foreignpolicy--2020-08-16--Afghans Worried About Pressure from Trump as Talks With the Taliban Get Underway

Afghans Worried About Pressure from Trump as Talks With the Taliban Get Underway KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban today but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November .
Last week the government convened a loya jirga , a mass gathering of representatives from across the country that decides on issues of national importance .
The group agreed to the release of 400 Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails , paving the way for the talks with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the prisoners as among the most dangerous and high-value Taliban captives currently held .
“ In order to remove the hurdles for the start of peace talks , stopping bloodshed , and for the good of the public , the loya jirga approves the release of 400 prisoners as demanded by the Taliban , ” the jirga ’ s decision read .
The attendees said they were not given the names or details of the prisoners , prompting speculation that some might be foreign fighters .
Many Afghans have long accused the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as part of their insurgency .
It was not immediately clear how such non-Afghans would be repatriated and prevented from returning to the country .
Muin Gul Samkanai , of the Rights and Justice party , said the lack of details about these prisoners seemed suspicious .
According to some reports , the list includes the alleged planners of a 2017 truck bomb in Kabul that killed more than 150 people .
“ The only reason they would gather 3,000 people [ for the loya jirga ] and not name a single @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among them .
That ’ s the only thing that makes sense , ” Samkanai said .
The Presidential Palace has denied the presence of foreign fighters among the 400 .
Nilofar Ibrahimi , a parliamentarian from the Northern province of Badakhshan , who was part of the planning committee for two recent loya jirgas , said the delegates were never provided with any details about the prisoners in question .
She said she feared that the Trump administration , in a rush to declare victory in Afghanistan ahead of the November U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic might to force the issue .
“ It ’ s obvious there was pressure on the government to hold this jirga , what I want to know is what exactly that pressure was ?
” Ibrahimi said that the entire peace process , which has so far excluded the Afghan government , highlights the power imbalance between Kabul and Washington , which signed an armistice with the Taliban in February .
“ Rather than state-to-state discussions , the whole process has been about putting pressure on the Afghan government.
” In response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo , the U.S. Secretary of State , and Mullah Baradar Akhund , the Taliban ’ s chief negotiator , Ibrahimi said she was worried that the United States was giving an armed group actively fighting the Afghan government the legitimacy of a state .
A source familiar with the Taliban position said the talks , slated to begin today , would likely be drawn-out with potential hitches and stalemates .
“ The first hurdle will appear right away .
The government ’ s initial point of order will be declaring a nation-wide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primary focus will be on the structure of a future Afghan government , ” said the source , who asked for anonymity .
Several analysts said the Taliban fears being neutralized or sidelined in any future government .
“ The Taliban don ’ t want to become like the old jihadi factions and made useless .
They can ’ t lose their religious dignity in this deal , ” said Obaid Ali , a Kabul-based analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network .
Adding to this fear for the Taliban is the continued existence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State .
Ali said the Taliban is fighting the Islamic State across Afghanistan in part to ensure that the country would be free of insurgencies once a peace deal is reached .
“ Taliban attacks on the IS forces are meant to send a clear signal , ‘ After us , there will be no more militant groups to take our place.
’ ” Ali said the Taliban had gained much diplomatic experience over the past 18 months , which helped the group forge relations with Western powers and regional neighbors .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has five to 10 meetings with representatives from different nations .
They ’ ve learned how to speak to dignitaries , how to negotiate.
” But the Taliban ’ s ability to draw these nations close has caused concern for Kabul—especially among Afghans who have taken part in previous meetings with the Taliban over the years .
Ibrahimi , the parliament member from Badakhshan , said the Taliban have always presented a united front , while the Afghans in attendance seemed to be much more divided .
“ In the past , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very specific points and they would never veer from them , whereas the Afghans all seemed to be speaking for themselves , ” said Ibrahimi , who took part in at least one such meeting and was briefed on others .
Ibrahimi said this fear was the reason the loya jirga included along with their approval of the prisoner release specific recommendations that foreign nationals be immediately repatriated to their own country , that a nation-wide ceasefire be prioritized as part of the talks with the Taliban and that the current democratic structure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace agreement .
While Taliban negotiators appear to be coordinating closely with their leadership council in Pakistan , the Afghan government ’ s diplomacy has been more chaotic .
The Afghan government currently has three bodies tasked with peace efforts : the High Peace Council , a semi-autonomous group created by former President Hamid Karzai , the State Ministry for Peace , currently headed by a former chief of staff to President Ashraf Ghani , and the High Council for National Reconciliation , which is led by Ghani ’ s long-time political rival @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the makeups and agendas of these bodies is not entirely clear to the Afghan people .
That could present a major challenge when sitting across from a more experienced and organized Taliban in Doha , ” said Ali .
The Taliban had first sought negotiations with Washington after the attacks of September 11 , 2001 , but the Bush administration refused .
It wasn ’ t until late into President Barack Obama ’ s first term in 2012 for when the Taliban sent representatives to Qatar talks with U.S. representatives .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ skills , the Afghan government has been increasingly distracted by the escalating war and corruption allegations .
As a result , many Afghans are skeptical that talks between the two sides will bring peace after four decades of violence .
“ Even if peace comes , I ’ m afraid it won ’ t last , ” said Ibrahimi , the parliament member .

KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban Sunday, but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November.
KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban Sunday, but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November.
Last week the government convened a Loya Jirga, a mass gathering of representatives from across the country that makes decisions on issues of national importance. The group agreed to the release of 400 Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails, paving the way for the talks with the Taliban.
The government has described the prisoners as among the most dangerous and high-value Taliban captives currently held.
“In order to remove the hurdles for the start of peace talks, stopping bloodshed, and for the good of the public, the Loya Jirga approves the release of 400 prisoners as demanded by the Taliban,” the group’s decision read.
The attendees said they were not given the names or details of the prisoners, prompting speculation that some might be foreign fighters. Many Afghans have long accused the Taliban of employing foreigners, namely Pakistani nationals, as part of their insurgency. It was not immediately clear how such non-Afghans would be repatriated and prevented from returning to the country.
Muin Gul Samkanai, of the Right and Justice party, said the lack of details about these prisoners seemed suspicious. According to some reports, the list includes the alleged planners of a 2017 truck bomb in Kabul that killed more than 150 people.
“The only reason they would gather 3,000 people [for the Loya Jirga] and not name a single prisoner is that there were foreign nationals among them. That’s the only thing that makes sense,” Samkanai said.
The presidential palace has denied the presence of foreign fighters among the 400.
Nilofar Ibrahimi, a member of parliament from the northern province of Badakhshan, who was part of the planning committee for two recent Loya Jirgas, said the delegates were never provided with any details about the prisoners in question.
She said she feared that the Trump administration, in a rush to declare victory in Afghanistan ahead of the November U.S. election, was using its political and economic might to force the issue.
“It’s obvious there was pressure on the government to hold this Jirga, what I want to know is what exactly that pressure was?” Ibrahimi said.
She said that the entire peace process, which has so far excluded the Afghan government, highlights the power imbalance between Kabul and Washington, which signed an armistice with the Taliban in February.
“Rather than state-to-state discussions, the whole process has been about putting pressure on the Afghan government,” she added.
In response to reports of video conversations between Mike Pompeo, the U.S. secretary of state, and Mullah Baradar Akhund, the Taliban’s chief negotiator, Ibrahimi said she was worried that the United States was giving an armed group actively fighting the Afghan government the legitimacy of a state.
A source familiar with the Taliban position said the talks, slated to begin today, would likely be drawn out with potential hitches and stalemates.
“The first hurdle will appear right away. The government’s initial point of order will be declaring a nationwide cease-fire, but the Taliban’s primary focus will be on the structure of a future Afghan government,” said the source, who asked for anonymity.
Several analysts said the Taliban fear being neutralized or sidelined in any future government.
“The Taliban don’t want to become like the old jihadi factions and made useless. They can’t lose their religious dignity in this deal,” said Obaid Ali, a Kabul-based analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network.
Adding to this fear for the Taliban is the continued existence of fighters claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. Ali said the Taliban are fighting the Islamic State across Afghanistan in part to ensure that the country would be free of insurgencies once a peace deal is reached.
“Taliban attacks on the IS forces are meant to send a clear signal, ‘After us, there will be no more militant groups to take our place,’” he said.
Ali said the Taliban had gained much diplomatic experience over the past 18 months, which helped the group forge relations with Western powers and regional neighbors: “Every day, their office in Doha has five to 10 meetings with representatives from different nations. They’ve learned how to speak to dignitaries, how to negotiate.”
But the Taliban’s ability to draw these nations close has caused concern for Kabul—especially among Afghans who have taken part in previous meetings with the Taliban over the years. Ibrahimi, the parliament member from Badakhshan, said the Taliban have always presented a united front, while the Afghans in attendance seemed to be much more divided.
“In the past, the Taliban would come with a list of very specific points and they would never veer from them, whereas the Afghans all seemed to be speaking for themselves,” said Ibrahimi, who took part in at least one such meeting and was briefed on others.
She said this fear was the reason the Loya Jirga included along with their approval of the prisoner release specific recommendations that foreign nationals be immediately repatriated to their own countries, that a nationwide cease-fire be prioritized as part of the talks with the Taliban, and that the current democratic structure of the nation be preserved in any peace agreement.
While Taliban negotiators appear to be coordinating closely with their leadership council in Pakistan, the Afghan government’s diplomacy has been more chaotic.
The Afghan government currently has three bodies tasked with peace efforts: the High Peace Council, a semi-autonomous group created by former President Hamid Karzai; the State Ministry for Peace, currently headed by a former chief of staff to President Ashraf Ghani; and the High Council for National Reconciliation, which is led by Ghani’s longtime political rival Abdullah Abdullah.
“The hierarchies, the makeups, and agendas of these bodies is not entirely clear to the Afghan people. That could present a major challenge when sitting across from a more experienced and organized Taliban in Doha,” Ali said.
The Taliban had first sought negotiations with Washington after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but the George W. Bush administration refused. It wasn’t until late into President Barack Obama’s first term in 2012 when the Taliban sent representatives to Qatar talks with U.S. representatives.
While the Taliban have been honing their diplomatic skills, the Afghan government has been increasingly distracted by the escalating war and corruption allegations.
As a result, many Afghans are skeptical that talks between the two sides will bring peace after four decades of violence.
“Even if peace comes, I’m afraid it won’t last,” Ibrahimi said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-17--What Donald Trump and George Washington Have in Common

What Donald Trump and George Washington Have in Common In the final days of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign , Donald Trump boasted that , unlike Hillary Clinton , he did not need celebrities to fill large stadiums with his supporters .
“ I didn ’ t have to bring J.Lo or Jay-Z , ” he said .
“ I am here all by myself .
Just me .
No guitar , no piano , no nothing.
” For once , the candidate was neither lying nor exaggerating .
During the campaign , Trump consistently turned out larger and more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in sheer zeal and passion , the crowds were unlike anything seen in American politics over the previous half-century , except for Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama .
Fast-forward four years and then-candidate Trump has become the president who has presided with jaw-dropping incompetence over the worst public health disaster in over a century , an economic collapse , and large-scale urban turmoil .
Yet polls still show him with an approval rating hovering around 40 percent , and a hard core of his base still displays as much fervor for him as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Trump Tower escalator in 2015 .
What is it that explains this continuing , apparently unshakable devotion to a president whom historians are likely to remember as the worst in American history ?
To understand the phenomenon , one must reckon with Trump ’ s charisma .
The word may sit uneasily with the large number of people in America and around the globe who see Trump as anything but charismatic , but this is because of a common misunderstanding about the nature of charisma .
In popular usage , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personal quality—a mixture of charm , confidence , exuberance , and sheer sex appeal .
But , in fact , charisma is more of a relationship .
The same personal qualities that one audience perceives as exuberant and charming may strike another as obnoxious and overbearing .
A great deal depends on what a particular audience is primed to see , is ready to see , and wants to see .
Indeed , in some cases an audience may be so desperate for a charismatic savior that it projects qualities onto a person @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understand charismatic appeal , the audience matters as much as the individual .
And so do the media through which the audience sees the individual and interacts with him or her .
In my new book on charisma in the age of the American Revolution , I gave an example of this approach with reference to a person whom many Americans would see as close to the diametrical opposite of Trump : George Washington .
Today , Washington remains , despite the fact that he owned slaves and tolerated slavery , one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American history .
He was adored and admired in his own time as well .
We tend to forget however , that while the adoration would turn out to be well deserved , it appeared well before Washington had done very much to deserve it .
In the earliest days of the American republic , Washington had a very mixed record , to say the least .
Although he succeeded in forcing the British out of Boston in the late winter of 1776 , that summer his tactical mistakes contributed to a disastrous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a painful retreat across the Hudson from New York to New Jersey .
By December , the American army was melting away , British officers were boasting that the war was almost over , and some of Washington ’ s subordinates were muttering that , as one of them put it , “ a certain great man is most damnably deficient.
” Yet during this period , not only did Washington ’ s reputation suffer no harm ; to the contrary , it flourished .
From the moment he had taken command of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he had been greeted with a torrent of adulation .
At least 15 ships were named for him and his wife .
Children were given his name , and printed portraits appeared in the thousands of copies .
Harvard University gave Washington an honorary degree .
In mid-1776 , a New Jersey family rewrote the anthem “ God Save the King ” with the words “ God save great Washington !
God damn the king !
” Throughout the desperate fall of 1776 , as Thomas Paine was writing “ these are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” scarcely a single word critical of Washington appeared in an American newspaper .
And after Washington ’ s small but important wintertime victories at Trenton and Princeton revived the American cause , the flood of praise turned into a tsunami , with many admirers calling him God ’ s chosen instrument to save America—or even a sort of divinity himself .
Already in this period , one keen observer , John Adams , claimed that the adulation of Washington indeed amounted to a species of idolatry .
But Adams also recognized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and blood to serve as a symbol of hope and unity for their very fragile new nation .
Not only was the United States on the brink of defeat in 1776 .
It was composed of 13 strikingly different states , had an unfamiliar and untried form of government , and was in revolt against a country and king to which its free inhabitants had mostly , until very recently , felt strong loyalty .
Americans did not just need a flag to follow .
They needed a person , and the handsome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bill perfectly , especially when appearing astride an impressive white warhorse in his immaculate uniform and powdered wig .
And the American world of print , which had expanded enormously in the previous quarter century , had a key role to play in casting Washington in the role .
Beyond the daily reporting about Washington in newspapers , printers rushed to profit from engraved portraits , poetry , at least one play that featured him as a lead character , and much else .
Through this material , Americans ( or , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population that was free and literate ) could come to imagine they had a personal connection with the commander in chief .
This sense of a personal connection—this relationship—was at the heart of Washington ’ s charisma .
Skip ahead to the present and while the cast of characters is depressingly different , something of the same phenomenon is still at work .
Much of Trump ’ s base feels that the country faces at least as great a mortal danger today as it did in the fall of 1776 .
( It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hysterical essay “ The Flight 93 Election ” had such resonance four years ago . )
The perceived danger this time is not military nor is it economic .
It supposedly comes from elites , and especially the left , who , either out of greed or sheer ideological malice , supposedly want to destroy the country and have come perilously close to doing so .
Talk to members of Trump ’ s base and you will hear that the left ’ s support of the so-called LGBT agenda threatens the family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ socialism threatens capitalist prosperity .
Its diversity policies threaten merit-based opportunity .
Its academic radicalism threatens patriotic pride .
And its globalism threatens American independence full stop .
The base hears about these threats on a daily basis from talk radio and Fox News .
These media deliberately stoke the fears of their audience , prompting its members to interpret the signs of instability they see all around them as tremors presaging complete social collapse ( at which point there is a pause for advertisements touting precious metals , identity theft protection , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these people long for a savior .
Trump might at first appear a very unlikely candidate for the role , especially in the eyes of evangelicals .
( Has there ever been a more perfect walking embodiment of the seven deadly sins ? )
But unlike previous Republican standard-bearers such as George W. Bush and Mitt Romney , Trump loudly and clearly identifies “ the left ” as a mortal enemy that must be utterly crushed to save the country and makes no attempt whatsoever to reach out to it .
Despite his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once made to win acceptance from Manhattan elites , he remains in manner and speech the brash outsider—the sort of person ( “ Donny from Queens ” ) who is heard on a daily basis phoning in to the Rush Limbaugh or Sean Hannity shows to rant about the liberal enemy .
These attitudes lead the base to see him as “ one of us , ” but at the same time his supposed talents—especially the business acumen he boasts so incessantly about—make him seem extraordinary , even “ chosen.
” His own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ biblical figures , while one of his many campaign managers asserted that “ only God could deliver such a savior to our nation.
” Such religious language , common in Washington ’ s day , had largely faded from American politics , at least outside evangelical circles , until the Trump era .
It has now returned with a vengeance .
In this context , it is worth remembering that the word “ charisma ” originally meant “ a gift of divine grace.
” As in the 18th century , the media also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that conservative media , especially talk radio and Fox , so continuously sing Trump ’ s praises , repeat his lies as truth , and suppress or distort information that might reflect badly on him ( particularly concerning his administration ’ s disastrous record , compared with that of other developed countries , in handling the current pandemic ) .
Trump himself is brilliant at using both his rallies and Twitter to build an intense , intimate , emotional bond with his followers—a charismatic relationship .
His speeches—rambling , often incoherent , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much as the daily monologues of the conservative shock jocks who have done so much to build up his base .
If you share his positions , then in listening to him at his rallies you will feel part of a select club , sharing the jokes and insults about the “ idiots ” and “ nasty people ” on the other side .
Trump ’ s Twitter account has the same effect .
Unlike many other politicians , Trump instinctively grasps that a distinctive feature of social media—the way algorithms put posts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same level as posts from friends and relatives—allows him to pose as a kind of friend or relative himself so that his followers can imagine a personal relationship with him .
Joe Biden ’ s very boring Twitter account reads mostly like a series of snippets from his press releases ( e.g.
, “ I believe that the right to vote is the most fundamental American right there is ” ) .
Trump ’ s Twitter account , with its crazy claims , its grammatical errors , its insults , and its repetitions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dyspeptic uncle .
But we tend to love our dyspeptic uncles , even if we think they sometimes go too far .
These features of Trump ’ s charisma suggest why his support has so far eroded so little despite the world-historical disasters he has presided over this year as president .
The support certainly has eroded somewhat .
Meanwhile , the amiable Biden is proving far harder to cast as an ideologically dangerous left elitist than Clinton .
At this point , it is hard to imagine that Biden will not receive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than Clinton did four years ago .
But Trump ’ s base , tied to him by one of the most remarkable charismatic relationships in American history , remains a formidable stumbling block , especially given the strong possibility of an utter train wreck in the ballot counting in key states on Election Day .
As has been the case so many times in American history , charisma may again make the difference in 2020 .
This article has been adapted from David A.
Bell ’ s new book , Men on Horseback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Age of Revolution .

In the final days of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump boasted that, unlike Hillary Clinton, he did not need celebrities to fill large stadiums with his supporters. “I didn’t have to bring J.Lo or Jay-Z,” he said. “I am here all by myself. Just me. No guitar, no piano, no nothing.” For once, the candidate was neither lying nor exaggerating. During the campaign, Trump consistently turned out larger and more enthusiastic crowds than Clinton. Indeed, in sheer zeal and passion, the crowds were unlike anything seen in American politics over the previous half-century, except for Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama.
In the final days of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump boasted that, unlike Hillary Clinton, he did not need celebrities to fill large stadiums with his supporters. “I didn’t have to bring J.Lo or Jay-Z,” he said. “I am here all by myself. Just me. No guitar, no piano, no nothing.” For once, the candidate was neither lying nor exaggerating. During the campaign, Trump consistently turned out larger and more enthusiastic crowds than Clinton. Indeed, in sheer zeal and passion, the crowds were unlike anything seen in American politics over the previous half-century, except for Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama.
Fast-forward four years and then-candidate Trump has become the president who has presided with jaw-dropping incompetence over the worst public health disaster in over a century, an economic collapse, and large-scale urban turmoil. Yet polls still show him with an approval rating hovering around 40 percent, and a hard core of his base still displays as much fervor for him as at any time since his famous descent of the Trump Tower escalator in 2015.
What is it that explains this continuing, apparently unshakable devotion to a president whom historians are likely to remember as the worst in American history? To understand the phenomenon, one must reckon with Trump’s charisma.
The word may sit uneasily with the large number of people in America and around the globe who see Trump as anything but charismatic, but this is because of a common misunderstanding about the nature of charisma. In popular usage, it tends to be seen solely as a personal quality—a mixture of charm, confidence, exuberance, and sheer sex appeal. But, in fact, charisma is more of a relationship. The same personal qualities that one audience perceives as exuberant and charming may strike another as obnoxious and overbearing. A great deal depends on what a particular audience is primed to see, is ready to see, and wants to see. Indeed, in some cases an audience may be so desperate for a charismatic savior that it projects qualities onto a person that the person completely lacks. To understand charismatic appeal, the audience matters as much as the individual. And so do the media through which the audience sees the individual and interacts with him or her.
In my new book on charisma in the age of the American Revolution, I gave an example of this approach with reference to a person whom many Americans would see as close to the diametrical opposite of Trump: George Washington. Today, Washington remains, despite the fact that he owned slaves and tolerated slavery, one of the most adored and admired figures in American history. He was adored and admired in his own time as well. We tend to forget however, that while the adoration would turn out to be well deserved, it appeared well before Washington had done very much to deserve it. In the earliest days of the American republic, Washington had a very mixed record, to say the least. Although he succeeded in forcing the British out of Boston in the late winter of 1776, that summer his tactical mistakes contributed to a disastrous American defeat in Brooklyn, followed by a painful retreat across the Hudson from New York to New Jersey. By December, the American army was melting away, British officers were boasting that the war was almost over, and some of Washington’s subordinates were muttering that, as one of them put it, “a certain great man is most damnably deficient.”
Yet during this period, not only did Washington’s reputation suffer no harm; to the contrary, it flourished. From the moment he had taken command of the American forces a year earlier, he had been greeted with a torrent of adulation. At least 15 ships were named for him and his wife. Children were given his name, and printed portraits appeared in the thousands of copies. Harvard University gave Washington an honorary degree. In mid-1776, a New Jersey family rewrote the anthem “God Save the King” with the words “God save great Washington! God damn the king!” Throughout the desperate fall of 1776, as Thomas Paine was writing “these are the times that try men’s souls,” scarcely a single word critical of Washington appeared in an American newspaper. And after Washington’s small but important wintertime victories at Trenton and Princeton revived the American cause, the flood of praise turned into a tsunami, with many admirers calling him God’s chosen instrument to save America—or even a sort of divinity himself. Already in this period, one keen observer, John Adams, claimed that the adulation of Washington indeed amounted to a species of idolatry.
But Adams also recognized that Americans needed a figure of flesh and blood to serve as a symbol of hope and unity for their very fragile new nation. Not only was the United States on the brink of defeat in 1776. It was composed of 13 strikingly different states, had an unfamiliar and untried form of government, and was in revolt against a country and king to which its free inhabitants had mostly, until very recently, felt strong loyalty. Americans did not just need a flag to follow. They needed a person, and the handsome, graceful, physically imposing Washington fit the bill perfectly, especially when appearing astride an impressive white warhorse in his immaculate uniform and powdered wig. And the American world of print, which had expanded enormously in the previous quarter century, had a key role to play in casting Washington in the role. Beyond the daily reporting about Washington in newspapers, printers rushed to profit from engraved portraits, poetry, at least one play that featured him as a lead character, and much else. Through this material, Americans (or, at least, the portion of the population that was free and literate) could come to imagine they had a personal connection with the commander in chief. This sense of a personal connection—this relationship—was at the heart of Washington’s charisma.
Skip ahead to the present and while the cast of characters is depressingly different, something of the same phenomenon is still at work. Much of Trump’s base feels that the country faces at least as great a mortal danger today as it did in the fall of 1776. (It is no coincidence that Michael Anton’s hysterical essay “The Flight 93 Election” had such resonance four years ago.) The perceived danger this time is not military nor is it economic. It supposedly comes from elites, and especially the left, who, either out of greed or sheer ideological malice, supposedly want to destroy the country and have come perilously close to doing so. Talk to members of Trump’s base and you will hear that the left’s support of the so-called LGBT agenda threatens the family. Its secularism threatens religion. Its socialism threatens capitalist prosperity. Its diversity policies threaten merit-based opportunity. Its academic radicalism threatens patriotic pride. And its globalism threatens American independence full stop. The base hears about these threats on a daily basis from talk radio and Fox News. These media deliberately stoke the fears of their audience, prompting its members to interpret the signs of instability they see all around them as tremors presaging complete social collapse (at which point there is a pause for advertisements touting precious metals, identity theft protection, and survivalist equipment). No wonder these people long for a savior.
Trump might at first appear a very unlikely candidate for the role, especially in the eyes of evangelicals. (Has there ever been a more perfect walking embodiment of the seven deadly sins?) But unlike previous Republican standard-bearers such as George W. Bush and Mitt Romney, Trump loudly and clearly identifies “the left” as a mortal enemy that must be utterly crushed to save the country and makes no attempt whatsoever to reach out to it. Despite his wealth, and the strenuous attempts he once made to win acceptance from Manhattan elites, he remains in manner and speech the brash outsider—the sort of person (“Donny from Queens”) who is heard on a daily basis phoning in to the Rush Limbaugh or Sean Hannity shows to rant about the liberal enemy.
These attitudes lead the base to see him as “one of us,” but at the same time his supposed talents—especially the business acumen he boasts so incessantly about—make him seem extraordinary, even “chosen.” His own secretary of state has compared him to biblical figures, while one of his many campaign managers asserted that “only God could deliver such a savior to our nation.” Such religious language, common in Washington’s day, had largely faded from American politics, at least outside evangelical circles, until the Trump era. It has now returned with a vengeance. In this context, it is worth remembering that the word “charisma” originally meant “a gift of divine grace.”
As in the 18th century, the media also matter. And it is not just that conservative media, especially talk radio and Fox, so continuously sing Trump’s praises, repeat his lies as truth, and suppress or distort information that might reflect badly on him (particularly concerning his administration’s disastrous record, compared with that of other developed countries, in handling the current pandemic). Trump himself is brilliant at using both his rallies and Twitter to build an intense, intimate, emotional bond with his followers—a charismatic relationship. His speeches—rambling, often incoherent, but also crudely funny and entertaining—resemble nothing so much as the daily monologues of the conservative shock jocks who have done so much to build up his base. If you share his positions, then in listening to him at his rallies you will feel part of a select club, sharing the jokes and insults about the “idiots” and “nasty people” on the other side.
Trump’s Twitter account has the same effect. Unlike many other politicians, Trump instinctively grasps that a distinctive feature of social media—the way algorithms put posts from politicians and celebrities on exactly the same level as posts from friends and relatives—allows him to pose as a kind of friend or relative himself so that his followers can imagine a personal relationship with him. Joe Biden’s very boring Twitter account reads mostly like a series of snippets from his press releases (e.g., “I believe that the right to vote is the most fundamental American right there is”). Trump’s Twitter account, with its crazy claims, its grammatical errors, its insults, and its repetitions, sounds like the ravings of a dyspeptic uncle. But we tend to love our dyspeptic uncles, even if we think they sometimes go too far.
These features of Trump’s charisma suggest why his support has so far eroded so little despite the world-historical disasters he has presided over this year as president. The support certainly has eroded somewhat. Meanwhile, the amiable Biden is proving far harder to cast as an ideologically dangerous left elitist than Clinton. At this point, it is hard to imagine that Biden will not receive a greater proportion of the popular vote than Clinton did four years ago. But Trump’s base, tied to him by one of the most remarkable charismatic relationships in American history, remains a formidable stumbling block, especially given the strong possibility of an utter train wreck in the ballot counting in key states on Election Day. As has been the case so many times in American history, charisma may again make the difference in 2020.
This article has been adapted from David A. Bell’s new book, Men on Horseback: The Power of Charisma in the Age of Revolution.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-17--China and the United States Are in a Race to Lose Power

China and the United States Are in a Race to Lose Power Back in the bad old days of the Cold War , I recall hearing a well-known academic ( and former diplomat ) remark that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in “ a relentless competition to see which one could lose influence fastest.
” Assuming my memory is accurate , he then added , “ Fortunately , the Soviets are winning.
” I ’ m wary of facile analogies to that earlier period of great-power rivalry , but that observation seems to be an apt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and American foreign policy .
Beijing and Washington can each point to a few successes over the past year or two , but for the most part both seem to be perfecting the art of the own goal .
Citizens of both countries have reason to be grateful ; given how poorly their leaders have performed , it ’ s a small miracle the other side hasn ’ t taken better advantage .
Let ’ s start with the United States .
I ’ m old enough to remember when it enjoyed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Empire .
Sadly , assorted sins of omission and commission under both Democrats and Republicans wasted the so-called unipolar moment and facilitated the rise of a new set of challengers .
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton made the first missteps but escaped most of the blame , because the consequences of his blunders ( NATO enlargement , dual containment , a bungled Middle East peace process , and overzealous pursuit of globalization ) did not come home to roost until after he had left office .
President George W. Bush got to deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the 9/11 attacks ) , and he compounded the error by launching global anti-terrorism campaigns , invading Iraq , and letting a dangerous financial bubble burst in 2008 .
President Barack Obama failed to reverse the slide despite his successful rescue of the economy and his personal popularity in much of the world , and the consequences of these accumulating failures helped open the door to President Donald Trump ’ s reign of error .
As president , Trump has mostly demonstrated how to squander goodwill and respect and get little or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and gratuitously insulted some of America ’ s closest allies , referred to poorer nations as “ shithole countries ” and described U.S. neighbors in Latin America as teeming with rapists , murderers , and other dangerous types .
In a world where a majority of people are nonwhite , he ’ s made common cause with racists and is basing his election campaign on stoking such sentiments in portions of his base .
His decisions on the Trans-Pacific Partnership , the Paris climate accord , the Iran nuclear deal , and North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of countries and brought the United States no significant benefits .
His fawning embrace of such dictators and autocrats as Russia ’ s Vladimir Putin , China ’ s Xi Jinping , Saudi Arabia ’ s Mohammed bin Salman , the Philippines ’ Rodrigo Duterte , and Egypt ’ s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi—to name but a few—has shredded whatever moral authority the United States might have had left .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s sanctimonious moralizing , mismanagement of his department , and lack of interest in genuine diplomacy hasn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most tellingly , Trump ’ s disastrous handling of the coronavirus pandemic has made the United States look incompetent and incapable of reform , a development that is bound to make other countries look elsewhere for advice on how to grapple with today ’ s challenges .
As the Irish Times writer Fintan O ’ Toole recently put it : As country after country bars Americans from entering because they are worried that they will spread disease , who can blame them ?
You ’ d think this situation would be a golden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and increasingly powerful China .
Beijing has benefited in the past from America ’ s mistakes and was careful not to imitate them .
Like the United States throughout most of the 19th century , which stayed out of trouble abroad and focused its energies on building a world-class economy at home , China was concentrated on internal development and been all too content to watch the United States stumble into costly quagmires and internal disarray .
But instead of taking advantage of America ’ s latest stumbles and working to consolidate its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ superpower , lately China appears to be succumbing to its own version of foreign-policy malpractice .
For starters , China ’ s reputation has suffered because the coronavirus pandemic began there , the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) bungled the initial response , and then Beijing tried to deny responsibility .
The government has done better since , but the initial damage could not be entirely assuaged .
And with a few exceptions ( such as Latin America ) , subsequent Chinese efforts to win influence by offering masks , medicines , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backfired or been seen more as a self-interested gambit to whitewash their image than a genuine effort to help foreigners .
Even worse , Beijing has doubled down on the practice of “ wolf warrior ” diplomacy , an increasingly assertive and belligerent approach that relies on intimidation and a certain take-no-prisoners style of engagement .
Such a policy may play well in an increasingly nationalistic China , but it appears to be antagonizing nearly everyone else .
It is based on the odd idea that foreign leaders will respond well to being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ So a legitimate and disinterested Australian proposal for an independent international investigation of the origins of the coronavirus prompted not a polite rejection from Beijing ( as one might expect ) , but the imposition of harsh tariffs on Australian beef and barley coupled with threats of additional sanctions if the Aussies didn ’ t back off .
The predictable result ?
A growing Australian consensus on the need to stand up to China more effectively .
More recently , when the Chinese ambassador to Somalia reportedly pressured the president of the disputed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to reduce his government ’ s ties with Taiwan , Bihi ended the meeting and told his foreign ministry to expand ties with Taiwan even more .
A couple of weeks later , diplomat from Somaliland arrived in Taiwan to open a new representative office there .
Lastly , the recent Chinese-Indian border clashes and the imposition of a rigid new security law in Hong Kong have solidified Asian and Western concerns about China ’ s long-term ambitions .
Countries that were once ambivalent about confronting China—including Australia , the United Kingdom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on such issues as 5G technology , despite their own reservations about the direction of U.S. policy and the mercurial personality of the current U.S. president .
Instead of taking advantage of America ’ s most recent stumbles , in short , China has helped insulate the Trump administration from some of the consequences of its own blunders .
The current competition to lose influence carries three obvious implications .
First , it reinforces what the political scientist Ian Bremmer has labeled the “ G-Zero World , ” an international order without a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coalition of like-minded countries coming together to manage critical global problems .
Second , this situation suggests that whichever great power wises up first will have a real opportunity .
Here the United States has one obvious advantage—at least in theory—as it is about to hold a national election .
Americans have the opportunity , therefore , to get rid of their incompetent incumbent and to try someone else .
The CCP ’ s 20th Party Congress will not occur until 2022 , and Xi Jinping is likely ( though not absolutely certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he is the principal architect of China ’ s more assertive international posture , a sharp change of course seems unlikely .
But China has responded nimbly to other adverse developments , and it ’ s possible that top officials ( including Xi ) will learn from their recent setbacks and continue to pursue their ambitious agenda in a more subtle and effective way .
If Trump remains U.S. president ( either legitimately or as a result of a rigged election ) , and if Xi and Co. learn the right lessons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have new opportunities to enhance its global stature and undermine some of America ’ s overseas partnerships .
On the other hand , if American voters decisively repudiate Trumpism in the November election and the CCP continues its heavy-handed , wolf-warrior approach to the outside world , keeping China comparatively isolated will be significantly easier .
But here ’ s a warning to those Americans who are now pinning their hopes on presidential candidate Joe Biden and his coterie of all-too-familiar and all-too-mainstream advisors : It ’ s too late to turn back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States go through four years of nonstop turbulence , other nations will wonder whether someone like Trump could get elected again .
A Biden victory won ’ t unite the divided nation overnight , and deep partisanship will continue to have baleful effects on U.S. foreign policy .
A Biden administration will have its hands full dealing with the pandemic and the economy at home , leaving less time and fewer resources to devote to big international projects .
A Democratic victory in November may be essential to preserving the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it won ’ t fix U.S. foreign policy overnight .
That said , the next administration does have the opportunity to fashion a smarter and more effective strategy toward China .
It would focus in part on pure geopolitics ( i.e.
, reinforcing U.S. alliances in Asia ) but mostly on meeting the technological challenge that China poses in areas such as artificial intelligence .
To do that , it will need to work more effectively with U.S. advanced allies , resurrect efforts to attract scientific and technical talent from abroad , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marginal strategic importance ( e.g.
, Afghanistan ) .
It would also recognize that launching an ideological cold war against Beijing—as implied by Pompeo ’ s recent jeremiad at the Nixon Library—is not going to persuade China to change its domestic policies and is more likely to alarm the allies whose support the United States will need .
A smarter competitive strategy would also keep the lines of communication open to Beijing and work to cooperate with China on the issues where the countries ’ interests overlap ( e.g.
, climate change , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ friend of mine once compared foreign policy to high school football : Victory tends to go not to the team that makes the most brilliant plays but to the one that commits the fewest turnovers , penalties , fumbles , and interceptions .
In short , it ’ s the team that makes the fewest errors that usually ends up on top .
The next administration doesn ’ t have to be brilliant to be a lot better than its predecessors ( and I don ’ t mean just Trump ) .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doesn ’ t have to be a starry-eyed idealist to believe that significant improvement is possible .

Back in the bad old days of the Cold War, I recall hearing a well-known academic (and former diplomat) remark that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in “a relentless competition to see which one could lose influence fastest.” Assuming my memory is accurate, he then added, “Fortunately, the Soviets are winning.”
Back in the bad old days of the Cold War, I recall hearing a well-known academic (and former diplomat) remark that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in “a relentless competition to see which one could lose influence fastest.” Assuming my memory is accurate, he then added, “Fortunately, the Soviets are winning.”
I’m wary of facile analogies to that earlier period of great-power rivalry, but that observation seems to be an apt description of the current state of Chinese and American foreign policy. Beijing and Washington can each point to a few successes over the past year or two, but for the most part both seem to be perfecting the art of the own goal. Citizens of both countries have reason to be grateful; given how poorly their leaders have performed, it’s a small miracle the other side hasn’t taken better advantage.
Let’s start with the United States. I’m old enough to remember when it enjoyed a position of primacy unseen since the Roman Empire. Sadly, assorted sins of omission and commission under both Democrats and Republicans wasted the so-called unipolar moment and facilitated the rise of a new set of challengers. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton made the first missteps but escaped most of the blame, because the consequences of his blunders (NATO enlargement, dual containment, a bungled Middle East peace process, and overzealous pursuit of globalization) did not come home to roost until after he had left office. President George W. Bush got to deal with some of the repercussions (such as the 9/11 attacks), and he compounded the error by launching global anti-terrorism campaigns, invading Iraq, and letting a dangerous financial bubble burst in 2008. President Barack Obama failed to reverse the slide despite his successful rescue of the economy and his personal popularity in much of the world, and the consequences of these accumulating failures helped open the door to President Donald Trump’s reign of error.
As president, Trump has mostly demonstrated how to squander goodwill and respect and get little or nothing in return. He has repeatedly and gratuitously insulted some of America’s closest allies, referred to poorer nations as “shithole countries” and described U.S. neighbors in Latin America as teeming with rapists, murderers, and other dangerous types. In a world where a majority of people are nonwhite, he’s made common cause with racists and is basing his election campaign on stoking such sentiments in portions of his base. His decisions on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal, and North Korea alarmed and alienated a wide range of countries and brought the United States no significant benefits. His fawning embrace of such dictators and autocrats as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi—to name but a few—has shredded whatever moral authority the United States might have had left. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s sanctimonious moralizing, mismanagement of his department, and lack of interest in genuine diplomacy hasn’t helped either.
Finally, and most tellingly, Trump’s disastrous handling of the coronavirus pandemic has made the United States look incompetent and incapable of reform, a development that is bound to make other countries look elsewhere for advice on how to grapple with today’s challenges.
As the Irish Times writer Fintan O’Toole recently put it: As country after country bars Americans from entering because they are worried that they will spread disease, who can blame them?
You’d think this situation would be a golden opportunity for an ambitious, restless, and increasingly powerful China. Beijing has benefited in the past from America’s mistakes and was careful not to imitate them. Like the United States throughout most of the 19th century, which stayed out of trouble abroad and focused its energies on building a world-class economy at home, China was concentrated on internal development and been all too content to watch the United States stumble into costly quagmires and internal disarray.
But instead of taking advantage of America’s latest stumbles and working to consolidate its position as the more sensible and responsible superpower, lately China appears to be succumbing to its own version of foreign-policy malpractice.
For starters, China’s reputation has suffered because the coronavirus pandemic began there, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bungled the initial response, and then Beijing tried to deny responsibility. The government has done better since, but the initial damage could not be entirely assuaged. And with a few exceptions (such as Latin America), subsequent Chinese efforts to win influence by offering masks, medicines, and other forms of aid have mostly backfired or been seen more as a self-interested gambit to whitewash their image than a genuine effort to help foreigners.
Even worse, Beijing has doubled down on the practice of “wolf warrior” diplomacy, an increasingly assertive and belligerent approach that relies on intimidation and a certain take-no-prisoners style of engagement. Such a policy may play well in an increasingly nationalistic China, but it appears to be antagonizing nearly everyone else. It is based on the odd idea that foreign leaders will respond well to being berated, threatened, and punished. So a legitimate and disinterested Australian proposal for an independent international investigation of the origins of the coronavirus prompted not a polite rejection from Beijing (as one might expect), but the imposition of harsh tariffs on Australian beef and barley coupled with threats of additional sanctions if the Aussies didn’t back off. The predictable result? A growing Australian consensus on the need to stand up to China more effectively. More recently, when the Chinese ambassador to Somalia reportedly pressured the president of the disputed territory of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi, to reduce his government’s ties with Taiwan, Bihi ended the meeting and told his foreign ministry to expand ties with Taiwan even more. A couple of weeks later, diplomat from Somaliland arrived in Taiwan to open a new representative office there.
Lastly, the recent Chinese-Indian border clashes and the imposition of a rigid new security law in Hong Kong have solidified Asian and Western concerns about China’s long-term ambitions. Countries that were once ambivalent about confronting China—including Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany—have moved close to Washington on such issues as 5G technology, despite their own reservations about the direction of U.S. policy and the mercurial personality of the current U.S. president. Instead of taking advantage of America’s most recent stumbles, in short, China has helped insulate the Trump administration from some of the consequences of its own blunders.
The current competition to lose influence carries three obvious implications. First, it reinforces what the political scientist Ian Bremmer has labeled the “G-Zero World,” an international order without a single clear leader or even a coherent coalition of like-minded countries coming together to manage critical global problems.
Second, this situation suggests that whichever great power wises up first will have a real opportunity. Here the United States has one obvious advantage—at least in theory—as it is about to hold a national election. Americans have the opportunity, therefore, to get rid of their incompetent incumbent and to try someone else. The CCP’s 20th Party Congress will not occur until 2022, and Xi Jinping is likely (though not absolutely certain) to remain in power. Given that he is the principal architect of China’s more assertive international posture, a sharp change of course seems unlikely. But China has responded nimbly to other adverse developments, and it’s possible that top officials (including Xi) will learn from their recent setbacks and continue to pursue their ambitious agenda in a more subtle and effective way.
If Trump remains U.S. president (either legitimately or as a result of a rigged election), and if Xi and Co. learn the right lessons from their recent stumbles, China will have new opportunities to enhance its global stature and undermine some of America’s overseas partnerships. On the other hand, if American voters decisively repudiate Trumpism in the November election and the CCP continues its heavy-handed, wolf-warrior approach to the outside world, keeping China comparatively isolated will be significantly easier.
But here’s a warning to those Americans who are now pinning their hopes on presidential candidate Joe Biden and his coterie of all-too-familiar and all-too-mainstream advisors: It’s too late to turn back the clock to 2016. Having watched the United States go through four years of nonstop turbulence, other nations will wonder whether someone like Trump could get elected again. A Biden victory won’t unite the divided nation overnight, and deep partisanship will continue to have baleful effects on U.S. foreign policy. A Biden administration will have its hands full dealing with the pandemic and the economy at home, leaving less time and fewer resources to devote to big international projects. A Democratic victory in November may be essential to preserving the United States as a constitutional republic, but it won’t fix U.S. foreign policy overnight.
That said, the next administration does have the opportunity to fashion a smarter and more effective strategy toward China. It would focus in part on pure geopolitics (i.e., reinforcing U.S. alliances in Asia) but mostly on meeting the technological challenge that China poses in areas such as artificial intelligence. To do that, it will need to work more effectively with U.S. advanced allies, resurrect efforts to attract scientific and technical talent from abroad, and stop wasting public resources in areas of marginal strategic importance (e.g., Afghanistan). It would also recognize that launching an ideological cold war against Beijing—as implied by Pompeo’s recent jeremiad at the Nixon Library—is not going to persuade China to change its domestic policies and is more likely to alarm the allies whose support the United States will need. A smarter competitive strategy would also keep the lines of communication open to Beijing and work to cooperate with China on the issues where the countries’ interests overlap (e.g., climate change, global health, etc.).
A friend of mine once compared foreign policy to high school football: Victory tends to go not to the team that makes the most brilliant plays but to the one that commits the fewest turnovers, penalties, fumbles, and interceptions. In short, it’s the team that makes the fewest errors that usually ends up on top. The next administration doesn’t have to be brilliant to be a lot better than its predecessors (and I don’t mean just Trump). I take some comfort from that; one doesn’t have to be a starry-eyed idealist to believe that significant improvement is possible.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-17--Lukashenko Hints at Russian Military Support

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : In Belarus , Aleksandr Lukashenko claims Russian military is prepared to support him , Bahrain and Oman may follow the UAE in normalizing relations with Israel , and negotiations over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam resume this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Protests against longtime Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko continue to grip the country as he hints that Russia has offered to provide military support if the situation continues to escalate .
On Sunday , the largest anti-government demonstrations since Lukashenko claimed a landslide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elections on Aug. 9 rocked the capital of Minsk , bringing an estimated 200,000 people to the streets to demand that Lukashenko step down .
Sounding the alarm .
Speaking at a rival demonstration of his supporters , Lukashenko claimed that NATO was building up its military presence near Belarus , positioning tanks and planes just 15 minutes from the country ’ s western border .
These accusations followed a decision by Lukashenko on Saturday to deploy a brigade of paratroopers to the border region of Grodno , citing concerns over NATO .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s claims , saying there was no buildup in the region but that they were watching developments closely .
Belarusian forces will conduct military exercises along the country ’ s border with Poland and Lithuania—both NATO member states—in the coming days , according to Russian state media .
The bear in the room .
Once considered a staunch Russian ally , Lukashenko ’ s relationship with Moscow worsened considerably in the months leading up to the election .
During the campaign , he claimed that Moscow was plotting to incite a revolution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to his power becomes more acute , Lukashenko appears to be leaning on Russia to save his presidency .
On Saturday , he spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin over the phone , telling reporters afterward that he had received a commitment from Putin that the Russian military could be used to bolster his government , in accordance with a mutual defense pact .
“ We agreed that at our very first request , comprehensive help will be given to ensure the security of Belarus , ” he said in a statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assistance to Lukashenko , but some influential voices in Russia echoed Lukashenko .
Margarita Simonyan , chief editor of the state-affiliated Russia Today news agency , called for Russia to invade Belarus to restore order .
August 16-18 .
Senior U.S. and Russian diplomats convene in Vienna to discuss strategic stability and nuclear arms .
August 17 .
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will join the Atlantic Council think tank for a discussion on the key foreign policy priorities facing the next U.S. administration .
August 17-20 .
The Democratic National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formally nominate former Vice President Joe Biden and his running mate Sen. Kamala Harris as the party ’ s candidates for president and vice president .
The week ’ s events will feature several high-profile speakers , including Hillary Clinton , Sen. Bernie Sanders , and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez .
August 17-20 .
The long-awaited peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government are due to begin this week .
August 18 .
Sudan , Ethiopia , and Egypt will resume talks today aimed at resolving their dispute over Ethiopia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The seventh round of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union over the former ’ s withdrawal from the bloc take place .
August 19-21 .
Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi hosts peace talks with the country ’ s armed ethnic groups .
It is the first such session since July 2018 .
Normalizing ties with Israel .
Israel ’ s historic agreement normalizing diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates seems to have opened the way for other Gulf states to do the same .
On Sunday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel is exploring similar agreements with several countries in the Middle East and North Africa , suggesting that Bahrain and Oman were at the top of the list .
Both countries praised the accord shortly after it was publicized , but have not confirmed whether similar deals with Israel were in the works .
The Israeli-UAE agreement represents a major change in the regional political landscape , as well as Israel ’ s place within it .
It suggests Arab countries are shifting their strategic priorities away from fighting Israel over the Palestinian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has been hailed by many observers as a major win for Israel ’ s government , Albert Wolf warns in FP that the deal isn ’ t all it ’ s cracked up to be—and comes with major risks .
Washington isolated on Iran .
An attempt by the United States to extend the arms embargo on Iran was struck down by U.N. Security Council on Friday after China and Russia voted against the proposed resolution and 11 countries , including key European allies , abstained .
Backed by the six-member Gulf @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to extend the arms embargo , which is due to expire in October , despite opposition from several EU countries .
In response to the resolution ’ s failure , U.S. President Donald Trump again threatened to trigger the “ snapback ” of the 2015 nuclear deal , a mechanism that reimposes all pre-2015 sanctions on Iran .
“ We ’ ll be doing a snapback , ” he said .
“ You ’ ll be watching it next week.
” But the United States is no longer a party to the nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the snapback is legally dubious .
“ Given that the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA … We consider that the US is not in a position to resort to mechanisms reserved for JCPOA participants , ” said one EU official .
Challenging the monarchy in Thailand .
More than 10,000 people took to the streets of Bangkok in protests against the monarchy on Sunday , representing the largest demonstrations the country has seen since a military coup overthrew the civilian government in 2014 .
Defying the country ’ s draconian laws against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the monarchy ’ s wide-ranging powers , a new constitution , and new elections .
Public discontent has been growing in Thailand since last year ’ s election of junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha as prime minister .
Accusations of corruption coupled with the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic heightened tensions , and protests against the government have taken place almost every day for the past month .
Nile dam disputes continue .
Negotiations between Ethiopia , Sudan , and Egypt over Ethiopia ’ s controversial Renaissance Dam project will resume on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have agreed to present their proposals for the management of the dam .
The decision came on Sunday during multilateral talks led by the African Union .
The dam , which will sit on one of the Nile ’ s major tributaries , is considered essential for the continued economic development of Ethiopia , but it will severely threaten the fresh water supply of the two downstream countries , Egypt and Sudan .
The governments of both countries have pushed back strongly on the dam since construction first started in 2011 , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after Ethiopia announced it had started filling the reservoir .
Foreign Policy ’ s Kathryn Salam gathered our best coverage of the controversy .
Mauritius oil spill .
A cargo ship that ran aground off the coast of Mauritius has broken apart , threatening to dump the rest of its oil cargo into one of the world ’ s most diverse ecosystems .
The MV Wakashio hit a coral reef on July 25 , immediately leaking around 1,000 of its 4,000 ton oil load into the surrounding waters .
International cleanup efforts were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local Mauritians undertook the burden and constructed makeshift devices to help clean up the spill .
Although most of the vessel ’ s remaining oil had been pumped out by authorities , there are still an estimated 166 tons on board .
A massive wildfire in northern California created a rare but extremely dangerous weather phenomenon known as a fire tornado—or “ firenado.
” Large wildfires can sometimes heat the surrounding air so much they produce clouds specific to combustion events .
In the presence of strong wind gusts , and as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and smoke , the clouds can rotate and produce a tornado .
Unsurprisingly , these weather events can be deadly .
A 2018 firenado in northern California claimed the lives of two people , and it was later determined that it reached wind speeds of up to 143 miles per hour .
It is unclear if the recent firenado killed anyone , but its accompanying wildfire has grown to 20,000 acres and had not been contained as of Sunday morning .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: In Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenko claims the Russian military is prepared to support him, Bahrain and Oman may follow the United Arab Emirates in normalizing relations with Israel , and negotiations over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam resume this week.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: In Belarus, President Aleksandr Lukashenko claims the Russian military is prepared to support him, Bahrain and Oman may follow the United Arab Emirates in normalizing relations with Israel, and negotiations over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam resume this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Lukashenko Claims Russian Military Backing as Protests Rage
Protests against longtime Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko continue to grip the country as he hints that Russia has offered to provide military support if the situation continues to escalate. On Sunday, the largest anti-government demonstrations since Lukashenko claimed a landslide victory in the country’s presidential elections on Aug. 9 rocked the capital of Minsk, bringing an estimated 200,000 people to the streets to demand that Lukashenko step down.
Sounding the alarm. Speaking at a rival demonstration of his supporters, Lukashenko claimed that NATO was building up its military presence near Belarus, positioning tanks and planes just 15 minutes from the country’s western border. These accusations followed a decision by Lukashenko on Saturday to deploy a brigade of paratroopers to the border region of Grodno, citing concerns over NATO.
NATO officials pushed back on Lukashenko’s claims, saying there was no buildup in the region but that they were watching developments closely. Belarusian forces will conduct military exercises along the country’s border with Poland and Lithuania—both NATO member states—in the coming days, according to Russian state media.
The bear in the room. Once considered a staunch Russian ally, Lukashenko’s relationship with Moscow worsened considerably in the months leading up to the election. During the campaign, he claimed that Moscow was plotting to incite a revolution to overthrow him. Now, as the threat to his power becomes more acute, Lukashenko appears to be leaning on Russia to save his presidency.
On Saturday, he spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin over the phone, telling reporters afterward that he had received a commitment from Putin that the Russian military could be used to bolster his government, in accordance with a mutual defense pact. “We agreed that at our very first request, comprehensive help will be given to ensure the security of Belarus,” he said in a statement.
The Kremlin denied it offered military assistance to Lukashenko, but some influential voices in Russia echoed Lukashenko. Margarita Simonyan, chief editor of the state-affiliated Russia Today news agency, called for Russia to invade Belarus to restore order.
The World This Week
August 16-18. Senior U.S. and Russian diplomats convene in Vienna to discuss strategic stability and nuclear arms.
August 17. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will join the Atlantic Council think tank for a discussion on the key foreign policy priorities facing the next U.S. administration.
August 17-20. The Democratic National Convention will take place this week to formally nominate former Vice President Joe Biden and his running mate Sen. Kamala Harris as the party’s candidates for president and vice president. The week’s events will feature several high-profile speakers, including Hillary Clinton, Sen. Bernie Sanders, and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
August 17-20. The long-awaited peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government are due to begin this week.
August 18. Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt will resume talks today aimed at resolving their dispute over Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam project.
August 18-21. The seventh round of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union over the former’s withdrawal from the bloc take place.
August 19-21. Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi hosts peace talks with the country’s armed ethnic groups. It is the first such session since July 2018.
What We’re Following Today
Normalizing ties with Israel. Israel’s historic agreement normalizing diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates seems to have opened the way for other Gulf states to do the same. On Sunday, Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen said that Israel is exploring similar agreements with several countries in the Middle East and North Africa, suggesting that Bahrain and Oman were at the top of the list. Both countries praised the accord shortly after it was publicized, but have not confirmed whether similar deals with Israel were in the works.
The Israeli-UAE agreement represents a major change in the regional political landscape, as well as Israel’s place within it. It suggests Arab countries are shifting their strategic priorities away from fighting Israel over the Palestinian issue to cooperating against Iran. Although it has been hailed by many observers as a major win for Israel’s government, Albert Wolf warns in FP that the deal isn’t all it’s cracked up to be—and comes with major risks.
Washington isolated on Iran. An attempt by the United States to extend the arms embargo on Iran was struck down by U.N. Security Council on Friday after China and Russia voted against the proposed resolution and 11 countries, including key European allies, abstained. Backed by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council, Washington has been pushing to extend the arms embargo, which is due to expire in October, despite opposition from several EU countries.
In response to the resolution’s failure, U.S. President Donald Trump again threatened to trigger the “snapback” of the 2015 nuclear deal, a mechanism that reimposes all pre-2015 sanctions on Iran. “We’ll be doing a snapback,” he said. “You’ll be watching it next week.” But the United States is no longer a party to the nuclear deal, so its ability to trigger the snapback is legally dubious. “Given that the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA … We consider that the US is not in a position to resort to mechanisms reserved for JCPOA participants,” said one EU official.
Challenging the monarchy in Thailand. More than 10,000 people took to the streets of Bangkok in protests against the monarchy on Sunday, representing the largest demonstrations the country has seen since a military coup overthrew the civilian government in 2014. Defying the country’s draconian laws against criticizing the monarchy, protesters demanded limits to the monarchy’s wide-ranging powers, a new constitution, and new elections.
Public discontent has been growing in Thailand since last year’s election of junta leader Prayuth Chan-ocha as prime minister. Accusations of corruption coupled with the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic heightened tensions, and protests against the government have taken place almost every day for the past month.
Keep an Eye On
Nile dam disputes continue. Negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over Ethiopia’s controversial Renaissance Dam project will resume on Tuesday as representatives of the three countries have agreed to present their proposals for the management of the dam. The decision came on Sunday during multilateral talks led by the African Union.
The dam, which will sit on one of the Nile’s major tributaries, is considered essential for the continued economic development of Ethiopia, but it will severely threaten the fresh water supply of the two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. The governments of both countries have pushed back strongly on the dam since construction first started in 2011, but tensions reached a tipping point in July after Ethiopia announced it had started filling the reservoir. Foreign Policy’s Kathryn Salam gathered our best coverage of the controversy.
Mauritius oil spill. A cargo ship that ran aground off the coast of Mauritius has broken apart, threatening to dump the rest of its oil cargo into one of the world’s most diverse ecosystems. The MV Wakashio hit a coral reef on July 25, immediately leaking around 1,000 of its 4,000 ton oil load into the surrounding waters. International cleanup efforts were initially hampered by strong winds, but local Mauritians undertook the burden and constructed makeshift devices to help clean up the spill. Although most of the vessel’s remaining oil had been pumped out by authorities, there are still an estimated 166 tons on board.
Odds and Ends
A massive wildfire in northern California created a rare but extremely dangerous weather phenomenon known as a fire tornado—or “firenado.” Large wildfires can sometimes heat the surrounding air so much they produce clouds specific to combustion events. In the presence of strong wind gusts, and as the intensity of the heat pulls in dirt and smoke, the clouds can rotate and produce a tornado.
Unsurprisingly, these weather events can be deadly. A 2018 firenado in northern California claimed the lives of two people, and it was later determined that it reached wind speeds of up to 143 miles per hour. It is unclear if the recent firenado killed anyone, but its accompanying wildfire has grown to 20,000 acres and had not been contained as of Sunday morning.
That’s it for today.
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