foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--Singapore’s Coronavirus Success Story Hits a Snag

SINGAPORE—Hailed as a model for its early success in containing the spread of the coronavirus , Singapore is now having to explain an alarming surge in infections—more than 75 percent of which are among low-paid migrant workers who live in shared dormitories .
The sudden rise in cases not only shines a spotlight on the difficult lives of Singapore ’ s often invisible foreign laborers but also foreshadows how difficult it will be for any country to eradicate a virus that has brought the world to a standstill .
From its first reported case on Jan. 23 , Singapore had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infections with zero deaths , earning praise from the World Health Organization .
Then , over the past week , the numbers soared .
On April 20 , the Ministry of Health ’ s website announced the highest number of new coronavirus cases in a single day : There were 1,426 new recorded infections with 1,396 of these—about 98 percent—among migrant workers .
Singapore now has the largest infected population in Southeast Asia with more than 8,000 cases , of which three-quarters are among the country ’ s foreigners who work as cleaners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We are working to break the chain of transmission in the dorms , to reduce the number of new cases , ” Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote in a Facebook post .
“ It will take some time to show results , so we must expect to see more dorm cases for a while longer.
” On Sunday , Lee ’ s government told 180,000 foreign workers who work in construction and their dependents that they could not leave their homes for the next two weeks.Singapore is now having to explain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Munir , a worker from Bangladesh who has been in Singapore for five years , told me on the phone he had no complaints with the living situation in his dorm .
“ I get three meals a day , there is a medical team to take our temperature , and the government has promised us that we will get paid , ” he said .
But , he added , “ I can not stop worrying .
Every day there are new cases , and the situation is very serious .
You @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be me.
” A large proportion of Singapore ’ s 323,000 foreign male workers drawn from countries such as India and Bangladesh are employed in low-wage jobs such as construction , loading goods at shipyards , and cleaning and maintenance .
They live in dorms that can house anywhere between 3,000 and 25,000 people .
The workers share communal facilities including toilets and showers , television rooms , and minimarts .
A single bedroom can accommodate as many as 20 men—making it impossible to implement social distancing .
The largest types of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around 200,000 workers and are operated by independent companies that charge employers between $ 200 and $ 300 a month per worker .
Workers typically pay $ 90 a month for three meals a day .
As of April 18 , half the purpose-built dorms have been found to be hot spots or clusters where at least one person has tested positive for the virus .
Another 95,000 workers live in 1,200 smaller dorms with each housing between 50 and 100 people .
A dozen of these have been declared off-limit isolation areas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The surge could be attributed to more active testing of workers , said Alex Cook , vice dean of research at the Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health at the National University of Singapore .
To tackle the surge , “ The same methods in principle should be used as in the general population : test for cases , isolate the positives and quarantine and test contacts , ” he said in an email response .
But quarantining with a family in an apartment is one thing ; isolating with dozens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infection can spread much more easily .
And that is exactly what seems to have happened for Singapore ’ s foreign migrants .
Despite its geographic proximity to China , the initial epicenter of the pandemic , Singapore seemed relatively relaxed in how it was handling the global coronavirus outbreak .
Until April 7 , schools and restaurants were open .
People were going to work .
It was fine to meet friends , provided gatherings didn ’ t exceed 10 people .
Even now , with what Singapore calls a circuit-breaker—a second @ @ @ @ @ @ @ running , and people can go out to buy groceries and medicine and exercise in parks while wearing masks .
Hair salons are open for haircuts , deemed an essential service , though hair-dyeing is not and , so , boxes of DIY hair dye have sold out at pharmacies.Isolating with dozens of other men with shared bathrooms means infection can spread much more easily .
Singapore , it was said , was ready for COVID-19 even before its first case , a 66-year-old tourist from Wuhan , on Jan. 23 .
Its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in dealing with SARS in 2002 and fine-tuned with its swine flu ( H1N1 ) outbreak in 2009 .
Typically , the acronym-loving nation had a crisis management plan called DORS , or Disease Outbreak Response System .
It reviewed its infrastructure capacities and built isolation hospitals .
It ramped up its testing capacity .
Three weeks before its first case , Singapore ’ s Changi Airport had already begun screening passengers from Wuhan , gradually expanding screening to all incoming passengers and requiring all travelers to stay at home for 14 days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were no transgressions , these passengers would receive messages on their phones and were required to click on a link to ensure that they were , in fact , staying at home .
A multiministry task force chaired by the ministers for health and national development was set up on Jan. 22 , and a combination of aggressive contact-tracing , liberal testing , and community engagement with the transparent sharing of information on government websites and through WhatsApp messages paid off in the early days .
A country known for its low tolerance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how serious it was .
A newsvendor who returned to Singapore from India and violated his stay-home notice now faces an eight-week jail term .
On April 18 , 200 people were fined $ 200 each for breaching safe distance norms .
Another 80 were fined for not wearing masks .
With a population of 5.8 million people , Singapore is home to 981,000 work permit holders .
While most of these immigrants are wealthy and work in the country ’ s lucrative corporate world , 323,000 of them live in dormitories .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ construction , transportation , logistics , food and beverage , elder care , sanitation , and as domestic helpers—cooks , nannies , and live-in cleaners—has fed Singapore ’ s growth story , building its shiny new malls and office complexes , its metro rail and luxury resorts .
Even now , work is underway to complete a new dormitory near Changi Airport that will accommodate 2,900 workers , reports the Straits Times .
When complete , this dorm will house workers who are building the airport ’ s Terminal 5 .
Most construction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the circuit-breaker , but some such as Changi Airport ’ s third runway have been exempted .
The first infected migrant worker was reported on Feb. 8—a 39-year-old Bangladeshi construction worker who caught the disease after visiting Mustafa Centre , a popular mall for South Asians .
And then it spread like wildfire in his dorm and among the migrant work force .
Breaking up the ratio of confirmed cases among groups is instructive : While 1.46 percent of migrants living in dormitories have tested positive , only 0.02 percent of Singaporean citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to the Ministry of Health.Despite the recent surge , Singapore may still be better prepared than most other countries But despite the recent surge , Singapore may still be better prepared than most other countries .
Between April 3 and 16 , the number of hospitalized COVID-19 patients went up from 473 to 1,886 , reports the Straits Times .
Singapore has 11,321 acute hospital beds , of which 9,400 are in the public sector .
Non-urgent treatments have been postponed , and this has freed up more than 2,000 public hospital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resort has been converted into a 500-patient-capacity isolation facility .
And two halls at the Singapore Expo Convention and Exhibition Centre have been repurposed to care for 950 patients .
Meanwhile , 7,000 healthy workers , many employed in essential services , have been tested and moved to temporary living quarters including vacant Housing and Development Board apartments and two offshore floating facilities .
“ The government has moved aggressively and quickly to deal with the newly emerging cases among migrant workers , ” said Jawed Ashraf , India ’ s high commissioner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers of their salaries , three meals , and medical help .
Communities are also stepping up .
There is no problem of resources , and it helps enormously that the government is so transparent with information about what it is doing.
” But , in other quarters , there is concern that the government , initially focused on the Singaporean population , has woken a little late to worker measures .
“ Foreign workers are housed 12 to 20 men per room in double-decker beds , ” Deborah Fordyce , the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on March 23 in an open letter .
She asked the government to announce its plans to rehouse workers should clusters break out in dorms .
“ The risk of a new cluster among this group remains undeniable , ” she said .
Phil Robertson , deputy director of Human Rights Watch ’ s Asia division , said the outbreak among migrant workers is no surprise .
“ Singapore ignored warning signs out of a mixture of hubris and negligence and continued to treat migrants as expendable second-class people whose problems could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ There may well be plenty of COVID-19 positive people in those dormitories who are asymptomatic so the government strategy appears to condemn much of that population to contract the virus sooner or later.
” COVID-19 has brought into the spotlight problems that already existed among low-wage migrants , wrote Laavanya Kathiravelu , an assistant professor at the Nanyang Technological University , in Academia SG , a website maintained by a group of Singaporean academics.COVID-19 has brought into the spotlight problems that already existed among low-wage migrants .
“ For example , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spaces in dormitories have been exacerbated .
Existing problems of hygiene indicated by bedbugs and rat infestations have become important public health concerns , ” she wrote .
But , she added , the discourse of containment , used to justify the seclusion of migrants in dormitories , “ now enables greater restrictions on their movement , with thousands effectively locked into their rooms for weeks.
” There is growing concern over Singapore ’ s reliance on cheap foreign labor .
“ Do we need so many of them ?
” asked associate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Calling for Singaporeans to be “ more open-minded to the nobility of work .
Any work , ” Sreenivasan argued that “ over-dependence on foreign labour can expose companies and employers to unforeseen circumstances , as is the case now.
” Migrant workers have literally lived at the fringes , with most dorms located at the edges of the island nation .
“ I can only hope that when all this is over , the sad realities related both to their living conditions and marginalization in society will be fully addressed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Transient Workers Count Too .
“ These workers can not be seen as a separate community but an integral part of Singapore.
” That sentiment has resonance at the highest levels of government .
Responding to a letter published in the Chinese-language daily Lianhe Zaobao linking the surge in COVID-19 among migrant workers to poor personal hygiene , Home Affairs and Law Minister K. Shanmugam had something to say .
Dismissing the letter as xenophobic , he said it was possible for Singaporeans to be professionals and managers because foreign workers form @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy .
“ Our duty as Singaporeans , really , is to show them empathy and take care of them , ” he wrote .

SINGAPORE—Hailed as a model for its early success in containing the spread of the coronavirus, Singapore is now having to explain an alarming surge in infections—more than 75 percent of which are among low-paid migrant workers who live in shared dormitories. The sudden rise in cases not only shines a spotlight on the difficult lives of Singapore’s often invisible foreign laborers but also foreshadows how difficult it will be for any country to eradicate a virus that has brought the world to a standstill.
SINGAPORE—Hailed as a model for its early success in containing the spread of the coronavirus, Singapore is now having to explain an alarming surge in infections—more than 75 percent of which are among low-paid migrant workers who live in shared dormitories. The sudden rise in cases not only shines a spotlight on the difficult lives of Singapore’s often invisible foreign laborers but also foreshadows how difficult it will be for any country to eradicate a virus that has brought the world to a standstill.
From its first reported case on Jan. 23, Singapore had until March 21 recorded fewer than 390 infections with zero deaths, earning praise from the World Health Organization. Then, over the past week, the numbers soared.
On April 20, the Ministry of Health’s website announced the highest number of new coronavirus cases in a single day: There were 1,426 new recorded infections with 1,396 of these—about 98 percent—among migrant workers. Singapore now has the largest infected population in Southeast Asia with more than 8,000 cases, of which three-quarters are among the country’s foreigners who work as cleaners, construction workers, and laborers.
“We are working to break the chain of transmission in the dorms, to reduce the number of new cases,” Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote in a Facebook post. “It will take some time to show results, so we must expect to see more dorm cases for a while longer.”
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
On Sunday, Lee’s government told 180,000 foreign workers who work in construction and their dependents that they could not leave their homes for the next two weeks.
Mohammad Munir, a worker from Bangladesh who has been in Singapore for five years, told me on the phone he had no complaints with the living situation in his dorm. “I get three meals a day, there is a medical team to take our temperature, and the government has promised us that we will get paid,” he said. But, he added, “I cannot stop worrying. Every day there are new cases, and the situation is very serious. You think, the next one is going to be me.”
A large proportion of Singapore’s 323,000 foreign male workers drawn from countries such as India and Bangladesh are employed in low-wage jobs such as construction, loading goods at shipyards, and cleaning and maintenance. They live in dorms that can house anywhere between 3,000 and 25,000 people. The workers share communal facilities including toilets and showers, television rooms, and minimarts. A single bedroom can accommodate as many as 20 men—making it impossible to implement social distancing.
Singapore is now having to explain an alarming surge in infections.
The largest types of facilities, so-called purpose-built dorms, house around 200,000 workers and are operated by independent companies that charge employers between $200 and $300 a month per worker. Workers typically pay $90 a month for three meals a day.
As of April 18, half the purpose-built dorms have been found to be hot spots or clusters where at least one person has tested positive for the virus. Another 95,000 workers live in 1,200 smaller dorms with each housing between 50 and 100 people. A dozen of these have been declared off-limit isolation areas after workers there tested positive for coronavirus.
The surge could be attributed to more active testing of workers, said Alex Cook, vice dean of research at the Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health at the National University of Singapore. To tackle the surge, “The same methods in principle should be used as in the general population: test for cases, isolate the positives and quarantine and test contacts,” he said in an email response.
But quarantining with a family in an apartment is one thing; isolating with dozens of other men with shared bathrooms means infection can spread much more easily. And that is exactly what seems to have happened for Singapore’s foreign migrants.
Singapore’s initial response to the coronavirus pandemic was hailed as a gold standard. “This is what success looks like. Everything goes forward with modifications as needed, and you keep doing this until there’s a vaccine or a treatment,” wrote Dale Fisher, the chair of infection control at the National University Hospital, in the South China Morning Post on March 25.
Despite its geographic proximity to China, the initial epicenter of the pandemic, Singapore seemed relatively relaxed in how it was handling the global coronavirus outbreak. Until April 7, schools and restaurants were open. People were going to work. It was fine to meet friends, provided gatherings didn’t exceed 10 people. Even now, with what Singapore calls a circuit-breaker—a second shutdown of sorts—public transportation is up and running, and people can go out to buy groceries and medicine and exercise in parks while wearing masks. Hair salons are open for haircuts, deemed an essential service, though hair-dyeing is not and, so, boxes of DIY hair dye have sold out at pharmacies.Isolating with dozens of other men with shared bathrooms means infection can spread much more easily.
Singapore, it was said, was ready for COVID-19 even before its first case, a 66-year-old tourist from Wuhan, on Jan. 23. Its readiness had been prompted by past experience in dealing with SARS in 2002 and fine-tuned with its swine flu (H1N1) outbreak in 2009.
Typically, the acronym-loving nation had a crisis management plan called DORS, or Disease Outbreak Response System. It reviewed its infrastructure capacities and built isolation hospitals. It ramped up its testing capacity.
Three weeks before its first case, Singapore’s Changi Airport had already begun screening passengers from Wuhan, gradually expanding screening to all incoming passengers and requiring all travelers to stay at home for 14 days after arrival. To make sure there were no transgressions, these passengers would receive messages on their phones and were required to click on a link to ensure that they were, in fact, staying at home.
A multiministry task force chaired by the ministers for health and national development was set up on Jan. 22, and a combination of aggressive contact-tracing, liberal testing, and community engagement with the transparent sharing of information on government websites and through WhatsApp messages paid off in the early days.
A country known for its low tolerance for violations was quick to demonstrate just how serious it was. A newsvendor who returned to Singapore from India and violated his stay-home notice now faces an eight-week jail term. On April 18, 200 people were fined $200 each for breaching safe distance norms. Another 80 were fined for not wearing masks.
Despite Singapore’s early success in dealing with the pandemic, it is now clear that its system was only as strong as its weakest link: migrant workers.
With a population of 5.8 million people, Singapore is home to 981,000 work permit holders. While most of these immigrants are wealthy and work in the country’s lucrative corporate world, 323,000 of them live in dormitories. This relatively cheap labor force working in construction, transportation, logistics, food and beverage, elder care, sanitation, and as domestic helpers—cooks, nannies, and live-in cleaners—has fed Singapore’s growth story, building its shiny new malls and office complexes, its metro rail and luxury resorts.
Even now, work is underway to complete a new dormitory near Changi Airport that will accommodate 2,900 workers, reports the Straits Times. When complete, this dorm will house workers who are building the airport’s Terminal 5. Most construction projects have been put on hold during the circuit-breaker, but some such as Changi Airport’s third runway have been exempted.
The first infected migrant worker was reported on Feb. 8—a 39-year-old Bangladeshi construction worker who caught the disease after visiting Mustafa Centre, a popular mall for South Asians. And then it spread like wildfire in his dorm and among the migrant work force. Breaking up the ratio of confirmed cases among groups is instructive: While 1.46 percent of migrants living in dormitories have tested positive, only 0.02 percent of Singaporean citizens and permanent residents have the coronavirus, according to the Ministry of Health.Despite the recent surge, Singapore may still be better prepared than most other countries
But despite the recent surge, Singapore may still be better prepared than most other countries. Between April 3 and 16, the number of hospitalized COVID-19 patients went up from 473 to 1,886, reports the Straits Times. Singapore has 11,321 acute hospital beds, of which 9,400 are in the public sector. Non-urgent treatments have been postponed, and this has freed up more than 2,000 public hospital beds. A former water park and resort has been converted into a 500-patient-capacity isolation facility. And two halls at the Singapore Expo Convention and Exhibition Centre have been repurposed to care for 950 patients.
Meanwhile, 7,000 healthy workers, many employed in essential services, have been tested and moved to temporary living quarters including vacant Housing and Development Board apartments and two offshore floating facilities.
“The government has moved aggressively and quickly to deal with the newly emerging cases among migrant workers,” said Jawed Ashraf, India’s high commissioner to Singapore. “It has assured workers of their salaries, three meals, and medical help. Communities are also stepping up. There is no problem of resources, and it helps enormously that the government is so transparent with information about what it is doing.”
But, in other quarters, there is concern that the government, initially focused on the Singaporean population, has woken a little late to worker measures. “Foreign workers are housed 12 to 20 men per room in double-decker beds,” Deborah Fordyce, the president of Transient Workers Count Too, wrote on March 23 in an open letter. She asked the government to announce its plans to rehouse workers should clusters break out in dorms. “The risk of a new cluster among this group remains undeniable,” she said.
Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, said the outbreak among migrant workers is no surprise. “Singapore ignored warning signs out of a mixture of hubris and negligence and continued to treat migrants as expendable second-class people whose problems could be addressed later,” he said. “There may well be plenty of COVID-19 positive people in those dormitories who are asymptomatic so the government strategy appears to condemn much of that population to contract the virus sooner or later.”
COVID-19 has brought into the spotlight problems that already existed among low-wage migrants, wrote Laavanya Kathiravelu, an assistant professor at the Nanyang Technological University, in Academia SG, a website maintained by a group of Singaporean academics.COVID-19 has brought into the spotlight problems that already existed among low-wage migrants.
“For example, the difficulties of living in tight, crowded spaces in dormitories have been exacerbated. Existing problems of hygiene indicated by bedbugs and rat infestations have become important public health concerns,” she wrote. But, she added, the discourse of containment, used to justify the seclusion of migrants in dormitories, “now enables greater restrictions on their movement, with thousands effectively locked into their rooms for weeks.”
There is growing concern over Singapore’s reliance on cheap foreign labor. “Do we need so many of them?” asked associate editor Ven Sreenivasan in the Straits Times. Calling for Singaporeans to be “more open-minded to the nobility of work. Any work,” Sreenivasan argued that “over-dependence on foreign labour can expose companies and employers to unforeseen circumstances, as is the case now.”
Migrant workers have literally lived at the fringes, with most dorms located at the edges of the island nation. “I can only hope that when all this is over, the sad realities related both to their living conditions and marginalization in society will be fully addressed,” said Christine Pelly, another representative of Transient Workers Count Too. “These workers cannot be seen as a separate community but an integral part of Singapore.”
That sentiment has resonance at the highest levels of government. Responding to a letter published in the Chinese-language daily Lianhe Zaobao linking the surge in COVID-19 among migrant workers to poor personal hygiene, Home Affairs and Law Minister K. Shanmugam had something to say. Dismissing the letter as xenophobic, he said it was possible for Singaporeans to be professionals and managers because foreign workers form the base of the country’s economy. “Our duty as Singaporeans, really, is to show them empathy and take care of them,” he wrote.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--Russia Isn’t the Only One Getting Its Hands Dirty in Libya

Russia Isn ’ t the Only One Getting Its Hands Dirty in Libya With all eyes on the coronavirus , one of the Middle East ’ s most protracted conflicts shows no sign of abating , and foreign actors seem committed to fanning the flames .
U.S. policymakers are mostly concerned with the increasing role of Russia , but among the flurry of actors involved in Libya ’ s turmoil today , the United Arab Emirates stands out as the only state whose intervention is ignored by the United States and other powers .
This needs to change if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolution between the country ’ s warring factions .
One of the primary motivations of the UAE ’ s support for the Libyan National Army ’ s ( LNA ) leader , Khalifa Haftar , is its obsession with Islamism .
Abu Dhabi wants to establish an authoritarian dictatorship in Libya that will stamp out any and all forms of political Islam , putting it at odds with Qatar and Turkey , both of which would prefer to see Islamists hold at least some power in the North African country .
To this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and politically supported the coup against Egypt ’ s democratically elected then President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 .
In a cynical zero-sum game catalyzed by the ripple effect of current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ’ s ascent to power in Egypt , as well as other intra-Gulf rivalries , Abu Dhabi , Doha , and Ankara exploited Libyans ’ post-revolution grievances and thwarted the country ’ s transition to democracy , fueling its descent into civil war .
Both Turkey and Qatar ’ s involvement gradually receded after 2014 , in part because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among large sections of the Libyan public , but more so to acknowledge an emerging international consensus in support of a U.N.-backed political process.Emirati drone strikes are believed to have killed scores of people and have caused immense material damage .
But while the international community consolidated its efforts to bring about a political solution , the UAE ’ s footprint in the country expanded .
Since April 4 , 2019 , alone , Abu Dhabi has conducted more than 850 drone and jet strikes on Haftar ’ s behalf .
Open source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , more than a 100 airlifters suspected of carrying tons of weaponry flew from the UAE into eastern Libya and Egypt .
Abu Dhabi is also suspected of tricking Sudanese workers into working as mercenaries with the LNA , along with transferring jet fuel to sustain Khalifa Haftar ’ s war effort .
Emirati drone strikes are believed to have killed scores of people and have caused immense material damage , a toll borne overwhelmingly by Libya ’ s civilian population .
This situation is no longer just perpetuating the conflict—it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humanitarian catastrophe in one of the world ’ s most fragile areas .
Yet neither the United Nations nor Abu Dhabi ’ s great-power protectors—the United States and France—have done much in the way of curbing this activity , and some policymakers have gone as far as rationalizing the UAE ’ s behavior because they agree with its broader geoeconomic objectives .
While this notion might have carried some weight in past years , the fact that the UAE is willing to enable the total destruction of Tripoli and its infrastructure today is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outweighs any future economic considerations .
Even the UAE ’ s stated ideological objectives don ’ t resonate with the public anymore .
Many Libyans are disillusioned with the aftermath of the revolution and would welcome a strong leader who offers to bring a semblance of security and stability .
Aside from the obvious ramifications this poses for the future prospects of liberal democracy in the country , Haftar ’ s own strength is highly questionable .
His bloody and destructive Pyrrhic victories in Benghazi and Derna would likely not have been possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Egyptians .
Cairo ’ s close proximity to Libya and Sisi ’ s ideological alignment with Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed was a crutch for Haftar , who relied on both men to give him air superiority as well as strategic and materiel support .
Abu Dhabi even established its own air base in eastern Libya in 2017 , ironically refurbishing the military facility in the midst of political dialogue aimed at ending the conflict .
This asset enabled Haftar ’ s territorial expansion into large swaths of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cover .
In the current fighting around Tripoli , Emirati-piloted Chinese-made drones and fixed-wing aircraft still allegedly use the air base as a launching pad , facilitating the LNA ’ s advance .
Haftar needed this extensive backing to attain the military advantage he enjoys today , and while this has given him leverage in both the civil war and the peace talks , his ability to rule a post-conflict Libya without foreign support is highly dubious.Many Libyans are disillusioned with the aftermath of the revolution and would welcome a strong leader .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ UAE ’ s military intervention that gives Haftar leverage .
His strength also stems from the UAE ’ s ability to influence—and , at times , freeze—diplomacy surrounding Libya by pushing its own interests through its bilateral ties , chiefly the ones it shares with France .
Recognizing that the United States ’ role in the Middle East and North Africa was declining , the UAE expanded its own role by capitalizing on European countries ’ inability to collectively project influence without the United States .
The primary European ally that Abu Dhabi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libya was France , a country with whom it already shared close bilateral security ties .
France ’ s clandestine military support of Haftar began in Benghazi as early as 2015 , with a view toward countering terrorism and restoring security in Libya .
Paris ’ support of the authoritarian Haftar looks inimical to its liberal-democratic values , but it is broadly in line with its efforts to develop military alliances with authoritarian leaders in other parts of Africa to secure the Sahel .
For the UAE , the real added value of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libya was not in the military realm , but the political one .
The election of Emmanuel Macron as French president in 2017 gave the UAE ’ s presence in Libya vital diplomatic cover because of Macron ’ s appetite for disruptive foreign policy .
France ’ s intervention helped turn Haftar ’ s control of eastern Libya and much of Libya ’ s oil infrastructure into political capital , and Macron hosted ameeting between Haftar and Government of National Accord ’ s ( GNA ) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in 2017 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace talks that have since developed , and the rest of the international community has gradually moved in support of the power-sharing initiative .
Even Italy , which had concerns about the possibility of reinstalling a dictator in Libya , still fell into line .
But this peace initiative suffers from an inherent problem : Few of the major players are that serious about reaching a settlement .
Neither Haftar nor the UAE were ever genuinely interested in an inclusive Libya in which Haftar would share power with the GNA .
More than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the importance of diplomacy involving Libya altogether .
Through its bilateral ties and lobbying efforts , Abu Dhabi enabled Haftar to evade much public condemnation for his bellicosity .
The Libya-related conferences that were hosted in foreign capitals were often followed by Haftar launching military operations that ran counter to these meetings ’ very purpose .
Western policymakers did little to challenge Haftar on this , and they never appeared to question the efficacy of their strategy of appeasement or the power-sharing blueprint.Emirati support effectively affords Haftar complete impunity on the international stage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supporting Haftar while simultaneously pushing for a peace agreement was epitomized by one particular episode in 2019 .
Shortly after a French-backed operation saw Haftar expand into Libya ’ s southwestern Fezzan region and take full control of the country ’ s oil infrastructure , the UAE hosted him and Sarraj to cement a power-sharing agreement .
Coasting on the favorable momentum afforded by an aura of inevitability and Western complacency , Haftar reneged on this deal by attacking Tripoli in April 2019 , and the UAE dutifully deployed its drones to support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pulverized the political process and extended the civil war into the foreseeable future .
Emirati support effectively affords Haftar complete impunity on the international stage .
This is compounded by the fact that both Turkey and Russia have once again become more deeply involved in the conflict , capitalizing on the muted international response that followed Haftar ’ s offensive in April 2019 .
The involvement of Ankara and Moscow has attracted far more attention and criticism from Western powers than Abu Dhabi ’ s has .
These countries have both sent hundreds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as tons of military hardware to Libya and have been rightly named and shamed for doing so , but the UAE ’ s prolonged intervention continues to be treated as an invisible feature of the conflict .
This is the primary obstacle to achieving a long-term settlement in Libya .
The bias of Western policymakers has shielded the UAE from the reputational damage one would have expected its long-standing intervention in Libya to have garnered .
With Haftar ’ s offensive now faltering as Ankara steps up its own military involvement , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since it fears no consequences .
European diplomats must now exert pressure on Paris to prioritize a more coherent European position vis-à-vis Libya over its narrow interests with Abu Dhabi .
To date , Western diplomats ’ backdoor meetings with Emirati counterparts have failed to bring about de-escalation because oftheir reluctance to use the tools of coercion at their disposal .
European and U.S. officials should jointly apply pressure by threatening the declassification of information regarding all U.N. arms embargo violations in Libya—including the UAE ’ s long-standing contraventions .
The threat of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committee , coupled with the possible reputational risks involved , would force new norms of behavior on Abu Dhabi in Libya .
This would also represent a much-needed admonishment that would temper the UAE ’ s belligerence in light of its disregard for international law in other contexts .
A concerted diplomatic effort from both Washington and Brussels that forces the UAE to halt its armed support for Haftar is the only way to avert an escalation that will plunge Libya into further bloodshed and destruction .

With all eyes on the coronavirus, one of the Middle East’s most protracted conflicts shows no sign of abating, and foreign actors seem committed to fanning the flames . U.S. policymakers are mostly concerned with the increasing role of Russia , but among the flurry of actors involved in Libya’s turmoil today, the United Arab Emirates stands out as the only state whose intervention is ignored by the United States and other powers. This needs to change if the international community is serious about forging a resolution between the country’s warring factions.
With all eyes on the coronavirus, one of the Middle East’s most protracted conflicts shows no sign of abating, and foreign actors seem committed to fanning the flames. U.S. policymakers are mostly concerned with the increasing role of Russia, but among the flurry of actors involved in Libya’s turmoil today, the United Arab Emirates stands out as the only state whose intervention is ignored by the United States and other powers. This needs to change if the international community is serious about forging a resolution between the country’s warring factions.
One of the primary motivations of the UAE’s support for the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) leader, Khalifa Haftar, is its obsession with Islamism. Abu Dhabi wants to establish an authoritarian dictatorship in Libya that will stamp out any and all forms of political Islam, putting it at odds with Qatar and Turkey, both of which would prefer to see Islamists hold at least some power in the North African country. To this end, the Emirates had already financed and politically supported the coup against Egypt’s democratically elected then President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In a cynical zero-sum game catalyzed by the ripple effect of current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s ascent to power in Egypt, as well as other intra-Gulf rivalries, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Ankara exploited Libyans’ post-revolution grievances and thwarted the country’s transition to democracy, fueling its descent into civil war.
Both Turkey and Qatar’s involvement gradually receded after 2014, in part because of the unpopularity of their Islamist proxies among large sections of the Libyan public, but more so to acknowledge an emerging international consensus in support of a U.N.-backed political process.Emirati drone strikes are believed to have killed scores of people and have caused immense material damage.
But while the international community consolidated its efforts to bring about a political solution, the UAE’s footprint in the country expanded. Since April 4, 2019, alone, Abu Dhabi has conducted more than 850 drone and jet strikes on Haftar’s behalf. Open source data also shows that, since January 2020, more than a 100 airlifters suspected of carrying tons of weaponry flew from the UAE into eastern Libya and Egypt. Abu Dhabi is also suspected of tricking Sudanese workers into working as mercenaries with the LNA, along with transferring jet fuel to sustain Khalifa Haftar’s war effort.
Emirati drone strikes are believed to have killed scores of people and have caused immense material damage, a toll borne overwhelmingly by Libya’s civilian population. This situation is no longer just perpetuating the conflict—it’s exacerbating it, creating a major humanitarian catastrophe in one of the world’s most fragile areas.
Yet neither the United Nations nor Abu Dhabi’s great-power protectors—the United States and France—have done much in the way of curbing this activity, and some policymakers have gone as far as rationalizing the UAE’s behavior because they agree with its broader geoeconomic objectives. While this notion might have carried some weight in past years, the fact that the UAE is willing to enable the total destruction of Tripoli and its infrastructure today is evidence that its ideological investment in Haftar outweighs any future economic considerations.
Even the UAE’s stated ideological objectives don’t resonate with the public anymore. Many Libyans are disillusioned with the aftermath of the revolution and would welcome a strong leader who offers to bring a semblance of security and stability. Aside from the obvious ramifications this poses for the future prospects of liberal democracy in the country, Haftar’s own strength is highly questionable.
His bloody and destructive Pyrrhic victories in Benghazi and Derna would likely not have been possible without extensive backing from both the Emiratis and the Egyptians. Cairo’s close proximity to Libya and Sisi’s ideological alignment with Emirati Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed was a crutch for Haftar, who relied on both men to give him air superiority as well as strategic and materiel support. Abu Dhabi even established its own air base in eastern Libya in 2017, ironically refurbishing the military facility in the midst of political dialogue aimed at ending the conflict. This asset enabled Haftar’s territorial expansion into large swaths of the country as Abu Dhabi continued to provide air cover.
In the current fighting around Tripoli, Emirati-piloted Chinese-made drones and fixed-wing aircraft still allegedly use the air base as a launching pad, facilitating the LNA’s advance. Haftar needed this extensive backing to attain the military advantage he enjoys today, and while this has given him leverage in both the civil war and the peace talks, his ability to rule a post-conflict Libya without foreign support is highly dubious.Many Libyans are disillusioned with the aftermath of the revolution and would welcome a strong leader.
But it isn’t just the UAE’s military intervention that gives Haftar leverage. His strength also stems from the UAE’s ability to influence—and, at times, freeze—diplomacy surrounding Libya by pushing its own interests through its bilateral ties, chiefly the ones it shares with France. Recognizing that the United States’ role in the Middle East and North Africa was declining, the UAE expanded its own role by capitalizing on European countries’ inability to collectively project influence without the United States. The primary European ally that Abu Dhabi galvanized into independently supporting its vision for Libya was France, a country with whom it already shared close bilateral security ties.
France’s clandestine military support of Haftar began in Benghazi as early as 2015, with a view toward countering terrorism and restoring security in Libya. Paris’ support of the authoritarian Haftar looks inimical to its liberal-democratic values, but it is broadly in line with its efforts to develop military alliances with authoritarian leaders in other parts of Africa to secure the Sahel.
For the UAE, the real added value of Paris’ support of its project in Libya was not in the military realm, but the political one. The election of Emmanuel Macron as French president in 2017 gave the UAE’s presence in Libya vital diplomatic cover because of Macron’s appetite for disruptive foreign policy.
France’s intervention helped turn Haftar’s control of eastern Libya and much of Libya’s oil infrastructure into political capital, and Macron hosted ameeting between Haftar and Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in 2017. That meeting became the blueprint for the peace talks that have since developed, and the rest of the international community has gradually moved in support of the power-sharing initiative. Even Italy, which had concerns about the possibility of reinstalling a dictator in Libya, still fell into line. But this peace initiative suffers from an inherent problem: Few of the major players are that serious about reaching a settlement. Neither Haftar nor the UAE were ever genuinely interested in an inclusive Libya in which Haftar would share power with the GNA.
More than that, the UAE has successfully diluted the importance of diplomacy involving Libya altogether. Through its bilateral ties and lobbying efforts, Abu Dhabi enabled Haftar to evade much public condemnation for his bellicosity. The Libya-related conferences that were hosted in foreign capitals were often followed by Haftar launching military operations that ran counter to these meetings’ very purpose. Western policymakers did little to challenge Haftar on this, and they never appeared to question the efficacy of their strategy of appeasement or the power-sharing blueprint.Emirati support effectively affords Haftar complete impunity on the international stage.
The counterintuitive nature of international powers supporting Haftar while simultaneously pushing for a peace agreement was epitomized by one particular episode in 2019. Shortly after a French-backed operation saw Haftar expand into Libya’s southwestern Fezzan region and take full control of the country’s oil infrastructure, the UAE hosted him and Sarraj to cement a power-sharing agreement. Coasting on the favorable momentum afforded by an aura of inevitability and Western complacency, Haftar reneged on this deal by attacking Tripoli in April 2019, and the UAE dutifully deployed its drones to support him. In doing so, Haftar pulverized the political process and extended the civil war into the foreseeable future.
Emirati support effectively affords Haftar complete impunity on the international stage. This is compounded by the fact that both Turkey and Russia have once again become more deeply involved in the conflict, capitalizing on the muted international response that followed Haftar’s offensive in April 2019. The involvement of Ankara and Moscow has attracted far more attention and criticism from Western powers than Abu Dhabi’s has. These countries have both sent hundreds of mercenaries and military contractors as well as tons of military hardware to Libya and have been rightly named and shamed for doing so, but the UAE’s prolonged intervention continues to be treated as an invisible feature of the conflict.
This is the primary obstacle to achieving a long-term settlement in Libya. The bias of Western policymakers has shielded the UAE from the reputational damage one would have expected its long-standing intervention in Libya to have garnered. With Haftar’s offensive now faltering as Ankara steps up its own military involvement, the UAE is once again incentivized to escalate since it fears no consequences. European diplomats must now exert pressure on Paris to prioritize a more coherent European position vis-à-vis Libya over its narrow interests with Abu Dhabi. To date, Western diplomats’ backdoor meetings with Emirati counterparts have failed to bring about de-escalation because oftheir reluctance to use the tools of coercion at their disposal.
European and U.S. officials should jointly apply pressure by threatening the declassification of information regarding all U.N. arms embargo violations in Libya—including the UAE’s long-standing contraventions. The threat of presenting frequent violators to a U.N. sanctions committee, coupled with the possible reputational risks involved, would force new norms of behavior on Abu Dhabi in Libya. This would also represent a much-needed admonishment that would temper the UAE’s belligerence in light of its disregard for international law in other contexts. A concerted diplomatic effort from both Washington and Brussels that forces the UAE to halt its armed support for Haftar is the only way to avert an escalation that will plunge Libya into further bloodshed and destruction.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--The Curious Case of the Maybe Dead Dictator

The Curious Case of the Maybe Dead Dictator SEOUL—The usual torrent of propaganda praising the genius of North Korea ’ s leader was not flowing across the Demilitarized Zone ( DMZ ) dividing North and South Korea a little past noon .
Instead , sad music played , and excerpts of the leader ’ s biography was read before the news broke : North Korea ’ s leader , Kim Il Sung , had been shot dead .
It was Nov. 16 , 1986 .
According to the North Korea-focused news site NK News , the message was followed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ near the DMZ .
The day after , on Nov. 17 , South Korea was gripped by confusion—nothing could be verified , and no one knew exactly what had happened .
Experts had their theories , some more certain than others , and confusion continued until Nov. 18 , when Kim , very much alive , was seen shaking hands with a Mongolian delegation visiting Pyongyang .
The reports of his death had been , it turned out , greatly exaggerated .
A similar case of “ he ’ s dead , she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report from the defector-run activist media Daily NK mentioned that Kim Jong Un , the current leader of North Korea , was recovering after surgery .
Then CNN , citing U.S. intelligence sources , reported that Kim was said to be in “ grave danger ” following surgery .
Suddenly , reports of Kim being brain-dead , in a coma , or sick with COVID-19 spread through social media .
But rather than taking a few days as in 1986 , it took a few hours before calming down .
“ It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve been trapped in this coronavirus news cycle for so long , ” said Go Myong-hyun , a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies .
“ Most of us , not only the media but foreign-policy experts , we focus on North Korea , and there ’ s been little North Korea news in the past few months , so we hear this info that something is happening in Pyongyang , we jump on it , ” he said .
Whether or not the North Korean leader is dead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perfectly fine is still unknown and most likely will be until anything official is released from Pyongyang .
The only thing we can say for certain is that Kim failed to show up for “ The Day of the Sun , ” on April 15 , which is the birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung , the country ’ s founder and eternal president .
And something like that is noteworthy since it ’ s arguably the nation ’ s single-most important day .
“ It ’ s difficult to interpret North Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create expectations in our part , ” said John Delury , a professor of East Asian studies at Yonsei University in Seoul .
“ The pattern that we expect is that Kim Jong Un would appear on the anniversary of his grandfather ’ s birth , so when that didn ’ t happen , that kind of opened the door to a lot of speculation.
” Delury is not much for speculating on what has happened or what will happen and awaits something more official from North Korea before making judgment calls .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ both denied the reports of Kim being seriously ill. “ There has been nothing to confirm regarding the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ’ s health as reported recently by some media , and so far , no specific trends have been identified inside North Korea , ” Kang Min-seok , a spokesman from South Korea ’ s presidential office , said in a statement to international press .
But , as most North Korea watchers keep pointing out , the story is not completely baseless and should therefore not necessarily be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be 36 years old , is in famously bad shape , a heavy smoker , and has an estimated body mass index of 45 , which would classify him as “ extremely obese.
” And the consensus seems to be that he did in fact undergo surgery , as reported by Daily NK .
“ Given the information that ’ s coming out of not just Pyongyang but China and Seoul , it ’ s probable that Kim Jong Un did go through a medical procedure , but I don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where he ’ s about to die or anything , ” Go said .
Go mentioned that there has been no irregular troop movement and no spike in communications as an indication that nothing extraordinary is happening as of right now .
But since most experts are wary of dismissing the story completely , what would happen if Kim were to die ?
“ It would be a major shock to the system if he really died , and North Korea would go through a transition period .
Not an unstable one , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stable transition period , ” Go said .
There ’ s an implicit consensus in North Korea that only a Kim from the same dynasty can lead , and luckily , there ’ s a few to take over immediately , such as Kim ’ s sister , Kim Yo Jong .
She has been more active lately , making public statements denouncing South Korea for example , and has shown that she can be a leader .
Unfortunately , analysts say North Korea is not ready for a woman to lead quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be a man because North Korea is a very chauvinistic society , so it implies that even though the likely candidate is the sister , it ’ ll be difficult .
So I say she ’ ll be the real power behind the regime or country in the transition period until they find a more fitting face , which is most likely Kim Jong Chul , the hidden brother to Kim Jong Un , ” Go said .
The fact is , no one can say anything conclusive yet .
We can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim Jong Il , the father of Kim Jong Un , died and it took North Korea two days to publicize it .
So , silence could mean something , but it could also mean nothing .
And the fact that we ’ re trying to read everything into almost nothing in terms of hard information also says something about us , Delury said .
“ You know , it also reflects our view .
We see North Korea as this highly unstable entity on the wrong side of history that shouldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , again , based on a fairly small amount of evidence , we start to ask , ‘ Is this the end of North Korea ?
’ ” Delury said .
“ That ’ s sort of what we ’ re talking about .
”

SEOUL—The usual torrent of propaganda praising the genius of North Korea’s leader was not flowing across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea a little past noon. Instead, sad music played, and excerpts of the leader’s biography were read before the news broke: North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, had been shot dead. It was Nov. 16, 1986.
SEOUL—The usual torrent of propaganda praising the genius of North Korea’s leader was not flowing across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea a little past noon. Instead, sad music played, and excerpts of the leader’s biography were read before the news broke: North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, had been shot dead. It was Nov. 16, 1986.
According to the North Korea-focused news site NK News, the message was followed by the lowering of the North Korean flag near the DMZ. The day after, on Nov. 17, South Korea was gripped by confusion—nothing could be verified, and no one knew exactly what had happened.
Experts had their theories, some more certain than others, and confusion continued until Nov. 18, when Kim, very much alive, was seen shaking hands with a Mongolian delegation visiting Pyongyang. The reports of his death had been, it turned out, greatly exaggerated.
A similar case of “he’s dead, she said” happened Monday night as a report from the defector-run activist media Daily NK mentioned that Kim Jong Un, the current leader of North Korea, was recovering after surgery. Then CNN, citing U.S. intelligence sources, reported that Kim was said to be in “grave danger” following surgery. Suddenly, reports of Kim being brain-dead, in a coma, or sick with COVID-19 spread through social media.
But rather than taking a few days as in 1986, it took a few hours before calming down. “It’s a cabin fever thing. We’ve been trapped in this coronavirus news cycle for so long,” said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
“Most of us, not only the media but foreign-policy experts, we focus on North Korea, and there’s been little North Korea news in the past few months, so we hear this info that something is happening in Pyongyang, we jump on it,” he said.
Whether or not the North Korean leader is dead, gravely ill, recovering, or perfectly fine is still unknown and most likely will be until anything official is released from Pyongyang.
The only thing we can say for certain is that Kim failed to show up for “The Day of the Sun,” on April 15, which is the birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung, the country’s founder and eternal president. And something like that is noteworthy since it’s arguably the nation’s single-most important day.
“It’s difficult to interpret North Korea, and they have certain patterns that create expectations in our part,” said John Delury, a professor of East Asian studies at Yonsei University in Seoul. “The pattern that we expect is that Kim Jong Un would appear on the anniversary of his grandfather’s birth, so when that didn’t happen, that kind of opened the door to a lot of speculation.”
Delury is not much for speculating on what has happened or what will happen and awaits something more official from North Korea before making judgment calls. Officials in South Korea and China have both denied the reports of Kim being seriously ill.
“There has been nothing to confirm regarding the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s health as reported recently by some media, and so far, no specific trends have been identified inside North Korea,” Kang Min-seok, a spokesman from South Korea’s presidential office, said in a statement to international press.
But, as most North Korea watchers keep pointing out, the story is not completely baseless and should therefore not necessarily be discredited. Kim, who is believed to be 36 years old, is in famously bad shape, a heavy smoker, and has an estimated body mass index of 45, which would classify him as “extremely obese.” And the consensus seems to be that he did in fact undergo surgery, as reported by Daily NK.
“Given the information that’s coming out of not just Pyongyang but China and Seoul, it’s probable that Kim Jong Un did go through a medical procedure, but I don’t think he’s in a situation where he’s about to die or anything,” Go said.
Go mentioned that there has been no irregular troop movement and no spike in communications as an indication that nothing extraordinary is happening as of right now. But since most experts are wary of dismissing the story completely, what would happen if Kim were to die?
“It would be a major shock to the system if he really died, and North Korea would go through a transition period. Not an unstable one, it’s going to be a stable transition period,” Go said.
There’s an implicit consensus in North Korea that only a Kim from the same dynasty can lead, and luckily, there’s a few to take over immediately, such as Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong.
She has been more active lately, making public statements denouncing South Korea for example, and has shown that she can be a leader. Unfortunately, analysts say North Korea is not ready for a woman to lead quite yet.
“The ideal leader has to be a man because North Korea is a very chauvinistic society, so it implies that even though the likely candidate is the sister, it’ll be difficult. So I say she’ll be the real power behind the regime or country in the transition period until they find a more fitting face, which is most likely Kim Jong Chul, the hidden brother to Kim Jong Un,” Go said.
The fact is, no one can say anything conclusive yet. We can point to history, such as when Kim Jong Il, the father of Kim Jong Un, died and it took North Korea two days to publicize it. So, silence could mean something, but it could also mean nothing. And the fact that we’re trying to read everything into almost nothing in terms of hard information also says something about us, Delury said.
“You know, it also reflects our view. We see North Korea as this highly unstable entity on the wrong side of history that shouldn’t be around anymore. And so, again, based on a fairly small amount of evidence, we start to ask, ‘Is this the end of North Korea?’” Delury said. “That’s sort of what we’re talking about.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-21--How the Coronavirus Saved Netanyahu’s Political Career

TEL AVIV , Israel—For leaders around the world , the coronavirus has been a colossal challenge , testing their ability to manage a crisis on an unparalleled scale .
But for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu , the pandemic has also been a political salve , allowing him to put off his corruption trial , smash the country ’ s main opposition party , and now forge a governing majority that had eluded him since late 2018 .
In the coming months , it could provide another dividend for Israel ’ s longest-serving prime minister : a chance to fulfill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West Bank and effectively quashing Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own Netanyahu finalized a power-sharing deal Monday with his main political challenger , Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party , after weeks of cliffhanger talks .
Under the agreement , which cites the “ historic crisis of the coronavirus spread , ” Netanyahu will continue serving as prime minister for 18 months , and then cede the position to Gantz .
The deal ends a long period of political uncertainty in Israel , which included three national elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election , held just last month , left Netanyahu in political peril .
His Likud-led right-wing bloc captured 58 seats in the 120-member Knesset .
Gantz , a former army chief , seemed close to forging a coalition that would have ousted Netanyahu after 11 years as prime minister .
Then cases of the new coronavirus began skyrocketing in Israel .
As Gantz ’ s coalition-building stalled , Netanyahu took to the airwaves nightly to brief the country on the growing threat while urging his rival to join forces against the virus in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintained that the criminal indictments filed against Netanyahu last year disqualified him from continuing to serve as prime minister .
But on March 26 , he relented , agreeing in principle to a partnership and splintering his own party—about half of which refused to go along .
It took another three weeks to finalize the deal .
“ Benny Gantz had an option to form a minority government .
And then this coronavirus struck , and gave Netanyahu another lifeline , and opportunity , ” said Yaakov Katz , the editor in chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Without the virus , I don ’ t know if we would have a government right now.
” The pandemic allowed Netanyahu to reassert his leadership credentials and demonstrate that he was “ in a league of his own ” when it came to political experience—a slogan from his election campaigns .
His addresses were part doomsaying , part calls to rally around the flag , and part personal promotion—talking up Israel ’ s relative success in fighting the pandemic .
The prime minister ’ s social media account bragged , falsely , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place to be during the coronavirus emergency .
Netanyahu was bolstered by Israel ’ s relative success in the coronavirus battle .
The country of 9 million has fewer than 10,000 active coronavirus cases , and the number of daily virus survivors this week surpassed the number of newly diagnosed .
Fewer than 200 people have died .
The crisis played to Netanyahu ’ s strengths , giving him a news agenda to dominate and another opportunity to assert himself as a national savior , said Anshel Pfeffer , the author of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Netanyahu is a great director of drama in which he is also the main star , ” said Pfeffer , who writes for the Economist and the Israeli daily Haaretz .
“ He ramps up the fear factor , emphasizing a great threat to the nation ’ s existence , but he always has the solution right up his sleeve , and that is why Israel needs his leadership to ride out the crisis.
” For Gantz , the crisis offered cover to go back on a yearlong vow not to serve under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scandal .
While Gantz invoked the need to avoid the possibility of a fourth consecutive election , his decision to partner with Netanyahu appears to have torched his credibility among a broad base of supporters .
It also splintered Blue and White , and killed an initiative of center-left parties to pass laws that would have disqualified Netanyahu from being prime minister over his corruption charges .
The political chatter class ridiculed Gantz as a naif over the agreement .
An Israeli satire show showed Gantz ’ s head as the main course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yossi Verter , a political columnist for the liberal Haaretz newspaper , dubbed the emergency government a “ Israel-bluff ” and accused him of “ surrendering time after time.
” The deal did exact concessions from Netanyahu .
He agreed to vacate the premier ’ s office after 18 months and cede the position to Gantz .
And Netanyahu ’ s new cabinet will be divided evenly between his Likud party and Gantz ’ s bloc .
But many political analysts thought the deal left Netanyahu in the driver ’ s seat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Few believe Gantz will actually get his chance to serve as prime minister .
The coalition agreement allows Netanyahu to continue serving even while his trial on bribery , fraud and corruption charges goes forward .
In the event Israel ’ s Supreme Court disqualifies him from serving in the role , the agreement stipulates the government will dissolve the parliament and call new elections rather than finding another prime minister .
Crucially , the agreement also sets in motion a governmental push this summer to take legal steps toward a unilateral annexation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watershed for Netanyahu ’ s ideological base and a milestone more than a half-century after Israel occupied the territory in the 1967 war with its Arab neighbors .
Such a move could eliminate the already-slim prospect of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , warned Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh , in response to the agreement .
“ The formation of an Israeli annexation government means ending the two-state solution and the dismantling of the rights of the people of Palestine as established under international law and resolutions , ” Shtayyeh tweeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ took the first steps in an “ exit strategy ” from its near-total lockdown over the past month .
But if the economy fails to recover or Israel suffers a second wave of virus , Netanyahu ’ s standing could be undermined .
Indeed , the government is already being criticized for relatively low fiscal support for businesses and individuals .
An Israeli private sector insurance company predicted a 50 percent rise in business bankruptcies this year , more than twice the worldwide average .
Netanyahu also came under fire for lax enforcement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
His own health minister , an ultra-Orthodox lawmaker , was accused of violating the restriction orders .
“ He has received fairly high marks from the public for his handling of the crisis because of the relatively low number of fatalities and the fact that the hospitals have not been overwhelmed , ” said Daniel Shapiro , a former U.S. ambassador to Israel .
“ It may be harder to sustain that support if there is a second wave , or if the economic recovery proves difficult .
But for now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dubbed the virus the “ enemy , ” portraying the coronavirus as threat akin to suicide bombers , Hamas rockets , Iran ’ s nuclear program , and even former U.S. President Barack Obama—and pitched himself as the only one able to defeat it , said Katz .
“ If you look throughout Netanyahu ’ s political career , he always needs to present the Israeli electorate with a threat that looms out there , ” the Jerusalem Post editor said .
“ Corona was another opponent , so-called adversary , so called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one , was the leader in the fight against .
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—For leaders around the world, the coronavirus has been a colossal challenge, testing their ability to manage a crisis on an unparalleled scale. But for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the pandemic has also been a political salve, allowing him to put off his corruption trial, smash the country’s main opposition party, and now forge a governing majority that had eluded him since late 2018.
TEL AVIV, Israel—For leaders around the world, the coronavirus has been a colossal challenge, testing their ability to manage a crisis on an unparalleled scale. But for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the pandemic has also been a political salve, allowing him to put off his corruption trial, smash the country’s main opposition party, and now forge a governing majority that had eluded him since late 2018.
In the coming months, it could provide another dividend for Israel’s longest-serving prime minister: a chance to fulfill a nationalist agenda of annexing parts of the West Bank and effectively quashing Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own
Netanyahu finalized a power-sharing deal Monday with his main political challenger, Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party, after weeks of cliffhanger talks. Under the agreement, which cites the “historic crisis of the coronavirus spread,” Netanyahu will continue serving as prime minister for 18 months, and then cede the position to Gantz.
The deal ends a long period of political uncertainty in Israel, which included three national elections that resulted in stalemate.
The third election, held just last month, left Netanyahu in political peril. His Likud-led right-wing bloc captured 58 seats in the 120-member Knesset. Gantz, a former army chief, seemed close to forging a coalition that would have ousted Netanyahu after 11 years as prime minister.
Then cases of the new coronavirus began skyrocketing in Israel. As Gantz’s coalition-building stalled, Netanyahu took to the airwaves nightly to brief the country on the growing threat while urging his rival to join forces against the virus in an emergency government.
Gantz had long maintained that the criminal indictments filed against Netanyahu last year disqualified him from continuing to serve as prime minister. But on March 26, he relented, agreeing in principle to a partnership and splintering his own party—about half of which refused to go along. It took another three weeks to finalize the deal.
“Benny Gantz had an option to form a minority government. And then this coronavirus struck, and gave Netanyahu another lifeline, and opportunity,” said Yaakov Katz, the editor in chief of the English-language Jerusalem Post. “Without the virus, I don’t know if we would have a government right now.”
The pandemic allowed Netanyahu to reassert his leadership credentials and demonstrate that he was “in a league of his own” when it came to political experience—a slogan from his election campaigns.
His addresses were part doomsaying, part calls to rally around the flag, and part personal promotion—talking up Israel’s relative success in fighting the pandemic. The prime minister’s social media account bragged, falsely, that Forbes had declared Israel the safest place to be during the coronavirus emergency.
Netanyahu was bolstered by Israel’s relative success in the coronavirus battle. The country of 9 million has fewer than 10,000 active coronavirus cases, and the number of daily virus survivors this week surpassed the number of newly diagnosed. Fewer than 200 people have died.
The crisis played to Netanyahu’s strengths, giving him a news agenda to dominate and another opportunity to assert himself as a national savior, said Anshel Pfeffer, the author of a biography on the prime minister.
“Netanyahu is a great director of drama in which he is also the main star,” said Pfeffer, who writes for the Economist and the Israeli daily Haaretz. “He ramps up the fear factor, emphasizing a great threat to the nation’s existence, but he always has the solution right up his sleeve, and that is why Israel needs his leadership to ride out the crisis.”
For Gantz, the crisis offered cover to go back on a yearlong vow not to serve under a prime minister mired in a corruption scandal. While Gantz invoked the need to avoid the possibility of a fourth consecutive election, his decision to partner with Netanyahu appears to have torched his credibility among a broad base of supporters. It also splintered Blue and White, and killed an initiative of center-left parties to pass laws that would have disqualified Netanyahu from being prime minister over his corruption charges.
The political chatter class ridiculed Gantz as a naif over the agreement. An Israeli satire show showed Gantz’s head as the main course of Netanyahu’s Passover holiday meal. Yossi Verter, a political columnist for the liberal Haaretz newspaper, dubbed the emergency government a “Israel-bluff” and accused him of “surrendering time after time.”
The deal did exact concessions from Netanyahu. He agreed to vacate the premier’s office after 18 months and cede the position to Gantz. And Netanyahu’s new cabinet will be divided evenly between his Likud party and Gantz’s bloc. But many political analysts thought the deal left Netanyahu in the driver’s seat and Gantz with no political leverage. Few believe Gantz will actually get his chance to serve as prime minister.
The coalition agreement allows Netanyahu to continue serving even while his trial on bribery, fraud and corruption charges goes forward. In the event Israel’s Supreme Court disqualifies him from serving in the role, the agreement stipulates the government will dissolve the parliament and call new elections rather than finding another prime minister.
Crucially, the agreement also sets in motion a governmental push this summer to take legal steps toward a unilateral annexation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank—a watershed for Netanyahu’s ideological base and a milestone more than a half-century after Israel occupied the territory in the 1967 war with its Arab neighbors.
Such a move could eliminate the already-slim prospect of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, warned Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, in response to the agreement. “The formation of an Israeli annexation government means ending the two-state solution and the dismantling of the rights of the people of Palestine as established under international law and resolutions,” Shtayyeh tweeted on Monday.
This week, Israel took the first steps in an “exit strategy” from its near-total lockdown over the past month. But if the economy fails to recover or Israel suffers a second wave of virus, Netanyahu’s standing could be undermined.
Indeed, the government is already being criticized for relatively low fiscal support for businesses and individuals. An Israeli private sector insurance company predicted a 50 percent rise in business bankruptcies this year, more than twice the worldwide average. Netanyahu also came under fire for lax enforcement of the lockdown among ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities. His own health minister, an ultra-Orthodox lawmaker, was accused of violating the restriction orders.
“He has received fairly high marks from the public for his handling of the crisis because of the relatively low number of fatalities and the fact that the hospitals have not been overwhelmed,” said Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel. “It may be harder to sustain that support if there is a second wave, or if the economic recovery proves difficult. But for now, he has benefited from it.”
Netanyahu dubbed the virus the “enemy,” portraying the coronavirus as threat akin to suicide bombers, Hamas rockets, Iran’s nuclear program, and even former U.S. President Barack Obama—and pitched himself as the only one able to defeat it, said Katz.
“If you look throughout Netanyahu’s political career, he always needs to present the Israeli electorate with a threat that looms out there,” the Jerusalem Post editor said. “Corona was another opponent, so-called adversary, so called threat, which Netanyahu, from day one, was the leader in the fight against.”