foreignpolicy--2020-01-20--The Killer Algorithms Nobody’s Talking About

This past fall , diplomats from around the globe gathered in Geneva to do something about killer robots .
In a result that surprised nobody , they failed .
The formal debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems—machines that can select and fire at targets on their own—began in earnest about half a decade ago under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons , the international community ’ s principal mechanism for banning systems and devices deemed too hellish for use in war .
But despite yearly meetings , the CCW has yet to agree what “ lethal autonomous weapons ” even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for how to rein them in .
Meanwhile , the technology is advancing ferociously ; militaries aren ’ t going to wait for delegates to pin down the exact meaning of slippery terms such as “ meaningful human control ” before sending advanced warbots to battle .
To be sure , that ’ s a nightmarish prospect .
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres , echoing a growing chorus of governments , think tanks , academics , and technologists , has called such weapons “ politically unacceptable ” and “ morally repugnant.
” But this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ autonomous systems that are not in themselves lethal but rather act as a key accessory to human violence .
The debate over so-called killer robots overlooks an equally urgent menace : autonomous systems that are not in themselves lethal but rather act as a key accessory to human violence .
Such tools—let ’ s call them lethality-enabling autonomous systems—might not sound as frightening as a swarm of intelligent hunter drones .
But they could be terrifying .
At best , they will make conflict far more unpredictable and less accountable .
At worst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Many such technologies are already in use .
Many more are right around the corner .
And because of our singular focus on headline-grabbing killer robots , they have largely gone ignored .
Militaries and spy services have long been developing and deploying software for autonomously finding “ unknown unknowns ” —potential targets who would have otherwise slipped by unnoticed in the torrent of data from their growing surveillance arsenals .
One particularly spooky strand of research seeks to build algorithms that tip human analysts off to such targets by singling out cars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Other lethality-enabling technologies can translate intercepted communications , synthesize intelligence reports , and predict an adversary ’ s next move—all of which are similarly crucial steps in the lead-up to a strike .
Even many entry-level surveillance devices on the market today , such as targeting cameras , come with standard features for automated tracking and detection .
For its part , the U.S. Department of Defense , whose self-imposed rules for autonomous weapons specifically exempt nonlethal systems , is allowing algorithms dangerously close to the trigger .
The Army wants to equip @ @ @ @ @ @ @ objects of interest ” ( translation : potential targets ) along with recommendation algorithms—kind of like Amazon ’ s—that advise weapons operators whether to destroy those objects with a cannon or a gun , or by calling in an airstrike .
All of these technologies fall outside the scope of the international debate on killer robots .
But their effects could be just as dangerous .
The widespread use of sophisticated autonomous aids in war would be fraught with unknown unknowns .
An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target .
But different systems could perform that same calculation with widely diverging results .
Even the reliability of a single given algorithm could vary wildly depending on the quality of the data it ingests .
It is also difficult to know whether lethality-enabling artificial intelligence—prone as computers are to bias—would contravene or reinforce those human passions that all too often lead to erroneous or illegal killings .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ how to ensure that a human finger on the trigger can be counted on as a reliable check against the fallibility of its algorithmic enablers .
As such , in the absence of standards on such matters , not to mention protocols for algorithmic accountability , there is no good way to assess whether a bad algorithmically enabled killing came down to poor data , human error , or a deliberate act of aggression against a protected group .
A well-intentioned military actor could be led astray by a deviant algorithm and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an actor with darker motives might use algorithms as a convenient veil for an intentionally insidious decisions .
Automation ’ s vast potential to make humans more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes .
If one system offers up a faulty conclusion , it could be easy to catch the mistake before it does any harm .
But these algorithms won ’ t act alone .
A few months ago , the U.S. Navy tested a network of three AI systems , mounted on a satellite and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an enemy ship and decided which vessel in the Navy ’ s fleet was best placed to destroy it , as well as what missile it should use .
The one human involved in this kill chain was a commanding officer on the chosen destroyer , whose only job was to give the order to fire .
Eventually , the lead-up to a strike may involve dozens or hundreds of separate algorithms , each with a different job , passing findings not just to human overseers but also from machine to machine .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ machine estimations would be impossible to parse from one another ; and the results could be wildly unpredictable .
These questions are even more troubling when you consider how central such technologies will become to all future military operations .
As the technology proliferates , even morally upstanding militaries may have to rely on autonomous assistance , in spite of its many risks , just to keep ahead of their less scrupulous AI-enabled adversaries .
Once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers , the human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its advice on trust And once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers , the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust—or , as one thoughtful participant at a recent U.S. Army symposium put it , targeting will become a matter of simply pressing the “ I-believe button.
” In such a context , assurances from top brass that their machines will never make the ultimate lethal decision seem a little beside the point .
Most distressing of all , automation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes .
In the wrong hands , a multi-source analytics system could , say , identify every member of a vulnerable ethnic group .
China ’ s Uighur population is already routinely submitted to exactly this kind of digital despotism ; state and local authorities have deployed facial recognition tools capable of picking out members of the predominantly Muslim minority in closed-circuit TV footage , along with myriad other spying tools , to chart their every move .
Imagine what such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have long argued that AI will make conflict more precise .
But that argument has a dark flipside : An algorithm designed to minimize civilian casualties could just as easily be used to calculate how civilian harm could be maximized .
Governments must broaden the debate on killer robots to include all algorithmic links in the kill-chain .
They need to consider how to align such systems to the fundamental laws of war , and model the complex interactions between disparate lethality-enabling systems so as to avoid nasty surprises .
Finally , governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ audit algorithms that go bad , as well as those humans who employ their algorithms badly .
This could even streamline the debate in Geneva , which has largely broken down over disagreements as to what counts as a true lethal autonomous weapon .
The norm-building process would no longer have to navigate the intellectually dubious distinction between warfighting AI and AI used by warfighters .
Instead , the same fundamental principles could be applied equally to those algorithms that do the killing and those that are adjacent to it .
If , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among policymakers remains narrowly focused on “ killer robots , ” these issues will remain unresolved until it ’ s too late .
That would be an unacceptable mistake .

This past fall, diplomats from around the globe gathered in Geneva to do something about killer robots. In a result that surprised nobody, they failed.
This past fall, diplomats from around the globe gathered in Geneva to do something about killer robots. In a result that surprised nobody, they failed.
The formal debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems—machines that can select and fire at targets on their own—began in earnest about half a decade ago under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the international community’s principal mechanism for banning systems and devices deemed too hellish for use in war. But despite yearly meetings, the CCW has yet to agree what “lethal autonomous weapons” even are, let alone set a blueprint for how to rein them in.
Meanwhile, the technology is advancing ferociously; militaries aren’t going to wait for delegates to pin down the exact meaning of slippery terms such as “meaningful human control” before sending advanced warbots to battle.
To be sure, that’s a nightmarish prospect. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, echoing a growing chorus of governments, think tanks, academics, and technologists, has called such weapons “politically unacceptable” and “morally repugnant.” But this all overlooks an equally urgent menace: autonomous systems that are not in themselves lethal but rather act as a key accessory to human violence.
The debate over so-called killer robots overlooks an equally urgent menace: autonomous systems that are not in themselves lethal but rather act as a key accessory to human violence.
Such tools—let’s call them lethality-enabling autonomous systems—might not sound as frightening as a swarm of intelligent hunter drones. But they could be terrifying. At best, they will make conflict far more unpredictable and less accountable. At worst, they could facilitate ghoulish atrocities.
Many such technologies are already in use. Many more are right around the corner. And because of our singular focus on headline-grabbing killer robots, they have largely gone ignored.
Militaries and spy services have long been developing and deploying software for autonomously finding “unknown unknowns”—potential targets who would have otherwise slipped by unnoticed in the torrent of data from their growing surveillance arsenals. One particularly spooky strand of research seeks to build algorithms that tip human analysts off to such targets by singling out cars driving suspiciously around a surveilled city.
Other lethality-enabling technologies can translate intercepted communications, synthesize intelligence reports, and predict an adversary’s next move—all of which are similarly crucial steps in the lead-up to a strike. Even many entry-level surveillance devices on the market today, such as targeting cameras, come with standard features for automated tracking and detection.
For its part, the U.S. Department of Defense, whose self-imposed rules for autonomous weapons specifically exempt nonlethal systems, is allowing algorithms dangerously close to the trigger. The Army wants to equip tanks with computer vision that identifies “objects of interest” (translation: potential targets) along with recommendation algorithms—kind of like Amazon’s—that advise weapons operators whether to destroy those objects with a cannon or a gun, or by calling in an airstrike. All of these technologies fall outside the scope of the international debate on killer robots. But their effects could be just as dangerous.
The widespread use of sophisticated autonomous aids in war would be fraught with unknown unknowns. An algorithm with the power to suggest whether a tank should use a small rocket or a fighter jet to take out an enemy could mark the difference between life and death for anybody who happens to be in the vicinity of the target. But different systems could perform that same calculation with widely diverging results. Even the reliability of a single given algorithm could vary wildly depending on the quality of the data it ingests.
It is also difficult to know whether lethality-enabling artificial intelligence—prone as computers are to bias—would contravene or reinforce those human passions that all too often lead to erroneous or illegal killings. Nor is there any consensus as to how to ensure that a human finger on the trigger can be counted on as a reliable check against the fallibility of its algorithmic enablers.
As such, in the absence of standards on such matters, not to mention protocols for algorithmic accountability, there is no good way to assess whether a bad algorithmically enabled killing came down to poor data, human error, or a deliberate act of aggression against a protected group.
A well-intentioned military actor could be led astray by a deviant algorithm and not know it; but just as easily, an actor with darker motives might use algorithms as a convenient veil for an intentionally insidious decisions.
Automation’s vast potential to make humans more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes.
If one system offers up a faulty conclusion, it could be easy to catch the mistake before it does any harm. But these algorithms won’t act alone. A few months ago, the U.S. Navy tested a network of three AI systems, mounted on a satellite and two different airplanes, that collaboratively found an enemy ship and decided which vessel in the Navy’s fleet was best placed to destroy it, as well as what missile it should use. The one human involved in this kill chain was a commanding officer on the chosen destroyer, whose only job was to give the order to fire.
Eventually, the lead-up to a strike may involve dozens or hundreds of separate algorithms, each with a different job, passing findings not just to human overseers but also from machine to machine. Mistakes could accrue; human judgment and machine estimations would be impossible to parse from one another; and the results could be wildly unpredictable.
These questions are even more troubling when you consider how central such technologies will become to all future military operations. As the technology proliferates, even morally upstanding militaries may have to rely on autonomous assistance, in spite of its many risks, just to keep ahead of their less scrupulous AI-enabled adversaries.
Once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust
And once an AI system can navigate complicated circumstances more intelligently than any team of soldiers, the human will have no choice but to take its advice on trust—or, as one thoughtful participant at a recent U.S. Army symposium put it, targeting will become a matter of simply pressing the “I-believe button.” In such a context, assurances from top brass that their machines will never make the ultimate lethal decision seem a little beside the point.
Most distressing of all, automation’s vast potential to make humans more efficient extends to the very human act of committing war crimes. In the wrong hands, a multi-source analytics system could, say, identify every member of a vulnerable ethnic group.
China’s Uighur population is already routinely submitted to exactly this kind of digital despotism; state and local authorities have deployed facial recognition tools capable of picking out members of the predominantly Muslim minority in closed-circuit TV footage, along with myriad other spying tools, to chart their every move.
Imagine what such a technology could achieve in war. Militaries have long argued that AI will make conflict more precise. But that argument has a dark flipside: An algorithm designed to minimize civilian casualties could just as easily be used to calculate how civilian harm could be maximized.
Governments must broaden the debate on killer robots to include all algorithmic links in the kill-chain. They need to consider how to align such systems to the fundamental laws of war, and model the complex interactions between disparate lethality-enabling systems so as to avoid nasty surprises. Finally, governments must develop inscrutable and transparent mechanisms to audit algorithms that go bad, as well as those humans who employ their algorithms badly.
This could even streamline the debate in Geneva, which has largely broken down over disagreements as to what counts as a true lethal autonomous weapon. The norm-building process would no longer have to navigate the intellectually dubious distinction between warfighting AI and AI used by warfighters. Instead, the same fundamental principles could be applied equally to those algorithms that do the killing and those that are adjacent to it.
If, on the other hand, the debate among policymakers remains narrowly focused on “killer robots,” these issues will remain unresolved until it’s too late. That would be an unacceptable mistake.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-20--Washington’s War on Huawei Is Causing Angst in Madrid

Washington ’ s War on Huawei Is Causing Angst in Madrid Spain is an important player in the current debate on whether the European Union should use foreign technology , particularly Huawei equipment , in its 5G networks .
Spain will become the fourth-biggest economy in the EU after Brexit , it is a committed NATO member , and it is also home to the headquarters of Telefónica , one of the biggest European telecom companies next to Deutsche Telekom , Vodafone , and Orange .
It also has a long-standing partnership with Huawei .
This puts Spain in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a security ally of Washington .
It has two U.S. bases on its territory , and many of its foreign-policy elites have strong trans-Atlantic links .
Furthermore , the military presence of the United States in Spain is growing , as there are plans to station two more destroyers in the strategic port of Rota , near Cádiz , accompanied by 600 U.S. military personnel .
When it comes to economics , the United States is also the most significant partner for Spain outside the EU .
It is Spain ’ s biggest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spanish foreign direct investment , and during the most recent crisis it has been the most important foreign market for Spanish exporters beyond Europe .
Hence , the only area in which Spain ’ s economic links are significantly more substantial with China than with the United States is the import of goods and services : China is the origin of 8.6 percent of total Spanish imports , while the United States represents only 4.5 percent .
For decades , Spain has also been keen to present itself as China ’ s best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations have deteriorated due to the Trump administration ’ s blatant disregard for multilateralism in facing key global challenges such as nonproliferation and climate change , as well as the administration ’ s imposition of trade tariffs on Spanish products , the United States is still regarded by the Spanish government as the country ’ s most important non-European partner .
However , for decades Spain has also been keen to present itself as China ’ s best friend in Europe .
Unlike the rest of the European Economic Community countries , Spain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic commission with Beijing after the Tiananmen Square crackdown .
Francisco Fernández Ordóñez and Juan Carlos I were , respectively , the first EU foreign minister and head of state to visit China after the June 1989 bloodshed .
Beijing has always appreciated this unique position .
In Europe , Spain has traditionally combined a soft approach toward China on political issues with a demanding position on economic matters .
For example , Spain is one of the most scrupulous countries in applying the “ One China ” policy , but it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese markets to Spanish goods and services .
As a result , Spain has traditionally been labeled an “ accommodating mercantilist ” vis-à-vis Beijing—pushing hard on the economic front but refraining from political pressure—but since the government of Mariano Rajoy from 2011 to 2018 , Spain has toughened its language and gravitated more toward a free-trade position , thus moving closer to the United Kingdom , the Netherlands , the Scandinavian countries , and Germany .
More recently , following a trend across Europe , Spanish political and economic elites are increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are serious concerns about its state capitalist model , its geopolitical ambitions under the Belt and Road Initiative , and its human rights record .
There are also increasing complaints about frequent Chinese cyberattacks on Spanish public agencies and companies , and growing awareness of China ’ s hybrid threats .
The Spanish National Cryptologic Center , for instance , warned in its 2019 annual report that Chinese attacks targeted critical infrastructure to gather information about possible vulnerabilities and used spear-phishing to conduct cyberespionage in order to acquire technological capacity and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time , the Spanish authorities recognize the need for cooperation with China in international organizations and the extraordinary potential of its economy .
Many Spanish businesses , especially in services related to law , consulting , engineering , and banking , want to profit from the Chinese market .
Hence , Spain does not want to follow a strategy of decoupling designed to contain and isolate China .
This is the reason why the geopolitical rivalry and trade and tech war between the United States and China causes great concern in Spanish political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump and the incessant pressure to curtail collaboration with key Chinese tech companies have been perceived as counterproductive , especially given Telefónica ’ s long-lasting collaboration with Huawei in its European and Latin American markets .
This cooperation has gone beyond mere purchasing of Huawei equipment to include joint programs in research , development , and innovation .
The Spanish government is aware of the geostrategic and geoeconomic dimensions of 5G technology , which will be key in the next phase of the digital revolution based on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and artificial intelligence .
This is precisely why the Spanish authorities are in favor of more European strategic autonomy and tech sovereignty , especially in critical infrastructure .
The feeling in the Spanish government is that the EU , or at least the most important countries in the EU , should have a common strategy on this topic before Spain organizes its 5G auction later this year .
Some Spanish officials are disappointed that France has already unilaterally approved a new law that gives the government ample discretion on 5G networks , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without really coordinating with other countries , and that the U.K. has moved from treating this issue as a network question to a national security affair—following the pressure from Washington and its imminent exit from the EU .
Against this backdrop , Spanish leaders do not want to take sides between the United States and China , but , if forced , in a bipolar world in which the EU has not developed strategic autonomy yet , Spain would side with the United States because of economic and strategic interests , in addition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratic values .
There is a hard reality on the ground that can not be avoided : Telefónica ’ s existing 4G technology in Spain depends entirely on Huawei equipment .
However , there is a hard reality on the ground that can not be avoided : Telefónica ’ s existing 4G technology in Spain depends entirely on Huawei equipment .
Therefore , no matter how much Washington complains , Telefónica will continue to have Huawei technology in what is known as its 5G core—where the most sensitive information is stored—for now and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of masts , antennas , and passive equipment .
Otherwise , Spain would lag in developing its 5G network , leading to a loss of competitiveness for its whole economy .
For the medium to long term , the suggested “ landing zone ” of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez ’ s government and Telefónica is to have a multivendor core and periphery approach , with no supplier controlling any network end to end , and with the gradual phasing out of Huawei from the core , while still maintaining it in the periphery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If the United States pushes even harder , demanding the elimination of Huawei from the periphery of Telefónica ’ s 5G networks—as might be the case in the U.K.—or even asking for its outright ban , Spain will feel bullied .
The United States would be seen as a predatory hegemon , and even if Spain prefers to choose the United States over China , this attitude may damage U.S.-Spanish links in the long term .
Already in private conversations , very influential pro-United States foreign-policy experts and pundits from Spain are starting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States as a long-standing ally due to the unilateral and protectionist policies of the current administration .
Instead of winning over European allies and convincing them to put pressure on China to commit to a level playing field based on common trade and investment rules , the Trump administration is alienating its foreign-policy partners .
In Madrid , many officials ask themselves : How can Spain side with the United States when Washington is currently hurting Spain with tariffs on many of its products and with the effective closure of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses due to secondary U.S. sanctions that impact Spanish firms operating in those countries ?
There is growing worry in Spain about entering into a protectionist spiral .
If the EU follows the United States and bans Huawei , China might retaliate and ban European cars—and this would be very damaging for the EU and for Spain , which post-Brexit will be the second-largest exporter of cars in Europe after Germany .
The feeling among Spanish policymakers and businesspeople is that the EU must collaborate and cooperate with China and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tech blocs in the world .
There is also a sense that open competition must not be squelched .
Telefónica , for example , has benefited a great deal from the competition among Ericsson , Nokia , and Huawei .
This has increased innovation and has kept prices low .
That said , if Huawei wants to remain a player , it needs to make its equipment open and follow the high security and fair competition standards that the EU demands .
Spanish tech and security experts say that backdoors are always possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among Spanish experts is that the United States has not provided a smoking gun proving Huawei is meddling in digital infrastructure it has built .
The reputational cost for Huawei would be devastating if it were found to be engaging in espionage or sabotage on behalf of the Chinese government .
At the end of the day , Huawei is the only genuine global and transnational Chinese company , with considerable operations based in foreign countries and many Chinese and local employees in places such as Spain .
If the firm is banned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more inward-looking , nationalistic , and dangerous—and this would be bad for everyone .
The challenge for Spain is to find the right balance so as to avoid alienating its traditional allies and China while developing its 5G network in an efficient and secure way .

Spain is an important player in the current debate on whether the European Union should use foreign technology, particularly Huawei equipment, in its 5G networks. Spain will become the fourth-biggest economy in the EU after Brexit, it is a committed NATO member, and it is also home to the headquarters of Telefónica, one of the biggest European telecom companies next to Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Orange. It also has a long-standing partnership with Huawei.
Spain is an important player in the current debate on whether the European Union should use foreign technology, particularly Huawei equipment, in its 5G networks. Spain will become the fourth-biggest economy in the EU after Brexit, it is a committed NATO member, and it is also home to the headquarters of Telefónica, one of the biggest European telecom companies next to Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Orange. It also has a long-standing partnership with Huawei.
This puts Spain in a difficult position. Madrid has always been a security ally of Washington. It has two U.S. bases on its territory, and many of its foreign-policy elites have strong trans-Atlantic links. Furthermore, the military presence of the United States in Spain is growing, as there are plans to station two more destroyers in the strategic port of Rota, near Cádiz, accompanied by 600 U.S. military personnel.
When it comes to economics, the United States is also the most significant partner for Spain outside the EU. It is Spain’s biggest foreign investor, the second-biggest destination of Spanish foreign direct investment, and during the most recent crisis it has been the most important foreign market for Spanish exporters beyond Europe. Hence, the only area in which Spain’s economic links are significantly more substantial with China than with the United States is the import of goods and services: China is the origin of 8.6 percent of total Spanish imports, while the United States represents only 4.5 percent.
For decades, Spain has also been keen to present itself as China’s best friend in Europe.
Even if diplomatic relations have deteriorated due to the Trump administration’s blatant disregard for multilateralism in facing key global challenges such as nonproliferation and climate change, as well as the administration’s imposition of trade tariffs on Spanish products, the United States is still regarded by the Spanish government as the country’s most important non-European partner.
However, for decades Spain has also been keen to present itself as China’s best friend in Europe. Unlike the rest of the European Economic Community countries, Spain maintained its development cooperation and a joint economic commission with Beijing after the Tiananmen Square crackdown.
Francisco Fernández Ordóñez and Juan Carlos I were, respectively, the first EU foreign minister and head of state to visit China after the June 1989 bloodshed. Beijing has always appreciated this unique position.
In Europe, Spain has traditionally combined a soft approach toward China on political issues with a demanding position on economic matters. For example, Spain is one of the most scrupulous countries in applying the “One China” policy, but it is also continuously asking for further opening of the Chinese markets to Spanish goods and services.
As a result, Spain has traditionally been labeled an “accommodating mercantilist” vis-à-vis Beijing—pushing hard on the economic front but refraining from political pressure—but since the government of Mariano Rajoy from 2011 to 2018, Spain has toughened its language and gravitated more toward a free-trade position, thus moving closer to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Germany.
More recently, following a trend across Europe, Spanish political and economic elites are increasingly seeing China as a systemic rival. There are serious concerns about its state capitalist model, its geopolitical ambitions under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its human rights record.
There are also increasing complaints about frequent Chinese cyberattacks on Spanish public agencies and companies, and growing awareness of China’s hybrid threats. The Spanish National Cryptologic Center, for instance, warned in its 2019 annual report that Chinese attacks targeted critical infrastructure to gather information about possible vulnerabilities and used spear-phishing to conduct cyberespionage in order to acquire technological capacity and economic and security intelligence.
At the same time, the Spanish authorities recognize the need for cooperation with China in international organizations and the extraordinary potential of its economy. Many Spanish businesses, especially in services related to law, consulting, engineering, and banking, want to profit from the Chinese market. Hence, Spain does not want to follow a strategy of decoupling designed to contain and isolate China. This is the reason why the geopolitical rivalry and trade and tech war between the United States and China causes great concern in Spanish political and business circles.
The protectionist spiral initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump and the incessant pressure to curtail collaboration with key Chinese tech companies have been perceived as counterproductive, especially given Telefónica’s long-lasting collaboration with Huawei in its European and Latin American markets. This cooperation has gone beyond mere purchasing of Huawei equipment to include joint programs in research, development, and innovation.
The Spanish government is aware of the geostrategic and geoeconomic dimensions of 5G technology, which will be key in the next phase of the digital revolution based on the internet of things, big data, and artificial intelligence. This is precisely why the Spanish authorities are in favor of more European strategic autonomy and tech sovereignty, especially in critical infrastructure. The feeling in the Spanish government is that the EU, or at least the most important countries in the EU, should have a common strategy on this topic before Spain organizes its 5G auction later this year.
Some Spanish officials are disappointed that France has already unilaterally approved a new law that gives the government ample discretion on 5G networks, that Germany is having an intense internal discussion without really coordinating with other countries, and that the U.K. has moved from treating this issue as a network question to a national security affair—following the pressure from Washington and its imminent exit from the EU.
Against this backdrop, Spanish leaders do not want to take sides between the United States and China, but, if forced, in a bipolar world in which the EU has not developed strategic autonomy yet, Spain would side with the United States because of economic and strategic interests, in addition to obvious affinities when it comes to democratic values.
There is a hard reality on the ground that cannot be avoided: Telefónica’s existing 4G technology in Spain depends entirely on Huawei equipment. However, there is a hard reality on the ground that cannot be avoided: Telefónica’s existing 4G technology in Spain depends entirely on Huawei equipment. Therefore, no matter how much Washington complains, Telefónica will continue to have Huawei technology in what is known as its 5G core—where the most sensitive information is stored—for now and in its so-called periphery, which consists of masts, antennas, and passive equipment. Otherwise, Spain would lag in developing its 5G network, leading to a loss of competitiveness for its whole economy.
For the medium to long term, the suggested “landing zone” of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government and Telefónica is to have a multivendor core and periphery approach, with no supplier controlling any network end to end, and with the gradual phasing out of Huawei from the core, while still maintaining it in the periphery of 5G networks to minimize costs.
If the United States pushes even harder, demanding the elimination of Huawei from the periphery of Telefónica’s 5G networks—as might be the case in the U.K.—or even asking for its outright ban, Spain will feel bullied. The United States would be seen as a predatory hegemon, and even if Spain prefers to choose the United States over China, this attitude may damage U.S.-Spanish links in the long term.
Already in private conversations, very influential pro-United States foreign-policy experts and pundits from Spain are starting to have doubts about the reliability of the United States as a long-standing ally due to the unilateral and protectionist policies of the current administration.
Instead of winning over European allies and convincing them to put pressure on China to commit to a level playing field based on common trade and investment rules, the Trump administration is alienating its foreign-policy partners.
In Madrid, many officials ask themselves: How can Spain side with the United States when Washington is currently hurting Spain with tariffs on many of its products and with the effective closure of the Cuban and Iranian markets to many Spanish businesses due to secondary U.S. sanctions that impact Spanish firms operating in those countries?
There is growing worry in Spain about entering into a protectionist spiral. If the EU follows the United States and bans Huawei, China might retaliate and ban European cars—and this would be very damaging for the EU and for Spain, which post-Brexit will be the second-largest exporter of cars in Europe after Germany.
The feeling among Spanish policymakers and businesspeople is that the EU must collaborate and cooperate with China and the United States to avoid the creation of two separate tech blocs in the world. There is also a sense that open competition must not be squelched. Telefónica, for example, has benefited a great deal from the competition among Ericsson, Nokia, and Huawei. This has increased innovation and has kept prices low.
That said, if Huawei wants to remain a player, it needs to make its equipment open and follow the high security and fair competition standards that the EU demands.
Spanish tech and security experts say that backdoors are always possible, but so far, the sense among Spanish experts is that the United States has not provided a smoking gun proving Huawei is meddling in digital infrastructure it has built.
The reputational cost for Huawei would be devastating if it were found to be engaging in espionage or sabotage on behalf of the Chinese government. At the end of the day, Huawei is the only genuine global and transnational Chinese company, with considerable operations based in foreign countries and many Chinese and local employees in places such as Spain. If the firm is banned from the EU, China could become more inward-looking, nationalistic, and dangerous—and this would be bad for everyone.
The challenge for Spain is to find the right balance so as to avoid alienating its traditional allies and China while developing its 5G network in an efficient and secure way.


Lebanon’s Protests Spiral

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Lebanon sees the worst violence since anti-government unrest began last October , hundreds of Central American migrants plan to cross into Mexico , and what to watch in the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Over the weekend Beirut saw some of the most violent unrest since anti-government protests began in October , with security forces using water cannons , tear gas , and rubber bullets to disperse crowds on both Saturday and Sunday .
The clashes capped what organizers had called a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slowdown in the mass protests that began in Lebanon three months ago , forcing then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign .
On Saturday , demonstrators clashed with riot police before a planned protest on the road to Lebanon ’ s parliament building , with violence accelerating throughout the night .
More than 370 people were injured .
The protests turned violent for the second night on Sunday , leading to another confrontation with police .
This week the protesters have also turned their anger on banks , vandalizing dozens across Beirut .
Why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , protesters called for an end to the ruling political elite .
But Lebanon ’ s elites remain deadlocked—unable to form a new government as the country ’ s economy continues a sharp decline .
Banks have imposed controls on U.S. and local currency , preventing people from taking out more than $ 300 per week , leading to anger against the banks .
What ’ s next ?
Many in Lebanon expect the spiral to continue .
The tone of the protests—once peaceful—has shifted , with many on Saturday calling for “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have condemned the use of force by police .
The defense and interior ministers , as well as other security heads , are meeting today at the presidential palace .
‘ Caravan ’ tests Mexico ’ s migration policy .
Hundreds of migrants from Central America plan to cross the border from Guatemala into Mexico today , testing Mexico ’ s commitment to curbing migration .
U.S. President Donald Trump has used economic threats to get Mexico to tighten its border security , and U.S. agents are keeping tabs on the latest group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico will require the migrants to either accept work in the south of the country or apply for asylum in order to remain .
China ’ s pneumonia virus is spreading .
Chinese authorities confirmed 139 new cases of the outbreak of coronavirus that was first reported in Wuhan this month .
So far , three people have died from the severe respiratory illness .
The new cases are the first within China outside the city of Wuhan .
( Two cases have been confirmed in Thailand and one in Japan . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tourists prepare to travel during the Lunar New Year holiday later this week .
Authorities say they are stepping up efforts to control the virus .
Hong Kong police arrest democracy activist .
Police in Hong arrested a prominent democracy activist , Ventus Lau , on Sunday—a day after police violently cracked down on a protest that he organized .
Protest organizers say that 150,000 turned out for the protest .
Though the rally was allowed by the city government , authorities say that it extended beyond its permitted area , leading the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong ’ s pro-democracy protests have grown considerably smaller in recent months .
Africa ’ s richest woman faces corruption allegations .
Isabel dos Santos , the daughter of Angola ’ s former president , José Eduardo dos Santos , is facing multiple allegations of corruption and nepotism after the Guardian and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed a trove of leaked emails and documents suggesting that dos Santos “ benefited from extraordinary opportunities afforded to her by the government of her father … before he stood down as president in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the victim of a political witch-hunt and denies that her wealth comes from corruption or nepotism .
Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó is in Colombia today for a counterterrorism conference , where he is expected to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as well as Colombian President Iván Duque .
Under a travel ban , Guaidó hasn ’ t left Venezuela since last February .
He is seeking support : His claim to power has been weakened after the ruling party seized the National Assembly this month .
The World Economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Switzerland , and Trump is expected to deliver opening remarks .
Trump ’ s second trip to Davos comes just after he signed a “ phase one ” trade deal with China last week .
It also coincides with the day his impeachment trial starts in the U.S. Senate , with lawmakers still fighting over whether to call witnesses during the proceedings .
In a genocide case against Myanmar , the International Court of Justice will rule on Thursday on whether to order emergency measures to prevent further harm against the Rohingya Muslim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Myanmar in November , and Thursday ’ s ruling marks the first step in a case expected to take years .
Italy faces a crucial vote on Sunday : a regional election in Emilia-Romagna , where Matteo Salvini ’ s far-right League party hopes to disrupt nearly 75 years of leftist rule .
A victory would give Salvini a boost after he left the ruling coalition last year .
With polls close , a new grassroots movement , the Sardines , held an anti-League rally in Bologna over the weekend .
Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vladimir Putin proposed a constitutional shake-up that would extend his rule after his term limit ends in 2024 , protesters marched against the reforms in Moscow over the weekend .
But the demonstrators don ’ t seem to be united in their cause : Just 1,000 people turned out , considerably fewer than the 60,000 opposition protesters over the summer .
Paraguay prison break .
At least 75 members of a Brazilian drug cartel tunneled out of a prison in Paraguay on Sunday—a plan that authorities knew about but were unable to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cartels have penetrated security agencies in Brazil and neighboring Paraguay .
“ This is a prison break without precedent , ” Paraguay ’ s justice minister said on Sunday .
Buckingham Palace officially announced on Saturday that Prince Harry and his wife , Meghan Markle , have agreed to give up their highest titles ( His and Her Royal Highness ) , forego public funding , and pay back the taxpayer money used to renovate their home .
The severance deal still leaves many options open for Harry and Meghan—and their future business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already said he ’ s interested in working with the pair .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Lebanon sees the worst violence since anti-government unrest began last October, hundreds of Central American migrants plan to cross into Mexico, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Lebanon sees the worst violence since anti-government unrest began last October, hundreds of Central American migrants plan to cross into Mexico, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every day, please sign up here.
Beirut’s Weekend of Violent Unrest
Over the weekend Beirut saw some of the most violent unrest since anti-government protests began in October, with security forces using water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse crowds on both Saturday and Sunday. The clashes capped what organizers had called a “week of anger,” after a slowdown in the mass protests that began in Lebanon three months ago, forcing then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign.
On Saturday, demonstrators clashed with riot police before a planned protest on the road to Lebanon’s parliament building, with violence accelerating throughout the night. More than 370 people were injured. The protests turned violent for the second night on Sunday, leading to another confrontation with police. This week the protesters have also turned their anger on banks, vandalizing dozens across Beirut.
Why are people still protesting? In October, protesters called for an end to the ruling political elite. But Lebanon’s elites remain deadlocked—unable to form a new government as the country’s economy continues a sharp decline. Banks have imposed controls on U.S. and local currency, preventing people from taking out more than $300 per week, leading to anger against the banks.
What’s next? Many in Lebanon expect the spiral to continue. The tone of the protests—once peaceful—has shifted, with many on Saturday calling for “revolution.” Rights groups, meanwhile, have condemned the use of force by police. The defense and interior ministers, as well as other security heads, are meeting today at the presidential palace.
What We’re Following Today
‘Caravan’ tests Mexico’s migration policy. Hundreds of migrants from Central America plan to cross the border from Guatemala into Mexico today, testing Mexico’s commitment to curbing migration. U.S. President Donald Trump has used economic threats to get Mexico to tighten its border security, and U.S. agents are keeping tabs on the latest group, which left Honduras this week. Mexico will require the migrants to either accept work in the south of the country or apply for asylum in order to remain.
China’s pneumonia virus is spreading. Chinese authorities confirmed 139 new cases of the outbreak of coronavirus that was first reported in Wuhan this month. So far, three people have died from the severe respiratory illness. The new cases are the first within China outside the city of Wuhan. (Two cases have been confirmed in Thailand and one in Japan.) The outbreak comes as millions of Chinese tourists prepare to travel during the Lunar New Year holiday later this week. Authorities say they are stepping up efforts to control the virus.
Hong Kong police arrest democracy activist. Police in Hong arrested a prominent democracy activist, Ventus Lau, on Sunday—a day after police violently cracked down on a protest that he organized. Protest organizers say that 150,000 turned out for the protest. Though the rally was allowed by the city government, authorities say that it extended beyond its permitted area, leading the riot police to disperse the crowd. Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests have grown considerably smaller in recent months.
Africa’s richest woman faces corruption allegations. Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president, José Eduardo dos Santos, is facing multiple allegations of corruption and nepotism after the Guardian and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed a trove of leaked emails and documents suggesting that dos Santos “benefited from extraordinary opportunities afforded to her by the government of her father … before he stood down as president in September 2017.” Dos Santos contends she is the victim of a political witch-hunt and denies that her wealth comes from corruption or nepotism.
The World This Week
Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó is in Colombia today for a counterterrorism conference, where he is expected to meet U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as well as Colombian President Iván Duque. Under a travel ban, Guaidó hasn’t left Venezuela since last February. He is seeking support: His claim to power has been weakened after the ruling party seized the National Assembly this month.
The World Economic Forum begins on Tuesday in Davos, Switzerland, and Trump is expected to deliver opening remarks. Trump’s second trip to Davos comes just after he signed a “phase one” trade deal with China last week. It also coincides with the day his impeachment trial starts in the U.S. Senate, with lawmakers still fighting over whether to call witnesses during the proceedings.
In a genocide case against Myanmar, the International Court of Justice will rule on Thursday on whether to order emergency measures to prevent further harm against the Rohingya Muslim minority. Gambia filed the suit against Myanmar in November, and Thursday’s ruling marks the first step in a case expected to take years.
Italy faces a crucial vote on Sunday: a regional election in Emilia-Romagna, where Matteo Salvini’s far-right League party hopes to disrupt nearly 75 years of leftist rule. A victory would give Salvini a boost after he left the ruling coalition last year. With polls close, a new grassroots movement, the Sardines, held an anti-League rally in Bologna over the weekend.
Keep an Eye On
Russia’s protesters. Days after Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a constitutional shake-up that would extend his rule after his term limit ends in 2024, protesters marched against the reforms in Moscow over the weekend. But the demonstrators don’t seem to be united in their cause: Just 1,000 people turned out, considerably fewer than the 60,000 opposition protesters over the summer.
Paraguay prison break. At least 75 members of a Brazilian drug cartel tunneled out of a prison in Paraguay on Sunday—a plan that authorities knew about but were unable to prevent. The escape illustrates how far Brazilian cartels have penetrated security agencies in Brazil and neighboring Paraguay. “This is a prison break without precedent,” Paraguay’s justice minister said on Sunday.
Odds and Ends
Buckingham Palace officially announced on Saturday that Prince Harry and his wife, Meghan Markle, have agreed to give up their highest titles (His and Her Royal Highness), forego public funding, and pay back the taxpayer money used to renovate their home. The severance deal still leaves many options open for Harry and Meghan—and their future business ventures. The head of Netflix has already said he’s interested in working with the pair.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-20--How Scared Should You Be of The Wuhan Coronavirus?

How Scared Should You Be of The Wuhan Coronavirus ?
A previously unknown virus , first reported in the Chinese city of Wuhan on Dec. 31 , is seriously worrying global health experts .
The World Health Organization announced Monday that it was convening an emergency meeting on the virus , which is a coronavirus , a species common in animals that occasionally leaps to humans .
In China , past cases of viruses passing from animals to humans have been relatively common thanks to close contact with domestic animals like chickens , as well as the consumption of wild @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sometimes because population and resource pressures have pushed people deeper into previously untouched forests and jungles in the south .
The most notable of these in recent years was SARS , a coronavirus first reported in 2003 that eventually killed over 800 people and infected around 8,000 ; the government was widely blamed for covering up the spread of SARS—short for “ severe acute respiratory syndrome ” —until Jiang Yanyong , a retired surgeon , raised the alarm ( and was briefly imprisoned as a result before eventually being hailed as a hero @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
How fast is it spreading ?
It ’ s hard to tell , because the information being released by the Chinese government is questionable .
Wuhan itself is a city of 11 million people , and within China , the virus is confirmed to have reached major metropolises such as Beijing and Shanghai , while it ’ s also traveled as far south as Shenzhen , which borders Hong Kong .
Outside of China , Japan , Thailand , and South Korea have all recorded cases—all Chinese travelers .
While it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of animal-to-human transmission , doctors have just confirmed human-to-human transmission ; 14 healthcare workers have also been reported as infected .
The virus causes pneumonia , resulting in difficulty breathing .
Only three people have been reported dead so far , but several dozen are in serious or critical condition .
The majority of victims , though , had only mild symptoms , and some have already been discharged .
It ’ s always an open question how bad a new virus could get .
Modern disease control methods have improved dramatically since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than World War I—and the global population is healthier and more resistant .
In the United States , the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says the odds of the virus reaching the country are low .
Right now , the main worries are in China itself—especially the government ’ s handling of the cases .
There are numerous unconfirmed posts and stories online claiming Wuhan hospitals are overflowing with victims or showing staff in full protective gear .
Those may just be rumors , but the government numbers are definitely suspicious , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For days authorities kept the figure of infected people at 41 ; then , it suddenly jumped up this weekend , eventually reaching 218 .
Foreign doctors estimate the number may be as high as 1,700 cases , using models of other outbreaks .
Admitting the existence of more cases seems to have been prompted , in part , by public skepticism that the disease could have reached Thailand and Japan but inside China somehow have been confined to just Wuhan .
What measures are the Chinese authorities taking ?
Inside Wuhan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steps , including door-to-door surveys , the recall of medical staff from holidays , and checks on all forms of transport for people showing symptoms of infection .
There have also been public announcements , including a statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping and by the trusted epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan .
Hong Kong , hard-hit by the SARS virus , has implemented a public health plan ; cities in China have been slower to act , though authorities have promised crackdowns on animal markets .
But the real challenge comes next week , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , what does Lunar New Year have to do with this ?
Every winter , China experiences one of the largest mass migrations in the world , known as “ spring journeying ” ( chunyun ) .
( It ’ s called that because of a confused rebranding of the Lunar New Year as the “ spring festival ” in 1912 . )
Hundreds of millions of people head home to see their families , often resulting in an emptying out of major cities as people return to the smaller towns and villages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theory , this is a 40-day period ; in practice it ’ s largely concentrated into the single week of vacation time most people get—this year that ’ s from Jan. 24 to Jan. 30 .
All those shuffling , coughing bodies packed into trains and airports are a petri dish for disease .
So are public gatherings to see fireworks or attend temple fairs .
Eating together family-style—picking from shared dishes—is also a big part of the celebrations , and another possible means of transmission .
Usually , that just means a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This year , it could be much worse—but the upcoming holiday also provides a powerful motivation for officials to underplay the disease .
Why would they downplay a health crisis ?
One immediate reason is that the Lunar New Year , like holidays everywhere , is a big consumption period that helps local officials keep their GDP numbers up .
GDP is one of the chief metrics used for judging an official ’ s performance , leading to regular statistical distortions—especially in a slowing economy .
SARS also initially broke out just before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of economic strain were a powerful motivation in keeping it secret—which in turn helped it spread .
Opinions differ sharply on how much the Chinese government has learned from the experience of SARS .
Epidemic expert Laurie Garrett argues that the signs are there for the crisis to repeat itself , while other medical specialists say the handling has been a lot better this time around .
But even if there ’ s more will to handle the crisis properly at the central level , there are lots of ways the system can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any disaster scenario , from earthquakes to epidemics , is that the Chinese party-state is incredibly opaque , even to itself .
Information within a very competitive and back-stabbing political environment becomes a commodity to be traded , rather than a good to be shared ; supposed colleagues regularly conceal their schedules from each other , for instance , while at every level people distort numbers in order to make themselves look better .
Juking the stats isn ’ t unknown in democratic institutions , of course , but with no freedom of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society , China lacks any institutions other than intraparty ones to keep things honest .
Getting over that instinctive paranoia about sharing information is hard and , in particular , holds back effective cooperation between different institutions or levels of government .
There ’ s also a deeply held belief among officials that the public is a fickle beast and that exposing frightening information will cause panic buying , mob assaults , looting , and the spread of uncontrolled rumors .
There ’ s some truth to this , though it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ knows the government regularly covers things up , they often assume things are worse than they are .
After the Fukushima disaster in Japan , for instance , people in China rushed to buy salt , which they believed protected them against radioactivity .
But Chinese disaster experts have emphasized the need for better and more-trustworthy information , and state media—before the crackdown on all dissent under Xi—often called for officials to be more honest .
In disaster preparation exercises with other countries , however , the Chinese side still emphasizes extremely tight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now , officials are threatening individuals who post or share information about the virus online .
Underpinning this may be a long-standing belief that natural disasters indicate heavenly disfavor with the ruling government .
How is the public taking it ?
There ’ s lots of concern being expressed online , but that doesn ’ t seem to have spread to the ground level so far—and there ’ s no sign of the kind of steps people took during SARS , such as buying private vehicles to avoid public transport or sealing off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very fast in the next week or two , especially if the government steps up the level of public awareness further .
If it does , and especially if travel restrictions are imposed , the economic consequences could be serious .
That might well be a price worth paying .

The Chinese city of Wuhan, the seventh largest in the country with approximately 11 million people, has been under quarantine from 10 a.m. Chinese time Thursday. Flights, long-haul buses, and trains from the city, which is a critical transport hub for central China, have been canceled, roads are blockaded, and residents have been told not to travel without special reason. The quarantine has now been extended to other cities neighboring Wuhan, including Huanggang, with 6 million people, and Ezhou, with 1 million. The coronavirus that emerged in Wuhan has been spreading with frightening speed, with the number of cases shooting up over the weekend and at least 17 people now dead.
The Chinese city of Wuhan, the seventh largest in the country with approximately 11 million people, has been under quarantine from 10 a.m. Chinese time Thursday. Flights, long-haul buses, and trains from the city, which is a critical transport hub for central China, have been canceled, roads are blockaded, and residents have been told not to travel without special reason. The quarantine has now been extended to other cities neighboring Wuhan, including Huanggang, with 6 million people, and Ezhou, with 1 million. The coronavirus that emerged in Wuhan has been spreading with frightening speed, with the number of cases shooting up over the weekend and at least 17 people now dead.
The previously unknown virus, first reported on Dec. 31, has global health experts seriously worried. The World Health Organization announced Monday that it was convening an emergency meeting on the virus, which is a coronavirus, a species common in animals that occasionally leaps to humans. In China, past cases of viruses passing from animals to humans have been relatively common thanks to close contact with domestic animals like chickens, as well as the consumption of wild animals such as civet cats, and sometimes because population and resource pressures have pushed people deeper into previously untouched forests and jungles in the south.
The most notable of these in recent years was SARS, a coronavirus first reported in 2003 that eventually killed over 800 people and infected around 8,000; the government was widely blamed for covering up the spread of SARS—short for “severe acute respiratory syndrome”—until Jiang Yanyong, a retired surgeon, raised the alarm (and was briefly imprisoned as a result before eventually being hailed as a hero).
Is this a deadly disease? How fast is it spreading?
It’s hard to tell, because the information being released by the Chinese government is questionable. Within China, the virus is confirmed to have reached major metropolises such as Beijing and Shanghai, while it’s also traveled as far south as Shenzhen, which borders Hong Kong. Outside of China, Japan, Thailand, and South Korea have all recorded cases—all Chinese travelers. While it was initially claimed to be only the result of animal-to-human transmission, doctors have just confirmed human-to-human transmission; 14 health care workers have also been reported as infected.
The virus causes pneumonia, resulting in difficulty breathing. As of Wednesday afternoon EST, the number of reported dead has risen to 17, mostly older men with pre-existing conditions. The majority of victims, though, had only mild symptoms, and some have already been discharged. Many others, however, remain in serious or critical condition.
It’s always an open question how bad a new virus could get. Modern disease control methods have improved dramatically since the 1918-19 influenza outbreak killed more people than World War I—and the global population is healthier and more resistant. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says the odds of the virus reaching the country are low. Right now, the main worries are in China itself—especially the government’s handling of the cases.
Even before the quarantine, there were numerous unconfirmed posts and stories online claiming Wuhan hospitals are overflowing with victims or showing staff in full protective gear. Those may just be rumors, but the government numbers are definitely suspicious, especially the sudden jump over the weekend. For days authorities kept the figure of infected people at 41; then, it suddenly jumped up this weekend, eventually reaching 218. As of Wednesday afternoon, the number is now over 500. Foreign doctors estimated last week the number might already be as high as 1,700 cases, using models of other outbreaks. Admitting the existence of more cases seems to have been prompted, in part, by public skepticism that the virus could have reached Thailand and Japan but inside China somehow have been confined to just Wuhan.
What measures did the Chinese authorities initially take?
Inside Wuhan itself, even before the quarantine, there have been extensive steps, including door-to-door surveys, the recall of medical staff from holidays, and checks on all forms of transport for people showing symptoms of infection. There have also been public announcements, including a statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping and by the trusted epidemiologist Zhong Nanshan. Hong Kong, hard-hit by the SARS virus, implemented a public health plan; cities in China were initially slower to act, though authorities promised crackdowns on animal markets. Some villages are reportedly banning people who have been working in Wuhan from returning.
But the real challenge comes on Friday, when the Lunar New Year vacation starts.
Wait, what does Lunar New Year have to do with this?
Every winter, China experiences one of the largest mass migrations in the world, known as “spring journeying” (chunyun). (It’s called that because of a confused rebranding of the Lunar New Year as the “spring festival” in 1912.) Hundreds of millions of people head home to see their families, often resulting in an emptying out of major cities as people return to the smaller towns and villages their parents still live in. In theory, this is a 40-day period; in practice it’s largely concentrated into the single week of vacation time most people get—this year that’s from Jan. 24 to Jan. 30.
All those shuffling, coughing bodies packed into trains and airports are a petri dish for disease. So are public gatherings to see fireworks or attend temple fairs. Eating together family-style—picking from shared dishes—is also a big part of the celebrations, and another possible means of transmission. Usually, that just means a bad case of the winter sniffles. This year, it could be much worse—but the upcoming holiday also initially provided a powerful motivation for officials to underplay the virus. As of Thursday, public concern is greatly heightened, and public events in most Chinese cities have been cancelled.
Why did they downplay the crisis?
One immediate reason is that the Lunar New Year, like holidays everywhere, is a big consumption period that helps local officials keep their GDP numbers up. GDP is one of the chief metrics used for judging an official’s performance, leading to regular statistical distortions—especially in a slowing economy. SARS also initially broke out just before the Lunar New Year, and fears of economic strain were a powerful motivation in keeping it secret—which in turn helped it spread.
Opinions differ sharply on how much the Chinese government has learned from the experience of SARS. Epidemic expert Laurie Garrett argues that the signs are there for the crisis to repeat itself, while other medical specialists say the handling has been a lot better this time around. Right now, the government seems to have an all-hands-on-deck policy, even as Chinese media still downplays the story in favor of propaganda around Xi and New Year’s good wishes. But even if there’s more will to handle the crisis properly at the central level, there are lots of ways the system can still fail.
One principal problem in any disaster scenario, from earthquakes to epidemics, is that the Chinese party-state is incredibly opaque, even to itself. Information within a very competitive and back-stabbing political environment becomes a commodity to be traded, rather than a good to be shared; supposed colleagues regularly conceal their schedules from each other, for instance, while at every level people distort numbers in order to make themselves look better. Juking the stats isn’t unknown in democratic institutions, of course, but with no freedom of the press, and a ground-down civil society, China lacks any institutions other than intraparty ones to keep things honest. Getting over that instinctive paranoia about sharing information is hard and, in particular, holds back effective cooperation between different institutions or levels of government.
There’s also a deeply held belief among officials that the public is a fickle beast and that exposing frightening information will cause panic buying, mob assaults, looting, and the spread of uncontrolled rumors. There’s some truth to this, though it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy; because the public knows the government regularly covers things up, they often assume things are worse than they are. After the Fukushima disaster in Japan, for instance, people in China rushed to buy salt, which they believed protected them against radioactivity.
But Chinese disaster experts have emphasized the need for better and more-trustworthy information, and state media—before the crackdown on all dissent under Xi—often called for officials to be more honest. In disaster preparation exercises with other countries, however, the Chinese side still emphasizes extremely tight information control from the start. Even now, officials are threatening individuals who post or share information about the virus online. Underpinning this may be a long-standing belief that natural disasters indicate heavenly disfavor with the ruling government.
How is the public taking it?
Initially, there was lots of concern being expressed online, but it didn’t spread to the ground level. That has been changing fast as the government admits more details and news of the virus spreads. Face masks have become the norm in Chinese cities, and shops and online stores have sold out of them as far afield as Malaysia. The quarantine in Hubei is only spreading further worry. If further travel restrictions are imposed or people voluntarily stay home during the Lunar New Year, the economic consequences have been estimated to be as much as 1 percent of GDP growth. That might well be a price worth paying.
Update, Jan. 23, 2020: This article has been updated to reflect new developments in the spread of the virus.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-20--Russia’s New Prime Minister Augurs Techno-Authoritarianism

Mikhail Mishustin , Russia ’ s new prime minister , comes to prominence little known by the public but as a rock star among technocrats .
Mishustin became famous within a policy genre that , even for hardcore wonks , has only a niche audience : tax enforcement .
Between this public service and his private sector background , many commentators say , Mishustin ’ s nomination underscores President Vladimir Putin ’ s concerns about the resuscitation of Russia ’ s stagnant economy .
They are not wrong .
But to view the significance of Mishustin ’ s nomination only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia ’ s economic growth is to indulge a myopia that would itself advance the farther-sighted strategic vision for Russia that his appointment likely reflects : a pivot toward a new brand of techno-authoritarianism .
Like many a rock star , Mishustin ’ s path to international fame has its dark side .
He delivered his eye-popping performance by constructing an economic surveillance apparatus that would elicit envy from any authoritarian state .
As prime minister , yes , his technical savvy may enhance efficiencies and boost growth .
But his time as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which he can marshal his technocratic acumen to advance Putin ’ s strategic objectives about more than dollars and cents .
If the direction in which Mishustin ’ s appointment signals Putin ’ s Russia is about to head has any contemporary analogue , it lies in a country that is increasingly its ally and also the world ’ s epicenter of techno-authoritarianism : Xi Jinping ’ s China .
Like Xi , for Putin , economic growth is likely only part of an overall strategic vision .
By his own admission , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Mishustin ’ s role as tax czar was more technologist than economist .
And so he is poised to fill the prime minister slot within Putin ’ s authoritarian regime , in effect , having thrived in a government post as a self-identified technologist who developed new and impressive ways of extending the state ’ s surveillance of the economy .
As taxman , Mishustin developed a set of futuristic technologies that allowed Russia ’ s government to raise revenues .
But these technologies also enhanced surveillance capabilities of Putin ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not as if Russia ’ s tax authorities simply set an algorithm on heaps of data to do the impersonal bidding of state administration .
Putin ’ s political appointees , like Mishustin , also maintain the ability to identify subjects and dredge up transaction-level data at their own discretion .
An example : The month after his boss declared that Western liberalism “ has become obsolete ” in an interview with the Financial Times , Mishustin allowed a journalist from the publication into Moscow ’ s tax headquarters .
Mishustin apparently asked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had a coffee in his hotel the evening before .
Within minutes , Mishustin , who can visualize the contents of his countrywide database on a “ huge video wall , ” had assembled a lineup of what the journalist had purchased .
The suspects : a latte , an espresso , three cappuccinos .
Mishustin , in other words , was only too happy to point out the surveillance capabilities of the Russian state to a foreign journalist by surveilling that journalist , a demonstration that sheds almost no light on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s intended purpose .
Identifying a reporter ’ s evening coffee does not show anything about the system ’ s efficiency at collecting revenue but rather its possible uses as a mechanism of surveillance targeted at individuals of interest to Russian authorities .
Now , as prime minister , Mishustin is poised to use his technical expertise to advance Putin ’ s agenda ; his track record of creating world-leading technology vanguards for the Russian state puts Putin in a position to define the cutting edge of techno-authoritarianism .
The rock star @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from his results .
During his tenure , the share of Russia ’ s value-added tax ( VAT ) that went uncollected by tax authorities reportedly shrank from around 20 percent to less than 1 percent , likely one of the world ’ s lowest .
By contrast , a typical advanced economy like the United Kingdom would tend to have a VAT gap closer to 10 percent .
Under Mishustin ’ s leadership , Russia ’ s Federal Tax Service ( FTS ) achieved these results through the deployment of dragnet technology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transaction in Russia .
New legislation required the submission of all business-to-business invoices .
After a successful pilot program , the FTS started in 2017 to require all retail establishments to use “ online cash registers ” that automatically transmitted data on all transactions to the tax authorities in real time .
Even if it happens in Siberia , any transaction in Russia registers in the FTS database in under 90 seconds .
The FTS then applies artificial intelligence to this encompassing universe of transaction-level data to identify likely tax evaders .
Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ techno-authoritarian innovations that can rival the expanding toolkit on display in Xi ’ s China .
Thanks to Mishustin , however , he has at least one .
While estimates for the share of the VAT that is uncollected in China remain significantly dated , even now , they seem extremely unlikely to have dropped to Russia ’ s record-leading low levels .
Mishustin ’ s tenure as taxman also illustrates his ability to benefit Russia ’ s strategic interests by pulling off something else pioneered by China : the tactic of dividing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dissonant factions .
One consists of economic-minded foreign-policy doves ; the other of foreign-policy hawks motivated by security and human rights concerns .
For years , China cultivated a flock of doves among the U.S. economics and business community .
This domestic constituency for U.S. policy toward China served to counterbalance the influence of the China hawks .
This equilibrium held , to China ’ s benefit , until recently—when a souring of the dovish constituency ’ s position seemed to coincide with hawkish shifts in official U.S. policy .
The new Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of success at this task from his days as tax czar .
Putin draws no shortage of Western criticism for security and human rights issues .
But economic technocrats even in bastions of Western liberalism praised the economic panopticon Mishustin constructed for him .
One official with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) conceded that addressing “ Big Brother ” -type concerns would require additional work but praised the system as a “ game changer ” that could allow the world ’ s governments to raise “ hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revenue .
The OECD was founded in 1961 , amid the heights of the Cold War , at least in part to serve as a mechanism to promulgate Western liberalism .
If Putin intended for Mishustin ’ s appointment to engender dovish sentiment among the business-minded West , he seems to be off to a pretty good start .
Western media coverage emphasized his success in boosting tax revenue and his Ph.D. in economics .
As Moscow ’ s taxman , however , he seemed to view his primary role as that of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the capacities of the state—not as that of an economist .
“ We built the technology and are now becoming economists , ” he told the Financial Times , explaining the development of his tax system .
His tenure as taxman also underscores the extent to which his acumen as a technocrat creates opportunities to bolster Putin ’ s long-standing goal of sowing discord about liberal democracy in Western democracies .
Putin ’ s attempts to undermine liberal democracy abroad would stand to grow stronger if Russia ’ s “ illiberal model ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advantages .
To the extent that Putin ’ s version of the state offers any quantifiable advantage over the Western liberal model , however , they come from Mishustin ’ s technocratic innovations .
In the West ’ s liberal democracies , to construct official measures of inflation , government agencies sample the prices of a fraction of goods and services .
Sampling rather than measuring every single item introduces a relatively small degree of measurement error in monthly inflation readings , though it washes out over time .
Appraised of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of liberal societies in which the state lacks an economic universal eye that directly observes all prices , Mishustin wasted no time in impugning the inferiority of their official data .
“ That ’ s bullshit , ” he told the Financial Times .
“ We can see everything bought everywhere.
” In government , technical expertise is only a means to an end .
Mishustin ’ s technical expertise served Putin ’ s ends well when he was head of Russia ’ s FTS .
The world is about to find out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s objectives from the prime minister position .
If past is prologue , financial markets and the business community may like the answer , even as Western governments do not .
Mishustin ’ s nomination , then , may herald the start of a variation on a play already seen once before in the 21st century .
Only this time it will have Russian rather than Chinese characteristics .

Mikhail Mishustin, Russia’s new prime minister, comes to prominence little known by the public but as a rock star among technocrats. Mishustin became famous within a policy genre that, even for hardcore wonks, has only a niche audience: tax enforcement.
Mikhail Mishustin, Russia’s new prime minister, comes to prominence little known by the public but as a rock star among technocrats. Mishustin became famous within a policy genre that, even for hardcore wonks, has only a niche audience: tax enforcement.
Between this public service and his private sector background, many commentators say, Mishustin’s nomination underscores President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about the resuscitation of Russia’s stagnant economy. They are not wrong. But to view the significance of Mishustin’s nomination only in terms of its first-order implications for Russia’s economic growth is to indulge a myopia that would itself advance the farther-sighted strategic vision for Russia that his appointment likely reflects: a pivot toward a new brand of techno-authoritarianism.
Like many a rock star, Mishustin’s path to international fame has its dark side. He delivered his eye-popping performance by constructing an economic surveillance apparatus that would elicit envy from any authoritarian state. As prime minister, yes, his technical savvy may enhance efficiencies and boost growth. But his time as tax czar also underscores the extent to which he can marshal his technocratic acumen to advance Putin’s strategic objectives about more than dollars and cents.
If the direction in which Mishustin’s appointment signals Putin’s Russia is about to head has any contemporary analogue, it lies in a country that is increasingly its ally and also the world’s epicenter of techno-authoritarianism: Xi Jinping’s China. Like Xi, for Putin, economic growth is likely only part of an overall strategic vision. By his own admission, in spite of his Ph.D. in economics, Mishustin’s role as tax czar was more technologist than economist. And so he is poised to fill the prime minister slot within Putin’s authoritarian regime, in effect, having thrived in a government post as a self-identified technologist who developed new and impressive ways of extending the state’s surveillance of the economy.
As taxman, Mishustin developed a set of futuristic technologies that allowed Russia’s government to raise revenues. But these technologies also enhanced surveillance capabilities of Putin’s authoritarian state. For it’s not as if Russia’s tax authorities simply set an algorithm on heaps of data to do the impersonal bidding of state administration. Putin’s political appointees, like Mishustin, also maintain the ability to identify subjects and dredge up transaction-level data at their own discretion.
An example: The month after his boss declared that Western liberalism “has become obsolete” in an interview with the Financial Times, Mishustin allowed a journalist from the publication into Moscow’s tax headquarters. Mishustin apparently asked the visiting journalist if he’d had a coffee in his hotel the evening before. Within minutes, Mishustin, who can visualize the contents of his countrywide database on a “huge video wall,” had assembled a lineup of what the journalist had purchased. The suspects: a latte, an espresso, three cappuccinos. Mishustin, in other words, was only too happy to point out the surveillance capabilities of the Russian state to a foreign journalist by surveilling that journalist, a demonstration that sheds almost no light on the tax collections that are ostensibly the system’s intended purpose.
Identifying a reporter’s evening coffee does not show anything about the system’s efficiency at collecting revenue but rather its possible uses as a mechanism of surveillance targeted at individuals of interest to Russian authorities. Now, as prime minister, Mishustin is poised to use his technical expertise to advance Putin’s agenda; his track record of creating world-leading technology vanguards for the Russian state puts Putin in a position to define the cutting edge of techno-authoritarianism.
The rock star status Mishustin achieved in tax enforcement came from his results. During his tenure, the share of Russia’s value-added tax (VAT) that went uncollected by tax authorities reportedly shrank from around 20 percent to less than 1 percent, likely one of the world’s lowest. By contrast, a typical advanced economy like the United Kingdom would tend to have a VAT gap closer to 10 percent.
Under Mishustin’s leadership, Russia’s Federal Tax Service (FTS) achieved these results through the deployment of dragnet technology that collected data on virtually every single transaction in Russia. New legislation required the submission of all business-to-business invoices. After a successful pilot program, the FTS started in 2017 to require all retail establishments to use “online cash registers” that automatically transmitted data on all transactions to the tax authorities in real time. Even if it happens in Siberia, any transaction in Russia registers in the FTS database in under 90 seconds. The FTS then applies artificial intelligence to this encompassing universe of transaction-level data to identify likely tax evaders.
Putin’s Russia does not have many techno-authoritarian innovations that can rival the expanding toolkit on display in Xi’s China. Thanks to Mishustin, however, he has at least one. While estimates for the share of the VAT that is uncollected in China remain significantly dated, even now, they seem extremely unlikely to have dropped to Russia’s record-leading low levels.
Mishustin’s tenure as taxman also illustrates his ability to benefit Russia’s strategic interests by pulling off something else pioneered by China: the tactic of dividing a would-be chorus of Western critics into dissonant factions. One consists of economic-minded foreign-policy doves; the other of foreign-policy hawks motivated by security and human rights concerns. For years, China cultivated a flock of doves among the U.S. economics and business community. This domestic constituency for U.S. policy toward China served to counterbalance the influence of the China hawks. This equilibrium held, to China’s benefit, until recently—when a souring of the dovish constituency’s position seemed to coincide with hawkish shifts in official U.S. policy.
The new Russian prime minister arrives with a track record of success at this task from his days as tax czar. Putin draws no shortage of Western criticism for security and human rights issues. But economic technocrats even in bastions of Western liberalism praised the economic panopticon Mishustin constructed for him. One official with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) conceded that addressing “Big Brother”-type concerns would require additional work but praised the system as a “game changer” that could allow the world’s governments to raise “hundreds of billions” of dollars in new tax revenue. The OECD was founded in 1961, amid the heights of the Cold War, at least in part to serve as a mechanism to promulgate Western liberalism.
If Putin intended for Mishustin’s appointment to engender dovish sentiment among the business-minded West, he seems to be off to a pretty good start. Western media coverage emphasized his success in boosting tax revenue and his Ph.D. in economics. As Moscow’s taxman, however, he seemed to view his primary role as that of a technologist whose function is to enhance the capacities of the state—not as that of an economist.
“We built the technology and are now becoming economists,” he told the Financial Times, explaining the development of his tax system.
His tenure as taxman also underscores the extent to which his acumen as a technocrat creates opportunities to bolster Putin’s long-standing goal of sowing discord about liberal democracy in Western democracies. Putin’s attempts to undermine liberal democracy abroad would stand to grow stronger if Russia’s “illiberal model” of the state seemed to offer relative advantages. To the extent that Putin’s version of the state offers any quantifiable advantage over the Western liberal model, however, they come from Mishustin’s technocratic innovations.
In the West’s liberal democracies, to construct official measures of inflation, government agencies sample the prices of a fraction of goods and services. Sampling rather than measuring every single item introduces a relatively small degree of measurement error in monthly inflation readings, though it washes out over time. Appraised of the United Kingdom’s sampling approach, typical of liberal societies in which the state lacks an economic universal eye that directly observes all prices, Mishustin wasted no time in impugning the inferiority of their official data.
“That’s bullshit,” he told the Financial Times. “We can see everything bought everywhere.”
In government, technical expertise is only a means to an end. Mishustin’s technical expertise served Putin’s ends well when he was head of Russia’s FTS. The world is about to find out how well that expertise serves Putin’s objectives from the prime minister position. If past is prologue, financial markets and the business community may like the answer, even as Western governments do not. Mishustin’s nomination, then, may herald the start of a variation on a play already seen once before in the 21st century. Only this time it will have Russian rather than Chinese characteristics.