foreignpolicy--2020-05-16--China’s Provocations Around Taiwan Aren’t a Crisis

A growing chorus of commentators and experts are warning that China is exploiting the pandemic to advance its interests in the Western Pacific .
With Washington distracted and the U.S. military handicapped due to COVID-19 infections , some observers believe that China may see no better opportunity to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland .
Yet , even if Beijing were to interpret the distraction and chaos wrought by the novel coronavirus as a uniquely advantageous moment , a Chinese military strike on Taiwan at this moment is unlikely .
A recent uptick in military provocations has fueled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the island .
The People ’ s Liberation Army Air Force ( PLAAF ) and Navy ( PLAN ) have conducted as many as 10 transits and military exercises near Taiwan since mid-January , including multiple deliberate incursions into Taiwan ’ s airspace .
In November 2016 , China began sending PLAAF sorties to circumnavigate the island and in March 2019 , two PLAAF J-11 fighters deliberately crossed the centerline of the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 20 years .
On two occasions this year , dozens of PLAAF aircraft crossed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiple PLAAF aircraft taking part in a rare nighttime drill above waters southwest of Taiwan .
On April 9 , the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning and five warships crossed the Miyako Strait between Taiwan and Japan .
This growing assertiveness has raised alarm bells in Washington .
In one recent example , a report released on May 12 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission contends that with “ the world distracted by COVID-19 ” China has “ intensified its multi-faceted pressure campaign against Taiwan.
” There is certainly evidence that some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of force .
During a Georgetown University webinar on April 16 , one of China ’ s top experts on the United States , Wang Jisi , warned that hawkish voices in China have suggested that “ U.S .
preoccupation in the election year and over the pandemic provides a good opportunity to solve the Taiwan issue by forceful means.
” Wang also noted that some Chinese are proposing that China “ amend the anti-secession law to make room for us to move on to the military solution to the Taiwan issue.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2005 and formalizes the policy that “ non-peaceful means ” can be used to forestall “ Taiwan independence.
” Wang ’ s comments imply that there is a push internally to revise the law to justify an attack for situations beyond those the law currently outlines , which include Taiwan ’ s secession from China or the exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful reunification .
A survey of recently published open-source Chinese writings provides additional clarity on Wang Jisi ’ s warning .
In early April , Wang Yunfei , a Chinese naval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ published a popular article ( soon taken offline ) on Ifeng.com in which he contends that now is the time for military action against Taiwan .
[ 1 ] Wang furthermore suggests that the mainland “ can use this chance to test the United States ’ bottom line on the cross-strait situation.
” Calls for military action have also come from the official WeChat account of the Eastern Theater Command ( ETC ) .
A series of articles calling for China to prepare for war were posted by the ETC in mid-April and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” tag trending on Weibo .
Even some legal commentators have joined the mix .
Tian Feilong , an associate professor at Beihang University , published an article on May 7 on nationalist site Guancha.cn declaring that political and social developments in Taiwan have made peaceful reunification impossible .
He asserts that the 2005 Anti-Secession Law provides the necessary legal authority to resolve the issue by force .
Other Chinese voices offer more temperate views .
A few days after Wang Yunfei ’ s article was taken down , Yang Chengjun , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formerly with the PLA Rocket Force , expressed a more moderate view in an article on a website managed by the State Council ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office ( TAO ) .
Lending credence to the notion that there is a push to seize the opportunity presented by the pandemic to attack Taiwan , Yang argue explicitly that the outbreak should not be viewed as an enabler of unification through the use of force .
A similarly cautious tone was echoed by retired air force Maj. Gen. Qiao Liang in an interview in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later reported by the South China Morning Post on May 4 ) .
Although Qiao is generally considered to hold hawkish views , he warned that taking Taiwan by force would be “ too costly ” and would “ jeopardize China ’ s goal of national rejuvenation.
” Public advocacy against using force is further evidence that there are influential proponents within China pressing Beijing to strike Taiwan now— but also that the debate has not got to a point where standing against an invasion is too risky to be done publicly .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that there is a debate underway , although it is difficult to know precisely what is being discussed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Politburo colleagues .
There is ample indication that Beijing is concerned Taiwan will benefit from the pandemic .
In a statement on Feb. 14 , TAO spokesperson Ma Xiaoguang criticized Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) authorities in Taiwan , saying “ their real intention is to seek independence under the pretext of the pandemic.
” This same accusation has appeared in at least seven statements by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespeople Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying reiterated similar rebukes on April 9 and May 6 , respectively .
The Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly feels insecure in the face of global criticism of its lack of transparency during the early days of the outbreak and its efforts to quash investigation into the origins of COVID-19 .
This pushback is happening at a time when the United States and other countries are praising Taiwan for its exemplary performance in curbing the outbreak and keeping the island ’ s death count @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community are now pushing for Taiwan ’ s observer status to the World Health Assembly to be reinstated .
China will seek to head off any erosion of its sovereignty claim over Taiwan or deterioration in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait , but that does not mean Beijing is poised to use outright force as a means to those ends .
While there is no denying there has been an increase in Chinese pressure against Taiwan since the beginning of the pandemic , there is also no known evidence to suggest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calculus .
Since coming to power in the fall of 2012 , Xi , like his predecessors , has consistently signaled that reunifying Taiwan with mainland China is inexorable .
In a speech delivered on Jan. 2 , 2019 , the 40th anniversary of the “ Message to Compatriots in Taiwan , ” Xi declared that “ our country must be reunified , and will surely be reunified.
” He reiterated that reunification is “ critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era , ” a statement he first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 19th Party Congress in October 2017 .
Xi has twice maintained that political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait “ should not be passed down generation after generation.
” These statements indicate that Xi has the ambition to set in motion an irreversible trend toward reunification and wants to make progress toward this goal during his term in office .
They do not , however , demonstrate that unifying the country is such an urgent priority that other interests should be put at risk .
Although Xi has adopted tougher @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guideline of pursuing “ the peaceful development of cross-strait relations , ” which he inherited from his predecessor Hu Jintao .
Moreover , Xi has resisted pressure from various constituencies , including retired military commanders , to conclude that time is no longer in China ’ s favor and that Beijing ’ s policy is a failure .
Even if Xi did wish to reconsider his position , he would still face the hard reality that a strike against Taiwan would compromise China ’ s other ambitions .
Using the PLA to force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confrontation that could escalate into a broader conflict .
Even if confrontation remained limited , an anti-China coalition might coalesce as countries across the Indo-Pacific recalculate their strategic thinking to account for a deterioration of the status quo .
This would severely damage China ’ s international relations , thereby jeopardizing the technology transfers that undergird Made in China 2025 and threatening the partnerships needed to advance the Belt and Road Initiative .
Military action against Taiwan could embolden proponents of greater independence for Hong Kong , creating further challenges for the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan might bog down the PLA in a counterinsurgency effort that lasts for years , which could compromise the military ’ s modernization efforts , drain precious resources from the Chinese economy , and lead to dissatisfaction at home as the body bags come home , many of them likely to be their parents ’ only sons .
Beijing must also consider the possibility that an effort to seize Taiwan fails .
Such an eventuality could lead countries to see the PLA as a “ paper tiger.
” It might even force the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defend Chinese sovereignty , potentially dealing a crippling blow to its legitimacy .
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus has done little , if anything , to lessen these risks .
Furthermore , the only real casus belli is Taiwan ’ s separation from the mainland , but China does not need to preemptively use force to prevent that outcome .
As Shelley Rigger has noted , Beijing has already effectively deterred Taipei from declaring de jure independence .
Even if a future leader of Taiwan took the gamble , it is highly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would recognize the island ’ s independent status , including the United States .
Of course , a low level of risk is not the same as zero risk .
China could very well miscalculate or misinterpret the intentions of other players .
Therefore , the United States must ensure that it continues to signal its resolve to deter aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific , especially as it relates to the possibility of force being used to determine Taiwan ’ s future .
Recent maneuvers—including a B-52 training exercise off the coast of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Taiwan Strait by the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry in April—suggest that the United States is doing just that .
Communications through military-to-military channels between the United States and China also remain an effective means of signaling and should continue to be used .
The United States should remain alert , but a cross-strait crisis is not at hand .

A growing chorus of commentators and experts are warning that China is exploiting the pandemic to advance its interests in the Western Pacific. With Washington distracted and the U.S. military handicapped due to COVID-19 infections, some observers believe that China may see no better opportunity to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Yet, even if Beijing were to interpret the distraction and chaos wrought by the novel coronavirus as a uniquely advantageous moment, a Chinese military strike on Taiwan at this moment is unlikely.
A growing chorus of commentators and experts are warning that China is exploiting the pandemic to advance its interests in the Western Pacific. With Washington distracted and the U.S. military handicapped due to COVID-19 infections, some observers believe that China may see no better opportunity to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Yet, even if Beijing were to interpret the distraction and chaos wrought by the novel coronavirus as a uniquely advantageous moment, a Chinese military strike on Taiwan at this moment is unlikely.
A recent uptick in military provocations has fueled suspicion that China is preparing to attack the island. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) have conducted as many as 10 transits and military exercises near Taiwan since mid-January, including multiple deliberate incursions into Taiwan’s airspace. In November 2016, China began sending PLAAF sorties to circumnavigate the island and in March 2019, two PLAAF J-11 fighters deliberately crossed the centerline of the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 20 years. On two occasions this year, dozens of PLAAF aircraft crossed the centerline. This past March witnessed multiple PLAAF aircraft taking part in a rare nighttime drill above waters southwest of Taiwan. On April 9, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning and five warships crossed the Miyako Strait between Taiwan and Japan.
This growing assertiveness has raised alarm bells in Washington. In one recent example, a report released on May 12 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission contends that with “the world distracted by COVID-19” China has “intensified its multi-faceted pressure campaign against Taiwan.”
There is certainly evidence that some in China are pushing for the use of force. During a Georgetown University webinar on April 16, one of China’s top experts on the United States, Wang Jisi, warned that hawkish voices in China have suggested that “U.S. preoccupation in the election year and over the pandemic provides a good opportunity to solve the Taiwan issue by forceful means.” Wang also noted that some Chinese are proposing that China “amend the anti-secession law to make room for us to move on to the military solution to the Taiwan issue.” China’s Anti-Secession Law entered force in 2005 and formalizes the policy that “non-peaceful means” can be used to forestall “Taiwan independence.” Wang’s comments imply that there is a push internally to revise the law to justify an attack for situations beyond those the law currently outlines, which include Taiwan’s secession from China or the exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful reunification.
A survey of recently published open-source Chinese writings provides additional clarity on Wang Jisi’s warning. In early April, Wang Yunfei, a Chinese naval expert and retired PLA naval officer , published a popular article (soon taken offline) on Ifeng.com in which he contends that now is the time for military action against Taiwan.[1] Wang furthermore suggests that the mainland “can use this chance to test the United States’ bottom line on the cross-strait situation.” Calls for military action have also come from the official WeChat account of the Eastern Theater Command (ETC). A series of articles calling for China to prepare for war were posted by the ETC in mid-April and contributed to the “Eastern Theater Command” tag trending on Weibo.
Even some legal commentators have joined the mix. Tian Feilong, an associate professor at Beihang University, published an article on May 7 on nationalist site Guancha.cn declaring that political and social developments in Taiwan have made peaceful reunification impossible. He asserts that the 2005 Anti-Secession Law provides the necessary legal authority to resolve the issue by force.
Other Chinese voices offer more temperate views. A few days after Wang Yunfei’s article was taken down, Yang Chengjun, a retired missile technology and nuclear strategy expert formerly with the PLA Rocket Force, expressed a more moderate view in an article on a website managed by the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Lending credence to the notion that there is a push to seize the opportunity presented by the pandemic to attack Taiwan, Yang argue d explicitly that the outbreak should not be viewed as an enabler of unification through the use of force. A similarly cautious tone was echoed by retired air force Maj. Gen. Qiao Liang in an interview in Bauhinia Magazine on May 1 (and later reported by the South China Morning Post on May 4). Although Qiao is generally considered to hold hawkish views, he warned that taking Taiwan by force would be “too costly” and would “jeopardize China’s goal of national rejuvenation.”
Public advocacy against using force is further evidence that there are influential proponents within China pressing Beijing to strike Taiwan now—but also that the debate has not got to a point where standing against an invasion is too risky to be done publicly. At a minimum, it is obvious that there is a debate underway, although it is difficult to know precisely what is being discussed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Politburo colleagues. There is ample indication that Beijing is concerned Taiwan will benefit from the pandemic. In a statement on Feb. 14, TAO spokesperson Ma Xiaoguang criticized Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities in Taiwan, saying “their real intention is to seek independence under the pretext of the pandemic.” This same accusation has appeared in at least seven statements by the TAO since Ma’s comments. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespeople Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying reiterated similar rebukes on April 9 and May 6, respectively.
The Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly feels insecure in the face of global criticism of its lack of transparency during the early days of the outbreak and its efforts to quash investigation into the origins of COVID-19. This pushback is happening at a time when the United States and other countries are praising Taiwan for its exemplary performance in curbing the outbreak and keeping the island’s death count low. Several members of the global community are now pushing for Taiwan’s observer status to the World Health Assembly to be reinstated.
China will seek to head off any erosion of its sovereignty claim over Taiwan or deterioration in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, but that does not mean Beijing is poised to use outright force as a means to those ends. While there is no denying there has been an increase in Chinese pressure against Taiwan since the beginning of the pandemic, there is also no known evidence to suggest that Xi has fundamentally altered his strategic calculus.
Since coming to power in the fall of 2012, Xi, like his predecessors, has consistently signaled that reunifying Taiwan with mainland China is inexorable. In a speech delivered on Jan. 2, 2019, the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Xi declared that “our country must be reunified, and will surely be reunified.” He reiterated that reunification is “critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era,” a statement he first made in his political report to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017.
Xi has twice maintained that political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait “should not be passed down generation after generation.” These statements indicate that Xi has the ambition to set in motion an irreversible trend toward reunification and wants to make progress toward this goal during his term in office. They do not, however, demonstrate that unifying the country is such an urgent priority that other interests should be put at risk. Although Xi has adopted tougher tactics, he has adhered to the guideline of pursuing “the peaceful development of cross-strait relations,” which he inherited from his predecessor Hu Jintao. Moreover, Xi has resisted pressure from various constituencies, including retired military commanders, to conclude that time is no longer in China’s favor and that Beijing’s policy is a failure.
Even if Xi did wish to reconsider his position, he would still face the hard reality that a strike against Taiwan would compromise China’s other ambitions. Using the PLA to force unification would likely precipitate a U.S.-China military confrontation that could escalate into a broader conflict. Even if confrontation remained limited, an anti-China coalition might coalesce as countries across the Indo-Pacific recalculate their strategic thinking to account for a deterioration of the status quo. This would severely damage China’s international relations, thereby jeopardizing the technology transfers that undergird Made in China 2025 and threatening the partnerships needed to advance the Belt and Road Initiative.
Military action against Taiwan could embolden proponents of greater independence for Hong Kong, creating further challenges for the Chinese Communist Party. An all-out invasion of Taiwan might bog down the PLA in a counterinsurgency effort that lasts for years, which could compromise the military’s modernization efforts, drain precious resources from the Chinese economy, and lead to dissatisfaction at home as the body bags come home, many of them likely to be their parents’ only sons.
Beijing must also consider the possibility that an effort to seize Taiwan fails. Such an eventuality could lead countries to see the PLA as a “paper tiger.” It might even force the Communist Party to acknowledge an inability to defend Chinese sovereignty, potentially dealing a crippling blow to its legitimacy.
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus has done little, if anything, to lessen these risks. Furthermore, the only real casus belli is Taiwan’s separation from the mainland, but China does not need to preemptively use force to prevent that outcome. As Shelley Rigger has noted, Beijing has already effectively deterred Taipei from declaring de jure independence. Even if a future leader of Taiwan took the gamble, it is highly unlikely that any country in the world would recognize the island’s independent status, including the United States.
Of course, a low level of risk is not the same as zero risk. China could very well miscalculate or misinterpret the intentions of other players. Therefore, the United States must ensure that it continues to signal its resolve to deter aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific, especially as it relates to the possibility of force being used to determine Taiwan’s future. Recent maneuvers—including a B-52 training exercise off the coast of Taiwan in February and two transits of the Taiwan Strait by the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry in April—suggest that the United States is doing just that. Communications through military-to-military channels between the United States and China also remain an effective means of signaling and should continue to be used. The United States should remain alert, but a cross-strait crisis is not at hand.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-16--Trump Escalates War on Government Watchdogs

President Donald Trump continued his post-impeachment purge of the U.S. government ’ s top independent watchdogs , telling Congress on Friday night that he was sacking the State Department inspector general .
Steve Linick , who has been the top State Department watchdog since 2013 , was fired after launching an investigation into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo himself , according to Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel , raising immediate questions to lawmakers about whether the decision was legal or not .
He will be replaced in the interim by a political appointee at the State Department close to Vice President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ouster , some State Department officials felt Pompeo had effectively kneecapped the power and independence of the Office of Inspector General ( OIG ) .
“ We are all pissed , ” said one State Department official , who questioned how the office could maintain its political independence and impartiality in future investigations .
“ Without someone nonpolitical , what hope is there for us to go to OIG and use this tool ?
How can I feel comfortable calling even the anonymous tip line to report waste fraud and abuse ?
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people are getting fired for doing their job , ” another official said .
“ It just makes me afraid.
” The move also infuriated Democratic lawmakers sitting on the committee that oversees the State Department .
“ This firing is the outrageous act of a President trying to protect one of his most loyal supporters , the Secretary of State , from accountability , ” Engel , the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , said in a statement .
“ I have learned that the Office of the Inspector General @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Mr. Linick ’ s firing amid such a probe strongly suggests that this is an unlawful act of retaliation.
” A State Department spokesperson confirmed to Foreign Policy that Linick was fired but did not give any indications or justification for his firing .
His replacement , Stephen Akard , served as a foreign service officer from 1997 to 2005 .
He is an ally of Pence and currently holds the position of State Department director of the Office of Foreign Missions .
The State Department watchdog was looking into Pompeo ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Department to perform personal tasks ” for himself and his wife , a Democratic congressional aide told Foreign Policy .
The State Department did not respond to additional requests for comment or confirm whether Pompeo was the subject of an inspector general investigation .
Linick ’ s dismissal represents the latest move by Trump to fire federal watchdogs deemed insufficiently loyal to the administration .
In early April , the president sacked the inspector general of the U.S. intelligence community , who drew the president ’ s ire after receiving a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the president for unduly pressuring the Ukrainian government into investigating his Democratic rival .
Days later , he fired the Defense Department ’ s acting inspector general , who was tasked with overseeing the administration ’ s $ 2 trillion coronavirus stimulus package on a federal panel established by Congress .
He then removed a senior watchdog at the Department of Health and Human Services , Christi Grimm , shortly after her office issued an unflattering report on how ill-prepared the United States was in its coronavirus response .
“ That failure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Irvin McCullough , a national security analyst at the Government Accountability Project , a nonprofit whistleblower protection group .
“ The president doesn ’ t have to provide any added explanation when he removes an [ inspector general ] because he doesn ’ t feel the pressure when he does.
” Linick ’ s firing was met with a mixture of anger , shock , and fear from the State Department ’ s diplomatic corps , according to four State Department officials .
All expressed fear that the department would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politicization just months after the diplomatic corps was dragged into a nationwide scandal with the impeachment trial .
“ [ We ] rely on offices like this to protect us , ” one State Department official said .
“ That ’ s clearly not happening.
” Inspectors general play a critical behind-the-scenes role in independently investigating fraud , waste , and abuse in the government and offering an independent check on politicized misconduct within the government .
Since the start of the Trump administration , Linick ’ s office has churned out a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political retaliation by Trump appointees at the State Department .
Linick last year recommended disciplinary action against U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook after he allegedly removed a career official from her post based on ethnic discrimination and questions over her personal political views .
The department disagreed with Linick ’ s findings , saying the inspector general ’ s report ignored “ compelling evidence ” Hook made the decision to remove Sahar Nowrouzzadeh from her post “ prior to any of the non-merit factors being brought to his attention.
” Linick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House ’ s Democratic-led impeachment investigation , delivering to lawmakers State Department documents on a smear campaign that Trump ’ s lawyer , Rudy Giuliani , waged against the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine before she was sacked .
Linick , appointed by President Barack Obama in 2013 , had a reputation among some within the department for being “ tough and eager to find wrongdoing but generally fair , ” according to one senior State Department official .
Others saw the watchdog as being too cautious in calling out retaliation against career officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ian Moss , a retired Marine who was a State Department lawyer on the Guantánamo Bay prison closure and later a human rights official at the National Security Council , said Linick ’ s office suppressed his complaint about political targeting that included emails between former Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen and another State Department official discussing him .
This is not the first time that the Pompeo family has been the subject of scrutiny for improper use of U.S. government resources .
Susan Pompeo , the wife of then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Post reported in 2018 that she used office space on the CIA ’ s seventh floor and had agency officials assist her with briefings , agendas , and travel overseas .
The Pompeo family also stayed at the CIA ’ s training facility in Virginia , known as “ the Farm , ” during Christmas 2017 .
After the Pompeos arrived in Foggy Bottom , a whistleblower complaint to Capitol Hill charged that the secretary and his family treated the diplomatic security like “ Uber Eats with guns , ” running errands such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo ’ s adult son from Washington ’ s Union Station and driving him home .

President Donald Trump continued his post-impeachment purge of the U.S. government’s top independent watchdogs, telling Congress on Friday night that he was sacking the State Department inspector general.
President Donald Trump continued his post-impeachment purge of the U.S. government’s top independent watchdogs, telling Congress on Friday night that he was sacking the State Department inspector general.
Steve Linick, who has been the top State Department watchdog since 2013, was fired after launching an investigation into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo himself, according to Democratic Rep. Eliot Engel, raising immediate questions to lawmakers about whether the decision was legal or not. He will be replaced in the interim by a political appointee at the State Department close to Vice President Mike Pence.
With Linick’s ouster, some State Department officials felt Pompeo had effectively kneecapped the power and independence of the Office of Inspector General (OIG). “We are all pissed,” said one State Department official, who questioned how the office could maintain its political independence and impartiality in future investigations. “Without someone nonpolitical, what hope is there for us to go to OIG and use this tool? How can I feel comfortable calling even the anonymous tip line to report waste fraud and abuse?”
“It seems like a lot of people are getting fired for doing their job,” another official said. “It just makes me afraid.”
The move also infuriated Democratic lawmakers sitting on the committee that oversees the State Department. “This firing is the outrageous act of a President trying to protect one of his most loyal supporters, the Secretary of State, from accountability,” Engel, the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement. “I have learned that the Office of the Inspector General had opened an investigation into Secretary Pompeo. Mr. Linick’s firing amid such a probe strongly suggests that this is an unlawful act of retaliation.”
A State Department spokesperson confirmed to Foreign Policy that Linick was fired but did not give any indications or justification for his firing. His replacement, Stephen Akard, served as a foreign service officer from 1997 to 2005. He is an ally of Pence and currently holds the position of State Department director of the Office of Foreign Missions.
The State Department watchdog was looking into Pompeo’s “misuse of a political appointee at the Department to perform personal tasks” for himself and his wife, a Democratic congressional aide told Foreign Policy. The State Department did not respond to additional requests for comment or confirm whether Pompeo was the subject of an inspector general investigation.
Linick’s dismissal represents the latest move by Trump to fire federal watchdogs deemed insufficiently loyal to the administration. In early April, the president sacked the inspector general of the U.S. intelligence community, who drew the president’s ire after receiving a whistleblower complaint that kick-started the impeachment process against the president for unduly pressuring the Ukrainian government into investigating his Democratic rival. Days later, he fired the Defense Department’s acting inspector general, who was tasked with overseeing the administration’s $2 trillion coronavirus stimulus package on a federal panel established by Congress. He then removed a senior watchdog at the Department of Health and Human Services, Christi Grimm, shortly after her office issued an unflattering report on how ill-prepared the United States was in its coronavirus response.
“That failure to pushback means the president feels untethered,” said Irvin McCullough, a national security analyst at the Government Accountability Project, a nonprofit whistleblower protection group. “The president doesn’t have to provide any added explanation when he removes an [inspector general] because he doesn’t feel the pressure when he does.”
Linick’s firing was met with a mixture of anger, shock, and fear from the State Department’s diplomatic corps, according to four State Department officials. All expressed fear that the department would be put through a new wave of politicization just months after the diplomatic corps was dragged into a nationwide scandal with the impeachment trial.
“[We] rely on offices like this to protect us,” one State Department official said. “That’s clearly not happening.”
Inspectors general play a critical behind-the-scenes role in independently investigating fraud, waste, and abuse in the government and offering an independent check on politicized misconduct within the government. Since the start of the Trump administration, Linick’s office has churned out a series of damning reports outlining mismanagement and political retaliation by Trump appointees at the State Department.
Linick last year recommended disciplinary action against U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook after he allegedly removed a career official from her post based on ethnic discrimination and questions over her personal political views. The department disagreed with Linick’s findings, saying the inspector general’s report ignored “compelling evidence” Hook made the decision to remove Sahar Nowrouzzadeh from her post “prior to any of the non-merit factors being brought to his attention.”
Linick also played a small role in the House’s Democratic-led impeachment investigation, delivering to lawmakers State Department documents on a smear campaign that Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, waged against the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine before she was sacked.
Linick, appointed by President Barack Obama in 2013, had a reputation among some within the department for being “tough and eager to find wrongdoing but generally fair,” according to one senior State Department official. Others saw the watchdog as being too cautious in calling out retaliation against career officials in the Trump administration, however. Ian Moss, a retired Marine who was a State Department lawyer on the Guantánamo Bay prison closure and later a human rights official at the National Security Council, said Linick’s office suppressed his complaint about political targeting that included emails between former Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen and another State Department official discussing him.
This is not the first time that the Pompeo family has been the subject of scrutiny for improper use of U.S. government resources. Susan Pompeo, the wife of then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo, first raised eyebrows when the Washington Post reported in 2018 that she used office space on the CIA’s seventh floor and had agency officials assist her with briefings, agendas, and travel overseas. The Pompeo family also stayed at the CIA’s training facility in Virginia, known as “the Farm,” during Christmas 2017. After the Pompeos arrived in Foggy Bottom, a whistleblower complaint to Capitol Hill charged that the secretary and his family treated the diplomatic security like “Uber Eats with guns,” running errands such as getting Chinese food and picking up Pompeo’s adult son from Washington’s Union Station and driving him home.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-16--Italy’s Next Phase: Returning Home

Italy’s Next Phase: Returning Home

PESCARA , Italy— “ Are you with us D ’ Agostino ?
” the nurse asked through her personal protective equipment .
“ Franco , are you with us ?
” On hearing his name , the patient opened his eyes .
“ It was as if a chill went through my body , ” said Franco D ’ Agostino , a 54-year-old metalworker born in Penne , a town in the Italian province of Pescara .
After being intubated and sedated for 18 days , he was free of the coronavirus and nearly ready to return home to embrace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt lucky that he had survived : “ It ’ s not a common flu .
I didn ’ t have any preexisting conditions .
This thing will kill you if you don ’ t treat it properly.
” Italy began easing restrictions and reopening some businesses on May 4 , entering “ phase two ” of its lockdown after nearly two months .
More than 31,000 Italians have died from COVID-19—the highest death toll in the European Union—but over 115,000 people have recovered , as of May 14 .
Hospitalizations have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And across the country , many such as D ’ Agostino who have defeated the coronavirus are now waking up after intubation—beginning the next phase of their recovery .
Many patients in Frattari ’ s intensive care unit suffered from acute respiratory distress syndrome ( ARDS ) , which causes a person ’ s respiratory rate to double as the level of oxygen in the blood decreases .
Despite having very low oxygen , people with ARDS may not realize the seriousness of their condition .
Often , the only solution is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Many patients , panicked and afraid of not waking up , make what they fear may be a final call to a loved one .
“ Unlike others , COVID patients who need to be intubated are lucid and aware , ” Frattari said .
“ They think about their family members .
It is a very touching moment , and we take part in that pain every time.
” Then , the patient is anesthetized , and the invasive procedure begins , with a breathing tube inserted through the nose or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long slumber , patients are in limbo : Deep sedation contributes to a feeling of suspension .
“ We administer sleep-inducing drugs that cause amnesia and the patients experience a sort of gap in time where it is not clear what happened immediately before and after intubation , ” Frattari said .
“ They are powerful painkillers , much stronger than morphine.
” The removal of tubes is an overwhelmingly emotional moment , even for experienced doctors .
“ For us , it is also a sentimental success , not just a professional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being intubated on March 30 , Lino Profeta , 68 , was very afraid .
“ Someone whispered to me , ‘ Now you will sleep a little.
’ ” All that he recalls from those five days is a recurring nightmare in which he tried to understand how he contracted the virus .
After they wake up , patients begin so-called respiratory weaning , in which the ventilator supports are gradually reduced until the tubes are removed and the patients regain their ability to breathe .
“ When they removed the tubes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Profeta said .
“ I asked for something to drink , and the nurse gave me a cocoa protein drink—the best thing in the world , a relief.
” After being woken , Profeta was then transferred to the infectious disease ward , where extubated COVID-19 patients who have made it out of the woods are treated as they begin their full recovery .
The ward is headed by Giustino Parruti , a member of the Abruzzo region ’ s coronavirus task force and Frattari ’ s husband .
Parruti is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the University of Pennsylvania that seeks to understand what determines the differences in how the coronavirus manifests in patients , using samples from those treated in Abruzzo .
Profeta considers himself lucky to have such good care .
“ He came to visit us showing empathy : a smile , a word of comfort .
He wasn ’ t cold , ” he said .
Parruti and Frattari have been on the coronavirus front lines day and night for more than two months .
But even as Italy sees a significant number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat .
“ With the end of the lockdown , we must go back to living by defending ourselves , ” Parruti said .
“ If in the coming weeks we continue to follow the rules for protection and distancing , we will be able to greatly reduce the risks .
Otherwise it won ’ t take much for the infections to pick up again.
” “ While I was sleeping deeply , waiting for my lungs to win their battle , I had the sensation that I could open my eyes and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maurizio Melchiorre , 62 .
“ I saw large beams of very intense light , with different diameters and consistency .
Rays that came from all sides.
” He willed himself to hold on , he said .
Hospitalized on March 24 and intubated twice during his stay , Melchiorre was discharged on April 27 , weighing 50 pounds less than when he was put under .
His wife and daughter welcomed him home with cake and balloons .
Both had recovered from mild cases of the coronavirus .
Melchiorre ’ s daughter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the lockdown while he was intubated—a greater satisfaction than his own recovery , he said .
Even as the recovered patients return to their lives , restrictions in Italy remain .
Once discharged , patients are allowed to go for a walk only with a face mask and must undergo physical therapy and personalized treatments because they have lost weight and muscle mass .
A full recovery in most cases takes several months .
From March 12 , Emanuela de Nicolo , 44 , was intubated for three interminable weeks .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw her own funeral .
When she woke up , she was lost .
She heard voices but didn ’ t understand where she was .
“ The first thing I said when the tubes were taken out was , ‘ Good morning , now I can talk—unfortunately for all of you !
’ There were those who laughed , those who cried , those who applauded.
” De Nicolo was discharged on May 5 after overcoming the worst of the disease and testing negative for COVID-19 twice .
Despite her face mask @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immediately when she returned home .
“ I haven ’ t seen my puppies for almost two months , ” she said .
“ I have a very strong bond with them .
They are my kindred spirits , and they ’ ve healed me from everything.
” “ Make me fall asleep , but wake me up , ” de Nicolo said to Frattari before she was intubated .
“ I promise , ” the doctor replied .

PESCARA, Italy—“Are you with us D’Agostino?” the nurse asked through her personal protective equipment. “Franco, are you with us?” On hearing his name, the patient opened his eyes. “It was as if a chill went through my body,” said Franco D’Agostino, a 54-year-old metalworker born in Penne, a town in the Italian province of Pescara. After being intubated and sedated for 18 days, he was free of the coronavirus and nearly ready to return home to embrace his wife and three daughters. He felt lucky that he had survived: “It’s not a common flu. I didn’t have any preexisting conditions. This thing will kill you if you don’t treat it properly.”
PESCARA, Italy—“Are you with us D’Agostino?” the nurse asked through her personal protective equipment. “Franco, are you with us?” On hearing his name, the patient opened his eyes. “It was as if a chill went through my body,” said Franco D’Agostino, a 54-year-old metalworker born in Penne, a town in the Italian province of Pescara. After being intubated and sedated for 18 days, he was free of the coronavirus and nearly ready to return home to embrace his wife and three daughters. He felt lucky that he had survived: “It’s not a common flu. I didn’t have any preexisting conditions. This thing will kill you if you don’t treat it properly.”
D’Agostino waits at Santo Spirito Hospital in Pescara, Italy, on April 27 for an ambulance to take him home.
D’Agostino talks to his wife in Penne from Santo Spirito Hospital on April 27, informing her that he is finally returning home.
Italy began easing restrictions and reopening some businesses on May 4, entering “phase two” of its lockdown after nearly two months. More than 31,000 Italians have died from COVID-19—the highest death toll in the European Union—but over 115,000 people have recovered, as of May 14. Hospitalizations have been declining since the third week of April. And across the country, many such as D’Agostino who have defeated the coronavirus are now waking up after intubation—beginning the next phase of their recovery.
Gina Di Giacobbe, still intubated after coming out of a pharmacological coma, receives training from hospital staff to regain strength in her arms at Santo Spirito Hospital on April 23.
Pescara, on the Adriatic coast, is one of the hardest-hit provinces in central and southern Italy. As of May 14, 1,467 people had tested positive for COVID-19 in Pescara, out of a population of 317,000—a per capita rate worse than in Bari, Naples, or Rome. “In my ward, in the months of March and April, we recorded 36 percent of the deaths [in the province],” said Antonella Frattari, the head of intensive care at Santo Spirito Hospital in Pescara.
Many patients in Frattari’s intensive care unit suffered from acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), which causes a person’s respiratory rate to double as the level of oxygen in the blood decreases. Despite having very low oxygen, people with ARDS may not realize the seriousness of their condition. Often, the only solution is intubation—sometimes for weeks—to let the lungs rest. Many patients, panicked and afraid of not waking up, make what they fear may be a final call to a loved one. “Unlike others, COVID patients who need to be intubated are lucid and aware,” Frattari said. “They think about their family members. It is a very touching moment, and we take part in that pain every time.”
Left: Giustino Parruti, 58, the director of the infectious disease unit at Santo Spirito Hospital in Pescara and a member of the region’s task force on the coronavirus emergency. Right: Antonella Frattari, 47, the head of intensive care at Santo Spirito Hospital.
Then, the patient is anesthetized, and the invasive procedure begins, with a breathing tube inserted through the nose or mouth to the trachea. During the long slumber, patients are in limbo: Deep sedation contributes to a feeling of suspension. “We administer sleep-inducing drugs that cause amnesia and the patients experience a sort of gap in time where it is not clear what happened immediately before and after intubation,” Frattari said. “They are powerful painkillers, much stronger than morphine.”
The removal of tubes is an overwhelmingly emotional moment, even for experienced doctors. “For us, it is also a sentimental success, not just a professional one,” Frattari said.
Lino Profeta prepares to depart Santo Spirito Hospital on April 20. He lost 22 pounds while in the hospital for COVID-19—a nurse gave him an infusion tube to tighten his loose trousers as he dressed to return home.
Family members also can’t be present when the coronavirus patients are intubated or extubated, meaning that they wake only among medical staff, most of them likely to be strangers. “The awakenings are not all the same,” Frattari said. “Some people are calm and awaken easily. Others are confused and agitated and would like to tear out all the tubes stuffed into their nose, mouth, hands, and bladder.”
Before being intubated on March 30, Lino Profeta, 68, was very afraid. “Someone whispered to me, ‘Now you will sleep a little.’” All that he recalls from those five days is a recurring nightmare in which he tried to understand how he contracted the virus. After they wake up, patients begin so-called respiratory weaning, in which the ventilator supports are gradually reduced until the tubes are removed and the patients regain their ability to breathe. “When they removed the tubes, I felt like I was reborn,” Profeta said. “I asked for something to drink, and the nurse gave me a cocoa protein drink—the best thing in the world, a relief.”
After being woken, Profeta was then transferred to the infectious disease ward, where extubated COVID-19 patients who have made it out of the woods are treated as they begin their full recovery. The ward is headed by Giustino Parruti, a member of the Abruzzo region’s coronavirus task force and Frattari’s husband. Parruti is involved in an international genetic study with the University of Pennsylvania that seeks to understand what determines the differences in how the coronavirus manifests in patients, using samples from those treated in Abruzzo. Profeta considers himself lucky to have such good care. “He came to visit us showing empathy: a smile, a word of comfort. He wasn’t cold,” he said.
Parruti and Frattari have been on the coronavirus front lines day and night for more than two months. But even as Italy sees a significant number of recoveries, the virus still poses a threat. “With the end of the lockdown, we must go back to living by defending ourselves,” Parruti said. “If in the coming weeks we continue to follow the rules for protection and distancing, we will be able to greatly reduce the risks. Otherwise it won’t take much for the infections to pick up again.”
Maurizio Melchiorre trains to regain his strength as he prepares to return home after 33 days at Santo Spirito Hospital on April 27. Melchiorre had to be intubated twice because his lungs were not able to ventilate on their own.
“While I was sleeping deeply, waiting for my lungs to win their battle, I had the sensation that I could open my eyes and see everything around me,” said Maurizio Melchiorre, 62. “I saw large beams of very intense light, with different diameters and consistency. Rays that came from all sides.” He willed himself to hold on, he said. Hospitalized on March 24 and intubated twice during his stay, Melchiorre was discharged on April 27, weighing 50 pounds less than when he was put under. His wife and daughter welcomed him home with cake and balloons. Both had recovered from mild cases of the coronavirus. Melchiorre’s daughter, Paola, graduated from university online during the lockdown while he was intubated—a greater satisfaction than his own recovery, he said. Melchiorre washes himself before getting ready to return home on April 27.
Melchiorre celebrates with his wife, Milena, and daughter, Paola, during a welcome party at their home in Pescara on April 28.
Even as the recovered patients return to their lives, restrictions in Italy remain. Once discharged, patients are allowed to go for a walk only with a face mask and must undergo physical therapy and personalized treatments because they have lost weight and muscle mass. A full recovery in most cases takes several months.
From March 12, Emanuela de Nicolo, 44, was intubated for three interminable weeks. During the medical sedation, she said she saw her own funeral. When she woke up, she was lost. She heard voices but didn’t understand where she was. “The first thing I said when the tubes were taken out was, ‘Good morning, now I can talk—unfortunately for all of you!’ There were those who laughed, those who cried, those who applauded.”
De Nicolo talks by video with her partner, Antonio, as she recovers at the hospital on April 21.
Parruti visits Profeta at Santo Spirito Hospital on April 19.
De Nicolo was discharged on May 5 after overcoming the worst of the disease and testing negative for COVID-19 twice. Despite her face mask, her two English pointers recognized her immediately when she returned home. “I haven’t seen my puppies for almost two months,” she said. “I have a very strong bond with them. They are my kindred spirits, and they’ve healed me from everything.”
“Make me fall asleep, but wake me up,” de Nicolo said to Frattari before she was intubated. “I promise,” the doctor replied.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--Coronavirus Conspiracies Give Boost to Canada’s Far-Right

In Toronto , scores of people have gathered since late April for regular anti-lockdown protests , some clustered around signs calling for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ’ s hanging .
In Vancouver , protesters recently descended on a hospital , demanding to see what they insisted were empty wards .
Anti-China rhetoric is salient in many of these rallies .
A woman was filmed ripping up a Chinese flag at one of the Toronto demonstrations while a fellow protester cheered her on : “ China is an evil empire !
Rip that up !
Rip that up !
” Canada @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lockdown to slow the spread of coronavirus , with each province and territory independently declaring a public health emergency in March .
Protests such as Toronto ’ s and Vancouver ’ s have become common around the country as conspiracy theories , anti-China sentiment , and white supremacy collide , with dangerous results .
Racist and lunatic theories are moving from the fringe to the mainstream .
The global depression has not spared Canada , which lost 2 million jobs in April .
Unemployment is now up to 13 percent , the highest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more ammunition for the demonstrators , who include both those irate about the impact of lockdown on the economy and more radical groups who interpret the pandemic as part of a global plot by China , the World Health Organization , and the United Nations to control Canadians .
International , “ globalist ” organizations have long been favorite targets of Canada ’ s far-right , and the pandemic provides fresh opportunity to attack these bodies with newly concocted narratives .
Analysts have tracked this conspiracy-theory-fueled worldview for months—but it ’ s now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national conversations on the pandemic .
Adherents of these theories have fixed their crosshairs on the governing Liberal Party .
Their favorite target is the chief public health officer , Theresa Tam who was born in Hong Kong and is of Chinese descent .
Tam had a prominent role in Canada ’ s responses to the SARS , swine flu , and Ebola outbreaks and has now been thrust into the limelight as the government ’ s top COVID-19 advisor .
Her presence has given Canada ’ s far-right the chance to rally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Tam ’ s high-profile position and , more importantly , ethnicity help conspiracy theorists string together their hatred for Trudeau , “ globalist ” organizations such as the World Health Organization ( WHO ) and the United Nations , and China—cast even by mainstream voices as Western civilization ’ s new top threat .
Many on the far-right allege that Tam is a longtime Chinese spy , sent to rise through the public health bureaucracy to one day use the coronavirus scare as a way to increase Chinese influence .
They wonder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for , and warn that she may import the Chinese government ’ s heavy-handed ideologies and methods at the expense of Canadians ’ rights .
They ask what the odds are that the disease originated in China and that Canada ’ s top health advisor is also Chinese .
General weariness over China ’ s influence on the WHO and the way Beijing initially handled the Wuhan outbreak has rightly generated much debate .
Members of the Liberal Party are constantly attacked by the opposition in Parliament for relying too much on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this lively debate is too easily appropriated as a launching pad for racist conspiracy theories .
The very fact that criticisms of Beijing ’ s policy and influence can hardly be separated nowadays from rumors of stealthy Chinese biological warfare demonstrates just how pervasive unchecked conspiracy theories have become in a time of heightened public anxiety and frustration .
It ’ s the perfect time for savvy demagogues ( or even more amateur ones ) to try to cash in .
An inability or unwillingness to separate legitimate criticism from racist conspiracy theories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fringe to the mainstream in a way that been previously rare in Canada .
For some in Canada ’ s Conservative Party , pandering to a party base prone to Sinophobic conspiracy theories is now a viable way of getting noticed .
On April 21 , Derek Sloan , an opposition Conservative Party member of Parliament , asked on camera : “ Does [ Tam ] work for Canada or for China ?
” A freshman member of Parliament who is also running for his party ’ s leadership , Sloan characterized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , itself portrayed as an irresponsible body that “ serves the Communist Party of the People ’ s Republic of China ( CCP ) .
” While a subsequent backlash forced Sloan to insist that his question was “ rhetorical , ” he has also said he does “ stand by it.
” Conservative Party leader Andrew initially failed to condemn Sloan and called accusations of dual loyalty “ not appropriate ” only after days of mounting public pressure .
That momentary silence from a federal leader deftly illustrated how the line between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can easily be blurred .
Canada ’ s right-wing politicians are increasingly resorting to racist dog-whistles .
Ahead of a general election last fall , Scheer ripped a page from U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s script on border policy to warn of MS-13 gang members entering Canada .
He also played into conspiracy theories of a globalist plot to erode Canadian border sovereignty when he denounced Trudeau ’ s signing of the 2018 U.N .
Global Compact for Migration .
Canada has long had a far-right , but the idea of whipping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before Trump .
His win inspired some Canadian politicians to try and build their own anti-immigrant base .
They ’ ve had limited success , but the emboldened xenophobic dog-whistling never left Canadian politics .
Fringe groups such as the neo-Nazi Canadian Nationalist Party and thuggish far-right gangs such as La Meute and Blood and Honour have become more active on the margins of Canadian life .
Trump ’ s success in rallying a loyal electoral base has always rested substantially on his ability to use and affirm conspiracy theories , whether it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Obamagate , ” or anti-vaccine claims .
Right-wing Canadian politicians have been trying to copy him ever since he won ; Sloan is just the latest example .
And much like in the United States , the proliferation of pandemic-related conspiracy theories are taking a toll on Canada ’ s national conversations .
For example , just this January , Canada ’ s top public health agency was forced to publicly deny the conspiracy theory that Chinese spies secretly developed the virus on Canadian soil .
A mainstream news report about two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high-level government lab in Winnipeg , Manitoba , was mischaracterized on Twitter by a popular American hedge fund manager and commentator as : “ Chinese spy team were recently removed from a Level 4 Infectious Disease facility in Canada for sending pathogens to the Wuhan facility.
” The tweet went viral and spun further conspiracy theories that got so much traction on social media that the Public Health Agency of Canada had to officially deny them .
Similarly , the fringe but officially registered far-right Cultural Action Party in the province of British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invented the virus to attack Western civilization .
It ’ s becoming harder and harder to disentangle conspiracy theories from everyday discussions on the pandemic .
Far-right groups and voices once obsessed with the apocalyptic prospect of being “ replaced ” by Muslim hordes performing “ demographic jihad ” against the West are now speaking of China ’ s multipronged “ demographic imperialism.
” ( Canada is particularly susceptible to ethnicity-focused attacks , given its large numbers of Chinese-Canadians—about 5 percent of the population—and Chinese residents . )
The coronavirus and Tam are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ silent invasion ’ ” into Canada and Western civilization .
A tireless contributor to this “ silent invasion ” rhetoric is Ricardo Duchesne , a former professor at one of Canada ’ s major universities who took early retirement last year after more than 100 of his colleagues jointly denounced his white supremacist writings and academic dishonesty .
Duchesne has long been sounding the alarm on China ’ s supposed incursion into the West .
He speaks regularly on campuses and is a regular guest on popular far-right platforms .
He ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s YouTube show several times , pontificating on subjects such as the “ ethnocide of Euro-Canadians.
” Since the pandemic , Duchesne has used his blog—influential among far-right circles—to promote the idea that Tam ’ s background and expertise is all a hoax and that it ’ s “ Odd that Canada ’ s Chief Medical Officer is a Chinese woman born in Hong Kong.
” Canada ’ s far-right has tried hard in recent years to shift the country ’ s Overton window so it can break through into mainstream electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and galvanizing a potential electoral base have been mass immigration , anti-Semitism , and Islamophobia .
That has mostly led nowhere as the Liberals won the general election again last fall .
But the far-right ’ s adoption of pandemic-related conspiracy theories has developed a limited political subculture into a real public health hazard .
This time , the economy is in the gutter and people from all walks of life are looking for a scapegoat .
Many people might seek out xenophobic explanations for what ’ s happening .
And if someone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into this energy by channeling racist conspiracy theories , then the ensuing frenzy might have a lasting effect on Canadian politics .

In Toronto, scores of people have gathered since late April for regular anti-lockdown protests, some clustered around signs calling for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s hanging . In Vancouver, protesters recently descended on a hospital , demanding to see what they insisted were empty wards. Anti-China rhetoric is salient in many of these rallies. A woman was filmed ripping up a Chinese flag at one of the Toronto demonstrations while a fellow protester cheered her on: “China is an evil empire! Rip that up! Rip that up!”
In Toronto, scores of people have gathered since late April for regular anti-lockdown protests, some clustered around signs calling for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s hanging. In Vancouver, protesters recently descended on a hospital, demanding to see what they insisted were empty wards. Anti-China rhetoric is salient in many of these rallies. A woman was filmed ripping up a Chinese flag at one of the Toronto demonstrations while a fellow protester cheered her on: “China is an evil empire! Rip that up! Rip that up!”
Canada’s 10 provinces have been on lockdown to slow the spread of coronavirus, with each province and territory independently declaring a public health emergency in March. Protests such as Toronto’s and Vancouver’s have become common around the country as conspiracy theories, anti-China sentiment, and white supremacy collide, with dangerous results. Racist and lunatic theories are moving from the fringe to the mainstream.
The global depression has not spared Canada, which lost 2 million jobs in April. Unemployment is now up to 13 percent, the highest rate since 1982. This has given more ammunition for the demonstrators, who include both those irate about the impact of lockdown on the economy and more radical groups who interpret the pandemic as part of a global plot by China, the World Health Organization, and the United Nations to control Canadians.
International, “globalist” organizations have long been favorite targets of Canada’s far-right, and the pandemic provides fresh opportunity to attack these bodies with newly concocted narratives. Analysts have tracked this conspiracy-theory-fueled worldview for months—but it’s now become a fixture in Canada’s national conversations on the pandemic.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Adherents of these theories have fixed their crosshairs on the governing Liberal Party. Their favorite target is the chief public health officer, Theresa Tam , who was born in Hong Kong and is of Chinese descent. Tam had a prominent role in Canada’s responses to the SARS, swine flu, and Ebola outbreaks and has now been thrust into the limelight as the government’s top COVID-19 advisor. Her presence has given Canada’s far-right the chance to rally together against a common, identifiable enemy.
Tam’s high-profile position and, more importantly, ethnicity help conspiracy theorists string together their hatred for Trudeau, “globalist” organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations, and China—cast even by mainstream voices as Western civilization’s new top threat.
Many on the far-right allege that Tam is a longtime Chinese spy, sent to rise through the public health bureaucracy to one day use the coronavirus scare as a way to increase Chinese influence. They wonder whether her loyalties can really be vouched for, and warn that she may import the Chinese government’s heavy-handed ideologies and methods at the expense of Canadians’ rights. They ask what the odds are that the disease originated in China and that Canada’s top health advisor is also Chinese.
General weariness over China’s influence on the WHO and the way Beijing initially handled the Wuhan outbreak has rightly generated much debate. Members of the Liberal Party are constantly attacked by the opposition in Parliament for relying too much on China’s official COVID-19 data. Yet this lively debate is too easily appropriated as a launching pad for racist conspiracy theories. The very fact that criticisms of Beijing’s policy and influence can hardly be separated nowadays from rumors of stealthy Chinese biological warfare demonstrates just how pervasive unchecked conspiracy theories have become in a time of heightened public anxiety and frustration. It’s the perfect time for savvy demagogues (or even more amateur ones) to try to cash in.
An inability or unwillingness to separate legitimate criticism from racist conspiracy theories has allowed the latter to move from the fringe to the mainstream in a way that been previously rare in Canada. For some in Canada’s Conservative Party, pandering to a party base prone to Sinophobic conspiracy theories is now a viable way of getting noticed. On April 21, Derek Sloan, an opposition Conservative Party member of Parliament, asked on camera: “Does [Tam] work for Canada or for China?” A freshman member of Parliament who is also running for his party’s leadership, Sloan characterized Tam as a product of the WHO, itself portrayed as an irresponsible body that “serves the Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China (CCP).”
While a subsequent backlash forced Sloan to insist that his question was “rhetorical,” he has also said he does “stand by it.” Conservative Party leader Andrew initially failed to condemn Sloan and called accusations of dual loyalty “not appropriate” only after days of mounting public pressure. That momentary silence from a federal leader deftly illustrated how the line between fringe conspiracy theories and actual parliamentary business can easily be blurred.
Canada’s right-wing politicians are increasingly resorting to racist dog-whistles. Ahead of a general election last fall, Scheer ripped a page from U.S. President Donald Trump’s script on border policy to warn of MS-13 gang members entering Canada. He also played into conspiracy theories of a globalist plot to erode Canadian border sovereignty when he denounced Trudeau’s signing of the 2018 U.N. Global Compact for Migration.
Canada has long had a far-right, but the idea of whipping it into a voting bloc seemed far-fetched before Trump. His win inspired some Canadian politicians to try and build their own anti-immigrant base. They’ve had limited success, but the emboldened xenophobic dog-whistling never left Canadian politics. Fringe groups such as the neo-Nazi Canadian Nationalist Party and thuggish far-right gangs such as La Meute and Blood and Honour have become more active on the margins of Canadian life.
Trump’s success in rallying a loyal electoral base has always rested substantially on his ability to use and affirm conspiracy theories, whether it be “birtherism,” a vaguely-defined “Obamagate,” or anti-vaccine claims. Right-wing Canadian politicians have been trying to copy him ever since he won; Sloan is just the latest example.
And much like in the United States, the proliferation of pandemic-related conspiracy theories are taking a toll on Canada’s national conversations.
For example, just this January, Canada’s top public health agency was forced to publicly deny the conspiracy theory that Chinese spies secretly developed the virus on Canadian soil. A mainstream news report about two Chinese scientists getting kicked out of a high-level government lab in Winnipeg, Manitoba, was mischaracterized on Twitter by a popular American hedge fund manager and commentator as: “Chinese spy team were recently removed from a Level 4 Infectious Disease facility in Canada for sending pathogens to the Wuhan facility.” The tweet went viral and spun further conspiracy theories that got so much traction on social media that the Public Health Agency of Canada had to officially deny them. Similarly, the fringe but officially registered far-right Cultural Action Party in the province of British Columbia is pushing the theory that China invented the virus to attack Western civilization.
It’s becoming harder and harder to disentangle conspiracy theories from everyday discussions on the pandemic. Far-right groups and voices once obsessed with the apocalyptic prospect of being “replaced” by Muslim hordes performing “demographic jihad” against the West are now speaking of China’s multipronged “demographic imperialism.” (Canada is particularly susceptible to ethnicity-focused attacks, given its large numbers of Chinese-Canadians—about 5 percent of the population—and Chinese residents.) The coronavirus and Tam are just new tools of the “Chinese ‘silent invasion’” into Canada and Western civilization.
A tireless contributor to this “silent invasion” rhetoric is Ricardo Duchesne, a former professor at one of Canada’s major universities who took early retirement last year after more than 100 of his colleagues jointly denounced his white supremacist writings and academic dishonesty.
Duchesne has long been sounding the alarm on China’s supposed incursion into the West. He speaks regularly on campuses and is a regular guest on popular far-right platforms. He’s appeared on the pro-eugenics Stefan Molyneux’s YouTube show several times, pontificating on subjects such as the “ethnocide of Euro-Canadians.” Since the pandemic, Duchesne has used his blog—influential among far-right circles—to promote the idea that Tam’s background and expertise is all a hoax and that it’s “Odd that Canada’s Chief Medical Officer is a Chinese woman born in Hong Kong.”
Canada’s far-right has tried hard in recent years to shift the country’s Overton window so it can break through into mainstream electoral politics. Its main tools for creating and galvanizing a potential electoral base have been mass immigration, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia. That has mostly led nowhere as the Liberals won the general election again last fall.
But the far-right’s adoption of pandemic-related conspiracy theories has developed a limited political subculture into a real public health hazard. This time, the economy is in the gutter and people from all walks of life are looking for a scapegoat. Many people might seek out xenophobic explanations for what’s happening. And if someone with more savvy than Sloan can tap into this energy by channeling racist conspiracy theories, then the ensuing frenzy might have a lasting effect on Canadian politics.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-18--Iraq’s New Prime Minister Is Taking Things Slow

After months of horse-trading and two failed attempts , Iraq finally has a new prime minister .
Former head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi is set to lead the country through an economic crisis stemming from a collapse in the oil price , a health crisis caused by an inadequate coronavirus response , and a potential security crisis due to a resurgent Islamic State .
But the root of all these crises is political .
Over the past few years , Iraq ’ s ruling elite has become less able to respond to the needs of its citizens .
As protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s south continue to call for revolution , the political elites are engulfed in infighting , vying for control of ministries and what ’ s left in the state coffers .
Despite this dire context , the new prime minister is neither a revolutionary who will overhaul the system nor a strongman who will centralize power .
Instead , he is seeking incremental reform , working within the existing system .
His vision is to navigate the impasse between citizens and elites—and the political fragmentation between elites themselves—by striking a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Kadhimi is not the first new prime minister to come in promising sweeping reform .
His initial days as prime minister offer glimpses into the challenges he will face—and his chances of overcoming them .
He will work closely with President Barham Salih to pursue this strategy .
Salih has been key to stopping certain previous prime minister candidates .
The governor of Basra , Asad al-Eidani , was nominated by the Fateh bloc , which is linked to the powerful Shia-sectarian Popular Mobilization Forces ( PMF ) .
He was widely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nomination , momentarily stepping out of the ceremonial nature of the presidency ’ s mandate .
From the beginning , Salih privately wanted Kadhimi to get the job .
The two reform-minded liberals—Kadhimi and Salih—now sit in the two most senior formal positions of Iraqi politics .
An initial strategy for the prime minister has been to convince protesters that he represents their voice .
In the past few years , Iraq ’ s government lost much of its legitimacy : Having lost the credibility to speak on behalf of their constituents or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like public jobs it instead resorted to violence to repress demonstrations .
More than 600 protesters were killed and tens of thousands wounded since protests began in October 2019 .
In a symbolic gesture , Kadhimi swiftly promoted Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahab al-Saadi , whose dismissal from the Counter Terrorism Service ( CTS ) in late September 2019 helped spark the mass protests .
When armed groups killed a protester in Basra in his first week of office , Kadhimi issued a statement demanding an investigation into all killings and imprisonments of protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to investigate the deaths of protesters .
But can Kadhimi transform these symbolic gestures into meaningful change ?
The first clues come from his attempt to form his cabinet .
Kadhimi was poised to play hardball and push through a full cabinet of allies .
He wanted his government to reflect popular protests and the general population rather than political parties .
Iraq ’ s politics are based on patronage , with political parties relying on their control over ministries to ensure economic rewards and power .
Rather than wait for parties to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usually do , Kadhimi sent his picks for ministers to the parties , which they could then agree to or veto .
Although he chose the candidates , he nonetheless tasked them with striking a deal with the party that controls the respective ministry .
Party bosses only agreed to candidates who promised them similar staffing arrangements in the ministry and favorable contracts in the future , so it was business as usual in those cases .
In reality , Kadhimi was removing himself from the backroom corruption but not removing corruption from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15 of 22 ministers , losing many of the close allies he had initially wanted in his cabinet .
Parties waited until the last minute to force the concessions .
Despite this , Kadhimi keenly ensured that the two security ministries—defense and interior—were headed by competent generals known for their discipline and who were not involved in political infighting .
The Interior Ministry is no longer headed by a minister from the Badr Organization—a group linked to the PMF .
Instead , it is under an experienced military general , Othman al-Ghanimi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assurances to get the post .
Ghanami will be tasked with overseeing the investigation of groups within the ministry that attacked protesters , which will test his commitment to comprehensive justice .
Kadhimi does not have friends in his cabinet .
He will try to develop allies in his attempt for incremental change , but he has also had to play by the rules by offering parties a share in the spoils .
For the past few years , Iraqi governments have been defined by independent technocrats .
In reaction to protests in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Abadi and Adil Abdul-Mahdi attempted to win back public trust by appointing nonpolitical and technocratic ministers , similarly offering the illusion of change .
Losing their ability to control the ministers , the political parties allowed for weak independent ministers at the top of each ministry and in exchange focused on flooding the ministries with their appointees at the lower levels .
In the technocratic era , the second tier of officials at the ministries—directors-general and deputy ministers—became more powerful than the top tier , often forcing the ministers into policy decisions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on varying profiles : from independent technocrats who have broad implicit “ understandings ” with parties or who made explicit deals with them , to former civil servants who have years of service as proxies within the system for ruling parties .
To varying extents , ministers have already reached understandings or agreements with the parties that they represent to ensure that their patterns of nepotism and corruption are maintained .
Although Kadhimi is against the corruption associated with this system of politics , it is the game he is willing to play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform strategy .
That strategy will be his key to winning back public trust .
To do so , his team is preparing to focus on electoral reform , political party law reform , and early elections .
While the electoral law is a parliamentary issue , and thus might be the very party whose stranglehold over the political system Kadhimi is trying to weaken , his team hopes to establish a committee to guide the process that will include prominent civil society activists .
However , the timeframe of incremental reform does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters are willing to offer the new prime minister .
Instead of more promises , they want action .
Instead , of calls for early elections , they want a committed election date .
Kadhimi ’ s primary battle will be over the prime minister ’ s office ( PMO ) .
The PMO is a powerful institution that houses the National Security Council , the CTS , the PMF commission , and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service .
His predecessor , Abdul-Mahdi , gave away much of the control over this office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Sadrists and Fateh .
Abdul-Mahdi even lost control over his inner circle of advisors who became proxies for the political parties .
Kadhimi will also engage in a strategic dialogue with the United States , especially over security issues , to win back trust following the failures of the Abdul-Mahdi government .
The last time I saw Kadhimi was in his office in Baghdad in February .
We chatted about many of the crises facing Iraq , particularly challenges faced by the protesters .
He told me of his admiration of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to try to reform the political system .
However , as the head of Iraqi intelligence , Kadhimi in his day job had to put personal beliefs aside and remained part of the system of repression .
Throughout his years as intelligence chief , he worked within the system , opening space for civil society activism and independent journalism , but was also in office during the killing of protesters in Basra in 2018 and Baghdad and southern Iraq in 2019 .
Later in the conversation , Kadhimi pointed to a picture in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prime minister , Lee Kuan Yew , who is credited with transforming Singapore in one generation from a developing to a developed country .
That admiration will need to be matched with tough choices , however , to execute a similar plan in Iraq .

After months of horse-trading and two failed attempts, Iraq finally has a new prime minister. Former head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi is set to lead the country through an economic crisis stemming from a collapse in the oil price, a health crisis caused by an inadequate coronavirus response, and a potential security crisis due to a resurgent Islamic State.
After months of horse-trading and two failed attempts, Iraq finally has a new prime minister. Former head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi is set to lead the country through an economic crisis stemming from a collapse in the oil price, a health crisis caused by an inadequate coronavirus response, and a potential security crisis due to a resurgent Islamic State.
But the root of all these crises is political. Over the past few years, Iraq’s ruling elite has become less able to respond to the needs of its citizens. As protesters in the squares of Baghdad and the country’s south continue to call for revolution, the political elites are engulfed in infighting, vying for control of ministries and what’s left in the state coffers.
Despite this dire context, the new prime minister is neither a revolutionary who will overhaul the system nor a strongman who will centralize power. Instead, he is seeking incremental reform, working within the existing system. His vision is to navigate the impasse between citizens and elites—and the political fragmentation between elites themselves—by striking a new balance between reform and the status quo.
Kadhimi is not the first new prime minister to come in promising sweeping reform. His initial days as prime minister offer glimpses into the challenges he will face—and his chances of overcoming them.
He will work closely with President Barham Salih to pursue this strategy. Salih has been key to stopping certain previous prime minister candidates. The governor of Basra, Asad al-Eidani, was nominated by the Fateh bloc, which is linked to the powerful Shia-sectarian Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). He was widely hated by protesters. Salih rejected the nomination, momentarily stepping out of the ceremonial nature of the presidency’s mandate. From the beginning, Salih privately wanted Kadhimi to get the job. The two reform-minded liberals—Kadhimi and Salih—now sit in the two most senior formal positions of Iraqi politics.
An initial strategy for the prime minister has been to convince protesters that he represents their voice. In the past few years, Iraq’s government lost much of its legitimacy: Having lost the credibility to speak on behalf of their constituents or the ability to hand out economic rewards like public jobs it instead resorted to violence to repress demonstrations. More than 600 protesters were killed and tens of thousands wounded since protests began in October 2019.
In a symbolic gesture, Kadhimi swiftly promoted Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahab al-Saadi, whose dismissal from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) in late September 2019 helped spark the mass protests. When armed groups killed a protester in Basra in his first week of office, Kadhimi issued a statement demanding an investigation into all killings and imprisonments of protesters and said he would create a committee to investigate the deaths of protesters.
But can Kadhimi transform these symbolic gestures into meaningful change? The first clues come from his attempt to form his cabinet. Kadhimi was poised to play hardball and push through a full cabinet of allies. He wanted his government to reflect popular protests and the general population rather than political parties. Iraq’s politics are based on patronage, with political parties relying on their control over ministries to ensure economic rewards and power.
Rather than wait for parties to submit their preferred candidates, as they usually do, Kadhimi sent his picks for ministers to the parties, which they could then agree to or veto.
Although he chose the candidates, he nonetheless tasked them with striking a deal with the party that controls the respective ministry. Party bosses only agreed to candidates who promised them similar staffing arrangements in the ministry and favorable contracts in the future, so it was business as usual in those cases. In reality, Kadhimi was removing himself from the backroom corruption but not removing corruption from the system.
Kadhimi initially secured only 15 of 22 ministers, losing many of the close allies he had initially wanted in his cabinet. Parties waited until the last minute to force the concessions.
Despite this, Kadhimi keenly ensured that the two security ministries—defense and interior—were headed by competent generals known for their discipline and who were not involved in political infighting. The Interior Ministry is no longer headed by a minister from the Badr Organization—a group linked to the PMF. Instead, it is under an experienced military general, Othman al-Ghanimi, who still had to give Badr certain assurances to get the post. Ghanami will be tasked with overseeing the investigation of groups within the ministry that attacked protesters, which will test his commitment to comprehensive justice.
Kadhimi does not have friends in his cabinet. He will try to develop allies in his attempt for incremental change, but he has also had to play by the rules by offering parties a share in the spoils.
For the past few years, Iraqi governments have been defined by independent technocrats. In reaction to protests in 2015 and 2016, Prime Ministers Haider al-Abadi and Adil Abdul-Mahdi attempted to win back public trust by appointing nonpolitical and technocratic ministers, similarly offering the illusion of change. Losing their ability to control the ministers, the political parties allowed for weak independent ministers at the top of each ministry and in exchange focused on flooding the ministries with their appointees at the lower levels. In the technocratic era, the second tier of officials at the ministries—directors-general and deputy ministers—became more powerful than the top tier, often forcing the ministers into policy decisions.
Kadhimi’s government is based instead on varying profiles: from independent technocrats who have broad implicit “understandings” with parties or who made explicit deals with them, to former civil servants who have years of service as proxies within the system for ruling parties. To varying extents, ministers have already reached understandings or agreements with the parties that they represent to ensure that their patterns of nepotism and corruption are maintained. Although Kadhimi is against the corruption associated with this system of politics, it is the game he is willing to play to become prime minister and pursue his reform strategy.
That strategy will be his key to winning back public trust. To do so, his team is preparing to focus on electoral reform, political party law reform, and early elections. While the electoral law is a parliamentary issue, and thus might be the very party whose stranglehold over the political system Kadhimi is trying to weaken, his team hopes to establish a committee to guide the process that will include prominent civil society activists.
However, the timeframe of incremental reform does not add up to the timeframe that protesters are willing to offer the new prime minister. Instead of more promises, they want action. Instead, of calls for early elections, they want a committed election date.
Kadhimi’s primary battle will be over the prime minister’s office (PMO). The PMO is a powerful institution that houses the National Security Council, the CTS, the PMF commission, and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. His predecessor, Abdul-Mahdi, gave away much of the control over this office to the political parties, particularly to the Sadrists and Fateh. Abdul-Mahdi even lost control over his inner circle of advisors who became proxies for the political parties. Kadhimi will also engage in a strategic dialogue with the United States, especially over security issues, to win back trust following the failures of the Abdul-Mahdi government.
The last time I saw Kadhimi was in his office in Baghdad in February. We chatted about many of the crises facing Iraq, particularly challenges faced by the protesters. He told me of his admiration of the protesters for their bravery in risking death to try to reform the political system. However, as the head of Iraqi intelligence, Kadhimi in his day job had to put personal beliefs aside and remained part of the system of repression. Throughout his years as intelligence chief, he worked within the system, opening space for civil society activism and independent journalism, but was also in office during the killing of protesters in Basra in 2018 and Baghdad and southern Iraq in 2019.
Later in the conversation, Kadhimi pointed to a picture in his office of Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who is credited with transforming Singapore in one generation from a developing to a developed country. That admiration will need to be matched with tough choices, however, to execute a similar plan in Iraq.