foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Don’t Count on China’s Help With a Coronavirus Inquiry

Don ’ t Count on China ’ s Help With a Coronavirus Inquiry The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over .
But while many countries are still grappling with how to handle the second wave , a group of international scientists is starting to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and how the next pandemic might be averted .
Don ’ t expect any help from Beijing on this , though .
China ’ s striking success in handling the pandemic has won it plaudits—but it is unlikely to meet international expectations for a transparent , meticulous , and meaningful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multilateral missions to examine the world ’ s pandemic response have been confirmed by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
The first has already begun .
On Oct. 30 , a group of WHO scientists met to initiate a study into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 , the virus that causes COVID-19 .
The second study will begin “ at the earliest appropriate moment ” and will look at the global community ’ s response to the pandemic .
China has agreed to support both but only on the condition they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second inquiry will take place when the pandemic is over and will not just focus on China .
Both of these inquiries are inherently political , as they revolve around questions about how national authorities reacted internally and worked with the international community .
China has many questions to answer .
As the country in which the first confirmed cases appeared , China ’ s early handling of the virus is under hard scrutiny—and no official can risk signing off on transparency that might endanger the national reputation .
Faced with a previously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reason to be cautious , but they may also have deliberately obfuscated events as they unfolded .
Doctors in Wuhan have said that they were blocked from raising the alarm about a new infectious disease that appeared in patients in late December .
The most publicized example of this was Li Wenliang , an ophthalmologist who was reprimanded by the police for “ spreading rumors ” and who later died of COVID-19 .
In January , although the WHO was in contact with the Chinese authorities about the outbreak in Wuhan , local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , potentially allowing the virus to spread—first to other parts of China , and then to the rest of the world .
The pattern of inaction in mid-January , followed by sudden , massive national action , suggests a paralysis caused by political fears .
One of the questions that the WHO mission will have to answer is why China ’ s National Health Commission only publicly acknowledged human-to-human transmission of the virus three days after Imperial College London researchers estimated the potential number of cases in China had already exceeded 4,000 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict with the approach of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) to crisis management .
Already , it has shifted blame away from the central government by firing local officials .
It is tightly vetting what research Chinese universities can publish on COVID-19 .
The story that China heroically saved its people—and tried to save the world—from a deadly virus is already being written .
A focus on the concealment of information and on China ’ s coercion of other countries such as Pakistan not to close their borders to travel is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Such obfuscation is a feature of the CCP , not a bug .
The party faced a wave of public criticism in 2011 when , after a high-speed rail crash in the southeastern city of Wenzhou killed 40 people , local officials focused on covering up the disaster rather than investigating its causes .
Lawyers were instructed by government officials not to take on cases from the families of victims because “ the accident is a major sensitive issue concerning social stability.
” The state ’ s preoccupation with social stability means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis , any inquiries take place within the opaque channels of the CCP .
This tendency has only intensified since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 .
The party is mistrustful of alternative sources of information , and it only allows the officially sanctioned version of events to be circulated in the public forum .
This is not China ’ s first experience with a deadly coronavirus , but there is an important difference between COVID-19 and the SARS epidemic .
With SARS , China had the highest number of cases and deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ publicly apologized for errors it made in reporting and communication .
COVID-19 is a different story , as by almost any measure China has successfully driven down its infection rate and limited deaths in a short period of time .
The United States has suffered 59 times as many deaths , despite having a population that is around a quarter the size of China ’ s .
The introspection among Western countries over their subsequent mishandling of COVID-19 serves to divert attention away from China ’ s actions in the early phase of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will also have to scrutinize the WHO ’ s relationship with China .
At times , the organization has appeared reluctant to move away from the CCP ’ s version of events .
On Jan. 14 , the WHO sent a now infamous tweet , saying : “ Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel # coronavirus.
” It was one of many statements that the organization made in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic that either praised China ’ s role in the handling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s desired narrative .
Two weeks after that tweet , the WHO declared a public health emergency .
The WHO ’ s director-general , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , has pushed back against accusations that the organization was too cozy with Beijing and has pleaded that the virus should not be politicized .
Tedros remains in a difficult position : The WHO has no legal mandate to conduct investigations , so it is dependent on the cooperation of individual nations that may be rescinded at any time .
But even the WHO ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the pandemic were not enough to open China ’ s doors fully : A delegation sent in February was not allowed to visit the wet market where the virus is suspected to have originated .
Tedros is not the first WHO official to have faced difficulties with China , but he may be less willing than some of his predecessors to challenge China .
As the SARS outbreak began to subside in 2003 , the head of the organization at the time , Gro Harlem Brundtland , criticized China ’ s refusal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country .
If the WHO has resolved to depoliticize COVID-19 , it may shy away from revealing internal complaints that China shared limited data on the virus at a time when time to prevent a global outbreak was running out .
There will be another pandemic after this one .
Dealing with that effectively will require learning the lessons from 2020 , and from 2003 , when Brundtland implored China : “ Next time something strange and new comes anywhere in the world , let us come in as quickly as possible @ @

The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over. But while many countries are still grappling with how to handle the second wave, a group of international scientists is starting to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and how the next pandemic might be averted. Don’t expect any help from Beijing on this, though. China’s striking success in handling the pandemic has won it plaudits—but it is unlikely to meet international expectations for a transparent, meticulous, and meaningful inquiry into the viral spread.
The COVID-19 pandemic is far from over. But while many countries are still grappling with how to handle the second wave, a group of international scientists is starting to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and how the next pandemic might be averted. Don’t expect any help from Beijing on this, though. China’s striking success in handling the pandemic has won it plaudits—but it is unlikely to meet international expectations for a transparent, meticulous, and meaningful inquiry into the viral spread.
Two multilateral missions to examine the world’s pandemic response have been confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO). The first has already begun. On Oct. 30, a group of WHO scientists met to initiate a study into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. The second study will begin “at the earliest appropriate moment” and will look at the global community’s response to the pandemic. China has agreed to support both but only on the condition they are led by the WHO and that the second inquiry will take place when the pandemic is over and will not just focus on China.
Both of these inquiries are inherently political, as they revolve around questions about how national authorities reacted internally and worked with the international community. China has many questions to answer. As the country in which the first confirmed cases appeared, China’s early handling of the virus is under hard scrutiny—and no official can risk signing off on transparency that might endanger the national reputation.
Faced with a previously unknown virus, Chinese authorities had some reason to be cautious, but they may also have deliberately obfuscated events as they unfolded. Doctors in Wuhan have said that they were blocked from raising the alarm about a new infectious disease that appeared in patients in late December. The most publicized example of this was Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist who was reprimanded by the police for “spreading rumors” and who later died of COVID-19.
In January, although the WHO was in contact with the Chinese authorities about the outbreak in Wuhan, local and municipal health authorities gave contradictory instructions, potentially allowing the virus to spread—first to other parts of China, and then to the rest of the world. The pattern of inaction in mid-January, followed by sudden, massive national action, suggests a paralysis caused by political fears. One of the questions that the WHO mission will have to answer is why China’s National Health Commission only publicly acknowledged human-to-human transmission of the virus three days after Imperial College London researchers estimated the potential number of cases in China had already exceeded 4,000.
Legitimate questions around responsibility are in direct conflict with the approach of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to crisis management. Already, it has shifted blame away from the central government by firing local officials. It is tightly vetting what research Chinese universities can publish on COVID-19. The story that China heroically saved its people—and tried to save the world—from a deadly virus is already being written. A focus on the concealment of information and on China’s coercion of other countries such as Pakistan not to close their borders to travel is not the narrative Beijing wants to sell.
Such obfuscation is a feature of the CCP, not a bug. The party faced a wave of public criticism in 2011 when, after a high-speed rail crash in the southeastern city of Wenzhou killed 40 people, local officials focused on covering up the disaster rather than investigating its causes. Lawyers were instructed by government officials not to take on cases from the families of victims because “the accident is a major sensitive issue concerning social stability.” The state’s preoccupation with social stability means that, in the event of a crisis, any inquiries take place within the opaque channels of the CCP. This tendency has only intensified since Xi Jinping took power in 2012. The party is mistrustful of alternative sources of information, and it only allows the officially sanctioned version of events to be circulated in the public forum.
This is not China’s first experience with a deadly coronavirus, but there is an important difference between COVID-19 and the SARS epidemic. With SARS, China had the highest number of cases and deaths worldwide, and in 2003 the party publicly apologized for errors it made in reporting and communication. COVID-19 is a different story, as by almost any measure China has successfully driven down its infection rate and limited deaths in a short period of time. The United States has suffered 59 times as many deaths, despite having a population that is around a quarter the size of China’s. The introspection among Western countries over their subsequent mishandling of COVID-19 serves to divert attention away from China’s actions in the early phase of the outbreak.
Any inquiry into COVID-19 will also have to scrutinize the WHO’s relationship with China. At times, the organization has appeared reluctant to move away from the CCP’s version of events. On Jan. 14, the WHO sent a now infamous tweet, saying: “Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel #coronavirus.” It was one of many statements that the organization made in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic that either praised China’s role in the handling of the outbreak or subscribed to the CCP’s desired narrative. Two weeks after that tweet, the WHO declared a public health emergency.
The WHO’s director-general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, has pushed back against accusations that the organization was too cozy with Beijing and has pleaded that the virus should not be politicized. Tedros remains in a difficult position: The WHO has no legal mandate to conduct investigations, so it is dependent on the cooperation of individual nations that may be rescinded at any time. But even the WHO’s mollifying statements in the early days of the pandemic were not enough to open China’s doors fully: A delegation sent in February was not allowed to visit the wet market where the virus is suspected to have originated.
Tedros is not the first WHO official to have faced difficulties with China, but he may be less willing than some of his predecessors to challenge China. As the SARS outbreak began to subside in 2003, the head of the organization at the time, Gro Harlem Brundtland, criticized China’s refusal to allow international investigators full access to the country. If the WHO has resolved to depoliticize COVID-19, it may shy away from revealing internal complaints that China shared limited data on the virus at a time when time to prevent a global outbreak was running out.
There will be another pandemic after this one. Dealing with that effectively will require learning the lessons from 2020, and from 2003, when Brundtland implored China: “Next time something strange and new comes anywhere in the world, let us come in as quickly as possible.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Biden Expected to Put the World’s Kleptocrats on Notice

Biden Expected to Put the World ’ s Kleptocrats on Notice This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is expected to make a crackdown on illicit finance both at home in the United States and abroad a centerpiece of his administration , a move that could have profound implications for anti-corruption efforts around the globe .
Biden , who as vice president spearheaded the Obama administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has repeatedly vowed to make it a focus as president .
Two years ago , Biden and his former advisor Michael Carpenter warned in Politico about the threat posed by foreign money of unknown origins to the integrity of U.S. elections .
He echoed those concerns in a Foreign Affairs essay this spring .
“ I will lead efforts internationally to bring transparency to the global financial system , go after illicit tax havens , seize stolen assets , and make it more difficult for leaders who steal from their people to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he wrote .
And Biden ’ s pick for national security advisor , Jake Sullivan , told Politico that one of his chief goals was to “ rally our allies to combat corruption and kleptocracy , and to hold systems of authoritarian capitalism accountable for greater transparency and participation in a rules-based system.
” A transition official said that “ President-elect Biden made countering corruption at home and around the world a staple of his agenda.
” “ It ’ s going to be absolutely essential for the next administration .
I think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corruption and kleptocracy , ” said Carpenter , now managing director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement .
And the prospects look promising , since cracking down on corruption and improving financial transparency enjoy support from both sides of the aisle—no small matter with Republicans likely to maintain control of the Senate .
Legislation that would create a beneficial ownership register—which would make it much harder to register anonymous shell companies in the United States—has been included in the National Defense Authorization Act , alongside a slate of other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the last remaining advanced economies that continues to allow for the creation of anonymous shell companies , the likes of which have been enabled human trafficking , terrorism , and sanctions evasion .
At present , more stringent identity checks are required to obtain a library card than to open a shell company in every U.S. state .
“ You have the national security community as interested in these issues as the anti-poverty community , ” said Gary Kalman , the Director of Transparency International U.S .
Estimates of the cost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from $ 1 trillion to $ 2.6 trillion annually , much of it coming from the developing world .
If even a fraction of that money were caught and kept in its country of origin each year by anti-corruption efforts , it would far outstrip development assistance spending , which in 2018 hit almost $ 166 billion worldwide .
“ You would literally change the economics of global poverty , ” Kalman said .
There ’ s a national security case , too .
Over the past decade authoritarian regimes , principally Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million—much of it by exploiting legal loopholes—to influence the politics of dozens of countries around the world , according to a report released earlier this year by the German Marshall Fund .
“ It also pushes back on countries like Russia and China that use our very porous and opaque system to first and foremost park their money in the U.S. where it ’ s safer but then even at times to use that for influence inside our country , ” said Michael McFaul , who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emphasis on working alongside allies is likely to find a ready reception , especially in other major banking and economic hubs .
“ The U.K. is absolutely desperate to start working more closely with the U.S. on this , ” said Nate Sibley , a research fellow for the Hudson Institute ’ s Kleptocracy Initiative .
“ That ’ s the two major global financial centers.
” Biden has also outlined his intention to make international commitments to combat corruption a core tenet of the global summit of democracies that he pledged to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ This needs to be injected , mainstreamed if you will , into all of our multilateral engagements , ” Carpenter said .
Biden ’ s expected focus on fighting financial opacity and corruption is a carry-over from his previous stint as vice president , when he was even more aggressive than President Barack Obama , according to Kalman .
“ This is not just a new thing you ’ re hearing from the campaign .
This has been a passion of Biden ’ s for years , ” he said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country charted a rocky but ambitious path of reforms in the wake of the 2014 revolution , and he leaned heavily on the country ’ s then-President Petro Poroshenko to clean up corruption .
Biden went as far as threatening to withhold $ 1 billion in U.S. aid to persuade the Ukrainians to oust the country ’ s notoriously corrupt prosecutor general Viktor Shokin .
( That effort , which had broad support from the U.S. government , the European Union , and the International Monetary Fund , was later used against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign . )
In Central America , Biden spearheaded a $ 750 million aid package intended to address the root causes of refugee and migrant flows , making much of the funds contingent on anti-corruption efforts , and he leaned on the former president of Guatemala to extend the work of a pioneering U.N.-backed anti-corruption commission .
U.S. support for the commission was kneecapped during the Trump administration as President Donald Trump sought Guatemalan support for policies key to his reelection bid .
The Biden team ’ s plan for Central America promises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heart of U.S. policy in Central America .
”

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is expected to make a crackdown on illicit finance both at home in the United States and abroad a centerpiece of his administration, a move that could have profound implications for anti-corruption efforts around the globe.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is expected to make a crackdown on illicit finance both at home in the United States and abroad a centerpiece of his administration, a move that could have profound implications for anti-corruption efforts around the globe.
Biden, who as vice president spearheaded the Obama administration’s fight against corruption and kleptocracy, has repeatedly vowed to make it a focus as president. Two years ago, Biden and his former advisor Michael Carpenter warned in Politico about the threat posed by foreign money of unknown origins to the integrity of U.S. elections. He echoed those concerns in a Foreign Affairs essay this spring.
“I will lead efforts internationally to bring transparency to the global financial system, go after illicit tax havens, seize stolen assets, and make it more difficult for leaders who steal from their people to hide behind anonymous front companies,” he wrote. And Biden’s pick for national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, told Politico that one of his chief goals was to “rally our allies to combat corruption and kleptocracy, and to hold systems of authoritarian capitalism accountable for greater transparency and participation in a rules-based system.”
A transition official said that “President-elect Biden made countering corruption at home and around the world a staple of his agenda.”
“It’s going to be absolutely essential for the next administration. I think they have a broad agenda to tackle corruption and kleptocracy,” said Carpenter, now managing director of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.
And the prospects look promising, since cracking down on corruption and improving financial transparency enjoy support from both sides of the aisle—no small matter with Republicans likely to maintain control of the Senate.
Legislation that would create a beneficial ownership register—which would make it much harder to register anonymous shell companies in the United States—has been included in the National Defense Authorization Act, alongside a slate of other anti-corruption legislation. The United States is one of the last remaining advanced economies that continues to allow for the creation of anonymous shell companies, the likes of which have been enabled human trafficking, terrorism, and sanctions evasion. At present, more stringent identity checks are required to obtain a library card than to open a shell company in every U.S. state.
“You have the national security community as interested in these issues as the anti-poverty community,” said Gary Kalman, the Director of Transparency International U.S.
Estimates of the cost of corruption to the global economy range from $1 trillion to $2.6 trillion annually, much of it coming from the developing world. If even a fraction of that money were caught and kept in its country of origin each year by anti-corruption efforts, it would far outstrip development assistance spending, which in 2018 hit almost $166 billion worldwide.
“You would literally change the economics of global poverty,” Kalman said.
There’s a national security case, too. Over the past decade authoritarian regimes, principally Russia and China, have spent $300 million—much of it by exploiting legal loopholes—to influence the politics of dozens of countries around the world, according to a report released earlier this year by the German Marshall Fund.
“It also pushes back on countries like Russia and China that use our very porous and opaque system to first and foremost park their money in the U.S. where it’s safer but then even at times to use that for influence inside our country,” said Michael McFaul, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration.
Sullivan’s emphasis on working alongside allies is likely to find a ready reception, especially in other major banking and economic hubs. “The U.K. is absolutely desperate to start working more closely with the U.S. on this,” said Nate Sibley, a research fellow for the Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative. “That’s the two major global financial centers.”
Biden has also outlined his intention to make international commitments to combat corruption a core tenet of the global summit of democracies that he pledged to host during his first year in office.
“This needs to be injected, mainstreamed if you will, into all of our multilateral engagements,” Carpenter said.
Biden’s expected focus on fighting financial opacity and corruption is a carry-over from his previous stint as vice president, when he was even more aggressive than President Barack Obama, according to Kalman. “This is not just a new thing you’re hearing from the campaign. This has been a passion of Biden’s for years,” he said.
Biden oversaw U.S. policy toward Ukraine as the country charted a rocky but ambitious path of reforms in the wake of the 2014 revolution, and he leaned heavily on the country’s then-President Petro Poroshenko to clean up corruption. Biden went as far as threatening to withhold $1 billion in U.S. aid to persuade the Ukrainians to oust the country’s notoriously corrupt prosecutor general Viktor Shokin. (That effort, which had broad support from the U.S. government, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund, was later used against Biden by Republicans during the 2020 presidential campaign.)
In Central America, Biden spearheaded a $750 million aid package intended to address the root causes of refugee and migrant flows, making much of the funds contingent on anti-corruption efforts, and he leaned on the former president of Guatemala to extend the work of a pioneering U.N.-backed anti-corruption commission.
U.S. support for the commission was kneecapped during the Trump administration as President Donald Trump sought Guatemalan support for policies key to his reelection bid. The Biden team’s plan for Central America promises to put “combating corruption at the heart of U.S. policy in Central America.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Where Do Things Stand With the COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout?

Where Do Things Stand With the COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout ?
The United Kingdom on Wednesday became the first Western country to approve a coronavirus vaccine , a decision the European Union condemned as “ hasty ” and potentially unsafe .
Though Britain is no longer part of the EU , it is still privy to EU regulations until the end of the month ; under normal circumstances , London would have to wait for Brussels ’ approval before distributing a drug .
But the pandemic has activated rules that allow EU member states to act unilaterally if necessary , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news out of Britain—which plans to start vaccinating nursing home residents and frontline workers with Pfizer ’ s drug as soon as next week—has upped the pressure on countries around the world , each burdened with different regulatory regimes and different distribution plans .
That threatens to make the global vaccine rollout disjointed , and potentially unequal .
Here ’ s where things stand with the major players .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson lauded his country ’ s Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for its fast-track approval of Pfizer ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expressing hope that the drug will “ allow us to reclaim our lives.
” But the reality may not be as rosy as the prime minister ’ s tweets .
For one , the product is far from a silver bullet : Two shots must be administered three weeks apart , meaning that the process of becoming immunized is a lengthy one .
Official government guidance on the vaccine also lists a slew of possible side effects , including fever , joint pain , and nausea .
The document cautions immunocompromised Britons—those most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doctor before receiving any inoculation .
Some members of Parliament have also expressed concern about Westminster ’ s vaccine priority list , which makes no mention of people with disabilities and those providing unpaid care .
Vaccinating immunocompromised individuals under 64 years of age also does not appear a top concern .
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration will meet on Dec. 10 to discuss whether to authorize the emergency approval of the Pfizer vaccine , and a week after that to deliberate on the Moderna one .
While both vaccines rely on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ultra-cold storage , which could be an additional challenge if compared to the Moderna one , which can be stored in normal medical refrigerators .
Ahead of the meetings , U.S. airlines have reportedly started shipping vaccines into the country .
If the FDA issues the green light on both vaccines , the country is planning to immunize at least 20 million at-risk people by the end of the year .
“ You go from people who are either at a highest risk or are important to society , ” Anthony Fauci , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Allergies and Infectious Diseases , said .
“ And then as you go down the list , it gets to people who are less at risk for serious disease and then , ultimately … the 25- , 30-year-old person with no underlying conditions who ’ s otherwise healthy.
” Despite the push to approve the vaccines , 42 percent of Americans indicate that they would not get a vaccine when it becomes available , so the United States still faces challenges to control the virus .
“ In order to get the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abandon public health measures , ” Fauci said this week , adding that a return to something “ approaching normal ” next summer would require at least 75 percent of the population to get the shots .
President-elect Joe Biden has announced that Fauci will retain his job as the nation ’ s top infectious disease expert under the next administration .
For these vaccine skeptics—perhaps swayed by the polarized political environment in the United States—there is potentially reassuring news .
Former Presidents Barack Obama , George W. Bush , and Bill Clinton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promote greater public confidence in a vaccine .
Well before news of Pfizer ’ s effective coronavirus vaccine broke , the European Union agreed to distribute any inoculation fairly among its member states .
And though Pfizer ’ s vaccine was developed at home—by BioNTech , a German biotech company—the EU ’ s strict regulatory regime may mean its rollout could lag behind that of the United States and Britain .
Tempering initial optimism , German Health Minister Jens Spahn announced on Dec. 1 : “ We have to assume that approval will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year.
” EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged Europeans to stay “ vigilant ” in the interim , during which renewed lockdowns are being implemented across the bloc to stem second and third waves of infections .
While Pfizer ’ s vaccine would almost certainly be the first available to the European public—Germany alone has pumped $ 450 million into BioNTech ’ s development efforts—the European Medicines Agency has indicated it could issue a decision on Moderna ’ s shot as soon as Jan. 12 .
The EU has also invested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany has come under fire from some activists for its decision to classify Israel as a European country in the EU ’ s vaccine distribution plans .
Israelis would receive inoculations from the EU ’ s planned stockpile from AstraZeneca whenever they become approved and available in the EU .
But it doesn ’ t appear that the EU-German plan would include vaccinations for Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip , threatening to worsen disparities between Israelis and Palestinians , whose access to medical provisions and care has already been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pre-ordered vaccines from a variety of Western drugmakers , but limited supplies pose a problem when the developed world has bought up most of the first production run .
Egypt—the most populous Arab state—and Lebanon—which has been roiled by a year of economic and political tumult—have only ordered enough shots to vaccinate 27 and 15 percent of their respective populations .
Other countries in the region are looking east , not west , for reprieve .
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have partnered with Sinopharm CNBG , which developed China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became the first country outside of China to approve the drug .
In October , the Gulf state announced it was also conducting phase three trials of the Russian vaccine Sputnik V. Iran is reportedly developing its own coronavirus vaccine , with eight candidates set to begin phase one trials before the end of the Persian calendar .
It is expected to reach the Iranian public by summer .
China , ground zero for the coronavirus , sees vaccine development as an opportunity to repair the international standing it has lost over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has five vaccine candidates operating phase three clinical trials , three of which have been approved for emergency usage .
Officials at one of the pharmaceutical companies involved in the effort , Sinopharm CNBG , claim that there has not been a single case of infection amongst those inoculated during clinical trials in June .
Though data backing up this proclaimed efficacy is not fully transparent , international observers are intrigued by the fact that COVID-19 itself has been virtually eradicated in China itself .
As a result , drugmakers have had to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at present , Chinese vaccines are being tested in at least 16 countries .
China hopes to distribute its vaccine in the developing world in particular .
Beijing ’ s approach—dubbed the “ Health Silk Road ” —contrasts sharply with Washington ’ s “ America first ” mantra .
Countries on China ’ s priority list include Cambodia , Myanmar , Laos , Thailand , Vietnam , Malaysia , and Afghanistan .
There are rumors that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has already received a Chinese coronavirus vaccine .
Still , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much of a rush to inoculate their populations as their Western counterparts .
This is largely because East Asian countries have been far more successful at stemming the virus domestically .
The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency is putting its faith in the WHO ’ s COVAX initiative—preferring to first observe how the various coronavirus vaccines fare elsewhere—and says it does not expect to start vaccinations until the second quarter of 2021 .
Unlike China , Russia ’ s domestic vaccine efforts have not been complemented by a stark reduction in domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ V drug was registered by the Russian Health Ministry in August and , after being bested by the U.K. ’ s announcement yesterday , Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a swift order calling for mass vaccinations of Sputnik V to begin immediately in his own country—which is wrestling with the world ’ s fourth-largest coronavirus caseload .
The release had initially been scheduled for 2021 .
The reported efficacy of Sputnik V is dubious .
The Russian government has reported varying levels of efficacy following announcements by rival Western drugmakers—the adjusted Russian percentages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November , the Russian Duma became the locus of a coronavirus superspreader event , despite that fact that most high-level government officials had already gotten shots of Sputnik V. Now , Putin promises his country will have two million doses of Sputnik V available to begin vaccinations by the end of the week .
Inoculation will be free and voluntary , and public opinion polling indicates that only 22 percent of Russians are comfortable getting a Russian-made coronavirus vaccine .
India makes 60 percent of the world ’ s vaccines , but inoculation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tall order for this country of over 1.3 billion people .
Of 30 potential vaccine candidates developed in India , five are currently undergoing clinical trials , and officials hope to vaccinate about a fifth of the population—250 million people—by July 2021 .
It could be a while until India gets access to a vaccine , though .
Neither Pfizer nor Moderna have begun the process of conducting clinical trials domestically—a prerequisite to approval by Indian regulators .
AstraZeneca may be the country ’ s best hope : Not only has it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also less expensive and more suitable to the South Asian climate than its counterparts , which must be stored and transported at extremely low temperatures .
The region that since June has been the epicenter of the coronavirus pandemic might have to wait longer to immunize its population .
With nearly 175,000 COVID-19 deaths , Brazil is working against the clock to have access to a vaccine .
Brazil , which had once developed a world-renowned national immunization program , has been criticized for its response to the pandemic , mostly due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the seriousness of the virus .
This week , however , the Brazilian Health Ministry indicated that it will start its vaccination campaign in the first quarter of 2021 , and it plans to immunize around 110 million at-risk people then .
Health care workers , those older than 75 , and Indigenous people will be among the first ones to receive the vaccine .
“ Starting today , Brazil starts thinking in a more concrete way about the COVID-19 vaccination , ” the country ’ s secretary for health vigilance said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ start its mass vaccination campaign in December , and that it hopes to immunize around 90 percent of its population next year .
Meanwhile , countries like Colombia and Argentina are likely to wait until the first half of next year to have access to the vaccines , but are hoping to immunize between 30 and 40 percent of their populations by then .
The region ’ s economic plight also has governments worried about the costs of immunization , so many are hoping to produce the vaccines themselves .
In August , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AstraZeneca to produce up to 250 million doses to be sold in Latin America for less than $ 5 each .
A week before that , the British company had already closed a deal with the Brazilian government to locally produce at least 100 million doses of the vaccine .
After being one of the last regions to be hit by the coronavirus , Africa may also become the last one to begin a mass immunization campaign .
The ultra-cold temperatures required for the storage of some of the promising vaccines are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And similarly to Latin America , the high costs associated with the implementation of immunization campaigns pose a challenge for governments across the continent .
“ It will not be , in my view , up until the middle of next year before we start truly getting vaccinations into Africa , ” John Nkengasong , the director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention , said .
Through COVAX , a global initiative to provide governments with equitable access to the COVID-19 vaccine , the World Health Organization estimates that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s population will have access to it starting this year , a number that is likely to scale up to 20 percent by the end of the first quarter of 2021 .

The United Kingdom on Wednesday became the first Western country to approve a coronavirus vaccine, a decision the European Union condemned as “hasty” and potentially unsafe. Though Britain is no longer part of the EU, it is still privy to EU regulations until the end of the month; under normal circumstances, London would have to wait for Brussels’ approval before distributing a drug. But the pandemic has activated rules that allow EU member states to act unilaterally if necessary, a distinction lost on hardcore Brexiteers.
The United Kingdom on Wednesday became the first Western country to approve a coronavirus vaccine, a decision the European Union condemned as “hasty” and potentially unsafe. Though Britain is no longer part of the EU, it is still privy to EU regulations until the end of the month; under normal circumstances, London would have to wait for Brussels’ approval before distributing a drug. But the pandemic has activated rules that allow EU member states to act unilaterally if necessary, a distinction lost on hardcore Brexiteers.
The news out of Britain—which plans to start vaccinating nursing home residents and frontline workers with Pfizer’s drug as soon as next week—has upped the pressure on countries around the world, each burdened with different regulatory regimes and different distribution plans. That threatens to make the global vaccine rollout disjointed, and potentially unequal.
Here’s where things stand with the major players.
United Kingdom
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson lauded his country’s Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for its fast-track approval of Pfizer’s coronavirus vaccine as “fantastic,” expressing hope that the drug will “allow us to reclaim our lives.”
But the reality may not be as rosy as the prime minister’s tweets. For one, the product is far from a silver bullet: Two shots must be administered three weeks apart, meaning that the process of becoming immunized is a lengthy one. Official government guidance on the vaccine also lists a slew of possible side effects, including fever, joint pain, and nausea. The document cautions immunocompromised Britons—those most vulnerable to the coronavirus—to consult with a doctor before receiving any inoculation.
Some members of Parliament have also expressed concern about Westminster’s vaccine priority list, which makes no mention of people with disabilities and those providing unpaid care. Vaccinating immunocompromised individuals under 64 years of age also does not appear a top concern.
United States
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration will meet on Dec. 10 to discuss whether to authorize the emergency approval of the Pfizer vaccine, and a week after that to deliberate on the Moderna one. While both vaccines rely on RNA technology, the Pfizer vaccine requires ultra-cold storage, which could be an additional challenge if compared to the Moderna one, which can be stored in normal medical refrigerators.
Ahead of the meetings, U.S. airlines have reportedly started shipping vaccines into the country. If the FDA issues the green light on both vaccines, the country is planning to immunize at least 20 million at-risk people by the end of the year.
“You go from people who are either at a highest risk or are important to society,” Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, said. “And then as you go down the list, it gets to people who are less at risk for serious disease and then, ultimately … the 25-, 30-year-old person with no underlying conditions who’s otherwise healthy.”
Despite the push to approve the vaccines, 42 percent of Americans indicate that they would not get a vaccine when it becomes available, so the United States still faces challenges to control the virus. “In order to get the country approaching normal, you never want to abandon public health measures,” Fauci said this week, adding that a return to something “approaching normal” next summer would require at least 75 percent of the population to get the shots. President-elect Joe Biden has announced that Fauci will retain his job as the nation’s top infectious disease expert under the next administration.
For these vaccine skeptics—perhaps swayed by the polarized political environment in the United States—there is potentially reassuring news. Former Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton have volunteered to be inoculated on-camera to promote greater public confidence in a vaccine.
European Union
Well before news of Pfizer’s effective coronavirus vaccine broke, the European Union agreed to distribute any inoculation fairly among its member states. And though Pfizer’s vaccine was developed at home—by BioNTech, a German biotech company—the EU’s strict regulatory regime may mean its rollout could lag behind that of the United States and Britain.
Tempering initial optimism, German Health Minister Jens Spahn announced on Dec. 1: “We have to assume that approval will only happen around the turn of the year.” EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urged Europeans to stay “vigilant” in the interim, during which renewed lockdowns are being implemented across the bloc to stem second and third waves of infections.
While Pfizer’s vaccine would almost certainly be the first available to the European public—Germany alone has pumped $450 million into BioNTech’s development efforts—the European Medicines Agency has indicated it could issue a decision on Moderna’s shot as soon as Jan. 12. The EU has also invested heavily in AstraZeneca’s drug.
Middle East
Germany has come under fire from some activists for its decision to classify Israel as a European country in the EU’s vaccine distribution plans. Israelis would receive inoculations from the EU’s planned stockpile from AstraZeneca whenever they become approved and available in the EU. But it doesn’t appear that the EU-German plan would include vaccinations for Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, threatening to worsen disparities between Israelis and Palestinians, whose access to medical provisions and care has already been severely restricted.
Many Arab states have pre-ordered vaccines from a variety of Western drugmakers, but limited supplies pose a problem when the developed world has bought up most of the first production run. Egypt—the most populous Arab state—and Lebanon—which has been roiled by a year of economic and political tumult—have only ordered enough shots to vaccinate 27 and 15 percent of their respective populations.
Other countries in the region are looking east, not west, for reprieve. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have partnered with Sinopharm CNBG, which developed China’s experimental vaccine. The UAE in September became the first country outside of China to approve the drug. In October, the Gulf state announced it was also conducting phase three trials of the Russian vaccine Sputnik V.
Iran is reportedly developing its own coronavirus vaccine, with eight candidates set to begin phase one trials before the end of the Persian calendar. It is expected to reach the Iranian public by summer.
East Asia
China, ground zero for the coronavirus, sees vaccine development as an opportunity to repair the international standing it has lost over the course of the pandemic. The country has five vaccine candidates operating phase three clinical trials, three of which have been approved for emergency usage. Officials at one of the pharmaceutical companies involved in the effort, Sinopharm CNBG, claim that there has not been a single case of infection amongst those inoculated during clinical trials in June.
Though data backing up this proclaimed efficacy is not fully transparent, international observers are intrigued by the fact that COVID-19 itself has been virtually eradicated in China itself. As a result, drugmakers have had to go elsewhere to conduct clinical trials; at present, Chinese vaccines are being tested in at least 16 countries.
China hopes to distribute its vaccine in the developing world in particular. Beijing’s approach—dubbed the “Health Silk Road”—contrasts sharply with Washington’s “America first” mantra. Countries on China’s priority list include Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Afghanistan. There are rumors that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has already received a Chinese coronavirus vaccine.
Still, many East Asian countries are not in as much of a rush to inoculate their populations as their Western counterparts. This is largely because East Asian countries have been far more successful at stemming the virus domestically. The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency is putting its faith in the WHO’s COVAX initiative—preferring to first observe how the various coronavirus vaccines fare elsewhere—and says it does not expect to start vaccinations until the second quarter of 2021.
Russia
Unlike China, Russia’s domestic vaccine efforts have not been complemented by a stark reduction in domestic cases. Russia’s Kremlin-sponsored Sputnik V drug was registered by the Russian Health Ministry in August and, after being bested by the U.K.’s announcement yesterday, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a swift order calling for mass vaccinations of Sputnik V to begin immediately in his own country—which is wrestling with the world’s fourth-largest coronavirus caseload. The release had initially been scheduled for 2021.
The reported efficacy of Sputnik V is dubious. The Russian government has reported varying levels of efficacy following announcements by rival Western drugmakers—the adjusted Russian percentages are always a tad higher. In November, the Russian Duma became the locus of a coronavirus superspreader event, despite that fact that most high-level government officials had already gotten shots of Sputnik V.
Now, Putin promises his country will have two million doses of Sputnik V available to begin vaccinations by the end of the week. Inoculation will be free and voluntary, and public opinion polling indicates that only 22 percent of Russians are comfortable getting a Russian-made coronavirus vaccine.
India
India makes 60 percent of the world’s vaccines, but inoculation against the coronavirus still promises to be a tall order for this country of over 1.3 billion people. Of 30 potential vaccine candidates developed in India, five are currently undergoing clinical trials, and officials hope to vaccinate about a fifth of the population—250 million people—by July 2021.
It could be a while until India gets access to a vaccine, though. Neither Pfizer nor Moderna have begun the process of conducting clinical trials domestically—a prerequisite to approval by Indian regulators. AstraZeneca may be the country’s best hope: Not only has it undergone trials in India, it is also less expensive and more suitable to the South Asian climate than its counterparts, which must be stored and transported at extremely low temperatures.
Latin America
The region that since June has been the epicenter of the coronavirus pandemic might have to wait longer to immunize its population. With nearly 175,000 COVID-19 deaths, Brazil is working against the clock to have access to a vaccine. Brazil, which had once developed a world-renowned national immunization program, has been criticized for its response to the pandemic, mostly due to President Jair Bolsonaro’s denial of the seriousness of the virus.
This week, however, the Brazilian Health Ministry indicated that it will start its vaccination campaign in the first quarter of 2021, and it plans to immunize around 110 million at-risk people then. Health care workers, those older than 75, and Indigenous people will be among the first ones to receive the vaccine.
“Starting today, Brazil starts thinking in a more concrete way about the COVID-19 vaccination,” the country’s secretary for health vigilance said.
Mexico has indicated that it plans to start its mass vaccination campaign in December, and that it hopes to immunize around 90 percent of its population next year. Meanwhile, countries like Colombia and Argentina are likely to wait until the first half of next year to have access to the vaccines, but are hoping to immunize between 30 and 40 percent of their populations by then.
The region’s economic plight also has governments worried about the costs of immunization, so many are hoping to produce the vaccines themselves. In August, Mexico and Argentina announced a partnership with AstraZeneca to produce up to 250 million doses to be sold in Latin America for less than $5 each. A week before that, the British company had already closed a deal with the Brazilian government to locally produce at least 100 million doses of the vaccine.
Africa
After being one of the last regions to be hit by the coronavirus, Africa may also become the last one to begin a mass immunization campaign. The ultra-cold temperatures required for the storage of some of the promising vaccines are still a huge challenge across much of Africa. And similarly to Latin America, the high costs associated with the implementation of immunization campaigns pose a challenge for governments across the continent.
“It will not be, in my view, up until the middle of next year before we start truly getting vaccinations into Africa,” John Nkengasong, the director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, said.
Through COVAX, a global initiative to provide governments with equitable access to the COVID-19 vaccine, the World Health Organization estimates that at least 3 percent of Africa’s population will have access to it starting this year, a number that is likely to scale up to 20 percent by the end of the first quarter of 2021.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Jerry Rawlings Is Dead, but He Still Looms Large in Ghanaian Politics

Jerry Rawlings Is Dead , but He Still Looms Large in Ghanaian Politics Ask any Ghanaian to guess which political party I am likely to support and they will , without mincing words , tell you the National Democratic Congress ( NDC ) .
That assumption stems from the fact that my family comes from the Volta region of Ghana .
The founder of the NDC was Jerry John Rawlings , who ruled Ghana as a military dictator and as a democratically elected president from 1981 to 1992 and from 1993 to 2001 , respectively , and who died last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rawlings ’ s father was Scottish and his mother was from the Volta region , which is why the party he founded still gets more than 80 percent of the votes there .
Politics in Ghana is still very ethnically divided ; the voters in the Ashanti region overwhelmingly vote for presidential candidates of the New Patriotic Party ( NPP ) , which is why people reflexively assume my political allegiance is a function of my ethnicity .
( It ’ s not ; I believe that politics should transcend ethnicity and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them on the basis of policy . )
Rawlings did not cause the ethnic division in Ghanaian politics , but it played to his political advantage when he grudgingly re-introduced multiparty democracy in 1992 .
Rawlings had first appeared on the political scene in 1979 following a successful military coup , and as chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council , embarked on his infamous “ house-cleaning.
” His mishandling of economic affairs , however , led politicians to persuade him to hand over the government to a civilian administration and he acquiesced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1979 and 1981 , he fraternized with leftist academics at the University of Ghana and got acquainted with dependency theory—which blamed the world economy ’ s wealthy “ core ” for the exploitation and underdevelopment of the poorer “ periphery ” —an approach that chimed with his core beliefs .
The economy had deteriorated even further , under Hilla Limann ’ s civilian government , by the time of Rawlings ’ s “ second coming ” in the coup of Dec. 31 , 1981 .
Under his watch in 1983 , the economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was the worst of times : Food and fuel were scarce , and people had to queue for hours just to buy uncooked kenkey ( fermented corn dough ) .
Because of economic hardship and widespread hunger , people developed what was popularly called “ Rawlings chain ” —characterized by “ deep gorges ” and emaciated skin around the neck , exposing protruding collarbones .
Faced with such deprivation , Rawlings made a U-turn ; the dependency-theory devotee entered into an agreement with Western multilateral donors .
The International Monetary Fund and World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ food and fuel again , but Ghana sacrificed a lot to the banks ’ neoliberal policies .
The productive arms of government , state-owned enterprises , were privatized and people had to pay for various social services ; the former angered leftist academics , but the latter , interestingly , did not diminish popular support for the charismatic Rawlings , who went on to win two national elections .
After the 1992 and 1996 elections , the Rawlings effect on Ghana ’ s ethnically aligned voting pattern had become entrenched and is likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades to come .
( Since Rawlings left the presidency , the NDC has never presented a presidential candidate from Volta , but the party has nevertheless won more than 80 percent of the votes in the region in every election since 2000 . )
People in Volta , who are largely ethnically Ewe , are generally bombarded with pro-NDC messaging , just as my Akan friends , from the Ashanti region , were largely fed arguments in favor of the NPP .
Consequently , the political parties , relying on ethnic allegiances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consciousness of young people and instead exploit these ethnic alignments in their quest to win elections .
The two major parties in Ghana seem to be committing the mistake Frantz Fanon warned of in The Wretched of the Earth : organizing along ethnic lines .
But gods sometimes have feet of clay .
Nkrumah ’ s weakness was his preference for a one-party state , and Rawlings ’ s was the fallout of the 1979 coup : the public flogging of market women , execution of innocent judges , and confiscation of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , honest men surrounded by greedy cabinet appointees .
These days , it ’ s not unusual to hear young Ghanaians refer in everyday conversations to Nkrumah and Rawlings .
These two former presidents occupy a big space in our national political imagination .
However , whenever their personalities are invoked or their legacies are referenced it is for different reasons : In the drama that is Ghanaian politics , Nkrumah plays the role of the visionary leader , and Rawlings is the no-nonsense leader .
If the trigger for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the ruling class , evidenced by a government policy which appears to mirror the myopic agenda of the political party in power or a conspicuous absence of leadership , then the ghost of Nkrumah is summoned with phrases like “ Ghana will not develop until we get another Kwame Nkrumah , ” or “ Look at what Nkrumah was able to build in a short period compared to today ’ s greedy politicians.
” If the conversation is about the absence of order in the country or an impudent display of indiscipline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is more likely to hear : “ Ah , what we need in this country is someone like Rawlings , ” or “ This nonsense wouldn ’ t take place under Rawlings.
” According to stories Ghanaians have been told , Rawlings was the stern disciplinarian who instilled order in Ghanaian society and swiftly punished miscreants ; after all , he was a military dictator for a decade .
As Ghana approaches its next election on Dec. 7 , there is a general disinterestedness in the exercise of voting among my friends—middle-class , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of disappointment with the perennial underperformance of the two major parties and a general preference for authoritarian-style leadership , in the Rawlings mode .
They believe that , generally , the masses are incalcitrant and very difficult to reason with , and that a leader must force the bitter medicine of development reform down their throats because they can not be persuaded into accepting what is good for them .
They also strongly hold the view that there are selfish people in most government bureaucracies who will oppose development reforms for very parochial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ R.A. Ayee , a professor of political science at the University of Ghana , has summarized the situation in Ghana ’ s government bureaucracies by categorizing their members as saints ( committed politicians and bureaucrats ) , demons ( hostile and apathetic groups ) , and wizards ( policy analysts ) .
“ Public policies and programmes have failed to achieve their objectives , ” Ayee argues , “ largely because the saints are few , the demons are many , the wizards are inappropriate , the systems are complex and the organizations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a no-nonsense leader such as Rawlings , those advocating a tough-love approach argue , demons would be swiftly rooted out .
Indeed , for a developing country like Ghana , it is not unusual to expect the initial stages of development to involve stepping on the toes of some interest groups whose incentives are threatened by reforms .
However , what if the reforms being pushed would have a negative impact and the elements resisting them are not saboteurs but well-meaning citizens , one could easily retort , citing the example of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Rawlings ’ s NDC championed from the late 1980s into the 1990s , and whose damaging effects are still palpable today .
Despite his many flaws , it was Rawlings ’ s passionate desire to change the ideals of the ruling class and the population at large .
When it came to corruption he was without blemish , and this , more than anything else , is why so many Ghanaians of my generation—even those who decry dictatorship—admire him .
In a video that was shared on many social media platforms by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he challenged an audience in his characteristic authoritative baritone : “ I would dare you to go and line up some of your finest policemen … some of your finest … judges , make any allegations against me.… I will be the one who will pass , ” he declared .
“ If we can learn to be bold enough to restore the value of truth in our society then we will have justice.
” Not many present and former politicians can publicly pose this dare , and this is why Rawlings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to have many young admirers .

Ask any Ghanaian to guess which political party I am likely to support and they will, without mincing words, tell you the National Democratic Congress (NDC). That assumption stems from the fact that my family comes from the Volta region of Ghana.
Ask any Ghanaian to guess which political party I am likely to support and they will, without mincing words, tell you the National Democratic Congress (NDC). That assumption stems from the fact that my family comes from the Volta region of Ghana.
The founder of the NDC was Jerry John Rawlings, who ruled Ghana as a military dictator and as a democratically elected president from 1981 to 1992 and from 1993 to 2001, respectively, and who died last month in a state hospital in Accra. Rawlings’s father was Scottish and his mother was from the Volta region, which is why the party he founded still gets more than 80 percent of the votes there.
Politics in Ghana is still very ethnically divided; the voters in the Ashanti region overwhelmingly vote for presidential candidates of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which is why people reflexively assume my political allegiance is a function of my ethnicity. (It’s not; I believe that politics should transcend ethnicity and that politicians must convince voters to back them on the basis of policy.)
Rawlings did not cause the ethnic division in Ghanaian politics, but it played to his political advantage when he grudgingly re-introduced multiparty democracy in 1992.
Rawlings had first appeared on the political scene in 1979 following a successful military coup, and as chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, embarked on his infamous “house-cleaning.” His mishandling of economic affairs, however, led politicians to persuade him to hand over the government to a civilian administration and he acquiesced. Later banned from the barracks between 1979 and 1981, he fraternized with leftist academics at the University of Ghana and got acquainted with dependency theory—which blamed the world economy’s wealthy “core” for the exploitation and underdevelopment of the poorer “periphery”—an approach that chimed with his core beliefs.
The economy had deteriorated even further, under Hilla Limann’s civilian government, by the time of Rawlings’s “second coming” in the coup of Dec. 31, 1981. Under his watch in 1983, the economy of Ghana was in shambles, it was the worst of times: Food and fuel were scarce, and people had to queue for hours just to buy uncooked kenkey (fermented corn dough). Because of economic hardship and widespread hunger, people developed what was popularly called “Rawlings chain”—characterized by “deep gorges” and emaciated skin around the neck, exposing protruding collarbones.
Faced with such deprivation, Rawlings made a U-turn; the dependency-theory devotee entered into an agreement with Western multilateral donors. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank saved the economy and there was food and fuel again, but Ghana sacrificed a lot to the banks’ neoliberal policies. The productive arms of government, state-owned enterprises, were privatized and people had to pay for various social services; the former angered leftist academics, but the latter, interestingly, did not diminish popular support for the charismatic Rawlings, who went on to win two national elections.
After the 1992 and 1996 elections, the Rawlings effect on Ghana’s ethnically aligned voting pattern had become entrenched and is likely to remain the case for many more decades to come. (Since Rawlings left the presidency, the NDC has never presented a presidential candidate from Volta, but the party has nevertheless won more than 80 percent of the votes in the region in every election since 2000.) People in Volta, who are largely ethnically Ewe, are generally bombarded with pro-NDC messaging, just as my Akan friends, from the Ashanti region, were largely fed arguments in favor of the NPP.
Consequently, the political parties, relying on ethnic allegiances, do little to raise the political consciousness of young people and instead exploit these ethnic alignments in their quest to win elections. The two major parties in Ghana seem to be committing the mistake Frantz Fanon warned of in The Wretched of the Earth: organizing along ethnic lines.
The spirit of Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, still broods over the nation. The man hailed as Osagyefo (Redeemer) is still remembered for his visionary leadership that placed Ghana on the path to modernity and continues to inspire generations of Ghanaian leaders after him. Former military leader Ignatius Acheampong, former President Limann, and Rawlings all sought to win popular appeal by cashing in on Nkrumah’s legacy.
But gods sometimes have feet of clay. Nkrumah’s weakness was his preference for a one-party state, and Rawlings’s was the fallout of the 1979 coup: the public flogging of market women, execution of innocent judges, and confiscation of the private property of civilians. Both were, however, honest men surrounded by greedy cabinet appointees.
These days, it’s not unusual to hear young Ghanaians refer in everyday conversations to Nkrumah and Rawlings. These two former presidents occupy a big space in our national political imagination. However, whenever their personalities are invoked or their legacies are referenced it is for different reasons: In the drama that is Ghanaian politics, Nkrumah plays the role of the visionary leader, and Rawlings is the no-nonsense leader.
If the trigger for the conversation relates to the lack of vision from the ruling class, evidenced by a government policy which appears to mirror the myopic agenda of the political party in power or a conspicuous absence of leadership, then the ghost of Nkrumah is summoned with phrases like “Ghana will not develop until we get another Kwame Nkrumah,” or “Look at what Nkrumah was able to build in a short period compared to today’s greedy politicians.”
If the conversation is about the absence of order in the country or an impudent display of indiscipline from citizens or politicians, then one is more likely to hear: “Ah, what we need in this country is someone like Rawlings,” or “This nonsense wouldn’t take place under Rawlings.” According to stories Ghanaians have been told, Rawlings was the stern disciplinarian who instilled order in Ghanaian society and swiftly punished miscreants; after all, he was a military dictator for a decade.
As Ghana approaches its next election on Dec. 7, there is a general disinterestedness in the exercise of voting among my friends—middle-class, college-educated 30-somethings. This apathy is born of disappointment with the perennial underperformance of the two major parties and a general preference for authoritarian-style leadership, in the Rawlings mode. They believe that, generally, the masses are incalcitrant and very difficult to reason with, and that a leader must force the bitter medicine of development reform down their throats because they cannot be persuaded into accepting what is good for them. They also strongly hold the view that there are selfish people in most government bureaucracies who will oppose development reforms for very parochial reasons or simply block them.
Joseph R.A. Ayee, a professor of political science at the University of Ghana, has summarized the situation in Ghana’s government bureaucracies by categorizing their members as saints (committed politicians and bureaucrats), demons (hostile and apathetic groups), and wizards (policy analysts). “Public policies and programmes have failed to achieve their objectives,” Ayee argues, “largely because the saints are few, the demons are many, the wizards are inappropriate, the systems are complex and the organizations are weak.”
Under the watch of a no-nonsense leader such as Rawlings, those advocating a tough-love approach argue, demons would be swiftly rooted out. Indeed, for a developing country like Ghana, it is not unusual to expect the initial stages of development to involve stepping on the toes of some interest groups whose incentives are threatened by reforms. However, what if the reforms being pushed would have a negative impact and the elements resisting them are not saboteurs but well-meaning citizens, one could easily retort, citing the example of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs which Rawlings’s NDC championed from the late 1980s into the 1990s, and whose damaging effects are still palpable today.
What Ghana needs is a developmental democracy; military dictatorships, even of the Rawlings type, did not get the country anywhere. Ayee’s demons, incalcitrant agents, and saboteurs may exist, but a political system that stokes a sense of a shared vision and common purpose and articulates properly the sacrifices and commitments that everyone—including leaders—must make stands a better chance of leading the country to prosperity. When it came to corruption Rawlings was without blemish, and this, more than anything else, is why so many Ghanaians admire him. As Fanon wrote, “the party, instead of welcoming the expression of popular discontentment, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the people up to the government, forms a screen, and forbids such ideas.”
Despite his many flaws, it was Rawlings’s passionate desire to change the ideals of the ruling class and the population at large. When it came to corruption he was without blemish, and this, more than anything else, is why so many Ghanaians of my generation—even those who decry dictatorship—admire him.
In a video that was shared on many social media platforms by young fans of the late former president, he challenged an audience in his characteristic authoritative baritone: “I would dare you to go and line up some of your finest policemen … some of your finest … judges, make any allegations against me.… I will be the one who will pass,” he declared. “If we can learn to be bold enough to restore the value of truth in our society then we will have justice.”
Not many present and former politicians can publicly pose this dare, and this is why Rawlings, even after his passing, will continue to have many young admirers.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Venezuelans Prepare to Vote as Maduro Looks to Consolidate Power

Venezuelans Prepare to Vote as Maduro Looks to Consolidate Power Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Venezuela prepares for National Assembly elections on Sunday , the United States sanctions two major Chinese firms , OPEC+ countries agree to a slight oil production increase .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Venezuelans go to the polls on Sunday in a National Assembly election that is likely to extinguish the country ’ s opposition following months of electoral maneuvers by the government .
In 2015 , the last time such elections were held , opposition parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ win paved the way for the ill-fated Assembly President Juan Guaidó to attempt to take power by declaring himself the rightful leader of the country .
More than 50 countries followed in recognizing Guaidó ’ s claim in 2019 .
Five years later , due to a decision to boycott the vote , neither Guaidó nor traditional opposition politicians are on the ballot this time around .
Over the summer , Venezuela ’ s Supreme Court handed over the leadership of the country ’ s main opposition parties to government loyalists , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ballot on Sunday .
A new assembly dilutes Guaidó ’ s claim to control in Venezuela as he ’ ll no longer be the most recent president of the assembly .
Turnout in the sanctions-ravaged country is expected to be low despite government attempts to entice voters to the polls , including a promise of “ special prizes ” to the communities with the highest rates of turnout .
A new U.S. approach ?
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has expressed his desire to open “ decent , sincere , direct channels of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and hopes to overcome the “ minefield between the government of the United States and Venezuela ” left by Donald Trump .
President-elect Joe Biden has not signaled any drastic changes in U.S. sanctions policy toward the country , although he does plan to open the door to Venezuelans and to address the country ’ s humanitarian crisis .
On a campaign stop in Florida in October , Biden promised to grant temporary protected status in the United States to Venezuelans fleeing their homeland .
Guaidó gone ?
Reuters reports that the shadow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scaled back , although members of the group still maintain their legitimacy citing the authenticity of the 2015 election versus the one on Sunday , where United Nations observers will not be present .
Guaidó will hope to get off to a better start with Biden than he did with President Trump , who took to calling the would-be leader the Beto O ’ Rourke of Venezuela , after the failed Senate and Democratic presidential candidate .
Guaidó said he has not yet made contact with Biden and his staff , but has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China blacklist grows .
The Trump administration has added two major Chinese companies , computing chip maker Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. ( SMIC ) and China National Offshore Oil Corp. ( CNOOC ) , to its growing security blacklist , which now includes 35 Chinese firms .
By being named on the list , they are deemed by the U.S. Department of Defense to be aiding the Chinese military and are henceforth banned from accessing U.S. technology and investment .
The Pentagon began compiling the list in June , and more companies are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ office on Jan. 20 .
Egyptians released .
Egyptian authorities have released three employees of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights , one of the few independent human rights organizations still operating in the country .
The trio ’ s arrests garnered worldwide attention in November , with Antony Blinken , the nominee for U.S. secretary of state , sharing his concern on Twitter .
The move comes as two Washington-based groups , the Center for International Policy and the Project on Middle East Democracy , called on Biden to impose strict human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in annual U.S. security assistance to Egypt .
Oil ticks up .
OPEC+ countries have agreed to increase oil production slightly in January , in a sign of guarded optimism about a global economic recovery .
The size of the increase—just 500,000 barrels per day collectively—is far smaller than the last production increase of 2 million barrels per day in August .
“ We need to be in a cautious mode , “ Saudi energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said following the meeting , adding that a lot will depend on whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not in the business of gambling , ” he added .
Milley ’ s musings .
As the House and Senate send a bill authorizing the defense budget to President Trump ’ s desk , the top U.S. military officer has ideas for how to reduce it .
Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the joints chiefs of staff , suggested on Thursday that putting U.S. troops permanently in allied countries needed a “ relook ” as the U.S. Defense Department faces the prospect of a shrinking budget in the face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States Naval Institute , Milley specifically mentioned the U.S. troop presence in Bahrain and South Korea as needing review , citing the cost and bigger U.S. footprint caused by military families stationed there .
Overall , Milley said the U.S. military had “ too much infrastructure overseas and too much permanent infrastructure , ” but was pessimistic about moves being taken to address the issue at the political level .
“ Frankly , there ’ s not a lot of enthusiasm to do what I just said , but I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the total cost of U.S. overseas bases and deployments was $ 24.4 billion in 2020 .
Cameroon votes .
Cameroon will hold regional elections on Sunday in an attempt to quell separatist sentiment in the country ’ s English-speaking regions .
The vote is a long-delayed implementation of a 1996 law aimed at decentralizing the government , ruled by President Paul Biya for the past 40 years .
As R. Maxwell Bone argued in Foreign Policy recently , the move is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little , too late .
Cho Ayaba , a separatist leader , has called for anyone “ collaborating with Cameroon ” in organizing the elections to be arrested .
Moldova ’ s power struggle .
Moldova ’ s parliament has voted to strip its pro-European President-elect Maia Sandu of power over the country ’ s intelligence services , just months after handing over the same powers to her predecessor Igor Dodon .
Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Chisinau to protest the move .
Sandu accused her opponents of trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throw “ the voice of the people into a landfill ” following her recent election victory .
As Nicolae Reutoi argued last month in FP , the surprising victory of a pro-European candidate is an indication of the Kremlin ’ s waning influence over Russia ’ s near-abroad .
A man named Adolf Hitler Uunona has won a landslide victory in a local election in Namibia , taking a council seat in the Ompundja constituency in the north of the country .
It ’ s unlikely voters in the former German colony were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as his middle initial was abbreviated to “ H. ” on official candidate lists .
Speaking to German press , Uunona said that although his father had chosen the name , he “ probably didn ’ t understand what Adolf Hitler stood for.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Venezuela prepares for National Assembly elections on Sunday, the United States sanctions two major Chinese firms, OPEC+ countries agree to a slight oil production increase.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Venezuela prepares for National Assembly elections on Sunday, the United States sanctions two major Chinese firms, OPEC+ countries agree to a slight oil production increase.
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Venezuela Votes as Opposition Boycotts Election
Venezuelans go to the polls on Sunday in a National Assembly election that is likely to extinguish the country’s opposition following months of electoral maneuvers by the government.
In 2015, the last time such elections were held, opposition parties won in a landslide victory. The win paved the way for the ill-fated Assembly President Juan Guaidó to attempt to take power by declaring himself the rightful leader of the country. More than 50 countries followed in recognizing Guaidó’s claim in 2019.
Five years later, due to a decision to boycott the vote, neither Guaidó nor traditional opposition politicians are on the ballot this time around. Over the summer, Venezuela’s Supreme Court handed over the leadership of the country’s main opposition parties to government loyalists, and those party names will still appear on the ballot on Sunday. A new assembly dilutes Guaidó’s claim to control in Venezuela as he’ll no longer be the most recent president of the assembly.
Turnout in the sanctions-ravaged country is expected to be low despite government attempts to entice voters to the polls, including a promise of “special prizes” to the communities with the highest rates of turnout.
A new U.S. approach? Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has expressed his desire to open “decent, sincere, direct channels of dialogue” with the Biden administration, and hopes to overcome the “minefield between the government of the United States and Venezuela” left by Donald Trump.
President-elect Joe Biden has not signaled any drastic changes in U.S. sanctions policy toward the country, although he does plan to open the door to Venezuelans and to address the country’s humanitarian crisis. On a campaign stop in Florida in October, Biden promised to grant temporary protected status in the United States to Venezuelans fleeing their homeland.
Guaidó gone? Reuters reports that the shadow government led by Juan Guaidó is being scaled back, although members of the group still maintain their legitimacy citing the authenticity of the 2015 election versus the one on Sunday, where United Nations observers will not be present.
Guaidó will hope to get off to a better start with Biden than he did with President Trump, who took to calling the would-be leader the Beto O’Rourke of Venezuela, after the failed Senate and Democratic presidential candidate. Guaidó said he has not yet made contact with Biden and his staff, but has made approaches to other U.S. politicians.
What We’re Following Today
China blacklist grows. The Trump administration has added two major Chinese companies, computing chip maker Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) and China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC), to its growing security blacklist, which now includes 35 Chinese firms. By being named on the list, they are deemed by the U.S. Department of Defense to be aiding the Chinese military and are henceforth banned from accessing U.S. technology and investment. The Pentagon began compiling the list in June, and more companies are likely to be added before Trump leaves office on Jan. 20.
Egyptians released. Egyptian authorities have released three employees of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, one of the few independent human rights organizations still operating in the country. The trio’s arrests garnered worldwide attention in November, with Antony Blinken, the nominee for U.S. secretary of state, sharing his concern on Twitter. The move comes as two Washington-based groups, the Center for International Policy and the Project on Middle East Democracy, called on Biden to impose strict human rights conditions on the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. security assistance to Egypt.
Oil ticks up. OPEC+ countries have agreed to increase oil production slightly in January, in a sign of guarded optimism about a global economic recovery. The size of the increase—just 500,000 barrels per day collectively—is far smaller than the last production increase of 2 million barrels per day in August. “We need to be in a cautious mode,“ Saudi energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said following the meeting, adding that a lot will depend on whether vaccination programs are successful. “We are not in the business of gambling,” he added.
Milley’s musings. As the House and Senate send a bill authorizing the defense budget to President Trump’s desk, the top U.S. military officer has ideas for how to reduce it. Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the joints chiefs of staff, suggested on Thursday that putting U.S. troops permanently in allied countries needed a “relook” as the U.S. Defense Department faces the prospect of a shrinking budget in the face of the coronavirus-driven economic downturn. Speaking to the United States Naval Institute, Milley specifically mentioned the U.S. troop presence in Bahrain and South Korea as needing review, citing the cost and bigger U.S. footprint caused by military families stationed there.
Overall, Milley said the U.S. military had “too much infrastructure overseas and too much permanent infrastructure,” but was pessimistic about moves being taken to address the issue at the political level. “Frankly, there’s not a lot of enthusiasm to do what I just said, but I do think that’s necessary,” he said. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the total cost of U.S. overseas bases and deployments was $24.4 billion in 2020.
Keep an Eye On
Cameroon votes. Cameroon will hold regional elections on Sunday in an attempt to quell separatist sentiment in the country’s English-speaking regions. The vote is a long-delayed implementation of a 1996 law aimed at decentralizing the government, ruled by President Paul Biya for the past 40 years. As R. Maxwell Bone argued in Foreign Policy recently, the move is a “fig leaf” that offers too little, too late. Cho Ayaba, a separatist leader, has called for anyone “collaborating with Cameroon” in organizing the elections to be arrested.
Moldova’s power struggle. Moldova’s parliament has voted to strip its pro-European President-elect Maia Sandu of power over the country’s intelligence services, just months after handing over the same powers to her predecessor Igor Dodon. Thousands of protesters took to the streets of Chisinau to protest the move. Sandu accused her opponents of trying to hide from corruption inquiries and wanting to throw “the voice of the people into a landfill” following her recent election victory. As Nicolae Reutoi argued last month in FP, the surprising victory of a pro-European candidate is an indication of the Kremlin’s waning influence over Russia’s near-abroad.
Odds and Ends
A man named Adolf Hitler Uunona has won a landslide victory in a local election in Namibia, taking a council seat in the Ompundja constituency in the north of the country. It’s unlikely voters in the former German colony were swayed by his unusual name, however, as his middle initial was abbreviated to “H.” on official candidate lists. Speaking to German press, Uunona said that although his father had chosen the name, he “probably didn’t understand what Adolf Hitler stood for.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.