foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--China Deserves Some Credit for Its Handling of the Wuhan Pneumonia

China Deserves Some Credit for Its Handling of the Wuhan Pneumonia In contrast to China ’ s early efforts to cover up the SARS epidemic that first struck southern China in 2002 and eventually spread worldwide , China has handled the outbreak of a new mystery pneumonia very differently .
Within weeks of detection of the initial outbreak in December in Wuhan , China has already identified the novel coronavirus ( “ nCoV ” ) that is the likely cause of infection in 41 patients and shared the genetic sequence of that virus with the world to allow for specific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognition of this outbreak is particularly remarkable given that it is winter , when influenza and other infections cause many respiratory illnesses that make it difficult to tell whether any particular case of illness is the responsibility of a new respiratory disease .
The major clue to this outbreak was that the initial patients had all had recent exposure to a single seafood and live animal market in Wuhan .
So far , all of them experienced the onset of illness between Dec. 8 and Jan. 2 .
The incubation period—the time between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of fever , cough , or trouble breathing—is still unknown .
As of Jan. 12 , one patient has died , seven remain in critical condition , and six have been able to leave the hospital .
Unlike with the SARS coronavirus that infected well over 1,000 health care workers worldwide ( and which also originated in a market in China ) , none of the 419 health care workers possibly exposed to this new virus have so far become ill , according to the latest official update from the Wuhan Municipal Health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Wuhan market ’ s link to the outbreak became clear , that particular market has been shut down .
The number of new reported cases since then has slowed .
If , as some reports say , the virus is not easily spread from person to person , major communitywide outbreaks in Wuhan are unexpected , as is a major pandemic spread by travelers .
Given that several hundred million people will travel across China before and after the Lunar New Year on Jan. 25 , this month will provide a crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the race is on to identify the one or more animal species that are the source of the new virus .
A diagnostic laboratory test for the virus ’ s nucleic acid , developed by Chinese researchers after isolating the nCoV on Jan. 7 , will be used to test animals .
If an animal source of the virus is found , then the same species will be tested in other markets in Wuhan and elsewhere inside and outside China .
Beyond the credit Beijing should rightly take for acting relatively swiftly on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( WHO ) has also played a key supporting role .
The organization posted official updates on its website on Jan. 5 , 9 , 10 , 11 , and 12. WHO has also provided detailed guidance on whom to evaluate for infection , on laboratory testing , on infection prevention and control , and on travel .
Hong Kong , likewise , has offered an exemplary model for how to respond to the outbreak—and others that are sure to come .
Immediately after publicly recognizing the Wuhan outbreak on Dec. 31 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its Centre for Health Protection took a series of precautionary steps .
Those started with public guidance for health workers , schools , and extended-care facilities .
Authorities also spoke with the media about the disease and created a dedicated webpage for information on the outbreak in Wuhan , which they updated daily .
On Jan. 4 , Hong Kong also posted a detailed “ Preparedness and Response Plan for Novel Infectious Disease of Public Health Significance ( 2020 ) ” on this site .
The document is perhaps the first such comprehensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been publicly released anywhere in the world .
Notably , Hong Kong immediately began evaluating and testing travelers coming from Wuhan with respiratory illness .
Between Dec. 31 and midday on Jan. 12 , they had tested 67 such patients and posted daily updates of the results on a government website .
None had reported links to the Wuhan market before its closing on Jan. 1 .
Most had laboratory evidence for common winter viral infections such as seasonal human influenza , parainfluenza , adenovirus , rhinovirus , and respiratory syncytial virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SARS or MERS coronavirus or for any other coronavirus .
The pan-coronavirus test Hong Kong authorities used would have likely indicated whether the novel coronavirus linked to the Wuhan market was present ; however , the new laboratory test specific for this novel virus would still be needed for precise identification .
The 16 patients in the reported cases mentioned in a Jan. 8 Foreign Policy article have all since be discharged from the hospital and discounted as potential Wuhan pnuemonia cases .
Meanwhile , one Chinese tourist from Wuhan who was hospitalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed to be infected with the new coronavirus .
No links to the Wuhan market at the epicenter of the outbreak have been reported .
The source of her infection—from another market or person-to-person spread—is not known .
As a result of this development , WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has announced that he “ will consult with the Emergency Committee members and could call for a meeting of the committee on short notice.
” This is the third pneumonia outbreak caused by coronavirus , The trajectory to date makes it unlikely that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the SARS or MERS coronavirus pneumonia epidemics .
The caveat is that projections are difficult at the beginning of any epidemic .
However it plays out , the Wuhan pneumonia is unlikely to be the last such outbreak .
While China and Hong Kong seem to have pulled off a scientific success story and an impressive level of national preparedness , control at a global level requires timely and complete information-sharing—or , even better , a universal coronavirus vaccine that could end this kind of epidemic for good .

In contrast to China’s early efforts to cover up the SARS epidemic that first struck southern China in 2002 and eventually spread worldwide, China has handled the outbreak of a new mystery pneumonia very differently. Within weeks of detection of the initial outbreak in December in Wuhan, China has already identified the novel coronavirus (“nCoV”) that is the likely cause of infection in 41 patients and shared the genetic sequence of that virus with the world to allow for specific laboratory testing.
In contrast to China’s early efforts to cover up the SARS epidemic that first struck southern China in 2002 and eventually spread worldwide, China has handled the outbreak of a new mystery pneumonia very differently. Within weeks of detection of the initial outbreak in December in Wuhan, China has already identified the novel coronavirus (“nCoV”) that is the likely cause of infection in 41 patients and shared the genetic sequence of that virus with the world to allow for specific laboratory testing.
China’s rapid recognition of this outbreak is particularly remarkable given that it is winter, when influenza and other infections cause many respiratory illnesses that make it difficult to tell whether any particular case of illness is the responsibility of a new respiratory disease. The major clue to this outbreak was that the initial patients had all had recent exposure to a single seafood and live animal market in Wuhan. So far, all of them experienced the onset of illness between Dec. 8 and Jan. 2. The incubation period—the time between exposure to the virus and the onset of fever, cough, or trouble breathing—is still unknown.
As of Jan. 12, one patient has died, seven remain in critical condition, and six have been able to leave the hospital. Unlike with the SARS coronavirus that infected well over 1,000 health care workers worldwide (and which also originated in a market in China), none of the 419 health care workers possibly exposed to this new virus have so far become ill, according to the latest official update from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission.
Since Jan. 1, when the Wuhan market’s link to the outbreak became clear, that particular market has been shut down. The number of new reported cases since then has slowed. If, as some reports say, the virus is not easily spread from person to person, major communitywide outbreaks in Wuhan are unexpected, as is a major pandemic spread by travelers. Given that several hundred million people will travel across China before and after the Lunar New Year on Jan. 25, this month will provide a crucial stress test of this hypothesis.
Now the race is on to identify the one or more animal species that are the source of the new virus. A diagnostic laboratory test for the virus’s nucleic acid, developed by Chinese researchers after isolating the nCoV on Jan. 7, will be used to test animals. If an animal source of the virus is found, then the same species will be tested in other markets in Wuhan and elsewhere inside and outside China.
Beyond the credit Beijing should rightly take for acting relatively swiftly on this disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) has also played a key supporting role. The organization posted official updates on its website on Jan. 5, 9, 10, 11, and 12. WHO has also provided detailed guidance on whom to evaluate for infection, on laboratory testing, on infection prevention and control, and on travel.
Hong Kong, likewise, has offered an exemplary model for how to respond to the outbreak—and others that are sure to come. Immediately after publicly recognizing the Wuhan outbreak on Dec. 31, the Hong Kong Department of Health and its Centre for Health Protection took a series of precautionary steps. Those started with public guidance for health workers, schools, and extended-care facilities. Authorities also spoke with the media about the disease and created a dedicated webpage for information on the outbreak in Wuhan, which they updated daily. On Jan. 4, Hong Kong also posted a detailed “Preparedness and Response Plan for Novel Infectious Disease of Public Health Significance (2020)” on this site. The document is perhaps the first such comprehensive plan for a novel infectious disease that has been publicly released anywhere in the world.
Notably, Hong Kong immediately began evaluating and testing travelers coming from Wuhan with respiratory illness. Between Dec. 31 and midday on Jan. 12, they had tested 67 such patients and posted daily updates of the results on a government website. None had reported links to the Wuhan market before its closing on Jan. 1. Most had laboratory evidence for common winter viral infections such as seasonal human influenza, parainfluenza, adenovirus, rhinovirus, and respiratory syncytial virus. None tested positive for either the SARS or MERS coronavirus or for any other coronavirus. The pan-coronavirus test Hong Kong authorities used would have likely indicated whether the novel coronavirus linked to the Wuhan market was present; however, the new laboratory test specific for this novel virus would still be needed for precise identification. The 16 patients in the reported cases mentioned in a Jan. 8 Foreign Policy article have all since be discharged from the hospital and discounted as potential Wuhan pnuemonia cases.
Meanwhile, one Chinese tourist from Wuhan who was hospitalized in Thailand earlier this month has been confirmed to be infected with the new coronavirus. No links to the Wuhan market at the epicenter of the outbreak have been reported. The source of her infection—from another market or person-to-person spread—is not known. As a result of this development, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has announced that he “will consult with the Emergency Committee members and could call for a meeting of the committee on short notice.”
This is the third pneumonia outbreak caused by coronavirus, The trajectory to date makes it unlikely that this particular outbreak will become as bad as the SARS or MERS coronavirus pneumonia epidemics. The caveat is that projections are difficult at the beginning of any epidemic.
However it plays out, the Wuhan pneumonia is unlikely to be the last such outbreak. While China and Hong Kong seem to have pulled off a scientific success story and an impressive level of national preparedness, control at a global level requires timely and complete information-sharing—or, even better, a universal coronavirus vaccine that could end this kind of epidemic for good.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--China Is Winning the Race for Young Entrepreneurs

China Is Winning the Race for Young Entrepreneurs When Leo Wen wrote his first ever business plan in the spring of 2017 , he believed that his social media app , called Pokke , would soon be profitable .
Having recently graduated from Hofstra University a year earlier with a master ’ s degree in accounting , the then 26-year-old Wen had experienced firsthand the isolation that Chinese international students studying in the United States can face .
He hoped Pokke , a map-based app that allowed users to post their activities and share relevant information based on their locations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assembled a team of 18 people , all Chinese students or fresh graduates , to design the app .
He needed to raise $ 500,000 to launch it and expected to reach 100,000 users by the end of 2018 .
It didn ’ t happen .
After winning that year ’ s Chunhui Cup , an entrepreneurship competition held jointly by China ’ s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science and Technology for overseas Chinese students around the world , Wen was offered a paid trip to China to tour government-run start-up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in hosting his project .
But he decided to return to the United States , as that was his initial target market .
Back in the United States after the trip , his rosy prospects began to fall apart .
Soon , half of Wen ’ s team had gone back to China for good , thanks to Washington ’ s tighter immigration policies and the increasingly tense U.S.-Chinese relationship .
Pokke is postponed indefinitely .
Wen is considering following his team back to his home country , too .
“ Lately , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do I want to stay in a country that doesn ’ t even trust us ?
” Wen said .
Stuck in the middle are young U.S.-educated Chinese nationals like Wen .
Students from China have been coming to the United States in increasing numbers since the two countries resumed their diplomatic relationship in 1979 .
In the 2018-2019 school year , for example , 370,000 Chinese were studying in the United States , making China the country ’ s No .
1 source for international students for 10 successive years .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers is the newly awakening entrepreneurship drive among the young Chinese students .
A couple of factors are pushing them along .
For one , the current generation of Chinese students is much wealthier than previous ones .
Many have grown up in relatively affluent families and have witnessed their own parents building up family businesses from scratch .
In addition , they also have entrepreneurial role models such as Jack Ma , the founder of Alibaba .
There isn ’ t one formal study that shows the increasing proportion of entrepreneurs among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points make the trend very clear .
Yuanyuan Zhou , a professor of computer science at the University of California , San Diego , ( UCSD ) and a serial entrepreneur herself has witnessed from the front lines how much more entrepreneurial young Chinese students in the United States have become .
When Zhou started her first company in 1999 as a Ph.D. student at Princeton University , she was unusual among her peers .
So far , she says , only two of the 20 or so Chinese Ph.D. students at Princeton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a student there have created their own companies .
By contrast , Zhou says , seven of the 19 Chinese Ph.D. students who have graduated since she became a professor have done so .
Last year , Zhou even offered a seminar in entrepreneurship at UCSD .
About half of the 25 students who took the class were Chinese .
“ Many people in my generation knew nothing about entrepreneurship , and we preferred a stable career to taking adventures , ” said Zhou , who created her first company , a data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investors pushed her to make ideas in her Ph.D. thesis into real products .
“ The new generation , ” she said , “ is familiar with the stories of Jack Ma , Michael Yu , and Robin Li .
Their passion for creating their own companies is much greater.
” ( Yu was the founder of New Oriental Education and Technology Group and Li of the Chinese search company Baidu . )
There ’ s a reason students are so passionate about entrepreneurship .
For one , in 2015 , Beijing issued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment in the country ’ s economic history .
Among the initiatives were building more incubator spaces , offering rent stipends to start-ups , launching entrepreneurship courses in colleges , and allowing college students to temporarily suspend their degree tracks to create their own companies .
The response was fast .
The average number of new businesses registered daily in China jumped from 7,000 in 2013 to 12,000 by the end of 2015 .
The number reached 19,700 by last October .
Since 2015 , China has designated 200 model colleges for innovation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launched 2,800 courses for 630,000 students .
Of college students graduating in 2017 , 3 percent started their own businesses within half a year , almost double the rate in 2011 .
A survey released by a few dozen colleges at the beginning of 2018 showed that close to 90 percent of college students in China have considered creating their own company .
The effects reached the United States almost immediately .
The number of entrepreneurship workshops and competitions in the country backed by the Chinese authorities , private investors , and student @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Those days , almost every week there was an event , ” said Bianca Chen , who , as a bilingual financial reporter for Reuters TV in New York , is often invited to host such occasions .
In the same year , Chen , herself a Chinese student at New York University 10 years earlier , launched a show in Mandarin called “ Startups Made in the USA , ” via her newly founded company OX3 TV Production .
Her series featured promising start-ups in the United States .
Uploaded on youku.com @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the show reached 700,000 views by the second episode .
“ We caught the best time , ” said Chen .
“ After Premier Li Keqiang called for mass entrepreneurship , the Chinese audience was hungry for such content.
” The show ’ s target audience is in China , but it was also seen among Chinese students in the United States .
Meanwhile , Chinese venture capitalists were increasingly active in the United States as well .
According to Pitchbook , whose data is not publicly available , Chinese venture capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-based start-ups in 2014 , but by 2018 the total had jumped to $ 14.8 billion .
It seemed to Sam Wang , who had attended Yale University as a graduate student and had started a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley , that the boom would continue indefinitely .
In a speech in early 2018 at the Silicon Valley Innovation & Entrepreneurship Forum , Wang predicted the year ahead would be a “ China year ” when Silicon Valley would witness the spread of Chinese business and investment models and advanced manufacturing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bring hundreds of billions of dollars of business opportunities , ” Wang said .
But what happened next made anyone expecting such a boom have to think again .
Then , in August 2018 , U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act , which handed the government ’ s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States greater powers to restrict direct investment from foreign countries , with China in focus .
A few months later , in November 2018 , the Office of the United States Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its trade partners ’ intellectual property protections .
The report included a specific focus on Chinese economic espionage and stealthy technology transfer .
Another section of the report dealt with Chinese venture capital investments in the United States .
The same month , the U.S. Department of Justice launched its China Initiative meant to target economic crimes of Chinese companies and individuals .
Soon , U.S. colleges and private entities began to receive letters from the FBI , reminding them to keep an eye on their Chinese students , scholars , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Thousand Talents Plan , a program Beijing initiated in 2008 to recruit top scientists and innovators from around the world , were likewise called in for interviews by the FBI .
In April 2019 , at the annual Carnegie Mellon University Summit on U.S.-China Innovation and Entrepreneurship , the impact of Washington ’ s policies had already become clear .
First assembled in 2012 , the summit had grown into one of the major platforms for young Chinese entrepreneurs to connect with funders in the United States .
But only 50 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , half of the number in 2018 .
And only one of the dozen or so China-based venture capital firms that regularly attended in the previous years showed up .
Two weeks later , the Chinese Consulate-General in New York hosted its annual ceremony to award scholarships to selected Chinese students in the United States .
I was able to attend a private preceremony meeting at which students spoke of their many concerns about their future prospects in the United States When Jun Yang , a consul and head of the education office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York , asked about the students ’ future plans , one who had just obtained his Ph.D. in rare earth chemistry and was scheduled to soon start working in a national lab in a U.S. university stood up and said solemnly : “ Honestly , I just want to survive.
” The audience nodded knowingly before Yang told them to strictly follow the law and protocols of their institutions to protect themselves .
Several months later was China ’ s annual Chunhui Cup award ceremony .
There were 553 business plans filed for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 10 percent increase from 2018 .
The United States was the only country that saw fewer applications .
“ The IP issues are very sensitive now , ” Dong Weiguo , a consul hosting an award ceremony at the New York consulate , told me at the time .
“ Students who were not sure about the IP ownership of their research would rather stay away from the competition.
” It is the second category that really scares Chinese entrepreneurs and investors .
This past October , I attended the annual convention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Science and Technology , USA , an organization boasting 10,000 members of Chinese American professionals in science and technology .
The convention lined up world-famous scientists as keynote speakers , including two Nobel laureates .
But the conference room was most packed for the last session of the day , a panel discussion titled “ The New Reality Ethnic Chinese Scientists and Tech Professionals Face in the U.S. ” in which Xiaoxing Xi , a former chair of the physics department at Temple University , joined two former U.S. prosecutors via Skype @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stay away from trouble .
Arrested at home by armed FBI agents in May 2015 , Xi was accused of sending restricted technology to China .
It later became clear that the brouhaha stemmed from the agents ’ misunderstanding of the technology he was dealing with .
The charges were dropped a few months later , but Xi said he and his family are far from recovering from the fear and humiliation .
“ I ’ ve been telling Chinese scientists : Don ’ t think this won ’ t happen to you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ break at the convention , I chatted with David Ho , the inventor of the cocktail therapy for HIV/AIDS and a founder of several biotech companies .
He warned that the chill among Chinese scientists and inventors brought on by Washington is going to hurt U.S. interests .
“ Chinese scientists ’ contributions [ to the U.S. ) are huge .
The chill will take away that contribution and drive more people back to China than the Thousand Talents Plan , ” Ho said .
As the Trump administration has made the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China has seen an uptick in returnees .
It does seem like , as the Trump administration has made the United States less welcome to Chinese graduates , China has seen an uptick in returnees .
Statistics from China ’ s Ministry of Education show that 519,400 Chinese students returned to China from around the world in 2018 , an 8 percent uptick from the previous year .
Beijing has also been happy to lure them back .
The Chunhui Cup , for one , has helped 634 promising start-ups to get funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inception in 2006 .
More recently added incentives are eye-popping .
By the end of 2018 , China had built 350 enterprise parks that offer services such as office space and business facilities to returning entrepreneurs .
Altogether , the parks host 25,000 companies .
These parks offer discounted rent and seed money .
In some cases , start-ups can receive financial support of more than 100 million RMB ( $ 14 million ) from local governments .
That was part of the reason Tony Gao brought his company , Easy Transfer , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States for high school in 2010 , co-founded the online payment system with his friend Michael Shang in 2013 .
He wanted to help Chinese international students like himself get money wired from China faster and with lower fees .
Shang , who was a few years older , initially proposed the idea to the U.S. education financial services company Nelnet , where he was working , but his idea was rejected .
In 2017 , when Gao graduated from college , he moved the company back to China so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ customers in China ’ s burgeoning payments market and with the education industry .
The company set up shop in the Haidian district of Beijing , which provides up to 50 percent in rental discounts and about $ 15,000 of financial assistance to start-ups run by returning students .
“ For a new company , these were quite appealing , ” said Gao , whose company has since become the largest online payment platform for Chinese international students , with 100,000 customers and 20 billion RMB ( $ 2.9 billion ) of total @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
With the help of returning entrepreneurs like Gao , China had by the end of 2018 already almost reached or exceeded many of the goals it set to have an innovation-driven economy by 2020 .
According to October 2019 figures from the Hurun Research Institute , China now has 206 so-called unicorns—privately owned start-ups worth more than $ 1 billion .
That is three more than the United States , making it the biggest unicorn hub in the world .
As much as China encourages entrepreneurship , of course , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also be disappointed .
China ’ s economy has shown signs of weakening , and a flood of seemingly endless venture capital has started to dry up .
Start-ups in China raised $ 35.6 billion in 2,047 rounds in 2019 until mid-November , compared to $ 93.4 billion over 2,795 rounds in the same period in 2018 , according to Crunchbase News .
And the United States , with its more mature venture capital operations and business environment , is still attractive to Chinese students , many of whom hope the trade war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ease considerably in its intensity .
And that will come with costs to both the students and to the United States .
Wen , the entrepreneur behind the planned app Pokke , has thrived in the United States .
Since he came here in 2013 , he has founded an alumni association for those like him who went to China Agricultural University , formed a rock band that performed at Lincoln Center in New York , and worked on creating his own businesses .
“ I won ’ t have done this if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.S. that set my mind free , ” Wen said .
But with his visa expiring in two years , Wen said he has stopped seeking other means to stay here any longer .
“ If the U.S. was still the open-minded country that welcomes immigrants , sure , ” Wen said .
“ But we are not welcomed here anymore .
And China is stronger and is having a wrist-wrestling with the U.S .
I see no reason why we won ’ t go back to help our own country.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ robust at the moment , particularly as reflected in the surging stock market and lower unemployment rate , there is a danger that , when the clouds eventually get darker , the United States will regret having missed out the investments by thousands young Chinese entrepreneurs .
This story is made possible by a fellowship from the Alicia Patterson Foundation .

When Leo Wen wrote his first ever business plan in the spring of 2017, he believed that his social media app, called Pokke, would soon be profitable. Having recently graduated from Hofstra University a year earlier with a master’s degree in accounting, the then 26-year-old Wen had experienced firsthand the isolation that Chinese international students studying in the United States can face. He hoped Pokke, a map-based app that allowed users to post their activities and share relevant information based on their locations, could better connect them.
When Leo Wen wrote his first ever business plan in the spring of 2017, he believed that his social media app, called Pokke, would soon be profitable. Having recently graduated from Hofstra University a year earlier with a master’s degree in accounting, the then 26-year-old Wen had experienced firsthand the isolation that Chinese international students studying in the United States can face. He hoped Pokke, a map-based app that allowed users to post their activities and share relevant information based on their locations, could better connect them.
Wen assembled a team of 18 people, all Chinese students or fresh graduates, to design the app. He needed to raise $500,000 to launch it and expected to reach 100,000 users by the end of 2018.
It didn’t happen. After winning that year’s Chunhui Cup, an entrepreneurship competition held jointly by China’s Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science and Technology for overseas Chinese students around the world, Wen was offered a paid trip to China to tour government-run start-up incubators, some of which were interested in hosting his project. But he decided to return to the United States, as that was his initial target market.
Back in the United States after the trip, his rosy prospects began to fall apart. Soon, half of Wen’s team had gone back to China for good, thanks to Washington’s tighter immigration policies and the increasingly tense U.S.-Chinese relationship. Pokke is postponed indefinitely. Wen is considering following his team back to his home country, too. “Lately, I have been asking myself, why do I want to stay in a country that doesn’t even trust us?” Wen said.
The relationship between the United States and China has swung from cooperation to mistrust and competition in the past two years. Those involved in innovation and technology may have felt the change most. While China is stepping on the accelerator of its Made in China 2025 strategy, a plan aimed at upgrading the country from a manufacturing center to an innovation center, the United States is ratcheting up its guard over its intellectual property. In part, that involves essentially placing all scholars and students from China under a watchful eye.
Stuck in the middle are young U.S.-educated Chinese nationals like Wen. Students from China have been coming to the United States in increasing numbers since the two countries resumed their diplomatic relationship in 1979. In the 2018-2019 school year, for example, 370,000 Chinese were studying in the United States, making China the country’s No. 1 source for international students for 10 successive years.
What’s more important than the headline numbers is the newly awakening entrepreneurship drive among the young Chinese students. A couple of factors are pushing them along. For one, the current generation of Chinese students is much wealthier than previous ones. Many have grown up in relatively affluent families and have witnessed their own parents building up family businesses from scratch. In addition, they also have entrepreneurial role models such as Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba.
There isn’t one formal study that shows the increasing proportion of entrepreneurs among Chinese students, but enough disparate data points make the trend very clear.
Yuanyuan Zhou, a professor of computer science at the University of California, San Diego, (UCSD) and a serial entrepreneur herself has witnessed from the front lines how much more entrepreneurial young Chinese students in the United States have become.
When Zhou started her first company in 1999 as a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, she was unusual among her peers. So far, she says, only two of the 20 or so Chinese Ph.D. students at Princeton she got to know while she was a student there have created their own companies. By contrast, Zhou says, seven of the 19 Chinese Ph.D. students who have graduated since she became a professor have done so. Last year, Zhou even offered a seminar in entrepreneurship at UCSD. About half of the 25 students who took the class were Chinese.
“Many people in my generation knew nothing about entrepreneurship, and we preferred a stable career to taking adventures,” said Zhou, who created her first company, a data management center, after potential clients and investors pushed her to make ideas in her Ph.D. thesis into real products. “The new generation,” she said, “is familiar with the stories of Jack Ma, Michael Yu, and Robin Li. Their passion for creating their own companies is much greater.” (Yu was the founder of New Oriental Education and Technology Group and Li of the Chinese search company Baidu.)
There’s a reason students are so passionate about entrepreneurship. For one, in 2015, Beijing issued directives to encourage entrepreneurship, a watershed moment in the country’s economic history. Among the initiatives were building more incubator spaces, offering rent stipends to start-ups, launching entrepreneurship courses in colleges, and allowing college students to temporarily suspend their degree tracks to create their own companies.
The response was fast. The average number of new businesses registered daily in China jumped from 7,000 in 2013 to 12,000 by the end of 2015. The number reached 19,700 by last October.
Since 2015, China has designated 200 model colleges for innovation and entrepreneurship education, and it has launched 2,800 courses for 630,000 students. Of college students graduating in 2017, 3 percent started their own businesses within half a year, almost double the rate in 2011. A survey released by a few dozen colleges at the beginning of 2018 showed that close to 90 percent of college students in China have considered creating their own company.
The effects reached the United States almost immediately. The number of entrepreneurship workshops and competitions in the country backed by the Chinese authorities, private investors, and student association, surged in 2015. “Those days, almost every week there was an event,” said Bianca Chen, who, as a bilingual financial reporter for Reuters TV in New York, is often invited to host such occasions.
In the same year, Chen, herself a Chinese student at New York University 10 years earlier, launched a show in Mandarin called “Startups Made in the USA,” via her newly founded company OX3 TV Production. Her series featured promising start-ups in the United States. Uploaded on youku.com, an online video carrier in China, the show reached 700,000 views by the second episode. “We caught the best time,” said Chen. “After Premier Li Keqiang called for mass entrepreneurship, the Chinese audience was hungry for such content.” The show’s target audience is in China, but it was also seen among Chinese students in the United States.
Meanwhile, Chinese venture capitalists were increasingly active in the United States as well. According to Pitchbook, whose data is not publicly available, Chinese venture capital firms had invested $2.8 billion in U.S.-based start-ups in 2014, but by 2018 the total had jumped to $14.8 billion.
It seemed to Sam Wang, who had attended Yale University as a graduate student and had started a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley, that the boom would continue indefinitely. In a speech in early 2018 at the Silicon Valley Innovation & Entrepreneurship Forum, Wang predicted the year ahead would be a “China year” when Silicon Valley would witness the spread of Chinese business and investment models and advanced manufacturing trends. “Each of these will bring hundreds of billions of dollars of business opportunities,” Wang said.
But what happened next made anyone expecting such a boom have to think again.
In February 2018, amid a tougher stance by the Trump administration on China’s trade practices, and particularly IP theft, Christopher Wray, the director of the FBI, called for a “whole-of-society response” to what he called China’s nontraditional espionage via Chinese students, scholars, and scientists in testimony in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Then, in August 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, which handed the government’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States greater powers to restrict direct investment from foreign countries, with China in focus.
A few months later, in November 2018, the Office of the United States Trade Representative updated its Special 301 Report, an annual review of its trade partners’ intellectual property protections. The report included a specific focus on Chinese economic espionage and stealthy technology transfer. Another section of the report dealt with Chinese venture capital investments in the United States.
The same month, the U.S. Department of Justice launched its China Initiative , meant to target economic crimes of Chinese companies and individuals. Soon, U.S. colleges and private entities began to receive letters from the FBI, reminding them to keep an eye on their Chinese students, scholars, and employees. Some researchers involved in China’s Thousand Talents Plan, a program Beijing initiated in 2008 to recruit top scientists and innovators from around the world, were likewise called in for interviews by the FBI.
Fear spread quickly.
In April 2019, at the annual Carnegie Mellon University Summit on U.S.-China Innovation and Entrepreneurship, the impact of Washington’s policies had already become clear. First assembled in 2012, the summit had grown into one of the major platforms for young Chinese entrepreneurs to connect with funders in the United States. But only 50 business plans were filed for the event, half of the number in 2018. And only one of the dozen or so China-based venture capital firms that regularly attended in the previous years showed up.
Two weeks later, the Chinese Consulate-General in New York hosted its annual ceremony to award scholarships to selected Chinese students in the United States. I was able to attend a private preceremony meeting at which students spoke of their many concerns about their future prospects in the United States
When Jun Yang, a consul and head of the education office at China’s consulate in New York, asked about the students’ future plans, one who had just obtained his Ph.D. in rare earth chemistry and was scheduled to soon start working in a national lab in a U.S. university stood up and said solemnly: “Honestly, I just want to survive.” The audience nodded knowingly before Yang told them to strictly follow the law and protocols of their institutions to protect themselves.
Several months later was China’s annual Chunhui Cup award ceremony. There were 553 business plans filed for the competition from around the world, a 10 percent increase from 2018. The United States was the only country that saw fewer applications. “The IP issues are very sensitive now,” Dong Weiguo, a consul hosting an award ceremony at the New York consulate, told me at the time. “Students who were not sure about the IP ownership of their research would rather stay away from the competition.”
Of course, the U.S. government is not wrong to sound the alert about Chinese involvement in intellectual property theft. More than 80 percent of the economic espionage cases prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice in the past seven years related to China, and some Chinese nationals have been convicted for stealing trade secrets, although others have been released for lack of evidence.
It is the second category that really scares Chinese entrepreneurs and investors.
This past October, I attended the annual convention in New York of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology, USA, an organization boasting 10,000 members of Chinese American professionals in science and technology.
The convention lined up world-famous scientists as keynote speakers, including two Nobel laureates. But the conference room was most packed for the last session of the day, a panel discussion titled “The New Reality Ethnic Chinese Scientists and Tech Professionals Face in the U.S.” in which Xiaoxing Xi, a former chair of the physics department at Temple University, joined two former U.S. prosecutors via Skype to advise the audience about how to stay away from trouble.
Arrested at home by armed FBI agents in May 2015, Xi was accused of sending restricted technology to China. It later became clear that the brouhaha stemmed from the agents’ misunderstanding of the technology he was dealing with. The charges were dropped a few months later, but Xi said he and his family are far from recovering from the fear and humiliation. “I’ve been telling Chinese scientists: Don’t think this won’t happen to you,” Xi said.
In a break at the convention, I chatted with David Ho, the inventor of the cocktail therapy for HIV/AIDS and a founder of several biotech companies. He warned that the chill among Chinese scientists and inventors brought on by Washington is going to hurt U.S. interests. “Chinese scientists’ contributions [to the U.S.) are huge. The chill will take away that contribution and drive more people back to China than the Thousand Talents Plan,” Ho said.
As the Trump administration has made the United States less welcome to Chinese graduates, China has seen an uptick in returnees.
It does seem like, as the Trump administration has made the United States less welcome to Chinese graduates, China has seen an uptick in returnees. Statistics from China’s Ministry of Education show that 519,400 Chinese students returned to China from around the world in 2018, an 8 percent uptick from the previous year.
Beijing has also been happy to lure them back. The Chunhui Cup, for one, has helped 634 promising start-ups to get funding and establish themselves in China since its inception in 2006. More recently added incentives are eye-popping. By the end of 2018, China had built 350 enterprise parks that offer services such as office space and business facilities to returning entrepreneurs. Altogether, the parks host 25,000 companies. These parks offer discounted rent and seed money. In some cases, start-ups can receive financial support of more than 100 million RMB ($14 million) from local governments.
That was part of the reason Tony Gao brought his company, Easy Transfer, to China. Gao, who came to the United States for high school in 2010, co-founded the online payment system with his friend Michael Shang in 2013. He wanted to help Chinese international students like himself get money wired from China faster and with lower fees. Shang, who was a few years older, initially proposed the idea to the U.S. education financial services company Nelnet, where he was working, but his idea was rejected.
In 2017, when Gao graduated from college, he moved the company back to China so he could work more closely with potential customers in China’s burgeoning payments market and with the education industry. The company set up shop in the Haidian district of Beijing, which provides up to 50 percent in rental discounts and about $15,000 of financial assistance to start-ups run by returning students.
“For a new company, these were quite appealing,” said Gao, whose company has since become the largest online payment platform for Chinese international students, with 100,000 customers and 20 billion RMB ($2.9 billion) of total transactions in 2019, double the previous year.
With the help of returning entrepreneurs like Gao, China had by the end of 2018 already almost reached or exceeded many of the goals it set to have an innovation-driven economy by 2020. According to October 2019 figures from the Hurun Research Institute, China now has 206 so-called unicorns—privately owned start-ups worth more than $1 billion. That is three more than the United States, making it the biggest unicorn hub in the world.
As much as China encourages entrepreneurship, of course, some of those returning to the country may also be disappointed. China’s economy has shown signs of weakening, and a flood of seemingly endless venture capital has started to dry up. Start-ups in China raised $35.6 billion in 2,047 rounds in 2019 until mid-November, compared to $93.4 billion over 2,795 rounds in the same period in 2018, according to Crunchbase News. And the United States, with its more mature venture capital operations and business environment, is still attractive to Chinese students, many of whom hope the trade war will be over soon or at least ease considerably in its intensity.
Even if that wish comes true, it seems unlikely that the barriers to Chinese graduates will ease anytime soon. Between 2010 and 2015, the denial rate for applications of H-1B visa, which international students need to be able to work in the United States after graduation, had never been higher than 8 percent a year, but in fiscal year 2018, it tripled to 24 percent.
And that will come with costs to both the students and to the United States. Wen, the entrepreneur behind the planned app Pokke, has thrived in the United States. Since he came here in 2013, he has founded an alumni association for those like him who went to China Agricultural University, formed a rock band that performed at Lincoln Center in New York, and worked on creating his own businesses.
“I won’t have done this if not being influenced by the dreamland atmosphere in the U.S. that set my mind free,” Wen said.
But with his visa expiring in two years, Wen said he has stopped seeking other means to stay here any longer. “If the U.S. was still the open-minded country that welcomes immigrants, sure,” Wen said. “But we are not welcomed here anymore. And China is stronger and is having a wrist-wrestling with the U.S. I see no reason why we won’t go back to help our own country.”
Although the U.S. economy may look robust at the moment, particularly as reflected in the surging stock market and lower unemployment rate, there is a danger that, when the clouds eventually get darker, the United States will regret having missed out the investments by thousands young Chinese entrepreneurs.
This story is made possible by a fellowship from the Alicia Patterson Foundation.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-14--Brexit Still Looms Over Northern Ireland’s New Government

Brexit Still Looms Over Northern Ireland ’ s New Government The new year brought good news to Northern Ireland : the restoration of the devolved power-sharing government ( known locally as Stormont ) , which had not sat since January 2017 .
Despite a patchy history , Stormont is both a critical governing institution and a potent symbol that Northern Ireland ’ s bitterly divided communities can work together .
As such , the “ New Decade , New Approach ” deal to restore power-sharing—agreed last week by Northern Ireland ’ s five main parties under the leadership of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Northern Ireland will still face tough day-to-day issues , such as a middling economy and a crisis in the health services , alongside the deeper challenges of ingrained sectarianism , Troubles-era legacy issues , and the fallout from Brexit .
Although one should always be skeptical , a functioning government does offer some chance of progress on each of these issues .
Stormont ’ s devolved institutions were established by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement , the landmark accord that largely brought an end to three decades of conflict in Northern Ireland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cabinetlike executive , the institutions have the power to govern most of Northern Ireland ’ s internal affairs , including health care , education , and policing .
Ministerial portfolios are allocated on the basis of mandatory power-sharing between predominantly Protestant unionists—who along with loyalists want Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom—and predominantly Catholic nationalists and republicans , who seek a united Ireland .
This guarantees that neither side can take charge of the region ’ s governance alone .
Thanks to last week ’ s agreement , the two largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DUP ) and Sinn Fein , will again share Northern Ireland ’ s dual leadership structure .
But now , for the first time , both of the two top posts are held by women : DUP leader Arlene Foster will retake the post of first minister , and Sinn Fein northern leader Michelle O ’ Neill will assume the role of deputy first minister.Although one should always be skeptical , a functioning government does offer some chance of progress .
It was the resignation of O ’ Neill ’ s predecessor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions three years ago .
Both communities are required to be represented at leadership level , so when Sinn Fein refused to nominate a replacement for McGuinness , elections were called .
McGuinness initially resigned over the mishandling of a renewable heating program for which Foster bore a large share of responsibility , but when the parties came together to negotiate a way to restore power-sharing after the elections in March 2017 , it was clear that a longer list of grievances were at play .
Eight other department heads were also appointed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are apportioned to parties according to the d ’ Hondt system , which distributes departmental posts in proportion to each party ’ s strength in the assembly .
Three departments thus went to the DUP , two to Sinn Fein , and one each to the Ulster Unionist Party and the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party ( SDLP ) .
The one exception is the justice department , which is responsible for an especially sensitive portfolio given Northern Ireland ’ s violent and divisive past .
Rather than being apportioned based on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justice minister is selected through a cross-community vote in the assembly , which requires support from both unionists and nationalists .
Naomi Long , the formidable leader of the nonsectarian Alliance Party , will now occupy this role .
After power-sharing broke down in 2017 , the parties undertook intensive negotiations to resurrect Stormont .
Disagreements between the DUP and Sinn Fein—most notably the latter ’ s demand for standalone legislation to promote the Irish language—proved too enduring , and after a promising deal in February 2018 was rejected by the DUP at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standstill .
Pressures and incentives finally aligned in favor of a deal last month .
First , the DUP and Sinn Fein both saw their electoral fortunes take a tumble in the recent U.K. parliamentary elections .
The DUP lost more than 5 percent of its votes , which translated to the loss of two parliamentary seats , including that of the high-profile parliamentary leader Nigel Dodds .
More importantly , Boris Johnson ’ s Conservative Party won an overwhelming majority , shutting down the confidence-and-supply agreement that had previously given the DUP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for its part , did hold on to seven seats in the House of Commons ( which it chooses not to occupy in protest of British sovereignty in Northern Ireland ) , but it lost nearly 7 percent of its vote share in the process .
Sinn Fein and the DUP also faced the prospect of a new assembly election if they could not restore power-sharing by Jan. 13 , which would have risked further losses for the big parties at the hands of both the SDLP and Alliance , whose vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the 2017 and 2019 elections .
From the DUP ’ s point of view , an election could have conceivably made Sinn Fein the largest party in the assembly , an historically unprecedented event that could have mirrored the Westminster result by possibly giving nationalists a plurality in the devolved legislature , too .
Currently the DUP has only one more assembly seat than its rival.From the DUP ’ s point of view , an election could have conceivably made Sinn Fein the largest party in the assembly .
This prospect , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Protestants ’ long-standing numerical advantage over Catholics , no doubt pushed the conservative DUP to restore the assembly with the current numbers intact .
More than that , the party needed a new power base after losing its kingmaker status in the House of Commons .
Sinn Fein , too , likely seeks to bolster its reputation as a responsible governing party .
This could improve its fortunes in the Irish Republic , where a general election is scheduled in three weeks on Feb. 8—and the party nurtures hopes of forming part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on all parties was a crisis in Northern Ireland ’ s health service .
Some 15,000 nurses , along with paramedics and other personnel , went on strike beginning in December as part of a long-standing dispute over pay .
The strikes , which shut down many medical offices and forced appointments to be postponed , spotlighted dire health care shortages in Northern Ireland .
Around 300,000 people—nearly one-sixth of the population—are waiting to see a specialist .
The deteriorating state of the health services was linked to the suspension of Stormont @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little surprise that the new executive swiftly sought to tackle these health care funding issues .
Ministers endorsed the idea of “ pay parity ” —paying Northern Irish health care workers the same as their counterparts in England—and assembled roughly 110 million pounds ( $ 143 million ) for this purpose .
The power-sharing agreement also includes financial assistance from London to address various priorities .
A BBC analysis suggests the government ’ s overall financial package could exceed 1 billion pounds ( $ 1.3 billion ) and possibly much more .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became the subject of partisan wrangling .
The Irish government will also contribute a smaller amount .
In a potentially significant development for victims and survivors of the Troubles—and for broader communal reconciliation—the British government will advance legislation to establish various bodies to address the legacy of the conflict .
These arrangements were laid out in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and developed in negotiations led by Richard Haass and Meghan O ’ Sullivan , in which I participated , the previous year .
The agreement also addresses Brexit .
Northern Ireland ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the executive to oversee Brexit issues , and the British government will involve the executive in relevant proceedings .
Although Northern Irish leaders no longer have direct influence in the British government , a functioning local government does provide at least some opportunity for them to shape a process that will have profound implications for the area ’ s economy and society .
Perhaps most important for the future of Northern Ireland ’ s economy , the British government has agreed to legislate , by the end of this year , “ to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s businesses to the whole of the UK internal market.
” The purpose is to address concerns among both unionists and the business community that Johnson ’ s Brexit deal will lead to trade barriers between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom .
Whether the government ’ s commitment will assuage those commercial concerns—as well as unionists and loyalists outraged by what some call Johnson ’ s “ betrayal ” —will depend on the implementation .
Beyond all of this , the agreement includes a compromise on what had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Sinn Fein : language .
A new commissioner will “ recognise , support , protect and enhance the development of the Irish language in Northern Ireland.
” Another such commissioner will exist for Ulster-Scots , a regional language similar to English that many Protestants consider a vital part of their heritage .
Both Irish and Ulster-Scots will receive official recognition and be allowed wider use in government settings.The agreement includes a compromise on what had been the chief sticking point between the DUP and Sinn Fein : language .
Irish language campaigners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provisions , while their mere existence is difficult for many unionists and loyalists to swallow .
In this sense , the agreement threads the needle between the core constituencies of Sinn Fein and the DUP .
Yet that fact also underscores one of the biggest challenges the restored institutions face .
In a visit to Belfast in the days surrounding the election in December , I heard widespread sentiment that the DUP and Sinn Fein had run the executive as an exclusive fiefdom , parceling out resources to their communities while marginalizing other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the entire power-sharing operation means the DUP and Sinn Fein will now face pressure to operate more inclusively .
At the same time , the parties have their own political imperatives .
Sinn Fein will seek to advance progress toward a united Ireland , a once distant prospect that Brexit has brought to the fore .
The DUP will seek to ensure Northern Ireland remains an indistinguishable part of the United Kingdom , which requires managing loyalist agitation while keeping more moderate voters on side .
How disruptive Brexit proves to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ business owners , and collective psyche will shape the terrain .
Other problems could easily arise in a charged sectarian environment , just as the renewable heat scandal did in 2017 .
Indeed , a report about the renewable heating program , which could emerge at any time , is expected to criticize Foster and other DUP figures .
This could threaten Foster ’ s position and , possibly , the executive ’ s existence once again .
Northern Ireland ’ s leaders and citizens should be happy to see Stormont back in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in expecting too much from these very fragile and divided institutions .
Sustaining decent governance—much less cementing peace and easing animosities hardened over centuries—is an enormous challenge at the best of times .
It will be all the harder as Northern Ireland navigates its most uncertain period since Good Friday almost 22 years ago .

The new year brought good news to Northern Ireland: the restoration of the devolved power-sharing government (known locally as Stormont), which had not sat since January 2017. Despite a patchy history, Stormont is both a critical governing institution and a potent symbol that Northern Ireland’s bitterly divided communities can work together.
The new year brought good news to Northern Ireland: the restoration of the devolved power-sharing government (known locally as Stormont), which had not sat since January 2017. Despite a patchy history, Stormont is both a critical governing institution and a potent symbol that Northern Ireland’s bitterly divided communities can work together.
As such, the “New Decade, New Approach” deal to restore power-sharing—agreed last week by Northern Ireland’s five main parties under the leadership of the British and Irish governments—is a significant achievement. Northern Ireland will still face tough day-to-day issues, such as a middling economy and a crisis in the health services, alongside the deeper challenges of ingrained sectarianism, Troubles-era legacy issues, and the fallout from Brexit.
Although one should always be skeptical, a functioning government does offer some chance of progress on each of these issues. Stormont’s devolved institutions were established by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the landmark accord that largely brought an end to three decades of conflict in Northern Ireland. With a unicameral assembly and a cabinetlike executive, the institutions have the power to govern most of Northern Ireland’s internal affairs, including health care, education, and policing.
Ministerial portfolios are allocated on the basis of mandatory power-sharing between predominantly Protestant unionists—who along with loyalists want Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom—and predominantly Catholic nationalists and republicans, who seek a united Ireland. This guarantees that neither side can take charge of the region’s governance alone.
Thanks to last week’s agreement, the two largest parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, will again share Northern Ireland’s dual leadership structure. But now, for the first time, both of the two top posts are held by women: DUP leader Arlene Foster will retake the post of first minister, and Sinn Fein northern leader Michelle O’Neill will assume the role of deputy first minister.Although one should always be skeptical, a functioning government does offer some chance of progress.
It was the resignation of O’Neill’s predecessor, Martin McGuinness, that brought down the institutions three years ago. Both communities are required to be represented at leadership level, so when Sinn Fein refused to nominate a replacement for McGuinness, elections were called. McGuinness initially resigned over the mishandling of a renewable heating program for which Foster bore a large share of responsibility, but when the parties came together to negotiate a way to restore power-sharing after the elections in March 2017, it was clear that a longer list of grievances were at play.
Eight other department heads were also appointed to the executive last weekend. Departments are apportioned to parties according to the d’Hondt system, which distributes departmental posts in proportion to each party’s strength in the assembly. Three departments thus went to the DUP, two to Sinn Fein, and one each to the Ulster Unionist Party and the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).
The one exception is the justice department, which is responsible for an especially sensitive portfolio given Northern Ireland’s violent and divisive past. Rather than being apportioned based on the d’Hondt system, the justice minister is selected through a cross-community vote in the assembly, which requires support from both unionists and nationalists. Naomi Long, the formidable leader of the nonsectarian Alliance Party, will now occupy this role.
After power-sharing broke down in 2017, the parties undertook intensive negotiations to resurrect Stormont. Disagreements between the DUP and Sinn Fein—most notably the latter’s demand for standalone legislation to promote the Irish language—proved too enduring, and after a promising deal in February 2018 was rejected by the DUP at the 11th hour, talks hit a standstill. Pressures and incentives finally aligned in favor of a deal last month.
First, the DUP and Sinn Fein both saw their electoral fortunes take a tumble in the recent U.K. parliamentary elections. The DUP lost more than 5 percent of its votes, which translated to the loss of two parliamentary seats, including that of the high-profile parliamentary leader Nigel Dodds. More importantly, Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party won an overwhelming majority, shutting down the confidence-and-supply agreement that had previously given the DUP outsized prominence in Westminster.
Sinn Fein, for its part, did hold on to seven seats in the House of Commons (which it chooses not to occupy in protest of British sovereignty in Northern Ireland), but it lost nearly 7 percent of its vote share in the process.
Sinn Fein and the DUP also faced the prospect of a new assembly election if they could not restore power-sharing by Jan. 13, which would have risked further losses for the big parties at the hands of both the SDLP and Alliance, whose vote share rose by a combined 11.9 percent between the 2017 and 2019 elections.
From the DUP’s point of view, an election could have conceivably made Sinn Fein the largest party in the assembly, an historically unprecedented event that could have mirrored the Westminster result by possibly giving nationalists a plurality in the devolved legislature, too. Currently the DUP has only one more assembly seat than its rival.From the DUP’s point of view, an election could have conceivably made Sinn Fein the largest party in the assembly.
This prospect, along with demographic trends that are erasing Protestants’ long-standing numerical advantage over Catholics, no doubt pushed the conservative DUP to restore the assembly with the current numbers intact. More than that, the party needed a new power base after losing its kingmaker status in the House of Commons.
Sinn Fein, too, likely seeks to bolster its reputation as a responsible governing party. This could improve its fortunes in the Irish Republic, where a general election is scheduled in three weeks on Feb. 8—and the party nurtures hopes of forming part of the next government.
Adding to the pressure on all parties was a crisis in Northern Ireland’s health service. Some 15,000 nurses, along with paramedics and other personnel, went on strike beginning in December as part of a long-standing dispute over pay.
The strikes, which shut down many medical offices and forced appointments to be postponed, spotlighted dire health care shortages in Northern Ireland. Around 300,000 people—nearly one-sixth of the population—are waiting to see a specialist. The deteriorating state of the health services was linked to the suspension of Stormont.
Given that context, it is little surprise that the new executive swiftly sought to tackle these health care funding issues. Ministers endorsed the idea of “pay parity”—paying Northern Irish health care workers the same as their counterparts in England—and assembled roughly 110 million pounds ($143 million) for this purpose.
The power-sharing agreement also includes financial assistance from London to address various priorities. A BBC analysis suggests the government’s overall financial package could exceed 1 billion pounds ($1.3 billion) and possibly much more. But the exact total remains uncertain and quickly became the subject of partisan wrangling. The Irish government will also contribute a smaller amount.
In a potentially significant development for victims and survivors of the Troubles—and for broader communal reconciliation—the British government will advance legislation to establish various bodies to address the legacy of the conflict. These arrangements were laid out in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement and developed in negotiations led by Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan, in which I participated, the previous year.
The agreement also addresses Brexit. Northern Ireland’s government will create a subcommittee of the executive to oversee Brexit issues, and the British government will involve the executive in relevant proceedings. Although Northern Irish leaders no longer have direct influence in the British government, a functioning local government does provide at least some opportunity for them to shape a process that will have profound implications for the area’s economy and society.
Perhaps most important for the future of Northern Ireland’s economy, the British government has agreed to legislate, by the end of this year, “to guarantee unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the UK internal market.” The purpose is to address concerns among both unionists and the business community that Johnson’s Brexit deal will lead to trade barriers between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Whether the government’s commitment will assuage those commercial concerns—as well as unionists and loyalists outraged by what some call Johnson’s “betrayal”—will depend on the implementation.
Beyond all of this, the agreement includes a compromise on what had been the chief sticking point between the DUP and Sinn Fein: language. A new commissioner will “recognise, support, protect and enhance the development of the Irish language in Northern Ireland.” Another such commissioner will exist for Ulster-Scots, a regional language similar to English that many Protestants consider a vital part of their heritage. Both Irish and Ulster-Scots will receive official recognition and be allowed wider use in government settings.The agreement includes a compromise on what had been the chief sticking point between the DUP and Sinn Fein: language.
Irish language campaigners are disappointed by the limits of these provisions, while their mere existence is difficult for many unionists and loyalists to swallow. In this sense, the agreement threads the needle between the core constituencies of Sinn Fein and the DUP.
Yet that fact also underscores one of the biggest challenges the restored institutions face. In a visit to Belfast in the days surrounding the election in December, I heard widespread sentiment that the DUP and Sinn Fein had run the executive as an exclusive fiefdom, parceling out resources to their communities while marginalizing other parties. This sense of public dissatisfaction with the entire power-sharing operation means the DUP and Sinn Fein will now face pressure to operate more inclusively.
At the same time, the parties have their own political imperatives. Sinn Fein will seek to advance progress toward a united Ireland, a once distant prospect that Brexit has brought to the fore. The DUP will seek to ensure Northern Ireland remains an indistinguishable part of the United Kingdom, which requires managing loyalist agitation while keeping more moderate voters on side.
How disruptive Brexit proves to be for Northern Ireland’s farmers, business owners, and collective psyche will shape the terrain. Other problems could easily arise in a charged sectarian environment, just as the renewable heat scandal did in 2017. Indeed, a report about the renewable heating program, which could emerge at any time, is expected to criticize Foster and other DUP figures. This could threaten Foster’s position and, possibly, the executive’s existence once again.
Northern Ireland’s leaders and citizens should be happy to see Stormont back in operation. But there is a danger in expecting too much from these very fragile and divided institutions. Sustaining decent governance—much less cementing peace and easing animosities hardened over centuries—is an enormous challenge at the best of times. It will be all the harder as Northern Ireland navigates its most uncertain period since Good Friday almost 22 years ago.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--The Iraqi Military Won’t Survive a Tug of War Between the United States and Iran

The Iraqi Military Won ’ t Survive a Tug of War Between the United States and Iran After a U.S. drone strike killed a prominent Iranian general , Qassem Suleimani , at the Baghdad international airport earlier this month , and Iran responded with strikes on Iraqi bases that housed U.S. troops , the future of the Iraqi military has been very much up for discussion .
If the conflict between Iran and the United States escalates , the Iraqi military will be tasked with both ensuring Iraqi stability and negotiating between the two major powers , which each have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both tasks may be too much to ask from an organization that recently suffered enormous causalities in the war with the Islamic State and is barely holding the country together during a wave of anti-government protests .
More fundamentally , the armed forces are hamstrung by a complex infrastructure designed to keep the military ethnically balanced—a good idea in theory but one that has led to problems at both the upper levels of the armed forces and among the rank and file .
Things get even more complicated when it comes to Kurdish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Kurdistan Regional Government .
Because Kurdistan is itself divided , when the Kurdistan Democratic Party , the governing party , makes a recommendation , it must first consult with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan , the main opposition .
The result is that political acceptability is prized over military skill .
Despite the quotas on hiring , the force still doesn ’ t seem balanced to many in it .
According to a Sunni solder we interviewed in January , “ Although we have around 30-40 percent Sunni in top military ranks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power as Shiite ones .
We have Sunnis with the rank of general working office jobs or are on standby , men on salary waiting for appointments.
” In other words , Sunni generals are hired so that their ranks stay balanced , but they are relegated to lesser jobs .
The dangers of Iraq ’ s quota system were particularly visible after the battle of Mosul in 2016 and 2017 , when many Iraqi special operations commanders died or retired .
Some of the top figures were still not replaced by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on the government in December 2019 due to anti-government protests , Baghdad even took the extraordinary step of trying to recall a retired commander , Maj. Gen. Sami al-Aradi , to take one of the unfilled positions .
They were not successful ; al-Aradi was not confirmed because of his age .
( He is said to be about 69 . )
Another danger of the system is that , to the extent that Iraqi support for the United States versus Iran is divided along ethnic lines , the military could replicate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategic coherence .
The situation in other quarters of the Iraqi military is not much better .
For years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq , the rank and file of the Iraqi military was thought of as being too heavily Shiite .
According to David Witty , a retired U.S. special operations colonel who served as a military advisor to Iraq , when the United States started withdrawing in 2009 , the “ Iraqi military was becoming increasingly Shia-centered.
” By 2011 , he told us this month , “ many even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” That set the stage for what followed : Prior to its march through Iraq starting in 2014 , the Islamic State used Sunni discontent with the armed forces for recruitment .
Some Sunni members of the military even abandoned their posts to join the militant group .
But over the course of the battle against the Islamic State , the situation started changing .
Some important military positions , including head of military in Nineveh ( a Sunni-majority region ) , were given to Arab Sunni military commanders .
And ultimately , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqi Special Operations Forces ( ISOF ) , against the Islamic State , many young Sunni men from territories that had been occupied by the militant group were eager to enlist .
But they were largely unsuccessful , namely because of the way the armed forces are internally organized .
The ISOF is the only branch of Iraqi military that does not have ethnic quotas and promotes on merit alone .
But to ensure the highest possible quality of soldiers in the force , enlistment requirements are very strict .
Not surprisingly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( for example , through family members ) aren ’ t allowed .
Unfortunately for potential Sunni recruits from territories held by the Islamic State , it is almost impossible to meet that requirement .
That leads to underrepresentation of Sunnis in the armed forces .
It also leads to another generation of would-be soldiers feeling discriminated against due to their family or ethnic backgrounds .
That ’ s an issue the Islamic State—or group like it—could easily exploit once more .
Despite all the force ’ s problems , Iraqi civilians still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During recent demonstrations , which were against corruption in politics and lack of opportunities of young people , protesters demanded that Army Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi—who was a member of the ISOF and is viewed as a nonsectarian , nonpolitical hero of the Battle of Mosul—be given a high position in the government .
They didn ’ t get their wish , partially because it is against the law for members of the military to take government positions .
The request even led to further political conflicts inside the military force , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saadi as using public support to achieve military promotion .
Nevertheless , the episode did show public trust for the military among civilians .
In the battle against the Islamic State , the Iraqi military demonstrated its worth .
But it is not built to solve political problems , namely sectarian tensions at home and the competition between Iran and the United States abroad .
And its quota system , although perhaps necessary given the country ’ s current political fragility , makes it particularly slow to respond to any changes of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their proxy war , both the United States and Iran are putting pressure on the Iraqi military to choose a side .
But the more they try , the more likely the Iraqi military is to fall casualty to their showdown .
And Iraq losing a professional military force , trusted by its citizens , is something that neither Iran nor the United States could afford .

After a U.S. drone strike killed a prominent Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani, at the Baghdad international airport earlier this month, and Iran responded with strikes on Iraqi bases that housed U.S. troops, the future of the Iraqi military has been very much up for discussion.
After a U.S. drone strike killed a prominent Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani, at the Baghdad international airport earlier this month, and Iran responded with strikes on Iraqi bases that housed U.S. troops, the future of the Iraqi military has been very much up for discussion.
If the conflict between Iran and the United States escalates, the Iraqi military will be tasked with both ensuring Iraqi stability and negotiating between the two major powers, which each have a stake in its operations. But both tasks may be too much to ask from an organization that recently suffered enormous causalities in the war with the Islamic State and is barely holding the country together during a wave of anti-government protests. More fundamentally, the armed forces are hamstrung by a complex infrastructure designed to keep the military ethnically balanced—a good idea in theory but one that has led to problems at both the upper levels of the armed forces and among the rank and file.
To ensure that the Iraqi military includes representation from all major groups within the country’s population, many of the highest-level military positions are allocated by sect or ethnic group. For example, if a Sunni Arab commander retires, he must be replaced by a Sunni Arab, whether that person is the most qualified person in line for the position or not. Haggling over these appointments slows them down, and the process can sometimes take years.
Things get even more complicated when it comes to Kurdish commanders, who must be recommended by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Because Kurdistan is itself divided, when the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the governing party, makes a recommendation, it must first consult with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the main opposition. The result is that political acceptability is prized over military skill.
Despite the quotas on hiring, the force still doesn’t seem balanced to many in it. According to a Sunni solder we interviewed in January, “Although we have around 30-40 percent Sunni in top military ranks, they do not have as much power as Shiite ones. We have Sunnis with the rank of general working office jobs or are on standby, men on salary waiting for appointments.” In other words, Sunni generals are hired so that their ranks stay balanced, but they are relegated to lesser jobs.
The dangers of Iraq’s quota system were particularly visible after the battle of Mosul in 2016 and 2017, when many Iraqi special operations commanders died or retired. Some of the top figures were still not replaced by the end of last year. Amid extra pressure on the government in December 2019 due to anti-government protests, Baghdad even took the extraordinary step of trying to recall a retired commander, Maj. Gen. Sami al-Aradi, to take one of the unfilled positions. They were not successful; al-Aradi was not confirmed because of his age. (He is said to be about 69.)
Another danger of the system is that, to the extent that Iraqi support for the United States versus Iran is divided along ethnic lines, the military could replicate such rifts, with dangerous consequences for strategic coherence.
The situation in other quarters of the Iraqi military is not much better. For years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the rank and file of the Iraqi military was thought of as being too heavily Shiite. According to David Witty, a retired U.S. special operations colonel who served as a military advisor to Iraq, when the United States started withdrawing in 2009, the “Iraqi military was becoming increasingly Shia-centered.” By 2011, he told us this month, “many even previously recruited Arab Sunnis and Kurds left.” That set the stage for what followed: Prior to its march through Iraq starting in 2014, the Islamic State used Sunni discontent with the armed forces for recruitment. Some Sunni members of the military even abandoned their posts to join the militant group.
But over the course of the battle against the Islamic State, the situation started changing. Some important military positions, including head of military in Nineveh (a Sunni-majority region), were given to Arab Sunni military commanders. And ultimately, seeing the success of the military–particularly the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), against the Islamic State, many young Sunni men from territories that had been occupied by the militant group were eager to enlist. But they were largely unsuccessful, namely because of the way the armed forces are internally organized.
The ISOF is the only branch of Iraqi military that does not have ethnic quotas and promotes on merit alone. But to ensure the highest possible quality of soldiers in the force, enlistment requirements are very strict. Not surprisingly, individuals who have connections to terrorist organizations (for example, through family members) aren’t allowed. Unfortunately for potential Sunni recruits from territories held by the Islamic State, it is almost impossible to meet that requirement. That leads to underrepresentation of Sunnis in the armed forces. It also leads to another generation of would-be soldiers feeling discriminated against due to their family or ethnic backgrounds. That’s an issue the Islamic State—or group like it—could easily exploit once more.
Despite all the force’s problems, Iraqi civilians still look to the military as a defender. During recent demonstrations, which were against corruption in politics and lack of opportunities of young people, protesters demanded that Army Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi—who was a member of the ISOF and is viewed as a nonsectarian, nonpolitical hero of the Battle of Mosul—be given a high position in the government. They didn’t get their wish, partially because it is against the law for members of the military to take government positions. The request even led to further political conflicts inside the military force, as many members of the military saw Saadi as using public support to achieve military promotion. Nevertheless, the episode did show public trust for the military among civilians.
In the battle against the Islamic State, the Iraqi military demonstrated its worth. But it is not built to solve political problems, namely sectarian tensions at home and the competition between Iran and the United States abroad. And its quota system, although perhaps necessary given the country’s current political fragility, makes it particularly slow to respond to any changes of the environment and harms professionalism. Meanwhile, in their proxy war, both the United States and Iran are putting pressure on the Iraqi military to choose a side. But the more they try, the more likely the Iraqi military is to fall casualty to their showdown. And Iraq losing a professional military force, trusted by its citizens, is something that neither Iran nor the United States could afford.