China’s Monumental Year

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
With the U.S.-China trade war , President Xi Jinping ’ s growing political ambitions , and global fallout from protests in Hong Kong and repression in Xinjiang , 2019 has been a big year for China .
On the first day of 2020 , here is China Brief ’ s year in review : Five stories from Foreign Policy and five pieces from other outlets that deepened our knowledge of China in 2019 .
Outfoxed and Outgunned : How China Routed the U.S. in a U.N. Agency by Colum Lynch and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ascent within international institutions , especially the United Nations , has gone largely unnoticed by everyone but specialists .
In 2019 , Beijing ’ s diplomatic alliances with African countries , combined with the Trump administration ’ s neglect of U.N. diplomacy , paid off big time .
Foreign Policy ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer traced one such success : China ’ s capture of the leadership of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization—a victory over Washington .
“ The win marked an international triumph for China , showcasing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newfound ability to seed top jobs at international institutions with hand-picked candidates , ” they report .
“ But the race also fueled allegations that it forgave tens of millions of dollars of debt to an African state in exchange for withdrawing its candidate from the race and threatened economic retaliation against smaller and more developing countries if they opposed China ’ s plan.
” As Foreign Policy continued to cover the politics of K-pop ( South Korean pop music ) in 2019 , Lauren Teixeira tackled one of the trickiest problems for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after a dispute over South Korea ’ s decision to cooperate with the United States to build a missile defense system .
That led to a two-year ban on South Korean cultural products in China—and the development of new Chinese pop stars .
“ Much like the decoupling of the Chinese internet from the rest of the world a decade ago , we will probably start to see a Chinese idol industry take shape that is self-contained and populated with only the most politically palatable artists , ” Teixeira writes .
China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Nationalism by Vicky Xiuzhong Xu , Oct. 1 In 2019 there was debate among analysts about whether Chinese students , especially on foreign campuses , believe the nationalist propaganda they embrace in public—or whether they have no choice but to echo Beijing ’ s words .
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu , a Chinese analyst based in Australia , comes down on the side that the propaganda is fully effective .
“ The romantic idea has long persisted that the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who enroll in Western universities each year are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the better , ” she writes .
“ Except most are not .
Even when Chinese nationalists go abroad , it is difficult for them to change their minds.
” Chinese parents are often caricatured in the media—both Western and Chinese—as “ tiger parents , ” demanding consistent overachievement from their kids .
The overwhelming marathon of Chinese child-rearing is the premise of the hit video game Chinese Parents .
In her review of the game , Rui Zhong picks up on the ways that consumer technology is altering ordinary Chinese lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clash between larger society ’ s economic limitations and deeply personal financial anxieties , ” she writes .
“ As one reviewer described the game ’ s impact on the Q & A website Zhihu : ‘ I ’ m not sure just how long this game is going to stay popular , but in terms of getting players to consider the real attitudes they face life with … it ’ s already succeeded.
’ ” The Untold Story of How George W. Bush Lost China by Paul Blustein , Oct. 2 There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy toward China failed and if so , who is to blame .
Most of that has focused on the 1990s , with U.S. President Bill Clinton and his advisors ’ decision to back China ’ s accession to the World Trade Organization in the hopes of prompting political reform .
But , Paul Blustein argues , this framing looks at the wrong leader and the wrong time .
“ It is a cruel historical irony that [ Henry ] Paulson , the kingpin of the Bush administration ’ s efforts to change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the financial collapse that fatally undermined them , ” he writes .
How a Big U.S. Chip Maker Gave China the ‘ Keys to the Kingdom ’ by Kate O ’ Keeffe and Brian Spegele , the Wall Street Journal , June 27 Kate O ’ Keeffe ’ s security reporting on China for the Wall Street Journal has been among the best this year .
This piece reported with Brian Spegele , which details a controversial and lucrative deal between a U.S. computer chip maker and Chinese partners , shows how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ businesses could cause harm for the rest of the country .
One Month , 500,000 Face Scans : How China Is Using A.I .
to Profile a Minority by Paul Mozur , the New York Times , April 14 Paul Mozur ’ s reporting on Chinese technology for the New York Times stands out in a genre once dominated by business access and uncritical repetition of tech myths .
This story shows how Chinese tech firms have built algorithms to single out ethnic Uighur Muslims for surveillance as part of the state ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It played a critical role in moving the conversation about facial recognition and ethics forward .
China ’ s Spies Are On the Offensive by Mike Giglio , the Atlantic , Aug. 26 The espionage war between Beijing and Washington is intensifying , and Mike Giglio at the Atlantic offered a comprehensive look at just how bad things have gotten for the United States .
As one officer told Giglio : “ If I were to start my CIA career all over again , I would try to get into our China program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese counterintelligence specialist … Our top priority in US counterintelligence today—and into the future—must be to stop or to drastically curtail China ’ s spying.
” In China , Kids Of Unwed Mothers May Be Barred From Public Health Care , Education by Emily Feng , NPR , Nov. 6 Feminist critiques of new Chinese policies have increased in recent years , but some forms of prejudice are more entrenched .
NPR ’ s Emily Feng examined how single mothers are singled out in a system that stigmatizes their children for life .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ left up to the discretion of local governments , ” she reports .
Many of those authorities have denied the children of single mothers access to education and health care .
Liu Cixin ’ s War of the Worlds by Jiayang Fan , the New Yorker , June 17 The science fiction author Liu Cixin is one of the few Chinese authors who has reached a mainstream Western audience .
But the pervasive cynicism of his books in some ways uncannily matches the priorities of the government , especially his winner-takes-all view of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a profile in the New Yorker , asking him about these links—and about the internment camps in Xinjiang .
“ The answer duplicated government propaganda so exactly that I couldn ’ t help asking Liu if he ever thought he might have been brainwashed , ” she writes .
“ ‘ I know what you are thinking , ’ he told me with weary clarity .
‘ What about individual liberty and freedom of governance ?
’ … ‘ But that ’ s not what Chinese people care about.
’ ” That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. With the U.S.-China trade war, President Xi Jinping’s growing political ambitions, and global fallout from protests in Hong Kong and repression in Xinjiang, 2019 has been a big year for China. On the first day of 2020, here is China Brief’s year in review: Five stories from Foreign Policy and five pieces from other outlets that deepened our knowledge of China in 2019.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. With the U.S.-China trade war, President Xi Jinping’s growing political ambitions, and global fallout from protests in Hong Kong and repression in Xinjiang, 2019 has been a big year for China. On the first day of 2020, here is China Brief’s year in review: Five stories from Foreign Policy and five pieces from other outlets that deepened our knowledge of China in 2019.
China’s Year in Review from FP
Qu Dongyu, the new director-general of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.
Outfoxed and Outgunned: How China Routed the U.S. in a U.N. Agency by Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, Oct. 23
China’s ascent within international institutions, especially the United Nations, has gone largely unnoticed by everyone but specialists. In 2019, Beijing’s diplomatic alliances with African countries, combined with the Trump administration’s neglect of U.N. diplomacy, paid off big time. Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer traced one such success: China’s capture of the leadership of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization—a victory over Washington.
“The win marked an international triumph for China, showcasing its growing political and economic might and its newfound ability to seed top jobs at international institutions with hand-picked candidates,” they report. “But the race also fueled allegations that it forgave tens of millions of dollars of debt to an African state in exchange for withdrawing its candidate from the race and threatened economic retaliation against smaller and more developing countries if they opposed China’s plan.”
K-Pop’s Big China Problem by Lauren Teixeira, July 30
As Foreign Policy continued to cover the politics of K-pop (South Korean pop music) in 2019, Lauren Teixeira tackled one of the trickiest problems for South Korea: its relationship with China after a dispute over South Korea’s decision to cooperate with the United States to build a missile defense system. That led to a two-year ban on South Korean cultural products in China—and the development of new Chinese pop stars.
“Much like the decoupling of the Chinese internet from the rest of the world a decade ago, we will probably start to see a Chinese idol industry take shape that is self-contained and populated with only the most politically palatable artists,” Teixeira writes.
Pro-China counterprotesters attempt to disrupt a pro-democracy rally in support of Hong Kong in London’s Trafalgar Square on Aug. 17.
China’s Youth Are Trapped in the Cult of Nationalism by Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Oct. 1
In 2019 there was debate among analysts about whether Chinese students, especially on foreign campuses, believe the nationalist propaganda they embrace in public—or whether they have no choice but to echo Beijing’s words. Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, a Chinese analyst based in Australia, comes down on the side that the propaganda is fully effective.
“The romantic idea has long persisted that the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who enroll in Western universities each year are secret rebels who will change the country for the better,” she writes. “Except most are not. Even when Chinese nationalists go abroad, it is difficult for them to change their minds.”
Press ‘A’ to Study Harder by Rui Zhong, Jan. 3
Chinese parents are often caricatured in the media—both Western and Chinese—as “tiger parents,” demanding consistent overachievement from their kids. The overwhelming marathon of Chinese child-rearing is the premise of the hit video game Chinese Parents. In her review of the game, Rui Zhong picks up on the ways that consumer technology is altering ordinary Chinese lives. “Chinese Parents captures perfectly the clash between larger society’s economic limitations and deeply personal financial anxieties,” she writes.
“As one reviewer described the game’s impact on the Q&A website Zhihu: ‘I’m not sure just how long this game is going to stay popular, but in terms of getting players to consider the real attitudes they face life with … it’s already succeeded.’”
The Untold Story of How George W. Bush Lost China by Paul Blustein, Oct. 2
There is an ongoing argument about whether U.S. policy toward China failed and if so, who is to blame. Most of that has focused on the 1990s, with U.S. President Bill Clinton and his advisors’ decision to back China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in the hopes of prompting political reform. But, Paul Blustein argues, this framing looks at the wrong leader and the wrong time. “It is a cruel historical irony that [Henry] Paulson, the kingpin of the Bush administration’s efforts to change Chinese policy, stood at the nexus of the financial collapse that fatally undermined them,” he writes.
How Others Covered China in 2019
How a Big U.S. Chip Maker Gave China the ‘Keys to the Kingdom’ by Kate O’Keeffe and Brian Spegele, the Wall Street Journal, June 27
Kate O’Keeffe’s security reporting on China for the Wall Street Journal has been among the best this year. This piece reported with Brian Spegele, which details a controversial and lucrative deal between a U.S. computer chip maker and Chinese partners, shows how what’s good for individual American businesses could cause harm for the rest of the country.
One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority by Paul Mozur, the New York Times, April 14
Paul Mozur’s reporting on Chinese technology for the New York Times stands out in a genre once dominated by business access and uncritical repetition of tech myths. This story shows how Chinese tech firms have built algorithms to single out ethnic Uighur Muslims for surveillance as part of the state’s crackdown in the Xinjiang region. It played a critical role in moving the conversation about facial recognition and ethics forward.
China’s Spies Are On the Offensive by Mike Giglio, the Atlantic, Aug. 26
The espionage war between Beijing and Washington is intensifying, and Mike Giglio at the Atlantic offered a comprehensive look at just how bad things have gotten for the United States. As one officer told Giglio: “If I were to start my CIA career all over again, I would try to get into our China program, learn Mandarin, and become a Chinese counterintelligence specialist … Our top priority in US counterintelligence today—and into the future—must be to stop or to drastically curtail China’s spying.”
In China, Kids Of Unwed Mothers May Be Barred From Public Health Care, Education by Emily Feng, NPR, Nov. 6
Feminist critiques of new Chinese policies have increased in recent years, but some forms of prejudice are more entrenched. NPR’s Emily Feng examined how single mothers are singled out in a system that stigmatizes their children for life. “The treatment of single mothers is left up to the discretion of local governments,” she reports. Many of those authorities have denied the children of single mothers access to education and health care.
Liu Cixin’s War of the Worlds by Jiayang Fan, the New Yorker, June 17
The science fiction author Liu Cixin is one of the few Chinese authors who has reached a mainstream Western audience. But the pervasive cynicism of his books in some ways uncannily matches the priorities of the government, especially his winner-takes-all view of international relations. Jiayang Fan interviewed Liu for a profile in the New Yorker, asking him about these links—and about the internment camps in Xinjiang.
“The answer duplicated government propaganda so exactly that I couldn’t help asking Liu if he ever thought he might have been brainwashed,” she writes. “‘I know what you are thinking,’ he told me with weary clarity. ‘What about individual liberty and freedom of governance?’ … ‘But that’s not what Chinese people care about.’”
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--China’s Reach Tests the Pacific’s Fragile Island Democracies

A decade ago , then-U.S. President Barack Obama billed himself as the “ first Pacific president ” and announced , several years later , a foreign-policy “ pivot to Asia.
” But the pivot proved largely illusory , and the region only grows more complex .
The growing challenges faced by Pacific island countries requires significant reassessment as the region becomes one of the tensest political battlegrounds in the world .
A growing battle of diplomatic and economic statecraft is playing out on remote islands .
China is acutely aware that the fledgling democracies of the Pacific are prone to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a result , are at risk of manipulation that goes against their best interests .
That lays the groundwork for Chinese expansionism , initially economically , with the long-term goal of a military presence to rival that of the United States .
The Solomon Islands derecognizing Taiwan is only the latest victory for Beijing .
China ’ s ambition to become the regional leader in the Pacific is pursued through the use of both diplomatic and economic statecraft , with the longer-term goal of military expansionism in the Pacific .
Within hours @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia , Arthur Culvahouse described China ’ s spending in the Pacific as akin to “ payday loan diplomacy.
” Otherwise reported as “ debt-trap diplomacy , ” this strategy sees vulnerable countries targeted with unsustainable debts with the intention of generating political leverage .
Calculating Chinese contributions in the Pacific is difficult , as China does not engage with the similar transparency and accountability mechanisms followed by other major donors .
China ’ s diplomatic statecraft has taken leaps and bounds over the past decade .
Beijing has become increasingly adept at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support and legitimize its actions .
Reports from this past year ’ s United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York point to an increasingly brazen China willing to tackle critiques and threats head-on .
A recent example is its swiftness in addressing criticism of the oppression of ethnic Uighurs and other Turkic minorities in Xinjiang .
At the U.N. , a nonbinding statement praising China ’ s record on human rights was supported by 54 countries including Egypt , Pakistan , and Russia—evidence of China ’ s growing diplomatic and economic clout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrawal of U.S. influence in international institutions , China has also been positioning its diplomats within U.N. agencies , slowly shaping institutions to reflect its interests .
This May , China ’ s nominated candidate stands a chance to head the U.N. ’ s World Intellectual Property Organization , much to the alarm of the West , whose companies are frequently falling victim to Chinese IP theft .
China ’ s growing skill at statecraft extends to Pacific affairs .
Recently , China exploited a rift between Australia and Fiji on climate change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tuvalu in August 2019 .
China ’ s foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang referred to Australia ’ s behavior as akin to a “ condescending master ” and “ insulting ” to climate-vulnerable nations .
Geng went on to accuse Australia of spreading “ the China threat fallacy among island countries ” and claimed—falsely—that Chinese engagement comes “ with no political strings attached.
” The comments were widely reported in Australia and across the Pacific , allowing China to point toward tangible tensions and in turn damage the Australian government ’ s stature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ island countries .
China ’ s use of development aid in the Pacific , particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative , has been raising concerns .
Analysts , including from the Lowy Institute , have spoken out on the scale of Chinese lending and the capability of Pacific nations to effectively scrutinize the financial sustainability of the debt they ’ re assuming through partnering with China on infrastructure projects .
A commonly cited example is the construction of a national conference center in Vanuatu .
Completed and handed over by China in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to poor lending and construction processes .
Prime Minister Charlot Salwai of Vanuatu said in early 2019 that the government is no longer able to maintain the building , which is incurring significant costs due to the absence of actual conferences .
The aforementioned Lowy Institute report states that several island countries in the Pacific , particularly Tonga , Samoa , and Vanuatu , are already significantly indebted to China .
The growing influence and presence of China in the Pacific have laid the foundations for China to lean on the island countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a military base in the region .
Such a base would likely be constructed out of a continued expansion of newly built or preexisting facilities that can serve multiple purposes .
The Chinese-built wharf on Espiritu Santo island in Vanuatu is one such example—built for commercial cruise ships , the wharf also has the capacity to service naval vessels .
It was built in close proximity to Vanuatu ’ s international airport , which China is assisting in upgrading .
China views a base in the Pacific as an imperative if it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the highly contested South China Sea .
It would be the second such base for the Peoples Liberation Army after the establishment of the Djibouti base in 2017 .
While Vanuatu is frequently identified as the most likely candidate where China could establish a permanent military presence , other Pacific states such as Tonga have also been mentioned .
Though Australia is the largest provider of development assistance in the Pacific , a nation of 25 million people is unable to tackle Chinese foreign influence alone .
Key to Prime Minister Scott @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pacific step-up ” strategy are the deep personal , historical , and cultural ties formed between Australia and Pacific island nations over the last 50-plus years .
Australia is using its sizable diplomatic presence , providing targeted aid , delivering infrastructure projects , assisting in governance , and tackling corruption .
In December 2019 , Australia announced that its aid budget will be subject to a landmark review to reprioritize and redirect Australian aid .
The review will identify “ new and emerging priorities , ” which will likely see further prioritization of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year also announced the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific .
The initiative , with 2 billion Australian dollars ( about $ 1.4 billion ) in funding , will use grants combined with loans to support the development of high priority infrastructure .
Australia has a long history of assisting in the development of significant infrastructure projects—most recently , the construction of the 3,000-mile-long Coral Sea Cable System between Papua New Guinea , the Solomon Islands , and Australia .
The project aims to deliver faster , cheaper , and more reliable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Guinea and the Solomon Islands will be the majority owners and beneficiaries of revenue raised .
Media reporting had linked Australia ’ s support of the project with ensuring that the high-profile Chinese telecommunications company Huawei did not undertake the project .
The Australia-China bilateral relationship has been consistently strained over the past five years .
China has been accused of attempts to influence Australian policy by a range of covert means .
One such case in 2016 saw Labor Party Sen. Sam Dastyari engulfed in a scandal involving Chinese donors that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transgressions , Dastyari had conducted a media conference calling on Australia to shift away from its strong rejection of China ’ s territorial claims in the South China Sea .
Tensions were further exacerbated by a major cyberattack on Australia ’ s Bureau of Meteorology that was widely linked to China .
Recently , China has denied visas for two Australian politicians who had spoken out against China ’ s treatment of the Muslim Uighur population .
One Australian commentator argues the high-water mark came with the signing of the China-Australia Free Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ permanently changed .
Australia is acutely aware that supporting the fragile democracies of the Pacific requires greater cooperation with likeminded nations , and allies are listening and engaging .
The United Kingdom announced in 2018 the expansion of its diplomatic presence in the Pacific—establishing new posts in Samoa , Tonga , and Vanuatu .
The growth in representation allows for a deepening of relations in the region by a fellow Five Eyes intelligence partner .
The U.K. is also highly regarded for the size and reach of its aid projects through its Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ engagement in the Pacific is often viewed through the lens of United States Indo-Pacific Command .
A report by the Sydney-based United States Studies Centre recently warned that the U.S. defense strategy is in “ the throes of an unprecedented crisis , ” which is born out of a misalignment between ambition and the reality of available defense resources .
The report argues for a need to develop a shared reliance on a network of allies in the region , noting Asian militaries such as Japan ’ s can offer significant strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States in some respects has been deepening in recent years .
In late 2018 , U.S. Vice President Mike Pence announced that Australia and the United States had commenced a naval base upgrade on Manus Island in northern Papua New Guinea .
The upgrades did not go unnoticed in Beijing , and China sent deep-water surveying vessels to the region .
Media reporting in Australia also shed light on the rumored construction of a new deep-water port facility outside of the northern Australian city of Darwin .
Such a facility could be an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been routinely stationed in Darwin since 2012 .
Developing a shared reliance on a network of military allies in the region would aid the Pacific—but this should be extended further .
The Pacific needs greater harmonization in rhetoric as well as cooperation in the delivery of both aid and infrastructure projects .
Likeminded states must work together to counter influence in the region that often fails to work in the best interest of the Pacific island countries .
It is unlikely that tensions will subside in the short to medium term—rather they will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pacific .

A decade ago, then-U.S. President Barack Obama billed himself as the “first Pacific president” and announced, several years later, a foreign-policy “ pivot to Asia .” But the pivot proved largely illusory, and the region only grows more complex. The growing challenges faced by Pacific island countries requires significant reassessment as the region becomes one of the tensest political battlegrounds in the world.
A decade ago, then-U.S. President Barack Obama billed himself as the “first Pacific president” and announced, several years later, a foreign-policy “pivot to Asia.” But the pivot proved largely illusory, and the region only grows more complex. The growing challenges faced by Pacific island countries requires significant reassessment as the region becomes one of the tensest political battlegrounds in the world.
A growing battle of diplomatic and economic statecraft is playing out on remote islands. China is acutely aware that the fledgling democracies of the Pacific are prone to shortsightedness—and in some cases outright corruption—and, as a result, are at risk of manipulation that goes against their best interests. That lays the groundwork for Chinese expansionism, initially economically, with the long-term goal of a military presence to rival that of the United States. The Solomon Islands derecognizing Taiwan is only the latest victory for Beijing.
China’s ambition to become the regional leader in the Pacific is pursued through the use of both diplomatic and economic statecraft, with the longer-term goal of military expansionism in the Pacific. Within hours of his appointment as U.S. ambassador to Australia, Arthur Culvahouse described China’s spending in the Pacific as akin to “payday loan diplomacy.” Otherwise reported as “debt-trap diplomacy,” this strategy sees vulnerable countries targeted with unsustainable debts with the intention of generating political leverage. Calculating Chinese contributions in the Pacific is difficult, as China does not engage with the similar transparency and accountability mechanisms followed by other major donors.
China’s diplomatic statecraft has taken leaps and bounds over the past decade. Beijing has become increasingly adept at working within and massaging international institutions to support and legitimize its actions. Reports from this past year’s United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York point to an increasingly brazen China willing to tackle critiques and threats head-on. A recent example is its swiftness in addressing criticism of the oppression of ethnic Uighurs and other Turkic minorities in Xinjiang. At the U.N., a nonbinding statement praising China’s record on human rights was supported by 54 countries including Egypt, Pakistan, and Russia—evidence of China’s growing diplomatic and economic clout.
Exploiting the vacuum created by a withdrawal of U.S. influence in international institutions, China has also been positioning its diplomats within U.N. agencies, slowly shaping institutions to reflect its interests. This May, China’s nominated candidate stands a chance to head the U.N.’s World Intellectual Property Organization, much to the alarm of the West, whose companies are frequently falling victim to Chinese IP theft.
China’s growing skill at statecraft extends to Pacific affairs. Recently, China exploited a rift between Australia and Fiji on climate change policy after the Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu in August 2019. China’s foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang referred to Australia’s behavior as akin to a “condescending master” and “insulting” to climate-vulnerable nations. Geng went on to accuse Australia of spreading “the China threat fallacy among island countries” and claimed—falsely—that Chinese engagement comes “with no political strings attached.” The comments were widely reported in Australia and across the Pacific, allowing China to point toward tangible tensions and in turn damage the Australian government’s stature as the primary ally of the Pacific island countries.
China’s use of development aid in the Pacific, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative, has been raising concerns. Analysts, including from the Lowy Institute, have spoken out on the scale of Chinese lending and the capability of Pacific nations to effectively scrutinize the financial sustainability of the debt they’re assuming through partnering with China on infrastructure projects. A commonly cited example is the construction of a national conference center in Vanuatu. Completed and handed over by China in 2016, it is now a monument to poor lending and construction processes. Prime Minister Charlot Salwai of Vanuatu said in early 2019 that the government is no longer able to maintain the building, which is incurring significant costs due to the absence of actual conferences. The aforementioned Lowy Institute report states that several island countries in the Pacific, particularly Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu, are already significantly indebted to China.
The growing influence and presence of China in the Pacific have laid the foundations for China to lean on the island countries to meet its longer-term ambition of establishing a military base in the region. Such a base would likely be constructed out of a continued expansion of newly built or preexisting facilities that can serve multiple purposes. The Chinese-built wharf on Espiritu Santo island in Vanuatu is one such example—built for commercial cruise ships, the wharf also has the capacity to service naval vessels. It was built in close proximity to Vanuatu’s international airport, which China is assisting in upgrading.
China views a base in the Pacific as an imperative if it is to establish a greater regional presence outside of the highly contested South China Sea. It would be the second such base for the Peoples Liberation Army after the establishment of the Djibouti base in 2017. While Vanuatu is frequently identified as the most likely candidate where China could establish a permanent military presence, other Pacific states such as Tonga have also been mentioned.
Though Australia is the largest provider of development assistance in the Pacific, a nation of 25 million people is unable to tackle Chinese foreign influence alone. Key to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s government’s “Pacific step-up” strategy are the deep personal, historical, and cultural ties formed between Australia and Pacific island nations over the last 50-plus years. Australia is using its sizable diplomatic presence, providing targeted aid, delivering infrastructure projects, assisting in governance, and tackling corruption.
In December 2019, Australia announced that its aid budget will be subject to a landmark review to reprioritize and redirect Australian aid. The review will identify “new and emerging priorities,” which will likely see further prioritization of the Pacific. The Morrison government last year also announced the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific. The initiative, with 2 billion Australian dollars (about $1.4 billion) in funding, will use grants combined with loans to support the development of high priority infrastructure.
Australia has a long history of assisting in the development of significant infrastructure projects—most recently, the construction of the 3,000-mile-long Coral Sea Cable System between Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Australia. The project aims to deliver faster, cheaper, and more reliable communications infrastructure. Upon completion, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands will be the majority owners and beneficiaries of revenue raised. Media reporting had linked Australia’s support of the project with ensuring that the high-profile Chinese telecommunications company Huawei did not undertake the project.
The Australia-China bilateral relationship has been consistently strained over the past five years. China has been accused of attempts to influence Australian policy by a range of covert means. One such case in 2016 saw Labor Party Sen. Sam Dastyari engulfed in a scandal involving Chinese donors that resulted in his resignation. Among other transgressions, Dastyari had conducted a media conference calling on Australia to shift away from its strong rejection of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Tensions were further exacerbated by a major cyberattack on Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology that was widely linked to China. Recently, China has denied visas for two Australian politicians who had spoken out against China’s treatment of the Muslim Uighur population. One Australian commentator argues the high-water mark came with the signing of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2015—now, the relationship has permanently changed.
Australia is acutely aware that supporting the fragile democracies of the Pacific requires greater cooperation with likeminded nations, and allies are listening and engaging. The United Kingdom announced in 2018 the expansion of its diplomatic presence in the Pacific—establishing new posts in Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The growth in representation allows for a deepening of relations in the region by a fellow Five Eyes intelligence partner. The U.K. is also highly regarded for the size and reach of its aid projects through its Department for International Development.
The United States’ engagement in the Pacific is often viewed through the lens of United States Indo-Pacific Command. A report by the Sydney-based United States Studies Centre recently warned that the U.S. defense strategy is in “the throes of an unprecedented crisis,” which is born out of a misalignment between ambition and the reality of available defense resources. The report argues for a need to develop a shared reliance on a network of allies in the region, noting Asian militaries such as Japan’s can offer significant strategic benefits.
Yet cooperation with the United States in some respects has been deepening in recent years. In late 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence announced that Australia and the United States had commenced a naval base upgrade on Manus Island in northern Papua New Guinea. The upgrades did not go unnoticed in Beijing, and China sent deep-water surveying vessels to the region. Media reporting in Australia also shed light on the rumored construction of a new deep-water port facility outside of the northern Australian city of Darwin. Such a facility could be an access point for U.S. Marines who have been routinely stationed in Darwin since 2012.
Developing a shared reliance on a network of military allies in the region would aid the Pacific—but this should be extended further. The Pacific needs greater harmonization in rhetoric as well as cooperation in the delivery of both aid and infrastructure projects. Likeminded states must work together to counter influence in the region that often fails to work in the best interest of the Pacific island countries. It is unlikely that tensions will subside in the short to medium term—rather they will continue to test the fragile democracies of the Pacific.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--What Explains Trump Pulling the Trigger on Suleimani? It’s the Economics, Stupid.

What Explains Trump Pulling the Trigger on Suleimani ?
It ’ s the Economics , Stupid .
The last two U.S. presidents , Barack Obama and George W. Bush , each considered killing Qassem Suleimani , the powerful commander of Iran ’ s Quds Force .
Unlike President Donald Trump , however , they demurred from pulling the trigger .
One answer may come from the dismal science : economics .
“ Men , ” Karl Marx wrote , “ make their own history , but they do not make it as they please ; they do not make it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ existing already.
” Yes , Trump is not Obama or Bush .
And no matter your views on the wisdom of his decision , the buck for Suleimani ’ s killing stops with the president .
But Trump at least made his choice in circumstances that favored the operation more than when Obama or Bush was in power .
To focus purely on personalities is to miss how shifts in economics upended the prospective risks and rewards facing U.S. policymakers in the months before Suleimani ’ s death .
Developments within the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deflects what was once a favorite economic weapon in Tehran ’ s quiver of asymmetric arrows—oil price shocks .
Meanwhile , in Iran , a spiraling collapse in macroeconomic conditions limited the regime ’ s ability to hurt American interests .
Neither Bush nor Obama enjoyed circumstances like these .
Nor did Trump himself , until very recently .
In September 2019 , the United States became a net exporter of oil for the first time since at least the 1940s .
Suddenly , global oil price increases were now a net positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the other way around .
This change in status largely negated Iran ’ s ability to hurt the United States with oil price shocks : For the first time in the Islamic Republic ’ s history , disrupting the flow of oil out of the Middle East would cause no harm to macroeconomic conditions within the United States .
U.S. President Jimmy Carter ’ s characterization of an energy crisis emanating from abroad as “ the moral equivalent of war ” underscores the extent to which ensuring the stability of oil flows once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But just months ago Trump became the first modern U.S. president with the opportunity to formulate foreign policy in the Middle East without this sword of Damocles hanging over America ’ s economy—a development he has welcomed .
Last September , after a drone attack on Saudi oil facilities attributed to Iran by U.S. officials created a record-breaking spike in the price of oil , he tweeted : “ Because we have done so well with Energy over the last few years … we are a net Energy Exporter .
… We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In Iran , however , the punishing impact of sanctions has bequeathed policymakers the opposite : more constraints and trade-offs than their predecessors would have faced in responding to an American attack .
Unlike in the past , several potential courses of retaliatory action would now impose major costs on the regime by accelerating historic rates of inflation that have been driving deadly domestic unrest ( although Suleimani ’ s killing seems to have briefly turned Iranians ’ attention away from demonstrating against their own regime ) .
Economic output in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to its own official data , on a downward slope : International Monetary Fund estimates indicate a contraction of 9.5 percent for 2019 .
And a shortage of foreign currency constrains the regime ’ s ability to fund activities abroad without worsening these conditions at home .
More than at any point in recent years , Tehran will find it more difficult to fund a potential retaliation for Suleimani ’ s assassination without sacrificing other priorities .
The connection between foreign exchange shortages and inflation is textbook economics .
A domestic shortage of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And so a domestic shortage of foreign currency causes its price , in terms of the domestic currency , to rise .
To the extent that people consume imported products , the currency devaluation then increases prices for domestic consumers , sparking a rise in inflation .
The Trump administration ’ s summer 2018 announcement of its decision to reimplement sanctions that November , and the anticipation of this announcement , caused Iran ’ s exchange rate to plummet .
Sanctions also decreased the availability of foreign currency in Iran by prohibiting or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much of 2016 , before Trump was elected and while the Iran nuclear deal was still in place , on the open market , a U.S. dollar cost between around 34,000 and 37,000 Iranian rials .
By the spring of 2018 , as rumors of the return of sanctions proliferated , the rial began to slide .
By the end of August , a U.S. dollar cost more than 110,000 Iranian rials—representing a rial devaluation of about 300 percent since Trump ’ s election .
After sanctions were reimposed in November 2018 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currency has fluctuated between around 110,000 and 150,000 rials per dollar .
Iran ’ s central bank maintains a relatively unchanged official rate of 42,000 rials per dollar , but this rate remains available only to finance the purchase of essential imports , for which it functions effectively as a subsidy .
Even with Tehran ’ s apparent attempts to conceal the extent of rising prices , domestic inflation in Iran has soared as the exchange rate has collapsed .
The central bank ceased publicly reporting inflation data in 2018 after its last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubled within the last six months .
But another source of apparently official data , the government-funded Statistical Center of Iran , estimated year-over-year consumer price inflation for the Persian month that approximates December 2019 to be 40 percent .
In the category that includes food , the figure was more than 50 percent .
The Statistical Center of Iran seems to have removed its historical time series data on inflation from its website sometime between December 2017 and November 2018 .
According to the decades of annual data available from Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1945 has inflation exceeded the annualized rate of 40 percent recently reported by the Statistical Center of Iran .
Such increases in prices have fueled domestic unrest within Iran that spilled onto the streets last November .
The impetus for the protests appears to have been the removal of a subsidy that prevented a rise in the price of gasoline—an expected effect of inflation , which has soared past rates observed during the presidencies of Bush and Obama .
Though the protesters would ultimately broaden the range of grievances they voiced , their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the extent to which economics was driving their dissatisfaction .
And in an indication of the protests ’ perceived threat to the regime , the marches elicited the deadliest response from the government since the Islamic Republic ’ s founding in 1979 , with about 1,500 people killed in crackdowns .
Until the end of 2019 , when large-scale protests over price increases broke out across Iran , increases in inflation could be passed on to the people without imposing serious costs to the government .
But economic conditions today effectively compel the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between violence abroad and security at home : If inflation continues to increase , the discontent that fueled last year ’ s protests will only deepen , which would in turn threaten the regime ’ s future .
Any potential retaliation to Suleimani ’ s killing through terrorist attacks in third countries or escalations of violence through proxies abroad would exacerbate Iran ’ s underlying foreign exchange shortage .
As always , the regime would need to fund any operation in a territory abroad through expenditures of foreign currency .
But a second-order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely jeopardize any remaining foreign currency obtained with the cooperation of the foreign governments—namely in Europe , India , and China—that preserved channels through which Iran can acquire foreign funds after the United States reimposed sanctions on its oil sector .
Tehran ’ s options are constrained by more than just inflation .
Contractions in economic output further limit the country ’ s ability to fund increases in military expenditure .
A $ 10.7 billion central government budget deficit reported in February 2019 set a record , but amid last November ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closer to $ 30 billion .
Unlike most countries , Iran can not simply turn to the international bond market to fund expansions of its deficit , due in part to the November 2018 implementation of U.S. sanctions on purchasers of Iranian sovereign debt .
Nor is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) positioned to raise revenues to fund a response to Suleimani ’ s elimination .
The IRGC has a mafialike economic structure , profiting from smuggling and other illicit activity .
If the IRGC had new sources of revenue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tapped them before Suleimani ’ s death .
In the coming weeks and months , additional details will surely emerge about Trump ’ s decision to eliminate Suleimani and of the plotting of the operation .
Even if these bits of information engender more speculation than they quell about the Trump administration ’ s Iran strategy , you don ’ t need to wait for the latest trickle of news to find an explanation for why a U.S. president whose first National Security Strategy emphasized that “ economic security is national security ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predecessors declined .
Three American presidents consider an operation—one of them under circumstances unlike those experienced by his two predecessors .
He comes up with a different answer .
Why ?
It ’ s the economics , stupid .

The last two U.S. presidents, Barack Obama and George W. Bush, each considered killing Qassem Suleimani, the powerful commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Unlike President Donald Trump, however, they demurred from pulling the trigger.
The last two U.S. presidents, Barack Obama and George W. Bush, each considered killing Qassem Suleimani, the powerful commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Unlike President Donald Trump, however, they demurred from pulling the trigger.
What, then, explains Trump’s decision?
One answer may come from the dismal science: economics.
“Men,” Karl Marx wrote, “make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already.”
Yes, Trump is not Obama or Bush. And no matter your views on the wisdom of his decision, the buck for Suleimani’s killing stops with the president. But Trump at least made his choice in circumstances that favored the operation more than when Obama or Bush was in power. To focus purely on personalities is to miss how shifts in economics upended the prospective risks and rewards facing U.S. policymakers in the months before Suleimani’s death.
Developments within the U.S. energy sector recently granted Washington armor that deflects what was once a favorite economic weapon in Tehran’s quiver of asymmetric arrows—oil price shocks. Meanwhile, in Iran, a spiraling collapse in macroeconomic conditions limited the regime’s ability to hurt American interests. Neither Bush nor Obama enjoyed circumstances like these. Nor did Trump himself, until very recently.
In September 2019, the United States became a net exporter of oil for the first time since at least the 1940s. Suddenly, global oil price increases were now a net positive for the U.S. economy, rather than the other way around. This change in status largely negated Iran’s ability to hurt the United States with oil price shocks: For the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history, disrupting the flow of oil out of the Middle East would cause no harm to macroeconomic conditions within the United States.
U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s characterization of an energy crisis emanating from abroad as “the moral equivalent of war” underscores the extent to which ensuring the stability of oil flows once defined U.S. interests in the Middle East. But just months ago Trump became the first modern U.S. president with the opportunity to formulate foreign policy in the Middle East without this sword of Damocles hanging over America’s economy—a development he has welcomed. Last September, after a drone attack on Saudi oil facilities attributed to Iran by U.S. officials created a record-breaking spike in the price of oil, he tweeted: “Because we have done so well with Energy over the last few years … we are a net Energy Exporter. … We don’t need Middle Eastern Oil.”
In Iran, however, the punishing impact of sanctions has bequeathed policymakers the opposite: more constraints and trade-offs than their predecessors would have faced in responding to an American attack. Unlike in the past, several potential courses of retaliatory action would now impose major costs on the regime by accelerating historic rates of inflation that have been driving deadly domestic unrest (although Suleimani’s killing seems to have briefly turned Iranians’ attention away from demonstrating against their own regime). Economic output in the Islamic Republic has also been, according to its own official data, on a downward slope: International Monetary Fund estimates indicate a contraction of 9.5 percent for 2019. And a shortage of foreign currency constrains the regime’s ability to fund activities abroad without worsening these conditions at home. More than at any point in recent years, Tehran will find it more difficult to fund a potential retaliation for Suleimani’s assassination without sacrificing other priorities.
The connection between foreign exchange shortages and inflation is textbook economics. A domestic shortage of anything induces its price to increase. And so a domestic shortage of foreign currency causes its price, in terms of the domestic currency, to rise. To the extent that people consume imported products, the currency devaluation then increases prices for domestic consumers, sparking a rise in inflation.
The Trump administration’s summer 2018 announcement of its decision to reimplement sanctions that November, and the anticipation of this announcement, caused Iran’s exchange rate to plummet. Sanctions also decreased the availability of foreign currency in Iran by prohibiting or discouraging foreign trade and business. For much of 2016, before Trump was elected and while the Iran nuclear deal was still in place, on the open market, a U.S. dollar cost between around 34,000 and 37,000 Iranian rials. By the spring of 2018, as rumors of the return of sanctions proliferated, the rial began to slide. By the end of August, a U.S. dollar cost more than 110,000 Iranian rials—representing a rial devaluation of about 300 percent since Trump’s election. After sanctions were reimposed in November 2018, the market rate for Iran’s currency has fluctuated between around 110,000 and 150,000 rials per dollar. Iran’s central bank maintains a relatively unchanged official rate of 42,000 rials per dollar, but this rate remains available only to finance the purchase of essential imports, for which it functions effectively as a subsidy.
Even with Tehran’s apparent attempts to conceal the extent of rising prices, domestic inflation in Iran has soared as the exchange rate has collapsed. The central bank ceased publicly reporting inflation data in 2018 after its last release indicated that it had more than doubled within the last six months. But another source of apparently official data, the government-funded Statistical Center of Iran, estimated year-over-year consumer price inflation for the Persian month that approximates December 2019 to be 40 percent. In the category that includes food, the figure was more than 50 percent.
The Statistical Center of Iran seems to have removed its historical time series data on inflation from its website sometime between December 2017 and November 2018. According to the decades of annual data available from Iran’s central bank, only once since 1945 has inflation exceeded the annualized rate of 40 percent recently reported by the Statistical Center of Iran.
Such increases in prices have fueled domestic unrest within Iran that spilled onto the streets last November. The impetus for the protests appears to have been the removal of a subsidy that prevented a rise in the price of gasoline—an expected effect of inflation, which has soared past rates observed during the presidencies of Bush and Obama. Though the protesters would ultimately broaden the range of grievances they voiced, their burning of hundreds of Iranian banks underscored the extent to which economics was driving their dissatisfaction. And in an indication of the protests’ perceived threat to the regime, the marches elicited the deadliest response from the government since the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979, with about 1,500 people killed in crackdowns.
Until the end of 2019, when large-scale protests over price increases broke out across Iran, increases in inflation could be passed on to the people without imposing serious costs to the government. But economic conditions today effectively compel the Islamic Republic’s leaders to choose between violence abroad and security at home: If inflation continues to increase, the discontent that fueled last year’s protests will only deepen, which would in turn threaten the regime’s future. Any potential retaliation to Suleimani’s killing through terrorist attacks in third countries or escalations of violence through proxies abroad would exacerbate Iran’s underlying foreign exchange shortage. As always, the regime would need to fund any operation in a territory abroad through expenditures of foreign currency. But a second-order effect is that any violence abroad would likely jeopardize any remaining foreign currency obtained with the cooperation of the foreign governments—namely in Europe, India, and China—that preserved channels through which Iran can acquire foreign funds after the United States reimposed sanctions on its oil sector.
Tehran’s options are constrained by more than just inflation. Contractions in economic output further limit the country’s ability to fund increases in military expenditure. A $10.7 billion central government budget deficit reported in February 2019 set a record, but amid last November’s protests, the government acknowledged a deficit closer to $30 billion.
Unlike most countries, Iran cannot simply turn to the international bond market to fund expansions of its deficit, due in part to the November 2018 implementation of U.S. sanctions on purchasers of Iranian sovereign debt. Nor is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positioned to raise revenues to fund a response to Suleimani’s elimination. The IRGC has a mafialike economic structure, profiting from smuggling and other illicit activity. If the IRGC had new sources of revenue it could tap, it would have tapped them before Suleimani’s death.
In the coming weeks and months, additional details will surely emerge about Trump’s decision to eliminate Suleimani and of the plotting of the operation. Even if these bits of information engender more speculation than they quell about the Trump administration’s Iran strategy, you don’t need to wait for the latest trickle of news to find an explanation for why a U.S. president whose first National Security Strategy emphasized that “economic security is national security” made use of a tactic that his predecessors declined.
Three American presidents consider an operation—one of them under circumstances unlike those experienced by his two predecessors. He comes up with a different answer. Why? It’s the economics, stupid.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Trump’s ‘Wag the Dog’ Moment

Trump’s ‘Wag the Dog’ Moment

Since the drone strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani , American analysts have focused on how Iran might react and how little thought U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have devoted to the consequences of his extraordinary action .
Some , like David Petraeus , the former U.S. commander in Iraq and CIA director , have attempted to put the event in a strategic framework , casting the strike as an effort to restore a measure of U.S. deterrence in the region , even while raising the question whether killing Suleimani was the right way to do it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ question of how Iran will respond to the death of its most revered military man—is understandable .
But it is misplaced .
What the nation needs to know most urgently is whether there was any substantive intelligence indicating that Suleimani was orchestrating a major military or terrorist campaign against the United States .
As former policymakers with extensive experience in countering Iran , we are struck by statements from within the administration suggesting that there was none .
The natural conclusion is that , with this attack , Trump used the unparalleled power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to distract Americans from his impeachment .
In doing so , he disregarded the profound dangers that killing Suleimani would engender and subordinated the safety of Americans to his own private political fortunes .
The charge that a president “ wagged the dog ” is not one anyone should make lightly .
We know this as well as anyone : Both of us were working on counterterrorism in the White House in 1998 , when this charge was most famously leveled at our boss , President Bill Clinton .
The phrase , derived @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the previous year , was instantly affixed to Clinton after he ordered cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan on Aug. 20 , 1998 , in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and less than two weeks after terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi , Kenya , and Dar es Salaam , Tanzania .
As National Security Council staffers during the impeachment of Clinton , we lived a surreal existence .
We spent our days in the Old Executive Office Building immersed in the intelligence on a little-known terrorist figure—Osama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and nuclear weapons for use against the United States .
And when we crossed West Executive Avenue for meetings with the national security advisor , we were suddenly confronted with the carnival of “ Monica Beach , ” the large swath of the White House front lawn that had been given to broadcast journalists who needed a place to report on location .
The juxtaposition was mind-bending , and there was no reconciling the national obsession with the president ’ s sex life and an urgent national security threat .
A refusal among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that bin Laden , the architect of the East Africa bombings , might represent a major danger to Americans was palpable .
It was tied to the certainty that Clinton was only up to shenanigans to distract the nation when he ordered the cruise strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan .
In the 48 hours after those attacks , NBC broadcast clips from the movie Wag the Dog at least six times , while the cast of CNN ’ s Crossfire joined the satirist Mark Russell in singing a ditty that began : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or maybe two or three … go to war .
It ’ s been done before .
It ’ s ‘ Wag the Dog.
’ ” Perhaps because of the lingering embarrassment of that episode , analysts are currently disinclined to accuse Trump of wagging the dog .
Perhaps because of the lingering embarrassment of that episode , which eroded Clinton ’ s effort to mount a military campaign to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan , analysts are currently disinclined to accuse Trump of wagging the dog .
One of the few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Jan. 4 , the presidential historian Douglas Brinkley brushed aside a question from CNN anchor Bianna Golodryga by saying , “ You can see why the comparisons are being made .
But I don ’ t believe Donald Trump is wagging the dog any more than I believe Bill Clinton did .
They ’ re just trying to do a target of opportunity , at this moment in time.
” But the fact that one president was wrongly accused of misusing the military to achieve a political end does not mean that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani was not a target of opportunity .
He was by no means an elusive figure like Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or bin Laden .
Western intelligence services knew where he was most days of the year , and he was a frequent visitor to Baghdad .
Nor , for that matter , is there any serious argument that Suleimani ’ s removal from the scene would yield the United States any substantive security benefits or geopolitical advantages .
Reuters has reported that Suleimani was planning his own “ Wag the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States in Iraq to distract Iraqis from protesting against their government ’ s incompetence and Iran ’ s influence in Iraq .
His hope , according to the report , was to trigger a U.S. response that would displace popular anger onto Washington .
If true , then Trump dutifully played into Suleimani ’ s hands and continues to do so , granting the Iranian general a string of posthumous victories .
The costs of this action are mounting faster than they can be tallied .
The Iraqi parliament , led by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expel U.S. forces from Iraq .
If carried out , such a move will mark an end to 16 years in which the United States has labored mightily to overcome the catastrophic blunder of the 2003 invasion , put Iraq on a stable footing as an American partner in the region , and , having opened the door to Iraq for Iran , compete with Tehran for Baghdad ’ s affections .
The strike appears already to have undermined , perhaps fatally , the coalition fighting the Islamic State , with United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and confining their troops to base for protection .
Adding to the wreckage , Iran has also announced that it will suspend compliance of most of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , otherwise known as the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal .
Iran had largely upheld its part of the deal for 20 months despite its dissatisfaction at the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement and imposition of wide-ranging economic sanctions .
Other possible fallout from Suleimani ’ s assassination includes stepped-up cooperation between Iran and the Taliban , which will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ woes in Afghanistan .
All of these consequences were absolutely foreseeable .
Foreign policy is treated as a tremendously complex subject , and often it is .
But sometimes , it is also starkly simple .
There will be no net benefit from Suleimani ’ s demise—regardless of how long his trail of bloodshed and mayhem—certainly not for U.S. service members or civilians working in the broader Middle East and certainly not for U.S. national security .
The organization he led , Iran ’ s elite Quds Force , is not a small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ removal of its leader ; it is a large bureaucracy that will keep conducting its dangerous business .
In any serious accounting , the only plus sign is in the political column for Trump , who has changed the subject from his own impeachment to a national security crisis .
Put another way , as recently as last year ’ s United Nations General Assembly , Trump essentially begged Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to take his phone call .
That call was aimed at kicking off one of Trump ’ s vaunted deals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while turning a blind eye to Iranian attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz as well as audacious drone strikes on Saudi oil production facilities .
What changed between then and the strike that killed Suleimani ?
For one thing , impeachment .
The contention that Tehran ’ s posture toward the United States was suddenly and ineluctably dangerous does not pass the straight face test , and if Trump twisted intelligence to a gain political edge , that would be yet one more impeachable offense .
For now , the legitimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the public at mutual disadvantage .
In 1998 , those inside the administration knew that the evidence of chemical weapons production at a facility in Khartoum , Sudan , was compelling , as was intelligence regarding bin Laden ’ s links to the plant .
But the sources and methods that yielded the information had to be kept secret .
Perhaps the same constraints apply now .
On Jan. 8 , Congress is scheduled to hear a briefing from the administration on the strike .
But U.S. lawmakers must not allow that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rather , they must insist on seeing all the relevant intelligence that suggests that there was a threat of imminent action by Iran against U.S. interests .
And that intelligence must be viewed in light of the fact that Suleimani had been planning contingencies for hitting the United States for decades—plans that remained on the shelf .
The president needs to prove that something had genuinely changed .
In past cases like this one , including the August 1998 strikes , the executive branch made relevant intelligence available .
Accepting any less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust .
Congress must also review the deliberations that led to the decision to strike .
It must not sit back while the administration asserts automatic congressional approval for Suleimani ’ s assassination under either the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force or the 2002 version cited on Jan. 3 by National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien .
The 2001 legislation was explicitly geared to the groups or individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks , and the 2002 follow-on specifically authorized the overthrow of Saddam Hussein ’ s regime , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 17 years ago .
Nor should Congress let the administration get away with a classified War Powers filing—the documentary explanation regarding the use of force required under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 , which was enacted with the specific purpose of preventing any president from dragging the country into a war without congressional consent .
The administration needs to make publicly clear whether there was an intelligence assessment regarding the likely consequences of the strike .
One should have been an essential part of the preparation , but there has not even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was conducted .
The lack of one would be another indication that the attack was not about security circumstances in the region but rather political circumstances at home .
Congress ’ s powers in matters of war and peace have been eroding for decades and especially rapidly since 9/11 .
But even supporters of a strong executive—and we count ourselves in that group—must acknowledge that a president who would abuse his power to advance his personal interests must be prevented from doing so by the institutional checks created by the framers of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in jeopardy , and U.S. national security has been imperiled .
If the killing of Suleimani was motivated by Trump ’ s personal political interests , he should be sanctioned just as he has been for corrupting the United States ’ policy toward Ukraine .

Since the drone strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani, American analysts have focused on how Iran might react and how little thought U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have devoted to the consequences of his extraordinary action. Some, like David Petraeus, the former U.S. commander in Iraq and CIA director, have attempted to put the event in a strategic framework, casting the strike as an effort to restore a measure of U.S. deterrence in the region, even while raising the question whether killing Suleimani was the right way to do it.
Since the drone strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani, American analysts have focused on how Iran might react and how little thought U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have devoted to the consequences of his extraordinary action. Some, like David Petraeus, the former U.S. commander in Iraq and CIA director, have attempted to put the event in a strategic framework, casting the strike as an effort to restore a measure of U.S. deterrence in the region, even while raising the question whether killing Suleimani was the right way to do it.
The fascination with such topics—particularly with the question of how Iran will respond to the death of its most revered military man—is understandable. But it is misplaced. What the nation needs to know most urgently is whether there was any substantive intelligence indicating that Suleimani was orchestrating a major military or terrorist campaign against the United States. As former policymakers with extensive experience in countering Iran, we are struck by statements from within the administration suggesting that there was none. The natural conclusion is that, with this attack, Trump used the unparalleled power of his office to authorize this strike to distract Americans from his impeachment. In doing so, he disregarded the profound dangers that killing Suleimani would engender and subordinated the safety of Americans to his own private political fortunes.
The charge that a president “wagged the dog” is not one anyone should make lightly. We know this as well as anyone: Both of us were working on counterterrorism in the White House in 1998, when this charge was most famously leveled at our boss, President Bill Clinton. The phrase, derived from the Robert De Niro-Dustin Hoffman movie of the previous year, was instantly affixed to Clinton after he ordered cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan on Aug. 20, 1998, in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and less than two weeks after terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
As National Security Council staffers during the impeachment of Clinton, we lived a surreal existence. We spent our days in the Old Executive Office Building immersed in the intelligence on a little-known terrorist figure—Osama bin Laden—and his efforts to procure chemical and nuclear weapons for use against the United States. And when we crossed West Executive Avenue for meetings with the national security advisor, we were suddenly confronted with the carnival of “Monica Beach,” the large swath of the White House front lawn that had been given to broadcast journalists who needed a place to report on location. The juxtaposition was mind-bending, and there was no reconciling the national obsession with the president’s sex life and an urgent national security threat.
A refusal among the press and the political commentariat to believe that bin Laden, the architect of the East Africa bombings, might represent a major danger to Americans was palpable. It was tied to the certainty that Clinton was only up to shenanigans to distract the nation when he ordered the cruise strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan. In the 48 hours after those attacks, NBC broadcast clips from the movie Wag the Dog at least six times, while the cast of CNN’s Crossfire joined the satirist Mark Russell in singing a ditty that began: “If a woman gives you trouble, or maybe two or three … go to war. It’s been done before. It’s ‘Wag the Dog.’”
Perhaps because of the lingering embarrassment of that episode, analysts are currently disinclined to accuse Trump of wagging the dog.
Perhaps because of the lingering embarrassment of that episode, which eroded Clinton’s effort to mount a military campaign to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan, analysts are currently disinclined to accuse Trump of wagging the dog. One of the few times the subject has come up, on Jan. 4, the presidential historian Douglas Brinkley brushed aside a question from CNN anchor Bianna Golodryga by saying, “You can see why the comparisons are being made. But I don’t believe Donald Trump is wagging the dog any more than I believe Bill Clinton did. They’re just trying to do a target of opportunity, at this moment in time.”
But the fact that one president was wrongly accused of misusing the military to achieve a political end does not mean that such a misdeed cannot happen. Suleimani was not a target of opportunity. He was by no means an elusive figure like Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or bin Laden. Western intelligence services knew where he was most days of the year, and he was a frequent visitor to Baghdad. Nor, for that matter, is there any serious argument that Suleimani’s removal from the scene would yield the United States any substantive security benefits or geopolitical advantages. Reuters has reported that Suleimani was planning his own “Wag the Dog”-style offensive against the United States in Iraq to distract Iraqis from protesting against their government’s incompetence and Iran’s influence in Iraq. His hope, according to the report, was to trigger a U.S. response that would displace popular anger onto Washington. If true, then Trump dutifully played into Suleimani’s hands and continues to do so, granting the Iranian general a string of posthumous victories.
The costs of this action are mounting faster than they can be tallied. The Iraqi parliament, led by a historically America-friendly prime minister, has voted to expel U.S. forces from Iraq. If carried out, such a move will mark an end to 16 years in which the United States has labored mightily to overcome the catastrophic blunder of the 2003 invasion, put Iraq on a stable footing as an American partner in the region, and, having opened the door to Iraq for Iran, compete with Tehran for Baghdad’s affections. The strike appears already to have undermined, perhaps fatally, the coalition fighting the Islamic State, with United States and its Western partners canceling operations and confining their troops to base for protection.
Adding to the wreckage, Iran has also announced that it will suspend compliance of most of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise known as the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. Iran had largely upheld its part of the deal for 20 months despite its dissatisfaction at the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement and imposition of wide-ranging economic sanctions. Other possible fallout from Suleimani’s assassination includes stepped-up cooperation between Iran and the Taliban, which will deepen the United States’ already considerable woes in Afghanistan. All of these consequences were absolutely foreseeable.
Foreign policy is treated as a tremendously complex subject, and often it is. But sometimes, it is also starkly simple. There will be no net benefit from Suleimani’s demise—regardless of how long his trail of bloodshed and mayhem—certainly not for U.S. service members or civilians working in the broader Middle East and certainly not for U.S. national security. The organization he led, Iran’s elite Quds Force, is not a small terrorist group that will collapse after the removal of its leader; it is a large bureaucracy that will keep conducting its dangerous business. In any serious accounting, the only plus sign is in the political column for Trump, who has changed the subject from his own impeachment to a national security crisis.
Put another way, as recently as last year’s United Nations General Assembly, Trump essentially begged Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to take his phone call. That call was aimed at kicking off one of Trump’s vaunted deals, and he continued to pursue it while turning a blind eye to Iranian attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz as well as audacious drone strikes on Saudi oil production facilities. What changed between then and the strike that killed Suleimani? For one thing, impeachment. The contention that Tehran’s posture toward the United States was suddenly and ineluctably dangerous does not pass the straight face test, and if Trump twisted intelligence to a gain political edge, that would be yet one more impeachable offense.
For now, the legitimate need for secrecy puts the executive branch and the public at mutual disadvantage. In 1998, those inside the administration knew that the evidence of chemical weapons production at a facility in Khartoum, Sudan, was compelling, as was intelligence regarding bin Laden’s links to the plant. But the sources and methods that yielded the information had to be kept secret. Perhaps the same constraints apply now.
On Jan. 8, Congress is scheduled to hear a briefing from the administration on the strike. But U.S. lawmakers must not allow that to be the end of the story. Rather, they must insist on seeing all the relevant intelligence that suggests that there was a threat of imminent action by Iran against U.S. interests. And that intelligence must be viewed in light of the fact that Suleimani had been planning contingencies for hitting the United States for decades—plans that remained on the shelf. The president needs to prove that something had genuinely changed. In past cases like this one, including the August 1998 strikes, the executive branch made relevant intelligence available. Accepting any less now would be an abrogation of public trust.
Congress must also review the deliberations that led to the decision to strike. It must not sit back while the administration asserts automatic congressional approval for Suleimani’s assassination under either the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force or the 2002 version cited on Jan. 3 by National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. The 2001 legislation was explicitly geared to the groups or individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks, and the 2002 follow-on specifically authorized the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, which took place in 2003, nearly 17 years ago.
Nor should Congress let the administration get away with a classified War Powers filing—the documentary explanation regarding the use of force required under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which was enacted with the specific purpose of preventing any president from dragging the country into a war without congressional consent. The administration needs to make publicly clear whether there was an intelligence assessment regarding the likely consequences of the strike. One should have been an essential part of the preparation, but there has not even been a rumor that such an exercise was conducted. The lack of one would be another indication that the attack was not about security circumstances in the region but rather political circumstances at home.
Congress’s powers in matters of war and peace have been eroding for decades and especially rapidly since 9/11. But even supporters of a strong executive—and we count ourselves in that group—must acknowledge that a president who would abuse his power to advance his personal interests must be prevented from doing so by the institutional checks created by the framers of the Constitution. American lives have been put in jeopardy, and U.S. national security has been imperiled. If the killing of Suleimani was motivated by Trump’s personal political interests, he should be sanctioned just as he has been for corrupting the United States’ policy toward Ukraine.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Why Are India’s Students Protesting?

Why Are India’s Students Protesting?

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : An attack on a New Delhi university campus fuels nationwide protests in India , how Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani ’ s assassination has had regional aftershocks , and a new e-commerce rival challenges Amazon and Walmart .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
Students across India are demonstrating against an attack at New Delhi ’ s prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University ( JNU ) on Sunday , when masked men @ @ @ @ @ @ @ teachers , students , and activists gathered on campus .
Protests have been held in the cities of Bengaluru , Chandigarh , Hyderabad , Kolkata , and Mumbai .
The violence at JNU has been condemned by senior officials such as the country ’ s Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman , both graduates of the university .
But troubling questions remain about the breakdown of law and order in the capital , the brazen stifling of free speech , and a climate of intimidation .
Police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Scroll.in reported , New Delhi ’ s police largely stood by as a mob entered the JNU campus and attacked reporters and activists .
There are competing claims over who was responsible for the attacks , a sign of how divided India has become .
Several reports from the scene identify the attackers as members of Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad , a student group affiliated with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) .
The group denies involvement , instead blaming the violence on left-wing activists .
But as Scroll.in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi ’ s police allowed the violence to unfold could be that they report to India ’ s home ministry , which is run by Amit Shah , the president of the BJP .
Officials haven ’ t yet offered their own explanations for why the streetlights outside JNU went out during the attack or why the police didn ’ t do more to stop the violent mob that showed up .
What ’ s next ?
As we have explained before , the countrywide protests stem from concerns over a controversial new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizenship for non-Muslim religious minorities from nearby countries .
Coupled with a proposed register of citizens , it could undermine the country ’ s secular foundations .
While the unrest is an embarrassment for Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s government—this past December , Japan ’ s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe canceled a visit to Guwahati because of violent protests in the state of Assam—the BJP shows no signs of backtracking on the law .
It remains to be seen how long citizens can maintain the protests .
Nationally , Modi remains India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part because fractured opposition parties have been unable to present a viable figure to rally around .
Two other factors may tip the balance .
The first is elections .
In early February , Delhi voters will pick a new state government .
Modi ’ s BJP was routed in the 2015 election , and another loss in the capital would be chastening .
More substantially , the issue India ’ s government may worry about most is the economy .
Unemployment remains at a historic high , and growth slowed in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rising fuel prices , especially after the killing of Iran ’ s military leader Qassem Suleimani , will further affect India ’ s economic bottom line .
Kaushik Basu , a Cornell University professor and India ’ s former chief economic advisor , warned last week that India could be in for a “ bad shock ” if there is a crisis in the global debt markets .
What doesn ’ t help , Basu said , is a divisive national mood that “ erodes trust ” in the country ’ s institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killing of Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s elite Quds Force , has already altered geopolitics in the Middle East .
The reverberations are being felt in South Asia , too .
On Sunday , thousands of Shiite demonstrators in Karachi , Pakistan , clashed with police as they tried to march to the U.S. consulate .
( Pakistan has a relatively large Shiite Muslim population . )
The protest prompted the government to issue a statement that it wouldn ’ t take sides in the dispute between its ally the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important trade partner with which it shares a nearly 600-mile border .
A wrinkle in Kabul .
A new player will soon be a part of the never-ending saga of the U.S. peace talks with the Taliban .
On Monday , the State Department announced that John Bass , the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan , would step down after two years in the job .
He will be replaced by career ambassador Ross Wilson .
The shuffle is sure to add complexity to negotiations over a peace agreement with the Taliban , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on track after canceling them last September .
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani , who appears to have won a second term in contested elections , has previously called for renewing the talks .
Winter dangerland .
Bangladesh and India aren ’ t typically considered chilly places , but a cold wave hit the region in late December 2019 , making it the coldest month in almost 120 years for New Delhi .
The weather killed at least six people in India and 50 in Bangladesh .
Experts say it is part of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climate change .
Perhaps the drastic weather gave a push to Bangladesh ’ s High Court , which on Monday issued a new environmental order , giving the government a one-year deadline for coastal areas , hotels , and restaurants to ban single-use plastics and better enforce an existing ban on plastic and polythene bags .
After Trump ’ s weekend threats to target cultural sites in Iran , FP ’ s C.K .
Hickey found that Iran has 24 World Heritage Sites as designated by UNESCO .
The United States also has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sites does India have ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Retail revolution .
The Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries has begun inviting people in Mumbai to test a grocery home delivery service , part of its upcoming e-commerce launch .
Jiomart will compete with Amazon and the Walmart-owned Flipkart in India ’ s fast-growing e-commerce market .
Although Reliance is starting later than its rivals , it may have a few advantages .
New laws prevent foreign-owned platforms from selling products stocked by their subsidiaries .
Reliance also has a strong foothold in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely allow it to cross-promote its e-commerce offerings .
Iran impact ?
South Asia ’ s economies are bracing for the fallout from any potential conflict in the Middle East after the assassination of Suleimani .
Not only are South Asian countries net importers of oil , which surged in price on the news , but they also each gain significant annual sums in workers ’ remittances from the region .
Dance bans .
In 2005 , the Indian state of Maharashtra banned Mumbai ’ s so-called dance bars , where migrant women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After appeals by dancers , the Supreme Court overturned the ban , only to reinstate it with another law in 2013 , which was overturned once more in 2019 .
The bars have never recovered .
In a new book , Bans & Bar Girls : Performing Caste in Mumbai ’ s Dance Bars , Sameena Dalwai traces how the dance bars and efforts to shut them down were rooted in caste bias against the women who made their livelihoods in them .
As shown below , China and Italy top the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each .
The 38 Indian landmarks selected by UNESCO include Humayun ’ s Tomb , the caves of Ajanta , and the Taj Mahal .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: An attack on a New Delhi university campus fuels nationwide protests in India , how Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani’s assassination has had regional aftershocks , and a new e-commerce rival challenges Amazon and Walmart.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: An attack on a New Delhi university campus fuels nationwide protests in India, how Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani’s assassination has had regional aftershocks, and a new e-commerce rival challenges Amazon and Walmart.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
Campus Mob Violence Leads to Fresh National Protests in India
Students across India are demonstrating against an attack at New Delhi’s prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) on Sunday, when masked men wielding sticks and iron rods beat up teachers, students, and activists gathered on campus. Protests have been held in the cities of Bengaluru, Chandigarh, Hyderabad, Kolkata, and Mumbai.
The violence at JNU has been condemned by senior officials such as the country’s Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman, both graduates of the university. But troubling questions remain about the breakdown of law and order in the capital, the brazen stifling of free speech, and a climate of intimidation.
Police complicity? As independent Indian news outlets such as Scroll.in reported, New Delhi’s police largely stood by as a mob entered the JNU campus and attacked reporters and activists. There are competing claims over who was responsible for the attacks, a sign of how divided India has become. Several reports from the scene identify the attackers as members of Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, a student group affiliated with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The group denies involvement, instead blaming the violence on left-wing activists.
But as Scroll.in points out, one explanation for why Delhi’s police allowed the violence to unfold could be that they report to India’s home ministry, which is run by Amit Shah, the president of the BJP. Officials haven’t yet offered their own explanations for why the streetlights outside JNU went out during the attack or why the police didn’t do more to stop the violent mob that showed up.
What’s next? As we have explained before, the countrywide protests stem from concerns over a controversial new law that provides a fast track to citizenship for non-Muslim religious minorities from nearby countries. Coupled with a proposed register of citizens, it could undermine the country’s secular foundations. While the unrest is an embarrassment for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government—this past December, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe canceled a visit to Guwahati because of violent protests in the state of Assam—the BJP shows no signs of backtracking on the law.
It remains to be seen how long citizens can maintain the protests. Nationally, Modi remains India’s most popular leader, in part because fractured opposition parties have been unable to present a viable figure to rally around. Two other factors may tip the balance. The first is elections. In early February, Delhi voters will pick a new state government. Modi’s BJP was routed in the 2015 election, and another loss in the capital would be chastening.
More substantially, the issue India’s government may worry about most is the economy. Unemployment remains at a historic high, and growth slowed in the last quarter to just 4.5 percent. Rising fuel prices, especially after the killing of Iran’s military leader Qassem Suleimani, will further affect India’s economic bottom line. Kaushik Basu, a Cornell University professor and India’s former chief economic advisor, warned last week that India could be in for a “bad shock” if there is a crisis in the global debt markets. What doesn’t help, Basu said, is a divisive national mood that “erodes trust” in the country’s institutions.
What We’re Following
Suleimani aftershocks. The U.S. targeted killing of Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, has already altered geopolitics in the Middle East. The reverberations are being felt in South Asia, too. On Sunday, thousands of Shiite demonstrators in Karachi, Pakistan, clashed with police as they tried to march to the U.S. consulate. (Pakistan has a relatively large Shiite Muslim population.) The protest prompted the government to issue a statement that it wouldn’t take sides in the dispute between its ally the United States and Iran, an increasingly important trade partner with which it shares a nearly 600-mile border.
A wrinkle in Kabul. A new player will soon be a part of the never-ending saga of the U.S. peace talks with the Taliban. On Monday, the State Department announced that John Bass, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, would step down after two years in the job. He will be replaced by career ambassador Ross Wilson. The shuffle is sure to add complexity to negotiations over a peace agreement with the Taliban, which U.S. President Donald Trump announced are back on track after canceling them last September. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, who appears to have won a second term in contested elections, has previously called for renewing the talks.
Winter dangerland. Bangladesh and India aren’t typically considered chilly places, but a cold wave hit the region in late December 2019, making it the coldest month in almost 120 years for New Delhi. The weather killed at least six people in India and 50 in Bangladesh. Experts say it is part of a recent trend of colder winters due to climate change. Perhaps the drastic weather gave a push to Bangladesh’s High Court, which on Monday issued a new environmental order, giving the government a one-year deadline for coastal areas, hotels, and restaurants to ban single-use plastics and better enforce an existing ban on plastic and polythene bags.
Question of the Week
The Taj Mahal mausoleum is pictured in Agra, India, on March 11, 2018.
After Trump’s weekend threats to target cultural sites in Iran, FP’s C.K. Hickey found that Iran has 24 World Heritage Sites as designated by UNESCO. The United States also has 24. How many UNESCO World Heritage Sites does India have?
A) 8
B) 28
C) 38
D) 58
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Retail revolution. The Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries has begun inviting people in Mumbai to test a grocery home delivery service, part of its upcoming e-commerce launch. Jiomart will compete with Amazon and the Walmart-owned Flipkart in India’s fast-growing e-commerce market. Although Reliance is starting later than its rivals, it may have a few advantages. New laws prevent foreign-owned platforms from selling products stocked by their subsidiaries. Reliance also has a strong foothold in the cellular data market, which would likely allow it to cross-promote its e-commerce offerings.
Iran impact? South Asia’s economies are bracing for the fallout from any potential conflict in the Middle East after the assassination of Suleimani. Not only are South Asian countries net importers of oil, which surged in price on the news, but they also each gain significant annual sums in workers’ remittances from the region.
Odds and Ends
Dance bans. In 2005, the Indian state of Maharashtra banned Mumbai’s so-called dance bars, where migrant women from elsewhere in the country would perform. After appeals by dancers, the Supreme Court overturned the ban, only to reinstate it with another law in 2013, which was overturned once more in 2019. The bars have never recovered. In a new book, Bans & Bar Girls: Performing Caste in Mumbai’s Dance Bars, Sameena Dalwai traces how the dance bars and efforts to shut them down were rooted in caste bias against the women who made their livelihoods in them.
And the Answer Is…
C) 38.
As shown below, China and Italy top the list with 55 designated World Heritage Sites each. The 38 Indian landmarks selected by UNESCO include Humayun’s Tomb, the caves of Ajanta, and the Taj Mahal.
Countries With More Than 15 UNESCO World Heritage Sites As of July 2019
Source: UNESCO
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.