foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--In Beirut, Lebanese Want to Clear Out More Than Just Rubble

BEIRUT—The second , much bigger explosion came just after Khadije Hussain ’ s five children had run into the kitchen with their mother , ducking into a corner as the blast wave hit their bodies and smashed windows pierced their skin .
“ I thought the war had returned , ” said Hussain , 37 .
She survived the Aug. 4 double explosion in Beirut ’ s port with only minor injuries .
Others weren ’ t so fortunate : The detonation of thousands of tons of ammonium nitrate killed at least 177 people and wounded over 6,000 more , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ damage to a place that was already broke and badly broken .
Ten days after the blasts , Hussain ’ s windows are still shattered : Her family couldn ’ t afford the repair , even if glass and glaziers were to be had .
“ Windows are hard to come by these days anyway .
The demand is too high , ” she said .
There won ’ t be any quick or cheap fixes for what ails Lebanon , either .
While the entire government cabinet resigned en masse just days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fear more of the same , even as they acknowledge that simply reshuffling the same political elite that has run the country since the end of the civil war in 1990 will lead to no lasting change .
“ We want to get rid of the ruling class—not just the politicians but also the contractors , the banks , and those protected by the state who are responsible for the economic crisis and the blast , ” said Fouad Debs , a lawyer by day and a protester by night .
Since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people have taken to Beirut ’ s streets , many hurling rocks at blocked-off government buildings or setting fire to puppets masked as Lebanese politicians hanging from gallows .
Demonstrations already began last October after the government announced that it would tax WhatsApp , the popular communications app ; it was the last straw in a chain of events that had led to an economic crisis .
Protests had already gotten out of hand and resulted in then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri ’ s resignation .
These days , riot police fired tear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Lebanese parliament on Thursday approved a state of emergency in the city , which will give extraordinary power to the military to suppress protests .
A flood of armed soldiers in the streets in recent days—as well as people working to clear up the city—has largely quelled the protests but not the people ’ s raw anger .
With hundreds of thousands of people suddenly homeless , countless volunteers armed with helmets , gloves , and shovels have taken it upon themselves to clean the piles of rubble that still fill the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s a job , they say , the government won ’ t be doing .
“ The explosion has demonstrated a complete disregard by the political elite , an ultimate failure of a corrupt system , ” Debs said .
Beirut ’ s citizens , already struggling with an economic collapse , a currency crisis , and skyrocketing food prices , will now have to rebuild their own city , with their own resources .
For decades , Lebanon ’ s multiconfessional parliament has been divided along geographical and sectarian lines .
Thirty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war , Lebanese political life remains dominated by the former Shiite , Sunni , and Christian warlords from that era .
Iran exercises outsized influence through its support of the militant Shiite Hezbollah , a militia and political party that has the upper hand in governing Lebanon ; keeps a close alliance with the country ’ s Christian president , Michel Aoun ; and also controlled large parts of the port , driving many Lebanese to speculate that the group was storing weapons there .
Political reform , long sought but seldom seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accountability for the recent explosions .
Serious reform is also a precondition for exactly the kind of international aid that Lebanon needs to restore its disastrous economic situation .
The International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) has offered to bail out the country , which is saddled with about $ 90 billion in debt , under one condition : The government must make specific reforms to restore the financial system , avoid capital outflows , and help the most vulnerable .
“ We stand ready to help , ” IMF Managing Director Kristalina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ donor conference aimed at raising money to help Beirut .
“ Commitment to these reforms will unlock billions of dollars for the benefit of the Lebanese people .
This is the moment for the country ’ s policymakers to act decisively.
” A top U.S. official , David Hale , the undersecretary of state for political affairs , on a visit to Beirut echoed the IMF ’ s request by stressing the need for economic reform in the country .
Two scenarios seem to be on the table for now , said Nadim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab Reform Initiative , a think tank .
The first would be a national unity government , which would include all current political parties and would essentially be nothing more than a continuation of the same faction-riven , elite-driven politics that have bedeviled the country for years .
Lebanese who ’ ve spent much of the past year—and especially the past week—in the streets would find that unacceptable .
The other option , though a lot less likely , would be some sort of interim “ national salvation government , ” which would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the groundwork for fresh future elections , and earn the trust of the international community , including the IMF .
For Lebanese , the shape of the next government is hardly an academic exercise .
Protests have in the past year brought down two governments already .
State of emergency or not , many Lebanese have vowed to stay in the streets until real change is on the horizon .
“ Lebanon could be at a tipping point , ” Houry told Foreign Policy .
“ If we miss this opportunity , we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic crisis.
” Back at Hussain ’ s home , about a mile from the devastated port , the family is hoping the blast that shattered their house will also blow up Lebanon ’ s political paralysis .
“ It should be our government helping us , but we have nothing to expect—we don ’ t even have a real government , ” Hussain said .
She stood by her 5-year-old son , Ali , who is still startled by any loud noise in the neighborhood .
“ Every day , my children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explosion , and I honestly don ’ t know what to tell them .
I ’ d like to ask our leaders : ‘ Could a similar disaster happen again ?
’ ”

BEIRUT—The second, much bigger explosion came just after Khadije Hussain’s five children had run into the kitchen with their mother, ducking into a corner as the blast wave hit their bodies and smashed windows pierced their skin.
BEIRUT—The second, much bigger explosion came just after Khadije Hussain’s five children had run into the kitchen with their mother, ducking into a corner as the blast wave hit their bodies and smashed windows pierced their skin.
“I thought the war had returned,” said Hussain, 37. She survived the Aug. 4 double explosion in Beirut’s port with only minor injuries. Others weren’t so fortunate: The detonation of thousands of tons of ammonium nitrate killed at least 177 people and wounded over 6,000 more, causing an estimated $15 billion in damage to a place that was already broke and badly broken.
Ten days after the blasts, Hussain’s windows are still shattered: Her family couldn’t afford the repair, even if glass and glaziers were to be had. “Windows are hard to come by these days anyway. The demand is too high,” she said.
Khadije Hussain stands with her son Ali in front of her house in Beirut on Aug. 10, her hand resting on window frames that were blown out during the port explosion.
There won’t be any quick or cheap fixes for what ails Lebanon, either. While the entire government cabinet resigned en masse just days after the blast, many people here fear more of the same, even as they acknowledge that simply reshuffling the same political elite that has run the country since the end of the civil war in 1990 will lead to no lasting change.
“We want to get rid of the ruling class—not just the politicians but also the contractors, the banks, and those protected by the state who are responsible for the economic crisis and the blast,” said Fouad Debs, a lawyer by day and a protester by night.
Since the double explosion 10 days ago, thousands of people have taken to Beirut’s streets, many hurling rocks at blocked-off government buildings or setting fire to puppets masked as Lebanese politicians hanging from gallows. Demonstrations already began last October after the government announced that it would tax WhatsApp, the popular communications app; it was the last straw in a chain of events that had led to an economic crisis. Protests had already gotten out of hand and resulted in then-Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation.
These days, riot police fired tear gas to disperse the crowds, and the Lebanese parliament on Thursday approved a state of emergency in the city, which will give extraordinary power to the military to suppress protests. A flood of armed soldiers in the streets in recent days—as well as people working to clear up the city—has largely quelled the protests but not the people’s raw anger.
With hundreds of thousands of people suddenly homeless, countless volunteers armed with helmets, gloves, and shovels have taken it upon themselves to clean the piles of rubble that still fill the city’s streets. It’s a job, they say, the government won’t be doing.
“The explosion has demonstrated a complete disregard by the political elite, an ultimate failure of a corrupt system,” Debs said. Beirut’s citizens, already struggling with an economic collapse, a currency crisis, and skyrocketing food prices, will now have to rebuild their own city, with their own resources.
For decades, Lebanon’s multiconfessional parliament has been divided along geographical and sectarian lines. Thirty years after the end of the civil war, Lebanese political life remains dominated by the former Shiite, Sunni, and Christian warlords from that era. Iran exercises outsized influence through its support of the militant Shiite Hezbollah, a militia and political party that has the upper hand in governing Lebanon; keeps a close alliance with the country’s Christian president, Michel Aoun; and also controlled large parts of the port, driving many Lebanese to speculate that the group was storing weapons there.
Political reform, long sought but seldom seen, is key not just to finding accountability for the recent explosions. Serious reform is also a precondition for exactly the kind of international aid that Lebanon needs to restore its disastrous economic situation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has offered to bail out the country, which is saddled with about $90 billion in debt, under one condition: The government must make specific reforms to restore the financial system, avoid capital outflows, and help the most vulnerable.
Syrian refugees sit in what is left of their houses after the explosion about a mile from Beirut’s port on Aug. 11.
“We stand ready to help,” IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva said last week at a French-organized donor conference aimed at raising money to help Beirut. “Commitment to these reforms will unlock billions of dollars for the benefit of the Lebanese people. This is the moment for the country’s policymakers to act decisively.” A top U.S. official, David Hale, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, on a visit to Beirut echoed the IMF’s request by stressing the need for economic reform in the country.
Two scenarios seem to be on the table for now, said Nadim Houry, the executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative, a think tank. The first would be a national unity government, which would include all current political parties and would essentially be nothing more than a continuation of the same faction-riven, elite-driven politics that have bedeviled the country for years. Lebanese who’ve spent much of the past year—and especially the past week—in the streets would find that unacceptable.
The other option, though a lot less likely, would be some sort of interim “national salvation government,” which would bypass the current political elite, lay the groundwork for fresh future elections, and earn the trust of the international community, including the IMF.
For Lebanese, the shape of the next government is hardly an academic exercise. Protests have in the past year brought down two governments already. State of emergency or not, many Lebanese have vowed to stay in the streets until real change is on the horizon.
“Lebanon could be at a tipping point,” Houry told Foreign Policy. “If we miss this opportunity, we will only accelerate the current situation and economic crisis.”
Back at Hussain’s home, about a mile from the devastated port, the family is hoping the blast that shattered their house will also blow up Lebanon’s political paralysis.
“It should be our government helping us, but we have nothing to expect—we don’t even have a real government,” Hussain said. She stood by her 5-year-old son, Ali, who is still startled by any loud noise in the neighborhood. “Every day, my children are asking if there will be another explosion, and I honestly don’t know what to tell them. I’d like to ask our leaders: ‘Could a similar disaster happen again?’”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--Don’t Believe the Hype. Wealth Taxes Are Nothing New.

Don ’ t Believe the Hype .
Wealth Taxes Are Nothing New .
In July , a group of 83 of the world ’ s richest people calling itself Millionaires for Humanity urged governments to increase taxes on them to help deal with the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic .
Their idea , the latest version of a wealth tax—where the rich are taxed on the assets they already own , rather than their earnings—was received as almost revolutionary .
This year , figures from onetime U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders to U.K .
Shadow Chancellor Anneliese Dodds have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wealth tax , making it one of the most popular and seemingly new policy ideas on both sides of the Atlantic .
Although wealth taxes may seem bold and innovative , however , the concept is almost as old as money itself .
Indeed , the first known currency was created by King Alyattes in Lydia , modern-day Turkey , in 600 B.C .
The ancient Greeks implemented a wealth tax just a century later .
Since then , there have been wealth taxes in various countries right through to the present day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has often been unsuccessful , with many countries having moved away from them recently .
In fact , in 1990 , 12 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development had a wealth tax .
By 2018 , only three still had the tax intact .
In other words , wealth taxes are not quite as revolutionary as some imagine .
Nor will they disrupt or end capitalism , as champions like the left-wing commentator Paul Mason and critics like the National Taxpayers Union Foundation allege .
But they can reform it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be more successful than its predecessors , it must be implemented in a way that gains support from the rich rather than simply incentivizing those with the means to take their capital elsewhere .
The eisphora evolved as ideas of economic justice changed .
Originally , the tax was of a fixed amount for all citizens whose wealth was above a certain level , meaning that the rich paid a higher effective tax rate than the super-rich .
In 378 B.C.
, the system was reformed so that the wealthy were taxed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that each person ’ s assets had to be quantified and declared .
More recently than the ancient Greeks , a wealth tax has been foundational to Islamic practice .
The zakat , a yearly religious duty , functions as a 2.5 percent wealth tax on liquid assets .
For the observant , zakat is a key part of economic justice .
And in some periods of Islamic history , the system has allowed for the absence of other forms of taxation ( for example , on income or inheritance ) and has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During the reign of Caliph Umar II ( A.D. 717-720 ) , for example , zakat collection was successful to the point where rulers in some regions struggled to find eligible recipients , leading to a surplus of zakat funds .
The zakat model is still alive today in nongovernmental form through organizations like the National Zakat Foundation in the United Kingdom and the Zakat Foundation of America , which collect some $ 6 million and $ 10 million from British and American Muslims , respectively , each year to give to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ examples point to an important lesson : The only effective wealth tax is a wealth tax by consent .
The eisphora was enacted during times of war , when wealthy Athenians understood that they needed to rally to protect their community .
The zakat , meanwhile , is a religious pillar for all Muslims .
Yet today ’ s wealth taxes , as framed by their left-leaning supporters , appear to be an attack on the wealthy and on capitalism .
In remarks in support of such a tax , then-Democratic presidential candidate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is working better and better for the billionaires , for the rich , for the well-connected , and worse and worse for everyone else.
” If the wealth tax is seen in those terms , it won ’ t work .
To get to consent , a new wealth tax would need to be framed in a way that preserves capitalism in its most sustainable and meritocratic forms and encourages wealth creation .
Indeed , a wealth tax would not tax wealth-creating activities , like investments , but would rather go after wealth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eisphora and zakat , modern economies can craft wealth taxes that the richest , as well as the poorest , benefit from .
Borrowing from the zakat concept , a wealth tax should not target all assets but should affect only liquid assets above a certain threshold .
This would mean that the wealthy are not penalized for their assets per se but are rather encouraged to circulate trapped wealth .
In turn , the wealthy would have the incentive to buy goods and services and illiquid assets rather than dumping money into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would effectively punish the risk-averse and reward the enterprising who are willing to pump their money into the real economy , to the benefit of all .
A wealth tax ’ s benefit of circulating trapped wealth could be significant .
According to estimates by the CIA World Factbook , there is more than $ 80 trillion in broad money ( that is , cash or very liquid cashlike assets ) in the world .
Much of that is effectively untaxed .
If there were a universal levy of , say , 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raise $ 1.6 trillion a year .
( According to the International Food Policy Research Institute , it could cost as little as $ 7 billion a year to eliminate world hunger . )
In the United States alone , there was some $ 18 trillion in broad money in 2018 , approximately 70 percent of which was held by the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans .
Assuming only the rich were taxed at 2 percent , that could net the government $ 250 billion .
To be sure , the real benefit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not in the additional money it might raise for governments but in the money it circulates into the economy .
For example , if someone is sitting on $ 2 million in cash and doesn ’ t invest it , the government could take in $ 40,000 with a 2 percent tax .
But if that same person wants to avoid the tax , the full $ 2 million could well end up circulating in the economy instead , an outcome that could be 50 times better ( as a contribution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This increased economic activity would in turn create more opportunities for productive and valuable activity that would fuel tax receipts and job creation—and help alleviate poverty .
The benefits to society could be even more significant if governments incentivize the wealthy to make their investments in areas where that money can deliver the most change .
In my experience working with Muslim investors , there is always an uptick in people looking for good investment opportunities around the time of their zakat calculations .
With the right direction , more of this capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , infrastructure , climate change , and education technology—all of which will be even more important as the world recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic .
The benefits to the wealthy of this kind of wealth tax could make the system sustainable .
It could push those who would have to pay it to find a mildly profitable investment for their cash , making them net winners compared to the status quo .
Investments like green bonds , which provide a fixed return for investments into green economy projects , or sukuk , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , could be good models .
And this brings us back to the question of buy-in .
Similar to the eisphora , a successful wealth tax may be framed as a response to an emergency ( in this case , the COVID-19 pandemic ) to increase support for it .
Already , at least 83 of the world ’ s wealthiest have said they ’ d sign up .
And if given the choice to be taxed or to invest and circulate their wealth in ways that help society recover , many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pay up .
If done right , a wealth tax could ensure a form of capitalism where the broadest shoulders carry the tax burden .
A wealth tax that learns from its successful predecessors can deliver that .

In July, a group of 83 of the world’s richest people calling itself Millionaires for Humanity urged governments to increase taxes on them to help deal with the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.
In July, a group of 83 of the world’s richest people calling itself Millionaires for Humanity urged governments to increase taxes on them to help deal with the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Their idea, the latest version of a wealth tax—where the rich are taxed on the assets they already own, rather than their earnings—was received as almost revolutionary. This year, figures from onetime U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders to U.K. Shadow Chancellor Anneliese Dodds have likewise called for the exploration of a wealth tax, making it one of the most popular and seemingly new policy ideas on both sides of the Atlantic.
Although wealth taxes may seem bold and innovative, however, the concept is almost as old as money itself. Indeed, the first known currency was created by King Alyattes in Lydia, modern-day Turkey, in 600 B.C. The ancient Greeks implemented a wealth tax just a century later. Since then, there have been wealth taxes in various countries right through to the present day. The problem is that their implementation has often been unsuccessful, with many countries having moved away from them recently. In fact, in 1990, 12 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development had a wealth tax. By 2018, only three still had the tax intact.
In other words, wealth taxes are not quite as revolutionary as some imagine. Nor will they disrupt or end capitalism, as champions like the left-wing commentator Paul Mason and critics like the National Taxpayers Union Foundation allege. But they can reform it. And for a modern wealth tax to be more successful than its predecessors, it must be implemented in a way that gains support from the rich rather than simply incentivizing those with the means to take their capital elsewhere.
A quick look back at history shows that wealth taxes are a very traditional—and some would say intuitive—form of government levies. In ancient Greek times, the eisphora wealth tax was levied on the richest Athenians, particularly during times of war. The tax was applicable to property as well as cash and other liquid assets, and it applied to around 4 percent of ancient Athens’s population, making it a tax for the truly rich, rather than just the relatively comfortable.
The eisphora evolved as ideas of economic justice changed. Originally, the tax was of a fixed amount for all citizens whose wealth was above a certain level, meaning that the rich paid a higher effective tax rate than the super-rich. In 378 B.C., the system was reformed so that the wealthy were taxed proportionally to their wealth, which meant that each person’s assets had to be quantified and declared.
More recently than the ancient Greeks, a wealth tax has been foundational to Islamic practice. The zakat, a yearly religious duty, functions as a 2.5 percent wealth tax on liquid assets. For the observant, zakat is a key part of economic justice. And in some periods of Islamic history, the system has allowed for the absence of other forms of taxation (for example, on income or inheritance) and has led to great strides in poverty eradication. During the reign of Caliph Umar II (A.D. 717-720), for example, zakat collection was successful to the point where rulers in some regions struggled to find eligible recipients, leading to a surplus of zakat funds.
The zakat model is still alive today in nongovernmental form through organizations like the National Zakat Foundation in the United Kingdom and the Zakat Foundation of America, which collect some $6 million and $10 million from British and American Muslims, respectively, each year to give to poorer members of the community.
Modern wealth taxes have often failed because they haven’t learned from their historical equivalents. In 1988, for example, France introduced a new wealth tax of between 1.5 percent and 1.8 percent. The French economist Eric Pichet estimated that, due to capital flight, France ended up losing double the actual tax revenues it gained from the tax before it was abolished in 2017. The problem was that there was little incentive for the rich to keep their money in France. The French experience is not unique. Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands achieved a similar result with their wealth taxes.
These examples point to an important lesson: The only effective wealth tax is a wealth tax by consent. The eisphora was enacted during times of war, when wealthy Athenians understood that they needed to rally to protect their community. The zakat, meanwhile, is a religious pillar for all Muslims.
Yet today’s wealth taxes, as framed by their left-leaning supporters, appear to be an attack on the wealthy and on capitalism. In remarks in support of such a tax, then-Democratic presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren argued that the “government is working better and better for the billionaires, for the rich, for the well-connected, and worse and worse for everyone else.” If the wealth tax is seen in those terms, it won’t work.
To get to consent, a new wealth tax would need to be framed in a way that preserves capitalism in its most sustainable and meritocratic forms and encourages wealth creation. Indeed, a wealth tax would not tax wealth-creating activities, like investments, but would rather go after wealth hoarding.
By combining some features of eisphora and zakat, modern economies can craft wealth taxes that the richest, as well as the poorest, benefit from. Borrowing from the zakat concept, a wealth tax should not target all assets but should affect only liquid assets above a certain threshold. This would mean that the wealthy are not penalized for their assets per se but are rather encouraged to circulate trapped wealth. In turn, the wealthy would have the incentive to buy goods and services and illiquid assets rather than dumping money into bank accounts. Such a wealth tax would effectively punish the risk-averse and reward the enterprising who are willing to pump their money into the real economy, to the benefit of all.
A wealth tax’s benefit of circulating trapped wealth could be significant. According to estimates by the CIA World Factbook, there is more than $80 trillion in broad money (that is, cash or very liquid cashlike assets) in the world. Much of that is effectively untaxed. If there were a universal levy of, say, 2 percent on this wealth, it would raise $1.6 trillion a year. (According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, it could cost as little as $7 billion a year to eliminate world hunger.) In the United States alone, there was some $18 trillion in broad money in 2018, approximately 70 percent of which was held by the wealthiest 10 percent of Americans. Assuming only the rich were taxed at 2 percent, that could net the government $250 billion.
To be sure, the real benefit of a wealth tax framed this way is not in the additional money it might raise for governments but in the money it circulates into the economy. For example, if someone is sitting on $2 million in cash and doesn’t invest it, the government could take in $40,000 with a 2 percent tax. But if that same person wants to avoid the tax, the full $2 million could well end up circulating in the economy instead, an outcome that could be 50 times better (as a contribution to GDP) than the $40,000. This increased economic activity would in turn create more opportunities for productive and valuable activity that would fuel tax receipts and job creation—and help alleviate poverty.
The benefits to society could be even more significant if governments incentivize the wealthy to make their investments in areas where that money can deliver the most change. In my experience working with Muslim investors, there is always an uptick in people looking for good investment opportunities around the time of their zakat calculations. With the right direction, more of this capital could go to high-impact areas like biotechnology, infrastructure, climate change, and education technology—all of which will be even more important as the world recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic.
The benefits to the wealthy of this kind of wealth tax could make the system sustainable. It could push those who would have to pay it to find a mildly profitable investment for their cash, making them net winners compared to the status quo. Investments like green bonds, which provide a fixed return for investments into green economy projects, or sukuk, which provide a sharia-compliant investment into core infrastructure, could be good models.
And this brings us back to the question of buy-in. Similar to the eisphora, a successful wealth tax may be framed as a response to an emergency (in this case, the COVID-19 pandemic) to increase support for it. Already, at least 83 of the world’s wealthiest have said they’d sign up. And if given the choice to be taxed or to invest and circulate their wealth in ways that help society recover, many of these wealthy may be even happier to pay up.
If done right, a wealth tax could ensure a form of capitalism where the broadest shoulders carry the tax burden. A wealth tax that learns from its successful predecessors can deliver that.


Rajapaksa Rule

On Aug. 5 , Sri Lankans put on masks and voted in South Asia ’ s first major election since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic .
Public health officials were present at every polling center .
In mine , people in lines were spaced out by black tape on the floor .
After a temperature check , voters were guided into the centers by officials wearing face visors and gloves .
We were asked to wash our hands before voting , and we received our ballot paper and finger ink from officials behind see-through partitions .
Even though turnout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , by the time voting closed at 5 in the evening , 71 percent of registered Sri Lankan voters had cast their ballot .
Some mistook the turnout as a sign of a close race—it was not .
The Rajapaksa family and their election vehicle , the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna ( SLPP ) party , won more seats than when Mahinda Rajapaksa went to the polls in 2010 , soon after Sri Lanka ’ s bloody civil war ended with a complete military victory for the government over the Liberation Tigers of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ original electoral feat was considered impossible to replicate , the SLPP has surpassed it in an election boasting higher turnout than in 2010 .
In doing so , it has consolidated the country ’ s majority population in a way previously thought impossible .
Along with its allies , the SLPP secured 150 seats in Parliament—a two-thirds supermajority that grants the SLPP the power to amend the constitution .
It now has the power to roll back the democratic reforms enacted in the five years after Rajapaksa ’ s shock defeat in 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sri Lanka ’ s hiatus from Rajapaksa rule .
At the same time , Sri Lanka ’ s main opposition parties were devoured by in-fighting .
The United National Party ( UNP ) leader , Ranil Wickremesinghe , repeatedly blocked the emergence of new party leadership .
After the 2019 presidential election , differences between Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa , the leader of a UNP breakaway faction called Samagi Jana Balawegaya ( SJB ) , materialized into a formal divide .
In the months prior to the parliamentary election , headlines about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such as when the UNP rescinded party membership for over 100 individuals .
Voters , frustrated by leadership struggles between 2016 and 2019 , unaddressed corruption , undelivered promises , and the destabilizing uncertainty of a pandemic , were in no mood for in-fighting .
The Rajapaksas capitalized on that mood , and the traumatic memory of Sri Lanka ’ s April 2019 Easter bombings , to effectively portray themselves as purveyors of security and stability with a no-nonsense leadership style .
Sri Lanka ’ s situation is not unusual .
Incumbent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spike in popularity as their electorates rally around the flag .
And in Sri Lanka , too , opposition members risked being considered “ anti-national ” if they were too critical of national coronavirus eradication efforts .
The last days of campaigning had very few posters , political rallies , or meetings .
In fact , it was socially costly for opposition politicians to hold gatherings .
Meanwhile , incumbent politicians doing essential government work had both media presence and good reason to be in the public eye .
For Sri Lanka @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not as difficult as for many other countries .
Not only did Colombo have early warning of the looming disaster , but unlike other South Asian countries , Sri Lanka has no land borders and boasts a remarkable health sector that covers nearly all citizens , is low-cost , comprehensive , and has made significant progress in eradicating communicable diseases .
So unlike natural disasters or financial crises , a health emergency is a crisis that Sri Lanka is particularly well equipped to manage .
The experience of war also means the military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to provide rapid logistical support—skills that are useful for contact tracing or relief distribution .
As a former defense secretary , Gotabaya Rajapaksa was particularly well placed to preside over COVID-19 containment efforts .
Effective coordination between the military and health sector thus far has allowed Sri Lanka to manage COVID-19 effectively , with just a few hiccups .
Sri Lankans had only to look over their shoulders to India ( which has over 2.4 million confirmed COVID-19 cases ) to appreciate their country ’ s deft management of the virus .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed cases . )
The popular use of wartime rhetoric , alongside curfews , increased military visibility , and high levels of uncertainty , also reminded voters every day of what it was like to be at war from 1983 to 2009 .
In 2014 , Mahinda Rajapaksa campaigned heavily on reminding southern voters of wartime efforts and why voters ought to be grateful to him , and in 2020 they remembered those efforts organically .
Sinhalese Buddhist ultranationalists belonging to a political party ( Our Power of People Party , or OPPP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election .
Several Buddhist monks contested as members of OPPP , which has been associated with anti-Muslim hate speech .
The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence recorded one OPPP candidate warning Muslims that if they make any more trouble , Buddhists will have to take up “ nonviolent arms ” against them .
The presence of Sinhalese Buddhist supremacists in Parliament normalizes violence against Sri Lanka ’ s Muslim minority , which has been the target of hate speech and race riots over the last decade .
The growth of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better demonstrated than in the success of candidates nominated by Viyathmaga , a civil organization founded by Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2016 .
One of its members , retired Rear Adm. Sarath Weerasekara , is one of Colombo district ’ s most popular parliamentarians .
The organization offers networking opportunities to professionals and academics , holds campaigns and workshops , lobbies policymakers , and appeals to upwardly mobile Sinhalese Buddhists .
Sinhalese Buddhists , the majority ethno-religious group in Sri Lanka , have consistently expressed fear of Sri Lanka ’ s ethnic minority groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ connected , powerful , and perhaps even existential threat .
Groups such as Viyathmaga are an antidote to such fears and attractive to those who have found the Sinhalese language a barrier to accessing the global marketplace ( of ideas , or otherwise ) .
Two of the group ’ s four stated values are “ country first ” and “ spirituality ” —but as of yet “ country first ” has been narrowly conceived and does not really include a commitment to Sri Lanka ’ s minorities .
Many Sinhalese Buddhists today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Tamil civilians , for example , and it may be several decades before Sri Lanka is ready or able to come to terms with that aspect of its history .
The consolidation of Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony comes as a pro-democracy and human rights civil society is so demoralized , afraid , and emotionally exhausted that it isn ’ t able to mount serious resistance to social injustice .
When Hejaaz Hizbullah , a human rights lawyer , was arrested on April 14 and subsequently detained without charge or access to a lawyer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weakly .
When Sri Lankan authorities raided the home of the New York Times correspondent Dharisha Bastians and attempted to seize her laptop two months ago , only a handful of opposition members spoke up .
There has been little interest in the arrest of former Criminal Investigations Department Director Shani Abeysekera , who led investigations into high-profile corruption cases against politicians now in power .
And this March , when a man convicted of massacring eight civilians in Jaffna district was pardoned by Gotabaya Rakapaksa , power had already shifted so drastically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , stayed silent .
Perhaps those who feel most betrayed by all of this are victims of human rights abuses and crime .
With the Rajapaksas back in power , activists representing the relatives of the forcibly disappeared have reported a significant increase in government surveillance and intimidation .
Many have risked their anonymity , security , and energy to speak up and demand truth or accountability .
It is unclear who will now champion human rights in Parliament , though .
In the minority-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces , the Tamil National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its parliamentary presence .
And it remains to be seen whether the SJB can or wishes to champion anti-corruption or substantive democracy—or whether it will instead engage instead in ethnic outbidding .
Exclusionary politics , I ’ ve argued previously , helps create the conditions for further conflict in Sri Lanka and may hurl the country into irretrievable economic peril .
With the SLPP ’ s parliamentary majority , it will be able to replace all the democratic gains of 2015-2019 , including the 19th Amendment , which features checks on executive power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn , it is quite possible that Sri Lanka will now depart altogether from the Westminster system of 1948 , the quasi-Westminster system of 1972 , and the Gaullist system of 1978 .
National SLPP organizer Basil Rajapaksa has said he would like Sri Lanka to develop governance structures similar in style to the Chinese Communist Party or India ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party .
Accelerated by COVID-19 , Sri Lanka ’ s economic meltdown is already here .
The country ’ s key foreign exchange earners ( tourism , garments , tea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure .
Thousands of layoffs have already occurred , and the Asian Development Bank predicts that Sri Lanka ’ s growth rates will drop by 6.1 percent in 2020 .
Investors already view the country as one of the more risky emerging markets , demonstrated by extensive foreign capital outflows since January .
It is not a positive sign that the Rajapaksa government recently breached the constitutional borrowing limit or that one of its members of Parliament is a convicted murderer .
Rule-bending does not necessarily help build the kind of confidence necessary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While the International Monetary Fund has provided several emerging Asian economies with funds under both the Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument , Sri Lanka is not one of them .
In the short run , imposing import bans may help the SLPP manage a run on foreign exchange reserves , but very soon the government will need import revenues and will have to ease protectionism , which has started to return .
Sri Lankans , for their part , have provided the SLPP a mandate to drive development and growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led to the UNP ’ s downfall .
But trade barriers combined with a few unwise proposals , like an international cricket stadium that Sri Lanka doesn ’ t need and that won ’ t generate income , could drive Sri Lanka into long-term poverty .
The SLPP can use its impressive election victory to silence dissent , consolidate Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony , or refashion the government in line with China ’ s one-party state .
But with an economic crisis at Sri Lanka ’ s doorstep , now probably isn ’ t @ @ @ @

On Aug. 5, Sri Lankans put on masks and voted in South Asia’s first major election since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health officials were present at every polling center. In mine, people in lines were spaced out by black tape on the floor. After a temperature check, voters were guided into the centers by officials wearing face visors and gloves. We were asked to wash our hands before voting, and we received our ballot paper and finger ink from officials behind see-through partitions.
On Aug. 5, Sri Lankans put on masks and voted in South Asia’s first major election since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. Public health officials were present at every polling center. In mine, people in lines were spaced out by black tape on the floor. After a temperature check, voters were guided into the centers by officials wearing face visors and gloves. We were asked to wash our hands before voting, and we received our ballot paper and finger ink from officials behind see-through partitions.
Even though turnout was marginally lower than in previous elections, by the time voting closed at 5 in the evening, 71 percent of registered Sri Lankan voters had cast their ballot. Some mistook the turnout as a sign of a close race—it was not.
The Rajapaksa family and their election vehicle, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party, won more seats than when Mahinda Rajapaksa went to the polls in 2010, soon after Sri Lanka’s bloody civil war ended with a complete military victory for the government over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Although Rajapaksa’s original electoral feat was considered impossible to replicate, the SLPP has surpassed it in an election boasting higher turnout than in 2010. In doing so, it has consolidated the country’s majority population in a way previously thought impossible.
Along with its allies, the SLPP secured 150 seats in Parliament—a two-thirds supermajority that grants the SLPP the power to amend the constitution. It now has the power to roll back the democratic reforms enacted in the five years after Rajapaksa’s shock defeat in 2015, effectively erasing any remaining elements of Sri Lanka’s hiatus from Rajapaksa rule.
Ahead of the race, many analysts predicted a landslide victory for the SLPP. The party, after all, was already riding the momentum of the November presidential election victory of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabaya. The winning party’s core voters and its party activists were energized by his success, and new supporters were lured to the party in anticipation of political patronage.
At the same time, Sri Lanka’s main opposition parties were devoured by in-fighting. The United National Party (UNP) leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, repeatedly blocked the emergence of new party leadership. After the 2019 presidential election, differences between Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa, the leader of a UNP breakaway faction called Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), materialized into a formal divide. In the months prior to the parliamentary election, headlines about the opposition revolved around stories that amplified in-fighting, such as when the UNP rescinded party membership for over 100 individuals.
Voters, frustrated by leadership struggles between 2016 and 2019, unaddressed corruption, undelivered promises, and the destabilizing uncertainty of a pandemic, were in no mood for in-fighting. The Rajapaksas capitalized on that mood, and the traumatic memory of Sri Lanka’s April 2019 Easter bombings, to effectively portray themselves as purveyors of security and stability with a no-nonsense leadership style.
During crises, people reward dominant leaders who promise to take quick and aggressive action. And in the months leading up to the election, the SLPP reaffirmed its promise to do just that. One month after curfews were imposed in March to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, the police had arrested 40,095 people for curfew violations and had taken 10,332 vehicles into custody. When the curfew began, there were only 72 confirmed cases. In the months leading up to the election, the media also broadcast arrests made in relation to anti-drug efforts, as if to advertise the state’s authoritarianism.
Sri Lanka’s situation is not unusual. Incumbent populist leaders across the world have seen a spike in popularity as their electorates rally around the flag. And in Sri Lanka, too, opposition members risked being considered “anti-national” if they were too critical of national coronavirus eradication efforts. The last days of campaigning had very few posters, political rallies, or meetings. In fact, it was socially costly for opposition politicians to hold gatherings. Meanwhile, incumbent politicians doing essential government work had both media presence and good reason to be in the public eye.
For Sri Lanka, of course, managing COVID-19 was not as difficult as for many other countries. Not only did Colombo have early warning of the looming disaster, but unlike other South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has no land borders and boasts a remarkable health sector that covers nearly all citizens, is low-cost, comprehensive, and has made significant progress in eradicating communicable diseases. So unlike natural disasters or financial crises, a health emergency is a crisis that Sri Lanka is particularly well equipped to manage. The experience of war also means the military is well trained in surveillance and able to provide rapid logistical support—skills that are useful for contact tracing or relief distribution.
As a former defense secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa was particularly well placed to preside over COVID-19 containment efforts. Effective coordination between the military and health sector thus far has allowed Sri Lanka to manage COVID-19 effectively, with just a few hiccups. Sri Lankans had only to look over their shoulders to India (which has over 2.4 million confirmed COVID-19 cases) to appreciate their country’s deft management of the virus. (Sri Lanka currently has fewer than 3,000 confirmed cases.)
The popular use of wartime rhetoric, alongside curfews, increased military visibility, and high levels of uncertainty, also reminded voters every day of what it was like to be at war from 1983 to 2009. In 2014, Mahinda Rajapaksa campaigned heavily on reminding southern voters of wartime efforts and why voters ought to be grateful to him, and in 2020 they remembered those efforts organically.
The SLPP’s resounding victory will certainly be interpreted as a mandate to strengthen Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony. Like his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa did nine months before, on Aug. 9 Mahinda Rajapaksa took his oath at a sacred Buddhist temple—the Kelaniya Raja Maha Vihara. This reaffirms the primacy of religion and ethnicity in the Rajapaksa’s campaign and likely in his government going forward.
Sinhalese Buddhist ultranationalists belonging to a political party (Our Power of People Party, or OPPP) won a seat in Parliament this election. Several Buddhist monks contested as members of OPPP, which has been associated with anti-Muslim hate speech. The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence recorded one OPPP candidate warning Muslims that if they make any more trouble, Buddhists will have to take up “nonviolent arms” against them. The presence of Sinhalese Buddhist supremacists in Parliament normalizes violence against Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority, which has been the target of hate speech and race riots over the last decade.
The growth of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism more broadly, however, is no better demonstrated than in the success of candidates nominated by Viyathmaga, a civil organization founded by Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2016. One of its members, retired Rear Adm. Sarath Weerasekara, is one of Colombo district’s most popular parliamentarians. The organization offers networking opportunities to professionals and academics, holds campaigns and workshops, lobbies policymakers, and appeals to upwardly mobile Sinhalese Buddhists.
Sinhalese Buddhists, the majority ethno-religious group in Sri Lanka, have consistently expressed fear of Sri Lanka’s ethnic minority groups, which they see as a globally connected, powerful, and perhaps even existential threat. Groups such as Viyathmaga are an antidote to such fears and attractive to those who have found the Sinhalese language a barrier to accessing the global marketplace (of ideas, or otherwise). Two of the group’s four stated values are “country first” and “spirituality”—but as of yet “country first” has been narrowly conceived and does not really include a commitment to Sri Lanka’s minorities. Many Sinhalese Buddhists today remain in denial about wartime atrocities committed against Tamil civilians, for example, and it may be several decades before Sri Lanka is ready or able to come to terms with that aspect of its history.
The consolidation of Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony comes as a pro-democracy and human rights civil society is so demoralized, afraid, and emotionally exhausted that it isn’t able to mount serious resistance to social injustice. When Hejaaz Hizbullah, a human rights lawyer, was arrested on April 14 and subsequently detained without charge or access to a lawyer, a drained civil society protested only weakly. When Sri Lankan authorities raided the home of the New York Times correspondent Dharisha Bastians and attempted to seize her laptop two months ago, only a handful of opposition members spoke up. There has been little interest in the arrest of former Criminal Investigations Department Director Shani Abeysekera, who led investigations into high-profile corruption cases against politicians now in power. And this March, when a man convicted of massacring eight civilians in Jaffna district was pardoned by Gotabaya Rakapaksa, power had already shifted so drastically that the main opposition party, SJB, stayed silent. Perhaps those who feel most betrayed by all of this are victims of human rights abuses and crime. With the Rajapaksas back in power, activists representing the relatives of the forcibly disappeared have reported a significant increase in government surveillance and intimidation. Many have risked their anonymity, security, and energy to speak up and demand truth or accountability.
It is unclear who will now champion human rights in Parliament, though. In the minority-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces, the Tamil National Alliance has lost almost 40 percent of its parliamentary presence. And it remains to be seen whether the SJB can or wishes to champion anti-corruption or substantive democracy—or whether it will instead engage instead in ethnic outbidding. Exclusionary politics, I’ve argued previously, helps create the conditions for further conflict in Sri Lanka and may hurl the country into irretrievable economic peril.
With the SLPP’s parliamentary majority, it will be able to replace all the democratic gains of 2015-2019, including the 19th Amendment, which features checks on executive power and several independent oversight bodies. In turn, it is quite possible that Sri Lanka will now depart altogether from the Westminster system of 1948, the quasi-Westminster system of 1972, and the Gaullist system of 1978. National SLPP organizer Basil Rajapaksa has said he would like Sri Lanka to develop governance structures similar in style to the Chinese Communist Party or India’s Bharatiya Janata Party.
Whether Sri Lanka maintains its democracy or not, it will not be able to avoid its next crisis.
Accelerated by COVID-19, Sri Lanka’s economic meltdown is already here. The country’s key foreign exchange earners (tourism, garments, tea, and migrant remittances) are under pressure. Thousands of layoffs have already occurred, and the Asian Development Bank predicts that Sri Lanka’s growth rates will drop by 6.1 percent in 2020.
Investors already view the country as one of the more risky emerging markets, demonstrated by extensive foreign capital outflows since January. It is not a positive sign that the Rajapaksa government recently breached the constitutional borrowing limit or that one of its members of Parliament is a convicted murderer. Rule-bending does not necessarily help build the kind of confidence necessary to create and sustain a thriving economy. While the International Monetary Fund has provided several emerging Asian economies with funds under both the Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument, Sri Lanka is not one of them.
In the short run, imposing import bans may help the SLPP manage a run on foreign exchange reserves, but very soon the government will need import revenues and will have to ease protectionism, which has started to return. Sri Lankans, for their part, have provided the SLPP a mandate to drive development and growth and weed out cronyism—the same kind that led to the UNP’s downfall. But trade barriers combined with a few unwise proposals, like an international cricket stadium that Sri Lanka doesn’t need and that won’t generate income, could drive Sri Lanka into long-term poverty.
The SLPP can use its impressive election victory to silence dissent, consolidate Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony, or refashion the government in line with China’s one-party state. But with an economic crisis at Sri Lanka’s doorstep, now probably isn’t the best time.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-14--Trump’s TikTok and WeChat Bans Could Shatter the Global Internet

Trump ’ s TikTok and WeChat Bans Could Shatter the Global Internet What remains of the global , open internet came under attack this month .
The latest salvo was launched from the White House and included two executive orders sanctioning the Chinese platforms WeChat and TikTok as well as expanding a so-called clean network program .
Intended to tighten the screws on China , these measures risk setting off a dangerous chain reaction far beyond their stated intent .
When the orders take effect in mid-September , they will , among other things , prohibit any U.S. citizen or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s parent company , or WeChat , owned by Tencent .
While the U.S. State Department says the objective is to fend off “ aggressive intrusions by malign actors , such as the Chinese Communist Party , ” the measures will undermine a free and open internet , strengthen the hand of authoritarian governments , and hasten the unraveling of the global economic integration that has fueled the most successful half-century in human history .
The new rules will likely accelerate the consolidation of the internet into at least three separate regions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the European Union .
U.S. President Donald Trump knows there is bipartisan support for ratcheting up pressure on China , especially on questions related to national security and defense .
He also understands that looking tough on China will be helpful for the November election , even if he has been anything but tough on China in the past .
But his gambit has far-reaching technological , economic , and geopolitical implications .
For one , it shatters the pretense of a free , interoperable , and global internet that has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and of which the United States has long been the prime guarantor and beneficiary .
It also gives license to authoritarians to crack down on the flow of information , threatens to cut the digital lifelines of their citizens to the outside world , and is likely to sharply curtail global trade in digital services .
Trump ’ s moves are likely to speed up the onset of what some call the “ splinternet.
” There are already several countries that have imposed data sovereignty regulations that restrict the flow of data , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the new rules decoupling the United States from Chinese internet services will likely accelerate the consolidation of the internet into at least three separate regions centered on the United States , China , and the European Union .
This , in turn , will give rise to fierce and destructive trade disputes and lead to new restrictions on online activities .
Complicating matters , there are few off-ramps available : Any U.S. decision-makers who oppose squeezing China with measures such as Trump ’ s will be cast as weak on security .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s orders , the history of U.S. prohibitions and sanctions make it easily conceivable that they will apply not just to Americans , but also to a much wider segment of the world ’ s population—if only because non-U.S. companies will strive to avoid regulatory risk by preemptively decoupling their digital networks and services from China , the United States , or both .
Although enforcing these regulations comprehensively will be virtually impossible and legal challenges are mounting , the damage is already being done .
Most obviously , these moves to cut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and China .
The two countries have already slipped into a Cold War mainly playing out in the arena of trade and technology , with much of the tension centered on Chinese access to technology and the competition over the future of 5G telecommunications .
At the very least , the president ’ s latest orders will speed up deglobalization : The new legal uncertainty and sanctions threat hanging over large parts of digital technology and services is a big deal for international trade and commerce .
With Chinese telecommunications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevalent all over the world , virtually everyone will be affected by Trump ’ s rulings .
Of course , Trump ’ s technological saber-rattling benefits Chinese President Xi Jinping .
Regardless of whether Microsoft makes a deal with ByteDance to take over its U.S. operations in time for next month ’ s deadline , China is likely to respond with actions against its rival .
Xi has many possible targets to choose from .
First , China could step up interference in November ’ s U.S. elections , as some believe it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affecting swing states—potentially influencing the outcome of the election .
Second , as the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt after Japan , China could also dump bonds , potentially increasing interest rates for a battered U.S. economy .
While this might temporarily impact China ’ s trade balance , it could also hurt Trump ’ s prospects for reelection .
Third , China could also put the squeeze on a U.S. ally such as Australia , creating another headache for U.S. policymakers .
Technology companies with investments and partnerships in China could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and retaliation aimed at them and their products .
Even without the likely revenge from Beijing , the wider economic implications of Trump ’ s moves are extensive .
Major e-commerce companies such as Amazon will need to rethink how to source hardware components for cloud computing .
Technology companies with direct investments in China ( including through partnerships with Tencent and ByteDance ) could incur heavy losses , impairments of their assets , and retaliation aimed directly at them and their products .
Tencent is one of the world ’ s largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ game studios , social media apps , and music companies .
Many U.S. companies including Visa , Mastercard , and Starbucks also use WeChat ’ s payment platform and e-commerce functions in China .
Trump ’ s orders could force these and many other companies to expensively reconfigure—and even reconsider their footprint in China .
The U.S.-China relationship is at rock bottom now and could worsen still further as the latest U.S. moves signal a new phase of accelerated competition .
The actions against TikTok and WeChat—together with recent sanctions against top Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the new national security law—are part of a widening strategic campaign against China .
The Trump administration is intent on hastening U.S. decoupling from China , and the potential for escalation is real .
One of the biggest losers of Trump ’ s moves could be the United States itself .
Since 1989 , the country has benefited from an open internet as a channel for spreading U.S. culture and values , including the extension of market capitalism .
China ’ s Great Firewall , Iran ’ s “ halal net , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were to a large extent intended to reduce U.S. online influence , while also exerting domestic control and stifling opposition .
A growing number of countries including India , North Korea , Saudi Arabia , Thailand , and Vietnam have followed suit .
By imposing new restrictions , the United States will constrain its influence further .
What ’ s more , Trump ’ s digital decoupling risks embroiling the entire world in what is largely a U.S.-Chinese dispute .
The U.S. plan , which includes the designation of over 30 so-called clean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and disintegration of the global internet , an outcome that was predicted by tech enthusiasts over a decade ago .
Like Beijing , Washington is forcing countries to take sides .
Not only will this undercut one of the most powerful expressions of U.S. soft power ever created , but it also risks undermining the stability of the digital economy at a time when the world can least afford it .

What remains of the global, open internet came under attack this month. The latest salvo was launched from the White House and included two executive orders sanctioning the Chinese platforms WeChat and TikTok as well as expanding a so-called clean network program . Intended to tighten the screws on China, these measures risk setting off a dangerous chain reaction far beyond their stated intent. When the orders take effect in mid-September, they will, among other things, prohibit any U.S. citizen or company from transacting with ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, or WeChat, owned by Tencent. While the U.S. State Department says the objective is to fend off “aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party,” the measures will undermine a free and open internet, strengthen the hand of authoritarian governments, and hasten the unraveling of the global economic integration that has fueled the most successful half-century in human history. The new rules will likely accelerate the consolidation of the internet into at least three separate regions centered on the United States, China, and the European Union.
What remains of the global, open internet came under attack this month. The latest salvo was launched from the White House and included two executive orders sanctioning the Chinese platforms WeChat and TikTok as well as expanding a so-called clean network program. Intended to tighten the screws on China, these measures risk setting off a dangerous chain reaction far beyond their stated intent. When the orders take effect in mid-September, they will, among other things, prohibit any U.S. citizen or company from transacting with ByteDance, TikTok’s parent company, or WeChat, owned by Tencent. While the U.S. State Department says the objective is to fend off “aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party,” the measures will undermine a free and open internet, strengthen the hand of authoritarian governments, and hasten the unraveling of the global economic integration that has fueled the most successful half-century in human history.
The new rules will likely accelerate the consolidation of the internet into at least three separate regions centered on the United States, China, and the European Union.
U.S. President Donald Trump knows there is bipartisan support for ratcheting up pressure on China, especially on questions related to national security and defense. He also understands that looking tough on China will be helpful for the November election, even if he has been anything but tough on China in the past. But his gambit has far-reaching technological, economic, and geopolitical implications. For one, it shatters the pretense of a free, interoperable, and global internet that has prevailed for the past three decades, and of which the United States has long been the prime guarantor and beneficiary. It also gives license to authoritarians to crack down on the flow of information, threatens to cut the digital lifelines of their citizens to the outside world, and is likely to sharply curtail global trade in digital services.
Trump’s moves are likely to speed up the onset of what some call the “splinternet.” There are already several countries that have imposed data sovereignty regulations that restrict the flow of data, information, and digital services. But the new rules decoupling the United States from Chinese internet services will likely accelerate the consolidation of the internet into at least three separate regions centered on the United States, China, and the European Union. This, in turn, will give rise to fierce and destructive trade disputes and lead to new restrictions on online activities. Complicating matters, there are few off-ramps available: Any U.S. decision-makers who oppose squeezing China with measures such as Trump’s will be cast as weak on security.
While the lawyers are still deciphering Trump’s orders, the history of U.S. prohibitions and sanctions make it easily conceivable that they will apply not just to Americans, but also to a much wider segment of the world’s population—if only because non-U.S. companies will strive to avoid regulatory risk by preemptively decoupling their digital networks and services from China, the United States, or both. Although enforcing these regulations comprehensively will be virtually impossible and legal challenges are mounting, the damage is already being done.
Most obviously, these moves to cut digital ties will deepen the rift between the United States and China. The two countries have already slipped into a Cold War mainly playing out in the arena of trade and technology, with much of the tension centered on Chinese access to technology and the competition over the future of 5G telecommunications. At the very least, the president’s latest orders will speed up deglobalization: The new legal uncertainty and sanctions threat hanging over large parts of digital technology and services is a big deal for international trade and commerce. With Chinese telecommunications products, components, and services so prevalent all over the world, virtually everyone will be affected by Trump’s rulings.
Of course, Trump’s technological saber-rattling benefits Chinese President Xi Jinping. Regardless of whether Microsoft makes a deal with ByteDance to take over its U.S. operations in time for next month’s deadline, China is likely to respond with actions against its rival. Xi has many possible targets to choose from. First, China could step up interference in November’s U.S. elections, as some believe it already has, including through sanctions disproportionately affecting swing states—potentially influencing the outcome of the election. Second, as the second-largest foreign holder of U.S. debt after Japan, China could also dump bonds, potentially increasing interest rates for a battered U.S. economy. While this might temporarily impact China’s trade balance, it could also hurt Trump’s prospects for reelection. Third, China could also put the squeeze on a U.S. ally such as Australia, creating another headache for U.S. policymakers.
Technology companies with investments and partnerships in China could incur heavy losses, asset impairments, and retaliation aimed at them and their products.
Even without the likely revenge from Beijing, the wider economic implications of Trump’s moves are extensive. Major e-commerce companies such as Amazon will need to rethink how to source hardware components for cloud computing. Technology companies with direct investments in China (including through partnerships with Tencent and ByteDance) could incur heavy losses, impairments of their assets, and retaliation aimed directly at them and their products. Tencent is one of the world’s largest technology companies and has stakes in video game studios, social media apps, and music companies. Many U.S. companies including Visa, Mastercard, and Starbucks also use WeChat’s payment platform and e-commerce functions in China. Trump’s orders could force these and many other companies to expensively reconfigure—and even reconsider their footprint in China.
The U.S.-China relationship is at rock bottom now and could worsen still further as the latest U.S. moves signal a new phase of accelerated competition. The actions against TikTok and WeChat—together with recent sanctions against top Beijing and Hong Kong officials involved in implementing the new national security law—are part of a widening strategic campaign against China. The Trump administration is intent on hastening U.S. decoupling from China, and the potential for escalation is real.
One of the biggest losers of Trump’s moves could be the United States itself. Since 1989, the country has benefited from an open internet as a channel for spreading U.S. culture and values, including the extension of market capitalism. China’s Great Firewall, Iran’s “halal net,” and Russia’s sovereign internet law were to a large extent intended to reduce U.S. online influence, while also exerting domestic control and stifling opposition. A growing number of countries including India, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Vietnam have followed suit. By imposing new restrictions, the United States will constrain its influence further.
What’s more, Trump’s digital decoupling risks embroiling the entire world in what is largely a U.S.-Chinese dispute. The U.S. plan, which includes the designation of over 30 so-called clean countries, will speed up the dismemberment and disintegration of the global internet, an outcome that was predicted by tech enthusiasts over a decade ago. Like Beijing, Washington is forcing countries to take sides. Not only will this undercut one of the most powerful expressions of U.S. soft power ever created, but it also risks undermining the stability of the digital economy at a time when the world can least afford it.