foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Congress Isn’t Leading on Human Rights in China

Members of the U.S. Congress say they want to be tougher on China and move human rights to the forefront of the relationship .
But representatives have failed to use the body ’ s strongest legislative levers in response to crises like the Xinjiang labor camps and Hong Kong ’ s new national security law .
Conversations with more than 20 Republican and Democratic staffers make clear that , without direction from the executive branch , Congress is not likely to act forcefully by itself .
The Biden administration will need to push Congress if it wants tough legislation to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Many members of Congress have expressed horror at China ’ s forced detention and labor camps for Uighur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang .
The Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act ( both 2020 ) , the two strongest pieces of legislation aimed at removing the products of forced labor from American supply chains , would presumably be no-brainers for most lawmakers looking to pick a fight with China .
However , 163 House Republicans voted against the Disclosure Act , and although it passed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ picked up by the Senate .
The Prevention Act , the narrower of the two , garnered near-unanimous approval from the House , but it also may very well not see a vote in the Senate .
The principal obstacle is that the bills bring new scrutiny to American business supply chains in Xinjiang .
The Prevention Act designates imports from Xinjiang as guilty of being produced by forced labor until proven innocent , requiring that Customs and Border Protection ( CBP ) have “ clear and convincing ” evidence that any imports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Disclosure Act goes a step further , putting the onus on public companies to actively audit supply chains in Xinjiang .
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce , which represents the interests of American businesses in Washington , came out against the bills .
The Chamber argues that the bills would cause American companies to shun businesses in Xinjiang altogether , ultimately harming Uighurs rather than helping them .
“ A well-intentioned effort to resolve abuses related to the mining of conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ( DRC ) in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ground , ” the Chamber wrote in an open letter to Congress .
“ [ It ] caused many companies to implement a de facto embargo against material sourced in the region which then hurt legitimate miners.
” The Chamber ’ s claims run contrary to the findings of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Congo , who determined that the U.S. measures there “ had a massive and welcome impact ” and “ should not and must not be thrown away or weakened.
” Nor does the Congolese case make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , only some warlords were using forced labor ; in Xinjiang , it is official policy .
But the bill ’ s impact on Uighurs is not the Chamber ’ s ultimate concern .
The group is presumably more worried about reputational and regulatory risks the bills pose to American companies , as well as the cost associated with cleaning out supply chains .
Regardless of the rationale for the Chamber ’ s opposition , the message got across .
In late September , 163 members of the House voted against the Disclosure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wexton .
“ Republicans were arguing on the floor that this would somehow hurt the Uighurs because it would cause companies to stop sourcing materials from the region , ” Mike Lucier , legislative director for Wexton , said .
“ But that ’ s sort of the point .
We should be pushing companies to reevaluate their supply chains in Xinjiang.
” Both bills face uphill battles in the Senate , where lobbyists from firms like Nike and Apple are striving to water them down or nix key provisions .
Hill staffers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Relations said that , faced with such opposition , its Chairman Jim Risch might not introduce the bills at all .
CBP ’ s decision yesterday to ban most cotton produced in Xinjiang from U.S. imports does not leave Congress off the hook .
CBP ’ s 15-person Forced Labor Division does not have the capacity to enforce such a measure .
More funding to support investigations of firms skirting the law , as well as penalties involving fines and naming and shaming firms caught importing illicit goods , would likely require congressional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Congress has shied away from maximalist policy options .
The new national security law , imposed from Beijing , heralds the end of China ’ s “ one country , two systems ” principle that allowed Hong Kong to enjoy relative political freedoms for the past two decades .
Journalists , opposition lawmakers , and protest leaders have been arrested for behavior deemed legal only months ago .
In response , this past summer Congress enacted the Hong Kong Autonomy Act , revoking Hong Kong ’ s special status and empowering the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It has not , however , moved on bills that would directly help Hong Kongers .
The Senate ’ s Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act , for example , creates new refugee allocations for Hong Kongers fearing political persecution .
In the House , Democrat Tom Malinowski and Republican Adam Kinzinger introduced the more ambitious Hong Kong People ’ s Freedom and Choice Act , creating up to 250,000 visa spots over five years for highly skilled Hong Kongers .
According to the logic behind the bill , by creating this special visa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China not to let conditions in Hong Kong deteriorate further , lest it drive away more of the city ’ s skilled population .
If Beijing continues to tighten its grip on the region , the legislation will position the U.S. firmly behind people impacted on the ground .
Similar moves by the United Kingdom clearly got under Beijing ’ s skin .
But neither bill has seen a floor vote .
Efforts to add the Hong Kong People ’ s Freedom and Choice Act to the National Defense Authorization Act , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ignored by House leadership .
Senate staffers who worked on the Safe Harbor Act doubt it will see a vote this year .
This all means that the Biden administration can not sit back and expect Congress to drive aggressive human rights policies to deal with China .
Instead , it will need to actively push Congress to do so , acting with executive powers when necessary .
This would reverse the traditional relationship between the executive branch and Congress on Chinese human rights issues .
Since the Tiananmen Square protests , every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Congress ’ s human rights concerns .
Former President George H.W .
Bush , against strong congressional opposition , tried to decouple trade and human rights .
Former President Bill Clinton butted heads with large congressional majorities in support of Taiwan that would have imperiled China ’ s ascension to the World Trade Organization .
Under outgoing President Donald Trump , the Uighurs and Hong Kong have been thrown under the bus in pursuit of a trade deal .
President-elect Joe Biden comes into office having already labelled Xinjiang a genocide , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drive action .
Thankfully , the president will have significant latitude to move .
For instance , on Xinjiang , he could direct the Department of Homeland Security to implement new due diligence requirements on imports without Congress .
On Hong Kong , Biden could unilaterally lift the refugee cap for applicants from the region , or direct consuls to expedite Hong Kongers ’ visa applications .
Biden could also raise the profile of human rights causes by building an international coalition of countries to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they would lack the long-term institutional staying power and the symbolic weight of congressional legislation .
To get U.S. policy on China back on a strong human rights footing , the Biden administration would do better to light a small fire behind Congress .
Bipartisan coalitions have put forward productive policy responses to Chinese human rights abuses .
The Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act would end the abhorrent reality of detained Uighurs making goods for American consumers .
The Hong Kong People ’ s Freedom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a means of getting out .
These measures merely await committee approvals and floor votes ; a slight push from Biden could get them over the line .

Members of the U.S. Congress say they want to be tougher on China and move human rights to the forefront of the relationship. But representatives have failed to use the body’s strongest legislative levers in response to crises like the Xinjiang labor camps and Hong Kong’s new national security law . Conversations with more than 20 Republican and Democratic staffers make clear that, without direction from the executive branch, Congress is not likely to act forcefully by itself. The Biden administration will need to push Congress if it wants tough legislation to deal with Chinese human rights abuses.
Members of the U.S. Congress say they want to be tougher on China and move human rights to the forefront of the relationship. But representatives have failed to use the body’s strongest legislative levers in response to crises like the Xinjiang labor camps and Hong Kong’s new national security law. Conversations with more than 20 Republican and Democratic staffers make clear that, without direction from the executive branch, Congress is not likely to act forcefully by itself. The Biden administration will need to push Congress if it wants tough legislation to deal with Chinese human rights abuses.
Many members of Congress have expressed horror at China’s forced detention and labor camps for Uighur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. The Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (both 2020), the two strongest pieces of legislation aimed at removing the products of forced labor from American supply chains, would presumably be no-brainers for most lawmakers looking to pick a fight with China. However, 163 House Republicans voted against the Disclosure Act, and although it passed the House it faces little chance of being picked up by the Senate. The Prevention Act, the narrower of the two, garnered near-unanimous approval from the House, but it also may very well not see a vote in the Senate.
The principal obstacle is that the bills bring new scrutiny to American business supply chains in Xinjiang. The Prevention Act designates imports from Xinjiang as guilty of being produced by forced labor until proven innocent, requiring that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have “clear and convincing” evidence that any imports from the region are clean. The Disclosure Act goes a step further, putting the onus on public companies to actively audit supply chains in Xinjiang.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents the interests of American businesses in Washington, came out against the bills. The Chamber argues that the bills would cause American companies to shun businesses in Xinjiang altogether, ultimately harming Uighurs rather than helping them. “A well-intentioned effort to resolve abuses related to the mining of conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in many cases worsened the situation on the ground,” the Chamber wrote in an open letter to Congress. “[It] caused many companies to implement a de facto embargo against material sourced in the region which then hurt legitimate miners.”
The Chamber’s claims run contrary to the findings of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Congo, who determined that the U.S. measures there “had a massive and welcome impact” and “should not and must not be thrown away or weakened.” Nor does the Congolese case make a good point of comparison. There, only some warlords were using forced labor; in Xinjiang, it is official policy. But the bill’s impact on Uighurs is not the Chamber’s ultimate concern. The group is presumably more worried about reputational and regulatory risks the bills pose to American companies, as well as the cost associated with cleaning out supply chains.
Regardless of the rationale for the Chamber’s opposition, the message got across. In late September, 163 members of the House voted against the Disclosure Act, sponsored by Democratic Rep. Jennifer Wexton. “Republicans were arguing on the floor that this would somehow hurt the Uighurs because it would cause companies to stop sourcing materials from the region,” Mike Lucier, legislative director for Wexton, said. “But that’s sort of the point. We should be pushing companies to reevaluate their supply chains in Xinjiang.”
Both bills face uphill battles in the Senate, where lobbyists from firms like Nike and Apple are striving to water them down or nix key provisions. Hill staffers close to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations said that, faced with such opposition, its Chairman Jim Risch might not introduce the bills at all.
CBP’s decision yesterday to ban most cotton produced in Xinjiang from U.S. imports does not leave Congress off the hook. CBP’s 15-person Forced Labor Division does not have the capacity to enforce such a measure. More funding to support investigations of firms skirting the law, as well as penalties involving fines and naming and shaming firms caught importing illicit goods, would likely require congressional action.
On Hong Kong, too, Congress has shied away from maximalist policy options. The new national security law, imposed from Beijing, heralds the end of China’s “one country, two systems” principle that allowed Hong Kong to enjoy relative political freedoms for the past two decades. Journalists, opposition lawmakers, and protest leaders have been arrested for behavior deemed legal only months ago. In response, this past summer Congress enacted the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, revoking Hong Kong’s special status and empowering the Trump administration to sanction responsible officials.
It has not, however, moved on bills that would directly help Hong Kongers. The Senate’s Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, for example, creates new refugee allocations for Hong Kongers fearing political persecution. In the House, Democrat Tom Malinowski and Republican Adam Kinzinger introduced the more ambitious Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act, creating up to 250,000 visa spots over five years for highly skilled Hong Kongers. According to the logic behind the bill, by creating this special visa category the United States would put pressure on China not to let conditions in Hong Kong deteriorate further, lest it drive away more of the city’s skilled population. If Beijing continues to tighten its grip on the region, the legislation will position the U.S. firmly behind people impacted on the ground. Similar moves by the United Kingdom clearly got under Beijing’s skin.
But neither bill has seen a floor vote. Efforts to add the Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act to the National Defense Authorization Act, in effect fast-tracking its passage, were ignored by House leadership. Senate staffers who worked on the Safe Harbor Act doubt it will see a vote this year.
This all means that the Biden administration cannot sit back and expect Congress to drive aggressive human rights policies to deal with China. Instead, it will need to actively push Congress to do so, acting with executive powers when necessary.
This would reverse the traditional relationship between the executive branch and Congress on Chinese human rights issues. Since the Tiananmen Square protests, every president has sought to shield economic cooperation from Congress’s human rights concerns. Former President George H.W. Bush, against strong congressional opposition, tried to decouple trade and human rights. Former President Bill Clinton butted heads with large congressional majorities in support of Taiwan that would have imperiled China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization. Under outgoing President Donald Trump, the Uighurs and Hong Kong have been thrown under the bus in pursuit of a trade deal.
President-elect Joe Biden comes into office having already labelled Xinjiang a genocide, but cannot count on Congress to drive action. Thankfully, the president will have significant latitude to move. For instance, on Xinjiang, he could direct the Department of Homeland Security to implement new due diligence requirements on imports without Congress. On Hong Kong, Biden could unilaterally lift the refugee cap for applicants from the region, or direct consuls to expedite Hong Kongers’ visa applications. Biden could also raise the profile of human rights causes by building an international coalition of countries to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.
While these actions would achieve valuable policy objectives, they would lack the long-term institutional staying power and the symbolic weight of congressional legislation. To get U.S. policy on China back on a strong human rights footing, the Biden administration would do better to light a small fire behind Congress. Bipartisan coalitions have put forward productive policy responses to Chinese human rights abuses. The Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act would end the abhorrent reality of detained Uighurs making goods for American consumers. The Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act would give vulnerable people a means of getting out. These measures merely await committee approvals and floor votes; a slight push from Biden could get them over the line.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--How Biden’s Climate Plans Will Shake Up Global Energy Markets

How Biden ’ s Climate Plans Will Shake Up Global Energy Markets U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will come to office in January with the most ambitious climate plan of any U.S. president in history .
But investors and corporate executives are wondering how big an impact the Biden administration can actually have on global energy markets—including renewable energy , oil , and gas—if Republicans retain control of the Senate and the Democrats have a narrower majority in the House of Representatives .
For answers , one should look not only to Biden ’ s domestic agenda but also to his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State John Kerry as his international climate envoy .
Given that Biden will be more constrained in passing new legislation if Republicans retain control of the Senate in the Georgia runoff elections on Jan. 5 , he may lean even more heavily on areas where the executive branch has existing legislative or constitutional authority .
Among the most significant is the conduct of foreign policy .
Selecting someone of Kerry ’ s stature as climate envoy and giving that person cabinet rank and a seat on the National Security Council signal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far beyond just rejoining the Paris climate agreement to make climate change a top foreign-policy priority .
The policy shifts that result—in areas as diverse as international trade , development finance , nonproliferation , and diplomacy—will do at least as much as his domestic agenda to shake up global energy markets and give a boost to clean energy firms and technologies .
First , Biden has promised to use the tools of trade policy to expand clean energy .
The scale and pace of the transition required to meet climate goals will result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clean energy technologies and products such as batteries , solar panels , critical minerals including lithium and cobalt , and eventually low-carbon fuels such as hydrogen .
By elevating climate change as a trade concern and returning to trade norms weakened by the Trump administration , Biden can pursue bilateral and multilateral agreements that make government subsidies for clean energy companies and products more permissible under trade rules , while still combating China ’ s damaging practices .
Climate change is likely to receive greater attention next year when Congress reauthorizes the Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president ’ s negotiation of trade agreements .
Biden has promised to impose border tariffs on carbon-intensive imports from abroad .
The European Union is already planning such a measure , and it would be preferable for the United States and Europe to cooperate rather than subject each other ’ s exports to tariffs .
In the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) , reforms to bolster clean energy might include allowing goods and services with lower carbon content to be treated more favorably even though they are alike in other respects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( so-called peace clauses ) before national climate measures that restrict trade can be challenged , and allowing greater state subsidies supporting lower carbon energy than permitted under current trade rules .
Other possible trade agreement provisions could allow nations greater leeway for public procurement of clean energy technologies and the reduction of tariffs on clean energy products .
No relationship is more consequential for global clean energy markets than that between the United States and China .
Second , no relationship is more consequential for global clean energy markets than that between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together are responsible for nearly half of global emissions .
On the one hand , it will be critical to build on bilateral climate diplomacy begun under former U.S. President Barack Obama .
China recently pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 while barely changing its 2030 targets , so a Biden administration can be expected to push China to deliver faster progress .
A return to the trade norms of the WTO may also reduce trade frictions between the United States and China and lead to greater trade in energy and clean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there remain significant issues of contention in the U.S.-China trade relationship , including cybersecurity , intellectual property theft , unfair subsidies , and protectionism .
Biden is also likely to confront China over political repression in Hong Kong and human rights abuses against Uighurs in Xinjiang .
These issues may undermine trade , including that in energy technologies and products .
Yet they may also spur greater U.S. innovation in clean energy as Washington increasingly works to protect the technological leadership of U.S. firms .
The Biden administration will be more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to promote certain industries seen to hold competitive and strategic advantages for the United States .
Indeed , Biden ’ s pick for national security advisor , Jake Sullivan , argued last year for just such an approach toward China , pairing economic competition with cooperation on transnational threats such as climate change , global pandemics , nonproliferation , and military escalation .
Third , the Biden administration will have significant influence with multilateral finance institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund , as well as many regional development banks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heart of development finance and encourage lending practices that promote low-carbon energy technologies and infrastructure .
The United States is now able to bring much more to the table when it partners with other development finance institutions following bipartisan legislation in 2018 that created the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation ( DFC ) .
With the DFC , the U.S. government now has much greater leeway to make equity investments and loans , including in local currencies to riskier borrowers , which makes it easier to partner with other countries , multilateral development @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy is essential for economic development , the electricity sector is by far the largest recipient of loans from development finance institutions around the world .
Development finance can also be an important source of U.S. soft power .
Biden has consistently said he would “ hold China accountable ” for its global investments in coal projects through the Belt and Road Initiative .
Doing so will require putting cleaner , yet still financially viable , options on the table for emerging-market countries as an alternative to Chinese investments .
The newly empowered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these alternatives , especially in concert with the development finance institutions of like-minded U.S. allies .
By elevating climate change to a priority for DFC , a Biden administration can mitigate private sector investment barriers—such as long project timelines and local currency fluctuations—and help unlock the trillions of dollars of capital that will be needed for global clean energy investments .
Scenarios for achieving a decarbonized global energy system by 2050 show that significantly more nuclear power is needed .
Fourth , the Biden administration has pledged to fulfill the United States ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor countries , of which $ 2 billion is still outstanding .
The U.S. Treasury Department also has other tools of climate finance at its disposal , such as how it responds to the looming global debt crisis in the wake of COVID-19 .
Modeled on the debt-for-nature swaps of the 1980s and 1990s that linked debt relief to investments in biodiversity and reforestation , including debt-for-climate swaps in debt restructuring negotiations could drive investment into low-carbon energy , energy efficiency , or conservation of forests and other carbon sinks .
Fifth , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase in research and development funding and multilateral collaboration on clean energy innovation .
Innovation is key to achieving climate goals and attracts bipartisan support across a range of technologies such as renewables , advanced nuclear , and carbon capture .
The International Energy Agency projects that to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 , half of the cumulative emissions reductions will have to come from technologies that are not yet commercially available .
A National Energy Innovation Mission , as recently proposed by scholars at Columbia University ’ s Center on Global Energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director , would triple federal funding for energy innovation , not only in early stage research but also the deployment and commercialization of technologies .
Through its climate diplomacy , the Biden administration can build R & D collaboration with other countries and speed up the development of new technologies by allowing countries with different skills and capabilities to share costs and expertise .
Changing the cost profile of clean energy through innovation can speed the pace of transition in other countries and open new markets to clean energy firms .
Sixth , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get a boost under Biden .
Scenarios for achieving a decarbonized global energy system by 2050 show that significantly more nuclear power is needed .
Moreover , U.S. national security interests in nuclear nonproliferation argue in favor of rebuilding U.S. leadership in nuclear energy and strengthening nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries .
At present , Russia and China have become the dominant global players in nuclear technology , giving them geopolitical influence to shape and influence the rules and norms in the sector .
Finally , the Biden administration is likely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targets after reentering the Paris climate agreement and also focus on implementation tools to achieve national commitments .
Targets are important , but many nations are already falling short of meeting their initial Paris commitments , let alone higher ones .
The Biden administration can use foreign and technical assistance , for example through the U.S. Agency for International Development and the national laboratories , to close the gap between ambition and reality .
A key priority should be developing new financial tools , technological innovations , and economic diversification strategies to help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where emissions are rapidly rising , not only to stop building new coal-fired power plants but also to phase down emissions from existing plants .
A Biden presidency increases the likelihood of further Russia sanctions that could also target energy companies .
Biden ’ s impact on clean energy firms may be especially pronounced in the United States .
That ’ s because underlying climate policy efforts will be a reeling domestic economy as the coronavirus pandemic continues , with unemployment at 7 to 8 percent and millions of Americans unable to pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , his domestic climate agenda is already aimed at putting Americans back to work .
Given what is likely to be a divided government , foreign-policy tools that both curb emissions and spur job growth will thus be particularly appealing .
That may strengthen the desire to invest in innovation ; use export credits to assist strategic clean energy sectors such as battery storage ; direct DFC funding to support U.S. businesses in energy technology , construction , or infrastructure that are competing for overseas investment opportunities ( explicitly part of DFC ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules and competition with China to permit targeted U.S. support for strategic domestic sectors .
While the Biden administration ’ s impact on global energy markets will be significant for clean energy firms and technologies , it will affect oil and gas markets as well .
Perhaps the most significant impact on these sectors would come from a return to the Iran nuclear agreement , which would result in large volumes of Iranian oil returning to an already oversupplied market as sanctions are lifted , thus depressing oil prices further , even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control with the new vaccines would give commodities a boost .
A Biden presidency increases the likelihood of further Russia sanctions that could also target energy companies .
Concerns about deteriorating relations with Washington may also drive Riyadh and Moscow toward even stronger cooperation in OPEC+ .
Biden ’ s pledge to ban new oil and gas leasing on federal lands would affect domestic production over time as output from existing wells and leases gradually declines .
At the same time , policies that curb U.S. gas flaring and methane leaks could make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in markets such as the European Union , where energy imports have to meet increasingly high environmental standards .
Biden ’ s biggest impact on oil and gas will come over time as his ambitious efforts to achieve climate goals and promote deep decarbonization would curb the demand for hydrocarbons .
The Biden administration ’ s ability to drive ambitious climate action abroad is , of course , linked to its domestic agenda .
Progress at home will enhance its credibility abroad and effect certain tools like border carbon adjustments .
At the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if limited by a divided Congress , can be amplified on the global stage through Biden ’ s authority in the international realm to use foreign policy tools to help deliver both clean-energy growth and domestic economic renewal .
As a result , one of the Biden administration ’ s most enduring legacies in global energy markets may be how diplomacy and geoeconomic tools in international finance , development assistance , trade , and innovation will have brightened the outlook for clean energy and expanded opportunities for U.S. firms in the sector .

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will come to office in January with the most ambitious climate plan of any U.S. president in history. But investors and corporate executives are wondering how big an impact the Biden administration can actually have on global energy markets—including renewable energy, oil, and gas—if Republicans retain control of the Senate and the Democrats have a narrower majority in the House of Representatives. For answers, one should look not only to Biden’s domestic agenda but also to his foreign policy and choice of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as his international climate envoy.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will come to office in January with the most ambitious climate plan of any U.S. president in history. But investors and corporate executives are wondering how big an impact the Biden administration can actually have on global energy markets—including renewable energy, oil, and gas—if Republicans retain control of the Senate and the Democrats have a narrower majority in the House of Representatives. For answers, one should look not only to Biden’s domestic agenda but also to his foreign policy and choice of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as his international climate envoy.
Given that Biden will be more constrained in passing new legislation if Republicans retain control of the Senate in the Georgia runoff elections on Jan. 5, he may lean even more heavily on areas where the executive branch has existing legislative or constitutional authority. Among the most significant is the conduct of foreign policy. Selecting someone of Kerry’s stature as climate envoy and giving that person cabinet rank and a seat on the National Security Council signal that the Biden administration intends to go far beyond just rejoining the Paris climate agreement to make climate change a top foreign-policy priority. The policy shifts that result—in areas as diverse as international trade, development finance, nonproliferation, and diplomacy—will do at least as much as his domestic agenda to shake up global energy markets and give a boost to clean energy firms and technologies.
First, Biden has promised to use the tools of trade policy to expand clean energy. The scale and pace of the transition required to meet climate goals will result in large increases in global shipments of clean energy technologies and products such as batteries, solar panels, critical minerals including lithium and cobalt, and eventually low-carbon fuels such as hydrogen. By elevating climate change as a trade concern and returning to trade norms weakened by the Trump administration, Biden can pursue bilateral and multilateral agreements that make government subsidies for clean energy companies and products more permissible under trade rules, while still combating China’s damaging practices. Climate change is likely to receive greater attention next year when Congress reauthorizes the Trade Promotion Authority, which sets parameters for the president’s negotiation of trade agreements.
Biden has promised to impose border tariffs on carbon-intensive imports from abroad. The European Union is already planning such a measure, and it would be preferable for the United States and Europe to cooperate rather than subject each other’s exports to tariffs. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), reforms to bolster clean energy might include allowing goods and services with lower carbon content to be treated more favorably even though they are alike in other respects, raising the bar or imposing delays (so-called peace clauses) before national climate measures that restrict trade can be challenged, and allowing greater state subsidies supporting lower carbon energy than permitted under current trade rules. Other possible trade agreement provisions could allow nations greater leeway for public procurement of clean energy technologies and the reduction of tariffs on clean energy products.
No relationship is more consequential for global clean energy markets than that between the United States and China.
Second, no relationship is more consequential for global clean energy markets than that between the United States and China, which together are responsible for nearly half of global emissions. On the one hand, it will be critical to build on bilateral climate diplomacy begun under former U.S. President Barack Obama. China recently pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 while barely changing its 2030 targets, so a Biden administration can be expected to push China to deliver faster progress. A return to the trade norms of the WTO may also reduce trade frictions between the United States and China and lead to greater trade in energy and clean energy products.
On the other hand, there remain significant issues of contention in the U.S.-China trade relationship, including cybersecurity, intellectual property theft, unfair subsidies, and protectionism. Biden is also likely to confront China over political repression in Hong Kong and human rights abuses against Uighurs in Xinjiang. These issues may undermine trade, including that in energy technologies and products. Yet they may also spur greater U.S. innovation in clean energy as Washington increasingly works to protect the technological leadership of U.S. firms. The Biden administration will be more likely to match China with its own policies to promote certain industries seen to hold competitive and strategic advantages for the United States. Indeed, Biden’s pick for national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, argued last year for just such an approach toward China, pairing economic competition with cooperation on transnational threats such as climate change, global pandemics, nonproliferation, and military escalation.
Third, the Biden administration will have significant influence with multilateral finance institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as many regional development banks, to put climate change at the heart of development finance and encourage lending practices that promote low-carbon energy technologies and infrastructure. The United States is now able to bring much more to the table when it partners with other development finance institutions following bipartisan legislation in 2018 that created the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). With the DFC, the U.S. government now has much greater leeway to make equity investments and loans, including in local currencies to riskier borrowers, which makes it easier to partner with other countries, multilateral development banks, and private investors.
Since energy is essential for economic development, the electricity sector is by far the largest recipient of loans from development finance institutions around the world. Development finance can also be an important source of U.S. soft power. Biden has consistently said he would “hold China accountable” for its global investments in coal projects through the Belt and Road Initiative. Doing so will require putting cleaner, yet still financially viable, options on the table for emerging-market countries as an alternative to Chinese investments. The newly empowered DFC is a powerful tool to deliver these alternatives, especially in concert with the development finance institutions of like-minded U.S. allies. By elevating climate change to a priority for DFC, a Biden administration can mitigate private sector investment barriers—such as long project timelines and local currency fluctuations—and help unlock the trillions of dollars of capital that will be needed for global clean energy investments.
Scenarios for achieving a decarbonized global energy system by 2050 show that significantly more nuclear power is needed.
Fourth, the Biden administration has pledged to fulfill the United States’ 2014 commitment to provide climate-related assistance to poor countries, of which $2 billion is still outstanding. The U.S. Treasury Department also has other tools of climate finance at its disposal, such as how it responds to the looming global debt crisis in the wake of COVID-19. Modeled on the debt-for-nature swaps of the 1980s and 1990s that linked debt relief to investments in biodiversity and reforestation, including debt-for-climate swaps in debt restructuring negotiations could drive investment into low-carbon energy, energy efficiency, or conservation of forests and other carbon sinks.
Fifth, the Biden administration has pledged a significant increase in research and development funding and multilateral collaboration on clean energy innovation. Innovation is key to achieving climate goals and attracts bipartisan support across a range of technologies such as renewables, advanced nuclear, and carbon capture. The International Energy Agency projects that to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, half of the cumulative emissions reductions will have to come from technologies that are not yet commercially available. A National Energy Innovation Mission, as recently proposed by scholars at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, of which I am the director, would triple federal funding for energy innovation, not only in early stage research but also the deployment and commercialization of technologies. Through its climate diplomacy, the Biden administration can build R&D collaboration with other countries and speed up the development of new technologies by allowing countries with different skills and capabilities to share costs and expertise. Changing the cost profile of clean energy through innovation can speed the pace of transition in other countries and open new markets to clean energy firms.
Sixth, the U.S. nuclear and construction industries may get a boost under Biden. Scenarios for achieving a decarbonized global energy system by 2050 show that significantly more nuclear power is needed. Moreover, U.S. national security interests in nuclear nonproliferation argue in favor of rebuilding U.S. leadership in nuclear energy and strengthening nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries. At present, Russia and China have become the dominant global players in nuclear technology, giving them geopolitical influence to shape and influence the rules and norms in the sector.
Finally, the Biden administration is likely to go beyond negotiations over higher emission reduction targets after reentering the Paris climate agreement and also focus on implementation tools to achieve national commitments. Targets are important, but many nations are already falling short of meeting their initial Paris commitments, let alone higher ones. The Biden administration can use foreign and technical assistance, for example through the U.S. Agency for International Development and the national laboratories, to close the gap between ambition and reality. A key priority should be developing new financial tools, technological innovations, and economic diversification strategies to help China, India, and other countries where emissions are rapidly rising, not only to stop building new coal-fired power plants but also to phase down emissions from existing plants.
A Biden presidency increases the likelihood of further Russia sanctions that could also target energy companies.
Biden’s impact on clean energy firms may be especially pronounced in the United States. That’s because underlying climate policy efforts will be a reeling domestic economy as the coronavirus pandemic continues, with unemployment at 7 to 8 percent and millions of Americans unable to pay their rent and other bills. Indeed, his domestic climate agenda is already aimed at putting Americans back to work. Given what is likely to be a divided government, foreign-policy tools that both curb emissions and spur job growth will thus be particularly appealing. That may strengthen the desire to invest in innovation; use export credits to assist strategic clean energy sectors such as battery storage; direct DFC funding to support U.S. businesses in energy technology, construction, or infrastructure that are competing for overseas investment opportunities (explicitly part of DFC’s mandate); or shape trade rules and competition with China to permit targeted U.S. support for strategic domestic sectors.
While the Biden administration’s impact on global energy markets will be significant for clean energy firms and technologies, it will affect oil and gas markets as well. Perhaps the most significant impact on these sectors would come from a return to the Iran nuclear agreement, which would result in large volumes of Iranian oil returning to an already oversupplied market as sanctions are lifted, thus depressing oil prices further, even if market optimism about getting the pandemic under control with the new vaccines would give commodities a boost. A Biden presidency increases the likelihood of further Russia sanctions that could also target energy companies. Concerns about deteriorating relations with Washington may also drive Riyadh and Moscow toward even stronger cooperation in OPEC+. Biden’s pledge to ban new oil and gas leasing on federal lands would affect domestic production over time as output from existing wells and leases gradually declines. At the same time, policies that curb U.S. gas flaring and methane leaks could make U.S. oil and gas exports more competitive in markets such as the European Union, where energy imports have to meet increasingly high environmental standards. Biden’s biggest impact on oil and gas will come over time as his ambitious efforts to achieve climate goals and promote deep decarbonization would curb the demand for hydrocarbons.
The Biden administration’s ability to drive ambitious climate action abroad is, of course, linked to its domestic agenda. Progress at home will enhance its credibility abroad and effect certain tools like border carbon adjustments. At the same time, domestic policies, even if limited by a divided Congress, can be amplified on the global stage through Biden’s authority in the international realm to use foreign policy tools to help deliver both clean-energy growth and domestic economic renewal. As a result, one of the Biden administration’s most enduring legacies in global energy markets may be how diplomacy and geoeconomic tools in international finance, development assistance, trade, and innovation will have brightened the outlook for clean energy and expanded opportunities for U.S. firms in the sector.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Meeks Makes History as First Black Lawmaker to Chair House Foreign Affairs Committee

Meeks Makes History as First Black Lawmaker to Chair House Foreign Affairs Committee This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
New York Rep. Gregory Meeks was selected as the next chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , after a rare three-way race for the influential congressional leadership post that will play an outsized role in helping shape U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s foreign policy from Capitol Hill .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ make Meeks the next chairman of the influential committee .
He beat a long-shot progressive challenger , Texas Rep. Joaquin Castro , by a vote of 148 to 78 , congressional aides told Foreign Policy .
Meeks will make history as the first Black chairman of the committee in its 198-year history .
California Rep. Brad Sherman , another contender , bowed out of the race earlier this week .
The race between the centrist Meeks and Castro reflected broader rifts within the Democratic Party over its foreign-policy platform .
Progressive lawmakers are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic Party to shift left on foreign policy , particularly on issues like military spending , U.S. troop deployments abroad , and international trade agreements .
When he becomes chairman in January , Meeks will have an outsized role in Congress ’ s work on national security , foreign aid , trade , and reforming the State Department .
In a statement issued after he was elected chair , Meeks outlined the committee ’ s priorities as Biden enters the White House .
“ The committee under the next Congress will preside over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and there is no shortage of work ahead of us , ” he said .
He said the committee would work to have the United States rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and World Health Organization , reversing departures under President Donald Trump , and “ take back Congress ’ constitutional authority ” on war powers that “ have led to ambiguous forever wars.
” He also said the committee “ must take a leading role in how we rebuild the State Department.
” The intraparty tensions seen in the race for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the incoming White House too , as the left flank of the Democratic Party pressures Biden over his expected picks for the heads of the CIA and Department of Defense .
In a statement , Castro outlined the common goals that he and Meeks shared for the committee despite the centrist-progressive divisions within the Democratic Party .
“ I look forward to working together with Chairman Meeks , particularly on our common goals such as promoting diversity at the U.S. State Department and rejoining the Iran nuclear deal , ” he said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ our vision and supported my bid for chair , especially those who dedicated their time to speak on my behalf , thank you .
I also appreciate the passionate advocates for their strategic organizing , and I ’ m proud to be part of a growing progressive foreign policy movement.
” Congressional aides familiar with the matter said that they expect Castro to keep his leadership position on the committee as chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations .
On the other side of the aisle , Texas Rep. Michael McCaul was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee .
McCaul has been a vocal supporter of the Trump administration ’ s hawkish policies toward China .
Rep. Eliot Engel , the outgoing chairman , helped lead Democratic investigations into Trump ’ s handling of U.S. foreign policy , including the impeachment investigation , inquiries into expedited arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates , and probes of other allegations of mismanagement at the State Department under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Both Meeks and Castro previously told Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump leaves office in January .

New York Rep. Gregory Meeks was selected as the next chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, after a rare three-way race for the influential congressional leadership post that will play an outsized role in helping shape U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s foreign policy from Capitol Hill.
New York Rep. Gregory Meeks was selected as the next chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, after a rare three-way race for the influential congressional leadership post that will play an outsized role in helping shape U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s foreign policy from Capitol Hill.
The Democratic caucus on Thursday voted to make Meeks the next chairman of the influential committee. He beat a long-shot progressive challenger, Texas Rep. Joaquin Castro, by a vote of 148 to 78, congressional aides told Foreign Policy. Meeks will make history as the first Black chairman of the committee in its 198-year history. California Rep. Brad Sherman, another contender, bowed out of the race earlier this week.
The race between the centrist Meeks and Castro reflected broader rifts within the Democratic Party over its foreign-policy platform. Progressive lawmakers are pushing Biden and other centrists in the Democratic Party to shift left on foreign policy, particularly on issues like military spending, U.S. troop deployments abroad, and international trade agreements.
When he becomes chairman in January, Meeks will have an outsized role in Congress’s work on national security, foreign aid, trade, and reforming the State Department.
In a statement issued after he was elected chair, Meeks outlined the committee’s priorities as Biden enters the White House.
“The committee under the next Congress will preside over an historic shift in US foreign policy, and there is no shortage of work ahead of us,” he said. He said the committee would work to have the United States rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and World Health Organization, reversing departures under President Donald Trump, and “take back Congress’ constitutional authority” on war powers that “have led to ambiguous forever wars.”
He also said the committee “must take a leading role in how we rebuild the State Department.”
The intraparty tensions seen in the race for the committee chairmanship are also playing out for the incoming White House too, as the left flank of the Democratic Party pressures Biden over his expected picks for the heads of the CIA and Department of Defense.
In a statement, Castro outlined the common goals that he and Meeks shared for the committee despite the centrist-progressive divisions within the Democratic Party.
“I look forward to working together with Chairman Meeks, particularly on our common goals such as promoting diversity at the U.S. State Department and rejoining the Iran nuclear deal,” he said. “To my colleagues who believed in our vision and supported my bid for chair, especially those who dedicated their time to speak on my behalf, thank you. I also appreciate the passionate advocates for their strategic organizing, and I’m proud to be part of a growing progressive foreign policy movement.”
Congressional aides familiar with the matter said that they expect Castro to keep his leadership position on the committee as chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
On the other side of the aisle, Texas Rep. Michael McCaul was reselected by House Republicans to be their top member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. McCaul has been a vocal supporter of the Trump administration’s hawkish policies toward China.
Rep. Eliot Engel, the outgoing chairman, helped lead Democratic investigations into Trump’s handling of U.S. foreign policy, including the impeachment investigation, inquiries into expedited arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and probes of other allegations of mismanagement at the State Department under Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Both Meeks and Castro previously told Foreign Policy they would keep those investigations open after Trump leaves office in January.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Will Biden’s National Security Team Include Members of the Democratic Party’s Progressive Wing?

Will Biden ’ s National Security Team Include Members of the Democratic Party ’ s Progressive Wing ?
This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Emma Ashford : Hey , Matt !
Did you have a good Thanksgiving ?
Or were you too distracted by our prediction from the last column coming true ?
Last time around , we asked if Donald Trump would try to destroy Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House , and just as we were all recovering from our Thanksgiving turkey comas , Iran ’ s senior nuclear scientist , Mohsen Fakhrizadeh , was assassinated by parties unknown .
Matthew Kroenig : We may have been prescient .
But most speculate that it was the Israeli Mossad ( not Trump ) behind the attack .
And , indeed , Israel has a history of covert action against weapons of mass destruction programs in the region going all the way back to Egypt ’ s nuclear and rocket programs in the 1950s—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1981 .
What is your assessment of the reasoning behind the attack and its likely effectiveness ?
EA : It was definitely the Israelis .
As you point out , they have a history of doing this kind of thing .
There are historical reasons for the willingness of the Mossad to take actions others might consider immoral , like assassinations or kidnappings .
And certainly , no one objected when it was former Nazis they were chasing down .
But it has produced a security service with almost no compunction about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appalled to see from the CIA , for example .
In this case , there ’ s little doubt that Trump at least implicitly condoned the assassination of an Iranian scientist on Iranian soil .
Should Americans really be comfortable with that ?
MK : The U.S. government has had a ban against assassinations for decades , so you are right that it would disapprove of the CIA doing something similar .
And I doubt Israel asked permission .
It has taken bold action , including destroying Iraq ’ s reactor in 1981 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Right , but they wouldn ’ t have done it if they thought it would seriously anger the United States .
And I think it ’ s worth thinking about why Washington is comfortable letting the Israelis do these things—and implicitly condoning them—if Americans don ’ t want the country ’ s own intelligence services to do them .
You said it will slow Iran ’ s nuclear program .
And I want to raise a problem with a lot of the coverage of the assassination , which describes Fakhrizadeh as the head @ @ @ @ @ @ @ program.
” There ’ s a big problem : Iran doesn ’ t have a nuclear weapons program .
It hasn ’ t had one since the early 2000s .
So killing this scientist might be a hedge against future weaponization , but it will have no impact on Iran ’ s civilian program and enrichment capabilities .
MK : I want to raise a problem with that kind of hair splitting .
Iran does not have a civilian nuclear program .
It is not economical for Iran to enrich its own uranium @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reactor .
It would be much more efficient to buy nuclear fuel on the open market like nearly every other country with a genuine civil nuclear program , like Mexico , the United Arab Emirates , and South Korea .
There is only one reason for Iran to enrich uranium itself : to have the option to build nuclear weapons .
EA : All nuclear programs are to some extent latent weapons programs .
Even states with no intention to weaponize—Japan , for example—can be so-called threshold nuclear states if they ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just a few months to convert their civilian programs to weapons if they wanted .
And I agree that it ’ s a hedge on the part of Iran .
But many other countries have taken similar steps .
The Saudi government , for example , announced last year that it intended to start domestic enrichment activities .
Should U.S. intelligence agents—or the Israelis—be assassinating Saudi or Emirati scientists now ?
An Israeli scholar was featured here at Foreign Policy recently arguing that those programs could be a threat to Israel someday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and will continue to resist the spread of enrichment capabilities to all countries , including Saudi Arabia .
When asked about a possible enrichment program in the kingdom , the U.S. State Department said that “ we oppose the spread of enrichment and reprocessing ” and encouraged “ strong nonproliferation protections.
” Riyadh might still try to build an enrichment plant , but to do so it would need to deceive , and then risk facing the wrath of , Washington .
And , to return to your earlier statement , this will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The top scientist has been eliminated .
Other nuclear scientists will have second thoughts about taking his place , and younger talent will consider safer fields .
Moreover , the Iranians will have to carefully review their security protocols to see if there ’ s a traitor in their midst and how they can better protect scientists in the future .
These are all obstacles to their progress .
It won ’ t be enough to stop the program in its tracks , but it will slow it down and increase the pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re probably right there .
But there was no urgent risk here to justify this assassination— other than Israel ’ s fear that President-elect Joe Biden will seek a new deal with Iran .
And that brings me to my next point : How often do we think that the United States or its allies can do this kind of thing before it creates blowback ?
Sure , this was the Israelis , not the United States .
But when you add it to the Qassem Suleimani killing at the start of this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long it will be before Iran—or some other country—decides that it ’ s OK to assassinate senior U.S. military or intelligence officials driving home from work in suburban Virginia .
At least here , the risk is low because of the change in U.S. administration .
What do you think ?
Will this all make it harder for Biden to deal with Iran ?
MK : I think the risk is low mostly because of U.S. escalation dominance .
Iran doesn ’ t want a major war with the Pentagon .
Tehran will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choose a de-escalatory , face-saving response ( such as a cyberattack ) if it does anything at all .
Most commentators say this will hurt the chances for diplomacy , but I am not so sure .
Americans tend to think that one prepares for diplomacy by being nice , but Iran only makes concessions under pressure .
The last spate of assassinations of Iranian scientists from 2010 to 2012 directly preceded serious negotiations toward the 2015 nuclear deal .
EA : I don ’ t think this will hurt the chances for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no doubt that ’ s what it was intended to do .
A lot of the actions that the Israelis—and the Trump administration— have taken toward Iran in recent months have been designed to make it as domestically unpalatable as possible for Iranian leaders to push for renewed diplomacy with the United States .
But the incentives are still huge .
As Biden pointed out just this week , dealing with the nuclear issue is still the best way to start pushing for regional stability and improving Iran ’ s behavior in other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get diplomacy moving here .
MK : Indeed .
I suspect a return to the 2015 nuclear deal is in the works whether one likes it or not .
Speaking of the new administration , the other prominent national security discussion in Washington this week is about Biden ’ s cabinet picks , which he announced since our last column .
I must say , I think it is the start of a good team .
I have a lot of respect for the experience and judgement of people like Antony Blinken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Michèle Flournoy is named defense secretary .
I worked for her when she was President Barack Obama ’ s undersecretary of defense for policy , and she was a great boss and is widely admired .
EA : You know , that ’ s what I keep hearing from everyone .
That she ’ s a nice person , a wonderful mentor , and extremely well-qualified .
There ’ s also a strong argument to be made that getting a woman into the defense secretary ’ s job would be a major step @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in national security .
That said , I ’ d like us to get to a place where it ’ s not a trade-off between gender equality and problematic foreign-policy views .
Because Flournoy has some worrying views .
She ’ s consistently supported military interventions throughout her career , she ’ s always pushed for bigger defense budgets , and she ’ s extremely hawkish on China .
Hardly a good match for Biden ’ s views .
MK : Interesting .
My only concern about her views is that she may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Specifically , she has questioned the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad , and I believe all are critical for nuclear deterrence .
But we are in a major-power competition with China , the military balance in Asia is shifting , so I think we need a defense secretary who understands the gravity of the challenge and is ready to stand up to Beijing .
An understanding of the defense industry is an asset for the secretary of defense .
A large part of the job is overseeing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future force and buys the weapons to equip U.S. troops .
Why is it a problem ?
EA : That ’ s kind of my point , Matt .
If defense hawks believe that Michèle Flournoy ’ s views will make her an excellent defense secretary candidate , I ’ m concerned !
But at the end of the day , it ’ s not obvious that the alternatives are any better .
Retired Gen. Lloyd Austin also has ties to defense contractors and would represent yet another retired general officer in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilian .
MK : Yes .
To ensure healthy civilian control of the military , I think it is important to have a strong civilian in this role , not a recently retired general .
But an understanding of the defense industry is an asset for the secretary of defense .
A large part of the job is overseeing the part of the Pentagon that plans the future force and buys the weapons to equip U.S. troops .
Why is it a problem ?
EA : The complaint is mostly about the cozy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revolving door .
We ’ ve seen it repeatedly during the Trump administration , where officials with long careers at defense contractors have stuck in their oar on procurement decisions to try to favor their old employer .
But it ’ s hard to tell when it ’ s going to be a problem .
And almost no one gets defense experience without some ties to industry .
Many of the other names in the mix—Sen .
Tammy Duckworth , for example—simply don ’ t have the necessary Pentagon know-how despite having combat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across most of Biden ’ s national security appointees , like Blinken or Avril Haines .
You simply can ’ t get the experience needed for these senior roles without some government or industry experience ; that makes it difficult to get those with true outsider perspectives into the room .
The progressive wing of the Democratic Party doesn ’ t yet have the bench of experienced foreign-policy hands that it needs if it wants to staff an administration .
That ’ s a work in progress , and it leaves us with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration .
MK : Who would progressives like to see in these roles ?
EA : The problem is that there is no good bench of alternative talent .
The progressive and “ restrainer ” foreign-policy movement has come a long way since 2016 , when Sen. Bernie Sanders barely mentioned foreign policy in his presidential run .
But most of the brightest thinkers in that space are still relatively junior .
One hope I have for a Biden administration is that it may provide them with an opportunity to gain the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for secretary of defense .
Until then , the choices are limited .
MK : Well , in the meantime , Trump is president for another six weeks , so I have a few more opportunities to point out that the administration is doing a better job than it gets credit for .
It looks like Operation Warp Speed is working and we could have a vaccine very soon .
EA : We could have two !
Both Pfizer and Moderna have submitted their vaccine candidates for approval by the Food and Drug @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , then it ’ s a question of production and distribution .
And I agree with you , Operation Warp Speed is something that the Trump administration should probably get more credit for .
Vaccine rollout will still be slow , but far faster than it would have been otherwise .
It ’ s also a victory for the U.S. free market system , which helps to foster ingenuity in biotech and other fields .
Of course , this raises some big foreign-policy questions : How will developing countries access the vaccine ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries continue to stick to “ vaccine nationalism ” ?
And will the fact that at least some of the final vaccines were developed right here in the United States rehabilitate America ’ s image after a truly terrible early response to the coronavirus ?
MK : Good questions .
I have a few of my own to add .
Pick it up here next time ?
EA : Sure .
Just as long as our next column is Christmas-themed .
After the rest of 2020 , I ’ m spending all of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Good idea .
We ’ ll toast .
I know I won ’ t be the only one drinking Australian wine this holiday season .

Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! Did you have a good Thanksgiving? Or were you too distracted by our prediction from the last column coming true?
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! Did you have a good Thanksgiving? Or were you too distracted by our prediction from the last column coming true?
Last time around, we asked if Donald Trump would try to destroy Iran’s nuclear program before he leaves the White House, and just as we were all recovering from our Thanksgiving turkey comas, Iran’s senior nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated by parties unknown.
Matthew Kroenig: We may have been prescient. But most speculate that it was the Israeli Mossad (not Trump) behind the attack. And, indeed, Israel has a history of covert action against weapons of mass destruction programs in the region going all the way back to Egypt’s nuclear and rocket programs in the 1950s—and most famously Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981.
What is your assessment of the reasoning behind the attack and its likely effectiveness?
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
EA: It was definitely the Israelis. As you point out, they have a history of doing this kind of thing. There are historical reasons for the willingness of the Mossad to take actions others might consider immoral, like assassinations or kidnappings. And certainly, no one objected when it was former Nazis they were chasing down.
But it has produced a security service with almost no compunction about engaging in behavior that Americans would be appalled to see from the CIA, for example. In this case, there’s little doubt that Trump at least implicitly condoned the assassination of an Iranian scientist on Iranian soil. Should Americans really be comfortable with that?
MK: The U.S. government has had a ban against assassinations for decades, so you are right that it would disapprove of the CIA doing something similar. And I doubt Israel asked permission. It has taken bold action, including destroying Iraq’s reactor in 1981, without notifying Washington.
EA: Right, but they wouldn’t have done it if they thought it would seriously anger the United States. And I think it’s worth thinking about why Washington is comfortable letting the Israelis do these things—and implicitly condoning them—if Americans don’t want the country’s own intelligence services to do them.
You said it will slow Iran’s nuclear program. And I want to raise a problem with a lot of the coverage of the assassination, which describes Fakhrizadeh as the head of Iran’s “nuclear weapons program.” There’s a big problem: Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapons program. It hasn’t had one since the early 2000s. So killing this scientist might be a hedge against future weaponization, but it will have no impact on Iran’s civilian program and enrichment capabilities.
MK: I want to raise a problem with that kind of hair splitting. Iran does not have a civilian nuclear program. It is not economical for Iran to enrich its own uranium to provide fuel for its single power reactor. It would be much more efficient to buy nuclear fuel on the open market like nearly every other country with a genuine civil nuclear program, like Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea. There is only one reason for Iran to enrich uranium itself: to have the option to build nuclear weapons.
EA: All nuclear programs are to some extent latent weapons programs. Even states with no intention to weaponize—Japan, for example—can be so-called threshold nuclear states if they’re technologically advanced; it would take many just a few months to convert their civilian programs to weapons if they wanted.
And I agree that it’s a hedge on the part of Iran. But many other countries have taken similar steps. The Saudi government, for example, announced last year that it intended to start domestic enrichment activities. Should U.S. intelligence agents—or the Israelis—be assassinating Saudi or Emirati scientists now? An Israeli scholar was featured here at Foreign Policy recently arguing that those programs could be a threat to Israel someday.
MK: The United States has resisted and will continue to resist the spread of enrichment capabilities to all countries, including Saudi Arabia. When asked about a possible enrichment program in the kingdom, the U.S. State Department said that “we oppose the spread of enrichment and reprocessing” and encouraged “strong nonproliferation protections.” Riyadh might still try to build an enrichment plant, but to do so it would need to deceive, and then risk facing the wrath of, Washington.
And, to return to your earlier statement, this will impede Iran’s enrichment program. The top scientist has been eliminated. Other nuclear scientists will have second thoughts about taking his place, and younger talent will consider safer fields. Moreover, the Iranians will have to carefully review their security protocols to see if there’s a traitor in their midst and how they can better protect scientists in the future. These are all obstacles to their progress. It won’t be enough to stop the program in its tracks, but it will slow it down and increase the pressure on Tehran.
EA: You’re probably right there. But there was no urgent risk here to justify this assassination— other than Israel’s fear that President-elect Joe Biden will seek a new deal with Iran. And that brings me to my next point: How often do we think that the United States or its allies can do this kind of thing before it creates blowback? Sure, this was the Israelis, not the United States. But when you add it to the Qassem Suleimani killing at the start of this year, I have to wonder how long it will be before Iran—or some other country—decides that it’s OK to assassinate senior U.S. military or intelligence officials driving home from work in suburban Virginia.
At least here, the risk is low because of the change in U.S. administration. What do you think? Will this all make it harder for Biden to deal with Iran?
MK: I think the risk is low mostly because of U.S. escalation dominance. Iran doesn’t want a major war with the Pentagon. Tehran will talk about retaliation, but it will choose a de-escalatory, face-saving response (such as a cyberattack) if it does anything at all.
Most commentators say this will hurt the chances for diplomacy, but I am not so sure. Americans tend to think that one prepares for diplomacy by being nice, but Iran only makes concessions under pressure. The last spate of assassinations of Iranian scientists from 2010 to 2012 directly preceded serious negotiations toward the 2015 nuclear deal.
EA: I don’t think this will hurt the chances for diplomacy too much, but I have no doubt that’s what it was intended to do. A lot of the actions that the Israelis—and the Trump administration— have taken toward Iran in recent months have been designed to make it as domestically unpalatable as possible for Iranian leaders to push for renewed diplomacy with the United States. But the incentives are still huge.
As Biden pointed out just this week, dealing with the nuclear issue is still the best way to start pushing for regional stability and improving Iran’s behavior in other areas. The new administration is keen to get diplomacy moving here.
MK: Indeed. I suspect a return to the 2015 nuclear deal is in the works whether one likes it or not.
Speaking of the new administration, the other prominent national security discussion in Washington this week is about Biden’s cabinet picks, which he announced since our last column. I must say, I think it is the start of a good team. I have a lot of respect for the experience and judgement of people like Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan. And I hope Michèle Flournoy is named defense secretary. I worked for her when she was President Barack Obama’s undersecretary of defense for policy, and she was a great boss and is widely admired.
EA: You know, that’s what I keep hearing from everyone. That she’s a nice person, a wonderful mentor, and extremely well-qualified. There’s also a strong argument to be made that getting a woman into the defense secretary’s job would be a major step forward for the cause of gender equality in national security.
That said, I’d like us to get to a place where it’s not a trade-off between gender equality and problematic foreign-policy views. Because Flournoy has some worrying views. She’s consistently supported military interventions throughout her career, she’s always pushed for bigger defense budgets, and she’s extremely hawkish on China. Hardly a good match for Biden’s views.
MK: Interesting. My only concern about her views is that she may be insufficiently committed to defense spending. Specifically, she has questioned the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad, and I believe all are critical for nuclear deterrence.
But we are in a major-power competition with China, the military balance in Asia is shifting, so I think we need a defense secretary who understands the gravity of the challenge and is ready to stand up to Beijing.
An understanding of the defense industry is an asset for the secretary of defense. A large part of the job is overseeing the part of the Pentagon that plans the future force and buys the weapons to equip U.S. troops. Why is it a problem?
EA: That’s kind of my point, Matt. If defense hawks believe that Michèle Flournoy’s views will make her an excellent defense secretary candidate, I’m concerned!
But at the end of the day, it’s not obvious that the alternatives are any better. Retired Gen. Lloyd Austin also has ties to defense contractors and would represent yet another retired general officer in a role that should be held by a civilian.
MK: Yes. To ensure healthy civilian control of the military, I think it is important to have a strong civilian in this role, not a recently retired general.
But an understanding of the defense industry is an asset for the secretary of defense. A large part of the job is overseeing the part of the Pentagon that plans the future force and buys the weapons to equip U.S. troops. Why is it a problem?
EA: The complaint is mostly about the cozy nature of the defense industry’s revolving door. We’ve seen it repeatedly during the Trump administration, where officials with long careers at defense contractors have stuck in their oar on procurement decisions to try to favor their old employer. But it’s hard to tell when it’s going to be a problem. And almost no one gets defense experience without some ties to industry.
Many of the other names in the mix—Sen. Tammy Duckworth, for example—simply don’t have the necessary Pentagon know-how despite having combat experience.
I see the same problem across most of Biden’s national security appointees, like Blinken or Avril Haines. You simply can’t get the experience needed for these senior roles without some government or industry experience; that makes it difficult to get those with true outsider perspectives into the room. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party doesn’t yet have the bench of experienced foreign-policy hands that it needs if it wants to staff an administration. That’s a work in progress, and it leaves us with less than ideal candidates for the Biden administration.
MK: Who would progressives like to see in these roles?
EA: The problem is that there is no good bench of alternative talent. The progressive and “restrainer” foreign-policy movement has come a long way since 2016, when Sen. Bernie Sanders barely mentioned foreign policy in his presidential run. But most of the brightest thinkers in that space are still relatively junior. One hope I have for a Biden administration is that it may provide them with an opportunity to gain the government experience that would one day qualify them for secretary of defense.
Until then, the choices are limited.
MK: Well, in the meantime, Trump is president for another six weeks, so I have a few more opportunities to point out that the administration is doing a better job than it gets credit for. It looks like Operation Warp Speed is working and we could have a vaccine very soon.
EA: We could have two! Both Pfizer and Moderna have submitted their vaccine candidates for approval by the Food and Drug Administration. Once they’re approved, then it’s a question of production and distribution. And I agree with you, Operation Warp Speed is something that the Trump administration should probably get more credit for. Vaccine rollout will still be slow, but far faster than it would have been otherwise. It’s also a victory for the U.S. free market system, which helps to foster ingenuity in biotech and other fields.
Of course, this raises some big foreign-policy questions: How will developing countries access the vaccine? Will the United States and other developed countries continue to stick to “vaccine nationalism”? And will the fact that at least some of the final vaccines were developed right here in the United States rehabilitate America’s image after a truly terrible early response to the coronavirus?
MK: Good questions. I have a few of my own to add. Pick it up here next time?
EA: Sure. Just as long as our next column is Christmas-themed. After the rest of 2020, I’m spending all of December looking for holiday cheer!
MK: Good idea. We’ll toast. I know I won’t be the only one drinking Australian wine this holiday season.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--The United States Can Negotiate With a China Driven More by Power Than Ideology

The United States Can Negotiate With a China Driven More by Power Than Ideology I ’ m increasingly troubled , when , in discussions of China ’ s reemergence , every time I raise the question , “ What does the United States consider China ’ s legitimate interests to be ?
” I am greeted by a stony silence .
The answer to that bottom-line question may determine whether the United States can reach a stable coexistence with China , or whether the conflict is inevitable .
Sorting out that question has sparked a debate in the pages of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese behavior fueling U.S.-China tensions driven mainly by a will to exercise great-power prerogatives , or by the Communist Party ’ s Marxist-Leninist ideology ?
This is not an academic squabble : Power is negotiable but ideology , like religion , offers little room for accommodation .
Coming to terms with a reemerging China requires understanding that the balance of power is shifting .
The post-World War II order was not ordained by God to last forever .
China has a much bigger footprint , and the West clearly doesn ’ t like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is doing is driven by great-power ambitions as opposed to ideology ?
I would say quite a lot .
Writing in Foreign Affairs , prominent voices Robert D. Kaplan and Eldridge Colby argue that the problem is China ’ s growing power relative to the United States which threatens to displace U.S. interests and influence .
It would be a huge mistake , they argue , to assume the problem is ideology , and conclude that , “ insistence on ideological concordance or total victory is a fool ’ s errand—and quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , my Atlantic Council colleague , Matthew Kroenig wrote recently in these pages that the febrile U.S.-China competition is not just great-power rivalry , but is ideologically driven , “ because the nature of the threat China poses abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home … This is not a competition with a generic China , but with the Communist Party ( CCP ) .
” While he agrees it is “ to a large degree about power , ” the threat is “ what China does with its great power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by its domestic political system.
” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s rhetoric takes such arguments to a logical extreme .
In a major speech earlier this year Pompeo argued : “ It ’ s this ideology that informs his [ President Xi Jinping ] decades-long desire for global hegemony of Chinese communism.
” Thus , he concluded , “ if the free world doesn ’ t change communist China , China will surely change us.
” One could be forgiven for concluding , as Beijing apparently has , that the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few tears would be shed if the CCP disappeared .
But there is no evidence that is going away anytime soon , nor does the United States have the agency to change that .
The CCP leads the government of the Chinese party-state as it has since 1949 .
In fact , despite the Trump administration ’ s full spectrum of efforts to wreak havoc—tariffs , tech bans , economic decoupling—China is thriving , the only major global economy on track for positive growth in 2020 , its bond markets booming with foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing ’ s myriad transgressions—its military assertiveness , false territorial claims , and predatory industrial policies—at the end of the day , China is a $ 15.4-trillion economy , the No .
1 global trading power , capital exporter , leading tech state , and No .
2 nuclear-armed military power .
It is Beijing ’ s power—and imperial overreach—flowing from these realities that threatens to displace the United States .
Tensions have risen in direct proportion to the narrowing of the economic and military gap between China and the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ form of government not also be acting like a classic great power ?
Millennia of history suggests it is fundamentally about power , though ideology is a significant factor .
Chinese empires , like other imperial powers , had a pattern of expansionism and central control , as well as subsequent revanchism , from the long occupation of Vietnam to the conquest , loss , and futile attempts to reclaim North Korea under the Han and Sui , to the Qing conquest of Xinjiang .
China also sees itself as the inheritor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large chip on its shoulder from what it calls the century of humiliation by foreign powers .
The CCP ’ s legitimacy has been based primarily on economic performance , and as that ebbs , increasingly on nationalism .
Notwithstanding the 1950s-style Cold War rhetoric , the CCP ’ s ideology is less about Marxism than Leninism .
For the party , ideology is primarily about centralizing social and political control .
Beijing has become more ideological in the sense than before Xi , it didn ’ t hype its hybrid so-called Market-Leninism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something to be emulated .
But this trend may be more about legitimizing its system at U.S. expense than trying to franchise it .
Beijing is playing off the disarray and dysfunction and COVID-19 failures in the United States , holding up China as a model of competence .
But few want to “ be like Xi , ” and a rejuvenated America would be an antidote .
Beijing is not exporting communist revolution across the Third World , as Mao Zedong tried to do in the 1960s .
However , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and striking back nations that disparage it with nasty economic coercion , as with its demands on Australia to end all criticism of China .
This behavior is way beyond the pale and should unite the United States , European Union , Japan , and other like-minded states in pushing back .
Yet unlike the U.S.-USSR existential struggle over competing political and economic systems in the Cold War , China has bet its future on globalization , and like any great power , it is trying to shape the rules to its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( e.g .
fantasy territorial irredentism ) .
Beijing is not trying to replace the IMF , World Bank , WTO , and other U.N. institutions ; it is trying to play a more dominant role in them—with no small amount of help from the Trump administration whose exit from many has left a vacuum for Beijing .
Beijing ’ s predatory industrial policies , the root of U.S.-China economic clashes , are a more extreme version of typical rising power efforts seeking to catch up .
Without suggesting equivalency , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past : Original U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton ’ s 1791 Report on Manufactures proposed industrial policies , and he sponsored espionage to still the secrets of Britain ’ s spinning wheel to jump start U.S. industry .
Current trade and tech wars are reminiscent of the U.S.-Japan clashes in the 1980s , fears of Japan as No .
1 , displacing U.S. economic primacy .
The ideology-first view has a false certainty—that everything we don ’ t like about China is inevitable .
It muddles how even a democratic or mildly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For example , nationalism is a key driver of China ’ s irredentist efforts to reunify with Taiwan and its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas .
A non-communist China could well pursue similar policies .
The point for U.S. policy is to fully test whether there is a difference between China ’ s aspirations and what it is willing to live with—given the consequences of conflict between nuclear states .
Would , for example , a U.S.-EU-Japan-Australia coalition have the leverage to force changes in Beijing ’ s trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with the threat of losing access to two-thirds of global markets ?
That was the original idea behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership .
Trump making trade a U.S.-China bilateral issue , instead of China vs. the World , has so far precluded testing that hypothesis .
If U.S.-China policy is ideology-driven , it will not be possible to assemble the coalitions needed to test China , to push back and press China back to the market reforms it has transgressed , the source of most U.S. grievances .
As Pompeo ’ s recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asians want is being forced to choose .
Europeans face a similar dilemma .
Moreover , as we have seen time and again—in U.S.-Europe pipeline battles , 5G , and the Iraq War—while shared values are important , they are only one of several factors determining how nations calculate their interests—geography , economics , culture , and history loom large .
Henry Kissinger said recently of the U.S.-China relationship : “ Our leaders and their leaders have to discuss the limits beyond which they will not push threats … You can say this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s totally impossible , we will slide into a situation similar to World War I.
” This time , with nukes and AI .
The United States has yet to define the terms , the limits , and redlines of what “ strategic competitor ” means .
I suspect the Biden administration will seek to shape a framework for competitive coexistence .
That will require determining what we consider China ’ s legitimate interests to be—and the price we ’ re willing to pay to oppose the illegitimate ones .

I’m increasingly troubled, when, in discussions of China’s reemergence, every time I raise the question, “What does the United States consider China’s legitimate interests to be?” I am greeted by a stony silence. The answer to that bottom-line question may determine whether the United States can reach a stable coexistence with China, or whether the conflict is inevitable.
I’m increasingly troubled, when, in discussions of China’s reemergence, every time I raise the question, “What does the United States consider China’s legitimate interests to be?” I am greeted by a stony silence. The answer to that bottom-line question may determine whether the United States can reach a stable coexistence with China, or whether the conflict is inevitable.
Sorting out that question has sparked a debate in the pages of policy journals: Is the source of Chinese behavior fueling U.S.-China tensions driven mainly by a will to exercise great-power prerogatives, or by the Communist Party’s Marxist-Leninist ideology? This is not an academic squabble: Power is negotiable but ideology, like religion, offers little room for accommodation.
Coming to terms with a reemerging China requires understanding that the balance of power is shifting. The post-World War II order was not ordained by God to last forever. China has a much bigger footprint, and the West clearly doesn’t like it. But how much of what it is doing is driven by great-power ambitions as opposed to ideology? I would say quite a lot.
Writing in Foreign Affairs, prominent voices Robert D. Kaplan and Eldridge Colby argue that the problem is China’s growing power relative to the United States which threatens to displace U.S. interests and influence. It would be a huge mistake, they argue, to assume the problem is ideology, and conclude that, “insistence on ideological concordance or total victory is a fool’s errand—and quite possibly an invitation to disaster.”
In contrast, my Atlantic Council colleague, Matthew Kroenig wrote recently in these pages that the febrile U.S.-China competition is not just great-power rivalry, but is ideologically driven, “because the nature of the threat China poses abroad stems from its autocratic politics at home … This is not a competition with a generic China, but with the Communist Party (CCP).” While he agrees it is “to a large degree about power,” the threat is “what China does with its great power,” which is “heavily shaped by its domestic political system.”
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s rhetoric takes such arguments to a logical extreme. In a major speech earlier this year Pompeo argued: “It’s this ideology that informs his [President Xi Jinping] decades-long desire for global hegemony of Chinese communism.” Thus, he concluded, “if the free world doesn’t change communist China, China will surely change us.” One could be forgiven for concluding, as Beijing apparently has, that the U.S. intent is regime change.
Certainly, few tears would be shed if the CCP disappeared. But there is no evidence that is going away anytime soon, nor does the United States have the agency to change that. The CCP leads the government of the Chinese party-state as it has since 1949. In fact, despite the Trump administration’s full spectrum of efforts to wreak havoc—tariffs, tech bans, economic decoupling—China is thriving, the only major global economy on track for positive growth in 2020, its bond markets booming with foreign funds.
In the meantime, notwithstanding Beijing’s myriad transgressions—its military assertiveness, false territorial claims, and predatory industrial policies—at the end of the day, China is a $15.4-trillion economy, the No. 1 global trading power, capital exporter, leading tech state, and No. 2 nuclear-armed military power. It is Beijing’s power—and imperial overreach—flowing from these realities that threatens to displace the United States. Tensions have risen in direct proportion to the narrowing of the economic and military gap between China and the United States.
Would a rising China with a democratic form of government not also be acting like a classic great power? Millennia of history suggests it is fundamentally about power, though ideology is a significant factor. Chinese empires, like other imperial powers, had a pattern of expansionism and central control, as well as subsequent revanchism, from the long occupation of Vietnam to the conquest, loss, and futile attempts to reclaim North Korea under the Han and Sui, to the Qing conquest of Xinjiang.
China also sees itself as the inheritor of an ancient cultural legacy and has a large chip on its shoulder from what it calls the century of humiliation by foreign powers. The CCP’s legitimacy has been based primarily on economic performance, and as that ebbs, increasingly on nationalism.
Notwithstanding the 1950s-style Cold War rhetoric, the CCP’s ideology is less about Marxism than Leninism. For the party, ideology is primarily about centralizing social and political control. Beijing has become more ideological in the sense than before Xi, it didn’t hype its hybrid so-called Market-Leninism development model of authoritarian state capitalism as something to be emulated.
But this trend may be more about legitimizing its system at U.S. expense than trying to franchise it. Beijing is playing off the disarray and dysfunction and COVID-19 failures in the United States, holding up China as a model of competence. But few want to “be like Xi,” and a rejuvenated America would be an antidote. Beijing is not exporting communist revolution across the Third World, as Mao Zedong tried to do in the 1960s. However, it is obnoxiously trying to control the Chinese diaspora, and striking back nations that disparage it with nasty economic coercion, as with its demands on Australia to end all criticism of China. This behavior is way beyond the pale and should unite the United States, European Union, Japan, and other like-minded states in pushing back.
Yet unlike the U.S.-USSR existential struggle over competing political and economic systems in the Cold War, China has bet its future on globalization, and like any great power, it is trying to shape the rules to its benefit. It is only selectively revisionist (e.g. fantasy territorial irredentism). Beijing is not trying to replace the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and other U.N. institutions; it is trying to play a more dominant role in them—with no small amount of help from the Trump administration whose exit from many has left a vacuum for Beijing.
Beijing’s predatory industrial policies, the root of U.S.-China economic clashes, are a more extreme version of typical rising power efforts seeking to catch up. Without suggesting equivalency, the United States did its share of this in the past: Original U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 Report on Manufactures proposed industrial policies, and he sponsored espionage to still the secrets of Britain’s spinning wheel to jump start U.S. industry. Current trade and tech wars are reminiscent of the U.S.-Japan clashes in the 1980s, fears of Japan as No. 1, displacing U.S. economic primacy.
The ideology-first view has a false certainty—that everything we don’t like about China is inevitable. It muddles how even a democratic or mildly authoritarian China would challenge U.S. interests. For example, nationalism is a key driver of China’s irredentist efforts to reunify with Taiwan and its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. A non-communist China could well pursue similar policies. The point for U.S. policy is to fully test whether there is a difference between China’s aspirations and what it is willing to live with—given the consequences of conflict between nuclear states.
Would, for example, a U.S.-EU-Japan-Australia coalition have the leverage to force changes in Beijing’s trade and industrial policy practices in the WTO, with the threat of losing access to two-thirds of global markets? That was the original idea behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump making trade a U.S.-China bilateral issue, instead of China vs. the World, has so far precluded testing that hypothesis.
If U.S.-China policy is ideology-driven, it will not be possible to assemble the coalitions needed to test China, to push back and press China back to the market reforms it has transgressed, the source of most U.S. grievances. As Pompeo’s recent Asia tour highlighted, the last thing Asians want is being forced to choose. Europeans face a similar dilemma. Moreover, as we have seen time and again—in U.S.-Europe pipeline battles, 5G, and the Iraq War—while shared values are important, they are only one of several factors determining how nations calculate their interests—geography, economics, culture, and history loom large.
Henry Kissinger said recently of the U.S.-China relationship: “Our leaders and their leaders have to discuss the limits beyond which they will not push threats … You can say this is totally impossible. And if it’s totally impossible, we will slide into a situation similar to World War I.” This time, with nukes and AI.
The United States has yet to define the terms, the limits, and redlines of what “strategic competitor” means. I suspect the Biden administration will seek to shape a framework for competitive coexistence. That will require determining what we consider China’s legitimate interests to be—and the price we’re willing to pay to oppose the illegitimate ones.