foreignpolicy--2020-08-17--Thai Protesters Test a Royal Redline

Thai Protesters Test a Royal Redline

BANGKOK— “ Over here , this is the good people , ” said one among a few dozen royalist supporters , who then gestured to the north end of the Democracy Monument memorializing Thailand ’ s 1932 revolution—where the far larger pro-democracy groups were just beginning to gather at 1 p.m. on Sunday—and added , “ Over there , not good.
” Within a few hours the band of around 60 royalist supporters holding golden-filigree portraits of the royal family and waving Thai flags retreated from what organizers claim were 20,000 citizens chanting , singing , and reenacting in impromptu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
By the time the pro-democracy protests began in earnest at 4 p.m. , the small right-wing royalist contingent had disappeared .
After weeks of rising tensions and days of light monsoon season rains , demonstrators of all ages gathered under clear skies on Sunday .
The rally , spearheaded by the Free People student movement that arose with earlier protests in July , follows weeks of increasingly bold demands from student-led groups and ramped-up government intimidation .
The protests began prior to COVID-19 lockdown as a response to the dissolution of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Around the 2019 Thai elections in March of that year , the government led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha—which took power in a 2014 military coup and installed a system in which no party can take power without the consent of the military—used a variety of legal tools to harass the opposition , particularly the Future Forward Party and its leader , the charismatic mogul Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit .
When COVID-19 began to abate in Thailand , the protests resumed around the country in July with the Free People movement , then known as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democracy Monument to demand the newly reshuffled cabinet ’ s resignation , the dissolution of parliament , and the drafting of a new constitution—of which Thailand has had 19 since the 1930s .
But the stakes got even higher on Aug. 3 , when some protesters began to suggest monarchical reform .
Thailand ’ s late king was widely popular , but the rule of his son and current monarch King Maha Vajiralongkorn of the 238-year-old Chakri dynasty has drawn controversy .
Apart from his raucous youth , divorces , and consolidation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from protesters—the monarch also spent the coronavirus pandemic in his residences in the Bavarian Alps at a time when Thailand has suffered intense economic problems .
Mentioning the king is a high-stakes gamble in Thailand .
Section 112 of the Criminal Code , also known as the lèse-majesté law , forbids criticizing the monarchy , and it has been used more than 90 times since the coup in 2014—with sentences as long as 15 years handed down .
But while the lèse-majesté law is the most infamous , in practice the government more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charges of sedition against opponents , charging them for public statements and even Facebook posts .
That makes any demonstration a risky endeavor .
As the crowd grew by the Democracy Monument , the protests got off to a tense start , with protesters reenacting past killings and shouting at police officers .
Two days before the protest on Sunday , the student leader Parit “ Penguin ” Chiwarak was filmed being carried by police officers to be charged with sedition under Section 116 of the Criminal Code .
Despite bail conditions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , waving through an apartment window .
The lawyer Anon Nampa and student activist Panupong Jaadnok were also arrested prior to the event and face further charges .
“ Without freedom , we have nothing .
We Thais want real democracy , ” said Fai , 23 , using only one name for anonymity , in a coffee shop on Dinso Road as the protests begin , thumbing through paper signs written in Thai and English reading “ Blood on Your Hands ” and “ Prayut Get Out.
” Behind him , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ How we get this I do not know , but this is how we start , ” Fai added .
After chants , speeches , and stirring commentary from a charismatic transgender presenter , the protests took on a concert atmosphere as the sun set , complete with rock ballads , comedy , and a surprise performance from Rap Against Dictatorship , famed for their popular and combative stance against the military government .
Protesters waved their phones with the music in solidarity as night fell .
Even as the Criminal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the protest , the attitude remained jubilant and triumphant into the evening , as the protest leaders planned to give themselves up to police as an act of civil disobedience .
The protest offered a rare opportunity to bring up topics usually silenced under a conservative junta .
The Women for Freedom and Democracy group set up a base to the far west of the Democracy Monument , where supporters of LGBT rights , sex workers ’ rights , and women ’ s rights converged to write stories in crayon on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy that means we can have true equality too .
LGBT people do not have true rights in Thailand , ” said a 21-year-old student protester from Chulalongkorn University wearing a rainbow LGBTQ pride flag as a cape .
When asked for his name , he waved his hand over the crowd and said , “ Today , my name is Victorious.
” Six hundred police officers with the Metropolitan Police Bureau were sent to the site to ensure security and prevent violence among protesters , police spokesman Kissana Phathanacharoen said , adding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters follow the law , including restrictions under the COVID-19 emergency decree .
As Thailand nears its sixth month under the pandemic emergency decree—despite not having a single community transmission since May—the continued emergency measures have caused concern .
“ With this COVID economy , it is difficult , ” said a 21-year-old protester who asked to be referred to as Alex .
“ We want to decide for ourselves.
” “ I was very sad to see this Future Forward Party go away like this ” added Alex , who said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to speak out .
But how can we ?
” It is not just at home that protesters face danger .
Nationalist forces have far-reaching powers under Southeast Asia ’ s dictator cabal , which , for example , enabled the abduction by armed men of the Thai pro-democracy activist Wanchalearm Satsaksit outside his home in Phnom Penh , Cambodia , while he was living in exile .
He is believed by some to be dead , but his sister maintains hope he is alive .
Official opposition to the protests took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sen. Somchai Sawaengkarn , appointed to his position by the junta , proposing authorities investigate the protest ’ s funding , questioning how the demonstrators could have afforded the giant LED screen on display during the protest .
He added that bail should be revoked for those arrested under the sweeping sedition laws .
The specter of the 1976 Thammasat University massacre , an attack on students and leftists in which dozens were killed and some hanged from trees by royalists and paramilitary attackers aided by police , also hangs over events .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ what a shame it would be if something of this nature were to happen again .
High-profile Gen. Apirat Kongsompong said of the protesters , “ The coronavirus can be cured , but the disease of chung-chart ( nation-hating ) can not be cured.
” While stressing they do not wish to end the monarchy , protesters have submitted a 10-point reform plan that includes limits to the palace budget , scrapping the lèse-majesté law , ending political indoctrination in schools , and investigating those who have been disappeared for slights against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the Aug. 16 protest did directly address the topic of the monarchy , there have been attempts from right-wing and royalist groups to paint the entire opposition as anti-monarchy .
The Coordination Center of Vocational Students , a pro-monarchy group , vowed prior to the protest to record video and audio in case anyone should say or do anything insulting to the monarchy .
The police , too , were on the lookout for so-called third parties in the protest , according to the Bangkok police department ’ s Maj. Gen. Somprasong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wore on , police sat in the alleyways surrounding Ratchadamnoen Avenue , eating , smoking , and taking pictures of the sunset on their phones .
“ It is the biggest protest ever after the coup in 2014 .
I am really surprised by the number of people joining the protest as well as the diversity , ” said the student protester Surachet Suanchabok , who is studying political science at Chulalongkorn University .
“ Not only the youth anymore but also the working class , the elders , the LGBTQ+ , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goal , which is justice .
I do not think that our demands are too much to manage to become a reality .
”

BANGKOK—“Over here, this is the good people,” said one among a few dozen royalist supporters, who then gestured to the north end of the Democracy Monument memorializing Thailand’s 1932 revolution—where the far larger pro-democracy groups were just beginning to gather at 1 p.m. on Sunday—and added, “Over there, not good.”
BANGKOK—“Over here, this is the good people,” said one among a few dozen royalist supporters, who then gestured to the north end of the Democracy Monument memorializing Thailand’s 1932 revolution—where the far larger pro-democracy groups were just beginning to gather at 1 p.m. on Sunday—and added, “Over there, not good.”
Within a few hours the band of around 60 royalist supporters holding golden-filigree portraits of the royal family and waving Thai flags retreated from what organizers claim were 20,000 citizens chanting, singing, and reenacting in impromptu plays past tragedies when protesters were massacred. By the time the pro-democracy protests began in earnest at 4 p.m., the small right-wing royalist contingent had disappeared.
After weeks of rising tensions and days of light monsoon season rains, demonstrators of all ages gathered under clear skies on Sunday. The rally, spearheaded by the Free People student movement that arose with earlier protests in July, follows weeks of increasingly bold demands from student-led groups and ramped-up government intimidation.
The protests began prior to COVID-19 lockdown as a response to the dissolution of the liberal Future Forward Party in February. Around the 2019 Thai elections in March of that year, the government led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha—which took power in a 2014 military coup and installed a system in which no party can take power without the consent of the military—used a variety of legal tools to harass the opposition, particularly the Future Forward Party and its leader, the charismatic mogul Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit.
When COVID-19 began to abate in Thailand, the protests resumed around the country in July with the Free People movement, then known as Free Youth, staging a protest at the Democracy Monument to demand the newly reshuffled cabinet’s resignation, the dissolution of parliament, and the drafting of a new constitution—of which Thailand has had 19 since the 1930s. But the stakes got even higher on Aug. 3, when some protesters began to suggest monarchical reform.
Thailand’s late king was widely popular, but the rule of his son and current monarch King Maha Vajiralongkorn of the 238-year-old Chakri dynasty has drawn controversy. Apart from his raucous youth, divorces, and consolidation of power—all of which have drawn condemnation from protesters—the monarch also spent the coronavirus pandemic in his residences in the Bavarian Alps at a time when Thailand has suffered intense economic problems.
Mentioning the king is a high-stakes gamble in Thailand. Section 112 of the Criminal Code, also known as the lèse-majesté law, forbids criticizing the monarchy, and it has been used more than 90 times since the coup in 2014—with sentences as long as 15 years handed down. But while the lèse-majesté law is the most infamous, in practice the government more commonly uses the Computer Crime Act and charges of sedition against opponents, charging them for public statements and even Facebook posts.
That makes any demonstration a risky endeavor. As the crowd grew by the Democracy Monument, the protests got off to a tense start, with protesters reenacting past killings and shouting at police officers.
A protester carries a sign saying “The king shouldn't express his own political opinion,” surrounded by doodles referring to the king's mistresses, frequent visits to Germany, and pampered dog, Foo-Foo.
Two days before the protest on Sunday, the student leader Parit “Penguin” Chiwarak was filmed being carried by police officers to be charged with sedition under Section 116 of the Criminal Code. Despite bail conditions, Penguin made an appearance at the protest, waving through an apartment window. The lawyer Anon Nampa and student activist Panupong Jaadnok were also arrested prior to the event and face further charges.
“Without freedom, we have nothing. We Thais want real democracy,” said Fai, 23, using only one name for anonymity, in a coffee shop on Dinso Road as the protests begin, thumbing through paper signs written in Thai and English reading “Blood on Your Hands” and “Prayut Get Out.” Behind him, a police officer picked up an iced Americano. “How we get this I do not know, but this is how we start,” Fai added.
After chants, speeches, and stirring commentary from a charismatic transgender presenter, the protests took on a concert atmosphere as the sun set, complete with rock ballads, comedy, and a surprise performance from Rap Against Dictatorship, famed for their popular and combative stance against the military government. Protesters waved their phones with the music in solidarity as night fell.
Even as the Criminal Court announced arrest warrants for 15 leaders during the protest, the attitude remained jubilant and triumphant into the evening, as the protest leaders planned to give themselves up to police as an act of civil disobedience.
The protest offered a rare opportunity to bring up topics usually silenced under a conservative junta. The Women for Freedom and Democracy group set up a base to the far west of the Democracy Monument, where supporters of LGBT rights, sex workers’ rights, and women’s rights converged to write stories in crayon on a tarpaulin.
“If we have true democracy that means we can have true equality too. LGBT people do not have true rights in Thailand,” said a 21-year-old student protester from Chulalongkorn University wearing a rainbow LGBTQ pride flag as a cape. When asked for his name, he waved his hand over the crowd and said, “Today, my name is Victorious.”
Six hundred police officers with the Metropolitan Police Bureau were sent to the site to ensure security and prevent violence among protesters, police spokesman Kissana Phathanacharoen said, adding that the authorities would be ensuring that protesters follow the law, including restrictions under the COVID-19 emergency decree.
As Thailand nears its sixth month under the pandemic emergency decree—despite not having a single community transmission since May—the continued emergency measures have caused concern.
“With this COVID economy, it is difficult,” said a 21-year-old protester who asked to be referred to as Alex. “We want to decide for ourselves.”
“I was very sad to see this Future Forward Party go away like this” added Alex, who said he attended the February protests. “We want to speak out. But how can we?”
It is not just at home that protesters face danger. Nationalist forces have far-reaching powers under Southeast Asia’s dictator cabal, which, for example, enabled the abduction by armed men of the Thai pro-democracy activist Wanchalearm Satsaksit outside his home in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, while he was living in exile. He is believed by some to be dead, but his sister maintains hope he is alive.
Pro-royalist protesters hold pictures of members of Thailand’s royal family in Bangkok on Aug. 16 ahead of anti-government protests in the Thai capital.
Official opposition to the protests took a familiar form, with government loyalist Sen. Somchai Sawaengkarn, appointed to his position by the junta, proposing authorities investigate the protest’s funding, questioning how the demonstrators could have afforded the giant LED screen on display during the protest. He added that bail should be revoked for those arrested under the sweeping sedition laws.
The specter of the 1976 Thammasat University massacre, an attack on students and leftists in which dozens were killed and some hanged from trees by royalists and paramilitary attackers aided by police, also hangs over events. Thai newspapers and royalist forces began intimating what a shame it would be if something of this nature were to happen again. High-profile Gen. Apirat Kongsompong said of the protesters, “The coronavirus can be cured, but the disease of chung-chart (nation-hating) cannot be cured.”
While stressing they do not wish to end the monarchy, protesters have submitted a 10-point reform plan that includes limits to the palace budget, scrapping the lèse-majesté law, ending political indoctrination in schools, and investigating those who have been disappeared for slights against the monarchy. While some signs and costumes during the Aug. 16 protest did directly address the topic of the monarchy, there have been attempts from right-wing and royalist groups to paint the entire opposition as anti-monarchy.
The Coordination Center of Vocational Students, a pro-monarchy group, vowed prior to the protest to record video and audio in case anyone should say or do anything insulting to the monarchy.
The police, too, were on the lookout for so-called third parties in the protest, according to the Bangkok police department’s Maj. Gen. Somprasong Yenthuam. However, as the day wore on, police sat in the alleyways surrounding Ratchadamnoen Avenue, eating, smoking, and taking pictures of the sunset on their phones.
“It is the biggest protest ever after the coup in 2014. I am really surprised by the number of people joining the protest as well as the diversity,” said the student protester Surachet Suanchabok, who is studying political science at Chulalongkorn University. “Not only the youth anymore but also the working class, the elders, the LGBTQ+, the feminists. … All share the same goal, which is justice. I do not think that our demands are too much to manage to become a reality.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-17--Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy

Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy If there was one skill Donald Trump touted when he ran for president in 2016 , it was his alleged ability to make good deals .
The United States , Trump argued , had for decades gotten “ ripped off ” by allies and adversaries alike , who consistently got the best of the United States in negotiation after negotiation .
The North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA ) was the “ worst trade deal ever , ” the nuclear deal with Iran was “ disastrous , ” and treaty allies in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steal the wealth ” of the United States by running trade surpluses and failing to pay enough for the U.S. troops on their soil .
As the author of The Art of the Deal , Trump claimed he would put an end to free-riding , renegotiate bad deals , and strike new diplomatic agreements in areas where all his predecessors had failed .
After nearly four years in office , Trump has strikingly little to show for his efforts .
For the past week , the administration has been making much of an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel to normalize relations , a largely positive step but far more of an exception than a rule .
In many more cases—such as the Iran nuclear deal , the Paris climate agreement , the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty , the Trans-Pacific Partnership , and the Open Skies Treaty—Trump has torn up or abandoned existing agreements but not managed to put anything in their place .
In other cases—including Israeli-Palestinian peace , North Korea , and Afghanistan—he has launched negotiations with great fanfare but failed to conclude any new deals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Ukraine , and Syria—the Trump administration has not really tried at all , often leaving the diplomacy to competing diplomatic powers such as Russia or Turkey .
On trade , Trump did manage to make marginal adjustments to NAFTA and struck a “ phase one ” deal with China that lowered U.S. tariffs in exchange for ( unfulfilled ) Chinese promises to purchase more American goods .
But those deals hardly amounted to examples of the masterful deal-making on which Trump had campaigned .
Only in the sycophantic atmosphere of the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look back at this overall diplomatic track record and conclude , as National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien put it , that Trump should be considered “ a front-runner for the Nobel Prize.
” Despite these failures , Trump has modified neither his negotiating tactics nor his objectives .
Instead , the administration has simply resorted to a scorched-earth policy apparently designed to destroy what it can not save .
Punishment of adversaries—and sometimes even allies—is no longer part of a diplomatic strategy to achieve specific policy goals ; it has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the administration appears to be no longer even trying to produce new deals but simply declaring the pain inflicted the measure of success .
The means to an end—economic damage and instability in a target country to build diplomatic leverage for a deal—has apparently become the end itself .
The most obvious example of scorched-earth tactics replacing strategy is the “ maximum pressure ” policy on Iran .
When Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 , he claimed the purpose of doing so was to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , Iran didn ’ t play along and instead restarted its frozen nuclear program and escalated its provocative actions in the Persian Gulf .
Of the 12 demands that U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made of Iran at the time , zero have been met , and Tehran has ruled out new negotiations with Trump .
On Aug. 14 at the UN Security Council , the administration suffered a humiliating defeat when a U.S.-sponsored resolution imposing an arms embargo on Iran only attracted the support of the Dominican Republic on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies including the United Kingdom , France , and Germany all abstained , while Russia and China voted against it .
Similar isolation is likely if and when the administration tries to invoke the “ snap-back ” of UN sanctions , since Washington abandoned the tools available to do so when it left the Iran deal in 2018 .
Yet administration officials and their supporters somehow continue to tout the “ astonishing ” effectiveness of sanctions , even while calling for more pressure because Iran , they admit , is still “ violating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Pompeo regularly asserts that the sanctions are achieving “ historic results ” while simultaneously claiming that Iran ’ s behavior is getting worse .
Trump himself has boasted that Iran was “ having riots every week , in every city—bigger than they ’ ve ever had before .
Their currency is under siege thanks to us .
A lot of bad things are happening.
” Unable to even get new talks started with Iran , let alone negotiate a new agreement , the departing special envoy for Iran , Brian Hook , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or no deal , we have been very successful.
” It is certainly true that the United States has managed to inflict severe economic pain .
But inflicting pain was never going to be the hard part , given the size and power of the U.S. economy .
“ A lot of bad things happening ” —while the nuclear program expands and Iran attacks its neighbors—is not success ; it is the definition of failure for a policy whose entire point is to promote stability and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria .
Having essentially abandoned a policy of seeking to get rid of Bashar al-Assad , U.S. policy now seems to consist of “ promoting accountability ” of the Assad regime in theory while punishing the Syrian people in practice .
The main tool of this approach is the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act , which imposes sanctions on anyone investing in or providing reconstruction assistance to Syria .
The act punishes individuals and corporations that deal with the Syrian energy , military , engineering , or construction businesses operating in government-held regions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ admirable , and no one could be more deserving of harsh punishment than Assad and his enablers .
The problem , however , is that the most likely result of the policy will be more suffering for the Syrian people , and spillover effects such as the further destruction of Lebanon ’ s economy , while Assad and his cronies remain in power .
Still , a recent article in Foreign Policy called “ Trump ’ s Syria Policy Is Working ” cited as evidence of success a “ mini-insurgency ” in Daraa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and an economy “ hurtling toward the abyss.
” It was an odd definition of success , particularly in a country that had been facing far worse upheaval for nearly a decade , with results that few would consider successful .
In the same vein , in May the U.S. special representative for Syria engagement , James Jeffrey , claimed that the maximum pressure policy on Syria was paying dividends and added that his job in Syria was to “ make it a quagmire for the Russians.
” Jeffrey did not make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war , refugees , extremism , and suffering—would serve the interests of the United States , much less those of the Syrian people .
Pompeo says the United States will not reduce the sanctions until Assad agrees to a process for his transition out of power , while Joel Rayburn , another Syria envoy , says sanctions will remain “ until the Syrian regime and its allies accede.
” If the administration believed such pressure was likely to lead to Assad ’ s departure and replacement by a more palatable regime , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea that Assad will give up under economic pressure what he clung to so fiercely through nearly 10 years of brutal civil war defies common sense .
So the pain is all that remains .
Trump ’ s China policy appears headed in a similar direction .
As in other cases , Trump initially outlined a long list of policy goals that economic pressure was meant to achieve , including modification of China ’ s nefarious trade practices .
By hitting China increasingly hard with tariffs , Trump claimed , Beijing would finally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the United States and end illegal dumping , intellectual property theft , and alleged currency manipulation .
Two years after those tariffs were imposed , however , the costs to the United States have been extremely high , while the so-called benefits came only in the form of a narrow trade deal that left fundamental problems unresolved .
Now Trump seems to have given up on getting a more comprehensive trade deal and admits he no longer thinks about it .
Instead , Trump gloats that “ China is doing very poorly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ original goal .
In an Axios on HBO interview aired on Aug. 3 , Trump claimed enormous “ progress ” on China because “ before the pandemic they had the worst year … that they ’ ve had in 67 years.
” It was a puzzling claim about a country that lost tens of millions of people to economic collapse and famine from 1958 to 1962 , but it was also an odd definition of success .
The goal of a trade war that had cost the American economy some 300,000 jobs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposed to be the modification of China ’ s trade practices , not the suffering of the Chinese people .
And with a trade deal out of reach , the administration seems to have pivoted to blaming China for the coronavirus , demonizing the Chinese leadership and hoping for regime change , as Pompeo articulated it in a July 23 speech at the Nixon Library .
Pompeo did not spell out a realistic plan to change China ’ s regime but suggested that was now the only way U.S. objectives could be achieved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accompanied Pompeo to the speech , immediately followed up with a column pronouncing the new approach on China as an “ accomplishment ” for Trump , as if harsh rhetoric , as opposed to a deal , had become the goal .
These are not isolated cases .
Scorched-earth tactics have substituted for failed negotiations across a broad swath of U.S. foreign policy .
When Palestinians refused to buy in to Trump ’ s proposed “ deal of the century , ” he retaliated by ending all financial assistance to the West Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cutting off diplomatic channels ; with prospects for negotiations now almost nonexistent , Trump is simply backing Israeli policies while leaving Palestinians to their fate .
In Venezuela , Trump imposed heavy sanctions in early 2019 as part of a plan to dislodge Nicolás Maduro but over time seemed to lose patience and interest , settling for a policy of punishing the Venezuelan people with no real prospects for change .
That would at least bring it in line with U.S. policy on Cuba , where Trump reversed former President Barack Obama ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a policy of sanctions and punishment that has failed for 60 years .
Even close allies such as Germany have not been spared .
On July 29 , Trump announced that he was unilaterally withdrawing nearly 12,000 troops from Germany , not in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives in Europe but to punish a partner that he believed had defied him .
Imposing pain through sanctions and other measures obviously has an important role to play in foreign policy , and there are many examples where U.S. administrations have translated pressure into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have achieved the INF Treaty had he not been willing to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe .
Bill Clinton would not have achieved peace agreements in the Balkans had he not been willing to threaten and even use military force .
Obama could not have coerced Iran to accept verifiable restrictions on its nuclear program had he not been willing to rally the world behind painful international sanctions .
But the point of punishment is to create the conditions for successful diplomacy .
Leaders need to show strength and resolve , but they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compromise .
Wars rarely end in unconditional surrender , and diplomacy never does .
Successful diplomacy requires picking battles carefully , understanding adversaries ’ politics , and putting together coalitions to achieve carefully determined priorities .
Simply punishing international adversaries might make Trump or his supporters feel good in the same way cruelty toward his domestic adversaries does , but that approach does little to advance U.S. interests or well-being .
A long-term strategy for better outcomes can inspire Americans to sacrifice and American allies to lend their support to punishment .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ punishment might support U.S. interests rather than his own fragile ego , Trump has condemned U.S. foreign policy to an unending cycle of scorched-earth tactics and sentenced populations in a growing number of countries to a permanent condition of war , instability , or poverty .
The Trump administration may consider that a success , but the American people should not .

If there was one skill Donald Trump touted when he ran for president in 2016, it was his alleged ability to make good deals. The United States, Trump argued, had for decades gotten “ ripped off ” by allies and adversaries alike, who consistently got the best of the United States in negotiation after negotiation. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the “ worst trade deal ever ,” the nuclear deal with Iran was “ disastrous ,” and treaty allies in Europe and Asia were trying to “ steal the wealth ” of the United States by running trade surpluses and failing to pay enough for the U.S. troops on their soil. As the author of The Art of the Deal, Trump claimed he would put an end to free-riding, renegotiate bad deals, and strike new diplomatic agreements in areas where all his predecessors had failed.
If there was one skill Donald Trump touted when he ran for president in 2016, it was his alleged ability to make good deals. The United States, Trump argued, had for decades gotten “ripped off” by allies and adversaries alike, who consistently got the best of the United States in negotiation after negotiation. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the “worst trade deal ever,” the nuclear deal with Iran was “disastrous,” and treaty allies in Europe and Asia were trying to “steal the wealth” of the United States by running trade surpluses and failing to pay enough for the U.S. troops on their soil. As the author of The Art of the Deal, Trump claimed he would put an end to free-riding, renegotiate bad deals, and strike new diplomatic agreements in areas where all his predecessors had failed.
After nearly four years in office, Trump has strikingly little to show for his efforts. For the past week, the administration has been making much of an agreement by the United Arab Emirates and Israel to normalize relations, a largely positive step but far more of an exception than a rule. In many more cases—such as the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate agreement, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Open Skies Treaty—Trump has torn up or abandoned existing agreements but not managed to put anything in their place. In other cases—including Israeli-Palestinian peace, North Korea, and Afghanistan—he has launched negotiations with great fanfare but failed to conclude any new deals. And in other cases—such as Libya, Ukraine, and Syria—the Trump administration has not really tried at all, often leaving the diplomacy to competing diplomatic powers such as Russia or Turkey.
On trade, Trump did manage to make marginal adjustments to NAFTA and struck a “phase one” deal with China that lowered U.S. tariffs in exchange for (unfulfilled) Chinese promises to purchase more American goods. But those deals hardly amounted to examples of the masterful deal-making on which Trump had campaigned. Only in the sycophantic atmosphere of the current White House would it be possible to look back at this overall diplomatic track record and conclude, as National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien put it, that Trump should be considered “a front-runner for the Nobel Prize.”
Despite these failures, Trump has modified neither his negotiating tactics nor his objectives. Instead, the administration has simply resorted to a scorched-earth policy apparently designed to destroy what it cannot save. Punishment of adversaries—and sometimes even allies—is no longer part of a diplomatic strategy to achieve specific policy goals; it has become the objective itself. In many cases, the administration appears to be no longer even trying to produce new deals but simply declaring the pain inflicted the measure of success. The means to an end—economic damage and instability in a target country to build diplomatic leverage for a deal—has apparently become the end itself.
The most obvious example of scorched-earth tactics replacing strategy is the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran. When Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, he claimed the purpose of doing so was to negotiate a better one. Predictably, however, Iran didn’t play along and instead restarted its frozen nuclear program and escalated its provocative actions in the Persian Gulf. Of the 12 demands that U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made of Iran at the time, zero have been met, and Tehran has ruled out new negotiations with Trump. On Aug. 14 at the UN Security Council, the administration suffered a humiliating defeat when a U.S.-sponsored resolution imposing an arms embargo on Iran only attracted the support of the Dominican Republic on the 15-member council. America’s historic allies including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all abstained, while Russia and China voted against it. Similar isolation is likely if and when the administration tries to invoke the “snap-back” of UN sanctions, since Washington abandoned the tools available to do so when it left the Iran deal in 2018.
Yet administration officials and their supporters somehow continue to tout the “astonishing” effectiveness of sanctions, even while calling for more pressure because Iran, they admit, is still “violating its nuclear commitments and attacking its neighbors.” Pompeo regularly asserts that the sanctions are achieving “historic results” while simultaneously claiming that Iran’s behavior is getting worse. Trump himself has boasted that Iran was “having riots every week, in every city—bigger than they’ve ever had before. Their currency is under siege thanks to us. A lot of bad things are happening.” Unable to even get new talks started with Iran, let alone negotiate a new agreement, the departing special envoy for Iran, Brian Hook, insisted on Aug. 5 that “deal or no deal, we have been very successful.” It is certainly true that the United States has managed to inflict severe economic pain. But inflicting pain was never going to be the hard part, given the size and power of the U.S. economy. “A lot of bad things happening”—while the nuclear program expands and Iran attacks its neighbors—is not success; it is the definition of failure for a policy whose entire point is to promote stability and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Trump has embraced a similar approach in Syria. Having essentially abandoned a policy of seeking to get rid of Bashar al-Assad, U.S. policy now seems to consist of “promoting accountability” of the Assad regime in theory while punishing the Syrian people in practice. The main tool of this approach is the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which imposes sanctions on anyone investing in or providing reconstruction assistance to Syria. The act punishes individuals and corporations that deal with the Syrian energy, military, engineering, or construction businesses operating in government-held regions. The aims of the act are admirable, and no one could be more deserving of harsh punishment than Assad and his enablers. The problem, however, is that the most likely result of the policy will be more suffering for the Syrian people, and spillover effects such as the further destruction of Lebanon’s economy, while Assad and his cronies remain in power.
Still, a recent article in Foreign Policy called “Trump’s Syria Policy Is Working” cited as evidence of success a “mini-insurgency” in Daraa, “stormy demonstrations” in Suwayda, and an economy “hurtling toward the abyss.” It was an odd definition of success, particularly in a country that had been facing far worse upheaval for nearly a decade, with results that few would consider successful. In the same vein, in May the U.S. special representative for Syria engagement, James Jeffrey, claimed that the maximum pressure policy on Syria was paying dividends and added that his job in Syria was to “make it a quagmire for the Russians.” Jeffrey did not make it clear how a quagmire—fueling further civil war, refugees, extremism, and suffering—would serve the interests of the United States, much less those of the Syrian people. Pompeo says the United States will not reduce the sanctions until Assad agrees to a process for his transition out of power, while Joel Rayburn, another Syria envoy, says sanctions will remain “until the Syrian regime and its allies accede.” If the administration believed such pressure was likely to lead to Assad’s departure and replacement by a more palatable regime, the approach might make sense. But the idea that Assad will give up under economic pressure what he clung to so fiercely through nearly 10 years of brutal civil war defies common sense. So the pain is all that remains.
Trump’s China policy appears headed in a similar direction. As in other cases, Trump initially outlined a long list of policy goals that economic pressure was meant to achieve, including modification of China’s nefarious trade practices. By hitting China increasingly hard with tariffs, Trump claimed, Beijing would finally be forced to reduce its trade deficit with the United States and end illegal dumping, intellectual property theft, and alleged currency manipulation. Two years after those tariffs were imposed, however, the costs to the United States have been extremely high, while the so-called benefits came only in the form of a narrow trade deal that left fundamental problems unresolved. Now Trump seems to have given up on getting a more comprehensive trade deal and admits he no longer thinks about it.
Instead, Trump gloats that “China is doing very poorly” as if that were itself the original goal. In an Axios on HBO interview aired on Aug. 3, Trump claimed enormous “progress” on China because “before the pandemic they had the worst year … that they’ve had in 67 years.” It was a puzzling claim about a country that lost tens of millions of people to economic collapse and famine from 1958 to 1962, but it was also an odd definition of success. The goal of a trade war that had cost the American economy some 300,000 jobs and over $40 billion in tariffs was supposed to be the modification of China’s trade practices, not the suffering of the Chinese people. And with a trade deal out of reach, the administration seems to have pivoted to blaming China for the coronavirus, demonizing the Chinese leadership and hoping for regime change, as Pompeo articulated it in a July 23 speech at the Nixon Library. Pompeo did not spell out a realistic plan to change China’s regime but suggested that was now the only way U.S. objectives could be achieved. Trump supporter Hugh Hewitt, who accompanied Pompeo to the speech, immediately followed up with a column pronouncing the new approach on China as an “accomplishment” for Trump, as if harsh rhetoric, as opposed to a deal, had become the goal.
These are not isolated cases. Scorched-earth tactics have substituted for failed negotiations across a broad swath of U.S. foreign policy. When Palestinians refused to buy in to Trump’s proposed “deal of the century,” he retaliated by ending all financial assistance to the West Bank, Gaza, and Palestinian refugees and cutting off diplomatic channels; with prospects for negotiations now almost nonexistent, Trump is simply backing Israeli policies while leaving Palestinians to their fate. In Venezuela, Trump imposed heavy sanctions in early 2019 as part of a plan to dislodge Nicolás Maduro but over time seemed to lose patience and interest, settling for a policy of punishing the Venezuelan people with no real prospects for change. That would at least bring it in line with U.S. policy on Cuba, where Trump reversed former President Barack Obama’s modest economic opening to double down on a policy of sanctions and punishment that has failed for 60 years. Even close allies such as Germany have not been spared. On July 29, Trump announced that he was unilaterally withdrawing nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, not in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives in Europe but to punish a partner that he believed had defied him.
Imposing pain through sanctions and other measures obviously has an important role to play in foreign policy, and there are many examples where U.S. administrations have translated pressure into diplomatic gains. Ronald Reagan would never have achieved the INF Treaty had he not been willing to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe. Bill Clinton would not have achieved peace agreements in the Balkans had he not been willing to threaten and even use military force. Obama could not have coerced Iran to accept verifiable restrictions on its nuclear program had he not been willing to rally the world behind painful international sanctions.
But the point of punishment is to create the conditions for successful diplomacy. Leaders need to show strength and resolve, but they also need to show a willingness to compromise. Wars rarely end in unconditional surrender, and diplomacy never does. Successful diplomacy requires picking battles carefully, understanding adversaries’ politics, and putting together coalitions to achieve carefully determined priorities. Simply punishing international adversaries might make Trump or his supporters feel good in the same way cruelty toward his domestic adversaries does, but that approach does little to advance U.S. interests or well-being.
A long-term strategy for better outcomes can inspire Americans to sacrifice and American allies to lend their support to punishment. By failing to define strategies for how such punishment might support U.S. interests rather than his own fragile ego, Trump has condemned U.S. foreign policy to an unending cycle of scorched-earth tactics and sentenced populations in a growing number of countries to a permanent condition of war, instability, or poverty. The Trump administration may consider that a success, but the American people should not.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-16--Afghans Worried About Pressure From Trump as Talks With the Taliban Get Underway

Afghans Worried About Pressure From Trump as Talks With the Taliban Get Underway KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban Sunday , but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November .
Last week the government convened a Loya Jirga , a mass gathering of representatives from across the country that makes decisions on issues of national importance .
The group agreed to the release of 400 Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails , paving the way for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has described the prisoners as among the most dangerous and high-value Taliban captives currently held .
“ In order to remove the hurdles for the start of peace talks , stopping bloodshed , and for the good of the public , the Loya Jirga approves the release of 400 prisoners as demanded by the Taliban , ” the group ’ s decision read .
The attendees said they were not given the names or details of the prisoners , prompting speculation that some might be foreign fighters .
Many Afghans have long accused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pakistani nationals , as part of their insurgency .
It was not immediately clear how such non-Afghans would be repatriated and prevented from returning to the country .
Muin Gul Samkanai , of the Right and Justice party , said the lack of details about these prisoners seemed suspicious .
According to some reports , the list includes the alleged planners of a 2017 truck bomb in Kabul that killed more than 150 people .
“ The only reason they would gather 3,000 people [ for the Loya Jirga ] and not name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign nationals among them .
That ’ s the only thing that makes sense , ” Samkanai said .
The presidential palace has denied the presence of foreign fighters among the 400 .
Nilofar Ibrahimi , a member of parliament from the northern province of Badakhshan , who was part of the planning committee for two recent Loya Jirgas , said the delegates were never provided with any details about the prisoners in question .
She said she feared that the Trump administration , in a rush to declare victory in Afghanistan ahead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using its political and economic might to force the issue .
“ It ’ s obvious there was pressure on the government to hold this Jirga , what I want to know is what exactly that pressure was ?
” Ibrahimi said .
She said that the entire peace process , which has so far excluded the Afghan government , highlights the power imbalance between Kabul and Washington , which signed an armistice with the Taliban in February .
“ Rather than state-to-state discussions , the whole process has been about putting pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added .
In response to reports of video conversations between Mike Pompeo , the U.S. secretary of state , and Mullah Baradar Akhund , the Taliban ’ s chief negotiator , Ibrahimi said she was worried that the United States was giving an armed group actively fighting the Afghan government the legitimacy of a state .
A source familiar with the Taliban position said the talks , slated to begin today , would likely be drawn out with potential hitches and stalemates .
“ The first hurdle will appear right away .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be declaring a nationwide cease-fire , but the Taliban ’ s primary focus will be on the structure of a future Afghan government , ” said the source , who asked for anonymity .
Several analysts said the Taliban fear being neutralized or sidelined in any future government .
“ The Taliban don ’ t want to become like the old jihadi factions and made useless .
They can ’ t lose their religious dignity in this deal , ” said Obaid Ali , a Kabul-based analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban is the continued existence of fighters claiming allegiance to the Islamic State .
Ali said the Taliban are fighting the Islamic State across Afghanistan in part to ensure that the country would be free of insurgencies once a peace deal is reached .
“ Taliban attacks on the IS forces are meant to send a clear signal , ‘ After us , there will be no more militant groups to take our place , ’ ” he said .
Ali said the Taliban had gained much diplomatic experience over the past 18 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations with Western powers and regional neighbors : “ Every day , their office in Doha has five to 10 meetings with representatives from different nations .
They ’ ve learned how to speak to dignitaries , how to negotiate.
” But the Taliban ’ s ability to draw these nations close has caused concern for Kabul—especially among Afghans who have taken part in previous meetings with the Taliban over the years .
Ibrahimi , the parliament member from Badakhshan , said the Taliban have always presented a united front , while the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more divided .
“ In the past , the Taliban would come with a list of very specific points and they would never veer from them , whereas the Afghans all seemed to be speaking for themselves , ” said Ibrahimi , who took part in at least one such meeting and was briefed on others .
She said this fear was the reason the Loya Jirga included along with their approval of the prisoner release specific recommendations that foreign nationals be immediately repatriated to their own countries , that a nationwide cease-fire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the Taliban , and that the current democratic structure of the nation be preserved in any peace agreement .
While Taliban negotiators appear to be coordinating closely with their leadership council in Pakistan , the Afghan government ’ s diplomacy has been more chaotic .
The Afghan government currently has three bodies tasked with peace efforts : the High Peace Council , a semi-autonomous group created by former President Hamid Karzai ; the State Ministry for Peace , currently headed by a former chief of staff to President Ashraf Ghani ; and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is led by Ghani ’ s longtime political rival Abdullah Abdullah .
“ The hierarchies , the makeups , and agendas of these bodies is not entirely clear to the Afghan people .
That could present a major challenge when sitting across from a more experienced and organized Taliban in Doha , ” Ali said .
The Taliban had first sought negotiations with Washington after the attacks of Sept. 11 , 2001 , but the George W. Bush administration refused .
It wasn ’ t until late into President Barack Obama ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban sent representatives to Qatar talks with U.S. representatives .
While the Taliban have been honing their diplomatic skills , the Afghan government has been increasingly distracted by the escalating war and corruption allegations .
As a result , many Afghans are skeptical that talks between the two sides will bring peace after four decades of violence .
“ Even if peace comes , I ’ m afraid it won ’ t last , ” Ibrahimi said .

KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban Sunday, but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November.
KABUL—The Afghan government is due to begin peace talks with representatives of the Taliban Sunday, but some officials are worried that the United States is pushing too hard for an agreement ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November.
Last week the government convened a Loya Jirga, a mass gathering of representatives from across the country that makes decisions on issues of national importance. The group agreed to the release of 400 Taliban prisoners from Afghan jails, paving the way for the talks with the Taliban.
The government has described the prisoners as among the most dangerous and high-value Taliban captives currently held.
“In order to remove the hurdles for the start of peace talks, stopping bloodshed, and for the good of the public, the Loya Jirga approves the release of 400 prisoners as demanded by the Taliban,” the group’s decision read.
The attendees said they were not given the names or details of the prisoners, prompting speculation that some might be foreign fighters. Many Afghans have long accused the Taliban of employing foreigners, namely Pakistani nationals, as part of their insurgency. It was not immediately clear how such non-Afghans would be repatriated and prevented from returning to the country.
Muin Gul Samkanai, of the Right and Justice party, said the lack of details about these prisoners seemed suspicious. According to some reports, the list includes the alleged planners of a 2017 truck bomb in Kabul that killed more than 150 people.
“The only reason they would gather 3,000 people [for the Loya Jirga] and not name a single prisoner is that there were foreign nationals among them. That’s the only thing that makes sense,” Samkanai said.
The presidential palace has denied the presence of foreign fighters among the 400.
Nilofar Ibrahimi, a member of parliament from the northern province of Badakhshan, who was part of the planning committee for two recent Loya Jirgas, said the delegates were never provided with any details about the prisoners in question.
She said she feared that the Trump administration, in a rush to declare victory in Afghanistan ahead of the November U.S. election, was using its political and economic might to force the issue.
“It’s obvious there was pressure on the government to hold this Jirga, what I want to know is what exactly that pressure was?” Ibrahimi said.
She said that the entire peace process, which has so far excluded the Afghan government, highlights the power imbalance between Kabul and Washington, which signed an armistice with the Taliban in February.
“Rather than state-to-state discussions, the whole process has been about putting pressure on the Afghan government,” she added.
In response to reports of video conversations between Mike Pompeo, the U.S. secretary of state, and Mullah Baradar Akhund, the Taliban’s chief negotiator, Ibrahimi said she was worried that the United States was giving an armed group actively fighting the Afghan government the legitimacy of a state.
A source familiar with the Taliban position said the talks, slated to begin today, would likely be drawn out with potential hitches and stalemates.
“The first hurdle will appear right away. The government’s initial point of order will be declaring a nationwide cease-fire, but the Taliban’s primary focus will be on the structure of a future Afghan government,” said the source, who asked for anonymity.
Several analysts said the Taliban fear being neutralized or sidelined in any future government.
“The Taliban don’t want to become like the old jihadi factions and made useless. They can’t lose their religious dignity in this deal,” said Obaid Ali, a Kabul-based analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network.
Adding to this fear for the Taliban is the continued existence of fighters claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. Ali said the Taliban are fighting the Islamic State across Afghanistan in part to ensure that the country would be free of insurgencies once a peace deal is reached.
“Taliban attacks on the IS forces are meant to send a clear signal, ‘After us, there will be no more militant groups to take our place,’” he said.
Ali said the Taliban had gained much diplomatic experience over the past 18 months, which helped the group forge relations with Western powers and regional neighbors: “Every day, their office in Doha has five to 10 meetings with representatives from different nations. They’ve learned how to speak to dignitaries, how to negotiate.”
But the Taliban’s ability to draw these nations close has caused concern for Kabul—especially among Afghans who have taken part in previous meetings with the Taliban over the years. Ibrahimi, the parliament member from Badakhshan, said the Taliban have always presented a united front, while the Afghans in attendance seemed to be much more divided.
“In the past, the Taliban would come with a list of very specific points and they would never veer from them, whereas the Afghans all seemed to be speaking for themselves,” said Ibrahimi, who took part in at least one such meeting and was briefed on others.
She said this fear was the reason the Loya Jirga included along with their approval of the prisoner release specific recommendations that foreign nationals be immediately repatriated to their own countries, that a nationwide cease-fire be prioritized as part of the talks with the Taliban, and that the current democratic structure of the nation be preserved in any peace agreement.
While Taliban negotiators appear to be coordinating closely with their leadership council in Pakistan, the Afghan government’s diplomacy has been more chaotic.
The Afghan government currently has three bodies tasked with peace efforts: the High Peace Council, a semi-autonomous group created by former President Hamid Karzai; the State Ministry for Peace, currently headed by a former chief of staff to President Ashraf Ghani; and the High Council for National Reconciliation, which is led by Ghani’s longtime political rival Abdullah Abdullah.
“The hierarchies, the makeups, and agendas of these bodies is not entirely clear to the Afghan people. That could present a major challenge when sitting across from a more experienced and organized Taliban in Doha,” Ali said.
The Taliban had first sought negotiations with Washington after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but the George W. Bush administration refused. It wasn’t until late into President Barack Obama’s first term in 2012 when the Taliban sent representatives to Qatar talks with U.S. representatives.
While the Taliban have been honing their diplomatic skills, the Afghan government has been increasingly distracted by the escalating war and corruption allegations.
As a result, many Afghans are skeptical that talks between the two sides will bring peace after four decades of violence.
“Even if peace comes, I’m afraid it won’t last,” Ibrahimi said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Legal Loopholes Leave the U.S. Vulnerable to Election Interference

Legal Loopholes Leave the U.S .
Vulnerable to Election Interference Authoritarian regimes including Russia and China have spent more than $ 300 million over the past decade to interfere in political processes of dozens of other countries around the world , according to a new report released Tuesday by the German Marshall Fund think tank .
In addition to cyberattacks and disinformation , these governments and their proxies have exploited legal loopholes to funnel money through straw donors , nonprofits , shell companies , and in-kind campaign contributions to buy influence in at least 33 countries , researchers found .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past decade , with almost 80 percent of the cases documented in the report taking place since 2016 .
Increased media scrutiny of foreign election interference following the 2016 U.S. presidential election may account for some of this rise .
But the period in question coincides with what experts say is a decision by both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping to escalate foreign interference efforts .
In the vast majority of cases examined in the report , the perpetrators exploited legal loopholes to influence the political process .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to close these loopholes , including ones that allow foreign money to seep into the democratic process ahead of the presidential election this November .
“ The United States has failed to similarly fortify its financial defenses since malign finance and other tools of election interference became top national security threats in 2016 , ” the report says .
Foreign funding is “ just as threatening as the online interference , the disinformation and cyberattacks , ” said Josh Rudolph , one of the report ’ s authors and an expert on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ But it ’ s actually easier to close these legal loopholes.
” The report comes as U.S. intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that Russia and other countries at odds with the United States are likely to try and interfere in the November vote .
In a briefing to Congress in February , U.S. intelligence officials said Russia was refining and expanding the interference playbook it used in 2016 in a bid to undermine Americans ’ faith in the integrity of the election system and to tip the vote in favor of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ memo written the same month outlined a range of tactics that could be used by Russia , including hacking and leaking but also economic and business measures .
“ Russia has sought to take advantage of countries that have perceived loopholes in laws preventing foreign campaign assistance , ” noted the memo , which was prepared by the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI and obtained by the Associated Press in May .
Earlier this month , U.S. intelligence officials released an assessment of Russian , Chinese , and Iranian efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is using a “ range of measures ” to undermine challenger Joe Biden ’ s campaign while China , which views Trump as erratic , would prefer the incumbent not be reelected .
Iran for its part seeks to use online disinformation to undermine Trump , according to the assessment released by William Evanina , the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center .
Foreign election interference has been heavily scrutinized since Russian operatives used cyberattacks and disinformation in a bid to tip the 2016 presidential election in Trump ’ s favor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Russia and other foreign actors have sought to use what the new report ’ s authors describe as “ malign finance ” to influence the democratic process .
FBI Director Christopher Wray recently described foreign malign influence as “ subversive , undeclared , criminal , or coercive attempts to sway our government ’ s policies , distort our country ’ s public discourse , and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.
” He made the remark at a speech on China at the Hudson Institute .
As opposed to corporate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have economic motives , malign finance sponsored by nation-states and their proxies is “ a form of geopolitical hostility that involves surreptitiously influencing political debate , decision-making , electoral outcomes , and societal cohesion in order to harm a country , ” the authors of the German Marshall Fund report write .
Their findings are based on an analysis of media reports in 16 languages as well as interviews with 90 current and former U.S. officials , congressional staffers , legal scholars , and other experts .
“ We only catalogue cases when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funding political elements in order to weaken the target country , ” the authors write , having compiled a database of 115 instances of foreign financial interference in dozens of countries .
Eighty two percent of the cases were perpetrated by Russia , with the rest coming from China and a handful from Iran and the United Arab Emirates .
Over half of the cases included in the study are Russian efforts to meddle in Europe , but the report notes that there has been a surge of Russian activity in Africa .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who was indicted for his role in interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections , were involved in political campaigns in 20 African countries in 2019 .
The total value of foreign election interference efforts outlined in the report was $ 300 million , but Rudolph said the true figure is likely higher .
Some of the cases examined in the report were illegal , such as Russian efforts to funnel tens of millions of dollars to Italy ’ s far-right League party , far outstripping the country ’ s maximum campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over $ 100,000 .
But in 83 percent of the cases , the malign influence was perpetrated using legal loopholes , which the authors break down into seven broad categories : in-kind campaign contributions from foreign nationals , the use of straw donors to funnel foreign donations , the use of anonymous shell companies and nonprofits that are not required to disclose their donors , online political advertising , foreign-funded media outlets , and the use of emerging technologies such as cryptocurrency to make anonymous campaign contributions .
The extensive exploitation of legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy reform that needs to be implemented , ” the report says .
While law enforcement agencies in the United States have stepped up their efforts to counter foreign election interference since 2016 , there has been little legislative progress to address these vulnerabilities , Rudolph said .
A bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives would close about half the loopholes outlined in the report , but it has stalled in the Senate , underscoring the extent to which election interference has become a partisan issue in Washington .
“ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a bipartisan way , ” Rudolph said .
“ Interference in our democracy , unlike all other attacks in our country in the past , has not really brought us together politically.
” “ It really strikes at the heart of our politics , and it ’ s meant to divide us , so the political response can take some time , ” he said .

Authoritarian regimes including Russia and China have spent more than $300 million over the past decade to interfere in political processes of dozens of other countries around the world, according to a new report released Tuesday by the German Marshall Fund think tank.
Authoritarian regimes including Russia and China have spent more than $300 million over the past decade to interfere in political processes of dozens of other countries around the world, according to a new report released Tuesday by the German Marshall Fund think tank.
In addition to cyberattacks and disinformation, these governments and their proxies have exploited legal loopholes to funnel money through straw donors, nonprofits, shell companies, and in-kind campaign contributions to buy influence in at least 33 countries, researchers found.
These interference efforts have escalated dramatically over the past decade, with almost 80 percent of the cases documented in the report taking place since 2016.
Increased media scrutiny of foreign election interference following the 2016 U.S. presidential election may account for some of this rise. But the period in question coincides with what experts say is a decision by both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping to escalate foreign interference efforts.
In the vast majority of cases examined in the report, the perpetrators exploited legal loopholes to influence the political process. Little has been done in the United States to close these loopholes, including ones that allow foreign money to seep into the democratic process ahead of the presidential election this November.
“The United States has failed to similarly fortify its financial defenses since malign finance and other tools of election interference became top national security threats in 2016,” the report says.
Foreign funding is “just as threatening as the online interference, the disinformation and cyberattacks,” said Josh Rudolph, one of the report’s authors and an expert on malign finance at the German Marshall Fund.
“But it’s actually easier to close these legal loopholes.”
The report comes as U.S. intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that Russia and other countries at odds with the United States are likely to try and interfere in the November vote.
In a briefing to Congress in February, U.S. intelligence officials said Russia was refining and expanding the interference playbook it used in 2016 in a bid to undermine Americans’ faith in the integrity of the election system and to tip the vote in favor of President Donald Trump.
A law enforcement memo written the same month outlined a range of tactics that could be used by Russia, including hacking and leaking but also economic and business measures. “Russia has sought to take advantage of countries that have perceived loopholes in laws preventing foreign campaign assistance,” noted the memo, which was prepared by the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI and obtained by the Associated Press in May.
Earlier this month, U.S. intelligence officials released an assessment of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian efforts to influence the election, noting that Moscow is using a “range of measures” to undermine challenger Joe Biden’s campaign while China, which views Trump as erratic, would prefer the incumbent not be reelected.
Iran for its part seeks to use online disinformation to undermine Trump, according to the assessment released by William Evanina, the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
Foreign election interference has been heavily scrutinized since Russian operatives used cyberattacks and disinformation in a bid to tip the 2016 presidential election in Trump’s favor. Less scrutinized are the ways in which Russia and other foreign actors have sought to use what the new report’s authors describe as “malign finance” to influence the democratic process.
FBI Director Christopher Wray recently described foreign malign influence as “subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.” He made the remark at a speech on China at the Hudson Institute.
As opposed to corporate attempts at political influence, which often have economic motives, malign finance sponsored by nation-states and their proxies is “a form of geopolitical hostility that involves surreptitiously influencing political debate, decision-making, electoral outcomes, and societal cohesion in order to harm a country,” the authors of the German Marshall Fund report write.
Their findings are based on an analysis of media reports in 16 languages as well as interviews with 90 current and former U.S. officials, congressional staffers, legal scholars, and other experts. “We only catalogue cases when authoritarian regimes are credibly shown to be funding political elements in order to weaken the target country,” the authors write, having compiled a database of 115 instances of foreign financial interference in dozens of countries.
Eighty two percent of the cases were perpetrated by Russia, with the rest coming from China and a handful from Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Over half of the cases included in the study are Russian efforts to meddle in Europe, but the report notes that there has been a surge of Russian activity in Africa. Strategists working for the businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was indicted for his role in interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, were involved in political campaigns in 20 African countries in 2019. The total value of foreign election interference efforts outlined in the report was $300 million, but Rudolph said the true figure is likely higher.
Some of the cases examined in the report were illegal, such as Russian efforts to funnel tens of millions of dollars to Italy’s far-right League party, far outstripping the country’s maximum campaign donation cap at the time of just over $100,000. But in 83 percent of the cases, the malign influence was perpetrated using legal loopholes, which the authors break down into seven broad categories: in-kind campaign contributions from foreign nationals, the use of straw donors to funnel foreign donations, the use of anonymous shell companies and nonprofits that are not required to disclose their donors, online political advertising, foreign-funded media outlets, and the use of emerging technologies such as cryptocurrency to make anonymous campaign contributions.
The extensive exploitation of legal loopholes, “underscores the amount of policy reform that needs to be implemented,” the report says. While law enforcement agencies in the United States have stepped up their efforts to counter foreign election interference since 2016, there has been little legislative progress to address these vulnerabilities, Rudolph said. A bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives would close about half the loopholes outlined in the report, but it has stalled in the Senate, underscoring the extent to which election interference has become a partisan issue in Washington.
“It is essential that this work is done in a bipartisan way,” Rudolph said. “Interference in our democracy, unlike all other attacks in our country in the past, has not really brought us together politically.”
“It really strikes at the heart of our politics, and it’s meant to divide us, so the political response can take some time,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan to Meet Over Dam Dispute

Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan to Meet Over Dam Dispute Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan will try to reach an agreement on the controversial Renaissance Dam , Iran stands accused of paying the Taliban bounties to attack U.S. troops , and Spain ’ s former king surfaces in the UAE .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Representatives of Ethiopia , Sudan , and Egypt are expected to meet today to present their proposals for the management of Ethiopia ’ s controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations … to work on unifying the texts of the agreements submitted by the three countries , ” the Sudanese water ministry said in a statement .
Damming the Nile .
The dispute began in 2011 after Ethiopia broke ground on the $ 4.5 billion project on the Blue Nile—one of the river ’ s major tributaries which provides 80 percent of its waters .
The Ethiopian government considers the dam to be a critical part of its future economic development , claiming it will provide 60 percent of Ethiopian households with electricity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its rapidly expanding population .
Threat to its neighbors .
But the dam is a potential threat to the two downstream countries , Egypt and Sudan .
For Egypt in particular , a huge proportion of its population lives along the banks of the Nile , relying on the river for irrigation and drinking water .
Egyptian officials argue that damming the Nile closer to its source in Ethiopia could severely threaten the country ’ s water supply .
The controversy came to a head in July after Ethiopia began filling the reservoir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said could not happen until the three countries had agreed to a legally binding deal .
In July , Foreign Policy ’ s Kathryn Salam rounded up our best coverage on the dam dispute .
Will this time be different ?
There have been several attempts to forge a long-term agreement between the three countries and international actors including the United States over the issue , but none have produced a lasting framework .
Although the filling of the reservoir seems to have injected a renewed sense of urgency into the talks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be overcome before the issue can be settled .
Can the U.S. be an honest broker ?
Writing for FP in March , Addisu Lashitew argued that U.S. mediation had “ ended up fueling tension in an already heated disagreement ” due to perceptions of the Trump administration ’ s pro-Egyptian bias .
“ The U.S. government has also squandered its hard-won soft power in Ethiopia , ” Lashitew wrote , noting that “ Sticks and carrots from Washington are … unlikely to succeed in getting Ethiopia to step into a treaty that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waters , ” especially in an election year when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is facing domestic unrest .
That ’ s because the dam is a rare unifying issue and a source of national pride in Ethiopia .
Intra-Afghan talks delayed .
The long-awaited peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban that were due to begin this week have been delayed after the Afghan government chose to withhold the release of the remaining 320 Taliban prisoners needed to kickstart the talks .
The U.S.-Taliban peace deal signed in February stipulated that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personnel in exchange for the Afghan government releasing 5,000 Taliban fighters .
This is considered a key precondition for the start of talks .
The process has been slow-moving and contentious , but a breakthrough was seemingly achieved earlier this month when the Afghan government agreed to release the final 400 of the 5,000 prisoners .
On Monday , the government halted the release of prisoners , accusing the Taliban of not reciprocating .
Talks were scheduled to begin on Thursday , but they have been postponed indefinitely .
Lukashenko on the ropes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lukashenko told reporters that he would step down as president and hold new elections if a referendum on constitutional changes is held in a surprise turn that seems to suggest he is buckling under pressure from protesters .
Massive protests have gripped the country since the hugely unpopular Lukashenko declared a landslide victory in presidential elections on Aug. 9 .
A brutal crackdown followed , prompting the EU to move forward with sanctions against key Belarusian officials .
Speaking from exile in Lithuania , Lukashenko ’ s main opposition challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya—who rejected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flee the country—said she was prepared to step in for Lukashenko and “ act as a national leader , ” possibly during a transition period .
Iranian bounties to the Taliban .
The Iranian government paid bounties to elements of the Taliban to carry out attacks on U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan , according to a report from CNN .
The bounties were paid out to militants in six different attacks , including the December 2019 attack on Bagram air base that left two dead and more than 70 injured , including four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report , Washington decided in March not to take retaliatory action over the revelation , apparently to preserve the burgeoning Afghan peace process and the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement , which was then just weeks old .
The report follows similar accusations that Russia had paid bounties to Taliban militants to conduct attacks on U.S. forces .
Spain ’ s former king found .
The Spanish royal palace confirmed that former King Juan Carlos has been in the United Arab Emirates since Aug. 3 , after weeks of international speculation over the king ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Juan Carlos unexpectedly announced he was leaving Spain amid an investigation into charges of corruption during his reign .
It was initially believed he had fled to the Dominican Republic , but the Dominican government denied knowledge of his entry into the country and could not find documentary evidence proving he was there .
Juan Carlos received praise for spearheading the country ’ s transition to democracy after the death of former dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 , but his popularity plummeted in the final years of his reign as some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became public .
As Mark Nayler wrote in FP last week , the latest scandal could be the nail in the coffin for the Spanish monarchy .
U.S. tightens Huawei restrictions .
On Monday , U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced a new round of sanctions on the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei , part of the Trump administration ’ s efforts to roll back China ’ s economic influence in the United States .
Companies will now have to acquire a license to sell microchips made using U.S. equipment to Huawei .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an additional 38 companies to the sanctions list in order to ensure all of Huawei ’ s affiliates are included .
In a new record that ’ s bound to be broken again sooner rather than later , the highest temperature ever reliably recorded on earth is believed to have been reached in California ’ s Death Valley .
At 130 degrees Fahrenheit , this figure topped the previous record of 129.2 degrees , which was recorded in 2013 , also in Death Valley .
A higher reading of 134 degrees was recorded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that number is disputed .
The searing temperatures are part of a major heat wave currently hitting much of the southwestwern United States .
Large parts of California have been left without power after the extreme heat caused a power plant to malfunction .
Over the weekend , an intense wildfire in northern California produced a rare and dangerous weather phenomenon known as a “ firenado ” —a fire tornado .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan will try to reach an agreement on the controversial Renaissance Dam , Iran stands accused of paying the Taliban bounties to attack U.S. troops, and Spain’s former king surfaces in the UAE.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan will try to reach an agreement on the controversial Renaissance Dam, Iran stands accused of paying the Taliban bounties to attack U.S. troops, and Spain’s former king surfaces in the UAE.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Talks Set to Resume Over Nile Dam Dispute
Representatives of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt are expected to meet today to present their proposals for the management of Ethiopia’s controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. “The attendees decided to resume negotiations … to work on unifying the texts of the agreements submitted by the three countries,” the Sudanese water ministry said in a statement.
Damming the Nile. The dispute began in 2011 after Ethiopia broke ground on the $4.5 billion project on the Blue Nile—one of the river’s major tributaries which provides 80 percent of its waters. The Ethiopian government considers the dam to be a critical part of its future economic development, claiming it will provide 60 percent of Ethiopian households with electricity, as well as fresh water for its rapidly expanding population.
Threat to its neighbors. But the dam is a potential threat to the two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. For Egypt in particular, a huge proportion of its population lives along the banks of the Nile, relying on the river for irrigation and drinking water. Egyptian officials argue that damming the Nile closer to its source in Ethiopia could severely threaten the country’s water supply.
The controversy came to a head in July after Ethiopia began filling the reservoir, a move Egypt and Sudan both said could not happen until the three countries had agreed to a legally binding deal. In July, Foreign Policy’s Kathryn Salam rounded up our best coverage on the dam dispute.
Will this time be different? There have been several attempts to forge a long-term agreement between the three countries and international actors including the United States over the issue, but none have produced a lasting framework. Although the filling of the reservoir seems to have injected a renewed sense of urgency into the talks, there are still several hurdles that must be overcome before the issue can be settled.
Can the U.S. be an honest broker? Writing for FP in March, Addisu Lashitew argued that U.S. mediation had “ended up fueling tension in an already heated disagreement” due to perceptions of the Trump administration’s pro-Egyptian bias. “The U.S. government has also squandered its hard-won soft power in Ethiopia,” Lashitew wrote, noting that “Sticks and carrots from Washington are … unlikely to succeed in getting Ethiopia to step into a treaty that purportedly affects its right to use Nile waters,” especially in an election year when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is facing domestic unrest. That’s because the dam is a rare unifying issue and a source of national pride in Ethiopia.
What We’re Following Today
Intra-Afghan talks delayed. The long-awaited peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban that were due to begin this week have been delayed after the Afghan government chose to withhold the release of the remaining 320 Taliban prisoners needed to kickstart the talks. The U.S.-Taliban peace deal signed in February stipulated that the Taliban would release 1,000 Afghan military personnel in exchange for the Afghan government releasing 5,000 Taliban fighters. This is considered a key precondition for the start of talks.
The process has been slow-moving and contentious, but a breakthrough was seemingly achieved earlier this month when the Afghan government agreed to release the final 400 of the 5,000 prisoners. On Monday, the government halted the release of prisoners, accusing the Taliban of not reciprocating. Talks were scheduled to begin on Thursday, but they have been postponed indefinitely.
Lukashenko on the ropes in Belarus. Longtime Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko told reporters that he would step down as president and hold new elections if a referendum on constitutional changes is held in a surprise turn that seems to suggest he is buckling under pressure from protesters. Massive protests have gripped the country since the hugely unpopular Lukashenko declared a landslide victory in presidential elections on Aug. 9. A brutal crackdown followed, prompting the EU to move forward with sanctions against key Belarusian officials.
Speaking from exile in Lithuania, Lukashenko’s main opposition challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya—who rejected the election results before being forced to flee the country—said she was prepared to step in for Lukashenko and “act as a national leader,” possibly during a transition period.
Iranian bounties to the Taliban. The Iranian government paid bounties to elements of the Taliban to carry out attacks on U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, according to a report from CNN. The bounties were paid out to militants in six different attacks, including the December 2019 attack on Bagram air base that left two dead and more than 70 injured, including four U.S. service members.
According to the report, Washington decided in March not to take retaliatory action over the revelation, apparently to preserve the burgeoning Afghan peace process and the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement, which was then just weeks old. The report follows similar accusations that Russia had paid bounties to Taliban militants to conduct attacks on U.S. forces.
Keep an Eye On
Spain’s former king found. The Spanish royal palace confirmed that former King Juan Carlos has been in the United Arab Emirates since Aug. 3, after weeks of international speculation over the king’s whereabouts. On Aug. 3, Juan Carlos unexpectedly announced he was leaving Spain amid an investigation into charges of corruption during his reign. It was initially believed he had fled to the Dominican Republic, but the Dominican government denied knowledge of his entry into the country and could not find documentary evidence proving he was there.
Juan Carlos received praise for spearheading the country’s transition to democracy after the death of former dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, but his popularity plummeted in the final years of his reign as some of the murkier details of his activities as king became public. As Mark Nayler wrote in FP last week, the latest scandal could be the nail in the coffin for the Spanish monarchy.
U.S. tightens Huawei restrictions. On Monday, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced a new round of sanctions on the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, part of the Trump administration’s efforts to roll back China’s economic influence in the United States. Companies will now have to acquire a license to sell microchips made using U.S. equipment to Huawei. The commerce department also said it would add an additional 38 companies to the sanctions list in order to ensure all of Huawei’s affiliates are included.
Odds and Ends
In a new record that’s bound to be broken again sooner rather than later, the highest temperature ever reliably recorded on earth is believed to have been reached in California’s Death Valley. At 130 degrees Fahrenheit, this figure topped the previous record of 129.2 degrees, which was recorded in 2013, also in Death Valley. A higher reading of 134 degrees was recorded in Death Valley in 1913, but that number is disputed.
The searing temperatures are part of a major heat wave currently hitting much of the southwestwern United States. Large parts of California have been left without power after the extreme heat caused a power plant to malfunction. Over the weekend, an intense wildfire in northern California produced a rare and dangerous weather phenomenon known as a “firenado”—a fire tornado.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.