Trump’s Curious Multilateralism

For all of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s disparagement of NATO and apathy toward multilateralism , his administration may be doing a far better job than many of its predecessors in working together with global allies and regional partners to secure an area most critical to the world economy : the waters of the Persian Gulf .
For the past two decades , the United States has pushed various allies whose national economies depend on the stability of the Gulf to play more active roles in protecting the energy-rich region from Iran ’ s hegemonic aspirations , terrorism , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , has been less than satisfactory , with both sides sharing the blame .
But U.S. efforts under the Trump administration to involve friendly powers in Gulf maritime security activities have intensified in recent years , suggesting that Washington is getting more serious about adopting a more inclusive approach .
The political and material challenges are many and will take months if not years to address , but with the United States seemingly changing its outlook toward and relaxing its grip over that part of the world , the opportunity for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least at sea , is now possible .
Operation Sentinel , the latest U.S. initiative to police the Gulf waters , was initiated in July 2019 .
That this new International Maritime Security Construct , as Washington calls it , was launched shortly after a string of attacks in the Gulf sponsored or perpetrated by Iran should not obscure the fact that various other collective maritime security processes in the region , led by the United States , had been developing for months if not years before .
Stationed in Bahrain , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Navcent ) manages the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces ( CMF ) —the latter created in 2002—in ensuring the free flow of legitimate commerce and freedom of movement at sea of U.S. and allied forces .
CMF comprises personnel from 33 like-minded countries .
It is meant to foster familiarity and improve coordination on core maritime tasks—counterterrorism , counterpiracy , and maritime interdiction operations—but it has no sea control or power projection mandates .
Each country participates in CMF voluntarily and within the constraints of its own national strategies .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. goal of internationalizing Gulf security .
The United States has assumed leadership of this coalition since its creation in 2002 , but its contributions have demonstrably decreased over the years .
Australia , Japan , France , Pakistan , and several Gulf partners , including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia , have stepped up recently and played key command roles .
This has been a net positive for the U.S. goal of internationalizing Gulf security and specifically Trump ’ s strong desire to more effectively address the problem of free riding in regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Maritime Security Working Group , created out of the Trump administration ’ s Middle East Strategic Alliance ( MESA ) initiative .
This group has a narrower membership than CMF—all Gulf Cooperation Council states plus Jordan and Egypt—but a broader mandate .
The working group seeks to enable regional navies and coast guards to counterbalance malign actors and complement CMF efforts through a regional lens .
What Trump ’ s MESA has done is provide the working group with top political cover by signaling its increasing importance to Navcent leadership and bureaucracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Operation Sentinel , which thus far includes the United States , United Kingdom , Australia , Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , Albania , and soon possibly Qatar and Kuwait , is complementary to CMF and MESA .
It seeks to maintain a persistent presence in the area , including with large naval vessels such as cruisers , frigates , and destroyers with air search radars ; robust command and control suites ; secure communications and data links ; and rotary wing aircraft capabilities .
Smaller vessels such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them .
Airborne surveillance monitors the flow of traffic through the highest-risk areas .
This is all underpinned by an international headquarters featuring a command center and supporting infrastructure in Bahrain .
One important operational challenge facing Operation Sentinel is the lack of clarity over rules of engagement and the notion of collective self-defense—a common problem for any such group .
If any vessel perceives a threat or gets attacked , should it coordinate its response ( and how ) with others , and what kind of support should it expect from them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributing to Operation Sentinel would fall under collective self-defense while nations that aren ’ t do not .
The issue of ship escorts is another important one .
The United States will share intelligence with members of the coalition but refrain from escorting their ships through dangerous waters .
That is an understandable and wise decision by Washington , but again , in the absence of clear rules of engagement , there might still be uncertainty that could be exploited by adversaries .
The aggregation of capabilities is also tricky business .
Just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bringing to bear additional military assets and resources doesn ’ t mean that Operation Sentinel as a whole will immediately become more effective than the sum of its parts .
Military history is replete with examples of coalitions operating suboptimally despite their individual members ’ various strengths .
Agreement on a common set of objectives and the establishment of clear strategic command and control frameworks is thus important .
Yet the biggest strategic hindrance dogging Operation Sentinel is the lack of consensus among its members on Iran policy .
The United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Iran , and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 was not well received by its European allies .
In turn , while Washington and Tehran seem to be on a collision course , the Europeans are doing their best to insulate themselves from a potential military conflict , which will continue to impact the nature of their involvement in and contributions to Operation Sentinel .
The United States has repeatedly tried to reassure its allies and partners that Operation Sentinel has no offensive purposes and is not directed at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant threats in the region do stem from Iran , the Europeans still have major qualms .
Given Trump ’ s interest in having allies “ do their fair share , ” Operation Sentinel appears more to be part of an older effort , timidly begun under the Obama administration , to solicit meaningful security contributions from allies and partners .
Washington has come to a definitive conclusion in recent years that to continue to bear almost all the costs of regional security would be strategic lunacy from which its primary competitor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , then , is less about Iran and more about China and Russia .
The United States doesn ’ t necessarily need this large consortium of friendly navies operating beside it to deter and counter Iran , whose maritime forces are simply no match for the U.S. Navy .
To be sure , Iran has mastered irregular warfare ; can cause damage at sea and on shore with its mines , missiles , and unmanned systems ; and could always harass the U.S. military below the threshold of war .
But the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that should force the Iranians to restrict their options and keep respecting red lines , which include keeping the Strait of Hormuz open .
It is precisely because of the United States ’ decisive advantages that Washington can afford to entertain and pursue multilateralist designs in the Gulf .
The United States would be less inclined to pursue such strategies in the Indo-Pacific , for example , because China is much more powerful and the margin for error is much smaller .
The United States will still need to prepare for a conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the lead military role—but it can still benefit from its allies and partners ’ intelligence , surveillance , reconnaissance , and efforts .
Such multilateralism should bring greater efficiency , but to secure it , U.S. policy must be precise and consistent .
None of this will happen overnight , and there will always be hesitancy and even resistance on the part of some allies and partners to share sensitive intelligence .
But that is why the administration ’ s Gulf security construct has proceeded calmly and gradually , setting the stage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy .

For all of U.S. President Donald Trump’s disparagement of NATO and apathy toward multilateralism, his administration may be doing a far better job than many of its predecessors in working together with global allies and regional partners to secure an area most critical to the world economy: the waters of the Persian Gulf.
For all of U.S. President Donald Trump’s disparagement of NATO and apathy toward multilateralism, his administration may be doing a far better job than many of its predecessors in working together with global allies and regional partners to secure an area most critical to the world economy: the waters of the Persian Gulf.
For the past two decades, the United States has pushed various allies whose national economies depend on the stability of the Gulf to play more active roles in protecting the energy-rich region from Iran’s hegemonic aspirations, terrorism, and international piracy. The outcome, however, has been less than satisfactory, with both sides sharing the blame.
But U.S. efforts under the Trump administration to involve friendly powers in Gulf maritime security activities have intensified in recent years, suggesting that Washington is getting more serious about adopting a more inclusive approach. The political and material challenges are many and will take months if not years to address, but with the United States seemingly changing its outlook toward and relaxing its grip over that part of the world, the opportunity for a multilateral security architecture in the Gulf, at least at sea, is now possible.
Operation Sentinel, the latest U.S. initiative to police the Gulf waters, was initiated in July 2019. That this new International Maritime Security Construct, as Washington calls it, was launched shortly after a string of attacks in the Gulf sponsored or perpetrated by Iran should not obscure the fact that various other collective maritime security processes in the region, led by the United States, had been developing for months if not years before.
Stationed in Bahrain, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (Navcent) manages the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)—the latter created in 2002—in ensuring the free flow of legitimate commerce and freedom of movement at sea of U.S. and allied forces. CMF comprises personnel from 33 like-minded countries. It is meant to foster familiarity and improve coordination on core maritime tasks—counterterrorism, counterpiracy, and maritime interdiction operations—but it has no sea control or power projection mandates. Each country participates in CMF voluntarily and within the constraints of its own national strategies.
This has been a net positive for the U.S. goal of internationalizing Gulf security.
The United States has assumed leadership of this coalition since its creation in 2002, but its contributions have demonstrably decreased over the years. Australia, Japan, France, Pakistan, and several Gulf partners, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have stepped up recently and played key command roles. This has been a net positive for the U.S. goal of internationalizing Gulf security and specifically Trump’s strong desire to more effectively address the problem of free riding in regional security.
Another venue for cooperation is the Maritime Security Working Group, created out of the Trump administration’s Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) initiative. This group has a narrower membership than CMF—all Gulf Cooperation Council states plus Jordan and Egypt—but a broader mandate. The working group seeks to enable regional navies and coast guards to counterbalance malign actors and complement CMF efforts through a regional lens. What Trump’s MESA has done is provide the working group with top political cover by signaling its increasing importance to Navcent leadership and bureaucracies in the U.S. Defense Department.
Meanwhile, Operation Sentinel, which thus far includes the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Albania, and soon possibly Qatar and Kuwait, is complementary to CMF and MESA. It seeks to maintain a persistent presence in the area, including with large naval vessels such as cruisers, frigates, and destroyers with air search radars; robust command and control suites; secure communications and data links; and rotary wing aircraft capabilities. Smaller vessels such as patrol craft and corvettes patrol between them. Airborne surveillance monitors the flow of traffic through the highest-risk areas. This is all underpinned by an international headquarters featuring a command center and supporting infrastructure in Bahrain.
One important operational challenge facing Operation Sentinel is the lack of clarity over rules of engagement and the notion of collective self-defense—a common problem for any such group. If any vessel perceives a threat or gets attacked, should it coordinate its response (and how) with others, and what kind of support should it expect from them? The U.S. position is that nations contributing to Operation Sentinel would fall under collective self-defense while nations that aren’t do not.
The issue of ship escorts is another important one. The United States will share intelligence with members of the coalition but refrain from escorting their ships through dangerous waters. That is an understandable and wise decision by Washington, but again, in the absence of clear rules of engagement, there might still be uncertainty that could be exploited by adversaries.
The aggregation of capabilities is also tricky business. Just because various members of the coalition are bringing to bear additional military assets and resources doesn’t mean that Operation Sentinel as a whole will immediately become more effective than the sum of its parts. Military history is replete with examples of coalitions operating suboptimally despite their individual members’ various strengths. Agreement on a common set of objectives and the establishment of clear strategic command and control frameworks is thus important.
Yet the biggest strategic hindrance dogging Operation Sentinel is the lack of consensus among its members on Iran policy. The United States is almost alone with its maximum pressure campaign against Iran, and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 was not well received by its European allies. In turn, while Washington and Tehran seem to be on a collision course, the Europeans are doing their best to insulate themselves from a potential military conflict, which will continue to impact the nature of their involvement in and contributions to Operation Sentinel. The United States has repeatedly tried to reassure its allies and partners that Operation Sentinel has no offensive purposes and is not directed at Iran, but given that the most significant threats in the region do stem from Iran, the Europeans still have major qualms.
Given Trump’s interest in having allies “do their fair share,” Operation Sentinel appears more to be part of an older effort, timidly begun under the Obama administration, to solicit meaningful security contributions from allies and partners. Washington has come to a definitive conclusion in recent years that to continue to bear almost all the costs of regional security would be strategic lunacy from which its primary competitor, China, would benefit. Operation Sentinel, then, is less about Iran and more about China and Russia. The United States doesn’t necessarily need this large consortium of friendly navies operating beside it to deter and counter Iran, whose maritime forces are simply no match for the U.S. Navy. To be sure, Iran has mastered irregular warfare; can cause damage at sea and on shore with its mines, missiles, and unmanned systems; and could always harass the U.S. military below the threshold of war. But the United States firmly maintains dominance, a reality that should force the Iranians to restrict their options and keep respecting red lines, which include keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.
It is precisely because of the United States’ decisive advantages that Washington can afford to entertain and pursue multilateralist designs in the Gulf. The United States would be less inclined to pursue such strategies in the Indo-Pacific, for example, because China is much more powerful and the margin for error is much smaller.
The United States will still need to prepare for a conflict with Iran—one in which it will take on the lead military role—but it can still benefit from its allies and partners’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. Such multilateralism should bring greater efficiency, but to secure it, U.S. policy must be precise and consistent.
None of this will happen overnight, and there will always be hesitancy and even resistance on the part of some allies and partners to share sensitive intelligence. But that is why the administration’s Gulf security construct has proceeded calmly and gradually, setting the stage for the long-term development of a regional strategy.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--Chinese Health Care Needs More Communism

As the Wuhan virus spreads , Chinese health care is under the microscope .
On Jan. 22 , the government declared that it would cover the costs of treatment for victims of the coronavirus .
But that might not be enough by itself .
In China , some 95 percent of the population has health care coverage , but the system looks more like a business than a platform to save lives .
Unlike in democratic socialist or most communist states , where health care is free for all citizens , in China the health care system is mostly private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is behind much of the failings of the system .
During Mao Zedong ’ s communist era , health care , although defined only through basic services , was freely provided to everybody .
That was the moment when “ barefoot doctors ” appeared .
Even though they lacked medical studies , by undergoing apprenticeships and by practicing basic medicine , they aided farmers ’ health , increasing life expectancy , contributing to the eradication of diseases such as smallpox and polio by promoting vaccination , and reducing the incidence of schistosomiasis—a disease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and rivers .
But once Deng Xiaoping came to power , China started its journey on the capitalist road , or , as China branded it , socialism with Chinese characteristics .
This enabled an economic miracle in which hundreds of millions of people escaped poverty .
Unfortunately , while profits boomed , access to health care suffered .
Paradoxically , this didn ’ t stop the average health of Chinese getting better—reflected , among other things , in ever increasing height .
Getting richer will do that , especially in a country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as will improved sanitation .
But getting sick in China is still a nightmarish experience .
I first encountered the Chinese health care system during my first visit to China in 2016 .
Because of jet lag , I had problems sleeping , and I was looking for a doctor to give me a prescription for sleeping pills .
Since my Chinese colleagues were aware of the impossible waiting times at Chinese doctors ’ doors , they recommended that I go to a private Japanese clinic .
While it was more available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go to for a simple prescription—which would cost around $ 350 .
Modern China has a saying : kanbing nan , kanbing gui— difficult to see a doctor , expensive to see a doctor .
Getting an appointment can take anywhere between minutes and months , depending on the doctor ’ s skills , the illness , and the patient or their family ’ s connections .
The better the doctor , the longer the waiting period .
That ’ s why a new black market job appeared in China , that of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scalpers who make a business by reselling appointment tickets , sometimes even 10 times more expensive .
The government has tried to fight that by ensuring that appointments can be made only through a mobile phone app .
Bribes are also common , creating another out-of-pocket expense for Chinese patients .
In 2015 , the head of a Chinese hospital was investigated for receiving almost $ 18 million in bribes , including properties .
Money is the name of the game , not only for individuals but also for institutions .
Most hospitals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They work like businesses , not nonprofits .
A friend of mine told me about the Russian roulette doctors played with her .
After being hospitalized because she was feeling unwell , she ended each day being told of a new scary diagnosis like cancer or another terminal illness , thus each day bringing new screenings and tests .
This friend ended up with a $ 15,000 bill ( a huge amount for China ) and without a clear diagnosis .
Even in a capitalist country , this would be a shock @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s beyond belief .
We don ’ t even have to compare China with the United States or Europe—all we need to do is take a look across the Taiwan Strait .
For example , in a typical case in Taiwan , which introduced single-payer health care in 1995 , one foreigner paid just $ 80 for a few days of hospitalization .
In China , for suturing a wound and for a few blood tests , I paid $ 250 ( half of the salary of a typical Chinese factory worker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health insurance in China : Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance , Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance , and the government insurance offered in rural areas , the New Cooperative Medical Scheme .
Many Chinese also have private insurance .
But this very rarely covers everything .
This is because , in China , almost one-third of health care expenses are paid out of pocket .
Chinese patients pay almost 30 percent of health care expenses , the government funds only 30 percent , and insurance covers the remaining 40 percent .
The out-of-pocket @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States : According to 2015 data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development , it amounted to 32 percent of health care spending , almost three times as much as in the United States , where it represented only 11 percent .
I learned this the hard way : going to the emergency room of a top Beijing hospital after an accident .
The insurance company refunded me only the cost for the surgical procedure—which it said was the only emergency procedure , ignoring the adjacent medical investigations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of pocket .
The poorer you are , the less chance there is you ’ ll receive free medical care .
Poor people from rural areas use health care insurance provided by the government , which has a limited coverage , so they must pay severely from their own pockets .
2015 data showed that 44 percent of poor families in China are impoverished by illness debts .
So , if you are poor in China , you will become even poorer because of hospital bills .
On top of that comes the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ makes access to better services even more difficult , as James Palmer and Rui Zhong explain , because it ’ s difficult to use your insurance away from the place you are registered in .
Even if they had the money to pay for medical services , farmers wouldn ’ t have access to good medical care because there is a scarcity of hospitals and doctors in rural areas .
China has only an average of 4.2 hospital beds for 1,000 people , compared with Japan and South Korea , which have 13.1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The total number of general practitioners in China reached 300,000 in 2019 , meaning that one general practitioner covers almost 4,700 people in China , while in developed nations the ratio is 1 to 1,500-2,000 .
And they are also getting older—due to the lack of personnel and a low average starting salary .
Preventing a disease is always better than curing it , and this applies to government expenses , too .
In China , the health care system is not focused on the patient but led by a capitalist Darwinism—those who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who don ’ t suffer or die .
Rural patients regularly die or suffer serious problems due to a lack of money .
But there is also some good news .
The government has introduced an initiative called Healthy China 2030 , whose goals include reducing out-of-pocket cost from almost 30 percent to 25 percent by 2030 .
Yet that marginal improvement isn ’ t enough in a rapidly aging country .
China needs an Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders—somebody willing to stand up for radical health care reform .
As a communist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a priority .
At the moment , the U.K. , Nordic countries such as Norway , Sweden , and Finland , and even many other Western states ( including my country , Romania ) do better at socialist health care than a supposedly communist state .
Xi Jinping has made frequent ideological fodder of Marxist ideas .
But the basic ideas of communism—fair and equal provision for all—seem sadly lacking , even as a self-proclaimed communist party still dominates politics .
If the People ’ s Republic actually wants to live up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take better care of its people .

As the Wuhan virus spreads, Chinese health care is under the microscope. On Jan. 22, the government declared that it would cover the costs of treatment for victims of the coronavirus. But that might not be enough by itself. In China, some 95 percent of the population has health care coverage, but the system looks more like a business than a platform to save lives. Unlike in democratic socialist or most communist states, where health care is free for all citizens, in China the health care system is mostly private and always pricey. That underlying reality is behind much of the failings of the system.
As the Wuhan virus spreads, Chinese health care is under the microscope. On Jan. 22, the government declared that it would cover the costs of treatment for victims of the coronavirus. But that might not be enough by itself. In China, some 95 percent of the population has health care coverage, but the system looks more like a business than a platform to save lives. Unlike in democratic socialist or most communist states, where health care is free for all citizens, in China the health care system is mostly private and always pricey. That underlying reality is behind much of the failings of the system.
During Mao Zedong’s communist era, health care, although defined only through basic services, was freely provided to everybody. That was the moment when “barefoot doctors” appeared. Even though they lacked medical studies, by undergoing apprenticeships and by practicing basic medicine, they aided farmers’ health, increasing life expectancy, contributing to the eradication of diseases such as smallpox and polio by promoting vaccination, and reducing the incidence of schistosomiasis—a disease caused by a worm living in swamps and rivers.
But once Deng Xiaoping came to power, China started its journey on the capitalist road, or, as China branded it, socialism with Chinese characteristics. This enabled an economic miracle in which hundreds of millions of people escaped poverty. Unfortunately, while profits boomed, access to health care suffered. Paradoxically, this didn’t stop the average health of Chinese getting better—reflected, among other things, in ever increasing height. Getting richer will do that, especially in a country that lacked food security until the 1980s, as will improved sanitation. But getting sick in China is still a nightmarish experience.
I first encountered the Chinese health care system during my first visit to China in 2016. Because of jet lag, I had problems sleeping, and I was looking for a doctor to give me a prescription for sleeping pills. Since my Chinese colleagues were aware of the impossible waiting times at Chinese doctors’ doors, they recommended that I go to a private Japanese clinic. While it was more available, it was also too expensive to go to for a simple prescription—which would cost around $350.
Modern China has a saying: kanbing nan, kanbing gui— difficult to see a doctor, expensive to see a doctor. Getting an appointment can take anywhere between minutes and months, depending on the doctor’s skills, the illness, and the patient or their family’s connections. The better the doctor, the longer the waiting period. That’s why a new black market job appeared in China, that of the “yellow cows,” the scalpers who make a business by reselling appointment tickets, sometimes even 10 times more expensive. The government has tried to fight that by ensuring that appointments can be made only through a mobile phone app. Bribes are also common, creating another out-of-pocket expense for Chinese patients.
In 2015, the head of a Chinese hospital was investigated for receiving almost $18 million in bribes, including properties. Money is the name of the game, not only for individuals but also for institutions. Most hospitals in China are private or mostly self-funded. They work like businesses, not nonprofits. A friend of mine told me about the Russian roulette doctors played with her. After being hospitalized because she was feeling unwell, she ended each day being told of a new scary diagnosis like cancer or another terminal illness, thus each day bringing new screenings and tests. This friend ended up with a $15,000 bill (a huge amount for China) and without a clear diagnosis.
Even in a capitalist country, this would be a shock. In a socialist country, it’s beyond belief. We don’t even have to compare China with the United States or Europe—all we need to do is take a look across the Taiwan Strait. For example, in a typical case in Taiwan, which introduced single-payer health care in 1995, one foreigner paid just $80 for a few days of hospitalization. In China, for suturing a wound and for a few blood tests, I paid $250 (half of the salary of a typical Chinese factory worker).
There are three types of health insurance in China: Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance, Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance, and the government insurance offered in rural areas, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme. Many Chinese also have private insurance. But this very rarely covers everything. This is because, in China, almost one-third of health care expenses are paid out of pocket. Chinese patients pay almost 30 percent of health care expenses, the government funds only 30 percent, and insurance covers the remaining 40 percent.
The out-of-pocket cost, incredibly, surpasses the sum in the United States: According to 2015 data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, it amounted to 32 percent of health care spending, almost three times as much as in the United States, where it represented only 11 percent. I learned this the hard way: going to the emergency room of a top Beijing hospital after an accident. The insurance company refunded me only the cost for the surgical procedure—which it said was the only emergency procedure, ignoring the adjacent medical investigations, which I had to pay for out of pocket.
The poorer you are, the less chance there is you’ll receive free medical care. Poor people from rural areas use health care insurance provided by the government, which has a limited coverage, so they must pay severely from their own pockets. 2015 data showed that 44 percent of poor families in China are impoverished by illness debts. So, if you are poor in China, you will become even poorer because of hospital bills. On top of that comes the hukou system of residence permits, which makes access to better services even more difficult, as James Palmer and Rui Zhong explain, because it’s difficult to use your insurance away from the place you are registered in.
Even if they had the money to pay for medical services, farmers wouldn’t have access to good medical care because there is a scarcity of hospitals and doctors in rural areas. China has only an average of 4.2 hospital beds for 1,000 people, compared with Japan and South Korea, which have 13.1 and 12 beds per 1,000 people. The total number of general practitioners in China reached 300,000 in 2019, meaning that one general practitioner covers almost 4,700 people in China, while in developed nations the ratio is 1 to 1,500-2,000. And they are also getting older—due to the lack of personnel and a low average starting salary. Preventing a disease is always better than curing it, and this applies to government expenses, too.
In China, the health care system is not focused on the patient but led by a capitalist Darwinism—those who have the money survive, while those who don’t suffer or die. Rural patients regularly die or suffer serious problems due to a lack of money. But there is also some good news. The government has introduced an initiative called Healthy China 2030, whose goals include reducing out-of-pocket cost from almost 30 percent to 25 percent by 2030. Yet that marginal improvement isn’t enough in a rapidly aging country.
China needs an Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders—somebody willing to stand up for radical health care reform. As a communist country, free health care access should be a priority. At the moment, the U.K., Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and even many other Western states (including my country, Romania) do better at socialist health care than a supposedly communist state.
Xi Jinping has made frequent ideological fodder of Marxist ideas. But the basic ideas of communism—fair and equal provision for all—seem sadly lacking, even as a self-proclaimed communist party still dominates politics. If the People’s Republic actually wants to live up to its name, it needs to take better care of its people.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--Market Players Wonder: Is China’s Coronavirus the Next Black Swan?

Market Players Wonder : Is China ’ s Coronavirus the Next Black Swan ?
Global stock markets that swooned on Monday over worries about the spread of China ’ s deadly coronavirus nearly all rebounded on Tuesday , underscoring how investors are still trying to figure out just how much impact the outbreak will actually have on the global economy .
Before the outbreak of the virus , investors were feeling pretty bullish .
With a mini U.S.-China trade deal in hand , a new North American Free Trade Agreement through Congress , and the worst of trade tensions seemingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happy to shrug off concerns about a worldwide manufacturing and investment downturn , record-high corporate debt , and growing doubts about the future of trade deals between the European Union and the United States , on one hand , and the United Kingdom , on the other .
But do this week ’ s market jitters hint that the still-spreading outbreak in China could be the black swan that brings the hoped-for global economic recovery to a screeching halt ?
Prior outbreaks of disease , whether SARS in 2003 , Middle East respiratory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ebola , all gut-punched equity markets for a short time , before fading away as a cause of economic uncertainty .
But there are a few reasons why this year ’ s outbreak in China could be different .
First , it ’ s not clear how much worse the outbreak will yet become and how long it will last ; many experts are now talking about an epidemic lasting into summer .
A very short-term disruption during the Lunar New Year holiday is one thing ; half a year of interrupted trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world ’ s second-biggest economy is potentially much more damaging .
The Chinese domestic economy has already suffered serious harm ; Lunar New Year is the equivalent of the United States ’ Thanksgiving or Christmas in China , but restaurants , entertainment facilities , and movie theaters have been closed or are doing minimal business thanks to the virus .
New movie releases—usually a billion-dollar trade at the New Year—have been canceled or indefinitely postponed .
The Lunar New Year holiday , set originally to end on Jan. 30 , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but many institutions and cities have already announced it will last until Feb. 9 .
With the speed with which the virus is spreading still uncertain , even that may be an optimistic date .
Even with many people avoiding Lunar New Year travel out of fear of the virus , tens of millions of people are out of place , facing what may be an impossible journey home if even more travel restrictions are imposed .
Some factories that produce critically needed supplies such as masks have already reopened , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now offering three or four times the usual wages .
The government , meanwhile , has announced that firms must keep paying employees through any extended holiday period , even if they can ’ t work .
And China itself is a much more crucial player in the global economy than it was at the time of SARS , or severe acute respiratory syndrome , in 2003 .
It occupies a central place in many supply chains used by other manufacturing countries—including pharmaceuticals , with China home to 13 percent of facilities that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voracious buyer of raw materials and other commodities , including oil , natural gas , and soybeans .
That means that any economic hiccups for China this year—coming on the heels of its worst economic performance in 30 years—will have a bigger impact on the rest of the world than during past crises .
That is particularly true given the epicenter of the outbreak : Wuhan , which is now under effective quarantine , is a riverine and rail transportation hub that is a key node in shipping bulky commodities between China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slower Chinese growth this year is already baked into global growth outlooks , “ even a modestly-sized epidemic has the potential to exert enough additional downside pressure to show up in the numbers , ” said James Lockhart Smith , the head of financial sector risk at Verisk Maplecroft , a U.K.-based risk consultancy .
He said the current outbreak could lead to a bit less economic impact than SARS had on China , which shaved 1 percentage point off GDP growth .
Among the first countries to feel the pain are China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have limited travel and tourism ; Thailand , for example , stands to lose more than $ 1 billion from interrupted travel , but Hong Kong , South Korea , Japan , and others have also pulled up the drawbridge .
( Tokyo ’ s stock market was the only major one in red numbers Tuesday . )
Lockhart Smith noted the double-barreled impact for other Asian economies : Chinese outbound tourism could well suffer , while Chinese demand for imports could fall off , affecting countries like Australia .
Also in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s compliance with the just-released terms of the U.S.-China phase one trade deal .
According to that agreement , China agreed to massively ramp up purchases this year and next of U.S. agricultural and manufactured goods , as well as more crude oil and natural gas , plus more services—an extra $ 200 billion worth of purchases over the next two years .
To the extent that the virus outbreak affects China ’ s economic growth and domestic appetite this year , it could call into question those already ambitious targets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , would likely dent China ’ s world-beating thirst for oil , which might make it harder to meet targets for purchases of U.S. crude .
Likewise , as with the swine fever outbreak that decimated China ’ s pig herd , and thus the export market for U.S. soybeans used as pig feed , the latest virus could put a damper on Chinese demand for U.S. agricultural and manufactured products .
( The phase one deal includes a clause calling for bilateral consultations in the event of “ a natural disaster or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the purchase targets . )
On the other hand , past scandals , such as the melamine milk disaster of 2008 , permanently increased Chinese demand for manufactured food products from abroad .
If the origins of the coronavirus are blamed on a lack of domestic safety standards , the Chinese middle class ’ s appetite for foreign products could rise again .
Though stock markets seemed to recover their stride on Tuesday , the risks of a serious market correction remain—with potentially bigger implications than dented investment portfolios .
That ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , are at historically high valuations , suggesting they are ripe for a downward move .
And there are plenty of other things for markets to worry about besides the coronavirus : geopolitical threats in the Middle East stemming from the U.S. showdown with Iran and the demise of the 2015 nuclear deal ; lingering trade tensions , such as U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s renewed push this week for yet more tariffs to undo the harms his first tranche of tariffs did to domestic firms ; threats of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and Europe ; and the specter of a sharp deterioration in U.S.-British relations in the wake of London ’ s decision to buck Washington and allow China ’ s Huawei to install part of its 5G telephone network .
“ Fears over the virus are pushing at an open door ” when it comes to jittery markets , Lockhart Smith said .
A big market correction would severely impact global growth this year , the International Monetary Fund and ratings agencies have warned .
The hit to U.S. consumers alone would likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , bringing U.S. growth to levels last seen during the financial crisis a decade ago .
And companies already burdened with a record level of high-yield debt would be even more exposed after a market downturn , creating the possibility of a wave of defaults that could further undermine confidence .

Global stock markets that swooned on Monday over worries about the spread of China’s deadly coronavirus nearly all rebounded on Tuesday, underscoring how investors are still trying to figure out just how much impact the outbreak will actually have on the global economy.
Global stock markets that swooned on Monday over worries about the spread of China’s deadly coronavirus nearly all rebounded on Tuesday, underscoring how investors are still trying to figure out just how much impact the outbreak will actually have on the global economy.
Before the outbreak of the virus, investors were feeling pretty bullish. With a mini U.S.-China trade deal in hand, a new North American Free Trade Agreement through Congress, and the worst of trade tensions seemingly in the rearview mirror, markets were happy to shrug off concerns about a worldwide manufacturing and investment downturn, record-high corporate debt, and growing doubts about the future of trade deals between the European Union and the United States, on one hand, and the United Kingdom, on the other.
But do this week’s market jitters hint that the still-spreading outbreak in China could be the black swan that brings the hoped-for global economic recovery to a screeching halt? Prior outbreaks of disease, whether SARS in 2003, Middle East respiratory syndrome in 2012 and 2015, or Ebola, all gut-punched equity markets for a short time, before fading away as a cause of economic uncertainty. But there are a few reasons why this year’s outbreak in China could be different.
First, it’s not clear how much worse the outbreak will yet become and how long it will last; many experts are now talking about an epidemic lasting into summer. A very short-term disruption during the Lunar New Year holiday is one thing; half a year of interrupted trade and canceled travel in at least swathes of the world’s second-biggest economy is potentially much more damaging.
The Chinese domestic economy has already suffered serious harm; Lunar New Year is the equivalent of the United States’ Thanksgiving or Christmas in China, but restaurants, entertainment facilities, and movie theaters have been closed or are doing minimal business thanks to the virus. New movie releases—usually a billion-dollar trade at the New Year—have been canceled or indefinitely postponed. The Lunar New Year holiday, set originally to end on Jan. 30, has been extended nationwide until Feb. 2, but many institutions and cities have already announced it will last until Feb. 9. With the speed with which the virus is spreading still uncertain, even that may be an optimistic date.
Even with many people avoiding Lunar New Year travel out of fear of the virus, tens of millions of people are out of place, facing what may be an impossible journey home if even more travel restrictions are imposed. Some factories that produce critically needed supplies such as masks have already reopened, but they are facing severe staff shortages and are now offering three or four times the usual wages. The government, meanwhile, has announced that firms must keep paying employees through any extended holiday period, even if they can’t work.
And China itself is a much more crucial player in the global economy than it was at the time of SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, in 2003. It occupies a central place in many supply chains used by other manufacturing countries—including pharmaceuticals, with China home to 13 percent of facilities that make ingredients for U.S. drugs—and is a voracious buyer of raw materials and other commodities, including oil, natural gas, and soybeans. That means that any economic hiccups for China this year—coming on the heels of its worst economic performance in 30 years—will have a bigger impact on the rest of the world than during past crises.
That is particularly true given the epicenter of the outbreak: Wuhan, which is now under effective quarantine, is a riverine and rail transportation hub that is a key node in shipping bulky commodities between China’s coast and its interior.
While slower Chinese growth this year is already baked into global growth outlooks, “even a modestly-sized epidemic has the potential to exert enough additional downside pressure to show up in the numbers,” said James Lockhart Smith, the head of financial sector risk at Verisk Maplecroft, a U.K.-based risk consultancy. He said the current outbreak could lead to a bit less economic impact than SARS had on China, which shaved 1 percentage point off GDP growth.
Among the first countries to feel the pain are China’s neighbors, most of whom have limited travel and tourism; Thailand, for example, stands to lose more than $1 billion from interrupted travel, but Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and others have also pulled up the drawbridge. (Tokyo’s stock market was the only major one in red numbers Tuesday.) Lockhart Smith noted the double-barreled impact for other Asian economies: Chinese outbound tourism could well suffer, while Chinese demand for imports could fall off, affecting countries like Australia.
Also in the crosshairs thanks to the virus outbreak is China’s compliance with the just-released terms of the U.S.-China phase one trade deal. According to that agreement, China agreed to massively ramp up purchases this year and next of U.S. agricultural and manufactured goods, as well as more crude oil and natural gas, plus more services—an extra $200 billion worth of purchases over the next two years.
To the extent that the virus outbreak affects China’s economic growth and domestic appetite this year, it could call into question those already ambitious targets. Any economic slowdown, for instance, would likely dent China’s world-beating thirst for oil, which might make it harder to meet targets for purchases of U.S. crude. Likewise, as with the swine fever outbreak that decimated China’s pig herd, and thus the export market for U.S. soybeans used as pig feed, the latest virus could put a damper on Chinese demand for U.S. agricultural and manufactured products. (The phase one deal includes a clause calling for bilateral consultations in the event of “a natural disaster or other unforeseeable event” that could imperil the purchase targets.)
On the other hand, past scandals, such as the melamine milk disaster of 2008, permanently increased Chinese demand for manufactured food products from abroad. If the origins of the coronavirus are blamed on a lack of domestic safety standards, the Chinese middle class’s appetite for foreign products could rise again.
Though stock markets seemed to recover their stride on Tuesday, the risks of a serious market correction remain—with potentially bigger implications than dented investment portfolios. That’s because global stock markets, especially in the United States, are at historically high valuations, suggesting they are ripe for a downward move.
And there are plenty of other things for markets to worry about besides the coronavirus: geopolitical threats in the Middle East stemming from the U.S. showdown with Iran and the demise of the 2015 nuclear deal; lingering trade tensions, such as U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed push this week for yet more tariffs to undo the harms his first tranche of tariffs did to domestic firms; threats of a brewing trade war between the United States and Europe; and the specter of a sharp deterioration in U.S.-British relations in the wake of London’s decision to buck Washington and allow China’s Huawei to install part of its 5G telephone network.
“Fears over the virus are pushing at an open door” when it comes to jittery markets, Lockhart Smith said.
A big market correction would severely impact global growth this year, the International Monetary Fund and ratings agencies have warned. The hit to U.S. consumers alone would likely dampen spending and could halve GDP growth, bringing U.S. growth to levels last seen during the financial crisis a decade ago. And companies already burdened with a record level of high-yield debt would be even more exposed after a market downturn, creating the possibility of a wave of defaults that could further undermine confidence.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--U.S. Officials Worry Looming Military Cuts in Africa Are ‘About Politics’

U.S. Officials Worry Looming Military Cuts in Africa Are ‘ About Politics ’ As Defense Secretary Mark Esper weighs proposals for a major reduction of U.S. forces in Africa , some Pentagon and State Department officials as well as top Republican lawmakers are concerned that the potential drawdown is more motivated by the president ’ s reelection campaign than sound military strategy .
Possible cuts to the U.S. military ’ s footprint in Africa , where the United States has roughly 5,000 troops , are part of the Defense Department ’ s recent review of deployments worldwide .
Esper has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military commanders to look for areas where they can free up resources in order to either bring troops home or reposition them to the Pacific to counter what the Pentagon sees as its long-term strategic threat : China .
But some senior Pentagon and State Department officials are concerned that political pressure could tilt the scales toward a full or partial withdrawal , effectively ceding the continent to Chinese influence , four current and former officials tell Foreign Policy .
“ The concern inside the Pentagon is that this is now not based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one former Trump administration official , referring to the Pentagon ’ s National Defense Strategy , which shifted the military ’ s focus from counterterrorism to competing with geopolitical rivals like China and Russia .
Instead , “ it is about politics.
” Facing a heated reelection fight in November , President Donald Trump is pushing to fulfill his 2016 campaign promises to bring U.S. troops home and to end the country ’ s so-called forever wars .
That has become more difficult as tensions with Iran in the Middle East have risen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployed thousands more U.S. forces to the region since the Jan. 3 U.S. strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , in addition to more than 10,000 troops it sent last year .
But experts say drawing down the U.S. footprint in places like Africa and South America could come at the expense of combating a rising threat from extremism and growing Chinese influence .
In a letter to Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sent on Jan. 24 , Republican lawmakers James Risch and Michael McCaul said they were “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported plans to cut back its presence in Africa .
“ Both China and Russia are increasing their presence throughout Africa .
US presence is vital to countering those efforts , ” they wrote .
“ Terrorist activity in this region is rapidly increasing , and it is part of the President ’ s National Security Strategy to continue working with our partners in Africa to defeat terrorist organizations to protect the homeland.
” Risch is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , and McCaul is the top Republican on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official pushed back on the idea that the White House is driving the drawdown , noting that any cuts are “ implicitly ” tied to the NDS .
Although Esper has not made a final decision , a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Africa is not likely , the official said , noting that China has a major presence on the continent that the Pentagon is looking to counter .
“ We are looking at the entire map and moving forces into a posture where they are able to longterm be addressing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , ” the official said .
Esper and a small group of senior defense officials discussed the proposals during a meeting on Friday , according to two officials .
A final decision likely won ’ t come for weeks or months , one defense official said .
The review comes at a critical time for the counterterrorism mission in Africa .
Despite yearslong efforts to stamp out terrorist groups across the continent , the threat is only increasing .
In 2019 , there were 3,471 violent events linked to extremist groups in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to research from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies , a think tank affiliated with the Pentagon ’ s National Defense University .
The Sahel saw the biggest uptick in violence .
During a summit earlier this month , French and West African leaders agreed to ramp up military cooperation to combat al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in the region , which have strengthened their hold and increased recruitment by exploiting grievances within local populations and marginalized communities .
France committed to sending an additional 220 troops to the Sahel region following the summit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Africa remained mostly unknown until October 2017 , when four U.S. Army special operations soldiers were killed in an ambush in Niger .
The majority of the 5,200 U.S. military personnel in Africa are currently serving at a base in Djibouti .
These troops focus primarily on supporting French forces and training local militias to defeat extremists .
Even as the Pentagon mulls a drawdown , top Trump administration officials and U.S. lawmakers have voiced alarm about the security situation in the Sahel .
“ That is one part of Africa where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s any , is very , very minimal , ” the top U.S. diplomat on Africa , Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy , told reporters in a briefing on Tuesday .
Nagy said the United States is “ very actively involved ” in the region , but confronting the security threats is ultimately up to governments in West Africa .
“ At the end of the day , the problems in the Sahel are not going to be solved by France or by the United States or the international community .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Sahel , ” he said .
Still , the Trump administration is eyeing plans to appoint a special presidential envoy for the Sahel to coordinate the international response to terrorist groups in the region .
The appointment could come as soon as next month , a senior U.S. diplomatic source said .
The State Department declined to comment for this story .
Republican Sen. Jim Inhofe , the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee , warned that any drawdown of U.S. troops on the continent would be “ short-sighted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s “ ability to execute its mission ” and “ would harm national security.
” Inhofe noted China ’ s predatory economic practices and increase in military activity across the continent , including building ports and establishing its first overseas military base , in Djibouti—which is strategically located on a critical maritime transit route .
Meanwhile , Russia is increasing its own influence by selling arms and deploying forces in the region .
Inhofe also stressed the continuing threat of terrorism , noting a deadly attack by al-Shabab militants in Kenya earlier this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and two Pentagon contractors .
“ Given what is at stake for both U.S. national security and effective implementation of NDS , we must have a meaningful , albeit limited , U.S. presence in Africa , ” Inhofe said .
Democratic Sen. Chris Coons met with Africom chief Stephen Townsend this week , reflecting similar concerns .
Their meeting “ confirmed [ Coons ’ s ] views that the presence of U.S. troops in Africa , roughly 0.3 percent of DoD ’ s personnel and budgetary resources , remains in our national interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spokesman for Coons .
The plan to reduce forces in Africa has also faced pushback from allies .
France , which is leading the fight in West Africa against extremists , is appealing to Trump not to cut off U.S. military support to French forces on the continent .
During a press conference after a meeting with Esper on Monday , French Defense Minister Florence Parly stressed that U.S. support in the Sahel is “ really critical ” to counterterrorism operations .
But Esper pushed back , calling on allies to step @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is time for other European allies to assist as well in the region , and that could offset whatever changes we make as we consider next steps in Africa , ” Esper said .

As Defense Secretary Mark Esper weighs proposals for a major reduction of U.S. forces in Africa, some Pentagon and State Department officials as well as top Republican lawmakers are concerned that the potential drawdown is more motivated by the president’s reelection campaign than sound military strategy.
As Defense Secretary Mark Esper weighs proposals for a major reduction of U.S. forces in Africa, some Pentagon and State Department officials as well as top Republican lawmakers are concerned that the potential drawdown is more motivated by the president’s reelection campaign than sound military strategy.
Possible cuts to the U.S. military’s footprint in Africa, where the United States has roughly 5,000 troops, are part of the Defense Department’s recent review of deployments worldwide. Esper has said he is asking all of his military commanders to look for areas where they can free up resources in order to either bring troops home or reposition them to the Pacific to counter what the Pentagon sees as its long-term strategic threat: China.
But some senior Pentagon and State Department officials are concerned that political pressure could tilt the scales toward a full or partial withdrawal, effectively ceding the continent to Chinese influence, four current and former officials tell Foreign Policy.
“The concern inside the Pentagon is that this is now not based on implementing the NDS,” said one former Trump administration official, referring to the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, which shifted the military’s focus from counterterrorism to competing with geopolitical rivals like China and Russia. Instead, “it is about politics.”
Facing a heated reelection fight in November, President Donald Trump is pushing to fulfill his 2016 campaign promises to bring U.S. troops home and to end the country’s so-called forever wars. That has become more difficult as tensions with Iran in the Middle East have risen in recent months: The Pentagon has deployed thousands more U.S. forces to the region since the Jan. 3 U.S. strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, in addition to more than 10,000 troops it sent last year.
But experts say drawing down the U.S. footprint in places like Africa and South America could come at the expense of combating a rising threat from extremism and growing Chinese influence.
In a letter to Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo sent on Jan. 24, Republican lawmakers James Risch and Michael McCaul said they were “concerned” by the Pentagon’s reported plans to cut back its presence in Africa.
“Both China and Russia are increasing their presence throughout Africa. US presence is vital to countering those efforts,” they wrote. “Terrorist activity in this region is rapidly increasing, and it is part of the President’s National Security Strategy to continue working with our partners in Africa to defeat terrorist organizations to protect the homeland.”
Risch is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and McCaul is the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
One defense official pushed back on the idea that the White House is driving the drawdown, noting that any cuts are “implicitly” tied to the NDS. Although Esper has not made a final decision, a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Africa is not likely, the official said, noting that China has a major presence on the continent that the Pentagon is looking to counter.
“We are looking at the entire map and moving forces into a posture where they are able to longterm be addressing key issues with regard to China and Russia,” the official said.
Esper and a small group of senior defense officials discussed the proposals during a meeting on Friday, according to two officials. A final decision likely won’t come for weeks or months, one defense official said.
The review comes at a critical time for the counterterrorism mission in Africa. Despite yearslong efforts to stamp out terrorist groups across the continent, the threat is only increasing. In 2019, there were 3,471 violent events linked to extremist groups in Africa—a doubling of such activities since 2013—according to research from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank affiliated with the Pentagon’s National Defense University. The Sahel saw the biggest uptick in violence.
During a summit earlier this month, French and West African leaders agreed to ramp up military cooperation to combat al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in the region, which have strengthened their hold and increased recruitment by exploiting grievances within local populations and marginalized communities. France committed to sending an additional 220 troops to the Sahel region following the summit.
America’s growing military role in Africa remained mostly unknown until October 2017, when four U.S. Army special operations soldiers were killed in an ambush in Niger. The majority of the 5,200 U.S. military personnel in Africa are currently serving at a base in Djibouti. These troops focus primarily on supporting French forces and training local militias to defeat extremists.
Even as the Pentagon mulls a drawdown, top Trump administration officials and U.S. lawmakers have voiced alarm about the security situation in the Sahel.
“That is one part of Africa where unfortunately the progress, if there’s any, is very, very minimal,” the top U.S. diplomat on Africa, Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy, told reporters in a briefing on Tuesday. Nagy said the United States is “very actively involved” in the region, but confronting the security threats is ultimately up to governments in West Africa. “At the end of the day, the problems in the Sahel are not going to be solved by France or by the United States or the international community. They have to be solved by the states in the Sahel,” he said.
Still, the Trump administration is eyeing plans to appoint a special presidential envoy for the Sahel to coordinate the international response to terrorist groups in the region. The appointment could come as soon as next month, a senior U.S. diplomatic source said.
The State Department declined to comment for this story.
Republican Sen. Jim Inhofe, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned that any drawdown of U.S. troops on the continent would be “short-sighted,” could destroy U.S. Africa Command’s “ability to execute its mission” and “would harm national security.”
Inhofe noted China’s predatory economic practices and increase in military activity across the continent, including building ports and establishing its first overseas military base, in Djibouti—which is strategically located on a critical maritime transit route. Meanwhile, Russia is increasing its own influence by selling arms and deploying forces in the region.
Inhofe also stressed the continuing threat of terrorism, noting a deadly attack by al-Shabab militants in Kenya earlier this month that killed a U.S. service member and two Pentagon contractors.
“Given what is at stake for both U.S. national security and effective implementation of NDS, we must have a meaningful, albeit limited, U.S. presence in Africa,” Inhofe said.
Democratic Sen. Chris Coons met with Africom chief Stephen Townsend this week, reflecting similar concerns. Their meeting “confirmed [Coons’s] views that the presence of U.S. troops in Africa, roughly 0.3 percent of DoD’s personnel and budgetary resources, remains in our national interest,” according to Sean Coit, a spokesman for Coons.
The plan to reduce forces in Africa has also faced pushback from allies. France, which is leading the fight in West Africa against extremists, is appealing to Trump not to cut off U.S. military support to French forces on the continent.
During a press conference after a meeting with Esper on Monday, French Defense Minister Florence Parly stressed that U.S. support in the Sahel is “really critical” to counterterrorism operations. But Esper pushed back, calling on allies to step up support for the fight.
“It is time for other European allies to assist as well in the region, and that could offset whatever changes we make as we consider next steps in Africa,” Esper said.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--Trump’s Phase One Deal With China Misunderstands Global Trade

Soon after U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a phase one U.S.-Chinese trade deal in late December 2019 , relief was palpable .
Pundits looked forward to the return of some semblance of stability and quickly jumped on who had won and who had lost .
And the winners seemed plentiful enough ; the global business community generally welcomed a “ truce ” that moderates tariff-based uncertainties , keeps stock markets at historic highs , and promises reforms in China ’ s foreign investment regime .
The agreement also appeared to meet the near-term political needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election , and those of Xi , who wants to moderate economic risks while trying to strengthen the role of the Communist Party .
Yet in the long term , the deal may have more losers than meets the eye .
Any violation of the agreement ’ s commitments would trigger an unusual dispute resolution mechanism that might ultimately destroy the rules-based international trading system created and nurtured by the United States over the past century .
The problem begins with Trump ’ s ill-advised obsession with trade deficits .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China accounts for the biggest share .
A key aspect of the deal is China ’ s obligation to increase purchases of U.S. goods and services to $ 200 billion above 2017 levels over the next two years ( a 92 percent increase in covered products ) .
Fulfilling this pledge will rely on state-managed purchases—in violation of globally accepted practices , which stipulate imports and exports should be primarily shaped by the market-based decisions of firms and consumers .
Beyond that , the countries ’ bilateral import commitments ignore the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The agreed targets for increased purchases of agricultural products , for example , suggest that China might have to buy considerably less agricultural products from Brazil .
Others indicate that it might have to purchase far fewer planes from Airbus than under normal market conditions .
Such arbitrary adjustments will distort global markets .
The deal may lower the United States ’ trade deficit with China , but it will largely be offset by higher deficits with other countries .
The diversion also contravenes World Trade Organization ( WTO ) guidelines and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complex litigation process that in all likelihood will lead to the deal being abandoned .
Another problem underlying the agreement is the assumption that technology transfer and intellectual property protections are the basis for U.S.-Chinese great-power competition , when in reality they are global developmental issues .
There is no dispute , of course , that practices bordering on outright theft of intellectual property should be eliminated , and the agreement does include provisions outlawing China ’ s requirement of technology transfer as a precondition for market access .
Foreign investors have long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it has come under harsher scrutiny recently as a result of raging technological competition between the United States and China .
U.S.-Chinese tech tensions have distracted from the fact that foreign direct investment has long been a key conduit for technology transfer to developing countries .
In China , the primary vehicle for such transfers has been the requirement that foreign investors form a joint venture with a domestic company as a condition for accessing the Chinese market .
China is by no means unique in this regard , and it generally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occur “ on voluntary , market based terms ” as stated in the text of the agreement .
Yet just because such requirements are not limited to China does not mean that they are permissible , but it does mean that the issue should be settled in multilateral venues rather than through ad hoc bilateral agreements .
On intellectual property , the trade agreement mandates that China issue an “ Action Plan ” within 30 working days enumerating “ measures that China will take to implement its obligations … and the date by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” For U.S. negotiators , this commitment is meant to foil any plans for China to “ [ steal ] its way up the economic ladder ” at the United States ’ expense .
Curbing China ’ s prolific intellectual property theft would be a welcome change , but , as we have argued previously , a country ’ s stance on intellectual property protections is a product of its domestic innovative capacity and overall developmental stage .
Emerging economies seek to promote the inflow of knowledge through a variety of means , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentive to innovate .
These trade-offs apply to everyone , and general principles for best practices are already enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement , which China consented to follow as part of its 2001 WTO accession .
Many observers point out that China has failed to honor its previous commitments and use this as justification for Trump ’ s more punitive measures .
Others raise doubts about the implementation of China ’ s new Foreign Investment Law , which in principle already banned forced technology transfer and strengthened intellectual property protections .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ phase one deal is its dispute resolution framework , which U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer promised would have “ real teeth.
” This framework is also crucial given the virtual inevitability of a violation , which would most likely result from China ’ s failure to meet such ambitious purchasing targets .
Yet under the terms of the appeals process , any decision is quickly elevated to Lighthizer , who has stated that “ the only arbitrator I trust is myself.
” If he and the Chinese vice premier , who would handle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not come to terms , the United States is allowed to adopt “ a remedial measure ” —likely tariffs .
If China judges such measures to be “ taken in bad faith , ” its only recourse will be to withdraw from the agreement .
If an infraction occurs , the greatest hope for the agreement ’ s survival would be a political calculation by Trump that triggering a withdrawal would risk his deal being exposed as a failure too close to the election .
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has loudly criticized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Trump will not want to give that view any credence .
This is a deal uniquely of Trump ’ s design : It represents a complete rejection of an international arbitration process in favor of concentrating bargaining power and judicial authority in the hands of his closest advisors .
Trump ’ s brand of economic statecraft—one in which unilateral tariffs and sanctions supersede established global norms and principles—has dealt a damaging blow to the global trading and foreign investment system .
His latest move reinforces the White House ’ s ongoing efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff its appellate body , which arbitrates disputes .
Meanwhile , the phase one deal prescribes state-managed trade over market forces , discourages international knowledge and technology flows , and hinges on a bilateral dispute resolution process that will likely be the deal ’ s undoing .
This deal undermines the interests of the broader global community in favor of the arbitrary whims of great powers .
When it all falls apart—and takes out remaining parts of the current trade order with it—even Trump may find that the United States is worse off @

Soon after U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a phase one U.S.-Chinese trade deal in late December 2019, relief was palpable. Pundits looked forward to the return of some semblance of stability and quickly jumped on who had won and who had lost . And the winners seemed plentiful enough; the global business community generally welcomed a “ truce ” that moderates tariff-based uncertainties, keeps stock markets at historic highs, and promises reforms in China’s foreign investment regime. The agreement also appeared to meet the near-term political needs of Trump, who faces an upcoming election, and those of Xi, who wants to moderate economic risks while trying to strengthen the role of the Communist Party.
Soon after U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a phase one U.S.-Chinese trade deal in late December 2019, relief was palpable. Pundits looked forward to the return of some semblance of stability and quickly jumped on who had won and who had lost. And the winners seemed plentiful enough; the global business community generally welcomed a “truce” that moderates tariff-based uncertainties, keeps stock markets at historic highs, and promises reforms in China’s foreign investment regime. The agreement also appeared to meet the near-term political needs of Trump, who faces an upcoming election, and those of Xi, who wants to moderate economic risks while trying to strengthen the role of the Communist Party.
Yet in the long term, the deal may have more losers than meets the eye. Any violation of the agreement’s commitments would trigger an unusual dispute resolution mechanism that might ultimately destroy the rules-based international trading system created and nurtured by the United States over the past century.
Some skeptical observers have noted that the deal leaves in place most of the trade-war tariffs that continue to burden both consumers and producers. There are also concerns that major issues in the trade relationship, such as the role that state enterprises and subsidies play in China’s economy, are being pushed off for future discussions. But a more fundamental problem is that the framework for this deal is conceptually flawed, which will result in unrealistic expectations and unfulfilled commitments.
The problem begins with Trump’s ill-advised obsession with trade deficits. The United States runs deficits with over 100 countries , but China accounts for the biggest share. A key aspect of the deal is China’s obligation to increase purchases of U.S. goods and services to $200 billion above 2017 levels over the next two years (a 92 percent increase in covered products). Fulfilling this pledge will rely on state-managed purchases—in violation of globally accepted practices, which stipulate imports and exports should be primarily shaped by the market-based decisions of firms and consumers.
Beyond that, the countries’ bilateral import commitments ignore the fact that trade outcomes really rest on multilateral relationships. The agreed targets for increased purchases of agricultural products, for example, suggest that China might have to buy considerably less agricultural products from Brazil. Others indicate that it might have to purchase far fewer planes from Airbus than under normal market conditions. Such arbitrary adjustments will distort global markets. The deal may lower the United States’ trade deficit with China, but it will largely be offset by higher deficits with other countries. The diversion also contravenes World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines and will inevitably drag affected parties into a complex litigation process that in all likelihood will lead to the deal being abandoned.
Another problem underlying the agreement is the assumption that technology transfer and intellectual property protections are the basis for U.S.-Chinese great-power competition, when in reality they are global developmental issues. There is no dispute, of course, that practices bordering on outright theft of intellectual property should be eliminated, and the agreement does include provisions outlawing China’s requirement of technology transfer as a precondition for market access. Foreign investors have long found this demand to be onerous, but it has come under harsher scrutiny recently as a result of raging technological competition between the United States and China. U.S.-Chinese tech tensions have distracted from the fact that foreign direct investment has long been a key conduit for technology transfer to developing countries.
In China, the primary vehicle for such transfers has been the requirement that foreign investors form a joint venture with a domestic company as a condition for accessing the Chinese market. China is by no means unique in this regard, and it generally supports the principle that such arrangements should occur “on voluntary, market based terms” as stated in the text of the agreement. Yet just because such requirements are not limited to China does not mean that they are permissible, but it does mean that the issue should be settled in multilateral venues rather than through ad hoc bilateral agreements.
On intellectual property, the trade agreement mandates that China issue an “Action Plan” within 30 working days enumerating “measures that China will take to implement its obligations … and the date by which each measure will go into effect.” For U.S. negotiators, this commitment is meant to foil any plans for China to “[steal] its way up the economic ladder” at the United States’ expense. Curbing China’s prolific intellectual property theft would be a welcome change, but, as we have argued previously, a country’s stance on intellectual property protections is a product of its domestic innovative capacity and overall developmental stage. Emerging economies seek to promote the inflow of knowledge through a variety of means, while developed economies argue for safeguarding the incentive to innovate. These trade-offs apply to everyone, and general principles for best practices are already enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement, which China consented to follow as part of its 2001 WTO accession.
Many observers point out that China has failed to honor its previous commitments and use this as justification for Trump’s more punitive measures. Others raise doubts about the implementation of China’s new Foreign Investment Law, which in principle already banned forced technology transfer and strengthened intellectual property protections. For this reason, the key to the phase one deal is its dispute resolution framework, which U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer promised would have “real teeth.” This framework is also crucial given the virtual inevitability of a violation, which would most likely result from China’s failure to meet such ambitious purchasing targets.
Yet under the terms of the appeals process, any decision is quickly elevated to Lighthizer, who has stated that “the only arbitrator I trust is myself.” If he and the Chinese vice premier, who would handle disputes on the Chinese side, cannot come to terms, the United States is allowed to adopt “a remedial measure”—likely tariffs. If China judges such measures to be “taken in bad faith,” its only recourse will be to withdraw from the agreement.
If an infraction occurs, the greatest hope for the agreement’s survival would be a political calculation by Trump that triggering a withdrawal would risk his deal being exposed as a failure too close to the election. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has loudly criticized the agreement for being too weak, and Trump will not want to give that view any credence.
This is a deal uniquely of Trump’s design: It represents a complete rejection of an international arbitration process in favor of concentrating bargaining power and judicial authority in the hands of his closest advisors. Trump’s brand of economic statecraft—one in which unilateral tariffs and sanctions supersede established global norms and principles—has dealt a damaging blow to the global trading and foreign investment system. His latest move reinforces the White House’s ongoing efforts to weaken the WTO by refusing to staff its appellate body, which arbitrates disputes. Meanwhile, the phase one deal prescribes state-managed trade over market forces, discourages international knowledge and technology flows, and hinges on a bilateral dispute resolution process that will likely be the deal’s undoing.
This deal undermines the interests of the broader global community in favor of the arbitrary whims of great powers. When it all falls apart—and takes out remaining parts of the current trade order with it—even Trump may find that the United States is worse off.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-28--Is South Asia Prepared for the Wuhan Virus?

Is South Asia Prepared for the Wuhan Virus ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : Sri Lanka and Nepal report cases of the Wuhan coronavirus , the U.S. military confirms an aircraft crash in Afghanistan , and India gears up for a state visit from U.S. President Donald Trump .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
South Asia is on high alert over the new Wuhan virus that has infected more than 4,500 people , mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 100 .
Nepal and Sri Lanka have each confirmed cases , and there are others suspected in India and Pakistan .
Five South Asian countries—Afghanistan , Bhutan , India , Nepal , and Pakistan—share a combined 4,000 miles of border territory with China , where the virus originated .
Given that the Wuhan virus can be spread during the incubation period—anywhere from two days to two weeks—there is a reasonable chance that South Asia may see a surge in reported cases in the coming days .
India , the region ’ s biggest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for passengers at 20 airports across the country .
Though some Indian airlines have offered cancellation waivers for direct flights to and from China , thousands of passengers continue to come and go—increasing the likelihood of contagion .
Risk factors .
South Asia ’ s countries have several characteristics that make them vulnerable to the spread of disease .
First , many are among the most densely populated countries in the world .
Literacy rates are low , general hygiene awareness is low , and access to clean water , gloves , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be small and expensive , while government-run ones are mostly understaffed and unprepared for major crises .
In Nepal , for example , a man tested positive for the Wuhan virus after he was released from medical observation .
According to the Kathmandu Post , other hospital patients were also discharged before their test results were received , suggesting that there could be several more cases in the coming days and that professional incompetence could worsen the crisis .
Finally , the region ’ s media fares poorly on most global surveys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raise awareness quickly enough or hold governments to account .
Reporters Without Borders ranks Nepal ’ s press 106th in the world , and India ’ s 140th .
Fake news is a regional scourge , too .
As millions of South Asians with low digital literacy have come online with smartphones in recent years , it ’ s more likely that misinformation and panic could spread during a crisis .
What ’ s next ?
Things could easily get bad .
South Asia ’ s countries rank among the worst around the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as shown below .
While the world focuses on how China contains the virus , it is worth considering what could happen if the epidemic spreads to the developing world : Regions such as South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa will not only be slower to diagnose and report new cases , but they will also be ill prepared to deal with a fast-mutating virus .
And as FP ’ s Laurie Garrett writes , China ’ s growing global interconnectedness as it pursues Belt and Road infrastructure projects has increased the likelihood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India says , “ Howdy , Trump ?
” Indian officials say that they are planning to host U.S. President Donald Trump for a state visit in late February .
The proposed trip would involve a day in New Delhi and perhaps a visit to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s home state of Gujarat .
Last September , Modi held a “ Howdy , Modi !
” rally in Houston that attracted tens of thousands of Indian American supporters—a showing that impressed Trump , who made a brief appearance .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump could headline a similar rally in Ahmedabad , Gujarat ’ s biggest city .
Pakistan ’ s military cracks down on critic .
For two years , a protest movement demanding accountability from Pakistan ’ s military , the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement ( PTM ) led by Manzoor Pashteen , has been a real thorn in the brass ’ side .
Though other movements against the military in Pakistan have fizzled out or remained local affairs , the PTM went national in its demands for justice and democracy .
Given the military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s no surprise that Pashteen was arrested on charges of criminal conspiracy and sedition this week .
Other PTM leaders have vowed to keep up the fight .
U.S. military plane crashes in Afghanistan .
On Monday , the U.S. military confirmed that an aircraft had crashed in Afghanistan ’ s Ghazni province , but it denied claims that the Taliban shot it down .
It is unclear how many people have died in the crash or whether it will further complicate the peace negotiations underway between the United States and the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which talks were ongoing—the United States dropped the most bombs over Afghanistan in nearly a decade , the Military Times reports .
Kashmir still left in the dark .
Nearly six months after shutting down the internet in Kashmir when it revoked the territory ’ s special status , India has finally lifted some restrictions—unblocking a few hundred websites and restoring low-speed 2G internet access .
But for many Kashmiris the gestures are empty : Most Kashmiri sites , including social media , remain off limits .
Among the allowed sites for Kashmiri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Netflix and Amazon , which now feature a wealth of TV shows created for growing Indian audiences .
On Netflix at least , Indian users spend more time watching movies than viewers in any other country .
What percentage watched at least one film a week in 2019 ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Budget time .
Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman will deliver the government ’ s budget on Saturday .
The event may sound less than thrilling , but it is widely followed and broadcast live alongside commentary from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year ’ s budget is crucial , given that the economy slowed to a 4.5 percent growth rate in the last reported quarter .
And next week , India ’ s central bank is scheduled to meet to discuss further cuts to interest rates .
Plane business .
India has announced it is ready to sell a 100 percent stake in Air India , its ailing national carrier .
An earlier move to sell a partial stake ( 76 percent ) didn ’ t attract buyers .
India ’ s government has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only to cut losses and raise money but also to try to increase efficiency .
Twin trouble in Sri Lanka .
Last week , a Sri Lankan organization attempted to set a world record for the largest gathering of twins at a sports stadium in Colombo .
The bid seems to have failed , but not because Sri Lanka has too few multiples .
Instead , higher than expected turnout led to long registration lines , which meant that organizers weren ’ t able to follow Guinness World Records ’ strict procedures .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Due in part to public suspicion after CIA efforts to use vaccination programs to gather information on al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden , giving out polio vaccines is difficult in Pakistan .
But with new efforts to involve female health workers and religious leaders in the campaign , health workers in the country hope to rebuild trust and eradicate polio , Sabrina Toppa reports for FP .
According to Netflix , 70 percent of subscribers in India watch at least one movie a week on the platform .
No wonder it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dollars on content in India .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Sri Lanka and Nepal report cases of the Wuhan coronavirus , the U.S. military confirms an aircraft crash in Afghanistan , and India gears up for a state visit from U.S. President Donald Trump .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Sri Lanka and Nepal report cases of the Wuhan coronavirus, the U.S. military confirms an aircraft crash in Afghanistan, and India gears up for a state visit from U.S. President Donald Trump.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
South Asia Braces for Wuhan Virus
South Asia is on high alert over the new Wuhan virus that has infected more than 4,500 people, mostly in China, and killed more than 100. Nepal and Sri Lanka have each confirmed cases, and there are others suspected in India and Pakistan. Five South Asian countries—Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan—share a combined 4,000 miles of border territory with China, where the virus originated.
Given that the Wuhan virus can be spread during the incubation period—anywhere from two days to two weeks—there is a reasonable chance that South Asia may see a surge in reported cases in the coming days. India, the region’s biggest country, has extended temperature screening measures for passengers at 20 airports across the country. Though some Indian airlines have offered cancellation waivers for direct flights to and from China, thousands of passengers continue to come and go—increasing the likelihood of contagion.
Risk factors. South Asia’s countries have several characteristics that make them vulnerable to the spread of disease. First, many are among the most densely populated countries in the world. Literacy rates are low, general hygiene awareness is low, and access to clean water, gloves, and masks is limited. Private hospitals tend to be small and expensive, while government-run ones are mostly understaffed and unprepared for major crises.
In Nepal, for example, a man tested positive for the Wuhan virus after he was released from medical observation. According to the Kathmandu Post, other hospital patients were also discharged before their test results were received, suggesting that there could be several more cases in the coming days and that professional incompetence could worsen the crisis.
Finally, the region’s media fares poorly on most global surveys, making it unlikely that journalists could raise awareness quickly enough or hold governments to account. Reporters Without Borders ranks Nepal’s press 106th in the world, and India’s 140th. Fake news is a regional scourge, too. As millions of South Asians with low digital literacy have come online with smartphones in recent years, it’s more likely that misinformation and panic could spread during a crisis.
What’s next? Things could easily get bad. South Asia’s countries rank among the worst around the globe on health care access and quality, as shown below. While the world focuses on how China contains the virus, it is worth considering what could happen if the epidemic spreads to the developing world: Regions such as South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa will not only be slower to diagnose and report new cases, but they will also be ill prepared to deal with a fast-mutating virus. And as FP’s Laurie Garrett writes, China’s growing global interconnectedness as it pursues Belt and Road infrastructure projects has increased the likelihood of the spread of viral outbreaks.
What We’re Following
India says, “Howdy, Trump?” Indian officials say that they are planning to host U.S. President Donald Trump for a state visit in late February. The proposed trip would involve a day in New Delhi and perhaps a visit to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state of Gujarat. Last September, Modi held a “Howdy, Modi!” rally in Houston that attracted tens of thousands of Indian American supporters—a showing that impressed Trump, who made a brief appearance. There are now some Indian media reports that Trump could headline a similar rally in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s biggest city.
Pakistan’s military cracks down on critic. For two years, a protest movement demanding accountability from Pakistan’s military, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) led by Manzoor Pashteen, has been a real thorn in the brass’ side. Though other movements against the military in Pakistan have fizzled out or remained local affairs, the PTM went national in its demands for justice and democracy. Given the military’s outsized power, it’s no surprise that Pashteen was arrested on charges of criminal conspiracy and sedition this week. Other PTM leaders have vowed to keep up the fight.
U.S. military plane crashes in Afghanistan. On Monday, the U.S. military confirmed that an aircraft had crashed in Afghanistan’s Ghazni province, but it denied claims that the Taliban shot it down. It is unclear how many people have died in the crash or whether it will further complicate the peace negotiations underway between the United States and the Taliban. Meanwhile, in 2019—during much of which talks were ongoing—the United States dropped the most bombs over Afghanistan in nearly a decade, the Military Times reports.
Kashmir still left in the dark. Nearly six months after shutting down the internet in Kashmir when it revoked the territory’s special status, India has finally lifted some restrictions—unblocking a few hundred websites and restoring low-speed 2G internet access. But for many Kashmiris the gestures are empty: Most Kashmiri sites, including social media, remain off limits.
Question of the Week
Among the allowed sites for Kashmiri internet users are video streaming services such as Netflix and Amazon, which now feature a wealth of TV shows created for growing Indian audiences.
On Netflix at least, Indian users spend more time watching movies than viewers in any other country. What percentage watched at least one film a week in 2019?
A) 30 percent
B) 50 percent
C) 70 percent
D) 90 percent
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Budget time. Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman will deliver the government’s budget on Saturday. The event may sound less than thrilling, but it is widely followed and broadcast live alongside commentary from corporate leaders and economic experts. This year’s budget is crucial, given that the economy slowed to a 4.5 percent growth rate in the last reported quarter. And next week, India’s central bank is scheduled to meet to discuss further cuts to interest rates.
Plane business. India has announced it is ready to sell a 100 percent stake in Air India, its ailing national carrier. An earlier move to sell a partial stake (76 percent) didn’t attract buyers. India’s government has been trying to divest from key holdings not only to cut losses and raise money but also to try to increase efficiency.
Odds and Ends
Sri Lankan Army Gens. Jayantha and Pooraka Seneviratne, pose for a picture during an attempt to break the world record for the biggest gathering of twins on Jan. 20 in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Twin trouble in Sri Lanka. Last week, a Sri Lankan organization attempted to set a world record for the largest gathering of twins at a sports stadium in Colombo. The bid seems to have failed, but not because Sri Lanka has too few multiples. Instead, higher than expected turnout led to long registration lines, which meant that organizers weren’t able to follow Guinness World Records’ strict procedures.
Pakistan’s fight against polio. Due in part to public suspicion after CIA efforts to use vaccination programs to gather information on al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, giving out polio vaccines is difficult in Pakistan. But with new efforts to involve female health workers and religious leaders in the campaign, health workers in the country hope to rebuild trust and eradicate polio, Sabrina Toppa reports for FP.
And the Answer Is…
C) 70 percent
According to Netflix, 70 percent of subscribers in India watch at least one movie a week on the platform. No wonder it is planning to invest hundreds of millions of dollars on content in India.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.