foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Finland’s President Can Hold His Own With Both Putin and Trump

Finland ’ s President Can Hold His Own With Both Putin and Trump Sauli Niinisto , now halfway through his second six-year term as Finnish president , tends to be discreet .
A lawyer by training , Niinisto is the leader of the European Union ’ s northernmost member—which also happens to be the one that shares the longest border with Russia—and is the only Western leader who could be said to have good relations with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump .
“ He knows which fights to pick and which to avoid , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brookings Institution .
Niinisto also knows how—and when—to make a point , as he did last October when he held a joint press conference with Trump , on the eve of the latter ’ s impeachment .
“ You have a great democracy , ” he said , locking his eyes with Trump , as the latter listened intently ( or seemed to ) .
“ Keep it going on.
” Still , Finland ’ s 72-year-old president has quite a few bones to pick , as he made clear in the course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last month , beginning with the troubled state of democracy itself .
“ Democracy could use some nurturing , ” he said .
The fact that a Finnish president can be taken seriously as a spokesperson for Western democracy illustrates how both Finland and Europe have changed since the fall of the Soviet Union .
Thirty years ago , Finland was Europe ’ s odd man out .
Its foreign policy was described as active neutrality ; it shared a mutually beneficial , if onerous so-called special relationship with the Soviet Union , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Finland ’ s leaders to avoid entangling alliances with the West .
The Finnish state still bore the effects of the quarter-century reign of former President Urho Kekkonen , its Cold War-era leader who used his own special relationship with Moscow to win four terms in office , while the Kremlin acknowledged Finnish neutrality .
Today Finland no longer calls itself neutral .
“ Non-aligned is the word we use now , ” Niinisto said .
“ We are also part of the European Union.
” Finnish support for the EU , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We belong to the West , ” he continued , pointing to Finland ’ s resiliently democratic culture as proof .
“ But we also are a neighbor to the east , ” he adds .
Even though the most arduous , military dimension of the special relationship—the odious mutual defense pact by which both pledged to hold joint military discussions in the unlikely event of an invasion of Russia by NATO via Finnish territory—was formally dissolved after the fall of the Soviet Union , the Finnish head of state still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also true .
“ I get along with him very well , ” he says of his Russian counterpart .
“ We can discuss issues very openly , even sensitive matters.
” “ Niinisto is a cool-headed realist , and not an idealist.
” “ Niinisto is a cool-headed realist , and not an idealist , ” says Mika Aaltola , director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs .
“ This means he is not going to bother Putin with long liberal lectures .
He has maintained a good working relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ukraine or other serious security concerns … it is in the Finnish realist tradition not to turn your backs on Russians and show fear.
” High on the list of sensitive matters which Niinisto discusses with Putin is the possibility of Finland upgrading its current status as a NATO partner to full membership , something which Putin has explicitly warned Finland against .
“ The Russians have made it quite clear that when they look across the border , they see Finns , ” he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 2018 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they would see enemies.
” For the moment , a majority of Finns also oppose NATO membership .
For Niinisto , keeping the option of joining NATO open while maintaining a strong , independent , well-equipped defense force , is a sufficient deterrent .
“ Our defense forces can equip 280,000 trained soldiers , ” Aaltola points out .
“ This compares very well with most European defense forces.
” Finland also ranks among the most militarily prepared nations in the world , in terms of the percentage of its population that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Finns willing to take up arms , something which Putin is doubtless aware of .
As proof of the two leaders ’ special connection , Niinisto tweeted that he had phoned Putin and discussed “ the possibilities of settling the tense situation in Belarus , ” as well as the condition of Alexei Navalny , the Russian opposition leader who was allegedly poisoned with Novichok on Aug. 20 , according to doctors treating him in Germany .
Navalny ’ s staff later explicitly thanked Niinisto for helping persuade Putin to allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Berlin for medical treatment .
The savvy Finn also felt he knew both Trump and Putin well enough to give the former “ a pep talk ” on how to mix it up with the latter before the two leaders met in Helsinki in July 2018 , according to John Bolton , the former U.S. national security advisor .
“ It is important to get along with Washington , if you want to have a stabilizing influence on Moscow , ” says Aaltola .
“ And obviously it is in Finland ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Moscow.
” “ Niinisto reminded Trump that Putin was a fighter , and Trump should therefore hit back if attacked , ” Bolton describes in his book , The Room Where It Happened .
“ As if preparing for a boxing match , Niinisto warned Trump never to provide an opening or give one inch.
” Trump had difficulty taking Niinisto ’ s advice , as the farcical press conference that followed their meeting made clear .
But no one questions that the advice Niinisto proffered was sound .
“ You have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to study and understand the modus operandi of the Kremlin more than any other Western country , ” Michael Franck , the noted Finnish filmmaker points out .
According to Bolton , after telling Trump that Finland didn ’ t want to join NATO at their meeting in Helsinki , Niinisto reminded Trump that “ Finland had an army of 280,000 if everyone was called up to make it clear the price would be high if they were invaded.
” Finland arguably has the most popular democratically elected government in Europe .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is something that the judicious Niinisto manages well , which helps account for his record-high poll ratings : around 90 percent of Finns approve of his job performance .
Between that and the high support for Finland ’ s celebrated 34-year-old prime minister , Sanna Marin , and her Social Democratic cabinet , Finland arguably has the most popular democratically elected government in Europe .
Nearly three-quarters of the Finnish electorate voted in last year ’ s parliamentary elections , and Transparency International ranks Finland as the world ’ s third-least corrupt country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corruption .
Trust in authorities is high , ” Niinisto proudly observes .
“ The health of our democracy is good.
” Still , as he gazes out from the presidential palace , Niinisto doesn ’ t seem to feel the same way about the health of liberal democracy in general .
“ We have learned that democracy is not a given thing , ” he said .
“ We must nurture it , perhaps more so than we have had to do for a long time.
” Niinisto is outspoken on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Social media has added a new and even aggravating platform for aggressive behavior and manipulation , ” he observes—an interesting position for the president of the country which gave the world Nokia , the company which essentially invented the mobile phone .
It seems that “ connecting people ” —Nokia ’ s old slogan—has turned out to be something of a mixed blessing , according to the president .
“ It is easier to write insults , ” says Niinisto , “ than to say them eye to eye.
” As befits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to steering between Scylla and Charybdis—the monster and whirlpool of Greek mythology—Niinisto refrains from directly criticizing either Trump or Putin .
However , he has no qualms about criticizing the two leaders ’ policies .
Regarding Washington ’ s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the World Health Organization in July , he says flatly : “ I would rather have seen the U.S. stay in.
” Niinisto also indirectly criticized Washington ’ s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement .
“ We were all surprised by COVID-19 .
We received a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common enemy , ” he said .
“ In order to stop the pandemic , it would be good to find the same common spirit as in the Paris climate agreement.
” As for the recent referendum that could allow the Russian president to remain in power until at least 2036 , Niinisto said , “ We do not know whether [ Putin ] is planning to continue or for how long.
” That said , he continued mordantly , “ the decision to hold the referendum does reveal that customs in Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy.
” In the past , Niinisto has also been outspoken on the subject of Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea .
Explaining his balancing act , he asserts : “ In Finland , we have long said we can not do anything about geography .
What we can do is to maintain a clear and consistent Western line in our relationship with our Eastern neighbor and improve understanding between East and West.
” He points out that “ it has worked , ” referring to the history of successful East-West summits that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclude the one he presided over in 2018 from the list—dating back to the 1975 mega-summit and the historic Helsinki Accords .
“ I believe it will continue to work in the future , too.
” He isn ’ t surprised by Trump ’ s position on NATO and the U.S. responsibility for Europe ’ s defense .
“ President Trump has continued what the U.S. has requested for many years , [ that ] Europe should take more responsibility for strengthening its defense and fulfilling its commitment to NATO .
Now he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I do understand the American opinion on this , including President ’ s Trump ’ s viewpoint.
” Niinisto appears to have mixed feelings about the European Union .
While he continues to support Finnish membership in EU , as do most Finns , he admits he is not happy with the lack of coordination with which the EU responded to the coronavirus pandemic , in contrast with the generally strong , proactive , and successful manner with which Finland and its neighbors—with the arguable exception of Sweden—conducted themselves .
He also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s lack of common economic and security strategy .
“ The EU has a lot of potential .
Counted together the EU member states have enormous economic power and 27 armies , ” Niinisto continued .
“ As long as I have talked with other European leaders about defense , the answer has always been ” to fall back on NATO , and particularly the United States , rather than having the EU develop and maintain its own discrete , defense force , he says .
“ The EU must develop its common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this potential turns into influence .
It has a lot to do to make a comeback as an influential geopolitical actor.
” Like many older Finns who recall that the then-neutral United States was reluctant to come to Finland ’ s aid during the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40 , Niinisto remains wary of relying on Washington—or NATO—too much .
He would like Europe to stand on its own , just as Finland has essentially done since World War II .
At the same time , he implied , he would like more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mutual defense clause which states that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its own territory , other member states are obliged to come to its aid .
Niinisto , like many Finns , isn ’ t sure what that means .
“ Finns like clarity when it comes to defense , ” says Aaltola .
Still , the president has remained mum on the subject of the continuing EU sanctions on trade with Russia enacted after Crimea , even though those sanctions hurt Finland more than other EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has avoided .
True to form , he is also reluctant to criticize Trump too openly .
When asked how he felt about the deployment of federal troops in response to protests in the United States and if the country still had a “ great democracy , ” as he put it during his White House visit last year , Niinisto declined to answer .

Sauli Niinisto, now halfway through his second six-year term as Finnish president, tends to be discreet.
Sauli Niinisto, now halfway through his second six-year term as Finnish president, tends to be discreet.
A lawyer by training, Niinisto is the leader of the European Union’s northernmost member—which also happens to be the one that shares the longest border with Russia—and is the only Western leader who could be said to have good relations with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump. “He knows which fights to pick and which to avoid,” observes Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.
Niinisto also knows how—and when—to make a point, as he did last October when he held a joint press conference with Trump, on the eve of the latter’s impeachment. “You have a great democracy,” he said, locking his eyes with Trump, as the latter listened intently (or seemed to). “Keep it going on.”
Still, Finland’s 72-year-old president has quite a few bones to pick, as he made clear in the course of a wide-ranging interview with Foreign Policy last month, beginning with the troubled state of democracy itself. “Democracy could use some nurturing,” he said.
The fact that a Finnish president can be taken seriously as a spokesperson for Western democracy illustrates how both Finland and Europe have changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Thirty years ago, Finland was Europe’s odd man out. Its foreign policy was described as active neutrality; it shared a mutually beneficial, if onerous so-called special relationship with the Soviet Union, which, among other things, obliged Finland’s leaders to avoid entangling alliances with the West.
The Finnish state still bore the effects of the quarter-century reign of former President Urho Kekkonen, its Cold War-era leader who used his own special relationship with Moscow to win four terms in office, while the Kremlin acknowledged Finnish neutrality.
Today Finland no longer calls itself neutral. “Non-aligned is the word we use now,” Niinisto said. “We are also part of the European Union.” Finnish support for the EU, which it joined in 1995, remains strong.
“We belong to the West,” he continued, pointing to Finland’s resiliently democratic culture as proof. “But we also are a neighbor to the east,” he adds. Even though the most arduous, military dimension of the special relationship—the odious mutual defense pact by which both pledged to hold joint military discussions in the unlikely event of an invasion of Russia by NATO via Finnish territory—was formally dissolved after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Finnish head of state still listens to Putin.
The reverse is also true. “I get along with him very well,” he says of his Russian counterpart. “We can discuss issues very openly, even sensitive matters.”
“Niinisto is a cool-headed realist, and not an idealist.” “Niinisto is a cool-headed realist, and not an idealist,” says Mika Aaltola, director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. “This means he is not going to bother Putin with long liberal lectures. He has maintained a good working relationship with Putin, irrespective of events in the Ukraine or other serious security concerns … it is in the Finnish realist tradition not to turn your backs on Russians and show fear.”
High on the list of sensitive matters which Niinisto discusses with Putin is the possibility of Finland upgrading its current status as a NATO partner to full membership, something which Putin has explicitly warned Finland against. “The Russians have made it quite clear that when they look across the border, they see Finns,” he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 2018. “If Finland were to join NATO, they would see enemies.”
For the moment, a majority of Finns also oppose NATO membership. For Niinisto, keeping the option of joining NATO open while maintaining a strong, independent, well-equipped defense force, is a sufficient deterrent. “Our defense forces can equip 280,000 trained soldiers,” Aaltola points out. “This compares very well with most European defense forces.”
Finland also ranks among the most militarily prepared nations in the world, in terms of the percentage of its population that is willing to defend itself—with nearly 80 percent of Finns willing to take up arms, something which Putin is doubtless aware of.
As proof of the two leaders’ special connection, Niinisto tweeted that he had phoned Putin and discussed “the possibilities of settling the tense situation in Belarus,” as well as the condition of Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader who was allegedly poisoned with Novichok on Aug. 20, according to doctors treating him in Germany.
Navalny’s staff later explicitly thanked Niinisto for helping persuade Putin to allow his sickened critic to be flown to Berlin for medical treatment.
The savvy Finn also felt he knew both Trump and Putin well enough to give the former “a pep talk” on how to mix it up with the latter before the two leaders met in Helsinki in July 2018, according to John Bolton, the former U.S. national security advisor.
“It is important to get along with Washington, if you want to have a stabilizing influence on Moscow,” says Aaltola. “And obviously it is in Finland’s interest to know what is going on in Moscow.”
“Niinisto reminded Trump that Putin was a fighter, and Trump should therefore hit back if attacked,” Bolton describes in his book, The Room Where It Happened. “As if preparing for a boxing match, Niinisto warned Trump never to provide an opening or give one inch.”
Trump had difficulty taking Niinisto’s advice, as the farcical press conference that followed their meeting made clear. But no one questions that the advice Niinisto proffered was sound.
“You have to understand, we Finns have had to study and understand the modus operandi of the Kremlin more than any other Western country,” Michael Franck, the noted Finnish filmmaker points out.
According to Bolton, after telling Trump that Finland didn’t want to join NATO at their meeting in Helsinki, Niinisto reminded Trump that “Finland had an army of 280,000 if everyone was called up to make it clear the price would be high if they were invaded.”
Finland arguably has the most popular democratically elected government in Europe.
The tricky triangulation required of a Finnish president is something that the judicious Niinisto manages well, which helps account for his record-high poll ratings: around 90 percent of Finns approve of his job performance. Between that and the high support for Finland’s celebrated 34-year-old prime minister, Sanna Marin, and her Social Democratic cabinet, Finland arguably has the most popular democratically elected government in Europe.
Nearly three-quarters of the Finnish electorate voted in last year’s parliamentary elections, and Transparency International ranks Finland as the world’s third-least corrupt country. “We are almost free of corruption. Trust in authorities is high,” Niinisto proudly observes. “The health of our democracy is good.”
Still, as he gazes out from the presidential palace, Niinisto doesn’t seem to feel the same way about the health of liberal democracy in general. “We have learned that democracy is not a given thing,” he said. “We must nurture it, perhaps more so than we have had to do for a long time.”
Niinisto is outspoken on the threat posed by the social media. “Social media has added a new and even aggravating platform for aggressive behavior and manipulation,” he observes—an interesting position for the president of the country which gave the world Nokia, the company which essentially invented the mobile phone.
It seems that “connecting people”—Nokia’s old slogan—has turned out to be something of a mixed blessing, according to the president. “It is easier to write insults,” says Niinisto, “than to say them eye to eye.”
As befits someone whose job description has been likened to steering between Scylla and Charybdis—the monster and whirlpool of Greek mythology—Niinisto refrains from directly criticizing either Trump or Putin. However, he has no qualms about criticizing the two leaders’ policies.
Regarding Washington’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the World Health Organization in July, he says flatly: “I would rather have seen the U.S. stay in.” Niinisto also indirectly criticized Washington’s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. “We were all surprised by COVID-19. We received a serious lesson—climate change is not our only common enemy,” he said. “In order to stop the pandemic, it would be good to find the same common spirit as in the Paris climate agreement.”
As for the recent referendum that could allow the Russian president to remain in power until at least 2036, Niinisto said, “We do not know whether [Putin] is planning to continue or for how long.” That said, he continued mordantly, “the decision to hold the referendum does reveal that customs in Russia are very different when compared to our democracy.”
In the past, Niinisto has also been outspoken on the subject of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Explaining his balancing act, he asserts: “In Finland, we have long said we cannot do anything about geography. What we can do is to maintain a clear and consistent Western line in our relationship with our Eastern neighbor and improve understanding between East and West.”
He points out that “it has worked,” referring to the history of successful East-West summits that have been held in Helsinki—although some might exclude the one he presided over in 2018 from the list—dating back to the 1975 mega-summit and the historic Helsinki Accords. “I believe it will continue to work in the future, too.”
He isn’t surprised by Trump’s position on NATO and the U.S. responsibility for Europe’s defense. “President Trump has continued what the U.S. has requested for many years, [that] Europe should take more responsibility for strengthening its defense and fulfilling its commitment to NATO. Now he has changed the request to a demand. I do understand the American opinion on this, including President’s Trump’s viewpoint.”
Niinisto appears to have mixed feelings about the European Union. While he continues to support Finnish membership in EU, as do most Finns, he admits he is not happy with the lack of coordination with which the EU responded to the coronavirus pandemic, in contrast with the generally strong, proactive, and successful manner with which Finland and its neighbors—with the arguable exception of Sweden—conducted themselves.
He also is unreservedly critical about the body’s lack of common economic and security strategy. “The EU has a lot of potential. Counted together the EU member states have enormous economic power and 27 armies,” Niinisto continued.
“As long as I have talked with other European leaders about defense, the answer has always been” to fall back on NATO, and particularly the United States, rather than having the EU develop and maintain its own discrete, defense force, he says. “The EU must develop its common economic and security strategy, so that this potential turns into influence. It has a lot to do to make a comeback as an influential geopolitical actor.”
Like many older Finns who recall that the then-neutral United States was reluctant to come to Finland’s aid during the Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40, Niinisto remains wary of relying on Washington—or NATO—too much. He would like Europe to stand on its own, just as Finland has essentially done since World War II.
At the same time, he implied, he would like more clarity regarding the EU’s nebulous mutual defense clause which states that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its own territory, other member states are obliged to come to its aid. Niinisto, like many Finns, isn’t sure what that means. “Finns like clarity when it comes to defense,” says Aaltola.
Still, the president has remained mum on the subject of the continuing EU sanctions on trade with Russia enacted after Crimea, even though those sanctions hurt Finland more than other EU members—an example of a fight which Niinisto has avoided.
True to form, he is also reluctant to criticize Trump too openly. When asked how he felt about the deployment of federal troops in response to protests in the United States and if the country still had a “great democracy,” as he put it during his White House visit last year, Niinisto declined to answer.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--What Does Putin Stand to Gain (and Lose) by Going After Navalny?

What Does Putin Stand to Gain ( and Lose ) by Going After Navalny ?
In the three weeks since Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny fell violently ill on a flight to Moscow , any pretense that this was anything other than a state-sponsored assassination attempt has worn increasingly thin .
After Navalny was airlifted from the Siberian city of Omsk to Berlin for treatment , German Chancellor Angela Merkel last week announced that he had been poisoned with Novichok , the same military-grade nerve agent used by Russian intelligence operatives to poison Sergei Skripal in England in 2018 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Navalny appears to have been poisoned by a previously unknown and deadlier strain of the nerve agent in an attack that could have only been ordered by the Kremlin , according to a report in the German weekly Der Zeit .
While Navalny is expected to survive this attempt on his life , significant questions remain as to why the decision was made to poison the country ’ s best-known opposition politician , what this says about the direction Russia is headed , and what price it may pay as Western leaders , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Kremlin critics and opposition politicians have all too often been poisoned or even murdered , but until last month Navalny ’ s very survival was conspicuous .
At an opposition event in the city of Tomsk the night before he was poisoned , Navalny himself addressed this very issue .
“ If they kill me , it will just create more problems for those in power , just as was the case with Nemtsov , ” he said , according to Der Spiegel .
Navalny was referring to opposition politician Boris Nemtsov @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kremlin in 2015 .
“ With the killing of Nemtsov , Russia became a country where members of the opposition die violently , ” said Sam Greene , the director of the Russia Institute at King ’ s College London .
“ I think if you see [ Navalny ’ s poisoning ] as a major shift , you haven ’ t been paying attention.
” But why now ?
Navalny was for a long time considered to be too famous and too popular to be quietly dispatched .
As news broke that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tatiana Stanovaya noted that his death was seen as a “ nightmare scenario ” in the Kremlin , one that risked triggering mass protests against the regime , which has become increasingly unpopular in recent years .
But it seems that calculus shifted in the wake of a constitutional referendum earlier this year , which gave Russian President Vladimir Putin the ability to run for two more terms—signaling a retreat from even the trappings of democracy .
“ After constitutional reform we are dealing with a completely new political regime .
This regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more repressive , ” said Stanovaya , the founder of the political analysis firm R. Politik .
“ After this we can expect things which we couldn ’ t expect before from Putin ’ s regime , ” she said .
The constitutional referendum made it clear for the Kremlin that domestic politics was becoming more problematic , Greene said .
Amid growing impatience with Putin and his party , and a haphazard response to the coronavirus pandemic , “ the usual ideological levers and wedges aren ’ t working , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an impulse in the Kremlin to clear the decks of challengers.
” Shortly after the referendum , Sergei Furgal , a popular regional governor , was arrested and charged with orchestrating multiple murders in the mid-2000s , a move seen as politically motivated that sparked weeks of protests in the far-east region of Khabarovsk .
Several other opposition politicians , activists , and journalists were arrested in Russia in the wake of the referendum , a sign of a widening crackdown .
Why does Navalny get under the Kremlin ’ s skin ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective opposition politician , Navalny was once described as the man Putin fears the most .
Homing in on one of the most hot-button issues for Russian voters , Navalny and his team have repeatedly exposed the dazzling corruption of some of Russia ’ s most senior politicians .
After a 2017 investigation alleged that then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had used $ 1 billion in bribes to buy lavish properties , it triggered nationwide protests in the Russian heartland traditionally thought to form the core of Putin ’ s base .
Until recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ degree of protest from Moscow ’ s liberals—and even sought to use it against them .
“ Before 2017 , the Kremlin ’ s narrative about the opposition was that , ‘ Okay , guys , you may have some fans among Moscow hipsters and among 2 percent or 3 percent of the well-educated middle-class urban dwellers , ’ ” said Leonid Volkov , campaign manager for Navalny ’ s attempted run in the 2018 presidential elections , speaking at an online event hosted by the Wilson Center on Wednesday .
“ But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow peripheral road doesn ’ t love you , doesn ’ t like you , doesn ’ t know you , doesn ’ t want to do anything with you.
” In 2017 , Navalny made a conscious effort to expand his reach , holding dozens of rallies across the country and opening a network of regional campaign offices , Volkov said .
Although he was eventually barred from running against Putin , many of those regional offices became local hubs supporting activists and opposition politicians , and conducting anti-corruption investigations .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for office , he has still been able to use his platform to tip the scales in favor of other opposition politicians .
In 2018 he unveiled a new initiative known as Smart Vote , a system of tactical voting that seeks to unite protest and opposition votes around the one candidate in each race deemed to have the best chance of beating politicians from Putin ’ s United Russia party .
In local elections in Moscow last year , pro-Kremlin candidates suffered significant losses , as their number of seats shrank from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 45 .
Navalny hailed the results as a success for the Smart Vote system .
But even prior to the constitutional referendum vote , the authorities were closing in on Navalny ’ s Anti-Corruption Foundation .
Last September , security services raided hundreds of homes and offices of activists in over 40 towns and cities across the country as part of a criminal anti-corruption investigation of the foundation .
Navalny eventually closed the foundation in July after being sued by the subjects of his investigations , including firms owned by Putin cronies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian pollster the Levada Center , respondents were asked to name which public figures most inspired them .
While 8 percent of people said Putin , Navalny came in second with 4 percent—and was first among people aged 40 to 54 .
“ These are quite amazing figures given the stance of Russian official media toward [ Navalny ] during the last 10 years or more , ” said Ekaterina Schulmann , an associate fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House , speaking at the Wilson Center event .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pay ?
It ’ s not yet clear .
After Novichok was used against Skripal , over 20 countries followed Britain ’ s lead in expelling dozens of Russian diplomats in what then-British Prime Minister Theresa May described as the largest collective expulsion of suspected Russian intelligence officers in history .
Merkel has faced growing calls , including from within her own party , to halt construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany , a project long backed by Germany and that is over 90 percent complete .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Magnitsky Act , which could impose sanctions on human rights abusers and corrupt officials abroad , was introduced in the German Bundestag ; if passed , it could provide Germany with another avenue to respond to future Russian misdeeds .
On Wednesday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that Washington was weighing how to respond , noting that there was a “ substantial chance ” that the order to poison Navalny came from senior Russian officials .
Only time will tell if Navalny ’ s poisoning , unlike so many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will finally force a tougher international reaction .

In the three weeks since Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny fell violently ill on a flight to Moscow, any pretense that this was anything other than a state-sponsored assassination attempt has worn increasingly thin. After Navalny was airlifted from the Siberian city of Omsk to Berlin for treatment, German Chancellor Angela Merkel last week announced that he had been poisoned with Novichok, the same military-grade nerve agent used by Russian intelligence operatives to poison Sergei Skripal in England in 2018.
In the three weeks since Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny fell violently ill on a flight to Moscow, any pretense that this was anything other than a state-sponsored assassination attempt has worn increasingly thin. After Navalny was airlifted from the Siberian city of Omsk to Berlin for treatment, German Chancellor Angela Merkel last week announced that he had been poisoned with Novichok, the same military-grade nerve agent used by Russian intelligence operatives to poison Sergei Skripal in England in 2018.
And Russia is upping the ante: Navalny appears to have been poisoned by a previously unknown and deadlier strain of the nerve agent in an attack that could have only been ordered by the Kremlin, according to a report in the German weekly Der Zeit.
While Navalny is expected to survive this attempt on his life, significant questions remain as to why the decision was made to poison the country’s best-known opposition politician, what this says about the direction Russia is headed, and what price it may pay as Western leaders, most notably Merkel, weigh their response.
Why poison Navalny?
Kremlin critics and opposition politicians have all too often been poisoned or even murdered, but until last month Navalny’s very survival was conspicuous. At an opposition event in the city of Tomsk the night before he was poisoned, Navalny himself addressed this very issue. “If they kill me, it will just create more problems for those in power, just as was the case with Nemtsov,” he said, according to Der Spiegel. Navalny was referring to opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, who was gunned down near the Kremlin in 2015.
“With the killing of Nemtsov, Russia became a country where members of the opposition die violently,” said Sam Greene, the director of the Russia Institute at King’s College London. “I think if you see [Navalny’s poisoning] as a major shift, you haven’t been paying attention.”
But why now?
Navalny was for a long time considered to be too famous and too popular to be quietly dispatched. As news broke that he had been poisoned, the analyst Tatiana Stanovaya noted that his death was seen as a “nightmare scenario” in the Kremlin, one that risked triggering mass protests against the regime, which has become increasingly unpopular in recent years.
But it seems that calculus shifted in the wake of a constitutional referendum earlier this year, which gave Russian President Vladimir Putin the ability to run for two more terms—signaling a retreat from even the trappings of democracy.
“After constitutional reform we are dealing with a completely new political regime. This regime is much more conservative, less tolerant, more repressive,” said Stanovaya, the founder of the political analysis firm R. Politik. “After this we can expect things which we couldn’t expect before from Putin’s regime,” she said.
The constitutional referendum made it clear for the Kremlin that domestic politics was becoming more problematic, Greene said. Amid growing impatience with Putin and his party, and a haphazard response to the coronavirus pandemic, “the usual ideological levers and wedges aren’t working,” Greene said. “That led to an impulse in the Kremlin to clear the decks of challengers.”
Shortly after the referendum, Sergei Furgal, a popular regional governor, was arrested and charged with orchestrating multiple murders in the mid-2000s, a move seen as politically motivated that sparked weeks of protests in the far-east region of Khabarovsk. Several other opposition politicians, activists, and journalists were arrested in Russia in the wake of the referendum, a sign of a widening crackdown.
Why does Navalny get under the Kremlin’s skin?
As Russia’s best-known and most effective opposition politician, Navalny was once described as the man Putin fears the most. Homing in on one of the most hot-button issues for Russian voters, Navalny and his team have repeatedly exposed the dazzling corruption of some of Russia’s most senior politicians. After a 2017 investigation alleged that then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had used $1 billion in bribes to buy lavish properties, it triggered nationwide protests in the Russian heartland traditionally thought to form the core of Putin’s base.
Until recently, the Kremlin appeared to tolerate a degree of protest from Moscow’s liberals—and even sought to use it against them. “Before 2017, the Kremlin’s narrative about the opposition was that, ‘Okay, guys, you may have some fans among Moscow hipsters and among 2 percent or 3 percent of the well-educated middle-class urban dwellers,’” said Leonid Volkov, campaign manager for Navalny’s attempted run in the 2018 presidential elections, speaking at an online event hosted by the Wilson Center on Wednesday.
“But the real Mother Russia outside of the Moscow peripheral road doesn’t love you, doesn’t like you, doesn’t know you, doesn’t want to do anything with you.”
In 2017, Navalny made a conscious effort to expand his reach, holding dozens of rallies across the country and opening a network of regional campaign offices, Volkov said. Although he was eventually barred from running against Putin, many of those regional offices became local hubs supporting activists and opposition politicians, and conducting anti-corruption investigations.
While Navalny himself has been prevented from running for office, he has still been able to use his platform to tip the scales in favor of other opposition politicians. In 2018 he unveiled a new initiative known as Smart Vote, a system of tactical voting that seeks to unite protest and opposition votes around the one candidate in each race deemed to have the best chance of beating politicians from Putin’s United Russia party. In local elections in Moscow last year, pro-Kremlin candidates suffered significant losses, as their number of seats shrank from 40 to 25 out of a possible 45. Navalny hailed the results as a success for the Smart Vote system.
But even prior to the constitutional referendum vote, the authorities were closing in on Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Last September, security services raided hundreds of homes and offices of activists in over 40 towns and cities across the country as part of a criminal anti-corruption investigation of the foundation. Navalny eventually closed the foundation in July after being sued by the subjects of his investigations, including firms owned by Putin cronies.
In an opinion poll released by independent Russian pollster the Levada Center, respondents were asked to name which public figures most inspired them. While 8 percent of people said Putin, Navalny came in second with 4 percent—and was first among people aged 40 to 54. “These are quite amazing figures given the stance of Russian official media toward [Navalny] during the last 10 years or more,” said Ekaterina Schulmann, an associate fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, speaking at the Wilson Center event.
What price, if any, will Russia pay?
It’s not yet clear. After Novichok was used against Skripal, over 20 countries followed Britain’s lead in expelling dozens of Russian diplomats in what then-British Prime Minister Theresa May described as the largest collective expulsion of suspected Russian intelligence officers in history. Merkel has faced growing calls, including from within her own party, to halt construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, a project long backed by Germany and that is over 90 percent complete. And on Monday, a version of the Magnitsky Act, which could impose sanctions on human rights abusers and corrupt officials abroad, was introduced in the German Bundestag; if passed, it could provide Germany with another avenue to respond to future Russian misdeeds.
On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that Washington was weighing how to respond, noting that there was a “substantial chance” that the order to poison Navalny came from senior Russian officials. Only time will tell if Navalny’s poisoning, unlike so many of Russia’s other misdeeds, will finally force a tougher international reaction.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--In Russia, All Politics Is Local

In Russia, All Politics Is Local

In Russia , All Politics Is Local In a Washington Post op-ed last month , Vladimir Kara-Murza , a Russian opposition figure , wrote that ongoing protests in the country ’ s Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk showed that “ Russian politics is becoming truly national.
” But there ’ s another way of looking at the same events .
If anything , the protests show that Russian politics are becoming truly local , driven by long-standing anger over corrupt and feckless governance in a country the size of a continent , where loyalty to Moscow still trumps results for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Khabarovsk region ’ s governor , the poisoning of activist Alexei Navalny in the Siberian city of Tomsk during his investigation into corrupt local government officials , and a surge in regional and local electoral manipulation by the Kremlin ’ s allies suggest that President Vladimir Putin recognizes that the regions are spinning out of control .
But the more the Kremlin tries to control them with brute force , the more dangerous every local loss becomes for Putin ’ s power .
The concerns of Russia ’ s citizens in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition to gain a foothold .
Local elections slated for Sept. 13 will be a major test of the fragile dynamic Putin has created .
Even though Furgal had defeated a Kremlin-backed candidate in 2018 , he was hardly a radical oppositionist : His party , the Liberal Democratic Party , is a member of the loyal opposition , content to sit in the national State Duma in Moscow and play the part of dissenters without actually challenging Putin ’ s rule .
Furgal ’ s sin appeared to be acting as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seeks to win reelection by implementing policies viewed positively by their constituents .
But in creating a constituency , Furgal undermined the public ’ s fealty to Putin and his allies ; the governor ’ s competence laid bare the failures of the former Kremlin-aligned regional administration , subsequently bringing electoral losses to Putin ’ s allies in the regional assembly .
He was likely removed to stop the effect from snowballing .
His arrest in July sparked spontaneous protests in Khabarovsk that have now lasted for two months and spread throughout Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Vladivostok .
A primary driver of the unrest all over Russia is local dissatisfaction about local issues .
True , Russians have been unhappy for years , but with the economy stagnant and the coronavirus pandemic grinding on , the discontent in the regions this time is a serious concern for the Kremlin .
As others have pointed out , the opposition has a number of paths to regional and municipal offices in the upcoming elections .
The vote in the Irkutsk region is particularly worthy of attention given the December 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sergei Levchenko , under apparent pressure from the federal government .
Moscow appointed as acting governor Igor Kobzev , a Kremlin loyalist with no ties to the region he governs .
Since he assumed power , Kobzev has antagonized local elites and exacerbated the region ’ s budgetary problems .
He now faces a difficult electoral battle against a serious Communist Party contender .
Electoral upsets are also possible in the gubernatorial elections in Komi and Arkhangelsk , two isolated regions with turbulent politics .
Since 2018 , residents from both regions have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s plans to construct a landfill for the capital ’ s trash near the Shiyes railway station in the Arkhangelsk region .
These protests have sparked a cross-coalitional movement that will likely prove a challenge for the Kremlin ’ s hold on the region ’ s leadership .
Indeed , keeping control in Komi and Arkhangelsk will be additionally difficult given both of their pro-Kremlin governors resigned earlier this year because of failures in managing both the unrest and a local COVID-19 outbreak .
Even at the city level , officials are employing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the opposition from winning .
For instance , in Novosibirsk , Russia ’ s third-largest city , opposition candidates face violent attacks and death threats as well as more routine inconveniences , such as the removal of campaign banners from public spaces .
The Kremlin is also taking advantage of the pandemic to deploy multiday voting , which makes fraud via ballot substitution easier , and was used during the constitutional referendum earlier this year .
In the face of the Kremlin ’ s machinations , Russia ’ s opposition is also innovating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the very least , a United Russia loss ) .
Shortly before to his poisoning , Navalny was in Novosibirsk working on an investigation that called out local lawmakers ’ corruption , urging local residents to “ free the Siberian capital from the invaders ” —that is , to vote for opposition candidates .
Some of Navalny ’ s allies have even suggested , according to the Novaya Gazeta that he was poisoned to “ get him out of the way during the upcoming local elections.
” The biggest threat from Navalny @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ smart voting ” in elections across the country , a coordinated voting strategy that identifies and informs the public of the candidate most likely to beat the pro-Kremlin option .
The opposition coalition is also urging voters to cast their ballots on the final day of the election , in hopes of making it more difficult for their ballots to be swapped out by Putin ’ s operatives .
In short , the opposition is using whatever strategies and resources it can muster to eke out successes in a deeply unfair electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its persistence and innovation , the opposition probably won ’ t win many majorities or more than a handful of governorships or city council seats .
The Kremlin ’ s reach is long and secure .
But the arrest of Furgal , the poisoning of Navalny , and the rise of local protests demonstrate the Kremlin ’ s focus on maintaining power over addressing local concerns .
And it is the Kremlin ’ s intense commitment to controlling local politics that makes the upcoming elections so important .
So long as the Kremlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s cronies over the well-being of Russia ’ s people , local problems will continue to be existential threats .
And as more Russians connect the dots between local problems and the Kremlin ’ s heavy-handed politicking , the bigger the cracks in Putin ’ s base of support .
It is in those breaks that the opposition can carve out political space .

In a Washington Post op-ed last month, Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian opposition figure, wrote that ongoing protests in the country’s Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk showed that “Russian politics is becoming truly national.”
In a Washington Post op-ed last month, Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian opposition figure, wrote that ongoing protests in the country’s Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk showed that “Russian politics is becoming truly national.”
But there’s another way of looking at the same events. If anything, the protests show that Russian politics are becoming truly local, driven by long-standing anger over corrupt and feckless governance in a country the size of a continent, where loyalty to Moscow still trumps results for citizens. The politically motivated arrest of the Khabarovsk region’s governor, the poisoning of activist Alexei Navalny in the Siberian city of Tomsk during his investigation into corrupt local government officials, and a surge in regional and local electoral manipulation by the Kremlin’s allies suggest that President Vladimir Putin recognizes that the regions are spinning out of control. But the more the Kremlin tries to control them with brute force, the more dangerous every local loss becomes for Putin’s power.
The concerns of Russia’s citizens in the regions—long neglected—are providing ample space for the opposition to gain a foothold. Local elections slated for Sept. 13 will be a major test of the fragile dynamic Putin has created.
On July 9, Sergei Furgal, the locally popular “people’s governor” of the Far Eastern region of Khabarovsk Krai, was arrested by the authorities on charges of involvement in a series of murders dating back to the mid-2000s. His arrest sparked an immediate backlash by the region’s outraged citizens. In his two years in power, Furgal had gained a strong following in the region, which lies along the Sea of Okhotsk in the Pacific Ocean, some 3,800 kilometers from Moscow. Particularly lauded were his efforts to address local issues, ranging from school lunches and housing to overfishing.
Even though Furgal had defeated a Kremlin-backed candidate in 2018, he was hardly a radical oppositionist: His party, the Liberal Democratic Party, is a member of the loyal opposition, content to sit in the national State Duma in Moscow and play the part of dissenters without actually challenging Putin’s rule. Furgal’s sin appeared to be acting as a “normal politician,” one who seeks to win reelection by implementing policies viewed positively by their constituents.
But in creating a constituency, Furgal undermined the public’s fealty to Putin and his allies; the governor’s competence laid bare the failures of the former Kremlin-aligned regional administration, subsequently bringing electoral losses to Putin’s allies in the regional assembly. He was likely removed to stop the effect from snowballing. His arrest in July sparked spontaneous protests in Khabarovsk that have now lasted for two months and spread throughout Russia’s vast territory, from Moscow to Vladivostok.
A primary driver of the unrest all over Russia is local dissatisfaction about local issues. True, Russians have been unhappy for years, but with the economy stagnant and the coronavirus pandemic grinding on, the discontent in the regions this time is a serious concern for the Kremlin.
As others have pointed out, the opposition has a number of paths to regional and municipal offices in the upcoming elections. The vote in the Irkutsk region is particularly worthy of attention given the December 2019 resignation of the Communist Party governor, Sergei Levchenko, under apparent pressure from the federal government. Moscow appointed as acting governor Igor Kobzev, a Kremlin loyalist with no ties to the region he governs. Since he assumed power, Kobzev has antagonized local elites and exacerbated the region’s budgetary problems. He now faces a difficult electoral battle against a serious Communist Party contender.
Electoral upsets are also possible in the gubernatorial elections in Komi and Arkhangelsk, two isolated regions with turbulent politics. Since 2018, residents from both regions have gone out and protested against Moscow’s plans to construct a landfill for the capital’s trash near the Shiyes railway station in the Arkhangelsk region. These protests have sparked a cross-coalitional movement that will likely prove a challenge for the Kremlin’s hold on the region’s leadership. Indeed, keeping control in Komi and Arkhangelsk will be additionally difficult given both of their pro-Kremlin governors resigned earlier this year because of failures in managing both the unrest and a local COVID-19 outbreak.
Even at the city level, officials are employing a host of authoritarian methods to prevent the opposition from winning. For instance, in Novosibirsk, Russia’s third-largest city, opposition candidates face violent attacks and death threats as well as more routine inconveniences, such as the removal of campaign banners from public spaces. The Kremlin is also taking advantage of the pandemic to deploy multiday voting, which makes fraud via ballot substitution easier, and was used during the constitutional referendum earlier this year.
In the face of the Kremlin’s machinations, Russia’s opposition is also innovating to secure a win (or, at the very least, a United Russia loss). Shortly before to his poisoning, Navalny was in Novosibirsk working on an investigation that called out local lawmakers’ corruption, urging local residents to “free the Siberian capital from the invaders”—that is, to vote for opposition candidates. Some of Navalny’s allies have even suggested, according to the Novaya Gazeta that he was poisoned to “get him out of the way during the upcoming local elections.”
The biggest threat from Navalny and his allies is the encouragement of “smart voting” in elections across the country, a coordinated voting strategy that identifies and informs the public of the candidate most likely to beat the pro-Kremlin option. The opposition coalition is also urging voters to cast their ballots on the final day of the election, in hopes of making it more difficult for their ballots to be swapped out by Putin’s operatives. In short, the opposition is using whatever strategies and resources it can muster to eke out successes in a deeply unfair electoral environment.
To be sure, despite its persistence and innovation, the opposition probably won’t win many majorities or more than a handful of governorships or city council seats. The Kremlin’s reach is long and secure. But the arrest of Furgal, the poisoning of Navalny, and the rise of local protests demonstrate the Kremlin’s focus on maintaining power over addressing local concerns.
And it is the Kremlin’s intense commitment to controlling local politics that makes the upcoming elections so important. So long as the Kremlin continues to prioritize the interest of Putin’s cronies over the well-being of Russia’s people, local problems will continue to be existential threats. And as more Russians connect the dots between local problems and the Kremlin’s heavy-handed politicking, the bigger the cracks in Putin’s base of support. It is in those breaks that the opposition can carve out political space.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--The Sorrows of Young Kim Jong Un

The Sorrows of Young Kim Jong Un

It was something close to love at first sight , Donald Trump said of his initial meeting with the leader of North Korea—especially , it seems , for the smitten Kim Jong Un .
“ It was great chemistry , ” the president told journalist Bob Woodward , and Trump then proceeded to compare their historic summit in Singapore in June 2018 to an actual romance .
“ You meet a woman .
In one second , you know whether or not it ’ s all going to happen .
It doesn ’ t take you 10 minutes , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks .
It ’ s like , whoa , ” he said , according to Woodward ’ s new book , Rage .
Playing out in 25 never-before-revealed letters between Kim and Trump , obtained by Woodward , the deeply personal courtship between the two leaders of long-hostile nations has few precedents in diplomatic history .
One is reminded , to some degree , of the deep , history-changing personal connection that Henry Kissinger struck with Chinese leader Zhao Enlai in the early 1970s .
But the actual words exchanged between the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more like Marc Antony falling hard for Cleopatra , and vice versa .
Kim ’ s letters to Trump especially suggest a young , deeply suspicious man ( he was 34 at the time ) who is shakily in charge of a hermetic regime and for the first time in his life is being taken seriously by an important figure from the outside world—indeed the most powerful man in the world .
And he is overwhelmed with gratitude , awe and perhaps a deeper emotion .
After negotiations dragged on for months following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote longingly of a return to their honeymoon period : “ Even now I can not forget that moment of history when I firmly held Your Excellency ’ s hand at that beautiful and sacred location as the whole world watched with great interest and hope to relive the honor of that day.
” The North Korean then expressed his hope for “ another historic meeting between myself and Your Excellency reminiscent of a scene from a fantasy film.
” When he read that last phrase about the fantasy film , “ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the celebrated Washington Post journalist who has produced books on nine presidents .
Even after their failed summit in Hanoi some eight months later , when Kim offered to close down his biggest and oldest nuclear facility at Yongbyon but Trump said he wanted all of them shuttered and walked out , Kim continued to appeal to their personal affection for each other .
“ Like the brief time we had together a year ago in Singapore , every minute we shared 103 days ago in Hanoi was also a moment of glory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim wrote Trump on June 10 , 2019 .
“ I also believe that the deep and special relationship between us will work as a magical force … ” Woodward concludes : “ The CIA never figured out conclusively who wrote and crafted Kim ’ s letters to Trump .
They were masterpieces .
The analysts marveled at the skill someone brought to finding the exact mixture of flattery while appealing to Trump ’ s sense of grandiosity and being center stage in history.
” To a certain degree , Kim ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the communist regime , language that can also swiftly turn hostile .
In one of the 18 interviews he gave Woodward for the book , Trump described how pleased he was to be called “ Your Excellency.
” Trump , in his replies ( of which Woodward received only a limited number ) , is less effusive and affectionate .
But he is clearly wooing the North Korean leader in a very personal way and playing up his initial offer to Kim : to turn him into one of the great men of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up his nuclear program entirely .
“ I completely agree with you , ” Trump wrote Kim two days later , on June 12 .
“ You and I have a unique style and a special friendship .
Only you and I , working together , can resolve the issues between our two countries and end nearly 70 years of hostility , bringing an era of prosperity to the Korean peninsula that will exceed all our greatest expectations—and you will be the one to lead .
It will be historic !
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unexpectedly tweeted an invitation to meet Kim at the concertina-wired treaty village of Panmunjom .
Kim accepted , and Trump became the first serving U.S. president to cross into North Korea .
Trump later tells Woodward : “ He never smiled before .
I ’ m the only one he smiles with.
” “ Trump has personally said they are ‘ love letters , ’ ” Woodward writes .
“ They are more than that—they reveal a decision by both to become friends .
Whether genuine or not , only history will tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the traditional diplomatic playbook .
They resemble declarations of personal fealty that might be uttered by the Knights of the Round Table , or perhaps suitors.
” But some courtships between suitors end in great bitterness , and since the failed Hanoi summit the language from North Korea has grown colder , with the North Korean lead negotiator promising “ terrible events ” last fall and Pyongyang warning of an ominous “ Christmas gift ” to the U.S. in late 2019 ( which never came to pass ) .
One of Kim ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like a disappointed friend or lover , ” Woodward writes , after the U.S. president sent Kim pictures of the two of them at Panmunjom .
While he said the photos hold “ special meaning ” and “ will remain an eternal memory ” —Kim said he had hung them in his office—Kim also wrote that he was “ really , very offended ” that the U.S. continued to play a military role in backing rival South Korea .
It is in the course of detailing these diplomatic failures that Trump delivers another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has developed a new , highly classified nuclear weapon .
“ I have built a nuclear—a weapons system that nobody ’ s ever had in this country before .
… .
What we have is incredible.
” Woodward writes that he later confirmed the existence of a new weapons system but could get no details and his sources were surprised that Trump had revealed it .
Trump also hints that despite his feelings for Kim , relations could revert back to the tense fall of 2017 , when he mocked Kim as “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ totally destroy ” North Korea if it didn ’ t stop developing a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile threat to U.S. shores , and Pyongyang responded by calling Trump a “ mentally deranged U.S. dotard.
” “ If he shoots , he shoots , ” Trump told Woodward .
“ And then he ’ s got big problems , let me put it that way .
Big , big problems .
Bigger than anybody ’ s ever had before.
” In his book , Woodward also reveals that Trump and senior U.S. officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to war in 2017 than the public realized , with the president saying of Kim , “ He was totally prepared to go .
And he expected to go .
But we met.
” In the final analysis , the U.S. and North Korea may have reached a diplomatic stalemate ; hawkish advisors surrounding Trump have warned him that in the end Pyongyang will be far too paranoid and invested in its militaristic self-identity to ever give up its nukes .
For its entire existence North Korea ’ s behavior has been driven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S. attack , with some 30,000 American troops looming just over the border and U.S. missiles threatening ; and injured pride—a sense of not being taken seriously enough , which has exacerbated the fear of being attacked .
Even so , some experts point out that Kim has resisted further ICBM or nuclear tests during his on-again , off-again relationship with Trump .
And Trump may have achieved a very substantial shutdown had he taken the deal that Kim offered in Hanoi—which Siegfried Hecker , the former director of the Los Alamos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities on Pyongyang ’ s nuclear program , told me was a “ missed opportunity.
” “ In my opinion , the deal that North Korea offered up at the very last minute , as Trump was walking out , spelled out what closing down Yongbyon really meant ; it was a deal worth taking , ” but John Bolton , Trump ’ s ultra-hard-line ( and later fired ) national security advisor , advised against it , Hecker told me in an email .
“ The reason Trump walked out was that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looked better.
” Woodward concludes : “ [ A ] s Trump says repeatedly , we had no war .
That was an achievement .
Diplomacy should always be worth a try .
It may have been worth it .
Where it goes next is one of the imponderables of the Trump era.
” Indeed , with Kim now keeping out of sight and Joe Biden bidding to replace Trump after Nov. 3 , the romance may already be over—and relations between the two countries could well revert back to the chronic mutual @ @ @ @ @

It was something close to love at first sight, Donald Trump said of his initial meeting with the leader of North Korea—especially, it seems, for the smitten Kim Jong Un. “It was great chemistry,” the president told journalist Bob Woodward, and Trump then proceeded to compare their historic summit in Singapore in June 2018 to an actual romance. “You meet a woman. In one second, you know whether or not it’s all going to happen. It doesn’t take you 10 minutes, and it doesn’t take you six weeks. It’s like, whoa,” he said, according to Woodward’s new book, Rage .
It was something close to love at first sight, Donald Trump said of his initial meeting with the leader of North Korea—especially, it seems, for the smitten Kim Jong Un. “It was great chemistry,” the president told journalist Bob Woodward, and Trump then proceeded to compare their historic summit in Singapore in June 2018 to an actual romance. “You meet a woman. In one second, you know whether or not it’s all going to happen. It doesn’t take you 10 minutes, and it doesn’t take you six weeks. It’s like, whoa,” he said, according to Woodward’s new book, Rage.
Playing out in 25 never-before-revealed letters between Kim and Trump, obtained by Woodward, the deeply personal courtship between the two leaders of long-hostile nations has few precedents in diplomatic history. One is reminded, to some degree, of the deep, history-changing personal connection that Henry Kissinger struck with Chinese leader Zhao Enlai in the early 1970s. But the actual words exchanged between the U.S. president and North Korean dictator often sound more like Marc Antony falling hard for Cleopatra, and vice versa.
Kim’s letters to Trump especially suggest a young, deeply suspicious man (he was 34 at the time) who is shakily in charge of a hermetic regime and for the first time in his life is being taken seriously by an important figure from the outside world—indeed the most powerful man in the world. And he is overwhelmed with gratitude, awe and perhaps a deeper emotion.
After negotiations dragged on for months following their first meeting in Singapore, Kim wrote longingly of a return to their honeymoon period: “Even now I cannot forget that moment of history when I firmly held Your Excellency’s hand at that beautiful and sacred location as the whole world watched with great interest and hope to relive the honor of that day.” The North Korean then expressed his hope for “another historic meeting between myself and Your Excellency reminiscent of a scene from a fantasy film.”
When he read that last phrase about the fantasy film, “I was shocked,” writes Woodward, the celebrated Washington Post journalist who has produced books on nine presidents. Even after their failed summit in Hanoi some eight months later, when Kim offered to close down his biggest and oldest nuclear facility at Yongbyon but Trump said he wanted all of them shuttered and walked out, Kim continued to appeal to their personal affection for each other. “Like the brief time we had together a year ago in Singapore, every minute we shared 103 days ago in Hanoi was also a moment of glory that remains a precious memory,” Kim wrote Trump on June 10, 2019. “I also believe that the deep and special relationship between us will work as a magical force …”
Woodward concludes: “The CIA never figured out conclusively who wrote and crafted Kim’s letters to Trump. They were masterpieces. The analysts marveled at the skill someone brought to finding the exact mixture of flattery while appealing to Trump’s sense of grandiosity and being center stage in history.” To a certain degree, Kim’s language may reflect the often-excessive rhetoric of the communist regime, language that can also swiftly turn hostile. In one of the 18 interviews he gave Woodward for the book, Trump described how pleased he was to be called “Your Excellency.”
Trump, in his replies (of which Woodward received only a limited number), is less effusive and affectionate. But he is clearly wooing the North Korean leader in a very personal way and playing up his initial offer to Kim: to turn him into one of the great men of history, if only he will give up his nuclear program entirely. “I completely agree with you,” Trump wrote Kim two days later, on June 12. “You and I have a unique style and a special friendship. Only you and I, working together, can resolve the issues between our two countries and end nearly 70 years of hostility, bringing an era of prosperity to the Korean peninsula that will exceed all our greatest expectations—and you will be the one to lead. It will be historic!”
The two met two weeks later when Trump unexpectedly tweeted an invitation to meet Kim at the concertina-wired treaty village of Panmunjom. Kim accepted, and Trump became the first serving U.S. president to cross into North Korea. Trump later tells Woodward: “He never smiled before. I’m the only one he smiles with.”
“Trump has personally said they are ‘love letters,’” Woodward writes. “They are more than that—they reveal a decision by both to become friends. Whether genuine or not, only history will tell. The language is not out of the traditional diplomatic playbook. They resemble declarations of personal fealty that might be uttered by the Knights of the Round Table, or perhaps suitors.”
But some courtships between suitors end in great bitterness, and since the failed Hanoi summit the language from North Korea has grown colder, with the North Korean lead negotiator promising “terrible events” last fall and Pyongyang warning of an ominous “Christmas gift” to the U.S. in late 2019 (which never came to pass). One of Kim’s later letters to Trump “sounded like a disappointed friend or lover,” Woodward writes, after the U.S. president sent Kim pictures of the two of them at Panmunjom. While he said the photos hold “special meaning” and “will remain an eternal memory”—Kim said he had hung them in his office—Kim also wrote that he was “really, very offended” that the U.S. continued to play a military role in backing rival South Korea.
It is in the course of detailing these diplomatic failures that Trump delivers another major revelation in the book—that the U.S. has developed a new, highly classified nuclear weapon. “I have built a nuclear—a weapons system that nobody’s ever had in this country before. …. What we have is incredible.” Woodward writes that he later confirmed the existence of a new weapons system but could get no details and his sources were surprised that Trump had revealed it. Trump also hints that despite his feelings for Kim, relations could revert back to the tense fall of 2017, when he mocked Kim as “Little Rocket Man” and promised to “totally destroy” North Korea if it didn’t stop developing a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile threat to U.S. shores, and Pyongyang responded by calling Trump a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.”
“If he shoots, he shoots,” Trump told Woodward. “And then he’s got big problems, let me put it that way. Big, big problems. Bigger than anybody’s ever had before.”
In his book, Woodward also reveals that Trump and senior U.S. officials told him the two nations came closer to war in 2017 than the public realized, with the president saying of Kim, “He was totally prepared to go. And he expected to go. But we met.”
In the final analysis, the U.S. and North Korea may have reached a diplomatic stalemate; hawkish advisors surrounding Trump have warned him that in the end Pyongyang will be far too paranoid and invested in its militaristic self-identity to ever give up its nukes. For its entire existence North Korea’s behavior has been driven largely by two factors: fear of a U.S. attack, with some 30,000 American troops looming just over the border and U.S. missiles threatening; and injured pride—a sense of not being taken seriously enough, which has exacerbated the fear of being attacked.
Even so, some experts point out that Kim has resisted further ICBM or nuclear tests during his on-again, off-again relationship with Trump. And Trump may have achieved a very substantial shutdown had he taken the deal that Kim offered in Hanoi—which Siegfried Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and one of the preeminent authorities on Pyongyang’s nuclear program, told me was a “missed opportunity.”
“In my opinion, the deal that North Korea offered up at the very last minute, as Trump was walking out, spelled out what closing down Yongbyon really meant; it was a deal worth taking,” but John Bolton, Trump’s ultra-hard-line (and later fired) national security advisor, advised against it, Hecker told me in an email. “The reason Trump walked out was that Bolton had convinced him that walking out looked better.”
Woodward concludes: “[A]s Trump says repeatedly, we had no war. That was an achievement. Diplomacy should always be worth a try. It may have been worth it. Where it goes next is one of the imponderables of the Trump era.”
Indeed, with Kim now keeping out of sight and Joe Biden bidding to replace Trump after Nov. 3, the romance may already be over—and relations between the two countries could well revert back to the chronic mutual threats of decades past.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--Al Qaeda’s Leader Is Old, Bumbling—and a Terrorist Mastermind

Nineteen years after 9/11 , al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has yet to achieve the household notoriety evoked by that of his immediate predecessor , Osama bin Laden .
In part that ’ s because the United States hasn ’ t cared enough to focus attention on him .
Aside from massive financial overtures for intelligence on his whereabouts—there ’ s currently a $ 25 million bounty offered for his head , higher than the reward for any other terrorist in the world—the U.S. government has been relatively blasé about al Qaeda since Zawahiri took over in 2011 .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has done more harm to al Qaeda than a dead one ever could .
But that conclusion doesn ’ t square with the recent trajectory of the group .
While al Qaeda has not been able to replicate an assault like 9/11 , that ’ s also a naive metric of success .
Al Qaeda maintains affiliates in regions across Africa , the Middle East , and South Asia .
And though he ’ s conjured less of a personality cult , al Qaeda ’ s current leader is just as dangerous to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Al Qaeda ’ s current leader is just as dangerous to the United States as its old one .
The basic facts are indisputable , if not especially flattering : Zawahiri is old and repeats himself in long-winded and meandering speeches .
Compared to bin Laden , Zawahiri is restrained in his operational strategy and sclerotic in his management style .
He has advocated a steadier , less flashy role for al Qaeda : preservation of the jihadi vanguard through unity and careful politics—an approach that remains particularly unappealing to younger cohorts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fissure between al Qaeda and its once-major affiliate in Syria , the Nusra Front , as emblematic of Zawahiri ’ s ineptitude at leadership .
In the time since bin Laden ’ s death , the Islamic State has emerged and been able to assert itself as the leader of the global jihad , the new kid on the block outpacing its forefathers .
That ’ s due not just to Zawahiri ’ s management missteps , but also to his failures in developing jihadi ideology that could match the Islamic State ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extreme violence .
But Zawahiri ’ s ostensible weaknesses have ultimately aided al Qaeda ’ s cause , especially in a world fixated on the Islamic State .
Zawahiri , for example , is averse to state-building—a stance that shielded al Qaeda and provided the group with relative respite as the Islamic State became a more immediate target of U.S counterterrorism efforts .
As U.S. strikes against the Islamic State intensified , the cohesion of al Qaeda ’ s affiliates and its allies improved .
Although the group had initially come under enormous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its leadership was able to recognize the strategic opportunity to focus on internal politics and local issues .
Most notably , perhaps , Zawahiri prevented the defection of al Qaeda senior leaders , including Saif al-Adel and Abu Mohammed al-Masri .
Adel ’ s continued obedience to Zawahiri is especially remarkable , as he was relatively independent-minded and even critical of bin Laden ’ s decision-making .
Zawahiri ’ s call for unity and his general lack of interest in outbidding violence enabled al Qaeda to portray itself to its supporters and potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposite the Islamic State .
Rather than be consumed by his rival , Zawahiri focused on using the Islamic State ’ s takfiri tendencies—declaring other Muslims to be nonbelievers—and obsession with grotesque violence to reframe al Qaeda ’ s brand .
Incredibly , the group responsible for the attacks of 9/11 was able to position itself as a moderate entity in the Sunni jihadi milieu .
Zawahiri ’ s appearance of restraint—at least relative to the Islamic State—bolstered local outreach efforts of the group ’ s regional affiliates .
As the Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faced popular backlash , Zawahiri-directed al Qaeda affiliates presented themselves as a more palatable jihadi alternative .
As part of these efforts , fighters have steadily ingratiated themselves at the local level in parts of Somalia , Syria , and Yemen , as well as in West Africa , in some cases taking the initiative from the Islamic State ’ s affiliates .
Al Qaeda affiliates presented themselves as a more palatable jihadi alternative .
Analysts have argued that that Zawahiri has entangled al Qaeda in local civil wars to a point where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus on transnational attacks .
The overall direction of al Qaeda , however , suggests otherwise .
Zawahiri has pushed al Qaeda away from the long-running dichotomous “ near enemy ” versus “ far enemy ” jihadi debate .
Instead , he has found a way to balance transnational goals and the local imperatives of regional affiliates , while attempting to manage the associated risks of being targeted by the United States .
For example , Zawahiri appears to have apportioned transnational operations to the affiliates in Yemen and Syria , even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , guided by an emphasis on being—according to one senior U.S. counterterrorism official— “ strategic and patient.
” In West Africa ’ s Sahel region , Zawahiri is content to allow al Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin pursue regional goals .
And in South Asia , Zawahiri wants the local affiliate to host the group ’ s senior leadership and support the Afghan Taliban .
Zawahiri has also been pragmatic regarding al Qaeda ’ s complicated relationship with Iran .
This was far from a given ; Zawahiri had harsh words @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past decade , however—and the past few years in particular—his views have softened .
This well-timed about-face has allowed al Qaeda to protect its leadership and mobilize some material aid—if not from Iran directly , at least via geographic routes afforded by Iranian territory .
Perhaps Zawahiri ’ s most significant strategic victory is that he has managed to preserve al Qaeda ’ s relationship with the Afghan Taliban , which has survived despite enormous international and U.S. military pressure to cut ties .
The United Nations recently reported that in recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghan Taliban leadership to obtain assurances of continued support .
These talks appear to have been successful ; despite commitments to the U.S. government as part of the February 2020 Doha peace deal between the Taliban and Afghan government , the Afghan Taliban has neither publicly renounced al Qaeda nor taken any discernible action to limit the group ’ s operations in Afghanistan .
Despite Zawahiri ’ s steady leadership—which has minimized al Qaeda ’ s losses while giving it an opportunity to rebuild itself—the group still faces serious challenges going forward .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ question of who will lead al Qaeda after Zawahiri ’ s gone .
Much like the generation before it , Zawahiri ’ s successor will face the dilemma of balancing what many in al Qaeda believe is the imperative of transnational terrorism in the West and the costs of U.S. and U.S.-allied counterterrorism efforts .
Many leaders likely perceive a major attack as proving al Qaeda ’ s imprimatur as the dominant jihadi movement , in service of bin Laden ’ s grand strategy of baiting and bleeding the United States in challenging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the costs of a large-scale terrorist operation .
One lesson Zawahiri seems to have internalized is that U.S. counterterrorism capabilities remain powerful , a fact that can limit al Qaeda ’ s freedom of movement while making it costly for some affiliates and allies to support the group .
They also seem to assess that rapid turnover of leadership—as in the period from 2008 to 2015—could potentially lead to al Qaeda ’ s collapse .
For now , however , Zawahiri is still at al Qaeda ’ s helm—and this soft-spoken , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reckoned with , regardless of whether another 9/11-style attack is in the offing .

Nineteen years after 9/11, al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has yet to achieve the household notoriety evoked by his immediate predecessor, Osama bin Laden. In part that’s because the United States hasn’t cared enough to focus attention on him. Aside from massive financial overtures for intelligence on his whereabouts—there’s currently a $25 million bounty offered for his head, higher than the reward for any other terrorist in the world—the U.S. government has been relatively blasé about al Qaeda since Zawahiri took over in 2011. Some terrorism analysts even claim a living Zawahiri has done more harm to al Qaeda than a dead one ever could.
Nineteen years after 9/11, al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has yet to achieve the household notoriety evoked by his immediate predecessor, Osama bin Laden. In part that’s because the United States hasn’t cared enough to focus attention on him. Aside from massive financial overtures for intelligence on his whereabouts—there’s currently a $25 million bounty offered for his head, higher than the reward for any other terrorist in the world—the U.S. government has been relatively blasé about al Qaeda since Zawahiri took over in 2011. Some terrorism analysts even claim a living Zawahiri has done more harm to al Qaeda than a dead one ever could.
But that conclusion doesn’t square with the recent trajectory of the group. While al Qaeda has not been able to replicate an assault like 9/11, that’s also a naive metric of success. Al Qaeda maintains affiliates in regions across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. And though he’s conjured less of a personality cult, al Qaeda’s current leader is just as dangerous to the United States as its old one.
Al Qaeda’s current leader is just as dangerous to the United States as its old one.
The basic facts are indisputable, if not especially flattering: Zawahiri is old and repeats himself in long-winded and meandering speeches. Compared to bin Laden, Zawahiri is restrained in his operational strategy and sclerotic in his management style. He has advocated a steadier, less flashy role for al Qaeda: preservation of the jihadi vanguard through unity and careful politics—an approach that remains particularly unappealing to younger cohorts of would-be jihadis. Critics pinpoint the fissure between al Qaeda and its once-major affiliate in Syria, the Nusra Front, as emblematic of Zawahiri’s ineptitude at leadership. In the time since bin Laden’s death, the Islamic State has emerged and been able to assert itself as the leader of the global jihad, the new kid on the block outpacing its forefathers. That’s due not just to Zawahiri’s management missteps, but also to his failures in developing jihadi ideology that could match the Islamic State’s focus on a territorial state and extreme violence.
But Zawahiri’s ostensible weaknesses have ultimately aided al Qaeda’s cause, especially in a world fixated on the Islamic State. Zawahiri, for example, is averse to state-building—a stance that shielded al Qaeda and provided the group with relative respite as the Islamic State became a more immediate target of U.S counterterrorism efforts. As U.S. strikes against the Islamic State intensified, the cohesion of al Qaeda’s affiliates and its allies improved. Although the group had initially come under enormous stress due to defections and splintering, its leadership was able to recognize the strategic opportunity to focus on internal politics and local issues. Most notably, perhaps, Zawahiri prevented the defection of al Qaeda senior leaders, including Saif al-Adel and Abu Mohammed al-Masri. Adel’s continued obedience to Zawahiri is especially remarkable, as he was relatively independent-minded and even critical of bin Laden’s decision-making.
Zawahiri’s ostensible weaknesses have ultimately aided al Qaeda’s cause.
Zawahiri’s call for unity and his general lack of interest in outbidding violence enabled al Qaeda to portray itself to its supporters and potential recruits as the more reliable jihadi front opposite the Islamic State. Rather than be consumed by his rival, Zawahiri focused on using the Islamic State’s takfiri tendencies—declaring other Muslims to be nonbelievers—and obsession with grotesque violence to reframe al Qaeda’s brand. Incredibly, the group responsible for the attacks of 9/11 was able to position itself as a moderate entity in the Sunni jihadi milieu.
Zawahiri’s appearance of restraint—at least relative to the Islamic State—bolstered local outreach efforts of the group’s regional affiliates. As the Islamic State stumbled after making initial inroads and then faced popular backlash, Zawahiri-directed al Qaeda affiliates presented themselves as a more palatable jihadi alternative. As part of these efforts, fighters have steadily ingratiated themselves at the local level in parts of Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well as in West Africa, in some cases taking the initiative from the Islamic State’s affiliates.
Al Qaeda affiliates presented themselves as a more palatable jihadi alternative.
Analysts have argued that that Zawahiri has entangled al Qaeda in local civil wars to a point where its affiliates can no longer maintain a focus on transnational attacks. The overall direction of al Qaeda, however, suggests otherwise. Zawahiri has pushed al Qaeda away from the long-running dichotomous “near enemy” versus “far enemy” jihadi debate. Instead, he has found a way to balance transnational goals and the local imperatives of regional affiliates, while attempting to manage the associated risks of being targeted by the United States.
For example, Zawahiri appears to have apportioned transnational operations to the affiliates in Yemen and Syria, even if that means fewer and more modest plots, guided by an emphasis on being—according to one senior U.S. counterterrorism official—“strategic and patient.” In West Africa’s Sahel region, Zawahiri is content to allow al Qaeda affiliate Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin pursue regional goals. And in South Asia, Zawahiri wants the local affiliate to host the group’s senior leadership and support the Afghan Taliban.
Zawahiri has also been pragmatic regarding al Qaeda’s complicated relationship with Iran. This was far from a given; Zawahiri had harsh words for the country until 2010. Over the past decade, however—and the past few years in particular—his views have softened. This well-timed about-face has allowed al Qaeda to protect its leadership and mobilize some material aid—if not from Iran directly, at least via geographic routes afforded by Iranian territory.
Perhaps Zawahiri’s most significant strategic victory is that he has managed to preserve al Qaeda’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban, which has survived despite enormous international and U.S. military pressure to cut ties. The United Nations recently reported that in recent months, Zawahiri personally negotiated with senior Afghan Taliban leadership to obtain assurances of continued support. These talks appear to have been successful; despite commitments to the U.S. government as part of the February 2020 Doha peace deal, the Afghan Taliban has neither publicly renounced al Qaeda nor taken any discernible action to limit the group’s operations in Afghanistan.
Despite Zawahiri’s steady leadership—which has minimized al Qaeda’s losses while giving it an opportunity to rebuild itself—the group still faces serious challenges going forward. For one, there’s the question of who will lead al Qaeda after Zawahiri’s gone.
Much like the generation before it, Zawahiri’s successor will face the dilemma of balancing what many in al Qaeda believe is the imperative of transnational terrorism in the West and the costs of U.S. and U.S.-allied counterterrorism efforts. Many leaders likely perceive a major attack as proving al Qaeda’s imprimatur as the dominant jihadi movement, in service of bin Laden’s grand strategy of baiting and bleeding the United States in challenging confrontations.
But others also appear aware of the costs of a large-scale terrorist operation. One lesson Zawahiri seems to have internalized is that U.S. counterterrorism capabilities remain powerful, a fact that can limit al Qaeda’s freedom of movement while making it costly for some affiliates and allies to support the group. They also seem to assess that rapid turnover of leadership—as in the period from 2008 to 2015—could potentially lead to al Qaeda’s collapse.
For now, however, Zawahiri is still at al Qaeda’s helm—and this soft-spoken, moderate-mannered leader remains a force to be reckoned with, regardless of whether another 9/11-style attack is in the offing.