foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--Will Trump’s Decision to Cut WHO Funding Accomplish Anything?

Will Trump ’ s Decision to Cut WHO Funding Accomplish Anything ?
Matt Kroenig : Hi , Emma !
After a month in lockdown , I have become a Zoom master and I am finally finding a quarantine routine that works for me .
Emma Ashford : I can ’ t do Zoom video calls any more , not since I did my own quarantine haircut on Saturday .
It ’ s OK , I ’ m sure it will grow out in a few weeks .
For now , I just put up a “ This is fine ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fire .
MK : Speaking of fires , a few weeks ago the Democratic Party seemed to be suffering from a giant self-inflicted dumpster fire , but now it appears to be getting its act together .
The old joke is that Democrats fall in love and Republicans fall in line , but now it is the Democrats who have fallen in line behind Joe Biden .
EA : You ’ re right about the Democratic Party .
Every talking head said they ’ d be in chaos until June or August , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days , Bernie Sanders dropped out of the presidential race , and his heartfelt endorsement of Joe Biden was followed up by Barack Obama ’ s endorsement the next day .
Seems like they ’ ve got their act together for sure .
Were you surprised ?
MK : A bit .
But in hindsight , Sanders had no real path to the nomination , so this was the right move for him and the party , to line up behind the person with the best chance of defeating Donald Trump in November @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see that the Biden campaign also invited staffers from the Sanders campaign to join and work with them on key issues , including foreign policy .
I think that bodes well for the future of Democratic foreign policy , which is undergoing a generational shift .
MK : True , that is a healthy sign .
The rift between Hillary Clinton and Obama lasted throughout the Obama administration , and the Never Trump movement continues to divide Republicans .
EA : Well , he did make her his secretary of state !
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I have no doubt that we ’ d be in a better place on foreign policy today if Clinton wasn ’ t in the Obama administration advocating her brand of hawkish internationalism .
No intervention in Libya , for a start .
MK : I meant more the rift between the staffs .
Obama aides weren ’ t happy to see their jobs go to Clinton ’ s people at State .
And I was reassured that Robert Gates at the Pentagon and Clinton were present to stiffen the spine of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Osama bin Laden raid , and a host of other issues .
But Democratic unity might not be enough .
The election will be a referendum on Trump ’ s handling of the coronavirus , and I think Democrats are too confident that the public ’ s judgement will go in their favor in November .
EA : Except he ’ s handling the coronavirus about as well as he handles criticism .
The president spends his time ranting at governors about what they can and can ’ t do , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hard-hit states to send them to places like Florida that he thinks will win him reelection .
And I doubt even that will work .
An incumbent ’ s reelection chances have so much to do with the economy , and we ’ re staring down the barrel of a double-digit recession here .
Unemployment claims continue to grow , with another 5 million this week .
Actually , I think a lot of Democrats—particularly a lot of Sanders supporters—are going to see this as a vindication of their worldview .
EA : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and others advocating for Medicare for All , for example , in an era where millions of Americans are about to lose their jobs—and by extension , their health care .
And universal basic income was a fringe idea when Andrew Yang raised it in the campaign a few months ago , but the same idea basically turned into the stimulus package that Congress passed recently with Republican support .
I ’ m still not convinced that this is a vindication of Sanders ’ s ideas as much as an acknowledgement that an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but his supporters won ’ t think that .
MK : Interesting point .
But I think there is a difference in the need for an outsize government role in the middle of a crisis compared to normal political times .
And despite the criticisms of the White House briefings , the U.S. government has been the single most important global actor in this crisis .
Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve have taken remarkable steps to try to keep the global economy afloat .
And although it hasn ’ t gotten much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion dollars in aid to the developing world .
Like much of the Trump administration ’ s foreign policy and Wagner ’ s music , the U.S. response to COVID-19 has been better than it sounds .
EA : Ha !
Last I checked , though , the Fed was meant to be independent of the White House .
I still don ’ t think it ’ s going to matter all that much .
There ’ s been some positive movement from the federal government , but there ’ s still a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for testing ramp-up .
And finally starting to make progress isn ’ t going to help Trump come November , when a thousand attack ads will surely point out that intelligence reports were clear on the risks of the coronavirus spreading as early as January , when Trump was saying the virus was completely under control .
Starting to make progress now isn ’ t going to help Trump come November , when a thousand attack ads will surely point out that intelligence reports were clear on the risks of the coronavirus spreading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disagreed on this last week .
This issue has moved fast , and there was not an obvious need , or political support , for drastic measures that early .
Trump restricted air traffic from China in January and was criticized for it .
After all , it is hard to believe now , but our March 7 column did not even mention coronavirus !
And I ’ m sure it would have gone over really well if Trump had ordered a nationwide lockdown in the middle of January and February ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EA : True .
And I can admit that I was probably too skeptical of Trump ’ s travel ban , assuming at the time that it was just another attempt to shut the border from an administration that has cried wolf far too many times .
If only the administration had done something with that time : stockpile equipment or ramp up testing , maybe .
MK : Well , the U.S. response wasn ’ t helped by China ’ s dissembling , aided and abetted by the WHO .
What do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to halt U.S. funding to the organization ?
EA : I ’ m honestly fascinated by the decision to cut WHO funding .
On the one hand , it ’ s pretty dumb to cut funding for global health and vaccinations during a pandemic .
It ’ s also very clearly another attempt by the Trump administration to shift blame .
But equally , there are serious problems with the U.N. system and with the WHO .
There may need to be a serious discussion about it after all this is over .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the greatest fears of global public health experts on the international health system .
We have all of these international agreements that look nice on paper ( the WHO , the International Health Regulations , the Nagoya Protocol , etc . )
, but would they function in a pandemic ?
What we learned is that they were all thrown out the window in a crisis , and no one blinked .
It reminds me of the old joke about arms control : When it is needed it doesn ’ t work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t needed .
EA : Isn ’ t that just a fancy way of saying that international institutions are just paper tigers ?
It seems to me that the controversy over the WHO boils down to two camps in the United States : those who thought it genuinely was exempt from power politics and those who just think the Chinese now have too much influence .
Seems like something we ’ ll see in a lot of international institutions going forward .
MK : Yes .
I hope the Trump decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abandoning the institution , but a first step toward reasserting U.S. authority within it .
We are entering a new era of competitive multilateralism in which these institutions will become arenas for U.S.-Chinese competition .
This might also be an opportunity to create new global public health institutions that work better .
The G-20 started holding summits and expanded its profile after the 2008 financial crisis .
Perhaps the United States and its allies can come together to create a new institution for public health .
EA : The Taiwan issue is concerning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pretty effective response to the virus—especially given its location—and it was all ignored by the WHO .
I just don ’ t think it ’ s going to be possible to create an organization that ignores the power political issues in the way you hope .
Either you include China , and have problems like Taiwan , or leave them out , and the organization can ’ t really be effective .
MK : I think greater coordination among the United States and leading democracies could accomplish quite a bit even without China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Boris Johnson fell ill to coronavirus .
Experts are debating whether this pandemic will be as transformational for global politics as 9/11 or the Great Recession , but this is one area where it is clearly more significant : Every single individual on Earth from the leaders of G-7 countries on down is vulnerable and will be personally affected .
I suspect a personal brush with death might instill in him greater resolve to tackle the crisis in Britain , which is now worsening .
EA : That ’ s true @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of hospital , but he ’ s not even back to work yet as he continues to recover .
The U.K. has been hit almost as hard as the United States by the pandemic ; most of my British friends and family are under lockdowns that are far stricter than what we ’ re experiencing here .
Still not clear what any of this will mean for Brexit , though I have a sneaking suspicion there will be at least a year ’ s delay in negotiations .
And Europe isn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even a few months ago .
Brexit pushed European countries together in opposition , but the coronavirus seems to be dividing them .
That might be to Britain ’ s advantage in negotiations .
MK : This is a huge uncertainty for the post-COVID world .
We saw that the 2008 financial crisis nearly tore Europe apart , and the economic impact of this crisis alone is likely to hit much harder .
We already see major divisions in Europe over Eurobonds and other recovery measures .
I very much hope that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a time when Russia and China are doing their best to divide the free world .
EA : Only time will tell .
But look , there was one last thing I wanted to talk about before we wrap up here .
I ’ ve been fascinated by the emerging civil-military relations problems we ’ re seeing here in the United States .
On the USS Theodore Roosevelt , a sailor has now died of COVID-19 after the captain on the ship was fired for calling attention to an outbreak .
MK : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this episode , but I think there is an even bigger implication for U.S. defense policy .
There are sick U.S. sailors .
We are cancelling major military exercises .
The Pentagon has halted troop movements .
How do you recruit , train , or deploy forces when you can ’ t gather large groups ?
EA : There are readiness issues for sure .
But as Capt .
Brett Crozier noted in his leaked letter , we ’ re not at war .
It is foolhardy and pointless to risk the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic just to sustain presence missions around the world .
Plus , surely maintaining these deployments at the cost of mass illness would be worse if we did end up in a conflict ; the French just announced that 700 sailors on the Charles de Gaulle , a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier , are now sick .
Or are you talking about something longer-term ?
MK : Defense budgets are going to take a hit .
It will be even harder for European allies to meet their burden-sharing requirements .
And what if this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for two to three years , as some believe is possible ?
I worry that Putin or Xi will miscalculate and think that this is their chance .
God forbid that China attacks Taiwan on the day the U.S. Pacific Fleet calls in sick .
EA : Well , there are two ways to get to the NATO target of 2 percent of GDP in defense spending .
One : increase spending .
Two : decrease GDP a lot .
We might manage No .
2 !
It ’ s not exactly good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you ’ re right that we ’ re going to see falling defense budgets across the world .
I don ’ t think that ’ s necessarily a bad thing—perhaps a topic for our next debate ?
MK : You ’ re on .
In the meantime , I ’ ll work on coming up with a better Zoom background .

Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
Matt Kroenig: Hi, Emma! After a month in lockdown, I have become a Zoom master and I am finally finding a quarantine routine that works for me.
Emma Ashford: I can’t do Zoom video calls any more, not since I did my own quarantine haircut on Saturday. It’s OK, I’m sure it will grow out in a few weeks. For now, I just put up a “This is fine” background where the room is entirely on fire.
MK: Speaking of fires, a few weeks ago the Democratic Party seemed to be suffering from a giant self-inflicted dumpster fire, but now it appears to be getting its act together. The old joke is that Democrats fall in love and Republicans fall in line, but now it is the Democrats who have fallen in line behind Joe Biden.
EA: You’re right about the Democratic Party. Every talking head said they’d be in chaos until June or August, but within the span of a few days, Bernie Sanders dropped out of the presidential race, and his heartfelt endorsement of Joe Biden was followed up by Barack Obama’s endorsement the next day. Seems like they’ve got their act together for sure. Were you surprised?
MK: A bit. But in hindsight, Sanders had no real path to the nomination, so this was the right move for him and the party, to line up behind the person with the best chance of defeating Donald Trump in November.
EA: I was pleased to see that the Biden campaign also invited staffers from the Sanders campaign to join and work with them on key issues, including foreign policy. I think that bodes well for the future of Democratic foreign policy, which is undergoing a generational shift.
MK: True, that is a healthy sign. The rift between Hillary Clinton and Obama lasted throughout the Obama administration, and the Never Trump movement continues to divide Republicans.
EA: Well, he did make her his secretary of state! One of his worst decisions, I think. I have no doubt that we’d be in a better place on foreign policy today if Clinton wasn’t in the Obama administration advocating her brand of hawkish internationalism. No intervention in Libya, for a start.
MK: I meant more the rift between the staffs. Obama aides weren’t happy to see their jobs go to Clinton’s people at State. And I was reassured that Robert Gates at the Pentagon and Clinton were present to stiffen the spine of the Obama White House on Iran sanctions, the Osama bin Laden raid, and a host of other issues.
But Democratic unity might not be enough. The election will be a referendum on Trump’s handling of the coronavirus, and I think Democrats are too confident that the public’s judgement will go in their favor in November.
EA: Except he’s handling the coronavirus about as well as he handles criticism. The president spends his time ranting at governors about what they can and can’t do, while his administration steals supplies out from under hard-hit states to send them to places like Florida that he thinks will win him reelection.
And I doubt even that will work. An incumbent’s reelection chances have so much to do with the economy, and we’re staring down the barrel of a double-digit recession here. Unemployment claims continue to grow, with another 5 million this week. Actually, I think a lot of Democrats—particularly a lot of Sanders supporters—are going to see this as a vindication of their worldview.
MK: How so?
EA: Well, we’ve had Sanders and others advocating for Medicare for All, for example, in an era where millions of Americans are about to lose their jobs—and by extension, their health care. And universal basic income was a fringe idea when Andrew Yang raised it in the campaign a few months ago, but the same idea basically turned into the stimulus package that Congress passed recently with Republican support. I’m still not convinced that this is a vindication of Sanders’s ideas as much as an acknowledgement that an unprecedented situation has required unprecedented solutions, but his supporters won’t think that.
MK: Interesting point. But I think there is a difference in the need for an outsize government role in the middle of a crisis compared to normal political times. And despite the criticisms of the White House briefings, the U.S. government has been the single most important global actor in this crisis.
Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve have taken remarkable steps to try to keep the global economy afloat. And although it hasn’t gotten much attention, USAID has provided half a billion dollars in aid to the developing world. Like much of the Trump administration’s foreign policy and Wagner’s music, the U.S. response to COVID-19 has been better than it sounds.
EA: Ha! Last I checked, though, the Fed was meant to be independent of the White House. I still don’t think it’s going to matter all that much. There’s been some positive movement from the federal government, but there’s still a lot of dysfunction and no obvious plan for testing ramp-up.
And finally starting to make progress isn’t going to help Trump come November, when a thousand attack ads will surely point out that intelligence reports were clear on the risks of the coronavirus spreading as early as January, when Trump was saying the virus was completely under control.
Starting to make progress now isn’t going to help Trump come November, when a thousand attack ads will surely point out that intelligence reports were clear on the risks of the coronavirus spreading as early as January
MK: We disagreed on this last week. This issue has moved fast, and there was not an obvious need, or political support, for drastic measures that early. Trump restricted air traffic from China in January and was criticized for it. After all, it is hard to believe now, but our March 7 column did not even mention coronavirus! And I’m sure it would have gone over really well if Trump had ordered a nationwide lockdown in the middle of January and February’s impeachment hearings. Hindsight is 20/20.
EA: True. And I can admit that I was probably too skeptical of Trump’s travel ban, assuming at the time that it was just another attempt to shut the border from an administration that has cried wolf far too many times. If only the administration had done something with that time: stockpile equipment or ramp up testing, maybe.
MK: Well, the U.S. response wasn’t helped by China’s dissembling, aided and abetted by the WHO. What do you make of Trump’s decision to halt U.S. funding to the organization?
EA: I’m honestly fascinated by the decision to cut WHO funding. On the one hand, it’s pretty dumb to cut funding for global health and vaccinations during a pandemic. It’s also very clearly another attempt by the Trump administration to shift blame. But equally, there are serious problems with the U.N. system and with the WHO. There may need to be a serious discussion about it after all this is over.
MK: This crisis has surfaced all of the greatest fears of global public health experts on the international health system. We have all of these international agreements that look nice on paper (the WHO, the International Health Regulations, the Nagoya Protocol, etc.), but would they function in a pandemic? What we learned is that they were all thrown out the window in a crisis, and no one blinked. It reminds me of the old joke about arms control: When it is needed it doesn’t work, and when it works, it wasn’t needed.
EA: Isn’t that just a fancy way of saying that international institutions are just paper tigers? It seems to me that the controversy over the WHO boils down to two camps in the United States: those who thought it genuinely was exempt from power politics and those who just think the Chinese now have too much influence. Seems like something we’ll see in a lot of international institutions going forward.
MK: Yes. I hope the Trump decision to cut aid isn’t about abandoning the institution, but a first step toward reasserting U.S. authority within it. We are entering a new era of competitive multilateralism in which these institutions will become arenas for U.S.-Chinese competition. This might also be an opportunity to create new global public health institutions that work better. The G-20 started holding summits and expanded its profile after the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps the United States and its allies can come together to create a new institution for public health.
EA: The Taiwan issue is concerning too. The Taiwanese government had a pretty effective response to the virus—especially given its location—and it was all ignored by the WHO. I just don’t think it’s going to be possible to create an organization that ignores the power political issues in the way you hope. Either you include China, and have problems like Taiwan, or leave them out, and the organization can’t really be effective.
MK: I think greater coordination among the United States and leading democracies could accomplish quite a bit even without China. Speaking of leading democracies, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson fell ill to coronavirus. Experts are debating whether this pandemic will be as transformational for global politics as 9/11 or the Great Recession, but this is one area where it is clearly more significant: Every single individual on Earth from the leaders of G-7 countries on down is vulnerable and will be personally affected. I suspect a personal brush with death might instill in him greater resolve to tackle the crisis in Britain, which is now worsening.
EA: That’s true. I’m glad Boris is out of hospital, but he’s not even back to work yet as he continues to recover. The U.K. has been hit almost as hard as the United States by the pandemic; most of my British friends and family are under lockdowns that are far stricter than what we’re experiencing here. Still not clear what any of this will mean for Brexit, though I have a sneaking suspicion there will be at least a year’s delay in negotiations.
And Europe isn’t nearly as united as it was even a few months ago. Brexit pushed European countries together in opposition, but the coronavirus seems to be dividing them. That might be to Britain’s advantage in negotiations.
MK: This is a huge uncertainty for the post-COVID world. We saw that the 2008 financial crisis nearly tore Europe apart, and the economic impact of this crisis alone is likely to hit much harder. We already see major divisions in Europe over Eurobonds and other recovery measures. I very much hope that we can maintain European and trans-Atlantic unity at a time when Russia and China are doing their best to divide the free world.
EA: Only time will tell. But look, there was one last thing I wanted to talk about before we wrap up here. I’ve been fascinated by the emerging civil-military relations problems we’re seeing here in the United States. On the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a sailor has now died of COVID-19 after the captain on the ship was fired for calling attention to an outbreak.
MK: I am interested in the civil-military dimension of this episode, but I think there is an even bigger implication for U.S. defense policy. There are sick U.S. sailors. We are cancelling major military exercises. The Pentagon has halted troop movements. How do you recruit, train, or deploy forces when you can’t gather large groups?
EA: There are readiness issues for sure. But as Capt. Brett Crozier noted in his leaked letter, we’re not at war. It is foolhardy and pointless to risk the lives of sailors and soldiers during this pandemic just to sustain presence missions around the world. Plus, surely maintaining these deployments at the cost of mass illness would be worse if we did end up in a conflict; the French just announced that 700 sailors on the Charles de Gaulle, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, are now sick.
Or are you talking about something longer-term?
MK: Defense budgets are going to take a hit. It will be even harder for European allies to meet their burden-sharing requirements. And what if this crisis lasts not for weeks, but for two to three years, as some believe is possible? I worry that Putin or Xi will miscalculate and think that this is their chance. God forbid that China attacks Taiwan on the day the U.S. Pacific Fleet calls in sick.
EA: Well, there are two ways to get to the NATO target of 2 percent of GDP in defense spending. One: increase spending. Two: decrease GDP a lot. We might manage No. 2! It’s not exactly good news, though. But I think you’re right that we’re going to see falling defense budgets across the world. I don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing—perhaps a topic for our next debate?
MK: You’re on. In the meantime, I’ll work on coming up with a better Zoom background.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-17--In Afghanistan, the Coronavirus Could Be Deadlier Than War

In Afghanistan , the Coronavirus Could Be Deadlier Than War Until recently , billboards around Kabul were emblazoned with a simple phrase : “ Imagine Peace.
” Now , they instruct people to wash their hands .
Afghan security forces weren ’ t only armed with guns when they rushed to the scene of a brutal massacre of Sikh worshippers by an Islamic State-affiliated gunman on March 25 ; they also wore protective masks and gloves .
Dreams of an end to violence are as distant as ever because Afghanistan now faces a more imminent and potentially deadly threat than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As of April 16 , Afghanistan had 840 confirmed cases of COVID-19 , with 30 deaths .
If estimates released by the Ministry of Public Health are accurate , Afghanistan is heading for a catastrophe .
Unless serious containment measures are enforced and adhered to throughout the country , the ministry anticipates that as many as 25 million Afghans will be infected with the coronavirus , leading to 110,000 deaths .
In other words , if this model is correct , more people will die of COVID-19 in Afghanistan than the estimated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than 18 years ago .
The coronavirus crisis could not have come at a worse time for Afghanistan , which is on the brink of losing critical U.S. military and financial support .
U.S. and NATO forces have already begun pulling troops from the country and will continue regardless of whether or not the Taliban and Kabul government make it to the negotiating table .
The fragile U.S.-Taliban deal agreed in February is already fraying at the seams , while talks between the Taliban and Afghan government initially stalled amid an impasse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been released from both sides , offering some hope that peace talks can progress , but if the precarious arrangement collapses , Afghan government forces will be left to fight the Taliban alone .
Meanwhile , the Afghan government itself is on the verge of imploding .
Following a contested election , both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah declared themselves president in February , and this leadership dispute has yet to be resolved .
As punishment , the U.S. government cut $ 1 billion of aid and threatened to slash a further $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Felbab-Brown , a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution , pointed out , these cuts will undermine not only the COVID-19 response but also Afghanistan ’ s military capability .
“ We all know that without foreign money , the Afghan military will buckle , ” she warned , pointing out that some troops are already forging agreements with the Taliban , warning them of planned attacks , and refusing to fight .
Without money to maintain unity in a military comprising multiple tribal factions , it will likely split up along ethnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is now seeking to hold back a tide of new coronavirus cases .
Afghanistan ’ s fragile health care system , creaking under the strain of extreme poverty and decades of war , lacks the capacity to adequately test or track cases .
As of April 13 , the Afghan government had tested just 4,314 people for the virus , with a further 542 tests announced in parliament on April 15 .
“ We have a shortage of resources .
We have a shortage of funds .
We have a shortage of equipment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advisor to Ghani .
“ But what is important is that we understand the gravity of the situation and we are pulling all of our resources and capacities to deal with it.
” Few believe these resources and capacity will be enough .
Speaking on condition of anonymity , one doctor in Kabul painted a bleak picture .
“ When I arrived here in the [ dedicated coronavirus ] hospital , there were no procedures , ” he said .
“ I have been here for a month , during which time I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For patients , there is no special preparation , not enough medicine and other equipment .
Doctors purchase medicine from private pharmacies for themselves when they need it.
” Outside the capital , things are even worse .
Only two health centers can process the results of testing kits provided by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , and in the western province of Herat , near the Iranian border , the epicenter of the crisis , testing stopped altogether when the kits ran out .
Just 300 ventilators are available @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a country of 38 million .
Even the hand sanitizer procured and distributed to dedicated hospitals by the health ministry turned out to be fake , with zero alcohol content .
Clearly , Afghanistan can not withstand a full-blown pandemic .
The country ’ s best hope is to curb the spread of the virus by persuading everyone to stay home and reduce contact .
But that is easier said than done .
In Kabul , going outside at all has long meant a gamble with death .
In Kabul , residents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demands of lockdown and self-isolation .
Police checkpoints are an everyday occurrence .
The capital has faced the daily risk of suicide attacks , car bombs , and military assaults for nearly two decades , meaning parts of the city are often abruptly shut down and people trapped inside homes and offices for extended periods of time .
Many people steer clear of crowds and busy areas , having seen these targeted for violence over and over again , with mass casualties .
Going outside at all has long meant a gamble with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kabul ( and several other provinces ) presents a new set of challenges .
Few Afghan people can afford to forgo their income for weeks on end , but those prevented from leaving their homes can ’ t work or provide for their families .
International assistance barely scratches the surface of the problem ; a World Bank grant of $ 100 million to fund the medical response pales in comparison with the lost $ 1 billion from the United States , and no donations have yet been earmarked to mitigate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghans stuck at home .
Food prices are soaring , while aid packages in the capital have so far been limited to a one-time allocation of a few pounds of wheat and lentils per family .
Desperate people still risk wandering the streets , looking for work .
At night , the tension is palpable ; frustrated residents , crowded in their homes , can be heard shouting “ Allahu akbar ” from their rooftops .
Officials are striving to educate people on the dangers of contagion through the channels available ; when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , you must first listen to a prerecorded message of government advice in Pashto and Dari .
Despite this , many Afghans struggle to buy basic supplies like face masks or are simply too preoccupied with other afflictions and day-to-day suffering to care about the threat of a new disease , said Noorullah Navayee , a researcher at the National Centre for Policy Research in Kabul .
For vulnerable groups like internally displaced people , the homeless , and drug addicts , following official advice on social distancing is often impossible .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s outbreak , street vendors staged a protest against the daylight curfew outside the city governor ’ s compound on March 26 , demanding the lockdown be rescinded to allow them to earn a living .
Local community groups have mobilized to support one another , but government-issued food packages do not appear to have materialized , and it ’ s unclear how long this can sustain a population already plagued by poverty and drought .
“ Afghanistan ’ s informal sector dominates the entire economic structure of the country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can you tell people , ‘ don ’ t go on the street to sell your kebab , ’ when people will literally starve to death ?
” Even if the authorities manage to contain people already in cities , tracking and restricting movement into and around the country is a formidable task .
In recent weeks , at least 130,000 Afghan migrants returned from Iran , one of the world ’ s hardest-hit nations .
Attention has focused on returnees to western Herat from Iran , where most cases have been detected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a member of parliament , between 3,000 and 6,000 Afghans also return each day to the as-yet-neglected province of Nimruz , which borders southeastern Iran .
The province ’ s capital , Zaranj , is less than an hour ’ s drive from the Iranian town of Zabol and three hours from Zahedan , both of which house prisons that human rights groups believe have hushed up riots over outbreaks of COVID-19 .
What ’ s more , in a bid to stop the virus spreading in their own crowded prisons ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Afghan government now plans to release 10,000 inmates .
For those already exposed to COVID-19 , this could mean transporting the virus into their communities—and for those without family left to take them in , it ’ s unclear where they will go .
The one Afghan industry most likely to weather any crisis is also one positioned to spread the virus from region to region : poppy farming for the heroin trade .
“ The harvest takes place in different periods and different regions of the country , and they migrate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rubin , a former U.S. State Department official .
“ Obviously that ’ s not consistent with social distancing.
” Felbab-Brown , too , expects the multibillion-dollar trade to grow as legitimate jobs fall away , exacerbating internal migration flows within Afghanistan .
And then , of course , there ’ s the biggest challenge of all : How do you maintain control in a crisis when a country is still at war ?
The government is not alone in calling for a truce to beat the virus .
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yousef al-Othaimeen , the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation , appealed to Afghan leaders to unite .
For a moment , it seemed the Taliban might actually be on board .
The group announced , first , that it would give safe passage to WHO and the Red Cross and , later , that it would consider a cease-fire in areas hit hard by COVID-19 .
On March 26 , it even disseminated images of mask-wearing militants and health workers in hazmat suits lined up ( at socially distanced intervals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flag in militant-held Kunduz .
COVID-19 had , it seemed , momentarily achieved what years of fighting and negotiations had not : The Afghan government and the Taliban appeared to be working toward a common goal .
Any optimism was short-lived , however .
In the week that followed those photos , at least 12 civilians and 75 pro-government police and soldiers were killed .
On March 29 , the militant group captured new territory , the Yamgan district in northern Badakhshan , a province that confirmed a case of COVID-19 a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which has seen 13 cases and four deaths from COVID-19 , heavy fighting continues ; on April 7 , the Taliban executed seven civilian captives , including three children .
There has been one glimmer of hope : Government health workers met with the Taliban on April 15 to coordinate a response to the pandemic in Faryab , but it remains to be seen if cooperation will extend beyond this one province or whether it will encourage fighting to stop elsewhere .
The very real prospect of a coronavirus outbreak eliminating aging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an already precarious political situation into a new era of chaos .
For Taliban leaders , the weakness of Kabul ’ s position presents a quandary : Do they seize the strategic opportunity to step up aggression , even though this will inevitably spread the pandemic beyond their control ?
The choice is stark .
Any leader or group considered by their supporters to fail them in this moment of crisis will weaken that support and , with it , hard-fought legitimacy and power .
Many other nonstate actors around the world are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as protectors against the pandemic .
After all , it ’ s not only civilians who risk losing their lives to the virus but Taliban leaders and negotiators—many of whom fall squarely in the high-risk age bracket .
Indeed , the very real prospect of a coronavirus outbreak eliminating aging power brokers on all sides could push an already precarious political situation into a new era of chaos .
“ Imagine that everybody who is older than 50 dies of COVID-19 among the Taliban leadership , ” Felbab-Brown said .
“ Will the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scenario change the attitudes toward negotiating ?
Will there be more calls for the fighting to end , or will they be more intransigent in the negotiation ?
” It ’ s a level of uncertainty for which neither side is prepared .
Harsh winter weather slowed fighting in much of the country , but as the snow melts , the Taliban will have to decide whether to intensify attacks .
If they do , hopes of stability in Afghanistan will slip away—and with them , any chance of controlling the pandemic .

Ezzatullah Mehrdad, Lindsey Kennedy and Nathan Paul Southern

Until recently, billboards around Kabul were emblazoned with a simple phrase: “Imagine Peace.” Now, they instruct people to wash their hands.
Afghan security forces weren’t only armed with guns when they rushed to the scene of a brutal massacre of Sikh worshippers by an Islamic State-affiliated gunman on March 25; they also wore protective masks and gloves. Dreams of an end to violence are as distant as ever because Afghanistan now faces a more imminent and potentially deadly threat than terrorism or even the Taliban: COVID-19.
As of April 16, Afghanistan had 840 confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 30 deaths. If estimates released by the Ministry of Public Health are accurate, Afghanistan is heading for a catastrophe. Unless serious containment measures are enforced and adhered to throughout the country, the ministry anticipates that as many as 25 million Afghans will be infected with the coronavirus, leading to 110,000 deaths. In other words, if this model is correct, more people will die of COVID-19 in Afghanistan than the estimated 100,000 civilians killed since the conflict began more than 18 years ago.
The coronavirus crisis could not have come at a worse time for Afghanistan, which is on the brink of losing critical U.S. military and financial support. U.S. and NATO forces have already begun pulling troops from the country and will continue regardless of whether or not the Taliban and Kabul government make it to the negotiating table. The fragile U.S.-Taliban deal agreed in February is already fraying at the seams, while talks between the Taliban and Afghan government initially stalled amid an impasse over prisoner swaps. Prisoners have now been released from both sides, offering some hope that peace talks can progress, but if the precarious arrangement collapses, Afghan government forces will be left to fight the Taliban alone.
If estimates released by the Ministry of Public Health are accurate, Afghanistan is heading for a catastrophe.
Meanwhile, the Afghan government itself is on the verge of imploding. Following a contested election, both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah declared themselves president in February, and this leadership dispute has yet to be resolved. As punishment, the U.S. government cut $1 billion of aid and threatened to slash a further $1 billion in 2021. As Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, pointed out, these cuts will undermine not only the COVID-19 response but also Afghanistan’s military capability. “We all know that without foreign money, the Afghan military will buckle,” she warned, pointing out that some troops are already forging agreements with the Taliban, warning them of planned attacks, and refusing to fight. Without money to maintain unity in a military comprising multiple tribal factions, it will likely split up along ethnic lines, she said.
The country is now seeking to hold back a tide of new coronavirus cases. Afghanistan’s fragile health care system, creaking under the strain of extreme poverty and decades of war, lacks the capacity to adequately test or track cases. As of April 13, the Afghan government had tested just 4,314 people for the virus, with a further 542 tests announced in parliament on April 15.
“We have a shortage of resources. We have a shortage of funds. We have a shortage of equipment,” said Waheed Omar, an advisor to Ghani. “But what is important is that we understand the gravity of the situation and we are pulling all of our resources and capacities to deal with it.”
Few believe these resources and capacity will be enough. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one doctor in Kabul painted a bleak picture. “When I arrived here in the [dedicated coronavirus] hospital, there were no procedures,” he said. “I have been here for a month, during which time I have received no training on the coronavirus. For patients, there is no special preparation, not enough medicine and other equipment. Doctors purchase medicine from private pharmacies for themselves when they need it.”
Outside the capital, things are even worse. Only two health centers can process the results of testing kits provided by the World Health Organization (WHO), and in the western province of Herat, near the Iranian border, the epicenter of the crisis, testing stopped altogether when the kits ran out. Just 300 ventilators are available to treat those affected by the virus in a country of 38 million. Even the hand sanitizer procured and distributed to dedicated hospitals by the health ministry turned out to be fake, with zero alcohol content.
Clearly, Afghanistan cannot withstand a full-blown pandemic. The country’s best hope is to curb the spread of the virus by persuading everyone to stay home and reduce contact. But that is easier said than done.
In Kabul, going outside at all has long meant a gamble with death.
In Kabul, residents are better prepared than most for the demands of lockdown and self-isolation. Police checkpoints are an everyday occurrence. The capital has faced the daily risk of suicide attacks, car bombs, and military assaults for nearly two decades, meaning parts of the city are often abruptly shut down and people trapped inside homes and offices for extended periods of time. Many people steer clear of crowds and busy areas, having seen these targeted for violence over and over again, with mass casualties. Going outside at all has long meant a gamble with death.
But the three-week lockdown announced in Kabul (and several other provinces) presents a new set of challenges. Few Afghan people can afford to forgo their income for weeks on end, but those prevented from leaving their homes can’t work or provide for their families. International assistance barely scratches the surface of the problem; a World Bank grant of $100 million to fund the medical response pales in comparison with the lost $1 billion from the United States, and no donations have yet been earmarked to mitigate the economic impact or loss of wages for Afghans stuck at home.
Food prices are soaring, while aid packages in the capital have so far been limited to a one-time allocation of a few pounds of wheat and lentils per family. Desperate people still risk wandering the streets, looking for work. At night, the tension is palpable; frustrated residents, crowded in their homes, can be heard shouting “Allahu akbar” from their rooftops.
Officials are striving to educate people on the dangers of contagion through the channels available; when you make a phone call, for example, you must first listen to a prerecorded message of government advice in Pashto and Dari. Despite this, many Afghans struggle to buy basic supplies like face masks or are simply too preoccupied with other afflictions and day-to-day suffering to care about the threat of a new disease, said Noorullah Navayee, a researcher at the National Centre for Policy Research in Kabul. For vulnerable groups like internally displaced people, the homeless, and drug addicts, following official advice on social distancing is often impossible.
In Herat, the epicenter of the country’s outbreak, street vendors staged a protest against the daylight curfew outside the city governor’s compound on March 26, demanding the lockdown be rescinded to allow them to earn a living. Local community groups have mobilized to support one another, but government-issued food packages do not appear to have materialized, and it’s unclear how long this can sustain a population already plagued by poverty and drought. “Afghanistan’s informal sector dominates the entire economic structure of the country,” Felbab-Brown said. “So how can you tell people, ‘don’t go on the street to sell your kebab,’ when people will literally starve to death?”
Even if the authorities manage to contain people already in cities, tracking and restricting movement into and around the country is a formidable task. In recent weeks, at least 130,000 Afghan migrants returned from Iran, one of the world’s hardest-hit nations. Attention has focused on returnees to western Herat from Iran, where most cases have been detected, but according to Gul Ahmad Noorzad, a member of parliament, between 3,000 and 6,000 Afghans also return each day to the as-yet-neglected province of Nimruz, which borders southeastern Iran. The province’s capital, Zaranj, is less than an hour’s drive from the Iranian town of Zabol and three hours from Zahedan, both of which house prisons that human rights groups believe have hushed up riots over outbreaks of COVID-19.
What’s more, in a bid to stop the virus spreading in their own crowded prisons (as it has done elsewhere), the Afghan government now plans to release 10,000 inmates. For those already exposed to COVID-19, this could mean transporting the virus into their communities—and for those without family left to take them in, it’s unclear where they will go.
The one Afghan industry most likely to weather any crisis is also one positioned to spread the virus from region to region: poppy farming for the heroin trade. “The harvest takes place in different periods and different regions of the country, and they migrate with the harvest,” said Barnett Rubin, a former U.S. State Department official. “Obviously that’s not consistent with social distancing.” Felbab-Brown, too, expects the multibillion-dollar trade to grow as legitimate jobs fall away, exacerbating internal migration flows within Afghanistan.
And then, of course, there’s the biggest challenge of all: How do you maintain control in a crisis when a country is still at war? The government is not alone in calling for a truce to beat the virus. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a global humanitarian cease-fire. Yousef al-Othaimeen, the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, appealed to Afghan leaders to unite.
For a moment, it seemed the Taliban might actually be on board. The group announced, first, that it would give safe passage to WHO and the Red Cross and, later, that it would consider a cease-fire in areas hit hard by COVID-19. On March 26, it even disseminated images of mask-wearing militants and health workers in hazmat suits lined up (at socially distanced intervals) on either side of the Taliban flag in militant-held Kunduz. COVID-19 had, it seemed, momentarily achieved what years of fighting and negotiations had not: The Afghan government and the Taliban appeared to be working toward a common goal.
Any optimism was short-lived, however. In the week that followed those photos, at least 12 civilians and 75 pro-government police and soldiers were killed. On March 29, the militant group captured new territory, the Yamgan district in northern Badakhshan, a province that confirmed a case of COVID-19 a few days later. In northern Balkh province, which has seen 13 cases and four deaths from COVID-19, heavy fighting continues; on April 7, the Taliban executed seven civilian captives, including three children. There has been one glimmer of hope: Government health workers met with the Taliban on April 13 to coordinate a response to the pandemic in Faryab, but it remains to be seen if cooperation will extend beyond this one province or whether it will encourage fighting to stop elsewhere.
The very real prospect of a coronavirus outbreak eliminating aging power brokers on all sides could push an already precarious political situation into a new era of chaos.
For Taliban leaders, the weakness of Kabul’s position presents a quandary: Do they seize the strategic opportunity to step up aggression, even though this will inevitably spread the pandemic beyond their control? The choice is stark. Any leader or group considered by their supporters to fail them in this moment of crisis will weaken that support and, with it, hard-fought legitimacy and power. Many other nonstate actors around the world are jumping at the chance to position themselves as protectors against the pandemic. After all, it’s not only civilians who risk losing their lives to the virus but Taliban leaders and negotiators—many of whom fall squarely in the high-risk age bracket.
Indeed, the very real prospect of a coronavirus outbreak eliminating aging power brokers on all sides could push an already precarious political situation into a new era of chaos. “Imagine that everybody who is older than 50 dies of COVID-19 among the Taliban leadership,” Felbab-Brown said. “Will the rise of middle-level commanders in such a scenario change the attitudes toward negotiating? Will there be more calls for the fighting to end, or will they be more intransigent in the negotiation?” It’s a level of uncertainty for which neither side is prepared.
Harsh winter weather slowed fighting in much of the country, but as the snow melts, the Taliban will have to decide whether to intensify attacks. If they do, hopes of stability in Afghanistan will slip away—and with them, any chance of controlling the pandemic.
Correction, April 30, 2020: Government officials in Faryab met with the Taliban to discuss a coordinated approach to the pandemic on April 13. A previous version of this story mistakenly said they met on April 15.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-18--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

The United States and Russia have quietly opposed efforts by the United Nations to promote a sweeping global cease-fire .
Meanwhile , the coronavirus has upended long-standing norms about the role of government in Western societies .
And the reasons policymakers and legislators rarely capitalize on accurate disaster predictions are often political .
1 .
How Trump and Putin Weakened U.N. Bid for a Global Cease-Fire Washington and Moscow both fear that a universal cease-fire proposed by the U.N. chief could potentially constrain their own efforts to mount what they consider legitimate counterterrorism operations overseas , Foreign Policy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources of support for populism erode , the next generation of Europe ’ s populists will seek to exploit the growing nationalism that the pandemic has produced , Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche write .
3 .
After the Coronavirus , the Era of Small Government Will Be Over National governments have deployed immense amounts of resources to curb the spread of the coronavirus .
But when the pandemic ends , big government will be here to stay , Foreign Policy ’ s James Traub writes .
4 .
In the Post-Coronavirus World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theme in coronavirus-induced geopolitical dystopianism is the failure of U.S. leadership coupled with the rise of China , but Chinese propaganda gains have been vastly overstated , Foreign Policy ’ s Salvatore Babones writes .
Experts are remarkably adept at predicting disaster scenarios before they happen , but the lessons learned from simulation exercises and probabilities are rarely given the funding or political attention to be put into practice , Malka Older writes .

The United States and Russia have quietly opposed efforts by the United Nations to promote a sweeping global cease-fire.
The United States and Russia have quietly opposed efforts by the United Nations to promote a sweeping global cease-fire.
Meanwhile, the coronavirus has upended long-standing norms about the role of government in Western societies.
And the reasons policymakers and legislators rarely capitalize on accurate disaster predictions are often political.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Turkish-backed Syrian fighters during a cease-fire
Washington and Moscow both fear that a universal cease-fire proposed by the U.N. chief could potentially constrain their own efforts to mount what they consider legitimate counterterrorism operations overseas, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch reports.
Fellow members of his party congratulate Italian far-right League leader Matteo Salvini after he addressed the Senate in Rome on Feb. 12.
As the traditional sources of support for populism erode, the next generation of Europe’s populists will seek to exploit the growing nationalism that the pandemic has produced, Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche write.
French President Emmanuel Macron (left) and U.S. President Donald Trump embrace at the completion of a joint press conference in the East Room of the White House in Washington on April 24, 2018.
National governments have deployed immense amounts of resources to curb the spread of the coronavirus. But when the pandemic ends, big government will be here to stay, Foreign Policy’s James Traub writes.
A paramilitary police officer stands guard in front of a portrait of Mao Zedong at the Tiananmen Gate in Beijing on Jan. 28.
A recurring theme in coronavirus-induced geopolitical dystopianism is the failure of U.S. leadership coupled with the rise of China, but Chinese propaganda gains have been vastly overstated, Foreign Policy’s Salvatore Babones writes.
French President Emmanuel Macron is seen on a tablet screen in Montpellier, southern France, as he speaks from the Élysée Palace in Paris during a televised address to the nation on April 13.
Experts are remarkably adept at predicting disaster scenarios before they happen, but the lessons learned from simulation exercises and probabilities are rarely given the funding or political attention to be put into practice, Malka Older writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-20--Turkey’s Coronavirus Crisis Grows as Infections Exceed China’s

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Turkey has surpassed China as the country with the most coronavirus cases outside the United States and Europe , Italy renews call for eurozone bonds , and China and the United States trade barbs over Hong Kong arrests .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Turkey has overtaken China as the country with the most coronavirus infections outside of the United States and Europe .
Turkey has now recorded 86,306 cases , with 2,017 deaths .
As the number of coronavirus cases has increased , Turkish Health Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of an overwhelmed health system .
Speaking on Friday , Koca said that unlike Western nations , Turkey ’ s hospitals still hold excess capacity and that intensive care units were not exceeding 60 percent occupancy .
A licensed physician , Koca ’ s daily briefings have made him a star on social media over the course of the pandemic ; he has gained over 4 million followers on Twitter since the beginning of the year .
Turkey ’ s problems with containing the virus came into focus on April 10 , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led to panic buying across the country .
Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu offered his resignation for the botched curfew that weekend , but Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to accept it .
Although schools and bars have closed , Turkey has so far avoided implementing a full-scale lockdown , preferring weekend curfews instead .
During a call between the two leaders on Sunday , U.S. President Donald Trump and Erdogan agreed to continue their “ close cooperation ” during the pandemic .
How has politics played into Turkey ’ s response ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ power over coronavirus relief efforts with municipal governments since the epidemic began .
Two of Turkey ’ s major cities , Ankara and Istanbul , are run by the opposition Republican People ’ s Party ( CHP ) and both found themselves blindsided by April 10 ’ s hasty lockdown announcement .
Writing in FP from Istanbul , Tessa Fox reports on the political decisions guiding Turkey ’ s response and how the rivalry between Erdogan and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu is shaping the government ’ s behavior .
“ Erdogan sees Imamoglu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Istanbul ’ s March 2019 mayoral election and a repeat race last June , as a major electoral threat…Anyone who runs Istanbul well can gain a foothold in national politics , ” just as Erdogan—a former Istanbul mayor—once did , she writes .
Can Turkey ’ s economy handle another shock like this ?
Turkey ’ s economy was in bad shape before the pandemic hit , and finds itself in an even tougher spot now .
On April 10 Reuters reported that Turkish officials had held talks with the U.S. Federal Reserve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bank .
The Turkish currency recently plummeted to a near-historic low of 6.95 lira to the U.S. dollar and is currently trading at 6.88 to the dollar .
Writing in FP on April 9 , Aykan Erdemir and John A. Lechner warned that Erdogan and his son-in-law , who is the finance minister , will need to adopt a new approach for Turkey ’ s economy to survive , “ During an unparalleled crisis that calls for solidarity and trust within and among nations , unless the Turkish president stops doubling down on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health crises await Turkey—and each of them will be contagious for the country ’ s trading partners near and far , ” they argued .
Italy ’ s Conte calls for Eurobonds .
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte has renewed a call for the European Union to issue eurozone-wide bonds as a way for the bloc to show solidarity with member nations .
The comments were printed today in the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung .
Germany and the Netherlands have pushed back against any EU-wide bond , preferring to use the European Stability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fund , instead .
Writing in FP last week , Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute argued that the European Union needs a modern-day Alexander Hamilton .
The new Eurobonds could not only act as a salve for Italy and Spain and send a signal of political solidarity , writes Rohac , but are “ first and foremost a matter of economic and financial self-preservation in a crisis that has no precedent in peacetime living memory.
” U.S.-China war of words after Hong Kong arrests .
Fifteen pro-democracy protesters were arrested in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alleged roles in organizing demonstrations against a proposed extradition law in August and October of last year .
The United States and other Western governments condemned the move .
U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr , in an effort to tie it to the current feud over the coronavirus , said the actions “ demonstrate once again that the Chinese Communist Party can not be trusted.
” The Commissioner ’ s Office of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong accused the United States and others of “ condoning evil acts and making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by ignoring facts.
” Gunmen kill 47 in Nigeria .
Dozens of people have been killed in northwestern Nigeria after gunmen opened fire on three villages Danmusa , Dutsenma , and Safana in Katsina state .
Local police blamed the attacks on “ armed bandits ” operating in the area .
Criminal gangs have killed hundreds of people in the region over the past year .
North Korea confirms coronavirus cases internally .
North Korean authorities have told their citizens that cases of coronavirus have been recorded in the country , going against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free of the virus .
Radio Free Asia reported that in lectures to neighborhood watch groups and other organizations the authorities mentioned cases in Pyongyang and two other parts of the country , without giving specific figures .
North Korea ’ s leader Kim Jong Un was absent from official coverage of a national holiday last Wednesday , prompting speculation over his health .
Coronavirus strikes Afghan presidential palace .
Afghanistan ’ s presidential palace is suffering a coronavirus outbreak , with up to 40 cases reported .
There is no indication that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan is particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus after the toll decades of war has taken on its health system .
In March , over 150,000 Afghans returned to the country from Iran , one of the first countries to record major coronavirus outbreaks .
Spain deaths slowing .
The number of coronavirus deaths in Spain rose by its lowest amount in four weeks on Sunday , suggesting the outbreak may have reached its peak in the world ’ s third-worst hit country .
The number of increased by 410 , the smallest daily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the first time we got below 500 since cases started to spike—this number gives us hope , ” Fernando Simon , a Spanish government adviser , said on Sunday .
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus today .
According to Iran ’ s foreign ministry , the meeting will focus on “ bilateral relations , regional developments , and the latest political and on-the-ground developments of the Arab country ’ s fight against terrorism.
” In its role as rotating head of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two ministerial meetings this week .
On Tuesday April 21 , it will host a virtual meeting with agriculture ministers and on Thursday April 23 it will host a meeting of employment ministers .
The latest round of videoconference Brexit negotiations between representatives of the European Union and United Kingdom begins today and will continue through the week .
The two sides are due to meet monthly until June .
Afghanistan ’ s all-women robotics team made headlines in 2017 when they were finally granted visas on their third attempt to attend an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; now they are back again to help with their country ’ s coronavirus epidemic .
The team is hard at work developing a prototype ventilator , with the help of some spare car parts .
Afghanistan is reported to have only 400 ventilators in a population of over 36 million .
Somaya Farooqi , one of the team ’ s members is adamant about her contribution , “ Afghans should be helping Afghanistan in this pandemic , ” she said .
“ We should not wait for others.
” For more from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Turkey has surpassed China as the country with the most coronavirus cases outside the United States and Europe, Italy renews call for eurozone bonds, and China and the United States trade barbs over Hong Kong arrests .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Turkey has surpassed China as the country with the most coronavirus cases outside the United States and Europe, Italy renews call for eurozone bonds, and China and the United States trade barbs over Hong Kong arrests.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Turkey Now Among World’s Worst-Hit Countries
Turkey has overtaken China as the country with the most coronavirus infections outside of the United States and Europe. Turkey has now recorded 86,306 cases, with 2,017 deaths.
As the number of coronavirus cases has increased, Turkish Health Minister Fahrettin Koca has sought to allay fears of an overwhelmed health system. Speaking on Friday, Koca said that unlike Western nations, Turkey’s hospitals still hold excess capacity and that intensive care units were not exceeding 60 percent occupancy. A licensed physician, Koca’s daily briefings have made him a star on social media over the course of the pandemic; he has gained over 4 million followers on Twitter since the beginning of the year.
Turkey’s problems with containing the virus came into focus on April 10, when a late announcement of a weekend curfew led to panic buying across the country. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu offered his resignation for the botched curfew that weekend, but Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to accept it. Although schools and bars have closed, Turkey has so far avoided implementing a full-scale lockdown, preferring weekend curfews instead.
During a call between the two leaders on Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump and Erdogan agreed to continue their “close cooperation” during the pandemic.
How has politics played into Turkey’s response? Erdogan has been in a battle for power over coronavirus relief efforts with municipal governments since the epidemic began. Two of Turkey’s major cities, Ankara and Istanbul, are run by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and both found themselves blindsided by April 10’s hasty lockdown announcement.
Writing in FP from Istanbul, Tessa Fox reports on the political decisions guiding Turkey’s response and how the rivalry between Erdogan and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu is shaping the government’s behavior. “Erdogan sees Imamoglu, who defeated the AKP twice in Istanbul’s March 2019 mayoral election and a repeat race last June, as a major electoral threat…Anyone who runs Istanbul well can gain a foothold in national politics,” just as Erdogan—a former Istanbul mayor—once did, she writes.
Can Turkey’s economy handle another shock like this? Turkey’s economy was in bad shape before the pandemic hit, and finds itself in an even tougher spot now. On April 10 Reuters reported that Turkish officials had held talks with the U.S. Federal Reserve on securing a swap line from the bank. The Turkish currency recently plummeted to a near-historic low of 6.95 lira to the U.S. dollar and is currently trading at 6.88 to the dollar.
Writing in FP on April 9, Aykan Erdemir and John A. Lechner warned that Erdogan and his son-in-law, who is the finance minister, will need to adopt a new approach for Turkey’s economy to survive, “During an unparalleled crisis that calls for solidarity and trust within and among nations, unless the Turkish president stops doubling down on past mistakes, calamitous financial and public health crises await Turkey—and each of them will be contagious for the country’s trading partners near and far,” they argued.
What We’re Following Today
Italy’s Conte calls for Eurobonds. Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte has renewed a call for the European Union to issue eurozone-wide bonds as a way for the bloc to show solidarity with member nations. The comments were printed today in the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung. Germany and the Netherlands have pushed back against any EU-wide bond, preferring to use the European Stability Mechanism, the EU’s bailout fund, instead.
Writing in FP last week, Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute argued that the European Union needs a modern-day Alexander Hamilton. The new Eurobonds could not only act as a salve for Italy and Spain and send a signal of political solidarity, writes Rohac, but are “first and foremost a matter of economic and financial self-preservation in a crisis that has no precedent in peacetime living memory.”
U.S.-China war of words after Hong Kong arrests. Fifteen pro-democracy protesters were arrested in Hong Kong over the weekend for their alleged roles in organizing demonstrations against a proposed extradition law in August and October of last year. The United States and other Western governments condemned the move. U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr, in an effort to tie it to the current feud over the coronavirus, said the actions “demonstrate once again that the Chinese Communist Party cannot be trusted.” The Commissioner’s Office of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong accused the United States and others of “condoning evil acts and making a travesty of the rule of law by ignoring facts.”
Gunmen kill 47 in Nigeria. Dozens of people have been killed in northwestern Nigeria after gunmen opened fire on three villages Danmusa, Dutsenma, and Safana in Katsina state. Local police blamed the attacks on “armed bandits” operating in the area. Criminal gangs have killed hundreds of people in the region over the past year.
Keep an Eye On
North Korea confirms coronavirus cases internally. North Korean authorities have told their citizens that cases of coronavirus have been recorded in the country, going against the country’s claim to be free of the virus. Radio Free Asia reported that in lectures to neighborhood watch groups and other organizations the authorities mentioned cases in Pyongyang and two other parts of the country, without giving specific figures. North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un was absent from official coverage of a national holiday last Wednesday, prompting speculation over his health.
Coronavirus strikes Afghan presidential palace. Afghanistan’s presidential palace is suffering a coronavirus outbreak, with up to 40 cases reported. There is no indication that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is infected. Afghanistan is particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus after the toll decades of war has taken on its health system. In March, over 150,000 Afghans returned to the country from Iran, one of the first countries to record major coronavirus outbreaks.
Spain deaths slowing. The number of coronavirus deaths in Spain rose by its lowest amount in four weeks on Sunday, suggesting the outbreak may have reached its peak in the world’s third-worst hit country. The number of increased by 410, the smallest daily increase since March 22. “This is the first time we got below 500 since cases started to spike—this number gives us hope,” Fernando Simon, a Spanish government adviser, said on Sunday.
The World This Week
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus today. According to Iran’s foreign ministry, the meeting will focus on “bilateral relations, regional developments, and the latest political and on-the-ground developments of the Arab country’s fight against terrorism.”
In its role as rotating head of the G-20 nations, Saudi Arabia will convene two ministerial meetings this week. On Tuesday April 21, it will host a virtual meeting with agriculture ministers and on Thursday April 23 it will host a meeting of employment ministers.
The latest round of videoconference Brexit negotiations between representatives of the European Union and United Kingdom begins today and will continue through the week. The two sides are due to meet monthly until June.
Odds and Ends
Afghanistan’s all-women robotics team made headlines in 2017 when they were finally granted visas on their third attempt to attend an international robotics competition in the United States; now they are back again to help with their country’s coronavirus epidemic. The team is hard at work developing a prototype ventilator, with the help of some spare car parts. Afghanistan is reported to have only 400 ventilators in a population of over 36 million. Somaya Farooqi, one of the team’s members is adamant about her contribution, “Afghans should be helping Afghanistan in this pandemic,” she said. “We should not wait for others.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-20--Why Jair Bolsonaro’s Coronavirus Denialism Won’t Hurt Him

Many leaders around the world have taken drastic steps to fight the spread of the coronavirus , but Brazil ’ s populist leader , Jair Bolsonaro , has fiercely resisted all pressure to take this pandemic seriously .
Since the outbreak began , Bolsonaro has compared the coronavirus to a mild flu , incited his supporters to participate in political rallies to oppose lockdown measures adopted by local governments , promoted unproven drugs on social media as miracle cures to the disease , and was even seen visiting bakeries and supermarkets in open defiance of the recommendations of health care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place in the capital city , Brasília .
Last Thursday , Bolsonaro doubled down on this radical strategy by firing his last critic within the federal administration : Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta .
Unlike his boss , Mandetta was a strong advocate of social distancing and lockdowns and had gained the trust of Brazilians who fear the country ’ s fragile public health care system will not be able to cope with this pandemic without stringent measures to slow down contagion .
Despite constant critical attacks by his boss , Mandetta was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claiming that this crisis had to be taken seriously and that the response had to be based on the best scientific evidence available .
Because of that , he was fired .
Mandetta was replaced by Nelson Teich , a doctor and businessman who was once an advisor to Bolsonaro ’ s presidential campaign .
The new minister is not a politician but a respected health care professional with strong ties to some of the country ’ s more respected hospitals .
In order to maintain his reputation , he is unlikely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wacky theories about public health .
This is in stark contrast to Mandetta , who is a career politician and will most likely now use his newfound popularity to run for the Senate or for governor in his home state of Mato Grosso do Sul .
At the same time , however , the fact that Teich is not likely to seek elected office but to return to the private sector once his stint in the ministry is over means that he will be more interested in influencing health care spending and regulation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the media or publicly clashing with Bolsonaro .
After Teich ’ s nomination , Bolsonaro posted a YouTube video in which he and his new minister talked about the pandemic .
The president , as has become usual , raved about the healing powers of chloroquine , a drug prescribed to patients with malaria that is currently being studied as a possible treatment for patients with COVID-19 .
Mandetta had always pointed out that there was no firm evidence that chloroquine was effective and that it was dangerous to mislead people into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Teich ’ s response , on the other hand , was carefully worded so that he would not appear to contradict his boss , while claiming that it would be “ up to the doctors ” to decide which treatment would be best for each patient .
But , as criticism of the president ’ s reckless position increases within Brazil , how can Bolsonaro get away with such a disastrous response to this pandemic ?
The long-standing rule of Brazilian politics is that presidents who lose too much popular support get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress got rid of President Dilma Rousseff amid a wave of street protests against corruption at the heart of the government ’ s then-ruling party .
Bolsonaro ’ s cavalier attitude toward the risks posed by the coronavirus has turned him into one of the few world leaders who have experienced a significant loss of popular support according to the polls .
According to the latest national survey conducted by IDEIA Big Data , one of the country ’ s foremost public opinion firms , only 33 percent of Brazilians support the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conversely , 74 percent of voters supported the former health minister ’ s response , according to unpublished portions of the IDEIA poll .
With such numbers—Brazil has more than 38,000 cases , the highest confirmed number in Latin America—one wonders how Bolsonaro can afford to fire a popular minister and to double down on his strategy without fear of losing his job like Rousseff .
The president appears to be biding his time , betting that Brazilians will soon be enraged by the economic consequences of lockdown measures adopted by local governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he could blame the country ’ s political establishment for supporting such measures and claim that lockdown measures were not necessary in the first place .
Brazil ’ s economy has already been weakened by almost 10 years of slow growth .
Unemployment reached 11.6 percent in March , and estimates suggest this number might double in the next two months .
The situation is made worse by the fact that over 41 percent of Brazilian laborers are informal workers and thus are left with no means to earn a salary under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases started to appear in Brazil , Bolsonaro and his finance minister have clashed with congressional leaders over how much money the government should spend to help those who have lost income as a result of the lockdowns .
Currently , Bolsonaro is not even a member of a formally recognized political party , and only a few legislators remain fiercely loyal to him .
As a result , despite government opposition , Congress passed a law providing informal workers with 600 reais ( roughly $ 115 ) a month in emergency aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reliable data means that many will not receive the support they need .
Once Brazilians start to fear an economic downturn more than they fear the virus , Bolsonaro is betting that many will come to believe that he was right all along .
But for this risky tactic to even have a chance of working , Bolsonaro must escape impeachment by Congress in the short run .
For that , he has a powerful ally in his vice president .
While the president has few friends in Congress , his vice president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elite more than the country ’ s populist head of state does .
Political leaders in Congress know full well that the current president harbors authoritarian tendencies and would love nothing more than an opportunity to sweep aside many of the democratic controls currently in place .
Yet in reality he has no support from the top brass of the armed forces for any such adventures .
Vice President Hamilton Mourão , on the other hand , is a retired four-star general who enjoys significant prestige with the country ’ s military elite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s military dictatorship ( 1964-1985 ) .
While most in Congress know that Bolsonaro ’ s populist rhetoric is a threat to them , they also think that having a general with no links to the country ’ s political power brokers is a bigger risk at the moment .
To be sure , the generals in the cabinet have often opposed some of Bolsonaro ’ s more controversial statements .
The best way to understand the political role that these generals seek for the military in Brazil is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to temper the more radical instincts of a reckless populist .
Rather , many appear nostalgic for the days in which the armed forces held an unelected tutelary role over civilian politicians and a broad influence in policymaking in general .
While there is broad agreement within the armed forces ’ top brass that going back to the days of military rule would not be in the their best interest , congressional leaders are still far more skeptical in supporting the rise to power of a general than they were in supporting previous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use this distrust in his favor and often says Mourão would be “ worse than me.
” Mandetta ’ s dismissal ensures that senior government officials in the federal government will be even less likely to publicly disagree with the president .
Fortunately , many of Brazil ’ s state governors and mayors have taken the lead in the fight against the virus .
The leaders of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro states , João Dória and Wilson Witzel—both presidential hopefuls who see this as an opportunity to denounce Bolsonaro—not only have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but also have ensured that strict quarantines continue to be observed in their respective territories .
Together these two states account for 32 percent of the Brazilian population .
As a result of the public ’ s support for these measures , many other local leaders have followed suit and are enacting legislation to make up for the lack of support from the federal government .
Unfortunately , most state and local governments lack the necessary financial and organizational resources to put together an effective response to this public health crisis .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to provide them with emergency funding , the lack of adequate support from the health ministry will significantly affect the country ’ s ability to deal with this pandemic .
For better or worse , Mandetta ’ s departure will change little in Brazil ’ s short-term strategy to fight the coronavirus .
Bolsonaro will continue to pursue a risky rhetorical strategy , but his ability to actually dismantle ongoing lockdown regulations will be limited by the opposition of local leaders and Congress .
The real risk is that Brazil ’ s frail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weakness soon .
When that happens , there is a significant chance that public opinion will start to turn and that Bolsonaro will come out of this crisis stronger as a result—leading to a further erosion of the country ’ s fragile democracy .

Many leaders around the world have taken drastic steps to fight the spread of the coronavirus, but Brazil’s populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro, has fiercely resisted all pressure to take this pandemic seriously.
Many leaders around the world have taken drastic steps to fight the spread of the coronavirus, but Brazil’s populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro, has fiercely resisted all pressure to take this pandemic seriously.
Since the outbreak began, Bolsonaro has compared the coronavirus to a mild flu, incited his supporters to participate in political rallies to oppose lockdown measures adopted by local governments, promoted unproven drugs on social media as miracle cures to the disease, and was even seen visiting bakeries and supermarkets in open defiance of the recommendations of health care experts and of health care regulations in place in the capital city, Brasília.
Last Thursday, Bolsonaro doubled down on this radical strategy by firing his last critic within the federal administration: Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Unlike his boss, Mandetta was a strong advocate of social distancing and lockdowns and had gained the trust of Brazilians who fear the country’s fragile public health care system will not be able to cope with this pandemic without stringent measures to slow down contagion. Despite constant critical attacks by his boss, Mandetta was the one person within the cabinet publicly claiming that this crisis had to be taken seriously and that the response had to be based on the best scientific evidence available. Because of that, he was fired.
Mandetta was replaced by Nelson Teich, a doctor and businessman who was once an advisor to Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign. The new minister is not a politician but a respected health care professional with strong ties to some of the country’s more respected hospitals. In order to maintain his reputation, he is unlikely to publicly endorse his boss’s more wacky theories about public health. This is in stark contrast to Mandetta, who is a career politician and will most likely now use his newfound popularity to run for the Senate or for governor in his home state of Mato Grosso do Sul.
At the same time, however, the fact that Teich is not likely to seek elected office but to return to the private sector once his stint in the ministry is over means that he will be more interested in influencing health care spending and regulation as minister, not in making headlines in the media or publicly clashing with Bolsonaro.
After Teich’s nomination, Bolsonaro posted a YouTube video in which he and his new minister talked about the pandemic. The president, as has become usual, raved about the healing powers of chloroquine, a drug prescribed to patients with malaria that is currently being studied as a possible treatment for patients with COVID-19.
Mandetta had always pointed out that there was no firm evidence that chloroquine was effective and that it was dangerous to mislead people into thinking there was a cure out there. Teich’s response, on the other hand, was carefully worded so that he would not appear to contradict his boss, while claiming that it would be “up to the doctors” to decide which treatment would be best for each patient.
Read More Jair Bolsonaro, the president-elect of Brazil, casts his vote in Rio de Janeiro on Oct. 28. (Ricardo Moraes-Pool/Getty Images) Jair Bolsonaro, the president-elect of Brazil, casts his vote in Rio de Janeiro on Oct. 28. (Ricardo Moraes-Pool/Getty Images) Bolsonaro Can’t Destroy Brazilian Democracy Brazil’s new president is a throwback to its authoritarian past—but the country is more resilient than it used to be. Argument | Omar G. Encarnación Jair Bolsonaro looks on during a press conference he called to announce his intention to run for the Brazilian presidency in the October 2018 election, in Rio de Janeiro on August 10, 2017. (Apu Gomes/AFP/Getty Images) Jair Bolsonaro looks on during a press conference he called to announce his intention to run for the Brazilian presidency in the October 2018 election, in Rio de Janeiro on August 10, 2017. (Apu Gomes/AFP/Getty Images) Jair Bolsonaro’s Model Isn’t Berlusconi. It’s Goebbels. The far-right Brazilian leader isn’t just another conservative populist. His propaganda campaign has taken a page straight from the Nazi playbook. Argument | Federico Finchelstein A sign reading “democracy” is hung in front of the Brazilian Embassy during a protest against Jair Bolsonaro in Buenos Aires on Oct. 30. (Mario De Fina/NurPhoto/Getty Images) A sign reading “democracy” is hung in front of the Brazilian Embassy during a protest against Jair Bolsonaro in Buenos Aires on Oct. 30. (Mario De Fina/NurPhoto/Getty Images) FP’s Guide to the Bolsonaro Presidency Eleven things to read after the vote. FP Guide | Kathryn Salam
But, as criticism of the president’s reckless position increases within Brazil, how can Bolsonaro get away with such a disastrous response to this pandemic? The long-standing rule of Brazilian politics is that presidents who lose too much popular support get impeached. As recently as 2016, Congress got rid of President Dilma Rousseff amid a wave of street protests against corruption at the heart of the government’s then-ruling party.
Bolsonaro’s cavalier attitude toward the risks posed by the coronavirus has turned him into one of the few world leaders who have experienced a significant loss of popular support according to the polls. According to the latest national survey conducted by IDEIA Big Data, one of the country’s foremost public opinion firms, only 33 percent of Brazilians support the president’s performance during this crisis. Conversely, 74 percent of voters supported the former health minister’s response, according to unpublished portions of the IDEIA poll.
With such numbers—Brazil has more than 38,000 cases, the highest confirmed number in Latin America—one wonders how Bolsonaro can afford to fire a popular minister and to double down on his strategy without fear of losing his job like Rousseff. The president appears to be biding his time, betting that Brazilians will soon be enraged by the economic consequences of lockdown measures adopted by local governments throughout the country. When that happens, he could blame the country’s political establishment for supporting such measures and claim that lockdown measures were not necessary in the first place.
Brazil’s economy has already been weakened by almost 10 years of slow growth. Unemployment reached 11.6 percent in March, and estimates suggest this number might double in the next two months. The situation is made worse by the fact that over 41 percent of Brazilian laborers are informal workers and thus are left with no means to earn a salary under the strict lockdown conditions.
Since coronavirus cases started to appear in Brazil, Bolsonaro and his finance minister have clashed with congressional leaders over how much money the government should spend to help those who have lost income as a result of the lockdowns. Currently, Bolsonaro is not even a member of a formally recognized political party, and only a few legislators remain fiercely loyal to him. As a result, despite government opposition, Congress passed a law providing informal workers with 600 reais (roughly $115) a month in emergency aid during lockdowns, but a lack of reliable data means that many will not receive the support they need. Once Brazilians start to fear an economic downturn more than they fear the virus, Bolsonaro is betting that many will come to believe that he was right all along.
But for this risky tactic to even have a chance of working, Bolsonaro must escape impeachment by Congress in the short run. For that, he has a powerful ally in his vice president. While the president has few friends in Congress, his vice president scares many in Brazil’s political elite more than the country’s populist head of state does. Political leaders in Congress know full well that the current president harbors authoritarian tendencies and would love nothing more than an opportunity to sweep aside many of the democratic controls currently in place. Yet in reality he has no support from the top brass of the armed forces for any such adventures.
Vice President Hamilton Mourão, on the other hand, is a retired four-star general who enjoys significant prestige with the country’s military elite and has a long history of praising the country’s military dictatorship (1964-1985). While most in Congress know that Bolsonaro’s populist rhetoric is a threat to them, they also think that having a general with no links to the country’s political power brokers is a bigger risk at the moment.
To be sure, the generals in the cabinet have often opposed some of Bolsonaro’s more controversial statements. The best way to understand the political role that these generals seek for the military in Brazil is not to think of them as moderates trying to temper the more radical instincts of a reckless populist. Rather, many appear nostalgic for the days in which the armed forces held an unelected tutelary role over civilian politicians and a broad influence in policymaking in general. While there is broad agreement within the armed forces’ top brass that going back to the days of military rule would not be in the their best interest, congressional leaders are still far more skeptical in supporting the rise to power of a general than they were in supporting previous vice presidents. Bolsonaro understands how to use this distrust in his favor and often says Mourão would be “worse than me.”
Mandetta’s dismissal ensures that senior government officials in the federal government will be even less likely to publicly disagree with the president. Fortunately, many of Brazil’s state governors and mayors have taken the lead in the fight against the virus. The leaders of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro states, João Dória and Wilson Witzel—both presidential hopefuls who see this as an opportunity to denounce Bolsonaro—not only have fiercely opposed the president’s stance but also have ensured that strict quarantines continue to be observed in their respective territories. Together these two states account for 32 percent of the Brazilian population.
As a result of the public’s support for these measures, many other local leaders have followed suit and are enacting legislation to make up for the lack of support from the federal government. Unfortunately, most state and local governments lack the necessary financial and organizational resources to put together an effective response to this public health crisis. While legislators in Congress have passed new legislation to provide them with emergency funding, the lack of adequate support from the health ministry will significantly affect the country’s ability to deal with this pandemic.
For better or worse, Mandetta’s departure will change little in Brazil’s short-term strategy to fight the coronavirus. Bolsonaro will continue to pursue a risky rhetorical strategy, but his ability to actually dismantle ongoing lockdown regulations will be limited by the opposition of local leaders and Congress. The real risk is that Brazil’s frail economy will start to show signs of weakness soon. When that happens, there is a significant chance that public opinion will start to turn and that Bolsonaro will come out of this crisis stronger as a result—leading to a further erosion of the country’s fragile democracy.