foreignpolicy--2020-06-15--Will Burundi’s New President Seize the Moment?

Will Burundi ’ s New President Seize the Moment ?
BUJUMBURA , Burundi—On Tuesday , Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza ’ s death was announced , more than 30 hours after he had died .
The government said he died of cardiac arrest .
Others weren ’ t so sure .
In the days since the shock announcement , there has been much speculation and reports in foreign media about the cause—including the theory , citing unnamed medical sources , that the president had been infected with COVID-19 .
The recent campaign ahead of the May 20 election was conducted in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with no lockdown or strict observance of social distancing at election rallies—while the president ’ s spokesperson claimed that God had protected the country against the virus .
Nkurunziza ’ s wife was previously reported to be undergoing treatment for the coronavirus in Nairobi , and there are claims that other family members had contracted the disease .
Though testing is very limited , 94 people in Burundi have reportedly tested positive for the coronavirus to date , and only one related death has been recorded .
But other observers argue that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the reliability of media reports that Nkurunziza ’ s wife flew to Kenya because she had the virus , and instead suspect foul play against the president .
When Nkurunziza ’ s death was announced , people went straight home in a state of fear , because many Burundians have already lived through the death of a president and remember what followed .
In 1993 , the assassination of the country ’ s first democratically elected president , Melchior Ndadaye , was followed by clashes that killed thousands and the flight of more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Burundi lost his successor , President Cyprien Ntaryamira , who was killed when his plane was shot down in Kigali , Rwanda .
The downing of the plane is seen now as the proximate cause of the Rwandan genocide , which claimed the lives of more than 800,000 people .
This time , no disturbances have been reported so far .
Officials have said people should mourn the president for seven days .
Music on the radio , on TV , and in studios , dance halls , and pubs has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president .
On Thursday , the cabinet met and called for the Constitutional Court to declare the vacancy and announce a replacement .
On Friday , the court ordered Évariste Ndayishimiye , a fellow member of Nkurunziza ’ s party who won last month ’ s presidential election , to take the oath as quickly as possible to avoid an extended period without an elected authority .
Ndayishimiye , a retired general , won the May 20 poll with 69 percent of the vote .
His main challenger , Agathon Rwasa of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebel leader , received 24 percent .
While the electoral commission had hailed the elections as peaceful , with a reported 88 percent turnout , the opposition candidate Rwasa alleged vote-rigging and contested the results in the Constitutional Court .
On June 4 , the court rejected the challenge as “ null and void.
” Rwasa pronounced himself disappointed but seemed to accept it , declaring , “ let ’ s give some time and see what will change , because we are Burundians , and we ought to respect Burundian laws.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sudden death have caused confusion but won ’ t necessarily lead to instability .
After all , the ruling party and its allies were never going to entertain opposition supporters ’ calls for new elections on the grounds that Ndayishimiye hadn ’ t been sworn in yet .
Nevertheless , this is a significant moment .
Nkurunziza was a pillar of his party and the country—Burundi ’ s longest-serving president since independence .
Nkurunziza also set an example for the rest of the continent when it comes to respecting term limits—although it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In April 2015 , he announced he would run again , after 10 years in office and despite a two-term limit , on the grounds that he was elected to his first mandate following the Burundian Civil War by Parliament , not by the people .
Opposition and human rights groups came together to contest this .
Clashes and demonstrations culminated in an attempted coup by former intelligence chief Gen. Godefroid Niyombare on May 13 , 2015 .
Within 36 hours , the coup had collapsed , and Niyombare fled to Rwanda .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 390,000 Burundians were pushed into exile .
In 2018 , Nkurunziza won a referendum that extended term limits to seven years and would have allowed him to stay in power until 2034 .
Yet soon afterward , he declared that he would not be standing for a fourth term .
Instead he was , before his death , due to receive the title of “ supreme guide to patriotism ” and a $ 540,000 retirement package .
Now that he is gone , a new government will have to address the question of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a public health crisis .
The new president does not seem worried about the pandemic and is forging ahead .
In his victory speech , Ndayishimiye pledged to listen to all citizens , touching particularly on his campaign promise to allow all refugees—more than 330,000 living in neighboring countries , according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—to return .
“ I call all those refugees in camps , to come back and drop away this misfortunate appellation of being a refugee , ” Ndayishimiye said .
If he honors this commitment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are reports of refugees being recruited by armed groups to attack Burundi .
During the 2020 election campaign , there were kidnappings and frequent clashes between the Imbonerakure—the ruling party ’ s youth league—and its rivals .
According to the opposition , more than 500 people were arrested , including 200 on polling day ; dozens were killed and others are still missing .
The Catholic Church in Burundi said the poll was marred by irregularities .
Nonetheless , there are several reasons to be cautiously optimistic .
There was equal enthusiasm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the election marks a shift to a new generation both of National Assembly members and voters .
Younger voters aren ’ t swayed by appeals to past freedom struggles : They want answers to bread-and-butter economic problems .
Addressing those concerns would be a sharp break from recent government policies .
Since the 2015 coup attempt , the Burundian government has been on a radical , isolationist footing .
It claimed the European Union , the former colonial power Belgium , and Rwanda were behind attempts at regime change .
While this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be noted that the senior army and police officers behind the coup did later take refuge in Rwanda , Belgium , and other Western countries—and , despite warrants being issued , none was handed over to Burundi .
Exiled journalists and human rights activists who are on the government ’ s most-wanted list deny working with the plotters , saying that they were only doing their job scrutinizing the administration .
In December 2015 , the African Union agreed to send 5,000 troops to Burundi to ensure security .
But Nkurunziza called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among other things that Burundi shouldn ’ t submit to troops on its soil when Burundian peacekeepers were active in Somalia .
Other members , notably South Africa , backed Burundi—leading the AU to withdraw the ultimatum .
Then , in October 2017 , Burundi became the first nation to leave the International Criminal Court , over the accusation that the court was only targeting African leaders .
Although the country once depended on the EU for a large portion of its budget , the EU imposed sanctions against senior Burundian officials late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in March 2016 .
Meanwhile , Burundi has found alternative allies in Russia and China , which have blocked proposed action against the country at the U.N. Security Council .
China has built a new presidential palace and funded dams , roads , schools , and hospitals .
“ There are two main views about Ndayishimiye , ” said Devon Curtis , a regional expert at the University of Cambridge .
“ The first is that he is a potential reformer , and that even though he fought with the CNDD-FDD [ a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ruling party ] during the civil war , he was more moderate than some of the other commanders .
This view emphasizes the fact that he played a big role in the negotiations leading to the 2003 cease-fire agreement and that he is much more open to discussions with donors and other international actors , ” she explained .
“ The second view is that Ndayishimiye is controlled by a powerful group of generals who determine the direction of the party and the country [ and ] will only be able to enact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The truth , Curtis argues , is somewhere in between : “ Ndayishimiye is certainly part of a system that has repressed political opponents and that has curtailed political and media space , but he nonetheless represents an opportunity for some change.
” However skillfully Ndayishimiye handles these political and security challenges , he also has to negotiate economic ones .
Burundi remains one of the world ’ s poorest countries .
In 2015 , GDP growth crashed to negative 3.9 percent .
According to the website Trading Economics , annual GDP per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the end of 2020—below the $ 245 it was in 2014 .
Inflation remains high at 7.6 percent , according to Burundi ’ s Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies .
In a country where 65 percent of young people lack regular jobs , Ndayishimiye must encourage the formation of new businesses and increase employment .
He needs to open Burundi up to investors in agriculture and mines—the country has major potential in rare earth metals , nickel and tin ores , and gold and uranium deposits .
Government investment in road @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lake Tanganyika could capitalize on potential export markets in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
Finally , there ’ s a major battle to be fought against corruption .
Burundi scores very low on Transparency International ’ s Corruption Perception Index , ranking at 165 out of 198 countries in 2019 .
The government could address this by ensuring consistent punishment of bribe-takers and educating students from a young age about the corrosiveness of corruption .
Greater transparency in the mining industry would help ensure that revenues aren ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And improved tech infrastructure would have the additional benefit , through increased take-up of mobile payment systems , of enabling the Revenue Authority to track corporate income and punish tax evasion .
If successful , these reforms could propel Burundi beyond its recent anemic GDP growth toward the ambitious 11 percent growth goal for 2027 set out in the country ’ s Decade Development Plan ( 2018-2027 ) .
But if Ndayishimiye is going to deliver on these high expectations , he must avoid being knocked off course by political or public health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ term .

BUJUMBURA, Burundi—On Tuesday, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza’s death was announced, more than 30 hours after he had died. The government said he died of cardiac arrest. Others weren’t so sure.
BUJUMBURA, Burundi—On Tuesday, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza’s death was announced, more than 30 hours after he had died. The government said he died of cardiac arrest. Others weren’t so sure.
In the days since the shock announcement, there has been much speculation and reports in foreign media about the cause—including the theory, citing unnamed medical sources, that the president had been infected with COVID-19. The recent campaign ahead of the May 20 election was conducted in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak, with no lockdown or strict observance of social distancing at election rallies—while the president’s spokesperson claimed that God had protected the country against the virus. Nkurunziza’s wife was previously reported to be undergoing treatment for the coronavirus in Nairobi, and there are claims that other family members had contracted the disease.
Though testing is very limited, 94 people in Burundi have reportedly tested positive for the coronavirus to date, and only one related death has been recorded. But other observers argue that the coronavirus is a convenient culprit, question the reliability of media reports that Nkurunziza’s wife flew to Kenya because she had the virus, and instead suspect foul play against the president.
When Nkurunziza’s death was announced, people went straight home in a state of fear, because many Burundians have already lived through the death of a president and remember what followed. In 1993, the assassination of the country’s first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, was followed by clashes that killed thousands and the flight of more than 700,000 refugees. The following year, Burundi lost his successor, President Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was killed when his plane was shot down in Kigali, Rwanda. The downing of the plane is seen now as the proximate cause of the Rwandan genocide, which claimed the lives of more than 800,000 people.
This time, no disturbances have been reported so far. Officials have said people should mourn the president for seven days. Music on the radio, on TV, and in studios, dance halls, and pubs has been banned, except gospel to mourn the president.
On Thursday, the cabinet met and called for the Constitutional Court to declare the vacancy and announce a replacement. On Friday, the court ordered Évariste Ndayishimiye, a fellow member of Nkurunziza’s party who won last month’s presidential election, to take the oath as quickly as possible to avoid an extended period without an elected authority.
Ndayishimiye, a retired general, won the May 20 poll with 69 percent of the vote. His main challenger, Agathon Rwasa of the National Freedom Council, also a former rebel leader, received 24 percent.
While the electoral commission had hailed the elections as peaceful, with a reported 88 percent turnout, the opposition candidate Rwasa alleged vote-rigging and contested the results in the Constitutional Court. On June 4, the court rejected the challenge as “null and void.” Rwasa pronounced himself disappointed but seemed to accept it, declaring, “let’s give some time and see what will change, because we are Burundians, and we ought to respect Burundian laws.”
The disputed election and Nkurunziza’s sudden death have caused confusion but won’t necessarily lead to instability. After all, the ruling party and its allies were never going to entertain opposition supporters’ calls for new elections on the grounds that Ndayishimiye hadn’t been sworn in yet. Nevertheless, this is a significant moment. Nkurunziza was a pillar of his party and the country—Burundi’s longest-serving president since independence.
As in neighboring Rwanda, Burundi’s history has been marked by ethnic violence between its Tutsi and Hutu population, including genocides both acknowledged and unacknowledged by the international community. Burundi’s stability is important, as events in the country have a disproportionate knock-on effect—for example, the activity of Hutu rebels in the 1990s civil war influenced Rwanda’s decision to invade Zaire, leading to the First Congo War, and Burundian refugees present a humanitarian and political challenge to neighboring governments.
Nkurunziza also set an example for the rest of the continent when it comes to respecting term limits—although it was a position he came to belatedly. In April 2015, he announced he would run again, after 10 years in office and despite a two-term limit, on the grounds that he was elected to his first mandate following the Burundian Civil War by Parliament, not by the people.
Opposition and human rights groups came together to contest this. Clashes and demonstrations culminated in an attempted coup by former intelligence chief Gen. Godefroid Niyombare on May 13, 2015. Within 36 hours, the coup had collapsed, and Niyombare fled to Rwanda. In the ensuing violence, more than 390,000 Burundians were pushed into exile.
In 2018, Nkurunziza won a referendum that extended term limits to seven years and would have allowed him to stay in power until 2034. Yet soon afterward, he declared that he would not be standing for a fourth term. Instead he was, before his death, due to receive the title of “supreme guide to patriotism” and a $540,000 retirement package. Now that he is gone, a new government will have to address the question of refugees, a precarious economy, and a public health crisis.
The Burundian government pushed ahead with the May election despite the first cases of the coronavirus being identified in the country in March. The government suspended most international flights, restricted land travel, and set up temperature-testing at the border and other key places. Ministers have encouraged social distancing and the use of hand-washing points—but no lockdown has been imposed.
The new president does not seem worried about the pandemic and is forging ahead. In his victory speech, Ndayishimiye pledged to listen to all citizens, touching particularly on his campaign promise to allow all refugees—more than 330,000 living in neighboring countries, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—to return.
“I call all those refugees in camps, to come back and drop away this misfortunate appellation of being a refugee,” Ndayishimiye said. If he honors this commitment, it will boost stability, since there are reports of refugees being recruited by armed groups to attack Burundi.
During the 2020 election campaign, there were kidnappings and frequent clashes between the Imbonerakure—the ruling party’s youth league—and its rivals. According to the opposition, more than 500 people were arrested, including 200 on polling day; dozens were killed and others are still missing. The Catholic Church in Burundi said the poll was marred by irregularities.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to be cautiously optimistic. There was equal enthusiasm among Hutus and Tutsis to campaign, and the election marks a shift to a new generation both of National Assembly members and voters. Younger voters aren’t swayed by appeals to past freedom struggles: They want answers to bread-and-butter economic problems. Addressing those concerns would be a sharp break from recent government policies.
Since the 2015 coup attempt, the Burundian government has been on a radical, isolationist footing. It claimed the European Union, the former colonial power Belgium, and Rwanda were behind attempts at regime change. While this may mainly reflect long-standing tensions, it should be noted that the senior army and police officers behind the coup did later take refuge in Rwanda, Belgium, and other Western countries—and, despite warrants being issued, none was handed over to Burundi. Exiled journalists and human rights activists who are on the government’s most-wanted list deny working with the plotters, saying that they were only doing their job scrutinizing the administration.
In December 2015, the African Union agreed to send 5,000 troops to Burundi to ensure security. But Nkurunziza called the AU’s bluff, arguing among other things that Burundi shouldn’t submit to troops on its soil when Burundian peacekeepers were active in Somalia. Other members, notably South Africa, backed Burundi—leading the AU to withdraw the ultimatum. Then, in October 2017, Burundi became the first nation to leave the International Criminal Court, over the accusation that the court was only targeting African leaders.
Although the country once depended on the EU for a large portion of its budget, the EU imposed sanctions against senior Burundian officials late in 2015 and suspended direct financial support in March 2016. Meanwhile, Burundi has found alternative allies in Russia and China, which have blocked proposed action against the country at the U.N. Security Council. China has built a new presidential palace and funded dams, roads, schools, and hospitals.
“There are two main views about Ndayishimiye,” said Devon Curtis, a regional expert at the University of Cambridge. “The first is that he is a potential reformer, and that even though he fought with the CNDD-FDD [a rebel group that became Burundi’s ruling party] during the civil war, he was more moderate than some of the other commanders. This view emphasizes the fact that he played a big role in the negotiations leading to the 2003 cease-fire agreement and that he is much more open to discussions with donors and other international actors,” she explained.
“The second view is that Ndayishimiye is controlled by a powerful group of generals who determine the direction of the party and the country [and] will only be able to enact superficial reform,” she added. The truth, Curtis argues, is somewhere in between: “Ndayishimiye is certainly part of a system that has repressed political opponents and that has curtailed political and media space, but he nonetheless represents an opportunity for some change.”
However skillfully Ndayishimiye handles these political and security challenges, he also has to negotiate economic ones. Burundi remains one of the world’s poorest countries. In 2015, GDP growth crashed to negative 3.9 percent. According to the website Trading Economics, annual GDP per capita is expected to reach $218 by the end of 2020—below the $245 it was in 2014. Inflation remains high at 7.6 percent, according to Burundi’s Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies.
In a country where 65 percent of young people lack regular jobs, Ndayishimiye must encourage the formation of new businesses and increase employment. He needs to open Burundi up to investors in agriculture and mines—the country has major potential in rare earth metals, nickel and tin ores, and gold and uranium deposits. Government investment in road and rail infrastructure and shipping routes across Lake Tanganyika could capitalize on potential export markets in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Finally, there’s a major battle to be fought against corruption. Burundi scores very low on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, ranking at 165 out of 198 countries in 2019. The government could address this by ensuring consistent punishment of bribe-takers and educating students from a young age about the corrosiveness of corruption. Greater transparency in the mining industry would help ensure that revenues aren’t being funneled out of the country. And improved tech infrastructure would have the additional benefit, through increased take-up of mobile payment systems, of enabling the Revenue Authority to track corporate income and punish tax evasion.
If successful, these reforms could propel Burundi beyond its recent anemic GDP growth toward the ambitious 11 percent growth goal for 2027 set out in the country’s Decade Development Plan (2018-2027). But if Ndayishimiye is going to deliver on these high expectations, he must avoid being knocked off course by political or public health crises before the end of his first term.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Trump Is Withdrawing U.S. Troops From Germany. Do Germans Care?

Trump Is Withdrawing U.S .
Troops From Germany .
Do Germans Care ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : President Trump confirms U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to meet Chinese counterpart in new talks , and Turkey eyes two Libyan military bases .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
On Monday , U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed in public for the first time his administration ’ s plans to cut the U.S. military troop presence in Germany from its current level of roughly 35,000 to a reduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re protecting Germany and they ’ re delinquent .
That doesn ’ t make sense , ” Trump said on Monday , in a reference to Germany ’ s failure to reach a 2 percent spending threshold agreed by NATO member states in 2014 .
“ So I said , we ’ re going to bring down the count to 25,000 soldiers , ” Trump added .
The abrupt shift is reminiscent of previous announcements of troop withdrawals .
In 2018 , then-Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned after Trump said he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s not even the only troop withdrawal plan currently under consideration , as the president reportedly wants U.S. forces in Afghanistan home before his election in November .
Revenge served kalt ?
Although gripes about NATO member spending have been shared by presidents before Trump , the timing does have hallmarks of a Trump response to a perceived slight .
The White House had to hastily rearrange a G-7 summit planned for Camp David at the end of June after German Chancellor Angela Merkel declined the invitation .
The White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans have been discussed since September .
The move also coincides with the return of Richard Grenell , who was described by a senior German politician as a “ biased propaganda machine ” during his recent stint as U.S .
Ambassador to Germany .
Speaking to the German newspaper Bild on June 11 , Grenell said Americans were “ tired ” of paying for the defense of allies and played down the withdrawal ’ s impact .
“ There will still be 25,000 American soldiers in Germany , that doesn ’ t seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
Do Germans care ?
The Pew Research Center asked Germans last September whether they thought U.S. military bases were important to their national security : 45 percent said the bases were either “ not too important ” or “ not important at all.
” Only 15 percent said the bases were very important .
In contrast , 56 percent of Americans said the bases in Germany were important for U.S. national security .
The countries also hold opposite opinions on whether to intervene if Russia were to enter conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Americans said their country should use military force to defend the NATO ally , whereas 60 percent of Germans said their country should stay out of it .
Does Germany need U.S. troops ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 9 , Michael John Williams argues that Germany ’ s U.S. troop presence is less about German security and more about U.S. interests .
“ U.S .
bases in Europe support U.S. national security first and foremost , ” he writes .
“ Without them U.S. force projection would be difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and stability in Europe would be questionable , ” Pompeo preparing for U.S.-China talks .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Hawaii for talks with his Chinese counterpart on Wednesday , in the first in-person discussions between the two countries since the coronavirus pandemic began .
The South China Morning Post reports that Pompeo will meet with China ’ s top diplomat Yang Jiechi .
An agenda has not yet been made public but is likely to include trade , arms control , and the global pandemic response .
U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paul Whelan , a U.S. citizen accused of spying in Russia on behalf of the United States has been sentenced to 16 years in prison by a Moscow court .
Secretary of State Pompeo said he was “ outraged ” by the verdict and that Whelan was deprived of a fair trial .
Russia ’ s Foreign Ministry said the 16-year sentence was not unfair or too harsh .
In the aftermath of the verdict , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer spoke with Whelan ’ s brother , David .
He said the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ punch.
” Brexit “ done ” in July ?
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has suggested a trade deal between the European Union and the United Kingdom could be completed as soon as July .
“ I don ’ t think we ’ re actually that far apart but what we need now is to see a bit of oomph in the negotiations , ” Johnson said .
Last week , the British government repeated its intention not to seek an extension to the current transition period , due to expire at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ radar deployment .
Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono has suspended the installation of two U.S.-made missile defense radar systems , called Aegis Ashore , citing technical issues and cost concerns amid the global economic downturn .
The defense systems , which have a joint price tag of $ 4.1 billion , were due to be installed in Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures as protection against missiles from North Korea .
Kyrgyz prime minister resigns .
Kyrgyzstan ’ s prime minister , Mukhammedkalyi Abylgaziev , has resigned his post citing an ongoing corruption investigation into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
“ In today ’ s difficult conditions , when the country confronts the threat of coronavirus infection and struggles with its impact on the economy , the government must work in a state of stability and enjoy the full confidence of citizens , ” Abylgaziev said in resignation statement .
The Social Democratic party , which holds a majority in the Kyrgyz parliament , must now nominate a successor .
Germany to monitor AfD office .
Germany ’ s domestic intelligence agency has put a regional branch of the far-right political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under surveillance .
“ The Brandenburg AfD has become more and more radical since its foundation and is now dominated by endeavors that are clearly directed against our free democratic fundamental order , ” Brandenburg Interior Minister Michael Stuebgen said .
Last month , Brandenburg AfD leader Andreas Kalbit was expelled from the party over links to far-right extremist groups .
Turkey eyes Libya bases .
Turkey is in talks with the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) in Libya to use two military bases in the country , Reuters reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increased its support to the GNA in recent weeks as it helped break a months-long siege by Khalifa Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army .
Awake to the possible threat to its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean , France has called for talks between NATO allies to discuss Turkey ’ s “ aggressive ” posture in Libya .
U.S. given low marks in global poll .
A new poll suggests the U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic has not gone unnoticed around the world .
The poll , by the Alliance of Democracies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assess country responses to the pandemic .
Over 60 percent of respondents said China had handled it well , while only a third said the United States had .
A large “ Black Lives Matter ” banner has been removed from the U.S. embassy in Seoul , just days after U.S .
Ambassador Harry Harris ordered its installation .
“ To avoid the misperception that American taxpayer dollars were spent to benefit such organizations , [ Harris ] directed that the banner be removed , ” An embassy spokesman said , adding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principles and ideals expressed by raising the banner.
” Reuters has reported that President Trump was displeased with the banner .
Iran ’ s public hospitals will no longer provide vasectomies or distribute contraceptives as the country tries to boost its birth rate .
Iranian women currently have an average birth rate of 1.7 children , below the 2.2 needed to maintain the population .
Hamed Barakati , director general of the office of population and family health at the Iranian ministry of health , blamed poor economic conditions for the decline in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as a trend of women delaying childbirth in order to receive a higher education .
Under the new rules , private hospitals will still allow contraception and other family planning services .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump confirms U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will meet his Chinese counterpart in new talks, and Turkey eyes two Libyan military bases.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump confirms U.S. troop withdrawal from Germany, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will meet his Chinese counterpart in new talks, and Turkey eyes two Libyan military bases.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Trump Confirms U.S. Troop Removal From “Delinquent” Germany
On Monday, U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed in public for the first time his administration’s plans to cut the U.S. military troop presence in Germany from its current level of roughly 35,000 to a reduced force of 25,000.
“So we’re protecting Germany and they’re delinquent. That doesn’t make sense,” Trump said on Monday, in a reference to Germany’s failure to reach a 2 percent spending threshold agreed by NATO member states in 2014. “So I said, we’re going to bring down the count to 25,000 soldiers,” Trump added.
The abrupt shift is reminiscent of previous announcements of troop withdrawals. In 2018, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned after Trump said he would withdraw 2,000 U.S. troops from Syria. It’s not even the only troop withdrawal plan currently under consideration, as the president reportedly wants U.S. forces in Afghanistan home before his election in November.
Revenge served kalt? Although gripes about NATO member spending have been shared by presidents before Trump, the timing does have hallmarks of a Trump response to a perceived slight. The White House had to hastily rearrange a G-7 summit planned for Camp David at the end of June after German Chancellor Angela Merkel declined the invitation. The White House denies this connection, and said such plans have been discussed since September.
The move also coincides with the return of Richard Grenell, who was described by a senior German politician as a “biased propaganda machine” during his recent stint as U.S. Ambassador to Germany. Speaking to the German newspaper Bild on June 11, Grenell said Americans were “tired” of paying for the defense of allies and played down the withdrawal’s impact. “There will still be 25,000 American soldiers in Germany, that doesn’t seem like a small number to me,” he said.
Do Germans care? The Pew Research Center asked Germans last September whether they thought U.S. military bases were important to their national security: 45 percent said the bases were either “not too important” or “not important at all.” Only 15 percent said the bases were very important. In contrast, 56 percent of Americans said the bases in Germany were important for U.S. national security.
The countries also hold opposite opinions on whether to intervene if Russia were to enter conflict with another NATO member state. 60 percent of Americans said their country should use military force to defend the NATO ally, whereas 60 percent of Germans said their country should stay out of it.
Does Germany need U.S. troops? Writing in Foreign Policy on June 9, Michael John Williams argues that Germany’s U.S. troop presence is less about German security and more about U.S. interests. “U.S. bases in Europe support U.S. national security first and foremost,” he writes. “Without them U.S. force projection would be difficult, some operations would be impossible, and stability in Europe would be questionable,”
What We’re Following Today
Pompeo preparing for U.S.-China talks. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will travel to Hawaii for talks with his Chinese counterpart on Wednesday, in the first in-person discussions between the two countries since the coronavirus pandemic began. The South China Morning Post reports that Pompeo will meet with China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi. An agenda has not yet been made public but is likely to include trade, arms control, and the global pandemic response.
U.S. “outraged” at Whelan verdict. Paul Whelan, a U.S. citizen accused of spying in Russia on behalf of the United States has been sentenced to 16 years in prison by a Moscow court. Secretary of State Pompeo said he was “outraged” by the verdict and that Whelan was deprived of a fair trial. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the 16-year sentence was not unfair or too harsh.
In the aftermath of the verdict, FP’s Robbie Gramer spoke with Whelan’s brother, David. He said the decision handed down was a “gut punch.”
Brexit “done” in July? British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has suggested a trade deal between the European Union and the United Kingdom could be completed as soon as July. “I don’t think we’re actually that far apart but what we need now is to see a bit of oomph in the negotiations,” Johnson said. Last week, the British government repeated its intention not to seek an extension to the current transition period, due to expire at the end of this year.
Japan suspends radar deployment. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono has suspended the installation of two U.S.-made missile defense radar systems, called Aegis Ashore, citing technical issues and cost concerns amid the global economic downturn. The defense systems, which have a joint price tag of $4.1 billion, were due to be installed in Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures as protection against missiles from North Korea.
Kyrgyz prime minister resigns. Kyrgyzstan’s prime minister, Mukhammedkalyi Abylgaziev, has resigned his post citing an ongoing corruption investigation into the awarding of radio frequencies in the country. “In today’s difficult conditions, when the country confronts the threat of coronavirus infection and struggles with its impact on the economy, the government must work in a state of stability and enjoy the full confidence of citizens,” Abylgaziev said in resignation statement. The Social Democratic party, which holds a majority in the Kyrgyz parliament, must now nominate a successor.
Keep an Eye On
Germany to monitor AfD office. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency has put a regional branch of the far-right political party Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) under surveillance. “The Brandenburg AfD has become more and more radical since its foundation and is now dominated by endeavors that are clearly directed against our free democratic fundamental order,” Brandenburg Interior Minister Michael Stuebgen said. Last month, Brandenburg AfD leader Andreas Kalbit was expelled from the party over links to far-right extremist groups.
Turkey eyes Libya bases. Turkey is in talks with the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya to use two military bases in the country, Reuters reports. The move comes as Turkey has increased its support to the GNA in recent weeks as it helped break a months-long siege by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Awake to the possible threat to its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, France has called for talks between NATO allies to discuss Turkey’s “aggressive” posture in Libya.
U.S. given low marks in global poll. A new poll suggests the U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic has not gone unnoticed around the world. The poll, by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation asked 120,000 people in 53 countries to assess country responses to the pandemic. Over 60 percent of respondents said China had handled it well, while only a third said the United States had.
Odds and Ends
A large “Black Lives Matter” banner has been removed from the U.S. embassy in Seoul, just days after U.S. Ambassador Harry Harris ordered its installation. “To avoid the misperception that American taxpayer dollars were spent to benefit such organizations, [Harris] directed that the banner be removed,” An embassy spokesman said, adding “this in no way lessens the principles and ideals expressed by raising the banner.” Reuters has reported that President Trump was displeased with the banner.
Iran’s public hospitals will no longer provide vasectomies or distribute contraceptives as the country tries to boost its birth rate. Iranian women currently have an average birth rate of 1.7 children, below the 2.2 needed to maintain the population. Hamed Barakati, director general of the office of population and family health at the Iranian ministry of health, blamed poor economic conditions for the decline in the country’s birth rate as well as a trend of women delaying childbirth in order to receive a higher education. Under the new rules, private hospitals will still allow contraception and other family planning services.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Europe Must Stand Up to China Before It’s Too Late

Europe Must Stand Up to China Before It ’ s Too Late Europe ’ s prosperity depends on an orderly system that ensures the global flow of goods , services , capital , and—however much populists object—labor .
But 2020 is turning out to be a very bad year for the rules-based international order .
Europe finds itself caught between a Chinese leadership that believes in order but not rules and a U.S. president who believes in neither .
The European Union can not assume that either Xi Jinping or Donald Trump will leave the scene or change his views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin planning for a world in which the United States is no longer the main bulwark of international order and European security and in which China ’ s economic power is backed up with global military might .
The EU needs to start the slow process of becoming a more independent international actor , able to stand up to its rivals and to defend its values and interests .
So far , the EU ’ s response to China ’ s assertive authoritarianism has been too weak .
Its stance is to some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with China is vital to the European economy—and it will be hard to get 27 countries to agree on credible policies .
Even before the COVID-19 crisis , China had been able to leverage its investments in some EU member states to get them to block EU criticism of its human rights record .
During the pandemic , it used so-called mask diplomacy—deliveries of protective equipment and medical supplies to Italy and elsewhere—to distract attention from Beijing ’ s responsibility for the initial spread of the coronavirus .
Last year , the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In a 10-point action plan , however , the EU made no proposals for how it could resist the systemic challenge or promote its own values in response .
Yet it must .
Under Xi , China has become more repressive than at any time since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 , with at least a million Uighurs in the Xinjiang region imprisoned in indoctrination camps .
And the recently announced Hong Kong security law confirmed what democracy activists there have long feared : China intends to erode the autonomy guaranteed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 1985 .
A bland EU statement after a foreign ministers ’ discussion on May 29 said the steps taken were not in conformity with China ’ s international commitments in the joint declaration .
But even this mild rebuke was undercut by the revelation that only the Swedish foreign minister had suggested that the EU should consider sanctions—and by the fact that EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell called China an “ ally ” in a press conference after the statement was published .
If China is a systemic rival—and it is—the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , not the Chinese Communist Party ’ s authoritarianism , come out on top .
EU member states should offer refuge to Hong Kong citizens whose rights are threatened , as the United Kingdom has : Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proposed giving almost 3 million Hong Kong residents a right to live in the U.K. and a pathway to full British citizenship .
EU members should also make clear their readiness to impose visa restrictions on Chinese or Hong Kong officials involved in any repression , as the U.S. government has .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ take steps to counter Chinese influence operations , including on university campuses , and to ensure that Chinese students studying in the West are not being organized to act as agents of the party .
The EU should also step up its political and security engagement with democracies in the Asia-Pacific region , particularly those under pressure from China , including Australia and Taiwan .
The EU should not unquestioningly accept China ’ s expansive definition of its core national interests , according to which the rest of the world should simply accept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the South China Sea , and disputed islands in the East China Sea .
In particular , the EU should make clear that it rejects China ’ s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its creation of militarized islands there , and those member states with the naval capability to do so should send ships through the area to underline that these are international waters .
The EU should be braced for China to respond .
Beijing has not hesitated to bully states or institutions that criticize its policies .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some goods from Australia in retaliation for Canberra calling for an investigation of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic .
The Chinese ambassador to Sweden has threatened Swedish media over their coverage of China ’ s kidnapping and imprisonment of a Swedish citizen of Chinese origin , Gui Minhai .
The EU itself has been in the firing line , too—for seeking to ensure more scrutiny of the security implications of Chinese investments in Europe and for exposing Chinese involvement in disinformation campaigns relating to the coronavirus .
If the EU fails to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s position will only worsen .
EU leaders should also recognize that one of the benefits of globalization is that China ’ s economy depends on its trade with the West as much as the West depends on its trade with China : China ’ s exports to the EU and United States amounted to around $ 850 billion in 2019—about 20 percent of its total exports and around 6 percent of its GDP .
While China has often threatened economic retaliation ( for example against countries where the Dalai Lama has met @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much has happened .
In normal times , the EU would be pursuing its policies in close coordination with the United States .
But when EU foreign ministers held a videoconference with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on June 15 , there was little agreement about anything , and Pompeo seemingly ignored an EU proposal for a bilateral dialogue on China .
The U.S. military commitment to European defense remains , for now , but after Trump ’ s repeated attacks on the international institutions and agreements that have helped make the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his decision to withdraw about one-third of U.S. forces from Germany , it ’ s no longer clear that Europe could rely on NATO ’ s Article 5 commitment to mutual defense if Trump were reelected .
It will take Europe decades to become capable of defending itself militarily without U.S. help .
After the economic devastation caused by COVID-19 , EU political leaders will be tempted to cut defense and external security budgets , not increase them .
But Europe must now invest in diplomacy as well as arms , to insure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an unreliable America .
The rules-based order is not yet lost , but if Europe dithers in the face of Chinese pressure and U.S. distraction , it may well be .

Europe’s prosperity depends on an orderly system that ensures the global flow of goods, services, capital, and—however much populists object—labor. But 2020 is turning out to be a very bad year for the rules-based international order.
Europe’s prosperity depends on an orderly system that ensures the global flow of goods, services, capital, and—however much populists object—labor. But 2020 is turning out to be a very bad year for the rules-based international order.
Europe finds itself caught between a Chinese leadership that believes in order but not rules and a U.S. president who believes in neither. The European Union cannot assume that either Xi Jinping or Donald Trump will leave the scene or change his views in the near future. It should begin planning for a world in which the United States is no longer the main bulwark of international order and European security and in which China’s economic power is backed up with global military might.
The EU needs to start the slow process of becoming a more independent international actor, able to stand up to its rivals and to defend its values and interests. So far, the EU’s response to China’s assertive authoritarianism has been too weak. Its stance is to some extent understandable. After all, trade with China is vital to the European economy—and it will be hard to get 27 countries to agree on credible policies.
Even before the COVID-19 crisis, China had been able to leverage its investments in some EU member states to get them to block EU criticism of its human rights record. During the pandemic, it used so-called mask diplomacy—deliveries of protective equipment and medical supplies to Italy and elsewhere—to distract attention from Beijing’s responsibility for the initial spread of the coronavirus.
Last year, the EU described China as a systemic rival. In a 10-point action plan, however, the EU made no proposals for how it could resist the systemic challenge or promote its own values in response. Yet it must.
Under Xi, China has become more repressive than at any time since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, with at least a million Uighurs in the Xinjiang region imprisoned in indoctrination camps. And the recently announced Hong Kong security law confirmed what democracy activists there have long feared: China intends to erode the autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1985.
A bland EU statement after a foreign ministers’ discussion on May 29 said the steps taken were not in conformity with China’s international commitments in the joint declaration. But even this mild rebuke was undercut by the revelation that only the Swedish foreign minister had suggested that the EU should consider sanctions—and by the fact that EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell called China an “ally” in a press conference after the statement was published.
If China is a systemic rival—and it is—the EU needs to make sure that its values, not the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarianism, come out on top. EU member states should offer refuge to Hong Kong citizens whose rights are threatened, as the United Kingdom has: Prime Minister Boris Johnson has proposed giving almost 3 million Hong Kong residents a right to live in the U.K. and a pathway to full British citizenship.
EU members should also make clear their readiness to impose visa restrictions on Chinese or Hong Kong officials involved in any repression, as the U.S. government has. Closer to home, member states should take steps to counter Chinese influence operations, including on university campuses, and to ensure that Chinese students studying in the West are not being organized to act as agents of the party.
The EU should also step up its political and security engagement with democracies in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly those under pressure from China, including Australia and Taiwan. The EU should not unquestioningly accept China’s expansive definition of its core national interests, according to which the rest of the world should simply accept China’s claims to Taiwan, the South China Sea, and disputed islands in the East China Sea. In particular, the EU should make clear that it rejects China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its creation of militarized islands there, and those member states with the naval capability to do so should send ships through the area to underline that these are international waters.
The EU should be braced for China to respond. Beijing has not hesitated to bully states or institutions that criticize its policies. It has already imposed tariffs or bans on some goods from Australia in retaliation for Canberra calling for an investigation of the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chinese ambassador to Sweden has threatened Swedish media over their coverage of China’s kidnapping and imprisonment of a Swedish citizen of Chinese origin, Gui Minhai. The EU itself has been in the firing line, too—for seeking to ensure more scrutiny of the security implications of Chinese investments in Europe and for exposing Chinese involvement in disinformation campaigns relating to the coronavirus.
If the EU fails to stand up to China, Europe’s position will only worsen. EU leaders should also recognize that one of the benefits of globalization is that China’s economy depends on its trade with the West as much as the West depends on its trade with China: China’s exports to the EU and United States amounted to around $850 billion in 2019—about 20 percent of its total exports and around 6 percent of its GDP. While China has often threatened economic retaliation (for example against countries where the Dalai Lama has met government ministers) in practice, not much has happened.
In normal times, the EU would be pursuing its policies in close coordination with the United States. But when EU foreign ministers held a videoconference with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on June 15, there was little agreement about anything, and Pompeo seemingly ignored an EU proposal for a bilateral dialogue on China.
The U.S. military commitment to European defense remains, for now, but after Trump’s repeated attacks on the international institutions and agreements that have helped make the United States safe and prosperous, and his decision to withdraw about one-third of U.S. forces from Germany, it’s no longer clear that Europe could rely on NATO’s Article 5 commitment to mutual defense if Trump were reelected.
It will take Europe decades to become capable of defending itself militarily without U.S. help. After the economic devastation caused by COVID-19, EU political leaders will be tempted to cut defense and external security budgets, not increase them. But Europe must now invest in diplomacy as well as arms, to insure itself against both an authoritarian China and an unreliable America. The rules-based order is not yet lost, but if Europe dithers in the face of Chinese pressure and U.S. distraction, it may well be.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--South Korea Shouldn’t Endorse North Korea’s Explosive Bullying

Dictators are notoriously touchy when it comes to criticism .
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is no exception .
Expressing anything less than extreme admiration of the supreme leader risks a lengthy prison stay .
The latest spat with South Korea has produced a literally explosive reaction from North Korea , which blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in the village of Kaesong , on the northern side of the border .
North Korea has very clearly signaled that talking is futile and that it ’ s back to bullying to get what it wants—and Seoul is only encouraging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is preparing to do Pyongyang ’ s dirty work by forbidding private groups from sending political tracts to North Korea .
This cowardly decision sacrifices citizens ’ basic rights and encourages North Korea to make additional demands .
Seoul ’ s policy toward North Korea was unremittingly hostile and counterproductive for a long time , changing significantly only with former President Kim Dae-jung ’ s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 .
Travel to the North was mostly prohibited , increasing the allure of North Korea to some .
The Republic of Korea would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critics on holiday to Pyongyang .
There ’ s nothing quite like seeing the other side close up .
The government of President Moon Jae-in has tried a very different approach , following on the earlier Sunshine Policy of the 1990s and 2000s , and ties between the two Koreas improved dramatically in 2018 .
However , the relationship cratered along with last year ’ s Hanoi summit .
North Korea now alternates between ignoring and insulting South Korea .
In contrast , South Korea remains silent .
In the past , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using high-powered speakers to broadcast propaganda and K-pop music across the Demilitarized Zone .
But in 2018 Seoul unplugged its propaganda operations to promote detente with North Korea .
Private groups did not halt their activities , however .
One of their favorite techniques was to send leaflets by balloon into the North .
It is impossible to know how many are read and what impact they have .
Still , angry complaints from Pyongyang suggest that the regime is unnerved by uncensored information seeping into North Korea .
That also was evident @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jong , Kim Jong Un ’ s sister , who is de facto head of the North ’ s propaganda efforts , issued a statement through the Korean Central News Agency demanding that Seoul halt leaflet campaigns and threatening countermeasures should it not comply .
She called critics “ rubbish-like mongrel dogs ” and “ human scum little short of wild animals , ” and demanded that South Korea “ take care of the consequences of evil conduct.
” In her statement , Kim Yo Jong blamed the South : “ If they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a will to thoroughly implement them , they should clear their house of rubbish , before thoughtlessly blowing the ‘ supporting ’ bugle.
” Moreover , she threatened , “ the south Korean authorities will be forced to pay a dear price if they let this situation go on while making sort of excuses.
” She said the North might initiate the “ complete withdrawal ” from joint projects , including Kaesong Industrial Park , close the inter-Korean liaison office , and drop “ the north-south agreement in military field which is hardly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pyongyang said it was ending its participation in the liaison office : “ The nonstop disposal of dirty rubbish from the South side has exhausted us so much as to come to a clearer conclusion that enemies are enemies after all , ” a spokesman declared .
Finally , on June 9 the North cut connections between the two Koreas , severing “ the East and West Seas communication lines between the militaries of the north and the south , the inter-Korean trial communication line and the hotline.
” North Korea explained that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the determination to completely shut down all contact means with south Korea and get rid of unnecessary things.
” More missives have followed , along with the explosive closure of the ( empty ) liaison office on Tuesday .
North Korea has played the game skillfully , ratcheting up pressure on a skittish South Korean government .
Panic appears to have afflicted South Korean officials .
After the two Koreas signed the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace , Prosperity and Unification on the Korean Peninsula at the first summit between Moon and Kim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Korean groups to halt their propaganda activities .
However , the Seoul government did little to enforce its edict—admittedly no easy task , since activists easily evaded the police when launching balloons .
More than two years passed without Pyongyang taking much notice .
But after Kim ’ s outburst the spokesman for South Korea ’ s Ministry of Unification , Yoh Sang-key , complained that the balloon launches “ led to the creation of tension in the border area ” and , less convincingly , “ are risking the life and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” and therefore should be banned .
Just hours after her statement the ministry said legislation was being prepared to outlaw the practice .
The ruling party ’ s large National Assembly majority should guarantee passage of the measure .
The next day a group of mayors of border cities complained that activists “ threaten the life and property of the border area residents ” and urged the Moon government to take “ strong measures ” to halt the practice .
That included arranging “ fundamental solutions as soon as possible , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that can punish those who break such measures.
” The same day police blocked a Christian nongovernmental organization from launching bottles filled with Bibles , food , and vitamins by sea toward North Korea .
The North contends that the 2018 pact bars such activities .
However , Pyongyang has no grounds to complain : North Korea has flagrantly ignored its commitments and treated the South with flamboyant disdain .
Kim Yo Jong ’ s rant provided an excellent opportunity for Moon to insist on reciprocity .
That probably would have triggered another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been made .
No doubt , South Korea ’ s craven response reflected its fear that relations would deteriorate further .
However , there is little reason to believe that the leaflet issue would have any meaningful impact on bilateral relations .
Over the past year or so the North has demonstrated ever greater hostility to South Korea .
The former downgraded its involvement in the liaison office , resumed short-range missile tests , demanded the removal of buildings at the Kumgang resort , and criticized Seoul for multiple reasons , big and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Seoul is powerless to move forward with economic cooperation because of U.S. and U.N. sanctions .
Thus , the contretemps about the leaflets is more symptom than cause , merely the latest cudgel used by North Korea to bash Seoul .
For Pyongyang , alleged South Korean perfidy and faithfulness are useful explanations for the breakdown of the North-South relationship .
Unfortunately , Seoul ’ s decision to grovel will not improve relations .
In fact , a statement attributed to the United Front Department dismissed South Koreans who believed Kim Yo Jong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to restart talks , calling it a “ pipe dream that the north seems to hope for dialogue and negotiations.
” Even if the South follows Pyongyang ’ s orders , Seoul will remain a hopelessly besotted yet perennially frustrated suitor .
The hasty move to outlaw leafletting has several negative consequences .
The Moon government sacrificed its dignity and its citizens ’ freedom , no small matters .
Moreover , Seoul abandoned its leverage , which Pyongyang revealed to be substantial .
The North fears propaganda directed at its citizens .
Instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South should encourage them .
Then Seoul could indicate that it would be happy to discuss the issue—once the other side restores a bilateral dialogue .
Worse , the alacrity with which the South genuflected invited further bullying , as today ’ s destruction showed .
What next will North Korea assert interferes with relations—which it has no apparent intention of improving ?
Is there anything the Moon government will not sacrifice to satisfy Pyongyang ?
It would be surprising if the Kims do not test South Korea again , and soon .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it is far too eager to engage the North .
In contrast , a tougher response would have punished the Kim regime for its arrogant behavior .
The fact that the supreme leader ’ s sister took the lead on the issue might have reflected domestic concerns , perhaps an attempt to demonstrate toughness in order to burnish her leadership credentials .
Seoul could have demonstrated that the North ’ s attempt at intimidation failed and the Moon government won ’ t be a willing political prop for the Kims .
Indeed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to counteract past media treatment of Kim Yo Jong as a glamorous celebrity .
Her snarling attack befits an unreconstructed apparatchik , not a putative reformer ready to lead her country into a new era .
The Moon government should criticize actions and rhetoric from Pyongyang so inconsistent with those of Kim Jong Un two years ago .
Engagement with North Korea remains the best approach for South Korea ( and the United States ) , but that does not mean submissively kowtowing when the North ’ s leaders return to a policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a position of strength and should respond accordingly .
Unless the other side becomes a better negotiating partner , the South should allow the balloons to keep flying .

Dictators are notoriously touchy when it comes to criticism. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is no exception. Expressing anything less than extreme admiration of the supreme leader risks a lengthy prison stay. The latest spat with South Korea has produced a literally explosive reaction from North Korea, which blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in the village of Kaesong, on the northern side of the border.
Dictators are notoriously touchy when it comes to criticism. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is no exception. Expressing anything less than extreme admiration of the supreme leader risks a lengthy prison stay. The latest spat with South Korea has produced a literally explosive reaction from North Korea, which blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in the village of Kaesong, on the northern side of the border.
North Korea has very clearly signaled that talking is futile and that it’s back to bullying to get what it wants—and Seoul is only encouraging it. Now the South Korean government is preparing to do Pyongyang’s dirty work by forbidding private groups from sending political tracts to North Korea. This cowardly decision sacrifices citizens’ basic rights and encourages North Korea to make additional demands.
Seoul’s policy toward North Korea was unremittingly hostile and counterproductive for a long time, changing significantly only with former President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000. Travel to the North was mostly prohibited, increasing the allure of North Korea to some. The Republic of Korea would have done better to send its domestic critics on holiday to Pyongyang. There’s nothing quite like seeing the other side close up.
The government of President Moon Jae-in has tried a very different approach, following on the earlier Sunshine Policy of the 1990s and 2000s, and ties between the two Koreas improved dramatically in 2018. However, the relationship cratered along with last year’s Hanoi summit. North Korea now alternates between ignoring and insulting South Korea.
In contrast, South Korea remains silent. In the past, it matched the North’s tactics, using high-powered speakers to broadcast propaganda and K-pop music across the Demilitarized Zone. But in 2018 Seoul unplugged its propaganda operations to promote detente with North Korea.
Private groups did not halt their activities, however. One of their favorite techniques was to send leaflets by balloon into the North. It is impossible to know how many are read and what impact they have. Still, angry complaints from Pyongyang suggest that the regime is unnerved by uncensored information seeping into North Korea.
That also was evident on June 4, when Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister, who is de facto head of the North’s propaganda efforts, issued a statement through the Korean Central News Agency demanding that Seoul halt leaflet campaigns and threatening countermeasures should it not comply. She called critics “rubbish-like mongrel dogs” and “human scum little short of wild animals,” and demanded that South Korea “take care of the consequences of evil conduct.”
In her statement, Kim Yo Jong blamed the South: “If they truly value the north-south agreements and have a will to thoroughly implement them, they should clear their house of rubbish, before thoughtlessly blowing the ‘supporting’ bugle.” Moreover, she threatened, “the south Korean authorities will be forced to pay a dear price if they let this situation go on while making sort of excuses.”
She said the North might initiate the “complete withdrawal” from joint projects, including Kaesong Industrial Park, close the inter-Korean liaison office, and drop “the north-south agreement in military field which is hardly of any value.” The next day Pyongyang said it was ending its participation in the liaison office: “The nonstop disposal of dirty rubbish from the South side has exhausted us so much as to come to a clearer conclusion that enemies are enemies after all,” a spokesman declared.
Finally, on June 9 the North cut connections between the two Koreas, severing “the East and West Seas communication lines between the militaries of the north and the south, the inter-Korean trial communication line and the hotline.” North Korea explained that “this measure is the first step of the determination to completely shut down all contact means with south Korea and get rid of unnecessary things.” More missives have followed, along with the explosive closure of the (empty) liaison office on Tuesday.
North Korea has played the game skillfully, ratcheting up pressure on a skittish South Korean government. Panic appears to have afflicted South Korean officials.
After the two Koreas signed the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification on the Korean Peninsula at the first summit between Moon and Kim Jong Un, the Moon administration ordered South Korean groups to halt their propaganda activities. However, the Seoul government did little to enforce its edict—admittedly no easy task, since activists easily evaded the police when launching balloons.
More than two years passed without Pyongyang taking much notice. But after Kim’s outburst the spokesman for South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, Yoh Sang-key, complained that the balloon launches “led to the creation of tension in the border area” and, less convincingly, “are risking the life and property of citizens of the border area” and therefore should be banned. Just hours after her statement the ministry said legislation was being prepared to outlaw the practice. The ruling party’s large National Assembly majority should guarantee passage of the measure.
The next day a group of mayors of border cities complained that activists “threaten the life and property of the border area residents” and urged the Moon government to take “strong measures” to halt the practice. That included arranging “fundamental solutions as soon as possible, such as preparing legislation to include such measures that can punish those who break such measures.” The same day police blocked a Christian nongovernmental organization from launching bottles filled with Bibles, food, and vitamins by sea toward North Korea.
The North contends that the 2018 pact bars such activities. However, Pyongyang has no grounds to complain: North Korea has flagrantly ignored its commitments and treated the South with flamboyant disdain. Kim Yo Jong’s rant provided an excellent opportunity for Moon to insist on reciprocity.
That probably would have triggered another outburst, but the point would have been made. No doubt, South Korea’s craven response reflected its fear that relations would deteriorate further. However, there is little reason to believe that the leaflet issue would have any meaningful impact on bilateral relations.
Over the past year or so the North has demonstrated ever greater hostility to South Korea. The former downgraded its involvement in the liaison office, resumed short-range missile tests, demanded the removal of buildings at the Kumgang resort, and criticized Seoul for multiple reasons, big and small. Kim apparently has decided that Seoul is powerless to move forward with economic cooperation because of U.S. and U.N. sanctions. Thus, the contretemps about the leaflets is more symptom than cause, merely the latest cudgel used by North Korea to bash Seoul. For Pyongyang, alleged South Korean perfidy and faithfulness are useful explanations for the breakdown of the North-South relationship.
Unfortunately, Seoul’s decision to grovel will not improve relations. In fact, a statement attributed to the United Front Department dismissed South Koreans who believed Kim Yo Jong’s earlier remarks indicated a desire to restart talks, calling it a “pipe dream that the north seems to hope for dialogue and negotiations.” Even if the South follows Pyongyang’s orders, Seoul will remain a hopelessly besotted yet perennially frustrated suitor.
The hasty move to outlaw leafletting has several negative consequences. The Moon government sacrificed its dignity and its citizens’ freedom, no small matters. Moreover, Seoul abandoned its leverage, which Pyongyang revealed to be substantial. The North fears propaganda directed at its citizens. Instead of shutting down such activities, the South should encourage them. Then Seoul could indicate that it would be happy to discuss the issue—once the other side restores a bilateral dialogue.
Worse, the alacrity with which the South genuflected invited further bullying, as today’s destruction showed. What next will North Korea assert interferes with relations—which it has no apparent intention of improving? Is there anything the Moon government will not sacrifice to satisfy Pyongyang? It would be surprising if the Kims do not test South Korea again, and soon. The Moon government has vindicated opposition claims that it is far too eager to engage the North.
In contrast, a tougher response would have punished the Kim regime for its arrogant behavior. The fact that the supreme leader’s sister took the lead on the issue might have reflected domestic concerns, perhaps an attempt to demonstrate toughness in order to burnish her leadership credentials. Seoul could have demonstrated that the North’s attempt at intimidation failed and the Moon government won’t be a willing political prop for the Kims.
Indeed, the South should publicize the incident to counteract past media treatment of Kim Yo Jong as a glamorous celebrity. Her snarling attack befits an unreconstructed apparatchik, not a putative reformer ready to lead her country into a new era. The Moon government should criticize actions and rhetoric from Pyongyang so inconsistent with those of Kim Jong Un two years ago.
Engagement with North Korea remains the best approach for South Korea (and the United States), but that does not mean submissively kowtowing when the North’s leaders return to a policy of insults and intimidation. Seoul enjoys a position of strength and should respond accordingly. Unless the other side becomes a better negotiating partner, the South should allow the balloons to keep flying.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-16--Revolutions Happen. This Might Be Ours.

Revolutions Happen. This Might Be Ours.

Revolutions Happen .
This Might Be Ours .
Whenever political and social upheaval occurs , William Butler Yeats ’ s famous poem “ The Second Coming ” ( 1919 ) immediately springs to mind .
Are we at a moment in history where , “ Things fall apart ; the centre can not hold ; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world ” ?
Will anger at entrenched injustice , racism , and other outmoded ideas sweep aside familiar institutions and replace them with something better ?
Are global arrangements that have been in place for decades being transformed as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ move fast and break things ” now the mantra for both local and global politics ?
If so , it will be a rude shock for people like me .
If you ’ re a privileged American baby boomer , you ’ ve lived most of your life in a fairly stable era of world history .
The Cold War began before you were born and lasted until you were approaching middle age .
For people of my generation , institutions like NATO , the Warsaw Pact , the United Nations , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seemed like permanent features of the landscape .
Even the nuclear arms race , worrisome as it was , eventually became a bit like watching reruns of Seinfeld or M.A.S.H .
: The players were familiar , we could recite all their lines , and we knew how every episode was going to turn out .
There were crises and upheavals of different sorts in many places , of course , and important changes did occur at home and abroad .
Some of those developments were highly contentious and involved the use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slowly , however , and rarely achieved as much as the protagonists hoped .
Even events as significant as the Sino-Soviet split , decolonization , the 1970s oil shocks , the end of the gold standard , the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements , or the Iranian revolution ultimately had only modest effects on the overall global order .
Until the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s , it was an era of considerable continuity in much of world politics .
If the stability that characterized the Cold War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” therefore , you ’ re probably inclined to see existing institutions as enduring and to think of revolutionary change as the rare exception rather than a constant possibility .
But suppose you had been born in the West in 1900 .
As a teenager , you would have watched the European great powers fall into a self-destructive blood-letting that toppled two empires and impoverished victors and vanquished alike .
If you were lucky , you ’ d have then survived the global influenza pandemic that killed roughly 50 million people in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen a new regime emerge in Russia that was committed to spreading a revolutionary political and economic ideology and watched as it attracted millions of followers around the world .
You would have witnessed the heady exuberance of the Roaring ’ 20s , followed by the deep quagmire of the Great Depression and the spread of fascism in Europe .
You would have observed a defeated and disarmed Germany abandon the Treaty of Versailles , rearm , and threaten to dominate Europe once again .
Beginning in 1939 , you ’ d have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas of Europe and the Pacific , then watched with amazement and relief when it took the Allies less than three years to reverse those conquests and compel their opponents to surrender unconditionally .
In short , if your life experience was formed by the first half of the 20th century rather than the second , you might have acquired a healthy respect for the fragility of political orders , a sense that seemingly stable balances of power could erode overnight , and a deep appreciation of the speed with which political fortunes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be inclined to think that maintaining stability and order was essential and required constant vigilance and a fair bit of luck .
As for today ’ s millennials ( and those even younger ) , many of them have lived through the collapse of the Soviet Union , the end of apartheid , and the hubristic failure of America ’ s so-called unipolar moment .
They watched the supposed “ Masters of the Universe ” on Wall Street crash the world economy in 2008 and seen glaciers melt and oceans rise as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ probably better than their parents ’ if they live in an emerging economy , but in the developed world , most will struggle to live as well as their parents did .
Well-established taboos about gender and other social issues have been overturned in their lifetimes , and technological change has proceeded at a pace that no one can anticipate , let alone manage .
They have plenty of reasons to be worried about the future—and to believe that radical change is both long overdue and genuinely possible .
Although they obviously arise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America Great Again , Bernie Sanders , and Black Lives Matter movements all reflect their followers ’ conviction that the current system is badly broken and that half-measures won ’ t fix it .
So which is it ?
Is this the moment when “ all that is solid melts into air , ” as Karl Marx once prophesied ?
Or is the alarm and agitation we are seeing today more smoke than fire ?
On the one hand , there are reasons to be skeptical that radical change is actually in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last column , revolutionary upheavals are inherently hard to predict , because it is impossible to know just how many people are eager for change , how much risk they are willing to bear to bring it about , and how they will react when opponents push back .
A country or even a whole region can be in a state of high revolutionary potential for a long time , and yet no revolution may occur or succeed .
Here the fate of the Arab Spring offers a cautionary tale .
There have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in much of the Arab world , due to widespread corruption , brutal authoritarianism , sectarian divisions , slow economic growth , deteriorating environmental conditions , etc .
Lots of people knew an explosion was going to occur eventually , and under President George W. Bush , the United States even tried to ignite one by invading Iraq and proclaiming a “ Liberty Doctrine.
” When the public suicide of a distraught Tunisian fruit vendor in 2010 triggered a popular rebellion and both traditional and social media began to spread the word to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment seemed to have arrived .
Plenty of people—myself included—could not figure out where the process was headed : Would it lead to far-reaching social and political change , or would the old order reassert itself and crush popular pressures for reform ?
We all know how things turned out .
As the British historian George Trevelyan said of the 1848 revolts in Europe , the Arab Spring proved to be “ the turning point at which [ Middle East ] history failed to turn.
” Egypt ’ s fledgling democracy was overthrown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into civil war following the ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi , the Assad regime in Syria held power by pursuing a brutal scorched-earth strategy with a frightful human cost , and the Gulf monarchies have used a combination of social spending and repression to ward off meaningful political change .
The failure of the Arab Spring is a telling reminder of the obstacles to truly revolutionary change .
But , on the other hand , the possibility of radical change can not be dismissed entirely .
We are in the midst of a global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still uncertain .
The world economy is contracting sharply , and the lives and career prospects of hundreds of millions of young people will inevitably suffer .
The balance of economic and military power is already shifting gradually from West to East .
Governments in several key countries are paralyzed by partisan division , and the political order in the United States has proved to be better at enriching the few than improving the lives of the many .
Over the past month , the deep institutional roots of American racism have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for structural change that are resonating more widely than before .
And all this is occurring at a moment when good leaders are hard ( though not impossible ) to find .
In two of the oldest and most influential democracies , voters succumbed to the seductive snake oil of U.S. President Donald Trump and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson : faux populists who turned out to be lazy , reflexively dishonest , morally corrupt , and supremely ill-suited for the challenges they are now facing .
At a moment that cries out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , both Trump and Johnson have shown themselves to be incapable of advancing the public interest or even pretending to care very much about it .
Don ’ t get me started about what is happening in Brazil .
If all these problems were not enough , the planet is still getting warmer , species extinction is accelerating , and new viruses are bound to make the leap from animals to humans and threaten us again .
Taken together , these challenges have left a lot of flammable material lying around , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for change have not been even greater .
An optimist would see these overlapping crises as a tremendous opportunity , and they might be right .
Perhaps a new burst of creative political energy will revitalize democratic institutions around the world , produce healthy economic reforms , lead to rapid and lasting progress toward racial equality , fix the criminal justice system , and encourage the United States and other countries to adopt more sensible and successful foreign policies .
One could even imagine a sustained international effort to construct a new operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world , one that sought to manage great-power competition and preserve as many positive gains from global cooperation as possible .
That is exactly what I ’ m hoping for , but I wouldn ’ t bet on it .
Political reform is challenging in the best of circumstances .
Entrenched elites in democracies and nondemocracies alike rarely give up their wealth or political prerogatives willingly , even when preserving economic and social stability would be in their own long-term interest .
States may recognize incentives to cooperate yet still be tempted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blame others .
Plenty of things may need fixing , but necessity does not guarantee they will actually get fixed .
If enough people conclude that the current order is incapable of meaningful change , however , there is literally no telling where their anger and their actions might lead .
I ’ ve studied enough revolutions to be wary of what can happen when a political order collapses completely , and it is rarely a pretty sight .
Familiar elements of our political order are now under siege—some of them for very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unpredictable process .
In the end , political institutions are not permanent phenomena like the laws of physics , a mountain range , or an ocean .
They are artificial human creations , and they ’ re only as enduring , adaptive , and effective as we make them .
I hold out my hopes for a serious and sustained process of democratic change , one that respects the nobler features of the U.S. constitutional order yet takes dead aim at all the ways in which America has failed to live up to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I fear , will be something much more dangerous .
If you don ’ t believe me , just ask the Pahlavi family , or any of the other former leaders who failed to read the writing on the wall .

Whenever political and social upheaval occurs, William Butler Yeats’s famous poem “The Second Coming” (1919) immediately springs to mind. Are we at a moment in history where, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world”? Will anger at entrenched injustice, racism, and other outmoded ideas sweep aside familiar institutions and replace them with something better? Are global arrangements that have been in place for decades being transformed as well? Is a desire to “move fast and break things” now the mantra for both local and global politics?
Whenever political and social upheaval occurs, William Butler Yeats’s famous poem “The Second Coming” (1919) immediately springs to mind. Are we at a moment in history where, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world”? Will anger at entrenched injustice, racism, and other outmoded ideas sweep aside familiar institutions and replace them with something better? Are global arrangements that have been in place for decades being transformed as well? Is a desire to “move fast and break things” now the mantra for both local and global politics?
If so, it will be a rude shock for people like me. If you’re a privileged American baby boomer, you’ve lived most of your life in a fairly stable era of world history. The Cold War began before you were born and lasted until you were approaching middle age. For people of my generation, institutions like NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United Nations, the World Bank, and countless other arrangements seemed like permanent features of the landscape. Even the nuclear arms race, worrisome as it was, eventually became a bit like watching reruns of Seinfeld or M.A.S.H.: The players were familiar, we could recite all their lines, and we knew how every episode was going to turn out.
There were crises and upheavals of different sorts in many places, of course, and important changes did occur at home and abroad. Some of those developments were highly contentious and involved the use of violence. Political and social reform occurred slowly, however, and rarely achieved as much as the protagonists hoped. Even events as significant as the Sino-Soviet split, decolonization, the 1970s oil shocks, the end of the gold standard, the civil rights and anti-apartheid movements, or the Iranian revolution ultimately had only modest effects on the overall global order. Until the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, it was an era of considerable continuity in much of world politics.
If the stability that characterized the Cold War order is your idea of “normal,” therefore, you’re probably inclined to see existing institutions as enduring and to think of revolutionary change as the rare exception rather than a constant possibility.
But suppose you had been born in the West in 1900. As a teenager, you would have watched the European great powers fall into a self-destructive blood-letting that toppled two empires and impoverished victors and vanquished alike. If you were lucky, you’d have then survived the global influenza pandemic that killed roughly 50 million people in 1918 and 1919. You would have seen a new regime emerge in Russia that was committed to spreading a revolutionary political and economic ideology and watched as it attracted millions of followers around the world. You would have witnessed the heady exuberance of the Roaring ’20s, followed by the deep quagmire of the Great Depression and the spread of fascism in Europe. You would have observed a defeated and disarmed Germany abandon the Treaty of Versailles, rearm, and threaten to dominate Europe once again. Beginning in 1939, you’d have seen the Axis powers rapidly conquer vast areas of Europe and the Pacific, then watched with amazement and relief when it took the Allies less than three years to reverse those conquests and compel their opponents to surrender unconditionally.
In short, if your life experience was formed by the first half of the 20th century rather than the second, you might have acquired a healthy respect for the fragility of political orders, a sense that seemingly stable balances of power could erode overnight, and a deep appreciation of the speed with which political fortunes can shift. And you’d be inclined to think that maintaining stability and order was essential and required constant vigilance and a fair bit of luck.
As for today’s millennials (and those even younger), many of them have lived through the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of apartheid, and the hubristic failure of America’s so-called unipolar moment. They watched the supposed “Masters of the Universe” on Wall Street crash the world economy in 2008 and seen glaciers melt and oceans rise as the planet warms. Their economic prospects are probably better than their parents’ if they live in an emerging economy, but in the developed world, most will struggle to live as well as their parents did. Well-established taboos about gender and other social issues have been overturned in their lifetimes, and technological change has proceeded at a pace that no one can anticipate, let alone manage. They have plenty of reasons to be worried about the future—and to believe that radical change is both long overdue and genuinely possible. Although they obviously arise from radically different impulses, the Make America Great Again, Bernie Sanders, and Black Lives Matter movements all reflect their followers’ conviction that the current system is badly broken and that half-measures won’t fix it.
So which is it? Is this the moment when “all that is solid melts into air,” as Karl Marx once prophesied? Or is the alarm and agitation we are seeing today more smoke than fire?
On the one hand, there are reasons to be skeptical that radical change is actually in the offing. As I noted in my last column, revolutionary upheavals are inherently hard to predict, because it is impossible to know just how many people are eager for change, how much risk they are willing to bear to bring it about, and how they will react when opponents push back. A country or even a whole region can be in a state of high revolutionary potential for a long time, and yet no revolution may occur or succeed.
Here the fate of the Arab Spring offers a cautionary tale. There have long been ample grounds for popular discontent in much of the Arab world, due to widespread corruption, brutal authoritarianism, sectarian divisions, slow economic growth, deteriorating environmental conditions, etc. Lots of people knew an explosion was going to occur eventually, and under President George W. Bush, the United States even tried to ignite one by invading Iraq and proclaiming a “Liberty Doctrine.” When the public suicide of a distraught Tunisian fruit vendor in 2010 triggered a popular rebellion and both traditional and social media began to spread the word to other Arab societies, a transnational revolutionary moment seemed to have arrived. Plenty of people—myself included—could not figure out where the process was headed: Would it lead to far-reaching social and political change, or would the old order reassert itself and crush popular pressures for reform?
We all know how things turned out. As the British historian George Trevelyan said of the 1848 revolts in Europe, the Arab Spring proved to be “the turning point at which [Middle East] history failed to turn.” Egypt’s fledgling democracy was overthrown by a military coup, Libya descended into civil war following the ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi, the Assad regime in Syria held power by pursuing a brutal scorched-earth strategy with a frightful human cost, and the Gulf monarchies have used a combination of social spending and repression to ward off meaningful political change. The failure of the Arab Spring is a telling reminder of the obstacles to truly revolutionary change.
But, on the other hand, the possibility of radical change cannot be dismissed entirely. We are in the midst of a global pandemic whose duration and cumulative damage are still uncertain. The world economy is contracting sharply, and the lives and career prospects of hundreds of millions of young people will inevitably suffer. The balance of economic and military power is already shifting gradually from West to East. Governments in several key countries are paralyzed by partisan division, and the political order in the United States has proved to be better at enriching the few than improving the lives of the many. Over the past month, the deep institutional roots of American racism have been exposed yet again, leading to demands for structural change that are resonating more widely than before.
And all this is occurring at a moment when good leaders are hard (though not impossible) to find. In two of the oldest and most influential democracies, voters succumbed to the seductive snake oil of U.S. President Donald Trump and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson: faux populists who turned out to be lazy, reflexively dishonest, morally corrupt, and supremely ill-suited for the challenges they are now facing. At a moment that cries out for disciplined, unifying, and inspiring leadership, both Trump and Johnson have shown themselves to be incapable of advancing the public interest or even pretending to care very much about it. Don’t get me started about what is happening in Brazil.
If all these problems were not enough, the planet is still getting warmer, species extinction is accelerating, and new viruses are bound to make the leap from animals to humans and threaten us again. Taken together, these challenges have left a lot of flammable material lying around, and it is somewhat surprising that demands for change have not been even greater.
An optimist would see these overlapping crises as a tremendous opportunity, and they might be right. Perhaps a new burst of creative political energy will revitalize democratic institutions around the world, produce healthy economic reforms, lead to rapid and lasting progress toward racial equality, fix the criminal justice system, and encourage the United States and other countries to adopt more sensible and successful foreign policies. One could even imagine a sustained international effort to construct a new operating system for the emerging multipolar or bipolar world, one that sought to manage great-power competition and preserve as many positive gains from global cooperation as possible.
That is exactly what I’m hoping for, but I wouldn’t bet on it. Political reform is challenging in the best of circumstances. Entrenched elites in democracies and nondemocracies alike rarely give up their wealth or political prerogatives willingly, even when preserving economic and social stability would be in their own long-term interest. States may recognize incentives to cooperate yet still be tempted to go it alone, free-ride, or blame others. Plenty of things may need fixing, but necessity does not guarantee they will actually get fixed.
If enough people conclude that the current order is incapable of meaningful change, however, there is literally no telling where their anger and their actions might lead. I’ve studied enough revolutions to be wary of what can happen when a political order collapses completely, and it is rarely a pretty sight. Familiar elements of our political order are now under siege—some of them for very good reasons—but radical change is an inherently unpredictable process. In the end, political institutions are not permanent phenomena like the laws of physics, a mountain range, or an ocean. They are artificial human creations, and they’re only as enduring, adaptive, and effective as we make them. I hold out my hopes for a serious and sustained process of democratic change, one that respects the nobler features of the U.S. constitutional order yet takes dead aim at all the ways in which America has failed to live up to its own professed ideals. The alternative, I fear, will be something much more dangerous. If you don’t believe me, just ask the Pahlavi family, or any of the other former leaders who failed to read the writing on the wall.