foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--America Needs To Talk About a China Reset

America Needs To Talk About a China Reset During this presidential campaign , there is at least one issue on which there is little daylight between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden : China .
If anything , Biden has called Trump out for his ineffective China policies and promised to be even tougher on Beijing .
The United States urgently needs a reset of its China debate .
The present level of tension between Washington and Beijing can not simply go on without a disruption that both sides may regret .
The next administration has to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It doesn ’ t have to deliver peace and goodwill , or end the “ cold war ” with China .
Washington and Beijing have fundamental differences on an array of issues , such as the South China Sea , trade , and ideology .
None of these issues can be easily solved—they can only be worked on .
Rather , rules must urgently be set for the ongoing competition in order to prevent an accidental outbreak of military hostilities or cyberconflict at a level that threatens global peace and stability .
Over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington and Beijing have not only become dramatically worse—they have become dramatically dysfunctional and emotional .
This is too dangerous to be allowed to continue .
To use a Cold War analogy , the next administration will have to move the U.S.-Chinese rivalry from a pre-Cuban missile crisis environment to a post-Cuban missile crisis environment , without having to go through the harrowing danger of the Cuban missile crisis itself .
Rules of the road were established to make the Cold War less dangerous ; that is where we need to get in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
Until 1962 , both the United States and the Soviet Union were testing atomic bombs in the atmosphere and relations between the two superpowers were extremely tense .
The Cuban missile crisis showed both sides that nuclear confrontation was very real—a confrontation that neither side wanted to repeat .
They had stared into the abyss and didn ’ t like what they saw .
In the wake of the crisis , therefore , came a treaty banning nuclear tests and other arms control treaties , a direct hotline between the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the two superpowers .
The Cold War did not end after 1962 , nor were any fundamental issues solved .
But more parameters and rules of the road were established between the two sides , making the Cold War less dangerous .
That is where we need to get in the struggle between the United States and China .
The next administration therefore has to sit down with the Chinese leadership and arrange a calendar of regular summits , a process that forces their respective bureaucracies to come up with markers for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It has to try to negotiate a ceiling on the level of cyberconflict .
It has to work on enhanced rules of naval engagement in contested seas .
There needs to be a mutual commitment that each side will seek to restrain itself from making rash moves without notifying the other side in advance .
This is all absolutely necessary , no matter what the candidates and their campaigns are saying right now .

During this presidential campaign, there is at least one issue on which there is little daylight between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden: China. If anything, Biden has called Trump out for his ineffective China policies and promised to be even tougher on Beijing.
During this presidential campaign, there is at least one issue on which there is little daylight between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden: China. If anything, Biden has called Trump out for his ineffective China policies and promised to be even tougher on Beijing.
The United States urgently needs a reset of its China debate. The present level of tension between Washington and Beijing cannot simply go on without a disruption that both sides may regret.
The next administration has to tackle the U.S.-Chinese rivalry fast—and head-on. It doesn’t have to deliver peace and goodwill, or end the “cold war” with China. Washington and Beijing have fundamental differences on an array of issues, such as the South China Sea, trade, and ideology. None of these issues can be easily solved—they can only be worked on. Rather, rules must urgently be set for the ongoing competition in order to prevent an accidental outbreak of military hostilities or cyberconflict at a level that threatens global peace and stability.
Rules of the road were established to make the Cold War less dangerous; that is where we need to get in the struggle between the United States and China.
Over the past four years, relations between Washington and Beijing have not only become dramatically worse—they have become dramatically dysfunctional and emotional. This is too dangerous to be allowed to continue. To use a Cold War analogy, the next administration will have to move the U.S.-Chinese rivalry from a pre-Cuban missile crisis environment to a post-Cuban missile crisis environment, without having to go through the harrowing danger of the Cuban missile crisis itself.
Until 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union were testing atomic bombs in the atmosphere and relations between the two superpowers were extremely tense. The Cuban missile crisis showed both sides that nuclear confrontation was very real—a confrontation that neither side wanted to repeat. They had stared into the abyss and didn’t like what they saw. In the wake of the crisis, therefore, came a treaty banning nuclear tests and other arms control treaties, a direct hotline between the U.S. and Soviet leaders, and beefed-up summitry between the two superpowers.
The Cold War did not end after 1962, nor were any fundamental issues solved. But more parameters and rules of the road were established between the two sides, making the Cold War less dangerous. That is where we need to get in the struggle between the United States and China. The next administration therefore has to sit down with the Chinese leadership and arrange a calendar of regular summits, a process that forces their respective bureaucracies to come up with markers for progress on a range of issues. It has to try to negotiate a ceiling on the level of cyberconflict. It has to work on enhanced rules of naval engagement in contested seas. There needs to be a mutual commitment that each side will seek to restrain itself from making rash moves without notifying the other side in advance.
This is all absolutely necessary, no matter what the candidates and their campaigns are saying right now.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Deporting Muslim Immigrants Won’t Make Poland Safer

Before Abdusalom left for a meeting with Poland ’ s Internal Security Agency ( ISA ) on May 7 , he kissed his wife goodbye .
It was not his first encounter with agents from the domestic counterintelligence agency , who had called and questioned him previously .
Since Maksym S. , a Ukrainian convert to Islam , was arrested in December 2019 on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on a shopping mall in the eastern city of Pulawy , the agency was pursuing other Muslims who may have been in contact with the man .
Abdusalom , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be referred to only by his first name to protect his privacy , met the agents in a car parked on a Warsaw street .
At first they were friendly , he said .
But then they began asking questions about his contacts with Maksym S. and other Islamists operating in Poland .
( Surnames of suspects like Maksym are not made public in Polish legal proceedings . )
Although Abdusalom said repeatedly that he had seen Maksym S. at the mosque only once , the agents handcuffed him and drove to an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a quick trial that took place over video link due to the coronavirus pandemic , the state charged Abdusalom with unspecified crimes—falling under a wide definition of “ terrorism ” and “ espionage.
” According to Polish law , terrorism and espionage cases are a state secret , leaving even the defendant in the dark about the specific charges .
If the authorities choose to pursue deportation in cases related to national security , neither the suspects nor their lawyers can access the classified case files .
The judge approved Abdusalom ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would await deportation to Tajikistan .
Under Poland ’ s controversial 2016 anti-terrorism law , the authorities can expel any foreigner suspected of involvement in terrorism or espionage with immediate effect .
The law has granted the ISA increased powers in monitoring foreigners , including European Union citizens , based only on suspicion .
In their fight against terrorism , the Polish authorities have focused especially on Muslim immigrants , leaving those like Abdusalom with little ability to defend themselves .
In addition to raising concerns about widespread rights violations , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far not seen a single terrorist attack inspired by Islamist ideology .
Nonetheless , Poland ’ s government—led by the right-wing Law and Justice ( PiS ) party—has increasingly used the anti-terrorism law to target Muslims based on questionable evidence .
PiS , which has normalized hate speech and created a hostile environment for immigrants in Poland , has granted the ISA a free hand to pursue foreign terrorists , regardless of human rights concerns .
But the policy doesn ’ t make Poland any safer , and it only worsens its human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order came along with orders for three other Tajiks charged with similar unspecified crimes .
They were moved from their homes in Warsaw to a high-security detention center in the eastern city of Przemysl to await deportation .
The European Court of Human Rights ruled in September that Abdusalom and one of the other men should not be expelled because they may face inhumane treatment in Tajikistan , which is known to jail and torture opposition members .
( The other two were deported on Sept .
2 . )
But the case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unclear how long they will remain under arrest and whether they will see their families again .
“ The moment the administrative court gives a deportation order , it is effective immediately.
” The number of foreigners under deportation orders for charges of terrorism and espionage is on the rise , raising concern among Polish human rights lawyers .
“ The moment the administrative court gives a deportation order , it is effective immediately , ” said Malgorzata Jazwinska , a lawyer with the Association for Legal Intervention , a human rights nongovernmental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dangerous situation , especially in the case of foreigners who claim that after being deported for security reasons , they can be detained , arrested , and possibly tortured.
” In many cases , the ISA has pressured Muslim immigrants to report on the activities of their peers .
If they do not cooperate , the agents threaten them with deportation—as in the case of Abdusalom , when the ISA agents sought information on Maksym S. According to Daniel Bockowski , a security expert at the University of Bialystok , the security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Maksym S. ’ s radicalization , who fled Poland after his 2019 arrest .
The ISA ’ s counterterrorism work has previously led to wrongful convictions .
In 2015 , Alvi Y. , a Chechen national , was charged with supporting the Islamic State .
He spent two years in prison after a conviction largely based on a faulty translation of an intercepted conversation .
Alvi Y. appealed the decision and managed to clear his name in 2018 .
Those who receive administrative deportation orders based on material gathered by the ISA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ option .
The case of Abdusalom shows how the ISA ’ s counterterrQuorism efforts appear to be misguided , at the very least .
The Polish security services have focused on Muslim immigrants beyond Europe , rather than nearby threats .
“ If there is ever a real threat of Islamist terrorism in Poland , the perpetrators will be most likely local , deeply radicalized converts coming from Germany or other Northern and Western European countries , where organizations that could really trigger radicalization operate , ” Bockowski said .
Furthermore , Poland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radicalized Poles capable of so-called lone wolf attacks .
Though authorities have emphasized the threat from external organizations such as the Islamic State , in recent years Poland has seen a number of homegrown terrorist attacks or plans , including the murder of Gdansk Mayor Pawel Adamowicz in 2019 , a knife attack in a shopping mall in Stalowa Wola , and an unsuccessful bombing attempt on a Wroclaw bus in 2016 .
The complete secrecy around cases related to national security means that it is impossible to know whether those under deportation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But it is clear that Poland lacks a coherent anti-terrorism strategy , with PiS ’ s political agenda informing the work of the ISA .
The current strategy is not only discriminatory , but it has also proved unsuccessful in identifying actual national security threats—and it could be counterproductive in the long run , leading to grievances among Poland ’ s Muslim community .
Poland needs a new anti-terrorism strategy that correctly identifies the threats and escapes politicization .
Otherwise , it will be neither a welcoming place nor a safe one .

Before Abdusalom left for a meeting with Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ISA) on May 7, he kissed his wife goodbye. It was not his first encounter with agents from the domestic counterintelligence agency, who had called and questioned him previously. Since Maksym S. , a Ukrainian convert to Islam, was arrested in December 2019 on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on a shopping mall in the eastern city of Pulawy, the agency was pursuing other Muslims who may have been in contact with the man.
Before Abdusalom left for a meeting with Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ISA) on May 7, he kissed his wife goodbye. It was not his first encounter with agents from the domestic counterintelligence agency, who had called and questioned him previously. Since Maksym S., a Ukrainian convert to Islam, was arrested in December 2019 on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on a shopping mall in the eastern city of Pulawy, the agency was pursuing other Muslims who may have been in contact with the man.
Abdusalom, who is originally from Tajikistan and asked to be referred to only by his first name to protect his privacy, met the agents in a car parked on a Warsaw street. At first they were friendly, he said. But then they began asking questions about his contacts with Maksym S. and other Islamists operating in Poland. (Surnames of suspects like Maksym are not made public in Polish legal proceedings.) Although Abdusalom said repeatedly that he had seen Maksym S. at the mosque only once, the agents handcuffed him and drove to an unknown location in the capital.
In a quick trial that took place over video link due to the coronavirus pandemic, the state charged Abdusalom with unspecified crimes—falling under a wide definition of “terrorism” and “espionage.” According to Polish law, terrorism and espionage cases are a state secret, leaving even the defendant in the dark about the specific charges. If the authorities choose to pursue deportation in cases related to national security, neither the suspects nor their lawyers can access the classified case files. The judge approved Abdusalom’s transfer to a detention center, where he would await deportation to Tajikistan.
Under Poland’s controversial 2016 anti-terrorism law, the authorities can expel any foreigner suspected of involvement in terrorism or espionage with immediate effect. The law has granted the ISA increased powers in monitoring foreigners, including European Union citizens, based only on suspicion. In their fight against terrorism, the Polish authorities have focused especially on Muslim immigrants, leaving those like Abdusalom with little ability to defend themselves.
In addition to raising concerns about widespread rights violations, the strategy is misplaced: Poland has so far not seen a single terrorist attack inspired by Islamist ideology. Nonetheless, Poland’s government—led by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party—has increasingly used the anti-terrorism law to target Muslims based on questionable evidence. PiS, which has normalized hate speech and created a hostile environment for immigrants in Poland, has granted the ISA a free hand to pursue foreign terrorists, regardless of human rights concerns. But the policy doesn’t make Poland any safer, and it only worsens its human rights record.
On the day of Abdusalom’s arrest, his wife, Bibirukaya—who also requested that only her first name be used—received unexpected guests: ISA officers in plain clothes who asked for Abdusalom’s passport. Bibirukaya, at the time six months pregnant, was unaware of her husband’s whereabouts and told the men to wait outside while she looked. They instead forced their way into the apartment, accusing her of hiding the passport, and took it themselves. But the agents did not confiscate Abdusalom’s laptop or other equipment that could provide evidence of wrongdoing.
Abdusalom’s deportation order came along with orders for three other Tajiks charged with similar unspecified crimes. They were moved from their homes in Warsaw to a high-security detention center in the eastern city of Przemysl to await deportation. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in September that Abdusalom and one of the other men should not be expelled because they may face inhumane treatment in Tajikistan, which is known to jail and torture opposition members. (The other two were deported on Sept. 2.) But the case is far from resolved: It is unclear how long they will remain under arrest and whether they will see their families again.
“The moment the administrative court gives a deportation order, it is effective immediately.”
The number of foreigners under deportation orders for charges of terrorism and espionage is on the rise, raising concern among Polish human rights lawyers. “The moment the administrative court gives a deportation order, it is effective immediately,” said Malgorzata Jazwinska, a lawyer with the Association for Legal Intervention, a human rights nongovernmental organization in Warsaw. “It is a dangerous situation, especially in the case of foreigners who claim that after being deported for security reasons, they can be detained, arrested, and possibly tortured.”
In many cases, the ISA has pressured Muslim immigrants to report on the activities of their peers. If they do not cooperate, the agents threaten them with deportation—as in the case of Abdusalom, when the ISA agents sought information on Maksym S. According to Daniel Bockowski, a security expert at the University of Bialystok, the security services failed to capture those allegedly responsible for Maksym S.’s radicalization, who fled Poland after his 2019 arrest.
The ISA’s counterterrorism work has previously led to wrongful convictions. In 2015, Alvi Y., a Chechen national, was charged with supporting the Islamic State. He spent two years in prison after a conviction largely based on a faulty translation of an intercepted conversation. Alvi Y. appealed the decision and managed to clear his name in 2018. Those who receive administrative deportation orders based on material gathered by the ISA, however, do not have that option.
The case of Abdusalom shows how the ISA’s counterterrorism efforts appear to be misguided, at the very least. The Polish security services have focused on Muslim immigrants beyond Europe, rather than nearby threats. “If there is ever a real threat of Islamist terrorism in Poland, the perpetrators will be most likely local, deeply radicalized converts coming from Germany or other Northern and Western European countries, where organizations that could really trigger radicalization operate,” Bockowski said.
Furthermore, Poland has long ignored domestic terrorist groups and radicalized Poles capable of so-called lone wolf attacks. Though authorities have emphasized the threat from external organizations such as the Islamic State, in recent years Poland has seen a number of homegrown terrorist attacks or plans, including the murder of Gdansk Mayor Pawel Adamowicz in 2019, a knife attack in a shopping mall in Stalowa Wola, and an unsuccessful bombing attempt on a Wroclaw bus in 2016.
The complete secrecy around cases related to national security means that it is impossible to know whether those under deportation orders have indeed committed a crime. But it is clear that Poland lacks a coherent anti-terrorism strategy, with PiS’s political agenda informing the work of the ISA. The current strategy is not only discriminatory, but it has also proved unsuccessful in identifying actual national security threats—and it could be counterproductive in the long run, leading to grievances among Poland’s Muslim community.
Poland needs a new anti-terrorism strategy that correctly identifies the threats and escapes politicization. Otherwise, it will be neither a welcoming place nor a safe one.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Thai Protesters Claim a Temporary Victory

BANGKOK—In a hard-fought weekend , Thailand ’ s pro-democracy protesters stuck to the streets of Bangkok , despite the government ’ s best efforts to shift them with methods including water cannons and media propaganda .
Riot police fired water cannons and water-based irritants on pro-democracy protesters on Friday in harrowing scenes that saw the largely peaceful protesters in defiance of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha ’ s emergency decree .
But that show of force has been met with mass protests in Bangkok in the days since , with protesters drawing inspiration from last year ’ s Hong Kong demonstrations—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s responses .
“ Do they think we will go ?
No , tomorrow , more tomorrow , ” a tattoo artist and protester who asked to be referred to as Tad said on Friday after being routed by riot police and water cannons .
When asked where the next protests would be , he smiled .
“ We don ’ t know , they don ’ t know.
” One lone man sat trying to make brick barricades , as seen in the Hong Kong protests to prevent vehicles from advancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The police had taken the area , and the few remaining straggling , soaking-wet protesters made their way to Chulalongkorn University for sanctuary and escape .
The protesters want the resignation of the prime minister , monarchical reform , and a new constitution .
The government has reacted fiercely , with a contentious state of emergency declared and a capricious spate of arrests .
After the violent breakup of the Friday protests at the National Stadium—which saw hundreds of riot police lining the area from the National Stadium to Siam Station—protest leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ released just prior to the event .
Every day , a new hashtag now rises for the latest protest location : Oct. 17 mob , Oct. 18 mob , Oct. 19 mob .
For Saturday , the protests were planned for Lao Phrao intersection and Udomsuk and Wongwian Yai stations , more than 7 miles away from the city center .
In response , almost before the protests began , the government forced the Bangkok Mass Transit System ( BTS ) and the city ’ s Mass Rapid Transit ( MRT ) to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s entire public transport network .
That , too , was a lesson taken from Hong Kong , where the city government shut down the metro system .
But tens of thousands of protesters showed up , undeterred by the stoppages , in a firm rebuke to the military government ’ s tactics .
Protests continued at Victory Monument and in the Asoke area downtown on Monday , filling the streets with multicolored ponchos and umbrellas .
The protest leader Mike Rayong was arrested by undercover police on Saturday , following dozens of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so the Sunday protests were largely leaderless , without microphones or speeches at Victory Monument until after nightfall .
Instead , protesters chanted at random and sang .
In a major shift from just three days ago , the Thailand pro-democracy protests now have front-line protesters , drawing on the organization shown in Hong Kong .
At Victory Monument on Sunday , protesters handed out plastic-covered hard hats to an ad hoc front-line barricade .
Demonstrators in multicolored ponchos formed an assembly line to move bottled water to the protesters nearer to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tea Alliance … teaches us , ” said one front-line protester on Sunday , wishing to remain anonymous , in reference to the online alliance between Hong Kong , Taiwan , and Thailand in promoting democracy .
He tapped his hard hat with an umbrella .
“ We are careful today.
” A few front-line leaders demonstrated how to physically hold up fellow protesters when encountering riot police ; others milled about taking selfies .
That was a defiant gesture , not a narcissistic one : The government has also announced “ selfie @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a protest incites others to join and could be construed as a breach of the state of emergency regulations punishable by 40,000 baht ( about $ 1,200 ) and/or two years in prison .
In the plush downtown district of Asoke , near the BTS and MRT stations there , the protesters linked arms .
The riot police and water cannons would never show .
The jubilant atmosphere marred by the state violence of the Friday protests had returned on Sunday .
Businesses were open , and people had sushi and 7/11 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s front line at Victory Monument .
Motorcycle taxis , the unsung heroes of these mobile protests , rode in on their scooters waving the three-finger salute , taken from the Hunger Games series , that has become another symbol of defiance .
There is little chance Prayuth and his government will back down , given the militarized machismo that has fueled the authorities so far .
In a somewhat more conciliatory approach to the protests after days of having the emergency decree flouted , a spokesperson on Sunday quoted the prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is willing to listen to everyone ’ s problems and continues to solve problems in all areas.
” When asked after Friday ’ s crackdown whether he was worried about the protesters possibly using the “ Hong Kong model , ” Prayuth said , “ What a media question !
So how is the Hong Kong model today ?
Hong Kong is damaged .
Businesses are all damaged .
Everything is devastated .
And how are the protesters ?
… But don ’ t forget that they are a democratic society—we are democratic.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ control the streets , has turned its attention to the media .
Monday saw the government issue an order to censor four local media organizations : Voice TV , the Facebook-based Reporters news agency , the Standard , and Prachatai , as well as the protest group Free Youth .
The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission claims that they created misleading information affecting national stability .
A Prachatai reporter , Kitti Pantapak , was arrested Friday and released after paying a fine of 300 baht ( $ 9.61 ) .
“ The arrest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalist on Friday night highlights the new risks for media in covering events .
The FCCT urges the authorities to respect the role and responsibilities of all media in Thailand , ” the Foreign Correspondents ’ Club of Thailand said in a statement .
Since Thursday last week , a white screen with the words “ Program will resume shortly ” appears on television screens around the country when the protests are addressed on CNN , BBC , and others—censored by the Thai broadcaster True Visions .
On Sunday , Thailand ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying the shutdown of transport was a tactic from the protesters , later retracting the story saying it was a mistake made during editing .
Companies ’ complacency in the government ’ s crackdown has not gone unnoticed .
BTS Group Holdings showed a nearly 4 percent drop on Thailand ’ s benchmark stock index on Monday , which is a likely result of the public transport giant ’ s willingness to stop services to quash the protests at the government ’ s behest .
Some protesters have left dog food at local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pets ” of the military government .
Sadly for the government , its problems are no longer confined to Bangkok .
Cities and universities around the country have been standing in solidarity with the Bangkok protesters , with shouts of “ Prayuth get out !
” ringing from Chiang Mai in the north to Khon Kaen in Thailand ’ s eastern heartland .
It is unclear how the media blackout orders will take effect , as those violating them now face the same prospect of arrest as the protest leaders .
Similarly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the messaging app Telegram in Thailand and raided the Same Sky Books publishing house .
For Monday ’ s demonstrations , the daily mob of thousands of protesters went to Kaset in north Bangkok led by Sirawith Seritiwat .
Protesters are waiting on where Tuesday ’ s will be held—and Wednesday ’ s and many more likely to come .

BANGKOK—In a hard-fought weekend, Thailand’s pro-democracy protesters stuck to the streets of Bangkok, despite the government’s best efforts to shift them with methods including water cannons and media propaganda.
BANGKOK—In a hard-fought weekend, Thailand’s pro-democracy protesters stuck to the streets of Bangkok, despite the government’s best efforts to shift them with methods including water cannons and media propaganda.
Riot police fired water cannons and water-based irritants on pro-democracy protesters on Friday in harrowing scenes that saw the largely peaceful protesters in defiance of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s emergency decree. But that show of force has been met with mass protests in Bangkok in the days since, with protesters drawing inspiration from last year’s Hong Kong demonstrations—and the authorities from the Hong Kong government’s responses.
“Do they think we will go? No, tomorrow, more tomorrow,” a tattoo artist and protester who asked to be referred to as Tad said on Friday after being routed by riot police and water cannons. When asked where the next protests would be, he smiled. “We don’t know, they don’t know.”
One lone man sat trying to make brick barricades, as seen in the Hong Kong protests to prevent vehicles from advancing, but it was of little use. The police had taken the area, and the few remaining straggling, soaking-wet protesters made their way to Chulalongkorn University for sanctuary and escape.
The protesters want the resignation of the prime minister, monarchical reform, and a new constitution. The government has reacted fiercely, with a contentious state of emergency declared and a capricious spate of arrests.
After the violent breakup of the Friday protests at the National Stadium—which saw hundreds of riot police lining the area from the National Stadium to Siam Station—protest leaders decided that future protest sites would be released just prior to the event. Every day, a new hashtag now rises for the latest protest location: Oct. 17 mob, Oct. 18 mob, Oct. 19 mob.
For Saturday, the protests were planned for Lao Phrao intersection and Udomsuk and Wongwian Yai stations, more than 7 miles away from the city center. In response, almost before the protests began, the government forced the Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) and the city’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) to cease all operations, paralyzing Bangkok’s entire public transport network. That, too, was a lesson taken from Hong Kong, where the city government shut down the metro system.
But tens of thousands of protesters showed up, undeterred by the stoppages, in a firm rebuke to the military government’s tactics. Protests continued at Victory Monument and in the Asoke area downtown on Monday, filling the streets with multicolored ponchos and umbrellas.
The protest leader Mike Rayong was arrested by undercover police on Saturday, following dozens of others including reporters and front-line doctors, so the Sunday protests were largely leaderless, without microphones or speeches at Victory Monument until after nightfall. Instead, protesters chanted at random and sang.
In a major shift from just three days ago, the Thailand pro-democracy protests now have front-line protesters, drawing on the organization shown in Hong Kong. At Victory Monument on Sunday, protesters handed out plastic-covered hard hats to an ad hoc front-line barricade. Demonstrators in multicolored ponchos formed an assembly line to move bottled water to the protesters nearer to the monument.
“Yes, the Milk Tea Alliance … teaches us,” said one front-line protester on Sunday, wishing to remain anonymous, in reference to the online alliance between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand in promoting democracy. He tapped his hard hat with an umbrella. “We are careful today.”
A few front-line leaders demonstrated how to physically hold up fellow protesters when encountering riot police; others milled about taking selfies. That was a defiant gesture, not a narcissistic one: The government has also announced “selfie rules,” stating that taking selfies at a protest incites others to join and could be construed as a breach of the state of emergency regulations punishable by 40,000 baht (about $1,200) and/or two years in prison.
In the plush downtown district of Asoke, near the BTS and MRT stations there, the protesters linked arms.
The riot police and water cannons would never show.
The jubilant atmosphere marred by the state violence of the Friday protests had returned on Sunday. Businesses were open, and people had sushi and 7/11 snacks just yards away from the protest’s front line at Victory Monument. Motorcycle taxis, the unsung heroes of these mobile protests, rode in on their scooters waving the three-finger salute, taken from the Hunger Games series, that has become another symbol of defiance.
There is little chance Prayuth and his government will back down, given the militarized machismo that has fueled the authorities so far. In a somewhat more conciliatory approach to the protests after days of having the emergency decree flouted, a spokesperson on Sunday quoted the prime minister as saying, “The government is willing to listen to everyone’s problems and continues to solve problems in all areas.”
When asked after Friday’s crackdown whether he was worried about the protesters possibly using the “Hong Kong model,” Prayuth said, “What a media question! So how is the Hong Kong model today? Hong Kong is damaged. Businesses are all damaged. Everything is devastated. And how are the protesters? … But don’t forget that they are a democratic society—we are democratic.”
The military government, unable to control the streets, has turned its attention to the media. Monday saw the government issue an order to censor four local media organizations: Voice TV, the Facebook-based Reporters news agency, the Standard, and Prachatai, as well as the protest group Free Youth. The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission claims that they created misleading information affecting national stability.
A Prachatai reporter, Kitti Pantapak, was arrested Friday and released after paying a fine of 300 baht ($9.61). “The arrest, albeit temporary, of a Thai journalist on Friday night highlights the new risks for media in covering events. The FCCT urges the authorities to respect the role and responsibilities of all media in Thailand,” the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand said in a statement.
Since Thursday last week, a white screen with the words “Program will resume shortly” appears on television screens around the country when the protests are addressed on CNN, BBC, and others—censored by the Thai broadcaster True Visions.
On Sunday, Thailand’s English-language Bangkok Post ran a front-page story saying the shutdown of transport was a tactic from the protesters, later retracting the story saying it was a mistake made during editing.
Companies’ complacency in the government’s crackdown has not gone unnoticed. BTS Group Holdings showed a nearly 4 percent drop on Thailand’s benchmark stock index on Monday, which is a likely result of the public transport giant’s willingness to stop services to quash the protests at the government’s behest. Some protesters have left dog food at local train stations for the so-called “loyal pets” of the military government.
Sadly for the government, its problems are no longer confined to Bangkok. Cities and universities around the country have been standing in solidarity with the Bangkok protesters, with shouts of “Prayuth get out!” ringing from Chiang Mai in the north to Khon Kaen in Thailand’s eastern heartland.
It is unclear how the media blackout orders will take effect, as those violating them now face the same prospect of arrest as the protest leaders. Similarly, the government has moved to shut down the messaging app Telegram in Thailand and raided the Same Sky Books publishing house.
For Monday’s demonstrations, the daily mob of thousands of protesters went to Kaset in north Bangkok led by Sirawith Seritiwat. Protesters are waiting on where Tuesday’s will be held—and Wednesday’s and many more likely to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--The Pope’s Latest Encyclical Is Beautiful—and Hypocritical

There is nothing in Pope Francis ’ s new encyclical—Fratelli Tutti ( “ All Brothers ” ) —with which I disagree , except its hypocrisy .
It is a clear restatement of Christianity ’ s central teachings of love , charity , peace-making , justice , and fundamental human rights—and a timely reminder of the need for compassion in a world of growing division , hatred , and conflict .
But core as those principles have been to Francis ’ s papacy , why have they never been consistently applied to the Vatican ’ s relationship with China ?
Centered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Good Samaritan , the encyclical presents a vivid call for us to reach out to help those who have been assaulted , robbed , left bleeding—and not to , as Francis puts it , “ hurry off as if they did not notice.
” Crucially , it urges us to “ recognize the urgent need to combat all that threatens or violates fundamental human rights ” and specifically to address human trafficking , the sale of human organs , and slave labor .
Interwoven among its pages is a demand for recognition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world regardless of race , religion , gender , class , background , or country .
“ If every human being possesses an inalienable dignity , if all people are my brothers and sisters , and if the world truly belongs to everyone , ” the pope writes , “ then it matters little whether my neighbour was born in my country or elsewhere .
My own country also shares responsibility for his or her development.
” Francis calls for reform of the United Nations “ so that the concept of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ; he applauds civil society for helping to “ compensate for the shortcomings of the international community , its lack of coordination … its lack of attention to fundamental human rights and to the critical needs of certain groups ” ; and he appeals for an end to impunity and for justice , “ out of respect for the victims , as a means of preventing new crimes.
” He emphasizes that forgiveness does not mean “ renouncing our own rights ” in the face of “ corrupt officials , criminals or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ True love , he argues , is making an oppressor “ cease his oppression ” and “ stripping ” the oppressor of power .
“ Forgiveness does not entail allowing oppressors to keep trampling on their own dignity and that of others , or letting criminals continue their wrongdoing , ” Francis writes .
“ Those who suffer injustice have to defend strenuously their own rights .
… If a criminal has harmed me or a loved one , no one can forbid me from demanding justice.
” And , he adds , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be forgotten in the journey towards fraternity and peace.
” He reiterates the church ’ s explicit opposition to the death penalty and calls for its abolition worldwide—an important message , especially for China , which remains the world ’ s leading executioner .
I agree passionately with all of this .
My only question—and I address this to the Holy Father himself—is why is China exempt from this , as far as the Vatican is concerned ?
Why , Holy Father , have you never once even expressed a prayer publicly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the crimes you rightly critique—slavery , trafficking , torture , and possible organ harvesting ?
In addition , at least 1 million are incarcerated in concentration camps ; women face a campaign of forced sterilization or forced abortion ; and the evidence is mounting that the Uighurs are facing the 21st century ’ s latest genocide .
So I ask , Holy Father , why are you about to renew a deal with the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) that has yielded no benefit at all to Catholics in China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more broadly , while remaining silent on the crimes that are currently being committed against the Uighurs ?
Moreover , why have you not expressed any public concern for the plight of Christians in China , who face the most severe repression arguably since the Cultural Revolution , with the destruction of churches and crosses , the imprisonment of clergy , intense surveillance in state-approved churches , a ban on minors going to worship , and a new translation of the Bible that reinterprets it according to the CCP ’ s way of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the release of jailed Catholics not made a precondition for the original Vatican-China deal two years ago , and what are you doing now to secure the release and well-being of those currently in prison ?
Holy Father , why is the text of the agreement between the Vatican and China still a secret ?
Why can ’ t it be released and reviewed more widely ?
And Holy Father , given all the principles you set out in your encyclical , about the importance of dialogue , solidarity , and fraternity , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Joseph Zen , the emeritus bishop of Hong Kong , when he made a long journey to Rome recently ?
This courageous cardinal came all the way to Rome , aged 88 , and was left waiting , a solitary—though truly inspiring—figure in St. Peter ’ s Square while the successor of St. Peter couldn ’ t spare him half an hour , even to hear him out , even to offer him some pastoral comfort ?
What fraternity and solidarity is that ?
The CCP reneged on its promises made under an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong ’ s freedoms , and at the same time the Vatican renews a deal with that same regime ?
What makes you confident that China will abide by its side of the agreement this time , when the regime ’ s record of mendacity and broken promises is well known ?
Worse still , Hong Kong ’ s Catholic Diocese instructs its priests to “ watch their words ” in homilies , bans a prayer for the city , and instructs its schools to teach so-called patriotic education and prohibit students at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Holy Father , how does this fit the standards of solidarity , fraternity , or fundamental human rights that you so beautifully articulate in the encyclical ?
The list could go on .
Most previous popes have met the Dalai Lama , but Pope Francis hasn ’ t .
No prayers for Tibet from St. Peter ’ s Square .
Three years ago , the Pontifical Academy of Sciences held a conference on organ trafficking around the world—and invited the architect of China ’ s transplant program , Huang Jiefu , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from researchers with evidence of organ harvesting in China itself .
The Pontifical Academy ’ s chancellor , Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo , claims that China is the best example of Catholic social teaching in the world today .
I worry that Francis is listening too much to the deluded Sánchez Sorondo and not enough to Catholic social teaching in shaping the Vatican ’ s approach to China .
Indeed , I worry that , as with so many other institutions around the world , the Vatican has been bought by China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ love this pope .
I love his message of mercy , his emphasis on the poor , his call for justice .
I am just perplexed , bewildered , and heartbroken that despite issuing such fine words in his encyclical , he remains so silent on the biggest human rights travesties of our time—the genocide of the Uighurs , the repression in Tibet , forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience , the persecution of Christians throughout China , and the destruction of Hong Kong ’ s freedoms—about which he has not said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principles in Francis ’ s encyclical and his actions is wide , and if he does not close it soon , his moral authority will be severely lost .
I hate to see that happen .
If he does not speak for the persecuted in China , Fratelli Tutti will become a Communist slogan rather than a Catholic doctrine .

There is nothing in Pope Francis’s new encyclical— Fratelli Tutti (“All Brothers”)—with which I disagree, except its hypocrisy.
There is nothing in Pope Francis’s new encyclical—Fratelli Tutti (“All Brothers”)—with which I disagree, except its hypocrisy.
It is a clear restatement of Christianity’s central teachings of love, charity, peace-making, justice, and fundamental human rights—and a timely reminder of the need for compassion in a world of growing division, hatred, and conflict. But core as those principles have been to Francis’s papacy, why have they never been consistently applied to the Vatican’s relationship with China?
Centered largely on the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan, the encyclical presents a vivid call for us to reach out to help those who have been assaulted, robbed, left bleeding—and not to, as Francis puts it, “hurry off as if they did not notice.”
Crucially, it urges us to “recognize the urgent need to combat all that threatens or violates fundamental human rights” and specifically to address human trafficking, the sale of human organs, and slave labor.
Interwoven among its pages is a demand for recognition of the human dignity of every person in the world regardless of race, religion, gender, class, background, or country. “If every human being possesses an inalienable dignity, if all people are my brothers and sisters, and if the world truly belongs to everyone,” the pope writes, “then it matters little whether my neighbour was born in my country or elsewhere. My own country also shares responsibility for his or her development.”
Francis calls for reform of the United Nations “so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire real teeth”; he applauds civil society for helping to “compensate for the shortcomings of the international community, its lack of coordination … its lack of attention to fundamental human rights and to the critical needs of certain groups”; and he appeals for an end to impunity and for justice, “out of respect for the victims, as a means of preventing new crimes.”
He emphasizes that forgiveness does not mean “renouncing our own rights” in the face of “corrupt officials, criminals or those who would debase our dignity.” True love, he argues, is making an oppressor “cease his oppression” and “stripping” the oppressor of power.
“Forgiveness does not entail allowing oppressors to keep trampling on their own dignity and that of others, or letting criminals continue their wrongdoing,” Francis writes. “Those who suffer injustice have to defend strenuously their own rights. … If a criminal has harmed me or a loved one, no one can forbid me from demanding justice.”
And, he adds, defending religious freedom for all “must not be forgotten in the journey towards fraternity and peace.”
He reiterates the church’s explicit opposition to the death penalty and calls for its abolition worldwide—an important message, especially for China, which remains the world’s leading executioner.
I agree passionately with all of this. My only question—and I address this to the Holy Father himself—is why is China exempt from this, as far as the Vatican is concerned?
Why, Holy Father, have you never once even expressed a prayer publicly for the Uighurs, who face many of the crimes you rightly critique—slavery, trafficking, torture, and possible organ harvesting? In addition, at least 1 million are incarcerated in concentration camps; women face a campaign of forced sterilization or forced abortion; and the evidence is mounting that the Uighurs are facing the 21st century’s latest genocide.
So I ask, Holy Father, why are you about to renew a deal with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that has yielded no benefit at all to Catholics in China, let alone religious freedom in the country more broadly, while remaining silent on the crimes that are currently being committed against the Uighurs?
Moreover, why have you not expressed any public concern for the plight of Christians in China, who face the most severe repression arguably since the Cultural Revolution, with the destruction of churches and crosses, the imprisonment of clergy, intense surveillance in state-approved churches, a ban on minors going to worship, and a new translation of the Bible that reinterprets it according to the CCP’s way of thinking?
Holy Father, why was the release of jailed Catholics not made a precondition for the original Vatican-China deal two years ago, and what are you doing now to secure the release and well-being of those currently in prison?
Holy Father, why is the text of the agreement between the Vatican and China still a secret? Why can’t it be released and reviewed more widely?
And Holy Father, given all the principles you set out in your encyclical, about the importance of dialogue, solidarity, and fraternity, why did you refuse to meet Cardinal Joseph Zen, the emeritus bishop of Hong Kong, when he made a long journey to Rome recently?
This courageous cardinal came all the way to Rome, aged 88, and was left waiting, a solitary—though truly inspiring—figure in St. Peter’s Square while the successor of St. Peter couldn’t spare him half an hour, even to hear him out, even to offer him some pastoral comfort? What fraternity and solidarity is that?
And then there’s Hong Kong.
The CCP reneged on its promises made under an international treaty—the Sino-British Joint Declaration—and destroyed Hong Kong’s freedoms, and at the same time the Vatican renews a deal with that same regime? What makes you confident that China will abide by its side of the agreement this time, when the regime’s record of mendacity and broken promises is well known?
Worse still, Hong Kong’s Catholic Diocese instructs its priests to “watch their words” in homilies, bans a prayer for the city, and instructs its schools to teach so-called patriotic education and prohibit students at Catholic schools from taking part in protests.
Holy Father, how does this fit the standards of solidarity, fraternity, or fundamental human rights that you so beautifully articulate in the encyclical?
The list could go on.
Most previous popes have met the Dalai Lama, but Pope Francis hasn’t. No prayers for Tibet from St. Peter’s Square.
Three years ago, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences held a conference on organ trafficking around the world—and invited the architect of China’s transplant program, Huang Jiefu, to address the meeting, refusing to hear from researchers with evidence of organ harvesting in China itself. The Pontifical Academy’s chancellor, Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, claims that China is the best example of Catholic social teaching in the world today. I worry that Francis is listening too much to the deluded Sánchez Sorondo and not enough to Catholic social teaching in shaping the Vatican’s approach to China. Indeed, I worry that, as with so many other institutions around the world, the Vatican has been bought by China.
In so many other ways, I love this pope. I love his message of mercy, his emphasis on the poor, his call for justice. I am just perplexed, bewildered, and heartbroken that despite issuing such fine words in his encyclical, he remains so silent on the biggest human rights travesties of our time—the genocide of the Uighurs, the repression in Tibet, forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience, the persecution of Christians throughout China, and the destruction of Hong Kong’s freedoms—about which he has not said a word.
The gap between the principles in Francis’s encyclical and his actions is wide, and if he does not close it soon, his moral authority will be severely lost. I hate to see that happen. If he does not speak for the persecuted in China, Fratelli Tutti will become a Communist slogan rather than a Catholic doctrine.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Duterte Will Fight Anyone but Beijing

Duterte Will Fight Anyone but Beijing

Duterte Will Fight Anyone but Beijing In late July , during a typically blusterous State of the Nation address , Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took a detour from his prepared remarks and addressed the country ’ s ongoing dispute with China over various landmarks in the South China Sea .
There was nothing to be done , he observed .
“ China is claiming it .
We are claiming it .
China has the arms .
We do not have it .
So it ’ s as simple as that .
They are in possession of the property.
” It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modest , was ready to pat himself on the back for his own national self-abnegation .
The Chinese government did .
After all , though it may have gone against Philippine interests , Duterte has played a significant role in ensuring China maintained possession of the disputed areas .
This turn of events could not have been predicted by the casual observer of Asian politics upon Duterte ’ s election , four years ago .
During his election campaign , Duterte boasted he would stand up to China by personally riding a water @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and planting the Philippine flag .
As spring turned to summer in 2016 , many regional observers expected a confrontation in the South China Sea .
China had gone on a building spree in the South China Sea , converting rocks into airstrips and reefs into solid land .
The Permanent Court of Arbitration was concluding a multiyear investigation into a 2013 case brought by the Philippines regarding Chinese claims in the South China Sea .
The administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama cajoled allies across the world to speak out against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Permanent Court of Arbitration against Chinese criticism .
Despite Chinese pressure to toe the line , far more countries publicly supported the Permanent Court of Arbitration ’ s ruling than opposed it .
But when the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China in July 2016 , just weeks after Duterte took office , he did not brandish the ruling on his promised water scooter .
He did not visit any disputed areas .
In fact , he avoided discussion of the issue altogether .
When he visited Beijing , he made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese officials in the Great Hall of the People as “ your honors , ” he declared his “ separation from the United States , ” going so far as to boldly state “ America has lost.
” The South China Sea is of immense strategic and geoeconomic importance .
About one-fifth of global trade passes through it .
The oil and gas resources beneath it are valued by conservative estimates in the trillions of dollars .
Claims to those resources depend , legally , on the U.N. Convention on the Law of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic zones , which lie within 200 nautical miles from any country ’ s land .
But the many rocks , reefs , sandbars , and islands in the South China Sea provide far more than the basis for claims and disputes about natural resources .
If the sea is fully militarized , it will provide China opportunities for power projection across the heavily populated region .
Institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration provide a fair assessment of the historical merits of claims .
China ’ s shockingly expansive claims were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history or international law .
But any attempts to enforce the court ’ s rulings inevitably fall apart before Chinese assertiveness when leaders such as Duterte are not even willing to diplomatically advance their own countries ’ claims .
Despite the fact that few of the infrastructure projects pledged by China during Duterte ’ s visits have materialized , Duterte ’ s loyalty has not wavered .
The president recently banned the Philippine Navy from participating in exercises with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea , an escalation from his previous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Navy in joint exercises not be covered in the media .
Ever since his election , Duterte has repeatedly pushed the issue of the South China Sea to the diplomatic back burner .
Duterte ’ s actions have cut against the grain of the political culture of the Philippines , especially with regard to foreign affairs .
Despite the legacy of 48 years of colonial rule by the Americans , relations with the United States have remained warm both diplomatically and culturally .
Despite the actions of Duterte , Filipinos ’ net trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while net trust in China has not only stayed low but deteriorated .
Some analysts have suggested that this is merely the natural behavior of a nation-state pursuing its interests within its regional context of the international system .
With China closer geographically and on the rise economically and militarily , it is sensible , they argue , for smaller countries such as the Philippines to jump on the bandwagon to maintain , or even increase , their own power .
Others , such as Mark Bryan Manantan , have argued that Duterte @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another to gain concessions , financial and otherwise , from each in turn .
No doubt there is some truth to each of these arguments .
There are other explanations as well , however .
Despite his popularity , Duterte may be in a bind .
Duterte admitted in 2016 that some of his political advertising was paid for by Chinese donors .
In fact , before his presidential campaign even began , his very first campaign ads were purchased directly with television stations by an anonymous Chinese donor .
In last month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he made a curious comment .
Battling China would be costly , he said .
“ I can not afford it , maybe other presidents can , but I can not .
” The situation of the Philippines in the South China Sea was fraught long before Duterte came to power .
What Duterte meant by other presidents being able to “ afford ” war with China is unclear .
Nevertheless , given his links with wealthy Chinese individuals and the deference he has shown to China as a state , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial connections with China go beyond some campaign ads several years ago .
Transnational corruption has afflicted many other democracies of late .
Meanwhile , Duterte ’ s signature policy—his extralegal killings and violence against suspected drug dealers and users—requires the compliance of the military and national security community .
However , this community generally remains far more skeptical of Chinese intentions than Duterte himself appears to be .
Duterte has placed himself in some degree of dependency on these conflicting interests—Chinese beneficence and state organs suspicious of Chinese expansionism .
This may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Beijing is occasionally broken by jagged , fleeting reversals .
The extent of Duterte ’ s connections to China may not be clear while he remains in power .
His crackdown on the opposition and the press has been fierce .
But the degree to which he ’ s willing to sell out his own country ’ s national interests , against the will of the public , may point toward an unpalatable truth .

In late July, during a typically blusterous State of the Nation address, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took a detour from his prepared remarks and addressed the country’s ongoing dispute with China over various landmarks in the South China Sea. There was nothing to be done, he observed . “China is claiming it. We are claiming it. China has the arms. We do not have it. So it’s as simple as that. They are in possession of the property.” It seemed almost as if Duterte, never modest, was ready to pat himself on the back for his own national self-abnegation. The Chinese government did . After all, though it may have gone against Philippine interests, Duterte has played a significant role in ensuring China maintained possession of the disputed areas.
In late July, during a typically blusterous State of the Nation address, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took a detour from his prepared remarks and addressed the country’s ongoing dispute with China over various landmarks in the South China Sea. There was nothing to be done, he observed. “China is claiming it. We are claiming it. China has the arms. We do not have it. So it’s as simple as that. They are in possession of the property.” It seemed almost as if Duterte, never modest, was ready to pat himself on the back for his own national self-abnegation. The Chinese government did. After all, though it may have gone against Philippine interests, Duterte has played a significant role in ensuring China maintained possession of the disputed areas.
This turn of events could not have been predicted by the casual observer of Asian politics upon Duterte’s election, four years ago. During his election campaign, Duterte boasted he would stand up to China by personally riding a water scooter to one of the disputed locations and planting the Philippine flag. As spring turned to summer in 2016, many regional observers expected a confrontation in the South China Sea. China had gone on a building spree in the South China Sea, converting rocks into airstrips and reefs into solid land. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was concluding a multiyear investigation into a 2013 case brought by the Philippines regarding Chinese claims in the South China Sea. The administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama cajoled allies across the world to speak out against China’s expansionist claims and defend the Permanent Court of Arbitration against Chinese criticism. Despite Chinese pressure to toe the line, far more countries publicly supported the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling than opposed it.
But when the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China in July 2016, just weeks after Duterte took office, he did not brandish the ruling on his promised water scooter. He did not visit any disputed areas. In fact, he avoided discussion of the issue altogether. When he visited Beijing, he made the change in allegiance clear. Addressing Chinese officials in the Great Hall of the People as “your honors,” he declared his “separation from the United States,” going so far as to boldly state “America has lost.”
The South China Sea is of immense strategic and geoeconomic importance. About one-fifth of global trade passes through it. The oil and gas resources beneath it are valued by conservative estimates in the trillions of dollars. Claims to those resources depend, legally, on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea’s establishment of exclusive economic zones, which lie within 200 nautical miles from any country’s land. But the many rocks, reefs, sandbars, and islands in the South China Sea provide far more than the basis for claims and disputes about natural resources.
If the sea is fully militarized, it will provide China opportunities for power projection across the heavily populated region. Institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration provide a fair assessment of the historical merits of claims. China’s shockingly expansive claims were found to be without any basis in history or international law. But any attempts to enforce the court’s rulings inevitably fall apart before Chinese assertiveness when leaders such as Duterte are not even willing to diplomatically advance their own countries’ claims.
Despite the fact that few of the infrastructure projects pledged by China during Duterte’s visits have materialized, Duterte’s loyalty has not wavered. The president recently banned the Philippine Navy from participating in exercises with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea, an escalation from his previous request that the participation of the Philippine Navy in joint exercises not be covered in the media. Ever since his election, Duterte has repeatedly pushed the issue of the South China Sea to the diplomatic back burner.
Duterte’s actions have cut against the grain of the political culture of the Philippines, especially with regard to foreign affairs. Despite the legacy of 48 years of colonial rule by the Americans, relations with the United States have remained warm both diplomatically and culturally. Despite the actions of Duterte, Filipinos’ net trust in the United States remains high, while net trust in China has not only stayed low but deteriorated.
Some analysts have suggested that this is merely the natural behavior of a nation-state pursuing its interests within its regional context of the international system. With China closer geographically and on the rise economically and militarily, it is sensible, they argue, for smaller countries such as the Philippines to jump on the bandwagon to maintain, or even increase, their own power. Others, such as Mark Bryan Manantan, have argued that Duterte is cleverly playing the superpowers against one another to gain concessions, financial and otherwise, from each in turn.
No doubt there is some truth to each of these arguments. There are other explanations as well, however. Despite his popularity, Duterte may be in a bind. Duterte admitted in 2016 that some of his political advertising was paid for by Chinese donors. In fact, before his presidential campaign even began, his very first campaign ads were purchased directly with television stations by an anonymous Chinese donor.
In last month’s State of the Nation address, he made a curious comment. Battling China would be costly, he said. “I cannot afford it, maybe other presidents can, but I cannot.” The situation of the Philippines in the South China Sea was fraught long before Duterte came to power. What Duterte meant by other presidents being able to “afford” war with China is unclear. Nevertheless, given his links with wealthy Chinese individuals and the deference he has shown to China as a state, it is certainly possible that Duterte’s financial connections with China go beyond some campaign ads several years ago. Transnational corruption has afflicted many other democracies of late.
Meanwhile, Duterte’s signature policy—his extralegal killings and violence against suspected drug dealers and users—requires the compliance of the military and national security community. However, this community generally remains far more skeptical of Chinese intentions than Duterte himself appears to be. Duterte has placed himself in some degree of dependency on these conflicting interests—Chinese beneficence and state organs suspicious of Chinese expansionism. This may explain why his general trend of toadying to Beijing is occasionally broken by jagged, fleeting reversals.
The extent of Duterte’s connections to China may not be clear while he remains in power. His crackdown on the opposition and the press has been fierce. But the degree to which he’s willing to sell out his own country’s national interests, against the will of the public, may point toward an unpalatable truth.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--The 4 False Deathbeds of John F. Kennedy

Not for “ Jack ” himself of course .
He grew up in a series of bubbles—the Hyannis Port compound ; another in Palm Beach , Florida ; the private schools ( Choate , Princeton , Harvard ) ; the U.S. ambassador ’ s residence overlooking Hyde Park in London .
Each allowed him to glide past most of life ’ s regular inconveniences .
He rarely carried cash , usually leaving friends or acquaintances to pick up the tab in restaurants and then having his factotum reimburse them .
Hotels around the world always knew where to send the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 25 , Kennedy gained access to the 1926 trust established for him by his father ; in 1948 , when he turned 31 , he was permitted to spend the earned income ( without touching the capital ) from another bigger trust .
Taken together , they made Jack a rich man , who , as the eldest living son , was also heir to the majority of his father ’ s fortune ( a billionaire in today ’ s money ) .
Growing up , Jack had some idea that he might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kennedy seemed at times like a young professor , ” the novelist Norman Mailer would say of him , “ whose mind was off in some intricacy of the Ph.D. thesis he was writing.
” And here again his father ’ s money and influence helped smooth the way .
A plethora of researchers , editors , and public relations boosters were assembled to help turn a Harvard senior thesis into the national bestseller Why England Slept .
At the end of World War II , his father ’ s friend , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him a job as a foreign correspondent and sent him to San Francisco to report on the founding United Nations Conference and to Potsdam in Germany for the “ Big Three ” conference at which Harry Truman told Joseph Stalin about the existence of the atomic bomb .
Jack ’ s sense of entitlement extended to his personal relationships .
He surrounded himself with loyal retainers , usually Irish Americans , who occupied a strange status between friends and staff .
He acknowledged no limits and did not abide by the usual rules @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sex are so well known now they barely need recounting .
Even Jack himself described most of the relationships as being of the “ Wham bam thank you ma ’ am ” variety .
Anecdotally he seems not to have forced himself on women , although judged by today ’ s standards his behavior has an unmistakably sinister quality .
Either way , it ’ s clear that in all these encounters , in the words of one of his lovers , he “ gave off light not heat.
” All of which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ callow , vain , entitled , and in many important ways deeply mediocre .
Yet as the Harvard professor and Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Fredrik Logevall points out in JFK : Coming of Age in the American Century , 1917-1956 , the impressive first volume of this biography , “ [ T ] hat was not the sum of the man.
” For Kennedy was someone who understood that “ life was capricious and fraught ” and that he should “ follow his parents ’ exhortation issued regularly to their kids , to contribute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater than themselves and to act accordingly.
” Logevall writes with command and authority but also with an unstuffy brio .
The research is extensive , taking advantage of the material now fully available in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library after decades of family defensiveness about releasing files into the public domain .
He is generous to other biographers and historians , quoting them at points in the story where earlier work shaped the accepted narrative on Kennedy ’ s life .
And on Kennedy himself he is broadly sympathetic without being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Dark Side of Camelot crowd , but no one , not even the fiercest Kennedy detractors , can dispute the high quality of Logevall ’ s analysis .
The most important correction that Logevall develops is to the idea that Jack was a reluctant entrant into politics , grudgingly taking up the burden of Kennedy family ambition after the death of his older brother , Joe Jr. , during World War II .
“ Jack had his own reasons for selecting his path , ” Logevall writes , which was “ not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place but in order to express his own ideals and aspirations.
” Jack had long been fascinated by politics , not least the political legend of his grandfather , John F. Fitzgerald ( “ Honey Fitz ” ) , who had been a charismatic mayor of Boston .
That attraction combined with his upbringing in a “ household that revered public service and preached the obligation to do something worthwhile with one ’ s life ” made entry into the arena almost inevitable for him .
Not the least significant reason for this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ hot-tempered and domineering … [ r ] elentlessly argumentative … lack [ ing ] subtlety and grace ” and borderline pro-fascist—had been an unpleasant person with hopeless political instincts , something that , by the end of his short life , he himself seemed to recognize .
In contrast , Jack even from childhood seemed to have more empathy with those born into poverty and despair .
“ But how much better chance ” in life , he asked in a schoolboy essay , “ has [ the ] boy born with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than the boy who from birth is surrounded by rottenness and filth ?
” It was a core philosophical position , Logevall writes , “ staked out at sixteen , in the midst of the Great Depression , from which the grown-up Jack Kennedy—congressman , senator , president—would never waver.
” All to the good , but while there are plenty of people with the means to help those “ less fortunate than themselves , ” it does not necessarily imbue them with the qualities required to be elected , at the age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
So what was it that made Kennedy anything more than a moderately thoughtful , heart-in-the-right-place trust fund baby with a snappy dress sense and a pleasing manner ?
In a word , as with his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt , it was physical adversity that made him .
“ Jack never wanted us to talk about this , ” Billings recalled , but “ all during his life [ he ] had few days when he wasn ’ t in pain or sick in some way.
” Kennedy almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , was regularly in and out of the hospital for weeks or even months on end in his late teens and throughout his twenties , was diagnosed with Addison ’ s disease in the year he turned 30 , and suffered from persistent migraines and severe stomach , prostate , and bladder pain , along with the extreme back pain that regularly required him to use crutches when out of the public eye .
By the late ’ 1950s , Kennedy had already been given the last rites four times .
Today we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a president ’ s health .
But for Kennedy , just his family and closest friends knew the full extent of his daily agonies , and it drew from them admiration and even awe .
“ I see him on TV , in rain and cold , bareheaded and I don ’ t worry , ” Joe Kennedy Sr. said of his son .
“ I ’ ve stood by his deathbed four times .
Each time I said goodbye to him , and he always came back .
… You can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but there ’ s that difference.
” That difference was most powerfully on display during the events in Blackett Strait , a channel in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands , on Aug. 2 , 1943 , when a Japanese destroyer sliced through the 80-foot naval patrol torpedo boat PT-109 under Kennedy ’ s command .
Two members of the 13-man crew were killed .
Kennedy , a powerful swimmer , led the other crew members on a 3-and-a-half-mile swim to the nearest patch of land with an injured man strapped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back out to Ferguson Passage , where he spent a terrifying night attempting to flag down passing PT boats and came close to death as cold and disorientation overwhelmed him .
“ Kennedy deserves no accolades for losing the first boat he commanded in the war , ” Logevall writes , “ but he does merit praise for his resourceful and , yes , heroic actions on behalf of his crew.
” That ’ s to say the least .
These were treacherous waters where Japanese forces patrolled and sharks and barracudas swam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kennedy ’ s lungs .
He had a badly injured man strapped to his back , with the safety straps held between his teeth .
There was no influential father to intervene here , no obliging staff to carry the extra load , no amount of money to make this experience any more palatable .
A sense of entitlement was not going to get Jack the 3 and half miles from sinking boat to shore .
Any obligation he felt to the man he was carrying on his back significantly decreased his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again during the ordeal he put his own life at risk to try to save his men .
No wonder that in the immediate aftermath , and afterward when Kennedy became famous , those men spoke nothing but praise for his leadership and bravery that night .
All told , it was an astonishing feat of physical and mental endurance , providing as good an insight into Kennedy ’ s character as is possible to imagine .
Dave Powers , Kennedy ’ s hard-nosed special assistant and general all-around fixer , would later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never would have been a President John F. Kennedy.
” He meant it in the context of Jack becoming an all-American war hero , thanks in no small part to Joe Sr. ’ s brilliant media campaign using the New York Times , the New Yorker , and , most importantly of all , the mass-market Reader ’ s Digest .
But it is also difficult to imagine that there could have been a President John F. Kennedy without the actual qualities of character that the swim exhibited .
Jack may have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was spoilt , not spoiled .
Sickness and adversity had given him unexpected depths , so when he looked into the abyss that night in 1943 , the abyss had not looked back .
That would be a quality much tested while occupying the most powerful office in the world at the height of the Cold War , as Logevall will no doubt show in the second part of this biography .
As to volume one of this life of Kennedy , what do I think of it ?
“ Terrific !
@

A weary visitor to the Kennedy compound at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, once compiled a set of “Rules for Visiting the Kennedys.” “Anticipate that each Kennedy will ask what you think of another Kennedy’s (a) dress, (b) hairdo, (c) backhand, (d) latest public achievement,” it advised. “Be sure to answer ‘terrific.’ This should get you through dinner.” Then there was the infamous touch football, which was always “murder.” Here the rules of engagement were even more straightforward. “Above all,” it warned, “don’t suggest any plays, even if you played quarterback at school. The Kennedys have the signal-calling department sewed up.” Essentially, everyone else’s job was to “[r]un madly on every play, and make a lot of noise.” Lem Billings, John F. Kennedy’s closest friend, observed of the Kennedys: “With them, life speeded up.” Yet as with most things done at speed, it must have been exhausting.
A weary visitor to the Kennedy compound at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, once compiled a set of “Rules for Visiting the Kennedys.” “Anticipate that each Kennedy will ask what you think of another Kennedy’s (a) dress, (b) hairdo, (c) backhand, (d) latest public achievement,” it advised. “Be sure to answer ‘terrific.’ This should get you through dinner.” Then there was the infamous touch football, which was always “murder.” Here the rules of engagement were even more straightforward. “Above all,” it warned, “don’t suggest any plays, even if you played quarterback at school. The Kennedys have the signal-calling department sewed up.” Essentially, everyone else’s job was to “[r]un madly on every play, and make a lot of noise.” Lem Billings, John F. Kennedy’s closest friend, observed of the Kennedys: “With them, life speeded up.” Yet as with most things done at speed, it must have been exhausting. JFK: Coming of Age in the American Century, 1917-1956, Fredrik Logevall, Random House, 816 pp., , September 2020
Not for “Jack” himself of course. He grew up in a series of bubbles—the Hyannis Port compound; another in Palm Beach, Florida; the private schools (Choate, Princeton, Harvard); the U.S. ambassador’s residence overlooking Hyde Park in London. Each allowed him to glide past most of life’s regular inconveniences. He rarely carried cash, usually leaving friends or acquaintances to pick up the tab in restaurants and then having his factotum reimburse them. Hotels around the world always knew where to send the bill. In 1942, on turning 25, Kennedy gained access to the 1926 trust established for him by his father; in 1948, when he turned 31, he was permitted to spend the earned income (without touching the capital) from another bigger trust. Taken together, they made Jack a rich man, who, as the eldest living son, was also heir to the majority of his father’s fortune (a billionaire in today’s money).
Growing up, Jack had some idea that he might like to be a writer. “Kennedy seemed at times like a young professor,” the novelist Norman Mailer would say of him, “whose mind was off in some intricacy of the Ph.D. thesis he was writing.” And here again his father’s money and influence helped smooth the way. A plethora of researchers, editors, and public relations boosters were assembled to help turn a Harvard senior thesis into the national bestseller Why England Slept. At the end of World War II, his father’s friend, the newspaper tycoon William Randolph Hearst, gave him a job as a foreign correspondent and sent him to San Francisco to report on the founding United Nations Conference and to Potsdam in Germany for the “Big Three” conference at which Harry Truman told Joseph Stalin about the existence of the atomic bomb.
Jack’s sense of entitlement extended to his personal relationships. He surrounded himself with loyal retainers, usually Irish Americans, who occupied a strange status between friends and staff. He acknowledged no limits and did not abide by the usual rules. The many stories surrounding JFK and sex are so well known now they barely need recounting. Even Jack himself described most of the relationships as being of the “Wham bam thank you ma’am” variety. Anecdotally he seems not to have forced himself on women, although judged by today’s standards his behavior has an unmistakably sinister quality. Either way, it’s clear that in all these encounters, in the words of one of his lovers, he “gave off light not heat.”
All of which is to say that Kennedy was often callow, vain, entitled, and in many important ways deeply mediocre. Yet as the Harvard professor and Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Fredrik Logevall points out in JFK: Coming of Age in the American Century, 1917-1956, the impressive first volume of this biography, “[T]hat was not the sum of the man.” For Kennedy was someone who understood that “life was capricious and fraught” and that he should “follow his parents’ exhortation issued regularly to their kids, to contribute to society, to believe in something greater than themselves and to act accordingly.”
Logevall writes with command and authority but also with an unstuffy brio. The research is extensive, taking advantage of the material now fully available in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library after decades of family defensiveness about releasing files into the public domain. He is generous to other biographers and historians, quoting them at points in the story where earlier work shaped the accepted narrative on Kennedy’s life. And on Kennedy himself he is broadly sympathetic without being hagiographic. This book will not please the Dark Side of Camelot crowd, but no one, not even the fiercest Kennedy detractors, can dispute the high quality of Logevall’s analysis.
The most important correction that Logevall develops is to the idea that Jack was a reluctant entrant into politics, grudgingly taking up the burden of Kennedy family ambition after the death of his older brother, Joe Jr., during World War II. “Jack had his own reasons for selecting his path,” Logevall writes, which was “not in order to take Joe’s place but in order to express his own ideals and aspirations.” Jack had long been fascinated by politics, not least the political legend of his grandfather, John F. Fitzgerald (“Honey Fitz”), who had been a charismatic mayor of Boston. That attraction combined with his upbringing in a “household that revered public service and preached the obligation to do something worthwhile with one’s life” made entry into the arena almost inevitable for him.
Not the least significant reason for this engagement was the fact that Joe Jr.—“hot-tempered and domineering … [r]elentlessly argumentative … lack[ing] subtlety and grace” and borderline pro-fascist—had been an unpleasant person with hopeless political instincts, something that, by the end of his short life, he himself seemed to recognize. In contrast, Jack even from childhood seemed to have more empathy with those born into poverty and despair. “But how much better chance” in life, he asked in a schoolboy essay, “has [the] boy born with a silver spoon in his mouth … than the boy who from birth is surrounded by rottenness and filth?” It was a core philosophical position, Logevall writes, “staked out at sixteen, in the midst of the Great Depression, from which the grown-up Jack Kennedy—congressman, senator, president—would never waver.”
All to the good, but while there are plenty of people with the means to help those “less fortunate than themselves,” it does not necessarily imbue them with the qualities required to be elected, at the age of 43, the youngest president of the United States. So what was it that made Kennedy anything more than a moderately thoughtful, heart-in-the-right-place trust fund baby with a snappy dress sense and a pleasing manner? In a word, as with his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt, it was physical adversity that made him.
“Jack never wanted us to talk about this,” Billings recalled, but “all during his life [he] had few days when he wasn’t in pain or sick in some way.” Kennedy almost died from scarlet fever as a baby, was regularly in and out of the hospital for weeks or even months on end in his late teens and throughout his twenties, was diagnosed with Addison’s disease in the year he turned 30, and suffered from persistent migraines and severe stomach, prostate, and bladder pain, along with the extreme back pain that regularly required him to use crutches when out of the public eye. By the late ’1950s, Kennedy had already been given the last rites four times. Today we expect to know every last intimate detail of a president’s health. But for Kennedy, just his family and closest friends knew the full extent of his daily agonies, and it drew from them admiration and even awe. “I see him on TV, in rain and cold, bareheaded and I don’t worry,” Joe Kennedy Sr. said of his son. “I’ve stood by his deathbed four times. Each time I said goodbye to him, and he always came back. … You can’t put your finger on it, but there’s that difference.”
That difference was most powerfully on display during the events in Blackett Strait, a channel in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands, on Aug. 2, 1943, when a Japanese destroyer sliced through the 80-foot naval patrol torpedo boat PT-109 under Kennedy’s command. Two members of the 13-man crew were killed. Kennedy, a powerful swimmer, led the other crew members on a 3-and-a-half-mile swim to the nearest patch of land with an injured man strapped to his back. Then he swam back out to Ferguson Passage, where he spent a terrifying night attempting to flag down passing PT boats and came close to death as cold and disorientation overwhelmed him.
“Kennedy deserves no accolades for losing the first boat he commanded in the war,” Logevall writes, “but he does merit praise for his resourceful and, yes, heroic actions on behalf of his crew.” That’s to say the least. These were treacherous waters where Japanese forces patrolled and sharks and barracudas swam too. Burning gasoline fumes had polluted Kennedy’s lungs. He had a badly injured man strapped to his back, with the safety straps held between his teeth. There was no influential father to intervene here, no obliging staff to carry the extra load, no amount of money to make this experience any more palatable. A sense of entitlement was not going to get Jack the 3 and half miles from sinking boat to shore. Any obligation he felt to the man he was carrying on his back significantly decreased his own chances of survival, yet time and again during the ordeal he put his own life at risk to try to save his men. No wonder that in the immediate aftermath, and afterward when Kennedy became famous, those men spoke nothing but praise for his leadership and bravery that night. All told, it was an astonishing feat of physical and mental endurance, providing as good an insight into Kennedy’s character as is possible to imagine.
Dave Powers, Kennedy’s hard-nosed special assistant and general all-around fixer, would later say: “Without PT-109, there never would have been a President John F. Kennedy.” He meant it in the context of Jack becoming an all-American war hero, thanks in no small part to Joe Sr.’s brilliant media campaign using the New York Times, the New Yorker, and, most importantly of all, the mass-market Reader’s Digest. But it is also difficult to imagine that there could have been a President John F. Kennedy without the actual qualities of character that the swim exhibited.
Jack may have been a brat in many ways, but he was spoilt, not spoiled. Sickness and adversity had given him unexpected depths, so when he looked into the abyss that night in 1943, the abyss had not looked back. That would be a quality much tested while occupying the most powerful office in the world at the height of the Cold War, as Logevall will no doubt show in the second part of this biography.
As to volume one of this life of Kennedy, what do I think of it? “Terrific!”