foreignpolicy--2020-08-06--Russia Ramps Up Disinformation Machine Ahead of 2020

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Russia targets the United States with coronavirus disinformation , Lebanon is reeling from the deadly blast in Beirut , and big shake-ups rock the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
It ’ s not just China trying to scramble the Trump administration ’ s flagging efforts to combat the coronavirus pandemic .
On Wednesday , the State Department disclosed that Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as deaths from the disease have surged by 26 percent in the United States over the last two weeks .
Among the conspiracies peddled on the websites , some of which describe themselves as “ alternative ” English-language news sources , are claims that the virus is a bioweapon created in U.S. government-run laboratories , and that the Microsoft founder Bill Gates is using the pandemic to mass-implant microchips “ in the whole of humanity.
” The sites have tried to distance themselves from the Kremlin .
The news comes as Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States would provide up to $ 10 million for information on foreign agents working to interfere with the November election .
President Donald Trump has repeatedly denied that Russia interfered in the 2016 election , contradicting the findings of U.S. intelligence agencies and a slew of well-documented indictments by former special counsel Robert Mueller .
Beirut blast .
Lebanon is still reeling from a massive explosion that killed at least 135 people and injured thousands more .
The explosion , which likely occurred after a warehouse full of abandoned ammonium nitrate ignited , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incompetence that has pushed the economy to the brink and spurred nationwide protests last year .
In Washington , the blast has exposed more rifts between the White House and Defense Secretary Mark Esper .
Trump said that generals told him the explosion could have been an attack , though initial evidence indicates it was an accident .
When Esper said it was an accident , White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows defended the president .
The Islamic State lives on .
The Islamic State is using Turkey as a regional transit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and funds , according to a new U.S. inspector general report for the military ’ s counter-ISIS mission .
While Turkey has pledged to step up efforts against the terror group within its own borders , the report serves as a reminder that ISIS is still active in the region .
The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that the group is likely only capable of carrying out small-scale attacks in Syria and Iraq .
State Department watchdog resigns .
Tumult reigns in the State Department ’ s watchdog office after the acting head of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resigned after less than three months .
Akard , a political appointee , was placed into the role of State Department Inspector General in May after Steve Linick was ousted from the job .
Republicans accused Linick of politically biased investigations and leaks to the media , which he denied .
Congressional Democrats opened an investigation into Linick ’ s firing amid probes into Pompeo ’ s misuse of State Department resources and expedited arms sales to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections .
Goldfein retires .
Air Force Chief of Staff David Goldfein @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chairman of the joint chiefs of staff , has stepped down from his post and retired from the U.S. military .
Goldfein was a highly respected commander who oversaw U.S. air operations against the Islamic State and helped establish the Space Force .
He was also the first service chief to speak out about racism in the military in the wake of the protests following the police killing of George Floyd .
Controversial USAID hire ousted .
A controversial Trump appointee who espoused anti-LGBTQ and anti-immigrant views and referred to women ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was removed from her post as deputy White House liaison at USAID just months into the job .
Merritt Corrigan ’ s ouster from USAID is a strange—even by Trump-era standards—involving accusations of stalking , racism , and falsified social media posts .
The Daily Beast has the story .
Pentagon staffing push .
The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing for four more Pentagon nominees on Thursday , including Lou Bremer , a former Navy SEAL in line to be Trump ’ s top civilian overseer for special forces and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon ’ s top watchdog .
Bremer found himself in hot water with Sen. Jeanne Shaheen , who raised issue with social media posts involving disgraced British far-right commentator Milo Yiannopoulos .
The powerful Senate panel already held hearings for four other top Pentagon nominees this week after the White House abandoned its nomination of Anthony Tata to lead the Defense Department ’ s policy shop .
It instead appointed Tata , who came under fire for Islamophobic comments , to an acting role in a move that skirted congressional oversight .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senior British diplomat Barbara Woodward has been appointed as the U.K. ’ s new ambassador to the United Nations , leaving her post as ambassador to China .
What the military can learn from narco-traffickers .
Three junior U.S. military officers co-authored a piece in War on the Rocks about what the Pentagon could learn from South American cocaine traffickers to keep U.S. troops in the far reaches of the Pacific supplied and supported in the event of a conflict with China .
Today marks the 75th anniversary of the U.S. dropping the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The 90-day reprieve from U.S. sanctions for companies dealing with Huawei is set to expire on Thursday , Aug. 13 .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Russia targets the United States with coronavirus disinformation , Lebanon is reeling from the deadly blast in Beirut , and big shake-ups rock the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Russia targets the United States with coronavirus disinformation, Lebanon is reeling from the deadly blast in Beirut, and big shake-ups rock the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Welcome to the Disinformation Machine
It’s not just China trying to scramble the Trump administration’s flagging efforts to combat the coronavirus pandemic. On Wednesday, the State Department disclosed that Russian disinformation networks were sowing confusion about COVID-19, as deaths from the disease have surged by 26 percent in the United States over the last two weeks.
Among the conspiracies peddled on the websites, some of which describe themselves as “alternative” English-language news sources, are claims that the virus is a bioweapon created in U.S. government-run laboratories, and that the Microsoft founder Bill Gates is using the pandemic to mass-implant microchips “in the whole of humanity.” The sites have tried to distance themselves from the Kremlin.
The news comes as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the United States would provide up to $10 million for information on foreign agents working to interfere with the November election. President Donald Trump has repeatedly denied that Russia interfered in the 2016 election, contradicting the findings of U.S. intelligence agencies and a slew of well-documented indictments by former special counsel Robert Mueller.
What We’re Watching
Beirut blast. Lebanon is still reeling from a massive explosion that killed at least 135 people and injured thousands more. The explosion, which likely occurred after a warehouse full of abandoned ammonium nitrate ignited, has laid bare the government corruption and incompetence that has pushed the economy to the brink and spurred nationwide protests last year.
In Washington, the blast has exposed more rifts between the White House and Defense Secretary Mark Esper. Trump said that generals told him the explosion could have been an attack, though initial evidence indicates it was an accident. When Esper said it was an accident, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows defended the president.
The Islamic State lives on. The Islamic State is using Turkey as a regional transit hub for smuggling fighters, supplies, and funds, according to a new U.S. inspector general report for the military’s counter-ISIS mission. While Turkey has pledged to step up efforts against the terror group within its own borders, the report serves as a reminder that ISIS is still active in the region. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that the group is likely only capable of carrying out small-scale attacks in Syria and Iraq.
Movers and Shakers
State Department watchdog resigns. Tumult reigns in the State Department’s watchdog office after the acting head of the office, Stephen Akard, abruptly resigned after less than three months. Akard, a political appointee, was placed into the role of State Department Inspector General in May after Steve Linick was ousted from the job. Republicans accused Linick of politically biased investigations and leaks to the media, which he denied.
Congressional Democrats opened an investigation into Linick’s firing amid probes into Pompeo’s misuse of State Department resources and expedited arms sales to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections.
Goldfein retires. Air Force Chief of Staff David Goldfein, passed over by Trump to be chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has stepped down from his post and retired from the U.S. military. Goldfein was a highly respected commander who oversaw U.S. air operations against the Islamic State and helped establish the Space Force. He was also the first service chief to speak out about racism in the military in the wake of the protests following the police killing of George Floyd.
Controversial USAID hire ousted. A controversial Trump appointee who espoused anti-LGBTQ and anti-immigrant views and referred to women’s empowerment as a “civilizational calamity” was removed from her post as deputy White House liaison at USAID just months into the job. Merritt Corrigan’s ouster from USAID is a strange—even by Trump-era standards—involving accusations of stalking, racism, and falsified social media posts. The Daily Beast has the story.
Pentagon staffing push. The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing for four more Pentagon nominees on Thursday, including Lou Bremer, a former Navy SEAL in line to be Trump’s top civilian overseer for special forces and the White House’s pick to be the Pentagon’s top watchdog. Bremer found himself in hot water with Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, who raised issue with social media posts involving disgraced British far-right commentator Milo Yiannopoulos.
The powerful Senate panel already held hearings for four other top Pentagon nominees this week after the White House abandoned its nomination of Anthony Tata to lead the Defense Department’s policy shop. It instead appointed Tata, who came under fire for Islamophobic comments, to an acting role in a move that skirted congressional oversight.
London’s new U.N. envoy. Senior British diplomat Barbara Woodward has been appointed as the U.K.’s new ambassador to the United Nations, leaving her post as ambassador to China.
Foreign Policy Recommends
What the military can learn from narco-traffickers. Three junior U.S. military officers co-authored a piece in War on the Rocks about what the Pentagon could learn from South American cocaine traffickers to keep U.S. troops in the far reaches of the Pacific supplied and supported in the event of a conflict with China.
The Week Ahead
Today marks the 75th anniversary of the U.S. dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
The 90-day reprieve from U.S. sanctions for companies dealing with Huawei is set to expire on Thursday, Aug. 13.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-06--How Israel Emerged as an Unlikely Peacemaker in the Middle East

How Israel Emerged as an Unlikely Peacemaker in the Middle East In a long season of other crises , it may be tempting to look away from the simmering conflict in the Middle East that pits Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Egypt against Qatar .
But that would be a mistake , as tensions among Washington ’ s key Arab partners remain high with no apparent resolution within sight .
The conflict first erupted in June 2017 when the self-declared anti-Qatar quartet imposed a blockade on Qatar over its alleged support for Hamas and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is well known .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stepped in on Qatar ’ s side by engaging leaders from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and urging them not to be drawn into the crisis by going along with the quartet ’ s plans .
Erdogan also dispatched Turkish troops to Qatar as part of a deterrence strategy against Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
Iran likewise prevented Qatar ’ s economy from collapsing by opening up its airspace for goods and services , including food and vegetable deliveries , during the early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is less understood , however , is that Israel also played a decisive role in stabilizing the conflict as well .
Even though the two countries had not had any diplomatic contact since 2012 , it quietly extended Doha a diplomatic lifeline by accelerating plans to work together on reconstructing Gaza , which changed the narrative in Washington away from Qatar supporting Hamas to one that focused on its leveraging its relationship with Hamas to get all the parties to cooperate in support of the Trump-administration ’ s peace plan .
All this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s initial diplomatic strategy for the regional conflict , which was to provide the feuding parties with a face-saving mechanism for de-escalation .
During a June 6 , 2017 , call with Saudi King Salman , U.S. President Donald Trump firmly rejected a Saudi proposal to invade Qatar .
Soon after , the United States requested Kuwaiti mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict within the confines of the Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) .
Israel , in the meantime , spoke out against legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state sponsor of terrorism because of its links to Hamas .
The legislation had been introduced by then-Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce , a Republican from California , and Israel ’ s de facto opposition to it became clear when neither the American Israel Public Affairs Committee or other mainstream pro-Israel groups lobbied for its passage .
At the same time , Israel strengthened its de facto strategic partnership with the UAE , Qatar ’ s regional nemesis , which included publicizing a positive meeting in Washington between Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the UAE and Bahrain that came shortly after Trump began moves to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal , an agreement that the Israeli leader had vigorously opposed .
Israel ’ s relationship with the UAE has since moved out of the shadows and into the open .
By strengthening its relationship with Abu Dhabi while at the same time extending Doha a hand in peace , Israel skillfully established itself in the process as an unlikely peacemaker .
Observers might assume that Israeli intervention has been unwelcome , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the quartet that entangled Israel in their inter-Arab struggle by nearly exclusively focusing on the Qatar-Hamas linkage as the primary argument for soliciting Trump ’ s support for their blockade of Doha .
In turn , Israel has evolved into an acceptable partner on this issue to the UAE , Qatar , and Oman because of its influence in Washington and ability to preserve the balance of power in the Gulf .
These dynamics hint at a potential strategy for productive engagement by Washington in the Gulf , namely through the kickoff of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Trump administration initiative that has yet to be brought to fruition .
Formally announced in May 2017 , the Middle East Strategic Alliance would include the six GCC countries—Bahrain , Kuwait , Oman , Qatar , Saudi Arabia , and the UAE—along with Egypt and Jordan .
Because of Israel ’ s extensive role in Gulf affairs , it would also be worth granting the country observer status .
To be sure , Israel ’ s public participation in the Middle East Strategic Alliance would be controversial for the Arab states in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Palestinians .
For Israel to be included , Ramallah would have to be granted observer status as well .
But therein lies an opportunity : Just as Israeli-Arab security cooperation has had a surprising stabilizing impact on regional rivalries , perhaps Israeli-Palestinian cooperation through the framework of the new forum—along with all GCC members , Egypt , and Jordan—could enhance regional security as well .
While it is unclear when the Middle East Strategic Alliance will be launched , it could be headquartered at Qatar ’ s Al Udeid Air Base , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other allied troops .
The U.S. presence would effectively provide Qatar with some security against future embargos or worse .
Further , given that the GCC headquarters is already based in Riyadh , establishing the new grouping ’ s counterpart at Al Udeid Air Base would not only strengthen the balance of power within the Gulf but also ensure that not all of the Gulf region ’ s multilateral organizations are concentrated in one country .
Because of the extreme distrust among Washington ’ s GCC partners , the Middle East Strategic Alliance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practical purposes be to preserve the peace on the Arabian Peninsula as opposed to establishing an anti-Iran alliance .
While the Gulf states and Israel are indeed drawing closer , it is not primarily driven by fear of Iran but rather by inter-GCC rivalry , including in Washington .
And in that respect , Israel has shown that it can help uphold the balance of power within the Gulf .
In the process , it has transformed itself into a reliable strategic partner for the UAE , Qatar , and Oman .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to double down on .

In a long season of other crises, it may be tempting to look away from the simmering conflict in the Middle East that pits Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt against Qatar. But that would be a mistake, as tensions among Washington’s key Arab partners remain high with no apparent resolution within sight.
In a long season of other crises, it may be tempting to look away from the simmering conflict in the Middle East that pits Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt against Qatar. But that would be a mistake, as tensions among Washington’s key Arab partners remain high with no apparent resolution within sight.
The conflict first erupted in June 2017 when the self-declared anti-Qatar quartet imposed a blockade on Qatar over its alleged support for Hamas and terrorism. Most of what happened next is well known. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stepped in on Qatar’s side by engaging leaders from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and urging them not to be drawn into the crisis by going along with the quartet’s plans. Erdogan also dispatched Turkish troops to Qatar as part of a deterrence strategy against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran likewise prevented Qatar’s economy from collapsing by opening up its airspace for goods and services, including food and vegetable deliveries, during the early stages of the blockade.
But what is less understood, however, is that Israel also played a decisive role in stabilizing the conflict as well. Even though the two countries had not had any diplomatic contact since 2012, it quietly extended Doha a diplomatic lifeline by accelerating plans to work together on reconstructing Gaza, which changed the narrative in Washington away from Qatar supporting Hamas to one that focused on its leveraging its relationship with Hamas to get all the parties to cooperate in support of the Trump-administration’s peace plan.
All this worked well with the Trump administration’s initial diplomatic strategy for the regional conflict, which was to provide the feuding parties with a face-saving mechanism for de-escalation. During a June 6, 2017, call with Saudi King Salman, U.S. President Donald Trump firmly rejected a Saudi proposal to invade Qatar. Soon after, the United States requested Kuwaiti mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict within the confines of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Israel, in the meantime, spoke out against legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress that would have effectively designated Qatar as a state sponsor of terrorism because of its links to Hamas. The legislation had been introduced by then-Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce, a Republican from California, and Israel’s de facto opposition to it became clear when neither the American Israel Public Affairs Committee or other mainstream pro-Israel groups lobbied for its passage.
At the same time, Israel strengthened its de facto strategic partnership with the UAE, Qatar’s regional nemesis, which included publicizing a positive meeting in Washington between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the ambassadors of the UAE and Bahrain that came shortly after Trump began moves to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, an agreement that the Israeli leader had vigorously opposed. Israel’s relationship with the UAE has since moved out of the shadows and into the open. By strengthening its relationship with Abu Dhabi while at the same time extending Doha a hand in peace, Israel skillfully established itself in the process as an unlikely peacemaker.
Observers might assume that Israeli intervention has been unwelcome, but, in fact, it was the quartet that entangled Israel in their inter-Arab struggle by nearly exclusively focusing on the Qatar-Hamas linkage as the primary argument for soliciting Trump’s support for their blockade of Doha. In turn, Israel has evolved into an acceptable partner on this issue to the UAE, Qatar, and Oman because of its influence in Washington and ability to preserve the balance of power in the Gulf.
These dynamics hint at a potential strategy for productive engagement by Washington in the Gulf, namely through the kickoff of the long-awaited Middle East Strategic Alliance, a Trump administration initiative that has yet to be brought to fruition.
Formally announced in May 2017, the Middle East Strategic Alliance would include the six GCC countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—along with Egypt and Jordan. Because of Israel’s extensive role in Gulf affairs, it would also be worth granting the country observer status.
To be sure, Israel’s public participation in the Middle East Strategic Alliance would be controversial for the Arab states in light of their own long-standing support for the Palestinians. For Israel to be included, Ramallah would have to be granted observer status as well. But therein lies an opportunity: Just as Israeli-Arab security cooperation has had a surprising stabilizing impact on regional rivalries, perhaps Israeli-Palestinian cooperation through the framework of the new forum—along with all GCC members, Egypt, and Jordan—could enhance regional security as well.
While it is unclear when the Middle East Strategic Alliance will be launched, it could be headquartered at Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, which houses U.S., Qatari, and other allied troops. The U.S. presence would effectively provide Qatar with some security against future embargos or worse. Further, given that the GCC headquarters is already based in Riyadh, establishing the new grouping’s counterpart at Al Udeid Air Base would not only strengthen the balance of power within the Gulf but also ensure that not all of the Gulf region’s multilateral organizations are concentrated in one country.
Because of the extreme distrust among Washington’s GCC partners, the Middle East Strategic Alliance’s strategic objective would for all practical purposes be to preserve the peace on the Arabian Peninsula as opposed to establishing an anti-Iran alliance.
While the Gulf states and Israel are indeed drawing closer, it is not primarily driven by fear of Iran but rather by inter-GCC rivalry, including in Washington.
And in that respect, Israel has shown that it can help uphold the balance of power within the Gulf. In the process, it has transformed itself into a reliable strategic partner for the UAE, Qatar, and Oman. That is progress that all interested parties should want to double down on.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-06--Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America’s Interest (and Their Own)

Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America ’ s Interest ( and Their Own ) Henry Kissinger is supposed to have written that “ America has no permanent friends or enemies , only interests.
” He didn ’ t ; it was actually Dinesh D ’ Souza channeling his inner Kissinger .
But even that inner Kissinger turns out to have been Henry John Temple , 3rd Viscount Palmerston , who really did say about England : “ We have no eternal allies , and we have no perpetual enemies .
Our interests are eternal and perpetual , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to follow.
” As a statement of foreign-policy realism , that seems conclusive .
At least until you hear what Palmerston thought those interests were .
Scroll back a few sentences in his 25,000 word speech to Parliament on March 1 , 1848 , and you find the answer : “ I hold that the real policy of England … is to be the champion of justice and right.
” If a cause was just , Palmerston was convinced , allies could always be found to support it .
Looking back on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tempting to hear echoes of Palmerston in George W. Bush ’ s “ coalition of the willing.
” That said , it ’ s not clear just how willing Bush ’ s post-9/11 coalition partners really were .
Barack Obama , by contrast , is fondly remembered for embracing America ’ s eternal allies—as well as trying to defuse Iranian hostility and reset relations with Russia .
If there was an Obama doctrine , its watchwords were internationalism and restraint .
“ Multilateralism regulates hubris , ” he told The Atlantic ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidency .
It ’ s no wonder he was so popular with foreign leaders and ordinary people all over the world .
Trump mostly kept the United States out of an unwinnable war in Syria , fired John Bolton before he could start a war in Iran , and won plaudits in Israel for moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem .
No one ever accused Donald Trump of being popular , whether at home or abroad .
And if there is one word that is most used to describe his foreign policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sticks , perhaps because it matches how Trump sees himself .
Martin Wolf of the Financial Times even swallowed his bile long enough to label him Palmerstonian , before reminding readers that Trump himself “ is no Palmerston.
” Wolf apparently hadn ’ t brushed up on his Palmerston , and certainly didn ’ t mean to imply that Trump was following the latter ’ s dictum of being a “ champion of justice and right.
” But looking back over four years of Trumpism in U.S. foreign policy , has there really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point to failures in the Middle East and North Korea , but Trump mostly kept the United States out of an unwinnable war in Syria , fired John Bolton before he could start a war in Iran , and won plaudits in Israel for moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem .
North Korea hasn ’ t conducted a nuclear test since 2017 .
And although many continue to believe that Trump is a puppet of Russian President Vladimir Putin , U.S. sanctions on Russia have only gotten tighter over the last four years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro , but the controversial leader has a strong democratic mandate , having been elected with 55 percent of the vote in 2018 .
Amidst the torrent of criticism , the administration ’ s accomplishments are often forgotten .
In North America , Trump pushed through a United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement that closed serious loopholes in the previous North American Free Trade Agreement , improved worker protections , and ( mostly ) stripped out controversial investor-state dispute settlement provisions .
Meanwhile in Europe , Trump made himself unpopular in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Stream 2 pipeline that will tie Western Europe to the Russian gas supply by carefully ( and expensively ) avoiding transit through Poland .
In East Asia , was it ever right to allow China to steal intellectual property , force U.S. firms into joint ventures , and erect an internet firewall around the entire country ?
Or to let it seize and militarize almost the entire South China Sea ?
In West Asia , the Arab-Israeli peace plan pushed by Trump ’ s son-in-law , Jared Kushner , has gone nowhere—but then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on that front in forty years .
And would it have been right to maintain the nuclear deal with Iran , a regime committed to “ wiping out Israel ” and that still calls the United States “ the Great Satan ” ?
Or to continue to support the highly corrupt , thoroughly undemocratic Palestinian Authority ?
In a welcome break from the recent past , the Trump administration ’ s tactic of applying “ maximum pressure ” has , in fact , been quite Palmerstonian .
Palmerston wanted Britain to stand up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the “ rights ” of small countries , but “ with moderation and prudence , not becoming the Quixote of the world.
” Like the Trump administration , Palmerston would have seen forcing allies to bear the costs of their own defense as eminently sensible , the Syrian civil war as a terrible situation that his country could do little to improve , and a global climate accord as not being worth the paper it was written on .
Just like people , countries don ’ t always want what ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to exerting maximum pressure on China to achieve British trade and investment targets , Palmerston prefigured Trump by 180 years .
In 1840 , he was the foreign secretary who effectively launched the First Opium War .
Nor was the imperialist Palmerston an angel in his personal business affairs : Later in the 1840s , he harshly evicted his starving Irish tenants during the potato famine .
But despite alienating potential allies and embittering political opponents , Palmerston effectively leveraged British power to achieve British aims , which were , on the whole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other major power at the time .
So Wolf is right after all that Trump , though no Palmerston , really is Palmerstonian .
That may be unpleasant for Wolf , whose native Britain is one of those countries feeling the pressure that the United States can exert .
But when the United States is pressuring Britain to deny Huawei a place in its 5G network infrastructure , should our sympathies lie with the long-suffering ally or the global bully ?
Ditto U.S. pressure on Germany to increase its defense spending , South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its soil , and the World Health Organization to stop shielding China from coronavirus criticism .
In criticizing the Trump administration ’ s foreign policies here on the pages of Foreign Policy , Harvard professor Stephen Walt calls Trump “ an incompetent and narcissistic charlatan.
” His Harvard colleague Wendy R. Sherman calls Trump ’ s approach to foreign policy “ vacuous and vain.
” Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon write that “ Trump has caused unprecedented damage to the system of alliances and partnerships that took the United States many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has “ ruined ” or “ destroyed ” U.S. influence in the world .
Yet it is not at all clear that being well-liked is the best path to being influential .
Just ask Obama .
In the end , God helps those who help themselves , and in the Trump administration ’ s view of the world , so should the United States .
Trump ’ s opponents may loathe his style , but if they want to see a more liberal international system in which Chinese and Russian power is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finally step up to the plate , they should support his methods .
Whatever they may think of Trump , they can hardly argue that the European Union , the United Nations , and the World Trade Organization were successfully fighting illiberalism at home and totalitarianism abroad before Trump came around .
In the Bush era , U.S. allies did their best to evade responsibility for maintaining global order .
In the Obama era , they outright demanded that America “ take the lead ” while not taking much responsibility for conflicts close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are—however reluctantly—starting to behave like their own actions matter .
They may not like it , and most of them probably share the U.S. foreign-policy establishment ’ s desperate hope for a Biden victory this fall , and for the return to quiescent normalcy they imagine it portends .
But just like people , countries don ’ t always want what ’ s good for them .
A second Trump term may be exactly what America ’ s allies need .

Henry Kissinger is supposed to have written that “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” He didn’t; it was actually Dinesh D'Souza channeling his inner Kissinger. But even that inner Kissinger turns out to have been Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, who really did say about England: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
Henry Kissinger is supposed to have written that “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.” He didn’t; it was actually Dinesh D’Souza channeling his inner Kissinger. But even that inner Kissinger turns out to have been Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, who really did say about England: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”
As a statement of foreign-policy realism, that seems conclusive. At least until you hear what Palmerston thought those interests were. Scroll back a few sentences in his 25,000 word speech to Parliament on March 1, 1848, and you find the answer: “I hold that the real policy of England … is to be the champion of justice and right.” If a cause was just, Palmerston was convinced, allies could always be found to support it.
Looking back on the last three U.S. presidents, it is tempting to hear echoes of Palmerston in George W. Bush’s “coalition of the willing.” That said, it’s not clear just how willing Bush’s post-9/11 coalition partners really were. Barack Obama, by contrast, is fondly remembered for embracing America’s eternal allies—as well as trying to defuse Iranian hostility and reset relations with Russia. If there was an Obama doctrine, its watchwords were internationalism and restraint. “Multilateralism regulates hubris,” he told The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg toward the end of his presidency. It’s no wonder he was so popular with foreign leaders and ordinary people all over the world.
Trump mostly kept the United States out of an unwinnable war in Syria, fired John Bolton before he could start a war in Iran, and won plaudits in Israel for moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
No one ever accused Donald Trump of being popular, whether at home or abroad. And if there is one word that is most used to describe his foreign policy, it is “transactional.” The label sticks, perhaps because it matches how Trump sees himself. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times even swallowed his bile long enough to label him Palmerstonian, before reminding readers that Trump himself “is no Palmerston.” Wolf apparently hadn’t brushed up on his Palmerston, and certainly didn’t mean to imply that Trump was following the latter’s dictum of being a “champion of justice and right.”
But looking back over four years of Trumpism in U.S. foreign policy, has there really been so much wrong? Critics will point to failures in the Middle East and North Korea, but Trump mostly kept the United States out of an unwinnable war in Syria, fired John Bolton before he could start a war in Iran, and won plaudits in Israel for moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. North Korea hasn’t conducted a nuclear test since 2017. And although many continue to believe that Trump is a puppet of Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. sanctions on Russia have only gotten tighter over the last four years. Trump sometimes takes flak for his support for Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, but the controversial leader has a strong democratic mandate, having been elected with 55 percent of the vote in 2018.
Amidst the torrent of criticism, the administration’s accomplishments are often forgotten. In North America, Trump pushed through a United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement that closed serious loopholes in the previous North American Free Trade Agreement, improved worker protections, and (mostly) stripped out controversial investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Meanwhile in Europe, Trump made himself unpopular in Germany by slapping sanctions on its Nord Stream 2 pipeline that will tie Western Europe to the Russian gas supply by carefully (and expensively) avoiding transit through Poland.
In East Asia, was it ever right to allow China to steal intellectual property, force U.S. firms into joint ventures, and erect an internet firewall around the entire country? Or to let it seize and militarize almost the entire South China Sea? In West Asia, the Arab-Israeli peace plan pushed by Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has gone nowhere—but then again, no one else has succeeded on that front in forty years. And would it have been right to maintain the nuclear deal with Iran, a regime committed to “wiping out Israel” and that still calls the United States “the Great Satan”? Or to continue to support the highly corrupt, thoroughly undemocratic Palestinian Authority?
In a welcome break from the recent past, the Trump administration’s tactic of applying “maximum pressure” has, in fact, been quite Palmerstonian. Palmerston wanted Britain to stand up for “justice” in international treaties and the “rights” of small countries, but “with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world.” Like the Trump administration, Palmerston would have seen forcing allies to bear the costs of their own defense as eminently sensible, the Syrian civil war as a terrible situation that his country could do little to improve, and a global climate accord as not being worth the paper it was written on.
Just like people, countries don’t always want what’s good for them.
When it comes to exerting maximum pressure on China to achieve British trade and investment targets, Palmerston prefigured Trump by 180 years. In 1840, he was the foreign secretary who effectively launched the First Opium War. Nor was the imperialist Palmerston an angel in his personal business affairs: Later in the 1840s, he harshly evicted his starving Irish tenants during the potato famine. But despite alienating potential allies and embittering political opponents, Palmerston effectively leveraged British power to achieve British aims, which were, on the whole, more liberal than those of any other major power at the time.
So Wolf is right after all that Trump, though no Palmerston, really is Palmerstonian. That may be unpleasant for Wolf, whose native Britain is one of those countries feeling the pressure that the United States can exert. But when the United States is pressuring Britain to deny Huawei a place in its 5G network infrastructure, should our sympathies lie with the long-suffering ally or the global bully? Ditto U.S. pressure on Germany to increase its defense spending, South Korea to pay more for U.S. troops on its soil, and the World Health Organization to stop shielding China from coronavirus criticism.
In criticizing the Trump administration’s foreign policies here on the pages of Foreign Policy, Harvard professor Stephen Walt calls Trump “an incompetent and narcissistic charlatan.” His Harvard colleague Wendy R. Sherman calls Trump’s approach to foreign policy “vacuous and vain.” Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon write that “Trump has caused unprecedented damage to the system of alliances and partnerships that took the United States many decades to construct.” All claim that he has “ruined” or “destroyed” U.S. influence in the world. Yet it is not at all clear that being well-liked is the best path to being influential. Just ask Obama.
In the end, God helps those who help themselves, and in the Trump administration’s view of the world, so should the United States. Trump’s opponents may loathe his style, but if they want to see a more liberal international system in which Chinese and Russian power is curtailed and the United States’ allies finally step up to the plate, they should support his methods. Whatever they may think of Trump, they can hardly argue that the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization were successfully fighting illiberalism at home and totalitarianism abroad before Trump came around.
In the Bush era, U.S. allies did their best to evade responsibility for maintaining global order. In the Obama era, they outright demanded that America “take the lead” while not taking much responsibility for conflicts close to their shores. Now, they are—however reluctantly—starting to behave like their own actions matter. They may not like it, and most of them probably share the U.S. foreign-policy establishment’s desperate hope for a Biden victory this fall, and for the return to quiescent normalcy they imagine it portends. But just like people, countries don’t always want what’s good for them. A second Trump term may be exactly what America’s allies need.


Modi’s Textbook Manipulations

As students across India logged in to their virtual classrooms last month , many of them no doubt felt their prayers had been answered .
The Central Board of Secondary Education ( CBSE ) , India ’ s largest education board , announced in July that it had cut this year ’ s syllabus by 30 percent .
It hopes that the move will relieve stressed-out students who have lost valuable hours in the classroom to COVID-19 and are trying to adapt to online learning .
But not everyone is pleased .
The move has fueled controversy over the fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ teach chapters on democratic rights , secularism , federalism , and citizenship , among other topics .
These concepts lie at the core of the Indian Constitution but have at times come into conflict with the Hindu-majoritarian ideology of the ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) .
The party ’ s well-established interest in using the education system to spread its own unitary brand of Indian identity has further raised concerns that the omissions are politically motivated .
When chapters like “ Popular Struggles and Movements ” and “ Democracy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 political science syllabus , stakeholders and opposition groups were quick to frame the cuts as being in line with the other steps for which Modi has been criticized .
The move advances the vision of an “ exclusivist , theocratic , intolerant , fascistic nation , ” Sitaram Yechury , the leader of Communist Party of India ( Marxist ) , wrote on Facebook in July .
His party later called for the cuts to be rescinded , saying they hurt “ secular democratic India ’ s future.
” The Education Ministry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move , which it said was backed by a consensus of policymakers .
It also issued a clarification on July 8 calling the cuts a “ one-time measure only.
” It is hard to separate the syllabus cuts from the current political climate .
For practitioners , though , it is hard to separate the syllabus cuts from the current political climate .
“ It ’ s clear that this was a very selective exercise , ” Anita Rampal , a professor and former dean of the education department at Delhi University , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deleted chapters relate directly to policies that are currently being questioned in the public sphere—and that ’ s important because not many issues usually are .
These are topics the government finds inconvenient.
” Adding weight to such interpretations are other activities the government has undertaken during the pandemic .
According to Human Rights Watch , New Delhi has stifled dissent and arrested protesters .
The government has also come under fire for refusing to release academics and social activists from jail , including the 80-year-old poet Varavara Rao , who was kept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inciting caste-based violence under India ’ s draconian Unlawful Activities Act .
He ended up contracting the coronavirus .
Meanwhile requests from opposition leaders to resume parliament or allow for videoconferencing have fallen on deaf ears .
In turn , the Indian National Congress , the main opposition party , has accused the government of trying to avoid parliamentary scrutiny .
Add to this a distracted mainstream media with little interest in covering education policy minutiae and educators like Rampal have little to be hopeful about .
“ It ’ s a populist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or inclination to question , ” she said .
“ Once deleted , I can ’ t see these chapters coming back in any meaningful way.
” The Education Ministry maintains that the recent move is in students ’ best interests .
Before the pandemic , too , ministry officials spoke about the need to “ rationalize ” the syllabus and unburden students from the lengthy slog .
But if that is the goal , the cuts have undermined it .
In an op-ed , Krishna Kumar , a former director of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( the organization responsible for designing the curriculum ) , argued that the cuts have left some remaining topics “ incomprehensible.
” He points out that students will now learn about the constitution without learning about India ’ s federal structure .
The deleted chapters were also among those that offered relief from the rote learning and factual regurgitation that are endemic to the Indian education system .
“ These chapters allowed students to raise questions about social justice and engage in critical analysis , ” Rampal said .
“ Removing these chapters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe is right for children to be learning.
” The CBSE has said teachers can still teach these topics if they wish .
But that is unlikely to happen .
“ Teachers are evaluated on how well their students score in the board exams and are penalized if they finish the syllabus late , ” a New Delhi secondary-school teacher told me .
“ When you ’ re already under so much pressure , there ’ s no incentive to be creative or deviate from the highly centralized teaching calendar.
” This system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removed any space for teachers to “ really think and talk about educating children ’ s minds , ” the teacher said .
“ It ’ s why so many great teachers have left.
” Policymakers must know that topics that are not going to be tested in board exams are unlikely to be covered in class , said Pradyumna Jairam , a former CBSE board social sciences teacher and researcher at King ’ s College London .
“ That ’ s why it is crucial to look at which chapters have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t want these chapters to be taught , ” he added .
Jairam ’ s answer is that the deleted chapters dealt with uncomfortable periods of Indian history , like the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and lower-caste struggles for emancipation .
The chapter on popular movements , for example , drew a strong parallel between the assertion of Dalit rights and the civil rights movement in 1960s America , he said .
“ I taught this chapter , so I know how effective it was .
It encouraged students to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society , as well as on their own privilege , which may have sheltered them from these uncomfortable truths.
” The answer lies in the ruling party ’ s ties to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( RSS ) , a volunteer paramilitary organization , and its deeply embedded Hindutva ideology .
“ The individualistic values promoted by liberal democracy is anathema to their view of Hindu traditions , ” said Christophe Jaffrelot , a political scientist specializing in South Asia .
He noted that Shah , Modi ’ s home minister , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western notion of human rights .
Nor does the RSS allow for any room for elections or public debate within the organization.
” Education reform has long been a priority of the RSS .
The organization itself operates a network of schools through its education wing , the Vidya Bharati .
It views changing curriculum content in particular as a key component of nation building and erasing foreign elements from India ’ s Nehruvian teaching methods .
When the BJP was last in power in the early 2000s , it appointed RSS members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national curriculum framework under the slogan “ Indianize , nationalize , and spiritualize.
” The way history textbooks have already been rewritten in BJP-ruled states can provide clues to the kind of agenda the current administration is pursuing .
In Rajasthan , for example , the state board removed all mentions of Jawaharlal Nehru , India ’ s first prime minister and champion of a diverse and secular India , while adding multiple references to V.D .
Savarkar , the father of Hindutva ideology .
Meanwhile B.R .
Ambedkar is labeled as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later conversion to Buddhism .
Critics claim his seminal key role in fighting for Dalit emancipation was also minimized .
Given this background , “ it ’ s actually surprising that central board textbooks were not rewritten sooner , ” Jaffrelot said .
In 1999 , the last time the BJP was in power and when Murli Manohar Joshi was the minister for human resources development , “ this was a priority of the party , and they began making changes straight away.
” In that way , there is a feeling among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left its most divisive policies for its second term in power .
With the Supreme Court ’ s independence under question , a brutal crackdown on dissenting voices from academic and civil society , and a feeble opposition , the path has been cleared for the government to pursue its most controversial objectives , starting with the revocation of Kashmir ’ s special status a year ago and leading , most recently , to reconfiguring textbooks .
“ Now is the time for them to do whatever they want , because who can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .

As students across India logged in to their virtual classrooms last month, many of them no doubt felt their prayers had been answered.
As students across India logged in to their virtual classrooms last month, many of them no doubt felt their prayers had been answered.
The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), India’s largest education board, announced in July that it had cut this year’s syllabus by 30 percent. It hopes that the move will relieve stressed-out students who have lost valuable hours in the classroom to COVID-19 and are trying to adapt to online learning.
But not everyone is pleased. The move has fueled controversy over the fact that government-run schools no longer have to teach chapters on democratic rights, secularism, federalism, and citizenship, among other topics. These concepts lie at the core of the Indian Constitution but have at times come into conflict with the Hindu-majoritarian ideology of the ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The party’s well-established interest in using the education system to spread its own unitary brand of Indian identity has further raised concerns that the omissions are politically motivated.
After a victory in last year’s general elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP began rolling out a set of controversial citizenship policies that critics have called unconstitutional and anti-Muslim and that have been condemned for promoting an ethnoreligious idea of India. The country has since witnessed a series of large-scale national protests against the measures, including the Citizenship Amendment Act—a law designed to aid refugees from neighboring countries but which excludes Muslims—and a new National Register of Citizens. When combined, the two measures could end up disenfranchising large numbers of India’s Muslim population. (That’s the point, Home Minister Amit Shah, has admitted.) The protests were the largest public challenge to Modi’s rule since he first came to power in 2014.
When chapters like “Popular Struggles and Movements” and “Democracy and Diversity” were removed from the Class 10 political science syllabus, stakeholders and opposition groups were quick to frame the cuts as being in line with the other steps for which Modi has been criticized. The move advances the vision of an “exclusivist, theocratic, intolerant, fascistic nation,” Sitaram Yechury, the leader of Communist Party of India (Marxist), wrote on Facebook in July. His party later called for the cuts to be rescinded, saying they hurt “secular democratic India’s future.”
The Education Ministry has denied any political motives behind the move, which it said was backed by a consensus of policymakers. It also issued a clarification on July 8 calling the cuts a “one-time measure only.”
It is hard to separate the syllabus cuts from the current political climate.
For practitioners, though, it is hard to separate the syllabus cuts from the current political climate. “It’s clear that this was a very selective exercise,” Anita Rampal, a professor and former dean of the education department at Delhi University, told me in July. “The deleted chapters relate directly to policies that are currently being questioned in the public sphere—and that’s important because not many issues usually are. These are topics the government finds inconvenient.”
Adding weight to such interpretations are other activities the government has undertaken during the pandemic. According to Human Rights Watch, New Delhi has stifled dissent and arrested protesters. The government has also come under fire for refusing to release academics and social activists from jail, including the 80-year-old poet Varavara Rao, who was kept in cramped prison conditions on charges of inciting caste-based violence under India’s draconian Unlawful Activities Act. He ended up contracting the coronavirus.
Meanwhile requests from opposition leaders to resume parliament or allow for videoconferencing have fallen on deaf ears. In turn, the Indian National Congress, the main opposition party, has accused the government of trying to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. Add to this a distracted mainstream media with little interest in covering education policy minutiae and educators like Rampal have little to be hopeful about. “It’s a populist move that few people have the time or inclination to question,” she said. “Once deleted, I can’t see these chapters coming back in any meaningful way.”
The Education Ministry maintains that the recent move is in students’ best interests. Before the pandemic, too, ministry officials spoke about the need to “rationalize” the syllabus and unburden students from the lengthy slog. But if that is the goal, the cuts have undermined it. In an op-ed, Krishna Kumar, a former director of the National Council of Education Research and Training (the organization responsible for designing the curriculum), argued that the cuts have left some remaining topics “incomprehensible.” He points out that students will now learn about the constitution without learning about India’s federal structure.
The deleted chapters were also among those that offered relief from the rote learning and factual regurgitation that are endemic to the Indian education system. “These chapters allowed students to raise questions about social justice and engage in critical analysis,” Rampal said. “Removing these chapters sends a clear signal about what they believe is right for children to be learning.”
The CBSE has said teachers can still teach these topics if they wish. But that is unlikely to happen. “Teachers are evaluated on how well their students score in the board exams and are penalized if they finish the syllabus late,” a New Delhi secondary-school teacher told me. “When you’re already under so much pressure, there’s no incentive to be creative or deviate from the highly centralized teaching calendar.” This system has bred a culture of survival and removed any space for teachers to “really think and talk about educating children’s minds,” the teacher said. “It’s why so many great teachers have left.”
Policymakers must know that topics that are not going to be tested in board exams are unlikely to be covered in class, said Pradyumna Jairam, a former CBSE board social sciences teacher and researcher at King’s College London. “That’s why it is crucial to look at which chapters have been deleted and to ask why they don’t want these chapters to be taught,” he added.
Jairam’s answer is that the deleted chapters dealt with uncomfortable periods of Indian history, like the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and lower-caste struggles for emancipation. The chapter on popular movements, for example, drew a strong parallel between the assertion of Dalit rights and the civil rights movement in 1960s America, he said. “I taught this chapter, so I know how effective it was. It encouraged students to reflect on how privilege still operates in society, as well as on their own privilege, which may have sheltered them from these uncomfortable truths.”
But Jairam’s interpretation begs the question of why the BJP might have a problem with students learning about human rights, democracy, local government, and civil liberties.
The answer lies in the ruling party’s ties to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a volunteer paramilitary organization, and its deeply embedded Hindutva ideology. “The individualistic values promoted by liberal democracy is anathema to their view of Hindu traditions,” said Christophe Jaffrelot, a political scientist specializing in South Asia. He noted that Shah, Modi’s home minister, “argued that India should not follow the Western notion of human rights. Nor does the RSS allow for any room for elections or public debate within the organization.”
Education reform has long been a priority of the RSS. The organization itself operates a network of schools through its education wing, the Vidya Bharati. It views changing curriculum content in particular as a key component of nation building and erasing foreign elements from India’s Nehruvian teaching methods. When the BJP was last in power in the early 2000s, it appointed RSS members to top education positions and launched a national curriculum framework under the slogan “Indianize, nationalize, and spiritualize.”
The way history textbooks have already been rewritten in BJP-ruled states can provide clues to the kind of agenda the current administration is pursuing. In Rajasthan, for example, the state board removed all mentions of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister and champion of a diverse and secular India, while adding multiple references to V.D. Savarkar, the father of Hindutva ideology. Meanwhile B.R. Ambedkar is labeled as a “Hindu social reformer” despite his later conversion to Buddhism. Critics claim his seminal key role in fighting for Dalit emancipation was also minimized.
Given this background, “it’s actually surprising that central board textbooks were not rewritten sooner,” Jaffrelot said. In 1999, the last time the BJP was in power and when Murli Manohar Joshi was the minister for human resources development, “this was a priority of the party, and they began making changes straight away.”
In that way, there is a feeling among some political observers that the BJP has left its most divisive policies for its second term in power. With the Supreme Court’s independence under question, a brutal crackdown on dissenting voices from academic and civil society, and a feeble opposition, the path has been cleared for the government to pursue its most controversial objectives, starting with the revocation of Kashmir’s special status a year ago and leading, most recently, to reconfiguring textbooks.
“Now is the time for them to do whatever they want, because who can say anything against them?” Jaffrelot said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-06--Putin Is Ruling Russia Like a Central Asian Dictator

Between June 25 and July 1 , Russian President Vladimir Putin held a national referendum on a host of constitutional amendments ; unsurprisingly , it passed by an overwhelming majority .
What drew the attention of most commentators was not the nature of these amendments—which touched on a variety of themes , from increasing social pensions to banning same-sex marriage—but the fact that , by changing the constitution , Putin opened the path to resetting his term as Russian president .
In office since 2000 , when he was first elected president , Putin has ruled Russia continuously for two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ briefly , taking the position of prime minister from 2008 to 2012 , but no one had any illusions as to who actually remained in charge . )
Having reset his term , he could now in theory rule until 2036 , by which point he will have bested Joseph Stalin as the longest-reigning ruler in Russia ’ s modern history .
If Putin wanted to stay on even then , who could stop him but the constitution , which has already been trampled on ?
It is anyone ’ s guess what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the immediate neighborhood offers some hints .
After all , Central Asian countries were the pioneers of perpetual rule through constitutional amendments and referendums .
Already in the 1990s , post-independence rulers of former Soviet republics schemed about holding on to power by resorting to superficially democratic methods .
Putin is simply following their lead and implementing the same model in Moscow .
The trailblazer was Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan .
In 1998 , the country ’ s Constitutional Court nullified then-President Akayev ’ s first term ( 1991-1995 ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ third term as president in 2000 .
Kazakhstan ’ s longtime leader Nursultan Nazarbayev used the same tactic , when in 2000 the Constitutional Council reset his first term by fiat .
Nazarbayev began his second term in 1999 , after his presidency was extended via a national referendum .
Because Kazakhstan ’ s constitution permitted no more than two presidential terms , Nazarbayev ’ s second term was simply declared his first .
This allowed him to stand in the following election , which he easily won in 2005 .
Nazarbayev was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He didn ’ t .
Instead , in 2007 , the constitutional two-term limit was eliminated just for Nazarbayev , making him de facto president for life .
He remained in office , winning in extraordinary elections in 2011 and 2015—first with over 95 percent of votes and then with nearly 98 percent .
Both elections were bitterly criticized by the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ( ODIHR ) as “ non-competitive ” and lacking “ genuine opposition.
” Curiously , in March 2019 , Nazarbayev finally decided to retire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on his continued rule ) .
But even as he stepped down after almost three decades in power , the former president retained significant levers of control as the lifetime head of the Security Council and the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan , as well as a member of the Constitutional Council .
He also kept the title of “ Elbasy ” ( leader of the nation ) .
Meanwhile , Kassym-Jomart Tokayev , the second president of Kazakhstan , promised to consult with Nazarbayev on the appointment of a wide range of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and all ministers apart from the ministers of foreign affairs , defense , and internal affairs .
Two other Central Asian states , Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan , have also resorted to pro forma referendums to keep tyrants in power .
In Uzbekistan , Islam Karimov ruled the country continuously from its independence in 1991 .
Karimov ’ s reign from 1995 to 2000 was extended by a national referendum ( that is , without holding elections ) , whereas his third presidential term ( 2007-2015 ) was ostensibly justified by 2002 constitutional amendments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to seven years and thus reset his term .
The unscheduled extraconstitutional event that ultimately put an end to Karimov ’ s presidency was his death in 2016 .
The same story marked Turkmenistan ’ s post-independence journey .
In 1994 , then-President Saparmurat Niyazov ( who had been in power since 1990 ) had his rule extended for eight more years by a nationwide referendum .
He shouldn ’ t have bothered because in 1999 the legislature officially declared Niyazov president for life , thereby doing away with any need to hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Niyazov ruled the country until he died in 2006 .
He was replaced by a former dentist , Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov , who has ruled Turkmenistan continuously since then as a brutal dictator—though he has had his mandate confirmed via regularly held and blatantly fraudulent elections .
Another interesting example comes from Tajikistan ’ s 2003 referendum .
As in Russia in 2020 , Tajik citizens in 2003 voted in a referendum on constitutional amendments , which allowed the president , Emomali Rahmon ( who had been in power since 1992 and was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , to run for another two terms .
Rahmon went on to win the 2006 and 2013 elections .
( As in Kazakhstan , ODIHR observers concluded that there was no “ genuine choice.
” ) At last , in 2016 , another constitutional referendum eliminated the term limits altogether , effectively making Rahmon president for life .
Similarly , the 2009 constitutional referendum in Azerbaijan eliminated the two-term restriction on then-President Ilham Aliyev ( who himself is the son of previous President Heydar Aliyev ) .
The younger Aliyev continues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently in 2018 .
He can stay in office indefinitely .
On Russia ’ s Western flank , in Belarus , constitutional amendments in the 1996 national referendum eventually added two more years to the presidency of the incumbent , Aleksandr Lukashenko .
His term , originally begun in 1994 , was now counted as having begun in 1996 , when the constitution ’ s new version came into force .
But in 2004 , Lukashenko , via another referendum , simply abolished the term limit .
This paved the way to his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2006 , 2010 , and 2015 .
Lukashenko is now running for his sixth consecutive term , but this time his political ambitions have met with spirited popular resistance .
He has therefore resorted to intimidation and arrests of opposition activists and journalists ahead of the Aug. 9 vote .
To avoid being shamed by ODIHR , the Belarusian dictator opted not to invite international observers to witness the election .
Seen against the backdrop of these manipulations , Putin ’ s decision to perpetuate his rule through the promulgation of a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within the post-Soviet region ’ s mainstream .
From holding fake elections to resetting or abolishing term limits to having oneself proclaimed as “ president for life , ” there is a wonderful range of options available to all aspiring dictators .
With the recent referendum , Putin has moved along the undemocratic continuum from the more nuanced ( electoral fraud ) to more creative ( resetting terms ) .
He has not yet reached the other end of the spectrum—having himself enthroned as Russia ’ s Elbasy—but nor will he have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peacefully die in office without needing any additional perks .
In the unlikely event that he does choose to retire early , an arsenal of measures to hold on to power behind the scenes is there for his choosing , with Kazakhstan offering a profitable and well-marked path .
Putin could also move in the other direction .
He could simply opt to step away from the helm when his current term expires in 2024 .
This will require an improbable change of direction , but it can not be ruled out .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his own volition , he will leave in his wake an institutional weakness that inevitably results from treating the constitution as a work in progress .
A stable democracy is , after all , first and foremost a matter of developing good political habits .
The longer the habit holds , the easier it is to sustain .
But every reset triggers a return to the starting line and perhaps another chance at transitioning to true democracy .
The experience of Russia ’ s immediate neighborhood shows that such chances have been @ @ @

Between June 25 and July 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a national referendum on a host of constitutional amendments; unsurprisingly, it passed by an overwhelming majority. What drew the attention of most commentators was not the nature of these amendments—which touched on a variety of themes, from increasing social pensions to banning same-sex marriage—but the fact that, by changing the constitution, Putin opened the path to resetting his term as Russian president.
Between June 25 and July 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a national referendum on a host of constitutional amendments; unsurprisingly, it passed by an overwhelming majority. What drew the attention of most commentators was not the nature of these amendments—which touched on a variety of themes, from increasing social pensions to banning same-sex marriage—but the fact that, by changing the constitution, Putin opened the path to resetting his term as Russian president.
In office since 2000, when he was first elected president, Putin has ruled Russia continuously for two decades. (He did step down briefly, taking the position of prime minister from 2008 to 2012, but no one had any illusions as to who actually remained in charge.) Having reset his term, he could now in theory rule until 2036, by which point he will have bested Joseph Stalin as the longest-reigning ruler in Russia’s modern history. If Putin wanted to stay on even then, who could stop him but the constitution, which has already been trampled on?
It is anyone’s guess what Russia’s future might look like, but the immediate neighborhood offers some hints. After all, Central Asian countries were the pioneers of perpetual rule through constitutional amendments and referendums. Already in the 1990s, post-independence rulers of former Soviet republics schemed about holding on to power by resorting to superficially democratic methods. Putin is simply following their lead and implementing the same model in Moscow.
The trailblazer was Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan. In 1998, the country’s Constitutional Court nullified then-President Akayev’s first term (1991-1995), formally allowing him to run for his third term as president in 2000.
Kazakhstan’s longtime leader Nursultan Nazarbayev used the same tactic, when in 2000 the Constitutional Council reset his first term by fiat. Nazarbayev began his second term in 1999, after his presidency was extended via a national referendum. Because Kazakhstan’s constitution permitted no more than two presidential terms, Nazarbayev’s second term was simply declared his first. This allowed him to stand in the following election, which he easily won in 2005.
Nazarbayev was due to step down in 2012. He didn’t. Instead, in 2007, the constitutional two-term limit was eliminated just for Nazarbayev, making him de facto president for life. He remained in office, winning in extraordinary elections in 2011 and 2015—first with over 95 percent of votes and then with nearly 98 percent. Both elections were bitterly criticized by the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as “non-competitive” and lacking “genuine opposition.”
Curiously, in March 2019, Nazarbayev finally decided to retire (though there were no constitutional restraints on his continued rule). But even as he stepped down after almost three decades in power, the former president retained significant levers of control as the lifetime head of the Security Council and the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, as well as a member of the Constitutional Council. He also kept the title of “Elbasy” (leader of the nation).
Meanwhile, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the second president of Kazakhstan, promised to consult with Nazarbayev on the appointment of a wide range of government positions, including heads of regions and all ministers apart from the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and internal affairs.
Two other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have also resorted to pro forma referendums to keep tyrants in power. In Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov ruled the country continuously from its independence in 1991. Karimov’s reign from 1995 to 2000 was extended by a national referendum (that is, without holding elections), whereas his third presidential term (2007-2015) was ostensibly justified by 2002 constitutional amendments that extended the presidential tenure from five to seven years and thus reset his term. The unscheduled extraconstitutional event that ultimately put an end to Karimov’s presidency was his death in 2016.
The same story marked Turkmenistan’s post-independence journey. In 1994, then-President Saparmurat Niyazov (who had been in power since 1990) had his rule extended for eight more years by a nationwide referendum. He shouldn’t have bothered because in 1999 the legislature officially declared Niyazov president for life, thereby doing away with any need to hold sham elections like his Central Asian neighbors.
Niyazov ruled the country until he died in 2006. He was replaced by a former dentist, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who has ruled Turkmenistan continuously since then as a brutal dictator—though he has had his mandate confirmed via regularly held and blatantly fraudulent elections.
Another interesting example comes from Tajikistan’s 2003 referendum. As in Russia in 2020, Tajik citizens in 2003 voted in a referendum on constitutional amendments, which allowed the president, Emomali Rahmon (who had been in power since 1992 and was approaching the end of his second term), to run for another two terms. Rahmon went on to win the 2006 and 2013 elections. (As in Kazakhstan, ODIHR observers concluded that there was no “genuine choice.”) At last, in 2016, another constitutional referendum eliminated the term limits altogether, effectively making Rahmon president for life.
Similarly, the 2009 constitutional referendum in Azerbaijan eliminated the two-term restriction on then-President Ilham Aliyev (who himself is the son of previous President Heydar Aliyev). The younger Aliyev continues to rule, after winning consecutive fraudulent elections—most recently in 2018. He can stay in office indefinitely.
On Russia’s Western flank, in Belarus, constitutional amendments in the 1996 national referendum eventually added two more years to the presidency of the incumbent, Aleksandr Lukashenko. His term, originally begun in 1994, was now counted as having begun in 1996, when the constitution’s new version came into force. But in 2004, Lukashenko, via another referendum, simply abolished the term limit. This paved the way to his continuous reign: He won elections in 2006, 2010, and 2015. Lukashenko is now running for his sixth consecutive term, but this time his political ambitions have met with spirited popular resistance. He has therefore resorted to intimidation and arrests of opposition activists and journalists ahead of the Aug. 9 vote. To avoid being shamed by ODIHR, the Belarusian dictator opted not to invite international observers to witness the election.
Seen against the backdrop of these manipulations, Putin’s decision to perpetuate his rule through the promulgation of a new constitution is wholly unexceptional, falling squarely within the post-Soviet region’s mainstream. From holding fake elections to resetting or abolishing term limits to having oneself proclaimed as “president for life,” there is a wonderful range of options available to all aspiring dictators.
With the recent referendum, Putin has moved along the undemocratic continuum from the more nuanced (electoral fraud) to more creative (resetting terms). He has not yet reached the other end of the spectrum—having himself enthroned as Russia’s Elbasy—but nor will he have to, as he has every opportunity to peacefully die in office without needing any additional perks. In the unlikely event that he does choose to retire early, an arsenal of measures to hold on to power behind the scenes is there for his choosing, with Kazakhstan offering a profitable and well-marked path.
Putin could also move in the other direction. He could simply opt to step away from the helm when his current term expires in 2024. This will require an improbable change of direction, but it cannot be ruled out. But whether or not Putin leaves office of his own volition, he will leave in his wake an institutional weakness that inevitably results from treating the constitution as a work in progress.
A stable democracy is, after all, first and foremost a matter of developing good political habits. The longer the habit holds, the easier it is to sustain. But every reset triggers a return to the starting line and perhaps another chance at transitioning to true democracy. The experience of Russia’s immediate neighborhood shows that such chances have been consistently squandered.