foreignpolicy--2020-01-08--Putin Moves to Heighten Russia’s Role After Suleimani Killing

Since its pivotal intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 , Russia has sought to position itself as a major player in the Middle East , establishing itself as a rare broker that is on good terms with all of the region ’ s feuding powers .
Now Moscow has a fresh chance to solidify that reputation .
Russian President Vladimir Putin will look to boost his country ’ s standing in the Middle East following the Trump administration ’ s decision to assassinate the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani last week and Iran ’ s missile attack against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which have roiled the Middle East and pushed Iran and the United States to the brink of war .
The escalating situation raises the stakes for Moscow ’ s calculus in the region significantly , but it also provides Putin with new opportunities to achieve two of his long-standing goals : undermining U.S. credibility and expanding Russia ’ s footprint across the Middle East .
“ Putin sees pushing back against U.S. unilateralism as a personal mission and he is extremely opportunistic .
He will therefore seek to capitalize on every opportunity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani and any ensuing instability to tarnish Washington ’ s reputation in the region , ” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor , a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who previously served as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council .
The killing sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity from Moscow .
In phone calls with his American , Iranian , Chinese , and Turkish counterparts , Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the killing and characterized it as a gross violation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made an impromptu visit to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and shore up Moscow ’ s patronage .
“ The last thing Putin wants is to have to pick a side in the Middle East , ” said Anna Borshchevskaya , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy , a Washington-based think tank .
“ His best card is as a mediator and I suspect they are in a wait-and-see mode now .
If Russia does something major , it will be diplomatically.
” The killing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. drone strike at Baghdad airport on January 3 will likely stress test Moscow ’ s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region .
On Wednesday , Putin traveled to Istanbul to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss escalating tensions in the Middle East .
Despite not always seeing eye to eye on the future of the region , Erdogan and Putin have managed to cut deals in the past , such as when both leaders agreed to effectively carve up northeastern Syria last year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrawal .
On Saturday , Putin will welcome German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow for talks about the crisis .
Both Russia and Germany are among the countries that have sought to prop up the Iranian nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 .
The killing of the Quds Force leader Suleimani in a U.S. drone strike at the Baghdad airport on Jan. 3 will likely stress test Moscow ’ s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region .
Russia and Iran have developed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together in Syria to tilt the balance of power in favor of the Assad regime .
Despite their shared interests , Moscow has simultaneously pursued deeper ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia , Tehran ’ s foes , as well as with other players across the region .
“ Moscow is trying to play this role as a reliable and stable player in the Middle East and this certainly helps its cause , ” said Julia Sveshnikova , a Middle East expert and consultant at the PIR Center , a Moscow think tank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerned about this situation and will be looking to stay out of the fray as much as possible.
” The Trump administration ’ s decision to assassinate a high-ranking official caught many countries around the world off guard and undermined U.S. credibility in the Middle East , an opening that Moscow will be looking to capitalize on .
The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives , from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria .
Washington has slapped Russia with sanctions for its intervention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Crimea , but the Kremlin has long pointed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and will likely use Suleimani ’ s killing and Trump ’ s call to target Iranian cultural sites as further evidence of U.S. overreach while furthering its own standing as a regional power broker .
While many of the United States ’ regional allies may privately welcome Suleimani ’ s demise , many also feared that they may bear the brunt of Iran ’ s retaliation .
Those fears may have been allayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its general by firing over a dozen missiles at U.S. military and coalition forces in Iraq .
Early reports suggested that there were no U.S. casualties , and both sides showed signs that they wanted to de-escalate the situation .
U.S. allies in the region may be breathing a sigh of relief , but if they conclude that Washington had left them exposed to Iranian retaliation , it could encourage a pivot toward Moscow for future mediation .
The last months of 2019 were marked by a wave of anti-Iranian protests in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment it looked as if Tehran ’ s potent influence in the region may be starting to fray .
But the Jan. 3 airstrike brought anti-American sentiment in the region to the fore once more , a shift that will undoubtedly be welcomed by Moscow .
The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives , from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria .
“ As much as Putin may have wanted [ a rise in anti-American sentiment ] to occur , Russia could not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Mark Katz , a professor of politics and government at George Mason University .
“ But Trump has done it for him.
” While a conventional Russian military presence in Iraq would be unlikely , some Russian analysts interviewed by Foreign Policy speculated that mercenaries from Russia ’ s Wagner Group , a shadowy private military contractor that has waged war on behalf of the Kremlin and for profit in Syria , Ukraine , and in parts of Africa , could appear in Iraq in the wake of a U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops in Iraq remains up in the air currently , as the Pentagon rushed to deny reports on Monday that it was withdrawing troops from the country after an unsigned letter from Brig .
Gen. William Seely , the commander of the U.S. task force in Iraq , saying that the Pentagon would respect the decision to the Iraqi parliament calling for U.S. troops to leave .
Still , Russian analysts are quick to note that Moscow is treading cautiously in the wake of the Suleimani killing and the ensuing U.S. and Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani killing , Moscow has not pledged any concrete actions in support of Tehran , and analysts say that Putin is unlikely to back any Iranian attempts at retaliation and may be limited in ways to bolster Tehran .
According to Adlan Margoev , an analyst on Russian-Iranian relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations , a university run by the Russian foreign ministry , the Kremlin ’ s main concerns are preventing escalation in the region that could overturn the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East that its Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the course that Putin has carved out for Russian interests across the region .
“ Nothing strategic has drastically changed for Moscow yet , ” he said .
“ It ’ s a difficult situation for Moscow to navigate , but that ’ s normal in a way .
All Russia does is deal with difficult situations in the Middle East .
”

Since its pivotal intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has sought to position itself as a major player in the Middle East, establishing itself as a rare broker that is on good terms with all of the region’s feuding powers.
Since its pivotal intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has sought to position itself as a major player in the Middle East, establishing itself as a rare broker that is on good terms with all of the region’s feuding powers.
Now Moscow has a fresh chance to solidify that reputation. Russian President Vladimir Putin will look to boost his country’s standing in the Middle East following the Trump administration’s decision to assassinate the Iranian military leader Qassem Suleimani last week and Iran’s missile attack against U.S. air bases in Iraq on Tuesday, which have roiled the Middle East and pushed Iran and the United States to the brink of war. The escalating situation raises the stakes for Moscow’s calculus in the region significantly, but it also provides Putin with new opportunities to achieve two of his long-standing goals: undermining U.S. credibility and expanding Russia’s footprint across the Middle East.
“Putin sees pushing back against U.S. unilateralism as a personal mission and he is extremely opportunistic. He will therefore seek to capitalize on every opportunity he can to use the assassination of Suleimani and any ensuing instability to tarnish Washington’s reputation in the region,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who previously served as deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council.
The killing sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity from Moscow. In phone calls with his American, Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish counterparts, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the killing and characterized it as a gross violation of international law. On Tuesday, Putin made an impromptu visit to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and shore up Moscow’s patronage.
“The last thing Putin wants is to have to pick a side in the Middle East,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington-based think tank. “His best card is as a mediator and I suspect they are in a wait-and-see mode now. If Russia does something major, it will be diplomatically.” The killing of Quds Force leader Suleimani in a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad airport on January 3 will likely stress test Moscow’s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region.
On Wednesday, Putin traveled to Istanbul to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss escalating tensions in the Middle East. Despite not always seeing eye to eye on the future of the region, Erdogan and Putin have managed to cut deals in the past, such as when both leaders agreed to effectively carve up northeastern Syria last year following the Trump administration’s unexpected withdrawal. On Saturday, Putin will welcome German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow for talks about the crisis. Both Russia and Germany are among the countries that have sought to prop up the Iranian nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.
The killing of the Quds Force leader Suleimani in a U.S. drone strike at the Baghdad airport on Jan. 3 will likely stress test Moscow’s ability to be a friend to all major players in the region. Russia and Iran have developed deep ties in recent years, working together in Syria to tilt the balance of power in favor of the Assad regime. Despite their shared interests, Moscow has simultaneously pursued deeper ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s foes, as well as with other players across the region.
“Moscow is trying to play this role as a reliable and stable player in the Middle East and this certainly helps its cause,” said Julia Sveshnikova, a Middle East expert and consultant at the PIR Center, a Moscow think tank. “But Moscow is also very concerned about this situation and will be looking to stay out of the fray as much as possible.”
The Trump administration’s decision to assassinate a high-ranking official caught many countries around the world off guard and undermined U.S. credibility in the Middle East, an opening that Moscow will be looking to capitalize on. The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives, from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria.
Washington has slapped Russia with sanctions for its intervention in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, but the Kremlin has long pointed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and will likely use Suleimani’s killing and Trump’s call to target Iranian cultural sites as further evidence of U.S. overreach while furthering its own standing as a regional power broker.
While many of the United States’ regional allies may privately welcome Suleimani’s demise, many also feared that they may bear the brunt of Iran’s retaliation. Those fears may have been allayed slightly as Iran responded to the killing of its general by firing over a dozen missiles at U.S. military and coalition forces in Iraq. Early reports suggested that there were no U.S. casualties, and both sides showed signs that they wanted to de-escalate the situation. U.S. allies in the region may be breathing a sigh of relief, but if they conclude that Washington had left them exposed to Iranian retaliation, it could encourage a pivot toward Moscow for future mediation.
The last months of 2019 were marked by a wave of anti-Iranian protests in Iraq and Lebanon, and for a moment it looked as if Tehran’s potent influence in the region may be starting to fray. But the Jan. 3 airstrike brought anti-American sentiment in the region to the fore once more, a shift that will undoubtedly be welcomed by Moscow. The Kremlin has long proven adept at exploiting crises around the world to advance its strategic objectives, from Ukraine to North Africa to Syria.
“As much as Putin may have wanted [a rise in anti-American sentiment] to occur, Russia could not have brought it about on its own,” said Mark Katz, a professor of politics and government at George Mason University. “But Trump has done it for him.”
While a conventional Russian military presence in Iraq would be unlikely, some Russian analysts interviewed by Foreign Policy speculated that mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group, a shadowy private military contractor that has waged war on behalf of the Kremlin and for profit in Syria, Ukraine, and in parts of Africa, could appear in Iraq in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal. The future role of U.S. troops in Iraq remains up in the air currently, as the Pentagon rushed to deny reports on Monday that it was withdrawing troops from the country after an unsigned letter from Brig. Gen. William Seely, the commander of the U.S. task force in Iraq, saying that the Pentagon would respect the decision to the Iraqi parliament calling for U.S. troops to leave.
Still, Russian analysts are quick to note that Moscow is treading cautiously in the wake of the Suleimani killing and the ensuing U.S. and Iranian responses. Despite Russian condemnation of the Suleimani killing, Moscow has not pledged any concrete actions in support of Tehran, and analysts say that Putin is unlikely to back any Iranian attempts at retaliation and may be limited in ways to bolster Tehran.
According to Adlan Margoev, an analyst on Russian-Iranian relations at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, a university run by the Russian foreign ministry, the Kremlin’s main concerns are preventing escalation in the region that could overturn the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East that its Syrian intervention helped enshrine and to keep charting the course that Putin has carved out for Russian interests across the region.
“Nothing strategic has drastically changed for Moscow yet,” he said. “It’s a difficult situation for Moscow to navigate, but that’s normal in a way. All Russia does is deal with difficult situations in the Middle East.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-08--Iran’s Revenge Plans Are Bigger Than Missile Strikes

The assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , perhaps the second most powerful person in Iran behind Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei , will reverberate in the Middle East and beyond for years , and perhaps decades .
But the immediate consequences , several U.S. intelligence officials say privately , will be clear : more deaths , and some of them American .
Tuesday ’ s noisy attacks , despite the reassuring words of the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that they were a “ proportionate measure , ” were only the beginning .
Those killings will be carried out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iraq by a U.S. drone strike , himself built .
The institution Suleimani led , the Quds Force—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ’ powerful hybrid military intelligence agency and covert action wing—midwifed Shiite extremist groups in Lebanon , Iraq , Yemen , Syria , Afghanistan , and elsewhere .
Suleimani understood that , unlike Russia or China , Iran was not , and would never be , powerful enough to challenge the United States head-on .
It would have to prepare for war differently .
This meant establishing deterrence ( in Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack through asymmetric means , by supporting proxy forces such as Lebanese Hezbollah , the world ’ s most formidable terrorist army .
It also meant backing spectacular acts of violence that did not rise to the level of , and would not precipitate , full-scale war .
The effectiveness of Suleimani and Iran ’ s larger program of terrorist assassinations , roadside bombs known as improvised explosive devices ( responsible for the deaths of over 600 U.S. soldiers ) , and the bombing of apartment buildings , Jewish community centers , tourist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s proxies showed that a state could forgo traditional means of power projection and nevertheless powerfully assert its suzerainty outside its own borders .
Those same tools will now be brought to bear by Iran on enacting vengeance for Suleimani—and not just in the region itself .
Senior U.S. Defense Department and intelligence officials are well aware that assassinating a senior official from a foreign military hierarchy exposes U.S. personnel to lethal retaliation by Iranian or Hezbollah operatives , who have tentacles in South America , Southeast Asia , Eastern Europe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely now .
“ The devil you know is better than the devil you don ’ t , ” said one former senior intelligence official of the killing of Suleimani .
“ We crossed a line.
” Prior high-profile U.S. killings , including those of the al Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and , recently , of the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria , differ from Suleimani ’ s in a key way : Though Suleimani also facilitated acts of terrorism , he was , foremost , a high-ranking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a real significance .
By ignoring this nonstate-state actor divide , the Trump administration has whittled away at a key global norm , one that may boomerang back , dangerously , on U.S. officials .
It is hard to know now what bright lines are left in the impending confrontation between the U.S. and Iran .
“ From this justice will come unpredictable chaos , ” said Douglas Wise , a former Defense Intelligence Agency deputy director and former longtime senior CIA official—a sentiment echoed by over half a dozen former U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since Suleimani ’ s death .
Some former officials worry about the potential for Iraq to fall back into civil war .
Others are concerned about a rising anti-American tide across the Middle East and a forcible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the region .
Most are shocked by the apparent lack of advance planning and deliberation by the Trump administration in making such a momentous move—a decision that could lead to war .
Middle Eastern intelligence officials are themselves “ gravely concerned ” over the U.S.-Iran conflict “ becoming an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mass violence , ” according to a former U.S. intelligence official in close touch with current officials in Iraq .
“ Suleimani ran Iraq with the supreme leader ’ s approval , ” said this person .
“ So you killed Suleimani : Does the Supreme Leader look at Suleimani as an extension of himself ?
If so , then it will be a long , bloody battle.
” The Iranians have built up “ long-term spy networks ” in such places as Kuwait , Bahrain , Saudi Arabia , and the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former official , that are used to inform potential Quds Force planning for potential future covert operations .
This enables Iran to “ push the pressure points ” —including military or terrorism-type actions—in these countries if need be , said the former official .
Further bloodshed—beyond Tuesday night ’ s scattered rocket attacks in Iraq—appears inevitable .
“ There is little doubt the U.S. will get hit hard in retaliatory strikes , perhaps globally and at a time and place of Iran ’ s choosing , ” said Marc Polymeropoulos , a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and counterterrorism experience who retired in June .
“ This event will not be without significant pain for many Americans.
” Other former senior U.S. intelligence officials agree .
“ There will be dead Americans , dead civilian Americans , as a result of this , ” said former acting CIA Director Michael Morell in an interview with CBS .
Iran has been preparing for this type of asymmetric conflict with the United States for decades , whether as a response to limited U.S. strikes to destroy Iran ’ s nuclear program or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frontal U.S. assault on the regime itself .
Going back to the 1990s , in the Middle East , Latin America , Europe , and North America , U.S. officials have observed Iranian intelligence operatives and their Hezbollah proxies casing U.S. diplomatic facilities , cultural centers , and military bases for potential attacks .
Iranian operatives have also stalked U.S. officials abroad for potential assassinations .
Around 2013 , U.S. officials scrambled to stop what they believed were imminent plans by Iranian intelligence officials to undertake targeted killings of undercover Defense Department intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the information that led the Iranians to identify those officials was provided by a former Air Force intelligence officer , Monica Witt , who defected to Iran in 2013 .
With this outbreak of hostilities , Witt ’ s stock has likely risen in Iran .
“ It ’ s possible any information Witt provided may have become operationally stale , but Iranians can come to her and ask about the perspective of their target , ” said Wise , the former Defense Intelligence Agency deputy director .
“ She can provide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perspective on how the U.S. government may now take steps to defend itself against inexorable Iranian asymmetric attacks may be helpful in Iranian asymmetrical planning.
” In order to not invite an overwhelming U.S. military response , Iran may opt for a more diffuse campaign of violence focused on lower-profile targets .
These will likely involve U.S. personnel or facilities abroad , former officials said , such as the anonymous bombing of U.S. diplomatic outposts in Latin America , Southeast Asia , or the Middle East ; or the targeted killing of CIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are known to Iran or Hezbollah .
Such a campaign—especially if carried out by Hezbollah—would follow the playbook written by Suleimani himself , providing Iran the ability to inflict great pain , repeatedly , on U.S. targets , while also helping maintain a fig leaf of deniability over its actions .
If , as former U.S. intelligence officials fear , the conflict spirals , some believe that Iran or its Hezbollah proxies may choose to strike inside the United States .
Iran has shown a willingness to cross this line in the past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a plot by the Quds Force to assassinate the Saudi ambassador by bombing a popular Washington , D.C. , restaurant .
Suleimani ’ s protegees—and his mentor , Khamenei—may be looking at a range of what they seem as proportional targets in retaliation to the killing of such a senior Iranian official .
Iran and its proxies have also clearly made contingency plans , including by dispatching sleeper agents , to plot potential attacks on soft targets within the U.S. homeland .
Last year , two Iranian men , including one based in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Iranian intelligence operatives .
One cased a Jewish center in Chicago and assembled targeting packages on Iranian dissidents within the United States .
And in a separate case , Ali Kourani , a Lebanese American man , was found guilty in 2019 of working as a Hezbollah operative in New York and assembling potential targeting data on local U.S. government facilities and John F. Kennedy International Airport .
The Kourani case , in particular , may offer a peek into the future .
In 2010 , Kourani was told by his Hezbollah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers living in New York for potential assassination , according to court documents .
This , Kourani said , was retaliation for Israel ’ s killing , two years earlier , of Imad Mughniyeh , Hezbollah ’ s chief operational leader .
Memories are long .
The initial outbreak of hostilities—a few missiles lobbed at U.S. military bases in Iraq , or maybe later across the Persian Gulf ; a bombing of U.S. diplomatic facilities—may give way , over time , to a long , hard tit-for-tat campaign spanning continents : not quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state of peace .
The philosopher Hannah Arendt once wrote that “ the practice of violence , like all action , changes the world , but the most probable change is to a more violent world.
” Suleimani ’ s bloody legacy testifies to that .

The assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, perhaps the second most powerful person in Iran behind Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, will reverberate in the Middle East and beyond for years, and perhaps decades. But the immediate consequences, several U.S. intelligence officials say privately, will be clear: more deaths, and some of them American. Tuesday’s noisy attacks, despite the reassuring words of the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that they were a “proportionate measure,” were only the beginning.
The assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, perhaps the second most powerful person in Iran behind Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, will reverberate in the Middle East and beyond for years, and perhaps decades. But the immediate consequences, several U.S. intelligence officials say privately, will be clear: more deaths, and some of them American. Tuesday’s noisy attacks, despite the reassuring words of the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that they were a “proportionate measure,” were only the beginning.
Those killings will be carried out using tools Suleimani, who was assassinated in Iraq by a U.S. drone strike, himself built. The institution Suleimani led, the Quds Force—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ powerful hybrid military intelligence agency and covert action wing—midwifed Shiite extremist groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
Suleimani understood that, unlike Russia or China, Iran was not, and would never be, powerful enough to challenge the United States head-on. It would have to prepare for war differently. This meant establishing deterrence (in Iran’s thinking) against a U.S. attack through asymmetric means, by supporting proxy forces such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the world’s most formidable terrorist army. It also meant backing spectacular acts of violence that did not rise to the level of, and would not precipitate, full-scale war.
The effectiveness of Suleimani and Iran’s larger program of terrorist assassinations, roadside bombs known as improvised explosive devices (responsible for the deaths of over 600 U.S. soldiers), and the bombing of apartment buildings, Jewish community centers, tourist buses, and diplomatic facilities by Iran’s proxies showed that a state could forgo traditional means of power projection and nevertheless powerfully assert its suzerainty outside its own borders.
Those same tools will now be brought to bear by Iran on enacting vengeance for Suleimani—and not just in the region itself. Senior U.S. Defense Department and intelligence officials are well aware that assassinating a senior official from a foreign military hierarchy exposes U.S. personnel to lethal retaliation by Iranian or Hezbollah operatives, who have tentacles in South America, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. This retaliation is certainly likely now. “The devil you know is better than the devil you don’t,” said one former senior intelligence official of the killing of Suleimani. “We crossed a line.”
Prior high-profile U.S. killings, including those of the al Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and, recently, of the Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria, differ from Suleimani’s in a key way: Though Suleimani also facilitated acts of terrorism, he was, foremost, a high-ranking government official. This is a distinction with a real significance.
By ignoring this nonstate-state actor divide, the Trump administration has whittled away at a key global norm, one that may boomerang back, dangerously, on U.S. officials. It is hard to know now what bright lines are left in the impending confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.
“From this justice will come unpredictable chaos,” said Douglas Wise, a former Defense Intelligence Agency deputy director and former longtime senior CIA official—a sentiment echoed by over half a dozen former U.S. intelligence officials I’ve spoken with since Suleimani’s death. Some former officials worry about the potential for Iraq to fall back into civil war. Others are concerned about a rising anti-American tide across the Middle East and a forcible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the region. Most are shocked by the apparent lack of advance planning and deliberation by the Trump administration in making such a momentous move—a decision that could lead to war.
Middle Eastern intelligence officials are themselves “gravely concerned” over the U.S.-Iran conflict “becoming an unending cycle of high impact and retaliatory mass violence,” according to a former U.S. intelligence official in close touch with current officials in Iraq. “Suleimani ran Iraq with the supreme leader’s approval,” said this person. “So you killed Suleimani: Does the Supreme Leader look at Suleimani as an extension of himself? If so, then it will be a long, bloody battle.”
The Iranians have built up “long-term spy networks” in such places as Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, according to the same former official, that are used to inform potential Quds Force planning for potential future covert operations. This enables Iran to “push the pressure points”—including military or terrorism-type actions—in these countries if need be, said the former official.
Further bloodshed—beyond Tuesday night’s scattered rocket attacks in Iraq—appears inevitable. “There is little doubt the U.S. will get hit hard in retaliatory strikes, perhaps globally and at a time and place of Iran’s choosing,” said Marc Polymeropoulos, a former senior CIA official with extensive Middle Eastern and counterterrorism experience who retired in June. “This event will not be without significant pain for many Americans.” Other former senior U.S. intelligence officials agree. “There will be dead Americans, dead civilian Americans, as a result of this,” said former acting CIA Director Michael Morell in an interview with CBS.
Iran has been preparing for this type of asymmetric conflict with the United States for decades, whether as a response to limited U.S. strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program or as a reaction to a long-feared, frontal U.S. assault on the regime itself. Going back to the 1990s, in the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and North America, U.S. officials have observed Iranian intelligence operatives and their Hezbollah proxies casing U.S. diplomatic facilities, cultural centers, and military bases for potential attacks.
Iranian operatives have also stalked U.S. officials abroad for potential assassinations. Around 2013, U.S. officials scrambled to stop what they believed were imminent plans by Iranian intelligence officials to undertake targeted killings of undercover Defense Department intelligence officials in Europe. U.S. officials believe that the information that led the Iranians to identify those officials was provided by a former Air Force intelligence officer, Monica Witt, who defected to Iran in 2013.
With this outbreak of hostilities, Witt’s stock has likely risen in Iran. “It’s possible any information Witt provided may have become operationally stale, but Iranians can come to her and ask about the perspective of their target,” said Wise, the former Defense Intelligence Agency deputy director. “She can provide great value to them there. Her perspective on how the U.S. government may now take steps to defend itself against inexorable Iranian asymmetric attacks may be helpful in Iranian asymmetrical planning.”
In order to not invite an overwhelming U.S. military response, Iran may opt for a more diffuse campaign of violence focused on lower-profile targets. These will likely involve U.S. personnel or facilities abroad, former officials said, such as the anonymous bombing of U.S. diplomatic outposts in Latin America, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East; or the targeted killing of CIA officers working under diplomatic cover whose identities are known to Iran or Hezbollah. Such a campaign—especially if carried out by Hezbollah—would follow the playbook written by Suleimani himself, providing Iran the ability to inflict great pain, repeatedly, on U.S. targets, while also helping maintain a fig leaf of deniability over its actions.
If, as former U.S. intelligence officials fear, the conflict spirals, some believe that Iran or its Hezbollah proxies may choose to strike inside the United States. Iran has shown a willingness to cross this line in the past. In 2011, U.S. officials foiled a plot by the Quds Force to assassinate the Saudi ambassador by bombing a popular Washington, D.C., restaurant. Suleimani’s protegees—and his mentor, Khamenei—may be looking at a range of what they seem as proportional targets in retaliation to the killing of such a senior Iranian official.
Iran and its proxies have also clearly made contingency plans, including by dispatching sleeper agents, to plot potential attacks on soft targets within the U.S. homeland. Last year, two Iranian men, including one based in Los Angeles, pleaded guilty to working as Iranian intelligence operatives. One cased a Jewish center in Chicago and assembled targeting packages on Iranian dissidents within the United States. And in a separate case, Ali Kourani, a Lebanese American man, was found guilty in 2019 of working as a Hezbollah operative in New York and assembling potential targeting data on local U.S. government facilities and John F. Kennedy International Airport.
The Kourani case, in particular, may offer a peek into the future. In 2010, Kourani was told by his Hezbollah bosses to research current or former Israeli soldiers living in New York for potential assassination, according to court documents. This, Kourani said, was retaliation for Israel’s killing, two years earlier, of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief operational leader.
Memories are long. The initial outbreak of hostilities—a few missiles lobbed at U.S. military bases in Iraq, or maybe later across the Persian Gulf; a bombing of U.S. diplomatic facilities—may give way, over time, to a long, hard tit-for-tat campaign spanning continents: not quite a war, but far from a state of peace. The philosopher Hannah Arendt once wrote that “the practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.” Suleimani’s bloody legacy testifies to that.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-08--Hezbollah’s Moment of Truth

Hezbollah’s Moment of Truth

Even before he was assassinated by U.S. drones this month , Qassem Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ’ Quds Force , was having a difficult few months .
For years , he had steadily expanded his operations through proxies in Lebanon , Syria , and Iraq .
But recently , his forces had taken numerous hits .
The Israeli army had attacked many Iranian bases in Syria and Iraq ( and potentially Lebanon ) , killing a large number of Lebanese and Iraqi fighters and commanders and eliminating most of Suleimani ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losses , Suleimani had one thing going for him : that he was never forced to directly confront the United States .
Eyes on the main prize of securing Iran ’ s influence over the region , he played down any mishaps and promised a response at “ the right time and place , ” a mantra for Iranian proxies and officials in recent years .
But the right time and place didn ’ t come .
Suleimani , the grand orchestrator of Iran ’ s regional power , was killed .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Doing nothing will indicate weakness , but responding forcefully could also expose the regime and its proxies to more U.S. strikes .
Given the constraints , it is likely that Iran will avoid drastic measures that could lead to war .
Rather , it will continue the same path blazed by Suleimani : no direct confrontation with its main foe , but a serious effort to secure Iran ’ s institutional influence in the region .
And Hezbollah—one of its main regional partners , which in recent days has promised a campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same .
Meanwhile , at a memorial service for Suleimani in Beirut ’ s southern suburbs on Jan. 5 , Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called for a far harsher response .
The U.S. military , he said , would have to pay the price for the killing of Suleimani , warning that its soldiers and officers would return home in coffins .
He declared that responding to the assassination would not be Iran ’ s responsibility alone , but all of its allies ’ too .
He cautioned , though , that U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fair punishment , ” he argued , would be aimed at “ the American military presence in the region : American military bases , American naval ships , every American officer and soldier in our countries and region.
” His comments came a day after Zainab Suleimani , Qassem Suleimani ’ s daughter , was interviewed on Hezbollah ’ s Al-Manar TV channel .
She said that she has faith in Nasrallah .
“ I know that he will avenge my father ’ s blood , ” she added .
Her statement was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon take the initiative to launch a military response against the United States .
Rather , it was clever messaging , a reminder of Iran ’ s regional power , and a hint at how Suleimani himself had cultivated Hezbollah into one of Iran ’ s most valuable allies .
In fact , fiery rhetoric aside , Nasrallah knows that he can not be directly involved in any kind of retribution .
It is telling that , in his remarks , he didn ’ t mention Lebanon once , nor did he hint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his bravado , Nasrallah knows that the best option for him and Iran is to continue to be pragmatic and not start a regional war .
For the past decade , Hezbollah ’ s strategy in Lebanon has been to preserve stability , but the kind of stability that protects Iran ’ s interests .
That ’ s exactly why the group saw the recent protests in Lebanon as a challenge that needed to be silenced .
Hezbollah sent in its thugs to attack the protesters in the streets , mainly in Shiite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against Shiite dissidents and activists .
Suleimani himself had frequently traveled to Beirut to help quell the marches by advising Hezbollah ’ s officials on how and when to engage with the protestors .
His strategy was focused on two goals : stopping Shiites from participating and pressuring security institutions to crush them .
He understood that any turmoil could pose a risk to Iran ’ s fragile interests and accomplishments in the region .
For now , Hezbollah still has control over the Lebanese state and its institutions , although its popularity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the opportunity afforded by Suleimani ’ s death to try to regain some of this popularly and revive its image by painting the United States as the bad guy , although this strategy has not recently worked for the group .
Lebanese people seem more focused today on the economy and daily hardships , rather than ideological rhetoric .
All this means that Hezbollah will have an uphill battle reconsolidating its power .
Beyond that , the group would have a hard time mustering a campaign of revenge even if it wanted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its elite forces in Syria and the rest of the region .
Much of its current fighting force is made up of new recruits who still need to be organized and structured .
That takes time , and it is also proving difficult , because many of the new fighters were hastily recruited during the Syria crisis and have been difficult to train .
Its finances are also under strain , given Iran ’ s own budgetary woes , and the group has limited bandwidth to take on any new adventures .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its power in Iraq via state institutions and limited maneuvers against U.S. troops , Hezbollah will try to do the same in Lebanon .
First , it will likely make an effort to form a government in Lebanon that will be more closely affiliated with the group and its allies .
And second , Hezbollah will try to sell this government as the only option that would ensure stability , hoping that the international community will value quiet over reform , especially as the region is boiling with tension .
At the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confrontation , Hezbollah will most likely work to rebuild its arsenal of precision missiles and prepare for war in the future .
And , finally , it will try to turn the Lebanese economic crisis to its own advantage .
For example , it may increase its smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian borders to bring in food and medicine from Iraq and Syria .
That is already happening at a small scale and has allowed Hezbollah to build a parallel economy in Lebanon .
When the Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February 2008 , the group ’ s most forceful response was inside Lebanon , where it deployed weapons against Lebanese throughout the summer .
That was the moment Hezbollah took over Lebanon , by eliminating the adversary March 14 government and founding the national unity government , which has since put Lebanon under the group ’ s authority .
Given Iran and Hezbollah ’ s likely strategy , the best way to contain them is to support and empower the people of Lebanon and Iraq , who are the real faction that can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support .
They are the genuine agents of change in the region .

Even before he was assassinated by U.S. drones this month, Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, was having a difficult few months.
Even before he was assassinated by U.S. drones this month, Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, was having a difficult few months.
For years, he had steadily expanded his operations through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. But recently, his forces had taken numerous hits. The Israeli army had attacked many Iranian bases in Syria and Iraq (and potentially Lebanon), killing a large number of Lebanese and Iraqi fighters and commanders and eliminating most of Suleimani’s precision missile factories.
Despite the considerable losses, Suleimani had one thing going for him: that he was never forced to directly confront the United States. Eyes on the main prize of securing Iran’s influence over the region, he played down any mishaps and promised a response at “the right time and place,” a mantra for Iranian proxies and officials in recent years.
But the right time and place didn’t come. Suleimani, the grand orchestrator of Iran’s regional power, was killed. And now Iran is in a difficult position. Doing nothing will indicate weakness, but responding forcefully could also expose the regime and its proxies to more U.S. strikes. Given the constraints, it is likely that Iran will avoid drastic measures that could lead to war. Rather, it will continue the same path blazed by Suleimani: no direct confrontation with its main foe, but a serious effort to secure Iran’s institutional influence in the region. And Hezbollah—one of its main regional partners, which in recent days has promised a campaign of fire and fury—will likely do the same.
Signs of Iran and Hezbollah’s strategy have already started to surface. On Jan. 5, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by any limits of its 2015 nuclear deal. Iraq’s parliament likewise passed a resolution calling for the removal of all remaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Days later, Iran struck American bases in Iraq, after which it claimed it does not seek war.
Meanwhile, at a memorial service for Suleimani in Beirut’s southern suburbs on Jan. 5, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called for a far harsher response. The U.S. military, he said, would have to pay the price for the killing of Suleimani, warning that its soldiers and officers would return home in coffins. He declared that responding to the assassination would not be Iran’s responsibility alone, but all of its allies’ too. He cautioned, though, that U.S. civilians should not be targeted. “Fair punishment,” he argued, would be aimed at “the American military presence in the region: American military bases, American naval ships, every American officer and soldier in our countries and region.”
His comments came a day after Zainab Suleimani, Qassem Suleimani’s daughter, was interviewed on Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV channel. She said that she has faith in Nasrallah. “I know that he will avenge my father’s blood,” she added.
Her statement was not really an indication that Hezbollah will soon take the initiative to launch a military response against the United States. Rather, it was clever messaging, a reminder of Iran’s regional power, and a hint at how Suleimani himself had cultivated Hezbollah into one of Iran’s most valuable allies.
In fact, fiery rhetoric aside, Nasrallah knows that he cannot be directly involved in any kind of retribution. It is telling that, in his remarks, he didn’t mention Lebanon once, nor did he hint at Israel as a target. Despite his bravado, Nasrallah knows that the best option for him and Iran is to continue to be pragmatic and not start a regional war.
For the past decade, Hezbollah’s strategy in Lebanon has been to preserve stability, but the kind of stability that protects Iran’s interests. That’s exactly why the group saw the recent protests in Lebanon as a challenge that needed to be silenced. Hezbollah sent in its thugs to attack the protesters in the streets, mainly in Shiite towns and villages, and increased threats against Shiite dissidents and activists. Suleimani himself had frequently traveled to Beirut to help quell the marches by advising Hezbollah’s officials on how and when to engage with the protestors. His strategy was focused on two goals: stopping Shiites from participating and pressuring security institutions to crush them. He understood that any turmoil could pose a risk to Iran’s fragile interests and accomplishments in the region.
For now, Hezbollah still has control over the Lebanese state and its institutions, although its popularity has been damaged. Hezbollah will take the opportunity afforded by Suleimani’s death to try to regain some of this popularly and revive its image by painting the United States as the bad guy, although this strategy has not recently worked for the group. Lebanese people seem more focused today on the economy and daily hardships, rather than ideological rhetoric. All this means that Hezbollah will have an uphill battle reconsolidating its power.
Beyond that, the group would have a hard time mustering a campaign of revenge even if it wanted to. It lost a large number of its elite forces in Syria and the rest of the region. Much of its current fighting force is made up of new recruits who still need to be organized and structured. That takes time, and it is also proving difficult, because many of the new fighters were hastily recruited during the Syria crisis and have been difficult to train. Its finances are also under strain, given Iran’s own budgetary woes, and the group has limited bandwidth to take on any new adventures.
And so, as Iran tries to consolidate its power in Iraq via state institutions and limited maneuvers against U.S. troops, Hezbollah will try to do the same in Lebanon.
First, it will likely make an effort to form a government in Lebanon that will be more closely affiliated with the group and its allies. And second, Hezbollah will try to sell this government as the only option that would ensure stability, hoping that the international community will value quiet over reform, especially as the region is boiling with tension.
At the same time, even as it avoids military confrontation, Hezbollah will most likely work to rebuild its arsenal of precision missiles and prepare for war in the future. And, finally, it will try to turn the Lebanese economic crisis to its own advantage. For example, it may increase its smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian borders to bring in food and medicine from Iraq and Syria. That is already happening at a small scale and has allowed Hezbollah to build a parallel economy in Lebanon.
Bloody revenge may sound great to Iran and Hezbollah supporters, but a steady, bloodless takeover across the region will pay off better in the long term.
When the Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated by the CIA and Mossad in Syria in February 2008, the group’s most forceful response was inside Lebanon, where it deployed weapons against Lebanese throughout the summer. That was the moment Hezbollah took over Lebanon, by eliminating the adversary March 14 government and founding the national unity government, which has since put Lebanon under the group’s authority.
Given Iran and Hezbollah’s likely strategy, the best way to contain them is to support and empower the people of Lebanon and Iraq, who are the real faction that can offer or deny Iran’s proxies support. They are the genuine agents of change in the region.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Trump Avoids North Korea as Iran Standoff Heats Up

For more than a decade , the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations : sanctions , sanctions , and more sanctions .
But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “ new strategic weapon ” to the world this year , the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
And so has U.S. President Donald Trump—especially now that he faces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Iran .
For nearly a year , Trump has found Pyongyang unwilling to engage with his all-or-nothing approach—full denuclearization first , then sanctions relief—yet at the same time he has been reluctant to pile on the pressure .
Indeed , Trump appears eager to avoid a fresh confrontation with Pyongyang that could result in an acceleration of its nuclear weapons program or armed conflict .
But Kim may have other ideas .
The North Korean leader whom Trump sought to charm with summit diplomacy a year ago plainly doesn ’ t like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision last week to assassinate a high-ranking Iranian general , Qassem Suleimani , was also no doubt unnerving to the perpetually insecure North Koreans .
At a recent party meeting , Kim took a new harsh tone , pledging the unveiling of a “ new strategic weapon ” and referring to its “ long-term confrontation with the United States.
” Trump ’ s biggest problem may be that he is entering 2020 without a viable strategy toward either hostile power , said Suzanne DiMaggio , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran , ” DiMaggio said .
“ A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs .
“ The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran , ” DiMaggio said .
“ A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs.
” … In the current context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imagine a quick ratcheting up of hostilities with Pyongyang , including once again spiraling toward a military confrontation like we experienced in 2017.
” It is a view held by many critics , including former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton , who says Trump ’ s former charm offensive with Kim only served to weaken his administration ’ s hard-line “ maximum pressure ” campaign , which is designed to apply increasing political and economic pressure on the regime until it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on North Korea is just unfortunately not true , ” Bolton told Axios in December .
And now Trump must deal with pressure from China and Russia to go easier on Pyongyang .
Last month , Moscow circulated a U.N. Security Council resolution , backed by China and Russia , calling to lift some existing trade sanctions , not impose new ones , to help spur stalled talks between the United States and North Korea .
Key regional allies , including South Korea , are reluctant to see the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as they did in 2017 , when Trump threatened to unleash “ fire and fury ” on Pyongyang in response to a series of long-range ballistic missile tests .
For the moment , the White House seems to be searching for a new diplomatic path forward in North Korea , even as Pyongyang has escalated tensions with the United States , resuming a series of ballistic missile tests in recent months .
“ The natural instinct would be to try to ramp up sanctions [ in response to such North Korean provocations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former advisor on North Korea to President George W. Bush .
“ But I think it ’ s harder because China , Russia , and South Korea have clearly signaled that they want to go in a different direction .
They don ’ t want to backslide in 2020 to 2017 and all that fire and fury stuff.
” Hanging over the debate is the question of whether Trump—eager to strike an election-year deal with Kim—would be willing to shrug off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I think Trump understands sanctions provide him with leverage over North Korea , ” Cha told Foreign Policy , voicing concern that Trump might be willing to accept a bad deal with Kim in order to produce a diplomatic success .
“ The real question is how badly does he want a deal in an election year .
Does he want a deal so badly that he is willing to sacrifice [ a new round of ] sanctions ?
” Few experts on North Korea ever believed it was possible to convince @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aspiration that appears even more distant after Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and targeted a top Iranian military leader for assassination .
But many felt U.S. engagement could help put the relationship on a more stable footing and gradually constrain North Korea ’ s nuclear ambitions .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters in Washington on Tuesday that the administration remains hopeful that it can still pursue negotiations , citing North Korea ’ s decision not to make good on Kim ’ s pledge to deliver a “ Christmas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat to test a nuclear explosive or an intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) by the end of 2019 .
“ We still remain engaged and hopeful that we can have a conversation about how to get the denuclearization that Chairman Kim promised to President Trump back in 2018 , ” Pompeo said .
Over the past year , the White House has been reluctant to ratchet up pressure on North Korea in the U.N. Security Council , playing down the importance of a spate of short-range ballistic missile tests , including a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises , and blocking an effort by European powers to convene a meeting last month to highlight the North Korean regime ’ s abominable human rights record .
When Britain , France , and Germany decided in August 2019 to issue a joint statement condemning North Korea ’ s missile launches , the United States stood on the sidelines .
The latest crisis comes against a background of unprecedented high-level diplomatic talks between U.S. and North Korean leaders , who signed a vaguely worded joint statement at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula .
But those talks faltered since the two leaders failed at a February 2019 summit in Hanoi to strike a follow-up deal .
Kim—who was disappointed by Trump ’ s refusal to offer sanctions relief without verifiable evidence that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear weapons program—has since ended a moratorium on ballistic missile tests .
Attempts by Trump ’ s North Korea envoy , Stephen Biegun , who was recently appointed deputy secretary of state , to conduct follow-up talks have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterparts .
“ I don ’ t see anything going on [ on the diplomatic front ] , ” said Bruce Klinger , a former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation ’ s Asian Studies Center .
Biegun has been eager to open discussions with the North Koreans , but , according to Klinger , “ his phone doesn ’ t ring.
” That is perhaps little surprise since Biegun has backed away from the step-by-step approach he suggested in a speech last January and sided with administration hard-liners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have provided partial sanctions relief in exchange for less than full denuclearization , at least at first .
North Korea experts say there is little or no chance Kim will engage diplomatically if those are the stakes—as he hasn ’ t so far .
The relationship took another turn for the worse late last year , when Kim pledged to deliver a “ Christmas gift ” —which was viewed by U.S. national security officials as a threat to end a two-year moratorium on ballistic missile tests .
In a subsequent New Year ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no longer bound by his pledge to observe a moratorium on missile tests , accusing the United States of failing to grant relief from sanctions—though he left the door slightly ajar for the possibility of future talks .
Trump has largely downplayed the significance of North Korea ’ s latest barrage of missile tests and claims to still have trust in the North Korean leader ’ s pledge to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula .
“ I know he ’ s sending out certain messages about Christmas presents , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beautiful vase , ” Trump told reporters recently at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida .
Negotiations sputtered and stalled in 2019 , with Biegun being iced out of talks with his counterparts from Pyongyang and North Korea conducting a spate of weapons tests to signal its anger and impatience with Washington .
Despite this , some U.S. officials say they remain hopeful that talks will bear fruit , pointing to Kim not acting on his vague threat to deliver a “ Christmas gift.
” “ [ 2019 ] was a good year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ supposed to come to pass in December did not , ” a senior U.S. State Department official told reporters on Tuesday .
“ In general , the absence of severely provocative activity says we ’ re accomplishing our goals.
” Klinger and other experts on North Korea completely disagree .
“ There is a Trump administration policy and a President Trump policy , which are not always in unison , ” Klinger said .
“ Trump has undermined his own administration policy on maximum pressure.
” Ever since 2006 , when North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tests , Democratic and Republican presidents have routinely turned to the Security Council , securing support for 11 sanctions resolutions that have gradually chipped away at North Korea ’ s economy .
But those measures have been fraying in the face of increasingly lax enforcement by Pyongyang ’ s primary trading partner , China , and North Korean officials ’ skill at evading sanctions with “ seeming impunity ” through a web of front companies , cyber-blackmail , and a shadow fleet of shipping vessels carrying out illicit trade , according to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with monitoring sanctions breaches .
On Dec. 16 , Moscow circulated a draft Security Council resolution , backed by Russia and China , that called for lifting a broad range of measures related to “ the livelihood of the civilian population ” in North Korea .
It also called for ending prohibition on joint South Korean-North Korean programs designed to rebuild the country ’ s dilapidated rail and road systems and for facilitating the import of humanitarian aid , which currently requires the approval of a Security Council committee before it can enter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its European allies oppose easing sanctions until North Korea takes a series of verifiable steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program .
But the United States has been rather evasive about how it might respond to a new provocation from Pyongyang .
Trump ’ s U.N. envoy , Kelly Craft , warned last month that North Korea ’ s ballistic missile tests risked “ closing to door ” on negotiations and that the council would have to “ act accordingly ” if Pyongyang engaged in “ further hostility and threats.
” So far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into discussions with the council ’ s other members about potential sanctions .
That could change if North Korea were to cross some unstated red line , such as testing a more advanced ICBM or detonating a nuclear explosion .
“ Any discussion of a new road map or Security Council resolution must bear in mind the reality that over the past year and a half , [ North Korea ] has continued to advance its prohibited programs , test its prohibited programs , and repeatedly refuse to engage in sustained diplomatic engagement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Craft , however , made it clear that Washington would prefer a resumption of talks and said the United States would also be “ flexible ” in seeking a diplomatic way forward with North Korea .
But some observers say it may be too late .
Trump and his team “ lack the discipline and skills to engage in the kind of diplomacy it takes to get results and make real deals , ” Carnegie ’ s DiMaggio said .
Kim , she added , “ knows that the solidarity on sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead to weakened sanctions enforcement , which essentially means the end of maximum pressure.
” The United States and North Korea may have “ squandered a groundswell of political goodwill ” that accompanied the first high-level talks in 2018 because of “ unrealistic expectations ” about what could be achieved , said Jenny Town , a fellow at the Stimson Center and the managing editor of 38 North .
“ Now that things are falling apart , it ’ s hard to see where the pieces fit together anymore , especially if North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” she said .
“ We are in a downward spiral now .
”

For more than a decade, the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations: sanctions, sanctions, and more sanctions. But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “new strategic weapon” to the world this year, the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
For more than a decade, the United States and its partners on the U.N. Security Council have had a standard response to an array of North Korean nuclear weapons provocations: sanctions, sanctions, and more sanctions. But as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatens to introduce a “new strategic weapon” to the world this year, the 15-nation security body appears to have lost its appetite for imposing additional measures on Pyongyang to compel it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
And so has U.S. President Donald Trump—especially now that he faces a possible war with another nuclear offender: Iran. For nearly a year, Trump has found Pyongyang unwilling to engage with his all-or-nothing approach—full denuclearization first, then sanctions relief—yet at the same time he has been reluctant to pile on the pressure. Indeed, Trump appears eager to avoid a fresh confrontation with Pyongyang that could result in an acceleration of its nuclear weapons program or armed conflict.
But Kim may have other ideas. The North Korean leader whom Trump sought to charm with summit diplomacy a year ago plainly doesn’t like being ignored. Trump’s surprise decision last week to assassinate a high-ranking Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani, was also no doubt unnerving to the perpetually insecure North Koreans. At a recent party meeting, Kim took a new harsh tone, pledging the unveiling of a “new strategic weapon” and referring to its “long-term confrontation with the United States.”
Trump’s biggest problem may be that he is entering 2020 without a viable strategy toward either hostile power, said Suzanne DiMaggio, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran,” DiMaggio said. “A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs. “The failed maximum pressure campaign against Iran has brought us to the brink of war with Tehran,” DiMaggio said. “A similar incoherent and inflexible approach has led the North Koreans to double down on advancing their nuclear and missile programs.”… In the current context, it’s not hard to imagine a quick ratcheting up of hostilities with Pyongyang, including once again spiraling toward a military confrontation like we experienced in 2017.”
It is a view held by many critics, including former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton, who says Trump’s former charm offensive with Kim only served to weaken his administration’s hard-line “maximum pressure” campaign, which is designed to apply increasing political and economic pressure on the regime until it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. “The idea that we are somehow exerting maximum pressure on North Korea is just unfortunately not true,” Bolton told Axios in December.
And now Trump must deal with pressure from China and Russia to go easier on Pyongyang. Last month, Moscow circulated a U.N. Security Council resolution, backed by China and Russia, calling to lift some existing trade sanctions, not impose new ones, to help spur stalled talks between the United States and North Korea. Key regional allies, including South Korea, are reluctant to see the United States and North Korea return to a war footing, as they did in 2017, when Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” on Pyongyang in response to a series of long-range ballistic missile tests.
For the moment, the White House seems to be searching for a new diplomatic path forward in North Korea, even as Pyongyang has escalated tensions with the United States, resuming a series of ballistic missile tests in recent months.
“The natural instinct would be to try to ramp up sanctions [in response to such North Korean provocations],” said Victor Cha, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former advisor on North Korea to President George W. Bush. “But I think it’s harder because China, Russia, and South Korea have clearly signaled that they want to go in a different direction. They don’t want to backslide in 2020 to 2017 and all that fire and fury stuff.”
Hanging over the debate is the question of whether Trump—eager to strike an election-year deal with Kim—would be willing to shrug off a serious provocation by North Korea.
“I think Trump understands sanctions provide him with leverage over North Korea,” Cha told Foreign Policy, voicing concern that Trump might be willing to accept a bad deal with Kim in order to produce a diplomatic success. “The real question is how badly does he want a deal in an election year. Does he want a deal so badly that he is willing to sacrifice [a new round of] sanctions?”
Few experts on North Korea ever believed it was possible to convince Kim to abandon his entire nuclear program—an aspiration that appears even more distant after Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and targeted a top Iranian military leader for assassination. But many felt U.S. engagement could help put the relationship on a more stable footing and gradually constrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters in Washington on Tuesday that the administration remains hopeful that it can still pursue negotiations, citing North Korea’s decision not to make good on Kim’s pledge to deliver a “Christmas gift”—which some viewed as a threat to test a nuclear explosive or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by the end of 2019. “We still remain engaged and hopeful that we can have a conversation about how to get the denuclearization that Chairman Kim promised to President Trump back in 2018,” Pompeo said.
Over the past year, the White House has been reluctant to ratchet up pressure on North Korea in the U.N. Security Council, playing down the importance of a spate of short-range ballistic missile tests, including a submarine-based ballistic missile launch, delaying plans for joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, and blocking an effort by European powers to convene a meeting last month to highlight the North Korean regime’s abominable human rights record. When Britain, France, and Germany decided in August 2019 to issue a joint statement condemning North Korea’s missile launches, the United States stood on the sidelines.
The latest crisis comes against a background of unprecedented high-level diplomatic talks between U.S. and North Korean leaders, who signed a vaguely worded joint statement at a June 2018 summit in Singapore committing North Korea to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
But those talks faltered since the two leaders failed at a February 2019 summit in Hanoi to strike a follow-up deal. Kim—who was disappointed by Trump’s refusal to offer sanctions relief without verifiable evidence that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear weapons program—has since ended a moratorium on ballistic missile tests. Attempts by Trump’s North Korea envoy, Stephen Biegun, who was recently appointed deputy secretary of state, to conduct follow-up talks have been met with silence from his North Korean counterparts.
“I don’t see anything going on [on the diplomatic front],” said Bruce Klinger, a former CIA analyst and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Biegun has been eager to open discussions with the North Koreans, but, according to Klinger, “his phone doesn’t ring.”
That is perhaps little surprise since Biegun has backed away from the step-by-step approach he suggested in a speech last January and sided with administration hard-liners in rejecting a phased negotiation that might have provided partial sanctions relief in exchange for less than full denuclearization, at least at first.
North Korea experts say there is little or no chance Kim will engage diplomatically if those are the stakes—as he hasn’t so far.
The relationship took another turn for the worse late last year, when Kim pledged to deliver a “Christmas gift”—which was viewed by U.S. national security officials as a threat to end a two-year moratorium on ballistic missile tests. In a subsequent New Year’s address, Kim said he was no longer bound by his pledge to observe a moratorium on missile tests, accusing the United States of failing to grant relief from sanctions—though he left the door slightly ajar for the possibility of future talks.
Trump has largely downplayed the significance of North Korea’s latest barrage of missile tests and claims to still have trust in the North Korean leader’s pledge to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. “I know he’s sending out certain messages about Christmas presents, and I hope his Christmas present is a beautiful vase,” Trump told reporters recently at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida.
Negotiations sputtered and stalled in 2019, with Biegun being iced out of talks with his counterparts from Pyongyang and North Korea conducting a spate of weapons tests to signal its anger and impatience with Washington. Despite this, some U.S. officials say they remain hopeful that talks will bear fruit, pointing to Kim not acting on his vague threat to deliver a “Christmas gift.”
“[2019] was a good year. … We saw the threats that were supposed to come to pass in December did not,” a senior U.S. State Department official told reporters on Tuesday. “In general, the absence of severely provocative activity says we’re accomplishing our goals.”
Klinger and other experts on North Korea completely disagree. “There is a Trump administration policy and a President Trump policy, which are not always in unison,” Klinger said. “Trump has undermined his own administration policy on maximum pressure.”
Ever since 2006, when North Korea carried out the first of six nuclear tests, Democratic and Republican presidents have routinely turned to the Security Council, securing support for 11 sanctions resolutions that have gradually chipped away at North Korea’s economy.
But those measures have been fraying in the face of increasingly lax enforcement by Pyongyang’s primary trading partner, China, and North Korean officials’ skill at evading sanctions with “seeming impunity” through a web of front companies, cyber-blackmail, and a shadow fleet of shipping vessels carrying out illicit trade, according to a U.N. Security Council panel of experts charged with monitoring sanctions breaches.
On Dec. 16, Moscow circulated a draft Security Council resolution, backed by Russia and China, that called for lifting a broad range of measures related to “the livelihood of the civilian population” in North Korea. It also called for ending prohibition on joint South Korean-North Korean programs designed to rebuild the country’s dilapidated rail and road systems and for facilitating the import of humanitarian aid, which currently requires the approval of a Security Council committee before it can enter the country.
The United States and its European allies oppose easing sanctions until North Korea takes a series of verifiable steps to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. But the United States has been rather evasive about how it might respond to a new provocation from Pyongyang.
Trump’s U.N. envoy, Kelly Craft, warned last month that North Korea’s ballistic missile tests risked “closing to door” on negotiations and that the council would have to “act accordingly” if Pyongyang engaged in “further hostility and threats.”
So far, the United States has not entered into discussions with the council’s other members about potential sanctions. That could change if North Korea were to cross some unstated red line, such as testing a more advanced ICBM or detonating a nuclear explosion.
“Any discussion of a new road map or Security Council resolution must bear in mind the reality that over the past year and a half, [North Korea] has continued to advance its prohibited programs, test its prohibited programs, and repeatedly refuse to engage in sustained diplomatic engagement,” Craft told the Security Council.
Craft, however, made it clear that Washington would prefer a resumption of talks and said the United States would also be “flexible” in seeking a diplomatic way forward with North Korea.
But some observers say it may be too late.
Trump and his team “lack the discipline and skills to engage in the kind of diplomacy it takes to get results and make real deals,” Carnegie’s DiMaggio said. Kim, she added, “knows that the solidarity on sanctions relief expressed by China and Russia will lead to weakened sanctions enforcement, which essentially means the end of maximum pressure.”
The United States and North Korea may have “squandered a groundswell of political goodwill” that accompanied the first high-level talks in 2018 because of “unrealistic expectations” about what could be achieved, said Jenny Town, a fellow at the Stimson Center and the managing editor of 38 North.
“Now that things are falling apart, it’s hard to see where the pieces fit together anymore, especially if North Korea goes down a more militaristic path,” she said. “We are in a downward spiral now.”
Foreign Policy staff writer Robbie Gramer contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Why Iran May Not Be Satisfied with a ‘Slap’ at Trump

Why Iran May Not Be Satisfied with a ‘ Slap ’ at Trump In a speech broadcast on Iranian state television on Wednesday , Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tacitly acknowledged that his nation ’ s missile strike on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops hadn ’ t amounted to much of a retaliation for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani .
“ Last night , they were given one slap , ” Khamenei said .
“ Such military actions are not enough as far the importance of retaliation is concerned .
What ’ s important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The question now is : What else can Iran do to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East , short of the all-out war that both Tehran and Washington have made clear they don ’ t want ?
Few U.S. actions have hit the Iranian leadership harder than the killing of Suleimani , who led the Quds Force , an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that conducts military operations outside Iran .
Though Suleimani ’ s deputy , Esmail Qaani , is already serving in his place , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focused on Afghanistan , and he is considered to be a far remove from Suleimani ’ s star quality or his predecessor ’ s intimate grasp of strategic battlefields , such as those in Iraq , Syria , and Lebanon .
Beyond that , the Iranian leadership appears somewhat divided about the sort of retaliation needed—what would satisfy national pride as well as the throngs of angry Iranians , dozens of whom were reportedly trampled to death Monday at Suleimani ’ s funeral procession—while at the same time not starting an open war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be an unmitigated disaster for Iran .
Whatever comes , the worst of it may not happen right away .
In terms of U.S. strikes on Iran , the only comparable moment was the April 1988 destruction of the Iranian navy by U.S. strikes , followed by the July 1988 accidental downing of an Iranian airliner and its 290 occupants by the United States .
In that case , it was eight years before Iran took its full revenge with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , serious retaliation may come sooner but not necessarily in days or weeks .
Those who know Iranian strategic culture are fond of saying that Iran has a “ long breath , ” meaning the Iranians are capable of tremendous strategic patience .
This is not always the case , of course .
In October 2011 , two Iranians were charged for plotting a car bombing at a restaurant in Washington , D.C. , to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States .
The attack seems to have been a hasty retaliatory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of an Arab Spring uprising of Bahraini Shiites eight months earlier .
That bungled plot , one of Suleimani ’ s less illustrious ventures , was an embarrassing fiasco and might caution Tehran against a new hasty response .
But for Khamenei , who formed a close fatherly bond with Suleimani and viewed him as a paragon of soldierly virtues and a next-generation leader , his death is deeply personal .
And the Islamic Republic is sending some unique messages this time .
On Jan. 4 , Iran took the unprecedented step of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mosque , near the regime ’ s religious center at Qom .
This important mosque is where the Persian Shiites believe their messiah , the Hidden Imam , reappeared one night during Ramadan .
For Shiites , red is the color of blood and revenge .
It is the symbol of Imam Abbas , a courageous warrior who tried to fight the caliph Yazid ’ s army even after his hands were cut off .
( The only recognizable part of Suleimani to survive was his ring-bearing hand . )
If additional retaliation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike on or near the Feb. 11 anniversary of the Islamic Revolution , which also happens to coincide with the 40th day of mourning for Suleimani , when Muslims memorialize the dead .
If alerted U.S. forces have demobilized , and if President Donald Trump is focused elsewhere , there could be an action intended to hurt but not goad America .
Indeed , Iran faces a major problem that could cause its leaders to think twice about Khamenei ’ s pledge of “ severe revenge.
” While national pride demanded a direct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike apparently was designed to minimize casualties since Iran ’ s leadership can ill afford a war with the United States , especially with its economy tottering under severe sanctions .
( The missile strike was preceded by a warning to Iraq ’ s government that was bound to be detected by the U.S. and followed by Iranian statements that underlined Tehran ’ s desire to de-escalate , for now . )
But that still leaves many options for retaliation open .
In the near term , Tehran may look to its nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issue is , in many ways , smarter terrain on which to fight , dividing Trump from his European allies : To much of the world , America—not Iran—is at fault for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
Europeans and U.N. leaders can not ignore the risk of a nuclear crisis .
This drove Iran to announce its newest step back from JCPOA commitments , ending some restrictions on uranium enrichment capacity , storage of enriched material , and research and development .
Other options would include @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel , partners such as Saudi Arabia , or U.S.-leaning politicians inside Iraq .
Deniable strikes would be preferable .
Cyberattacks might be used , counting on Trump ’ s track record of meeting lethal force with lethal force and using cyber-retaliation for lesser offenses .
As Tuesday night ’ s non-lethal strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq showed , Iran is quite capable of “ aiming to miss , ” something it has turned into an art form when it wants to send a message to the world without triggering devastating retaliation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely to mount its real and heavier response in the summer or fall , in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election .
Such an attack might find Trump distracted and less willing to incur political negatives by appearing to invite war ( unpopular with most Americans ) and by threatening to drive up gas prices .
The attacks might take the form of terrorist and military strikes on U.S. bases and ships in the Persian Gulf and Bab el-Mandeb ; proxy attacks on U.S. diplomatic stations in Lebanon , Iraq , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; cyberattacks on air traffic control or major industrial plants ; and terrorism attacks on the U.S. homeland—Iran can certainly do some of these actions and possibly all of them .
To figure out what moves Tehran might make next , it ’ s useful to trace the evolution of its policy toward Washington .
On Jan. 1 , Khamenei made a statement that reflected Iran ’ s usual policy against open conflict , a long-standing preference formed during the grueling eight-year war with Iraq .
“ We would not take the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ But if others want to impose something on this country , we will stand before them forcefully.
” At the moment that Khamenei made this comment , Suleimani ’ s proxies in Iraq had just killed an American contractor and suffered heavier than expected retaliation in the Dec. 29 strikes that killed 25 militiamen and wounded more than 50 .
Even so , Iranians had not been killed at that point , leaving Khamenei in his comfort zone : fighting the Americans to the last Iraqi , Afghan , Lebanese , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death ( alongside four other Iranian staff officers ) change Khamenei ’ s calculus ?
The last six months provide puzzling but potentially important insights into the Iranian regime ’ s real objectives .
One can identify three phases of escalation in Iranian-armed actions .
The first phase followed U.S. sanctioning of Iran ’ s oil sales in April 2019 , whereon Iran began to fire drones at Saudi pipelines , attack an Emirati oil anchorage , harass tankers in the Strait of Hormuz , and finally launch a breathtakingly audacious cruise missile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world in Saudi Arabia .
In this phase , Iran was careful not to kill Americans , only targeting U.S. drones on two occasions .
Iran ’ s motive seemed reasonably clear : to scare the world about cutting off Iranian oil and to indirectly pressure the United States to relent .
The problem was that Trump did not respond .
Iran seemed to recognize that and ceased the actions .
A new phase began with the October 2019 protests against Iranian-controlled governments in Iraq and Lebanon , which led to similar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a pressured Iranian regime seemed to have genuinely believed that the United States had a hand in fomenting the protests , and this may have driven Iran to cross the U.S. red line against harming an American .
In November and December 2019 , Iranian-backed strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq grew more reckless and finally killed an American on Dec. 27 .
As with the earlier provocative shootdown of a valuable U.S. MQ-4 drone over Hormuz on June 20 , 2019 – and now the January 7 , 2020 missile strikes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have “ costed in ” some form of retaliation when it risked killing Americans in Iraq .
Even the heavy U.S. strikes on Iran ’ s local proxy Kataib Hezbollah were tolerable to Tehran , but the unanticipated killing of Suleimani marked the outset of a new phase .
Today , for the first time , the Iranian regime is not only being strangled by sanctions and threatened by uprising , but it is also deeply , directly , and personally wounded by a U.S. strike .
Offsetting the deep anger inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump is alerted and in punchy form .
Unlike in June , when he nixed retaliation for the lost U.S. drone over collateral damage concerns , Trump is now threatening expansive retaliatory airstrikes on the Iranian mainland .
The worm has turned once again .
Neither the summer ’ s naval and missile actions nor the recent killing of an American have improved Iran ’ s position at all .
Open war initiated by Tehran would only ease Trump ’ s domestic worries about the lack of an authorization for the use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite the current rhetoric , it is even possible that Iran ’ s main response might be nonexistent—as was the case despite its thundering at the United States for the February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah ’ s Imad Mughniyeh , the highest-profile Iranian-backed commander to be killed until Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , who also died in the Jan. 3 attack .
We are still waiting almost 12 years later .
Showing the “ long breath ” for which it is famous , the Iranian regime may choose to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2021 it gets either a second-term Trump ( who is not vulnerable to reelection and who likes making deals ) or a peacenik Democrat with four or eight years of running time .

In a speech broadcast on Iranian state television on Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tacitly acknowledged that his nation's missile strike on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops hadn't amounted to much of a retaliation for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. “Last night, they were given one slap,” Khamenei said . “Such military actions are not enough as far the importance of retaliation is concerned. What’s important is that their corruption-creating presence should end.”
In a speech broadcast on Iranian state television on Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tacitly acknowledged that his nation’s missile strike on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops hadn’t amounted to much of a retaliation for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. “Last night, they were given one slap,” Khamenei said. “Such military actions are not enough as far the importance of retaliation is concerned. What’s important is that their corruption-creating presence should end.”
The question now is: What else can Iran do to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East, short of the all-out war that both Tehran and Washington have made clear they don’t want? Few U.S. actions have hit the Iranian leadership harder than the killing of Suleimani, who led the Quds Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that conducts military operations outside Iran. Though Suleimani’s deputy, Esmail Qaani, is already serving in his place, the new commander is a stolid workhorse focused on Afghanistan, and he is considered to be a far remove from Suleimani’s star quality or his predecessor’s intimate grasp of strategic battlefields, such as those in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Beyond that, the Iranian leadership appears somewhat divided about the sort of retaliation needed—what would satisfy national pride as well as the throngs of angry Iranians, dozens of whom were reportedly trampled to death Monday at Suleimani’s funeral procession—while at the same time not starting an open war with the United States, which would be an unmitigated disaster for Iran.
Whatever comes, the worst of it may not happen right away. In terms of U.S. strikes on Iran, the only comparable moment was the April 1988 destruction of the Iranian navy by U.S. strikes, followed by the July 1988 accidental downing of an Iranian airliner and its 290 occupants by the United States. In that case, it was eight years before Iran took its full revenge with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. military personnel.
In today’s scenario, serious retaliation may come sooner but not necessarily in days or weeks. Those who know Iranian strategic culture are fond of saying that Iran has a “long breath,” meaning the Iranians are capable of tremendous strategic patience.
This is not always the case, of course. In October 2011, two Iranians were charged for plotting a car bombing at a restaurant in Washington, D.C., to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The attack seems to have been a hasty retaliatory blow after Saudi Arabia crushed Iranian hopes of an Arab Spring uprising of Bahraini Shiites eight months earlier. That bungled plot, one of Suleimani’s less illustrious ventures, was an embarrassing fiasco and might caution Tehran against a new hasty response.
But for Khamenei, who formed a close fatherly bond with Suleimani and viewed him as a paragon of soldierly virtues and a next-generation leader, his death is deeply personal. And the Islamic Republic is sending some unique messages this time. On Jan. 4, Iran took the unprecedented step of raising a red flag over the Jamkaran Mosque, near the regime’s religious center at Qom. This important mosque is where the Persian Shiites believe their messiah, the Hidden Imam, reappeared one night during Ramadan.
For Shiites, red is the color of blood and revenge. It is the symbol of Imam Abbas, a courageous warrior who tried to fight the caliph Yazid’s army even after his hands were cut off. (The only recognizable part of Suleimani to survive was his ring-bearing hand.)
If additional retaliation comes, Iran may be tempted to strike on or near the Feb. 11 anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, which also happens to coincide with the 40th day of mourning for Suleimani, when Muslims memorialize the dead. If alerted U.S. forces have demobilized, and if President Donald Trump is focused elsewhere, there could be an action intended to hurt but not goad America.
Indeed, Iran faces a major problem that could cause its leaders to think twice about Khamenei’s pledge of “severe revenge.” While national pride demanded a direct response, Tuesday night’s missile strike apparently was designed to minimize casualties since Iran’s leadership can ill afford a war with the United States, especially with its economy tottering under severe sanctions. (The missile strike was preceded by a warning to Iraq’s government that was bound to be detected by the U.S. and followed by Iranian statements that underlined Tehran’s desire to de-escalate, for now.)
But that still leaves many options for retaliation open. In the near term, Tehran may look to its nuclear program for a distraction. The nuclear issue is, in many ways, smarter terrain on which to fight, dividing Trump from his European allies: To much of the world, America—not Iran—is at fault for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Europeans and U.N. leaders cannot ignore the risk of a nuclear crisis. This drove Iran to announce its newest step back from JCPOA commitments, ending some restrictions on uranium enrichment capacity, storage of enriched material, and research and development.
Other options would include painful military strikes on allies such as Israel, partners such as Saudi Arabia, or U.S.-leaning politicians inside Iraq. Deniable strikes would be preferable. Cyberattacks might be used, counting on Trump’s track record of meeting lethal force with lethal force and using cyber-retaliation for lesser offenses. As Tuesday night’s non-lethal strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq showed, Iran is quite capable of “aiming to miss,” something it has turned into an art form when it wants to send a message to the world without triggering devastating retaliation.
Over the longer term, Iran is likely to mount its real and heavier response in the summer or fall, in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election. Such an attack might find Trump distracted and less willing to incur political negatives by appearing to invite war (unpopular with most Americans) and by threatening to drive up gas prices. The attacks might take the form of terrorist and military strikes on U.S. bases and ships in the Persian Gulf and Bab el-Mandeb; proxy attacks on U.S. diplomatic stations in Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere; interference with shipping lanes; cyberattacks on air traffic control or major industrial plants; and terrorism attacks on the U.S. homeland—Iran can certainly do some of these actions and possibly all of them.
An evolving Iranian response
To figure out what moves Tehran might make next, it’s useful to trace the evolution of its policy toward Washington. On Jan. 1, Khamenei made a statement that reflected Iran’s usual policy against open conflict, a long-standing preference formed during the grueling eight-year war with Iraq. “We would not take the country to war,” Khamenei said. “But if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.”
At the moment that Khamenei made this comment, Suleimani’s proxies in Iraq had just killed an American contractor and suffered heavier than expected retaliation in the Dec. 29 strikes that killed 25 militiamen and wounded more than 50.
Even so, Iranians had not been killed at that point, leaving Khamenei in his comfort zone: fighting the Americans to the last Iraqi, Afghan, Lebanese, or Pakistani proxy. Will Suleimani’s death (alongside four other Iranian staff officers) change Khamenei’s calculus?
The last six months provide puzzling but potentially important insights into the Iranian regime’s real objectives. One can identify three phases of escalation in Iranian-armed actions.
The first phase followed U.S. sanctioning of Iran’s oil sales in April 2019, whereon Iran began to fire drones at Saudi pipelines, attack an Emirati oil anchorage, harass tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and finally launch a breathtakingly audacious cruise missile strike on the largest energy sites in the world in Saudi Arabia.
In this phase, Iran was careful not to kill Americans, only targeting U.S. drones on two occasions. Iran’s motive seemed reasonably clear: to scare the world about cutting off Iranian oil and to indirectly pressure the United States to relent. The problem was that Trump did not respond. Iran seemed to recognize that and ceased the actions.
A new phase began with the October 2019 protests against Iranian-controlled governments in Iraq and Lebanon, which led to similar protests in Iran. From the outset, a pressured Iranian regime seemed to have genuinely believed that the United States had a hand in fomenting the protests, and this may have driven Iran to cross the U.S. red line against harming an American. In November and December 2019, Iranian-backed strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq grew more reckless and finally killed an American on Dec. 27.
As with the earlier provocative shootdown of a valuable U.S. MQ-4 drone over Hormuz on June 20, 2019 – and now the January 7, 2020 missile strikes on U.S. bases -, Iran seemed to have “costed in” some form of retaliation when it risked killing Americans in Iraq. Even the heavy U.S. strikes on Iran’s local proxy Kataib Hezbollah were tolerable to Tehran, but the unanticipated killing of Suleimani marked the outset of a new phase. Today, for the first time, the Iranian regime is not only being strangled by sanctions and threatened by uprising, but it is also deeply, directly, and personally wounded by a U.S. strike.
Offsetting the deep anger inside the Iranian leadership is the recognition that Trump is alerted and in punchy form. Unlike in June, when he nixed retaliation for the lost U.S. drone over collateral damage concerns, Trump is now threatening expansive retaliatory airstrikes on the Iranian mainland. The worm has turned once again.
Neither the summer’s naval and missile actions nor the recent killing of an American have improved Iran’s position at all. Open war initiated by Tehran would only ease Trump’s domestic worries about the lack of an authorization for the use of military force.
In the end, despite the current rhetoric, it is even possible that Iran’s main response might be nonexistent—as was the case despite its thundering at the United States for the February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, the highest-profile Iranian-backed commander to be killed until Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who also died in the Jan. 3 attack. We are still waiting almost 12 years later.
Showing the “long breath” for which it is famous, the Iranian regime may choose to do the minimum, knowing that in 2021 it gets either a second-term Trump (who is not vulnerable to reelection and who likes making deals) or a peacenik Democrat with four or eight years of running time.