foreignpolicy--2020-01-05--Pentagon Chief Kept Tight Circle on Suleimani Strike

In the hours leading up to the U.S. drone strike that killed Qassem Suleimani this past week , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper kept President Donald Trump ’ s decision to target the commander of Iran ’ s powerful Quds Force closely held , cutting out some senior Pentagon leaders who are typically consulted on decisions of such magnitude .
Senior officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would ordinarily be part of the discussion , or at least briefed ahead of time , on such a momentous decision—one that the administrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Barack Obama considered and rejected .
But in this case , many senior leaders found out after the fact , current and former officials familiar with the discussions told Foreign Policy .
“ The usual approval process , the decision-making process , did not occur , ” said one defense official , speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues .
Even among the small group of officials who were in the loop , there was dissent about whether killing Suleimani was a wise decision , said a former senior administration official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The DoD was not all in agreement that killing the second most popular person in Iran at an international airport in Iraq was a good idea , ” the former official said .
The death of Suleimani , a widely popular figure in Iran and mastermind of Tehran ’ s regional security strategy , in a strike that also killed the Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , has caused tensions in the Middle East to soar , raising fears of an all-out war .
On Saturday , tens of thousands of pro-Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the United States , and two rocket attacks occurred near Iraqi bases that host American troops , although no one was injured .
On Sunday , Iraq ’ s parliament voted to expel the U.S. military from the country , and reports emerged that the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition announced a pause in operations so it can protect Iraqi bases where U.S. troops are located .
“ The region if possible has just become more complicated , ” said retired Gen. Joseph Votel , the commander of U.S. Central Command until early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that now can ’ t be determined.
” Some defense officials say Esper ’ s decision to keep the decision to strike closely held was understandable .
“ The people who needed to be in the room were in the room , ” said a second defense official .
“ The voices that needed to be heard from were heard from.
” The first defense official posited that Esper is keeping a tighter circle of trust , particularly after a Wall Street Journal article last month said that the United States was considering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East to deter Iran—a report Esper vehemently denied .
The second defense official disputed that characterization .
“ The publishing of a fabricated story by the WSJ had no impact on the decision making process of the Secretary of Defense—it ’ s silly to suggest so , ” the official said .
The administration on Friday defended the decision , saying Trump ordered the strikes in order to disrupt imminent attacks Suleimani had been planning on American service members in the Middle East .
Robert O ’ Brien , Trump ’ s national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action was authorized under the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force and consistent with the president ’ s “ constitutional authority as commander in chief to defend our nation.
” Democratic legislators including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi disputed that interpretation .
Following the strike , Esper ordered some 3,500 soldiers in the U.S. Army ’ s 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East to protect U.S. interests , in one of the largest rapid deployments in decades .
Senior members of the Defense and State departments , as well as the Office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ briefed staff members from the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee on Friday about recent threats and attacks on U.S. personnel and interests in Iraq .
But publicly , senior leaders have provided few details on the planned attacks since news of the strike emerged .
State and Defense officials disagreed on how “ imminent ” the attacks really were , the former senior official said .
Some officials argued that there were other actions that were not so “ escalatory ” and that killing Suleimani in Iraq “ was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than it is worth , ” the former official said .
The knock-on effects became clearer on Friday , with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calling for “ forceful revenge ” for Suleimani ’ s death .
On Saturday , Trump hit back , vowing to strike 52 sites across Iran—representing the number of U.S. hostages taken by Tehran in 1979—if Iran attacks Americans or U.S. assets .
“ [ T ] hose targets , and Iran itself , WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD .
The USA wants no more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a long history of attacking U.S. service members and is responsible for the deaths of at least 600 Americans in Iraq alone , current and former officials say .
O ’ Brien on Friday also cited Suleimani ’ s support for President Bashar al-Assad ’ s brutal regime in Syria and violent repressing of recent protests in Iran .
The most notable example of Suleimani ’ s malign activities in recent weeks was the Dec. 27 , 2019 , attack on the K1 Air Base that killed one American contractor and injured @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brien said .
“ This was something that the president felt was necessary to do , ” O ’ Brien said , defending the decision to kill Suleimani .
“ This was designed to prevent further bloodshed .
This was a defensive action.
” The administration has offered to sit down with Iranian officials to discuss a peaceful resolution .
But so far , Tehran has declined to negotiate without the lifting of harsh U.S. sanctions .
Officials are likely hoping that the strike on Suleimani will bring Tehran to the negotiating table @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Eventually we are going to run out of escalation room , ” said retired Vice Adm. John Miller , a former commander of the U.S. Navy ’ s 5th Fleet , responsible for naval forces in the Persian Gulf , Red Sea , and Arabian Sea .
“ At the end of the day certainly a full on conflict in the region would not be good for the region [ and ] would also be devastating for Iran .
It ’ s important that they do the math and understand that.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ few signs Tehran will take Trump up on his offer .
On Sunday , Hossein Dehghan , the military adviser to the supreme leader , told CNN that Iran ’ s response will certainly be a military response “ against military sites.
” “ We don ’ t fully understand their red lines and they don ’ t fully understand ours , ” Miller said .

In the hours leading up to the U.S. drone strike that killed Qassem Suleimani this past week, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper kept President Donald Trump’s decision to target the commander of Iran’s powerful Quds Force closely held, cutting out some senior Pentagon leaders who are typically consulted on decisions of such magnitude.
In the hours leading up to the U.S. drone strike that killed Qassem Suleimani this past week, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper kept President Donald Trump’s decision to target the commander of Iran’s powerful Quds Force closely held, cutting out some senior Pentagon leaders who are typically consulted on decisions of such magnitude.
Senior officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would ordinarily be part of the discussion, or at least briefed ahead of time, on such a momentous decision—one that the administrations of both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama considered and rejected. But in this case, many senior leaders found out after the fact, current and former officials familiar with the discussions told Foreign Policy.
“The usual approval process, the decision-making process, did not occur,” said one defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive issues.
Even among the small group of officials who were in the loop, there was dissent about whether killing Suleimani was a wise decision, said a former senior administration official with knowledge of the discussions. “The DoD was not all in agreement that killing the second most popular person in Iran at an international airport in Iraq was a good idea,” the former official said.
The death of Suleimani, a widely popular figure in Iran and mastermind of Tehran’s regional security strategy, in a strike that also killed the Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, has caused tensions in the Middle East to soar, raising fears of an all-out war. On Saturday, tens of thousands of pro-Iranian fighters marched through Baghdad calling for revenge on the United States, and two rocket attacks occurred near Iraqi bases that host American troops, although no one was injured.
On Sunday, Iraq’s parliament voted to expel the U.S. military from the country, and reports emerged that the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition announced a pause in operations so it can protect Iraqi bases where U.S. troops are located.
“The region if possible has just become more complicated,” said retired Gen. Joseph Votel, the commander of U.S. Central Command until early 2019. “There will be consequences that now can’t be determined.”
Some defense officials say Esper’s decision to keep the decision to strike closely held was understandable. “The people who needed to be in the room were in the room,” said a second defense official. “The voices that needed to be heard from were heard from.”
The first defense official posited that Esper is keeping a tighter circle of trust, particularly after a Wall Street Journal article last month said that the United States was considering sending 14,000 additional troops to the Middle East to deter Iran—a report Esper vehemently denied.
The second defense official disputed that characterization. “The publishing of a fabricated story by the WSJ had no impact on the decision making process of the Secretary of Defense—it’s silly to suggest so,” the official said.
The administration on Friday defended the decision, saying Trump ordered the strikes in order to disrupt imminent attacks Suleimani had been planning on American service members in the Middle East. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s national security advisor, told reporters that the action was authorized under the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force and consistent with the president’s “constitutional authority as commander in chief to defend our nation.” Democratic legislators including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi disputed that interpretation.
Following the strike, Esper ordered some 3,500 soldiers in the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East to protect U.S. interests, in one of the largest rapid deployments in decades.
Senior members of the Defense and State departments, as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, briefed staff members from the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee on Friday about recent threats and attacks on U.S. personnel and interests in Iraq.
But publicly, senior leaders have provided few details on the planned attacks since news of the strike emerged. State and Defense officials disagreed on how “imminent” the attacks really were, the former senior official said.
Some officials argued that there were other actions that were not so “escalatory” and that killing Suleimani in Iraq “was only going to cause us more problems than it is worth,” the former official said.
The knock-on effects became clearer on Friday, with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calling for “forceful revenge” for Suleimani’s death. On Saturday, Trump hit back, vowing to strike 52 sites across Iran—representing the number of U.S. hostages taken by Tehran in 1979—if Iran attacks Americans or U.S. assets.
“[T]hose targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!” Trump tweeted.
Suleimani has a long history of attacking U.S. service members and is responsible for the deaths of at least 600 Americans in Iraq alone, current and former officials say. O’Brien on Friday also cited Suleimani’s support for President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria and violent repressing of recent protests in Iran.
The most notable example of Suleimani’s malign activities in recent weeks was the Dec. 27, 2019, attack on the K1 Air Base that killed one American contractor and injured four U.S. service members, O’Brien said.
“This was something that the president felt was necessary to do,” O’Brien said, defending the decision to kill Suleimani. “This was designed to prevent further bloodshed. This was a defensive action.”
The administration has offered to sit down with Iranian officials to discuss a peaceful resolution. But so far, Tehran has declined to negotiate without the lifting of harsh U.S. sanctions. Officials are likely hoping that the strike on Suleimani will bring Tehran to the negotiating table in order to avoid an all-out war.
“Eventually we are going to run out of escalation room,” said retired Vice Adm. John Miller, a former commander of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, responsible for naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea. “At the end of the day certainly a full on conflict in the region would not be good for the region [and] would also be devastating for Iran. It’s important that they do the math and understand that.”
But so far, there are few signs Tehran will take Trump up on his offer. On Sunday, Hossein Dehghan, the military adviser to the supreme leader, told CNN that Iran’s response will certainly be a military response “against military sites.”
“We don’t fully understand their red lines and they don’t fully understand ours,” Miller said.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-04--Trump Is Playing With Fire in the Middle East

Trump Is Playing With Fire in the Middle East In June 2011 , as U.S. forces were withdrawing from Iraq , Iranian-backed militants launched a series of powerful rocket attacks on American bases .
More than a dozen U.S. soldiers were killed , the largest loss of life in many months .
The Obama administration had two options for retaliating : a strike inside Iran that would kill Iranian operatives or unilateral special operations forces raids in Iraq against the militia rocket teams .
To head off an escalation to a wider war with Iran , the administration chose the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a Dec. 27 , 2019 , rocket attack that killed an American contractor and wounded several U.S. and Iraqi personnel at a base near Kirkuk , the Trump administration initially followed a similar path by launching retaliatory airstrikes against Kataib Hezbollah , an Iraqi militia closely aligned with Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) .
But then , early Friday morning in Iraq ( Thursday evening in the United States ) , U.S. President Donald Trump threw caution to the wind , authorizing a drone strike that killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Quds Force of the IRGC and one of Iran ’ s most prominent leaders—as well as a number of senior Iraqi militia leaders near the Baghdad airport .
With Suleimani ’ s death , the monthslong tit-for-tat cycle of pressure and provocation between Washington and Tehran has entered a much more dangerous phase .
The risk of a regionwide conflagration is higher than ever .
Shortly before the strike , U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper threatened preemptive action to protect U.S. forces , saying “ the game has changed.
” But this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both sides could not be higher .
No American should shed a tear for Suleimani .
As the leader of Iran ’ s elite paramilitary Quds Force , Suleimani helped orchestrate attacks by Shiite Iraqi militias that killed hundreds of American troops during the U.S. occupation .
He also directed Iranian policy and support for Lebanese Hezbollah , jihadists in Gaza , Houthi militants in Yemen , and the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria .
He had a hand in Iranian terrorist attacks abroad and brutal crackdowns against Iranian protesters at home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement and the administration ’ s maximum pressure campaign of withering sanctions , Iran has carried out a series of provocations with Suleimani ’ s fingerprints all over them—including threats to U.S. troops in Iraq .
According Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley , Iranian-backed groups have engaged in a sustained campaign of rocket attacks targeting U.S. facilities in Iraq since October 2019 .
But until Dec. 27 , none had drawn American blood .
Once one did , the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hezbollah targets on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border .
That , in turn , prompted Shiite militia leaders to mobilize a siege of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad , raising the specter of a Benghazi-like scenario .
This was the context for Trump ’ s decision to kill Suleimani .
But whatever underlying sense of justice Americans may feel now that a terrorist mastermind is dead , it should not obscure the very real prospect that his assassination could set in motion events that spiral out of control in ways that put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Two previous U.S. administrations decided against a direct shot against Suleimani out of concern , widely shared by the Pentagon and the intelligence community , that all-out escalation would likely follow .
As recently as this past spring , the Department of Defense warned the White House against designating the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization , arguing that it could put the lives of U.S. personnel in Iraq and elsewhere in the region at risk .
( Trump did so anyway . )
And in June , then-Chairman of the Joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump out of retaliating on Iranian soil for the Tehran ’ s downing of a U.S. drone .
This cautious tradition has now been overturned .
Both Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo justified the Suleimani strike as necessary to head off imminent additional attacks against U.S. forces and , in Trump ’ s words , “ stop a war.
” It is hard to assess these claims absent the administration releasing relevant intelligence , and whereas the Pentagon statement announcing the strike framed it as defensive , it did not say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imminent .
Moreover , some reporting suggests that Trump authorized the targeting of Suleimani after the Dec. 27 rocket assault , and U.S. special operations forces had been waiting for an opportunity for a clean shot ever since .
That could explain why the strike happened even after the siege of the U.S. Embassy had ended and events in Iraq appeared to be de-escalating .
Regardless , the president and his closest advisors appear to have a theory behind the targeted killing of Suleimani .
They seem to believe that Iran is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the nose , it will slink back into its cave .
It is true that , in the past , the Iranian regime has sometimes shown caution in the face of a stronger adversary .
It is also the case that , in order to manage escalation , Iranian leaders have historically responded to covert attacks with their own deniable actions or looked the other way when their proxies and advisers have been targeted by Americans or Israelis on foreign soil .
But the Suleimani strike is different .
It was an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iran .
From an Iranian perspective , the assassination is the equivalent of another country taking out the director of the CIA , secretary of defense , and shadow secretary of state all rolled into one .
Whether the United States agrees or not , Iran sees this as an act of war .
And the regime will respond at a time , place , and manner of its choosing , because the one thing it fears more than a conflict with the United States is backing down in the face of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Reacting to Suleimani ’ s demise , Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned that “ forceful revenge awaits the criminals who have his blood and the blood of the other martyrs last night on their hands.
” Revenge could come in many forms .
Iran could greenlight Shiite militia groups to significantly escalate rocket and roadside bomb attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq , and to organize additional protests and assaults against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad .
Iranian proxies may target the few hundred American forces protecting oil fields in eastern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Afghanistan .
Iran could fire ballistic missiles at U.S. facilities in Iraq or the Persian Gulf , ramp up the sabotage of international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz , launch additional missile or drone attacks against critical energy infrastructure in the region , or encourage Lebanese Hezbollah or Palestinian militants to attack Israel .
Tehran could orchestrate terrorist attacks against Americans or U.S. interests in the region , as it did in the 1980s in Beirut and in 1996 at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia , or plot an attack inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do in 2011 against the Saudi ambassador in Washington .
Or Iran could use its increasingly sophisticated cybercapabilities to strike at the U.S. homeland .
If Iranian retaliation draws more American blood , it will prompt other U.S. counterpunches aimed at , in the words of a recent statement from the Pentagon , “ deterring future Iranian attack plans.
” And Iranian leaders , facing additional U.S. strikes against their forces and interests , will face a similar calculus .
Neither side may want an all-out war , but each increment of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defensive logic—and it is hard to see a clean escape from this spiraling vortex .
Even if the sides avoid a regional war , there will likely be other profound collateral consequences for the killing of Suleimani .
Iraqi outrage at the strike could soon make the U.S. position in the country untenable .
Caretaker Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi has already denounced the strike as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and an act of aggression against the Iraqi people , and it would not be surprising if the Iraqi parliament demanded the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coming days .
Trump , long a skeptic of underwriting “ ungrateful ” allies , may actually leap at the opportunity to pull troops out .
The result might appeal to Trump ’ s base , but it would also set the stage for Iran to further expand its influence in Iraq while making it more difficult to check a resurgence of the Islamic State .
On the nuclear front , too , Iran is likely to ramp up its provocations .
Over the past year , in response to Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has incrementally restarted elements of its nuclear program .
As tensions with the United States heighten , more dramatic steps , including the resumption of much higher levels of uranium enrichment , are likely .
And as Iran gets closer and closer to the capability to produce fuel for a nuclear weapon—and the prospects for a diplomatic solution fade—yet another path to a military confrontation with the United States or Israel will emerge .
Given these dangers , the administration needs to level with the American people about its strategy and its plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it used to justify the strike and explain how it will mitigate the myriad risks emanating from it .
In another administration , there would also be a coherent national security process to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel and diplomats across the Middle East , prepare for possible civilian evacuations , harden critical infrastructure in the region and at home against Iranian-backed terrorism or cyberattacks , and ready U.S. forces and synchronize public messaging to both deter and manage escalation with Tehran .
To date , Trump hasn ’ t shown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and his administration has never consistently demonstrated these competencies .
Now , because of the fateful decisions Trump has made , the administration is facing by far its greatest test .
And as the United States dives head first into increasingly dark waters , there is a very real danger the administration is navigating blind .

In June 2011, as U.S. forces were withdrawing from Iraq, Iranian-backed militants launched a series of powerful rocket attacks on American bases. More than a dozen U.S. soldiers were killed, the largest loss of life in many months. The Obama administration had two options for retaliating: a strike inside Iran that would kill Iranian operatives or unilateral special operations forces raids in Iraq against the militia rocket teams. To head off an escalation to a wider war with Iran, the administration chose the latter.
In June 2011, as U.S. forces were withdrawing from Iraq, Iranian-backed militants launched a series of powerful rocket attacks on American bases. More than a dozen U.S. soldiers were killed, the largest loss of life in many months. The Obama administration had two options for retaliating: a strike inside Iran that would kill Iranian operatives or unilateral special operations forces raids in Iraq against the militia rocket teams. To head off an escalation to a wider war with Iran, the administration chose the latter.
Last weekend, in response to a Dec. 27, 2019, rocket attack that killed an American contractor and wounded several U.S. and Iraqi personnel at a base near Kirkuk, the Trump administration initially followed a similar path by launching retaliatory airstrikes against Kataib Hezbollah, an Iraqi militia closely aligned with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But then, early Friday morning in Iraq (Thursday evening in the United States), U.S. President Donald Trump threw caution to the wind, authorizing a drone strike that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani—the head of the Quds Force of the IRGC and one of Iran’s most prominent leaders—as well as a number of senior Iraqi militia leaders near the Baghdad airport.
With Suleimani’s death, the monthslong tit-for-tat cycle of pressure and provocation between Washington and Tehran has entered a much more dangerous phase. The risk of a regionwide conflagration is higher than ever. Shortly before the strike, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper threatened preemptive action to protect U.S. forces, saying “the game has changed.” But this is not a game—and the stakes for both sides could not be higher.
No American should shed a tear for Suleimani. As the leader of Iran’s elite paramilitary Quds Force, Suleimani helped orchestrate attacks by Shiite Iraqi militias that killed hundreds of American troops during the U.S. occupation. He also directed Iranian policy and support for Lebanese Hezbollah, jihadists in Gaza, Houthi militants in Yemen, and the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. He had a hand in Iranian terrorist attacks abroad and brutal crackdowns against Iranian protesters at home.
Most recently, in response to Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement and the administration’s maximum pressure campaign of withering sanctions, Iran has carried out a series of provocations with Suleimani’s fingerprints all over them—including threats to U.S. troops in Iraq. According Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, Iranian-backed groups have engaged in a sustained campaign of rocket attacks targeting U.S. facilities in Iraq since October 2019. But until Dec. 27, none had drawn American blood. Once one did, the United States swiftly retaliated, launching strikes against Kataib Hezbollah targets on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border. That, in turn, prompted Shiite militia leaders to mobilize a siege of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, raising the specter of a Benghazi-like scenario. This was the context for Trump’s decision to kill Suleimani.
But whatever underlying sense of justice Americans may feel now that a terrorist mastermind is dead, it should not obscure the very real prospect that his assassination could set in motion events that spiral out of control in ways that put Americans and U.S. interests in deeper danger.
Two previous U.S. administrations decided against a direct shot against Suleimani out of concern, widely shared by the Pentagon and the intelligence community, that all-out escalation would likely follow. As recently as this past spring, the Department of Defense warned the White House against designating the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization, arguing that it could put the lives of U.S. personnel in Iraq and elsewhere in the region at risk. (Trump did so anyway.) And in June, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford helped talk Trump out of retaliating on Iranian soil for the Tehran’s downing of a U.S. drone. This cautious tradition has now been overturned.
Both Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo justified the Suleimani strike as necessary to head off imminent additional attacks against U.S. forces and, in Trump’s words, “stop a war.” It is hard to assess these claims absent the administration releasing relevant intelligence, and whereas the Pentagon statement announcing the strike framed it as defensive, it did not say that any attack from Iran had been imminent. Moreover, some reporting suggests that Trump authorized the targeting of Suleimani after the Dec. 27 rocket assault, and U.S. special operations forces had been waiting for an opportunity for a clean shot ever since. That could explain why the strike happened even after the siege of the U.S. Embassy had ended and events in Iraq appeared to be de-escalating.
Regardless, the president and his closest advisors appear to have a theory behind the targeted killing of Suleimani. They seem to believe that Iran is a paper tiger and that, once punched in the nose, it will slink back into its cave. It is true that, in the past, the Iranian regime has sometimes shown caution in the face of a stronger adversary. It is also the case that, in order to manage escalation, Iranian leaders have historically responded to covert attacks with their own deniable actions or looked the other way when their proxies and advisers have been targeted by Americans or Israelis on foreign soil.
But the Suleimani strike is different. It was an overt act against perhaps the second-most-prominent official in Iran. From an Iranian perspective, the assassination is the equivalent of another country taking out the director of the CIA, secretary of defense, and shadow secretary of state all rolled into one. Whether the United States agrees or not, Iran sees this as an act of war. And the regime will respond at a time, place, and manner of its choosing, because the one thing it fears more than a conflict with the United States is backing down in the face of such a direct challenge to the regime.
Reacting to Suleimani’s demise, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned that “forceful revenge awaits the criminals who have his blood and the blood of the other martyrs last night on their hands.” Revenge could come in many forms. Iran could greenlight Shiite militia groups to significantly escalate rocket and roadside bomb attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq, and to organize additional protests and assaults against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Iranian proxies may target the few hundred American forces protecting oil fields in eastern Syria or direct attacks against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Iran could fire ballistic missiles at U.S. facilities in Iraq or the Persian Gulf, ramp up the sabotage of international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, launch additional missile or drone attacks against critical energy infrastructure in the region, or encourage Lebanese Hezbollah or Palestinian militants to attack Israel. Tehran could orchestrate terrorist attacks against Americans or U.S. interests in the region, as it did in the 1980s in Beirut and in 1996 at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, or plot an attack inside the United States, as it attempted to do in 2011 against the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Or Iran could use its increasingly sophisticated cybercapabilities to strike at the U.S. homeland.
If Iranian retaliation draws more American blood, it will prompt other U.S. counterpunches aimed at, in the words of a recent statement from the Pentagon, “deterring future Iranian attack plans.” And Iranian leaders, facing additional U.S. strikes against their forces and interests, will face a similar calculus. Neither side may want an all-out war, but each increment of escalation and counterescalation will have its own defensive logic—and it is hard to see a clean escape from this spiraling vortex.
Even if the sides avoid a regional war, there will likely be other profound collateral consequences for the killing of Suleimani. Iraqi outrage at the strike could soon make the U.S. position in the country untenable. Caretaker Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi has already denounced the strike as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and an act of aggression against the Iraqi people, and it would not be surprising if the Iraqi parliament demanded the full withdrawal of U.S. forces in the coming days. Trump, long a skeptic of underwriting “ungrateful” allies, may actually leap at the opportunity to pull troops out. The result might appeal to Trump’s base, but it would also set the stage for Iran to further expand its influence in Iraq while making it more difficult to check a resurgence of the Islamic State.
On the nuclear front, too, Iran is likely to ramp up its provocations. Over the past year, in response to Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear accord, Tehran has incrementally restarted elements of its nuclear program. As tensions with the United States heighten, more dramatic steps, including the resumption of much higher levels of uranium enrichment, are likely. And as Iran gets closer and closer to the capability to produce fuel for a nuclear weapon—and the prospects for a diplomatic solution fade—yet another path to a military confrontation with the United States or Israel will emerge.
Given these dangers, the administration needs to level with the American people about its strategy and its plans. It needs to provide the intelligence it used to justify the strike and explain how it will mitigate the myriad risks emanating from it. In another administration, there would also be a coherent national security process to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel and diplomats across the Middle East, prepare for possible civilian evacuations, harden critical infrastructure in the region and at home against Iranian-backed terrorism or cyberattacks, and ready U.S. forces and synchronize public messaging to both deter and manage escalation with Tehran. To date, Trump hasn’t shown the temperament or patience for such deliberation, and his administration has never consistently demonstrated these competencies. Now, because of the fateful decisions Trump has made, the administration is facing by far its greatest test. And as the United States dives head first into increasingly dark waters, there is a very real danger the administration is navigating blind.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-03--Trump’s Iran Policy Is Brain-Dead

Trump’s Iran Policy Is Brain-Dead

Well , that didn ’ t take long .
2020 is less than a week old , and U.S. President Donald Trump has managed to stumble into another pointless and dangerous crisis with Iran .
It is the near-inevitable result of his myopic approach to the entire Middle East ( and especially Iran ) and another demonstration of Washington ’ s inability to formulate a coherent and effective policy toward any important global issue .
When did this country get so bad at strategy ?
In fairness , the problem predates Trump , although his own incompetence , impulsiveness , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pick third-rate advisors has made the problem worse .
The end result may be more innocent lives lost—some of them American—and a further erosion in the United States ’ global position .
And that ’ s assuming that Trump ’ s ordering of the killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Suleimani doesn ’ t lead to all-out war .
With respect to Iran , the assassination is a strategic error entirely of Trump ’ s own making .
Egged on by Saudi Arabia , Israel , hawkish institutes like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and some of his wealthy backers , the president abandoned the multilateral agreement that had successfully capped Iran ’ s nuclear program and also created a diplomatic opening that a savvier administration could have used to address Iran ’ s regional activities .
He then began his campaign of so-called maximum pressure—a comprehensive program of economic warfare against Iran that sought to eliminate the country ’ s enrichment capacity , force Iran to change its foreign policy to suit the United States , and maybe topple the regime itself .
Ordinary Iranians are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions , but the regime has neither caved to Trump ’ s demands nor collapsed .
Instead , it has moved gradually to restart its nuclear program , cultivated closer ties with Russia and China , and retaliated against U.S. allies in the region .
The logic of Tehran ’ s response is straightforward and utterly predictable : If the United States wants to make life difficult for Iran , its leaders will demonstrate that they can make life difficult for the United States too .
It wouldn ’ t take more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ’ s response and recognize that unilateral pressure was not going to work .
By eschewing diplomacy and relying solely on threats and coercion , Trump gave himself no choice but to back down or escalate once it became clear that maximum pressure had backfired .
When an Iraqi militia with ties to Iran staged a rocket attack in early December 2019 that killed a U.S. contractor , Trump responded with airstrikes against the militia camps that killed some two dozen Iraqis .
Pro-Iranian Iraqi demonstrators proceeded to besiege the U.S. Embassy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of life .
The demonstrators eventually dispersed , and the situation seemed to be deescalating .
But then Trump approved the assassination of Suleimani , a very senior and highly respected Iranian official , in Baghdad early Friday morning .
To understand how this chain of events might look from Iran ’ s perspective , consider how the United States might respond if a foreign adversary killed a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the head of the CIA , or maybe even the vice president .
Washington would not just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not to defend Suleimani , who was by all accounts an ardent foe of the United States .
It is rather to ask the proper strategic question : Did assassinating a prominent official of a foreign government advance the country ’ s national interest ?
Will this act make Americans safer and richer , or increase their influence around the world ?
The answer is : no and no .
For starters , Iran will almost inevitably respond , just as the United States would were the situation reversed .
The regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with means of its own choosing , and in ways designed to maximize the pain and political impact .
Second , the assassination is going to inflame Iranian nationalism and strengthen hard-line forces in Iran , further reducing any possibility of regime change there .
Third , killing Suleimani on Iraqi soil is a violation of Iraqi sovereignty that put its fragile government on even shakier ground , and it is worth noting that caretaker Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi has already condemned the U.S. action .
Fourth , Trump has now given Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a step that would force Washington to go to all-out war or back down and accept an Iranian bomb .
All this over a country that has serious disputes with some of the United States ’ regional partners but does not threaten the security or prosperity of the United States itself in any meaningful way .
And finally , there ’ s the precedent the United States is setting .
As the political scientist Ward Thomas explained in a seminal article in 2000 , there has long been a powerful international norm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the leaders of powerful states understand that it is in their mutual self-interest not to try to kill each other .
The taboo didn ’ t completely eliminate the use of this tactic , of course , and Thomas argues that the norm has begun to break down in recent decades .
But do we really want to live in a world where assassination is regarded as a perfectly normal way of doing business and becomes more and more commonplace ?
Surely hawkish American politicians who think killing Suleimani was acceptable don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of ending up on somebody else ’ s target list .
And to be sure , if Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the killing of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky , or if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un decided to redouble his grandfather ’ s efforts to murder politicians in South Korea , it would be far harder for the United States to object .
Moreover , although taking out bad guys may appeal to a crude desire for vengeance , it rarely solves the underlying political problem .
A lot of bad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent decades , yet the political challenges they embodied continue to bedevil us .
Al Qaeda ’ s Osama bin Laden , Libya ’ s Muammar al-Qaddafi , North Korea ’ s Kim Jong Il , Iraq ’ s Saddam Hussein , the Taliban ’ s Mullah Mohammad Omar , the Islamic State ’ s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , and many other U.S. foes are gone , but their deaths didn ’ t magically solve the foreign-policy problems with which they were associated .
Indeed , there is some evidence that “ decapitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders ) tends to empower extremists and incline them toward even greater violence .
In short , the Trump administration ’ s approach to Iran—including this most recent incident—appears devoid of strategic logic or purpose .
Trump , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , Secretary of Defense Mark Esper , and the rest of the administration ’ s foreign-policy team are like chess players who have failed to consider more than one move at a time and thus miss what should be an obvious fact of life in international politics : The other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Their denunciations , reinforcements , sanctions , and drone strikes are foreign policy as performance art , instead of the tough-minded and careful realpolitik that should inform a great nation ’ s approach to the world.iran Now for the really bad news : The lack of strategic thinking—formulating a clear objective and developing a coherent plan to achieve it that anticipates how others are likely to respond—isn ’ t limited to the United States ’ dealings with Iran .
And it goes well beyond the Trump administration , besides .
Indeed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s ability to formulate clear and effective strategies has been steadily eroding for some time .
In my next column , I ’ ll offer some additional illustrations of the problem and explain why genuine strategic thinking is now an endangered species in the Land of the Free .

Well, that didn’t take long. 2020 is less than a week old, and U.S. President Donald Trump has managed to stumble into another pointless and dangerous crisis with Iran. It is the near-inevitable result of his myopic approach to the entire Middle East (and especially Iran) and another demonstration of Washington’s inability to formulate a coherent and effective policy toward any important global issue.
Well, that didn’t take long. 2020 is less than a week old, and U.S. President Donald Trump has managed to stumble into another pointless and dangerous crisis with Iran. It is the near-inevitable result of his myopic approach to the entire Middle East (and especially Iran) and another demonstration of Washington’s inability to formulate a coherent and effective policy toward any important global issue.
When did this country get so bad at strategy?
In fairness, the problem predates Trump, although his own incompetence, impulsiveness, indifference to advice, and uncanny ability to pick third-rate advisors has made the problem worse. The end result may be more innocent lives lost—some of them American—and a further erosion in the United States’ global position. And that’s assuming that Trump’s ordering of the killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Suleimani doesn’t lead to all-out war.
With respect to Iran, the assassination is a strategic error entirely of Trump’s own making. Egged on by Saudi Arabia, Israel, hawkish institutes like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and some of his wealthy backers, the president abandoned the multilateral agreement that had successfully capped Iran’s nuclear program and also created a diplomatic opening that a savvier administration could have used to address Iran’s regional activities. He then began his campaign of so-called maximum pressure—a comprehensive program of economic warfare against Iran that sought to eliminate the country’s enrichment capacity, force Iran to change its foreign policy to suit the United States, and maybe topple the regime itself. Ordinary Iranians are suffering mightily as a result of U.S. sanctions, but the regime has neither caved to Trump’s demands nor collapsed. Instead, it has moved gradually to restart its nuclear program, cultivated closer ties with Russia and China, and retaliated against U.S. allies in the region. The logic of Tehran’s response is straightforward and utterly predictable: If the United States wants to make life difficult for Iran, its leaders will demonstrate that they can make life difficult for the United States too. It wouldn’t take more than a shred of strategic thinking to anticipate Iran’s response and recognize that unilateral pressure was not going to work.
By eschewing diplomacy and relying solely on threats and coercion, Trump gave himself no choice but to back down or escalate once it became clear that maximum pressure had backfired. When an Iraqi militia with ties to Iran staged a rocket attack in early December 2019 that killed a U.S. contractor, Trump responded with airstrikes against the militia camps that killed some two dozen Iraqis. Pro-Iranian Iraqi demonstrators proceeded to besiege the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, although with no loss of life. The demonstrators eventually dispersed, and the situation seemed to be deescalating. But then Trump approved the assassination of Suleimani, a very senior and highly respected Iranian official, in Baghdad early Friday morning.
To understand how this chain of events might look from Iran’s perspective, consider how the United States might respond if a foreign adversary killed a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the head of the CIA, or maybe even the vice president. Washington would not just shrug it off. To say this is not to defend Suleimani, who was by all accounts an ardent foe of the United States. It is rather to ask the proper strategic question: Did assassinating a prominent official of a foreign government advance the country’s national interest? Will this act make Americans safer and richer, or increase their influence around the world? The answer is: no and no.
For starters, Iran will almost inevitably respond, just as the United States would were the situation reversed. The regime will do so at a time and with means of its own choosing, and in ways designed to maximize the pain and political impact. Second, the assassination is going to inflame Iranian nationalism and strengthen hard-line forces in Iran, further reducing any possibility of regime change there. Third, killing Suleimani on Iraqi soil is a violation of Iraqi sovereignty that put its fragile government on even shakier ground, and it is worth noting that caretaker Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi has already condemned the U.S. action. Fourth, Trump has now given Iran even more incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, a step that would force Washington to go to all-out war or back down and accept an Iranian bomb. All this over a country that has serious disputes with some of the United States’ regional partners but does not threaten the security or prosperity of the United States itself in any meaningful way.
And finally, there’s the precedent the United States is setting. As the political scientist Ward Thomas explained in a seminal article in 2000, there has long been a powerful international norm against assassinations by governments, largely because the leaders of powerful states understand that it is in their mutual self-interest not to try to kill each other. The taboo didn’t completely eliminate the use of this tactic, of course, and Thomas argues that the norm has begun to break down in recent decades. But do we really want to live in a world where assassination is regarded as a perfectly normal way of doing business and becomes more and more commonplace? Surely hawkish American politicians who think killing Suleimani was acceptable don’t really want to run the risk of ending up on somebody else’s target list. And to be sure, if Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the killing of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, or if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un decided to redouble his grandfather’s efforts to murder politicians in South Korea, it would be far harder for the United States to object.
Moreover, although taking out bad guys may appeal to a crude desire for vengeance, it rarely solves the underlying political problem. A lot of bad leaders have departed this mortal coil in recent decades, yet the political challenges they embodied continue to bedevil us. Al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, the Taliban’s Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many other U.S. foes are gone, but their deaths didn’t magically solve the foreign-policy problems with which they were associated. Indeed, there is some evidence that “decapitation” (that is, killing top leaders) tends to empower extremists and incline them toward even greater violence.
In short, the Trump administration’s approach to Iran—including this most recent incident—appears devoid of strategic logic or purpose. Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and the rest of the administration’s foreign-policy team are like chess players who have failed to consider more than one move at a time and thus miss what should be an obvious fact of life in international politics: The other player gets to move their pieces too. Their denunciations, reinforcements, sanctions, and drone strikes are foreign policy as performance art, instead of the tough-minded and careful realpolitik that should inform a great nation’s approach to the world.iran
Now for the really bad news: The lack of strategic thinking—formulating a clear objective and developing a coherent plan to achieve it that anticipates how others are likely to respond—isn’t limited to the United States’ dealings with Iran. And it goes well beyond the Trump administration, besides. Indeed, I’d argue that the country’s ability to formulate clear and effective strategies has been steadily eroding for some time. In my next column, I’ll offer some additional illustrations of the problem and explain why genuine strategic thinking is now an endangered species in the Land of the Free.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-03--The U.S. Public Still Doesn’t Want War With Iran

The U.S. Public Still Doesn ’ t Want War With Iran For a president who professes aversion to wars in the Middle East , in ordering the killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani , U.S. President Donald Trump may have made an already slippery slope toward military conflict with Iran much more slippery .
To be sure , it is easy for Trump to point out to the U.S. public that Suleimani had much American blood on his hands , but that still doesn ’ t mean that the public believes that it is in the best interest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A September 2019 University of Maryland poll of a nationally representative sample of 3,016 respondents shows the trouble Trump faces with U.S. public opinion as the crisis with Iran escalates .
There are three main takeaways : Three-quarters of Americans , including a majority of Republicans , say that war with Iran would be unwarranted ; the public mostly blames the Trump administration for heightened tensions with Iran and disapproves of Trump ’ s Iran policy ; and Americans are deeply divided in assessing Trump ’ s goals in Iran .
Overwhelmingly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. interests warrant war with Iran .
Only about one-fifth of respondents say that their country “ should be prepared to go to war ” to achieve its goals with Iran , while three-quarters say that U.S. goals do not warrant it .
Among Republicans , only 34 percent say that war should be on the table to protect U.S. interests .
Even more worrying for Trump , roughly half the poll was conducted before the Sept. 14 militant attacks on Saudi oil fields , which the United States pinned on Iran , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an unusual window into public reaction .
The attack had no impact on U.S. public attitudes , with three-quarters continuing to say the war option is unwarranted .
And there ’ s reason to believe that the recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and the killing of Suleimani would have the same result .
An October University of Maryland poll probed four different possible explanations for the crisis with Iran : the nature of the Iranian regime ; the war in Yemen ; the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new sanctions on Iran , including on its oil exports .
The importance of each was probed separately , after which respondents were asked to rank these factors .
The least popular options were the war in Yemen , which 5 percent blamed , and the nature of the Iranian regime , which 22 percent blamed .
A greater 69 percent fault Trump administration policy , either his decision to withdraw from the Iran deal ( 35 percent ) or the imposition of new sanctions ( 34 percent ) .
Notably , 60 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration actions .
Disapproval of Trump ’ s Iran policy rose from 51 percent before the attack on the Saudi oil fields to 57 percent after .
One might expect a similar public reaction after the latest news events , given the public ’ s aversion to war and apparent belief that early Trump policies are behind the escalation in the Persian Gulf .
The fact that the goal Republicans most cite for Trump ’ s Iran policy is preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons could spell trouble ahead for the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear program in recent months and is likely to move faster after Suleimani ’ s killing .
This polling suggests that an escalation between the United States and Iran that follows the killing of Suleimani will test Trump ’ s approval among the U.S. public .
Of course , the president has demonstrated a superior ability to control the narrative , especially among his supporters .
He ’ ll surely be able to encourage some rallying around the flag .
But the public ’ s weariness of war is real—as are the costs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would entail—and Trump ’ s early actions in withdrawing from the Iran deal and tightening sanctions on Iran are seen by both Democrats and Republicans to be the real culprit in poor relations between the two countries .
And the more Trump ’ s policies are seen as dragging the United States toward confrontation with Iran , the more public opposition he ’ ll face .

For a president who professes aversion to wars in the Middle East, in ordering the killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, U.S. President Donald Trump may have made an already slippery slope toward military conflict with Iran much more slippery. To be sure, it is easy for Trump to point out to the U.S. public that Suleimani had much American blood on his hands, but that still doesn’t mean that the public believes that it is in the best interest of their country to go to war.
For a president who professes aversion to wars in the Middle East, in ordering the killing of the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, U.S. President Donald Trump may have made an already slippery slope toward military conflict with Iran much more slippery. To be sure, it is easy for Trump to point out to the U.S. public that Suleimani had much American blood on his hands, but that still doesn’t mean that the public believes that it is in the best interest of their country to go to war.
A September 2019 University of Maryland poll of a nationally representative sample of 3,016 respondents shows the trouble Trump faces with U.S. public opinion as the crisis with Iran escalates. There are three main takeaways: Three-quarters of Americans, including a majority of Republicans, say that war with Iran would be unwarranted; the public mostly blames the Trump administration for heightened tensions with Iran and disapproves of Trump’s Iran policy; and Americans are deeply divided in assessing Trump’s goals in Iran.
Overwhelmingly, the U.S. public does not believe that U.S. interests warrant war with Iran. Only about one-fifth of respondents say that their country “should be prepared to go to war” to achieve its goals with Iran, while three-quarters say that U.S. goals do not warrant it. Among Republicans, only 34 percent say that war should be on the table to protect U.S. interests.
Which of the following is closer to your view? As of Sept. 2019
Source: University of Maryland
Even more worrying for Trump, roughly half the poll was conducted before the Sept. 14 militant attacks on Saudi oil fields, which the United States pinned on Iran, and half was conducted after, providing an unusual window into public reaction. The attack had no impact on U.S. public attitudes, with three-quarters continuing to say the war option is unwarranted. And there’s reason to believe that the recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and the killing of Suleimani would have the same result.
Which of the following is closer to your view? As of Sept. 2019
Source: University of Maryland
An October University of Maryland poll probed four different possible explanations for the crisis with Iran: the nature of the Iranian regime; the war in Yemen; the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal; and the U.S. imposition of new sanctions on Iran, including on its oil exports. The importance of each was probed separately, after which respondents were asked to rank these factors. The least popular options were the war in Yemen, which 5 percent blamed, and the nature of the Iranian regime, which 22 percent blamed. A greater 69 percent fault Trump administration policy, either his decision to withdraw from the Iran deal (35 percent) or the imposition of new sanctions (34 percent). Notably, 60 percent of Republicans attributed the crisis to Trump administration actions.
Which issue do you think best explains the tensions in the Persian Gulf? As of Oct. 2019
Source: University of Maryland
Disapproval of Trump’s Iran policy rose from 51 percent before the attack on the Saudi oil fields to 57 percent after. One might expect a similar public reaction after the latest news events, given the public’s aversion to war and apparent belief that early Trump policies are behind the escalation in the Persian Gulf.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the U.S. government is handling Iran? As of Sept. 2019
Source: University of Maryland
In assessing the possible goals of Trump administration Iran policy, 30 percent (53 percent of Republicans) say the aim is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. A similar 28 percent (45 percent of Democrats) say the aim is undoing former U.S. President Barack Obama’s policy; 9 percent say Trump just wants to “look tough” at home; and 7 percent each say it’s either to please Middle East allies or to change Iranian behavior.
The fact that the goal Republicans most cite for Trump’s Iran policy is preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons could spell trouble ahead for the president, since Iran has been accelerating its nuclear program in recent months and is likely to move faster after Suleimani’s killing.
What do you believe the Trump administration’s most important goal in its policy toward Iran is currently? As of Sept. 2019
Source: University of Maryland
This polling suggests that an escalation between the United States and Iran that follows the killing of Suleimani will test Trump’s approval among the U.S. public. Of course, the president has demonstrated a superior ability to control the narrative, especially among his supporters. He’ll surely be able to encourage some rallying around the flag. But the public’s weariness of war is real—as are the costs in American blood that conflict with Iran would entail—and Trump’s early actions in withdrawing from the Iran deal and tightening sanctions on Iran are seen by both Democrats and Republicans to be the real culprit in poor relations between the two countries. And the more Trump’s policies are seen as dragging the United States toward confrontation with Iran, the more public opposition he’ll face.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-03--East Asia’s Alliances Are Falling Apart

East Asia’s Alliances Are Falling Apart

2019 was a tough year for established alliances in Northeast Asia .
Between the ongoing diplomatic spat between Japan and South Korea , and U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s upending of decades of U.S. policy toward both treaty allies , old relationships seemed ready to crumble , while new ones are only just being shaped .
The timing and pace of tensions between Japan and South Korea—which involve multiple disputes concerning past agreements , trade , and security—testifies to a new climate of what some have called “ geopolitical recession , ” marked by heightened great-power competition , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing trade protectionism , and negligence regarding prior diplomatic commitments .
It ’ s a leaderless climate that experts argue has been accelerated by Trump ’ s transactional attitude toward the United States ’ collective security arrangements in Europe and hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia , as well as by his forgoing or renegotiation of international agreements such as the Paris climate accord , Trans-Pacific Partnership , North American Free Trade Agreement , and U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement .
Japan-South Korea relations began unraveling in May 2017 , when South Korea ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , walked back a 2015 agreement with Japan on the sensitive issue of South Korea ’ s so-called comfort women , who were forced into sexual slavery during World War II .
Tensions escalated in 2018 , after South Korea ’ s Supreme Court and other high courts ruled in favor of colonial-era forced labor claims that may impact 284 Japanese companies .
An unresolved dispute over rules of engagement between a South Korean Navy vessel and Japanese reconnaissance plane flared in December 2018 and January 2019 , interrupting regular bilateral military exercises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In July 2019 , the government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe placed export controls on strategic goods critical for the production of South Korean semiconductors and smartphones , accusing Seoul of contravening United Nations sanctions by allowing their shipment to North Korea , Iran , and the United Arab Emirates .
Japan next removed South Korea from its white list of preferred trading partners .
South Korea returned the favor , setting off a nationwide boycott of Japanese goods , which led to plummeting sales by companies such as Asahi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and sparked declines in South Korean tourism to Japan .
This past August , Seoul announced it would terminate an intelligence-sharing agreement , the General Security of Military Information Agreement ( GSOMIA ) , with Japan , which the United States helped negotiate in 2016 .
It later backed down after mounting pressure from Washington , agreeing to conditionally push back the deadline for renegotiating GSOMIA hours before it was due to expire in November 2019 .
Tensions persist despite Japan ’ s partial removal of export controls ahead of the Dec. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chengdu , China , with both sides still unwilling to take steps to reset relations .
Through all of this , Tokyo ’ s basic position concerning the recurring historical differences that triggered the expanded dispute has been to uphold three key diplomatic accords : a 1965 treaty normalizing relations with South Korea , a 1998 joint declaration affirming the 1965 agreement as the basis for future cooperation , and the 2015 settlement establishing a $ 9 million joint fund for the surviving comfort women and promising to “ irreversibly ” settle all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Moon ’ s jettisoning of the 2015 comfort women agreement is proof of Seoul ’ s unreliability as a negotiating partner––and Tokyo has a point , to the extent that South Korean national politics tend to be divisive .
All of its living former presidents are serving or have served prison sentences at one time or another .
With the 2015 agreement , Tokyo had intended to conclude years of diplomatic wrangling over revelations in 2005 that the Park Chung-hee government , which ratified the 1965 treaty , did not disburse most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million in restitution to any actual victims , instead earmarking the funds for industrial projects .
Tokyo signed the 2015 agreement while disavowing ownership of the disbursement problem , essentially compromising and simultaneously underwriting its fundamental position that all issues concerning property and claims ( including by comfort women ) were settled in 1965 .
From Japan ’ s perspective , Moon ’ s subsequent enforcement of the forced labor rulings thus solidifies his bad faith in diplomacy , contributing to Tokyo ’ s rejection of Seoul ’ s interest in consummating a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determined opposition to the forced labor issue is born of an additional dilemma : that the Blue House ’ s actions set a dangerous precedent for other countries to reopen their wartime claims , at a time when China and North Korea continue to use history as a diplomatic cudgel against Japan .
Indeed , by expanding the potential universe of contestable historical issues , the forced labor rulings work in Beijing ’ s favor by distracting from Abe ’ s efforts with other Asian leaders to fashion a new architecture of free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Indo-Pacific .
On the South Korean side , Moon has staked a claim as a populist leader determined to reverse the policies of his corrupt , disgraced predecessor Park Geun-hye .
It ’ s a position that compels him not only to undo the perceived wrongdoings of the previous government but also to be extra mindful of public opinions .
Moon has been able to underwrite these changes because the brief period of renewed U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation preceding his administration did not have the backing of the South Korean public––instead , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s wartime victims who felt unrepresented at this summitry and came out strongly against Park during the Candlelight Protests .
Indeed , the 2015-2016 diplomatic achievements of U.S. administration under President Barack Obama , which played an important role in bringing Park and Abe to the negotiating table , have been overshadowed by the anti-Park demonstrations of 2016 and 2017 .
This progressive movement , which cast the comfort women agreement as a breach of democratic civil society ’ s basic right to political representation , outweighed the realpolitik objectives of serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Seoul who hoped GSOMIA would build trust , further bridge state-level differences , and pave the way for a stronger regional security architecture capable of addressing threats such as North Korea ’ s nuclear and missile program .
This sidelining of strategic interests persists under Moon .
The South Korean president does not appear to have a clear approach for dealing with U.S.-China competition .
His New Southern Policy , which attempts to reposition Seoul as a major economic player in Southeast Asia , creates new potential synergies with Japan and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moon ’ s foreign policy––a New Northern Policy mirroring China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia ’ s New Eastern Policy visions for Eurasian connectivity––reveals additional pathways toward cooperation with Tokyo and Washington .
However , Moon administration officials initially rejected any notion of aligning with Trump ’ s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy , which piggybacks on Japan ’ s own Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy plan .
Formal discussions to integrate South Korea into the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy only commenced in mid-2019 when Moon began to face pressure from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over an annual defense cost-sharing Special Measures Agreement , as well as mounting U.S. concern regarding GSOMIA .
Moon is now entering the lame-duck half of his constitutionally limited five-year presidency , the recent uptick in his approval ratings belies a growing disillusionment with his scandal-hit government , impasses in inter-Korean talks , and the failure of his left-leaning economic policies to shield South Korea ’ s cooling economy from the U.S.-China trade war .
Moon is also gearing up to shepherd his party through potentially damaging national assembly elections in April , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drive innovation , and reduce inequality ringing increasingly hollow .
Sensing Moon ’ s weakness , the Abe government has plenty of reasons to continue tightening the spigots on his administration heading into 2020 , despite the toll exacted on Japanese companies in South Korea .
Seoul ’ s eleventh-hour decision to renew GSOMIA , while eliciting a sigh of relief from Tokyo , has not softened Japanese views of Moon .
Despite multiple attempts by South Korean lawmakers to begin defusing tensions , Abe has reportedly told close advisors that he expects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last month , Tokyo deployed a new ambassador to Seoul , Koji Tomita , who analysts believe will signal a new resolve to draw on the United States ’ clout to corner Moon .
A well-respected Japanese interlocutor in Washington who was Abe ’ s special ambassador in charge of coordinating the recent G-20 summit in Osaka , Tomita previously served as head of the Japanese foreign ministry ’ s North American Affairs Bureau and might be expected to draw on his lengthy rolodex of American contacts .
Tomita ’ s access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with military and intelligence matters—he also directed the foreign ministry ’ s national security division—make him a unique choice for navigating the complex security environment of the Korean Peninsula .
Still , Washington ’ s ultimate role in rehabilitating Japan-South Korea ties may be limited .
Even with a new round of U.S.-facilitated diplomacy , the underlying fault lines of public opinion that catalyzed the current row will likely persist .
Though a new generation of politicians in Tokyo and Seoul might hope to wash away history ’ s grim legacy , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crop of leaders––who have presided over otherwise robust economic and people-to-people ties that have achieved noticeably little in terms of mitigating recent disagreements .
Young Japanese and South Koreans are increasingly disengaged from politics , unaware of the finer points regarding the comfort women dispute in particular , and therefore just as likely to be accommodating of or swayed by elite nationalist opinions as they are to overlook historical differences for shared cultural or economic interests .
One result has been that many young South Koreans oppose Abe for his perceived nationalist views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all surviving comfort women––a position that even moderate Japanese who might otherwise dislike Abe may find untenable given Japan ’ s 50-odd official apologies for World War II .
As complicated as these disputes are , Trump has fomented additional uncertainty in Tokyo and Seoul with his indiscriminate threats to authorize new tariffs and troop withdrawals , his unnecessarily aggressive demands for both countries to shoulder larger defense budgets and new missile deployments , and his casual speculation that the United States would be “ better off ” if Japan and South Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off a nuclear arms race .
Tokyo and Seoul both already support boosting military expenditures and developing their own defense industry hubs .
If Trump must prioritize the Special Measures Agreement burden-sharing negotiations with South Korea and Japan , as is now the case , his administration should look for ways of making these negotiations less coercive and taxing on scarce diplomatic resources .
With South Korea , for example , Trump could push Seoul to purchase U.S. defense equipment , providing new capabilities that would allow its military to respond more effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purchases could be deducted from the fivefold increase in defense spending that Washington is currently insisting for the next Special Measures Agreement , thus ameliorating the bitterness caused by the demand in South Korea while additionally supporting U.S. companies .
In expanding South Korea ’ s military capabilities , these purchases would also free Washington to justifiably support an accelerated schedule for the transfer of wartime operational control from United States Forces Korea to the South Korean Armed Forces––something Moon and other South Korean progressives who advocate for military sovereignty would welcome .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the latest in a long line of strategic thinkers to make the case for alliances .
As Washington reinserts itself into the ongoing talks regarding GSOMIA , Trump should use this opportunity to test a new approach to alliance management reflective of these uncertain geopolitical times .
Otherwise , the United States could be in real danger of securing immediate gains from Tokyo and Seoul––only to alienate them later .

2019 was a tough year for established alliances in Northeast Asia. Between the ongoing diplomatic spat between Japan and South Korea, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s upending of decades of U.S. policy toward both treaty allies, old relationships seemed ready to crumble, while new ones are only just being shaped.
2019 was a tough year for established alliances in Northeast Asia. Between the ongoing diplomatic spat between Japan and South Korea, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s upending of decades of U.S. policy toward both treaty allies, old relationships seemed ready to crumble, while new ones are only just being shaped.
The timing and pace of tensions between Japan and South Korea—which involve multiple disputes concerning past agreements, trade, and security—testifies to a new climate of what some have called “geopolitical recession,” marked by heightened great-power competition, a breakdown of international rules and norms, growing trade protectionism, and negligence regarding prior diplomatic commitments. It’s a leaderless climate that experts argue has been accelerated by Trump’s transactional attitude toward the United States’ collective security arrangements in Europe and hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia, as well as by his forgoing or renegotiation of international agreements such as the Paris climate accord, Trans-Pacific Partnership, North American Free Trade Agreement, and U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
Japan-South Korea relations began unraveling in May 2017, when South Korea’s then newly elected president, Moon Jae-in, walked back a 2015 agreement with Japan on the sensitive issue of South Korea’s so-called comfort women, who were forced into sexual slavery during World War II. Tensions escalated in 2018, after South Korea’s Supreme Court and other high courts ruled in favor of colonial-era forced labor claims that may impact 284 Japanese companies. An unresolved dispute over rules of engagement between a South Korean Navy vessel and Japanese reconnaissance plane flared in December 2018 and January 2019, interrupting regular bilateral military exercises and delaying an annual joint business forum.
In July 2019, the government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe placed export controls on strategic goods critical for the production of South Korean semiconductors and smartphones, accusing Seoul of contravening United Nations sanctions by allowing their shipment to North Korea, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Japan next removed South Korea from its white list of preferred trading partners. South Korea returned the favor, setting off a nationwide boycott of Japanese goods, which led to plummeting sales by companies such as Asahi, Toyota, Nissan, and Fast Retailing, and sparked declines in South Korean tourism to Japan.
This past August, Seoul announced it would terminate an intelligence-sharing agreement, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), with Japan, which the United States helped negotiate in 2016. It later backed down after mounting pressure from Washington, agreeing to conditionally push back the deadline for renegotiating GSOMIA hours before it was due to expire in November 2019.
Tensions persist despite Japan’s partial removal of export controls ahead of the Dec. 24, 2019, Moon-Abe summit in Chengdu, China, with both sides still unwilling to take steps to reset relations.
Through all of this, Tokyo’s basic position concerning the recurring historical differences that triggered the expanded dispute has been to uphold three key diplomatic accords: a 1965 treaty normalizing relations with South Korea, a 1998 joint declaration affirming the 1965 agreement as the basis for future cooperation, and the 2015 settlement establishing a $9 million joint fund for the surviving comfort women and promising to “irreversibly” settle all compensation issues.
Japan has made clear that Moon’s jettisoning of the 2015 comfort women agreement is proof of Seoul’s unreliability as a negotiating partner––and Tokyo has a point, to the extent that South Korean national politics tend to be divisive. All of its living former presidents are serving or have served prison sentences at one time or another.
With the 2015 agreement, Tokyo had intended to conclude years of diplomatic wrangling over revelations in 2005 that the Park Chung-hee government, which ratified the 1965 treaty, did not disburse most of Japan’s original $800 million in restitution to any actual victims, instead earmarking the funds for industrial projects. Tokyo signed the 2015 agreement while disavowing ownership of the disbursement problem, essentially compromising and simultaneously underwriting its fundamental position that all issues concerning property and claims (including by comfort women) were settled in 1965.
From Japan’s perspective, Moon’s subsequent enforcement of the forced labor rulings thus solidifies his bad faith in diplomacy, contributing to Tokyo’s rejection of Seoul’s interest in consummating a new grand bargain.
Abe’s determined opposition to the forced labor issue is born of an additional dilemma: that the Blue House’s actions set a dangerous precedent for other countries to reopen their wartime claims, at a time when China and North Korea continue to use history as a diplomatic cudgel against Japan. Indeed, by expanding the potential universe of contestable historical issues, the forced labor rulings work in Beijing’s favor by distracting from Abe’s efforts with other Asian leaders to fashion a new architecture of free and open economic and security institutions for the Indo-Pacific.
On the South Korean side, Moon has staked a claim as a populist leader determined to reverse the policies of his corrupt, disgraced predecessor Park Geun-hye. It’s a position that compels him not only to undo the perceived wrongdoings of the previous government but also to be extra mindful of public opinions. Moon has been able to underwrite these changes because the brief period of renewed U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation preceding his administration did not have the backing of the South Korean public––instead, it alienated outspoken civic groups such as Japan’s wartime victims who felt unrepresented at this summitry and came out strongly against Park during the Candlelight Protests.
Indeed, the 2015-2016 diplomatic achievements of U.S. administration under President Barack Obama, which played an important role in bringing Park and Abe to the negotiating table, have been overshadowed by the anti-Park demonstrations of 2016 and 2017. This progressive movement, which cast the comfort women agreement as a breach of democratic civil society’s basic right to political representation, outweighed the realpolitik objectives of serious policy thinkers in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul who hoped GSOMIA would build trust, further bridge state-level differences, and pave the way for a stronger regional security architecture capable of addressing threats such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.
This sidelining of strategic interests persists under Moon. The South Korean president does not appear to have a clear approach for dealing with U.S.-China competition. His New Southern Policy, which attempts to reposition Seoul as a major economic player in Southeast Asia, creates new potential synergies with Japan and the United States. The other half of Moon’s foreign policy––a New Northern Policy mirroring China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia’s New Eastern Policy visions for Eurasian connectivity––reveals additional pathways toward cooperation with Tokyo and Washington. However, Moon administration officials initially rejected any notion of aligning with Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, which piggybacks on Japan’s own Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy plan. Formal discussions to integrate South Korea into the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy only commenced in mid-2019 when Moon began to face pressure from Trump in the context of hardball negotiations over an annual defense cost-sharing Special Measures Agreement, as well as mounting U.S. concern regarding GSOMIA.
Moon is now entering the lame-duck half of his constitutionally limited five-year presidency, the recent uptick in his approval ratings belies a growing disillusionment with his scandal-hit government, impasses in inter-Korean talks, and the failure of his left-leaning economic policies to shield South Korea’s cooling economy from the U.S.-China trade war. Moon is also gearing up to shepherd his party through potentially damaging national assembly elections in April, with his promises to boost incomes, drive innovation, and reduce inequality ringing increasingly hollow.
Sensing Moon’s weakness, the Abe government has plenty of reasons to continue tightening the spigots on his administration heading into 2020, despite the toll exacted on Japanese companies in South Korea. Seoul’s eleventh-hour decision to renew GSOMIA, while eliciting a sigh of relief from Tokyo, has not softened Japanese views of Moon. Despite multiple attempts by South Korean lawmakers to begin defusing tensions, Abe has reportedly told close advisors that he expects the situation to remain difficult for years.
Last month, Tokyo deployed a new ambassador to Seoul, Koji Tomita, who analysts believe will signal a new resolve to draw on the United States’ clout to corner Moon. A well-respected Japanese interlocutor in Washington who was Abe’s special ambassador in charge of coordinating the recent G-20 summit in Osaka, Tomita previously served as head of the Japanese foreign ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau and might be expected to draw on his lengthy rolodex of American contacts. Tomita’s access to Washington and his particular expertise dealing with military and intelligence matters—he also directed the foreign ministry’s national security division—make him a unique choice for navigating the complex security environment of the Korean Peninsula.
Still, Washington’s ultimate role in rehabilitating Japan-South Korea ties may be limited. Even with a new round of U.S.-facilitated diplomacy, the underlying fault lines of public opinion that catalyzed the current row will likely persist. Though a new generation of politicians in Tokyo and Seoul might hope to wash away history’s grim legacy, the same was expected of today’s crop of leaders––who have presided over otherwise robust economic and people-to-people ties that have achieved noticeably little in terms of mitigating recent disagreements.
Young Japanese and South Koreans are increasingly disengaged from politics, unaware of the finer points regarding the comfort women dispute in particular, and therefore just as likely to be accommodating of or swayed by elite nationalist opinions as they are to overlook historical differences for shared cultural or economic interests. One result has been that many young South Koreans oppose Abe for his perceived nationalist views and believe he should personally apologize to all surviving comfort women––a position that even moderate Japanese who might otherwise dislike Abe may find untenable given Japan’s 50-odd official apologies for World War II.
As complicated as these disputes are, Trump has fomented additional uncertainty in Tokyo and Seoul with his indiscriminate threats to authorize new tariffs and troop withdrawals, his unnecessarily aggressive demands for both countries to shoulder larger defense budgets and new missile deployments, and his casual speculation that the United States would be “better off” if Japan and South Korea protected themselves––even to the point of setting off a nuclear arms race.
Tokyo and Seoul both already support boosting military expenditures and developing their own defense industry hubs. If Trump must prioritize the Special Measures Agreement burden-sharing negotiations with South Korea and Japan, as is now the case, his administration should look for ways of making these negotiations less coercive and taxing on scarce diplomatic resources. With South Korea, for example, Trump could push Seoul to purchase U.S. defense equipment, providing new capabilities that would allow its military to respond more effectively to nuclear and missile threats. These purchases could be deducted from the fivefold increase in defense spending that Washington is currently insisting for the next Special Measures Agreement, thus ameliorating the bitterness caused by the demand in South Korea while additionally supporting U.S. companies. In expanding South Korea’s military capabilities, these purchases would also free Washington to justifiably support an accelerated schedule for the transfer of wartime operational control from United States Forces Korea to the South Korean Armed Forces––something Moon and other South Korean progressives who advocate for military sovereignty would welcome.
Former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis is the latest in a long line of strategic thinkers to make the case for alliances. As Washington reinserts itself into the ongoing talks regarding GSOMIA, Trump should use this opportunity to test a new approach to alliance management reflective of these uncertain geopolitical times. Otherwise, the United States could be in real danger of securing immediate gains from Tokyo and Seoul––only to alienate them later.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-03--Petraeus Says Trump May Have Helped ‘Reestablish Deterrence’ by Killing Suleimani

Petraeus Says Trump May Have Helped ‘ Reestablish Deterrence ’ by Killing Suleimani As a former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former CIA director , retired Gen. David Petraeus is keenly familiar with Qassem Suleimani , the powerful chief of Iran ’ s Quds Force , who was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad Friday morning .
After months of a muted U.S. response to Tehran ’ s repeated lashing out—the downing of a U.S. military drone , a devastating attack on Saudi oil infrastructure , and more—Suleimani ’ s killing was designed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the United States will not tolerate continued provocation , he said .
Petraeus spoke to Foreign Policy on Friday about the implications of an action he called “ more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden.
” This interview has been edited for clarity and length .
Foreign Policy : What impact will the killing of Gen. Suleimani have on regional tensions ?
David Petraeus : It is impossible to overstate the importance of this particular action .
It is more significant than the killing of Osama bin Laden or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abu Bakr ] al-Baghdadi .
Suleimani was the architect and operational commander of the Iranian effort to solidify control of the so-called Shia crescent , stretching from Iran to Iraq through Syria into southern Lebanon .
He is responsible for providing explosives , projectiles , and arms and other munitions that killed well over 600 American soldiers and many more of our coalition and Iraqi partners just in Iraq , as well as in many other countries such as Syria .
So his death is of enormous significance .
The question of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of direct action by its military and Revolutionary Guard Corps forces ?
And how does it direct its proxies—the Iranian-supported Shia militia in Iraq and Syria and southern Lebanon , and throughout the world ?
FP : Two previous administrations have reportedly considered this course of action and dismissed it .
Why did Trump act now ?
DP : The reasoning seems to be to show in the most significant way possible that the U.S. is just not going to allow the continued violence—the rocketing of our bases , the killing of an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on unarmed drones—without a very significant response .
Many people had rightly questioned whether American deterrence had eroded somewhat because of the relatively insignificant responses to the earlier actions .
This clearly was of vastly greater importance .
Of course it also , per the Defense Department statement , was a defensive action given the reported planning and contingencies that Suleimani was going to Iraq to discuss and presumably approve .
This was in response to the killing of an American contractor , the wounding of American forces , and just a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from here if the Iranians don ’ t realize that this can not continue .
FP : Do you think this response was proportionate ?
DP : It was a defensive response and this is , again , of enormous consequence and significance .
But now the question is : How does Iran respond with its own forces and its proxies , and then what does that lead the U.S. to do ?
Iran is in a very precarious economic situation , it is very fragile domestically—they ’ ve killed many , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who were demonstrating on the streets of Iran in response to the dismal economic situation and the mismanagement and corruption .
I just don ’ t see the Iranians as anywhere near as supportive of the regime at this point as they were decades ago during the Iran-Iraq War .
Clearly the supreme leader has to consider that as Iran considers the potential responses to what the U.S. has done .
It will be interesting now to see if there is a U.S. diplomatic initiative to reach out to Iran and to say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be strikes against your oil infrastructure and your forces in your country—where does that end ?
” FP : Will Iran consider this an act of war ?
DP : I don ’ t know what that means , to be truthful .
They clearly recognize how very significant it was .
But as to the definition—is a cyberattack an act of war ?
No one can ever answer that .
We haven ’ t declared war , but we have taken a very , very significant action .
FP : How @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces in the region ?
DP : We ’ ve taken numerous actions to augment our air defenses in the region , our offensive capabilities in the region , in terms of general purpose and special operations forces and air assets .
The Pentagon has considered the implications the potential consequences and has done a great deal to mitigate the risks—although you can ’ t fully mitigate the potential risks .
FP : Do you think the decision to conduct this attack on Iraqi soil was overly provocative ?
DP : Again what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ?
Think of the implications of that .
This is the most formidable adversary that we have faced for decades .
He is a combination of CIA director , JSOC [ Joint Special Operations Command ] commander , and special presidential envoy for the region .
This is a very significant effort to reestablish deterrence , which obviously had not been shored up by the relatively insignificant responses up until now .
FP : What is the likelihood that there will be an all-out war ?
DP : Obviously all sides will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but Iran has to be very worried that—in the state of its economy , the significant popular unrest and demonstrations against the regime—that this is a real threat to the regime in a way that we have not seen prior to this .
FP : Given the maximum pressure campaign that has crippled its economy , the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization , and now this assassination , what incentive does Iran have to negotiate now ?
DP : The incentive would be to get out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crippling .
Could we get back to the Iran nuclear deal plus some additional actions that could address the shortcomings of the agreement ?
This is a very significant escalation , and they don ’ t know where this goes any more than anyone else does .
Yes , they can respond and they can retaliate , and that can lead to further retaliation—and that it is clear now that the administration is willing to take very substantial action .
This is a pretty clarifying moment in that regard .
FP : What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Right now they are probably doing what anyone does in this situation : considering the menu of options .
There could be actions in the gulf , in the Strait of Hormuz by proxies in the regional countries , and in other continents where the Quds Force have activities .
There ’ s a very considerable number of potential responses by Iran , and then there ’ s any number of potential U.S. responses to those actions Given the state of their economy , I think they have to be very leery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result in the first real challenge to the regime certainly since the Iran-Iraq War .
FP : Will the Iraqi government kick the U.S. military out of Iraq ?
DP : The prime minister has said that he would put forward legislation to do that , although I don ’ t think that the majority of Iraqi leaders want to see that given that ISIS is still a significant threat .
They are keenly aware that it was not the Iranian supported militias that defeated the Islamic State , it was U.S.-enabled Iraqi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fought the decisive battles .

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