foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--Thai Protesters Defy Government Crackdown

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Thailand ’ s pro-democracy protesters continue to defy an emergency decree , the European Union wants the United Kingdom to keep negotiating on a Brexit trade deal , and Kyrgyzstan ’ s president resigns .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Thousands of protesters are set to join a rally in Bangkok today in continued defiance of emergency laws designed to blunt an unprecedented protest movement that has been building since July .
The rallies are seen as a direct challenge to the power of not just Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reign of King Maha Vajiralongkorn , who returned to Thailand from his residence in Germany this week .
In a bid to crack down on dissent , laws announced by emergency decree in the early hours of Thursday morning banned mass gatherings and prohibited the publication of news that might “ incite fear ” among the public .
Police took things a step further by arresting two of the protest leaders , Parit Chiwarak and Arnon Nampa .
Their arrests only seemed to galvanize protesters who have added their leaders ’ immediate release @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demands .
Protesters have been demanding democratic reforms , including a new constitution , new parliamentary elections , and an end to intimidation of political dissidents .
As the protests grow , reforming the monarchy to dilute the power of the king has become a central demand .
The view from the ground .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Tyler Roney joined protesters on the streets of Bangkok yesterday where the announcement of the emergency decree was greeted with “ boos , jeers , and three-finger salutes , a gesture taken from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ symbol of Thailand ’ s pro-democracy struggle.
” “ Without elections , Prayuth ’ s resignation , or a rewriting of the constitution , there is no clear way forward for either the military-controlled government or the protesters , ” Roney writes .
Europe wants to keep talking .
The ball is in Britain ’ s court today after a communiqué issued by EU leaders yesterday called on Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s government to “ make the necessary moves to make an agreement possible.
” Accepting the invitation to continue trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reversal for Johnson ’ s government after a self-imposed deadline for the conclusion of negotiations expired this week .
On Twitter , the British chief negotiator David Frost said he was “ surprised by suggestion that to get an agreement all future moves must come from U.K. ” Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan .
Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov resigned on Thursday after a week of unrest that followed disputed parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 .
Jeenbekov said he was leaving his post in order to bring an end to the country ’ s political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to power .
I do not want to go down in the history of Kyrgyzstan as a president who allowed bloodshed and shooting on its people , ” he said .
Jeenbekov has been replaced by Sadyr Zhaparov , who had only been named prime minister earlier this week .
Zhaparov was freed from jail by supporters just last week where he had been serving a sentence for kidnapping another politician in 2013 .
According to Kyrgyzstan ’ s constitution , an election for a new president must take place within three months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be barred from running .
COVID-19 on the campaign trail .
After U.S. President Donald Trump became the victim of a White House coronavirus outbreak earlier this month , it ’ s now the turn of his Democratic Party opponents to deal with the virus .
On Thursday , the communications director for vice presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris tested positive for the virus , leading the Biden campaign to cancel some of Harris ’ s travel plans .
It also emerged that a member of the flight crew on a jet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tested positive .
Former Mexican defense minister detained in Los Angeles .
Salvador Cienfuegos , who served as Mexico ’ s defense minister from 2012-2018 has been detained on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering in Los Angeles .
His arrest was reportedly carried out by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration , the anti-narcotics agency .
Cienfuegos becomes the second former Mexican minister to be detained in the United States after ex-public security minister Genaro García Luna was arrested for taking bribes from drug cartels in 2019 .
Sweden ’ s defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 40 percent increase in military spending over the next five years as “ a consequence of Russia ’ s actions ” in the region , according to Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist .
The move would see a $ 3.1 billion overall spending increase by 2025 .
As part of the plans , Sweden aims to increase the number of its military personnel from 60,000 to 90,000 and double the size of its military draft to 8,000 conscripts per year .
Weekend elections .
National elections take place on three continents this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Jacinda Ardern is hoping her handling of the country ’ s coronavirus epidemic propels her Labour party to victory in parliamentary elections on Saturday .
A recent poll shows her party a full 15 points ahead of the rival National party .
In Guinea , 82-year-old President Alpha Condé is seeking a third term , although he will need 50 percent of Sunday ’ s vote to win outright .
Also on Sunday , Bolivians vote for a new president .
Polls show ousted President Evo Morales ’ s ideological successor Luis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to gain more than 40 percent of the vote as well as have a ten point lead over his closest rival to avoid a November runoff .
Bolsonaro ally caught with his pants down .
A Brazilian senator was caught hiding money in an unusual place during a raid on his residence by federal authorities last Wednesday .
During a search for misappropriated coronavirus funds , police found approximately $ 5,200 hidden on the senator ’ s person—specifically between his buttocks .
Senator Chico Rodrigues , an ally of Brazilian President Jair @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the wake of the corruption scandal .
Speaking to reporters , Bolsonaro attempted to distance himself from his former colleague .
“ If a government official does something wrong , it has nothing to do with me .
Or better yet , it has to do with me when I send the police after him , ” Bolsonaro said .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Thailand’s pro-democracy protesters continue to defy an emergency decree, the European Union wants the United Kingdom to keep negotiating on a Brexit trade deal, and Kyrgyzstan ’s president resigns.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Thailand’s pro-democracy protesters continue to defy an emergency decree, the European Union wants the United Kingdom to keep negotiating on a Brexit trade deal, and Kyrgyzstan’s president resigns.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Emergency Decree Fails to Deter Bangkok Protesters
Thousands of protesters are set to join a rally in Bangkok today in continued defiance of emergency laws designed to blunt an unprecedented protest movement that has been building since July.
The rallies are seen as a direct challenge to the power of not just Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, but to the reign of King Maha Vajiralongkorn, who returned to Thailand from his residence in Germany this week.
In a bid to crack down on dissent, laws announced by emergency decree in the early hours of Thursday morning banned mass gatherings and prohibited the publication of news that might “incite fear” among the public. Police took things a step further by arresting two of the protest leaders, Parit Chiwarak and Arnon Nampa. Their arrests only seemed to galvanize protesters who have added their leaders’ immediate release to the list of demands.
The demands. Protesters have been demanding democratic reforms, including a new constitution, new parliamentary elections, and an end to intimidation of political dissidents. As the protests grow, reforming the monarchy to dilute the power of the king has become a central demand.
The view from the ground. Writing in Foreign Policy, Tyler Roney joined protesters on the streets of Bangkok yesterday where the announcement of the emergency decree was greeted with “boos, jeers, and three-finger salutes, a gesture taken from the Hunger Games films that has become a symbol of Thailand’s pro-democracy struggle.”
“Without elections, Prayuth’s resignation, or a rewriting of the constitution, there is no clear way forward for either the military-controlled government or the protesters,” Roney writes.
What We’re Following Today
Europe wants to keep talking. The ball is in Britain’s court today after a communiqué issued by EU leaders yesterday called on Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s government to “make the necessary moves to make an agreement possible.” Accepting the invitation to continue trade talks into the coming weeks would represent a reversal for Johnson’s government after a self-imposed deadline for the conclusion of negotiations expired this week. On Twitter, the British chief negotiator David Frost said he was “surprised by suggestion that to get an agreement all future moves must come from U.K.”
Turmoil in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov resigned on Thursday after a week of unrest that followed disputed parliamentary elections on Oct. 4. Jeenbekov said he was leaving his post in order to bring an end to the country’s political crisis. “I am not clinging to power. I do not want to go down in the history of Kyrgyzstan as a president who allowed bloodshed and shooting on its people,” he said.
Jeenbekov has been replaced by Sadyr Zhaparov, who had only been named prime minister earlier this week. Zhaparov was freed from jail by supporters just last week where he had been serving a sentence for kidnapping another politician in 2013. According to Kyrgyzstan’s constitution, an election for a new president must take place within three months and, as interim president, Zhaparov should be barred from running.
COVID-19 on the campaign trail. After U.S. President Donald Trump became the victim of a White House coronavirus outbreak earlier this month, it’s now the turn of his Democratic Party opponents to deal with the virus. On Thursday, the communications director for vice presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris tested positive for the virus, leading the Biden campaign to cancel some of Harris’s travel plans. It also emerged that a member of the flight crew on a jet Joe Biden had travelled on had also tested positive.
Former Mexican defense minister detained in Los Angeles. Salvador Cienfuegos, who served as Mexico’s defense minister from 2012-2018 has been detained on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering in Los Angeles. His arrest was reportedly carried out by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the anti-narcotics agency. Cienfuegos becomes the second former Mexican minister to be detained in the United States after ex-public security minister Genaro García Luna was arrested for taking bribes from drug cartels in 2019.
Keep an Eye On
Sweden’s defense spending. The Swedish government has proposed a 40 percent increase in military spending over the next five years as “a consequence of Russia’s actions” in the region, according to Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist. The move would see a $3.1 billion overall spending increase by 2025. As part of the plans, Sweden aims to increase the number of its military personnel from 60,000 to 90,000 and double the size of its military draft to 8,000 conscripts per year.
Weekend elections. National elections take place on three continents this weekend.
In New Zealand, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern is hoping her handling of the country’s coronavirus epidemic propels her Labour party to victory in parliamentary elections on Saturday. A recent poll shows her party a full 15 points ahead of the rival National party.
In Guinea, 82-year-old President Alpha Condé is seeking a third term, although he will need 50 percent of Sunday’s vote to win outright.
Also on Sunday, Bolivians vote for a new president. Polls show ousted President Evo Morales’s ideological successor Luis Arce in the lead. Arce will need to gain more than 40 percent of the vote as well as have a ten point lead over his closest rival to avoid a November runoff.
Odds and Ends
Bolsonaro ally caught with his pants down. A Brazilian senator was caught hiding money in an unusual place during a raid on his residence by federal authorities last Wednesday. During a search for misappropriated coronavirus funds, police found approximately $5,200 hidden on the senator’s person—specifically between his buttocks. Senator Chico Rodrigues, an ally of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, resigned his post Thursday in the wake of the corruption scandal.
Speaking to reporters, Bolsonaro attempted to distance himself from his former colleague. “If a government official does something wrong, it has nothing to do with me. Or better yet, it has to do with me when I send the police after him,” Bolsonaro said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--Americans Are Officially Giving Up on Democracy

Americans Are Officially Giving Up on Democracy U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently attacked the integrity of the upcoming presidential election .
He has called mail-in voting a “ big scam ” and has suggested that he may not transfer power if he loses .
These are exceptional and unprecedented threats to American democracy .
But they mask an equally dangerous fact that we have recently uncovered : A significant portion of the American population agrees with him .
This is the tinder for an impending constitutional crisis along with a host of other indicators that scholars are calling to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has long cast doubt on the validity of American elections .
For years he has claimed , without evidence , that millions of ballots were cast fraudulently in the 2016 election and that he should have won by a wider margin .
He also claimed that key midterm elections in 2018 were rigged against Republicans .
The crescendo of vitriol and misinformation about elections is currently at fever pitch .
Some prominent Republicans , such as Sens .
Susan Collins , Mitch McConnell , and Mitt Romney have publicly stated that the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcome will be respected .
But most Republicans have remained silent .
And the rush to confirm Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court is in part motivated by hope that the outcome of next month ’ s election , if legally contested , would be litigated in favor of the Republican nominee .
Research we recently conducted , however , suggests that the president is not alone in disregarding elections .
We administered a survey to a representative sample of the American population in July of this year and found that 31 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good idea to have a “ strong incumbent leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections.
” Predictably in the current context of political polarization , political loyalties strongly condition views on elections .
A total of 38 percent of Trump supporters back giving up on elections and Congress .
This figure would likely climb substantially higher if Trump publicly and vociferously alleges that the election has been stolen come November .
Alarmingly , a smaller but still significant share of individuals who did not support Trump in the 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Congress .
These numbers in the aggregate have trended up in recent years .
The World Values Survey asks individuals a similar question about having a strong and unencumbered leader .
The most recent survey in 2017 reported 38 percent of Americans supporting an unchecked leader , compared to 24 percent in the mid-1990s and 29 percent in the early 2000s .
The considerable popular support for the violation of core democratic principles such as the supremacy of elections and separation of powers is worrisome .
Many Americans may be willing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vote count but decides to dig in .
Others may outright support the president staying in office against clear constitutional guidelines to the contrary should he lose .
American have similarly checkered support for other important democratic practices .
We conducted an experiment in which we prompted respondents to consider a fictitious scenario in which the president orders the Department of Justice to investigate his main political opponent on charges of corruption .
We told respondents that the department has a mandate to enforce federal law and is headed by public prosecutors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meritocratic process based on expertise and have served under different administrations across the political spectrum .
The department refuses the president ’ s order , indicating that there is not sufficient evidence to merit an investigation .
In response , the president replaces long-term public prosecutors with loyalists who will start an investigation against the president ’ s main opponent .
One-fifth of respondents supported this nakedly partisan move .
And again , this was dominated by Trump supporters , with 36 percent of his supporters supporting this action .
Whereas 55 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , only 10 percent of his supporters felt it was worthy of impeachment .
We then randomized whether respondents were told that public prosecutors were protected from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based decisions by existing law or long-standing norms of executive noninterference .
More Trump supporters ( 40 percent ) backed the president ’ s action when it violated existing law .
This suggests that elections are not the only pressure point for democracy .
Because our survey was nationally representative , it does not just capture nonvoters who might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This suggests genuinely tepid or qualified support for democracy .
Mediocre support for democracy , especially among the president ’ s supporters , is a recipe for a constitutional crisis .
The military is debating whether to step in should Trump sow election chaos or refuse to concede defeat if he loses .
Trump is also trying to quickly nominate a favorable replacement for Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court in order to capture the top referee of American democracy .
And with the Senate controlled by Republicans and the House of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hope for Congress to decisively check Trump .
The likelihood that Trump manages to stay in office in the face of a clear loss in the Electoral College vote is probably small .
But with so many mail-in ballots and other changes due to the pandemic , vote-counting may take time , and early results may not be able to quickly adjudicate the election .
Such a scenario could spell trouble for American democracy .
Experts have spelled out a number of nightmare scenarios .
These range from allegations of foreign hacking to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the worst case , an unclear and contested outcome could bring Americans onto the streets , where armed rabble-rousers could stir chaos and provide fodder for an emergency executive declaration .
Even if the most far-fetched scenarios remain improbable , the fact that they should be taken seriously represents a sea change in U.S. politics .

U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently attacked the integrity of the upcoming presidential election. He has called mail-in voting a “big scam” and has suggested that he may not transfer power if he loses. These are exceptional and unprecedented threats to American democracy. But they mask an equally dangerous fact that we have recently uncovered: A significant portion of the American population agrees with him. This is the tinder for an impending constitutional crisis along with a host of other indicators that scholars are calling to the public’s attention.
U.S. President Donald Trump has consistently attacked the integrity of the upcoming presidential election. He has called mail-in voting a “big scam” and has suggested that he may not transfer power if he loses. These are exceptional and unprecedented threats to American democracy. But they mask an equally dangerous fact that we have recently uncovered: A significant portion of the American population agrees with him. This is the tinder for an impending constitutional crisis along with a host of other indicators that scholars are calling to the public’s attention.
Trump has long cast doubt on the validity of American elections. For years he has claimed, without evidence, that millions of ballots were cast fraudulently in the 2016 election and that he should have won by a wider margin. He also claimed that key midterm elections in 2018 were rigged against Republicans.
The crescendo of vitriol and misinformation about elections is currently at fever pitch. Some prominent Republicans, such as Sens. Susan Collins, Mitch McConnell, and Mitt Romney have publicly stated that the election will be conducted fairly and that the outcome will be respected. But most Republicans have remained silent. And the rush to confirm Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court is in part motivated by hope that the outcome of next month’s election, if legally contested, would be litigated in favor of the Republican nominee.
Research we recently conducted, however, suggests that the president is not alone in disregarding elections. We administered a survey to a representative sample of the American population in July of this year and found that 31 percent of Americans believe it is a good idea to have a “strong incumbent leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections.”
Predictably in the current context of political polarization, political loyalties strongly condition views on elections. A total of 38 percent of Trump supporters back giving up on elections and Congress. This figure would likely climb substantially higher if Trump publicly and vociferously alleges that the election has been stolen come November. Alarmingly, a smaller but still significant share of individuals who did not support Trump in the 2016 election—27 percent—similarly doubt the importance of elections and Congress.
These numbers in the aggregate have trended up in recent years. The World Values Survey asks individuals a similar question about having a strong and unencumbered leader. The most recent survey in 2017 reported 38 percent of Americans supporting an unchecked leader, compared to 24 percent in the mid-1990s and 29 percent in the early 2000s.
The considerable popular support for the violation of core democratic principles such as the supremacy of elections and separation of powers is worrisome. Many Americans may be willing to look the other way if Trump loses the vote count but decides to dig in. Others may outright support the president staying in office against clear constitutional guidelines to the contrary should he lose.
American have similarly checkered support for other important democratic practices. We conducted an experiment in which we prompted respondents to consider a fictitious scenario in which the president orders the Department of Justice to investigate his main political opponent on charges of corruption. We told respondents that the department has a mandate to enforce federal law and is headed by public prosecutors who have been appointed through a nonpolitical meritocratic process based on expertise and have served under different administrations across the political spectrum. The department refuses the president’s order, indicating that there is not sufficient evidence to merit an investigation. In response, the president replaces long-term public prosecutors with loyalists who will start an investigation against the president’s main opponent.
One-fifth of respondents supported this nakedly partisan move. And again, this was dominated by Trump supporters, with 36 percent of his supporters supporting this action. Whereas 55 percent of non-Trump supporters found this action impeachable, only 10 percent of his supporters felt it was worthy of impeachment. We then randomized whether respondents were told that public prosecutors were protected from being fired on the basis of their expertise-based decisions by existing law or long-standing norms of executive noninterference. More Trump supporters (40 percent) backed the president’s action when it violated existing law. This suggests that elections are not the only pressure point for democracy.
Because our survey was nationally representative, it does not just capture nonvoters who might be apathetic about politics in general. This suggests genuinely tepid or qualified support for democracy.
Mediocre support for democracy, especially among the president’s supporters, is a recipe for a constitutional crisis. The military is debating whether to step in should Trump sow election chaos or refuse to concede defeat if he loses. Trump is also trying to quickly nominate a favorable replacement for Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court in order to capture the top referee of American democracy. And with the Senate controlled by Republicans and the House of Representatives by Democrats, there is little hope for Congress to decisively check Trump.
The likelihood that Trump manages to stay in office in the face of a clear loss in the Electoral College vote is probably small. But with so many mail-in ballots and other changes due to the pandemic, vote-counting may take time, and early results may not be able to quickly adjudicate the election. Such a scenario could spell trouble for American democracy.
Experts have spelled out a number of nightmare scenarios. These range from allegations of foreign hacking to tedious and contested recounts in swing states. In the worst case, an unclear and contested outcome could bring Americans onto the streets, where armed rabble-rousers could stir chaos and provide fodder for an emergency executive declaration. Even if the most far-fetched scenarios remain improbable, the fact that they should be taken seriously represents a sea change in U.S. politics.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--Could Cyberattacks Stop the Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang?

Could Cyberattacks Stop the Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang ?
On Oct. 14 , the United Nations Human Rights Council confirmed China ’ s membership , though with fewer votes than when it last stood for election to the council in 2016 .
Beijing has served as a council member for 12 of the last 14 years , despite having an appalling record of human rights abuses .
The new three-year term means that it can continue to influence the monitoring of human rights violations around the world , including arbitrary detentions .
Over the past two years , Chinese authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in some 400 internment camps across the Xinjiang region .
Most of the prisoners are Muslim , primarily Uighurs and Kazakhs .
But in the camps they are forced to abandon their religion , espouse Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) ideology , and learn to speak Mandarin .
China initially denied the existence of the camps , but it now acknowledges them as “ reeducation ” camps intended for counterterrorism .
Despite the government ’ s whitewashing , it ’ s clear to the outside world that the camps in Xinjiang are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genocide .
Western democracies , including the United States , the United Kingdom , and France , have increased pressure on China in an attempt to stop the human rights violations in Xinjiang , but economic sanctions and public criticism have so far had no effect .
China is too big , too powerful , and too self-reliant to be restrained by other nations individually .
It is time for democracies to adopt a strategy that will have an immediate effect : covert cyberattacks to gather reliable intelligence and disrupt the CCP ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass surveillance has transformed Xinjiang into a virtual cage , where technology enables the authorities to see , collect , and analyze personal details—determining who is labeled as harmful to the state .
The establishment of a so-called smart region—tightly controlled by technology—makes government persecution more effective , but it also exposes the systems to cyberattacks , providing an opportunity for countries with advanced offensive capabilities to disrupt the operation of the camps .
Countries with the capabilities to do so already use offensive cyberattacks widely .
The United States has directed cyberattacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile systems , nuclear plants , and intelligence units .
Israel has targeted Iranian nuclear facilities , and Iran has attempted to hack into U.S. and Israeli critical infrastructure .
Russia is a known perpetrator of cyberattacks , including the one against the Pentagon in 2008 that prompted the United States to establish the U.S. Cyber Command—one of the most advanced cyberspace operations units in the world .
Given the secretive nature of the camps , access to cameras and data could provide reliable intelligence about human rights abuses .
The principles of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used to perpetrate crimes against humanity in Xinjiang .
Covert and targeted cyberattacks against technology in the internment camps would have numerous advantages .
Given the secretive nature of the camps , access to cameras and data could provide reliable intelligence about human rights abuses .
Such evidence could be used against CCP officials , including by bringing a case to the International Court of Justice .
Covert information-gathering would also reveal information about the camps ’ vulnerabilities , shaping future cyberattacks for maximum disruption .
Successful hacks could disable anything in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used to spy on prisoners would considerably reduce efficiency in the camps .
It would also relieve—even temporarily—the psychological pressure on the prisoners of being under constant watch .
Deactivating communication devices used by staff inside the camps and between staff and authorities outside the camps could compromise operations by disrupting the flow of information and instructions—as well as impeding the guards ’ ability to prevent prisoners from escaping .
Hacking also makes it possible to encrypt data or delete it without the option of restoring it , particularly if the backup system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ knowledge .
Considering the volume of data in the camps , it is unlikely that information is saved in hard copy .
Coordinated cyberattacks would send a clear message to China that the international community does not accept ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang or in other regions , such as Tibet .
It may also deter CCP officials from other breaches of international law , making clear that the West will resort to cyberwarfare when other measures fail .
If cyberattacks prove to be an effective strategy , they could be escalated : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ camps used for persecution and entrapment .
But hacking into China ’ s systems in Xinjiang will not be easy .
Chinese authorities already have advanced cybersecurity measures in place and highly trained personnel to guard the networks , though these measures have their own vulnerabilities .
One such measure is microsegmentation , which alerts operators of unsanctioned activity and blocks it .
It works on a zero-trust model , which separates data into secure zones to secure it individually , making it quicker to detect and contain breaches .
Microsegmentation slows down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the specific host , or segment , that it attacks—but it is costly and unscalable .
Microsegmentation is also prone to human error , making it susceptible to infiltration .
Using the right resources , it can be compromised remotely by installing threats via vulnerable services or malicious software updates .
China ’ s “ Great Firewall ” relies on deep packet inspection ( DPI ) , which blocks intrusions by evaluating the data transmitted through an inspection point , stopping viruses , noncompliance protocols , and other potential threats .
The system @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without which the network is vulnerable to hacking .
The DPI system has difficulty reading and blocking the encrypted packets that enable hackers access to the system .
Like microsegmentation , DPI can be hacked remotely .
Other cybersecurity measures—such as air gapping , which isolates computers from networks—would require using an employee to gain physical access , either through recruitment or unwitting exploitation .
The United States has some of the world ’ s most advanced cyberoffensive powers and the resources to expand and improve them .
It should lead an international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries such as the United Kingdom , France , and possibly Germany , Canada , and Australia .
Pooling together resources and experience would provide a major advantage against China ’ s resources and manpower , which at the moment make it possibly better prepared for cyberwarfare than the United States .
Beijing recognizes cyberspace as an important national security domain , investing considerable resources in ramping up its capabilities .
And the Chinese government ’ s suppression in Xinjiang promotes more than Han Chinese culture and identity : The region is crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Road Initiative .
Asserting the government ’ s complete control over Xinjiang is important to President Xi Jinping , meaning that any cyberattacks on the camps will likely prompt nonviolent retaliation from China .
The Chinese authorities may suspect the identity of the attacker but will be unable to prove it .
The coordinated missions should remain covert after completion to avoid escalation of conflict by China , and collaboration between democracies with advanced cybercapabilities is key .
As a matter of policy , these countries should neither confirm nor deny participation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities may suspect the identity of the attacker but will be unable to prove it .
Without a proven enemy , they are unlikely to resort to a warlike response .
Covert infiltrations also have the benefit of deniability , allowing the CCP to avoid public humiliation that could cause further escalation .
It isn ’ t likely that the CCP will resort to preemptive cyberattacks , as doing so would require considerable resources and could produce a rapid and aggressive response .
Still , it is essential that the countries involved improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cyberattacks against Chinese systems in Xinjiang , investing in advanced technologies , personnel , and updated response methodologies .
They must be prepared to defend critical infrastructure and national security and intelligence agencies .
In any case , strengthening these capabilities is crucial : Technological advancement in the cybersphere will in part determine the future of warfare .
The evidence of human rights abuses in Xinjiang is undeniable : Torture , slave labor , compulsory sterilization , sexual abuse , and the separation of children from their parents are only a few examples @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of dead before the allied powers shut down and liberated what remained of the Nazi death camps , doing so with limited tactical capabilities .
Democracies now have the ability to disrupt the Chinese concentration camps in Xinjiang by nonviolent means , from a distance—a major advantage that could be more effective against cultural genocide than sanctions and criticism .

On Oct. 14, the United Nations Human Rights Council confirmed China’s membership, though with fewer votes than when it last stood for election to the council in 2016. Beijing has served as a council member for 12 of the last 14 years, despite having an appalling record of human rights abuses. The new three-year term means that it can continue to influence the monitoring of human rights violations around the world, including arbitrary detentions.
On Oct. 14, the United Nations Human Rights Council confirmed China’s membership, though with fewer votes than when it last stood for election to the council in 2016. Beijing has served as a council member for 12 of the last 14 years, despite having an appalling record of human rights abuses. The new three-year term means that it can continue to influence the monitoring of human rights violations around the world, including arbitrary detentions.
Over the past two years, Chinese authorities have detained more than 1 million people in some 400 internment camps across the Xinjiang region. Most of the prisoners are Muslim, primarily Uighurs and Kazakhs. But in the camps they are forced to abandon their religion, espouse Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology, and learn to speak Mandarin. China initially denied the existence of the camps, but it now acknowledges them as “reeducation” camps intended for counterterrorism. Despite the government’s whitewashing, it’s clear to the outside world that the camps in Xinjiang are modern concentration camps—the sites of a cultural genocide.
Western democracies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have increased pressure on China in an attempt to stop the human rights violations in Xinjiang, but economic sanctions and public criticism have so far had no effect. China is too big, too powerful, and too self-reliant to be restrained by other nations individually. It is time for democracies to adopt a strategy that will have an immediate effect: covert cyberattacks to gather reliable intelligence and disrupt the CCP’s control of the camps.
High-tech mass surveillance has transformed Xinjiang into a virtual cage, where technology enables the authorities to see, collect, and analyze personal details—determining who is labeled as harmful to the state. The establishment of a so-called smart region—tightly controlled by technology—makes government persecution more effective, but it also exposes the systems to cyberattacks, providing an opportunity for countries with advanced offensive capabilities to disrupt the operation of the camps.
Countries with the capabilities to do so already use offensive cyberattacks widely. The United States has directed cyberattacks against Iranian and Russian targets, including missile systems, nuclear plants, and intelligence units. Israel has targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, and Iran has attempted to hack into U.S. and Israeli critical infrastructure. Russia is a known perpetrator of cyberattacks, including the one against the Pentagon in 2008 that prompted the United States to establish the U.S. Cyber Command—one of the most advanced cyberspace operations units in the world.
Given the secretive nature of the camps, access to cameras and data could provide reliable intelligence about human rights abuses.
The principles of cyberwarfare could be applied to attack targets used to perpetrate crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. Covert and targeted cyberattacks against technology in the internment camps would have numerous advantages. Given the secretive nature of the camps, access to cameras and data could provide reliable intelligence about human rights abuses. Such evidence could be used against CCP officials, including by bringing a case to the International Court of Justice.
Covert information-gathering would also reveal information about the camps’ vulnerabilities, shaping future cyberattacks for maximum disruption. Successful hacks could disable anything in the camps controlled by technology. Disabling cameras used to spy on prisoners would considerably reduce efficiency in the camps. It would also relieve—even temporarily—the psychological pressure on the prisoners of being under constant watch.
Deactivating communication devices used by staff inside the camps and between staff and authorities outside the camps could compromise operations by disrupting the flow of information and instructions—as well as impeding the guards’ ability to prevent prisoners from escaping. Hacking also makes it possible to encrypt data or delete it without the option of restoring it, particularly if the backup system is disabled in advance without the authorities’ knowledge. Considering the volume of data in the camps, it is unlikely that information is saved in hard copy.
Coordinated cyberattacks would send a clear message to China that the international community does not accept ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang or in other regions, such as Tibet. It may also deter CCP officials from other breaches of international law, making clear that the West will resort to cyberwarfare when other measures fail. If cyberattacks prove to be an effective strategy, they could be escalated: to target technology beyond Xinjiang’s camps used for persecution and entrapment.
But hacking into China’s systems in Xinjiang will not be easy. Chinese authorities already have advanced cybersecurity measures in place and highly trained personnel to guard the networks, though these measures have their own vulnerabilities.
One such measure is microsegmentation, which alerts operators of unsanctioned activity and blocks it. It works on a zero-trust model, which separates data into secure zones to secure it individually, making it quicker to detect and contain breaches. Microsegmentation slows down the attack by limiting the hacker to the specific host, or segment, that it attacks—but it is costly and unscalable. Microsegmentation is also prone to human error, making it susceptible to infiltration. Using the right resources, it can be compromised remotely by installing threats via vulnerable services or malicious software updates.
China’s “Great Firewall” relies on deep packet inspection (DPI), which blocks intrusions by evaluating the data transmitted through an inspection point, stopping viruses, noncompliance protocols, and other potential threats. The system’s policies require constant updates, without which the network is vulnerable to hacking. The DPI system has difficulty reading and blocking the encrypted packets that enable hackers access to the system. Like microsegmentation, DPI can be hacked remotely. Other cybersecurity measures—such as air gapping, which isolates computers from networks—would require using an employee to gain physical access, either through recruitment or unwitting exploitation.
The United States has some of the world’s most advanced cyberoffensive powers and the resources to expand and improve them. It should lead an international effort along with other Western cyberagencies in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and possibly Germany, Canada, and Australia. Pooling together resources and experience would provide a major advantage against China’s resources and manpower, which at the moment make it possibly better prepared for cyberwarfare than the United States.
Beijing recognizes cyberspace as an important national security domain, investing considerable resources in ramping up its capabilities. And the Chinese government’s suppression in Xinjiang promotes more than Han Chinese culture and identity: The region is crucial for the government’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Asserting the government’s complete control over Xinjiang is important to President Xi Jinping, meaning that any cyberattacks on the camps will likely prompt nonviolent retaliation from China.
The Chinese authorities may suspect the identity of the attacker but will be unable to prove it.
The coordinated missions should remain covert after completion to avoid escalation of conflict by China, and collaboration between democracies with advanced cybercapabilities is key. As a matter of policy, these countries should neither confirm nor deny participation in any specific attack. The Chinese authorities may suspect the identity of the attacker but will be unable to prove it. Without a proven enemy, they are unlikely to resort to a warlike response. Covert infiltrations also have the benefit of deniability, allowing the CCP to avoid public humiliation that could cause further escalation.
It isn’t likely that the CCP will resort to preemptive cyberattacks, as doing so would require considerable resources and could produce a rapid and aggressive response. Still, it is essential that the countries involved improve their cyberdefenses before they engage in any cyberattacks against Chinese systems in Xinjiang, investing in advanced technologies, personnel, and updated response methodologies. They must be prepared to defend critical infrastructure and national security and intelligence agencies. In any case, strengthening these capabilities is crucial: Technological advancement in the cybersphere will in part determine the future of warfare.
The evidence of human rights abuses in Xinjiang is undeniable: Torture, slave labor, compulsory sterilization, sexual abuse, and the separation of children from their parents are only a few examples. It took five years and millions of dead before the allied powers shut down and liberated what remained of the Nazi death camps, doing so with limited tactical capabilities. Democracies now have the ability to disrupt the Chinese concentration camps in Xinjiang by nonviolent means, from a distance—a major advantage that could be more effective against cultural genocide than sanctions and criticism.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--Will Bolivia’s Elections Usher in a New Wave of Socialism in Latin America?

Will Bolivia ’ s Elections Usher in a New Wave of Socialism in Latin America ?
In the final months of 2019 , an unexpected series of events unleashed the perfect storm in Bolivia .
After a contested election and mass protests , President Evo Morales—who had served for nearly 14 years—saw his hopes for a fourth term dashed .
Morales , a controversial leftist leader and Bolivia ’ s first Indigenous president , fled the country , and an interim government has led La Paz ever since .
Now , a year later , Bolivians will finally head to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new president in what will be the second general election in Latin America since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the region .
The stakes are high—the election may determine not only Bolivia ’ s democratic future , but also the fate of leftist movements in South America and beyond .
Political unrest in Bolivia came to a head last year when Morales , South America ’ s longest-standing contemporary president , faced numerous charges of electoral fraud after he was declared the winner of the presidential election .
Mounting public pressure and large-scale @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s government had the Organization of American States ( OAS ) , where I am a permanent representative , carry out a binding audit of the results .
On Nov. 10 , the same day the OAS released its report outlining serious irregularities and manipulation , Morales resigned .
Although Morales and other left-wing politicians around the world have since denounced his fall from grace—and the OAS ’ s role in it—as a coup , it is clear that his demise was of his own making .
Since then , Bolivia has continued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the interim government of Jeanine Áñez , previously a conservative senator .
One source of controversy was Áñez ’ s announcement in January that she was running for president , after she had initially ruled herself out and pledged to guide the country to transparent new elections .
Another has been the government ’ s decision to postpone the general elections twice due to the pandemic , which has led to protests throughout the country .
In September , Áñez pulled out of the election in a bid to strengthen the campaigns of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party , Movement for Socialism ( known by the Spanish acronym MAS ) .Sunday ’ s elections will be critical as Bolivia attempts both to navigate dire public health and economic crises and to redress the democratic backsliding of the Morales years .
Sunday ’ s elections will be critical as Bolivia attempts both to navigate dire public health and economic crises and to redress the democratic backsliding of the Morales years .
According to the latest polls , the general election will likely result in a second-round election between two front-runners : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the former finance minister under the Morales administration who is seen as Morales ’ s successor , and the centrist Carlos Mesa , the former Bolivian president from 2003 to 2005 .
The MAS controls the congress , but Arce ’ s former lead is slipping , and the election is getting closer .
Mesa may have a greater chance of winning if he is able to garner support from the voting pool that still opposes Morales .
Whatever the outcome of the vote , the fight between the country ’ s populist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ re known in Bolivian politics—will reverberate throughout the region .
The turning point was perhaps Morales ’ s decision to run for a fourth term , which was unconstitutional .
After voters rejected a proposed amendment in 2016 to allow for his indefinite reelection , Morales appealed to his handpicked Electoral Court , which ruled that prohibiting his reelection was a violation of his human rights .
Because of this , many voters were already angry , even before reports of electoral fraud culminated in the OAS ’ s electoral audit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experts and specialists found evidence of major voting irregularities and manipulation , including hidden servers , pre-filled and modified tally sheets , and an inexplicable halt in the recording of results for 23 hours .
The OAS thus recommended that Bolivia hold new elections .
In recent months , some journalistic and academic analyses have questioned the statistical methodology of the OAS .
But according to the OAS , those analyses were based on a false premise : that the results reported in the official tally were valid .
The OAS has since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and its original report has been confirmed by the Bolivian attorney general and backed by the European Union .
The future of the MAS has been uncertain since Morales fled the country last November—first to Mexico , and then to Argentina , where he currently lives as a refugee .
Morales himself has suffered further blows to his reputation , including when he was accused of statutory rape in August .
( His office has denounced the criminal complaint filed by Bolivia ’ s justice ministry . )
And support for his party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up blockades that same month , which prevented medical supplies and oxygen from reaching hospitals in the middle of the pandemic , resulting in 40 deaths , according to the Bolivian government .
Now , although the MAS candidate , Arce , formerly had a clear lead in the polls , it ’ s unclear whether he ’ ll be able to shepherd the party back to power and return the country to socialism .
The other path would be liberal rule under Mesa , whose main goals include restoring democratic institutions and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Today , only Argentina , Mexico , and their allies in Venezuela , Cuba , and Nicaragua remain bound by this common ideological vision in the region , and , as of 2019 , they are now known as the Puebla Group .
One of the Puebla Group ’ s main goals is to support leftist candidates in countries where general elections will be held over the next year , including Ecuador , Chile , and Peru.If the left can capture Bolivia , then it will finally occupy the heart of South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolivia , according to Bolivian Foreign Minister Karen Longaric in the Financial Times , the administration of Argentina ’ s Peronist president , Alberto Fernández , has continued its “ disagreeable meddling in Bolivia ’ s internal affairs ” on behalf of the MAS , despite complaints to the OAS and the United Nations .
This has included promising Morales , who is close to Fernández , that Argentina would work to increase voter turnout among Bolivians living in Argentina to secure a win for Arce and the MAS .
If the left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put an end to the regional isolation of Argentina ’ s leftist government and finally occupy the heart of South America again .
Overall , the international network of the Puebla Group has the support of the governments of Cuba , Venezuela , Argentina , and Mexico ; of former Latin American and Spanish presidents including Lula , Ecuador ’ s Rafael Correa , and Spain ’ s José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero ; and of members of leftist European parties such as Spain ’ s Podemos .
Yet in the following years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and increasing polarization has shattered the consensus of the 1990s .
Today , strong ideological differences prevail , and some regimes reject the political principles and commitments to representative democracy , open markets , and hemispheric integration on which the post-Cold War , inter-American agenda was built three decades ago .
Amid this polarized climate , the foreign-policy challenges that the region faces are daunting .
In addition to political fragmentation , South America ’ s next presidents will have to deal with a triple crisis : public health , social upheaval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a rise in poverty .
Bolivia ’ s election just may shape how the region begins to address those—and if voters opt for strong democratic institutions and a country governed by law rather than ideology , they will be putting their country and region on the right path .

In the final months of 2019, an unexpected series of events unleashed the perfect storm in Bolivia. After a contested election and mass protests, President Evo Morales—who had served for nearly 14 years—saw his hopes for a fourth term dashed. Morales, a controversial leftist leader and Bolivia’s first Indigenous president, fled the country, and an interim government has led La Paz ever since.
In the final months of 2019, an unexpected series of events unleashed the perfect storm in Bolivia. After a contested election and mass protests, President Evo Morales—who had served for nearly 14 years—saw his hopes for a fourth term dashed. Morales, a controversial leftist leader and Bolivia’s first Indigenous president, fled the country, and an interim government has led La Paz ever since.
Now, a year later, Bolivians will finally head to the polls again on Sunday to elect a new president in what will be the second general election in Latin America since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the region. The stakes are high—the election may determine not only Bolivia’s democratic future, but also the fate of leftist movements in South America and beyond.
Political unrest in Bolivia came to a head last year when Morales, South America’s longest-standing contemporary president, faced numerous charges of electoral fraud after he was declared the winner of the presidential election. Mounting public pressure and large-scale citizen protests ensued, and Morales’s government had the Organization of American States (OAS), where I am a permanent representative, carry out a binding audit of the results. On Nov. 10, the same day the OAS released its report outlining serious irregularities and manipulation, Morales resigned. Although Morales and other left-wing politicians around the world have since denounced his fall from grace—and the OAS’s role in it—as a coup, it is clear that his demise was of his own making.
Since then, Bolivia has continued to confront social and political turmoil under the interim government of Jeanine Áñez, previously a conservative senator. One source of controversy was Áñez’s announcement in January that she was running for president, after she had initially ruled herself out and pledged to guide the country to transparent new elections. Another has been the government’s decision to postpone the general elections twice due to the pandemic, which has led to protests throughout the country. In September, Áñez pulled out of the election in a bid to strengthen the campaigns of other candidates running against Morales’s party, Movement for Socialism (known by the Spanish acronym MAS).Sunday’s elections will be critical as Bolivia attempts both to navigate dire public health and economic crises and to redress the democratic backsliding of the Morales years.
Sunday’s elections will be critical as Bolivia attempts both to navigate dire public health and economic crises and to redress the democratic backsliding of the Morales years. According to the latest polls, the general election will likely result in a second-round election between two front-runners: the left-wing MAS candidate Luis Arce, the former finance minister under the Morales administration who is seen as Morales’s successor, and the centrist Carlos Mesa, the former Bolivian president from 2003 to 2005. The MAS controls the congress, but Arce’s former lead is slipping, and the election is getting closer. Mesa may have a greater chance of winning if he is able to garner support from the voting pool that still opposes Morales.
Whatever the outcome of the vote, the fight between the country’s populist left and its centrists—or liberals, as they’re known in Bolivian politics—will reverberate throughout the region.
Today’s political showdown was years in the making. Despite starting off his government in 2006 with the highest-ever popular support of a president in Bolivia’s democratic history, Morales saw his overwhelming popularity that had lasted for more than a decade wane ahead of last year’s election, which culminated in protesters taking to the streets for 21 days to demand his resignation. Under Morales, Bolivia had benefited from high commodity prices and an economic boom, but those periods of growth were later overshadowed by corruption scandals and vanity projects.
The turning point was perhaps Morales’s decision to run for a fourth term, which was unconstitutional. After voters rejected a proposed amendment in 2016 to allow for his indefinite reelection, Morales appealed to his handpicked Electoral Court, which ruled that prohibiting his reelection was a violation of his human rights. Because of this, many voters were already angry, even before reports of electoral fraud culminated in the OAS’s electoral audit.
In the OAS audit, forensic experts and specialists found evidence of major voting irregularities and manipulation, including hidden servers, pre-filled and modified tally sheets, and an inexplicable halt in the recording of results for 23 hours. The OAS thus recommended that Bolivia hold new elections. In recent months, some journalistic and academic analyses have questioned the statistical methodology of the OAS. But according to the OAS, those analyses were based on a false premise: that the results reported in the official tally were valid. The OAS has since explained why its findings were correct, and its original report has been confirmed by the Bolivian attorney general and backed by the European Union.
The future of the MAS has been uncertain since Morales fled the country last November—first to Mexico, and then to Argentina, where he currently lives as a refugee. Morales himself has suffered further blows to his reputation, including when he was accused of statutory rape in August. (His office has denounced the criminal complaint filed by Bolivia’s justice ministry.) And support for his party has slipped slightly since MAS protesters set up blockades that same month, which prevented medical supplies and oxygen from reaching hospitals in the middle of the pandemic, resulting in 40 deaths, according to the Bolivian government. Now, although the MAS candidate, Arce, formerly had a clear lead in the polls, it’s unclear whether he’ll be able to shepherd the party back to power and return the country to socialism. The other path would be liberal rule under Mesa, whose main goals include restoring democratic institutions and ensuring democratic checks and balances to power.
This month’s elections come at a time of great political fragmentation not just in Bolivia, but in the entire region, and they’ve become a touchstone for Latin America’s biggest leftist project. Initially, this project was known as the São Paulo Forum, which was launched in 1990 under the leadership of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who would later become president of Brazil; then-Cuban President Fidel Castro; and Néstor Kirchner, who later became president of Argentina. These politicians, and Morales, were part of the region’s left-populist “pink tide,” which has started to recede due to mismanagement and allegations of corruption.
Today, only Argentina, Mexico, and their allies in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua remain bound by this common ideological vision in the region, and, as of 2019, they are now known as the Puebla Group. One of the Puebla Group’s main goals is to support leftist candidates in countries where general elections will be held over the next year, including Ecuador, Chile, and Peru.If the left can capture Bolivia, then it will finally occupy the heart of South America again.
In the case of Bolivia, according to Bolivian Foreign Minister Karen Longaric in the Financial Times, the administration of Argentina’s Peronist president, Alberto Fernández, has continued its “disagreeable meddling in Bolivia’s internal affairs” on behalf of the MAS, despite complaints to the OAS and the United Nations. This has included promising Morales, who is close to Fernández, that Argentina would work to increase voter turnout among Bolivians living in Argentina to secure a win for Arce and the MAS. If the left can capture Bolivia, then it will put an end to the regional isolation of Argentina’s leftist government and finally occupy the heart of South America again.
Overall, the international network of the Puebla Group has the support of the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico; of former Latin American and Spanish presidents including Lula, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Spain’s José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero; and of members of leftist European parties such as Spain’s Podemos.
In order to revive its democratic institutions, the committed democracies in the Americas will need to forge a renewed partnership. At the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994, all 34 governments of the Americas, from Canada to Chile—with the exception of Cuba—were representative democracies ready to commit themselves to the collective defense of democracy and the free market
Yet in the following years, the mood of the region has changed, and increasing polarization has shattered the consensus of the 1990s. Today, strong ideological differences prevail, and some regimes reject the political principles and commitments to representative democracy, open markets, and hemispheric integration on which the post-Cold War, inter-American agenda was built three decades ago.
Amid this polarized climate, the foreign-policy challenges that the region faces are daunting. In addition to political fragmentation, South America’s next presidents will have to deal with a triple crisis: public health, social upheaval, and economic troubles amid inadequate resources and a rise in poverty. Bolivia’s election just may shape how the region begins to address those—and if voters opt for strong democratic institutions and a country governed by law rather than ideology, they will be putting their country and region on the right path.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-16--Assad’s Horrible War Crimes Are Finally Coming to Light Under Oath

Assad ’ s Horrible War Crimes Are Finally Coming to Light Under Oath Bashar al-Assad , the defiant president of Syria , may never go on trial , at least not as long as his patrons in Russia don ’ t wish to replace him .
But an ongoing trial in a German court in the quiet city of Koblenz against two regime officials , Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib , is slowly but steadily quashing any hopes that Assad may have had that Europe will normalize ties with his regime anytime soon .
The trial is also giving millions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have lived under the fear that they may be forced to return to their home countries , hope that their hosts may finally understand their vulnerability .
The court has been revealing , one witness at a time—in the testimony of survivors of torture in Syrian prisons , of relatives of those who were killed , of experts , and of regime insiders—the extent of the Syrian government ’ s crimes against humanity .
For the first time , it ’ s possible for outsiders to perceive how , under Assad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of life .
On Sept. 9 , day 30 of the trial in Koblenz , at 11:10 in the morning , the court saw its most important testimony to date .
That was when a Syrian undertaker , part of a team that buried countless mutilated corpses , took the stand .
His testimony detailed how the corpses were brought not just from al-Khatib , a state security intelligence directorate lead by Raslan in Damascus also known as Branch 251 , but from multiple departments in Syrian intelligence services , including those of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For the safety of his family in Syria , the undertaker appeared with his face covered and is being described as witness Z 30/07/19 .
Local and global activists had previously reported widespread torture of the civilian population , and a military photographer , codenamed Caesar , had already leaked 50,000 photos as evidence of torture and extrajudicial killings .
Z ’ s contribution was to paint the picture of what followed .
He told the court about the state he found the bodies in , what happened to them , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accessed a copy of his entire testimony .
“ There were rivers of blood and maggots , ” exuding from the bodies , “ once , I couldn ’ t eat anything for days.
” Some corpses were totally rotten and their faces “ unrecognizable , ” as if they had been deliberately disfigured with a chemical .
It is the stench of the rotting corpses that most disturbed him and continues to date .
“ The smell stayed in my nose , even after I showered at home.
” Witness Z was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ machinery that allegedly arrested peaceful protesters and anyone who was either with the opposition or even seemed to support it , tortured them in detention centers and prisons , executed many , and organized their secret burials .
Z was a part of the last act .
Unable to bear the stench of the corpses , he was tasked with transporting the men who buried the bodies and also to note down the numbers of the dead against the intelligence branch they had been brought from , i.e.
, the state ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Z was previously part of the Syrian administration in Damascus governorate burying those who died of natural causes until the uprising began in 2011 .
A few months after Syria was engulfed in anti-regime protests , he was approached by two intelligence officers to drive a van , without a license plate but covered in Assad ’ s posters , to graveyards on the outskirts of the city .
In this van , with eight to 12 other men , he sometimes drove straight to the cemeteries of Najha and Qutiefa , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Tishreen and Harasta military hospitals .
Parked outside , Z witnessed 35-feet-long refrigerated trucks stuffed with 200 to 700 corpses , usually accompanied by at least one military officer , and followed them to the cemeteries .
He remembered the graveyards looked like camps “ with various army units.
” The entry of civilians was prohibited .
There was a checkpoint at the intersection that led to one of the burial sites , manned by an officer with “ the rank of a colonel , ” who recognized the van and waved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instructions , ” Z informed the court .
At the graveyards , Z ’ s colleagues , also hired by the regime , opened the refrigerated trucks and threw one corpse after another in a disorderly manner in 6-feet-deep and 160- to 330-feet-long trenches .
“ After about 40 to 50 loads , such a pit was full.
” Four times a week , for six years at least , thousands of corpses were buried without a semblance of dignity .
There were no relatives , no prayers , only a large hole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He corroborated the claims of Caesar , the military photographer who photographed corpses in military hospitals , when he told the court that every corpse had the number of the intelligence or military branch scribbled on the forehead and chest .
At the graveyards , Z assisted the regime officers on the spot in listing the numbers of the dead and where the bodies originated from .
He named some of the most dreaded intel branches in the country , such as “ al-Khatib , ” “ Palestine Branch , ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military intelligence—from all departments that belong to the Syrian regime.
” Sensitive to the overbearing smell of rotting bodies , Z stayed a dozen feet away from the ditches .
But those killed in the infamous Sednaya prison did not smell .
The officer who brought the Sednaya corpses from the hospitals had told Z that was because they had been killed the same day .
They were still warm , with unmissable signs of torture that Z confirmed he had seen .
Many were still handcuffed , with their toes and fingernails @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of execution on their necks , ” Z said , a statement that corroborates the findings of the international nongovernmental organization Amnesty .
An Amnesty report released in 2017 found that thousands of people had been killed in mass hangings in Sednaya between 2011 and 2015 .
The trial of these victims lasted one to three minutes in two field military courts , and the days the prison authorities carried out the killings were referred to as “ the party.
” Philip Luther , the research and advocacy director for the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several corroborations in Z ’ s testimony , including the time frame and the method of the killings .
The Amnesty report found that the highest echelons in the government authorized the killings : “ Death sentences are approved by the Grand Mufti of Syria and by either the Minister of Defence or the Chief of Staff of the Army , who are deputized to act on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad.
” Patrick Kroker , a lawyer fighting the case at Koblenz and the senior legal advisor on Syria at the European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is supporting 16 Syrians in the proceedings , said there is no proof that the Syrian regime stopped committing these crimes—in fact , Z ’ s testimony is to the contrary .
He said the trial is bound to impact broader European policy on Syria .
For instance , Kroker said that to even entertain the idea of normalizing ties with such a regime feels repulsive .
“ Someone gives evidence that mass graves were still being dug until at least 2017 , ” he said .
“ This is the kind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that you don ’ t establish relations with.
” He also highlighted the lasting legal importance of the trial and the revelations made in such testimonies and said the evidence laid out now will facilitate future trials against regime officials if they were caught traveling to Europe ” “ The individual acts of torture only constitute a crime against humanity if they are being committed within a specific context , that being a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population .
Z ’ s testimony establishes the crimes were systematic.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if the victory is symbolic and merely two mid-ranking regime officials are convicted , experts believe the evidence is beginning to influence refugee policy in Germany .
In the light of such testimonies , it is harder for the populists to demand the refugees return to Syria .
Bente Scheller , the head of the Middle East and North Africa Division at the Heinrich Böll Foundation , said every six months the interior ministers of federal states in Germany discuss the possibility of returning the refugees .
“ But from what we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happening in Syria it is absolutely impossible to deport people , ” Bente said , adding that there is a hope that the trial is softening German attitudes toward the refugees .
“ Nobody can say that they didn ’ t hear about it , that they were not aware.
” The Europeans are hearing more about the long-standing ordeal of Syrians and that they fled not just bombs and other privations of war but allegedly also rampant torture and brutal killings by the regime .
Testimonies such as Z ’ s show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by some officers but crimes organized by numerous state bodies , with men like Z at the bottom of the food chain having little choice but to follow orders .

Bashar al-Assad, the defiant president of Syria, may never go on trial, at least not as long as his patrons in Russia don’t wish to replace him. But an ongoing trial in a German court in the quiet city of Koblenz against two regime officials, Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib, is slowly but steadily quashing any hopes that Assad may have had that Europe will normalize ties with his regime anytime soon. The trial is also giving millions of Syrian refugees in Europe, who have lived under the fear that they may be forced to return to their home countries, hope that their hosts may finally understand their vulnerability.
Bashar al-Assad, the defiant president of Syria, may never go on trial, at least not as long as his patrons in Russia don’t wish to replace him. But an ongoing trial in a German court in the quiet city of Koblenz against two regime officials, Anwar Raslan and Eyad al-Gharib, is slowly but steadily quashing any hopes that Assad may have had that Europe will normalize ties with his regime anytime soon. The trial is also giving millions of Syrian refugees in Europe, who have lived under the fear that they may be forced to return to their home countries, hope that their hosts may finally understand their vulnerability.
The court has been revealing, one witness at a time—in the testimony of survivors of torture in Syrian prisons, of relatives of those who were killed, of experts, and of regime insiders—the extent of the Syrian government’s crimes against humanity. For the first time, it’s possible for outsiders to perceive how, under Assad’s leadership, atrocities became a routine way of life.
On Sept. 9, day 30 of the trial in Koblenz, at 11:10 in the morning, the court saw its most important testimony to date. That was when a Syrian undertaker, part of a team that buried countless mutilated corpses, took the stand. His testimony detailed how the corpses were brought not just from al-Khatib, a state security intelligence directorate lead by Raslan in Damascus also known as Branch 251, but from multiple departments in Syrian intelligence services, including those of the military, between 2011 and 2017. For the safety of his family in Syria, the undertaker appeared with his face covered and is being described as witness Z 30/07/19.
Local and global activists had previously reported widespread torture of the civilian population, and a military photographer, codenamed Caesar, had already leaked 50,000 photos as evidence of torture and extrajudicial killings. Z’s contribution was to paint the picture of what followed. He told the court about the state he found the bodies in, what happened to them, and under whose command. Foreign Policy has accessed a copy of his entire testimony.
“There were rivers of blood and maggots,” exuding from the bodies, “once, I couldn’t eat anything for days.” Some corpses were totally rotten and their faces “unrecognizable,” as if they had been deliberately disfigured with a chemical. It is the stench of the rotting corpses that most disturbed him and continues to date. “The smell stayed in my nose, even after I showered at home.”
Witness Z was a small cog in the larger regime machinery that allegedly arrested peaceful protesters and anyone who was either with the opposition or even seemed to support it, tortured them in detention centers and prisons, executed many, and organized their secret burials. Z was a part of the last act. Unable to bear the stench of the corpses, he was tasked with transporting the men who buried the bodies and also to note down the numbers of the dead against the intelligence branch they had been brought from, i.e., the state’s secret services departments responsible for each killing.
Z was previously part of the Syrian administration in Damascus governorate burying those who died of natural causes until the uprising began in 2011. A few months after Syria was engulfed in anti-regime protests, he was approached by two intelligence officers to drive a van, without a license plate but covered in Assad’s posters, to graveyards on the outskirts of the city. In this van, with eight to 12 other men, he sometimes drove straight to the cemeteries of Najha and Qutiefa, and on other occasions first waited at the Tishreen and Harasta military hospitals. Parked outside, Z witnessed 35-feet-long refrigerated trucks stuffed with 200 to 700 corpses, usually accompanied by at least one military officer, and followed them to the cemeteries.
He remembered the graveyards looked like camps “with various army units.” The entry of civilians was prohibited. There was a checkpoint at the intersection that led to one of the burial sites, manned by an officer with “the rank of a colonel,” who recognized the van and waved him through. “The officer had instructions,” Z informed the court.
At the graveyards, Z’s colleagues, also hired by the regime, opened the refrigerated trucks and threw one corpse after another in a disorderly manner in 6-feet-deep and 160- to 330-feet-long trenches. “After about 40 to 50 loads, such a pit was full.” Four times a week, for six years at least, thousands of corpses were buried without a semblance of dignity. There were no relatives, no prayers, only a large hole in the vast desert in the countryside.
He corroborated the claims of Caesar, the military photographer who photographed corpses in military hospitals, when he told the court that every corpse had the number of the intelligence or military branch scribbled on the forehead and chest.
At the graveyards, Z assisted the regime officers on the spot in listing the numbers of the dead and where the bodies originated from. He named some of the most dreaded intel branches in the country, such as “al-Khatib,” “Palestine Branch,” and “from air force intelligence, including military intelligence—from all departments that belong to the Syrian regime.”
Sensitive to the overbearing smell of rotting bodies, Z stayed a dozen feet away from the ditches. But those killed in the infamous Sednaya prison did not smell. The officer who brought the Sednaya corpses from the hospitals had told Z that was because they had been killed the same day. They were still warm, with unmissable signs of torture that Z confirmed he had seen. Many were still handcuffed, with their toes and fingernails pulled out. “There were signs of execution on their necks,” Z said, a statement that corroborates the findings of the international nongovernmental organization Amnesty.
An Amnesty report released in 2017 found that thousands of people had been killed in mass hangings in Sednaya between 2011 and 2015. The trial of these victims lasted one to three minutes in two field military courts, and the days the prison authorities carried out the killings were referred to as “the party.” Philip Luther, the research and advocacy director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty, counted several corroborations in Z’s testimony, including the time frame and the method of the killings. The Amnesty report found that the highest echelons in the government authorized the killings: “Death sentences are approved by the Grand Mufti of Syria and by either the Minister of Defence or the Chief of Staff of the Army, who are deputized to act on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad.”
Patrick Kroker, a lawyer fighting the case at Koblenz and the senior legal advisor on Syria at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, which is supporting 16 Syrians in the proceedings, said there is no proof that the Syrian regime stopped committing these crimes—in fact, Z’s testimony is to the contrary. He said the trial is bound to impact broader European policy on Syria. For instance, Kroker said that to even entertain the idea of normalizing ties with such a regime feels repulsive. “Someone gives evidence that mass graves were still being dug until at least 2017,” he said. “This is the kind of government, the kind of regime, that you don’t establish relations with.”
He also highlighted the lasting legal importance of the trial and the revelations made in such testimonies and said the evidence laid out now will facilitate future trials against regime officials if they were caught traveling to Europe” “The individual acts of torture only constitute a crime against humanity if they are being committed within a specific context, that being a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. Z’s testimony establishes the crimes were systematic.”
At the end of the trial, even if the victory is symbolic and merely two mid-ranking regime officials are convicted, experts believe the evidence is beginning to influence refugee policy in Germany. In the light of such testimonies, it is harder for the populists to demand the refugees return to Syria. Bente Scheller, the head of the Middle East and North Africa Division at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, said every six months the interior ministers of federal states in Germany discuss the possibility of returning the refugees. “But from what we hear in trials on all that is happening in Syria it is absolutely impossible to deport people,” Scheller said, adding that there is a hope that the trial is softening German attitudes toward the refugees. “Nobody can say that they didn’t hear about it, that they were not aware.”
The Europeans are hearing more about the long-standing ordeal of Syrians and that they fled not just bombs and other privations of war but allegedly also rampant torture and brutal killings by the regime. Testimonies such as Z’s show how the killings were not random acts by some officers but crimes organized by numerous state bodies, with men like Z at the bottom of the food chain having little choice but to follow orders.