foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--Does ‘Hamilton’ Have All the Answers for U.S. Foreign Policy?

Does ‘ Hamilton ’ Have All the Answers for U.S. Foreign Policy ?
Emma Ashford : Happy Fourth of July , Matt !
I celebrated in the now-traditional way : watching Hamilton on repeat and enjoying the Founding Fathers singing all the catchy songs .
How was your holiday weekend ?
Matthew Kroenig : It was good .
I watched a program about another great American , the documentary The Last Dance about Michael Jordan ’ s final NBA season .
Hamilton is still on my family ’ s to-do list .
EA : Glad to hear it !
Alexander @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should seriously consider .
For example : his opposition to regime change .
As he puts it in the musical : “ If we try to fight in every revolution in the world , we never stop .
Where do we draw the line ?
” MK : Let ’ s come back to that later if that ’ s OK ?
Sticking with July Fourth for a moment , we had many people this year saying they didn ’ t feel like celebrating because the United States is so flawed .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rushmore was widely criticized as divisive .
I don ’ t get it .
Even though we have our problems in the United States , this is still the greatest country on Earth .
Americans can work on our imperfections even as we celebrate our strengths .
And Trump ’ s speech was mostly a pretty standard speech about American exceptionalism .
EA : Did we watch different speeches ?
I ’ ve never seen a president celebrate the Fourth of July before by calling on Americans to fight against “ far-left fascism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overthrow the American Revolution.
” You don ’ t think that kind of hyperbole is divisive ?
MK : That part was direct , but other parts of the speech praised American achievement and mentioned Martin Luther King Jr. and Frederick Douglass on themes of equality .
And it is a fact that there is a threat to our traditional liberal principles from a radical left that is becoming increasingly illiberal and intolerant .
EA : I don ’ t doubt that his language plays well on Fox News and with the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ re talking about is a tiny minority of a minority here .
MK : I think it is more mainstream ; many are now cowering in fear of being “ canceled ” by woke mobs .
The New York Times , for example , fired editors for running an op-ed by a sitting U.S. senator expressing a view shared by much of the country .
EA : I think they mostly fired that editor for not doing his job .
He didn ’ t even read a controversial op-ed before publication @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controversial op-ed a problem ?
EA : Look , I ’ ll grant that there ’ s an illiberal undercurrent in some of today ’ s debates that I don ’ t much like .
But the right to free speech includes both your right to speak and the right of others to criticize you for it .
The central theme of the Trump administration is projection .
He is using left-wing illiberalism to distract from his own illiberal record and his disastrous handling of the pandemic .
He accused his critics of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the founding generation .
But you ’ ve got Attorney General Bill Barr actively undermining the rule of law to help the President ’ s cronies , and the president calling for peaceful protesters to be arrested .
If that ’ s not illiberalism , I don ’ t know what is .
But we ’ re way off topic .
To paraphrase Hamilton again , can we get back to foreign policy ?
Please ?
The big news this week is Hong Kong .
MK : Indeed , as Americans were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong were losing theirs .
The Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) is really baring its teeth .
It criminalizes so-called subversion and sedition , meaning that effectively all protests could be banned .
There have been arrests , while activist groups have disbanded , and some dissidents have fled the country .
To make matters worse , in addition to the national security law , there were reports this week here in Foreign Policy and elsewhere that China is forcibly sterilizing its Muslim Uighur population and selling their hair abroad .
Usually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overblown , but the CCP is doing its best to make them relevant .
EA : You ’ d think they ’ d at least try to hide their repression .
But at the end of the day , there ’ s not much the U.S. government can really do to prevent human rights abuses on Chinese territory .
And the most obvious options aren ’ t likely in this administration .
There ’ s trade restrictions , which Trump isn ’ t keen to use now he has his “ deal ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a proposal in Congress to open up immigration to those fleeing Hong Kong .
But it ’ s hard to see how the administration reconciles that with its opposition to almost all immigration .
MK : The U.S. policy to revoke Hong Kong ’ s special economic privileges makes good sense , as would allowing refugees from the territory .
And while there are limits to what Washington can do directly , the United States can use China ’ s overreach to its advantage .
Many are outraged by China ’ s human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Free World Commission , a group of legislators from leading democracies , issued a joint statement condemning the national security law .
Australia ended its extradition treaty with the city and has offered residency to thousands of people from Hong Kong .
And the U.K. has provided a path to citizenship for up to 3 million people there .
Previously , countries were trying to stay neutral , but China ’ s aggressive actions are provoking a counterbalancing coalition against it .
It ’ s hard to see how the Trump administration reconciles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition to almost all immigration .
EA : This is good !
I ’ m particularly thrilled to see that the Conservative Party government in Britain was able to overcome its anti-immigration tendencies in this case , given the historic obligation that Britain owes to the citizens of Hong Kong .
But the absence of any concrete promises from the United States is notable .
You can ’ t believe that this administration will honestly open up immigration to fleeing Hong Kongers ?
The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act , which offers Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headed to the president ’ s desk for signature soon .
But given his prior stances on refugees—and his unwillingness to challenge Xi Jinping on other human rights abuses—I ’ m not so sure he won ’ t veto it .
MK : It ’ s possible , but the president has surprised me before with his tough actions on China .
It took courage to push back on China ’ s unfair trade practices at a time when everyone was getting rich doing business there .
And there is value in getting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Hong Kong is the near-term crisis , but China will present a long-term challenge to the global economic system , to U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia , and to freedom and democracy around the world .
EA : But this administration is even trying to end skilled immigration .
They just announced that all students whose classes can not be held in person due to the coronavirus will have their visas revoked and must return home .
MK : Darn , we were just having such a good fight and now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drain is one of America ’ s superpowers .
There is an illegal immigration problem that needs to be fixed , but the United States should continue to recruit the best and the brightest from around the world to study at American universities and to entice them to stay and contribute to the country ’ s economic and cultural dynamism .
But agreement is boring .
Let ’ s get back to regime change .
EA : Well , Harvard University ’ s Stephen M. Walt has a great column up this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argues that the U.S. response to COVID-19 pretty definitively proves that if Washington can ’ t manage its own problems , it ’ s not capable of successfully engaging in regime change .
He ’ s got a point .
MK : Walt and others have overlearned the lessons of the Iraq War .
Yes , invading a country , overthrowing the government , deploying more than 100,000 troops , and staying for a decade should only be undertaken with extreme caution , if at all .
But regime change ( pressuring autocratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , etc . )
should still be an important tool in the U.S. foreign-policy toolkit .
EA : You ’ re the professor , not me .
So you ’ re aware of the academic research on regime change that shows that it ’ s almost never successful for a simple reason : It ’ s hard to impose a government from abroad that can be both accountable to the population and responsive to a foreign sponsor .
That ’ s why the governments Washington imposes usually end in disaster , whether it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the 1979 Iranian Revolution , or Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fomenting sectarianism in Iraq .
And Walt ’ s point that if the U.S. government can ’ t even create a coronavirus testing infrastructure at home , then it probably can ’ t run a different country , is even more persuasive .
I ’ m more open to debate on the peaceful forms of democracy promotion : helping activists , providing technology , etc .
But is there even a single successful case of U.S.-led regime change through force ?
MK @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Japan .
And it depends on how you define success .
The Iraq War was costly , but I am glad Saddam Hussein is no longer in power .
EA : You ’ re right about Germany and Japan , but it was under very different circumstances : the end of a world war , with multilateral occupation by all the world ’ s key advanced powers .
And those states were already coherent nation-states with good , solid institutions .
Regime change might be possible in those cases , but why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ?
If the only places regime change can succeed are advanced industrialized states , that ’ s hardly helpful .
Unless you want to engage in regime change in Norway to make sure that Trump finally gets the Norwegian refugees he wants so badly ?
MK : The existing academic research on regime change is narrow and doesn ’ t really speak to the full range of issues policymakers must consider .
There is a difference between weakening an autocratic rival and turning it into Switzerland .
The former can be valuable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The greatest threats to the security of the United States and its allies come from autocracies : China , Russia , North Korea , and Iran .
Autocratic mismanagement in Venezuela is posing real problems in the United States ’ own backyard .
These regimes are brittle , and they fear their own people more than anything else .
Why give them sanctuary ?
EA : Three of those have nuclear weapons , which makes regime change rather more costly than Americans typically expect .
And I think you are seriously overstating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are willing to overthrow its government .
They may dislike it ; they probably want reform .
But that doesn ’ t mean they ’ re about to take up arms , especially to help a foreign power that—for historical reasons—is already widely distrusted .
And it wouldn ’ t be easy , either : Major protests were suppressed by the government as recently as early 2020 .
The bottom line , however , is that I fail to see how it ’ s in U.S. interests to consider regime change in any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are small , while the downsides are possibly disastrous : anything from a failed state with loose nukes to another 20-year insurgency .
MK : So you would prefer that Nazi Germany , Imperial Japan , and the Soviet Union were still in existence ?
All of America ’ s major 20th-century rivalries ended with the regime collapse of the autocratic rival .
And the same will likely be true in the 21st century .
EA : You think the United States should fight World War III ?
MK : I prefer the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not some peculiarity of U.S. decision-makers .
Good strategy is all about leveraging one ’ s strengths against the enemy ’ s weaknesses .
And regime fragility is the autocrat ’ s Achilles ’ heel .
President Xi has made China ’ s problem even worse by eliminating institutionalized procedures for leadership transition .
The same is largely true for Vladimir Putin in Russia , North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei .
The only way Xi , Putin , Kim , and Khamenei are leaving office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next ?
It could be a smooth transition to a hand-picked successor , but it could also be the end of a government hostile to the United States .
EA : It ’ s still a big risk , one with significant implications for Americans .
You know , you really do have to watch Hamilton .
Lin-Manuel Miranda ’ s musical might be a bit dramatized , but he gets some things right about historical U.S. foreign policy .
One of them is that U.S. interests should be paramount , even when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thomas Jefferson , Hamilton argued smartly and successfully for neutrality during France ’ s revolutionary wars .
Hamilton helped George Washington draft his farewell address , in which he argued that the country ’ s interests would be best served by staying out of European power politics .
American values are important .
As John Quincy Adams put it , Americans should be well-wishers to the freedom and liberty of all .
But it ’ s not the United States ’ job to destroy foreign monsters .
MK : The world has changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t practice what he preached .
But I think we ’ re out of space .
Let ’ s pick this up next time ?
EA : Don ’ t modulate the key , then not debate with me !

Emma Ashford: Happy Fourth of July, Matt! I celebrated in the now-traditional way: watching Hamilton on repeat and enjoying the Founding Fathers singing all the catchy songs. How was your holiday weekend?
Emma Ashford: Happy Fourth of July, Matt! I celebrated in the now-traditional way: watching Hamilton on repeat and enjoying the Founding Fathers singing all the catchy songs. How was your holiday weekend?
Matthew Kroenig: It was good. I watched a program about another great American, the documentary The Last Dance about Michael Jordan’s final NBA season. Hamilton is still on my family’s to-do list.
EA: Glad to hear it! Alexander Hamilton has some ideas I think you should seriously consider. For example: his opposition to regime change. As he puts it in the musical: “If we try to fight in every revolution in the world, we never stop. Where do we draw the line?”
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: Let’s come back to that later if that’s OK? Sticking with July Fourth for a moment, we had many people this year saying they didn’t feel like celebrating because the United States is so flawed. And Donald Trump’s speech at Mount Rushmore was widely criticized as divisive. I don’t get it. Even though we have our problems in the United States, this is still the greatest country on Earth. Americans can work on our imperfections even as we celebrate our strengths. And Trump’s speech was mostly a pretty standard speech about American exceptionalism.
EA: Did we watch different speeches? I’ve never seen a president celebrate the Fourth of July before by calling on Americans to fight against “far-left fascism” that’s “designed to overthrow the American Revolution.” You don’t think that kind of hyperbole is divisive?
MK: That part was direct, but other parts of the speech praised American achievement and mentioned Martin Luther King Jr. and Frederick Douglass on themes of equality. And it is a fact that there is a threat to our traditional liberal principles from a radical left that is becoming increasingly illiberal and intolerant.
EA: I don’t doubt that his language plays well on Fox News and with the president’s base. But the illiberalism we’re talking about is a tiny minority of a minority here.
MK: I think it is more mainstream; many are now cowering in fear of being “canceled” by woke mobs. The New York Times, for example, fired editors for running an op-ed by a sitting U.S. senator expressing a view shared by much of the country.
EA: I think they mostly fired that editor for not doing his job. He didn’t even read a controversial op-ed before publication!
MK: Since when is a controversial op-ed a problem?
EA: Look, I’ll grant that there’s an illiberal undercurrent in some of today’s debates that I don’t much like. But the right to free speech includes both your right to speak and the right of others to criticize you for it.
The central theme of the Trump administration is projection. He is using left-wing illiberalism to distract from his own illiberal record and his disastrous handling of the pandemic. He accused his critics of working to “defile the memory” of the founding generation. But you’ve got Attorney General Bill Barr actively undermining the rule of law to help the President’s cronies, and the president calling for peaceful protesters to be arrested. If that’s not illiberalism, I don’t know what is.
But we’re way off topic. To paraphrase Hamilton again, can we get back to foreign policy? Please?
The big news this week is Hong Kong.
MK: Indeed, as Americans were celebrating freedom, the people of Hong Kong were losing theirs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is really baring its teeth. It criminalizes so-called subversion and sedition, meaning that effectively all protests could be banned. There have been arrests, while activist groups have disbanded, and some dissidents have fled the country.
To make matters worse, in addition to the national security law, there were reports this week here in Foreign Policy and elsewhere that China is forcibly sterilizing its Muslim Uighur population and selling their hair abroad. Usually, comparisons to Nazi Germany are way overblown, but the CCP is doing its best to make them relevant.
EA: You’d think they’d at least try to hide their repression. But at the end of the day, there’s not much the U.S. government can really do to prevent human rights abuses on Chinese territory. And the most obvious options aren’t likely in this administration. There’s trade restrictions, which Trump isn’t keen to use now he has his “deal” with China. And there’s a proposal in Congress to open up immigration to those fleeing Hong Kong. But it’s hard to see how the administration reconciles that with its opposition to almost all immigration.
MK: The U.S. policy to revoke Hong Kong’s special economic privileges makes good sense, as would allowing refugees from the territory. And while there are limits to what Washington can do directly, the United States can use China’s overreach to its advantage. Many are outraged by China’s human rights abuses. For example, the Free World Commission, a group of legislators from leading democracies, issued a joint statement condemning the national security law.
Australia ended its extradition treaty with the city and has offered residency to thousands of people from Hong Kong. And the U.K. has provided a path to citizenship for up to 3 million people there. Previously, countries were trying to stay neutral, but China’s aggressive actions are provoking a counterbalancing coalition against it.
It’s hard to see how the Trump administration reconciles welcoming those fleeing Hong Kong with its opposition to almost all immigration.
EA: This is good! I’m particularly thrilled to see that the Conservative Party government in Britain was able to overcome its anti-immigration tendencies in this case, given the historic obligation that Britain owes to the citizens of Hong Kong.
But the absence of any concrete promises from the United States is notable. You can’t believe that this administration will honestly open up immigration to fleeing Hong Kongers? The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act, which offers Hong Kong residents refugee status, is likely headed to the president’s desk for signature soon. But given his prior stances on refugees—and his unwillingness to challenge Xi Jinping on other human rights abuses—I’m not so sure he won’t veto it.
MK: It’s possible, but the president has surprised me before with his tough actions on China. It took courage to push back on China’s unfair trade practices at a time when everyone was getting rich doing business there.
And there is value in getting major partners aligned on the China threat. Hong Kong is the near-term crisis, but China will present a long-term challenge to the global economic system, to U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and to freedom and democracy around the world.
EA: But this administration is even trying to end skilled immigration. They just announced that all students whose classes cannot be held in person due to the coronavirus will have their visas revoked and must return home.
MK: Darn, we were just having such a good fight and now we will have to agree. Brain drain is one of America’s superpowers. There is an illegal immigration problem that needs to be fixed, but the United States should continue to recruit the best and the brightest from around the world to study at American universities and to entice them to stay and contribute to the country’s economic and cultural dynamism.
But agreement is boring. Let’s get back to regime change.
EA: Well, Harvard University’s Stephen M. Walt has a great column up this week here at Foreign Policy in which he argues that the U.S. response to COVID-19 pretty definitively proves that if Washington can’t manage its own problems, it’s not capable of successfully engaging in regime change. He’s got a point.
MK: Walt and others have overlearned the lessons of the Iraq War. Yes, invading a country, overthrowing the government, deploying more than 100,000 troops, and staying for a decade should only be undertaken with extreme caution, if at all. But regime change (pressuring autocratic regimes, promoting democracy and human rights, etc.) should still be an important tool in the U.S. foreign-policy toolkit.
EA: You’re the professor, not me. So you’re aware of the academic research on regime change that shows that it’s almost never successful for a simple reason: It’s hard to impose a government from abroad that can be both accountable to the population and responsive to a foreign sponsor. That’s why the governments Washington imposes usually end in disaster, whether it’s the shah’s fall and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, or Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fomenting sectarianism in Iraq. And Walt’s point that if the U.S. government can’t even create a coronavirus testing infrastructure at home, then it probably can’t run a different country, is even more persuasive.
I’m more open to debate on the peaceful forms of democracy promotion: helping activists, providing technology, etc. But is there even a single successful case of U.S.-led regime change through force?
MK: Let’s see. Germany. Japan. And it depends on how you define success. The Iraq War was costly, but I am glad Saddam Hussein is no longer in power.
EA: You’re right about Germany and Japan, but it was under very different circumstances: the end of a world war, with multilateral occupation by all the world’s key advanced powers. And those states were already coherent nation-states with good, solid institutions. Regime change might be possible in those cases, but why would the United States want to pursue it? If the only places regime change can succeed are advanced industrialized states, that’s hardly helpful. Unless you want to engage in regime change in Norway to make sure that Trump finally gets the Norwegian refugees he wants so badly?
MK: The existing academic research on regime change is narrow and doesn’t really speak to the full range of issues policymakers must consider. There is a difference between weakening an autocratic rival and turning it into Switzerland. The former can be valuable even if the latter is impossible.
The greatest threats to the security of the United States and its allies come from autocracies: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Autocratic mismanagement in Venezuela is posing real problems in the United States’ own backyard. These regimes are brittle, and they fear their own people more than anything else. Why give them sanctuary?
EA: Three of those have nuclear weapons, which makes regime change rather more costly than Americans typically expect. And I think you are seriously overstating the extent to which Iran’s people are willing to overthrow its government. They may dislike it; they probably want reform. But that doesn’t mean they’re about to take up arms, especially to help a foreign power that—for historical reasons—is already widely distrusted. And it wouldn’t be easy, either: Major protests were suppressed by the government as recently as early 2020.
The bottom line, however, is that I fail to see how it’s in U.S. interests to consider regime change in any of those cases. The potential upsides are small, while the downsides are possibly disastrous: anything from a failed state with loose nukes to another 20-year insurgency.
MK: So you would prefer that Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union were still in existence? All of America’s major 20th-century rivalries ended with the regime collapse of the autocratic rival. And the same will likely be true in the 21st century.
EA: You think the United States should fight World War III?
MK: I prefer the Cold War model. But this is not some peculiarity of U.S. decision-makers. Good strategy is all about leveraging one’s strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. And regime fragility is the autocrat’s Achilles’ heel. President Xi has made China’s problem even worse by eliminating institutionalized procedures for leadership transition. The same is largely true for Vladimir Putin in Russia, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The only way Xi, Putin, Kim, and Khamenei are leaving office is in a coffin—and then what comes next? It could be a smooth transition to a hand-picked successor, but it could also be the end of a government hostile to the United States.
EA: It’s still a big risk, one with significant implications for Americans. You know, you really do have to watch Hamilton. Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical might be a bit dramatized, but he gets some things right about historical U.S. foreign policy. One of them is that U.S. interests should be paramount, even when they conflict with American values. Unlike Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton argued smartly and successfully for neutrality during France’s revolutionary wars. Hamilton helped George Washington draft his farewell address, in which he argued that the country’s interests would be best served by staying out of European power politics.
American values are important. As John Quincy Adams put it, Americans should be well-wishers to the freedom and liberty of all. But it’s not the United States’ job to destroy foreign monsters.
MK: The world has changed since then. And Adams didn’t practice what he preached. But I think we’re out of space. Let’s pick this up next time?
EA: Don’t modulate the key, then not debate with me!


foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--Europe Needs to Push Back Against Trump

Europe Needs to Push Back Against Trump

Europe Needs to Push Back Against Trump In the last three years , the Trump administration has fractured the United States ’ relationship with its European partners .
The most recent manifestation of this was the sudden decision to remove 9,500 U.S. troops from Germany by September , a move that sent shockwaves through NATO .
But this is just one of many instances in which the United States has shown disregard for the wishes and concerns of European partners .
Despite international pushback , Washington withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces ( INF ) Treaty in 2019 and this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Open Skies Treaty .
After the bombshell revelations from former National Security Advisor John Bolton ’ s book , European fears of American abandonment seem more probable than ever .
This includes the possibility of being trapped by the often quixotic foreign-policy decisions emanating from Washington .
For example , the abrupt decision last fall to remove U.S. Special Forces from northern Syria both disheartened Kurdish forces and also caught Europe off guard .
In light of this , trans-Atlantic partners are walking on eggshells with the Trump administration .
But this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as reluctance to push the United States to uphold the structures that are the backbone of European security could ultimately undermine its position and weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance .
Europe should leverage American domestic support for the alliance by working with congressional leaders to secure long-term cooperation .
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg ’ s response to the U.S. withdrawal from yet another confidence-building treaty has been paltry .
In May , in response to the U.S. announcement of its intentions to pull out from the Open Skies Treaty , he stated that NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support , and further strengthen arms control , disarmament , and non-proliferation … taking into account the prevailing security environment.
” But NATO can ’ t do this without its largest contributor .
Some European states , including France , Germany , and Belgium , have released a statement announcing their “ regret ” at the U.S. decision and reiterating that they have no intention to leave the treaty .
Even Russia does not appear to be abandoning the treaty , leaving the United States as the outlier .
But without one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , will it still have staying power ?
As for reports of the Trump administration cutting troop levels in Germany to 25,000 personnel , German officials were initially in quiet denial .
When asked directly about these developments during the German Marshall Fund ’ s Brussels Forum early last month , German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said there was no “ official confirmation ” of this and it was only reported by “ one media outlet ” —the Wall Street Journal .
However , the report from this “ one media outlet ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee Republicans to issue a letter warning against the pullout .
Rumor gave way to confirmation as current White House National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien published an op-ed attempting to justify the Trump administration ’ s decision by using Germany ’ s lack of defense spending as an excuse .
“ It is time … for all European nations to contribute their fair share in defending their homelands , ” he wrote .
Perhaps countries like Germany would do so if they weren ’ t also providing the resources for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While open revolt against the American abandonment of arms control is not the answer , trans-Atlantic partners should play a more active role in putting pressure on the United States to remain a party to agreements like the INF Treaty .
The agreements were made with European security in mind , and Europe will be the first victim if Russia is released from the legal fetters imposed by the INF Treaty .
Europeans should use American domestic support to talk President Donald Trump down from his threats to leave the alliance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for NATO in Congress .
Last year , Stoltenberg ’ s address on Capitol Hill to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the alliance received positive feedback .
Even average Americans agree that NATO is indispensable to U.S. global security .
Though Europeans are usually hesitant when it comes to interfering in domestic politics , using Trump ’ s vulnerabilities at home could help provide the alliance with resilience it needs to withstand a possible second term of his presidency .
There are some allies such as Poland ’ s President Andrzej Duda who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their own short-term domestic interests , while undermining the long-term cohesion of NATO .
But as a whole , Europeans should fear abandonment by the United States more than receiving a verbal backlash from the Trump administration—especially as it moves into what may be its final months .
As for Open Skies , many have pointed out that European NATO states ’ capacity to track Russian military movements in the region would be diminished .
The four multinational NATO battalion groups deployed to the Baltics and Poland as part of NATO ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they not be able to mobilize quickly in case of a Russian military incursion .
This erosion of information-sharing and confidence-building exposes the vulnerabilities in NATO and , in turn , benefits Russia ’ s strategic interests .
Europe is not the exclusive beneficiary of strong trans-Atlantic ties—which is precisely why the Europeans have more leverage than they might suppose .
American military bases in Germany are vital for drone communications , host both U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command , and contain military hospitals that have saved many hundreds of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Middle East .
If the United States is serious about great-power competition being the top national security threat , it can not forget the alliances that made it the great power it is today .
The 2018 National Defense Strategy supports reinforcing the trans-Atlantic NATO alliance to “ deter Russian adventurism.
” To not uphold these principles is antithetical to American strategic goals and will further diminish the little remaining goodwill the United States has globally .
It is important that Europe recognize that an overwhelming number of Americans , including those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Taking advantage of that could impact whether or not Trump does the unthinkable and leaves NATO to fend for itself .
It is true that wealthy NATO members like Germany have consistently failed to uphold their defense spending obligations .
But fear of hypocrisy should not lead Berlin to shrink back from holding Washington accountable to its commitments as well .
A recent report from the Berlin-based think tank Global Public Policy Institute reveals that younger Germans increasingly want their country to engage with and take on more responsibility in the international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German Studies has recently put forth recommendations for strengthening the relationship by establishing dialogue between House and Senate committees on foreign affairs and their German Bundestag counterparts .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already taken a firm stance against Trump by refusing to attend a G-7 meeting that would include Russian President Vladimir Putin .
Germany should leverage its unique position in the alliance to remind the Trump administration that without its support , the United States will not be able to project power in such parts of the world as Africa and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until November and the possibility of a new U.S. president will not be enough .
Europeans can not mince words while the damage of the Trump administration continues to accumulate , perhaps even leading to an irreversible rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance .
If European states are serious about preserving the alliance , they must put diplomatic pressure on the United States before it ’ s too late .
Alliance contributions should not only be measured in terms of the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense spending but must also include diplomatic efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ultimately , alive .

In the last three years, the Trump administration has fractured the United States’ relationship with its European partners. The most recent manifestation of this was the sudden decision to remove 9,500 U.S. troops from Germany by September, a move that sent shockwaves through NATO.
In the last three years, the Trump administration has fractured the United States’ relationship with its European partners. The most recent manifestation of this was the sudden decision to remove 9,500 U.S. troops from Germany by September, a move that sent shockwaves through NATO.
But this is just one of many instances in which the United States has shown disregard for the wishes and concerns of European partners. Despite international pushback, Washington withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and this May announced its intentions to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty.
After the bombshell revelations from former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s book, European fears of American abandonment seem more probable than ever. This includes the possibility of being trapped by the often quixotic foreign-policy decisions emanating from Washington. For example, the abrupt decision last fall to remove U.S. Special Forces from northern Syria both disheartened Kurdish forces and also caught Europe off guard. In light of this, trans-Atlantic partners are walking on eggshells with the Trump administration. But this excessive caution has serious negative consequences, as reluctance to push the United States to uphold the structures that are the backbone of European security could ultimately undermine its position and weaken the trans-Atlantic alliance. Europe should leverage American domestic support for the alliance by working with congressional leaders to secure long-term cooperation.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s response to the U.S. withdrawal from yet another confidence-building treaty has been paltry. In May, in response to the U.S. announcement of its intentions to pull out from the Open Skies Treaty, he stated that NATO allies “will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation … taking into account the prevailing security environment.” But NATO can’t do this without its largest contributor. Some European states, including France, Germany, and Belgium, have released a statement announcing their “regret” at the U.S. decision and reiterating that they have no intention to leave the treaty. Even Russia does not appear to be abandoning the treaty, leaving the United States as the outlier. But without one of the two largest countries in the treaty, will it still have staying power?
As for reports of the Trump administration cutting troop levels in Germany to 25,000 personnel, German officials were initially in quiet denial. When asked directly about these developments during the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum early last month, German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said there was no “official confirmation” of this and it was only reported by “one media outlet”—the Wall Street Journal. However, the report from this “one media outlet” was enough to rouse House Armed Services Committee Republicans to issue a letter warning against the pullout. Rumor gave way to confirmation as current White House National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien published an op-ed attempting to justify the Trump administration’s decision by using Germany’s lack of defense spending as an excuse. “It is time … for all European nations to contribute their fair share in defending their homelands,” he wrote. Perhaps countries like Germany would do so if they weren’t also providing the resources for the United States to defend its own homeland.
While open revolt against the American abandonment of arms control is not the answer, trans-Atlantic partners should play a more active role in putting pressure on the United States to remain a party to agreements like the INF Treaty. The agreements were made with European security in mind, and Europe will be the first victim if Russia is released from the legal fetters imposed by the INF Treaty. Europeans should use American domestic support to talk President Donald Trump down from his threats to leave the alliance. Despite appearances, there is bipartisan support for NATO in Congress. Last year, Stoltenberg’s address on Capitol Hill to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the alliance received positive feedback. Even average Americans agree that NATO is indispensable to U.S. global security. Though Europeans are usually hesitant when it comes to interfering in domestic politics, using Trump’s vulnerabilities at home could help provide the alliance with resilience it needs to withstand a possible second term of his presidency.
There are some allies such as Poland’s President Andrzej Duda who are embracing the Trump administration to advance their own short-term domestic interests, while undermining the long-term cohesion of NATO. But as a whole, Europeans should fear abandonment by the United States more than receiving a verbal backlash from the Trump administration—especially as it moves into what may be its final months. As for Open Skies, many have pointed out that European NATO states’ capacity to track Russian military movements in the region would be diminished. The four multinational NATO battalion groups deployed to the Baltics and Poland as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence would also suffer should they not be able to mobilize quickly in case of a Russian military incursion. This erosion of information-sharing and confidence-building exposes the vulnerabilities in NATO and, in turn, benefits Russia’s strategic interests.
Europe is not the exclusive beneficiary of strong trans-Atlantic ties—which is precisely why the Europeans have more leverage than they might suppose. American military bases in Germany are vital for drone communications, host both U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command, and contain military hospitals that have saved many hundreds of U.S. troops wounded during the recent conflicts in the Middle East.
If the United States is serious about great-power competition being the top national security threat, it cannot forget the alliances that made it the great power it is today. The 2018 National Defense Strategy supports reinforcing the trans-Atlantic NATO alliance to “deter Russian adventurism.” To not uphold these principles is antithetical to American strategic goals and will further diminish the little remaining goodwill the United States has globally. It is important that Europe recognize that an overwhelming number of Americans, including those in Congress, still support the alliance. Taking advantage of that could impact whether or not Trump does the unthinkable and leaves NATO to fend for itself.
It is true that wealthy NATO members like Germany have consistently failed to uphold their defense spending obligations. But fear of hypocrisy should not lead Berlin to shrink back from holding Washington accountable to its commitments as well. A recent report from the Berlin-based think tank Global Public Policy Institute reveals that younger Germans increasingly want their country to engage with and take on more responsibility in the international system. The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies has recently put forth recommendations for strengthening the relationship by establishing dialogue between House and Senate committees on foreign affairs and their German Bundestag counterparts. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has already taken a firm stance against Trump by refusing to attend a G-7 meeting that would include Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Germany should leverage its unique position in the alliance to remind the Trump administration that without its support, the United States will not be able to project power in such parts of the world as Africa and the Middle East.
However, waiting until November and the possibility of a new U.S. president will not be enough. Europeans cannot mince words while the damage of the Trump administration continues to accumulate, perhaps even leading to an irreversible rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance. If European states are serious about preserving the alliance, they must put diplomatic pressure on the United States before it’s too late. Alliance contributions should not only be measured in terms of the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense spending but must also include diplomatic efforts to keep the alliance relevant and, ultimately, alive.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--Xu Zhangrun Was China’s Loyal Opposition. Now, He’s In Jail.

Xu Zhangrun Was China ’ s Loyal Opposition .
Now , He ’ s In Jail .
The knock at the door came Monday morning for Xu Zhangrun .
The Beijing-based legal scholar had long anticipated such a day would come , writing more than once that an essay might be his last and keeping a fresh change of clothes by the door of his home .
A score of police officers surrounded and seized him , reportedly with an accusation that he had solicited prostitutes—a charge so commonly trumped-up against dissidents that Xu himself previously warned it would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was a well-connected scholar at one of the country ’ s preeminent universities , Tsinghua .
Now he is in the opaque world of the party-state legal system , meaning months of detention without formal charge followed by a brief show trial .
It is perhaps easiest to define Xu ’ s place in the tradition of dissent to Chinese authoritarianism by first stating what he is not .
Xu Zhangrun is not an ethnic or religious minority .
He is not a human rights lawyer .
He is not a feminist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He is not known to have been a participant in the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement .
All these groups , and many others , have been targeted in Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s many strikes at opposition , real and imagined , to absolutist rule since his ascension to power in 2012 .
Xu ’ s role in the vanishingly thin network of resistance to the Chinese Communist Party ’ s spreading social control is different than leaders in each of those laudable groups .
Xu is a scholar and critic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clearly sees himself in the tradition of reformist personages going back to the imperial era .
Figures such as Zhang Zhidong ( 1837-1909 ) remained loyal to China but sought to reform the Qing empire and reconcile Chinese sociopolitical traditions with the impositions of foreign thought .
This tradition is perhaps vaguely similar to the notion of the loyal opposition in Europe .
Xu ’ s writings are critical of Chinese political power structures but always evince a care for the well-being of the Chinese nation .
It was this visible affection for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initially thrive as a scholar .
Xu ’ s first monograph , which began as his doctoral dissertation , provides a clue to his character .
He discusses the thought of Liang Shuming , a notable scholar and official in the 20th century whose criticism of Mao Zedong in the early 1950s drew a sharp rebuke from Mao himself .
Xu openly admires Liang , writing that he was “ m by rooting it within China ’ s cultural heritage .
Liang did not call for the end of the Communist Party or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Liang criticized Mao and others not only for the mistakes of the early years after the revolution but for seeking social transformations by locating modernity only within external traditions of thought , “ whether of the Euro-American variety or later Soviet.
” Xu and Liang both view communism as foreign to Chinese culture , despite all efforts by the party to weld itself to Chinese nationalism and social traditions .
“ Can groups of humans who were bounded with home-grown traditions survive by totally shifting to those of others , after they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xu asks , noting the risk of social dysphoria caused by the broad application of any system not rooted within China ’ s own culture , whether liberal or socialist in nature .
Without deep roots in the “ solid meaningful soil ” of Chinese culture , he argues , the legitimacy of any legal system is questionable .
While Xu praised the reforms of the early 1980s , his suggestion in his work on Liang Shuming that the legal system ’ s legitimacy requires a deeper foundation in Chinese culture is different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese characteristics.
” Xu finds in Liang ’ s work and in the Confucian tradition a basis for equality before the law , and the law standing above any person or movement .
Further , he argues that a central tenet of Chinese tradition is that a contemporary political authority may not so dominate as to impede the processes of human reason .
This is quite different from the party ’ s notion of Chinese characteristics consisting of an overwhelming central authority , a mixed economy with market and socialist aspects , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not reject the Communist Party ’ s rule outright , even in his harshest criticisms , Xu does not call for an end to the party-state nor even directly call for democracy .
Instead , in the 2018 essay that brought him much greater prominence , “ Imminent Fears , Immediate Hopes—A Beijing Jeremiad , ” he offers a series of reforms that he says would improve the social harmony and well-being of the Chinese nation .
Perhaps Xu ’ s most penetrating insight in this essay was to dissect just how toxic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limits was .
Xu argues that a limit of 10 years on a leader ’ s term meant greater tranquility for the Chinese people— “ one less thing to worry about ” as the chances of “ yet another period of political instability ” were reduced .
“ Despite all the vacuous hoopla about other kinds of political reform initiatives , ” Xu contends , the establishment of term limits in the 1980s had been “ the only tangible example of real political reform and progress in China ” in three decades that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
By further concentrating power , China risked returning “ back to the Dark Ages ” of personality cults ruining the lives of ordinary Chinese .
As his own freedoms were relentlessly curtailed , this year Xu allowed himself to admit his own emotions were closest to “ righteous indignation ” ( a term he carefully delineated as Western ) when he considered the political system that had allowed the coronavirus to flourish while stripping him of his occupation for merely writing an essay .
Though he despaired that scholars such as himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called on fellow Chinese to “ rage against this injustice.
” In his last missive , he even dared to call openly for independent political parties to be formed .
What happened to Xu on Monday is part of the larger constriction of political , social , and cultural thought occurring in China under Xi .
Mirroring the aggressive maneuvers Xi has pursued at China ’ s periphery while the world is distracted with the coronavirus , it reaches nearly every corner of society .
It is becoming more formalized with each passing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party removed the phrase “ freedom of thought ” from the charters of several major universities , replacing it with language insisting upon allegiance to the party .
It remains to be seen how successful the party will be at erasing every smudge of dissent .
So far , no force of sufficient power has resisted it .
The link that once led to Xu ’ s biographical page on the website of Tsinghua University now leads only to an error message stating that the page can not be found .

The knock at the door came Monday morning for Xu Zhangrun. The Beijing-based legal scholar had long anticipated such a day would come, writing more than once that an essay might be his last and keeping a fresh change of clothes by the door of his home. A score of police officers surrounded and seized him, reportedly with an accusation that he had solicited prostitutes—a charge so commonly trumped-up against dissidents that Xu himself previously warned it would be used against him. Until recently, he was a well-connected scholar at one of the country’s preeminent universities, Tsinghua. Now he is in the opaque world of the party-state legal system, meaning months of detention without formal charge followed by a brief show trial.
The knock at the door came Monday morning for Xu Zhangrun. The Beijing-based legal scholar had long anticipated such a day would come, writing more than once that an essay might be his last and keeping a fresh change of clothes by the door of his home. A score of police officers surrounded and seized him, reportedly with an accusation that he had solicited prostitutes—a charge so commonly trumped-up against dissidents that Xu himself previously warned it would be used against him. Until recently, he was a well-connected scholar at one of the country’s preeminent universities, Tsinghua. Now he is in the opaque world of the party-state legal system, meaning months of detention without formal charge followed by a brief show trial.
It is perhaps easiest to define Xu’s place in the tradition of dissent to Chinese authoritarianism by first stating what he is not. Xu Zhangrun is not an ethnic or religious minority. He is not a human rights lawyer. He is not a feminist activist. He is not an artist. He is not known to have been a participant in the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement. All these groups, and many others, have been targeted in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s many strikes at opposition, real and imagined, to absolutist rule since his ascension to power in 2012.
Xu’s role in the vanishingly thin network of resistance to the Chinese Communist Party’s spreading social control is different than leaders in each of those laudable groups. Xu is a scholar and critic seeking reform, not revolution. He clearly sees himself in the tradition of reformist personages going back to the imperial era. Figures such as Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) remained loyal to China but sought to reform the Qing empire and reconcile Chinese sociopolitical traditions with the impositions of foreign thought. This tradition is perhaps vaguely similar to the notion of the loyal opposition in Europe. Xu’s writings are critical of Chinese political power structures but always evince a care for the well-being of the Chinese nation. It was this visible affection for his native land that allowed him to initially thrive as a scholar.
Xu’s first monograph, which began as his doctoral dissertation, provides a clue to his character. He discusses the thought of Liang Shuming, a notable scholar and official in the 20th century whose criticism of Mao Zedong in the early 1950s drew a sharp rebuke from Mao himself. Xu openly admires Liang, writing that he was “a great human being.” Xu presents the fundamental question of his study as how to forge legitimacy in the legal system by rooting it within China’s cultural heritage. Liang did not call for the end of the Communist Party or flee the country. As Xu explains, Liang criticized Mao and others not only for the mistakes of the early years after the revolution but for seeking social transformations by locating modernity only within external traditions of thought, “whether of the Euro-American variety or later Soviet.”
Chinese police
Xu and Liang both view communism as foreign to Chinese culture, despite all efforts by the party to weld itself to Chinese nationalism and social traditions. “Can groups of humans who were bounded with home-grown traditions survive by totally shifting to those of others, after they have destroyed their own traditions?” Xu asks, noting the risk of social dysphoria caused by the broad application of any system not rooted within China’s own culture, whether liberal or socialist in nature. Without deep roots in the “solid meaningful soil” of Chinese culture, he argues, the legitimacy of any legal system is questionable.
While Xu praised the reforms of the early 1980s, his suggestion in his work on Liang Shuming that the legal system’s legitimacy requires a deeper foundation in Chinese culture is different than the party’s oft-touted “Chinese characteristics.” Xu finds in Liang’s work and in the Confucian tradition a basis for equality before the law, and the law standing above any person or movement. Further, he argues that a central tenet of Chinese tradition is that a contemporary political authority may not so dominate as to impede the processes of human reason. This is quite different from the party’s notion of Chinese characteristics consisting of an overwhelming central authority, a mixed economy with market and socialist aspects, and Han favoritism.
Just as Liang did not reject the Communist Party’s rule outright, even in his harshest criticisms, Xu does not call for an end to the party-state nor even directly call for democracy. Instead, in the 2018 essay that brought him much greater prominence, “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes—A Beijing Jeremiad,” he offers a series of reforms that he says would improve the social harmony and well-being of the Chinese nation. Perhaps Xu’s most penetrating insight in this essay was to dissect just how toxic Xi’s abolition of presidential term limits was. Xu argues that a limit of 10 years on a leader’s term meant greater tranquility for the Chinese people—“one less thing to worry about” as the chances of “yet another period of political instability” were reduced. “Despite all the vacuous hoopla about other kinds of political reform initiatives,” Xu contends, the establishment of term limits in the 1980s had been “the only tangible example of real political reform and progress in China” in three decades that was actually meaningful to ordinary Chinese people. By further concentrating power, China risked returning “back to the Dark Ages” of personality cults ruining the lives of ordinary Chinese.
As his own freedoms were relentlessly curtailed, this year Xu allowed himself to admit his own emotions were closest to “righteous indignation” (a term he carefully delineated as Western) when he considered the political system that had allowed the coronavirus to flourish while stripping him of his occupation for merely writing an essay. Though he despaired that scholars such as himself were “useless,” he still called on fellow Chinese to “rage against this injustice.” In his last missive, he even dared to call openly for independent political parties to be formed.
What happened to Xu on Monday is part of the larger constriction of political, social, and cultural thought occurring in China under Xi. Mirroring the aggressive maneuvers Xi has pursued at China’s periphery while the world is distracted with the coronavirus, it reaches nearly every corner of society. It is becoming more formalized with each passing day.
Late last year, the party removed the phrase “freedom of thought” from the charters of several major universities, replacing it with language insisting upon allegiance to the party. It remains to be seen how successful the party will be at erasing every smudge of dissent. So far, no force of sufficient power has resisted it. The link that once led to Xu’s biographical page on the website of Tsinghua University now leads only to an error message stating that the page cannot be found.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--Trump Promotes Senior Diplomats, Including Star Impeachment Witness

President Donald Trump this week signed off on promotions for a batch of senior U.S. diplomats including George Kent , a State Department official who became a key witness in the president ’ s impeachment trial , officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
While many officials drawn into the impeachment investigation resigned or were forced out of office , including top diplomats , Kent has kept his job as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs .
Kent ’ s job standing and promotion were seen by some diplomats as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go inside the State Department in the aftermath of impeachment .
Kent and a group of other diplomats were first recommended by the State Department for promotions in the ranks of the senior foreign service last summer , months before the House-led impeachment investigation began .
The promotion list that included Kent was sent to the White House during the fall , when the impeachment investigation began ramping up .
The list remained in the White House ’ s hands for months without moving to the Senate for confirmation votes , several officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the list in June , and the president signed off on the promotions this week , the officials said .
Kent ’ s promotion comes the same week that another star witness in the impeachment trial , Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman , resigned after a 21-year career in the Army following a “ campaign of bullying , intimidation , and retaliation , ” according to his lawyer .
Vindman was sacked from his job on the National Security Council after testifying in the trial about the president ’ s efforts to block military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to investigate Trump ’ s Democratic rival , former Vice President Joe Biden .
Many career diplomats were angered when senior administration officials—including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—did nothing to shield civil servants from political attacks when they were thrust into the impeachment spotlight , including former U.S .
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch , who was ousted from her job following a smear campaign by the president ’ s associates .
These diplomats , including colleagues of Kent who spoke to Foreign Policy , feared that his career would be upended before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is good news—it suggests a certain normality in State Department promotion procedures , despite all the peculiarities last fall , ” said John Herbst , a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine .
“ An outstanding officer received a well-deserved promotion , which is how it ’ s supposed to work.
” Remembered for his signature bow tie as well as his sober testimony , Kent emerged as a crucial witness during the impeachment hearings .
A career foreign service officer with a deep understanding of Ukraine , Kent was able to give a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kyiv and how it was undermined by Trump ’ s lawyer , Rudy Giuliani , and his allies as they sought to unearth compromising information on Biden and his son Hunter , who served on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was vice president .
“ It was unexpected , and most unfortunate , to watch some Americans—including those who allied themselves with corrupt Ukrainians in pursuit of private agendas—launch attacks on dedicated public servants advancing U.S. interests in Ukraine , ” Kent said in his testimony .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. and Ukrainian national interests and damaged our critical bilateral relationship.
” Kent , like the other sitting government officials who testified in the impeachment trial , was compelled to do so by congressional subpoena .
Trump was acquitted of all charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress on mostly partisan lines in early February .
Promotions in the senior foreign service require approvals from State Department promotion boards , then presidential nomination and Senate confirmation .
State Department officials described promoting batches of senior foreign service officers as a largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or rigorous political reviews of other presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed positions such as ambassador posts .
It would be highly unusual for the White House to block promotions within the senior foreign service or take officers off the list before passing along to the Senate , officials said .
But the president broke precedent in the past to remove other officials involved in the impeachment probe from their posts .
Trump sacked the U.S. intelligence community ’ s inspector general who first reviewed the whistleblower complaint that sparked the impeachment investigation .
Several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern over the president ’ s policy of withholding military aid to Ukraine were also forced out of their jobs this year .
Vindman ’ s brother , also a National Security Council aide , was removed from his post at the White House the same day as his brother—days after Trump ’ s acquittal—despite having no role in the impeachment trial .
Yovanovitch , another career foreign service officer who was ambassador to Ukraine , retired from the State Department after she was pulled from her post in Kyiv following a smear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compelled to testify in the impeachment trial .
Bill Taylor , a former diplomat pulled back into the service to serve as acting ambassador after Yovanovitch left , was also removed from his post a week ahead of his planned departure in January , just before a visit by Pompeo to Kyiv .
The White House did not respond to a request for comment for this story .

President Donald Trump this week signed off on promotions for a batch of senior U.S. diplomats including George Kent, a State Department official who became a key witness in the president’s impeachment trial, officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
President Donald Trump this week signed off on promotions for a batch of senior U.S. diplomats including George Kent, a State Department official who became a key witness in the president’s impeachment trial, officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
While many officials drawn into the impeachment investigation resigned or were forced out of office, including top diplomats, Kent has kept his job as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Kent’s job standing and promotion were seen by some diplomats as a bellwether for how far political retaliation would go inside the State Department in the aftermath of impeachment.
Kent and a group of other diplomats were first recommended by the State Department for promotions in the ranks of the senior foreign service last summer, months before the House-led impeachment investigation began. The promotion list that included Kent was sent to the White House during the fall, when the impeachment investigation began ramping up. The list remained in the White House’s hands for months without moving to the Senate for confirmation votes, several officials told Foreign Policy. The Senate approved the list in June, and the president signed off on the promotions this week, the officials said.
Kent’s promotion comes the same week that another star witness in the impeachment trial, Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, resigned after a 21-year career in the Army following a “campaign of bullying, intimidation, and retaliation,” according to his lawyer. Vindman was sacked from his job on the National Security Council after testifying in the trial about the president’s efforts to block military aid to Ukraine unless the country agreed to investigate Trump’s Democratic rival, former Vice President Joe Biden.
Many career diplomats were angered when senior administration officials—including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—did nothing to shield civil servants from political attacks when they were thrust into the impeachment spotlight, including former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, who was ousted from her job following a smear campaign by the president’s associates. These diplomats, including colleagues of Kent who spoke to Foreign Policy, feared that his career would be upended before learning of his promotion.
“This is good news—it suggests a certain normality in State Department promotion procedures, despite all the peculiarities last fall,” said John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. “An outstanding officer received a well-deserved promotion, which is how it’s supposed to work.”
Remembered for his signature bow tie as well as his sober testimony, Kent emerged as a crucial witness during the impeachment hearings. A career foreign service officer with a deep understanding of Ukraine, Kent was able to give a long-lens view on U.S. foreign policy toward Kyiv and how it was undermined by Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, and his allies as they sought to unearth compromising information on Biden and his son Hunter, who served on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was vice president.
“It was unexpected, and most unfortunate, to watch some Americans—including those who allied themselves with corrupt Ukrainians in pursuit of private agendas—launch attacks on dedicated public servants advancing U.S. interests in Ukraine,” Kent said in his testimony. “In my opinion, those attacks undermined U.S. and Ukrainian national interests and damaged our critical bilateral relationship.”
Kent, like the other sitting government officials who testified in the impeachment trial, was compelled to do so by congressional subpoena. Trump was acquitted of all charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress on mostly partisan lines in early February.
Promotions in the senior foreign service require approvals from State Department promotion boards, then presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. State Department officials described promoting batches of senior foreign service officers as a largely pro forma process, without the scrutiny or rigorous political reviews of other presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed positions such as ambassador posts. It would be highly unusual for the White House to block promotions within the senior foreign service or take officers off the list before passing along to the Senate, officials said.
But the president broke precedent in the past to remove other officials involved in the impeachment probe from their posts. Trump sacked the U.S. intelligence community’s inspector general who first reviewed the whistleblower complaint that sparked the impeachment investigation. Several other key Defense Department officials who expressed concern over the president’s policy of withholding military aid to Ukraine were also forced out of their jobs this year. Vindman’s brother, also a National Security Council aide, was removed from his post at the White House the same day as his brother—days after Trump’s acquittal—despite having no role in the impeachment trial.
Yovanovitch, another career foreign service officer who was ambassador to Ukraine, retired from the State Department after she was pulled from her post in Kyiv following a smear campaign by associates of the president and compelled to testify in the impeachment trial. Bill Taylor, a former diplomat pulled back into the service to serve as acting ambassador after Yovanovitch left, was also removed from his post a week ahead of his planned departure in January, just before a visit by Pompeo to Kyiv.
The White House did not respond to a request for comment for this story.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-10--The Turkish Government Closed a University Because It Fears Free Speech

The Turkish Government Closed a University Because It Fears Free Speech On June 30 , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a midnight decree , announcing the termination of educational activities at Istanbul Sehir University , a nonprofit private university known for its high educational standards .
The stated justification for the decision was the financial incapacity of the university to continue its activities .
The university , inaugurated in 2010 at a ceremony in which Erdogan himself participated , has come under increased political and financial pressures following an intraparty dispute between Erdogan and his former prime minister , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ university will render me and many colleagues unemployed at a difficult time .
This is not my first encounter with authoritarian governments that seek to intervene in the higher education sector .
I suffered from Turkey ’ s military-led authoritarianism in the 1990s , when my university degree obtained from Malaysia ’ s International Islamic University ( IIU ) was canceled following my graduation , forcing me to continue my education and academic career abroad .
The Malaysian IIU was conceived in 1982 with the participation of seven Muslim governments , including Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a secularist military regime at the time .
This is not my first encounter with authoritarian governments that seek to intervene in the higher education sector .
I suffered from Turkey ’ s military-led authoritarianism in the 1990s .
But that regime disliked anything associated with visible expressions of religious practice .
As part of a campaign to curb religious education during a time when the military controlled Turkish politics , the Turkish Higher Education Council—an authority created by the 1980 military junta to control all universities in the country , decided to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own graduation .
This decision effectively demoted me to the level of a high school graduate and made me unable to postpone compulsory military service and thus renew my passport .
At that time , I had to end my Ph.D. studies at the University of Tübingen in Germany and leave for the United States , where I could obtain a longer student visa .
These were the days that many members of Turkish conservative society remember as “ 28 February , ” referring to the date of the event when the military-imposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1997 , a process that eventually forced religious conservative Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign .
During this period , headscarf-wearing students could not enter universities , the bureaucracy , or the parliament , and severe restrictions were imposed on the graduates of religious high schools to enter universities .
The electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party ( AKP ) in 2002 was made possible by the massive popular reaction to this process .
In 2011 , with my degree recognized , I returned to contribute to the newly established Istanbul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ academic organization , the Foundation for Science and Arts , formed by a group of conservative academicians including Davutoglu , Sehir has earned a strong reputation both in Turkey and abroad .
In an open letter to Erdogan on May 20 , the Middle East Studies Association described Sehir “ as an autonomous institution of higher education that quickly established a strong reputation in numerous academic disciplines , ” adding that it “ was a haven for diverse viewpoints , and attracted some of the most distinguished scholars in Turkey.
” I was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a faculty member , partly as a reflection of my previous suffering , that I left behind a tenure-track position at a prestigious U.S. liberal arts college .
But now Sehir has fallen out of Erdogan ’ s favor .
As Davutoglu parted ways with the president and formed his own political party , formerly closed legal cases against the university were reopened , and the university came under severe legal and financial troubles .
Thousands of Sehir students are awaiting an uncertain future , and hundreds of Sehir faculty have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a time when finding an academic job is next to impossible amid the COVID-19 crisis .
My experience with authoritarian regimes cracking down on institutions they dislike continues , despite the seemingly different ideological predisposition of the ruling elites at different periods .
Of course , Sehir ’ s is not the first case of restrictions on academic freedom .
Throughout history , Turkey has experienced purges leading to the expulsion of hundreds of academics from their positions during periods of both military and civilian authoritarian rule .
Following the July 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many universities were closed down due to their alleged links with the Gulenists , the clandestine network connected to the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen that Turkey charges with plotting the coup attempt .
However , what specifically the Sehir closure case shows is that the fight has now taken a new stage and transformed into an internal battle within the ruling party .
Sehir ’ s closure will leave a deep scar in the conservative psyche as a case where the absolute power achieved through an electoral democratic revolution has turned against its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was a liberal university with many faculty members from various perspectives , it was still regarded as an institution built by conservative elites .
Its uniquely cosmopolitan campus culture was perhaps unmatched by any other institution in the country .
Despite its short duration , Sehir had the reputation of a first-class institution , and certainly , its closure will leave a deep scar in the conservative psyche as a case where the absolute power achieved through an electoral democratic revolution has turned against its own sons and daughters .
The two new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AKP directly addressed this trauma .
Davutoglu , who now leads a conservative party challenging the AKP , the Future ( Gelecek ) Party , blamed the closure directly on Erdogan .
And former AKP Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan , now the leader of the Democracy and Progress ( Deva ) Party , expressed his reaction on Twitter , describing the closure decision process as antagonistic and illegal .
In a sign indicating the emerging sprit of a multiparty pro-democracy alliance , the decision to close down Sehir was condemned by all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican People ’ s Party and the nationalist Good Party .
According to a study conducted by Sodev , an Istanbul-based research organization , a significant majority of young people ( 70 percent ) do not believe that their qualifications will be enough for them to find a job if they do not have sufficiently strong connections ; youth unemployment reached 27 percent in 2019 ; and 62 percent of youths indicate that they will leave the country to seek a professional career abroad if they have the opportunity to do so .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ people who consider themselves supporters of the ruling party confirm that they would do the same .
Youth unemployment reached 27 percent in 2019 ; and 62 percent of youths indicate that they will leave the country to seek a professional career abroad if they have the opportunity to do so .
The resentment felt by young members of Turkish society was clear during a YouTube live program organized by the president .
Young people stormed the site just to leave negative comments and press the “ dislike ” button , an incident @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to denounce social media .
Moreover , following some personal insults on Twitter against Erdogan ’ s daughter Esra Albayrak , who is the wife of Turkey ’ s finance minister , Berat Albayrak , there have been increased calls against social media companies .
Erdogan reiterated that he understands the importance of social media during his conversation with young Turks but later expressed his reaction against social media platforms that spread “ lies , slander , [ and ] attack [ s ] on personal rights and dignity.
” He called for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ social media outlets , specifically mentioning YouTube and Twitter .
The government demands that social media companies open offices in Turkey so that their financial structures and content can be officially scrutinized .
The government ’ s effective coalition partner , the Nationalist Movement Party , has vowed to close its own accounts on Twitter .
The campaign against Twitter is not new .
In 2014 , Turkey closed down the social media platform but the ban lasted only a month .
In an open challenge against the ban , former President Abdullah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s conservative political circles , expressed his reaction by sending a Twitter message .
Erdogan ’ s move against social media has been partly provoked by the suspension more than 7,000 pro-government accounts by Twitter labeled by the company as engaging in trolling activity .
This time , however , the move against social media platforms has been partly provoked by the suspension more than 7,000 pro-government accounts by Twitter labeled by the company as engaging in trolling activity .
Many of the pro-government trolls issue similar targeted insults against opposition leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closing down of such accounts is characterized by the ruling party ’ s deputy chair , Mahir Unal , as “ ideologically motivated ” and “ unlawful.
” Yet the larger reason for the government ’ s anger at social media companies is that they allow a platform for the opposition and critical voices .
Given the increased monopolization of conventional media organizations by pro-government figures , which severely limits the chance for the opposition to broadcast its opinions , Erdogan ’ s proposed restrictions on social media are motivated by political goals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the government control remain , and they are regularly penalized by the state media regulation authority .
However , the existence of social media renders the government ’ s attempts to control conventional media outlets ineffective , by allowing free speech on platforms that remain outside the government ’ s control .
More critically for the ruling AKP , new political parties formed by its former members—Davutoglu ’ s Gelecek and Babacan ’ s Deva—effectively utilize social media platforms to campaign and address the electorate .
Numerous interviews made with them by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conventional media sector are watched by millions of people on YouTube .
Without social media , the Turkish public will be condemned to government-owned and -controlled conventional channels .
Both Sehir ’ s closure and the government ’ s efforts against social media companies are indications of the ruling coalition ’ s desperation as Turkey faces a major economic crisis and a demographic shift Both Sehir ’ s closure and the government ’ s efforts against social media companies are indications of the ruling coalition ’ s desperation as Turkey faces a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that increases the number of young voters in the next elections .
Once a leader who inspired reform and democratization , Erdogan today is unable to project an image that energizes Turkey ’ s increasingly young society .
He is therefore seeking instead to control the mindset of educated young members of Turkish society by denying them access to a pluralistic academic and media environment .
There is still some room for optimism .
As history has shown , Turkey can not sustain close-minded authoritarianism for a long period .
Being an energy-poor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dynamic exporting economy with a liberal economic orientation .
This is only possible through openness to the outside world , exposure to a variety of ideas and viewpoints , and by keeping its youth hopeful about the future of their nation .

On June 30, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a midnight decree, announcing the termination of educational activities at Istanbul Sehir University, a nonprofit private university known for its high educational standards. The stated justification for the decision was the financial incapacity of the university to continue its activities. The university, inaugurated in 2010 at a ceremony in which Erdogan himself participated, has come under increased political and financial pressures following an intraparty dispute between Erdogan and his former prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The closure of the university will render me and many colleagues unemployed at a difficult time.
On June 30, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a midnight decree, announcing the termination of educational activities at Istanbul Sehir University, a nonprofit private university known for its high educational standards. The stated justification for the decision was the financial incapacity of the university to continue its activities. The university, inaugurated in 2010 at a ceremony in which Erdogan himself participated, has come under increased political and financial pressures following an intraparty dispute between Erdogan and his former prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The closure of the university will render me and many colleagues unemployed at a difficult time.
This is not my first encounter with authoritarian governments that seek to intervene in the higher education sector. I suffered from Turkey’s military-led authoritarianism in the 1990s, when my university degree obtained from Malaysia’s International Islamic University (IIU) was canceled following my graduation, forcing me to continue my education and academic career abroad. The Malaysian IIU was conceived in 1982 with the participation of seven Muslim governments, including Turkey, despite the fact that Turkey had a secularist military regime at the time.
This is not my first encounter with authoritarian governments that seek to intervene in the higher education sector. I suffered from Turkey’s military-led authoritarianism in the 1990s.
But that regime disliked anything associated with visible expressions of religious practice. As part of a campaign to curb religious education during a time when the military controlled Turkish politics, the Turkish Higher Education Council—an authority created by the 1980 military junta to control all universities in the country, decided to cancel the degree recognition shortly after my own graduation. This decision effectively demoted me to the level of a high school graduate and made me unable to postpone compulsory military service and thus renew my passport. At that time, I had to end my Ph.D. studies at the University of Tübingen in Germany and leave for the United States, where I could obtain a longer student visa.
These were the days that many members of Turkish conservative society remember as “28 February,” referring to the date of the event when the military-imposed National Security Council issued its memorandum in 1997, a process that eventually forced religious conservative Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. During this period, headscarf-wearing students could not enter universities, the bureaucracy, or the parliament, and severe restrictions were imposed on the graduates of religious high schools to enter universities. The electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 was made possible by the massive popular reaction to this process.
In 2011, with my degree recognized, I returned to contribute to the newly established Istanbul Sehir University. Built by a prestigious academic organization, the Foundation for Science and Arts, formed by a group of conservative academicians including Davutoglu, Sehir has earned a strong reputation both in Turkey and abroad. In an open letter to Erdogan on May 20, the Middle East Studies Association described Sehir “as an autonomous institution of higher education that quickly established a strong reputation in numerous academic disciplines,” adding that it “was a haven for diverse viewpoints, and attracted some of the most distinguished scholars in Turkey.” I was so motivated to join this new university as a faculty member, partly as a reflection of my previous suffering, that I left behind a tenure-track position at a prestigious U.S. liberal arts college.
But now Sehir has fallen out of Erdogan’s favor. As Davutoglu parted ways with the president and formed his own political party, formerly closed legal cases against the university were reopened, and the university came under severe legal and financial troubles. Thousands of Sehir students are awaiting an uncertain future, and hundreds of Sehir faculty have been forced to enter into the job market at a time when finding an academic job is next to impossible amid the COVID-19 crisis. My experience with authoritarian regimes cracking down on institutions they dislike continues, despite the seemingly different ideological predisposition of the ruling elites at different periods.
Of course, Sehir’s is not the first case of restrictions on academic freedom. Throughout history, Turkey has experienced purges leading to the expulsion of hundreds of academics from their positions during periods of both military and civilian authoritarian rule. Following the July 15, 2016, military coup attempt, many universities were closed down due to their alleged links with the Gulenists, the clandestine network connected to the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen that Turkey charges with plotting the coup attempt. However, what specifically the Sehir closure case shows is that the fight has now taken a new stage and transformed into an internal battle within the ruling party.
Sehir’s closure will leave a deep scar in the conservative psyche as a case where the absolute power achieved through an electoral democratic revolution has turned against its own sons and daughters.
Although Sehir was a liberal university with many faculty members from various perspectives, it was still regarded as an institution built by conservative elites. Its uniquely cosmopolitan campus culture was perhaps unmatched by any other institution in the country. Despite its short duration, Sehir had the reputation of a first-class institution, and certainly, its closure will leave a deep scar in the conservative psyche as a case where the absolute power achieved through an electoral democratic revolution has turned against its own sons and daughters. The two new conservative opposition parties formed from within the AKP directly addressed this trauma. Davutoglu, who now leads a conservative party challenging the AKP, the Future (Gelecek) Party, blamed the closure directly on Erdogan.
And former AKP Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan, now the leader of the Democracy and Progress (Deva) Party, expressed his reaction on Twitter, describing the closure decision process as antagonistic and illegal. In a sign indicating the emerging sprit of a multiparty pro-democracy alliance, the decision to close down Sehir was condemned by all other opposition parties, including the secularist Republican People’s Party and the nationalist Good Party.
Closing down a prestigious academic university on meager financial pretext is only a part of a larger political program of regressive authoritarianism. The ruling nationalist coalition is also trying to shape young minds by censoring social media. Turkey has a young and dynamic population; 1 in 6 people are between 15 and 24 years old.
According to a study conducted by Sodev, an Istanbul-based research organization, a significant majority of young people (70 percent) do not believe that their qualifications will be enough for them to find a job if they do not have sufficiently strong connections; youth unemployment reached 27 percent in 2019; and 62 percent of youths indicate that they will leave the country to seek a professional career abroad if they have the opportunity to do so. Even more dramatically, half of young people who consider themselves supporters of the ruling party confirm that they would do the same.
Youth unemployment reached 27 percent in 2019; and 62 percent of youths indicate that they will leave the country to seek a professional career abroad if they have the opportunity to do so.
The resentment felt by young members of Turkish society was clear during a YouTube live program organized by the president. Young people stormed the site just to leave negative comments and press the “dislike” button, an incident that seems to have triggered the government to denounce social media. Moreover, following some personal insults on Twitter against Erdogan’s daughter Esra Albayrak, who is the wife of Turkey’s finance minister, Berat Albayrak, there have been increased calls against social media companies.
Erdogan reiterated that he understands the importance of social media during his conversation with young Turks but later expressed his reaction against social media platforms that spread “lies, slander, [and] attack[s] on personal rights and dignity.” He called for a parliamentary motion to remove and control social media outlets, specifically mentioning YouTube and Twitter. The government demands that social media companies open offices in Turkey so that their financial structures and content can be officially scrutinized. The government’s effective coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party, has vowed to close its own accounts on Twitter.
The campaign against Twitter is not new. In 2014, Turkey closed down the social media platform but the ban lasted only a month. In an open challenge against the ban, former President Abdullah Gul, a liberal voice in Turkey’s conservative political circles, expressed his reaction by sending a Twitter message.
Erdogan’s move against social media has been partly provoked by the suspension more than 7,000 pro-government accounts by Twitter labeled by the company as engaging in trolling activity.
This time, however, the move against social media platforms has been partly provoked by the suspension more than 7,000 pro-government accounts by Twitter labeled by the company as engaging in trolling activity. Many of the pro-government trolls issue similar targeted insults against opposition leaders and their families. Still, the closing down of such accounts is characterized by the ruling party’s deputy chair, Mahir Unal, as “ideologically motivated” and “unlawful.” Yet the larger reason for the government’s anger at social media companies is that they allow a platform for the opposition and critical voices.
Given the increased monopolization of conventional media organizations by pro-government figures, which severely limits the chance for the opposition to broadcast its opinions, Erdogan’s proposed restrictions on social media are motivated by political goals.
Only a few media organizations out of the government control remain, and they are regularly penalized by the state media regulation authority. However, the existence of social media renders the government’s attempts to control conventional media outlets ineffective, by allowing free speech on platforms that remain outside the government’s control.
More critically for the ruling AKP, new political parties formed by its former members—Davutoglu’s Gelecek and Babacan’s Deva—effectively utilize social media platforms to campaign and address the electorate. Numerous interviews made with them by independent journalists who lost their jobs in the conventional media sector are watched by millions of people on YouTube. Without social media, the Turkish public will be condemned to government-owned and -controlled conventional channels.
Both Sehir’s closure and the government’s efforts against social media companies are indications of the ruling coalition’s desperation as Turkey faces a major economic crisis and a demographic shift
Both Sehir’s closure and the government’s efforts against social media companies are indications of the ruling coalition’s desperation as Turkey faces a major economic crisis and a demographic shift that increases the number of young voters in the next elections.
Once a leader who inspired reform and democratization, Erdogan today is unable to project an image that energizes Turkey’s increasingly young society. He is therefore seeking instead to control the mindset of educated young members of Turkish society by denying them access to a pluralistic academic and media environment.
There is still some room for optimism. As history has shown, Turkey cannot sustain close-minded authoritarianism for a long period. Being an energy-poor nation, it needs to be a dynamic exporting economy with a liberal economic orientation. This is only possible through openness to the outside world, exposure to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, and by keeping its youth hopeful about the future of their nation.