foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--How Putin Changed Russia Forever

How Putin Changed Russia Forever

In the two decades since rising to the top of the Kremlin , Putin has consolidated power and strengthened Russia ’ s role on the world stage .
Many of these changes , which have come at no small cost , would have been unfathomable at the turn of the century ; Putin ’ s election marked the country ’ s first democratic change of power .
With Moscow now paving the way for Putin to rule until 2036 , one of the world ’ s most powerful leaders may well become one of the world ’ s longest-serving .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ its place in the world over the past 20 years , and what the future may bring , Foreign Policy reached out to leading scholars , journalists , and experts .
Little to Celebrate in Putin ’ s Russia Twenty years ago , if you had asked me or basically anyone whether Vladimir Putin would become the longest-serving Russian leader since Joseph Stalin , the response would have likely been either incredulous silence or uproarious laughter .
When he ascended to the Russian presidency while still in his 40s , Putin ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least based on the many Russians I spoke with during his first years in office when I was the Washington Post ’ s co-bureau chief in Moscow , were that he was : young , articulate , and , literally , sober .
That he was , in other words , not Boris Yeltsin—his sick , aging predecessor , who spent his later years in the Kremlin in vodka-soaked meanderings as gangster capitalism took hold of the realm and his own government .
Putin spoke of tax reform , his admiration for Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s post-Soviet economy to beat out Portugal .
To admirers at home as well as many who misread him in the West , he seemed to represent a different course for Russia—toward becoming a “ normal , ” more modern , if more modest , country .
Of course , that required overlooking much , even at the time : the brutal war in Chechnya that launched Putin as a political figure , the fact that he had been hand-picked by Yeltsin ’ s crooked inner circle in exchange for guaranteeing their amnesty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s own background in the Soviet-era KGB and persistent fealty to the idea of a security state .
Two decades on , Russia is once again a struggling petrostate with an aging leader , struggling with an authoritarian tradition that hinders its political development and an unreformed , corruption-ridden economy far too dependent on natural resource extraction .
Putin did not restore the Soviet Union or create a new gulag at home .
His new normal , however , turned out to be more like the old normal than he would admit .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil prices , a poor response to the global coronavirus pandemic , and political overreach that had him schedule , then postpone , a constitutional referendum that could keep him in power for over a decade more to come .
May 2020 was meant to be a 20th anniversary party for Putinism , but the party has been canceled .
Russia Has Become Deeply Dependent on Putin It sometimes seems to me that Russians view Vladimir Putin a bit the way much of the world views the United States .
That is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has done for them in the increasingly distant past ; they are ambivalent , and in some cases deeply disturbed , when it comes to more recent actions ; and they are trepidatious about the future .
On the other hand , they don ’ t see an alternative .
If the methods and available tools have changed over the decades and centuries , the foreign-policy goals Putin ’ s Russia has pursued are not different from historical Russian , Soviet , and Imperial Russian foreign-policy goals.Putin has seen Russia through economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over a notable return of his country to the global stage .
But if the methods and available tools have changed over the decades and centuries , the foreign-policy goals Putin ’ s Russia has pursued are not different from historical Russian , Soviet , and Imperial Russian foreign-policy goals .
Nor were the last two decades unique in economic ups and downs and cycles of liberalization and constraint at home .
I would say the real change Putin has wrought is to establish a system that appears extraordinarily dependent on him personally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make decisions and take action .
And that , by definition , lasts only as long as Putin remains in power .
Realists argue that states and the balance of power between them drive international relations ; leaders don ’ t matter .
Russia emerged from the rubble of the Soviet collapse as a weak state and therefore was compelled to do what the strongest power in the system—the United States— dictated .
Russia today has recovered and reemerged as a great power , clashing as such powers always do with other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confrontational dynamics would have occurred with or without Vladimir Putin .
Had Yeltsin chosen Boris Nemtsov to succeed him , Russian democracy might have survived , and Russia ’ s cooperation with the West might have continued .
This theory is elegant but wrong .
All explanations of state behavior must begin with assessments of power , but never is the balance of power the whole story .
Leaders and their ideas can also influence state behavior .
Putin and Putinism have impacted Russia and its place in the world .
Selected by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Russian people , to become president in 2000 , Putin was an accidental leader .
His views on governance and foreign policy were not well known .
Early in his tenure , however , he made clear his disdain for checks on executive power .
Today , Putin has replaced Russia ’ s fragile democracy from the 1990s with a consolidated autocracy .
Over time , Putin has explicitly rejected liberalism and multilateralism and instead embraced and promoted conservative , orthodox , nationalist ideas .
The clash between Putinism and liberalism takes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them .
None of this was inevitable .
In the last 30 years , after all , Mikhail Gorbachev , Boris Yeltsin , and even Dmitry Medvedev to a lesser degree have embraced more liberal ideas and sought greater cooperation with the West .
Had Yeltsin chosen Boris Nemtsov to succeed him , Russian democracy might have survived , and Russia ’ s cooperation with the West might have continued .
Because leaders matters , Russia and the West are not destined for confrontation forever because of the balance of power in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia might change Russia ’ s path .
It happened before ; it can happen again .
The most significant change Putin has made in Russia is that young Russians who grew up under Putin don ’ t know what free discussion is or what democracy means .
A society where one can make money only by not interfering in politics and not criticizing the authorities forces people to give up all options beyond their personal life and work .
There is enormous anxiety in Russian society , which is only growing as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Operating roughly , but consistently on the world stage , Putin has demonstrated that Russia can violate the human rights of its citizens and others without serious consequences from the European Union or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe .
In spite of the discontent of the United States and the EU , Russia sent troops to Syria and resurrected its influence in the Middle East , without spending as much money and resources as the Soviet Union did .
Russia also won military contracts with Turkey , a NATO member @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have been impossible to imagine 20 years ago .
After the collapse of the USSR , Russia was a country that had hope and the potential to become a part of the civilized world .
It has none of that now .
Putin promised to “ Make Russia Great Again ” in exchange for the loyalty of his subjects .
He annexed foreign land and injected a hybrid war in the neighboring country .
As a result , Russia didn ’ t become great or even respected as a regional power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ close neighbors and distrusted or disgusted by the larger world for its policies based on lies , assassinations , and unpredictability .
Russia is feared by its close neighbors and distrusted by the larger world for its policies based on lies , assassinations , and unpredictability .
If not for Russia ’ s vast arsenal of nuclear weapons , the world would likely try to forget about its existence for the foreseeable future .
Russia would be little more than yet another example of rampant corruption , greedy elites , and their inability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common good .
Did Russia have a chance ?
Yes , it did .
So who “ lost ” Russia , as was commonly asked in the United States ?
Not the U.S. Democrats , nor U.S. Republicans , nor anyone else .
Only we Russians of the educated class are responsible for our inability to see Russia succeed on the road to democracy .
Little to Offer Beyond Deadlock and Stagnation Vladimir Putin delayed Russia ’ s moves toward becoming a developed market economy for decades .
When he first came to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the developed Western world and warned against government interference in politics , civil liberties , and the economy .
If Russia had followed the footprint of reforms promised in the early Putin era , it could have been a totally different country by now—a responsible , respected player on the global stage .
Contrary to Putin ’ s rhetoric of “ restoring Russia ’ s greatness , ” Russia is increasingly isolated and faces unprecedented international sanctions that exclude its future positive economic development .
Twenty years on , Russia has reached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic dead end .
Since 2008 , the GDP has not grown—Putin ’ s economic model is not working .
Even his loyalists admit Russia needs political changes , but Putin is fiercely resistant and seemingly wishes to serve as a lifetime ruler , prolonging the deadlock indefinitely .
Contrary to Putin ’ s rhetoric of “ restoring Russia ’ s greatness , ” Russia is increasingly isolated and faces unprecedented international sanctions that exclude its future positive economic development .
The only way Russia can make itself visible in international affairs is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China and other dictatorial regimes to counter the international liberal order .
We have nothing positive to offer to the world except threats , disinformation , and disruption—sadly , that ’ s the face of Putinism .
In Putin , Everyone Saw What They Wanted When Vladimir Putin took on the mantle of Russian president 20 years ago , many in the West had long written off any notion that the Russian security services could be a force to be reckoned with .
The West was still high on its apparent Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were expanding ever eastward .
After nearly a decade of upheaval under Boris Yeltsin , Russia seemed irreversibly weakened .
In Putin , everyone saw what they wanted to see .
Putin was a chameleon , and therein lay his power.For the Russian oligarchs and much of the West , Putin was the president who would help secure the fragile gains of Russia ’ s market transition .
For most of the Russian population , he was the leader who would help bring order to a country riven by chaos .
Putin appeared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seemingly nondescript midlevel former KGB officer who pledged to restore the Russian state .
But he was a chameleon , and therein lay his power .
Behind him stood a ruthless caste of security men .
Instead of strengthening democratic institutions , these men usurped them to shore up their own position .
Then , once they ’ d taken over the country ’ s economy and legal system , Putin ’ s men sought to rewrite the rules and undermine the West .
The tactics are the same as those deployed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 80s—using illicit funds to buy off and corrupt Western politicians and institutions .
The only difference now is that they have been funded by a much deeper well of cash , enabling them to penetrate much further into Western markets .
Russia has succeeded in exacerbating weaknesses and divisions in Western society .
Compared to 20 years ago , Western liberal democracy is under siege .
But Putin and his men are no more than warped relics of an earlier era who have yet to learn that without building a strong competitive economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such short-term power games can only be the same collapse .
A Clear Strategy for Global Power May Have Met Its Limit Under Putin , Russia has become a centralized , authoritarian state and has returned as a global player , competing with the United States for influence and aligning itself with China to try to create a post-West global order .
In 2000 , Russia was a pluralist but economically struggling state that had largely retreated from global ambitions .
Putin was determined to restore Russia to its rightful role , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power .
He was able to accomplish this both because he , unlike the United States , had a strategy and because he has been what I call the “ judoist ” —adept at seizing opportunities presented by a divided and distracted West .
While Russia ’ s relations with the West have sharply deteriorated since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and launch of a war in southeastern Ukraine , much of the rest of the world regards Russia as a large , authoritarian state with which they can do business .
Nevertheless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extending its global reach may be constrained in the coronavirus era .
High oil prices from 2000 to 2008 , and their rebound after the financial crisis , enabled Putin to consolidate power and expand Russian influence .
The collapse of oil prices and the sharp decline in economic growth may well limit Russia ’ s ability to project power going forward .
Putin made Russia both suspicious and aggressive .
In just few years of Putin ’ s being in power , Russia became adamantly distrustful of outsiders .
It developed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at large .
Inside , the country adopted a similar view toward everybody who happened to be not within the state , including experts , journalists , nongovernmental organizations , and opposition parties .
When the dissatisfied middle class took to the streets in Moscow , Putin ’ s people said that “ protesters who hurt riot police should have their livers smeared on the asphalt.
” The Kremlin also discovered aggression as the way to react to any international or national crisis .
When the dissatisfied middle class took to the streets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that “ protesters who hurt riot police should have their livers smeared on the asphalt ” ; when Ukrainians took to the streets in Kyiv , the Kremlin attacked Crimea .
In the larger world , Putin made an even more significant shift .
Before Putin , the country was , politically speaking , part of the history of Eastern Europe ’ s difficult democratization .
Mikhail Gorbachev was judged against the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall ; Boris Yeltsin ’ s wars in Chechnya were seen through the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin changed that .
He shifted the country further East , to a traditional place occupied by Russia for centuries .
It ’ s not Eastern Europe anymore ; it ’ s only Russia , the powerful , aggressive , totalitarian Russia it has always been .
Many Russia hands have expanded their historical references—it became common to invoke the tsars as a way to explain Putin ’ s foreign policy .
Some reviews of our recent book on Russian political emigration criticized us for failing to mention Ivan the Terrible ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exactly what makes Putin ’ s contribution so damaging : It undermines the hope that Russia could ever become a rational , normal country .
For the past 20 years , Putin has been driven principally by his desire to maintain power .
To this end , he has weakened the state , eliminated competition , and personalized Russia ’ s political system .
While an older generation of Russians credit Putin for helping Russia overcome the turmoil of the 1990s , in reality he has turned the country into a kleptocracy that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As he has grown more paranoid about threats to his power—internal and external , real and imagined—Putin has suppressed the freedoms of Russians , increasingly through an arsenal of digital tactics .
Despite Russia ’ s internal weaknesses , Putin has boosted the country ’ s global standing .
The lack of constraints on his power , his investment in modernizing his military , and his ability to exploit asymmetries of interest between Russia and the West have allowed Putin to seize opportunities , even those that violate international laws .
Today , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues of consequence .
But Putin also understands the limits of Russian influence .
He has therefore sought to undermine Western democracies to improve Russia ’ s relative standing .
His tactics and strongman brand have created a model that anti-democratic leaders emulate .
As Putin has alienated Russia from the West , Russia ’ s place in the world is increasingly alongside the regimes of Bashar al-Assad , Hassan Rouhani , Nicolás Maduro , and Xi Jinping .
Much can be told from the company one keeps .
20 Years Lost , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 years , Vladimir Putin has managed to take Russia from imperfect democracy to perfect authoritarianism at home , and from a respected partner to near-pariah in international affairs .
By 2000 , Russia had competitive elections , a vibrant free press , a pluralistic parliament , and a growing civil society .
On the world stage , it was a member of the G-8 , the prestigious club of industrialized democracies , and had recently ratified the European Convention on Human Rights , bringing its citizens under the umbrella of Europe ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure , there were many problems—and many mistakes—in both political and economic spheres , but the trajectory was the right one .
It will take time and effort to undo this damage once Russia has a democratic government that respects the rights of its own people and behaves responsibly on the international stage .
After two decades of Putin ’ s rule , Russia is a country where all major media are controlled by the state ; where elections are meaningless rituals with predetermined outcomes ; where parliament—in the words of its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ; where peaceful demonstrators are beaten by police ; and where political opponents are imprisoned—or worse .
Abroad , it has been kicked out of the G-8 , faces crushing economic sanctions , and , for the first time in decades , has unrecognized international borders .
It will take time and effort to undo this damage once Russia has a democratic government that respects the rights of its own people and behaves responsibly on the international stage .
Sooner or later , that day will come .

Yevgenia Albats, Catherine Belton, Irina Borogan, Susan Glasser, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Vladimir Milov, Michael McFaul, Olga Oliker, Andrei Soldatov and Angela Stent

On May 7, 2000, Vladimir Putin was sworn in as president of Russia. It was the first of four inaugurations—and counting. Four months earlier, Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly stepped down, elevating the prime minister and former security services head to the position of acting president. When elections were held in late March, Yeltsin’s anointed successor won just over half the votes, a slim majority that prevented a runoff and shifted Russia's trajectory immeasurably.
On May 7, 2000, Vladimir Putin was sworn in as president of Russia. It was the first of four inaugurations—and counting. Four months earlier, Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly stepped down, elevating the prime minister and former security services head to the position of acting president. When elections were held in late March, Yeltsin’s anointed successor won just over half the votes, a slim majority that prevented a runoff and shifted Russia’s trajectory immeasurably.
In the two decades since rising to the top of the Kremlin, Putin has consolidated power and strengthened Russia’s role on the world stage. Many of these changes, which have come at no small cost, would have been unfathomable at the turn of the century; Putin’s election marked the country’s first democratic change of power. With Moscow now paving the way for Putin to rule until 2036, one of the world’s most powerful leaders may well become one of the world’s longest-serving.
To understand how Putin changed Russia and its place in the world over the past 20 years, and what the future may bring, Foreign Policy reached out to leading scholars, journalists, and experts.
Little to Celebrate in Putin’s Russia
by Susan B. Glasser
Twenty years ago, if you had asked me or basically anyone whether Vladimir Putin would become the longest-serving Russian leader since Joseph Stalin, the response would have likely been either incredulous silence or uproarious laughter. When he ascended to the Russian presidency while still in his 40s, Putin’s main qualifications for the job, at least based on the many Russians I spoke with during his first years in office when I was the Washington Post’s co-bureau chief in Moscow, were that he was: young, articulate, and, literally, sober. That he was, in other words, not Boris Yeltsin—his sick, aging predecessor, who spent his later years in the Kremlin in vodka-soaked meanderings as gangster capitalism took hold of the realm and his own government. Putin spoke of tax reform, his admiration for Europe, and one day growing Russia’s post-Soviet economy to beat out Portugal. To admirers at home as well as many who misread him in the West, he seemed to represent a different course for Russia—toward becoming a “normal,” more modern, if more modest, country.
Of course, that required overlooking much, even at the time: the brutal war in Chechnya that launched Putin as a political figure, the fact that he had been hand-picked by Yeltsin’s crooked inner circle in exchange for guaranteeing their amnesty, and, especially, Putin’s own background in the Soviet-era KGB and persistent fealty to the idea of a security state.
Two decades on, Russia is once again a struggling petrostate with an aging leader, struggling with an authoritarian tradition that hinders its political development and an unreformed, corruption-ridden economy far too dependent on natural resource extraction. Putin did not restore the Soviet Union or create a new gulag at home. His new normal, however, turned out to be more like the old normal than he would admit. Now, Putin must reckon with cratering oil prices, a poor response to the global coronavirus pandemic, and political overreach that had him schedule, then postpone, a constitutional referendum that could keep him in power for over a decade more to come. May 2020 was meant to be a 20th anniversary party for Putinism, but the party has been canceled.
Russia Has Become Deeply Dependent on Putin
by Olga Oliker
It sometimes seems to me that Russians view Vladimir Putin a bit the way much of the world views the United States. That is to say that they are grateful for what he has done for them in the increasingly distant past; they are ambivalent, and in some cases deeply disturbed, when it comes to more recent actions; and they are trepidatious about the future. On the other hand, they don’t see an alternative.
If the methods and available tools have changed over the decades and centuries, the foreign-policy goals Putin’s Russia has pursued are not different from historical Russian, Soviet, and Imperial Russian foreign-policy goals.Putin has seen Russia through economic rebirth and stagnation. He has presided over a notable return of his country to the global stage. But if the methods and available tools have changed over the decades and centuries, the foreign-policy goals Putin’s Russia has pursued are not different from historical Russian, Soviet, and Imperial Russian foreign-policy goals. Nor were the last two decades unique in economic ups and downs and cycles of liberalization and constraint at home. I would say the real change Putin has wrought is to establish a system that appears extraordinarily dependent on him personally, both for its own sustainment and to make decisions and take action. And that, by definition, lasts only as long as Putin remains in power.
Putin Shows Precisely How Much Leaders Matter
by Michael McFaul
Realists argue that states and the balance of power between them drive international relations; leaders don’t matter. Russia emerged from the rubble of the Soviet collapse as a weak state and therefore was compelled to do what the strongest power in the system—the United States— dictated. Russia today has recovered and reemerged as a great power, clashing as such powers always do with other major powers in the world. These confrontational dynamics would have occurred with or without Vladimir Putin.
Had Yeltsin chosen Boris Nemtsov to succeed him, Russian democracy might have survived, and Russia’s cooperation with the West might have continued.
This theory is elegant but wrong. All explanations of state behavior must begin with assessments of power, but never is the balance of power the whole story. Leaders and their ideas can also influence state behavior. Putin and Putinism have impacted Russia and its place in the world.
Selected by Boris Yeltsin, and then ratified by the Russian people, to become president in 2000, Putin was an accidental leader. His views on governance and foreign policy were not well known. Early in his tenure, however, he made clear his disdain for checks on executive power. Today, Putin has replaced Russia’s fragile democracy from the 1990s with a consolidated autocracy. Over time, Putin has explicitly rejected liberalism and multilateralism and instead embraced and promoted conservative, orthodox, nationalist ideas. The clash between Putinism and liberalism takes place not only between states but within them.
None of this was inevitable. In the last 30 years, after all, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and even Dmitry Medvedev to a lesser degree have embraced more liberal ideas and sought greater cooperation with the West. Had Yeltsin chosen Boris Nemtsov to succeed him, Russian democracy might have survived, and Russia’s cooperation with the West might have continued.
Because leaders matters, Russia and the West are not destined for confrontation forever because of the balance of power in the international system. A new leader in Russia might change Russia’s path. It happened before; it can happen again.
Russia’s Youngest Generation Has Been Deprived
by Irina Borogan
The most significant change Putin has made in Russia is that young Russians who grew up under Putin don’t know what free discussion is or what democracy means. A society where one can make money only by not interfering in politics and not criticizing the authorities forces people to give up all options beyond their personal life and work. There is enormous anxiety in Russian society, which is only growing as the coronavirus and economic crises worsen.
Operating roughly, but consistently on the world stage, Putin has demonstrated that Russia can violate the human rights of its citizens and others without serious consequences from the European Union or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In spite of the discontent of the United States and the EU, Russia sent troops to Syria and resurrected its influence in the Middle East, without spending as much money and resources as the Soviet Union did. Russia also won military contracts with Turkey, a NATO member state, bypassing the United States—something that would have been impossible to imagine 20 years ago.
Greed Has Won the Day
by Yevgenia Albats
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia was a country that had hope and the potential to become a part of the civilized world. It has none of that now. Putin promised to “Make Russia Great Again” in exchange for the loyalty of his subjects. He annexed foreign land and injected a hybrid war in the neighboring country. As a result, Russia didn’t become great or even respected as a regional power. Instead, it is feared by its close neighbors and distrusted or disgusted by the larger world for its policies based on lies, assassinations, and unpredictability. Russia is feared by its close neighbors and distrusted by the larger world for its policies based on lies, assassinations, and unpredictability.
If not for Russia’s vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, the world would likely try to forget about its existence for the foreseeable future. Russia would be little more than yet another example of rampant corruption, greedy elites, and their inability to see long-term gains out of the common good. Did Russia have a chance? Yes, it did. So who “lost” Russia, as was commonly asked in the United States? Not the U.S. Democrats, nor U.S. Republicans, nor anyone else. Only we Russians of the educated class are responsible for our inability to see Russia succeed on the road to democracy.
Little to Offer Beyond Deadlock and Stagnation
by Vladimir Milov
Vladimir Putin delayed Russia’s moves toward becoming a developed market economy for decades. When he first came to power, Putin declared aspirations for engagement with the developed Western world and warned against government interference in politics, civil liberties, and the economy. If Russia had followed the footprint of reforms promised in the early Putin era, it could have been a totally different country by now—a responsible, respected player on the global stage. Contrary to Putin’s rhetoric of “restoring Russia’s greatness,” Russia is increasingly isolated and faces unprecedented international sanctions that exclude its future positive economic development.
Twenty years on, Russia has reached a complete domestic, political, and economic dead end. Since 2008, the GDP has not grown—Putin’s economic model is not working. Even his loyalists admit Russia needs political changes, but Putin is fiercely resistant and seemingly wishes to serve as a lifetime ruler, prolonging the deadlock indefinitely. Contrary to Putin’s rhetoric of “restoring Russia’s greatness,” Russia is increasingly isolated and faces unprecedented international sanctions that exclude its future positive economic development. The only way Russia can make itself visible in international affairs is through disruptive behavior and through siding with China and other dictatorial regimes to counter the international liberal order. We have nothing positive to offer to the world except threats, disinformation, and disruption—sadly, that’s the face of Putinism.
In Putin, Everyone Saw What They Wanted
by Catherine Belton
When Vladimir Putin took on the mantle of Russian president 20 years ago, many in the West had long written off any notion that the Russian security services could be a force to be reckoned with. The West was still high on its apparent Cold War triumph. NATO and the European Union were expanding ever eastward. After nearly a decade of upheaval under Boris Yeltsin, Russia seemed irreversibly weakened. In Putin, everyone saw what they wanted to see.
Putin was a chameleon, and therein lay his power.For the Russian oligarchs and much of the West, Putin was the president who would help secure the fragile gains of Russia’s market transition. For most of the Russian population, he was the leader who would help bring order to a country riven by chaos. Putin appeared to be a Russian Everyman, a seemingly nondescript midlevel former KGB officer who pledged to restore the Russian state. But he was a chameleon, and therein lay his power. Behind him stood a ruthless caste of security men. Instead of strengthening democratic institutions, these men usurped them to shore up their own position. Then, once they’d taken over the country’s economy and legal system, Putin’s men sought to rewrite the rules and undermine the West.
The tactics are the same as those deployed by the KGB in the 1970s and ’80s—using illicit funds to buy off and corrupt Western politicians and institutions. The only difference now is that they have been funded by a much deeper well of cash, enabling them to penetrate much further into Western markets. Russia has succeeded in exacerbating weaknesses and divisions in Western society. Compared to 20 years ago, Western liberal democracy is under siege. But Putin and his men are no more than warped relics of an earlier era who have yet to learn that without building a strong competitive economy in their own country the outcome of such short-term power games can only be the same collapse.
A Clear Strategy for Global Power May Have Met Its Limit
by Angela Stent
Under Putin, Russia has become a centralized, authoritarian state and has returned as a global player, competing with the United States for influence and aligning itself with China to try to create a post-West global order. In 2000, Russia was a pluralist but economically struggling state that had largely retreated from global ambitions. Putin was determined to restore Russia to its rightful role, as he saw it: as a great power. He was able to accomplish this both because he, unlike the United States, had a strategy and because he has been what I call the “judoist”—adept at seizing opportunities presented by a divided and distracted West.
While Russia’s relations with the West have sharply deteriorated since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and launch of a war in southeastern Ukraine, much of the rest of the world regards Russia as a large, authoritarian state with which they can do business. Nevertheless, Russia’s ability to continue extending its global reach may be constrained in the coronavirus era. High oil prices from 2000 to 2008, and their rebound after the financial crisis, enabled Putin to consolidate power and expand Russian influence. The collapse of oil prices and the sharp decline in economic growth may well limit Russia’s ability to project power going forward.
A Suspicious, Aggressive Russia
by Andrei Soldatov
Putin made Russia both suspicious and aggressive. In just few years of Putin’s being in power, Russia became adamantly distrustful of outsiders. It developed a deep-rooted distrust of foreigners and foreign countries at large. Inside, the country adopted a similar view toward everybody who happened to be not within the state, including experts, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and opposition parties.
When the dissatisfied middle class took to the streets in Moscow, Putin’s people said that “protesters who hurt riot police should have their livers smeared on the asphalt.”
The Kremlin also discovered aggression as the way to react to any international or national crisis. When the dissatisfied middle class took to the streets in Moscow, Putin’s people said that “protesters who hurt riot police should have their livers smeared on the asphalt”; when Ukrainians took to the streets in Kyiv, the Kremlin attacked Crimea.
In the larger world, Putin made an even more significant shift. Before Putin, the country was, politically speaking, part of the history of Eastern Europe’s difficult democratization. Mikhail Gorbachev was judged against the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall; Boris Yeltsin’s wars in Chechnya were seen through the prism of the wars in Yugoslavia.
Putin changed that. He shifted the country further East, to a traditional place occupied by Russia for centuries. It’s not Eastern Europe anymore; it’s only Russia, the powerful, aggressive, totalitarian Russia it has always been. Many Russia hands have expanded their historical references—it became common to invoke the tsars as a way to explain Putin’s foreign policy. Some reviews of our recent book on Russian political emigration criticized us for failing to mention Ivan the Terrible’s policy toward exiles. And this is exactly what makes Putin’s contribution so damaging: It undermines the hope that Russia could ever become a rational, normal country.
A Strongman Brand Others Can Emulate
by Andrea Kendall-Taylor
For the past 20 years, Putin has been driven principally by his desire to maintain power. To this end, he has weakened the state, eliminated competition, and personalized Russia’s political system. While an older generation of Russians credit Putin for helping Russia overcome the turmoil of the 1990s, in reality he has turned the country into a kleptocracy that does not work for ordinary Russians. As he has grown more paranoid about threats to his power—internal and external, real and imagined—Putin has suppressed the freedoms of Russians, increasingly through an arsenal of digital tactics.
Despite Russia’s internal weaknesses, Putin has boosted the country’s global standing. The lack of constraints on his power, his investment in modernizing his military, and his ability to exploit asymmetries of interest between Russia and the West have allowed Putin to seize opportunities, even those that violate international laws. Today, Russia has a role in most global issues of consequence. But Putin also understands the limits of Russian influence. He has therefore sought to undermine Western democracies to improve Russia’s relative standing. His tactics and strongman brand have created a model that anti-democratic leaders emulate. As Putin has alienated Russia from the West, Russia’s place in the world is increasingly alongside the regimes of Bashar al-Assad, Hassan Rouhani, Nicolás Maduro, and Xi Jinping. Much can be told from the company one keeps.
20 Years Lost, Democratic Trajectory Could Yet Be Regained
by Vladimir Kara-Murza
In 20 years, Vladimir Putin has managed to take Russia from imperfect democracy to perfect authoritarianism at home, and from a respected partner to near-pariah in international affairs. By 2000, Russia had competitive elections, a vibrant free press, a pluralistic parliament, and a growing civil society. On the world stage, it was a member of the G-8, the prestigious club of industrialized democracies, and had recently ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, bringing its citizens under the umbrella of Europe’s strongest oversight mechanism. To be sure, there were many problems—and many mistakes—in both political and economic spheres, but the trajectory was the right one.
It will take time and effort to undo this damage once Russia has a democratic government that respects the rights of its own people and behaves responsibly on the international stage.
After two decades of Putin’s rule, Russia is a country where all major media are controlled by the state; where elections are meaningless rituals with predetermined outcomes; where parliament—in the words of its own speaker—is “not a place for discussion”; where peaceful demonstrators are beaten by police; and where political opponents are imprisoned—or worse. Abroad, it has been kicked out of the G-8, faces crushing economic sanctions, and, for the first time in decades, has unrecognized international borders. It will take time and effort to undo this damage once Russia has a democratic government that respects the rights of its own people and behaves responsibly on the international stage. Sooner or later, that day will come.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--How the Pandemic Threatens Democracy

How the Pandemic Threatens Democracy

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Democracy during the pandemic is under the microscope , U.S. military acknowledges civilian deaths , and China ’ s oil imports increase .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Citizens of the countries most badly affected by the coronavirus , and facing the most severe public health measures , have at least been able to take comfort in the fact they freely chose their leaders .
As the pandemic expands toward summer , however , its worrisome effects on democracy are coming into focus .
Hungary already failed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic , enacting laws that stifle free speech and postpone any future elections—effectively keeping Prime Minister Viktor Orban in power indefinitely .
This week , the democracy watchdog Freedom House demoted Hungary from a fully-fledged democracy to the level of “ hybrid regime.
” Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice party came close to forcing through electoral rule changes that could have opened the door to ballot tampering .
The move was only stopped at the last minute when the election it would have affected was postponed .
Less surprising are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a PR opportunity : The prime ministers of both Ireland and Israel found themselves almost out of office after their parties lost key parliamentary seats in elections held just before the coronavirus struck .
The crisis has allowed them to recast themselves as serious men in serious times : Both are expected to enter into government ( albeit in coalitions ) in the next few weeks .
What about the United States ?
Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden doesn ’ t think the United States is immune from the trend and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a way to delay voting in November .
“ Mark my words : I think he is gon na try to kick back the election somehow , come up with some rationale why it can ’ t be held , ” the Democratic candidate said during an April 24 event .
A Trump campaign spokesman dismissed the charge as “ the incoherent , conspiracy theory ramblings of a lost candidate who is out of touch with reality.
” An international problem .
Writing in Foreign Policy on May 7 , Steven Feldstein , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state for democracy , human rights , and labor , sees coronavirus-related pressures on democracies around the world .
“ Pandemic-fueled leadership wobbles are widespread but especially serious in Brazil , Indonesia , and the Philippines , ” he writes .
The worries don ’ t stop there : Bolivia , Lebanon , Kenya , and Nigeria are all faced with challenges that could decide their future democratic trajectory .
Even as countries focus on their first priorities—defeating the coronavirus—upholding democracy is at risk of taking a back seat .
“ If democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another casualty to the terrible toll already inflicted by the coronavirus : the demise of democracies that were too fragile to withstand the authoritarian inclinations of their leaders , ” Feldstein writes .
How high is the U.S. unemployment rate ?
We ’ ll find out today as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases its monthly report on the U.S. employment situation , expected to be the most in-depth look yet at the extent of the country ’ s growing unemployment crisis .
A report earlier this week estimated approximately 20 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and April .
As FP ’ s Keith Johnson and Michael Hirsh reported last month , the United States and Europe have taken divergent routes to stem unemployment , with the European model so far proving more effective .
Pentagon acknowledges civilian deaths in operations .
The U.S. Defense Department released its annual civilian casualties report on Thursday , claiming 132 civilians were killed in the course of its global operations .
The number is disputed by rights groups and other monitors , who claim the number is much higher .
The report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ airstrike in Somalia that the Pentagon acknowledged in a rare public announcement last month .
The United States conducted a record 63 airstrikes in Africa in 2019 , up from 47 in 2018 .
China takes on more oil .
China ’ s oil imports are continuing to increase , suggesting it is on a gradual road to economic recovery following its coronavirus epidemic .
Data from the Chinese customs agency shows oil imports increased slightly from March to April , rising from 9.68 million barrels per day to 9.84 million barrels per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to go before a return to pre-pandemic normalcy : The import levels are more than a million barrels per day fewer than the same time last year .
On March 25 , Foreign Policy ’ s Keith Johnson looked at how China ’ s economy was fairing as it began to reopen , and explored whether Europe and the United States can follow the same route out of their current economic downturns .
Basic income .
As the global debate continues over how much government support should be given to citizens during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ study in Finland has shown how beneficial direct cash transfers can be .
The experiment , which gave 560 euros per month to 2,000 randomly chosen unemployed residents from 2017 to the end of 2018 led to lower levels of depression and higher levels of satisfaction with life .
Although part of the study was to see whether unemployed Finns would be more attracted to low-paying jobs if part of their income was guaranteed , the overall days worked during the study only increased slightly compared to the control group .
Christian Kroll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team , said the study ’ s results could be interpreted positively by both proponents and opponents of basic income .
“ But as we ’ ve all learned in the early part of 2020 , insecurity is not a good way to live , ” Kroll said .
The new federalism ?
The shift in leadership from the White House to the governor ’ s state house has been one of the defining dynamics of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States to date , and a new poll underlines the shift @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 71 percent of likely U.S. voters trust their state governor over the U.S. president to “ make the right decision ” on when to ease social distancing guidelines and reopen businesses.. U.S. President Donald Trump has attempted to shore up the White House response in recent days by reversing a decision to disband a presidential coronavirus task force .
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador began his term in office at the end of 2018 by making a crowd-pleasing gesture—he would forgo the traditional presidential residence at Los Pinos and instead turn the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ museum .
Amid the coronavirus pandemic , Los Pinos has a new incarnation as a living quarters for doctors and nurses treating patients at a nearby hospital .
Meals , laundry and cleaning services are provided to the health care workers over the course of their stay , and a shuttle bus is provided to take them to work .
“ ( The palace ) is a space that was built for public servants and the nurses and doctors are public servants and they are risking their lives to save the lives of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico ’ s Social Security Director , told Reuters .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Democracy during the pandemic is under the microscope, U.S. military acknowledges civilian deaths, and China's oil imports increase.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Democracy during the pandemic is under the microscope, U.S. military acknowledges civilian deaths, and China’s oil imports increase.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
How The Pandemic Is Disrupting Democracies
Citizens of the countries most badly affected by the coronavirus, and facing the most severe public health measures, have at least been able to take comfort in the fact they freely chose their leaders. As the pandemic expands toward summer, however, its worrisome effects on democracy are coming into focus.
Hungary already failed a democratic test at the outset of the pandemic, enacting laws that stifle free speech and postpone any future elections—effectively keeping Prime Minister Viktor Orban in power indefinitely. This week, the democracy watchdog Freedom House demoted Hungary from a fully-fledged democracy to the level of “hybrid regime.”
Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party came close to forcing through electoral rule changes that could have opened the door to ballot tampering. The move was only stopped at the last minute when the election it would have affected was postponed.
Less surprising are the leaders who have used the pandemic as a PR opportunity: The prime ministers of both Ireland and Israel found themselves almost out of office after their parties lost key parliamentary seats in elections held just before the coronavirus struck. The crisis has allowed them to recast themselves as serious men in serious times: Both are expected to enter into government (albeit in coalitions) in the next few weeks.
What about the United States? Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden doesn’t think the United States is immune from the trend and thinks U.S. President Donald Trump will find a way to delay voting in November. “Mark my words: I think he is gonna try to kick back the election somehow, come up with some rationale why it can’t be held,” the Democratic candidate said during an April 24 event. A Trump campaign spokesman dismissed the charge as “the incoherent, conspiracy theory ramblings of a lost candidate who is out of touch with reality.”
An international problem. Writing in Foreign Policy on May 7, Steven Feldstein, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, sees coronavirus-related pressures on democracies around the world. “Pandemic-fueled leadership wobbles are widespread but especially serious in Brazil, Indonesia, and the Philippines,” he writes. The worries don’t stop there: Bolivia, Lebanon, Kenya, and Nigeria are all faced with challenges that could decide their future democratic trajectory.
Even as countries focus on their first priorities—defeating the coronavirus—upholding democracy is at risk of taking a back seat. “If democratic backsliding intensifies, then we can add another casualty to the terrible toll already inflicted by the coronavirus: the demise of democracies that were too fragile to withstand the authoritarian inclinations of their leaders,” Feldstein writes.
What We’re Following Today
How high is the U.S. unemployment rate? We’ll find out today as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics releases its monthly report on the U.S. employment situation, expected to be the most in-depth look yet at the extent of the country’s growing unemployment crisis. A report earlier this week estimated approximately 20 million Americans had lost their jobs between March and April.
As FP’s Keith Johnson and Michael Hirsh reported last month, the United States and Europe have taken divergent routes to stem unemployment, with the European model so far proving more effective.
Pentagon acknowledges civilian deaths in operations. The U.S. Defense Department released its annual civilian casualties report on Thursday, claiming 132 civilians were killed in the course of its global operations. The number is disputed by rights groups and other monitors, who claim the number is much higher.
The report records civilian deaths from a February 2019 airstrike in Somalia that the Pentagon acknowledged in a rare public announcement last month. The United States conducted a record 63 airstrikes in Africa in 2019, up from 47 in 2018.
China takes on more oil. China’s oil imports are continuing to increase, suggesting it is on a gradual road to economic recovery following its coronavirus epidemic. Data from the Chinese customs agency shows oil imports increased slightly from March to April, rising from 9.68 million barrels per day to 9.84 million barrels per day. There is still a while to go before a return to pre-pandemic normalcy: The import levels are more than a million barrels per day fewer than the same time last year.
On March 25, Foreign Policy’s Keith Johnson looked at how China’s economy was fairing as it began to reopen, and explored whether Europe and the United States can follow the same route out of their current economic downturns.
Keep an Eye On
Basic income. As the global debate continues over how much government support should be given to citizens during the pandemic, a first of its kind study in Finland has shown how beneficial direct cash transfers can be. The experiment, which gave 560 euros per month to 2,000 randomly chosen unemployed residents from 2017 to the end of 2018 led to lower levels of depression and higher levels of satisfaction with life.
Although part of the study was to see whether unemployed Finns would be more attracted to low-paying jobs if part of their income was guaranteed, the overall days worked during the study only increased slightly compared to the control group. Christian Kroll, part of the Helsinki University research team, said the study’s results could be interpreted positively by both proponents and opponents of basic income. “But as we’ve all learned in the early part of 2020, insecurity is not a good way to live,” Kroll said.
The new federalism? The shift in leadership from the White House to the governor’s state house has been one of the defining dynamics of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States to date, and a new poll underlines the shift. The Financial Times-Peterson Foundation poll found 71 percent of likely U.S. voters trust their state governor over the U.S. president to “make the right decision” on when to ease social distancing guidelines and reopen businesses.. U.S. President Donald Trump has attempted to shore up the White House response in recent days by reversing a decision to disband a presidential coronavirus task force.
Odds and Ends
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador began his term in office at the end of 2018 by making a crowd-pleasing gesture—he would forgo the traditional presidential residence at Los Pinos and instead turn the palatial grounds and buildings into a public museum. Amid the coronavirus pandemic, Los Pinos has a new incarnation as a living quarters for doctors and nurses treating patients at a nearby hospital. Meals, laundry and cleaning services are provided to the health care workers over the course of their stay, and a shuttle bus is provided to take them to work. “(The palace) is a space that was built for public servants and the nurses and doctors are public servants and they are risking their lives to save the lives of other people,” Zoe Robledo, Mexico’s Social Security Director, told Reuters.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-08--In Belarus, Lukashenko Bets on No Lockdown

In Belarus , Lukashenko Bets on No Lockdown Belarus is one of the only European countries that has not implemented strict coronavirus containment measures .
Its daily rate of new cases is now among the highest in Europe , according to the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
The country has conducted its fair share of diagnostic tests—more than 240,000 , or around 2.5 percent of its citizens .
Belarus has officially confirmed 21,101 cases and 121 deaths as of May 8 .
But health care professionals suggest that the number of deaths in Belarus has been intentionally underreported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media users reporting that hospitals are under pressure to register deaths from COVID-19 as cases of pneumonia or heart failure .
“ The Health Ministry is hiding the real number of cases and especially the real number of deaths , ” said Alexander Loban , an ophthalmologist .
“ Additionally , the ministry doesn ’ t want to cross the psychological threshold of 1,000 new cases a day.
” The Belarusian regime isn ’ t known for its transparency .
In power for 25 years , President Aleksandr Lukashenko runs the country with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state apparatus .
In recent months , he has downplayed the dangers of the coronavirus , calling it a “ psychosis.
” On April 21 , Lukashenko attributed deaths in the Mogilev region , south of the capital of Minsk , to chronic diseases rather than to COVID-19 .
The president continued to play hockey on an amateur team amid the crisis .
In March , he challenged a journalist in a crowded arena : “ There are no viruses here .
Did you see any of them flying around ?
” ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ later tested positive . )
Lukashenko ’ s “ don ’ t panic ” policymaking and absolute power are an insidious combination .
Belarus almost equals Germany in its number of intensive care unit beds per capita .
With its obedient citizens and extensive free public health care system , it could have been a role model in flattening the curve .
So why does Lukashenko keep downplaying the coronavirus ?
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
The president wants to project himself as in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t interrupt Belarusians ’ lives—nor the country ’ s fragile economy .
He is also campaigning for reelection , scheduled for Aug. 9—a plan that did not account for the coronavirus .
“ Lukashenko wants to show he ’ s a strongman , and it ’ s difficult for him to acknowledge he was wrong , ” said Andrei Yeliseyeu , the research director of the EAST Center , a think tank focused on Eastern Europe and post-Soviet countries .
In denying the threat of the virus , he is “ moving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to follow.
” So even though the coronavirus may soon reach its peak in Belarus , commemorations of the 75th anniversary of Nazi Germany ’ s surrender in World War II on May 9 have been kept on the national agenda .
The official obstinance echoes the May 1 parade held by the Soviet authorities in Belarus in 1986—in total denial of the Chernobyl explosion five days earlier .
But with 80 percent of the Belarusian population now online , it is hard to hide the pandemic .
The Health Ministry ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president ’ s .
The ministry reports on the situation daily—though its own messaging has been overshadowed by Lukashenko ’ s televised statements .
“ The Ministry of Health is working hard to ensure that stricter measures to contain the epidemic are taken , ” Yuri Tsarik , the head of Russia studies at the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies , said in an email .
But Lukashenko has “ severely limited the powers of the ministry expected to ‘ treat the patients ’ instead of promoting a lockdown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step with Lukashenko—have taken precautions .
The Belarusian national train service rearranged passenger seats to enable social distancing .
The Health Ministry has discouraged people from attending Mass—though Lukashenko himself attended an Orthodox Easter Mass on April 19 .
Knowing Lukashenko wouldn ’ t act to slow the spread of the coronavirus , members of the public did not wait to enact their own proactive containment measures .
The private sector has largely switched to remote work .
Fewer people are on the streets or public transport , and those who do venture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and restaurants have closed on their own .
Unfortunately , at-risk older adults are the most likely to watch state television channels , which broadcast misleading or conflicting messages about the coronavirus and how to contain it .
The response of Belarusian civil society organizations has been applauded by the Health Ministry and WHO .
“ Of course the spread of the coronavirus depends on the authorities , but it depends a lot on all of us , ” said Andrej Stryzhak , a volunteer for # ByCovid19 , a grassroots support group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for personal protective equipment for health care workers across the country .
It has shared its database of needs across the sector with the Health Ministry .
Having tamped down the Belarusian opposition for years , Lukashenko is certain of another landslide victory in this year ’ s election .
No election held since 1996 has been free or fair .
While he may be unaccountable to his public , he is still dependent on his neighbor , Russian President Vladimir Putin .
Belarus has long relied on Russian energy subsidies to prop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s invasion of their mutual neighbor Ukraine in 2014 prompted Lukashenko to rethink that dependence , and he began to make overtures toward the West .
To tighten the screws on Minsk—an important buffer between Russia and Europe—Moscow is looking to dust off a 20-year-old “ union state ” treaty signed by the two countries that would see them form a supranational union , undermining Belarus ’ s sovereignty .
“ A potential serious epidemiological situation on the eve of the elections would pose a big risk for the political and internal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If Russia deals more successfully with the epidemic , the Kremlin could try to play this card too to push its ‘ integration ’ project ahead with Belarus.
” Lukashenko is also diminishing the coronavirus threat to shield the precarious Belarusian economy , which is highly dependent on Russian markets .
Without a full lockdown , the economy faces a crisis : It has suffered from a dispute with Russia over crude oil , which Belarus used to import at a subsidized rate to refine and sell on the European market .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as oil prices crashed , increasing hardship .
Belarus already has extremely low unemployment benefits—less than $ 23 per month .
“ A proper lockdown would mean that thousands of people would lose their salaries , ” said Lev Lvovskiy , a senior research fellow at BEROC , a Belarusian think tank .
And Belarus doesn ’ t have any emergency state funds to support the unemployed , meaning that in the case of a lockdown there would be little additional financial aid .
So Lukashenko insists that the economy should run without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more complicated situation than Russia , ” he said on April 17 .
“ They are on vacation , but their pipelines continue operating .
Even though the price [ of oil ] has fallen , the foreign currency continues to come into the country .
We do not have such a safety net.
” And because of its bad credit rating , Belarus can not access international loans at a preferential rate .
“ Other post-Soviet countries either usually have some savings for emergencies , like Kazakhstan or Russia , or some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Ukraine , ” Lvovskiy said .
But increased social distancing measures short of a lockdown aren ’ t likely to have any further negative effect on the economy .
And Belarus still may decide to implement them as the coronavirus crisis worsens .
“ The authorities are just losing time , ” Yeliseyeu said .
“ They will have to accept measures later anyway as the situation escalates.
” An online survey taken in Belarus between March 20 and April 5 showed that 86 percent of respondents disapproved of Lukashenko ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discontent alone will not change the nature of his regime .
The president ’ s iron grip has not eased since 1994 , and there are no opposition representatives in the rubber-stamp National Assembly .
While the awakening of Belarusian civil society is remarkable , it is likely to disappear again when the coronavirus outbreak slows .
“ It ’ s like during natural disasters , we work on adrenaline .
Then everything is likely to vanish , ” Stryzhak said .
It seems the political structure Lukashenko has built will resist the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ severe pressure if the death toll is devastating and cracks appear in the establishment .
Putin , who has silently waged an economic war against Lukashenko , is also looming—and he could interfere if the coronavirus further weakens Belarus .

Belarus is one of the only European countries that has not implemented strict coronavirus containment measures. Its daily rate of new cases is now among the highest in Europe, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The country has conducted its fair share of diagnostic tests—more than 240,000, or around 2.5 percent of its citizens. Belarus has officially confirmed 21,101 cases and 121 deaths as of May 8.
Belarus is one of the only European countries that has not implemented strict coronavirus containment measures. Its daily rate of new cases is now among the highest in Europe, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The country has conducted its fair share of diagnostic tests—more than 240,000, or around 2.5 percent of its citizens. Belarus has officially confirmed 21,101 cases and 121 deaths as of May 8.
But health care professionals suggest that the number of deaths in Belarus has been intentionally underreported, with independent media outlets and social media users reporting that hospitals are under pressure to register deaths from COVID-19 as cases of pneumonia or heart failure. “The Health Ministry is hiding the real number of cases and especially the real number of deaths,” said Alexander Loban, an ophthalmologist. “Additionally, the ministry doesn’t want to cross the psychological threshold of 1,000 new cases a day.”
The Belarusian regime isn’t known for its transparency. In power for 25 years, President Aleksandr Lukashenko runs the country with an iron fist and oversees a repressive state apparatus. In recent months, he has downplayed the dangers of the coronavirus, calling it a “psychosis.” On April 21, Lukashenko attributed deaths in the Mogilev region, south of the capital of Minsk, to chronic diseases rather than to COVID-19. The president continued to play hockey on an amateur team amid the crisis. In March, he challenged a journalist in a crowded arena: “There are no viruses here. Did you see any of them flying around?” (A player on Lukashenko’s team later tested positive.)
Lukashenko’s “don’t panic” policymaking and absolute power are an insidious combination. Belarus almost equals Germany in its number of intensive care unit beds per capita. With its obedient citizens and extensive free public health care system, it could have been a role model in flattening the curve. So why does Lukashenko keep downplaying the coronavirus?
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
The president wants to project himself as in control and demonstrate that the coronavirus shouldn’t interrupt Belarusians’ lives—nor the country’s fragile economy. He is also campaigning for reelection, scheduled for Aug. 9—a plan that did not account for the coronavirus. “Lukashenko wants to show he’s a strongman, and it’s difficult for him to acknowledge he was wrong,” said Andrei Yeliseyeu, the research director of the EAST Center, a think tank focused on Eastern Europe and post-Soviet countries. In denying the threat of the virus, he is “moving forward with a narrative that other officials have to follow.”
So even though the coronavirus may soon reach its peak in Belarus, commemorations of the 75th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender in World War II on May 9 have been kept on the national agenda. The official obstinance echoes the May 1 parade held by the Soviet authorities in Belarus in 1986—in total denial of the Chernobyl explosion five days earlier.
But with 80 percent of the Belarusian population now online, it is hard to hide the pandemic. The Health Ministry’s response has been strikingly different from the president’s. The ministry reports on the situation daily—though its own messaging has been overshadowed by Lukashenko’s televised statements. “The Ministry of Health is working hard to ensure that stricter measures to contain the epidemic are taken,” Yuri Tsarik, the head of Russia studies at the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, said in an email. But Lukashenko has “severely limited the powers of the ministry expected to ‘treat the patients’ instead of promoting a lockdown,” he wrote.
Some authorities—out of step with Lukashenko—have taken precautions. The Belarusian national train service rearranged passenger seats to enable social distancing. The Health Ministry has discouraged people from attending Mass—though Lukashenko himself attended an Orthodox Easter Mass on April 19.
Knowing Lukashenko wouldn’t act to slow the spread of the coronavirus, members of the public did not wait to enact their own proactive containment measures. The private sector has largely switched to remote work. Fewer people are on the streets or public transport, and those who do venture out wear face masks. Some bars and restaurants have closed on their own. Unfortunately, at-risk older adults are the most likely to watch state television channels, which broadcast misleading or conflicting messages about the coronavirus and how to contain it.
The response of Belarusian civil society organizations has been applauded by the Health Ministry and WHO. “Of course the spread of the coronavirus depends on the authorities, but it depends a lot on all of us,” said Andrej Stryzhak, a volunteer for #ByCovid19, a grassroots support group that has raised more than $210,000 for personal protective equipment for health care workers across the country. It has shared its database of needs across the sector with the Health Ministry.
Having tamped down the Belarusian opposition for years, Lukashenko is certain of another landslide victory in this year’s election. No election held since 1996 has been free or fair. While he may be unaccountable to his public, he is still dependent on his neighbor, Russian President Vladimir Putin. Belarus has long relied on Russian energy subsidies to prop up its ailing economy. But Russia’s invasion of their mutual neighbor Ukraine in 2014 prompted Lukashenko to rethink that dependence, and he began to make overtures toward the West. To tighten the screws on Minsk—an important buffer between Russia and Europe—Moscow is looking to dust off a 20-year-old “union state” treaty signed by the two countries that would see them form a supranational union, undermining Belarus’s sovereignty.
“A potential serious epidemiological situation on the eve of the elections would pose a big risk for the political and internal situation,” Yeliseyeu said. “If Russia deals more successfully with the epidemic, the Kremlin could try to play this card too to push its ‘integration’ project ahead with Belarus.”
Lukashenko is also diminishing the coronavirus threat to shield the precarious Belarusian economy, which is highly dependent on Russian markets. Without a full lockdown, the economy faces a crisis: It has suffered from a dispute with Russia over crude oil, which Belarus used to import at a subsidized rate to refine and sell on the European market. The value of the Belarusian ruble has plunged as oil prices crashed, increasing hardship.
Belarus already has extremely low unemployment benefits—less than $23 per month. “A proper lockdown would mean that thousands of people would lose their salaries,” said Lev Lvovskiy, a senior research fellow at BEROC, a Belarusian think tank. And Belarus doesn’t have any emergency state funds to support the unemployed, meaning that in the case of a lockdown there would be little additional financial aid.
So Lukashenko insists that the economy should run without interruption. “We are in a more complicated situation than Russia,” he said on April 17. “They are on vacation, but their pipelines continue operating. Even though the price [of oil] has fallen, the foreign currency continues to come into the country. We do not have such a safety net.” And because of its bad credit rating, Belarus cannot access international loans at a preferential rate. “Other post-Soviet countries either usually have some savings for emergencies, like Kazakhstan or Russia, or some can borrow at a better rate, such as Ukraine,” Lvovskiy said.
But increased social distancing measures short of a lockdown aren’t likely to have any further negative effect on the economy. And Belarus still may decide to implement them as the coronavirus crisis worsens. “The authorities are just losing time,” Yeliseyeu said. “They will have to accept measures later anyway as the situation escalates.”
An online survey taken in Belarus between March 20 and April 5 showed that 86 percent of respondents disapproved of Lukashenko’s response to the coronavirus. But discontent alone will not change the nature of his regime. The president’s iron grip has not eased since 1994, and there are no opposition representatives in the rubber-stamp National Assembly. While the awakening of Belarusian civil society is remarkable, it is likely to disappear again when the coronavirus outbreak slows. “It’s like during natural disasters, we work on adrenaline. Then everything is likely to vanish,” Stryzhak said.
It seems the political structure Lukashenko has built will resist the growing discontent, but it could face severe pressure if the death toll is devastating and cracks appear in the establishment. Putin, who has silently waged an economic war against Lukashenko, is also looming—and he could interfere if the coronavirus further weakens Belarus.