Guilt by Location

They join more than 30 million refugees and asylum-seekers who have crossed an international border to seek sanctuary in other countries .
Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 .
Yet government responses to the pandemic have worsened conditions in displacement camps and reception centers , encouraged the scapegoating of refugees and migrants , and limited access to asylum .
The potential for the coronavirus to exacerbate the suffering of the displaced , even as the United States and other countries increasingly restrict asylum , has renewed calls to focus on addressing the root causes of displacement .
People flee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , economic , social , and environmental .
But armed conflict is a primary culprit .
Wartime displacement is not just an unintended consequence of violence but also a deliberate strategy pursued by combatants .
In a variety of countries that have been convulsed by civil wars and insurgencies in recent years—including Burkina Faso , Cameroon , Iraq , Myanmar , Nigeria , South Sudan , and Syria—armed groups have routinely and intentionally displaced civilians .
It is thus critical to understand the strategic logic behind these actions .
If any displacement crises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are intentionally created by political and military actors .
When armed forces uproot people , the act tends to be characterized by journalists , politicians , and policymakers as ethnic cleansing .
This suggests that the primary purpose is to expel or eliminate the targeted population .
Strategic displacement takes different forms and can serve multiple purposes , from interdicting enemy supply lines to facilitating territorial annexation .
What my research suggests , however , is that combatants , particularly state forces , often displace civilians to sort the targeted population—not to get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a high degree of uncertainty .
When armed groups lack information about opponents ’ identities and civilians ’ loyalties , they can use human mobility to infer them through what I term “ guilt by location.
” Triggering displacement forces people to send costly and visible signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether , when , and to where they flee .
Those who comply with orders to move are vetted and often serve as sources of rents and recruits for perpetrators .
Those who defect by staying behind in contested territory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposing side are often written off—fairly or not—as enemies .
Displacement is therefore used not only to remove the undesirables or the disloyal .
It is used to help identify them in the first place .
In northeast Nigeria , for example , the government has responded to the Boko Haram insurgency by ordering local residents to evacuate their villages and move to so-called garrison towns overseen by the military .
According to Reuters , “ the demarcation between garrison towns and a lawless countryside means people have a choice : live in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ homes in the countryside , where Boko Haram roam , and be treated by security forces as potential insurgency sympathizers.
” This strategy mimics the use of strategic hamlets , regroupment centers , and so-called protected villages during civil wars in Burundi , Indonesia , the Philippines , Peru , Rwanda , Uganda , and Vietnam , where government forces ordered people living in conflict areas to relocate to particular locations .
In addition to denying rebels access to the population , these methods were used to help counterinsurgents distinguish friend from foe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians .
Areas outside relocation sites were transformed into free-fire zones where those remaining were assumed to be rebel fighters or supporters .
The sites themselves served as instruments of identification .
Occupants were screened and catalogued—making the population more “ legible ” to the state—and their movements were used as continuous indicators of their political loyalties .
Consider Uganda .
In the 1990s and early 2000s , the government relocated people into internally displaced persons ( IDP ) camps during military campaigns against the Lord ’ s Resistance Army and the Allied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told me , “ It was impossible to differentiate between rebels and civilians.
” Relocating the population into camps was “ very important , they helped us know who the enemy was.
” Another Ugandan soldier I interviewed explained how the military used displacement as a crude method of sorting the population : “ The good people were in the camps ” and so “ anyone found out of the camp was seen as a rebel or collaborator automatically.
” This meant that , as one report from a nongovernmental organization put it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians no longer depends on whether or not you are actively engaged in armed conflict , but on your geographical location.
” A similar dynamic can be seen in Syria .
Throughout the conflict , the government of Bashar al-Assad and its allies have engaged in a ferocious campaign to expel civilians from cities and towns controlled by Syrian rebels .
These displacement tactics have undermined rebels ’ ability to govern and deprived them of civilian support .
But they have also been used to weed out those considered disloyal to the Assad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lure the displaced to its territories and employed civil registration , property claims , and other administrative procedures to screen returning refugees and IDPs .
As part of evacuation and reconciliation agreements in areas retaken from opposition groups , the Assad regime has given residents a choice of moving to government areas or to other rebel-held parts of Syria .
Electing the latter is seen as signaling allegiance to the opposition .
Many of those who moved are now being relentlessly targeted by regime forces in Idlib province , the only remaining opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defector from the Syrian army , he conveyed the logic through a chilling metaphor : “ Think of a dumpster where you gather garbage to finally burn it.
” Indeed , while some observers have characterized forced displacement in Syria as “ demographic engineering , ” civilians have often been treated differently based on their movements and physical locations , not just their ethnic or religious identities .
Using displacement to help pull people back to the state has aided the government politically and militarily .
IDPs have served as conscripts—helping bolster the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propaganda fodder , with authorities hailing their return to government territory as evidence of the regime ’ s legitimacy .
Viewing displacement as a sorting mechanism is essential to understanding the drivers and consequences of wartime migrations , and for improving efforts to manage them .
The United Nations and international NGOs typically set up and manage displacement camps ; provide food , shelter , health care , education , and other services ; advocate on behalf of the displaced ; and help governments adopt domestic policies on displacement-related issues .
While this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has also raised the specter of moral hazard .
It is one thing for the international community to assist those who flee to another country in order to ease the strain on refugee-hosting governments .
It is quite another for it to shoulder the burden of displacement within a country on behalf of a government or nonstate actor that is directly responsible for the displacement in the first place .
In Syria , for instance , the Assad regime has steered massive amounts of humanitarian assistance to areas it controls , which has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of their needs .
If humanitarian agencies show they are willing to offset the costs of uprooting civilians , they could perversely incentivize armed groups to engage in these practices .
This is not hypothetical .
There are multiple instances where international aid , while providing crucial life-saving assistance to people in conflict zones , has also enabled combatants to implement , sustain , or expand policies of forced displacement .
In addition to covering the costs and containing the consequences of displacement , meanwhile , aid organizations can unwittingly help perpetrators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ registering , and cataloging them as part of relief distribution .
Humanitarian groups must be willing to make tough choices if they hope to avoid this moral hazard .
In situations of internal displacement , if there is evidence that displacement has been orchestrated by armed groups , donors and NGOs should threaten to withdraw aid unless combatants are meeting their obligations under international law .
( Displacement can be lawful where “ the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand , ” but perpetrators must take measures to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , safety , and nutrition . )
Such a choice can be an excruciating one , particularly for organizations dedicated to saving lives .
But in order to adhere to the principle of “ do no harm , ” aid agencies must ensure they are conducting their operations without inadvertently encouraging the very outcomes they are seeking to prevent .
Governments and international organizations must also give greater attention to the politics of displacement when devising initiatives to secure peace after conflicts end .
The widespread use of sorting displaced people demonstrates that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a political act .
But the presumption of guilt by location is often embraced by combatants and civilians alike , and not just in cases where displacement is used as a weapon of war .
As Stephanie Schwartz argued in a previous article in Foreign Policy , post-conflict societies commonly experience hostility between people who fled during a conflict and those who stayed .
That means repatriation and resettlement of displaced people is central to broader peace-building processes .
Conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need to treat displacement and return as a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To be effective , these initiatives must address displacement-related cleavages when seeking to strengthen social relations and foster meaningful reconciliation .
And if combatants purposely compelled people to flee during the conflict , then victims will need greater security assurances to return , along with accountability mechanisms that recognize these violations and provide restitution and justice .
Rarely are state or nonstate actors held responsible for displacement .
This will require fostering the political will to either prosecute perpetrators using existing enforcement mechanisms or , potentially , establishing displacement as a separate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the strategic logic behind forced displacement reaffirms the importance of an international refugee system that is increasingly seen as feckless and disconnected from the realities of modern migration .
That ’ s because in civil wars , civilians are valuable assets for armed groups .
If people are given the ability to escape conflict-affected countries , then they are not compelled to “ pick a side ” through their movements .
Armed groups are deprived of vulnerable recruits and propaganda pawns .
Leaving the country may still be perceived as treachery , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians beyond the reach of all warring parties and makes them eligible for international protection .
Limiting the possibility of exit only stands to embolden combatants while forcing people to decide between bad options .
There is also strategic value in enacting more generous asylum policies as a tool of conflict management .
Even before the current global health crisis , the prospects for expanding asylum looked bleak , with more and more countries closing their borders and attempting to skirt their responsibilities to those fleeing violence and persecution .
But throughout history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationalist sentiment have been accompanied by political leaders recognizing the advantages of welcoming refugees from other countries .
A prominent example is the Cold War .
For the United States , accepting emigres from the Soviet Union and allied countries was a foreign-policy priority meant to signal the discontents of communist rule and the relative merits of American values and institutions .
Today , the refugee system is in desperate need of reform , which could gain some momentum if more emphasis is placed on articulating and promoting the strategic benefits of asylum @ @ @ @

The coronavirus pandemic has cast a light on the global displacement crisis and given governments an excuse to perpetuate it. Around the globe, 50 million people are internally displaced—the highest number in history—having been uprooted within their countries by conflict, violence, and disasters.
They join more than 30 million refugees and asylum-seekers who have crossed an international border to seek sanctuary in other countries. Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Yet government responses to the pandemic have worsened conditions in displacement camps and reception centers, encouraged the scapegoating of refugees and migrants, and limited access to asylum.
The potential for the coronavirus to exacerbate the suffering of the displaced, even as the United States and other countries increasingly restrict asylum, has renewed calls to focus on addressing the root causes of displacement.
People flee their homes for a variety of reasons—political, economic, social, and environmental. But armed conflict is a primary culprit. Wartime displacement is not just an unintended consequence of violence but also a deliberate strategy pursued by combatants. In a variety of countries that have been convulsed by civil wars and insurgencies in recent years—including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Syria—armed groups have routinely and intentionally displaced civilians. It is thus critical to understand the strategic logic behind these actions. If any displacement crises are preventable, it is those that are intentionally created by political and military actors.
Children stand outside a school in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on June 13, 2019. The school is being used as a shelter for internally displaced people from northern Burkina Faso who have fled intercommunal clashes.
When armed forces uproot people, the act tends to be characterized by journalists, politicians, and policymakers as ethnic cleansing. This suggests that the primary purpose is to expel or eliminate the targeted population. Strategic displacement takes different forms and can serve multiple purposes, from interdicting enemy supply lines to facilitating territorial annexation. What my research suggests, however, is that combatants, particularly state forces, often displace civilians to sort the targeted population—not to get rid of it.
Civil wars entail a high degree of uncertainty. When armed groups lack information about opponents’ identities and civilians’ loyalties, they can use human mobility to infer them through what I term “guilt by location.” Triggering displacement forces people to send costly and visible signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether, when, and to where they flee. Those who comply with orders to move are vetted and often serve as sources of rents and recruits for perpetrators. Those who defect by staying behind in contested territory or moving to areas controlled by the opposing side are often written off—fairly or not—as enemies. Displacement is therefore used not only to remove the undesirables or the disloyal. It is used to help identify them in the first place.
In northeast Nigeria, for example, the government has responded to the Boko Haram insurgency by ordering local residents to evacuate their villages and move to so-called garrison towns overseen by the military. According to Reuters, “the demarcation between garrison towns and a lawless countryside means people have a choice: live in virtual quarantine, or return to their homes in the countryside, where Boko Haram roam, and be treated by security forces as potential insurgency sympathizers.”
The Bakassi internally displaced people’s camp in Maiduguri, Nigeria, pictured on March 26, houses some of the 1.8 million people internally displaced across the country by the decadelong Boko Haram insurgency.
This strategy mimics the use of strategic hamlets, regroupment centers, and so-called protected villages during civil wars in Burundi, Indonesia, the Philippines, Peru, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam, where government forces ordered people living in conflict areas to relocate to particular locations. In addition to denying rebels access to the population, these methods were used to help counterinsurgents distinguish friend from foe while fighting shadowy guerrillas who hid among civilians. Areas outside relocation sites were transformed into free-fire zones where those remaining were assumed to be rebel fighters or supporters. The sites themselves served as instruments of identification. Occupants were screened and catalogued—making the population more “legible” to the state—and their movements were used as continuous indicators of their political loyalties.
Consider Uganda. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the government relocated people into internally displaced persons (IDP) camps during military campaigns against the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces. As one army commander told me, “It was impossible to differentiate between rebels and civilians.” Relocating the population into camps was “very important, they helped us know who the enemy was.” Another Ugandan soldier I interviewed explained how the military used displacement as a crude method of sorting the population: “The good people were in the camps” and so “anyone found out of the camp was seen as a rebel or collaborator automatically.” This meant that, as one report from a nongovernmental organization put it, the “distinction between combatants and civilians no longer depends on whether or not you are actively engaged in armed conflict, but on your geographical location.”
A similar dynamic can be seen in Syria. Throughout the conflict, the government of Bashar al-Assad and its allies have engaged in a ferocious campaign to expel civilians from cities and towns controlled by Syrian rebels. These displacement tactics have undermined rebels’ ability to govern and deprived them of civilian support. But they have also been used to weed out those considered disloyal to the Assad regime. The government has sought to lure the displaced to its territories and employed civil registration, property claims, and other administrative procedures to screen returning refugees and IDPs. As part of evacuation and reconciliation agreements in areas retaken from opposition groups, the Assad regime has given residents a choice of moving to government areas or to other rebel-held parts of Syria. Electing the latter is seen as signaling allegiance to the opposition. Many of those who moved are now being relentlessly targeted by regime forces in Idlib province, the only remaining opposition stronghold. When I spoke to a defector from the Syrian army, he conveyed the logic through a chilling metaphor: “Think of a dumpster where you gather garbage to finally burn it.”
Indeed, while some observers have characterized forced displacement in Syria as “demographic engineering,” civilians have often been treated differently based on their movements and physical locations, not just their ethnic or religious identities. Using displacement to help pull people back to the state has aided the government politically and militarily. IDPs have served as conscripts—helping bolster the manpower of the depleted Syrian army—and as propaganda fodder, with authorities hailing their return to government territory as evidence of the regime’s legitimacy.
Displaced Syrians wait in a line for humanitarian aid as a nongovernmental organization delivers bread in a stadium that has been turned into a makeshift refugee shelter in Idlib, Syria, on Feb. 19.
Viewing displacement as a sorting mechanism is essential to understanding the drivers and consequences of wartime migrations, and for improving efforts to manage them. The United Nations and international NGOs typically set up and manage displacement camps; provide food, shelter, health care, education, and other services; advocate on behalf of the displaced; and help governments adopt domestic policies on displacement-related issues.
While this assistance has done much good, it has also raised the specter of moral hazard. It is one thing for the international community to assist those who flee to another country in order to ease the strain on refugee-hosting governments. It is quite another for it to shoulder the burden of displacement within a country on behalf of a government or nonstate actor that is directly responsible for the displacement in the first place. In Syria, for instance, the Assad regime has steered massive amounts of humanitarian assistance to areas it controls, which has helped the government lure IDPs and address some of their needs.
If humanitarian agencies show they are willing to offset the costs of uprooting civilians, they could perversely incentivize armed groups to engage in these practices. This is not hypothetical. There are multiple instances where international aid, while providing crucial life-saving assistance to people in conflict zones, has also enabled combatants to implement, sustain, or expand policies of forced displacement. In addition to covering the costs and containing the consequences of displacement, meanwhile, aid organizations can unwittingly help perpetrators track and sort civilians by encamping, registering, and cataloging them as part of relief distribution.
Humanitarian groups must be willing to make tough choices if they hope to avoid this moral hazard. In situations of internal displacement, if there is evidence that displacement has been orchestrated by armed groups, donors and NGOs should threaten to withdraw aid unless combatants are meeting their obligations under international law. (Displacement can be lawful where “the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand,” but perpetrators must take measures to provide satisfactory shelter, hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition.) Such a choice can be an excruciating one, particularly for organizations dedicated to saving lives. But in order to adhere to the principle of “do no harm,” aid agencies must ensure they are conducting their operations without inadvertently encouraging the very outcomes they are seeking to prevent.
Governments and international organizations must also give greater attention to the politics of displacement when devising initiatives to secure peace after conflicts end. The widespread use of sorting displaced people demonstrates that fleeing in wartime can be perceived as a political act. But the presumption of guilt by location is often embraced by combatants and civilians alike, and not just in cases where displacement is used as a weapon of war. As Stephanie Schwartz argued in a previous article in Foreign Policy, post-conflict societies commonly experience hostility between people who fled during a conflict and those who stayed.
Ntahombaye Melania reaches up to greet her husband, Misago Alexis, who fled political violence in Burundi in 2015, as he returns to the Gisuru border post in Ruyigi, Burundi, on Oct. 3, 2019.
That means repatriation and resettlement of displaced people is central to broader peace-building processes. Conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need to treat displacement and return as a political phenomenon, not just a humanitarian one. To be effective, these initiatives must address displacement-related cleavages when seeking to strengthen social relations and foster meaningful reconciliation. And if combatants purposely compelled people to flee during the conflict, then victims will need greater security assurances to return, along with accountability mechanisms that recognize these violations and provide restitution and justice. Rarely are state or nonstate actors held responsible for displacement. This will require fostering the political will to either prosecute perpetrators using existing enforcement mechanisms or, potentially, establishing displacement as a separate international crime.
A more nuanced understanding of the strategic logic behind forced displacement reaffirms the importance of an international refugee system that is increasingly seen as feckless and disconnected from the realities of modern migration. That’s because in civil wars, civilians are valuable assets for armed groups. If people are given the ability to escape conflict-affected countries, then they are not compelled to “pick a side” through their movements. Armed groups are deprived of vulnerable recruits and propaganda pawns. Leaving the country may still be perceived as treachery, but at least crossing the border puts civilians beyond the reach of all warring parties and makes them eligible for international protection. Limiting the possibility of exit only stands to embolden combatants while forcing people to decide between bad options.
There is also strategic value in enacting more generous asylum policies as a tool of conflict management. Even before the current global health crisis, the prospects for expanding asylum looked bleak, with more and more countries closing their borders and attempting to skirt their responsibilities to those fleeing violence and persecution. But throughout history, hostility toward immigrants and surges of nationalist sentiment have been accompanied by political leaders recognizing the advantages of welcoming refugees from other countries. A prominent example is the Cold War. For the United States, accepting emigres from the Soviet Union and allied countries was a foreign-policy priority meant to signal the discontents of communist rule and the relative merits of American values and institutions. Today, the refugee system is in desperate need of reform, which could gain some momentum if more emphasis is placed on articulating and promoting the strategic benefits of asylum and refugee resettlement.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--The Foreign-Policy Blob Is Structurally Racist

The ongoing awakening to the long-standing realities of discrimination against African Americans is marked by a scope and intensity that were unimaginable even one month ago .
Polling shows a significant increase from 2015 among Americans who believe “ racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States ” are big problems , and widespread protests—including in rural and suburban communities where such activism is unprecedented—against systemic racism and police misconduct have erupted .
The United States has thus entered a window of opportunity where real social change is more likely than at any time in recent history .
But are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Could this enhanced recognition of racial discrimination at home result in meaningful differences in how the United States engages with the world ?
It ’ s tempting to think so—but the answer to both questions is almost certainly no .
The structural impediments to more seriously accounting for social justice and human rights in foreign policy are simply too great .
There are at least four such structural factors .
First , the composition of foreign-policy shapers ( think tank experts , columnists ) and implementers ( government officials ) remains disproportionately white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visibly evident from any photograph of senior military officials .
But it also pronounced in America ’ s diplomatic corps .
In 2002 , 70 percent of all State Department employees were white ; by September 2018 , it remained nearly unchanged at 68 percent .
Moreover , in 2018 , the more senior the role , the greater the proportion of employees who were white—going from 35 percent for midlevel GS-10 rank up to 87 percent for the most senior civil service executives .
This relatively homogenous composition of the foreign-policy elite—including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oppression at home and abroad is a glaring blind spot .
In 20-plus years of working at academic institutions and think tanks , I can recall very few mentions of race .
And even these observations were made not out of inherent concern for racial underrepresentation or discrimination within the United States but because the lack of progress toward combating those twin evils could lessen America ’ s relative power on the international stage .
Second , the predominant frame through which foreign-policy debates are conveyed is as national security interests .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or objectives , ranked by their purported interest-ness : vital , extremely important , important , or secondary .
Those categories come from a landmark 2000 report by the Commission on America ’ s National Interests , which was representative of many comparable bipartisan initiatives .
The 23-member commission included just three women , one of whom was the only person of color ( Condoleezza Rice ) .
The sole mention of individual rights—one of 10 “ important national interests ” —was in promoting “ pluralism , freedom , and democracy in strategically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without destabilization.
” The caveats that this august group of geostrategic thinkers added on demonstrate that rights are not universal and should never hinder stability—meaning a government that endorses U.S. interests retains power .
Though the facts shift , and allies and adversaries come and go , the narrative of America ’ s global role is always conveyed via static interests , which remain wholly uninformed by human rights concerns—unless it can be weaponized selectively to highlight an adversary ’ s human rights abuses .
Foreign policy can not be reconfigured in enduring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and language that could enable such change .
Third , and relatedly , a consistently missing element in elite foreign-policy debates is the livelihoods of actual humans .
The central unit of analysis is countries , which are overwhelmingly evaluated through the words and actions of their leaders .
When people are considered at all , it is as demographic clusters that might influence the countries or regions where they reside—the Arab youth bulge , Russia ’ s population decline , and China ’ s graying citizenry are popular examples .
So-called voices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , English-speaking people who reside in the rolodexes of TV producers , serve as visiting think tank fellows , or are escorted through Capitol Hill offices by K Street lobbyists .
Without a reimagining of America ’ s global influence from the perspective of the individuals who experience hatred , bigotry , and oppression , it is impossible to conceive of a foreign policy that ever truly confronts racism .
Finally , the defining manifestation of U.S. foreign policy for 75 years has been the threat or use of military force .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at any time requires host nation basing and overflight permissions .
These , in turn , require permanently stationing U.S. troops abroad , which increases civil wars and enables human rights violations by host nation governments .
These governments enjoy military assistance in the form of arms sales .
According to the State Department ’ s latest “ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers ” report , the United States is the top arms exporter to the least democratic countries ( meaning those in the lowest quintile as determined by Polity Project rankings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such sales .
In short , to project military power , the United States tolerates or abets subjugation .
Moreover , military spending ( $ 712 billion ) absorbs more than half of all federal discretionary spending , towering over the diplomacy and development budget ( $ 48 billion ) , which could be far better suited to promoting individual rights and freedoms globally .
Unfortunately , when you review what country receives the most foreign assistance from the United States , it is a conspicuous list of occupiers , autocrats , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recipients for 2020 , in order , are : Israel , Egypt , Jordan , Afghanistan , Nigeria , and Uganda .
These are so-called strategic partners showered with aid because of their geographic location , security partnerships , or a consequence of great-power competition ( Uganda ) .
Congress could vastly increase funding for international and nongovernmental organizations that work to protect groups experiencing prejudice and seriously hold recipients of foreign aid to account for their human rights violations .
But there is nothing in recent history to suggest that legislators will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most basic oversight functions .
For these four reasons , and many others , an overdue turn toward an individual , rights-centric foreign policy is unimaginable , at least for now .
The current defensiveness among elite foreign-policy institutions toward considering the role that race plays in U.S. foreign policy is simply too overwhelming .
A more diverse group of future foreign-policy thinkers and leaders could one day lead the way—but that group won ’ t arrive in time to keep pace with the current push for racial justice across the rest of @ @ @

The ongoing awakening to the long-standing realities of discrimination against African Americans is marked by a scope and intensity that were unimaginable even one month ago. Polling shows a significant increase from 2015 among Americans who believe “racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States” are big problems, and widespread protests —including in rural and suburban communities where such activism is unprecedented—against systemic racism and police misconduct have erupted. The United States has thus entered a window of opportunity where real social change is more likely than at any time in recent history.
The ongoing awakening to the long-standing realities of discrimination against African Americans is marked by a scope and intensity that were unimaginable even one month ago. Polling shows a significant increase from 2015 among Americans who believe “racial and ethnic discrimination in the United States” are big problems, and widespread protests—including in rural and suburban communities where such activism is unprecedented—against systemic racism and police misconduct have erupted. The United States has thus entered a window of opportunity where real social change is more likely than at any time in recent history.
But are there foreign-policy implications for this moment? Could this enhanced recognition of racial discrimination at home result in meaningful differences in how the United States engages with the world? It’s tempting to think so—but the answer to both questions is almost certainly no. The structural impediments to more seriously accounting for social justice and human rights in foreign policy are simply too great.
There are at least four such structural factors. First, the composition of foreign-policy shapers (think tank experts, columnists) and implementers (government officials) remains disproportionately white (and male). This is visibly evident from any photograph of senior military officials. But it also pronounced in America’s diplomatic corps. In 2002, 70 percent of all State Department employees were white; by September 2018, it remained nearly unchanged at 68 percent. Moreover, in 2018, the more senior the role, the greater the proportion of employees who were white—going from 35 percent for midlevel GS-10 rank up to 87 percent for the most senior civil service executives.
This relatively homogenous composition of the foreign-policy elite—including yours truly—matters because the recognition of racial oppression at home and abroad is a glaring blind spot. In 20-plus years of working at academic institutions and think tanks, I can recall very few mentions of race. And even these observations were made not out of inherent concern for racial underrepresentation or discrimination within the United States but because the lack of progress toward combating those twin evils could lessen America’s relative power on the international stage.
Second, the predominant frame through which foreign-policy debates are conveyed is as national security interests. These seemingly neutral concepts are conveyed through principles or objectives, ranked by their purported interest-ness: vital, extremely important, important, or secondary. Those categories come from a landmark 2000 report by the Commission on America’s National Interests, which was representative of many comparable bipartisan initiatives. The 23-member commission included just three women, one of whom was the only person of color (Condoleezza Rice). The sole mention of individual rights—one of 10 “important national interests”—was in promoting “pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization.” The caveats that this august group of geostrategic thinkers added on demonstrate that rights are not universal and should never hinder stability—meaning a government that endorses U.S. interests retains power.
Though the facts shift, and allies and adversaries come and go, the narrative of America’s global role is always conveyed via static interests, which remain wholly uninformed by human rights concerns—unless it can be weaponized selectively to highlight an adversary’s human rights abuses. Foreign policy cannot be reconfigured in enduring and impactful ways without updating the thinking and language that could enable such change.
Third, and relatedly, a consistently missing element in elite foreign-policy debates is the livelihoods of actual humans. The central unit of analysis is countries, which are overwhelmingly evaluated through the words and actions of their leaders. When people are considered at all, it is as demographic clusters that might influence the countries or regions where they reside—the Arab youth bulge, Russia’s population decline, and China’s graying citizenry are popular examples. So-called voices from the regions are those few media-tested, English-speaking people who reside in the rolodexes of TV producers, serve as visiting think tank fellows, or are escorted through Capitol Hill offices by K Street lobbyists.
Without a reimagining of America’s global influence from the perspective of the individuals who experience hatred, bigotry, and oppression, it is impossible to conceive of a foreign policy that ever truly confronts racism.
Finally, the defining manifestation of U.S. foreign policy for 75 years has been the threat or use of military force. The global architecture required to use force anywhere at any time requires host nation basing and overflight permissions. These, in turn, require permanently stationing U.S. troops abroad, which increases civil wars and enables human rights violations by host nation governments. These governments enjoy military assistance in the form of arms sales. According to the State Department’s latest “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers” report, the United States is the top arms exporter to the least democratic countries (meaning those in the lowest quintile as determined by Polity Project rankings)—accounting for 66 percent of all such sales. In short, to project military power, the United States tolerates or abets subjugation.
Moreover, military spending ($712 billion) absorbs more than half of all federal discretionary spending, towering over the diplomacy and development budget ($48 billion), which could be far better suited to promoting individual rights and freedoms globally. Unfortunately, when you review what country receives the most foreign assistance from the United States, it is a conspicuous list of occupiers, autocrats, and illiberal regimes. The top six proposed recipients for 2020, in order, are: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Uganda. These are so-called strategic partners showered with aid because of their geographic location, security partnerships, or a consequence of great-power competition (Uganda). Congress could vastly increase funding for international and nongovernmental organizations that work to protect groups experiencing prejudice and seriously hold recipients of foreign aid to account for their human rights violations. But there is nothing in recent history to suggest that legislators will fulfill this needed role or even its most basic oversight functions.
For these four reasons, and many others, an overdue turn toward an individual, rights-centric foreign policy is unimaginable, at least for now. The current defensiveness among elite foreign-policy institutions toward considering the role that race plays in U.S. foreign policy is simply too overwhelming. A more diverse group of future foreign-policy thinkers and leaders could one day lead the way—but that group won’t arrive in time to keep pace with the current push for racial justice across the rest of U.S. society.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-11--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

President Donald Trump wants international students to return home if their classes go online in the fall , a move that could undermine U.S. soft power abroad .
Meanwhile , after a series of major policy and electoral victories , Britain ’ s Conservatives are beginning to resemble American Republicans .
And the Trump presidency displays many of the hallmarks of fascism , including his attempt to use the term to label the opposition .
A recent announcement by U.S. immigration officials that international students might be forced to leave the country in the fall could undermine one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic and soft power , Foreign Policy ’ s Amy Mackinnon and Augusta Saraiva write .
2 .
Britain Is Becoming America in All the Worst Ways Between the weaponization of culture wars and rousing the masses against elites , the British Conservative Party is beginning to resemble the U.S. Republican Party , Andrew Brown writes .
The Egyptian government would prefer to remain in denial about a recent surge in coronavirus cases , but ordinary Egyptians on social media have forced it to own up to the growing crisis , Ola Salem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mount Rushmore Speech Is the Closest He ’ s Come to Fascism In a recent speech at Mount Rushmore , Trump tried to position fascism as an ideology of the left , but historians of fascism know that it has always resided firmly on the extreme right , Federico Finchelstein writes .
5 .
The Post-Pandemic Economy Could Be Green and Clean—but Not With These Plans The collapse in economic activity caused by the coronavirus pandemic has prompted calls to make the recovery greener and less carbon-intensive , but current plans for green @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustainability , Foreign Policy ’ s Jason Bordoff writes .

President Donald Trump wants international students to return home if their classes go online in the fall, a move that could undermine U.S. soft power abroad.
President Donald Trump wants international students to return home if their classes go online in the fall, a move that could undermine U.S. soft power abroad.
Meanwhile, after a series of major policy and electoral victories, Britain’s Conservatives are beginning to resemble American Republicans.
And the Trump presidency displays many of the hallmarks of fascism, including his attempt to use the term to label the opposition.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Students at Harvard University
A recent announcement by U.S. immigration officials that international students might be forced to leave the country in the fall could undermine one of the United States’ most powerful pillars of economic and soft power, Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon and Augusta Saraiva write.
A man wearing a facemask walks past a billboard featuring Britain's Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Michael Gove, Number 10 special advisor Dominic Cummings and Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Between the weaponization of culture wars and rousing the masses against elites, the British Conservative Party is beginning to resemble the U.S. Republican Party, Andrew Brown writes.
An Egyptian anti-government demonstrator sleeps on the pavement under spray paint that reads "Al-Jazeera" and "Facebook" at Cairo's Tahrir square on February 7, 2011.
The Egyptian government would prefer to remain in denial about a recent surge in coronavirus cases, but ordinary Egyptians on social media have forced it to own up to the growing crisis, Ola Salem writes.
U.S. President Donald Trump pumps his fist as he arrives for an Independence Day event at the Mount Rushmore National Memorial in Keystone, South Dakota on July 3, 2020.
In a recent speech at Mount Rushmore, Trump tried to position fascism as an ideology of the left, but historians of fascism know that it has always resided firmly on the extreme right, Federico Finchelstein writes.
Workers install a solar panel system on the roof of a home in Palmetto Bay, Florida, on Jan. 23, 2018.
The collapse in economic activity caused by the coronavirus pandemic has prompted calls to make the recovery greener and less carbon-intensive, but current plans for green stimulus programs fail to account for long-term sustainability, Foreign Policy’s Jason Bordoff writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-11--The Curious Case of ‘Russian Lives Matter’

As Black Lives Matter protests spread across the globe , Russia has proven a notable exception .
There have been solidarity demonstrations and localized movements against racism and police violence in Helsinki ; Almaty , Kazakhstan ; and Vilnius , Lithuania ; but no such scenes in Moscow .
Instead , Russia has used the civil unrest in the United States to continue its history of reflecting the United States ’ most unbecoming aspects on itself .
The Russian government and its liberal opposition alike have used their platforms to discredit the relatively peaceful spirit of the demonstrations and project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doing so , the opposition stands to harm its larger fight against Russian state oppression .
The development of the “ Russian Lives Matter ” social media movement is perhaps the strongest example of how the liberal opposition in Russia has unwittingly aided its government in subverting a global anti-racist effort .
Russian Lives Matter started after police raided a home in Yekaterinburg and killed a resident on May 31 .
Since the police shooting , members of Russia ’ s libertarian movement , including Libertarian Party leader Mikhail Svetov , have used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police violence against citizens .
The hashtag is not a show of solidarity with the internationally known Black Lives Matter movement .
Instead , # RussianLivesMatter has been used to undermine the American fight against systemic racism by downplaying the impact of racism against African Americans , by suggesting police killings of Black Americans were deserved , and by framing empathy towards victims of police violence in Russia as a zero-sum game .
The hashtag itself hints at the exclusionary undertones of the movement ’ s participants .
In a recent podcast interview @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Svetov made clear that his concern was not racism , but police violence against ethnic Russians ( a point he drove home by using the word russkie , meaning ethnic Russian , rather than the more all-encompassing rossiyane ) .
Asked whether policing in Russia is influenced by race , Svetov demurred saying it depended on the region , noting that in Chechnya , for example , police violence is focused on Russians .
In truth , much Russian police violence is targeted at ethnic minorities and migrants from Central Asia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be seen in recent cases such as the September 2019 police torture of two Uzbek migrants and the June interrogation of Afro-Russian blogger Mariya Tunkara .
The omission of minorities from the Russian Lives Matter movement coincides with outright dismissals of Black Lives Matter , as Meduza noted , with supporters on Twitter saying things such as “ I don ’ t give a damn about blacks in America when they ’ re lynching Russians in Yekaterinburg.
” Prominent Russian journalist Oleg Kashin added to the racist imagery online by posting a meme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shoeboxes and cellphone boxes with the text “ Martin Looter King.
” Such racist sentiments have placed members of the Russian opposition in strange proximity to the government .
Russian liberals who have vociferously opposed President Vladimir Putin ’ s regime are now silent at best and parrot Moscow ’ s messaging at worst .
Russian liberals such as Ksenia Sobchak , who ran against Putin in 2018 , and the high-profile journalist Yulia Latynina have gone a step further , writing articles and creating social media posts that focus on looting , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of law and order in the United States—a near mirroring of government media , which portrays U.S. society in a state of chaos .
Sobchak recently lost her job as a spokeswoman for Audi after posting a racist tirade on Instagram describing Black Americans as stupid and lazy .
Latynina ’ s recent op-ed in Novaya Gazeta compared the Black Lives Matter movement with Ukraine ’ s Euromaidan protests to undermine African American complaints of racism .
“ That is why it is ridiculous and shameful to regard these pogroms as ‘ rebellion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equate the rioters and even peaceful protests with those who really risk their lives when they go to the Maidan or Tiananmen Square.
” The protests , she wrote , were “ pogroms ” and the protesters “ hooligans.
” The language echoes that of Russian state-controlled media .
News sites such as RT and Sputnik have published articles decrying the “ woke mafia ” and focusing on an alleged rise in crime following demands to defund the police .
Even the famous film Brother 2 received a new ending—Russian viewers of state-controlled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of looting and police violence at the U.S. protests juxtaposed with the song “ Goodbye America.
” Moscow , meanwhile , has used the opportunity to undermine U.S. legitimacy at home .
In a recent interview , Putin pointed to the U.S. protests and Washington ’ s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic to contrast Russia ’ s rigorous law-and-order response .
This instance is hardly the first time Russia has sought to exploit U.S. racial issues , particularly police and civilian violence towards African Americans , for domestic and geopolitical purposes .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ targeted African American communities with disinformation , including posts on police mistreatment of African Americans and posts on Instagram promoting Black women and beauty .
The Internet Research Agency also created content on YouTube that focused on the Black Lives Matter movement .
These well-documented efforts demonstrate how systemic racism and police brutality against American civilians and specifically African Americans present a national security problem for the United States .
Of course , the genesis of the threat is not Russia ’ s meddling , but the United States ’ failure to address @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regimes such as Russia ’ s an opportunity to undermine U.S. foreign policy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union .
When Russia uses state-sanctioned violence against ethnic minorities and political opponents , can the United States project itself as a counter to this regime ?
As U.S. policymakers learned in the competition against the Soviet Union for influence in the newly independent African states during the 1960s , they can not successfully promote democratic values abroad when U.S. citizens are denied their rights at home .
With the 2020 election on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward the European Union , and an impending revision of the Russian Constitution that would extend Putin ’ s term limit , it is a critical moment for U.S.-Russia relations .
And the failure of Washington to uphold fundamental rights within the United States will endanger the opposition in Russia and elsewhere .
Russia ’ s opposition , for its part , has missed a critical chance to build transnational solidarity against police brutality .
In using the notoriety of the United States ’ Black Lives Matter slogan and American white supremacy logic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and promote ethnic Russian nationalism , opposition members have undermined their own cause .
In its eagerness to ignore the role of racism in Russia , the Russian Lives Matter movement has inadvertently stumbled on the same messaging as Putin ’ s regime .
In the long run , this can only hurt its cause .
Putin has no problem using the police and accusations of hooliganism to stop public demonstrations against his regime .
Now , Moscow can point to the very logic of the opposition regarding the protests in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

As Black Lives Matter protests spread across the globe, Russia has proven a notable exception. There have been solidarity demonstrations and localized movements against racism and police violence in Helsinki; Almaty, Kazakhstan; and Vilnius, Lithuania; but no such scenes in Moscow. Instead, Russia has used the civil unrest in the United States to continue its history of reflecting the United States’ most unbecoming aspects on itself. The Russian government and its liberal opposition alike have used their platforms to discredit the relatively peaceful spirit of the demonstrations and project ideas of U.S. weakness. And in doing so, the opposition stands to harm its larger fight against Russian state oppression.
As Black Lives Matter protests spread across the globe, Russia has proven a notable exception. There have been solidarity demonstrations and localized movements against racism and police violence in Helsinki; Almaty, Kazakhstan; and Vilnius, Lithuania; but no such scenes in Moscow. Instead, Russia has used the civil unrest in the United States to continue its history of reflecting the United States’ most unbecoming aspects on itself. The Russian government and its liberal opposition alike have used their platforms to discredit the relatively peaceful spirit of the demonstrations and project ideas of U.S. weakness. And in doing so, the opposition stands to harm its larger fight against Russian state oppression.
The development of the “Russian Lives Matter” social media movement is perhaps the strongest example of how the liberal opposition in Russia has unwittingly aided its government in subverting a global anti-racist effort. Russian Lives Matter started after police raided a home in Yekaterinburg and killed a resident on May 31. Since the police shooting, members of Russia’s libertarian movement, including Libertarian Party leader Mikhail Svetov, have used the hashtag to shed light on Russian police violence against citizens. The hashtag is not a show of solidarity with the internationally known Black Lives Matter movement. Instead, #RussianLivesMatter has been used to undermine the American fight against systemic racism by downplaying the impact of racism against African Americans, by suggesting police killings of Black Americans were deserved, and by framing empathy towards victims of police violence in Russia as a zero-sum game.
The hashtag itself hints at the exclusionary undertones of the movement’s participants. In a recent podcast interview with the independent Russian media site Meduza, Svetov made clear that his concern was not racism, but police violence against ethnic Russians (a point he drove home by using the word russkie, meaning ethnic Russian, rather than the more all-encompassing rossiyane). Asked whether policing in Russia is influenced by race, Svetov demurred saying it depended on the region, noting that in Chechnya, for example, police violence is focused on Russians. In truth, much Russian police violence is targeted at ethnic minorities and migrants from Central Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, as can be seen in recent cases such as the September 2019 police torture of two Uzbek migrants and the June interrogation of Afro-Russian blogger Mariya Tunkara.
The omission of minorities from the Russian Lives Matter movement coincides with outright dismissals of Black Lives Matter, as Meduza noted, with supporters on Twitter saying things such as “I don’t give a damn about blacks in America when they’re lynching Russians in Yekaterinburg.” Prominent Russian journalist Oleg Kashin added to the racist imagery online by posting a meme of Martin Luther King Jr. surrounded by shoeboxes and cellphone boxes with the text “Martin Looter King.”
Such racist sentiments have placed members of the Russian opposition in strange proximity to the government. Russian liberals who have vociferously opposed President Vladimir Putin’s regime are now silent at best and parrot Moscow’s messaging at worst. Russian liberals such as Ksenia Sobchak, who ran against Putin in 2018, and the high-profile journalist Yulia Latynina have gone a step further, writing articles and creating social media posts that focus on looting, property damage, and a perceived lack of law and order in the United States—a near mirroring of government media, which portrays U.S. society in a state of chaos. Sobchak recently lost her job as a spokeswoman for Audi after posting a racist tirade on Instagram describing Black Americans as stupid and lazy. Latynina’s recent op-ed in Novaya Gazeta compared the Black Lives Matter movement with Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests to undermine African American complaints of racism. “That is why it is ridiculous and shameful to regard these pogroms as ‘rebellion against the system,’ and to equate the rioters and even peaceful protests with those who really risk their lives when they go to the Maidan or Tiananmen Square.” The protests, she wrote, were “pogroms” and the protesters “hooligans.”
The language echoes that of Russian state-controlled media. News sites such as RT and Sputnik have published articles decrying the “woke mafia” and focusing on an alleged rise in crime following demands to defund the police. Even the famous film Brother 2 received a new ending—Russian viewers of state-controlled Channel One were surprised to see images of looting and police violence at the U.S. protests juxtaposed with the song “Goodbye America.”
Moscow, meanwhile, has used the opportunity to undermine U.S. legitimacy at home. In a recent interview, Putin pointed to the U.S. protests and Washington’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic to contrast Russia’s rigorous law-and-order response.
This instance is hardly the first time Russia has sought to exploit U.S. racial issues, particularly police and civilian violence towards African Americans, for domestic and geopolitical purposes. During the 2016 presidential election, Russian operatives targeted African American communities with disinformation, including posts on police mistreatment of African Americans and posts on Instagram promoting Black women and beauty. The Internet Research Agency also created content on YouTube that focused on the Black Lives Matter movement.
These well-documented efforts demonstrate how systemic racism and police brutality against American civilians and specifically African Americans present a national security problem for the United States. Of course, the genesis of the threat is not Russia’s meddling, but the United States’ failure to address centuries-old systemic racism, which hands authoritarian regimes such as Russia’s an opportunity to undermine U.S. foreign policy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. When Russia uses state-sanctioned violence against ethnic minorities and political opponents, can the United States project itself as a counter to this regime? As U.S. policymakers learned in the competition against the Soviet Union for influence in the newly independent African states during the 1960s, they cannot successfully promote democratic values abroad when U.S. citizens are denied their rights at home.
With the 2020 election on the horizon, Ukraine’s pivot toward the European Union, and an impending revision of the Russian Constitution that would extend Putin’s term limit, it is a critical moment for U.S.-Russia relations. And the failure of Washington to uphold fundamental rights within the United States will endanger the opposition in Russia and elsewhere.
Russia’s opposition, for its part, has missed a critical chance to build transnational solidarity against police brutality. In using the notoriety of the United States’ Black Lives Matter slogan and American white supremacy logic to shed light on Russian police brutality and promote ethnic Russian nationalism, opposition members have undermined their own cause. In its eagerness to ignore the role of racism in Russia, the Russian Lives Matter movement has inadvertently stumbled on the same messaging as Putin’s regime. In the long run, this can only hurt its cause. Putin has no problem using the police and accusations of hooliganism to stop public demonstrations against his regime. Now, Moscow can point to the very logic of the opposition regarding the protests in the United States amid any accusations of state oppression.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--The Pandemic Could Be the Crisis Liberalism Needed

The Pandemic Could Be the Crisis Liberalism Needed The world may be reaching a dangerous inflection point for liberalism .
According to the latest reports from Freedom House , over the last 15 years the share of unfree countries in the world has risen while the share of free countries has dropped .
Today , government deficits are spiking in response to the public ’ s demand for intervention to mitigate the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic , and some warn that authoritarian leaders are seizing the opportunity to expand their control .
Still , this may be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not lose it .
A new study by World Bank economists , drawing on data from 190 economies spanning the last 15 years , finds that fiscal crises—of the sort created by the pandemic in countries around the world—are likely to spur liberal reforms , particularly in the economic policy areas of property , investment , and trade .
How liberal advocates act on this glimmer of hope will be crucial .
Post-Cold War efforts to spread liberal democracy have disappointed to date .
Instead of ushering in the end of history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a know-it-all approach to proselytizing liberal institutions to other countries has engendered widespread resentment toward Western influences .
And yet , it ’ s more complicated .
The political scientists Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes recently argued that we should think of that resentment not as a rejection of liberalism , per se , but as an indignant reaction to its perceived imposition .
What ’ s the lesson here ?
Liberals must stop thinking of liberalism as theirs alone to give .
Instead , they should recognize it as a universal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ traditions and cultures .
It is on such foundations that enduring liberal institutions can be built in diverse places .
Extensive research on institutional change bears that out .
There is a saying : “ People support what they help create.
” For liberal institutions to “ stick ” in new places , they must not be mere knockoffs of institutions that grew elsewhere .
The West ’ s own liberal democratic institutions , including the division of powers , property rights , freedom of exchange , free speech , and public deliberation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but not the ideals themselves .
They are successful , but they ’ re works in progress .
They are worthy of thoughtful study , but they ’ re not suited for franchise-like plug and play .
This should prompt a tectonic shift in the foreign aid approach to development .
A growing number of voices within development circles have been trying to do just that .
They advocate a “ localization ” agenda , which means shrinking the role and influence of foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations and narrowing their focus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better suited to help , such as information-sharing and providing operating support for local NGOs to increase their capacity to lead change for themselves .
With widespread belt-tightening across the development sector due to the coronavirus pandemic , including at major institutions such as Oxfam and the U.K. Department for International Development , such a radical change has become thinkable , perhaps even imminent , in a way we would not have imagined a year ago .
This may provide a short window to permanently curb the undue influence of outsiders on local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suggest a pure agnosticism about what to support abroad .
Liberal reforms and liberal institutions should remain the priority .
The same logic that commends federalism and its principles of subsidiarity applies equally to development work in other countries : Decentralization works .
But if foreigners continue to hold the reins , even unwittingly , their efforts will continue to breed resentment and , more importantly , fail to serve local needs .
For maximum effect , we should look to private philanthropy for most grant-making to foreign NGOs .
Voluntary nongovernmental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political manipulation .
Just as importantly , private philanthropy can be less rigid about predetermined compliance requirements .
Such flexibility is important .
Through the grant-making our organization has administered to think tanks and other NGOs in recent years , we have learned to hold our tongues and listen .
We invite our grantees to tell us what ’ s possible , what ’ s important , how they will do it , and , most importantly , how they will measure meaningfully their success for the projects they are proposing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ know about the diffusion of good ideas and practices .
In their study on “ Regulatory Reforms after Covid-19 , ” Simeon Djankov and other World Bank economists also found that countries that share borders or that trade heavily with each other are more likely to adopt for themselves the reforms of their neighbors and commercial partners .
They see with their own eyes the successes and failures in neighboring countries and can , on their own initiative , decide for themselves what changes to pursue and how best to pursue them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ navigating this time of great uncertainty .
In 2020 , we have seen the limits of centralized models at work .
From the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the Internal Revenue Service to the Food and Drug Administration in the United States and , at the global level , the United Nations ’ World Health Organization , big institutions have failed .
It ’ s a stark reminder that there are very real limits to the types of problems that distant authorities are able to solve , no matter how well-funded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this crisis , the Microsoft billionaire Bill Gates invested billions of dollars in seven different vaccine candidates simultaneously knowing that , at best , one or two might work .
Gates knows what a big mistake it can be to place all your bets on one unproven solution .
Not only does it raise the stakes considerably if you get it wrong , but it also severely limits any opportunities for learning , since there are no alternative results for comparison .
Liberal economies , with their presumption of decentralized decision-making , allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learning .
That model takes advantage of centralized knowledge and expertise , to be sure , but it also integrates the dispersed knowledge the rest of us possess about our individual circumstances .
People close to the problems can find solutions that actually work , long before a large and distant bureaucracy ever could .
Our instinct when facing fear and uncertainty is to shift the tough decisions to the experts and to insist on one uniform—and presumably “ best ” —solution to our diverse problems .
Experts play important roles in collating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not know enough to successfully conjure up one great solution for us all .
It ’ s the lesson we have learned in our failed attempt to install liberal democracies throughout the world .
In this moment of crisis , we now have a second chance to get it right .
Let ’ s keep making history .

The world may be reaching a dangerous inflection point for liberalism. According to the latest reports from Freedom House, over the last 15 years the share of unfree countries in the world has risen while the share of free countries has dropped. Today, government deficits are spiking in response to the public’s demand for intervention to mitigate the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, and some warn that authoritarian leaders are seizing the opportunity to expand their control.
The world may be reaching a dangerous inflection point for liberalism. According to the latest reports from Freedom House, over the last 15 years the share of unfree countries in the world has risen while the share of free countries has dropped. Today, government deficits are spiking in response to the public’s demand for intervention to mitigate the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, and some warn that authoritarian leaders are seizing the opportunity to expand their control.
Still, this may be a time when liberalism starts to gain ground, not lose it. A new study by World Bank economists, drawing on data from 190 economies spanning the last 15 years, finds that fiscal crises—of the sort created by the pandemic in countries around the world—are likely to spur liberal reforms, particularly in the economic policy areas of property, investment, and trade.
How liberal advocates act on this glimmer of hope will be crucial. Post-Cold War efforts to spread liberal democracy have disappointed to date. Instead of ushering in the end of history, as Francis Fukuyama predicted in 1989, a know-it-all approach to proselytizing liberal institutions to other countries has engendered widespread resentment toward Western influences. And yet, it’s more complicated. The political scientists Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes recently argued that we should think of that resentment not as a rejection of liberalism, per se, but as an indignant reaction to its perceived imposition.
What’s the lesson here? Liberals must stop thinking of liberalism as theirs alone to give. Instead, they should recognize it as a universal ideal that has roots in many different traditions and cultures. It is on such foundations that enduring liberal institutions can be built in diverse places.
Extensive research on institutional change bears that out. There is a saying: “People support what they help create.” For liberal institutions to “stick” in new places, they must not be mere knockoffs of institutions that grew elsewhere. The West’s own liberal democratic institutions, including the division of powers, property rights, freedom of exchange, free speech, and public deliberation, are idiosyncratic versions of liberal ideals, but not the ideals themselves. They are successful, but they’re works in progress. They are worthy of thoughtful study, but they’re not suited for franchise-like plug and play.
This should prompt a tectonic shift in the foreign aid approach to development. A growing number of voices within development circles have been trying to do just that. They advocate a “localization” agenda, which means shrinking the role and influence of foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations and narrowing their focus to a few areas where they are better suited to help, such as information-sharing and providing operating support for local NGOs to increase their capacity to lead change for themselves.
With widespread belt-tightening across the development sector due to the coronavirus pandemic, including at major institutions such as Oxfam and the U.K. Department for International Development, such a radical change has become thinkable, perhaps even imminent, in a way we would not have imagined a year ago. This may provide a short window to permanently curb the undue influence of outsiders on local development questions.
That’s not to suggest a pure agnosticism about what to support abroad. Liberal reforms and liberal institutions should remain the priority. The same logic that commends federalism and its principles of subsidiarity applies equally to development work in other countries: Decentralization works. But if foreigners continue to hold the reins, even unwittingly, their efforts will continue to breed resentment and, more importantly, fail to serve local needs.
For maximum effect, we should look to private philanthropy for most grant-making to foreign NGOs. Voluntary nongovernmental philanthropy is less liable to special-interest distortions and political manipulation. Just as importantly, private philanthropy can be less rigid about predetermined compliance requirements.
Such flexibility is important. Through the grant-making our organization has administered to think tanks and other NGOs in recent years, we have learned to hold our tongues and listen. We invite our grantees to tell us what’s possible, what’s important, how they will do it, and, most importantly, how they will measure meaningfully their success for the projects they are proposing.
That model fits best with what we know about the diffusion of good ideas and practices. In their study on “Regulatory Reforms after Covid-19,” Simeon Djankov and other World Bank economists also found that countries that share borders or that trade heavily with each other are more likely to adopt for themselves the reforms of their neighbors and commercial partners. They see with their own eyes the successes and failures in neighboring countries and can, on their own initiative, decide for themselves what changes to pursue and how best to pursue them.
Decentralized liberalism is a prudent strategy for navigating this time of great uncertainty. In 2020, we have seen the limits of centralized models at work. From the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the Internal Revenue Service to the Food and Drug Administration in the United States and, at the global level, the United Nations’ World Health Organization, big institutions have failed. It’s a stark reminder that there are very real limits to the types of problems that distant authorities are able to solve, no matter how well-funded or well-trained they are.
Early in this crisis, the Microsoft billionaire Bill Gates invested billions of dollars in seven different vaccine candidates simultaneously knowing that, at best, one or two might work. Gates knows what a big mistake it can be to place all your bets on one unproven solution. Not only does it raise the stakes considerably if you get it wrong, but it also severely limits any opportunities for learning, since there are no alternative results for comparison.
Liberal economies, with their presumption of decentralized decision-making, allow fast-acting, widespread, uncoordinated experimentation and learning. That model takes advantage of centralized knowledge and expertise, to be sure, but it also integrates the dispersed knowledge the rest of us possess about our individual circumstances. People close to the problems can find solutions that actually work, long before a large and distant bureaucracy ever could.
Our instinct when facing fear and uncertainty is to shift the tough decisions to the experts and to insist on one uniform—and presumably “best”—solution to our diverse problems. Experts play important roles in collating and disseminating knowledge, but they cannot know enough to successfully conjure up one great solution for us all. It’s the lesson we have learned in our failed attempt to install liberal democracies throughout the world. In this moment of crisis, we now have a second chance to get it right. Let’s keep making history.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--U.S. Coronavirus Cases Spike, With India Close Behind

U.S. Coronavirus Cases Spike , With India Close Behind Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : India sees a record daily number of coronavirus cases , an unexplained explosion rocks a U.S. Navy vessel , Poland ’ s ruling party narrowly wins presidential election , and the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
On Sunday , the World Health Organization announced another record number of cases recorded in one day , with more than 230,000 cases reported globally .
The United States remains the world ’ s hotspot , with some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If the state of Florida were a country , the 15,300 new cases reported there on Sunday would have put it in the top ten globally .
In the United States , the search for a scapegoat appears to have led to Anthony Fauci , the top infectious disease expert and lead public health official on U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s coronavirus task force .
A White House official told CNN on Saturday that “ several White House officials are concerned about the number of times Dr. Fauci has been wrong on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speak for himself during an appearance at an event hosted by Georgetown University this Tuesday .
India ’ s ignominy .
For the first time , India outpaced Brazil in new cases after the country recorded almost 30,000 on Sunday .
Although delays in reporting can distort any one-day figures , the continued rise in cases shows how India has still failed to bend its curve .
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 22 , Kunal Purohit wrote about the country ’ s “ bungling ” response to its coronavirus outbreak and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before the pandemic struck .
Modi ’ s reckoning ?
On July 6 , Kapil Komireddi wrote about Prime Minister Narendra Modi and how “ the dire state in which India finds itself today is the direct consequence of his ineptitude.
” Komireddi warns of a wider press crackdown in the country as its coronavirus crisis worsens .
Explosion at U.S. naval base .
At least 21 people were injured , including 17 sailors , after an explosion and fire occurred on a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship while undergoing maintenance at port @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is still unknown , the incident is believed to have taken place on the ship ’ s well deck , where small craft board and disembark the ship .
PiS wins close Polish election .
Incumbent Polish President Andrzej Duda has claimed victory in Sunday ’ s presidential runoff election pitting him against Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski .
With 99 percent of precincts reporting , Duda is leading with 51.2 percent of the vote .
Despite coronavirus fears , voter turnout was approximately 68 percent—the highest in 25 years .
Thaci heads to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visits the Hague today to be interviewed after he was indicted on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes .
Thaci , who led an ethnic Albanian guerilla group in the 1998-99 Kosovo war , has defended his conduct .
“ Our war was clean and just , ” he told Albanian television on Sunday .
Okinawa coronavirus cases cause tension .
More than 60 U.S. Marines on the Japanese island of Okinawa have tested positive for the coronavirus , angering local officials after they had struggled to obtain exact figures from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governor , Denny Tamaki , has demanded that the U.S. military stop sending soldiers from the U.S. mainland and for the bases to be sealed off .
A Marine statement said that off-base activities would be restricted due to the outbreak , but stopped short of a full lockdown of bases .
Okinawa has had roughly 150 cases of the coronavirus so far .
Russia advances Syria policy at U.N. Russia scored a diplomatic victory on Saturday when it successfully reduced the number of border crossings for United Nations aid to enter Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote from the U.N. Security Council on Saturday .
The move closes a humanitarian aid route from Bab al-Salam in Turkey to Aleppo .
Bab al-Hawa , another Turkish crossing point which supplies Idlib , will remain open to aid until July 2021 .
The cost of Brexit .
The United Kingdom announced plans to spend $ 890 million on border infrastructure to better facilitate trade after its transition deal with the European Union , according to Cabinet Secretary Michael Gove .
Talks between the two sides are ongoing , with another formal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on July 20 .
How the British government plans to handle the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland , a sticking point in EU negotiations , will be announced “ later this month , ” Gove said .
Norilsk spills again in Arctic .
Norilsk Nickel has caused another environmental incident in Russia ’ s far north after roughly 45 tons of aviation fuel leaked from a pipeline near Tukhard , close to the Arctic port of Dudinka .
The leak follows a massive fuel spill in Siberia on May @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaked into nearby rivers after a fuel tank collapsed .
Norilsk was fined a record $ 2 billion by the Russian government for the destruction caused by the spill .
The company plans to appeal the financial penalty .
Sudan puts some laws in the past .
Sudan ’ s Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari announced a slate of new policies that dismantle laws put in place by the previous Islamist regime .
Female genital mutilation will be banned , women will no longer need permits from male family members for travel , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state television .
The country ’ s non-Muslims—who amount to roughly 3 percent of the population—will now be allowed drink alcohol in private , although the Muslim majority is still banned from drinking .
On Tuesday , hearings begin in a case brought by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement .
The two higher-learning institutions are seeking to block a rule , announced last week , that would leave foreign students open to deportation if they attend colleges that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fall semester .
On Wednesday , North Macedonia votes in parliamentary elections .
The elections had been scheduled for April 12 but were postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic .
On Thursday , the European Court of Justice will issue its judgment in a case brought by privacy activist Max Schrems , over the transfer of his personal data from Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc. in the United States .
Schrems contends that Facebook is violating the EU ’ s data protection laws by allowing U.S. intelligence services to access his personal data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of EU member states will meet in Brussels for the first in-person European Council summit since the coronavirus pandemic began .
The revised multi-annual financial framework ( MFF ) and economic recovery proposal are expected to top the agenda .
A part of Indian history has been unearthed in the French Alps after a local café manager discovered a batch of newspapers hailing the election of Indira Gandhi among the melting ice of the Mont Blanc glacier .
The newspapers are thought to have come from the wreckage of an Air India Boeing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1966 .
Timothee Mottin , who found the time capsule , plans to display the papers—along with other found items from the crash—at his café near Chamonix .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: India sees a record daily number of coronavirus cases, an unexplained explosion rocks a U.S. Navy vessel, Poland’s ruling party narrowly wins presidential election, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: India sees a record daily number of coronavirus cases, an unexplained explosion rocks a U.S. Navy vessel, Poland’s ruling party narrowly wins presidential election, and what to watch in the world this week.
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Daily Coronavirus Cases Surge in U.S., India
On Sunday, the World Health Organization announced another record number of cases recorded in one day, with more than 230,000 cases reported globally.
The United States remains the world’s hotspot, with some states seeing huge spikes in cases. If the state of Florida were a country, the 15,300 new cases reported there on Sunday would have put it in the top ten globally.
In the United States, the search for a scapegoat appears to have led to Anthony Fauci, the top infectious disease expert and lead public health official on U.S. President Donald Trump’s coronavirus task force. A White House official told CNN on Saturday that “several White House officials are concerned about the number of times Dr. Fauci has been wrong on things.” Fauci has a chance to speak for himself during an appearance at an event hosted by Georgetown University this Tuesday.
India’s ignominy. For the first time, India outpaced Brazil in new cases after the country recorded almost 30,000 on Sunday. Although delays in reporting can distort any one-day figures, the continued rise in cases shows how India has still failed to bend its curve. Writing in Foreign Policy on June 22, Kunal Purohit wrote about the country’s “bungling” response to its coronavirus outbreak and the sorry state of its healthcare system even before the pandemic struck.
Modi’s reckoning? On July 6, Kapil Komireddi wrote about Prime Minister Narendra Modi and how “the dire state in which India finds itself today is the direct consequence of his ineptitude.” Komireddi warns of a wider press crackdown in the country as its coronavirus crisis worsens.
What We’re Following Today
Explosion at U.S. naval base. At least 21 people were injured, including 17 sailors, after an explosion and fire occurred on a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship while undergoing maintenance at port in San Diego. Although the cause is still unknown, the incident is believed to have taken place on the ship’s well deck, where small craft board and disembark the ship.
PiS wins close Polish election. Incumbent Polish President Andrzej Duda has claimed victory in Sunday’s presidential runoff election pitting him against Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski. With 99 percent of precincts reporting, Duda is leading with 51.2 percent of the vote. Despite coronavirus fears, voter turnout was approximately 68 percent—the highest in 25 years.
Thaci heads to the Hague. Kosovo President Hashim Thaci visits the Hague today to be interviewed after he was indicted on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Thaci, who led an ethnic Albanian guerilla group in the 1998-99 Kosovo war, has defended his conduct. “Our war was clean and just,” he told Albanian television on Sunday.
Okinawa coronavirus cases cause tension. More than 60 U.S. Marines on the Japanese island of Okinawa have tested positive for the coronavirus, angering local officials after they had struggled to obtain exact figures from the U.S. military. Okinawa’s governor, Denny Tamaki, has demanded that the U.S. military stop sending soldiers from the U.S. mainland and for the bases to be sealed off. A Marine statement said that off-base activities would be restricted due to the outbreak, but stopped short of a full lockdown of bases. Okinawa has had roughly 150 cases of the coronavirus so far.
Russia advances Syria policy at U.N. Russia scored a diplomatic victory on Saturday when it successfully reduced the number of border crossings for United Nations aid to enter Syria from two to one, following a vote from the U.N. Security Council on Saturday. The move closes a humanitarian aid route from Bab al-Salam in Turkey to Aleppo. Bab al-Hawa, another Turkish crossing point which supplies Idlib, will remain open to aid until July 2021.
Keep an Eye On
The cost of Brexit. The United Kingdom announced plans to spend $890 million on border infrastructure to better facilitate trade after its transition deal with the European Union, according to Cabinet Secretary Michael Gove. Talks between the two sides are ongoing, with another formal round of trade talks set to begin on July 20. How the British government plans to handle the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a sticking point in EU negotiations, will be announced “later this month,” Gove said.
Norilsk spills again in Arctic. Norilsk Nickel has caused another environmental incident in Russia’s far north after roughly 45 tons of aviation fuel leaked from a pipeline near Tukhard, close to the Arctic port of Dudinka. The leak follows a massive fuel spill in Siberia on May 29, when 21,000 tons of diesel leaked into nearby rivers after a fuel tank collapsed. Norilsk was fined a record $2 billion by the Russian government for the destruction caused by the spill. The company plans to appeal the financial penalty.
Sudan puts some laws in the past. Sudan’s Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari announced a slate of new policies that dismantle laws put in place by the previous Islamist regime. Female genital mutilation will be banned, women will no longer need permits from male family members for travel, and apostasy will be decriminalized, Abdulbari told state television. The country’s non-Muslims—who amount to roughly 3 percent of the population—will now be allowed drink alcohol in private, although the Muslim majority is still banned from drinking.
The World This Week
On Tuesday, hearings begin in a case brought by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The two higher-learning institutions are seeking to block a rule, announced last week, that would leave foreign students open to deportation if they attend colleges that do not offer in-person classes for the fall semester.
On Wednesday, North Macedonia votes in parliamentary elections. The elections had been scheduled for April 12 but were postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic.
On Thursday, the European Court of Justice will issue its judgment in a case brought by privacy activist Max Schrems, over the transfer of his personal data from Facebook Ireland to Facebook Inc. in the United States. Schrems contends that Facebook is violating the EU’s data protection laws by allowing U.S. intelligence services to access his personal data.
On July 17, the leaders of EU member states will meet in Brussels for the first in-person European Council summit since the coronavirus pandemic began. The revised multi-annual financial framework (MFF) and economic recovery proposal are expected to top the agenda.
Odds and Ends
A part of Indian history has been unearthed in the French Alps after a local café manager discovered a batch of newspapers hailing the election of Indira Gandhi among the melting ice of the Mont Blanc glacier. The newspapers are thought to have come from the wreckage of an Air India Boeing 707 that crashed into the mountain in 1966. Timothee Mottin, who found the time capsule, plans to display the papers—along with other found items from the crash—at his café near Chamonix.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.