foreignpolicy--2020-08-13--Biden’s China Policy Can’t Help but Be Incoherent

Biden ’ s China Policy Can ’ t Help but Be Incoherent It ’ s clash-of-civilizations stuff that rivals even the scaremongering of the early Cold War .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has given multiple speeches in recent months that actively promote a narrative not just of competition with China , but of a totalizing ideological threat that must be stopped at any cost .
That ’ s a disaster waiting to happen .
And yet , U.S. policy toward China has already been a train wreck of pathos , lies , and contradictions for several years running .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ’ response to China has been at best ham-fisted .
The tariff war is an avoidable self-inflicted wound .
The ongoing process of economic decoupling is happening without any real debate about its strategic merits .
President Trump tried to parlay his perceived personal chemistry with President Xi Jinping into China colluding with him to get reelected , until Beijing turned him down and he decided instead to go all out with a series of unprecedented sanctions in the span of only a few weeks .
And lest we forget , Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crack down on Hong Kong ’ s political autonomy and continue with internment camps for Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang—two issues that catalyzed the recent sanctions and that the administration routinely advertises as proof of China ’ s villainy .
Enter the anti-Trump , former vice president Joe Biden .
One of Biden ’ s virtues is the promise of consistency and prudence where Trump delivers mainly chaos and incompetence .
But despite his deserved reputation as a rational statesman , Biden is set to pursue a China policy full of contradictions , just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way that Trump has .
That ’ s not just because politics surrounding China issues today all but ensures strategic inconsistency .
The problem is intrinsic to the ideological core evident in Biden ’ s understanding of how to deal with China and everything else in foreign policy—liberal internationalism .
China ’ s assertive , anti-democratic conduct at home and abroad is throwing the political and economic aspects of Biden ’ s restorationist worldview into sharp relief , and when it comes to China , the biggest strategic issue in a generation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ painful .
Liberalism , though a capacious concept , implies a Lockean commitment to individual rights and the ability to make credible contracts .
Translating this philosophy into foreign policy yields a basket of familiar political and economic priorities .
As an ideal , the political dimension of liberal internationalism concerns human rights protections , democracy promotion , and the sovereign equality of states .
The economic dimension emphasizes free trade and unfettered capital movement across borders .
This is an uneasy combination , but one that ’ s defined the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions also feature prominently in liberal internationalism because , in theory , not only do they peacefully regulate relations among states and promote liberal norms ; they protect transnational capital from governments that would impede free trade in the name of sovereignty .
And the distinctly American variant of liberal internationalism fuses these liberal values with a commitment to military power , forward troop presence , and alliances on the belief that the latter hard-power calculations make the former values possible .
The results of this fusion can be paradoxically anti-liberal .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have explained how a broadly liberal U.S. foreign policy has nevertheless nurtured within itself relations of an imperial character , such as the structure of U.S. ties to Iraq and Afghanistan during the Bush era or America ’ s control of Guam , a territory denied incorporation into the U.S. federal system .
Neoconservatism , largely in disrepute today , is arguably so liberal that it ’ s willing to use force to make the world more so , which highlights another tension in liberal internationalism—it can give rise to manifestly illiberal actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal tradition ends up in tension with another .
Decisions to use military force for regime change assault liberal values in all sorts of ways , yet are sometimes motivated by the liberal impulse to spread , ironically enough , liberal values .
And of course progressives have always decried privileging economic liberalism over political liberalism , as with the “ Washington consensus ” policies that for decades used international financial institutions to impose sovereignty-violating fiscal austerity reforms on developing countries .
These contradictions were always there .
But they ’ re set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under a Biden administration because China ’ s more assertive behavior makes it impossible for Washington to simultaneously optimize for both political and economic liberal values in Sino-US relations .
As a young senator , Biden was part of the first U.S. delegation to visit Beijing following diplomatic normalization in 1979 .
After the Cold War , he made the same wager as most of Washington—a liberal internationalist wager—that exploiting the China market and forging economic interdependence would liberalize the Middle Kingdom .
As part of that premise , he supported China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And as vice president , he echoed the then-common refrain that “ a rising China is a positive , positive development.
” Of course , times have changed .
The new conventional wisdom in Washington—that we lost the China wager—has spawned a corresponding belief in the need for a way of life based not on détente or compromise , but competition .
Anti-China sentiment in Congress has become bipartisan .
For the first time this century , there appears to be a popular stigma against doing business with China .
The Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates to aggressively go after China in GOP political campaigns rather than bother defending a president who does outlandish shit almost as often as he changes his mind .
Even the progressive wing of the Democratic Party , which strikes a less strident tone than the establishment on Sino-US relations , recognizes that China poses a political threat , if not a military one .
This is the new Washington , a place whose politics on China leave Biden trapped between Trump and a hard place .
Decisions made in the Trump era @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primarily on the threat China poses to political liberalism—that will constrain Biden ’ s choices should he become president .
Whether a $ 680 billion defense budget with its sights firmly fixed on China , or the global effort to neuter Chinese tech firms like Huawei , the legislative and bureaucratic institutionalization of Sino-US rivalry will be hard to reverse regardless of whether China changes .
The zeitgeist has already made it difficult to level even valid critiques against Trump without generating hollow accusations of being “ weak ” or “ soft ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aloud that Biden ’ s campaign will fall for this “ China hawk trap.
” Biden , as well as some of his advisors , have accommodated the new tough-on-China moment by opting to somewhat prioritize political liberalism over economic liberalism .
Senior advisor Jake Sullivan , for instance , suggested Biden would effectively unwind great-power interdependence by helping “ reshore supply chains so we are never again dependent on China in a crisis.
” Striking a different tone than in the past , Biden called Xi a “ thug ” during a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And Tony Blinken , another Biden senior advisor , said Biden would “ fully enforce ” the sanctions regime introduced as part of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act .
But the economic side of liberal internationalism promises to exert a significant gravitational pull in the opposing direction .
Wall Street thinks China will be open for business in a Biden presidency .
At a minimum , the financial class expects that “ a Biden victory ends tariffs on China.
” With some 70 percent of Chinese imports now subject to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for at least a partial rollback of the trade war .
And his pro-business track record as a senator and vice president makes this a reasonable bet .
After all , would a Biden administration have tried to ban immensely popular Chinese-linked apps like TikTok ?
Maybe , but in 2019 , Biden indicated on the campaign trail that his view of trade with China hasn ’ t adjusted , dismissing China ’ s economic threat with the comment , “ China ’ s going to eat our lunch ?
Come on , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ … they ’ re not competition for us.
” International institutions , meanwhile , are uniquely positioned to encourage Biden to strategically dither .
For a Biden presidency to diminish , defund , contain , or subvert international institutions would be to cut one of the arms off of liberal internationalism by ceding the architectures of global governance to China by default .
China has increasingly rendered institutions , which would otherwise be amplifiers of liberal values or at least of U.S. influence , into places where it can steer agendas and secure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberalism ’ s ) expense .
Yet to compete for influence with China within international institutions simply renders them into venues of great-power jockeying .
That may be necessary , and one should not be naïve about power politics , but it brings with it both the risk of diminishing their legitimacy as stewards of process and a liberal internationalism that looks a lot like neoconservatism ’ s ethos of muscular liberalism unhindered by institutional checks .
Yet even if Biden does not succumb to the lobbying pressures of moneyed interests and crafts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any rational approach to China will have to dial back the emotionalism of the Trump era in both rhetoric and substance .
Unless Biden ’ s staffers agree that China is a totalizing threat to humanity unrivaled in American history , his administration ’ s position on China will be more restrained than what we ’ ve seen from Washington the past three years .
Just adopting minimally responsible language , such as dropping the use of racially tinged pejoratives like “ Kung Flu , ” will appear measured and muted .
Competing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directions on China and they will continue to do so , because liberal internationalism is of two minds about China .
The United States must get tough on China but not resign itself to an existential rivalry .
It must improve Taiwan ’ s defenses without increasing the risks of war .
It must sanction China but ease tariffs .
It must not inhibit free trade but pursue aspects of decoupling all the same .
If this seems like a series of contradictions , that ’ s the point .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s all strategically Janus-faced .
A crucial criterion of competent statecraft is the harmonization of elements in pursuit of a goal .
Your actions should not be self-undermining and ideally should achieve a degree of synergy with one another—an impossibly tall order for a rational China policy that seeks to both protect democracy and the right to make a buck off Beijing while managing risks of conflict .
Biden has made a successful career out of rational mainstream calculations .
That may be just what the country needs to nurse a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflicts within U.S. policy on China .
A vanguard politician might drag the country to clearly prioritize political or economic liberalism .
A pragmatic politician will try to satisfice among competing interests .
The tensions in Biden ’ s China choice represent a distinctly liberal dilemma that does not lend itself to clear thinking or easy solutions .
The form that U.S. liberal internationalism ends up taking won ’ t be because of a single doctrine or strategy , but the result of an accumulation of decisions and improvisations .

It’s clash-of-civilizations stuff that rivals even the scaremongering of the early Cold War. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has given multiple speeches in recent months that actively promote a narrative not just of competition with China, but of a totalizing ideological threat that must be stopped at any cost. That’s a disaster waiting to happen. And yet, U.S. policy toward China has already been a train wreck of pathos, lies, and contradictions for several years running.
It’s clash-of-civilizations stuff that rivals even the scaremongering of the early Cold War. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has given multiple speeches in recent months that actively promote a narrative not just of competition with China, but of a totalizing ideological threat that must be stopped at any cost. That’s a disaster waiting to happen. And yet, U.S. policy toward China has already been a train wreck of pathos, lies, and contradictions for several years running.
In word and deed, the United States’ response to China has been at best ham-fisted. The tariff war is an avoidable self-inflicted wound. The ongoing process of economic decoupling is happening without any real debate about its strategic merits. President Trump tried to parlay his perceived personal chemistry with President Xi Jinping into China colluding with him to get reelected, until Beijing turned him down and he decided instead to go all out with a series of unprecedented sanctions in the span of only a few weeks. And lest we forget, Trump gave Xi a green light both to crack down on Hong Kong’s political autonomy and continue with internment camps for Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang—two issues that catalyzed the recent sanctions and that the administration routinely advertises as proof of China’s villainy.
Enter the anti-Trump, former vice president Joe Biden. One of Biden’s virtues is the promise of consistency and prudence where Trump delivers mainly chaos and incompetence. But despite his deserved reputation as a rational statesman, Biden is set to pursue a China policy full of contradictions, just not in the uniquely self-serving and incoherent way that Trump has. That’s not just because politics surrounding China issues today all but ensures strategic inconsistency. The problem is intrinsic to the ideological core evident in Biden’s understanding of how to deal with China and everything else in foreign policy—liberal internationalism. China’s assertive, anti-democratic conduct at home and abroad is throwing the political and economic aspects of Biden’s restorationist worldview into sharp relief, and when it comes to China, the biggest strategic issue in a generation, those conflicts are going to be particularly painful.
Liberalism, though a capacious concept, implies a Lockean commitment to individual rights and the ability to make credible contracts. Translating this philosophy into foreign policy yields a basket of familiar political and economic priorities. As an ideal, the political dimension of liberal internationalism concerns human rights protections, democracy promotion, and the sovereign equality of states. The economic dimension emphasizes free trade and unfettered capital movement across borders. This is an uneasy combination, but one that’s defined the United States’ global action for decades.
International institutions also feature prominently in liberal internationalism because, in theory, not only do they peacefully regulate relations among states and promote liberal norms; they protect transnational capital from governments that would impede free trade in the name of sovereignty. And the distinctly American variant of liberal internationalism fuses these liberal values with a commitment to military power, forward troop presence, and alliances on the belief that the latter hard-power calculations make the former values possible.
The results of this fusion can be paradoxically anti-liberal. For instance, Dan Nexon and Paul Musgrave have explained how a broadly liberal U.S. foreign policy has nevertheless nurtured within itself relations of an imperial character, such as the structure of U.S. ties to Iraq and Afghanistan during the Bush era or America’s control of Guam, a territory denied incorporation into the U.S. federal system. Neoconservatism, largely in disrepute today, is arguably so liberal that it’s willing to use force to make the world more so, which highlights another tension in liberal internationalism—it can give rise to manifestly illiberal actions in practice when one aspect of the liberal tradition ends up in tension with another.
Decisions to use military force for regime change assault liberal values in all sorts of ways, yet are sometimes motivated by the liberal impulse to spread, ironically enough, liberal values. And of course progressives have always decried privileging economic liberalism over political liberalism, as with the “Washington consensus” policies that for decades used international financial institutions to impose sovereignty-violating fiscal austerity reforms on developing countries.
These contradictions were always there. But they’re set to be harshly manifest in China policy under a Biden administration because China’s more assertive behavior makes it impossible for Washington to simultaneously optimize for both political and economic liberal values in Sino-US relations.
As a young senator, Biden was part of the first U.S. delegation to visit Beijing following diplomatic normalization in 1979. After the Cold War, he made the same wager as most of Washington—a liberal internationalist wager—that exploiting the China market and forging economic interdependence would liberalize the Middle Kingdom. As part of that premise, he supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. And as vice president, he echoed the then-common refrain that “a rising China is a positive, positive development.”
Of course, times have changed. The new conventional wisdom in Washington—that we lost the China wager—has spawned a corresponding belief in the need for a way of life based not on détente or compromise, but competition. Anti-China sentiment in Congress has become bipartisan. For the first time this century, there appears to be a popular stigma against doing business with China. The Republican National Senatorial Committee has issued guidance for candidates to aggressively go after China in GOP political campaigns rather than bother defending a president who does outlandish shit almost as often as he changes his mind. Even the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, which strikes a less strident tone than the establishment on Sino-US relations, recognizes that China poses a political threat, if not a military one.
This is the new Washington, a place whose politics on China leave Biden trapped between Trump and a hard place. Decisions made in the Trump era have been locking in a confrontational imperative—premised primarily on the threat China poses to political liberalism—that will constrain Biden’s choices should he become president. Whether a $680 billion defense budget with its sights firmly fixed on China, or the global effort to neuter Chinese tech firms like Huawei, the legislative and bureaucratic institutionalization of Sino-US rivalry will be hard to reverse regardless of whether China changes.
The zeitgeist has already made it difficult to level even valid critiques against Trump without generating hollow accusations of being “weak” or “soft” on Beijing. Progressive groups have worried aloud that Biden’s campaign will fall for this “China hawk trap.” Biden, as well as some of his advisors, have accommodated the new tough-on-China moment by opting to somewhat prioritize political liberalism over economic liberalism. Senior advisor Jake Sullivan, for instance, suggested Biden would effectively unwind great-power interdependence by helping “reshore supply chains so we are never again dependent on China in a crisis.” Striking a different tone than in the past, Biden called Xi a “thug” during a Democratic Primary debate earlier this year. And Tony Blinken, another Biden senior advisor, said Biden would “fully enforce” the sanctions regime introduced as part of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.
But the economic side of liberal internationalism promises to exert a significant gravitational pull in the opposing direction. Wall Street thinks China will be open for business in a Biden presidency. At a minimum, the financial class expects that “a Biden victory ends tariffs on China.” With some 70 percent of Chinese imports now subject to tariffs, there will be corporate pressure for at least a partial rollback of the trade war. And his pro-business track record as a senator and vice president makes this a reasonable bet. After all, would a Biden administration have tried to ban immensely popular Chinese-linked apps like TikTok? Maybe, but in 2019, Biden indicated on the campaign trail that his view of trade with China hasn’t adjusted, dismissing China’s economic threat with the comment, “China’s going to eat our lunch? Come on, man… They’re not bad folks … they’re not competition for us.”
International institutions, meanwhile, are uniquely positioned to encourage Biden to strategically dither. For a Biden presidency to diminish, defund, contain, or subvert international institutions would be to cut one of the arms off of liberal internationalism by ceding the architectures of global governance to China by default. China has increasingly rendered institutions, which would otherwise be amplifiers of liberal values or at least of U.S. influence, into places where it can steer agendas and secure influence at America’s (and liberalism’s) expense. Yet to compete for influence with China within international institutions simply renders them into venues of great-power jockeying. That may be necessary, and one should not be naïve about power politics, but it brings with it both the risk of diminishing their legitimacy as stewards of process and a liberal internationalism that looks a lot like neoconservatism’s ethos of muscular liberalism unhindered by institutional checks.
Yet even if Biden does not succumb to the lobbying pressures of moneyed interests and crafts a Goldilocks solution to competitive institutionalism, any rational approach to China will have to dial back the emotionalism of the Trump era in both rhetoric and substance. Unless Biden’s staffers agree that China is a totalizing threat to humanity unrivaled in American history, his administration’s position on China will be more restrained than what we’ve seen from Washington the past three years. Just adopting minimally responsible language, such as dropping the use of racially tinged pejoratives like “Kung Flu,” will appear measured and muted.
Competing political demands are pulling Biden in opposing directions on China and they will continue to do so, because liberal internationalism is of two minds about China. The United States must get tough on China but not resign itself to an existential rivalry. It must improve Taiwan’s defenses without increasing the risks of war. It must sanction China but ease tariffs. It must not inhibit free trade but pursue aspects of decoupling all the same.
If this seems like a series of contradictions, that’s the point. It’s all compatible with liberal internationalism and yet it’s all strategically Janus-faced. A crucial criterion of competent statecraft is the harmonization of elements in pursuit of a goal. Your actions should not be self-undermining and ideally should achieve a degree of synergy with one another—an impossibly tall order for a rational China policy that seeks to both protect democracy and the right to make a buck off Beijing while managing risks of conflict.
Biden has made a successful career out of rational mainstream calculations. That may be just what the country needs to nurse a post-Trump hangover. But it accentuates the conflicts within U.S. policy on China. A vanguard politician might drag the country to clearly prioritize political or economic liberalism. A pragmatic politician will try to satisfice among competing interests.
The tensions in Biden’s China choice represent a distinctly liberal dilemma that does not lend itself to clear thinking or easy solutions. The form that U.S. liberal internationalism ends up taking won’t be because of a single doctrine or strategy, but the result of an accumulation of decisions and improvisations.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-13--In Historic Deal With the UAE, Israel Is the Biggest Winner

In Historic Deal With the UAE , Israel Is the Biggest Winner No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable : Israel was the biggest victor .
Israel , and specifically its embattled prime minister , Benjamin Netanyahu , has scored a huge victory .
In suspending threats to annex parts of the West Bank in return for full normalization of relations with the UAE , he has given himself room to back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been popular but never realistic .
Netanyahu thus pocketed normalization with a rising Arab power in return for something he wasn ’ t likely to do and was not in Israel ’ s long-term interest .
In diplomatic circles , that ’ s what you call a coup .
To be sure , the UAE gets plenty in return .
In striking the bargain , it solidifies both a leadership status in the Arab world and its outsized role in geopolitics .
Enhanced and formalized bilateral cooperation in sectors such as energy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will also reap large dividends for both countries .
Already ambitious and entrepreneurial , the two societies will get an opportunity to team up without having to worry about politics .
The sky is the limit in terms of technological advancements that will benefit the region and possibly the world .
The Middle East as a whole surely stands to gain from any cooling of tensions and positive diplomacy .
But it is worth tempering expectations regarding the effects of this deal on regional security .
After all , the UAE and Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viewed each other as traditional enemies .
So to call this agreement a “ peace deal , ” as the Trump administration already has , is a bit of a stretch .
Instead , it represents the formal recognition of bilateral ties that have existed for decades .
It ’ s also explicitly the beginning of a diplomatic process , so broader gains could take time to come to full fruition .
The agreement also still has to survive political opposition from some in Israel ’ s ultraconservative community .
If Israel reneges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Emiratis will bail .
U.S. President Donald Trump , who claims to have brokered the deal , should in fact be credited for this historic breakthrough , regardless of the nature of his own personal involvement .
His administration ’ s mediation role was indispensable .
Of course , he will not stop boasting of having made peace in the Middle East until after the U.S. presidential election in November .
But his constant self-aggrandizement and politicking shouldn ’ t distract from the fact that what he just pulled off has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region .
And for once , in a positive way .
If the elephant in the room—Saudi Arabia—joins the diplomatic party , this is when praise for the deal should be doubled and even tripled .
Saudi Arabia , not the UAE , is the biggest prize for Israel in terms of diplomatic recognition .
And it is Saudi Arabia , not the UAE , that traditionally speaks for the Muslim world and whose king is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques .
The Arab domino effect will happen the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If or when they do , the code of broader Arab-Israeli security cooperation will finally be cracked .
But where is Riyadh in all this ?
Major diplomatic moves , such as the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative , which offered Israel full Arab recognition in exchange for its withdrawal from Arab lands captured in the 1967 war , have typically been the prerogatives of the Saudis .
That the Emiratis now are at the forefront of bold Arab diplomacy is most intriguing—but also expected given the recent travails of the Saudis under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There ’ s no evidence to suggest that , in striking this deal with Israel , the UAE broke with Saudi Arabia .
But the agreement did surely make it look as if Abu Dhabi was pressing ahead and charting an increasingly independent course .
First , Abu Dhabi pulls its troops from Yemen and leaves its Saudi coalition partner hanging .
Now this .
And even if Saudi Arabia signs on to the agreement , a possibility Trump left open by saying that other Arab states could join this agreement soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a follower , not initiator .
Arab history would not be kind to the Saudis for effectively abdicating their leadership to their junior partner .
Then again , maybe this was a Saudi preference all along , effectively coordinated with the Emiratis .
Watch and learn , the Saudis probably calculated .
They might want to see first how the deal is received in the Arab world and most importantly in Tehran , a longtime nemesis .
And on that basis , determine whether to join or distance .
The Iranians will almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will label the Emiratis as traitors , but what matters will be actions .
And that could be what Riyadh will wait for .
It ’ s also worth recalling that the Saudis are in a totally different position from the Emiratis when it comes to Israel .
The deal involved minimal risks for the Emiratis domestically .
Not so for the Saudis .
If the regime embraces Israel prematurely—without there being a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians that settles the issue of Jerusalem—the Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s clerics would , and that is something Mohammed bin Salman simply can not afford .
All the young crown prince has focused on since launching his transformative project dubbed Saudi Vision 2030 is limiting the role and authority of the kingdom ’ s conservative sheikhs .
Even the perception of giving up Jerusalem to Israel could catapult the influence of the clerics to new heights .
It might even bring back extremist militancy , which wreaked havoc in the country in 1979 and then again from 2003 to 2004 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this agreement , which had been kept miraculously quiet until Trump issued his statement .
But one thing for sure is that the Arab world ’ s power relations have firmly shifted in favor of its smaller states : the UAE and its rival Qatar .
Saudi Arabia is busy with its delicate transition , and Egypt ’ s prestige has long faded .
As praiseworthy as this deal is , the ultimate challenge and most valuable achievement for the Middle East remains the significant reduction of tensions with Iran .
If relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t blow up as a result of it—and lately they ’ ve been pretty good—the Emiratis will be able to more effectively mediate between the Israelis and the Iranians , a role the Omanis have historically played .
Tehran ’ s hard-liners might never make peace with Israel , but they sure have an interest in stopping a large-scale war .
Abu Dhabi ’ s clever and opportunistic diplomacy with Israel could contribute in that regard and indeed change the region forever .

No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.
No matter how one reads the diplomatic deal announced Thursday between Israel and the United Arab Emirates—and there will surely be many supporters and detractors given its historic nature—there is one conclusion that seems irrefutable: Israel was the biggest victor.
Israel, and specifically its embattled prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has scored a huge victory. In suspending threats to annex parts of the West Bank in return for full normalization of relations with the UAE, he has given himself room to back away from a promise that may have been popular but never realistic. Netanyahu thus pocketed normalization with a rising Arab power in return for something he wasn’t likely to do and was not in Israel’s long-term interest. In diplomatic circles, that’s what you call a coup.
To be sure, the UAE gets plenty in return. In striking the bargain, it solidifies both a leadership status in the Arab world and its outsized role in geopolitics. Enhanced and formalized bilateral cooperation in sectors such as energy, medicine, technology, and military industry will also reap large dividends for both countries. Already ambitious and entrepreneurial, the two societies will get an opportunity to team up without having to worry about politics. The sky is the limit in terms of technological advancements that will benefit the region and possibly the world.
The Middle East as a whole surely stands to gain from any cooling of tensions and positive diplomacy. But it is worth tempering expectations regarding the effects of this deal on regional security. After all, the UAE and Israel have never fought against each other or viewed each other as traditional enemies. So to call this agreement a “peace deal,” as the Trump administration already has, is a bit of a stretch. Instead, it represents the formal recognition of bilateral ties that have existed for decades. It’s also explicitly the beginning of a diplomatic process, so broader gains could take time to come to full fruition. The agreement also still has to survive political opposition from some in Israel’s ultraconservative community. If Israel reneges on its promises in the West Bank, the Emiratis will bail.
U.S. President Donald Trump, who claims to have brokered the deal, should in fact be credited for this historic breakthrough, regardless of the nature of his own personal involvement. His administration’s mediation role was indispensable. Of course, he will not stop boasting of having made peace in the Middle East until after the U.S. presidential election in November. But his constant self-aggrandizement and politicking shouldn’t distract from the fact that what he just pulled off has the potential to truly shake things up in the region. And for once, in a positive way.
If the elephant in the room—Saudi Arabia—joins the diplomatic party, this is when praise for the deal should be doubled and even tripled. Saudi Arabia, not the UAE, is the biggest prize for Israel in terms of diplomatic recognition. And it is Saudi Arabia, not the UAE, that traditionally speaks for the Muslim world and whose king is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The Arab domino effect will happen the moment the Saudis get on board. If or when they do, the code of broader Arab-Israeli security cooperation will finally be cracked.
But where is Riyadh in all this?
Major diplomatic moves, such as the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which offered Israel full Arab recognition in exchange for its withdrawal from Arab lands captured in the 1967 war, have typically been the prerogatives of the Saudis. That the Emiratis now are at the forefront of bold Arab diplomacy is most intriguing—but also expected given the recent travails of the Saudis under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
There’s no evidence to suggest that, in striking this deal with Israel, the UAE broke with Saudi Arabia. But the agreement did surely make it look as if Abu Dhabi was pressing ahead and charting an increasingly independent course. First, Abu Dhabi pulls its troops from Yemen and leaves its Saudi coalition partner hanging. Now this. And even if Saudi Arabia signs on to the agreement, a possibility Trump left open by saying that other Arab states could join this agreement soon, it would be forever remembered as a follower, not initiator. Arab history would not be kind to the Saudis for effectively abdicating their leadership to their junior partner.
Then again, maybe this was a Saudi preference all along, effectively coordinated with the Emiratis. Watch and learn, the Saudis probably calculated. They might want to see first how the deal is received in the Arab world and most importantly in Tehran, a longtime nemesis. And on that basis, determine whether to join or distance. The Iranians will almost surely criticize the deal, and the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will label the Emiratis as traitors, but what matters will be actions. And that could be what Riyadh will wait for.
It’s also worth recalling that the Saudis are in a totally different position from the Emiratis when it comes to Israel. The deal involved minimal risks for the Emiratis domestically. Not so for the Saudis. If the regime embraces Israel prematurely—without there being a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians that settles the issue of Jerusalem—the Saudi people might revolt, or at least the country’s clerics would, and that is something Mohammed bin Salman simply cannot afford.
All the young crown prince has focused on since launching his transformative project dubbed Saudi Vision 2030 is limiting the role and authority of the kingdom’s conservative sheikhs. Even the perception of giving up Jerusalem to Israel could catapult the influence of the clerics to new heights. It might even bring back extremist militancy, which wreaked havoc in the country in 1979 and then again from 2003 to 2004.
There are too many unknowns in this agreement, which had been kept miraculously quiet until Trump issued his statement. But one thing for sure is that the Arab world’s power relations have firmly shifted in favor of its smaller states: the UAE and its rival Qatar. Saudi Arabia is busy with its delicate transition, and Egypt’s prestige has long faded.
As praiseworthy as this deal is, the ultimate challenge and most valuable achievement for the Middle East remains the significant reduction of tensions with Iran. If relations between Abu Dhabi and Tehran don’t blow up as a result of it—and lately they’ve been pretty good—the Emiratis will be able to more effectively mediate between the Israelis and the Iranians, a role the Omanis have historically played. Tehran’s hard-liners might never make peace with Israel, but they sure have an interest in stopping a large-scale war. Abu Dhabi’s clever and opportunistic diplomacy with Israel could contribute in that regard and indeed change the region forever.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-13--Kamala Harris Is a Soft-Power Boon for America’s Global Image

Kamala Harris wants to “ cooperate with China on global issues like climate change ” but not “ allow [ its ] human rights abuses to go unchecked.
” She wants to block weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and end U.S. support for the war in Yemen but maintain the counterterrorism partnership with the kingdom .
She supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bringing the troops home from Afghanistan , eventually .
Judged by her statements so far , the foreign-policy agenda of presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden ’ s running mate is profoundly middle of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a candidate who made her bones in state-level politics and has never held a foreign policy-related role , beyond membership in Senate committees like intelligence .
Nevertheless , if she and Biden win the presidential election in three months—as they are heavily favored to do , as of now—and Harris becomes both the first Black woman and person of Indian descent ever in the White House , she would immediately transform America ’ s face to the world .
The purely symbolic cachet would come first .
Think of the rapturous reception @ @ @ @ @ @ @ George W. Bush , who started two unpopular wars and maintained a somewhat anti-cosmopolitan affect otherwise .
The palpable relief in the international community in 2008 was so acute that Obama was given the Nobel Peace Prize just for getting elected .
( He accepted it nearly a year after authorizing his first of many drone strikes . )
But a similar breath of global relief seems inevitable in the case of Harris .
For the international community , having someone with any kind of multicultural background helping to lead the world ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unalloyed good in an age of ceaseless migration and hyperglobalization .
“ I think having a Black woman in the White House as vice president might serve to repair America ’ s current image and once again portray it as a society with opportunities open to all races and backgrounds , ” said Linda Heywood , a Boston University professor and editor of the book African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy .
The contrast with the current president could not be starker .
Whereas Donald Trump has projected his vision for a homogenous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so-called Muslim ban and the suspension of work visas for foreigners , Harris is herself the child of two immigrants , from Jamaica and India .
“ After four years of regression and the promotion of white nationalism , this is an awakening for the nation and the opportunity for women and women of color who … work hard in policy and politics , and who dream of leading , to know that this is in the realm of the possible .
As a Jamaican American Black woman , attorney , policy wonk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Inc. , former Hill staffer , and former government official , it is amazing to potentially see someone whose experiences—both positive and negative—resemble mine in the White House , ” said Camille Stewart , a cybersecurity expert and New America fellow who served in the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ) during the Obama administration .
Harris ’ s identity as a Black woman could also bolster one of the most surprising American soft-power exports of the year : Black Lives Matter and the racial justice movement .
The immediate global resonance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brutality , from France to Indonesia to Australia , shows how America ’ s social justice vernacular still sets a global agenda , even during a year dominated by the country ’ s singularly disastrous pandemic response .
Under a potential Vice President Harris , the goodwill created by these flashes of global solidarity could be actively harnessed for diplomatic ties in the many countries where Black Lives Matter has resonated abroad .
That being said , a single politician ’ s identity is far from a skeleton key for smooth diplomacy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ does not travel well [ everywhere ] , ” said Ibrahim Sundiata , a scholar of African and Afro-American studies at Brandeis University .
Obama , he noted , found that he had little pull in Kenya , where his father was from , because “ his father ’ s [ ethnic ] Luo identity was more definitive in a Kikuyu-dominated polity than any imported notion of an all-encompassing ‘ Blackness.
’ ” Sundiata posited that “ Harris ’ s Black identity will greatly help her in Western Europe , where ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same reforms as people of color in the United States .
In Africa , her ‘ Blackness ’ may be more questioned .
… And in Latin America , the reaction may be mixed .
In Brazil , thousands of young ‘ Black and brown ’ women will doubtlessly be inspired by Senator Harris .
At the same time , pundits on the left and right will point out that this upper-class woman from California has little in common with the phenotypically Black women of Brazil ’ s favelas.
” When it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely to stick to well-trodden paths .
That ’ s partially because she ’ ll be constrained not just by the famously ill-defined office but also by the so-called “ Blob , ” as the Washington foreign-policy establishment and bureaucracy came to be called during the Obama years .
As Foreign Policy reported last month , the Biden campaign has assembled a working group of over 2,000 people to advise on foreign policy , and there are countless Obama veterans in the mix .
Harris herself has been advised , during her presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spence , former deputy assistant secretary of defense ; Michèle Flournoy , former undersecretary of defense for policy ; Dana Shell , former U.S. ambassador to Qatar ; former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen ; former State Department official Philip Gordon ; and Matthew Olsen , the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center .
Still , even the Blob has changed its contours since the last Democratic administration , as shown in part by Biden ’ s campaign pledge , in January , to “ end the forever wars ” in Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no question that the Overton window [ of mainstream discourse ] is shifting , ” said Stephen Wertheim , a historian and deputy director at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft , an anti-interventionist think tank .
“ Many Americans , left and right , now say that the biggest foreign-policy problem is that their own country is waging endless war .
… In a recent poll , around three-quarters of Americans favor bringing troops home from Afghanistan and Iraq .
It ’ s staggering.
” It ’ s significant that Biden has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he himself once voted for the Iraq War .
And what it illustrates at large is that Biden , a party man at the end of the day , is essentially receptive to public opinion and that a Biden-Harris administration has some leverage to accommodate other popular demands .
This is surely part of why Harris has embraced climate change as an agenda item , co-sponsored the Green New Deal , and pledged to rejoin the 2015 Paris agreement .
Nearly 90 percent of Democrats consider climate change a “ major threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Pew Research Center survey from March .
( Her home state is also among those most severely affected by global warming . )
Harris has also been vocal about white supremacist and right-wing terrorism , which she has called the top domestic terrorism threat in the United States today , a position that seems to correct for the excesses of the so-called global war on terrorism , which focused on Islamist fundamentalism and extremism .
Given the pervasiveness—and the traditionally dominant whiteness and maleness—of the Blob , it would be important for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team , Wertheim said .
Biden ’ s working group is amorphously large as of now , but it seems significant that his campaign has already established a working group to promote diversity in national security , which is chaired by a veteran female Black diplomat and the first transgender veteran appointed by the Obama administration to a federal agency .
Of course , Harris is not only a Black woman .
If her ticket wins , she would also be the highest elected official of South Asian descent in American history .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ her Indian heritage to date—she once said , “ I was born Black .
I will die Black.
” —and attended a historically Black university , but it is already becoming commonplace to note that her mother was an intrepid , progressive scientist who immigrated from southern India to the Bay Area and who regularly brought her family back to Chennai during Harris ’ s childhood .
This heritage would doubtless be a powerful , and unprecedented , card to play in U.S.-India relations .
And it raises the possibility of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights concerns with the Indian government , from which U.S. administrations have largely refrained in recent years ; last year ’ s bipartisan congressional hearing on Kashmir was an exception that proved the rule of noninterference .
Whereas Trump has cultivated close ties with right-wing , Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi , Harris has been vocally critical of India ’ s decision to revoke Kashmir ’ s special status in 2019 .
( She did , however , nominally welcome Modi ’ s visit in 2017—before his administration acted on Kashmir and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the northeast of their citizenship—and tweeted about the “ unbreakable bonds ” between the United States and India . )
As her uncle in Chennai told the Hindustan Times this week , Harris won ’ t give a “ free pass ” to India ’ s human rights record despite her heritage .
Up to a point , that is .
It ’ s unlikely that a Biden administration would too seriously censure India , whose strategic importance in Asia would increase if Biden continued his hawkish stance against China .
A Vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things to a lot of people around the world , but at home , her impact would be most keenly felt if her presence helped diversify the foreign-policy ranks downstream once again .
There would be even more openings than usual if they take over from Trump , who has left a huge number of diplomatic posts unfilled to this day .
“ During the Obama administration , particularly the second term , the national security and foreign-policy apparatus became more diverse , but there was and is a lot of work to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former DHS official .
“ That diversity was often at the lower levels , a common problem across industries … but the Biden administration seems to be taking this seriously [ so far ] .
” And all these caveats aside , many people of color involved in American foreign policy seem to not be able to help a cautious optimism .
This is already a “ proud moment for America , ” Sundiata said , “ one which could usher in a new era of inclusivity .
”

Kamala Harris wants to “cooperate with China on global issues like climate change” but not “allow [its] human rights abuses to go unchecked.” She wants to block weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and end U.S. support for the war in Yemen but maintain the counterterrorism partnership with the kingdom. She supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bringing the troops home from Afghanistan, eventually.
Kamala Harris wants to “cooperate with China on global issues like climate change” but not “allow [its] human rights abuses to go unchecked.” She wants to block weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and end U.S. support for the war in Yemen but maintain the counterterrorism partnership with the kingdom. She supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bringing the troops home from Afghanistan, eventually.
Judged by her statements so far, the foreign-policy agenda of presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden’s running mate is profoundly middle of the road. That’s not surprising for a candidate who made her bones in state-level politics and has never held a foreign policy-related role, beyond membership in Senate committees like intelligence. Nevertheless, if she and Biden win the presidential election in three months—as they are heavily favored to do, as of now—and Harris becomes both the first Black woman and person of Indian descent ever in the White House, she would immediately transform America’s face to the world.
The purely symbolic cachet would come first. Think of the rapturous reception of Barack Obama after eight years of George W. Bush, who started two unpopular wars and maintained a somewhat anti-cosmopolitan affect otherwise. The palpable relief in the international community in 2008 was so acute that Obama was given the Nobel Peace Prize just for getting elected. (He accepted it nearly a year after authorizing his first of many drone strikes.) But a similar breath of global relief seems inevitable in the case of Harris. For the international community, having someone with any kind of multicultural background helping to lead the world’s richest country is sort of an unalloyed good in an age of ceaseless migration and hyperglobalization.
“I think having a Black woman in the White House as vice president might serve to repair America’s current image and once again portray it as a society with opportunities open to all races and backgrounds,” said Linda Heywood, a Boston University professor and editor of the book African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy. The contrast with the current president could not be starker. Whereas Donald Trump has projected his vision for a homogenous, white nation-state in actions including the so-called Muslim ban and the suspension of work visas for foreigners, Harris is herself the child of two immigrants, from Jamaica and India.
“After four years of regression and the promotion of white nationalism, this is an awakening for the nation and the opportunity for women and women of color who … work hard in policy and politics, and who dream of leading, to know that this is in the realm of the possible. As a Jamaican American Black woman, attorney, policy wonk, member of Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority Inc., former Hill staffer, and former government official, it is amazing to potentially see someone whose experiences—both positive and negative—resemble mine in the White House,” said Camille Stewart, a cybersecurity expert and New America fellow who served in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) during the Obama administration.
Harris’s identity as a Black woman could also bolster one of the most surprising American soft-power exports of the year: Black Lives Matter and the racial justice movement. The immediate global resonance of the George Floyd protests against police brutality, from France to Indonesia to Australia, shows how America’s social justice vernacular still sets a global agenda, even during a year dominated by the country’s singularly disastrous pandemic response. Under a potential Vice President Harris, the goodwill created by these flashes of global solidarity could be actively harnessed for diplomatic ties in the many countries where Black Lives Matter has resonated abroad.
That being said, a single politician’s identity is far from a skeleton key for smooth diplomacy. “The American notion of ‘race’ does not travel well [everywhere],” said Ibrahim Sundiata, a scholar of African and Afro-American studies at Brandeis University. Obama, he noted, found that he had little pull in Kenya, where his father was from, because “his father’s [ethnic] Luo identity was more definitive in a Kikuyu-dominated polity than any imported notion of an all-encompassing ‘Blackness.’”
Sundiata posited that “Harris’s Black identity will greatly help her in Western Europe, where ‘people of color’ immigrants are demanding the same reforms as people of color in the United States. In Africa, her ‘Blackness’ may be more questioned. … And in Latin America, the reaction may be mixed. In Brazil, thousands of young ‘Black and brown’ women will doubtlessly be inspired by Senator Harris. At the same time, pundits on the left and right will point out that this upper-class woman from California has little in common with the phenotypically Black women of Brazil’s favelas.”
When it comes to actual policy, Harris is likely to stick to well-trodden paths. That’s partially because she’ll be constrained not just by the famously ill-defined office but also by the so-called “Blob,” as the Washington foreign-policy establishment and bureaucracy came to be called during the Obama years. As Foreign Policy reported last month, the Biden campaign has assembled a working group of over 2,000 people to advise on foreign policy, and there are countless Obama veterans in the mix. Harris herself has been advised, during her presidential bid, by veteran officials like Matthew Spence, former deputy assistant secretary of defense; Michèle Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense for policy; Dana Shell, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar; former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen; former State Department official Philip Gordon; and Matthew Olsen, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Still, even the Blob has changed its contours since the last Democratic administration, as shown in part by Biden’s campaign pledge, in January, to “end the forever wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. “There’s no question that the Overton window [of mainstream discourse] is shifting,” said Stephen Wertheim, a historian and deputy director at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an anti-interventionist think tank. “Many Americans, left and right, now say that the biggest foreign-policy problem is that their own country is waging endless war. … In a recent poll, around three-quarters of Americans favor bringing troops home from Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s staggering.” It’s significant that Biden has staked out such a position, given that he himself once voted for the Iraq War. And what it illustrates at large is that Biden, a party man at the end of the day, is essentially receptive to public opinion and that a Biden-Harris administration has some leverage to accommodate other popular demands.
This is surely part of why Harris has embraced climate change as an agenda item, co-sponsored the Green New Deal, and pledged to rejoin the 2015 Paris agreement. Nearly 90 percent of Democrats consider climate change a “major threat to the nation,” according to a Pew Research Center survey from March. (Her home state is also among those most severely affected by global warming.) Harris has also been vocal about white supremacist and right-wing terrorism, which she has called the top domestic terrorism threat in the United States today, a position that seems to correct for the excesses of the so-called global war on terrorism, which focused on Islamist fundamentalism and extremism.
Given the pervasiveness—and the traditionally dominant whiteness and maleness—of the Blob, it would be important for a Biden-Harris administration to diversify its foreign-policy team, Wertheim said. Biden’s working group is amorphously large as of now, but it seems significant that his campaign has already established a working group to promote diversity in national security, which is chaired by a veteran female Black diplomat and the first transgender veteran appointed by the Obama administration to a federal agency.
Of course, Harris is not only a Black woman. If her ticket wins, she would also be the highest elected official of South Asian descent in American history. She has placed somewhat less emphasis on her Indian heritage to date—she once said, “I was born Black. I will die Black.”—and attended a historically Black university, but it is already becoming commonplace to note that her mother was an intrepid, progressive scientist who immigrated from southern India to the Bay Area and who regularly brought her family back to Chennai during Harris’s childhood. This heritage would doubtless be a powerful, and unprecedented, card to play in U.S.-India relations.
And it raises the possibility of the United States speaking out more authoritatively on human rights concerns with the Indian government, from which U.S. administrations have largely refrained in recent years; last year’s bipartisan congressional hearing on Kashmir was an exception that proved the rule of noninterference. Whereas Trump has cultivated close ties with right-wing, Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Harris has been vocally critical of India’s decision to revoke Kashmir’s special status in 2019. (She did, however, nominally welcome Modi’s visit in 2017—before his administration acted on Kashmir and a massive drive to strip people in the northeast of their citizenship—and tweeted about the “unbreakable bonds” between the United States and India.) As her uncle in Chennai told the Hindustan Times this week, Harris won’t give a “free pass” to India’s human rights record despite her heritage. Up to a point, that is. It’s unlikely that a Biden administration would too seriously censure India, whose strategic importance in Asia would increase if Biden continued his hawkish stance against China.
A Vice President Harris would mean a lot of things to a lot of people around the world, but at home, her impact would be most keenly felt if her presence helped diversify the foreign-policy ranks downstream once again. There would be even more openings than usual if they take over from Trump, who has left a huge number of diplomatic posts unfilled to this day. “During the Obama administration, particularly the second term, the national security and foreign-policy apparatus became more diverse, but there was and is a lot of work to do,” said Stewart, the former DHS official. “That diversity was often at the lower levels, a common problem across industries … but the Biden administration seems to be taking this seriously [so far].”
And all these caveats aside, many people of color involved in American foreign policy seem to not be able to help a cautious optimism. This is already a “proud moment for America,” Sundiata said, “one which could usher in a new era of inclusivity.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-13--The United States Can’t Handle China Alone

After an initially fractious allied response to China ’ s COVID-19 failures and Hong Kong crackdown , Western nations appear to be acting with greater unity in presenting a response to Beijing .
The best hope to restrain the misbehavior of a rising power grown confident , even arrogant , is consistent and coordinated pressure , designed with an off-ramp to encourage negotiation and compromise .
Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s government has sacrificed whatever goodwill it gained from its success against COVID-19 and limited aid to Europe , even as the Trump administration ’ s efforts to coerce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Beijing went from negligence and recklessness to brutality and criminality with its treatment of Hong Kong .
Continued mass repression in Xinjiang , dubious territorial claims in the South China Sea , and a violent clash with India added to the hostile balance .
Although Trump administration credibility remains minimal , many Asian and European states increasingly share the U.S. criticism of China .
On Hong Kong , in contrast to on COVID-19 , the G-7 issued a critical statement as individual countries consider what specific policies to take .
Several governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offered to welcome Hong Kongers seeking to flee as the city faces the harsh embrace of mainland law .
Many countries have canceled previous extradition agreements .
The European Union ’ s foreign minister , Josep Borrell , said the organization was working on a united response , likely to include export bans on sensitive technology , extradition limits , and expanded visas for Hong Kongers .
Of course , some countries remain reluctant to tangle with China : Germany ’ s response has been tepid , and South Korea , still smarting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over anti-missile deployment , refused to join Washington in denouncing Beijing ’ s Hong Kong policy .
Nevertheless , other governments have taken a tougher approach .
London decided to reverse course and ban the Chinese company Huawei from participating in its 5G infrastructure buildout .
And after the killings in the Galwan Valley , the mood in India is fiercely anti-China , matched with app bans and economic measures by the government .
Although these actions are unlikely to cause Beijing to retreat , they illustrate a way forward for democratic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to penalize The Chinese government while offering an escape opportunity for its victims .
If frequently though prudently pressed , this approach could help constrain if not contain China , tempering its willingness to misuse its growing power .
Collective action , beginning with diplomatic and economic measures , has several advantages .
One is to magnify the impact of even modest individual responses .
If the top dozen or so Western economies restrict visas and bank access to Chinese officials , the impact might be more than symbolic .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concert to address adverse commercial and trade practices likely would force Beijing to address issues without a trade war .
Multiple nations welcoming Hong Kongers increases the options for productive , energetic people while reducing capital and economic growth passed through to the mainland .
A demarche from China ’ s most important economic partners insisting on greater transparency regarding the COVID-19 outbreak would defuse claims that the call for transparency is but an American political ploy .
Moreover , coordinated action would buttress governments more vulnerable to Chinese retaliation .
It would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out any one actor , and other nations could collectively respond to any Chinese attempt to target the weakest link .
The demonstrated willingness of nations to act would encourage more vigorous action by isolating governments tempted to stand aside and leave the work to others .
Even starting slow and small would be beneficial , helping to prepare countries for what could be more serious crises to come .
It would make sense for major Western countries to establish an ongoing consultative mechanism to consider how to best respond to China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and most European nations .
Hong Kong had fallen into a predictable stalemate when Beijing unexpectedly and dramatically broke the deadlock by imposing the new national security law .
Even more dangerous and rushed could be the need to respond to an armed clash in the South China Sea or nearby waters , an intimidation attempt against Taiwan that rapidly escalated , or a serious confrontation between the United States and China .
An early but strong allied response might avoid a later military reaction or escalation .
Swift action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developed a regular communication channel and cooperated before .
Normally one would look to the United States for leadership .
However , in the short term at least , that may prove difficult .
The Trump administration has squandered American credibility , and its own .
Washington has gone out of its way to offend natural allies , especially in Europe .
So bad is the trans-Atlantic relationship that European leaders have continued to lean toward Tehran rather than Washington in response to the latter ’ s demands that they join its so-far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In mid-July , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expanded sanctions on Germany—an extraordinary assault on a longtime ally—in an attempt to halt the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia .
U.S. President Donald Trump has also ostentatiously turned relations with Beijing into a campaign issue , designed to aid his reelection .
Few American allies are eager to see that prospect , and they are unlikely to subordinate their policies to someone widely seen as willing to wreck the international order to advance his electoral prospects .
Nevertheless , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an answer , either a new president or secretary of state , and in any case a less election-minded administration .
Washington needs to relearn how to negotiate and persuade , rather than to dictate and insist .
Broad , responsible , workable cooperation will take time to develop .
Reaching agreement on issues as broad as China ’ s crackdown on human rights , its territorial aggression , Beijing ’ s drive for technological dominance , and the disputes in the Asia-Pacific will be difficult .
Finding genuine solutions—actions likely to achieve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international equivalent of virtue-signaling—will be even tougher .
Nevertheless , cooperating to reach broad agreement on coordinated action is much more likely to shape Chinese behavior than the sort of hysterical huffing and puffing that characterizes the Trump administration .
Equally important , creating a form of international accountability for action would help weed out truly bizarre and counterproductive proposals , such as the talk of banning visas for Chinese Communist Party members and their families—tens of millions of people .
China poses a substantial challenge to the United States and the West @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not set : China faces enormous economic , demographic , and political obstacles itself .
Moreover , Xi will not rule forever , and a future leadership could return to a more responsible , less confrontational path .
But democratic states around the globe have a stake in restraining Chinese misbehavior , which has expanded in scope .
So far , their efforts leave much to be desired—yet the signs of a new purpose are there .
It is incumbent upon the United States to work with allied and friendly states to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peaceful .

After an initially fractious allied response to China’s COVID-19 failures and Hong Kong crackdown, Western nations appear to be acting with greater unity in presenting a response to Beijing. The best hope to restrain the misbehavior of a rising power grown confident, even arrogant, is consistent and coordinated pressure, designed with an off-ramp to encourage negotiation and compromise.
After an initially fractious allied response to China’s COVID-19 failures and Hong Kong crackdown, Western nations appear to be acting with greater unity in presenting a response to Beijing. The best hope to restrain the misbehavior of a rising power grown confident, even arrogant, is consistent and coordinated pressure, designed with an off-ramp to encourage negotiation and compromise.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government has sacrificed whatever goodwill it gained from its success against COVID-19 and limited aid to Europe, even as the Trump administration’s efforts to coerce allies to act against China often backfired. Beijing went from negligence and recklessness to brutality and criminality with its treatment of Hong Kong. Continued mass repression in Xinjiang, dubious territorial claims in the South China Sea, and a violent clash with India added to the hostile balance.
Although Trump administration credibility remains minimal, many Asian and European states increasingly share the U.S. criticism of China. On Hong Kong, in contrast to on COVID-19, the G-7 issued a critical statement as individual countries consider what specific policies to take.
Several governments, led by the United Kingdom, offered to welcome Hong Kongers seeking to flee as the city faces the harsh embrace of mainland law. Many countries have canceled previous extradition agreements.
The European Union’s foreign minister, Josep Borrell, said the organization was working on a united response, likely to include export bans on sensitive technology, extradition limits, and expanded visas for Hong Kongers. Of course, some countries remain reluctant to tangle with China: Germany’s response has been tepid, and South Korea, still smarting from the economic pain inflicted by China over anti-missile deployment, refused to join Washington in denouncing Beijing’s Hong Kong policy. Nevertheless, other governments have taken a tougher approach. London decided to reverse course and ban the Chinese company Huawei from participating in its 5G infrastructure buildout. And after the killings in the Galwan Valley, the mood in India is fiercely anti-China, matched with app bans and economic measures by the government.
Although these actions are unlikely to cause Beijing to retreat, they illustrate a way forward for democratic and industrialized nations. They need concerted action to penalize the Chinese government while offering an escape opportunity for its victims. If frequently though prudently pressed, this approach could help constrain if not contain China, tempering its willingness to misuse its growing power.
Collective action, beginning with diplomatic and economic measures, has several advantages. One is to magnify the impact of even modest individual responses. If the top dozen or so Western economies restrict visas and bank access to Chinese officials, the impact might be more than symbolic. The United States, Europe, and Japan acting in concert to address adverse commercial and trade practices likely would force Beijing to address issues without a trade war. Multiple nations welcoming Hong Kongers increases the options for productive, energetic people while reducing capital and economic growth passed through to the mainland. A demarche from China’s most important economic partners insisting on greater transparency regarding the COVID-19 outbreak would defuse claims that the call for transparency is but an American political ploy.
Moreover, coordinated action would buttress governments more vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. It would be more difficult for Beijing to single out any one actor, and other nations could collectively respond to any Chinese attempt to target the weakest link. The demonstrated willingness of nations to act would encourage more vigorous action by isolating governments tempted to stand aside and leave the work to others. Even starting slow and small would be beneficial, helping to prepare countries for what could be more serious crises to come.
It would make sense for major Western countries to establish an ongoing consultative mechanism to consider how to best respond to China. The coronavirus outbreak was unexpected and surprised the United States and most European nations. Hong Kong had fallen into a predictable stalemate when Beijing unexpectedly and dramatically broke the deadlock by imposing the new national security law.
Even more dangerous and rushed could be the need to respond to an armed clash in the South China Sea or nearby waters, an intimidation attempt against Taiwan that rapidly escalated, or a serious confrontation between the United States and China. An early but strong allied response might avoid a later military reaction or escalation. Swift action would be most likely if countries had developed a regular communication channel and cooperated before.
Normally one would look to the United States for leadership. However, in the short term at least, that may prove difficult. The Trump administration has squandered American credibility, and its own. Washington has gone out of its way to offend natural allies, especially in Europe. So bad is the trans-Atlantic relationship that European leaders have continued to lean toward Tehran rather than Washington in response to the latter’s demands that they join its so-far failed campaign of maximum pressure on Iran. In mid-July, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expanded sanctions on Germany—an extraordinary assault on a longtime ally—in an attempt to halt the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia.
U.S. President Donald Trump has also ostentatiously turned relations with Beijing into a campaign issue, designed to aid his reelection. Few American allies are eager to see that prospect, and they are unlikely to subordinate their policies to someone widely seen as willing to wreck the international order to advance his electoral prospects.
Nevertheless, the Nov. 3 U.S. election could provide an answer, either a new president or secretary of state, and in any case a less election-minded administration. Washington needs to relearn how to negotiate and persuade, rather than to dictate and insist. Broad, responsible, workable cooperation will take time to develop.
Reaching agreement on issues as broad as China’s crackdown on human rights, its territorial aggression, Beijing’s drive for technological dominance, and the disputes in the Asia-Pacific will be difficult. Finding genuine solutions—actions likely to achieve results, as opposed to being the international equivalent of virtue-signaling—will be even tougher. Nevertheless, cooperating to reach broad agreement on coordinated action is much more likely to shape Chinese behavior than the sort of hysterical huffing and puffing that characterizes the Trump administration. Equally important, creating a form of international accountability for action would help weed out truly bizarre and counterproductive proposals, such as the talk of banning visas for Chinese Communist Party members and their families—tens of millions of people.
China poses a substantial challenge to the United States and the West more broadly. However, the future is not set: China faces enormous economic, demographic, and political obstacles itself. Moreover, Xi will not rule forever, and a future leadership could return to a more responsible, less confrontational path. But democratic states around the globe have a stake in restraining Chinese misbehavior, which has expanded in scope. So far, their efforts leave much to be desired—yet the signs of a new purpose are there. It is incumbent upon the United States to work with allied and friendly states to ensure that Beijing’s rise remains peaceful.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-13--Maximum Pressure May Bring Iran Back to the Table After All

Maximum Pressure May Bring Iran Back to the Table After All Iran has not faced such severe economic pressure since the Mongol invasion in the 13th century .
At least that ’ s the view of Saeed Laylaz , a prominent Iranian economist , whose quip was evidently an attempt to shock the Iranian policy elite into action over the country ’ s teetering economy .
Whether or not the Islamic Republic is under as much duress as its medieval predecessor , there is little doubt that the country does face a dire economic situation .
The economy will likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .
Inflation is officially 26 percent and rising , and the rial has reached a historic low against the dollar .
Meanwhile , the government has been unwilling and unable to take more decisive steps to stem the coronavirus pandemic , which has officially claimed more than 19,000 lives , although the actual death toll is likely much higher .
The combined effect of U.S. sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic has left the Iranian economy in a highly vulnerable position .
And things are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes to terms with the fact that its strategy for funding the budget will come up short .
Although the economy is not the only factor in play , the deteriorating conditions certainly raise the odds of talks with the West in the medium term .
Starting in May 2018 , the United States ’ “ maximum pressure ” campaign severed Iran ’ s financial ties to the outside world and devastated its oil exports .
Iran sank into recession , inflation soared , and the foreign exchange market shuddered .
The economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that are endemic in Iran .
About a year after the sanctions were implemented , though , the economy began to show signs of stabilizing .
The government and central bank had brought the rial ’ s value under control , and non-oil trade improved .
Iranian officials and traders focused their attention to their neighbors , on the logic that cross-border trade with countries like Afghanistan , Iraq , and Turkey would be very difficult for the United States to stop .
The economy was not out of the woods , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders could conclude that they had some hope of withstanding U.S. pressure .
But the pandemic dealt the regime a serious blow ; the United States might not have been able to compel Iran ’ s neighbors to shut their borders , but the virus did .
As Afghanistan , Iraq , Turkey , and others took public health precautions and closed border crossings , Iranian businesses suddenly had very limited means for exporting goods .
That reduced the government ’ s access to foreign currency and sent shockwaves through domestic markets .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ across Iranian society .
The government projected confidence in the early days of the crisis , but countering the virus proved much harder .
BBC Persian reported last week that the death toll is likely nearly triple the official numbers , with the number of infections likely twice as large .
The economic impacts have been significant .
As domestic consumption fell and businesses shuttered , hundreds of thousands of Iranians lost their jobs .
The rial has lost 40 percent of its value against the dollar this year and 20 percent since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and corruption .
This spring , the Hassan Rouhani administration rolled out a fiscal stimulus package of about 6 percent of GDP .
That figure is above average for developing countries but is still not up to the task .
The government was unable and unwilling to do more financially : unable , given the state of the country ’ s finances and lack of much external aid , and unwilling , given the prioritization of other spending .
In the midst of the coronavirus outbreak , Tehran ramped up military spending by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accounting for inflation ) , with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps receiving the lion ’ s share of the funding increase .
The pandemic has further exposed the vulnerabilities in the government ’ s budgeting .
Tehran funds its annual expenditures from three main sources : energy exports , tax revenue , and privatizations/bond issuances .
All three are on shaky ground .
Iran built its budget on the deeply unrealistic expectation that it would be able export 1 million barrels per day at $ 50/barrel .
In reality , it will likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around half the price , accounting for the steep discounts Iran offers its buyers .
Tax revenue will almost certainly fall short as well , given the unexpected impact of the coronavirus .
With limited oil and tax revenue , Tehran is doubling down on a privatization scheme , relying on its overheated stock exchange to raise cash .
State-owned companies like Shasta , the massive investment firm , have recently offered shares on the Tehran Stock Exchange to citizens , who have flocked to the promise of high returns .
Egged on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rouhani , the exchange ’ s value has skyrocketed , doubling between mid-March and early June .
And between June and this week , its value doubled again , making it both the best-performing market in the world and likely a bubble that could burst , wiping away the savings of many Iranians .
The government will also try to cover the deficit through a huge amount of bond issuances this year , saddling it with a mountain of debt .
If there is not enough interest , especially given other attractive investments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to government-owned banks to buy the bonds , exacerbating inflationary pressures .
The government could , of course , try to cut expenditures or raise revenues in other ways , such as increasing taxes .
But that would be risky even in better circumstances , and the government does not appear to have the political will to pull it off .
The last time the state tried to decrease subsidies , in November , nationwide demonstrations erupted .
Security forces killed hundreds of protesting citizens .
With the economy under extreme pressure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make ends meet .
They have little choice , given that the political leadership has almost certainly decided to wait until the U.S. election in November before deciding what to do next .
Regardless of who wins the U.S. presidency , any further economic pressure would be difficult for Iranian leaders to stomach .
The United States has assessed that only 10 percent of Iran ’ s foreign currency reserves are accessible , which would mean that Iran has less than $ 10 billion in its emergency fund , equivalent to about four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought a $ 5 billion loan from the IMF , to no avail .
As international trade picks up in the coming months , pressure on the trade deficit will likely ease somewhat , reducing the imminence of a balance-of-payments crisis .
Iran also has untold sums of off-the-books cash collected over the years in religious foundations and the supreme leader ’ s various organizations .
This can provide a cushion , but it ’ s not a sustainable solution .
Whether to negotiate with the United States is ultimately a political , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be highly averse to talking if the attitude from Washington is one of unremitting hostility .
Still , if the U.S. president in January 2021 decides to consider a credible diplomatic path with Tehran , he will find significant economic leverage at his disposal .

Iran has not faced such severe economic pressure since the Mongol invasion in the 13th century. At least that’s the view of Saeed Laylaz , a prominent Iranian economist, whose quip was evidently an attempt to shock the Iranian policy elite into action over the country’s teetering economy.
Iran has not faced such severe economic pressure since the Mongol invasion in the 13th century. At least that’s the view of Saeed Laylaz, a prominent Iranian economist, whose quip was evidently an attempt to shock the Iranian policy elite into action over the country’s teetering economy.
Whether or not the Islamic Republic is under as much duress as its medieval predecessor, there is little doubt that the country does face a dire economic situation. The economy will likely shrink by 6 percent this year, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Inflation is officially 26 percent and rising, and the rial has reached a historic low against the dollar. Meanwhile, the government has been unwilling and unable to take more decisive steps to stem the coronavirus pandemic, which has officially claimed more than 19,000 lives, although the actual death toll is likely much higher.
The combined effect of U.S. sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic has left the Iranian economy in a highly vulnerable position. And things are likely to get worse as the government comes to terms with the fact that its strategy for funding the budget will come up short. Although the economy is not the only factor in play, the deteriorating conditions certainly raise the odds of talks with the West in the medium term.
Starting in May 2018, the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign severed Iran’s financial ties to the outside world and devastated its oil exports. Iran sank into recession, inflation soared, and the foreign exchange market shuddered. The economic pressure compounded the corruption and economic mismanagement that are endemic in Iran.
About a year after the sanctions were implemented, though, the economy began to show signs of stabilizing. The government and central bank had brought the rial’s value under control, and non-oil trade improved. Iranian officials and traders focused their attention to their neighbors, on the logic that cross-border trade with countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey would be very difficult for the United States to stop. The economy was not out of the woods, but by the end of 2019, Iranian leaders could conclude that they had some hope of withstanding U.S. pressure.
But the pandemic dealt the regime a serious blow; the United States might not have been able to compel Iran’s neighbors to shut their borders, but the virus did. As Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, and others took public health precautions and closed border crossings, Iranian businesses suddenly had very limited means for exporting goods. That reduced the government’s access to foreign currency and sent shockwaves through domestic markets.
The pandemic’s effects have rippled across Iranian society. The government projected confidence in the early days of the crisis, but countering the virus proved much harder. BBC Persian reported last week that the death toll is likely nearly triple the official numbers, with the number of infections likely twice as large. The economic impacts have been significant. As domestic consumption fell and businesses shuttered, hundreds of thousands of Iranians lost their jobs. The rial has lost 40 percent of its value against the dollar this year and 20 percent since early June, driven by trade disruptions and corruption.
This spring, the Hassan Rouhani administration rolled out a fiscal stimulus package of about 6 percent of GDP. That figure is above average for developing countries but is still not up to the task. The government was unable and unwilling to do more financially: unable, given the state of the country’s finances and lack of much external aid, and unwilling, given the prioritization of other spending. In the midst of the coronavirus outbreak, Tehran ramped up military spending by 9 percent compared with last year (accounting for inflation), with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps receiving the lion’s share of the funding increase.
The pandemic has further exposed the vulnerabilities in the government’s budgeting. Tehran funds its annual expenditures from three main sources: energy exports, tax revenue, and privatizations/bond issuances. All three are on shaky ground. Iran built its budget on the deeply unrealistic expectation that it would be able export 1 million barrels per day at $50/barrel. In reality, it will likely export about half as much oil at around half the price, accounting for the steep discounts Iran offers its buyers. Tax revenue will almost certainly fall short as well, given the unexpected impact of the coronavirus.
With limited oil and tax revenue, Tehran is doubling down on a privatization scheme, relying on its overheated stock exchange to raise cash. State-owned companies like Shasta, the massive investment firm, have recently offered shares on the Tehran Stock Exchange to citizens, who have flocked to the promise of high returns. Egged on by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Rouhani, the exchange’s value has skyrocketed, doubling between mid-March and early June. And between June and this week, its value doubled again, making it both the best-performing market in the world and likely a bubble that could burst, wiping away the savings of many Iranians. The government will also try to cover the deficit through a huge amount of bond issuances this year, saddling it with a mountain of debt. If there is not enough interest, especially given other attractive investments, the central bank may lend money to government-owned banks to buy the bonds, exacerbating inflationary pressures.
The government could, of course, try to cut expenditures or raise revenues in other ways, such as increasing taxes. But that would be risky even in better circumstances, and the government does not appear to have the political will to pull it off. The last time the state tried to decrease subsidies, in November, nationwide demonstrations erupted. Security forces killed hundreds of protesting citizens.
With the economy under extreme pressure, Iranian policymakers are using short-term strategies to make ends meet. They have little choice, given that the political leadership has almost certainly decided to wait until the U.S. election in November before deciding what to do next.
Regardless of who wins the U.S. presidency, any further economic pressure would be difficult for Iranian leaders to stomach. The United States has assessed that only 10 percent of Iran’s foreign currency reserves are accessible, which would mean that Iran has less than $10 billion in its emergency fund, equivalent to about four months of imports. Iran has also sought a $5 billion loan from the IMF, to no avail. As international trade picks up in the coming months, pressure on the trade deficit will likely ease somewhat, reducing the imminence of a balance-of-payments crisis. Iran also has untold sums of off-the-books cash collected over the years in religious foundations and the supreme leader’s various organizations. This can provide a cushion, but it’s not a sustainable solution.
Whether to negotiate with the United States is ultimately a political, not economic, decision. Tehran will be highly averse to talking if the attitude from Washington is one of unremitting hostility. Still, if the U.S. president in January 2021 decides to consider a credible diplomatic path with Tehran, he will find significant economic leverage at his disposal.