foreignpolicy--2020-12-30--America’s Asian Allies Need Their Own Nukes

America ’ s Asian Allies Need Their Own Nukes Nobody envies U.S. President-elect Joe Biden at the moment .
The problems he faces seem insurmountable .
China likely will be the administration ’ s most serious foreign challenge .
The United States is wealthier and more powerful , but remains committed—overcommitted , in fact—around the globe .
The world ’ s finest—and most expensive—military goes only so far .
Moreover , domestic needs and international wants will increasingly clash .
As America entered 2020 , the federal budget deficit was expected to run to $ 1.1 trillion .
Combating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that number to $ 3.1 trillion .
It will be more than $ 2 trillion this year , and could go much higher , if Congress and the president agree on a new stimulus package .
The Congressional Budget Office had predicted another $ 10 trillion in red ink over the coming decade , but the additional COVID-19 deficit , reflecting a combination of increased outlays and decreased revenues , could be as much as $ 16 trillion .
China is a challenge—but it ’ s not a direct military threat to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat , it will be difficult if not impossible to rouse public sentiment sufficiently to fund the sort of military expansion necessary to overawe and defeat a rising China in its own neighborhood .
It costs much more to project power than deter its use , especially across an ocean several thousand miles wide .
But there ’ s a cheaper and more effective solution to keeping the peace : Let America ’ s allies have nukes .
Can the United States defend Taiwan , destroy Chinese naval outposts on artificial islands , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claimed by Japan and the Philippines , and so on ?
Beijing is focused on developing Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities : It costs much less for China to build missiles and submarines capable of sinking aircraft carriers than for the United States to construct , staff , and maintain the latter .
The Pentagon is concocting countervailing strategies , but they will be neither cheap nor risk-free .
How much can Americans , facing manifold , expensive challenges at home and elsewhere abroad , afford to devote to containing the PRC essentially within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States even attempt to do so ?
It will be difficult to generate sustained public support for sacrificial military spending to , say , ensure that the Senkaku Islands remain under Japanese control .
Japan analysts at Washington think tanks might wax eloquent in their latest webinar about the vital American interests at stake , but the public will be more skeptical .
And , in fact , many of the Washington policy community ’ s greatest fears understandably don ’ t matter much to the American people .
For instance , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing has grabbed control of Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines .
Ownership of such specks of land yield control over fish and hydrocarbons , but that does not make them worth Americans ’ blood .
Nor are the Paracel and Spratly Islands .
Indeed , American involvement is not the best response , and certainly shouldn ’ t be the first response in such contingencies .
It is self-evident that such activities matter more to allied and friendly nations than to America .
The best constraint on the PRC comes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by nations it ’ s fought with in the last century , both as victim and invader : Russia , Japan , Korea , Vietnam , and India .
New middling powers include Australia , Indonesia , Malaysia , and Singapore .
Just as Beijing is concentrating on deterring U.S. military intervention in the region , other countries can create forces capable of deterring China .
They surely have an interest to do so —and not just to hold outlying territories .
The independence of these and other nations matters more than their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , these nations , which vary widely in size , wealth , and government , typically contend that they can ill afford to mount a defense , and that historical or political differences prevent them organizing together .
Despite some truth to their objections , such claims should not become excuses for cheap riding .
If these states are under threat , one much greater than that facing the United States , with pacific neighbors south and north , and vast oceans east and west , they have a powerful incentive to act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies have taken a shockingly lackadaisical attitude toward their own security .
Even if the United States backstops their independence , American involvement should be a last resort .
The Europeans have pioneered freeloading on Washington ’ s vast military spending , but the Asians are not far behind .
If Tokyo is truly worried about losing a few barren pieces of rock—or , more seriously , fears an invasion of its main islands—why doesn ’ t it devote more than 1 percent of spending on defense ?
The tribulations of history are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for expecting badly cash-strapped Americans to step into the breach .
The Philippines barely makes an effort , devoting less than a 1 percent of its GDP to its armed forces .
A few years back its defense minister complained that the navy could barely sail and the air force could barely fly .
The navy ’ s flagship is a half-century old U.S. Coast Guard cast-off .
Manila hopes to borrow the U.S. Pacific fleet in case of trouble .
Worse , Taiwan , by far China ’ s most endangered neighbor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GDP to protect itself—although a recently proposed budget envisages raising this considerably .
Military outlays have gotten caught in the political crossfire between the two major parties .
Grant Newsham of the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies cited “ successive Democratic Progressive Party and Kuomintang administrations ’ mystifying but steadfast refusal to properly fund defense—even though Taiwan is a wealthy nation and facing a serious threat from mainland China.
” Why are countries so unwilling to do more on their own behalf ?
Perhaps they do not believe Beijing poses a threat—or they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if necessary .
Growing concern over the PRC and its perceived ambitions appears to have loosened the military purse strings of some Chinese neighbors—but not nearly enough .
U.S. officials have tried complaining , whining , and demanding , with only indifferent success .
Better for the incoming administration to tell allies and friends that while America “ is back , ” as the president-elect has proclaimed , that doesn ’ t mean Americans should carry a burden that rightly belongs to others .
Nor should other governments want to put their nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hands , even those belonging to the United States .
This applies with greatest force to the principle of extended deterrence , which friendly governments seem to assume is their due .
Washington ’ s threat to go nuclear on its allies ’ behalf—an implicit promise of undetermined reach in unstated circumstances—is an extraordinary commitment , since it treats other nations ’ interests of varying importance as existential for America .
This strategy is most likely to work if the opponent does not possess nuclear weapons or Washington ’ s interest in its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as great as that of the nuclear-armed adversary .
That is not the case in today ’ s potential East Asia-Pacific conflicts .
Put bluntly , none of the contested interests are worth the resulting risks to America ’ s homeland .
Certainly not the various islands , reefs , shoals , islets , rocks , and other detritus strewn about the South China Sea , East China Sea , and other waters nearby .
Nor the Philippines , a semi-failed state , almost uniquely badly governed .
Taiwan is a better , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but is little more important to America ’ s defense than Cuba is to Chinese security , which isn ’ t much .
It is difficult to make a credible case for extended deterrence even for Japan .
Would any American president really trade Los Angeles for Tokyo ?
The promise is made on the assumption that the bluff will never be called : Advocates simply assume perfect deterrence .
However , history is littered with similar military and political presumptions , later shattered with catastrophic consequences .
The danger surrounding South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of Beijing .
Rather , the threat is North Korea ’ s nuclear program .
Pyongyang has no interest in attacking the United States but can be expected to defend itself .
It would have a strong incentive to use nukes if Washington threatened the North ’ s defeat .
Yet nothing in the Korean peninsula is worth the sacrifice of American cities .
What to do ?
There is one way to square the circle .
The Biden administration should reconsider reflexive U.S. opposition to “ friendly proliferation.
” Ironically , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held by only the worst Asian states—authoritarian and revisionist China and Russia , Islamist and unstable Pakistan , illiberal and Hindu nationalist India , and totalitarian and threatening North Korea .
Against all these , Washington is supposed to defend Japan and South Korea , certainly , the Philippines and Australia , possibly , and Taiwan , conceivably .
That is dangerous for everyone , especially the United States .
Reversing a policy supported by neoconservative nation-builders , unilateral nationalists , and liberal internationalists would not be easy .
The change would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether from potential terrorism , nuclear accidents , or geopolitical provocations .
Although the nuclear age has been surprisingly stable , proliferation necessarily creates additional risks for conflict and leakage .
Nevertheless , the existence of nuclear weapons probably helped contain conventional conflict , especially between the United States and the Soviet Union .
Even more , nations are convinced that modest arsenals keep rival states at bay , which is why countries as disparate as Israel , North Korea , and India have developed arsenals at great cost .
All of these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ easily capable of developing their own nuclear weapons .
Of course , they might decide not to do so , as is their right .
However , there is significant popular support in South Korea for amassing a countervailing arsenal .
The issue is understandably far more fraught for Japan .
However , Japanese enthusiasm for pacifism always has reflected a belief that Washington would come to that country ’ s defense .
If that was no longer certain , the Japanese people might react differently .
Australia is another potential nuclear state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been hesitant to risk its commercially advantageous relationship with the PRC .
However , under sharp economic assault from Beijing today , Australians may be more inclined to add the ultimate weapon to their military repertoire .
Taiwan is in greatest need of such a weapon , but developing one would be highly destabilizing , since Beijing would be tempted to preempt the process .
The alternative would be for Washington to fill Taiwan ’ s need , with a profound impact on Sino-American relations .
Proliferation would not be a good solution—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
No doubt , a nuclear-armed China would react badly to better-armed neighbors , but it is no happier with a more involved United States .
Moreover , the prospect of American friends and allies developing nukes might prompt the PRC to change course , backing away from confrontation , seeking diplomatic answers for territorial disputes , and pushing North Korea harder to limit if not roll back its nuclear program .
Two or three additional nations choosing nukes would permanently transform the regional balance of power , to China ’ s great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the Middle East , will pose the defining challenge to the Biden administration .
Grappling with such a rising power will be very different to confronting the Soviet Union during the Cold War .
It is easier to know what not to do with China than what to do .
Don ’ t go to war .
Don ’ t stage a new cold war .
Don ’ t sacrifice core values and basic interests .
Don ’ t make the issue all about Washington .
Don ’ t waste money and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ containment .
Don ’ t attempt to dictate to the PRC .
But what to do ?
The United States should think creatively about new approaches to old problems .
One way to do so is to stop hectoring partners and preventing them from doing what they want to do .
Including , perhaps , developing nuclear weapons .

Nobody envies U.S. President-elect Joe Biden at the moment. The problems he faces seem insurmountable.
China likely will be the administration’s most serious foreign challenge. The United States is wealthier and more powerful, but remains committed—overcommitted, in fact—around the globe. The world’s finest—and most expensive—military goes only so far.
Moreover, domestic needs and international wants will increasingly clash. As America entered 2020, the federal budget deficit was expected to run to $1.1 trillion. Combating the coronavirus pandemic and providing economic relief pushed that number to $3.1 trillion. It will be more than $2 trillion this year, and could go much higher, if Congress and the president agree on a new stimulus package. The Congressional Budget Office had predicted another $10 trillion in red ink over the coming decade, but the additional COVID-19 deficit, reflecting a combination of increased outlays and decreased revenues, could be as much as $16 trillion.
China is a challenge—but it’s not a direct military threat to the United States itself. Without such a threat, it will be difficult if not impossible to rouse public sentiment sufficiently to fund the sort of military expansion necessary to overawe and defeat a rising China in its own neighborhood. It costs much more to project power than deter its use, especially across an ocean several thousand miles wide. But there’s a cheaper and more effective solution to keeping the peace: Let America’s allies have nukes.
Can the United States defend Taiwan, destroy Chinese naval outposts on artificial islands, keep sea lanes open, protect territories claimed by Japan and the Philippines, and so on? Beijing is focused on developing Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities: It costs much less for China to build missiles and submarines capable of sinking aircraft carriers than for the United States to construct, staff, and maintain the latter. The Pentagon is concocting countervailing strategies, but they will be neither cheap nor risk-free. How much can Americans, facing manifold, expensive challenges at home and elsewhere abroad, afford to devote to containing the PRC essentially within its own borders?
And should the United States even attempt to do so? It will be difficult to generate sustained public support for sacrificial military spending to, say, ensure that the Senkaku Islands remain under Japanese control. Japan analysts at Washington think tanks might wax eloquent in their latest webinar about the vital American interests at stake, but the public will be more skeptical. And, in fact, many of the Washington policy community’s greatest fears understandably don’t matter much to the American people.
For instance, it isn’t terribly important that Beijing has grabbed control of Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Ownership of such specks of land yield control over fish and hydrocarbons, but that does not make them worth Americans’ blood. Nor are the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Indeed, American involvement is not the best response, and certainly shouldn’t be the first response in such contingencies. It is self-evident that such activities matter more to allied and friendly nations than to America. The best constraint on the PRC comes from its neighbors. It is surrounded by nations it’s fought with in the last century, both as victim and invader: Russia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and India. New middling powers include Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Just as Beijing is concentrating on deterring U.S. military intervention in the region, other countries can create forces capable of deterring China. They surely have an interest to do so —and not just to hold outlying territories. The independence of these and other nations matters more than their control over disputed lands.
Of course, these nations, which vary widely in size, wealth, and government, typically contend that they can ill afford to mount a defense, and that historical or political differences prevent them organizing together. Despite some truth to their objections, such claims should not become excuses for cheap riding. If these states are under threat, one much greater than that facing the United States, with pacific neighbors south and north, and vast oceans east and west, they have a powerful incentive to act. Yet America’s friends and allies have taken a shockingly lackadaisical attitude toward their own security. Even if the United States backstops their independence, American involvement should be a last resort.
The Europeans have pioneered freeloading on Washington’s vast military spending, but the Asians are not far behind. If Tokyo is truly worried about losing a few barren pieces of rock—or, more seriously, fears an invasion of its main islands—why doesn’t it devote more than 1 percent of spending on defense? The tribulations of history are well-known, but they are no justification for expecting badly cash-strapped Americans to step into the breach.
The Philippines barely makes an effort, devoting less than a 1 percent of its GDP to its armed forces. A few years back its defense minister complained that the navy could barely sail and the air force could barely fly. The navy’s flagship is a half-century old U.S. Coast Guard cast-off. Manila hopes to borrow the U.S. Pacific fleet in case of trouble.
Worse, Taiwan, by far China’s most endangered neighbor, spends less than 2 percent of GDP to protect itself—although a recently proposed budget envisages raising this considerably. Military outlays have gotten caught in the political crossfire between the two major parties. Grant Newsham of the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies cited “successive Democratic Progressive Party and Kuomintang administrations’ mystifying but steadfast refusal to properly fund defense—even though Taiwan is a wealthy nation and facing a serious threat from mainland China.”
Why are countries so unwilling to do more on their own behalf? Perhaps they do not believe Beijing poses a threat—or they are convinced that America will step in if necessary. Growing concern over the PRC and its perceived ambitions appears to have loosened the military purse strings of some Chinese neighbors—but not nearly enough. U.S. officials have tried complaining, whining, and demanding, with only indifferent success. Better for the incoming administration to tell allies and friends that while America “is back,” as the president-elect has proclaimed, that doesn’t mean Americans should carry a burden that rightly belongs to others. Nor should other governments want to put their nations’ futures into someone else’s hands, even those belonging to the United States.
This applies with greatest force to the principle of extended deterrence, which friendly governments seem to assume is their due. Washington’s threat to go nuclear on its allies’ behalf—an implicit promise of undetermined reach in unstated circumstances—is an extraordinary commitment, since it treats other nations’ interests of varying importance as existential for America. This strategy is most likely to work if the opponent does not possess nuclear weapons or Washington’s interest in its ally’s security is at least as great as that of the nuclear-armed adversary. That is not the case in today’s potential East Asia-Pacific conflicts.
Put bluntly, none of the contested interests are worth the resulting risks to America’s homeland. Certainly not the various islands, reefs, shoals, islets, rocks, and other detritus strewn about the South China Sea, East China Sea, and other waters nearby. Nor the Philippines, a semi-failed state, almost uniquely badly governed. Taiwan is a better, or certainly a more valuable, friend, but is little more important to America’s defense than Cuba is to Chinese security, which isn’t much.
It is difficult to make a credible case for extended deterrence even for Japan. Would any American president really trade Los Angeles for Tokyo? The promise is made on the assumption that the bluff will never be called: Advocates simply assume perfect deterrence. However, history is littered with similar military and political presumptions, later shattered with catastrophic consequences.
The danger surrounding South Korea is most acute, and not because of Beijing. Rather, the threat is North Korea’s nuclear program. Pyongyang has no interest in attacking the United States but can be expected to defend itself. It would have a strong incentive to use nukes if Washington threatened the North’s defeat. Yet nothing in the Korean peninsula is worth the sacrifice of American cities.
What to do? There is one way to square the circle. The Biden administration should reconsider reflexive U.S. opposition to “friendly proliferation.” Ironically, current policy ensures that nuclear weapons are held by only the worst Asian states—authoritarian and revisionist China and Russia, Islamist and unstable Pakistan, illiberal and Hindu nationalist India, and totalitarian and threatening North Korea. Against all these, Washington is supposed to defend Japan and South Korea, certainly, the Philippines and Australia, possibly, and Taiwan, conceivably. That is dangerous for everyone, especially the United States.
Reversing a policy supported by neoconservative nation-builders, unilateral nationalists, and liberal internationalists would not be easy. The change would be dramatic, and not without risk, whether from potential terrorism, nuclear accidents, or geopolitical provocations. Although the nuclear age has been surprisingly stable, proliferation necessarily creates additional risks for conflict and leakage. Nevertheless, the existence of nuclear weapons probably helped contain conventional conflict, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even more, nations are convinced that modest arsenals keep rival states at bay, which is why countries as disparate as Israel, North Korea, and India have developed arsenals at great cost.
All of these countries, except the Philippines, are easily capable of developing their own nuclear weapons. Of course, they might decide not to do so, as is their right. However, there is significant popular support in South Korea for amassing a countervailing arsenal. The issue is understandably far more fraught for Japan. However, Japanese enthusiasm for pacifism always has reflected a belief that Washington would come to that country’s defense. If that was no longer certain, the Japanese people might react differently.
Australia is another potential nuclear state. Until recently, Canberra might have been hesitant to risk its commercially advantageous relationship with the PRC. However, under sharp economic assault from Beijing today, Australians may be more inclined to add the ultimate weapon to their military repertoire.
Taiwan is in greatest need of such a weapon, but developing one would be highly destabilizing, since Beijing would be tempted to preempt the process. The alternative would be for Washington to fill Taiwan’s need, with a profound impact on Sino-American relations. Proliferation would not be a good solution—but it might be the least bad one.
No doubt, a nuclear-armed China would react badly to better-armed neighbors, but it is no happier with a more involved United States. Moreover, the prospect of American friends and allies developing nukes might prompt the PRC to change course, backing away from confrontation, seeking diplomatic answers for territorial disputes, and pushing North Korea harder to limit if not roll back its nuclear program. Two or three additional nations choosing nukes would permanently transform the regional balance of power, to China’s great disadvantage.
The PRC, not Russia or the Middle East, will pose the defining challenge to the Biden administration. Grappling with such a rising power will be very different to confronting the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is easier to know what not to do with China than what to do. Don’t go to war. Don’t stage a new cold war. Don’t sacrifice core values and basic interests. Don’t make the issue all about Washington. Don’t waste money and credibility on overambitious, unsustainable attempts at containment. Don’t attempt to dictate to the PRC.
But what to do? The United States should think creatively about new approaches to old problems. One way to do so is to stop hectoring partners and preventing them from doing what they want to do. Including, perhaps, developing nuclear weapons.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--At State Department, Some Concerned That Political Appointees Are Jumping the Line to Get COVID-19 V

At State Department, Some Concerned That Political Appointees Are Jumping the Line to Get COVID-19 Vaccine

At State Department , Some Concerned That Political Appointees Are Jumping the Line to Get COVID-19 Vaccine An unanticipated surplus of COVID-19 vaccines in the U.S. State Department set off a frenzied competition for which employees would get protection from the virus first , fueling suspicions among career employees that political loyalists were attempting to jump the line just as they prepared to leave their jobs—prioritizing themselves ahead of career staffers with underlying illnesses .
The State Department vigorously denied it was playing favorites , claiming that it was distributing the vaccines to staffers who were carrying out operations critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic mission .
But the rollout—which has been marked by a frantic rush to identify candidates—infuriated career diplomats in some bureaus who said they were largely kept in the dark until reporters and congressional staff began asking questions .
Two State Department officials said senior political appointees , including Pamela Pryor , the acting assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs , and Eric Ueland , the acting undersecretary of state for civilian security , democracy , and human rights , have either received the vaccine or are scheduled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spokesperson initially declined to comment , saying the Privacy Act prohibits the release of information on employees ’ vaccination status without their consent .
But the spokesperson subsequently said after the publication of this story that Pryor had declined the offer of the vaccine and had not taken it .
“ Confusion today about sudden , unanticipated vaccine availability , so bureaus are scrambling to come up with prioritized lists , ” one U.S. official told Foreign Policy in a text message , describing the rollout as disorganized and haphazard .
“ No @ @ @ @ @ @ @ available , how many , or why no planning has been done before now to have a list of prioritized employees , including those with pre-exist [ ing ] conditions.
” The push to vaccinate America ’ s diplomatic corps comes at a time of deepening distrust between the Trump administration ’ s political appointees and career employees , who feel the administration has ignored public health guidance calling for social distancing and the wearing of masks .
Those concerns were heightened by the decision of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to host @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with hundreds of invitations sent to U.S. officials , foreign diplomats , and party loyalists—and by an initial plan to vaccinate White House staffers in the first round of vaccinations .
President Donald Trump reversed the White House policy following a storm of criticism .
The State Department holiday parties ended up drawing dozens , not hundreds , of guests .
The department insisted it instituted health precautions including masks and social distancing requirements at the parties .
This week , the heads of State Department bureaus sent out emails informing staff of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be given to essential State Department employees—those required to travel or work at Foggy Bottom headquarters .
“ We received word that there is a short-notice opportunity to have the first of the two-part Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine administered tomorrow AM , ” Robert Ramey , the deputy director of the Office of Global Criminal Justice , wrote to staff on Tuesday .
“ I am reaching out to see who might be interested and qualify.
” Pompeo also indicated in a memo that the additional vaccines would go to essential workers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to wait .
Department officials decided in recent days that the heads of each bureau should decide how to best dole out the extra doses among their staff , officials said .
From there , some top bureau officials offered vaccines to employees who had to come into the office or may have been considered more high risk .
But several officials said the lack of communication with staff over the criteria for dispensing the shots fueled concerns that the vaccines would be reserved for loyalists .
“ At the end of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them , who are going to be leaving in a few weeks , while career colleagues who have medical issues or family members who are vulnerable now have to wait , ” said another official familiar with the matter , speaking on condition of anonymity .
“ There ’ s the irony that these politicals that are going into the office , business as usual , flaunting the mask rules , those are the ones that are rushing to get it first , ” the official added .
“ I find that despicable.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Legislative Affairs initially intended to limit distribution to officials in the department ’ s front office , where most of the political appointees are based .
Those concerned were heightened when many career staffers were not notified that a new stock of vaccines had become available .
A State Department spokesperson denied the allegations of favoritism , saying that not a single political appointee in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs would receive a vaccine in the current round .
“ It is categorically false that political appointees have been or will be given @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no political appointee in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs is receiving one of the vaccines in the first round , ” the spokesperson told Foreign Policy in a prepared statement .
“ Allegations to the contrary are entirely false.
” “ The Department was able to distribute its initial allotment according to categories of employees performing mission-essential functions under heightened risk of exposure , ” the spokesperson added .
“ Leadership continues to consult the data to articulate a fair and equitable allocation methodology , weighing the availability of vaccine with the risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and domestic facility.
” In the weeks leading up to the disbursement of vaccines , the State Department expected to receive an initial batch of more than 13,000 Pfizer doses , which would be enough to vaccinate about 6,500 people .
( The Pfizer vaccine requires two shots , a priming dose followed by a booster shot . )
As of mid-December , they had received fewer than 1,000 doses , officials said .
The department prioritized vaccinating medical and diplomatic security personnel , as well as employees stationed in Afghanistan , Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ due to local conditions that can exacerbate the disease burden and the challenges of providing medical support services in these locations , ” according to a Dec. 15 memo from Brian Bulatao , the undersecretary of state for management .
“ We are working closely with Operation Warp Speed ( OWS ) and the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure the Department receives its requested allotment of vaccines on an accelerated timeline to support mission-critical work both domestically and overseas , ” he added , referring to the operation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of COVID-19 vaccines .
“ We expect to receive vaccines incrementally over the next several months , and , therefore , will need to prioritize distribution .
”

An unanticipated surplus of COVID-19 vaccines in the U.S. State Department set off a frenzied competition for which employees would get protection from the virus first, fueling suspicions among career employees that political loyalists were attempting to jump the line just as they prepared to leave their jobs—prioritizing themselves ahead of career staffers with underlying illnesses.
An unanticipated surplus of COVID-19 vaccines in the U.S. State Department set off a frenzied competition for which employees would get protection from the virus first, fueling suspicions among career employees that political loyalists were attempting to jump the line just as they prepared to leave their jobs—prioritizing themselves ahead of career staffers with underlying illnesses.
The State Department vigorously denied it was playing favorites, claiming that it was distributing the vaccines to staffers who were carrying out operations critical to the functioning of America’s diplomatic mission. But the rollout—which has been marked by a frantic rush to identify candidates—infuriated career diplomats in some bureaus who said they were largely kept in the dark until reporters and congressional staff began asking questions.
Two State Department officials said senior political appointees, including Pamela Pryor, the acting assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, and Eric Ueland, the acting undersecretary of state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, have either received the vaccine or are scheduled to receive it. A State Department spokesperson initially declined to comment, saying the Privacy Act prohibits the release of information on employees’ vaccination status without their consent. But the spokesperson subsequently said after the publication of this story that Pryor had declined the offer of the vaccine and had not taken it.
“I have read with surprise and dismay a Foreign Policy article…that names me as purportedly having received the COVID-19 vaccine,” Pryor said in a statement. “That information is incorrect. I have not received said vaccine and am on no schedule to receive it.”
“Confusion today about sudden, unanticipated vaccine availability, so bureaus are scrambling to come up with prioritized lists,” one U.S. official told Foreign Policy in a text message, describing the rollout as disorganized and haphazard. “No clarity on why there are shots suddenly available, how many, or why no planning has been done before now to have a list of prioritized employees, including those with pre-exist[ing] conditions.”
The push to vaccinate America’s diplomatic corps comes at a time of deepening distrust between the Trump administration’s political appointees and career employees, who feel the administration has ignored public health guidance calling for social distancing and the wearing of masks.
Those concerns were heightened by the decision of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to host a series of mostly indoor holiday parties with hundreds of invitations sent to U.S. officials, foreign diplomats, and party loyalists—and by an initial plan to vaccinate White House staffers in the first round of vaccinations.
President Donald Trump reversed the White House policy following a storm of criticism. The State Department holiday parties ended up drawing dozens, not hundreds, of guests. The department insisted it instituted health precautions including masks and social distancing requirements at the parties.
This week, the heads of State Department bureaus sent out emails informing staff of the vaccine surplus and saying the doses would be given to essential State Department employees—those required to travel or work at Foggy Bottom headquarters.
“We received word that there is a short-notice opportunity to have the first of the two-part Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine administered tomorrow AM,” Robert Ramey, the deputy director of the Office of Global Criminal Justice, wrote to staff on Tuesday. “I am reaching out to see who might be interested and qualify.”
Pompeo also indicated in a memo that the additional vaccines would go to essential workers. Other staff with underlying illnesses would have to wait.
Department officials decided in recent days that the heads of each bureau should decide how to best dole out the extra doses among their staff, officials said. From there, some top bureau officials offered vaccines to employees who had to come into the office or may have been considered more high risk.
But several officials said the lack of communication with staff over the criteria for dispensing the shots fueled concerns that the vaccines would be reserved for loyalists.
“At the end of the day, there are these 30-something-year-olds getting them, who are going to be leaving in a few weeks, while career colleagues who have medical issues or family members who are vulnerable now have to wait,” said another official familiar with the matter, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“There’s the irony that these politicals that are going into the office, business as usual, flaunting the mask rules, those are the ones that are rushing to get it first,” the official added. “I find that despicable.”
Officials suspected that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs initially intended to limit distribution to officials in the department’s front office, where most of the political appointees are based. Those concerned were heightened when many career staffers were not notified that a new stock of vaccines had become available.
A State Department spokesperson denied the allegations of favoritism, saying that not a single political appointee in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs would receive a vaccine in the current round.
“It is categorically false that political appointees have been or will be given preferential treatment, and in fact, no political appointee in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs is receiving one of the vaccines in the first round,” the spokesperson told Foreign Policy in a prepared statement. “Allegations to the contrary are entirely false.”
“The Department was able to distribute its initial allotment according to categories of employees performing mission-essential functions under heightened risk of exposure,” the spokesperson added. “Leadership continues to consult the data to articulate a fair and equitable allocation methodology, weighing the availability of vaccine with the risk posed to our workforce at each post and domestic facility.”
In the weeks leading up to the disbursement of vaccines, the State Department expected to receive an initial batch of more than 13,000 Pfizer doses, which would be enough to vaccinate about 6,500 people. (The Pfizer vaccine requires two shots, a priming dose followed by a booster shot.) As of mid-December, they had received fewer than 1,000 doses, officials said.
The department prioritized vaccinating medical and diplomatic security personnel, as well as employees stationed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and other high-risk locations, “due to local conditions that can exacerbate the disease burden and the challenges of providing medical support services in these locations,” according to a Dec. 15 memo from Brian Bulatao, the undersecretary of state for management.
“We are working closely with Operation Warp Speed (OWS) and the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure the Department receives its requested allotment of vaccines on an accelerated timeline to support mission-critical work both domestically and overseas,” he added, referring to the operation to speed up the development and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. “We expect to receive vaccines incrementally over the next several months, and, therefore, will need to prioritize distribution.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Can the U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship Weather the Huawei Storm?

Can the U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship Weather the Huawei Storm ?
In one of the first serious clashes between new British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. President Donald Trump , the United Kingdom defied the White House this week with its decision not to ban equipment made by the Chinese technology giant Huawei from being used in its 5G high-speed wireless network .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a sharp warning about China during a visit to London on Thursday , expressing U.S. unease at the British decision even while touting strong ties between the two countries as Britain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. officials and lawmakers fear Huawei ’ s role in building its 5G network could be used as a bridgehead for Chinese spy agencies to infiltrate Western communications infrastructure .
“ We were trying to make the case , as we made the case with every country in the world , that we think putting Huawei technology anywhere in your system is very , very difficult to mitigate and therefore not worth the gamble , ” Pompeo said during an event with British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab .
But the Huawei debate could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side of the so-called “ special relationship ” between Washington and London , currently led by two like-minded conservative populist leaders .
Johnson , pushing through a Brexit deal with the EU after three messy years of negotiations , is banking on swiftly clenching a new U.S.-U.K. trade deal to ease concerns over Britain leaving the EU common market .
“ Here ’ s the sad truth : our special relationship is less special now that the U.K. has embraced the surveillance state commies at Huawei , ” Republican Sen. Ben Sasse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said in a statement .
“ The Chinese Communist Party has infected Five Eyes with Huawei , right at a time when the U.S. and U.K. must be unified in order to meet the global security challenges of China ’ s resurgence.
” A U.K. government official said members of the Trump administration conveyed their disappointment at the decision to their British counterparts “ reasonably candidly.
” But the official defended Britain ’ s decision , stressing that while it doesn ’ t go as far as the White House wanted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serious way ” the concerns both governments have about the security of the 5G network .
In a decision announced this week , the British government will ban Huawei services and hardware from Britain ’ s “ core ” national security networks , which U.K. officials argue minimizes the security risk to sensitive intelligence , including that which it shares with the United States .
In addition , Huawei ’ s presence in the “ non-core ” network—on which most of the British public will operate—has been capped at 35 percent .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have put our national security interests at risk , ” the official said .
“ Huawei never has been and , post this decision , never will be in our most sensitive networks .
The security of our intelligence sharing is wholly protected.
” Some U.S. lawmakers seem to disagree , however , with several top Republican senators warning they would review long-standing intelligence-sharing pacts with the British government .
Rep. Abigail Spanberger , a Democrat from Virginia and former CIA operations officer , said she reacted to the news that Britain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ network “ with a deep sigh of concern.
” “ I think it ’ s one more indicator that the time is now to act .
And we need to act today because we needed to act yesterday , ” she said in an interview .
Some lawmakers and U.S. officials have expressed concern that the United States is too little , too late in launching a campaign against Huawei , given how many years it takes to lay the groundwork for 5G infrastructure and how few viable alternatives there are from Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would require the administration to publish an unclassified strategy on securing 5G infrastructure .
Trump has put the U.K. and other European allies in a tricky position on Huawei because European providers—Nokia and Ericsson—have lagged far behind in moving to 5G , which will provide the significantly faster connectivity necessary to realize the potential of new developments in artificial intelligence and big data .
For Britain in particular , the U.K. has had Huawei in its networks since 2003 .
The British prime minister has committed to providing fully 5G services across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Huawei-free network—which would include replacing some of the existing hardware and software—would add “ delays of years ” and “ very considerable ” costs , said another U.K. official .
“ It ’ s the opportunity cost as well as the immediate cost of vendors , ” the second U.K. official said .
Still , some experts say the cost of embracing Huawei is still too great .
“ It ’ s important to note that Huawei gets its foot in the proverbial door via very attractive pricing that is the result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Terry Dunlap , a former cyberoperator at the U.S. National Security Agency and co-founder of the cybersecurity firm ReFirm Labs .
“ Their strategy is long-term , slowly over time adding more and more pieces of communications gear until the eventual switching costs you would face from a non-subsidized replacement option become huge , ” he said .
“ We can not be penny wise and pound foolish .
There ’ s too much at stake.
” During his visit to London , Pompeo downplayed concerns that the Huawei decision would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ confident that as we work together to figure out how to implement this decision that we ’ ll work to get this right.
” But some U.S. lawmakers said otherwise , casting doubt on the sanctity of the deep intelligence ties between the two countries , part of the “ Five Eyes ” partnership of intelligence communities between the United States , United Kingdom , Canada , Australia , and New Zealand .
Republican Sens .
Tom Cotton of Arkansas , Marco Rubio of Florida , and John Cornyn of Texas have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence to carry out a review of U.S.-U.K. intelligence-sharing practices in the wake of the decision .

In one of the first serious clashes between new British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. President Donald Trump, the United Kingdom defied the White House this week with its decision not to ban equipment made by the Chinese technology giant Huawei from being used in its 5G high-speed wireless network.
In one of the first serious clashes between new British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. President Donald Trump, the United Kingdom defied the White House this week with its decision not to ban equipment made by the Chinese technology giant Huawei from being used in its 5G high-speed wireless network.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a sharp warning about China during a visit to London on Thursday, expressing U.S. unease at the British decision even while touting strong ties between the two countries as Britain prepares to exit the European Union. U.S. officials and lawmakers fear Huawei’s role in building its 5G network could be used as a bridgehead for Chinese spy agencies to infiltrate Western communications infrastructure.
“We were trying to make the case, as we made the case with every country in the world, that we think putting Huawei technology anywhere in your system is very, very difficult to mitigate and therefore not worth the gamble,” Pompeo said during an event with British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab.
But the Huawei debate could pose significant roadblocks to the national security side of the so-called “special relationship” between Washington and London, currently led by two like-minded conservative populist leaders. Johnson, pushing through a Brexit deal with the EU after three messy years of negotiations, is banking on swiftly clenching a new U.S.-U.K. trade deal to ease concerns over Britain leaving the EU common market.
“Here’s the sad truth: our special relationship is less special now that the U.K. has embraced the surveillance state commies at Huawei,” Republican Sen. Ben Sasse, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement. “The Chinese Communist Party has infected Five Eyes with Huawei, right at a time when the U.S. and U.K. must be unified in order to meet the global security challenges of China’s resurgence.”
A U.K. government official said members of the Trump administration conveyed their disappointment at the decision to their British counterparts “reasonably candidly.” But the official defended Britain’s decision, stressing that while it doesn’t go as far as the White House wanted, it does address “in a very serious way” the concerns both governments have about the security of the 5G network.
In a decision announced this week, the British government will ban Huawei services and hardware from Britain’s “core” national security networks, which U.K. officials argue minimizes the security risk to sensitive intelligence, including that which it shares with the United States. In addition, Huawei’s presence in the “non-core” network—on which most of the British public will operate—has been capped at 35 percent.
“We have not considered any options that would have put our national security interests at risk,” the official said. “Huawei never has been and, post this decision, never will be in our most sensitive networks. The security of our intelligence sharing is wholly protected.”
Some U.S. lawmakers seem to disagree, however, with several top Republican senators warning they would review long-standing intelligence-sharing pacts with the British government.
Rep. Abigail Spanberger, a Democrat from Virginia and former CIA operations officer, said she reacted to the news that Britain would not ban Huawei from its 5G network “with a deep sigh of concern.”
“I think it’s one more indicator that the time is now to act. And we need to act today because we needed to act yesterday,” she said in an interview.
Some lawmakers and U.S. officials have expressed concern that the United States is too little, too late in launching a campaign against Huawei, given how many years it takes to lay the groundwork for 5G infrastructure and how few viable alternatives there are from Western companies. Spanberger has co-sponsored a bill that would require the administration to publish an unclassified strategy on securing 5G infrastructure.
Trump has put the U.K. and other European allies in a tricky position on Huawei because European providers—Nokia and Ericsson—have lagged far behind in moving to 5G, which will provide the significantly faster connectivity necessary to realize the potential of new developments in artificial intelligence and big data. For Britain in particular, the U.K. has had Huawei in its networks since 2003.
The British prime minister has committed to providing fully 5G services across the country within the decade. Building a Huawei-free network—which would include replacing some of the existing hardware and software—would add “delays of years” and “very considerable” costs, said another U.K. official.
“It’s the opportunity cost as well as the immediate cost of vendors,” the second U.K. official said.
Still, some experts say the cost of embracing Huawei is still too great. “It’s important to note that Huawei gets its foot in the proverbial door via very attractive pricing that is the result of subsidization by the Chinese government,” said Terry Dunlap, a former cyberoperator at the U.S. National Security Agency and co-founder of the cybersecurity firm ReFirm Labs.
“Their strategy is long-term, slowly over time adding more and more pieces of communications gear until the eventual switching costs you would face from a non-subsidized replacement option become huge,” he said. “We cannot be penny wise and pound foolish. There’s too much at stake.”
During his visit to London, Pompeo downplayed concerns that the Huawei decision would harm bilateral ties, saying he was “confident that as we work together to figure out how to implement this decision that we’ll work to get this right.”
But some U.S. lawmakers said otherwise, casting doubt on the sanctity of the deep intelligence ties between the two countries, part of the “Five Eyes” partnership of intelligence communities between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
Republican Sens. Tom Cotton of Arkansas, Marco Rubio of Florida, and John Cornyn of Texas have called for the U.S. director of national intelligence to carry out a review of U.S.-U.K. intelligence-sharing practices in the wake of the decision.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Iraqi F-16s Could Be in Jeopardy Amid Iran Tensions

Iraqi F-16s Could Be in Jeopardy Amid Iran Tensions It was supposed to be a gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State .
But some U.S. and Iraqi officials say they are increasingly concerned that Iraq ’ s F-16 fighter jet program—supplied by the United States and , until recently , secured and maintained by foreign contractors—is vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias .
Sallyport Global , part of the Caliburn contractor conglomerate based in Reston , Virginia , provided security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Balad Air Base alongside contractors from Lockheed Martin , who provided maintenance , and Iraqi personnel .
But in early January , Sallyport and Lockheed Martin contractors withdrew from the base after facing indirect rocket fire from Iran-backed militias , leaving sensitive U.S. technology potentially vulnerable , U.S. and Iraqi officials tell Foreign Policy .
“ Due to concerns about the safety and security of their personnel supporting Iraqi F-16 operations at Balad Air Base , Iraq , Lockheed-Martin initiated an evacuation of their personnel on 4 January , 2020 , ” U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed to Foreign Policy , noting that the Iraqi Air Force was notified before the evacuation , which was completed on Jan. 8 .
Lodewick stressed that the United States is “ always concerned about the security of technologies provided to any partner nation through foreign military sales and takes appropriate measures to safeguard against unwarranted divulgence.
” Security relations between the United States and Iraq , a critical U.S. partner in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist group and efforts to counter Iranian influence in the region , have been tested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump approved a Jan. 3 drone strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil .
Suleimani ’ s death sparked outrage across Iraq , prompting the Iraqi parliament to vote on a nonbinding resolution to expel U.S. troops from the country .
Tensions only increased after Iran launched a retaliatory missile strike against U.S. and coalition targets in Iraq on Jan. 7 , sending U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts scrambling and leaving more than 50 U.S. troops with various degrees of traumatic brain injuries .
Tehran has since signaled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but Iraqi militia groups linked to Iran such as the Popular Mobilization Forces ( PMF ) continue to conduct lower-level attacks on outposts across the country .
U.S. and Iraqi forces are on high alert ; the State Department has urged all nonmilitary U.S. personnel to leave the country .
Since the contractors left Balad , some officials are concerned that the weapons , technology , and components associated with the F-16s could be vulnerable .
Some say it ’ s only a matter of time before PMF militias—Asaib Ahl al-Haq is active @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Michael Knights , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—can access Balad Air Base , and quite possibly the weapons the contractors were there to protect .
One U.S. official familiar with the F-16 program told Foreign Policy the “ biggest concern ” is securing the F-16 ’ s sensitive technology .
“ We just have absolutely no way to verify what they are looking at , what they ’ re carrying away , ” the official said .
“ Right now , at Balad , there ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. personnel at all providing security , ” the official told Foreign Policy .
“ As far as the technology , once that ’ s compromised , that ’ s compromised and there ’ s nothing we can do , ” “ Nobody ’ s going to stop them , ” one former Iraqi Air Force F-16 pilot told Foreign Policy .
Other American officials are more confident about the security of the systems .
One U.S. military official , who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue , said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ well guarded ” by Iraqi soldiers .
“ We have received assurances from the Iraqi Government that they have taken steps to increase the security of U.S. divested equipment at Balad AB , ” said Lodewic , the spokesperson .
For the PMF to seize the base “ would require a substantial mobilization and force , ” said Michael Mulroy , who served as the Pentagon ’ s Middle East policy chief until December 2019 and is now a national security and defense analyst with ABC News .
“ I wouldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about an actual assault or takeover.
” However , the former Iraqi F-16 pilot expressed concern about the reliability of the Iraqi soldiers on base , who the former pilot said aren ’ t being fed adequately—getting meals of only soup and rice—and don ’ t get adequate crew rest .
Further , Iraqi soldiers on the base operate on a rotating schedule , with one week on base and one week off so they can seek employment elsewhere , causing potential operations gaps .
Even when Sallyport was providing security on-base , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 Associated Press investigation found .
In addition to allegedly smuggling alcohol on base and participating in human trafficking , Sallyport security allowed nearby militias to come onto Balad and take three massive generators .
A statement from Sallyport said at the time that the contractor followed all protocols .
But officials are more worried about Iraq ’ s long-term ability to sustain the fleet without contractor support .
“ The longer Lockheed is out , the more difficult to sustain the fleet , ” said the U.S. military official .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the contract help coming back in within a few months.
” John Losinger , a Lockheed spokesman , confirmed that its personnel had departed the base “ following the U.S. State Department ’ s alert for all American citizens to depart Iraq due to escalating tension in the region.
” For now , according to the U.S. official familiar with the program , the jets aren ’ t being flown regularly , which on one hand reduces the need for replacement parts but on the other hand degrades the systems .
“ A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even faster when they ’ re not being used , so it ’ s kind of a Catch-22 , ” the official said .
PMF units have previously gotten hold of American-made Iraqi M1 Abrams tanks , with several different factions using them as part of the fight against the Islamic State , and the U.S. government urging Iraq to get them back per their initial sale agreement .
The militias have been subsumed into the Iraqi military but still maintain their independence and are often backed by Iran .
Iraq initially purchased @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the Obama administration ’ s pullout from the country and just before a period of instability that led to the rise of the Islamic State .
As Jane ’ s reports , the initial aircraft were delivered in 2014 , with the second batch delivered last May .
But the twin blows of dropping oil prices and the rise of the Islamic State left Iraq unable to pay for the squadron and other weapons entirely with national funds .
So in 2016 , the United States extended Iraq a $ 2.7 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and maintenance for systems including the Abrams tank and the F-16 .
“ We ’ ve always tried to put the spotlight on Iraqis .
And even when we ’ re doing all the heavy lifting ourselves , we ’ ve always worked very hard to stress the Iraqi role in everything , ” Knights told Foreign Policy .
The F-16 sale , he said , pointed to the United States ’ desire to “ show how effectively we were rebuilding the Iraqi military.
” But since then , U.S. officials have grown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of the sophisticated technology .
Mulroy said during his time at the Pentagon there were discussions about potentially selling the F-16s secondhand to another party .
“ They can ’ t afford them , they can ’ t maintain them , ” Mulroy said .
“ It ’ s an example of : Why aren ’ t we having them buy things that they can actually use and won ’ t cost them a fortune to maintain ?
” Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich , a retired Navy SEAL commander and a senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Middle East Institute , critiqued U.S. policy in Iraq in a recent report , saying that the United States ’ attempts to build a “ mirror image ” military force in Iraq has been both extraordinarily expensive and largely unsustainable .
After 10 years of supplying the Iraqi Security Forces with billions of dollars ’ worth of equipment and training , the report cautions , “ an irregular army of lightly equipped ISIS terrorists defeated the internationally supported and equipped ISF , murdered Iraqi leaders , and brutalized Iraqi citizens with very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces taking advantage of Iraqi assets .
The desire of the Iraqi government to maintain the mirror-image military that the United States has tried so fervently to stand up is in doubt , too , according to one former senior U.S. official .
“ In the past few years , Iranian-influenced members of the Iraqi parliament have sought to reduce funding for the main line Iraqi defense forces—the Army , Air Force , Navy , and Counterterrorism Service—and increase funding to the irregular Popular Mobilization Forces , ” the former senior official said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy that the Iraqi government seems to be building a parallel , but dominant , security force like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran , pointing to the government ’ s reduction in recruiting and funding for the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service—which the former official described as “ Iraq ’ s most professional and successful military service ” —as a particularly glaring example of this policy .
Foreign Policy contacted Caliburn International , Sallyport ’ s parent company , and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense multiple times for comment but did not @ @ @ @ @ @

It was supposed to be a gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State. But some U.S. and Iraqi officials say they are increasingly concerned that Iraq’s F-16 fighter jet program—supplied by the United States and, until recently, secured and maintained by foreign contractors—is vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias.
It was supposed to be a gesture of goodwill and a good-faith effort to give Iraq the military it needed to defend itself against regional adversaries like Iran and the Islamic State. But some U.S. and Iraqi officials say they are increasingly concerned that Iraq’s F-16 fighter jet program—supplied by the United States and, until recently, secured and maintained by foreign contractors—is vulnerable to seizure by Iranian-backed militias.
Sallyport Global, part of the Caliburn contractor conglomerate based in Reston, Virginia, provided security for the roughly 34-aircraft F-16 squadron at Balad Air Base alongside contractors from Lockheed Martin, who provided maintenance, and Iraqi personnel. But in early January, Sallyport and Lockheed Martin contractors withdrew from the base after facing indirect rocket fire from Iran-backed militias, leaving sensitive U.S. technology potentially vulnerable, U.S. and Iraqi officials tell Foreign Policy.
“Due to concerns about the safety and security of their personnel supporting Iraqi F-16 operations at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Lockheed-Martin initiated an evacuation of their personnel on 4 January, 2020,” U.S. Defense Department spokesperson Maj. Rob Lodewick confirmed to Foreign Policy, noting that the Iraqi Air Force was notified before the evacuation, which was completed on Jan. 8.
Lodewick stressed that the United States is “always concerned about the security of technologies provided to any partner nation through foreign military sales and takes appropriate measures to safeguard against unwarranted divulgence.”
Security relations between the United States and Iraq, a critical U.S. partner in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist group and efforts to counter Iranian influence in the region, have been tested in recent weeks since U.S. President Donald Trump approved a Jan. 3 drone strike that killed Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil. Suleimani’s death sparked outrage across Iraq, prompting the Iraqi parliament to vote on a nonbinding resolution to expel U.S. troops from the country.
Tensions only increased after Iran launched a retaliatory missile strike against U.S. and coalition targets in Iraq on Jan. 7, sending U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts scrambling and leaving more than 50 U.S. troops with various degrees of traumatic brain injuries. Tehran has since signaled an end to direct military action, but Iraqi militia groups linked to Iran such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) continue to conduct lower-level attacks on outposts across the country. U.S. and Iraqi forces are on high alert; the State Department has urged all nonmilitary U.S. personnel to leave the country.
Since the contractors left Balad, some officials are concerned that the weapons, technology, and components associated with the F-16s could be vulnerable. Some say it’s only a matter of time before PMF militias—Asaib Ahl al-Haq is active in the area around Balad, according to Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—can access Balad Air Base, and quite possibly the weapons the contractors were there to protect.
One U.S. official familiar with the F-16 program told Foreign Policy the “biggest concern” is securing the F-16’s sensitive technology. “We just have absolutely no way to verify what they are looking at, what they’re carrying away,” the official said.
“Right now, at Balad, there’s nothing. There’s no U.S. personnel at all providing security,” the official told Foreign Policy. “As far as the technology, once that’s compromised, that’s compromised and there’s nothing we can do,”
“Nobody’s going to stop them,” one former Iraqi Air Force F-16 pilot told Foreign Policy.
Other American officials are more confident about the security of the systems. One U.S. military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue, said the planes and related equipment are being “well guarded” by Iraqi soldiers.
“We have received assurances from the Iraqi Government that they have taken steps to increase the security of U.S. divested equipment at Balad AB,” said Lodewic, the spokesperson.
For the PMF to seize the base “would require a substantial mobilization and force,” said Michael Mulroy, who served as the Pentagon’s Middle East policy chief until December 2019 and is now a national security and defense analyst with ABC News. “I wouldn’t imagine that they are very concerned about an actual assault or takeover.”
However, the former Iraqi F-16 pilot expressed concern about the reliability of the Iraqi soldiers on base, who the former pilot said aren’t being fed adequately—getting meals of only soup and rice—and don’t get adequate crew rest. Further, Iraqi soldiers on the base operate on a rotating schedule, with one week on base and one week off so they can seek employment elsewhere, causing potential operations gaps.
Even when Sallyport was providing security on-base, there were serious security infringements, a 2017 Associated Press investigation found. In addition to allegedly smuggling alcohol on base and participating in human trafficking, Sallyport security allowed nearby militias to come onto Balad and take three massive generators.
A statement from Sallyport said at the time that the contractor followed all protocols.
But officials are more worried about Iraq’s long-term ability to sustain the fleet without contractor support.
“The longer Lockheed is out, the more difficult to sustain the fleet,” said the U.S. military official. “The Iraqis can’t do it without the contract help coming back in within a few months.”
John Losinger, a Lockheed spokesman, confirmed that its personnel had departed the base “following the U.S. State Department’s alert for all American citizens to depart Iraq due to escalating tension in the region.”
For now, according to the U.S. official familiar with the program, the jets aren’t being flown regularly, which on one hand reduces the need for replacement parts but on the other hand degrades the systems.
“A lot of things on the jets degrade even faster when they’re not being used, so it’s kind of a Catch-22,” the official said.
PMF units have previously gotten hold of American-made Iraqi M1 Abrams tanks, with several different factions using them as part of the fight against the Islamic State, and the U.S. government urging Iraq to get them back per their initial sale agreement. The militias have been subsumed into the Iraqi military but still maintain their independence and are often backed by Iran.
Iraq initially purchased the F-16s in 2011 and 2012, during the Obama administration’s pullout from the country and just before a period of instability that led to the rise of the Islamic State. As Jane’s reports, the initial aircraft were delivered in 2014, with the second batch delivered last May. But the twin blows of dropping oil prices and the rise of the Islamic State left Iraq unable to pay for the squadron and other weapons entirely with national funds. So in 2016, the United States extended Iraq a $2.7 billion credit facility—essentially a soft loan for weapons and maintenance for systems including the Abrams tank and the F-16.
“We’ve always tried to put the spotlight on Iraqis. And even when we’re doing all the heavy lifting ourselves, we’ve always worked very hard to stress the Iraqi role in everything,” Knights told Foreign Policy. The F-16 sale, he said, pointed to the United States’ desire to “show how effectively we were rebuilding the Iraqi military.”
But since then, U.S. officials have grown concerned that the Iraqis are not making use of the sophisticated technology. Mulroy said during his time at the Pentagon there were discussions about potentially selling the F-16s secondhand to another party.
“They can’t afford them, they can’t maintain them,” Mulroy said. “It’s an example of: Why aren’t we having them buy things that they can actually use and won’t cost them a fortune to maintain?”
Mulroy and Eric Oehlerich, a retired Navy SEAL commander and a senior fellow for technology and national security at the Middle East Institute, critiqued U.S. policy in Iraq in a recent report, saying that the United States’ attempts to build a “mirror image” military force in Iraq has been both extraordinarily expensive and largely unsustainable.
After 10 years of supplying the Iraqi Security Forces with billions of dollars’ worth of equipment and training, the report cautions, “an irregular army of lightly equipped ISIS terrorists defeated the internationally supported and equipped ISF, murdered Iraqi leaders, and brutalized Iraqi citizens with very little resistance,” with Islamic State forces taking advantage of Iraqi assets.
The desire of the Iraqi government to maintain the mirror-image military that the United States has tried so fervently to stand up is in doubt, too, according to one former senior U.S. official.
“In the past few years, Iranian-influenced members of the Iraqi parliament have sought to reduce funding for the main line Iraqi defense forces—the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Counterterrorism Service—and increase funding to the irregular Popular Mobilization Forces,” the former senior official said.
The former senior official told Foreign Policy that the Iraqi government seems to be building a parallel, but dominant, security force like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, pointing to the government’s reduction in recruiting and funding for the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service—which the former official described as “Iraq’s most professional and successful military service”—as a particularly glaring example of this policy.
Foreign Policy contacted Caliburn International, Sallyport’s parent company, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense multiple times for comment but did not receive responses by publication time.


Obamacare for Geopolitics

Assume you ’ re the leader of a nation that wants to strike another country—and that you want to do so without running the risk of devastating military revenge against your own .
You ’ re in luck : Thanks to globalization and ever-increasing digitalization , you can hurt your rival by , say , launching multiple deniable cyberattacks against vital targets in its capital .
You or your proxies can , for example , shut down transport networks or major corporations .
Otherwise , there ’ s increasingly something even more insidious you could try : exploiting cities ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Consider this : Geopolitical and security risks endanger about $ 133 billon in some of the world ’ s 279 most important cities .
That ’ s about 25 percent of the total economic activity in those cities .
According to the Global Risk Outlook 2020 , a report published by the Centre for Risk Studies at the University of Cambridge , the cities most vulnerable to geopolitical and security risks are Tokyo followed by Baghdad , Istanbul , Cairo , Riyadh , Osaka , Lagos , Khartoum , Tehran , and Manila @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only a small share of assets are insured against geopolitical and security risk .
The same is true for many cargo ships—troubling , given that 80 percent of the world ’ s trade travels by sea .
Likewise , commercial firms supply armed forces around the globe with many of their vital goods via this route .
These are insurance gaps , James Vickers , the chairman of Willis Re International , a global reinsurance broker , told me in January .
“ And they ’ re growing as the economies in many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In the [ United States ] for example , there ’ s more and more economic growth on the coasts , which are more exposed than the middle of the country to severe weather events.
” Insurance gaps are a serious issue , whether the attacks are perpetrated by Mother Nature , terrorists , or hostile states and their proxies .
The tremors that hit Italy in August and October 2016 caused losses of $ 6 billion , of which only 3.4 percent was covered by insurance , the insurance think tank Geneva @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Kumamoto earthquakes in Japan the same year caused economic losses of $ 32 billion , of which only $ 7 billion was covered by insurance .
The terrorist attack on London Bridge and Borough Market in London in 2017 , meanwhile , cost merchants forced to close their businesses for nearly two weeks an estimated 1.4 billion pounds , about $ 1.8 billion .
They had no other recourse ; the insurance available didn ’ t provide cover for such situations .
It is safe to assume that countries around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insurance gaps .
Of course , asymmetric aggression—attacks below the threshold that would trigger a military response—are enormously attractive to rival countries even without such holes .
And they ’ re increasingly common .
In May 2019 , for example , Deutsche Telekom ’ s honeypot system , a set of decoy targets for hackers , was targeted by cyberattacks an average of 30 million times per day ; by November that figure had risen to an average of 42 million attacks per day .
Not all of the attacks came from hostile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but many did .
Such grey-zone attempts are so appealing to attackers because they ’ re hard to attribute to a foreign government and even harder to retaliate against .
Insurance gaps make such attacks even more appealing .
Companies have already learned to make themselves less attractive targets through good cyberdefense and hygiene , but they may not have realized that the absence of something as humble as an insurance policy may entice hostile actors to target them .
U.S. firms may , for example , want to think about whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran may launch to avenge the military leader Qassem Suleimani ’ s death .
It is , of course , in insurers ’ interest to highlight the need for insurance , but there ’ s no doubt that insurance gaps are becoming a national security issue .
Indeed , as the London Bridge terrorist made painfully clear , insurers may need to create new policies that will cover the range of devious deeds terrorists may come up with .
There have always been people and companies that skimped on insurance , assuming they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country that best exploits the weakness of another gains the upper hand—and insurance is one such weakness , as striking an underinsured target causes more harm than striking a well-insured one .
When NotPetya , a computer virus that originated with the Russian government , hit Merck in 2017 , one of the results was that Merck couldn ’ t make its planned supply of HPV vaccine and had to borrow emergency supplies from the U.S. government .
The pharmaceutical giant lost $ 870 million .
If the U.S. government retaliated against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t say so .
And Merck didn ’ t get the insurance payout it had counted on : It merely had property insurance , not war insurance , and its insurers made the rather logical point that an attack by the Russian government was an act of war .
Of course , governments of most developed countries possess powerful offensive capabilities that can deter at least some nonmilitary attacks .
They also have good defensive tools , including civil contingencies agencies , that can limit the effects of catastrophic events .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for deterrence purposes .
For example , in its 2018 Cyber Strategy , the U.S. Department of Defense vowed to “ defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source , including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.
” In practice , under this defending forward policy , U.S. cybersoldiers patrol the world like neighborhood cops , occasionally making arrests to signal that it ’ s not worth misbehaving .
While insurance may not be their foremost concern , they ’ re aware that cyberconflicts are only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not even the best cop can prevent all crime .
Like earthquakes and terrorist attacks , nonmilitary attacks by hostile states could bring companies to the edge of ruin .
“ What do people do when they ’ re hit and can ’ t stand themselves up ?
They ask the government for money , ” Vickers noted .
“ But governments are stretched.
” Indeed , even wealthy governments such as those of Japan or Italy would struggle to provide repeated multibillion-dollar rescues .
And the situation is much more critical in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Tehran , where governments are both less wealthy and less able to minimize disruptions—strong insurance coverage would thus be vital .
NATO , meanwhile , worries about insurance during severe emergencies—that is , when one or more member states are under immediate threat of military attack .
Because insurance policies typically ( and not unreasonably ) have so-called war exclusions , the outbreak of fighting would very rapidly put peacetime insurance policies out of action .
Ships and aircraft would have a limited window to exit threatened areas , and new commercial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would become commercially unavailable or extremely expensive .
“ In a crisis or conflict , the lack of war risk insurance would limit governments ’ access to commercial air and sea lift , ” Hasit Thankey , NATO ’ s head of resilience , told me .
“ NATO recognizes the importance of prearranging such insurance , or at least having alternative means to indemnify commercial carriers.
” Attacks on companies and other civilian targets will keep occurring simply because the costs are so low and they are such attractive targets .
Governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insure themselves and insurers to offer policies that cover all the forms of aggression hostile states , their proxies , and terrorists might come up with .
But who ’ s going to pay for it ?
The Geneva Association proposes mandatory insurance schemes—a model similar to Germany ’ s health care system , where residents are obliged to get health insurance , which is provided by government-approved private companies .
Call it Obamacare for geopolitics , with all the associated upsides and drawbacks .
Yet the uncomfortable truth is this : Countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rivals ’ imagination .
Protecting everyday life requires imagination , too , along with some money .

Assume you’re the leader of a nation that wants to strike another country—and that you want to do so without running the risk of devastating military revenge against your own. You’re in luck: Thanks to globalization and ever-increasing digitalization, you can hurt your rival by, say, launching multiple deniable cyberattacks against vital targets in its capital. You or your proxies can, for example, shut down transport networks or major corporations. Otherwise, there’s increasingly something even more insidious you could try: exploiting cities’ and businesses’ massive insurance gaps.
Assume you’re the leader of a nation that wants to strike another country—and that you want to do so without running the risk of devastating military revenge against your own. You’re in luck: Thanks to globalization and ever-increasing digitalization, you can hurt your rival by, say, launching multiple deniable cyberattacks against vital targets in its capital. You or your proxies can, for example, shut down transport networks or major corporations. Otherwise, there’s increasingly something even more insidious you could try: exploiting cities’ and businesses’ massive insurance gaps.
Consider this: Geopolitical and security risks endanger about $133 billon in some of the world’s 279 most important cities. That’s about 25 percent of the total economic activity in those cities. According to the Global Risk Outlook 2020, a report published by the Centre for Risk Studies at the University of Cambridge, the cities most vulnerable to geopolitical and security risks are Tokyo followed by Baghdad, Istanbul, Cairo, Riyadh, Osaka, Lagos, Khartoum, Tehran, and Manila.
In these and other cities, only a small share of assets are insured against geopolitical and security risk. The same is true for many cargo ships—troubling, given that 80 percent of the world’s trade travels by sea. Likewise, commercial firms supply armed forces around the globe with many of their vital goods via this route. These are insurance gaps, James Vickers, the chairman of Willis Re International, a global reinsurance broker, told me in January. “And they’re growing as the economies in many countries expands toward more exposed areas. In the [United States] for example, there’s more and more economic growth on the coasts, which are more exposed than the middle of the country to severe weather events.”
Insurance gaps are a serious issue, whether the attacks are perpetrated by Mother Nature, terrorists, or hostile states and their proxies. The tremors that hit Italy in August and October 2016 caused losses of $6 billion, of which only 3.4 percent was covered by insurance, the insurance think tank Geneva Association explains in a 2018 report. The Kumamoto earthquakes in Japan the same year caused economic losses of $32 billion, of which only $7 billion was covered by insurance. The terrorist attack on London Bridge and Borough Market in London in 2017, meanwhile, cost merchants forced to close their businesses for nearly two weeks an estimated 1.4 billion pounds, about $1.8 billion. They had no other recourse; the insurance available didn’t provide cover for such situations.
It is safe to assume that countries around the world are familiarizing themselves with their adversaries’ insurance gaps. Of course, asymmetric aggression—attacks below the threshold that would trigger a military response—are enormously attractive to rival countries even without such holes. And they’re increasingly common. In May 2019, for example, Deutsche Telekom’s honeypot system, a set of decoy targets for hackers, was targeted by cyberattacks an average of 30 million times per day; by November that figure had risen to an average of 42 million attacks per day. Not all of the attacks came from hostile states or their proxies, of course, but many did. Such grey-zone attempts are so appealing to attackers because they’re hard to attribute to a foreign government and even harder to retaliate against.
Insurance gaps make such attacks even more appealing. Companies have already learned to make themselves less attractive targets through good cyberdefense and hygiene, but they may not have realized that the absence of something as humble as an insurance policy may entice hostile actors to target them. U.S. firms may, for example, want to think about whether they’re covered against a strike Iran may launch to avenge the military leader Qassem Suleimani’s death.
It is, of course, in insurers’ interest to highlight the need for insurance, but there’s no doubt that insurance gaps are becoming a national security issue. Indeed, as the London Bridge terrorist made painfully clear, insurers may need to create new policies that will cover the range of devious deeds terrorists may come up with. There have always been people and companies that skimped on insurance, assuming they’d never need it. But the country that best exploits the weakness of another gains the upper hand—and insurance is one such weakness, as striking an underinsured target causes more harm than striking a well-insured one.
When NotPetya, a computer virus that originated with the Russian government, hit Merck in 2017, one of the results was that Merck couldn’t make its planned supply of HPV vaccine and had to borrow emergency supplies from the U.S. government. The pharmaceutical giant lost $870 million. If the U.S. government retaliated against Russia for the trouble, it didn’t say so. And Merck didn’t get the insurance payout it had counted on: It merely had property insurance, not war insurance, and its insurers made the rather logical point that an attack by the Russian government was an act of war.
Of course, governments of most developed countries possess powerful offensive capabilities that can deter at least some nonmilitary attacks. They also have good defensive tools, including civil contingencies agencies, that can limit the effects of catastrophic events. Some also conduct offensive cyberoperations themselves, partly for deterrence purposes. For example, in its 2018 Cyber Strategy, the U.S. Department of Defense vowed to “defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.” In practice, under this defending forward policy, U.S. cybersoldiers patrol the world like neighborhood cops, occasionally making arrests to signal that it’s not worth misbehaving. While insurance may not be their foremost concern, they’re aware that cyberconflicts are only limited by attackers’ imaginations.
And not even the best cop can prevent all crime. Like earthquakes and terrorist attacks, nonmilitary attacks by hostile states could bring companies to the edge of ruin. “What do people do when they’re hit and can’t stand themselves up? They ask the government for money,” Vickers noted. “But governments are stretched.” Indeed, even wealthy governments such as those of Japan or Italy would struggle to provide repeated multibillion-dollar rescues. And the situation is much more critical in, say, Baghdad, Khartoum, and Tehran, where governments are both less wealthy and less able to minimize disruptions—strong insurance coverage would thus be vital.
NATO, meanwhile, worries about insurance during severe emergencies—that is, when one or more member states are under immediate threat of military attack. Because insurance policies typically (and not unreasonably) have so-called war exclusions, the outbreak of fighting would very rapidly put peacetime insurance policies out of action. Ships and aircraft would have a limited window to exit threatened areas, and new commercial war risk insurance policies that do exist would become commercially unavailable or extremely expensive. “In a crisis or conflict, the lack of war risk insurance would limit governments’ access to commercial air and sea lift,” Hasit Thankey, NATO’s head of resilience, told me. “NATO recognizes the importance of prearranging such insurance, or at least having alternative means to indemnify commercial carriers.”
Attacks on companies and other civilian targets will keep occurring simply because the costs are so low and they are such attractive targets. Governments may need to oblige companies to properly insure themselves and insurers to offer policies that cover all the forms of aggression hostile states, their proxies, and terrorists might come up with. But who’s going to pay for it? The Geneva Association proposes mandatory insurance schemes—a model similar to Germany’s health care system, where residents are obliged to get health insurance, which is provided by government-approved private companies. Call it Obamacare for geopolitics, with all the associated upsides and drawbacks. Yet the uncomfortable truth is this: Countries’ vulnerabilities are limited only by their rivals’ imagination. Protecting everyday life requires imagination, too, along with some money.