foreignpolicy--2020-12-30--The Great Game With China Is 3D Chess

The Great Game With China Is 3D Chess

Many Trump administration officials blamed so-called free-riding allies and partners for shirking their obligations .
Most outside experts , conversely , blamed the Trump administration ’ s America First approach for alienating many of those same allies and partners—a failure that the incoming Biden administration is presumed to be able to easily correct .
Both explanations have some truth , but there are also deeper forces at work .
The disconnect between U.S. strategy and global reality has its roots in two fundamental misconceptions .
First , many American conceptions of the competition with China rest on the false premise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replay of the East-West standoff in Europe during the Cold War .
In reality , a much messier world is taking shape .
Frustrated European leaders are charting their own course , with some advocating equidistance between Washington and Beijing .
Important third countries , such as India , Indonesia , and Turkey , are exploring similar options .
These countries feel no need to align entirely with the United States , nor with China , when they can gain by playing Washington and Beijing off each other .
As a result , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a bipolar one .
Second , hopes for a “ new alliance of democracies , ” as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo advocated , often reflect a mistaken belief that a single alliance will emerge to counter China .
That might be the case if the same group of countries saw China as a military rival , an economic rival , a technological rival , and an ideological rival .
But in an environment characterized by fluid alignments , the makeup of the counter-China coalition will shift depending on the problem .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ some issues but not others .
The countries that most fear Chinese military power are not always the same countries that most fear its authoritarian influence .
Succeeding in a multifaceted competition will therefore require not one coalition but many .
In particular , the United States must forge a geostrategic coalition of countries that oppose Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific , an economic coalition to offset the coercive leverage that China ’ s commercial heft provides , a technological coalition to ensure that the CCP does not capture the commanding heights of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a governance coalition that can prevent Beijing from rewriting the world ’ s rules and norms .
Gone are the days when America could simply rally the West to its side .
Unless the United States adopts a more sophisticated approach to coalition building , it will be stuck trying to re-create a world that no longer exists .
To deal with the Soviet military threat , the Western bloc established alliances with the United States , most notably NATO .
The trans-Atlantic allies addressed economic issues through the Marshall Plan and an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the World Bank , the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—that promoted recovery and growth within a capitalist framework .
And as the United Nations became paralyzed by Cold War disagreements , the West built regional organizations—such as the European Community—to promote cooperation rooted in common liberal norms .
The memberships of these various institutions were never entirely congruent .
Yet by and large , the European countries that cooperated most closely with Washington on geostrategic issues were also those that cooperated most closely on economic issues and most fully shared its commitment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Cold War , which is why U.S. policymakers so readily default to it when thinking about China .
But Beijing is not Moscow with Chinese characteristics .
And the world America inhabits now is not that of the Cold War .
Today , there is much less alignment across key issues than there was in Cold War Europe .
American allies such as Italy have signed up for China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative .
Key U.S. partners such as Vietnam are not democratic .
Many of the countries most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of human rights and individual liberties are not geographically positioned to challenge Beijing in the Indo-Pacific .
Barring massive overreach by Beijing , the United States will struggle to create a 21st-century equivalent of the Western bloc .
Rather than building a single alliance of democracies , America will need four separate coalitions .
The first coalition is geostrategic and should focus on deterring China from using force or coercion in the Indo-Pacific .
Beijing ’ s desire to replace the United States as the region ’ s leading power is a central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long-running military buildup as well as more recent efforts to coerce neighbors from Japan to the Philippines to India .
If China succeeds , it could use its primacy in the Indo-Pacific as a springboard to more expansive global goals .
From a U.S. perspective , then , preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is not sufficient to prevail in the competition with China , but it is necessary .
Washington can not tackle this , or any other , aspect of the rivalry alone .
Fortunately , elements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The United States has dozens of formal treaty allies in Europe and five in Asia .
Unfortunately , these alliances were mostly built to contain Soviet communism and can not simply be redirected to manage China ’ s rise .
Some allies , including most members of NATO , are physically too far from China to help balance its power in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait .
Others , such as Thailand , have little interest in aligning squarely against China because they increasingly look to Beijing not only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well .
The geostrategic coalition should instead comprise those countries that are inclined to balance Beijing where it matters most—along its territorial and maritime peripheries .
This list begins with Japan , a major regional power that is fiercely committed to blunting any Chinese effort to overturn the status quo in the Western Pacific .
Other U.S. regional allies have critical roles to play as well .
Australia is weathering a ferocious pressure campaign from Beijing and has recently revised its defense strategy with China squarely in mind .
South Korea has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is increasingly looking to extend its geopolitical influence beyond the Korean Peninsula .
Meanwhile , the Philippines is a more challenging ally , but Manila might return to a firmer stance toward Beijing once Rodrigo Duterte leaves office .
Around this core of allies is arrayed a growing network of security partners .
These partners include Vietnam , the most recent country to fight a major war against the People ’ s Liberation Army ; India , a key player in the Indian Ocean and along China ’ s southwestern border that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years ; Singapore , which has quietly emerged as a hub of U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia ; and Taiwan , which has more experience than anyone at deterring Chinese use of force and coercion .
If China continues to overplay its hand , it might even encourage fence-sitters such as Malaysia and Indonesia to join this coalition in an effort to protect their maritime rights in the South China Sea .
Collectively , these countries would—with U.S. support—create barriers to China ’ s use of military power on important frontiers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure that the growth of Chinese military capabilities is offset by the development of a countervailing coalition .
And if the balancing coalition shows promise , it could attract countries concerned by China ’ s rise but unsure of whether their participation would be advantageous .
For example , the United Kingdom , France , Germany , and Canada possess some power projection capabilities and have shown an interest in resisting Chinese pressure .
Over time , they and others might help enmesh Beijing in a geostrategic net that tightens when China engages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Collectively , these countries would—with U.S. support—create barriers to China ’ s use of military power on important frontiers .
As the membership of this geostrategic coalition indicates , this would not be an Asian version of NATO .
The countries involved are too different—in geography , capabilities , and governance—to create the sort of formal , deeply institutionalized alliance Washington enjoys with Europe .
This limits the military interoperability that a NATO-like structure makes possible , but it is also an advantage , because many members of the geostrategic coalition would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
Tying these countries together will therefore require more flexible , and sometimes subtler , approaches .
Quiet staff talks about how to help a given member in the event of conflict might be more common than formal security guarantees .
New mechanisms would need to be constructed to allow countries to “ plug and play ” when they desire to take part in an exercise or operation .
Multilateral initiatives can start small , as was the case with the Quad ( an informal but increasingly ambitious grouping involving the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan ) , which initially coordinated on disaster relief .
Members of a geostrategic coalition would align on different issues at different moments , so cooperating creatively will be the key to competing effectively .
Much of China ’ s geostrategic challenge is rooted in its immense economic leverage , so the United States will also require a new approach to economic competition .
At its peak , the Soviet economy was perhaps one-third the size of the U.S. economy .
China long ago surpassed that marker , and its economy dwarfs that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 100 years .
Most Europeans now see China as the world ’ s leading economic power , not the United States .
And Beijing is already the primary trading partner of nearly every country in the Indo-Pacific region .
Beijing has turned this economic clout into diplomatic advantage , using trade restrictions to punish countries that criticize its human rights abuses , question its performance on COVID-19 , or resist its regional expansion .
It is dangling trade , loans , and investment to draw countries into its Belt and Road Initiative , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic , diplomatic , and sometimes military influence .
And perhaps most concerningly , Beijing continues to engage in a variety of unfair trading practices , from intellectual property theft to massive state-directed subsidies .
This state control over economic behavior , and the willingness to leverage it abroad , creates a set of strategic imperatives for the United States and other countries that desire to maintain their freedom of action .
Many countries will need to selectively decouple from China in certain critical sectors to avoid dangerous dependencies .
Countries in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade will need to shield themselves from geopolitical coercion by diversifying their economic relationships .
Many countries will need to selectively decouple from China in certain critical sectors—from personal protective equipment and pharmaceuticals to components of sophisticated military equipment—to avoid dangerous dependencies .
Finally , the United States and its friends must stimulate stronger economic growth to compete with China , lest the balance of economic power shift too far in Beijing ’ s favor .
After the Cold War , Washington pursued economic integration across geopolitical lines , in hopes of making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must pursue deeper economic cooperation within geopolitical lines : It must forge a broad coalition of countries committed to forcing China to play by a common set of rules and otherwise blunting its economic leverage .
The economic coalition would not reside in a single institution or organization .
Like the geostrategic coalition , it would consist of overlapping subgroups of countries committed to the basic purpose .
The signatories to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—a pact originally meant , in part , to reduce its members ’ reliance on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So would Atlantic democracies that have become increasingly disturbed by China ’ s unfair trade practices and bare-knuckle economic diplomacy .
Other nations that stand to benefit from a reorientation of supply chains , such as India , might also participate , as would developing nations seeking to remain free of Beijing ’ s economic grip .
The economic coalition would thus span regions ; it would include advanced economies as well as emerging markets .
These countries could pursue a variety of complementary initiatives .
A group of more advanced economies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to steal intellectual property or benefit from unfair state subsidies .
They might create a system of multilateral controls on sensitive exports to China , similar to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls during the Cold War .
They could also increase and pool resources available for infrastructure investment in developing nations to make it less tempting for key countries to accept disadvantageous deals with Beijing .
This effort could build on nascent multilateral initiatives to protect key supply chains , which several Indo-Pacific democracies are already considering today .
Most ambitiously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements to boost growth among their members .
Rather than reinforce trends toward de-globalization , this might encourage re-globalization on fairer terms .
The United States and other countries have already taken initial steps in this direction .
Yet the lack of coordination speaks to the fact that the economic coalition has recently lacked its obvious leader .
Rather than serving as the linchpin of high-standards economic arrangements , the Trump administration exacerbated divisions within that world , thereby exchanging modest , short-term commercial gains for larger , long-term strategic losses .
U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems and catalyzing collective action .
Without it , the economic coalition will flounder .
The geostrategic and economic challenges presented by China ’ s rise also point to the need for a technological coalition .
China ’ s efforts to overtake the world ’ s most advanced industrial economies have led the CCP to build “ national champions ” in key technology areas such as semiconductors , robotics , and information technology .
As part of its Made in China 2025 plan , Beijing has used market restrictions and massive state subsidies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has also stolen massive amounts of information and technology , estimated at And although the world has thus far focused primarily on 5G networking , there are a number of other advanced technologies—such as artificial intelligence ( AI ) and machine learning , automation , and biotechnology—that will be critical to the industries of the future .
The implications of the Chinese technological challenge are profoundly troubling .
If Chinese companies take a commanding lead in constructing the world ’ s 5G networks , Beijing could gain access to substantial intelligence and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if China uses its early lead in 5G to bring additional countries , especially in the developing world , into its technological sphere .
Yet the risks go well beyond this particular technology .
One of the major difficulties the United States faces in competing technologically is that the scale of the Chinese internal market—and the amount of data available to Chinese firms—creates advantages that no single democracy can match .
Similarly , the Chinese government ’ s investments in many advanced technologies outstrip those of other leading countries .
China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to or surpass the United States economically , negating a major advantage Washington enjoyed over Moscow during the Cold War .
Over time , then , the technology race could increasingly impact other areas of competition .
China ’ s technological advances could help Beijing catch up to or surpass the United States economically , negating a major advantage Washington enjoyed over Moscow during the Cold War .
Research in AI , machine learning , autonomy , and robotics could eventually translate into an asymmetric military edge for Beijing .
As then-U.S. Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Those who are first to harness once-in-a-generation technologies often have a decisive advantage on the battlefield for years to come.
” China might also gain a geopolitical edge through its development and proliferation of techno-authoritarianism .
By creating advanced surveillance and censorship systems , the CCP is trying to safeguard its hold on power .
By proliferating these systems , it is also helping to entrench autocrats around the world .
And as Beijing becomes more technologically sophisticated , it will have greater success in setting global technology standards , such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a collective effort can offset these challenges .
A key objective of a technology coalition should therefore be to collectively accelerate the development and subsidize the adoption of alternatives to Chinese technology , beginning with 5G and expanding into other critical areas .
Such a coalition could counteract the inherent advantages of scale and unfair market access restrictions that China currently enjoys .
Furthermore , by serving as a sort of common market for advanced technologies , a coalition of this sort could ensure a common set of technology standards , rules , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Leading countries might also cooperate in efforts to regulate Chinese-owned technology firms operating in democratic countries and to ensure that investments are properly vetted from both an economic and a security standpoint .
Efforts to build a technological coalition should be centered on advanced economies .
The G-7 countries—the United States , Canada , Japan , Germany , France , United Kingdom , and Italy—all qualify .
So , too , do techno-democracies such as Sweden , Finland , the Netherlands , South Korea , Israel , and Taiwan .
The group might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a technological power but does offer a massive market and has recently become more worried about technological dependence on China .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proposed one version of this coalition : an expanded G-7 that would promote collective investments in 5G and other emerging technologies , which he has called the D-10 .
Others have proposed a similar construct but more explicitly focused on technology : the T-12 .
The challenges associated with creating such a technology coalition are numerous .
Among other things , it would require stronger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some other democracies , as well as greater effort to align those policies .
It would necessitate broad cooperation on long-term challenges but also quick action in areas such as 5G , where the window to prevent Chinese control is closing rapidly .
Above all , it would demand a multilateral ethos that has been sorely lacking in U.S. policy of late .
Yet the idea has nonetheless been gaining traction in high places , including with technology leaders , U.S. allies , the incoming Biden administration , and on Capitol Hill .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ technological challenge China poses , creating a technological coalition is not as far-fetched as it might once have seemed .
Finally , the U.S.-China competition is not just about geostrategic , economic , and technological rivalry ; it is also inescapably ideological .
As Chinese policymakers and scholars have themselves argued , the CCP can not feel secure in a world where universal values and a democratic superpower are preponderant .
Chinese leaders are thus seeking to fashion a system in which authoritarian rule is protected .
They have done so by supporting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , proliferating the tools and techniques of repression to illiberal rulers around the world , and striving for greater control of international organizations that set global governance rules and norms .
In response , the United States must rally a coalition of democracies committed to protecting democratic principles and universal values .
This final coalition should be transregional because it is defined by political philosophy rather than geography .
Its core members would be the world ’ s pivotal democracies , principally in the Indo-Pacific and Europe .
In this endeavor , countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just as important as larger states like Germany and the United Kingdom , given their opposition to China ’ s human rights abuses , bullying of democratic countries , and efforts to stifle free speech .
The coalition might also draw in other democracies from South Asia , Latin America , Africa , and elsewhere , as long as those states are willing to speak up for democracy and human rights , even at the risk of offending Beijing .
This governance coalition would be something less than the global alliance of democracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geostrategic coalition , it might initially feature a “ coalitions of the willing ” approach to key issues , with the hope of building toward more institutionalized cooperation over time .
This coalition could , for example , improve the democratic world ’ s resilience against Chinese political influence operations by exchanging insights on the tactics Beijing has used against Taiwan , Australia , and others and by coordinating multilateral responses .
This coalition could also coordinate sanctions and diplomatic penalties for the horrifying abuses in Xinjiang , Hong Kong , and elsewhere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its collective strength to bear in resisting Chinese takeovers of key international organizations—such as the U.N. Human Rights Council—that Beijing uses to defend its authoritarian rule at home and project its autocratic influence abroad .
This coalition would also help put the CCP on the defensive by spotlighting and penalizing the most repugnant aspects of its behavior .
The strategic value of this type of governance coalition would be considerable .
By highlighting shared political values , it could help bring new partners into the fold .
Many European countries have no interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South China Sea , but they can and will push back against Beijing ’ s human rights abuses and coercive tactics against democracies .
This coalition would also help put the CCP on the defensive by spotlighting and penalizing the most repugnant aspects of its behavior .
Finally , forging such a coalition would underscore to audiences around the world that this is not simply a struggle for power between China and the United States .
Rather , it is a struggle over the future of the international system and over how people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creating a governance coalition will be difficult .
Key democracies have different views of the level of threat from China .
And a coalition of this sort would likely exclude key members of the geostrategic coalition , such as Vietnam , in addition to raising tough questions about how to engage backsliding democracies such as the Philippines .
Not least , America ’ s ability to lead an explicitly democratic coalition has come under greater doubt , given that President Donald Trump showed such indifference to the fate of democratic values , both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obstacles are not insurmountable .
The United States managed to combine values with realpolitik during the Cold War ; it waged a deeply ideological struggle against the Soviet Union while still cooperating with friendly autocrats and even friendly communists .
A post-Trump America could refocus on rallying the democratic world .
Indeed , President-elect Biden has already proposed convening a summit of the world ’ s democracies in his first year in office .
Despite the difficulties of coordinating a geographically and geopolitically diverse group of nations , stark ideological threats such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the benefit of reminding democratic nations that they will hang separately if they do not hang together .
The good news is that the United States has all the tools it needs to manage the dangers presented by the growing assertiveness of CCP leaders , the most critical of which is the ability to rally countries to its side on a variety of issues .
But Washington will fail if it takes a one-size-fits-all approach to coalition building .
Although parts of the Sino-American struggle , particularly the military and ideological rivalries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s world is increasingly multipolar , and the competition is highly multidimensional .
The challenge China presents demands a concerted , multilateral response .
Yet the global environment and the nature of Chinese power make that concerted response more difficult to summon than it was during the Cold War .
The hard truth is that countries around the world may not rally to America ’ s side on all issues , just because the CCP engages in coercive and abhorrent behavior .
Different countries will unite on different issues at different times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by building a series of overlapping coalitions and asking countries to act on the issues that most concern them .
This will be a new challenge , but it will require Washington to revive an older tradition of creative multilateralism that it seems recently to have abandoned .
The world will need multiple coalitions to head off the worst potential consequences of China ’ s rise—and none of those coalitions will succeed without the constructive leadership of the United States .

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A crowd of women wearing scarves on their heads and colorful garb hold torches during a demonstration demanding the restoration of peace in India's northeastern Manipur state in Imphal on July 10. Is the world standing by as ethnic cleansing takes place in the Indian state of Manipur? Since May, violence between the Meitei ethnic majority and the Kuki minority has torn through the sma...Show morell state bordering Myanmar in India’s northeast. Mobs have burned hundreds of homes and churches, and tens of thousands of people have fled. The conflict has largely been ignored by Western media, despite global attention focused on India, which is the rotating host of the G-20 this year. What is actually going on in Manipur? What should New Delhi do? What are the ramifications for India, Myanmar, and the world? Indian journalist Barkha Dutt has reported extensively from Manipur this year. Join her and defense expert Sushant Singh, who has chronicled the conflict in Foreign Policy, for a FP Live conversation with host Ravi Agrawal.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-30--Checking In on Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy

Mexico ’ s explicitly feminist foreign policy , announced by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in January , is a first among Latin American nations .
The policy , which mandates gender equality and freedom from gender-based violence in Mexico ’ s foreign ministry and foreign service , is intended to raise awareness of women ’ s contributions to the field and to prioritize the pursuit of international relations with a gender perspective and an intersectional feminist framework , meaning engagement with interconnected categories and domains of power .
Mexico had been leading gender equality efforts in the international community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formally announced .
It pushed for the inclusion of a Gender Action Plan for climate policy at the UN COP25 climate change conference in December 2019 , which was adopted .
The same year , it began a partnership with the European Union and the United Nations to implement the Spotlight Initiative , a large-scale program aimed at eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls in Africa , Asia , the Caribbean , Latin America , and the Pacific .
The initiatives are consistent with the country ’ s long commitment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global policymaking in key areas such as nuclear nonproliferation and wealth distribution .
The feminist foreign policy is overseen by Martha Delgado Peralta , Mexico ’ s undersecretary for multilateral affairs and human rights .
She has spent much of the year promoting the policy at home and abroad , particularly through Generation Equality , a United Nations conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action .
The first half of the physical Generation Equality conference was to be held in Mexico City this year but was postponed due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in a briefing provided to Foreign Policy by Delgado ’ s office , the minister noted that Mexico and France , which was to host the second part of the conference , were able to announce the creation of the Generation Equality Action Coalitions , which will develop six concrete road maps on specific gender equality topics to follow in the next five years .
The road maps will be launched at the second half of the Generation Equality conference , to be held in Paris in 2021 .
As a large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , the first nationwide strike of women workers—are pointing out , Mexico is home to a widespread culture of rigid patriarchal gender roles , combined with near-total impunity for crime .
Together , those factors mean that violence against women is endemic and often deadly .
Every day , on average , an estimated 11 women are killed , including for reasons related to their gender , most often by a male partner or family member .
Yet President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has proved considerably unsympathetic to calls for government action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ documented rise in deadly violence against women during the COVID-19 pandemic ( even as the number of women in the paid workforce has decreased by around 10 percentage points ) , the president suggested in May that most calls to Mexico ’ s 911 system from women experiencing domestic violence were false .
Beyond domestic violence , women have also faced high levels of state violence .
The catastrophic war on drugs has had a markedly gendered effect , as demonstrated by the increase in disappearances and killings of thousands of women since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which the government is regularly implicated .
According to the feminist public policy think tank Intersecta , the militarization of public security ( in many places , the Army has taken a local policing role for the ostensible purpose of suppressing organized crime ) has played a particular role in this pattern , with Intersecta research showing that between 2007 and 2018 the killing of women in particular increased whenever and wherever the Army was a protagonist in conflict .
One might also note Mexico ’ s recent approaches to the presence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or seeking to settle in their country .
This , after all , concerns the actions of the Mexican state in the international community and has involved diplomatic agreements .
Particularly notable is that in 2019 , as U.S. President Donald Trump applied increasing pressure on Mexico to comply with policies intended to deter asylum-seekers and migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border , López Obrador deployed Mexican troops to the Guatemala-Mexico border to drive back migrants from Central America .
African migrants seeking asylum in Mexico reported having been detained by Mexican police and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all of these groups , many of whom are migrating to escape domestic violence and gendered gang violence in their countries of origin , have not been spared this treatment .
As per a formal complaint from Human Rights Watch , migrants have reported either failure to respond from the police or implication in violence .
In a post for the Women ’ s International League for Peace and Freedom , Daniela Philipson writes : “ While Mexico ’ s Foreign Feminist Policy might be well-intentioned , it conflicts with the Federal government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women and girls ’ rights and wellbeing.
” Philipson recommends that Mexico might also take heed of the Women , Peace , and Security agenda of the U.N. Security Council .
This is a collection of Security Council resolutions that includes calling on national governments to make concrete plans for protecting women and girls from gender-based violence , particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse , in situations of armed conflict .
The Spotlight Initiative is explicitly focused on ending the country ’ s high level of femicide .
In 2020 the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You Are Not Alone ) campaign to reach women experiencing domestic violence and provide them with support services as rates of violence against women in the home began to climb with the pandemic and attendant stay-at-home and social distancing measures .
It has also created a video on women who are leading the charge to eliminate COVID-19 in Mexico and produced news on grassroots efforts to protect women and protest against violence , such as the Justice for Our Daughters coalition founded in the state of Chihuahua , which fights , among other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ murder of Marisela Escobedo Ortiz and her daughter , currently the subject of the Netflix series Las tres muertes de Marisela Escobedo ( The Three Deaths of Marisela Escobedo ) .
Delgado called the rollout of Spotlight “ one of the most ambitious programs within our feminist foreign policy.
” The initiative will report on its results in 2022 .
Tania Del Rio , a former member of Mexico ’ s foreign service who in 2016 conducted research on gender equity in Mexico ’ s embassies all over the world , says that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy is evidence of gains for equality in Mexico .
“ Four years ago , when I was doing my research , this conversation wasn ’ t even on the table , ” she said in a November interview .
Del Rio , who now leads the Mayor ’ s Office of Women ’ s Advancement in Boston , produced quantitative and qualitative data on gender bias in Mexico ’ s foreign service , covering aspects including gender disparities in career progression and experiences of sexual harassment .
Del Rio found strong evidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women made up 38 percent of the lowest-ranking foreign service officers , with the presence of women dwindling further up the career ladder .
She credited her superiors for encouraging her to focus on the issue .
Under its feminist foreign policy , Mexico has pledged to reach gender equality within its foreign service by 2024 .
But is this pure lip service , or could the new policy play a strategic role in improving women ’ s lives ?
While there is no doubt that what Del Rio calls “ the internal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equality—affects Mexico ’ s credibility on this question , she notes that advancing a feminist foreign policy in Mexico is also an effort to invest in and protect the international legal system .
Comparing the country to Sweden , which released its feminist foreign policy platform in 2014 , Del Rio noted that in both countries ’ foreign outlooks , gender equality is linked to global disarmament and the pursuit of peace .
“ Part of the context for Sweden ’ s feminist foreign policy was Russia ’ s annexation of the Crimea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Del Rio said , adding that both Mexico and Sweden are neighbors of major nuclear powers .
“ In this sense , a national feminist foreign policy is just another way to strengthen the international system.
” Prior to Mexico , said Marissa Conway , a co-founder of the Europe-based Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy , the only countries pursuing such an approach to their external relations were states in the global north—an activist term that refers to high-income countries in Europe and North America , with the global south referring to lower-income @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa , and Oceania .
For Conway , until Mexico declared their feminist foreign policy , the small field of countries that had also done so “ reflected the ongoing status quo where Eurocentric and Western knowledge is widely accepted as the norm ” where “ foreign policy is … seen by global north countries as something to be conducted ‘ on , ’ rather than ‘ with , ’ global south countries , ” she told Foreign Policy .
In this , Mexico ’ s leadership is clear—advancing a standard to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And a stronger international system is arguably in all of our interests , even more so if it is led by those who have been historically disenfranchised within that system .
Still , as López Obrador himself said in 2019 , “ domestic policy is the best foreign policy.
” Unless the metrics on gendered violence within Mexico improve , it will be difficult for the country to continue to convincingly prosecute the case for equity on the international stage .

Mexico’s explicitly feminist foreign policy , announced by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in January, is a first among Latin American nations. The policy , which mandates gender equality and freedom from gender-based violence in Mexico’s foreign ministry and foreign service, is intended to raise awareness of women’s contributions to the field and to prioritize the pursuit of international relations with a gender perspective and an intersectional feminist framework, meaning engagement with interconnected categories and domains of power.
Mexico’s explicitly feminist foreign policy, announced by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in January, is a first among Latin American nations. The policy, which mandates gender equality and freedom from gender-based violence in Mexico’s foreign ministry and foreign service, is intended to raise awareness of women’s contributions to the field and to prioritize the pursuit of international relations with a gender perspective and an intersectional feminist framework, meaning engagement with interconnected categories and domains of power.
Mexico had been leading gender equality efforts in the international community even before the feminist foreign policy was formally announced. It pushed for the inclusion of a Gender Action Plan for climate policy at the UN COP25 climate change conference in December 2019, which was adopted. The same year, it began a partnership with the European Union and the United Nations to implement the Spotlight Initiative, a large-scale program aimed at eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Pacific. The initiatives are consistent with the country’s long commitment to multilateralism and its role in advancing global policymaking in key areas such as nuclear nonproliferation and wealth distribution.
The feminist foreign policy is overseen by Martha Delgado Peralta, Mexico’s undersecretary for multilateral affairs and human rights. She has spent much of the year promoting the policy at home and abroad, particularly through Generation Equality, a United Nations conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action. The first half of the physical Generation Equality conference was to be held in Mexico City this year but was postponed due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Even so, in a briefing provided to Foreign Policy by Delgado’s office, the minister noted that Mexico and France, which was to host the second part of the conference, were able to announce the creation of the Generation Equality Action Coalitions, which will develop six concrete road maps on specific gender equality topics to follow in the next five years. The road maps will be launched at the second half of the Generation Equality conference, to be held in Paris in 2021.
Mexico’s feminist foreign policy is a welcome development, but the incongruency between the country’s aspirations and leadership on the world stage and the actual state of gender relations in the country remains problematic. As the country has been winning accolades for its promotion of gender equality in the international sphere, things at home have largely only gotten worse for women in 2020.
As a large number of protests and occupations—including, this year, the first nationwide strike of women workers—are pointing out, Mexico is home to a widespread culture of rigid patriarchal gender roles, combined with near-total impunity for crime. Together, those factors mean that violence against women is endemic and often deadly. Every day, on average, an estimated 11 women are killed, including for reasons related to their gender, most often by a male partner or family member. Yet President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has proved considerably unsympathetic to calls for government action on violence against women. Despite a documented rise in deadly violence against women during the COVID-19 pandemic (even as the number of women in the paid workforce has decreased by around 10 percentage points), the president suggested in May that most calls to Mexico’s 911 system from women experiencing domestic violence were false.
Beyond domestic violence, women have also faced high levels of state violence. The catastrophic war on drugs has had a markedly gendered effect, as demonstrated by the increase in disappearances and killings of thousands of women since the offensive began in 2006, in which the government is regularly implicated. According to the feminist public policy think tank Intersecta, the militarization of public security (in many places, the Army has taken a local policing role for the ostensible purpose of suppressing organized crime) has played a particular role in this pattern, with Intersecta research showing that between 2007 and 2018 the killing of women in particular increased whenever and wherever the Army was a protagonist in conflict.
One might also note Mexico’s recent approaches to the presence of migrants passing through, seeking asylum, or seeking to settle in their country. This, after all, concerns the actions of the Mexican state in the international community and has involved diplomatic agreements.
Particularly notable is that in 2019, as U.S. President Donald Trump applied increasing pressure on Mexico to comply with policies intended to deter asylum-seekers and migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border, López Obrador deployed Mexican troops to the Guatemala-Mexico border to drive back migrants from Central America. African migrants seeking asylum in Mexico reported having been detained by Mexican police and immigration officials. Women and children in all of these groups, many of whom are migrating to escape domestic violence and gendered gang violence in their countries of origin, have not been spared this treatment. As per a formal complaint from Human Rights Watch, migrants have reported either failure to respond from the police or implication in violence.
In a post for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Daniela Philipson writes: “While Mexico’s Foreign Feminist Policy might be well-intentioned, it conflicts with the Federal government’s general agenda which constantly undermines women and girls’ rights and wellbeing.” Philipson recommends that Mexico might also take heed of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda of the U.N. Security Council. This is a collection of Security Council resolutions that includes calling on national governments to make concrete plans for protecting women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict.
Where Philipson and other critics think Mexico should be taking more pains to fortify its commitments to women at home, Delgado is betting on foreign policy as a way to bring support for gender equality from the international community into Mexico. “Mexico is still far from achieving gender equality,” said the undersecretary, according to the briefing provided to Foreign Policy by Delgado’s office. “Mexico’s feminist foreign policy means supporting the cause of gender equality internationally, but also working to bring useful resources into our country.” She sees the ongoing rollout of the Spotlight Initiative in Mexico, which is being implemented by a coalition of U.N. and Mexican agencies and coordinated through Delgado’s office, as a highlight.
The Spotlight Initiative is explicitly focused on ending the country’s high level of femicide. In 2020 the initiative has overseen the #NoEstásSola (You Are Not Alone) campaign to reach women experiencing domestic violence and provide them with support services as rates of violence against women in the home began to climb with the pandemic and attendant stay-at-home and social distancing measures. It has also created a video on women who are leading the charge to eliminate COVID-19 in Mexico and produced news on grassroots efforts to protect women and protest against violence, such as the Justice for Our Daughters coalition founded in the state of Chihuahua, which fights, among other cases, for state accountability for the murder of Marisela Escobedo Ortiz and her daughter, currently the subject of the Netflix series Las tres muertes de Marisela Escobedo (The Three Deaths of Marisela Escobedo). Delgado called the rollout of Spotlight “one of the most ambitious programs within our feminist foreign policy.” The initiative will report on its results in 2022.
Tania Del Rio, a former member of Mexico’s foreign service who in 2016 conducted research on gender equity in Mexico’s embassies all over the world, says that the very existence of a feminist foreign policy is evidence of gains for equality in Mexico. “Four years ago, when I was doing my research, this conversation wasn’t even on the table,” she said in a November interview. Del Rio, who now leads the Mayor’s Office of Women’s Advancement in Boston, produced quantitative and qualitative data on gender bias in Mexico’s foreign service, covering aspects including gender disparities in career progression and experiences of sexual harassment. Del Rio found strong evidence of gender bias—for example, in 2016 women made up 38 percent of the lowest-ranking foreign service officers, with the presence of women dwindling further up the career ladder. She credited her superiors for encouraging her to focus on the issue.
Under its feminist foreign policy, Mexico has pledged to reach gender equality within its foreign service by 2024. But is this pure lip service, or could the new policy play a strategic role in improving women’s lives? While there is no doubt that what Del Rio calls “the internal piece”—domestic policy success on gender equality—affects Mexico’s credibility on this question, she notes that advancing a feminist foreign policy in Mexico is also an effort to invest in and protect the international legal system. Comparing the country to Sweden, which released its feminist foreign policy platform in 2014, Del Rio noted that in both countries’ foreign outlooks, gender equality is linked to global disarmament and the pursuit of peace. “Part of the context for Sweden’s feminist foreign policy was Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the prospect of war,” Del Rio said, adding that both Mexico and Sweden are neighbors of major nuclear powers.
“In this sense, a national feminist foreign policy is just another way to strengthen the international system.”
Prior to Mexico, said Marissa Conway, a co-founder of the Europe-based Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, the only countries pursuing such an approach to their external relations were states in the global north—an activist term that refers to high-income countries in Europe and North America, with the global south referring to lower-income countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania.
For Conway, until Mexico declared their feminist foreign policy, the small field of countries that had also done so “reflected the ongoing status quo where Eurocentric and Western knowledge is widely accepted as the norm” where “foreign policy is … seen by global north countries as something to be conducted ‘on,’ rather than ‘with,’ global south countries,” she told Foreign Policy.
In this, Mexico’s leadership is clear—advancing a standard to the international community and strengthening that community forthwith. And a stronger international system is arguably in all of our interests, even more so if it is led by those who have been historically disenfranchised within that system.
Still, as López Obrador himself said in 2019, “domestic policy is the best foreign policy.” Unless the metrics on gendered violence within Mexico improve, it will be difficult for the country to continue to convincingly prosecute the case for equity on the international stage.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--The Quiet and Dangerous Way U.S. Politics Is Becoming Europeanized

The Quiet and Dangerous Way U.S .
Politics Is Becoming Europeanized For the past several decades , pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization .
From Bill Clinton ’ s impeachment to the global war on terrorism , and from Obamacare to “ build the wall , ” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps .
Yet to the extent that polarization implies a hollowing of the middle ground , its supposed prevalence in U.S. politics doesn ’ t square with the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2020 presidential election .
To be fair , Biden ’ s victory certainly drew on anti-Trump sentiment .
But that raises the question of how Biden prevailed over those candidates further to the left , such as Sen. Bernie Sanders , in the first place .
The crystallization of a centrist camp around him during the primary process demonstrated that progressives don ’ t comprise a majority , even within the Democratic Party .
Wasn ’ t polarization supposed to imply a run to the extremes ?
To make sense of Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its possible consequences —it is necessary to dissect the United States ’ two main political parties .
Doing so makes clear that mere partisan polarization is an inadequate description of U.S. political reality .
That ’ s because , in addition to the bitter conflict between the two parties , there is also an increasingly salient conflict within each .
And this largely overlooked internal conflict is set to play a decisive role in determining future political outcomes .
Recognizing this intrapartisan rivalry allows contemporary U.S. politics to be analyzed in terms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continental European multiparty systems than the increasingly obsolete two-party system dynamics familiar to U.S. political commentators .
This transformation doesn ’ t necessarily spell the death of U.S. democracy , but it does mean we need to start thinking differently about it .
Extending this analogy with European multiparty systems can help Americans better understand the gridlock within their own .
Hanging on to the myth of U.S. exceptionalism obscures important lessons that can be learned from the Old World .
So how exactly does the U.S. political spectrum map onto those on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For starters , the progressive faction of the Democratic Party explicitly models itself on the continental European tradition of social democracy .
Proposals such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal may be perceived as “ radical ” or “ far-left ” in the United States , but they appear pretty familiar from a European perspective .
Most continental European countries take for granted their publicly funded universal health care systems , and many Northern European countries have already implemented sweeping new environmental regimes under social democratic leadership .
Sanders may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggests the United States take after Sweden or Denmark .
Moving toward the center , the more moderate faction of the Democratic Party has a surprising number of features in common with the European tradition of Christian democracy : from their self-presentation as centrists blazing a moderate middle path between the far-left and the far-right to their goal of restoring social harmony through political compromise—aptly encapsulated in Biden ’ s campaign promise to “ restore the soul of America.
” In this respect , it is noteworthy that Biden will be only the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While his religion does not determine his political persuasions , he has maintained that it functions as an important source of inspiration for him .
Biden places rhetorical emphasis on notions such as human dignity , social civility , and the resolutely multilateralist conception of international affairs .
It ’ s a similar approach to that of Germany ’ s current chancellor , Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union .
On the other side of the U.S. political center , there is a residual rump of traditional Republicans , most of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era but may now resurface along with the political ambitions of figures such as Mitt Romney , John Kasich , and Larry Hogan .
More socially conservative and free market-friendly than centrist Democrats—often invoking former President Ronald Reagan as inspiration—this ideological current can be likened to the right-leaning strand of liberalism traditionally espoused by European liberal parties or the British Conservatives under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher .
Finally , on the far-right of the contemporary U.S. political spectrum , there is a form of authoritarian populism that was , until recently , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s political culture : Trumpism .
Some commentators have debated whether one might go so far as to label it a form of proto- or neofascism .
U.S. President Donald Trump certainly flaunts his strong , racially tinged nationalism and strategic disregard for democratic procedures .
But he has so far stopped short of openly glorifying violence and still appeals to democratic themes—such as his false claims that he won the 2020 election—in claiming legitimacy ; a real fascist wouldn ’ t even try to pretend his rule was cemented by democratic means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more appropriately be compared to European leaders like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Viktor Orban in Hungary , who are authoritarian populists .
Given that the U.S. political landscape has become so Europeanized , it makes sense to look at classical European political science for insight into which partisan dynamics are most likely to shape the United States in the near future .
The concept of polarized pluralism , originally developed by the Columbia University political scientist Giovanni Sartori to explain the stalemate of Italian party politics in the 1960s and ’ 70s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Sartori ’ s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time .
Sartori ’ s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time .
He predicted two main consequences of this double whammy .
First , political discourse becomes “ centrifugal , ” as parties on the extremes have an incentive to distinguish themselves from others by outbidding each other with more and more radical stances .
Second , governmental action becomes “ centripetal , ” as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unite the various strands of the center in cross-party coalitions that settle for the little they can agree on .
Italy in the 1960s and ’ 70s featured bitter attacks on the very legitimacy of the democratic order from two parties : the Communists on the far-left and the neofascists on the far-right .
Between them lay a multitude of fragmented parties and party factions that gravitated around the centrist Christian Democrats , with the Socialists to their left and the Liberals to their right .
But this framework made alternation in leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the center had to stick together in a succession of unstable coalitions to keep the far-left and the far-right out of power .
Sound familiar ?
Italy half a century ago displays an uncanny likeness with what is already taking shape in the United States today : a residually and internally fragmented centrist government—condemned to tow a status quo line in order to keep together its cross-partisan appeal—besieged on both sides by radical opposition .
This sort of polarized pluralism is bound to only be further consolidated if the Republican Party retains control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ runoff elections in Georgia—mandating an intraparty coalition to get anything done .
Biden ’ s cabinet nominations—and the reactions they have elicited—are providing us a preview of what ’ s to come .
Both Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin are prominent figures of Washington ’ s centrist establishment , and their appointments are designed so as not to alienate the moderate wing of the Republican Party .
Both , however , have already been sternly condemned by Trumpists and progressives alike as signaling a return to the “ swamp.
” What ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Sartori , the kind of residual centrism that results from polarized pluralism was a cause for concern , not reassurance .
Even though its status quo bias may please business interests in the short run , polarized pluralism also tends to undermine the legitimacy of the whole political framework in the long run , since it both generates and frustrates increasingly radical social demands .
In situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country ’ s institutional framework as a whole .
The lesson contemporary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continental European party politics , then , is that in situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country ’ s institutional framework as a whole .
The fact that Trump has so far refused to accept his election loss—as well as the delegitimation of the democratic process among large swaths of the Republican base that has ensued—is not to be taken lightly .
Nor is there any easy fix for polarized pluralism , since it is a reflection of real social divisions that increasingly correspond to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe over the past century may invite speculation that the United States is faced with a radical choice between a complete breakdown of the political system—as happened in Italy and Germany during the interwar years—and a radical overhaul of the underlying socioeconomic order comparable to the postwar welfarist revolution .
The most probable scenario , however , remains something more akin to the stagnation and breakdown that happened in Europe after all the midcentury ’ s sound and fury .
For now , the United States is likely to be governed by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition to the far-left and the far-right—perpetually kicking the can down the road and maintaining a veneer of stability while social dissatisfaction continues to brew beneath the surface .
Eventually , it will boil over .

For the past several decades, pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization . From Bill Clinton’s impeachment to the global war on terrorism, and from Obamacare to “build the wall,” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps.
For the past several decades, pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization. From Bill Clinton’s impeachment to the global war on terrorism, and from Obamacare to “build the wall,” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps.
Yet to the extent that polarization implies a hollowing of the middle ground, its supposed prevalence in U.S. politics doesn’t square with the fact that an adamantly moderate centrist—Joe Biden—ended up winning the 2020 presidential election. To be fair, Biden’s victory certainly drew on anti-Trump sentiment. But that raises the question of how Biden prevailed over those candidates further to the left, such as Sen. Bernie Sanders, in the first place. The crystallization of a centrist camp around him during the primary process demonstrated that progressives don’t comprise a majority, even within the Democratic Party. Wasn’t polarization supposed to imply a run to the extremes?
To make sense of Biden’s victory—and begin thinking about some of its possible consequences —it is necessary to dissect the United States’ two main political parties. Doing so makes clear that mere partisan polarization is an inadequate description of U.S. political reality. That’s because, in addition to the bitter conflict between the two parties, there is also an increasingly salient conflict within each. And this largely overlooked internal conflict is set to play a decisive role in determining future political outcomes.
Recognizing this intrapartisan rivalry allows contemporary U.S. politics to be analyzed in terms of a four-way struggle more reminiscent of continental European multiparty systems than the increasingly obsolete two-party system dynamics familiar to U.S. political commentators. This transformation doesn’t necessarily spell the death of U.S. democracy, but it does mean we need to start thinking differently about it.
Extending this analogy with European multiparty systems can help Americans better understand the gridlock within their own. Hanging on to the myth of U.S. exceptionalism obscures important lessons that can be learned from the Old World.
So how exactly does the U.S. political spectrum map onto those on the other side of the Atlantic? For starters, the progressive faction of the Democratic Party explicitly models itself on the continental European tradition of social democracy. Proposals such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal may be perceived as “radical” or “far-left” in the United States, but they appear pretty familiar from a European perspective. Most continental European countries take for granted their publicly funded universal health care systems, and many Northern European countries have already implemented sweeping new environmental regimes under social democratic leadership. Sanders may not be that far off when he suggests the United States take after Sweden or Denmark.
Moving toward the center, the more moderate faction of the Democratic Party has a surprising number of features in common with the European tradition of Christian democracy: from their self-presentation as centrists blazing a moderate middle path between the far-left and the far-right to their goal of restoring social harmony through political compromise—aptly encapsulated in Biden’s campaign promise to “restore the soul of America.”
In this respect, it is noteworthy that Biden will be only the second Catholic president of the United States. While his religion does not determine his political persuasions, he has maintained that it functions as an important source of inspiration for him. Biden places rhetorical emphasis on notions such as human dignity, social civility, and the resolutely multilateralist conception of international affairs. It’s a similar approach to that of Germany’s current chancellor, Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union.
On the other side of the U.S. political center, there is a residual rump of traditional Republicans, most of whom have remained submerged during the Trump era but may now resurface along with the political ambitions of figures such as Mitt Romney, John Kasich, and Larry Hogan. More socially conservative and free market-friendly than centrist Democrats—often invoking former President Ronald Reagan as inspiration—this ideological current can be likened to the right-leaning strand of liberalism traditionally espoused by European liberal parties or the British Conservatives under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
Finally, on the far-right of the contemporary U.S. political spectrum, there is a form of authoritarian populism that was, until recently, considered quite foreign to the country’s political culture: Trumpism. Some commentators have debated whether one might go so far as to label it a form of proto- or neofascism.
U.S. President Donald Trump certainly flaunts his strong, racially tinged nationalism and strategic disregard for democratic procedures. But he has so far stopped short of openly glorifying violence and still appeals to democratic themes—such as his false claims that he won the 2020 election—in claiming legitimacy; a real fascist wouldn’t even try to pretend his rule was cemented by democratic means. In that vein, Trump can more appropriately be compared to European leaders like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Viktor Orban in Hungary, who are authoritarian populists.
Given that the U.S. political landscape has become so Europeanized, it makes sense to look at classical European political science for insight into which partisan dynamics are most likely to shape the United States in the near future. The concept of polarized pluralism, originally developed by the Columbia University political scientist Giovanni Sartori to explain the stalemate of Italian party politics in the 1960s and ’70s, appears particularly illuminating in this regard.
Sartori’s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time.
Sartori’s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time. He predicted two main consequences of this double whammy. First, political discourse becomes “centrifugal,” as parties on the extremes have an incentive to distinguish themselves from others by outbidding each other with more and more radical stances. Second, governmental action becomes “centripetal,” as the only possible governing majorities are ones that unite the various strands of the center in cross-party coalitions that settle for the little they can agree on.
Italy in the 1960s and ’70s featured bitter attacks on the very legitimacy of the democratic order from two parties: the Communists on the far-left and the neofascists on the far-right. Between them lay a multitude of fragmented parties and party factions that gravitated around the centrist Christian Democrats, with the Socialists to their left and the Liberals to their right. But this framework made alternation in leadership effectively impossible; all the factions of the center had to stick together in a succession of unstable coalitions to keep the far-left and the far-right out of power.
Sound familiar? Italy half a century ago displays an uncanny likeness with what is already taking shape in the United States today: a residually and internally fragmented centrist government—condemned to tow a status quo line in order to keep together its cross-partisan appeal—besieged on both sides by radical opposition. This sort of polarized pluralism is bound to only be further consolidated if the Republican Party retains control of the Senate after January’s runoff elections in Georgia—mandating an intraparty coalition to get anything done.
Biden’s cabinet nominations—and the reactions they have elicited—are providing us a preview of what’s to come. Both Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin are prominent figures of Washington’s centrist establishment, and their appointments are designed so as not to alienate the moderate wing of the Republican Party. Both, however, have already been sternly condemned by Trumpists and progressives alike as signaling a return to the “swamp.”
What’s important to highlight here is that, for Sartori, the kind of residual centrism that results from polarized pluralism was a cause for concern, not reassurance. Even though its status quo bias may please business interests in the short run, polarized pluralism also tends to undermine the legitimacy of the whole political framework in the long run, since it both generates and frustrates increasingly radical social demands.
In situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country’s institutional framework as a whole.
The lesson contemporary Americans can draw from the history of continental European party politics, then, is that in situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country’s institutional framework as a whole. The fact that Trump has so far refused to accept his election loss—as well as the delegitimation of the democratic process among large swaths of the Republican base that has ensued—is not to be taken lightly. Nor is there any easy fix for polarized pluralism, since it is a reflection of real social divisions that increasingly correspond to solidified ideological blocs.
The comparison to Europe over the past century may invite speculation that the United States is faced with a radical choice between a complete breakdown of the political system—as happened in Italy and Germany during the interwar years—and a radical overhaul of the underlying socioeconomic order comparable to the postwar welfarist revolution. The most probable scenario, however, remains something more akin to the stagnation and breakdown that happened in Europe after all the midcentury’s sound and fury. For now, the United States is likely to be governed by a form of residual centrism defined primarily by opposition to the far-left and the far-right—perpetually kicking the can down the road and maintaining a veneer of stability while social dissatisfaction continues to brew beneath the surface. Eventually, it will boil over.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-31--Anti-Balloon Launching Laws Are No Threat to South Korean Democracy

Anti-Balloon Launching Laws Are No Threat to South Korean Democracy The first weeks of December were eventful in South Korean politics .
After months of partisan jawing and committee deadlock , the ruling Democratic Party flexed its 174-seat majority in the National Assembly to pass a truly massive slate of laws—more than 130 bills that touched on areas including government organization , corporate governance , labor rights , and climate change .
But in Washington , only one bill among the 130-plus received any attention : the revision to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act , the so-called anti-leaflet law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zone ( DMZ ) by launching large helium balloons in a manner that could cause “ serious danger.
” Rep. Michael McCaul , the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , issued a statement criticizing the bill .
A Washington Post op-ed reported that Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun conveyed concerns about the legislation in his recent visit to Seoul .
Amid the small club of Korea watchers in the United States , the bill was the only topic in South Korean politics that generated any significant discussion .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a typical example of the old mindset—one I ’ ve criticized before—that assesses South Korea solely on the basis on how closely its North Korea policy aligns with U.S. needs .
These blinkered views , disconnected from ground-level events , cause an unnecessary strain on an alliance that is far more important than just for dealing with North Korea .
Few dispute that China is this century ’ s greatest U.S. foreign-policy challenge .
This naturally means that the U.S. ally nearest to China must be given a very high priority .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War , South Korea is as important as West Germany was : a wealthy democracy with a twin in the communist camp , standing at the front line of the liberal world order .
South Korea isn ’ t an auxiliary player but rather deserves to be evaluated on its own terms—something that ’ s unfortunately rare in Washington foreign-policy circles .
Even among experts and think tanks that specialize in East Asia and the Koreas , there is little attempt to keep tabs on South Korea ’ s domestic politics .
Instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entire democracy ) is judged based on two questions only : What is South Korea ’ s plan for North Korea , and how closely does that plan align with the U.S. plan for North Korea ?
Such myopia is especially harmful today , when South Korean politics is going through a fundamental realignment similar to the ones overseen by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan in the United States .
For 29 years after the end of military dictatorship in 1987 , South Korea was largely a conservative country , with 19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of liberal ones .
When liberal presidents like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun did win , they did so by making strategic alliances with smaller conservative factions .
Kim Dae-jung partnered with Kim Jong-pil , a former lieutenant of the dictator Park Chung-hee , while Roh campaigned with Chung Mong-joon , a centrist scion of the Hyundai Group .
Even when they won the presidency , the liberals persistently faced a legislative minority , constricting their ability to implement a large-scale , center-left political agenda .
That era ended with the impeachment and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The twilight years of Park ’ s presidency saw the changing of the guards , as the liberals scored four national victories in a row : the 2016 legislative elections , 2017 presidential election , 2018 local elections , and the legislative elections once again in April of this year , in which the Democratic Party earned a historic , filibuster-proof majority that it applied with gusto to pass a massive slate of progressive laws .
With these victories , the electoral mainstream of South Korean politics shifted decisively .
Voters in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the whole voting population , support the liberal parties by a 2-to-1 margin , making South Korea ’ s baseline electorate center-left rather than center-right .
Conservatives may yet recapture the presidency , but in all likelihood , they will only be able to do so in the same way that liberals did 20 years ago—by co-opting center-left issues and forming an alliance with some of the progressive factions .
This sea change , however , has been mostly lost on Washington ’ s Korea watchers .
In December , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with no attention paid to the other 130-plus that , according to the conservative Dong-A Ilbo , “ effectively changed the foundation of our [ South Korea ’ s ] society.
” The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials Act , for example , is the culmination of the Moon Jae-in administration ’ s prosecution reform , whose drama involving the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Prosecutor ’ s Office gripped South Korea for months .
Revisions to the Fair Trade Act are virtually certain to trigger billions of dollars ’ worth of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corporations as they come under greater scrutiny for anti-competitive behavior .
The “ three ILO acts ” represent the greatest expansion of labor union rights in decades , making South Korea catch up to the recommendations of the International Labour Organization , the United Nations agency that sets global labor standards .
In fact , the leaflet law is not even the most important North Korea-related bill that passed ; that would be the corresponding revisions to the National Intelligence Service Act and the Police Act , which shifted the authority to investigate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the police .
None of these laws drew any attention in Washington ; there was no congressional statement , no op-ed , no policy paper on any of them .
This is a pity , not least because studying South Korean politics would have made the debate on the leaflet ban more rigorous and informed .
Most of the criticisms against the law come from the hard-liners in Washington who characterize the leaflet ban as a weak-kneed “ capitulation ” to North Korea by the liberal Moon .
But if they had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have known that this issue long pre-dated Moon .
South Korea ’ s restriction on launching balloons containing leaflets near the DMZ began in 2007 , with even conservative Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye enforcing the restriction .
They did so because the safety concern was real : The last time North Korean shells landed in South Korean territory was 2014 , when the North Korean military shot anti-aircraft guns at large helium balloons launched by activists .
The activists challenged the restriction with the court and lost , as the Supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the danger justified the restriction .
The new law is no more than a legislative ratification of the Supreme Court ’ s decision four years ago , made more urgent today due to the risk of an inadvertent escalation into a nuclear war with North Korea .
None of the criticism from the United States refers to any of this history , makes any analysis of the 2016 Supreme Court opinion , or engages with the text of the law that makes clear the ban is not a wholesale prohibition—as Article 24 of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is prohibited only to the extent that it is done in a manner that causes actual harm or danger .
Greater focus on South Korean politics would have also revealed the domestic political dynamic around the balloon-launching activists , many of whom are North Koreans who escaped to the South .
Many in the North Korean defector community in South Korea have joined forces with South Korea ’ s far-right .
This trend was especially pronounced during the conservative Park Geun-hye administration , which subsidized the North Korean defector groups in exchange for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As a result , they mostly stayed silent when the Park administration abused North Korean defectors , by falsely charging some as spies , but now vigorously protest Moon .
Being blind to these overall political dynamics harms the U.S.-South Korea alliance .
Freedom of speech for North Korea activists is an important issue , but it is not the only important issue in the alliance that serves as the lynchpin for the liberal order in the Indo-Pacific .
When the U.S. government expresses concern for freedom of speech only when North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , the Park Geun-hye administration blacklisted and censored some 9,000 liberal-leaning artists , including the Academy Award-winning director Bong Joon-ho , South Koreans justifiably wonder if the United States ’ supposed love for free speech is no more than a pretext to defend a hawkish stance against Pyongyang .
When the South Korean public sees U.S. experts on the Korean Peninsula—who are supposed to be well versed on these issues—cavalierly dismiss the concerns of more than 1.1 million residents living near the DMZ , they feel viewed as disposable chess pieces in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as human beings who carry on their lives in a community .
The leaflet ban may deserve debate , but it should be a better , more rigorous one , with an eye on the health of the overall alliance .

The first weeks of December were eventful in South Korean politics. After months of partisan jawing and committee deadlock, the ruling Democratic Party flexed its 174-seat majority in the National Assembly to pass a truly massive slate of laws—more than 130 bills that touched on areas including government organization, corporate governance, labor rights, and climate change. But in Washington, only one bill among the 130-plus received any attention: the revision to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, the so-called anti-leaflet law that prohibits disseminating leaflets near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by launching large helium balloons in a manner that could cause “serious danger.”
The first weeks of December were eventful in South Korean politics. After months of partisan jawing and committee deadlock, the ruling Democratic Party flexed its 174-seat majority in the National Assembly to pass a truly massive slate of laws—more than 130 bills that touched on areas including government organization, corporate governance, labor rights, and climate change. But in Washington, only one bill among the 130-plus received any attention: the revision to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, the so-called anti-leaflet law that prohibits disseminating leaflets near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by launching large helium balloons in a manner that could cause “serious danger.”
Rep. Michael McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued a statement criticizing the bill. A Washington Post op-ed reported that Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun conveyed concerns about the legislation in his recent visit to Seoul. Amid the small club of Korea watchers in the United States, the bill was the only topic in South Korean politics that generated any significant discussion.
The singular focus on the leaflet law is a typical example of the old mindset—one I’ve criticized before—that assesses South Korea solely on the basis on how closely its North Korea policy aligns with U.S. needs. These blinkered views, disconnected from ground-level events, cause an unnecessary strain on an alliance that is far more important than just for dealing with North Korea.
Few dispute that China is this century’s greatest U.S. foreign-policy challenge. This naturally means that the U.S. ally nearest to China must be given a very high priority. If we really are in a second Cold War, South Korea is as important as West Germany was: a wealthy democracy with a twin in the communist camp, standing at the front line of the liberal world order. South Korea isn’t an auxiliary player but rather deserves to be evaluated on its own terms—something that’s unfortunately rare in Washington foreign-policy circles. Even among experts and think tanks that specialize in East Asia and the Koreas, there is little attempt to keep tabs on South Korea’s domestic politics. Instead, its politics (and sometimes its entire democracy) is judged based on two questions only: What is South Korea’s plan for North Korea, and how closely does that plan align with the U.S. plan for North Korea?
Such myopia is especially harmful today, when South Korean politics is going through a fundamental realignment similar to the ones overseen by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan in the United States. For 29 years after the end of military dictatorship in 1987, South Korea was largely a conservative country, with 19 years of conservative presidencies and 10 years of liberal ones. When liberal presidents like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun did win, they did so by making strategic alliances with smaller conservative factions. Kim Dae-jung partnered with Kim Jong-pil, a former lieutenant of the dictator Park Chung-hee, while Roh campaigned with Chung Mong-joon, a centrist scion of the Hyundai Group. Even when they won the presidency, the liberals persistently faced a legislative minority, constricting their ability to implement a large-scale, center-left political agenda.
That era ended with the impeachment and removal of Park Geun-hye in 2017. The twilight years of Park’s presidency saw the changing of the guards, as the liberals scored four national victories in a row: the 2016 legislative elections, 2017 presidential election, 2018 local elections, and the legislative elections once again in April of this year, in which the Democratic Party earned a historic, filibuster-proof majority that it applied with gusto to pass a massive slate of progressive laws. With these victories, the electoral mainstream of South Korean politics shifted decisively. Voters in their 40s, who make up nearly 20 percent of the whole voting population, support the liberal parties by a 2-to-1 margin, making South Korea’s baseline electorate center-left rather than center-right. Conservatives may yet recapture the presidency, but in all likelihood, they will only be able to do so in the same way that liberals did 20 years ago—by co-opting center-left issues and forming an alliance with some of the progressive factions.
This sea change, however, has been mostly lost on Washington’s Korea watchers. In December, they were content to focus on one law with no attention paid to the other 130-plus that, according to the conservative Dong-A Ilbo, “effectively changed the foundation of our [South Korea’s] society.” The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials Act, for example, is the culmination of the Moon Jae-in administration’s prosecution reform, whose drama involving the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office gripped South Korea for months. Revisions to the Fair Trade Act are virtually certain to trigger billions of dollars’ worth of restructuring in South Korea’s largest corporations as they come under greater scrutiny for anti-competitive behavior. The “three ILO acts” represent the greatest expansion of labor union rights in decades, making South Korea catch up to the recommendations of the International Labour Organization, the United Nations agency that sets global labor standards. In fact, the leaflet law is not even the most important North Korea-related bill that passed; that would be the corresponding revisions to the National Intelligence Service Act and the Police Act, which shifted the authority to investigate espionage cases from the spy agency to the police. None of these laws drew any attention in Washington; there was no congressional statement, no op-ed, no policy paper on any of them.
This is a pity, not least because studying South Korean politics would have made the debate on the leaflet ban more rigorous and informed. Most of the criticisms against the law come from the hard-liners in Washington who characterize the leaflet ban as a weak-kneed “capitulation” to North Korea by the liberal Moon. But if they had been following South Korean politics, they would have known that this issue long pre-dated Moon. South Korea’s restriction on launching balloons containing leaflets near the DMZ began in 2007, with even conservative Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye enforcing the restriction. They did so because the safety concern was real: The last time North Korean shells landed in South Korean territory was 2014, when the North Korean military shot anti-aircraft guns at large helium balloons launched by activists.
The activists challenged the restriction with the court and lost, as the Supreme Court of Korea held in 2016 that the danger justified the restriction. The new law is no more than a legislative ratification of the Supreme Court’s decision four years ago, made more urgent today due to the risk of an inadvertent escalation into a nuclear war with North Korea. None of the criticism from the United States refers to any of this history, makes any analysis of the 2016 Supreme Court opinion, or engages with the text of the law that makes clear the ban is not a wholesale prohibition—as Article 24 of the law states, the leaflet distribution is prohibited only to the extent that it is done in a manner that causes actual harm or danger.
Greater focus on South Korean politics would have also revealed the domestic political dynamic around the balloon-launching activists, many of whom are North Koreans who escaped to the South. Many in the North Korean defector community in South Korea have joined forces with South Korea’s far-right. This trend was especially pronounced during the conservative Park Geun-hye administration, which subsidized the North Korean defector groups in exchange for their flag-waving support in downtown Seoul. As a result, they mostly stayed silent when the Park administration abused North Korean defectors, by falsely charging some as spies, but now vigorously protest Moon.
Being blind to these overall political dynamics harms the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Freedom of speech for North Korea activists is an important issue, but it is not the only important issue in the alliance that serves as the lynchpin for the liberal order in the Indo-Pacific. When the U.S. government expresses concern for freedom of speech only when North Korea is involved and not when, for example, the Park Geun-hye administration blacklisted and censored some 9,000 liberal-leaning artists, including the Academy Award-winning director Bong Joon-ho, South Koreans justifiably wonder if the United States’ supposed love for free speech is no more than a pretext to defend a hawkish stance against Pyongyang.
When the South Korean public sees U.S. experts on the Korean Peninsula—who are supposed to be well versed on these issues—cavalierly dismiss the concerns of more than 1.1 million residents living near the DMZ, they feel viewed as disposable chess pieces in the game of foreign policy, not as human beings who carry on their lives in a community. The leaflet ban may deserve debate, but it should be a better, more rigorous one, with an eye on the health of the overall alliance.