foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Did John Bolton Transform U.S. Foreign Policy or Enable Trump’s Transgressions?

Did John Bolton Transform U.S. Foreign Policy or Enable Trump ’ s Transgressions ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma , I heard there is some new book by a guy named John Bolton .
Have you heard anything about this ?
Emma Ashford : Sorry I ’ m late .
I was busy listening to Stephen Colbert interview Bolton about his book , and couldn ’ t stop laughing at how ridiculous Bolton ’ s talking points are .
His mustache is very impressive , though .
EA : We all know that memoirs are often self-serving attempts by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of history that makes them look good .
But even though Bolton ’ s book is full of juicy tidbits about the Trump administration , you can ’ t exactly escape the fact that his tenure as national security advisor was largely disastrous .
He refused to testify at impeachment , and he seems to just be trying to profit from publishing this now .
Or do you disagree and see Bolton as a hero of the resistance ?
MK : I have a lot of respect for Bolton ’ s intelligence and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maligned .
And there are certainly some new revelations in the book .
I ’ m somewhat critical for another reason .
I don ’ t think the book tells us anything about the president that we didn ’ t already know .
Donald Trump isn ’ t a longtime student of foreign policy , and he makes decisions based on instinct .
In addition , I ’ m not sure it is good for the country to have a recent senior official write a tell-all memoir while the president is still in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first part is certainly true .
I don ’ t know if Bolton ’ s revelations would have carried more weight if he ’ d actually testified under oath during the impeachment hearings back in January .
But at this point , I ’ m not sure how much worse revelations like this could make the president look .
Since impeachment , the president has failed to deal with a pandemic , an economic collapse , and mass protests , even as he ’ s found time to continue to undermine the rule @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it disturbing that most people are so inured to Trump ’ s transgressions at this point that lots of readers just looked at Bolton ’ s revelations about the president—that he didn ’ t know the United Kingdom has nuclear weapons , that he asked China for electoral help—and just shrugged .
What does it say about America that we ’ re all just unable to be shocked by Trump anymore ?
MK : While people may not be shocked , I think it could have some marginal electoral consequences .
Bolton is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s respected in the party .
He was never a Never Trumper .
He worked for Trump , saw him up close , and now says he will not vote for him in November .
That could encourage some other committed Republicans to do the same .
EA : I ’ m not so sure .
I think Bolton may find that he has less pull in the Republican Party than he used to ; it ’ s Trump ’ s party now .
But the main reason I ’ m so dismissive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got what he wanted in foreign policy during the Trump administration .
He got a withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and a more aggressive Iran policy .
He got an extremely confrontational approach to Venezuela .
He got to kill a bunch of arms control treaties , which—as one author noted this week in Foreign Policy—could lead to a nuclear arms race .
Certainly , you can see why the president ’ s penchant for befriending dictators annoyed Bolton , but he chose to enter the Trump administration to achieve his own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the White House would let him .
It was self-serving from beginning to end , and it ’ s been costly for U.S. foreign policy .
MK : I think you meant selfless and advantageous ?
Bolton is the rare senior official who has a clear worldview and cares deeply about policy .
Apparently , one of the few mementos he took from his office was a copy of the president ’ s order to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal .
In my view , that was the right policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ irredeemable flaws , including lifting an arms embargo on Iran after only a few years .
The Trump administration now has to introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution to try to keep Iran from buying advanced conventional weapons from Russia and China .
EA : Sorry , Matt , I almost forgot you were one of the few people who don ’ t think Bolton is too hawkish by far .
Look , I don ’ t deny he ’ s effective .
He achieved many of his foreign-policy goals during his time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ m sure Bolton is still happy with the administration ’ s Iran policy : a continued maximum pressure campaign .
But the failure of that campaign is already pretty obvious .
The U.N. Security Council resolution you mention is likely to be vetoed ; it might not even get the necessary votes to advance to the veto stage !
That ’ s not the picture of a policy that ’ s winning friends around the world , is it ?
MK : Not winning friends ?
Two dozen of America ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors last week , with only Russia and China in opposition .
But , to be sure , we are in a tight spot due to the flaws of the Iran nuclear deal .
It was naive when the deal was signed in 2015 to think that the United States could trust Iran—an anti-American , terrorist-sponsoring , revisionist , autocratic power—to buy advanced conventional weapons after only five years .
Now it ’ s up to the Trump administration to try to clean up the mess .
Or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons that will threaten U.S. partners , forces , and bases in the Middle East ?
EA : Well , at least you ’ re not emulating Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and using misleading charts to suggest that Iran could suddenly threaten Europe and Asia .
Look , I ’ d love to live in the world you ’ re talking about , where if Americans don ’ t like something—such as Iran buying weapons—Washington can just stop it .
The choice in 2015 wasn ’ t the deal or continued sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions breakdown as other countries decided to sell them weapons anyway .
The choice today isn ’ t between selling Iran weapons or not ; China and Russia are almost certainly going to do that no matter what the United States does .
The deal was a triumph of the art of compromise .
Trump might have written The Art of the Deal , but thanks to Bolton , his Iran policy has no place for that kind of pragmatism .
MK : There was a U.N. arms embargo on Iran , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of the nuclear deal .
Diplomacy requires compromise , but the U.S. government shouldn ’ t compromise on core national security interests .
No one forced Washington to sign the deal .
It was an unforced error .
EA : It ’ s funny you should say that .
My colleague John Glaser and I wrote a policy paper a few years back titled “ Unforced Error.
” It was about the risks of pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal .
The fact is that we ’ re already seeing what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It includes an Iran that ’ s closer to China and Russia , more able to buy arms , and more likely to enrich uranium without proper safeguards and inspections .
Maximum pressure is a failure .
That ’ s Bolton ’ s real legacy .
I ’ m just glad he didn ’ t actually manage to start a war with Iran .
Though I seem to recall you making the case for such a conflict in the past .
If the nuclear deal is so bad , is the alternative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alternative is maximum pressure in pursuit of an agreement that , unlike the 2015 deal , actually advances U.S. interests .
Like Presidents Barack Obama and Trump , I still believe a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and the military option should be on the table as a last resort .
And you say that pulling out of the deal would allow Iran to buy arms and enrich uranium without limits , but that is precisely what the deal permitted over time due to its sunset causes .
EA : That discussion of sunsets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ d like to remind both you and Bolton that even when the nuclear deal ’ s provisions expire , Iran agreed to continue to be bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to its rules on inspection and enrichment .
That ’ s hardly “ without limits.
” But at least Trump has found a way to distract himself from Bolton ’ s revelations .
He finally got back to his favorite pastime : holding campaign rallies , in this case a rally in Tulsa , Oklahoma—an event intended to prove that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was roaring back .
It didn ’ t exactly go well .
Did you get a ticket ?
MK : Iran ’ s NPT commitments ( which it repeatedly violated ) are not enough to solve this problem .
If they were , then the entire Iran nuclear crisis , including the deal , would have been unnecessary .
I didn ’ t make it to Tulsa , but I was in the Midwest last week and it was striking how different the attitude there is toward the pandemic .
In this particular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of COVID-19 , and people are tired of having their lives and business affected by lockdowns .
Most people were not wearing masks , and restaurants were open for inside dining despite the stated restrictions .
The response to the coronavirus and whether it is time to lift restrictions is shaping up to be a major national cleavage .
I take it you did not attend the Tulsa rally either ?
EA : I didn ’ t , and most Oklahomans didn ’ t either .
It was striking how empty the arena @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it was only about one-third full , and the campaign had to cancel the outside overflow area that it had set up .
That ’ s notable because it implies that despite the supposed partisan split on reopening , most people still aren ’ t willing to risk their health personally .
The country has to find a smart way to reopen the economy .
Look at Singapore or South Korea , where effective quarantines combined with masks and other public health initiatives have kept case numbers low and allowed for life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast , what we ’ ve been seeing is foolhardy things like the rally , or states reopening bars and restaurants .
The result has been a big surge in cases .
Perhaps that ’ s why the president is looking for other ways to appease his base .
I do think we should talk about what ’ s going on with immigration .
Trump issued another executive order this week , this one barring most skilled immigrants from getting visas .
He claims it ’ s about protecting jobs during the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no one .
We want artificial intelligence engineers , for example , to go to Silicon Valley , not to Shenzhen .
So , it is a mistake to restrict legal immigration excessively , especially H-1B visas for the most highly skilled workers .
MK : The United States is a country of laws , including when it comes to how people enter and exit .
And I agree with the president that illegal immigration is a problem that needs to be addressed .
But we might actually agree on the newly announced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attract the best and the brightest from around the world has always been one of its greatest strengths .
You are an immigrant to this country and a good example of this .
In this era of great-power competition , we want a brain drain working in our favor .
We want artificial intelligence engineers , for example , to go to Silicon Valley , not to Shenzhen , in order to help us build driverless cars and autonomous weapons systems .
So , it is a mistake to restrict legal immigration excessively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly skilled workers .
EA : Absolutely .
This is one area where I ’ m afraid to say that today ’ s Republican Party is very much at odds with itself .
The xenophobia that leads it to restrict immigration works against the national security imperatives you describe .
I am indeed an immigrant !
And I would hope that the United States wants to attract people like me who want to contribute to this country .
But even before these crackdowns , it was very difficult for skilled immigrants like me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we ’ re going to start to seeing immigrants go elsewhere : Australia , Canada , and New Zealand all have high standards of living , lots of jobs for skilled workers , and much more attractive visa regimes .
But all Trump seems to have left electorally is the culture war at this point .
It ’ s looking increasingly like he ’ ll be focused on immigration restrictions and diatribes about Confederate statues all the way to November .
MK : The mobs pulling down statues of people like President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Golden Gate Park have gone way too far .
A city council can vote to remove a statue if it chooses , but we shouldn ’ t leave it to violent mobs to decide .
Grant is an American hero who fought to defeat the Confederacy .
Protesters should distinguish between people , like Grant and the Founding Fathers , who accomplished much and deserve to be honored despite their records on racial issues , and Confederate leaders who are honored primarily because they fought to preserve slavery .
In the latter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Confederates were traitors and they lost , so why do they deserve statues ?
EA : The fact they ’ re pulling down statues of Grant suggests that these mobs aren ’ t exactly putting much thought into it .
It seems as if they ’ re just trying to pull down everyone on—or off—a horse .
But the discussion of how to handle the complicated legacies of historical figures is long overdue .
I attended the University of Virginia ; there have been debates there for years about how to handle Thomas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all , he wrote the Declaration of Independence while owning slaves .
He had children who were slaves .
And in the U.K. , how do we judge Winston Churchill ’ s legacy ?
The man helped to save the free world , but he participated in brutal imperial wars .
President Woodrow Wilson , the father of modern liberalism , was an inveterate racist who resegregated the U.S. civil service .
The bottom line is that historical figures are complicated .
It ’ s far better to talk about how we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expunge them from it entirely .
The one thing I ’ m sure of is that we won ’ t be seeing a statue of John Bolton anytime soon—unless it ’ s a monument to the great mustaches of the world .

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma, I heard there is some new book by a guy named John Bolton. Have you heard anything about this?
Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma, I heard there is some new book by a guy named John Bolton. Have you heard anything about this?
Emma Ashford: Sorry I’m late. I was busy listening to Stephen Colbert interview Bolton about his book, and couldn’t stop laughing at how ridiculous Bolton’s talking points are. His mustache is very impressive, though.
MK: Ridiculous? Why?
EA: We all know that memoirs are often self-serving attempts by former officials to write a first draft of history that makes them look good. But even though Bolton’s book is full of juicy tidbits about the Trump administration, you can’t exactly escape the fact that his tenure as national security advisor was largely disastrous. He refused to testify at impeachment, and he seems to just be trying to profit from publishing this now. Or do you disagree and see Bolton as a hero of the resistance?
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: I have a lot of respect for Bolton’s intelligence and experience and think he is often unfairly maligned. And there are certainly some new revelations in the book.
I’m somewhat critical for another reason. I don’t think the book tells us anything about the president that we didn’t already know. Donald Trump isn’t a longtime student of foreign policy, and he makes decisions based on instinct. In addition, I’m not sure it is good for the country to have a recent senior official write a tell-all memoir while the president is still in office.
EA: Well, the first part is certainly true. I don’t know if Bolton’s revelations would have carried more weight if he’d actually testified under oath during the impeachment hearings back in January. But at this point, I’m not sure how much worse revelations like this could make the president look. Since impeachment, the president has failed to deal with a pandemic, an economic collapse, and mass protests, even as he’s found time to continue to undermine the rule of law.
Frankly, I find it disturbing that most people are so inured to Trump’s transgressions at this point that lots of readers just looked at Bolton’s revelations about the president—that he didn’t know the United Kingdom has nuclear weapons, that he asked China for electoral help—and just shrugged. What does it say about America that we’re all just unable to be shocked by Trump anymore?
MK: While people may not be shocked, I think it could have some marginal electoral consequences. Bolton is a longtime Republican, and he’s respected in the party. He was never a Never Trumper. He worked for Trump, saw him up close, and now says he will not vote for him in November. That could encourage some other committed Republicans to do the same.
EA: I’m not so sure. I think Bolton may find that he has less pull in the Republican Party than he used to; it’s Trump’s party now. But the main reason I’m so dismissive of this book is that Bolton largely got what he wanted in foreign policy during the Trump administration. He got a withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and a more aggressive Iran policy. He got an extremely confrontational approach to Venezuela. He got to kill a bunch of arms control treaties, which—as one author noted this week in Foreign Policy—could lead to a nuclear arms race.
Certainly, you can see why the president’s penchant for befriending dictators annoyed Bolton, but he chose to enter the Trump administration to achieve his own goals, and he stayed as long as the White House would let him. It was self-serving from beginning to end, and it’s been costly for U.S. foreign policy.
MK: I think you meant selfless and advantageous? Bolton is the rare senior official who has a clear worldview and cares deeply about policy. Apparently, one of the few mementos he took from his office was a copy of the president’s order to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal.
In my view, that was the right policy. The Iran deal had too many irredeemable flaws, including lifting an arms embargo on Iran after only a few years. The Trump administration now has to introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution to try to keep Iran from buying advanced conventional weapons from Russia and China.
EA: Sorry, Matt, I almost forgot you were one of the few people who don’t think Bolton is too hawkish by far. Look, I don’t deny he’s effective. He achieved many of his foreign-policy goals during his time as national security advisor.
And I’m sure Bolton is still happy with the administration’s Iran policy: a continued maximum pressure campaign. But the failure of that campaign is already pretty obvious. The U.N. Security Council resolution you mention is likely to be vetoed; it might not even get the necessary votes to advance to the veto stage! That’s not the picture of a policy that’s winning friends around the world, is it?
MK: Not winning friends? Two dozen of America’s friends voted against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors last week, with only Russia and China in opposition. But, to be sure, we are in a tight spot due to the flaws of the Iran nuclear deal. It was naive when the deal was signed in 2015 to think that the United States could trust Iran—an anti-American, terrorist-sponsoring, revisionist, autocratic power—to buy advanced conventional weapons after only five years. Now it’s up to the Trump administration to try to clean up the mess. Or are you comfortable with Iran buying advanced weapons that will threaten U.S. partners, forces, and bases in the Middle East?
EA: Well, at least you’re not emulating Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and using misleading charts to suggest that Iran could suddenly threaten Europe and Asia.
Look, I’d love to live in the world you’re talking about, where if Americans don’t like something—such as Iran buying weapons—Washington can just stop it. The choice in 2015 wasn’t the deal or continued sanctions, it was the deal or potential sanctions breakdown as other countries decided to sell them weapons anyway. The choice today isn’t between selling Iran weapons or not; China and Russia are almost certainly going to do that no matter what the United States does.
The deal was a triumph of the art of compromise. Trump might have written The Art of the Deal, but thanks to Bolton, his Iran policy has no place for that kind of pragmatism.
MK: There was a U.N. arms embargo on Iran, and it is set to be lifted as part of the nuclear deal. Diplomacy requires compromise, but the U.S. government shouldn’t compromise on core national security interests. No one forced Washington to sign the deal. It was an unforced error.
EA: It’s funny you should say that. My colleague John Glaser and I wrote a policy paper a few years back titled “Unforced Error.” It was about the risks of pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal. The fact is that we’re already seeing what happens in a world without the deal. It includes an Iran that’s closer to China and Russia, more able to buy arms, and more likely to enrich uranium without proper safeguards and inspections.
Maximum pressure is a failure. That’s Bolton’s real legacy. I’m just glad he didn’t actually manage to start a war with Iran. Though I seem to recall you making the case for such a conflict in the past. If the nuclear deal is so bad, is the alternative war?
MK: No. The alternative is maximum pressure in pursuit of an agreement that, unlike the 2015 deal, actually advances U.S. interests. Like Presidents Barack Obama and Trump, I still believe a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and the military option should be on the table as a last resort. And you say that pulling out of the deal would allow Iran to buy arms and enrich uranium without limits, but that is precisely what the deal permitted over time due to its sunset causes.
EA: That discussion of sunsets is a bit disingenuous. I’d like to remind both you and Bolton that even when the nuclear deal’s provisions expire, Iran agreed to continue to be bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject to its rules on inspection and enrichment. That’s hardly “without limits.”
But at least Trump has found a way to distract himself from Bolton’s revelations. He finally got back to his favorite pastime: holding campaign rallies, in this case a rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma—an event intended to prove that the coronavirus was gone and the economy was roaring back. It didn’t exactly go well. Did you get a ticket?
MK: Iran’s NPT commitments (which it repeatedly violated) are not enough to solve this problem. If they were, then the entire Iran nuclear crisis, including the deal, would have been unnecessary.
I didn’t make it to Tulsa, but I was in the Midwest last week and it was striking how different the attitude there is toward the pandemic. In this particular town, there were zero confirmed cases of COVID-19, and people are tired of having their lives and business affected by lockdowns. Most people were not wearing masks, and restaurants were open for inside dining despite the stated restrictions. The response to the coronavirus and whether it is time to lift restrictions is shaping up to be a major national cleavage. I take it you did not attend the Tulsa rally either?
EA: I didn’t, and most Oklahomans didn’t either. It was striking how empty the arena was: The Tulsa fire marshal confirmed that it was only about one-third full, and the campaign had to cancel the outside overflow area that it had set up. That’s notable because it implies that despite the supposed partisan split on reopening, most people still aren’t willing to risk their health personally.
The country has to find a smart way to reopen the economy. Look at Singapore or South Korea, where effective quarantines combined with masks and other public health initiatives have kept case numbers low and allowed for life to go on. Here, in contrast, what we’ve been seeing is foolhardy things like the rally, or states reopening bars and restaurants. The result has been a big surge in cases.
Perhaps that’s why the president is looking for other ways to appease his base. I do think we should talk about what’s going on with immigration. Trump issued another executive order this week, this one barring most skilled immigrants from getting visas. He claims it’s about protecting jobs during the coronavirus crisis, but he’s fooling no one.
We want artificial intelligence engineers, for example, to go to Silicon Valley, not to Shenzhen. So, it is a mistake to restrict legal immigration excessively, especially H-1B visas for the most highly skilled workers.
MK: The United States is a country of laws, including when it comes to how people enter and exit. And I agree with the president that illegal immigration is a problem that needs to be addressed.
But we might actually agree on the newly announced measures. America’s ability to attract the best and the brightest from around the world has always been one of its greatest strengths. You are an immigrant to this country and a good example of this. In this era of great-power competition, we want a brain drain working in our favor. We want artificial intelligence engineers, for example, to go to Silicon Valley, not to Shenzhen, in order to help us build driverless cars and autonomous weapons systems. So, it is a mistake to restrict legal immigration excessively, especially H-1B visas for the most highly skilled workers.
EA: Absolutely. This is one area where I’m afraid to say that today’s Republican Party is very much at odds with itself. The xenophobia that leads it to restrict immigration works against the national security imperatives you describe.
I am indeed an immigrant! And I would hope that the United States wants to attract people like me who want to contribute to this country. But even before these crackdowns, it was very difficult for skilled immigrants like me to come here legally. Pretty soon, we’re going to start to seeing immigrants go elsewhere: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all have high standards of living, lots of jobs for skilled workers, and much more attractive visa regimes.
But all Trump seems to have left electorally is the culture war at this point. It’s looking increasingly like he’ll be focused on immigration restrictions and diatribes about Confederate statues all the way to November.
MK: The mobs pulling down statues of people like President Ulysses S. Grant in San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park have gone way too far. A city council can vote to remove a statue if it chooses, but we shouldn’t leave it to violent mobs to decide. Grant is an American hero who fought to defeat the Confederacy. Protesters should distinguish between people, like Grant and the Founding Fathers, who accomplished much and deserve to be honored despite their records on racial issues, and Confederate leaders who are honored primarily because they fought to preserve slavery. In the latter case, my view is that the Confederates were traitors and they lost, so why do they deserve statues?
EA: The fact they’re pulling down statues of Grant suggests that these mobs aren’t exactly putting much thought into it. It seems as if they’re just trying to pull down everyone on—or off—a horse. But the discussion of how to handle the complicated legacies of historical figures is long overdue. I attended the University of Virginia; there have been debates there for years about how to handle Thomas Jefferson’s controversial legacy. After all, he wrote the Declaration of Independence while owning slaves. He had children who were slaves.
And in the U.K., how do we judge Winston Churchill’s legacy? The man helped to save the free world, but he participated in brutal imperial wars. President Woodrow Wilson, the father of modern liberalism, was an inveterate racist who resegregated the U.S. civil service. The bottom line is that historical figures are complicated. It’s far better to talk about how we can add context to the historical record than expunge them from it entirely.
The one thing I’m sure of is that we won’t be seeing a statue of John Bolton anytime soon—unless it’s a monument to the great mustaches of the world.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Why North Korea Needs Its Nukes

Why North Korea Needs Its Nukes

Why North Korea Needs Its Nukes On June 25 , 1950 , North Korea sent 75,000 soldiers across its border with South Korea , the opening salvo of the three-year Korean War .
The conflict , which the United States entered within days , served as one of the first proxy wars of the Cold War .
And its bloody , but inconclusive , outcome in July 1953 reshaped U.S. foreign policy , including the country ’ s modern approach to nuclear deterrence .
Seventy years on , deterrence is still the watchword for Washington ’ s approach to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be reassessed .
In recent weeks , North Korea has been ramping up regional tensions .
The coming months could well see Pyongyang stage a military confrontation with Seoul , or the country could test a nuclear weapon or send a missile toward the United States .
Beyond the resulting physical danger , the latter two possibilities would pose a particular embarrassment for U.S. President Donald Trump , who declared Pyongyang ’ s nuclear threat to be over .
Trump may be the only person in Washington who believes that North Korea ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surrender his nuclear arsenal .
Kim himself has suggested nothing of the sort .
After weeks in hiding , the North Korean leader reemerged late last month to chair a session of the Central Military Commission on “ new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence ” of North Korea .
The participants intended to put “ the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation in line with the general requirements for the building and development of the armed forces of the country.
” That does not sound like preparation for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Pentagon report on “ Nuclear Deterrence : America ’ s Foundation and Backstop for National Defense ” lumps North Korea ( and nukeless-Iran ) together with Russia and China as justifying the U.S. nuclear arsenal .
Pyongyang ’ s tests , notes the Pentagon report , “ pose a threat to the U.S. homeland and our allies.
” In reality , however , the Democratic People ’ s Republic of Korea remains a modest nuclear power , with an estimated 20 to 30 warheads and sufficient fissile material for an additional 30 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produces enough nuclear material for up to 12 weapons annually .
This arsenal offers a potentially potent deterrent but far short of a serious offensive weapon against another nuclear power .
Drew Walter , U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters , admitted as much last month , saying that North Korea is “ not yet on the scale of some of our other nuclear-armed potential adversaries.
” So , he said , “ I don ’ t foresee very exquisite new capabilities to deter North Korea in that sense.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea would abandon its nuclear ambitions .
However , it is unlikely to do so .
And so it is critical for Washington to understand why Pyongyang wants nukes .
The Kim family dynasty is a malign regime that emerged from the Soviet occupation zone of Japan ’ s former colony after Tokyo ’ s surrender in World War II in 1945 .
Over the years , North Korea ’ s security situation steadily deteriorated .
The North ’ s economy stagnated and its people starved , while Beijing ’ s post-Mao @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collapse deprived the North of its military backers .
In contrast , South Korea surged ahead economically while enjoying a security guarantee from the globe ’ s dominant power , the United States .
Moreover , during and after the Cold War , Washington took advantage of its position to defenestrate disfavored governments almost at will .
In such a world , nuclear weapons looked increasingly attractive to the North as a means to deter attacks and preserve its regime .
No doubt , nukes provide other benefits , too : They offer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the military , and provide a tool for neighborly extortion .
But their main advantage is that the only sure way to prevent an attack by nations with an overwhelming conventional advantage is with nuclear weapons .
Which means it makes little sense for the United States to speak of deterring North Korea .
Pyongyang would attack only if Washington struck first , because the result of any nuclear exchange would be North Korea ’ s annihilation .
So why has the United States spent years frenetically attempting to block the North ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even strategies to attack the North to destroy its nuclear capabilities ?
In essence , U.S. policymakers have plotted to strike the country now to preserve the United States ’ ability to strike it later .
That is the practical reality of U.S. doctrine .
After the North invaded the South in 1950 , only urgent American intervention prevented conquest by Kim Il Sung .
China subsequently deployed hundreds of thousands of “ volunteers ” to rescue its neighbor , and the war ultimately stalemated near the original border .
An armistice but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces remained , necessary to secure a country ravaged by war , badly behind economically , and unstable politically under an aging autocrat .
That world long ago disappeared .
South Korea took off economically in the 1960s .
Democracy arrived in the late 1980s .
Today , the South possesses twice the population and enjoys an economy 53 times as large as the North .
Seoul ’ s military is qualitatively superior .
And the country could buy , build , hire , or acquire whatever else was necessary in its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintains a permanent garrison of about 28,500 personnel , backed by abundant forces throughout the Pacific and in the homeland .
As long as North Korea possessed only conventional weapons , the United States ’ deterrent presence was credible .
It was believable that Washington would enter a second Korean War to defend the South and almost certainly go on to liberate the North .
Although the fighting undoubtedly would be desperate and fierce , the result would not be in doubt .
Unlike in 1950 , China would not intervene militarily against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the military balance .
The North ’ s arsenal , with the possibility of being able to reach the United States , ensures the regime ’ s survival irrespective of Washington ’ s policy .
From Pyongyang ’ s perspective , its arsenal allows several forms of protection .
First , it removes any possibility of Washington launching a preventive war to eliminate the North ’ s nuclear program .
Some war advocates contend that North Korea could be prevented from retaliating or persuaded not to do so , but trusting hope over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risky .
Second , even conventional U.S. intervention in any Korean conflict would become problematic .
If Washington threatened Pyongyang with defeat , the North Korean leadership would have little reason not to threaten nuclear attacks on the American homeland .
The threat to incinerate American cities almost certainly would be sufficient to force Washington to back away from the peninsula .
Why , then , would Kim yield his weapons voluntarily ?
U.S. policymakers talk of making North Korea believe it is less secure with nukes than without them .
But none @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The United States ’ ruthless approach to regimes on Washington ’ s naughty list—most notably Libya ’ s Muammar al-Qaddafi , who abandoned his missile and nascent nuclear efforts only to be later overthrown with American assistance—highlights the vulnerability of any government without nukes .
Trump further degraded U.S. credibility by tearing up the Iranian nuclear agreement .
What is to prevent Trump or his successor from changing the terms once Kim has yielded his nukes ?
Instead , Washington would be wise to implicitly accept North Korea as a nuclear state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arms control .
If the United States could move toward a world that limits Pyongyang ’ s arsenal , safeguards the possibilities for proliferation , and requires active inspectors , this would be a success .
These goals would be difficult to achieve , but they are far more realistic than denuclearization .
To broker an agreement , Washington should propose a series of discrete deals trading specific sanctions relief for disarmament steps that would promote stability and peace while pushing along the road toward denuclearization .
The latter objective could guide ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever be achieved .
The United States would also be wise to lessen the circumstances under which the North might feel forced to resort to nuclear arms .
Seoul should take over its own defense , including developing conventional weapons that would give it deterrent capabilities against Pyongyang .
After a reasonable time for South Korea to adjust its force structure , American forces should return home , and the Mutual Defense Treaty should be turned into a cooperative pact between equals .
Most importantly , there should no longer be any presumption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a future Korean conflict and certainly not set as its objective the elimination of the North Korean state .
Lastly , Washington should be open to a decision by South Korea to construct its own nuclear deterrent .
A majority of South Koreans currently support the idea , although the political class so far has been more reluctant .
There are obvious downsides , but the risk to U.S. cities from the North ’ s growing nuclear arsenal outweighs such considerations .
A South Korean bomb would also help constrain China .
Ultimately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and risk it is prepared to accept to try to police East Asia as Chinese power further expands .
Inertia is a constant in government but is particularly dangerous in foreign policy .
Three decades ago , there seemed to be a possibility of persuading North Korea to drop its nuclear program .
That moment is long gone .
It is a nuclear state with expanding delivery options .
And the bilateral relationship is again turning hostile , with North Korea threatening the United States with “ a new round of the Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requires a significant change in U.S. policy .
At the very least , such a transformation deserves serious debate .

On June 25, 1950, North Korea sent 75,000 soldiers across its border with South Korea, the opening salvo of the three-year Korean War. The conflict, which the United States entered within days, served as one of the first proxy wars of the Cold War. And its bloody, but inconclusive, outcome in July 1953 reshaped U.S. foreign policy, including the country’s modern approach to nuclear deterrence. Seventy years on, deterrence is still the watchword for Washington’s approach to a nuclear Pyongyang—an increasingly misguided effort that should be reassessed.
On June 25, 1950, North Korea sent 75,000 soldiers across its border with South Korea, the opening salvo of the three-year Korean War. The conflict, which the United States entered within days, served as one of the first proxy wars of the Cold War. And its bloody, but inconclusive, outcome in July 1953 reshaped U.S. foreign policy, including the country’s modern approach to nuclear deterrence. Seventy years on, deterrence is still the watchword for Washington’s approach to a nuclear Pyongyang—an increasingly misguided effort that should be reassessed.
In recent weeks, North Korea has been ramping up regional tensions. The coming months could well see Pyongyang stage a military confrontation with Seoul, or the country could test a nuclear weapon or send a missile toward the United States. Beyond the resulting physical danger, the latter two possibilities would pose a particular embarrassment for U.S. President Donald Trump, who declared Pyongyang’s nuclear threat to be over.
Trump may be the only person in Washington who believes that North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is ready to surrender his nuclear arsenal. Kim himself has suggested nothing of the sort. After weeks in hiding, the North Korean leader reemerged late last month to chair a session of the Central Military Commission on “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence” of North Korea. The participants intended to put “the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation in line with the general requirements for the building and development of the armed forces of the country.” That does not sound like preparation for denuclearization.
On the U.S. side, a Pentagon report on “Nuclear Deterrence: America’s Foundation and Backstop for National Defense” lumps North Korea (and nukeless-Iran) together with Russia and China as justifying the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Pyongyang’s tests, notes the Pentagon report, “pose a threat to the U.S. homeland and our allies.”
In reality, however, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains a modest nuclear power, with an estimated 20 to 30 warheads and sufficient fissile material for an additional 30 to 60 nuclear weapons. The regime produces enough nuclear material for up to 12 weapons annually. This arsenal offers a potentially potent deterrent but far short of a serious offensive weapon against another nuclear power.
Drew Walter, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters, admitted as much last month, saying that North Korea is “not yet on the scale of some of our other nuclear-armed potential adversaries.” So, he said, “I don’t foresee very exquisite new capabilities to deter North Korea in that sense.”
There are good reasons to wish that North Korea would abandon its nuclear ambitions. However, it is unlikely to do so. And so it is critical for Washington to understand why Pyongyang wants nukes.
The Kim family dynasty is a malign regime that emerged from the Soviet occupation zone of Japan’s former colony after Tokyo’s surrender in World War II in 1945. Over the years, North Korea’s security situation steadily deteriorated. The North’s economy stagnated and its people starved, while Beijing’s post-Mao transformation and the Soviet Union’s collapse deprived the North of its military backers. In contrast, South Korea surged ahead economically while enjoying a security guarantee from the globe’s dominant power, the United States. Moreover, during and after the Cold War, Washington took advantage of its position to defenestrate disfavored governments almost at will. In such a world, nuclear weapons looked increasingly attractive to the North as a means to deter attacks and preserve its regime. No doubt, nukes provide other benefits, too: They offer international status, strengthen domestic support from the military, and provide a tool for neighborly extortion. But their main advantage is that the only sure way to prevent an attack by nations with an overwhelming conventional advantage is with nuclear weapons.
Which means it makes little sense for the United States to speak of deterring North Korea. Pyongyang would attack only if Washington struck first, because the result of any nuclear exchange would be North Korea’s annihilation.
So why has the United States spent years frenetically attempting to block the North’s plans, buttressed by threats and even strategies to attack the North to destroy its nuclear capabilities? In essence, U.S. policymakers have plotted to strike the country now to preserve the United States’ ability to strike it later.
That is the practical reality of U.S. doctrine. After the North invaded the South in 1950, only urgent American intervention prevented conquest by Kim Il Sung. China subsequently deployed hundreds of thousands of “volunteers” to rescue its neighbor, and the war ultimately stalemated near the original border. An armistice but no formal peace followed. And U.S. forces remained, necessary to secure a country ravaged by war, badly behind economically, and unstable politically under an aging autocrat.
That world long ago disappeared. South Korea took off economically in the 1960s. Democracy arrived in the late 1980s. Today, the South possesses twice the population and enjoys an economy 53 times as large as the North. Seoul’s military is qualitatively superior. And the country could buy, build, hire, or acquire whatever else was necessary in its own defense. Yet the United States still maintains a permanent garrison of about 28,500 personnel, backed by abundant forces throughout the Pacific and in the homeland.
As long as North Korea possessed only conventional weapons, the United States’ deterrent presence was credible. It was believable that Washington would enter a second Korean War to defend the South and almost certainly go on to liberate the North. Although the fighting undoubtedly would be desperate and fierce, the result would not be in doubt. Unlike in 1950, China would not intervene militarily against America.
A nuclear North Korea upends the military balance. The North’s arsenal, with the possibility of being able to reach the United States, ensures the regime’s survival irrespective of Washington’s policy.
From Pyongyang’s perspective, its arsenal allows several forms of protection. First, it removes any possibility of Washington launching a preventive war to eliminate the North’s nuclear program. Some war advocates contend that North Korea could be prevented from retaliating or persuaded not to do so, but trusting hope over experience in this way is far too risky. Second, even conventional U.S. intervention in any Korean conflict would become problematic. If Washington threatened Pyongyang with defeat, the North Korean leadership would have little reason not to threaten nuclear attacks on the American homeland. The threat to incinerate American cities almost certainly would be sufficient to force Washington to back away from the peninsula.
Why, then, would Kim yield his weapons voluntarily?
U.S. policymakers talk of making North Korea believe it is less secure with nukes than without them. But none of the arguments advanced seems vaguely plausible. The United States’ ruthless approach to regimes on Washington’s naughty list—most notably Libya’s Muammar
al-Qaddafi, who abandoned his missile and nascent nuclear efforts only to be later overthrown with American assistance—highlights the vulnerability of any government without nukes. Trump further degraded U.S. credibility by tearing up the Iranian nuclear agreement. What is to prevent Trump or his successor from changing the terms once Kim has yielded his nukes?
Instead, Washington would be wise to implicitly accept North Korea as a nuclear state and shift its focus from denuclearization to arms control. If the United States could move toward a world that limits Pyongyang’s arsenal, safeguards the possibilities for proliferation, and requires active inspectors, this would be a success. These goals would be difficult to achieve, but they are far more realistic than denuclearization.
To broker an agreement, Washington should propose a series of discrete deals trading specific sanctions relief for disarmament steps that would promote stability and peace while pushing along the road toward denuclearization. The latter objective could guide ongoing policy even though it is unlikely to ever be achieved.
The United States would also be wise to lessen the circumstances under which the North might feel forced to resort to nuclear arms. Seoul should take over its own defense, including developing conventional weapons that would give it deterrent capabilities against Pyongyang. After a reasonable time for South Korea to adjust its force structure, American forces should return home, and the Mutual Defense Treaty should be turned into a cooperative pact between equals. Most importantly, there should no longer be any presumption that the United States would intervene in a future Korean conflict and certainly not set as its objective the elimination of the North Korean state.
Lastly, Washington should be open to a decision by South Korea to construct its own nuclear deterrent. A majority of South Koreans currently support the idea, although the political class so far has been more reluctant. There are obvious downsides, but the risk to U.S. cities from the North’s growing nuclear arsenal outweighs such considerations. A South Korean bomb would also help constrain China. Ultimately, Washington must decide how much cost and risk it is prepared to accept to try to police East Asia as Chinese power further expands.
Inertia is a constant in government but is particularly dangerous in foreign policy. Three decades ago, there seemed to be a possibility of persuading North Korea to drop its nuclear program. That moment is long gone. It is a nuclear state with expanding delivery options. And the bilateral relationship is again turning hostile, with North Korea threatening the United States with “a new round of the Korean War.” An appropriate response to Pyongyang requires a significant change in U.S. policy. At the very least, such a transformation deserves serious debate.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--Collapse of Kosovo Talks Amid Leader’s War Crimes Charges Are Rebuff for Trump

Collapse of Kosovo Talks Amid Leader ’ s War Crimes Charges Are Rebuff for Trump Last weekend , his party won a landslide victory in elections boycotted by opposition parties in protest of his strongman tactics .
This coming Saturday , he was due to appear at the White House for peace talks with President Hashim Thaci of Kosovo , but the summit collapsed before it had even begun after an international tribunal announced on Wednesday that Thaci had been charged with war crimes .
The prime minister of Kosovo , Avdullah Hoti , was due to take his place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was canceling his trip too .
Observers on both sides of the Atlantic are likely relieved at the collapse of the U.S.-led talks , which many feared could do more harm than good .
U.S. President Donald Trump has been keen to bolster his deal-maker image by brokering a hasty agreement between the quarreling countries at any cost , taking a heavy-handed approach with U.S. ally Kosovo while asking little of Serbia .
Trump ’ s envoy for the peace talks , Richard Grenell , initially heralded Saturday ’ s summit as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ downplayed it , saying that the leaders would focus on economic issues to create jobs and “ bring capitalism ” to improve ties between the two countries while thorny political talks over Kosovo ’ s declaration of independence from Serbia would be left to the European Union .
With the U.S.-led talks now on pause for the foreseeable future , Vucic can now “ kick the can down the road ” for a little while longer , said Dimitar Bechev , a research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a solution .
He was interested in talking about it , because that ’ s what he ’ s offering basically , really , ” said Florian Bieber , a professor of Southeast European history and politics at the University of Graz in Austria .
The United States played a decisive role in the collapse of the government of Kosovo in March , as Grenell had grown increasingly frustrated with headstrong then-Prime Minister Albin Kurti , who had resisted U.S. pressure .
Kosovo has often been described as the most pro-American country on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intended to halt ethnic cleansing enabled Kosovo to break away from Serbia and later declare its independence in 2008 .
Serbia has refused to recognize the sovereignty of its former province .
Kosovo ’ s politics will likely be plunged into chaos by the charges announced against the president , who was one of the top commanders in the Kosovo Liberation Army .
A mainstay of Kosovar politics since independence , Thaci has seen his future as president thrown into doubt because of the new charges brought by a special tribunal based in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him and nine others of being responsible for the murder of nearly 100 Kosovar Albanians , Serbs , and Romani people .
While the charges are still to be confirmed by a pretrial judge , the court took the unusual step of announcing them on Wednesday because of Thaci ’ s efforts to “ obstruct and undermine ” the work of the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor ’ s Office .
Thaci is a key backer of Hoti , who has served as prime minister for only three weeks , so the president ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I am doubtful that the Hoti government will survive for long in such circumstances , ” Bieber said .
There was a time when a slide into authoritarianism came with a cost , but in an increasingly multipolar and transactional world , Vucic has effortlessly played major powers off against one another while shoring up his grip on power at home .
“ Twenty years ago , there was basically no alternative to the EU .
There was no one competing for influence or authority in the region , so they all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And that ’ s no longer the case , at least not economically , ” said Eric Gordy , a professor of political and cultural sociology at University College London .
While Serbia seeks to join the European Union , attacks on the media and opposition there have increased under Vucic , prompting Freedom House to downgrade its assessment of the country from free to partly free in 2019 .
The EU ’ s ability to check this has been hamstrung by flourishing authoritarianism within its member states .
Hungarian Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international leaders to congratulate Vucic after his faction and their junior coalition partners won a dizzying 230 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament on Sunday .
“ The European Union and the United States have not done enough to hold Serbian government accountable and enact political consequences on Serbian government for its blatant disregard of democratic rules , ” said Majda Ruge , a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations .
“ Certainly the West is more circumspect when it comes to criticizing him because in some European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perception that if you ’ re too harsh on Serbia they may look elsewhere , ” said Bechev , the author of Rival Power : Russia in Southeast Europe .
Candidates for EU membership are expected to align their foreign policy with that of the bloc , but Serbia has instead steadily drifted in the opposite direction .
An analysis by the International and Security Affairs Centre , a think tank based in Belgrade , Serbia , found that in 2019 Serbia aligned with 57 percent of the foreign-policy declarations made by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2012 .
“ The EU should be clear that Serbia has to choose its direction , ” said Molly Montgomery , a former special advisor to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence for Europe and Eurasia .
“ I think there ’ s an argument that the EU should focus less on wooing countries like Serbia that are trying to play powers off of each other , and more on supporting countries that are dedicated to moving full speed ahead on membership.
” Vucic has spoken publicly about this desire to continue balancing Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Union is by far Serbia ’ s most significant business partner , accounting for more than two-thirds of the country ’ s trade , the EU ’ s leaders have failed to translate this into political clout .
Asked in opinion polls who they think is Belgrade ’ s most significant trade partner , almost three-quarters of Serbs said China and Russia .
“ This clearly suggests to me that there ’ s misunderstanding , deliberately fostered by leaders like Vucic , ” said Bieber of the University of Graz .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ long and deep , and Moscow has proved to be an invaluable ally in international institutions when it comes to blocking Kosovo ’ s attempts to gain recognition .
This week , Vucic met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow after attending a World War II victory parade previously postponed by the pandemic .
Beijing ’ s footprint in the region is new , but it has expanded significantly over the past decade , with China making billions of dollars of loans and investments in Serbia .
In March , as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China sent a shipment of medical aid to Serbia .
In a press conference , Vucic said , “ European solidarity does not exist .
That was a fairy tale on paper , ” and he sent a letter of thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping in which he said he addressed the Chinese leader “ not only as a dear friend , but as a brother.
” “ China is seen as the big piggy bank arriving .
Of course , this perception is flawed because the money is recycled into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t get much from it , ” said Bechev .
While Chinese investments in Serbia are expected to reach $ 10 billion , of the total $ 2.2 billion that has entered Serbia so far , almost two-thirds were loans .
While Vucic ’ s balancing act may have paid off for him so far , he may end up painting himself into a corner , experts warn .
The EU has typically led talks between Serbia and Kosovo , but under Trump the United States had sought to forge a parallel process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on pause , Europe may once again take the lead , and Brussels is less likely to be as accommodating of Vucic as Washington has been .
With an overwhelming majority of the parliament now under his control , Vucic may face increased pressure from the European Union to make concessions with a view to striking a deal with Kosovo .
For decades , Serbian leaders have used their fear of their political opponents as a reason for dragging their heels on peace talks .
“ He no longer has an excuse for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to do .
Any failure to deliver is all on him , ” said Gordy of University College London .

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is having a good week.
Last weekend, his party won a landslide victory in elections boycotted by opposition parties in protest of his strongman tactics. This coming Saturday, he was due to appear at the White House for peace talks with President Hashim Thaci of Kosovo, but the summit collapsed before it had even begun after an international tribunal announced on Wednesday that Thaci had been charged with war crimes. The prime minister of Kosovo, Avdullah Hoti, was due to take his place, but on Thursday he announced that he was canceling his trip too.
Observers on both sides of the Atlantic are likely relieved at the collapse of the U.S.-led talks, which many feared could do more harm than good. U.S. President Donald Trump has been keen to bolster his deal-maker image by brokering a hasty agreement between the quarreling countries at any cost, taking a heavy-handed approach with U.S. ally Kosovo while asking little of Serbia.
Trump’s envoy for the peace talks, Richard Grenell, initially heralded Saturday’s summit as “historic,” but he later downplayed it, saying that the leaders would focus on economic issues to create jobs and “bring capitalism” to improve ties between the two countries while thorny political talks over Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia would be left to the European Union.
With the U.S.-led talks now on pause for the foreseeable future, Vucic can now “kick the can down the road” for a little while longer, said Dimitar Bechev, a research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
“Vucic was never interested in a solution. He was interested in talking about it, because that’s what he’s offering basically, really,” said Florian Bieber, a professor of Southeast European history and politics at the University of Graz in Austria.
The United States played a decisive role in the collapse of the government of Kosovo in March, as Grenell had grown increasingly frustrated with headstrong then-Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who had resisted U.S. pressure.
Kosovo has often been described as the most pro-American country on earth after a 1999 NATO bombing campaign intended to halt ethnic cleansing enabled Kosovo to break away from Serbia and later declare its independence in 2008. Serbia has refused to recognize the sovereignty of its former province.
Kosovo’s politics will likely be plunged into chaos by the charges announced against the president, who was one of the top commanders in the Kosovo Liberation Army. A mainstay of Kosovar politics since independence, Thaci has seen his future as president thrown into doubt because of the new charges brought by a special tribunal based in The Hague, Netherlands, which accused him and nine others of being responsible for the murder of nearly 100 Kosovar Albanians, Serbs, and Romani people. While the charges are still to be confirmed by a pretrial judge, the court took the unusual step of announcing them on Wednesday because of Thaci’s efforts to “obstruct and undermine” the work of the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.
Thaci is a key backer of Hoti, who has served as prime minister for only three weeks, so the president’s departure could lead to new elections. “I am doubtful that the Hoti government will survive for long in such circumstances,” Bieber said.
There was a time when a slide into authoritarianism came with a cost, but in an increasingly multipolar and transactional world, Vucic has effortlessly played major powers off against one another while shoring up his grip on power at home. “Twenty years ago, there was basically no alternative to the EU. There was no one competing for influence or authority in the region, so they all had to orient themselves to the EU. And that’s no longer the case, at least not economically,” said Eric Gordy, a professor of political and cultural sociology at University College London.
While Serbia seeks to join the European Union, attacks on the media and opposition there have increased under Vucic, prompting Freedom House to downgrade its assessment of the country from free to partly free in 2019. The EU’s ability to check this has been hamstrung by flourishing authoritarianism within its member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was one of the first international leaders to congratulate Vucic after his faction and their junior coalition partners won a dizzying 230 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament on Sunday. “The European Union and the United States have not done enough to hold Serbian government accountable and enact political consequences on Serbian government for its blatant disregard of democratic rules,” said Majda Ruge, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
“Certainly the West is more circumspect when it comes to criticizing him because in some European capitals at least there’s a perception that if you’re too harsh on Serbia they may look elsewhere,” said Bechev, the author of Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe.
Candidates for EU membership are expected to align their foreign policy with that of the bloc, but Serbia has instead steadily drifted in the opposite direction. An analysis by the International and Security Affairs Centre, a think tank based in Belgrade, Serbia, found that in 2019 Serbia aligned with 57 percent of the foreign-policy declarations made by the EU, down from 99 percent in 2012.
“The EU should be clear that Serbia has to choose its direction,” said Molly Montgomery, a former special advisor to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence for Europe and Eurasia. “I think there’s an argument that the EU should focus less on wooing countries like Serbia that are trying to play powers off of each other, and more on supporting countries that are dedicated to moving full speed ahead on membership.”
Vucic has spoken publicly about this desire to continue balancing Russia and China with the West. While the European Union is by far Serbia’s most significant business partner, accounting for more than two-thirds of the country’s trade, the EU’s leaders have failed to translate this into political clout. Asked in opinion polls who they think is Belgrade’s most significant trade partner, almost three-quarters of Serbs said China and Russia. “This clearly suggests to me that there’s misunderstanding, deliberately fostered by leaders like Vucic,” said Bieber of the University of Graz.
Russia’s ties with Belgrade run long and deep, and Moscow has proved to be an invaluable ally in international institutions when it comes to blocking Kosovo’s attempts to gain recognition. This week, Vucic met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow after attending a World War II victory parade previously postponed by the pandemic.
Beijing’s footprint in the region is new, but it has expanded significantly over the past decade, with China making billions of dollars of loans and investments in Serbia. In March, as the coronavirus was picking up speed in Europe, China sent a shipment of medical aid to Serbia. In a press conference, Vucic said, “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper,” and he sent a letter of thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping in which he said he addressed the Chinese leader “not only as a dear friend, but as a brother.”
“China is seen as the big piggy bank arriving. Of course, this perception is flawed because the money is recycled into Chinese companies and local contractors won’t get much from it,” said Bechev. While Chinese investments in Serbia are expected to reach $10 billion, of the total $2.2 billion that has entered Serbia so far, almost two-thirds were loans.
While Vucic’s balancing act may have paid off for him so far, he may end up painting himself into a corner, experts warn. The EU has typically led talks between Serbia and Kosovo, but under Trump the United States had sought to forge a parallel process. With the U.S.-led process likely now on pause, Europe may once again take the lead, and Brussels is less likely to be as accommodating of Vucic as Washington has been.
With an overwhelming majority of the parliament now under his control, Vucic may face increased pressure from the European Union to make concessions with a view to striking a deal with Kosovo. For decades, Serbian leaders have used their fear of their political opponents as a reason for dragging their heels on peace talks. “He no longer has an excuse for doing things that he won’t want to do. Any failure to deliver is all on him,” said Gordy of University College London.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-26--The Galwan Killings Are the Nail in the Coffin for China and India’s Relationship

The Galwan Killings Are the Nail in the Coffin for China and India ’ s Relationship For the last two months , China and India have been embroiled in a series of standoffs along their disputed Himalayan border that has become the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations in over 50 years .
In some ways , this is familiar territory : India records several hundred Chinese transgressions across the de facto border , known as the Line of Actual Control ( LAC ) , annually , and this marks the fourth prolonged border crisis in seven years .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ novel and consequential crisis , threatening the tenuous framework that has previously prevented China-India relations from devolving into open rivalry .
It was clear from the outset this border crisis would be different .
Following uncommon , but not unprecedented , reports of fistfighting between Chinese and Indian border patrols in early May , the Indian press made a dramatic revelation .
The Chinese military had massed thousands of soldiers and towed artillery at multiple noncontiguous locations along the LAC where the Indian union territory of Ladakh meets Tibet , even temporarily crossing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ May .
What ’ s worse , the Chinese army was probing in sectors of the LAC , including Sikkim and the Galwan River , long considered settled by New Delhi .
Perhaps most concerning , the army seemed to be trying to alter the status quo by occupying a so-called gray zone along the banks of Pangong Lake , a particularly contentious stretch of the border where the very location of the LAC is disputed .
The proximate cause of China ’ s border maneuvers was the subject of feverish speculation in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ footsteps of its “ all-weather friend ” Pakistan by responding to New Delhi ’ s August 2019 decision to revoke Kashmir ’ s autonomous statehood ?
Was it objecting to new Indian restrictions on Chinese investment ?
Lashing out amid international pressure over the COVID-19 pandemic and growing domestic incentives to project a muscular nationalism abroad ?
Or should the Chinese be taken at their word ?
Were they , as they had done numerous times in the past , objecting to recent Indian infrastructure upgrades near the LAC by presenting it with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that remains the most likely explanation .
But if Beijing was drawing from a familiar playbook , its tactics this time appeared far more aggressive .
After several inconclusive rounds of talks between local officers , senior Chinese and Indian commanders met on June 6 and agreed to ease tensions at the border .
One week later , with the crisis seemingly unwinding , disaster struck .
On the night of June 15 , the LAC witnessed a terrible spasm of violence near the Galwan River .
The rules of engagement near the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not brutal , medieval combat .
Fighting along the narrow ridgeline of a Himalayan mountain , 20 Indian soldiers were killed .
Some were beaten to death with metal rods and spiked clubs .
Others literally fell , or were pushed , to their death .
China hasn ’ t reported its own casualties , as “ comparisons may trigger antagonism on both sides.
” The precise details and location of that fateful brawl remain the subject of debate , but the fight reportedly began when Indian forces approached the LAC to confirm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pact .
The violence erupted when the Indian patrol demanded the dismantlement of a Chinese outpost straddling the LAC on India ’ s side .
In the aftermath , Beijing and Delhi blamed each other for violating the LAC and initiating hostilities .
Surprisingly , China also laid claim to the entire Galwan River valley , a departure from outside analysts ’ prior understanding of China ’ s claims there .
Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar insisted China ’ s actions “ reflected an intent to change the facts on the ground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At the same time , both sides signaled their interest in further de-escalating the situation .
Neither country has shown any interest in a wider conflict , and an 11-hour meeting between senior military commanders on June 22 focused on future steps for de-escalation .
For now , the LAC near the Galwan River has fallen quiet again .
There are several catches here .
First , recent reports aided by satellite imagery suggest that , far from disengaging from the site of the Galwan brawl ( which either lies right on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s side , depending on the map ) , China appears to have substantially reinforced its position there .
There are now Chinese defensive structures , shelters , trenches , and vehicles visible , as well as culverts constructed over the Galwan River “ near the spot where bulldozers appeared to have stopped the flow of the waters ” in May , the Indian broadcaster NDTV reported .
Other reports suggest China continues to mass forces and erect structures near the LAC in other parts of the eastern sector , including the Depsang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two sides return to the June 6 de-escalation road map covering multiple sites at the Galwan River , Depsang , Gogra , and Hot Springs , there ’ s a more intractable standoff unfolding farther south , at Pangong Lake .
In recent years , the banks of the lake have become a tinderbox , host to a growing number of hostile confrontations between the two sides .
With no mutual agreement on the LAC there , a several-kilometer stretch along the northern bank between spits of land known as “ Finger 4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a volatile gray zone , claimed and patrolled by both sides .
Notably , China has enjoyed a superior position there , having built a road through the area in 1999 , while Indian soldiers are forced by inhospitable geography to patrol the contentious stretch on foot .
Last month , several hundred Chinese troops pushed west from their base near Finger 8 to a point near India ’ s easternmost base at Finger 4 and set up camp , erecting dozens of new structures along the way , seizing the high ground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gray zone .
The Indian media is now embroiled in a debate over whether China has effectively seized Indian territory while reviewing Delhi ’ s options to respond .
Unsurprisingly , the Indian public is outraged .
A large and growing segment of the Indian elite had already grown increasingly disenchanted with China in recent years , frustrated by Beijing ’ s ongoing patronage to Pakistan , its probing at the border , and its growing footprint in India ’ s immediate neighborhood .
As a result , they have also grown increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States .
Now , those calls have been amplified and joined by a broader cross-section of Indian society , including those once hopeful for a more constructive relationship with China , or at least more equidistance between Washington and Beijing .
“ The policy of riding on two horses – getting closer to the US without ruffling too many feathers in China – has run its course , ” writes the researcher Sushant Sareen .
“ India will have to decide whether to reinforce a failed policy , or forge a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the US and its allies.
” For its part , the Trump administration has been largely reserved in its public commentary on the crisis .
In May , Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells warned of China ’ s “ constant aggression , the constant attempt to shift the norms , to shift what is the status quo .
That has to be resisted whether it ’ s in the South China Sea … or whether it ’ s in India ’ s own backyard.
” More recently , administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the LAC crisis .
However , this is likely less a sign of impartiality from the United States than a reflection of the Indian government ’ s preferences : It has traditionally cautioned Washington privately against taking too public a role in India ’ s disputes with China .
Over the last few decades China and India have invested considerable energy into managing their conflicts of interest and their over 2,100-mile disputed border .
It ’ s required both sides to strike a delicate balance , competing and sparring along numerous fault lines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoiding crossing each other ’ s red lines .
Occasionally , Chinese actions have upset that balance , provoking a sharp response from India .
That was the case when Beijing refused to issue a visa to an Indian military officer from Kashmir in 2010 ; when Chinese submarines surfaced in Sri Lanka in 2014 ; and when the Chinese military tried to extend a road into the disputed Doklam plateau in 2017 .
China ’ s latest adventure at the border hasn ’ t so much disrupted the balance as reset the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , writes the Times of India ’ s Indrani Bagchi , “ achieved precisely the opposite of what it wanted — it has pushed India into much closer partnerships with the west.
” Some analysts contend Beijing is convinced India ’ s history of nonalignment will prevent it from ever drawing too close to the United States .
The China expert Yun Sun and others argue the opposite : that Beijing views India as a “ lost cause ” and that no amount of catering to Indian sensitivities will prevent it from aligning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States .
She writes : “ India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India ’ s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions .
… If a strategic friendship with India is untenable , it frees up room for tactical gains.
” With China having established its own infrastructure network along the LAC , Yun believes Beijing “ wants to put an end to the infrastructure arms race ” and sees India ’ s road-building as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the back while China was trying to deal with ” growing tensions with the United States and international criticism over the COVID-19 pandemic .
Whatever China ’ s calculus , it should prepare for a more confrontational posture from the Indian government in the years ahead .
Within days of the fighting , the Indian press reported Delhi will “ bar Chinese companies from providing any telecom equipment to state-run telcos and may also prohibit private mobile phone operators from using gear supplied by the likes of Huawei and ZTE.
” In early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inviting Australia to the Japan-India-U.S. trilateral naval exercise , Malabar .
Beginning June 22 , Chinese imports were reportedly being stalled at key Indian ports .
Meanwhile , an article in India ’ s largest Hindi-language newspaper urges the Modi government to “ reimagine its policies on Tibet , Taiwan , and Hong Kong ” and “ be prepared to exit organizations like the [ Shanghai Cooperation Organization ] .
” India will likely review its approach to the broad spectrum of policies that fall within the China portfolio , from the Quad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the South China Sea and the Dalai Lama .
In the near term , India will be seeking to return to the pre-May status quo at the LAC , including at Pangong Lake .
If Beijing balks , Delhi ’ s immediate options to respond are limited and unpalatable .
While there have been calls inside India for military retaliation and escalation , amid a global recession and pandemic Delhi will be reluctant to start a war over a few dozen kilometers of real estate not previously in its sovereign possession .
Over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more at stake than the fingers of Pangong Lake .
And there are more effective , albeit less immediate , ways of imposing costs on China for its border adventure .
India already enjoys the world ’ s third-largest military budget .
Within a decade it will likely be the world ’ s most populous country , with the fourth-largest economy .
Many in China know this , which is why , despite its palpable disdain for India , Beijing has over the years sought to avoid a dramatic rupture with Delhi .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ one where “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomats casually throw decades of more cautious diplomacy to the wind .
It ’ s a China that may have forgotten what it means to win the battle but lose the war .

For the last two months, China and India have been embroiled in a series of standoffs along their disputed Himalayan border that has become the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations in over 50 years. In some ways, this is familiar territory: India records several hundred Chinese transgressions across the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), annually, and this marks the fourth prolonged border crisis in seven years. However, the still-unfolding standoffs represent a far more novel and consequential crisis, threatening the tenuous framework that has previously prevented China-India relations from devolving into open rivalry.
For the last two months, China and India have been embroiled in a series of standoffs along their disputed Himalayan border that has become the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations in over 50 years. In some ways, this is familiar territory: India records several hundred Chinese transgressions across the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), annually, and this marks the fourth prolonged border crisis in seven years. However, the still-unfolding standoffs represent a far more novel and consequential crisis, threatening the tenuous framework that has previously prevented China-India relations from devolving into open rivalry.
It was clear from the outset this border crisis would be different. Following uncommon, but not unprecedented, reports of fistfighting between Chinese and Indian border patrols in early May, the Indian press made a dramatic revelation. The Chinese military had massed thousands of soldiers and towed artillery at multiple noncontiguous locations along the LAC where the Indian union territory of Ladakh meets Tibet, even temporarily crossing the LAC near the Galwan River in May.
What’s worse, the Chinese army was probing in sectors of the LAC, including Sikkim and the Galwan River, long considered settled by New Delhi. Perhaps most concerning, the army seemed to be trying to alter the status quo by occupying a so-called gray zone along the banks of Pangong Lake, a particularly contentious stretch of the border where the very location of the LAC is disputed.
The proximate cause of China’s border maneuvers was the subject of feverish speculation in India. Was Beijing following in the footsteps of its “all-weather friend” Pakistan by responding to New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to revoke Kashmir’s autonomous statehood? Was it objecting to new Indian restrictions on Chinese investment? Lashing out amid international pressure over the COVID-19 pandemic and growing domestic incentives to project a muscular nationalism abroad? Or should the Chinese be taken at their word? Were they, as they had done numerous times in the past, objecting to recent Indian infrastructure upgrades near the LAC by presenting it with a fait accompli? To this day that remains the most likely explanation. But if Beijing was drawing from a familiar playbook, its tactics this time appeared far more aggressive.
After several inconclusive rounds of talks between local officers, senior Chinese and Indian commanders met on June 6 and agreed to ease tensions at the border. One week later, with the crisis seemingly unwinding, disaster struck. On the night of June 15, the LAC witnessed a terrible spasm of violence near the Galwan River. The rules of engagement near the LAC bar the use of live ammunition—but not brutal, medieval combat. Fighting along the narrow ridgeline of a Himalayan mountain, 20 Indian soldiers were killed. Some were beaten to death with metal rods and spiked clubs. Others literally fell, or were pushed, to their death. China hasn’t reported its own casualties, as “comparisons may trigger antagonism on both sides.”
The precise details and location of that fateful brawl remain the subject of debate, but the fight reportedly began when Indian forces approached the LAC to confirm China’s compliance with the disengagement pact. The violence erupted when the Indian patrol demanded the dismantlement of a Chinese outpost straddling the LAC on India’s side.
In the aftermath, Beijing and Delhi blamed each other for violating the LAC and initiating hostilities. Surprisingly, China also laid claim to the entire Galwan River valley, a departure from outside analysts’ prior understanding of China’s claims there. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar insisted China’s actions “reflected an intent to change the facts on the ground in violation of all our agreement.”
At the same time, both sides signaled their interest in further de-escalating the situation. Neither country has shown any interest in a wider conflict, and an 11-hour meeting between senior military commanders on June 22 focused on future steps for de-escalation. For now, the LAC near the Galwan River has fallen quiet again.
There are several catches here. First, recent reports aided by satellite imagery suggest that, far from disengaging from the site of the Galwan brawl (which either lies right on the LAC or 100 meters on India’s side, depending on the map), China appears to have substantially reinforced its position there. There are now Chinese defensive structures, shelters, trenches, and vehicles visible, as well as culverts constructed over the Galwan River “near the spot where bulldozers appeared to have stopped the flow of the waters” in May, the Indian broadcaster NDTV reported. Other reports suggest China continues to mass forces and erect structures near the LAC in other parts of the eastern sector, including the Depsang Valley.
Second, even if the two sides return to the June 6 de-escalation road map covering multiple sites at the Galwan River, Depsang, Gogra, and Hot Springs, there’s a more intractable standoff unfolding farther south, at Pangong Lake. In recent years, the banks of the lake have become a tinderbox, host to a growing number of hostile confrontations between the two sides. With no mutual agreement on the LAC there, a several-kilometer stretch along the northern bank between spits of land known as “Finger 4” and “Finger 8” became a volatile gray zone, claimed and patrolled by both sides. Notably, China has enjoyed a superior position there, having built a road through the area in 1999, while Indian soldiers are forced by inhospitable geography to patrol the contentious stretch on foot.
Last month, several hundred Chinese troops pushed west from their base near Finger 8 to a point near India’s easternmost base at Finger 4 and set up camp, erecting dozens of new structures along the way, seizing the high ground, and staking claim over the Pangong gray zone. The Indian media is now embroiled in a debate over whether China has effectively seized Indian territory while reviewing Delhi’s options to respond.
Unsurprisingly, the Indian public is outraged. A large and growing segment of the Indian elite had already grown increasingly disenchanted with China in recent years, frustrated by Beijing’s ongoing patronage to Pakistan, its probing at the border, and its growing footprint in India’s immediate neighborhood. As a result, they have also grown increasingly desirous of a stronger partnership with the United States. Now, those calls have been amplified and joined by a broader cross-section of Indian society, including those once hopeful for a more constructive relationship with China, or at least more equidistance between Washington and Beijing. “The policy of riding on two horses – getting closer to the US without ruffling too many feathers in China – has run its course,” writes the researcher Sushant Sareen. “India will have to decide whether to reinforce a failed policy, or forge a new one which involves a much closer alliance with the US and its allies.”
For its part, the Trump administration has been largely reserved in its public commentary on the crisis. In May, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells warned of China’s “constant aggression, the constant attempt to shift the norms, to shift what is the status quo. That has to be resisted whether it’s in the South China Sea … or whether it’s in India’s own backyard.” More recently, administration officials have made only passing references to the LAC crisis. However, this is likely less a sign of impartiality from the United States than a reflection of the Indian government’s preferences: It has traditionally cautioned Washington privately against taking too public a role in India’s disputes with China.
Over the last few decades China and India have invested considerable energy into managing their conflicts of interest and their over 2,100-mile disputed border. It’s required both sides to strike a delicate balance, competing and sparring along numerous fault lines while maintaining the veneer of comity and avoiding crossing each other’s red lines. Occasionally, Chinese actions have upset that balance, provoking a sharp response from India. That was the case when Beijing refused to issue a visa to an Indian military officer from Kashmir in 2010; when Chinese submarines surfaced in Sri Lanka in 2014; and when the Chinese military tried to extend a road into the disputed Doklam plateau in 2017. China’s latest adventure at the border hasn’t so much disrupted the balance as reset the entire equation. China’s actions, writes the Times of India’s Indrani Bagchi, “achieved precisely the opposite of what it wanted — it has pushed India into much closer partnerships with the west.”
Some analysts contend Beijing is convinced India’s history of nonalignment will prevent it from ever drawing too close to the United States. The China expert Yun Sun and others argue the opposite: that Beijing views India as a “lost cause” and that no amount of catering to Indian sensitivities will prevent it from aligning with its more natural partner in the United States. She writes: “India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India’s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions. … If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains.” With China having established its own infrastructure network along the LAC, Yun believes Beijing “wants to put an end to the infrastructure arms race” and sees India’s road-building as “an attempt to stab it in the back while China was trying to deal with” growing tensions with the United States and international criticism over the COVID-19 pandemic.
Whatever China’s calculus, it should prepare for a more confrontational posture from the Indian government in the years ahead. Within days of the fighting, the Indian press reported Delhi will “bar Chinese companies from providing any telecom equipment to state-run telcos and may also prohibit private mobile phone operators from using gear supplied by the likes of Huawei and ZTE.”
In early June, reports suggested India is considering inviting Australia to the Japan-India-U.S. trilateral naval exercise, Malabar. Beginning June 22, Chinese imports were reportedly being stalled at key Indian ports. Meanwhile, an article in India’s largest Hindi-language newspaper urges the Modi government to “reimagine its policies on Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong” and “be prepared to exit organizations like the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization].” India will likely review its approach to the broad spectrum of policies that fall within the China portfolio, from the Quad and the Belt and Road Initiative to the South China Sea and the Dalai Lama.
In the near term, India will be seeking to return to the pre-May status quo at the LAC, including at Pangong Lake. If Beijing balks, Delhi’s immediate options to respond are limited and unpalatable. While there have been calls inside India for military retaliation and escalation, amid a global recession and pandemic Delhi will be reluctant to start a war over a few dozen kilometers of real estate not previously in its sovereign possession.
Over the long term, there’s more at stake than the fingers of Pangong Lake. And there are more effective, albeit less immediate, ways of imposing costs on China for its border adventure. India already enjoys the world’s third-largest military budget. Within a decade it will likely be the world’s most populous country, with the fourth-largest economy.
Many in China know this, which is why, despite its palpable disdain for India, Beijing has over the years sought to avoid a dramatic rupture with Delhi. But this is a new China, one where “Wolf Warrior” diplomats casually throw decades of more cautious diplomacy to the wind. It’s a China that may have forgotten what it means to win the battle but lose the war.