foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--U.S. Hostility With Iran Only Serves Hardliners on Both Sides

U.S .
Hostility With Iran Only Serves Hardliners on Both Sides In the aftermath of President-elect Joe Biden ’ s election victory , U.S. and European think tanks and pundits are flooding the internet with papers about how to fix this or that aspect of U.S. foreign policy after four years of President Donald Trump .
The Atlantic Council and the European Leadership Network , with an assist from the top Iran hand at the European Council on Foreign Relations , just put out a roadmap for Europe to act as a bridge between Iran and the incoming Biden team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) —by returning the United States and Iran to compliance , promoting regional conflict resolution , and reviving people-to-people engagement .
In the longer run , however , U.S.-Iranian relations need a more radical rethink .
For about 40 years , they ’ ve been going in circles , with occasional flickers of détente interrupting longer periods of economic warfare , cyber-attacks , and loss of life from direct and indirect military confrontation .
Just last week , Trump reportedly asked for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escalation that even Mike Pompeo , his hawkish secretary of state , is said to have opposed .
The mutual hostility serves hardliners on both sides—and the arms dealers that cater to their respective regional partners—but also hurts U.S. national interests and , most especially , the Iranian people .
It also hobbles Iran ’ s ties with European and Asian democracies .
The first order of business for a Biden administration may well be to freeze Iran ’ s slow walk out of the JCPOA in return for calibrated sanctions relief .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ something much bolder , to be conveyed to Iran through back-channel talks in the region or in Europe .
The United States ’ ability to advance its interests in the Middle East has been severely undermined by its lack of a functioning diplomatic relationship with Iran , the largest , most populous , and most scientifically advanced ( apart from Israel ) country in the region .
Estrangement has left successive U.S. administrations reliant on Arab autocrats and an increasingly undemocratic Israel , which has in turn boosted Iran ’ s influence among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasing economic and strategic power .
Twice , U.S. and Iranian interests have actually coincided to a surprising extent—in post-2001 Afghanistan and post-2003 Iraq—but the George W. Bush administration put Iran in its crosshairs as a charter member of the “ axis of evil ” rather than building on Washington and Tehran ’ s shared animosity toward the Taliban and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein .
Instead , Iran exploited the power vacuums created by U.S. military interventions and the chaos that followed the 2011 Arab Spring to build new Shia militias in Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Houthi rebel groups .
Despite that success , though , Iran has dramatically underperformed in economic terms compared to countries that 40 years ago were at similar stages of development .
As long as the United States and Iran are at so deeply at odds , Iran will continue to thwart U.S. interests while also failing to achieve its potential—and its government will remain chronically unpopular and insecure .
So what to do ?
The Biden administration should propose a serious rollback of U.S. sanctions—including over the use of the U.S. dollar—in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2.0 that indefinitely extends restrictions on Iran ’ s nuclear program , and a nonaggression pact .
Critics will no doubt call such a proposal naïve and unattainable .
They may point out that Iran ’ s leadership needs continued animosity with the United States to survive .
But the prospects for a big breakthrough between the two countries are bolstered by the fact that the American people are sick of U.S. military confrontations in the Middle East , and Iranians are fed up with being isolated .
Iran , of course , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces in the region , which it perceives as part of a provocative containment regime .
As Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif put it to American journalists a few years ago : “ Have you seen that map with all the US bases around us and said , ‘ Why are these Iranians putting their country in the middle of all these bases ?
’ ” Since the 1980s , when the United States escorted Kuwaiti tankers down the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war , the U.S. military has had a large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Since 2003 , tens of thousands of American troops have been based to Iran ’ s east and west and the U.S. navy remains a near constant presence near the Strait of Hormuz , the main chokepoint for Iranian and Arab oil exports .
The value of that oil is declining , however , as the world confronts the need to deal with climate change .
Iran ’ s Arab neighbors have learned that the United States , with its rotating administrations , can be a fickle friend , while Iran , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , will be there “ forever.
” All of the parties involved , more than ever , need to focus on their own domestic problems and divisions , which have only grown more acute and worrisome thanks to this year ’ s pandemic and accompanying economic crisis .
It isn ’ t guaranteed that a grand bargain with Iran will work when it has not in the past .
But it is still worth an effort .
And even if such overtures only result in a tenuous détente , it would be better @ @ @ @ @ @ @

In the aftermath of President-elect Joe Biden’s election victory, U.S. and European think tanks and pundits are flooding the internet with papers about how to fix this or that aspect of U.S. foreign policy after four years of President Donald Trump.
In the aftermath of President-elect Joe Biden’s election victory, U.S. and European think tanks and pundits are flooding the internet with papers about how to fix this or that aspect of U.S. foreign policy after four years of President Donald Trump.
The Atlantic Council and the European Leadership Network, with an assist from the top Iran hand at the European Council on Foreign Relations, just put out a roadmap for Europe to act as a bridge between Iran and the incoming Biden team. The recommendations seek to salvage the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—by returning the United States and Iran to compliance, promoting regional conflict resolution, and reviving people-to-people engagement.
In the longer run, however, U.S.-Iranian relations need a more radical rethink. For about 40 years, they’ve been going in circles, with occasional flickers of détente interrupting longer periods of economic warfare, cyber-attacks, and loss of life from direct and indirect military confrontation. Just last week, Trump reportedly asked for options to bomb Iranian nuclear sites—a reckless escalation that even Mike Pompeo, his hawkish secretary of state, is said to have opposed. The mutual hostility serves hardliners on both sides—and the arms dealers that cater to their respective regional partners—but also hurts U.S. national interests and, most especially, the Iranian people. It also hobbles Iran’s ties with European and Asian democracies.
The first order of business for a Biden administration may well be to freeze Iran’s slow walk out of the JCPOA in return for calibrated sanctions relief. But the Bidenites should be thinking of something much bolder, to be conveyed to Iran through back-channel talks in the region or in Europe.
The United States’ ability to advance its interests in the Middle East has been severely undermined by its lack of a functioning diplomatic relationship with Iran, the largest, most populous, and most scientifically advanced (apart from Israel) country in the region. Estrangement has left successive U.S. administrations reliant on Arab autocrats and an increasingly undemocratic Israel, which has in turn boosted Iran’s influence among Arab Shias and handed Russia and China increasing economic and strategic power.
Twice, U.S. and Iranian interests have actually coincided to a surprising extent—in post-2001 Afghanistan and post-2003 Iraq—but the George W. Bush administration put Iran in its crosshairs as a charter member of the “axis of evil” rather than building on Washington and Tehran’s shared animosity toward the Taliban and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Instead, Iran exploited the power vacuums created by U.S. military interventions and the chaos that followed the 2011 Arab Spring to build new Shia militias in Iraq and to deepen ties with Yemen’s Houthi rebel groups. Despite that success, though, Iran has dramatically underperformed in economic terms compared to countries that 40 years ago were at similar stages of development.
As long as the United States and Iran are at so deeply at odds, Iran will continue to thwart U.S. interests while also failing to achieve its potential—and its government will remain chronically unpopular and insecure.
So what to do? The Biden administration should propose a serious rollback of U.S. sanctions—including over the use of the U.S. dollar—in return for diplomatic relations, a JCPOA 2.0 that indefinitely extends restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, and a nonaggression pact.
Critics will no doubt call such a proposal naïve and unattainable. They may point out that Iran’s leadership needs continued animosity with the United States to survive. But the prospects for a big breakthrough between the two countries are bolstered by the fact that the American people are sick of U.S. military confrontations in the Middle East, and Iranians are fed up with being isolated.
Iran, of course, has long sought a reduction in U.S. forces in the region, which it perceives as part of a provocative containment regime. As Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif put it to American journalists a few years ago: “Have you seen that map with all the US bases around us and said, ‘Why are these Iranians putting their country in the middle of all these bases?’”
Since the 1980s, when the United States escorted Kuwaiti tankers down the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. military has had a large presence on Iran’s flanks. Since 2003, tens of thousands of American troops have been based to Iran’s east and west and the U.S. navy remains a near constant presence near the Strait of Hormuz, the main chokepoint for Iranian and Arab oil exports.
The value of that oil is declining, however, as the world confronts the need to deal with climate change. Iran’s Arab neighbors have learned that the United States, with its rotating administrations, can be a fickle friend, while Iran, as Zarif put it in a recent tweet, will be there “forever.” All of the parties involved, more than ever, need to focus on their own domestic problems and divisions, which have only grown more acute and worrisome thanks to this year’s pandemic and accompanying economic crisis.
It isn’t guaranteed that a grand bargain with Iran will work when it has not in the past. But it is still worth an effort. And even if such overtures only result in a tenuous détente, it would be better than where the world is now.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Trump’s Scorched Earth Farewell

Trump’s Scorched Earth Farewell

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
The problem is not just that President Donald Trump is denying the outcome of the Nov. 3 election and seemingly attempting a coup to reverse that result .
It ’ s that on almost every front from COVID-19 response and economic rescue plans to the fate of hotspots such as Afghanistan and Iran , the outgoing president is sowing chaos within his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a muddle and President-elect Joe Biden in a bind .
The most immediate and dangerous challenge is the Trump administration ’ s failure to respond to the alarming upswing in COVID-19 cases , or to coordinate pandemic response or vaccine distribution with the incoming Biden team .
But that same scorched-earth policy applies to the economic carnage caused by the virus , which is likely to persist next year as cases and deaths increase dramatically .
The latest confusion erupted Thursday when U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Fed to close down most of its emergency lending facilities , even as COVID cases reach new highs across the country that will no doubt be exacerbated by the coming winter weather , flu season and holiday travel .
In a rare public disagreement , the Fed retorted that it “ would prefer that the full suite of emergency facilities established during the coronavirus pandemic continue to serve their important role as a backstop for our still-strained and vulnerable economy.
” The U.S. outbreak has already exceeded 11.5 million cases and 250,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testing stages as thousands of schools and businesses shut down anew .
On Friday CNN reported that more than 2,300 Americans could be losing their lives every day by Dec. 18 , according to new numbers from the University of Washington ’ s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation ( IHME ) .
“ We expect daily deaths to reach a peak of over 2,500 a day in mid-January , ” the IHME modeling team said .
There ’ s little progress on additional economic aid , either , as Mnuchin and House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial relief , and after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky sent the upper chamber on recess .
Meanwhile , Trump is threatening the growing number of Republicans who are challenging his efforts to overturn the election ; Trump pointedly fired the head of the government cybersecurity unit that touted the “ most secure ” election in U.S. history .
Rather than focus on the pandemic , or the lingering economic pain it has caused , Trump has poured all his attention into staying in power , reportedly trying to strongarm Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the winner of that battleground state , despite a resounding margin of victory for Biden .
Trump met with two of Michigan ’ s top state lawmakers at the White House Friday afternoon in a last-ditch effort to reverse the will of the voters .
At a news conference Friday he declared once again that he had “ won ” the election .
“ It is difficult to imagine a worse , more undemocratic action by a sitting American president , ” Utah Republican Sen. Mitt Romney , a frequent critic of Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers say that , as with so much Trump has done during his presidency , all this behavior is unprecedented .
“ The chaos and the complete abandonment of the basic principles of orderly transition of power are undermining our ability to provide global leadership , ” said former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg .
Trump is also breaking all sorts of diplomatic crockery when it comes to foreign policy .
In Afghanistan , Trump purged Pentagon leadership to ensure a hasty pullout of most of the remaining U.S. troops in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ground for the U.S. withdrawal have not been met , according to U.S. commanders .
That ’ s leading to some rare intra-party fights .
McConnell , usually a stalwart Trump ally , blasted the troop withdrawal .
“ The consequences of a premature American exit would likely be even worse than President Obama ’ s withdrawal from Iraq back in 2011 , which fueled the rise of ISIS and a new round of global terrorism , ” McConnell said on the Senate floor this week .
“ It would be reminiscent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1975.
” “ Trump ’ s behavior suggests he does not care about what happens in or to Afghanistan as long as he gets to claim to his base that he did what he promised to do , ” said Husain Haqqani , a former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. “ In acting against the advice of almost everyone , Trump wants to force Biden to resend troops to Afghanistan after Biden ’ s inauguration .
Trump would then be able to crow that he is against forever wars while Biden is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan.
” Haqqani added : “ President Obama had also set a schedule for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan but he stopped its implementation closer to the 2016 election , saying he did not want to tie down the hands of the next president.
” Trump is also still ramping up his maximum pressure campaign on Iran to limit the Biden administration ’ s room for maneuver .
The administration is reportedly weighing additional rounds of sanctions to further squeeze Iran ’ s battered economy .
And this week , the New York Times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bombing Iran ’ s nuclear facilities before leaving office , since he has failed to persuade Tehran to negotiate with him after abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal .
Officials reportedly dissuaded Trump from doing so .
But some government officials are concerned about more surprises to come .
According to one well-placed Capitol Hill source , some intelligence professionals expressed concern that Trump , outraged by what he called the role of the “ China virus ” in his defeat , may be planning action of some kind against Beijing .
Those worries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary Mark Esper and other senior Pentagon officials , and their replacement by Trump loyalists .
Yet the most urgent crisis lies with COVID , and the administration ’ s ongoing refusal to sign off on additional rescue money while allowing five of the Fed ’ s nine emergency facilities to expire at the end of the year .
As fall turns to winter , and Covid cases continue to rise , most experts expect further economic turbulence just as the Biden administration comes into office .
That makes the decision to hobble @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ With the COVID-19 crisis worsening and activity slowing in the absence of fiscal aid , the decision to curtail the Fed ’ s firepower could unsettle markets and exacerbate economic stress , ” wrote Gregory Daco , chief U.S. economist at Oxford Economics on Friday .

The problem is not just that President Donald Trump is denying the outcome of the Nov. 3 election and seemingly attempting a coup to reverse that result. It’s that on almost every front from COVID-19 response and economic rescue plans to the fate of hotspots such as Afghanistan and Iran, the outgoing president is sowing chaos within his own administration that has left every world capital in a muddle and President-elect Joe Biden in a bind.
The problem is not just that President Donald Trump is denying the outcome of the Nov. 3 election and seemingly attempting a coup to reverse that result. It’s that on almost every front from COVID-19 response and economic rescue plans to the fate of hotspots such as Afghanistan and Iran, the outgoing president is sowing chaos within his own administration that has left every world capital in a muddle and President-elect Joe Biden in a bind.
The most immediate and dangerous challenge is the Trump administration’s failure to respond to the alarming upswing in COVID-19 cases, or to coordinate pandemic response or vaccine distribution with the incoming Biden team. But that same scorched-earth policy applies to the economic carnage caused by the virus, which is likely to persist next year as cases and deaths increase dramatically.
The latest confusion erupted Thursday when U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell in a letter that he wants the Fed to close down most of its emergency lending facilities, even as COVID cases reach new highs across the country that will no doubt be exacerbated by the coming winter weather, flu season and holiday travel.
In a rare public disagreement, the Fed retorted that it “would prefer that the full suite of emergency facilities established during the coronavirus pandemic continue to serve their important role as a backstop for our still-strained and vulnerable economy.” The U.S. outbreak has already exceeded 11.5 million cases and 250,000 deaths, and vaccines remain in early testing stages as thousands of schools and businesses shut down anew.
On Friday CNN reported that more than 2,300 Americans could be losing their lives every day by Dec. 18, according to new numbers from the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). “We expect daily deaths to reach a peak of over 2,500 a day in mid-January,” the IHME modeling team said.
There’s little progress on additional economic aid, either, as Mnuchin and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi remain stalemated over renewed financial relief, and after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky sent the upper chamber on recess. Meanwhile, Trump is threatening the growing number of Republicans who are challenging his efforts to overturn the election; Trump pointedly fired the head of the government cybersecurity unit that touted the “most secure” election in U.S. history.
Rather than focus on the pandemic, or the lingering economic pain it has caused, Trump has poured all his attention into staying in power, reportedly trying to strongarm Republican lawmakers in Michigan to certify him as the winner of that battleground state, despite a resounding margin of victory for Biden. Trump met with two of Michigan’s top state lawmakers at the White House Friday afternoon in a last-ditch effort to reverse the will of the voters. At a news conference Friday he declared once again that he had “won” the election.
“It is difficult to imagine a worse, more undemocratic action by a sitting American president,” Utah Republican Sen. Mitt Romney, a frequent critic of Trump, tweeted on Friday.
Longtime political observers say that, as with so much Trump has done during his presidency, all this behavior is unprecedented. “The chaos and the complete abandonment of the basic principles of orderly transition of power are undermining our ability to provide global leadership,” said former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.
Trump is also breaking all sorts of diplomatic crockery when it comes to foreign policy. In Afghanistan, Trump purged Pentagon leadership to ensure a hasty pullout of most of the remaining U.S. troops in the country, even though the conditions on the ground for the U.S. withdrawal have not been met, according to U.S. commanders. That’s leading to some rare intra-party fights. McConnell, usually a stalwart Trump ally, blasted the troop withdrawal.
“The consequences of a premature American exit would likely be even worse than President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq back in 2011, which fueled the rise of ISIS and a new round of global terrorism,” McConnell said on the Senate floor this week. “It would be reminiscent of the humiliating American departure from Saigon in 1975.”
“Trump’s behavior suggests he does not care about what happens in or to Afghanistan as long as he gets to claim to his base that he did what he promised to do,” said Husain Haqqani, a former Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. “In acting against the advice of almost everyone, Trump wants to force Biden to resend troops to Afghanistan after Biden’s inauguration. Trump would then be able to crow that he is against forever wars while Biden is the one who sent troops back to Afghanistan.”
Haqqani added: “President Obama had also set a schedule for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan but he stopped its implementation closer to the 2016 election, saying he did not want to tie down the hands of the next president.”
Trump is also still ramping up his maximum pressure campaign on Iran to limit the Biden administration’s room for maneuver. The administration is reportedly weighing additional rounds of sanctions to further squeeze Iran’s battered economy. And this week, the New York Times quoted officials saying Trump sought options for bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities before leaving office, since he has failed to persuade Tehran to negotiate with him after abandoning the 2015 nuclear deal. Officials reportedly dissuaded Trump from doing so.
But some government officials are concerned about more surprises to come. According to one well-placed Capitol Hill source, some intelligence professionals expressed concern that Trump, outraged by what he called the role of the “China virus” in his defeat, may be planning action of some kind against Beijing. Those worries have increased with the firing of Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other senior Pentagon officials, and their replacement by Trump loyalists.
Yet the most urgent crisis lies with COVID, and the administration’s ongoing refusal to sign off on additional rescue money while allowing five of the Fed’s nine emergency facilities to expire at the end of the year. As fall turns to winter, and Covid cases continue to rise, most experts expect further economic turbulence just as the Biden administration comes into office. That makes the decision to hobble the Fed look like a landmine.
“With the COVID-19 crisis worsening and activity slowing in the absence of fiscal aid, the decision to curtail the Fed’s firepower could unsettle markets and exacerbate economic stress,” wrote Gregory Daco, chief U.S. economist at Oxford Economics on Friday.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Egypt’s Sisi Intensifies Crackdown on Rights Advocates in Waning Days of Trump Administration

Egypt ’ s Sisi Intensifies Crackdown on Rights Advocates in Waning Days of Trump Administration At last year ’ s G-7 meeting in France , U.S. President Donald Trump called out loud enough for several to hear , “ Where ’ s my favorite dictator ?
” He was looking for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi , who led a military coup against the country ’ s democratically elected leader in 2013 , before becoming president himself .
Trump ’ s offhand comment got at the uncomfortable heart of what has been a long-standing relationship between the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alliance-despite-dictatorship that Trump took to new levels , often praising Sisi publicly .
But with Trump on his way out the door , after losing the Nov. 3 election in resounding fashion to Joe Biden , Sisi is taking advantage of the Trump administration ’ s waning days to crack down even harder on human rights advocates at home .
This week , security forces arrested three senior members of one of the country ’ s most prominent , and few remaining , human rights groups , the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the organization hosted more than a dozen Western ambassadors and diplomats at its Cairo office—a move Egypt clearly felt it could get away with .
On Nov. 15 , plainclothes security forces arrested Mohamed Basheer , EIPR ’ s administrative manager , in Cairo .
Three days later , Karim Ennarah , EIPR ’ s criminal justice director , was arrested at a seaside restaurant in the Sinai resort town of Dahab .
Both men ’ s names were added to a long-standing investigation into terrorism-related charges that already includes several other political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s arrest , EIPR ’ s executive director , Gasser Abdel Razek , said it was a direct response to the organization ’ s meeting with Western diplomats , and he expressed shock that “ a security force would feel threatened by a meeting with ambassadors.
” The next day , Abdel Razek was arrested , too .
They are now all in Tora Prison , a notorious jail near Cairo , adding to the estimated 60,000 political detainees in Egypt held on flimsy or trumped-up charges .
The three have faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their meeting with Western diplomats from countries considered allies of Egypt .
The Swiss Embassy said the meeting was a briefing on the work of civil society in Egypt .
Amnesty International has called the crackdown on the organization a “ smear campaign ” and says the charges are baseless .
Rights advocates say the United States and other Western states have for too long looked away from human rights abuses by friendly authoritarians across the Middle East , a trend that has only intensified under Trump , which in addition to flattering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even after the brutal killing of a Washington Post columnist in 2018 .
Biden has promised to crack down on global rights abusers—tweeting in July that there would be “ [ n ] o more blank checks for Trump ’ s ‘ favorite dictator ’ ” —and Egypt seems willing to put that pledge to the test .
Since the EIPR arrests , there have been vocal condemnations and calls for their release from some prominent members of the U.S. Congress , including Sens .
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders .
Sanders called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adding , “ The incoming administration must make it clear to Egypt and all countries that , once again , the United States will support democracy , not dictatorship.
” But so far , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other top administration officials have been silent on the arrests .
Pompeo is currently traveling in the Middle East .
Egypt , like other countries across the region , is starting to recalibrate its relationship with a Washington not likely to be as forgiving of strong-arm tactics .
Just days after Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. lobbying firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck on a $ 65,000-a-month retainer , suggesting Egypt may be worried that its relative impunity is coming to an end .
The close U.S.-Egypt relationship is in many ways a relic of a bygone era , said Michael Wahid Hanna of the Century Foundation .
Born during the Cold War and tempered during decades of Soviet intromission in the Middle East , the relationship sought to give Washington a friendly bridgehead in a pivotal regional state .
After the 1978 Camp David Accords and a peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in U.S. military funding poured into Egypt and made Cairo one of America ’ s top regional allies .
But that started to wobble during the Arab Spring .
In early 2011 , as Egypt began a vicious crackdown on protesting civilians , then-President Barack Obama gently called for political change in Egypt .
Since then , internal turmoil and increasingly authoritarian rule in Egypt have put a public strain on U.S.-Egyptian relations .
“ Egypt is now just a producer of headaches , ” Hanna said .
The problem is , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will almost surely be different from Trump ’ s , it ’ s not clear that Washington has meaningful levers to drive real change in Egypt .
Biden will take office with a host of thorny domestic issues—including Trump ’ s effort to overturn the election and a raging coronavirus pandemic—that will keep a lot of foreign policy , let alone Egypt , well short of the top priority .
But even if Biden wants to withdraw Sisi ’ s “ blank checks , ” it ’ s not clear how he will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Morsi in 2013 , the country ’ s first democratically elected president , and began his crackdown on political opponents , Obama froze some U.S. aid to the country , but it seemed to have little impact .
Egypt “ basically called his bluff , ” Hanna said .
Two years later , the United States reinstated the aid .
Even on the rare occasions when Trump administration officials put pressure on Cairo , it seemed to do little good .
In January , Mustafa Kassem , a 54-year-old Egyptian American auto parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after six years in custody with ailing health and without proper medical care .
His case had been raised by Vice President Mike Pence , Pompeo , and several members of Congress .
But even that high-level lobbying wasn ’ t a deterrent to a country that has enjoyed decades of relative impunity for its human rights abuses .
Hanna says diplomatic pressure clearly doesn ’ t work and it ’ s time for the United States to reevaluate its relationship with Egypt .
“ The question is no longer how can we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
“ The question is how complicit do we want to be in Egyptian political repression ?
”

At last year’s G-7 meeting in France, U.S. President Donald Trump called out loud enough for several to hear, “Where’s my favorite dictator?” He was looking for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led a military coup against the country’s democratically elected leader in 2013, before becoming president himself.
At last year’s G-7 meeting in France, U.S. President Donald Trump called out loud enough for several to hear, “Where’s my favorite dictator?” He was looking for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led a military coup against the country’s democratically elected leader in 2013, before becoming president himself.
Trump’s offhand comment got at the uncomfortable heart of what has been a long-standing relationship between the United States and Egypt’s authoritarian rulers—a sort of alliance-despite-dictatorship that Trump took to new levels, often praising Sisi publicly. But with Trump on his way out the door, after losing the Nov. 3 election in resounding fashion to Joe Biden, Sisi is taking advantage of the Trump administration’s waning days to crack down even harder on human rights advocates at home.
This week, security forces arrested three senior members of one of the country’s most prominent, and few remaining, human rights groups, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), just days after the organization hosted more than a dozen Western ambassadors and diplomats at its Cairo office—a move Egypt clearly felt it could get away with.
On Nov. 15, plainclothes security forces arrested Mohamed Basheer, EIPR’s administrative manager, in Cairo. Three days later, Karim Ennarah, EIPR’s criminal justice director, was arrested at a seaside restaurant in the Sinai resort town of Dahab. Both men’s names were added to a long-standing investigation into terrorism-related charges that already includes several other political detainees. At the time of Basheer’s arrest, EIPR’s executive director, Gasser Abdel Razek, said it was a direct response to the organization’s meeting with Western diplomats, and he expressed shock that “a security force would feel threatened by a meeting with ambassadors.”
The next day, Abdel Razek was arrested, too. They are now all in Tora Prison, a notorious jail near Cairo, adding to the estimated 60,000 political detainees in Egypt held on flimsy or trumped-up charges. The three have faced hours of questioning, including interrogations about their meeting with Western diplomats from countries considered allies of Egypt. The Swiss Embassy said the meeting was a briefing on the work of civil society in Egypt. Amnesty International has called the crackdown on the organization a “smear campaign” and says the charges are baseless.
Rights advocates say the United States and other Western states have for too long looked away from human rights abuses by friendly authoritarians across the Middle East, a trend that has only intensified under Trump, which in addition to flattering Sisi has deepened ties with Saudi Arabia even after the brutal killing of a Washington Post columnist in 2018. Biden has promised to crack down on global rights abusers—tweeting in July that there would be “[n]o more blank checks for Trump’s ‘favorite dictator’”—and Egypt seems willing to put that pledge to the test.
Since the EIPR arrests, there have been vocal condemnations and calls for their release from some prominent members of the U.S. Congress, including Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders. Sanders called the arrests an “outrage,” adding, “The incoming administration must make it clear to Egypt and all countries that, once again, the United States will support democracy, not dictatorship.”
But so far, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other top administration officials have been silent on the arrests. Pompeo is currently traveling in the Middle East.
Egypt, like other countries across the region, is starting to recalibrate its relationship with a Washington not likely to be as forgiving of strong-arm tactics. Just days after Biden’s victory, Egypt hired the U.S. lobbying firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck on a $65,000-a-month retainer, suggesting Egypt may be worried that its relative impunity is coming to an end.
The close U.S.-Egypt relationship is in many ways a relic of a bygone era, said Michael Wahid Hanna of the Century Foundation. Born during the Cold War and tempered during decades of Soviet intromission in the Middle East, the relationship sought to give Washington a friendly bridgehead in a pivotal regional state. After the 1978 Camp David Accords and a peace treaty with Israel, billions of dollars in U.S. military funding poured into Egypt and made Cairo one of America’s top regional allies.
But that started to wobble during the Arab Spring. In early 2011, as Egypt began a vicious crackdown on protesting civilians, then-President Barack Obama gently called for political change in Egypt. Since then, internal turmoil and increasingly authoritarian rule in Egypt have put a public strain on U.S.-Egyptian relations.
“Egypt is now just a producer of headaches,” Hanna said.
The problem is, while the tone from the incoming Biden administration will almost surely be different from Trump’s, it’s not clear that Washington has meaningful levers to drive real change in Egypt. Biden will take office with a host of thorny domestic issues—including Trump’s effort to overturn the election and a raging coronavirus pandemic—that will keep a lot of foreign policy, let alone Egypt, well short of the top priority. But even if Biden wants to withdraw Sisi’s “blank checks,” it’s not clear how he will do it.
When Sisi ousted Mohamed Morsi in 2013, the country’s first democratically elected president, and began his crackdown on political opponents, Obama froze some U.S. aid to the country, but it seemed to have little impact. Egypt “basically called his bluff,” Hanna said. Two years later, the United States reinstated the aid.
Even on the rare occasions when Trump administration officials put pressure on Cairo, it seemed to do little good. In January, Mustafa Kassem, a 54-year-old Egyptian American auto parts dealer, died in an Egyptian prison after six years in custody with ailing health and without proper medical care. His case had been raised by Vice President Mike Pence, Pompeo, and several members of Congress. But even that high-level lobbying wasn’t a deterrent to a country that has enjoyed decades of relative impunity for its human rights abuses.
Hanna says diplomatic pressure clearly doesn’t work and it’s time for the United States to reevaluate its relationship with Egypt.
“The question is no longer how can we produce better political outcomes,” Hanna said. “The question is how complicit do we want to be in Egyptian political repression?”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Peruvian Presidents Are Becoming an Endangered Species

Peruvian Presidents Are Becoming an Endangered Species Last week was the Week of Three Presidents in Peru , seized by political turmoil and fierce protests after the rapid ouster of one president , the resignation of a second , and the swearing-in of a third .
The chaos comes from a breakdown in the political system and what one analyst described as “ zombie parties ” in a nation with a long history of corruption and little experience in democracy .
“ Ultimately this is about the collapse of the political parties , ” said Steven Levitsky , a professor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies .
Because the parties are so weak , the president comes to power with no strength and few allies .
Francisco Sagasti , a 76-year-old engineer , academic , and former World Bank official , was sworn in on Tuesday as the country ’ s interim president .
In his first remarks after being selected by Congress to fill the vacant seat , Sagasti promised that his administration would “ do everything possible to return hope to the people and show them they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predecessor , former President of Congress Manuel Merino , stepped down on Sunday following days of street clashes with police in which at least two protesters were killed and dozens were injured .
In an address to Congress after his swearing-in , Sagasti said , “ It is absolutely necessary to remain calm , but do not confuse this with passivity , conformity , or resignation.
” He also asked for “ forgiveness on behalf of the state ” from the families of the two dead protesters .
“ We can ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we can stop this from happening again.
” Sagasti is taking the helm during the worst crisis the South American nation has faced since the downfall of authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori in 2000 thanks to his corruption and human rights abuses .
He was convicted nine years later over human rights violations committed during his government ’ s battle against leftist guerrillas in the 1990s .
The political crisis is worsened by an economic and health catastrophe .
Peru , which lacks vital oxygen needed to treat coronavirus patients , has one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mortality rates , and the International Monetary Fund projects a 14 percent decline in its GDP this year .
“ Many Peruvians were under the impression that the return to democracy would automatically purge government institutions of their deeply ingrained corruption , generate stability and comity among political and social movements , and address some of the grievances boiling underneath the glossy economic statistics , ” Álvaro Vargas Llosa , a senior fellow at the Center on Global Prosperity at the Independent Institute , wrote in an opinion piece published by the Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 years after the return of democracy , Peru ’ s institutions and social and economic structures are as fragile as ever , and the economy , mired in crony capitalism and mercantilism , stopped shining years ago.
” Over the past five years , lawmakers have ousted a handful of presidents using a controversial 19th-century “ vacancia ” clause that allows for such action on the grounds of “ permanent moral incapacity.
” The process is similar to impeachment in the United States , but it ’ s far more commonly and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 130-person Congress must vote in favor of the motion .
In the last five years , Peru has had five presidents , including Sagasti .
The most recent turmoil began on Nov. 9 when Congress voted to remove the popular President Martín Vizcarra over allegations that he accepted more than $ 600,000 in bribes while he was a regional governor years ago , as well as criticism over his handling of the current coronavirus pandemic .
Vizcarra , who was appointed as president by Congress in 2018 , gained support from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He has not been formally charged , vehemently denies any wrongdoing , and has vowed to cooperate with prosecutors .
A judge has ordered him not to leave the country .
Elected as first vice president in 2016 , Vizcarra became president in March 2018 after his predecessor in office , Pedro Pablo Kuczynski , resigned amid allegations of vote buying .
Last year , as part of his efforts to clean up government corruption , Vizcarra dissolved Congress , made changes on how judges are selected , and tried to eliminate prosecutorial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now work with the 130 politicians who make up Congress .
Most are first-time legislators who were elected in January .
And half are themselves under investigation for crimes ranging from money laundering to homicide .
“ What ’ s at stake is taking a first step toward rebuilding confidence between the people and the state , ” Samuel Rotta , the president of the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International , told The Associated Press .
Experts said Peruvian politicians are more focused on advancing their own business interests than in public service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weak party system , loose campaign financing rules that allow for the funneling of cash to candidates to buy influence , and a referendum passed by voters in 2018 that limits congressional service to a single term .
“ These are not professional politicians but amateur politicians , ” Levitsky , the Harvard expert , said .
“ Nobody sitting in Congress thinks about planning for the future.
” Sagasti , who belongs to the centrist Partido Morado ( Purple Party ) , is also a newcomer to the political arena .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populace , he is gaining recognition as one of the few members of Congress who voted against the removal of Vizcarra .
He is respected by international leaders , and many have publicly recognized him as interim president , including Organization of American States Secretary-General Luis Almagro .
“ We trust in his capacity to guide the country through this crisis and until the next presidential and legislative elections on April 11 , 2021 , ” Almagro posted on Twitter .
“ Sagasti is a decent guy , and I think there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the next election , ” Levitsky said .
“ He ’ s a very smart , capable guy , but he has a lot of catching up to do .
This is going to be a government that ’ s focused on surviving .
”

Last week was the Week of Three Presidents in Peru, seized by political turmoil and fierce protests after the rapid ouster of one president, the resignation of a second, and the swearing-in of a third. The chaos comes from a breakdown in the political system and what one analyst described as “zombie parties” in a nation with a long history of corruption and little experience in democracy.
Last week was the Week of Three Presidents in Peru, seized by political turmoil and fierce protests after the rapid ouster of one president, the resignation of a second, and the swearing-in of a third. The chaos comes from a breakdown in the political system and what one analyst described as “zombie parties” in a nation with a long history of corruption and little experience in democracy.
“Ultimately this is about the collapse of the political parties,” said Steven Levitsky, a professor of government at Harvard University and the director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies.
Because the parties are so weak, the president comes to power with no strength and few allies.
“It’s pretty ugly,” Levitsky said.
Francisco Sagasti, a 76-year-old engineer, academic, and former World Bank official, was sworn in on Tuesday as the country’s interim president. In his first remarks after being selected by Congress to fill the vacant seat, Sagasti promised that his administration would “do everything possible to return hope to the people and show them they can trust in us.”
His immediate predecessor, former President of Congress Manuel Merino, stepped down on Sunday following days of street clashes with police in which at least two protesters were killed and dozens were injured.
In an address to Congress after his swearing-in, Sagasti said, “It is absolutely necessary to remain calm, but do not confuse this with passivity, conformity, or resignation.”
He also asked for “forgiveness on behalf of the state” from the families of the two dead protesters. “We can’t bring them back to life. But we can stop this from happening again.”
Sagasti is taking the helm during the worst crisis the South American nation has faced since the downfall of authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori in 2000 thanks to his corruption and human rights abuses. He was convicted nine years later over human rights violations committed during his government’s battle against leftist guerrillas in the 1990s.
The political crisis is worsened by an economic and health catastrophe. Peru, which lacks vital oxygen needed to treat coronavirus patients, has one of the world’s highest per-capita COVID-19 mortality rates, and the International Monetary Fund projects a 14 percent decline in its GDP this year.
“Many Peruvians were under the impression that the return to democracy would automatically purge government institutions of their deeply ingrained corruption, generate stability and comity among political and social movements, and address some of the grievances boiling underneath the glossy economic statistics,” Álvaro Vargas Llosa, a senior fellow at the Center on Global Prosperity at the Independent Institute, wrote in an opinion piece published by the Washington Post this week. “But, 20 years after the return of democracy, Peru’s institutions and social and economic structures are as fragile as ever, and the economy, mired in crony capitalism and mercantilism, stopped shining years ago.”
Over the past five years, lawmakers have ousted a handful of presidents using a controversial 19th-century “vacancia” clause that allows for such action on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity.” The process is similar to impeachment in the United States, but it’s far more commonly and effectively used. At least 87 members of the 130-person Congress must vote in favor of the motion. In the last five years, Peru has had five presidents, including Sagasti.
The most recent turmoil began on Nov. 9 when Congress voted to remove the popular President Martín Vizcarra over allegations that he accepted more than $600,000 in bribes while he was a regional governor years ago, as well as criticism over his handling of the current coronavirus pandemic.
Vizcarra, who was appointed as president by Congress in 2018, gained support from many Peruvians for his anti-corruption stance. He has not been formally charged, vehemently denies any wrongdoing, and has vowed to cooperate with prosecutors. A judge has ordered him not to leave the country.
Elected as first vice president in 2016, Vizcarra became president in March 2018 after his predecessor in office, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, resigned amid allegations of vote buying.
Last year, as part of his efforts to clean up government corruption, Vizcarra dissolved Congress, made changes on how judges are selected, and tried to eliminate prosecutorial immunity granted to lawmakers.
Sagasti must now work with the 130 politicians who make up Congress. Most are first-time legislators who were elected in January. And half are themselves under investigation for crimes ranging from money laundering to homicide.
“What’s at stake is taking a first step toward rebuilding confidence between the people and the state,” Samuel Rotta, the president of the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International, told The Associated Press.
Experts said Peruvian politicians are more focused on advancing their own business interests than in public service. That is largely due to a weak party system, loose campaign financing rules that allow for the funneling of cash to candidates to buy influence, and a referendum passed by voters in 2018 that limits congressional service to a single term.
“These are not professional politicians but amateur politicians,” Levitsky, the Harvard expert, said. “Nobody sitting in Congress thinks about planning for the future.”
Sagasti, who belongs to the centrist Partido Morado (Purple Party), is also a newcomer to the political arena. While he is not well known among the populace, he is gaining recognition as one of the few members of Congress who voted against the removal of Vizcarra.
He is respected by international leaders, and many have publicly recognized him as interim president, including Organization of American States Secretary-General Luis Almagro.
“We trust in his capacity to guide the country through this crisis and until the next presidential and legislative elections on April 11, 2021,” Almagro posted on Twitter.
“Sagasti is a decent guy, and I think there is a good chance he can lead Peru to the next election,” Levitsky said. “He’s a very smart, capable guy, but he has a lot of catching up to do. This is going to be a government that’s focused on surviving.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Will Trump Try to Bomb Iran Before He Leaves the White House?

Will Trump Try to Bomb Iran Before He Leaves the White House ?
This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Matthew Kroenig : It has been an interesting couple of weeks .
There has been a slow transition process to the new administration .
Trump fired Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and other senior national security officials , leading some to fear that a coup was underway .
And everyone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posts in a Biden administration and what that will mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy .
Emma Ashford : I heard we ’ re actually transitioning to the second Trump administration .
Of course , it was from a pretty non-reputable source : Mike Pompeo , secretary of state .
But even most Republicans now accept that the election is officially over , and that Biden won .
In Washington that can mean only one thing : jockeying for positions in a new administration !
But other than Michèle Flournoy—the perennial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually know a lot about Biden ’ s potential national security appointments yet .
Anyone you have your eye on in particular ?
Or any foreign policy issues ?
MK : Biden ’ s long-time confidant Tony Blinken is a near lock for national security adviser .
There was talk of Susan Rice for secretary of state , but Senate Republicans say she ’ ll never be confirmed .
And her past closeness to the party now involved in a civil war against the Ethiopian government could make her politically unpalatable for other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posts , they might inherit a changed landscape in the greater Middle East .
According to press reports , Trump may pull out of Afghanistan and bomb Iran all before Jan. 20 .
It could be a busy holiday season for national security professionals .
EA : Ah , Donald Trump , the world ’ s foremost dove .
I remember when the New York Times ran an opinion article hailing Trump as “ Donald the Dove.
” And here we are only four years later , and the man has barely managed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , and is suggesting he might bomb Iran .
I doubt even this Afghanistan move would be enough to actually fulfill his 2016 campaign promise to end the United States ’ wars overseas .
MK : It is for these reasons that I warmed to Trump while he was in office .
I worried about many of his proposed policies on the campaign trail , but by the spring of 2017 , he showed he was comfortable with American power , promising to build a nuclear arsenal at “ the top of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gassing his own people .
EA : I bet you ’ re not pleased about the Afghanistan decision , though ?
MK : Pulling out would be the wrong move .
The Afghan government would likely fall to the Taliban without U.S. support and that is not an outcome I want to see .
People talk about ending endless wars , but U.S. forces are there at the behest of the Afghan government , helping them secure their country .
No one complains about endless wars because we still have troops in Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I checked , U.S. troops in Germany weren ’ t actively fighting insurgents .
Twenty-two servicemen and women died in Afghanistan last year alone .
U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is effectively non-existent .
The troops there are engaged in a perennial war with an enemy that wasn ’ t beaten with ten times the troops .
And what ’ s the plan ?
Just leave troops there forever ?
I rarely give Trump credit for anything , but his decision to talk to the Taliban , and to pull troops from Afghanistan is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MK : So you would be OK with the Taliban taking back control of the country ?
EA : I wouldn ’ t be thrilled about it .
It would be bad for liberty , for women ’ s rights , and for the Afghan population .
But the fact I dislike something doesn ’ t necessarily make it a national security threat .
There ’ s no evidence the Taliban will go back to hosting terrorist groups , and political processes like the Doha talks can work to tie that objective to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
MK : But the United States won ’ t have any leverage in the peace talks if it retreats regardless of what happens at the negotiating table .
And there is a strategy : help the Afghan government control the capital and most of the country even while recognizing it ’ s not possible to decisively defeat the Taliban .
That is a stable and tolerable outcome that can be achieved at a reasonable cost .
Not all foreign policy problems can be solved ; this is one we will just have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ describe as a tolerable outcome is effectively a perpetual U.S. military presence in the country .
For how long ?
It ’ s been almost 20 years at this point , and those “ reasonable costs ” are still being borne by U.S. troops and their families .
And my bigger point is that Washington can effectively achieve the same aims without a major presence on the ground in Afghanistan .
The U.S. military is already adept at using drones—if perhaps , too willing—and other remote capabilities to strike at terrorist groups abroad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ option to send troops back to Afghanistan if the Taliban invites al Qaeda back in .
If we ’ re considering U.S. interests—rather than Afghan ones—there ’ s no real difference between these strategies !
MK : There is no shot clock in international security .
U.S. troops should stay as long as they have to .
Again , no one is counting the years for U.S. deployments in other allied and security partner nations .
And it is much easier to stay than it is to withdraw now only to fight one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation later .
We might agree on one point , however .
Trump is the elected commander-in-chief and , if his intention is to pull out , then the Pentagon should do its best to responsibly carry out that order .
EA : If the order is legal , absolutely .
Military leaders have a responsibility to refuse unconstitutional or illegal orders , like committing war crimes , or dispersing peaceful protesters by force .
But on something like troop withdrawals , if the president says “ jump , ” the Pentagon response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” I don ’ t know how much credence to put into the rumors that Trump fired much of the civilian Pentagon leadership over their opposition to Afghan troop removals , as opposed to what he perceived as insufficient loyalty on issues like using troops on protesters .
MK : You put the question well .
These firings were almost certainly about long-simmering policy and personal differences and Trump was just holding off on major staff changes until after the election .
The talk that this was all preparation for a coup was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final ) example of Trump Derangement Syndrome .
EA : Oh God .
That ’ s a term best confined to the dustbin of history .
But the bigger point is that Trump ’ s term in office has been characterized by appointees who have done their best to undermine his policy choices .
You can argue that Trump is so erratic that these officials were doing us all a service , but that ’ s a very risky argument .
Who gets to decide what ’ s bad ?
We ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria envoy and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Jim Jeffrey get to decide that troops belong in Syria rather than the elected president ?
MK : So we are in agreement then that if Trump orders a strike on Iran in his waning days of office , then the Pentagon should act on it ?
EA : Of course .
If it isn ’ t an illegal order—something blatantly unconstitutional—the Pentagon needs to do it .
Even the war powers act allows the president to commit U.S. troops to conflict for up to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all bad ideas are illegal , unfortunately .
And I think the possibilities being floated in various publications—that Trump will strike Iranian nuclear sites , or that he ’ ll give the Israelis the green light to do it for him—are truly terrible ideas .
MK : I used to work on the Iran desk in the Pentagon and have written extensively on this issue in the past .
A limited strike on Iran ’ s nuclear facilities would be better than living with the dangers of a nuclear Iran for years to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama ’ s and Trump ’ s public statements , they agree with me .
But we are not there yet .
According to public estimates , Iran ’ s breakout time to a bomb is 3.5 months .
So , it is not too early to have this discussion , but we don ’ t need to pull the trigger tomorrow .
EA : Look , the fundamental question is one of permanence .
A strike might well undermine Iran ’ s progress toward nuclear weapons , but only temporarily .
Two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know , Iran hasn ’ t actually crossed the rubicon from enrichment to weapons development since the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal .
And the only reason we ’ re having this discussion is that Trump ’ s withdrawal from the agreement brought us to a point where Iran now has 12 times the highly enriched uranium it did under the deal !
MK : Do you think the enrichment program is a high-school science project ?
There is only one logical purpose for a country like Iran : to make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caught Iran designing nuclear warheads .
And Iran has the most sophisticated missile program in the region .
The last remaining piece is to acquire one bomb ’ s worth of weapons-grade fissile material .
Iran is inching closer and the best estimates are that that can be achieved 3.5 months after Iran ’ s Supreme Leader says : “ Go.
” EA : The IAEA caught them designing warheads in the 1990s .
As someone who was a teenager in the 1990s , I ’ d prefer we didn ’ t hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they did three decades ago .
Sarcasm aside , the enrichment program is political in nature .
It serves the regime ’ s domestic political needs by thumbing their nose at the West , and it serves their international needs in providing them a bargaining chip to encourage future U.S. administrations to come back to the nuclear deal .
Look , even if a strike undermines their nuclear capabilities , what ’ s to stop them building it again , this time further underground ?
MK : If Iran is on the verge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t strike , then it will have nuclear weapons .
Washington doesn ’ t want to make the same mistake as in North Korea and simply watch as a rogue state joins the nuclear club .
Military strikes at least keep the non-nuclear path open .
They might rebuild , but they might prefer not to waste additional years and billions of dollars only to get bombed again .
And I dare them to rebuild further underground .
The Fordow uranium enrichment facility near Qom is already built into the side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rock and it is still vulnerable to U.S. bunker-busting bombs .
EA : I have a healthy regard for human ingenuity .
If they can ’ t bury it , they ’ ll hide it .
The list of countries that have successfully hidden some form of nuclear development from the international community is lengthy , even if only some of them succeeded in getting the bomb : North Korea , South Korea , South Africa , Israel , Brazil , Argentina , India , Pakistan , Libya , Syria , and more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ’ s nuclear program are huge ; otherwise , the regime looks weak domestically .
It seems to me military strikes just put the U.S. government in a situation where it has to find increasingly complex ways to strike the program every few years .
It would surely be better to defuse the issue through diplomacy , inspections , and safeguards .
Conveniently , those are all things that open the country up economically , support reformist voices , and undermine the power of groups like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ be the best possible solution , but it hasn ’ t been easy .
The Trump administration offered to negotiate , and it was Iran that refused .
And even the nuclear deal did not solve this problem permanently ; it only kicked it down the road 10-15 years .
It would be great if we could talk Tehran out of the bomb , but I am not optimistic .
EA : I ’ m hardly surprised that Iran didn ’ t jump at the opportunity to negotiate with an administration that pulled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on them “ to behave like a normal nation.
” It sounds like what Trump is trying to do here is foreclose the diplomatic option for Biden .
I ’ ve always felt that presidents had a duty to not screw things up on purpose for their opponents and successors .
Some presidents have clearly felt differently , like when Reagan negotiated for the release of Iranian hostages behind Jimmy Carter ’ s back .
But Trump is still piling on new sanctions and considering military strikes to lock in his maximum pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far from the worst thing he ’ s done , but it ’ s still not good .
MK : Maybe we can end on a note of agreement .
Trump is a lame-duck president .
The responsible thing would be to keep the ship of state on a steady course until the handover on Jan. 20 .
So , that means no Iran strike and no Afghan troop withdrawal .
It will then be up to Biden to decide .
EA : You may be right there .
Of course , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continuity between Biden and Trump on Afghanistan than on Iran .
But I think you might be being unrealistic again .
This president has refused to accept the election results and is denying his successor access to classified intelligence and transition resources .
I don ’ t exactly see him honoring the incoming administration ’ s foreign-policy preferences .
Perhaps that ’ s why so many foreign leaders—with the notable exception of Benjamin Netenyahu and Mohammed Bin Salman—seem so happy to see a Biden victory ?
It will be refreshing to get back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on policy , but don ’ t need to be embarrassed about .
MK : I am not easily embarrassed by the democratically elected leader of the world ’ s greatest country .
That is , unless the Onion is correct and we need to worry about a shirtless Uncle Joe washing his Trans Am in the White House driveway .

Matthew Kroenig: It has been an interesting couple of weeks. There has been a slow transition process to the new administration. Trump fired Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and other senior national security officials, leading some to fear that a coup was underway. And everyone is speculating about who will land cabinet posts in a Biden administration and what that will mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy.
Matthew Kroenig: It has been an interesting couple of weeks. There has been a slow transition process to the new administration. Trump fired Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and other senior national security officials, leading some to fear that a coup was underway. And everyone is speculating about who will land cabinet posts in a Biden administration and what that will mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy.
Emma Ashford: I heard we’re actually transitioning to the second Trump administration. Of course, it was from a pretty non-reputable source: Mike Pompeo, secretary of state.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
But even most Republicans now accept that the election is officially over, and that Biden won. In Washington that can mean only one thing: jockeying for positions in a new administration! But other than Michèle Flournoy—the perennial next Secretary of Defense—we don’t actually know a lot about Biden’s potential national security appointments yet.
Anyone you have your eye on in particular? Or any foreign policy issues?
MK: Biden’s long-time confidant Tony Blinken is a near lock for national security adviser. There was talk of Susan Rice for secretary of state, but Senate Republicans say she’ll never be confirmed. And her past closeness to the party now involved in a civil war against the Ethiopian government could make her politically unpalatable for other reasons.
Regardless of who lands these posts, they might inherit a changed landscape in the greater Middle East. According to press reports, Trump may pull out of Afghanistan and bomb Iran all before Jan. 20. It could be a busy holiday season for national security professionals.
EA: Ah, Donald Trump, the world’s foremost dove. I remember when the New York Times ran an opinion article hailing Trump as “Donald the Dove.” And here we are only four years later, and the man has barely managed to pull 2,000 more troops out of Afghanistan, and is suggesting he might bomb Iran. I doubt even this Afghanistan move would be enough to actually fulfill his 2016 campaign promise to end the United States’ wars overseas.
MK: It is for these reasons that I warmed to Trump while he was in office. I worried about many of his proposed policies on the campaign trail, but by the spring of 2017, he showed he was comfortable with American power, promising to build a nuclear arsenal at “the top of the pack” and striking Assad for gassing his own people.
EA: I bet you’re not pleased about the Afghanistan decision, though?
MK: Pulling out would be the wrong move. The Afghan government would likely fall to the Taliban without U.S. support and that is not an outcome I want to see. People talk about ending endless wars, but U.S. forces are there at the behest of the Afghan government, helping them secure their country. No one complains about endless wars because we still have troops in Germany and Japan.
EA: The last I checked, U.S. troops in Germany weren’t actively fighting insurgents. Twenty-two servicemen and women died in Afghanistan last year alone.
U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is effectively non-existent. The troops there are engaged in a perennial war with an enemy that wasn’t beaten with ten times the troops. And what’s the plan? Just leave troops there forever? I rarely give Trump credit for anything, but his decision to talk to the Taliban, and to pull troops from Afghanistan is long overdue in U.S. foreign policy.
MK: So you would be OK with the Taliban taking back control of the country?
EA: I wouldn’t be thrilled about it. It would be bad for liberty, for women’s rights, and for the Afghan population. But the fact I dislike something doesn’t necessarily make it a national security threat. There’s no evidence the Taliban will go back to hosting terrorist groups, and political processes like the Doha talks can work to tie that objective to concrete incentives that make it less likely.
MK: But the United States won’t have any leverage in the peace talks if it retreats regardless of what happens at the negotiating table. And there is a strategy: help the Afghan government control the capital and most of the country even while recognizing it’s not possible to decisively defeat the Taliban. That is a stable and tolerable outcome that can be achieved at a reasonable cost. Not all foreign policy problems can be solved; this is one we will just have to manage.
EA: What you describe as a tolerable outcome is effectively a perpetual U.S. military presence in the country. For how long? It’s been almost 20 years at this point, and those “reasonable costs” are still being borne by U.S. troops and their families.
And my bigger point is that Washington can effectively achieve the same aims without a major presence on the ground in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is already adept at using drones—if perhaps, too willing—and other remote capabilities to strike at terrorist groups abroad if needed, and always retains the option to send troops back to Afghanistan if the Taliban invites al Qaeda back in. If we’re considering U.S. interests—rather than Afghan ones—there’s no real difference between these strategies!
MK: There is no shot clock in international security. U.S. troops should stay as long as they have to. Again, no one is counting the years for U.S. deployments in other allied and security partner nations. And it is much easier to stay than it is to withdraw now only to fight one’s way back into a difficult situation later.
We might agree on one point, however. Trump is the elected commander-in-chief and, if his intention is to pull out, then the Pentagon should do its best to responsibly carry out that order.
EA: If the order is legal, absolutely. Military leaders have a responsibility to refuse unconstitutional or illegal orders, like committing war crimes, or dispersing peaceful protesters by force. But on something like troop withdrawals, if the president says “jump,” the Pentagon response should be: “How high?”
I don’t know how much credence to put into the rumors that Trump fired much of the civilian Pentagon leadership over their opposition to Afghan troop removals, as opposed to what he perceived as insufficient loyalty on issues like using troops on protesters.
MK: You put the question well. These firings were almost certainly about long-simmering policy and personal differences and Trump was just holding off on major staff changes until after the election. The talk that this was all preparation for a coup was just the latest (and I hope final) example of Trump Derangement Syndrome.
EA: Oh God. That’s a term best confined to the dustbin of history.
But the bigger point is that Trump’s term in office has been characterized by appointees who have done their best to undermine his policy choices. You can argue that Trump is so erratic that these officials were doing us all a service, but that’s a very risky argument. Who gets to decide what’s bad? We’re a democracy. Why should someone like Syria envoy and former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Jim Jeffrey get to decide that troops belong in Syria rather than the elected president?
MK: So we are in agreement then that if Trump orders a strike on Iran in his waning days of office, then the Pentagon should act on it?
EA: Of course. If it isn’t an illegal order—something blatantly unconstitutional—the Pentagon needs to do it. Even the war powers act allows the president to commit U.S. troops to conflict for up to 60 days without congressional approval.
Not all bad ideas are illegal, unfortunately. And I think the possibilities being floated in various publications—that Trump will strike Iranian nuclear sites, or that he’ll give the Israelis the green light to do it for him—are truly terrible ideas.
MK: I used to work on the Iran desk in the Pentagon and have written extensively on this issue in the past. A limited strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be better than living with the dangers of a nuclear Iran for years to come. And, if you believe Obama’s and Trump’s public statements, they agree with me.
But we are not there yet. According to public estimates, Iran’s breakout time to a bomb is 3.5 months. So, it is not too early to have this discussion, but we don’t need to pull the trigger tomorrow.
EA: Look, the fundamental question is one of permanence. A strike might well undermine Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons, but only temporarily.
Two other points: So far as we know, Iran hasn’t actually crossed the rubicon from enrichment to weapons development since the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal. And the only reason we’re having this discussion is that Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement brought us to a point where Iran now has 12 times the highly enriched uranium it did under the deal!
MK: Do you think the enrichment program is a high-school science project? There is only one logical purpose for a country like Iran: to make fuel for nuclear weapons. The IAEA caught Iran designing nuclear warheads. And Iran has the most sophisticated missile program in the region. The last remaining piece is to acquire one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade fissile material. Iran is inching closer and the best estimates are that that can be achieved 3.5 months after Iran’s Supreme Leader says: “Go.”
EA: The IAEA caught them designing warheads in the 1990s. As someone who was a teenager in the 1990s, I’d prefer we didn’t hold people to account for things—like fashion crimes—that they did three decades ago.
Sarcasm aside, the enrichment program is political in nature. It serves the regime’s domestic political needs by thumbing their nose at the West, and it serves their international needs in providing them a bargaining chip to encourage future U.S. administrations to come back to the nuclear deal.
Look, even if a strike undermines their nuclear capabilities, what’s to stop them building it again, this time further underground?
MK: If Iran is on the verge of developing weapons and the U.S. military doesn’t strike, then it will have nuclear weapons. Washington doesn’t want to make the same mistake as in North Korea and simply watch as a rogue state joins the nuclear club. Military strikes at least keep the non-nuclear path open.
They might rebuild, but they might prefer not to waste additional years and billions of dollars only to get bombed again.
And I dare them to rebuild further underground. The Fordow uranium enrichment facility near Qom is already built into the side of the mountain under 300 feet of rock and it is still vulnerable to U.S. bunker-busting bombs.
EA: I have a healthy regard for human ingenuity. If they can’t bury it, they’ll hide it. The list of countries that have successfully hidden some form of nuclear development from the international community is lengthy, even if only some of them succeeded in getting the bomb: North Korea, South Korea, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, India, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and more.
And the political incentives to rebuild Iran’s nuclear program are huge; otherwise, the regime looks weak domestically. It seems to me military strikes just put the U.S. government in a situation where it has to find increasingly complex ways to strike the program every few years. It would surely be better to defuse the issue through diplomacy, inspections, and safeguards. Conveniently, those are all things that open the country up economically, support reformist voices, and undermine the power of groups like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
MK: Of course, diplomacy would be the best possible solution, but it hasn’t been easy. The Trump administration offered to negotiate, and it was Iran that refused. And even the nuclear deal did not solve this problem permanently; it only kicked it down the road 10-15 years. It would be great if we could talk Tehran out of the bomb, but I am not optimistic.
EA: I’m hardly surprised that Iran didn’t jump at the opportunity to negotiate with an administration that pulled out of the deal and then called on them “to behave like a normal nation.”
It sounds like what Trump is trying to do here is foreclose the diplomatic option for Biden. I’ve always felt that presidents had a duty to not screw things up on purpose for their opponents and successors. Some presidents have clearly felt differently, like when Reagan negotiated for the release of Iranian hostages behind Jimmy Carter’s back. But Trump is still piling on new sanctions and considering military strikes to lock in his maximum pressure campaign against Iran. It’s far from the worst thing he’s done, but it’s still not good.
MK: Maybe we can end on a note of agreement. Trump is a lame-duck president. The responsible thing would be to keep the ship of state on a steady course until the handover on Jan. 20. So, that means no Iran strike and no Afghan troop withdrawal. It will then be up to Biden to decide.
EA: You may be right there. Of course, there’s a lot more likelihood of continuity between Biden and Trump on Afghanistan than on Iran.
But I think you might be being unrealistic again. This president has refused to accept the election results and is denying his successor access to classified intelligence and transition resources. I don’t exactly see him honoring the incoming administration’s foreign-policy preferences.
Perhaps that’s why so many foreign leaders—with the notable exception of Benjamin Netenyahu and Mohammed Bin Salman—seem so happy to see a Biden victory? It will be refreshing to get back to a president whom we can criticize on policy, but don’t need to be embarrassed about.
MK: I am not easily embarrassed by the democratically elected leader of the world’s greatest country. That is, unless the Onion is correct and we need to worry about a shirtless Uncle Joe washing his Trans Am in the White House driveway.