foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--It’s a New Europe—if You Can Keep It

It’s a New Europe—if You Can Keep It

It ’ s a New Europe—if You Can Keep It With the troubled last decade of the eurozone in mind , it is tempting to view these changes as long-overdue updates of Europe ’ s incomplete union .
That is both true and reassuring in confirming that , once again , Europe “ got there ” in the end .
But by the same token , this complacent narrative tends to diminish the scale of Europe ’ s problems and the novelty of the crisis we face in 2020 .
The speed and scale of changes forced on Europe since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for thought .
To move Europe this far this fast takes an almighty shock .
Even with this latest package , it is far from obvious that Europe is sufficiently equipped to meet the challenges ahead .
The lockdowns that stopped the virus in Europe have had a devastating economic impact .
Again , the American habit of dramatizing data by means of annualizing rates of change disguises the fact that economic implosion in Europe has been every bit as bad , if not worse .
The U.S. economy fell 9.5 percent in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s contracted by 10 percent .
In Spain , the collapse was twice as bad , at 18.5 percent .
( If Spain reported its data in the American style , it would be down 65 percent on the year . )
On top of the virus and the economic catastrophe , in May it looked as though everything was going wrong in political terms as well .
As the crisis hit hard in late February , the Europeans , with France and Germany in the lead , resorted to national measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protective equipment and closing down borders .
Italy ’ s appeals for aid were met with stony silence , and Brussels lacked the powers to push through a more cooperative approach .
On March 12 , Christine Lagarde , the president of the European Central Bank ( ECB ) , announced that Italy ’ s spreads were not the business of the European bank , sending interest rates on Italian debt to new highs .
A proposal from a coalition of heavyweight governments led by France for joint borrowing in the form of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Berlin .
Then a ruling by the German Constitutional Court put in question the legal basis for the ECB ’ s bond market purchases .
Perhaps unsurprisingly , public opinion , especially in hard-hit Spain and Italy , was swinging against Europe .
It was a disillusioning shock .
Since the start of the year , Ursula von der Leyen ’ s new European Commission had been doing its best to encourage deeper integration with the mood music of a Green New Deal .
Now COVID-19 was reopening old wounds , reminding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eurozone crisis in 2012 , they had made frustratingly little progress on the key issues of structural reform , notably on the banking union and the capacity for a more proactive fiscal policy .
By early April , the sense of crisis was acute .
Not for nothing , French President Emmanuel Macron spoke of Europe facing a “ moment of truth.
” This being Europe , that “ moment ” turned into a protracted three-month battle .
But the results , in terms of responding to the pandemic in public health , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impressive , certainly by contrast with anywhere in the world outside of East Asia .
With regard to the virus , the Europeans have managed to do what the United States has failed to do .
They have not just damped down the hot spots , as New York has done .
The EU has managed to prevent a massive spillover to member states , for instance in Eastern Europe , that were largely spared the first wave .
This made possible a cautious return to a “ new normality.
” Furthermore , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit , European countries have used short-time working schemes to keep unemployment levels far below the extraordinary levels seen in the United States , at least for now .
And rather than escalating the political tensions , again by contrast with the United States , they have been turned in a positive direction .
With the connivance of the German government and even the Bundesbank , the challenge to the ECB by Germany ’ s Constitutional Court was smothered .
In May , France and Germany sidestepped the coronabonds impasse and threw their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the July 21 deal : to raise money directly via the EU ’ s own budget ; fund that budget with debts issued by the EU itself rather than member states ; and distribute a large share of the funds to the most distressed countries in the form of grants , rather than loans , so that their already heavy debt burdens do not grow .
It was never going to be an easy deal to sell to the coalition of fiscal conservatives led by the Dutch .
The negotiations were extraordinarily protracted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dignified .
There was media gamesmanship .
Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are said to have lost their tempers on more than one occasion .
But no one quit the marathon meeting .
A deal was done .
This , the EU spin tells us , is what adult politics looks like .
In the process , the more conservative voices of Northern Europe extracted serious concessions .
Unfortunately , those came at the expense of some of the more progressive and innovative budget elements , including spending on joint efforts in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment .
Thankfully , the package is up for debate in the European Parliament , which is , step by step , asserting leverage over Europe ’ s politics .
Earlier in the crisis , the Parliament favored a far more expansive plan , and hopefully it will make adjustments to the July compromise .
This is how the standard Europe storyline goes .
Europe writes commitments to solidarity and cooperation that it can not cash .
It comes up hard against reality .
It responds by “ falling forward ” and deepening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ functionalism ” is the homegrown ideology of the EU .
It has served Brussels well .
And in short order , 2020 will no doubt be inscribed in the long list of crises through which Europe has developed .
This summer , there was certainly nothing inevitable about the way the deal was done .
It did not seem likely .
Credit goes to the European Commission for raising the stakes , upping the original suggestion by Merkel and Macron to an ask of 750 billion euros , on top of the regular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) multiyear budget .
( It was the Commission ’ s officials who dug up the legal precedent that would allow the EU to justify massive borrowing . )
Among national governments , one has to admire the Spanish and Italians , who began the long march toward a constructive European response back in March and suffered through the demeaning objections of Northern Europeans without walking away .
The best that can be said for the Dutch and the Austrians is that they gave way in the end .
Perhaps the shameless defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz will serve some useful purpose in dampening criticism from their domestic populists .
But in the last instance , it is clear that what held the negotiations together was the weight of the Franco-German alliance .
And the clear-headed and dauntless advocates of that partnership are the French .
Since he assumed the French presidency in 2017 , in the wake of the disastrous refugee crisis that had rocked Europe in 2015-2016 , Macron has been appealing to Berlin for cooperation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Macron the strategic alliance that he craved .
That hurt .
And in the fall of 2019 , there were signs of increasing impatience in Paris , with Macron making unilateral moves toward Moscow .
What changed in 2020 was that Merkel came around .
It is true , of course , that Merkel has announced her retirement .
She does not face reelection .
But that was true already last year , when she showed no inclination to lead the way on Europe .
Since the disastrously inconclusive Bundestag election of 2017 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been on a fragile footing , with both partners losing public support .
It takes an effort to remember now , but in February , as COVID-19 was silently spreading in Europe , the main news in Germany was the crisis in the Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) unleashed by the coalition negotiations in Thuringia , in which Merkel ’ s party ended up partnering with the far-right Alternative for Germany .
That ended the prospects of Merkel ’ s designated successor , Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer .
Later that same month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burst into the open , Berlin ’ s focus was on the Eastern Mediterranean and the urgent need to patch up the refugee deal with Turkey .
The biggest threat to Europe was thought to be an escalation of the crisis in Syria and a return of the migrant crisis .
On March 6 , the CDU slumped to a record low of 26 percent in the polls .
Not since the formation of the Federal Republic had the party system seemed more in flux .
It was not by accident that as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ started its latest approach to Berlin not via the chancellery but by working its connections to the Social Democrats in the German Finance Ministry .
In a desperate effort to revive the flagging political fortunes of the Social Democrats and his own chances of party leadership in 2019 , Finance Minister Olaf Scholz had become the leading German proponent of European reform , pushing ideas both for unemployment insurance and banking .
Both had been met by stony disapproval from the CDU and a nein from the chancellery .
As recently as April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronabonds but explicitly rejecting any idea of grants rather than loans from the EU to its members .
Then something shifted .
What Merkel saw in the polls was not only a remarkable surge in support for her and her party but also a shift in the center ground of German public opinion in favor of greater European solidarity .
As the full impact of the lockdowns made itself felt , it became clear that Europe was facing a truly devastating economic shock that would divide the continent—a risk made worse , once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success .
Meanwhile , the threats to Germany ’ s export-orientated economy from a European recession were all too real .
COVID-19 is the right kind of crisis for Merkel .
As is well known , Merkel is not a conviction politician when it comes to Europe , in the sense that her great Christian Democratic predecessors—Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl—were .
But that is in part because Merkel is more forward- than backward-looking .
Her reference points are not World War II and the Cold War but the longer and broader history @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this challenge that the Europeans need each other .
It was entirely typical that in the climactic press conference of May 18 , in which Macron and Merkel committed themselves to their joint approach , Merkel made the point that COVID-19 was the kind of crisis that demonstrated the obsolescence of the nation-state .
“ Europe must act together , ” she said .
“ The nation-state alone has no future.
” At the time , this was greeted with puzzlement .
Had not Germany ’ s own comparative success in dealing with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ?
Did the comparison with the United States not drive that point home ?
But Merkel ’ s standard is not basic competence .
She is thinking about the bigger , more strategic question of the German economy and how such public health crises can be managed in the future , through joint surveillance , countermeasures , and vaccine development .
She is holding fast to the basic common sense of the era of globalization not as an act of faith or idealistic commitment but as a realism .
COVID-19 is one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a complex , multilateral response .
On that stage , European cooperation is clearly more urgent than ever .
And that is what the differential impact of the crisis in Europe put in question .
It was when the problem was framed in those terms , precisely not as a rerun of the eurozone crisis but as a new challenge requiring new solutions , that Merkel grasped the nettle .
Defining the problem in these terms freed the conversation .
But it also defined the limits of the new deal .
The COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the era of the eurozone crisis .
It does not even mention them .
The discussions in July centered entirely on new money to be raised by the EU .
The old debts that burden the public accounts of Italy , Spain , and France were not part of the conversation .
Nor were the giant new debts that they are loading onto their national balance sheets this year and next to meet the COVID-19 crisis .
For now , the fiscal rules of the eurozone are in abeyance .
But what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Council was a new control mechanism , a process through which the European nations review and criticize each other ’ s use of the common funds .
As skeptics have observed , this pushes conflict off into the future .
In academic discourse about the EU , the old mantras of functionalism are now shadowed by what is called postfunctionalism—or might better be termed dysfunctionalism .
The fear is that the grand bargain of July may turn out to have created an arena for bitter nationalist posturing in which the Dutch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Southern Europeans respond by naming and shaming Dutch tax havens .
Meanwhile , the economic damage is huge .
Paying for workers to be put on short-time is no doubt the best response to the kind of shock that Europe has suffered .
But it is far from obvious that it can be sustained .
Particularly in Spain , the epicenter of the eurozone unemployment crisis , the rate of joblessness is rising ominously .
Because of the limited scope of the July deal that could be agreed with the fiscal conservatives and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the immediate fiscal response will continue to weigh on the budgets of all European nation-states .
This means that the future of Europe continues to hinge on three questions .
First , can Europe achieve not just a recovery from the COVID-19 shock but a return to the kind of growth that it experienced before 2008 ?
In particular , can something be done to raise Italy ’ s growth rate , or at least to offer its young people a future , perhaps in the form of assistance for education and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.K. labor market is less hospitable ?
This will require support for education and training and additional investment in housing to accommodate further growth in the hot spots of the pan-European economy .
Before the COVID-19 crisis hit , escalating rents in Germany ’ s boomtowns were one of the country ’ s hottest political issues .
Second , will the conservative forces that have been held at bay in 2020 return dogmatically to imposing a hard and fast fiscal corset across Europe ?
Keen-eyed observers of the Greek situation , like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out that even in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis , the Eurogroup was envisioning Greece returning to a primary budget surplus by 2021 .
If this were to be implemented in Greece , let alone across the eurozone more generally , it would require a disastrous scale of austerity .
For Brussels to offset a fiscal crunch on that scale would require spending far beyond the sums agreed in July .
The question is whether , as Merkel leaves the stage , there will be a resurgence of the right-wing in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weight to the lightweight coalition of fiscal conservatives currently headed by the Netherlands and Austria .
Finally , there is the ECB .
Given the debt levels that will be accumulated by Italy in the course of the next 12 months , Europe ’ s central bank remains pivotal .
Since March , the reason that Europe ’ s bond markets have been calm is the ECB .
Without its bond purchases , the unsteady progress of the talks would have unleashed chaos , as it did during the eurozone crisis after 2010 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trichet , took that off the table .
That was a political decision .
In light of the surging deficits , the ECB will have a crucial role in warehousing public debt and keeping interest rates low .
Here , too , politics matters .
Even at the height of the crisis in March , there was opposition on the ECB Governing Council to Lagarde ’ s supportive policy .
If that criticism were to become strong enough to put the ECB ’ s commitment in question , both markets and the European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escalation of financial tension .
Growth , fiscal policy , the ECB—this trio of issues was at the heart of European politics when the year began .
The difference is that , in the meantime , the Anthropocene has revealed its fangs ; more than 130,000 people in Europe have died , many of them unnecessarily ; and the continent ’ s fiscal and economic situation is far worse .
It was this stark reality that drove Europe ’ s recovery package across the finish line .
That should not be said lightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both deeply uncomfortable facts and profound internal divisions is a very considerable achievement , one of which the United States has so far proved conspicuously incapable .
There is , however , no room for European complacency .
As far as COVID-19 is concerned , this may be the end of the beginning .
But there is very rough water ahead .
To regard the July compromise as anything more than a preliminary answer to the crisis would be a betrayal of the realism that makes the deal so remarkable .

This summer, Europe is basking in a sense of accomplishment. On July 21, after protracted labor, the European Union announced the birth of a historic recovery package to the tune of 750 billion euros ($880 billion). It’s not only that this is a lot of money. For the first time, a considerable sum will be financed through large-scale borrowing by the EU itself. Once again Europe has managed to turn a crisis into the spur for major institutional change.
This summer, Europe is basking in a sense of accomplishment. On July 21, after protracted labor, the European Union announced the birth of a historic recovery package to the tune of 750 billion euros ($880 billion). It’s not only that this is a lot of money. For the first time, a considerable sum will be financed through large-scale borrowing by the EU itself. Once again Europe has managed to turn a crisis into the spur for major institutional change.
With the troubled last decade of the eurozone in mind, it is tempting to view these changes as long-overdue updates of Europe’s incomplete union. That is both true and reassuring in confirming that, once again, Europe “got there” in the end. But by the same token, this complacent narrative tends to diminish the scale of Europe’s problems and the novelty of the crisis we face in 2020. The speed and scale of changes forced on Europe since this spring ought to give one pause for thought. To move Europe this far this fast takes an almighty shock. Even with this latest package, it is far from obvious that Europe is sufficiently equipped to meet the challenges ahead.
To appreciate the sense of relief in Europe this summer, it is worth recalling how unlikely this outcome seemed only a few months ago—and how serious a disaster COVID-19 has been for the continent. In terms of national excess mortality, only Ecuador and Peru exceed the levels of mortality recorded in Spain, Italy, and Belgium. We talk a lot about America’s mishandling of the crisis. But in terms of mortality, only New York and New Jersey are in the same league as Europe’s hot spots. As of July, recalcitrant red states like Texas, Florida, and Georgia aren’t even close.
The lockdowns that stopped the virus in Europe have had a devastating economic impact. Again, the American habit of dramatizing data by means of annualizing rates of change disguises the fact that economic implosion in Europe has been every bit as bad, if not worse. The U.S. economy fell 9.5 percent in the second quarter of 2020. Germany’s contracted by 10 percent. In Spain, the collapse was twice as bad, at 18.5 percent. (If Spain reported its data in the American style, it would be down 65 percent on the year.)
On top of the virus and the economic catastrophe, in May it looked as though everything was going wrong in political terms as well. As the crisis hit hard in late February, the Europeans, with France and Germany in the lead, resorted to national measures, shutting off the export of personal protective equipment and closing down borders. Italy’s appeals for aid were met with stony silence, and Brussels lacked the powers to push through a more cooperative approach. On March 12, Christine Lagarde, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), announced that Italy’s spreads were not the business of the European bank, sending interest rates on Italian debt to new highs. A proposal from a coalition of heavyweight governments led by France for joint borrowing in the form of “coronabonds” was unceremoniously shot down by Berlin. Then a ruling by the German Constitutional Court put in question the legal basis for the ECB’s bond market purchases. Perhaps unsurprisingly, public opinion, especially in hard-hit Spain and Italy, was swinging against Europe.
It was a disillusioning shock. Since the start of the year, Ursula von der Leyen’s new European Commission had been doing its best to encourage deeper integration with the mood music of a Green New Deal. Now COVID-19 was reopening old wounds, reminding Europeans that since the end of the eurozone crisis in 2012, they had made frustratingly little progress on the key issues of structural reform, notably on the banking union and the capacity for a more proactive fiscal policy. By early April, the sense of crisis was acute. Not for nothing, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke of Europe facing a “moment of truth.”
This being Europe, that “moment” turned into a protracted three-month battle. But the results, in terms of responding to the pandemic in public health, political, and economic terms, are impressive, certainly by contrast with anywhere in the world outside of East Asia.
With regard to the virus, the Europeans have managed to do what the United States has failed to do. They have not just damped down the hot spots, as New York has done. The EU has managed to prevent a massive spillover to member states, for instance in Eastern Europe, that were largely spared the first wave. This made possible a cautious return to a “new normality.”
Furthermore, though their economies have taken a huge hit, European countries have used short-time working schemes to keep unemployment levels far below the extraordinary levels seen in the United States, at least for now. And rather than escalating the political tensions, again by contrast with the United States, they have been turned in a positive direction.
With the connivance of the German government and even the Bundesbank, the challenge to the ECB by Germany’s Constitutional Court was smothered. In May, France and Germany sidestepped the coronabonds impasse and threw their weight behind the proposal that would become the July 21 deal: to raise money directly via the EU’s own budget; fund that budget with debts issued by the EU itself rather than member states; and distribute a large share of the funds to the most distressed countries in the form of grants, rather than loans, so that their already heavy debt burdens do not grow.
It was never going to be an easy deal to sell to the coalition of fiscal conservatives led by the Dutch. The negotiations were extraordinarily protracted and fraught. They were not always dignified. There was media gamesmanship. Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are said to have lost their tempers on more than one occasion. But no one quit the marathon meeting. A deal was done. This, the EU spin tells us, is what adult politics looks like.
In the process, the more conservative voices of Northern Europe extracted serious concessions. Unfortunately, those came at the expense of some of the more progressive and innovative budget elements, including spending on joint efforts in the areas of health care and green investment. Thankfully, the package is up for debate in the European Parliament, which is, step by step, asserting leverage over Europe’s politics. Earlier in the crisis, the Parliament favored a far more expansive plan, and hopefully it will make adjustments to the July compromise.
This is how the standard Europe storyline goes. Europe writes commitments to solidarity and cooperation that it cannot cash. It comes up hard against reality. It responds by “falling forward” and deepening its institutional commitments. This so-called “functionalism” is the homegrown ideology of the EU. It has served Brussels well. And in short order, 2020 will no doubt be inscribed in the long list of crises through which Europe has developed.
As an ideology to live by, the EU’s functionalism is both comforting and oddly disempowering. After all, needing a fix is one thing; developing and agreeing on a solution in a timely fashion is quite another. To assume that the former necessarily leads to the latter is to take a remarkable sanguine view of history that tends to underestimates the degree of risk and the need for agency.
This summer, there was certainly nothing inevitable about the way the deal was done. It did not seem likely. Credit goes to the European Commission for raising the stakes, upping the original suggestion by Merkel and Macron to an ask of 750 billion euros, on top of the regular 1.1 trillion euro ($1.3 trillion) multiyear budget. (It was the Commission’s officials who dug up the legal precedent that would allow the EU to justify massive borrowing.) Among national governments, one has to admire the Spanish and Italians, who began the long march toward a constructive European response back in March and suffered through the demeaning objections of Northern Europeans without walking away. The best that can be said for the Dutch and the Austrians is that they gave way in the end. Perhaps the shameless defense of the narrowest conception of national interest by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz will serve some useful purpose in dampening criticism from their domestic populists.
But in the last instance, it is clear that what held the negotiations together was the weight of the Franco-German alliance. And the clear-headed and dauntless advocates of that partnership are the French. Since he assumed the French presidency in 2017, in the wake of the disastrous refugee crisis that had rocked Europe in 2015-2016, Macron has been appealing to Berlin for cooperation. For three long years, Merkel denied Macron the strategic alliance that he craved. That hurt. And in the fall of 2019, there were signs of increasing impatience in Paris, with Macron making unilateral moves toward Moscow. What changed in 2020 was that Merkel came around.
What motivated the shift?
It is true, of course, that Merkel has announced her retirement. She does not face reelection. But that was true already last year, when she showed no inclination to lead the way on Europe.
Since the disastrously inconclusive Bundestag election of 2017, Merkel’s so-called grand coalition had been on a fragile footing, with both partners losing public support. It takes an effort to remember now, but in February, as COVID-19 was silently spreading in Europe, the main news in Germany was the crisis in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) unleashed by the coalition negotiations in Thuringia, in which Merkel’s party ended up partnering with the far-right Alternative for Germany. That ended the prospects of Merkel’s designated successor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Later that same month, as the outbreak in Italy had already burst into the open, Berlin’s focus was on the Eastern Mediterranean and the urgent need to patch up the refugee deal with Turkey. The biggest threat to Europe was thought to be an escalation of the crisis in Syria and a return of the migrant crisis. On March 6, the CDU slumped to a record low of 26 percent in the polls. Not since the formation of the Federal Republic had the party system seemed more in flux.
It was not by accident that as the crisis deepened, the French government started its latest approach to Berlin not via the chancellery but by working its connections to the Social Democrats in the German Finance Ministry. In a desperate effort to revive the flagging political fortunes of the Social Democrats and his own chances of party leadership in 2019, Finance Minister Olaf Scholz had become the leading German proponent of European reform, pushing ideas both for unemployment insurance and banking. Both had been met by stony disapproval from the CDU and a nein from the chancellery.
As recently as April, Merkel was not just stonewalling on coronabonds but explicitly rejecting any idea of grants rather than loans from the EU to its members. Then something shifted. What Merkel saw in the polls was not only a remarkable surge in support for her and her party but also a shift in the center ground of German public opinion in favor of greater European solidarity. As the full impact of the lockdowns made itself felt, it became clear that Europe was facing a truly devastating economic shock that would divide the continent—a risk made worse, once again, by Germany’s relative success. Meanwhile, the threats to Germany’s export-orientated economy from a European recession were all too real.
COVID-19 is the right kind of crisis for Merkel. As is well known, Merkel is not a conviction politician when it comes to Europe, in the sense that her great Christian Democratic predecessors—Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl—were. But that is in part because Merkel is more forward- than backward-looking. Her reference points are not World War II and the Cold War but the longer and broader history of globalization. It is to meet this challenge that the Europeans need each other. It was entirely typical that in the climactic press conference of May 18, in which Macron and Merkel committed themselves to their joint approach, Merkel made the point that COVID-19 was the kind of crisis that demonstrated the obsolescence of the nation-state. “Europe must act together,” she said. “The nation-state alone has no future.”
At the time, this was greeted with puzzlement. Had not Germany’s own comparative success in dealing with COVID-19 demonstrated the importance of competent national government? Did the comparison with the United States not drive that point home?
But Merkel’s standard is not basic competence. She is thinking about the bigger, more strategic question of the German economy and how such public health crises can be managed in the future, through joint surveillance, countermeasures, and vaccine development. She is holding fast to the basic common sense of the era of globalization not as an act of faith or idealistic commitment but as a realism. COVID-19 is one of a range of challenges that demand a complex, multilateral response. On that stage, European cooperation is clearly more urgent than ever. And that is what the differential impact of the crisis in Europe put in question.
It was when the problem was framed in those terms, precisely not as a rerun of the eurozone crisis but as a new challenge requiring new solutions, that Merkel grasped the nettle.
Defining the problem in these terms freed the conversation. But it also defined the limits of the new deal. The COVID-19 fix does not resolve the legacy issues of the era of the eurozone crisis. It does not even mention them.
The discussions in July centered entirely on new money to be raised by the EU. The old debts that burden the public accounts of Italy, Spain, and France were not part of the conversation. Nor were the giant new debts that they are loading onto their national balance sheets this year and next to meet the COVID-19 crisis. For now, the fiscal rules of the eurozone are in abeyance. But what was agreed in the laborious discussions of the European Council was a new control mechanism, a process through which the European nations review and criticize each other’s use of the common funds. As skeptics have observed, this pushes conflict off into the future. In academic discourse about the EU, the old mantras of functionalism are now shadowed by what is called postfunctionalism—or might better be termed dysfunctionalism. The fear is that the grand bargain of July may turn out to have created an arena for bitter nationalist posturing in which the Dutch criticize the Italians and Spaniards and the Southern Europeans respond by naming and shaming Dutch tax havens.
And there is every reason to think conflict will, indeed, arise in the future. Europe has undeniably enjoyed a few good months. But it is far from being out of the woods. Controlling the virus remains a huge challenge. It is far from obvious that it will be possible to get through the rest of the summer and into the fall flu season without further draconian measures.
Meanwhile, the economic damage is huge. Paying for workers to be put on short-time is no doubt the best response to the kind of shock that Europe has suffered. But it is far from obvious that it can be sustained. Particularly in Spain, the epicenter of the eurozone unemployment crisis, the rate of joblessness is rising ominously. Because of the limited scope of the July deal that could be agreed with the fiscal conservatives and the inevitable delay in disbursing the funds, the immediate fiscal response will continue to weigh on the budgets of all European nation-states.
This means that the future of Europe continues to hinge on three questions. First, can Europe achieve not just a recovery from the COVID-19 shock but a return to the kind of growth that it experienced before 2008? In particular, can something be done to raise Italy’s growth rate, or at least to offer its young people a future, perhaps in the form of assistance for education and employment outside Italy, especially now that the U.K. labor market is less hospitable? This will require support for education and training and additional investment in housing to accommodate further growth in the hot spots of the pan-European economy. Before the COVID-19 crisis hit, escalating rents in Germany’s boomtowns were one of the country’s hottest political issues.
Second, will the conservative forces that have been held at bay in 2020 return dogmatically to imposing a hard and fast fiscal corset across Europe? Keen-eyed observers of the Greek situation, like ex-Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, have pointed out that even in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis, the Eurogroup was envisioning Greece returning to a primary budget surplus by 2021. If this were to be implemented in Greece, let alone across the eurozone more generally, it would require a disastrous scale of austerity. For Brussels to offset a fiscal crunch on that scale would require spending far beyond the sums agreed in July. The question is whether, as Merkel leaves the stage, there will be a resurgence of the right-wing in the CDU that would add Germany’s weight to the lightweight coalition of fiscal conservatives currently headed by the Netherlands and Austria.
Finally, there is the ECB. Given the debt levels that will be accumulated by Italy in the course of the next 12 months, Europe’s central bank remains pivotal. Since March, the reason that Europe’s bond markets have been calm is the ECB. Without its bond purchases, the unsteady progress of the talks would have unleashed chaos, as it did during the eurozone crisis after 2010. Lagarde, unlike her predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet, took that off the table. That was a political decision. In light of the surging deficits, the ECB will have a crucial role in warehousing public debt and keeping interest rates low. Here, too, politics matters. Even at the height of the crisis in March, there was opposition on the ECB Governing Council to Lagarde’s supportive policy. If that criticism were to become strong enough to put the ECB’s commitment in question, both markets and the European public would have reason to fear an escalation of financial tension.
Growth, fiscal policy, the ECB—this trio of issues was at the heart of European politics when the year began. The difference is that, in the meantime, the Anthropocene has revealed its fangs; more than 130,000 people in Europe have died, many of them unnecessarily; and the continent’s fiscal and economic situation is far worse.
It was this stark reality that drove Europe’s recovery package across the finish line. That should not be said lightly. Acting constructively in the face of both deeply uncomfortable facts and profound internal divisions is a very considerable achievement, one of which the United States has so far proved conspicuously incapable. There is, however, no room for European complacency. As far as COVID-19 is concerned, this may be the end of the beginning. But there is very rough water ahead. To regard the July compromise as anything more than a preliminary answer to the crisis would be a betrayal of the realism that makes the deal so remarkable.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Document of the Week: U.S. Pushes Doomed Iran Resolution at U.N.

Document of the Week : U.S. Pushes Doomed Iran Resolution at U.N. A day after the United States ’ Iran envoy , Brian Hook , announced his resignation , throwing Washington ’ s Iran policy into disarray , the Trump administration plans to forge ahead with a doomed diplomatic campaign to adopt a U.N. resolution that seeks to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran scheduled to expire in October .
The draft resolution—which has not been made public yet and which we are posting here as our Document of the Week—is a classic piece of Trumpian diplomacy .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legal obligations on countries to confront and seize vessels carrying Iranian cargo .
It is punitive , looking to subject multiple Iranian individuals and entities , including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps , to an asset freeze and travel ban .
And it is expected to secure little , if any , support from key Europeans allies , who feel the initiative would undercut the terms of the landmark 2015 Iran nuclear deal , which pledged to lift the embargo if Iran agreed to a series of verifiable steps to limit its nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to formally table the resolution on Monday , with plans to put it to a vote on Tuesday , according to U.N.-based diplomats .
China and Russia have made clear they would veto the U.S. resolution .
But they may not have to .
Washington lacks the minimum nine votes it needs for a resolution to be adopted in the Security Council .
During his tenure , Hook asserted that if the U.S. resolution failed , the administration would pursue another approach to preserving the U.N. arms embargo .
Under the terms of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , any one of the participants in the nuclear pact—Britain , China , France , Germany , Russia , the United States , Iran , or the European Union—has the right to invoke a snapback provision , which would reimpose a broad range of sanctions , including the arms embargo , if they determine that another party has not met its obligations .
China and Russia have made it clear they believe the United States has no legal standing to invoke the snapback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018 .
The three European signatories—Britain , France , and Germany—issued a statement in June that they would not support a U.S. effort to reimpose sanctions , saying that such a decision “ would be incompatible with our current efforts to preserve the JCPOA.
” “ We firmly believe that any unilateral attempt to trigger UN Sanctions snapback would have serious adverse consequences in the [ U.N. Security Council ] , ” they stated .
The Europeans intend to keep a unilateral European arms embargo in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would like to begin negotiations with China , Iran , Russia , the United States , and other signatories of the nuclear deal aimed at containing Iran ’ s arms trade , but they believe that a decision to extend the U.N. arms embargo would run contrary to their pledge to lift it under the nuclear pact .
The State Department argues that the United States—which is named as a participant in the nuclear deal in a U.N. Security Council resolution that remains in force—has legal standing to invoke the snapback provision , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accord two years ago .
Hook ’ s replacement , Elliott Abrams , who was convicted of lying to Congress in 1991 about the Iran-Contra affair and was later pardoned by then-President George H.W .
Bush , has not said yet whether he will follow the Hook playbook .
But it is becoming abundantly clear that the Trump administration is unlikely to meet its ostensible goal of renegotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran before the November presidential election .
That won ’ t be Abrams ’ s only festering sore : He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. special representative for Venezuela , where the government has outlasted Trump administration efforts to install an opposition lawmaker , Juan Guaidó , as president .

A day after the United States’ Iran envoy, Brian Hook, announced his resignation, throwing Washington’s Iran policy into disarray, the Trump administration plans to forge ahead with a doomed diplomatic campaign to adopt a U.N. resolution that seeks to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran scheduled to expire in October.
A day after the United States’ Iran envoy, Brian Hook, announced his resignation, throwing Washington’s Iran policy into disarray, the Trump administration plans to forge ahead with a doomed diplomatic campaign to adopt a U.N. resolution that seeks to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran scheduled to expire in October.
The draft resolution—which has not been made public yet and which we are posting here as our Document of the Week—is a classic piece of Trumpian diplomacy. It is bold, aiming to impose sweeping legal obligations on countries to confront and seize vessels carrying Iranian cargo. It is punitive, looking to subject multiple Iranian individuals and entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to an asset freeze and travel ban. And it is expected to secure little, if any, support from key Europeans allies, who feel the initiative would undercut the terms of the landmark 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which pledged to lift the embargo if Iran agreed to a series of verifiable steps to limit its nuclear program.
The United States is expected to formally table the resolution on Monday, with plans to put it to a vote on Tuesday, according to U.N.-based diplomats. China and Russia have made clear they would veto the U.S. resolution. But they may not have to. Washington lacks the minimum nine votes it needs for a resolution to be adopted in the Security Council.
During his tenure, Hook asserted that if the U.S. resolution failed, the administration would pursue another approach to preserving the U.N. arms embargo. Under the terms of the Iran nuclear pact, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), any one of the participants in the nuclear pact—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Iran, or the European Union—has the right to invoke a snapback provision, which would reimpose a broad range of sanctions, including the arms embargo, if they determine that another party has not met its obligations.
China and Russia have made it clear they believe the United States has no legal standing to invoke the snapback provision, as President Donald Trump formally withdrew from the nuclear deal in May 2018. The three European signatories—Britain, France, and Germany—issued a statement in June that they would not support a U.S. effort to reimpose sanctions, saying that such a decision “would be incompatible with our current efforts to preserve the JCPOA.”
“We firmly believe that any unilateral attempt to trigger UN Sanctions snapback would have serious adverse consequences in the [U.N. Security Council],” they stated. The Europeans intend to keep a unilateral European arms embargo in place at least until 2023. They would like to begin negotiations with China, Iran, Russia, the United States, and other signatories of the nuclear deal aimed at containing Iran’s arms trade, but they believe that a decision to extend the U.N. arms embargo would run contrary to their pledge to lift it under the nuclear pact.
The State Department argues that the United States—which is named as a participant in the nuclear deal in a U.N. Security Council resolution that remains in force—has legal standing to invoke the snapback provision, even though it pulled out of the accord two years ago.
Hook’s replacement, Elliott Abrams, who was convicted of lying to Congress in 1991 about the Iran-Contra affair and was later pardoned by then-President George H.W. Bush, has not said yet whether he will follow the Hook playbook.
But it is becoming abundantly clear that the Trump administration is unlikely to meet its ostensible goal of renegotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran before the November presidential election. That won’t be Abrams’s only festering sore: He’ll continue in his role as U.S. special representative for Venezuela, where the government has outlasted Trump administration efforts to install an opposition lawmaker, Juan Guaidó, as president.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--The Rajapaksas Win in a Landslide in Sri Lanka

The Rajapaksas Win in a Landslide in Sri Lanka Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : The Rajapaksa family cements its power with a landslide victory in Sri Lanka , a Saudi dissident files a lawsuit against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , and scientists in Rwanda identify a new strain of drug-resistant malaria .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parliamentary allies , the SLPP is expected to easily secure the two-thirds majority needed to repeal a 2015 amendment to the constitution that diluted the power of the presidency and strengthened the roles of the parliament and prime minister .
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president last November and appointed his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa , who served as president from 2005 to 2015 , as prime minister .
During Mahinda ’ s presidency , Gotabaya served as defense minister , overseeing the last years of Sri Lanka ’ s 25-year civil war .
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ successor government accused the family of involvement in massive corruption , including stashing as much as $ 18 billion overseas .
The Rajapaksas ’ role in ending the conflict in 2009 , when the army regained full control of the island and killed the leader of the Tamil Tigers , brought the brothers significant support among the Sinhalese Buddhist majority .
Gotabaya , a U.S. citizen , has been accused in a California court of committing crimes against humanity during the brutal final stages of the war .
“ Alarming trend.
” Last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights organizations , including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch , signed a joint letter calling on the Sri Lankan government to end targeted arrests and intimidation of lawyers , human rights defenders , and activists .
The letter warned of an “ alarming trend towards the militarization of the state , ” as retired military officers have taken on senior roles previously held by civilians .
Institutions such as the NGO Secretariat have been brought under the control of the Defense Ministry .
Debt-trap diplomacy .
During the Rajapaksas ’ previous tenure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from China and handed over control of the port of Hambantota to Beijing after failing to keep up with repayments .
A drift toward China is likely to cause concern in Washington as the United States seeks to check China ’ s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific .
During the previous government , Sri Lanka became the U.S. Navy ’ s logistics hub in the Indian Ocean , but further agreements are unlikely under the Rajapaksas , the Wall Street Journal reports .
Saudi Arabia ’ s reach .
A former senior Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Salman of sending a group of agents to Canada to kill him less than two weeks after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi , according to a case filed in a U.S. federal court on Thursday .
In a detailed filing , Saad Aljabri , who is in exile in Toronto , alleges that the crown prince wants him dead because he is “ uniquely positioned to existentially threaten Defendant bin Salman ’ s standing with the U.S. Government ” and has damning insights into Mohammed bin Salman ’ s rise to power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a former senior Saudi official has publicly accused Mohammed bin Salman of trying to violently suppress his critics , according to the New York Times .
Aljabri also said his two adult children were arrested in Riyadh in March in a bid to lure him back to Saudi Arabia .
Drug-resistant malaria .
Scientists in Rwanda have identified a drug-resistant strain of the parasite that causes malaria .
Their research , published in the journal Nature this week , is the first time scientists have observed resistance to artemisinin , one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The authors of the research said resistance to the drug could pose a “ major public health threat ” in Africa .
Resistance to earlier antimalarials , such as chloroquine and pyrimethamine , is thought to have contributed to millions of additional deaths among African children in the 1980s .
Eyes over Taiwan .
The United States is in talks to sell at least four sophisticated aerial surveillance drones to Taiwan , Reuters reported Thursday .
The move will likely fuel rising tensions with China .
The SeaGuardian drones have a reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase Taiwan ’ s ability to keep tabs on Chinese activity in the region .
News of the negotiations came on the heels of Tuesday ’ s announcement that U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar will visit the island—the most senior U.S. official to do so since Washington broke off official ties with Taiwan in 1979 .
Sanctions challenge .
Last Friday , the Trump administration announced that it would sanction the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps ( XPCC ) , a Chinese paramilitary colonial organization that is a critical part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persecution of Uighurs and other Muslims .
The organization controls a substantial portion of the Xinjiang economy , and the sanctions represent a significant U.S. escalation .
Research by the analysis firm Sayari found that the XPCC is the beneficial owner of 862,600 subsidiaries in 147 countries , including in the United States and Europe , some of which were buried in ownership structures 10 steps removed from the paramilitary organization .
The findings underscore the magnitude and scope of the sanctions but also the challenge for companies around the world seeking to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the XPCC ’ s extensive reach .
The XPCC runs around 20 percent of Xinjiang ’ s economy , making the sanctions effectively a ban on any trade .
ISIS in Afghanistan .
Militants associated with the Islamic State launched an assault on a prison in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan on Sunday , leaving some 400 prisoners—many of them Islamic State and Taliban militants—unaccounted for .
Twenty-nine people were killed in the 20-hour siege , including security guards , civilians , and prisoners .
All the assailants were reportedly killed .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pulled off by Islamic State affiliates in Afghanistan , where the group is known for its attacks on so-called soft targets , such as the assault on a wedding in Kabul last year that killed 63 people and wounded nearly 200 .
Kashmir one year on .
This week marked the one-year anniversary of India ’ s decision to end the semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir—its only Muslim-majority state—by revoking Article 370 of the Indian Constitution .
Following the move , Kashmir ’ s internet was shut down for several months , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployed to what was already thought to be one of the most militarized areas in the world .
One year on , Adil Amin Akhoon and Sharafat Ali report for Foreign Policy from Srinagar , the region ’ s largest city , where peace remains a distant hope .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: The Rajapaksa family cements its power with a landslide victory in Sri Lanka, a Saudi dissident files a lawsuit against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and scientists in Rwanda identify a new strain of drug-resistant malaria.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Fridays, please sign up here.
Sri Lanka’s Elections Boost Rajapaksas’ Power This week’s parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka have strengthened the power of the Rajapaksa family, handing them a supermajority to change the constitution, as rights groups warn that human rights in the country are in critical danger. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party won 145 out of 225 seats in the parliament in results announced Friday.
With the support of its parliamentary allies, the SLPP is expected to easily secure the two-thirds majority needed to repeal a 2015 amendment to the constitution that diluted the power of the presidency and strengthened the roles of the parliament and prime minister. Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president last November and appointed his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, who served as president from 2005 to 2015, as prime minister.
During Mahinda’s presidency, Gotabaya served as defense minister, overseeing the last years of Sri Lanka’s 25-year civil war. After their presidential loss in 2015, the successor government accused the family of involvement in massive corruption, including stashing as much as $18 billion overseas. The Rajapaksas’ role in ending the conflict in 2009, when the army regained full control of the island and killed the leader of the Tamil Tigers, brought the brothers significant support among the Sinhalese Buddhist majority.
Gotabaya, a U.S. citizen, has been accused in a California court of committing crimes against humanity during the brutal final stages of the war.
“Alarming trend.” Last week, almost a dozen international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, signed a joint letter calling on the Sri Lankan government to end targeted arrests and intimidation of lawyers, human rights defenders, and activists. The letter warned of an “alarming trend towards the militarization of the state,” as retired military officers have taken on senior roles previously held by civilians. Institutions such as the NGO Secretariat have been brought under the control of the Defense Ministry.
Debt-trap diplomacy. During the Rajapaksas’ previous tenure, Sri Lanka borrowed billions of dollars from China and handed over control of the port of Hambantota to Beijing after failing to keep up with repayments. A drift toward China is likely to cause concern in Washington as the United States seeks to check China’s increasing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
During the previous government, Sri Lanka became the U.S. Navy’s logistics hub in the Indian Ocean, but further agreements are unlikely under the Rajapaksas, the Wall Street Journal reports.
What We’re Following
Saudi Arabia’s reach. A former senior Saudi intelligence official accused Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of sending a group of agents to Canada to kill him less than two weeks after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, according to a case filed in a U.S. federal court on Thursday. In a detailed filing, Saad Aljabri, who is in exile in Toronto, alleges that the crown prince wants him dead because he is “uniquely positioned to existentially threaten Defendant bin Salman’s standing with the U.S. Government” and has damning insights into Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power.
The case marks the first time that a former senior Saudi official has publicly accused Mohammed bin Salman of trying to violently suppress his critics, according to the New York Times. Aljabri also said his two adult children were arrested in Riyadh in March in a bid to lure him back to Saudi Arabia.
Drug-resistant malaria. Scientists in Rwanda have identified a drug-resistant strain of the parasite that causes malaria. Their research, published in the journal Nature this week, is the first time scientists have observed resistance to artemisinin, one of the most commonly used drugs against the disease. The authors of the research said resistance to the drug could pose a “major public health threat” in Africa. Resistance to earlier antimalarials, such as chloroquine and pyrimethamine, is thought to have contributed to millions of additional deaths among African children in the 1980s.
Eyes over Taiwan. The United States is in talks to sell at least four sophisticated aerial surveillance drones to Taiwan, Reuters reported Thursday. The move will likely fuel rising tensions with China. The SeaGuardian drones have a reach of 6,000 nautical miles and could dramatically increase Taiwan’s ability to keep tabs on Chinese activity in the region. News of the negotiations came on the heels of Tuesday’s announcement that U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar will visit the island—the most senior U.S. official to do so since Washington broke off official ties with Taiwan in 1979.
Sanctions challenge. Last Friday, the Trump administration announced that it would sanction the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a Chinese paramilitary colonial organization that is a critical part of Beijing’s mass incarceration and persecution of Uighurs and other Muslims. The organization controls a substantial portion of the Xinjiang economy, and the sanctions represent a significant U.S. escalation. Research by the analysis firm Sayari found that the XPCC is the beneficial owner of 862,600 subsidiaries in 147 countries, including in the United States and Europe, some of which were buried in ownership structures 10 steps removed from the paramilitary organization.
The findings underscore the magnitude and scope of the sanctions but also the challenge for companies around the world seeking to figure out whether their supply chains intersect with the XPCC’s extensive reach. The XPCC runs around 20 percent of Xinjiang’s economy, making the sanctions effectively a ban on any trade.
Keep an Eye On
ISIS in Afghanistan. Militants associated with the Islamic State launched an assault on a prison in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan on Sunday, leaving some 400 prisoners—many of them Islamic State and Taliban militants—unaccounted for. Twenty-nine people were killed in the 20-hour siege, including security guards, civilians, and prisoners. All the assailants were reportedly killed. The attack was one of the most complicated pulled off by Islamic State affiliates in Afghanistan, where the group is known for its attacks on so-called soft targets, such as the assault on a wedding in Kabul last year that killed 63 people and wounded nearly 200.
Kashmir one year on. This week marked the one-year anniversary of India’s decision to end the semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir—its only Muslim-majority state—by revoking Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Following the move, Kashmir’s internet was shut down for several months, and tens of thousands of troops were deployed to what was already thought to be one of the most militarized areas in the world. One year on, Adil Amin Akhoon and Sharafat Ali report for Foreign Policy from Srinagar, the region’s largest city, where peace remains a distant hope.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Europe Must Stand Up for Belarus

Europe Must Stand Up for Belarus

Europe Must Stand Up for Belarus Russia watchers are fond of talking of an “ August surprise , ” with the month ’ s rich pedigree of shocks like the 2008 Georgian War .
This year that surprise could easily come from Minsk , the capital of Belarus , where veteran authoritarian President Aleksandr Lukashenko , battered by his mishandling of the pandemic that has caused almost 70,000 cases in a country of fewer than 10 million people , has been rocked by mass protests and a sudden surge in opposition confidence .
The elections this week could just as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , fizzle out , or even trigger a Russian power play—at which the arrest of so-called Russian mercenaries in Minsk might hint .
Seizing on the concept of such Kremlin-deployed “ little green men ” to paint himself as the savior of Belarusian independence , Lukashenko has warned that “ an attempt to organize a massacre in the center of Minsk is already obvious.
” But amid this crisis , Western foreign policy is missing in action .
The failure to act decisively in Belarus , in fact , clearly shows the decline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington , which seemed on the verge of offering material help to the Lukashenko regime to distance itself from Russia when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited in February , is now nowhere to be seen .
The United States previously had a long-term strategy , however flawed , to support the post-Soviet states by proactively seeking to distance them from Russia : Under Trump , this is no longer the case .
The Minsk mass protests could not have come at a worse time for the West .
London , Paris , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and running distinct and barely coordinated Russia policies—from Macron ’ s engagement strategy and Merkel ’ s silence to Johnson ’ s new Magnitsky sanctions and Trump ’ s regular calls with Vladimir Putin .
The next six months could get much worse : A protracted crisis following a disputed election in the United States is a distinct possibility .
It is time for the European democracies to take responsibility and provide their own strategic leadership .
That ’ s not the case right now .
In Brussels , the Belarus crisis exposes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the limits of Europe ’ s neighborhood policy and the inability of its flagship Eastern Partnership to make much of a difference in its more entrenched authoritarian neighbors .
The EU ’ s great tools , trade and integration offers , have proved extremely weak when it comes to states like Belarus and Azerbaijan that have shown no interest in them , while the EU has lacked the strategic will to use energy or security diplomacy to make up for it .
And in London , the crisis reveals a lack of strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Russian aggression .
It ’ s a sharp contrast with the days of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 when the United Kingdom and the United States pledged not only to affirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine , Kazakhstan , and Belarus , but also to provide them with security assurances in the event of it coming under threat .
But Belarus seems to be making barely any impact in London , despite Britain ’ s major investments in European security , NATO , and recent support for Kyiv .
But the mounting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reboot a format that will serve them well in the months to come : the E-3 group of Britain , France , and Germany .
Britain ’ s signature on the Budapest Memorandum provides a firm ground on which to act , but Britain can ’ t act alone .
London , Paris , and Berlin should put aside their differences and commit to a new and mutually reinforcing approach to foreign policy .
Belarus is a European crisis and key capitals need to treat it as such .
The E-3 is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe ’ s borderlands for two reasons .
Firstly , as the French presidency has frequently pointed out , the EU ’ s formal foreign-policy infrastructure is subject to national veto and bold moves can instantly be vetoed by an actor like Hungary .
Meanwhile , Boris Johnson ’ s Global Britain lacks the weight on its own and after Brexit needs to cooperate with France and Germany to shape world affairs .
Contrary to expectations , Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron have been impressed by each other and have a good working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind them .
They should propose greater use of the E-3 format , starting with the Belarus crisis , reinforced by Josep Borrell , the EU ’ s High Representative for Foreign Affairs , to represent the other member states .
That way , statements will be released not by the E-3 alone , but the E-3 and whoever Borell can gather to sign .
Foreign-policy coordination should be stepped up .
Inspired by the “ Quad ” of the U.K. , United States , France , and Germany in the Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and ambassadorial coordination should be established .
What does this mean in practice ?
Firstly , the grouping should begin issuing clear and firm statements daily on the imminent election , making clear their support for free and fair elections , political prisoners , and no repression .
The grouping should establish a Belarus contact group , bringing Sweden , Poland , and the neighbor Baltic states into daily crisis coordination .
Publicly , the Europeans should learn the lessons of Ukraine and stick to a firm public script of values and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scenes , there should be no denial of the geopolitical reality .
If High Representative Borrell is serious about Brussels “ relearning the language of power , ” the mounting crisis in Minsk is the place to start by embracing Europe ’ s real strengths and limits .
To achieve its goals , the grouping should present a twin-track approach .
Toward the regime in Minsk , it should be clear that if elections were peaceful and free then it would materially support the state during a transition , and be flexible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Such elections , of course , remain unlikely .
But if delivered with a warning , a severe crackdown would terminate the dialogue between the European powers and Minsk , and Magnitsky-style sanctions on senior officials .
It would also show that London , Paris , Brussels , and Berlin are ready to impose a real cost on repression .
Toward Moscow , the grouping should be clear that it favors the same approach the West took toward the Armenia revolution in spring 2018 : It supports democracy , but will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ membership toward Belarus .
That will leave less room for Russian propaganda , with the E-3 placing its bets on the hope that Belarusian society will continue to evolve toward greater democracy .
While Europeans should be flexible , they should also be firm about the red line of Belarusian sovereignty as laid out in the Budapest Memorandum .
The grouping should make clear by a joint private communiqué from the E-3 leaders to Moscow that any dramatic erosion of Belarusian sovereignty would be met by sanctions—either a “ soft annexation ” in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the guise of the existing “ Union State ” agreement , or a hard annexation , as some analysts have suggested is a possibility .
Macron should also make clear that the Franco-Russian dialogue would be terminated by any aggression toward protesters or power grab .
Moscow ’ s policy on Belarus , and the group ’ s ability to engage Putin , will be a good test of the outreach efforts by Paris .
With mass protests in Khabarovsk worrying the Russian regime , it is reasonable that the possibility of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions might at least cause a pause for reflection .
The Europeans have nothing to lose by making things clear .
Such an initiative can start a process that a more constructive U.S. administration post-Trump can pick up .
This was the model the E-3 deployed for nuclear diplomacy with Iran under the Bush administration that then laid the groundwork for Obama ’ s diplomacy .
Europeans could create a fait accompli , putting them at the center of the administration ’ s approach to Eastern Europe come January 2021 .
Those hoping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make clear that if a conflagration erupts in Belarus , they will stand fully behind the E-3 , and that both Minsk and Moscow should view the grouping as an expression of a policy platform that it will also embrace should the Democrats win in November .
Biden should give a high-profile interview on his foreign policy toward the region and use it to lay a coordinated set of red lines with the E-3 .
Six years ago , Maidan brutally awakened Europeans to geopolitical realities .
As the EU was negotiating a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests , the fall of Yanukovych , and ensuing Russian aggression caught the EU unaware and left a frozen conflict , 10,000 deaths , and a derailed transition on Europe ’ s doors .
This time , Europeans must seize the moment and learn the lessons of Ukraine .
Distraction and denial about mounting crises is not a foreign policy .
Europe is alone until American leadership finds some new form .
Learning how to navigate these crises without Washington will require setting down what the continent ’ s democracies are and are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pig-headedness , and post-Brexit blues will only reward the authoritarians .

Russia watchers are fond of talking of an “August surprise,” with the month’s rich pedigree of shocks like the 2008 Georgian War. This year that surprise could easily come from Minsk, the capital of Belarus, where veteran authoritarian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, battered by his mishandling of the pandemic that has caused almost 70,000 cases in a country of fewer than 10 million people, has been rocked by mass protests and a sudden surge in opposition confidence.
Russia watchers are fond of talking of an “August surprise,” with the month’s rich pedigree of shocks like the 2008 Georgian War. This year that surprise could easily come from Minsk, the capital of Belarus, where veteran authoritarian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, battered by his mishandling of the pandemic that has caused almost 70,000 cases in a country of fewer than 10 million people, has been rocked by mass protests and a sudden surge in opposition confidence.
The elections this week could just as easily see the pro-democracy movement establish itself, fizzle out, or even trigger a Russian power play—at which the arrest of so-called Russian mercenaries in Minsk might hint. Seizing on the concept of such Kremlin-deployed “little green men” to paint himself as the savior of Belarusian independence, Lukashenko has warned that “an attempt to organize a massacre in the center of Minsk is already obvious.”
But amid this crisis, Western foreign policy is missing in action. The failure to act decisively in Belarus, in fact, clearly shows the decline of Western influence. A profoundly erratic Washington, which seemed on the verge of offering material help to the Lukashenko regime to distance itself from Russia when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited in February, is now nowhere to be seen. The United States previously had a long-term strategy, however flawed, to support the post-Soviet states by proactively seeking to distance them from Russia: Under Trump, this is no longer the case.
The Minsk mass protests could not have come at a worse time for the West. London, Paris, Berlin, and Washington are all distracted and running distinct and barely coordinated Russia policies—from Macron’s engagement strategy and Merkel’s silence to Johnson’s new Magnitsky sanctions and Trump’s regular calls with Vladimir Putin. The next six months could get much worse: A protracted crisis following a disputed election in the United States is a distinct possibility. It is time for the European democracies to take responsibility and provide their own strategic leadership.
That’s not the case right now. In Brussels, the Belarus crisis exposes more than a decade of denial over the limits of Europe’s neighborhood policy and the inability of its flagship Eastern Partnership to make much of a difference in its more entrenched authoritarian neighbors. The EU’s great tools, trade and integration offers, have proved extremely weak when it comes to states like Belarus and Azerbaijan that have shown no interest in them, while the EU has lacked the strategic will to use energy or security diplomacy to make up for it.
And in London, the crisis reveals a lack of strategy for handling Europe’s strategic frontiers and Russian aggression. It’s a sharp contrast with the days of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 when the United Kingdom and the United States pledged not only to affirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, but also to provide them with security assurances in the event of it coming under threat. But Belarus seems to be making barely any impact in London, despite Britain’s major investments in European security, NATO, and recent support for Kyiv.
But the mounting crisis in Belarus offers Europe an occasion to reboot a format that will serve them well in the months to come: the E-3 group of Britain, France, and Germany. Britain’s signature on the Budapest Memorandum provides a firm ground on which to act, but Britain can’t act alone. London, Paris, and Berlin should put aside their differences and commit to a new and mutually reinforcing approach to foreign policy. Belarus is a European crisis and key capitals need to treat it as such.
The E-3 is an attractive format for the crisis on Europe’s borderlands for two reasons. Firstly, as the French presidency has frequently pointed out, the EU’s formal foreign-policy infrastructure is subject to national veto and bold moves can instantly be vetoed by an actor like Hungary. Meanwhile, Boris Johnson’s Global Britain lacks the weight on its own and after Brexit needs to cooperate with France and Germany to shape world affairs.
Contrary to expectations, Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron have been impressed by each other and have a good working relationship, both eager to put Brexit behind them. They should propose greater use of the E-3 format, starting with the Belarus crisis, reinforced by Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to represent the other member states.
That way, statements will be released not by the E-3 alone, but the E-3 and whoever Borell can gather to sign. Foreign-policy coordination should be stepped up. Inspired by the “Quad” of the U.K., United States, France, and Germany in the Cold War, a rotating secretariat, working groups, and ambassadorial coordination should be established.
What does this mean in practice? Firstly, the grouping should begin issuing clear and firm statements daily on the imminent election, making clear their support for free and fair elections, political prisoners, and no repression. The grouping should establish a Belarus contact group, bringing Sweden, Poland, and the neighbor Baltic states into daily crisis coordination. Publicly, the Europeans should learn the lessons of Ukraine and stick to a firm public script of values and rule of law.
However, behind the scenes, there should be no denial of the geopolitical reality. If High Representative Borrell is serious about Brussels “relearning the language of power,” the mounting crisis in Minsk is the place to start by embracing Europe’s real strengths and limits.
To achieve its goals, the grouping should present a twin-track approach. Toward the regime in Minsk, it should be clear that if elections were peaceful and free then it would materially support the state during a transition, and be flexible to insiders wanting to assist the process. Such elections, of course, remain unlikely. But if delivered with a warning, a severe crackdown would terminate the dialogue between the European powers and Minsk, and Magnitsky-style sanctions on senior officials. It would also show that London, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin are ready to impose a real cost on repression.
Toward Moscow, the grouping should be clear that it favors the same approach the West took toward the Armenia revolution in spring 2018: It supports democracy, but will not seek to expand either NATO or EU membership toward Belarus. That will leave less room for Russian propaganda, with the E-3 placing its bets on the hope that Belarusian society will continue to evolve toward greater democracy.
While Europeans should be flexible, they should also be firm about the red line of Belarusian sovereignty as laid out in the Budapest Memorandum. The grouping should make clear by a joint private communiqué from the E-3 leaders to Moscow that any dramatic erosion of Belarusian sovereignty would be met by sanctions—either a “soft annexation” in the form of political power grab under the guise of the existing “Union State” agreement, or a hard annexation, as some analysts have suggested is a possibility. Macron should also make clear that the Franco-Russian dialogue would be terminated by any aggression toward protesters or power grab. Moscow’s policy on Belarus, and the group’s ability to engage Putin, will be a good test of the outreach efforts by Paris. With mass protests in Khabarovsk worrying the Russian regime, it is reasonable that the possibility of a power grab or aggressive crackdown triggering European sanctions might at least cause a pause for reflection. The Europeans have nothing to lose by making things clear.
Such an initiative can start a process that a more constructive U.S. administration post-Trump can pick up. This was the model the E-3 deployed for nuclear diplomacy with Iran under the Bush administration that then laid the groundwork for Obama’s diplomacy. Europeans could create a fait accompli, putting them at the center of the administration’s approach to Eastern Europe come January 2021. Those hoping to form the future Biden Administration should make clear that if a conflagration erupts in Belarus, they will stand fully behind the E-3, and that both Minsk and Moscow should view the grouping as an expression of a policy platform that it will also embrace should the Democrats win in November. Biden should give a high-profile interview on his foreign policy toward the region and use it to lay a coordinated set of red lines with the E-3.
Six years ago, Maidan brutally awakened Europeans to geopolitical realities. As the EU was negotiating a free trade agreement with Kyiv, democratic protests, the fall of Yanukovych, and ensuing Russian aggression caught the EU unaware and left a frozen conflict, 10,000 deaths, and a derailed transition on Europe’s doors. This time, Europeans must seize the moment and learn the lessons of Ukraine. Distraction and denial about mounting crises is not a foreign policy.
Europe is alone until American leadership finds some new form. Learning how to navigate these crises without Washington will require setting down what the continent’s democracies are and are not prepared to tolerate. Inattention, pig-headedness, and post-Brexit blues will only reward the authoritarians.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Jalalabad Jailbreak Highlights Resurgence of ‘Eliminated’ ISIS

JALALABAD , Afghanistan—On Aug. 2 , Atiqullah was at home enjoying the final hours of the Eid al-Adha holiday when news broke of an attack on the prison in Jalalabad , only a few miles from his house .
Gunfire and explosions echoed all night , and the armed jailbreak turned into a running gun battle that lasted 20 hours before government forces put it down .
The site of the attack was particularly worrying because the Jalalabad prison holds hundreds of Taliban fighters—and , potentially worse , fighters claiming allegiance to the Islamic State , a terrorist group that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its primary targets .
Atiqullah , a 26-year-old Afghan who declined to provide his last name , saw his photo business wrecked in the attack ; other businesses in the nearby shopping center were gutted , and residents spent days sweeping up broken glass and dreading the daunting costs of rebuilding .
But it ’ s not just locals who are in shock : Much of the country was taken aback by the brazenness of the attack , claimed by the Islamic State , a group that the Afghan government last year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the run.
” In the days since the prison assault , Afghans are wondering how a group said to be defeated has continued to wage brutal strikes , especially in Kabul , over the past year .
That includes a March attack on a Sikh temple in the capital that left 25 people dead , followed by a vicious attack in May on a maternity clinic in western Kabul run by Médecins Sans Frontières ( MSF ) that left 25 dead , including 16 mothers and two children .
MSF shuttered the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may have lost its hold on territory but not its ability to unleash terror .
“ The government is right .
They , along with U.S. forces and the Taliban , were able to take out the Daesh leadership in 2019 , ” said Rahmatullah Amiri , a Kabul-based analyst who has conducted extensive research on both the Taliban and Daesh , as the Islamic State is also known .
“ But in the span of a few months , they have been able to transform themselves into sleeper cells that can strike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s apparent ability to bounce back from blows including the recent killing of Assadullah Orakzai , the Islamic State ’ s intelligence chief in the country , as well as the capture of three top commanders in Kabul in May , underscores how hard it is to stamp out the group altogether .
“ If any other group , even the Taliban , was dealt such a massive blow , they wouldn ’ t be able to recover so soon and stage such attacks , ” Amiri said .
“ They would have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has demonstrated this level of resilience.
” For the Afghan people , the ability of the Islamic State to survive , despite concerted efforts by Kabul and its Western allies , presents another dangerous challenge .
Just as the government is inching closer to intra-Afghan talks that could pave the way for peace with the Taliban , another group is showing itself to be even more potent and dangerous .
And unlike the Taliban , who claim to be fighting a foreign occupation , very little is known about the actual goals of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Afghan government , which last year touted its seeming victory over the terrorist group , claims that the recent revival , particularly the brazen jailbreak , shows the Islamic State is getting help from other militants , especially the Taliban .
“ Daesh can ’ t hide so easily and conduct an attack of this magnitude on their own .
Something like this takes a lot of coordination and effort , ” said Javid Faisal , a spokesperson for Afghanistan ’ s National Security Council .
With the Taliban holding peace talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials in Kabul suspect they are essentially outsourcing their terrorism to other groups , including the Islamic State .
Acting Interior Minister Masoud Andarabi on Monday equated Islamic State attacks with those carried out by groups like the Haqqani network .
“ Haqani & the Taliban carry out their terrorism on a daily basis across [ Afghanistan ] & when their terrorist activities does not suit them politically they rebrand it under ISKP , ” he tweeted , a reference to the Islamic State Khorasan Province , the group ’ s Afghan branch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Provincial Council in Nangarhar , of which Jalalabad is the capital , believes Islamic State fighters are being helped by groups including the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad .
Reports indicate that at least seven of the 11 attackers involved in the assault on the prison were Indian , Pakistani , and Tajik nationals and that they could be heard speaking in Urdu , a language native to India and Pakistan .
Still , residents in Nangarhar don ’ t think the group needs outside help and believe the Islamic State has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you look at this attack , it was all planned in the city .
There were no fighters that came from the districts—they were all already here , ” said Haji Pakhtun , an elder in Shinwar , a district that was one of the group ’ s bases from 2014 to 2019 .
There are other reasons to be skeptical of coordination between the Islamic State and the Taliban .
There are repeated accounts from the districts of Khogyani , Achin , and Shinwar that the Taliban and the Islamic State have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadly battles across the country .
Amiri , the Kabul-based analyst , also sees religious disagreement between the two groups .
The Taliban have become vehemently opposed to the Salafi and Wahhabi doctrines of Islam , even going so far as to close down a Wahhabi mosque in the northern province of Samangan , as they try to steer people toward their even more austere interpretation , the Hanafi school of Islam .
The Islamic State , in contrast , is tapping into long-standing sympathy for Salafi and Wahhabi interpretations in eastern Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where the first-known Salafi group emerged in the 1980s under Soviet occupation .
The Islamic State used to lure new recruits with money—paying between $ 200 and $ 300 a month—but in recent years , its propaganda has tapped into young men ’ s religiosity in the east .
“ It ’ s ideological now , and once one person joins , others follow suit .
It becomes a fast-moving trend , ” said Haji Jan Mohammad , a Shinwari elder whose own family has taken up arms against the Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrast with the Taliban : that group ’ s perceived reliance on foreign help , whether from Pakistan—whose intelligence services for years propped up and sheltered the Taliban—Iran , or Russia .
“ When Daesh recruits young Afghans , they say very simply , ‘ The Taliban is beholden Pakistan , to Iran , to Russia .
We don ’ t care about any of them .
We just want to declare our caliphate , ’ ” Amiri said .

JALALABAD, Afghanistan—On Aug. 2, Atiqullah was at home enjoying the final hours of the Eid al-Adha holiday when news broke of an attack on the prison in Jalalabad, only a few miles from his house. Gunfire and explosions echoed all night, and the armed jailbreak turned into a running gun battle that lasted 20 hours before government forces put it down.
JALALABAD, Afghanistan—On Aug. 2, Atiqullah was at home enjoying the final hours of the Eid al-Adha holiday when news broke of an attack on the prison in Jalalabad, only a few miles from his house. Gunfire and explosions echoed all night, and the armed jailbreak turned into a running gun battle that lasted 20 hours before government forces put it down.
The site of the attack was particularly worrying because the Jalalabad prison holds hundreds of Taliban fighters—and, potentially worse, fighters claiming allegiance to the Islamic State, a terrorist group that has made this eastern Afghan city one of its primary targets.
Atiqullah, a 26-year-old Afghan who declined to provide his last name, saw his photo business wrecked in the attack; other businesses in the nearby shopping center were gutted, and residents spent days sweeping up broken glass and dreading the daunting costs of rebuilding. But it’s not just locals who are in shock: Much of the country was taken aback by the brazenness of the attack, claimed by the Islamic State, a group that the Afghan government last year said was “eliminated” and “on the run.”
In the days since the prison assault, Afghans are wondering how a group said to be defeated has continued to wage brutal strikes, especially in Kabul, over the past year. That includes a March attack on a Sikh temple in the capital that left 25 people dead, followed by a vicious attack in May on a maternity clinic in western Kabul run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) that left 25 dead, including 16 mothers and two children. MSF shuttered the clinic in June.
The Islamic State may have lost its hold on territory but not its ability to unleash terror.
“The government is right. They, along with U.S. forces and the Taliban, were able to take out the Daesh leadership in 2019,” said Rahmatullah Amiri, a Kabul-based analyst who has conducted extensive research on both the Taliban and Daesh, as the Islamic State is also known. “But in the span of a few months, they have been able to transform themselves into sleeper cells that can strike at any moment.”
The group’s apparent ability to bounce back from blows including the recent killing of Assadullah Orakzai, the Islamic State’s intelligence chief in the country, as well as the capture of three top commanders in Kabul in May, underscores how hard it is to stamp out the group altogether.
“If any other group, even the Taliban, was dealt such a massive blow, they wouldn’t be able to recover so soon and stage such attacks,” Amiri said. “They would have been done for. No other group has demonstrated this level of resilience.”
For the Afghan people, the ability of the Islamic State to survive, despite concerted efforts by Kabul and its Western allies, presents another dangerous challenge. Just as the government is inching closer to intra-Afghan talks that could pave the way for peace with the Taliban, another group is showing itself to be even more potent and dangerous. And unlike the Taliban, who claim to be fighting a foreign occupation, very little is known about the actual goals of the Islamic State in the country.
The Afghan government, which last year touted its seeming victory over the terrorist group, claims that the recent revival, particularly the brazen jailbreak, shows the Islamic State is getting help from other militants, especially the Taliban.
“Daesh can’t hide so easily and conduct an attack of this magnitude on their own. Something like this takes a lot of coordination and effort,” said Javid Faisal, a spokesperson for Afghanistan’s National Security Council. With the Taliban holding peace talks and prisoner exchanges with the government, officials in Kabul suspect they are essentially outsourcing their terrorism to other groups, including the Islamic State.
Acting Interior Minister Masoud Andarabi on Monday equated Islamic State attacks with those carried out by groups like the Haqqani network. “Haqani & the Taliban carry out their terrorism on a daily basis across [Afghanistan] & when their terrorist activities does not suit them politically they rebrand it under ISKP,” he tweeted, a reference to the Islamic State Khorasan Province, the group’s Afghan branch.
Ahmad Ali Hazrat, the head of the Provincial Council in Nangarhar, of which Jalalabad is the capital, believes Islamic State fighters are being helped by groups including the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Reports indicate that at least seven of the 11 attackers involved in the assault on the prison were Indian, Pakistani, and Tajik nationals and that they could be heard speaking in Urdu, a language native to India and Pakistan.
Still, residents in Nangarhar don’t think the group needs outside help and believe the Islamic State has put down local roots.
“If you look at this attack, it was all planned in the city. There were no fighters that came from the districts—they were all already here,” said Haji Pakhtun, an elder in Shinwar, a district that was one of the group’s bases from 2014 to 2019.
There are other reasons to be skeptical of coordination between the Islamic State and the Taliban. There are repeated accounts from the districts of Khogyani, Achin, and Shinwar that the Taliban and the Islamic State have fought each other in a series of deadly battles across the country.
Amiri, the Kabul-based analyst, also sees religious disagreement between the two groups. The Taliban have become vehemently opposed to the Salafi and Wahhabi doctrines of Islam, even going so far as to close down a Wahhabi mosque in the northern province of Samangan, as they try to steer people toward their even more austere interpretation, the Hanafi school of Islam.
The Islamic State, in contrast, is tapping into long-standing sympathy for Salafi and Wahhabi interpretations in eastern Afghanistan, especially in the province of Kunar, where the first-known Salafi group emerged in the 1980s under Soviet occupation.
The Islamic State used to lure new recruits with money—paying between $200 and $300 a month—but in recent years, its propaganda has tapped into young men’s religiosity in the east.
“It’s ideological now, and once one person joins, others follow suit. It becomes a fast-moving trend,” said Haji Jan Mohammad, a Shinwari elder whose own family has taken up arms against the Islamic State.
The Islamic State also draws another contrast with the Taliban: that group’s perceived reliance on foreign help, whether from Pakistan—whose intelligence services for years propped up and sheltered the Taliban—Iran, or Russia.
“When Daesh recruits young Afghans, they say very simply, ‘The Taliban is beholden Pakistan, to Iran, to Russia. We don’t care about any of them. We just want to declare our caliphate,’” Amiri said.