon chief, he has toed the administration’s line and avoided contradicting the president. He has focused his efforts inward rather than outward, making reforming the Pentagon and cutting budgets his top priorities. Rather than driving a particular agenda in the Middle East—an accusation leveled at Pompeo and John Bolton, Trump’s former national security advisor—Esper aims to shift the department’s focus to the Pacific.
There is also a clear personality difference between Esper and Pompeo. A former congressman, the secretary of state is bombastic and sometimes abrasive. Esper, by contrast, is very much an Army infantry officer in his presentation: stolid and direct, choosing his words carefully.
This dynamic has caused some concern in the Pentagon and beyond that Esper views the role of the defense secretary too narrowly and is not asserting himself in foreign-policy discussions out of deference to Pompeo, who has strong opinions on Iran, and Robert O’Brien, the national security advisor.
“It’s not that he’s being pushed around—it’s that he doesn’t even push back. That’s not his approach, and some people find that very frustrating,” said one former senior defense official, noting that Esper leans on his military counterparts, particularly Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for advice.
“Esper is seen as an excellent manager, [but] he is not a disruptor, he is not a change agent.”
The former senior official also noted that compared to many former Pentagon chiefs, Esper has relatively limited foreign-policy chops. He has a range of experience in the military, the Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill, but all at a more junior level, the former official said, citing his time as a congressional staffer, deputy assistant secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration, and Army secretary under Trump.
“I think Pompeo is definitely the dominant force between the two,” said one administration official. “Esper is focused on details and Pompeo on big picture.”
But those who know him say Esper does not shrink from contradicting the president. After Trump drew criticism for threatening to strike cultural sites in Iran, Esper pushed back, noting that targeting cultural sites is against international law and that the Pentagon “will follow the laws of armed conflict.”
Other experts pushed back on the notion that Esper is playing second fiddle to Pompeo.
“I know his style and I can guarantee you he is no shrinking violet,” said Punaro, adding that Esper has a “backbone of steel.” “The notion that somehow he is a get along, go along kind of guy—that’s not Mark Esper.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--With Parliament Voting for Brexit, Is Irish Unification Inevitable?

With Parliament Voting for Brexit , Is Irish Unification Inevitable ?
Almost a century after partition carved two separate political entities out of Ireland , Brexit has revived the prospect of unification in a serious way .
On Thursday , the British House of Commons passed Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s Brexit withdrawal bill by 330 votes to 231—an outcome even many Protestant unionists don ’ t want—thereby putting the United Kingdom on course to leave the European Union on Jan. 31 .
As Irish nationalist politicians find themselves increasingly in the ascendancy in Northern Ireland , this sets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Irish unity .
The argument for unity is closely tied to the strong economic underpinnings that argue for it in the face of the Brexit threat .
Northern Ireland has received more than 600 million pounds ( $ 780 million ) a year in funding from the EU aimed at supporting agricultural projects , economic growth , cultural development , and peace initiatives .
The open border with the Republic of Ireland in the south facilitates annual exports worth 3.4 billion pounds ( $ 4.4 billion ) , and some academics have argued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Britain and Ireland helped support peace efforts in the 1990s .
The Northern Irish electorate , by and large , seemed to recognize these benefits , and despite the United Kingdom as a whole voting Leave in the June 2016 Brexit referendum , Northern Ireland voted Remain with a 55.8 percent majority .
Those results sparked immediate calls for a border poll—the mechanism by which voters in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic can vote through referendum to unify .
Then-Northern Ireland deputy leader Martin McGuinness declared in the aftermath of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has no democratic mandate to represent the views of the North ” and “ that there is a democratic imperative for a ‘ border poll.
’ ” Even if nationalists do get a border poll , if they lose , the Good Friday Agreement stipulates that another one can ’ t be held for seven years .
Even so , political union with the Irish Republic could take a long time—perhaps a decade or more .
Johnson and his Conservative government have strong unionist sympathies , and they are unlikely to hold a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure .
Nationalists might decide to work through the north ’ s devolved power-sharing administration at Stormont ( which would at least restore their institutional voice ) , but current negotiations remain at a standstill .
In the republic itself , questions over the cost of onboarding Northern Ireland have fueled skepticism about unity , and given the overwhelming backlash against the Irish government ’ s recent decision to commemorate police officers who fought on the British side during the War of Independence , it is doubtful that nationalist Ireland is ready to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if nationalists do get a border poll , if they lose , the Good Friday Agreement stipulates that another one can ’ t be held for seven years .
Notwithstanding the difficulties they face , nationalists have argued that unity is the only way to maintain the standard of living Northern Ireland has grown into because unifying with the republic will secure its EU membership and thus , by extension , protect the benefits it has accrued since accession .
Brussels has affirmed that Northern Ireland would automatically regain EU membership in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the referendum seem to suggest that pro-EU voters are turning the tide in favor of unity .
In March 2017 , unionists—who are largely pro-Leave—lost their majority in the north ’ s devolved assembly .
Perhaps more significantly , nationalists won a plurality of Northern Ireland ’ s Westminster seats at the recent British elections for the first time in history .
Sinn Fein—Northern Ireland ’ s largest nationalist party—was quick to suggest that the election results represented a mandate for a border poll .
“ [ I ] t is now impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referendum on Irish Unity , ” party leader Mary Lou McDonald said in an official statement after the election .
“ I want to reiterate Sinn Fein ’ s call for the Irish government to establish an All-Ireland Forum on Irish Unity without delay.
” Nationalists won a plurality of Northern Ireland ’ s Westminster seats at the recent British elections for the first time in history .
The decision to hold a border poll is ultimately dependent on the discretion of Northern Ireland ’ s secretary of state—whose feelings toward unity might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the political mood in London .
But certain facts are undeniable .
The fortunes of nationalist politicians are growing , and although public attitudes are difficult to pinpoint , some polls do suggest that a majority of people now favor unity .
One survey from the independent pollster Lord Ashcroft found that 51 percent of people would vote for unity if a border poll were held the next day .
Another poll commissioned by the pro-EU advocacy group Our Future Our Choice said 52 percent of people it surveyed backed a united @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent opinion polls show that a large majority of the public believes Brexit has made unity more likely , regardless of their individual feelings on the issue .
Getting a border poll on the agenda is the first step ; the next is actually winning it .
While the great bulk of nationalists are expected to support a border poll , they still comprise only 21 percent of the Northern Irish population , so any campaign that places unity as its objective will necessarily need to find a way to attract voters from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Sinn Fein senator and the party ’ s spokesman on uniting Ireland and Brexit .
Although he acknowledged that Brexit and the prospect of losing EU membership have made unity more likely , he was clear that any move toward unification first would require an all-encompassing debate “ that includes the entirety of Irish life right across our island , right across our diaspora.
” Key to this process , he said , is assuring the country ’ s unionist community that their identities would be “ protected and cherished ” inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the largest single community in Northern Ireland , and their prevailing fear over unification is that their British and Protestant identities would be subsumed inside an overwhelming Irish Catholic-majority state .
For O Donnghaile , assuaging unionist fears is critical not only to winning a border poll but also to creating a united Ireland that is “ competent , inclusive , modern , and progressive.
” Nationalist viewpoints are divergent , however .
Gareth Brown was the campaign manager for Claire Hanna , a member of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seat over incumbent unionist Emma Little-Pengelly .
Based on conversations he had with the people of South Belfast—a constituency that voted heavily Remain—Brown concluded that the growing appeal of Irish unity was rooted more in a desire to maintain stability rather than any overarching devotion to the EU .
“ What is driving a sentiment towards Irish unity is less this kind of romantic notion of remaining a member of the European Union , ” he told Foreign Policy , “ and more the prospect of day-to-day life in Northern Ireland changing radically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Most of those voters are not hardcore nationalists .
Rather , they are part of a large and growing community that doesn ’ t align with either of Northern Ireland ’ s dominant political traditions and whose stance on the constitutional question is largely rooted in a desire to maintain the status quo .
According to Brown , the road to unity lies through this community , and the key to winning them over is convincing them that unity is more likely to keep things the way they are .
In this view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less than its impact , and the likelihood of unity will depend on how damaging ( or not ) Brexit is for Northern Ireland .
“ A Brexit outcome that is very unsettling or very damaging will be a key factor that drives those people to consider Irish unity when they never have potentially before , ” Brown said.The particular form of Brexit matters less than its impact , and the likelihood of unity will depend on how damaging ( or not ) Brexit is for Northern Ireland .
Republican hard-liners—who are increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results have changed the prospects for Irish unity because they do not recognize British institutions in the country .
Paddy Gallagher is the spokesman of Saoradh , a far-left republican party that police allege maintains links with the New Irish Republican Army , though the party denies this claim .
He told Foreign Policy that the performance of nationalist politicians in the recent elections was insignificant and pushed back on the notion that a border poll imposed unilaterally by the British government could serve as a legitimate expression of Irish self-determination .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comfortable asking my British occupier , ‘ Can I have my country back ?
’ ” he said .
“ Why should the Irish people be forced to vote in a British border poll to determine whether our country should be free from British rule ?
” Although Gallagher rejects a border poll in principle , he is in agreement with other nationalists that Brexit does , indeed , advance the cause of Irish unity .
“ Any difficulty for Britain , which Brexit has been , is always an opportunity for Ireland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wouldn ’ t be talking about Irish unity if it wasn ’ t for Brexit.
” But nothing about unity is inevitable , and proponents will have to contend with a substantial portion of the population that will not countenance unification under any circumstances .
Loyalists are the more hard-line subsection of the unionist community , and they have spearheaded grassroots efforts to resist the latest push for unity .
Jamie Bryson is a prominent loyalist activist and blogger who is positioning himself as one of the leading public faces of the loyalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the election results were insignificant ( with regards to unity ) because nationalist politicians campaigned almost exclusively on Brexit—not unity—so the claim that their electoral performance represented a mandate for a border poll , he said , is false .
He is far more concerned about Johnson ’ s Brexit deal and the prospects of creating an “ economic united Ireland ” because it could eventually trundle unionists unwittingly into a constitutional united Ireland .
Under Johnson ’ s deal , Northern Ireland will legally be a part of the new U.K. customs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be aligned with the EU ’ s regulatory framework .
In practice , that means the Irish border will remain open , but goods passing between Britain and Northern Ireland will have to undergo customs checks in the Irish Sea .
Unionists are almost universally opposed to this arrangement , and they have held several well-attended rallies since October 2019 protesting it.Proponents [ of unity ] will have to contend with a substantial portion of the population that will not countenance unification under any circumstances .
Asked about the likelihood of a border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , Bryson was nonchalant .
“ With a Conservative government in power , I don ’ t think there ’ s any opportunity or any notion whatsoever of there being a border poll , and I would imagine the government will rule that out pretty quickly.
” Of course , loyalists would oppose a border poll if the government did choose to hold one , and Bryson is confident the numbers simply aren ’ t there to push it through .
Several opinion polls on the issue strongly reinforce that claim .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that loyalists—under the combined weight of a bad Brexit deal , the receding electoral fortunes of unionists , and negative demographic change—might decide there is no other option but to take to the streets and defend Northern Ireland by whatever means they deem necessary .
“ When unionists and loyalists feel like their identity—like their place in the world—is being attacked or threatened , then that is sufficient to mobilize loyalism , ” said Mary C. Murphy , a lecturer at University College Cork and an expert on Northern Ireland .
Bryson went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would probably be civil war first before unionists and loyalists would ever walk into a united Ireland.
” What that could mean for the future of Northern Ireland is anyone ’ s guess , but it ’ s clear that the outlook is as uncertain , complex , and divisive as ever .
Nationalists might well get a border poll on the agenda within the next decade , especially as the economic impact of Brexit is realized .
But its success will ultimately depend on the articulation of a coherent plan for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do succeed in that endeavor , don ’ t expect unionists to go quietly .

Almost a century after partition carved two separate political entities out of Ireland, Brexit has revived the prospect of unification in a serious way. On Thursday, the British House of Commons passed Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit withdrawal bill by 330 votes to 231—an outcome even many Protestant unionists don’t want—thereby putting the United Kingdom on course to leave the European Union on Jan. 31. As Irish nationalist politicians find themselves increasingly in the ascendancy in Northern Ireland, this sets the stage for a renewed debate on Irish unity.
Almost a century after partition carved two separate political entities out of Ireland, Brexit has revived the prospect of unification in a serious way. On Thursday, the British House of Commons passed Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit withdrawal bill by 330 votes to 231—an outcome even many Protestant unionists don’t want—thereby putting the United Kingdom on course to leave the European Union on Jan. 31. As Irish nationalist politicians find themselves increasingly in the ascendancy in Northern Ireland, this sets the stage for a renewed debate on Irish unity.
The argument for unity is closely tied to the strong economic underpinnings that argue for it in the face of the Brexit threat. Northern Ireland has received more than 600 million pounds ($780 million) a year in funding from the EU aimed at supporting agricultural projects, economic growth, cultural development, and peace initiatives. The open border with the Republic of Ireland in the south facilitates annual exports worth 3.4 billion pounds ($4.4 billion), and some academics have argued that the elimination of economic barriers across Britain and Ireland helped support peace efforts in the 1990s.
The Northern Irish electorate, by and large, seemed to recognize these benefits, and despite the United Kingdom as a whole voting Leave in the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Northern Ireland voted Remain with a 55.8 percent majority.
Those results sparked immediate calls for a border poll—the mechanism by which voters in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic can vote through referendum to unify. Then-Northern Ireland deputy leader Martin McGuinness declared in the aftermath of the result that “the British government now has no democratic mandate to represent the views of the North” and “that there is a democratic imperative for a ‘border poll.’”Even if nationalists do get a border poll, if they lose, the Good Friday Agreement stipulates that another one can’t be held for seven years.
Even so, political union with the Irish Republic could take a long time—perhaps a decade or more. Johnson and his Conservative government have strong unionist sympathies, and they are unlikely to hold a border poll in the absence of external pressure. After a recent breakthrough to restore power-sharing, nationalists might decide to work through the north’s devolved administration at Stormont (which would at least give them an institutional voice), but they are still a minority in that body. In the republic itself, questions over the cost of onboarding Northern Ireland have fueled skepticism about unity, and given the overwhelming backlash against the Irish government’s recent decision to commemorate police officers who fought on the British side during the War of Independence, it is doubtful that nationalist Ireland is ready to incorporate a substantial unionist minority. Even if nationalists do get a border poll, if they lose, the Good Friday Agreement stipulates that another one can’t be held for seven years.
Notwithstanding the difficulties they face, nationalists have argued that unity is the only way to maintain the standard of living Northern Ireland has grown into because unifying with the republic will secure its EU membership and thus, by extension, protect the benefits it has accrued since accession. Brussels has affirmed that Northern Ireland would automatically regain EU membership in the event of unity.
Election results since the referendum seem to suggest that pro-EU voters are turning the tide in favor of unity. In March 2017, unionists—who are largely pro-Leave—lost their majority in the north’s devolved assembly. Perhaps more significantly, nationalists won a plurality of Northern Ireland’s Westminster seats at the recent British elections for the first time in history.
Sinn Fein—Northern Ireland’s largest nationalist party—was quick to suggest that the election results represented a mandate for a border poll. “[I]t is now impossible to ignore the growing demand for a referendum on Irish Unity,” party leader Mary Lou McDonald said in an official statement after the election. “I want to reiterate Sinn Fein’s call for the Irish government to establish an All-Ireland Forum on Irish Unity without delay.”Nationalists won a plurality of Northern Ireland’s Westminster seats at the recent British elections for the first time in history.
The decision to hold a border poll is ultimately dependent on the discretion of Northern Ireland’s secretary of state—whose feelings toward unity might change one way or the other depending on the political mood in London. But certain facts are undeniable. The fortunes of nationalist politicians are growing, and although public attitudes are difficult to pinpoint, some polls do suggest that a majority of people now favor unity. One survey from the independent pollster Lord Ashcroft found that 51 percent of people would vote for unity if a border poll were held the next day. Another poll commissioned by the pro-EU advocacy group Our Future Our Choice said 52 percent of people it surveyed backed a united Ireland. At the very least, recent opinion polls show that a large majority of the public believes Brexit has made unity more likely, regardless of their individual feelings on the issue.
Getting a border poll on the agenda is the first step; the next is actually winning it. While the great bulk of nationalists are expected to support a border poll, they still comprise only 21 percent of the Northern Irish population, so any campaign that places unity as its objective will necessarily need to find a way to attract voters from other traditions.
Niall O Donnghaile is a Sinn Fein senator and the party’s spokesman on uniting Ireland and Brexit. Although he acknowledged that Brexit and the prospect of losing EU membership have made unity more likely, he was clear that any move toward unification first would require an all-encompassing debate “that includes the entirety of Irish life right across our island, right across our diaspora.”
Key to this process, he said, is assuring the country’s unionist community that their identities would be “protected and cherished” inside a united Ireland. Unionists are still the largest single community in Northern Ireland, and their prevailing fear over unification is that their British and Protestant identities would be subsumed inside an overwhelming Irish Catholic-majority state. For O Donnghaile, assuaging unionist fears is critical not only to winning a border poll but also to creating a united Ireland that is “competent, inclusive, modern, and progressive.”
Nationalist viewpoints are divergent, however. Gareth Brown was the campaign manager for Claire Hanna, a member of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party who recently won the South Belfast parliamentary seat over incumbent unionist Emma Little-Pengelly. Based on conversations he had with the people of South Belfast—a constituency that voted heavily Remain—Brown concluded that the growing appeal of Irish unity was rooted more in a desire to maintain stability rather than any overarching devotion to the EU.
“What is driving a sentiment towards Irish unity is less this kind of romantic notion of remaining a member of the European Union,” he told Foreign Policy, “and more the prospect of day-to-day life in Northern Ireland changing radically [due to Brexit].”
Most of those voters are not hardcore nationalists. Rather, they are part of a large and growing community that doesn’t align with either of Northern Ireland’s dominant political traditions and whose stance on the constitutional question is largely rooted in a desire to maintain the status quo. According to Brown, the road to unity lies through this community, and the key to winning them over is convincing them that unity is more likely to keep things the way they are.
In this view, the particular form of Brexit matters less than its impact, and the likelihood of unity will depend on how damaging (or not) Brexit is for Northern Ireland. “A Brexit outcome that is very unsettling or very damaging will be a key factor that drives those people to consider Irish unity when they never have potentially before,” Brown said.The particular form of Brexit matters less than its impact, and the likelihood of unity will depend on how damaging (or not) Brexit is for Northern Ireland.
Republican hard-liners—who are increasingly vocal and active—do not believe the election results have changed the prospects for Irish unity because they do not recognize British institutions in the country. Paddy Gallagher is the spokesman of Saoradh, a far-left republican party that police allege maintains links with the New Irish Republican Army, though the party denies this claim. He told Foreign Policy that the performance of nationalist politicians in the recent elections was insignificant and pushed back on the notion that a border poll imposed unilaterally by the British government could serve as a legitimate expression of Irish self-determination.
“As a republican, I am not comfortable asking my British occupier, ‘Can I have my country back?’” he said. “Why should the Irish people be forced to vote in a British border poll to determine whether our country should be free from British rule?”
Although Gallagher rejects a border poll in principle, he is in agreement with other nationalists that Brexit does, indeed, advance the cause of Irish unity. “Any difficulty for Britain, which Brexit has been, is always an opportunity for Ireland. … The fact is, we wouldn’t be talking about Irish unity if it wasn’t for Brexit.”
But nothing about unity is inevitable, and proponents will have to contend with a substantial portion of the population that will not countenance unification under any circumstances. Loyalists are the more hard-line subsection of the unionist community, and they have spearheaded grassroots efforts to resist the latest push for unity. Jamie Bryson is a prominent loyalist activist and blogger who is positioning himself as one of the leading public faces of the loyalist resistance. He told Foreign Policy that the election results were insignificant (with regards to unity) because nationalist politicians campaigned almost exclusively on Brexit—not unity—so the claim that their electoral performance represented a mandate for a border poll, he said, is false.
He is far more concerned about Johnson’s Brexit deal and the prospects of creating an “economic united Ireland” because it could eventually trundle unionists unwittingly into a constitutional united Ireland.
Under Johnson’s deal, Northern Ireland will legally be a part of the new U.K. customs union, but it will continue to be aligned with the EU’s regulatory framework. In practice, that means the Irish border will remain open, but goods passing between Britain and Northern Ireland will have to undergo customs checks in the Irish Sea. Unionists are almost universally opposed to this arrangement, and they have held several well-attended rallies since October 2019 protesting it.Proponents [of unity] will have to contend with a substantial portion of the population that will not countenance unification under any circumstances.
Asked about the likelihood of a border poll in the lifetime of the current government, Bryson was nonchalant. “With a Conservative government in power, I don’t think there’s any opportunity or any notion whatsoever of there being a border poll, and I would imagine the government will rule that out pretty quickly.”
Of course, loyalists would oppose a border poll if the government did choose to hold one, and Bryson is confident the numbers simply aren’t there to push it through. Several opinion polls on the issue strongly reinforce that claim.
There is, however, widespread concern that loyalists—under the combined weight of a bad Brexit deal, the receding electoral fortunes of unionists, and negative demographic change—might decide there is no other option but to take to the streets and defend Northern Ireland by whatever means they deem necessary. “When unionists and loyalists feel like their identity—like their place in the world—is being attacked or threatened, then that is sufficient to mobilize loyalism,” said Mary C. Murphy, a lecturer at University College Cork and an expert on Northern Ireland. Bryson went further: “I would imagine there would probably be civil war first before unionists and loyalists would ever walk into a united Ireland.”
What that could mean for the future of Northern Ireland is anyone’s guess, but it’s clear that the outlook is as uncertain, complex, and divisive as ever. Nationalists might well get a border poll on the agenda within the next decade, especially as the economic impact of Brexit is realized. But its success will ultimately depend on the articulation of a coherent plan for a united Ireland, and even if nationalists do succeed in that endeavor, don’t expect unionists to go quietly.
Update, Jan. 10, 2020: This article has been updated to reflect news that parties in Northern Ireland reached an agreement to restore power-sharing.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--U.S.-Iran Tensions Fuel New War Powers Debate in Congress

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief Plus .
What ’ s on tap today : Lawmakers push to rein in Trump ’ s war powers authorities over Iran , Russia and Turkey call for a cease-fire in Libya , and few details emerge on the Ukrainian plane crash in Tehran .
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
On Wednesday , U.S. President Donald Trump pushed to ease tensions with Iran following its missile attacks on U.S. military installations in Iraq .
But the near-miss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Capitol Hill over the authority the president has to carry out strikes on foreign targets without prior congressional approval .
Today the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives is expected to vote on a war powers resolution to limit the president ’ s ability to carry out military actions against Iran without congressional authorization .
The vote follows a U.S. strike that killed senior Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and retaliatory attacks by Iran that raised fears of an all-out war .
Lawmakers incensed .
Top Trump administration officials gave Congress a classified briefing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but many Democratic lawmakers—and several Republicans—were none too pleased with the briefing .
“ The worst briefing I ’ ve seen—at least on a military issue—in my nine years [ in the Senate ] , ” Sen. Mike Lee , a Republican , said afterward .
“ The administration took this action without consulting Congress , ” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Wednesday .
“ This action endangered our service members , diplomats , and others by risking a serious escalation of tensions with Iran.
” Pentagon says Iran aimed to kill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary Mark Esper and Gen. Mark Milley , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , sought to tamp down speculation that Tehran intentionally avoided U.S. casualties in its Tuesday night strike .
After briefing members of Congress , Milley told reporters he assessed that the missiles were intended to “ kill personnel.
” Calls for a Libya cease-fire .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday called for a cease-fire in Libya , demonstrating their growing clout in the country ’ s civil war .
In September @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Libya to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army ( LNA ) ’ s bid to take Tripoli .
Ankara recently deployed troops to back the internationally recognized government based in the capital and fighting Haftar ’ s forces .
The calls for a cease-fire come as the LNA consolidates control outside Tripoli .
The government announced Tuesday that Haftar had seized the coastal city of Sirte , under siege since April , severely weakening the government ’ s authority and reducing its control to a small strip of territory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plane crash in Tehran .
A Ukrainian Boeing 737-800 crashed shortly after taking off from Tehran ’ s Imam Khomeini airport on Wednesday , just after Iran launched its attacks on U.S. military installations in Iraq .
The crash killed all 176 passengers on board , most of whom were from Iran and Canada .
The plane reportedly had no problems at the time of takeoff , and an official told the BBC that “ the airplane was heavily fragmented , which means either there was an intense impact on the ground or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initial report by Iranian investigators said the plane had attempted to return to the airport but that crew had not radioed for assistance .
Eyewitnesses reported the plane was on fire before it hit the ground .
Global opinions of Trump .
An opinion poll published on Wednesday by Pew Research opinion poll found that the overwhelming majority of the world has a negative view of U.S. President Donald Trump , though his approval ratings of the United States remain relatively high .
Of those surveyed , 64 percent said they had no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right thing in world affairs , while only 29 percent said they did .
That contrasts sharply with respondents ’ opinion of the United States : 54 had a favorable view of the United States , while 38 percent had an unfavorable view .
Some of the lowest levels of confidence were reported in Western Europe , where roughly three quarters of respondents in Germany , France , Sweden , Spain , and the Netherlands said they had no confidence in Trump .
The U.S. president does have significant support in other parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel and the Philippines hover around 75 percent , and a majority in Kenya and India also report confidence in him .
Guaidó forces his way in .
Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó and 100 fellow lawmakers forced their way into the country ’ s legislative building after a tense standoff with police on Tuesday .
( Guaidó was previously blocked from entering the building by supporters of President Nicolás Maduro to prevent his reelection as head of the National Assembly . )
Guaidó ’ s leadership role bolstered his claim to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is recognized by over 50 other countries , including the United States .
Guaidó was reelected head of the legislature in a session held outside the building .
USAID gets new national security advisor .
Eddy Acevedo , a veteran U.S. Agency for International Development official and former congressional staffer , has been tapped as the national security advisor to USAID chief Mark Green , the agency announced this week .
In his new role , Acevedo will coordinate national security issues with the State Department , the Pentagon , and other U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as USAID ’ s chief legislative strategist .
FBI gets new counterterrorism head .
The FBI announced on Wednesday it appointed Jill Sanborn to head its counterterrorrism division .
Sanborn , a career FBI special agent , had previously served stints at the CIA ’ s counterterrorism center and worked in the Middle East , Afghanistan , and Pakistan before being tapped as assistant director of the counterterrorism division .
EU projects linked to forced labor in Eritrea .
In an attempt to prevent Mediterranean migration to Europe , the European Union funneled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where many asylum seekers in Europe originate .
The New York Times reports that the money supported infrastructure projects in the country , but that the labor for those projects was undertaken by forced conscripts—sparking backlash from human rights groups .
The EU has no oversight of the projects and does not make the funding conditional on democratic or economic reform .
That ’ s it for today .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief Plus. What’s on tap today: Lawmakers push to rein in Trump’s war powers authorities over Iran , Russia and Turkey call for a cease-fire in Libya , and few details emerge on the Ukrainian plane crash in Tehran.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief Plus. What’s on tap today: Lawmakers push to rein in Trump’s war powers authorities over Iran, Russia and Turkey call for a cease-fire in Libya, and few details emerge on the Ukrainian plane crash in Tehran.
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Iran Escalation Sparks Showdown in Congress
On Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump pushed to ease tensions with Iran following its missile attacks on U.S. military installations in Iraq. But the near-miss of major conflict has reignited the debate on Capitol Hill over the authority the president has to carry out strikes on foreign targets without prior congressional approval.
Today the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives is expected to vote on a war powers resolution to limit the president’s ability to carry out military actions against Iran without congressional authorization. The vote follows a U.S. strike that killed senior Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and retaliatory attacks by Iran that raised fears of an all-out war.
Lawmakers incensed. Top Trump administration officials gave Congress a classified briefing on the decision to assassinate Suleimani, but many Democratic lawmakers—and several Republicans—were none too pleased with the briefing. “The worst briefing I’ve seen—at least on a military issue—in my nine years [in the Senate],” Sen. Mike Lee, a Republican, said afterward.
“The administration took this action without consulting Congress,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Wednesday. “This action endangered our service members, diplomats, and others by risking a serious escalation of tensions with Iran.”
Pentagon says Iran aimed to kill. Meanwhile at the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sought to tamp down speculation that Tehran intentionally avoided U.S. casualties in its Tuesday night strike. After briefing members of Congress, Milley told reporters he assessed that the missiles were intended to “kill personnel.”
What We’re Watching
Calls for a Libya cease-fire. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday called for a cease-fire in Libya, demonstrating their growing clout in the country’s civil war. In September, Moscow clandestinely sent several hundred mercenaries to Libya to support Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA)’s bid to take Tripoli. Ankara recently deployed troops to back the internationally recognized government based in the capital and fighting Haftar’s forces.
The calls for a cease-fire come as the LNA consolidates control outside Tripoli. The government announced Tuesday that Haftar had seized the coastal city of Sirte, under siege since April, severely weakening the government’s authority and reducing its control to a small strip of territory that surrounds Tripoli.
Questions remain about plane crash in Tehran. A Ukrainian Boeing 737-800 crashed shortly after taking off from Tehran’s Imam Khomeini airport on Wednesday, just after Iran launched its attacks on U.S. military installations in Iraq. The crash killed all 176 passengers on board, most of whom were from Iran and Canada. The plane reportedly had no problems at the time of takeoff, and an official told the BBC that “the airplane was heavily fragmented, which means either there was an intense impact on the ground or something happened in the sky.”
An initial report by Iranian investigators said the plane had attempted to return to the airport but that crew had not radioed for assistance. Eyewitnesses reported the plane was on fire before it hit the ground.
Global opinions of Trump. An opinion poll published on Wednesday by Pew Research opinion poll found that the overwhelming majority of the world has a negative view of U.S. President Donald Trump, though his approval ratings of the United States remain relatively high. Of those surveyed, 64 percent said they had no confidence in the president to do the right thing in world affairs, while only 29 percent said they did. That contrasts sharply with respondents’ opinion of the United States: 54 had a favorable view of the United States, while 38 percent had an unfavorable view.
Some of the lowest levels of confidence were reported in Western Europe, where roughly three quarters of respondents in Germany, France, Sweden, Spain, and the Netherlands said they had no confidence in Trump. The U.S. president does have significant support in other parts of the world: His ratings in Israel and the Philippines hover around 75 percent, and a majority in Kenya and India also report confidence in him.
Guaidó forces his way in. Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó and 100 fellow lawmakers forced their way into the country’s legislative building after a tense standoff with police on Tuesday. (Guaidó was previously blocked from entering the building by supporters of President Nicolás Maduro to prevent his reelection as head of the National Assembly.) Guaidó’s leadership role bolstered his claim to the country’s disputed presidency, which is recognized by over 50 other countries, including the United States. Guaidó was reelected head of the legislature in a session held outside the building.
Movers and Shakers
USAID gets new national security advisor. Eddy Acevedo, a veteran U.S. Agency for International Development official and former congressional staffer, has been tapped as the national security advisor to USAID chief Mark Green, the agency announced this week. In his new role, Acevedo will coordinate national security issues with the State Department, the Pentagon, and other U.S. agencies. He will retain his role as USAID’s chief legislative strategist.
FBI gets new counterterrorism head. The FBI announced on Wednesday it appointed Jill Sanborn to head its counterterrorrism division. Sanborn, a career FBI special agent, had previously served stints at the CIA’s counterterrorism center and worked in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan before being tapped as assistant director of the counterterrorism division.
Foreign Policy Recommends
EU projects linked to forced labor in Eritrea. In an attempt to prevent Mediterranean migration to Europe, the European Union funneled 20 million euros last year to Eritrea, where many asylum seekers in Europe originate. The New York Times reports that the money supported infrastructure projects in the country, but that the labor for those projects was undertaken by forced conscripts—sparking backlash from human rights groups. The EU has no oversight of the projects and does not make the funding conditional on democratic or economic reform.
That’s it for today. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--The World’s Next Energy Bonanza

The World’s Next Energy Bonanza

The fracking of shale gas may have substantially shifted the global energy landscape , but another hydrocarbon resource—oceanic methane hydrates—has the possibility to do even more to change the picture .
Formed only under the unusual combination of low temperatures and high pressure under the ocean subsurface and in permafrost regions at high latitudes , the potential of these hydrates is truly extraordinary .
Depending on economics and technology , they could potentially supply the world with more than 1 million exajoules of energy , equivalent to thousands of years of current global energy demand .
And they are nearing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be only half a decade away .
That ’ s why it is time now to think about how to govern their use .
Ocean hydrates consist of methane—essentially natural gas—trapped in icelike cages called clathrates on the ocean floor .
Originally discovered in the mid-20th century , the hydrates have long been a focus of national energy research programs .
Recently , key demonstration projects have shown that producing natural gas for energy use from hydrates is technically feasible .
And Canada , China , Japan , and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The race is on .
Although the economics of hydrate production remain highly uncertain , the coming boom raises at least two major governance challenges .
First , hydrates are present off the coasts of many countries worldwide .
While this makes them attractive from an energy security perspective , it also raises international cooperation issues .
Second , they have significant potential environmental impacts , both in terms of production-related concerns ( an uncontrolled leak could be catastrophic ) and in terms of greenhouse gas emissions from their use ( likewise with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nature of methane hydrates could upend the global energy trade .
Existing oil and natural gas deposits are geographically limited to certain regions , leading to the trade patterns and associated geopolitics—conflicts in the Middle East , pipeline disputes in Eurasia , and so on—we see today .
But the prevalence of hydrates offshore of many countries could enable large and emerging energy importers , including China , Japan , and South Korea , to reduce their dependence on others .
For other coastal nations , hydrates could represent a first major indigenous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development and export opportunity—and the start of a possible resource curse .
Under the statutory and customary United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , nations can claim territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from their land-based shore .
Beyond territorial waters and an accompanying contiguous zone , they can also claim an exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) of up to 200 nautical miles or 350 nautical miles off their coast if they can demonstrate that the undersea floor is a continuation of their land-based continental plate .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international waters for many purposes , a country is granted exclusive control over resource rights there , including seafloor resources like methane hydrates .
Although there are some hydrates in territorial waters and in the internationally managed high seas , most are located within claimed EEZs .
Accordingly , the economic and environmental governance of these deposits will occur at a national level .
In some cases , the process will be relatively straightforward and an extension of existing oil and gas law .
In others , however , the presence of such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territorial disputes .
The most contested waters in the world , including the South China Sea and the Arctic , contain substantial amounts of methane hydrates .
The South China Sea in particular is concerning as it is China ’ s largest potential source , yet the country ’ s most aggressive territorial claims there have been rejected internationally .
Beyond EEZs , hydrates in the high seas are the responsibility of the International Seabed Authority , which has focused less on hydrate governance than on other deep-sea mining regulations .
Although there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the changes methane hydrates will bring to energy geopolitics , a focus on the early development of strong and fair governance can help mitigate the risks of conflict .
Oil and gas deposits located in EEZs have long been a source of territorial disputes ; in many cases , bilateral joint production agreements have helped countries move beyond the spats to the benefit of both parties .
Further , the large size of hydrate deposits means that , unlike relatively rare oil and gas deposits , there are vast amounts of resources in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hydrates also have environmental risks .
Although recent research has indicated that the chances are relatively low , hydrate production could potentially destabilize the seafloor and cause large submarine mudslides and accompanying tsunamis .
Similarly , as methane is a potent greenhouse gas , seafloor production could release large amounts of methane into the water and eventually the atmosphere .
Beyond these low-risk , high-impact environmental concerns , many local environmental impacts on fisheries and the marine environment are almost certain to occur .
And of course , burning methane hydrates could exacerbate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential environmental benefits , though .
Natural gas hydrates can reduce greenhouse gas emissions if they are used to replace coal or if their use comes with the required implementation of carbon capture technologies .
One way to uncover hydrates involves replacing the methane with carbon dioxide , meaning that hydrate reservoirs could double as carbon sequestration reservoirs , which are limited on land .
If methane hydrates are to be extracted responsibly , the world needs to create strong regulations to protect the marine environment and the atmosphere .
Given how widespread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be global , although regional environmental management plans , such as those used for other deep-sea mining activities , could help mitigate risks in deposits that cross multiple EEZs .
Just as the shale revolution has transformed the energy economic and security situation of the United States , widespread use of methane hydrates could upend global energy markets .
Countries that are traditionally energy importers or have poor energy resources could have a scalable and abundant energy source for the first time .
Traditionally , coal has been used , as it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources—hydrates could rival its ubiquity , displacing the fuel where it is used now and preventing its adoption elsewhere .
This source still , of course , comes with environmental perils—but it also offers the promise of global energy abundance .

Alex Gilbert, Morgan D. Bazilian and Sterling Loza

The fracking of shale gas may have substantially shifted the global energy landscape, but another hydrocarbon resource—oceanic methane hydrates—has the possibility to do even more to change the picture. Formed only under the unusual combination of low temperatures and high pressure under the ocean subsurface and in permafrost regions at high latitudes, the potential of these hydrates is truly extraordinary . Depending on economics and technology, they could potentially supply the world with more than 1 million exajoules of energy, equivalent to thousands of years of current global energy demand. And they are nearing commercial production, with some ventures looking to be only half a decade away. That’s why it is time now to think about how to govern their use.
The fracking of shale gas may have substantially shifted the global energy landscape, but another hydrocarbon resource—oceanic methane hydrates—has the possibility to do even more to change the picture. Formed only under the unusual combination of low temperatures and high pressure under the ocean subsurface and in permafrost regions at high latitudes, the potential of these hydrates is truly extraordinary. Depending on economics and technology, they could potentially supply the world with more than 1 million exajoules of energy, equivalent to thousands of years of current global energy demand. And they are nearing commercial production, with some ventures looking to be only half a decade away. That’s why it is time now to think about how to govern their use.
Ocean hydrates consist of methane—essentially natural gas—trapped in icelike cages called clathrates on the ocean floor. Originally discovered in the mid-20th century, the hydrates have long been a focus of national energy research programs. Recently, key demonstration projects have shown that producing natural gas for energy use from hydrates is technically feasible. And Canada, China, Japan, and the United States have all begun testing extraction processes. The race is on.
Although the economics of hydrate production remain highly uncertain, the coming boom raises at least two major governance challenges. First, hydrates are present off the coasts of many countries worldwide. While this makes them attractive from an energy security perspective, it also raises international cooperation issues. Second, they have significant potential environmental impacts, both in terms of production-related concerns (an uncontrolled leak could be catastrophic) and in terms of greenhouse gas emissions from their use (likewise with enormous possible consequences).
The widespread nature of methane hydrates could upend the global energy trade. Existing oil and natural gas deposits are geographically limited to certain regions, leading to the trade patterns and associated geopolitics—conflicts in the Middle East, pipeline disputes in Eurasia, and so on—we see today. But the prevalence of hydrates offshore of many countries could enable large and emerging energy importers, including China, Japan, and South Korea, to reduce their dependence on others. For other coastal nations, hydrates could represent a first major indigenous energy resource, which is both a development and export opportunity—and the start of a possible resource curse.
Under the statutory and customary United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, nations can claim territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from their land-based shore. Beyond territorial waters and an accompanying contiguous zone, they can also claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 nautical miles or 350 nautical miles off their coast if they can demonstrate that the undersea floor is a continuation of their land-based continental plate. Although a nation’s EEZ is considered international waters for many purposes, a country is granted exclusive control over resource rights there, including seafloor resources like methane hydrates. Although there are some hydrates in territorial waters and in the internationally managed high seas, most are located within claimed EEZs.
Accordingly, the economic and environmental governance of these deposits will occur at a national level. In some cases, the process will be relatively straightforward and an extension of existing oil and gas law. In others, however, the presence of such a valuable new resource could exacerbate existing territorial disputes. The most contested waters in the world, including the South China Sea and the Arctic, contain substantial amounts of methane hydrates. The South China Sea in particular is concerning as it is China’s largest potential source, yet the country’s most aggressive territorial claims there have been rejected internationally. Beyond EEZs, hydrates in the high seas are the responsibility of the International Seabed Authority, which has focused less on hydrate governance than on other deep-sea mining regulations.
Although there is plenty of reason to worry about the changes methane hydrates will bring to energy geopolitics, a focus on the early development of strong and fair governance can help mitigate the risks of conflict. Oil and gas deposits located in EEZs have long been a source of territorial disputes; in many cases, bilateral joint production agreements have helped countries move beyond the spats to the benefit of both parties. Further, the large size of hydrate deposits means that, unlike relatively rare oil and gas deposits, there are vast amounts of resources in undisputed territory.
Beyond governance considerations, hydrates also have environmental risks. Although recent research has indicated that the chances are relatively low, hydrate production could potentially destabilize the seafloor and cause large submarine mudslides and accompanying tsunamis. Similarly, as methane is a potent greenhouse gas, seafloor production could release large amounts of methane into the water and eventually the atmosphere. Beyond these low-risk, high-impact environmental concerns, many local environmental impacts on fisheries and the marine environment are almost certain to occur. And of course, burning methane hydrates could exacerbate global climate change.
There are also potential environmental benefits, though. Natural gas hydrates can reduce greenhouse gas emissions if they are used to replace coal or if their use comes with the required implementation of carbon capture technologies. One way to uncover hydrates involves replacing the methane with carbon dioxide, meaning that hydrate reservoirs could double as carbon sequestration reservoirs, which are limited on land.
If methane hydrates are to be extracted responsibly, the world needs to create strong regulations to protect the marine environment and the atmosphere. Given how widespread the reserves are, these regulations should be global, although regional environmental management plans, such as those used for other deep-sea mining activities, could help mitigate risks in deposits that cross multiple EEZs.
Just as the shale revolution has transformed the energy economic and security situation of the United States, widespread use of methane hydrates could upend global energy markets. Countries that are traditionally energy importers or have poor energy resources could have a scalable and abundant energy source for the first time. Traditionally, coal has been used, as it is one of the most common national energy resources—hydrates could rival its ubiquity, displacing the fuel where it is used now and preventing its adoption elsewhere. This source still, of course, comes with environmental perils—but it also offers the promise of global energy abundance.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Entangled by Iran, Trump Avoids North Korea

For more than a decade , the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations : sanctions , sanctions , and more sanctions .
But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “ new strategic weapon ” to the world this year , the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
And so has U.S. President Donald Trump—especially now that he faces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Iran .
For nearly a year , Trump has found Pyongyang unwilling to engage with his all-or-nothing approach—full denuclearization first , then sanctions relief—yet at the same time he has been reluctant to pile on the pressure .
Indeed , Trump appears eager to avoid a fresh confrontation with Pyongyang that could result in an acceleration of its nuclear weapons program or armed conflict .
But Kim may have other ideas .
The North Korean leader whom Trump sought to charm with summit diplomacy a year ago plainly doesn ’ t like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision last week to assassinate a high-ranking Iranian general , Qassem Suleimani , was also no doubt unnerving to the perpetually insecure North Koreans .
At a recent party meeting , Kim took a new harsh tone , pledging the unveiling of a “ new strategic weapon ” and referring to its “ long-term confrontation with the United States.
” Trump ’ s biggest problem may be that he is entering 2020 without a viable strategy toward either hostile power , said Suzanne DiMaggio , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran , ” DiMaggio said .
“ A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs .
“ The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran , ” DiMaggio said .
“ A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs.
” … In the current context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imagine a quick ratcheting up of hostilities with Pyongyang , including once again spiraling toward a military confrontation like we experienced in 2017.
” It is a view held by many critics , including former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton , who says Trump ’ s former charm offensive with Kim only served to weaken his administration ’ s hard-line “ maximum pressure ” campaign , which is designed to apply increasing political and economic pressure on the regime until it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on North Korea is just unfortunately not true , ” Bolton told Axios in December .
And now Trump must deal with pressure from China and Russia to go easier on Pyongyang .
Last month , Moscow circulated a U.N. Security Council resolution , backed by China and Russia , calling to lift some existing trade sanctions , not impose new ones , to help spur stalled talks between the United States and North Korea .
Key regional allies , including South Korea , are reluctant to see the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as they did in 2017 , when Trump threatened to unleash “ fire and fury ” on Pyongyang in response to a series of long-range ballistic missile tests .
For the moment , the White House seems to be searching for a new diplomatic path forward in North Korea , even as Pyongyang has escalated tensions with the United States , resuming a series of ballistic missile tests in recent months .
“ The natural instinct would be to try to ramp up sanctions [ in response to such North Korean provocations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former advisor on North Korea to President George W. Bush .
“ But I think it ’ s harder because China , Russia , and South Korea have clearly signaled that they want to go in a different direction .
They don ’ t want to backslide in 2020 to 2017 and all that fire and fury stuff.
” Hanging over the debate is the question of whether Trump—eager to strike an election-year deal with Kim—would be willing to shrug off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I think Trump understands sanctions provide him with leverage over North Korea , ” Cha told Foreign Policy , voicing concern that Trump might be willing to accept a bad deal with Kim in order to produce a diplomatic success .
“ The real question is how badly does he want a deal in an election year .
Does he want a deal so badly that he is willing to sacrifice [ a new round of ] sanctions ?
” Few experts on North Korea ever believed it was possible to convince @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspiration that appears even more distant after Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and targeted a top Iranian military leader for assassination .
But many felt U.S. engagement could help put the relationship on a more stable footing and gradually constrain North Korea ’ s nuclear ambitions .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters in Washington on Tuesday that the administration remains hopeful that it can still pursue negotiations , citing North Korea ’ s decision not to make good on Kim ’ s pledge to deliver a “ Christmas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to test a nuclear explosive or an intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) by the end of 2019 .
“ We still remain engaged and hopeful that we can have a conversation about how to get the denuclearization that Chairman Kim promised to President Trump back in 2018 , ” Pompeo said .
Over the past year , the White House has been reluctant to ratchet up pressure on North Korea in the U.N. Security Council , playing down the importance of a spate of short-range ballistic missile tests , including a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises , and blocking an effort by European powers to convene a meeting last month to highlight the North Korean regime ’ s abominable human rights record .
When Britain , France , and Germany decided in August 2019 to issue a joint statement condemning North Korea ’ s missile launches , the United States stood on the sidelines .
The latest crisis comes against a background of unprecedented high-level diplomatic talks between U.S. and North Korean leaders , who signed a vaguely worded joint statement at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula .
But those talks faltered since the two leaders failed at a February 2019 summit in Hanoi to strike a follow-up deal .
Kim—who was disappointed by Trump ’ s refusal to offer sanctions relief without verifiable evidence that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear weapons program—has since ended a moratorium on ballistic missile tests .
Attempts by Trump ’ s North Korea envoy , Stephen Biegun , who was recently appointed deputy secretary of state , to conduct follow-up talks have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterparts .
“ I don ’ t see anything going on [ on the diplomatic front ] , ” said Bruce Klinger , a former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation ’ s Asian Studies Center .
Biegun has been eager to open discussions with the North Koreans , but , according to Klinger , “ his phone doesn ’ t ring.
” That is perhaps little surprise since Biegun has backed away from the step-by-step approach he suggested in a speech last January and sided with administration hard-liners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have provided partial sanctions relief in exchange for less than full denuclearization , at least at first .
North Korea experts say there is little or no chance Kim will engage diplomatically if those are the stakes—as he hasn ’ t so far .
The relationship took another turn for the worse late last year , when Kim pledged to deliver a “ Christmas gift ” —which was viewed by U.S. national security officials as a threat to end a two-year moratorium on ballistic missile tests .
In a subsequent New Year ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no longer bound by his pledge to observe a moratorium on missile tests , accusing the United States of failing to grant relief from sanctions—though he left the door slightly ajar for the possibility of future talks .
Trump has largely downplayed the significance of North Korea ’ s latest barrage of missile tests and claims to still have trust in the North Korean leader ’ s pledge to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula .
“ I know he ’ s sending out certain messages about Christmas presents , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beautiful vase , ” Trump told reporters recently at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida .
Negotiations sputtered and stalled in 2019 , with Biegun being iced out of talks with his counterparts from Pyongyang and North Korea conducting a spate of weapons tests to signal its anger and impatience with Washington .
Despite this , some U.S. officials say they remain hopeful that talks will bear fruit , pointing to Kim not acting on his vague threat to deliver a “ Christmas gift.
” “ [ 2019 ] was a good year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposed to come to pass in December did not , ” a senior U.S. State Department official told reporters on Tuesday .
“ In general , the absence of severely provocative activity says we ’ re accomplishing our goals.
” Klinger and other experts on North Korea completely disagree .
“ There is a Trump administration policy and a President Trump policy , which are not always in unison , ” Klinger said .
“ Trump has undermined his own administration policy on maximum pressure.
” Ever since 2006 , when North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tests , Democratic and Republican presidents have routinely turned to the Security Council , securing support for 11 sanctions resolutions that have gradually chipped away at North Korea ’ s economy .
But those measures have been fraying in the face of increasingly lax enforcement by Pyongyang ’ s primary trading partner , China , and North Korean officials ’ skill at evading sanctions with “ seeming impunity ” through a web of front companies , cyber-blackmail , and a shadow fleet of shipping vessels carrying out illicit trade , according to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with monitoring sanctions breaches .
On Dec. 16 , Moscow circulated a draft Security Council resolution , backed by Russia and China , that called for lifting a broad range of measures related to “ the livelihood of the civilian population ” in North Korea .
It also called for ending prohibition on joint South Korean-North Korean programs designed to rebuild the country ’ s dilapidated rail and road systems and for facilitating the import of humanitarian aid , which currently requires the approval of a Security Council committee before it can enter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its European allies oppose easing sanctions until North Korea takes a series of verifiable steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
But the United States has been rather evasive about how it might respond to a new provocation from Pyongyang .
Trump ’ s U.N. envoy , Kelly Craft , warned last month that North Korea ’ s ballistic missile tests risked “ closing to door ” on negotiations and that the council would have to “ act accordingly ” if Pyongyang engaged in “ further hostility and threats.
” So far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into discussions with the council ’ s other members about potential sanctions .
That could change if North Korea were to cross some unstated red line , such as testing a more advanced ICBM or detonating a nuclear explosion .
“ Any discussion of a new road map or Security Council resolution must bear in mind the reality that over the past year and a half , [ North Korea ] has continued to advance its prohibited programs , test its prohibited programs , and repeatedly refuse to engage in sustained diplomatic engagement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Craft , however , made it clear that Washington would prefer a resumption of talks and said the United States would also be “ flexible ” in seeking a diplomatic way forward with North Korea .
But some observers say it may be too late .
Trump and his team “ lack the discipline and skills to engage in the kind of diplomacy it takes to get results and make real deals , ” Carnegie ’ s DiMaggio said .
Kim , she added , “ knows that the solidarity on sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to weakened sanctions enforcement , which essentially means the end of maximum pressure.
” The United States and North Korea may have “ squandered a groundswell of political goodwill ” that accompanied the first high-level talks in 2018 because of “ unrealistic expectations ” about what could be achieved , said Jenny Town , a fellow at the Stimson Center and the managing editor of 38 North .
“ Now that things are falling apart , it ’ s hard to see where the pieces fit together anymore , especially if North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” she said .
“ We are in a downward spiral now .
”

For more than a decade, the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations: sanctions, sanctions, and more sanctions. But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “new strategic weapon” to the world this year, the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
For more than a decade, the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations: sanctions, sanctions, and more sanctions. But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “new strategic weapon” to the world this year, the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
And so has U.S. President Donald Trump—especially now that he faces a possible war with another nuclear offender: Iran. For nearly a year, Trump has found Pyongyang unwilling to engage with his all-or-nothing approach—full denuclearization first, then sanctions relief—yet at the same time he has been reluctant to pile on the pressure. Indeed, Trump appears eager to avoid a fresh confrontation with Pyongyang that could result in an acceleration of its nuclear weapons program or armed conflict.
But Kim may have other ideas. The North Korean leader whom Trump sought to charm with summit diplomacy a year ago plainly doesn’t like being ignored. Trump’s surprise decision last week to assassinate a high-ranking Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani, was also no doubt unnerving to the perpetually insecure North Koreans. At a recent party meeting, Kim took a new harsh tone, pledging the unveiling of a “new strategic weapon” and referring to its “long-term confrontation with the United States.”
Trump’s biggest problem may be that he is entering 2020 without a viable strategy toward either hostile power, said Suzanne DiMaggio, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran,” DiMaggio said. “A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs. “The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran,” DiMaggio said. “A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs.”… In the current context, it’s not hard to imagine a quick ratcheting up of hostilities with Pyongyang, including once again spiraling toward a military confrontation like we experienced in 2017.”
It is a view held by many critics, including former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton, who says Trump’s former charm offensive with Kim only served to weaken his administration’s hard-line “maximum pressure” campaign, which is designed to apply increasing political and economic pressure on the regime until it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. “The idea that we are somehow exerting maximum pressure on North Korea is just unfortunately not true,” Bolton told Axios in December.
And now Trump must deal with pressure from China and Russia to go easier on Pyongyang. Last month, Moscow circulated a U.N. Security Council resolution, backed by China and Russia, calling to lift some existing trade sanctions, not impose new ones, to help spur stalled talks between the United States and North Korea. Key regional allies, including South Korea, are reluctant to see the United States and North Korea return to a war footing, as they did in 2017, when Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” on Pyongyang in response to a series of long-range ballistic missile tests.
For the moment, the White House seems to be searching for a new diplomatic path forward in North Korea, even as Pyongyang has escalated tensions with the United States, resuming a series of ballistic missile tests in recent months.
“The natural instinct would be to try to ramp up sanctions [in response to such North Korean provocations],” said Victor Cha, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former advisor on North Korea to President George W. Bush. “But I think it’s harder because China, Russia, and South Korea have clearly signaled that they want to go in a different direction. They don’t want to backslide in 2020 to 2017 and all that fire and fury stuff.”
Hanging over the debate is the question of whether Trump—eager to strike an election-year deal with Kim—would be willing to shrug off a serious provocation by North Korea.
“I think Trump understands sanctions provide him with leverage over North Korea,” Cha told Foreign Policy, voicing concern that Trump might be willing to accept a bad deal with Kim in order to produce a diplomatic success. “The real question is how badly does he want a deal in an election year. Does he want a deal so badly that he is willing to sacrifice [a new round of] sanctions?”
Few experts on North Korea ever believed it was possible to convince Kim to abandon his entire nuclear program—an aspiration that appears even more distant after Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and targeted a top Iranian military leader for assassination. But many felt U.S. engagement could help put the relationship on a more stable footing and gradually constrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters in Washington on Tuesday that the administration remains hopeful that it can still pursue negotiations, citing North Korea’s decision not to make good on Kim’s pledge to deliver a “Christmas gift”—which some viewed as a threat to test a nuclear explosive or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by the end of 2019. “We still remain engaged and hopeful that we can have a conversation about how to get the denuclearization that Chairman Kim promised to President Trump back in 2018,” Pompeo said.
Over the past year, the White House has been reluctant to ratchet up pressure on North Korea in the U.N. Security Council, playing down the importance of a spate of short-range ballistic missile tests, including a submarine-based ballistic missile launch, delaying plans for joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, and blocking an effort by European powers to convene a meeting last month to highlight the North Korean regime’s abominable human rights record. When Britain, France, and Germany decided in August 2019 to issue a joint statement condemning North Korea’s missile launches, the United States stood on the sidelines.
The latest crisis comes against a background of unprecedented high-level diplomatic talks between U.S. and North Korean leaders, who signed a vaguely worded joint statement at a June 2018 summit in Singapore committing North Korea to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
But those talks faltered since the two leaders failed at a February 2019 summit in Hanoi to strike a follow-up deal. Kim—who was disappointed by Trump’s refusal to offer sanctions relief without verifiable evidence that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear weapons program—has since ended a moratorium on ballistic missile tests. Attempts by Trump’s North Korea envoy, Stephen Biegun, who was recently appointed deputy secretary of state, to conduct follow-up talks have been met with silence from his North Korean counterparts.
“I don’t see anything going on [on the diplomatic front],” said Bruce Klinger, a former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Biegun has been eager to open discussions with the North Koreans, but, according to Klinger, “his phone doesn’t ring.”
That is perhaps little surprise since Biegun has backed away from the step-by-step approach he suggested in a speech last January and sided with administration hard-liners in rejecting a phased negotiation that might have provided partial sanctions relief in exchange for less than full denuclearization, at least at first.
North Korea experts say there is little or no chance Kim will engage diplomatically if those are the stakes—as he hasn’t so far.
The relationship took another turn for the worse late last year, when Kim pledged to deliver a “Christmas gift”—which was viewed by U.S. national security officials as a threat to end a two-year moratorium on ballistic missile tests. In a subsequent New Year’s address, Kim said he was no longer bound by his pledge to observe a moratorium on missile tests, accusing the United States of failing to grant relief from sanctions—though he left the door slightly ajar for the possibility of future talks.
Trump has largely downplayed the significance of North Korea’s latest barrage of missile tests and claims to still have trust in the North Korean leader’s pledge to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. “I know he’s sending out certain messages about Christmas presents, and I hope his Christmas present is a beautiful vase,” Trump told reporters recently at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida.
Negotiations sputtered and stalled in 2019, with Biegun being iced out of talks with his counterparts from Pyongyang and North Korea conducting a spate of weapons tests to signal its anger and impatience with Washington. Despite this, some U.S. officials say they remain hopeful that talks will bear fruit, pointing to Kim not acting on his vague threat to deliver a “Christmas gift.”
“[2019] was a good year. … We saw the threats that were supposed to come to pass in December did not,” a senior U.S. State Department official told reporters on Tuesday. “In general, the absence of severely provocative activity says we’re accomplishing our goals.”
Klinger and other experts on North Korea completely disagree. “There is a Trump administration policy and a President Trump policy, which are not always in unison,” Klinger said. “Trump has undermined his own administration policy on maximum pressure.”
Ever since 2006, when North Korea carried out the first of six nuclear tests, Democratic and Republican presidents have routinely turned to the Security Council, securing support for 11 sanctions resolutions that have gradually chipped away at North Korea’s economy.
But those measures have been fraying in the face of increasingly lax enforcement by Pyongyang’s primary trading partner, China, and North Korean officials’ skill at evading sanctions with “seeming impunity” through a web of front companies, cyber-blackmail, and a shadow fleet of shipping vessels carrying out illicit trade, according to a U.N. Security Council panel of experts charged with monitoring sanctions breaches.
On Dec. 16, Moscow circulated a draft Security Council resolution, backed by Russia and China, that called for lifting a broad range of measures related to “the livelihood of the civilian population” in North Korea. It also called for ending prohibition on joint South Korean-North Korean programs designed to rebuild the country’s dilapidated rail and road systems and for facilitating the import of humanitarian aid, which currently requires the approval of a Security Council committee before it can enter the country.
The United States and its European allies oppose easing sanctions until North Korea takes a series of verifiable steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. But the United States has been rather evasive about how it might respond to a new provocation from Pyongyang.
Trump’s U.N. envoy, Kelly Craft, warned last month that North Korea’s ballistic missile tests risked “closing to door” on negotiations and that the council would have to “act accordingly” if Pyongyang engaged in “further hostility and threats.”
So far, the United States has not entered into discussions with the council’s other members about potential sanctions. That could change if North Korea were to cross some unstated red line, such as testing a more advanced ICBM or detonating a nuclear explosion.
“Any discussion of a new road map or Security Council resolution must bear in mind the reality that over the past year and a half, [North Korea] has continued to advance its prohibited programs, test its prohibited programs, and repeatedly refuse to engage in sustained diplomatic engagement,” Craft told the Security Council.
Craft, however, made it clear that Washington would prefer a resumption of talks and said the United States would also be “flexible” in seeking a diplomatic way forward with North Korea.
But some observers say it may be too late.
Trump and his team “lack the discipline and skills to engage in the kind of diplomacy it takes to get results and make real deals,” Carnegie’s DiMaggio said. Kim, she added, “knows that the solidarity on sanctions relief expressed by China and Russia will lead to weakened sanctions enforcement, which essentially means the end of maximum pressure.”
The United States and North Korea may have “squandered a groundswell of political goodwill” that accompanied the first high-level talks in 2018 because of “unrealistic expectations” about what could be achieved, said Jenny Town, a fellow at the Stimson Center and the managing editor of 38 North.
“Now that things are falling apart, it’s hard to see where the pieces fit together anymore, especially if North Korea goes down a more militaristic path,” she said. “We are in a downward spiral now.”
Foreign Policy staff writer Robbie Gramer contributed to this report.