foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--Peru’s Civil War Left It Vulnerable to the Pandemic

Peru ’ s Civil War Left It Vulnerable to the Pandemic May 17 marks the 40th anniversary of the start of Peru ’ s two-decade-long civil war , when the Marxist insurgent group Shining Path kicked off an internal conflict by burning ballot boxes in the rural village of Chuschi .
The move was a symbolic rejection of the 1980 national elections that were slated to return Peru to democracy .
Today , the country is still living with the war ’ s consequences as it fights a new enemy : the novel coronavirus .
The civil war , despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long legacy in the country , creating conditions ripe for the spread of contagions like the coronavirus by displacing hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from rural areas where the conflict was most severe and concentrating them in tightly packed settlements in the capital , Lima .
Most work in the informal economy and do not have reliable access to government services including health care .
The pandemic is Peru ’ s gravest threat in decades .
To adequately help citizens facing its effects , the country must also address some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Peruvian civil war was one of Latin America ’ s most brutal 20th-century conflicts : Parties including militant groups , paramilitaries , and the armed forces killed an estimated 70,000 people from 1980 to 2000 .
Many of the conflict ’ s refugees began informal settlements at the outskirts of Lima .
They cobbled together houses on the city ’ s fringes and sought any work they could find .
Most joined Peru ’ s enormous informal sector and received little government support .
Informal urban settlements ballooned in subsequent years and are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the spread of the coronavirus in the country .
Lima has half of the confirmed cases in the country , and the sprawling , poor settlement of San Juan de Lurigancho was the district with the greatest number of cases as of early May .
Most inhabitants in these urban areas have never been able to reliably access state health care , nor can they afford to shelter at home for long , as they have spotty access to social safety net programs .
This helps account for Peru ’ s emergence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Latin America—second only to Brazil—despite the Peruvian government ’ s laudable early and vigorous efforts to stem the outbreak of the virus .
Peru implemented travel restrictions , mandatory quarantine measures for suspected and confirmed cases , and social distancing measures before most of its regional peers .
However , the legacy of the civil war is not entirely to blame .
Other subsequent conditions have continued to drive rural displacement and migration to informal urban settlements .
One such factor is rural policy .
During the war , the military was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as bases of operation .
After a violent and bungled scorched-earth counterterrorism campaign at the war ’ s outset , the government later shifted to trying to win the hearts and minds of rural constituents in order to facilitate intelligence-gathering and counterinsurgency .
It initiated a number of local development projects and increased rural assistance .
My recent research indicates that its efforts paid off particularly well in areas where the government had previously redistributed land to peasants through an enormous land reform program in the 1970s .
Guerrilla attacks on communities and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systematically lower in these areas .
But rural development policies since the war have been limited and spotty .
For instance , many of the millions of land reform beneficiaries from the 1970s still lacked land titles in the 2000s , which consigned them to poverty .
A land titling program sought to close that property rights gap , but my research shows that the long years of living with property that lacked secure rights fueled poverty by limiting the ability to sell land or use it as collateral to access credit and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lack of rural support ultimately drew people to cities looking for more opportunity and upward mobility .
Furthermore , birth rates remain high in rural areas , generating land pressure and out-migration because of limited opportunities for young adults to make a good living by farming .
National-level politics since the civil war has further exacerbated inequality .
Peru ’ s postwar presidents lacked both the capacity and incentives to deliver broad-based and coherent social and economic policies that would meaningfully impact citizens ’ lives .
Instead , they have garnered support by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dole out minuscule short-term favors to people in exchange for channeling votes to politicians .
That generates marginalization , because it alleviates pressure on politicians to invest in big projects and meaningful policies that voters really want , like an effective public health system , dignified public housing , and infrastructure to deliver clean water , paved streets , and electricity .
The health system is illustrative .
The country spends less than $ 700 per capita annually on health care , and most of this accrues to upper- and middle-class private sector @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exposed to the pandemic than the poor .
Instead , national leaders have mostly catered to big business and foreign capital .
These powerful interests win valuable mining concessions and juicy government contracts with little competition and favorable terms of trade .
Insider lobbying and corruption are common .
Every one of Peru ’ s former elected presidents from Alberto Fujimori on is either jailed or under investigation for corruption , and one killed himself shortly before an arrest was due to be carried out .
Since the pandemic began , Peru ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many of its faults .
It has a shortage of beds in intensive care units , has little overflow capacity , and is paralyzed by bureaucratic and administrative turnover and the fact that control of public hospitals is divided across multiple government agencies .
As the virus rages in Lima , inhabitants of its informal settlements are packing up and shipping out by the hundreds of thousands .
This is reversing the long-standing trend toward urban migration .
In the short term , this reverse migration could spread the coronavirus more widely across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care is limited could be especially hard-hit .
And ultimately , Peru ’ s decadeslong rural exodus to informal urban settlements , which made the country vulnerable to the initial spread of the virus , will come back to roost in rural areas .
According to the State Density Index developed by the United Nations Development Program , at least 107 of Peru ’ s 196 provinces have fewer than 10 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants .
These are mainly rural provinces , where poverty is widespread .
But migration back to the countryside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address some of the long-standing problems and imbalances sparked by the civil war .
It offers a chance for the government to invest more heavily in rural areas , repairing some of the legacies of the violence , which heavily affected the countryside , and making it sustainable for some migrants to remain in smaller outlying cities and rural areas .
Government stimulus programs should target rural areas more generously .
Many of Peru ’ s regions are agriculturally rich and can help to ensure a stable food supply .
When the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could offer retraining programs and job opportunities in education , services , and technical trades in secondary cities .
And it could double down on subsidies and credits to farmers in the short term while it invests in improvements in rural infrastructure and markets in the medium term .
Much of Peru ’ s agricultural output currently occurs in valleys on the country ’ s northern and central coastline .
But production is widespread throughout the country in valuable crops such as coffee , cacao , quinoa , and tropical fruit .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facilitating access to markets , and creating programs to differentiate products for different consumer niches , the government could broaden Peru ’ s economy and bring more prosperity to the countryside .
Presented with a grim reminder of the inequality perpetuated by conflict , Peru should act quickly to stem the effects of the coronavirus by addressing some of the scars of its civil war .

May 17 marks the 40th anniversary of the start of Peru’s two-decade-long civil war, when the Marxist insurgent group Shining Path kicked off an internal conflict by burning ballot boxes in the rural village of Chuschi. The move was a symbolic rejection of the 1980 national elections that were slated to return Peru to democracy. Today, the country is still living with the war’s consequences as it fights a new enemy: the novel coronavirus.
May 17 marks the 40th anniversary of the start of Peru’s two-decade-long civil war, when the Marxist insurgent group Shining Path kicked off an internal conflict by burning ballot boxes in the rural village of Chuschi. The move was a symbolic rejection of the 1980 national elections that were slated to return Peru to democracy. Today, the country is still living with the war’s consequences as it fights a new enemy: the novel coronavirus.
The civil war, despite ending 20 years ago, has had a long legacy in the country, creating conditions ripe for the spread of contagions like the coronavirus by displacing hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from rural areas where the conflict was most severe and concentrating them in tightly packed settlements in the capital, Lima. Most work in the informal economy and do not have reliable access to government services including health care.
The pandemic is Peru’s gravest threat in decades. To adequately help citizens facing its effects, the country must also address some of the war’s lasting legacies.
The Peruvian civil war was one of Latin America’s most brutal 20th-century conflicts: Parties including militant groups, paramilitaries, and the armed forces killed an estimated 70,000 people from 1980 to 2000. Many of the conflict’s refugees began informal settlements at the outskirts of Lima. They cobbled together houses on the city’s fringes and sought any work they could find. Most joined Peru’s enormous informal sector and received little government support.
Informal urban settlements ballooned in subsequent years and are now among the most serious hot spots for the spread of the coronavirus in the country. Lima has half of the confirmed cases in the country, and the sprawling, poor settlement of San Juan de Lurigancho was the district with the greatest number of cases as of early May. Most inhabitants in these urban areas have never been able to reliably access state health care, nor can they afford to shelter at home for long, as they have spotty access to social safety net programs. This helps account for Peru’s emergence as a center of the coronavirus pandemic in Latin America—second only to Brazil—despite the Peruvian government’s laudable early and vigorous efforts to stem the outbreak of the virus. Peru implemented travel restrictions, mandatory quarantine measures for suspected and confirmed cases, and social distancing measures before most of its regional peers.
However, the legacy of the civil war is not entirely to blame. Other subsequent conditions have continued to drive rural displacement and migration to informal urban settlements. One such factor is rural policy. During the war, the military was deployed to rural areas that insurgents used as bases of operation. After a violent and bungled scorched-earth counterterrorism campaign at the war’s outset, the government later shifted to trying to win the hearts and minds of rural constituents in order to facilitate intelligence-gathering and counterinsurgency. It initiated a number of local development projects and increased rural assistance.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
My recent research indicates that its efforts paid off particularly well in areas where the government had previously redistributed land to peasants through an enormous land reform program in the 1970s. Guerrilla attacks on communities and the state and overall conflict deaths were systematically lower in these areas.
But rural development policies since the war have been limited and spotty. For instance, many of the millions of land reform beneficiaries from the 1970s still lacked land titles in the 2000s, which consigned them to poverty. A land titling program sought to close that property rights gap, but my research shows that the long years of living with property that lacked secure rights fueled poverty by limiting the ability to sell land or use it as collateral to access credit and inputs that would enhance productivity. The lack of rural support ultimately drew people to cities looking for more opportunity and upward mobility. Furthermore, birth rates remain high in rural areas, generating land pressure and out-migration because of limited opportunities for young adults to make a good living by farming.
Read More A woman wearing a face mask walks in an empty market during the outbreak of the coronavirus, in Mexico City, on April 3. A woman wearing a face mask walks in an empty market during the outbreak of the coronavirus, in Mexico City, on April 3. The Coronavirus Will Cause New Crises in Latin America The region’s economic and political systems were already under strain. In 2020, the virus may push them to a breaking point. Argument | Michael Albertus A farmer holding a large chainsaw steps across the severed trunk of a downed tree as he cuts trees to plant coca at a plantation in Colombia. Behind him are more trees in the Amazon rainforest. A farmer holding a large chainsaw steps across the severed trunk of a downed tree as he cuts trees to plant coca at a plantation in Colombia. Behind him are more trees in the Amazon rainforest. How Drugs Are Destroying the Amazon In the world’s largest rainforest, cocaine and deforestation are increasingly linked. Analysis | Robert Muggah A man carries a flag with the faces of former Peruvian presidents Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia, former first lady Nadine Heredia and her husband, former president Ollanta Humala, and current President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, while thousands march against corruption through the streets of downtown Lima on February 16, 2017. A man carries a flag with the faces of former Peruvian presidents Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia, former first lady Nadine Heredia and her husband, former president Ollanta Humala, and current President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, while thousands march against corruption through the streets of downtown Lima on February 16, 2017. Justice in Peru Is a Danger for Its Politics The extradition of a former president is a big risk for an already teetering political system. Analysis | Michael Albertus
National-level politics since the civil war has further exacerbated inequality. Peru’s postwar presidents lacked both the capacity and incentives to deliver broad-based and coherent social and economic policies that would meaningfully impact citizens’ lives. Instead, they have garnered support by cultivating local-level political brokers. These brokers dole out minuscule short-term favors to people in exchange for channeling votes to politicians. That generates marginalization, because it alleviates pressure on politicians to invest in big projects and meaningful policies that voters really want, like an effective public health system, dignified public housing, and infrastructure to deliver clean water, paved streets, and electricity. The health system is illustrative. The country spends less than $700 per capita annually on health care, and most of this accrues to upper- and middle-class private sector workers who are less likely to be exposed to the pandemic than the poor.
Instead, national leaders have mostly catered to big business and foreign capital. These powerful interests win valuable mining concessions and juicy government contracts with little competition and favorable terms of trade. Insider lobbying and corruption are common. Every one of Peru’s former elected presidents from Alberto Fujimori on is either jailed or under investigation for corruption, and one killed himself shortly before an arrest was due to be carried out.
Since the pandemic began, Peru’s patchy health care system has betrayed many of its faults. It has a shortage of beds in intensive care units, has little overflow capacity, and is paralyzed by bureaucratic and administrative turnover and the fact that control of public hospitals is divided across multiple government agencies.
As the virus rages in Lima, inhabitants of its informal settlements are packing up and shipping out by the hundreds of thousands. This is reversing the long-standing trend toward urban migration. In the short term, this reverse migration could spread the coronavirus more widely across the country. Rural areas where health care is limited could be especially hard-hit. And ultimately, Peru’s decadeslong rural exodus to informal urban settlements, which made the country vulnerable to the initial spread of the virus, will come back to roost in rural areas. According to the State Density Index developed by the United Nations Development Program, at least 107 of Peru’s 196 provinces have fewer than 10 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants. These are mainly rural provinces, where poverty is widespread.
But migration back to the countryside also presents Peru with an opportunity to address some of the long-standing problems and imbalances sparked by the civil war. It offers a chance for the government to invest more heavily in rural areas, repairing some of the legacies of the violence, which heavily affected the countryside, and making it sustainable for some migrants to remain in smaller outlying cities and rural areas.
Government stimulus programs should target rural areas more generously. Many of Peru’s regions are agriculturally rich and can help to ensure a stable food supply. When the country begins to gradually reopen, the government could offer retraining programs and job opportunities in education, services, and technical trades in secondary cities. And it could double down on subsidies and credits to farmers in the short term while it invests in improvements in rural infrastructure and markets in the medium term.
Much of Peru’s agricultural output currently occurs in valleys on the country’s northern and central coastline. But production is widespread throughout the country in valuable crops such as coffee, cacao, quinoa, and tropical fruit. By helping farmers invest in technical improvements, facilitating access to markets, and creating programs to differentiate products for different consumer niches, the government could broaden Peru’s economy and bring more prosperity to the countryside. Presented with a grim reminder of the inequality perpetuated by conflict, Peru should act quickly to stem the effects of the coronavirus by addressing some of the scars of its civil war.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--Top Trump Defense Pick Shows Up at Pentagon Before Senate Confirmation

Top Trump Defense Pick Shows Up at Pentagon Before Senate Confirmation U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s presumptive choice to be the Defense Department ’ s top policy official is already serving inside the Pentagon as a senior advisor to Defense Secretary Mark Esper , four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy , a move that could raise eyebrows in Congress ahead of what ’ s expected to be a difficult confirmation process .
Anthony Tata , a Fox News commentator and Trump loyalist who is facing questions over his potential nomination to be the undersecretary of defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and falsifying a court document to defend himself against past adultery claims , is apparently getting up to speed on the Pentagon .
The onetime U.S. Army brigadier general has not been involved in Defense Department policy since Army investigators concluded in 2007 he had at least two extramarital affairs during a previous marriage , prompting his early retirement .
Tata was recently asked to sit in on meetings as the incoming policy chief with acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson ’ s approval , three of the sources said , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as nominees are not supposed to take any action to presume confirmation for the role .
The White House has not yet sent Tata ’ s nomination to Congress , nor has it announced any intent to deliver the nomination .
But a defense official who spoke to Foreign Policy denied that Tata is sitting in on official meetings in anticipation of his new role .
Tata serves as a noncareer member of the senior executive service and as senior advisor to Esper , the official said .
It is not clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacity .
“ There is no validity to reports of him sitting in on official meetings inside Policy as an acting [ undersecretary of defense for policy ] or in anticipation of a potential nomination , ” the official said , indicating that Tata is in the Pentagon as a secretarial Schedule C appointment , a lower-level civilian appointment that does not require Senate confirmation .
It is not necessarily unusual for presidential appointees to get a look inside the agencies where they will be charged with leadership roles within a very limited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrations to rely on acting officials to cover gaps in senior appointments , particularly during personnel shifts at the beginning and end of administrations .
Trump has also stated his preference for having acting officials in top roles .
“ I like ‘ acting ’ because I can move so quickly , ” he told CBS ’ s Face the Nation in 2019 .
“ It gives me more flexibility.
” But Democratic lawmakers have grown concerned with Trump ’ s practice of keeping so many acting appointees in place for so long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ uncomfortable with the administration ’ s pattern of installing presumptive nominees for senior appointments in the agencies in stopgap roles before they are put before the Senate for confirmation hearings .
They say by doing so , the Trump administration is maneuvering around Congress ’ s constitutionally required confirmation process .
“ The administration has played loose with the vacancies act and acting positions , ” said one Democratic congressional aide .
“ It is considered very arrogant , ” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy .
“ And it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ Tata ] was a good nominee with the Senate.
” During the Obama administration , senior Pentagon personnel official Brad Carson got a harsh hearing on Capitol Hill and eventually resigned after pushing ahead with major changes to the military personnel system while serving as acting undersecretary for defense for personnel and readiness , which some senators saw as presuming confirmation for the job to which he was nominated .
Richard Grenell , Trump ’ s acting head of intelligence , has also faced harsh criticism from lawmakers for approving sweeping changes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaving Capitol Hill in the dark on the moves .
However , nominees in the Defense Department are typically given “ rules of the road ” for actions that they can and can not perform by the agency ’ s general counsel , said Arnold Punaro , a retired Marine major general and a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee , who added that nominees who are not full-time government employees can come in under temporary legal status .
While a nominee can prepare for confirmation at the Pentagon , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would appear to be presuming confirmation , such as influencing policy or getting involved in personnel decisions .
But Punaro told Foreign Policy that the Defense Department has a good track record of self-policing red lines for nominees and that missteps are relatively rare .
“ The people in the department are very savvy about this , ” Punaro said .
“ If there ’ s a nominee and they ’ re throwing their weight around , someone will call the [ congressional ] committee and rat them out.
” There are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Pentagon .
Three candidates , including Kenneth Braithwaite , Trump ’ s pick to be secretary of the navy , and James Anderson , who would serve as Tata ’ s deputy if both are confirmed , have attended Senate hearings and are awaiting a confirmation vote .
But the Trump administration has recently gotten in trouble with Congress over interpretations of federal law that would give the executive branch the ability to keep acting officials in power beyond legal norms , worrying aides and former officials who think the White @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the rules .
Of 753 senior administration posts that require a presidential nomination and Senate confirmation , 138 have no nominees , according to data from the Washington Post .
At the Department of Homeland Security , for example , nine of the most senior positions are held by acting officials , including the agency ’ s chief , Chad Wolf , who has held the job for six months without a confirmation hearing .
Earlier this month , Democratic Rep. Katie Porter introduced a bill aimed at cracking down on unconfirmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s high number of vacancies and acting appointments .
The bill would limit the number of days someone could serve as an acting agency head from 120 to 60 days , require congressional testimony from acting officials every 60 days , and close other loopholes .
A recent Columbia Law Review study by Stanford University professor Anne Joseph O ’ Connell found that , while prior administrations relied heavily on acting officials at the start and end of their administrations , Trump is the only president in the past four decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than confirmed acting secretaries .
Tata ’ s potential nomination has come alongside a push to install more Trump loyalists at higher levels of the Pentagon .
Foreign Policy reported earlier this month that Trump appointed Michael Cutrone to a behind-the-scenes Pentagon role to vet officials for loyalty to the administration .
Specifically , the White House is prioritizing bringing in agency leaders who support providing more Pentagon money to build Trump ’ s proposed border wall with Mexico , withdrawing U.S. troops rapidly from Syria and Afghanistan , and a implementing a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to a former senior administration official .
There is increasing concern inside the Defense Department and Congress that Tata , who retired from the military amid an adultery complaint in 2007 , would face a turbulent confirmation process , even with Republicans in control of the Senate .
Tata did not deny the complaints at the time , which included three extramarital affairs and a child born out of wedlock .
An Army investigation that found Tata committed adultery with at least two women in a previous marriage also discovered that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that his ex-wife knowingly charged him with unfair medical bills , the News & Observer reported .
The Council on American-Islamic Relations , a Muslim civil rights advocacy group based in Washington , papered the Senate Armed Services Committee with emails earlier this month urging the Senate to reject Tata ’ s reported nomination , saying that a spy novel written by the former general last year falsely claimed that Muslim men in the United Kingdom engage in the gang-rape of women as part of their ceremonial transition to manhood , and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government .
The organization , also known as CAIR , plans to organize progressive lawmakers around a pressure campaign to push the Senate to reject the nomination if it advances .
“ Again you have another anti-Muslim wannabe official trying to get into the Trump administration to bolster his anti-immigration agenda , ” Robert McCaw , CAIR ’ s government affairs director , told Foreign Policy .
“ We ’ re really hoping right now through raising this nomination publicly we can spoil [ it ] .
”

U.S. President Donald Trump’s presumptive choice to be the Defense Department’s top policy official is already serving inside the Pentagon as a senior advisor to Defense Secretary Mark Esper, four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy , a move that could raise eyebrows in Congress ahead of what’s expected to be a difficult confirmation process.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s presumptive choice to be the Defense Department’s top policy official is already serving inside the Pentagon as a senior advisor to Defense Secretary Mark Esper, four sources familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy, a move that could raise eyebrows in Congress ahead of what’s expected to be a difficult confirmation process.
Anthony Tata, a Fox News commentator and Trump loyalist who is facing questions over his potential nomination to be the undersecretary of defense for policy related to perceived Islamophobic comments and falsifying a court document to defend himself against past adultery claims, is apparently getting up to speed on the Pentagon. The onetime U.S. Army brigadier general has not been involved in Defense Department policy since Army investigators concluded in 2007 he had at least two extramarital affairs during a previous marriage, prompting his early retirement.
Tata was recently asked to sit in on meetings as the incoming policy chief with acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson’s approval, three of the sources said, which could raise concerns in the Senate, as nominees are not supposed to take any action to presume confirmation for the role. The White House has not yet sent Tata’s nomination to Congress, nor has it announced any intent to deliver the nomination.
But a defense official who spoke to Foreign Policy denied that Tata is sitting in on official meetings in anticipation of his new role. Tata serves as a noncareer member of the senior executive service and as senior advisor to Esper, the official said. It is not clear when Tata entered the Pentagon in this capacity.
“There is no validity to reports of him sitting in on official meetings inside Policy as an acting [undersecretary of defense for policy] or in anticipation of a potential nomination,” the official said, indicating that Tata is in the Pentagon as a secretarial Schedule C appointment, a lower-level civilian appointment that does not require Senate confirmation.
It is not necessarily unusual for presidential appointees to get a look inside the agencies where they will be charged with leadership roles within a very limited scope. Nor is it unusual for administrations to rely on acting officials to cover gaps in senior appointments, particularly during personnel shifts at the beginning and end of administrations.
Trump has also stated his preference for having acting officials in top roles. “I like ‘acting’ because I can move so quickly,” he told CBS’s Face the Nation in 2019. “It gives me more flexibility.”
But Democratic lawmakers have grown concerned with Trump’s practice of keeping so many acting appointees in place for so long. Congressional aides say they are also uncomfortable with the administration’s pattern of installing presumptive nominees for senior appointments in the agencies in stopgap roles before they are put before the Senate for confirmation hearings. They say by doing so, the Trump administration is maneuvering around Congress’s constitutionally required confirmation process.
“The administration has played loose with the vacancies act and acting positions,” said one Democratic congressional aide.
“It is considered very arrogant,” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy. “And it will not go over well even if [Tata] was a good nominee with the Senate.”
During the Obama administration, senior Pentagon personnel official Brad Carson got a harsh hearing on Capitol Hill and eventually resigned after pushing ahead with major changes to the military personnel system while serving as acting undersecretary for defense for personnel and readiness, which some senators saw as presuming confirmation for the job to which he was nominated.
Richard Grenell, Trump’s acting head of intelligence, has also faced harsh criticism from lawmakers for approving sweeping changes to the 17-agency intelligence community, while leaving Capitol Hill in the dark on the moves.
However, nominees in the Defense Department are typically given “rules of the road” for actions that they can and cannot perform by the agency’s general counsel, said Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine major general and a former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who added that nominees who are not full-time government employees can come in under temporary legal status.
While a nominee can prepare for confirmation at the Pentagon, they are not allowed to perform actions that would appear to be presuming confirmation, such as influencing policy or getting involved in personnel decisions. But Punaro told Foreign Policy that the Defense Department has a good track record of self-policing red lines for nominees and that missteps are relatively rare.
“The people in the department are very savvy about this,” Punaro said. “If there’s a nominee and they’re throwing their weight around, someone will call the [congressional] committee and rat them out.”
There are currently 20 vacancies among senior Senate-confirmed positions at the Pentagon. Three candidates, including Kenneth Braithwaite, Trump’s pick to be secretary of the navy, and James Anderson, who would serve as Tata’s deputy if both are confirmed, have attended Senate hearings and are awaiting a confirmation vote.
But the Trump administration has recently gotten in trouble with Congress over interpretations of federal law that would give the executive branch the ability to keep acting officials in power beyond legal norms, worrying aides and former officials who think the White House may be playing fast and loose with the rules.
Of 753 senior administration posts that require a presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, 138 have no nominees, according to data from the Washington Post. At the Department of Homeland Security, for example, nine of the most senior positions are held by acting officials, including the agency’s chief, Chad Wolf, who has held the job for six months without a confirmation hearing.
Earlier this month, Democratic Rep. Katie Porter introduced a bill aimed at cracking down on unconfirmed agency officials in response to the Trump administration’s high number of vacancies and acting appointments.
The bill would limit the number of days someone could serve as an acting agency head from 120 to 60 days, require congressional testimony from acting officials every 60 days, and close other loopholes.
A recent Columbia Law Review study by Stanford University professor Anne Joseph O’Connell found that, while prior administrations relied heavily on acting officials at the start and end of their administrations, Trump is the only president in the past four decades to rely on more acting cabinet secretaries than confirmed acting secretaries.
Tata’s potential nomination has come alongside a push to install more Trump loyalists at higher levels of the Pentagon. Foreign Policy reported earlier this month that Trump appointed Michael Cutrone to a behind-the-scenes Pentagon role to vet officials for loyalty to the administration.
Specifically, the White House is prioritizing bringing in agency leaders who support providing more Pentagon money to build Trump’s proposed border wall with Mexico, withdrawing U.S. troops rapidly from Syria and Afghanistan, and a implementing a more aggressive offensive posture against Iran, according to a former senior administration official.
There is increasing concern inside the Defense Department and Congress that Tata, who retired from the military amid an adultery complaint in 2007, would face a turbulent confirmation process, even with Republicans in control of the Senate. Tata did not deny the complaints at the time, which included three extramarital affairs and a child born out of wedlock.
An Army investigation that found Tata committed adultery with at least two women in a previous marriage also discovered that the general forged a Georgia court order claiming that his ex-wife knowingly charged him with unfair medical bills, the News & Observer reported.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Muslim civil rights advocacy group based in Washington, papered the Senate Armed Services Committee with emails earlier this month urging the Senate to reject Tata’s reported nomination, saying that a spy novel written by the former general last year falsely claimed that Muslim men in the United Kingdom engage in the gang-rape of women as part of their ceremonial transition to manhood, and that the act is covered up by the government.
The organization, also known as CAIR, plans to organize progressive lawmakers around a pressure campaign to push the Senate to reject the nomination if it advances. “Again you have another anti-Muslim wannabe official trying to get into the Trump administration to bolster his anti-immigration agenda,” Robert McCaw, CAIR’s government affairs director, told Foreign Policy. “We’re really hoping right now through raising this nomination publicly we can spoil [it].”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--Oil Price Crash Revives Fossil Fuel Divestment Campaigns

With a global economic shutdown pushing oil prices to record lows , climate activists across the world are taking a moment to say “ I told you so ” to the banks and governments that have dragged their feet on fossil fuel divestment .
“ There might not be another moment where there is the political and economic window to take the drastic action on climate that is necessary , ” said Connor Chung , the communications coordinator for Divest Harvard , a student activist organization .
“ We don ’ t have the luxury of trusting that we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the market will fix the problem by itself.
” Divestment organizers—climate activists who are pushing government and financial institutions to divest from the fossil fuel industry—have been using the pandemic ’ s ripple effects throughout the global economy , most notably through the oil and gas sector , to demonstrate just how dire the need to remove pension funds and other investments from the struggling sector really is .
Still , Chung and other activists realize they face an uphill battle .
Nobody at Divest Harvard was impressed when their university released its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , made on April 21 ( the day before Earth Day ) , said the university would cancel out any man-made greenhouse gas emissions in its investment portfolio by 2050 .
Though the Harvard Corp. , which runs the university ’ s endowment , insists it ’ s in line with the Paris climate agreement , activists argue that the commitment is woefully insufficient to stop the serious effects of climate change , especially at such a pivotal moment.
“ We don ’ t have the luxury of trusting that we can nudge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message to university faculty reported by the Crimson , Harvard University President Lawrence Bacow said the university would be working with fossil fuel companies rather than divesting , arguing that the university “ can not risk alienating and demonizing possible partners.
” Chung disagrees with that approach , arguing that it would be akin to “ asking Pepsi to sell less soda.
” Meanwhile , other endowments , like those of the University of California system and American University , have announced more aggressive plans to make their investments carbon neutral much sooner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Government passed a resolution in 2014 calling on the Board of Trustees to divest the school ’ s then- $ 425 million endowment from fossil fuels , the board eventually convened a task force to study the possibility of doing so .
The school found that its endowment was not directly invested in any fossil fuel company stocks , like Chevron or ExxonMobil , but was indirectly exposed through investments in S & P 500 mutual funds , which roll up those companies and others in the oil and gas industry into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from those funds , which are incredibly cheap to manage , seemed too expensive if it meant switching over to fledgling fossil-free funds .
“ That ’ s where the trustees came down and said , ‘ That seems like a pretty steep price to pay at this stage for a portfolio , ’ ” said Jeffrey Harris , a professor at American University ’ s Kogod School of Business .
“ It wasn ’ t a trade-off they wanted to make immediately.
” Over time , though , the cost of those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more institutions began buying into them .
American University finally removed its fossil fuel exposure completely in early March and made an announcement on Earth Day .
“ We have been on this path for a while now , ” Doug Kudravetz , the chief financial officer of American University , said in an email .
“ We want to use our voice to support climate initiatives , when we can do so in a way that also preserves our board ’ s fiduciary responsibility.
” Similar debates are occurring in locally or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in April to the New York City Council calling on New York financial institutions to divest from fossil fuels is sitting in legislative purgatory—but it ’ s far from forgotten .
Though it ’ s likely to be signed into effect , lawmakers in the city are too busy dealing with one of the worst coronavirus outbreaks in the world to pass symbolic legislation .
Even so , the climate activists who supported the call have continued their work remotely .
“ The resolution is a shot across the [ financial ] industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sikora , a senior advisor for New York Communities for Change .
“ If they want to retain New York City ’ s business in the long run , they should understand that elected officials and activists are not going to tolerate an industry that is destroying the city ’ s future.
” Resolution 1286 specifically calls on JPMorgan Chase , BlackRock , Liberty Mutual , and other banks and insurers “ to stop lending to , investing in and insuring the fossil fuel industry.
” Though it ’ s nonbinding , other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ City , including divesting the city ’ s pension fund from the fossil fuel industry , indicate there ’ s some bite to it .
To be clear , while this oil crash is near unprecedented in its severity and outside of anyone ’ s predictions , it hasn ’ t caused a revolution in thinking : Those monitoring the energy sector have suspected for a decade that oil and gas companies were likely to underperform in a greener global economy .
But the present oil shock has driven home the point climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decade—oil is risky business .
“ Like with pandemics , scientists are warning us , desperately warning us , to get ready and stop a disaster , ” Sikora said .
“ It ’ s up to corporations to make the changes necessary to avoid worldwide catastrophe.
” Moreover , fossil-free funds have turned out to be an even better investment than many investors expected .
Since the financial crisis over a decade ago , the energy sector has fallen to its lowest share of the S & P 500 since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investments have outperformed those with fossil fuel companies in their portfolio over the past five years , according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis ( IEEFA ) .
As headlines have screamed , the price for oil of late has dropped so low that for a time oil futures were trading at a negative price , meaning that it could theoretically cost more to store barrels of oil than the oil itself was actually worth .
This is a slight mischaracterization , but the truth is that oil prices had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s stunning collapse .
Kathy Hipple has written about what she sees as the decline of the oil and gas industry at IEEFA since 2018 .
She has compared the fossil fuel industry to the Yellow Pages , writing that “ a head-in-the-sand mindset persists across the declining fossil-fuel industry similar to the one I saw take root in the Yellow Pages business , ” where she once served as a board member .
“ It ’ s a declining industry , and it ’ s facing an existential crisis , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy .
“ At some point when industries face an existential crisis , they will cease to exist in their present form .
There ’ s no bottom for their stock prices.
” “ You could throw a dart and find an industry that has performed better.
” Though Hipple notes that the oil and gas industry will still serve a function in the green energy transition , she argues that investment in fossil fuel companies has been overvalued for years .
Now , as oil prices and new production crater , Hipple @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to oil and gas in the same way it will return to other industries .
“ You could throw a dart and find an industry that has performed better , ” Hipple said .
“ I ’ m always amazed that the people who get paid a lot of money to manage money are not as proactive as they need to be.
” Hipple and Harris noted that for all the prognostication on Wall Street , investment is deeply influenced by human behavior .
If more people , and investors especially , begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks , the markets could begin to reflect that .
“ People are baking their bread now , but eventually … they ’ ll let someone else bake the bread , ” Hipple said .
“ But the fact is the economy can grow without the growth in the fossil fuel sector .
The fossil fuel sector is destined to shrink .
It is shrinking .
”

With a global economic shutdown pushing oil prices to record lows, climate activists across the world are taking a moment to say “I told you so” to the banks and governments that have dragged their feet on fossil fuel divestment.
With a global economic shutdown pushing oil prices to record lows, climate activists across the world are taking a moment to say “I told you so” to the banks and governments that have dragged their feet on fossil fuel divestment.
“There might not be another moment where there is the political and economic window to take the drastic action on climate that is necessary,” said Connor Chung, the communications coordinator for Divest Harvard, a student activist organization. “We don’t have the luxury of trusting that we can nudge the industry into behavior or that the market will fix the problem by itself.”
Divestment organizers—climate activists who are pushing government and financial institutions to divest from the fossil fuel industry—have been using the pandemic’s ripple effects throughout the global economy, most notably through the oil and gas sector, to demonstrate just how dire the need to remove pension funds and other investments from the struggling sector really is.
Still, Chung and other activists realize they face an uphill battle. Nobody at Divest Harvard was impressed when their university released its divestment plan last month. The announcement, made on April 21 (the day before Earth Day), said the university would cancel out any man-made greenhouse gas emissions in its investment portfolio by 2050. Though the Harvard Corp., which runs the university’s endowment, insists it’s in line with the Paris climate agreement, activists argue that the commitment is woefully insufficient to stop the serious effects of climate change, especially at such a pivotal moment.“We don’t have the luxury of trusting that we can nudge the industry into behavior.”
In a message to university faculty reported by the Crimson, Harvard University President Lawrence Bacow said the university would be working with fossil fuel companies rather than divesting, arguing that the university “cannot risk alienating and demonizing possible partners.”
Chung disagrees with that approach, arguing that it would be akin to “asking Pepsi to sell less soda.” Meanwhile, other endowments, like those of the University of California system and American University, have announced more aggressive plans to make their investments carbon neutral much sooner.
When American University’s Student Government passed a resolution in 2014 calling on the Board of Trustees to divest the school’s then-$425 million endowment from fossil fuels, the board eventually convened a task force to study the possibility of doing so. The school found that its endowment was not directly invested in any fossil fuel company stocks, like Chevron or ExxonMobil, but was indirectly exposed through investments in S&P 500 mutual funds, which roll up those companies and others in the oil and gas industry into the portfolio. At the time, divesting from those funds, which are incredibly cheap to manage, seemed too expensive if it meant switching over to fledgling fossil-free funds.
“That’s where the trustees came down and said, ‘That seems like a pretty steep price to pay at this stage for a portfolio,’” said Jeffrey Harris, a professor at American University’s Kogod School of Business. “It wasn’t a trade-off they wanted to make immediately.”
Over time, though, the cost of those fossil-free funds came down as more and more institutions began buying into them. American University finally removed its fossil fuel exposure completely in early March and made an announcement on Earth Day.
“We have been on this path for a while now,” Doug Kudravetz, the chief financial officer of American University, said in an email. “We want to use our voice to support climate initiatives, when we can do so in a way that also preserves our board’s fiduciary responsibility.”
Similar debates are occurring in locally or city-run investment funds. A resolution introduced in April to the New York City Council calling on New York financial institutions to divest from fossil fuels is sitting in legislative purgatory—but it’s far from forgotten. Though it’s likely to be signed into effect, lawmakers in the city are too busy dealing with one of the worst coronavirus outbreaks in the world to pass symbolic legislation. Even so, the climate activists who supported the call have continued their work remotely.
“The resolution is a shot across the [financial] industry’s bow,” said Pete Sikora, a senior advisor for New York Communities for Change. “If they want to retain New York City’s business in the long run, they should understand that elected officials and activists are not going to tolerate an industry that is destroying the city’s future.”
Resolution 1286 specifically calls on JPMorgan Chase, BlackRock, Liberty Mutual, and other banks and insurers “to stop lending to, investing in and insuring the fossil fuel industry.” Though it’s nonbinding, other more permanent actions taken by New York City, including divesting the city’s pension fund from the fossil fuel industry, indicate there’s some bite to it.
To be clear, while this oil crash is near unprecedented in its severity and outside of anyone’s predictions, it hasn’t caused a revolution in thinking: Those monitoring the energy sector have suspected for a decade that oil and gas companies were likely to underperform in a greener global economy. But the present oil shock has driven home the point climate activists have been trying to make for a decade—oil is risky business.
“Like with pandemics, scientists are warning us, desperately warning us, to get ready and stop a disaster,” Sikora said. “It’s up to corporations to make the changes necessary to avoid worldwide catastrophe.”
Moreover, fossil-free funds have turned out to be an even better investment than many investors expected. Since the financial crisis over a decade ago, the energy sector has fallen to its lowest share of the S&P 500 since the 1990s. Index funds without fossil fuel investments have outperformed those with fossil fuel companies in their portfolio over the past five years, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
As headlines have screamed, the price for oil of late has dropped so low that for a time oil futures were trading at a negative price, meaning that it could theoretically cost more to store barrels of oil than the oil itself was actually worth. This is a slight mischaracterization, but the truth is that oil prices had already been trending down even before April’s stunning collapse.
Kathy Hipple has written about what she sees as the decline of the oil and gas industry at IEEFA since 2018. She has compared the fossil fuel industry to the Yellow Pages, writing that “a head-in-the-sand mindset persists across the declining fossil-fuel industry similar to the one I saw take root in the Yellow Pages business,” where she once served as a board member.
“It’s a declining industry, and it’s facing an existential crisis,” Hipple said in an interview with Foreign Policy. “At some point when industries face an existential crisis, they will cease to exist in their present form. There’s no bottom for their stock prices.”
“You could throw a dart and find an industry that has performed better.”Though Hipple notes that the oil and gas industry will still serve a function in the green energy transition, she argues that investment in fossil fuel companies has been overvalued for years. Now, as oil prices and new production crater, Hipple anticipates that investment won’t return to oil and gas in the same way it will return to other industries.
“You could throw a dart and find an industry that has performed better,” Hipple said. “I’m always amazed that the people who get paid a lot of money to manage money are not as proactive as they need to be.”
Hipple and Harris noted that for all the prognostication on Wall Street, investment is deeply influenced by human behavior. If more people, and investors especially, begin to demand the market account for climate risks, the markets could begin to reflect that.
“People are baking their bread now, but eventually … they’ll let someone else bake the bread,” Hipple said. “But the fact is the economy can grow without the growth in the fossil fuel sector. The fossil fuel sector is destined to shrink. It is shrinking.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--Is the U.S. Government Back in the Business of Regime Change?

Is the U.S. Government Back in the Business of Regime Change ?
Emma Ashford : Hey , Matt !
Another two weeks of rarely leaving my house , and the news just continues to get stranger .
I ’ m honestly a bit upset that I ’ m stuck inside while other Americans are—apparently—still out there doing fun things like getting haircuts , going to the beach , or invading Venezuela .
How ’ s life treating you ?
Matthew Kroenig : Yes .
Nothing like a good coup attempt to break up the monotony of quarantine .
That was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by most accounts , the U.S. government was not behind the plot , but I do worry that this will strengthen Nicolás Maduro and undermine the opposition—and it could have implications for the U.S. presidential election given the large number of Venezuelan exiles in Florida .
What do you make of it ?
EA : Well , first of all , I highly doubt this was officially backed by the U.S. government .
It ’ s simply too incompetent .
I mean , the coup plotters were live-tweeting their mission , for god @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s the kind of thing that you wonder about in the Trump administration .
Given President Donald Trump ’ s admiration for this kind of retired special forces contractor , the administration ’ s ties to people like Blackwater ’ s Erik Prince , and its strong support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó , you have to wonder if these coup plotters somehow came to believe they had U.S. support .
Speaking of the November election , do you really think the Venezuelan vote is that important ?
MK : It does seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. support .
Guaidó apparently even signed one of the documents in the possession of the plotters .
On the Venezuelan vote , I ’ ll defer to experts on U.S. politics , but there are 200,000 voters with Venezuelan roots in Florida , the state was decided by fewer votes than that in 2016 , and the race will hinge on a few swing states like Florida , so it could be significant .
Do you think this episode will be a setback for Trump ’ s Venezuela policy ?
EA : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Florida for many years .
But I think it would be hard to do much worse than existing Venezuela policy .
Moreover , calling it Trump ’ s policy is a bit misleading .
Vice President Mike Pence has been taking the lead on this , coupled with Elliott Abrams , the special envoy for Venezuela .
They ’ re the ones pushing for a Guaidó government and the overthrow of Maduro .
For obvious reasons , including the fact that Maduro still has a strong base of support from the Venezuelan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unsuccessful .
If nothing else , the coup plotters and the White House do seem to be operating from the same point of view : Both seem to believe that Maduro would be far easier to remove from power than he is in reality .
MK : Yes .
He has been more resilient than many believed .
I still think this is the right policy , however .
Pence and Abrams are not alone—there is broad international support for Maduro ’ s ouster and for recognizing Guaidó as the successor .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better for U.S. interests and for the Venezuelan people .
Are you saying that Maduro can do a better job than the opposition ?
Both the coup plotters and the White House seem to be operating from the same point of view : both seem to believe that Maduro would be far easier to remove from power than he is in reality .
EA : Of course not .
He ’ s a dictator who helped wreck one of the strongest economies in Latin America .
He proved incapable of keeping a petrostate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prices .
If that ’ s not incompetence , I don ’ t know what is .
But the question shouldn ’ t be whether Maduro is good or bad .
It should be : 1 ) whether it ’ s in the United States ’ national interests to do anything about it , and 2 ) whether it ’ s possible to remove him .
The answers to both are probably no .
Unless you think we should still be engaging in Cold War-style regime change ?
MK : The benefits of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quite high , and the costs of providing diplomatic support to the opposition are low , so it seems like the right policy even if the prospects of toppling Maduro are uncertain .
On the broader question , regime change is not only a Cold War phenomenon .
Great powers have attempted to support regimes in their own image since the Greco-Persian Wars if not before .
U.S. adversaries , such as Russia and China , are currently messing around in democratic domestic politics .
And autocracies are notoriously brittle .
So I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States should give hostile dictators sanctuary .
EA : You ’ re not alone .
Hal Brands , a professor at Johns Hopkins University , has an article out this week in which he argues that the U.S. government might want to consider covert regime change in certain countries in response to growing U.S.-China tensions .
Here ’ s the thing , though : There ’ s a decent set of academic works on the topic , and they almost all conclude that regime change—covert or overt—typically fails .
Your policy preferences are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does cost the United States when Washington engages in regime change ; it can lead to civil wars and overspilling conflicts or even just suspicion and pushback from other autocratic states .
MK : There is great value to good political science research , but there are also limits .
To be rigorous , it must zero in on a specific outcome , and it can not cover the broad range of issues policymakers must take into account .
Regime change may often fail , but making the attempt can still be in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result in big payoffs .
There might still be an Iron Curtain across Europe if it hadn ’ t been for Washington ’ s consistent efforts to support freedom and democracy overtly and covertly during the Cold War .
EA : Come on , Matt !
Even the CIA thinks covert intervention is a bad idea these days !
But we should probably move on .
You might remember we spoke a few weeks back about Russia and its response to COVID-19 ?
At the time , we had no good information about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the dubious data suggested just a few cases .
As expected , we ’ re now starting to learn more .
And I ’ m finding it hard to believe just how poor the Kremlin ’ s response to the pandemic is .
Any thoughts ?
MK : I guess I ’ m less surprised .
Russia had a poor public health system to begin with .
On many measures , it is closer to sub-Saharan Africa than to Europe .
Russia ’ s military forces are suffering because they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers of able-bodied young men .
Did you expect Russia to perform better ?
EA : Well , we ’ ve had prior conversations about whether autocracies are responding better to the pandemic .
You were hopeful about the ability of democracies to handle the coronavirus , and I was concerned that autocracies seem to have the upper hand , at least in public relations terms .
By now we can tell that it seems to come down more to state capacity than to regime type .
So the structural factors you point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think that President Vladimir Putin is somewhat trapped by his own mythology .
If he steps up to manage the pandemic , he ’ ll look weak and powerless to fix it .
But leaving it to his governors just makes it look as if he just doesn ’ t care .
MK : You ’ re right that some autocracies , like Vietnam , have done well employing extreme authoritarian social control measures—as an article in Foreign Policy this week pointed out—but I stand by my prediction that , with the benefit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracies performed better on balance .
In fact , new data leaked this week shows that the true number of COVID-19 infections in China may be more than 10 times the official figures .
EA : Yeah , the data shows pretty much exactly what we all expected : China systematically altered its coronavirus case numbers downward .
Hopefully , the leaked data will help researchers get a clearer picture of what happened there .
It ’ s funny , though , we ’ re comparing China , Russia , and Vietnam here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Putin ’ s response and Trump ’ s response .
Both have tried to avoid responsibility for coronavirus failures by delegating down from the federal level .
Both are relying on the idea of the “ good tsar ” —hoping that people will believe that they are not responsible and that they ’ re being undermined by incompetent underlings .
But it ’ s not working well in either case , and COVID-19 is now spreading inside the White House and the Kremlin .
MK : As I ’ ve said before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different .
Everyone , including top officials in the White House and the Kremlin , is vulnerable .
Another leader addressing the COVID-19 challenge is Iraq ’ s new prime minister , Mustafa al-Kadhimi .
His election is the first good news in Iraqi politics in some time .
Do you think he can succeed in bringing order to the country and working with both Iran and the United States ?
EA : I ’ m glad to see Iraq finally has a prime minister , but to be blunt , I feel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drawn a very short straw : We ’ re in a historically unprecedented oil price slump , and Iraq gets over 90 percent of its revenues from oil .
Hard to see how he handles that , plus coronavirus , plus all of Iraq ’ s other problems .
I did see an interesting article on the Foreign Policy site the other day suggesting that the best solution might be to “ Finlandize ” Iraq—in other words , to let it become effectively neutral in the U.S.-Iran confrontation .
And I have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iraqis themselves if that were the case .
MK : It ’ s certainly an interesting proposal , but given Iran ’ s interests and vast informal influence over Shiite militias in Iraq , I can ’ t see Tehran abiding by such an agreement .
The author argued this would be a way to avoid war with Iran , but I think the United States can also avoid war by deterring Iran and responding when it crosses U.S. red lines .
Iran has been more cautious I would argue since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EA : It would definitely be difficult to be ensure Tehran was abiding by such a deal , but it could still be worthwhile if it helps lower tensions .
Perhaps the best hope for Iraq at the moment is that both the United States and Iran remain distracted by COVID-19 and leave it alone .
MK : Trump would like to see a reduced U.S. role in the country , and Iraq is certainly not the central issue in U.S. politics that it was just a few years ago .
Trade , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue in the presidential election .
Did you see that the Republican Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley called for the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) ?
EA : I did .
I thought it was a fascinating insight into how some conservative internationalists today actually view international organizations like the WTO .
The idea is that these institutions improve global security .
But we ’ re increasingly seeing conservatives like Hawley turning against them when it becomes clear that Washington can ’ t just enforce its will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firmer ground emphasizing trade in the election , though .
The supply shortages caused by COVID-19 aren ’ t just the result of globalized supply chains , but it ’ s a plausible explanation that sounds good to voters and supports Trump ’ s anti-trade arguments .
MK : The problem is not that the United States can ’ t enforce its will .
It ’ s that these institutions are being preyed on by China , undermining the purposes they were intended to serve .
Beijing used its influence in the World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 , and it systematically engages in unfair trade practices inconsistent with WTO rules .
It would not be wise , however , to abandon these institutions altogether .
A better approach would be two-tracked , to reform them from within even as Washington builds new institutions with allies and like-minded states that work better .
EA : This may be the rare issue where I ’ m more hard-line than you .
I don ’ t think we should pull out of the WTO , but to me , institutions matter far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is outdated and needs reform , while the United Nations is a pointless talk shop .
Before we go , though , I saw you had another article on the Foreign Policy site this week .
Writing without me to yell at you must be so relaxing .
As you might expect , I don ’ t completely agree with your argument about Russia and China .
But before I shoot it down , why don ’ t you tell our readers about it ?
MK : Some big names in the foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have argued that the United States should seek to work with Russia to contain China ; I think that ’ s a mistake .
Rather than rely on shifty dictators , the United States should work with its democratic allies to counter China and Russia at the same time .
EA : I think it ’ s unclear whether Russia would be a good partner for the United States .
They have all those big structural economic and demographic problems we talked about earlier on .
But if it ’ s a choice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them and the much bigger costs of working against them , it ’ s probably better to find common ground .
To paraphrase LBJ : Would you rather have the Russians outside the tent or inside the tent ?
MK : Inside , in theory .
But the concessions we would have to make to lure Putin in would be too great , and I wouldn ’ t trust him once he was there .
EA : Well , with Putin ’ s press secretary and his prime minister both now in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who you ’ ll be dealing with when this is all over ?
MK : It sounds like you ’ re looking forward to a post-Putin Russia .
See , maybe regime change isn ’ t so bad after all .

Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! Another two weeks of rarely leaving my house, and the news just continues to get stranger. I’m honestly a bit upset that I’m stuck inside while other Americans are—apparently—still out there doing fun things like getting haircuts, going to the beach, or invading Venezuela. How’s life treating you?
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! Another two weeks of rarely leaving my house, and the news just continues to get stranger. I’m honestly a bit upset that I’m stuck inside while other Americans are—apparently—still out there doing fun things like getting haircuts, going to the beach, or invading Venezuela. How’s life treating you?
Matthew Kroenig: Yes. Nothing like a good coup attempt to break up the monotony of quarantine. That was such a strange episode. Fortunately, by most accounts, the U.S. government was not behind the plot, but I do worry that this will strengthen Nicolás Maduro and undermine the opposition—and it could have implications for the U.S. presidential election given the large number of Venezuelan exiles in Florida. What do you make of it?
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
EA: Well, first of all, I highly doubt this was officially backed by the U.S. government. It’s simply too incompetent. I mean, the coup plotters were live-tweeting their mission, for god’s sake!
But it’s the kind of thing that you wonder about in the Trump administration. Given President Donald Trump’s admiration for this kind of retired special forces contractor, the administration’s ties to people like Blackwater’s Erik Prince, and its strong support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó, you have to wonder if these coup plotters somehow came to believe they had U.S. support.
Speaking of the November election, do you really think the Venezuelan vote is that important?
MK: It does seem as if the plotters thought they had U.S. support. Guaidó apparently even signed one of the documents in the possession of the plotters.
On the Venezuelan vote, I’ll defer to experts on U.S. politics, but there are 200,000 voters with Venezuelan roots in Florida, the state was decided by fewer votes than that in 2016, and the race will hinge on a few swing states like Florida, so it could be significant. Do you think this episode will be a setback for Trump’s Venezuela policy?
EA: A tough stance on Cuba helped Republicans in Florida for many years. But I think it would be hard to do much worse than existing Venezuela policy. Moreover, calling it Trump’s policy is a bit misleading. Vice President Mike Pence has been taking the lead on this, coupled with Elliott Abrams, the special envoy for Venezuela. They’re the ones pushing for a Guaidó government and the overthrow of Maduro. For obvious reasons, including the fact that Maduro still has a strong base of support from the Venezuelan military, they’ve been entirely unsuccessful.
If nothing else, the coup plotters and the White House do seem to be operating from the same point of view: Both seem to believe that Maduro would be far easier to remove from power than he is in reality.
MK: Yes. He has been more resilient than many believed. I still think this is the right policy, however. Pence and Abrams are not alone—there is broad international support for Maduro’s ouster and for recognizing Guaidó as the successor. And getting rid of Maduro would clearly be better for U.S. interests and for the Venezuelan people. Are you saying that Maduro can do a better job than the opposition?
Both the coup plotters and the White House seem to be operating from the same point of view: both seem to believe that Maduro would be far easier to remove from power than he is in reality.
EA: Of course not. He’s a dictator who helped wreck one of the strongest economies in Latin America. He proved incapable of keeping a petrostate solvent in an era of record oil prices. If that’s not incompetence, I don’t know what is.
But the question shouldn’t be whether Maduro is good or bad. It should be: 1) whether it’s in the United States’ national interests to do anything about it, and 2) whether it’s possible to remove him. The answers to both are probably no. Unless you think we should still be engaging in Cold War-style regime change?
MK: The benefits of having a friendly democracy in Venezuela are quite high, and the costs of providing diplomatic support to the opposition are low, so it seems like the right policy even if the prospects of toppling Maduro are uncertain.
On the broader question, regime change is not only a Cold War phenomenon. Great powers have attempted to support regimes in their own image since the Greco-Persian Wars if not before. U.S. adversaries, such as Russia and China, are currently messing around in democratic domestic politics. And autocracies are notoriously brittle. So I don’t see why the United States should give hostile dictators sanctuary.
EA: You’re not alone. Hal Brands, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, has an article out this week in which he argues that the U.S. government might want to consider covert regime change in certain countries in response to growing U.S.-China tensions. Here’s the thing, though: There’s a decent set of academic works on the topic, and they almost all conclude that regime change—covert or overt—typically fails.
Your policy preferences are more costly than you think. It does cost the United States when Washington engages in regime change; it can lead to civil wars and overspilling conflicts or even just suspicion and pushback from other autocratic states.
MK: There is great value to good political science research, but there are also limits. To be rigorous, it must zero in on a specific outcome, and it cannot cover the broad range of issues policymakers must take into account. Regime change may often fail, but making the attempt can still be in the U.S. national interest if the successes result in big payoffs. There might still be an Iron Curtain across Europe if it hadn’t been for Washington’s consistent efforts to support freedom and democracy overtly and covertly during the Cold War.
EA: Come on, Matt! Even the CIA thinks covert intervention is a bad idea these days!
But we should probably move on. You might remember we spoke a few weeks back about Russia and its response to COVID-19? At the time, we had no good information about how the country was handling the pandemic, and the dubious data suggested just a few cases. As expected, we’re now starting to learn more. And I’m finding it hard to believe just how poor the Kremlin’s response to the pandemic is. Any thoughts?
MK: I guess I’m less surprised. Russia had a poor public health system to begin with. On many measures, it is closer to sub-Saharan Africa than to Europe. Russia’s military forces are suffering because they are having such a hard time finding sufficient numbers of able-bodied young men. Did you expect Russia to perform better?
EA: Well, we’ve had prior conversations about whether autocracies are responding better to the pandemic. You were hopeful about the ability of democracies to handle the coronavirus, and I was concerned that autocracies seem to have the upper hand, at least in public relations terms. By now we can tell that it seems to come down more to state capacity than to regime type.
So the structural factors you point out are important, but I also think that President Vladimir Putin is somewhat trapped by his own mythology. If he steps up to manage the pandemic, he’ll look weak and powerless to fix it. But leaving it to his governors just makes it look as if he just doesn’t care.
MK: You’re right that some autocracies, like Vietnam, have done well employing extreme authoritarian social control measures—as an article in Foreign Policy this week pointed out—but I stand by my prediction that, with the benefit of hindsight, we will see that democracies performed better on balance. In fact, new data leaked this week shows that the true number of COVID-19 infections in China may be more than 10 times the official figures.
EA: Yeah, the data shows pretty much exactly what we all expected: China systematically altered its coronavirus case numbers downward. Hopefully, the leaked data will help researchers get a clearer picture of what happened there.
It’s funny, though, we’re comparing China, Russia, and Vietnam here, but I actually see stronger parallels between Putin’s response and Trump’s response. Both have tried to avoid responsibility for coronavirus failures by delegating down from the federal level. Both are relying on the idea of the “good tsar”—hoping that people will believe that they are not responsible and that they’re being undermined by incompetent underlings.
But it’s not working well in either case, and COVID-19 is now spreading inside the White House and the Kremlin.
MK: As I’ve said before, this is what makes this crisis different. Everyone, including top officials in the White House and the Kremlin, is vulnerable. Another leader addressing the COVID-19 challenge is Iraq’s new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi. His election is the first good news in Iraqi politics in some time. Do you think he can succeed in bringing order to the country and working with both Iran and the United States?
EA: I’m glad to see Iraq finally has a prime minister, but to be blunt, I feel sorry for him. He’s drawn a very short straw: We’re in a historically unprecedented oil price slump, and Iraq gets over 90 percent of its revenues from oil. Hard to see how he handles that, plus coronavirus, plus all of Iraq’s other problems.
I did see an interesting article on the Foreign Policy site the other day suggesting that the best solution might be to “Finlandize” Iraq—in other words, to let it become effectively neutral in the U.S.-Iran confrontation. And I have to say, it might be best for the Iraqis themselves if that were the case.
MK: It’s certainly an interesting proposal, but given Iran’s interests and vast informal influence over Shiite militias in Iraq, I can’t see Tehran abiding by such an agreement. The author argued this would be a way to avoid war with Iran, but I think the United States can also avoid war by deterring Iran and responding when it crosses U.S. red lines. Iran has been more cautious I would argue since the killing of Qassem Suleimani for example.
EA: It would definitely be difficult to be ensure Tehran was abiding by such a deal, but it could still be worthwhile if it helps lower tensions. Perhaps the best hope for Iraq at the moment is that both the United States and Iran remain distracted by COVID-19 and leave it alone.
MK: Trump would like to see a reduced U.S. role in the country, and Iraq is certainly not the central issue in U.S. politics that it was just a few years ago. Trade, however, will likely be a major issue in the presidential election. Did you see that the Republican Missouri Sen. Josh Hawley called for the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO)?
EA: I did. I thought it was a fascinating insight into how some conservative internationalists today actually view international organizations like the WTO. The idea is that these institutions improve global security. But we’re increasingly seeing conservatives like Hawley turning against them when it becomes clear that Washington can’t just enforce its will through them.
Republicans may be on firmer ground emphasizing trade in the election, though. The supply shortages caused by COVID-19 aren’t just the result of globalized supply chains, but it’s a plausible explanation that sounds good to voters and supports Trump’s anti-trade arguments.
MK: The problem is not that the United States can’t enforce its will. It’s that these institutions are being preyed on by China, undermining the purposes they were intended to serve. Beijing used its influence in the World Health Organization to mislead the world on COVID-19, and it systematically engages in unfair trade practices inconsistent with WTO rules. It would not be wise, however, to abandon these institutions altogether. A better approach would be two-tracked, to reform them from within even as Washington builds new institutions with allies and like-minded states that work better.
EA: This may be the rare issue where I’m more hard-line than you. I don’t think we should pull out of the WTO, but to me, institutions matter far less than power. I think NATO is outdated and needs reform, while the United Nations is a pointless talk shop.
Before we go, though, I saw you had another article on the Foreign Policy site this week. Writing without me to yell at you must be so relaxing. As you might expect, I don’t completely agree with your argument about Russia and China. But before I shoot it down, why don’t you tell our readers about it?
MK: Some big names in the foreign-policy world, including reportedly Henry Kissinger, have argued that the United States should seek to work with Russia to contain China; I think that’s a mistake. Rather than rely on shifty dictators, the United States should work with its democratic allies to counter China and Russia at the same time.
EA: I think it’s unclear whether Russia would be a good partner for the United States. They have all those big structural economic and demographic problems we talked about earlier on. But if it’s a choice between the small benefits of working with them and the much bigger costs of working against them, it’s probably better to find common ground. To paraphrase LBJ: Would you rather have the Russians outside the tent or inside the tent?
MK: Inside, in theory. But the concessions we would have to make to lure Putin in would be too great, and I wouldn’t trust him once he was there.
EA: Well, with Putin’s press secretary and his prime minister both now in the hospital with the coronavirus, who knows who you’ll be dealing with when this is all over?
MK: It sounds like you’re looking forward to a post-Putin Russia. See, maybe regime change isn’t so bad after all.