foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--The Birth of Belarusian Nationalism

The Birth of Belarusian Nationalism

“ You asked me why I am against the integration ?
Just take a look at Russia .
Corruption is everywhere .
You can not do anything without bribe or having good krysha.
” Maria , who prefers to go by a pseudonym , used the Russian word that literally means “ roof ” but is broadly used in post-Soviet states to describe illicit protection or patronage .
She was sitting with her friends in the cozy kitchen in a block of flats in the Belarusian city of Brest .
The owner of the apartment , Yauhen Skrabutan , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , labeled “ Europe ’ s last dictator , ” and a supporter of the country ’ s pro-democracy movement .
Maria admitted that , unlike for Skrabutan , politics is not essential to her .
She prefers to focus on the challenges of everyday life , like avoiding any food from Russia , especially meat and dairy products , because of their low quality .
To her mind , anything that comes from Russia is worse than its Belarusian or EU counterpart .
“ The roads there are horribly devastated , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mess lies everywhere , and corruption is overwhelming .
Russia is not the country where I want to live and raise my children in the future , ” Maria concluded firmly .
This is not an isolated opinion , even in Belarus , which is commonly perceived as the most Soviet-nostalgic and pro-Russian public in Europe .
( As Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy , the director of Belsat TV , an independent channel broadcasting from Poland to Belarus , told me this fall , “ Belarusians have been intensively Russified for the most of two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there are only seven Belarusian-language schools , six of which are in Minsk , the capital of Belarus , and only two of them are secondary schools.
” ) Yet according to survey data from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus , only 7.7 percent of respondents would support entry of their homeland into Russia—a prospect that seems increasingly on the table as Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold frequent meetings to discuss deeper integration .
The first meeting was held in connection with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to create the Union State of Russia and Belarus .
At the end the gathering , the two sides put out no formal declaration , but the then-Russian minister of economic development , Maxim Oreshkin , stated that both sides were close to finalizing the agreement—which would apparently integrate the countries ’ agriculture , telecommunication , and customs policies .
However , the details were not publicly announced .
In September , the Russian newspaper Kommersant claimed that the deal also included creating common civil and tax legislation .
With key differences over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both Russian and Belarusian officials have said negotiations are still pending .
As the two leaders held their discussions , about 1,000 protesters were marching in Minsk , where chants of “ Long live Belarus ” and “ Independence ” were loud and constant .
Some of them ripped portraits of the Russian president off walls around the city .
“ We are observing the generational renewal in Belarus , ” Ales Zarembiuk , the chairman of the Poland-based NGO Belarusian House , told me in December .
“ Half of Belarusians no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is no nostalgia for this reason .
Young people have iPhones , access to the internet , travel to the West .
… They want to live as their European peers do.
” That doesn ’ t necessarily mean that they want to be part of Europe , though , either .
“ The striking aspect of Belarusian public opinion is that it is exceptionally volatile in terms of geopolitical orientation , ” Romaszewska-Guzy pointed out .
“ Survey results can vary by up to several percentages from month to month.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and history , the “ basic goal is to adapt to changing political environments and somehow survive.
” Indeed , added Piotr Rudkouski , the director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies , “ The vast majority of Belarusians stick to the idea of independence , but given weak national identity , this attitude may easily change .
The public opinion in Belarus is more pro-Russian , pro-Orthodox , and anti-Western.
” Some kind of Belarusian identity apart from those factors has been relatively hard to find .
But that may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would be unimaginable to find stores on Belarusian streets selling folk handicrafts .
Now they are everywhere .
Young people are more enthusiastic about wearing T-shirts with patriotic emblems like “ Pahonia , ” the Lithuanian/Belarusian historical coat of arms , or even vyshyvanka , a type of folk embroidered shirt .
Lukashenko himself appeared in a blue one on a television spot presenting him as a hardworking farmer mowing a field of grain .
As for the rise of nationalism , it appears that Lukahensko might have realized that the Russification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mistake .
At the end of the 1990s , he might have dreamed of becoming the head of joint Russian-Belarusian state , but now he is striving to survive as an independent leader .
In this struggle , he must see potential for turning Belarusians back into his allies by playing up national identity and distinctiveness from Russians .
In general , Lukashenko likes to boast about the economic successes of his country , the development of its infrastructure , and the increase in citizens ’ living standards .
In 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 ) in the World Bank ’ s Ease of Doing Business index .
It even performs better than some European Union countries , including , for example , Greece ( 79 ) .
The capital itself shines with perfectly clean streets , newly constructed office buildings ( even though they resemble nothing so much as the communist behemoths of yore ) , and Chinese electric buses .
Meanwhile , in the mid-2000s , Lukashenko realized that to boost the economy it was necessary to invest in the tech industry .
In 2006 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nicknamed “ Belarusian Silicon Valley , ” which now boasts more than 30,000 software engineers .
One of the world ’ s most popular online multiplayer video games World of Tanks and the internet communications app Viber were both developed in Belarus .
However , whereas IT specialists can earn up to $ 2,000 or more per month , the average wage nationwide is still around $ 450 .
According to Aliaksandr Klaskouski , the head of analytical projects at the BelaPAN news agency , this is a problem .
“ Authorities have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our Soviet-style economy .
Their strategies were based on Chinese credits , upgrading oil refineries , creating the IT industry , and diversifying export markets.
” The plan , he said , was successful in the short term but insufficient in the long run .
“ The ‘ golden decade ’ of Belarusian development is gone , ” he continued .
The country is still economically dependent on Russia , thanks to Russian energy subsidies and unlimited access to its market .
Moscow can intimidate Minsk by limiting its purchases of Belarusian goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gas , and the like .
Although Lukashenko desires that money , it is clear that he does not want to become just another governor of a Russian province .
To that end , some observers believe , he might try to take advantage of the country ’ s emerging national identity .
It is remarkable , for one , that Belarusian authorities have generally refrained from using force and dispersing the demonstrators violently .
That stands in stark contrast to reactions to previous bouts of protests , including in 2006 , 2011 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ variously roughed up , detained , and in some cases killed .
“ At the moment , Lukashenko allows protests as a bargaining tool in negotiations with Putin .
This is supposed to be a warning signal : ‘ Look out what ’ s going on in here .
We don ’ t want second Kyiv in Minsk , right ?
’ Otherwise , me and the other organizers of the demonstrations would have already been arrested , ” said Paval Sieviaryniec , the co-leader of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( Two weeks later , he was sentenced to 45 days of jail . )
Yet whether Minsk does let some protest proceed is almost beside the point , depending on what Russian intentions in Belarus really are .
For Rudkouski , the “ Kremlin is not ultimately determined about the annexation of Belarus , be it gradual or instant .
There are not many in the Kremlin establishment that dream of new annexations .
Economic technocrats , for example , strongly dislike this idea.
” Public opinion , meanwhile , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a survey by the Russia Public Opinion Research Center conducted in January 2019 : Only 17 percent of Russians would like Belarus to accede to their country .
Putin , Rukouski argues , “ is not blind to the costs that any violent annexation will certainly involve .
Acquiring one more area with a high potential of separatism would be a too irrational step for quite a pragmatic establishment.
” Romaszewska-Guzy isn ’ t so sure .
She believes that Putin ’ s aims are strictly political , not economic .
“ He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success.
” The win in Crimea has already passed , and the broader war in Ukraine has turned out to be a disaster .
“ Then imagine that Russian border guards step on the Belarusian-European Union frontier in Brest !
It would be something spectacular.
” Whereas Lukashenko ’ s aim of holding on to power is clear , Putin ’ s ultimate goals are less so .
He ’ s unlikely to want to try to fully incorporate Belarus into Russia , as was the plan in Crimea , but to transform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Kremlin ’ s rule .
In turn , Belarus ’ s factual status would become similar to Abkhazia or South Ossetia , even though it would remain a formally independent entity .
Moscow is moreover determined to achieve this target with minimal economic costs and thus force Belarus to rely less on Russian economic aid .
Colorful swirls flow from the nostrils of a big hairy animal and flood the whole world with fanciful spots in all shades of the rainbow .
“ This is what our bison looks like after LSD @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our daily Belarusian reality ?
Stoned bison , ” said a young man , laughing as he sips a craft beer and shakes a spray can .
His mural covering the wall of a former factory plant is about 100 meters long and several dozen high .
It is so vast that it is impossible to embrace it all at once .
Kastrycnickaya ( “ October ” in Belarusian ) used to be a typical , dull industrial street on the outskirt of Minsk ’ s city center .
A few years ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into a small hipster district .
But for the language , it would be hard to distinguish it from other artistic neighborhoods in Berlin , London , or Paris .
Young people can enjoy creative freedom here ; authorities treat it as a safety valve that helps prove that Belarus is a normal European state .
Sitting here , it is easy to forget about the Russian threat looming over the horizon .
“ [ The ] Ukrainian revolution was a great lesson for our society , ” Sieviaryniec said .
“ After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realize the value of independence—from football fans … to housewives attending Belarusian-language courses .
Lukashenko … tries to cheat and dodge between East and West , but for the first time for decades , he must take into account us .
”

“You asked me why I am against the integration? Just take a look at Russia. Corruption is everywhere. You cannot do anything without bribe or having good krysha.” Maria, who prefers to go by a pseudonym, used the Russian word that literally means “roof” but is broadly used in post-Soviet states to describe illicit protection or patronage. She was sitting with her friends in the cozy kitchen in a block of flats in the Belarusian city of Brest. The owner of the apartment, Yauhen Skrabutan, is a declared opponent of President Alexander Lukashenko, labeled “Europe’s last dictator,” and a supporter of the country’s pro-democracy movement.
“You asked me why I am against the integration? Just take a look at Russia. Corruption is everywhere. You cannot do anything without bribe or having good krysha.” Maria, who prefers to go by a pseudonym, used the Russian word that literally means “roof” but is broadly used in post-Soviet states to describe illicit protection or patronage. She was sitting with her friends in the cozy kitchen in a block of flats in the Belarusian city of Brest. The owner of the apartment, Yauhen Skrabutan, is a declared opponent of President Alexander Lukashenko, labeled “Europe’s last dictator,” and a supporter of the country’s pro-democracy movement.
Maria admitted that, unlike for Skrabutan, politics is not essential to her. She prefers to focus on the challenges of everyday life, like avoiding any food from Russia, especially meat and dairy products, because of their low quality. To her mind, anything that comes from Russia is worse than its Belarusian or EU counterpart. “The roads there are horribly devastated, the food is awful, dirty, and mess lies everywhere, and corruption is overwhelming. Russia is not the country where I want to live and raise my children in the future,” Maria concluded firmly.
This is not an isolated opinion, even in Belarus, which is commonly perceived as the most Soviet-nostalgic and pro-Russian public in Europe. (As Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy, the director of Belsat TV, an independent channel broadcasting from Poland to Belarus, told me this fall, “Belarusians have been intensively Russified for the most of two decades of Lukashenko rule. For instance, there are only seven Belarusian-language schools, six of which are in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, and only two of them are secondary schools.”) Yet according to survey data from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, only 7.7 percent of respondents would support entry of their homeland into Russia—a prospect that seems increasingly on the table as Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin hold frequent meetings to discuss deeper integration.
Far from the kitchen in Brest, in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on Dec. 7 and in St. Petersburg on Dec. 20, Lukashenko and Putin met to negotiate the 31 road maps of deepening integration of the two states.
The first meeting was held in connection with the 20th anniversary of a union treaty meant to create the Union State of Russia and Belarus. At the end the gathering, the two sides put out no formal declaration, but the then-Russian minister of economic development, Maxim Oreshkin, stated that both sides were close to finalizing the agreement—which would apparently integrate the countries’ agriculture, telecommunication, and customs policies. However, the details were not publicly announced. In September, the Russian newspaper Kommersant claimed that the deal also included creating common civil and tax legislation. With key differences over oil and gas prices still unsettled, both Russian and Belarusian officials have said negotiations are still pending.
As the two leaders held their discussions, about 1,000 protesters were marching in Minsk, where chants of “Long live Belarus” and “Independence” were loud and constant. Some of them ripped portraits of the Russian president off walls around the city. “We are observing the generational renewal in Belarus,” Ales Zarembiuk, the chairman of the Poland-based NGO Belarusian House, told me in December. “Half of Belarusians no longer remember the Soviet Union, and there is no nostalgia for this reason. Young people have iPhones, access to the internet, travel to the West. … They want to live as their European peers do.”
That doesn’t necessarily mean that they want to be part of Europe, though, either. “The striking aspect of Belarusian public opinion is that it is exceptionally volatile in terms of geopolitical orientation,” Romaszewska-Guzy pointed out. “Survey results can vary by up to several percentages from month to month.” Given Belarusians’ strong experiences of war and history, the “basic goal is to adapt to changing political environments and somehow survive.”
Indeed, added Piotr Rudkouski, the director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, “The vast majority of Belarusians stick to the idea of independence, but given weak national identity, this attitude may easily change. The public opinion in Belarus is more pro-Russian, pro-Orthodox, and anti-Western.” Some kind of Belarusian identity apart from those factors has been relatively hard to find.
But that may be changing. A few years ago, it would be unimaginable to find stores on Belarusian streets selling folk handicrafts. Now they are everywhere. Young people are more enthusiastic about wearing T-shirts with patriotic emblems like “Pahonia,” the Lithuanian/Belarusian historical coat of arms, or even vyshyvanka, a type of folk embroidered shirt. Lukashenko himself appeared in a blue one on a television spot presenting him as a hardworking farmer mowing a field of grain.
As for the rise of nationalism, it appears that Lukahensko might have realized that the Russification of the past several decades has been a mistake. At the end of the 1990s, he might have dreamed of becoming the head of joint Russian-Belarusian state, but now he is striving to survive as an independent leader. In this struggle, he must see potential for turning Belarusians back into his allies by playing up national identity and distinctiveness from Russians.
The transponder attached to the windscreen beeped in time with the car crossing sensors. The main road connecting Brest with Minsk is broad and extremely well-maintained. A newly introduced electronic toll collection system called “BelToll” works perfectly. Traffic is low, but omnipresent cameras, police patrols, and hefty fines cause drivers to comply with speed limits and other traffic rules strictly. Belarus is proud that, unlike in Russia or Ukraine, citizens say, roads here reach global standards, and one can travel comfortably without the risk of blowing out one’s suspension.
In general, Lukashenko likes to boast about the economic successes of his country, the development of its infrastructure, and the increase in citizens’ living standards. In 2019, Belarus took 49th place (38 in 2018) in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index. It even performs better than some European Union countries, including, for example, Greece (79).
The capital itself shines with perfectly clean streets, newly constructed office buildings (even though they resemble nothing so much as the communist behemoths of yore), and Chinese electric buses. Meanwhile, in the mid-2000s, Lukashenko realized that to boost the economy it was necessary to invest in the tech industry. In 2006, the government opened a high-tech park nicknamed “Belarusian Silicon Valley,” which now boasts more than 30,000 software engineers. One of the world’s most popular online multiplayer video games World of Tanks and the internet communications app Viber were both developed in Belarus.
However, whereas IT specialists can earn up to $2,000 or more per month, the average wage nationwide is still around $450. According to Aliaksandr Klaskouski, the head of analytical projects at the BelaPAN news agency, this is a problem. “Authorities have been trying to introduce different reforms to our Soviet-style economy. Their strategies were based on Chinese credits, upgrading oil refineries, creating the IT industry, and diversifying export markets.” The plan, he said, was successful in the short term but insufficient in the long run.
“The ‘golden decade’ of Belarusian development is gone,” he continued. The country is still economically dependent on Russia, thanks to Russian energy subsidies and unlimited access to its market. Moscow can intimidate Minsk by limiting its purchases of Belarusian goods, raising the price for the natural gas, and the like. Although Lukashenko desires that money, it is clear that he does not want to become just another governor of a Russian province.
To that end, some observers believe, he might try to take advantage of the country’s emerging national identity. It is remarkable, for one, that Belarusian authorities have generally refrained from using force and dispersing the demonstrators violently. That stands in stark contrast to reactions to previous bouts of protests, including in 2006, 2011, and 2017, when protesters were variously roughed up, detained, and in some cases killed.
“At the moment, Lukashenko allows protests as a bargaining tool in negotiations with Putin. This is supposed to be a warning signal: ‘Look out what’s going on in here. We don’t want second Kyiv in Minsk, right?’ Otherwise, me and the other organizers of the demonstrations would have already been arrested,” said Paval Sieviaryniec, the co-leader of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party and the organizer of the protests, in mid-December. (Two weeks later, he was sentenced to 45 days of jail.)
Yet whether Minsk does let some protest proceed is almost beside the point, depending on what Russian intentions in Belarus really are. For Rudkouski, the “Kremlin is not ultimately determined about the annexation of Belarus, be it gradual or instant. There are not many in the Kremlin establishment that dream of new annexations. Economic technocrats, for example, strongly dislike this idea.” Public opinion, meanwhile, is not in favor either, according to a survey by the Russia Public Opinion Research Center conducted in January 2019: Only 17 percent of Russians would like Belarus to accede to their country. Putin, Rukouski argues, “is not blind to the costs that any violent annexation will certainly involve. Acquiring one more area with a high potential of separatism would be a too irrational step for quite a pragmatic establishment.”
Romaszewska-Guzy isn’t so sure. She believes that Putin’s aims are strictly political, not economic. “He urgently needs [a] new international success.” The win in Crimea has already passed, and the broader war in Ukraine has turned out to be a disaster. “Then imagine that Russian border guards step on the Belarusian-European Union frontier in Brest! It would be something spectacular.”
Whereas Lukashenko’s aim of holding on to power is clear, Putin’s ultimate goals are less so. He’s unlikely to want to try to fully incorporate Belarus into Russia, as was the plan in Crimea, but to transform it into a puppet state entirely subjugated to Kremlin’s rule. In turn, Belarus’s factual status would become similar to Abkhazia or South Ossetia, even though it would remain a formally independent entity. Moscow is moreover determined to achieve this target with minimal economic costs and thus force Belarus to rely less on Russian economic aid.
Colorful swirls flow from the nostrils of a big hairy animal and flood the whole world with fanciful spots in all shades of the rainbow. “This is what our bison looks like after LSD. Doesn’t it sound like our daily Belarusian reality? Stoned bison,” said a young man, laughing as he sips a craft beer and shakes a spray can. His mural covering the wall of a former factory plant is about 100 meters long and several dozen high. It is so vast that it is impossible to embrace it all at once. Kastrycnickaya (“October” in Belarusian) used to be a typical, dull industrial street on the outskirt of Minsk’s city center. A few years ago, though, it started to transform into a small hipster district. But for the language, it would be hard to distinguish it from other artistic neighborhoods in Berlin, London, or Paris. Young people can enjoy creative freedom here; authorities treat it as a safety valve that helps prove that Belarus is a normal European state. Sitting here, it is easy to forget about the Russian threat looming over the horizon.
“[The] Ukrainian revolution was a great lesson for our society,” Sieviaryniec said. “After 2014, many people have begun to realize the value of independence—from football fans … to housewives attending Belarusian-language courses. Lukashenko … tries to cheat and dodge between East and West, but for the first time for decades, he must take into account us.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Washington Doesn’t Understand Shiite Clerics in Iran or Iraq

On Jan. 17 , as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani , the most prominent Shiite leader in Iraq , was discharged from the hospital , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo posted three tweets—in English , Arabic , and Farsi—wishing him a speedy recovery and calling the ayatollah “ a source of guidance and inspiration.
” The friendly approach toward Sistani was regarded as an attempt by Pompeo to portray U.S. support for the ayatollah , who the administration believes is countering Iranian influence in Iraq .
This comes only weeks after Pompeo himself encouraged President Donald Trump to assassinate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ airstrike while the general was visiting Iraq .
It is no secret that Pompeo is a champion of exerting a maximum pressure strategy on what he calls “ Khamenei ’ s kleptocracy , ” in reference to Iran ’ s supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei .
But his different and conflicting attitudes toward the two ayatollahs are yet another miscalculation on the part of the U.S. government in the tumultuous Middle East .
Just a day after the killing of Suleimani , Sistani sent an unprecedented letter to Khamenei expressing his condolences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ praised the extraordinary role that the martyr Suleimani played in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq .
The letter is the first of its kind sent by Sistani to Khamenei in decades .
The subject of the letter—expressing condolences to Khamenei over the death of Suleimani—is noteworthy .
Sistani has rarely issued a letter over the death of a non-cleric .
This raises the question of what was so unique about Suleimani that made Sistani send a public letter to Khamenei .
The answer lies in their shared belief in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to combat threats from outsiders .
The perceived threat for the two ayatollahs comes both from fanatical militant groups like the Islamic State and from foreign intervention in the region .
In their eyes , both have exacerbated regional instability over the past decade .
To tackle the former threat , Sistani took striking and definitive action in June 2014 .
As the threat of Islamic State encroachment on Baghdad was heightening , he issued a fatwa of jihad , obligating all Iraqis who were able to fight the terrorists to join the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ homeland .
This was almost a century after Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim al-Yazdi ’ s fatwa against British forces who invaded Iraq in 1914 , the last time a Shiite leader issued such a political edict .
His fatwa , nonetheless , paved the way for the foundation of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces .
It was then that Suleimani and Iran ’ s Quds Force rushed to help Iraqis ( Sunni , Shiite , and most notably Kurds ) to organize the popular units in their fight against the Islamic State .
Sistani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq as the homeland of all Iraqis .
Sistani seeks a sovereign and strong Iraqi state , which can safeguard the Shiite community but also Sunnis , Kurds , Yazidis , and Shabaks .
Sistani recognized the “ extraordinary ” and “ unforgettable ” role Suleimani played in achieving this goal in his letter .
When it comes to foreign intervention , as a Shiite religious elite , Sistani can not remain on the sidelines when Shiites in other countries , including Lebanon and Iran , are in danger .
A case in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States to support a cease-fire during the 2006 war between the militant group and Israel .
Hamed al-Khaffaf , Sistani ’ s representative in Beirut and his son-in-law , revealed in an interview with one of us in August 2012 that at the time , following a request from Nabih Berri , the Shiite speaker of the Lebanese Parliament , Sistani sent a dispatch to U.S. President George W. Bush through an Iraqi courier , reminding him about the regional consequences of postponing a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ objections , the United States voted in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and called for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah .
His attitude toward Iran , which is a Shiite theocracy under the leadership of his fellow ayatollahs , is different .
Although he is of Iranian descent , he has never publicly intervened in Iran ’ s domestic affairs .
He never answered questions of his Iranian Shiite followers , the majority of his followers , whenever he was asked about domestic issues .
On the contrary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who met with him to become united under the leadership of Khamenei .
There are many reasons to believe that when either clerical establishment is threatened by outsiders , their collective priority will be to maintain unity .
There is no debate over the fact that religious authorities in Iraq and Iran hold different political views .
Nevertheless , there are many reasons to believe that when either clerical establishment is threatened by outsiders , their collective priority will be to maintain unity .
Indeed , mainstream Shiite ayatollahs believe that they must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As Iran is ruled by ayatollahs , for Sistani , no matter if he belongs to a different school of thought , any threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran is tantamount to casting aspersions on Shiite Islam .
Sistani ’ s letter makes clear that he was not , is not , and would never be an enemy of Iran , despite all the differences he may have with its leaders .
And this is a blind spot for decision-makers in Washington .
Time and again , U.S. strategy toward the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when it comes to their internal dynamics , priorities , and interests .
This internal dynamic—the ayatollahs ’ nonnegotiable support for Shiite clerical authority and its stature—is so important and an unvarying principle among them that it even prompted the stubborn Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to revisit his earlier positions .
Sadr ’ s rise coincided with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 .
Then , in his early 20s , he openly criticized the Najaf religious authority , referring to it as a “ silent school ” —hence passive toward political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sadr wanted Sistani to act as a revolutionary leader ; he might have wanted to see an Iraqi version of the Islamic Republic of Iran ’ s founder , Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini .
Yet the seemingly quiet Shiite leader , or marja , had a different agenda .
From his perspective , the priority was the future of the Shiite community and its clerical authority in such a volatile time and area .
Sistani was looking forward to the chance for Shiites to gain power in a democratic Iraq , though expressing on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Shiite political elites in power .
This was not only Sistani ’ s worry ; it was a matter of concern for all prominent Shiite leaders .
In Iran , Khamenei had to weigh the costs and benefits of proceeding with harsh ideological rhetoric against the United States and exerting efforts to fight U.S. influence in Iraq against losing the opportunity for Shiites to ascend to power for the first time in Iraq ’ s modern history through the political process .
He chose both , by supporting the political process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creating a parallel path , backing factions that sought to fight the coalition forces .
Sadr ’ s group was among them .
Sadr ’ s relations with Sistani deteriorated , just days after the ouster of Saddam Hussein ’ s regime in 2003 .
On one occasion in April 2003 , supporters of Sadr besieged the ayatollah , calling on him to leave Iraq .
The origins of this tension go back to Sadr ’ s father , Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr , another senior Iraqi cleric who used to be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1999 .
The elder Sadr vehemently criticized top clerics in Najaf , including Sistani , and believed that their quiescent approach in politics made Iraqi Shiites virtually leaderless in the face of the rampant excesses of Saddam ’ s regime .
In the summer of 2004 , U.S. forces besieged Sadr and a group of his supporters in the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf .
The differences between the two men were put aside because of what Sistani saw as the interest of Shiites .
This allowed him to play a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an end , building on the organic leverage of being one of Shiite Islam ’ s highest religious authorities .
Sistani ’ s moves were seconded by Khamenei , who sent him a message urging him to intervene .
Iran was known to be the main backer of Sadr during that period , yet it was then that Sistani ’ s balancing role within the Shiite community came to the forefront of people ’ s attention .
Khamenei ’ s message to Sistani was delivered via phone and was an invitation to intervene @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Sadr in the shrine of Imam Ali .
The Iranian supreme leader feared the implications of Sadr ’ s killing on the one hand and the idea of a Shiite cleric losing his life in a fight against foreign troops at Ali ’ s shrine on the other .
Khamenei ’ s phone message , which was transcribed by Sistani ’ s son , Mohammad Reza al-Sistani , read : “ What is happening is very bad for Shiites .
If the clerics in Iran and myself are not doing anything , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , yet it is necessary that you send the Iraqi government a strong message.
” Khamenei added in his conversation : “ If this group got killed , and Sayyid Muqtada ’ s blood was shed , the Iraqi people and the Shiites will say , ‘ The clerics sat and watched those being killed .
There should be a solution.
’ ” Sistani and Khamenei worked closely together , though remotely , to reach a cease-fire .
According to Khaffaf , Sistani ’ s spokesman , Sistani drafted a four-point cease-fire initiative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khamenei in Najaf to hand to Sadr .
Sadr discovered that , silent or not , Sistani ’ s authority was capable of influencing major events and that he had legitimacy .
To Iran , this has been clear ever since .
Indeed , Sistani played a role in the 2014 political crisis over appointing a prime minister in Iraq .
Iran wanted Nouri al-Maliki , but Sistani had a veto , so Tehran had to accept Sistani ’ s final say .
He was , after all , the highest-ranking Shiite cleric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be undermined by his Iranian colleagues .
Sistani ’ s objection to Maliki resulted in the appointment of Haidar al-Abadi as Iraqi prime minister in September 2014 .
The latest source of tension has been Iraqis ’ rising sense of resentment toward Iran due to Iranian involvement in Iraq ’ s domestic affairs .
Sistani raised the issue , long before the ongoing protests broke out in Iraq , when he met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last March .
During the meeting , he further emphasized that “ Iraq ’ s sovereignty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq-Iran relations to be built based on the principle of good neighborliness .
This has not changed even now , with Sistani affirming through his Friday prayers , following the U.S. and Iranian attacks on Iraqi territory in January , that no foreign powers should be allowed to decide Iraq ’ s fate .
For many Iraqis , Iran ’ s intervention in their country ’ s domestic politics is partly to be blamed for their destitution .
The spillover of the fight between Iran and the United States into Iraq—as has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the prospects of it being further exacerbated over the killing of Suleimani , is another factor that might exacerbate the negative image of Iran among Iraqi protesters in coming weeks and months .
A united Iraq , within which all citizens move beyond sectarian rhetoric and cultivate a unified national identity , can defeat all internal security threats without the direct intervention of foreign forces .
Not surprisingly , Sistani has a solution : “ A united , free , and strong Iraq.
” The United States and Iran should follow his lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq , within which all citizens move beyond sectarian rhetoric and cultivate a unified national identity , can defeat all internal security threats without the direct intervention of foreign forces .
A free Iraq does not require U.S. and coalition soldiers on its land .
A strong Iraq could act as an adept broker between Iran and the United States—and the broader Arab world—should there be any appetite for diplomacy and reconciliation .
It seems that the best person under whose guidance these aims could be achieved is Sistani—the man who , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his cloak in a paternal way by supporting all Iraqis since 2003 .
If the U.S. government and Pompeo are sincere in their calls for a peaceful region , they should seize this unique opportunity and follow the advice of a “ friend of their enemy .
”

On Jan. 17, as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most prominent Shiite leader in Iraq, was discharged from the hospital, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo posted three tweets —in English, Arabic, and Farsi—wishing him a speedy recovery and calling the ayatollah “a source of guidance and inspiration.”
On Jan. 17, as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most prominent Shiite leader in Iraq, was discharged from the hospital, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo posted three tweets—in English, Arabic, and Farsi—wishing him a speedy recovery and calling the ayatollah “a source of guidance and inspiration.”
The friendly approach toward Sistani was regarded as an attempt by Pompeo to portray U.S. support for the ayatollah, who the administration believes is countering Iranian influence in Iraq. This comes only weeks after Pompeo himself encouraged President Donald Trump to assassinate the Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in an airstrike while the general was visiting Iraq.
It is no secret that Pompeo is a champion of exerting a maximum pressure strategy on what he calls “Khamenei’s kleptocracy,” in reference to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But his different and conflicting attitudes toward the two ayatollahs are yet another miscalculation on the part of the U.S. government in the tumultuous Middle East.
Just a day after the killing of Suleimani, Sistani sent an unprecedented letter to Khamenei expressing his condolences to Iran’s leader. Sistani praised the extraordinary role that the martyr Suleimani played in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq. The letter is the first of its kind sent by Sistani to Khamenei in decades.
The subject of the letter—expressing condolences to Khamenei over the death of Suleimani—is noteworthy. Sistani has rarely issued a letter over the death of a non-cleric. This raises the question of what was so unique about Suleimani that made Sistani send a public letter to Khamenei. The answer lies in their shared belief in the necessity of an orchestrated, transnational effort to combat threats from outsiders. The perceived threat for the two ayatollahs comes both from fanatical militant groups like the Islamic State and from foreign intervention in the region. In their eyes, both have exacerbated regional instability over the past decade.
To tackle the former threat, Sistani took striking and definitive action in June 2014. As the threat of Islamic State encroachment on Baghdad was heightening, he issued a fatwa of jihad, obligating all Iraqis who were able to fight the terrorists to join the Iraqi security forces and to defend their homeland. This was almost a century after Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhim al-Yazdi’s fatwa against British forces who invaded Iraq in 1914, the last time a Shiite leader issued such a political edict.
His fatwa, nonetheless, paved the way for the foundation of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces. It was then that Suleimani and Iran’s Quds Force rushed to help Iraqis (Sunni, Shiite, and most notably Kurds) to organize the popular units in their fight against the Islamic State. Sistani’s goal was the protection of Iraq as the homeland of all Iraqis. Sistani seeks a sovereign and strong Iraqi state, which can safeguard the Shiite community but also Sunnis, Kurds, Yazidis, and Shabaks. Sistani recognized the “extraordinary” and “unforgettable” role Suleimani played in achieving this goal in his letter.
When it comes to foreign intervention, as a Shiite religious elite, Sistani cannot remain on the sidelines when Shiites in other countries, including Lebanon and Iran, are in danger. A case in point is when he liaised covertly with the United States to support a cease-fire during the 2006 war between the militant group and Israel.
Hamed al-Khaffaf, Sistani’s representative in Beirut and his son-in-law, revealed in an interview with one of us in August 2012 that at the time, following a request from Nabih Berri, the Shiite speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Sistani sent a dispatch to U.S. President George W. Bush through an Iraqi courier, reminding him about the regional consequences of postponing a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. A couple of days later, despite previous objections, the United States voted in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and called for a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah.
His attitude toward Iran, which is a Shiite theocracy under the leadership of his fellow ayatollahs, is different. Although he is of Iranian descent, he has never publicly intervened in Iran’s domestic affairs. He never answered questions of his Iranian Shiite followers, the majority of his followers, whenever he was asked about domestic issues. On the contrary, he has frequently advised those Iranian elites who met with him to become united under the leadership of Khamenei.
There are many reasons to believe that when either clerical establishment is threatened by outsiders, their collective priority will be to maintain unity.
There is no debate over the fact that religious authorities in Iraq and Iran hold different political views. Nevertheless, there are many reasons to believe that when either clerical establishment is threatened by outsiders, their collective priority will be to maintain unity. Indeed, mainstream Shiite ayatollahs believe that they must avoid any attempt to weaken clerical authority. As Iran is ruled by ayatollahs, for Sistani, no matter if he belongs to a different school of thought, any threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran is tantamount to casting aspersions on Shiite Islam.
Sistani’s letter makes clear that he was not, is not, and would never be an enemy of Iran, despite all the differences he may have with its leaders. And this is a blind spot for decision-makers in Washington.
Time and again, U.S. strategy toward the Shiite ayatollahs has proved to be ill-informed when it comes to their internal dynamics, priorities, and interests. This internal dynamic—the ayatollahs’ nonnegotiable support for Shiite clerical authority and its stature—is so important and an unvarying principle among them that it even prompted the stubborn Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to revisit his earlier positions.
Sadr’s rise coincided with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Then, in his early 20s, he openly criticized the Najaf religious authority, referring to it as a “silent school”—hence passive toward political events taking place in its surroundings. Sadr wanted Sistani to act as a revolutionary leader; he might have wanted to see an Iraqi version of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Yet the seemingly quiet Shiite leader, or marja, had a different agenda. From his perspective, the priority was the future of the Shiite community and its clerical authority in such a volatile time and area. Sistani was looking forward to the chance for Shiites to gain power in a democratic Iraq, though expressing on several occasions his dismay with the attitude of the Shiite political elites in power.
This was not only Sistani’s worry; it was a matter of concern for all prominent Shiite leaders. In Iran, Khamenei had to weigh the costs and benefits of proceeding with harsh ideological rhetoric against the United States and exerting efforts to fight U.S. influence in Iraq against losing the opportunity for Shiites to ascend to power for the first time in Iraq’s modern history through the political process.
He chose both, by supporting the political process under the auspices of Sistani and by creating a parallel path, backing factions that sought to fight the coalition forces. Sadr’s group was among them. Sadr’s relations with Sistani deteriorated, just days after the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003.
On one occasion in April 2003, supporters of Sadr besieged the ayatollah, calling on him to leave Iraq. The origins of this tension go back to Sadr’s father, Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, another senior Iraqi cleric who used to be a vocal critic of Saddam and was assassinated in 1999. The elder Sadr vehemently criticized top clerics in Najaf, including Sistani, and believed that their quiescent approach in politics made Iraqi Shiites virtually leaderless in the face of the rampant excesses of Saddam’s regime. In the summer of 2004, U.S. forces besieged Sadr and a group of his supporters in the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf.
The differences between the two men were put aside because of what Sistani saw as the interest of Shiites. This allowed him to play a central role in bringing this episode to an end, building on the organic leverage of being one of Shiite Islam’s highest religious authorities. Sistani’s moves were seconded by Khamenei, who sent him a message urging him to intervene. Iran was known to be the main backer of Sadr during that period, yet it was then that Sistani’s balancing role within the Shiite community came to the forefront of people’s attention.
Khamenei’s message to Sistani was delivered via phone and was an invitation to intervene and prevent the killing of a cleric like Sadr in the shrine of Imam Ali. The Iranian supreme leader feared the implications of Sadr’s killing on the one hand and the idea of a Shiite cleric losing his life in a fight against foreign troops at Ali’s shrine on the other. Khamenei’s phone message, which was transcribed by Sistani’s son, Mohammad Reza al-Sistani, read: “What is happening is very bad for Shiites. If the clerics in Iran and myself are not doing anything, it is out of respect to you, yet it is necessary that you send the Iraqi government a strong message.”
Khamenei added in his conversation: “If this group got killed, and Sayyid Muqtada’s blood was shed, the Iraqi people and the Shiites will say, ‘The clerics sat and watched those being killed. There should be a solution.’”
Sistani and Khamenei worked closely together, though remotely, to reach a cease-fire. According to Khaffaf, Sistani’s spokesman, Sistani drafted a four-point cease-fire initiative that was given to a representative of Khamenei in Najaf to hand to Sadr.
Sadr discovered that, silent or not, Sistani’s authority was capable of influencing major events and that he had legitimacy. To Iran, this has been clear ever since. Indeed, Sistani played a role in the 2014 political crisis over appointing a prime minister in Iraq. Iran wanted Nouri al-Maliki, but Sistani had a veto, so Tehran had to accept Sistani’s final say. He was, after all, the highest-ranking Shiite cleric in Iraq, whose position should not be undermined by his Iranian colleagues. Sistani’s objection to Maliki resulted in the appointment of Haidar al-Abadi as Iraqi prime minister in September 2014.
The latest source of tension has been Iraqis’ rising sense of resentment toward Iran due to Iranian involvement in Iraq’s domestic affairs. Sistani raised the issue, long before the ongoing protests broke out in Iraq, when he met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last March. During the meeting, he further emphasized that “Iraq’s sovereignty must be respected” and asked for Iraq-Iran relations to be built based on the principle of good neighborliness. This has not changed even now, with Sistani affirming through his Friday prayers, following the U.S. and Iranian attacks on Iraqi territory in January, that no foreign powers should be allowed to decide Iraq’s fate.
For many Iraqis, Iran’s intervention in their country’s domestic politics is partly to be blamed for their destitution. The spillover of the fight between Iran and the United States into Iraq—as has been witnessed in the last couple of weeks—and the prospects of it being further exacerbated over the killing of Suleimani, is another factor that might exacerbate the negative image of Iran among Iraqi protesters in coming weeks and months.
A united Iraq, within which all citizens move beyond sectarian rhetoric and cultivate a unified national identity, can defeat all internal security threats without the direct intervention of foreign forces.
Not surprisingly, Sistani has a solution: “A united, free, and strong Iraq.” The United States and Iran should follow his lead in implementing this proposition. A united Iraq, within which all citizens move beyond sectarian rhetoric and cultivate a unified national identity, can defeat all internal security threats without the direct intervention of foreign forces.
A free Iraq does not require U.S. and coalition soldiers on its land. A strong Iraq could act as an adept broker between Iran and the United States—and the broader Arab world—should there be any appetite for diplomacy and reconciliation.
It seems that the best person under whose guidance these aims could be achieved is Sistani—the man who, in the words of Suleimani, has extended his cloak in a paternal way by supporting all Iraqis since 2003.
If the U.S. government and Pompeo are sincere in their calls for a peaceful region, they should seize this unique opportunity and follow the advice of a “friend of their enemy.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Pentagon Debates Drawdown in Africa, South America

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief Plus .
What ’ s on tap today : The U.S. Department of Defense eyes cuts in Africa and South America , the U.S. Senate debates calling witnesses in the impeachment trial , and officials dispute spending on the U.S. nuclear arsenal .
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
The officers face senators at a critical time , as Defense Secretary Mark Esper weighs major drawdowns in both regions .
The reductions are being considered as part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. forces worldwide .
Esper has tasked commanders with looking at where they can free up resources—to either bring troops home or reposition them in the Pacific to counter what the Pentagon sees as its long-term strategic threat : China .
Some Pentagon and State Department officials , as well as Republican lawmakers , have expressed concern that the potential cuts are driven by the president ’ s reelection campaign rather than sound military strategy , Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report .
Countering China ?
Sen. Jim Inhofe , the chairman of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spoken out against reducing the U.S. footprint in Africa—some 5,000 troops , compared to 75,000 in the Middle East .
He doubled down on that criticism during his opening statement today .
Inhofe and others argue that withdrawing from Africa and South America would allow China to increase its influence in regions where it already has a significant economic presence .
Meanwhile , Russia is buying influence with arms sales and paramilitaries .
Terrorism is still a threat .
The debate comes at a critical time for the counterterrorism mission in Africa .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ terrorist groups across the continent , the threat is increasing , particularly in the Sahel region .
In 2019 , there were 3,471 violent events linked to extremist groups in Africa—double the number in 2013 .
During a press conference with the French defense minister on Monday , Esper called on European allies to step up their support in the Sahel to fill the gap if and when the United States draws down .
Townsend echoed those comments in his testimony , warning that withdrawing troops “ precipitously ” could have a negative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump seeks nuke boost .
U.S. President Donald Trump will ask for an additional $ 20 billion in funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration ( NNSA ) , the federal agency that maintains U.S. nuclear weapons , according to Sen. Jim Inhofe .
The decision follows a brief internal spat in which Lisa Gordon-Hegarty , the head of the NNSA , requested a $ 20 billion increase but was rebuffed by White House budget officials and Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette .
Several Republican lawmakers , including Inhofe , supported the funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considered to settle the dispute , pending congressional approval .
Speaking of nukes .
The United States has deployed a Trident W76-2 nuclear warhead aboard the USS Tennessee submarine for the first time since Trump commissioned this type of warhead two years ago .
It is a low-yield warhead , with about a third of the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima .
The Trump administration argues it needs such weapons to counter Russia ’ s tactical nuclear weapons .
But critics say deploying the warhead raises the likelihood of nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marks the last day of senators are questioning lawyers from both teams at Trump ’ s impeachment trial .
Democrats are working behind the scenes to push for enough votes to allow witnesses at the trial , aiming at a handful of moderate Republican senators .
But those efforts appear to be faltering in the Republican-controlled chamber .
If the Senate doesn ’ t vote to allow witnesses , Republicans could move to acquit Trump as soon as Friday .
Stay tuned .
Special ops review .
U.S. Special Operations Command conducted an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place too much emphasis on combat experience at the expense of “ leadership , discipline , and accountability.
” The review followed a series of conduct violations involving special operations troops , including Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher , who was charged with committing war crimes , including murdering an Islamic State prisoner .
Gallagher was eventually acquitted , with his rank restored by Trump .
Despite sweeping allegations of misconduct , the report also concluded that there were no “ systemic ethics problem ” in special ops .
Don ’ t call it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tensions between Iran and the United States in the Middle East have given the Islamic State room to bounce back .
The U.S. military temporarily suspended operations in Iraq after the showdown with Iran following the assassination of military commander Qassem Suleimani .
That has given the remnants of the Islamic State the opportunity to gain ground and ramp up attacks in Iraq and Syria .
U.S. operations resumed on Jan. 15 after a 10-day pause .
“ And of course , the American people care about the people of Ukraine.
” —U.S @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speaking to reporters on his way to Ukraine—days after reportedly telling NPR : “ Do you think Americans care about Ukraine ?
” Life along the line of control .
Life along the highly militarized border between India and Pakistan , known as the Line of Control , sometimes has a festive flair , as captured in this New York Times dispatch .
Every night at the Wagah-Attari border crossing , thousands of patrons fill purpose-built stadiums on either side of the border for nationalist pep rallies , filled with singing , chanting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ falls over .
A section of Trump ’ s wall along the U.S.-Mexico border is apparently susceptible to high winds .
A section of the wall that was under construction between Calexico , California , and Mexicali , Mexico , was hit by strong winds this week .
Its concrete anchors had yet to cure , pushing the steel frames over into the Mexican side .
Pop geography quiz .
After Pompeo reportedly lashed out at an NPR reporter for asking him questions about Ukraine—including demanding that she point out Ukraine on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newsy geography quiz featuring a blank map : “ Can You Survive The Pompeo Challenge ?
” For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief Plus. What’s on tap today: The U.S. Department of Defense eyes cuts in Africa and South America , the U.S. Senate debates calling witnesses in the impeachment trial , and officials dispute spending on the U.S. nuclear arsenal .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief Plus. What’s on tap today: The U.S. Department of Defense eyes cuts in Africa and South America, the U.S. Senate debates calling witnesses in the impeachment trial, and officials dispute spending on the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
If you would like to receive Security Brief Plus in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Africom and Southcom Chiefs Face Lawmakers The four-star officers in charge of U.S. forces in Africa and Central and South America are testifying on Capitol Hill this morning about their respective commands. Army Gen. Stephen Townsend, of U.S. Africa Command (Africom), and Navy Adm. Craig Faller, of U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), spoke to the lawmakers on the Senate Armed Services Committee in a hearing that started at 9 a.m. this morning.
The officers face senators at a critical time, as Defense Secretary Mark Esper weighs major drawdowns in both regions. The reductions are being considered as part of a wide-ranging review of the posture of U.S. forces worldwide. Esper has tasked commanders with looking at where they can free up resources—to either bring troops home or reposition them in the Pacific to counter what the Pentagon sees as its long-term strategic threat: China.
Some Pentagon and State Department officials, as well as Republican lawmakers, have expressed concern that the potential cuts are driven by the president’s reelection campaign rather than sound military strategy, Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer report.
Countering China? Sen. Jim Inhofe, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has spoken out against reducing the U.S. footprint in Africa—some 5,000 troops, compared to 75,000 in the Middle East. He doubled down on that criticism during his opening statement today. Inhofe and others argue that withdrawing from Africa and South America would allow China to increase its influence in regions where it already has a significant economic presence. Meanwhile, Russia is buying influence with arms sales and paramilitaries.
Terrorism is still a threat. The debate comes at a critical time for the counterterrorism mission in Africa. Despite years of efforts to stamp out terrorist groups across the continent, the threat is increasing, particularly in the Sahel region. In 2019, there were 3,471 violent events linked to extremist groups in Africa—double the number in 2013.
During a press conference with the French defense minister on Monday, Esper called on European allies to step up their support in the Sahel to fill the gap if and when the United States draws down. Townsend echoed those comments in his testimony, warning that withdrawing troops “precipitously” could have a negative impact on the fight against the extremists.
What We’re Watching
Trump seeks nuke boost. U.S. President Donald Trump will ask for an additional $20 billion in funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the federal agency that maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, according to Sen. Jim Inhofe. The decision follows a brief internal spat in which Lisa Gordon-Hegarty, the head of the NNSA, requested a $20 billion increase but was rebuffed by White House budget officials and Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette. Several Republican lawmakers, including Inhofe, supported the funding increase and Trump’s decision is considered to settle the dispute, pending congressional approval.
Speaking of nukes. The United States has deployed a Trident W76-2 nuclear warhead aboard the USS Tennessee submarine for the first time since Trump commissioned this type of warhead two years ago. It is a low-yield warhead, with about a third of the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The Trump administration argues it needs such weapons to counter Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. But critics say deploying the warhead raises the likelihood of nuclear confrontation.
Impeachment trial continues. Thursday marks the last day of senators are questioning lawyers from both teams at Trump’s impeachment trial. Democrats are working behind the scenes to push for enough votes to allow witnesses at the trial, aiming at a handful of moderate Republican senators. But those efforts appear to be faltering in the Republican-controlled chamber. If the Senate doesn’t vote to allow witnesses, Republicans could move to acquit Trump as soon as Friday. Stay tuned.
Special ops review. U.S. Special Operations Command conducted an internal review that found special operations forces place too much emphasis on combat experience at the expense of “leadership, discipline, and accountability.” The review followed a series of conduct violations involving special operations troops, including Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher, who was charged with committing war crimes, including murdering an Islamic State prisoner. Gallagher was eventually acquitted, with his rank restored by Trump. Despite sweeping allegations of misconduct, the report also concluded that there were no “systemic ethics problem” in special ops.
Don’t call it a comeback (yet). Worsening tensions between Iran and the United States in the Middle East have given the Islamic State room to bounce back. The U.S. military temporarily suspended operations in Iraq after the showdown with Iran following the assassination of military commander Qassem Suleimani. That has given the remnants of the Islamic State the opportunity to gain ground and ramp up attacks in Iraq and Syria. U.S. operations resumed on Jan. 15 after a 10-day pause.
Quote of the Week
“And of course, the American people care about the people of Ukraine.”
—U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking to reporters on his way to Ukraine—days after reportedly telling NPR:“Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?”
Foreign Policy Recommends
Life along the line of control. Life along the highly militarized border between India and Pakistan, known as the Line of Control, sometimes has a festive flair, as captured in this New York Times dispatch. Every night at the Wagah-Attari border crossing, thousands of patrons fill purpose-built stadiums on either side of the border for nationalist pep rallies, filled with singing, chanting, and dancing.
Odds and Ends
Trump border wall falls over. A section of Trump’s wall along the U.S.-Mexico border is apparently susceptible to high winds. A section of the wall that was under construction between Calexico, California, and Mexicali, Mexico, was hit by strong winds this week. Its concrete anchors had yet to cure, pushing the steel frames over into the Mexican side.
Pop geography quiz. After Pompeo reportedly lashed out at an NPR reporter for asking him questions about Ukraine—including demanding that she point out Ukraine on a blank map—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty produced a newsy geography quiz featuring a blank map: “Can You Survive The Pompeo Challenge?”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-30--Kobe Bryant Was the United States’ Best Ambassador in China

Kobe Bryant Was the United States ’ Best Ambassador in China When news of the basketball legend Kobe Bryant ’ s fatal helicopter crash broke Sunday , his death was perhaps mourned even more widely in China than in his home .
The hashtag about Bryant ’ s death on Weibo , China ’ s Twitter-like social networking platform , had accumulated 3 billion views by midafternoon , shooting to the top of trending searches and temporarily burying discussion about the deadly Wuhan coronavirus , which has dominated Chinese social media for the past week .
Even state media weighed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ People ’ s Daily saying of Bryant : “ His fearless spirit of fighting , both on the court and in real life , is worth remembering.
” Basketball has been in China almost since the sport ’ s invention , after YMCA missionaries brought it to the country in the 1890s .
People ’ s Liberation Army soldiers played basketball during downtime between bitter marches and battles throughout the 1930s ; during Mao Zedong ’ s era , basketball was encouraged , and it was one of only two sports ( along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crackdown on Western imports during the Cultural Revolution .
Basketball courts are an economical use of space in urban China , where real estate is at a premium .
Not all Chinese schools have soccer fields , but they all have basketball courts .
American basketball , however , did not enjoy the huge following in China it has today until the 7-foot-6-inch star Yao Ming joined the Houston Rockets as starting center in 2002 and the NBA captured the imagination of the country .
Yao acted as a gateway for Chinese fans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that era , and Bryant was the most popular .
For most of this decade , Bryant had the highest-selling jersey in China , eclipsing even Yao .
When I started teaching English at a Chinese public high school in 2014 , I found that Kobe was the most popular name among my male students .
Those not called Kobe were often named after either LeBron James , Derrick Rose , or Stephen Curry .
For a long time , the NBA served as a largely uncontroversial ( and highly lucrative ) channel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China—one where Bryant was the primary ambassador .
Bryant was even declared a cultural ambassador by the Asia Society in 2009 at a ceremony attended by the Communist Party politician and sports director Liu Peng .
Bryant visited China during every off season and continued to visit frequently after his retirement .
He attended store openings , held clinics to teach basketball skills , and made high-profile visits to classic Chinese sites like the Terracotta Warriors in Xi ’ an .
Everywhere he went , he was mobbed with fans .
Bryant also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which donated supplies to poor children with the backing of the Chinese government .
In the United States , the fund sponsored Chinese cultural activities like Mandarin-language lessons and Chinese cooking classes .
Bryant was by all accounts incredibly kind and generous with his Chinese fans .
Two days before he died , he had posted a Lunar New Year greeting video on his Weibo , wishing his “ dear friends in China ” a happy and prosperous Year of the Rat .
The NBA also provided the basis for person-to-person cultural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affable Yao humanized China to Americans amid hysterical speculation about the “ rising dragon ” in the U.S. press .
When I first came to China , I frequently found myself wishing I followed the NBA so I could discuss it with people .
Love of basketball crosses class lines .
Taxi drivers who might not know who is running for U.S. president can tell you the names of plenty of second-tier American cities thanks to the NBA .
When the Chinese stunt-drinking sensation Hebei Pangzai first started blowing up on Twitter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ classic San Antonio Spurs games ( although he has unfortunately since deleted those tweets ) .
This utopian cultural exchange was also lubricated by unimaginable heaps of money , most of it flowing into the United States .
It ’ s estimated that China is a $ 4 billion market for the NBA .
Around 500 million Chinese people watched at least one NBA game last season , which is more than the entire U.S. population .
The Rockets remain the most popular team in China , and last year the ESPN reporter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tencent to develop his own Chinese market-facing show , Woj in the House .
Furthermore , the association of the NBA and its star players with sportswear behemoths like Nike and Adidas helped introduce those brands to the Chinese market , where they remain incredibly popular .
( Bryant ’ s trips to China were frequently sponsored by Nike . )
This asymmetrical flow of cash was always obvious , but it never dampened the enthusiasm and passion Chinese fans held for the NBA .
Then , last fall , Houston Rockets general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong ’ s fight for freedom .
While Chinese social media went apoplectic , the Chinese Basketball Association and numerous sponsors rushed to cut ties with the Rockets .
The windfall the NBA had been making in China for decades suddenly became both a sore subject and a source of leverage .
In an emotional post shared widely on Weibo , the Chinese NBA reporter Yuan Fang expressed his outrage not only about Morey ’ s tweet but that Wojnarowski had “ liked ” that tweet .
“ If you want to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more money—no problem , ” Yuan wrote .
“ But you have to understand that China is not a country of moneyed idiots .
You have to understand that in this world , in this world , there is only one China.
” Wojnarowski ’ s show became a casualty of the crisis .
Throughout the fiasco , Bryant wisely stayed silent .
The outpouring of grief on Chinese social media , untempered by the concern about abuse allegations that complicate his legacy in the United States , shows that his popularity will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries crumble .
With Bryant ’ s death , the NBA has lost its greatest ambassador and so too perhaps has Sino-American relations .

When news of the basketball legend Kobe Bryant’s fatal helicopter crash broke Sunday, his death was perhaps mourned even more widely in China than in his home. The hashtag about Bryant’s death on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like social networking platform, had accumulated 3 billion views by midafternoon, shooting to the top of trending searches and temporarily burying discussion about the deadly Wuhan coronavirus, which has dominated Chinese social media for the past week. Even state media weighed in, with the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily saying of Bryant: “His fearless spirit of fighting, both on the court and in real life, is worth remembering.”
When news of the basketball legend Kobe Bryant’s fatal helicopter crash broke Sunday, his death was perhaps mourned even more widely in China than in his home. The hashtag about Bryant’s death on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like social networking platform, had accumulated 3 billion views by midafternoon, shooting to the top of trending searches and temporarily burying discussion about the deadly Wuhan coronavirus, which has dominated Chinese social media for the past week. Even state media weighed in, with the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily saying of Bryant: “His fearless spirit of fighting, both on the court and in real life, is worth remembering.”
Basketball has been in China almost since the sport’s invention, after YMCA missionaries brought it to the country in the 1890s. People’s Liberation Army soldiers played basketball during downtime between bitter marches and battles throughout the 1930s; during Mao Zedong’s era, basketball was encouraged, and it was one of only two sports (along with table tennis) to survive the crackdown on Western imports during the Cultural Revolution. Basketball courts are an economical use of space in urban China, where real estate is at a premium. Not all Chinese schools have soccer fields, but they all have basketball courts.
American basketball, however, did not enjoy the huge following in China it has today until the 7-foot-6-inch star Yao Ming joined the Houston Rockets as starting center in 2002 and the NBA captured the imagination of the country. Yao acted as a gateway for Chinese fans to look to American basketball stars of that era, and Bryant was the most popular. For most of this decade, Bryant had the highest-selling jersey in China, eclipsing even Yao. When I started teaching English at a Chinese public high school in 2014, I found that Kobe was the most popular name among my male students. Those not called Kobe were often named after either LeBron James, Derrick Rose, or Stephen Curry.
For a long time, the NBA served as a largely uncontroversial (and highly lucrative) channel of diplomacy between the United States and China—one where Bryant was the primary ambassador. Bryant was even declared a cultural ambassador by the Asia Society in 2009 at a ceremony attended by the Communist Party politician and sports director Liu Peng. Bryant visited China during every off season and continued to visit frequently after his retirement. He attended store openings, held clinics to teach basketball skills, and made high-profile visits to classic Chinese sites like the Terracotta Warriors in Xi’an. Everywhere he went, he was mobbed with fans.
Bryant also established the charitable Kobe Bryant China Fund, which donated supplies to poor children with the backing of the Chinese government. In the United States, the fund sponsored Chinese cultural activities like Mandarin-language lessons and Chinese cooking classes. Bryant was by all accounts incredibly kind and generous with his Chinese fans. Two days before he died, he had posted a Lunar New Year greeting video on his Weibo, wishing his “dear friends in China” a happy and prosperous Year of the Rat.
The NBA also provided the basis for person-to-person cultural exchange. During the aughts, the affable Yao humanized China to Americans amid hysterical speculation about the “rising dragon” in the U.S. press. When I first came to China, I frequently found myself wishing I followed the NBA so I could discuss it with people. Love of basketball crosses class lines. Taxi drivers who might not know who is running for U.S. president can tell you the names of plenty of second-tier American cities thanks to the NBA. When the Chinese stunt-drinking sensation Hebei Pangzai first started blowing up on Twitter, he bonded with his fans by discussing classic San Antonio Spurs games (although he has unfortunately since deleted those tweets).
This utopian cultural exchange was also lubricated by unimaginable heaps of money, most of it flowing into the United States. It’s estimated that China is a $4 billion market for the NBA. Around 500 million Chinese people watched at least one NBA game last season, which is more than the entire U.S. population. The Rockets remain the most popular team in China, and last year the ESPN reporter Adrian Wojnarowski worked with the internet giant Tencent to develop his own Chinese market-facing show, Woj in the House.
Furthermore, the association of the NBA and its star players with sportswear behemoths like Nike and Adidas helped introduce those brands to the Chinese market, where they remain incredibly popular. (Bryant’s trips to China were frequently sponsored by Nike.) This asymmetrical flow of cash was always obvious, but it never dampened the enthusiasm and passion Chinese fans held for the NBA.
Then, last fall, Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey tweeted in support of Hong Kong’s fight for freedom. While Chinese social media went apoplectic, the Chinese Basketball Association and numerous sponsors rushed to cut ties with the Rockets. The windfall the NBA had been making in China for decades suddenly became both a sore subject and a source of leverage. In an emotional post shared widely on Weibo, the Chinese NBA reporter Yuan Fang expressed his outrage not only about Morey’s tweet but that Wojnarowski had “liked” that tweet. “If you want to become even more popular, make even more money—no problem,” Yuan wrote. “But you have to understand that China is not a country of moneyed idiots. You have to understand that in this world, in this world, there is only one China.” Wojnarowski’s show became a casualty of the crisis.
Throughout the fiasco, Bryant wisely stayed silent. The outpouring of grief on Chinese social media, untempered by the concern about abuse allegations that complicate his legacy in the United States, shows that his popularity will remain even if relations between the two countries crumble. With Bryant’s death, the NBA has lost its greatest ambassador and so too perhaps has Sino-American relations.