foreignpolicy--2020-09-18--Partition Is the Only Solution to Lebanon’s Woes

Over the course of that century , Lebanon lived through two civil wars , two foreign occupations , and assorted calamities while being plagued by corruption and substantial losses of liberties .
Regrettably , all nation-building efforts came to naught , as political and religious leaders raised fresh power-sharing formulas .
These ranged the gamut from federalism to partition , as the Lebanese , Christians , Druze , Sunni Muslims , and Shiite Muslims repeatedly rejected “ communal coexistence ” —a colloquial expression that is frequently used but lost meaning some time ago .
After 100 years , many Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ live a lie ?
In 1920 , French Gen. Henri Gouraud was optimistic and , along with the Catholic Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoayek and Sunni Grand Mufti Sheikh Mustafa Naja , expanded the predominantly Christian-inhabited Mount Lebanon by creating a new geographical entity , which the French official and the two clerics named Greater Lebanon .
They added the coastal towns of Beirut ( then chiefly Greek Orthodox ) ; Tripoli , Sidon , Tyre , and their hinterlands ( then mostly Sunni ) ; and the Bekaa Valley ( whose populations included @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Overnight , Mount Lebanon ’ s 80 percent Christian majority was reduced to 55 percent , which was the basis of flawed political apportionments on Sept. 1 , 1920 .
Importantly , a demographic parity was reached between Muslims and Christians as early as 1943 , when Lebanon gained formal independence .
The country made a crucial error by preserving an unwritten sectarian system that granted the top posts of the presidency to Maronites , the premiership to Sunnis , and the speakership of parliament to Shiites .
The French believed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ republic , granting the three leading religious communities high-level posts .
All 18 officially recognized religious communities were allocated specific positions that , in effect , created a unique democracy based on consociationalism .
A consociational state rests on a carefully divided internal setup along ethnic , religious , or linguistic lines , with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group that would or even could dominate the rest , but which remains relatively stable because leaders consult among each other to maintain a balance of power .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meant to maintain internal stability among the newly created state ’ s Christian and Muslim elites .
Christians promised to maintain distance from Western protectors , and Muslims pledged to forgo attachment to Syria , though only Georges Naccache , a Renaissance man par excellence , lamented this so-called National Pact as a “ double negative.
” In 1949 , Naccache wrote that “ two negations don ’ t make a nation , ” an affirmation that was repeatedly overlooked during the country ’ s civil wars .
Over time , the Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1989 Saudi-brokered Taif Agreement , which suspended the civil war and put an end successive Syrian and Israeli invasions .
The Taif Agreement called for a return to political normalcy and reasserted Lebanese authority in southern Lebanon ( then controlled by Israel and its South Lebanese Army allies ) .
It also stipulated that the Syrian army withdraw within two years , though the actual withdrawal did not occur until 2005 .
United Nations resolutions , along with U.N. peacekeeping troops that have now been deployed for more than four decades , mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Syrian occupying troops imposed peace from 1990 until 2005 , even if Damascus emasculated every Lebanese political and security institution by encouraging the creation of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia as a state within the state .
Remarkably , after Syrian troops were withdrawn in 2005 , Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s Baath Party retained its intelligence operatives in Lebanon who , among other things , dominated local politics .
Their grip was so strong that Damascus surfed through its own post-2011 civil war relatively unscathed , using Lebanon as a conduit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it relied on Hezbollah for both warfare and terrorism .
Unwilling to preserve and protect their country ’ s sovereignty , Lebanese merchant-politicians such as Walid Jumblatt and former Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil , both of whom owned dozens of companies and media outlets—saw fresh opportunities in Syria , while Hezbollah executed Iranian orders to provide troops and prop up increasingly challenged governments in both countries .
In fact , expatriate Lebanese workers helped keep their native land afloat , sending $ 7 billion to $ 8 billion in annual remittances—which amounted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy was riding high in 2010 and were deposited in local banks or earmarked to buy property .
Local banks offered high interest rates , ranging from 6 to 12 percent—and sometimes reaching 15 to 20 percent—with the full approval of the central bank that had kept the lira stable at 1,507 to the dollar since 1997 , though the currency spiraled downward to around 10,000 to the dollar on the black market a few months ago ( and was back down to 7,600 as of this writing ) .
Today , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bank accounts , uniting both rich and poor in anger , with many businesses no longer accepting card payments .
Most Lebanese believed that their steadily growing bank accounts were safe and that they would be allowed to enjoy life—oblivious to sophisticated mechanisms introduced by incredibly savvy pilferers .
Organized corruption melted most savings as banks ran out of dollars and paid out dollar accounts in Lebanese lira first at the 2,600 lira rate before settling at 3,900 lira to the dollar , at a time when a dollar fetched 8,000 lira on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prices skyrocketed , unemployment increased , emigration exploded , poverty settled in for at least 50 percent of the population , and the Lebanese lira lost nearly 80 percent of its value in less than a year .
Beyond the explosions that rocked Beirut on Aug. 4 , beyond successive economic crises that impoverished a large majority of the Lebanese , and beyond the continued hijacking of political life by one of the most corrupt ruling establishments anywhere on the planet , Lebanon is now confronting its thirsty post-1920 demons .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanese journalist , “ the 1943 National Pact was dead and the 1989 Ta ’ if Accords were no longer viable , ” even if Lebanese Shiites were now openly calling for a constitutional convention that would presumably reach a new power-sharing accord .
“ It was imperative … not to accept a new Iranian-sponsored Ta ’ if since that would be based on excessive Shiite power .
Lebanon would disappear , ” Badaoui wrote in his 2019 opus Marounia : Une identité en péril .
Of course , calls for a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not mean that whatever emerged would favor Shiites , though the openly advocated associations with Iran by Hezbollah and , far more ominously , the unabashed desire to be part of the wilayat al-faqih —the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist council that maintains a supreme leader who must serve all Shiites everywhere—unsettled the rest of Lebanese society .
Hezbollah representatives and Shiite religious figures seldom missed an opportunity to reiterate their desire and duty to be part of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist , which drew sharp criticisms from Christians and Sunnis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Ra ‘ i reacted strongly to such pronouncements and recently advocated neutrality to preserve the country ’ s political identity .
Shiite officials promptly rejected his call .
For his part , Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian , the Sunni mufti of Lebanon , emphasized that there were no alternatives to the Taif Agreement , which Shiite clerics dismissed as a spent deal .
Interestingly , a majority of Lebanese wished to see real technocrats in charge of their government , a desire expressed during the protests of October 2019 and more recently .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ these calls , unwilling to surrender lucrative activities that allowed them to remain in power and perpetuate their proven performances .
One government resigned and was replaced by another , with the same political leaders manipulating the process .
In reality , nothing changed .
Although Lebanese Christians , Druze and Sunni Muslims rejected Shiite jurisprudence , this did not and does not mean that they no longer wanted to coexist with Shiites .
Rather , the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese , including Shiites not beholden to Iran , appeared to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in society in a way that made coexistence nearly impossible .
Admittedly , this was a difficult proposition to test , given that no scientific surveys on sectarianism were conducted or even allowed .
Still , evidence that buttressed sectarian preferences proliferated , as Hezbollah coerced key Christian officials and corralled the Free Patriotic Movement of Gen. Michel Aoun , who only became head of state after Hezbollah forced a suspension of parliament for two years , eager to reach power and rule with impunity , thus ensuring that Aoun was beholden to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new alliances crossing traditional lines , which prevented civil society candidates from winning all but a single seat out of 128 .
The gerrymandering upset every political apple cart , leading to then Prime Minister Saad Hariri losing 12 of the 33 seats his Future Movement held in the 128-member parliament .
Hariri , the son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri , was one of the pillars of the March 14 Alliance , ostensibly opposed to Hezbollah but , in reality , a silent partner in several successive governments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as many chanted : “ Beirut is Shia , Beirut is Shia.
” Shiite operatives posted video clips on YouTube and other social media outlets praising the sect and arguing the time was long overdue to rule Lebanon .
Of course , there were hundreds if not thousands of such clips , even as leading Shiite religious leaders cautioned overzealous speakers to tone the rhetoric down .
Sadly , the “ Shiite , Shiite , Shiite ” chants were repeated in the aftermath of the October 2019 uprisings that saw nearly 2 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , armed partisans attacked demonstrators , burned tents , and otherwise terrorized peaceful opponents of the regime .
This was important because Hezbollah operatives were behind these acts , all to show who was in charge of security in Lebanon .
Partition is a serious option that would help avoid repeated mistakes that largely defined Lebanon during the past century .
Lebanese public opinion solidified against Shiite community activities after villagers in Lassa illegally erected a building on land owned by the Maronite Church in 2011 .
The long-running dispute over land @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elsewhere throughout the country , threatened to upset demographic conditions .
Similar flare-ups occurred in several predominently Druze villages in the Chouf Mountains and resulted in deaths while government officials watched .
There was also a backlash from Christians .
In mid-2019 , the town of Hadath banned Muslims from buying property , which sparked a national outcry , though these developments illustrated Lebanon ’ s rapidly changing demographic makeup against the backdrop of deep-rooted sectarian divisions .
More recent attacks on the Maronite patriarch , who boldly called on Aug. 24 for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , meaning Hezbollah ’ s weapons , further exacerbated conditions .
For his part , Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah , whose almost weekly televised speeches were broadcast on all local channels , warned protesters who set up mock gallows for him in Beirut ’ s Martyrs ’ Square to watch it .
On Aug. 12 , Nasrallah strenuously objected , adding : “ We ’ ve seen all boundaries crossed .
Who do these people represent ?
We respect those peacefully protesting not those who are backed by embassies , ” insinuating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian-funded militia was the genuine representative of the people ’ s will .
Moreover , the secretary-general warned many when he stated : “ I don ’ t say let go of your anger , hold on to it , but restrain it , because the day might come when you will need it to end all attempts to drag Lebanon into a civil war , ” It was a warning to all , especially Christians , not to rely on outsiders to save them .
There was some media outcry , leading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they would no longer broadcast Nasrallah ’ s orations .
It fell to a former minister , Pierre BouAssi from the Lebanese Forces party , to call a spade a spade .
When pressed by an interviewer to clarify his criticisms of the Shiites , BouAssi bluntly stated that “ we are different people ” ; he also called on Aoun to resign because of his deals with , and tolerance of , Hezbollah .
As Lebanon teeters on the brink of collapse , the country ’ s Christians , Druze , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their freedoms .
Many endured hardships for four centuries under Ottoman rule , and some have once again begun talking about federalism as an option to ensure their long-term safety , though how that would work in a sectarian society such as Lebanon is unclear , especially when Hezbollah is opposed to the very idea of federalism or partition .
Many wonder whether the Lebanese can survive with Hezbollah ’ s guns imposing Shiite minority rule over all other communities .
Others deliberate how many more will need to perish before the Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a serious option that would help avoid repeated mistakes that largely defined Lebanon during the past century .
It was amply clear that while the Lebanese shared common attributes , they could not agree on basic political and social freedoms , which can only be preserved through a new political pact .
Without liberty , Lebanon has no meaning , since those who presumably created the current geographic entity intended to empower its inhabitants with the freedoms that were absent elsewhere in the region .
Regrettably , the 1920 experiment failed , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2020 is whether the country ought to go back to its pre-1920 settings .

A noose and gallows hang from the monument at Martyrs’ Square in Beirut on Aug. 9. Lebanon’s political elite faced pressure from all sides after a deadly explosion was blamed on official negligence. JOSEPH EID/AFP via Getty Images
Lebanon is an ancient land that is mentioned 71 times in the Old Testament; the current geopolitical entity that bears that name, which was created in September 1920 by the French government, has survived for a century—but barely.
Over the course of that century, Lebanon lived through two civil wars, two foreign occupations, and assorted calamities while being plagued by corruption and substantial losses of liberties. Regrettably, all nation-building efforts came to naught, as political and religious leaders raised fresh power-sharing formulas. These ranged the gamut from federalism to partition, as the Lebanese, Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims repeatedly rejected “communal coexistence”—a colloquial expression that is frequently used but lost meaning some time ago. After 100 years, many Lebanese are asking themselves: Why continue to live a lie?
In 1920, French Gen. Henri Gouraud was optimistic and, along with the Catholic Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoayek and Sunni Grand Mufti Sheikh Mustafa Naja, expanded the predominantly Christian-inhabited Mount Lebanon by creating a new geographical entity, which the French official and the two clerics named Greater Lebanon. They added the coastal towns of Beirut (then chiefly Greek Orthodox); Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and their hinterlands (then mostly Sunni); and the Bekaa Valley(whose populations included Shiites, Sunnis, and Christians).
Overnight, Mount Lebanon’s 80 percent Christian majority was reduced to 55 percent, which was the basis of flawed political apportionments on Sept. 1, 1920. Importantly, a demographic parity was reached between Muslims and Christians as early as 1943, when Lebanon gained formal independence.
The country made a crucial error by preserving an unwritten sectarian system that granted the top posts of the presidency to Maronites, the premiership to Sunnis, and the speakership of parliament to Shiites. The French believed that power sharing would best serve the new republic, granting the three leading religious communities high-level posts.
All 18 officially recognized religious communities were allocated specific positions that, in effect, created a unique democracy based on consociationalism. A consociational state rests on a carefully divided internal setup along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group that would or even could dominate the rest, but which remains relatively stable because leaders consult among each other to maintain a balance of power. In Lebanon’s case, consociationalism was meant to maintain internal stability among the newly created state’s Christian and Muslim elites.
Christians promised to maintain distance from Western protectors, and Muslims pledged to forgo attachment to Syria, though only Georges Naccache, a Renaissance man par excellence, lamented this so-called National Pact as a “double negative.” In 1949, Naccache wrote that “two negations don’t make a nation,” an affirmation that was repeatedly overlooked during the country’s civil wars.
Over time, the Lebanese reached new accords, such as the 1989 Saudi-brokered Taif Agreement, which suspended the civil war and put an end successive Syrian and Israeli invasions. The Taif Agreement called for a return to political normalcy and reasserted Lebanese authority in southern Lebanon (then controlled by Israel and its South Lebanese Army allies). It also stipulated that the Syrian army withdraw within two years, though the actual withdrawal did not occur until 2005.
United Nations resolutions, along with U.N. peacekeeping troops that have now been deployed for more than four decades, mostly kept the peace on the southern border. Syrian occupying troops imposed peace from 1990 until 2005, even if Damascus emasculated every Lebanese political and security institution by encouraging the creation of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia as a state within the state.
Remarkably, after Syrian troops were withdrawn in 2005, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Baath Party retained its intelligence operatives in Lebanon who, among other things, dominated local politics. Their grip was so strong that Damascus surfed through its own post-2011 civil war relatively unscathed, using Lebanon as a conduit for every imaginable good and service while it relied on Hezbollah for both warfare and terrorism.
Unwilling to preserve and protect their country’s sovereignty, Lebanese merchant-politicians such as Walid Jumblatt and former Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, both of whom owned dozens of companies and media outlets—saw fresh opportunities in Syria, while Hezbollah executed Iranian orders to provide troops and prop up increasingly challenged governments in both countries.
A Lebanese anti-government protester
A century is a very long time for a failed experiment in nation-building. What 100 years of neglect and greed produced were immense contradictions, as relative poverty and extreme wealth existed side by side. When functional unemployment increased, for example, it was quickly camouflaged through sectarian corruption, as party bosses and other power brokers disbursed generous financial donations to smother social unrest. Simultaneously, most of the nearly 1 million Lebanese workers toiling overseas dutifully transferred hard-earned salaries year in and year out. Their remittances ensured the creation of a first-rate banking Ponzi scheme that enriched the superwealthy while it provided the illusion of prosperity to the middle class.
In fact, expatriate Lebanese workers helped keep their native land afloat, sending $7 billion to $8 billion in annual remittances—which amounted to 18 percent of gross domestic product when the economy was riding high in 2010 and were deposited in local banks or earmarked to buy property. Local banks offered high interest rates, ranging from 6 to 12 percent—and sometimes reaching 15 to 20 percent—with the full approval of the central bank that had kept the lira stable at 1,507 to the dollar since 1997, though the currency spiraled downward to around 10,000 to the dollar on the black market a few months ago (and was back down to 7,600 as of this writing).
Today, capital controls have locked up dollars in bank accounts, uniting both rich and poor in anger, with many businesses no longer accepting card payments. Most Lebanese believed that their steadily growing bank accounts were safe and that they would be allowed to enjoy life—oblivious to sophisticated mechanisms introduced by incredibly savvy pilferers. Organized corruption melted most savings as banks ran out of dollars and paid out dollar accounts in Lebanese lira first at the 2,600 lira rate before settling at 3,900 lira to the dollar, at a time when a dollar fetched 8,000 lira on the black market. Inflation galloped, prices skyrocketed, unemployment increased, emigration exploded, poverty settled in for at least 50 percent of the population, and the Lebanese lira lost nearly 80 percent of its value in less than a year.
Beyond the explosions that rocked Beirut on Aug. 4, beyond successive economic crises that impoverished a large majority of the Lebanese, and beyond the continued hijacking of political life by one of the most corrupt ruling establishments anywhere on the planet, Lebanon is now confronting its thirsty post-1920 demons.
In the words of Salim Badaoui, a French-educated Lebanese journalist, “the 1943 National Pact was dead and the 1989 Ta’if Accords were no longer viable,” even if Lebanese Shiites were now openly calling for a constitutional convention that would presumably reach a new power-sharing accord. “It was imperative … not to accept a new Iranian-sponsored Ta’if since that would be based on excessive Shiite power. Lebanon would disappear,” Badaoui wrote in his 2019 opus Marounia: Une identité en péril.
Of course, calls for a new pact today between Christians and Muslims did not mean that whatever emerged would favor Shiites, though the openly advocated associations with Iran by Hezbollah and, far more ominously, the unabashed desire to be part of the wilayat al-faqih —the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist council that maintains a supreme leader who must serve all Shiites everywhere—unsettled the rest of Lebanese society.
Hezbollah representatives and Shiite religious figures seldom missed an opportunity to reiterate their desire and duty to be part of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which drew sharp criticisms from Christians and Sunnis alike. Maronite Patriach Mar Bisharah Boutros al-Ra‘i reacted strongly to such pronouncements and recently advocated neutrality to preserve the country’s political identity. Shiite officials promptly rejected his call.
For his part, Sheikh Abdul Latif Derian, the Sunni mufti of Lebanon, emphasized that there were no alternatives to the Taif Agreement, which Shiite clerics dismissed as a spent deal. Interestingly, a majority of Lebanese wished to see real technocrats in charge of their government, a desire expressed during the protests of October 2019 and more recently. Naturally, establishment stakeholders ignored all of these calls, unwilling to surrender lucrative activities that allowed them to remain in power and perpetuate their proven performances. One government resigned and was replaced by another, with the same political leaders manipulating the process. In reality, nothing changed.
Although Lebanese Christians, Druze and Sunni Muslims rejected Shiite jurisprudence, this did not and does not mean that they no longer wanted to coexist with Shiites. Rather, the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese, including Shiites not beholden to Iran, appeared to be aghast at how Shiite leaders positioned themselves in society in a way that made coexistence nearly impossible.
Admittedly, this was a difficult proposition to test, given that no scientific surveys on sectarianism were conducted or even allowed. Still, evidence that buttressed sectarian preferences proliferated, as Hezbollah coerced key Christian officials and corralled the Free Patriotic Movement of Gen. Michel Aoun, who only became head of state after Hezbollah forced a suspension of parliament for two years, eager to reach power and rule with impunity, thus ensuring that Aoun was beholden to them.
A Lebanese anti-government protester
In the aftermath of the 2018 parliamentary elections—after the agreement between the militia and Aoun, now Lebanon’s president—Hezbollah was euphoric. Successful gerrymandering also played a role. In 2017, Lebanese politicians passed a new electoral law that allowed almost all political parties to engage in proportional representation, opening fresh fields of electoral competition, which had been previously confined to just a few constituencies. As a result, the country’s political architecture changed, with a new level of uncertainty that forced parties to build ad hoc alliances with a broad, shifting set of partners, established district by district.
There were numerous cases of new alliances crossing traditional lines, which prevented civil society candidates from winning all but a single seat out of 128. The gerrymandering upset every political apple cart, leading to then Prime Minister Saad Hariri losing 12 of the 33 seats his Future Movement held in the 128-member parliament. Hariri, the son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, was one of the pillars of the March 14 Alliance, ostensibly opposed to Hezbollah but, in reality, a silent partner in several successive governments. The journalist Kim Ghattas reported exuberant celebrations as many chanted: “Beirut is Shia, Beirut is Shia.”
Shiite operatives posted video clips on YouTube and other social media outlets praising the sect and arguing the time was long overdue to rule Lebanon. Of course, there were hundreds if not thousands of such clips, even as leading Shiite religious leaders cautioned overzealous speakers to tone the rhetoric down. Sadly, the “Shiite, Shiite, Shiite” chants were repeated in the aftermath of the October 2019 uprisings that saw nearly 2 million protesters in downtown Beirut. In some cases, armed partisans attacked demonstrators, burned tents, and otherwise terrorized peaceful opponents of the regime. This was important because Hezbollah operatives were behind these acts, all to show who was in charge of security in Lebanon.
Partition is a serious option that would help avoid repeated mistakes that largely defined Lebanon during the past century.
Lebanese public opinion solidified against Shiite community activities after villagers in Lassa illegally erected a building on land owned by the Maronite Church in 2011. The long-running dispute over land ownership in the mixed community, as elsewhere throughout the country, threatened to upset demographic conditions. Similar flare-ups occurred in several predominently Druze villages in the Chouf Mountains and resulted in deaths while government officials watched.
There was also a backlash from Christians. In mid-2019, the town of Hadath banned Muslims from buying property, which sparked a national outcry, though these developments illustrated Lebanon’s rapidly changing demographic makeup against the backdrop of deep-rooted sectarian divisions.
More recent attacks on the Maronite patriarch, who boldly called on Aug. 24 for state authorities to remove all illegal weapons, meaning Hezbollah’s weapons, further exacerbated conditions. For his part, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose almost weekly televised speeches were broadcast on all local channels, warned protesters who set up mock gallows for him in Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square to watch it.
On Aug. 12, Nasrallah strenuously objected, adding: “We’ve seen all boundaries crossed. Who do these people represent? We respect those peacefully protesting not those who are backed by embassies,” insinuating the widespread anti-government protests were foreign-funded while his Iranian-funded militia was the genuine representative of the people’s will. Moreover, the secretary-general warned many when he stated: “I don’t say let go of your anger, hold on to it, but restrain it, because the day might come when you will need it to end all attempts to drag Lebanon into a civil war,” It was a warning to all, especially Christians, not to rely on outsiders to save them. There was some media outcry, leading top managers at TV stations to decide they would no longer broadcast Nasrallah’s orations.
It fell to a former minister, Pierre BouAssi from the Lebanese Forces party, to call a spade a spade. When pressed by an interviewer to clarify his criticisms of the Shiites, BouAssi bluntly stated that “we are different people”; he also called on Aoun to resign because of his deals with, and tolerance of, Hezbollah.
As Lebanon teeters on the brink of collapse, the country’s Christians, Druze, and Sunnis—along with some Shiites—are determined to preserve their freedoms. Many endured hardships for four centuries under Ottoman rule, and some have once again begun talking about federalism as an option to ensure their long-term safety, though how that would work in a sectarian society such as Lebanon is unclear, especially when Hezbollah is opposed to the very idea of federalism or partition.
Many wonder whether the Lebanese can survive with Hezbollah’s guns imposing Shiite minority rule over all other communities. Others deliberate how many more will need to perish before the Lebanese can truly be free. Partition is a serious option that would help avoid repeated mistakes that largely defined Lebanon during the past century. It was amply clear that while the Lebanese shared common attributes, they could not agree on basic political and social freedoms, which can only be preserved through a new political pact.
Without liberty, Lebanon has no meaning, since those who presumably created the current geographic entity intended to empower its inhabitants with the freedoms that were absent elsewhere in the region. Regrettably, the 1920 experiment failed, and the real question that confronts the Lebanese in 2020 is whether the country ought to go back to its pre-1920 settings.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-18--Brexit Is a Distraction from the United Kingdom’s Real Economic Woes

Brexit Is a Distraction from the United Kingdom ’ s Real Economic Woes The scars of the 2008 financial crisis haven ’ t even healed yet , and the United Kingdom ’ s economy is now facing up to one of the G-7 ’ s largest pandemic-induced economic slumps .
The decline comes alongside a potentially disruptive decoupling with its biggest trading partner , the European Union , when the Brexit transition period ends on Dec. 31 .
For some critics , the turmoil is just another chapter in the long saga of Britain ’ s demise on the global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inevitable .
For a country well accustomed to short-term crisis management , the United Kingdom will need to rediscover the sense of the long term if it seeks to refresh its position as an economic powerhouse .
The United Kingdom ’ s finance-driven economy never truly bounced back after the global credit crisis .
Productivity growth—which is vital for long-term improvements in living standards—has been largely stagnant .
Post-industrial northern regions continue to lag behind southern urban centers .
Since 2008 , growth in wages and business investment has also been among the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years of political tumult over how to leave the EU have diverted attention from the country ’ s underlying economic maladies .
Indeed , the past decade has seen it lose its coveted place as one of the world ’ s five largest economies to India , and it is projected to drop out the top 10 by 2030 .
The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly come at the worst possible time .
In the second quarter of 2020 , economic activity shrunk by about one-fifth , surpassing the 10 percent drop across nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Development as a whole .
The United Kingdom ’ s relatively lengthy lockdown and reliance on the hard-hit retail , leisure , and hospitality sectors were at play , alongside one of the worst virus outbreaks across Europe .
As the government ’ s emergency grant and loans scheme begins to wind down in the coming months , a wave of redundancies and highly indebted businesses will be left in its wake .
And so , the prospect for a speedy recovery looks bleak .
And that ’ s without even accounting for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreaks , a disorderly no-deal Brexit , or tax hikes to manage its $ 2.6 trillion debt pile .
The United Kingdom needs a plan .
Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s barnstorming victory at the polls in December may have closed out a chaotic period that included two general elections , several Brexit delays , regular ministerial chopping and changing , and the surge of a socialist-leaning opposition party , but the pandemic has since stifled attempts to move on .
Meanwhile , the prime minister ’ s ambitions to “ level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ global Britain ” after it leaves the EU have been uplifting but lacking in specificity .
Now , between a terrible recession and looming Brexit , the government has a crucial introspective moment to build a long-term economic strategy .
The administration ’ s autumn budget , along with its plans to review departmental spending , will need to be its boldest in generations .
With the United Kingdom ’ s recovery already set to lag behind peers—it will not return to pre-crisis gross domestic product levels until around 2022—economic Band-Aids and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Building on the country ’ s strong business environment should be a starting point .
The government should capitalize on the country ’ s world-class legal and regulatory frameworks—underpinned by its top 10 ranking in the World Bank ’ s Ease of Doing Business index—to support British firms to grow .
Although research shows the United Kingdom is considered among the best OECD nations at starting businesses , it lags further behind in scaling them up .
Part of this derives from issues accessing finance .
The British Business Bank , the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just a portion of the assets that Germany ’ s KfW has to help finance small businesses .
Likewise , after years of underspending on technology and management training , the British Treasury should look to encourage business investment through tax credits to drive up productivity growth .
The agenda to overturn regional disparities across the United Kingdom must also be fleshed out further and set in motion .
Widely varying experiences of globalization and technological change have turned the country into one of the most geographically imbalanced economies in Europe , constraining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also one of the most centralized major economies in the world , and devolving more funding and power to its regions and nations could help them respond quicker to challenges .
Meanwhile , improving infrastructure should be a key priority .
Britain lags behind its peers in the World Economic Forum ’ s Global Competitiveness Index for road , rail , and fast broadband connectivity .
Enabling growth sectors , including the digital and green industries , and supporting exporters to access global markets after Brexit could also spur jobs growth and renewal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southeast .
The government will also need to invest in skills .
Access to science , technology , engineering , and mathematics talent is an ongoing challenge , as is the need to encourage lifelong learning to make the United Kingdom ’ s workforce more agile .
Plans for a points-based immigration system after Brexit could help by placing greater emphasis on attracting high-skilled global talent .
The country ’ s world-class universities—located across all its regions—are also an advantage .
Investing in them as regional hubs could help support growth nationwide by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ London .
Building their ties to the business community could also help connect the country ’ s strength in research to productivity- and wage-enhancing activities .
Successive governments have discussed ad nauseam the need to capitalize on the United Kingdom ’ s economic strengths and to invest where it is weak .
But it never happens .
Much parliamentary bandwidth has instead been absorbed by elections and referendums .
With Brexit still looming alongside the country ’ s worst public health crisis in a generation , the capacity to enact long-term economic policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus economic rescue packages too early and attempting to refill public coffers too soon may also stymie the nation ’ s near-term prospects .
Yet as the government pulls the next stage of its response to coronavirus together , it would do well to acknowledge that at stake is more than just an economic recovery from the pandemic .
If Britain is to reverse its declining economic clout on the world stage , it must go beyond the short term and consider rewiring its economy for the long term .

The scars of the 2008 financial crisis haven’t even healed yet, and the United Kingdom’s economy is now facing up to one of the G-7’s largest pandemic-induced economic slumps. The decline comes alongside a potentially disruptive decoupling with its biggest trading partner, the European Union, when the Brexit transition period ends on Dec. 31. For some critics, the turmoil is just another chapter in the long saga of Britain’s demise on the global economic stage. But decline is not inevitable. For a country well accustomed to short-term crisis management, the United Kingdom will need to rediscover the sense of the long term if it seeks to refresh its position as an economic powerhouse.
The scars of the 2008 financial crisis haven’t even healed yet, and the United Kingdom’s economy is now facing up to one of the G-7’s largest pandemic-induced economic slumps. The decline comes alongside a potentially disruptive decoupling with its biggest trading partner, the European Union, when the Brexit transition period ends on Dec. 31. For some critics, the turmoil is just another chapter in the long saga of Britain’s demise on the global economic stage. But decline is not inevitable. For a country well accustomed to short-term crisis management, the United Kingdom will need to rediscover the sense of the long term if it seeks to refresh its position as an economic powerhouse.
The United Kingdom’s finance-driven economy never truly bounced back after the global credit crisis. Productivity growth—which is vital for long-term improvements in living standards—has been largely stagnant. Post-industrial northern regions continue to lag behind southern urban centers. Since 2008, growth in wages and business investment has also been among the weakest across developed nations. Meanwhile, years of political tumult over how to leave the EU have diverted attention from the country’s underlying economic maladies. Indeed, the past decade has seen it lose its coveted place as one of the world’s five largest economies to India, and it is projected to drop out the top 10 by 2030.
The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly come at the worst possible time. In the second quarter of 2020, economic activity shrunk by about one-fifth, surpassing the 10 percent drop across nations in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development as a whole. The United Kingdom’s relatively lengthy lockdown and reliance on the hard-hit retail, leisure, and hospitality sectors were at play, alongside one of the worst virus outbreaks across Europe. As the government’s emergency grant and loans scheme begins to wind down in the coming months, a wave of redundancies and highly indebted businesses will be left in its wake. And so, the prospect for a speedy recovery looks bleak. And that’s without even accounting for the risk of further waves of COVID-19 outbreaks, a disorderly no-deal Brexit, or tax hikes to manage its $2.6 trillion debt pile.
The United Kingdom needs a plan. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s barnstorming victory at the polls in December may have closed out a chaotic period that included two general elections, several Brexit delays, regular ministerial chopping and changing, and the surge of a socialist-leaning opposition party, but the pandemic has since stifled attempts to move on. Meanwhile, the prime minister’s ambitions to “level up” left-behind regions and unleash a “global Britain” after it leaves the EU have been uplifting but lacking in specificity. Now, between a terrible recession and looming Brexit, the government has a crucial introspective moment to build a long-term economic strategy. The administration’s autumn budget, along with its plans to review departmental spending, will need to be its boldest in generations.
With the United Kingdom’s recovery already set to lag behind peers—it will not return to pre-crisis gross domestic product levels until around 2022—economic Band-Aids and bombast simply won’t do. Building on the country’s strong business environment should be a starting point. The government should capitalize on the country’s world-class legal and regulatory frameworks—underpinned by its top 10 ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index—to support British firms to grow. Although research shows the United Kingdom is considered among the best OECD nations at starting businesses, it lags further behind in scaling them up. Part of this derives from issues accessing finance. The British Business Bank, the country’s economic development bank, has just a portion of the assets that Germany’s KfW has to help finance small businesses. Likewise, after years of underspending on technology and management training, the British Treasury should look to encourage business investment through tax credits to drive up productivity growth.
The agenda to overturn regional disparities across the United Kingdom must also be fleshed out further and set in motion. Widely varying experiences of globalization and technological change have turned the country into one of the most geographically imbalanced economies in Europe, constraining its overall growth potential. It is also one of the most centralized major economies in the world, and devolving more funding and power to its regions and nations could help them respond quicker to challenges. Meanwhile, improving infrastructure should be a key priority. Britain lags behind its peers in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index for road, rail, and fast broadband connectivity. Enabling growth sectors, including the digital and green industries, and supporting exporters to access global markets after Brexit could also spur jobs growth and renewal beyond London and the country’s southeast.
The government will also need to invest in skills. Access to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics talent is an ongoing challenge, as is the need to encourage lifelong learning to make the United Kingdom’s workforce more agile. Plans for a points-based immigration system after Brexit could help by placing greater emphasis on attracting high-skilled global talent. The country’s world-class universities—located across all its regions—are also an advantage. Investing in them as regional hubs could help support growth nationwide by stemming the brain drain of talent to London. Building their ties to the business community could also help connect the country’s strength in research to productivity- and wage-enhancing activities.
Successive governments have discussed ad nauseam the need to capitalize on the United Kingdom’s economic strengths and to invest where it is weak. But it never happens. Much parliamentary bandwidth has instead been absorbed by elections and referendums. With Brexit still looming alongside the country’s worst public health crisis in a generation, the capacity to enact long-term economic policies looks worryingly thin. Meanwhile, ending the coronavirus economic rescue packages too early and attempting to refill public coffers too soon may also stymie the nation’s near-term prospects.
Yet as the government pulls the next stage of its response to coronavirus together, it would do well to acknowledge that at stake is more than just an economic recovery from the pandemic. If Britain is to reverse its declining economic clout on the world stage, it must go beyond the short term and consider rewiring its economy for the long term.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-19--Tackling Disinformation in Brazil

Tackling Disinformation in Brazil

In October 2018 , just over a week before the presidential election that would cement Jair Bolsonaro ’ s rise to power , Brazil ’ s newspaper of record Folha de S.Paulo published an exposé on his campaign ’ s allegedly illegal use of WhatsApp to spread false news stories about his opponent Fernando Haddad .
The author of the story , the award-winning journalist Patrícia Campos Mello , woke up the next day to a barrage of online threats against her and her family .
The attacks never stopped : To this day , she remains the target of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign against a single person in Brazil .
Despite the abuse , Campos Mello , who has covered presidential elections from the United States to India , has continued to report on the dark underbelly of Brazilian politics .
Campos Mello ’ s new book A Máquina do Ódio ( The Hate Machine ) explores the rise of disinformation in Brazil—and how to prevent it from happening again .
She spoke with Foreign Policy both about her personal experience and the broader problems confronting media in her country .
This interview has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy : Why has your story gained so much prominence in Brazil ?
Patrícia Campos Mello : I covered the 2016 elections in the United States , which served as a wake-up call about the power of disinformation and the use of social media to interfere with public discourse .
That ’ s how I ended up focusing on the role of the media in Brazil ’ s 2018 election .
In October 2018 , I published an investigation into a businessman buying bulk WhatsApp messages .
The reaction to the story was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups my schedule and the places I was going to be moderating events .
My newspaper thought it would be appropriate to get me a bodyguard .
It got overwhelming .
This is when I realized that various groups were going to personalize attacks on the media , singling out specific journalists—many of them female .
Every time I write a story , there ’ s some sort of online reaction—either a picture that ’ s not me but they ’ re saying it ’ s me , or fake news saying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stories .
During a story about a congressional investigation , a witness claimed I offered sex in exchange for a scoop .
We later proved that he was lying .
But at the time , just minutes after he made his claim in court , several lawmakers amplified his message , saying , “ She was offering sex in exchange for information against Bolsonaro.
” People who participated in this campaign against me made porn memes , montages with pictures of my face and then naked woman , and messages saying , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ really overwhelming .
As journalists , we are not used to being the story .
It ’ s very uncomfortable .
The reason I decided to speak about this is because it has become so common in Brazil .
So many female journalists have faced misogynistic attacks online and in real life that I thought we had to speak about this .
FP : Latin America continues to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world for both journalists and women .
And you ’ re at the intersection of that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : I used to cover a lot of conflict , and people usually ask , “ Oh , what is it like to be a woman covering conflict , covering war ?
” And I tend to think that we have an advantage because we have access to half the population—an access that male journalists don ’ t usually have in more conservative countries .
We can better see their family life , get into their homes .
It ’ s a privilege .
So usually it ’ s excellent to be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that in Brazil—and I ’ m sure this is true for other parts of Latin America too—as a woman , people feel authorized to use all sorts of misogynistic and personal attacks against us .
It ’ s way more aggressive than anything that happens to male journalists .
Professional media in general is under attack in Brazil , but for male journalists , it ’ s always a different kind of attack : It ’ s never that personal , and it ’ s never against their family .
FP : Why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into a book ?
PCM : I started writing this book in May 2019 , and the book was not about a personal experience at all .
It was a book comparing the use of social media in disinformation campaigns in Brazil , India , and the United States .
But once I realized that disinformation campaigns are an integral part of a strategy to discredit and disarm specific journalists , I had to include myself as part of the story .
FP : What makes the Brazilian experience with disinformation unique ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ you have reported from , such as India and the United States ?
PCM : The main platform for disinformation campaigns in Brazil is WhatsApp .
It has the second-largest market for WhatsApp after India .
Pretty much everybody has and uses WhatsApp .
And the problem with WhatsApp is the same thing that makes it a good messaging app : privacy .
The encryption means you don ’ t know who ’ s sending what .
It protects political activists or journalists who want to maintain their sources , but on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ track people who engage in professional disinformation campaigns .
FP : The Brazilian Senate approved an anti-fake news bill , which seems to be surrounded by controversy .
How do you see it ?
PCM : There ’ s a very binary discussion around the bill .
On the one hand , you have an improbable alliance between the social media platforms , internet clients , and some politicians who agree that there ’ s no need for regulation because that would interfere with freedom of speech and privacy .
On the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civil society activists who are advocating for the criminalization of social media users .
There is in fact a huge need for regulation .
There ’ s a realization in Brazil that disinformation is eroding democracy .
But we have to discuss the legislation so that we don ’ t end up with something that ’ s going to be weaponized against regular citizens and free press .

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foreignpolicy--2020-09-19--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Lebanon has faced a century of corruption , foreign occupation , and civil war .
Now , as Hezbollah ’ s dominance has deprived non-Shiite Lebanese of basic political freedoms , a new form of government may be the only path forward .
Meanwhile , Isabel Wilkerson ’ s new bestselling book , Caste : The Origins of Our Discontents , deftly analyzes race in the United States , but it fails to address the ongoing horrors of India ’ s caste system .
And in Tanzania and elsewhere , the pandemic and rising authoritarianism have made for strange—yet increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Only Solution to Lebanon ’ s Woes A century is a very long time for a failed experiment in nation-building .
Now , as Lebanon teeters on the brink of collapse , partition may be the only way to avoid the repeated mistakes that have defined the country since 1920 , Joseph A. Kéchichian writes .
Isabel Wilkerson ’ s new bestselling book , Caste : The Origins of Our Discontents , deftly uses caste structure to analyze the racial hierarchies ingrained in the United States .
Yet Wilkerson fails to adequately address @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in India , Yashica Dutt writes .
3 .
Brexit Is a Distraction from the United Kingdom ’ s Real Economic Woes For some , the turmoil of Brexit is just another chapter in the saga of Britain ’ s retreat from the global economic stage .
But decline is not inevitable—even though its reversal will require rewiring Britain ’ s economy for the long term , Tej Parikh writes .
4 .
If You Want to Keep Talent Out of China , Invest at Home China ’ s efforts to recruit scientists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and grown more sophisticated in recent years .
If U.S. policymakers want to retain the United States ’ best and brightest scientists , they must create more opportunities for them at home , Ryan Fedasiuk writes .
In Tanzania , the pandemic is meeting rising authoritarianism , making both problems far worse .
But Tanzania is not the only country where the pandemic has collided with a government tightening its authoritarian grip , Travis L. Adkins and Jeffrey Smith write .

Lebanon has faced a century of corruption, foreign occupation, and civil war. Now, as Hezbollah’s dominance has deprived non-Shiite Lebanese of basic political freedoms, a new form of government may be the only path forward.
Lebanon has faced a century of corruption, foreign occupation, and civil war. Now, as Hezbollah’s dominance has deprived non-Shiite Lebanese of basic political freedoms, a new form of government may be the only path forward.
Meanwhile, Isabel Wilkerson’s new bestselling book, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, deftly analyzes race in the United States, but it fails to address the ongoing horrors of India’s caste system.
And in Tanzania and elsewhere, the pandemic and rising authoritarianism have made for strange—yet increasingly close—bedfellows.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A noose and gallows hang from the monument at Martyrs’ Square.
A century is a very long time for a failed experiment in nation-building. Now, as Lebanon teeters on the brink of collapse, partition may be the only way to avoid the repeated mistakes that have defined the country since 1920, Joseph A. Kéchichian writes.
Isabel Wilkerson’s new bestselling book, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, deftly uses caste structure to analyze the racial hierarchies ingrained in the United States. Yet Wilkerson fails to adequately address the ongoing horrors of the caste system in India, Yashica Dutt writes.
A commuter crosses a road by London Bridge in London on Sept. 15.
For some, the turmoil of Brexit is just another chapter in the saga of Britain’s retreat from the global economic stage. But decline is not inevitable—even though its reversal will require rewiring Britain’s economy for the long term, Tej Parikh writes.
Harvard Yard
China’s efforts to recruit scientists and other top academics have only expanded and grown more sophisticated in recent years. If U.S. policymakers want to retain the United States’ best and brightest scientists, they must create more opportunities for them at home, Ryan Fedasiuk writes.
A supporter of Tanzania’s ruling party holds a sign during the official launch of its official campaign for the October general election in Dodoma, Tanzania, on Aug. 29.
In Tanzania, the pandemic is meeting rising authoritarianism, making both problems far worse. But Tanzania is not the only country where the pandemic has collided with a government tightening its authoritarian grip, Travis L. Adkins and Jeffrey Smith write.