foreignpolicy--2020-12-14--Brexit Deadline Is Ditched as Both Sides Agree to Go “Extra Mile”

Brexit Deadline Is Ditched as Both Sides Agree to Go “ Extra Mile ” Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : EU and U.K. agree to keep Brexit negotiations going , U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments hacked , and Trump threatens NDAA veto .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Brexit negotiations are to continue through this week as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson agreed to keep talking .
In joint a statement issued on Sunday , the pair said it was “ responsible at this point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadline after deadline has been missed in Brexit negotiations between the European Union and United Kingdom , you ’ d be forgiven for thinking that an extra mile might be underestimating the actual distance between the two sides .
Especially because , after months of discussions , a dispute still remains on the issue of fisheries and the so-called level playing field .
The deadline that cried wolf .
In the financial world , the ever-shifting ultimatums have led to cynicism .
“ If these talks fail , my bet would be that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them next year , ” Marc Chandler , chief market strategist at Bannockburn Global , told Bloomberg , adding “ deadlines don ’ t matter.
” Supermarket jitters .
Beyond financial markets , the literal meat and potatoes of a no-deal Brexit remains a concern .
Grocery stores in the United Kingdom have reportedly been told by the British government to begin stockpiling items .
“ There was a conversation a week ago when ministers said prepare for no-deal .
This weekend the message is that it ’ s no-deal , ” one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Royal delays .
Cultural totems are also having to readjust to cope with the sinking feeling of a no-deal Brexit .
The recording of Queen Elizabeth ’ s Christmas message—considered as much of an institution as NFL football is on Thanksgiving day—has had to be pushed back from its usual filming date in mid-December in order to deal with the uncertainty of Brexit negotiations .
A fight over fish ?
The U.K. ministry of defense has threatened to roll out the big guns once the Brexit transition period ends , saying it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and marine organizations that are used to provide physical presence , deterrence and inspection capability , ” suggesting a standoff over fishing rights is on the cards .
European Council President Charles Michel scoffed at the likelihood of conflict breaking out as a result of a no-deal outcome .
“ I will not say like Donald Trump might that our boats are bigger than theirs , because I try to be serious .
On the European side , we will keep our composure , ” he said .
Kelly Craft , the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Heritage Foundation .
The Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence is due to release its findings on unidentified aerial phenomena and threats to the U.S. military .
On Tuesday , Dec. 15 , France ’ s national lockdown is due to end .
On Wednesday , Dec. 16 , U.S. Federal Reserve is to issue its decision on whether to raise , lower , or maintain U.S. interest rates .
Followed by a press conference led by Fed Chair Jerome Powell .
Two-day meeting of the WTO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Organization ’ s highest-level decision-making body .
Discussions expected on proposal to waive intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments .
The remaining signatories of the Iran nuclear deal meet in Vienna .
On Thursday , Dec. 17 , Russian President Vladimir Putin gives his annual end-of-year press conference .
On Friday , Dec. 18 , the U.S. Senate is scheduled to adjourn , although an extension is possible .
NDAA veto threat .
U.S. President Donald Trump again warned that he would veto the bill authorizing the U.S. defense budget , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China .
“ THE BIGGEST WINNER OF OUR NEW DEFENSE BILL IS CHINA !
I WILL VETO !
, ” Trump tweeted on Sunday .
The proposed $ 740.5 billion dollar budget , which has been agreed upon by both Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate , is roughly three times larger than China ’ s .
The White House declined to elaborate on why Trump referred to China in the tweet , although it could be down to a Matryoshka doll line of reasoning on Trump ’ s part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a perceived social media company bias against conservatives , and Chinese officials ’ recent use of Twitter .
Treasury hacked .
Hackers linked to the Russian government have had access to the networks of the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments for months after making use of a security vulnerability in a software management system used by the department called SolarWinds .
Upon learning about the hack , the U.S. National Security Council reportedly convened an emergency meeting on Saturday .
According to the company ’ s website , SolarWinds is used by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as the Defense department , State department , Justice department , NASA , the Executive Office of the President , and the National Security Agency , suggesting hackers may have breached even more U.S. government agencies than first reported .
It ’ s not yet clear what kind of information was extracted by the hackers .
Sudan rebuffed .
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has rebuffed an offer by Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to mediate between Abiy ’ s government and the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rejected the offer as his government maintains that all fighting ceased once government forces took the Tigrayan capital of Mekele , although the TPLF maintains that they continue fighting in the mountains surrounding the city .
Abiy had described Hamdok ’ s visit as a two-day trip , however , Hamdok left Ethiopia within hours .
The United Nations estimates that nearly 50,000 Ethiopians have fled into Sudan since the beginning of Abiy ’ s campaign against the TPLF .
Europe-Iran relations .
European nations have pulled out of a Europe-Iran business forum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalist Rouhollah Zam over the weekend .
Zam had been kidnapped from Iraq and taken to Iran to face charges of fomenting dissent during anti-government demonstrations in 2017 .
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was also due to take part in the forum , which has now been cancelled .
Iran summoned the German ambassador to Tehran over the European actions , and blasted the “ interventionist statements ” made in the wake of the execution .
Cease-fire ceased ?
Armenia and Azerbaijan have accused the other of breaking a Russian-brokered cease-fire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh .
established WHEN .
Azerbaijan ’ s defense ministry reported that four Azeri soldiers had been killed in recent weeks , while Armenia said that six of their troops were wounded while defending what is considered ethnic Armenian-held land under the terms of the last cease-fire .
Bolsonaro bump .
Even as a local newspaper blames his “ homicidal negligence ” in the face of the coronavirus pandemic , Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is seeing record approval ratings .
A recent poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha found that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as great or good , while the number viewing it as bad or terrible reduced 2 points to 32 percent .
Bolsonaro ’ s relatively solid approval is likely due to his support for a cash benefit for low-income residents hit by the pandemic , which Bolsonaro recently extended until the end of the year .
Consumers around the world are facing a Christmas tree supply crunch , as shoppers scramble to spruce up the homes they have spent much of the past year getting intimately acquainted with under lockdown .
The Wall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going for as much as $ 2,167 in Hong Kong and prices for otherwise substandard trees have spiked in the United States .
The shortage is likely due to supplier miscalculations on demand , and a fear of oversupplying a market where many have been facing unemployment for months .
The time needed to grow a tree to most home standards—about 8 to 12 years—means that finding more at short notice is difficult .
“ We have retailers asking us to go out and cut more trees , which we are not doing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next year , ” one U.S. grower said .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European Union and United Kingdom agree to keep Brexit negotiations going, hackers target the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments, and U.S. President Donald Trump threatens to veto the National Defense Authorization Act .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The European Union and United Kingdom agree to keep Brexit negotiations going, hackers target the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments, and U.S. President Donald Trump threatens to veto the National Defense Authorization Act.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Brexit Talks to Go “Extra Mile”
Brexit negotiations are to continue through this week as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson agreed to keep talking. In joint a statement issued on Sunday, the pair said it was “responsible at this point to go the extra mile.”
As deadline after deadline has been missed in Brexit negotiations between the European Union and United Kingdom, one would be forgiven for thinking that an extra mile might be underestimating the actual distance between the two sides. Especially because, after months of discussions, a dispute still remains on the issue of fisheries and the so-called level playing field.
The deadline that cried wolf. In the financial world, the ever-shifting ultimatums have led to cynicism. “If these talks fail, my bet would be that there will be an effort to restart them next year,” Marc Chandler, chief market strategist at Bannockburn Global, told Bloomberg, adding “deadlines don’t matter.”
Supermarket jitters. Beyond financial markets, the literal meat and potatoes of a no-deal Brexit remains a concern. Grocery stores in the United Kingdom have reportedly been told by the British government to begin stockpiling items. “There was a conversation a week ago when ministers said prepare for no-deal. This weekend the message is that it’s no-deal,” one supermarket consultant told the Sunday Times.
Royal delays. Cultural totems are also having to readjust to cope with the sinking feeling of a no-deal Brexit. The recording of Queen Elizabeth II’s Christmas message—considered as much of an institution as NFL football is on Thanksgiving day—has had to be pushed back from its usual filming date in mid-December in order to deal with the uncertainty of Brexit negotiations.
A fight over fish? The U.K. ministry of defense has threatened to roll out the big guns once the Brexit transition period ends, saying it would activate “numerous patrol vessels across military and marine organizations that are used to provide physical presence, deterrence and inspection capability,” suggesting a standoff over fishing rights is on the cards.
European Council President Charles Michel scoffed at the likelihood of conflict breaking out as a result of a no-deal outcome. “I will not say like Donald Trump might that our boats are bigger than theirs, because I try to be serious. On the European side, we will keep our composure,” he said.
The World This Week On Monday, Dec. 14, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosts a virtual discussion with Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
Kelly Craft, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, addresses the Heritage Foundation.
The Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence is due to release its findings on unidentified aerial phenomena and threats to the U.S. military.
On Tuesday, Dec. 15, France’s national lockdown is due to end.
On Wednesday, Dec. 16, U.S. Federal Reserve is to issue its decision on whether to raise, lower, or maintain U.S. interest rates. Followed by a press conference led by Fed Chair Jerome Powell.
Two-day meeting of the WTO General Council begins, the World Trade Organization’s highest-level decision-making body. Discussions expected on proposal to waive intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments.
The remaining signatories of the Iran nuclear deal meet in Vienna.
On Thursday, Dec. 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin gives his annual end-of-year press conference.
On Friday, Dec. 18, the U.S. Senate is scheduled to adjourn, although an extension is possible.
What We’re Following Today
NDAA veto threat. U.S. President Donald Trump again warned that he would veto the bill authorizing the U.S. defense budget, this time because it is too soft on China. “THE BIGGEST WINNER OF OUR NEW DEFENSE BILL IS CHINA! I WILL VETO!,” Trump tweeted on Sunday. The proposed $740.5 billion dollar budget, which has been agreed upon by both Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate, is roughly three times larger than China’s.
The White House declined to elaborate on why Trump referred to China in the tweet, although it could be down to a Matryoshka doll line of reasoning on Trump’s part encapsulating Section 230 of the communications act, a perceived social media company bias against conservatives, and Chinese officials’ recent use of Twitter.
Treasury hacked. Hackers linked to the Russian government have had access to the networks of the U.S. Treasury and Commerce departments for months after making use of a security vulnerability in a software management system used by the department called SolarWinds. Upon learning about the hack, the U.S. National Security Council reportedly convened an emergency meeting on Saturday.
According to the company’s website, SolarWinds is used by all five branches of the U.S. military, as well as the Defense Department, State Department, Justice Department, NASA, the Executive Office of the President, and the National Security Agency, suggesting hackers may have breached even more U.S. government agencies than first reported. It’s not yet clear what kind of information was extracted by the hackers.
Sudan rebuffed. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has rebuffed an offer by Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to mediate between Abiy’s government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Reuters reports that Abiy rejected the offer as his government maintains that all fighting ceased once government forces took the Tigrayan capital of Mekele, although the TPLF maintains that they continue fighting in the mountains surrounding the city. Abiy had described Hamdok’s visit as a two-day trip, however, Hamdok left Ethiopia within hours.
The United Nations estimates that nearly 50,000 Ethiopians have fled into Sudan since the beginning of Abiy’s campaign against the TPLF.
Keep an Eye On
Europe-Iran relations. European nations have pulled out of a Europe-Iran business forum in protest over the execution of dissident journalist Rouhollah Zam over the weekend. Zam had been kidnapped from Iraq and taken to Iran to face charges of fomenting dissent during anti-government demonstrations in 2017. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was also due to take part in the forum, which has now been cancelled. Iran summoned the German ambassador to Tehran over the European actions, and blasted the “interventionist statements” made in the wake of the execution.
Cease-fire ceased? Armenia and Azerbaijan have accused the other of breaking a Russian-brokered cease-fire established last month, as both sides reported renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s defense ministry reported that four Azeri soldiers had been killed in recent weeks, while Armenia said that six of their troops were wounded while defending what is considered ethnic Armenian-held land under the terms of the last cease-fire.
Bolsonaro bump. Even as a local newspaper blames his “homicidal negligence” in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is seeing record approval ratings. A recent poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha found that 37 percent of Brazilians see his government as great or good, while the number viewing it as bad or terrible reduced 2 points to 32 percent. Bolsonaro’s relatively solid approval is likely due to his support for a cash benefit for low-income residents hit by the pandemic, which Bolsonaro recently extended until the end of the year.
Odds and Ends Consumers around the world are facing a Christmas tree supply crunch, as shoppers scramble to spruce up the homes they have spent much of the past year getting intimately acquainted with under lockdown. The Wall Street Journal reports that 8-foot trees are going for as much as $2,167 in Hong Kong and prices for otherwise substandard trees have spiked in the United States. The shortage is likely due to supplier miscalculations on demand, and a fear of oversupplying a market where many have been facing unemployment for months. The time needed to grow a tree to most home standards—about 8 to 12 years—means that finding more at short notice is difficult. “We have retailers asking us to go out and cut more trees, which we are not doing because we have to save some for next year,” one U.S. grower said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-14--Cracks Appear Among Lukashenko’s Security Forces

To maintain his grip on power , Aleksandr Lukashenko , the 26-year president of Belarus who fraudulently claimed victory in the country ’ s Aug. 9 presidential election , relies on two factors : support from Russia and backing from Belarus ’ powerful security services .
Patience in Moscow with Lukashenko may be running thin , as evidenced by the recent visit to Minsk by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov , but the Kremlin doesn ’ t appear ready to abandon Lukashenko yet .
A more promising sign that Lukashenko ’ s days in power might be numbered is emerging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may come as a surprise given the extreme violence that police and other security forces have used for the past four months against thousands of Belarusians protesting Lukashenko ’ s efforts to steal the election .
The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the country ’ s largest law enforcement agency , with some 130,000 employees .
It forms the backbone of Lukashenko ’ s regime—and what happens in its ranks shapes the political situation in the country .
Defections among the ranks of the police and security services could change the tide .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ orders to use brutal methods against protesters were to realize those orders are wrong and stop following them , then the regime would collapse like a house of cards .
And there are signs that that is happening .
Those carrying out Lukashenko ’ s orders face a stark choice : to comply and be complicit with a discredited leader who perpetrates human rights abuses against his own people , or to do the right thing and join their fellow citizens in deciding that 26 awful years under Lukashenko are enough .
Members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that one day there will be a serious investigation of who did what—and they need to decide now whether they want to be among those being investigated or those doing the investigation .
The outflow of personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies began during the presidential election campaign and continues to this day .
Employees began to quit in the weeks and months leading up to the election , when Lukashenko used the security services to obstruct the candidacies of opposition figures , using such methods as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , preventing meetings , and rejecting signatures collected for candidates .
Some Ministry of Internal Affairs employees did not show up for work on the day of the election .
The documentation will serve as the basis for identifying the perpetrators .
According to information obtained by our organization , the International Strategic Action Network for Security , the pace of defections from the ministry picked up after the electoral fraud was committed and massive force was being used against peaceful protesters .
There were more than 300 reports of officer dismissals at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Internal Affairs at the end of August .
Staff losses continued in September and then decreased significantly .
As of Nov. 1 , staffing at the city of Minsk ’ s Main Internal Affairs Directorate had declined by some 18 percent .
Another security department in Minsk , the Central District Department of Internal Affairs , has lost 29 percent of its staff .
Many of the dismissed employees have since been supported with funds raised by the Belarusian diaspora , who have also provided moral support .
A number of active @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies have recognized that Lukashenko is illegitimately clinging to power .
They have united in By_Pol ( short for Belarus police ) , a network of officers from the internal affairs services , border troops , the state prosecutor ’ s office , the criminal police , and the secret police ( which still goes by the old Soviet initials of KGB ) .
They have decided to stand with the people of Belarus instead of the discredited Lukashenko .
They simply do not want to be at war with their own people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are being joined by growing numbers of new defectors .
Aleh Talerchyk , who resigned from the Prosecutor General ’ s Office , is one of the defectors .
“ I want to support the brave Belarusians who were repressed , ” he said .
Talerchyk and a number of other highly qualified specialists have recently left the Prosecutor General ’ s Office to object to the treatment of their fellow citizens .
They are being joined by a rising number of doctors and medical professionals who have been treating those badly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The evidence includes gunshot wounds to the head and various parts of the body , open chest wounds , shrapnel wounds , injuries from explosives , stab wounds , thermal and chemical burns , trauma from barometric bombs , and signs of torture .
By_Pol has compiled documentation of more than 1,100 cases of torture and major injuries among civilians between Aug. 9 and Aug. 21 alone .
The number of cases , tragically , has only grown since then .
The documentation will serve as the basis for identifying the perpetrators , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ injury can later be matched with available recordings from surveillance cameras , other video material , as well as the communications between direct participants in the suppression of the peaceful protests .
And since By_Pol is already a significant network within the Belarusian power structure , the list of those who appear to be directly guilty of abuse is growing .
Some of the information comes from interviews By_Pol members have conducted with civilian victims who have left Belarus .
While the officers organized in By_Pol remain loyal to their country , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and instead view opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya as the victor in the election—and thus the legitimate president of Belarus .
After all , their inside knowledge of the political situation has given them access to information about the election results that are contrary to Lukashenko ’ s claims of victory .
Independent surveys support their claim .
According to a poll of Belarusian internet users commissioned by Chatham House , Tikhanovskaya received 52 percent of the vote compared to only 21 percent for Lukashenko .
According to another opinion survey whose name can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are illegal in Belarus , Lukashenko ’ s vote was even lower—below 10 percent .
The initiators of By_Pol met in Warsaw with Tikhanovskaya during her recent visit to Poland and proposed creating a trade union for security services employees .
Such a union , supported by By_Pol , would help guarantee the independence of the security forces , lay the groundwork for a reconstituted Belarusian police force after Lukashenko leaves , and ensure the loyalty of the security forces to the country and people , not to any dictator .
The security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the core of a new Belarusian police force , which would replace the existing police and the especially brutal OMON units , which have covered themselves with the blood of peaceful Belarusians .
By_Pol could also form the basis for a new prosecutor ’ s office and law enforcement bodies .
It could even be deployed to investigate members of the security services who committed crimes against their own people .
The security services members organized in By_Pol could form the core of a new Belarusian police force .
On Dec. 1 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Latushka , announced the launch of a Unified Crime Registration Book .
Using the platform , victims and witnesses of abuses can provide information that will be used to develop a unified register of crimes and suspects .
Encouraging more Belarusian security forces to join the ranks of By_Pol and support the registration of crimes should be a top priority of the Belarusian opposition—and of the West as well .
This could be done by providing financial assistance to those who lose their paying jobs and by granting immunity in exchange for testimony @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement gains momentum , it could soon leave Lukashenko without much of a force to support him .
If Lukashenko has no one to carry out his brutal orders , he loses his ability to stay in power—barring Russian intervention .
But even then , the struggle would continue , as an intervention would turn the people of Belarus , many of whom still have a neutral or even positive view of Russia , against Moscow .
After losing Ukraine in a similar fashion , that is something Russian President Vladimir Putin can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lukashenko ’ s security forces offers the best hope for real change in Belarus .
The country ’ s citizens deserve better—and that includes those who serve in the security services and police but never signed up to beat , torture , and even kill their fellow citizens .

To maintain his grip on power, Aleksandr Lukashenko, the 26-year president of Belarus who fraudulently claimed victory in the country’s Aug. 9 presidential election, relies on two factors: support from Russia and backing from Belarus’ powerful security services. Patience in Moscow with Lukashenko may be running thin, as evidenced by the recent visit to Minsk by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov , but the Kremlin doesn’t appear ready to abandon Lukashenko yet.
To maintain his grip on power, Aleksandr Lukashenko, the 26-year president of Belarus who fraudulently claimed victory in the country’s Aug. 9 presidential election, relies on two factors: support from Russia and backing from Belarus’ powerful security services. Patience in Moscow with Lukashenko may be running thin, as evidenced by the recent visit to Minsk by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, but the Kremlin doesn’t appear ready to abandon Lukashenko yet.
A more promising sign that Lukashenko’s days in power might be numbered is emerging among the Belarusian security forces. This may come as a surprise given the systematic violence that police and other security forces have used for the past four months against thousands of Belarusians protesting Lukashenko’s efforts to steal the election. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the country’s largest law enforcement agency, with some 130,000 employees. It forms the backbone of Lukashenko’s regime—and what happens in its ranks shapes the political situation in the country.
Defections among the ranks of the police and security services could change the tide. If those carrying out Lukashenko’s orders to use brutal methods against protesters were to realize those orders are wrong and stop following them, then the regime would collapse like a house of cards. And there are signs that that is happening.
Those carrying out Lukashenko’s orders face a stark choice: to comply and be complicit with a discredited leader who perpetrates human rights abuses against his own people, or to do the right thing and join their fellow citizens in deciding that 26 awful years under Lukashenko are enough. Members of the security forces need to understand that one day there will be a serious investigation of who did what—and they need to decide now whether they want to be among those being investigated or those doing the investigation.
The outflow of personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies began during the presidential election campaign and continues to this day. Employees began to quit in the weeks and months leading up to the election, when Lukashenko used the security services to obstruct the candidacies of opposition figures, using such methods as initiating criminal proceedings, arresting opposition members, preventing meetings, and rejecting signatures collected for candidates. Some Ministry of Internal Affairs employees did not show up for work on the day of the election.
The documentation will serve as the basis for identifying the perpetrators.
According to information obtained by our organization, the International Strategic Action Network for Security, the pace of defections from the ministry picked up after the electoral fraud was committed and massive force was being used against peaceful protesters. There were more than 300 reports of officer dismissals at the main personnel department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of August. Staff losses continued in September and then decreased significantly. As of Nov. 1, staffing at the city of Minsk’s Main Internal Affairs Directorate had declined by some 18 percent. Another security department in Minsk, the Central District Department of Internal Affairs, has lost 29 percent of its staff. Many of the dismissed employees have since been supported with funds raised by the Belarusian diaspora, who have also provided moral support.
A number of active and former members of various law enforcement agencies have recognized that Lukashenko is illegitimately clinging to power. They have united in By_Pol (short for Belarus police), a network of officers from the internal affairs services, border troops, the state prosecutor’s office, the criminal police, and the secret police (which still goes by the old Soviet initials of KGB). They have decided to stand with the people of Belarus instead of the discredited Lukashenko. They simply do not want to be at war with their own people, friends, and families. And they are being joined by growing numbers of new defectors.
Aleh Talerchyk, who resigned from the Prosecutor General’s Office, is one of the defectors. “I want to support the brave Belarusians who were repressed,” he said. Talerchyk and a number of other highly qualified specialists have recently left the Prosecutor General’s Office to object to the treatment of their fellow citizens. They are being joined by a rising number of doctors and medical professionals who have been treating those badly injured by police and security forces. The evidence includes gunshot wounds to the head and various parts of the body, open chest wounds, shrapnel wounds, injuries from explosives, stab wounds, thermal and chemical burns, trauma from barometric bombs, and signs of torture.
By_Pol has compiled documentation of more than 1,100 cases of torture and major injuries among civilians between Aug. 9 and Aug. 21 alone. The number of cases, tragically, has only grown since then. The documentation will serve as the basis for identifying the perpetrators, since the time and place of each injury can later be matched with available recordings from surveillance cameras, other video material, as well as the communications between direct participants in the suppression of the peaceful protests.
And since By_Pol is already a significant network within the Belarusian power structure, the list of those who appear to be directly guilty of abuse is growing. Some of the information comes from interviews By_Pol members have conducted with civilian victims who have left Belarus.
While the officers organized in By_Pol remain loyal to their country, they do not recognize Lukashenko as their president and instead view opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya as the victor in the election—and thus the legitimate president of Belarus. After all, their inside knowledge of the political situation has given them access to information about the election results that are contrary to Lukashenko’s claims of victory. Independent surveys support their claim. According to a poll of Belarusian internet users commissioned by Chatham House, Tikhanovskaya received 52 percent of the vote compared to only 21 percent for Lukashenko. According to another opinion survey whose name cannot be used since independent opinion polls are illegal in Belarus, Lukashenko’s vote was even lower—below 10 percent.
The initiators of By_Pol met in Warsaw with Tikhanovskaya during her recent visit to Poland and proposed creating a trade union for security services employees. Such a union, supported by By_Pol, would help guarantee the independence of the security forces, lay the groundwork for a reconstituted Belarusian police force after Lukashenko leaves, and ensure the loyalty of the security forces to the country and people, not to any dictator.
The security services members organized in By_Pol could form the core of a new Belarusian police force, which would replace the existing police and the especially brutal OMON units, which have covered themselves with the blood of peaceful Belarusians. By_Pol could also form the basis for a new prosecutor’s office and law enforcement bodies. It could even be deployed to investigate members of the security services who committed crimes against their own people.
The security services members organized in By_Pol could form the core of a new Belarusian police force.
On Dec. 1, Tikhanovskaya and another opposition figure, Pavel Latushka, announced the launch of a Unified Crime Registration Book. Using the platform, victims and witnesses of abuses can provide information that will be used to develop a unified register of crimes and suspects.
Encouraging more Belarusian security forces to join the ranks of By_Pol and support the registration of crimes should be a top priority of the Belarusian opposition—and of the West as well. This could be done by providing financial assistance to those who lose their paying jobs and by granting immunity in exchange for testimony against perpetrators of abuse.
If this movement gains momentum, it could soon leave Lukashenko without much of a force to support him. If Lukashenko has no one to carry out his brutal orders, he loses his ability to stay in power—barring Russian intervention. But even then, the struggle would continue, as an intervention would turn the people of Belarus, many of whom still have a neutral or even positive view of Russia, against Moscow. After losing Ukraine in a similar fashion, that is something Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot afford.
Encouraging the defection of Lukashenko’s security forces offers the best hope for real change in Belarus. The country’s citizens deserve better—and that includes those who serve in the security services and police but never signed up to beat, torture, and even kill their fellow citizens.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-14--With Base in Sudan, Russia Expands Its Military Reach in Africa

With Base in Sudan , Russia Expands Its Military Reach in Africa Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly update on emerging global stories .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Russia signs a deal with Sudan establishing its first naval base in Africa , an attack on a Nigerian school leaves hundreds of boys feared missing , and Austrian police seize a cache of weapons with links to neo-Nazi groups in Germany .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here .
Russia has struck a deal with Sudan to establish a naval base in the country , as Moscow seeks to expand its military reach in the Middle East and North Africa .
The deal , made public on Dec. 8 , allows Russia to station four ships and up to 300 personnel at Port Sudan on the Red Sea as part of a 25-year agreement .
It will be Russia ’ s first naval base in Africa .
The base will be used as a logistics support center and repair and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow the right to use Sudan ’ s airports for the transport of “ weapons , ammunition and equipment ” required to support the base .
Port Sudan is significantly smaller than the Russian base in Tartus , Syria—Moscow ’ s only other naval facility outside of the former Soviet Union—but it will give Russia a strategic foothold along the Red Sea , which links European and Asian waters and is one of the world ’ s busiest waterways .
China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The only permanent U.S. military base on the continent is also in Djibouti . )
At various points during the Cold War , the Soviet Union had bases in the region in South Yemen , Somalia , and Ethiopia—but they were lost following the USSR ’ s collapse .
Russian President Vladimir Putin has made restoring the country ’ s global military might a cornerstone of his two decades in power .
While Russia has sought to beef up its presence in the Mediterranean through its interventions in the conflicts in Syria and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one eye on the Red Sea .
Russian officials have previously probed the possibility of establishing a military foothold in Djibouti and Eritrea , although the talks didn ’ t progress .
Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir raised the prospect of hosting a Russian base in the country during a 2017 meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergi Shoigu .
After Bashir ’ s ouster in 2019 , the discussions continued with the head of Sudan ’ s Transitional Military Council .
Moscow and Khartoum have long enjoyed a close relationship , and Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country .
The Wagner Group , private military security contractors that the U.S. State Department has characterized as a “ surrogate ” for the Russian Ministry of Defense , already has a well-established presence in Sudan .
Two mining companies from the Wagner network , which is believed to be backed by Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin , were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in July for formulating plans to suppress the pro-democracy demonstrations that toppled Bashir , including “ the staging of public executions ” to distract the protesters .
“ Yevgeniy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s natural resources for personal gain and spreading malign influence around the globe , ” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement issued at the time .
School attack in Nigeria .
More than 300 Nigerian boys are feared missing after gunmen mounted an assault on their boarding school last Friday , an attack that evokes memories of the 2014 kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls from the town of Chibok .
Hundreds of students fled into the forest during the attack in the northwestern town of Kankara , and 333 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Aminu Masari said on Sunday .
Students have emerged from hiding places in the forest since the incident , and it ’ s unclear how many of the boys who remain missing have been kidnapped .
No group has claimed responsibility for the attack .
It was similar in nature to previous attacks carried out by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram , although Kankara is far from northeastern Nigeria , where the militants predominantly operate .
The attack may have been carried out by violent gangs known to operate in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Seven of the top 10 countries most at risk for terrorism are in sub-Saharan Africa , according to a quarterly Terrorism Intensity Index released by risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft released on Friday .
Militant activity in the region has surged in recent years , with a 13 percent increase in terrorist incidents across the continent during the last quarter alone compared to the previous period .
According to the index , Afghanistan , Burkina Faso , Mali , Somalia , and Syria are the countries most at risk , followed by Cameroon , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Congo , and Iraq .
China squeezes freedom of speech .
Hong Kong media tycoon and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai was charged under China ’ s controversial new national security law last Friday for allegedly conspiring with foreign forces .
Lai , who was first arrested in August , is the highest-profile person charged under the new law , although other senior democratic figures have faced a variety of other charges .
Separately , Bloomberg confirmed on Friday that Haze Fan , a Chinese staffer in its Beijing bureau , had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suspicion of endangering national security .
Climate emergency .
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called on global leaders to declare a state of “ climate emergency ” on Saturday , as 70 world leaders convened for a virtual Climate Ambition Summit to mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement .
Guterres noted that many G-20 members were investing heavily in fossil-fuel production and consumption as part of stimulus packages intended to curb pandemic-related recessions .
“ The trillions of dollars needed for COVID recovery is money that we are borrowing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We can not use these resources to lock in policies that burden future generations with a mountain of debt on a broken planet.
” Germany ’ s far-right .
Austrian police have seized a large quantity of weapons , ammunition , and hand grenades intended to help establish a far-right network in Germany .
Five men with links to neo-Nazi groups were arrested in a series of house searches .
The investigation leading to the discoveries was initially intended to target drug-related organized crime , but officers uncovered crossover links with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons were recovered , along with 100,000 rounds of ammunition , 14 handguns , and six grenades .
The Beijing-Moscow relationship .
Strengthening Beijing ’ s ties with Moscow and resetting the relationship with Washington will be high on China ’ s foreign-policy agenda in the coming year , Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Friday .
“ We must deepen China-Russia comprehensive strategic cooperation … so as to build a Sino-Russian pillar for world peace and security and global strategic stability , ” he said , according to the South China Morning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their political and economic ties in recent years , but the relationship is not without its problems due to its asymmetry and areas of competing interests .
Novichok negroni .
A joint investigation by Bellingcat and the Russian news site the Insider has implicated the Russian security services in the poisoning of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny .
Cellphone and travel data revealed that agents from the Federal Security Service ( FSB ) that specialize in poisons trailed Navalny for three years , including to the Russian city of Tomsk in August , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lethal nerve agent Novichok in a cocktail .
The investigation reveals the identities of several of the operatives involved in the poisoning .
Bellingcat co-founder Eliot Higgins described the report as the biggest story the outlet had ever published .
To give you a sense of the significance of the project , that ’ s coming from an organization that revealed the Russian intelligence operatives who poisoned Sergei Skripal in Britain and traced the movements of the Russian missile that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine .
Watch Navalny @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly update on emerging global stories.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: Russia signs a deal with Sudan establishing its first naval base in Africa, an attack on a Nigerian school leaves hundreds of boys feared missing, and Austrian police seize a cache of weapons with links to neo-Nazi groups in Germany.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Mondays, please sign up here.
Russia Set to Establish Naval Base in Africa
Russia has struck a deal with Sudan to establish a naval base in the country, as Moscow seeks to expand its military reach in the Middle East and North Africa. The deal, made public on Dec. 8, allows Russia to station four ships and up to 300 personnel at Port Sudan on the Red Sea as part of a 25-year agreement. It will be Russia’s first naval base in Africa.
The base will be used as a logistics support center and repair and resupply point. The deal also gives Moscow the right to use Sudan’s airports for the transport of “weapons, ammunition and equipment” required to support the base.
Port Sudan is significantly smaller than the Russian base in Tartus, Syria—Moscow’s only other naval facility outside of the former Soviet Union—but it will give Russia a strategic foothold along the Red Sea, which links European and Asian waters and is one of the world’s busiest waterways. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 at the mouth of the Red Sea. (The only permanent U.S. military base on the continent is also in Djibouti.)
At various points during the Cold War, the Soviet Union had bases in the region in South Yemen, Somalia, and Ethiopia—but they were lost following the USSR’s collapse. Russian President Vladimir Putin has made restoring the country’s global military might a cornerstone of his two decades in power.
While Russia has sought to beef up its presence in the Mediterranean through its interventions in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, the Kremlin has also kept one eye on the Red Sea. Russian officials have previously probed the possibility of establishing a military foothold in Djibouti and Eritrea, although the talks didn’t progress.
Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir raised the prospect of hosting a Russian base in the country during a 2017 meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergi Shoigu. After Bashir’s ouster in 2019, the discussions continued with the head of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council. Moscow and Khartoum have long enjoyed a close relationship, and Russia is a major supplier of arms to the country.
The Wagner Group, private military security contractors that the U.S. State Department has characterized as a “surrogate” for the Russian Ministry of Defense, already has a well-established presence in Sudan. Two mining companies from the Wagner network, which is believed to be backed by Putin ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in July for formulating plans to suppress the pro-democracy demonstrations that toppled Bashir, including “the staging of public executions” to distract the protesters.
“Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his network are exploiting Sudan’s natural resources for personal gain and spreading malign influence around the globe,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement issued at the time.
What We’re Following
School attack in Nigeria. More than 300 Nigerian boys are feared missing after gunmen mounted an assault on their boarding school last Friday, an attack that evokes memories of the 2014 kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls from the town of Chibok. Hundreds of students fled into the forest during the attack in the northwestern town of Kankara, and 333 remain unaccounted for, Katsina state Gov. Aminu Masari said on Sunday.
Students have emerged from hiding places in the forest since the incident, and it’s unclear how many of the boys who remain missing have been kidnapped. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. It was similar in nature to previous attacks carried out by the militant Islamist group Boko Haram, although Kankara is far from northeastern Nigeria, where the militants predominantly operate. The attack may have been carried out by violent gangs known to operate in the area.
Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Seven of the top 10 countries most at risk for terrorism are in sub-Saharan Africa, according to a quarterly Terrorism Intensity Index released by risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft released on Friday. Militant activity in the region has surged in recent years, with a 13 percent increase in terrorist incidents across the continent during the last quarter alone compared to the previous period.
According to the index, Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia, and Syria are the countries most at risk, followed by Cameroon, Mozambique, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq.
China squeezes freedom of speech. Hong Kong media tycoon and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai was charged under China’s controversial new national security law last Friday for allegedly conspiring with foreign forces. Lai, who was first arrested in August, is the highest-profile person charged under the new law, although other senior democratic figures have faced a variety of other charges. Separately, Bloomberg confirmed on Friday that Haze Fan, a Chinese staffer in its Beijing bureau, had been detained earlier in the week on suspicion of endangering national security.
Climate emergency. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called on global leaders to declare a state of “climate emergency” on Saturday, as 70 world leaders convened for a virtual Climate Ambition Summit to mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement. Guterres noted that many G-20 members were investing heavily in fossil-fuel production and consumption as part of stimulus packages intended to curb pandemic-related recessions.
“The trillions of dollars needed for COVID recovery is money that we are borrowing from future generations,” Guterres said. “We cannot use these resources to lock in policies that burden future generations with a mountain of debt on a broken planet.”
Keep an Eye On
Germany’s far-right. Austrian police have seized a large quantity of weapons, ammunition, and hand grenades intended to help establish a far-right network in Germany. Five men with links to neo-Nazi groups were arrested in a series of house searches. The investigation leading to the discoveries was initially intended to target drug-related organized crime, but officers uncovered crossover links with the far-right. Seventy-six automatic and semiautomatic weapons were recovered, along with 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 14 handguns, and six grenades.
The Beijing-Moscow relationship. Strengthening Beijing’s ties with Moscow and resetting the relationship with Washington will be high on China’s foreign-policy agenda in the coming year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Friday. “We must deepen China-Russia comprehensive strategic cooperation … so as to build a Sino-Russian pillar for world peace and security and global strategic stability,” he said, according to the South China Morning Post.
Russia and China have deepened their political and economic ties in recent years, but the relationship is not without its problems due to its asymmetry and areas of competing interests.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Novichok negroni. A joint investigation by Bellingcat and the Russian news site the Insider has implicated the Russian security services in the poisoning of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. Cellphone and travel data revealed that agents from the Federal Security Service (FSB) that specialize in poisons trailed Navalny for three years, including to the Russian city of Tomsk in August, where doctors believe he was poisoned with the lethal nerve agent Novichok in a cocktail. The investigation reveals the identities of several of the operatives involved in the poisoning.
Bellingcat co-founder Eliot Higgins described the report as the biggest story the outlet had ever published. To give you a sense of the significance of the project, that’s coming from an organization that revealed the Russian intelligence operatives who poisoned Sergei Skripal in Britain and traced the movements of the Russian missile that shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine. Watch Navalny’s own video about the investigation here.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-14--Iraq’s Economic Collapse Could Be Biden’s First Foreign-Policy Headache

Iraq ’ s Economic Collapse Could Be Biden ’ s First Foreign-Policy Headache This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
A new Iraq crisis is the last thing that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden needs .
Unfortunately , it may be the first foreign-policy problem he has to face .
Iraq is headed for a financial collapse , and in its current fragile state , fiscal ruin is likely to bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could then ignite yet another round of civil war .
Over the course of the past two decades , corruption has created a two-headed problem for Iraq .
Iraq ’ s weak , collusive , inclusionary governments have meant that every major political party gets to run one or more ministries .
They administer these bureaucracies not for the good of the country but as massive patronage networks—corruption machines that suck oil revenues from the treasury and pass them on to their constituencies in the form of jobs , contracts , and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smothered what little private sector Iraq once had , meaning there isn ’ t much of an alternative to public-sector jobs .
As a result , the government is now the largest employer by far and a huge percentage of the populace counts on the state for its livelihood—either directly through salaries and pensions , or indirectly via contracts or the provision of goods and services to those on the government payroll .
Even small businesses in Iraq ultimately depend on the government because so many of their customers—especially in the major cities—are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way or another .
Moreover , the Iraqi government still provides a monthly “ food basket ” via the Public Distribution System , which remains an important element in the daily lives of working-class and poor Iraqis .
Not surprisingly , there has been a threefold increase in public workers since 2004 , and the government pays 400 percent more in salaries than it did 15 years ago .
Thus , the government and its oil revenues have become the principal driver of the Iraqi economy and the provider of the Iraqi people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 5 billion every month to pay direct salaries and pensions , as well as another $ 2 billion to cover essential services and operating costs , much of which constitutes indirect forms of support to the population .
However , since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of oil prices ( which provide some 90 percent of government revenue ) , Iraq ’ s monthly income has fluctuated between $ 2.5 and $ 3.5 billion .
That means Baghdad is running a monthly deficit of $ 3.5 to $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of money to sustain that deficit .
In October , Iraq ’ s minister of finance , Ali Allawi , stated in a TV interview that Iraq ’ s “ Central Bank reserves stand at $ 53 billion.
” Since then , the parliament passed a funding deficit law that enabled the government to borrow $ 10 billion to pay salaries for October , November , and December 2020 .
That brings Iraq ’ s total debt to a staggering $ 80 billion , according to government sources and budget proposals , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than $ 12 billion from the yearly budget to interest and principal repayment on these loans—all of which is further exacerbating the government ’ s capital shortfalls .
By the summer of 2021 , Iraq ’ s hard currency reserves could be dangerously low .
Indeed , the government could run out of cash to pay for most of its current , minimal obligations .
Moreover , devaluation would probably cause further inflation as well .
The evaporation of hard currency means that Iraq soon won ’ t be able to pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq is a net importer of virtually everything except oil .
If money flows run low and the dinar is devalued , goods will become scarce and prices will rise .
The dinar could go into free fall within six months should the government continue to draw down the remaining funds in the Central Bank of Iraq once a devaluation starts .
Some Iraqi government officials are simply hoping that a projected increase in oil prices this spring will save them .
Yet most projections suggest no more than a 10 to 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil traders and analysts—far too little to eliminate Iraq ’ s looming crisis .
And even that could vanish if expanded Iraqi , Libyan , and Iranian oil exports cause the Saudis and Russians to follow suit and increase production to protect their market share .
If Iraq is unable to continue paying salaries , minimal government expenses , and operating costs , it would have devastating consequences .
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi sounded the alarm of a coming financial reckoning in a press conference on Nov. 17 , warning , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ salaries in January .
I am warning you now.
” As a technocrat without a political power base , Kadhimi has been unable to push Iraq ’ s political parties to address , let alone solve , the problem .
The government produced a white paper for reform on Oct. 13 ; however , it has not started its implementation .
Consequently , there has been no effort to reduce salaries , pare back the numbers of government employees , or even to eliminate the hundreds of thousands of so-called ghost employees on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ upsetting important Iraqi political bosses .
When he took power , Kadhimi had widespread support : from average Iraqis and the thousands who had been protesting in the streets , from Iraq ’ s Shiite religious establishment , from moderate Shiite political parties , from many Sunnis , and even from the Kurds .
He was seen as smart , apolitical , effective , and close to the Americans .
However , there is a growing fear across the country that Kadhimi can not fix Iraq ’ s broken system .
The economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of money could be the nail in that coffin .
Kadhimi would likely be completely discredited .
Many of Iraq ’ s venal political parties would try to make him the scapegoat to avoid the inevitable popular backlash .
Meanwhile , the Iranians , who oppose Kadhimi , would try to exploit the chaos to reassert their influence over the Iraqi government .
In such a situation , armed conflict and land grabs could become commonplace again , except in those areas with robust security , such as the Kurdistan region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be safe from internal economic troubles unless it can expand its resource base , because it , too , is financially dependent on Baghdad .
Perhaps the Kurds ’ most apparent target would be Kirkuk and its oil fields , but this would only inflame the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad , not to mention Shiite militias , who would resist such a move .
As was the case from 2005 to 2007 and from 2014 to 2017 , another round of civil strife in Iraq would invariably suck in Iraq ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important to all of them , and they could be expected to intervene to secure their interests .
Turkey would feel threatened by Kurdish gains , particularly if the Kurdistan region retakes Kirkuk .
Ankara would feel obligated to defend the Turkmen ethnic group there and prevent the Kurds from reviving their dream of independence .
Iran is already working to regain its dominant influence in Baghdad , and Tehran can not afford to lose Iraqi trade revenues ( which stand at around $ 12 billion ) , smuggling opportunities , and access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might well respond to any resurgence in Iranian influence by supporting Sunni groups and tribes with funding or weapons to defend themselves , especially since Riyadh can not count on a large U.S. troop presence to handle the problem , as they could in 2006 .
Iraq could easily slide back into intercommunal civil war , with regional powers intervening against both the Iraqis and one another .
If the U.S. government is willing to provide some leadership , many others will likely be willing to chip in as well .
International financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the International Monetary Fund , the Persian Gulf states , and even some European and East Asian countries could be expected to pony up some cash .
Iraq ’ s coming crisis is a crisis of liquidity .
Iraq will need money to prevent the collapse of its financial system , which would be the first domino to fall .
If the United States were willing to pledge a significant amount , perhaps $ 1 billion , it should be possible to put together a larger package of $ 5 billion to $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chipping in .
The idea of providing $ 1 billion in emergency budget support to Iraq may seem impossible at this moment .
It shouldn ’ t .
It wouldn ’ t come out of the pockets of ordinary Americans in the form of increased taxes—and the last 12 years should have taught the United States two important lessons about this part of the world .
First , what happens in the Middle East does not stay there .
And second , an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure—as Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria , and Libya have all demonstrated .
Of course , at Iraq ’ s current burn rate , even $ 10 billion will barely last three months .
That ’ s why the money must come with strong conditions attached : austerity measures to encourage saving , major cuts in government spending , draconian anti-corruption measures , fully integrating militia personnel into the Iraqi military—as individuals , not as militias , and therefore answerable to the Iraqi government .
Subsequent aid packages should be dangled as a further incentive , but only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Such an international aid package would have a crucial secondary purpose .
In Iraq , the only way to build support for a political agenda—and to build a power base to see it implemented—is with resources .
Kadhimi has demonstrated repeatedly that he has the right intentions and ideas , but he lacks the political and military strength to follow through .
Putting billions of dollars at his disposal but with strict conditions would give him the resources to build that support and use it to take on Iraq ’ s political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Such measures are what Iraq needs over the long term as well .
The more that Kadhimi can blame the international community for forcing Iraq to take these steps , and the more that other Iraqis understand that either they take them or the entire system collapses , the better able he will be to do what he has always hoped to do and what the U.S. government always hoped that he would .
When Biden was U.S. vice president , he won the dubious prize of handling Iraq .
Given then-President Barack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was arguably the worst assignment of all .
When he takes office as president , addressing the problems of Iraq may not be his priority or his desire , but Baghdad ’ s crisis offers him an opportunity to put the country—and U.S. interests there—on the right path in a way he never could the last time he was responsible for Iraq policy .

A new Iraq crisis is the last thing that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden needs. Unfortunately, it may be the first foreign-policy problem he has to face.
A new Iraq crisis is the last thing that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden needs. Unfortunately, it may be the first foreign-policy problem he has to face.
Iraq is headed for a financial collapse, and in its current fragile state, fiscal ruin is likely to bring down its rickety political system, which could then ignite yet another round of civil war.
Over the course of the past two decades, corruption has created a two-headed problem for Iraq. Iraq’s weak, collusive, inclusionary governments have meant that every major political party gets to run one or more ministries. They administer these bureaucracies not for the good of the country but as massive patronage networks—corruption machines that suck oil revenues from the treasury and pass them on to their constituencies in the form of jobs, contracts, and other perks. The rampant graft has effectively smothered what little private sector Iraq once had, meaning there isn’t much of an alternative to public-sector jobs.
As a result, the government is now the largest employer by far and a huge percentage of the populace counts on the state for its livelihood—either directly through salaries and pensions, or indirectly via contracts or the provision of goods and services to those on the government payroll. Even small businesses in Iraq ultimately depend on the government because so many of their customers—especially in the major cities—are themselves paid by the government, one way or another. Moreover, the Iraqi government still provides a monthly “food basket” via the Public Distribution System, which remains an important element in the daily lives of working-class and poor Iraqis.
Not surprisingly, there has been a threefold increase in public workers since 2004, and the government pays 400 percent more in salaries than it did 15 years ago. Thus, the government and its oil revenues have become the principal driver of the Iraqi economy and the provider of the Iraqi people.
The upshot is that Baghdad needs $5 billion every month to pay direct salaries and pensions, as well as another $2 billion to cover essential services and operating costs, much of which constitutes indirect forms of support to the population. However, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of oil prices (which provide some 90 percent of government revenue), Iraq’s monthly income has fluctuated between $2.5 and $3.5 billion. That means Baghdad is running a monthly deficit of $3.5 to $4.5 billion.
Now Iraq is running out of money to sustain that deficit. In October, Iraq’s minister of finance, Ali Allawi, stated in a TV interview that Iraq’s “Central Bank reserves stand at $53 billion.” Since then, the parliament passed a funding deficit law that enabled the government to borrow $10 billion to pay salaries for October, November, and December 2020. That brings Iraq’s total debt to a staggering $80 billion, according to government sources and budget proposals, and has forced the country to allocate more than $12 billion from the yearly budget to interest and principal repayment on these loans—all of which is further exacerbating the government’s capital shortfalls.
By the summer of 2021, Iraq’s hard currency reserves could be dangerously low. Indeed, the government could run out of cash to pay for most of its current, minimal obligations.
According to Iraqi officials, because Iraq’s currency reserves are already drying up, the government is being forced to print money to pay for loans to the government that cover salaries and operation costs, running the risk of unleashing rampant inflation. Because of the dangers of unchecked inflation, Baghdad may soon have to devalue the dinar instead, but this, too, entails major economic and political risks. Devaluation without accompanying economic reforms—which Iraq’s political powers refuse to consider—will cripple imports, undermine savings, and increase hardship.
Moreover, devaluation would probably cause further inflation as well. The evaporation of hard currency means that Iraq soon won’t be able to pay for imports of food and goods. Iraq is a net importer of virtually everything except oil. If money flows run low and the dinar is devalued, goods will become scarce and prices will rise. The dinar could go into free fall within six months should the government continue to draw down the remaining funds in the Central Bank of Iraq once a devaluation starts.
Some Iraqi government officials are simply hoping that a projected increase in oil prices this spring will save them. Yet most projections suggest no more than a 10 to 15 percent price hike, according to multiple oil traders and analysts—far too little to eliminate Iraq’s looming crisis. And even that could vanish if expanded Iraqi, Libyan, and Iranian oil exports cause the Saudis and Russians to follow suit and increase production to protect their market share.
If Iraq is unable to continue paying salaries, minimal government expenses, and operating costs, it would have devastating consequences. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi sounded the alarm of a coming financial reckoning in a press conference on Nov. 17, warning, “We will face the problem of paying salaries in January. I am warning you now.”
As a technocrat without a political power base, Kadhimi has been unable to push Iraq’s political parties to address, let alone solve, the problem. The government produced a white paper for reform on Oct. 13; however, it has not started its implementation. Consequently, there has been no effort to reduce salaries, pare back the numbers of government employees, or even to eliminate the hundreds of thousands of so-called ghost employees on Baghdad’s payroll for fear of upsetting important Iraqi political bosses.
When he took power, Kadhimi had widespread support: from average Iraqis and the thousands who had been protesting in the streets, from Iraq’s Shiite religious establishment, from moderate Shiite political parties, from many Sunnis, and even from the Kurds. He was seen as smart, apolitical, effective, and close to the Americans.
However, there is a growing fear across the country that Kadhimi cannot fix Iraq’s broken system. The economic crisis that would result from Iraq running out of money could be the nail in that coffin. Kadhimi would likely be completely discredited. Many of Iraq’s venal political parties would try to make him the scapegoat to avoid the inevitable popular backlash. Meanwhile, the Iranians, who oppose Kadhimi, would try to exploit the chaos to reassert their influence over the Iraqi government.
A financial crisis would almost certainly spark widespread street demonstrations, with Iraqis once again demanding a change of government. It would be challenging for the government to keep order if salaries were not being paid and the prime minister lacked authority. Armed groups and tribes, including the armed militias backed by Iran, would try to fill the vacuum and usurp the role of the primary security forces in Iraq. These same groups would also fight for territory to control. They might try to take control of revenue-generating resources such as oil fields, ports, border crossings, large businesses, agricultural land, and private properties.
In such a situation, armed conflict and land grabs could become commonplace again, except in those areas with robust security, such as the Kurdistan region. However, even the Kurdistan region will not be safe from internal economic troubles unless it can expand its resource base, because it, too, is financially dependent on Baghdad. Perhaps the Kurds’ most apparent target would be Kirkuk and its oil fields, but this would only inflame the conflict between Erbil and Baghdad, not to mention Shiite militias, who would resist such a move.
As was the case from 2005 to 2007 and from 2014 to 2017, another round of civil strife in Iraq would invariably suck in Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq is simply too important to all of them, and they could be expected to intervene to secure their interests.
Turkey would feel threatened by Kurdish gains, particularly if the Kurdistan region retakes Kirkuk. Ankara would feel obligated to defend the Turkmen ethnic group there and prevent the Kurds from reviving their dream of independence. Iran is already working to regain its dominant influence in Baghdad, and Tehran cannot afford to lose Iraqi trade revenues (which stand at around $12 billion), smuggling opportunities, and access to international financial markets.
The Saudis might well respond to any resurgence in Iranian influence by supporting Sunni groups and tribes with funding or weapons to defend themselves, especially since Riyadh cannot count on a large U.S. troop presence to handle the problem, as they could in 2006. Iraq could easily slide back into intercommunal civil war, with regional powers intervening against both the Iraqis and one another.
Given the gravity of the situation and the importance of Iraq to the region and the international oil market, the United States and the international community cannot idly stand by. Of course, during the first six months of his administration and with a pandemic and massive economic crisis at home to deal with, Biden won’t be able to afford to make this his highest priority either—but acting sooner will be cheaper and avoid harder choices later, when Iraq could be in free fall.
If the U.S. government is willing to provide some leadership, many others will likely be willing to chip in as well. International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Persian Gulf states, and even some European and East Asian countries could be expected to pony up some cash.
Iraq’s coming crisis is a crisis of liquidity. Iraq will need money to prevent the collapse of its financial system, which would be the first domino to fall. If the United States were willing to pledge a significant amount, perhaps $1 billion, it should be possible to put together a larger package of $5 billion to $10 billion for Iraq with other countries chipping in.
The idea of providing $1 billion in emergency budget support to Iraq may seem impossible at this moment. It shouldn’t. It wouldn’t come out of the pockets of ordinary Americans in the form of increased taxes—and the last 12 years should have taught the United States two important lessons about this part of the world.
First, what happens in the Middle East does not stay there. And second, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure—as Washington’s tragic policies toward Iraq, Syria, and Libya have all demonstrated.
Of course, at Iraq’s current burn rate, even $10 billion will barely last three months. That’s why the money must come with strong conditions attached: austerity measures to encourage saving, major cuts in government spending, draconian anti-corruption measures, fully integrating militia personnel into the Iraqi military—as individuals, not as militias, and therefore answerable to the Iraqi government. Subsequent aid packages should be dangled as a further incentive, but only if Iraq makes good on these requirements.
Such an international aid package would have a crucial secondary purpose. In Iraq, the only way to build support for a political agenda—and to build a power base to see it implemented—is with resources. Kadhimi has demonstrated repeatedly that he has the right intentions and ideas, but he lacks the political and military strength to follow through. Putting billions of dollars at his disposal but with strict conditions would give him the resources to build that support and use it to take on Iraq’s political parties, militias, and kleptocrats.
Such measures are what Iraq needs over the long term as well. The more that Kadhimi can blame the international community for forcing Iraq to take these steps, and the more that other Iraqis understand that either they take them or the entire system collapses, the better able he will be to do what he has always hoped to do and what the U.S. government always hoped that he would.
When Biden was U.S. vice president, he won the dubious prize of handling Iraq. Given then-President Barack Obama’s intended course of action, it was arguably the worst assignment of all. When he takes office as president, addressing the problems of Iraq may not be his priority or his desire, but Baghdad’s crisis offers him an opportunity to put the country—and U.S. interests there—on the right path in a way he never could the last time he was responsible for Iraq policy.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--Europe Embraces Tighter Measures as Coronavirus Cases Surge

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Europe embraces stricter coronavirus measures , an oil tanker is attacked in the Saudi port of Jeddah , and U.S. Attorney General Wiliam Barr resigns .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
As the Christmas season approached in Europe , authorities are already taking steps to make it a quiet affair for residents as an increase in COVID-19 cases shows no sign of halting .
Germany , once considered an exemplar of success in tackling the virus , will enter a strict lockdown on Wednesday that will last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , schools , daycare facilities and most shops will be closed after Chancellor Angela Merkel blamed Christmas shopping for a “ considerable ” increase in social gatherings .
Amid noisy protests outside his office , Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced his country “ will close for five weeks.
” “ We ’ re not dealing with a simple flu like the people behind us think , ” Rutte said , in reference to those shouting outside .
France is bucking the trend by relaxing some of its strict lockdown measures—barely .
Although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place , residents will no longer need to have an essential reason to leave their homes as before .
Rising numbers .
The new moves come as the continent has struggled to contain a second wave of infections .
Despite some progress in reducing the number of infections since a peak in November , recorded daily cases are still more than three times higher today than they were on October 1 .
Across the pond .
Europe ’ s targeted measures contrast with the United States , where recorded daily cases are more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and where the overall death toll has now passed 300,000 .
Absent a national plan , a state-by-state strategy to manage infections has largely failed , with hopes now pinned on a coronavirus vaccine which began rolling out on Monday .
Barr flies .
U.S. Attorney General William Barr is out of the job , following an announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday evening .
Trump tweeted a letter written by Barr outlining his respect for the president , ending with the confirmation that he would resign on Dec. 23 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the attorney general ’ s statement that no significant voter fraud could be found in the Nov. 3 presidential election .
Deputy Attorney General Jeff Rosen will now take on Barr ’ s former post in an acting capacity .
Brexit talks warm up .
The United Kingdom and the European Union may be close to finding a compromise on one of the main sticking points of Brexit negotiations—the so-called level playing field .
The Financial Times reports that a “ rebalancing mechanism ” is close to being agreed by both sides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tariffs on the other if one diverges too far from existing labor , environmental , or competition standards .
The report suggests that British negotiators have already found a way to sell the idea to euroskeptic MPs , calling it a “ freedom clause.
” The news comes as EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier told an assembly of European ambassadors that there “ might now be a narrow path ” toward reaching an agreement .
Kidnapping victims still missing .
Over 300 schoolchildren are still missing following an attack on a secondary school @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Muhammadu Buhari said authorities had located the perpetrators of the attack and were engaged in gun battles in the Zango/Paula forest area .
No group has claimed responsibility for the mass abduction , although Boko Haram and its offshoot , the Islamic State ’ s West Africa Province ( ISWAP ) , have targeted students in the area in the past .
Mexico considers controversial bill .
Mexico is set to pass a law that would limit the activities of “ foreign agents ” —including U.S. anti-narcotic officers—on Mexican soil .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share intelligence gathered in Mexico with local authorities , raising fears of the information getting into the hands of drug cartels .
The legislation has already passed in the Senate and is expected to be voted on in the lower house today .
Damián Zepeda , a leader in the opposition National Action Party , called the bill a “ tantrum ” over the arrest of Salvador Cienfuegos—a former Mexican defense minister—who was charged by U.S. authorities in October of money laundering and drug trafficking .
Iran ’ s missile policy .
Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s ballistic missile program , suggesting he would block any attempt to alter it as part of any U.S. negotiations under a Biden administration .
“ The Americans were trying for months to add the missile issue and this was rejected .
Trump was uninformed and did not know about the matter , but Mr. Biden is well aware of the details of the deal , ” Rouhani told a news conference .
“ I have not heard Biden say that we have to reach another agreement in order to return to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump says , ” Rouhani added .
Jake Sullivan , Biden ’ s choice for national security adviser , told an audience on Dec. 7 that any deal on Iranian missiles would be discussed after the United States had reentered the Iran nuclear deal , and would not be a condition of its return .
Inter-Korean relations .
The South Korean government has outlawed the practice of sending leaflets , money , or goods over the North Korean border by surreptitious means following criticism by Kim Yo Jong , the sister of North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the year .
North Korean authorities demolished a liaison office near its border with the south in an apparent retaliation for the perceived failure by the Moon government in Seoul to curb activists activities in sending material into the north .
Under the new law , violators could face up to three years in prison or a roughly $ 27,500 fine .
Human rights organizations have denounced the move as giving into North Korea too easily .
“ Such appeasement efforts only risk inviting further North Korean provocations and demands , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Justice Working Group .
Saudi oil attacks .
An explosives-laden boat caused damage to an oil tanker docked at the Saudi port of Jeddah on Monday , adding to the number of attacks on the country ’ s oil industry in recent weeks .
Officials described the attack as an act of terror but did not identify the perpetrators .
The Wall Street Journal cited two European security officials who pinned the blame on Houthi rebels .
No one was injured in the attack , although some oil may have been spilled , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one in November , when the Houthis claimed to have hit a fuel depot in Jeddah using a cruise missile .
The Ukrainian government is pursuing an initiative to have the site added to the heritage list in a bid to boost tourism to the area , 20 years after the power plant finally ceased operating , and four years since a protective dome over the doomed fourth reactor was completed .
124,000 tourists—a record number—visited Chernobyl in 2019 amid renewed interest following a popular television drama of the same name .
Ukrainian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boost annual tourist numbers to one million .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Europe embraces stricter coronavirus measures, an oil tanker is attacked in the Saudi port of Jeddah , and U.S. Attorney General Wiliam Barr resigns.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Europe embraces stricter coronavirus measures, an oil tanker is attacked in the Saudi port of Jeddah, and U.S. Attorney General Wiliam Barr resigns.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Europe Attempts to Stop a Covid Christmas
As the Christmas season approached in Europe, authorities are already taking steps to make it a quiet affair for residents as an increase in COVID-19 cases shows no sign of halting.
Germany, once considered an exemplar of success in tackling the virus, will enter a strict lockdown on Wednesday that will last until Jan. 10. During this period, schools, daycare facilities and most shops will be closed after Chancellor Angela Merkel blamed Christmas shopping for a “considerable” increase in social gatherings.
Amid noisy protests outside his office, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced his country “will close for five weeks.” “We’re not dealing with a simple flu like the people behind us think,” Rutte said, in reference to those shouting outside.
France is bucking the trend by relaxing some of its strict lockdown measures—barely. Although an 8 p.m. curfew will remain in place, residents will no longer need to have an essential reason to leave their homes as before.
Rising numbers. The new moves come as the continent has struggled to contain a second wave of infections. Despite some progress in reducing the number of infections since a peak in November, recorded daily cases are still more than three times higher today than they were on October 1.
Across the pond. Europe’s targeted measures contrast with the United States, where recorded daily cases are more than twice as high per capita, and where the overall death toll has now passed 300,000. Absent a national plan, a state-by-state strategy to manage infections has largely failed, with hopes now pinned on a coronavirus vaccine that began rolling out on Monday.
What We’re Following Today Barr flies. U.S. Attorney General William Barr is out of the job, following an announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday evening. Trump tweeted a letter written by Barr outlining his respect for the president, ending with the confirmation that he would resign on Dec. 23. Barr had reportedly fallen out with Trump over the attorney general’s statement that no significant voter fraud could be found in the Nov. 3 presidential election. Deputy Attorney General Jeff Rosen will now take on Barr’s former post in an acting capacity. Brexit talks warm up. The United Kingdom and the European Union may be close to finding a compromise on one of the main sticking points of Brexit negotiations—the so-called level playing field. The Financial Times reports that a “rebalancing mechanism” is close to being agreed by both sides, allowing for the parties to impose tariffs on the other if one diverges too far from existing labor, environmental, or competition standards. The report suggests that British negotiators have already found a way to sell the idea to Euroskeptic MPs, calling it a “freedom clause.” The news comes as EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier told an assembly of European ambassadors that there “might now be a narrow path” toward reaching an agreement.
Kidnapping victims still missing. Over 300 schoolchildren are still missing following an attack on a secondary school in northern Nigeria last Friday. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari said authorities had located the perpetrators of the attack and were engaged in gun battles in the Zango/Paula forest area.
No group has claimed responsibility for the mass abduction, although Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), have targeted students in the area in the past.
Mexico considers controversial bill. Mexico is set to pass a law that would limit the activities of “foreign agents” —including U.S. anti-narcotic officers—on Mexican soil. The bill would force U.S. federal agents to share intelligence gathered in Mexico with local authorities, raising fears of the information getting into the hands of drug cartels. The legislation has already passed in the Senate and is expected to be voted on in the lower house today.
Damián Zepeda, a leader in the opposition National Action Party, called the bill a “tantrum” over the arrest of Salvador Cienfuegos—a former Mexican defense minister—who was charged by U.S. authorities in October of money laundering and drug trafficking.
Keep an Eye On
Iran’s missile policy. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has defended his country’s ballistic missile program, suggesting he would block any attempt to alter it as part of any U.S. negotiations under a Biden administration.
“The Americans were trying for months to add the missile issue and this was rejected. Trump was uninformed and did not know about the matter, but Mr. Biden is well aware of the details of the deal,” Rouhani told a news conference. “I have not heard Biden say that we have to reach another agreement in order to return to the nuclear deal, that is what Trump says,” Rouhani added.
Jake Sullivan, Biden’s choice for national security advisor, told an audience on Dec. 7 that any deal on Iranian missiles would be discussed after the United States had reentered the Iran nuclear deal, and would not be a condition of its return.
Inter-Korean relations. The South Korean government has outlawed the practice of sending leaflets, money, or goods over the North Korean border by surreptitious means following criticism by Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, earlier in the year.
North Korean authorities demolished a liaison office near its border with the south in an apparent retaliation for the perceived failure by the Moon government in Seoul to curb activists activities in sending material into the north. Under the new law, violators could face up to three years in prison or a roughly $27,500 fine.
Human rights organizations have denounced the move as giving into North Korea too easily. “Such appeasement efforts only risk inviting further North Korean provocations and demands,” said said Shin Hee-seok of the Transitional Justice Working Group.
Saudi oil attacks. An explosives-laden boat caused damage to an oil tanker docked at the Saudi port of Jeddah on Monday, adding to the number of attacks on the country’s oil industry in recent weeks. Officials described the attack as an act of terror but did not identify the perpetrators. TheWall Street Journal cited two European security officials who pinned the blame on Houthi rebels.
No one was injured in the attack, although some oil may have been spilled, authorities said. The incident follows another one in November, when the Houthis claimed to have hit a fuel depot in Jeddah using a cruise missile.
Odds and Ends In a year has shown that what you do after disaster has struck is often more important than the disaster itself, it’s perhaps fitting that Chernobyl—the site of the world’s worst nuclear accident—is in a push to be recognized as a UNESCO world heritage site.
The Ukrainian government is pursuing an initiative to have the site added to the heritage list in a bid to boost tourism to the area, 20 years after the power plant finally ceased operating, and four years since a protective dome over the doomed fourth reactor was completed.
A record 124,000 tourists visited Chernobyl in 2019 amid renewed interest following a popular television drama of the same name. Ukrainian Culture Minister Oleksandr Tkachenko now hopes to boost annual tourist numbers to 1 million.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--Arctic Competition – Part Two

Arctic Competition – Part Two

“ Things build up more and more , and everyone pushes the other to react .
And at some point , you have something build up that can easily evolve into something larger , especially when you have the type of rhetoric on the U.S. side that we saw last year , where you are accusing Russia to be an aggressor in the Arctic.
” “ I think there ’ s probably two aspects to it .
One is that small things can escalate quickly .
I mean , we ’ re seeing so much more military activity on both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more patrols and fighter jets that are patrolling the nuclear bombers , a lot more surveillance flights , and we have a lot more activity under the water , under the ice , too , in terms of submarines , and so there ’ s always risk similar to the Cold War .
Things build up more and more , and everyone pushes the other to react .
And at some point , you have something build up that can easily evolve into something larger , especially when you have the type of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw last year , where you are accusing Russia to be an aggressor in the Arctic .
So , I think a lot of those military exercises , Russia [ reinvigorating the ] Northern Fleet [ and building ] up offensive weaponry .
It all creates risk , right ?
It all [ creates ] risks for incidents with potential for misunderstandings .
The more assets you have in the region , the risk goes up .
And then there ’ s potential economic risk , too , that as Russia and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclusive economic zone , depending on the subterranean readings submitted to the UNCLOS , there ’ s potential for conflict there that they can ’ t agree on where delineations should be .
I don ’ t think it ’ s going to lead to war between Russia and Canada , but there ’ s definitely room for political conflict there .
The third aspect is that conflict outside of the Arctic can transpire or move into the Arctic .
If you think of military confrontation between the U.S. and China in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or over Japan or whatever it may be , there ’ s no reason why that conflict wouldn ’ t also happen in the Arctic when the Arctic has suddenly , and over time , [ become a ] pretty normal navigable ocean .
Because twenty , thirty years ago , even if there would have been a war between two countries , that war wouldn ’ t have also escalated into the Arctic , because you wouldn ’ t have been able to put your blue-water navy in the Arctic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the ice [ or ] some surveillance flights over the Arctic or whatever it may be , but [ the Arctic ] was really just a frozen bed .
It ’ s like if you play [ a ] board game , and there ’ s a big dead spot in the middle that no one really cares about because you can ’ t get in there .
And , if you could get in there , then you can ’ t really fight there , because it ’ s all frozen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and I think that ’ s definitely a concern that future military conflicts can potentially also occur in the Arctic , just like they could happen in the Atlantic , or they would have an effect on the Pacific or whatever it may be .
So , once you have a navigable ocean , you can send a carrier group through the Arctic , and that ’ s not unrealistic that that happens within the next ten or twenty years .
Certainly , the equation of what is possible in the Arctic in @ @ @ @ @ @

“Things build up more and more, and everyone pushes the other to react. And at some point, you have something build up that can easily evolve into something larger, especially when you have the type of rhetoric on the U.S. side that we saw last year, where you are accusing Russia to be an aggressor in the Arctic.”
Read Hide the transcript
“I think there’s probably two aspects to it. One is that small things can escalate quickly. I mean, we’re seeing so much more military activity on both sides—NATO and Russia in the Arctic—so much more patrols and fighter jets that are patrolling the nuclear bombers, a lot more surveillance flights, and we have a lot more activity under the water, under the ice, too, in terms of submarines, and so there’s always risk similar to the Cold War. Things build up more and more, and everyone pushes the other to react. And at some point, you have something build up that can easily evolve into something larger, especially when you have the type of rhetoric on the U.S. side that we saw last year, where you are accusing Russia to be an aggressor in the Arctic.
So, I think a lot of those military exercises, Russia [reinvigorating the] Northern Fleet [and building] up offensive weaponry. It all creates risk, right? It all [creates] risks for incidents with potential for misunderstandings. The more assets you have in the region, the risk goes up. And then there’s potential economic risk, too, that as Russia and other Arctic states are trying to expand their exclusive economic zone, depending on the subterranean readings submitted to the UNCLOS, there’s potential for conflict there that they can’t agree on where delineations should be. I don’t think it’s going to lead to war between Russia and Canada, but there’s definitely room for political conflict there.
The third aspect is that conflict outside of the Arctic can transpire or move into the Arctic. If you think of military confrontation between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, or over Taiwan, or over Japan or whatever it may be, there’s no reason why that conflict wouldn’t also happen in the Arctic when the Arctic has suddenly, and over time, [become a] pretty normal navigable ocean. Because twenty, thirty years ago, even if there would have been a war between two countries, that war wouldn’t have also escalated into the Arctic, because you wouldn’t have been able to put your blue-water navy in the Arctic. There might’ve been some submarines under the ice [or] some surveillance flights over the Arctic or whatever it may be, but [the Arctic] was really just a frozen bed.
It’s like if you play [a] board game, and there’s a big dead spot in the middle that no one really cares about because you can’t get in there. And, if you could get in there, then you can’t really fight there, because it’s all frozen. But that’s changing, and I think that’s definitely a concern that future military conflicts can potentially also occur in the Arctic, just like they could happen in the Atlantic, or they would have an effect on the Pacific or whatever it may be. So, once you have a navigable ocean, you can send a carrier group through the Arctic, and that’s not unrealistic that that happens within the next ten or twenty years. Certainly, the equation of what is possible in the Arctic in terms of conflict changes.”