foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President

America ’ s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President As the Trump era potentially comes to an end , many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country ’ s roaring return to the global stage .
But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake .
If anything , the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner .
Much of the debate surrounding the next administration ’ s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement .
What ’ s been largely missing from this debate , however , are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation ’ s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes .
The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East , the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization , and the national calamity caused by COVID-19 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable .
Otherwise , the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design , risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach .
Indeed , that ’ s what ’ s been happening during Trump ’ s presidency .
He seems to have understood the need to retrench .
But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan , Iraq , Syria , and Germany have been haphazard , making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not be done by tweet , in unpredictable fits and starts , and couched in an abrasive “ America first ” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.What ’ s been missing from the debate are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad .
Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation ’ s foreign policy and its political will .
Throughout his career , he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ require a more selective and discriminating internationalism , not restoration of the status quo ante .
Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East .
U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources , putting more emphasis on diplomacy , cybersecurity , global public health , and climate change .
Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load ; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posed by China , managing international trade and finance , preventing nuclear proliferation , addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation .
And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman , it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap .
These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork .
The top priorities of the next president will be at home : taming the pandemic , repairing the economy , and reviving democratic institutions and norms .
Only if the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effectively deal with the rest of the world .
In the meantime , the next administration needs to continue Trump ’ s effort to downsize the nation ’ s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way .
The United States needs to step back without stepping away .
“ Build back better ” applies abroad just as much as it does at home .

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.
As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.
Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.
What’s been missing from the debate are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad.
The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.
Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.
The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--U.S. and Russia Close to Agreement on Nuclear Weapons Treaty

U.S. and Russia Close to Agreement on Nuclear Weapons Treaty Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The United States and Russia edge closer to a deal on extending nuclear arms treaty , authorities fire at protesters in Nigeria , and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is to meet with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an attempt to mediate the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
At the end of a term that has seen the United States withdraw from the Paris climate agreement , the Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Organization , the Trump administration is about to finalize a deal that would extend an Obama-era treaty on nuclear weapons , potentially notching a foreign policy win ahead of November ’ s presidential election .
After a summer of halting negotiations to extend New START , a U.S.-Russian treaty limiting each country ’ s nuclear arsenals that is due to expire in February , the U.S. State Department on Tuesday appeared to signal a resolution was imminent .
“ The United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do the same , ” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said .
On the table is a one-year extension to the nuclear treaty and a freeze on the number of nuclear warheads , which should provide breathing room for a longer-term solution , and perhaps give time to entice China to join any future agreement .
Sticking points .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report , the agreement still has some ground to cover before it can be finalized .
One issue is the process of verification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taken to ensure Russia is in compliance , whereas Russia wants to keep verification procedures as they currently are .
Not standing still .
While the change in positions should be seen as a breakthrough , it doesn ’ t mean all is rosy in the world of U.S.-Russia arms control .
On Tuesday , CNN reported that Russia appears to be resuming testing of a nuclear-powered cruise missile , a weapon not covered by New START .
Just this week , the U.S. Department of Defense put the price tag on replacing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short of $ 100 billion .
The next steps in nuclear competition between the two countries may be decided by the U.S. presidential election : The Trump administration has made modernizing the country ’ s nuclear arsenal a pillar of its defense strategy .
Biden says he will scale back U.S. nuclear ambitions if elected .
Writing in Foreign Policy on Tuesday , Bhaskar Chakravorti , the dean of global business at Tufts University ’ s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy , argued that existing efforts to combat misinformation in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of misinformation is almost always local , he argues , and so countering it involves knowing which communities are most vulnerable .
The chart above shows the U.S. states most at risk of misinformation campaigns in the upcoming presidential election and beyond .
For more on the index behind the chart , read Chakravorti ’ s full argument .
Nigerian protesters targeted by security forces .
As many as 12 people were reportedly killed in Lagos on Tuesday after security forces opened fire on protesters .
Eyewitnesses told CNN of shots being fired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Lagos ’ s busy Lekki toll gate .
The states of Lagos , Ekiti , and Edo are now under curfew as authorities struggle to quell national protests over police brutality and government corruption .
Pompeo to meet with Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers .
After two Russian-brokered cease-fires failed to hold , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is trying his hand at negotiating peace in Nagorno-Karabakh .
On Friday , Pompeo will meet with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov as well as his Armenian counterpart , Zohrab Mnatsakanyan .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s yet to be confirmed whether the warring sides will hold a joint meeting in Washington .
Sweden ditches Huawei and ZTE .
Sweden has become the latest European country to announce a ban on the use of Huawei and ZTE equipment in its 5G networks .
The Swedish telecom authority announced the ban on the Chinese companies on Tuesday , saying it was necessary to “ ensure that the use of frequencies does not endanger the security of Sweden.
” Existing Huawei and ZTE equipment is slated to be removed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Brazil in OECD ?
Brazilian Economy Minister Paulo Guedes has said that the country will join the elite Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) group of nations within a year .
Speaking at an event hosted by a Washington think tank , Guedes said that Brazil had already fulfilled two-thirds of the requirements necessary for joining .
Brazil currently holds “ Key Partner ” status with the group .
Russia in Serbia .
Russia ’ s defense ministry is to open an office in Serbia , potentially exacerbating relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Serbia is still in membership negotiations .
It follows Serbia ’ s announcement last month that it would suspend military exercises with foreign forces , citing “ great and undeserved ” pressure from the EU surrounding its joint exercises with Russia and Belarus .
The head of Russia ’ s new office in Serbia will also have the right to visit Serbian military units that use Russian-made weapons and equipment .
DHS proposes cutting foreign journalist visa length .
A new rule proposed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of stay in the United States allowed on a foreign journalist ( I ) visa .
Under current rules , foreign journalists can extend their stay indefinitely as long as they fulfill certain criteria .
Under the new rule , foreign journalists would only be allowed stay for a maximum of 480 days .
According to DHS , the move is designed to “ reduce fraud and enhance national security.
” While the last few months have seen record U.S. weekly jobless claims and mass unemployment , the U.S. jewelry industry is seeing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sales were up nearly 10 percent to $ 5.25 billion in August compared to data from the previous year , according to one research firm .
Jewelers theorize that the lack of travel opportunities during the coronavirus pandemic has led the wealthy to pursue other means of parting with their money .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States and Russia edge closer to a deal on extending nuclear arms treaty, authorities fire at protesters in Nigeria , and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is to meet with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an attempt to mediate the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States and Russia edge closer to a deal on extending nuclear arms treaty, authorities fire at protesters in Nigeria, and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is to meet with the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an attempt to mediate the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. and Russia Appear to Reach Common Ground on New START
At the end of a term that has seen the United States withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and the World Health Organization, the Trump administration is about to finalize a deal that would extend an Obama-era treaty on nuclear weapons, potentially notching a foreign policy win ahead of November’s presidential election.
After a summer of halting negotiations to extend New START, a U.S.-Russian treaty limiting each country’s nuclear arsenals that is due to expire in February, the U.S. State Department on Tuesday appeared to signal a resolution was imminent. “The United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement. We expect Russia to empower its diplomats to do the same,” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said.
On the table is a one-year extension to the nuclear treaty and a freeze on the number of nuclear warheads, which should provide breathing room for a longer-term solution, and perhaps give time to entice China to join any future agreement.
Sticking points. As Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report, the agreement still has some ground to cover before it can be finalized. One issue is the process of verification: The United States wants tougher measures taken to ensure Russia is in compliance, whereas Russia wants to keep verification procedures as they currently are.
Not standing still. While the change in positions should be seen as a breakthrough, it doesn’t mean all is rosy in the world of U.S.-Russia arms control. On Tuesday, CNN reported that Russia appears to be resuming testing of a nuclear-powered cruise missile, a weapon not covered by New START.
Just this week, the U.S. Department of Defense put the price tag on replacing its Minuteman land-based nuclear missiles at just short of $100 billion. The next steps in nuclear competition between the two countries may be decided by the U.S. presidential election: The Trump administration has made modernizing the country’s nuclear arsenal a pillar of its defense strategy. Biden says he will scale back U.S. nuclear ambitions if elected.
United States of Misinformation
Writing in Foreign Policy on Tuesday, Bhaskar Chakravorti, the dean of global business at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, argued that existing efforts to combat misinformation in the United States miss the point. The nature of misinformation is almost always local, he argues, and so countering it involves knowing which communities are most vulnerable. The chart above shows the U.S. states most at risk of misinformation campaigns in the upcoming presidential election and beyond. For more on the index behind the chart, read Chakravorti’s full argument.
What We’re Following Today
Nigerian protesters targeted by security forces. As many as 12 people were reportedly killed in Lagos on Tuesday after security forces opened fire on protesters. Eyewitnesses told CNN of shots being fired by Nigerian forces into the crowds gathered at Lagos’s busy Lekki toll gate. The states of Lagos, Ekiti, and Edo are now under curfew as authorities struggle to quell national protests over police brutality and government corruption.
Pompeo to meet with Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. After two Russian-brokered cease-fires failed to hold, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is trying his hand at negotiating peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. On Friday, Pompeo will meet with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov as well as his Armenian counterpart, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan. The meetings will take place separately, and it’s yet to be confirmed whether the warring sides will hold a joint meeting in Washington.
Sweden ditches Huawei and ZTE. Sweden has become the latest European country to announce a ban on the use of Huawei and ZTE equipment in its 5G networks. The Swedish telecom authority announced the ban on the Chinese companies on Tuesday, saying it was necessary to “ensure that the use of frequencies does not endanger the security of Sweden.” Existing Huawei and ZTE equipment is slated to be removed from Sweden’s network by 2025.
Keep an Eye On
Brazil in OECD? Brazilian Economy Minister Paulo Guedes has said that the country will join the elite Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group of nations within a year. Speaking at an event hosted by a Washington think tank, Guedes said that Brazil had already fulfilled two-thirds of the requirements necessary for joining. Brazil currently holds “Key Partner” status with the group.
Russia in Serbia. Russia’s defense ministry is to open an office in Serbia, potentially exacerbating relations with the European Union, with which Serbia is still in membership negotiations. It follows Serbia’s announcement last month that it would suspend military exercises with foreign forces, citing “great and undeserved” pressure from the EU surrounding its joint exercises with Russia and Belarus. The head of Russia’s new office in Serbia will also have the right to visit Serbian military units that use Russian-made weapons and equipment.
DHS proposes cutting foreign journalist visa length. A new rule proposed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that would dramatically reduce the the length of stay in the United States allowed on a foreign journalist (I) visa. Under current rules, foreign journalists can extend their stay indefinitely as long as they fulfill certain criteria. Under the new rule, foreign journalists would only be allowed stay for a maximum of 480 days. According to DHS, the move is designed to “reduce fraud and enhance national security.”
Odds and Ends
While the last few months have seen record U.S. weekly jobless claims and mass unemployment, the U.S. jewelry industry is seeing a bump in sales. Fine jewelry sales were up nearly 10 percent to $5.25 billion in August compared to data from the previous year, according to one research firm. Jewelers theorize that the lack of travel opportunities during the coronavirus pandemic has led the wealthy to pursue other means of parting with their money.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--China’s Nuclear Program Baffled Soviet Intelligence

The United States wants to include China in negotiations on nuclear weapons with the Russian Federation .
Russia ’ s reaction to this policy depends in part on its own understanding of Beijing ’ s nuclear intentions and capabilities .
The question of just what Russia knows—or believes—about China is a tough one .
Fortunately , an extraordinary collection of newly declassified documents from the Russian archives , including the party records known as The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History ( RGANI ) , reveals how the Soviet Union studied China ’ s nuclear and missile programs during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when nuclear war between Moscow and Beijing was very possible .
The Soviet Union adopted an exceptionally broad view of what types of information were useful , and Soviet assets were highly successful in obtaining various types of evidence not only from China but around the world .
Soviet analysts often recognized the limitations of their sources , but they , like their American counterparts , often overestimated Chinese advances during the Cultural Revolution era .
The evidence shows just how hard it was for even a state like the Soviet Union to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had one significant advantage over the United States in terms of intelligence on China ’ s nuclear weapons program : Moscow had participated in the early days of Beijing ’ s nuclear industry .
In 1968 , Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin requested that the Ministry of Geology provide a report on uranium resources in the People ’ s Republic of China ( PRC ) .
That report noted that Soviet specialists had participated in seeking uranium deposits in China between 1955 and 1960 .
During that time , 30 percent of all possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas with uranium ore—allowing rough forecasts of how much more China might have access to .
But the past ties could be a disadvantage , too .
In the 1950s , the Soviets helped train Chinese spymasters , and Moscow allegedly removed most of its own spies during the 1950s .
Those conditions created special difficulties for recruiting agents in the PRC .
Especially after the March 1969 crisis on the Sino-Soviet border , the top-secret in-house journal of the KGB ran multiple articles on how to convince Chinese citizens to provide intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ specifically discuss how to gain information on the Chinese bomb—although one article on counterintelligence warned about Chinese interest in Soviet nuclear weapons and referred to a Chinese diplomat that bought a book on rockets .
Yet the articles are revealing about the Soviet approach , and one article that summarized best practices suggests that they at least occasionally applied crude approaches .
The author resorted to culturally essentialist views of Chinese people , suggesting that KGB operatives remember that Chinese characteristics included nationalism , “ mystical belief in the vozhd ’ ( an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used for Stalin ) , “ brutality and vengefulness , ” “ cleverness and shiftiness , ” “ lack of inclination to rapidly solve any problem , ” “ a developed sense of envy , ” “ ability to endure hardship , ” “ tendency for exaggeration , ” preoccupation with maintaining “ face , ” and others .
The article also warned about the tendency among “ some ” skeptical KGB operatives to believe Chinese were too dishonest and untrustworthy to be good agents .
Another source of intelligence for the Soviet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and satellite observations .
The Soviets paid close attention to signals intelligence from Chinese weather observation posts to determine whether a nuclear test was imminent .
For example , in September 1967 , the Soviets intercepted directives to two weather stations in Xinjiang to strengthen observation of meteorological conditions .
Throughout the 1969 crisis , the GRU , Russia ’ s military intelligence agency , repeatedly reported on the operation of meteorological posts in Xinjiang as the strongest possible evidence that could predict an upcoming test .
The Soviets were also able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or transmitted data on air radioactivity samples .
Satellite intelligence also played a role .
On Oct. 24 , 1966 , for instance , space assets allowed the Soviets to discover a rocket with a height of 23 meters , which led the GRU to conclude that the first batch of Dongfeng rockets “ might have already been produced.
” In August 1967 , space intelligence found another rocket with a height of 30-35 meters and a diameter of 3 meters , which the GRU believed might be a rocket with a range @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , were dissatisfied with their ability to gain intelligence on China ’ s nuclear explosions .
In July 1968 , Ivan Serbin , head of the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee , complained in a top-secret report that “ currently , the effectiveness of discovering nuclear explosions still remains low , and information about them comes with great delay.
” Serbin noted that , although in 1967 a special “ Horizon ” facility was established in the Mongolian People ’ s Republic , that installation “ was not able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China in December 1967 , while stations that were located significantly further away from the place of the explosion discovered [ it ] .
” But technical information was not the only means .
Due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution , the Soviets were also able to pick up on key details about the military-industrial complex through the so-called big character posters ( wall-mounted posters used to express a political view ) and Red Guard materials .
For example , one such poster allowed the Soviets to learn that a high-ranking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Building , which ran the missile programs , had been killed during factional violence .
Another set of materials allowed the Soviets to learn that the same ministry was undergoing a “ purge of the leadership.
” Defectors also played an important role .
Wang Ming , a former high-ranking Chinese Communist Party leader who had defected to Moscow after losing a power struggle with Mao , regularly provided analysis to the Soviets , including on the bomb .
In May 1966 , Wang told his interlocutors : “ Mao wants to show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons above all aims to hit a blow to the Soviet Union , show the USA that it , like before , will consistently pursue the anti-Soviet line… ” All this intelligence , however , needed to be processed .
Especially after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution , Soviet leaders were clearly perplexed by China ’ s behavior .
In September 1966 , the Politburo established a secret Institute on the Problems of Modern China , as part of the Academy of Sciences , with 200 individuals .
The Ministry of Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ give classified information to the institution .
Both scholars and former policymakers participated .
Soviet academics sometimes provided very interesting insights .
In December 1969 , the Director of the Institute of the USA at the Academy of Sciences , Georgi Arbatov , displayed a sensitivity to the pressures of a strategic nuclear triangle .
In a secret report , he wrote that “ due to the geographical position , the threat of China to the USA requires fewer expenses that it does from us .
Basically , the Americans maintain one dual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ USSR and against China .
When it comes to us , however , this threat forces us to have two separate groups of the armed forces—in the West and in the East.
” At other times , however , the work produced by Soviet academics was poor .
For example , a top-secret report on China ’ s military-industrial complex , written by the Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in May 1971 , relied upon sources such as the Hong Kong Standard , TASS , and Electronic News —and contained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence officers paid extremely close attention to the views of foreign scholars , particularly American ones .
Professor Robert Barnett told the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy that , “ The USSR and USA should consider in their plans on defense from nuclear attack the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by China.
” K. Kelin , who worked at the U.N. Secretariat , reported on a conversation with Walter Clemens during a meeting of the Association for Asia and Far East Studies .
Clemens told Kelin that the Chinese program was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been protected despite the Cultural Revolution , and that the thermonuclear explosion was “ unexpected ” for the United States .
Igor Rogachev , the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington , met with Angus M. Fraser of the Institute for Defense Analyses , and Vladimir Petrov of George Washington University .
Fraser claimed that anti-Soviet propaganda in Beijing had become “ more serious and concrete ” with a “ military-strategic character.
” In the margins of the Rogachev report , there is a handwritten remark : “ This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans are strenuously throwing us against each other militarily.
” Fraser then hinted that China might be considering the deployment of medium-range rockets in Albania .
Think tank reports also caught the GRU ’ s attention .
The head of the GRU himself , Petr Ivashutin , not only submitted to the Central Committee a translated copy of the Research Analysis Corporation ’ s “ Communist China ’ s Military Doctrines ” report , but also included his own introductory remarks .
Ivashutin wrote that the PRC most feared a sudden strategic attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a ] ccording to the theory of the Maoists , the decisive significance in war is played by a person well prepared politically , not weapons ( including atomic ) .
” The Soviets also closely followed the views of American policymakers on China ’ s nuclear weapons .
Discussions with the Americans helped the Soviets better understand Washington ’ s views of the strategic nuclear triangle .
In September 1967 , Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States ’ ABM system “ will serve the purpose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” and would not provide protection “ from the large scale strategic rocket attack the Soviet Union is capable of launching.
” The Soviets looked to foreign sources to help understand the effect of their implicit nuclear threats against China during the 1969 crisis .
In October 1969 , the GRU reported that among “ Western military circles [ … ] an opinion is voiced ” that “ the PRC settled for talks under the influence of the well-known warnings of the Soviet Union….
” In December , the third secretary of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported that “ [ t ] he real reasons that forced the PRC to agree to the talks with the USSR , according to the USA , do not lie in China ’ s strength , rather in its weakness.
” That same month , another GRU report claimed that “ American military specialists ” believed Chinese nuclear forces “ do not considerably influence China ’ s military-political and military-strategic standing and the situation in the world in general.
” Although we still do not have enough evidence to make sweeping generalizations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources was likely the result of at least two factors .
First , the Soviets believed that the Chinese government was deeply irrational , and Moscow had trouble comprehending Beijing ’ s “ bizarre ” behavior , especially during the Cultural Revolution .
Second , the deterioration of relations placed Soviet diplomats and spies in Beijing in a very difficult situation .
The KGB resident in Beijing , Iurii Drozdov , wrote in his memoirs that , “ Several times our officers were subjected to attacks by Red Guards , ” and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geographical proximity , a previously close relationship , and similar Leninist systems , the Soviets struggled to comprehend the Chinese bomb .
Although these initial findings are preliminary , the new documents do unambiguously demonstrate the difficulty even for superpowers to understand nuclear intentions .
Washington should remember that Moscow today is similarly looking at a mix of complicated evidence and deeply interested in the views of third parties .
Clear answers are hard to find , but understanding Russia ’ s analysis of China ’ s nuclear weapons will be crucial for @ @ @ @ @ @ @

The United States wants to include China in negotiations on nuclear weapons with the Russian Federation. Russia’s reaction to this policy depends in part on its own understanding of Beijing’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The question of just what Russia knows—or believes—about China is a tough one. Fortunately, an extraordinary collection of newly declassified documents from the Russian archives, including the party records known as The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), reveals how the Soviet Union studied China’s nuclear and missile programs during the height of the Cold War—at a time when nuclear war between Moscow and Beijing was very possible.
The United States wants to include China in negotiations on nuclear weapons with the Russian Federation. Russia’s reaction to this policy depends in part on its own understanding of Beijing’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. The question of just what Russia knows—or believes—about China is a tough one. Fortunately, an extraordinary collection of newly declassified documents from the Russian archives, including the party records known as The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), reveals how the Soviet Union studied China’s nuclear and missile programs during the height of the Cold War—at a time when nuclear war between Moscow and Beijing was very possible.
The Soviet Union adopted an exceptionally broad view of what types of information were useful, and Soviet assets were highly successful in obtaining various types of evidence not only from China but around the world. Soviet analysts often recognized the limitations of their sources, but they, like their American counterparts, often overestimated Chinese advances during the Cultural Revolution era. The evidence shows just how hard it was for even a state like the Soviet Union to conduct nuclear intelligence effectively.
The Soviets had one significant advantage over the United States in terms of intelligence on China’s nuclear weapons program: Moscow had participated in the early days of Beijing’s nuclear industry. In 1968, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin requested that the Ministry of Geology provide a report on uranium resources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) . That report noted that Soviet specialists had participated in seeking uranium deposits in China between 1955 and 1960. During that time, 30 percent of all possible areas had been inspected which revealed 15 areas with uranium ore—allowing rough forecasts of how much more China might have access to.
But the past ties could be a disadvantage, too. In the 1950s, the Soviets helped train Chinese spymasters, and Moscow allegedly removed most of its own spies during the 1950s. Those conditions created special difficulties for recruiting agents in the PRC. Especially after the March 1969 crisis on the Sino-Soviet border, the top-secret in-house journal of the KGB ran multiple articles on how to convince Chinese citizens to provide intelligence to Moscow.
The journal did not specifically discuss how to gain information on the Chinese bomb—although one article on counterintelligence warned about Chinese interest in Soviet nuclear weapons and referred to a Chinese diplomat that bought a book on rockets. Yet the articles are revealing about the Soviet approach, and one article that summarized best practices suggests that they at least occasionally applied crude approaches. The author resorted to culturally essentialist views of Chinese people, suggesting that KGB operatives remember that Chinese characteristics included nationalism, “mystical belief in the vozhd’ (an archaic Russian term for top leader also used for Stalin), “brutality and vengefulness,” “cleverness and shiftiness,” “lack of inclination to rapidly solve any problem,” “a developed sense of envy,” “ability to endure hardship,” “tendency for exaggeration,” preoccupation with maintaining “face,” and others. The article also warned about the tendency among “some” skeptical KGB operatives to believe Chinese were too dishonest and untrustworthy to be good agents.
Another source of intelligence for the Soviet Union were signals, atmospheric changes, and satellite observations. The Soviets paid close attention to signals intelligence from Chinese weather observation posts to determine whether a nuclear test was imminent. For example, in September 1967, the Soviets intercepted directives to two weather stations in Xinjiang to strengthen observation of meteorological conditions. Throughout the 1969 crisis, the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, repeatedly reported on the operation of meteorological posts in Xinjiang as the strongest possible evidence that could predict an upcoming test. The Soviets were also able to detect when the Chinese tracked bomber aircrafts or transmitted data on air radioactivity samples.
Satellite intelligence also played a role. On Oct. 24, 1966, for instance, space assets allowed the Soviets to discover a rocket with a height of 23 meters, which led the GRU to conclude that the first batch of Dongfeng rockets “might have already been produced.” In August 1967, space intelligence found another rocket with a height of 30-35 meters and a diameter of 3 meters, which the GRU believed might be a rocket with a range over 2,000 kilometers.
The Soviets, however, were dissatisfied with their ability to gain intelligence on China’s nuclear explosions. In July 1968, Ivan Serbin, head of the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee, complained in a top-secret report that “currently, the effectiveness of discovering nuclear explosions still remains low, and information about them comes with great delay.” Serbin noted that, although in 1967 a special “Horizon” facility was established in the Mongolian People’s Republic, that installation “was not able to register an air nuclear explosion conducted in China in December 1967, while stations that were located significantly further away from the place of the explosion discovered [it].”
But technical information was not the only means. Due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the Soviets were also able to pick up on key details about the military-industrial complex through the so-called big character posters (wall-mounted posters used to express a political view) and Red Guard materials. For example, one such poster allowed the Soviets to learn that a high-ranking scientist in the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building, which ran the missile programs, had been killed during factional violence. Another set of materials allowed the Soviets to learn that the same ministry was undergoing a “purge of the leadership.”
Defectors also played an important role. Wang Ming, a former high-ranking Chinese Communist Party leader who had defected to Moscow after losing a power struggle with Mao, regularly provided analysis to the Soviets, including on the bomb. In May 1966, Wang told his interlocutors: “Mao wants to show the USA that an explosion of nuclear weapons above all aims to hit a blow to the Soviet Union, show the USA that it, like before, will consistently pursue the anti-Soviet line…”
All this intelligence, however, needed to be processed. Especially after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Soviet leaders were clearly perplexed by China’s behavior. In September 1966, the Politburo established a secret Institute on the Problems of Modern China, as part of the Academy of Sciences, with 200 individuals. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB were told to give classified information to the institution. Both scholars and former policymakers participated.
Soviet academics sometimes provided very interesting insights. In December 1969, the Director of the Institute of the USA at the Academy of Sciences, Georgi Arbatov, displayed a sensitivity to the pressures of a strategic nuclear triangle. In a secret report, he wrote that “due to the geographical position, the threat of China to the USA requires fewer expenses that it does from us. Basically, the Americans maintain one dual purpose group of strategic forces—both against the USSR and against China. When it comes to us, however, this threat forces us to have two separate groups of the armed forces—in the West and in the East.”
At other times, however, the work produced by Soviet academics was poor. For example, a top-secret report on China’s military-industrial complex, written by the Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in May 1971, relied upon sources such as the Hong Kong Standard, TASS, and Electronic News —and contained multiple errors.
Yet Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers paid extremely close attention to the views of foreign scholars, particularly American ones. Professor Robert Barnett told the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy that, “The USSR and USA should consider in their plans on defense from nuclear attack the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by China.”
K. Kelin, who worked at the U.N. Secretariat, reported on a conversation with Walter Clemens during a meeting of the Association for Asia and Far East Studies. Clemens told Kelin that the Chinese program was surprisingly fast, that scientists and engineers had been protected despite the Cultural Revolution, and that the thermonuclear explosion was “unexpected” for the United States.
Igor Rogachev, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington, met with Angus M. Fraser of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Vladimir Petrov of George Washington University. Fraser claimed that anti-Soviet propaganda in Beijing had become “more serious and concrete” with a “military-strategic character.” In the margins of the Rogachev report, there is a handwritten remark: “This is already not the first statement. The Americans are strenuously throwing us against each other militarily.” Fraser then hinted that China might be considering the deployment of medium-range rockets in Albania.
Think tank reports also caught the GRU’s attention. The head of the GRU himself, Petr Ivashutin, not only submitted to the Central Committee a translated copy of the Research Analysis Corporation’s “Communist China’s Military Doctrines” report, but also included his own introductory remarks. Ivashutin wrote that the PRC most feared a sudden strategic attack with nuclear weapons, but “[a]ccording to the theory of the Maoists, the decisive significance in war is played by a person well prepared politically, not weapons (including atomic).”
The Soviets also closely followed the views of American policymakers on China’s nuclear weapons. Discussions with the Americans helped the Soviets better understand Washington’s views of the strategic nuclear triangle. In September 1967, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States’ ABM system “will serve the purpose of protection from a possible Chinese attack” and would not provide protection “from the large scale strategic rocket attack the Soviet Union is capable of launching.”
The Soviets looked to foreign sources to help understand the effect of their implicit nuclear threats against China during the 1969 crisis. In October 1969, the GRU reported that among “Western military circles […] an opinion is voiced” that “the PRC settled for talks under the influence of the well-known warnings of the Soviet Union….” In December, the third secretary of the USSR’s Mission to the U.N. reported that “[t]he real reasons that forced the PRC to agree to the talks with the USSR, according to the USA, do not lie in China’s strength, rather in its weakness.” That same month, another GRU report claimed that “American military specialists” believed Chinese nuclear forces “do not considerably influence China’s military-political and military-strategic standing and the situation in the world in general.”
Although we still do not have enough evidence to make sweeping generalizations, the expansive use of a variety of sources was likely the result of at least two factors. First, the Soviets believed that the Chinese government was deeply irrational, and Moscow had trouble comprehending Beijing’s “bizarre” behavior, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Second, the deterioration of relations placed Soviet diplomats and spies in Beijing in a very difficult situation. The KGB resident in Beijing, Iurii Drozdov, wrote in his memoirs that, “Several times our officers were subjected to attacks by Red Guards,” and the Soviet embassy itself was assaulted. Despite geographical proximity, a previously close relationship, and similar Leninist systems, the Soviets struggled to comprehend the Chinese bomb.
Although these initial findings are preliminary, the new documents do unambiguously demonstrate the difficulty even for superpowers to understand nuclear intentions. Washington should remember that Moscow today is similarly looking at a mix of complicated evidence and deeply interested in the views of third parties. Clear answers are hard to find, but understanding Russia’s analysis of China’s nuclear weapons will be crucial for achieving cooperation among the great powers.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--What’s Behind the Mysterious Illness of U.S. Diplomats and Spies?

What ’ s Behind the Mysterious Illness of U.S. Diplomats and Spies ?
Beginning in 2016 , U.S. diplomats and CIA officials posted abroad , including in Cuba and China , began falling ill with debilitating headaches , vertigo , memory loss , dizziness , and other troubling symptoms .
The U.S. government vowed to get to the bottom of the matter , tasking top investigators and scientists to unearth what exactly was going on .
Now , nearly four years later , they still don ’ t have answers .
But new developments in the mysterious cases have once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reports in the New York Times and GQ magazine .
U.S. officials suspect that whatever is going on , it could be part of a coordinated attack from a U.S. adversary .
It ’ s not clear yet what could have caused these symptoms .
Theories range from microwave energy weapons to poisoning to mass hysteria .
But one thing ’ s for sure : U.S. officials overseas have suffered debilitating symptoms , and some feel they ’ re not getting the help they need from the U.S. government .
Here ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we know what ’ s causing this ?
In a word , no .
But officials and scientists are narrowing in on a few theories , including the use of microwave weapons .
In 2018 , a team of doctors published a report in the Journal of the American Medical Association that found the diplomats affected in Cuba had sustained brain injuries similar to those caused by concussion , but had no recent history of head trauma .
The study ’ s lead author , Douglas H. Smith , the director of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Perelman School of Medicine , told the New York Times later that year that while there was skepticism at first , there was increasing suspicion that the diplomats ’ brains had been affected by microwaves .
The U.S. military has developed its own prototypes of directed energy weapons that can deliver nonlethal charges .
But the U.S. military ’ s system is as big as a truck and takes hours to power up—a bit too conspicuous outside a diplomat ’ s apartment in Havana .
During the Cold War , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow with microwaves for decades , what came to be known as the Moscow signal .
They weren ’ t mind-control devices but a way to activate listening bugs implanted in the walls of the embassy .
“ The Soviets , in the bad old days like the 1970s , were using a lot of high-energy devices to actually do technical collection operations .
But it turned out that if you cranked them up too high , it would also have negative health impacts .
My assumption was always that that ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s going on in China , and Russia , and Cuba , ” said Steven Hall , a former CIA station chief in Moscow , who retired from the agency in 2015 .
There are other theories : toxins , or even mass hysteria .
Canadian diplomats based in Cuba also sustained mysterious brain injuries around the same time as their U.S. counterparts .
A study commissioned by the Canadian government pointed to side effects of chemicals used in fumigation against mosquitoes , noting that the diplomats ’ brain damage occurred in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Others suspect a mass psychogenic illness , where people from a tight-knit group convince themselves that they have developed similar symptoms , what one professor described to Vanity Fair as a kind of “ placebo effect in reverse.
” But the authors of the 2018 report noted that some of the symptoms experienced by the diplomats could not have been feigned , and that cases of mass psychogenic illness tend to pass quickly .
The best hope of an answer may lie with a study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spring , the academy convened neurologists , experts in electrical engineering , toxicologists , and epidemiologists .
The committee submitted its report to the State Department in early August , but it has not yet been released to lawmakers or the public .
“ It ’ s been extremely frustrating to me and my colleagues , in some ways disheartening , and certainly surprising , ” said David Relman , the Stanford University medical professor who chaired the committee .
Relman couldn ’ t share the report ’ s findings , but he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explanations for the health effects and found one of them to be the most plausible .
“ But that ’ s not to say that necessarily that one mechanism explains everything , ” he said .
“ Because , again , this was really complicated clinically .
Lots of people , lots of places , spread out over time.
” When did this begin ?
The mysterious illness first garnered public attention in 2017 when a cluster of U.S. officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba reported that they had been experiencing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fatigue , cognitive issues , and difficulty sleeping .
The next year , U.S. diplomats based in China developed symptoms that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told lawmakers were “ very similar and entirely consistent with the medical indications that have taken place to Americans working in Cuba.
” But there is at least one other case that significantly predates the Cuba and China clusters .
In 2013 , an employee of the National Security Agency named Mike Beck filed a workers ’ compensation claim with the Department of Labor claiming that exposure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a hostile country in 1996 may have caused him to develop Parkinson ’ s disease at the unusually young age of 46 .
The agency released a summary of a classified intelligence assessment that found that a country Beck went to was believed to have had a “ high-powered microwave system weapon that may have the ability to weaken , intimidate , or kill an enemy over time and without leaving evidence.
” The New York Times reported that people familiar with the assessment said that the country in question was Russia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s claim . )
How has the government responded ?
Retaliating against Cuba presented no difficulty , as the Trump administration was already looking to undo former President Barack Obama ’ s thaw with the island nation .
Fifteen Cuban diplomats were expelled from Washington , and the State Department issued a travel warning for American citizens .
( The Cuban government has repeatedly denied it had any involvement in the supposed attacks . )
In China , the response was far more muted , as Trump was trying to secure a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have hung us out to dry , ” Mark Lenzi , one of the diplomats affected , told the New York Times .
Pompeo called the suggestion that political considerations had shaped the administration ’ s response “ patently false ” in a press conference Wednesday .
It ’ s not just China .
Marc Polymeropoulos , the CIA ’ s former deputy chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia , who suffered all the same symptoms after a stay in Moscow in 2017 , told GQ about his experience after the agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Walter Reed military hospital .
“ The U.S. government handled this very poorly , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ This is like the [ National Football League ] 15 years ago with [ traumatic brain injury ] , putting their heads in the sand.
” Who is behind this ?
Suspicion has fallen on the Kremlin , given Russia ’ s history of using microwave weapons against U.S. officials and its interest in keeping U.S. relations with China and Cuba on ice .
Moscow has proved willing to pursue its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have offered Taliban militants bounties to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan .
Russia ’ s foreign ministry denies any connection to the incident in Cuba .
Yet there are indications .
According to GQ , a CIA investigation using cellphone location data found that individuals believed to work for the Russian security services were in the area at the time that U.S. officials in these countries first began experiencing symptoms .
But according to the New York Times , senior U.S. officials want to see more evidence before pointing a finger at @ @

Beginning in 2016, U.S. diplomats and CIA officials posted abroad, including in Cuba and China, began falling ill with debilitating headaches, vertigo, memory loss, dizziness, and other troubling symptoms. The U.S. government vowed to get to the bottom of the matter, tasking top investigators and scientists to unearth what exactly was going on.
Beginning in 2016, U.S. diplomats and CIA officials posted abroad, including in Cuba and China, began falling ill with debilitating headaches, vertigo, memory loss, dizziness, and other troubling symptoms. The U.S. government vowed to get to the bottom of the matter, tasking top investigators and scientists to unearth what exactly was going on.
Now, nearly four years later, they still don’t have answers. But new developments in the mysterious cases have once again brought the issue to light—including new reports in the New York Times and GQ magazine. U.S. officials suspect that whatever is going on, it could be part of a coordinated attack from a U.S. adversary.
It’s not clear yet what could have caused these symptoms. Theories range from microwave energy weapons to poisoning to mass hysteria. But one thing’s for sure: U.S. officials overseas have suffered debilitating symptoms, and some feel they’re not getting the help they need from the U.S. government.
Here’s what we know so far.
Do we know what’s causing this?
In a word, no. But officials and scientists are narrowing in on a few theories, including the use of microwave weapons. In 2018, a team of doctors published a report in the Journal of the American Medical Association that found the diplomats affected in Cuba had sustained brain injuries similar to those caused by concussion, but had no recent history of head trauma.
The study’s lead author, Douglas H. Smith, the director of the Penn Center for Brain Injury and Repair at the Perelman School of Medicine, told the New York Times later that year that while there was skepticism at first, there was increasing suspicion that the diplomats’ brains had been affected by microwaves.
The U.S. military has developed its own prototypes of directed energy weapons that can deliver nonlethal charges. But the U.S. military’s system is as big as a truck and takes hours to power up—a bit too conspicuous outside a diplomat’s apartment in Havana.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union bombarded the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with microwaves for decades, what came to be known as the Moscow signal. They weren’t mind-control devices but a way to activate listening bugs implanted in the walls of the embassy.
“The Soviets, in the bad old days like the 1970s, were using a lot of high-energy devices to actually do technical collection operations. But it turned out that if you cranked them up too high, it would also have negative health impacts. My assumption was always that that’s probably some version of that is what’s going on in China, and Russia, and Cuba,” said Steven Hall, a former CIA station chief in Moscow, who retired from the agency in 2015.
There are other theories: toxins, or even mass hysteria. Canadian diplomats based in Cuba also sustained mysterious brain injuries around the same time as their U.S. counterparts. A study commissioned by the Canadian government pointed to side effects of chemicals used in fumigation against mosquitoes, noting that the diplomats’ brain damage occurred in an area that is susceptible to neurotoxins. Others suspect a mass psychogenic illness, where people from a tight-knit group convince themselves that they have developed similar symptoms, what one professor described to Vanity Fair as a kind of “placebo effect in reverse.” But the authors of the 2018 report noted that some of the symptoms experienced by the diplomats could not have been feigned, and that cases of mass psychogenic illness tend to pass quickly.
The best hope of an answer may lie with a study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned by the State Department last spring, the academy convened neurologists, experts in electrical engineering, toxicologists, and epidemiologists.
The committee submitted its report to the State Department in early August, but it has not yet been released to lawmakers or the public. “It’s been extremely frustrating to me and my colleagues, in some ways disheartening, and certainly surprising,” said David Relman, the Stanford University medical professor who chaired the committee.
Relman couldn’t share the report’s findings, but he said that the committee reviewed four possible explanations for the health effects and found one of them to be the most plausible. “But that’s not to say that necessarily that one mechanism explains everything,” he said. “Because, again, this was really complicated clinically. Lots of people, lots of places, spread out over time.”
When did this begin?
The mysterious illness first garnered public attention in 2017 when a cluster of U.S. officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Cuba reported that they had been experiencing hearing loss, dizziness, headaches, fatigue, cognitive issues, and difficulty sleeping. The next year, U.S. diplomats based in China developed symptoms that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told lawmakers were “very similar and entirely consistent with the medical indications that have taken place to Americans working in Cuba.”
But there is at least one other case that significantly predates the Cuba and China clusters. In 2013, an employee of the National Security Agency named Mike Beck filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Department of Labor claiming that exposure to microwaves while on a trip to a hostile country in 1996 may have caused him to develop Parkinson’s disease at the unusually young age of 46. The agency released a summary of a classified intelligence assessment that found that a country Beck went to was believed to have had a “high-powered microwave system weapon that may have the ability to weaken, intimidate, or kill an enemy over time and without leaving evidence.” The New York Times reported that people familiar with the assessment said that the country in question was Russia. (The Department of Labor rejected Beck’s claim.)
How has the government responded?
Retaliating against Cuba presented no difficulty, as the Trump administration was already looking to undo former President Barack Obama’s thaw with the island nation. Fifteen Cuban diplomats were expelled from Washington, and the State Department issued a travel warning for American citizens. (The Cuban government has repeatedly denied it had any involvement in the supposed attacks.) In China, the response was far more muted, as Trump was trying to secure a trade deal with Beijing. “They have hung us out to dry,” Mark Lenzi, one of the diplomats affected, told the New York Times.
Pompeo called the suggestion that political considerations had shaped the administration’s response “patently false” in a press conference Wednesday.
It’s not just China. Marc Polymeropoulos, the CIA’s former deputy chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia, who suffered all the same symptoms after a stay in Moscow in 2017, told GQ about his experience after the agency refused to transfer him for treatment to the Walter Reed military hospital.
“The U.S. government handled this very poorly,” he told Foreign Policy. “This is like the [National Football League] 15 years ago with [traumatic brain injury], putting their heads in the sand.”
Who is behind this?
Suspicion has fallen on the Kremlin, given Russia’s history of using microwave weapons against U.S. officials and its interest in keeping U.S. relations with China and Cuba on ice. Moscow has proved willing to pursue its enemies in the West and is reported to have offered Taliban militants bounties to kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Russia’s foreign ministry denies any connection to the incident in Cuba.
Yet there are indications. According to GQ, a CIA investigation using cellphone location data found that individuals believed to work for the Russian security services were in the area at the time that U.S. officials in these countries first began experiencing symptoms. But according to the New York Times, senior U.S. officials want to see more evidence before pointing a finger at Moscow.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--Why Does Trump Have a Chinese Bank Account?

Why Does Trump Have a Chinese Bank Account ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s tax records show his company has a Chinese bank account , Chinese diplomats wreak havoc over Taiwan at a party in Fiji , and Chinese officials threaten U.S. citizens living in China .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s tax records show a bank account in China controlled by Trump International Hotel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times , as part of its investigation into his tax returns .
That is embarrassing for Trump , who has attempted to smear his electoral opponent , Joe Biden , by going after his son Hunter ’ s business dealings in China—where Trump himself has tried to do business for years .
Setting up a bank account in China used to be pretty easy , and it wasn ’ t uncommon for firms to establish them just to give employees access to cash while traveling—back in the days when credit cards were rare @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the 100-yuan note was king .
In those days , one could set up a Chinese bank account by just sending in a passport ; today , it requires a face-to-face meeting .
The details remain sketchy , but it seems that the Trump account was set up for business purposes—either as a wholly owned foreign enterprise or as a joint venture with an unknown Chinese partner .
In that case , having a bank account would be not only legitimate but also advised , Dan Harris , an experienced China business @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Maybe he was operating 100 percent legally in China , ” Harris said .
“ But he simply didn ’ t reveal it ( as he should have done ) because the optics were so bad for him.
” The records show that the company paid Chinese authorities $ 188,561 in taxes between 2013 and 2015 .
“ Chinese taxes are usually about 25 percent of profits in China , so he ’ d have had to have done some business there to justify it , ” Harris said .
Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in China , but an attorney for the Trump organization told the Times that no deals or transactions “ ever materialized ” and the office has been inactive since 2015 .
Special treatment .
Ivanka Trump appears to have received favorable treatment from the Chinese authorities for her own business efforts there .
That ’ s not unusual , either : In China , the children of foreign leaders have often capitalized on their parents ’ positions .
Hunter Biden ’ s own private equity deals there may have benefited from his father @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the son of President George H.W .
Bush ( and George W. Bush ’ s brother ) , has had substantial dealings in China , including appearances at propaganda events .
Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd ’ s daughter is a brand ambassador for the Chinese firm Alibaba .
None of this necessarily implies parental collusion—only children taking advantage of their surnames .
The practice is also common in reverse : Western firms regularly employ the children and grandchildren of Chinese political leaders in the hope of buying influence .
Fiji cake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party held by the Taiwanese mission on the island of Fiji this month , violently objecting to a cake displaying the Taiwanese flag—and beat up a Taiwanese representative so badly he was hospitalized .
The undiplomatic behavior shows how seriously the Chinese Foreign Ministry takes not giving Taiwan an inch , as Peter Martin , the author of an upcoming book on “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy , explains .
Apart from personal conviction , Chinese diplomats care far more about covering themselves from political attacks at home than about convincing their host @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embassy ’ s own statement on the fight , which falls flat to foreign ears .
U.S. citizens in China threatened .
Chinese officials have reportedly told their Trump administration counterparts that U.S. citizens in China are at risk of imprisonment if the United States continues to act against China .
Exit bans and arbitrary detention have been a danger for foreigners in China for a long time , but fears increased with the detention of two Canadians held as de facto hostages over the arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usually had a glimmer of rationale , and foreigners arrested on political charges—such as the activist Peter Dahlin—tended to be expelled rather than held permanently .
Those norms look likely to crumble in the future .
Chinese media targeted .
The Trump administration has labeled six more Chinese media outlets operating in the United States as so-called foreign missions : Yicai Global , Jiefang Daily , Xinmin Evening News , Social Sciences in China Press , Beijing Review , and Economic Daily .
These choices are , frankly , weird—especially compared with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Daily and CGTN .
Social Sciences in China Press is an academic publishing house linked to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences , which is a government think tank—but hardly a foreign mission .
It ’ s possible that these outlets have been used as visa cover for espionage purposes .
But in the absence of evidence , it seems more like the United States picking a fight for the sake of it and risking more retaliation .
No-talent firms , stay out of chipmaking .
There ’ s a big government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , where electronics currently depend largely on foreign suppliers .
This year , the industry missed the target—for 40 percent of components to come from domestic sources—and it has a lot of ground to make up to meet the 70 percent target in 2025 .
That , combined with growing fears of decoupling , has pushed heavy investment in next-generation chips .
But any project with the weight of the government behind it attracts a lot of chancers and unrelated firms trying to tap into government funds—resulting in a stern warning from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chipmakers to stay away after several prominent firms collapsed .
Major insurance firm dissolves .
Last month , the once prominent insurance firm Anbang announced it would dissolve , prompting a wave of creditors to move in to pick over the pieces .
Anbang had substantial links to elite families and was used in a shopping spree that looked like an attempt to get serious amounts of money out of China .
That included striking deals with U.S. presidential advisor Jared Kushner on highly favorable terms .
Tech restrictions .
This week brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing , as China introduced restrictions on the export of sensitive goods and technologies .
The United States still has a broad lead over Chinese tech , but Chinese firms are way ahead in a few fields , including online payments .
Escalation probably harms China worse than the United States in the long run , but as business ties are unknotted , neither side really looks like a winner .
“ China ’ s Influence in Japan : Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular , ” Center for Strategic and International Studies ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese influence in Japan—a country deeply shaped by Chinese culture yet strangely immune to China ’ s present-day influence efforts .
As the report points out , that is in part because of the clumsiness of such efforts , which often target the wrong people .
But it ’ s also because of Japan ’ s relatively placid political environment , where suspicion of outside influence prevails .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump’s tax records show his company has a Chinese bank account, Chinese diplomats wreak havoc over Taiwan at a party in Fiji, and Chinese officials threaten U.S. citizens living in China .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump’s tax records show his company has a Chinese bank account, Chinese diplomats wreak havoc over Taiwan at a party in Fiji, and Chinese officials threaten U.S. citizens living in China.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Does Trump Have Business in China?
U.S. President Donald Trump’s tax records show a bank account in China controlled by Trump International Hotel Management, according to the New York Times, as part of its investigation into his tax returns. That is embarrassing for Trump, who has attempted to smear his electoral opponent, Joe Biden, by going after his son Hunter’s business dealings in China—where Trump himself has tried to do business for years.
Setting up a bank account in China used to be pretty easy, and it wasn’t uncommon for firms to establish them just to give employees access to cash while traveling—back in the days when credit cards were rare, electronic payments were unheard of, and the 100-yuan note was king. In those days, one could set up a Chinese bank account by just sending in a passport; today, it requires a face-to-face meeting.
The details remain sketchy, but it seems that the Trump account was set up for business purposes—either as a wholly owned foreign enterprise or as a joint venture with an unknown Chinese partner. In that case, having a bank account would be not only legitimate but also advised, Dan Harris, an experienced China business attorney, wrote in a text message.
“Maybe he was operating 100 percent legally in China,” Harris said. “But he simply didn’t reveal it (as he should have done) because the optics were so bad for him.”
The records show that the company paid Chinese authorities $188,561 in taxes between 2013 and 2015. “Chinese taxes are usually about 25 percent of profits in China, so he’d have had to have done some business there to justify it,” Harris said. Trump has long pursued various interests and licenses in China, but an attorney for the Trump organization told the Times that no deals or transactions “ever materialized” and the office has been inactive since 2015.
Special treatment. Ivanka Trump appears to have received favorable treatment from the Chinese authorities for her own business efforts there. That’s not unusual, either: In China, the children of foreign leaders have often capitalized on their parents’ positions. Hunter Biden’s own private equity deals there may have benefited from his father’s visibility. Neil Bush, the son of President George H.W. Bush (and George W. Bush’s brother), has had substantial dealings in China, including appearances at propaganda events. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s daughter is a brand ambassador for the Chinese firm Alibaba.
None of this necessarily implies parental collusion—only children taking advantage of their surnames. The practice is also common in reverse: Western firms regularly employ the children and grandchildren of Chinese political leaders in the hope of buying influence.
What We’re Following
Fiji cake fight. Two Chinese diplomats gate-crashed a party held by the Taiwanese mission on the island of Fiji this month, violently objecting to a cake displaying the Taiwanese flag—and beat up a Taiwanese representative so badly he was hospitalized. The undiplomatic behavior shows how seriously the Chinese Foreign Ministry takes not giving Taiwan an inch, as Peter Martin, the author of an upcoming book on “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, explains.
Apart from personal conviction, Chinese diplomats care far more about covering themselves from political attacks at home than about convincing their host countries of good intentions—as evinced by the embassy’s own statement on the fight, which falls flat to foreign ears.
U.S. citizens in China threatened. Chinese officials have reportedly told their Trump administration counterparts that U.S. citizens in China are at risk of imprisonment if the United States continues to act against China. Exit bans and arbitrary detention have been a danger for foreigners in China for a long time, but fears increased with the detention of two Canadians held as de facto hostages over the arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou.
In the past, arrests have usually had a glimmer of rationale, and foreigners arrested on political charges—such as the activist Peter Dahlin—tended to be expelled rather than held permanently. Those norms look likely to crumble in the future.
Chinese media targeted. The Trump administration has labeled six more Chinese media outlets operating in the United States as so-called foreign missions: Yicai Global, Jiefang Daily, Xinmin Evening News, Social Sciences in China Press, Beijing Review, and Economic Daily. These choices are, frankly, weird—especially compared with the well-funded outlets chosen earlier, such as China Daily and CGTN.
Social Sciences in China Press is an academic publishing house linked to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which is a government think tank—but hardly a foreign mission. It’s possible that these outlets have been used as visa cover for espionage purposes. But in the absence of evidence, it seems more like the United States picking a fight for the sake of it and risking more retaliation.
Tech and Business
No-talent firms, stay out of chipmaking. There’s a big government push to domesticize the semiconductor industry in China, where electronics currently depend largely on foreign suppliers. This year, the industry missed the target—for 40 percent of components to come from domestic sources—and it has a lot of ground to make up to meet the 70 percent target in 2025. That, combined with growing fears of decoupling, has pushed heavy investment in next-generation chips.
But any project with the weight of the government behind it attracts a lot of chancers and unrelated firms trying to tap into government funds—resulting in a stern warning from the central government this week for unqualified chipmakers to stay away after several prominent firms collapsed.
Major insurance firm dissolves. Last month, the once prominent insurance firm Anbang announced it would dissolve, prompting a wave of creditors to move in to pick over the pieces. Anbang had substantial links to elite families and was used in a shopping spree that looked like an attempt to get serious amounts of money out of China. That included striking deals with U.S. presidential advisor Jared Kushner on highly favorable terms.
Tech restrictions. This week brought more tit for tat between Washington and Beijing, as China introduced restrictions on the export of sensitive goods and technologies. The United States still has a broad lead over Chinese tech, but Chinese firms are way ahead in a few fields, including online payments. Escalation probably harms China worse than the United States in the long run, but as business ties are unknotted, neither side really looks like a winner.
What We’re Reading
“China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
This new CSIS report details Chinese influence in Japan—a country deeply shaped by Chinese culture yet strangely immune to China’s present-day influence efforts. As the report points out, that is in part because of the clumsiness of such efforts, which often target the wrong people. But it’s also because of Japan’s relatively placid political environment, where suspicion of outside influence prevails.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--Same Old Hariri, Newly Traumatized Lebanon

Lebanon has come full circle .
A year ago , a million Lebanese thronged the streets and demanded the removal of the entire political class , as they chanted “ Killon yani Killon ” — “ All of them , we mean all.
” Now , Saad Hariri , the prime minister who resigned soon after the uprising engulfed the country , is staging a comeback .
A decision about whether he is to become Lebanon ’ s next prime minister is expected to be made this week .
Other politicians from the old guard who previously ran the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deploying familiar pressure tactics to retain control over ministries .
Some , like Gebran Bassil—a former foreign minister and the son-in-law of President Michel Aoun who was much criticized by last year ’ s crowds and ultimately forced to resign—will back Hariri ’ s return if it paves the way for his return as well , senior political sources told Foreign Policy .
Hariri will ostensibly bring in a government made of technocrats—other than , of course , himself as the man in charge—to solve the nation ’ s deepening economic crisis .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has had to compromise with Hezbollah and its Shiite ally the Amal Movement on the post of the finance minister .
Hariri has agreed that a Shiite will head the crucial ministry .
It was already implicit that it would be a name satisfactory to Hezbollah and Amal , but Yassine Jaber , an independent member of parliament affiliated with the Amal Movement , said it clearly .
“ Hariri has given his consent that he will pick from the names suggested , ” Jaber said .
The finance minister ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the government , which grants him and his backers a veto over government decisions .
Moreover , he has access to official documents that are needed to prove past graft and wasteful expenses .
A puppet finance minister will ensure immunity for Hezbollah and its allies .
Electricity supply comes under the Ministry of Energy and Water , and for decades it has been run , or rather run into the ground , by Bassil and Aoun ’ s party , the Free Patriotic Movement ( FPM ) .
It guzzles state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 24-hour-a-day electricity .
Reforming electricity supply is a leading commitment agreed on by all political parties in accordance with the French initiative to bail out the country that Hariri has said he intends to implement .
But political sources told Foreign Policy that he is under pressure to choose a candidate for the ministry who is to FPM ’ s liking .
Such politicking indicates that Lebanon ’ s political class is unruffled by the crises swallowing the country and is still busy plotting how to pull the strings of any future government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is now clear that Lebanon ’ s ruling elite never intended to relinquish power and were just playing for time .
However , Lebanon has run out of time .
Over the last year , decades of corruption and financial mismanagement culminated in a steep and unimpeded economic deterioration , further exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic .
The local currency plummeted by nearly 80 percent and made salaries earned in Lebanese pounds almost worthless .
In parallel , prices of basic commodities skyrocketed .
Capital controls imposed by banks denied people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plunged into joblessness as the coronavirus necessitated a string of lockdowns .
Just when you thought things couldn ’ t get worse , thousands of tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut ’ s port .
Despite repeated warnings about the danger the explosive presented to neighborhoods nearby , multiple government agencies turned a blind eye and are now held responsible for the catastrophe in public opinion .
The explosion left many parts of the city destroyed and uninhabitable .
Billions of dollars are needed to resurrect the city , on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanon has sought from the International Monetary Fund to revive the economy and pay its bills .
In April , an estimated 75 percent of Lebanese were in need of aid , and many relied on charity as well as on historic government subsidies on flour and fuel .
However , those subsidies may soon be withdrawn .
According to the central bank director Riad Salame , the man accused of playing a key role in causing the monetary crisis , the reserves can not guarantee subsidies for much longer .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and yet there is little apparent remorse or a sense of urgency among the political elite .
Even if , after making all the compromises and assuaging bruised egos , Hariri is sworn in and is pushed by the French to usher in reforms , they will be minimal , according to over a dozen civil society members , experts , and politicians who spoke to Foreign Policy .
Last week , on Oct. 17 , a few hundred Lebanese gathered at Martyrs ’ Square , the epicenter of the protests in downtown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the uprising .
Again they demanded the political class be gotten rid of , and again they unfurled the Lebanese flag as they chanted “ thawra , ” “ revolution.
” Some , however , conceded defeat and admitted they had achieved nothing , outmaneuvered by the ruling elite .
Amani Saleh was marching with her compatriots and filming the demonstration on her phone .
Her eyes , ringed with maroon and golden eyeshadow , drooped with shame and disappointment as she said , “ Nothing , nothing has changed so far.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ not deal with the endemic corruption , inefficiency , and sectarian politics , the genesis of Lebanon ’ s multitude of crises , she thought he might convince Europe to shell out some money .
“ He has contacts with Europeans , maybe he can bring in dollars or euros , ” she said .
Others were even more pessimistic .
Norma G. , who asked not to give her full name as she feared she might be identified and tracked by the authorities , said the Lebanese had tried Hariri “ many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he had been taken for a ride by Hezbollah and its Christian allies .
“ He is talking to the same politicians again , like Hezbollah , ” she said .
“ He is one of them , he won ’ t change anything.
” Gilbert Doumit , who contested the last election in 2018 on a civil society , anti-establishment ticket , but lost , dismissed Hariri by citing an aphorism often attributed to Albert Einstein .
“ He can not change anything because no problem can be solved from the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
However , the former candidate did not take any responsibility for the protest movement ’ s own failings , namely the absence of a united front to fill in the vacuum left by the failure of the old guard and to offer a new generation of leaders .
He said fielding a singular leadership from the protest movement would have divided the people and broken its momentum .
Despite his caution , that warning has come true in any case : The movement is split among many citizens ’ groups and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanese political analyst , said that expecting politicians to reform a system that has benefited them for so many years is like asking patients to cut off their own oxygen supply .
He gave the now-familiar explanation of the workings of Lebanon ’ s confessional system : The political elite have been using the public sector as personal fiefdoms , handing out jobs to coreligionists to buy their loyalty and make them dependent on their sectarian overlords-cum-party chiefs .
For decades the same political parties have been in charge of the same ministries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough loopholes to ensure that public money runs the operations of their political parties .
“ When they distributed the economic sectors among each other they ensured their way of financing themselves , ” Nader said .
“ For instance : Hariri ’ s al-Mustaqbal or Future Movement controls telecom , so they got the advantage .
Bassil ’ s FPM controls electricity , so they are getting an advantage .
That is why , I repeat , they can not reform .
It is suicide for them.
” Hariri ’ s strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backing to cobble together a cabinet and then wait for the results of U.S. elections and , he would hope , a Joe Biden presidency .
If Biden wins next month , and if he is softer on Iran than his predecessor , then he might make it easier for Hariri to procure an IMF bailout .
But that would depend on what sort of agreement Biden would arrive at with Iran to assuage concerns of regional allies Saudi Arabia and Israel .
Hezbollah is Iran ’ s most effective proxy and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group ’ s growing strength in Lebanon and the wider Levant will be an important part of any U.S. government ’ s foreign policy .
Hanin Ghaddar , a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy , said there was no reason for Biden to give in to Iran .
“ When Obama made a deal with Iran he was in his second term and he was in a hurry , the Iranians were not in a hurry .
This time the Iranians are in a hurry but Biden is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has other priorities so Iran and Hezbollah will be forced to make concessions unless they want to live with the status quo and don ’ t feel the pressure of the economies in their countries collapsing.
” Hariri ’ s political backers also hope that the dire economic situation may force other political parties to allow him both to form a government and to push through at least enough reforms to compel the West to loosen its purse strings .
But the Lebanese who demonstrated on the streets to warn about the crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ find themselves engulfed in it .
That is the Catch-22 they face .
Lebanon can not sign a deal with the IMF without a government—but as long as the political elite is still in a position to infiltrate any future government with their own people , the revolution of the past year will have been rendered pointless .

Lebanon has come full circle. A year ago, a million Lebanese thronged the streets and demanded the removal of the entire political class, as they chanted “Killon yani Killon”—“All of them, we mean all.” Now, Saad Hariri, the prime minister who resigned soon after the uprising engulfed the country, is staging a comeback. A decision about whether he is to become Lebanon’s next prime minister is expected to be made this week.
Lebanon has come full circle. A year ago, a million Lebanese thronged the streets and demanded the removal of the entire political class, as they chanted “Killon yani Killon”—“All of them, we mean all.” Now, Saad Hariri, the prime minister who resigned soon after the uprising engulfed the country, is staging a comeback. A decision about whether he is to become Lebanon’s next prime minister is expected to be made this week.
Other politicians from the old guard who previously ran the country under its sectarian constitutional system are also deploying familiar pressure tactics to retain control over ministries. Some, like Gebran Bassil—a former foreign minister and the son-in-law of President Michel Aoun who was much criticized by last year’s crowds and ultimately forced to resign—will back Hariri’s return if it paves the way for his return as well, senior political sources told Foreign Policy.
Hariri will ostensibly bring in a government made of technocrats—other than, of course, himself as the man in charge—to solve the nation’s deepening economic crisis. But even before he is sworn in he has had to compromise with Hezbollah and its Shiite ally the Amal Movement on the post of the finance minister. Hariri has agreed that a Shiite will head the crucial ministry. It was already implicit that it would be a name satisfactory to Hezbollah and Amal, but Yassine Jaber, an independent member of parliament affiliated with the Amal Movement, said it clearly. “Hariri has given his consent that he will pick from the names suggested,” Jaber said.
The finance minister’s signature is needed on every decree passed by the government, which grants him and his backers a veto over government decisions. Moreover, he has access to official documents that are needed to prove past graft and wasteful expenses. A puppet finance minister will ensure immunity for Hezbollah and its allies. Electricity supply comes under the Ministry of Energy and Water, and for decades it has been run, or rather run into the ground, by Bassil and Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). It guzzles state revenue while nevertheless failing to provide people 24-hour-a-day electricity. Reforming electricity supply is a leading commitment agreed on by all political parties in accordance with the French initiative to bail out the country that Hariri has said he intends to implement. But political sources told Foreign Policy that he is under pressure to choose a candidate for the ministry who is to FPM’s liking.
Such politicking indicates that Lebanon’s political class is unruffled by the crises swallowing the country and is still busy plotting how to pull the strings of any future government. If it was ever in doubt, it is now clear that Lebanon’s ruling elite never intended to relinquish power and were just playing for time.
However, Lebanon has run out of time. Over the last year, decades of corruption and financial mismanagement culminated in a steep and unimpeded economic deterioration, further exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. The local currency plummeted by nearly 80 percent and made salaries earned in Lebanese pounds almost worthless. In parallel, prices of basic commodities skyrocketed. Capital controls imposed by banks denied people their hard-earned savings, and thousands more plunged into joblessness as the coronavirus necessitated a string of lockdowns.
Just when you thought things couldn’t get worse, thousands of tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port. Despite repeated warnings about the danger the explosive presented to neighborhoods nearby, multiple government agencies turned a blind eye and are now held responsible for the catastrophe in public opinion. The explosion left many parts of the city destroyed and uninhabitable. Billions of dollars are needed to resurrect the city, on top of the $10 billion bailout Lebanon has sought from the International Monetary Fund to revive the economy and pay its bills.
In April, an estimated 75 percent of Lebanese were in need of aid, and many relied on charity as well as on historic government subsidies on flour and fuel. However, those subsidies may soon be withdrawn. According to the central bank director Riad Salame, the man accused of playing a key role in causing the monetary crisis, the reserves cannot guarantee subsidies for much longer. That is a dark picture by any standards, and yet there is little apparent remorse or a sense of urgency among the political elite.
Even if, after making all the compromises and assuaging bruised egos, Hariri is sworn in and is pushed by the French to usher in reforms, they will be minimal, according to over a dozen civil society members, experts, and politicians who spoke to Foreign Policy.
Last week, on Oct. 17, a few hundred Lebanese gathered at Martyrs’ Square, the epicenter of the protests in downtown Beirut, to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the uprising. Again they demanded the political class be gotten rid of, and again they unfurled the Lebanese flag as they chanted “thawra,” “revolution.” Some, however, conceded defeat and admitted they had achieved nothing, outmaneuvered by the ruling elite. Amani Saleh was marching with her compatriots and filming the demonstration on her phone. Her eyes, ringed with maroon and golden eyeshadow, drooped with shame and disappointment as she said, “Nothing, nothing has changed so far.” But while she thought Hariri would not deal with the endemic corruption, inefficiency, and sectarian politics, the genesis of Lebanon’s multitude of crises, she thought he might convince Europe to shell out some money. “He has contacts with Europeans, maybe he can bring in dollars or euros,” she said.
Others were even more pessimistic. Norma G., who asked not to give her full name as she feared she might be identified and tracked by the authorities, said the Lebanese had tried Hariri “many times,” but that every time he had been taken for a ride by Hezbollah and its Christian allies. “He is talking to the same politicians again, like Hezbollah,” she said. “He is one of them, he won’t change anything.”
Gilbert Doumit, who contested the last election in 2018 on a civil society, anti-establishment ticket, but lost, dismissed Hariri by citing an aphorism often attributed to Albert Einstein. “He cannot change anything because no problem can be solved from the same consciousness that created it,” Doumit said. However, the former candidate did not take any responsibility for the protest movement’s own failings, namely the absence of a united front to fill in the vacuum left by the failure of the old guard and to offer a new generation of leaders. He said fielding a singular leadership from the protest movement would have divided the people and broken its momentum. Despite his caution, that warning has come true in any case: The movement is split among many citizens’ groups and is leaderless.
Sami Nader, a Lebanese political analyst, said that expecting politicians to reform a system that has benefited them for so many years is like asking patients to cut off their own oxygen supply. He gave the now-familiar explanation of the workings of Lebanon’s confessional system: The political elite have been using the public sector as personal fiefdoms, handing out jobs to coreligionists to buy their loyalty and make them dependent on their sectarian overlords-cum-party chiefs. For decades the same political parties have been in charge of the same ministries, which has allowed them to engineer enough loopholes to ensure that public money runs the operations of their political parties. “When they distributed the economic sectors among each other they ensured their way of financing themselves,” Nader said. “For instance: Hariri’s al-Mustaqbal or Future Movement controls telecom, so they got the advantage. Bassil’s FPM controls electricity, so they are getting an advantage. That is why, I repeat, they cannot reform. It is suicide for them.”
Hariri’s strategy seems to be to use the French backing to cobble together a cabinet and then wait for the results of U.S. elections and, he would hope, a Joe Biden presidency. If Biden wins next month, and if he is softer on Iran than his predecessor, then he might make it easier for Hariri to procure an IMF bailout. But that would depend on what sort of agreement Biden would arrive at with Iran to assuage concerns of regional allies Saudi Arabia and Israel. Hezbollah is Iran’s most effective proxy and a self-professed enemy of Israel. Containing the group’s growing strength in Lebanon and the wider Levant will be an important part of any U.S. government’s foreign policy.
Hanin Ghaddar, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said there was no reason for Biden to give in to Iran. “When Obama made a deal with Iran he was in his second term and he was in a hurry, the Iranians were not in a hurry. This time the Iranians are in a hurry but Biden is not,” Ghaddar said. “He has other priorities so Iran and Hezbollah will be forced to make concessions unless they want to live with the status quo and don’t feel the pressure of the economies in their countries collapsing.”
Hariri’s political backers also hope that the dire economic situation may force other political parties to allow him both to form a government and to push through at least enough reforms to compel the West to loosen its purse strings. But the Lebanese who demonstrated on the streets to warn about the crisis their leaders were driving them into now find themselves engulfed in it. That is the Catch-22 they face. Lebanon cannot sign a deal with the IMF without a government—but as long as the political elite is still in a position to infiltrate any future government with their own people, the revolution of the past year will have been rendered pointless.