foreignpolicy--2020-11-01--The Case for Disaggregating the European Union

The Case for Disaggregating the European Union This fall , it took the European Union almost two months to impose sanctions against Aleksandr Lukashenko ’ s regime in Belarus after a clearly rigged presidential election and the government ’ s heavy-handed crackdown of mass protests .
Although the EU was quick to refuse to recognize the results when they were released in August , stated that Lukashenko ’ s new presidential mandate lacked “ any democratic legitimacy , ” and called for “ an inclusive national dialogue and responding positively to the demands of the Belarusian people for new democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks , as it used its veto as a bargaining chip in its own dispute with Turkey .
Then , in September , European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced with great fanfare that the EU was stepping up its efforts to combat climate change .
As part of that plan , by 2030 the bloc would seek to reduce its carbon emissions 55 percent below 1990 levels .
It would also aim to spend over half a trillion euros over the next seven years on climate-related efforts .
Again , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which relies heavily on coal and lignite ( a cousin of coal ) , has openly defied the ambitious emissions goals .
Meanwhile , across Central and Eastern Europe new natural gas infrastructure , including the infamous Nord Stream 2 pipeline and several liquified natural gas terminals , is springing up .
While cleaner than coal , an addiction to natural gas would run counter to von der Leyen ’ s plans .
Both situations raise the question of whether the EU is the right venue to address issues including European geopolitics , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theory , the answer is a resounding yes .
But reality is more complicated .
True , dealing with climate change requires a high degree of international coordination in order to prevent carbon leakage from countries that have committed themselves to reducing their carbon footprint to jurisdictions that have taken a lax approach .
And no European country , not even Germany or France , can sit as an equal with the world ’ s great powers .
But the EU collective , with a population of 450 million , can .
Meanwhile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elite off from the EU ’ s entire financial and real estate market would be more consequential than sanctions by individual countries .
Yet , in both cases , the EU lacks the policy toolbox to act effectively .
This mismatch was long supposed to be remedied by the bloc ’ s gradual evolution toward an ever closer union .
According to the logic advocated by many of the EU ’ s founding fathers , successive policy decisions and crises would lead to the gradual completion of the EU ’ s institutional architecture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would make genuine fiscal union inevitable .
Schengen would lead sooner or later to a common visa and asylum policy .
The political culture of “ total optimism ” is unsustainable .
But the political culture of “ total optimism , ” as the Italian political scientist Giandomenico Majone called it , is unsustainable .
Over the past decade , marked by a multiplicity of crises threatening the very existence of the European project , the bloc responded with improvised make-do fixes , agreed by national leaders outside the scope of European treaties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a chaotic unraveling of the eurozone , in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis , only then did European leaders agree , reluctantly , on the creation of a rescue fund for countries in financial distress .
And only when the wave of Syrian asylum-seekers risked overwhelming the Schengen Area did German Chancellor Angela Merkel decide to strike a bargain with Turkey ’ s Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt the migratory flows .
Oftentimes , both acute and chronic problems—such as rule of law in Poland and Hungary , the China challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reason is twofold .
First , the not-quite-federal institutional setup of the EU requires states to meet a high threshold of agreement , often unanimity , on consequential decisions , especially to changes to its treaties .
Second , EU member states tend to have widely different views on how various policy challenges ought to be resolved and also about the future of the European project , including the desirable depth of political integration , future enlargements , and the role and size of European institutions .
The underlying assumption of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , for all their differences , all EU members are moving toward the same destination .
But that is not true .
Poles , Czechs , and Swedes may never adopt the euro , in spite of their formal commitment to eventually do so .
Climate goals set by Brussels might go ignored by national policymakers , just as the ambitious economic goals articulated in the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 once were .
And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban-style populism might not be a one-off aberration but a permanent state of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary .
Perhaps such frictions could be overcome if the threshold of agreement required for action in the European Council were lowered so that decisions were made by qualified majorities , not by unanimity .
After Brexit , however , even the most ardent Eurofederalists should think twice before giving member states the prospect of being systematically outvoted .
Fortunately , there is another path .
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty , the European project was commonly referred to as the “ European Communities.
” There was the European Coal and Steel Community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the European Economic Community—all governed by the same set of Brussels-based institutions .
If , 30 years in , the bundling of these groups into the EU has not produced greater unity , perhaps it is time to start thinking about the EU in pluralistic terms again .
It may not be one monolithic entity but a multiplicity of only partially geographically overlapping projects of economic and political integration .
The idea of unbundling is not new—Majone articulated it in a book analyzing the EU ’ s travails during the financial crisis—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the past decade as the EU has relied more and more on intergovernmental responses to events in Europe and abroad .
The idea is by no means radical .
The EU has long featured a single market , in which several nonmembers take part .
There is also the Schengen Agreement and the currency union , which both include subsets of EU members and some nonmembers .
While the EU strives to make its lowest common denominator attempts at common security and foreign policies viable , member states , large and small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Explicit and implicit carve-outs and special accommodations exist in many other areas , including the Irish protocol on the Lisbon Treaty , Denmark ’ s opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty , and Poland ’ s opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights .
Such special treatment does not have to be a threat to European unity .
If used well , it can be a tool keeping the European edifice together while different blocs of countries deepen their cooperation in various policy areas .
When Cyprus refused to sanction Lukashenko , the remaining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their own .
True , doing so would raise legal questions , since sanctioned entities could still reach the EU ’ s financial and real estate markets via Cyprus .
But that is not an unsurmountable problem given the scrutiny that the union has devoted to such questions in its anti-money laundering directives .
If a subset of EU members are truly serious about addressing climate change , they should not be held back by naysayers .
And if most but not all eurozone members want to pool their public debt into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t they ?
To become a global foreign and security policy player , Brussels has launched a number of formal , institutionalized initiatives , most prominently the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund .
Yet , in order for such efforts to succeed , it will be critical for the United Kingdom to be heavily involved , in spite of the British decision to formally leave the EU .
The U.K. might no longer be an EU member state , but it is one of the few remaining military powers in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European project is a plurality of initiatives that run in parallel and involve different sets of actors would inevitably de-emphasize the role of common European institutions , such as its parliament and the commission , and put member states firmly in the driver ’ s seat .
But that has already started happening over the past decade .
There are practical limits to the EU ’ s unbundling , which have to do with the problems of free-riding and adverse selection , where those countries most interested in remaining in the union are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , whether in investment , fiscal transfers , security , or otherwise .
If most but not all of the EU ’ s members embrace ambitious climate goals , there may indeed be carbon leakage to countries such as Poland—and available tax remedies might well be inadequate .
If only a subset of eurozone countries moves to build the fiscal union needed to make the currency union sustainable over the long term , other member states will benefit from the added degree of financial stability without bearing any of the costs .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ place .
The frictions entailed by the EU ’ s bow to its pluralistic , multifaceted nature should not be compared against an optimal mix of policies and institutions in an ideal European federation but against the union ’ s current , highly imperfect reality—in which desirable initiatives are constantly held back and derailed .
An unbundling of the EU would be a simple acknowledgment of reality today .
Its alternative , namely obstinate insistence on European unity and one-size-fits-all solutions , will not lead to an ever closer union .
Instead , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bloc ’ s paralysis and ultimate irrelevance .

This fall, it took the European Union almost two months to impose sanctions against Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus after a clearly rigged presidential election and the government’s heavy-handed crackdown of mass protests. Although the EU was quick to refuse to recognize the results when they were released in August, stated that Lukashenko’s new presidential mandate lacked “any democratic legitimacy,” and called for “an inclusive national dialogue and responding positively to the demands of the Belarusian people for new democratic elections.” Cyprus blocked concrete action for weeks, as it used its veto as a bargaining chip in its own dispute with Turkey.
This fall, it took the European Union almost two months to impose sanctions against Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus after a clearly rigged presidential election and the government’s heavy-handed crackdown of mass protests. Although the EU was quick to refuse to recognize the results when they were released in August, stated that Lukashenko’s new presidential mandate lacked “any democratic legitimacy,” and called for “an inclusive national dialogue and responding positively to the demands of the Belarusian people for new democratic elections.” Cyprus blocked concrete action for weeks, as it used its veto as a bargaining chip in its own dispute with Turkey.
Then, in September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced with great fanfare that the EU was stepping up its efforts to combat climate change. As part of that plan, by 2030 the bloc would seek to reduce its carbon emissions 55 percent below 1990 levels. It would also aim to spend over half a trillion euros over the next seven years on climate-related efforts. Again, not everybody was on board. Poland, which relies heavily on coal and lignite (a cousin of coal), has openly defied the ambitious emissions goals. Meanwhile, across Central and Eastern Europe new natural gas infrastructure, including the infamous Nord Stream 2 pipeline and several liquified natural gas terminals, is springing up. While cleaner than coal, an addiction to natural gas would run counter to von der Leyen’s plans.
Both situations raise the question of whether the EU is the right venue to address issues including European geopolitics, climate change, and others. In theory, the answer is a resounding yes. But reality is more complicated.
True, dealing with climate change requires a high degree of international coordination in order to prevent carbon leakage from countries that have committed themselves to reducing their carbon footprint to jurisdictions that have taken a lax approach. And no European country, not even Germany or France, can sit as an equal with the world’s great powers. But the EU collective, with a population of 450 million, can. Meanwhile, actions like cutting Lukashenko’s elite off from the EU’s entire financial and real estate market would be more consequential than sanctions by individual countries.
Yet, in both cases, the EU lacks the policy toolbox to act effectively. This mismatch was long supposed to be remedied by the bloc’s gradual evolution toward an ever closer union. According to the logic advocated by many of the EU’s founding fathers, successive policy decisions and crises would lead to the gradual completion of the EU’s institutional architecture. The euro, for example, would make genuine fiscal union inevitable. Schengen would lead sooner or later to a common visa and asylum policy.
The political culture of “total optimism” is unsustainable.
But the political culture of “total optimism,” as the Italian political scientist Giandomenico Majone called it, is unsustainable. Over the past decade, marked by a multiplicity of crises threatening the very existence of the European project, the bloc responded with improvised make-do fixes, agreed by national leaders outside the scope of European treaties. When faced with the prospect of a chaotic unraveling of the eurozone, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, only then did European leaders agree, reluctantly, on the creation of a rescue fund for countries in financial distress. And only when the wave of Syrian asylum-seekers risked overwhelming the Schengen Area did German Chancellor Angela Merkel decide to strike a bargain with Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan to halt the migratory flows.
Oftentimes, both acute and chronic problems—such as rule of law in Poland and Hungary, the China challenge, and the turmoil in Syria—linger unaddressed. The reason is twofold. First, the not-quite-federal institutional setup of the EU requires states to meet a high threshold of agreement, often unanimity, on consequential decisions, especially to changes to its treaties. Second, EU member states tend to have widely different views on how various policy challenges ought to be resolved and also about the future of the European project, including the desirable depth of political integration, future enlargements, and the role and size of European institutions.
The underlying assumption of the “ever closer union” is that, for all their differences, all EU members are moving toward the same destination. But that is not true. Poles, Czechs, and Swedes may never adopt the euro, in spite of their formal commitment to eventually do so. Climate goals set by Brussels might go ignored by national policymakers, just as the ambitious economic goals articulated in the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020 once were. And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban-style populism might not be a one-off aberration but a permanent state of affairs in places such as Poland and Hungary.
Perhaps such frictions could be overcome if the threshold of agreement required for action in the European Council were lowered so that decisions were made by qualified majorities, not by unanimity. After Brexit, however, even the most ardent Eurofederalists should think twice before giving member states the prospect of being systematically outvoted.
Fortunately, there is another path. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the European project was commonly referred to as the “European Communities.” There was the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community—all governed by the same set of Brussels-based institutions. If, 30 years in, the bundling of these groups into the EU has not produced greater unity, perhaps it is time to start thinking about the EU in pluralistic terms again. It may not be one monolithic entity but a multiplicity of only partially geographically overlapping projects of economic and political integration.
The idea of unbundling is not new—Majone articulated it in a book analyzing the EU’s travails during the financial crisis—but the case for it has grown stronger over the past decade as the EU has relied more and more on intergovernmental responses to events in Europe and abroad.
The idea is by no means radical. The EU has long featured a single market, in which several nonmembers take part. There is also the Schengen Agreement and the currency union, which both include subsets of EU members and some nonmembers. While the EU strives to make its lowest common denominator attempts at common security and foreign policies viable, member states, large and small, often act on their own. Explicit and implicit carve-outs and special accommodations exist in many other areas, including the Irish protocol on the Lisbon Treaty, Denmark’s opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty, and Poland’s opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Such special treatment does not have to be a threat to European unity. If used well, it can be a tool keeping the European edifice together while different blocs of countries deepen their cooperation in various policy areas. When Cyprus refused to sanction Lukashenko, the remaining 26 member states should have proceeded on their own. True, doing so would raise legal questions, since sanctioned entities could still reach the EU’s financial and real estate markets via Cyprus. But that is not an unsurmountable problem given the scrutiny that the union has devoted to such questions in its anti-money laundering directives. If a subset of EU members are truly serious about addressing climate change, they should not be held back by naysayers. And if most but not all eurozone members want to pool their public debt into a common debt instrument, why shouldn’t they?
To become a global foreign and security policy player, Brussels has launched a number of formal, institutionalized initiatives, most prominently the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund. Yet, in order for such efforts to succeed, it will be critical for the United Kingdom to be heavily involved, in spite of the British decision to formally leave the EU. The U.K. might no longer be an EU member state, but it is one of the few remaining military powers in Europe.
Embracing the reality that the European project is a plurality of initiatives that run in parallel and involve different sets of actors would inevitably de-emphasize the role of common European institutions, such as its parliament and the commission, and put member states firmly in the driver’s seat. But that has already started happening over the past decade.
There are practical limits to the EU’s unbundling, which have to do with the problems of free-riding and adverse selection, where those countries most interested in remaining in the union are the same who require the most from it, whether in investment, fiscal transfers, security, or otherwise. If most but not all of the EU’s members embrace ambitious climate goals, there may indeed be carbon leakage to countries such as Poland—and available tax remedies might well be inadequate. If only a subset of eurozone countries moves to build the fiscal union needed to make the currency union sustainable over the long term, other member states will benefit from the added degree of financial stability without bearing any of the costs.
Yet the world is necessarily an imperfect place. The frictions entailed by the EU’s bow to its pluralistic, multifaceted nature should not be compared against an optimal mix of policies and institutions in an ideal European federation but against the union’s current, highly imperfect reality—in which desirable initiatives are constantly held back and derailed.
An unbundling of the EU would be a simple acknowledgment of reality today. Its alternative, namely obstinate insistence on European unity and one-size-fits-all solutions, will not lead to an ever closer union. Instead, it is the surest path to the bloc’s paralysis and ultimate irrelevance.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-03--Terrorist Attack in Kabul Shatters Lives—and Illusions

KABUL—Abdul Akbari was in his bed at Ali Abad Hospital in Kabul , nursing a gunshot wound in his left leg .
He clearly remembered what happened in the terrorist attack on his university campus in Kabul on Monday .
“ The terrorists came as suicide attackers and killers , murdering many .
One of them , wearing a type of security guard uniform and no face covering , opened our classroom door and looked us straight in the eyes , shouting ‘ Allahu akbar ’ before starting to shoot , ” Akbari said .
“ Many of my friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the floor when I tried to escape.
” The 22-year-old student survived , but of the 13 students taken to Ali Abad , he ’ s one of the luckier ones .
Across the hall , in a spartan intensive care unit , another student lay unconscious with four bullets in his belly and a growing pool of blood under his bed .
The nurses were not optimistic .
At least 22 people were killed and dozens more injured in a terrorist attack Monday at Kabul University , Afghanistan ’ s largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 22,000 .
The Islamic State in Afghanistan claimed credit for the attack .
It was just the latest sign that the fragile peace deal inked this year between the United States and the Taliban is far from the final word on a conflict that has gutted Afghanistan for decades .
The attack is yet another Islamic State assault on education in just over a week.The six-hour siege started in the late morning and ended with Afghan forces and U.S. commandos killing three attackers .
All afternoon , loud explosions and ongoing gunfire rocked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were sheltering while the majority had managed to flee .
The attack is yet another Islamic State assault on education in just over a week , coming shortly after an attack on a private education center on Oct. 24 in a mainly Shiite Kabul neighborhood , killing at least 30 people , most of them teenage students .
The Taliban were quick to deny Monday ’ s attack but were blamed by a number of Afghan government officials regardless ; since signing the peace deal with Washington , the Taliban have launched a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government forces and civilians .
The United Nations documented 5,939 civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2020 , including more than 2,000 killed , and said last week that peace talks have failed to slow this toll .
As U.S. troops pull out , many Afghans worry the violence will simply escalate .
One Afghan National Police officer , his black boots covered in dry blood , his face cadaverous , admitted he wasn ’ t hopeful .
He asked that his name be withheld .
“ We carried dozens of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Classrooms were covered in blood .
It was carnage , ” he said , sure that the official number of deaths would still rise .
“ It seems that with every day , we ’ re getting further away from peace .
There is no safe place in this country.
” Afghanistan has seen over four decades of grueling and tiring conflict , with U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad warning that the window to achieve a political settlement will not stay open forever .
“ Afghans are dying at a high rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as cannon fodder for their illegitimate objectives , ” he said .
Few expect the situation to change .
“ It seems that with every day , we ’ re getting further away from peace.
” At Ali Abad Hospital , just opposite the university ’ s campus , cars kept pulling up late into the night on Monday .
Relatives of those wounded , or killed , piled out .
Their faces were stern with worry , their eyes frantically scanning lists of names of those admitted to the clinic , hoping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their next stop .
Nahida Muhradi ’ s family ’ s search ended , less awfully than it could have , at Ali Abad .
The 22-year-old law student was recovering from a bullet wound to her left leg , sharing her intensive care room with five other women , most of them injured in the attack .
Muhradi ’ s sister got the doctors ’ permission to visit ; sitting by her bed , the two young women were screaming and crying , holding hands , and touching each other ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t sure if she would look for a way out of her war-torn nation .
Akbari , who saw a lot of classmates shot dead , said it ’ s difficult to see his future in Afghanistan .
“ Both our government and the international community—including the U.S.—has failed us .
It is not even safe anymore to attend university , ” he said .
“ The terrorists come to kill and injure us .
We had hopes , but we are not allowed to hope .
All we—our young generation—want is to @ @ @ @ @ @

KABUL—Abdul Akbari was in his bed at Ali Abad Hospital in Kabul, nursing a gunshot wound in his left leg. He clearly remembered what happened in the terrorist attack on his university campus in Kabul on Monday.
KABUL—Abdul Akbari was in his bed at Ali Abad Hospital in Kabul, nursing a gunshot wound in his left leg. He clearly remembered what happened in the terrorist attack on his university campus in Kabul on Monday.
“The terrorists came as suicide attackers and killers, murdering many. One of them, wearing a type of security guard uniform and no face covering, opened our classroom door and looked us straight in the eyes, shouting ‘Allahu akbar’ before starting to shoot,” Akbari said. “Many of my friends are dead. I saw them lying on the floor when I tried to escape.”
The 22-year-old student survived, but of the 13 students taken to Ali Abad, he’s one of the luckier ones. Across the hall, in a spartan intensive care unit, another student lay unconscious with four bullets in his belly and a growing pool of blood under his bed. The nurses were not optimistic.
At least 22 people were killed and dozens more injured in a terrorist attack Monday at Kabul University, Afghanistan’s largest, with a student body of about 22,000. The Islamic State in Afghanistan claimed credit for the attack. It was just the latest sign that the fragile peace deal inked this year between the United States and the Taliban is far from the final word on a conflict that has gutted Afghanistan for decades.
The attack is yet another Islamic State assault on education in just over a week.The six-hour siege started in the late morning and ended with Afghan forces and U.S. commandos killing three attackers. All afternoon, loud explosions and ongoing gunfire rocked the university campus, where many students were sheltering while the majority had managed to flee.
The attack is yet another Islamic State assault on education in just over a week, coming shortly after an attack on a private education center on Oct. 24 in a mainly Shiite Kabul neighborhood, killing at least 30 people, most of them teenage students.
The Taliban were quick to deny Monday’s attack but were blamed by a number of Afghan government officials regardless; since signing the peace deal with Washington, the Taliban have launched a nearly unprecedented campaign of violence against Afghan government forces and civilians. The United Nations documented 5,939 civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2020, including more than 2,000 killed, and said last week that peace talks have failed to slow this toll.
As U.S. troops pull out, many Afghans worry the violence will simply escalate. One Afghan National Police officer, his black boots covered in dry blood, his face cadaverous, admitted he wasn’t hopeful. He asked that his name be withheld.
Family members of students injured in the Kabul University attack wait outside the intensive care unit at Ali Abed hospital, a clinic right opposite the university, on Nov. 2.
“We carried dozens of dead bodies out of the university campus. Classrooms were covered in blood. It was carnage,” he said, sure that the official number of deaths would still rise. “It seems that with every day, we’re getting further away from peace. There is no safe place in this country.”
“It seems that with every day, we’re getting further away from peace.”
Afghanistan has seen over four decades of grueling and tiring conflict, with U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad warning that the window to achieve a political settlement will not stay open forever. “Afghans are dying at a high rate, and regional spoilers are using Afghans as cannon fodder for their illegitimate objectives,” he said.
Few expect the situation to change.
At Ali Abad Hospital, just opposite the university’s campus, cars kept pulling up late into the night on Monday. Relatives of those wounded, or killed, piled out. Their faces were stern with worry, their eyes frantically scanning lists of names of those admitted to the clinic, hoping that the morgue wouldn’t be their next stop.
Nahida Muhradi, a 22-year-old law student, rests at Ali Abed hospital in Kabul, where she is recovering from her injuries, on Nov. 2.
Nahida Muhradi’s family’s search ended, less awfully than it could have, at Ali Abad. The 22-year-old law student was recovering from a bullet wound to her left leg, sharing her intensive care room with five other women, most of them injured in the attack. Muhradi’s sister got the doctors’ permission to visit; sitting by her bed, the two young women were screaming and crying, holding hands, and touching each other’s faces.
Muhradi said she wasn’t sure if she would look for a way out of her war-torn nation. Akbari, who saw a lot of classmates shot dead, said it’s difficult to see his future in Afghanistan. “Both our government and the international community—including the U.S.—has failed us. It is not even safe anymore to attend university,” he said.
“The terrorists come to kill and injure us. We had hopes, but we are not allowed to hope. All we—our young generation—want is to make Afghanistan great again.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-03--Tracking the U.S. House Races Like a Foreign Policy Pro

Tracking the U.S. House Races Like a Foreign Policy Pro This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Democrats are widely expected to retain control of the House .
In fact , David Wasserman of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report predicts that the Democratic Party will pick up anywhere between five and 20 new seats .
Here are the races that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : Texas 10th District : Michael McCaul ( 1 ) , the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , is in a toss-up race against second-time Democratic challenger Mike Siegel , according to the Cook Political Report .
( Siegel lost his bid to represent the Republican-leaning district by just over 4 percentage points two years ago . )
Texas 22nd : Sri Kulkarni ( 2 ) , a former foreign service officer , is running for Congress in Texas ’ s 22nd District—an area where voters have helped turn Texas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential battleground for Democrats .
Texas 23rd : Gina Ortiz Jones ( 3 ) , a U.S. Air Force veteran , is in a heated race to gain the sprawling 23rd District of Texas that spans nearly one-third of the U.S.-Mexico border .
Republican Rep. Will Hurd , a former CIA officer , announced last year he would not run again .
Michigan 8th : Rep. Elissa Slotkin ( 4 ) , a former CIA analyst and senior Pentagon official , is running for reelection in Michigan .
She has been vocal about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hyperpartisan and ultra-politicized atmosphere across the country could become a grave national security threat .
New Jersey 3rd : Rep. Andy Kim ( 5 ) , a former National Security Council staffer in the Obama administration , is running for reelection in New Jersey ’ s 3rd District after winning by a narrow margin in 2018 .
He is one of a group of national security experts who ditched the Beltway to run for Congress in 2018 .
He ’ s also co-chair of the House ’ s National Security Task Force .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( 6 ) , a former senior State Department official in the Obama administration , is running in a tight race for a second term in Congress .
From his perch on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Malinowski has been one of the Democrats ’ most vocal critics of Trump ’ s foreign policy and of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Virginia 7th : Once represented by two-term Republican insurgent Dave Brat ( who knocked off House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in a 2014 primary upset ) , this suburban Richmond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close fight between Rep. Abigail Spanberger ( 7 ) —a Blue Dog Democrat and former CIA official who sits on the House Foreign Affairs committee—and Republican challenger and Army veteran Nick Freitas ( 8 ) .
To leave FP ’ s live election blog and read the rest of this article , click here .

Democrats are widely expected to retain control of the House. In fact, David Wasserman of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report predicts that the Democratic Party will pick up anywhere between five and 20 new seats. Here are the races that foreign-policy pros should be watching most closely:
Democrats are widely expected to retain control of the House. In fact, David Wasserman of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report predicts that the Democratic Party will pick up anywhere between five and 20 new seats. Here are the races that foreign-policy pros should be watching most closely:
Texas 10th District: Michael McCaul (1), the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is in a toss-up race against second-time Democratic challenger Mike Siegel, according to the Cook Political Report. (Siegel lost his bid to represent the Republican-leaning district by just over 4 percentage points two years ago.)
Texas 22nd: Sri Kulkarni (2), a former foreign service officer, is running for Congress in Texas’s 22nd District—an area where voters have helped turn Texas from a deep red state to a potential battleground for Democrats.
Texas 23rd: Gina Ortiz Jones (3), a U.S. Air Force veteran, is in a heated race to gain the sprawling 23rd District of Texas that spans nearly one-third of the U.S.-Mexico border. Republican Rep. Will Hurd, a former CIA officer, announced last year he would not run again.
Michigan 8th: Rep. Elissa Slotkin (4), a former CIA analyst and senior Pentagon official, is running for reelection in Michigan. She has been vocal about fears of homegrown extremism and how the hyperpartisan and ultra-politicized atmosphere across the country could become a grave national security threat.
New Jersey 3rd: Rep. Andy Kim (5), a former National Security Council staffer in the Obama administration, is running for reelection in New Jersey’s 3rd District after winning by a narrow margin in 2018. He is one of a group of national security experts who ditched the Beltway to run for Congress in 2018. He’s also co-chair of the House’s National Security Task Force.
New Jersey 7th: Rep. Tom Malinowski (6), a former senior State Department official in the Obama administration, is running in a tight race for a second term in Congress. From his perch on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Malinowski has been one of the Democrats’ most vocal critics of Trump’s foreign policy and of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Virginia 7th: Once represented by two-term Republican insurgent Dave Brat (who knocked off House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in a 2014 primary upset), this suburban Richmond district is now the site of a close fight between Rep. Abigail Spanberger (7)—a Blue Dog Democrat and former CIA official who sits on the House Foreign Affairs committee—and Republican challenger and Army veteran Nick Freitas (8).
To leave FP’s live election blog and read the rest of this article, click here.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--The Senate Races That Are Crucial for U.S. Foreign Policy

The Senate Races That Are Crucial for U.S. Foreign Policy This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
The race for control for the U.S. Senate is much tighter than for control of the House of Representatives .
Whichever party wins will have a razor-thin majority , according to projections .
We ’ re not likely to have final results on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
The Democrats stand a good chance to lead key foreign-policy oversight committees , including the Senate ’ s armed services panel , where many members are in close campaigns .
Republican Sens .
Joni Ernst of Iowa , Thom Tillis of North Carolina , David Perdue of Georgia , and Martha McSally of Arizona are all in toss-up races .
Democratic Sen. Gary Peters of Michigan faces a challenge from Republican businessman John James , who has run ahead of Trump in state opinion polls .
Likely to lose his seat is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also sits on the Armed Services Committee .
South Carolina : A potential game-changer could come in South Carolina , where the well-funded Democrat Jaime Harrison has consistently outraised Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham , the chairman of the congressional panel overseeing the State Department ’ s appropriations .
Graham has been one of the Republican Party ’ s most dogged defenders of funding for U.S. diplomacy and aid amid repeated attempts by the Trump administration to make deep spending cuts .
To leave FP ’ s live election blog and read the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

The race for control for the U.S. Senate is much tighter than for control of the House of Representatives. Whichever party wins will have a razor-thin majority, according to projections. We’re not likely to have final results on election night.
The race for control for the U.S. Senate is much tighter than for control of the House of Representatives. Whichever party wins will have a razor-thin majority, according to projections. We’re not likely to have final results on election night.
Who controls the committees? The Democrats stand a good chance to lead key foreign-policy oversight committees, including the Senate’s armed services panel, where many members are in close campaigns. Republican Sens. Joni Ernst of Iowa, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, David Perdue of Georgia, and Martha McSally of Arizona are all in toss-up races. Democratic Sen. Gary Peters of Michigan faces a challenge from Republican businessman John James, who has run ahead of Trump in state opinion polls. Likely to lose his seat is Alabama Democratic Sen. Doug Jones, who also sits on the Armed Services Committee.
South Carolina: A potential game-changer could come in South Carolina, where the well-funded Democrat Jaime Harrison has consistently outraised Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham, the chairman of the congressional panel overseeing the State Department’s appropriations. Graham has been one of the Republican Party’s most dogged defenders of funding for U.S. diplomacy and aid amid repeated attempts by the Trump administration to make deep spending cuts.
To leave FP’s live election blog and read the rest of this article, click here.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Get Ready for a November Foreign-Policy Surprise

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Although the international system is filled with threats and uncertainties , there is a strange public quiet in the days before the U.S. elections .
Hackers and propagandists from various countries are burying deep into foreign systems , military forces continue to clash in numerous conflict zones , and competition for resources and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States .
Nonetheless , the focus of national security in early November is internal for the U.S. government : securing a peaceful and legitimate election .
Regardless of what happens on Nov. 3 and the days after , foreign crises will almost certainly rise in importance for U.S. national security .
The historical record reminds us that foreign adversaries pay close attention to American domestic weaknesses .
First , conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh , the South China Sea , the Indo-China border , and other regions are escalating .
With the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , local actors who believe they have the upper hand ( and external support ) will be tempted to expand their attacks , widening the violence .
Second , our near-peer competitors will surely recognize that the messy presidential transition will weaken the ability of the United States to act abroad with decisiveness and coherence .
They might also perceive a defeated President Trump as a potential collaborator against American national interests , in return for payments and other personal benefits .
Trump ’ s undermining of long-standing American commitments to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of his domestic rival , are a tempting model for President Vladimir Putin , Chinese leader Xi Jinping , and others eager to exploit America ’ s leadership vacuum for their own purposes .
Third , and perhaps most concerning , smaller actors , especially North Korea , will surely see the post-election instability in the United States as an opportunity for more aggressive behavior aimed at strategic goals and their own domestic audiences .
We should expect more North Korean missile tests at the end of the year , and perhaps other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Why wouldn ’ t Kim want to show his strength , and highlight America ’ s limited will to respond ?
More than ever , we need a bipartisan group of current and former national security officials to assemble and prepare for the likely international crises of the next few months .
Speaker Nancy Pelosi should convene this group , perhaps under the auspices of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , and she should reach out to Republican members of the House and Senate to join .
At the very least , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ productive public discussion of foreign policy , which might temper the actions of foreign adversaries , encourage some sound judgment in the current administration , and lay out a path for the next president and his team .

Although the international system is filled with threats and uncertainties, there is a strange public quiet in the days before the U.S. elections. Hackers and propagandists from various countries are burying deep into foreign systems, military forces continue to clash in numerous conflict zones, and competition for resources and markets has intensified, particularly between China and the United States. Nonetheless, the focus of national security in early November is internal for the U.S. government: securing a peaceful and legitimate election.
Although the international system is filled with threats and uncertainties, there is a strange public quiet in the days before the U.S. elections. Hackers and propagandists from various countries are burying deep into foreign systems, military forces continue to clash in numerous conflict zones, and competition for resources and markets has intensified, particularly between China and the United States. Nonetheless, the focus of national security in early November is internal for the U.S. government: securing a peaceful and legitimate election.
Regardless of what happens on Nov. 3 and the days after, foreign crises will almost certainly rise in importance for U.S. national security. The historical record reminds us that foreign adversaries pay close attention to American domestic weaknesses.
First, conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, the South China Sea, the Indo-China border, and other regions are escalating. With the world distracted by electoral instability in the United States, local actors who believe they have the upper hand (and external support) will be tempted to expand their attacks, widening the violence.
Second, our near-peer competitors will surely recognize that the messy presidential transition will weaken the ability of the United States to act abroad with decisiveness and coherence. They might also perceive a defeated President Trump as a potential collaborator against American national interests, in return for payments and other personal benefits. Trump’s undermining of long-standing American commitments to Ukrainian security, in return for investigations of his domestic rival, are a tempting model for President Vladimir Putin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and others eager to exploit America’s leadership vacuum for their own purposes.
Third, and perhaps most concerning, smaller actors, especially North Korea, will surely see the post-election instability in the United States as an opportunity for more aggressive behavior aimed at strategic goals and their own domestic audiences. We should expect more North Korean missile tests at the end of the year, and perhaps other forms of aggression around the demilitarized zone. Why wouldn’t Kim want to show his strength, and highlight America’s limited will to respond?
More than ever, we need a bipartisan group of current and former national security officials to assemble and prepare for the likely international crises of the next few months. Speaker Nancy Pelosi should convene this group, perhaps under the auspices of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and she should reach out to Republican members of the House and Senate to join. At the very least, this initiative will encourage a substantive and productive public discussion of foreign policy, which might temper the actions of foreign adversaries, encourage some sound judgment in the current administration, and lay out a path for the next president and his team.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--How to Track the U.S. Elections Like a Foreign Policy Pro

How to Track the U.S .
Elections Like a Foreign Policy Pro At long last , Election Day is here .
Whether this election cycle has left you energized or exhausted , there are ways to watch the results while still retaining your sanity and cutting down on the signal-to-noise ratio .
To help you out , Foreign Policy reporters are opening their notebooks to offer some tips on what to watch , how to watch it , and how to understand what ’ s really going on as the United States chooses its next president .
We ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ races that could have serious impact on Washington ’ s foreign-policy world down the line , no matter who wins the presidential election—Donald Trump or Joe Biden .
So without further ado , here is how to track the U.S. elections like a foreign-policy pro .
No clear result.This year an unprecedented number of Americans are voting by mail , thanks mostly to the coronavirus pandemic , and that means many states won ’ t have complete results on election night .
As a result , we might all go to bed late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The New York Times lists every state ’ s vote counting schedule to give you a better idea when the results can be expected .
The swing states.The 2020 race will likely boil down to a few key swing states .
The toss-up ones to watch this year are : Arizona , Florida , and Pennsylvania .
Other potential battleground states that appear to be leaning Democratic include Nevada , New Hampshire , Minnesota , Michigan , and Wisconsin .
Trump appears to have the advantage in Georgia , Iowa , North Carolina @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number junkies out there , it ’ s hard to beat FiveThirtyEight on polling data and analysis .
Can we count on the polls ?
The 2016 polling errors have created trust issues for a lot of people .
Us , too .
First , here is a good analysis from the Pew Research Center on what polls can and can ’ t tell us .
Second , Wisconsin Public Radio has a handy explainer on why presidential polls are expected to be more accurate this time around .
Demographic dividend.For the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make up the largest share of nonwhite voters in the electorate ( a Latino turns 18 and becomes eligible to vote every 30 seconds in the United States , according to an analysis of Census Bureau data by The World ) .
That demographic evolution accounts at least partially for the fact that Arizona and Texas are in play for the first time in years .
A rise in the number of Asian American voters in the electorate ( including Democratic-leaning Indian Americans ) is also contributing to the leftward shift as immigrant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Read more about important constituencies with roots abroad in Foreign Policy ’ s Postcards From the Wedge series .
What to Watch Out For Premature victory laps .
Trump has told his confidants he ’ ll declare victory on election night if things look to be going his way , according to Axios .
Trump ’ s campaign might also argue ( falsely ) that ballots counted after Nov. 3—valid mail-in ballots that would likely favor Democrats—indicate fraudulent election results .
Don ’ t fall for it .
Counting will take time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spent the past four years issuing warnings about disinformation from China , Russia , Iran , or their proxies designed to sow confusion and discord in an already-heated election cycle .
Watch for statements from the FBI , Department of Homeland Security , or U.S. intelligence community—agencies that track the issue .
When it comes to Russia , the Kremlin ’ s main goal is to sow distrust in the electoral process and to pit Americans against each other .
Disinformation experts caution that Russia may seek to amplify both domestic discord and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Court fights.While the Supreme Court opted not to override extended ballot deadlines in two key swing states last week , Trump ’ s reelection campaign has pledged to wage a possible fight in U.S. appeals courts to stop Pennsylvania—considered by many analysts to be a tipping-point state in the Electoral College—from counting mail-in votes received after the election .
22 U.S. states allow for late-arriving ballots—which in this election could well affect the outcome of the race .
What to watch for in House races : Democrats are widely expected to retain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , David Wasserman of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report predicts that the Democratic Party will pick up anywhere between five and 20 new seats .
Here are the races that foreign-policy pros should be watching most closely : Texas 10th District : Michael McCaul , the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , is in a toss-up race against second-time Democratic challenger Mike Siegel , according to the Cook Political Report .
( Siegel lost his bid to represent the Republican-leaning district by just over 4 percentage points two years ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a former foreign service officer , is running for Congress in Texas ’ s 22nd District—an area where voters have helped turn Texas from a deep red state to a potential battleground for Democrats .
Texas 23rd : Gina Ortiz Jones , a U.S. Air Force veteran , is in a heated race to gain the sprawling 23rd District of Texas that spans nearly one-third of the U.S.-Mexico border .
Republican Rep. Will Hurd , a former CIA officer , announced last year he would not run again .
Michigan 8th : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analyst and senior Pentagon official , is running for reelection in Michigan .
She has been vocal about fears of homegrown extremism and how the hyperpartisan and ultra-politicized atmosphere across the country could become a grave national security threat .
New Jersey 3rd : Rep. Andy Kim , a former National Security Council staffer in the Obama administration , is running for reelection in New Jersey ’ s 3rd District after winning by a narrow margin in 2018 .
He is one of a group of national security experts who ditched the Beltway @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He ’ s also co-chair of the House ’ s National Security Task Force .
New Jersey 7th : Rep. Tom Malinowski , a former senior State Department official in the Obama administration , is running in a tight race for a second term in Congress .
From his perch on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Malinowski has been one of the Democrats ’ most vocal critics of Trump ’ s foreign policy and of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Virginia 7th : Once represented by two-term Republican insurgent Dave Brat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eric Cantor in a 2014 primary upset ) , this suburban Richmond district is now the site of a close fight between Rep. Abigail Spanberger—a Blue Dog Democrat and former CIA official who sits on the House Foreign Affairs committee—and Republican challenger and Army veteran Nick Freitas .
What to watch for in Senate races : The race for control for the Senate is much tighter .
Whichever party wins will have a razor-thin majority , according to projections .
We ’ re not likely to have final results on election night .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand a good chance to lead key foreign-policy oversight committees , including the Senate ’ s armed services panel , where many members are in close campaigns .
Republican Sens .
Joni Ernst of Iowa , Thom Tillis of North Carolina , David Perdue of Georgia , and Martha McSally of Arizona are all in toss-up races .
Democratic Sen. Gary Peters of Michigan faces a challenge from Republican businessman John James , who has run ahead of Trump in state opinion polls .
Likely to lose his seat is Alabama Democratic Sen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Armed Services Committee .
South Carolina : A potential game-changer could come in South Carolina , where the well-funded Democrat Jaime Harrison has consistently outraised Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham , the chairman of the congressional panel overseeing the State Department ’ s appropriations .
Graham has been one of the Republican Party ’ s most dogged defenders of funding for U.S. diplomacy and aid amid repeated attempts by the Trump administration to make deep spending cuts .

At long last, Election Day is here. Whether this election cycle has left you energized or exhausted, there are ways to watch the results while still retaining your sanity and cutting down on the signal-to-noise ratio.
At long last, Election Day is here. Whether this election cycle has left you energized or exhausted, there are ways to watch the results while still retaining your sanity and cutting down on the signal-to-noise ratio.
To help you out, Foreign Policy reporters are opening their notebooks to offer some tips on what to watch, how to watch it, and how to understand what’s really going on as the United States chooses its next president. We’re also tracking some important House and Senate races that could have serious impact on Washington’s foreign-policy world down the line, no matter who wins the presidential election—Donald Trump or Joe Biden.
So without further ado, here is how to track the U.S. elections like a foreign-policy pro.
What to Watch
No clear result.This year an unprecedented number of Americans are voting by mail, thanks mostly to the coronavirus pandemic, and that means many states won’t have complete results on election night. As a result, we might all go to bed late Tuesday night without knowing the winner. The New York Times lists every state’s vote counting schedule to give you a better idea when the results can be expected.
The swing states.The 2020 race will likely boil down to a few key swing states. The toss-up ones to watch this year are: Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania. Other potential battleground states that appear to be leaning Democratic include Nevada, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Trump appears to have the advantage in Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. For the number junkies out there, it’s hard to beat FiveThirtyEight on polling data and analysis.
Can we count on the polls? The 2016 polling errors have created trust issues for a lot of people. Us, too. First, here is a good analysis from the Pew Research Center on what polls can and can’t tell us. Second, Wisconsin Public Radio has a handy explainer on why presidential polls are expected to be more accurate this time around.
Demographic dividend.For the first time in U.S. history, Latinos make up the largest share of nonwhite voters in the electorate (a Latino turns 18 and becomes eligible to vote every 30 seconds in the United States, according to an analysis of Census Bureau data by The World). That demographic evolution accounts at least partially for the fact that Arizona and Texas are in play for the first time in years. A rise in the number of Asian American voters in the electorate (including Democratic-leaning Indian Americans) is also contributing to the leftward shift as immigrant communities become more influential in key states.
Read more about important constituencies with roots abroad in Foreign Policy’s Postcards From the Wedge series.
What to Watch Out For
Premature victory laps. Trump has told his confidants he’ll declare victory on election night if things look to be going his way, according to Axios. Trump’s campaign might also argue (falsely) that ballots counted after Nov. 3—valid mail-in ballots that would likely favor Democrats—indicate fraudulent election results. Don’t fall for it. Counting will take time.
Disinformation.Top U.S. national security officials have spent the past four years issuing warnings about disinformation from China, Russia, Iran, or their proxies designed to sow confusion and discord in an already-heated election cycle. Watch for statements from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, or U.S. intelligence community—agencies that track the issue. When it comes to Russia, the Kremlin’s main goal is to sow distrust in the electoral process and to pit Americans against each other. Disinformation experts caution that Russia may seek to amplify both domestic discord and doubts about the integrity of the vote.
Court fights.While the Supreme Court opted not to override extended ballot deadlines in two key swing states last week, Trump’s reelection campaign has pledged to wage a possible fight in U.S. appeals courts to stop Pennsylvania—considered by many analysts to be a tipping-point state in the Electoral College—from counting mail-in votes received after the election. 22 U.S. states allow for late-arriving ballots—which in this election could well affect the outcome of the race.
Beyond the White House
What to watch for in House races:
Democrats are widely expected to retain control of the House. In fact, David Wasserman of the nonpartisan Cook Political Report predicts that the Democratic Party will pick up anywhere between five and 20 new seats. Here are the races that foreign-policy pros should be watching most closely:
Texas 10th District: Michael McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is in a toss-up race against second-time Democratic challenger Mike Siegel, according to the Cook Political Report. (Siegel lost his bid to represent the Republican-leaning district by just over 4 percentage points two years ago).
Texas 22nd: Sri Kulkarni, a former foreign service officer, is running for Congress in Texas’s 22nd District—an area where voters have helped turn Texas from a deep red state to a potential battleground for Democrats.
Texas 23rd: Gina Ortiz Jones, a U.S. Air Force veteran, is in a heated race to gain the sprawling 23rd District of Texas that spans nearly one-third of the U.S.-Mexico border. Republican Rep. Will Hurd, a former CIA officer, announced last year he would not run again.
Michigan 8th: Rep. Elissa Slotkin, a former CIA analyst and senior Pentagon official, is running for reelection in Michigan. She has been vocal about fears of homegrown extremism and how the hyperpartisan and ultra-politicized atmosphere across the country could become a grave national security threat.
New Jersey 3rd: Rep. Andy Kim, a former National Security Council staffer in the Obama administration, is running for reelection in New Jersey’s 3rd District after winning by a narrow margin in 2018. He is one of a group of national security experts who ditched the Beltway to run for Congress in 2018. He’s also co-chair of the House’s National Security Task Force.
New Jersey 7th: Rep. Tom Malinowski, a former senior State Department official in the Obama administration, is running in a tight race for a second term in Congress. From his perch on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Malinowski has been one of the Democrats’ most vocal critics of Trump’s foreign policy and of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Virginia 7th: Once represented by two-term Republican insurgent Dave Brat (who knocked off House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in a 2014 primary upset), this suburban Richmond district is now the site of a close fight between Rep. Abigail Spanberger—a Blue Dog Democrat and former CIA official who sits on the House Foreign Affairs committee—and Republican challenger and Army veteran Nick Freitas.
What to watch for in Senate races:
The race for control for the Senate is much tighter. Whichever party wins will have a razor-thin majority, according to projections. We’re not likely to have final results on election night.
Who controls the committees? The Democrats stand a good chance to lead key foreign-policy oversight committees, including the Senate’s armed services panel, where many members are in close campaigns. Republican Sens. Joni Ernst of Iowa, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, David Perdue of Georgia, and Martha McSally of Arizona are all in toss-up races. Democratic Sen. Gary Peters of Michigan faces a challenge from Republican businessman John James, who has run ahead of Trump in state opinion polls. Likely to lose his seat is Alabama Democratic Sen. Doug Jones, who also sits on the Armed Services Committee.
South Carolina: A potential game-changer could come in South Carolina, where the well-funded Democrat Jaime Harrison has consistently outraised Trump ally Sen. Lindsey Graham, the chairman of the congressional panel overseeing the State Department’s appropriations. Graham has been one of the Republican Party’s most dogged defenders of funding for U.S. diplomacy and aid amid repeated attempts by the Trump administration to make deep spending cuts.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--The View of the Vote From Asia

The View of the Vote From Asia

The View of the Vote From Asia This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
The 2020 U.S. presidential election will have seismic long-term implications , whichever way it goes .
But it is the short-term threat of violence that is most catching Asia ’ s attention ahead of tomorrow ’ s vote .
“ Here is Bloomingdales boarded up today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days back to a sprawling WhatsApp group , mostly filled with political obsessives from India , of which I ’ m a member .
The image showed the high-end retailer ’ s flagship location in Manhattan apparently preparing for rioting .
“ Oh , that ’ s crazy , ” one replied .
“ Wow !
Bloomingstan , ” another member of the group replied .
The threat of post-election disorder ought not be quite as shocking as it is , given the United States ’ recent history with violent political protests and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. President Donald Trump to kidnap the Democratic governor of Michigan , Gretchen Whitmer , and given that many of Trump ’ s supporters seem unlikely to accept a victory by former Vice President Joe Biden under any circumstances .
But there are two other things about the election that Asian observers are more justified in being surprised by .
First , there are the seemingly unbridgeable divisions in U.S. society , which appear likely to remain whoever wins .
And second is the sheer ricketiness of U.S. election infrastructure , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy—Bloomingstan , or Americanistan perhaps—in its unfairness , unreliability , and vulnerability to interference .
The fact that Monday ’ s news was so dominated by stories about court cases and post-election legal challenges will only have deepened this alarm .
Perhaps one should view all this as a perverse sign of American strength .
Unlike China , the United States has traditionally been able to endure moments of political protest , even extreme street violence , without anyone suggesting the republic itself is actually in peril .
And perhaps this time either @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the threat of unrest simply dissolves on election night , beaten back by the sheer size of the victory .
Viewed from Asia , however , that threat of ever deeper division looms large , and behind it the reality that the United States is no longer anything close to a model democracy .
Rather , U.S. democracy seems fragile and potentially ready to crack , whoever wins .
“ A weary world is watching , ” as one Singapore news channel put it this week , but an alarmed world , @ @

The 2020 U.S. presidential election will have seismic long-term implications, whichever way it goes. But it is the short-term threat of violence that is most catching Asia’s attention ahead of tomorrow’s vote.
The 2020 U.S. presidential election will have seismic long-term implications, whichever way it goes. But it is the short-term threat of violence that is most catching Asia’s attention ahead of tomorrow’s vote.
“Here is Bloomingdales boarded up today,” a friend wrote a few days back to a sprawling WhatsApp group, mostly filled with political obsessives from India, of which I’m a member. The image showed the high-end retailer’s flagship location in Manhattan apparently preparing for rioting. “Oh, that’s crazy,” one replied. “Wow! Bloomingstan,” another member of the group replied.
The threat of post-election disorder ought not be quite as shocking as it is, given the United States’ recent history with violent political protests and plots such as that launched by supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump to kidnap the Democratic governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, and given that many of Trump’s supporters seem unlikely to accept a victory by former Vice President Joe Biden under any circumstances.
But there are two other things about the election that Asian observers are more justified in being surprised by. First, there are the seemingly unbridgeable divisions in U.S. society, which appear likely to remain whoever wins. And second is the sheer ricketiness of U.S. election infrastructure, which increasingly looks like something from an emerging economy—Bloomingstan, or Americanistan perhaps—in its unfairness, unreliability, and vulnerability to interference. The fact that Monday’s news was so dominated by stories about court cases and post-election legal challenges will only have deepened this alarm.
Perhaps one should view all this as a perverse sign of American strength. Unlike China, the United States has traditionally been able to endure moments of political protest, even extreme street violence, without anyone suggesting the republic itself is actually in peril. And perhaps this time either Trump or Biden will win so convincingly that the threat of unrest simply dissolves on election night, beaten back by the sheer size of the victory.
Viewed from Asia, however, that threat of ever deeper division looms large, and behind it the reality that the United States is no longer anything close to a model democracy. Rather, U.S. democracy seems fragile and potentially ready to crack, whoever wins. “A weary world is watching,” as one Singapore news channel put it this week, but an alarmed world, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Why the Middle East’s Strongmen Are Rooting for Trump

Why the Middle East ’ s Strongmen Are Rooting for Trump This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Over the past few weeks , there has been a fair amount of speculation about what the U.S. presidential election means for the Middle East .
I ’ ve chatted with American , Turkish , and Egyptian journalists about this , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it seems clear that a victory for U.S. President Donald Trump would be good for the region ’ s leaders and their supporters .
Not so much for Iran , the Palestinians , or the democratic opposition in the rest of the region .
The Middle East ’ s pro-U.S. strongmen and their backers seem to know it .
Saudi social media , which has become one immense propaganda campaign for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , has sought to reinforce the Hunter Biden laptop story .
Many Israelis also openly favor four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-regime Egyptian singer , Wissam Magdy , has taken an old ode to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and turned it into a paean to Trump .
None of this should be surprising .
Just look at Trump ’ s record : He is tough on Iran , doesn ’ t care about human rights , has moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem , has shielded regional authoritarians from congressional criticism and legal jeopardy , has produced a plan to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians that reads as though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister ’ s office , and wants to transfer more high-tech weapons to Israel , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates .
That ’ s a list that should make nearly all the Middle East ’ s kings , presidents , and prime ministers happy .
The exceptions being , of course , the people in the Middle East who dare to resist .
There is also the issue of style .
In many ways , Trump conducts U.S. foreign policy in the same way the Middle East ’ s leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is easy to pull an end run around the U.S. State Department when a prince or minister can just WhatsApp the U.S. president ’ s son-in-law , Jared Kushner .
If Trump plans to run his second administration like he ran his first one , the worst thing Middle Eastern potentates and leaders for life can expect from Washington is to make them really sick of winning .

Over the past few weeks, there has been a fair amount of speculation about what the U.S. presidential election means for the Middle East. I’ve chatted with American, Turkish, and Egyptian journalists about this, and no matter how you slice it, it seems clear that a victory for U.S. President Donald Trump would be good for the region’s leaders and their supporters. Not so much for Iran, the Palestinians, or the democratic opposition in the rest of the region.
Over the past few weeks, there has been a fair amount of speculation about what the U.S. presidential election means for the Middle East. I’ve chatted with American, Turkish, and Egyptian journalists about this, and no matter how you slice it, it seems clear that a victory for U.S. President Donald Trump would be good for the region’s leaders and their supporters. Not so much for Iran, the Palestinians, or the democratic opposition in the rest of the region.
The Middle East’s pro-U.S. strongmen and their backers seem to know it. Saudi social media, which has become one immense propaganda campaign for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has sought to reinforce the Hunter Biden laptop story. Many Israelis also openly favor four more years of Trump. And a pro-regime Egyptian singer, Wissam Magdy, has taken an old ode to former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and turned it into a paean to Trump.
None of this should be surprising. Just look at Trump’s record: He is tough on Iran, doesn’t care about human rights, has moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, has shielded regional authoritarians from congressional criticism and legal jeopardy, has produced a plan to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians that reads as though it was written in the Israeli prime minister’s office, and wants to transfer more high-tech weapons to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. That’s a list that should make nearly all the Middle East’s kings, presidents, and prime ministers happy. The exceptions being, of course, the people in the Middle East who dare to resist.
There is also the issue of style. In many ways, Trump conducts U.S. foreign policy in the same way the Middle East’s leaders do—informally and based on personal ties. It is easy to pull an end run around the U.S. State Department when a prince or minister can just WhatsApp the U.S. president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
If Trump plans to run his second administration like he ran his first one, the worst thing Middle Eastern potentates and leaders for life can expect from Washington is to make them really sick of winning.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--If Biden Wins, Lebanon Is Afraid of Losing

If Biden Wins , Lebanon Is Afraid of Losing This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
BEIRUT—When Donald Trump moved the American embassy to the disputed city of Jerusalem in 2018 , Lebanon , a country that has been at the frontline of the Israeli-Arab rivalry since the start , witnessed muted protests .
One year later , the Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political elites and demanded they be replaced , along with the country ’ s sect-based power-sharing system .
To the extent that Lebanese people are now thinking about the U.S. election at all , they are hoping the winner will recognize that the economy , not Israel , is their country ’ s top concern .
They want more U.S. diplomacy—just not filtered strictly through the prism of Palestine .
They should be careful what they wish for .
Such diplomacy will inevitably focus on what Lebanon can do for U.S. strategic interests—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iran ’ s proxy , Hezbollah , and its Shia ally the Amal movement gave in to American pressure and greenlighted Lebanon ’ s government to engage in talks with Israel to resolve their dispute over maritime boundaries .
It was a de facto recognition of a state they do not officially recognize .
As the two delegations met in Naqoura in southern Lebanon , under U.S. mediation , hopes were raised that the discovery of gas in the disputed area might alleviate Lebanon ’ s economic misery .
Some went as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earn billions annually if an agreement is reached .
But many in Lebanon—oil and gas experts , political analysts , and civil society activists—have been skeptical .
They say everyone benefits from the talks , except for the Lebanese .
Gas has not yet been discovered and the only offshore drilling attempt revealed a dry well , according to Laury Haytayan , a Lebanese oil and gas expert .
Even if gas were discovered , it could take up to a decade to put the required infrastructure in place .
Activists say that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create a false impression that they would be able to pay the country ’ s debts with revenue the state might earn from gas , without ushering in political or economic reforms .
“ You need to drill , find gas , do your analysis to find out if it is commercial and economically viable ; you need to build necessary infrastructures and then start production , ” Haytayan said .
“ It is a long process , time that Lebanon does not have to save its economy.
” Hezbollah ’ s acquiescence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have come without Iran ’ s counsel .
Both conceded to avoid more American sanctions from the Trump administration .
But the extent to which Hezbollah , and Iran , agree to further concessions to reform the Lebanese economy could depend on what the next U.S. administration decides it wants for the region .
Joe Biden has said that , if he wins the election , the United States will rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , also known as the Iran nuclear deal , and end Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That is music to the ears of Hezbollah , and of course its Iranian patron .
“ But if Biden wins then Iran and Hezbollah may make fewer concessions , ” for instance on reforms in Lebanon , said Sami Nader , a Lebanese political analyst .
Many in Lebanon feel that , although Trump ’ s pressure campaign did not force Hezbollah to give up its weapons , it at least squeezed Hezbollah financially .
A deal with Iran that again allow it to easily sell its oil on international markets would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventually fill Hezbollah ’ s coffers .
Whether Biden wins or Trump returns , Lebanon ’ s wily politicians have used their recent deal with Israel to show that they , not the activists or the demonstrators who oppose them , can deliver on U.S. strategic interests .
Many Lebanese now fear that in the larger battle between global and regional powers , their cause might turn out to be a casualty .

BEIRUT—When Donald Trump moved the American embassy to the disputed city of Jerusalem in 2018, Lebanon, a country that has been at the frontline of the Israeli-Arab rivalry since the start, witnessed muted protests. One year later, the Lebanese emerged in the thousands against their own political elites and demanded they be replaced, along with the country’s sect-based power-sharing system.
BEIRUT—When Donald Trump moved the American embassy to the disputed city of Jerusalem in 2018, Lebanon, a country that has been at the frontline of the Israeli-Arab rivalry since the start, witnessed muted protests. One year later, the Lebanese emerged in the thousands against their own political elites and demanded they be replaced, along with the country’s sect-based power-sharing system.
To the extent that Lebanese people are now thinking about the U.S. election at all, they are hoping the winner will recognize that the economy, not Israel, is their country’s top concern. They want more U.S. diplomacy—just not filtered strictly through the prism of Palestine.
They should be careful what they wish for. Such diplomacy will inevitably focus on what Lebanon can do for U.S. strategic interests—and it has already started. Last month, Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, and its Shia ally the Amal movement gave in to American pressure and greenlighted Lebanon’s government to engage in talks with Israel to resolve their dispute over maritime boundaries. It was a de facto recognition of a state they do not officially recognize.
As the two delegations met in Naqoura in southern Lebanon, under U.S. mediation, hopes were raised that the discovery of gas in the disputed area might alleviate Lebanon’s economic misery. Some went as far as to say that Lebanon would earn billions annually if an agreement is reached. But many in Lebanon—oil and gas experts, political analysts, and civil society activists—have been skeptical. They say everyone benefits from the talks, except for the Lebanese. Gas has not yet been discovered and the only offshore drilling attempt revealed a dry well, according to Laury Haytayan, a Lebanese oil and gas expert. Even if gas were discovered, it could take up to a decade to put the required infrastructure in place. Activists say that the politicians were using the talks to create a false impression that they would be able to pay the country’s debts with revenue the state might earn from gas, without ushering in political or economic reforms.
“You need to drill, find gas, do your analysis to find out if it is commercial and economically viable; you need to build necessary infrastructures and then start production,” Haytayan said. “It is a long process, time that Lebanon does not have to save its economy.”
Hezbollah’s acquiescence to the talks with Israel would not have come without Iran’s counsel. Both conceded to avoid more American sanctions from the Trump administration. But the extent to which Hezbollah, and Iran, agree to further concessions to reform the Lebanese economy could depend on what the next U.S. administration decides it wants for the region.
Joe Biden has said that, if he wins the election, the United States will rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, and end Trump’s maximum pressure policy against Tehran. That is music to the ears of Hezbollah, and of course its Iranian patron. “But if Biden wins then Iran and Hezbollah may make fewer concessions,” for instance on reforms in Lebanon, said Sami Nader, a Lebanese political analyst. Many in Lebanon feel that, although Trump’s pressure campaign did not force Hezbollah to give up its weapons, it at least squeezed Hezbollah financially. A deal with Iran that again allows it to easily sell its oil on international markets would flood Iran with cash—some of which would eventually fill Hezbollah’s coffers.
Whether Biden wins or Trump returns, Lebanon’s wily politicians have used their recent deal with Israel to show that they, not the activists or the demonstrators who oppose them, can deliver on U.S. strategic interests. Many Lebanese now fear that in the larger battle between global and regional powers, their cause might turn out to be a casualty.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--If Trump Wins, Washington’s Brain Trust Is Eyeing the Exit Door

If Trump Wins , Washington ’ s Brain Trust Is Eyeing the Exit Door This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
National security professionals across U.S. government agencies fear an exodus of senior experts from government if Donald Trump is elected to a second term , according to a dozen current and former officials across multiple agencies , who said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government expertise and political attacks on seasoned diplomats could spark a massive brain drain .
During his four years in the White House , Trump has drawn fire for dismissing or undermining senior intelligence and law enforcement officials dealing with Russia , ignoring top government health experts on the response to the coronavirus pandemic , and shutting out career diplomats from decisions on foreign policy .
Already , Trump has vowed to fire more senior government officials if he is reelected , including CIA Director Gina Haspel , FBI Director Christopher Wray , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s leading expert on infectious diseases , who has been at the forefront of the U.S. response to the pandemic—and who rendered a scathing judgment of the administration ’ s failed response in a Washington Post interview last week .
The onslaught of politicized attacks , scattershot approaches to policymaking , and Trump ’ s norm-shattering methods of governance have worn down many veteran national security professionals , said the current and former officials , many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity .
“ It ’ s not simply a question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support , it ’ s a deliberate undermining of the way we protect the integrity of government services , ” said one former senior State Department official who served under multiple administrations .
“ I can ’ t remember another administration in which there was such a wholesale assault on the professionalism of the mid- and senior-levels of bureaucracies in the US government.
” To leave FP ’ s live election blog and read the rest of this article , click here .

National security professionals across U.S. government agencies fear an exodus of senior experts from government if Donald Trump is elected to a second term, according to a dozen current and former officials across multiple agencies, who said that the president’s disdain of government expertise and political attacks on seasoned diplomats could spark a massive brain drain.
National security professionals across U.S. government agencies fear an exodus of senior experts from government if Donald Trump is elected to a second term, according to a dozen current and former officials across multiple agencies, who said that the president’s disdain of government expertise and political attacks on seasoned diplomats could spark a massive brain drain.
During his four years in the White House, Trump has drawn fire for dismissing or undermining senior intelligence and law enforcement officials dealing with Russia, ignoring top government health experts on the response to the coronavirus pandemic, and shutting out career diplomats from decisions on foreign policy.
Already, Trump has vowed to fire more senior government officials if he is reelected, including CIA Director Gina Haspel, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and Anthony Fauci, the country’s leading expert on infectious diseases, who has been at the forefront of the U.S. response to the pandemic—and who rendered a scathing judgment of the administration’s failed response in a Washington Post interview last week.
The onslaught of politicized attacks, scattershot approaches to policymaking, and Trump’s norm-shattering methods of governance have worn down many veteran national security professionals, said the current and former officials, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity.
“It’s not simply a question of policies that may be difficult to support, it’s a deliberate undermining of the way we protect the integrity of government services,” said one former senior State Department official who served under multiple administrations. “I can’t remember another administration in which there was such a wholesale assault on the professionalism of the mid- and senior-levels of bureaucracies in the US government.”
To leave FP’s live election blog and read the rest of this article, click here.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-02--Some Brazilian Americans Favor Trump as Their Bolsonaro

Some Brazilian Americans Favor Trump as Their Bolsonaro Many supporters of the populist Bolsonaro see Trump as his American doppelganger and might be inclined to support him , according to Carlos Gustavo Poggio , an expert in Brazil-U.S. relations at the Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation in Brazil .
“ They look at Trump as some sort of American Bolsonaro , subsequently transferring their loyalty from Bolsonaro to Trump , ” Poggio said .
“ These people have developed an affectionate relationship with these presidents and defend them tooth and nail.
” Bolsonaro ’ s base in Brazil consists mainly of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a feature that ’ s reflected in the Brazilian American community as well , especially in Massachusetts and Maryland .
Over the past decade , attendance to the Brazilian congregation of the Assemblies of God , a popular branch of Christianity among Brazilians , grew by nearly 40 percent in the United States .
Members of this community , who are mostly pro-life and anti-gay rights , tend to see the Trump administration ’ s policies as consistent with their values .
During the most recent Brazilian election two years ago , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Miami and Boston , home to the two largest Brazilian American communities in the United States , voted for Bolsonaro .
Unfortunately for Trump , many of these expatriates are not allowed to vote in the U.S. election .
As of 2017 , only 35 percent of all Brazilian immigrants in the United States were naturalized citizens—a fact that potentially explains Trump ’ s low poll numbers in the community .
This is the case with Christiane , a 38-year-old undocumented Brazilian manicurist in Maryland who asked to be identified only by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolsonaro in 2018 and says that she supports Trump because of “ the values he defends , which are family and faith.
” She said she likes that Trump “ welcomes immigrants and defends liberty.
” Christiane is not eligible to vote in the United States .
“ The wall he wants to build , it ’ s not because of the immigrants , it ’ s because of all the trafficking that happens there , ” said Christiane , who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border illegally in 2002 .
“ He ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the country.
” Republicans are still hoping to make inroads with Brazilians who are eligible to vote—including some who have soured on Bolsonaro .
Vane Garcia , a 65-year-old Baptist in Derwood , Maryland , said she campaigned for Bolsonaro in 2018 but that his soft approach to corruption disappointed her .
“ Trump would never do that , ” she said .
“ When Trump was elected , God spoke inside my heart and said that he was giving this country a chance to regenerate , ” said Garcia , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and campaigning for Trump on social media .
Trump mania has even reached the Brazilian countryside .
This month , two billboards featuring a photo of Trump and the slogan “ Pro God , pro family , pro life , pro Israel , pro Brazil ” were displayed in the city of Governador Valadares , whose population is around 280,000 .
The billboards ’ sponsor , an evangelical Bolsonaro supporter named Edson Delana , told a Brazilian newspaper that he backs Trump because “ he defends the family , defends Israel , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to abortion .
He has courage.
” To be sure , many Brazilian Americans do not identify as socially conservative , and some of the ones who voted for Bolsonaro did so mainly because of his pro-market platform .
Among the 260,000 Brazilian Americans in Florida , many are part of Brazil ’ s nouveau riche elite that prospered in the years the economy in their home country took off .
Some of them are now ranked among the top real estate investors in Miami .
Many of them are comfortable with Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Brazilian American community is about as diverse as the country , ” said Fernando Cutz , a Brazilian American who served in the administrations of Trump and former President Barack Obama .
Though it didn ’ t come as a surprise , Bolsonaro ’ s endorsement of Trump worries some foreign-policy experts who fear Brazilian officials could face a cooler reception in Washington if Biden wins the White House .
“ Bolsonaro is not only burning bridges with traditional partners like Argentina and the Europeans , but he is also burning bridges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ When it comes to foreign policy , it ’ s not possible to understand what Brazil might have to gain by acting like this.
” During the first presidential debate , Biden said Brazil should face “ significant economic consequences ” if it failed to protect the Amazon .
Bolsonaro fired back , calling the Democratic candidate ’ s comments “ a disastrous and unnecessary declaration .
”

The Brazilian American community has grown tenfold since the 1980s, but it has not received much attention from U.S. presidential candidates, who have been more focused on outreach to Spanish-speaking groups during this year’s election campaign. According to a recent poll, nearly 3 in 4 Brazilian Americans favor the Democratic Party candidate, former Vice President Joe Biden. But President Donald Trump could make inroads among the approximately 660,000 Brazilian Americans thanks to one key endorsement he picked up in October—from Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.
The Brazilian American community has grown tenfold since the 1980s, but it has not received much attention from U.S. presidential candidates, who have been more focused on outreach to Spanish-speaking groups during this year’s election campaign. According to a recent poll, nearly 3 in 4 Brazilian Americans favor the Democratic Party candidate, former Vice President Joe Biden. But President Donald Trump could make inroads among the approximately 660,000 Brazilian Americans thanks to one key endorsement he picked up in October—from Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro.
Many supporters of the populist Bolsonaro see Trump as his American doppelganger and might be inclined to support him, according to Carlos Gustavo Poggio, an expert in Brazil-U.S. relations at the Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation in Brazil.
“They look at Trump as some sort of American Bolsonaro, subsequently transferring their loyalty from Bolsonaro to Trump,” Poggio said. “These people have developed an affectionate relationship with these presidents and defend them tooth and nail.”
Bolsonaro’s base in Brazil consists mainly of social conservatives from Catholic and evangelical groups, a feature that’s reflected in the Brazilian American community as well, especially in Massachusetts and Maryland. Over the past decade, attendance to the Brazilian congregation of the Assemblies of God, a popular branch of Christianity among Brazilians, grew by nearly 40 percent in the United States. Members of this community, who are mostly pro-life and anti-gay rights, tend to see the Trump administration’s policies as consistent with their values.
During the most recent Brazilian election two years ago, around 90 percent of Brazilian voters living in Miami and Boston, home to the two largest Brazilian American communities in the United States, voted for Bolsonaro. Unfortunately for Trump, many of these expatriates are not allowed to vote in the U.S. election. As of 2017, only 35 percent of all Brazilian immigrants in the United States were naturalized citizens—a fact that potentially explains Trump’s low poll numbers in the community.
This is the case with Christiane, a 38-year-old undocumented Brazilian manicurist in Maryland who asked to be identified only by her first name. Christiane voted for Bolsonaro in 2018 and says that she supports Trump because of “the values he defends, which are family and faith.” She said she likes that Trump “welcomes immigrants and defends liberty.” Christiane is not eligible to vote in the United States.
“The wall he wants to build, it’s not because of the immigrants, it’s because of all the trafficking that happens there,” said Christiane, who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border illegally in 2002. “He’s doing that because he wants the best for the country.”
Republicans are still hoping to make inroads with Brazilians who are eligible to vote—including some who have soured on Bolsonaro. Vane Garcia, a 65-year-old Baptist in Derwood, Maryland, said she campaigned for Bolsonaro in 2018 but that his soft approach to corruption disappointed her. “Trump would never do that,” she said.
“When Trump was elected, God spoke inside my heart and said that he was giving this country a chance to regenerate,” said Garcia, who divides her time between her Christian ministry and campaigning for Trump on social media.
Trump mania has even reached the Brazilian countryside. This month, two billboards featuring a photo of Trump and the slogan “Pro God, pro family, pro life, pro Israel, pro Brazil” were displayed in the city of Governador Valadares, whose population is around 280,000. The billboards’ sponsor, an evangelical Bolsonaro supporter named Edson Delana, told a Brazilian newspaper that he backs Trump because “he defends the family, defends Israel, he hasn’t allowed money to go to abortion. He has courage.”
To be sure, many Brazilian Americans do not identify as socially conservative, and some of the ones who voted for Bolsonaro did so mainly because of his pro-market platform. Among the 260,000 Brazilian Americans in Florida, many are part of Brazil’s nouveau riche elite that prospered in the years the economy in their home country took off. Some of them are now ranked among the top real estate investors in Miami. Many of them are comfortable with Biden’s centrist economic platform. “The Brazilian American community is about as diverse as the country,” said Fernando Cutz, a Brazilian American who served in the administrations of Trump and former President Barack Obama.
Though it didn’t come as a surprise, Bolsonaro’s endorsement of Trump worries some foreign-policy experts who fear Brazilian officials could face a cooler reception in Washington if Biden wins the White House.
“Bolsonaro is not only burning bridges with traditional partners like Argentina and the Europeans, but he is also burning bridges with the Democrats,” Poggio said. “When it comes to foreign policy, it’s not possible to understand what Brazil might have to gain by acting like this.”
During the first presidential debate, Biden said Brazil should face “significant economic consequences” if it failed to protect the Amazon. Bolsonaro fired back, calling the Democratic candidate’s comments “a disastrous and unnecessary declaration.”