foreignpolicy--2020-04-03--Will Trump’s Pandemic Response Help or Harm U.S. Power?

Will Trump ’ s Pandemic Response Help or Harm U.S. Power ?
Emma Ashford : Good morning , Matt !
How is social distancing treating you ?
I started stress-baking last night , so I ’ m glad to have this discussion as a distraction .
Matthew Kroenig : I ’ ve been avoiding the grocery store , and we are down to frozen vegetables and leftover chicken .
But , yes , I always look forward to our discussions .
EA : Well at least we ’ re still in touch over the internet , unlike Joe Biden , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he essentially clinched the Democratic nomination .
Any idea what ’ s going on there ?
MK : It is amazing .
You could almost forget it ’ s an election year .
But we are in crisis mode with everyone in lockdown and people fearing for their own lives and the lives of loved ones .
Electioneering in these conditions would be unseemly .
Or do you think Biden should be using this crisis as an opportunity to contrast himself with President Trump ?
EA : I ’ m not a huge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in his interest to just sit back and wait .
But I have to admit , it would be nice to see some kind of leadership from anyone during this crisis .
I can ’ t believe how badly the White House is botching this situation .
More Americans have now died of the coronavirus than died on 9/11 .
It sort of makes a mockery of the amount of lives and money the country wasted on the global war on terror in the last two decades .
MK : Well , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ steps to prevent another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil .
And , despite a slow start , the U.S. government is now putting in place a more comprehensive response to the coronavirus .
In the wake of 9/11 and now with COVID-19 , we ’ ve seen rally-around-the-flag effects with Donald Trump ’ s approval ratings hitting record highs in recent days .
So , I don ’ t think this is necessarily a winning election issue for Biden .
EA : Rally-around-the-flag effects are pretty transitory .
And approval ratings today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to November .
I think we ’ re about to see a lot more death and destruction in the coming months , unfortunately .
MK : There is another 9/11 comparison that doesn ’ t hold up : This wasn ’ t an intelligence failure .
The intelligence community has been warning about a possible pandemic since the early 2000s , and the Dark Winter simulation showed that the United States and its health system were unprepared for a biological attack .
( Whether inflicted by man or nature , the effects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ . )
EA : True , but that raises the question of what an intelligence failure is .
Yes , the intelligence community did predict a pandemic .
The National Security Council was pushing for a stronger response to the coronavirus in January and February .
The president ignored them , for fear of spooking the markets .
That ’ s a massive governmental failure , and one that Donald Trump bears full responsibility for .
If there are 100,000 to 200,000 deaths , they ’ re on him .
MK : In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slow .
But it was ’ nt initially obvious that the solution was to shut down the entire country .
During the SARS pandemic in 2003 , the United States did very little , and it turned out to be the right move .
Trump was even criticized for restricting air traffic from China back in January .
Sure it ’ s been a patchwork and halting approach , but I prefer that to the Chinese government welding people inside their homes .
EA : That argument has been driving me crazy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the China option and nothing .
Even if we ’ d just started sourcing medical equipment and telling people to wear masks in February , we ’ d be in a much better position today .
But maybe we should get back to discussing foreign policy ?
MK : Good idea .
With all of the focus on pandemics , it was nice to get a bit of good news this week .
NATO expanded to include North Macedonia .
This will strengthen the most successful alliance in history and reinforce the message @ @ @ @ @ @ @ granted a veto over the foreign and defense policies of small European states .
Moscow tried to keep North Macedonia out of NATO by intervening in a referendum there in 2018 , but this week ’ s news demonstrates that Russia ’ s interference has failed .
This also challenges the notion that the Trump administration is anti-NATO ; after Montenegro , North Macedonia was the second country to join the alliance under his watch .
EA : I ’ m so grateful that the world-renowned military might of North Macedonia is here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decides to start a war !
This is just silly , Matt .
North Macedonia adds no strategic value to the NATO alliance , though at least it doesn ’ t come with big strategic risks like Georgia or Ukraine .
And sure , it ’ s nice that Russia can ’ t veto North Macedonian foreign policy .
But I don ’ t see why it ’ s in our interest to carry the burden of defense for North Macedonia just to annoy Russia .
Why is it in U.S. interests to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see it as part of the broader U.S. and allied project since 1945 of creating and defending a U.S.-led , rules-based system .
According to almost any objective measure , the world is more peaceful , prosperous , and free than in 1945 , and that is due in large part to this system .
EA : I ’ d agree with you if we ’ re talking about the Cold War .
But in the post-Cold War era , NATO expansion has weakened the security of existing members , riled up Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that ’ s too unwieldy to defend .
We ’ ve expanded almost to Russia ’ s borders , so it ’ s no surprise that Moscow feels threatened .
Russia ’ s choices to invade Georgia and Ukraine were in many ways a response to the prospect of NATO membership for these states .
And NATO ’ s new members bring territory that we need to defend but rarely add any military strength to the alliance .
NATO needs reform , not further expansion .
MK : NATO expansion moved the central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Berlin to Kyiv .
That strengthened the security of existing members—Germany is certainly safer now than it was in the 1980s .
And at a time when many signs point to a weakening of this order , it ’ s nice to see a data point in the other direction .
Despite all the talk about NATO spreading Western values , the results haven ’ t been good .
Hungary and Poland weren ’ t consolidated democracies when they joined , and now they ’ re moving backward .
EA : Germany is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the Soviet Union is gone !
And despite all the talk about NATO spreading Western values , the results haven ’ t been good .
Hungary and Poland weren ’ t consolidated democracies when they joined , and now they ’ re moving backward .
Look at what happened in Hungary this week , for goodness ’ sake .
It ’ s now an autocracy , and there ’ s no legal mechanism to remove it from NATO .
MK : I wouldn ’ t want to kick Hungary out of NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed doors about democratic backsliding , but the United States should aim to keep our friends as our friends , especially at a time when Russia and China are actively aiming to weaken our alliances in Europe and elsewhere .
EA : Let me ask you a blunt question : What is it that we ’ re trying to do with these alliances ?
Is NATO about protecting Western values and democracy ?
Or is it a collective security arrangement ?
You mention Russia and China , but neither is a threat on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Cold War .
MK : I disagree .
China could be a greater threat than the Soviet Union .
This is the first time in a century that the United States has faced a rival with greater than 40 percent of U.S. GDP .
We can ’ t simply outspend China like we did with the Soviets .
But to answer your question on alliances , the United States has an interest in preventing hostile , autocratic states from dominating important geopolitical regions .
We defend against Russia and China in Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to do it here .
Security and stability promote prosperity in Europe and Asia that makes Americans richer .
And it advances freedom and good governance globally , which helps to protect American democracy at home .
Let me ask you a blunt question : Do you think the average American would be better off if we granted Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping autocratic spheres of influence in their regions ?
And why would they stop there ?
EA : Hang on .
Russia and China already have de facto spheres of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good governance , then why is democracy in decline for the 14th year in a row ?
Why do we have at least two NATO members , Hungary and Turkey , backsliding into autocracy ?
And , though this is more speculative , I have to wonder if the way things are going with tariffs and trade wars it ’ s possible that in a few more years we won ’ t even be able to make the economic prosperity argument about alliances anymore .
MK : Russia has a de facto sphere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , former-Soviet states , but Putin would prefer that it include much of Europe .
Actions like North Macedonia ’ s accession to NATO are valuable defenses against Russian expansionism .
The shine has come off the American model in the eyes of many people around the world , and lots of would-be autocrats find China ’ s authoritarian state-led capitalist system appealing .
I agree that trade wars with allies do not make sense when it is unfair Chinese practices that are the major threat to the global trading system .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not less , U.S. global engagement .
EA : It ’ s kind of hard to argue that the United States has been less engaged in recent years .
There are more U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East—by an order of magnitude—than in 1989 .
NATO has expanded from 16 to 30 countries in less than 30 years .
And U.S. troops are fighting terrorism on at least three continents .
The last few weeks have shown that Washington is perfectly able to hurt other states , through military force and sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our sanctions on Iran ’ s health crisis today .
But we ’ re not very good at helping or cooperating .
China and Russia seem to have been doing a better job of sending aid to our alliance partners than we have .
China sent masks , medical equipment , and experts to Italy when other EU states weren ’ t helping .
And a cargo plane of Russian aid landed this week at JFK in New York .
Sure , that ’ s a PR stunt , but it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Russian aid landed this week at JFK in New York .
Sure , that ’ s a PR stunt , but it ’ s an effective one .
MK : Ask governments in Poland and Japan if we help or cooperate , especially on defense .
Sure , the United States should have had more robust diplomatic engagement with Europe to deal with the pandemic , maybe through the creation of a Countering Coronavirus Coalition .
Fortunately , the autocrats have largely bungled their attempts to fill the vacuum , with promises @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profiteering by selling faulty medical equipment to Europe .
Several countries have now rejected and returned dud coronavirus testing kits .
EA : Thank goodness we can rely on the incompetence of autocrats .
Look , I ’ m not saying that all alliances are useless .
But the current U.S. approach is to keep all the old alliances , keep expanding NATO , and make a bunch of new alliances .
There is no coherent theory of how it ’ s actually supposed to improve the security of existing members .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington would push to change the rules to expel Hungary .
And if it ’ s about defense , NATO wouldn ’ t be admitting North Macedonia .
You can ’ t keep doing it all .
MK : I still maintain that these alliances advance U.S. interests .
But we disagree , and I ’ m sure we ’ ll revisit it soon .
For now , let ’ s turn back to something upon which we apparently agree : the incompetence of autocrats .
EA : They ’ re not totally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least some PR success for China in Europe .
Countries like Serbia are cozying up to China .
And Washington ’ s major European allies are now engaged in sanctions-busting with Iran through Instex , a mechanism that allows trade with Iran through barter while protecting European companies from U.S. sanctions .
MK : Calls from within Europe and the United States to lift sanctions on Iran for humanitarian reasons are misguided .
If Tehran really cares about the well-being of its people , it can receive sanctions relief any time by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ programs and ceasing its support for terrorism .
EA : And I ’ d like the ayatollah to bring me a pet unicorn , but it ’ s not going to happen !
If we don ’ t lift some sanctions and help Iran get a handle on its coronavirus outbreak , it could spiral out of control and be far worse for the West than the risk of the Iranian government getting a few more dollars .
MK : The United States has always allowed a humanitarian and medical exception to its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Europe ’ s Instex transactions because they will be used solely for that purpose .
I don ’ t see how giving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more resources helps combat the coronavirus .
Many calling for the lifting of sanctions are simply opposed to Trump ’ s maximum pressure strategy .
EA : I don ’ t think any of these developments are particularly problematic for U.S. foreign policy in general .
But they ’ re self-inflicted wounds .
If the Trump administration hadn ’ t dialed up sanctions on Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t exist .
If the White House had been more forthcoming with aid , China wouldn ’ t have had this opening .
The myopic focus on military alliances undermines U.S. diplomatic ties—and actually weakens American security .
MK : Autocrats have some strengths , but as I argue in my new book out this week ( final plug I promise ) they are more than outweighed by their weaknesses .
Already it ’ s clear that Russia and China ’ s disaster diplomacy has proved to be less effective and the medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predicted .
America ’ s weaknesses are increasingly visible : a top-heavy , incompetent administration and a focus on military solutions to every problem .
This administration pushed a $ 700 billion military budget , while cutting the office devoted to pandemic preparedness .
EA : But you could make the same argument about the United States .
America has so many sources of strength , from the private companies developing coronavirus test kits to the people sewing masks at home .
But the country ’ s weaknesses are increasingly visible : a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on military solutions to every problem .
This administration pushed a $ 700 billion military budget , while cutting the office devoted to pandemic preparedness .
MK : The process is slow and messy , but generally the end result is more considered and effective than dictates from the Politburo .
Democracies , such as Taiwan , that were hit hard by SARS learned their lesson and adapted to be ready for the coronavirus .
I suspect these are the same conclusions we will draw about the U.S. coronavirus response years from now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messy .
So is the free market .
But it ’ s still better than anything else .
I just wish all America ’ s so-called allies agreed with us , rather than ushering in a new era of dictatorial rule in Central Europe .

Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
Emma Ashford: Good morning, Matt! How is social distancing treating you? I started stress-baking last night, so I’m glad to have this discussion as a distraction.
Matthew Kroenig: I’ve been avoiding the grocery store, and we are down to frozen vegetables and leftover chicken. But, yes, I always look forward to our discussions.
EA: Well at least we’re still in touch over the internet, unlike Joe Biden, who appears to have just disappeared since he essentially clinched the Democratic nomination. Any idea what’s going on there?
MK: It is amazing. You could almost forget it’s an election year. But we are in crisis mode with everyone in lockdown and people fearing for their own lives and the lives of loved ones. Electioneering in these conditions would be unseemly. Or do you think Biden should be using this crisis as an opportunity to contrast himself with President Trump?
EA: I’m not a huge Biden fan, and it may be in his interest to just sit back and wait. But I have to admit, it would be nice to see some kind of leadership from anyone during this crisis.
I can’t believe how badly the White House is botching this situation. More Americans have now died of the coronavirus than died on 9/11. It sort of makes a mockery of the amount of lives and money the country wasted on the global war on terror in the last two decades.
MK: Well, I think we were right to take necessary steps to prevent another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil. And, despite a slow start, the U.S. government is now putting in place a more comprehensive response to the coronavirus. In the wake of 9/11 and now with COVID-19, we’ve seen rally-around-the-flag effects with Donald Trump’s approval ratings hitting record highs in recent days. So, I don’t think this is necessarily a winning election issue for Biden.
EA: Rally-around-the-flag effects are pretty transitory. And approval ratings today are pretty much meaningless when it comes to November. I think we’re about to see a lot more death and destruction in the coming months, unfortunately.
MK: There is another 9/11 comparison that doesn’t hold up: This wasn’t an intelligence failure. The intelligence community has been warning about a possible pandemic since the early 2000s, and the Dark Winter simulation showed that the United States and its health system were unprepared for a biological attack. (Whether inflicted by man or nature, the effects of a pandemic are pretty much the same.)
EA: True, but that raises the question of what an intelligence failure is. Yes, the intelligence community did predict a pandemic. The National Security Council was pushing for a stronger response to the coronavirus in January and February. The president ignored them, for fear of spooking the markets. That’s a massive governmental failure, and one that Donald Trump bears full responsibility for. If there are 100,000 to 200,000 deaths, they’re on him.
MK: In hindsight, the government response was too slow. But it was’nt initially obvious that the solution was to shut down the entire country. During the SARS pandemic in 2003, the United States did very little, and it turned out to be the right move. Trump was even criticized for restricting air traffic from China back in January. Sure it’s been a patchwork and halting approach, but I prefer that to the Chinese government welding people inside their homes.
EA: That argument has been driving me crazy. There’s a middle ground between the China option and nothing. Even if we’d just started sourcing medical equipment and telling people to wear masks in February, we’d be in a much better position today.
But maybe we should get back to discussing foreign policy?
MK: Good idea. With all of the focus on pandemics, it was nice to get a bit of good news this week. NATO expanded to include North Macedonia. This will strengthen the most successful alliance in history and reinforce the message to Russia that it will not be granted a veto over the foreign and defense policies of small European states.
Moscow tried to keep North Macedonia out of NATO by intervening in a referendum there in 2018, but this week’s news demonstrates that Russia’s interference has failed. This also challenges the notion that the Trump administration is anti-NATO; after Montenegro, North Macedonia was the second country to join the alliance under his watch.
EA: I’m so grateful that the world-renowned military might of North Macedonia is here for us if Russia or China ever decides to start a war!
This is just silly, Matt. North Macedonia adds no strategic value to the NATO alliance, though at least it doesn’t come with big strategic risks like Georgia or Ukraine. And sure, it’s nice that Russia can’t veto North Macedonian foreign policy. But I don’t see why it’s in our interest to carry the burden of defense for North Macedonia just to annoy Russia.
Why is it in U.S. interests to constantly expand NATO?
MK: I see it as part of the broader U.S. and allied project since 1945 of creating and defending a U.S.-led, rules-based system. According to almost any objective measure, the world is more peaceful, prosperous, and free than in 1945, and that is due in large part to this system.
EA: I’d agree with you if we’re talking about the Cold War. But in the post-Cold War era, NATO expansion has weakened the security of existing members, riled up Russia, and left us with an alliance that’s too unwieldy to defend. We’ve expanded almost to Russia’s borders, so it’s no surprise that Moscow feels threatened.
Russia’s choices to invade Georgia and Ukraine were in many ways a response to the prospect of NATO membership for these states. And NATO’s new members bring territory that we need to defend but rarely add any military strength to the alliance. NATO needs reform, not further expansion.
MK: NATO expansion moved the central front in Europe 750 miles east from Berlin to Kyiv. That strengthened the security of existing members—Germany is certainly safer now than it was in the 1980s. And at a time when many signs point to a weakening of this order, it’s nice to see a data point in the other direction.
Despite all the talk about NATO spreading Western values, the results haven’t been good. Hungary and Poland weren’t consolidated democracies when they joined, and now they’re moving backward.
EA: Germany is safer than it was in the 1980s because the Soviet Union is gone! And despite all the talk about NATO spreading Western values, the results haven’t been good. Hungary and Poland weren’t consolidated democracies when they joined, and now they’re moving backward. Look at what happened in Hungary this week, for goodness’ sake. It’s now an autocracy, and there’s no legal mechanism to remove it from NATO.
MK: I wouldn’t want to kick Hungary out of NATO. Leaders should have frank discussions behind closed doors about democratic backsliding, but the United States should aim to keep our friends as our friends, especially at a time when Russia and China are actively aiming to weaken our alliances in Europe and elsewhere.
EA: Let me ask you a blunt question: What is it that we’re trying to do with these alliances? Is NATO about protecting Western values and democracy? Or is it a collective security arrangement? You mention Russia and China, but neither is a threat on the order of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
MK: I disagree. China could be a greater threat than the Soviet Union. This is the first time in a century that the United States has faced a rival with greater than 40 percent of U.S. GDP. We can’t simply outspend China like we did with the Soviets. But to answer your question on alliances, the United States has an interest in preventing hostile, autocratic states from dominating important geopolitical regions. We defend against Russia and China in Europe and Asia so we don’t have to do it here.
Security and stability promote prosperity in Europe and Asia that makes Americans richer. And it advances freedom and good governance globally, which helps to protect American democracy at home.
Let me ask you a blunt question: Do you think the average American would be better off if we granted Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping autocratic spheres of influence in their regions? And why would they stop there?
EA: Hang on. Russia and China already have de facto spheres of influence. If alliances advance freedom and good governance, then why is democracy in decline for the 14th year in a row? Why do we have at least two NATO members, Hungary and Turkey, backsliding into autocracy? And, though this is more speculative, I have to wonder if the way things are going with tariffs and trade wars it’s possible that in a few more years we won’t even be able to make the economic prosperity argument about alliances anymore.
MK: Russia has a de facto sphere of influence over a couple of small, former-Soviet states, but Putin would prefer that it include much of Europe. Actions like North Macedonia’s accession to NATO are valuable defenses against Russian expansionism.
The shine has come off the American model in the eyes of many people around the world, and lots of would-be autocrats find China’s authoritarian state-led capitalist system appealing. I agree that trade wars with allies do not make sense when it is unfair Chinese practices that are the major threat to the global trading system. The solution to these problems is more, not less, U.S. global engagement.
EA: It’s kind of hard to argue that the United States has been less engaged in recent years. There are more U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East—by an order of magnitude—than in 1989. NATO has expanded from 16 to 30 countries in less than 30 years. And U.S. troops are fighting terrorism on at least three continents.
The last few weeks have shown that Washington is perfectly able to hurt other states, through military force and sanctions. Just look at the impact of our sanctions on Iran’s health crisis today. But we’re not very good at helping or cooperating.
China and Russia seem to have been doing a better job of sending aid to our alliance partners than we have. China sent masks, medical equipment, and experts to Italy when other EU states weren’t helping. And a cargo plane of Russian aid landed this week at JFK in New York. Sure, that’s a PR stunt, but it’s an effective one.
A cargo plane of Russian aid landed this week at JFK in New York. Sure, that’s a PR stunt, but it’s an effective one.
MK: Ask governments in Poland and Japan if we help or cooperate, especially on defense. Sure, the United States should have had more robust diplomatic engagement with Europe to deal with the pandemic, maybe through the creation of a Countering Coronavirus Coalition. Fortunately, the autocrats have largely bungled their attempts to fill the vacuum, with promises of Chinese aid turning into Chinese companies profiteering by selling faulty medical equipment to Europe. Several countries have now rejected and returned dud coronavirus testing kits.
EA: Thank goodness we can rely on the incompetence of autocrats.
Look, I’m not saying that all alliances are useless. But the current U.S. approach is to keep all the old alliances, keep expanding NATO, and make a bunch of new alliances. There is no coherent theory of how it’s actually supposed to improve the security of existing members. If NATO was truly concerned about autocracy, Washington would push to change the rules to expel Hungary. And if it’s about defense, NATO wouldn’t be admitting North Macedonia. You can’t keep doing it all.
MK: I still maintain that these alliances advance U.S. interests. But we disagree, and I’m sure we’ll revisit it soon. For now, let’s turn back to something upon which we apparently agree: the incompetence of autocrats.
EA: They’re not totally incompetent, though. There has been at least some PR success for China in Europe. Countries like Serbia are cozying up to China. And Washington’s major European allies are now engaged in sanctions-busting with Iran through Instex, a mechanism that allows trade with Iran through barter while protecting European companies from U.S. sanctions.
MK: Calls from within Europe and the United States to lift sanctions on Iran for humanitarian reasons are misguided. If Tehran really cares about the well-being of its people, it can receive sanctions relief any time by simply dismantling its illegal nuclear and missile programs and ceasing its support for terrorism.
EA: And I’d like the ayatollah to bring me a pet unicorn, but it’s not going to happen! If we don’t lift some sanctions and help Iran get a handle on its coronavirus outbreak, it could spiral out of control and be far worse for the West than the risk of the Iranian government getting a few more dollars.
MK: The United States has always allowed a humanitarian and medical exception to its sanctions policy, and it is fine with Europe’s Instex transactions because they will be used solely for that purpose. I don’t see how giving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more resources helps combat the coronavirus. Many calling for the lifting of sanctions are simply opposed to Trump’s maximum pressure strategy.
EA: I don’t think any of these developments are particularly problematic for U.S. foreign policy in general. But they’re self-inflicted wounds. If the Trump administration hadn’t dialed up sanctions on Iran against European wishes, Instex wouldn’t exist. If the White House had been more forthcoming with aid, China wouldn’t have had this opening. The myopic focus on military alliances undermines U.S. diplomatic ties—and actually weakens American security.
MK: Autocrats have some strengths, but as I argue in my new book out this week (final plug I promise) they are more than outweighed by their weaknesses. Already it’s clear that Russia and China’s disaster diplomacy has proved to be less effective and the medical equipment more defective than some Western observers predicted.
America’s weaknesses are increasingly visible: a top-heavy, incompetent administration and a focus on military solutions to every problem. This administration pushed a $700 billion military budget, while cutting the office devoted to pandemic preparedness.
EA: But you could make the same argument about the United States. America has so many sources of strength, from the private companies developing coronavirus test kits to the people sewing masks at home. But the country’s weaknesses are increasingly visible: a top-heavy, incompetent administration and a focus on military solutions to every problem. This administration pushed a $700 billion military budget, while cutting the office devoted to pandemic preparedness.
MK: The process is slow and messy, but generally the end result is more considered and effective than dictates from the Politburo. Democracies, such as Taiwan, that were hit hard by SARS learned their lesson and adapted to be ready for the coronavirus. I suspect these are the same conclusions we will draw about the U.S. coronavirus response years from now.
EA: Right! Democracy is messy. So is the free market. But it’s still better than anything else. I just wish all America’s so-called allies agreed with us, rather than ushering in a new era of dictatorial rule in Central Europe.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-03--The United States Can Still Win the Coronavirus Pandemic

The United States Can Still Win the Coronavirus Pandemic An event like the new coronavirus forces all of us to make rapid judgments and decisions—in our personal lives , in our financial dealings , in how we do our jobs , and in what we think is going to happen .
Whether on Twitter , in interviews , or here at Foreign Policy , prognosticators are offering up hot takes daily , based on whatever information they can gather and the worldviews ( i.e.
, theories ) on which they typically rely .
I ’ m no exception .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ realist ” interpretation of what is happening and suggested the crisis was likely to reinforce nationalism , strengthen the state , accelerate a shift in influence toward Asia , reduce confidence in U.S. leadership and competence , and encourage a partial retreat from hyperglobalization .
In a Foreign Policy symposium last month , I suggested the end result would be a world “ that is less open , less prosperous , and less free ” than the world of today .
I stand by those forecasts , but I have also spent some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether some of my expectations might not be borne out .
In particular , I ’ ve wondered if my initial forecast of a shift in influence from West to East is going to be as profound as I thought .
Despite all the mistakes the Trump administration has made and continues to make—missteps and misjudgments that will cause thousands of otherwise preventable deaths and billions of dollars of economic damage that could have been avoided—it ’ s still possible that the flexibility , inventiveness , and adaptability of American society , combined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , will enable the United States to get through the worst phase of the crisis and recover fairly quickly .
Don ’ t get me wrong : The situation is grim and is going to get worse , but the question is how matters will look a year or two from now .
Needless to say , I ’ ll be delighted if the country turns out to be more competent and resilient than I thought .
Similarly , Asia ’ s success story may not turn out to be as impressive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s no question that countries such as Singapore and South Korea have done an excellent job in mitigating the impact of the coronavirus , but the effectiveness of China ’ s belated response is uncertain , because we do not know if the figures being reported out of China are accurate or not .
Experts have long understood that Chinese economic statistics were unreliable ( a common feature in authoritarian regimes ) , and the pandemic got rolling in part because Chinese authorities suppressed news about what was happening until it was too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authoritarian impulse to deny reality also goes a long way toward explaining U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s lethargic response as well . )
Beijing ’ s recent decision to expel a number of foreign journalists does not lend confidence to official statements about the progress it has made .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
If China is still concealing the true extent of the virus and it restarts economic activity prematurely , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infections , and there are worrisome if not entirely unexpected signs of a second wave in other parts of Asia .
This could also happen in the United States , of course , which is why it is a good thing that Trump has abandoned his desire to reopen the economy and fill the pews later this month on Easter Sunday .
My point is simply that while the U.S. response thus far has been badly bungled , the overall response may—repeat , may—look better a year from now .
If that proves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus won ’ t necessarily herald a profound shift in global influence .
As the national security expert Rachel Kleinfeld wrote on March 31 , global responses to date do not vindicate authoritarianism : Some democracies have done very well in reacting to the crisis , and some dictatorships have reacted very badly .
In other words , regime type doesn ’ t appear to be the critical variable here .
There is another reason why the United States may get out of this in better shape than one might initially think : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s reserve currency and is still considered a relatively safe asset in times of economic uncertainty .
The rush to safety amid the global economic crisis prompted by the pandemic has strengthened it already , and foreign demand for dollars will make it easier for the United States to borrow .
Indeed , according to Paul Poast of the University of Chicago , “ If anything , the economic turmoil brought about by # COVID19 is simply reinforcing the dollar-dominance.
” Insofar as the dollar has been an important aspect of America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus may not do as much damage as one might otherwise think .
The extent of long-term damage to America ’ s global position will depend on two main factors .
First , can the United States get the pandemic under control at home , so that it can safely restart its economy and so that other nations will decide that Americans still know how to respond in a crisis ?
The country will have to do a lot better henceforth than it has done so far , but it certainly isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States maintain an “ America first ” approach to this global problem , or does it begin to exhibit the kind of global leadership that it showed after World War II , the 9/11 attacks , or the financial crisis of 2008 ?
Thus far , America ’ s response has been a case study in diplomatic malpractice , which is hardly surprising given who is in the White House and who is running the State Department .
Instead of working to get other major world powers on the same page @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was mostly absent from view during the first phase of the crisis .
Then he blew up the recent G-7 meeting by insisting any joint statement had to call the coronavirus the “ Wuhan virus.
” If Pompeo ’ s goal was to increase foreign resentment of the United States and make the country look petty rather than principled , he could hardly have come up with a better approach .
Add to this his continued obsession with Iran , at a moment when all states face the same peril and hot spots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There are hints that the United States might be moving toward a more flexible stance , but thus far the U.S. response has been cruel , short-sighted , and politically tone-deaf .
To be sure , Congress has authorized some modest increases in U.S. foreign assistance and aid to multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund , but , according to Scott Morris of the Center for Global Development , “ If you look at the whole body of international response in this package , it ’ s frankly pretty modest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. agencies.
” One certainly does not see the kind of creative multilateral leadership that previous administrations have exerted .
Is my desire to see the United States exercise greater leadership at this moment at odds with my commitment to a grand strategy of offshore balancing and my repeated criticisms of liberal hegemony ?
Hardly .
Offshore balancers ( aka “ restrainers ” ) do not oppose extensive U.S. engagement in world affairs ; in fact , most of us favor strengthening the State Department and believe diplomacy should be America ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and military force should be used sparingly , and only as a last resort .
As I put it in The Hell of Good Intentions , “ under offshore balancing , diplomacy takes center stage.
” And this is true in spades when dealing with the combination of a global pandemic and looming global recession .
What restrainers oppose is military commitments that do not enhance U.S. security ; efforts at regime change , social engineering , and nation-building in far-flung lands of little strategic importance ; a tendency to issue ultimatums @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the bloated military budgets that an unrealistic foreign policy requires and that rob the country of the resources it needs to maintain prosperity and preparedness at home in the United States .
Is it too late for the Trump administration to pirouette from incompetence at home and indifference abroad ?
I ’ m not optimistic , but it ’ s not impossible .
As I ’ ve noted before , perhaps Donald Trump ’ s sole virtue as president is his ability to reverse course without apology or shame and to pretend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is what he meant to do all along .
He ’ s already trying rewrite the history of his failures at the start of this crisis , and there ’ s no logical reason why he couldn ’ t use this moment as an opportunity to restore a modest degree of confidence in American judgment and goodwill overseas .
If he did , the long-term damage to America ’ s global position might be significantly attenuated .
Despite abundant evidence to the contrary , I continue to hope that Trump will finally heed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mark Twain : “ Do the right thing .
It will gratify some people and astonish the rest .
”

An event like the new coronavirus forces all of us to make rapid judgments and decisions—in our personal lives, in our financial dealings, in how we do our jobs, and in what we think is going to happen. Whether on Twitter, in interviews, or here at Foreign Policy, prognosticators are offering up hot takes daily, based on whatever information they can gather and the worldviews (i.e., theories) on which they typically rely.
An event like the new coronavirus forces all of us to make rapid judgments and decisions—in our personal lives, in our financial dealings, in how we do our jobs, and in what we think is going to happen. Whether on Twitter, in interviews, or here at Foreign Policy, prognosticators are offering up hot takes daily, based on whatever information they can gather and the worldviews (i.e., theories) on which they typically rely.
I’m no exception. I’ve already offered a quick “realist” interpretation of what is happening and suggested the crisis was likely to reinforce nationalism, strengthen the state, accelerate a shift in influence toward Asia, reduce confidence in U.S. leadership and competence, and encourage a partial retreat from hyperglobalization. In a Foreign Policy symposium last month, I suggested the end result would be a world “that is less open, less prosperous, and less free” than the world of today.
I stand by those forecasts, but I have also spent some time over the last several days considering whether some of my expectations might not be borne out. In particular, I’ve wondered if my initial forecast of a shift in influence from West to East is going to be as profound as I thought. Despite all the mistakes the Trump administration has made and continues to make—missteps and misjudgments that will cause thousands of otherwise preventable deaths and billions of dollars of economic damage that could have been avoided—it’s still possible that the flexibility, inventiveness, and adaptability of American society, combined with smart initiatives at all levels of government, will enable the United States to get through the worst phase of the crisis and recover fairly quickly. Don’t get me wrong: The situation is grim and is going to get worse, but the question is how matters will look a year or two from now. Needless to say, I’ll be delighted if the country turns out to be more competent and resilient than I thought.
Similarly, Asia’s success story may not turn out to be as impressive as it now appears. There’s no question that countries such as Singapore and South Korea have done an excellent job in mitigating the impact of the coronavirus, but the effectiveness of China’s belated response is uncertain, because we do not know if the figures being reported out of China are accurate or not. Experts have long understood that Chinese economic statistics were unreliable (a common feature in authoritarian regimes), and the pandemic got rolling in part because Chinese authorities suppressed news about what was happening until it was too late to contain it. (The authoritarian impulse to deny reality also goes a long way toward explaining U.S. President Donald Trump’s lethargic response as well.) Beijing’s recent decision to expel a number of foreign journalists does not lend confidence to official statements about the progress it has made.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
If China is still concealing the true extent of the virus and it restarts economic activity prematurely, it could suffer another punishing wave of infections, and there are worrisome if not entirely unexpected signs of a second wave in other parts of Asia. This could also happen in the United States, of course, which is why it is a good thing that Trump has abandoned his desire to reopen the economy and fill the pews later this month on Easter Sunday. My point is simply that while the U.S. response thus far has been badly bungled, the overall response may—repeat, may—look better a year from now. If that proves to be the case, then the coronavirus won’t necessarily herald a profound shift in global influence. As the national security expert Rachel Kleinfeld wrote on March 31, global responses to date do not vindicate authoritarianism: Some democracies have done very well in reacting to the crisis, and some dictatorships have reacted very badly. In other words, regime type doesn’t appear to be the critical variable here.
There is another reason why the United States may get out of this in better shape than one might initially think: the dollar. It remains the world’s reserve currency and is still considered a relatively safe asset in times of economic uncertainty. The rush to safety amid the global economic crisis prompted by the pandemic has strengthened it already, and foreign demand for dollars will make it easier for the United States to borrow. Indeed, according to Paul Poast of the University of Chicago, “If anything, the economic turmoil brought about by #COVID19 is simply reinforcing the dollar-dominance.” Insofar as the dollar has been an important aspect of America’s enduring global influence, then the coronavirus may not do as much damage as one might otherwise think.
The extent of long-term damage to America’s global position will depend on two main factors. First, can the United States get the pandemic under control at home, so that it can safely restart its economy and so that other nations will decide that Americans still know how to respond in a crisis? The country will have to do a lot better henceforth than it has done so far, but it certainly isn’t impossible. Second, does the United States maintain an “America first” approach to this global problem, or does it begin to exhibit the kind of global leadership that it showed after World War II, the 9/11 attacks, or the financial crisis of 2008?
Thus far, America’s response has been a case study in diplomatic malpractice, which is hardly surprising given who is in the White House and who is running the State Department. Instead of working to get other major world powers on the same page, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was mostly absent from view during the first phase of the crisis. Then he blew up the recent G-7 meeting by insisting any joint statement had to call the coronavirus the “Wuhan virus.” If Pompeo’s goal was to increase foreign resentment of the United States and make the country look petty rather than principled, he could hardly have come up with a better approach. Add to this his continued obsession with Iran, at a moment when all states face the same peril and hot spots anywhere are a potential threat to others. There are hints that the United States might be moving toward a more flexible stance, but thus far the U.S. response has been cruel, short-sighted, and politically tone-deaf.
To be sure, Congress has authorized some modest increases in U.S. foreign assistance and aid to multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, but, according to Scott Morris of the Center for Global Development, “If you look at the whole body of international response in this package, it’s frankly pretty modest, very small, plus ups in the U.S. agencies.” One certainly does not see the kind of creative multilateral leadership that previous administrations have exerted.
Is my desire to see the United States exercise greater leadership at this moment at odds with my commitment to a grand strategy of offshore balancing and my repeated criticisms of liberal hegemony? Hardly. Offshore balancers (aka “restrainers”) do not oppose extensive U.S. engagement in world affairs; in fact, most of us favor strengthening the State Department and believe diplomacy should be America’s first impulse and sanctions, coercion, and military force should be used sparingly, and only as a last resort. As I put it in The Hell of Good Intentions, “under offshore balancing, diplomacy takes center stage.” And this is true in spades when dealing with the combination of a global pandemic and looming global recession.
What restrainers oppose is military commitments that do not enhance U.S. security; efforts at regime change, social engineering, and nation-building in far-flung lands of little strategic importance; a tendency to issue ultimatums instead of looking for creative compromises; and the bloated military budgets that an unrealistic foreign policy requires and that rob the country of the resources it needs to maintain prosperity and preparedness at home in the United States.
Is it too late for the Trump administration to pirouette from incompetence at home and indifference abroad? I’m not optimistic, but it’s not impossible. As I’ve noted before, perhaps Donald Trump’s sole virtue as president is his ability to reverse course without apology or shame and to pretend that whatever he’s doing today is what he meant to do all along. He’s already trying rewrite the history of his failures at the start of this crisis, and there’s no logical reason why he couldn’t use this moment as an opportunity to restore a modest degree of confidence in American judgment and goodwill overseas. If he did, the long-term damage to America’s global position might be significantly attenuated. Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, I continue to hope that Trump will finally heed a piece of advice frequently attributed to Mark Twain: “Do the right thing. It will gratify some people and astonish the rest.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-03--I Knew Coronavirus Denier Landon Spradlin. His Death Wasn’t a Punchline.

On March 25 , an old friend of my family died of pneumonia and coronavirus .
The next day , his story went viral .
The local blues musician and small-time street preacher became a symbol and a punchline , presented as a pandemic-denying Trumpist evangelical who got what he deserved .
But Landon Spradlin wasn ’ t killed by his misguided religious beliefs , and he deserves better than to be remembered as a punchline .
He died because he came from a casually conservative rural America that has become worryingly detached from reality over the pandemic , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Landon was always a strange and controversial figure , even among the dominant conservative Christians of my hometown of Chatham , Virginia .
He ’ d “ witness ” on street corners and try to get people to kneel on the sidewalk and accept Jesus , even if they ’ d been lifelong church-goers .
He ’ d go to parties , condemn the drinking , and try to “ save souls.
” My earliest memory of him was the loud baptisms he performed in the lake in front of my neighbor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obnoxious and self-righteous at times .
But he wasn ’ t some prosperity gospel huckster or wealthy megachurch pastor .
He was a traveling musician who frequently went out of his way to help the forgotten and the downtrodden , and he never had much money .
He condemned drugs and alcohol , but he tried his best to help addicts recover and give them a place to stay when they had nobody else .
I have no idea what he thought about me , the left-wing transgender niece of one of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said anything negative to my family .
I certainly preferred his preaching and music over the sheer hatred spewed in some of the churches around here .
Later in life , he ’ d moderated his tone somewhat and focused on secular music , though he maintained his beliefs and continued his mission trips .
He loved playing the blues , and he loved people .
He went to New Orleans , where he caught the coronavirus , in a misguided attempt to save souls , but he also wanted to see his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s absolutely fair to criticize Landon for his reckless decision .
He put himself and his family at risk .
If his condition had worsened only a couple of days later , he might have inadvertently started an outbreak in my hometown and put my immunocompromised relatives at risk .
He was a grown man who made a terrible choice and paid an awful price .
But he was no different from the average Republican in my hometown .
They may not share his religious views , but they expressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and some still congregate in public places without regard for social distance .
They aren ’ t doing it because they think God will give them immunity to disease , and they aren ’ t going out to restaurants to save souls .
They ’ re doing it because they don ’ t take the problem seriously enough , thanks to right-wing media outlets that downplayed the pandemic even as the numbers ticked up .
Some of them were shocked by Donald Trump ’ s nomination and election , and a few have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But the majority see him as just another president , a victim of crooked political smear campaigns spread by ridiculous jealousy-crazed liberals .
When he told them that Russian meddling was a hoax , that climate change was overblown , that what happened in Ukraine was just typical diplomacy , they easily accepted it .
To them , it was just common sense that Democrats were always going to lie and blow things out of proportion .
It ’ s not something they spend all their waking hours thinking about .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learned from their parents as children and rarely question .
It ’ s frustrating and baffling , and arguing with them rarely gets anywhere .
Usually the damage done by these convictions is slow and long-term .
But the pandemic posed a much more immediate threat .
When Landon shared a meme calling the coronavirus pandemic an overblown hoax , he was following in the footsteps of millions of other conservatives who made the mistake of trusting the president of the United States and their favorite media outlets .
Landon even acknowledged that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thought it would come and go with little effect .
He probably doubted he ’ d ever be exposed .
Around the same time Landon was preparing for Mardi Gras , Trump was claiming that he had the coronavirus under control and that cases were decreasing in the United States .
He implied only a tiny handful would get the virus and that most Americans would never need to worry about it .
Anyone who saw Trump as a normal president and relied on Fox News and Facebook posts from their like-minded friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the coronavirus wasn ’ t a big deal .
Like many evangelicals in the charismatic tradition , Landon thought that God would likely protect him from any serious disease .
It ’ s a nonnegotiable belief for that subset of evangelical Christianity , and some believers even deliberately put themselves at risk as an expression of faith .
But even that belief has limits .
I don ’ t know what Landon was thinking , but I can ’ t believe that he would have put himself and his family at risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began feeling sick sometime after Mardi Gras , but a coronavirus test returned a false negative .
On his way home , he suddenly collapsed .
Another test came up positive .
He spent his last days in a strange city , sedated and face down in a desperate effort to keep him breathing .
Whatever mistakes he made , nobody deserves that .
I ’ m angry and heartbroken at his death and worried about the millions of others who continue to laugh off the virus .
These beliefs continue even after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the virus .
I don ’ t know how to convince people that Trump was lying to them or get certain evangelicals to stop putting themselves at risk .
Maybe they ’ d be more cautious if they imagined their families mourning them , unable to even see them in person in their last days .
Maybe evangelicals will realize that if a sincere believer like Landon can get sick while witnessing to crowds , nobody has unconditional protection from God .
This situation is infuriating , and I understand why people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ random street preacher .
But we ’ re all in this together , and the virus doesn ’ t distinguish between conservatives and progressives .
We need to stop the spread , even if that means swallowing legitimate anger and reaching out to the misinformed and reckless .
There will be plenty of time for blame after this is over .

On March 25, an old friend of my family died of pneumonia and coronavirus. The next day, his story went viral . The local blues musician and small-time street preacher became a symbol and a punchline, presented as a pandemic-denying Trumpist evangelical who got what he deserved. But Landon Spradlin wasn’t killed by his misguided religious beliefs, and he deserves better than to be remembered as a punchline. He died because he came from a casually conservative rural America that has become worryingly detached from reality over the pandemic, and thousands of others could follow his path.
On March 25, an old friend of my family died of pneumonia and coronavirus. The next day, his story went viral. The local blues musician and small-time street preacher became a symbol and a punchline, presented as a pandemic-denying Trumpist evangelical who got what he deserved. But Landon Spradlin wasn’t killed by his misguided religious beliefs, and he deserves better than to be remembered as a punchline. He died because he came from a casually conservative rural America that has become worryingly detached from reality over the pandemic, and thousands of others could follow his path.
Landon was always a strange and controversial figure, even among the dominant conservative Christians of my hometown of Chatham, Virginia. He’d “witness” on street corners and try to get people to kneel on the sidewalk and accept Jesus, even if they’d been lifelong church-goers. He’d go to parties, condemn the drinking, and try to “save souls.” My earliest memory of him was the loud baptisms he performed in the lake in front of my neighbor’s house. He could be obnoxious and self-righteous at times.
But he wasn’t some prosperity gospel huckster or wealthy megachurch pastor. He was a traveling musician who frequently went out of his way to help the forgotten and the downtrodden, and he never had much money. He condemned drugs and alcohol, but he tried his best to help addicts recover and give them a place to stay when they had nobody else. I have no idea what he thought about me, the left-wing transgender niece of one of his closest friends, but he certainly never said anything negative to my family. I certainly preferred his preaching and music over the sheer hatred spewed in some of the churches around here.
Later in life, he’d moderated his tone somewhat and focused on secular music, though he maintained his beliefs and continued his mission trips. He loved playing the blues, and he loved people. He went to New Orleans, where he caught the coronavirus, in a misguided attempt to save souls, but he also wanted to see his old friends and experience another Mardi Gras.
Landon Spradlin and his wife were on their way home from a mission trip in New Orleans when he collapsed. He was taken to a hospital in Concord and tested positive for COVID-19. Spradlin was put on a ventilator but his health took a bad turn Tuesday. He died a short time later pic.twitter.com/fEeUhrlLzz — Joe Bruno (@JoeBrunoWSOC9) March 26, 2020
It’s absolutely fair to criticize Landon for his reckless decision. He put himself and his family at risk. If his condition had worsened only a couple of days later, he might have inadvertently started an outbreak in my hometown and put my immunocompromised relatives at risk. He was a grown man who made a terrible choice and paid an awful price.
But he was no different from the average Republican in my hometown. They may not share his religious views, but they expressed the same skepticism regarding the pandemic, and some still congregate in public places without regard for social distance. They aren’t doing it because they think God will give them immunity to disease, and they aren’t going out to restaurants to save souls. They’re doing it because they don’t take the problem seriously enough, thanks to right-wing media outlets that downplayed the pandemic even as the numbers ticked up.
Some of them were shocked by Donald Trump’s nomination and election, and a few have left the party or sought alternatives. But the majority see him as just another president, a victim of crooked political smear campaigns spread by ridiculous jealousy-crazed liberals. When he told them that Russian meddling was a hoax, that climate change was overblown, that what happened in Ukraine was just typical diplomacy, they easily accepted it. To them, it was just common sense that Democrats were always going to lie and blow things out of proportion. It’s not something they spend all their waking hours thinking about. It’s just a set of beliefs they learned from their parents as children and rarely question. It’s frustrating and baffling, and arguing with them rarely gets anywhere.
Usually the damage done by these convictions is slow and long-term. But the pandemic posed a much more immediate threat. When Landon shared a meme calling the coronavirus pandemic an overblown hoax, he was following in the footsteps of millions of other conservatives who made the mistake of trusting the president of the United States and their favorite media outlets. Landon even acknowledged that the coronavirus was real, but he thought it would come and go with little effect. He probably doubted he’d ever be exposed.
Around the same time Landon was preparing for Mardi Gras, Trump was claiming that he had the coronavirus under control and that cases were decreasing in the United States. He implied only a tiny handful would get the virus and that most Americans would never need to worry about it. Anyone who saw Trump as a normal president and relied on Fox News and Facebook posts from their like-minded friends was seeing a constant stream of reassurances that the coronavirus wasn’t a big deal.
Like many evangelicals in the charismatic tradition, Landon thought that God would likely protect him from any serious disease. It’s a nonnegotiable belief for that subset of evangelical Christianity, and some believers even deliberately put themselves at risk as an expression of faith. But even that belief has limits. I don’t know what Landon was thinking, but I can’t believe that he would have put himself and his family at risk had he known the truth.
He began feeling sick sometime after Mardi Gras, but a coronavirus test returned a false negative. On his way home, he suddenly collapsed. Another test came up positive. He spent his last days in a strange city, sedated and face down in a desperate effort to keep him breathing. Whatever mistakes he made, nobody deserves that. I’m angry and heartbroken at his death and worried about the millions of others who continue to laugh off the virus.
These beliefs continue even after the president dropped his own previous claims about the virus. I don’t know how to convince people that Trump was lying to them or get certain evangelicals to stop putting themselves at risk. Maybe they’d be more cautious if they imagined their families mourning them, unable to even see them in person in their last days. Maybe evangelicals will realize that if a sincere believer like Landon can get sick while witnessing to crowds, nobody has unconditional protection from God.
This situation is infuriating, and I understand why people are taking out their frustrations on this random street preacher. But we’re all in this together, and the virus doesn’t distinguish between conservatives and progressives. We need to stop the spread, even if that means swallowing legitimate anger and reaching out to the misinformed and reckless. There will be plenty of time for blame after this is over.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-04--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

A coronavirus-induced economic depression might have social consequences that could be deep and long-lasting .
Meanwhile , as India faces domestic turmoil due to the virus , Prime Minister Narendra Modi is focusing on cultivating his country ’ s global leadership .
And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is using the pandemic to tear down whatever remains of democracy in his country .
As some economists and knowledgeable pundits suggest the U.S. economy is heading into a depression , it ’ s worth second-guessing Wall Street once again , Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh writes .
Even as India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there warn could produce a “ national disaster ” in a matter of weeks , Modi is trying to position the country as a leader in global responses , Michael Kugelman writes .
3 .
China Will Do Anything to Deflect Coronavirus Blame China does not actually hope to convince the world that the virus may have started in the United States .
But it does feel the need to blunt and undercut Washington ’ s efforts to point out Beijing ’ s early role in letting the coronavirus spread , David Gitter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ write .
4 .
Coronavirus and the Dawn of Post-Democratic Europe With the pandemic crisis as an alibi , Orban is pouncing on the opportunity to secure his power in the long run , even at the expense of Hungary ’ s remaining vestiges of democracy , Paul Hockenos writes .
Some media outlets have offered reductive cultural explanations for the success of the South Korean response to the coronavirus , but it is due more to competent leadership that inspired public trust—which any nation could emulate , S. Nathan Park writes .

A coronavirus-induced economic depression might have social consequences that could be deep and long-lasting.
A coronavirus-induced economic depression might have social consequences that could be deep and long-lasting.
Meanwhile, as India faces domestic turmoil due to the virus, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is focusing on cultivating his country’s global leadership.
And Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is using the pandemic to tear down whatever remains of democracy in his country.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A mostly empty Wall Street
As some economists and knowledgeable pundits suggest the U.S. economy is heading into a depression, it’s worth second-guessing Wall Street once again, Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh writes.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping
Even as India confronts a coronavirus challenge that medical experts there warn could produce a “national disaster” in a matter of weeks, Modi is trying to position the country as a leader in global responses, Michael Kugelman writes.
President Xi Jinping arrives at a meeting of the National People's Congress
China does not actually hope to convince the world that the virus may have started in the United States. But it does feel the need to blunt and undercut Washington’s efforts to point out Beijing’s early role in letting the coronavirus spread, David Gitter, Sandy Lu, and Brock Erdahl write.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen welcomes Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban
With the pandemic crisis as an alibi, Orban is pouncing on the opportunity to secure his power in the long run, even at the expense of Hungary’s remaining vestiges of democracy, Paul Hockenos writes.
Medical staff take COVID-19 test samples from a foreign passenger at a virus testing booth outside Incheon International Airport, near Seoul, on April 1.
Some media outlets have offered reductive cultural explanations for the success of the South Korean response to the coronavirus, but it is due more to competent leadership that inspired public trust—which any nation could emulate, S. Nathan Park writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-04--West Africa Is Increasingly Vulnerable to Terrorist Groups

In the coming weeks , West Africa ’ s terrorist groups are set to encroach further into Togo , Benin , and Ghana .
This year ’ s presidential elections and their associated impact in Ivory Coast , Guinea , and Togo may create further tensions for terrorist groups to exploit .
As part of the United States ’ global retreat , military forces have departed from West Africa , leaving the Economic Community of West African States ( Ecowas ) , France , and the G-5 Sahel to pick up the slack and attempt to prevent the spread of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military force alone is not enough .
West Africa must provide a test case for innovative and collective preventive diplomacy , which adapts to the growing risks , builds local resilience , and prevents the next security and humanitarian disaster .
In recent years , international diplomacy has failed in the face of devastating crises in Syria , Yemen , Mali , Burkina Faso , and Libya .
More innovation , partnerships , and connections among state , local , and international governments are required to help prevent the spread of terrorism , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerabilities and drive an even larger humanitarian disaster .
While no form of collective action is easy , a coalition of states , international , and local bodies must move beyond predominantly military action .
The path forward requires working collectively and innovatively on development initiatives , local governance issues , and intelligence sharing .
This is likely to become only more urgent in the coming months .
A combination of weak border security forces , the growing capabilities of terrorist groups in Burkina Faso , and an apparent interest in extending operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increasing risk in Togo , Benin , and Ghana .
For jihadi groups , including Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin ( JNIM ) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara ( ISGS ) , financial incentives and prestige are attached to moving into neighboring countries .
By establishing further control over parts of West Africa , they could access ports , control trade , and benefit from the funds generated .
They could also attempt to gain control of the gold mining industry .
Along with terrorist attacks designed to exploit political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is potential for larger attention-grabbing attacks against Western interests , including mining companies , hotels , foreign businesses , and tourists in cities such as Cotonou and Porto Novo in Benin .
The movement of these groups into West Africa is aided by weak border controls , experienced smugglers , trafficking networks , and local corruption .
West Africa is a major transit point for drugs smuggled from South America and Asia into Europe .
Other goods such as people , migrants , and weapons are also trafficked across the borders .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that , while it is fighting fires and focusing on Burkina Faso and Mali , it is not looking at the bigger picture—including the likely spread of terrorism into Togo , Benin , and Ghana .
Ecowas is divided and reluctant to share sensitive security information among participating nations .
Meanwhile , the very factors that have aided the terrorist growth across Mali and Burkina Faso—including widespread poverty , lack of health and education opportunities , and ethnic tensions—are being replicated in neighboring countries , which are already vulnerable from a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a severe shock such as a jihadi intervention could be catastrophic , in particular for Togo ’ s stability .
The consequences of a severe shock such as a jihadi intervention could be catastrophic .
Togo faces frequent land disputes and disagreements between local elites and others .
Other underlying risk factors include common violence between farmers and herders , conflict around resource management , and extreme poverty .
Togo was included in the Fund for Peace ’ s 2019 Fragile States Index as one of the five most at-risk countries .
Benin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ include high rates of poverty , factionalized ethnic groups , significant disparities between urban and rural populations , and high levels of illiteracy .
These issues tend to erode citizens ’ faith in their governments and often encourage them to seek alternative—and sometimes—radical ideologies .
In both Togo and Ivory Coast , there is an absence of local-led initiatives that might otherwise provide opportunities for employment , training , and a better standard of living .
Then there are the human security implications .
Burkina Faso is one of the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Feb. 1 and 21 , more than 150,000 people have been displaced primarily by jihadi groups .
Armed attacks on civilians are rapidly increasing , and ethnic tensions have been inflamed and exploited by terrorist groups to boost their ranks .
To reduce the risk of further terrorist encroachment on West Africa , urgent action is needed from regional bodies in sub-Saharan Africa .
The present situation is unlikely to be resolved by one actor alone .
Policymakers in the region need better intelligence—both local knowledge and research and analysis—on the decision-making capabilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups such as Ansaroul Islam and the Islamic State in West Africa .
This would help neighboring countries not only disrupt planned attacks but also counteract movement of resources and propaganda .
It would also provide a focus on the possible connections between people smugglers and terrorist groups .
International partners such as the United Nations should support Ecowas in sharing timely intelligence and coordinating efforts to disrupt terrorist groups in their efforts to cross borders .
Meanwhile , international support , including from the United States and France , should focus on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Border technology is improving and , at a minimum , should include more effective biometrics and enhanced training for border control agents .
In the future , as drones become more accurate , they will also help manage border crossings and help prevent both weapons and people smuggling .
The aim should be to better detect the cargo that is crossing borders , along with flagging those likely to be attached to terrorist groups who are attempting to cross .
Security in the region also requires better governance , humanitarian aid , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jihadi groups are best combated by locally led development projects .
Togo elected new mayors last summer for the first time in more than 30 years .
Such developments should ensure a better social contract between local populations and governance and also help build services such as health care and better schools while improving the scrutiny of security forces .
Meanwhile , it is also possible for local citizens to play a more active role in providing early warning .
According to the Institute for Security Studies , an African nonprofit organization , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Togo these local communities—by collecting data such as the movement of people , guns , and signs of radicalization among the local population—can provide better early warning systems of infiltration attempts by jihadi groups .
Beyond this , development actors and humanitarian agencies should work to scale up programs aimed at combating violent extremism and propaganda efforts by terrorist groups , such as context-specific mediation and locally driven employment opportunities .
This includes working with security forces to better regulate their behavior and improve their interactions with communities .
The growing capabilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Burkina Faso and recent attacks near its border with Benin , as well as the flow of terrorists across neighboring borders , suggest that the entire region is at risk of being exposed to terrorist groups .
Confronting them is a test of collective will .
Without new models for coordinated international action and efforts to build local resilience in the face of jihadism , the consequences for all of West Africa could be devastating .

In the coming weeks, West Africa’s terrorist groups are set to encroach further into Togo, Benin, and Ghana. This year’s presidential elections and their associated impact in Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Togo may create further tensions for terrorist groups to exploit. As part of the United States’ global retreat, military forces have departed from West Africa, leaving the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), France, and the G-5 Sahel to pick up the slack and attempt to prevent the spread of terrorism further into West Africa. But military force alone is not enough. West Africa must provide a test case for innovative and collective preventive diplomacy, which adapts to the growing risks, builds local resilience, and prevents the next security and humanitarian disaster.
In the coming weeks, West Africa’s terrorist groups are set to encroach further into Togo, Benin, and Ghana. This year’s presidential elections and their associated impact in Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Togo may create further tensions for terrorist groups to exploit. As part of the United States’ global retreat, military forces have departed from West Africa, leaving the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), France, and the G-5 Sahel to pick up the slack and attempt to prevent the spread of terrorism further into West Africa. But military force alone is not enough. West Africa must provide a test case for innovative and collective preventive diplomacy, which adapts to the growing risks, builds local resilience, and prevents the next security and humanitarian disaster.
In recent years, international diplomacy has failed in the face of devastating crises in Syria, Yemen, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Libya. More innovation, partnerships, and connections among state, local, and international governments are required to help prevent the spread of terrorism, which may exacerbate underlying political and ethnic vulnerabilities and drive an even larger humanitarian disaster. While no form of collective action is easy, a coalition of states, international, and local bodies must move beyond predominantly military action. The path forward requires working collectively and innovatively on development initiatives, local governance issues, and intelligence sharing.
This is likely to become only more urgent in the coming months. A combination of weak border security forces, the growing capabilities of terrorist groups in Burkina Faso, and an apparent interest in extending operations into neighboring countries all point to an increasing risk in Togo, Benin, and Ghana. For jihadi groups, including Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), financial incentives and prestige are attached to moving into neighboring countries. By establishing further control over parts of West Africa, they could access ports, control trade, and benefit from the funds generated. They could also attempt to gain control of the gold mining industry. Along with terrorist attacks designed to exploit political tensions and garner local support, there is potential for larger attention-grabbing attacks against Western interests, including mining companies, hotels, foreign businesses, and tourists in cities such as Cotonou and Porto Novo in Benin.
The movement of these groups into West Africa is aided by weak border controls, experienced smugglers, trafficking networks, and local corruption. West Africa is a major transit point for drugs smuggled from South America and Asia into Europe. Other goods such as people, migrants, and weapons are also trafficked across the borders.
A common criticism of the underresourced G-5 Sahel is that, while it is fighting fires and focusing on Burkina Faso and Mali, it is not looking at the bigger picture—including the likely spread of terrorism into Togo, Benin, and Ghana. Ecowas is divided and reluctant to share sensitive security information among participating nations. Meanwhile, the very factors that have aided the terrorist growth across Mali and Burkina Faso—including widespread poverty, lack of health and education opportunities, and ethnic tensions—are being replicated in neighboring countries, which are already vulnerable from a political and security perspective. The consequences of a severe shock such as a jihadi intervention could be catastrophic, in particular for Togo’s stability.
The consequences of a severe shock such as a jihadi intervention could be catastrophic.
Togo faces frequent land disputes and disagreements between local elites and others. Other underlying risk factors include common violence between farmers and herders, conflict around resource management, and extreme poverty. Togo was included in the Fund for Peace’s 2019 Fragile States Index as one of the five most at-risk countries. Benin also faces significant underlying vulnerabilities, which include high rates of poverty, factionalized ethnic groups, significant disparities between urban and rural populations, and high levels of illiteracy. These issues tend to erode citizens’ faith in their governments and often encourage them to seek alternative—and sometimes—radical ideologies. In both Togo and Ivory Coast, there is an absence of local-led initiatives that might otherwise provide opportunities for employment, training, and a better standard of living.
Then there are the human security implications. Burkina Faso is one of the world’s fastest-growing humanitarian and security disasters. Between Feb. 1 and 21, more than 150,000 people have been displaced primarily by jihadi groups. Armed attacks on civilians are rapidly increasing, and ethnic tensions have been inflamed and exploited by terrorist groups to boost their ranks.
To reduce the risk of further terrorist encroachment on West Africa, urgent action is needed from regional bodies in sub-Saharan Africa. The present situation is unlikely to be resolved by one actor alone.
Policymakers in the region need better intelligence—both local knowledge and research and analysis—on the decision-making capabilities, resources, and regional strategy of groups such as Ansaroul Islam and the Islamic State in West Africa. This would help neighboring countries not only disrupt planned attacks but also counteract movement of resources and propaganda. It would also provide a focus on the possible connections between people smugglers and terrorist groups. International partners such as the United Nations should support Ecowas in sharing timely intelligence and coordinating efforts to disrupt terrorist groups in their efforts to cross borders.
Meanwhile, international support, including from the United States and France, should focus on improving border security between West African countries. Border technology is improving and, at a minimum, should include more effective biometrics and enhanced training for border control agents. In the future, as drones become more accurate, they will also help manage border crossings and help prevent both weapons and people smuggling. The aim should be to better detect the cargo that is crossing borders, along with flagging those likely to be attached to terrorist groups who are attempting to cross.
Security in the region also requires better governance, humanitarian aid, and development programs. The ideologies of jihadi groups are best combated by locally led development projects. Togo elected new mayors last summer for the first time in more than 30 years. Such developments should ensure a better social contract between local populations and governance and also help build services such as health care and better schools while improving the scrutiny of security forces. Meanwhile, it is also possible for local citizens to play a more active role in providing early warning. According to the Institute for Security Studies, an African nonprofit organization, through the development of the Inter-Ministerial Committee in Togo these local communities—by collecting data such as the movement of people, guns, and signs of radicalization among the local population—can provide better early warning systems of infiltration attempts by jihadi groups.
Beyond this, development actors and humanitarian agencies should work to scale up programs aimed at combating violent extremism and propaganda efforts by terrorist groups, such as context-specific mediation and locally driven employment opportunities. This includes working with security forces to better regulate their behavior and improve their interactions with communities.
The growing capabilities and increasing territorial control of jihadi groups in Burkina Faso and recent attacks near its border with Benin, as well as the flow of terrorists across neighboring borders, suggest that the entire region is at risk of being exposed to terrorist groups. Confronting them is a test of collective will. Without new models for coordinated international action and efforts to build local resilience in the face of jihadism, the consequences for all of West Africa could be devastating.