foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--If You Want to Keep Talent Out of China, Invest at Home

If You Want to Keep Talent Out of China , Invest at Home Many Americans first heard about China ’ s Thousand Talents Plan when FBI agents led Charles Lieber out of his Harvard office in handcuffs earlier this year .
The world ’ s leading chemist , Lieber mentored hundreds of students and chaired Harvard ’ s Chemistry Department while allegedly deceiving the university about his connections to the Wuhan Institute of Technology and Thousand Talents .
Lieber ’ s arrest alerted the U.S. public to China ’ s long-standing efforts to recruit overseas scientists .
By itself , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not constitute a crime—but some participants concealed their affiliations with Chinese universities and double-dipped into the purses of American research institutions .
Facing heightened scrutiny , the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) issued a gag order on any references to the Thousand Talents Plan , its largest and most infamous talent recruitment initiative , before rebranding it entirely in 2018 .
But China ’ s recruitment efforts have only expanded and grown more sophisticated since the reinvention of Thousand Talents .
Today , applicants for any of the hundreds of national and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apply , and be matched directly with prospective employers through a single online recruitment portal .
Overseas Chinese experts who return to the country may be exempt from its draconian hukou system , which normally governs where people may live and work .
Some are paid signing bonuses on the order of $ 145,000 , with the promise of national distinction , work visas for their family members , and tenure track positions at world-class universities in China .
The bottom line is that the CCP ’ s efforts to poach science and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accessible , at the same time that Chinese experts are feeling undervalued and unwelcome overseas .
If U.S. policymakers want to retain this country ’ s best and brightest scientists , they must face an uncomfortable truth : Formal talent recruitment programs are just one part of China ’ s strategy to exploit the cracks in America ’ s immigration and education systems .
Formulating an effective response requires understanding three facts neglected in much of the coverage of the Lieber investigation .
First , China ’ s talent recruitment is more about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two are related .
To be sure , some awardees are recruited for positions that could threaten U.S. national security .
In a recent report for the Center for Security and Emerging Technology ( CSET ) , for example , my colleague Jacob Feldgoise and I found that 36 of the nearly 3,600 people the CCP selected to receive awards under the “ youth ” branch of Thousand Talents were offered jobs at China ’ s leading nuclear weapons lab .
On the whole , though , just 8 percent of awardees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese defense industry , and most other talent plans also tend to target professors and entrepreneurs .
The CCP is particularly interested in scientists who can help in its broader push to localize supply chains hamstrung by U.S.-China economic decoupling .
For example , many of the awardees we identified specialized in ferroics and subfields of materials science that are especially useful for producing semiconductor devices—the focal point of recent U.S. export controls .
Focusing on the pool of experts who could lend a hand to the Chinese military ignores the majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or develop commercial technologies .
Second , the bulk of the problem doesn ’ t lie with criminals , or even formal talent plans .
In many well-publicized cases , China ’ s talent plan awardees have been charged with crimes that run the gamut from wire or visa fraud to theft of trade secrets .
But the outsized focus on academic espionage and IP theft is leading many U.S. observers to miss the forest for the trees : The steady outflow of intellectual capital owned by Chinese scholars and entrepreneurs—many of whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans—poses a much greater threat to U.S. and allies ’ economic well-being than the trickle of trade secrets stolen by recognized talent plan awardees .
Espionage and IP theft are major threats to U.S. and allies ’ national security .
But news stories about China ’ s talent plans tend to overemphasize the most sensational DOJ indictments , especially the rare cases—just 3 percent—that involve non-Chinese awardees .
A narrow focus on criminal cases , however , overlooks more anodyne but widespread forms of technology transfer facilitated by Chinese professionals working overseas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and exchange IP with counterparts in China .
Third , China ’ s aggressive approach to talent recruitment should be understood as a sign of weakness , not strength .
China ’ s talent plans are extraordinarily expensive investments .
If the Communist Party did recruit 7,600 scientists under the Thousand Talents Plan over a 10-year period , it probably paid between $ 550 million and $ 1.1 billion USD in signing bonuses , according to the program ’ s guidelines .
Last year alone , the Ministry of Science and Technology set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the salaries of talent plan awardees .
The United States runs fellowship programs of comparable size for promising young scientists , but they serve to accelerate the careers of U.S. citizens and permanent residents—not to recruit talent from overseas .
For decades , the promise of the American Dream has been enough to solidify the United States as the world ’ s top destination for migrants , including highly skilled technology professionals .
It is a good thing that the U.S. government does not pay the salary of every foreign professor hired at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet these universities continue to attract the world ’ s most accomplished researchers .
Conversely , despite massive talent plan expenditures and eased visa restrictions , Chinese universities primarily recruit from within the country , and very few foreigners apply for permanent residence in China each year , although the number is growing .
The U.S. science and technology ecosystem is sustained by foreign partners .
More than 40 percent of science and engineering research articles published in the United States are written with overseas collaborators , and international students alone contribute more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ tuition revenue .
These metrics are the envy of foreign governments , friend and foe , because the United States ’ ability to crowdsource research costs pays for its advances in science and technology .
Sacrificing the most valuable aspects of the American S & T system in the name of research security plays into the hands of China ’ s talent scouts—and they know it .
An effective response to Chinese talent recruitment requires recalibration .
The U.S. government should continue to investigate cases of academic espionage and work with universities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But at the end of the day , the best way to improve America ’ s resilience to Chinese talent plans is to create more opportunities for experts who might otherwise be attracted to them .
That means scaling up federal funding for science and technology , sponsoring and streamlining visas for foreign scientists , and expanding—not canceling—the STEM Optional Training Program for recent PhD graduates .
In addition to creating new opportunities , policymakers must address the push factors that make China an appealing option to begin with .
Although the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losing its immigration advantage outright , it is no wonder some Chinese-American experts are choosing to leave , given the shameful academic job market , hostile work environment , and mercurial legal landscape they must navigate to stay in the U.S. Dueling for experts is not new for the United States , which has long shaped the trajectory of global science and technology with its own talent recruitment programs .
At the end of the Cold War , for example , the U.S. government resourced grantmaking organizations like CRDF Global to act as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take up consulting jobs for nuclear programs in the Middle East and North Africa .
Conversely , when the United States forced out hundreds of scientists and foreign students suspected of harboring communist sympathies during the second Red Scare , it ejected the man who would become the father of China ’ s nuclear and rocketry programs .
A simple but effective answer to Chinese talent recruitment today would build institutional capacity , drastically expand funding for grants and fellowship positions at the National Science Foundation and Department of Energy , and allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions .
As they take steps to reduce risk across the research enterprise , U.S. policymakers should consider which countermeasures may inadvertently accelerate the exodus of Chinese talent from this country .
They must invest in systemic remedies to sharpen America ’ s edge in science and technology .
Otherwise , the Justice Department should expect to continue playing a very long and expensive game of whack-a-mole , when the United States could just as easily lead the way in pushing on the endless frontier of science itself .

Many Americans first heard about China’s Thousand Talents Plan when FBI agents led Charles Lieber out of his Harvard office in handcuffs earlier this year. The world’s leading chemist , Lieber mentored hundreds of students and chaired Harvard’s Chemistry Department while allegedly deceiving the university about his connections to the Wuhan Institute of Technology and Thousand Talents.
Many Americans first heard about China’s Thousand Talents Plan when FBI agents led Charles Lieber out of his Harvard office in handcuffs earlier this year. The world’s leading chemist, Lieber mentored hundreds of students and chaired Harvard’s Chemistry Department while allegedly deceiving the university about his connections to the Wuhan Institute of Technology and Thousand Talents.
Lieber’s arrest alerted the U.S. public to China’s long-standing efforts to recruit overseas scientists. By itself, participating in a talent recruitment program does not constitute a crime—but some participants concealed their affiliations with Chinese universities and double-dipped into the purses of American research institutions. Facing heightened scrutiny, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued a gag order on any references to the Thousand Talents Plan, its largest and most infamous talent recruitment initiative, before rebranding it entirely in 2018. But China’s recruitment efforts have only expanded and grown more sophisticated since the reinvention of Thousand Talents.
Today, applicants for any of the hundreds of national and local Chinese award programs may register, apply, and be matched directly with prospective employers through a single online recruitment portal. Overseas Chinese experts who return to the country may be exempt from its draconian hukou system, which normally governs where people may live and work. Some are paid signing bonuses on the order of $145,000, with the promise of national distinction, work visas for their family members, and tenure track positions at world-class universities in China. The bottom line is that the CCP’s efforts to poach science and technology professionals are becoming more appealing and accessible, at the same time that Chinese experts are feeling undervalued and unwelcome overseas.
If U.S. policymakers want to retain this country’s best and brightest scientists, they must face an uncomfortable truth: Formal talent recruitment programs are just one part of China’s strategy to exploit the cracks in America’s immigration and education systems. Formulating an effective response requires understanding three facts neglected in much of the coverage of the Lieber investigation.
First, China’s talent recruitment is more about economic competitiveness than military superiority, though the two are related. To be sure, some awardees are recruited for positions that could threaten U.S. national security. In a recent report for the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), for example, my colleague Jacob Feldgoise and I found that 36 of the nearly 3,600 people the CCP selected to receive awards under the “youth” branch of Thousand Talents were offered jobs at China’s leading nuclear weapons lab.
On the whole, though, just 8 percent of awardees were offered jobs at institutions affiliated with the Chinese defense industry, and most other talent plans also tend to target professors and entrepreneurs. The CCP is particularly interested in scientists who can help in its broader push to localize supply chains hamstrung by U.S.-China economic decoupling. For example, many of the awardees we identified specialized in ferroics and subfields of materials science that are especially useful for producing semiconductor devices—the focal point of recent U.S. export controls. Focusing on the pool of experts who could lend a hand to the Chinese military ignores the majority of those recruited to do basic research or develop commercial technologies.
Second, the bulk of the problem doesn’t lie with criminals, or even formal talent plans. In many well-publicized cases, China’s talent plan awardees have been charged with crimes that run the gamut from wire or visa fraud to theft of trade secrets. But the outsized focus on academic espionage and IP theft is leading many U.S. observers to miss the forest for the trees: The steady outflow of intellectual capital owned by Chinese scholars and entrepreneurs—many of whom are not even party to formal talent plans—poses a much greater threat to U.S. and allies’ economic well-being than the trickle of trade secrets stolen by recognized talent plan awardees.
Espionage and IP theft are major threats to U.S. and allies’ national security. But news stories about China’s talent plans tend to overemphasize the most sensational DOJ indictments, especially the rare cases—just 3 percent—that involve non-Chinese awardees. A narrow focus on criminal cases, however, overlooks more anodyne but widespread forms of technology transfer facilitated by Chinese professionals working overseas, who often consult for Chinese state-owned enterprises and exchange IP with counterparts in China.
Third, China’s aggressive approach to talent recruitment should be understood as a sign of weakness, not strength. China’s talent plans are extraordinarily expensive investments. If the Communist Party did recruit 7,600 scientists under the Thousand Talents Plan over a 10-year period, it probably paid between $550 million and $1.1 billion USD in signing bonuses, according to the program’s guidelines. Last year alone, the Ministry of Science and Technology set aside $44 million just to pay the salaries of talent plan awardees. The United States runs fellowship programs of comparable size for promising young scientists, but they serve to accelerate the careers of U.S. citizens and permanent residents—not to recruit talent from overseas.
For decades, the promise of the American Dream has been enough to solidify the United States as the world’s top destination for migrants, including highly skilled technology professionals. It is a good thing that the U.S. government does not pay the salary of every foreign professor hired at Harvard, Stanford, and MIT, yet these universities continue to attract the world’s most accomplished researchers. Conversely, despite massive talent plan expenditures and eased visa restrictions, Chinese universities primarily recruit from within the country, and very few foreigners apply for permanent residence in China each year, although the number is growing.
The U.S. science and technology ecosystem is sustained by foreign partners. More than 40 percent of science and engineering research articles published in the United States are written with overseas collaborators, and international students alone contribute more than a quarter of public U.S. universities’ tuition revenue. These metrics are the envy of foreign governments, friend and foe, because the United States’ ability to crowdsource research costs pays for its advances in science and technology. Sacrificing the most valuable aspects of the American S&T system in the name of research security plays into the hands of China’s talent scouts—and they know it.
An effective response to Chinese talent recruitment requires recalibration. The U.S. government should continue to investigate cases of academic espionage and work with universities to mitigate risk in the research enterprise. But at the end of the day, the best way to improve America’s resilience to Chinese talent plans is to create more opportunities for experts who might otherwise be attracted to them. That means scaling up federal funding for science and technology, sponsoring and streamlining visas for foreign scientists, and expanding—not canceling—the STEM Optional Training Program for recent PhD graduates.
In addition to creating new opportunities, policymakers must address the push factors that make China an appealing option to begin with. Although the United States is not in danger of losing its immigration advantage outright, it is no wonder some Chinese-American experts are choosing to leave, given the shameful academic job market, hostile work environment, and mercurial legal landscape they must navigate to stay in the U.S.
Dueling for experts is not new for the United States, which has long shaped the trajectory of global science and technology with its own talent recruitment programs. At the end of the Cold War, for example, the U.S. government resourced grantmaking organizations like CRDF Global to act as sponges for ex-Soviet scientists, lest they take up consulting jobs for nuclear programs in the Middle East and North Africa. Conversely, when the United States forced out hundreds of scientists and foreign students suspected of harboring communist sympathies during the second Red Scare, it ejected the man who would become the father of China’s nuclear and rocketry programs. A simple but effective answer to Chinese talent recruitment today would build institutional capacity, drastically expand funding for grants and fellowship positions at the National Science Foundation and Department of Energy, and allow foreigners to compete for some of these positions.
As they take steps to reduce risk across the research enterprise, U.S. policymakers should consider which countermeasures may inadvertently accelerate the exodus of Chinese talent from this country. They must invest in systemic remedies to sharpen America’s edge in science and technology. Otherwise, the Justice Department should expect to continue playing a very long and expensive game of whack-a-mole, when the United States could just as easily lead the way in pushing on the endless frontier of science itself.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--India’s Dubious Coronavirus Record

India’s Dubious Coronavirus Record

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity .
Today : India sets a worldwide record for the most coronavirus cases in a single day , Pakistanis express outrage over rape , Bangladesh faces another onion crisis , and a Dalit perspective on the U.S. bestseller Caste .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
India recorded 97,894 new cases of the coronavirus on Thursday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ country has confirmed as many infections in a single day .
As shown below , India has now recorded more than 5.1 million total cases—a number surpassed only by the United States .
But India may not be No .
2 for long .
It has recorded 1 million cases in the last 11 days , on track to overtake the United States sometime in October .
Low death rate ?
According to official records , 1,132 Indians died from COVID-19 on Thursday .
While that number seems high—and has risen in recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comparison to other countries .
For every 1 million people , only 61 Indians have died of the coronavirus , compared with a global average of 121.7—and averages of 131 , 609 , and 631 for Russia , the United States , and Brazil , respectively .
While India ’ s government cites the relatively low death rate as a success story , the reality is that the data is too murky to pass judgment .
Even under normal circumstances , only 22 percent of deaths in India are medically certified .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths is accurately recorded .
A growing body of anecdotal evidence shows that many deaths linked to COVID-19 are not appearing on the official lists of those killed by the virus .
India may have good reason for a lower death rate than many Western countries .
After all , it has a median age of 28 , and data suggests that younger people have a better chance of surviving the virus .
But there is danger in celebrating a perceived low death rate , especially if it encourages Indians to lower their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Reopening underway .
Despite the rapidly rising numbers , India has reopened gyms , most workplaces , and markets .
Bars can once again serve alcohol .
Given that India has administered only 60 million tests so far , the majority of its population may yet contract the virus .
But New Delhi ’ s approach seems to prioritize protecting livelihoods—a choice perhaps influenced by the release earlier this month of quarterly data showing a 24 percent contraction of India ’ s economy .
Regional picture .
Other South Asian countries seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan—countries whose median ages are 10 , two , and four years lower than that of India , respectively—have dramatically slowed the spread of the coronavirus and recorded a low number of new deaths .
But these countries are also testing few people .
Bangladesh and Pakistan have respectively administered only 1.78 million and 3 million tests since the start of the pandemic .
India , on the other hand , is now administering 1 million tests per day .
If things do get worse in other parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a while until we find out .
Outrage over rape in Pakistan .
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said this week that rapists and child molesters should be publicly hanged or castrated after the rape of a woman last week fueled nationwide outrage .
The attack took place last Thursday near Lahore when a group of men smashed the woman ’ s car window and then raped her in a nearby field .
When Lahore police chief Umar Shaikh later blamed the woman for traveling alone , his comments inflamed the national mood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After months of delays , Afghan and Taliban representatives finally held direct talks on Tuesday in Doha , Qatar , as the two sides attempt to discuss a peace agreement amid a withdrawal of U.S. troops .
Kabul says it wants the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire , but reports suggest the insurgent group is reluctant to fully call back its fighters at this stage .
India-China tensions .
Despite last week ’ s meeting between India and China ’ s foreign ministers in Moscow , reports suggest both sides plan to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Himalayan border .
Reuters ’ Devjyot Ghoshal reported this week from the city of Leh with details of a massive influx of soldiers and material , including large storage facilities for everything from fuel and tents to instant noodles and pistachios .
And writing in the Financial Times this week , Devesh Kapur argues that the two Asian powers are likely to remain at loggerheads .
“ It is no longer possible to dismiss the conflict between India and China as a skirmish , ” he wrote .
“ The understanding reached last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points to a pause .
But it does not address the underlying issues that have pushed the countries closer to serious conflict.
” Asian recession .
Perhaps unsurprisingly , the Asian Development Bank ( ADB ) said this week that Asia ’ s economies will shrink by 0.7 percent in 2020—the first regional recession in six decades .
India ’ s economy is among the worst affected , with a 9 percent contraction expected this year .
Tourism-dependent economies such as Fiji and the Maldives will each contract by about one-fifth in 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the ADB expects the region to bounce back with a projected growth rate of 6.8 percent next year—although much may be depend on the speed with which a coronavirus vaccine can be produced and disseminated .
Root problem .
India has banned onion exports after heavy rainfall damaged its yield and delayed this year ’ s harvest .
The move has led to a threefold jump in onion prices in Bangladesh since the beginning of September ; Bangladesh imports more than 350,000 tons of the root vegetable from India every year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitute an important part of South Asian cuisine .
Bangladesh is now reportedly looking to Turkey and other countries to step in with supplies .
For more , read the Economist ’ s report this week on how Dhaka is turning to Beijing as its ties with New Delhi weaken .
Isabel Wilkerson ’ s Caste : The Origins of Our Discontents is one of the most talked-about books of the year , with widely positive reviews .
Writing for Foreign Policy this week , Yashica Dutt , a Dalit living in New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ book with a different lens .
“ As a Dalit woman and immigrant from a formerly untouchable manual scavenging caste in India , my place in the Indian social order lies at the very bottom .
But as a brown resident in the United States , I fall somewhere in the middle of the racial caste pyramid , ” she writes , describing the importance of Wilkerson ’ s framework for understanding race in the United States .
But “ Wilkerson gives little space to the inequities that affect Dalits today , some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than even before India ’ s independence , ” Dutt argues .
“ Wilkerson forces readers to confront the implications of a skewed racial hierarchy .
Yet for me , a Dalit reader often marginalized and restricted to the bottom of an even more lopsided global order , it often feels like being left out of my own history.
” That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: India sets a worldwide record for the most coronavirus cases in a single day, Pakistanis express outrage over rape , Bangladesh faces another onion crisis , and a Dalit perspective on the U.S. bestseller Caste .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: India sets a worldwide record for the most coronavirus cases in a single day, Pakistanis express outrage over rape, Bangladesh faces another onion crisis, and a Dalit perspective on the U.S. bestseller Caste.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
India Sets Coronavirus Record
India recorded 97,894 new cases of the coronavirus on Thursday. Since the pandemic began, no other country has confirmed as many infections in a single day. As shown below, India has now recorded more than 5.1 million total cases—a number surpassed only by the United States. But India may not be No. 2 for long. It has recorded 1 million cases in the last 11 days, on track to overtake the United States sometime in October.
Low death rate? According to official records, 1,132 Indians died from COVID-19 on Thursday. While that number seems high—and has risen in recent weeks—India has a low death rate in comparison to other countries. For every 1 million people, only 61 Indians have died of the coronavirus, compared with a global average of 121.7—and averages of 131, 609, and 631 for Russia, the United States, and Brazil, respectively.
While India’s government cites the relatively low death rate as a success story, the reality is that the data is too murky to pass judgment. Even under normal circumstances, only 22 percent of deaths in India are medically certified. In other words, only 1 in 5 deaths is accurately recorded. A growing body of anecdotal evidence shows that many deaths linked to COVID-19 are not appearing on the official lists of those killed by the virus.
India may have good reason for a lower death rate than many Western countries. After all, it has a median age of 28, and data suggests that younger people have a better chance of surviving the virus. But there is danger in celebrating a perceived low death rate, especially if it encourages Indians to lower their guards and not take the pandemic seriously.
Reopening underway. Despite the rapidly rising numbers, India has reopened gyms, most workplaces, and markets. Bars can once again serve alcohol. Given that India has administered only 60 million tests so far, the majority of its population may yet contract the virus. But New Delhi’s approach seems to prioritize protecting livelihoods—a choice perhaps influenced by the release earlier this month of quarterly data showing a 24 percent contraction of India’s economy.
Regional picture. Other South Asian countries seem to be faring better than India. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—countries whose median ages are 10, two, and four years lower than that of India, respectively—have dramatically slowed the spread of the coronavirus and recorded a low number of new deaths.
But these countries are also testing few people. Bangladesh and Pakistan have respectively administered only 1.78 million and 3 million tests since the start of the pandemic. India, on the other hand, is now administering 1 million tests per day. If things do get worse in other parts of South Asia, it will be a while until we find out.
What We’re Following Nepal landslides. At least 11 people have died in Nepal after heavy rainfall last weekend triggered landslides near the country’s border with Tibet. Many more people are reported missing. Sindhupalchok, the area hit by the landslides, was also badly affected by the 2015 Nepal earthquake, which killed more than 8,700 people. As the New York Times reports, many in the area had only recently rebuilt their homes after the devastation. Nepal, which relies heavily on tourism, is also facing an economic crisis due to the pandemic.
Outrage over rape in Pakistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said this week that rapists and child molesters should be publicly hanged or castrated after the rape of a woman last week fueled nationwide outrage. The attack took place last Thursday near Lahore when a group of men smashed the woman’s car window and then raped her in a nearby field. When Lahore police chief Umar Shaikh later blamed the woman for traveling alone, his comments inflamed the national mood.
Afghan peace talks finally begin. After months of delays, Afghan and Taliban representatives finally held direct talks on Tuesday in Doha, Qatar, as the two sides attempt to discuss a peace agreement amid a withdrawal of U.S. troops. Kabul says it wants the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire, but reports suggest the insurgent group is reluctant to fully call back its fighters at this stage.
India-China tensions. Despite last week’s meeting between India and China’s foreign ministers in Moscow, reports suggest both sides plan to maintain large troop presences along their disputed Himalayan border. Reuters’ Devjyot Ghoshal reported this week from the city of Leh with details of a massive influx of soldiers and material, including large storage facilities for everything from fuel and tents to instant noodles and pistachios.
And writing in the Financial Times this week, Devesh Kapur argues that the two Asian powers are likely to remain at loggerheads. “It is no longer possible to dismiss the conflict between India and China as a skirmish,” he wrote. “The understanding reached last week between the countries’ foreign ministers points to a pause. But it does not address the underlying issues that have pushed the countries closer to serious conflict.”
South Asia, Inc.
Asian recession. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said this week that Asia’s economies will shrink by 0.7 percent in 2020—the first regional recession in six decades. India’s economy is among the worst affected, with a 9 percent contraction expected this year. Tourism-dependent economies such as Fiji and the Maldives will each contract by about one-fifth in 2020.
The only ray of light is that the ADB expects the region to bounce back with a projected growth rate of 6.8 percent next year—although much may be depend on the speed with which a coronavirus vaccine can be produced and disseminated.
Root problem. India has banned onion exports after heavy rainfall damaged its yield and delayed this year’s harvest. The move has led to a threefold jump in onion prices in Bangladesh since the beginning of September; Bangladesh imports more than 350,000 tons of the root vegetable from India every year. The base of many curries, onions constitute an important part of South Asian cuisine.
Bangladesh is now reportedly looking to Turkey and other countries to step in with supplies. For more, read the Economist’s report this week on how Dhaka is turning to Beijing as its ties with New Delhi weaken.
What We’re Reading
Isabel Wilkerson’s Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents is one of the most talked-about books of the year, with widely positive reviews. Writing for Foreign Policy this week, Yashica Dutt, a Dalit living in New York City, approached Wilkerson’s book with a different lens.
“As a Dalit woman and immigrant from a formerly untouchable manual scavenging caste in India, my place in the Indian social order lies at the very bottom. But as a brown resident in the United States, I fall somewhere in the middle of the racial caste pyramid,” she writes, describing the importance of Wilkerson’s framework for understanding race in the United States.
But “Wilkerson gives little space to the inequities that affect Dalits today, some of which are more brutal and dehumanizing than even before India’s independence,” Dutt argues. “Wilkerson forces readers to confront the implications of a skewed racial hierarchy. Yet for me, a Dalit reader often marginalized and restricted to the bottom of an even more lopsided global order, it often feels like being left out of my own history.”
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--‘The Stakes Couldn’t Be Any Higher’

‘The Stakes Couldn’t Be Any Higher’

Even as the California wildfires have charred more than 5 million acres , displacing hundreds of thousands of people and sending smoke as far as New York City , U.S. President Donald Trump has continued to dismiss scientific evidence of climate change , bizarrely claiming “ it ’ ll start getting cooler.
” Meanwhile , Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has taken up the mantle of scientific reason .
Only a day after calling Trump a “ climate arsonist , ” Biden received Scientific American ’ s first presidential endorsement in its 175-year history .
Trump ’ s denial and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its former role as an international leader on climate change .
For Todd Stern , who served as climate change envoy under President Barack Obama and helped negotiate the landmark 2015 Paris climate accords , the only chance of reversing this trend is a Biden victory in November , since Trump ’ s “ every move ” is “ in the wrong direction.
” Stern , now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution , spoke to Foreign Policy about Trump ’ s confusion , COVID-19 ’ s impact on the climate crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden presidency versus a second Trump term .
This interview has been edited for length and clarity .
Foreign Policy : Wildfires continue to ravage the West Coast of the United States .
When Trump finally addressed the fires on Monday , he once more dismissed climate science .
What did you think when you saw the president promise global cooling soon ?
Todd Stern : You ’ re not going to get any satisfaction on climate change from President Trump .
Nothing ’ s going to happen in a constructive way if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s no reason whatsoever to think that he will change or has any capacity or desire to change .
So there was nothing about what he said in connection with the California fires that I found the least bit surprising , because this has been a constant with him from the very beginning .
FP : You led talks for the Paris accords in 2015 .
What do Trump ’ s remarks say about how different the country is now ?
You ’ re not going to get any satisfaction on climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t think the United States is so different—the administration is certainly different , because it ’ s a complete about-face .
But there is still very broad support [ for climate action ] in the United States .
There ’ s a belief in climate change , a belief in the need for action , and support for the Paris agreement .
This is not so much a matter of the broad United States as it is a matter of the Trump administration .
FP : Biden has repeatedly said tackling the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And this week , Scientific American endorsed him for president .
When it comes to addressing climate change , what are the stakes in November ?
TS : The stakes couldn ’ t be any higher .
The way to think about this is to start with the recognition of what the temperature goals are , and what the emission goals need to be , and then what that means in terms of policy .
The Paris goals were to hold the rise in global average temperature to well below 2 degrees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hold to a 1.5-degree rise .
You also just have to look around you .
We see the apocalyptic fires on the West Coast , and Australia was on fire for a long time .
There have been huge disruptive events , whether extreme storms , floods , droughts , extreme heat , and the like .
And that ’ s what we ’ re seeing with temperature having gone up 1 degree .
So the notion that we should try to do everything humanly possible to hold to 1.5 makes complete sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as , “ Oh , there go the environmentalists exaggerating.
” It ’ s just what we ’ re living right now .
That then translates into something like a net zero carbon world by 2050 .
And to do that is going to require tremendous mobilization , a transformation to a clean energy economy , at speed and scale .
And so when Biden talks about wanting to invest $ 2 trillion in the first four years for climate , about trying to get to a carbon-free electricity system by 2035 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things make it clear that , at this point , he is thinking at the scale of what needs to be done and acted on , in a way that is very encouraging .
Trump is not going to change his spots .
He has done everything possible to undo not just the Paris climate agreement , but virtually every [ climate ] policy that was put in place by the Obama administration .
He has done everything he can to increase and support the further use of fossil fuels .
Every move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What Biden clearly wants to do is going to require partly executive action , partly legislation .
And all of that ’ s going to be challenging , but Biden is on the program and can help lead other countries as well .
The first step for the United States , internationally , will be to demonstrate that the United States is back on the program , back in Paris , and committed to the right things , because for the last four years , the world has seen the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to see U.S. leadership , but the world has also been burned by the United States.FP : Earlier this year , you suggested that in order to fight the climate crisis , the United States would have to show an “ unhesitating commitment to leadership abroad.
” In practical terms , what would that look like ?
TS : Well , I think there are a number of things .
To begin with , the United States absolutely has to come back .
I think the world is hungry to see U.S. leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burned by the United States .
So we ’ re going to need to show that we ’ re walking the walk at home , right away , right out of the box .
I ’ m sure that a President Biden would make clear from day one his intention to rejoin the Paris agreement .
We will also need to work with allies and other major players to transform the economy consistent with a net zero emissions world by 2050 .
We ’ re also going to need to work with other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the private sector on ways to stimulate a much larger flow of capital to developing countries .
It ’ s not going to come simply out of government coffers , because there ’ s not enough there .
But by using government policy and government money , we ’ re going to need to leverage large flows of capital to help developing countries develop in a way that is climate-friendly and that involves both developing low-carbon economies and building the kind of resilience that they need to deal with the impacts of climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now and will get worse .
FP : How can the United States square its status as an energy powerhouse with the need to lead on climate ?
What does the United States need to do domestically to show leadership abroad ?
TS : We will need to take large-scale action across the different sectors of our economy to reduce emissions .
Whether what we do is called a “ Green New Deal , ” or it ’ s called something else , it ’ s got to be a set of policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in power , transport , industry , buildings .
We will greatly improve the economy if we act aggressively.The economic impact of this kind of move would be enormously positive .
People think , “ Oh , it ’ s going to cost so much .
Oh , it ’ s going to be so hard.
” On any kind of net basis , we will greatly improve the economy if we act aggressively .
It ’ s absolutely going to cost money , but it ’ s going to cost less money @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many countries and multilateral organizations are putting green initiatives at the heart of coronavirus recovery packages , others are prioritizing economic recovery .
What kind of impact will COVID-19 have on the climate battle ?
Is there a silver lining to COVID ?
TS : I would never say that .
We ’ re getting close to 200,000 people killed in this country .
[ NB : The U.S. death toll has now surpassed 200,000 . ]
Our response has been disastrously bad because of the lack of leadership .
But the focus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here , in Europe , China , India—all over the world .
The economic impact of COVID has been dramatic in the United States , and the need for not just a kind of short-term rescue plan but a true recovery plan is very real .
And it ’ s imperative for it to be green , and it ’ s imperative for that to be true around the world .
COVID has taught us three lessons that are relevant to climate change : that science and facts matter , that preparation matters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most extraordinary things very rapidly , if they actually believe that they have to do it .
Who would have ever thought that you could shut down entire countries overnight ?
This [ climate change ] transformation that we keep talking about—net zero in 2050—sounds really hard .
Sure , it ’ s hard , but it ’ s doable .
The only thing that needs to change is the mindset of leaders and citizens .
FP : You mentioned China , the world ’ s biggest carbon emitter .
With the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that cripple climate cooperation ?
There is absolutely no way that the world can meet its climate goals without the United States and China both acting aggressively on climate change.TS : The overall bilateral relationship with China has obviously been deteriorating .
There ’ s a lot of appropriate concern in this country about China ’ s conduct in a wide range of areas , whether it ’ s Hong Kong , the South China Sea , treatment of Uighur minorities , or any number of other things .
It is also true @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world can meet its climate goals without the United States and China both acting aggressively on climate change , and it would be extremely useful for them to revive some version of the climate cooperation that was built up during the Obama years .
That won ’ t be easy , both because of the backdrop of the broader relationship and because it will only be possible if both countries understand the scale and speed of change that ’ s necessary .
We ’ re not simply going to go back to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two countries are at now .
But it ’ s going to be very important to be able to find a modus vivendi , where there are areas of disagreement and competition , but also areas where we can collaborate .
Global problems are an area where we should be trying to collaborate , and climate change is certainly one of those .
What is clear is that the world can ’ t get where we need to without China .
China is responsible for 27 percent of global emissions .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them .

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Don’t Politicize Water

The recently announced peace deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain stop short of repairing the political damage inflicted on the region and keep the door open for the possibility of future Israeli annexation of portions of the West Bank and Jordan Valley .
The last few months of uncertainty over annexation come on the heels of not only a deterioration in Israel ’ s relationship with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority but also a crisis in critical issue areas such as water cooperation .
Broadly , water cooperation is vital for fostering effective water management across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and confidence among adversaries .
Recent events have only exerted greater pressure on water resource availability in the Middle East .
The combination of climate change , natural aridity , an influx of refugees from conflict-torn neighboring states , an ongoing pandemic , and mismanagement of existing supplies is challenging the region ’ s ability to meet daily domestic water needs .
The relatively small Jordan basin provides access to the only perennial river for Israel , Jordan , and the Palestinian territories , and is also shared by Lebanon and Syria .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict predominantly defined relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors , and global leaders warned of so-called water wars in the Middle East .
Instead , water has sometimes provided a glimmer of hope for bringing peace to the region .
In the 1950s , after sporadic fighting over the construction of hydrological projects , U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston as an envoy to the region to negotiate a settlement to the Jordan River water dispute .
Although the Arab League failed to accept and ratify the Jordan Valley Unified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Plan , the two riparian states most dependent on the river , Israel and Jordan , attempted to comply with the agreement in exchange for U.S. funding .
Israel ’ s capture of the Golan Heights , West Bank , and Jordan Valley in the 1967 war increased its access to the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River , which the Jordanian monarchy depended on .
To coordinate the dredging of the Yarmouk ’ s sediments , Israeli and Jordanian technicians and engineers began meeting in the late 1970s in what has often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Talks .
Members of this informal institution negotiated the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty , which dealt with all shared water systems between the signatories .
Despite periodic misunderstandings or miscommunication , a relatively warm and highly effective working relationship developed whereby commissioners regularly communicated and effectively sheltered water relations from issues of high politics .
Then in 2013 , to manage a water deficit plaguing the basin , Israel , Jordan , and the Palestinian Authority reached an understanding over a trilateral project : The Red Sea-Dead Sea project was designed to increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ save the ever-shrinking Dead Sea , and encourage peace and prosperity among the signatories .
It was promoted as one of the few remaining opportunities for peace , as many in the basin began accepting the failure of the Oslo process .
Over the past few years , multiple factors have converged to accelerate the deterioration of Israeli-Jordanian relations , negatively impacting water cooperation .
However , over the past few years , multiple factors have converged to accelerate the deterioration of Israeli-Jordanian relations , negatively impacting water cooperation .
The demise of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Palestinian population in Jordan : Because around 50 percent of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian descent and the country is host to many Palestinian refugees , the monarchy is highly sensitive to Israeli-Palestinian relations .
Washington ’ s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital in December 2017 intensified pressure on the monarchy , which sees itself as the custodian of the two Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem ’ s Old City .
Israel initially stalled negotiations , then it pulled back from the Red-Dead project over the last few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from environmentalists .
Instead , Israel became more interested in revisiting the Mediterranean Sea to Dead Sea conveyance system , granting it complete control over the hydrological infrastructure within its territory despite prior efforts by the U.S. Middle East envoy Jason Greenblatt to breathe life into the Red-Dead Project in 2017 .
Bilateral tensions with Jordan only mounted .
As one of the most water-scarce states in the world , Jordan is predominately landlocked , economically poor , and limited in its ability to follow Israel ’ s use of large desalinization projects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project ’ s desalinization plant in Jordan ’ s southern port city of Aqaba and water exchanges in the densely populated north were designed to meet growing water demands .
The failure to move forward on the Red-Dead project , despite years of discussion and collaboration , has only further undercut water cooperation .
The Jordanian leadership also began to dismantle some symbols of cooperation from the 1994 Peace Treaty .
In October 2018 , Jordan refused to renew a treaty provision allowing Israeli farmers to lease and farm land along the border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Arabic , and Naharayim and Tzofar in Hebrew—the former having been called the “ Island of Peace.
” This move was promptly followed by an Israeli threat to reduce water supplies to Jordan from four to two days per week .
Such politicization of water resources was unprecedented in Israeli-Jordanian politics .
The chilling of relations became particularly notable in October 2019 , when the 25th anniversary of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty passed without celebration in either state .
Bilateral relations were further undercut by the Middle East peace plan proposed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When unveiled , instead of any explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights that had been recognized in the interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority , albeit never fully implemented , the proposal demanded that control of the Jordan Valley be ceded to Israel , which would , in practice , mean forgoing rights to the Jordan River .
Responding to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s annexation proposal , Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said this past June that annexation would “ destroy all prospects for peace ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bedrock of stability in the region .
Jordan not only shares a long , stable border with Israel in a region plagued by conflict , but it is also the second state to sign a peace treaty with Israel .
Often too understated in Israeli discourse is how critical this peace treaty and Jordanian stability are for Israel ’ s security .
Complicating matters further is the generational shift in the policymakers managing Israeli-Jordanian water relations .
The generation that met in the middle of the Yarmouk , under the watchful eyes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and afterward participated in negotiating and implementing the treaty ’ s water section , has retired .
With it , years of social capital along with informal understanding have disappeared .
Without the United States actively supporting regional water cooperation efforts , this younger generation has few opportunities to meet and use water for peace .
Hope for cooperation lies with an ever-shrinking number of environmentalists who work across borders and understand that cooperation is required for managing a water system and a climate crisis .
Regional nongovernmental organizations , such as Ecopeace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefits of cooperation and interdependence for building resilience in the face of climate change .
Opportunities for expanding peace in the Middle East have been rare over the last few decades , but they should not come with a dismantling of institutions that have provided the foundation for cooperation .
With the withering of Israeli-Jordanian bilateral relations , water cooperation has become politicized and vulnerable .
Water-stressed Jordan still depends on Israel to secure water allocated to it by the 1994 Peace Treaty , and deteriorating ties with Israel not only put regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s water security .
The influx of refugees , primarily from Syria , over the last decade—coupled with a pandemic—has only increased Jordan ’ s needs for water .
Complaints have risen since the COVID-19 lockdown about water shortages , as the demand for access to water on a daily basis for hand-washing continues to increase .
A 2020 rapid assessment of Jordan from the United Nations Development Program found that nearly 40 percent of the respondents were concerned about accessing clean drinking water .
Climate change is likely to reduce Jordan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are projected to rise and rainfall to diminish , resulting in prolonged droughts .
In Jordan , there is unease that a shortage of water is among the factors that can contribute to the type of social unrest that brought down regimes across the Middle East during the 2011 Arab uprisings .
The challenges facing Israel and Jordan , stemming from climate change and the ongoing pandemic , should make it clear to policymakers that the countries should avoid the politicization of a natural resource essential for human rights , human security , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international negotiations , they should leverage the mutual benefits from cooperation over a shared water body .
Water has always been and will continue to be the most likely resource to serve as an entry point for bringing states together even when political relations have faltered .

The recently announced peace deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain stop short of repairing the political damage inflicted on the region and keep the door open for the possibility of future Israeli annexation of portions of the West Bank and Jordan Valley. The last few months of uncertainty over annexation come on the heels of not only a deterioration in Israel’s relationship with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority but also a crisis in critical issue areas such as water cooperation. Broadly, water cooperation is vital for fostering effective water management across borders as well as for building trust and confidence among adversaries.
The recently announced peace deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain stop short of repairing the political damage inflicted on the region and keep the door open for the possibility of future Israeli annexation of portions of the West Bank and Jordan Valley. The last few months of uncertainty over annexation come on the heels of not only a deterioration in Israel’s relationship with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority but also a crisis in critical issue areas such as water cooperation. Broadly, water cooperation is vital for fostering effective water management across borders as well as for building trust and confidence among adversaries.
Recent events have only exerted greater pressure on water resource availability in the Middle East. The combination of climate change, natural aridity, an influx of refugees from conflict-torn neighboring states, an ongoing pandemic, and mismanagement of existing supplies is challenging the region’s ability to meet daily domestic water needs. The relatively small Jordan basin provides access to the only perennial river for Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories, and is also shared by Lebanon and Syria.
For most of the 20th century, conflict predominantly defined relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and global leaders warned of so-called water wars in the Middle East. Instead, water has sometimes provided a glimmer of hope for bringing peace to the region. In the 1950s, after sporadic fighting over the construction of hydrological projects, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston as an envoy to the region to negotiate a settlement to the Jordan River water dispute. Although the Arab League failed to accept and ratify the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan, known as the Johnston Plan, the two riparian states most dependent on the river, Israel and Jordan, attempted to comply with the agreement in exchange for U.S. funding.
Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights, West Bank, and Jordan Valley in the 1967 war increased its access to the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River, which the Jordanian monarchy depended on. To coordinate the dredging of the Yarmouk’s sediments, Israeli and Jordanian technicians and engineers began meeting in the late 1970s in what has often been referred to as the Picnic Table Talks. Members of this informal institution negotiated the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, which dealt with all shared water systems between the signatories. Despite periodic misunderstandings or miscommunication, a relatively warm and highly effective working relationship developed whereby commissioners regularly communicated and effectively sheltered water relations from issues of high politics.
Then in 2013, to manage a water deficit plaguing the basin, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority reached an understanding over a trilateral project: The Red Sea-Dead Sea project was designed to increase the supply of water to Jordan, save the ever-shrinking Dead Sea, and encourage peace and prosperity among the signatories. It was promoted as one of the few remaining opportunities for peace, as many in the basin began accepting the failure of the Oslo process.
Over the past few years, multiple factors have converged to accelerate the deterioration of Israeli-Jordanian relations, negatively impacting water cooperation.
However, over the past few years, multiple factors have converged to accelerate the deterioration of Israeli-Jordanian relations, negatively impacting water cooperation. The demise of the Oslo process has caused consternation among the Palestinian population in Jordan: Because around 50 percent of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian descent and the country is host to many Palestinian refugees, the monarchy is highly sensitive to Israeli-Palestinian relations. Washington’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017 intensified pressure on the monarchy, which sees itself as the custodian of the two Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem’s Old City.
Israel initially stalled negotiations, then it pulled back from the Red-Dead project over the last few years, citing high costs and pressure from environmentalists. Instead, Israel became more interested in revisiting the Mediterranean Sea to Dead Sea conveyance system, granting it complete control over the hydrological infrastructure within its territory despite prior efforts by the U.S. Middle East envoy Jason Greenblatt to breathe life into the Red-Dead Project in 2017. Bilateral tensions with Jordan only mounted. As one of the most water-scarce states in the world, Jordan is predominately landlocked, economically poor, and limited in its ability to follow Israel’s use of large desalinization projects to alleviate water shortages. The Red-Dead project’s desalinization plant in Jordan’s southern port city of Aqaba and water exchanges in the densely populated north were designed to meet growing water demands. The failure to move forward on the Red-Dead project, despite years of discussion and collaboration, has only further undercut water cooperation.
The Jordanian leadership also began to dismantle some symbols of cooperation from the 1994 Peace Treaty. In October 2018, Jordan refused to renew a treaty provision allowing Israeli farmers to lease and farm land along the border in areas known as Baqura and Ghamr in Arabic, and Naharayim and Tzofar in Hebrew—the former having been called the “Island of Peace.” This move was promptly followed by an Israeli threat to reduce water supplies to Jordan from four to two days per week. Such politicization of water resources was unprecedented in Israeli-Jordanian politics.
The chilling of relations became particularly notable in October 2019, when the 25th anniversary of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty passed without celebration in either state. Bilateral relations were further undercut by the Middle East peace plan proposed by the Trump administration in early 2020. When unveiled, instead of any explicit recognition of Palestinian water rights that had been recognized in the interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, albeit never fully implemented, the proposal demanded that control of the Jordan Valley be ceded to Israel, which would, in practice, mean forgoing rights to the Jordan River. Responding to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation proposal, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said this past June that annexation would “destroy all prospects for peace” and endanger Israeli-Jordanian relations, which had provided a bedrock of stability in the region. Jordan not only shares a long, stable border with Israel in a region plagued by conflict, but it is also the second state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Often too understated in Israeli discourse is how critical this peace treaty and Jordanian stability are for Israel’s security.
Complicating matters further is the generational shift in the policymakers managing Israeli-Jordanian water relations. The generation that met in the middle of the Yarmouk, under the watchful eyes of their well-equipped state military personnel, and afterward participated in negotiating and implementing the treaty’s water section, has retired. With it, years of social capital along with informal understanding have disappeared. Without the United States actively supporting regional water cooperation efforts, this younger generation has few opportunities to meet and use water for peace. Hope for cooperation lies with an ever-shrinking number of environmentalists who work across borders and understand that cooperation is required for managing a water system and a climate crisis. Regional nongovernmental organizations, such as Ecopeace Middle East, continue to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation and interdependence for building resilience in the face of climate change.
Opportunities for expanding peace in the Middle East have been rare over the last few decades, but they should not come with a dismantling of institutions that have provided the foundation for cooperation. With the withering of Israeli-Jordanian bilateral relations, water cooperation has become politicized and vulnerable. Water-stressed Jordan still depends on Israel to secure water allocated to it by the 1994 Peace Treaty, and deteriorating ties with Israel not only put regional stability at risk but also harm Jordan’s water security. The influx of refugees, primarily from Syria, over the last decade—coupled with a pandemic—has only increased Jordan’s needs for water. Complaints have risen since the COVID-19 lockdown about water shortages, as the demand for access to water on a daily basis for hand-washing continues to increase. A 2020 rapid assessment of Jordan from the United Nations Development Program found that nearly 40 percent of the respondents were concerned about accessing clean drinking water. Climate change is likely to reduce Jordan’s freshwater availability, as temperatures are projected to rise and rainfall to diminish, resulting in prolonged droughts. In Jordan, there is unease that a shortage of water is among the factors that can contribute to the type of social unrest that brought down regimes across the Middle East during the 2011 Arab uprisings.
The challenges facing Israel and Jordan, stemming from climate change and the ongoing pandemic, should make it clear to policymakers that the countries should avoid the politicization of a natural resource essential for human rights, human security, and national security. In domestic and international negotiations, they should leverage the mutual benefits from cooperation over a shared water body. Water has always been and will continue to be the most likely resource to serve as an entry point for bringing states together even when political relations have faltered.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--Montenegro Is the Latest Domino to Fall Toward Russia

Montenegro Is the Latest Domino to Fall Toward Russia A recent parliamentary election in Montenegro may have attracted little notice outside the country , but it will have outsized repercussions for the international order .
Strongman President Milo Djukanovic has been in power for nearly 30 years at the helm of his pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists , which lost its bid for reelection in the Aug. 30 vote , although Djukanovic will stay president until 2023 .
Taking the Democratic Party of Socialists ’ place is a pro-Russian and pro-Serbian-led alliance , which has given Moscow an ally not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Union .
It ’ s high time the EU wakes up and does something to stem Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s creeping influence in the Balkans .
The newly formed coalition of opposition parties set to lead the small Balkan state have notionally agreed to continue Djukanovic ’ s pro-Western tilt , but that is unlikely to stop the festivities in the Kremlin .
After all , the new coalition ’ s first goal , according to one of its leaders , is to lift the country ’ s sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Montenegrin public may be cheering the end of Djukanovic ’ s autocratic rule , the happiness is likely to be short-lived .
Their small nation is just the latest Balkan domino to fall toward Moscow .
A longtime Moscow ally , Montenegro split from both pro-Russian Serbia and Russia in 2006 , following a new pro-Western path geared toward joining NATO .
Seeing NATO ’ s expansion eastward as a threat , Russia lobbied hard to dissuade Montenegro from joining the alliance .
In 2016 , the Kremlin even went so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nonetheless , Montenegro joined NATO in 2017 .
Such setbacks aside , Russia and its political fellow travelers in Serbia continue to enjoy enormous influence in the country .
Moscow remains the biggest foreign direct investor in Montenegro , and it wields the Serbian Orthodox Church as a powerful weapon .
Putin worked through the church to fight Montenegro ’ s independence from Serbia in 2006 , and its NATO bid .
The new ruling coalition in Podgorica is dominated by an alliance of Serbian nationalist parties known as For the Future of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Serbian Orthodox Church .
The Moscow-leaning Serbian Orthodox Church not only is the largest religious institution in Montenegro but also hopes to position itself as one of the state ’ s most decisive political players .
The church supported the leader of the For the Future of Montenegro party , Zdravko Krivokapic , and even before this election it united diverse communities by organizing massive religious-political gatherings .
Serbia also did its best to ensure a congenial outcome to Montenegro ’ s elections , and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic crowed over the results @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s government financed Serbian organizations in Montenegro to the tune of almost $ 2 million , resulting in massive displays of Serbian nationalism in Podgorica during the election .
Djukanovic accused Serbia of election meddling , which Serbia denies .
All this bodes ill for Montenegrins , who can look forward to more nationalism and deeper divisions within their society .
Democratization and the development of civil society will inevitably suffer .
Despite the international community ’ s best efforts , Montenegrin politics is regressing back toward the 1990s .
Thus , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happens in this small Balkan country , too .
As the Kremlin ’ s influence expands in the Balkans , the risks of conflict grow with it .
Montenegro is important for Russia because of its location on the Adriatic Sea and its associated naval presence .
Nipping Moscow ’ s influence will require some fast work .
Montenegro is in negotiations to join the European Union , but it has not yet done so .
The process of the EU membership must be accelerated .
And NATO itself must ensure the integrity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian allies don ’ t have access to sensitive NATO information .
The best way to do that is to fashion a cybersecurity hub in Montenegro—an ideal headquarters to counter Moscow ’ s increasingly aggressive cyberintrusions and troll farms in the region .
Similarly , Brussels must warn Serbia—in the midst of its own negotiations to join the EU—that it can neither remain Russia ’ s main foothold in the Balkans nor continue its interference in Montenegrin politics .
After a U.S.-brokered deal that normalized economic ties between Kosovo and Serbia earlier this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. National Security Council congratulated Vucic on his courage to confront Russia .
Serbia ’ s relations with Montenegro will be the litmus test for whether or not Serbia is shifting its foreign-policy goals toward the West .
In 2018 , a year after the occasion of Montenegro ’ s NATO accession , U.S. President Donald Trump infamously warned that defending a small NATO ally in Montenegro could lead to World War III .
Europe ’ s leaders are well known for their reluctance in managing conflicts in their ever-growing neighborhood .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1990s crisis in the Balkans resulted in the bloodiest conflict Europe had seen since World War II .
Without action , the continent may well be forced to watch as another conflict ignites with little warning .

A recent parliamentary election in Montenegro may have attracted little notice outside the country, but it will have outsized repercussions for the international order. Strongman President Milo Djukanovic has been in power for nearly 30 years at the helm of his pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists, which lost its bid for reelection in the Aug. 30 vote, although Djukanovic will stay president until 2023. Taking the Democratic Party of Socialists’ place is a pro-Russian and pro-Serbian-led alliance, which has given Moscow an ally not just within NATO, but potentially within the European Union. It’s high time the EU wakes up and does something to stem Russian President Vladimir Putin’s creeping influence in the Balkans.
A recent parliamentary election in Montenegro may have attracted little notice outside the country, but it will have outsized repercussions for the international order. Strongman President Milo Djukanovic has been in power for nearly 30 years at the helm of his pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists, which lost its bid for reelection in the Aug. 30 vote, although Djukanovic will stay president until 2023. Taking the Democratic Party of Socialists’ place is a pro-Russian and pro-Serbian-led alliance, which has given Moscow an ally not just within NATO, but potentially within the European Union. It’s high time the EU wakes up and does something to stem Russian President Vladimir Putin’s creeping influence in the Balkans.
The newly formed coalition of opposition parties set to lead the small Balkan state have notionally agreed to continue Djukanovic’s pro-Western tilt, but that is unlikely to stop the festivities in the Kremlin. After all, the new coalition’s first goal, according to one of its leaders, is to lift the country’s sanctions on Russia. And although much of the Montenegrin public may be cheering the end of Djukanovic’s autocratic rule, the happiness is likely to be short-lived. Their small nation is just the latest Balkan domino to fall toward Moscow.
A longtime Moscow ally, Montenegro split from both pro-Russian Serbia and Russia in 2006, following a new pro-Western path geared toward joining NATO. Seeing NATO’s expansion eastward as a threat, Russia lobbied hard to dissuade Montenegro from joining the alliance. In 2016, the Kremlin even went so far as to back a coup attempt. Nonetheless, Montenegro joined NATO in 2017.
Such setbacks aside, Russia and its political fellow travelers in Serbia continue to enjoy enormous influence in the country. Moscow remains the biggest foreign direct investor in Montenegro, and it wields the Serbian Orthodox Church as a powerful weapon. Putin worked through the church to fight Montenegro’s independence from Serbia in 2006, and its NATO bid. The new ruling coalition in Podgorica is dominated by an alliance of Serbian nationalist parties known as For the Future of Montenegro, which is backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The Moscow-leaning Serbian Orthodox Church not only is the largest religious institution in Montenegro but also hopes to position itself as one of the state’s most decisive political players. The church supported the leader of the For the Future of Montenegro party, Zdravko Krivokapic, and even before this election it united diverse communities by organizing massive religious-political gatherings.
Serbia also did its best to ensure a congenial outcome to Montenegro’s elections, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic crowed over the results. As well he should have—Vucic’s government financed Serbian organizations in Montenegro to the tune of almost $2 million, resulting in massive displays of Serbian nationalism in Podgorica during the election. Djukanovic accused Serbia of election meddling, which Serbia denies.
All this bodes ill for Montenegrins, who can look forward to more nationalism and deeper divisions within their society. Democratization and the development of civil society will inevitably suffer. Despite the international community’s best efforts, Montenegrin politics is regressing back toward the 1990s.
Thus, the international community should pay attention to what happens in this small Balkan country, too. As the Kremlin’s influence expands in the Balkans, the risks of conflict grow with it. Montenegro is important for Russia because of its location on the Adriatic Sea and its associated naval presence.
Nipping Moscow’s influence will require some fast work. Montenegro is in negotiations to join the European Union, but it has not yet done so. The process of the EU membership must be accelerated. And NATO itself must ensure the integrity of the Montenegrin security sector so that Russian allies don’t have access to sensitive NATO information. The best way to do that is to fashion a cybersecurity hub in Montenegro—an ideal headquarters to counter Moscow’s increasingly aggressive cyberintrusions and troll farms in the region.
Similarly, Brussels must warn Serbia—in the midst of its own negotiations to join the EU—that it can neither remain Russia’s main foothold in the Balkans nor continue its interference in Montenegrin politics. After a U.S.-brokered deal that normalized economic ties between Kosovo and Serbia earlier this month—and as a consequence angered the Kremlin—the U.S. National Security Council congratulated Vucic on his courage to confront Russia. Serbia’s relations with Montenegro will be the litmus test for whether or not Serbia is shifting its foreign-policy goals toward the West.
In 2018, a year after the occasion of Montenegro’s NATO accession, U.S. President Donald Trump infamously warned that defending a small NATO ally in Montenegro could lead to World War III. Europe’s leaders are well known for their reluctance in managing conflicts in their ever-growing neighborhood. But they would do well to recall that the 1990s crisis in the Balkans resulted in the bloodiest conflict Europe had seen since World War II. Without action, the continent may well be forced to watch as another conflict ignites with little warning.