foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--China Backs Off From Fight With K-Pop Fans

China Backs Off From Fight With K-Pop Fans The PRC proved no match for ARMY .
When the K-pop superstar group BTS acknowledged the shared sacrifice of Americans and Koreans as they received the Korea Society ’ s James A .
Van Fleet Award , named after a U.S. general during the Korean War , Chinese social media roiled with outrage , perceiving BTS ’ s message to be a slight against Chinese soldiers in the war .
The Global Times , China ’ s state-owned tabloid , blasted the group for its “ one-sided attitude ” that “ negate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began pulling BTS-related product , anticipating the kind of nationalist frenzy that has cost giant franchises like the NBA and the South Korean supermarket store Lotte hundreds of millions of dollars in the past .
But China ’ s media offensive against the kings of K-pop barely lasted two days .
Global Times quietly deleted some of its articles criticizing BTS , and the negativity against the group in Chinese social media also faded quickly .
Some Chinese fans ’ call for a boycott barely made a dent on BTS , supported by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( which stands for Adorable Representative M.C .
for Youth , if you were wondering ) .
Shortly after they received the Van Fleet Award , BTS became one of only five music groups in history to seize the top two spots simultaneously on Billboard ’ s Hot 100 songs chart , joining the Beatles and Bee Gees among others .
Last week ’ s initial public offering of Big Hit Entertainment , BTS ’ s production company , was among the most successful IPOs in the history of the Korean stock market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first day .
This recent episode is yet another example of an increasingly obvious fact : China is bad at soft power .
Its recent turn toward heightened and obnoxious nationalism is not winning hearts and minds .
Across the globe , negative perception of China is reaching historic highs .
In a recent survey of 14 countries by the Pew Research Center , the average negative opinion of China was 74 percent—up from 36.5 percent in 2002 .
That ’ s in stark contrast to its next-door neighbor South Korea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to many countries when it comes to , ahem , expressive nationalism .
In a 2019 survey conducted by the Korean Culture and Information Service ( KOCIS ) , the average favorability of South Korea among the 15 countries surveyed was a solid 76.7 percent , with over 90 percent favorability ratings from several countries , including Russia , India , Brazil , and Thailand .
South Korea , in other words , is as popular as China is unpopular .
South Korea ’ s pop culture has played a major role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nation : A plurality of the respondents in the same KOCIS survey said K-pop was the first thing that came to mind about South Korea ( 12.5 percent ) , followed by Korean food ( 8.5 percent ) and culture ( 6.5 percent ) .
China would be wise to take a page from South Korea ’ s soft power strategy .
To be sure , the fashionable claim that the “ Korean government created K-pop ” is an overstatement and is usually deployed to discount the artistry and creativity of Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a dreary public works project .
Fundamentally , South Korean pop culture found global resonance because Korea ’ s artists created cultural products that the world found compelling .
But the Korean government did play a role : It wanted to gain soft power through pop culture , devised an overarching strategy to boost its own artists ’ reach , and implemented specific policies conducive to the flowering of pop culture .
Former South Korean President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae-jung was the architect of the country ’ s soft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the right time in 1997 , as South Korea was beginning to see an explosion of pop culture following the transition from military dictatorship in 1987 .
Seo Taiji and Boys , the fountainhead of modern K-pop , debuted in 1992 .
Seopyeonje , a 1993 movie about Korea ’ s traditional pansori music , drew nearly 3 million viewers , becoming the most successful domestic movie to date .
The 1991 megahit What Is Love , with an unreal national household rating of 64.9 percent ( the third-highest ratings for a Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first Korean drama to find popularity in China when CCTV ( now CGTN ) aired the show in 1997 .
Standing at the cusp of this Big Bang , Kim Dae-jung formulated a stance toward pop culture development that continues to this day .
Kim had a great deal of confidence in Korean culture ’ s ability to stand out on the world stage .
He liked to note that although Korea was influenced by Chinese culture for 2,000 years , Korea was never Sinicized unlike , as he saw it , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Manchus of the Qing Empire—because Koreans were able to accept international culture and create their own unique version .
Kim also believed that culture grew through exchanges ; any attempt to shield a culture from international exposure would lead to stagnation .
Most importantly , Kim recognized that the government had a role supporting culture , but it must not overstep its boundaries .
In a 2007 interview that revisited his administration ’ s achievements , Kim made this belief clear : “ Intervention kills the arts .
Creativity must flow freely .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government should support them financially .
Help them with money , but do not intervene.
” This “ support but do not intervene ” came to be known as the “ arm ’ s-length principle ” —the guiding doctrine for South Korea ’ s cultural policy to this day .
Under this principle , the Kim administration focused on promoting freedom in creation and exchange , establishing the legal infrastructure to protect artists ’ right to intellectual property , and providing financial subsidies without reference to the contents of the art .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ movies that effectively acted as censorship .
The ban on Japan ’ s pop culture products was lifted , allowing movies , TV shows , comic books , and music to travel freely across the strait .
Initially , some feared that the superior Japanese product would decimate the Korean market—but the result was the opposite , as Korean dramas and K-pop began to flourish in the Japanese market instead .
Numerous laws were passed to protect intellectual property rights and the flow of money arising from such rights , especially with respect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also provided clarity on the legal status of emerging forms of pop culture at the time , such as video games , live music clubs for indie bands , and online streaming .
Kim promised to dedicate at least 1 percent of the government budget for the promotion of arts , bringing it up from the 0.3 percent range at the time .
His administration achieved this milestone in 1999 ; some of the budget was used to establish the Culture Industry Promotion Fund that provided low-interest loans for content creators .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is the game developer Bluehole , best known for its multiplayer online game PlayerUnknown ’ s Battlegrounds ( PUBG ) , one of the world ’ s most popular e-sports platforms .
All of these policies formed the foundation for what came to be known as hallyu , or the “ Korean wave , ” a global surge of popularity for Korean pop culture products , including movies , TV shows , and music .
Successive South Korean administrations did not always adhere to the Kim administration ’ s arm ’ s-length @ @ @ @ @ @ @ temptation of trying to control culture through pulling on the purse strings .
Conservative President Lee Myung-bak , in an attempt to “ balance the cultural power , ” compiled a blacklist of left-leaning celebrities to cut off from public support .
In the following Park Geun-hye administration , the blacklist grew to include nearly 10,000 names .
Fortunately , however , such attempts to subjugate the arts were never normalized .
When the blacklist was revealed in 2016 , it became one of the flash points for the candlelight protests that brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
With the arm ’ s-length principle restored , South Korea ’ s pop culture has had another banner year in 2020 : In addition to BTS ’ s success , the movie Parasite by Bong Joon-ho—who was one of the first directors to be blacklisted by the Lee and Park administrations—won four Academy Awards , including best picture .
China certainly does not lack the ability to make fantastic pop culture products ; indeed , it was not too long ago that Hong Kong was the cinematic capital of Asia , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John Woo .
What it lacks , instead , is a leadership committed to supporting the arts without intervention and the civil society that would discipline the leadership if it strayed from that principle , as was the case with Kim Dae-jung and South Korea ’ s body politic .
Instead , the controls over pop culture have become tighter and tighter in the last eight years under Xi Jinping .
Chinese leaders who desire greater soft power would do well to heed Kim ’ s simple diagnosis : “ China does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a democracy .
”

The PRC proved no match for ARMY. When the K-pop superstar group BTS acknowledged the shared sacrifice of Americans and Koreans as they received the Korea Society’s James A. Van Fleet Award, named after a U.S. general during the Korean War, Chinese social media roiled with outrage, perceiving BTS’s message to be a slight against Chinese soldiers in the war. The Global Times, China’s state-owned tabloid, blasted the group for its “one-sided attitude” that “negate[d] history.” Online stores began pulling BTS-related product, anticipating the kind of nationalist frenzy that has cost giant franchises like the NBA and the South Korean supermarket store Lotte hundreds of millions of dollars in the past.
The PRC proved no match for ARMY. When the K-pop superstar group BTS acknowledged the shared sacrifice of Americans and Koreans as they received the Korea Society’s James A. Van Fleet Award, named after a U.S. general during the Korean War, Chinese social media roiled with outrage, perceiving BTS’s message to be a slight against Chinese soldiers in the war. The Global Times, China’s state-owned tabloid, blasted the group for its “one-sided attitude” that “negate[d] history.” Online stores began pulling BTS-related product, anticipating the kind of nationalist frenzy that has cost giant franchises like the NBA and the South Korean supermarket store Lotte hundreds of millions of dollars in the past.
But China’s media offensive against the kings of K-pop barely lasted two days. Global Times quietly deleted some of its articles criticizing BTS, and the negativity against the group in Chinese social media also faded quickly. Some Chinese fans’ call for a boycott hardly made a dent on BTS, supported by their worldwide fan club “ARMY” (which stands for Adorable Representative M.C. for Youth, if you were wondering). Shortly after they received the Van Fleet Award, BTS became one of only five music groups in history to seize the top two spots simultaneously on Billboard’s Hot 100 songs chart, joining the Beatles and Bee Gees among others. Last week’s initial public offering of Big Hit Entertainment, BTS’s production company, was among the most successful IPOs in the history of the Korean stock market as its share price nearly doubled on the first day.
This recent episode is yet another example of an increasingly obvious fact: China is bad at soft power. Its recent turn toward heightened and obnoxious nationalism is not winning hearts and minds. Across the globe, negative perception of China is reaching historic highs. In a recent survey of 14 countries by the Pew Research Center, the average negative opinion of China was 74 percent—up from 36.5 percent in 2002. That’s in stark contrast to its next-door neighbor South Korea, which does not take a back seat to many countries when it comes to, ahem, expressive nationalism. In a 2019 survey conducted by the Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS), the average favorability of South Korea among the 15 countries surveyed was a solid 76.7 percent, with over 90 percent favorability ratings from several countries, including Russia, India, Brazil, and Thailand. South Korea, in other words, is as popular as China is unpopular. South Korea’s pop culture has played a major role in the world’s positive image of the nation: A plurality of the respondents in the same KOCIS survey said K-pop was the first thing that came to mind about South Korea (12.5 percent), followed by Korean food (8.5 percent) and culture (6.5 percent).
China would be wise to take a page from South Korea’s soft power strategy. To be sure, the fashionable claim that “the Korean government created K-pop” is an overstatement and is usually deployed to discount the artistry and creativity of Korea’s pop culture by painting it as a dreary public works project. Fundamentally, South Korean pop culture found global resonance because Korea’s artists created cultural products that the world found compelling. But the Korean government did play a role: It wanted to gain soft power through pop culture, devised an overarching strategy to boost its own artists’ reach, and implemented specific policies conducive to the flowering of pop culture.
Former South Korean President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae-jung was the architect of the country’s soft power strategy. Kim won office at the right time in 1997, as South Korea was beginning to see an explosion of pop culture following the transition from military dictatorship in 1987. Seo Taiji and Boys, the fountainhead of modern K-pop, debuted in 1992. Seopyeonje, a 1993 movie about Korea’s traditional pansori music, drew nearly 3 million viewers, becoming the most successful domestic movie to date. The 1991 megahit What Is Love, with an unreal national household rating of 64.9 percent (the third-highest ratings for a Korean drama ever), was also the first Korean drama to find popularity in China when CCTV (now CGTN) aired the show in 1997. Standing at the cusp of this Big Bang, Kim Dae-jung formulated a stance toward pop culture development that continues to this day.
Kim had a great deal of confidence in Korean culture’s ability to stand out on the world stage. He liked to note that although Korea was influenced by Chinese culture for 2,000 years, Korea was never Sinicized unlike, as he saw it, the Mongols of the Yuan Empire or the Manchus of the Qing Empire—because Koreans were able to accept international culture and create their own unique version. Kim also believed that culture grew through exchanges; any attempt to shield a culture from international exposure would lead to stagnation. Most importantly, Kim recognized that the government had a role supporting culture but that it must not overstep its boundaries. In a 2007 interview that revisited his administration’s achievements, Kim made this belief clear: “Intervention kills the arts. Creativity must flow freely. But artists are economically weak, so the government should support them financially. Help them with money, but do not intervene.”
This “support but do not intervene” mantra came to be known as the “arm’s-length principle”—the guiding doctrine for South Korea’s cultural policy to this day. Under this principle, the Kim administration focused on promoting freedom in creation and exchange, establishing the legal infrastructure to protect artists’ right to intellectual property, and providing financial subsidies without reference to the contents of the art. The administration abolished the approval process for movies that effectively acted as censorship. The ban on Japan’s pop culture products was lifted, allowing movies, TV shows, comic books, and music to travel freely across the strait. Initially, some feared that the superior Japanese product would decimate the Korean market—but the result was the opposite, as Korean dramas and K-pop began to flourish in the Japanese market instead.
Numerous laws were passed to protect intellectual property rights and the flow of money arising from such rights, especially with respect to movies and music. The laws also provided clarity on the legal status of emerging forms of pop culture at the time, such as video games, live music clubs for indie bands, and online streaming. Kim promised to dedicate at least 1 percent of the government budget for the promotion of arts, bringing it up from the 0.3 percent range at the time. His administration achieved this milestone in 1999; some of the budget was used to establish the Culture Industry Promotion Fund that provided low-interest loans for content creators. One beneficiary of this fund, for example, is the game developer Bluehole, best known for its multiplayer online game PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds (PUBG), one of the world’s most popular e-sports platforms. All of these policies formed the foundation for what came to be known as hallyu, or the “Korean wave,” a global surge of popularity for Korean pop culture products, including movies, TV shows, and music.
Successive South Korean administrations did not always adhere to the Kim administration’s arm’s-length rule, as they gave in to the temptation of trying to control culture through pulling on the purse strings. Conservative President Lee Myung-bak, in an attempt to “balance the cultural power,” compiled a blacklist of left-leaning celebrities to cut off from public support. In the following Park Geun-hye administration, the blacklist grew to include nearly 10,000 names. Fortunately, however, such attempts to subjugate the arts were never normalized. When the blacklist was revealed in 2016, it became one of the flash points for the candlelight protests that brought down Park’s presidency through impeachment. With the arm’s-length principle restored, South Korea’s pop culture has had another banner year in 2020: In addition to BTS’s success, the movie Parasite by Bong Joon-ho—who was one of the first directors to be blacklisted by the Lee and Park administrations—won four Academy Awards, including best picture.
China certainly does not lack the ability to make fantastic pop culture products; indeed, it was not too long ago that Hong Kong was the cinematic capital of Asia, with masterpieces from directors like Wong Kar-wai and John Woo. What it lacks, instead, is a leadership committed to supporting the arts without intervention and the civil society that would discipline the leadership if it strayed from that principle, as was the case with Kim Dae-jung and South Korea’s body politic. Instead, the controls over pop culture have become tighter and tighter in the last eight years under Xi Jinping. Chinese leaders who desire greater soft power would do well to heed Kim’s simple diagnosis: “China does not have anything like hallyu because it is not a democracy.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Start Preparing for the Coming Debt Crisis

This article is part of Election 2020 : What We ’ re Missing , FP ’ s series of daily takes by leading global thinkers on the most important foreign-policy issues not being talked about during the presidential election campaign .
The next U.S. administration will likely face a global debt crisis that could dwarf what the world experienced in 2008-2009 .
To prevent the worst , it will need to address the burdensome debt plaguing both the United States and the global economy .
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic paralyzed economies around the world , economists were warning about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States : A surge in spending to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the pandemic has brought the total public debt in the United States to over 100 percent of GDP—its highest level since 1946 and a hurdle that will create a considerable drag on future economic growth .
Other types of debt—household , auto , and student loans , as well as credit card debt—have seen similar surges .
Almost 20 percent of U.S. corporations have become zombie companies that are unable to generate enough cash flow to service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and only survive thanks to continued loans and bailouts .
Multiply that across the globe .
Total global debt stands at an unsustainable 320 percent of GDP .
Perhaps more worrisome , China is now an important creditor , which adds a geopolitical dimension to the concerns over debt .
China is the largest foreign lender not only to the United States , but to many emerging economies .
This gives the Chinese political class enormous leverage .
Naturally , the combination of strained U.S.-Chinese relations and the dependence of many advanced and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment limits the scope for negotiations on debt restructuring or moratoriums .
A new administration will need to act quickly and deftly to avoid outright default scenarios at home and abroad .
The global picture has become even more complicated because many of the conventional ways to manage excess debt no longer look like credible options .
For instance , with the IMF projecting the global economy to contract by 4.4 percent in 2020 , it looks unlikely that countries can simply grow their way out of debt .
Conventional or even unconventional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any relief—interest rates in most developed economies are already historically low and even negative , and central banks ’ balance sheets are stretched from the policies they have followed since the 2008 financial crisis and expanded in the course of the pandemic .
Piling debt on top of debt seems to have reached a dead end .
A growing number of economists and policymakers are beginning to talk about the need to shift to a new , possibly digital monetary regime whose contours remain unclear .
With the pandemic and its economic fallout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be the next administration that will have to manage this complicated domestic and international transition with all its potential for financial , social , and political instability .
Even short of such a challenging transition , policymakers in a new administration will need to act quickly and deftly to avoid outright default scenarios at home and abroad .
Default would severely limit the ability of governments to address urgent concerns such as public health , economic recovery , and climate change .
A full-fledged debt crisis would be devastating to the whole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ progress .

The next U.S. administration will likely face a global debt crisis that could dwarf what the world experienced in 2008-2009. To prevent the worst, it will need to address the burdensome debt plaguing both the United States and the global economy.
The next U.S. administration will likely face a global debt crisis that could dwarf what the world experienced in 2008-2009. To prevent the worst, it will need to address the burdensome debt plaguing both the United States and the global economy.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic paralyzed economies around the world, economists were warning about unsustainable debt in many countries. Take the United States: A surge in spending to mitigate the health and economic impacts of the pandemic has brought the total public debt in the United States to over 100 percent of GDP—its highest level since 1946 and a hurdle that will create a considerable drag on future economic growth. Other types of debt—household, auto, and student loans, as well as credit card debt—have seen similar surges. Almost 20 percent of U.S. corporations have become zombie companies that are unable to generate enough cash flow to service even the interest on their debt, and only survive thanks to continued loans and bailouts.
A new administration will need to act quickly and deftly to avoid outright default scenarios at home and abroad.
Multiply that across the globe. Total global debt stands at an unsustainable 320 percent of GDP. Perhaps more worrisome, China is now an important creditor, which adds a geopolitical dimension to the concerns over debt. China is the largest foreign lender not only to the United States, but to many emerging economies. This gives the Chinese political class enormous leverage. Naturally, the combination of strained U.S.-Chinese relations and the dependence of many advanced and developing countries on continued Chinese credit and investment limits the scope for negotiations on debt restructuring or moratoriums.
The global picture has become even more complicated because many of the conventional ways to manage excess debt no longer look like credible options. For instance, with the IMF projecting the global economy to contract by 4.4 percent in 2020, it looks unlikely that countries can simply grow their way out of debt. Conventional or even unconventional monetary policies are also unlikely to provide any relief—interest rates in most developed economies are already historically low and even negative, and central banks’ balance sheets are stretched from the policies they have followed since the 2008 financial crisis and expanded in the course of the pandemic. Piling debt on top of debt seems to have reached a dead end.
A growing number of economists and policymakers are beginning to talk about the need to shift to a new, possibly digital monetary regime whose contours remain unclear. With the pandemic and its economic fallout showing little sign of abating, it could be the next administration that will have to manage this complicated domestic and international transition with all its potential for financial, social, and political instability.
Even short of such a challenging transition, policymakers in a new administration will need to act quickly and deftly to avoid outright default scenarios at home and abroad. Default would severely limit the ability of governments to address urgent concerns such as public health, economic recovery, and climate change. A full-fledged debt crisis would be devastating to the whole global economy—and to the prospects for human progress.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Trump Moves Closer to Renewing Nuclear Treaty With Russia

The United States and Russia appear to be closer to clinching a deal to extend the Barack Obama-era New START arms control treaty , after Russian negotiators publicly conceded to a freeze on the number of nuclear warheads in exchange for a one-year extension of the agreement , according to new statements from U.S. and Russian officials .
The Wall Street Journal first reported that the Trump administration was near a deal with Russian negotiators , something that U.S. President Donald Trump has pushed for ahead of the November election despite calls within the administration for a more expansive agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear power .
If a last-minute agreement is reached , it could avert the collapse of one of the most important nuclear arms agreements in the post-Cold War era and give the Trump administration an opening to tout a foreign-policy achievement ahead of the contentious 2020 elections .
“ We appreciate the Russian Federation ’ s willingness to make progress on the issue of nuclear arms control , ” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in a statement on Tuesday .
“ The United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ empower its diplomats to do the same.
” But hurdles remain , and there appears to be daylight between U.S. and Russian statements on key remaining issues .
While the Russian statement on Tuesday ceded ground to U.S. negotiators on warheads , it did not offer stepped-up verification protocols to ensure that it would abide by the freeze .
“ Russia wants an unverified warhead freeze .
It would be very difficult to monitor through intelligence collection , ” tweeted James Acton , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States would presumably … continue to produce new warheads , while dismantling old ones.
” Trump ’ s top arms control negotiator , Marshall Billingslea , is expected to brief NATO allies on the developments this week .
Senior European and NATO officials have voiced concerns about the status of the talks in recent months .
After the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia in 2019 , they urged the United States to not abandon New START before its scheduled expiration in February , lest it risk the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the post-Cold War era .
In recent reports to Congress , the Trump administration has repeatedly acknowledged that Russia has remained in compliance with New START—unlike other Cold War-era arms control treaties—but it has raised questions about whether the deal remains in U.S. interests .
The statements on Tuesday marked a major shift from the administration .
Russian President Vladimir Putin last week called for an unconditional renewal of the deal , causing Trump ’ s National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien to urge Moscow to rethink its position “ before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the remaining issues that U.S. and Russian negotiators would need to hash out before such a deal is secured are the definitions of a warhead and how each side would verify compliance with the warhead freeze .
Billingslea , the top negotiator , has called for a more rigorous inspection regime under a fresh New START agreement than in the original 2010 deal signed under the Obama administration .
Still , it ’ s a major step forward after New START negotiations sputtered and stalled in recent months , as the Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to include China .
Officials in Beijing refused to entertain such an offer .
The rift led to a minor and clumsy diplomatic spat over social media that reflected the sharp disagreements between the United States and China .
Trump appeared to shift gears and abandon his proposal on trilateral talks the following month , when he called for a deal with Russia first before engaging with China .

The United States and Russia appear to be closer to clinching a deal to extend the Barack Obama-era New START arms control treaty, after Russian negotiators publicly conceded to a freeze on the number of nuclear warheads in exchange for a one-year extension of the agreement, according to new statements from U.S. and Russian officials.
The United States and Russia appear to be closer to clinching a deal to extend the Barack Obama-era New START arms control treaty, after Russian negotiators publicly conceded to a freeze on the number of nuclear warheads in exchange for a one-year extension of the agreement, according to new statements from U.S. and Russian officials.
The Wall Street Journal first reported that the Trump administration was near a deal with Russian negotiators, something that U.S. President Donald Trump has pushed for ahead of the November election despite calls within the administration for a more expansive agreement that would include China, another rising nuclear power.
If a last-minute agreement is reached, it could avert the collapse of one of the most important nuclear arms agreements in the post-Cold War era and give the Trump administration an opening to tout a foreign-policy achievement ahead of the contentious 2020 elections.
“We appreciate the Russian Federation’s willingness to make progress on the issue of nuclear arms control,” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in a statement on Tuesday. “The United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement. We expect Russia to empower its diplomats to do the same.”
But hurdles remain, and there appears to be daylight between U.S. and Russian statements on key remaining issues. While the Russian statement on Tuesday ceded ground to U.S. negotiators on warheads, it did not offer stepped-up verification protocols to ensure that it would abide by the freeze.
“Russia wants an unverified warhead freeze. It would be very difficult to monitor through intelligence collection,” tweeted James Acton, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Both Russia and the United States would presumably … continue to produce new warheads, while dismantling old ones.”
Trump’s top arms control negotiator, Marshall Billingslea, is expected to brief NATO allies on the developments this week. Senior European and NATO officials have voiced concerns about the status of the talks in recent months. After the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia in 2019, they urged the United States to not abandon New START before its scheduled expiration in February, lest it risk the collapse of the entire arms control architecture in the post-Cold War era.
In recent reports to Congress, the Trump administration has repeatedly acknowledged that Russia has remained in compliance with New START—unlike other Cold War-era arms control treaties—but it has raised questions about whether the deal remains in U.S. interests.
The statements on Tuesday marked a major shift from the administration. Russian President Vladimir Putin last week called for an unconditional renewal of the deal, causing Trump’s National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien to urge Moscow to rethink its position “before a costly arms race ensues.” Among the remaining issues that U.S. and Russian negotiators would need to hash out before such a deal is secured are the definitions of a warhead and how each side would verify compliance with the warhead freeze. Billingslea, the top negotiator, has called for a more rigorous inspection regime under a fresh New START agreement than in the original 2010 deal signed under the Obama administration.
Still, it’s a major step forward after New START negotiations sputtered and stalled in recent months, as the Trump administration initially tried to extend the nuclear treaty to include China. Officials in Beijing refused to entertain such an offer. The rift led to a minor and clumsy diplomatic spat over social media that reflected the sharp disagreements between the United States and China.
Trump appeared to shift gears and abandon his proposal on trilateral talks the following month, when he called for a deal with Russia first before engaging with China.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--The Canadian Women Who Changed Trump’s Mind on Tariffs

The Canadian Women Who Changed Trump ’ s Mind on Tariffs When the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump decided to reimpose tariffs on Canadian aluminum in August—claiming there was too much aluminum headed south to the United States—it looked like an electoral stunt .
After all , two U.S. companies in red states key to Trump ’ s reelection had been actively pushing for tariffs ’ return .
Given the stakes , Canadian policymakers thought it unlikely that the tariffs would be lifted before the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election .
Ottawa nevertheless tried to overturn Washington ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ succeeded .
On Sept.15 , Washington backed down .
It was a Canadian victory in this latest tit-for-tat , won through skillful coordination and the imposition of countertariffs .
And the negotiators credited with changing Trump ’ s mind ?
They ’ re all women .
“ Yesterday ’ s decision by the U.S. administration to remove unjustified tariffs on Canadian aluminum was the right thing to do , ” Canada ’ s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said on Sept. 16 .
He thanked Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland , Minister of Small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington Kirsten Hillman , the first woman to ever represent Canada in Washington , “ for their hard work on this important issue.
” “ We had a trio of formidable Canadian women who probably , just by chance , happened to be at the helm of the negotiating decision-making and influencing crossroads , ” Jean Simard , the president of Canada ’ s Aluminum association , said .
“ Those women were very studious , knew their files like you only see people at that level , which gave them an edge.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the three , has been Ottawa ’ s resident problem-solver since the early days of the Trudeau government .
She successfully renegotiated the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement ( USMCA ) while she was minister of foreign affairs and was recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister , a role in which she handles the sometimes tense relationship between Canada ’ s provinces .
In August , Trudeau tapped Freeland to be minister of finance after the acting minister quit amid the government ’ s entanglement in a corruption scandal .
Even after leaving the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fixture in U.S.-Canadian relations .
Even after leaving the Foreign Affairs Ministry , Freeland has remained a fixture in U.S.-Canadian relations , so her involvement in changing Washington ’ s mind on aluminum tariffs was not surprising .
But she didn ’ t do it alone .
Rather , Freeland coupled her diplomatic expertise with issue-area knowledge of Ng and Hillman .
Hillman , Canada ’ s ambassador in Washington , has a long résumé working on the U.S.-Canadian trade relationship ; Ng is an experienced parliamentarian who inherited the Canadian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ portfolio in 2018 .
Also critical of Washington ’ s August surprise was Catherine Loubier , Quebec ’ s representative in New York .
Quebec is by far Canada ’ s largest aluminum producer ; as such , aluminum is one of Loubier ’ s top priorities .
( “ In Quebec , it ’ s 30,000 jobs and 1,500 companies , ” she said . )
Well before the tariffs came into effect over the summer , she had launched a nationwide campaign in the United States .
Together , the women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to counter Trump ’ s claims that Canada was “ taking advantage of us as usual , ” and that Canada ’ s aluminum was a threat to national security .
Trump ’ s claims that Canada was taking advantage of the United States on aluminum relate to the pandemic .
In June , Robert Lighthizer claimed that U.S. import of Canada ’ s aluminum “ have surged above historical levels ” from May 2019 to June 2020 .
Canada argues the surplus is circumstantial .
Prior to the pandemic , in early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States decreased because of railroad blockades in Canada .
When the pandemic hit , though , Canadian smelters—like those elsewhere in the world—didn ’ t shut down and continued to produce and export raw materials .
What the U.S. administration didn ’ t take into account is that , while the export of raw Canadian aluminum did in fact increase over the summer , exports of other aluminum products fell .
“ We shut down the economy , ” Freeland said , “ especially the manufacturing economy , and that had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aluminum exports to the United States.
” Canada ’ s aluminum production depends on its access to cheap hydroelectricity—which makes it hard for American companies to compete .
So two U.S. companies , Magnitude 7 and Century Aluminum , pressured the Trump administration to reinstate tariffs .
Magnitude 7 claims it was saved by the first round of tariffs ; earlier in 2020 , the firm warned its losses could push it to close .
Meanwhile , the U.S. aluminum association opposed the new tariffs , saying that , after the successful USMCA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shame to move backward by reapplying tariffs or quotas on aluminum.
” But both Magnitude 7 and Century Aluminum are in states key to Trump ’ s reelection—Kentucky and Missouri , respectively—indicating that Trump ’ s tariffs may have been less economic strategy than electoral bargain .
Trump ’ s tariffs may have been less economic strategy than electoral bargain .
Century Aluminum and Magnitude 7 did not answer requests for interviews .
With U.S. firms central to Trump ’ s push , the Quebec mission opted to reach out to as many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-American counternarrative against tariffs rather than focusing solely on the Canadian side of the equation .
Products produced in the United States and Canada tend to cross the border many times throughout production , so tariffs can be detrimental to manufacturers in the United States , too .
“ [ This ] was not an operation where we would just try to make them aware that this is happening , ” Loubier said .
“ It was really putting a sort of a fire under a desk and saying how this is affecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up with a “ dollar to dollar ” countertariff strategy , which was supposed to be put in place two hours after Washington changed its mind .
According to CBC News , “ the preliminary list of counter-tariffs included a disproportionate number of products from U.S. swing states that will determine Trump ’ s fate in the Nov. 3 presidential election.
” In the end , as Freeland noted , “ the United States… [ chose ] to unilaterally lift its tariffs.
” Part of that was the Canadian team ’ s negotiating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emerged that painted a different story than the one presented by the Trump administration .
Data published in August revealed the aluminum trade balance became more equal between the U.S. and Canada over the past year , and showed no increase in Canadian total exports whatsoever .
“ Facts are facts and evidence is evidence , ” Loubier said .
While the threat of tariffs is still looming— they could technically be reimposed at any time—for the time being , the storm has passed .
The coronavirus pandemic has the Canada-United States relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebuilding it than stoking further tension .
This summer , Loubier , along with the Canadian American Business Council , launched North American Rebound , a campaign that aims to rally business voices against protectionism .
So far , 654,400 businesses and chambers of commerce have signed on the initiative in the United States and Canada .
Working closely with Loubier on North American Rebound is the President of the Canada-U.S. Chamber of Commerce—who is , once again , a woman : Maryscott Greenwood .
But Ottawa isn ’ t celebrating yet ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constantly walking on eggshells with the Trump administration .
“ There are no guarantees going forward , ” Freeland said , “ as we have learned , there are [ none ] in our trading relationship with this administration .
”

When the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump decided to reimpose tariffs on Canadian aluminum in August—claiming there was too much aluminum headed south to the United States—it looked like an electoral stunt. After all, two U.S. companies in red states key to Trump’s reelection had been actively pushing for tariffs’ return.
When the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump decided to reimpose tariffs on Canadian aluminum in August—claiming there was too much aluminum headed south to the United States—it looked like an electoral stunt. After all, two U.S. companies in red states key to Trump’s reelection had been actively pushing for tariffs’ return.
Given the stakes, Canadian policymakers thought it unlikely that the tariffs would be lifted before the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election. Ottawa nevertheless tried to overturn Washington’s decision. And, surprisingly, it succeeded.
On Sept.15, Washington backed down. It was a Canadian victory in this latest tit-for-tat, won through skillful coordination and the imposition of countertariffs. And the negotiators credited with changing Trump’s mind? They’re all women.
“Yesterday’s decision by the U.S. administration to remove unjustified tariffs on Canadian aluminum was the right thing to do,” Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said on Sept. 16. He thanked Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Small Business Mary Ng, and Ambassador to Washington Kirsten Hillman, the first woman to ever represent Canada in Washington, “for their hard work on this important issue.”
“We had a trio of formidable Canadian women who probably, just by chance, happened to be at the helm of the negotiating decision-making and influencing crossroads,” Jean Simard, the president of Canada’s Aluminum association, said. “Those women were very studious, knew their files like you only see people at that level, which gave them an edge.”
Freeland, the most well-known of the three, has been Ottawa’s resident problem-solver since the early days of the Trudeau government. She successfully renegotiated the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) while she was minister of foreign affairs and was recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister, a role in which she handles the sometimes tense relationship between Canada’s provinces. In August, Trudeau tapped Freeland to be minister of finance after the acting minister quit amid the government’s entanglement in a corruption scandal.
Even after leaving the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Freeland has remained a fixture in U.S.-Canadian relations.
Even after leaving the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Freeland has remained a fixture in U.S.-Canadian relations, so her involvement in changing Washington’s mind on aluminum tariffs was not surprising. But she didn’t do it alone. Rather, Freeland coupled her diplomatic expertise with issue-area knowledge of Ng and Hillman. Hillman, Canada’s ambassador in Washington, has a long résumé working on the U.S.-Canadian trade relationship; Ng is an experienced parliamentarian who inherited the Canadian government’s export promotion and small business portfolio in 2018.
Also critical of Washington’s August surprise was Catherine Loubier, Quebec’s representative in New York. Quebec is by far Canada’s largest aluminum producer; as such, aluminum is one of Loubier’s top priorities. (“In Quebec, it’s 30,000 jobs and 1,500 companies,” she said.) Well before the tariffs came into effect over the summer, she had launched a nationwide campaign in the United States.
Together, the women were able to speak with one voice to counter Trump’s claims that Canada was “taking advantage of us as usual,” and that Canada’s aluminum was a threat to national security.
Trump’s claims that Canada was taking advantage of the United States on aluminum relate to the pandemic. In June, Robert Lighthizer claimed that U.S. import of Canada’s aluminum “have surged above historical levels” from May 2019 to June 2020. Canada argues the surplus is circumstantial. Prior to the pandemic, in early 2020, export of Canadian aluminum to the United States decreased because of railroad blockades in Canada. When the pandemic hit, though, Canadian smelters—like those elsewhere in the world—didn’t shut down and continued to produce and export raw materials. What the U.S. administration didn’t take into account is that, while the export of raw Canadian aluminum did in fact increase over the summer, exports of other aluminum products fell.
“We shut down the economy,” Freeland said, “especially the manufacturing economy, and that had an effect on the composition of our aluminum exports to the United States.” Canada’s aluminum production depends on its access to cheap hydroelectricity—which makes it hard for American companies to compete. So two U.S. companies, Magnitude 7 and Century Aluminum, pressured the Trump administration to reinstate tariffs.
Magnitude 7 claims it was saved by the first round of tariffs; earlier in 2020, the firm warned its losses could push it to close. Meanwhile, the U.S. aluminum association opposed the new tariffs, saying that, after the successful USMCA negotiations, “it would be a shame to move backward by reapplying tariffs or quotas on aluminum.” But both Magnitude 7 and Century Aluminum are in states key to Trump’s reelection—Kentucky and Missouri, respectively—indicating that Trump’s tariffs may have been less economic strategy than electoral bargain.
Trump’s tariffs may have been less economic strategy than electoral bargain.
Century Aluminum and Magnitude 7 did not answer requests for interviews.
With U.S. firms central to Trump’s push, the Quebec mission opted to reach out to as many U.S. representatives as possible, mounting a pro-American counternarrative against tariffs rather than focusing solely on the Canadian side of the equation. Products produced in the United States and Canada tend to cross the border many times throughout production, so tariffs can be detrimental to manufacturers in the United States, too. “[This] was not an operation where we would just try to make them aware that this is happening,” Loubier said. “It was really putting a sort of a fire under a desk and saying how this is affecting you.”
The Canadian team also came up with a “dollar to dollar” countertariff strategy, which was supposed to be put in place two hours after Washington changed its mind. According to CBC News, “the preliminary list of counter-tariffs included a disproportionate number of products from U.S. swing states that will determine Trump’s fate in the Nov. 3 presidential election.”
In the end, as Freeland noted, “the United States…[chose] to unilaterally lift its tariffs.” Part of that was the Canadian team’s negotiating, but part was new data that emerged that painted a different story than the one presented by the Trump administration. Data published in August revealed the aluminum trade balance became more equal between the U.S. and Canada over the past year, and showed no increase in Canadian total exports whatsoever. “Facts are facts and evidence is evidence,” Loubier said.
While the threat of tariffs is still looming— they could technically be reimposed at any time—for the time being, the storm has passed. The coronavirus pandemic has shaken the Canada-United States relationship, and leaders are more focused on rebuilding it than stoking further tension. This summer, Loubier, along with the Canadian American Business Council, launched North American Rebound, a campaign that aims to rally business voices against protectionism. So far, 654,400 businesses and chambers of commerce have signed on the initiative in the United States and Canada.
Working closely with Loubier on North American Rebound is the President of the Canada-U.S. Chamber of Commerce—who is, once again, a woman: Maryscott Greenwood. But Ottawa isn’t celebrating yet; Canada is well aware that it is constantly walking on eggshells with the Trump administration. “There are no guarantees going forward,” Freeland said, “as we have learned, there are [none] in our trading relationship with this administration.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--In South Africa, Police Violence Isn’t Black and White

Sometimes an unjust killing reveals all the hidden scars of a nation .
An innocent 16-year-old teenager , Nathaniel Julies , was shot dead by police on the evening of Wednesday , Aug. 26 near Johannesburg .
This violent act was remarkable for many reasons despite South Africa ’ s familiarity with violence : Nathaniel was merely on his way to buy a biscuit at a nearby shop , and was killed a few meters from his home , for no apparent reason .
He was a popular kid who had Down ’ s syndrome—and everyone in the community loved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quick to burst into dance .
His killing felt like one gratuitous police assault too many on the entire neighborhood .
The racial dynamics of this case—and of South Africa more generally—tend to confuse most outside observers .
While the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States is straightforwardly about Black people pushing back against anti-Black racism , South Africa ’ s situation is more complicated .
The country ’ s apartheid and colonial histories introduced more fine-grained racial classifications that drew an administrative and sociopolitical wedge between Black people and so-called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heritage ) .
In Eldorado Park , the brutality of the largely Black police force left Nathaniel ’ s predominantly coloured community furious .
The killing affirmed locals ’ deeply held belief that they were marginalized and trampled on during the apartheid era under white supremacist rule , and now face a similar fate during the post-apartheid period under Black leaders .
Their anger , in other words , stems in an important respect from the fact that they identify as neither Black nor white .
It was all the more significant because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ herself a coloured woman .
The deepest source of rage in the community is that the police are seen as representatives of the country ’ s Black-led government and are perceived as institutionally racist against coloured people .
Regardless of how individual officers look , the force is simply not trusted by a community that has experienced too much brutality from those meant to enforce law and order .
A closer look at Black-coloured relations reinforces just how abominable colonialism and apartheid were and allows outsiders a clearer understanding of South Africa ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the apartheid government came to power in 1948 , it passed legislation that defined each race group .
Every person was designated a race according to the state ’ s arbitrary criteria .
These included skin color , hair texture , the shape and size of one ’ s nose , and even whether you “ passed ” certain unscientific tests like a pencil being stuck in your hair to see whether it fell out or not—an apparent indicator of whether you may be white , coloured , or Black .
There were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arbitrarily defined , and your race depended on the whimsical judgment of a white state bureaucrat .
This led to ridiculous and unjust scenarios in which families could be torn apart because officials assigned different members to different race groups .
The apartheid regime ’ s divide-and-rule tactics worked well for white supremacists to the extent that , over the course of the country ’ s history , many coloured people internalized the fiction that we were not Black .
These classifications were accompanied by laws that compelled people to only live in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group .
This apartheid spatial geography is how coloured and Black communities came to be further separated from each other .
It was a divide-and-rule tactic and worked well for white supremacists to the extent that , over the course of the country ’ s history , many coloured people internalized the fiction that we were not Black .
This belief was prevalent in my neighborhood , too .
I grew up in Grahamstown , a South African frontier city named after a colonial-era Scottish soldier , Colonel John Graham , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indigenous Xhosa people as part of Britain ’ s racist , colonial project to expand its empire across the world .
Only recently ( in 2018 ) did the name of the city change to Makhanda , a Xhosa warrior and prophet who had led an attack against the British garrison in Grahamstown in 1819 .
This change signaled the commitment to remembering resistance to empire .
But name changes can not mask the enduring legacies of colonialism that still define the geography of the city .
The neighborhood where I spent most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ homogenous .
I grew up hearing people in my neighborhood being referred to as coloured or brown .
We were , mostly , of mixed racial heritage .
These definitions were also framed in the negative : coloured or brown people are neither white nor Black .
We spoke Afrikaans , not English or Xhosa , and we self-identified as a distinctive cultural and racial grouping .
I have many warm and positive memories of my early childhood , but I also have distinctly shameful memories of casual anti-Black racism and bigotry .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ get my sisters and I to draw the curtains in our bedroom at night was to scare us by saying that “ the Bantu ” would stare at us while we slept if we did not close the curtains .
Bantu was a racist term for a Black person .
My mom knew that we had been raised to think of “ the Bantu ” as a scary monster , and so she could draw from the well of anti-Black racist sentiment among coloureds to get us to behave .
One of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that many poor and working-class families have domestic workers .
In my community , domestic workers and gardeners were mostly Black .
Some were treated decently but many were also badly mistreated by coloured families .
I recall witnessing lots of abuse and prejudices , from a refusal to use the Xhosa names of the workers and giving them English names instead—Mavis and Regina were especially popular choices—to accusations of theft , without due process , that could lead to dismissals on the spot .
Spatial segregation and political divide-and-rule tactics nonetheless had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by dividing Black people with the invention of coloured identity .
White supremacists were so successful with their political project to keep race groups apart , in an attempt to preserve the imagined racial purity and presumed moral superiority of white people , that a hierarchy of races were codified in law , with profound social and political consequences for every community .
The apartheid government went so far as to establish separate and unequal chambers of parliament in the 1980s to represent coloured and Indian people .
The puppet parliament supposedly elevated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defuse any sense of solidarity among South Africans who are not white against apartheid , although it quickly lost credibility .
Spatial segregation and political divide-and-rule tactics nonetheless had the intentional upshot of fueling Black-on-Black racism by dividing Black people with the invention of coloured identity .
I was not immune to this racism .
I could not imagine being attracted to Black people sexually or romantically .
It was only through cross-racial friendships and experiences at a mixed-race high school and university that I started to chip away at my own inherited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too many South Africans , as the shooting in Eldorado Park showed , that racial hierarchy and the antagonism it created between Black and coloured people lingers .
These feelings of political and economic marginalization reveal several things : Coloured people feel invisible , neglected and , crucially , they feel they are not being seen because they are coloured .
Not many coloured people connect their struggles for visibility and inclusion to the struggles of Black communities that are also living under conditions of poverty or relative deprivation .
The failure to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and apartheid made coloured people think they are not Black , or even African .
Historian Patric Tariq Mellet has argued that the “ de-Africanization ” of coloured people goes back to at least 1911 , when the British-South African authorities , in the census data of that period , lumped together a diverse range of people as “ coloured.
” This was entrenched in the middle of the 20th century with apartheid ’ s racist legal framework .
Sadly , this long history is what has led to so many coloured people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A quick way to insult a coloured person in my neighborhood was to accuse them of behaving like a Black person or , worse , of being a Black person .
This insult worked , not because it reminds the coloured person of white racism , but because the insult “ reduces ” you to being Black .
This , of course , is precisely what white supremacists intended .
Although there are historical examples of cross-class and cross-race solidarity ( such as the anti-apartheid work of the United Democratic Front—a non-racial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and other organizations—in the 1980s or the 1956 Women ’ s March on the Union Buildings in Pretoria that protested against racist laws limiting Black people ’ s movements ) , these are , to this day , few and far between .
That is one way to respond to the historical fiction .
Some people simply want to reject the label of coloured even if they do not yet know what to replace it with .
Others , like Mellet , insist on the recognition of the “ de-Africanization ” of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affinities between all people who are not of European descent .
But the yearning for a non-racial South Africa , or a nascent Black political project that aims to dismantle the Black-coloured distinction , should not be dishonest about how much anti-Black racism coloured communities must still deal with , and how much anti-coloured racism exists in Black communities .
South Africans can not , painful as it is , deny the psychological successes of colonialism and apartheid .
Just because many white South Africans have work to do to root out an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean that Black-coloured relations don ’ t require urgent attention .
South Africa may yet be a gift to the global Black Lives Matter movements .
It demonstrates the complexity and necessity of both opposing white supremacy while taking a long look at our Black selves and the way we have been damaged by white supremacists—in more ways than are comfortable to admit .

Sometimes an unjust killing reveals all the hidden scars of a nation. An innocent 16-year-old teenager, Nathaniel Julies, was shot dead by police on the evening of Wednesday, Aug. 26 near Johannesburg. This violent act was remarkable for many reasons despite South Africa’s familiarity with violence: Nathaniel was merely on his way to buy a biscuit at a nearby shop, and was killed a few meters from his home, for no apparent reason. He was a popular kid who had Down’s syndrome—and everyone in the community loved him. He was often jovial and quick to burst into dance. His killing felt like one gratuitous police assault too many on the entire neighborhood.
Sometimes an unjust killing reveals all the hidden scars of a nation. An innocent 16-year-old teenager, Nathaniel Julies, was shot dead by police on the evening of Wednesday, Aug. 26 near Johannesburg. This violent act was remarkable for many reasons despite South Africa’s familiarity with violence: Nathaniel was merely on his way to buy a biscuit at a nearby shop, and was killed a few meters from his home, for no apparent reason. He was a popular kid who had Down’s syndrome—and everyone in the community loved him. He was often jovial and quick to burst into dance. His killing felt like one gratuitous police assault too many on the entire neighborhood.
The racial dynamics of this case—and of South Africa more generally—tend to confuse most outside observers. While the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States is straightforwardly about Black people pushing back against anti-Black racism, South Africa’s situation is more complicated. The country’s apartheid and colonial histories introduced more fine-grained racial classifications that drew an administrative and sociopolitical wedge between Black people and so-called coloured people (mostly people of mixed heritage).
In Eldorado Park, the brutality of the largely Black police force left Nathaniel’s predominantly coloured community furious. The killing affirmed locals’ deeply held belief that they were marginalized and trampled on during the apartheid era under white supremacist rule, and now face a similar fate during the post-apartheid period under Black leaders. Their anger, in other words, stems in an important respect from the fact that they identify as neither Black nor white.
It was all the more significant because the officer who pulled the trigger was herself a coloured woman. The deepest source of rage in the community is that the police are seen as representatives of the country’s Black-led government and are perceived as institutionally racist against coloured people. Regardless of how individual officers look, the force is simply not trusted by a community that has experienced too much brutality from those meant to enforce law and order.
A closer look at Black-coloured relations reinforces just how abominable colonialism and apartheid were and allows outsiders a clearer understanding of South Africa’s contemporary racial politics.
Identity politics is sharply contested the world over, but the reality is that none of us, including skeptics of identity politics, are free of identities—even if these are imposed on us by society. My own experiences growing up as a coloured South African reveals some stark truths about my country.
Shortly after the apartheid government came to power in 1948, it passed legislation that defined each race group. Every person was designated a race according to the state’s arbitrary criteria. These included skin color, hair texture, the shape and size of one’s nose, and even whether you “passed” certain unscientific tests like a pencil being stuck in your hair to see whether it fell out or not—an apparent indicator of whether you may be white, coloured, or Black.
There were many sub-categories too, all of them arbitrarily defined, and your race depended on the whimsical judgment of a white state bureaucrat. This led to ridiculous and unjust scenarios in which families could be torn apart because officials assigned different members to different race groups.
Over the course of the country’s history, many coloured people internalized the fiction that we were not Black.
These classifications were accompanied by laws that compelled people to only live in areas with members of the same racial group. This apartheid spatial geography is how coloured and Black communities came to be further separated from each other. It was a divide-and-rule tactic and worked well for white supremacists to the extent that, over the course of the country’s history, many coloured people internalized the fiction that we were not Black. This belief was prevalent in my neighborhood, too.
I grew up in Grahamstown, a South African frontier city named after a colonial-era Scottish soldier, Colonel John Graham, in the early 1800s. He had fought the indigenous Xhosa people as part of Britain’s racist, colonial project to expand its empire across the world.
Only recently (in 2018) did the name of the city change to Makhanda, a Xhosa warrior and prophet who had led an attack against the British garrison in Grahamstown in 1819. This change signaled the commitment to remembering resistance to empire. But name changes cannot mask the enduring legacies of colonialism that still define the geography of the city.
The neighborhood where I spent most of the 1980s and 1990s was racially homogenous. I grew up hearing people in my neighborhood being referred to as coloured or brown. We were, mostly, of mixed racial heritage. These definitions were also framed in the negative: coloured or brown people are neither white nor Black. We spoke Afrikaans, not English or Xhosa, and we self-identified as a distinctive cultural and racial grouping.
I have many warm and positive memories of my early childhood, but I also have distinctly shameful memories of casual anti-Black racism and bigotry. My late mother’s tactic to get my sisters and I to draw the curtains in our bedroom at night was to scare us by saying that “the Bantu” would stare at us while we slept if we did not close the curtains. Bantu was a racist term for a Black person. My mom knew that we had been raised to think of “the Bantu” as a scary monster, and so she could draw from the well of anti-Black racist sentiment among coloureds to get us to behave.
One of the interesting aspects of South African life is that many poor and working-class families have domestic workers. In my community, domestic workers and gardeners were mostly Black. Some were treated decently but many were also badly mistreated by coloured families. I recall witnessing lots of abuse and prejudices, from a refusal to use the Xhosa names of the workers and giving them English names instead—Mavis and Regina were especially popular choices—to accusations of theft, without due process, that could lead to dismissals on the spot.
White supremacists were so successful with their political project to keep race groups apart, in an attempt to preserve the imagined racial purity and presumed moral superiority of white people, that a hierarchy of races were codified in law, with profound social and political consequences for every community.
The apartheid government went so far as to establish separate and unequal chambers of parliament in the 1980s to represent coloured and Indian people. The puppet parliament supposedly elevated these groups above Blacks and sought to defuse any sense of solidarity among South Africans who are not white against apartheid, although it quickly lost credibility. Spatial segregation and political divide-and-rule tactics nonetheless had the intentional upshot of fueling Black-on-Black racism by dividing Black people with the invention of coloured identity.
I was not immune to this racism. I could not imagine being attracted to Black people sexually or romantically. It was only through cross-racial friendships and experiences at a mixed-race high school and university that I started to chip away at my own inherited anti-Black beliefs and attitudes. But for too many South Africans, as the shooting in Eldorado Park showed, that racial hierarchy and the antagonism it created between Black and coloured people lingers.
After the police shooting, many of the locals I spoke to in Eldorado Park echoed a popular refrain among coloured South Africans, “During apartheid we were not white enough! Now we are not Black enough!” This captures a sense of being neglected by both the apartheid state and the current democratic government.
These feelings of political and economic marginalization reveal several things: Coloured people feel invisible, neglected and, crucially, they feel they are not being seen because they are coloured. Not many coloured people connect their struggles for visibility and inclusion to the struggles of Black communities that are also living under conditions of poverty or relative deprivation. The failure to see these connections is precisely because colonialism and apartheid made coloured people think they are not Black, or even African.
Historian Patric Tariq Mellet has argued that the “de-Africanization” of coloured people goes back to at least 1911, when the British-South African authorities, in the census data of that period, lumped together a diverse range of people as “coloured.” This was entrenched in the middle of the 20th century with apartheid’s racist legal framework.
Sadly, this long history is what has led to so many coloured people still feeing morally superior to Black people. A quick way to insult a coloured person in my neighborhood was to accuse them of behaving like a Black person or, worse, of being a Black person. This insult worked, not because it reminds the coloured person of white racism, but because the insult “reduces” you to being Black. This, of course, is precisely what white supremacists intended.
Although there are historical examples of cross-class and cross-race solidarity (such as the anti-apartheid work of the United Democratic Front—a non-racial movement of civic, labor, church, and other organizations—in the 1980s or the 1956 Women’s March on the Union Buildings in Pretoria that protested against racist laws limiting Black people’s movements), these are, to this day, few and far between.
The coloured community is ultimately a construction. There are many so-called coloured communities in South Africa with different lineages. Mellet argues that instead of talking of coloured people we should “talk of Cape Khoi, Camissa, Nama, Korana, Griqua, Damara and San”—a reference to many indigenous groups of mixed racial heritage.
That is one way to respond to the historical fiction. Some people simply want to reject the label of coloured even if they do not yet know what to replace it with. Others, like Mellet, insist on the recognition of the “de-Africanization” of coloured people and restoring the deeper historical affinities between all people who are not of European descent.
But the yearning for a non-racial South Africa, or a nascent Black political project that aims to dismantle the Black-coloured distinction, should not be dishonest about how much anti-Black racism coloured communities must still deal with, and how much anti-coloured racism exists in Black communities.
South Africans cannot, painful as it is, deny the psychological successes of colonialism and apartheid. Just because many white South Africans have work to do to root out an ingrained sense of superiority, does not mean that Black-coloured relations don’t require urgent attention.
South Africa may yet be a gift to the global Black Lives Matter movements. It demonstrates the complexity and necessity of both opposing white supremacy while taking a long look at our Black selves and the way we have been damaged by white supremacists—in more ways than are comfortable to admit.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--The United States Can Counter Putin and Assad With a Light Footprint in Syria

The United States Can Counter Putin and Assad With a Light Footprint in Syria For more than eight years , the leaders of North and East Syria have pursued their project of self-rule in defiance of the Assad regime in Damascus .
The Kurdish-led region has withstood the Islamic State , multiple Turkish interventions , a partial U.S. withdrawal , and the deployment of Russian troops .
Russian President Vladimir Putin seemingly believed the U.S. withdrawal last autumn would make it possible to finally achieve his foremost objective in Syria : to allow Bashar al-Assad to reclaim control over all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ semi-autonomous region would easily fall back under control of the central government , the way rebel-held Aleppo or Homs collapsed once regime forces moved in .
But that did not happen .
Instead of collapsing , the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria continues to govern about a quarter of Syria from Raqqa in the West to Derik in the East , even paying salaries that are double those in regime-held territory .
I visited northeast Syria for several weeks in September and witnessed myself how virtually all of the institutions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to operate in defiance of Assad .
Schools continue to teach a new curriculum that features language instruction in Kurdish and Aramaic , in addition to Arabic .
Teachers do not , however , peddle the Assad regime ’ s Baathist ideology meant to instill loyalty to Assad still taught in regime-held territory .
Local courts continue to operate with their own system of jurisprudence , effectively abolishing numerous laws still upheld by the central government , such as the death penalty .
Child marriage is still permitted under the Assad regime , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have enacted laws that aim to prevent it .
Perhaps disappointingly for Putin , the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) have maintained their unified command structure .
Instead of suffering defections in the face of the Turkish onslaught and deployment of Russian and regime troops , the SDF stood their ground .
The SDF now has an estimated 100,000 fighters and includes internal security forces .
It is the second-largest armed force in all of Syria , second only to Assad ’ s army .
Both Putin and Assad want the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Army .
This is key to reasserting regime control over the semi-autonomous region .
But the commander-in-chief of the SDF , General Mazloum Abdi , has no plans to do so .
“ We want to be part of the future Syrian army—but not the current one , ” Mazloum told me in a lengthy face-to-face interview .
The SDF and the autonomous administration have repeatedly confirmed that they are committed to the territorial integrity of Syria .
They want to implement their project in other parts of Syria , not separate from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refer to Syrian Kurds as migrants rather than Syrian citizens and accuse them of harboring separatist ambitions .
Russian officials appear to either genuinely believe the anti-Kurdish propaganda or find it a helpful stick to use against them .
One carrot that officials in Moscow have often used is their offer to mediate talks between Damascus and the autonomous administration .
So far , however , Assad has refused to make a single concession .
I asked Mazloum why .
Is it because the Russians are unable , or simply unwilling to pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s because they don ’ t want to , they support the regime , ” he said .
“ We received the Russians not because we wanted to , but because of the U.S. withdrawal.
” The SDF negotiated the terms under which the Russians could operate in their area .
“ One of the preconditions for the Russians to enter this area was that they should coordinate with us [ the SDF ] , not the regime .
So we always confront the Russians if they don ’ t abide by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintains that the SDF still has the upper hand : “ The Russians are guests of the SDF , we accompany them on their patrols.
” But the Russian military often tests the limits .
Because the Northeast has refused to submit to central government control , Russia has now shifted to new forms of subterfuge .
These include demanding additional Russian bases in the Northeast , attempting to divide the SDF by inciting sectarian tensions between Kurds and Arabs , amplifying the Assad regime ’ s propaganda machine which refers to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and further encroaching on U.S. troops in an attempt to force them to fully withdraw .
There are an estimated 600 U.S. troops still in Syria .
So far , these tactics have proven futile—but they have caused trouble .
The Russian military expanded its presence to more than 15 military bases , and promised to act as guarantor against further Turkish incursions .
Officials in Moscow signed a cease-fire agreement with Ankara on Oct. 22 , 2019 just days after Vice President Mike Pence had negotiated a similar agreement on Oct. 17 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. agreement has prevented Turkey and Turkish-backed factions from committing over 800 cease-fire violations in the past year .
Last month , the Russian military demanded additional bases in the region .
When the SDF refused , the Russian military threatened to withdraw .
The focus of the dispute was on the sensitive Tel Tamer region , home to an ancient community of Assyrians who are struggling to defend their homeland after being assaulted by the Islamic State in 2015 .
Tel Tamer is now on the frontlines of the area occupied by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkish-backed factions .
Russia ’ s threat to withdraw raises questions regarding the commitment of the Russian military to protect the region from further Turkish incursions , and may have been intended to force the SDF into making concessions .
Local media reported that the Russians held meetings in Qamishli and Hasakah with seven different Arab tribes .
The goal of the meetings was purportedly to convince them to defect from the SDF , and form a separate militia under Russian command .
The story of the SDF ’ s success in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian regime , and Erdogan ’ s threats to launch yet another cross-border offensive can not be attributed to U.S. patronage alone .
Timber Sycamore , a covert billion-dollar program to train and equip other militia factions , resulted in unmitigated failure .
The SDF draws its strength from its sheer diversity .
It is the only armed force in Syria that does not discriminate on the basis of gender , ethnicity , or religion .
The unprecedented inclusivity of the SDF has helped to overcome sectarianism , which has been a major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stable region of Syria .
Whether motivated by higher salaries , greater stability in the Northeast , a commitment to the new political system being established , or just a desire to escape Assad , Arabs from across Syria are enlisting in the SDF .
I have interviewed Arabs from numerous regime and rebel-held cities who have left their homes and traveled great distances and at great risk , in order to join the SDF .
Not all Russian efforts have fallen flat .
Recently , Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov invited a delegation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ body within the autonomous administration—to Moscow .
The delegation signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the People ’ s Will Party , led by Qadri Jamil , calling for a united but decentralized Syria that recognizes all of its ethnic and religious components .
Putin ’ s partial success in Syria is in no small measure due to the simple fact that the Russian ministries of defense and foreign affairs coordinate their policies toward Syria .
In the United States , disagreements between the White House , the Pentagon , and the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ display , perhaps most dramatically when former Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned in protest because he was unwilling to carry out Trump ’ s initial withdrawal order in late 2018 .
The lack of a strong U.S. commitment to northeast Syria—other than Trump ’ s professed desire to “ protect the oil ” —also works in Russia ’ s favor .
An increased diplomatic presence would go a long way toward restoring trust since Trump ’ s botched partial withdrawal a year ago .
A larger diplomatic presence is also necessary to ensure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ground .
These policies range from stabilization efforts aimed to restore livelihoods and prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State , to sanctions on the Assad regime , to the repatriation of Islamic State detainees , to supporting the ongoing Kurdish unity talks .
In an effort to overcome political deadlock , Mazloum took the initiative to begin unity talks between rival Kurdish parties .
In contrast to the Russian-sponsored talks between the region ’ s leaders and the Assad regime , which have gone nowhere , the U.S.-sponsored Kurdish unity talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ succeed , the Kurdish unity talks could pave the way to greater political pluralism in northeast Syria , and potentially reduce tensions with both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan .
This could have a transformative impact on the larger region and make it possible for the U.S. military to eventually withdraw or downsize—without throwing the region into chaos , endangering the lives of some four million people , or betraying U.S. allies .
To increase the prospects of the unity talks succeeding , the United States should commit to including the autonomous administration in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to find a political resolution to the conflict .
It ’ s time that Washington stop treating the SDF as just a tool to defeat the Islamic State .
The SDF and autonomous administration have also held territory after liberating it from the Caliphate , made the Northeast the most stable region of Syria , and have refused—for more than eight years—to surrender to Assad .
An alternative to the Assad regime is already on the horizon ; the U.S. government just needs to acknowledge it .

For more than eight years, the leaders of North and East Syria have pursued their project of self-rule in defiance of the Assad regime in Damascus. The Kurdish-led region has withstood the Islamic State, multiple Turkish interventions, a partial U.S. withdrawal, and the deployment of Russian troops.
For more than eight years, the leaders of North and East Syria have pursued their project of self-rule in defiance of the Assad regime in Damascus. The Kurdish-led region has withstood the Islamic State, multiple Turkish interventions, a partial U.S. withdrawal, and the deployment of Russian troops.
Russian President Vladimir Putin seemingly believed the U.S. withdrawal last autumn would make it possible to finally achieve his foremost objective in Syria: to allow Bashar al-Assad to reclaim control over all Syrian territory. Putin calculated that the semi-autonomous region would easily fall back under control of the central government, the way rebel-held Aleppo or Homs collapsed once regime forces moved in. But that did not happen.
Instead of collapsing, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria continues to govern about a quarter of Syria from Raqqa in the West to Derik in the East, even paying salaries that are double those in regime-held territory. I visited northeast Syria for several weeks in September and witnessed myself how virtually all of the institutions of governance established by the autonomous administration continue to operate in defiance of Assad.
Schools continue to teach a new curriculum that features language instruction in Kurdish and Aramaic, in addition to Arabic. Teachers do not, however, peddle the Assad regime’s Baathist ideology meant to instill loyalty to Assad still taught in regime-held territory. Local courts continue to operate with their own system of jurisprudence, effectively abolishing numerous laws still upheld by the central government, such as the death penalty. Child marriage is still permitted under the Assad regime, but the autonomous administration’s leaders have enacted laws that aim to prevent it.
Perhaps disappointingly for Putin, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have maintained their unified command structure. Instead of suffering defections in the face of the Turkish onslaught and deployment of Russian and regime troops, the SDF stood their ground. The SDF now has an estimated 100,000 fighters and includes internal security forces. It is the second-largest armed force in all of Syria, second only to Assad’s army.
Both Putin and Assad want the SDF to surrender to the Syrian Arab Army. This is key to reasserting regime control over the semi-autonomous region. But the commander-in-chief of the SDF, General Mazloum Abdi, has no plans to do so.
“We want to be part of the future Syrian army—but not the current one,” Mazloum told me in a lengthy face-to-face interview. The SDF and the autonomous administration have repeatedly confirmed that they are committed to the territorial integrity of Syria. They want to implement their project in other parts of Syria, not separate from Syria. And yet regime officials still refer to Syrian Kurds as migrants rather than Syrian citizens and accuse them of harboring separatist ambitions. Russian officials appear to either genuinely believe the anti-Kurdish propaganda or find it a helpful stick to use against them.
One carrot that officials in Moscow have often used is their offer to mediate talks between Damascus and the autonomous administration. So far, however, Assad has refused to make a single concession. I asked Mazloum why. Is it because the Russians are unable, or simply unwilling to pressure Assad into making concessions? “It’s because they don’t want to, they support the regime,” he said. “We received the Russians not because we wanted to, but because of the U.S. withdrawal.”
The SDF negotiated the terms under which the Russians could operate in their area. “One of the preconditions for the Russians to enter this area was that they should coordinate with us [the SDF], not the regime. So we always confront the Russians if they don’t abide by the agreement.” For now, Mazloum maintains that the SDF still has the upper hand: “The Russians are guests of the SDF, we accompany them on their patrols.” But the Russian military often tests the limits.
Because the Northeast has refused to submit to central government control, Russia has now shifted to new forms of subterfuge. These include demanding additional Russian bases in the Northeast, attempting to divide the SDF by inciting sectarian tensions between Kurds and Arabs, amplifying the Assad regime’s propaganda machine which refers to the SDF as “dissolved forces,” and further encroaching on U.S. troops in an attempt to force them to fully withdraw. There are an estimated 600 U.S. troops still in Syria. So far, these tactics have proven futile—but they have caused trouble.
The groundwork for today’s situation was laid a year ago. After a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Oct. 6, 2019, but no consultation with his own national security advisors, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered U.S. troops to withdraw from northeast Syria. Three days later, the Turkish military and their proxies surged across the border, occupying a large swath of territory between Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.
The Russian military expanded its presence to more than 15 military bases, and promised to act as guarantor against further Turkish incursions. Officials in Moscow signed a cease-fire agreement with Ankara on Oct. 22, 2019 just days after Vice President Mike Pence had negotiated a similar agreement on Oct. 17. And yet neither the Russian nor U.S. agreement has prevented Turkey and Turkish-backed factions from committing over 800 cease-fire violations in the past year.
Last month, the Russian military demanded additional bases in the region. When the SDF refused, the Russian military threatened to withdraw. The focus of the dispute was on the sensitive Tel Tamer region, home to an ancient community of Assyrians who are struggling to defend their homeland after being assaulted by the Islamic State in 2015. Tel Tamer is now on the frontlines of the area occupied by Turkey and has suffered repeated attacks by Turkish-backed factions.
Russia’s threat to withdraw raises questions regarding the commitment of the Russian military to protect the region from further Turkish incursions, and may have been intended to force the SDF into making concessions. Local media reported that the Russians held meetings in Qamishli and Hasakah with seven different Arab tribes. The goal of the meetings was purportedly to convince them to defect from the SDF, and form a separate militia under Russian command.
The story of the SDF’s success in the face of pressures from Moscow, the Syrian regime, and Erdogan’s threats to launch yet another cross-border offensive cannot be attributed to U.S. patronage alone. Timber Sycamore, a covert billion-dollar program to train and equip other militia factions, resulted in unmitigated failure. The SDF draws its strength from its sheer diversity. It is the only armed force in Syria that does not discriminate on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or religion.
The unprecedented inclusivity of the SDF has helped to overcome sectarianism, which has been a major factor in making the Northeast the most stable region of Syria. Whether motivated by higher salaries, greater stability in the Northeast, a commitment to the new political system being established, or just a desire to escape Assad, Arabs from across Syria are enlisting in the SDF. I have interviewed Arabs from numerous regime and rebel-held cities who have left their homes and traveled great distances and at great risk, in order to join the SDF.
Not all Russian efforts have fallen flat. Recently, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov invited a delegation of the Syrian Democratic Council—the highest political body within the autonomous administration—to Moscow. The delegation signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the People’s Will Party, led by Qadri Jamil, calling for a united but decentralized Syria that recognizes all of its ethnic and religious components.
Putin’s partial success in Syria is in no small measure due to the simple fact that the Russian ministries of defense and foreign affairs coordinate their policies toward Syria. In the United States, disagreements between the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department have at times been on open display, perhaps most dramatically when former Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned in protest because he was unwilling to carry out Trump’s initial withdrawal order in late 2018. The lack of a strong U.S. commitment to northeast Syria—other than Trump’s professed desire to “protect the oil”—also works in Russia’s favor.
A stronger U.S. commitment to northeast Syria does not have to entail a large or open-ended troop deployment. The past year has shown that even with a reduced military footprint, the United States is capable of carrying out anti-Islamic State missions across wide swaths of northern Syria, including the raid in Idlib that led to the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, the stabilization and humanitarian needs are enormous and the U.S. diplomatic presence is minimal.
An increased diplomatic presence would go a long way toward restoring trust since Trump’s botched partial withdrawal a year ago. A larger diplomatic presence is also necessary to ensure that wide-ranging U.S. policies are implemented on the ground. These policies range from stabilization efforts aimed to restore livelihoods and prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State, to sanctions on the Assad regime, to the repatriation of Islamic State detainees, to supporting the ongoing Kurdish unity talks.
In an effort to overcome political deadlock, Mazloum took the initiative to begin unity talks between rival Kurdish parties. In contrast to the Russian-sponsored talks between the region’s leaders and the Assad regime, which have gone nowhere, the U.S.-sponsored Kurdish unity talks are slowly making progress.
If they succeed, the Kurdish unity talks could pave the way to greater political pluralism in northeast Syria, and potentially reduce tensions with both Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. This could have a transformative impact on the larger region and make it possible for the U.S. military to eventually withdraw or downsize—without throwing the region into chaos, endangering the lives of some four million people, or betraying U.S. allies.
To increase the prospects of the unity talks succeeding, the United States should commit to including the autonomous administration in the U.N.-sponsored talks in Geneva that aim to find a political resolution to the conflict.
It’s time that Washington stop treating the SDF as just a tool to defeat the Islamic State. The SDF and autonomous administration have also held territory after liberating it from the Caliphate, made the Northeast the most stable region of Syria, and have refused—for more than eight years—to surrender to Assad. An alternative to the Assad regime is already on the horizon; the U.S. government just needs to acknowledge it.