foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--A Nuclear Test Would Blow Up in Trump’s Face

A Nuclear Test Would Blow Up in Trump ’ s Face The last 42 months have offered a sobering window into the Trump administration ’ s philosophy on nuclear arms control .
On display is its penchant for withdrawing from agreements rather than engaging in dispute resolution—be they the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty , or , most recently , the Open Skies Treaty .
While many experts see this approach as ill-conceived and damaging to U.S. national security interests , the administration often frames it as a form of brinkmanship designed to signal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The intended message appears to be that the United States will no longer play ball unless its rivals—Russia and China—agree to abide by Washington ’ s rules .
The latest example of this tendency comes amid reports that the administration might conduct a “ rapid ” nuclear test to strengthen its hand in negotiations with China and Russia .
Experts around the world have denounced this proposal as dangerous , foolhardy , and “ catastrophically stupid.
” As they point out , were the United States to test for the first time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open the door for the resumption of widespread explosive testing .
At the same time , it would undermine the nuclear taboo , hurt the credibility of the nonproliferation regime , and diminish support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ( CTBT ) .
While all true , these arguments are unlikely to sway this administration , which has shown little regard for existing norms or the disarmament machinery writ large .
What might give decision-makers pause , though , is the fact that a nuclear test is unlikely to be an effective signal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not help deliver President Donald Trump ’ s goal of a trilateral arms control agreement , but it would provide ample opportunity for misinterpretation and a response in kind .
In the process , it would likely put Washington in a worse negotiating position than when it started , making it not only risky but also pointless to boot .
There are a number of reasons why this is the case , the first being that effective nuclear signals communicate a credible intent to escalate if the demands of the signaler are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a signal intended to drive Russia and China to the negotiating table , it can not then also be the consequence if they do not acquiesce .
Conversely , if the prospect of a U.S. test is the signal and the test itself is the threat , then there is little reason to think officials in Moscow or Beijing will be especially compelled .
Testing on U.S. soil would put the health and safety of American citizens in jeopardy , but it would not convey new information about U.S. capabilities that could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control .
Second , proponents of a rapid nuclear test may hope to signal that Trump is reckless in order to convince Beijing and Moscow to take his demands seriously .
But more than three years into Trump ’ s presidency , his unpredictability is hardly news , and a nuclear test is more likely to paint him as a pariah than someone who defies convention .
In the nearly three decades since the United States last tested a nuclear weapon , a robust international norm has developed against explosive testing , despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The only country that has tested in the 21st century is North Korea—and it has drawn widespread condemnation from the international community and the United States for doing so .
If the administration wants to entice China to negotiate by promising it a seat at the “ big kids table , ” it should be wary of sending signals that diminish the cache of this proposition .
Third , U.S. doctrine already lays out in clear terms the circumstances under which it would resume explosive testing .
While the United States has carried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country in the world , it hasn ’ t conducted any since 1992 and now uses subcritical test and computer models instead .
The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states unequivocally that the “ United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
” By conducting a test now , what message would this send about the state of America ’ s nuclear deterrent ?
Proponents of a U.S. nuclear test might feel confident that they could clarify the purpose of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Research and history show , however , that even the clearest nuclear signals can be read in unintended ways depending on the target ’ s priorities , cost-benefit analyses , and perceived threats .
What is more , it is naive to think that Russia or China would accept at face value any U.S. rationale for a test when relations are rife with mutual suspicion , acrimony , and mistrust .
Instead , Moscow and Beijing will draw their own conclusions about what a U.S. test is meant to signal and respond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control , not a new beginning .
Despite these risks , there will still be those in Washington who believe that conducting a nuclear test is worth putting U.S. national security—and the administration ’ s arms control objectives—on the line .
That is because , for them , a test is not a signal designed to exert leverage on U.S. adversaries but rather a desirable outcome in and of itself .
There are some in Washington who have long pushed for the United States to resume explosive testing and are happy to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these efforts have been ongoing for decades , they are more likely to gain support now amid renewed , but unsubstantiated , allegations that Russia and China are testing , too .
The trouble is that test proponents do not just exist in Washington .
They have analogues in Moscow and Beijing who would relish an excuse to conduct explosive tests , too .
In the last week alone , one Russian analyst has already stated that a U.S. nuclear test would enable Russia to withdraw from the CTBT by claiming that its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testing , the Trump administration would give a free pass to those in Moscow and Beijing who are pushing to do the same while enabling them to retain the moral upper hand .
In short , if decision-makers in Washington do choose to test , this attempt at brinkmanship will certainly fail to convince Russia or China to sit down at the arms control negotiating table .
Instead , it will make it all the more likely that the very outcomes trilateral arms control seems to be intended to prevent come to bear—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is that there is plenty of time to walk this ill-conceived and ineffective plan back from the brink .
In this instance , restraint—such as it is—may be the most effective nuclear signal this administration could possibly send .

The last 42 months have offered a sobering window into the Trump administration’s philosophy on nuclear arms control. On display is its penchant for withdrawing from agreements rather than engaging in dispute resolution—be they the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or, most recently, the Open Skies Treaty. While many experts see this approach as ill-conceived and damaging to U.S. national security interests, the administration often frames it as a form of brinkmanship designed to signal resolve in an era of strategic competition. The intended message appears to be that the United States will no longer play ball unless its rivals—Russia and China—agree to abide by Washington’s rules.
The last 42 months have offered a sobering window into the Trump administration’s philosophy on nuclear arms control. On display is its penchant for withdrawing from agreements rather than engaging in dispute resolution—be they the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or, most recently, the Open Skies Treaty. While many experts see this approach as ill-conceived and damaging to U.S. national security interests, the administration often frames it as a form of brinkmanship designed to signal resolve in an era of strategic competition. The intended message appears to be that the United States will no longer play ball unless its rivals—Russia and China—agree to abide by Washington’s rules.
The latest example of this tendency comes amid reports that the administration might conduct a “rapid” nuclear test to strengthen its hand in negotiations with China and Russia. Experts around the world have denounced this proposal as dangerous, foolhardy, and “catastrophically stupid.” As they point out, were the United States to test for the first time in nearly three decades, it would open the door for the resumption of widespread explosive testing. At the same time, it would undermine the nuclear taboo, hurt the credibility of the nonproliferation regime, and diminish support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). While all true, these arguments are unlikely to sway this administration, which has shown little regard for existing norms or the disarmament machinery writ large.
What might give decision-makers pause, though, is the fact that a nuclear test is unlikely to be an effective signal in the current context. It would not help deliver President Donald Trump’s goal of a trilateral arms control agreement, but it would provide ample opportunity for misinterpretation and a response in kind. In the process, it would likely put Washington in a worse negotiating position than when it started, making it not only risky but also pointless to boot.
There are a number of reasons why this is the case, the first being that effective nuclear signals communicate a credible intent to escalate if the demands of the signaler are not met. If a U.S. rapid test is a signal intended to drive Russia and China to the negotiating table, it cannot then also be the consequence if they do not acquiesce. Conversely, if the prospect of a U.S. test is the signal and the test itself is the threat, then there is little reason to think officials in Moscow or Beijing will be especially compelled. Testing on U.S. soil would put the health and safety of American citizens in jeopardy, but it would not convey new information about U.S. capabilities that could change Russian or Chinese views on arms control.
Second, proponents of a rapid nuclear test may hope to signal that Trump is reckless in order to convince Beijing and Moscow to take his demands seriously. But more than three years into Trump’s presidency, his unpredictability is hardly news, and a nuclear test is more likely to paint him as a pariah than someone who defies convention. In the nearly three decades since the United States last tested a nuclear weapon, a robust international norm has developed against explosive testing, despite the CTBT not being in force. The only country that has tested in the 21st century is North Korea—and it has drawn widespread condemnation from the international community and the United States for doing so. If the administration wants to entice China to negotiate by promising it a seat at the “big kids table,” it should be wary of sending signals that diminish the cache of this proposition.
Third, U.S. doctrine already lays out in clear terms the circumstances under which it would resume explosive testing. While the United States has carried out more nuclear tests than any other country in the world, it hasn’t conducted any since 1992 and now uses subcritical test and computer models instead. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review states unequivocally that the “United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.” By conducting a test now, what message would this send about the state of America’s nuclear deterrent?
Proponents of a U.S. nuclear test might feel confident that they could clarify the purpose of a test and eliminate possibilities for misinterpretation. Research and history show, however, that even the clearest nuclear signals can be read in unintended ways depending on the target’s priorities, cost-benefit analyses, and perceived threats. What is more, it is naive to think that Russia or China would accept at face value any U.S. rationale for a test when relations are rife with mutual suspicion, acrimony, and mistrust. Instead, Moscow and Beijing will draw their own conclusions about what a U.S. test is meant to signal and respond accordingly—a recipe for the end of arms control, not a new beginning.
Despite these risks, there will still be those in Washington who believe that conducting a nuclear test is worth putting U.S. national security—and the administration’s arms control objectives—on the line. That is because, for them, a test is not a signal designed to exert leverage on U.S. adversaries but rather a desirable outcome in and of itself. There are some in Washington who have long pushed for the United States to resume explosive testing and are happy to support arguments that could justify it. While these efforts have been ongoing for decades, they are more likely to gain support now amid renewed, but unsubstantiated, allegations that Russia and China are testing, too.
The trouble is that test proponents do not just exist in Washington. They have analogues in Moscow and Beijing who would relish an excuse to conduct explosive tests, too. In the last week alone, one Russian analyst has already stated that a U.S. nuclear test would enable Russia to withdraw from the CTBT by claiming that its national interests were under threat. By testing, the Trump administration would give a free pass to those in Moscow and Beijing who are pushing to do the same while enabling them to retain the moral upper hand.
In short, if decision-makers in Washington do choose to test, this attempt at brinkmanship will certainly fail to convince Russia or China to sit down at the arms control negotiating table. Instead, it will make it all the more likely that the very outcomes trilateral arms control seems to be intended to prevent come to bear—and soon. The good news, then, is that there is plenty of time to walk this ill-conceived and ineffective plan back from the brink. In this instance, restraint—such as it is—may be the most effective nuclear signal this administration could possibly send.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--American Cops Could Learn a Lesson From Italy’s Carabinieri

Italy ’ s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute , operating jointly under Italy ’ s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior .
They carry arms and conduct the country ’ s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists .
But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly .
The Carabinieri are highly trained officers—and masters of de-escalation .
As law enforcement officers respond to protests against police brutality across the United States with further violence , U.S. police forces could learn from Italy ’ s skilled force .
“ A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and wisdom , called the Royal Carabinieri Corps … [ is incepted ] for the purpose of contributing to the overall prosperity of the State , that can ’ t be separated from the protection and defense of our good and loyal Subjects , and from the punishment of the guilty , ” wrote King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia in the royal decree that established the Carabinieri 206 years ago .
On festive occasions , the Carabinieri still wear their distinctly regal-looking uniforms—and that ’ s how most foreigners picture the force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are far from pomp and circumstance .
They investigate Mafia groups and other organized crime , arrest hardened criminals , seize illicit drugs , conduct peacekeeping in complex environments ( such as Kosovo ) , and train other countries ’ police forces in the use of firearms .
They are , in other words , the real deal : highly skilled officers who take on the toughest cases .
Three years ago , members of the Carabinieri arrested the legendary ’ Ndrangheta mafia boss Giuseppe Giorgi , also known as The Goat , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police commander .
Earlier this year , hundreds of Carabinieri , working with Italy ’ s financial police , the Guardia di Finanza , arrested nearly 100 people in Sicily who—led by two Mafia clans—had systematically pillaged EU funds .
Last December , they arrested more than 300 members of the vicious ’ Ndrangheta .
And last month , a team of Carabinieri seized 6 million euros ( $ 6.5 million ) in a raid on a drug-trafficking syndicate , while another team discovered a large weapons cache including a bomb with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are , it ’ s rare to see a Carabinieri officer brandishing a gun .
“ Even during arrests of Mafia leaders , the officers only rarely use their weapons , ” said Brig .
Gen. Massimo Mennitti , the Carabinieri ’ s chief of external relations .
“ We simply make clear to them that they have no option but to give up.
” But how to communicate that to an extremely dangerous mafioso without , say , pointing a weapon at him ?
“ As they say in Sicily , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you receive respect , ’ ” Mennitti explained .
“ That ’ s obviously easy to say .
It ’ s harder when you ’ re arresting somebody in a dark street .
But your first instinct should be to remain calm.
” It doesn ’ t always work .
In one incident in 1992 , three Carabinieri lost their lives in the bombing attack on prosecutor Giovanni Falcone when a bomb was detonated as they traveled on a Sicilian motorway .
Last year , three Carabinieri officers were killed on duty , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unarmed officer stabbed to death by an American teenager when he intercepted the U.S. national , who had stolen a backpack during a botched drug deal .
Another 2,033 officers were injured last year , according to figures provided by the Carabinieri .
Still , considering the often highly dangerous nature of the 110,000-strong force ’ s duties , that ’ s a relatively small number .
Indeed , while the number of officers injured has increased in recent years , the number of deaths has declined .
The Carabinieri ’ s approach—military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rare use of weapons—is worlds away from U.S. policing .
Even though U.S. police officers are not a military force with corresponding training , since 1997 they have bought $ 7.2 billion worth of heavily discounted military surplus equipment .
Between 2006 and 2014 , that included 79,288 assault rifles , 205 grenade launchers , and 11,959 bayonets from the Pentagon .
The influx of equipment has had consequences : A 2017 academic study found that use of the program ’ s equipment “ increases civilian deaths by roughly 129 % .
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both the defense of the country and the investigation of serious crime , also specialize in community policing .
During the coronavirus crisis , Carabinieri have been bringing food to older people , homeless people , and others who are struggling .
In some towns , they have even teamed up with local priests to buy food for needy families .
And because locked-down elderly Italians have been unable to collect their pensions at the post office—as is customary—local Carabinieri have delivered the money to them .
There have been bad apples : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of manslaughter in the case of Stefano Cucchi , who died in 2009 after having been beaten in police custody .
But on the whole , the Carabinieri enjoy enormous respect in Italian society .
Though that may seem natural today , matters could have turned out very differently .
“ In the 1970s we had a combination of [ domestic ] terrorism and widespread student protests , ” recalled Stefano Stefanini , a former Italian ambassador to NATO and advisor to ex-President Giorgio Napolitano .
“ That ’ s where the Carabinieri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The situation was often violent , but the Carabinieri responded with extreme caution.
” That period , often referred to as the Years of Lead , came at a staggering human cost , with more than 400 people killed , according to most estimates .
The majority were civilians , but civil servants were killed too , as were military officers and more than a dozen Carabinieri .
But if they had employed more confrontational U.S.-style policing tactics back then , it ’ s likely many more lives would have been lost .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , could make a promising model for police forces everywhere—and it ’ s one that U.S. police forces should study .
Indeed , the Carabinieri teach their model at NATO ’ s Stability Policing center in the Italian town of Vicenza .
There are clearly differences between the legal systems in the United States and Italy ; the American system is a federal one with local police forces , while the Italian government is more centralized .
The Carabinieri are a national force , where officers change assignments every few years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Carabinieri ’ s head of external relations , for example , transferred to headquarters after commanding the force in the Trentino region .
He told me that the regular transfers between duties instilled a culture among officers of constant learning .
That learning includes foreign deployments : The Carabinieri are much in demand as trainers of police forces in Iraq , Afghanistan , and other countries .
And it includes regular training at the Carabinieri ’ s academies .
Militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the FBI are , of course , national forces—but ones tasked with intelligence and investigations , not patrolling and community policing .
Even if it could be constitutionally arranged , few Americans would want the FBI turned into a federally run police force .
What needs fixing is instead the deterioration in trust between police forces and parts of the community .
Not all U.S. police officers are confrontational and violent .
Many conduct phenomenal detective work based on sleuthing and instinct , not use of weapons , and others excel in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to contend with a level of civilian weapons use that far exceeds European levels .
But as the events of recent weeks make clear , militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing .
If Carabinieri can apprehend mafia kingpins without heavy artillery , it should be possible for U.S. police officers to apprehend garden-variety offenders without killing them and without using bullets , helicopters , and armored vehicles .
Dysfunctional though it often is , there are a few things Italy can teach the United States .
Forceful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surely one of them .

Italy’s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute, operating jointly under Italy’s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. They carry arms and conduct the country’s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists. But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly.
Italy’s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute, operating jointly under Italy’s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. They carry arms and conduct the country’s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists. But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly.
The Carabinieri are highly trained officers—and masters of de-escalation. As law enforcement officers respond to protests against police brutality across the United States with further violence, U.S. police forces could learn from Italy’s skilled force.
“A military Corps known for its good conduct and wisdom, called the Royal Carabinieri Corps … [is incepted] for the purpose of contributing to the overall prosperity of the State, that can’t be separated from the protection and defense of our good and loyal Subjects, and from the punishment of the guilty,” wrote King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia in the royal decree that established the Carabinieri 206 years ago. On festive occasions, the Carabinieri still wear their distinctly regal-looking uniforms—and that’s how most foreigners picture the force.
But on most days, Carabinieri are far from pomp and circumstance. They investigate Mafia groups and other organized crime, arrest hardened criminals, seize illicit drugs, conduct peacekeeping in complex environments (such as Kosovo), and train other countries’ police forces in the use of firearms. They are, in other words, the real deal: highly skilled officers who take on the toughest cases.
Three years ago, members of the Carabinieri arrested the legendary ’Ndrangheta mafia boss Giuseppe Giorgi, also known as The Goat, a nickname reportedly coined by a local police commander. Earlier this year, hundreds of Carabinieri, working with Italy’s financial police, the Guardia di Finanza, arrested nearly 100 people in Sicily who—led by two Mafia clans—had systematically pillaged EU funds. Last December, they arrested more than 300 members of the vicious ’Ndrangheta. And last month, a team of Carabinieri seized 6 million euros ($6.5 million) in a raid on a drug-trafficking syndicate, while another team discovered a large weapons cache including a bomb with its fuse connected.
As highly trained as they are, it’s rare to see a Carabinieri officer brandishing a gun. “Even during arrests of Mafia leaders, the officers only rarely use their weapons,” said Brig. Gen. Massimo Mennitti, the Carabinieri’s chief of external relations. “We simply make clear to them that they have no option but to give up.” But how to communicate that to an extremely dangerous mafioso without, say, pointing a weapon at him? “As they say in Sicily, ‘If you act with respect, you receive respect,’” Mennitti explained. “That’s obviously easy to say. It’s harder when you’re arresting somebody in a dark street. But your first instinct should be to remain calm.” It doesn’t always work.
In one incident in 1992, three Carabinieri lost their lives in the bombing attack on prosecutor Giovanni Falcone when a bomb was detonated as they traveled on a Sicilian motorway. Last year, three Carabinieri officers were killed on duty, among them Mario Cerciello Rega, an unarmed officer stabbed to death by an American teenager when he intercepted the U.S. national, who had stolen a backpack during a botched drug deal. Another 2,033 officers were injured last year, according to figures provided by the Carabinieri. Still, considering the often highly dangerous nature of the 110,000-strong force’s duties, that’s a relatively small number. Indeed, while the number of officers injured has increased in recent years, the number of deaths has declined.
The Carabinieri’s approach—military duties and advanced weapons skills, but rare use of weapons—is worlds away from U.S. policing. Even though U.S. police officers are not a military force with corresponding training, since 1997 they have bought $7.2 billion worth of heavily discounted military surplus equipment. Between 2006 and 2014, that included 79,288 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers, and 11,959 bayonets from the Pentagon. The influx of equipment has had consequences: A 2017 academic study found that use of the program’s equipment “increases civilian deaths by roughly 129%.”
The Carabinieri, meanwhile, tasked with both the defense of the country and the investigation of serious crime, also specialize in community policing. During the coronavirus crisis, Carabinieri have been bringing food to older people, homeless people, and others who are struggling. In some towns, they have even teamed up with local priests to buy food for needy families. And because locked-down elderly Italians have been unable to collect their pensions at the post office—as is customary—local Carabinieri have delivered the money to them. There have been bad apples: last year two Carabinieri were found guilty of manslaughter in the case of Stefano Cucchi, who died in 2009 after having been beaten in police custody.
But on the whole, the Carabinieri enjoy enormous respect in Italian society. Though that may seem natural today, matters could have turned out very differently. “In the 1970s we had a combination of [domestic] terrorism and widespread student protests,” recalled Stefano Stefanini, a former Italian ambassador to NATO and advisor to ex-President Giorgio Napolitano. “That’s where the Carabinieri learned their skills in crowd control. The situation was often violent, but the Carabinieri responded with extreme caution.”
That period, often referred to as the Years of Lead, came at a staggering human cost, with more than 400 people killed, according to most estimates. The majority were civilians, but civil servants were killed too, as were military officers and more than a dozen Carabinieri. But if they had employed more confrontational U.S.-style policing tactics back then, it’s likely many more lives would have been lost.
Capable of force, but rarely using it, could make a promising model for police forces everywhere—and it’s one that U.S. police forces should study. Indeed, the Carabinieri teach their model at NATO’s Stability Policing center in the Italian town of Vicenza. There are clearly differences between the legal systems in the United States and Italy; the American system is a federal one with local police forces, while the Italian government is more centralized. The Carabinieri are a national force, where officers change assignments every few years, much like armed forces everywhere.
Mennitti, the Carabinieri’s head of external relations, for example, transferred to headquarters after commanding the force in the Trentino region. He told me that the regular transfers between duties instilled a culture among officers of constant learning. That learning includes foreign deployments: The Carabinieri are much in demand as trainers of police forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. And it includes regular training at the Carabinieri’s academies.
Militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing.
In the United States, the CIA and the FBI are, of course, national forces—but ones tasked with intelligence and investigations, not patrolling and community policing. Even if it could be constitutionally arranged, few Americans would want the FBI turned into a federally run police force. What needs fixing is instead the deterioration in trust between police forces and parts of the community.
Not all U.S. police officers are confrontational and violent. Many conduct phenomenal detective work based on sleuthing and instinct, not use of weapons, and others excel in community relations. And all American officers have to contend with a level of civilian weapons use that far exceeds European levels. But as the events of recent weeks make clear, militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing.
If Carabinieri can apprehend mafia kingpins without heavy artillery, it should be possible for U.S. police officers to apprehend garden-variety offenders without killing them and without using bullets, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Dysfunctional though it often is, there are a few things Italy can teach the United States. Forceful policing without the use of force is surely one of them.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-12--Reality Strikes the Stock Market

Reality Strikes the Stock Market

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. stock market takes its first big dive after weeks of gains , North Korea says it is finished with U.S. diplomatic efforts , and Syria names a new prime minister .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The U.S. stock market appears to be facing reality after weeks of climbing amid mass unemployment , mass unrest in U.S. cities , and tens of thousands across the country—and the world—dying of COVID-19 .
Two factors seem to be driving the dive : a less than optimistic economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wednesday and a realization that the easing of lockdowns may have been premature .
On a day when the S & P 500 dropped 5.9 percent , the VIX , known as Wall Street ’ s “ fear gauge ” climbed by approximately 50 percent to over $ 41 , a level not seen since late April .
Prior to Thursday ’ s dip , the S & P was on course to rapidly erase all its losses from 2020 .
How come it took so long ?
Although it may be obvious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things are not looking good , the stock market is not always primed to focus on the present .
On May 29 , Foreign Policy asked leading experts to explain why the market rallied even as the world crumbled .
Many investors still see the world “ through pre-pandemic-tinted lenses.
” Diane Swonk , the chief economist at Grant Thornton said .
“ They take previous recessions as a benchmark and expect profits to rebound as in the past—and don ’ t see the much larger and longer-term challenges created by COVID-19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the future.
” It ’ s all about the Fed .
Eduardo Porter , an economics reporter at the New York Times , is a little more blunt , highlighting the newfound clout of the U.S. central bank .
“ Wall Street types like to believe that the price of the stocks they peddle somehow represents the value of a business or the state of the economy .
Nonsense , ” he said .
“ These days , the price of stocks has mostly been a function of policy at the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waves of money on the economy , that money seeks assets to buy.
” For some more insights from our panel of economic experts , read the whole piece here .
On Thursday , the World Health Organization ’ s Africa regional director Matshidiso Moeti said shortages of testing kits remain a challenge for the continent , home to some of the world ’ s poorest countries .
The gap between rich and poor when it comes to testing is stark .
High income countries have tested their populations at a rate 40 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea says “ never again ” to Trump-Kim meetings .
On the two-year anniversary of the first meeting between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , Pyongyang seems in no mood to pursue closer ties , according to a statement by Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon .
“ Never again will we provide the U.S. chief executive with another package to be used for achievements without receiving any returns , ” Ri said .
The statement called for a change of direction in U.S. policy and pointed out what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The U.S. professes to be an advocate for improved relations with the DPRK , but in fact , it is hell-bent on only exacerbating the situation , ” Ri added .
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 4 , Doug Bandow explained why opening lines of communication with North Korea—and shelving talk of denuclearization—could be “ a rare , winning foreign-policy legacy for the Trump administration.
” Syria names new prime minister .
Syrian Presdient Bashar al-Assad has fired Prime Minister Imad Khamis and replaced him with Hussein Arnous , the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlook has led to a fresh outbreak of protests against Assad ’ s leadership : Hundreds of protesters took to the streets of Sweida this week to call for his overthrow .
Mass graves unearthed in Libya .
Forces loyal to the internationally backed Government of National Accord ( GNA ) have reported discovering eight mass graves in territory formerly held by Khalifa Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army ( LNA ) .
The discovery comes as both sides enter peace talks , and has the potential to shame the main international backers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Arab Emirates , Egypt , and Jordan .
The number of corpses the graves contain has not yet been reported .
The U.N. Mission in Libya has called for a “ prompt , effective and transparent ” investigation .
More U.K.-EU trade talks planned .
The United Kingdom and European Union have agreed to an accelerated round of trade talks as Prime Minister Boris Johnson attempts to keep his promise to get an agreement finalized by the end of the year .
Talks will now take place each week between June 29 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin , Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will meet for talks on June 15 .
Nepal ’ s map irks India .
Nepal ’ s parliament is due to vote over the weekend on a new map of its border with India .
The new map would extend Nepal ’ s territory into India , a move New Delhi rejects as a “ unilateral act.
” Nepal ’ s Prime Minister K.P .
Sharma Oli said he has tried to broker talks with India over the land dispute .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that we want to resolve this through diplomatic talks … And the solution is that our land should be returned to us , ” Oli said .
A statue of the seventeenth-century slave trader Edward Colston has been retrieved from the Bristol harbor where it had been gleefully disposed of during last weekend ’ s anti-racism protests in the British city .
Bristol City Council said the statue “ is being taken to a secure location before later forming part of our museums collection.
” A Spanish archeologist has been sentenced to two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a hoax discovery of artifacts described by the lead police officer as “ one of the greatest falsifications or manipulations relating to archaeological materials from the Roman world.
” The archeologist , Eliseo Gil , claimed he ’ d found third-century pottery that referenced the crucifixion of Jesus as well as objects with Egyptian hieroglyphics .
However , an inquiry found traces of modern glue , as well as the use of the letter J—a letter not used in the Latin alphabet—and references to French philosopher René Descartes .
Under Spanish law , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prison for the offense .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. stock market takes its first big dive after weeks of gains, North Korea says it is finished with U.S. diplomatic efforts, and Syria names a new prime minister.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. stock market takes its first big dive after weeks of gains, North Korea says it is finished with U.S. diplomatic efforts, and Syria names a new prime minister.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
After Weeks of Gains, Stocks Take a Dive
The U.S. stock market appears to be facing reality after weeks of climbing amid mass unemployment, mass unrest in U.S. cities, and tens of thousands across the country—and the world—dying of COVID-19.
Two factors seem to be driving the dive: a less than optimistic economic outlook from Fed Chairman Jerome Powell on Wednesday and a realization that the easing of lockdowns may have been premature.
On a day when the S&P 500 dropped 5.9 percent, the VIX, known as Wall Street’s “fear gauge” climbed by approximately 50 percent to over $41, a level not seen since late April. Prior to Thursday’s dip, the S&P was on course to rapidly erase all its losses from 2020.
How come it took so long? Although it may be obvious to those outside the financial world that things are not looking good, the stock market is not always primed to focus on the present. On May 29, Foreign Policy asked leading experts to explain why the market rallied even as the world crumbled.
Many investors still see the world “through pre-pandemic-tinted lenses.” Diane Swonk, the chief economist at Grant Thornton said. “They take previous recessions as a benchmark and expect profits to rebound as in the past—and don’t see the much larger and longer-term challenges created by COVID-19, including our need to maintain social distancing in the future.”
It’s all about the Fed. Eduardo Porter, an economics reporter at the New York Times, is a little more blunt, highlighting the newfound clout of the U.S. central bank. “Wall Street types like to believe that the price of the stocks they peddle somehow represents the value of a business or the state of the economy. Nonsense,” he said. “These days, the price of stocks has mostly been a function of policy at the U.S. Federal Reserve: When the Fed unleashes waves of money on the economy, that money seeks assets to buy.”
For some more insights from our panel of economic experts, read the whole piece here.
Testing Times
On Thursday, the World Health Organization’s Africa regional director Matshidiso Moeti said shortages of testing kits remain a challenge for the continent, home to some of the world’s poorest countries. The gap between rich and poor when it comes to testing is stark. High income countries have tested their populations at a rate 40 times higher than low income ones.
What We’re Following Today
North Korea says “never again” to Trump-Kim meetings. On the two-year anniversary of the first meeting between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang seems in no mood to pursue closer ties, according to a statement by Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon. “Never again will we provide the U.S. chief executive with another package to be used for achievements without receiving any returns,” Ri said. The statement called for a change of direction in U.S. policy and pointed out what North Korea believes is U.S. hypocrisy. “The U.S. professes to be an advocate for improved relations with the DPRK, but in fact, it is hell-bent on only exacerbating the situation,” Ri added.
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 4, Doug Bandow explained why opening lines of communication with North Korea—and shelving talk of denuclearization—could be “a rare, winning foreign-policy legacy for the Trump administration.”
Syria names new prime minister. Syrian Presdient Bashar al-Assad has fired Prime Minister Imad Khamis and replaced him with Hussein Arnous, the current water resources minister. A worsening economic outlook has led to a fresh outbreak of protests against Assad’s leadership: Hundreds of protesters took to the streets of Sweida this week to call for his overthrow.
Mass graves unearthed in Libya. Forces loyal to the internationally backed Government of National Accord (GNA) have reported discovering eight mass graves in territory formerly held by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The discovery comes as both sides enter peace talks, and has the potential to shame the main international backers of the LNA: France, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan. The number of corpses the graves contain has not yet been reported. The U.N. Mission in Libya has called for a “prompt, effective and transparent” investigation.
Keep an Eye On
More U.K.-EU trade talks planned. The United Kingdom and European Union have agreed to an accelerated round of trade talks as Prime Minister Boris Johnson attempts to keep his promise to get an agreement finalized by the end of the year. Talks will now take place each week between June 29 and July 27. Before those talks begin, Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will meet for talks on June 15.
Nepal’s map irks India. Nepal’s parliament is due to vote over the weekend on a new map of its border with India. The new map would extend Nepal’s territory into India, a move New Delhi rejects as a “unilateral act.” Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli said he has tried to broker talks with India over the land dispute. “We have told [India] that we want to resolve this through diplomatic talks … And the solution is that our land should be returned to us,” Oli said.
Odds and Ends
A statue of the seventeenth-century slave trader Edward Colston has been retrieved from the Bristol harbor where it had been gleefully disposed of during last weekend’s anti-racism protests in the British city. Bristol City Council said the statue “is being taken to a secure location before later forming part of our museums collection.”
A Spanish archeologist has been sentenced to two years in prison for his part in a hoax discovery of artifacts described by the lead police officer as “one of the greatest falsifications or manipulations relating to archaeological materials from the Roman world.” The archeologist, Eliseo Gil, claimed he’d found third-century pottery that referenced the crucifixion of Jesus as well as objects with Egyptian hieroglyphics. However, an inquiry found traces of modern glue, as well as the use of the letter J—a letter not used in the Latin alphabet—and references to French philosopher René Descartes. Under Spanish law, Gil is unlikely to serve time in prison for the offense.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-12--The World Is Watching America’s Reaction to the George Floyd Protests

The World Is Watching America ’ s Reaction to the George Floyd Protests Hearing and watching George Floyd say “ I can ’ t breathe ” on video is bound to shake you .
If you are American , it can make you sad , angry , and ashamed—renewing your belief that black lives matter and that systemic racism must end .
For many non-Americans , though , Floyd ’ s unjust and gruesome death has meant all of this , but also much more .
Particularly in autocratic countries and in countries where democratization is incomplete and fragile , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American protesters getting tear-gassed , and journalists getting attacked can shake one ’ s faith in the values that the United States has long prided itself on standing for .
Those outside the United States can not help but ask themselves : How can “ the land of the free and the home of the brave ” fail to confront police racism ?
If democratic values and human rights can not be upheld in the land where the Constitution secures “ the blessings of liberty , ” can they be upheld at all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with much bitterness , in countries like Egypt ( and , it is safe to assume , in other countries undergoing similar conditions or equally severe political repression ) where pro-democracy activists have made sacrifices and paid a high price in their pursuit of democratization and human rights .
The Arab Spring and the 2011 Egyptian revolution awed many Americans and reminded them of their own revolutionary history .
Sadly , in 2013 , a counterrevolutionary military coup brought Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power and shattered Egyptian democrats ’ dreams .
Since then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters rounded up , and dissidents jailed and sometimes tortured .
The brutality of the crackdown on supporters of democracy and human rights was severe enough to make some lose their faith in the revolution that had given them hope almost a decade ago : calls for freedom seem to have brought only a reactionary government and a level of political repression that many had never even witnessed in the era of Hosni Mubarak .
While already in distress , Egyptians watched in shock as Americans voted Donald Trump into office in 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president ’ s hostility toward the media and toward minorities and immigrants .
Prior to 2016 , Egyptian supporters of democracy and human rights were at least able to point to the U.S. system , along with other democracies , as positive examples in their effort to convince fellow Egyptians of the merits of democratic principles and human rights , and to rally them behind this cause .
Now , after Floyd ’ s killing and police attacks on protesters , it has become increasingly hard to do so .
In many nondemocratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights , such as those in Egypt who prefer to prioritize the Sisi regime ’ s war against militants in the Sinai Peninsula over democratization , are now saying , “ See , we told you : Democracy just does not work .
Human rights are nothing but empty words that mean little when more pressing and realistic issues , such as fighting terrorism or imposing law and order , are at stake.
” Nondemocratic leaders know that the violations taking place in the United States are being watched live by their citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. State Department ’ s annual reports criticizing their own human rights practices .
Nondemocratic leaders are even more confident in their suppression of freedoms and their condoning of police brutality .
They know that the violations taking place in the United States are being watched live by their citizens .
These leaders can now simply laugh off the U.S. State Department ’ s annual reports criticizing their own human rights practices .
While there is no guarantee that freedom , democracy , and justice will ultimately triumph , there are many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ values , wherever they are , to cling to their faith : The wave of anti-racism protests that have swept around the world despite the pandemic ’ s lingering danger ; the fact that many Americans of all races are standing in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement , with many white Americans engaging in a renewed conversation about their white privilege ; and the relatively rare conversation about race sparked by Floyd ’ s killing in countries like Egypt , where race was barely on the public ’ s radar before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside the United States , are discovering and rediscovering their very own racism .
Moreover , they are linking the Black Lives Matter cause to their own struggles against police brutality and their call for democracy , freedom , and a better life at home .
“ I can ’ t breathe ” was translated into Arabic , and into numerous other languages , too , and it has gone viral—in art , graffiti , social media , and conversations in living rooms .
Democratic principles , human rights , and justice are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who adhere to these ideals need to discard notions of American exceptionalism and think beyond their own borders and to realize the value of solidarity with those championing the same cause elsewhere in the world .
“ We the people ” are not only of and in the United States .
We are in Egypt , Tunisia , Syria , Sudan , Lebanon , Ethiopia , South Africa , and around the globe .
More importantly , when Americans vote this November , their votes will not only be about the next occupant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broader universal principles—about faith in democracy and human rights , and the idea that they are achievable and worth struggling for .
Many Egyptian activists and democrats , as well as others around the world holding their breath while they are following news from the United States , are well aware of the deeply rooted injustices that have marred the American system since its inception , from slavery to the violent elimination of indigenous North Americans .
But they also know that U.S. democracy , when upheld and preserved , provides the mechanisms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights violations elsewhere in the world to be addressed—even if the legacy of slavery and the violence of settler colonialism will never be undone .
Democracy has enabled many U.S. officials to defy Trump in line with the U.S. system ’ s principle of separation of powers .
It empowered the president ’ s opponents to take him to court with reasonable hope that justice can indeed prevail , just as the Washington Post and the New York Times challenged Richard Nixon in 1971 and Oliver Brown challenged the Board of Education in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ v. Board did not end Jim Crow segregation , and its implementation was marred by massive resistance from racists , but it achieved something—and it was a historic step in black Americans ’ long and unfinished walk to freedom .
The upcoming election is not the end of the road or the ultimate answer to the current crisis in the United States , but Trump ’ s reelection poses a real danger , not only to America ’ s system but also to faith in democracy ’ s self-correcting mechanisms .
For those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to keep up the momentum of grassroots action on the streets that was triggered by Floyd ’ s brutal death .

Hearing and watching George Floyd say “I can’t breathe” on video is bound to shake you. If you are American, it can make you sad, angry, and ashamed—renewing your belief that black lives matter and that systemic racism must end. For many non-Americans, though, Floyd’s unjust and gruesome death has meant all of this, but also much more.
Hearing and watching George Floyd say “I can’t breathe” on video is bound to shake you. If you are American, it can make you sad, angry, and ashamed—renewing your belief that black lives matter and that systemic racism must end. For many non-Americans, though, Floyd’s unjust and gruesome death has meant all of this, but also much more.
Particularly in autocratic countries and in countries where democratization is incomplete and fragile, watching Floyd pleading for his life, American protesters getting tear-gassed, and journalists getting attacked can shake one’s faith in the values that the United States has long prided itself on standing for.
Those outside the United States cannot help but ask themselves: How can “the land of the free and the home of the brave” fail to confront police racism? If democratic values and human rights cannot be upheld in the land where the Constitution secures “the blessings of liberty,” can they be upheld at all?
These questions are being asked, with much bitterness, in countries like Egypt (and, it is safe to assume, in other countries undergoing similar conditions or equally severe political repression) where pro-democracy activists have made sacrifices and paid a high price in their pursuit of democratization and human rights.
The Arab Spring and the 2011 Egyptian revolution awed many Americans and reminded them of their own revolutionary history. Sadly, in 2013, a counterrevolutionary military coup brought Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power and shattered Egyptian democrats’ dreams. Since then, street protests have been restricted, protesters rounded up, and dissidents jailed and sometimes tortured.
The brutality of the crackdown on supporters of democracy and human rights was severe enough to make some lose their faith in the revolution that had given them hope almost a decade ago: calls for freedom seem to have brought only a reactionary government and a level of political repression that many had never even witnessed in the era of Hosni Mubarak.
While already in distress, Egyptians watched in shock as Americans voted Donald Trump into office in 2016. Then, they observed the U.S. president’s hostility toward the media and toward minorities and immigrants. Prior to 2016, Egyptian supporters of democracy and human rights were at least able to point to the U.S. system, along with other democracies, as positive examples in their effort to convince fellow Egyptians of the merits of democratic principles and human rights, and to rally them behind this cause.
Now, after Floyd’s killing and police attacks on protesters, it has become increasingly hard to do so. In many nondemocratic countries, opponents of democracy and human rights, such as those in Egypt who prefer to prioritize the Sisi regime’s war against militants in the Sinai Peninsula over democratization, are now saying, “See, we told you: Democracy just does not work. Human rights are nothing but empty words that mean little when more pressing and realistic issues, such as fighting terrorism or imposing law and order, are at stake.”
Nondemocratic leaders know that the violations taking place in the United States are being watched live by their citizens and they can now simply laugh off the U.S. State Department’s annual reports criticizing their own human rights practices.
Nondemocratic leaders are even more confident in their suppression of freedoms and their condoning of police brutality. They know that the violations taking place in the United States are being watched live by their citizens. These leaders can now simply laugh off the U.S. State Department’s annual reports criticizing their own human rights practices.
While there is no guarantee that freedom, democracy, and justice will ultimately triumph, there are many reasons for those who advocate those universal values, wherever they are, to cling to their faith: The wave of anti-racism protests that have swept around the world despite the pandemic’s lingering danger; the fact that many Americans of all races are standing in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, with many white Americans engaging in a renewed conversation about their white privilege; and the relatively rare conversation about race sparked by Floyd’s killing in countries like Egypt, where race was barely on the public’s radar before.
Many Egyptians, along with others outside the United States, are discovering and rediscovering their very own racism. Moreover, they are linking the Black Lives Matter cause to their own struggles against police brutality and their call for democracy, freedom, and a better life at home. “I can’t breathe” was translated into Arabic, and into numerous other languages, too, and it has gone viral—in art, graffiti, social media, and conversations in living rooms.
Democratic principles, human rights, and justice are widely shared human values. Liberal Americans who adhere to these ideals need to discard notions of American exceptionalism and think beyond their own borders and to realize the value of solidarity with those championing the same cause elsewhere in the world. “We the people” are not only of and in the United States. We are in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, Ethiopia, South Africa, and around the globe.
More importantly, when Americans vote this November, their votes will not only be about the next occupant of the White House, but about broader universal principles—about faith in democracy and human rights, and the idea that they are achievable and worth struggling for.
Many Egyptian activists and democrats, as well as others around the world holding their breath while they are following news from the United States, are well aware of the deeply rooted injustices that have marred the American system since its inception, from slavery to the violent elimination of indigenous North Americans. But they also know that U.S. democracy, when upheld and preserved, provides the mechanisms and tools that enable injustices and human rights violations elsewhere in the world to be addressed—even if the legacy of slavery and the violence of settler colonialism will never be undone.
Democracy has enabled many U.S. officials to defy Trump in line with the U.S. system’s principle of separation of powers. It empowered the president’s opponents to take him to court with reasonable hope that justice can indeed prevail, just as the Washington Post and the New York Times challenged Richard Nixon in 1971 and Oliver Brown challenged the Board of Education in Topeka, Kansas in 1954. Brown v. Board did not end Jim Crow segregation, and its implementation was marred by massive resistance from racists, but it achieved something—and it was a historic step in black Americans’ long and unfinished walk to freedom.
The upcoming election is not the end of the road or the ultimate answer to the current crisis in the United States, but Trump’s reelection poses a real danger, not only to America’s system but also to faith in democracy’s self-correcting mechanisms. For those reasons, democracy advocates around the world need to keep up the momentum of grassroots action on the streets that was triggered by Floyd’s brutal death.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-12--America’s Disdain for Black Lives Extends to Africa

Since the police killing of George Floyd on May 25 , several U.S. embassies in Africa have issued statements seeking to mollify African protests against the killings of black people by police and white vigilantes in the United States .
The chair of the African Union Commission , Moussa Faki Mahamat , said the pan-African body rejects the “ continuing discriminatory practices against Black citizens ” of the United States—just as it did in a historic Resolution on Racial Discrimination in the United States of America made by African leaders at the Organization of African Unity ’ s first assembly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against police brutality and institutional racism continue and spread around the world , U.S. diplomats in Africa are reportedly concerned that the reality of violence against people of African descent in the United States creates a propaganda opportunity for China , particularly on the continent .
But such thinking—verbalized by U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien—is an insult to the intelligence of all Africans , who are quite capable of judging America on its own failed merits .
Racial violence against African Americans is historic , systemic , institutionalized , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the first Africans were enslaved and taken to America 400 years ago .
Despite the abolition of slavery in 1865 and the gains of the U.S. civil rights movement 100 years later , African Americans suffer the consequences of an economic , political , and social system that glorifies and privileges whiteness and uses violence to limit the freedoms , rights , and economic opportunities of black people .
The present unrest is but the latest wave in the struggle for justice and the structural change needed to protect the human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know this .
They know it in part because they have experienced the same racism and militarism in U.S. foreign policy toward the continent from colonial times to the present .
This history includes U.S. support for Belgian King Leopold II ’ s brutal rule of Congo at the end of the 19th century , which claimed as many as 10-15 million lives , and the U.S. role in the capture of Nelson Mandela by the apartheid South African state in 1962 .
During the Cold War , the United States propped up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries such as Zaire ( now the Democratic Republic of the Congo ) , Liberia , Sudan , Somalia , and Kenya .
It only distanced itself from the apartheid regime in South Africa after massive protests in the mid-1980s .
More recently , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s has subjected African citizens to travel bans and infamously referred to African countries as “ shithole countries.
” The current protests come as the coronavirus pandemic has stripped away the facade of American exceptionalism and exposed deep and persistent racial inequalities in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of COVID-19 infections , hospitalizations , and deaths among black people .
Beyond the public health crisis , African Americans are also the most exposed to the consequences of the economic crisis that follows in the wake of the virus .
The cavalier and inept response by the Trump administration and allied white Republican governors demonstrates a depraved disregard for black lives .
Africans know this .
The individual victims of U.S. police brutality include people of African descent from Haiti such as Abner Louima and African immigrants such as Amadou Diallo .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ include people of African descent from Haiti such as Abner Louima and African immigrants such as Amadou Diallo , among an impossibly long list of other black Americans .
Recently , that list has included children such as Trayvon Martin and Tamir Rice , women such as Sandra Bland and Breonna Taylor , and men such as Ahmaud Arbery and George Floyd .
Historically , the hypermilitarized brand of policing in the United States has been primarily enforced against African Americans , Latinx Americans , and Asian Americans—not to mention the Native American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genocide .
Africans are painfully aware of this part of U.S. history .
What is less well known in both the United States and in Africa is Washington is responsible today for ongoing violence against Africans in Africa .
U.S. militarism on the continent inevitably results in the killing of unarmed civilians in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa , mirroring the police killings of black Americans in the United States .
The growth of the U.S. military footprint in Africa is a white American knee on Africa ’ s neck .
But Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not captured on smartphone videos .
A sharp militarization of U.S. relations with Africa followed 9/11 and the so-called global war on terrorism .
In 2003 , the Bush administration established the first permanent U.S. base on the continent , in Djibouti .
U.S. Africa Command was created in 2007 .
U.S. troop presence rapidly increased by nearly 170 percent .
By 2016 , special operations commandos in sub-Saharan Africa soon represented around 17 percent of those deployed globally .
Between 2015 and 2018 , U.S. Defense Department counterterrorism aid to African countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration , drone bases have proliferated , and airstrikes have spiked , particularly in Somalia and Libya .
In the first two years of the Trump presidency , drone strikes in Somalia alone were more than double the total number of raids there during the previous two U.S. presidencies combined .
Construction on the $ 110 million Reaper drone base in Agadez , Niger , began in 2016 and was completed and operationalized last year—the U.S. Air Force ’ s largest-ever single construction project .
Since the Barack Obama years , Africom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance—though they could also be outfitted with rockets .
It is not entirely clear how many temporary or permanent drone bases in Africa are weaponized beyond Djibouti , Niger , Ethiopia , the Seychelles , and on U.S. ships off the coast of Somalia .
In the United States and in the African countries where the U.S. military is active , the public is largely unaware of these military arrangements .
There is an intentional lack of transparency on the part of the U.S. military and the CIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 7,500 U.S. troops operating in 50 countries in Africa and an unknown number of special operations forces in at least 33 countries .
Between 29 and 34 bases across the continent house special operations forces and manned and unmanned aircraft .
In 2016 alone , the U.S. military undertook 3,500 missions in Africa—a nearly twentyfold increase since the establishment of Africom—and that number has increased under Trump .
The unaccountable , hypermilitarized policing of African territories by the U.S. military resembles the urban warfare and police brutality against black people in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass protest .
The consequences of the militarization of U.S. policy toward Africa include an unknown and growing number of civilian deaths , deepening conflict and poverty , and an increase in violent movements in Africa , particularly in the Sahel region .
Amnesty International released a report last year on the increase in U.S. airstrikes and civilian deaths in Somalia that suggests that the secret war there may have already resulted in numerous war crimes .
During the past two decades , the United States has killed nearly 2,000 people in Somalia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during Ramadan , U.S. drone strikes were reported to have hit a home of six residents in the town of Kunya Barrow , Somalia , and injured four civilians , including a mother and three children .
Africom refused recognition of the civilian casualties and claimed to have “ killed two terrorists.
” During the past two decades , the United States has killed nearly 2,000 people in Somalia alone .
It ’ s unknown how many were civilians : The U.S. government claims that the vast majority were terrorists or members of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ evidence .
Last year , Africom went as far as to say that despite more than 100 airstrikes since June 2017 , it had not killed or injured a single civilian—a claim it was later forced to retract .
Why is no one held accountable for these possible war crimes ?
Is it because they are African and there is no video ?
America ’ s official disdain for black lives , sustained for four centuries and enshrined in the original U.S. Constitution , has certainly spiked during the Trump presidency .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , and it never has been .
For Africans , awareness of America ’ s structural racism and its enforcement through violence is a consequence of direct experience .
Throughout history , Africans have been the targets of this violence—whether enslaved , free , immigrants , or at home on the African continent .
Our demands today to end institutionalized racism and hypermilitarism in the United States must include a call to end the institutionalized racism of American foreign policy , too .

Since the police killing of George Floyd on May 25, several U.S. embassies in Africa have issued statements seeking to mollify African protests against the killings of black people by police and white vigilantes in the United States. The chair of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, said the pan-African body rejects the “continuing discriminatory practices against Black citizens” of the United States—just as it did in a historic Resolution on Racial Discrimination in the United States of America made by African leaders at the Organization of African Unity’s first assembly meeting in 1964.
Since the police killing of George Floyd on May 25, several U.S. embassies in Africa have issued statements seeking to mollify African protests against the killings of black people by police and white vigilantes in the United States. The chair of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, said the pan-African body rejects the “continuing discriminatory practices against Black citizens” of the United States—just as it did in a historic Resolution on Racial Discrimination in the United States of America made by African leaders at the Organization of African Unity’s first assembly meeting in 1964.
As mass demonstrations against police brutality and institutional racism continue and spread around the world, U.S. diplomats in Africa are reportedly concerned that the reality of violence against people of African descent in the United States creates a propaganda opportunity for China, particularly on the continent. But such thinking—verbalized by U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien—is an insult to the intelligence of all Africans, who are quite capable of judging America on its own failed merits.
Racial violence against African Americans is historic, systemic, institutionalized, and structural. This has been the case since the first Africans were enslaved and taken to America 400 years ago. Despite the abolition of slavery in 1865 and the gains of the U.S. civil rights movement 100 years later, African Americans suffer the consequences of an economic, political, and social system that glorifies and privileges whiteness and uses violence to limit the freedoms, rights, and economic opportunities of black people.
The present unrest is but the latest wave in the struggle for justice and the structural change needed to protect the human rights of people of African descent. Africans know this.
They know it in part because they have experienced the same racism and militarism in U.S. foreign policy toward the continent from colonial times to the present. This history includes U.S. support for Belgian King Leopold II’s brutal rule of Congo at the end of the 19th century, which claimed as many as 10-15 million lives, and the U.S. role in the capture of Nelson Mandela by the apartheid South African state in 1962.
During the Cold War, the United States propped up military dictatorships and repressive one-party states in countries such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. It only distanced itself from the apartheid regime in South Africa after massive protests in the mid-1980s. More recently, U.S. President Donald Trump’s has subjected African citizens to travel bans and infamously referred to African countries as “shithole countries.”
The current protests come as the coronavirus pandemic has stripped away the facade of American exceptionalism and exposed deep and persistent racial inequalities in the United States—evidenced by the disproportionately high rate of COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths among black people. Beyond the public health crisis, African Americans are also the most exposed to the consequences of the economic crisis that follows in the wake of the virus. The cavalier and inept response by the Trump administration and allied white Republican governors demonstrates a depraved disregard for black lives. Africans know this.
The individual victims of U.S. police brutality include people of African descent from Haiti such as Abner Louima and African immigrants such as Amadou Diallo.
The individual victims of U.S. police brutality include people of African descent from Haiti such as Abner Louima and African immigrants such as Amadou Diallo, among an impossibly long list of other black Americans. Recently, that list has included children such as Trayvon Martin and Tamir Rice, women such as Sandra Bland and Breonna Taylor, and men such as Ahmaud Arbery and George Floyd. Historically, the hypermilitarized brand of policing in the United States has been primarily enforced against African Americans, Latinx Americans, and Asian Americans—not to mention the Native American nations for which law and order meant genocide. Africans are painfully aware of this part of U.S. history.
What is less well known in both the United States and in Africa is Washington is responsible today for ongoing violence against Africans in Africa. U.S. militarism on the continent inevitably results in the killing of unarmed civilians in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, mirroring the police killings of black Americans in the United States. The growth of the U.S. military footprint in Africa is a white American knee on Africa’s neck. But Washington’s violent behavior in Africa is not captured on smartphone videos.
A sharp militarization of U.S. relations with Africa followed 9/11 and the so-called global war on terrorism. In 2003, the Bush administration established the first permanent U.S. base on the continent, in Djibouti. U.S. Africa Command was created in 2007. U.S. troop presence rapidly increased by nearly 170 percent. By 2016, special operations commandos in sub-Saharan Africa soon represented around 17 percent of those deployed globally.
Between 2015 and 2018, U.S. Defense Department counterterrorism aid to African countries more than tripled. Especially under the Trump administration, drone bases have proliferated, and airstrikes have spiked, particularly in Somalia and Libya. In the first two years of the Trump presidency, drone strikes in Somalia alone were more than double the total number of raids there during the previous two U.S. presidencies combined.
Construction on the $110 million Reaper drone base in Agadez, Niger, began in 2016 and was completed and operationalized last year—the U.S. Air Force’s largest-ever single construction project. Since the Barack Obama years, Africom has expanded drone bases across Africa for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—though they could also be outfitted with rockets. It is not entirely clear how many temporary or permanent drone bases in Africa are weaponized beyond Djibouti, Niger, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, and on U.S. ships off the coast of Somalia.
In the United States and in the African countries where the U.S. military is active, the public is largely unaware of these military arrangements. There is an intentional lack of transparency on the part of the U.S. military and the CIA, but there are between 6,000 and 7,500 U.S. troops operating in 50 countries in Africa and an unknown number of special operations forces in at least 33 countries. Between 29 and 34 bases across the continent house special operations forces and manned and unmanned aircraft. In 2016 alone, the U.S. military undertook 3,500 missions in Africa—a nearly twentyfold increase since the establishment of Africom—and that number has increased under Trump.
The unaccountable, hypermilitarized policing of African territories by the U.S. military resembles the urban warfare and police brutality against black people in the United States that are now the focus of mass protest. The consequences of the militarization of U.S. policy toward Africa include an unknown and growing number of civilian deaths, deepening conflict and poverty, and an increase in violent movements in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. Amnesty International released a report last year on the increase in U.S. airstrikes and civilian deaths in Somalia that suggests that the secret war there may have already resulted in numerous war crimes.
During the past two decades, the United States has killed nearly 2,000 people in Somalia alone.
Just three weeks ago, during Ramadan, U.S. drone strikes were reported to have hit a home of six residents in the town of Kunya Barrow, Somalia, and injured four civilians, including a mother and three children. Africom refused recognition of the civilian casualties and claimed to have “killed two terrorists.” During the past two decades, the United States has killed nearly 2,000 people in Somalia alone. It’s unknown how many were civilians: The U.S. government claims that the vast majority were terrorists or members of al-Shabab, but it has not provided evidence. Last year, Africom went as far as to say that despite more than 100 airstrikes since June 2017, it had not killed or injured a single civilian—a claim it was later forced to retract.
Why is no one held accountable for these possible war crimes? Is it because they are African and there is no video?
America’s official disdain for black lives, sustained for four centuries and enshrined in the original U.S. Constitution, has certainly spiked during the Trump presidency. It has not been limited to the continental United States, and it never has been. For Africans, awareness of America’s structural racism and its enforcement through violence is a consequence of direct experience. Throughout history, Africans have been the targets of this violence—whether enslaved, free, immigrants, or at home on the African continent.
Our demands today to end institutionalized racism and hypermilitarism in the United States must include a call to end the institutionalized racism of American foreign policy, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-12--North Korea Needs to Extort Democracies to Survive

North Korea Needs to Extort Democracies to Survive Pyongyang has made clear this week that its patience for business as usual with Washington and Seoul is wearing thin .
Cutting off all official communication lines , including military hotlines with Seoul , North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ’ s regime and its chorus of state media outlets deemed South Korea an “ enemy ” that it would turn against .
The swift deterioration of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang once again dashed the lofty aspirations of the peace-craving administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in , which had staked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ architect of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.
” The events of the week harkened back to the single most scrutinized line in Kim ’ s 2019 New Year ’ s address—his admonition that if the United States maintained its pressure campaign against North Korea , he would be compelled to find a “ new way … for achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.
” Analysts at the time predicted a renewed spate of nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests or a North Korean pivot back to China .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy .
The reality is that the COVID-19 pandemic has severely constrained North Korea ’ s maneuvering space , and it is thus returning to old methods – ones that have worked well for it in the past .
Two years after Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump , with much fanfare , signed a historic joint statement in Singapore , the United States and North Korea are locked in a very different kind of “ freeze for freeze ” than envisioned .
Pyongyang ’ s latest ploy to stir the pot by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a well-established diplomatic playbook to extract near-term concessions from both Washington and Seoul—a gambit made all the more urgent by the devastation that the pandemic has wrought on North Korea and its economy .
And while Pyongyang has consistently reported zero COVID-19 cases , a statistic widely rejected by experts , cities straddling the China-North Korea border have recently seen a surge in infections .
To safeguard against cross-border transmission of the virus , North Korea took swift and drastic action beginning in January such as locking down its borders to the outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trading partner .
These measures have deeply afflicted an economy already battered by sanctions .
North Korean trade with China reportedly contracted by 24 percent in January and February at the height of the pandemic , according to official statistics from China ’ s customs agency .
Meanwhile , the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea this week cited a 90 percent fall in trade between North Korea and China in March and April and warned of “ drastic ” food shortages in the country .
But while North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of relative vulnerability , a series of time-tested diplomatic stratagems give Pyongyang strategic cover to maneuver with strength .
Since the June 2018 Singapore summit , Pyongyang has embarked on a war of attrition—draining U.S. diplomatic stamina by flip-flopping on rhetoric , keeping commitments as vague as possible , and dragging out verification procedures and timelines .
Kim has wagered that he can use negotiations to seek economic relief and investments , particularly from Beijing , while evading any meaningful denuclearization action by waiting out the Trump administration and its demands for rapid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foot-dragging tactics have squandered precious time for negotiation to work , running the clock out on “ maximum pressure ” and weakening the severity of sanctions arrayed against North Korea .
Barring a sudden U.S. decision to unilaterally escalate tensions , the time-killing strategy has undermined a real chance at curbing North Korea ’ s nuclear threat .
Pyongyang ’ s playbook has been undergirded by a keen understanding of the importance of steadily building constructive relationships with key stakeholders in the region—which brought it the time it needed .
In the months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration , Kim shuttled between Beijing , Panmunjom , and Vladivostok , building up credibility with some of the most important players in the region .
He thrust his country onto the world stage by tugging at the heartstrings of a dovish South Korean government , while positioning North Korea to extract concessions from the United States and China by playing off mutual antagonism .
And despite its isolation , Pyongyang is closely attuned to the political environments in democratic countries—as well as the peculiarities of their leaders .
North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a unique alignment of stars .
The political upsets that swept Trump and Moon into power provided North Korea with a narrow window of opportunity to break out of its decadeslong deadlock with two of its longtime adversaries .
Kim found in Trump a highly unorthodox , perhaps even sympathetic U.S. leader , and in Moon a deep-seated yearning for inter-Korean peace—and Kim has aggressively capitalized on their idiosyncrasies .
Yet while Kim certainly shares Trump ’ s penchant for theatrics and fiery rhetoric , he and his cadre of advisors are fundamentally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations .
As a matter of regime survival , they can not afford massive , abrupt change or risk .
In the past two years , Pyongyang has thus not only sought to pressure South Korea and reassure North Koreans of North Korea ’ s military might , but it has also probed the upper limits of the United States and its allies ’ trigger points .
In 2019 alone , after a year of silence brought on by the promise of post-Singapore concessions , North Korea launched 19 short-range ballistic missiles into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ latest provocation is thus effectively a test—and one particularly aimed at Seoul .
At base , the Kim regime ’ s provocations are rooted in a desire for resources , survival , and stability .
In weighing and executing its responses , Washington and Seoul should judiciously separate Pyongyang ’ s latest theatrics and rhetorical flourishes from its underlying intentions .
The humanitarian crisis that is brewing within North Korean borders amid the pandemic should certainly be a priority for South Korea as well as the United States .
The Moon administration , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well served to lead a coordinated response within existing multilateral structures , including and beyond the United Nations , to meet pressing needs that the North Korean population faces , such as for medical supplies .
This is particularly critical as Beijing is angling to tighten its vise over North Korea by casting the Kim regime a lifeline through capacity building and other assistance in combating the pandemic .
But as Pyongyang revisits an old playbook , Washington should also return to the fundamentals that undergird U.S. policy in Northeast Asia—that is , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for new pressure points in the U.S.-South Korea alliance , it has never been more imperative that Washington carefully steward its ties with Seoul .
In particular , this requires moving away from a maximalist position in future Special Measures Agreement ( SMA ) talks .
The Trump administration ’ s focus on maximizing the financial resources put up by U.S. allies has introduced additional friction into the United States ’ alliance with South Korea at a time when renewed volatility in inter-Korean relations demands airtight coordination between the allies .
Fortune has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea .
While the United States has confidently pursued summitry with North Korea and Moon has called for “ bold action ” to bring an end to the Korean conflict , Pyongyang has quietly and incrementally laid the groundwork to tighten its grip over and even expand its nuclear arsenal .
Unless Washington can return to fundamentals of alliance management , Pyongyang will only continue to opportunistically exploit pressure points in the U.S.-South Korea relationship and manufacture crises to extract concessions from one or both countries .

Pyongyang has made clear this week that its patience for business as usual with Washington and Seoul is wearing thin. Cutting off all official communication lines, including military hotlines with Seoul, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s regime and its chorus of state media outlets deemed South Korea an “enemy” that it would turn against.
Pyongyang has made clear this week that its patience for business as usual with Washington and Seoul is wearing thin. Cutting off all official communication lines, including military hotlines with Seoul, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s regime and its chorus of state media outlets deemed South Korea an “enemy” that it would turn against.
The swift deterioration of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang once again dashed the lofty aspirations of the peace-craving administration of South Korean President Moon Jae-in, which had staked its legacy on emerging as “the architect of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.”
The events of the week harkened back to the single most scrutinized line in Kim’s 2019 New Year’s address—his admonition that if the United States maintained its pressure campaign against North Korea, he would be compelled to find a “new way … for achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.” Analysts at the time predicted a renewed spate of nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests or a North Korean pivot back to China.
But this isn’t a masterful new strategy. The reality is that the COVID-19 pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s maneuvering space, and it is thus returning to old methods – ones that have worked well for it in the past. Two years after Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump, with much fanfare, signed a historic joint statement in Singapore, the United States and North Korea are locked in a very different kind of “freeze for freeze” than envisioned.
Pyongyang’s latest ploy to stir the pot by antagonizing the Moon administration is part of a well-established diplomatic playbook to extract near-term concessions from both Washington and Seoul—a gambit made all the more urgent by the devastation that the pandemic has wrought on North Korea and its economy. And while Pyongyang has consistently reported zero COVID-19 cases, a statistic widely rejected by experts, cities straddling the China-North Korea border have recently seen a surge in infections. To safeguard against cross-border transmission of the virus, North Korea took swift and drastic action beginning in January such as locking down its borders to the outside world, including China, its largest trading partner.
These measures have deeply afflicted an economy already battered by sanctions. North Korean trade with China reportedly contracted by 24 percent in January and February at the height of the pandemic, according to official statistics from China’s customs agency. Meanwhile, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea this week cited a 90 percent fall in trade between North Korea and China in March and April and warned of “drastic” food shortages in the country.
But while North Korea has been forced into a position of relative vulnerability, a series of time-tested diplomatic stratagems give Pyongyang strategic cover to maneuver with strength.
Since the June 2018 Singapore summit, Pyongyang has embarked on a war of attrition—draining U.S. diplomatic stamina by flip-flopping on rhetoric, keeping commitments as vague as possible, and dragging out verification procedures and timelines. Kim has wagered that he can use negotiations to seek economic relief and investments, particularly from Beijing, while evading any meaningful denuclearization action by waiting out the Trump administration and its demands for rapid, complete denuclearization. Kim’s foot-dragging tactics have squandered precious time for negotiation to work, running the clock out on “maximum pressure” and weakening the severity of sanctions arrayed against North Korea. Barring a sudden U.S. decision to unilaterally escalate tensions, the time-killing strategy has undermined a real chance at curbing North Korea’s nuclear threat.
Pyongyang’s playbook has been undergirded by a keen understanding of the importance of steadily building constructive relationships with key stakeholders in the region—which brought it the time it needed. In the months following his initial foray into diplomacy with the Trump administration, Kim shuttled between Beijing, Panmunjom, and Vladivostok, building up credibility with some of the most important players in the region. He thrust his country onto the world stage by tugging at the heartstrings of a dovish South Korean government, while positioning North Korea to extract concessions from the United States and China by playing off mutual antagonism.
And despite its isolation, Pyongyang is closely attuned to the political environments in democratic countries—as well as the peculiarities of their leaders. North Korea’s diplomacy has been buoyed by a unique alignment of stars. The political upsets that swept Trump and Moon into power provided North Korea with a narrow window of opportunity to break out of its decadeslong deadlock with two of its longtime adversaries. Kim found in Trump a highly unorthodox, perhaps even sympathetic U.S. leader, and in Moon a deep-seated yearning for inter-Korean peace—and Kim has aggressively capitalized on their idiosyncrasies.
Yet while Kim certainly shares Trump’s penchant for theatrics and fiery rhetoric, he and his cadre of advisors are fundamentally incrementalists when it comes to navigating nuclear negotiations. As a matter of regime survival, they cannot afford massive, abrupt change or risk. In the past two years, Pyongyang has thus not only sought to pressure South Korea and reassure North Koreans of North Korea’s military might, but it has also probed the upper limits of the United States and its allies’ trigger points. In 2019 alone, after a year of silence brought on by the promise of post-Singapore concessions, North Korea launched 19 short-range ballistic missiles into South Korean and Japanese waters. The latest provocation is thus effectively a test—and one particularly aimed at Seoul.
At base, the Kim regime’s provocations are rooted in a desire for resources, survival, and stability. In weighing and executing its responses, Washington and Seoul should judiciously separate Pyongyang’s latest theatrics and rhetorical flourishes from its underlying intentions.
The humanitarian crisis that is brewing within North Korean borders amid the pandemic should certainly be a priority for South Korea as well as the United States. The Moon administration, in coordination with Washington, would be well served to lead a coordinated response within existing multilateral structures, including and beyond the United Nations, to meet pressing needs that the North Korean population faces, such as for medical supplies. This is particularly critical as Beijing is angling to tighten its vise over North Korea by casting the Kim regime a lifeline through capacity building and other assistance in combating the pandemic.
But as Pyongyang revisits an old playbook, Washington should also return to the fundamentals that undergird U.S. policy in Northeast Asia—that is, alliance management. As North Korea probes for new pressure points in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, it has never been more imperative that Washington carefully steward its ties with Seoul. In particular, this requires moving away from a maximalist position in future Special Measures Agreement (SMA) talks. The Trump administration’s focus on maximizing the financial resources put up by U.S. allies has introduced additional friction into the United States’ alliance with South Korea at a time when renewed volatility in inter-Korean relations demands airtight coordination between the allies.
Fortune has not favored the bold in dealing with North Korea. While the United States has confidently pursued summitry with North Korea and Moon has called for “bold action” to bring an end to the Korean conflict, Pyongyang has quietly and incrementally laid the groundwork to tighten its grip over and even expand its nuclear arsenal. Unless Washington can return to fundamentals of alliance management, Pyongyang will only continue to opportunistically exploit pressure points in the U.S.-South Korea relationship and manufacture crises to extract concessions from one or both countries.