foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Nigeria’s Years of Protest

Nigeria’s Years of Protest

On Thursday night , after days of protest in Nigeria over police abuse , President Muhammadu Buhari finally addressed the nation .
Tensions had been running high since a high-level military unit , the Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) , shot and killed at least 12 demonstrators earlier in the week .
But Buhari failed to mention those deaths in his remarks , instead warning government critics against “ undermining national security.
” As observers wait to see whether anger will bubble over into a new wave of protests this weekend , Foreign Policy has gathered together its best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
Buhari , who was a military dictator in the 1980s , was elected president in 2015 .
In his first term , according to Matt Mossman , a political risk analyst , he continued to rule more like a dictator than “ the head of a modern democracy.
” But Buhari did at least prove his ability to go after corrupt elites , recovering billions of dollars for the state .
By the time of the 2019 presidential election , voters rewarded him “ with a victory that looks decisive by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A smaller number of people than in previous rounds opted to vote , and the new mandate sounds more like ‘ OK , but do better this time ’ than it does ‘ thanks and keep at it.
’ ” Since that vote , the news out of Nigeria has been a mix of good and bad .
In mid-2019 , the country—one of the last three in the world with endemic polio—declared itself polio-free , reported FP ’ s Jefcoate O ’ Donnell .
The success came , O ’ Donnell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts of an array of vaccine advocates , including northern Nigeria ’ s traditional and religious leaders , a network of 20,000 women who have stepped up to take the oral form of the vaccine door to door , and polio survivors themselves.
” The same year , Buhari declared the defeat of the insurgent Islamist group Boko Haram , although its attacks have continued .
Nigeria would never move past the conflict , wrote Audu Bulama Bukarti , an analyst with the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change , until it came @ @ @ @ @ @ @ children—mostly boys—drafted into the conflict on both sides .
“ Regardless of whether boys have been forced to take up arms for Boko Haram or against it by vigilante groups , Nigeria needs to offer the space and resources for them , and others , to heal.
” Meanwhile , explained the journalist Patrick Egwu , “ Nigeria is still deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines .
… Marginalization , unequal political appointments , and ethnic and religious tensions are still brewing division.
” The south , Egwu noted , has criticized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a movement for an independent Biafra , the breakaway state with which Nigeria fought a civil war between 1967 and 1970 , is once again gaining momentum .
“ Insecurity still remains one of Nigeria ’ s biggest challenges , ” affirmed Egwu in another article .
And across the country , “ millions of Christians are living in fear because of the growing attacks by armed men or cattle herders from the Fulani ethnic group.
” The “ herders are Muslims who make regular journeys with their cattle to pastures down south—an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he continued .
The raids , Egwu warned , were increasing the chances of major conflict on yet another dimension : religion .
Especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns , rising violence against women has also reached a crisis point , leading to the declaration of a state of emergency on the issue by the Nigerian governors ’ forum , which also promised to set up a sex offenders registry , according to Egwu .
The move came after days of marches in which protesters “ defied the lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent wave of rape and murder of women and girls in the country.
” Those marches may have been a sign of what was to come this month : further protests , this time over police brutality .
“ During the first two weeks after lockdown began on March 30 , 18 people were killed extrajudicially by the police , according to the National Human Rights Commission , ” Egwu reported .
“ This is not a new phenomenon .
Nigerian police have a notorious record of human rights abuses , brutality , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of offenses , such as refusing to give bribes , holding an expensive phone , or driving a fancy car.
” In fact , he went on , “ [ r ] eports of police brutality are so common across Africa that they ’ re not meaningfully tracked.
” Until that point , police killings were typically followed by “ fancy hashtag activism for justice ” that “ trends for some days .
A moment later , everything returns to normal , and life continues .
There are no street protests demanding justice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The police and other security actors such as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad unit carry on as before .
Hashtag activism is no answer.
” In late October , though , hashtags turned to marches—and how far they will go toward reforming the country remains an open question .

On Thursday night, after days of protest in Nigeria over police abuse, President Muhammadu Buhari finally addressed the nation. Tensions had been running high since a high-level military unit, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), shot and killed at least 12 demonstrators earlier in the week. But Buhari failed to mention those deaths in his remarks, instead warning government critics against “undermining national security.”
On Thursday night, after days of protest in Nigeria over police abuse, President Muhammadu Buhari finally addressed the nation. Tensions had been running high since a high-level military unit, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), shot and killed at least 12 demonstrators earlier in the week. But Buhari failed to mention those deaths in his remarks, instead warning government critics against “undermining national security.”
As observers wait to see whether anger will bubble over into a new wave of protests this weekend, Foreign Policy has gathered together its best reads on Nigeria from the past few years.
Buhari, who was a military dictator in the 1980s, was elected president in 2015. In his first term, according to Matt Mossman, a political risk analyst, he continued to rule more like a dictator than “the head of a modern democracy.” But Buhari did at least prove his ability to go after corrupt elites, recovering billions of dollars for the state. By the time of the 2019 presidential election, voters rewarded him “with a victory that looks decisive by the numbers but feels far less so. A smaller number of people than in previous rounds opted to vote, and the new mandate sounds more like ‘OK, but do better this time’ than it does ‘thanks and keep at it.’”
Since that vote, the news out of Nigeria has been a mix of good and bad. In mid-2019, the country—one of the last three in the world with endemic polio—declared itself polio-free, reported FP’s Jefcoate O’Donnell. The success came, O’Donnell reported, thanks to “the concerted efforts of an array of vaccine advocates, including northern Nigeria’s traditional and religious leaders, a network of 20,000 women who have stepped up to take the oral form of the vaccine door to door, and polio survivors themselves.”
The same year, Buhari declared the defeat of the insurgent Islamist group Boko Haram, although its attacks have continued. Nigeria would never move past the conflict, wrote Audu Bulama Bukarti, an analyst with the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, until it came up with better plans for assisting the children—mostly boys—drafted into the conflict on both sides. “Regardless of whether boys have been forced to take up arms for Boko Haram or against it by vigilante groups, Nigeria needs to offer the space and resources for them, and others, to heal.”
Meanwhile, explained the journalist Patrick Egwu, “Nigeria is still deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. … Marginalization, unequal political appointments, and ethnic and religious tensions are still brewing division.” The south, Egwu noted, has criticized Buhari for favoring the north, and a movement for an independent Biafra, the breakaway state with which Nigeria fought a civil war between 1967 and 1970, is once again gaining momentum.
“Insecurity still remains one of Nigeria’s biggest challenges,” affirmed Egwu in another article. And across the country, “millions of Christians are living in fear because of the growing attacks by armed men or cattle herders from the Fulani ethnic group.” The “herders are Muslims who make regular journeys with their cattle to pastures down south—an area mostly dominated by Christians,” he continued. The raids, Egwu warned, were increasing the chances of major conflict on yet another dimension: religion.
Especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, rising violence against women has also reached a crisis point, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency on the issue by the Nigerian governors’ forum, which also promised to set up a sex offenders registry, according to Egwu. The move came after days of marches in which protesters “defied the lockdown restrictions to voice their anger over the recent wave of rape and murder of women and girls in the country.”
Those marches may have been a sign of what was to come this month: further protests, this time over police brutality. “During the first two weeks after lockdown began on March 30, 18 people were killed extrajudicially by the police, according to the National Human Rights Commission,” Egwu reported. “This is not a new phenomenon. Nigerian police have a notorious record of human rights abuses, brutality, and even extrajudicial killings for the slightest of offenses, such as refusing to give bribes, holding an expensive phone, or driving a fancy car.” In fact, he went on, “[r]eports of police brutality are so common across Africa that they’re not meaningfully tracked.”
Until that point, police killings were typically followed by “fancy hashtag activism for justice” that “trends for some days. A moment later, everything returns to normal, and life continues. There are no street protests demanding justice or the prosecution of the killers. The police and other security actors such as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad unit carry on as before. Hashtag activism is no answer.”
In late October, though, hashtags turned to marches—and how far they will go toward reforming the country remains an open question.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Beijing’s Human Rights Victims Shouldn’t Support Trump

Foreign policy , it is said , rarely makes a dent on the ballot box in the United States .
But in the upcoming presidential election , China has emerged as a dominant if not defining issue .
This is especially true for communities that have long sought to hold Beijing accountable for its litany of human rights crimes .
Among Beijing ’ s strongest opponents—a loose coalition of single-issue voters including Tibetan Americans , Uighur Americans , Hong Kong Americans , Taiwanese Americans , and Chinese dissidents—there is a perception that U.S. President Donald Trump is “ tough on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of reelection .
Trump ’ s clash with China , they believe , could indirectly benefit the aggrieved groups stuck under Beijing ’ s boot .
But the belief that Trump , if reelected , will contain China and empower its adversaries stems from several false assumptions .
First , it overestimates a second Trump administration ’ s commitment to a Cold War-style ideological struggle against Beijing .
Second , it overlooks the fact that a real containment policy can not proceed , let alone succeed , without a global coalition of allies—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under Trump .
Last but not least , it misses the simple truth that Washington can neither democratize nor contain China if Trump destabilizes the United States first .
It is understandable that communities that have been at the receiving end of Beijing ’ s brutality are impressed by Trump ’ s fiery rhetoric , especially his promises to “ make China pay ” for damage done by the COVID-19 pandemic and to “ decouple ” the United States from China .
Three decades of U.S. engagement with China—propelled by the theory that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only failed to democratize China but also further entrenched authoritarianism under the Chinese Communist Party .
In the half century since the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset postulated a causal link between economic modernization and democratization , the so-called modernization theory has faced no challenge as great as China , where an authoritarian regime is drawing its sustenance from the very economic growth that was supposed to end it .
As China becomes a global power , the threat it poses to freedom and human rights goes far beyond its borders .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any intention of waging a sustained geostrategic struggle to contain China or strengthen its adversaries .
Leaked stories from his inner sanctum reveal that Trump lacks the ideological commitment to freedom or democracy necessary to wage a new cold war .
For instance , he told Chinese leader Xi Jinping last year that building concentration camps for Uighurs was the right thing to do , practically greenlighting an impending genocide .
On the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre , he refused to make a statement sympathizing with the students who were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Who cares about it ?
” he complained .
“ I ’ m trying to make a deal.
” On the Tibet front , he could have at least promptly appointed a special coordinator for Tibetan issues , an undersecretary-level position created under President Bill Clinton and filled by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama within one year of taking office .
Trump left this position vacant for the last four years , finally filling it last week but downgrading it to the assistant secretary level .
Each of these incidents reveals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s political imagination .
To be fair , the Trump administration adopted several strong measures on the strategic-economic front and blew open the parameters of U.S. economic dealings with China .
From waging a trade war and sanctioning Huawei to banning WeChat and shutting down the Houston Chinese consulate , Trump has confronted Beijing in a way no other U.S. president has .
Much of the credit , though , should go to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other realists in the administration , who called for injecting reciprocity into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor for too long .
And yet , the anticlimactic end goal of these aggressive measures , in the president ’ s own words , is to “ make a deal ” with Beijing .
Trump is not seeking a systemic transformation of China ; he ’ s merely pursuing a business transaction for the United States .
Furthermore , there is reason to believe that many of his moves were tactical gambles driven by reelection politics rather than strategic initiatives guided by his understanding of the national interest .
Therefore , should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , his hard-line approach to Beijing is unlikely to survive beyond the first trade deal he strikes with Xi .
Trump is not seeking a systemic transformation of China ; he ’ s merely pursuing a business transaction for the United States.Even in the doubly hypothetical scenario that Trump gets reelected and commits himself to a new Cold War against China , he would be highly dependent on the cooperation of multiple allies and like-minded nations .
It is worth pointing out that the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was hardly a two-corner fight ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders matched political will with diplomatic skill to recruit allies to their side .
As Thomas Christensen , the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the George W. Bush administration , put it , “ One nation , however powerful , can not simply create a Cold War on its own.
” Given the relative decline in American power since the turn of the millennium , especially when contrasted with the expanding orbit of Chinese influence , the role of alliances will be even more crucial today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last four years dismantling America ’ s military alliances and strategic partnerships , alienating traditional allies , and antagonizing neutral parties from the Atlantic to the Pacific .
Even the future of NATO , the cornerstone of post-World War II security , has been cast into uncertainty .
Global trust in U.S. leadership has tanked since Trump took office , and the leaders of the country ’ s closest allies—liberal democratic nations such as Germany , Britain , Canada , and France—find it increasingly difficult to advocate pro-U.S. positions to their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the degree to which Trump has orchestrated a retreat from international coordination , heaping scorn on liberal norms and institutions and relinquishing the few human rights instruments that remain in place for holding Beijing accountable for its crimes .
In boycotting key multilateral forums such as the Paris climate agreement and the United Nations Human Rights Council , the Trump administration has only succeeded in ceding these arenas to authoritarian and illiberal states , allowing China in particular to shape the norms that will govern new frontiers of international relations .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences on the ground .
Over the last several years , human rights conditions in China and its occupied territories have steadily deteriorated .
The Chinese government is holding more than 1 million people—mostly Uighurs—in concentration camps in Xinjiang province .
This past year , Beijing laid siege to Hong Kong and passed a harsh national security law , effectively breaking its promise of “ one country , two systems.
” Last month , the German scholar Adrian Zenz reported that Beijing is now bringing Xinjiang ’ s “ system of coercive vocational @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those seeking freedom in or from China are staring into an abyss , as Xi fuses 21st-century technologies with 20th-century totalitarianism to forge a data-driven surveillance state .
The United States ’ democracy promotion tools , which have produced modest success in lesser regimes , have come up short against Beijing .
Many Tibetan Americans , Uighur Americans , Hong Kong Americans , Taiwanese Americans , and Chinese dissidents are left to wonder : If Washington can not democratize China , can it at least destabilize its regime ?
They may see Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that might , in theory , contribute to some kind of regime breakdown in China .
In reality , the only nation Trump is likely to destabilize is his own.In reality , however , the only nation Trump is likely to destabilize is his own .
His unrelenting assault on U.S. democracy—attacking the media , abusing presidential powers , delegitimizing the electoral process—has raised the prospect of democratic breakdown .
Meanwhile , Trump ’ s colossal failure to defend the American public from the COVID-19 pandemic has made Xi seem competent and effective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false halo of legitimacy .
There is a simpler reason why some opponents of Beijing may want to reelect Trump even as they are personally repelled by him : They worry that a Joe Biden presidency might be too soft on China .
As vice president in 2011 , Biden said a rising China was a “ positive development ” not just for China but also “ for America and the world writ large.
” As a senator in 2001 , he supported China ’ s entry into the World Trade Organization .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is that back in 1991 , for instance , Biden sponsored a law that resulted in the creation of Radio Free Asia , one of the most effective institutions of liberation Congress has funded to open up China ’ s closed society by undermining Beijing ’ s media monopoly .
Overall , his record on China is mixed rather than poor .
Ultimately , at a time when the U.S. defense establishment has designated China as the “ greatest long-term threat ” to U.S. security , and when Congress is passing hard-hitting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the fire , Biden will be reluctant to defy the new foreign-policy consensus in Washington .
In fact , the two presidential candidates ’ China policies might converge in practice as much as they diverge in rhetoric .
Yet important differences set Biden apart from Trump .
A Biden administration would be unlikely to trigger a regime breakdown in the United States and accidentally clear the way for a China-led world order .
Most importantly , a Biden administration would repair rather than tear down the rules-based liberal democratic order , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights stands .

Foreign policy, it is said, rarely makes a dent on the ballot box in the United States. But in the upcoming presidential election, China has emerged as a dominant if not defining issue. This is especially true for communities that have long sought to hold Beijing accountable for its litany of human rights crimes. Among Beijing’s strongest opponents—a loose coalition of single-issue voters including Tibetan Americans, Uighur Americans, Hong Kong Americans, Taiwanese Americans, and Chinese dissidents—there is a perception that U.S. President Donald Trump is “ tough on China ” and, therefore, worthy of reelection. Trump’s clash with China, they believe, could indirectly benefit the aggrieved groups stuck under Beijing’s boot.
Foreign policy, it is said, rarely makes a dent on the ballot box in the United States. But in the upcoming presidential election, China has emerged as a dominant if not defining issue. This is especially true for communities that have long sought to hold Beijing accountable for its litany of human rights crimes. Among Beijing’s strongest opponents—a loose coalition of single-issue voters including Tibetan Americans, Uighur Americans, Hong Kong Americans, Taiwanese Americans, and Chinese dissidents—there is a perception that U.S. President Donald Trump is “tough on China” and, therefore, worthy of reelection. Trump’s clash with China, they believe, could indirectly benefit the aggrieved groups stuck under Beijing’s boot.
But the belief that Trump, if reelected, will contain China and empower its adversaries stems from several false assumptions. First, it overestimates a second Trump administration’s commitment to a Cold War-style ideological struggle against Beijing. Second, it overlooks the fact that a real containment policy cannot proceed, let alone succeed, without a global coalition of allies—a core U.S. asset that has greatly depreciated under Trump. Last but not least, it misses the simple truth that Washington can neither democratize nor contain China if Trump destabilizes the United States first.
It is understandable that communities that have been at the receiving end of Beijing’s brutality are impressed by Trump’s fiery rhetoric, especially his promises to “make China pay” for damage done by the COVID-19 pandemic and to “decouple” the United States from China. Three decades of U.S. engagement with China—propelled by the theory that economic development leads to political liberalization—has not only failed to democratize China but also further entrenched authoritarianism under the Chinese Communist Party. In the half century since the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset postulated a causal link between economic modernization and democratization, the so-called modernization theory has faced no challenge as great as China, where an authoritarian regime is drawing its sustenance from the very economic growth that was supposed to end it. As China becomes a global power, the threat it poses to freedom and human rights goes far beyond its borders.
However, there is little evidence that Trump has any intention of waging a sustained geostrategic struggle to contain China or strengthen its adversaries. Leaked stories from his inner sanctum reveal that Trump lacks the ideological commitment to freedom or democracy necessary to wage a new cold war. For instance, he told Chinese leader Xi Jinping last year that building concentration camps for Uighurs was the right thing to do, practically greenlighting an impending genocide. On the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, he refused to make a statement sympathizing with the students who were crushed for seeking democratic reforms. “Who cares about it?” he complained. “I’m trying to make a deal.” On the Tibet front, he could have at least promptly appointed a special coordinator for Tibetan issues, an undersecretary-level position created under President Bill Clinton and filled by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama within one year of taking office. Trump left this position vacant for the last four years, finally filling it last week but downgrading it to the assistant secretary level. Each of these incidents reveals the insignificance of human rights in Trump’s political imagination.
To be fair, the Trump administration adopted several strong measures on the strategic-economic front and blew open the parameters of U.S. economic dealings with China. From waging a trade war and sanctioning Huawei to banning WeChat and shutting down the Houston Chinese consulate, Trump has confronted Beijing in a way no other U.S. president has. Much of the credit, though, should go to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other realists in the administration, who called for injecting reciprocity into a lopsided relationship rigged in China’s favor for too long.
And yet, the anticlimactic end goal of these aggressive measures, in the president’s own words, is to “make a deal” with Beijing. Trump is not seeking a systemic transformation of China; he’s merely pursuing a business transaction for the United States. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that many of his moves were tactical gambles driven by reelection politics rather than strategic initiatives guided by his understanding of the national interest. Therefore, should Trump win a second term in office, his hard-line approach to Beijing is unlikely to survive beyond the first trade deal he strikes with Xi.
Trump is not seeking a systemic transformation of China; he’s merely pursuing a business transaction for the United States.Even in the doubly hypothetical scenario that Trump gets reelected and commits himself to a new Cold War against China, he would be highly dependent on the cooperation of multiple allies and like-minded nations. It is worth pointing out that the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was hardly a two-corner fight; it was a multi-actor conflict where American leaders matched political will with diplomatic skill to recruit allies to their side. As Thomas Christensen, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the George W. Bush administration, put it, “One nation, however powerful, cannot simply create a Cold War on its own.”
Given the relative decline in American power since the turn of the millennium, especially when contrasted with the expanding orbit of Chinese influence, the role of alliances will be even more crucial today. But the Trump administration has spent the last four years dismantling America’s military alliances and strategic partnerships, alienating traditional allies, and antagonizing neutral parties from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Even the future of NATO, the cornerstone of post-World War II security, has been cast into uncertainty. Global trust in U.S. leadership has tanked since Trump took office, and the leaders of the country’s closest allies—liberal democratic nations such as Germany, Britain, Canada, and France—find it increasingly difficult to advocate pro-U.S. positions to their own constituencies.
Equally corrosive to U.S. influence is the degree to which Trump has orchestrated a retreat from international coordination, heaping scorn on liberal norms and institutions and relinquishing the few human rights instruments that remain in place for holding Beijing accountable for its crimes. In boycotting key multilateral forums such as the Paris climate agreement and the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Trump administration has only succeeded in ceding these arenas to authoritarian and illiberal states, allowing China in particular to shape the norms that will govern new frontiers of international relations.
This ongoing erosion of liberal norms has real consequences on the ground. Over the last several years, human rights conditions in China and its occupied territories have steadily deteriorated. The Chinese government is holding more than 1 million people—mostly Uighurs—in concentration camps in Xinjiang province. This past year, Beijing laid siege to Hong Kong and passed a harsh national security law, effectively breaking its promise of “one country, two systems.” Last month, the German scholar Adrian Zenz reported that Beijing is now bringing Xinjiang’s “system of coercive vocational training” to Tibet.
Today, those seeking freedom in or from China are staring into an abyss, as Xi fuses 21st-century technologies with 20th-century totalitarianism to forge a data-driven surveillance state. The United States’ democracy promotion tools, which have produced modest success in lesser regimes, have come up short against Beijing.
Many Tibetan Americans, Uighur Americans, Hong Kong Americans, Taiwanese Americans, and Chinese dissidents are left to wonder: If Washington cannot democratize China, can it at least destabilize its regime? They may see Trump as a disrupter-in-chief, a destabilizing force that might, in theory, contribute to some kind of regime breakdown in China.
In reality, the only nation Trump is likely to destabilize is his own.In reality, however, the only nation Trump is likely to destabilize is his own. His unrelenting assault on U.S. democracy—attacking the media, abusing presidential powers, delegitimizing the electoral process—has raised the prospect of democratic breakdown. Meanwhile, Trump’s colossal failure to defend the American public from the COVID-19 pandemic has made Xi seem competent and effective by comparison, giving the dictatorship a false halo of legitimacy.
There is a simpler reason why some opponents of Beijing may want to reelect Trump even as they are personally repelled by him: They worry that a Joe Biden presidency might be too soft on China. As vice president in 2011, Biden said a rising China was a “positive development” not just for China but also “for America and the world writ large.” As a senator in 2001, he supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that back in 1991, for instance, Biden sponsored a law that resulted in the creation of Radio Free Asia, one of the most effective institutions of liberation Congress has funded to open up China’s closed society by undermining Beijing’s media monopoly. Overall, his record on China is mixed rather than poor.
Ultimately, at a time when the U.S. defense establishment has designated China as the “greatest long-term threat” to U.S. security, and when Congress is passing hard-hitting legislation to hold China’s feet to the fire, Biden will be reluctant to defy the new foreign-policy consensus in Washington. In fact, the two presidential candidates’ China policies might converge in practice as much as they diverge in rhetoric. Yet important differences set Biden apart from Trump. A Biden administration would be unlikely to trigger a regime breakdown in the United States and accidentally clear the way for a China-led world order. Most importantly, a Biden administration would repair rather than tear down the rules-based liberal democratic order, the foundation on which the entire edifice of human rights stands.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--U.S. Plan to Save Semiconductors Misses the Mark, Defense Firms Say

U.S. Plan to Save Semiconductors Misses the Mark , Defense Firms Say In the 2006 film The Departed , Massachusetts State Police take down a mob boss who is smuggling U.S.-made microprocessors to China .
Those microprocessors , one of the cops says , “ are the kind of processors they put into computers to put a cruise missile up the ass of a camel from a couple hundred miles away.
” These “ little pieces of plastic , ” he adds emphatically , “ are about a hundred grand apiece.
” Fourteen years later , the competition between U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever as the rivals pursue 5G technology , hypersonic weapons , and quantum computing .
For U.S. lawmakers , rebuilding a domestic supply chain for critical materials—whether semiconductors or rare-earth elements—has become a central part of the economic and technological rivalry with China .
To lure back some of the semiconductor and microelectronics manufacturing that in the last three decades has fled to Asia , especially China , lawmakers are turning to incentive grants .
What began as several separate congressional bills ended as a section of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to $ 3 billion to build new , U.S.-based semiconductor fabrication plants .
Congress hopes to agree on a final version of the defense funding bill ahead of the Nov. 3 presidential election and vote on it soon after .
But there ’ s one big problem , say companies that build the specialized semiconductors used by the U.S. Defense Department in , for example , radiation-hardened chips on space satellites , anti-jam GPS receivers , and the F-35 fighter .
The bill ’ s current language focuses too much on state-of-the-art @ @ @ @ @ @ @ application-specific , small-order chips that the Pentagon needs to build directed energy weapons , they argue .
Without the addition , their collective employees ’ livelihoods—about 50,000 jobs across the country—are at stake.More than a dozen companies—concerned less with what could power your laptop and more on what might steer that cruise missile—are lobbying Congress to change the defense bill ’ s language to include “ mission-critical and integration-level semiconductors ” before the compromise language is finalized .
This addition would put a spotlight on Pentagon-qualified semiconductor manufacturing and integration and help secure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Without it , their collective employees ’ livelihoods—about 50,000 jobs across the country—are at stake , those companies said .
But the incentive program , even though it ’ s tucked into a defense bill , is meant to be a broader fix for the decades-long disappearance of U.S. chip manufacturing .
The current NDAA language is meant to improve the entire U.S. supply chain for semiconductor manufacturing , said a Hill staffer for a senator involved in the process .
“ Our goal as legislators is to create a broad program that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we want to make sure that it ’ s not overly specific so we don ’ t limit our ability to innovate , ” the staffer said .
The section , multiple sources noted , was included in the NDAA not only because it has national security implications but because it ’ s pretty much the only bill Congress can pass with a broad majority anymore .
While members of Congress are taking the defense industries ’ concerns into account as they finalize the NDAA , the Hill staffer said the inclusion of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limiting the flexibility of the proposed grant incentives .
“ There ’ s nothing in the current language that would make them ineligible from the program or participating in the program .
They just have to compete , ” the staffer continued .
The grants , to be distributed via the Commerce Department , will have a finite amount of funding .
Multiple senators had previously advocated to authorize $ 15 billion , per documents viewed by Foreign Policy , but the total amount is expected to be included in the compromise NDAA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is meant to rejuvenate the whole gamut of high-end U.S. semiconductor design and manufacture , noted James Lewis , the director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , giving the United States the ability to make a play for the high ground of the new global economy .
Adding more sector-specific language to the semiconductor section to assuage defense firms risks watering down that intent , he said , as more firms will be taking a slice out of a single pie .
“ We want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the technological leader in semiconductors , ” Lewis said .
“ The Chinese can not duplicate what they get from Qualcomm and Intel .
They can not make 5G without America.
” Meanwhile , the United States could easily replicate what it gets from China , “ but we got out of that business … because it ’ s not where you make the most money.
” “ We want to spend money on keeping America as the technological leader in semiconductors.
” For decades , lawmakers , industry , and experts have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share of global semiconductor manufacturing has plummeted , while China ’ s share has risen .
In 1990 , the United States made 37 percent of the world ’ s semiconductors , according to a September report by the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Boston Consulting Group .
It ’ s now at 12 percent and is projected to drop to 10 percent by 2030 .
By 2030 , 77 percent of computing chips will likely be produced in Asia , primarily in China and Taiwan , with 24 percent and 21 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report said .
Industry experts noted that should tensions between China and Taiwan worsen , the U.S. semiconductor makers that rely on parts made by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. ( TSMC ) and other foundries in the country would suffer greatly .
“ Because 75 % of the global capacity is already concentrated in East Asia , maintaining domestic manufacturing capabilities is essential to ensure the US semiconductor industry has a highly resilient , geographically diversified supply chain , ” the report ’ s authors said , noting that this issue is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. defense systems .
Ellen Lord , the Pentagon ’ s chief acquisition czar , said at a think tank event in July that the country has become entangled in a “ potentially compromised position , where we have U.S. intellectual property , in terms of designs , going offshore for fabrication and packaging.
” This leaves the United States with vulnerabilities that are “ unacceptable moving forward , ” she added .
The commercial semiconductor industry has begun to respond .
TSMC , which owns the world ’ s largest foundry , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 12 billion to build a new fabrication facility , or fab , in Arizona .
Currently , most of its facilities are in Taiwan , with two in mainland China and one in Washington state .
Intel has also expressed interest in working with the Defense Department to build a new U.S.-based foundry .
Ironically , U.S. defense needs are one driver of the exodus of chipmakers .
Fewer companies are able to meet the stringent Defense Department requirements for design and manufacturing , said John Costello , the vice president of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ develops circuits for defense and aerospace systems .
It makes better financial sense for some to exit the market and then adopt a “ fab-less model and outsource a lot of stuff so [ they ] can go after that high-volume commercial application , ” he said .
Costello , whose company is part of the group lobbying Congress to change the language , underscored the threat of offshore supply chains , even if they ’ re in a friendly place like Taiwan .
If there were a disruption in Taiwan , Microchip @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of silicon wafers for its microchips , he said , and would have to requalify its whole line of products .
Other chipmakers acknowledge that reshoring will mean higher costs—but also greater resilience .
China has the benefit of “ very , very cheap labor , ” and manufacturing and integration should be reshored to the United States , said Terry Spitzer , the CEO of Global Technical Systems .
His company provides cybersecurity and security products to the U.S. military and is also advocating for the language change .
“ Will it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cost a little more , ” he said .
“ But in the long run , we ’ ll have those jobs in this country , we ’ ll have the technology … and we ’ ll have the secure supply lines.
” For Lewis , the whole fight over which firms and which technologies should benefit from multibillion-dollar government grants has a familiar ring .
“ This is the usual unseemly battle over who gets to feed at the federal trough , ” he said .
Those involved in the joint industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case .
“ We take this issue very seriously , as our country ’ s competitive edge from global rivals , our national security , and more than 50,000 American jobs in at least 16 U.S. cities in nine different states are at stake , ” the group said .

In the 2006 film The Departed, Massachusetts State Police take down a mob boss who is smuggling U.S.-made microprocessors to China. Those microprocessors, one of the cops says, “are the kind of processors they put into computers to put a cruise missile up the ass of a camel from a couple hundred miles away.” These “little pieces of plastic,” he adds emphatically, “are about a hundred grand apiece.”
In the 2006 film The Departed, Massachusetts State Police take down a mob boss who is smuggling U.S.-made microprocessors to China. Those microprocessors, one of the cops says, “are the kind of processors they put into computers to put a cruise missile up the ass of a camel from a couple hundred miles away.” These “little pieces of plastic,” he adds emphatically, “are about a hundred grand apiece.”
Fourteen years later, the competition between U.S. and Chinese microelectronics manufacturing is hotter than ever as the rivals pursue 5G technology, hypersonic weapons, and quantum computing. For U.S. lawmakers, rebuilding a domestic supply chain for critical materials—whether semiconductors or rare-earth elements—has become a central part of the economic and technological rivalry with China.
To lure back some of the semiconductor and microelectronics manufacturing that in the last three decades has fled to Asia, especially China, lawmakers are turning to incentive grants. What began as several separate congressional bills ended as a section of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would offer companies up to $3 billion to build new, U.S.-based semiconductor fabrication plants. Congress hopes to agree on a final version of the defense funding bill ahead of the Nov. 3 presidential election and vote on it soon after.
But there’s one big problem, say companies that build the specialized semiconductors used by the U.S. Defense Department in, for example, radiation-hardened chips on space satellites, anti-jam GPS receivers, and the F-35 fighter. The bill’s current language focuses too much on state-of-the-art commercial chips and not enough on the application-specific, small-order chips that the Pentagon needs to build directed energy weapons, they argue.
Without the addition, their collective employees’ livelihoods—about 50,000 jobs across the country—are at stake.More than a dozen companies—concerned less with what could power your laptop and more on what might steer that cruise missile—are lobbying Congress to change the defense bill’s language to include “mission-critical and integration-level semiconductors” before the compromise language is finalized. This addition would put a spotlight on Pentagon-qualified semiconductor manufacturing and integration and help secure an increasingly fragile global supply chain. Without it, their collective employees’ livelihoods—about 50,000 jobs across the country—are at stake, those companies said.
But the incentive program, even though it’s tucked into a defense bill, is meant to be a broader fix for the decades-long disappearance of U.S. chip manufacturing. The current NDAA language is meant to improve the entire U.S. supply chain for semiconductor manufacturing, said a Hill staffer for a senator involved in the process.
“Our goal as legislators is to create a broad program that can help solve this problem, and we want to make sure that it’s not overly specific so we don’t limit our ability to innovate,” the staffer said. The section, multiple sources noted, was included in the NDAA not only because it has national security implications but because it’s pretty much the only bill Congress can pass with a broad majority anymore.
While members of Congress are taking the defense industries’ concerns into account as they finalize the NDAA, the Hill staffer said the inclusion of “mission-critical and integration-level semiconductors” risked limiting the flexibility of the proposed grant incentives.
“There’s nothing in the current language that would make them ineligible from the program or participating in the program. They just have to compete,” the staffer continued.
The grants, to be distributed via the Commerce Department, will have a finite amount of funding. Multiple senators had previously advocated to authorize $15 billion, per documents viewed by Foreign Policy, but the total amount is expected to be included in the compromise NDAA.
The language of the NDAA section is meant to rejuvenate the whole gamut of high-end U.S. semiconductor design and manufacture, noted James Lewis, the director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, giving the United States the ability to make a play for the high ground of the new global economy. Adding more sector-specific language to the semiconductor section to assuage defense firms risks watering down that intent, he said, as more firms will be taking a slice out of a single pie.
“We want to spend money on keeping America as the technological leader in semiconductors,” Lewis said. “The Chinese cannot duplicate what they get from Qualcomm and Intel. They cannot make 5G without America.” Meanwhile, the United States could easily replicate what it gets from China, “but we got out of that business … because it’s not where you make the most money.”“We want to spend money on keeping America as the technological leader in semiconductors.”
For decades, lawmakers, industry, and experts have all watched with concern as the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing has plummeted, while China’s share has risen. In 1990, the United States made 37 percent of the world’s semiconductors, according to a September report by the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Boston Consulting Group. It’s now at 12 percent and is projected to drop to 10 percent by 2030.
By 2030, 77 percent of computing chips will likely be produced in Asia, primarily in China and Taiwan, with 24 percent and 21 percent of the share, respectively, the report said. Industry experts noted that should tensions between China and Taiwan worsen, the U.S. semiconductor makers that rely on parts made by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) and other foundries in the country would suffer greatly.
“Because 75% of the global capacity is already concentrated in East Asia, maintaining domestic manufacturing capabilities is essential to ensure the US semiconductor industry has a highly resilient, geographically diversified supply chain,” the report’s authors said, noting that this issue is particularly critical for computer chips used in U.S. defense systems.
Ellen Lord, the Pentagon’s chief acquisition czar, said at a think tank event in July that the country has become entangled in a “potentially compromised position, where we have U.S. intellectual property, in terms of designs, going offshore for fabrication and packaging.” This leaves the United States with vulnerabilities that are “unacceptable moving forward,” she added.
The commercial semiconductor industry has begun to respond. TSMC, which owns the world’s largest foundry, announced this year that it would invest $12 billion to build a new fabrication facility, or fab, in Arizona. Currently, most of its facilities are in Taiwan, with two in mainland China and one in Washington state. Intel has also expressed interest in working with the Defense Department to build a new U.S.-based foundry.
Ironically, U.S. defense needs are one driver of the exodus of chipmakers. Fewer companies are able to meet the stringent Defense Department requirements for design and manufacturing, said John Costello, the vice president of government affairs for Microchip Technology, which develops circuits for defense and aerospace systems. It makes better financial sense for some to exit the market and then adopt a “fab-less model and outsource a lot of stuff so [they] can go after that high-volume commercial application,” he said.
Costello, whose company is part of the group lobbying Congress to change the language, underscored the threat of offshore supply chains, even if they’re in a friendly place like Taiwan. If there were a disruption in Taiwan, Microchip Technology would need to find another supplier of silicon wafers for its microchips, he said, and would have to requalify its whole line of products.
Other chipmakers acknowledge that reshoring will mean higher costs—but also greater resilience. China has the benefit of “very, very cheap labor,” and manufacturing and integration should be reshored to the United States, said Terry Spitzer, the CEO of Global Technical Systems. His company provides cybersecurity and security products to the U.S. military and is also advocating for the language change.
“Will it cost a little more? It will cost a little more,” he said. “But in the long run, we’ll have those jobs in this country, we’ll have the technology … and we’ll have the secure supply lines.”
For Lewis, the whole fight over which firms and which technologies should benefit from multibillion-dollar government grants has a familiar ring.
“This is the usual unseemly battle over who gets to feed at the federal trough,” he said.
Those involved in the joint industry effort insist that’s not the case. “We take this issue very seriously, as our country’s competitive edge from global rivals, our national security, and more than 50,000 American jobs in at least 16 U.S. cities in nine different states are at stake,” the group said.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--The Taliban’s Highway Robbery

The Taliban’s Highway Robbery

KABUL—Each year , as winter closes in on Afghanistan ’ s rugged mountainous region , Mohammad Bilal , a 45-year-old coal worker , readies himself for a busy few months .
As temperatures drop , and without better sources for heat , the demand for coal will soar .
This year , Bilal , who requested to go by a pseudonym for his safety , expects the winter months to be stressful for a different reason .
Thanks to hikes in the payments that the Taliban extort from businesses as “ taxes , ” he expects the price of this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and customers who depend on the fuel for warmth .
While businesses in the region have grown accustomed to local insurgent groups demanding money , the recent spike in fighting has seen an increase in the amount they have had to pay to ensure secure passage of their goods through Taliban-controlled areas .
“ We pay the Afghan government taxes , but we also have to pay the Taliban to continue operating , ” Bilal , who has been operating a coal distribution business in the northern provinces of Afghanistan for the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Earlier we used to pay Taliban 3,000-3,500 afghanis [ $ 40-45 ] per truck , but now they charge 10,000 afghanis [ $ 130 ] per truck .
This is aside from what we pay the Afghan government.
” The Taliban ’ s so-called taxes are collected at various checkpoints along the national highways that crisscross Afghanistan ’ s conflict-riddled landscape .
In years past , the checkpoints weren ’ t always manned .
But this year , “ there is always someone there to collect the money , ” Bilal said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complete with their logo and a stamp to officiate the collection process .
A failure to pay or to provide a receipt , Bilal says , is punished by Taliban insurgents setting fire to their trucks .
Rizwan , an Afghan truck driver who regularly transits the northern trade routes between Kabul and the provinces that border Turkmenistan , Uzbekistan , and Tajikistan , concurred with Bilal .
Rizwan , whose name has also been changed , has been a driver for nearly a decade and has seen the gradual change in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Not only do they have more control over certain parts of the road than they did before , they are also more serious about collecting their taxes , ” he said in an interview in September .
“ If we don ’ t pay , they won ’ t let us pass .
… If you escape , you will be caught at another checkpoint .
It is impossible to avoid their taxes.
” According to Mohammad Najeeb Azizi , a former chief economist with the Afghan government , the Taliban are also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the south , southeast , southwest , and including on crucial trade highways between Herat and Kandahar , Kabul and Kandahar , and even Kabul and Khost .
“ In fact , it is not only the coal traders who are paying these illegal taxes to the Taliban , but there are unconfirmed reports that even state-owned enterprises such as DABS [ Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat , Afghanistan ’ s national power company ] are paying these taxes to them in a number of districts they control , ” he said in Kabul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various sources of revenue , mainly coming from state as well as nonstate actors in the region and internationally , ” Azizi pointed out .
“ However , for their local military operations , they rely heavily on the narcotics and mining sector , along with collecting Islamic taxes such as zakat and ushr from local farmers and businesses.
” The Taliban ’ s finances , although opaque , have been the subject of many studies over the years .
A recent report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty estimated that the Taliban earned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last financial year , of which $ 160 million was acquired from taxes .
This is significantly higher than in the previous years , when the total was speculated to be about $ 1 billion .
The most notable increase in profits , the report observed , was from the mining sector , “ growing from $ 35 million in 2016 to $ 464 million in 2020.
” Afghan officials acknowledge the problem .
“ Let ’ s not call it tax .
Tax is only paid to the government that provides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khan Masjidi , a spokesperson at the Afghan Finance Ministry , said in an interview in Kabul last week .
“ What the Taliban collect is extortion money and is against the law , ” he said , admitting that it was an unfortunate extra burden on the private sector .
The Afghan security agencies have attempted , with little success , to protect districts and highways that the Taliban troll for “ tax collection.
” However , the magnitude of the war and the increasing areas of control under the Taliban have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s illegal business .
Afghan economists suspect the increase in the amount that the Taliban extort from the transportation services is to help fund their growing insurgency .
According to Azizi , the revenue is used particularly for financing their operations , strengthening their networks , and for new recruitments .
“ Of course , since the deal signed between the U.S. and Taliban , we have seen a dramatic increase in the military operations by the Taliban across the country , so I do see it as a reason why this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he speculated .
Meanwhile , the Taliban taxes have become part of the way the group is positioning itself as an alternative government .
The Taliban spend a small fraction of their budgets on public services .
For instance , at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic , they launched a health campaign to raise awareness of the disease and encourage people to take precaution .
However , such efforts are not a significant portion of the Taliban ’ s spending .
For local coal businesses , the multiple duties , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor , are bound to increase the costs of their products this year .
“ Last year , the prices were about 12,000 afghanis [ $ 156 ] per tonne , but this year it is already over 15,000 afghanis [ $ 195 ] for the same amount , and we fear it might increase further , ” Bilal said .
“ I don ’ t know how will the poor will afford coal , especially with the winter coming.
” Rizwan added in agreement .
“ The rich will survive .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suffer , ” he said , the concern sounding deeply personal to the truck driver who makes about $ 130 per month .
“ We earn our living , despite these risks , to feed our family and children , but they use the money they collect to feed our children and families with bullets and rockets .
”

KABUL—Each year, as winter closes in on Afghanistan’s rugged mountainous region, Mohammad Bilal, a 45-year-old coal worker, readies himself for a busy few months. As temperatures drop, and without better sources for heat, the demand for coal will soar.
KABUL—Each year, as winter closes in on Afghanistan’s rugged mountainous region, Mohammad Bilal, a 45-year-old coal worker, readies himself for a busy few months. As temperatures drop, and without better sources for heat, the demand for coal will soar.
This year, Bilal, who requested to go by a pseudonym for his safety, expects the winter months to be stressful for a different reason. Thanks to hikes in the payments that the Taliban extort from businesses as “taxes,” he expects the price of this essential winter commodity to rise significantly—straining markets and customers who depend on the fuel for warmth.
While businesses in the region have grown accustomed to local insurgent groups demanding money, the recent spike in fighting has seen an increase in the amount they have had to pay to ensure secure passage of their goods through Taliban-controlled areas. “We pay the Afghan government taxes, but we also have to pay the Taliban to continue operating,” Bilal, who has been operating a coal distribution business in the northern provinces of Afghanistan for the last 18 years, said in September. “Earlier we used to pay Taliban 3,000-3,500 afghanis [$40-45] per truck, but now they charge 10,000 afghanis [$130] per truck. This is aside from what we pay the Afghan government.”
The Taliban’s so-called taxes are collected at various checkpoints along the national highways that crisscross Afghanistan’s conflict-riddled landscape. In years past, the checkpoints weren’t always manned. But this year, “there is always someone there to collect the money,” Bilal said. The Taliban even issue tax receipts complete with their logo and a stamp to officiate the collection process. A failure to pay or to provide a receipt, Bilal says, is punished by Taliban insurgents setting fire to their trucks.
Rizwan, an Afghan truck driver who regularly transits the northern trade routes between Kabul and the provinces that border Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, concurred with Bilal. Rizwan, whose name has also been changed, has been a driver for nearly a decade and has seen the gradual change in the Taliban’s extortion operations. “Not only do they have more control over certain parts of the road than they did before, they are also more serious about collecting their taxes,” he said in an interview in September. “If we don’t pay, they won’t let us pass. … If you escape, you will be caught at another checkpoint. It is impossible to avoid their taxes.”
Coalworkers share anecdotal evidence of harassment by the Taliban who have threatened to set trucks on fire over non-payment of their taxes in Mazar-i-Sharif on Sept. 26. Hikmat Noori for Foreign Policy
According to Mohammad Najeeb Azizi, a former chief economist with the Afghan government, the Taliban are also getting serious about levying their tolls in the south, southeast, southwest, and including on crucial trade highways between Herat and Kandahar, Kabul and Kandahar, and even Kabul and Khost. “In fact, it is not only the coal traders who are paying these illegal taxes to the Taliban, but there are unconfirmed reports that even state-owned enterprises such as DABS [Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, Afghanistan’s national power company] are paying these taxes to them in a number of districts they control,” he said in Kabul in October.
“The Taliban have various sources of revenue, mainly coming from state as well as nonstate actors in the region and internationally,” Azizi pointed out. “However, for their local military operations, they rely heavily on the narcotics and mining sector, along with collecting Islamic taxes such as zakat and ushr from local farmers and businesses.”
The Taliban’s finances, although opaque, have been the subject of many studies over the years. A recent report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty estimated that the Taliban earned a total of $1.6 billion in the last financial year, of which $160 million was acquired from taxes. This is significantly higher than in the previous years, when the total was speculated to be about $1 billion. The most notable increase in profits, the report observed, was from the mining sector, “growing from $35 million in 2016 to $464 million in 2020.”
Afghan officials acknowledge the problem. “Let’s not call it tax. Tax is only paid to the government that provides services to the people,” Shamroz Khan Masjidi, a spokesperson at the Afghan Finance Ministry, said in an interview in Kabul last week. “What the Taliban collect is extortion money and is against the law,” he said, admitting that it was an unfortunate extra burden on the private sector. The Afghan security agencies have attempted, with little success, to protect districts and highways that the Taliban troll for “tax collection.” However, the magnitude of the war and the increasing areas of control under the Taliban have made it harder to prevent the group’s illegal business.
Afghan economists suspect the increase in the amount that the Taliban extort from the transportation services is to help fund their growing insurgency. According to Azizi, the revenue is used particularly for financing their operations, strengthening their networks, and for new recruitments. “Of course, since the deal signed between the U.S. and Taliban, we have seen a dramatic increase in the military operations by the Taliban across the country, so I do see it as a reason why this may have increased taxes and collection frequencies,” he speculated.
Meanwhile, the Taliban taxes have become part of the way the group is positioning itself as an alternative government. The Taliban spend a small fraction of their budgets on public services. For instance, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, they launched a health campaign to raise awareness of the disease and encourage people to take precaution. However, such efforts are not a significant portion of the Taliban’s spending.
For local coal businesses, the multiple duties, coupled with high costs of production and labor, are bound to increase the costs of their products this year. “Last year, the prices were about 12,000 afghanis [$156] per tonne, but this year it is already over 15,000 afghanis [$195] for the same amount, and we fear it might increase further,” Bilal said. “I don’t know how will the poor will afford coal, especially with the winter coming.”
Rizwan added in agreement. “The rich will survive. It will be the poor Afghans who will suffer,” he said, the concern sounding deeply personal to the truck driver who makes about $130 per month. “We earn our living, despite these risks, to feed our family and children, but they use the money they collect to feed our children and families with bullets and rockets.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--There’s Still Time (Barely) for America to Have a Free and Fair Election

There ’ s Still Time ( Barely ) for America to Have a Free and Fair Election When U.S. President Donald Trump predicts electoral fraud , unfair elections , or tampering with mail-in ballots , he is essentially indicting himself .
If global election monitoring teaches anything , it ’ s that responsibility for addressing glitches in an election process , and ensuring it serves voters , ultimately belongs with the serving government .
That is not to imply that elections are ever perfect .
There are always new insights to apply , especially as new technologies are introduced across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as the United States deals with the public health threat posed by COVID-19 , securing a safe , fair and healthy election will require unconventional steps .
Fortunately , lessons can already be gleaned from experience .
Looking around the world , it ’ s safe to conclude that most people will still opt to vote in person .
Anticipating the needed protective equipment such as face masks and sanitizers for poll workers and voters will be a vital measure .
Election authorities across the United States will also need to compensate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Those hurdles mean there will be an increase in overseas votes , which authorities will need additional capacity to count in timely fashion .
Specific exemptions on travel restrictions should also be made for international election observers and journalists who have always been able to report on the election .
American authorities should plan ways to counter adversaries hoping to interfere in the election .
Research has shown that manipulating media and public opinion is the main objective of many of the outsiders who meddle in elections .
To avoid amplifying such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to maintain discipline and clarity in their messaging .
This is important before but especially after election day .
In a divided country , credible and consistent messengers—people outside the partisan fray , widely recognized for their expertise in public health , democratic processes , or cybersecurity—will be vital to ensuring key information reaches people .
U.S. authorities should already be considering how to bring such a group of messengers together .
Journalists will have a responsibility to adopt a code of conduct on how to deal with last-minute leaks of information exfiltrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they not take initial claims , including those circulating on social media , at face value .
( Often , malicious actors have manipulated the spread of rumors by attaching the label “ leak ” to disinformation . )
In France , the national electoral commission warned media organizations ahead of the last presidential election not to publish materials illegally obtained through hacking attacks .
When hacked documents were dumped online an hour before the start of the so-called blackout barring campaign coverage days before the vote , French media followed the commission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Le Monde did eventually assess the documents but concluded the timing and release of the information could only be aimed at disturbing the democratic process .
And so # MacronLeaks did not have the massive impact that the hackers might have hoped for .
Authorities should work to make more IT support available to local election officials .
Having technical experts on call would help deal with Election Day glitches .
Before the elections , a combination of stress tests , tabletop exercises , and Election Day simulation games can ensure that technical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Having auditable systems and paper trails for verification purposes would further help bolster voter confidence .
Social media companies must also accept responsibility for ensuring a fair election .
New civic initiatives—including the Election Integrity Partnership and the Healthy Elections Project—allow for real-time monitoring of potential threats and the sharing of best practices .
Still , no external party will ever have the view that social media companies themselves have of what disinformation and manipulation attempts are flowing through their ecosystems .
The government , or other social actors , can attempt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that happens , the greatest impact will come from the companies themselves committing to be transparent about the measures they are taking to police disinformation and to otherwise avoid becoming the instruments of those who want to destroy democracy .
Political parties and candidates should likewise pledge not to use hacked , leaked , or doxxed information and must vow to refrain from deploying such tactics , including through third-party consultants .
Any claims of illegal behavior by political participants should be directed to independent arbiters who can ensure swift accountability .
Having @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will independently evaluate the elections , regardless of whether there is acute reason for concern , would further inspire confidence in the election .
Even with the sort of ad hoc all-of-society approach described above , the Nov. 3 election will still surface underlying social or political problems .
In the United States , these include the lack of a federal data protection law , structural inequalities , or the de facto disenfranchisement of people with health challenges .
A long-term agenda to ensure these structural problems are tackled must not be overshadowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ term .
From the procurement of election technologies to the updating of campaign finance and advertising rules , the work toward safeguarding fair , safe , and healthy elections in the United States is an ongoing process .
The only way to ensure trust in the coming presidential election is for all of society—from poll workers to journalists to researchers to campaign workers , and not least to voters—to work together toward that goal .
The challenge is great , because of the pandemic , polarization , and allegations of fraud that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s why the United States should not wait to carry out ad hoc measures to improve the electoral system ’ s resilience .
There is no doubt that the world will be watching what happens in November .
The fairness , safety , and legitimacy of the presidential election will have consequences for the resilience of democracy not only in the United States , but everywhere .

When U.S. President Donald Trump predicts electoral fraud, unfair elections, or tampering with mail-in ballots, he is essentially indicting himself. If global election monitoring teaches anything, it’s that responsibility for addressing glitches in an election process, and ensuring it serves voters, ultimately belongs with the serving government.
When U.S. President Donald Trump predicts electoral fraud, unfair elections, or tampering with mail-in ballots, he is essentially indicting himself. If global election monitoring teaches anything, it’s that responsibility for addressing glitches in an election process, and ensuring it serves voters, ultimately belongs with the serving government.
That is not to imply that elections are ever perfect. There are always new insights to apply, especially as new technologies are introduced across the entire electoral process. This year, as the United States deals with the public health threat posed by COVID-19, securing a safe, fair and healthy election will require unconventional steps. Fortunately, lessons can already be gleaned from experience.
Looking around the world, it’s safe to conclude that most people will still opt to vote in person. Anticipating the needed protective equipment such as face masks and sanitizers for poll workers and voters will be a vital measure. Election authorities across the United States will also need to compensate for the effects of international travel restrictions. Those hurdles mean there will be an increase in overseas votes, which authorities will need additional capacity to count in timely fashion. Specific exemptions on travel restrictions should also be made for international election observers and journalists who have always been able to report on the election.
American authorities should plan ways to counter adversaries hoping to interfere in the election. Research has shown that manipulating media and public opinion is the main objective of many of the outsiders who meddle in elections. To avoid amplifying such malicious efforts, public authorities will need to maintain discipline and clarity in their messaging. This is important before but especially after election day. In a divided country, credible and consistent messengers—people outside the partisan fray, widely recognized for their expertise in public health, democratic processes, or cybersecurity—will be vital to ensuring key information reaches people. U.S. authorities should already be considering how to bring such a group of messengers together.
Journalists will have a responsibility to adopt a code of conduct on how to deal with last-minute leaks of information exfiltrated through hacks. It is crucial that they not take initial claims, including those circulating on social media, at face value. (Often, malicious actors have manipulated the spread of rumors by attaching the label “leak” to disinformation.)
In France, the national electoral commission warned media organizations ahead of the last presidential election not to publish materials illegally obtained through hacking attacks. When hacked documents were dumped online an hour before the start of the so-called blackout barring campaign coverage days before the vote, French media followed the commission’s advice. Media organizations including Le Monde did eventually assess the documents but concluded the timing and release of the information could only be aimed at disturbing the democratic process. And so #MacronLeaks did not have the massive impact that the hackers might have hoped for.
Authorities should work to make more IT support available to local election officials. Having technical experts on call would help deal with Election Day glitches. Before the elections, a combination of stress tests, tabletop exercises, and Election Day simulation games can ensure that technical vulnerabilities are caught and patched in time. Having auditable systems and paper trails for verification purposes would further help bolster voter confidence.
Social media companies must also accept responsibility for ensuring a fair election. New civic initiatives—including the Election Integrity Partnership and the Healthy Elections Project—allow for real-time monitoring of potential threats and the sharing of best practices. Still, no external party will ever have the view that social media companies themselves have of what disinformation and manipulation attempts are flowing through their ecosystems. The government, or other social actors, can attempt to regulate these companies, but until that happens, the greatest impact will come from the companies themselves committing to be transparent about the measures they are taking to police disinformation and to otherwise avoid becoming the instruments of those who want to destroy democracy.
Political parties and candidates should likewise pledge not to use hacked, leaked, or doxxed information and must vow to refrain from deploying such tactics, including through third-party consultants. Any claims of illegal behavior by political participants should be directed to independent arbiters who can ensure swift accountability. Having in place a committee of inquiry that will independently evaluate the elections, regardless of whether there is acute reason for concern, would further inspire confidence in the election.
Even with the sort of ad hoc all-of-society approach described above, the Nov. 3 election will still surface underlying social or political problems. In the United States, these include the lack of a federal data protection law, structural inequalities, or the de facto disenfranchisement of people with health challenges. A long-term agenda to ensure these structural problems are tackled must not be overshadowed by the urgent needs in the short term. From the procurement of election technologies to the updating of campaign finance and advertising rules, the work toward safeguarding fair, safe, and healthy elections in the United States is an ongoing process.
The only way to ensure trust in the coming presidential election is for all of society—from poll workers to journalists to researchers to campaign workers, and not least to voters—to work together toward that goal. The challenge is great, because of the pandemic, polarization, and allegations of fraud that the president himself regularly fuels. That’s why the United States should not wait to carry out ad hoc measures to improve the electoral system’s resilience.
There is no doubt that the world will be watching what happens in November. The fairness, safety, and legitimacy of the presidential election will have consequences for the resilience of democracy not only in the United States, but everywhere.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Is India Overturning Decades of Nuclear Doctrine?

In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Oct. 14 , Indian Ambassador Pankaj Sharma reiterated that—even as tensions with neighboring China heat up—his country remains committed to its doctrine that it will not use its nuclear weapons against an adversary unless first attacked with them .
India ’ s adherence to a no-first-use principle is long-standing .
Ever since 1998 , when the country went nuclear , New Delhi has rejected the idea of initiating the use of such weapons in any conflict scenario .
Nukes , in Indian strategy , are purely retaliatory .
And that stance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The relatively small size of India ’ s arsenal ruled out a first strike anyway , and the country ’ s commitment to restraint , meanwhile , built its image as a responsible nuclear stakeholder and helped ease New Delhi ’ s accommodation in the international nuclear order .
But India ’ s steadfast rhetorical adherence to its no-first-use principle has been facing challenges on multiple fronts .
First , there is a growing consensus in the Western nonproliferation community that , in practice , New Delhi has already nearly relinquished the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that should India and Pakistan go to war , India would ready its nuclear force for preemptive strikes .
And it has acquired the capability—nuclear arsenal , delivery systems , and ISR ( intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance ) systems—to do so .
Moreover , having already been granted recognition of its right to a nuclear program through the 2005 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal , New Delhi has less incentive for caution .
Second , China and India are embroiled in military scuffling in the Western Himalayas , where the Chinese army has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Given the disparity between New Delhi ’ s conventional military power and Beijing ’ s , publicly adopting a first-use doctrine would communicate both power and resolve on India ’ s part .
In other words , this would be an opportune time for India to align its stated policy with its apparent intentions .
Sharma ’ s message , though , amounts to a categorical rejection of both facts .
The essential puzzle in India ’ s nuclear policy , therefore , boils down to the following : If Indian intentions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear weapons have indeed shifted , why is New Delhi hesitant about leveraging this shift where it may matter most—against China ?
States do have an incentive to hide new military capabilities ; the no-first-use doctrine may simply be a public lie to hide private intentions .
However , backing away from the principle would also signal strength and perhaps make it less likely that India would need to use its new military capabilities to begin with .
Another explanation is that India doesn ’ t think it needs the added deterrence .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a conventional buildup along the border with China .
But that has put enormous strain on its underequipped and overstretched armed forces , as well as its underperforming economy .
Diplomatically , too , building up conventional deterrence has been costly .
Measures such as inviting Australia to joint naval exercises in Malabar and initiating official trade talks with Taiwan rattle Beijing , but not much more .
Meanwhile , they entrap New Delhi into expensive commitments .
In reality , the reason New Delhi persists with the same old principles despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear capabilities are not all that the assessments suggest .
India remains fundamentally vulnerable .
For a country facing two nuclear-armed adversaries—China and Pakistan , both of which have territorial aims against India and maintain a strategic alliance by targeting it—India ’ s nuclear arsenal remains relatively modest : 150 atomic warheads and perhaps 50-60 missiles .
Any preemptive targeting of Pakistani atomic assets , for example , would consume most of that arsenal , leaving India utterly vulnerable to a Chinese strike .
An attack on Pakistan would , meanwhile , free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using nuclear weapons of its own even as it undermines India ’ s own moral authority .
In that way , relinquishing its no-first-use policy would actually exaggerate India ’ s nuclear dilemmas .
There ’ s also the problem that its existing arsenal is not really suited to any of its tactical objectives .
As the Indian national security expert Bharat Karnad has argued , the “ only credible nuclear deterrent ” in the case of an Indian-Chinese war on the Himalayan front , would be “ atomic demolition munitions ( ADMs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ line along the likely ingress routes of the [ Chinese military ] in the mountain.
” AMDs are nuclear land mines , whose tactical value in the rugged terrain of the Himalayas has been questioned by the Indian Army since the 1960s .
Moreover , as the downstream nation , the environmental effects of nuclear use would be disastrous for India more than for China .
Efficiency notwithstanding , the problem of proportionality persists as well .
No decision-maker in Beijing would believe a threat from New Delhi to use tactical nuclear weapons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its territory .
Beijing remains the overwhelmingly superior conventional and nuclear power .
To be sure , against the backdrop of Sino-Indian military tensions , calls in India for New Delhi to leverage its nukes for deterrence will grow .
India has been here before : In the late 1960s , New Delhi considered using tactical nukes to outmatch China in the Himalayas .
But under P.N .
Haksar , the principal secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi , the Department of Atomic Energy stood firm against the idea .
“ Every time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it noted , “ it invariably escalates to a strategic exchange as soon as one of the parties starts having the worst of tactical exchange.
” But P.N .
Haksar , the principal secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi , stood firm against the idea .
“ Every time a tactical exchange takes place , ” he noted , “ it invariably escalates to a strategic exchange as soon as one of the parties starts having the worst of tactical exchange.
” Similar views seem to be shaping the thinking in New Delhi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s statement at the Conference on Disarmament , then .
India is wedded to its policy of no first use and opposed to nuclear war .
India ’ s nuclear weapons have and will continue to remain weapons of last resort , meant to fulfil only one objective : deterring its adversaries from using nuclear weapons first .

In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Oct. 14, Indian Ambassador Pankaj Sharma reiterated that—even as tensions with neighboring China heat up—his country remains committed to its doctrine that it will not use its nuclear weapons against an adversary unless first attacked with them.
In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Oct. 14, Indian Ambassador Pankaj Sharma reiterated that—even as tensions with neighboring China heat up—his country remains committed to its doctrine that it will not use its nuclear weapons against an adversary unless first attacked with them.
India’s adherence to a no-first-use principle is long-standing. Ever since 1998, when the country went nuclear, New Delhi has rejected the idea of initiating the use of such weapons in any conflict scenario. Nukes, in Indian strategy, are purely retaliatory. And that stance has made good military and diplomatic sense. The relatively small size of India’s arsenal ruled out a first strike anyway, and the country’s commitment to restraint, meanwhile, built its image as a responsible nuclear stakeholder and helped ease New Delhi’s accommodation in the international nuclear order.
But India’s steadfast rhetorical adherence to its no-first-use principle has been facing challenges on multiple fronts.
First, there is a growing consensus in the Western nonproliferation community that, in practice, New Delhi has already nearly relinquished the policy. In fact, experts believe that should India and Pakistan go to war, India would ready its nuclear force for preemptive strikes. And it has acquired the capability—nuclear arsenal, delivery systems, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems—to do so. Moreover, having already been granted recognition of its right to a nuclear program through the 2005 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, New Delhi has less incentive for caution.
Second, China and India are embroiled in military scuffling in the Western Himalayas, where the Chinese army has sliced off significant chunks of Indian territory. Given the disparity between New Delhi’s conventional military power and Beijing’s, publicly adopting a first-use doctrine would communicate both power and resolve on India’s part. In other words, this would be an opportune time for India to align its stated policy with its apparent intentions.
Sharma’s message, though, amounts to a categorical rejection of both facts. The essential puzzle in India’s nuclear policy, therefore, boils down to the following: If Indian intentions and capability to initiate first use of nuclear weapons have indeed shifted, why is New Delhi hesitant about leveraging this shift where it may matter most—against China?
States do have an incentive to hide new military capabilities; the no-first-use doctrine may simply be a public lie to hide private intentions. However, backing away from the principle would also signal strength and perhaps make it less likely that India would need to use its new military capabilities to begin with.
Another explanation is that India doesn’t think it needs the added deterrence. So far, New Delhi has opted for a conventional buildup along the border with China. But that has put enormous strain on its underequipped and overstretched armed forces, as well as its underperforming economy. Diplomatically, too, building up conventional deterrence has been costly. Measures such as inviting Australia to joint naval exercises in Malabar and initiating official trade talks with Taiwan rattle Beijing, but not much more. Meanwhile, they entrap New Delhi into expensive commitments.
In reality, the reason New Delhi persists with the same old principles despite changing strategic conditions may be that Indian nuclear capabilities are not all that the assessments suggest. India remains fundamentally vulnerable. For a country facing two nuclear-armed adversaries—China and Pakistan, both of which have territorial aims against India and maintain a strategic alliance by targeting it—India’s nuclear arsenal remains relatively modest: 150 atomic warheads and perhaps 50-60 missiles. Any preemptive targeting of Pakistani atomic assets, for example, would consume most of that arsenal, leaving India utterly vulnerable to a Chinese strike. An attack on Pakistan would, meanwhile, free the Chinese from any moral compunctions against using nuclear weapons of its own even as it undermines India’s own moral authority.
In that way, relinquishing its no-first-use policy would actually exaggerate India’s nuclear dilemmas. There’s also the problem that its existing arsenal is not really suited to any of its tactical objectives. As the Indian national security expert Bharat Karnad has argued, the “only credible nuclear deterrent” in the case of an Indian-Chinese war on the Himalayan front, would be “atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) placed just behind the prepared defensive line along the likely ingress routes of the [Chinese military] in the mountain.” AMDs are nuclear land mines, whose tactical value in the rugged terrain of the Himalayas has been questioned by the Indian Army since the 1960s. Moreover, as the downstream nation, the environmental effects of nuclear use would be disastrous for India more than for China.
Efficiency notwithstanding, the problem of proportionality persists as well. No decision-maker in Beijing would believe a threat from New Delhi to use tactical nuclear weapons to deter salami-slicing of small portions of its territory. Beijing remains the overwhelmingly superior conventional and nuclear power.
To be sure, against the backdrop of Sino-Indian military tensions, calls in India for New Delhi to leverage its nukes for deterrence will grow. India has been here before: In the late 1960s, New Delhi considered using tactical nukes to outmatch China in the Himalayas. But under P.N. Haksar, the principal secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Department of Atomic Energy stood firm against the idea. “Every time a tactical exchange takes place,” it noted, “it invariably escalates to a strategic exchange as soon as one of the parties starts having the worst of tactical exchange.”
But P.N. Haksar, the principal secretary to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, stood firm against the idea. “Every time a tactical exchange takes place,” he noted, “it invariably escalates to a strategic exchange as soon as one of the parties starts having the worst of tactical exchange.” Similar views seem to be shaping the thinking in New Delhi today.
It is worth believing Sharma’s statement at the Conference on Disarmament, then. India is wedded to its policy of no first use and opposed to nuclear war. India’s nuclear weapons have and will continue to remain weapons of last resort, meant to fulfil only one objective: deterring its adversaries from using nuclear weapons first.