foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--In Egypt, the Coronavirus Poses a Political Threat

On March 16 , Egypt had 126 confirmed cases of the new coronavirus .
By mid-April , that figure had reached 2,700 .
A week later , cases had grown by more than a third .
While the outbreak is just beginning , Egypt ’ s fragile health care system is already struggling .
So too is its population .
A long-troubled economy and a government that has not prioritized spending on health services is adding tinder to the fire .
Should the coronavirus continue its rapid spread , it is only a matter of time before the current health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The steep increase in the number of coronavirus cases has underscored the dire shape of Egypt ’ s health care system .
Some 5,000 cases have been confirmed and 359 people have died of the coronavirus as of April 28 , though with so little testing the real figure is doubtless higher .
Throughout the country , there is a shortage of doctors , nurses , drugs , medical supplies , and beds , leaving the health care system ill equipped to manage a fast-moving and highly lethal pandemic .
Low pay and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to leave the country , including around 10,000 over the past three years alone .
According to an estimate by Egypt ’ s Medical Syndicate , out of a total of 220,000 registered medical doctors , around 120,000 work outside Egypt .
Public hospitals are understaffed by some 55,000 to 60,000 nurses .
Egypt has 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people , compared with around 13 in Japan , 8 in Germany , and 6 in France .
Unsurprisingly , according to Arab Barometer , only 31 percent of Egyptians said they were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s health care service in 2018-2019 , a 19-point drop since 2010 .
Doctors , nurses , and medics now account for 13 percent of Egypt ’ s coronavirus cases , roughly the same percentage recorded in Italy and Spain .
Despite the danger of speaking out , many doctors have resorted to social media to raise awareness over the working conditions , mismanagement , and supply shortages that they say are endangering their lives .
Videos of health workers protesting in the hallways of hospitals have become common .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their voices may prove unsuccessful .
For decades , health care has been all but ignored by the government—particularly when compared with the sizable share of the national budget allocated to security forces .
Government funding for health declined from 6.7 percent of the national budget in 2000 to 4.2 percent in 2016 .
The growing coronavirus caseload will serve as a tragic reminder to the country ’ s leaders that not all threats are military in nature .
Since Abdel Fattah al-Sisi became president in 2014 , he has overemphasized the threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egypt ’ s military and police to curb it .
This came at the expense of other risks .
The military is Egypt ’ s most powerful political , economic , and security institution .
Since 1952 , its role in the political system , the economy , and society has been central and decisive .
It has been heavily engaged in fighting Islamist militants in Sinai for the past seven years .
Entrenched corruption and mismanaged state resources have exacerbated public frustration .
Rare protests against Sisi broke out last September after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exile , Mohamed Ali , released viral videos in which he accused senior leaders of corruption .
Sisi ’ s assertions that the presidential palaces he was criticized for constructing were for the greater good—necessary to build “ a new state ” —only added to public outrage .
Meanwhile , the Egyptian government continues to construct a glitzy new capital east of Cairo , estimated to cost $ 58 billion .
This is all the more disturbing given the country ’ s economic woes .
Egyptians still bear the brunt of the 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led the pound to lose half its value against the U.S. dollar .
In 2018 , the nationwide poverty rate rose to 32.5 percent , a 5 percentage point increase from two years prior .
Economic recovery has been lethargic , so much so that Egypt ’ s non-oil private economic activity contracted in January to its lowest point in nearly three years .
There is no doubt that the coronavirus-induced global lockdown will cause a sharp decline in the country ’ s main sources of badly needed hard currency : revenues from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Egypt ’ s GDP ) , fees from shipping through the Suez Canal , foreign investment , and remittances from workers abroad—many of whom work in sectors that have been immediately affected by restrictive anti-coronavirus measures and the drop in consumer spending .
Inevitably , rates of unemployment and poverty will grow .
Egypt ’ s temporary labor force , estimated at somewhere between 5 million and 12 million , will be hit the hardest .
Of them , only 1.5 million workers will receive aid from the Ministry of Manpower—an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 95 ) over three installments .
The rest will not receive payments because they are not registered with the ministry .
Without social insurance or regular pay , the forgotten millions constitute a ticking time bomb .
As the health sector continues to crumble under the weight of the pandemic and public struggles mount , the government will find it impossible to continue justifying its vast expenditures on gated cities , presidential palaces , and a bloated security apparatus .
In the coming months , Sisi will likely seek to mitigate public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and health workers ( already hailed as Egypt ’ s “ white army ” in the state-run media ) and injecting more resources into the health care system .
He has already taken a number of steps on that path .
Ramping up its efforts to stem the tide of COVID-19 , the government has opened more testing centers , purchased additional testing kits and medical supplies , and raised the salaries of intern medical doctors .
Meanwhile , to support the industrial sector and boost investment , the government has reduced the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to factories and delayed property taxes for three months .
The government has also reduced taxes on equities , and the central bank has cut interest rates by 3 percent and postponed by six months the due dates for small-business and consumer loans .
But these efforts may not be enough .
Observers of modern Egyptian politics know how rapidly calls for change can snowball in times of crisis .
If the government does not take drastic steps—particularly to buttress the health sector—a new season of discontent can be expected .
In January @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force vanished into thin air—battered by three days of protests and clashes .
The sudden withdrawal emboldened the revolutionaries and eventually led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of rule : Egypt ’ s Arab Spring .
Decades earlier , Egypt ’ s massive military defeat against Israel in June 1967 prompted its charismatic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to resign .
Nasser later withdrew his resignation , but the defeat shattered Egypt ’ s image in the Arab world .
In the same vein , the frantic events of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as “ the autumn of fury , ” climaxed with the assassination of President Anwar Sadat , which , in turn , triggered violent clashes between security forces and armed Islamists that snuffed out more than 100 lives in the southern city of Asyut .
Without much legitimacy to lean on , Egypt ’ s political class today is feebler than at those other moments .
Already , the current crisis has fostered visible cracks .
Egypt ’ s minister of health , Hala Zayed , has become a source of ire on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provide medical aid while supplies at home remained unavailable or overpriced .
Last month , crowds assembled in various parts of Alexandria to chant prayers against the virus , a rarity under a draconian 2013 law that bans unauthorized protests and public gatherings .
On April 11 , police forces fired rounds of tear gas in a village in Dakahlia after its inhabitants prevented the burial of a doctor who had died from COVID-19 for fear of getting infected .
Dissent could find a fertile ground in the convergence of political , economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The current crisis may trigger another change , this one concerning political perceptions and preferences .
Since Egypt ’ s ruling elite recaptured power in 2013 , they have been preaching a gospel of ultranationalism , spinning its tenets , rituals , and myths .
The government uses the law , public discourse , state media , education , film , and television shows to stress that heroism comes exclusively in uniform and that a strongman at the helm is the only remedy for the country ’ s ills .
A blend of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become a sort of state ideology .
But it is doctors and nurses now on the front line , defending against the deadly virus with little support ; white has been shouldering khaki aside .
Social media is already replete with praise for doctors and complaints about the poor working conditions they endure .
If it seems far-fetched that a virus could reshape Egyptian politics and society , there ’ s a precedent .
In 1918 , the Spanish flu devastated Egypt , killing 138,000 people—about 1 percent of the population , mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christopher S. Rose , who studied the political impact of the pandemic , notes that military needs had supplanted those of civilians .
The hospitals were quickly overrun , and agricultural production ground to a halt as the virus swept through the countryside .
The catastrophe , coming on the heels of World War I , pushed Egyptians to the brink .
In 1919 , mass protests against British rule roiled the nation .
Hundreds of people were killed , but the revolution was a success : Within three years , Egypt gained @ @ @

On March 16, Egypt had 126 confirmed cases of the new coronavirus. By mid-April, that figure had reached 2,700. A week later, cases had grown by more than a third. While the outbreak is just beginning, Egypt’s fragile health care system is already struggling. So too is its population. A long-troubled economy and a government that has not prioritized spending on health services is adding tinder to the fire. Should the coronavirus continue its rapid spread, it is only a matter of time before the current health crisis explodes into a political one.
On March 16, Egypt had 126 confirmed cases of the new coronavirus. By mid-April, that figure had reached 2,700. A week later, cases had grown by more than a third. While the outbreak is just beginning, Egypt’s fragile health care system is already struggling. So too is its population. A long-troubled economy and a government that has not prioritized spending on health services is adding tinder to the fire. Should the coronavirus continue its rapid spread, it is only a matter of time before the current health crisis explodes into a political one.
The steep increase in the number of coronavirus cases has underscored the dire shape of Egypt’s health care system. Some 5,000 cases have been confirmed and 359 people have died of the coronavirus as of April 28, though with so little testing the real figure is doubtless higher.
Throughout the country, there is a shortage of doctors, nurses, drugs, medical supplies, and beds, leaving the health care system ill equipped to manage a fast-moving and highly lethal pandemic. Low pay and bad working conditions have led many physicians to leave the country, including around 10,000 over the past three years alone. According to an estimate by Egypt’s Medical Syndicate, out of a total of 220,000 registered medical doctors, around 120,000 work outside Egypt. Public hospitals are understaffed by some 55,000 to 60,000 nurses. Egypt has 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people, compared with around 13 in Japan, 8 in Germany, and 6 in France. Unsurprisingly, according to Arab Barometer, only 31 percent of Egyptians said they were satisfied with the overall performance of their government’s health care service in 2018-2019, a 19-point drop since 2010.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Doctors, nurses, and medics now account for 13 percent of Egypt’s coronavirus cases, roughly the same percentage recorded in Italy and Spain. Despite the danger of speaking out, many doctors have resorted to social media to raise awareness over the working conditions, mismanagement, and supply shortages that they say are endangering their lives. Videos of health workers protesting in the hallways of hospitals have become common. If the crisis escalates, attempts to muzzle their voices may prove unsuccessful.
For decades, health care has been all but ignored by the government—particularly when compared with the sizable share of the national budget allocated to security forces. Government funding for health declined from 6.7 percent of the national budget in 2000 to 4.2 percent in 2016.
The growing coronavirus caseload will serve as a tragic reminder to the country’s leaders that not all threats are military in nature. Since Abdel Fattah al-Sisi became president in 2014, he has overemphasized the threat of terrorism and the sacrifices made by Egypt’s military and police to curb it. This came at the expense of other risks. The military is Egypt’s most powerful political, economic, and security institution. Since 1952, its role in the political system, the economy, and society has been central and decisive. It has been heavily engaged in fighting Islamist militants in Sinai for the past seven years.
Entrenched corruption and mismanaged state resources have exacerbated public frustration. Rare protests against Sisi broke out last September after a former army contractor living in self-imposed exile, Mohamed Ali, released viral videos in which he accused senior leaders of corruption. Sisi’s assertions that the presidential palaces he was criticized for constructing were for the greater good—necessary to build “a new state”—only added to public outrage. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government continues to construct a glitzy new capital east of Cairo, estimated to cost $58 billion.
This is all the more disturbing given the country’s economic woes. Egyptians still bear the brunt of the 2016 float of the Egyptian pound, which led the pound to lose half its value against the U.S. dollar. In 2018, the nationwide poverty rate rose to 32.5 percent, a 5 percentage point increase from two years prior. Economic recovery has been lethargic, so much so that Egypt’s non-oil private economic activity contracted in January to its lowest point in nearly three years. There is no doubt that the coronavirus-induced global lockdown will cause a sharp decline in the country’s main sources of badly needed hard currency: revenues from tourism (which accounts for some 12 percent of Egypt’s GDP), fees from shipping through the Suez Canal, foreign investment, and remittances from workers abroad—many of whom work in sectors that have been immediately affected by restrictive anti-coronavirus measures and the drop in consumer spending.
Inevitably, rates of unemployment and poverty will grow. Egypt’s temporary labor force, estimated at somewhere between 5 million and 12 million, will be hit the hardest. Of them, only 1.5 million workers will receive aid from the Ministry of Manpower—an allowance of 1,500 Egyptian pounds (around $95) over three installments. The rest will not receive payments because they are not registered with the ministry. Without social insurance or regular pay, the forgotten millions constitute a ticking time bomb.
As the health sector continues to crumble under the weight of the pandemic and public struggles mount, the government will find it impossible to continue justifying its vast expenditures on gated cities, presidential palaces, and a bloated security apparatus.
In the coming months, Sisi will likely seek to mitigate public anger by paying homage to the doctors and health workers (already hailed as Egypt’s “white army” in the state-run media) and injecting more resources into the health care system. He has already taken a number of steps on that path. Ramping up its efforts to stem the tide of COVID-19, the government has opened more testing centers, purchased additional testing kits and medical supplies, and raised the salaries of intern medical doctors.
Meanwhile, to support the industrial sector and boost investment, the government has reduced the price of natural gas and electricity provided to factories and delayed property taxes for three months. The government has also reduced taxes on equities, and the central bank has cut interest rates by 3 percent and postponed by six months the due dates for small-business and consumer loans.
But these efforts may not be enough.
Observers of modern Egyptian politics know how rapidly calls for change can snowball in times of crisis. If the government does not take drastic steps—particularly to buttress the health sector—a new season of discontent can be expected.
In January 2011, Egypt’s entire police force vanished into thin air—battered by three days of protests and clashes. The sudden withdrawal emboldened the revolutionaries and eventually led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of rule: Egypt’s Arab Spring. Decades earlier, Egypt’s massive military defeat against Israel in June 1967 prompted its charismatic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser to resign. Nasser later withdrew his resignation, but the defeat shattered Egypt’s image in the Arab world. In the same vein, the frantic events of 1981, dubbed in Egyptian political parlance as “the autumn of fury,” climaxed with the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, which, in turn, triggered violent clashes between security forces and armed Islamists that snuffed out more than 100 lives in the southern city of Asyut.
Without much legitimacy to lean on, Egypt’s political class today is feebler than at those other moments. Already, the current crisis has fostered visible cracks. Egypt’s minister of health, Hala Zayed, has become a source of ire on social media after flying to Italy to provide medical aid while supplies at home remained unavailable or overpriced. Last month, crowds assembled in various parts of Alexandria to chant prayers against the virus, a rarity under a draconian 2013 law that bans unauthorized protests and public gatherings. On April 11, police forces fired rounds of tear gas in a village in Dakahlia after its inhabitants prevented the burial of a doctor who had died from COVID-19 for fear of getting infected. Dissent could find a fertile ground in the convergence of political, economic, social, and health grievances.
The current crisis may trigger another change, this one concerning political perceptions and preferences. Since Egypt’s ruling elite recaptured power in 2013, they have been preaching a gospel of ultranationalism, spinning its tenets, rituals, and myths. The government uses the law, public discourse, state media, education, film, and television shows to stress that heroism comes exclusively in uniform and that a strongman at the helm is the only remedy for the country’s ills.
Already, the current crisis has fostered visible cracks. Egypt’s minister of health, Hala Zayed, has become a source of ire on social media after flying to Italy to provide medical aid while supplies at home remained unavailable or overpriced.
A blend of nationalism, militarism, and masculinity has become a sort of state ideology. But it is doctors and nurses now on the front line, defending against the deadly virus with little support; white has been shouldering khaki aside. Social media is already replete with praise for doctors and complaints about the poor working conditions they endure.
If it seems far-fetched that a virus could reshape Egyptian politics and society, there’s a precedent. In 1918, the Spanish flu devastated Egypt, killing 138,000 people—about 1 percent of the population, mostly in its impoverished countryside. The historian Christopher S. Rose, who studied the political impact of the pandemic, notes that military needs had supplanted those of civilians. The hospitals were quickly overrun, and agricultural production ground to a halt as the virus swept through the countryside. The catastrophe, coming on the heels of World War I, pushed Egyptians to the brink. In 1919, mass protests against British rule roiled the nation. Hundreds of people were killed, but the revolution was a success: Within three years, Egypt gained its independence.
Editor’s Note: We have amended the article to anonymize the author out of concerns for the author’s safety.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-30--Can a Small Lebanese Town Become a Model for Conquering COVID-19?

Can a Small Lebanese Town Become a Model for Conquering COVID-19 ?
BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn ’ t usually make national headlines , but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight .
“ Today marks seven days since we ’ ve closed off Bsharri , ” Mayor Freddy Keyrouz said in a phone interview with Foreign Policy on April 17 .
“ We are on the offensive against this virus.
” The municipality ’ s decision to close off the small mountainous town raised eyebrows across Lebanon , followed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreak would be imminent in Bsharri , and ultimately across the country .
Apart from a nighttime curfew and travel restrictions to minimize traffic , Lebanon ’ s national government has yet to close off towns from each other .
With an estimated 5,000 residents , Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands , like Zahara de la Sierra in southern Spain .
And much like the Spanish hilltop town , both geographically and functionally , Bsharri has primarily relied on its local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the national government struggles to secure financial and medical aid .
The town ’ s first reported coronavirus case was a doctor at a hospital earlier this month , which gave the local government the green light to implement its strict measures .
“ We already had a preemptive strategy well before the first case hit the Bsharri or Lebanon , ” Keyrouz added.Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands .
The director of Bsharri ’ s government hospital , Eddie Lazem , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was allocated for coronavirus patients , while a floor in an unfinished hospital building was set up as a quarantine facility .
“ We set up a response team preemptively , ” Lazem told Foreign Policy by phone—reporting locally was made impossible after the town was sealed off .
“ And despite financial limitations we took the strictest measures possible for our facilities—sanitization , masks , everything.
” Critical cases are sent to Beirut ’ s government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital or to a hospital in the northern city of Tripoli .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bsharri has at least 70 confirmed cases , over 10 percent of confirmed cases across the entire country .
But at the same time , Bsharri has administered a significantly greater number of tests per capita compared to other municipalities in Lebanon .
“ We did 400 tests just this week so we can see where to take things going forward , ” Keyrouz said .
Mass testing has since become part of the global consensus on how to best respond to the coronavirus pandemic .
Medical workers in Brazil , where President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a little flu , ” have said the underreporting of coronavirus cases ignores a “ mountain of other deaths.
” Keyrouz echoed these sentiments .
“ The high numbers isn ’ t because we have a bad situation—it ’ s because we ’ re testing widely .
… We started testing in places where lots of human interactions take place : gas stations , stores , pharmacies , and so on , ” he said .
Lebanon ’ s Health Ministry has documented over 720 coronavirus cases and 24 related deaths thus far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practitioners , however , have called for at least 2,500 tests per day , and to be more inclusive of patients in rural areas and refugee camps .
Those calls appear to have been in vain , however .
Following the first confirmed case on April 21 in Lebanon ’ s Jalil Palestinian refugee camp—one of 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency—a series of tests the following day revealed that there were at least four other positive cases there .
An overreliance on private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only provided a minimal response has also placed a huge burden on the underfunded government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital in Beirut to lead the country ’ s response to the pandemic .
One of the most indebted countries in the world , Lebanon eventually defaulted on its enormous foreign debt in March .
Factor in state budget cuts , including a 7 percent cut to health care , and it couldn ’ t be a worse time for Lebanon to deal with a pandemic .
Though Lebanon has high-quality private health care facilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative approach to the situation ; hospitals that want to take in COVID-19 patients can only allocate up to 20 beds per facility .
Despite a recent United States government donation of $ 5.3 million to private hospitals to help “ mitigate ” the virus , it is unclear whether that will incentivize them to take in more patients .
( The government ’ s requests that they do so are nonbinding . )
To further bolster its patchwork response , Lebanon has received aid from UNICEF and the French government , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World Bank to reallocate $ 40 million in loans to be used for the COVID-19 effort .
The country has also been struggling to implement reforms mandatory to unlock a pledged $ 11.1 billion in loans from the international community in April 2018 .
It has also reached out to the International Monetary Fund for emergency aid but has been unsuccessful so far .
Crucially , in economically depressed Lebanon , mass government borrowing to extend the social safety net isn ’ t an option .
There are no grants to small businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ payment exemptions to prevent further layoffs as is the case in France—about half of Lebanon ’ s population is unemployed .
There certainly aren ’ t any grants for freelance workers and others in the gig economy , like those offered in Germany .
About 40,000 Lebanese families , however , were set to benefit from a one-time payment of roughly $ 133 .
But this aid was postponed due to “ errors , ” which the army has now been tasked with remedying .
Parliament was set to vote on a wider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses and workers , but to no avail ; with too few members of parliament present to establish a quorum , the session ended early with no vote on the matter .
Back in Bsharri , Ghiwa Fakhry isn ’ t getting used to working from home ; she ’ s part of a community initiative called the Bsharri Crisis Team .
Though politically unaffiliated , this collective has reached out to everyone for collaboration .
Fakhry and her colleagues are among many people in Bsharri who quickly set up community groups to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable families—now more in need than ever as a result of the pandemic .
“ We ’ ve been in contact with the local government , priests , MPs , and other stakeholders in the community—and the majority were supportive and cooperative , ” Fakhry told Foreign Policy .
“ Our goal is to make sure that everyone in need‚ with no exceptions , gets their fair share of support and to do this in an organized and transparent way.
” But as in the rest of Lebanon , where state-funded social services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the country ’ s wide patronage networks of political parties , warlords , and business magnates that have filled the state ’ s gap for decades .
For example , Iran-backed Hezbollah , known for its sophisticated welfare and services , has allocated about $ 1.75 million to fund their efforts against the coronavirus , with a team of 24,500 medical workers .
A key political stronghold for the Lebanese Forces , a prominent Christian party and key ally of the United States and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon , Bsharri is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader , Samir Geagea , and his spouse , Bsharri MP Sethrida Geagea .
“ The Lebanese Forces helped upscale the hospital and provided testing [ kits ] , ” Hany Rahme , an activist with the party , said .
“ And also 1,500 food packages.
” Among the party ’ s donors is a former health minister , the Lebanese British businessman Ghassan Hasbani , who donated 100 test kits .
Just days after the first case was confirmed in Bsharri , its hospital announced that it received 800 testing kits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia and 500 from the office of William Tawk—a rival of the Lebanese Forces .
Political parties across the country have undertaken similar initiatives , including billionaires and ex-Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati , and political rivals Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement across their constituencies—but these top-down efforts haven ’ t matched Bsharri ’ s targeted community-driven mobilizations .
“ I encourage all the capitalists and businessmen to donate to the efforts of their hometowns , ” Keyrouz , Bsharri ’ s mayor , said , emphasizing the need for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a better understanding of the situation in Lebanon that way.
” He compared his town ’ s response to Germany ’ s and South Korea ’ s , which included implementing wider testing and tracking the whereabouts of positive cases .
And while this resulted in skyrocketing documented cases due to the high rate of testing , Germany and South Korea had significantly lower mortality rates .
Large-scale testing and effective aid distribution is a far cry from what the rest of Lebanon has witnessed thus far .
The number of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dwindling in Bsharri , as all positive cases were quarantined and their whereabouts were tracked to test other potential cases .
Fakhry , the Bsharri community activist , believes that this tells a story about what an adequate response to the outbreak should look like for the rest of the country—and perhaps elsewhere .
“ There is no other way than to implement wider testing , ” she said .
“ The vast majority of the cases here were asymptomatic , including the elderly .
You ’ re putting people at risk.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy is on life-support , ought to have implemented a preemptive and holistic strategy prior to its first case in late February .
“ For such a small country , I think we could have implemented these kinds of procedures within two weeks , ” she said .
“ We ’ d have been in a more comfortable situation with less pressure on the hospitals.
” Slovakia , a country of similar size , was ahead of the curve in implementing border closures and social distancing measures—despite its reliance on the European market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road.In Bsharri there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes .
As Lebanon continues to slash public spending , it ’ s unlikely that an increase in spending on social services is imminent .
And now with the spotlight on Bsharri , it was unsurprising that some speculation came about that the town was trying to score points against Health Minister Hamad Hassan of Hezbollah , a Lebanese Forces rival .
Lazem , the Bsharri hospital director , said that there is no tension .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was very supportive , ” Lazem said .
“ His visit was in good faith , despite political differences.
” Meanwhile in Bsharri , closed off from the rest of the country , there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes .
There was a sense of urgency to put people ’ s immediate health and economic needs at the forefront , especially at a time where popular protests swept across Lebanon calling for the downfall of its ruling political parties .
“ We united @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Bsharri love each other—whether it ’ s civil society or Lebanese Forces such as myself , ” Rahme told Foreign Policy .
But whether everyone feels the same way is questionable .
Renewed protests and riots across Lebanon over the economic crisis continue to target the country ’ s ruling elite—including the Lebanese Forces and their allies—as a seething population demands change .
As Bsharri ’ s case numbers go down , numerous towns and cities in Lebanon have been protesting over the past week , now over lack of economic compensation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to greater demand for medical resources , and it ’ s clear that the situation in Lebanon as a whole is far from under control .
While acknowledging the positive trajectory in Bsharri , Lazem insisted that people must stay vigilant , even in his town .
“ Now we ’ re fine , ” he said .
“ Tomorrow morning , who knows ?
”

BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn’t usually make national headlines, but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight.
BEIRUT—The remote northern Lebanese town of Bsharri doesn’t usually make national headlines, but its unique response to the coronavirus pandemic has thrust it into the spotlight.
“Today marks seven days since we’ve closed off Bsharri,” Mayor Freddy Keyrouz said in a phone interview with Foreign Policy on April 17. “We are on the offensive against this virus.”
The municipality’s decision to close off the small mountainous town raised eyebrows across Lebanon, followed by a media frenzy over whether a devastating outbreak would be imminent in Bsharri, and ultimately across the country. Apart from a nighttime curfew and travel restrictions to minimize traffic, Lebanon’s national government has yet to close off towns from each other.
With an estimated 5,000 residents, Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands, like Zahara de la Sierra in southern Spain. And much like the Spanish hilltop town, both geographically and functionally, Bsharri has primarily relied on its local community to contain the situation, while the national government struggles to secure financial and medical aid.
The town’s first reported coronavirus case was a doctor at a hospital earlier this month, which gave the local government the green light to implement its strict measures. “We already had a preemptive strategy well before the first case hit the Bsharri or Lebanon,” Keyrouz added.
The director of Bsharri’s government hospital, Eddie Lazem, said that a floor of the hospital was allocated for coronavirus patients, while a floor in an unfinished hospital building was set up as a quarantine facility. “We set up a response team preemptively,” Lazem told Foreign Policy by phone—reporting locally was made impossible after the town was sealed off. “And despite financial limitations we took the strictest measures possible for our facilities—sanitization, masks, everything.”
Critical cases are sent to Beirut’s government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital or to a hospital in the northern city of Tripoli.
Bsharri resembles some other remote towns around the world that have taken matters into their own hands.
One month since its first positive case, Bsharri has at least 70 confirmed cases, over 10 percent of confirmed cases across the entire country. But at the same time, Bsharri has administered a significantly greater number of tests per capita compared to other municipalities in Lebanon.
“We did 400 tests just this week so we can see where to take things going forward,” Keyrouz said. Mass testing has since become part of the global consensus on how to best respond to the coronavirus pandemic. Medical workers in Brazil, where President Jair Bolsonaro downplayed the pandemic as “a little flu,” have said the underreporting of coronavirus cases ignores a “mountain of other deaths.” Keyrouz echoed these sentiments.
“The high numbers isn’t because we have a bad situation—it’s because we’re testing widely. … We started testing in places where lots of human interactions take place: gas stations, stores, pharmacies, and so on,” he said.
Lebanon’s Health Ministry has documented over 720 coronavirus cases and 24 related deaths thus far with roughly 1,000 daily tests; medical practitioners, however, have called for at least 2,500 tests per day, and to be more inclusive of patients in rural areas and refugee camps. Those calls appear to have been in vain, however.
Following the first confirmed case on April 21 in Lebanon’s Jalil Palestinian refugee camp—one of 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency—a series of tests the following day revealed that there were at least four other positive cases there. An overreliance on private health care facilities that have thus far only provided a minimal response has also placed a huge burden on the underfunded government-run Rafik Hariri University Hospital in Beirut to lead the country’s response to the pandemic.
The coronavirus hit Lebanon just as the country was going through what is arguably the worst fiscal crisis in its history. The local currency, the Lebanese pound, officially pegged to the U.S. dollar, has lost half of its value on the black market in just six months, and a shortage of U.S. dollars means the country has struggled to import essential food items, fuel, medical equipment, and life-saving medicines.
One of the most indebted countries in the world, Lebanon eventually defaulted on its enormous foreign debt in March. Factor in state budget cuts, including a 7 percent cut to health care, and it couldn’t be a worse time for Lebanon to deal with a pandemic.
Though Lebanon has high-quality private health care facilities, they’ve taken a very conservative approach to the situation; hospitals that want to take in COVID-19 patients can only allocate up to 20 beds per facility. Despite a recent United States government donation of $5.3 million to private hospitals to help “mitigate” the virus, it is unclear whether that will incentivize them to take in more patients. (The government’s requests that they do so are nonbinding.)
To further bolster its patchwork response, Lebanon has received aid from UNICEF and the French government, and it has won the approval of the World Bank to reallocate $40 million in loans to be used for the COVID-19 effort. The country has also been struggling to implement reforms mandatory to unlock a pledged $11.1 billion in loans from the international community in April 2018. It has also reached out to the International Monetary Fund for emergency aid but has been unsuccessful so far.
Crucially, in economically depressed Lebanon, mass government borrowing to extend the social safety net isn’t an option. There are no grants to small businesses, nor are there rent and utility payment exemptions to prevent further layoffs as is the case in France—about half of Lebanon’s population is unemployed. There certainly aren’t any grants for freelance workers and others in the gig economy, like those offered in Germany.
About 40,000 Lebanese families, however, were set to benefit from a one-time payment of roughly $133. But this aid was postponed due to “errors,” which the army has now been tasked with remedying. Parliament was set to vote on a wider proposal to include zero-interest loans to small businesses and workers, but to no avail; with too few members of parliament present to establish a quorum, the session ended early with no vote on the matter.
Back in Bsharri, Ghiwa Fakhry isn’t getting used to working from home; she’s part of a community initiative called the Bsharri Crisis Team. Though politically unaffiliated, this collective has reached out to everyone for collaboration. Fakhry and her colleagues are among many people in Bsharri who quickly set up community groups to coordinate effective aid efforts and distribution for vulnerable families—now more in need than ever as a result of the pandemic.
“We’ve been in contact with the local government, priests, MPs, and other stakeholders in the community—and the majority were supportive and cooperative,” Fakhry told Foreign Policy. “Our goal is to make sure that everyone in need‚ with no exceptions, gets their fair share of support and to do this in an organized and transparent way.”
But as in the rest of Lebanon, where state-funded social services are minimal, Bsharri residents also rely on the country’s wide patronage networks of political parties, warlords, and business magnates that have filled the state’s gap for decades. For example, Iran-backed Hezbollah, known for its sophisticated welfare and services, has allocated about $1.75 million to fund their efforts against the coronavirus, with a team of 24,500 medical workers.
A key political stronghold for the Lebanese Forces, a prominent Christian party and key ally of the United States and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, Bsharri is the hometown of both the party’s leader, Samir Geagea, and his spouse, Bsharri MP Sethrida Geagea.
“The Lebanese Forces helped upscale the hospital and provided testing [kits],” Hany Rahme, an activist with the party, said. “And also 1,500 food packages.”
Among the party’s donors is a former health minister, the Lebanese British businessman Ghassan Hasbani, who donated 100 test kits. Just days after the first case was confirmed in Bsharri, its hospital announced that it received 800 testing kits: 300 from the Lebanese diaspora in Australia and 500 from the office of William Tawk—a rival of the Lebanese Forces.
Political parties across the country have undertaken similar initiatives, including billionaires and ex-Prime Ministers Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati, and political rivals Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement across their constituencies—but these top-down efforts haven’t matched Bsharri’s targeted community-driven mobilizations.
“I encourage all the capitalists and businessmen to donate to the efforts of their hometowns,” Keyrouz, Bsharri’s mayor, said, emphasizing the need for wider tests. “We’d have a better understanding of the situation in Lebanon that way.”
He compared his town’s response to Germany’s and South Korea’s, which included implementing wider testing and tracking the whereabouts of positive cases. And while this resulted in skyrocketing documented cases due to the high rate of testing, Germany and South Korea had significantly lower mortality rates. Large-scale testing and effective aid distribution is a far cry from what the rest of Lebanon has witnessed thus far.
The number of people testing positive for the coronavirus has started dwindling in Bsharri, as all positive cases were quarantined and their whereabouts were tracked to test other potential cases. Fakhry, the Bsharri community activist, believes that this tells a story about what an adequate response to the outbreak should look like for the rest of the country—and perhaps elsewhere.
“There is no other way than to implement wider testing,” she said. “The vast majority of the cases here were asymptomatic, including the elderly. You’re putting people at risk.”
Fakhry added that Lebanon, though its economy is on life-support, ought to have implemented a preemptive and holistic strategy prior to its first case in late February. “For such a small country, I think we could have implemented these kinds of procedures within two weeks,” she said. “We’d have been in a more comfortable situation with less pressure on the hospitals.” Slovakia, a country of similar size, was ahead of the curve in implementing border closures and social distancing measures—despite its reliance on the European market and the potential economic consequences down the road.In Bsharri there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes.
As Lebanon continues to slash public spending, it’s unlikely that an increase in spending on social services is imminent.
And now with the spotlight on Bsharri, it was unsurprising that some speculation came about that the town was trying to score points against Health Minister Hamad Hassan of Hezbollah, a Lebanese Forces rival.
Lazem, the Bsharri hospital director, said that there is no tension. “The health minister visited Bsharri, and he was very supportive,” Lazem said. “His visit was in good faith, despite political differences.”
Meanwhile in Bsharri, closed off from the rest of the country, there is a sense of both optimism and caution among residents of different political stripes. There was a sense of urgency to put people’s immediate health and economic needs at the forefront, especially at a time where popular protests swept across Lebanon calling for the downfall of its ruling political parties.
“We united at this difficult time because the people of Bsharri love each other—whether it’s civil society or Lebanese Forces such as myself,” Rahme told Foreign Policy.
But whether everyone feels the same way is questionable. Renewed protests and riots across Lebanon over the economic crisis continue to target the country’s ruling elite—including the Lebanese Forces and their allies—as a seething population demands change.
As Bsharri’s case numbers go down, numerous towns and cities in Lebanon have been protesting over the past week, now over lack of economic compensation and skyrocketing food prices. This could lead to greater demand for medical resources, and it’s clear that the situation in Lebanon as a whole is far from under control.
While acknowledging the positive trajectory in Bsharri, Lazem insisted that people must stay vigilant, even in his town. “Now we’re fine,” he said. “Tomorrow morning, who knows?”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--U.S. Intelligence Says Coronavirus Isn’t Manmade. Trump Isn’t So Sure.

U.S. Intelligence Says Coronavirus Isn ’ t Manmade .
Trump Isn ’ t So Sure .
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. intelligence community says the coronavirus was not manmade , the Arab League condemns Israel ’ s annexation plans , and Russia ’ s prime minister is diagnosed with the coronavirus .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence , the U.S. agency responsible for overseeing the sprawling U.S. intelligence network , said on Thursday that it sees the coronavirus as a natural phenomenon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified , ” it said in a statement on Thursday .
The statement undercuts a popular conspiracy theory that the virus was developed in a Wuhan laboratory .
A less conspiratorial theory holds that naturally-occurring bat coronaviruses being studied at a Wuhan lab may have been unintentionally spread outside of the building due to lax biosecurity protocols .
The intelligence community report did not rule out the possibility of accidental escape of pathogens .
Trump blames China , again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cast blame on China regardless of what his intelligence experts conclude .
When asked at a White House press conference whether he has seen any evidence that the virus began in a Chinese lab , U.S. President Donald Trump replied , “ Yes , I have.
” He didn ’ t give any further details , other than he has a “ high degree of confidence ” that the virus came from a Chinese lab .
The Trump administration has gone to great lengths to blame China for the coronavirus and has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the initial travel restrictions , to the branding of the coronavirus as the “ Chinese ” virus , to this more aggressive play .
On Thursday , the Washington Post reported that Trump administration officials are preparing a menu of retaliatory options , including suing China for damages .
China has consistently denied any wrongdoing surrounding the origins of the coronavirus .
On Thursday , Xinhua , a Chinese state news outlet , posted a video mocking the Trump administration ’ s response to the coronavirus pandemic—through the medium of LEGO .
Isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on ?
Amid the geopolitical posturing , it ’ s worth asking why it ’ s happening .
James Green , writing in Foreign Policy provides a compelling reason : bickering provides a distraction for two governments that would prefer to talk about anything other than how they have handled the outbreak .
He calls on the United States to step up and put the blame game aside .
“ The U.S. government and its institutions will be judged by how they deal with the outbreak and its aftermath—not by a finger-pointing tweet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show some self-confidence and not sully the country with the eye-for-eye tactics of the Chinese Communist Party.
” Russia ’ s prime minister has coronavirus .
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has been diagnosed with the coronavirus , making him the first high-ranking Russian official with a confirmed infection .
Mishustin publicly announced the news in a video conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin .
“ What is happening to you can happen to anyone , ” Putin told Mishustin .
“ When you get to the hospital , call me .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ call.
” Mishustin has been one of the key figures in Russia ’ s coronavirus response , as cases in the country have pushed past the 100,000 mark .
He has recommended First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov as his temporary replacement .
Arab League condemns annexation .
The member states of the Arab League issued a joint statement on Thursday calling Israel ’ s planned annexation of the West Bank a “ new war crime ” against the Palestinian people .
Arab League secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit said Israel was being opportunistic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the coronavirus pandemic to “ impose a new reality on the ground.
” Writing in Foreign Policy on April 23 , a trio of seasoned Israeli military commanders warned Israel against annexation .
Ami Ayalon ( a former chief of the Israeli Shin Bet security service ) , Tamir Pardo ( a former director of the Mossad ) , and Gadi Shamni ( a former commander of the Israel Defense Forces Central Command ) argued that annexation would undermine Israeli security and could spark a popular backlash in Jordan and Egypt—two countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement .
“ This irreversible step , once taken , is likely to trigger a chain reaction beyond Israel ’ s control , ” they wrote .
Johnson says worst is behind U.K .
In his first press conference since leaving the hospital , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that the United Kingdom had moved past its peak number of coronavirus cases .
“ I can confirm today that for the first time , we are past the peak of this disease .
We ’ re past the peak and we ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we have so many reasons to be hopeful for the long term , ” he said .
Johnson added that his government would be issuing a plan next week to reopen businesses and schools .
Britain has recorded the third highest coronavirus death toll globally at 26,097 .
Lebanon lays out economic rescue plan .
Lebanon outlined a rescue plan for its tattered economy on Thursday amid hopes it can secure funding from the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .
“ If we get ( IMF support ) , and God willing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pass through this difficult economic phase , which could be three , four or five years , ” Prime Minister Hassan Diab said , after his cabinet approved the plan .
Lebanon is seeking $ 10 billion in external support , Diab added .
In March , Lebanon defaulted on a debt payment of $ 1.2 billion , marking the first time it had defaulted on its sovereign debt .
The economic crisis has fueled months of unrest , and one protester was killed this week during demonstrations in the city of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ S-400 .
Turkey continued to make clear its ambitions for the Russian-made S-400 air defense system , even as the U.S. threatens sanctions if it is deployed .
Turkey has delayed deploying the system , saying it was focused on its coronavirus response .
Speaking on Thursday , Ibrahim Kalin , an advisor to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , said although an April launch is now not possible , Turkey will “ move forward as it was planned.
” The United States renewed its threat on Thursday when David Satterfield , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO ally will expose itself to sanctions if it makes the S-400 system operational .
Washington already retaliated against Turkey last summer by kicking it off the U.S. F-35 fighter program after it had initially purchased the Russian weapon system .
While Berlin has moved to increase its number of cycle lanes in anticipation of a ridership shortfall on public transit , France is looking to go one better and give cyclists cash to repair their bikes .
Environment Minister Elisabeth Borne announced a $ 22 million dollar scheme to boost cycling infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distributed in 50 euro checks to individuals to get their bikes in working order .
“ We want this period to be another step toward a cycling culture , ” Borne wrote on Twitter .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. intelligence community says the coronavirus was not manmade , the Arab League condemns Israel ’s annexation plans, and Russia ’s prime minister is diagnosed with the coronavirus.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. intelligence community says the coronavirus was not manmade, the Arab League condemns Israel’s annexation plans, and Russia’s prime minister is diagnosed with the coronavirus.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S.-China Blame Game Continues
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. agency responsible for overseeing the sprawling U.S. intelligence network, said on Thursday that it sees the coronavirus as a natural phenomenon. “The Intelligence Community … concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified,” it said in a statement on Thursday.
The statement undercuts a popular conspiracy theory that the virus was developed in a Wuhan laboratory. A less conspiratorial theory holds that naturally-occurring bat coronaviruses being studied at a Wuhan lab may have been unintentionally spread outside of the building due to lax biosecurity protocols. The intelligence community report did not rule out the possibility of accidental escape of pathogens.
Trump blames China, again. The U.S. commander-in chief seems eager to cast blame on China regardless of what his intelligence experts conclude. When asked at a White House press conference whether he has seen any evidence that the virus began in a Chinese lab, U.S. President Donald Trump replied, “Yes, I have.” He didn’t give any further details, other than he has a “high degree of confidence” that the virus came from a Chinese lab.
The Trump administration has gone to great lengths to blame China for the coronavirus and has tried a number of strategies, from the initial travel restrictions, to the branding of the coronavirus as the “Chinese” virus, to this more aggressive play. On Thursday, the Washington Post reported that Trump administration officials are preparing a menu of retaliatory options, including suing China for damages.
China has consistently denied any wrongdoing surrounding the origins of the coronavirus. On Thursday, Xinhua, a Chinese state news outlet, posted a video mocking the Trump administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic—through the medium of LEGO.
Isn’t there a pandemic still going on? Amid the geopolitical posturing, it’s worth asking why it’s happening. James Green, writing in Foreign Policy provides a compelling reason: bickering provides a distraction for two governments that would prefer to talk about anything other than how they have handled the outbreak.
He calls on the United States to step up and put the blame game aside. “The U.S. government and its institutions will be judged by how they deal with the outbreak and its aftermath—not by a finger-pointing tweet,” Green writes. “Time to show some self-confidence and not sully the country with the eye-for-eye tactics of the Chinese Communist Party.”
What We’re Following Today
Russia’s prime minister has coronavirus. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has been diagnosed with the coronavirus, making him the first high-ranking Russian official with a confirmed infection. Mishustin publicly announced the news in a video conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin. “What is happening to you can happen to anyone,” Putin told Mishustin. “When you get to the hospital, call me. I’ll be waiting for your call.” Mishustin has been one of the key figures in Russia’s coronavirus response, as cases in the country have pushed past the 100,000 mark. He has recommended First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov as his temporary replacement.
Arab League condemns annexation. The member states of the Arab League issued a joint statement on Thursday calling Israel’s planned annexation of the West Bank a “new war crime” against the Palestinian people. Arab League secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit said Israel was being opportunistic, using the world’s distraction during the coronavirus pandemic to “impose a new reality on the ground.”
Writing in Foreign Policy on April 23, a trio of seasoned Israeli military commanders warned Israel against annexation. Ami Ayalon (a former chief of the Israeli Shin Bet security service), Tamir Pardo (a former director of the Mossad), and Gadi Shamni (a former commander of the Israel Defense Forces Central Command) argued that annexation would undermine Israeli security and could spark a popular backlash in Jordan and Egypt—two countries that backed today’s Arab League statement. “This irreversible step, once taken, is likely to trigger a chain reaction beyond Israel’s control,” they wrote.
Johnson says worst is behind U.K. In his first press conference since leaving the hospital, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that the United Kingdom had moved past its peak number of coronavirus cases. “I can confirm today that for the first time, we are past the peak of this disease. We’re past the peak and we’re on the downward slope, and we have so many reasons to be hopeful for the long term,” he said. Johnson added that his government would be issuing a plan next week to reopen businesses and schools. Britain has recorded the third highest coronavirus death toll globally at 26,097.
Keep an Eye On
Lebanon lays out economic rescue plan. Lebanon outlined a rescue plan for its tattered economy on Thursday amid hopes it can secure funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “If we get (IMF support), and God willing we will, it will help us to pass through this difficult economic phase, which could be three, four or five years,” Prime Minister Hassan Diab said, after his cabinet approved the plan. Lebanon is seeking $10 billion in external support, Diab added.
In March, Lebanon defaulted on a debt payment of $1.2 billion, marking the first time it had defaulted on its sovereign debt. The economic crisis has fueled months of unrest, and one protester was killed this week during demonstrations in the city of Tripoli.
Turkey not backing down on S-400. Turkey continued to make clear its ambitions for the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, even as the U.S. threatens sanctions if it is deployed. Turkey has delayed deploying the system, saying it was focused on its coronavirus response. Speaking on Thursday, Ibrahim Kalin, an advisor to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said although an April launch is now not possible, Turkey will “move forward as it was planned.”
The United States renewed its threat on Thursday when David Satterfield, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, said its NATO ally will expose itself to sanctions if it makes the S-400 system operational. Washington already retaliated against Turkey last summer by kicking it off the U.S. F-35 fighter program after it had initially purchased the Russian weapon system.
Odds and Ends
While Berlin has moved to increase its number of cycle lanes in anticipation of a ridership shortfall on public transit, France is looking to go one better and give cyclists cash to repair their bikes. Environment Minister Elisabeth Borne announced a $22 million dollar scheme to boost cycling infrastructure, the majority of which will be distributed in 50 euro checks to individuals to get their bikes in working order. “We want this period to be another step toward a cycling culture,” Borne wrote on Twitter.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--The Coronavirus Is Creating a Crisis on Europe’s Borders

The Coronavirus Is Creating a Crisis on Europe ’ s Borders For Europe , the internal economic shock created by the coronavirus is set to be compounded by an external security shock triggered by the economic collapse of its neighborhood .
For many reasons , Europe ’ s southern and eastern neighbors remain highly vulnerable to such a disaster scenario .
These generally middle-income countries—including Turkey , Ukraine , Egypt , and Morocco—do not benefit from global initiatives like the debt relief programs led by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) , which target less developed nations .
Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effectively from the deep recession that awaits them .
The rising risk aversion in global markets has constrained their debt-raising options .
Their economic well-being has further been undermined by the coronavirus-related economic downturn , raising fears about economic dislocation and political instability .
Middle-income countrie like Turkey , Ukraine , Egypt , and Morocco lack the domestic resources to rebound effectively from the deep recession that awaits them .
Europe is now looking at the emergence of exactly the type of scenario of regional instability that it sought to preempt .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to improve the political and economic resilience of its regional partners .
But now the economic resilience of Europe ’ s neighbors is clearly at risk .
A major revenue stream for many of Europe ’ s southern and eastern neighbors is tourism .
In 2018 , tourism revenues as a share of total exports of goods and services reached 41 percent in Jordan and 25 percent in Egypt , according to the United Nations World Tourism Organization .
In absolute numbers , Turkey ’ s tourism revenues including international transport were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amounting to around 5 percent of GDP .
This important revenue source is now set to evaporate as the virus takes its toll .
The collapse of the tourism industry will also have significant repercussions for the sustainability of employment .
For Jordan , Morocco , and Tunisia , tourism provided for around 7 percent of total employment , compared with the global median of 3.8 percent .
This critical gap in foreign exchange earnings comes at a time when these economies are also suffering from a global reversal of capital flows .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ response to the rapid spread of the coronavirus , putting further pressure on capital accounts .
The Turkish lira , for instance , has depreciated by 7 percent in the last month alone against the U.S. dollar .
Europe ’ s neighbors are set to endure even more hardship when it comes to trade imbalances as their exports are due to collapse .
They will be among the most affected from the ongoing fall in consumer demand in Europe given their heavy reliance on the continental market .
The European Union ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 65 percent for Morocco , 50 percent for Turkey , and 43 percent for Ukraine .
The world is now witnessing the formation of a perfect storm on Europe ’ s borders .
The combination of recessionary economics , balance of payments difficulties , and surging unemployment has created a formidable challenge that will jeopardize domestic social contracts .
Just like the current protests unfolding in Lebanon , governments will come under pressure by an ever larger group of unemployed and disenfranchised citizens .
The ensuing political and economic instabilities would not only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radicalization in these afflicted societies but also trigger new cross-border movements and refugee flows across the Mediterranean .
Yet the EU ’ s response so far has been very timid .
Brussels has earmarked 15.6 billion euros ( $ 17 billion ) in its Team Europe package , which was launched in April to support partner countries in their efforts to address the impact of the coronavirus crisis .
This amount corresponds to about 3 percent of the initial funding of 500 billion euros ( $ 547 billion ) allocated to EU governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understandable that EU leaders prefer to prioritize their own societies in this time of acute need .
But this task should not be seen as a zero-sum game .
The assistance to neighbors should not necessarily cannibalize the resources set aside for helping EU governments .
There are at least two costless options that remain unexplored .
First , there have been calls for the IMF to substantially increase Special Drawing Rights ( known as SDRs ) from the current level of $ 286 billion to about $ 1 trillion as a means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to combat the impact of the virus .
SDRs are an international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries ’ official reserves .
But this proposal has been blocked by the U.S. government .
Washington rightly argues that the increase would disproportionally benefit richer countries ; U.S. reticence may also be linked to a recalcitrance to provide financial help to countries like Iran and Russia .
In the absence of a global consensus , EU governments should consider shifting their IMF-held SDRs to financially strained neighboring countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stimulus of about $ 95 billion with no fiscal impact on EU and national budgets .
There is no reason why the European Central Bank should not follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Federal Reserve , which has already set up swap arrangements with 14 countries .
Second , the European Central Bank ( ECB ) should be more actively involved in establishing swap arrangements with the central banks of partner countries .
Under such a scheme , beneficiary countries would obtain euros from the ECB against a collateral in their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries with foreign exchange liquidity and replenish their reserves .
There is no reason why the ECB should not follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Federal Reserve , which has already set up this mechanism with some 14 countries .
The EU is finally eager to shape a more concerted response to the coronavirus crisis after an initial era of prevarication .
The danger now is that European governments ’ responses remain too introverted—and largely oblivious to the severity of the regional crisis surrounding them .

For Europe, the internal economic shock created by the coronavirus is set to be compounded by an external security shock triggered by the economic collapse of its neighborhood. For many reasons, Europe’s southern and eastern neighbors remain highly vulnerable to such a disaster scenario.
For Europe, the internal economic shock created by the coronavirus is set to be compounded by an external security shock triggered by the economic collapse of its neighborhood. For many reasons, Europe’s southern and eastern neighbors remain highly vulnerable to such a disaster scenario.
These generally middle-income countries—including Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, and Morocco—do not benefit from global initiatives like the debt relief programs led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which target less developed nations. Yet they lack the domestic resources to rebound effectively from the deep recession that awaits them. The rising risk aversion in global markets has constrained their debt-raising options. Their economic well-being has further been undermined by the coronavirus-related economic downturn, raising fears about economic dislocation and political instability.
Europe is now looking at the emergence of exactly the type of scenario of regional instability that it sought to preempt. A key recommendation of its 2016 Global Strategy was to improve the political and economic resilience of its regional partners.
But now the economic resilience of Europe’s neighbors is clearly at risk. A major revenue stream for many of Europe’s southern and eastern neighbors is tourism. In 2018, tourism revenues as a share of total exports of goods and services reached 41 percent in Jordan and 25 percent in Egypt, according to the United Nations World Tourism Organization.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
In absolute numbers, Turkey’s tourism revenues including international transport were the highest at $37 billion, amounting to around 5 percent of GDP. This important revenue source is now set to evaporate as the virus takes its toll. The collapse of the tourism industry will also have significant repercussions for the sustainability of employment. For Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, tourism provided for around 7 percent of total employment, compared with the global median of 3.8 percent.
This critical gap in foreign exchange earnings comes at a time when these economies are also suffering from a global reversal of capital flows. Emerging-market capital inflows have dramatically declined in response to the rapid spread of the coronavirus, putting further pressure on capital accounts.
The world is now witnessing the formation of a perfect storm on Europe’s borders.
The Turkish lira, for instance, has depreciated by 7 percent in the last month alone against the U.S. dollar. Europe’s neighbors are set to endure even more hardship when it comes to trade imbalances as their exports are due to collapse. They will be among the most affected from the ongoing fall in consumer demand in Europe given their heavy reliance on the continental market. The European Union’s share of total exports stands at some 65 percent for Morocco, 50 percent for Turkey, and 43 percent for Ukraine.
The world is now witnessing the formation of a perfect storm on Europe’s borders. The combination of recessionary economics, balance of payments difficulties, and surging unemployment has created a formidable challenge that will jeopardize domestic social contracts.
Just like the current protests unfolding in Lebanon, governments will come under pressure by an ever larger group of unemployed and disenfranchised citizens. The ensuing political and economic instabilities would not only create the conditions for the rise of radicalization in these afflicted societies but also trigger new cross-border movements and refugee flows across the Mediterranean.
Yet the EU’s response so far has been very timid. Brussels has earmarked 15.6 billion euros ($17 billion) in its Team Europe package, which was launched in April to support partner countries in their efforts to address the impact of the coronavirus crisis. This amount corresponds to about 3 percent of the initial funding of 500 billion euros ($547 billion) allocated to EU governments for the same purpose.
It is understandable that EU leaders prefer to prioritize their own societies in this time of acute need. But this task should not be seen as a zero-sum game. The assistance to neighbors should not necessarily cannibalize the resources set aside for helping EU governments. There are at least two costless options that remain unexplored.
First, there have been calls for the IMF to substantially increase Special Drawing Rights (known as SDRs) from the current level of $286 billion to about $1 trillion as a means to provide all countries with more resources to combat the impact of the virus. SDRs are an international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. But this proposal has been blocked by the U.S. government. Washington rightly argues that the increase would disproportionally benefit richer countries; U.S. reticence may also be linked to a recalcitrance to provide financial help to countries like Iran and Russia.
In the absence of a global consensus, EU governments should consider shifting their IMF-held SDRs to financially strained neighboring countries. That would amount to a financial stimulus of about $95 billion with no fiscal impact on EU and national budgets.
Second, the European Central Bank (ECB) should be more actively involved in establishing swap arrangements with the central banks of partner countries. Under such a scheme, beneficiary countries would obtain euros from the ECB against a collateral in their own currency.
These arrangements would provide beneficiary countries with foreign exchange liquidity and replenish their reserves. There is no reason why the ECB should not follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Federal Reserve, which has already set up this mechanism with some 14 countries.
The EU is finally eager to shape a more concerted response to the coronavirus crisis after an initial era of prevarication. The danger now is that European governments’ responses remain too introverted—and largely oblivious to the severity of the regional crisis surrounding them.