foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--India’s Muslims Are Fighting for Their Religion. Should They Display It, Too?

India ’ s Muslims Are Fighting for Their Religion .
Should They Display It , Too ?
For several weeks now , Indians from dozens of cities have taken to the streets to protest a new citizenship law that explicitly excludes Muslims .
Initially , students from select Muslim universities protested peacefully , but as the police began to beat them and deploy tear gas and water cannons , a growing number of people—of all stripes—have joined the protesters .
The groundswell continues .
In many places , such as New Delhi ’ s Shaheen Bagh , protesters have relentlessly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dec. 15 .
With Delhi ’ s High Court refusing to evict them from their place of protest , they are resolute .
Little red dots that depict mass protests against India ’ s Citizenship Amendment Act constantly expand on this interactive map , covering all corners of the country .
On Jan. 22 , the Supreme Court of India heard more than 140 petitions requesting to repeal the act and gave the Indian government four weeks to respond—but refused to stay the law .
The nationwide protests have thrown up important questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , some of which have driven a wedge within the progressive circles opposing the designs of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) for Hindu supremacy .
What is the identity of the Muslims who started and joined these protests in large numbers ?
Should Muslim demonstrators protest as Muslims or as Indians who happen to be Muslim ?
Is their primary identity their religion or their nationality ?
Nationwide protests have thrown up important questions of identity , religion , and belonging .
Thousands of Muslims have simultaneously held up the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ akbar ” while demonstrating for a secular India .
While critics see this as an affront to the idea of an inclusive India—in that they are deploying religious symbolism to argue in favor of secularism—others argue that religious freedom is an integral part of a secular nation .
But one other way of seeing it is that when a religious community is persistently marginalized , demonized , and persecuted , asserting such religiosity is empowering in itself .
After several weeks of street protests , more than 25 lives lost , businesses stranded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one could call this the second revolution to reclaim a secular India .
( The first time was when India fought the British to ultimately gain its independence , in 1947 . )
And if this is India ’ s second war to reclaim its progressive identity , it is also the second time the country ’ s 200 million Muslims are being asked to define their identity .
At the time of India ’ s independence , there was rigorous debate on whether India should adopt Hindu nationalism , along the lines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or a more open form of Indian nationalism—one where a principle of secularism would separate the state ’ s activities from matters of faith .
India ’ s first prime minister , Jawaharlal Nehru , and other senior leaders put their weight behind a secular vision of the country and sealed it by incorporating the ideals of justice , equality , and religious freedom into the constitution .
But while Hindus were never asked to prove their allegiance toward India , Muslims constantly were .
And seven decades later , both implicitly and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if they are Muslim first or Indian first .
The ruling BJP and its parent organization , the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( RSS ) , are heavily influenced by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar , a young independence activist who openly admired Adolf Hitler .
When Narendra Modi was elected prime minister in 2014 , many RSS supporters felt that the moment they had waited for since India ’ s independence had arrived—finally , Hindus could reclaim their historic dominance over the lands India was built on .
When Muslims are persecuted for being Muslim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to exhibit their Muslimness ?
The Citizenship Amendment Act was the tool to realize just such a dream .
The act fast-tracks Indian citizenship for Hindus , Sikhs , Buddhists , Jains , Zoroastrians , and Christians from neighboring Afghanistan , Pakistan , and Bangladesh .
By excluding Muslims , the legislation creates a two-tiered structure for Indian citizenship .
When combined with the proposed National Register of Citizens , where every Indian resident is required to show documents to prove citizenship , it is a perfect recipe to disenfranchise large groups , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are more likely to not have the right paperwork , and Muslims .
Unlike any other time in the past six years of Modi ’ s rule , many Muslims took to the streets for the first time in December .
At one of the protests in Delhi last month , two Jamia Millia Islamia students , Ladeeda Farzana and Ayesha Renna , protected a male student from a police force that was increasingly violent .
Farzana later wrote about the demonstration in a Facebook post : “ Some liberals dictated us to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ‘ Allahu Akbar ’ .
… Those slogans are our spirit , our imagination and the one which refines our existence.
” She went on to write that she had abandoned secular slogans .
But arguments like Farzana ’ s have created a rift within the progressive movement to uphold the country ’ s constitution .
“ The answer to Allahu akbar is Har Har Mahadev , ” said one protester at Mumbai ’ s famous Gateway of India last month .
Har Har Mahadev has , over time , become a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We should keep religious slogans out of these protests .
We are fighting for a secular idea of India , ” she added .
The opposition politician and commentator Shashi Tharoor added to that argument when he tweeted : “ You can ’ t fight Hindutva communalism by promoting Muslim communalism .
Identity politics will destroy India.
” His concern was that it would play into the ruling party ’ s narrative that Muslims are not Indian first .
But an opposing explanation comes from Muslims such as Hilal Ahmed , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Study , who said India ’ s Muslims are asserting a new political identity and are strengthening India ’ s secular credentials.Abandoning religious symbols is a privilege accorded to the majority .
The question then is whether Indian secularism is so fragile that exhibiting religious symbols would shake its foundations .
When Muslims are persecuted for being Muslim , what is a better response than to exhibit their Muslimness ?
Hannah Arendt wrote , “ When one is attacked as a Jew , one must defend oneself as a Jew .
Not as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not as an upholder of the Rights of Man.
” On Jan. 5 , two Hindu women in Chennai joined their city ’ s protests wearing hijabs .
“ Our fight is against authoritarian rule .
They command us to not eat beef , we eat beef .
They demand that we stand up during the national anthem , we sit .
They ask us to disown our Muslim friends , we become Muslim , ” one of them told me , requesting anonymity .
The current Muslim reaction hasn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s revocation of Muslim-majority Kashmir ’ s special status and the BJP ’ s plans to build a Hindu temple at the site of a demolished mosque are just some of the recent developments to have riled up India ’ s Muslims , already feeling under siege after decades of simmering tensions .
December ’ s citizenship law was the proverbial straw that broke the camel ’ s back .
When a particular community is repeatedly pushed against the wall , closely identifying and displaying their religious symbols is only natural .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ had never donned a hijab but wore one to the protests .
Abandoning religious symbols is a privilege accorded to the majority .
As the students continued protesting on cold Delhi nights , Modi said those who burnt buses in the name of protests could be identified by their clothes .
It was thinly veiled attempt not only to paint the entire Muslim community as violent but also to intimidate it by threatening to identify them and retaliate with all the state ’ s might .
When the prime minister of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population whose welfare he is responsible for , what other way will they protest unless by asserting such identity ?
Perhaps taking a cue from Modi ’ s words , on Dec. 19 Delhi police arrested a man who had nothing to do with the protests simply because , it turned out , he looked Muslim .
A journalist captured the entire incident on camera .
On Jan. 5 , masked men and women attacked students and teachers of Delhi ’ s Jawaharlal Nehru University , injuring dozens of them .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ news channel , one of the perpetrators admitted on camera that he attacked a man with a “ flowing beard [ who ] looked like a Kashmiri.
” By wearing headscarves and skullcaps to the protests and chanting religious slogans , Muslims defy these threats to silence them .
Instead , they assert their right to be a visible part of secular India .
When the grip of Hindu supremacy is loosened , one might see a gradual decline in the assertion of Muslim identity .
But for now , India ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within a debate , and at least some participants will stand up to attacks on secularism by being Indian Muslims—and showing it .

For several weeks now, Indians from dozens of cities have taken to the streets to protest a new citizenship law that explicitly excludes Muslims. Initially, students from select Muslim universities protested peacefully, but as the police began to beat them and deploy tear gas and water cannons, a growing number of people —of all stripes—have joined the protesters. The groundswell continues.
For several weeks now, Indians from dozens of cities have taken to the streets to protest a new citizenship law that explicitly excludes Muslims. Initially, students from select Muslim universities protested peacefully, but as the police began to beat them and deploy tear gas and water cannons, a growing number of people—of all stripes—have joined the protesters. The groundswell continues.
In many places, such as New Delhi’s Shaheen Bagh, protesters have relentlessly turned up every day and night since Dec. 15. With Delhi’s High Court refusing to evict them from their place of protest, they are resolute. Little red dots that depict mass protests against India’s Citizenship Amendment Act constantly expand on this interactive map, covering all corners of the country.
On Jan. 22, the Supreme Court of India heard more than 140 petitions requesting to repeal the act and gave the Indian government four weeks to respond—but refused to stay the law.
The nationwide protests have thrown up important questions of identity, religion, and belonging, some of which have driven a wedge within the progressive circles opposing the designs of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for Hindu supremacy. What is the identity of the Muslims who started and joined these protests in large numbers? Should Muslim demonstrators protest as Muslims or as Indians who happen to be Muslim? Is their primary identity their religion or their nationality? Nationwide protests have thrown up important questions of identity, religion, and belonging.
Thousands of Muslims have simultaneously held up the Indian national flag and chanted “Allahu akbar” while demonstrating for a secular India. While critics see this as an affront to the idea of an inclusive India—in that they are deploying religious symbolism to argue in favor of secularism—others argue that religious freedom is an integral part of a secular nation. But one other way of seeing it is that when a religious community is persistently marginalized, demonized, and persecuted, asserting such religiosity is empowering in itself.
After several weeks of street protests, more than 25 lives lost, businesses stranded, and thousands of lives disrupted, one could call this the second revolution to reclaim a secular India. (The first time was when India fought the British to ultimately gain its independence, in 1947.) And if this is India’s second war to reclaim its progressive identity, it is also the second time the country’s 200 million Muslims are being asked to define their identity.
At the time of India’s independence, there was rigorous debate on whether India should adopt Hindu nationalism, along the lines of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, or a more open form of Indian nationalism—one where a principle of secularism would separate the state’s activities from matters of faith.
India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and other senior leaders put their weight behind a secular vision of the country and sealed it by incorporating the ideals of justice, equality, and religious freedom into the constitution. But while Hindus were never asked to prove their allegiance toward India, Muslims constantly were. And seven decades later, both implicitly and explicitly, they are asked to assert if they are Muslim first or Indian first.
The ruling BJP and its parent organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), are heavily influenced by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a young independence activist who openly admired Adolf Hitler. When Narendra Modi was elected prime minister in 2014, many RSS supporters felt that the moment they had waited for since India’s independence had arrived—finally, Hindus could reclaim their historic dominance over the lands India was built on. When Muslims are persecuted for being Muslim, what is a better response than to exhibit their Muslimness?
The Citizenship Amendment Act was the tool to realize just such a dream. The act fast-tracks Indian citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, and Christians from neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. By excluding Muslims, the legislation creates a two-tiered structure for Indian citizenship. When combined with the proposed National Register of Citizens, where every Indian resident is required to show documents to prove citizenship, it is a perfect recipe to disenfranchise large groups, especially Indians of lesser means, who are more likely to not have the right paperwork, and Muslims.
Unlike any other time in the past six years of Modi’s rule, many Muslims took to the streets for the first time in December. At one of the protests in Delhi last month, two Jamia Millia Islamia students, Ladeeda Farzana and Ayesha Renna, protected a male student from a police force that was increasingly violent. Farzana later wrote about the demonstration in a Facebook post: “Some liberals dictated us to refrain from chanting ‘Insha Allah’ and ‘Allahu Akbar’. … Those slogans are our spirit, our imagination and the one which refines our existence.” She went on to write that she had abandoned secular slogans.
But arguments like Farzana’s have created a rift within the progressive movement to uphold the country’s constitution. “The answer to Allahu akbar is Har Har Mahadev,” said one protester at Mumbai’s famous Gateway of India last month. Har Har Mahadev has, over time, become a Hindu war cry against Muslim invaders. “We should keep religious slogans out of these protests. We are fighting for a secular idea of India,” she added.
The opposition politician and commentator Shashi Tharoor added to that argument when he tweeted: “You can’t fight Hindutva communalism by promoting Muslim communalism. Identity politics will destroy India.” His concern was that it would play into the ruling party’s narrative that Muslims are not Indian first. But an opposing explanation comes from Muslims such as Hilal Ahmed, a fellow at the Nantes Institute for Advanced Study, who said India’s Muslims are asserting a new political identity and are strengthening India’s secular credentials.Abandoning religious symbols is a privilege accorded to the majority.
The question then is whether Indian secularism is so fragile that exhibiting religious symbols would shake its foundations. When Muslims are persecuted for being Muslim, what is a better response than to exhibit their Muslimness? Hannah Arendt wrote, “When one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a world-citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man.”
On Jan. 5, two Hindu women in Chennai joined their city’s protests wearing hijabs. “Our fight is against authoritarian rule. They command us to not eat beef, we eat beef. They demand that we stand up during the national anthem, we sit. They ask us to disown our Muslim friends, we become Muslim,” one of them told me, requesting anonymity.
The current Muslim reaction hasn’t erupted in isolation. The Modi government’s revocation of Muslim-majority Kashmir’s special status and the BJP’s plans to build a Hindu temple at the site of a demolished mosque are just some of the recent developments to have riled up India’s Muslims, already feeling under siege after decades of simmering tensions. December’s citizenship law was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.
When a particular community is repeatedly pushed against the wall, closely identifying and displaying their religious symbols is only natural. I know of several Muslim women who had never donned a hijab but wore one to the protests. Abandoning religious symbols is a privilege accorded to the majority.
As the students continued protesting on cold Delhi nights, Modi said those who burnt buses in the name of protests could be identified by their clothes. It was thinly veiled attempt not only to paint the entire Muslim community as violent but also to intimidate it by threatening to identify them and retaliate with all the state’s might. When the prime minister of the country can alienate an entire section of the population whose welfare he is responsible for, what other way will they protest unless by asserting such identity?
Perhaps taking a cue from Modi’s words, on Dec. 19 Delhi police arrested a man who had nothing to do with the protests simply because, it turned out, he looked Muslim. A journalist captured the entire incident on camera. On Jan. 5, masked men and women attacked students and teachers of Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, injuring dozens of them. According to a hidden camera report by a national news channel, one of the perpetrators admitted on camera that he attacked a man with a “flowing beard [who] looked like a Kashmiri.”
By wearing headscarves and skullcaps to the protests and chanting religious slogans, Muslims defy these threats to silence them. Instead, they assert their right to be a visible part of secular India. When the grip of Hindu supremacy is loosened, one might see a gradual decline in the assertion of Muslim identity. But for now, India’s protesters will continue to have a debate within a debate, and at least some participants will stand up to attacks on secularism by being Indian Muslims—and showing it.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Europe Is Destined to Age—but Not to Suffer the Consequences

Europe Is Destined to Age—but Not to Suffer the Consequences The popular narrative of the aging of Europe suggests a grim future of decline : Many fear sinking standards of living and a flood of people dependent on social services , or , as the Financial Times put it last week , a “ demographic time-bomb.
” Acknowledging this anxiety , European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently appointed a vice president of democracy and demography , with the goal of launching a public debate on aging and the people it could leave without proper social protections or infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s aging problem gained prominence during the European refugee crisis of 2015 .
Many argued that new migration was necessary to keep up Europe ’ s social systems .
“ The equation is clear : to meet its workforce deficit and maintain its economic dynamism , Europe needs migrants , ” then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in Brussels in 2015 .
That argument still shapes discourse around immigration : “ Unless we want to gradually turn into an aging continent , we need new blood , ” Spain ’ s then-Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Union ’ s foreign minister , said in 2018 .
The crisis also sparked a three-year investigation by the European Commission into the EU ’ s demographic future , which I contributed to as a co-author .
The findings , released last June , detail a sobering reality : More migration or higher fertility rates won ’ t change the momentum toward an aging society and a weakening labor force .
There is no prospect for meaningfully altering Europe ’ s aging .
Regardless of which policies are adopted over the next decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ altering Europe ’ s aging .
In the long term , migration has limited effects on aging populations , because newcomers inevitably get older , adding to both the populations of workers and nonworkers over time .
Even if EU countries overcome their different views and unite behind an approach to migration as open as Canada ’ s , adding over 100 million people by 2060 , the average age in Europe will continue to climb .
The real dangers of a graying society can be seen in the labor force dependency ratio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not self-supporting relative to productive workers .
For example , an unfavorable balance in France has prompted the government to plan pension reforms , recently setting off a month of public sector strikes and protests .
Commentators often rely on simplistic indicators , assuming that age structure alone determines the future health of the labor force .
Such metrics overlook three key transformations in labor participation and education that could help maintain the current near-balance between dependents and workers in Europe .
First , Europeans are enjoying longer lives with more years in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to medical advances and healthier lifestyles .
That means they can stay active in the labor force for longer , which warrants a fundamental reappraisal of when working life ends and old age begins in many societies .
Ten EU countries are taking prudent action by linking retirement age to life expectancy , limiting the average number of dependent years later in life .
Second , growing female labor participation is converting a large part of Europe ’ s population from dependents to workers .
Young women are increasingly entering the European labor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working than in previous generations .
This trend doesn ’ t necessarily come at the expense of childbearing .
Scandinavia maintains both high female labor participation ( between 75 and 82 percent ) and relatively high fertility rates ( 1.71 to 1.85 births per woman ) by offering flexible work arrangements , extended parental leave , and heavily subsidized day care .
If the EU gradually boosts labor participation rates for men and women to match those in Sweden today , the feared spike in dependents—about a 30 percent increase by 2060—would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participation owes in part to its to incentivization policies , including earned income tax credits , separate taxation with lower rates for part-time work , and stricter criteria to qualify for disability benefits and pensions.Growing female labor participation is converting a large part of Europe ’ s population from dependents to workers .
Poland and Hungary , which have illiberal migration policies , are perhaps the EU ’ s most outspoken pro-natalists—embracing state support for fertility to boost their workforces in the long term .
Poland provides new parents a sizable monthly allowance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has expanded kindergartens , has subsidized loans for family homes and cars , and is even testing out offering leave for new grandparents who are not yet retired .
The birthrates of these countries are showing signs of recovery , but for now the effects remain overshadowed by emigration to Western Europe .
Of the various scenarios laid out in the European Commission study , the youngest possible future for the EU resulted from a theoretical push for a better work-family balance that supports women so they can have a number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : around 2.3 children , or slightly above replacement level .
But closing the gap between actual and desired fertility would bring greater demographic stability only after decades—a goal for countries that can base their planning on the time scale of generations .
The third major transformation is that the future EU labor force will look different from today ’ s .
Workers are expected to be better educated , with far fewer people who ended their education at secondary school or earlier .
The number of workers who have graduated from technical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to nearly 40 million by 2060 , comprising nearly 60 percent of the labor force .
Source : Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration Adaptability in the face of artificial intelligence and automation will be perhaps the greatest asset of a better-educated labor force .
Economists do not agree on the ultimate impact of AI technology in terms of jobs lost or created , but they do forecast massive disruptions to the status quo .
To maximize the future benefits of a larger post-secondary education system , administrators should ensure curriculums anticipate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to inflate grades or undermine the value of academic degrees as they become less exclusive .
That Europeans can expect longer lives in good health is a historic achievement .
Population aging is a mark of success .
Indeed , nearly all populations of the world are now moving toward older versions of themselves , with Europe further along than most .
This new demographic frontier calls for setting realistic expectations and a viable , long-term vision .
Population aging is inevitable , but it ’ s manageable .

The popular narrative of the aging of Europe suggests a grim future of decline: Many fear sinking standards of living and a flood of people dependent on social services, or, as the Financial Times put it last week, a “ demographic time-bomb .” Acknowledging this anxiety, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently appointed a vice president of democracy and demography, with the goal of launching a public debate on aging and the people it could leave without proper social protections or infrastructure.
The popular narrative of the aging of Europe suggests a grim future of decline: Many fear sinking standards of living and a flood of people dependent on social services, or, as the Financial Times put it last week, a “demographic time-bomb.” Acknowledging this anxiety, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently appointed a vice president of democracy and demography, with the goal of launching a public debate on aging and the people it could leave without proper social protections or infrastructure.
Discussion about how to solve Europe’s aging problem gained prominence during the European refugee crisis of 2015. Many argued that new migration was necessary to keep up Europe’s social systems. “The equation is clear: to meet its workforce deficit and maintain its economic dynamism, Europe needs migrants,” then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in Brussels in 2015. That argument still shapes discourse around immigration: “Unless we want to gradually turn into an aging continent, we need new blood,” Spain’s then-Foreign Minister Josep Borrell, now the European Union’s foreign minister, said in 2018.
The crisis also sparked a three-year investigation by the European Commission into the EU’s demographic future, which I contributed to as a co-author. The findings, released last June, detail a sobering reality: More migration or higher fertility rates won’t change the momentum toward an aging society and a weakening labor force.
There is no prospect for meaningfully altering Europe’s aging.
Regardless of which policies are adopted over the next decade, there is no prospect for meaningfully altering Europe’s aging. In the long term, migration has limited effects on aging populations, because newcomers inevitably get older, adding to both the populations of workers and nonworkers over time. Even if EU countries overcome their different views and unite behind an approach to migration as open as Canada’s, adding over 100 million people by 2060, the average age in Europe will continue to climb.
The real dangers of a graying society can be seen in the labor force dependency ratio, the proportion of people who are not self-supporting relative to productive workers. For example, an unfavorable balance in France has prompted the government to plan pension reforms, recently setting off a month of public sector strikes and protests.
Commentators often rely on simplistic indicators, assuming that age structure alone determines the future health of the labor force. Such metrics overlook three key transformations in labor participation and education that could help maintain the current near-balance between dependents and workers in Europe.
First, Europeans are enjoying longer lives with more years in good health than ever before, thanks to medical advances and healthier lifestyles. That means they can stay active in the labor force for longer, which warrants a fundamental reappraisal of when working life ends and old age begins in many societies. Ten EU countries are taking prudent action by linking retirement age to life expectancy, limiting the average number of dependent years later in life.
Labor Force Participation 15- to 64-year-olds in 2018 (Key Countries Highlighted)
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Second, growing female labor participation is converting a large part of Europe’s population from dependents to workers. Young women are increasingly entering the European labor force, meaning that more people are working than in previous generations. This trend doesn’t necessarily come at the expense of childbearing. Scandinavia maintains both high female labor participation (between 75 and 82 percent) and relatively high fertility rates (1.71 to 1.85 births per woman) by offering flexible work arrangements, extended parental leave, and heavily subsidized day care.
If the EU gradually boosts labor participation rates for men and women to match those in Sweden today, the feared spike in dependents—about a 30 percent increase by 2060—would be nullified. Sweden’s high labor participation owes in part to its to incentivization policies, including earned income tax credits, separate taxation with lower rates for part-time work, and stricter criteria to qualify for disability benefits and pensions.Growing female labor participation is converting a large part of Europe’s population from dependents to workers.
Poland and Hungary, which have illiberal migration policies, are perhaps the EU’s most outspoken pro-natalists—embracing state support for fertility to boost their workforces in the long term. Poland provides new parents a sizable monthly allowance for each child. Hungary, meanwhile, has expanded kindergartens, has subsidized loans for family homes and cars, and is even testing out offering leave for new grandparents who are not yet retired. The birthrates of these countries are showing signs of recovery, but for now the effects remain overshadowed by emigration to Western Europe.
Of the various scenarios laid out in the European Commission study, the youngest possible future for the EU resulted from a theoretical push for a better work-family balance that supports women so they can have a number of children closer to what they reportedly desire: around 2.3 children, or slightly above replacement level. But closing the gap between actual and desired fertility would bring greater demographic stability only after decades—a goal for countries that can base their planning on the time scale of generations.
The third major transformation is that the future EU labor force will look different from today’s. Workers are expected to be better educated, with far fewer people who ended their education at secondary school or earlier. The number of workers who have graduated from technical training or university is projected to expand to nearly 40 million by 2060, comprising nearly 60 percent of the labor force.
EU Labor Force by Education Level 2015-2060
Source: Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration
Adaptability in the face of artificial intelligence and automation will be perhaps the greatest asset of a better-educated labor force. Economists do not agree on the ultimate impact of AI technology in terms of jobs lost or created, but they do forecast massive disruptions to the status quo. To maximize the future benefits of a larger post-secondary education system, administrators should ensure curriculums anticipate in-demand skills and proactively guard against pressures to inflate grades or undermine the value of academic degrees as they become less exclusive.
That Europeans can expect longer lives in good health is a historic achievement. Population aging is a mark of success. Indeed, nearly all populations of the world are now moving toward older versions of themselves, with Europe further along than most. This new demographic frontier calls for setting realistic expectations and a viable, long-term vision. Population aging is inevitable, but it’s manageable.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--The Greenback Needs a Digital Makeover

The Greenback Needs a Digital Makeover

Last July , U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin took to the podium in the White House briefing room to explain his view on the risks of so-called digital , or “ crypto , ” currencies .
“ Cryptocurrencies , such as bitcoin , have been exploited to support billions of dollars of illicit activity , ” the secretary said .
“ Many players have attempted to use cryptocurrencies to fund their malign behavior .
This is indeed a national security issue.
” Since then , the federal government has failed to adopt any overarching policy toward digital currency , leading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is driving innovation away from the United States .
Mnuchin was quite correct : The emerging revolution of digital currency is a national security issue .
But the problem is that his approach to digital currency may drive innovation into the hands of the United States ’ leading national security competitor : China .
Chinese President Xi Jinping has made digital currency a key innovation goal for his country .
For example , in October 2019 , three months after Mnuchin ’ s White House statement , Xi told his Politburo that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important breakthrough for independent innovation … clarify the main directions , increase investment … and accelerate the development of blockchain.
” Almost immediately after this statement , the National People ’ s Congress dutifully enacted a new cryptocurrency law to establish the framework for a regulatory regime for a Chinese national digital currency .
This Chinese digital currency , a so-called “ digital yuan , ” is now ready for trial , according to the People ’ s Bank of China .
While Washington focuses on whether to allow digital currency in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China is moving ahead in earnest .
The prospect of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) dominating this emerging financial technology should be alarming .
Since the end of World War II , the United States has enjoyed significant advantages related to the U.S. dollar ’ s role as the world ’ s reserve currency .
So great are those benefits that a former French president characterized them as an “ exorbitant privilege.
” For example , when it comes time for Washington to finance its profligate fiscal irresponsibility , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world relies on the dollar .
Meanwhile , the U.S. military would likely be the first to suffer from a more austere fiscal balance sheet if the cost of borrowing rose significantly .
Or , consider U.S. economic sanctions .
The foundation of U.S. sanctions is the unique status enjoyed by the dollar as a global reserve currency .
“ Even a company that has basically no trade in the United States , their banks do , ” Jarrett Blanc , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so they basically can ’ t be banked if they are trading with a country that has been targeted with these very powerful U.S. sanctions.
” In turn , the U.S. president has options between tolerating illicit behavior—whether a North Korean ballistic missile test or Iranian terrorism—and sending in the military .
Indeed , innumerable U.S. policies are served by economic sanctions , from stopping sex trafficking to punishing human rights abuses ( for example , those against Uighur Muslims in China ) .
The frequency with which the targets of U.S. economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing may shed some light on why Xi is so interested in finding ways to avoid the dollar .
So too does the deeper control it would give him over those in China .
As the Wall Street Journal noted in November that “ [ f ] oreign tourists in China looking to buy a bottle of water or a taxi ride with cash or credit card are finding themselves out of luck.
” The reliance on digital payments gives the CCP unprecedented insight and control into every transaction in China .
Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this power to punish its adversaries , whether a Hong Kong activist or a Uighur Muslim .
Already the master of the largest surveillance state in the world , the CCP is exporting its system and tools across its Belt and Road global mercantilist system , from Kazakhstan to Djibouti to Europe itself .
With a digital currency , in other words , China may all but eliminate blocks posed by foreign exchange controls while setting up a parallel network that needn ’ t rely on the dollar .
The dollar ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overnight .
Beijing has been described as having “ infinite patience , ” and with the latest moves in cryptocurrency , it is framing an alternative today for exploitation tomorrow .
And it is clear that this alternative currency system won ’ t be designed to promote Western values of privacy and rule of law .
Digital currency innovators don ’ t have to work in the United States if it continues to reject them ; they can and will search for the best place to do business .
Increasingly , central banks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iran , Japan , or the European Union—are looking at digital currency and how they will position themselves for the post-dollar world .
The Trump administration ’ s National Security Strategy noted that “ economic security is national security.
” The United States must lead in digital currency : It ’ s time for the greenback ’ s digital makeover .

Last July, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin took to the podium in the White House briefing room to explain his view on the risks of so-called digital, or “crypto,” currencies. “Cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, have been exploited to support billions of dollars of illicit activity,” the secretary said . “Many players have attempted to use cryptocurrencies to fund their malign behavior. This is indeed a national security issue.” Since then, the federal government has failed to adopt any overarching policy toward digital currency, leading to regulatory uncertainty and a stated hostility that is driving innovation away from the United States.
Last July, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin took to the podium in the White House briefing room to explain his view on the risks of so-called digital, or “crypto,” currencies. “Cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, have been exploited to support billions of dollars of illicit activity,” the secretary said. “Many players have attempted to use cryptocurrencies to fund their malign behavior. This is indeed a national security issue.” Since then, the federal government has failed to adopt any overarching policy toward digital currency, leading to regulatory uncertainty and a stated hostility that is driving innovation away from the United States.
Mnuchin was quite correct: The emerging revolution of digital currency is a national security issue. But the problem is that his approach to digital currency may drive innovation into the hands of the United States’ leading national security competitor: China.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has made digital currency a key innovation goal for his country. For example, in October 2019, three months after Mnuchin’s White House statement, Xi told his Politburo that they “must take blockchain as an important breakthrough for independent innovation … clarify the main directions, increase investment … and accelerate the development of blockchain.”
Almost immediately after this statement, the National People’s Congress dutifully enacted a new cryptocurrency law to establish the framework for a regulatory regime for a Chinese national digital currency. This Chinese digital currency, a so-called “digital yuan,” is now ready for trial, according to the People’s Bank of China.
While Washington focuses on whether to allow digital currency in the U.S. financial system, in other words, China is moving ahead in earnest. The prospect of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominating this emerging financial technology should be alarming.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has enjoyed significant advantages related to the U.S. dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. So great are those benefits that a former French president characterized them as an “exorbitant privilege.” For example, when it comes time for Washington to finance its profligate fiscal irresponsibility, it can do so more cheaply because all of the world relies on the dollar. Meanwhile, the U.S. military would likely be the first to suffer from a more austere fiscal balance sheet if the cost of borrowing rose significantly.
Or, consider U.S. economic sanctions. The foundation of U.S. sanctions is the unique status enjoyed by the dollar as a global reserve currency. “Even a company that has basically no trade in the United States, their banks do,” Jarrett Blanc, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the Atlantic. “And so they basically can’t be banked if they are trading with a country that has been targeted with these very powerful U.S. sanctions.”
In turn, the U.S. president has options between tolerating illicit behavior—whether a North Korean ballistic missile test or Iranian terrorism—and sending in the military. Indeed, innumerable U.S. policies are served by economic sanctions, from stopping sex trafficking to punishing human rights abuses (for example, those against Uighur Muslims in China).
The frequency with which the targets of U.S. economic sanctions are entities under the control of Beijing may shed some light on why Xi is so interested in finding ways to avoid the dollar. So too does the deeper control it would give him over those in China. As the Wall Street Journal noted in November that “[f]oreign tourists in China looking to buy a bottle of water or a taxi ride with cash or credit card are finding themselves out of luck.” The reliance on digital payments gives the CCP unprecedented insight and control into every transaction in China. Xi’s government is free to weaponize this power to punish its adversaries, whether a Hong Kong activist or a Uighur Muslim.
Already the master of the largest surveillance state in the world, the CCP is exporting its system and tools across its Belt and Road global mercantilist system, from Kazakhstan to Djibouti to Europe itself. With a digital currency, in other words, China may all but eliminate blocks posed by foreign exchange controls while setting up a parallel network that needn’t rely on the dollar.
The dollar’s unique status—the exorbitant privilege—won’t disappear overnight. Beijing has been described as having “infinite patience,” and with the latest moves in cryptocurrency, it is framing an alternative today for exploitation tomorrow. And it is clear that this alternative currency system won’t be designed to promote Western values of privacy and rule of law.
Digital currency innovators don’t have to work in the United States if it continues to reject them; they can and will search for the best place to do business. Increasingly, central banks around the world—whether in China, Russia, Iran, Japan, or the European Union—are looking at digital currency and how they will position themselves for the post-dollar world.
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy noted that “economic security is national security.” The United States must lead in digital currency: It’s time for the greenback’s digital makeover.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Italy’s Sardines Want to Stop Matteo Salvini. They Might End Up Strengthening Him.

Italy ’ s Sardines Want to Stop Matteo Salvini .
They Might End Up Strengthening Him .
“ If the League wins these elections , it won ’ t change much from our perspective , because somehow we have already won our cultural battle , ” said Mattia Santori , the 32-year-old spokesperson of the anti-populist grassroots movement known as the Sardines , as people gathered for a big rally in Bologna , Italy , on Jan. 19 .
Later that day , an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people were packed like , well , sardines in a square that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arc under the common purpose of defeating Matteo Salvini ’ s right-wing League party in the Jan. 26 elections in the Emilia-Romagna region , a long-standing leftist stronghold .
The socialist tradition is so deeply rooted in the area that Soviet-style statues and paraphernalia can be still spotted here and there .
In the village of Cavriago , near the city of Reggio Emilia , a bust of Vladimir Lenin still stands in one of the main squares .
It ’ s a gift from the Soviet Union honoring the local comrades who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Given this political background , even the reelection of the incumbent governor by a modest margin would be a severe setback for the left .
The socialist tradition is so deeply rooted in the area that Soviet-style statues and paraphernalia can still be spotted .
In the village of Cavriago , a bust of Vladimir Lenin still stands in one of the main squares .
In virtually every town in the region , at least one street is named after Antonio Gramsci , one of the founding members of the Communist Party of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is best known for his theory of “ cultural hegemony , ” according to which the struggle for power depends on an intellectual class imposing a worldview that in time becomes the cultural norm .
The current fight between far-right populists and the Sardines is taking place on a distinctly Gramscian battlefield .
One side has pledged to force a radical change in the region ’ s mindset— “ Let ’ s free Emilia-Romagna , ” is the slogan of the League ’ s campaign—while the Sardines defend the existing system by portraying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense of common sense .
The upcoming local vote in the well-to-do region is also a crucial test for the national government , whose majority in Parliament depends on a flimsy coalition between the Democratic Party ( PD ) and the Five Star Movement , which has recently been weakened by the resignation of its political leader , Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio , as a result of internal strife .
The “ cultural battle ” Santori referred to is the struggle for civility , common sense , and sober eloquence that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ otherwise tainted by hateful rhetoric and authoritarian instincts .
Two months ago , “ the political and social climate in Italy was very different from what it is now , ” said the curly-haired economist , the most recognizable of the four founders of the Sardines movement .
The group adopted the slogan “ no insults , no violence , no flags , ” they speak of “ sustainable democracy , ” and as the official website notes , the Sardines ’ language “ is based on scientific data , packaged with art @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and listening.
” As Italians wonder what ’ s next for the semi-spontaneous campaign that has rocked Italian politics since early December 2019 , the Sardines insist their chief goal is not even political ; it ’ s a moral struggle .
Their aim is to restore politeness and truthfulness to counter nasty populist leaders whom they frame not merely as political adversaries , but as morally abject hatemongers and promoters of fake news .
In short , the Sardines say they stand for good against evil .
In mid-December , when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gathering about 100,000 people in Rome , they announced a six-point platform .
Only one proposal was strictly political : the abolition of the security decree pushed by Salvini during the previous government , which gave the government new powers to restrict immigration by prohibiting ships from docking in Italian ports .
Other proposals included what would amount to a near ban on politicians using social media networks , demanding that “ media protects , defend , and come as close as possible to the truth , ” treating verbal violence as equivalent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to clean up the country ’ s polluted political discourse .
In March , the Sardines leaders will convene to figure out how to capitalize on the energy they ’ ve sparked in the last months .
Meanwhile , they will seek to remind Italian readers of the essentially moral dimension of their effort in a book , co-authored by the four founders , recapping the journey from a Facebook post half-jokingly calling for an “ ichthyic , ” or fishlike , revolution to a national phenomenon that quickly spread in dozens of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Although some of the leaders have admitted to being personally on the left , the Sardines formally refused from the very beginning any affiliation with political parties .
Supporters were instructed to just wave sardine-shaped cardboard signs during rallies , avoiding flags and political symbols .
The only political figure at the core of Sardines ’ narrative is Salvini himself .
Serving as both a foil and a villain , he is the center of gravity around which the movement rotates and an indispensable and ubiquitous presence in their grassroots campaign against populism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so central to their narrative that they began rallying against him at a time when he was out of government , held no power , and was slowly declining in popularity .
Last summer Salvini , then deputy prime minister and the government ’ s power broker , clumsily prompted a government crisis , giving his adversaries the opportunity to form a new coalition with the sole purpose of excluding him from power .
A series of local elections are providing Salvini the chance for a comeback—including this weekend ’ s vote in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a strategy that may backfire , as the media-obsessed leader thrives when he ’ s at the center of the storm .
But as much as the Sardines seek to distance themselves from Italy ’ s populist politicians , the movement ’ s simultaneous distrust of traditional political parties and its obsession with having an enemy to stand against makes it more of a populist movement than it ’ s willing to admit .
“ Sardines employ tools similar to the ones typically used by the forces they claim to fight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the need for a scapegoat , ” said Giovanni Orsina , a professor of history and director of the school of government at LUISS University in Rome , who is also the co-author of a forthcoming book on the Sardines .
While far-right populists have picked the “ external other ” —primarily immigrants , Muslims , and minorities—as their preferred scapegoats , the Sardines have applied a similar principle to the “ internal other , the populist himself , presented as the root of all evil , ” Orsina told Foreign Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ end up strengthening rather than marginalizing Salvini .
In an op-ed in the newspaper La Stampa , Orsina argued that the Sardines ’ lack of new political vision and their inability to get out of the traditional “ symbolic and cultural space of the left ” might eventually help the League win Sunday ’ s crucial election in Emilia-Romagna .
But if their generic demand for civility is not the movement ’ s true objective , what do the Sardines want ?
According to Orsina , their unstated purpose is the “ moral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of values that were affirmed during the 1990s , ” meaning the individualistic , globalized , market-oriented ethos that today ’ s populists are working to dismantle .
In other words , the activists now storming the Italian political landscape are promoting the revival of the very ideas that the current brand of populism was born to defeat .
If the populist era that the contemporary world is facing is merely a blip in history , the Sardines ’ goal of reestablishing the prior consensus is an achievable one .
But if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeper , structural crisis of the liberal order , then repackaging old politics that failed to deliver by waving pictures of cute and collaborative sea creatures won ’ t do the trick .
“ The Sardines claim to be a fresh movement that crosses the political aisle , but they lined up with the Democratic Party , ” said former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi , whose center-right party , Forza Italia , supports Lucia Borgonzoni , the League ’ s candidate for governor in Emilia-Romagna .
“ They represent the usual old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are maneuvered by other political players , and therefore their legitimate appeal for more respectful debate in politics is not really credible , ” Berlusconi told Foreign Policy .
“ They represent the usual old politics , it looks as if they are maneuvered by other political players , and therefore their legitimate appeal for more respectful debate in politics is not really credible , ” Silvio Berlusconi told Foreign Policy .
The Sardines ’ relationship with the political establishment has been a contested issue since the rise of the movement .
Critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy-focused magazine called Energia headed by Romano Prodi , a former center-left prime minister and European Union commissioner in the early 2000s .
Prodi denied being involved in the Sardines movement , though he says he nonetheless supports it .
“ I really wish I had been able to generate something like that , ” he told the Corriere della Sera newspaper .
Recently , Santori said that during the campaign in Emilia-Romagna the incumbent PD governor , Stefano Bonaccini , never tried to get in touch with them , while members of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alongside the PD , reached out to establish a connection .
The Sardines ’ leaders made a point of not being involved with political parties and managed to frame their campaign in Emilia-Romagna as primarily against the League and only indirectly in support of the PD incumbent .
This raises the question of whether the Sardines will launch a new party .
The movement ’ s leaders have repeatedly dismissed the idea , but one pollster recently estimated the Sardines could get around 11 percent of the vote nationally , draining support mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Star Movement , which is now a mere shadow of the energetic force that only a few years ago was able to stir up the angry masses against the rotten establishment .
Some supporters suggest the Sardines should find a home within the traditional political spectrum .
“ It ’ s desirable , if not necessary , that they will turn their energy into a political form , ” said the philosopher Massimo Cacciari , a former PD mayor of Venice .
“ They could create a new force or , even better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to revive it , taking advantage of the next party convention , ” Cacciari said , referring to the upcoming internal battle to replace the party ’ s leadership .
But if they turn to electoral politics , the Sardines will face a challenge : They have struggled to represent Italy ’ s most economically vulnerable voters—precisely the ones turning to populist parties .
Protesters in the streets mainly gave voice to what the sociologist Luca Ricolfi has provocatively labeled as “ stately mass society ” in his latest book .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ricolfi observed that Sardines ’ rallies predominantly feature members of the upper middle class , while low-income Italians , the uneducated , retirees , unskilled workers , and working-class people were barely represented .
“ These groups , ” Ricolfi added , “ are more exposed to the harshness of the markets and social life , and therefore express demands for protection to which now the League and Brothers of Italy [ a far-right party ] are more sensitive than leftist parties.
” In the short run , the Sardines are focused on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two main candidates in a virtual dead heat .
A victory for the center-right coalition would be shocking for a region that for over 70 years was consistently run by the Communist Party and then by the Democratic Party .
The League is hoping instead that a victory would shake Italy ’ s already feeble government , led by Giuseppe Conte .
In the last several weeks , Salvini obsessively covered every inch of the region—taking an uncountable number of selfies while sampling local delicacies , another instance of what has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to project the local election on a national scale .
“ On January 27th … with victory in my pocket , I will issue Conte with an eviction order , ” Salvini told his supporters in the town of Maranello .
A pack of Sardines may not be enough to stop him , and in the long term , they might inadvertently end up fattening the sharks they seek to escape from .

“If the League wins these elections, it won’t change much from our perspective, because somehow we have already won our cultural battle,” said Mattia Santori, the 32-year-old spokesperson of the anti-populist grassroots movement known as the Sardines, as people gathered for a big rally in Bologna, Italy, on Jan. 19.
“If the League wins these elections, it won’t change much from our perspective, because somehow we have already won our cultural battle,” said Mattia Santori, the 32-year-old spokesperson of the anti-populist grassroots movement known as the Sardines, as people gathered for a big rally in Bologna, Italy, on Jan. 19.
Later that day, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people were packed like, well, sardines in a square that brought together many sensibilities within the progressive arc under the common purpose of defeating Matteo Salvini’s right-wing League party in the Jan. 26 elections in the Emilia-Romagna region, a long-standing leftist stronghold.
The socialist tradition is so deeply rooted in the area that Soviet-style statues and paraphernalia can be still spotted here and there. In the village of Cavriago, near the city of Reggio Emilia, a bust of Vladimir Lenin still stands in one of the main squares. It’s a gift from the Soviet Union honoring the local comrades who wholeheartedly supported the Bolsheviks in 1918. Given this political background, even the reelection of the incumbent governor by a modest margin would be a severe setback for the left.
The socialist tradition is so deeply rooted in the area that Soviet-style statues and paraphernalia can still be spotted. In the village of Cavriago, a bust of Vladimir Lenin still stands in one of the main squares.
In virtually every town in the region, at least one street is named after Antonio Gramsci, one of the founding members of the Communist Party of Italy and a prominent Marxist philosopher who is best known for his theory of “cultural hegemony,” according to which the struggle for power depends on an intellectual class imposing a worldview that in time becomes the cultural norm.
The current fight between far-right populists and the Sardines is taking place on a distinctly Gramscian battlefield. One side has pledged to force a radical change in the region’s mindset—“Let’s free Emilia-Romagna,” is the slogan of the League’s campaign—while the Sardines defend the existing system by portraying their own acts of resistance as a defense of common sense.
The upcoming local vote in the well-to-do region is also a crucial test for the national government, whose majority in Parliament depends on a flimsy coalition between the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement, which has recently been weakened by the resignation of its political leader, Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, as a result of internal strife.
The “cultural battle” Santori referred to is the struggle for civility, common sense, and sober eloquence that the movement has been injecting in a debate otherwise tainted by hateful rhetoric and authoritarian instincts. Two months ago, “the political and social climate in Italy was very different from what it is now,” said the curly-haired economist, the most recognizable of the four founders of the Sardines movement. The group adopted the slogan “no insults, no violence, no flags,” they speak of “sustainable democracy,” and as the official website notes, the Sardines’ language “is based on scientific data, packaged with art, beauty, nonviolence, creativity, and listening.”
As Italians wonder what’s next for the semi-spontaneous campaign that has rocked Italian politics since early December 2019, the Sardines insist their chief goal is not even political; it’s a moral struggle. Their aim is to restore politeness and truthfulness to counter nasty populist leaders whom they frame not merely as political adversaries, but as morally abject hatemongers and promoters of fake news. In short, the Sardines say they stand for good against evil.
In mid-December, when the Sardines packed their largest square yet, gathering about 100,000 people in Rome, they announced a six-point platform. Only one proposal was strictly political: the abolition of the security decree pushed by Salvini during the previous government, which gave the government new powers to restrict immigration by prohibiting ships from docking in Italian ports. Other proposals included what would amount to a near ban on politicians using social media networks, demanding that “media protects, defend, and come as close as possible to the truth,” treating verbal violence as equivalent to physical violence, and additional measures to clean up the country’s polluted political discourse.
In March, the Sardines leaders will convene to figure out how to capitalize on the energy they’ve sparked in the last months. Meanwhile, they will seek to remind Italian readers of the essentially moral dimension of their effort in a book, co-authored by the four founders, recapping the journey from a Facebook post half-jokingly calling for an “ichthyic,” or fishlike, revolution to a national phenomenon that quickly spread in dozens of cities, sparking a media frenzy.
Although some of the leaders have admitted to being personally on the left, the Sardines formally refused from the very beginning any affiliation with political parties. Supporters were instructed to just wave sardine-shaped cardboard signs during rallies, avoiding flags and political symbols.
The only political figure at the core of Sardines’ narrative is Salvini himself. Serving as both a foil and a villain, he is the center of gravity around which the movement rotates and an indispensable and ubiquitous presence in their grassroots campaign against populism. The leader of the League is so central to their narrative that they began rallying against him at a time when he was out of government, held no power, and was slowly declining in popularity.
Last summer Salvini, then deputy prime minister and the government’s power broker, clumsily prompted a government crisis, giving his adversaries the opportunity to form a new coalition with the sole purpose of excluding him from power. A series of local elections are providing Salvini the chance for a comeback—including this weekend’s vote in Emilia-Romagna. Turning the spotlight on Salvini is a strategy that may backfire, as the media-obsessed leader thrives when he’s at the center of the storm.
But as much as the Sardines seek to distance themselves from Italy’s populist politicians, the movement’s simultaneous distrust of traditional political parties and its obsession with having an enemy to stand against makes it more of a populist movement than it’s willing to admit. “Sardines employ tools similar to the ones typically used by the forces they claim to fight, like the preference for Manichean logic and the need for a scapegoat,” said Giovanni Orsina, a professor of history and director of the school of government at LUISS University in Rome, who is also the co-author of a forthcoming book on the Sardines.
While far-right populists have picked the “external other”—primarily immigrants, Muslims, and minorities—as their preferred scapegoats, the Sardines have applied a similar principle to the “internal other, the populist himself, presented as the root of all evil,” Orsina told Foreign Policy.
It’s a strategy that could end up strengthening rather than marginalizing Salvini. In an op-ed in the newspaper La Stampa, Orsina argued that the Sardines’ lack of new political vision and their inability to get out of the traditional “symbolic and cultural space of the left” might eventually help the League win Sunday’s crucial election in Emilia-Romagna.
But if their generic demand for civility is not the movement’s true objective, what do the Sardines want? According to Orsina, their unstated purpose is the “moral and cultural restoration of the progressive set of values that were affirmed during the 1990s,” meaning the individualistic, globalized, market-oriented ethos that today’s populists are working to dismantle. In other words, the activists now storming the Italian political landscape are promoting the revival of the very ideas that the current brand of populism was born to defeat.
If the populist era that the contemporary world is facing is merely a blip in history, the Sardines’ goal of reestablishing the prior consensus is an achievable one. But if the populist age is the symptom of a deeper, structural crisis of the liberal order, then repackaging old politics that failed to deliver by waving pictures of cute and collaborative sea creatures won’t do the trick.
“The Sardines claim to be a fresh movement that crosses the political aisle, but they lined up with the Democratic Party,” said former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose center-right party, Forza Italia, supports Lucia Borgonzoni, the League’s candidate for governor in Emilia-Romagna. “They represent the usual old politics, it looks as if they are maneuvered by other political players, and therefore their legitimate appeal for more respectful debate in politics is not really credible,” Berlusconi told Foreign Policy.
“They represent the usual old politics, it looks as if they are maneuvered by other political players, and therefore their legitimate appeal for more respectful debate in politics is not really credible,” Silvio Berlusconi told Foreign Policy.
The Sardines’ relationship with the political establishment has been a contested issue since the rise of the movement. Critics pointed out that Santori works for an energy-focused magazine called Energia headed by Romano Prodi, a former center-left prime minister and European Union commissioner in the early 2000s. Prodi denied being involved in the Sardines movement, though he says he nonetheless supports it. “I really wish I had been able to generate something like that,” he told the Corriere della Sera newspaper.
Recently, Santori said that during the campaign in Emilia-Romagna the incumbent PD governor, Stefano Bonaccini, never tried to get in touch with them, while members of the Five Star Movement, currently governing alongside the PD, reached out to establish a connection. The Sardines’ leaders made a point of not being involved with political parties and managed to frame their campaign in Emilia-Romagna as primarily against the League and only indirectly in support of the PD incumbent.
This raises the question of whether the Sardines will launch a new party. The movement’s leaders have repeatedly dismissed the idea, but one pollster recently estimated the Sardines could get around 11 percent of the vote nationally, draining support mostly from the vulnerable PD and the Five Star Movement, which is now a mere shadow of the energetic force that only a few years ago was able to stir up the angry masses against the rotten establishment.
Some supporters suggest the Sardines should find a home within the traditional political spectrum. “It’s desirable, if not necessary, that they will turn their energy into a political form,” said the philosopher Massimo Cacciari, a former PD mayor of Venice. “They could create a new force or, even better, coalesce into the Democratic Party in order to revive it, taking advantage of the next party convention,” Cacciari said, referring to the upcoming internal battle to replace the party’s leadership.
But if they turn to electoral politics, the Sardines will face a challenge: They have struggled to represent Italy’s most economically vulnerable voters—precisely the ones turning to populist parties. Protesters in the streets mainly gave voice to what the sociologist Luca Ricolfi has provocatively labeled as “stately mass society” in his latest book. A professor at the University of Turin, Ricolfi observed that Sardines’ rallies predominantly feature members of the upper middle class, while low-income Italians, the uneducated, retirees, unskilled workers, and working-class people were barely represented.
“These groups,” Ricolfi added, “are more exposed to the harshness of the markets and social life, and therefore express demands for protection to which now the League and Brothers of Italy [a far-right party] are more sensitive than leftist parties.”
In the short run, the Sardines are focused on the Emilia-Romagna election, where pollsters put the two main candidates in a virtual dead heat. A victory for the center-right coalition would be shocking for a region that for over 70 years was consistently run by the Communist Party and then by the Democratic Party.
The League is hoping instead that a victory would shake Italy’s already feeble government, led by Giuseppe Conte. In the last several weeks, Salvini obsessively covered every inch of the region—taking an uncountable number of selfies while sampling local delicacies, another instance of what has been aptly termed “gastropopulism”—in order to project the local election on a national scale. “On January 27th … with victory in my pocket, I will issue Conte with an eviction order,” Salvini told his supporters in the town of Maranello.
A pack of Sardines may not be enough to stop him, and in the long term, they might inadvertently end up fattening the sharks they seek to escape from.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-24--Iran Has a Bitcoin Strategy to Beat Trump

In narrow terms , the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran in the last two years have been effective , shrinking the Iranian economy by 10 to 20 percent .
But they have also accelerated Iran ’ s use of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin , which are increasingly used by the Iranian government and public to evade legal barriers .
This has led to an attempted crackdown on bitcoin by international regulators—but the cryptocurrency industry is proving more nimble than the enforcers of sanctions .
The Iranian government has long had an interest in using cryptocurrencies to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ banking system .
In July 2018 , President Hassan Rouhani ’ s administration declared its intention of launching a national cryptocurrency ; one month later , a news agency affiliated with the Central Bank of Iran outlined multiple features of the national cryptocurrency , stating that it would be backed by the rial—Iran ’ s national currency .
Multiple blockchain projects—developing the underlying technology for cryptocurrencies—were revealed by the central bank at a digital payments conference last year , one of which is reportedly already being tested by four Iranian banks ( three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cryptocurrency transactions are already popular with the Iranian public , according to various reports .
In some interviews , people have described bitcoin as the only way to get money out of Iran .
Cryptocurrency mining activity , which is a heavy computational process that generates , or “ mines , ” new cryptocurrency , is also significant in Iran .
Lured by the cheap cost of electricity in the country , and the devaluation of the Iranian rial , several bitcoin miners set up operations in Iran in 2018 .
In 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using bitcoin showed that 25 percent of respondents made $ 500 to $ 3,000 per month working with cryptocurrency .
The Iranian government also appears to have recognized the value in mining as an economic sector .
In August 2019 , after a month of harsh crackdowns on mining activity for abusing cheap electricity , the cabinet issued a regulation that recognized mining as a legal sector in the economy .
Interestingly , Iran also appears to have attracted interest from other countries willing to collaborate via blockchain platforms .
In 2017 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invest in firms on the Iranian stock market by using bitcoin .
In November 2018 , Iranian and Russian blockchain industry personnel signed an agreement for cooperation in developing Iran ’ s blockchain industry , with a stated aim to address challenges arising from sanctions .
In 2019 , Iran ’ s Trade Promotion Organization conducted negotiations on the use of cryptocurrencies in financial transactions with representatives of eight countries , including Switzerland , South Africa , France , England , Russia , Austria , Germany , and Bosnia-Herzegovina .
In 2016 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United Nations and European Union lifted sanctions on Iran .
The EU recently launched Instex , a transactions channel between Europe and Iran .
Multiple obstacles still exist , however , before Iran can fully harness the power of cryptocurrencies .
The room for anonymity is steadily shrinking for cryptocurrency transactions as formal identification of customers through “ know your customer ” ( KYC ) compliance rises globally .
In 2018 , the U.S. Treasury Department ’ s Office of Foreign Assets Control added two Iranian individuals and their bitcoin addresses to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to forensic analysis by the Treasury Department , more than 7,000 bitcoin transactions valuing millions of dollars had been processed by these addresses .
Apart from other criminal activity such as the Silk Road case and numerous scams , cryptocurrency usage by regimes such as Venezuela and Iran has been one of the driving factors for heavy regulation of the sector .
Apart from country-specific regulations that mandate financial compliance , the Financial Action Task Force ’ s standards were set in 2019 and are now enforced across 37 member countries .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of virtual asset service providers , as well as a “ travel rule ” that requires both originators and beneficiaries of cryptocurrency transactions to identify and report suspicious information .
These regulations effectively exclude Iran from major cryptocurrency exchanges .
This has tilted the Iranian cryptomarket toward local exchanges , where price premiums on the currency are higher .
Iran is thus losing out on its competitiveness in mining compared with other jurisdictions .
While electricity costs are lower , other costs related to mining , such as hardware and operations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is still regulatory uncertainty over the future of cryptocurrency within Iran .
Despite these challenges , there are new developments in the world of cryptocurrency that may open up new possibilities for the Iranian government and people to evade sanctions .
One significant development is the rise of central bank digital currencies , which are the governmental take on cryptocurrencies—central banks issuing natively digital money .
China and Russia have notably been working on these projects for some time , and the Chinese sovereign coin , or “ digital yuan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
The implications for international sanctions are vast .
First , these projects inevitably run on private blockchains that provide no traceability to outside countries the way a bitcoin network does .
The second is that these instruments are completely outside the purview of current U.S.-led global financial architecture .
Countries that are still open to cooperating with Iran could easily explore avenues through the use of such sovereign coins .
Another more significant industry-led development is decentralized finance .
Popularly referred to as “ DeFi , ” this rising class of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ services such as banking , lending , and trading over decentralized networks and without intermediaries .
These expand significantly on the financial options available for ordinary citizens to services beyond just payments , which is what bitcoin currently offers .
For example , Iran has been facing record-high inflation since 2019 , but by using DeFi , Iranians can borrow from global markets at rates much lower than those inside Iran .
Leveraging decentralized exchanges can also help the regime convert cryptocurrencies to fiat through channels that can not be effectively controlled by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these platforms makes them difficult to regulate as effectively as centralized exchanges .
DeFi still offers challenges for would-be sanctions evaders .
These channels can not offer very high liquidity as compared with large centralized cryptocurrency exchanges .
The entire outstanding market cap for DeFi is estimated at around $ 430 million , and handling trades of $ 10 million to $ 20 million becomes challenging through these platforms .
The Iranian regime might also deter access to DeFi for citizens by imposing harsh punishment , as it can pose a significant capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the industry side , the DeFi community leans heavily toward transparency , and all transactions are recorded in a blockchain , which can be subject to forensic analyses similar to bitcoin .
Most service providers additionally undertake significant checks from their side to limit illicit activity through their platforms and avoid regulatory noncompliance .
Iran has clearly understood that cryptocurrencies are among the ways to challenge and subvert the U.S.-dominated financial architecture .
Closing off these channels effectively will take global coordination and cooperation with cryptocurrency service providers ; both global and Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to these avenues .
In the meantime , as long as holes in regulation exist , they are sure to be exploited by the Iranian regime and people .

In narrow terms, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran in the last two years have been effective, shrinking the Iranian economy by 10 to 20 percent. But they have also accelerated Iran’s use of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which are increasingly used by the Iranian government and public to evade legal barriers. This has led to an attempted crackdown on bitcoin by international regulators—but the cryptocurrency industry is proving more nimble than the enforcers of sanctions.
In narrow terms, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran in the last two years have been effective, shrinking the Iranian economy by 10 to 20 percent. But they have also accelerated Iran’s use of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which are increasingly used by the Iranian government and public to evade legal barriers. This has led to an attempted crackdown on bitcoin by international regulators—but the cryptocurrency industry is proving more nimble than the enforcers of sanctions.
The Iranian government has long had an interest in using cryptocurrencies to support international trade outside of the traditional banking system. In July 2018, President Hassan Rouhani’s administration declared its intention of launching a national cryptocurrency; one month later, a news agency affiliated with the Central Bank of Iran outlined multiple features of the national cryptocurrency, stating that it would be backed by the rial—Iran’s national currency. Multiple blockchain projects—developing the underlying technology for cryptocurrencies—were revealed by the central bank at a digital payments conference last year, one of which is reportedly already being tested by four Iranian banks (three of which are under sanctions).
Cryptocurrency transactions are already popular with the Iranian public, according to various reports. In some interviews, people have described bitcoin as the only way to get money out of Iran. Cryptocurrency mining activity, which is a heavy computational process that generates, or “mines,” new cryptocurrency, is also significant in Iran. Lured by the cheap cost of electricity in the country, and the devaluation of the Iranian rial, several bitcoin miners set up operations in Iran in 2018. In 2019, a survey conducted with 1,650 Iranians using bitcoin showed that 25 percent of respondents made $500 to $3,000 per month working with cryptocurrency. The Iranian government also appears to have recognized the value in mining as an economic sector. In August 2019, after a month of harsh crackdowns on mining activity for abusing cheap electricity, the cabinet issued a regulation that recognized mining as a legal sector in the economy.
Interestingly, Iran also appears to have attracted interest from other countries willing to collaborate via blockchain platforms. In 2017, Sweden reportedly authorized a local start-up to invest in firms on the Iranian stock market by using bitcoin. In November 2018, Iranian and Russian blockchain industry personnel signed an agreement for cooperation in developing Iran’s blockchain industry, with a stated aim to address challenges arising from sanctions. In 2019, Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization conducted negotiations on the use of cryptocurrencies in financial transactions with representatives of eight countries, including Switzerland, South Africa, France, England, Russia, Austria, Germany, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2016, as per the Iran nuclear deal, the United Nations and European Union lifted sanctions on Iran. The EU recently launched Instex, a transactions channel between Europe and Iran.
Multiple obstacles still exist, however, before Iran can fully harness the power of cryptocurrencies. The room for anonymity is steadily shrinking for cryptocurrency transactions as formal identification of customers through “know your customer” (KYC) compliance rises globally. In 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control added two Iranian individuals and their bitcoin addresses to its Specially Designated Nationals List. According to forensic analysis by the Treasury Department, more than 7,000 bitcoin transactions valuing millions of dollars had been processed by these addresses. Apart from other criminal activity such as the Silk Road case and numerous scams, cryptocurrency usage by regimes such as Venezuela and Iran has been one of the driving factors for heavy regulation of the sector.
Apart from country-specific regulations that mandate financial compliance, the Financial Action Task Force’s standards were set in 2019 and are now enforced across 37 member countries. These standards impose full KYC compliance at the level of virtual asset service providers, as well as a “travel rule” that requires both originators and beneficiaries of cryptocurrency transactions to identify and report suspicious information. These regulations effectively exclude Iran from major cryptocurrency exchanges. This has tilted the Iranian cryptomarket toward local exchanges, where price premiums on the currency are higher. Iran is thus losing out on its competitiveness in mining compared with other jurisdictions. While electricity costs are lower, other costs related to mining, such as hardware and operations, are much higher in Iran. Meanwhile, there is still regulatory uncertainty over the future of cryptocurrency within Iran.
Despite these challenges, there are new developments in the world of cryptocurrency that may open up new possibilities for the Iranian government and people to evade sanctions. One significant development is the rise of central bank digital currencies, which are the governmental take on cryptocurrencies—central banks issuing natively digital money. China and Russia have notably been working on these projects for some time, and the Chinese sovereign coin, or “digital yuan,” is expected to be launched this year. The implications for international sanctions are vast. First, these projects inevitably run on private blockchains that provide no traceability to outside countries the way a bitcoin network does. The second is that these instruments are completely outside the purview of current U.S.-led global financial architecture. Countries that are still open to cooperating with Iran could easily explore avenues through the use of such sovereign coins.
Another more significant industry-led development is decentralized finance. Popularly referred to as “DeFi,” this rising class of cryptocurrency projects aims to provide traditional financial services such as banking, lending, and trading over decentralized networks and without intermediaries. These expand significantly on the financial options available for ordinary citizens to services beyond just payments, which is what bitcoin currently offers. For example, Iran has been facing record-high inflation since 2019, but by using DeFi, Iranians can borrow from global markets at rates much lower than those inside Iran. Leveraging decentralized exchanges can also help the regime convert cryptocurrencies to fiat through channels that cannot be effectively controlled by outside regulators. The decentralized nature of these platforms makes them difficult to regulate as effectively as centralized exchanges.
DeFi still offers challenges for would-be sanctions evaders. These channels cannot offer very high liquidity as compared with large centralized cryptocurrency exchanges. The entire outstanding market cap for DeFi is estimated at around $430 million, and handling trades of $10 million to $20 million becomes challenging through these platforms. The Iranian regime might also deter access to DeFi for citizens by imposing harsh punishment, as it can pose a significant capital flight risk for the economy. On the industry side, the DeFi community leans heavily toward transparency, and all transactions are recorded in a blockchain, which can be subject to forensic analyses similar to bitcoin. Most service providers additionally undertake significant checks from their side to limit illicit activity through their platforms and avoid regulatory noncompliance.
Iran has clearly understood that cryptocurrencies are among the ways to challenge and subvert the U.S.-dominated financial architecture. Closing off these channels effectively will take global coordination and cooperation with cryptocurrency service providers; both global and Iranian regulations will determine the degree of access to these avenues. In the meantime, as long as holes in regulation exist, they are sure to be exploited by the Iranian regime and people.