foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Were They Lost Students or Inept Spies for China?

Toward the end of their winter break in January , a pair of 24-year-old roommates from China studying at the University of Michigan—on a road trip that included Disney World , museums , and national parks—pulled up to a guard station in their blue Hyundai rental car .
The guard post was the entrance to a half-mile bridge leading to Dredgers Key , an island belonging to the Naval Air Station Key West .
Half an hour later , they were in police custody .
Within hours , they were being interrogated by the FBI , and five months later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could have yielded more than six years ’ imprisonment , Wang Yuhao and Zhang Jielun took a plea deal .
They now sit in a Florida federal penitentiary , waiting to be deported back to China after their release .
After their arrest , media reports painted them as spies .
To some , they embody a theory of Chinese espionage where multiple small bits of sensitive information are collected by everyone from students to tourists .
But the men ’ s lawyers argue they are the victims of an innocent misunderstanding of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common as U.S. authorities ’ suspicion of Chinese nationals grows .
The two men had previously taken road trips together and told friends they were planning to fly to Orlando and drive down the southern tip of Florida over their winter break .
Key West is a popular vacation destination for Chinese tourists , including students at the University of Michigan during Ann Arbor ’ s frigid winters .
But the area is also home to a major U.S. military facility—the Naval Air Station Key West .
The base comprises seven disconnected annexes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of them directly adjacent to tourist sites .
This mixture of military and civilian activities in the area routinely creates problems .
“ We occasionally catch trespassers on each of our seven annexes , ” said Trice Denny , a spokesperson for the air station .
“ Sometimes it ’ s simply a matter of boat or personal watercraft trouble , sometimes it ’ s because of people not paying attention to signage or maps.
” Dredgers Key , where Wang and Zhang were arrested , is primarily a residential and recreational community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at nearby facilities , and their families .
A military ID is needed to access the island , though anyone in the company of someone possessing one is allowed .
On the day of their arrest , according to a later sentencing memorandum submitted by Wang ’ s attorney , the men ate breakfast at a nearby McDonald ’ s and spotted Dredgers Key across the water .
Thinking it might make for good photos , they decided to head there briefly before visiting the nearby Ernest Hemingway museum .
With Wang behind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land bridge .
On the way in , there is at least one sign with a list of regulations , one of them being “ U.S .
Government Property—No Trespassing ” and “ Authorized Personnel Only.
” At the bottom , it warns that violators “ shall be fined not more than $ 50 or imprisoned not more than thirty days , or both.
” Zhang and Wang reportedly initially thought the island was a national park and , because they were in a sleepy state , having awoken at 4 a.m. that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weren ’ t particularly observant .
The land bridge entrance had only a small booth with a stop sign and retractable arm—often left in the open position—surrounded by trees on either side of the road .
As the men pulled up to the booth , a uniformed guard asked for a military ID and Zhang handed over his ordinary ID .
The guard instructed Wang to make a U-turn and said she would hold onto the ID until they exited .
According to a memorandum submitted for sentencing by Wang ’ s attorney @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many Chinese students studying scientific topics in the United States , has limited spoken English ability , and was unclear on the instructions .
According to U.S. assistant attorney Jonathan Kobrinski , the prosecutor in the case , Wang and Zhang later gave conflicting statements as to what happened at this point .
“ Mr .
Wang ’ s account is that he did have a little bit of a discussion and argument with his friend , that he told Zhang he was uncomfortable but that Zhang told him to proceed anyway , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hearing .
“ Zhang ’ s account is they never even discussed it.
” This was the only substantial discrepancy of facts alleged in the case that was apparent from court documents .
In his memorandum , Michelen said that as the men continued to drive down the land bridge , they briefly discussed what had just happened , and concluded that if they were not supposed to be there , they would not have been let in .
“ After all , they had provided a legitimate Chinese identification card , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them through .
Surely , they thought ; if this were a sensitive military installation , they would not let two Chinese students , with limited English and foreign IDs , simply drive right in .
Unfortunately , that is exactly what happened.
” They drove past the end of the land bridge , through a small residential community , and to the beachside recreational-vehicle park and campground that sits between a baseball field and wooded area .
Now one mile from the guard station , they got out and took several photos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zhang with a Nikon camera .
The photos reportedly captured the shoreline , ocean , and an adjacent island in the background nearly a mile away .
Altogether , about 15 to 20 minutes had elapsed since they had first entered .
But on their way out , a naval security officer was waiting for them .
Soon after , they were indicted for trespassing on military property and photographing military installations .
At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in 2018 , Sen. Marco Rubio asked FBI Director Christopher Wray about the counterintelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese students .
Wray responded that China ’ s use of “ nontraditional collectors ” such as professors , scientists , and students was being seen in almost every FBI field office , adding that China presented “ not just the whole-of-government threat , but a whole-of-society threat on their end , and I think it ’ s going to take a whole-of-society response by us.
” But some advocacy groups say racial profiling and overzealous prosecutions are putting Chinese and Chinese Americans at greater risk of false accusations and unjust punishments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ February , the group Asian Americans Advancing Justice testified that messaging such as Wray ’ s encourages bias among law enforcement and government officials “ to view students and scholars of Asian descent as suspect , increasing surveillance and the likelihood of false reporting and arrests without proper evidence and errors in investigations.
” There have been several high-profile instances of people of Chinese ethnicity being falsely accused in espionage investigations in recent years .
In separate cases , physicist Xiaoxing Xi , hydrologist Sherry Chen , and biologists Guoqing Cao and Shuyu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to China , only to have the charges dropped with little explanation in the face of mounting exculpatory evidence .
In its testimony , Asian Americans Advancing Justice pointed to a study examining 136 cases involving 187 individuals charged under the Economic Espionage Act from 1997 to 2015 .
It found that from 1997 to 2009 , 17 percent of defendants charged under the act were of Chinese descent , but after 2009 , that rate tripled to 52 percent .
Furthermore , the average sentence for defendants with Chinese names convicted of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 11 months for those with Western names .
Similarly , 48 percent of defendants with Western names escaped imprisonment and received only probation—more than double the 21 percent rate of those with Chinese names .
Liao ’ s case was also similar to that of 20-year-old Qianli Zhao , a university student in China who was in the United States on a J-1 exchange visitor visa for a three-month summer work-study program .
Zhao was arrested in late 2018 at the same antenna field after allegedly wading through water to circumvent the fence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Zhao lied on his visa application and to investigators about his background , and that a search of his belongings turned up paraphernalia and images suggesting police or military ties .
He was charged with six counts of photographing defense installations and took a plea deal , copping to one count in exchange for having the rest dismissed .
At his sentencing hearing , Zhao ’ s lawyer argued that he had “ committed a stupid mistake ” and compared his case to that of Otto Warmbier in North Korea .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ clearly offended ” the U.S. district judge who presided over Zhao ’ s case .
Moore went beyond the recommended guidelines of zero to six months , and even beyond the nine months requested by the prosecutor , giving Zhao the one-year statutory maximum .
And with that , a precedent was set .
What led the case to escalate at this point isn ’ t clear .
As Denny , the air station spokesperson , said , there are regular trespassing incidents on the base , and “ each situation is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are taken , if any.
” That same day , two other men had illegally come onto Dredgers Key by boat .
When police were called , they were simply escorted off the island .
Boats also routinely trespass into restricted waters in the area ; 37 people were given federal citations for doing so in a single sweep last year , and they were at most given a $ 250 fine .
After they were stopped by naval security , Wang and Zhang were taken into custody by Key West police and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consented to allowing their hotel room and home in Ann Arbor to be searched , and provided passwords to their emails and electronic devices .
According to their attorneys , nothing suspicious or suggestive of espionage was ever found in those searches , and nothing of the sort was ever publicly alleged by the FBI or prosecutor .
After their arrest , the State Department revoked Wang and Zhang ’ s student visas and the indictments came down .
While there are no apparent military installations on Dredgers Key , where the men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Key—the island nearly a mile away across the bay , which houses facilities that include small arms bunkers and the Army Special Forces Underwater Operations School .
According to testimony by an FBI agent who investigated Wang and Zhang , some of their photographs depicted water , sky , and Fleming Key in the background .
From their vantage point , the images could not have contained more than a vague outline of some structures on Fleming Key , many of them obscured by trees , and an antenna nearly a mile and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each charged with six counts of photographing defense installations and one count of illegally entering military property .
Although the charges were all misdemeanors , they potentially faced six-and-a-half years in prison—up to one year for each photograph taken and six months on the trespassing charge .
Three of the six photos in question did not depict Fleming Key at all , only images of Dredgers Key , according to the indictments .
The men were denied bail at a pretrial hearing .
“ It is not my belief that either of these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a master spy or anything of that nature , ” said Judge Lurana Snow at the hearing .
“ Alas , there is also no question in my mind that the purpose of going onto the military base and defying orders and not doing what was told and taking the pictures was for purposes of obtaining information that was valuable to someone other than these two defendants.
” What that value might be , Snow didn ’ t say .
In fact , if someone had wanted images of the installations Wang and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely could have gotten far better results through completely legal means , or simply by logging on the Internet .
Any authorized visitors to Dredgers Key and their civilian guests are allowed to freely take photographs—many of which can be found on online blogs .
Boats are also permitted to roam the waters around Dredgers and Fleming Keys so long as they stay at least 100 yards from shore , and photography of the keys from these boats is not regulated , according to the base spokesperson .
If getting photos of Fleming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s goal , they could have gotten much closer by renting kayaks or jet skis , without violating any regulations .
Or they simply could have stayed home and obtained crisp 3D images of the entire island on Google Earth .
All the circumstances surrounding Wang and Zhang were consistent with two students on vacation , and their explanation of misunderstanding the situation at the guard station was well within the realm of possibility .
An FBI agent who investigated them conceded in court that there was no evidence they had ever traveled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during their years in the United States .
There was no evidence presented that they had any connections or contact with Chinese authorities .
Quartz asserted that the men ’ s actions were a “ Chinese surveillance operation.
” The online magazine Breaking Defense wrongly reported that they had led military police on “ a 30-minute chase , ” and speculated as to why “ the Chinese ” might be interested in the area by mentioning several military activities conducted miles away from where any of the four Chinese students were arrested .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ case was part of “ a distraction from some greater targeting or an attempt to tie up federal security resources.
” Or perhaps China was attempting to “ test the Trump administration ’ s ability to react.
” Few outlets or analysts entertained the possibility that Wang and Zhang might simply have been confused tourists .
Then there was the issue of the charges being applied to the men .
The seldom invoked charge of “ photographing and sketching defense installations , ” part of the “ Espionage and Censorship ” section of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only to “ vital ” military installations , which have a specific definition under a 1950 executive order .
It ’ s not clear what , if anything , on Dredgers or Fleming Key would qualify—particularly since anyone can freely photograph those facilities under most circumstances without explicit permission .
It ’ s even been argued in the past that the statute itself—which on its face makes it unlawful to take photos even from public areas without criminal intent—is likely unconstitutional .
There doesn ’ t appear to be any case of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be tested .
After initially pleading not guilty , Wang and Zhang ’ s odds of acquittal became more daunting .
The assigned judge in their trial would be K. Michael Moore , the same who had presided over Qianli Zhao ’ s case .
And according to Will Thomson , who was one of Zhang ’ s professors at the University of Michigan , unfamiliarity with the U.S. justice system further complicated matters for the men .
Wang and Zhang were largely deferential to their parents throughout the ordeal , and coming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of defendants who go to trial is higher than 99 percent , they felt fighting the charges was hopeless .
In the face of a possible six-and-a-half-year prison sentence , Wang and Zhang took a deal , pleading guilty to one count of photographing military installations .
But they would still be at Moore ’ s mercy as to what their sentence on that guilty charge would be , which could range from immediate release to up to a year in prison and a $ 100,000 fine .
Based on the offense and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history , the recommended sentencing guideline was zero to six months ’ imprisonment .
But Kobrinski , the prosecutor , submitted a motion for a tougher penalty .
In the first sentence of the motion , he noted that Wang and Zhang were “ nationals of China.
” “ This offense involves the intrusion by foreign nationals onto a secure military facility for the purpose of taking photographs , ” he wrote , requesting that “ to reflect their respective culpability , ” Zhang be given 12 months ’ imprisonment and Wang nine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case , saying “ it should be noted ” that Zhao was sentenced to the statutory maximum following a similar plea agreement .
In his only remarks at the sentencing hearing that deviated from routine procedure , Moore referred to the men ’ s nationality and the separate cases of Zhao and Liao .
“ What do you make of the frequency of these cases in this relatively short period of time ?
” he asked Michelen .
“ Of individuals all attempting to engage in the same kind of conduct , all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think it ’ s just a coincidence ?
” Michelen responded that the idea of Wang and Zhang being spies just didn ’ t make sense .
“ Let ’ s say the Chinese government is sending young Chinese students to America to spy , ” he said .
“ They ’ re going to give him a University of Michigan education , have him be one credit shy of graduating , then say : Go potentially blow your cover driving up to a guardhouse and showing your Chinese ID ?
And there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of China ’ s investment into this spy.
” “ I mean , this was an RV park , ” Zhang ’ s attorney , Hector Flores , later noted , adding that the government had also reviewed “ hundreds of thousands ” of emails , texts , and social media posts , “ and there ’ s nothing that they can point to that would support the conclusion that they ’ re spies.
” Without giving any rationale , Moore handed down the sentences : the nine months for Wang and 12 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When they ’ re released from federal prison , they ’ ll be turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement until their deportation to China can be facilitated .
Prior to their sentencing , Wang and Zhang signed agreements waiving their right to challenge deportation orders , and they will be permanently barred from the United States .
In August , Trump announced that he was nominating Moore to be chairman of the United States Sentencing Commission—an agency that develops sentencing guidelines and policies for the federal court system .
Wang and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for this story , and their defense attorneys did not respond to requests for comment .
The FBI declined a Freedom of Information Act request for investigation documents , saying in a standard response that it would constitute an “ unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
” The Naval Criminal Investigative Service also denied a request for investigation documents , citing matters “ established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
” In a statement , a spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said : “ The facts are that Zhang and Wang drove to a sensitive national defense facility , illegally accessed that facility against a security guard ’ s orders , and proceeded to photograph very specific parts of the facility .
Based on their actions , we recommended 12 months of imprisonment for Zhang and nine months for Wang .
The Court agreed that this was appropriate .
The Department of Justice will aggressively seek deterrence through prosecutions and enhanced sentences in order to protect our national security and public safety.
” The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the men ’ s nationality in Kobrinski ’ s motion for longer sentences and the applicability of statute ’ s “ vital ” definition to the facilities in question , directing further questions to public filings and court records .
Nicholas Eftimiades , author of the 1994 book Chinese Intelligence Operations and a former U.S. government official who held positions in the CIA , State Department , and Department of Defense , said authorities and the justice system have certainly made mistakes in the past when it comes to Chinese espionage , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overwhelmed and backlogged ” right now .
But he remains skeptical that Wang and Zhang are wholly innocent , pointing to a separate case last year wherein a pair of Chinese Embassy officials were expelled from the United States after driving onto a Virginia military base .
They similarly claimed they had misunderstood the entrance guard ’ s English instructions to turn around .
Cedric Leighton , a military analyst and former intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force , said that there is an ongoing pattern of Chinese espionage that includes using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to carry out relatively unsophisticated operations , and that the Naval Air Station Key West is a likely target for Chinese espionage .
But he also notes that it ’ s certainly possible Wang and Zhang “ took a proverbial wrong turn.
” “ A careless kid is a careless kid , whether they ’ re Chinese or American , ” he said .
“ We have a tendency , especially in the counterintelligence world , to look at everyone as a potential threat .
”

Toward the end of their winter break in January, a pair of 24-year-old roommates from China studying at the University of Michigan—on a road trip that included Disney World, museums, and national parks—pulled up to a guard station in their blue Hyundai rental car. The guard post was the entrance to a half-mile bridge leading to Dredgers Key, an island belonging to the Naval Air Station Key West.
Toward the end of their winter break in January, a pair of 24-year-old roommates from China studying at the University of Michigan—on a road trip that included Disney World, museums, and national parks—pulled up to a guard station in their blue Hyundai rental car. The guard post was the entrance to a half-mile bridge leading to Dredgers Key, an island belonging to the Naval Air Station Key West.
Half an hour later, they were in police custody. Within hours, they were being interrogated by the FBI, and five months later, in the face of charges that could have yielded more than six years’ imprisonment, Wang Yuhao and Zhang Jielun took a plea deal. They now sit in a Florida federal penitentiary, waiting to be deported back to China after their release.
After their arrest, media reports painted them as spies. To some, they embody a theory of Chinese espionage where multiple small bits of sensitive information are collected by everyone from students to tourists. But the men’s lawyers argue they are the victims of an innocent misunderstanding of a type that’s becoming more common as U.S. authorities’ suspicion of Chinese nationals grows.
Zhang and Wang both came from middle-class backgrounds and had pooled family resources to fund their U.S. educations, according to documents and character testimonies submitted during sentencing. Zhang was halfway through a three-year graduate engineering program at the University of Michigan, where Wang likewise studied electrical and computer engineering. Wang hoped to one day develop technology that helps the elderly, in honor of his grandparents, who had raised him. He was only one credit short of graduating.
The two men had previously taken road trips together and told friends they were planning to fly to Orlando and drive down the southern tip of Florida over their winter break. Key West is a popular vacation destination for Chinese tourists, including students at the University of Michigan during Ann Arbor’s frigid winters.
But the area is also home to a major U.S. military facility—the Naval Air Station Key West. The base comprises seven disconnected annexes scattered amid civilian communities across Key West—some of them directly adjacent to tourist sites. This mixture of military and civilian activities in the area routinely creates problems. “We occasionally catch trespassers on each of our seven annexes,” said Trice Denny, a spokesperson for the air station. “Sometimes it’s simply a matter of boat or personal watercraft trouble, sometimes it’s because of people not paying attention to signage or maps.”
Dredgers Key, where Wang and Zhang were arrested, is primarily a residential and recreational community for military personnel, civilian staff working at nearby facilities, and their families. A military ID is needed to access the island, though anyone in the company of someone possessing one is allowed.
On the day of their arrest, according to a later sentencing memorandum submitted by Wang’s attorney, the men ate breakfast at a nearby McDonald’s and spotted Dredgers Key across the water. Thinking it might make for good photos, they decided to head there briefly before visiting the nearby Ernest Hemingway museum.
With Wang behind the wheel, they drove onto the land bridge. On the way in, there is at least one sign with a list of regulations, one of them being “U.S. Government Property—No Trespassing” and “Authorized Personnel Only.” At the bottom, it warns that violators “shall be fined not more than $50 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.”
Zhang and Wang reportedly initially thought the island was a national park and, because they were in a sleepy state, having awoken at 4 a.m. that day to make the drive, they weren’t particularly observant. The land bridge entrance had only a small booth with a stop sign and retractable arm—often left in the open position—surrounded by trees on either side of the road.
As the men pulled up to the booth, a uniformed guard asked for a military ID and Zhang handed over his ordinary ID. The guard instructed Wang to make a U-turn and said she would hold onto the ID until they exited. According to a memorandum submitted for sentencing by Wang’s attorney, Juan Michelen, Wang, like many Chinese students studying scientific topics in the United States, has limited spoken English ability, and was unclear on the instructions.
According to U.S. assistant attorney Jonathan Kobrinski, the prosecutor in the case, Wang and Zhang later gave conflicting statements as to what happened at this point. “Mr. Wang’s account is that he did have a little bit of a discussion and argument with his friend, that he told Zhang he was uncomfortable but that Zhang told him to proceed anyway,” Kobrinski said at a pre-trial detention hearing. “Zhang’s account is they never even discussed it.”
This was the only substantial discrepancy of facts alleged in the case that was apparent from court documents.
In his memorandum, Michelen said that as the men continued to drive down the land bridge, they briefly discussed what had just happened, and concluded that if they were not supposed to be there, they would not have been let in. “After all, they had provided a legitimate Chinese identification card, and the guard opened the gate and let them through. Surely, they thought; if this were a sensitive military installation, they would not let two Chinese students, with limited English and foreign IDs, simply drive right in. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.”
They drove past the end of the land bridge, through a small residential community, and to the beachside recreational-vehicle park and campground that sits between a baseball field and wooded area. Now one mile from the guard station, they got out and took several photos from the beach—Wang with his phone and Zhang with a Nikon camera. The photos reportedly captured the shoreline, ocean, and an adjacent island in the background nearly a mile away.
Altogether, about 15 to 20 minutes had elapsed since they had first entered. But on their way out, a naval security officer was waiting for them. Soon after, they were indicted for trespassing on military property and photographing military installations.
In recent years, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have stepped up efforts to counter all manner of Chinese espionage—economic, political, scientific, and military—be it connected to Chinese government organs, private business interests, or some ambiguous ground in between. Amid the U.S.-China trade war and U.S. President Donald Trump’s hard line on China, these efforts have taken on greater urgency.
At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in 2018, Sen. Marco Rubio asked FBI Director Christopher Wray about the counterintelligence risk posed to U.S. national security from Chinese students. Wray responded that China’s use of “nontraditional collectors” such as professors, scientists, and students was being seen in almost every FBI field office, adding that China presented “not just the whole-of-government threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, and I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society response by us.”
But some advocacy groups say racial profiling and overzealous prosecutions are putting Chinese and Chinese Americans at greater risk of false accusations and unjust punishments. At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in February, the group Asian Americans Advancing Justice testified that messaging such as Wray’s encourages bias among law enforcement and government officials “to view students and scholars of Asian descent as suspect, increasing surveillance and the likelihood of false reporting and arrests without proper evidence and errors in investigations.”
There have been several high-profile instances of people of Chinese ethnicity being falsely accused in espionage investigations in recent years. In separate cases, physicist Xiaoxing Xi, hydrologist Sherry Chen, and biologists Guoqing Cao and Shuyu Li were accused of illegally passing secrets to China, only to have the charges dropped with little explanation in the face of mounting exculpatory evidence.
In its testimony, Asian Americans Advancing Justice pointed to a study examining 136 cases involving 187 individuals charged under the Economic Espionage Act from 1997 to 2015. It found that from 1997 to 2009, 17 percent of defendants charged under the act were of Chinese descent, but after 2009, that rate tripled to 52 percent. Furthermore, the average sentence for defendants with Chinese names convicted of espionage was 25 months, compared with 11 months for those with Western names. Similarly, 48 percent of defendants with Western names escaped imprisonment and received only probation—more than double the 21 percent rate of those with Chinese names.
Wang and Zhang‘s arrest couldn’t have come at a worse time for them. Just nine days earlier, another Chinese man, a 27-year-old visiting scholar at Washington University in St. Louis named Lyuyou Liao, had been arrested on similar charges at a separate facility at Truman Annex a few miles away. Liao allegedly walked from a tourist beach around a fence with “No Trespassing” warnings and took video and photos of an antenna farm and other structures. In his case, witnesses reported shouting to him, warning him to turn back, and according to Kobrinski, who also prosecuted Liao’s case, he “transmitted images containing the sensitive equipment to another person via a Chinese-based social media application.” Liao was charged with photographing defense installations and unlawfully entering a military facility.
Liao’s case was also similar to that of 20-year-old Qianli Zhao, a university student in China who was in the United States on a J-1 exchange visitor visa for a three-month summer work-study program. Zhao was arrested in late 2018 at the same antenna field after allegedly wading through water to circumvent the fence and take photos. It was alleged that Zhao lied on his visa application and to investigators about his background, and that a search of his belongings turned up paraphernalia and images suggesting police or military ties. He was charged with six counts of photographing defense installations and took a plea deal, copping to one count in exchange for having the rest dismissed.
At his sentencing hearing, Zhao’s lawyer argued that he had “committed a stupid mistake” and compared his case to that of Otto Warmbier in North Korea. According to the Miami Herald, this comparison “clearly offended” the U.S. district judge who presided over Zhao’s case. Moore went beyond the recommended guidelines of zero to six months, and even beyond the nine months requested by the prosecutor, giving Zhao the one-year statutory maximum. And with that, a precedent was set.
The vantage point from the RV Park on Dredgers Key near Naval Station Key West.
When Wang and Zhang were intercepted by a naval security officer on their way off Dredgers Key, they were cooperative, answered all questions, and allowed the officer to look though their phones and camera. After taking Wang’s phone, the officer initially began to delete several of his pictures.
What led the case to escalate at this point isn’t clear. As Denny, the air station spokesperson, said, there are regular trespassing incidents on the base, and “each situation is evaluated by our Security Forces before actions are taken, if any.” That same day, two other men had illegally come onto Dredgers Key by boat. When police were called, they were simply escorted off the island. Boats also routinely trespass into restricted waters in the area; 37 people were given federal citations for doing so in a single sweep last year, and they were at most given a $250 fine.
After they were stopped by naval security, Wang and Zhang were taken into custody by Key West police and the FBI was called. The men consented to allowing their hotel room and home in Ann Arbor to be searched, and provided passwords to their emails and electronic devices. According to their attorneys, nothing suspicious or suggestive of espionage was ever found in those searches, and nothing of the sort was ever publicly alleged by the FBI or prosecutor.
After their arrest, the State Department revoked Wang and Zhang’s student visas and the indictments came down. While there are no apparent military installations on Dredgers Key, where the men were arrested, there are on Fleming Key—the island nearly a mile away across the bay, which houses facilities that include small arms bunkers and the Army Special Forces Underwater Operations School.
According to testimony by an FBI agent who investigated Wang and Zhang, some of their photographs depicted water, sky, and Fleming Key in the background. From their vantage point, the images could not have contained more than a vague outline of some structures on Fleming Key, many of them obscured by trees, and an antenna nearly a mile and a half away.
The men were each charged with six counts of photographing defense installations and one count of illegally entering military property. Although the charges were all misdemeanors, they potentially faced six-and-a-half years in prison—up to one year for each photograph taken and six months on the trespassing charge. Three of the six photos in question did not depict Fleming Key at all, only images of Dredgers Key, according to the indictments.
The men were denied bail at a pretrial hearing. “It is not my belief that either of these two defendants is an undercover agent or a master spy or anything of that nature,” said Judge Lurana Snow at the hearing. “Alas, there is also no question in my mind that the purpose of going onto the military base and defying orders and not doing what was told and taking the pictures was for purposes of obtaining information that was valuable to someone other than these two defendants.”
What that value might be, Snow didn’t say. In fact, if someone had wanted images of the installations Wang and Zhang were charged with photographing, they likely could have gotten far better results through completely legal means, or simply by logging on the Internet.
Any authorized visitors to Dredgers Key and their civilian guests are allowed to freely take photographs—many of which can be found on online blogs. Boats are also permitted to roam the waters around Dredgers and Fleming Keys so long as they stay at least 100 yards from shore, and photography of the keys from these boats is not regulated, according to the base spokesperson. If getting photos of Fleming Key military installations was the men’s goal, they could have gotten much closer by renting kayaks or jet skis, without violating any regulations. Or they simply could have stayed home and obtained crisp 3D images of the entire island on Google Earth.
All the circumstances surrounding Wang and Zhang were consistent with two students on vacation, and their explanation of misunderstanding the situation at the guard station was well within the realm of possibility. An FBI agent who investigated them conceded in court that there was no evidence they had ever traveled to other locations with restricted military areas during their years in the United States. There was no evidence presented that they had any connections or contact with Chinese authorities.
A Navy aerial photo of Naval Air Station Key West’s Fleming Key, left, Sigsbee Park, top, and Trumbo Point Annexes, right.
Wang and Zhang were never explicitly alleged to be spies for China by the FBI or prosecutors, but some media were perfectly willing to fill in the blanks, sometimes along with speculation and exaggerations.
Quartz asserted that the men’s actions were a “Chinese surveillance operation.” The online magazine Breaking Defense wrongly reported that they had led military police on “a 30-minute chase,” and speculated as to why “the Chinese” might be interested in the area by mentioning several military activities conducted miles away from where any of the four Chinese students were arrested. NBC quoted analysts positing that perhaps the case was part of “a distraction from some greater targeting or an attempt to tie up federal security resources.” Or perhaps China was attempting to “test the Trump administration’s ability to react.” Few outlets or analysts entertained the possibility that Wang and Zhang might simply have been confused tourists.
Then there was the issue of the charges being applied to the men. The seldom invoked charge of “photographing and sketching defense installations,” part of the “Espionage and Censorship” section of the U.S Code of Laws, pertains only to “vital” military installations, which have a specific definition under a 1950 executive order. It’s not clear what, if anything, on Dredgers or Fleming Key would qualify—particularly since anyone can freely photograph those facilities under most circumstances without explicit permission. It’s even been argued in the past that the statute itself—which on its face makes it unlawful to take photos even from public areas without criminal intent—is likely unconstitutional. There doesn’t appear to be any case of the charge ever making it to trial to be tested.
After initially pleading not guilty, Wang and Zhang’s odds of acquittal became more daunting. The assigned judge in their trial would be K. Michael Moore, the same who had presided over Qianli Zhao’s case. And according to Will Thomson, who was one of Zhang’s professors at the University of Michigan, unfamiliarity with the U.S. justice system further complicated matters for the men. Wang and Zhang were largely deferential to their parents throughout the ordeal, and coming from China, where the conviction rate of defendants who go to trial is higher than 99 percent, they felt fighting the charges was hopeless.
In the face of a possible six-and-a-half-year prison sentence, Wang and Zhang took a deal, pleading guilty to one count of photographing military installations. But they would still be at Moore’s mercy as to what their sentence on that guilty charge would be, which could range from immediate release to up to a year in prison and a $100,000 fine. Based on the offense and the men’s lack of criminal history, the recommended sentencing guideline was zero to six months’ imprisonment. But Kobrinski, the prosecutor, submitted a motion for a tougher penalty. In the first sentence of the motion, he noted that Wang and Zhang were “nationals of China.”
“This offense involves the intrusion by foreign nationals onto a secure military facility for the purpose of taking photographs,” he wrote, requesting that “to reflect their respective culpability,” Zhang be given 12 months’ imprisonment and Wang nine months’. He cited the earlier case, saying “it should be noted” that Zhao was sentenced to the statutory maximum following a similar plea agreement.
In his only remarks at the sentencing hearing that deviated from routine procedure, Moore referred to the men’s nationality and the separate cases of Zhao and Liao. “What do you make of the frequency of these cases in this relatively short period of time?” he asked Michelen. “Of individuals all attempting to engage in the same kind of conduct, all of the same nationality? Do you think it’s just a coincidence?”
Michelen responded that the idea of Wang and Zhang being spies just didn’t make sense. “Let’s say the Chinese government is sending young Chinese students to America to spy,” he said. “They’re going to give him a University of Michigan education, have him be one credit shy of graduating, then say: Go potentially blow your cover driving up to a guardhouse and showing your Chinese ID? And there goes the entire People’s Republic of China’s investment into this spy.”
“I mean, this was an RV park,” Zhang’s attorney, Hector Flores, later noted, adding that the government had also reviewed “hundreds of thousands” of emails, texts, and social media posts, “and there’s nothing that they can point to that would support the conclusion that they’re spies.”
Without giving any rationale, Moore handed down the sentences: the nine months for Wang and 12 months for Zhang that Kobrinski had requested. When they’re released from federal prison, they’ll be turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement until their deportation to China can be facilitated. Prior to their sentencing, Wang and Zhang signed agreements waiving their right to challenge deportation orders, and they will be permanently barred from the United States. In August, Trump announced that he was nominating Moore to be chairman of the United States Sentencing Commission—an agency that develops sentencing guidelines and policies for the federal court system.
Wang and Zhang could not be reached for comment for this story, and their defense attorneys did not respond to requests for comment. The FBI declined a Freedom of Information Act request for investigation documents, saying in a standard response that it would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Naval Criminal Investigative Service also denied a request for investigation documents, citing matters “established by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”
In a statement, a spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida said: “The facts are that Zhang and Wang drove to a sensitive national defense facility, illegally accessed that facility against a security guard’s orders, and proceeded to photograph very specific parts of the facility. Based on their actions, we recommended 12 months of imprisonment for Zhang and nine months for Wang. The Court agreed that this was appropriate. The Department of Justice will aggressively seek deterrence through prosecutions and enhanced sentences in order to protect our national security and public safety.”
The spokesperson declined to comment on references to the men’s nationality in Kobrinski’s motion for longer sentences and the applicability of statute’s “vital” definition to the facilities in question, directing further questions to public filings and court records.
Nicholas Eftimiades, author of the 1994 book Chinese Intelligence Operations and a former U.S. government official who held positions in the CIA, State Department, and Department of Defense, said authorities and the justice system have certainly made mistakes in the past when it comes to Chinese espionage, and that “the system is kind of overwhelmed and backlogged” right now. But he remains skeptical that Wang and Zhang are wholly innocent, pointing to a separate case last year wherein a pair of Chinese Embassy officials were expelled from the United States after driving onto a Virginia military base. They similarly claimed they had misunderstood the entrance guard’s English instructions to turn around.
Cedric Leighton, a military analyst and former intelligence officer in the U.S. Air Force, said that there is an ongoing pattern of Chinese espionage that includes using temporary, nonprofessional actors such as students to carry out relatively unsophisticated operations, and that the Naval Air Station Key West is a likely target for Chinese espionage. But he also notes that it’s certainly possible Wang and Zhang “took a proverbial wrong turn.”
“A careless kid is a careless kid, whether they’re Chinese or American,” he said. “We have a tendency, especially in the counterintelligence world, to look at everyone as a potential threat.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-29--Global Coronavirus Death Toll Surpasses 1 Million

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Coronavirus deaths top 1 million , deadly clashes continue between Azerbaijan and Armenia , and Togo appoints its first female prime minister .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The death toll from the coronavirus pandemic has officially hit 1 million people as much of the world is now experiencing a second wave and a vaccine remains elusive .
Total worldwide cases also continue to rise , topping 33.5 million today .
Large parts of the world have seen a resurgence in recent weeks .
Europe in particular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , despite several European countries being praised for their quick action earlier this year and the continent ’ s ability to stem the spread of the virus for much of the spring and early summer .
The United Kingdom , France , and Spain have emerged as new hotspots , and the U.K. government was recently forced to reimpose new restrictions in certain parts of the country .
The United States still leads the world in total cases with just over 7 million , but India , which has also experienced its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Numbers don ’ t tell the whole story .
Mike Ryan , the executive director of the WHO ’ s health emergencies program , said the numbers are “ likely an underestimate ” of the actual figure .
“ When you count anything , ” he added , “ you can ’ t count it perfectly .
But I can assure you that the current numbers are likely an underestimate of the true toll of Covid.
” Ryan also warned last week that it was “ not impossible ” for the death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries don ’ t implement a coordinated approach to defeating the virus .
The long road to a vaccine .
The Trump administration has pushed hard in recent months to develop a vaccine before the November presidential election .
This week , Johnson & Johnson ’ s vaccine entered Phase 3 of testing , making it the fourth one in the United States to do so , following vaccines currently being developed by AstraZeneca , the University of Oxford , and BioNTech and Pfizer .
But the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ excessive optimism .
CDC Director Robert Redfield warned that it could take many months to make a vaccine available to the entire U.S. population , possibly until as late as next July—and even then strong anti-vaccine sentiment could be a barrier to widespread vaccination .
More problems on the horizon .
The global push for a vaccine has already been marred by international politics and geopolitical competition .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Adam Tooze wrote earlier this month , a vaccine could solve many political and economic problems , but it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between countries as well as within them .
Pompeo calls for calm in Greece .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo touched down on the island of Crete on Monday to begin a two-day round of talks with the Greek government amid the country ’ s worsening dispute with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean .
After meeting with Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias , the United States and Greece issued a joint statement “ [ reaffirming ] their belief that maritime delimitation issues should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law.
” Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the United States in the current dispute between Greece and Turkey , but it could reflect the Trump administration ’ s broader effort to boost its foreign-policy credentials in the run-up to the presidential election in November .
Efforts at a peaceful resolution have largely been spearheaded by the European Union , and EU leaders are scheduled to meet later this week to discuss ways forward .
Violence escalates around Nagorno-Karabakh .
Dozens more people have been killed in Nagorno-Karabakh after the second day of clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violence broke out on Sunday .
The clashes began under unclear circumstances but appear to have escalated sharply after Azerbaijan launched a series of airstrikes on Nagorno-Karabakh .
Both countries have been put under martial law , and Armenia mobilized its military in preparation for a confrontation .
Nagorno-Karabakh has reportedly lost some territory to Azerbaijani forces .
Nagorno-Karabakh is the source of considerable tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan .
Nominally under Azerbaijan ’ s jurisdiction , the majority-ethnic Armenian region gained de facto independence after a brutal war between the two countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s James Palmer wrote , the current round of hostilities is unlikely to pass control of the region to Azerbaijan , but it could spark a wider confrontation between Turkey and Russia .
Pushing for peace in Pakistan .
Abdullah Abdullah , one of Afghanistan ’ s top peace representatives , arrived in Pakistan on Monday to start a three-day visit aimed at boosting the Afghan government ’ s efforts at peace with the Taliban .
According to a statement released by the Pakistani foreign ministry , Abdullah ’ s visit “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of views on the Afghan peace process and strengthening of Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations and people-to-people interaction.
” Pakistan has long been seen as a key part of the Afghan peace process .
Its relationship with the Afghan government has always been strained , and Afghan officials have accused the country of covertly supporting the Taliban .
But as Fahd Humayun wrote in Foreign Policy earlier this month , Pakistan ’ s influence over the Taliban has decreased in recent years , and the loss of its status as a guarantor of the peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road .
Togo Prime Minister .
Togo ’ s President Faure Gnassingbé has appointed Victoire Tomégah-Dogbé , a longtime government official who has held several ministerial posts , as the country ’ s next prime minister in a historic move that makes her the first woman to hold the position .
The government of Prime Minister Komi Selom Klassou resigned on Friday as the country continues to grapple with the effects of the pandemic .
Klassou had served as prime minister since 2015 , but his resignation was expected after Gnassingbé won re-election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s long-time hold on the presidency .
Tomégah-Dogbé ’ s new government is expected to be sworn in in the coming weeks .
U.S. threatens Iraq .
U.S. officials have threatened to pull the country ’ s diplomatic corps from the country ’ s embassy in Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to curb attacks on U.S. personnel in the country .
The threat of a U.S. withdrawal has raised concerns in Iraq about the possibility of renewed warfare in the country , with some Iraqis concerned that a diplomatic withdrawal would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militias .
The initial U.S. threat came just before a high-level meeting between Iraqi and Iranian officials last weekend , during which efforts to strengthen economic and political ties between the two countries were discussed , as well as the role of the United States in the region .
Ion Aliman , the late mayor of the Romanian village of Deveselu , won in a landslide victory to serve a third term as mayor despite his death from coronavirus complications earlier this month .
Local officials said Aliman ’ s death occurred too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to remove his name from the ballot , but his victory was considered a symbolic demonstration of his mass popularity among locals .
“ It is your victory , ” said one man in a video posted on social media showing people gathering around his tombstone .
A new vote is due to be held to elect a new mayor .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ @ @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Coronavirus deaths top 1 million, deadly clashes continue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Togo appoints its first female prime minister.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
The Pandemic Reaches Another Grim Milestone
The death toll from the coronavirus pandemic has officially hit 1 million people as much of the world is now experiencing a second wave and a vaccine remains elusive. Total worldwide cases also continue to rise, topping 33.5 million today.
Large parts of the world have seen a resurgence in recent weeks. Europe in particular has been hit by a major spike, despite several European countries being praised for their quick action earlier this year and the continent’s ability to stem the spread of the virus for much of the spring and early summer. The United Kingdom, France, and Spain have emerged as new hotspots, and the U.K. government was recently forced to reimpose new restrictions in certain parts of the country.
The United States still leads the world in total cases with just over 7 million, but India, which has also experienced its own recent surge, now follows closely behind.
Numbers don’t tell the whole story. Mike Ryan, the executive director of the WHO’s health emergencies program, said the numbers are “likely an underestimate” of the actual figure. “When you count anything,” he added, “you can’t count it perfectly. But I can assure you that the current numbers are likely an underestimate of the true toll of Covid.” Ryan also warned last week that it was “not impossible” for the death toll to eventually reach 2 million if countries don’t implement a coordinated approach to defeating the virus.
The long road to a vaccine. The Trump administration has pushed hard in recent months to develop a vaccine before the November presidential election. This week, Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine entered Phase 3 of testing, making it the fourth one in the United States to do so, following vaccines currently being developed by AstraZeneca, the University of Oxford, and BioNTech and Pfizer. But the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently cautioned against excessive optimism. CDC Director Robert Redfield warned that it could take many months to make a vaccine available to the entire U.S. population, possibly until as late as next July—and even then strong anti-vaccine sentiment could be a barrier to widespread vaccination.
More problems on the horizon. The global push for a vaccine has already been marred by international politics and geopolitical competition. As Foreign Policy’s Adam Tooze wrote earlier this month, a vaccine could solve many political and economic problems, but it could also exacerbate others, especially inequality both between countries as well as within them.
What We’re Following Today
Pompeo calls for calm in Greece. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo touched down on the island of Crete on Monday to begin a two-day round of talks with the Greek government amid the country’s worsening dispute with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. After meeting with Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, the United States and Greece issued a joint statement “[reaffirming] their belief that maritime delimitation issues should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law.”
Pompeo’s visit represented a rare intervention by the United States in the current dispute between Greece and Turkey, but it could reflect the Trump administration’s broader effort to boost its foreign-policy credentials in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Efforts at a peaceful resolution have largely been spearheaded by the European Union, and EU leaders are scheduled to meet later this week to discuss ways forward.
Violence escalates around Nagorno-Karabakh. Dozens more people have been killed in Nagorno-Karabakh after the second day of clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, bringing the total dead to 59 since violence broke out on Sunday. The clashes began under unclear circumstances but appear to have escalated sharply after Azerbaijan launched a series of airstrikes on Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries have been put under martial law, and Armenia mobilized its military in preparation for a confrontation. Nagorno-Karabakh has reportedly lost some territory to Azerbaijani forces.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the source of considerable tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nominally under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction, the majority-ethnic Armenian region gained de facto independence after a brutal war between the two countries in the 1990s. As Foreign Policy’s James Palmer wrote, the current round of hostilities is unlikely to pass control of the region to Azerbaijan, but it could spark a wider confrontation between Turkey and Russia.
Pushing for peace in Pakistan. Abdullah Abdullah, one of Afghanistan’s top peace representatives, arrived in Pakistan on Monday to start a three-day visit aimed at boosting the Afghan government’s efforts at peace with the Taliban. According to a statement released by the Pakistani foreign ministry, Abdullah’s visit “will provide an opportunity for wide-ranging exchange of views on the Afghan peace process and strengthening of Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations and people-to-people interaction.”
Pakistan has long been seen as a key part of the Afghan peace process. Its relationship with the Afghan government has always been strained, and Afghan officials have accused the country of covertly supporting the Taliban. But as Fahd Humayun wrote in Foreign Policy earlier this month, Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban has decreased in recent years, and the loss of its status as a guarantor of the peace process could cause serious problems down the road.
Keep an Eye On
Togo Prime Minister. Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé has appointed Victoire Tomégah-Dogbé, a longtime government official who has held several ministerial posts, as the country’s next prime minister in a historic move that makes her the first woman to hold the position. The government of Prime Minister Komi Selom Klassou resigned on Friday as the country continues to grapple with the effects of the pandemic. Klassou had served as prime minister since 2015, but his resignation was expected after Gnassingbé won re-election in March, extending his family’s long-time hold on the presidency. Tomégah-Dogbé’s new government is expected to be sworn in in the coming weeks.
U.S. threatens Iraq. U.S. officials have threatened to pull the country’s diplomatic corps from the country’s embassy in Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to curb attacks on U.S. personnel in the country. The threat of a U.S. withdrawal has raised concerns in Iraq about the possibility of renewed warfare in the country, with some Iraqis concerned that a diplomatic withdrawal would be followed by increased military action against Iran-backed militias.
The initial U.S. threat came just before a high-level meeting between Iraqi and Iranian officials last weekend, during which efforts to strengthen economic and political ties between the two countries were discussed, as well as the role of the United States in the region.
Odds and Ends
Ion Aliman, the late mayor of the Romanian village of Deveselu, won in a landslide victory to serve a third term as mayor despite his death from coronavirus complications earlier this month. Local officials said Aliman’s death occurred too close to the date of the election to remove his name from the ballot, but his victory was considered a symbolic demonstration of his mass popularity among locals. “It is your victory,” said one man in a video posted on social media showing people gathering around his tombstone. A new vote is due to be held to elect a new mayor.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-30--Washington’s ‘Blind Eye’ Toward Human Rights Abuses in Latin America

With a record number of Latinos eligible to cast their ballot in the upcoming U.S. presidential election , the future of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has become a pressing issue for many of them—as well as for both President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden .
Trump has seen his popularity spike among some Hispanic voters , especially in the key battleground state of Florida , after four years of relentless criticism of countries like Cuba , Venezuela , and Nicaragua .
The Trump administration has reversed an earlier opening to Cuba and massively ramped up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s dismal record on human rights and democracy .
But while the administration plays up human rights abuses in left-wing countries , it has largely held its tongue when faced with similar abuses in places ideologically aligned with Washington .
When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo paid his fourth trip to Colombia this month—the most of any Latin American country—he lauded Washington ’ s “ vital ” relationship with Bogotá while publicly ignoring the assassination of more than 100 human rights defenders in the last year alone , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police brutality that the country is currently enduring .
Trump administration officials have also urged Colombia to free former President Álvaro Uribe , currently under house arrest for alleged fraud , bribery , and witness tampering ( not to mention his alleged ties to a right-wing paramilitary group designated by the United States as terrorists ) .
It ’ s not just Colombia .
Before heading to Bogotá , Pompeo was in Brazil , where President Jair Bolsonaro has made headlines for his mishandling of the pandemic and his assault on human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said nothing about Brasilia ’ s own attacks on free media and the rule of law , instead targeting the abuses of the Maduro government in Venezuela .
With Washington relying on Bogotá and Brasilia as its main regional partners to push for regime change in Venezuela , some leading U.S. lawmakers worry the country is turning a blind eye to abuses by its allies , ultimately undermining its own message to the rest of the region and the world .
“ We have globally turned away from human rights , and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America , ” said Sen. Chris Murphy ( Democrat , Connecticut ) , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
“ We start to look hypocritical when we talk a good game on human rights , but then continually do business with countries with miserable records on human rights , ” Murphy said , drawing a parallel with the Trump administration ’ s willingness to cut off aid to some Central American countries to force them to curtail migration , arguing that U.S. aid could be leveraged to promote human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We should be willing to put our money where our mouth is , and show that we ’ re not willing to make cutoffs in Latin America , ” he said .
U.S. ambivalence when it comes to human rights is important , former diplomats said , because the lack of a consistent approach undermines American efforts to get countries like China to rein in human-rights abuses in Xinjiang or Hong Kong—let alone to nudge U.S. partners toward their better angels .
“ The key , in my view , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as democracy , open markets , and the rule of law , and to be ready to partner with any nation broadly guided by these same values , while being unwilling to overlook abuses when they are perpetrated by those perceived as friends , ” said Eric Farnsworth , who worked on Latin America in the Clinton administration .
“ It is also critically important , of course , that the United States abide by these principles itself , or else credibility suffers significantly , and the ability to promote such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Farnsworth , now vice president of the Council of the Americas .
Part of the problem when it comes to Latin America is domestic politics , Farnsworth says , with Democrats strident on abuses in right-wing countries seen as close to the United States , and Republicans generally harsh on left-wing countries while seemingly offering a free pass to others .
“ The politicization of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has been an unfortunate reality at least since the 1980s , making sustainable progress over time more difficult , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a senior Latin America expert at The Heritage Foundation , “ Every administration has different priorities.
” The past administration ’ s lifting of some travel and economic restrictions on Cuba , which culminated in a high-profile visit to the island by then-President Barack Obama , showed that “ the previous administration was willing to overlook serious human rights abuses in Cuba , ” she said .
Colombia in particular is a special case of bipartisanship in U.S. policy .
Nearly a failed state in the 1990s , wracked by a decades-long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States spent years , and billions of dollars , aiding Colombia in building up capacity for the rule of law and narcotics eradication—and not simply out of altruism .
“ U.S .
assistance to Colombia was focused on fighting drug trafficking .
Security and stability in Colombia is within the national interest of Colombia , of course , but also of the United States , ” said Jason Marczak , the director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council .
“ Colombia is one of our top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but across the world.
” One big question is what would change in U.S. policy toward Latin America if Democratic candidate Joe Biden , who served as point man for the Obama administration in the region , won the election ?
“ The rhetorical tone would change immediately , from ‘ rapists and murderers ’ to ‘ partners and neighbors , ’ ” said Farnsworth , ticking off a list of probable policy reversals .
The Obama-era engagement with Cuba would likely be revisited , while the Mexican border wall and the ineffective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ halted in favor of a negotiated solution to the political impasse .
Human rights , the environment , and regional pandemic response would all be likely priorities .
Another contrast would be a reversal of the Trump administration ’ s use of U.S. aid money and trade access to strongarm smaller Latin American countries into doing its bidding , said Roberta Jacobson , the head of Western Hemisphere affairs during the Obama administration , and , most recently , U.S. ambassador to Mexico under Trump .
“ There will be an effort to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an administration , ” she said , recalling almost a score of trips she made to the region with then-Vice President Biden .
“ You ’ ll see a shift to collegiality versus confrontation , and you will definitely see a shift back to a more positive view of multilateralism.
” The abrupt change may ruffle feathers in some countries which have spent the last few years riding roughshod over human rights and the rule of law , but also pave the way for dialogue with countries that have already been condemned for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to American values of democracy promotion , and the rule of law , that at times is uncomfortable for the relationship with some Latin American countries , ” she said .
“ But I think that ’ s much more likely to be part of the conversation under a President Biden .
”

With a record number of Latinos eligible to cast their ballot in the upcoming U.S. presidential election, the future of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has become a pressing issue for many of them—as well as for both President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden.
With a record number of Latinos eligible to cast their ballot in the upcoming U.S. presidential election, the future of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has become a pressing issue for many of them—as well as for both President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden.
Trump has seen his popularity spike among some Hispanic voters, especially in the key battleground state of Florida, after four years of relentless criticism of countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. The Trump administration has reversed an earlier opening to Cuba and massively ramped up pressure on Venezuela, while criticizing its government’s dismal record on human rights and democracy.
But while the administration plays up human rights abuses in left-wing countries, it has largely held its tongue when faced with similar abuses in places ideologically aligned with Washington. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo paid his fourth trip to Colombia this month—the most of any Latin American country—he lauded Washington’s “vital” relationship with Bogotá while publicly ignoring the assassination of more than 100 human rights defenders in the last year alone, as well as the growing deadly protests against racism and police brutality that the country is currently enduring. Trump administration officials have also urged Colombia to free former President Álvaro Uribe, currently under house arrest for alleged fraud, bribery, and witness tampering (not to mention his alleged ties to a right-wing paramilitary group designated by the United States as terrorists).
It’s not just Colombia. Before heading to Bogotá, Pompeo was in Brazil, where President Jair Bolsonaro has made headlines for his mishandling of the pandemic and his assault on human rights. But Pompeo and his Brazilian counterpart said nothing about Brasilia’s own attacks on free media and the rule of law, instead targeting the abuses of the Maduro government in Venezuela.
With Washington relying on Bogotá and Brasilia as its main regional partners to push for regime change in Venezuela, some leading U.S. lawmakers worry the country is turning a blind eye to abuses by its allies, ultimately undermining its own message to the rest of the region and the world.
“We have globally turned away from human rights, and that’s been particularly acute in Latin America,” said Sen. Chris Murphy (Democrat, Connecticut), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
“We start to look hypocritical when we talk a good game on human rights, but then continually do business with countries with miserable records on human rights,” Murphy said, drawing a parallel with the Trump administration’s willingness to cut off aid to some Central American countries to force them to curtail migration, arguing that U.S. aid could be leveraged to promote human rights and democracy rather than punishing would-be migrants. “We should be willing to put our money where our mouth is, and show that we’re not willing to make cutoffs in Latin America,” he said.
U.S. ambivalence when it comes to human rights is important, former diplomats said, because the lack of a consistent approach undermines American efforts to get countries like China to rein in human-rights abuses in Xinjiang or Hong Kong—let alone to nudge U.S. partners toward their better angels.
“The key, in my view, is to stand for principles and U.S. interests such as democracy, open markets, and the rule of law, and to be ready to partner with any nation broadly guided by these same values, while being unwilling to overlook abuses when they are perpetrated by those perceived as friends,” said Eric Farnsworth, who worked on Latin America in the Clinton administration.
“It is also critically important, of course, that the United States abide by these principles itself, or else credibility suffers significantly, and the ability to promote such a values-based agenda is dramatically reduced,” said Farnsworth, now vice president of the Council of the Americas.
Part of the problem when it comes to Latin America is domestic politics, Farnsworth says, with Democrats strident on abuses in right-wing countries seen as close to the United States, and Republicans generally harsh on left-wing countries while seemingly offering a free pass to others. “The politicization of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has been an unfortunate reality at least since the 1980s, making sustainable progress over time more difficult,” Farnsworth said.
For Ana Quintana, a senior Latin America expert at The Heritage Foundation, “Every administration has different priorities.” The past administration’s lifting of some travel and economic restrictions on Cuba, which culminated in a high-profile visit to the island by then-President Barack Obama, showed that “the previous administration was willing to overlook serious human rights abuses in Cuba,” she said.
Colombia in particular is a special case of bipartisanship in U.S. policy. Nearly a failed state in the 1990s, wracked by a decades-long armed conflict and rampant drug trafficking, the United States spent years, and billions of dollars, aiding Colombia in building up capacity for the rule of law and narcotics eradication—and not simply out of altruism.
“U.S. assistance to Colombia was focused on fighting drug trafficking. Security and stability in Colombia is within the national interest of Colombia, of course, but also of the United States,” said Jason Marczak, the director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council. “Colombia is one of our top partners, not only in Latin America but across the world.”
One big question is what would change in U.S. policy toward Latin America if Democratic candidate Joe Biden, who served as point man for the Obama administration in the region, won the election?
“The rhetorical tone would change immediately, from ‘rapists and murderers’ to ‘partners and neighbors,’” said Farnsworth, ticking off a list of probable policy reversals. The Obama-era engagement with Cuba would likely be revisited, while the Mexican border wall and the ineffective maximum pressure campaign on Venezuela would be halted in favor of a negotiated solution to the political impasse. Human rights, the environment, and regional pandemic response would all be likely priorities.
Another contrast would be a reversal of the Trump administration’s use of U.S. aid money and trade access to strongarm smaller Latin American countries into doing its bidding, said Roberta Jacobson, the head of Western Hemisphere affairs during the Obama administration, and, most recently, U.S. ambassador to Mexico under Trump.
“There will be an effort to be more collaborative and less punitive as an administration,” she said, recalling almost a score of trips she made to the region with then-Vice President Biden. “You’ll see a shift to collegiality versus confrontation, and you will definitely see a shift back to a more positive view of multilateralism.”
The abrupt change may ruffle feathers in some countries which have spent the last few years riding roughshod over human rights and the rule of law, but also pave the way for dialogue with countries that have already been condemned for doing so.
“That goes back to American values of democracy promotion, and the rule of law, that at times is uncomfortable for the relationship with some Latin American countries,” she said. “But I think that’s much more likely to be part of the conversation under a President Biden.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-29--Global Capital Is the Tail That Wags the U.S. Economic Dog

Global Capital Is the Tail That Wags the U.S. Economic Dog When he signed the finalized NAFTA agreement in September 1993 , U.S. President Bill Clinton was backing away from a campaign promise he made months before .
He famously explained his decision to do so by arguing that the marriage of finance and technology had wrought major changes in the global economy .
“ Nothing we do in this great capital , ” he added , “ can change the fact … that people can move money around in the blink of an eye.
” That is why , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no choice but to accept the disruptions NAFTA might impose .
But while Clinton was right to stress the disruptive impact of frictionless capital flows on the American economy , he drew the wrong conclusion .
It is true that the unfettered flow of capital around the world sharply constrains the ability of individual countries to manage their economies .
By transferring production to more pliant jurisdictions , for example , investors can swiftly punish economies for policies that protect or boost workers ’ income at the expense of business profits .
Contrary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not just about transferring production facilities from high-wage to low-wage countries .
It is about transferring production from countries in which wages are high relative to average worker productivity to those in which wages are lower .
( Germany , for example , is a high-wage country , but its wage levels are still low compared to the high productivity of its workers . )
It is this mismatch between wages and productivity , not lower wages per se , that creates global trade imbalances .
And it is the unfettered flow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Countries like Germany and China that have been the most successful in raising exports and running large trade surpluses are able to do so not because they are more efficient , but because of policies that promote manufacturing at the expense of household income .
They do this either directly , by putting downward pressure on wages , or indirectly , through currency depreciation , manufacturing subsidies , environmental degradation , weakening social safety nets , and so on .
These arrangements effectively transfer income from middle-class households , workers , and farmers—who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deliver it to large businesses , governments , and the rich—who are most likely to save it .
But even as these policies promote manufacturing , they also create the twin problems of excess savings and excess production above what the economy can absorb domestically .
The solution to both problems is to foist them onto trade partners abroad by exporting the excess savings and running the corresponding trade surpluses .
If they weren ’ t able to do that , countries with deficient domestic demand would be forced either to reverse their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidies—or to endure the consequences in the form of rising unemployment .
But there are two problems with this solution .
First , the global economy suffers from weaker demand as countries compete in manufacturing by suppressing growth in domestic wages .
Second , the countries that receive the excess savings must then run the corresponding deficits .
This requires paying for their deficits by transferring ownership of assets—in the form of stocks , bonds , real estate , and factories—to the rich savers of the exporting country , and forcing their economies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The way they adjust , if they are advanced economies , always involves either higher unemployment or ( much more likely in the case of countries like the United States ) a rapid rise in debt .
Those who claim , in other words , that the United States needs foreign financial inflows because of its low savings rate have gotten it backward .
It is the foreign financial inflows that necessarily drive down American savings rates , and they do so either through higher unemployment or rising debt .
This is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States were a developing country , in which high investment needs were constrained by scarce savings , foreign capital inflows might increase American investment , as they did in the 19th century , which would be a good thing .
But in a world characterized by excess global savings and the lowest interest rates in history , and in which American businesses sit on stockpiles of uninvested cash , it is obvious that more foreign savings will not lead to additional investment .
In that case , if foreign capital inflows @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they must cause savings to decline .
This is an iron rule of the balance of payments .
There are several mechanisms by which foreign capital inflows can force down American savings .
Foreign capital inflows can cause the value of the dollar to rise , shifting income from net exporters ( businesses ) to net importers ( households ) , which in turn raises the consumption share of GDP and lowers the savings share .
Cheap imports can displace American products sold at home or abroad , resulting in layoffs in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negative savings rates . )
Or to forestall this rise in unemployment , fiscal authorities might increase the deficit , or monetary authorities might put into place policies that encourage looser lending standards , in either case forcing up debt levels .
( Debt is negative savings . )
Finally , foreign purchases of American stocks , bonds , and real estate can cause their prices to surge , making Americans feel richer , which spurs them to borrow more and spend a larger part of their income .
But the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passively .
It could instead reverse policies that in recent decades have enshrined the unfettered flow of capital .
It ’ s not that there are no arguments in favor of the free flow of capital .
The standard claim by economists is that if investment can flow freely to its most productive use , the global economy advances by transferring resources from less productive users to the more productive .
In this idealized world , smart investors constantly search out investment efficiencies around the world in an attempt to profit by improving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facilities .
This benefits the whole world by raising global productivity , even if it creates conflicts over the distribution of those benefits .
But few international traders and investors believe that this is actually what happens .
International capital flows mainly take the form of portfolio flows—short-term flows into stocks and bonds—rather than direct investment in productivity-enhancing projects .
Portfolio flows tend to be driven by speculation , investment fads , capital flight , reserve accumulation , index investing , or a dozen other reasons that have nothing to do with allocating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In fact , rather than flow from advanced economies with slow investment growth , low interest rates , and excess capital to rapidly growing emerging economies with high investment needs , as the theory tells us should happen , the vast majority of international capital flows into advanced economies that are already flooded with excess savings and cheap capital .
This means that there is little to justify the fetish for unfettered capital movement .
In a world already flooded with excess savings , it doesn ’ t result in more productive investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowing wage suppression in trade surplus countries to be exported abroad ; it forces up either unemployment or debt in trade deficit economies ; and it weakens the negotiating power of workers and exacerbates income inequality everywhere .
The only ones who benefit from unfettered capital flows are international bankers and the very wealthy owners of movable capital .
For the past several decades the unfettered flow of global capital has allowed financial elites to create and profit from savings and production imbalances in one country that force the opposite imbalances elsewhere .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ wags the economic dog .
It is time for governments , and especially Washington , to take steps either to limit or to stabilize these flows .
The are many ways to do so without creating distortions in trade or undermining real direct investment .
For example , Washington can impose one-off taxes on foreign currency transactions , or on all capital inflows .
It can withhold a portion of interest and dividend payments made abroad ( as it did until the early 1980s ) .
It can restrict use of the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a synthetic basket of currencies .
It can organize with like-minded countries a new international trade and capital flow regime .
The point is that Clinton was wrong : We can and should change the fact that people can move money around in the blink of an eye .
Only then can we rebalance trade in a way that is optimal for the global economy .
Much of Wall Street , for obvious reasons , will be ferociously opposed to policies that limit the unfettered flow of capital around the world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economic disruption wreaked on workers , producers , farmers , and the middle class .
And as was the case for most of U.S. history , they will force large businesses around the world once again to compete for profits by investing in domestic productivity , rather than by lowering wages .

When he signed the finalized NAFTA agreement in September 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton was backing away from a campaign promise he made months before. He famously explained his decision to do so by arguing that the marriage of finance and technology had wrought major changes in the global economy. “Nothing we do in this great capital,” he added, “can change the fact … that people can move money around in the blink of an eye.” That is why, he argued, the United States had no choice but to accept the disruptions NAFTA might impose.
When he signed the finalized NAFTA agreement in September 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton was backing away from a campaign promise he made months before. He famously explained his decision to do so by arguing that the marriage of finance and technology had wrought major changes in the global economy. “Nothing we do in this great capital,” he added, “can change the fact … that people can move money around in the blink of an eye.” That is why, he argued, the United States had no choice but to accept the disruptions NAFTA might impose.
But while Clinton was right to stress the disruptive impact of frictionless capital flows on the American economy, he drew the wrong conclusion.
It is true that the unfettered flow of capital around the world sharply constrains the ability of individual countries to manage their economies. By transferring production to more pliant jurisdictions, for example, investors can swiftly punish economies for policies that protect or boost workers’ income at the expense of business profits. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, this is not just about transferring production facilities from high-wage to low-wage countries. It is about transferring production from countries in which wages are high relative to average worker productivity to those in which wages are lower. (Germany, for example, is a high-wage country, but its wage levels are still low compared to the high productivity of its workers.) It is this mismatch between wages and productivity, not lower wages per se, that creates global trade imbalances.
And it is the unfettered flow of capital that abets these imbalances. Countries like Germany and China that have been the most successful in raising exports and running large trade surpluses are able to do so not because they are more efficient, but because of policies that promote manufacturing at the expense of household income. They do this either directly, by putting downward pressure on wages, or indirectly, through currency depreciation, manufacturing subsidies, environmental degradation, weakening social safety nets, and so on. These arrangements effectively transfer income from middle-class households, workers, and farmers—who are most likely to spend their income—and deliver it to large businesses, governments, and the rich—who are most likely to save it. But even as these policies promote manufacturing, they also create the twin problems of excess savings and excess production above what the economy can absorb domestically.
The solution to both problems is to foist them onto trade partners abroad by exporting the excess savings and running the corresponding trade surpluses. If they weren’t able to do that, countries with deficient domestic demand would be forced either to reverse their earlier policies—by raising wages and reducing manufacturing subsidies—or to endure the consequences in the form of rising unemployment.
But there are two problems with this solution. First, the global economy suffers from weaker demand as countries compete in manufacturing by suppressing growth in domestic wages. Second, the countries that receive the excess savings must then run the corresponding deficits. This requires paying for their deficits by transferring ownership of assets—in the form of stocks, bonds, real estate, and factories—to the rich savers of the exporting country, and forcing their economies to adjust to the capital inflows. The way they adjust, if they are advanced economies, always involves either higher unemployment or (much more likely in the case of countries like the United States) a rapid rise in debt.
Those who claim, in other words, that the United States needs foreign financial inflows because of its low savings rate have gotten it backward. It is the foreign financial inflows that necessarily drive down American savings rates, and they do so either through higher unemployment or rising debt.
This is a point that mainstream economists miss. If the United States were a developing country, in which high investment needs were constrained by scarce savings, foreign capital inflows might increase American investment, as they did in the 19th century, which would be a good thing. But in a world characterized by excess global savings and the lowest interest rates in history, and in which American businesses sit on stockpiles of uninvested cash, it is obvious that more foreign savings will not lead to additional investment. In that case, if foreign capital inflows do not cause investment to rise, they must cause savings to decline. This is an iron rule of the balance of payments.
There are several mechanisms by which foreign capital inflows can force down American savings. Foreign capital inflows can cause the value of the dollar to rise, shifting income from net exporters (businesses) to net importers (households), which in turn raises the consumption share of GDP and lowers the savings share. Cheap imports can displace American products sold at home or abroad, resulting in layoffs in the United States. (Unemployed workers have negative savings rates.) Or to forestall this rise in unemployment, fiscal authorities might increase the deficit, or monetary authorities might put into place policies that encourage looser lending standards, in either case forcing up debt levels. (Debt is negative savings.) Finally, foreign purchases of American stocks, bonds, and real estate can cause their prices to surge, making Americans feel richer, which spurs them to borrow more and spend a larger part of their income.
But the United States does not have to accept these consequences passively. It could instead reverse policies that in recent decades have enshrined the unfettered flow of capital.
It’s not that there are no arguments in favor of the free flow of capital. The standard claim by economists is that if investment can flow freely to its most productive use, the global economy advances by transferring resources from less productive users to the more productive. In this idealized world, smart investors constantly search out investment efficiencies around the world in an attempt to profit by improving the productive capacity of infrastructure and manufacturing facilities. This benefits the whole world by raising global productivity, even if it creates conflicts over the distribution of those benefits.
But few international traders and investors believe that this is actually what happens. International capital flows mainly take the form of portfolio flows—short-term flows into stocks and bonds—rather than direct investment in productivity-enhancing projects. Portfolio flows tend to be driven by speculation, investment fads, capital flight, reserve accumulation, index investing, or a dozen other reasons that have nothing to do with allocating capital to its most productive uses. In fact, rather than flow from advanced economies with slow investment growth, low interest rates, and excess capital to rapidly growing emerging economies with high investment needs, as the theory tells us should happen, the vast majority of international capital flows into advanced economies that are already flooded with excess savings and cheap capital.
This means that there is little to justify the fetish for unfettered capital movement. In a world already flooded with excess savings, it doesn’t result in more productive investment; it encourages global savings imbalances by allowing wage suppression in trade surplus countries to be exported abroad; it forces up either unemployment or debt in trade deficit economies; and it weakens the negotiating power of workers and exacerbates income inequality everywhere. The only ones who benefit from unfettered capital flows are international bankers and the very wealthy owners of movable capital.
For the past several decades the unfettered flow of global capital has allowed financial elites to create and profit from savings and production imbalances in one country that force the opposite imbalances elsewhere. Global capital has become the tail that wags the economic dog. It is time for governments, and especially Washington, to take steps either to limit or to stabilize these flows. The are many ways to do so without creating distortions in trade or undermining real direct investment. For example, Washington can impose one-off taxes on foreign currency transactions, or on all capital inflows. It can withhold a portion of interest and dividend payments made abroad (as it did until the early 1980s). It can restrict use of the U.S. dollar internationally, perhaps by replacing it with a synthetic basket of currencies. It can organize with like-minded countries a new international trade and capital flow regime.
The point is that Clinton was wrong: We can and should change the fact that people can move money around in the blink of an eye. Only then can we rebalance trade in a way that is optimal for the global economy. Much of Wall Street, for obvious reasons, will be ferociously opposed to policies that limit the unfettered flow of capital around the world, but the right polices can sharply reduce the economic disruption wreaked on workers, producers, farmers, and the middle class. And as was the case for most of U.S. history, they will force large businesses around the world once again to compete for profits by investing in domestic productivity, rather than by lowering wages.