foreignpolicy--2020-11-24--Can Biden Make the Military Safe for Those Who Serve?

Can Biden Make the Military Safe for Those Who Serve ?
In April this year , Airman 1st Class Natasha Aposhian arrived at Grand Forks Air Force base in North Dakota .
Around the same time , Army Specialist Vanessa Guillén disappeared from her Fort Hood base in Texas after experiencing sexual harassment that , according to her family and attorney , she was too afraid to report .
Both were found dead in June : Aposhian was shot and killed in her dormitory by a fellow airman she had been dating , while Guillén ’ s mutilated remains were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her murderer—an Army enlisted soldier—had hidden her .
The next month , in a letter to the heads of the Air Force and Army ( the military branches in which Aposhian and Guillén had served ) , State Senator Daniel Ivey-Soto , president of the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators , mourned the loss .
“ Enlisted women—especially enlisted women of color , ” he lamented , “ have more to fear from those with whom they serve than from this nation ’ s enemies.
” That ’ s been the sad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it became even worse under the Trump administration : take as one example sexual assault in the workplace ( referred to as military sexual assault ) —a 2018 Pentagon survey found a 44 percent increase in the number of women victims compared to 2016 .
Guillén ’ s case has sparked outrage around the country and an outpouring of female service members ’ stories of their own sexual harassment and assault .
It prompted investigations into a culture of sexual harassment and bullying that Fort Hood soldiers allege their leadership ignored , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the House and Senate ) that would change how the military investigates and prosecutes sexual harassment complaints , reinforcing a years-long Senate push .
Aposhian ’ s family hopes that the military ’ s current reckoning will also address the intimate partner violence that claimed their daughter ’ s life—going beyond victim services ( the focus of a Senate bill introduced last week ) to tackle systemic reform .
With the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on Nov. 25 , activists are looking ahead with hope .
Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final National Defense Authorization Act and its proposed provisions on domestic violence and sexual harassment in the military .
President-elect Joe Biden has promised that the Department of Defense will “ take urgent and aggressive action ” on this issue—guided by an expert commission—and recognized that “ ending assault in the military requires determined leadership and accountability at every level—starting with the commander in chief.
” He ’ s right .
Attempts to address military sexual assault have been inadequate , leaving women and LGBTQ service members at heightened risk of violence and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s attention to this issue is welcome , and should extend to all forms of gender-based violence in the military—including the long-neglected violence that service members experience in their homes .
Indeed , too many officials dismiss intimate partner violence in the military as a private family matter , despite the significant number of active-duty women it harms .
Roughly one in three female service members are affected by physical violence , rape , or stalking by a partner in their lifetimes , and over half report psychological aggression from an intimate partner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed by their partners , including on the very military bases that should be the safest places for them to live and work .
Yet , symbolically , the office with primary responsibility for military domestic violence , the Family Advocacy Program , is under separate command from every other Pentagon office charged with addressing violent and harmful behavior in the military .
In permitting gender-based violence in all its forms to continue across the military with little response , for years , the Pentagon and Congress overlook its ramifications on the health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force .
When service members are afraid to report the violence they experience , from intimate partner violence to workplace harassment—as was the case for Aposhian , Guillén , and countless other women—it signals soldiers ’ broken trust in their leaders , which undermines the unit ’ s cohesiveness and readiness .
The military ’ s strength is determined by its ability to attract and retain talented and hardworking women and men , yet efforts by the Pentagon to increase diversity are undermined by a hostile environment of misogyny and racism that drives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , survivors feel betrayed by the Pentagon ’ s insufficient response , which creates “ an environment in which they no longer felt valued , ” according to one study , and contributes to higher rates of suicidal thoughts among veterans with a history of military sexual trauma .
The costs of this betrayal are staggering : Estimates suggest the Department loses more total service members to discharge after they report sexual assault than it does to combat ( around 5,300 service members separated from service due to sexual assault in just the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around 6,900 soldiers killed in action over nearly 20 years of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom ) .
And the costs of the department ’ s inaction are growing : Pointing to the Army ’ s failure to protect Guillén and its mishandling of the investigation , civil society stakeholders and veterans organizations are now actively discouraging women from entering into military service for fear of their safety .
This pattern persists despite the Department ’ s commitment to be a model for increasing gender diversity and inclusion .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress to elevate all forms of gender-based violence in the military—including intimate partner violence—to the level that victims deserve .
The marching orders for Biden ’ s proposed White House commission should be clear .
First , protection of threatened service members or military dependents is weak .
Currently , the military protective orders that commanders issue to protect victims from their abusers provide insufficient coverage for survivors outside of the military base , including the more than 65 percent of military families who live off base .
Lawmakers have proposed allowing military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ addition to commanders—in order to make the orders enforceable by civilian law enforcement ( this approach would also be more compliant with the Violence Against Women Act that Biden championed as a senator ) .
Yet , defense officials have actively discouraged this solution , arguing that the administrative burden on military judges ( read : the extra work these orders would entail ) outweighs the benefits of the additional protections for at-risk military families .
Second , too few perpetrators are held accountable .
It was only in 2018 that Congress identified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military law—before that , it was prosecuted as a general form of assault , which advocates argued diminished the unique and serious nature of the crime .
But ensuring domestic abusers are routinely charged with the crime by the military is another matter ; until the president requires it ( which Trump never did ) , military lawyers can still opt not to use this specific indictment .
And when the abuser is a service member , the decision of whether to prosecute—as with sexual assault and abuse , and other crimes—controversially belongs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proposed shifting prosecutorial authority to independent military prosecutors , given perceptions of commanders ’ conflicts of interest and the chilling effect on reporting ; others have argued for maintaining and respecting the Pentagon ’ s chain of command .
Biden has committed to exploring “ all options ” for how cases are reported and prosecuted in order to end this scourge .
Third , the Pentagon does not effectively monitor intimate partner violence in the military .
It relies on incomplete data despite recommendations by the Government Accountability Office 14 years ago ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fix its broken tracking system .
And it does not have a formalized , data-driven annual fatality review process for domestic violence-related deaths and other homicides and suicides related to gendered abuse , assault , and harassment—failing to hold its leaders accountable for losses like Aposhian and Guillén , and missing an opportunity to identify trends that could improve its prevention efforts .
It is long past time for the United States to ensure its military is safe for all who want to serve .
Indeed , the next Secretary of Defense will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ key inflection point in the U.S. military ’ s—and the nation ’ s—reckoning with systemic racial and gender injustice .
Left unaddressed , long-standing undercurrents of racism and misogyny will continue to foster an unequal and unsafe climate for the service members most impacted by violence and abuse , with women of color , and gay , lesbian , and transgender service members paying the highest price ( a climate that the Trump administration ’ s ban on transgender soldiers has no doubt worsened , and which Biden has promised to reverse ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that while “ casualties on the battlefield are understood to be consistent with our military duties , ” the Pentagon should accept “ no casualties due to sexual assault within our ranks.
” And yet , as the deaths of Aposhian and Guillén have made painfully clear , the armed forces and broader department remain a hostile , unsafe environment for many women servicemembers and civilians .
The White House , Pentagon , and Congress must urgently change that—for the sake of servicewomen ’ s lives and dignity , the strength of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

In April this year, Airman 1st Class Natasha Aposhian arrived at Grand Forks Air Force base in North Dakota. Around the same time, Army Specialist Vanessa Guillén disappeared from her Fort Hood base in Texas after experiencing sexual harassment that, according to her family and attorney, she was too afraid to report. Both were found dead in June: Aposhian was shot and killed in a dormitory by a fellow airman she had been dating, while Guillén’s mutilated remains were discovered just outside the base, where her murderer—an Army enlisted soldier—had hidden her.
In April this year, Airman 1st Class Natasha Aposhian arrived at Grand Forks Air Force base in North Dakota. Around the same time, Army Specialist Vanessa Guillén disappeared from her Fort Hood base in Texas after experiencing sexual harassment that, according to her family and attorney, she was too afraid to report. Both were found dead in June: Aposhian was shot and killed in a dormitory by a fellow airman she had been dating, while Guillén’s mutilated remains were discovered just outside the base, where her murderer—an Army enlisted soldier—had hidden her.
The next month, in a letter to the heads of the Air Force and Army (the military branches in which Aposhian and Guillén had served), State Senator Daniel Ivey-Soto, president of the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators, mourned the loss. “Enlisted women—especially enlisted women of color,” he lamented, “have more to fear from those with whom they serve than from this nation’s enemies.” That’s been the sad truth for much too long, and it became even worse under the Trump administration: take as one example sexual assault in the workplace (referred to as military sexual assault)—a 2018 Pentagon survey found a 44 percent increase in the number of women victims compared to 2016.
Guillén’s case has sparked outrage around the country and an outpouring of female service members’ stories of their own sexual harassment and assault. It prompted investigations into a culture of sexual harassment and bullying that Fort Hood soldiers allege their leadership ignored, and new legislation (introduced with bipartisan support in the House and Senate) that would change how the military investigates and prosecutes sexual harassment complaints, reinforcing a years-long Senate push. Aposhian’s family hopes that the military’s current reckoning will also address the intimate partner violence that claimed their daughter’s life—going beyond victim services (the focus of a Senate bill introduced last week) to tackle systemic reform.
With the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on Nov. 25, activists are looking ahead with hope. Congress is in the throes of negotiating the final National Defense Authorization Act and its proposed provisions on domestic violence and sexual harassment in the military. President-elect Joe Biden has promised that the Department of Defense will “take urgent and aggressive action” on this issue—guided by an expert commission—and recognized that “ending assault in the military requires determined leadership and accountability at every level—starting with the commander in chief.”
He’s right. Attempts to address military sexual assault have been inadequate, leaving women and LGBTQ service members at heightened risk of violence and harassment in the workplace. Biden’s attention to this issue is welcome, and should extend to all forms of gender-based violence in the military—including the long-neglected violence that service members experience in their homes. Indeed, too many officials dismiss intimate partner violence in the military as a private family matter, despite the significant number of active-duty women it harms. Roughly one in three female service members are affected by physical violence, rape, or stalking by a partner in their lifetimes, and over half report psychological aggression from an intimate partner. And like Aposhian, some are killed by their partners, including on the very military bases that should be the safest places for them to live and work. Yet, symbolically, the office with primary responsibility for military domestic violence, the Family Advocacy Program, is under separate command from every other Pentagon office charged with addressing violent and harmful behavior in the military.
In permitting gender-based violence in all its forms to continue across the military with little response, for years, the Pentagon and Congress overlook its ramifications on the health, readiness, and diversity of the force. When service members are afraid to report the violence they experience, from intimate partner violence to workplace harassment—as was the case for Aposhian, Guillén, and countless other women—it signals soldiers’ broken trust in their leaders, which undermines the unit’s cohesiveness and readiness.
The military’s strength is determined by its ability to attract and retain talented and hardworking women and men, yet efforts by the Pentagon to increase diversity are undermined by a hostile environment of misogyny and racism that drives women out of the force. Indeed, survivors feel betrayed by the Pentagon’s insufficient response, which creates “an environment in which they no longer felt valued,” according to one study, and contributes to higher rates of suicidal thoughts among veterans with a history of military sexual trauma.
The costs of this betrayal are staggering: Estimates suggest the Department loses more total service members to discharge after they report sexual assault than it does to combat (around 5,300 service members separated from service due to sexual assault in just the six-year period of 2009-2015, compared to around 6,900 soldiers killed in action over nearly 20 years of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom). And the costs of the department’s inaction are growing: Pointing to the Army’s failure to protect Guillén and its mishandling of the investigation, civil society stakeholders and veterans organizations are now actively discouraging women from entering into military service for fear of their safety. This pattern persists despite the Department’s commitment to be a model for increasing gender diversity and inclusion.
It is long past time for the Pentagon and Congress to elevate all forms of gender-based violence in the military—including intimate partner violence—to the level that victims deserve. The marching orders for Biden’s proposed White House commission should be clear.
First, protection of threatened service members or military dependents is weak. Currently, the military protective orders that commanders issue to protect victims from their abusers provide insufficient coverage for survivors outside of the military base, including the more than 65 percent of military families who live off base. Lawmakers have proposed allowing military judges to issue protective orders, in addition to commanders—in order to make the orders enforceable by civilian law enforcement (this approach would also be more compliant with the Violence Against Women Act that Biden championed as a senator). Yet, defense officials have actively discouraged this solution, arguing that the administrative burden on military judges (read: the extra work these orders would entail) outweighs the benefits of the additional protections for at-risk military families.
Second, too few perpetrators are held accountable. It was only in 2018 that Congress identified domestic violence as its own crime under military law—before that, it was prosecuted as a general form of assault, which advocates argued diminished the unique and serious nature of the crime. But ensuring domestic abusers are routinely charged with the crime by the military is another matter; until the president requires it (which Trump never did), military lawyers can still opt not to use this specific indictment. And when the abuser is a service member, the decision of whether to prosecute—as with sexual assault and abuse, and other crimes—controversially belongs to their commander. Some lawmakers have proposed shifting prosecutorial authority to independent military prosecutors, given perceptions of commanders’ conflicts of interest and the chilling effect on reporting; others have argued for maintaining and respecting the Pentagon’s chain of command. Biden has committed to exploring “all options” for how cases are reported and prosecuted in order to end this scourge.
Third, the Pentagon does not effectively monitor intimate partner violence in the military. It relies on incomplete data despite recommendations by the Government Accountability Office 14 years ago (and again 10 years ago) to fix its broken tracking system. And it does not have a formalized, data-driven annual fatality review process for domestic violence-related deaths and other homicides and suicides related to gendered abuse, assault, and harassment—failing to hold its leaders accountable for losses like Aposhian and Guillén, and missing an opportunity to identify trends that could improve its prevention efforts.
It is long past time for the United States to ensure its military is safe for all who want to serve. Indeed, the next Secretary of Defense will assume leadership of the Pentagon at a key inflection point in the U.S. military’s—and the nation’s—reckoning with systemic racial and gender injustice. Left unaddressed, long-standing undercurrents of racism and misogyny will continue to foster an unequal and unsafe climate for the service members most impacted by violence and abuse, with women of color, and gay, lesbian, and transgender service members paying the highest price (a climate that the Trump administration’s ban on transgender soldiers has no doubt worsened, and which Biden has promised to reverse).
Former Defense Secretary James Mattis once said that while “casualties on the battlefield are understood to be consistent with our military duties,” the Pentagon should accept “no casualties due to sexual assault within our ranks.” And yet, as the deaths of Aposhian and Guillén have made painfully clear, the armed forces and broader department remain a hostile, unsafe environment for many women servicemembers and civilians. The White House, Pentagon, and Congress must urgently change that—for the sake of servicewomen’s lives and dignity, the strength of our military, and our global credibility.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-23--Biden’s Likely Defense Secretary Pick Flournoy Faces Progressive Pushback

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden named a slate of experienced hands for his national security team on Monday—but stopped short of selecting a defense secretary .
Now , backers of Michèle Flournoy , his likely pick for defense secretary , are trying to head off a last-minute push by some left-leaning Democrats trying to derail her selection , with many progressives seeing her nomination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to as America ’ s “ forever wars.
” In a letter obtained by Foreign Policy organized by No Exceptions , a mostly inactive nonprofit that previously advocated for opening more military service roles to women , expected to be signed by more than 100 former U.S. and military officials and national security experts , Flournoy is described as a consensus-builder able to heal the tensions and mistrust sown during the Trump administration .
“ This level of wide-spread trust and confidence will enable Michèle to build a coherent defense strategy and restore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the authors wrote .
“ She will repair the actual and reputational erosion of the last few years , while recruiting and sustaining talent to set our country on a confident and renewed course.
” In response , progressive groups led by Just Foreign Policy and Demand Progress are planning a letter asking Flournoy and Biden ’ s already-announced top national security picks , Avril Haines and Antony Blinken , to account for perceived past foreign-policy mistakes , including U.S. policy in Yemen , Libya , Syria , and with regards to Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the simmering tensions between the progressive and centrist wings of the Democratic Party as Biden tries to hold Democrats together while he prepares to enter the Oval Office .
On Monday evening , Biden got a boost in efforts to begin his stalled transition as General Services Administration chief Emily Murphy finally issued a letter of ascertainment certifying the former vice president as the winner of the November election , a move that will formally allow his team access to federal transition resources and to begin onboarding at U.S. government agencies .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a request for comment .
But several foreign-policy experts in contact with the transition team said that it is highly unlikely the pushback would derail Flournoy ’ s likely nomination .
Additionally , it is unclear who progressives would like to replace Flournoy in the event their campaign to quash her nomination gained traction .
In a letter earlier this month , progressive Democratic Reps. Mark Pocan of Wisconsin and Barbara Lee of California urged Biden not to select a new nominee for the Pentagon job with a track record of working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmation hearing of President Donald Trump ’ s former Defense Secretary Mark Esper .
The former secretary , who was recently fired by tweet , was a senior lobbyist for Raytheon , a major defense contractor , before joining the Trump administration .
Flournoy serves on the board of Booz Allen Hamilton and , along with Blinken , founded WestExec Advisors , a Washington consulting firm that reportedly advises the defense industry , private equity firms , and hedge funds .
But Flournoy ’ s wide experience in the Defense Department , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clinton administration as a principal deputy assistant secretary of defense and carried her through the Obama administration , where she served as the agency ’ s Senate-confirmed undersecretary of defense for policy , is seen as likely to help her clear a possible Republican-controlled Senate .
She also became known for co-founding the Center for a New American Security in 2007 , a bipartisan think tank focused on defense issues .
Still , some progressive foreign-policy experts view her consulting work as a liability , fearing her ties to the defense industry could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take up the top post at the Pentagon .
Mandy Smithberger , of the nonpartisan group Project on Government Oversight , has questioned whether Flournoy ’ s policy proposals for a new administration “ benefit the bottom line of current or former clients of her consulting firm ” in a piece on the influence of defense contractors over a Biden administration ’ s Pentagon .
Moreover , as Smithberger noted , one-third of Biden ’ s Pentagon agency review team work for think tanks , organizations , or companies that receive defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy circles .
Notably , Blinken , who was picked for secretary of state , has faced less public pushback for his work with WestExec than Flournoy .
Some Democratic foreign-policy experts said that is because the Pentagon is simply a bigger institution where conflicts of interest with defense contractors would more quickly arise than at the State Department .
Others said Blinken has done a better job making inroads with progressive groups in the runup to the elections .
Still others attribute it in part to sexism ; Flournoy is being unfairly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterparts , they said .
Progressive foreign-policy experts who have questions said that the future administration could allay these concerns by requiring nominees like Flournoy and Blinken to more fully disclose their investments and business dealings before taking up their government posts .
Andrew Albertson , the head of the advocacy organization Foreign Policy for America , described Flournoy as extremely qualified for the job of defense secretary and said some of the pushback from the left wing of the party was less about her and more about grievances over U.S. defense policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frustrated by the fact that the defense budget has grown to more than half our discretionary budget every year and shows no signs of stopping , and frustrated that they haven ’ t found a real formula for turning the [ National Defense Authorization Act ] from a wish list into a real policy document that makes hard choices , ” he said .
“ And that ’ s some of what you ’ re seeing bubble up.
” Despite widespread support of Flournoy from many foreign-policy experts , who dismissed any nefarious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense industry , some progressive Democratic lawmakers have raised a battle cry .
“ Flournoy supported the war in Iraq [ and ] Libya , criticized Obama on Syria , and helped craft the surge in Afghanistan , ” Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna , a progressive backer of Sen. Bernie Sanders and an architect of the 2019 War Powers Resolution to end U.S. involvement in Yemen , tweeted on Sunday .
“ I want to support the President ’ s picks .
But will Flournoy now commit to a full withdrawal from Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Saudis to end the Yemen war ?
” Flournoy , as Pentagon policy chief during the Obama administration , clashed with Biden when he was vice president over the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan , as did much of the Obama administration , and in the past pushed to keep more U.S. forces in Iraq .
Opposition to Flournoy is tempered , but not fully allayed , by the historic prospect of a first female defense secretary .
In a call with the likely pick earlier this month , progressives specifically raised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense contractors and expressed frustration that she wasn ’ t willing to agree to an outright ban on U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia , instead favoring just a ban on offensive weapons sales .
Some progressives have also been frustrated by the Biden team ’ s unwillingness to commit to defense spending cuts and to redirect more of the Pentagon budget toward domestic priorities .
News of the call was first reported by Politico .
Some others on Capitol Hill weren ’ t as committed to opposing Flournoy and other Biden picks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on key policy decisions for progressives .
“ I think you ’ ll find the concerns with Biden ’ s picks to be fairly limited , ” said one House aide .

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden named a slate of experienced hands for his national security team on Monday—but stopped short of selecting a defense secretary. Now, backers of Michèle Flournoy, his likely pick for defense secretary, are trying to head off a last-minute push by some left-leaning Democrats trying to derail her selection, with many progressives seeing her nomination as a continuation of what critics refer to as America’s “forever wars.”
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden named a slate of experienced hands for his national security team on Monday—but stopped short of selecting a defense secretary. Now, backers of Michèle Flournoy, his likely pick for defense secretary, are trying to head off a last-minute push by some left-leaning Democrats trying to derail her selection, with many progressives seeing her nomination as a continuation of what critics refer to as America’s “forever wars.”
In a letter obtained by Foreign Policy organized by No Exceptions, a mostly inactive nonprofit that previously advocated for opening more military service roles to women, expected to be signed by more than 100 former U.S. and military officials and national security experts, Flournoy is described as a consensus-builder able to heal the tensions and mistrust sown during the Trump administration.
“This level of wide-spread trust and confidence will enable Michèle to build a coherent defense strategy and restore trust amongst allies and partners,” the authors wrote. “She will repair the actual and reputational erosion of the last few years, while recruiting and sustaining talent to set our country on a confident and renewed course.”
For weeks, the left-leaning Center for International Policy has petitioned the Senate not to confirm cabinet picks on the incoming Biden team with corporate and lobbying ties, an effort that has been backed by Arizona Democratic Rep. Raul Grijalva. The organization is also working with the Congressional Progressive Caucus on a letter seeking clarity on Flournoy’s client list at WestExec Advisors, the consulting firm she started in recent years, and asking the former top Pentagon official to recuse herself if she worked on major weapons programs in the private sector.
Progressive groups led by Just Foreign Policy and Demand Progress are planning a letter asking Flournoy and Biden’s already-announced top national security picks, Avril Haines and Antony Blinken, to account for perceived past foreign-policy mistakes, including U.S. policy in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and with regards to Saudi arms sales.
The dueling letters reflect the simmering tensions between the progressive and centrist wings of the Democratic Party as Biden tries to hold Democrats together while he prepares to enter the Oval Office. On Monday evening, Biden got a boost in efforts to begin his stalled transition as General Services Administration chief Emily Murphy finally issued a letter of ascertainment certifying the former vice president as the winner of the November election, a move that will formally allow his team access to federal transition resources and to begin onboarding at U.S. government agencies.
The Biden transition team did not immediately respond to a request for comment. But several foreign-policy experts in contact with the transition team said that it is highly unlikely the pushback would derail Flournoy’s likely nomination. Additionally, it is unclear who progressives would like to replace Flournoy in the event their campaign to quash her nomination gained traction.
In a letter earlier this month, progressive Democratic Reps. Mark Pocan of Wisconsin and Barbara Lee of California urged Biden not to select a new nominee for the Pentagon job with a track record of working with defense contractors—a trip wire during the confirmation hearing of President Donald Trump’s former Defense Secretary Mark Esper. The former secretary, who was recently fired by tweet, was a senior lobbyist for Raytheon, a major defense contractor, before joining the Trump administration. Flournoy serves on the board of Booz Allen Hamilton and, along with Blinken, founded WestExec Advisors, a Washington consulting firm that reportedly advises the defense industry, private equity firms, and hedge funds.
But Flournoy’s wide experience in the Defense Department, which began nearly three decades ago in the Clinton administration as a principal deputy assistant secretary of defense and carried her through the Obama administration, where she served as the agency’s Senate-confirmed undersecretary of defense for policy, is seen as likely to help her clear a possible Republican-controlled Senate. She also became known for co-founding the Center for a New American Security in 2007, a bipartisan think tank focused on defense issues.
Still, some progressive foreign-policy experts view her consulting work as a liability, fearing her ties to the defense industry could pose conflicts of interest if she were to take up the top post at the Pentagon.
Mandy Smithberger, of the nonpartisan group Project on Government Oversight, has questioned whether Flournoy’s policy proposals for a new administration “benefit the bottom line of current or former clients of her consulting firm” in a piece on the influence of defense contractors over a Biden administration’s Pentagon.
Moreover, as Smithberger noted, one-third of Biden’s Pentagon agency review team work for think tanks, organizations, or companies that receive defense industry funding—a point of contention with progressive foreign-policy circles.
Notably, Blinken, who was picked for secretary of state, has faced less public pushback for his work with WestExec than Flournoy. Some Democratic foreign-policy experts said that is because the Pentagon is simply a bigger institution where conflicts of interest with defense contractors would more quickly arise than at the State Department. Others said Blinken has done a better job making inroads with progressive groups in the runup to the elections. Still others attribute it in part to sexism; Flournoy is being unfairly held to a different standard than male counterparts, they said.
Progressive foreign-policy experts who have questions said that the future administration could allay these concerns by requiring nominees like Flournoy and Blinken to more fully disclose their investments and business dealings before taking up their government posts.
Andrew Albertson, the head of the advocacy organization Foreign Policy for America, described Flournoy as extremely qualified for the job of defense secretary and said some of the pushback from the left wing of the party was less about her and more about grievances over U.S. defense policy overall.
“I think progressives are frustrated by the fact that the defense budget has grown to more than half our discretionary budget every year and shows no signs of stopping, and frustrated that they haven’t found a real formula for turning the [National Defense Authorization Act] from a wish list into a real policy document that makes hard choices,” he said. “And that’s some of what you’re seeing bubble up.”
Despite widespread support of Flournoy from many foreign-policy experts, who dismissed any nefarious influence from her past ties to the defense industry, some progressive Democratic lawmakers have raised a battle cry.
“Flournoy supported the war in Iraq [and] Libya, criticized Obama on Syria, and helped craft the surge in Afghanistan,” Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna, a progressive backer of Sen. Bernie Sanders and an architect of the 2019 War Powers Resolution to end U.S. involvement in Yemen, tweeted on Sunday. “I want to support the President’s picks. But will Flournoy now commit to a full withdrawal from Afghanistan & a ban on arms sales to the Saudis to end the Yemen war?”
Flournoy, as Pentagon policy chief during the Obama administration, clashed with Biden when he was vice president over the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, as did much of the Obama administration, and in the past pushed to keep more U.S. forces in Iraq.
Opposition to Flournoy is tempered, but not fully allayed, by the historic prospect of a first female defense secretary. In a call with the likely pick earlier this month, progressives specifically raised issues with Flournoy’s ties to defense contractors and expressed frustration that she wasn’t willing to agree to an outright ban on U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, instead favoring just a ban on offensive weapons sales. Some progressives have also been frustrated by the Biden team’s unwillingness to commit to defense spending cuts and to redirect more of the Pentagon budget toward domestic priorities. News of the call was first reported by Politico.
Some others on Capitol Hill weren’t as committed to opposing Flournoy and other Biden picks, and simply sought to get assurances on key policy decisions for progressives.
“I think you’ll find the concerns with Biden’s picks to be fairly limited,” said one House aide.
Update, Nov. 25, 2020: This article was updated to provide further details on progressive pushback over Biden cabinet picks.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-23--Why India Refused to Join the World’s Biggest Trading Bloc

Why India Refused to Join the World ’ s Biggest Trading Bloc On Sunday , Nov. 15 , 15 Asian nations representing nearly a third of the global economy signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP ) , forming the world ’ s biggest trading bloc .
But one Asian economic giant was missing : India .
Despite protracted negotiations , New Delhi refused to join the accord .
Once implemented , the RCEP will either reduce or eliminate tariffs on a range of goods and services and set up rules on investment and competition , and ensure protections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analysts have argued that India would in fact benefit from joining the RCEP .
Besides the obvious upside to domestic consumers in the form of cheaper and higher quality products , the specific advantage of the RCEP lies in the opportunity it provides Indian firms to participate in global value chains and in attracting foreign investment .
India ’ s experience with past free trade agreements shows that these deals have led to increases in exports to Thailand , Cambodia , Vietnam , Malaysia , and the Philippines .
Cheaper imports of goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan have increased India ’ s productive capacity .
Analysts have further argued that joining the RCEP would create jobs and sustain economic growth .
There were compelling political reasons for joining the RCEP as well : Being a signatory would have given India the opportunity to shape the agreement in the future .
And staying out of the deal isolates India , limiting its ability to shape the emerging trade architecture .
The potential benefits notwithstanding , India ’ s refusal to accede to the agreement was not entirely surprising .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly protectionist set of economic policies as part of its historic commitment to a strategy of import-substituting industrialization .
It was only in the aftermath of an unprecedented financial crisis in 1991 that the country gradually moved to dismantle an array of tariff barriers .
Even though India ’ s integration into the global economy increased dramatically during the last 30 years , New Delhi ’ s rhetoric in trade negotiations has remained mostly protectionist .
And this tone has become more pronounced during the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” strategy early in its tenure .
Most recently , even before the coronavirus pandemic cratered the Indian economy , it announced a policy of economic self-reliance—atmanirbhar in Hindi—designed to boost domestic industry .
In some ways , these policies harked back to a previous era when the pursuit of economic self-reliance was an integral component of India ’ s developmental strategy .
India ’ s refusal to accede to the agreement was not entirely surprising .
Aspects of India ’ s experience with free trade agreements have reinforced an ideological narrative of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government ’ s own research has shown that India has , in sum , benefited from the trade agreements it has signed in the past , critics have pointed out that as a result of previous agreements , India has negative trade balances with several RCEP member countries .
Critics have also linked such agreements , such as FTAs with Japan , South Korea , and ASEAN , to the decline of manufacturing in India .
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , India ’ s minister for external affairs , recently argued that trade deals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the minister did not mention specific sectors , trade associations argue that industries such as electronics and light manufacturing have suffered on account of FTAs .
There is no denying that policy and regulatory reforms and the effort to build a supportive infrastructure did not accompany past trade deals , limiting potential gains from FTAs .
One of the biggest complaints is that the absence of safeguards in former FTAs have allowed an unchecked flow of Chinese imports into India .
Apart from the legacies of the past , both national political parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BJP ) and the principal opposition party , the Indian National Congress , despite significant other ideological differences , share a common distrust of free market economics .
As a result , the BJP has faced little hostility from its most significant political rival when rejecting trade pacts .
In fact , the negative tone of the narrative around past FTAs , many of which were negotiated during the Congress-led administration between 2004-14 , might have led the opposition to vehemently oppose RCEP .
Both national political parties share a common distrust of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideological distaste of free trade there are at least two other compelling reasons for India ’ s intransigence .
First , rapidly dismantling tariff barriers would prove costly for a number of Indian industrial enterprises that are not globally competitive .
Unsurprisingly , significant segments of Indian industry , such as those of steel , plastic , copper , aluminum , paper , automobiles , and chemicals , lauded the decision to steer clear of the RCEP .
Second , India ’ s politicians are also beholden to India ’ s vast farm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimate reasons , believe that a swift opening up of the country ’ s markets to foreign agricultural products could place them at a significant disadvantage .
Large-scale reforms could prove costly—and even wipe out—the small , family-owned farms which dot the country ’ s landscape .
Dairy farmers are particularly opposed to offering market access to foreign producers as they fear competition from the competitive , and more industrialized , dairy industries in Australia and New Zealand .
While there is significant opposition to RCEP from agriculture and industry , one would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advocate for joining the agreement .
According to World Trade Organization data , India was the world ’ s eighth largest service exporter and ninth largest service trader in 2018 and is known as a powerhouse in the areas of information technology and business services .
Indeed , Indian IT firms have lobbied for greater access into RCEP member country markets .
But the nature of India ’ s IT exports involves cross-border movement of professionals .
IT firms have , accordingly , sought concessions relating to restrictive business visa rules , statutory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , particularly in China .
These issues tend to get embroiled in domestic immigration and regulatory policy debates and have proven to be particularly challenging to negotiate .
While the RCEP has promised some service sector liberalization , member countries have not offered concessions on such cross-border movement of professionals , a key interest for India .
In other areas of service trade , India is more defensive and is not yet ready to open its markets .
E-commerce is one such example in which India ’ s policy framework and lack of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up its market .
Other RCEP members have emerged as large service exporters .
China , for example , is a prominent exporter of infrastructure , logistics , and technology .
According to the same WTO data , China was also the fifth largest and the fastest growing service exporter in 2018 .
As this analysis of sectoral interests demonstrates , there is no strong constituency in favor of the deal while there are several vocal ones opposed to it .
Crafting a free trade deal with the United States will not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the RCEP may have as much to do with economic interests as it does with broader trade strategy and geopolitics .
The Modi government has sought to reset its approach to free trade agreements by shifting its focus away from Asia to the United States , the European Union , and the United Kingdom .
Such a strategy would counter those who argue that leaving the RCEP will isolate India with respect to multilateral trade agreements .
However , as past experience has shown , crafting a free trade deal with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Washington usually demands much higher standards in its trade agreements than what is present in RCEP , a requirement that is particularly true of issue areas such as investor-state disputes and intellectual property rights .
New Delhi has gambled that by not joining the RCEP and building a self-reliant India , it would be in a position to craft future FTAs from a position of strength .
That is an unlikely scenario .
As China ’ s accession to the World Trade Organization demonstrated , joining an existing deal requires paying a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Further , not joining RCEP robbed India of the chance to play a role in setting norms in new issue areas in trade such as e-commerce .
Building an economically strong India requires reforming New Delhi ’ s policy and regulatory environment and revisiting and renegotiating past agreements .
Staying out of new ones is not the answer .

On Sunday, Nov. 15, 15 Asian nations representing nearly a third of the global economy signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), forming the world’s biggest trading bloc. But one Asian economic giant was missing: India. Despite protracted negotiations, New Delhi refused to join the accord.
On Sunday, Nov. 15, 15 Asian nations representing nearly a third of the global economy signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), forming the world’s biggest trading bloc. But one Asian economic giant was missing: India. Despite protracted negotiations, New Delhi refused to join the accord.
Once implemented, the RCEP will either reduce or eliminate tariffs on a range of goods and services and set up rules on investment and competition, and ensure protections for intellectual property. Economists and policy analysts have argued that India would in fact benefit from joining the RCEP. Besides the obvious upside to domestic consumers in the form of cheaper and higher quality products, the specific advantage of the RCEP lies in the opportunity it provides Indian firms to participate in global value chains and in attracting foreign investment. India’s experience with past free trade agreements shows that these deals have led to increases in exports to Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Cheaper imports of goods and industrial supplies from countries such as Japan have increased India’s productive capacity. Analysts have further argued that joining the RCEP would create jobs and sustain economic growth. There were compelling political reasons for joining the RCEP as well: Being a signatory would have given India the opportunity to shape the agreement in the future. And staying out of the deal isolates India, limiting its ability to shape the emerging trade architecture.
The potential benefits notwithstanding, India’s refusal to accede to the agreement was not entirely surprising. For decades, New Delhi has followed a highly protectionist set of economic policies as part of its historic commitment to a strategy of import-substituting industrialization. It was only in the aftermath of an unprecedented financial crisis in 1991 that the country gradually moved to dismantle an array of tariff barriers. Even though India’s integration into the global economy increased dramatically during the last 30 years, New Delhi’s rhetoric in trade negotiations has remained mostly protectionist. And this tone has become more pronounced during the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which focused on a “Make in India” strategy early in its tenure. Most recently, even before the coronavirus pandemic cratered the Indian economy, it announced a policy of economic self-reliance—atmanirbhar in Hindi—designed to boost domestic industry. In some ways, these policies harked back to a previous era when the pursuit of economic self-reliance was an integral component of India’s developmental strategy.
India’s refusal to accede to the agreement was not entirely surprising.
Aspects of India’s experience with free trade agreements have reinforced an ideological narrative of the importance of self-reliance. Even though the government’s own research has shown that India has, in sum, benefited from the trade agreements it has signed in the past, critics have pointed out that as a result of previous agreements, India has negative trade balances with several RCEP member countries. Critics have also linked such agreements, such as FTAs with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN, to the decline of manufacturing in India. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s minister for external affairs, recently argued that trade deals have led to deindustrialization, and while the minister did not mention specific sectors, trade associations argue that industries such as electronics and light manufacturing have suffered on account of FTAs. There is no denying that policy and regulatory reforms and the effort to build a supportive infrastructure did not accompany past trade deals, limiting potential gains from FTAs. One of the biggest complaints is that the absence of safeguards in former FTAs have allowed an unchecked flow of Chinese imports into India.
Apart from the legacies of the past, both national political parties, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the principal opposition party, the Indian National Congress, despite significant other ideological differences, share a common distrust of free market economics. As a result, the BJP has faced little hostility from its most significant political rival when rejecting trade pacts. In fact, the negative tone of the narrative around past FTAs, many of which were negotiated during the Congress-led administration between 2004-14, might have led the opposition to vehemently oppose RCEP.
Both national political parties share a common distrust of free market economics. Apart from the ideological distaste of free trade there are at least two other compelling reasons for India’s intransigence. First, rapidly dismantling tariff barriers would prove costly for a number of Indian industrial enterprises that are not globally competitive. Unsurprisingly, significant segments of Indian industry, such as those of steel, plastic, copper, aluminum, paper, automobiles, and chemicals, lauded the decision to steer clear of the RCEP.
Second, India’s politicians are also beholden to India’s vast farm lobby. Many Indian farmers, for legitimate reasons, believe that a swift opening up of the country’s markets to foreign agricultural products could place them at a significant disadvantage. Large-scale reforms could prove costly—and even wipe out—the small, family-owned farms which dot the country’s landscape. Dairy farmers are particularly opposed to offering market access to foreign producers as they fear competition from the competitive, and more industrialized, dairy industries in Australia and New Zealand.
While there is significant opposition to RCEP from agriculture and industry, one would expect India’s service sector to advocate for joining the agreement. According to World Trade Organization data, India was the world’s eighth largest service exporter and ninth largest service trader in 2018 and is known as a powerhouse in the areas of information technology and business services. Indeed, Indian IT firms have lobbied for greater access into RCEP member country markets. But the nature of India’s IT exports involves cross-border movement of professionals. IT firms have, accordingly, sought concessions relating to restrictive business visa rules, statutory compliance costs, and domestic tax regimes, particularly in China. These issues tend to get embroiled in domestic immigration and regulatory policy debates and have proven to be particularly challenging to negotiate. While the RCEP has promised some service sector liberalization, member countries have not offered concessions on such cross-border movement of professionals, a key interest for India.
In other areas of service trade, India is more defensive and is not yet ready to open its markets. E-commerce is one such example in which India’s policy framework and lack of a regulatory environment prevents it from opening up its market. Other RCEP members have emerged as large service exporters. China, for example, is a prominent exporter of infrastructure, logistics, and technology. According to the same WTO data, China was also the fifth largest and the fastest growing service exporter in 2018. As this analysis of sectoral interests demonstrates, there is no strong constituency in favor of the deal while there are several vocal ones opposed to it.
Crafting a free trade deal with the United States will not be easy either. India’s exit from the RCEP may have as much to do with economic interests as it does with broader trade strategy and geopolitics. The Modi government has sought to reset its approach to free trade agreements by shifting its focus away from Asia to the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Such a strategy would counter those who argue that leaving the RCEP will isolate India with respect to multilateral trade agreements. However, as past experience has shown, crafting a free trade deal with the United States will not be easy either. Washington usually demands much higher standards in its trade agreements than what is present in RCEP, a requirement that is particularly true of issue areas such as investor-state disputes and intellectual property rights.
New Delhi has gambled that by not joining the RCEP and building a self-reliant India, it would be in a position to craft future FTAs from a position of strength. That is an unlikely scenario. As China’s accession to the World Trade Organization demonstrated, joining an existing deal requires paying a higher price in terms of trade concessions. Further, not joining RCEP robbed India of the chance to play a role in setting norms in new issue areas in trade such as e-commerce.
Building an economically strong India requires reforming New Delhi’s policy and regulatory environment and revisiting and renegotiating past agreements. Staying out of new ones is not the answer.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-23--Polling Has a 98 Percent Chance of Being Bad for You

Polling Has a 98 Percent Chance of Being Bad for You In 2016 and 2020 , Americans were hard pressed to escape election polls .
From the whiplash of Trump ’ s obsessive tweets— “ the polls are fake , ” ( Oct. 13 ) “ poll numbers looking very strong , ” ( Oct. 16 ) —to news coverage saturated with the latest findings , the ever-shifting numbers were omnipresent .
On Election Day , everyone watched in real time to see how predictions were lining up with exit polls .
But on the eve of the 2017 French @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look internationally for their fix of data .
A 32-hour legally enforced blanket of silence around the election fell over the country at midnight , just as it has since 1977 when the law was first passed .
No campaigning , no statements from campaigns , and , perhaps strangest of all , no polling or publication of polls , on pain of a 75,000-euro fine .
Political junkies had to settle for Swiss and Belgian reports , marked on social media with # RadioLondres , a reference to coded messages sent during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ station of the French Resistance .
It ’ s hard to imagine such restrictions in France , where censorship is reserved for offensive speech and religious symbols .
( A stricter weeklong blackout was scaled back in 2002 over free speech concerns . )
And yet the law endures , alongside similar laws in a host of other countries , among them Italy , Spain , Portugal , Taiwan , and Peru .
In Honduras the embargo on polls lasts a whopping 45 days .
Common to all the laws is the original @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the effects of exposing the electorate to polling data .
This concern is not just about bad polling data , which is usually the focus of critics .
Bad data comes in two varieties .
There are deliberately fraudulent polls like those that flooded Mexico before the 2018 election .
And there are incompetent or inaccurate polls , a major topic in the wake of Brexit and America ’ s last two elections .
“ If public-opinion data are unreliable , we ’ re all flying blind , ” wrote David Graham @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polling catastrophe ” in the Atlantic .
In response , pollsters and modelers have defended their trade by suggesting polls performed as advertised but statistical simpletons persist in misreading them .
Yet prohibitions on publicizing polling results near an election are not motivated primarily by preventing access to bad data , or bad interpretations of good data .
However imperfect , the laws acknowledge an obvious truth that 21st-century information gluttons have forgotten : Sometimes not knowing is a blessing .
While legislation may not be the ideal way to secure salutary ignorance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As French lawmakers argued in 1977 , sondomanie or “ poll mania ” —already an issue back then—can make it difficult to clear one ’ s mind and evaluate the candidates on their merits .
They lamented the resulting “ sheeplike movement ” and “ collective madness.
” Better to secure an environment well suited to responsible decision-making , which they described using the terms “ serenity , tranquility , calm , and silence.
” Imagine what those lawmakers would think if they saw the explosion of modern polling : thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance of elections , like Christmas decorations on sale in May , and the media and the public consulting the results like an oracle , compulsively gorging themselves on data .
Political science has multiple terms for the potential influence of polling data , among them the bandwagon effect ( conformity with perceived majority ) and spiral of silence ( reluctance to express perceived minority opinions ) , all of which can influence voter choices and voter turnout .
The laws against publishing polling results are meant to insulate against these psychological intrusions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Our myopic focus on bad data and fallacious interpretation results from an assumption shared by pollsters and their critics alike , an assumption so deeply engrained that questioning it is taboo : Accurate information is always good .
Yes , misinformation should be fought .
So should information illiteracy .
But surely an educated public should welcome good data , the more the better ?
Suggesting otherwise—perhaps flying blind is better under certain circumstances ?
—reeks of censorship and paternalism .
At FiveThirtyEight , the popular polling aggregator , Maggie Koerth makes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a crucial right , regardless of its potential influence .
“ Polls may well have changed the outcome of an election in France , ” she concedes of the 2002 French presidential primaries , when an extreme far-right candidate shocked the nation with a surprise win .
“ But that was a choice the voters had the right to make.
” But the right to do something does not entail the wisdom of doing it .
Ending the discussion with our right to polling data relegates a suite of important questions to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough ?
With what frequency should the public consume them ?
Even if they are accurate , what exactly is their value to individuals and society ?
Is it pure entertainment , and if so , does that cheapen what ought to be a serious topic ?
Political scientists have long wrung their hands about how polls encourage shallow horse-race coverage , which in turn shapes attitudes toward politics .
A growing body of research suggests it contributes to distrust in politicians and media , diminished coverage of third-party candidates , and , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inhibits the development of an informed citizenship because the public is mostly familiar with the political rivalries instead of actually knowing what the substantive debate is about.
” We can only consume a limited amount of information , just like we can only consume a limited amount of food .
Is it possible that a diet of election coverage dominated by polls might be unhealthy ?
Is checking FiveThirtyEight on a daily basis like eating a pint of ice cream once a day ?
( According to Nate Silver , the site ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the low end of what ’ s necessary to “ know all that you need to know.
” ) In other contexts , we routinely restrict information access to facilitate ideal forms of decision-making .
Blind wine tastings are not a safeguard against fraudulent labels or fake prices .
They allow participants to reflect on and evaluate the flavor of the wine undistracted by prejudgments .
When participants vote on the best tasting wine , the result is “ better ” because it was produced in accordance with certain criteria of what constitutes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is an impossible and contested ideal , but it would be foolish to abandon it .
Virtually all democracies place limitations on electioneering near polling places , ranging from prohibitions on campaign paraphernalia to bans on political persuasion .
These restrictions on free speech serve an obvious and laudable purpose , shared by the French lawmakers in 1977 : to create an environment conducive to good decision-making .
Election silence legislation is not the best way to achieve this goal in the United States .
General prohibitions can easily backfire as they did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political discussion to social media algorithms .
Banning legitimate polls in the media will almost certainly create a vacuum filled by illegitimate polls distributed online .
The absence of legislative solutions , however , does not mean the absence of all solutions .
Here the food metaphor is helpful .
Overconsumption of calories has become an urgent global health crisis .
Our global food ecosystem is breaking down , with companies stoking pathological demand and then happily meeting it .
Unfortunately , soda taxes and bans on school vending machines will not solve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures would be dystopian—but the problem is still there .
Individuals and communities will have to make a concerted effort to change that ecosystem , instituting new norms around food distribution and consumption , even actively changing their palates .
Likewise , the information ecosystem is in the middle of a calamitous breakdown .
Just as technology facilitated an unprecedented increase in ultra-processed foods—cheap , calorie-dense , and highly palatable—it is now facilitating the distribution and consumption of ultra-processed information : ubiquitous , highly palatable pictures of the world chosen not according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the compulsion with which the public consumes them .
It ’ s easy to blame outside influence or domestic extremists for this , whether it ’ s Russian interference or QAnon .
But even honestly produced , well-intentioned information can be toxic in excess .
Election polls are a textbook example .
Useful to policymakers that need to understand their constituents , the data has no obvious use for voters , especially months out from the election .
Yet it ’ s consumed voraciously , each new round sending ripples through the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pleasure of prophetic power .
“ I ’ m a pollaholic , ” confesses David Brooks in the New York Times , and then turns to the food metaphor himself .
“ It ’ s hard to figure out how each candidate will handle the so-called budgetary fiscal cliff , or the uncertainties involved with Iran .
But the polling numbers are like candy .
So clear and digestible !
” Candy bars taste great .
We have the right to consume them and companies have the right to produce them in whatever @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this changes the fact that in massive quantities they harm our bodies .
The recent history of prohibitions on polls reflects a shared intuition that in massive quantities they , too , can harm our body politic .
Lack of attention to actual issues , the disappearance of complicated individuals into demographic homogeneity , increased skepticism about every percentage presented by the media , whether election outcomes or vaccine efficacy : Look closely and the signs of chronic illness are there .
And if we don ’ t change our collective information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information overload may become a full-blown epidemic .

In 2016 and 2020, Americans were hard pressed to escape election polls. From the whiplash of Trump’s obsessive tweets —“the polls are fake,” (Oct. 13) “poll numbers looking very strong,” (Oct. 16)—to news coverage saturated with the latest findings, the ever-shifting numbers were omnipresent. On Election Day, everyone watched in real time to see how predictions were lining up with exit polls.
In 2016 and 2020, Americans were hard pressed to escape election polls. From the whiplash of Trump’s obsessive tweets—“the polls are fake,” (Oct. 13) “poll numbers looking very strong,” (Oct. 16)—to news coverage saturated with the latest findings, the ever-shifting numbers were omnipresent. On Election Day, everyone watched in real time to see how predictions were lining up with exit polls.
But on the eve of the 2017 French presidential election, French citizens had to look internationally for their fix of data. A 32-hour legally enforced blanket of silence around the election fell over the country at midnight, just as it has since 1977 when the law was first passed. No campaigning, no statements from campaigns, and, perhaps strangest of all, no polling or publication of polls, on pain of a 75,000-euro fine. Political junkies had to settle for Swiss and Belgian reports, marked on social media with #RadioLondres, a reference to coded messages sent during World War II from a London-based radio station of the French Resistance.
It’s hard to imagine such restrictions in France, where censorship is reserved for offensive speech and religious symbols. (A stricter weeklong blackout was scaled back in 2002 over free speech concerns.) And yet the law endures, alongside similar laws in a host of other countries, among them Italy, Spain, Portugal, Taiwan, and Peru. In Honduras the embargo on polls lasts a whopping 45 days. Common to all the laws is the original motivation for the French law: concern about the effects of exposing the electorate to polling data.
This concern is not just about bad polling data, which is usually the focus of critics. Bad data comes in two varieties. There are deliberately fraudulent polls like those that flooded Mexico before the 2018 election. And there are incompetent or inaccurate polls, a major topic in the wake of Brexit and America’s last two elections. “If public-opinion data are unreliable, we’re all flying blind,” wrote David Graham in a post-mortem of the 2020 “polling catastrophe” in the Atlantic. In response, pollsters and modelers have defended their trade by suggesting polls performed as advertised but statistical simpletons persist in misreading them.
Yet prohibitions on publicizing polling results near an election are not motivated primarily by preventing access to bad data, or bad interpretations of good data. However imperfect, the laws acknowledge an obvious truth that 21st-century information gluttons have forgotten: Sometimes not knowing is a blessing. While legislation may not be the ideal way to secure salutary ignorance, neglecting its existence is a mistake. As French lawmakers argued in 1977, sondomanie or “poll mania”—already an issue back then—can make it difficult to clear one’s mind and evaluate the candidates on their merits. They lamented the resulting “sheeplike movement” and “collective madness.” Better to secure an environment well suited to responsible decision-making, which they described using the terms “serenity, tranquility, calm, and silence.”
Imagine what those lawmakers would think if they saw the explosion of modern polling: thousands of pollsters producing reams of data months in advance of elections, like Christmas decorations on sale in May, and the media and the public consulting the results like an oracle, compulsively gorging themselves on data.
Political science has multiple terms for the potential influence of polling data, among them the bandwagon effect (conformity with perceived majority) and spiral of silence (reluctance to express perceived minority opinions), all of which can influence voter choices and voter turnout. The laws against publishing polling results are meant to insulate against these psychological intrusions, even if they reflect accurate information.
Our myopic focus on bad data and fallacious interpretation results from an assumption shared by pollsters and their critics alike, an assumption so deeply engrained that questioning it is taboo: Accurate information is always good. Yes, misinformation should be fought. So should information illiteracy. But surely an educated public should welcome good data, the more the better? Suggesting otherwise—perhaps flying blind is better under certain circumstances?—reeks of censorship and paternalism. At FiveThirtyEight, the popular polling aggregator, Maggie Koerth makes the case that access to information is a crucial right, regardless of its potential influence. “Polls may well have changed the outcome of an election in France,” she concedes of the 2002 French presidential primaries, when an extreme far-right candidate shocked the nation with a surprise win. “But that was a choice the voters had the right to make.”
But the right to do something does not entail the wisdom of doing it. Ending the discussion with our right to polling data relegates a suite of important questions to the scholarly shadows: How many polls are enough? With what frequency should the public consume them? Even if they are accurate, what exactly is their value to individuals and society? Is it pure entertainment, and if so, does that cheapen what ought to be a serious topic?
Political scientists have long wrung their hands about how polls encourage shallow horse-race coverage, which in turn shapes attitudes toward politics. A growing body of research suggests it contributes to distrust in politicians and media, diminished coverage of third-party candidates, and, according to a 2018 meta-analysis, “inhibits the development of an informed citizenship because the public is mostly familiar with the political rivalries instead of actually knowing what the substantive debate is about.”
We can only consume a limited amount of information, just like we can only consume a limited amount of food. Is it possible that a diet of election coverage dominated by polls might be unhealthy? Is checking FiveThirtyEight on a daily basis like eating a pint of ice cream once a day? (According to Nate Silver, the site’s founder, daily check-ins are at the low end of what’s necessary to “know all that you need to know.”)
In other contexts, we routinely restrict information access to facilitate ideal forms of decision-making. Blind wine tastings are not a safeguard against fraudulent labels or fake prices. They allow participants to reflect on and evaluate the flavor of the wine undistracted by prejudgments. When participants vote on the best tasting wine, the result is “better” because it was produced in accordance with certain criteria of what constitutes objective, unbiased judgment.
Unbiased judgment is an impossible and contested ideal, but it would be foolish to abandon it. Virtually all democracies place limitations on electioneering near polling places, ranging from prohibitions on campaign paraphernalia to bans on political persuasion. These restrictions on free speech serve an obvious and laudable purpose, shared by the French lawmakers in 1977: to create an environment conducive to good decision-making.
Election silence legislation is not the best way to achieve this goal in the United States. General prohibitions can easily backfire as they did in France, ceding the dynamics of political discussion to social media algorithms. Banning legitimate polls in the media will almost certainly create a vacuum filled by illegitimate polls distributed online.
The absence of legislative solutions, however, does not mean the absence of all solutions. Here the food metaphor is helpful. Overconsumption of calories has become an urgent global health crisis. Our global food ecosystem is breaking down, with companies stoking pathological demand and then happily meeting it. Unfortunately, soda taxes and bans on school vending machines will not solve the problem, and more draconian government measures would be dystopian—but the problem is still there. Individuals and communities will have to make a concerted effort to change that ecosystem, instituting new norms around food distribution and consumption, even actively changing their palates.
Likewise, the information ecosystem is in the middle of a calamitous breakdown. Just as technology facilitated an unprecedented increase in ultra-processed foods—cheap, calorie-dense, and highly palatable—it is now facilitating the distribution and consumption of ultra-processed information: ubiquitous, highly palatable pictures of the world chosen not according to their value or their effects, but for the compulsion with which the public consumes them.
It’s easy to blame outside influence or domestic extremists for this, whether it’s Russian interference or QAnon. But even honestly produced, well-intentioned information can be toxic in excess. Election polls are a textbook example. Useful to policymakers that need to understand their constituents, the data has no obvious use for voters, especially months out from the election. Yet it’s consumed voraciously, each new round sending ripples through the media. Our brains flood with the pleasure of prophetic power. “I’m a pollaholic,” confesses David Brooks in the New York Times, and then turns to the food metaphor himself. “It’s hard to figure out how each candidate will handle the so-called budgetary fiscal cliff, or the uncertainties involved with Iran. But the polling numbers are like candy. So clear and digestible!”
Candy bars taste great. We have the right to consume them and companies have the right to produce them in whatever amount the market can bear. None of this changes the fact that in massive quantities they harm our bodies. The recent history of prohibitions on polls reflects a shared intuition that in massive quantities they, too, can harm our body politic. Lack of attention to actual issues, the disappearance of complicated individuals into demographic homogeneity, increased skepticism about every percentage presented by the media, whether election outcomes or vaccine efficacy: Look closely and the signs of chronic illness are there. And if we don’t change our collective information palate, sondomanie and other forms of information overload may become a full-blown epidemic.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-23--Secret Flight Shows Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman Joining to Face Biden

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s apparent trip to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday raises the tantalizing prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the new alliance of Gulf Arab states with Israel .
It also seems to show how the former enemies are relying on each other to dispel the ill winds already blowing in their direction from the incoming Biden administration .
As arguably the greatest beneficiaries of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s foreign policy , Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman now seek to insulate themselves against indications they ’ ll soon be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rogue actors .
So Netanyahu canceled a cabinet meeting on Sunday and , according to multiple accounts , slipped into a private business jet for the one-hour flight across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia ’ s western coast .
In the desert city of Neom , under construction as a $ 500 billion showcase of technological innovation , the Israeli leader spent as much as five hours with Saudi Arabia ’ s heir to the throne , joined by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Mossad Director Yossi Cohen .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of wild speculation—some thought the meeting was about an imminent attack on Iran before U.S. President-elect Joe Biden gets a chance to rejoin the 2015 nuclear agreement , while others hoped Saudi Arabia might follow the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in officially normalizing relations with the Jewish state .
Come Jan. 20 , Washington is likely to be following a different policy in the Middle East .
Biden has talked openly about a reassessment of the U.S.-Saudi relationship in light of the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to negotiations with Iran , particularly his 2015 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress , is still remembered as an impudent poke at former President Barack Obama when Biden was vice president .
The meeting in Neom was meant “ to nail something down ” before Trump leaves office and “ send a signal to the Biden administration , ” said Joshua Teitelbaum , a political scientist at Israel ’ s Bar-Ilan University , who is writing a book on the history of the Saudi military .
The message , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are two major allies in the region who are getting together.
” It appears , however , that the message wasn ’ t meant for the public : After news of the Sunday flight was leaked to Israeli media on Monday and confirmed by both Israeli and Saudi officials , it was officially denied by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan .
Come Jan. 20 , Washington is likely to be following a different policy in the Middle East .
Netanyahu , who declined on Monday to confirm or deny the encounter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dropping hints about secret engagements with Arab leaders without confirming that they took place .
Reports have popped up about meetings between Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman aboard Red Sea yachts , in neighboring Jordan , and in various European cities .
The only time Netanyahu has met publicly with any Gulf ruler was in 2018 , when he visited Oman ’ s late Sultan Qaboos , who died in January , in Muscat .
All those hints , though , masked deepening but unofficial diplomatic relations that Netanyahu conducted with a wide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was vilified in public for his hardline policy toward the Palestinians and plans to annex almost 30 percent of the West Bank .
The payoff came in September , when he sat beside Trump on the South Lawn of the White House and signed the Abraham Accords with the foreign ministers of the UAE and Bahrain , opening the path toward diplomatic relations with the Gulf states , along with promised cooperation in business , defense , intelligence , aviation , tourism , medical research , and Muslim-Jewish reconciliation .
The icing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion arms deal in which Israel dropped long-standing objections to the United States selling F-35 stealth fighter jets to the UAE .
What has been missing from Middle East rapprochement , however , is the participation of Saudi Arabia , the biggest and wealthiest member of the Gulf Cooperation Council .
Trump ’ s first foreign trip as president was to Saudi Arabia , which he followed with a groundbreaking direct flight from Riyadh to Tel Aviv .
Since announcing the Israel-UAE agreement from the Oval Office in August , Trump and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to climb aboard as well .
Until this point , the Saudis have said any formal agreement with Israel would have to rest on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative originally brought forward by the Saudis , which requires Israel to accept Palestinian statehood and withdraw from the West Bank , East Jerusalem , and Gaza .
As the Trump era ends , both Israel and the Gulf states are anxious about what to expect from the new administration and positioning themselves for a return to the familiar policy outlines followed by Obama , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Palestinians , and a stress on human rights .
It ’ s clear that Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman share some deep concerns before Trump ’ s departure , said Ebtesam al-Ketbi , president of the Emirates Policy Center in Abu Dhabi .
“ They want to be sure that what Biden is going to do will not affect their mutual interests .
”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apparent trip to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday raises the tantalizing prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the new alliance of Gulf Arab states with Israel. It also seems to show how the former enemies are relying on each other to dispel the ill winds already blowing in their direction from the incoming Biden administration. As arguably the greatest beneficiaries of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy, Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman now seek to insulate themselves against indications they’ll soon be shunned by the Biden White House as rogue actors.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apparent trip to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on Sunday raises the tantalizing prospect of Saudi Arabia joining the new alliance of Gulf Arab states with Israel. It also seems to show how the former enemies are relying on each other to dispel the ill winds already blowing in their direction from the incoming Biden administration. As arguably the greatest beneficiaries of U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy, Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman now seek to insulate themselves against indications they’ll soon be shunned by the Biden White House as rogue actors.
So Netanyahu canceled a cabinet meeting on Sunday and, according to multiple accounts, slipped into a private business jet for the one-hour flight across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia’s western coast. In the desert city of Neom, under construction as a $500 billion showcase of technological innovation, the Israeli leader spent as much as five hours with Saudi Arabia’s heir to the throne, joined by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Mossad Director Yossi Cohen.
What the four men discussed is a matter of wild speculation—some thought the meeting was about an imminent attack on Iran before U.S. President-elect Joe Biden gets a chance to rejoin the 2015 nuclear agreement, while others hoped Saudi Arabia might follow the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in officially normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Come Jan. 20, Washington is likely to be following a different policy in the Middle East. Biden has talked openly about a reassessment of the U.S.-Saudi relationship in light of the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in Istanbul. Netanyahu’s outspoken opposition to negotiations with Iran, particularly his 2015 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, is still remembered as an impudent poke at former President Barack Obama when Biden was vice president.
The meeting in Neom was meant “to nail something down” before Trump leaves office and “send a signal to the Biden administration,” said Joshua Teitelbaum, a professor at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, who is writing a book on the history of the Saudi military. The message, he said, is that “these are two major allies in the region who are getting together.” It appears, however, that the message wasn’t meant for the public: After news of the Sunday flight was leaked to Israeli media on Monday and confirmed by both Israeli and Saudi officials, it was officially denied by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan.
Come Jan. 20, Washington is likely to be following a different policy in the Middle East.
Netanyahu, who declined on Monday to confirm or deny the encounter, has made an art form out of dropping hints about secret engagements with Arab leaders without confirming that they took place. Reports have popped up about meetings between Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman aboard Red Sea yachts, in neighboring Jordan, and in various European cities. The only time Netanyahu has met publicly with any Gulf ruler was in 2018, when he visited Oman’s late Sultan Qaboos, who died in January, in Muscat.
All those hints, though, masked deepening but unofficial diplomatic relations that Netanyahu conducted with a wide range of Arab countries, even as he was vilified in public for his hardline policy toward the Palestinians and plans to annex almost 30 percent of the West Bank. The payoff came in September, when he sat beside Trump on the South Lawn of the White House and signed the Abraham Accords with the foreign ministers of the UAE and Bahrain, opening the path toward diplomatic relations with the Gulf states, along with promised cooperation in business, defense, intelligence, aviation, tourism, medical research, and Muslim-Jewish reconciliation. The icing on the cake was a $23 billion arms deal in which Israel dropped long-standing objections to the United States selling F-35 stealth fighter jets to the UAE.
What has been missing from Middle East rapprochement, however, is the participation of Saudi Arabia, the biggest and wealthiest member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Trump’s first foreign trip as president was to Saudi Arabia, which he followed with a groundbreaking direct flight from Riyadh to Tel Aviv. Since announcing the Israel-UAE agreement from the Oval Office in August, Trump and his aides have said they expect the Saudis to climb aboard as well. Until this point, the Saudis have said any formal agreement with Israel would have to rest on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative originally brought forward by the Saudis, which requires Israel to accept Palestinian statehood and withdraw from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.
As the Trump era ends, both Israel and the Gulf states are anxious about what to expect from the new administration and positioning themselves for a return to the familiar policy outlines followed by Obama, including defusing the Iran conflict, sympathy for the Palestinians, and a stress on human rights. It’s clear that Netanyahu and Mohammed bin Salman share some deep concerns before Trump’s departure, said Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center in Abu Dhabi. “They want to be sure that what Biden is going to do will not affect their mutual interests.”