foreignpolicy--2020-04-02--How WHO Became China’s Coronavirus Accomplice

How WHO Became China ’ s Coronavirus Accomplice While the novel coronavirus is changing the world , China is trying to do the same .
Already a serious strategic rival of the United States with considerable international clout , it ’ s now moving into a new field—health .
After initial denials and cover-ups , China successfully contained the COVID-19 outbreak—but not before it had exported many cases to the rest of the world .
Today , despite the falsehoods it initially passed on , which played a critical role in delaying global response , it ’ s trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stronger position on international health bodies .
Most critically , Beijing succeeded from the start in steering the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , which both receives funding from China and is dependent on the regime of the Communist Party on many levels .
Its international experts didn ’ t get access to the country until Director-General Tedros Adhanom visited President Xi Jinping at the end of January .
Before then , WHO was uncritically repeating information from the Chinese authorities , ignoring warnings from Taiwanese doctors—unrepresented in WHO , which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ public health emergency of international concern , ” denying after a meeting Jan. 22 that there was any need to do so .
After the Beijing visit , though , WHO said in a statement that it appreciated “ especially the commitment from top leadership , and the transparency they have demonstrated.
” Only after the meeting did it declared , on Jan. 30 , a public health emergency of international concern .
And after China reported only a few new cases each day , WHO declared the coronavirus a pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks before .
WHO was keen to broadcast Beijing ’ s message .
“ In the face of a previously unknown virus , China has rolled out perhaps the most ambitious , agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history , ” WHO experts said in their February report on the mission to China .
The country had gained “ invaluable time for the response ” in an “ all-of-government and all-of society approach ” that has averted or delayed hundreds of thousands of cases , protecting the global community and “ creating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international spread.
” China ’ s “ uncompromising and rigorous use of non-pharmaceutical measures ” provides vital lessons for the global response , the WHO report said .
Beijing ’ s strategy “ demonstrated that containment can be adapted and successfully operationalized in a wide range of settings.
” However , while recommending China ’ s epidemic control policy to the world , WHO neglected the negative externalities—from economic damage to the failure to treat many non-coronavirus patients , psychological woes , and human rights costs .
It ’ s not surprising that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said Richard Neher , virologist at the University of Basel .
“ The big lockdown , centralized quarantine , and contact tracing for sure accelerated the decline , ” Neher said .
Lawrence O. Gostin , director of the WHO Collaborating Center on National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University , points to “ major human rights ” concerns with the lockdown techniques pioneered in China and now—to a different degree—adopted in many nations .
Gostin recommends standard public health measures like testing , treatment , contact tracing , and isolation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ While the rising number of cases elsewhere shows that China isn ’ t alone in failing in the initial stages of an outbreak , the full story of the Chinese loss will probably never be known—and certainly not recognized by WHO or other bodies .
One reason is that official data from China is often highly dubious—which can lead to ill-advised health policies in other countries , since studies based on information from China are the first used to understand COVID-19 .
Countless cases of people dying at home in Wuhan—some being described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the statistics .
And while a report by Caixin on the Chinese province of Heilongjiang said that a considerable percentage of asymptomatic cases has not been reported—which amounts to about 50 percent more known infections in China , according to a South China Morning Post report on classified government data—WHO takes numbers reported by Beijing at face value .
“ I thought the greatest success of the Chinese party-state was in getting the WHO to focus on the positive sides of China ’ s responses and ignore the negative sides of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director of the China Institute at the SOAS University of London .
“ With the WHO presenting China ’ s responses in a positive light , the Chinese government is able to make its propaganda campaign to ignore its earlier mistakes appear credible and to ignore the human , societal , and economic costs of its responses.
” Indeed , WHO closes its eyes to such problems .
“ China reported and isolated ALL individuals with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 , ” Christian Lindmeier , a WHO spokesperson , said in mid-March .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April started to make current numbers of asymptomatic cases with lab-confirmed infections public—which also are included in the WHO case definition for COVID-19 .
“ Every country has its own self-reporting processes ” , Lindmeier said .
WHO epidemiologist Bruce Aylward , who headed the visit , said in an interview that China was not hiding anything .
When asked how many people have been put in quarantine , isolation , or residential restriction , Lindmeier referred to numbers from China ’ s National Health Commission—which are much smaller than the numbers calculated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO works with these data , ” he said .
Yet it is unclear whether the WHO experts who traveled to China sufficiently understood the situation on the ground .
For example , based on numbers from the South China province of Guangdong , WHO argued that undetected cases are rare .
However , a screening program for COVID-19 only included patients seen at fever clinics ; most of them probably showed at least a fever .
In Germany , most of the people who tested positive did not show a fever .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ been a substantial number of undetected cases , Neher said , which is the “ big unknown ” in calculations of the death rate .
WHO also left many questions open about how exactly public engagement was managed in its report .
Chinese people have reacted “ with courage and conviction , ” it says ; they have “ accepted and adhered to the starkest of containment measures.
” While this is probably true for many , others were likely motivated by a statement of the Supreme People ’ s Court : People @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow quarantine restrictions “ face jail terms ranging from three to 10 years if the consequence is not serious , ” it says .
Otherwise , they could face a life sentence or death .
“ The community has largely accepted the prevention and control measures and is fully participating in the management of self-isolation and enhancement of public compliance , ” the WHO report says .
In China , no measures have been implemented that could not also be used elsewhere , Aylward claimed in an interview .
Apparently , the WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to speak with people with opposing views .
Many Chinese people told him that they all have been attacked together and need to react in a united fashion , Aylward said .
The very uniformity of this narrative should have been a wake-up call , said Mareike Ohlberg from the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies .
Indeed , the whole trip of both foreign and national experts seems to have been organized along Potemkin-esque lines for a team where most of its international members lacked linguistic skills and familiarity with China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ much interaction until after all the site visits , ” said Clifford Lane , a deputy director at the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and a member of the delegation .
It was his first trip to China , he told Science .
“ I was really surprised with how modern the cities were.
” Ohlberg said the statements of the WHO have clearly been heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party .
She says she was surprised that , from the start , many experts uncritically repeated information from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO and the Chinese government.
” The WHO report rightly emphasized the heroic commitment of the population of Wuhan .
“ But it ’ s important that the WHO does not degrade itself to an instrument of the Chinese government—which does not want to make transparent how the population suffered , ” she said .
Osman Dar , global health expert at Public Health England and the Royal Institute of International Affairs , said that China is no different from other countries that seek to exert influence .
WHO had evolved out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European powers and expansionist U.S. policy , he said .
Since WHO was controlled and largely influenced by the national interests of Western powers before , in the past 20 years , countries like China “ have started to have more influence in the global health space.
” Beijing ’ s say is growing not only at WHO , but also in the health policies of more and more countries .
This also is an important area in China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative and its activities in African countries .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the best interests of its partners .
“ Chinese health aid allocation is poorly related to direct health needs of African countries , ” French researchers last year concluded .
The same is true for the current outbreak , which is politically important , said Tankred Stöbe , former president of MSF ( Doctors Without Borders ) Germany and a former member of the International Board of MSF International .
In February , he traveled to Southeast Asia ( SEA ) as a COVID-19 emergency coordinator for Doctors Without Borders .
Countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ can not escape the influence of China , ” he said .
“ I know about meetings where representatives of China have said : Dear friends in Southeast Asia , we ’ re interested in continuing good cooperation .
It is clear for us that you must let your borders open—otherwise we would have to rethink our friendship.
” The countries “ can not refuse , ” Stöbe said .
Countries like Cambodia and Pakistan kept accepting flights from China during the outbreak .
For political reasons , “ Vietnam can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” physician Rafi Kot told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz .
He founded several medical centers in the country .
“ The Chinese have put immense pressure on everyone : the Koreans , Vietnam , everyone , ” he told the newspaper .
“ Asian countries can not act as they want vis-a-vis China because it ’ s the big power in the neighborhood.
” While Cambodia closed its borders to several Western countries in mid-March , it started military drills together with hundreds of Chinese soldiers , which concluded this Monday .
China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost completely during its COVID-19 outbreak , Stöbe said , forcing the north of the country into a critical economic crisis .
And last weekend Beijing closed its borders to almost all foreigners—a move that it had criticized other countries for during the outbreak within its own borders .
“ The fact that the Chinese government can persuade some SEA countries to keep their borders open to Chinese visitors , whereas it locks down a province with a population larger than most SEA countries shows how influential it is in the region , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Brian Eyler , Southeast Asia program director of The Stimson Center , said he was surprised to see China follow through with sending its foreign minister and an entourage of high-level officials to a Lancang-Mekong Cooperation ministerial meeting in Vientiane on Feb. 20 .
That was “ a day in which the rest of China was on lockdown and cases of new viruses were increasing , ” Eyler said .
The U.S. State Department had “ prudently postponed ” a similar high-level meeting on the same day in Bangkok .
“ So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems China would rather project a business-as-usual stance to its backyard , rather than to err on the side of caution to safeguard those who attended.
” From a human rights perspective , “ authoritarianism is bad for your health , ” said Sophie Richardson , China director at Human Rights Watch .
“ We may never have a clear picture how the virus spread out and who died and why and who is denied access to treatments.
” The world is now living with the consequences of the Chinese government ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only do we have this problem now , we might have it again in the future .
”

While the novel coronavirus is changing the world, China is trying to do the same. Already a serious strategic rival of the United States with considerable international clout, it’s now moving into a new field—health.
While the novel coronavirus is changing the world, China is trying to do the same. Already a serious strategic rival of the United States with considerable international clout, it’s now moving into a new field—health.
After initial denials and cover-ups, China successfully contained the COVID-19 outbreak—but not before it had exported many cases to the rest of the world. Today, despite the falsehoods it initially passed on, which played a critical role in delaying global response, it’s trying to leverage its reputed success story into a stronger position on international health bodies.
Most critically, Beijing succeeded from the start in steering the World Health Organization (WHO), which both receives funding from China and is dependent on the regime of the Communist Party on many levels. Its international experts didn’t get access to the country until Director-General Tedros Adhanom visited President Xi Jinping at the end of January. Before then, WHO was uncritically repeating information from the Chinese authorities, ignoring warnings from Taiwanese doctors—unrepresented in WHO, which is a United Nations body—and reluctant to declare a “public health emergency of international concern,” denying after a meeting Jan. 22 that there was any need to do so.
After the Beijing visit, though, WHO said in a statement that it appreciated “especially the commitment from top leadership, and the transparency they have demonstrated.” Only after the meeting did it declared, on Jan. 30, a public health emergency of international concern. And after China reported only a few new cases each day, WHO declared the coronavirus a pandemic March 11—even though it had spread globally weeks before.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
WHO was keen to broadcast Beijing’s message. “In the face of a previously unknown virus, China has rolled out perhaps the most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history,” WHO experts said in their February report on the mission to China. The country had gained “invaluable time for the response” in an “all-of-government and all-of society approach” that has averted or delayed hundreds of thousands of cases, protecting the global community and “creating a stronger first line of defense against international spread.”
China’s “uncompromising and rigorous use of non-pharmaceutical measures” provides vital lessons for the global response, the WHO report said. Beijing’s strategy “demonstrated that containment can be adapted and successfully operationalized in a wide range of settings.” However, while recommending China’s epidemic control policy to the world, WHO neglected the negative externalities—from economic damage to the failure to treat many non-coronavirus patients, psychological woes, and human rights costs.
It’s not surprising that China’s containment strategy was effective, said Richard Neher, virologist at the University of Basel. “The big lockdown, centralized quarantine, and contact tracing for sure accelerated the decline,” Neher said. Lawrence O. Gostin, director of the WHO Collaborating Center on National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University, points to “major human rights” concerns with the lockdown techniques pioneered in China and now—to a different degree—adopted in many nations. Gostin recommends standard public health measures like testing, treatment, contact tracing, and isolation or quarantine “as scientifically justified.”
While the rising number of cases elsewhere shows that China isn’t alone in failing in the initial stages of an outbreak, the full story of the Chinese loss will probably never be known—and certainly not recognized by WHO or other bodies.
One reason is that official data from China is often highly dubious—which can lead to ill-advised health policies in other countries, since studies based on information from China are the first used to understand COVID-19. Countless cases of people dying at home in Wuhan—some being described in social media posts—will probably never go into the statistics. And while a report by Caixin on the Chinese province of Heilongjiang said that a considerable percentage of asymptomatic cases has not been reported—which amounts to about 50 percent more known infections in China, according to a South China Morning Post report on classified government data—WHO takes numbers reported by Beijing at face value.
“I thought the greatest success of the Chinese party-state was in getting the WHO to focus on the positive sides of China’s responses and ignore the negative sides of the responses,” said Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at the SOAS University of London. “With the WHO presenting China’s responses in a positive light, the Chinese government is able to make its propaganda campaign to ignore its earlier mistakes appear credible and to ignore the human, societal, and economic costs of its responses.”
Indeed, WHO closes its eyes to such problems. “China reported and isolated ALL individuals with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19,” Christian Lindmeier, a WHO spokesperson, said in mid-March. However, Chinese authorities only in the beginning of April started to make current numbers of asymptomatic cases with lab-confirmed infections public—which also are included in the WHO case definition for COVID-19. “Every country has its own self-reporting processes”, Lindmeier said. WHO epidemiologist Bruce Aylward, who headed the visit, said in an interview that China was not hiding anything. When asked how many people have been put in quarantine, isolation, or residential restriction, Lindmeier referred to numbers from China’s National Health Commission—which are much smaller than the numbers calculated by the New York Times. “WHO works with these data,” he said.
Yet it is unclear whether the WHO experts who traveled to China sufficiently understood the situation on the ground. For example, based on numbers from the South China province of Guangdong, WHO argued that undetected cases are rare. However, a screening program for COVID-19 only included patients seen at fever clinics; most of them probably showed at least a fever. In Germany, most of the people who tested positive did not show a fever. It is easily possible that there has been a substantial number of undetected cases, Neher said, which is the “big unknown” in calculations of the death rate.
WHO also left many questions open about how exactly public engagement was managed in its report. Chinese people have reacted “with courage and conviction,” it says; they have “accepted and adhered to the starkest of containment measures.” While this is probably true for many, others were likely motivated by a statement of the Supreme People’s Court: People carrying the virus who don’t follow quarantine restrictions “face jail terms ranging from three to 10 years if the consequence is not serious,” it says. Otherwise, they could face a life sentence or death.
“The community has largely accepted the prevention and control measures and is fully participating in the management of self-isolation and enhancement of public compliance,” the WHO report says. In China, no measures have been implemented that could not also be used elsewhere, Aylward claimed in an interview. Apparently, the WHO mission didn’t have the chance to speak with people with opposing views. Many Chinese people told him that they all have been attacked together and need to react in a united fashion, Aylward said.
The very uniformity of this narrative should have been a wake-up call, said Mareike Ohlberg from the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies. Indeed, the whole trip of both foreign and national experts seems to have been organized along Potemkin-esque lines for a team where most of its international members lacked linguistic skills and familiarity with China. “We really didn’t have much interaction until after all the site visits,” said Clifford Lane, a deputy director at the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and a member of the delegation. It was his first trip to China, he told Science. “I was really surprised with how modern the cities were.”
Ohlberg said the statements of the WHO have clearly been heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party. She says she was surprised that, from the start, many experts uncritically repeated information from Beijing and “preached confidence in the WHO and the Chinese government.” The WHO report rightly emphasized the heroic commitment of the population of Wuhan. “But it’s important that the WHO does not degrade itself to an instrument of the Chinese government—which does not want to make transparent how the population suffered,” she said.
Osman Dar, global health expert at Public Health England and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, said that China is no different from other countries that seek to exert influence. WHO had evolved out of colonial-era international sanitary conferences convened by the European powers and expansionist U.S. policy, he said. Since WHO was controlled and largely influenced by the national interests of Western powers before, in the past 20 years, countries like China “have started to have more influence in the global health space.”
Beijing’s say is growing not only at WHO, but also in the health policies of more and more countries. This also is an important area in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its activities in African countries. It may be doubted whether Beijing always acts in the best interests of its partners. “Chinese health aid allocation is poorly related to direct health needs of African countries,” French researchers last year concluded.
The same is true for the current outbreak, which is politically important, said Tankred Stöbe, former president of MSF (Doctors Without Borders) Germany and a former member of the International Board of MSF International. In February, he traveled to Southeast Asia (SEA) as a COVID-19 emergency coordinator for Doctors Without Borders. Countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand “cannot escape the influence of China,” he said. “I know about meetings where representatives of China have said: Dear friends in Southeast Asia, we’re interested in continuing good cooperation. It is clear for us that you must let your borders open—otherwise we would have to rethink our friendship.” The countries “cannot refuse,” Stöbe said. Countries like Cambodia and Pakistan kept accepting flights from China during the outbreak.
For political reasons, “Vietnam can’t close its border with China,” physician Rafi Kot told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. He founded several medical centers in the country. “The Chinese have put immense pressure on everyone: the Koreans, Vietnam, everyone,” he told the newspaper. “Asian countries cannot act as they want vis-a-vis China because it’s the big power in the neighborhood.” While Cambodia closed its borders to several Western countries in mid-March, it started military drills together with hundreds of Chinese soldiers, which concluded this Monday.
China itself temporarily closed its border to Laos almost completely during its COVID-19 outbreak, Stöbe said, forcing the north of the country into a critical economic crisis. And last weekend Beijing closed its borders to almost all foreigners—a move that it had criticized other countries for during the outbreak within its own borders.
“The fact that the Chinese government can persuade some SEA countries to keep their borders open to Chinese visitors, whereas it locks down a province with a population larger than most SEA countries shows how influential it is in the region,” said Tsang of the China Institute.
Brian Eyler, Southeast Asia program director of The Stimson Center, said he was surprised to see China follow through with sending its foreign minister and an entourage of high-level officials to a Lancang-Mekong Cooperation ministerial meeting in Vientiane on Feb. 20. That was “a day in which the rest of China was on lockdown and cases of new viruses were increasing,” Eyler said. The U.S. State Department had “prudently postponed” a similar high-level meeting on the same day in Bangkok. “So at the end of February, it seems China would rather project a business-as-usual stance to its backyard, rather than to err on the side of caution to safeguard those who attended.”
From a human rights perspective, “authoritarianism is bad for your health,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “We may never have a clear picture how the virus spread out and who died and why and who is denied access to treatments.”
The world is now living with the consequences of the Chinese government’s censorship, Richardson said. “Not only do we have this problem now, we might have it again in the future.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-02--Trump’s Plan to Deploy Anti-Drug Mission in Caribbean Sparks Backlash in Pentagon

Trump ’ s Plan to Deploy Anti-Drug Mission in Caribbean Sparks Backlash in Pentagon Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
We hope all of our readers are staying safe and healthy and doing their part to flatten the curve .
What ’ s on tap today : Some in the Pentagon are pushing back on Trump ’ s directive for a counter-narcotics deployment in the Caribbean , the U.S. military is pulling out of more bases in Iraq , and the U.S. Space Force ramps up spending .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up here .
The U.S. Defense Department has pushed back sharply against President Donald Trump ’ s decision to send a phalanx of naval assets to interdict drug shipments in the Caribbean Sea , a former senior administration official told Foreign Policy .
Resources are somewhat limited : The coronavirus pandemic has ravaged a U.S. aircraft carrier in Asia and sidelined thousands of troops .
Trump apparently ignored the opposition .
“ DoD was against it .
Didn ’ t matter to POTUS , ” the former senior administration official said , adding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assets heading out for the counter-narcotics mission include U.S. Navy destroyers and littoral combat ships , as well as Coast Guard cutters , helicopters , reconnaissance , and patrol planes .
Distraction ?
The former official added that the timing was off , coming as the White House released projections showing that as many as 240,000 Americans could die from the coronavirus .
Trump , the official said , wants to be able to tout the administration ’ s work on building the southern border wall and stopping the flow of drugs from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States indicted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro last week on charges of narco-terrorism conspiracy and drug trafficking .
Pivoting assets ?
Though Trump ’ s announcement came as a surprise to some Pentagon officials , another former defense official said there has been a growing conversation about sending Navy assets to support U.S. Southern Command .
With the Pentagon likely pausing some deployments due to the impacts of COVID-19 and Trump facing re-election , pivoting assets for the drug fight could be another blow to the administration ’ s strategy to get ready @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
U.S. withdrawals from Iraqi bases continue .
The United States continues to consolidate its troop presence in Iraq .
On Tuesday , it withdrew from the K1 Air Base in the northern part of the country , the third base that it has transferred to Iraqi forces since the beginning of March .
The base was at the center of a geopolitical row between the United States and Iran in December , after Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed a U.S. contractor at the site .
That attack led to the U.S. strike that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ January .
Withdrawals from two more bases in western Iraq are planned for the coming days .
Space Force begins spending big time .
The newly created U.S. Space Force has wasted no time in doling out awards for lucrative contracts to ramp up the military ’ s eyes and ears in space .
The latest example : The Space Force awarded L3Harris Technologies a contract worth up to $ 1.2 billion to maintain and upgrade the Pentagon ’ s ground-based sensors tracking developments in space , as C4ISRNet reports .
Still , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ’ next war is in space , as the new director of operations for Space Command emphasized in an interview with FP in December .
More missile tests from North Korea .
Because the world doesn ’ t have enough to deal with , North Korea has decided to test fire more missiles .
As the country ’ s leadership becomes more concerned about the coronavirus within its borders , some experts suggest that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is now using missile tests to demonstrate control in the face of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fired two ballistic missiles into the sea , the latest in a series of similar tests it has conducted in recent weeks .
U.S. negotiations with North Korea have been at a standstill for months .
A pandemic PR coup for Moscow .
A Russian military transport plane landed at New York ’ s John F. Kennedy airport on Wednesday , delivering medical supplies to the United States following a call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin .
The United States is sorely in need of medical supplies—but it ’ s also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , giving it a geopolitical edge on the West , as FP ’ s Amy MacKinnon and Robbie Gramer report .
Canada ’ s ambassador in Washington .
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has formally appointed Kirsten Hillman as ambassador to the United States .
Hillman previously held the post of deputy ambassador from August 2017 to August 2019 , before taking over as acting ambassador upon the resignation of David MacNaughton .
Sanctions in the pandemic era .
The Trump administration is facing growing pressure to temporarily ease some sanctions on countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better respond to the pandemic .
Could this backfire ?
Sanctions expert and former Treasury and CIA official Brian O ’ Toole explores what the U.S. government can and should do in a new piece for the Atlantic Council .
Today the Afghan government begins the process of swapping prisoners with the Taliban , in line with the peace deal struck between the Taliban and the United States in February .
The Afghan government will release 100 jailed Taliban militants in exchange for 20 members of its security forces .
Despite a raft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Europe ’ s largest exercise is moving forward .
The British-led Exercise Joint Warrior exercise will continue in Scotland until its scheduled end date on April 9 , though it has been downsized because of the pandemic .
Case study in Chinese espionage .
How did an ordinary , hard-working American woman sent to do public service abroad end up working as an asset for Chinese intelligence ?
A captivating long read in the Economist ’ s 1843 Magazine by Mara Hvistendahl details how a U.S. State Department administrative employee was wooed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even realized what was happening .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We hope all of our readers are staying safe and healthy and doing their part to flatten the curve . What’s on tap today: Some in the Pentagon are pushing back on Trump’s directive for a counter-narcotics deployment in the Caribbean, the U.S. military is pulling out of more bases in Iraq , and the U.S. Space Force ramps up spending.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We hope all of our readers are staying safe and healthy and doing their part to flatten the curve. What’s on tap today: Some in the Pentagon are pushing back on Trump’s directive for a counter-narcotics deployment in the Caribbean, the U.S. military is pulling out of more bases in Iraq, and the U.S. Space Force ramps up spending.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Pentagon Pushes Back on Trump’s Caribbean Counter-Drug Mission
The U.S. Defense Department has pushed back sharply against President Donald Trump’s decision to send a phalanx of naval assets to interdict drug shipments in the Caribbean Sea, a former senior administration official told Foreign Policy. Resources are somewhat limited: The coronavirus pandemic has ravaged a U.S. aircraft carrier in Asia and sidelined thousands of troops.
Trump apparently ignored the opposition. “DoD was against it. Didn’t matter to POTUS,” the former senior administration official said, adding it was “all politics.” The assets heading out for the counter-narcotics mission include U.S. Navy destroyers and littoral combat ships, as well as Coast Guard cutters, helicopters, reconnaissance, and patrol planes.
Distraction? The former official added that the timing was off, coming as the White House released projections showing that as many as 240,000 Americans could die from the coronavirus. Trump, the official said, wants to be able to tout the administration’s work on building the southern border wall and stopping the flow of drugs from South America. It comes after the United States indicted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro last week on charges of narco-terrorism conspiracy and drug trafficking.
Pivoting assets? Though Trump’s announcement came as a surprise to some Pentagon officials, another former defense official said there has been a growing conversation about sending Navy assets to support U.S. Southern Command. With the Pentagon likely pausing some deployments due to the impacts of COVID-19 and Trump facing re-election, pivoting assets for the drug fight could be another blow to the administration’s strategy to get ready for a potential future war with China.
What We’re Watching
U.S. withdrawals from Iraqi bases continue. The United States continues to consolidate its troop presence in Iraq. On Tuesday, it withdrew from the K1 Air Base in the northern part of the country, the third base that it has transferred to Iraqi forces since the beginning of March. The base was at the center of a geopolitical row between the United States and Iran in December, after Iranian-backed Iraqi militias killed a U.S. contractor at the site. That attack led to the U.S. strike that killed Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in January. Withdrawals from two more bases in western Iraq are planned for the coming days.
Space Force begins spending big time. The newly created U.S. Space Force has wasted no time in doling out awards for lucrative contracts to ramp up the military’s eyes and ears in space. The latest example: The Space Force awarded L3Harris Technologies a contract worth up to $1.2 billion to maintain and upgrade the Pentagon’s ground-based sensors tracking developments in space, as C4ISRNet reports. Still, none of this means that the United States’ next war is in space, as the new director of operations for Space Command emphasized in an interview with FP in December.
More missile tests from North Korea. Because the world doesn’t have enough to deal with, North Korea has decided to test fire more missiles. As the country’s leadership becomes more concerned about the coronavirus within its borders, some experts suggest that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is now using missile tests to demonstrate control in the face of crisis. On March 29, Pyongyang fired two ballistic missiles into the sea, the latest in a series of similar tests it has conducted in recent weeks. U.S. negotiations with North Korea have been at a standstill for months.
A pandemic PR coup for Moscow. A Russian military transport plane landed at New York’s John F. Kennedy airport on Wednesday, delivering medical supplies to the United States following a call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The United States is sorely in need of medical supplies—but it’s also a major public relations victory for Russia, giving it a geopolitical edge on the West, as FP’s Amy MacKinnon and Robbie Gramer report.
Movers and Shakers
Canada’s ambassador in Washington. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has formally appointed Kirsten Hillman as ambassador to the United States. Hillman previously held the post of deputy ambassador from August 2017 to August 2019, before taking over as acting ambassador upon the resignation of David MacNaughton.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Sanctions in the pandemic era. The Trump administration is facing growing pressure to temporarily ease some sanctions on countries including Iran and Venezuela to help them better respond to the pandemic. Could this backfire? Sanctions expert and former Treasury and CIA official Brian O’Toole explores what the U.S. government can and should do in a new piece for the Atlantic Council.
The Week Ahead
Today the Afghan government begins the process of swapping prisoners with the Taliban, in line with the peace deal struck between the Taliban and the United States in February. The Afghan government will release 100 jailed Taliban militants in exchange for 20 members of its security forces.
Despite a raft of military maneuvers canceled amid the pandemic, Europe’s largest exercise is moving forward. The British-led Exercise Joint Warrior exercise will continue in Scotland until its scheduled end date on April 9, though it has been downsized because of the pandemic.
Odds and Ends
Case study in Chinese espionage. How did an ordinary, hard-working American woman sent to do public service abroad end up working as an asset for Chinese intelligence? A captivating long read in the Economist’s 1843 Magazine by Mara Hvistendahl details how a U.S. State Department administrative employee was wooed by Chinese intelligence, perhaps before she even realized what was happening.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-03--Oil Prices Surge After Trump Hints at Saudi-Russian Truce

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Trump teases oil price agreement , U.S. employment report due today , and global coronavirus cases exceed 1 million .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Oil prices posted record daily increases yesterday after U.S. President Donald Trump teased the possibility of a truce in the Saudi-Russian price war and a dramatic cut in oil production .
Trump said production could decrease by as much as 15 million barrels per day , prompting Brent Crude prices to surge 47 percent before settling back down to about 30 dollars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Keith Johnson helps put the move in context , “ There is no actual agreement to trim production among the three biggest oil producers—the United States , Saudi Arabia , and Russia—let alone the other members of OPEC or other countries , like Mexico or Brazil .
And it ’ s also unclear what Trump was even referring to in terms of production cuts—whether total barrels of oil or barrels per day or who might be making the cuts or why.
” Dmitry Peskov , a Russian government spokesman , said no such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , Saudi Arabia immediately called for a meeting between the OPEC plus members “ and other countries ” to seek a deal .
The United States has traditionally not been a part of these kinds of meetings , but its new status as the world ’ s largest oil producer , coupled with its particularly expensive method of extracting oil , means that things could be about to change .
Ryan Sitton , a regulator of the Texas oil industry , said he has talked with Russia Energy Minister Alexander Novak about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per day cut .
President Trump meets with oil industry executives today , with U.S. strategy likely to top the agenda .
With the world under lockdown , isn ’ t a production cut already a necessity ?
In the short-term , no .
Both Russia and Saudi Arabia have enough in cash reserves to ride out any price drop , especially in Russia ’ s case .
Smaller producers do not have that luxury , and so are more likely to go along with any deal .
One immediate problem that cratering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ physical storage capacity : If stores are overloaded and can ’ t be shifted , oil fields may have to cease production entirely—and it can be difficult to start back up again .
Cutting production helps solve that issue .
“ It ’ s a lot more important to slow the flow of oil into storage to prevent the price from catastrophically collapsing , ” Kevin Book , managing director at research firm ClearView Energy Partners , told FP .
How much is the United States likely to influence the talks ?
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clearer following Trump ’ s meeting with oil executives , however , signals of U.S. strategy are beginning to emerge .
U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams made use of U.S. leverage over Russian oil producer Rosneft by signaling that he would consider dropping sanctions against the company .
“ If Rosneft Trading has nothing to do with Venezuela , then the sanctions that are based on its conduct in Venezuela or with respect to Venezuela should be lifted … I don ’ t know if that ’ s true yet , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At 8:30 a.m. in Washington , the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will produce its monthly update on the U.S. employment situation .
However , since its methods of calculation rely largely on data from before the worst coronavirus-related shocks , more accurate numbers are not likely until early May .
On Thursday , the United States shattered its previous weekly record number of jobless claims , as 6.6 million Americans filed for unemployment .
That figure is likely higher , as many state labor departments were not able to keep up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poll by the Associated Press , about half of all working Americans reported a drop in household income as a result of the coronavirus pandemic .
Commander of coronavirus-stricken aircraft carrier dismissed .
The U.S. Navy is to remove the commander of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt after a letter he wrote , outlining deteriorating conditions on the vessel , was leaked to the media .
Over 100 sailors onboard have tested positive for the coronavirus , and the ship has docked at a naval base in Guam in order to cope with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anonymous officials said the commander , Captain Brett Crozier , was being relieved because it is believed he was the source of the media leak .
U.S. aircraft carriers are likely to be shifted around in response to the pandemic , and FP ’ s Jack Detsch reports that the United States will remove an aircraft carrier previously slated to stay in the Persian Gulf .
It ’ s not yet clear where the carrier will now go , but it ’ s expected to deploy to the Pacific .
Coronavirus cases top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rack up , the number of reported coronavirus cases worldwide has passed the 1 million mark—doubling in the past week .
In New York , where over 92,000 cases have been reported , Governor Andrew Cuomo said the state only had enough ventilators stocked to last the next six days .
EU apologizes to Italy .
EU Commision President Ursula von der Leyen has apologized to Italy for the bloc ’ s coronavirus response , as dormant tensions resurface between Europe ’ s north and south .
In a letter in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Leyen said the European Union would set aside 100 billion euros to assist the worst hit countries and that “ Today Europe is rallying to Italy ’ s side.
” The letter did not mention the so-called coronabonds that Italy has requested , and northern countries like the Netherlands and Germany have balked at .
Earlier this week , FP ’ s Keith Johnson reported on why an agreement on a financial solution to the coronavirus crisis is so hard to find .
North Macedonia joins NATO .
In a joint statement , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Macedonia as NATO ’ s 30th alliance member .
North Macedonia removed a major stumbling block to its accession earlier in the process by changing its name from Macedonia and thereby ending a dispute with fellow member Greece .
UN calls for Yemen peace talks .
The United Nations has renewed a call for talks between warring groups in the protracted war in Yemen , Reuters reports .
The UN has proposed convening the Yemeni government , the Saudi-led coalition , and the Houthis in a bid to establish a ceasefire between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Houthi-held Yemeni capital Sanaa earlier this week in retaliation for an attempted missile strike on Riyadh by Houthi forces .
ECJ rules in refugee case .
Hungary has again fallen foul of the European Union after the European Court of Justice ruled that they , along with the Czech Republic and Poland , “ failed to fulfill their obligations under European Union law ” in not meeting refugee quotas established during the 2015 migrant crisis .
The Czech Republic took in 12 refugees , while Hungary and Poland took in none , citing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries are now likely to face fines from the EU .
Afghan prisoner swaps begin .
In the first step of confidence-building measures ahead of potential peace talks , the process of prisoner exchanges is beginning between the Afghan government and Taliban .
To start , 100 Taliban militant prisoners and 20 imprisoned Afghan forces will be released , according to statements by both sides .
The Taliban has demanded that 5,000 of its prisoners be released before peace talks can begin .
FP Conference Call—Please join Foreign Policy for a lively discussion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic today at 11 a.m. EST .
FP Managing Editor Ravi Agrawal will be in conversation with Raghuram Rajan , the former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund and former governor of India ’ s central bank , and Adam Posen , the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics .
Join the livestream here .
The residents of Chicureo , north of the Chilean capital Santiago , probably wish an invasion of wild mountain goats was their only problem .
With Santiago under lockdown , mountain lions have now begun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one found exploring a Chicureo apartment complex late Wednesday night .
Chilean authorities say they have already captured two lions in the past ten days .
Marcelo Giagnoni , the regional director of Chile ’ s Agriculture and Livestock Service , said drought in the Andes foothills surrounding Santiago likely drew the animals closer to the city .
Chicureo ’ s mountain lion has been transferred to the Santiago zoo , where it will be examined before being released .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump teases an oil price agreement, the U.S. employment report is due today, and global coronavirus cases exceed 1 million.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Oil Prices Surge After Trump Teases Price Agreement
Oil prices posted record daily increases yesterday after U.S. President Donald Trump teased the possibility of a truce in the Saudi-Russian price war and a dramatic cut in oil production. Trump said production could decrease by as much as 15 million barrels per day, prompting Brent Crude prices to surge 47 percent before settling back down to about 30 dollars per barrel.
Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson helps put the move in context, “There is no actual agreement to trim production among the three biggest oil producers—the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia—let alone the other members of OPEC or other countries, like Mexico or Brazil. And it’s also unclear what Trump was even referring to in terms of production cuts—whether total barrels of oil or barrels per day or who might be making the cuts or why.”
Dmitry Peskov, a Russian government spokesman, said no such deal is currently on the table, however, Saudi Arabia immediately called for a meeting between the OPEC plus members “and other countries” to seek a deal.
The United States has traditionally not been a part of these kinds of meetings, but its new status as the world’s largest oil producer, coupled with its particularly expensive method of extracting oil, means that things could be about to change. Ryan Sitton, a regulator of the Texas oil industry, said he has talked with Russia Energy Minister Alexander Novak about the possibility of a 10 million barrel per day cut. President Trump meets with oil industry executives today, with U.S. strategy likely to top the agenda.
With the world under lockdown, isn’t a production cut already a necessity? In the short-term, no. Both Russia and Saudi Arabia have enough in cash reserves to ride out any price drop, especially in Russia’s case. Smaller producers do not have that luxury, and so are more likely to go along with any deal. One immediate problem that cratering demand is causing the oil industry is physical storage capacity: If stores are overloaded and can’t be shifted, oil fields may have to cease production entirely—and it can be difficult to start back up again. Cutting production helps solve that issue. “It’s a lot more important to slow the flow of oil into storage to prevent the price from catastrophically collapsing,” Kevin Book, managing director at research firm ClearView Energy Partners, told FP.
How much is the United States likely to influence the talks? The extent of U.S. involvement will be become clearer following Trump’s meeting with oil executives, however, signals of U.S. strategy are beginning to emerge. U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams made use of U.S. leverage over Russian oil producer Rosneft by signaling that he would consider dropping sanctions against the company. “If Rosneft Trading has nothing to do with Venezuela, then the sanctions that are based on its conduct in Venezuela or with respect to Venezuela should be lifted … I don’t know if that’s true yet,” he said.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. employment statistics. At 8:30 a.m. in Washington, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will produce its monthly update on the U.S. employment situation. However, since its methods of calculation rely largely on data from before the worst coronavirus-related shocks, more accurate numbers are not likely until early May.
On Thursday, the United States shattered its previous weekly record number of jobless claims, as 6.6 million Americans filed for unemployment. That figure is likely higher, as many state labor departments were not able to keep up with demand. According to a new poll by the Associated Press, about half of all working Americans reported a drop in household income as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.
Commander of coronavirus-stricken aircraft carrier dismissed. The U.S. Navy is to remove the commander of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt after a letter he wrote, outlining deteriorating conditions on the vessel, was leaked to the media. Over 100 sailors onboard have tested positive for the coronavirus, and the ship has docked at a naval base in Guam in order to cope with the outbreak. Speaking to Reuters, anonymous officials said the commander, Captain Brett Crozier, was being relieved because it is believed he was the source of the media leak.
U.S. aircraft carriers are likely to be shifted around in response to the pandemic, and FP’s Jack Detsch reports that the United States will remove an aircraft carrier previously slated to stay in the Persian Gulf. It’s not yet clear where the carrier will now go, but it’s expected to deploy to the Pacific.
Coronavirus cases top one million. As U.S. cases continue to rack up, the number of reported coronavirus cases worldwide has passed the 1 million mark—doubling in the past week. In New York, where over 92,000 cases have been reported, Governor Andrew Cuomo said the state only had enough ventilators stocked to last the next six days.
EU apologizes to Italy. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has apologized to Italy for the bloc’s coronavirus response, as dormant tensions resurface between Europe’s north and south. In a letter in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Von der Leyen said the European Union would set aside 100 billion euros to assist the worst hit countries and that “Today Europe is rallying to Italy’s side.” The letter did not mention the so-called coronabonds that Italy has requested, and northern countries like the Netherlands and Germany have balked at. Earlier this week, FP’s Keith Johnson reported on why an agreement on a financial solution to the coronavirus crisis is so hard to find.
North Macedonia joins NATO. In a joint statement, NATO’s foreign ministers welcomed North Macedonia as NATO’s 30th alliance member. North Macedonia removed a major stumbling block to its accession earlier in the process by changing its name from Macedonia and thereby ending a dispute with fellow member Greece.
Keep an Eye On
UN calls for Yemen peace talks. The United Nations has renewed a call for talks between warring groups in the protracted war in Yemen, Reuters reports. The UN has proposed convening the Yemeni government, the Saudi-led coalition, and the Houthis in a bid to establish a ceasefire between the sides. The Saudi coalition bombed the Houthi-held Yemeni capital Sanaa earlier this week in retaliation for an attempted missile strike on Riyadh by Houthi forces.
ECJ rules in refugee case. Hungary has again fallen foul of the European Union after the European Court of Justice ruled that they, along with the Czech Republic and Poland, “failed to fulfill their obligations under European Union law” in not meeting refugee quotas established during the 2015 migrant crisis. The Czech Republic took in 12 refugees, while Hungary and Poland took in none, citing threats to public safety. The three countries are now likely to face fines from the EU.
Afghan prisoner swaps begin. In the first step of confidence-building measures ahead of potential peace talks, the process of prisoner exchanges is beginning between the Afghan government and Taliban. To start, 100 Taliban militant prisoners and 20 imprisoned Afghan forces will be released, according to statements by both sides. The Taliban has demanded that 5,000 of its prisoners be released before peace talks can begin.
FP Conference Call—Please join Foreign Policy for a lively discussion on the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic today at 11 a.m. EST. FP Managing Editor Ravi Agrawal will be in conversation with Raghuram Rajan, the former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund and former governor of India’s central bank, and Adam Posen, the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Join the livestream here.
Odds and Ends
The residents of Chicureo, north of the Chilean capital Santiago, probably wish an invasion of wild mountain goats was their only problem. With Santiago under lockdown, mountain lions have now begun venturing deeper into the city, with one found exploring a Chicureo apartment complex late Wednesday night. Chilean authorities say they have already captured two lions in the past ten days. Marcelo Giagnoni, the regional director of Chile’s Agriculture and Livestock Service, said drought in the Andes foothills surrounding Santiago likely drew the animals closer to the city. Chicureo’s mountain lion has been transferred to the Santiago zoo, where it will be examined before being released.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-03--A Most Lonely Union

A Most Lonely Union

Geopolitics is the ruthless pursuit of self-interest by powerful states , no matter the cost to others .
Multilateralism involves mutual agreements among states pursuing their collective welfare .
At a minimum , the two sit awkwardly with each other ; at the worst , they are radically incompatible .
The latter is true of the current system of globalization , which has been supported by a complex system of multilateral rules and agreements among states .
Von der Leyen—and the EU—faces a fundamental strategic dilemma .
More than any ordinary nation-state , the EU is as pure a creature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world .
It is most comfortable when the outside world mirrors its traditional internal principles of organization : free economic exchange and mutually beneficial cooperation .
Deglobalization has cut the EU adrift .
In the new world order , geopolitics—in the form of newly assertive great powers like the United States and China—is coming to trump old trade commitments and international cooperation .
Europe , for its part , has been vacillating between defending the remnants of multilateralism and building up geopolitical muscle so it can pursue its own strategic self-interest .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been willing to leave Italy high and dry—shows how the EU may suffer if it does not figure out how to reconcile these clashing imperatives .
Geopolitics abroad may come to roost at home , undermining the solidarity that the EU needs to exist .
The EU ( then called the European Economic Community ) was founded in a 1957 treaty that set out the new group ’ s aims : eliminating restrictions on the import and export of goods between its member states and abolishing “ obstacles to freedom of movement for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ four freedoms ” —for things , people , services , and money—are still the cornerstone of the EU .
The four freedoms were supposed to not only power an economic dynamo but also build the foundations of a lasting peace .
For most of modern history , Europe had been torn apart by wars between great powers such as Germany and France .
The founders of the EU wanted to transform the politics of Europe , replacing geopolitical conflict with shared institutions and cooperation .
Power had to be recognized : The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they got more votes on crucial EU decisions .
However , their clout was balanced by institutions such as the European Commission and European Court of Justice ( ECJ ) , which were supposed to deal evenhandedly with all members and protect the interests of the smaller states .
The result was a unique set of political arrangements .
The EU has never looked much like a national state .
It employs fewer people than a regional government , has no army , and has very limited spending power .
Even today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The key decisions are taken by its member states .
What it has is the power of rules .
The commission proposes laws , drafts regulations , and makes antitrust decisions .
The ECJ interprets EU law , as well as the basic treaty texts that the EU is founded on , when national courts ask it to .
Even before the current wave of globalization began , the EU was building a globalization in miniature .
Together , the court and commission drew on the four freedoms to build a European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the process .
ECJ decisions struck down national standards and rules that restricted imports from other member states .
The commission issued common regulations to support a truly European marketplace .
Its Directorate- General for Competition acted as an antitrust enforcer against potential monopolists .
In the 1980s and early 1990s , the commission implemented a highly ambitious “ single market ” program aimed at eliminating existing barriers to trade and exchange .
Even before the current wave of globalization began , the EU was building a globalization in miniature .
Within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dominated while free trade rules constrained national governments from building favored firms into national champions .
When globalization really began to take off in the 1990s , the EU was thus ready to help shape it .
It understood how to knock down barriers to market competition .
The founding director-general of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) , Peter Sutherland , had been Europe ’ s competition commissioner at the height of the single market program .
In some ways , the EU was more comfortable with globalization than the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been founded on the belief that open commerce and shared institutions were a better guarantee of peace than great-power maneuverings .
Like the United States , the EU resisted multilateralism in areas of trade that might undermine internal political bargains or sensitive external relationships .
Europe was slow to abandon restrictions on textile imports .
It was notoriously opposed to free trade in bananas , which might damage its ties to former European colonies .
Nonetheless , it grudgingly opened up .
The EU gradually discovered that it could turn its embrace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It could use the internal market ’ s rules and standards to shape the rules and standards of a globalized world .
The EU ’ s combination of a large market and a common standard setting system gave it unique leverage in many sectors .
While the United States had a big market too , its internal regulations and standards were often weak or created by squabbling private organizations .
The commission was a sophisticated and internationally oriented regulator , with decades of experience in making its regulations work across different countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only to impose its rules and standards on multinational firms that wanted to sell to Europe but to get them to apply these rules and standards outside Europe too .
This subtle form of influence , which Columbia University ’ s Anu Bradford has dubbed the “ Brussels effect , ” reshaped global markets .
The EU gradually discovered that it could turn its embrace of globalization into a strategy of influence .
In short , the EU seemed well adapted to a globalized world .
The stronger the EU became , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Europe ’ s direction .
The relationship worked the other way too : The ideas of globalization helped EU officials push for further internal reforms .
It was easier to push member states to accept more European integration in a world where everyone believed in open trade and free movement .
Together , these created a feedback loop between European integration and global markets .
The Brussels effect turned out to have limitations as well .
The EU was able to spread its privacy rules worldwide , but it was too late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s information economy had already been eaten up by Google , Facebook , Amazon , and other big technology firms .
These are not just companies that can be tamed through ordinary antitrust regulation : They aspire to become economies in their own right .
Amazon , for example , is already both a marketplace and a formidable market regulator , setting rules for the businesses that use its many different backend services .
Even before 2016 , it was clear that the EU ’ s approach to globalization needed to be updated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ themselves effectively evolving into markets .
Now Europe is facing the new challenges of a deglobalizing world .
The Trump administration wants to tear apart the existing globalized economy and replace it with an “ America First ” approach to trade .
It scorns multilateralism in favor of threats and one-sided bargains .
It fears China as an adversary and is trying to cut it out of global technology supply chains .
When the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal , it threatened to punish allies that were impertinent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States itself negotiated .
As the political scientist Abraham Newman and I have argued , the United States is weaponizing the trade and financial networks that wove globalization together and turning them into tools of coercion .
Unfortunately for Europe , the United States isn ’ t the only problem .
China is not as powerful as the United States but is just as ruthless in exploiting what economic leverage it has .
For example , it has threatened to retaliate against German car manufacturers if Germany gives in to U.S. pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When a Swedish writers ’ organization gave a prize to a dissident Chinese publisher late last year , China ’ s ambassador to Sweden said on Swedish public radio : “ We treat our friends with fine wine , but for our enemies we got shotguns , ” warning of trade restrictions .
The way that the global economy works is now at odds with the way that Europe itself does business .
Globalization is unraveling as the United States and China face off against each other .
It will not unravel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are too entangled to be easily separated from each other .
But the way that the global economy works is now at odds with the way that Europe itself does business .
Deglobalization has especially imperiled the multilateral institutions governing trade .
The WTO Appellate Body , which serves as a final court of appeal for trade decisions , can not do its work because the United States is vetoing new appointments to it .
The EU is trying to keep the appellate system on life support through independent arbitration .
The Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security exception to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminum may be an even greater threat to the multilateral trade regime that Europe favors .
Global free trade will not survive if states can invoke national security more or less on a whim , but the current U.S. administration may provoke an even bigger crisis if the WTO rules against it .
Europe now finds itself caught between two unattractive alternatives .
It can accept deglobalization and embrace geopolitics , pushing to protect its own businesses as the United States and China protects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within Europe in this direction : Politicians are talking about watering down antitrust regulations and building and promoting European businesses .
However , this would mean giving up on the multilateral institutions that Europe has relied on and hoping that soft power can be transformed into hard bargaining strength .
That may be possible , but it will require luck , time , and profound internal transformation .
For example , the EU is unhappy with how the United States has used the dominance of the dollar to bully European officials and firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ euro as a credible alternative , it will have to create a real system of common banking regulation and shared fiscal capacities , as well as offer stability to non-European currencies in times of economic crisis , just as the United States has .
Even this might be insufficient .
Europe has just lost its greatest geopolitical asset : the city of London , which is one of the core nodes in the global financial network .
Building up clout would require the EU to figure out practical ways to bring London back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can double down on protecting the existing multilateral system , working with other states such as Japan and Canada to build an “ alliance for multilateralism.
” The problem is that the two other great economic powers are taking just the opposite course .
Even if the Trump administration is replaced by a Democratic leadership , the days of easy multilateralism will never return .
Democrats , too , are hawkish about China , and presidential candidates like Bernie Sanders are skeptical about the old free trade nostrums .
What Europe needs is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world to connect its internal and external environments .
EU experts used to describe the “ bicycle theory ” of European integration , claiming that , like a bicycle , European integration must keep on moving or it will fall over .
In its golden age , globalization acted as Europe ’ s bicycle chain connecting the gear of its inner order and the gear of its outside environment , propelling the whole system forward .
Now it needs a new strategy and a new bike chain .
It is a mistake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrawal of nation-states from the world economy .
It is altogether more complex .
The push toward economic decoupling goes together with new needs for global engagement .
The challenge of climate change will require extensive global cooperation .
Under the digital platform economy , algorithms designed by market actors inevitably allow global information flows to impinge on national-level democracy .
( New forms of machine learning , for example , can lump users of digital services into self-perpetuating disadvantaged categories such that a person ’ s online habits might make it nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or to get a loan on reasonable terms . )
Both of these challenges provide new ways to connect Europe ’ s inside and outside .
If Europe is to tackle them , it will need to move to an unparalleled level of internal integration , where it thinks about internal market rules—right from the beginning—as external means of projecting European interests and values .
Responding to climate change will require large-scale regulation and coordinated investment .
Properly regulating information platforms will mean a fundamental shift in how the EU thinks about market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of how the accumulation of data creates its own forms of influence .
Yet integration on its own will be insufficient : Both are global problems .
Europe ’ s challenge , then , is to figure out how climate globalization and information globalization can become a new bicycle chain , using the smaller gear of European integration to propel change in the global economy and the larger gear of the global economy to power change within Europe .
Europe is taking initial steps in this direction .
The new proposals to price @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example of how this can be done , creating a virtuous cycle between Europe ’ s own efforts to reduce carbon emissions and those of other world producers , which will either have to match these efforts or pay a surtax when selling to the European market .
In contrast to traditional tariffs , the ideal outcome of this border tax is that no one will have to pay it because the hope is that everyone will move to more carbon-efficient forms of production .
Even better would be if Europe ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too , making it easier to eventually build a global institutional infrastructure .
Antitrust regulation , too , is changing .
Sutherland ’ s distant successor as EU competition commissioner , Margrethe Vestager , is pioneering a new approach to global enforcement .
Privacy regulation , citizen protection , and traditional antitrust regulation are no longer seen as separate priorities but as different aspects of a single problem : reducing inequities of power within the market to prevent abuses .
Again , this promises to help create a mutually reinforcing relationship between European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far greater , since what European and other democracies value may be seen by countries such as China as undermining their domestic system of rule .
The EU will have a hard time figuring out creative rules to tame big tech companies , but if it succeeds , it can use the Brussels effect to spread these values to other jurisdictions .
None of this will be easy in a world where the United States and China weaponize their economic clout .
Yet it is necessary .
Europe ’ s apparent dilemma between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem .
Deglobalization has broken the relationship between Europe ’ s way of organizing itself and Europe ’ s way of acting in the world .
Rebuilding that relationship will require Europe to discover new ways to couple the engine of integration to the engine of globalization so that strategy and multilateralism point again in the same direction .
This article appears in the Spring 2020 print issue .

In September 2019, two months before officially taking office, the new European Commission president was already insisting that the European Union needed to change. On the one hand, Ursula von der Leyen promised a new “geopolitical Commission,” but on the other, she wanted the EU “to be the guardian of multilateralism.” The difficult question was left unstated: How exactly is the EU supposed to reconcile the great-power maneuvering of geopolitics with the more level playing field of multilateralism?
In September 2019, two months before officially taking office, the new European Commission president was already insisting that the European Union needed to change. On the one hand, Ursula von der Leyen promised a new “geopolitical Commission,” but on the other, she wanted the EU “to be the guardian of multilateralism.” The difficult question was left unstated: How exactly is the EU supposed to reconcile the great-power maneuvering of geopolitics with the more level playing field of multilateralism?
Geopolitics is the ruthless pursuit of self-interest by powerful states, no matter the cost to others. Multilateralism involves mutual agreements among states pursuing their collective welfare. At a minimum, the two sit awkwardly with each other; at the worst, they are radically incompatible. The latter is true of the current system of globalization, which has been supported by a complex system of multilateral rules and agreements among states.
Von der Leyen—and the EU—faces a fundamental strategic dilemma. More than any ordinary nation-state, the EU is as pure a creature of multilateral globalization as exists in the world. It is most comfortable when the outside world mirrors its traditional internal principles of organization: free economic exchange and mutually beneficial cooperation.
Deglobalization has cut the EU adrift. In the new world order, geopolitics—in the form of newly assertive great powers like the United States and China—is coming to trump old trade commitments and international cooperation. Europe, for its part, has been vacillating between defending the remnants of multilateralism and building up geopolitical muscle so it can pursue its own strategic self-interest.
The coronavirus crisis—in which other member states have been willing to leave Italy high and dry—shows how the EU may suffer if it does not figure out how to reconcile these clashing imperatives. Geopolitics abroad may come to roost at home, undermining the solidarity that the EU needs to exist.
Globalization remade Europe before it remade the world. The historian Quinn Slobodian has shown how the driving ideas of globalization—strengthening cross-border exchange and restraining the nation-state—were the motivating force behind European integration.
The EU (then called the European Economic Community) was founded in a 1957 treaty that set out the new group’s aims: eliminating restrictions on the import and export of goods between its member states and abolishing “obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital.” These “four freedoms”—for things, people, services, and money—are still the cornerstone of the EU.
The four freedoms were supposed to not only power an economic dynamo but also build the foundations of a lasting peace. For most of modern history, Europe had been torn apart by wars between great powers such as Germany and France. The founders of the EU wanted to transform the politics of Europe, replacing geopolitical conflict with shared institutions and cooperation. Power had to be recognized: The size of the bigger member states meant that they got more votes on crucial EU decisions. However, their clout was balanced by institutions such as the European Commission and European Court of Justice (ECJ), which were supposed to deal evenhandedly with all members and protect the interests of the smaller states.
The result was a unique set of political arrangements. The EU has never looked much like a national state. It employs fewer people than a regional government, has no army, and has very limited spending power. Even today, its national security powers are negligible: The key decisions are taken by its member states.
What it has is the power of rules. The commission
proposes laws, drafts regulations, and makes antitrust decisions. The ECJ interprets EU law, as well as the basic treaty texts that the EU is founded on, when national courts ask it to.
Even before the current wave of globalization began, the EU was building a globalization in miniature.
Together, the court and commission drew on the four freedoms to build a European free market, enhancing their own authority in the process. ECJ decisions struck down national standards and rules that restricted imports from other member states. The commission issued common regulations to support a truly European marketplace. Its Directorate-
General for Competition acted as an antitrust enforcer against potential monopolists. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the commission implemented a highly ambitious “single market” program aimed at eliminating existing barriers to trade and exchange. Even before the current wave of globalization began, the EU was building a globalization in miniature. Within EU borders, markets and free movement dominated while free trade rules constrained national governments from building favored firms into national champions.
When globalization really began to take off in the 1990s, the EU was thus ready to help shape it. It understood how to knock down barriers to market competition. The founding director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Peter Sutherland, had been Europe’s competition commissioner at the height of the single market program. In some ways, the EU was more comfortable with globalization than the United States was. After all, it had been founded on the belief that open commerce and shared institutions were a better guarantee of peace than great-power maneuverings.
Like the United States, the EU resisted multilateralism in areas of trade that might undermine internal political bargains or sensitive external relationships. Europe was slow to abandon restrictions on textile imports. It was notoriously opposed to free trade in bananas, which might damage its ties to former European colonies. Nonetheless, it grudgingly opened up.
The EU gradually discovered that it could turn its embrace of globalization into a strategy of influence. It could use the internal market’s rules and standards to shape the rules and standards of a globalized world. The EU’s combination of a large market and a common standard setting system gave it unique leverage in many sectors. While the United States had a big market too, its internal regulations and standards were often weak or created by squabbling private organizations. The commission was a sophisticated and internationally oriented regulator, with decades of experience in making its regulations work across different countries. Often, it was able not only to impose its rules and standards on multinational firms that wanted to sell to Europe but to get them to apply these rules and standards outside Europe too. This subtle form of influence, which Columbia University’s Anu Bradford has dubbed the “Brussels effect,” reshaped global markets.
The EU gradually discovered that it could turn its embrace of globalization into a strategy of influence.
In short, the EU seemed well adapted to a globalized world. The stronger the EU became, the easier it was to influence world markets in Europe’s direction. The relationship worked the other way too: The ideas of globalization helped EU officials push for further internal reforms. It was easier to push member states to accept more European integration in a world where everyone believed in open trade and free movement. Together, these created a feedback loop between European integration and global markets.
Now that feedback loop is breaking down. Just as the EU began to globalize before most other countries, it started encountering problems earlier too. International market integration necessarily limited national democracy—and voters didn’t always like it. When EU leaders tried to introduce a new constitution in 2005, French and Dutch voters rejected it. A somewhat less ambitious follow-up document, the Treaty of Lisbon, was rejected by Irish voters in 2008 (though it passed when they were asked to vote again in 2009). The 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated the problems of easy financial flows across borders. The EU was especially weak in financial regulation, meaning banks could relocate their most risky and speculative lending to lax jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Ireland without difficulty. And as the Greek debt crisis mounted, power politics—and the self-interest of Germany—reemerged within Europe. German taxpayers were unwilling to support further integration if it meant they had to pay the bill.
The Brussels effect turned out to have limitations as well. The EU was able to spread its privacy rules worldwide, but it was too late to help European firms. Europe’s information economy had already been eaten up by Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other big technology firms. These are not just companies that can be tamed through ordinary antitrust regulation: They aspire to become economies in their own right. Amazon, for example, is already both a marketplace and a formidable market regulator, setting rules for the businesses that use its many different backend services. Even before 2016, it was clear that the EU’s approach to globalization needed to be updated to deal with market actors that were themselves effectively evolving into markets.
Now Europe is facing the new challenges of a deglobalizing world. The Trump administration wants to tear apart the existing globalized economy and replace it with an “America First” approach to trade. It scorns multilateralism in favor of threats and one-sided bargains. It fears China as an adversary and is trying to cut it out of global technology supply chains. When the Trump administration decided to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, it threatened to punish allies that were impertinent enough to uphold a treaty that the United States itself negotiated. As the political scientist Abraham Newman and I have argued, the United States is weaponizing the trade and financial networks that wove globalization together and turning them into tools of coercion.
Unfortunately for Europe, the United States isn’t the only problem. China is not as powerful as the United States but is just as ruthless in exploiting what economic leverage it has. For example, it has threatened to retaliate against German car manufacturers if Germany gives in to U.S. pressure to block the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei. When a Swedish writers’ organization gave a prize to a dissident Chinese publisher late last year, China’s ambassador to Sweden said on Swedish public radio: “We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we got shotguns,” warning of trade restrictions.
The way that the global economy works is now at odds with the way that Europe itself does business.
Globalization is unraveling as the United States and China face off against each other. It will not unravel completely: The world’s economies are too entangled to be easily separated from each other. But the way that the global economy works is now at odds with the way that Europe itself does business. Deglobalization has especially imperiled the multilateral institutions governing trade. The WTO Appellate Body, which serves as a final court of appeal for trade decisions, cannot do its work because the United States is vetoing new appointments to it. The EU is trying to keep the appellate system on life support through independent arbitration.
The Trump administration’s invocation of a national security exception to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminum may be an even greater threat to the multilateral trade regime that Europe favors. Global free trade will not survive if states can invoke national security more or less on a whim, but the current U.S. administration may provoke an even bigger crisis if the WTO rules against it.
Europe now finds itself caught between two unattractive alternatives. It can accept deglobalization and embrace geopolitics, pushing to protect its own businesses as the United States and China protects theirs. Already, there are moves within Europe in this direction: Politicians are talking about watering down antitrust regulations and building and promoting European businesses. However, this would mean giving up on the multilateral institutions that Europe has relied on and hoping that soft power can be transformed into hard bargaining strength. That may be possible, but it will require luck, time, and profound internal transformation.
For example, the EU is unhappy with how the United States has used the dominance of the dollar to bully European officials and firms. If it wants to build the euro as a credible alternative, it will have to create a real system of common banking regulation and shared fiscal capacities, as well as offer stability to non-European currencies in times of economic crisis, just as the United States has. Even this might be insufficient. Europe has just lost its greatest geopolitical asset: the city of London, which is one of the core nodes in the global financial network. Building up clout would require the EU to figure out practical ways to bring London back into its orbit.
Alternatively, Europe can double down on protecting the existing multilateral system, working with other states such as Japan and Canada to build an “alliance for multilateralism.” The problem is that the two other great economic powers are taking just the opposite course. Even if the Trump administration is replaced by a Democratic leadership, the days of easy multilateralism will never return. Democrats, too, are hawkish about China, and presidential candidates like Bernie Sanders are skeptical about the old free trade nostrums.
Europe needs more than knee-jerk multilateralism or geopolitical cunning if it is to prosper. Naive multilateralism would lead to the EU getting squashed. Geopolitical cunning on its own would suggest that the EU should adopt Trumpism (or Xi Jinping-ism) with European characteristics, championing national firms at home while aggressively pressing its interests abroad. This is a recipe for failure. Europe’s external influence is based on patience and persuasion rather than brute force; it would wither if it became a crude proxy for self-interest. Without a shared commitment to problem-solving, Europe’s internal market would degenerate into a sordid squabble among member states, each favoring its own politically connected firms. Even worse, the political union might disintegrate, as member states absorbed the lesson that national interest trumps all. The EU can manage some temporary national ruthlessness, of the kind exhibited in the Greek debt crisis, or the decision of some member states to close their borders to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. But even this is damaging, and it would undermine the EU if it continued indefinitely. EU experts used to describe the “bicycle theory” of European integration, claiming that, like a bicycle, European integration must keep on moving or it will fall over.
What Europe needs is a new understanding of its place in the world to connect its internal and external environments. EU experts used to describe the “bicycle theory” of European integration, claiming that, like a bicycle, European integration must keep on moving or it will fall over. In its golden age, globalization acted as Europe’s bicycle chain connecting the gear of its inner order and the gear of its outside environment, propelling the whole system forward. Now it needs a new strategy and a new bike chain.
It is a mistake to think of deglobalization as a universal withdrawal of nation-states from the world economy. It is altogether more complex. The push toward economic decoupling goes together with new needs for global engagement. The challenge of climate change will require extensive global cooperation. Under the digital platform economy, algorithms designed by market actors inevitably allow global information flows to impinge on national-level democracy. (New forms of machine learning, for example, can lump users of digital services into self-perpetuating disadvantaged categories such that a person’s online habits might make it nearly impossible for them to find a job or to get a loan on reasonable terms.)
Both of these challenges provide new ways to connect Europe’s inside and outside. If Europe is to tackle them, it will need to move to an unparalleled level of internal integration, where it thinks about internal market rules—right from the beginning—as external means of projecting European interests and values. Responding to climate change will require large-scale regulation and coordinated investment. Properly regulating information platforms will mean a fundamental shift in how the EU thinks about market power so that it incorporates an understanding of how the accumulation of data creates its own forms of influence.
Yet integration on its own will be insufficient: Both are global problems. Europe’s challenge, then, is to figure out how climate globalization and information globalization can become a new bicycle chain, using the smaller gear of European integration to propel change in the global
economy and the larger gear of the global economy to power change within Europe.
Europe is taking initial steps in this direction. The new proposals to price carbon emissions into border taxes provide one example of how this can be done, creating a virtuous cycle between Europe’s own efforts to reduce carbon emissions and those of other world producers, which will either have to match these efforts or pay a surtax when selling to the European market. In contrast to traditional tariffs, the ideal outcome of this border tax is that no one will have to pay it because the hope is that everyone will move to more carbon-efficient forms of production. Even better would be if Europe’s competitors introduced carbon taxes and carbon regulation too, making it easier to eventually build a global institutional infrastructure.
Antitrust regulation, too, is changing. Sutherland’s distant successor as EU competition commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, is pioneering a new approach to global enforcement. Privacy regulation, citizen protection, and traditional antitrust regulation are no longer seen as separate priorities but as different aspects of a single problem: reducing inequities of power within the market to prevent abuses. Again, this promises to help create a mutually reinforcing relationship between European and global rules—although here the challenge is far greater, since what European and other democracies value may be seen by countries such as China as undermining their domestic system of rule. The EU will have a hard time figuring out creative rules to tame big tech companies, but if it succeeds, it can use the Brussels effect to spread these values to other jurisdictions.
None of this will be easy in a world where the United States and China weaponize their economic clout. Yet it is necessary. Europe’s apparent dilemma between geopolitics and multilateralism reflects a much deeper problem. Deglobalization has broken the relationship between Europe’s way of organizing itself and Europe’s way of acting in the world. Rebuilding that relationship will require Europe to discover new ways to couple the engine of integration to the engine of globalization so that strategy and multilateralism point again in the same direction.
This article appears in the Spring 2020 print issue.