foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--Trump’s New Director of National Intelligence Doesn’t Understand His Job

Trump ’ s New Director of National Intelligence Doesn ’ t Understand His Job John Ratcliffe , a loyalist of U.S. President Donald Trump and former U.S. representative from Texas with little experience in national security , was sworn in on May 26 as the sixth director of national intelligence ( DNI ) .
As the head of the United States ’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence advisor to the president , the DNI is a profoundly important position .
At his confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate , Ratcliffe promised his “ commitment to deliver timely , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speak truth to power.
” But since taking up his office , Ratcliffe has acted more like a White House press secretary protecting Trump ’ s political interests than a provider of objective intelligence that serves U.S. national security .
At a time when the U.S. intelligence community is already facing tremendous pressure and politicization under Trump , undermining its ability to protect the United States , Ratcliffe ’ s misinterpretation of his critical role should alarm all Americans.As the head of the United States ’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a profoundly important position .
During his first five weeks as DNI , Ratcliffe issued four press releases in his own name , a highly unusual pace for a role traditionally more focused on providing internal counsel on issues of intelligence and national security than making high-profile public statements .
In late May , Ratcliffe issued a statement explaining why he declassified transcripts concerning former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn , who twice pleaded guilty of lying to the FBI .
In justifying the release , which Ratcliffe claimed was done in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ omitted that it supported a politically motivated investigation led by Republican Sens .
Ron Johnson and Chuck Grassley designed to reinforce Trump ’ s baseless claim that Flynn was somehow mistreated by the FBI .
In mid-June , Ratcliffe issued a statement in support of the Trump administration ’ s lawsuit seeking to prevent former National Security Advisor John Bolton from publishing a book that revealed shocking behavior by Trump , including asking Chinese President Xi Jinping to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election on Trump ’ s behalf .
Less than two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ backing up the White House ’ s claim that neither Trump nor Vice President Mike Pence was ever briefed on intelligence indicating that Russia paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan—a statement whose truth appears to hinge on the definition of “ briefed.
” And two days later , Ratcliffe issued another statement helpful to the White House , this time decrying the purported leaks of classified information regarding those Russian bounty payments .
Conveniently , Ratcliffe has not responded to multiple reports that the Russian bounty information @ @ @ @ @ @ @ daily brief , a summary of the most important intelligence that the vice president and other senior policymakers also receive .
The DNI manages the daily brief .
Beyond his public statements in support of Trump , other recent actions by Ratcliffe also suggest that politics are driving his work as DNI .
In late June , he commissioned an intelligence assessment that reportedly confirmed the Russian bounties to kill U.S. personnel but stressed information gaps and varying levels of confidence among intelligence agencies—attack lines that were then used by the White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politicization of the DNI ’ s role could not come at a worse time .
Ratcliffe assumed leadership of the U.S. intelligence community at a time when its relationship with the White House was already under severe strain due to Trump ’ s incessant attacks .
Morale within the intelligence agencies has been low and declining .
Several leaders within the Office of the DNI have been fired or pushed out by the White House , including an acting DNI , the inspector general of the intelligence community , and the head of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close to Trump and his Republican supporters on Capitol Hill have been placed in important positions within the Office of the DNI.Across the entire intelligence community , the fear of upsetting the president has cowed leaders from speaking publicly about threats facing the nation .
Across the entire intelligence community , the fear of upsetting the president has cowed leaders from speaking publicly about threats facing the nation .
This puts the United States at an inflection point : Without principled leadership by the DNI , continued attacks by Trump on the intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and staff may well cause lasting damage to the institutional safeguards and norms that for decades have allowed the intelligence community to provide unvarnished assessments in support of U.S. national security without fear of retribution .
Ratcliffe ’ s behavior thus far suggests that he is more focused on defending Trump and putting further pressure on the intelligence community—the opposite of what ’ s needed for U.S. intelligence to function effectively and safeguard the nation .
If Ratcliffe is indeed committed to speaking truth to power , as he vowed during his confirmation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should take to demonstrate this commitment .
First , he should agree to hold public hearings before Congress soon on the annual Worldwide Threat Assessment , which the Office of the DNI abruptly canceled in February , reportedly over concerns that the assessment would upset Trump .
Traditionally , these briefings have provided Congress and the American public with a candid assessment of the full range of threats facing the United States—including pandemics , cyberthreats , Russia , and North Korea .
Notably , reports indicate that this year ’ s canceled briefing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States was unprepared for a pandemic .
That ’ s just one of many reasons that these hearings are particularly important to hold regularly and shouldn ’ t be canceled .
Second , even if Ratcliffe refuses to reschedule the Worldwide Threats hearing , he should publicly update Congress and the American public on the status of foreign efforts to interfere in the 2020 presidential election .
In late 2019 , U.S. intelligence chiefs now headed by Ratcliffe publicly warned that “ Russia , China , Iran , and other foreign malicious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the voting process or influence voter perceptions , ” potentially using “ a variety of means , including social media campaigns , directing disinformation operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local infrastructure.
” Since then , DNI officials have offered contradictory statements on efforts by foreign adversaries to intervene in the election : One senior official stated in February that Russia had “ developed a preference ” for Trump , while in March another official claimed a lack of evidence that Russia was interfering in the election .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2016 , Russia was far along in its campaign to help elect Trump .
It is vital , then , that Ratcliffe soon provide an impartial , public threat assessment .
After all , one of the best defenses against covert influence is educating the public on the nature of the threat and the tactics deployed so they can separate fact from fiction and make informed decisions.One senior official stated that Russia had “ developed a preference ” for Trump , while another claimed a lack of evidence that Russia was interfering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could demonstrate his claimed commitment to transparency by submitting to Congress an unclassified report on who was responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi , a Washington Post columnist and Virginia resident , as required by law .
In February , former acting DNI Richard Grenell sent a letter to Congress claiming his office could not provide any information on Khashoggi ’ s death without endangering sources and revealing intelligence-gathering methods .
But several lawmakers have disputed this claim , asserting that there is a large body of unclassified material that could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The choice to say nothing appears driven not by any need to protect sensitive sources but by the desire not to embarrass Trump ’ s Saudi supporters .
The concern is not that a DNI is issuing public statements—all past DNIs have occasionally done this .
The issue is the astonishing amount of public relations work with an apparent political motivation to help Trump , even if it means undermining and tarnishing the reputation of the intelligence community that Ratcliffe now heads .
This is deeply troubling .
The Office of the DNI @ @ @ @ @ @ @ core values : excellence , courage , respect , and integrity .
Time will tell if Ratcliffe is serious about upholding these values , but the first several weeks of his tenure do not bode well .

John Ratcliffe, a loyalist of U.S. President Donald Trump and former U.S. representative from Texas with little experience in national security, was sworn in on May 26 as the sixth director of national intelligence (DNI). As the head of the United States’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence advisor to the president, the DNI is a profoundly important position. At his confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate, Ratcliffe promised his “commitment to deliver timely, accurate, and objective intelligence and to speak truth to power.” But since taking up his office, Ratcliffe has acted more like a White House press secretary protecting Trump’s political interests than a provider of objective intelligence that serves U.S. national security. At a time when the U.S. intelligence community is already facing tremendous pressure and politicization under Trump, undermining its ability to protect the United States, Ratcliffe’s misinterpretation of his critical role should alarm all Americans.As the head of the United States’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence advisor to the president, the DNI is a profoundly important position.
John Ratcliffe, a loyalist of U.S. President Donald Trump and former U.S. representative from Texas with little experience in national security, was sworn in on May 26 as the sixth director of national intelligence (DNI). As the head of the United States’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence advisor to the president, the DNI is a profoundly important position. At his confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate, Ratcliffe promised his “commitment to deliver timely, accurate, and objective intelligence and to speak truth to power.” But since taking up his office, Ratcliffe has acted more like a White House press secretary protecting Trump’s political interests than a provider of objective intelligence that serves U.S. national security. At a time when the U.S. intelligence community is already facing tremendous pressure and politicization under Trump, undermining its ability to protect the United States, Ratcliffe’s misinterpretation of his critical role should alarm all Americans.As the head of the United States’ 17 intelligence agencies and the principal intelligence advisor to the president, the DNI is a profoundly important position.
During his first five weeks as DNI, Ratcliffe issued four press releases in his own name, a highly unusual pace for a role traditionally more focused on providing internal counsel on issues of intelligence and national security than making high-profile public statements. In late May, Ratcliffe issued a statement explaining why he declassified transcripts concerning former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, who twice pleaded guilty of lying to the FBI. In justifying the release, which Ratcliffe claimed was done in the interest of transparency, he conveniently omitted that it supported a politically motivated investigation led by Republican Sens. Ron Johnson and Chuck Grassley designed to reinforce Trump’s baseless claim that Flynn was somehow mistreated by the FBI.
In mid-June, Ratcliffe issued a statement in support of the Trump administration’s lawsuit seeking to prevent former National Security Advisor John Bolton from publishing a book that revealed shocking behavior by Trump, including asking Chinese President Xi Jinping to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election on Trump’s behalf.
Less than two weeks later, Ratcliffe released a statement backing up the White House’s claim that neither Trump nor Vice President Mike Pence was ever briefed on intelligence indicating that Russia paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan—a statement whose truth appears to hinge on the definition of “briefed.” And two days later, Ratcliffe issued another statement helpful to the White House, this time decrying the purported leaks of classified information regarding those Russian bounty payments. Conveniently, Ratcliffe has not responded to multiple reports that the Russian bounty information was included in the president’s daily brief, a summary of the most important intelligence that the vice president and other senior policymakers also receive. The DNI manages the daily brief.
Beyond his public statements in support of Trump, other recent actions by Ratcliffe also suggest that politics are driving his work as DNI. In late June, he commissioned an intelligence assessment that reportedly confirmed the Russian bounties to kill U.S. personnel but stressed information gaps and varying levels of confidence among intelligence agencies—attack lines that were then used by the White House to justify inaction against Russia.
The politicization of the DNI’s role could not come at a worse time. Ratcliffe assumed leadership of the U.S. intelligence community at a time when its relationship with the White House was already under severe strain due to Trump’s incessant attacks. Morale within the intelligence agencies has been low and declining. Several leaders within the Office of the DNI have been fired or pushed out by the White House, including an acting DNI, the inspector general of the intelligence community, and the head of the National Counterterrorism Center. Political operatives close to Trump and his Republican supporters on Capitol Hill have been placed in important positions within the Office of the DNI.Across the entire intelligence community, the fear of upsetting the president has cowed leaders from speaking publicly about threats facing the nation.
Across the entire intelligence community, the fear of upsetting the president has cowed leaders from speaking publicly about threats facing the nation. This puts the United States at an inflection point: Without principled leadership by the DNI, continued attacks by Trump on the intelligence community’s independence, objectivity, and staff may well cause lasting damage to the institutional safeguards and norms that for decades have allowed the intelligence community to provide unvarnished assessments in support of U.S. national security without fear of retribution. Ratcliffe’s behavior thus far suggests that he is more focused on defending Trump and putting further pressure on the intelligence community—the opposite of what’s needed for U.S. intelligence to function effectively and safeguard the nation.
If Ratcliffe is indeed committed to speaking truth to power, as he vowed during his confirmation hearing, there are several steps he should take to demonstrate this commitment. First, he should agree to hold public hearings before Congress soon on the annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, which the Office of the DNI abruptly canceled in February, reportedly over concerns that the assessment would upset Trump. Traditionally, these briefings have provided Congress and the American public with a candid assessment of the full range of threats facing the United States—including pandemics, cyberthreats, Russia, and North Korea. Notably, reports indicate that this year’s canceled briefing would have warned in February that the United States was unprepared for a pandemic. That’s just one of many reasons that these hearings are particularly important to hold regularly and shouldn’t be canceled.
Second, even if Ratcliffe refuses to reschedule the Worldwide Threats hearing, he should publicly update Congress and the American public on the status of foreign efforts to interfere in the 2020 presidential election. In late 2019, U.S. intelligence chiefs now headed by Ratcliffe publicly warned that “Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign malicious actors all will seek to interfere in the voting process or influence voter perceptions,” potentially using “a variety of means, including social media campaigns, directing disinformation operations or conducting disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks on state and local infrastructure.” Since then, DNI officials have offered contradictory statements on efforts by foreign adversaries to intervene in the election: One senior official stated in February that Russia had “developed a preference” for Trump, while in March another official claimed a lack of evidence that Russia was interfering in the election. As we now know, at this time in 2016, Russia was far along in its campaign to help elect Trump. It is vital, then, that Ratcliffe soon provide an impartial, public threat assessment. After all, one of the best defenses against covert influence is educating the public on the nature of the threat and the tactics deployed so they can separate fact from fiction and make informed decisions.One senior official stated that Russia had “developed a preference” for Trump, while another claimed a lack of evidence that Russia was interfering in the election.
Finally, Ratcliffe could demonstrate his claimed commitment to transparency by submitting to Congress an unclassified report on who was responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist and Virginia resident, as required by law. In February, former acting DNI Richard Grenell sent a letter to Congress claiming his office could not provide any information on Khashoggi’s death without endangering sources and revealing intelligence-gathering methods. But several lawmakers have disputed this claim, asserting that there is a large body of unclassified material that could be made public without jeopardizing national security. The choice to say nothing appears driven not by any need to protect sensitive sources but by the desire not to embarrass Trump’s Saudi supporters.
The concern is not that a DNI is issuing public statements—all past DNIs have occasionally done this. The issue is the astonishing amount of public relations work with an apparent political motivation to help Trump, even if it means undermining and tarnishing the reputation of the intelligence community that Ratcliffe now heads. This is deeply troubling. The Office of the DNI’s public website lists as its core values: excellence, courage, respect, and integrity. Time will tell if Ratcliffe is serious about upholding these values, but the first several weeks of his tenure do not bode well.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--Russia Loosens Its Belt

Russia Loosens Its Belt

Last month , China held a virtual conference on the Belt and Road Initiative .
Hosted by Foreign Minister Wang Yi , the high-level meeting was , in the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping , “ an opportunity to discuss a collective response to COVID-19 , advance Belt and Road cooperation , and strengthen international solidarity.
” As a testament to the infrastructure and investment project ’ s clout , the event was attended by ministerial-level officials from 25 countries .
Even the director-general of the World Health Organization was present to parrot the party line about turning the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ true ‘ Health Silk Road ’ ” —central to Xi ’ s efforts to position China as a global leader in health care .
But one face was noticeably missing : Sergei Lavrov , Russia ’ s foreign minister .
To the dozens gathered virtually , Lavrov delivered a written statement , and an ambassador at large attended in his place .
In truth , Russia could barely be counted among the participants to begin with .
Though both nations have spent years claiming a close relationship and commitment to the project , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But Moscow ’ s unwillingness to even put in a proper appearance at the latest forum suggests a subtle change in approach : It no longer feels obliged to bow before Beijing ’ s Belt and Road .
This leaves China in a difficult position .
As Beijing continues to roll out infrastructure and investment in Russia ’ s backyard and undermine its influence in the former Soviet Union , it needs , at the very least , tacit acceptance of the initiative from Russia .
The last thing China wants is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Belt and Road , especially at a time when so many of its other partners are pushing back against the initiative .
Any step back from Moscow also reveals to the United States and Europe a vulnerability in an otherwise maturing Sino-Russian entente .
Russia ’ s diluted attendance shows where its true interests lie .
“ Russia is not part of the BRI .
It is only a supporter of Chinese global outreach as long as it is in Russia ’ s interests , ” said Igor Denisov , a senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of International Relations .
This standpoint contradicts the official narratives that both countries have long spun about the Belt and Road Initiative .
Since 2014 , Beijing has consistently framed Moscow as its most integral partner .
In 2019 , an influential Chinese think tank named Russia the most involved partner country in the program , ranking highest in “ political coordination ” and “ facilities connectivity.
” Even in the context of the current coronavirus pandemic , which has created friction at the land border between the two neighbors , Chinese state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Road connectivity between China and Russia for helping to increase Chinese trade with Europe .
For its part , Russia rarely turns down superficial opportunities to showcase its ties with China .
President Vladimir Putin is a regular attendee at Beijing ’ s biennial Belt and Road Forum .
At last year ’ s Valdai Discussion Club , Putin for the first time described ties with China as “ alliance-like , ” enjoying “ an unprecedently high level of trust and cooperation.
” He has primarily pushed for economic and political engagement with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its compatibility with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union , an economic union in the post-Soviet space .
In what was then considered a landmark agreement , in 2015 the countries agreed to integrate the two initiatives .
By 2019 , China had yet to deem any of the union ’ s projects worthy of the “ Belt and Road ” label .
But despite the public rhetoric harmonizing Xi and Putin ’ s premier foreign-policy projects , there is little tangible evidence to show that Russia is even an official partner country of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 transportation projects proposed by the Eurasian Economic Union to China in 2017 , every single one was rejected .
By 2019 , China had yet to deem any of the union ’ s projects worthy of the “ Belt and Road ” label .
A senior Russian government official interviewed in July 2019 told Bobo Lo , a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute , that the needle has barely shifted since the political declaration .
The strategic ties that do exist between the two countries exist almost entirely outside the Belt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the contrary .
Yamal LNG , a liquified natural gas project in northern Russia , is a case in point .
In 2016 , the Silk Road Fund , a Chinese government investment vehicle for Belt and Road , acquired a 9.9 percent stake in the project , and it has since been repackaged as part of what ’ s known as the Polar Silk Road .
Still , Lo said in an interview : “ Yamal LNG has precious little to do with BRI .
It is simply a bilateral project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is also able to acquire access to key strategic sectors of Russia ’ s economy in a way that was inconceivable a decade ago .
For Russia ’ s part , Chinese investment is much needed to fill the gap left by Western firms since sanctions were enforced in 2014 .
But for all of the bluster around the Belt and Road Initiative , the overall rate of Chinese investment in Russia remains very low .
In 2017 , China ’ s total foreign direct investment into Russia totaled just $ 140 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s total $ 25.3 billion inflows .
This pales in comparison to the $ 50 billion China has offered to pump into neighboring Pakistan through the Belt and Road .
The contradiction between China ’ s continual celebration of Russia ’ s importance to the Belt and Road and the lack of opportunities it affords it has become a source of frustration among the Russian business community .
Apart from flagship projects that gain momentum after being endorsed by the political elite , especially members of Putin ’ s inner circle , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to draw Chinese interest and investment .
A look back at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 confirms China ’ s restraint , showing that of China ’ s 283 tangible deliverables , only 15 are related to Russia .
Russia ’ s corruption and its underdeveloped infrastructure have long kept away foreign investors .
Now , those same shortcomings are discouraging Chinese investment , according to Jonathan Hillman , the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
Of 91 projects launched as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Northeast China and Russia ’ s Far East , which began in 2009 and was shut down in 2018 , only 15 were in the implementation phase as of 2015 .
According to Hillman , shortcomings such as these may be discouraging Chinese investment .
After years of patchy participation , Russia ’ s public distancing from the Belt and Road program comes at a time when the initiative is already suffering major setbacks .
A recent survey by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that 20 percent of Belt and Road @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the global pandemic , with a further 30 to 40 percent “ somewhat affected.
” Fears of a global recession have provoked China ’ s partners to review the viability of Belt and Road projects in their countries .
This may lead to renegotiations , or even project cancellations .
Whether Russia ’ s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative will diminish further is unclear .
Lo believes that there is an internal understanding that Moscow must not get any closer to Beijing in order to signal on the world stage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actor .
China is well aware of Russia ’ s potential to be a spoiler in international relations .
Having become the increasingly dominant partner in the bilateral relationship , Beijing will have to be even more careful in managing Moscow within the Belt and Road .

Last month, China held a virtual conference on the Belt and Road Initiative. Hosted by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the high-level meeting was, in the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping, “an opportunity to discuss a collective response to COVID-19, advance Belt and Road cooperation, and strengthen international solidarity.”
Last month, China held a virtual conference on the Belt and Road Initiative. Hosted by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the high-level meeting was, in the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping, “an opportunity to discuss a collective response to COVID-19, advance Belt and Road cooperation, and strengthen international solidarity.”
As a testament to the infrastructure and investment project’s clout, the event was attended by ministerial-level officials from 25 countries. Even the director-general of the World Health Organization was present to parrot the party line about turning the Belt and Road Initiative “into a true ‘Health Silk Road’”—central to Xi’s efforts to position China as a global leader in health care.
But one face was noticeably missing: Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister. To the dozens gathered virtually, Lavrov delivered a written statement, and an ambassador at large attended in his place.
In truth, Russia could barely be counted among the participants to begin with. Though both nations have spent years claiming a close relationship and commitment to the project, Russia has long been an absent partner. But Moscow’s unwillingness to even put in a proper appearance at the latest forum suggests a subtle change in approach: It no longer feels obliged to bow before Beijing’s Belt and Road. This leaves China in a difficult position. As Beijing continues to roll out infrastructure and investment in Russia’s backyard and undermine its influence in the former Soviet Union, it needs, at the very least, tacit acceptance of the initiative from Russia. The last thing China wants is any hint of backlash from Russia over the Belt and Road, especially at a time when so many of its other partners are pushing back against the initiative. Any step back from Moscow also reveals to the United States and Europe a vulnerability in an otherwise maturing Sino-Russian entente.
Russia’s diluted attendance shows where its true interests lie. “Russia is not part of the BRI. It is only a supporter of Chinese global outreach as long as it is in Russia’s interests,” said Igor Denisov, a senior research fellow at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
This standpoint contradicts the official narratives that both countries have long spun about the Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2014, Beijing has consistently framed Moscow as its most integral partner. In 2019, an influential Chinese think tank named Russia the most involved partner country in the program, ranking highest in “political coordination” and “facilities connectivity.” Even in the context of the current coronavirus pandemic, which has created friction at the land border between the two neighbors, Chinese state media has continued to promote Belt and Road connectivity between China and Russia for helping to increase Chinese trade with Europe.
For its part, Russia rarely turns down superficial opportunities to showcase its ties with China. President Vladimir Putin is a regular attendee at Beijing’s biennial Belt and Road Forum. At last year’s Valdai Discussion Club, Putin for the first time described ties with China as “alliance-like,” enjoying “an unprecedently high level of trust and cooperation.” He has primarily pushed for economic and political engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative by promoting its compatibility with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, an economic union in the post-Soviet space. In what was then considered a landmark agreement, in 2015 the countries agreed to integrate the two initiatives.
By 2019, China had yet to deem any of the union’s projects worthy of the “Belt and Road” label. But despite the public rhetoric harmonizing Xi and Putin’s premier foreign-policy projects, there is little tangible evidence to show that Russia is even an official partner country of the Belt and Road Initiative. Of 40 transportation projects proposed by the Eurasian Economic Union to China in 2017, every single one was rejected. By 2019, China had yet to deem any of the union’s projects worthy of the “Belt and Road” label. A senior Russian government official interviewed in July 2019 told Bobo Lo, a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute, that the needle has barely shifted since the political declaration.
The strategic ties that do exist between the two countries exist almost entirely outside the Belt and Road framework—in spite of the branding to the contrary. Yamal LNG, a liquified natural gas project in northern Russia, is a case in point. In 2016, the Silk Road Fund, a Chinese government investment vehicle for Belt and Road, acquired a 9.9 percent stake in the project, and it has since been repackaged as part of what’s known as the Polar Silk Road. Still, Lo said in an interview: “Yamal LNG has precious little to do with BRI. It is simply a bilateral project between China and Russia.”
Simultaneously, China is also able to acquire access to key strategic sectors of Russia’s economy in a way that was inconceivable a decade ago. For Russia’s part, Chinese investment is much needed to fill the gap left by Western firms since sanctions were enforced in 2014. But for all of the bluster around the Belt and Road Initiative, the overall rate of Chinese investment in Russia remains very low. In 2017, China’s total foreign direct investment into Russia totaled just $140 million, a minute portion of Russia’s total $25.3 billion inflows. This pales in comparison to the $50 billion China has offered to pump into neighboring Pakistan through the Belt and Road.
The contradiction between China’s continual celebration of Russia’s importance to the Belt and Road and the lack of opportunities it affords it has become a source of frustration among the Russian business community. Apart from flagship projects that gain momentum after being endorsed by the political elite, especially members of Putin’s inner circle, projects that are not high-profile often fail to draw Chinese interest and investment. A look back at the second Belt and Road Forum in 2019 confirms China’s restraint, showing that of China’s 283 tangible deliverables, only 15 are related to Russia. Russia’s corruption and its underdeveloped infrastructure have long kept away foreign investors. Now, those same shortcomings are discouraging Chinese investment, according to Jonathan Hillman, the director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Of 91 projects launched as part of a Program of Cooperation between Northeast China and Russia’s Far East, which began in 2009 and was shut down in 2018, only 15 were in the implementation phase as of 2015. According to Hillman, shortcomings such as these may be discouraging Chinese investment.
After years of patchy participation, Russia’s public distancing from the Belt and Road program comes at a time when the initiative is already suffering major setbacks. A recent survey by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that 20 percent of Belt and Road projects have been “seriously affected” by the global pandemic, with a further 30 to 40 percent “somewhat affected.” Fears of a global recession have provoked China’s partners to review the viability of Belt and Road projects in their countries. This may lead to renegotiations, or even project cancellations.
Whether Russia’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative will diminish further is unclear. Lo believes that there is an internal understanding that Moscow must not get any closer to Beijing in order to signal on the world stage that it is still an independent strategic actor. China is well aware of Russia’s potential to be a spoiler in international relations. Having become the increasingly dominant partner in the bilateral relationship, Beijing will have to be even more careful in managing Moscow within the Belt and Road.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--An Insecure Twitter Means an Insecure World

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : An unprecedented Twitter hack hijacks high-profile accounts , China reports a return to growth in the second quarter of 2020 , and Tunisia ’ s prime minister resigns .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
Twitter accounts belonging to high-profile business leaders and politicians were hacked yesterday in the biggest security breach in the website ’ s 14-year history , opening a new range of possibilities for disinformation campaigns .
In a statement on its website , Twitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ coordinated social engineering attack by people who successfully targeted some of our employees with access to internal systems and tools.
” The admission suggests the company ’ s internal systems were compromised , and individual users were not at fault .
Reporting in Vice suggests it may have been an inside job .
Fortunately , the goal of the hackers was more con artist than saboteur .
Accounts belonging to business leaders such as Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates as well as Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and former U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same message : A call to donate money to a cryptocurrency account in return for your money back twice over .
Despite the millions of followers these accounts have , the scam seems to have convinced very few of them .
Only about $ 120,000 in bitcoin has been deposited to the hacker ’ s accounts , according to Reuters .
There were other more mundane effects : With all “ verified ” accounts frozen in the wake of the hack , U.S. President Donald Trump announced he was demoting his 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead .
Digital world .
Real effects .
Although the refrain “ Twitter is not real life ” is often used as a putdown toward the social media-addled masses , the website can have an outsized grip on reality .
In 2013 , a hacker took control of the Associated Press Twitter account and wrote a hoax tweet describing explosions at the White House .
The tweet was quickly deleted , but not before tricking high-frequency trading algorithms—sending the U.S. stock market into a flash crash .
Given the propensity of President Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resulting real world effects , it ’ s lucky that Wednesday ’ s hackers appear to have been only looking for money .
Who is tweeting ?
The hack comes at a rough time for Twitter , which despite being a media darling and political prop , is struggling to retain ordinary users .
The company stopped sharing the number of total users on its platform in 2019 following months of consistent decline .
Only 22 percent of U.S. adults reported using Twitter in 2019 , compared to 69 percent who said they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to growth .
China ’ s economy grew 3.2 percent in the second quarter of 2020 , Chinese officials announced today , making it the first major economy to return to growth following the coronavirus pandemic .
China ’ s economy had suffered in the first three months of the year , contracting 6.8 percent .
Hopes for a V-shaped recovery in China will depend on how the rest of the world fares ; about one-fifth of China ’ s overall economic growth is driven by exports , the Wall Street Journal reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh resigned on Wednesday , heading off a potential no-confidence vote in the country ’ s parliament .
Fakhfakh is alleged to have profited from owning shares in companies that were awarded state contracts , although he denies any wrongdoing .
President Kais Saied has ten days to nominate a new prime minister , who will then have 30 days to form a new government .
Given the already divided nature of Tunisia ’ s parliament ( no party currently holds more than a quarter of seats ) , fresh @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Apple wins in Europe tax case .
The EU ’ s General Court has dealt a blow to EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager and her campaign to rein in Big Tech .
The court sided with Apple on the subject of a $ 14.8 billion tax bill that the EU said the company owed to Ireland .
EU officials had argued that Apple gained special treatment from Irish tax authorities , allowing it to avoid paying high taxes on its billions in profits .
Both Ireland and Apple contended they were operating within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unlikely to be the end of Vestager ’ s tech crusade .
In an interview with Ravi Agrawal in the Summer issue of Foreign Policy , Vestager says the momentum for countries to cooperate on antitrust legislation is increasing .
OPEC agrees to increase production .
OPEC+ , the grouping of OPEC that includes Russia and other oil producers has agreed to ease oil production cuts .
Oil producing nations had agreed to cut production in May following cratering demand amid a global standstill .
Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman said the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy recovers from the coronavirus pandemic led to the decision .
World leaders speak out on vaccine availability .
Writing in the Washington Post , leaders from Canada , Ethiopia , South Korea , New Zealand , South Africa , Spain , Sweden , and Tunisia have issued a joint call for any coronavirus vaccine to be distributed equally and according to a “ set of transparent , equitable and scientifically sound principles.
” The statement comes as worries grow that protectionism may prevent poorer countries from receiving a vaccine at the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the health news site STAT , the United States , India , and China should expect to be first in line for a vaccine , given the scale of their production capacities .
U.N. environmental chief issues Yemen warning .
An abandoned fuel tanker moored off the coast of Houthi-controlled Yemen is a “ a looming environmental , economic and humanitarian catastrophe , ” United Nations Environment Chief Inger Andersen told the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday .
The tanker holds 1.1 million barrels of crude oil , and its deteriorating condition could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger than the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster .
Houthi rebels , who control access to the port housing the tanker , have previously dismissed U.N. attempts to assess the ship , but last week offered to allow inspectors to access it .
A similar offer made last August was rescinded the night before a planned U.N. mission .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been forced to deny speculation that he was poking fun at Chinese President Xi Jinping by posting a picture of his dog , Mercer , with a stuffed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s feet .
Chinese censors have targeted images of the A.A. Milne creation ever since 2013 , when internet users began posting images highlighting the bear ’ s apparent resemblance to the Chinese leader .
When asked by an Iowa conservative radio host whether it was intention to troll Xi with the photo , Pompeo departed from his customary anti-China stance .
“ No , I imagine there were a series of stuffed animals , and they were equally distributed for Mercer ’ s benefit , ” he said .
For more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: An unprecedented Twitter hack hijacks high-profile accounts, China reports a return to growth in the second quarter of 2020, and Tunisia’s prime minister resigns.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: An unprecedented Twitter hack hijacks high-profile accounts, China reports a return to growth in the second quarter of 2020, and Tunisia’s prime minister resigns.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Twitter Hack Exposes Frailty of the Digital Public Square
Twitter accounts belonging to high-profile business leaders and politicians were hacked yesterday in the biggest security breach in the website’s 14-year history, opening a new range of possibilities for disinformation campaigns.
In a statement on its website, Twitter said that the hack was caused by a “coordinated social engineering attack by people who successfully targeted some of our employees with access to internal systems and tools.” The admission suggests the company’s internal systems were compromised, and individual users were not at fault. Reporting in Vice suggests it may have been an inside job.
Fortunately, the goal of the hackers was more con artist than saboteur. Accounts belonging to business leaders such as Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates as well as Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden and former U.S. President Barack Obama all posted a version of the same message: A call to donate money to a cryptocurrency account in return for your money back twice over.
Despite the millions of followers these accounts have, the scam seems to have convinced very few of them. Only about $120,000 in bitcoin has been deposited to the hacker’s accounts, according to Reuters.
There were other more mundane effects: With all “verified” accounts frozen in the wake of the hack, U.S. President Donald Trump announced he was demoting his 2020 campaign manager using the less media-friendly Facebook instead.
Digital world. Real effects. Although the refrain “Twitter is not real life” is often used as a putdown toward the social media-addled masses, the website can have an outsized grip on reality. In 2013, a hacker took control of the Associated Press Twitter account and wrote a hoax tweet describing explosions at the White House. The tweet was quickly deleted, but not before tricking high-frequency trading algorithms—sending the U.S. stock market into a flash crash. Given the propensity of President Trump to dictate policy via Twitter and its resulting real world effects, it’s lucky that Wednesday’s hackers appear to have been only looking for money.
Who is tweeting? The hack comes at a rough time for Twitter, which despite being a media darling and political prop, is struggling to retain ordinary users. The company stopped sharing the number of total users on its platform in 2019 following months of consistent decline. Only 22 percent of U.S. adults reported using Twitter in 2019, compared to 69 percent who said they use Facebook.
What We’re Following Today
China reports a return to growth. China’s economy grew 3.2 percent in the second quarter of 2020, Chinese officials announced today, making it the first major economy to return to growth following the coronavirus pandemic. China’s economy had suffered in the first three months of the year, contracting 6.8 percent. Hopes for a V-shaped recovery in China will depend on how the rest of the world fares; about one-fifth of China’s overall economic growth is driven by exports, the Wall Street Journal reports.
Tunisian prime minister resigns. Tunisian Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh resigned on Wednesday, heading off a potential no-confidence vote in the country’s parliament. Fakhfakh is alleged to have profited from owning shares in companies that were awarded state contracts, although he denies any wrongdoing. President Kais Saied has ten days to nominate a new prime minister, who will then have 30 days to form a new government. Given the already divided nature of Tunisia’s parliament (no party currently holds more than a quarter of seats), fresh elections could be on the horizon.
Apple wins in Europe tax case. The EU’s General Court has dealt a blow to EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager and her campaign to rein in Big Tech. The court sided with Apple on the subject of a $14.8 billion tax bill that the EU said the company owed to Ireland. EU officials had argued that Apple gained special treatment from Irish tax authorities, allowing it to avoid paying high taxes on its billions in profits. Both Ireland and Apple contended they were operating within existing tax law.
The case is unlikely to be the end of Vestager’s tech crusade. In an interview with Ravi Agrawal in the Summer issue of Foreign Policy, Vestager says the momentum for countries to cooperate on antitrust legislation is increasing.
OPEC agrees to increase production. OPEC+, the grouping of OPEC that includes Russia and other oil producers has agreed to ease oil production cuts. Oil producing nations had agreed to cut production in May following cratering demand amid a global standstill. Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman said the anticipated demand for fuel as the global economy recovers from the coronavirus pandemic led to the decision.
Keep an Eye On
World leaders speak out on vaccine availability. Writing in the Washington Post, leaders from Canada, Ethiopia, South Korea, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Tunisia have issued a joint call for any coronavirus vaccine to be distributed equally and according to a “set of transparent, equitable and scientifically sound principles.” The statement comes as worries grow that protectionism may prevent poorer countries from receiving a vaccine at the same time as richer ones. According to the health news site STAT, the United States, India, and China should expect to be first in line for a vaccine, given the scale of their production capacities.
U.N. environmental chief issues Yemen warning. An abandoned fuel tanker moored off the coast of Houthi-controlled Yemen is a “a looming environmental, economic and humanitarian catastrophe,” United Nations Environment Chief Inger Andersen told the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday. The tanker holds 1.1 million barrels of crude oil, and its deteriorating condition could lead to an oil spill four times larger than the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster. Houthi rebels, who control access to the port housing the tanker, have previously dismissed U.N. attempts to assess the ship, but last week offered to allow inspectors to access it. A similar offer made last August was rescinded the night before a planned U.N. mission.
Odds and Ends
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been forced to deny speculation that he was poking fun at Chinese President Xi Jinping by posting a picture of his dog, Mercer, with a stuffed toy Winnie the Pooh at the dog’s feet. Chinese censors have targeted images of the A.A. Milne creation ever since 2013, when internet users began posting images highlighting the bear’s apparent resemblance to the Chinese leader. When asked by an Iowa conservative radio host whether it was intention to troll Xi with the photo, Pompeo departed from his customary anti-China stance. “No, I imagine there were a series of stuffed animals, and they were equally distributed for Mercer’s benefit,” he said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-16--The United States Is Pushing Lebanon Further Into Iran’s Embrace

The United States Is Pushing Lebanon Further Into Iran ’ s Embrace Lebanon is in crisis .
On the face of it , that ’ s nothing new .
I ’ ve lived all of my 40 years with the knowledge that my country is in crisis .
Invasions , civil war , local unrest , assassinations , foreign occupation , economic fragility , you name it—but it was never as bad as today .
In a matter of days , a number of crisis-related suicides have been reported ; one man shot himself outside a cafe in busy Beirut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and passersby .
Things have become surreal .
It ’ s not only that people can ’ t work , or have lost their savings , or can ’ t afford to buy anything ; these hardships are significant , but we ’ ve been through such times before .
The difference is that today ’ s Lebanese can not dream of a better tomorrow .
Only those who ’ ve been forced to abandon the country know what this means .
But Lebanon isn ’ t like other countries ; its sectarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its citizens loyal to their sects above anything else .
The current status quo is a legacy of the fragmentation that has flourished over decades in the absence of a strong central government .
Hezbollah isn ’ t a proxy but more of an organic extension of the dominant ideology within Iran—with members who are indigenous Lebanese .
During the first half of the 20th century , feudal lords represented the sects , and people pledged loyalty to them .
But since the late 1960s , some feudal fiefdoms transformed into political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ angry peasants who became masters to their former rulers—the Shiites of Lebanon are one example .
The rise of political Shiism in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 marked the peak of the transformation with the formation of Hezbollah .
Now , in days of great misery and need , people know where to turn if they want to survive .
As part of the U.S. government ’ s campaign of maximum pressure on Iran , and because of Hezbollah ’ s footprint , maximum economic pressure is being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say this has sent Lebanon into free fall is an understatement : Banks are empty of dollars , power cuts in the capital are widespread , businesses are closing their doors for lack of customers , and the dollar value of the national minimum wage has fallen from around $ 450 per month to $ 80 as of this writing .
A government minister whose monthly salary a few months ago was around $ 8,500 today earns roughly $ 1,500 .
Much the same can be said of the country ’ s president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the fortunate ones .
But the weakening of the state will in no way weaken Hezbollah , which is armed to the teeth and coming off an eight-year adventure in Syria , which it views as a great success .
The more the country dips into chaos , the more people will cling to their sects , whose leaders will become de facto rulers .
The predictable future of a country now in tatters consists not of civil war but of zones of local unrest and violence ; in the absence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the potential to stem the chaos will be the people ’ s preferred authority .
This is true for each and every faction exerting control of its areas : Druze leader Walid Jumblatt will consolidate his power in Mount Lebanon , Sunni former Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Sunni areas , the various Christian leaders in their areas of influence , and , of course , Hezbollah will consolidate power in southern Lebanon and on the Israeli border , Beirut ’ s southern suburbs , and Bekaa to the east , on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a regional solution to the situation is emerging : Iran , too , will assert its power , positioning itself as a savior of the Shiite community .
After all , Lebanon isn ’ t Venezuela .
There ’ s no need to cross the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean to deliver food , medicine , fuel , and other supplies .
The more dire the crisis gets , the greater the likelihood that Lebanon will be drawn into Iran ’ s list of protected satellites .
Tehran has already offered to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government in Lebanese pounds—thereby saving the Lebanese government from the burden of rampant currency devaluation—and on several past occasions its leaders have vowed that , if the Lebanese authorities just say the word , they would provide Lebanon with electricity .
The more the United States ratchets up its pressure on Lebanon , the more opportunities will open up for Iran to exert power and influence in the disintegrating state .
This will not necessarily come via the Iranian government ; influence could flow directly through Hezbollah , which has vowed not to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hunger .
The United States ’ maximum pressure strategy could therefore easily play into the hands of its avowed enemy .
This appears to be a concern in Washington .
The remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on preventing Iran from selling oil to Lebanon reflects that worry .
Yet with Lebanon quickly becoming a failed state , there will be few options .
That means the idea of creating a parallel economy for the sanctioned countries is gaining steam .
It ’ s an idea Iran seems to fancy despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the maximum pressure strategy .
During an on-the-record briefing with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Joel Rayburn at the Center for Global Policy , I presented this narrative ; the answer I received was that the Iranians can ’ t exert such power , because they don ’ t have the money and resources to do it .
But this might not be the case on the ground .
Tehran might be ready to take the pain in the short term to solidify its position .
Iran , in the cases of Lebanon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ payment in local currencies because it can make use of the local currencies to finance both its operations in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon .
This would make a big difference for both the Lebanese government ’ s bottom line and Iran ’ s regional operations .
What the U.S. government has failed to grasp over the past four decades of its fight with Iran in a country like Lebanon is the fact that Iranian influence was bred organically in areas where Shiites are a majority .
Put simply , the view in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bekaa , and southern Beirut is that a weaker Iran would necessarily have an impact on them , so despite all the grievances that they may have against Iran or Hezbollah , both became central to the collective thinking of the sect ’ s position in the context of the sectarian struggle in the region .
Because of this , it ’ s very unlikely that the United States could curb Iran ’ s role in Lebanon .
Previous attempts to empower civil society within the Shiite community didn ’ t succeed—and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different reality without sinking the country into a worse situation .
However , there are still options to consider limiting Iran ’ s reach in Lebanon .
A different U.S. approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict would help .
This is not a marginal factor at all , especially after Trump ’ s so-called Deal of the Century deprived the U.S. government of any remaining capability to reach to the hearts and minds of the people on this side of the borders .
There ’ s also the possibility of future U.S.-Iranian detente ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Lebanon .
That said , there ’ s not much optimism in Tehran over the reviving of the nuclear deal within the framework of 2015 agreement even if presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden came to power ; decision-makers in Tehran are aiming at creating a new de facto regional order that would enable them to sit at a future U.S. administration ’ s negotiating table with some additional cards to play .
But such a negotiation depends on both Tehran ’ s and Washington ’ s willingness to expand the scope of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take into consideration all the pending issues between the United States and Iran will only make things worse in areas where the countries ’ interests collide .
Few options remain for the Lebanese under such circumstances .
Even those who believe a civil war might be the solution to the crisis—and there are quite a few—know full well that even this bloody option is out of the question given the world financial crisis and the desire of no one to bankroll a civil war from which Hezbollah would likely emerge the winner .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Lebanon is 17 times smaller than its neighbor .
Lebanon should not be squeezed and suffocated through a pressure campaign that will only make the Shiites more Shiite and less Lebanese—and the Sunnis , Druze , and Christians , too .
It will be tempting for them to take the easier route and leave the country .
For individuals , it may be easier to flee .
But a nation can ’ t flee itself .

Lebanon is in crisis. On the face of it, that’s nothing new. I’ve lived all of my 40 years with the knowledge that my country is in crisis. Invasions, civil war, local unrest, assassinations, foreign occupation, economic fragility, you name it—but it was never as bad as today.
Lebanon is in crisis. On the face of it, that’s nothing new. I’ve lived all of my 40 years with the knowledge that my country is in crisis. Invasions, civil war, local unrest, assassinations, foreign occupation, economic fragility, you name it—but it was never as bad as today.
In a matter of days, a number of crisis-related suicides have been reported; one man shot himself outside a cafe in busy Beirut Street, in full view of customers and passersby. Things have become surreal. It’s not only that people can’t work, or have lost their savings, or can’t afford to buy anything; these hardships are significant, but we’ve been through such times before. The difference is that today’s Lebanese cannot dream of a better tomorrow. Only those who’ve been forced to abandon the country know what this means.
In 2005, in the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a new player emerged on the political scene. Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organization by the United States but celebrated by many Lebanese as the resistance force that in 2000 liberated south Lebanon from Israeli occupation, took its first seats in the national cabinet. Conventional wisdom holds that Hezbollah is an ideological offshoot of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, but it’s important to recognize that the group isn’t a proxy but more of an organic extension of the dominant ideology within Iran—with members who are indigenous Lebanese. Thus, it can be seen as a hybrid, with a status comparable to that of communist parties around the world during the Cold War era.
But Lebanon isn’t like other countries; its sectarian divides are beyond bridging, with most of its citizens loyal to their sects above anything else. The current status quo is a legacy of the fragmentation that has flourished over decades in the absence of a strong central government.
Hezbollah isn’t a proxy but more of an organic extension of the dominant ideology within Iran—with members who are indigenous Lebanese.
During the first half of the 20th century, feudal lords represented the sects, and people pledged loyalty to them. But since the late 1960s, some feudal fiefdoms transformed into political parties, while others were toppled by angry peasants who became masters to their former rulers—the Shiites of Lebanon are one example. The rise of political Shiism in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 marked the peak of the transformation with the formation of Hezbollah. Now, in days of great misery and need, people know where to turn if they want to survive.
As part of the U.S. government’s campaign of maximum pressure on Iran, and because of Hezbollah’s footprint, maximum economic pressure is being brought to bear on Lebanon. To say this has sent Lebanon into free fall is an understatement: Banks are empty of dollars, power cuts in the capital are widespread, businesses are closing their doors for lack of customers, and the dollar value of the national minimum wage has fallen from around $450 per month to $80 as of this writing. A government minister whose monthly salary a few months ago was around $8,500 today earns roughly $1,500. Much the same can be said of the country’s president, speaker, and prime minister—and they are the fortunate ones.
But the weakening of the state will in no way weaken Hezbollah, which is armed to the teeth and coming off an eight-year adventure in Syria, which it views as a great success. The more the country dips into chaos, the more people will cling to their sects, whose leaders will become de facto rulers. The predictable future of a country now in tatters consists not of civil war but of zones of local unrest and violence; in the absence of a functioning state, any authority with the potential to stem the chaos will be the people’s preferred authority.
This is true for each and every faction exerting control of its areas: Druze leader Walid Jumblatt will consolidate his power in Mount Lebanon, Sunni former Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Sunni areas, the various Christian leaders in their areas of influence, and, of course, Hezbollah will consolidate power in southern Lebanon and on the Israeli border, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and Bekaa to the east, on the Syrian border. At the same time, a regional solution to the situation is emerging: Iran, too, will assert its power, positioning itself as a savior of the Shiite community. After all, Lebanon isn’t Venezuela. There’s no need to cross the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean to deliver food, medicine, fuel, and other supplies.
The more dire the crisis gets, the greater the likelihood that Lebanon will be drawn into Iran’s list of protected satellites. Tehran has already offered to sell oil and gasoline to the Lebanese government in Lebanese pounds—thereby saving the Lebanese government from the burden of rampant currency devaluation—and on several past occasions its leaders have vowed that, if the Lebanese authorities just say the word, they would provide Lebanon with electricity.
The more the United States ratchets up its pressure on Lebanon, the more opportunities will open up for Iran to exert power and influence in the disintegrating state. This will not necessarily come via the Iranian government; influence could flow directly through Hezbollah, which has vowed not to allow Shiites in Lebanon to die of hunger. The United States’ maximum pressure strategy could therefore easily play into the hands of its avowed enemy.
This appears to be a concern in Washington. The remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on preventing Iran from selling oil to Lebanon reflects that worry. Yet with Lebanon quickly becoming a failed state, there will be few options. That means the idea of creating a parallel economy for the sanctioned countries is gaining steam. It’s an idea Iran seems to fancy despite the economic hardships it’s suffering under the maximum pressure strategy.
During an on-the-record briefing with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Joel Rayburn at the Center for Global Policy, I presented this narrative; the answer I received was that the Iranians can’t exert such power, because they don’t have the money and resources to do it. But this might not be the case on the ground. Tehran might be ready to take the pain in the short term to solidify its position.
Iran, in the cases of Lebanon and Syria, is offering to accept payment in local currencies because it can make use of the local currencies to finance both its operations in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This would make a big difference for both the Lebanese government’s bottom line and Iran’s regional operations.
What the U.S. government has failed to grasp over the past four decades of its fight with Iran in a country like Lebanon is the fact that Iranian influence was bred organically in areas where Shiites are a majority. Put simply, the view in many Shiite households in southern Lebanon, Bekaa, and southern Beirut is that a weaker Iran would necessarily have an impact on them, so despite all the grievances that they may have against Iran or Hezbollah, both became central to the collective thinking of the sect’s position in the context of the sectarian struggle in the region.
Because of this, it’s very unlikely that the United States could curb Iran’s role in Lebanon. Previous attempts to empower civil society within the Shiite community didn’t succeed—and even a war can’t create a different reality without sinking the country into a worse situation.
However, there are still options to consider limiting Iran’s reach in Lebanon. A different U.S. approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict would help. This is not a marginal factor at all, especially after Trump’s so-called Deal of the Century deprived the U.S. government of any remaining capability to reach to the hearts and minds of the people on this side of the borders.
There’s also the possibility of future U.S.-Iranian detente; a new deal could be a savior for Lebanon. That said, there’s not much optimism in Tehran over the reviving of the nuclear deal within the framework of 2015 agreement even if presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden came to power; decision-makers in Tehran are aiming at creating a new de facto regional order that would enable them to sit at a future U.S. administration’s negotiating table with some additional cards to play. But such a negotiation depends on both Tehran’s and Washington’s willingness to expand the scope of talks. A deal that fails to take into consideration all the pending issues between the United States and Iran will only make things worse in areas where the countries’ interests collide.
Few options remain for the Lebanese under such circumstances. Even those who believe a civil war might be the solution to the crisis—and there are quite a few—know full well that even this bloody option is out of the question given the world financial crisis and the desire of no one to bankroll a civil war from which Hezbollah would likely emerge the winner. The Syrian example is fresh in memory, and Lebanon is 17 times smaller than its neighbor.
Lebanon should not be squeezed and suffocated through a pressure campaign that will only make the Shiites more Shiite and less Lebanese—and the Sunnis, Druze, and Christians, too. It will be tempting for them to take the easier route and leave the country. For individuals, it may be easier to flee. But a nation can’t flee itself.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-15--Trump’s China Speech Wasn’t About China

Trump’s China Speech Wasn’t About China

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : U.S. President Donald Trump delivers an incoherent speech amid rising tensions with China , why the South China Sea could be the next flash point , and the implications of the national security law in Hong Kong grow worse .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
In a strange , rambling public appearance at the White House on Tuesday , nominally on the U.S.-China conflict and the situation in Hong Kong , U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launching into a wide-ranging attack on the presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden .
Amid the Trump administration ’ s failures in responding to the coronavirus pandemic , it is now engaging in a badly coordinated attempt to turn China into the main 2020 election issue .
The efforts contradict Trump ’ s frequent praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping and his alleged appeal to China to help him in the election .
Among Trump ’ s claims : that China had been “ flatlining for years ” before joining the World Trade Organization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annual GDP growth between 1980 and 2001 was often in double digits ; that the United States had never been granted “ most favored trading nation status , ” seemingly confusing a WTO category and the designations used by the United States itself for partners ; and that “ hundreds of billions of dollars were taken out of the United States Treasury in order to rebuild China.
” The incoherent speech came after a week of rising tensions between the United States and China .
The Trump administration has derecognized Hong Kong as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on some Chinese tech workers , and officially opposed China ’ s sweeping claims in the South China Sea .
( Trump has held off on targeting individual Chinese officials . )
The most consequential changes to the relationship between the world ’ s two foremost powers in five decades are taking place under Trump ’ s leadership .
What is Beijing ’ s perspective ?
The Chinese leadership holds two dangerous and somewhat contradictory ideas about the United States .
The first is that Washington is unfairly hostile to Beijing , seeking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recognize its rights as a natural leader in the region .
The second is that the United States is a failing , decadent power with corrupt leaders who can not stand up to Chinese determination .
These ideas aren ’ t new : They echo the convictions that led the Japanese to Pearl Harbor .
Trump ’ s swing between crawling personal appeals to Xi and bellicose rhetoric , detached from any reality on the ground , reinforces both ideas .
It makes the Chinese leadership more convinced that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can win in a long-term conflict with a nation led by someone like Trump .
South China Sea positions .
The United States has dispatched two aircraft carriers—likely to be backed by British support—to the South China Sea , increasing the possibility of a regional flash point .
It has also declared its formal alignment against China ’ s disputed claims for the first time , saying that it would use “ all tools ” to oppose them .
In the last decade , China has made significant gains in the South China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ artificial islands to act as bases while strengthening its naval militia .
It is also increasingly aggressive in challenging rival claimants , including stalking Vietnamese oil ships and clashing with fishing boats .
The U.S. move is long overdue , but it ’ s also risky : Xi stakes considerable credibility on the South China Sea claims , and there ’ s no likelihood of Beijing backing down .
The pressure on Chinese officials and military personnel to demonstrate their nationalist enthusiasm is growing , increasing the chance of serious conflict similar to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
No haven in Hong Kong .
The implications of the new national security law in Hong Kong are growing .
The democratic parties ’ primaries on July 11 and 12 were threatened by claims that voting may breach the law , and numerous leaders are seeking refugee status overseas .
Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam has declared the act of voting against government legislation potentially illegal .
Trump ’ s derecognition of the city ’ s special status will likely have sharp economic consequences , though those may be hard to distinguish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Everything seems set for future explosive protests as Hong Kongers struggle to defend their freedoms .
Meanwhile , Hong Kong was once seen as a relatively safe haven for journalists , but the veteran New York Times reporter Chris Buckley was kicked out of the city due to a refusal to renew his visa after a similar expulsion from the mainland earlier this year .
In response , the Times is shifting part of its long-established Asia hub in Hong Kong to Seoul .
The security law is also likely to be used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media outlets .
Massive flooding in Southern China .
Floods in Southern China are a recurring threat , but they are worse than ever this year—with some 38 million people evacuated and at least 141 dead .
Rainfall has been double than the predicted amount in many places , threatening millions of lives and numerous important cultural sites .
Thousands of soldiers have been dispatched to help shore up defenses against the rising tides .
Water control has been a preoccupation for every Chinese ruler , and it will only worsen with climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in 1931 , killed over 2 million people .
The U.K. bans Huawei .
After years of resisting U.S. pressure , Britain made a remarkable turn this week , as Prime Minister Boris Johnson officially banned Huawei from the United Kingdom ’ s 5G networks .
The full implementation of the move won ’ t be completed until 2027—by which time 6G could be an issue—but China has reacted fiercely , condemning the action as “ groundless.
” Substantial parts of the British Conservative Party always opposed allowing the Chinese tech giant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next-generation cellular infrastructure , but the determination to forge post-Brexit trade links previously overwhelmed other concerns .
But the pandemic and the new national security law in Hong Kong sunk the U.K. and China ’ s so-called golden era .
The United States has tightened its own restrictions , slapping visa bans on Huawei employees in a statement that called the company “ an arm of the Chinese state.
” Student relief .
The Trump administration has been forced to back off its self-destructive attempt to expel foreign university students with online-only classes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that caused a rapid retreat .
But the number of new Chinese students , financially critical for many U.S. schools , is likely to be close to zero thanks to travel bans , Chinese parents ’ fears of the pandemic , and spiraling hostilities .
The loss of Chinese students is only one of the horsemen of the financial apocalypse for U.S. universities this year , but it has long been predicted : The University of Illinois even took out insurance against the possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that far-sighted , despite numerous warnings .
The trade deal is still dead .
China Brief called time on the U.S.-China trade deal months ago , but hopes have remained for its resurrection .
Trump spoke against continuing to seek a deal last weekend , blaming China for not stopping the pandemic—words reinforced in interviews on Tuesday .
But China is at least attempting to stick to phase one of the deal , making record-setting corn purchases in an attempt to live up to its obligations .
Land Wars : The Story of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brian DeMare Amid the glittering spires and high-tech oppression of Xi ’ s China , the country ’ s fundamental reliance on its large agrarian sector can often go unnoticed .
There have been several critical works on Chinese agriculture and politics in recent years .
The latest is the historian Brian DeMare ’ s examination of how land reform became the locus of violent contention in the early People ’ s Republic of China .
That history laid the groundwork for future violent political struggles .
It also led the way for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for years to eventually be able to reliably feed itself for the first time in centuries .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
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Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump delivers an incoherent speech amid rising tensions with China , why the South China Sea could be the next flash point, and the implications of the national security law in Hong Kong grow worse.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump delivers an incoherent speech amid rising tensions with China, why the South China Sea could be the next flash point, and the implications of the national security law in Hong Kong grow worse.
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Trump Gives Incoherent Speech on China
In a strange, rambling public appearance at the White House on Tuesday, nominally on the U.S.-China conflict and the situation in Hong Kong, U.S. President Donald Trump repeated numerous falsehoods before launching into a wide-ranging attack on the presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden. Amid the Trump administration’s failures in responding to the coronavirus pandemic, it is now engaging in a badly coordinated attempt to turn China into the main 2020 election issue. The efforts contradict Trump’s frequent praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping and his alleged appeal to China to help him in the election.
Among Trump’s claims: that China had been “flatlining for years” before joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, although China’s annual GDP growth between 1980 and 2001 was often in double digits; that the United States had never been granted “most favored trading nation status,” seemingly confusing a WTO category and the designations used by the United States itself for partners; and that “hundreds of billions of dollars were taken out of the United States Treasury in order to rebuild China.”
The incoherent speech came after a week of rising tensions between the United States and China. The Trump administration has derecognized Hong Kong as a separate territory, imposed visa bans on some Chinese tech workers, and officially opposed China’s sweeping claims in the South China Sea. (Trump has held off on targeting individual Chinese officials.) The most consequential changes to the relationship between the world’s two foremost powers in five decades are taking place under Trump’s leadership.
What is Beijing’s perspective? The Chinese leadership holds two dangerous and somewhat contradictory ideas about the United States. The first is that Washington is unfairly hostile to Beijing, seeking to crush Chinese economic hopes and failing to recognize its rights as a natural leader in the region. The second is that the United States is a failing, decadent power with corrupt leaders who cannot stand up to Chinese determination. These ideas aren’t new: They echo the convictions that led the Japanese to Pearl Harbor.
Trump’s swing between crawling personal appeals to Xi and bellicose rhetoric, detached from any reality on the ground, reinforces both ideas. It makes the Chinese leadership more convinced that the United States is its natural enemy and that they can win in a long-term conflict with a nation led by someone like Trump.
What We’re Watching
South China Sea positions. The United States has dispatched two aircraft carriers—likely to be backed by British support—to the South China Sea, increasing the possibility of a regional flash point. It has also declared its formal alignment against China’s disputed claims for the first time, saying that it would use “all tools” to oppose them. In the last decade, China has made significant gains in the South China Sea, building a formidable infrastructure of artificial islands to act as bases while strengthening its naval militia. It is also increasingly aggressive in challenging rival claimants, including stalking Vietnamese oil ships and clashing with fishing boats.
The U.S. move is long overdue, but it’s also risky: Xi stakes considerable credibility on the South China Sea claims, and there’s no likelihood of Beijing backing down. The pressure on Chinese officials and military personnel to demonstrate their nationalist enthusiasm is growing, increasing the chance of serious conflict similar to the deadly clash on the Indian border.
No haven in Hong Kong. The implications of the new national security law in Hong Kong are growing. The democratic parties’ primaries on July 11 and 12 were threatened by claims that voting may breach the law, and numerous leaders are seeking refugee status overseas. Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam has declared the act of voting against government legislation potentially illegal. Trump’s derecognition of the city’s special status will likely have sharp economic consequences, though those may be hard to distinguish from the impact of the pandemic. Everything seems set for future explosive protests as Hong Kongers struggle to defend their freedoms.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong was once seen as a relatively safe haven for journalists, but the veteran New York Times reporter Chris Buckley was kicked out of the city due to a refusal to renew his visa after a similar expulsion from the mainland earlier this year. In response, the Times is shifting part of its long-established Asia hub in Hong Kong to Seoul. The security law is also likely to be used to persecute Hong Kongers working for foreign media outlets.
Massive flooding in Southern China. Floods in Southern China are a recurring threat, but they are worse than ever this year—with some 38 million people evacuated and at least 141 dead. Rainfall has been double than the predicted amount in many places, threatening millions of lives and numerous important cultural sites. Thousands of soldiers have been dispatched to help shore up defenses against the rising tides. Water control has been a preoccupation for every Chinese ruler, and it will only worsen with climate change. China’s worst-known flooding, in 1931, killed over 2 million people.
Tech and Business
The U.K. bans Huawei. After years of resisting U.S. pressure, Britain made a remarkable turn this week, as Prime Minister Boris Johnson officially banned Huawei from the United Kingdom’s 5G networks. The full implementation of the move won’t be completed until 2027—by which time 6G could be an issue—but China has reacted fiercely, condemning the action as “groundless.” Substantial parts of the British Conservative Party always opposed allowing the Chinese tech giant Huawei to work on Britain’s next-generation cellular infrastructure, but the determination to forge post-Brexit trade links previously overwhelmed other concerns.
But the pandemic and the new national security law in Hong Kong sunk the U.K. and China’s so-called golden era. The United States has tightened its own restrictions, slapping visa bans on Huawei employees in a statement that called the company “an arm of the Chinese state.”
Student relief. The Trump administration has been forced to back off its self-destructive attempt to expel foreign university students with online-only classes next semester, thanks to legal action by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that caused a rapid retreat. But the number of new Chinese students, financially critical for many U.S. schools, is likely to be close to zero thanks to travel bans, Chinese parents’ fears of the pandemic, and spiraling hostilities.
The loss of Chinese students is only one of the horsemen of the financial apocalypse for U.S. universities this year, but it has long been predicted: The University of Illinois even took out insurance against the possibility two years ago. Few others were that far-sighted, despite numerous warnings.
The trade deal is still dead. China Brief called time on the U.S.-China trade deal months ago, but hopes have remained for its resurrection. Trump spoke against continuing to seek a deal last weekend, blaming China for not stopping the pandemic—words reinforced in interviews on Tuesday. But China is at least attempting to stick to phase one of the deal, making record-setting corn purchases in an attempt to live up to its obligations.
What We’re Reading
Land Wars: The Story of China’s Agrarian Revolution, by Brian DeMare
Amid the glittering spires and high-tech oppression of Xi’s China, the country’s fundamental reliance on its large agrarian sector can often go unnoticed. There have been several critical works on Chinese agriculture and politics in recent years. The latest is the historian Brian DeMare’s examination of how land reform became the locus of violent contention in the early People’s Republic of China. That history laid the groundwork for future violent political struggles. It also led the way for a country that had struggled with starvation for years to eventually be able to reliably feed itself for the first time in centuries.
That’s it for this week.
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