foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--Erdogan Is Turning Turkey Into a Chinese Client State

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used to send shockwaves to Beijing with his outspoken support of China ’ s Uighur minority , a predominantly Turkic-speaking Muslim group in Xinjiang that is subject to horrific human rights violations .
“ The incidents in China are , simply put , a genocide , ” Erdogan said in 2009 , when he was prime minister .
And it wasn ’ t just empty words : Turkey has been a safe haven for Uighurs fleeing persecution ever since the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949 and hosts one of the largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Then came a sudden , unexpected switch .
In 2016 , Turkey arrested Abdulkadir Yapcan , a prominent Uighur political activist living in the country since 2001 and initiated his extradition .
In 2017 , Turkey and China signed an agreement allowing extradition even if the purported offense is only illegal in one of the two countries .
Since early 2019 , Turkey has arrested hundreds of Uighurs and sent them to deportation centers .
And Erdogan ’ s remarks have turned diplomatically bland , just like any Uighur-related coverage in newspapers controlled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s remarkable U-turn has a simple explanation : His regime and Turkey ’ s economy are in crisis .
With few other friends , Ankara is counting on Beijing to patch things up , and that requires adherence to Beijing ’ s talking points .
Erdogan ’ s problems are mounting : Turkey ’ s economy has been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic , which has devastated its primary economic sector , tourism .
As Erdogan tightens his control over the central bank and the courts , foreign reserves are shrinking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Turkish lira is plunging .
Once seen as a model of democracy and economic development in the region , Turkey is now an authoritarian country ; on the Liberal Democracy Index compiled by the University of Gothenburg ’ s V-Dem Institute , Turkey now ranks among the bottom 20 , closer to China than the developed countries to which it once aspired .
Western companies and investors , once attracted to Turkey ’ s fast-growing economy and population , are staying away .
China ’ s appetite for expansion into Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Cooperation has expanded exponentially : Since 2016 , the two countries have signed 10 bilateral agreements including on health and nuclear energy .
China is now Turkey ’ s second-largest import partner after Russia .
China has invested $ 3 billion in Turkey between 2016 and 2019 and intends to double that by the end of next year .
Cash flowing in from China has become critical for Erdogan ’ s regime and has strengthened the president ’ s hand at crucial moments .
When the lira ’ s value dropped by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided the Turkish government $ 3.6 billion in loans for ongoing energy and transportation projects .
In June 2019 , in the wake of Istanbul municipal elections that indicated crumbling support for Erdogan , China ’ s central bank transferred $ 1 billion—the largest cash inflow under a swap agreement between the two countries ’ central banks that was last renewed in 2012 .
As Erdogan ’ s popularity has dwindled this year amid the coronavirus crisis and a severe currency shortage , China came @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing is now allowing Turkish companies to use the Chinese yuan to make trade payments , allowing them easier access to Chinese liquidity—another step up in financial cooperation .
China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) offers Turkey a source of fresh cash—and Beijing a strategic foothold on the Mediterranean Sea .
As part of the infrastructure-building initiative , Turkey completed a railroad from Kars in eastern Turkey via Tbilisi , Georgia , to Baku , Azerbaijan , on the Caspian Sea , from where it links to transportation networks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese consortium bought 65 percent of Turkey ’ s third-largest container terminal , Kumport , in Istanbul , acquiring a pivotal position in container transportation .
Chinese investors also helped salvage Erdogan ’ s own poorly managed megaprojects .
In January 2020 , a Chinese consortium bought 51 percent of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge connecting Europe and Asia across the Bosporus after revenue projections failed and the Italian-Turkish consortium controlling the bridge wanted out .
The BRI projects help shore up Erdogan in other ways .
They have reinforced Turkey ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corridor and have boosted Erdogan ’ s political brand by promoting him as someone who can develop infrastructure , attract funds , and undertake large-scale projects .
And the cash keeps coming : This year , China ’ s Export and Credit Insurance Corp. committed up to $ 5 billion for Turkey ’ s Wealth Fund , to be used for BRI projects .
The fund ’ s limited transparency and accountability raise further concerns about where the money is going and Turkey ’ s ability to repay .
Energy , another sector @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s power , has seen even greater investment under the BRI umbrella .
China is providing $ 1.7 billion to build the Hunutlu coal-fired power plant on the Mediterranean Sea , projected to produce 3 percent of the country ’ s electricity when it is completed .
Ankara plans to sign a deal with China ’ s State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. to build Turkey ’ s third nuclear power plant .
Beyond infrastructure , Sino-Turkish cooperation involves deepening bilateral military and security ties , including in intelligence and cyberwarfare .
Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese B-611 missile , introduced in 2017 , and deployed in the Turkish military operation against the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ( PKK ) in May 2019—is a product of bilateral defense cooperation , as was the participation of Chinese military officers in Turkey ’ s Ephesus military exercise in 2018 .
Huawei , which has been designated a national security threat in the United States and elsewhere due to its ties to the Chinese government and military , has no such opposition in Turkey .
Its share in the Turkish market has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 30 percent in 2019 .
Allegations about Chinese use of telecommunications infrastructure for state surveillance and suppression are especially worrisome in Turkey , where the population relies on the internet and social media for information due to strict control of other media channels .
Another Chinese technology company , ZTE , took over 48 percent of Netas , Turkey ’ s key telecommunications equipment manufacturer , in 2016 .
Netas manages pivotal projects including the new Istanbul Airport ’ s telecommunications and the digitalization of national health data .
For now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to benefit both sides .
China has found a highly strategic foothold in Turkey—a NATO member with a large market for energy , infrastructure , defense technology , and telecommunications at the crossroads of Europe , Asia , and Africa .
For Turkey and Erdogan , China provides desperately needed resources to fund high-profile megaprojects and maintain the veneer of development despite the crippling economic reality underneath .
Just as importantly , Chinese cash helps Erdogan avoid seeking help from Western-dominated institutions such as the International Monetary Fund , which would require him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could undermine his unfettered control over the country ’ s economy .
There is another reason why Turkey and China are in an ever tighter embrace .
Both are increasingly shunned by Western countries for their anti-democratic practices at home and expansionism abroad .
Neither has many friends in its region .
Both share a vision of challenging the hegemony of the United States and an international order based on Western-created institutions .
Casualties of the emerging Sino-Turkish strategic partnership are groups like the Uighurs and dissidents in both countries whose protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freedoms are protected through democratic institutions and processes without making them secondary to economic survival and growth .

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used to send shockwaves to Beijing with his outspoken support of China’s Uighur minority, a predominantly Turkic-speaking Muslim group in Xinjiang that is subject to horrific human rights violations. “The incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide,” Erdogan said in 2009, when he was prime minister. And it wasn’t just empty words: Turkey has been a safe haven for Uighurs fleeing persecution ever since the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949 and hosts one of the largest Uighur diaspora populations in the world.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used to send shockwaves to Beijing with his outspoken support of China’s Uighur minority, a predominantly Turkic-speaking Muslim group in Xinjiang that is subject to horrific human rights violations. “The incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide,” Erdogan said in 2009, when he was prime minister. And it wasn’t just empty words: Turkey has been a safe haven for Uighurs fleeing persecution ever since the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949 and hosts one of the largest Uighur diaspora populations in the world.
Then came a sudden, unexpected switch. In 2016, Turkey arrested Abdulkadir Yapcan, a prominent Uighur political activist living in the country since 2001 and initiated his extradition. In 2017, Turkey and China signed an agreement allowing extradition even if the purported offense is only illegal in one of the two countries. Since early 2019, Turkey has arrested hundreds of Uighurs and sent them to deportation centers. And Erdogan’s remarks have turned diplomatically bland, just like any Uighur-related coverage in newspapers controlled by Erdogan and his supporters.
Erdogan’s remarkable U-turn has a simple explanation: His regime and Turkey’s economy are in crisis. With few other friends, Ankara is counting on Beijing to patch things up, and that requires adherence to Beijing’s talking points. Erdogan’s problems are mounting: Turkey’s economy has been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, which has devastated its primary economic sector, tourism. As Erdogan tightens his control over the central bank and the courts, foreign reserves are shrinking, the trade deficit is rising, and the Turkish lira is plunging. Once seen as a model of democracy and economic development in the region, Turkey is now an authoritarian country; on the Liberal Democracy Index compiled by the University of Gothenburg’s V-Dem Institute, Turkey now ranks among the bottom 20, closer to China than the developed countries to which it once aspired. Western companies and investors, once attracted to Turkey’s fast-growing economy and population, are staying away.
China’s appetite for expansion into Western Asia and Europe offers Erdogan a lifeline. Cooperation has expanded exponentially: Since 2016, the two countries have signed 10 bilateral agreements including on health and nuclear energy. China is now Turkey’s second-largest import partner after Russia. China has invested $3 billion in Turkey between 2016 and 2019 and intends to double that by the end of next year. Cash flowing in from China has become critical for Erdogan’s regime and has strengthened the president’s hand at crucial moments. When the lira’s value dropped by more than 40 percent in 2018, the state-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provided the Turkish government $3.6 billion in loans for ongoing energy and transportation projects. In June 2019, in the wake of Istanbul municipal elections that indicated crumbling support for Erdogan, China’s central bank transferred $1 billion—the largest cash inflow under a swap agreement between the two countries’ central banks that was last renewed in 2012. As Erdogan’s popularity has dwindled this year amid the coronavirus crisis and a severe currency shortage, China came to the rescue again in June. Beijing is now allowing Turkish companies to use the Chinese yuan to make trade payments, allowing them easier access to Chinese liquidity—another step up in financial cooperation.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers Turkey a source of fresh cash—and Beijing a strategic foothold on the Mediterranean Sea. As part of the infrastructure-building initiative, Turkey completed a railroad from Kars in eastern Turkey via Tbilisi, Georgia, to Baku, Azerbaijan, on the Caspian Sea, from where it links to transportation networks to China. In 2015, a Chinese consortium bought 65 percent of Turkey’s third-largest container terminal, Kumport, in Istanbul, acquiring a pivotal position in container transportation. Chinese investors also helped salvage Erdogan’s own poorly managed megaprojects. In January 2020, a Chinese consortium bought 51 percent of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge connecting Europe and Asia across the Bosporus after revenue projections failed and the Italian-Turkish consortium controlling the bridge wanted out.
The BRI projects help shore up Erdogan in other ways. They have reinforced Turkey’s strategy to assert itself as a transportation corridor and have boosted Erdogan’s political brand by promoting him as someone who can develop infrastructure, attract funds, and undertake large-scale projects. And the cash keeps coming: This year, China’s Export and Credit Insurance Corp. committed up to $5 billion for Turkey’s Wealth Fund, to be used for BRI projects. The fund’s limited transparency and accountability raise further concerns about where the money is going and Turkey’s ability to repay.
Energy, another sector whose development has been key to Erdogan’s power, has seen even greater investment under the BRI umbrella. China is providing $1.7 billion to build the Hunutlu coal-fired power plant on the Mediterranean Sea, projected to produce 3 percent of the country’s electricity when it is completed. Ankara plans to sign a deal with China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. to build Turkey’s third nuclear power plant.
Beyond infrastructure, Sino-Turkish cooperation involves deepening bilateral military and security ties, including in intelligence and cyberwarfare. Turkey’s Bora ballistic missile—modeled on the Chinese B-611 missile, introduced in 2017, and deployed in the Turkish military operation against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in May 2019—is a product of bilateral defense cooperation, as was the participation of Chinese military officers in Turkey’s Ephesus military exercise in 2018.
Huawei, which has been designated a national security threat in the United States and elsewhere due to its ties to the Chinese government and military, has no such opposition in Turkey. Its share in the Turkish market has grown from only 3 percent in 2017 to 30 percent in 2019. Allegations about Chinese use of telecommunications infrastructure for state surveillance and suppression are especially worrisome in Turkey, where the population relies on the internet and social media for information due to strict control of other media channels. Another Chinese technology company, ZTE, took over 48 percent of Netas, Turkey’s key telecommunications equipment manufacturer, in 2016. Netas manages pivotal projects including the new Istanbul Airport’s telecommunications and the digitalization of national health data.
For now, strengthening relations between China and Turkey appears to benefit both sides. China has found a highly strategic foothold in Turkey—a NATO member with a large market for energy, infrastructure, defense technology, and telecommunications at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa. For Turkey and Erdogan, China provides desperately needed resources to fund high-profile megaprojects and maintain the veneer of development despite the crippling economic reality underneath. Just as importantly, Chinese cash helps Erdogan avoid seeking help from Western-dominated institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, which would require him to commit to reforms and other measures that could undermine his unfettered control over the country’s economy.
There is another reason why Turkey and China are in an ever tighter embrace. Both are increasingly shunned by Western countries for their anti-democratic practices at home and expansionism abroad. Neither has many friends in its region. Both share a vision of challenging the hegemony of the United States and an international order based on Western-created institutions. Casualties of the emerging Sino-Turkish strategic partnership are groups like the Uighurs and dissidents in both countries whose protection requires responsive political systems where rights and freedoms are protected through democratic institutions and processes without making them secondary to economic survival and growth.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--COVID-19 Has Crushed Everybody’s Economy—Except for South Korea’s

SEOUL—As the United States struggles with a stubbornly persistent pandemic and a stubbornly slow return to economic growth , South Korea seems to have found the recipe to succeed on both fronts—if it can survive a late-year uptick in new coronavirus cases .
In the latest economic projections by the OECD , South Korea is looking at a mere 1 percent GDP contraction for 2020 , the second-best performer among major economies behind only China .
In contrast , the euro area is expected to shrink by around 8 percent , and the United States could see full-year contraction on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GDP .
“ The world is facing the most dramatic economic slowdown since the Second World War , ” said Laurence Boone , the chief economist of the OECD , introducing the newest outlook .
The OECD presentation underscored that economic success went hand in hand with success in tamping down the pandemic .
That ’ s part of the reason for South Korea escaping relatively unscathed economically—starting with its highly effective management of the pandemic in the first place .
The United States and South Korea both recorded their first case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; since then , cases in South Korea peaked at 851 new daily cases in March , before flattening to the single digits .
In the United States , the cases never really plateaued until mid-July , where the peak was at 74,818 confirmed infections in a single day .
South Korea has recorded seven deaths per million people ; the United States has seen nearly 600 deaths per million , according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Johns Hopkins University .
Economic success went hand in hand with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That efficacious handling of the outbreak made a strict national lockdown—of the sort that paralyzed entire European economies for months on end—largely unnecessary in South Korea , which in turn meant less economic dislocation from shuttered factories , closed restaurants , and the like .
“ The main reason is that they ’ ve been able to contain the epidemic much better than others , so disruptions to activity have been more limited , ” said Christophe André , the senior economist for South Korea at the OECD .
That can be seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which shows South Korea barely changed its normal routines after the outbreak in late February , and what little changed quickly recovered in April .
The biggest factors for change were weather and public holidays , not the virus .
In contrast , hard-hit Italy saw shop visits plummet .
Further , even though South Korea wasn ’ t hit as hard as most other countries , it quickly launched a fairly aggressive fiscal response , pouring around $ 12.2 billion , or about 0.7 percent of the country ’ s GDP , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in early spring .
That wasn ’ t as big as countries such as Germany , which is launching a stimulus package worth around 4 percent of GDP , but because Seoul provided support quickly , it helped keep consumption up .
South Korea is also continuing to provide support in the form of loans and guarantees totaling about $ 230 billion .
More to the point , South Korea has kept the fiscal taps open : Last week , it announced its fourth round of stimulus adding an additional $ 6.5 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expansionary approach will likely continue through next year to combat the lingering economic impacts of the pandemic .
That , too , stands in contrast to countries like the United States , which started the year with a fiscal and monetary bang but which has since slowed down efforts to throw cash at the continued economic weakness .
Earlier this month , the U.S. Congress failed to agree on a fresh stimulus package , after Republican lawmakers sought to trim already paltry benefits , while Democrats sought more aid for the huge numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s André said that fiscal response was one key to getting domestic consumption back on track .
“ So domestic demand has remained relatively solid ; there was a fall in consumption in the first half of the year , but there was a rebound which was helped also by fiscal support , ” he said .
And South Korea ’ s fiscal response carried more bang for the buck than in other places .
First , more businesses were open to spend those cash payouts at , which translated to South Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their bailout checks .
A significant portion of the money distributed in the first three tranches of stimulus was spent by South Korean consumers ; in the United States , many households simply banked much of their famous $ 1,200 stimulus check .
“ There was a big impact on consumption , consumption rebounded actually , end-of-June consumption was up year-on-year , which is quite spectacular .
So , this stimulus was very important , ” André said .
Second , some South Korean provinces also used creative solutions to ensure that government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and help boost consumption .
Lee Jae-myung , the governor of Gyeonggi province , the country ’ s most populous region , decided to test out non-cash payments .
Each resident received 100,000 won , about $ 85 , which could be spent over a three-month period .
But it came in the form of a local currency that could only be spent in shops inside the region , rather than as cash that could be hoarded .
“ We used the [ money ] to eat out at local restaurants ; we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use the emergency funds , ” said Lee Jong-hyang , a mother in her 50s in Gyeonggi province .
She wasn ’ t alone .
“ After the disaster relief was distributed [ local businesses ’ ] monthly sales went up 18 percent , and for small business owners , 56 percent of them said their sales went up , ” said Heo Yeung-gil , the leader of the Safety Planning Division in Gyeonggi province , which oversees the distribution of the disaster relief .
Heo said that despite a price tag for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he believes the program is sustainable .
“ It was to boost consumption and to create a more virtuous cycle of spending for the economy .
And in that sense , yes , it is worth it , ” Heo said .
Despite its relative success so far , South Korea is far from done dealing with the virus or its fallout .
The country has been hovering between 100 and 200 new daily cases for over two weeks , stoking fears of a new outbreak .
Seoul has been forced to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowing restaurants to serve takeout after 9 p.m. and making cafes carryout only .
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that the government is walking “ a tightrope between virus control and the economy , ” and after pressure from local businesses Seoul eased those restrictions again , two weeks after they went into effect.South Korea may even be in for more economic pain that it expected .
South Korea may even be in for more economic pain that it expected .
The country ’ s central bank last month downgraded its full-year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 1.3 percent , a big jump from its earlier rosier estimates .
The second wave of virus in South Korea is also what has caused the OECD to adjust its initial assessment from negative 0.8 percent growth to negative 1 percent .
And , as in many countries , deficit hawks are worried about the sustainability of big fiscal stimulus packages that can ameliorate short-term pain but only at the cost of long-term debt accumulation .
“ Basically , it ’ s a government subsidy to the Korean people , but the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies forever .
Because of these subsidies , the Korean government budget balance is deteriorating , ” said Lee Doowon , an economist at Yonsei University in Seoul .
For South Korea , an export-oriented economy , that ’ s a particularly acute risk as the pandemic continues to depress cross-border trade .
“ Korea depends a lot on international trade .
And because of this pandemic , global trade has shrunk and that has a negative impact on the Korean export industry .
Unless we make a serious breakthrough in the near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse in the coming several months , ” Lee said .
Boone from the OECD agrees .
South Korea ’ s hopes for a rebound next year depend on the rest of the world climbing out of the COVID-19 hole—and that is outside Seoul ’ s control .
“ Looking ahead , Korea is very much integrated in the global economy , ” Boone said .
“ And for that reason , the extent of the rebound will be either limited or helped by the size and the magnitude of the rebound elsewhere @ @

SEOUL—As the United States struggles with a stubbornly persistent pandemic and a stubbornly slow return to economic growth, South Korea seems to have found the recipe to succeed on both fronts—if it can survive a late-year uptick in new coronavirus cases.
SEOUL—As the United States struggles with a stubbornly persistent pandemic and a stubbornly slow return to economic growth, South Korea seems to have found the recipe to succeed on both fronts—if it can survive a late-year uptick in new coronavirus cases.
In the latest economic projections by the OECD, South Korea is looking at a mere 1 percent GDP contraction for 2020, the second-best performer among major economies behind only China. In contrast, the euro area is expected to shrink by around 8 percent, and the United States could see full-year contraction on the order of almost 4 percent of GDP.
“The world is facing the most dramatic economic slowdown since the Second World War,” said Laurence Boone, the chief economist of the OECD, introducing the newest outlook.
The OECD presentation underscored that economic success went hand in hand with success in tamping down the pandemic. That’s part of the reason for South Korea escaping relatively unscathed economically—starting with its highly effective management of the pandemic in the first place.
The United States and South Korea both recorded their first case of the new coronavirus on the same day; since then, cases in South Korea peaked at 851 new daily cases in March, before flattening to the single digits. In the United States, the cases never really plateaued until mid-July, where the peak was at 74,818 confirmed infections in a single day. South Korea has recorded seven deaths per million people; the United States has seen nearly 600 deaths per million, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Johns Hopkins University. Economic success went hand in hand with success in tamping down the pandemic.
That efficacious handling of the outbreak made a strict national lockdown—of the sort that paralyzed entire European economies for months on end—largely unnecessary in South Korea, which in turn meant less economic dislocation from shuttered factories, closed restaurants, and the like.
“The main reason is that they’ve been able to contain the epidemic much better than others, so disruptions to activity have been more limited,” said Christophe André, the senior economist for South Korea at the OECD.
That can be seen in Google’s mobility data, which shows South Korea barely changed its normal routines after the outbreak in late February, and what little changed quickly recovered in April. The biggest factors for change were weather and public holidays, not the virus. In contrast, hard-hit Italy saw shop visits plummet.
Further, even though South Korea wasn’t hit as hard as most other countries, it quickly launched a fairly aggressive fiscal response, pouring around $12.2 billion, or about 0.7 percent of the country’s GDP, into the pockets of businesses and citizens in early spring.
That wasn’t as big as countries such as Germany, which is launching a stimulus package worth around 4 percent of GDP, but because Seoul provided support quickly, it helped keep consumption up. South Korea is also continuing to provide support in the form of loans and guarantees totaling about $230 billion.
More to the point, South Korea has kept the fiscal taps open: Last week, it announced its fourth round of stimulus adding an additional $6.5 billion, and South Korean policymakers say that expansionary approach will likely continue through next year to combat the lingering economic impacts of the pandemic.
That, too, stands in contrast to countries like the United States, which started the year with a fiscal and monetary bang but which has since slowed down efforts to throw cash at the continued economic weakness. Earlier this month, the U.S. Congress failed to agree on a fresh stimulus package, after Republican lawmakers sought to trim already paltry benefits, while Democrats sought more aid for the huge numbers of unemployed Americans.
The OECD’s André said that fiscal response was one key to getting domestic consumption back on track.
“So domestic demand has remained relatively solid; there was a fall in consumption in the first half of the year, but there was a rebound which was helped also by fiscal support,” he said.
And South Korea’s fiscal response carried more bang for the buck than in other places. First, more businesses were open to spend those cash payouts at, which translated to South Korean consumers spending more and saving less of their bailout checks. A significant portion of the money distributed in the first three tranches of stimulus was spent by South Korean consumers; in the United States, many households simply banked much of their famous $1,200 stimulus check.
“There was a big impact on consumption, consumption rebounded actually, end-of-June consumption was up year-on-year, which is quite spectacular. So, this stimulus was very important,” André said.
Second, some South Korean provinces also used creative solutions to ensure that government payouts would be recycled into the economy and help boost consumption.
Lee Jae-myung, the governor of Gyeonggi province, the country’s most populous region, decided to test out non-cash payments. Each resident received 100,000 won, about $85, which could be spent over a three-month period. But it came in the form of a local currency that could only be spent in shops inside the region, rather than as cash that could be hoarded.
“We used the [money] to eat out at local restaurants; we ate out more often than usual to use the emergency funds,” said Lee Jong-hyang, a mother in her 50s in Gyeonggi province.
She wasn’t alone. “After the disaster relief was distributed [local businesses’] monthly sales went up 18 percent, and for small business owners, 56 percent of them said their sales went up,” said Heo Yeung-gil, the leader of the Safety Planning Division in Gyeonggi province, which oversees the distribution of the disaster relief.
Heo said that despite a price tag for the region of about $850 million, he believes the program is sustainable.
“It was to boost consumption and to create a more virtuous cycle of spending for the economy. And in that sense, yes, it is worth it,” Heo said.
Despite its relative success so far, South Korea is far from done dealing with the virus or its fallout. The country has been hovering between 100 and 200 new daily cases for over two weeks, stoking fears of a new outbreak. Seoul has been forced to restrict business activity, such as only allowing restaurants to serve takeout after 9 p.m. and making cafes carryout only.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in said that the government is walking “a tightrope between virus control and the economy,” and after pressure from local businesses Seoul eased those restrictions again, two weeks after they went into effect.South Korea may even be in for more economic pain that it expected.
South Korea may even be in for more economic pain that it expected. The country’s central bank last month downgraded its full-year outlook for the economy to a contraction of 1.3 percent, a big jump from its earlier rosier estimates. The second wave of virus in South Korea is also what has caused the OECD to adjust its initial assessment from negative 0.8 percent growth to negative 1 percent.
And, as in many countries, deficit hawks are worried about the sustainability of big fiscal stimulus packages that can ameliorate short-term pain but only at the cost of long-term debt accumulation.
“Basically, it’s a government subsidy to the Korean people, but the thing is, we cannot provide subsidies forever. Because of these subsidies, the Korean government budget balance is deteriorating,” said Lee Doowon, an economist at Yonsei University in Seoul.
For South Korea, an export-oriented economy, that’s a particularly acute risk as the pandemic continues to depress cross-border trade.
“Korea depends a lot on international trade. And because of this pandemic, global trade has shrunk and that has a negative impact on the Korean export industry. Unless we make a serious breakthrough in the near future, this situation will be even worse in the coming several months,” Lee said.
Boone from the OECD agrees. South Korea’s hopes for a rebound next year depend on the rest of the world climbing out of the COVID-19 hole—and that is outside Seoul’s control.
“Looking ahead, Korea is very much integrated in the global economy,” Boone said. “And for that reason, the extent of the rebound will be either limited or helped by the size and the magnitude of the rebound elsewhere.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--For Netanyahu, Normalization Deals Are a Long-Awaited Vindication

Years before he became the leader of Israel , Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his vision of the Middle East in an English-language book titled A Place Among the Nations .
Published in 1993 , the same year that Israel signed the Oslo accords with the Palestinians , Netanyahu ’ s book rejected the idea that Israel should give up land in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors .
He argued instead for a formula that seemed like a pipe dream at the time , and for decades since : peace for peace .
“ One simply can not talk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the same breath expect Israel to significantly alter its existing boundaries , ” he wrote .
Twenty-seven years later , at a grandly choreographed White House ceremony yesterday where the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed normalization deals with Israel , Netanyahu got his vindication—even as his political troubles were mounting at home .
The two Gulf Arab states effectively declared that they would not wait until the Palestinians ’ grievances are resolved before coming to terms with Israel .
In Netanyahu ’ s view , it was a ratification of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strength and economic vitality would eventually lead its Arab neighbors to put aside decades of hostility .
“ History has taught us that strength brings security , strength brings allies and… .
ultimately strength brings peace , ’ ’ Netanyahu said , speaking to about 700 guests on the White House lawn and gazing toward the Washington Monument .
He then followed Trump down a flight of winding stairs to a mahogany desk with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two Gulf diplomats , dressed in business suits rather than traditional Arab robes and headdress , gave their own speeches that were music to Netanyahu ’ s ears , asserting that they were interested in “ warm relations ” with Israel .
If so , it would contrast with the cold version that characterizes Israel ’ s ties with Egypt , the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state in 1979 , and Jordan , which followed 15 years later .
Many in Israel who oppose Netanyahu have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deals have been dubbed , are not on the level of the earlier peace agreements because neither the UAE nor Bahrain ever fought an actual war with Israel .
Israel and the UAE have maintained quiet intelligence and military cooperation for years .
But other critics said that this time the prime minister should receive his due .
“ All the difference in the world lies in the move from secret ties , from which only a handful of those close to power and arms dealers benefitted from , and open relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a plane to Dubai , without a costume and foreign passport , ” wrote Aluf Benn , editor-in-chief of the Haaretz newspaper , which is deeply critical of Netanyahu .
“ This is the democratization of peace.
” Still , there were dark clouds gathering at home , where Israelis are being sent back into lockdown this week , just before the Jewish New Year holiday of Rosh Hashanah because of a dramatic spike across the country in the number of COVID-19 cases .
Netanyahu is also in the midst of a trial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of thousands of demonstrators to fill the streets outside his official residence each week on Saturday nights .
Protesters wearing face masks that say Crime Minister hounded Netanyahu on his departure from Tel Aviv , staging a traffic slowdown at Ben Gurion International Airport to disrupt the government motorcade .
Members of the anti-Netanyahu movement also turned up outside the White House to remind him of the legal travails that await him at home .
In Washington , Netanyahu ’ s travel team struggled to square the demands for diplomatic razzle dazzle arranged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Israeli leader to project concern about the coronavirus misery building back home .
The prime minister ’ s handlers confined the 100-member delegation , including journalists , to the palatial Willard InterContinental Hotel during the 44-hour stay in Washington when not attending the ceremony .
The ultra-strict adherence to COVID-19 guidelines clashed with looser interpretations observed at the White House , which said masks were only recommended .
Missing from the White House were the leaders of the two countries who made the groundbreaking decisions to sign the agreements with Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan and Bahrain ’ s King Hamad al Isa bin Khalifa .
Their absence indicated that there remain some details to be nailed down before the agreements are fully embraced .
The audience included delegations from Bahrain and the UAE , among them the leaders of the Jewish community in Dubai , which until recently conducted weekly Sabbath services at a secret location .
The UAE has declared its dedication to religious tolerance and is building a monumental prayer compound in the capital city of Abu Dhabi that will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The accords themselves are described as vehicles of normalization with Israel , a fuzzy term that has been anathema to Palestinians and their supporters because it promises diplomatic benefits for Israel without requiring it to withdraw from occupied land in the West Bank , Gaza Strip , and East Jerusalem .
The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative , first proposed by Saudi Arabia , required a complete pullout from Palestinian territory before normalization could take place .
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas condemned the accords , saying “ no peace , security , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region without ending the occupation.
” Netanyahu , Trump , and the foreign ministers signed three documents at the ceremony .
One was a general declaration by all four proclaiming their commitment to regional peace .
The other two were separate bilateral accords between Israel and both of the Gulf states outlining efforts for cementing ties in areas ranging from finance , trade and medical research , to civil aviation , sports , education and Muslim-Jewish interfaith activities .
In a gesture to COVID-19 concerns , the four men refrained from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead patting their hearts to acknowledge each other .
They did not wear masks .
Among the points left open was whether the UAE would get the advanced F-35 fighter jets it has sought from the United States .
Asked about that in a meeting in the Oval Office before the ceremony , Trump told reporters he expected to “ work that out ” and “ that ’ s going to be an easy thing.
” Israel has objected to the sale out of fear it will upset the “ qualitative military edge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. to keep the country safe from its hostile neighbors .
Trump , whose first foreign trip as president in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia , was also upbeat about prospects of getting the oil-rich kingdom and other Arab states to join the UAE and Bahrain in making peace with Israel , saying : “ We ’ re very far down the road with about five countries.
” Drawing a contrast with the history of war in the region , Trump termed the Abraham accords as “ peace in the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ”

Years before he became the leader of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his vision of the Middle East in an English-language book titled A Place Among the Nations.
Years before he became the leader of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his vision of the Middle East in an English-language book titled A Place Among the Nations.
Published in 1993, the same year that Israel signed the Oslo accords with the Palestinians, Netanyahu’s book rejected the idea that Israel should give up land in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors. He argued instead for a formula that seemed like a pipe dream at the time, and for decades since: peace for peace.
“One simply cannot talk about peace and security for Israel and in the same breath expect Israel to significantly alter its existing boundaries,” he wrote.
Twenty-seven years later, at a grandly choreographed White House ceremony yesterday where the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed normalization deals with Israel, Netanyahu got his vindication—even as his political troubles were mounting at home.
The two Gulf Arab states effectively declared that they would not wait until the Palestinians’ grievances are resolved before coming to terms with Israel. In Netanyahu’s view, it was a ratification of his long-standing doctrine that Israel’s military strength and economic vitality would eventually lead its Arab neighbors to put aside decades of hostility.
“History has taught us that strength brings security, strength brings allies and…. ultimately strength brings peace,’’ Netanyahu said, speaking to about 700 guests on the White House lawn and gazing toward the Washington Monument. He then followed Trump down a flight of winding stairs to a mahogany desk with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani and the four men signed the agreements.
The two Gulf diplomats, dressed in business suits rather than traditional Arab robes and headdress, gave their own speeches that were music to Netanyahu’s ears, asserting that they were interested in “warm relations” with Israel. If so, it would contrast with the cold version that characterizes Israel’s ties with Egypt, the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state in 1979, and Jordan, which followed 15 years later.
Many in Israel who oppose Netanyahu have suggested that the Abraham Accords, as the deals have been dubbed, are not on the level of the earlier peace agreements because neither the UAE nor Bahrain ever fought an actual war with Israel. Israel and the UAE have maintained quiet intelligence and military cooperation for years.
But other critics said that this time the prime minister should receive his due.
“All the difference in the world lies in the move from secret ties, from which only a handful of those close to power and arms dealers benefitted from, and open relations in which any Israeli can get on a plane to Dubai, without a costume and foreign passport,” wrote Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Haaretz newspaper, which is deeply critical of Netanyahu. “This is the democratization of peace.”
Still, there were dark clouds gathering at home, where Israelis are being sent back into lockdown this week, just before the Jewish New Year holiday of Rosh Hashanah because of a dramatic spike across the country in the number of COVID-19 cases.
Netanyahu is also in the midst of a trial on corruption charges that has led tens of thousands of demonstrators to fill the streets outside his official residence each week on Saturday nights. Protesters wearing face masks that say Crime Minister hounded Netanyahu on his departure from Tel Aviv, staging a traffic slowdown at Ben Gurion International Airport to disrupt the government motorcade. Members of the anti-Netanyahu movement also turned up outside the White House to remind him of the legal travails that await him at home.
In Washington, Netanyahu’s travel team struggled to square the demands for diplomatic razzle dazzle arranged by the White House with the need for the Israeli leader to project concern about the coronavirus misery building back home. The prime minister’s handlers confined the 100-member delegation, including journalists, to the palatial Willard InterContinental Hotel during the 44-hour stay in Washington when not attending the ceremony. The ultra-strict adherence to COVID-19 guidelines clashed with looser interpretations observed at the White House, which said masks were only recommended.
Missing from the White House were the leaders of the two countries who made the groundbreaking decisions to sign the agreements with Israel, the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan and Bahrain’s King Hamad al Isa bin Khalifa. Their absence indicated that there remain some details to be nailed down before the agreements are fully embraced.
The audience included delegations from Bahrain and the UAE, among them the leaders of the Jewish community in Dubai, which until recently conducted weekly Sabbath services at a secret location. The UAE has declared its dedication to religious tolerance and is building a monumental prayer compound in the capital city of Abu Dhabi that will contain a mosque, church and synagogue.
The accords themselves are described as vehicles of normalization with Israel, a fuzzy term that has been anathema to Palestinians and their supporters because it promises diplomatic benefits for Israel without requiring it to withdraw from occupied land in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, first proposed by Saudi Arabia, required a complete pullout from Palestinian territory before normalization could take place. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas condemned the accords, saying “no peace, security, or stability will be achieved for anyone in the region without ending the occupation.”
Netanyahu, Trump, and the foreign ministers signed three documents at the ceremony. One was a general declaration by all four proclaiming their commitment to regional peace. The other two were separate bilateral accords between Israel and both of the Gulf states outlining efforts for cementing ties in areas ranging from finance, trade and medical research, to civil aviation, sports, education and Muslim-Jewish interfaith activities. In a gesture to COVID-19 concerns, the four men refrained from shaking hands after signing the agreements, instead patting their hearts to acknowledge each other. They did not wear masks.
Among the points left open was whether the UAE would get the advanced F-35 fighter jets it has sought from the United States. Asked about that in a meeting in the Oval Office before the ceremony, Trump told reporters he expected to “work that out” and “that’s going to be an easy thing.” Israel has objected to the sale out of fear it will upset the “qualitative military edge” it has historically been promised by the U.S. to keep the country safe from its hostile neighbors.
Trump, whose first foreign trip as president in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, was also upbeat about prospects of getting the oil-rich kingdom and other Arab states to join the UAE and Bahrain in making peace with Israel, saying: “We’re very far down the road with about five countries.” Drawing a contrast with the history of war in the region, Trump termed the Abraham accords as “peace in the Middle East without blood all over the sand.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--Palestinians Can’t Stand In the Way of Israel’s Regional Integration

Palestinians Can ’ t Stand In the Way of Israel ’ s Regional Integration There ’ s nothing normal about the normalization deals Israel formalized at the White House yesterday .
Having weeks ago made public the news of an agreement with the United Arab Emirates , President Donald Trump then announced that , at the same White House event , Bahrain will also sign an accord with Israel .
This diplomatic double-play refutes notions that have powerfully influenced U.S. Middle East policy for more than half a century .
The first is the assumption that the Palestinians are central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second is the belief that the Palestinian problem has to be solved before the United States or Israel can improve relations with the Arab states .
Both belong on the trash heap of the peace process .
The agreements to normalize relations include opening embassies in each other ’ s countries .
They are the most stunning developments in Arab-Israeli affairs since the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords .
Gulf Arabs—businessmen , athletes , and officials—have increased both clandestine and open contact with Israelis over the last decade or so , but full normalization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The agreements to normalize relations are the most stunning developments in Arab-Israeli affairs since the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords .
The accords reflect common apprehension of strategic danger from Iran .
A number of Arab states , including the UAE and Bahrain , see Israel as a valuable ally in opposing that threat .
Israel already counters Iran by military and cyber means , as well as diplomatically , especially in Washington .
This had drawn the UAE , Bahrain , and Israel closer .
As reflected in Trump ’ s Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iran threat created an opportunity for Israel to normalize its relations with Arab states .
“ Enhanced strategic cooperation ” among them , the plan said , could help counter Iran , serve U.S. security interests generally , and increase chances for peace .
In that plan , published in January , the administration identified the parts of the West Bank they believed Israel would retain in any realistic peace deal .
Trump said it was very important that the United States “ recognize Israeli sovereignty ” over those areas if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Israel proposed .
On the assumption that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was largely about Palestinian control over the West Bank , successive Israeli governments tried unsuccessfully to make peace with the Palestinians based on a division of the territory .
Israel and the Palestinians both have historically based legal claims .
Jordan conquered the West Bank in the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war and Israel then conquered it in the 1967 war .
Israel has controlled the West Bank since 1967 , but has not formally extended sovereignty over it .
In 2000 , Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yasser Arafat a peace deal including control over an area at least 95 percent of the size of the West Bank .
Arafat turned it down .
In 2007 and 2008 , Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas a peace deal including approximately 94 percent of the West Bank and a so-called land swap from pre-1967 Israel equal to another 5 percent , together with other concessions .
Unhappy with the land swap specifics and insistent that Israel take in millions of descendants of Palestinian refugees , Abbas rejected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Trump team rejects the view that the West Bank is the essence of the conflict .
It sees the key to peace as Israeli strength and Palestinian resignation to Israel ’ s permanent existence .
When Trump promised to recognize Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank important to Israeli security , he was warning the Palestinians that continued rejectionism would lose them ground .
He was showing support for Israeli security and , in effect , minting currency that Israel and the United States could use with the Palestinians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team rejects the view that the West Bank is the essence of the conflict .
It sees the key to peace as Israeli strength and Palestinian resignation to Israel ’ s permanent existence .
Trump ’ s promise to recognize Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank triggered debate among Israelis on how and when they might change the legal status of parts of the territory .
Some call it “ annexation , ” others “ extension of sovereignty.
” The issue became a hot controversy throughout the Middle East and around the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and now Bahraini officials have seized .
They have an interest in opening diplomatic , technological , commercial , and other connections to Israel .
The controversy allowed them to strike a deal with Israel in return for Israel ’ s agreeing to “ suspend declaring sovereignty ” over parts of the West Bank .
It appears that the Israeli government would have been happy to apply Israeli sovereignty to parts of the West Bank with U.S. support , but it was even happier to suspend the action in return for a peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to boot .
Israel did not renounce its claim to sovereignty in the West Bank .
It has agreed only to suspend formally extending it , without specifying a time period .
In return , Israel wins the benefits of recognition from the UAE and Bahrain , hoping it also will lead to normalization with Oman , Saudi Arabia , Sudan , and other states .
As a practical matter , Israel already controls the West Bank , including the Jordan Valley , anyway .
It has kicked down the road the problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its suspension .
Despite decades of extravagant rhetoric— “ We reaffirm that the Palestine Cause is the entire Arab nation ’ s main priority , ” the Arab League declared in 2018—the Arab states never actually subordinated their own interests to those of the Palestinians .
In the last dozen years or so , when there have been no serious Palestinian-Israeli peace talks , the Gulf Arab states have quietly expanded cooperation with Israel , with only occasional public displays , for example at sporting events .
With increasing boldness , they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel .
They are shedding even the pretense of deference to Palestinian politicians .
The UAE-Israel and Bahrain-Israel deals make this reality undeniable .
The countries say they will not only work together against Iranian threats ; they will also do business , investing jointly and working together to manufacture goods , grow food , and organize cultural events .
They have spoken of medical cooperation and forging scientific and technological ties .
They seem intent on making their peace far more normal—involving lots of people-to-people interaction—than has been the case with Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Jordan .
There is sympathy for ordinary Palestinians , to be sure , but Arab state officials have ( yet again ) lost patience with Palestinian politicians whose corruption is surpassed only by their ineptitude .
The Palestinian economy is poor and growing worse .
Endemic corruption discourages investment and initiative , and there is much wasteful spending that includes paying huge sums to the families of those whom Israel convicted and imprisoned as terrorists or killed in action .
More and more Gulf Arab state officials recognize that the Palestinian people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States ( not to mention Israel ) would all be better off if new , more constructive Palestinian leaders came to power .
At the same time , there is less and less adherence to the conventional view that Israel must make peace with the Palestinians before it can make peace with the Arab states .
By noting that greater strategic cooperation between Israel and the Arab states against Iran would “ set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs , ” the Trump peace plan anticipated the UAE-Israel and Bahrain-Israel accords .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on the Palestinians to reform their politics , which is the key to a breakthrough on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace .
The message to the Palestinians from yesterday ’ s White House signing ceremony is that they need a political upheaval—new leaders , new institutions , new ideas—or they are going to become utterly irrelevant in the eyes of the world , including the broader Arab world .
As they lose attention , they will lose diplomatic support and economic aid .
If they can not make war and they will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shape their own future will diminish to nothing .
A venerable strategic maxim says that if a problem is too hard , expand it .
Trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by focusing only on the Palestinians and the tiny slice of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a mission impossible , but the two new peace deals point the way to a wider and wiser approach : encourage greater cooperation between Israel and the Arab states and enlist those states in pressing the Palestinians to empower new and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasonable means to advance U.S. interests and to make Palestinian-Israeli peace possible .
The UAE and Bahrain deals with Israel are so full of promise that the U.S. policy that helped bring it about should be continued no matter who wins the presidential election in November .

There’s nothing normal about the normalization deals Israel formalized at the White House yesterday. Having weeks ago made public the news of an agreement with the United Arab Emirates, President Donald Trump then announced that, at the same White House event, Bahrain will also sign an accord with Israel.
There’s nothing normal about the normalization deals Israel formalized at the White House yesterday. Having weeks ago made public the news of an agreement with the United Arab Emirates, President Donald Trump then announced that, at the same White House event, Bahrain will also sign an accord with Israel.
This diplomatic double-play refutes notions that have powerfully influenced U.S. Middle East policy for more than half a century. The first is the assumption that the Palestinians are central to the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. The second is the belief that the Palestinian problem has to be solved before the United States or Israel can improve relations with the Arab states. Both belong on the trash heap of the peace process.
The agreements to normalize relations include opening embassies in each other’s countries. They are the most stunning developments in Arab-Israeli affairs since the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords. Gulf Arabs—businessmen, athletes, and officials—have increased both clandestine and open contact with Israelis over the last decade or so, but full normalization between nations is a large leap forward.
The agreements to normalize relations are the most stunning developments in Arab-Israeli affairs since the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Oslo Accords.
The accords reflect common apprehension of strategic danger from Iran. A number of Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain, see Israel as a valuable ally in opposing that threat. Israel already counters Iran by military and cyber means, as well as diplomatically, especially in Washington. This had drawn the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel closer. As reflected in Trump’s Middle East peace plan, officials believed that the Iran threat created an opportunity for Israel to normalize its relations with Arab states. “Enhanced strategic cooperation” among them, the plan said, could help counter Iran, serve U.S. security interests generally, and increase chances for peace.
In that plan, published in January, the administration identified the parts of the West Bank they believed Israel would retain in any realistic peace deal. Trump said it was very important that the United States “recognize Israeli sovereignty” over those areas if the Palestinian side continued to reject peace deals that Israel proposed.
On the assumption that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was largely about Palestinian control over the West Bank, successive Israeli governments tried unsuccessfully to make peace with the Palestinians based on a division of the territory. Israel and the Palestinians both have historically based legal claims. Jordan conquered the West Bank in the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war and Israel then conquered it in the 1967 war. Israel has controlled the West Bank since 1967, but has not formally extended sovereignty over it.
In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat a peace deal including control over an area at least 95 percent of the size of the West Bank. Arafat turned it down. In 2007 and 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas a peace deal including approximately 94 percent of the West Bank and a so-called land swap from pre-1967 Israel equal to another 5 percent, together with other concessions. Unhappy with the land swap specifics and insistent that Israel take in millions of descendants of Palestinian refugees, Abbas rejected it.
In light of this history, the Trump team rejects the view that the West Bank is the essence of the conflict. It sees the key to peace as Israeli strength and Palestinian resignation to Israel’s permanent existence. When Trump promised to recognize Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank important to Israeli security, he was warning the Palestinians that continued rejectionism would lose them ground. He was showing support for Israeli security and, in effect, minting currency that Israel and the United States could use with the Palestinians or the Arab states.
The Trump team rejects the view that the West Bank is the essence of the conflict. It sees the key to peace as Israeli strength and Palestinian resignation to Israel’s permanent existence.
Trump’s promise to recognize Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank triggered debate among Israelis on how and when they might change the legal status of parts of the territory. Some call it “annexation,” others “extension of sovereignty.” The issue became a hot controversy throughout the Middle East and around the world, creating a diplomatic opportunity which Emirati and now Bahraini officials have seized.
They have an interest in opening diplomatic, technological, commercial, and other connections to Israel. The controversy allowed them to strike a deal with Israel in return for Israel’s agreeing to “suspend declaring sovereignty” over parts of the West Bank. It appears that the Israeli government would have been happy to apply Israeli sovereignty to parts of the West Bank with U.S. support, but it was even happier to suspend the action in return for a peace deal with the UAE—and one with Bahrain to boot.
Israel did not renounce its claim to sovereignty in the West Bank. It has agreed only to suspend formally extending it, without specifying a time period. In return, Israel wins the benefits of recognition from the UAE and Bahrain, hoping it also will lead to normalization with Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and other states. As a practical matter, Israel already controls the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley, anyway. It has kicked down the road the problem of when and how it might suspend its suspension.
Despite decades of extravagant rhetoric—“We reaffirm that the Palestine Cause is the entire Arab nation’s main priority,” the Arab League declared in 2018—the Arab states never actually subordinated their own interests to those of the Palestinians. In the last dozen years or so, when there have been no serious Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, the Gulf Arab states have quietly expanded cooperation with Israel, with only occasional public displays, for example at sporting events.
With increasing boldness, they are now showing a willingness to ally with Israel. They are shedding even the pretense of deference to Palestinian politicians. The UAE-Israel and Bahrain-Israel deals make this reality undeniable. The countries say they will not only work together against Iranian threats; they will also do business, investing jointly and working together to manufacture goods, grow food, and organize cultural events. They have spoken of medical cooperation and forging scientific and technological ties. They seem intent on making their peace far more normal—involving lots of people-to-people interaction—than has been the case with Israel’s so-called cold-peace relations with Egypt and Jordan.
There is sympathy for ordinary Palestinians, to be sure, but Arab state officials have (yet again) lost patience with Palestinian politicians whose corruption is surpassed only by their ineptitude. The Palestinian economy is poor and growing worse. Endemic corruption discourages investment and initiative, and there is much wasteful spending that includes paying huge sums to the families of those whom Israel convicted and imprisoned as terrorists or killed in action.
More and more Gulf Arab state officials recognize that the Palestinian people, the Arab states, and the United States (not to mention Israel) would all be better off if new, more constructive Palestinian leaders came to power. At the same time, there is less and less adherence to the conventional view that Israel must make peace with the Palestinians before it can make peace with the Arab states.
By noting that greater strategic cooperation between Israel and the Arab states against Iran would “set the stage for diplomatic breakthroughs,” the Trump peace plan anticipated the UAE-Israel and Bahrain-Israel accords. It implied that such deals could usefully increase pressure on the Palestinians to reform their politics, which is the key to a breakthrough on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The message to the Palestinians from yesterday’s White House signing ceremony is that they need a political upheaval—new leaders, new institutions, new ideas—or they are going to become utterly irrelevant in the eyes of the world, including the broader Arab world. As they lose attention, they will lose diplomatic support and economic aid. If they cannot make war and they will not make peace, their hopes to shape their own future will diminish to nothing.
A venerable strategic maxim says that if a problem is too hard, expand it. Trying to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by focusing only on the Palestinians and the tiny slice of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a mission impossible, but the two new peace deals point the way to a wider and wiser approach: encourage greater cooperation between Israel and the Arab states and enlist those states in pressing the Palestinians to empower new and better leaders.
That is the most reasonable means to advance U.S. interests and to make Palestinian-Israeli peace possible. The UAE and Bahrain deals with Israel are so full of promise that the U.S. policy that helped bring it about should be continued no matter who wins the presidential election in November.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--The Dutch Don’t Love Europe—and Never Did

The Dutch Don ’ t Love Europe—and Never Did Last April , while Dutch and Italian politicians were trading insults on the European COVID recovery package , the Corriere della Sera wrote that in early days of European integration , young Italian diplomats posted to Brussels were told to apply the following principle : “ In case of doubt , f… the Dutch.
” There was even a diplomatic version in circulation in Rome ’ s foreign ministry , the Farnesina : “ Let the Dutch speak and take the diametrically opposite position ’ .
” This is not just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as true today as it was at the start of the European communities : In many respects the Dutch are , again , more skeptical about European integration than the Italians .
Yes—again .
Nowadays , many who remember the Dutch as engaged , enthusiastic Europeans are puzzled by the harsh positions on eurozone reform or the COVID-19 package coming from The Hague .
But this is not new .
During the first two decades of European integration , the Dutch behaved the same way .
They only softened their stance after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Taking a closer look at recent history , it is clear the Dutch feel better in Europe with the British on their side .
And that the problems they currently have are partly the result of Brexit .
After the Second World War , the Dutch dreamed of a loose , transatlantic alliance focused on trade with the UK , United States and others .
Apart from a protestant culture they have much else in common with the British : their love of the sea , a sober outlook on life and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , seafaring and trading nations that once had overseas empires , used to striking out on their own .
But the transatlantic alliance never materialized .
Instead , in 1950 the Dutch heard ( on the radio ) that France and Germany decided to form the European Coal and Steel Community , run by a supranational authority .
The Dutch were not informed of this Schuman plan , which was officially launched on 9 May 1950 : Paris and Berlin assumed—correctly—that they would oppose it .
Indeed , the Dutch government was unhappy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a recent occupier , planned to join political forces .
The small , liberal , pragmatic country always looking west , fearing being smothered by , alternately , the heavy German legalistic culture and French étatisme that the Dutch love to hate .
But the Netherlands had little choice .
The post-war economy was weak .
Losing its colonies , the country needed to earn its income closer to home .
Its first post-war trade agreement with Germany functioned well—already the Netherlands was , economically speaking , becoming a German province .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ afford to say no to the Schuman plan .
Since France and Germany would go ahead anyway , it would be smarter to join and water it down from the inside .
This is what the Dutch have been doing ever since , to various degrees .
It is their own , instinctive European Pavlovian response .
From the first day , The Hague had a mission : to get the UK to join .
In 1973 , after several French vetoes , it finally managed .
For the Dutch , UK accession @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the continent ’ s economic reality .
The Dutch have always been Anglophiles .
They set up multinationals like Shell and Unilever with the UK .
They speak much better English than German or French .
Alongside the British the Dutch finally felt at home in continental Europe , and became more confident .
The two countries fought , and won , many liberal battles together—for the single market and several enlargements , for example .
This is when the Dutch lost some of their aversion to political integration , jumping head-on into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ else .
From the mid-Seventies till the mid-Nineties , roughly , they could definitely be described as euro-enthusiasts .
But the British drifted off .
While the Dutch proposed full political union for the Maastricht treaty—an unthinkable move today—London refused to join Schengen , the euro or judicial cooperation .
The British wanted the internal market and little else , and negotiated several opt-outs .
They became outsiders .
This is when Dutch ambivalence in Europe resurfaced , and euroskepticism started to rise .
It is partly directed against the EU itself , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that failed to explain why the country sits in the heart of European integration .
At school , Dutch children learn nothing about the EU , its purpose and history .
Newcomers wanting to become Dutch must pass an exam , for which they must be able to answer how the Dutch celebrate birthdays and what the waterworks are for—but in the accompanying textbook Europe is mentioned just twice : as a market .
Most Dutch citizens , while opinionated about the EU , can ’ t tell the difference between the Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , exporting country dependent on European networks , this is an awkward situation .
The Dutch central bank president Klaas Knot recently said that thanks to the EU , each Dutch household earns between 6,000 to 10,000 euros more per year .
Knot is no cheering Europhile .
But he understands that more European integration , including beefed-up eurozone resilience , will be necessary in today ’ s mercantilist world where raw power prevails .
Knot urged party leaders to discuss this more often ahead of parliamentary elections early next year .
Debating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a country that still loves looking west .
Former Prime Minister David Cameron ’ s insistence on the “ repatriation of powers ” from Brussels was popular in the Netherlands .
Most Dutch love the internal market and are positive about EU membership , but many reject the political aspects of European integration .
European defense , a common foreign policy , or European taxes make them jittery .
Their first reflex is to oppose those things .
The central question in The Netherlands is therefore an existential one : What are we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The honest answer is , of course , something like this : We are there because Germany and France are there to avoid more war , and we thought it wasn ’ t wise not to join .
This is too complicated a pitch for most politicians .
So they stick to the economic narrative— “ the EU is a market ” —ignoring the political origin and character of European integration .
That ’ s why in a Europe whose main challenges are now profoundly political , the Dutch behave like bookkeepers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond by counting beans .
This reflex grew stronger because of Brexit and the phantom pain it caused .
Brexit weakens the liberal , northern voice in Brussels .
It strengthens the power of Germany and France , and of Europe ’ s south .
The Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is traumatized by Britain ’ s departure .
He knows it could happen in his country , too .
Rutte ’ s liberal-conservative party , the VVD , is the largest in the Netherlands .
But the far-right euroskeptic PVV , led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Another far-right party , Democratic Forum , is also fanning anti-European sentiment .
Mr Rutte is determined to avoid a Dutch exit .
It would devastate a country that participates in every European program under the sun .
But the more Rutte wants to avoid the political debate about Europe , the more the opposition presses the point .
In this respect , he is in the same spot as David Cameron was before the Brexit referendum : failing to make a strong , convincing case for continued membership .
But there ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : the Dutch Prime Minister doesn ’ t withdraw from Brussels .
On the contrary , he ’ s actively forming new alliances across the continent .
He understands that Brexit changes the political ballgame in Europe .
The UK often amplified positions in Brussels .
Now , if the Dutch want to be heard , they need new allies .
Dutch diplomats and civil servants are fanning out to European capitals , listening , trying to make deals .
The shape of these alliances depends on the issue .
In some aspects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany .
They are reaching out to France , too , on single market issues and even trade .
Spain and Austria have also come into the picture .
For financial and economic issues , the Dutch formed a kind of new Hanseatic league , which puts pressure on Germany not to make too many concessions to France .
The fact that the group partly consists of small Nordics outside the eurozone and banking union doesn ’ t seem to bother The Hague .
In the budget and COVID-19 recovery battles of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But with Germany and France teaming up because both felt Europe ’ s political future was at stake , the Dutch did not manage to fundamentally alter the plan—they mostly got financial concessions .
When Chancellor Angela Merkel returned to Berlin afterwards , she talked about having averted a European disaster .
President Emmanuel Macron spoke about Europe , too .
Mr Rutte , back at The Hague , said he was happy that Dutch contributions to Brussels had not risen .
End of story .
No wonder Rutte needed an extensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , before securing approval for the deal .
Just 10 percent of the Dutch thought he should have been more lenient during the July Council .
According to a recent ECFR poll in 27 capitals , the Netherlands is currently seen as the fourth “ most disappointing country ” in the EU .
Of course the Dutch care about the diplomatic fallout .
In The Hague the dominance of the Finance Ministry on European affairs , to the detriment of the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry , has led to fierce discussions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 100 children from Greece ’ s burnt Moria camp , a clear gesture of goodwill to other EU countries .
But its financial and monetary positions that caused the fallout in the first place , haven ’ t changed .
Few observers expect this to happen before the elections .
So , no , it isn ’ t surprising that Italian diplomats are sometimes reminded of Dutch obstructionism in the early days in Brussels .
They call it the fracassi principle—from the Italian fracassare : to shatter .
And fracassi , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italian word for the Netherlands : ‘ Paesi Bassi ’ .

Last April, while Dutch and Italian politicians were trading insults on the European COVID recovery package, the Corriere della Sera wrote that in early days of European integration, young Italian diplomats posted to Brussels were told to apply the following principle: “In case of doubt, f… the Dutch.” There was even a diplomatic version in circulation in Rome’s foreign ministry , the Farnesina: “Let the Dutch speak and take the diametrically opposite position’.”
Last April, while Dutch and Italian politicians were trading insults on the European COVID recovery package, the Corriere della Sera wrote that in early days of European integration, young Italian diplomats posted to Brussels were told to apply the following principle: “In case of doubt, f… the Dutch.” There was even a diplomatic version in circulation in Rome’s foreign ministry, the Farnesina: “Let the Dutch speak and take the diametrically opposite position’.”
This is not just an amusing anecdote. It is probably as true today as it was at the start of the European communities: In many respects the Dutch are, again, more skeptical about European integration than the Italians.
Yes—again. Nowadays, many who remember the Dutch as engaged, enthusiastic Europeans are puzzled by the harsh positions on eurozone reform or the COVID-19 package coming from The Hague. But this is not new. During the first two decades of European integration, the Dutch behaved the same way. They only softened their stance after the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973.
Taking a closer look at recent history, it is clear the Dutch feel better in Europe with the British on their side. And that the problems they currently have are partly the result of Brexit.
After the Second World War, the Dutch dreamed of a loose, transatlantic alliance focused on trade with the UK, United States and others. Apart from a protestant culture they have much else in common with the British: their love of the sea, a sober outlook on life and a commercial disposition. Both are liberal, seafaring and trading nations that once had overseas empires, used to striking out on their own.
But the transatlantic alliance never materialized. Instead, in 1950 the Dutch heard (on the radio) that France and Germany decided to form the European Coal and Steel Community, run by a supranational authority. The Dutch were not informed of this Schuman plan, which was officially launched on 9 May 1950: Paris and Berlin assumed—correctly—that they would oppose it. Indeed, the Dutch government was unhappy that its two large neighbors, one a recent occupier, planned to join political forces. The small, liberal, pragmatic country always looking west, fearing being smothered by, alternately, the heavy German legalistic culture and French étatisme that the Dutch love to hate.
But the Netherlands had little choice. The post-war economy was weak. Losing its colonies, the country needed to earn its income closer to home. Its first post-war trade agreement with Germany functioned well—already the Netherlands was, economically speaking, becoming a German province. In short, the Dutch couldn’t afford to say no to the Schuman plan. Since France and Germany would go ahead anyway, it would be smarter to join and water it down from the inside.
This is what the Dutch have been doing ever since, to various degrees. It is their own, instinctive European Pavlovian response.
From the first day, The Hague had a mission: to get the UK to join. In 1973, after several French vetoes, it finally managed. For the Dutch, UK accession finally brought cultural and political meaning to the continent’s economic reality. The Dutch have always been Anglophiles. They set up multinationals like Shell and Unilever with the UK. They speak much better English than German or French.
Alongside the British the Dutch finally felt at home in continental Europe, and became more confident. The two countries fought, and won, many liberal battles together—for the single market and several enlargements, for example. This is when the Dutch lost some of their aversion to political integration, jumping head-on into Schengen, the monetary union and much else. From the mid-Seventies till the mid-Nineties, roughly, they could definitely be described as euro-enthusiasts.
But the British drifted off. While the Dutch proposed full political union for the Maastricht treaty—an unthinkable move today—London refused to join Schengen, the euro or judicial cooperation. The British wanted the internal market and little else, and negotiated several opt-outs. They became outsiders.
This is when Dutch ambivalence in Europe resurfaced, and euroskepticism started to rise. It is partly directed against the EU itself, but mainly against many successive Dutch governments that failed to explain why the country sits in the heart of European integration. At school, Dutch children learn nothing about the EU, its purpose and history. Newcomers wanting to become Dutch must pass an exam, for which they must be able to answer how the Dutch celebrate birthdays and what the waterworks are for—but in the accompanying textbook Europe is mentioned just twice: as a market. Most Dutch citizens, while opinionated about the EU, can’t tell the difference between the Council and the Commission.
For an open, exporting country dependent on European networks, this is an awkward situation. The Dutch central bank president Klaas Knot recently said that thanks to the EU, each Dutch household earns between 6,000 to 10,000 euros more per year. Knot is no cheering Europhile. But he understands that more European integration, including beefed-up eurozone resilience, will be necessary in today’s mercantilist world where raw power prevails. Knot urged party leaders to discuss this more often ahead of parliamentary elections early next year.
Debating Europe, however, is difficult in a country that still loves looking west. Former Prime Minister David Cameron’s insistence on the “repatriation of powers” from Brussels was popular in the Netherlands. Most Dutch love the internal market and are positive about EU membership, but many reject the political aspects of European integration. European defense, a common foreign policy, or European taxes make them jittery. Their first reflex is to oppose those things.
The central question in The Netherlands is therefore an existential one: What are we doing in the heart of Europe? The honest answer is, of course, something like this: We are there because Germany and France are there to avoid more war, and we thought it wasn’t wise not to join. This is too complicated a pitch for most politicians. So they stick to the economic narrative—“the EU is a market”—ignoring the political origin and character of European integration. That’s why in a Europe whose main challenges are now profoundly political, the Dutch behave like bookkeepers. When Italy needs solidarity, the Dutch respond by counting beans.
This reflex grew stronger because of Brexit and the phantom pain it caused. Brexit weakens the liberal, northern voice in Brussels. It strengthens the power of Germany and France, and of Europe’s south.
The Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is traumatized by Britain’s departure. He knows it could happen in his country, too. Rutte’s liberal-conservative party, the VVD, is the largest in the Netherlands. But the far-right euroskeptic PVV, led by Geert Wilders, is second. Another far-right party, Democratic Forum, is also fanning anti-European sentiment. Mr Rutte is determined to avoid a Dutch exit. It would devastate a country that participates in every European program under the sun.
But the more Rutte wants to avoid the political debate about Europe, the more the opposition presses the point. In this respect, he is in the same spot as David Cameron was before the Brexit referendum: failing to make a strong, convincing case for continued membership. But there’s also a difference between the two: the Dutch Prime Minister doesn’t withdraw from Brussels. On the contrary, he’s actively forming new alliances across the continent. He understands that Brexit changes the political ballgame in Europe.
The UK often amplified positions in Brussels. Now, if the Dutch want to be heard, they need new allies. Dutch diplomats and civil servants are fanning out to European capitals, listening, trying to make deals. The shape of these alliances depends on the issue. In some aspects, the Dutch are getting closer to Germany. They are reaching out to France, too, on single market issues and even trade. Spain and Austria have also come into the picture. For financial and economic issues, the Dutch formed a kind of new Hanseatic league, which puts pressure on Germany not to make too many concessions to France. The fact that the group partly consists of small Nordics outside the eurozone and banking union doesn’t seem to bother The Hague.
In the budget and COVID-19 recovery battles of the summer, the Dutch fought like lions. But with Germany and France teaming up because both felt Europe’s political future was at stake, the Dutch did not manage to fundamentally alter the plan—they mostly got financial concessions. When Chancellor Angela Merkel returned to Berlin afterwards, she talked about having averted a European disaster. President Emmanuel Macron spoke about Europe, too. Mr Rutte, back at The Hague, said he was happy that Dutch contributions to Brussels had not risen. End of story.
No wonder Rutte needed an extensive session in Parliament afterwards to explain himself, before securing approval for the deal. Just 10 percent of the Dutch thought he should have been more lenient during the July Council. According to a recent ECFR poll in 27 capitals, the Netherlands is currently seen as the fourth “most disappointing country” in the EU.
Of course the Dutch care about the diplomatic fallout. In The Hague the dominance of the Finance Ministry on European affairs, to the detriment of the diplomats in the Foreign Ministry, has led to fierce discussions. The government was also quick to take in 100 children from Greece’s burnt Moria camp, a clear gesture of goodwill to other EU countries. But its financial and monetary positions that caused the fallout in the first place, haven’t changed. Few observers expect this to happen before the elections.
So, no, it isn’t surprising that Italian diplomats are sometimes reminded of Dutch obstructionism in the early days in Brussels. They call it the fracassi principle—from the Italian fracassare: to shatter. And fracassi, it so happens, rhymes beautifully with the Italian word for the Netherlands: ‘Paesi Bassi’.