foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Pentagon Not Ready for Space Fight, Experts Say

Pentagon Not Ready for Space Fight , Experts Say The U.S. Department of Defense ’ s new space strategy is doing little to settle fears that the United States isn ’ t ready for a conflict that would extend beyond Earth ’ s atmosphere , experts told Foreign Policy on Wednesday .
The Defense Space Strategy , a sublayer of the 2018 National Defense Strategy , indicates the Pentagon ’ s growing concern that China and Russia have developed military doctrine that would extend a conflict into space , where the Pentagon admits it has little operational experience .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States relies on space-based capabilities to project and employ power on a global scale , ” the strategy , which was released on Wednesday and follows a 2011 effort from the Obama administration , said .
“ China and Russia have analyzed U.S. dependencies on space and have developed doctrine , organizations , and capabilities specifically designed to contest or deny U.S. access to and operations in the domain .
Concurrently , their use of space is expanding significantly.
” Stephen Kitay , the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ahead of China and Russia in developing capabilities , the strategy would serve as a wake-up call that outer space could become an area of conflict .
“ The U.S. space enterprise was not built for the current strategic environment , ” Kitay said .
“ I would say that we are still ahead of them , but we are absolutely at risk with the pace they are developing these capabilities .
And these are very serious threats.
” According to a recent report from the Secure World Foundation , China has worked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tests in low-Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit , and it may have as many as three anti-satellite programs that the organization assesses to be “ likely mature.
” But Beijing has had less success in medium and geostationary earth orbit—as it looks to grow out capabilities for jamming and directed energy weapons that could disable communications or knock out satellites .
Russia , which the Pentagon recently slapped on the wrist in a series of statements condemning Moscow for tailing an American satellite in space and testing an anti-satellite missile in low-Earth orbit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counter-space weapons dating back to the Cold War .
But even with the launch of the Space Force , the United States has been slow to protect satellites from attack .
“ We had the better part of 20 years to do something about it , ” said Brian Weeden , the director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation , a Colorado and Washington-based private foundation .
“ It ’ s hard to point your finger to show what we actually did.
” Weeden , a former U.S. Air Force officer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations , said the Pentagon had been able to successfully bring in allies into the fold after spending a long time viewing space unilaterally .
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California was inaugurated as a combined space operations center in 2018 , enabling greater allied participation .
The Air Force ’ s space command ’ s war games , known as the “ Schriever Wargames , ” include U.S. allies , as does “ Thor ’ s Hammer , ” a National Reconnaissance Office war simulation .
The Florida-based defense contractor L3Harris is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Meadowlands .
But Weeden criticized the new strategy , which calls on the United States to develop defensive systems that can “ counter hostile use of space ” and improve its intelligence and command and control functions , as failing to connect ends with means .
“ In general I think this is something of a step back from what we had nine years ago , ” he said .
“ It ’ s very big on the grand goals but it says even less about the specifics of how to get there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the Defense Department calling out China and Russia for a greater militarization of space in recent years , some former military officials believe that the nascent Space Force is too focused on looking downward toward the Earth , by securing satellites that help with terrestrial combat .
“ You ’ re going to run out of money before you can make your satellites secure , ” said Steven Kwast , a retired Air Force lieutenant general who led the service ’ s air education and training command until last year .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Knox as you want , but if you know where it ’ s going to be , your enemy can paralyze it and kill it.
” Instead , Kwast said , the United States needs to think about adapting more quickly to develop the technological edge when it comes to maneuvering and using firepower in outer space .
“ We ’ re here in space , ” he said .
“ If you try to defend the orbits it will be like building a moat and a wall around your city in the @ @ @ @ @ @

The U.S. Department of Defense’s new space strategy is doing little to settle fears that the United States isn’t ready for a conflict that would extend beyond Earth’s atmosphere, experts told Foreign Policy on Wednesday.
The U.S. Department of Defense’s new space strategy is doing little to settle fears that the United States isn’t ready for a conflict that would extend beyond Earth’s atmosphere, experts told Foreign Policy on Wednesday.
The Defense Space Strategy, a sublayer of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, indicates the Pentagon’s growing concern that China and Russia have developed military doctrine that would extend a conflict into space, where the Pentagon admits it has little operational experience.
“More than any other nation, the United States relies on space-based capabilities to project and employ power on a global scale,” the strategy, which was released on Wednesday and follows a 2011 effort from the Obama administration, said. “China and Russia have analyzed U.S. dependencies on space and have developed doctrine, organizations, and capabilities specifically designed to contest or deny U.S. access to and operations in the domain. Concurrently, their use of space is expanding significantly.”
Stephen Kitay, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for space, said that while the United States remains ahead of China and Russia in developing capabilities, the strategy would serve as a wake-up call that outer space could become an area of conflict.
“The U.S. space enterprise was not built for the current strategic environment,” Kitay said. “I would say that we are still ahead of them, but we are absolutely at risk with the pace they are developing these capabilities. And these are very serious threats.”
According to a recent report from the Secure World Foundation, China has worked to develop a wide range of technological tests in low-Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit, and it may have as many as three anti-satellite programs that the organization assesses to be “likely mature.” But Beijing has had less success in medium and geostationary earth orbit—as it looks to grow out capabilities for jamming and directed energy weapons that could disable communications or knock out satellites.
Russia, which the Pentagon recently slapped on the wrist in a series of statements condemning Moscow for tailing an American satellite in space and testing an anti-satellite missile in low-Earth orbit, has a track record of developing counter-space weapons dating back to the Cold War. But even with the launch of the Space Force, the United States has been slow to protect satellites from attack.
“We had the better part of 20 years to do something about it,” said Brian Weeden, the director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation, a Colorado and Washington-based private foundation. “It’s hard to point your finger to show what we actually did.”
Weeden, a former U.S. Air Force officer who worked on space and ballistic missile operations, said the Pentagon had been able to successfully bring in allies into the fold after spending a long time viewing space unilaterally. Vandenberg Air Force Base in California was inaugurated as a combined space operations center in 2018, enabling greater allied participation.
The Air Force’s space command’s war games, known as the “Schriever Wargames,” include U.S. allies, as does “Thor’s Hammer,” a National Reconnaissance Office war simulation. The Florida-based defense contractor L3Harris is working on a next-generation jamming system called Meadowlands.
But Weeden criticized the new strategy, which calls on the United States to develop defensive systems that can “counter hostile use of space” and improve its intelligence and command and control functions, as failing to connect ends with means. “In general I think this is something of a step back from what we had nine years ago,” he said. “It’s very big on the grand goals but it says even less about the specifics of how to get there than it did in 2011.”
Even with the Defense Department calling out China and Russia for a greater militarization of space in recent years, some former military officials believe that the nascent Space Force is too focused on looking downward toward the Earth, by securing satellites that help with terrestrial combat.
“You’re going to run out of money before you can make your satellites secure,” said Steven Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who led the service’s air education and training command until last year. “You can make the satellite as Fort Knox as you want, but if you know where it’s going to be, your enemy can paralyze it and kill it.”
Instead, Kwast said, the United States needs to think about adapting more quickly to develop the technological edge when it comes to maneuvering and using firepower in outer space. “We’re here in space,” he said. “If you try to defend the orbits it will be like building a moat and a wall around your city in the age of air power.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--The Myth of America’s Green Growth

The Myth of America’s Green Growth

Scientists are increasingly concerned about the impact that excess industrial activity is having on our planet ’ s ecosystems .
Our pursuit of perpetual economic growth is driving ever-increasing levels of material extraction , which is causing a wide range of ecological problems : deforestation , soil depletion , habitat loss , and species extinction .
The crisis has become so severe that last year more than 11,000 scientists from over 150 countries published an article calling on governments to shift toward “ post-growth ” economic models , focusing on human well-being and ecological stability rather than constant expansion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and are rallying around a different narrative altogether .
In a book published last October titled More From Less , the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-based technologist Andrew McAfee argues that we can continue to grow global GDP indefinitely while reducing our ecological impact at the same time—and all without any structural , much less revolutionary , changes to the economy or society .
At the core of McAfee ’ s argument is his analysis of the U.S. economy .
He claims that U.S. consumption of resources has remained steady or even declined since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to rise .
In other words , the United States is “ dematerializing , ” thanks to increasingly efficient technology and a shift toward services .
The same thing has been happening in other high-income nations , he says .
This proves “ green growth ” can be achieved ; rich countries are showing the way , and the rest of the world should follow suit .
It ’ s a striking claim , and it has garnered attention from a number of high-profile commentators and policymakers .
More From Less received exuberant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde , and the economist Larry Summers , plus CEOs , bankers , and a number of Silicon Valley celebrities .
The Bloomberg columnist Noah Smith has repeatedly leaned on McAfee to bolster his own narrative about green growth .
People find solace in this story , because it means there ’ s no need to worry—we don ’ t need to rethink our growth-based economy or question the consumption patterns of rich countries ; we can just carry on with business as usual , and everything will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alibi for inaction .
There ’ s only one problem : McAfee ’ s argument is based on a fundamental accounting error .
McAfee uses data on domestic material consumption , which tallies up the resources that a nation extracts and consumes each year .
But this metric ignores a crucial piece of the puzzle .
While it includes the imported goods a country consumes , it does not include the resources involved in extracting , producing , and transporting those goods .
Because the United States and other rich countries have offshored @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries over the past 40 years , that side of resource use has been conveniently shifted off their books .
In other words , what looks like “ green growth ” is really just an artifact of globalization .
Given how much the U.S. economy relies on offshored production , McAfee ’ s data can not be legitimately compared to U.S. GDP , and can not be used to make claims about dematerialization .
Ecological economists have been aware of this problem for a long time .
To correct for it , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raw material consumption , ” which fully accounts for trade .
When we look at this data , which is readily available from the United Nations , the story changes completely .
We see that total resource use in the United States hasn ’ t been falling at all ; in fact , it has been rising more or less exactly in line with GDP .
The same is true of all other major industrial economies , including the European Union , and the OECD as a group .
There has been zero @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was all an illusion of accounting .
This is a problem , because McAfee holds rich nations up as an example for the rest of the world to follow ; but if rich nations are achieving “ green growth ” by offshoring , then this approach by definition can not be universalized .
Where will the rest of the world offshore to ?
This is why , when we zoom out and look at the world economy as a whole , where trade no longer makes a difference , we see that global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down at all , no matter what metric you use .
In fact , it has been accelerating since 2000 , rising at a historically unprecedented rate , even to the point of outstripping GDP .
In other words , the world economy has been rematerializing .
It ’ s the exact opposite of green growth .
Ecologists say that the planet can handle maximum annual resource use of about 50 billion metric tons per year .
We crossed that boundary in the late 1990s , and today we ’ re overshooting it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is what ’ s driving ecological breakdown : Every additional ton of material extraction has an impact on the planet ’ s ecosystems .
Crucially , high-income nations are the worst offenders here—not the saviors that McAfee claims .
Rich countries consume a staggering 28 tons of material stuff per person per year , nearly four times more than the sustainable per-capita boundary .
In the United States it ’ s up to 35 tons .
If everyone consumed like the United States , global resource use would run up to a staggering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get a sense for what this would be like , imagine our existing crisis multiplied by a factor of three .
These might seem like strange results when you consider that high-income nations have undergone an extraordinary shift to services over the past few decades .
It seems reasonable to believe , as McAfee does , that this should lead to less resource use .
But things haven ’ t turned out that way .
Why not ?
The main reason is that incomes earned in the service sector end up being used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make money from YouTube but then spend it on furniture and cars .
But it ’ s also that most services are resource-intensive in their own right : cruise ships , airlines , hotels , resorts , real estate , retail , tourism—all require significant material inputs .
Given the evidence from the past few decades , there ’ s no reason to believe that shifting to services is somehow magically going to reduce our resource use .
It ’ s time to put that myth aside .
What about technological innovation ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ resource use .
And in theory , that ’ s true , all else being equal .
But in growth-oriented economies , savings from efficiency improvements are typically reinvested to expand the process of production and consumption , which ends up causing aggregate resource use to rise .
For instance , if a soda company finds ways to use less metal in its cans , it will immediately invest any savings into expanding the business by , say , pumping out advertising to get people to buy more soda .
In other words @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gains we achieve through efficiency improvements .
And this raises a real challenge in terms of policy going forward .
If technology hasn ’ t helped us reduce total resource use so far , it doesn ’ t make any sense to hope that it will somehow magically happen in the future .
Don ’ t get me wrong : We need all the technological innovation we can get in our fight against ecological breakdown .
But ultimately it ’ s not our technology that ’ s the problem ; it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , scientists are beginning to discover that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources .
Sure , we might be able to produce lighter soda cans , but we can ’ t produce them out of thin air .
We might shift the economy to services like gyms and restaurants , but even these require material inputs .
There is always a limit to how lightweight something can be .
And once we approach that limit , then continued growth causes resource use to start rising again .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a team of scientists in Australia .
They ran a series of models with extremely optimistic rates of efficiency—faster than anything that ’ s ever been achieved before .
What they found is that while resource use might decline temporarily , it quickly recouples with GDP as we reach the limits of efficiency .
This evidence throws real doubt on green growth narratives .
“ It is misleading , ” they concluded , “ to develop growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible.
” So where does this leave us ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to reduce resource use—which we must do if we are to avert ecological collapse—then we can not wait around for dematerialization to somehow miraculously occur , when all the evidence suggests it ’ s not going to happen .
We need to be smarter than that .
The only fail-safe strategy is to impose legally binding caps on resource use and gradually ratchet it back down to safe levels .
Ecological economists have been calling for this for decades .
In a way , this is an elegant solution to the long-standing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and others really believe that GDP will keep growing despite active reductions in material use , then this shouldn ’ t worry them one bit .
In fact , they should welcome such a move—it will give them a chance to prove once and for all that they are right .
But , to my knowledge , not a single proponent of green growth has ever agreed to this proposal .
Perhaps on some deep level , despite the rosy rhetoric , they realize that this isn ’ t how capitalism actually works @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depended on extraction from nature .
It has always needed an “ outside , ” external to itself , from which it can plunder surplus value , for free—or as close to free as possible .
To put a limit on material extraction is to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs .
There is a deeper question that we need to address here .
McAfee and others go to such extraordinary extents to justify perpetual economic expansion because they start from the assumption that we need it .
They assume that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indeed , they seem to see it as a proxy for human progress itself .
But is it true ?
The evidence suggests otherwise .
Let ’ s take the United States , for example .
The United States has had extraordinary GDP growth over the past four decades .
But , oddly , enough , real wages are lower today than they were in the 1970s , and poverty rates are higher .
Why ?
Because virtually all of the gains from growth have gone to those who are already rich .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have more than tripled since 1980 , soaring to an average of $ 1.5 million per person .
In other words , we ’ ve all been pressing on the accelerator of growth , with devastating consequences for the living world , all to make rich people richer .
When you look at it this way , it becomes clear that the United States doesn ’ t need more growth in order to improve people ’ s lives .
We can do it right now , without any growth at all , simply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fairly .
Equity is the antidote to growth—and a much saner way to achieve our social goals .
The key point to grasp here is that beyond a certain level , which high-income nations have long since surpassed , the relationship between GDP and well-being completely breaks down .
There are dozens of countries that outperform the United States on every indicator of human well-being , with significantly less GDP .
Take life expectancy , for example .
Japan beats the United States in life expectancy by more than five years , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Korea also beats the United States with 50 percent less GDP per capita .
Portugal , too , with 65 percent less GDP per capita .
Costa Ricans live longer , healthier lives than Americans , with 80 percent less GDP per capita .
We can see the same pattern playing out when it comes to every measure of human progress , from education to employment , health care to happiness .
Over and over again , empirical data shows that it is possible to achieve high levels of human welfare without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on the planet .
How ?
By sharing income more fairly and investing in universal health care , education , and other public goods .
The evidence is clear : When it comes to delivering long , healthy , flourishing lives for all , this is what counts—this is what progress looks like .

Scientists are increasingly concerned about the impact that excess industrial activity is having on our planet’s ecosystems. Our pursuit of perpetual economic growth is driving ever-increasing levels of material extraction, which is causing a wide range of ecological problems: deforestation, soil depletion, habitat loss, and species extinction . The crisis has become so severe that last year more than 11,000 scientists from over 150 countries published an article calling on governments to shift toward “post-growth” economic models, focusing on human well-being and ecological stability rather than constant expansion.
Scientists are increasingly concerned about the impact that excess industrial activity is having on our planet’s ecosystems. Our pursuit of perpetual economic growth is driving ever-increasing levels of material extraction, which is causing a wide range of ecological problems: deforestation, soil depletion, habitat loss, and species extinction. The crisis has become so severe that last year more than 11,000 scientists from over 150 countries published an article calling on governments to shift toward “post-growth” economic models, focusing on human well-being and ecological stability rather than constant expansion.
But some figures have rejected this idea and are rallying around a different narrative altogether. In a book published last October titled More From Less, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-based technologist Andrew McAfee argues that we can continue to grow global GDP indefinitely while reducing our ecological impact at the same time—and all without any structural, much less revolutionary, changes to the economy or society.
At the core of McAfee’s argument is his analysis of the U.S. economy. He claims that U.S. consumption of resources has remained steady or even declined since the 1980s, while GDP has continued to rise. In other words, the United States is “dematerializing,” thanks to increasingly efficient technology and a shift toward services. The same thing has been happening in other high-income nations, he says. This proves “green growth” can be achieved; rich countries are showing the way, and the rest of the world should follow suit.
It’s a striking claim, and it has garnered attention from a number of high-profile commentators and policymakers. More From Less received exuberant endorsements from the writer Steven Pinker, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, and the economist Larry Summers, plus CEOs, bankers, and a number of Silicon Valley celebrities. The Bloomberg columnist Noah Smith has repeatedly leaned on McAfee to bolster his own narrative about green growth. People find solace in this story, because it means there’s no need to worry—we don’t need to rethink our growth-based economy or question the consumption patterns of rich countries; we can just carry on with business as usual, and everything will be fine. It’s an alibi for inaction.
There’s only one problem: McAfee’s argument is based on a fundamental accounting error. McAfee uses data on domestic material consumption, which tallies up the resources that a nation extracts and consumes each year. But this metric ignores a crucial piece of the puzzle. While it includes the imported goods a country consumes, it does not include the resources involved in extracting, producing, and transporting those goods. Because the United States and other rich countries have offshored so much of their production to poorer countries over the past 40 years, that side of resource use has been conveniently shifted off their books.
In other words, what looks like “green growth” is really just an artifact of globalization. Given how much the U.S. economy relies on offshored production, McAfee’s data cannot be legitimately compared to U.S. GDP, and cannot be used to make claims about dematerialization.
Ecological economists have been aware of this problem for a long time. To correct for it, they use a more holistic metric called “raw material consumption,” which fully accounts for trade. When we look at this data, which is readily available from the United Nations, the story changes completely. We see that total resource use in the United States hasn’t been falling at all; in fact, it has been rising more or less exactly in line with GDP. The same is true of all other major industrial economies, including the European Union, and the OECD as a group. There has been zero dematerialization. No green growth. It was all an illusion of accounting.
This is a problem, because McAfee holds rich nations up as an example for the rest of the world to follow; but if rich nations are achieving “green growth” by offshoring, then this approach by definition cannot be universalized. Where will the rest of the world offshore to? This is why, when we zoom out and look at the world economy as a whole, where trade no longer makes a difference, we see that global resource use hasn’t been slowing down at all, no matter what metric you use. In fact, it has been accelerating since 2000, rising at a historically unprecedented rate, even to the point of outstripping GDP. In other words, the world economy has been rematerializing. It’s the exact opposite of green growth.
Ecologists say that the planet can handle maximum annual resource use of about 50 billion metric tons per year. We crossed that boundary in the late 1990s, and today we’re overshooting it by more than 90 percent. This is what’s driving ecological breakdown: Every additional ton of material extraction has an impact on the planet’s ecosystems.
Crucially, high-income nations are the worst offenders here—not the saviors that McAfee claims. Rich countries consume a staggering 28 tons of material stuff per person per year, nearly four times more than the sustainable per-capita boundary. In the United States it’s up to 35 tons. If everyone consumed like the United States, global resource use would run up to a staggering 260 billion tons per year. To get a sense for what this would be like, imagine our existing crisis multiplied by a factor of three.
These might seem like strange results when you consider that high-income nations have undergone an extraordinary shift to services over the past few decades. It seems reasonable to believe, as McAfee does, that this should lead to less resource use. But things haven’t turned out that way. Why not? The main reason is that incomes earned in the service sector end up being used to buy material goods. Someone might make money from YouTube but then spend it on furniture and cars. But it’s also that most services are resource-intensive in their own right: cruise ships, airlines, hotels, resorts, real estate, retail, tourism—all require significant material inputs.
Given the evidence from the past few decades, there’s no reason to believe that shifting to services is somehow magically going to reduce our resource use. It’s time to put that myth aside.
What about technological innovation? McAfee argues that efficiency improvements will cut resource use. And in theory, that’s true, all else being equal. But in growth-oriented economies, savings from efficiency improvements are typically reinvested to expand the process of production and consumption, which ends up causing aggregate resource use to rise. For instance, if a soda company finds ways to use less metal in its cans, it will immediately invest any savings into expanding the business by, say, pumping out advertising to get people to buy more soda.
In other words, growth ends up wiping out the gains we achieve through efficiency improvements. And this raises a real challenge in terms of policy going forward. If technology hasn’t helped us reduce total resource use so far, it doesn’t make any sense to hope that it will somehow magically happen in the future. Don’t get me wrong: We need all the technological innovation we can get in our fight against ecological breakdown. But ultimately it’s not our technology that’s the problem; it’s growth.
On top of all this, scientists are beginning to discover that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce lighter soda cans, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services like gyms and restaurants, but even these require material inputs. There is always a limit to how lightweight something can be. And once we approach that limit, then continued growth causes resource use to start rising again.
This question was recently studied in detail by a team of scientists in Australia. They ran a series of models with extremely optimistic rates of efficiency—faster than anything that’s ever been achieved before. What they found is that while resource use might decline temporarily, it quickly recouples with GDP as we reach the limits of efficiency. This evidence throws real doubt on green growth narratives. “It is misleading,” they concluded, “to develop growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible.”
So where does this leave us? What are our options? If we want to reduce resource use—which we must do if we are to avert ecological collapse—then we cannot wait around for dematerialization to somehow miraculously occur, when all the evidence suggests it’s not going to happen. We need to be smarter than that.
The only fail-safe strategy is to impose legally binding caps on resource use and gradually ratchet it back down to safe levels. Ecological economists have been calling for this for decades. In a way, this is an elegant solution to the long-standing debate about green growth. If McAfee and others really believe that GDP will keep growing despite active reductions in material use, then this shouldn’t worry them one bit. In fact, they should welcome such a move—it will give them a chance to prove once and for all that they are right.
But, to my knowledge, not a single proponent of green growth has ever agreed to this proposal. Perhaps on some deep level, despite the rosy rhetoric, they realize that this isn’t how capitalism actually works. For 200 years, capitalism has depended on extraction from nature. It has always needed an “outside,” external to itself, from which it can plunder surplus value, for free—or as close to free as possible. To put a limit on material extraction is to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.
There is a deeper question that we need to address here. McAfee and others go to such extraordinary extents to justify perpetual economic expansion because they start from the assumption that we need it. They assume that GDP is necessary for human well-being. Indeed, they seem to see it as a proxy for human progress itself.
But is it true? The evidence suggests otherwise. Let’s take the United States, for example. The United States has had extraordinary GDP growth over the past four decades. But, oddly, enough, real wages are lower today than they were in the 1970s, and poverty rates are higher. Why? Because virtually all of the gains from growth have gone to those who are already rich. The incomes of the richest 1 percent have more than tripled since 1980, soaring to an average of $1.5 million per person. In other words, we’ve all been pressing on the accelerator of growth, with devastating consequences for the living world, all to make rich people richer.
When you look at it this way, it becomes clear that the United States doesn’t need more growth in order to improve people’s lives. We can do it right now, without any growth at all, simply by sharing what we already have more fairly. Equity is the antidote to growth—and a much saner way to achieve our social goals.
The key point to grasp here is that beyond a certain level, which high-income nations have long since surpassed, the relationship between GDP and well-being completely breaks down. There are dozens of countries that outperform the United States on every indicator of human well-being, with significantly less GDP. Take life expectancy, for example. Japan beats the United States in life expectancy by more than five years, with 35 percent less GDP per capita. South Korea also beats the United States with 50 percent less GDP per capita. Portugal, too, with 65 percent less GDP per capita. Costa Ricans live longer, healthier lives than Americans, with 80 percent less GDP per capita.
We can see the same pattern playing out when it comes to every measure of human progress, from education to employment, health care to happiness. Over and over again, empirical data shows that it is possible to achieve high levels of human welfare without high levels of GDP with significantly less pressure on the planet. How? By sharing income more fairly and investing in universal health care, education, and other public goods. The evidence is clear: When it comes to delivering long, healthy, flourishing lives for all, this is what counts—this is what progress looks like.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--China’s Post-Coronavirus Aggression Is Reshaping Asia

The gloves—or masks—are off in Asia .
China ’ s coronavirus mask diplomacy has given way to bare-knuckled geopolitical fistfights with a growing array of its neighbors .
In the past few months alone , it clashed with India in one of the worst border flare-ups in decades , escalated standoffs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea , pressured Taiwan with nighttime drills in the Taiwan Strait , and threatened Australia with boycotts of wine , beef , barley , and Chinese students .
Meanwhile , China ’ s “ wolf warrior ” diplomats—a moniker taken from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vigorous cybercampaign to defend Communist Party interests and offer thinly veiled threats if countries stray from the “ correct stance ” on important issues .
Beijing ’ s blatant aggressiveness is accelerating long-standing debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China and spurring support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners .
The governments of India , Japan , Malaysia , and Australia have all taken steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing , exploring new efforts to restrict foreign investment rules or shift manufacturing capabilities away from the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new military logistics agreement at the “ virtual summit ” between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison , with a similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo likely to follow .
In spite of Beijing ’ s objections , many regional governments have praised Taiwan ’ s highly successful COVID-19 response and offered support for restoring its observer status in the World Health Assembly .
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia , India , Japan , and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding—with a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weekly calls between these countries as well as New Zealand , South Korea , and Vietnam .
Other responses are from the bottom up .
Chinese cyberbullying of a Thai film star spawned a new “ Milk Tea Alliance , ” named after the popular beverage , to forge solidarity between Taiwanese , Hong Kongers , and Thais online .
Overtly rejecting China ’ s attempts to play up support for the “ One China ” principle , online supporters quickly propelled a hashtag that translates as “ milk tea is thicker than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a matter of days .
The backlash expanded to other issues such as China ’ s damming of the Mekong River .
It also garnered the praise of Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong , who called for “ pan-Asian solidarity that opposes all forms of authoritarianism.
” Asian multilateralism has often been born out of crises .
The Chiang Mai Initiative—a financial swap mechanism between China , Japan , South Korea , and Southeast Asia—emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis .
The grandfather of all Asian regional organizations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( ASEAN ) , was created in 1967 but did not convene its first heads-of-state meeting until 1976 , when Southeast Asian leaders were shocked into action by the fall of Saigon the previous year .
As Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew later argued , “ Without this shock , I doubt if the organization … could have been more than just another organization for ministers and other officials to go conferencing .
The seriousness of purpose came only with the shock of the terrible alternatives.
” If crises and wars tend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ orders and institutions are forged , the COVID-19 crisis is likely to be no exception—it may be remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific .
The ongoing crisis seems to have imbued countries in the region with a new seriousness of purpose about the risks of a slow slide toward Chinese hegemony .
This is handing the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump openings it has long sought : more credible multilateral coordination among allies , pushback against online disinformation , and the desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also raising renewed questions about the durability of U.S. leadership .
So the question now facing the administration is whether it can harness this new regional momentum—or whether Trump ’ s anarchic instincts will squander the opening .
Thus far , Trump continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners—more often than not , at exactly the wrong moment .
For example , his focus on cutting support for the World Health Organization and assertion that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra , right at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forcefully to assert regional leadership , launch an impartial international investigation of the pandemic ’ s origins , and push back on Beijing .
News that Trump will withdraw U.S. troops from Germany , and of his ongoing desire to remove U.S. forces from other allied nations , has landed in Seoul and Tokyo just as North Korea appears poised to embark on a new cycle of provocations .
Similarly , reports recently emerged that the administration is mulling the suspension of various worker visas , a move that would almost certainly have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right at the moment Indian policymakers are grappling with a new border crisis with Beijing .
To improve , the United States needs to make two major shifts .
First , U.S. policy needs to start supporting , rather than attempting to commandeer , regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific .
U.S. leaders need to recognize that while Chinese aggression provides a powerful motivation for closer coordination , U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in much broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideas about their own security and the future of the region .
U.S. leaders should recall the longstanding resonance of the Non-Aligned Movement in a region that resists a “ new Cold War ” framing .
Australia ’ s efforts to call for a COVID-19 investigation through the WHO , as well as Japan ’ s desire to take the lead on a G-7 statement on Hong Kong , reflect not just an effort to push back on Beijing .
They also reflect concern that a U.S.-led approach may box them into an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wants to better harness the growing desire to reduce reliance on Beijing and “ recouple ” investments and supply chains among allied nations , it is going to have to make compromises—an approach this administration has been loath to embrace .
Additionally , U.S. leadership would be far more effective if it worked with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritize and provided them significant space for independent action .
Right now , that means crafting an agenda broader than just punishing Beijing for what Trump has called “ the plague from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the public health crisis , economic recovery , and preventing instability in places with limited or broken social safety nets .
Second , while China certainly has the power to coerce , it also has a tremendous ability to be its own worst enemy by pushing too hard on its neighbors .
It is often China ’ s own overreach ( rather than Washington ’ s entreaties ) that stiffens the spines of other Asian nations .
Washington should avoid repeating Beijing ’ s mistakes and offer a clear alternative in word @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wolf warrior ” diplomacy .
Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “ Wuhan virus ” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying that the U.S. should leave to China .
Across the Indo-Pacific , the desire for U.S. leadership remains strong .
From South Korea , the Philippines , and Japan to Australia , India , and Indonesia , the United States is , according to the Pew Research Center , still viewed more favorably than China .
But Asian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just driven by concerns about Chinese power .
It is also a statement about the United States ’ eroding credibility—a problem that predates the current administration .
Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19—and in the absence of greater certainty about U.S. commitments—Asian leaders will continue pursuing new forms of coordination with each other .
They have a unique chance to build more equal and capable regional partnerships and institutions in the long recovery ahead , which will challenge and complicate the views of those in both Washington and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a sparring ground in a bipolar U.S.-China competition .
For U.S. leaders , the choice is stark : Encourage and foster this trend , recognizing that stronger intra-Asian coordination will require the United States to learn to compromise more frequently , or resist it and risk being left behind .

The gloves—or masks—are off in Asia. China’s coronavirus mask diplomacy has given way to bare-knuckled geopolitical fistfights with a growing array of its neighbors. In the past few months alone, it clashed with India in one of the worst border flare-ups in decades, escalated standoffs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea, pressured Taiwan with nighttime drills in the Taiwan Strait, and threatened Australia with boycotts of wine, beef, barley, and Chinese students. Meanwhile, China’s “wolf warrior” diplomats—a moniker taken from a particularly nationalistic Rambo-esque movie—are engaging in a vigorous cybercampaign to defend Communist Party interests and offer thinly veiled threats if countries stray from the “correct stance” on important issues.
The gloves—or masks—are off in Asia. China’s coronavirus mask diplomacy has given way to bare-knuckled geopolitical fistfights with a growing array of its neighbors. In the past few months alone, it clashed with India in one of the worst border flare-ups in decades, escalated standoffs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea, pressured Taiwan with nighttime drills in the Taiwan Strait, and threatened Australia with boycotts of wine, beef, barley, and Chinese students. Meanwhile, China’s “wolf warrior” diplomats—a moniker taken from a particularly nationalistic Rambo-esque movie—are engaging in a vigorous cybercampaign to defend Communist Party interests and offer thinly veiled threats if countries stray from the “correct stance” on important issues.
Beijing’s blatant aggressiveness is accelerating long-standing debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China and spurring support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners. The governments of India, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia have all taken steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing, exploring new efforts to restrict foreign investment rules or shift manufacturing capabilities away from the Chinese mainland. India and Australia recently inked a new military logistics agreement at the “virtual summit” between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, with a similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo likely to follow. In spite of Beijing’s objections, many regional governments have praised Taiwan’s highly successful COVID-19 response and offered support for restoring its observer status in the World Health Assembly. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding—with a new “Indo-Pacific Coordination Group” that involves weekly calls between these countries as well as New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam.
Other responses are from the bottom up. Chinese cyberbullying of a Thai film star spawned a new “Milk Tea Alliance,” named after the popular beverage, to forge solidarity between Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Thais online. Overtly rejecting China’s attempts to play up support for the “One China” principle, online supporters quickly propelled a hashtag that translates as “milk tea is thicker than blood” to nearly 1 million tweets in a matter of days. The backlash expanded to other issues such as China’s damming of the Mekong River. It also garnered the praise of Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong, who called for “pan-Asian solidarity that opposes all forms of authoritarianism.”
Asian multilateralism has often been born out of crises. The Chiang Mai Initiative—a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia—emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis. The grandfather of all Asian regional organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was created in 1967 but did not convene its first heads-of-state meeting until 1976, when Southeast Asian leaders were shocked into action by the fall of Saigon the previous year. As Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew later argued, “Without this shock, I doubt if the organization … could have been more than just another organization for ministers and other officials to go conferencing. The seriousness of purpose came only with the shock of the terrible alternatives.”
If crises and wars tend to be the crucibles in which new orders and institutions are forged, the COVID-19 crisis is likely to be no exception—it may be remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The ongoing crisis seems to have imbued countries in the region with a new seriousness of purpose about the risks of a slow slide toward Chinese hegemony. This is handing the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump openings it has long sought: more credible multilateral coordination among allies, pushback against online disinformation, and the desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains. At the same time, the crisis is also raising renewed questions about the durability of U.S. leadership. So the question now facing the administration is whether it can harness this new regional momentum—or whether Trump’s anarchic instincts will squander the opening.
Thus far, Trump continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners—more often than not, at exactly the wrong moment. For example, his focus on cutting support for the World Health Organization and assertion that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra, right at the moment when Australia was stepping up more forcefully to assert regional leadership, launch an impartial international investigation of the pandemic’s origins, and push back on Beijing. News that Trump will withdraw U.S. troops from Germany, and of his ongoing desire to remove U.S. forces from other allied nations, has landed in Seoul and Tokyo just as North Korea appears poised to embark on a new cycle of provocations. Similarly, reports recently emerged that the administration is mulling the suspension of various worker visas, a move that would almost certainly have serious repercussions for the U.S.-India relationship—again, right at the moment Indian policymakers are grappling with a new border crisis with Beijing.
To improve, the United States needs to make two major shifts. First, U.S. policy needs to start supporting, rather than attempting to commandeer, regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific. U.S. leaders need to recognize that while Chinese aggression provides a powerful motivation for closer coordination, U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in much broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing. Asian countries have strong, historically rooted ideas about their own security and the future of the region. U.S. leaders should recall the longstanding resonance of the Non-Aligned Movement in a region that resists a “new Cold War” framing. Australia’s efforts to call for a COVID-19 investigation through the WHO, as well as Japan’s desire to take the lead on a G-7 statement on Hong Kong, reflect not just an effort to push back on Beijing. They also reflect concern that a U.S.-led approach may box them into an untenable corner.
If the United States wants to better harness the growing desire to reduce reliance on Beijing and “recouple” investments and supply chains among allied nations, it is going to have to make compromises—an approach this administration has been loath to embrace. Additionally, U.S. leadership would be far more effective if it worked with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritize and provided them significant space for independent action. Right now, that means crafting an agenda broader than just punishing Beijing for what Trump has called “the plague from China” and putting more rhetorical emphasis on the public health crisis, economic recovery, and preventing instability in places with limited or broken social safety nets.
Second, while China certainly has the power to coerce, it also has a tremendous ability to be its own worst enemy by pushing too hard on its neighbors. It is often China’s own overreach (rather than Washington’s entreaties) that stiffens the spines of other Asian nations. Washington should avoid repeating Beijing’s mistakes and offer a clear alternative in word and deed to China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying that the U.S. should leave to China.
Across the Indo-Pacific, the desire for U.S. leadership remains strong. From South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan to Australia, India, and Indonesia, the United States is, according to the Pew Research Center, still viewed more favorably than China. But Asian countries’ push for enhanced multilateralism is not just driven by concerns about Chinese power. It is also a statement about the United States’ eroding credibility—a problem that predates the current administration. Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19—and in the absence of greater certainty about U.S. commitments—Asian leaders will continue pursuing new forms of coordination with each other. They have a unique chance to build more equal and capable regional partnerships and institutions in the long recovery ahead, which will challenge and complicate the views of those in both Washington and Beijing who would see the region only as a sparring ground in a bipolar U.S.-China competition.
For U.S. leaders, the choice is stark: Encourage and foster this trend, recognizing that stronger intra-Asian coordination will require the United States to learn to compromise more frequently, or resist it and risk being left behind.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Green Energy’s Dirty Side Effects

Green Energy’s Dirty Side Effects

Climate change remains one of the most serious threats to the integrity of life on earth .
Thankfully , many of the tools needed to stop heating the planet already exist .
The use of renewable energy resources is expanding in the West , but the production of electric vehicles , wind turbines , and solar cells needs to be scaled up .
To source all energy from renewables by 2050—necessary to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius—citizens will need 1 billion additional electric cars and a more than 30-fold increase in solar photovoltaic capacity .
But as economies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a painstakingly slow pace—another crisis is worsening elsewhere .
Making all those vehicles , panels , and turbines requires resources such as copper , lithium , and cobalt—which , like fossil fuels , are extracted from the ground .
But unlike fossil fuels , many raw materials for green energy come disproportionately from developing countries .
In the last few years , cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has trickled into the public consciousness , beginning with a 2016 Amnesty International report that revealed child labor at the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provide the cobalt that ends up in smart phones and other devices around the world .
The human rights abuses and environmental degradation in places like Congo do not bode well for the West ’ s transition to sustainable energy , which will stretch the demand for green energy materials .
Some critics even cite such adverse effects of renewable energy production to argue against any transition to green energy , such as in the recent , widely criticized Michael Moore-produced documentary Planet of the Humans—which also pushes the falsehood that manufacturing renewable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burning them .
Scientific studies conclude that even the production of materials needed to build wind and solar technologies causes far lower emissions than coal or oil .
“ Fossil fuels are categorically worse at hurting the environment , and even society , than renewables , ” said Benjamin Sovacool , a professor of energy policy at the University of Sussex .
His research also estimates that fossil fuels are more expensive and environmentally harmful than renewables in the long run .
The question of how to source metals and minerals ethically remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the question of how to source metals and minerals ethically remains a legitimate and urgent one .
Policymakers , researchers , and mining industry leaders are now debating how to ensure that the transition to green energy doesn ’ t exacerbate environmental and social problems elsewhere .
One proposal is to improve the traceability of mining supply chains .
At first glance , it makes sense : If manufacturers can achieve transparency from mine to final product , consumers will be able to make ethical purchases and put the “ bad guys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has played an important role in pushing companies toward more ethical conduct .
For example , some diamond retailers use blockchain technology as a tamper-proof transaction tracing system to ensure that conflict diamonds do not enter the legitimate supply chain .
But applying this tracing model to something more complex , such as a battery , is more difficult .
A battery consists of dozens of materials from factories around the world , each deriving resources from places with disparate environmental and social standards .
“ If you were to certify that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of child labor , it ’ s not enough to focus on the facility where they manufactured the battery , ” Sovacool said .
“ You also have to certify that no children were involved when they collected the cobalt , alongside numerous other metals and minerals in supply chains that will change month-to-month based on availability , price , and stability.
” Renewable technologies create ethical issues at both ends of their life cycle .
Sovacool was part of a team of researchers who recently visited the two ends of technology supply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congo , where miners extract the metal using rudimentary tools or their hands , and electronic waste scrapyards in Ghana , a global cemetery for electronics such as solar panels .
The team ’ s findings reveal widespread child labor , the subjugation of ethnic minorities , toxic pollution , biodiversity loss , and gender inequality along the length of the supply chain .
Sovacool and his colleagues call this inequality the “ decarbonization divide , ” which may widen as the world ramps up renewable energy use .
For example , solar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low-carbon energy many times over .
But the sheer size of solar panels , which often contain lead , cadmium , and other toxic metals , makes them one the largest global contributors of electronic waste .
By 2050 , which is the rough expiration date of solar panels manufactured today , the technology is estimated to produce 78 million metric tons of waste—some 80 percent more than the total annual waste from all combined technologies today .
Much of the e-waste generated by the West is sent , sometimes illegally , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a small amount of it is mined for reusable materials and sold back to world markets .
This economic opportunity often causes toxic pollution , fueling environmental and public health crises .
Many workers at one of the largest e-waste processing sites in Ghana , Agbogbloshie , are children who help dismantle electronic goods , extract metals , and then burn the waste—producing smoke that envelops the surrounding communities .
Studies have found high levels of lead in the blood of those living near the processing sites .
Although traceability has a role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bullet that can solve these problems .
There are already international treaties and conventions that aim to solve issues such as child labor , social inequality , environmental degradation , and biodiversity loss .
But a recent United Nations review of 80 existing international initiatives that govern the mining sector concluded that they often fail to be enforced by national governments .
Countries with weak governance , such as Congo—where mining companies from all over the world operate—are less likely to take part in such international treaties and practices .
There are already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Congo ’ s mining code , but without adequate enforcement , it is left to mining companies to self-regulate .
This structure allows unscrupulous mining companies to exacerbate socioeconomic inequality , violence , and conflict by sourcing resources from illegal miners , displacing communities , and polluting .
Such issues have galvanized a growing global community of anti-mining activists seeking corporate transparency , with some going as far as calling for the complete withdrawal of Western mining companies from developing countries .
Others question the utility of this approach .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and leave the field open to more unscrupulous players , ” said Tom Butler , the CEO of the International Council on Mining and Metals , an international organization set up to improve sustainability in the industry .
Corporate sustainability is not enough to address all the ethical issues in the mining supply chain , but some observers pin their hopes on it—fueled by a consumer appetite for sustainable materials .
Butler says that mining companies can sometimes fill the void left by weak governments , building schools , hospitals , roads , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prevent damage to the environment by making operations more resource-efficient .
They can also create benefits for people in local communities that extend beyond the lifetime of the mining operation , such as equipping locals with training and education that make them more likely to be hired in the future .
One of the largest mining companies operating in Congo , Switzerland-based Glencore , sources 96 percent of its staff locally across its global operations , and it paid $ 680 million in wages and benefits in Congo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the South Africa-based Gold Fields , which has operations in Ghana , hired 55 percent of its overall staff locally in 2019 .
For every job created in the mining sector , another 25 are created indirectly through the procurement of goods and services or transport , according to Butler .
“ So I say if you want to invest where it makes a difference , then a responsible mining company operating in the DRC is a good bet , ” he said .
( Glencore has recently been accused of facilitating child @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the company insists it does not tolerate child or forced labor ) .
But there is a limit to what corporate social responsibility can achieve .
The mining companies are often reluctant to shoulder too much of the responsibility of governments , as it risks undermining local efforts to strengthen communities .
Individual companies operating responsibly can ’ t ensure that others follow the same standards .
They also can ’ t solve the structural issues of poverty and the lack of domestic and international governance that underpin illegal mining , child labor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West .
What is needed is collaboration between mining companies and governments and stronger policy .
What is needed is collaboration between mining companies and governments and stronger policies .
Though international treaties have limited impact in countries with weak governance , a unified policy that all countries in the mining supply chain agree on could overcome that issue .
“ What we need is an international protocol that coordinates among existing environmental treaties , ” said Saleem Ali , a professor of energy and the environment at the University of Delaware @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have additional policy recommendations to lessen the burden of extractive industries on communities and the environment .
Policymakers should ensure that mining companies are at least partially owned by locals , either by including requirements for minimum local ownership into national mining laws or by incentivizing mining companies through tax cuts or other financial benefits .
They also recommend that countries consider mining impacts as part of their commitments to existing international treaties , such as the Paris climate accord .
A different set of solutions is needed to tackle the growing pile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ green energy supply chain .
Today , much solar technology is discarded after it expires rather than being reused due to the cost dynamics of solar markets .
Maintaining affordability requires “ better design , so that it is easier to repurpose , repower , or recycle components , ” Sovacool said .
Governments and major companies have difficult decisions to make , and the window of opportunity for addressing climate change is rapidly closing .
While difficult , it is not impossible to convert the world to renewables without exacerbating existing inequalities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solved through cooperation across the green energy supply chain that incorporates technological and social strategies .
In this way , green energy could be truly sustainable .

Climate change remains one of the most serious threats to the integrity of life on earth. Thankfully, many of the tools needed to stop heating the planet already exist. The use of renewable energy resources is expanding in the West, but the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar cells needs to be scaled up. To source all energy from renewables by 2050—necessary to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius—citizens will need 1 billion additional electric cars and a more than 30-fold increase in solar photovoltaic capacity.
Climate change remains one of the most serious threats to the integrity of life on earth. Thankfully, many of the tools needed to stop heating the planet already exist. The use of renewable energy resources is expanding in the West, but the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar cells needs to be scaled up. To source all energy from renewables by 2050—necessary to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius—citizens will need 1 billion additional electric cars and a more than 30-fold increase in solar photovoltaic capacity.
But as economies in the West address the climate crisis—albeit at a painstakingly slow pace—another crisis is worsening elsewhere. Making all those vehicles, panels, and turbines requires resources such as copper, lithium, and cobalt—which, like fossil fuels, are extracted from the ground. But unlike fossil fuels, many raw materials for green energy come disproportionately from developing countries.
In the last few years, cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has trickled into the public consciousness, beginning with a 2016 Amnesty International report that revealed child labor at the country’s nonindustrial mine sites, which provide the cobalt that ends up in smart phones and other devices around the world.
The human rights abuses and environmental degradation in places like Congo do not bode well for the West’s transition to sustainable energy, which will stretch the demand for green energy materials. Some critics even cite such adverse effects of renewable energy production to argue against any transition to green energy, such as in the recent, widely criticized Michael Moore-produced documentary Planet of the Humans—which also pushes the falsehood that manufacturing renewable technology consumes as many fossil fuels as burning them.
Scientific studies conclude that even the production of materials needed to build wind and solar technologies causes far lower emissions than coal or oil. “Fossil fuels are categorically worse at hurting the environment, and even society, than renewables,” said Benjamin Sovacool, a professor of energy policy at the University of Sussex. His research also estimates that fossil fuels are more expensive and environmentally harmful than renewables in the long run.
The question of how to source metals and minerals ethically remains a legitimate and urgent one.
Still, the question of how to source metals and minerals ethically remains a legitimate and urgent one. Policymakers, researchers, and mining industry leaders are now debating how to ensure that the transition to green energy doesn’t exacerbate environmental and social problems elsewhere.
One proposal is to improve the traceability of mining supply chains. At first glance, it makes sense: If manufacturers can achieve transparency from mine to final product, consumers will be able to make ethical purchases and put the “bad guys” out of business. Improved traceability has played an important role in pushing companies toward more ethical conduct. For example, some diamond retailers use blockchain technology as a tamper-proof transaction tracing system to ensure that conflict diamonds do not enter the legitimate supply chain.
But applying this tracing model to something more complex, such as a battery, is more difficult. A battery consists of dozens of materials from factories around the world, each deriving resources from places with disparate environmental and social standards. “If you were to certify that a battery from an electric vehicle was free of child labor, it’s not enough to focus on the facility where they manufactured the battery,” Sovacool said. “You also have to certify that no children were involved when they collected the cobalt, alongside numerous other metals and minerals in supply chains that will change month-to-month based on availability, price, and stability.”
Renewable technologies create ethical issues at both ends of their life cycle. Sovacool was part of a team of researchers who recently visited the two ends of technology supply chains: artisanal cobalt mining sites in Congo, where miners extract the metal using rudimentary tools or their hands, and electronic waste scrapyards in Ghana, a global cemetery for electronics such as solar panels. The team’s findings reveal widespread child labor, the subjugation of ethnic minorities, toxic pollution, biodiversity loss, and gender inequality along the length of the supply chain.
Sovacool and his colleagues call this inequality the “decarbonization divide,” which may widen as the world ramps up renewable energy use. For example, solar energy could meet the global demand for low-carbon energy many times over. But the sheer size of solar panels, which often contain lead, cadmium, and other toxic metals, makes them one the largest global contributors of electronic waste. By 2050, which is the rough expiration date of solar panels manufactured today, the technology is estimated to produce 78 million metric tons of waste—some 80 percent more than the total annual waste from all combined technologies today.
Much of the e-waste generated by the West is sent, sometimes illegally, to countries in Asia or Africa, where a small amount of it is mined for reusable materials and sold back to world markets. This economic opportunity often causes toxic pollution, fueling environmental and public health crises. Many workers at one of the largest e-waste processing sites in Ghana, Agbogbloshie, are children who help dismantle electronic goods, extract metals, and then burn the waste—producing smoke that envelops the surrounding communities. Studies have found high levels of lead in the blood of those living near the processing sites.
Although traceability has a role to play, there is no silver bullet that can solve these problems. There are already international treaties and conventions that aim to solve issues such as child labor, social inequality, environmental degradation, and biodiversity loss. But a recent United Nations review of 80 existing international initiatives that govern the mining sector concluded that they often fail to be enforced by national governments.
Countries with weak governance, such as Congo—where mining companies from all over the world operate—are less likely to take part in such international treaties and practices. There are already rules for environmental protection and social responsibilities in Congo’s mining code, but without adequate enforcement, it is left to mining companies to self-regulate. This structure allows unscrupulous mining companies to exacerbate socioeconomic inequality, violence, and conflict by sourcing resources from illegal miners, displacing communities, and polluting.
Such issues have galvanized a growing global community of anti-mining activists seeking corporate transparency, with some going as far as calling for the complete withdrawal of Western mining companies from developing countries. Others question the utility of this approach. “The risk is that responsible companies pull out and leave the field open to more unscrupulous players,” said Tom Butler, the CEO of the International Council on Mining and Metals, an international organization set up to improve sustainability in the industry.
Corporate sustainability is not enough to address all the ethical issues in the mining supply chain, but some observers pin their hopes on it—fueled by a consumer appetite for sustainable materials.
Butler says that mining companies can sometimes fill the void left by weak governments, building schools, hospitals, roads, and water systems. Mining companies can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prevent damage to the environment by making operations more resource-efficient. They can also create benefits for people in local communities that extend beyond the lifetime of the mining operation, such as equipping locals with training and education that make them more likely to be hired in the future.
One of the largest mining companies operating in Congo, Switzerland-based Glencore, sources 96 percent of its staff locally across its global operations, and it paid $680 million in wages and benefits in Congo between 2015 and 2018. Similarly, the South Africa-based Gold Fields, which has operations in Ghana, hired 55 percent of its overall staff locally in 2019. For every job created in the mining sector, another 25 are created indirectly through the procurement of goods and services or transport, according to Butler. “So I say if you want to invest where it makes a difference, then a responsible mining company operating in the DRC is a good bet,” he said. (Glencore has recently been accused of facilitating child labor in cobalt mining practices, although the company insists it does not tolerate child or forced labor).
But there is a limit to what corporate social responsibility can achieve. The mining companies are often reluctant to shoulder too much of the responsibility of governments, as it risks undermining local efforts to strengthen communities. Individual companies operating responsibly can’t ensure that others follow the same standards. They also can’t solve the structural issues of poverty and the lack of domestic and international governance that underpin illegal mining, child labor, and the streams of e-waste from the West.
What is needed is collaboration between mining companies and governments and stronger policy.
What is needed is collaboration between mining companies and governments and stronger policies. Though international treaties have limited impact in countries with weak governance, a unified policy that all countries in the mining supply chain agree on could overcome that issue. “What we need is an international protocol that coordinates among existing environmental treaties,” said Saleem Ali, a professor of energy and the environment at the University of Delaware.
Sovacool, Ali, and others have additional policy recommendations to lessen the burden of extractive industries on communities and the environment. Policymakers should ensure that mining companies are at least partially owned by locals, either by including requirements for minimum local ownership into national mining laws or by incentivizing mining companies through tax cuts or other financial benefits. They also recommend that countries consider mining impacts as part of their commitments to existing international treaties, such as the Paris climate accord.
A different set of solutions is needed to tackle the growing pile of e-waste at the end of the green energy supply chain. Today, much solar technology is discarded after it expires rather than being reused due to the cost dynamics of solar markets. Maintaining affordability requires “better design, so that it is easier to repurpose, repower, or recycle components,” Sovacool said.
Governments and major companies have difficult decisions to make, and the window of opportunity for addressing climate change is rapidly closing. While difficult, it is not impossible to convert the world to renewables without exacerbating existing inequalities. But the problem can only be solved through cooperation across the green energy supply chain that incorporates technological and social strategies.
In this way, green energy could be truly sustainable.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--The Free World’s Leader Isn’t Free Anymore

Virtually everything good , and everything bad , that American leaders have done in the world over the last century—both the establishment of the liberal order after World War II and the prosecution of ruinous wars in Vietnam and Iraq—has been carried out in the name of a mission to promote America ’ s liberal and democratic values .
“ American exceptionalism , ” as that faith was once known , in turn presupposed that the nation was uniquely endowed with those values .
Critics on the left always regarded that claim as evidence of national hubris .
Yet 20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say , as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did , that “ we stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.
” After the events of the last four months , however , that premise has tipped over into the laughable .
America plainly does not see further .
The national response to the coronavirus pandemic has been short-sighted and incoherent ; in the face of crisis the nation has become more polarized rather than less .
And now the killing of George Floyd and the violent response to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policing is shot through with racism and brutality .
President Donald Trump is determined to pour salt into every fresh wound .
America now seems exceptional almost entirely in a pejorative sense .
Of course the polarization and paralysis , institutional racism , and contempt for democratic norms predate the election of Donald Trump .
One can argue about when the downward trajectory began ; in How Democracies Die , Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt trace the rot back to the Republican revolution sparked by Newt Gingrich in the 1980s .
( I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Liberalism ? )
One useful way to reduce the question to numbers is to study the relative and absolute decline of the United States in Freedom House ’ s annual Freedom in the World Index .
While the index has existed since 1972 , only starting in 2003 did Freedom House develop a 1-100 scale that made it possible to rank countries .
The United States initially clocked in at 94 , where it remained through 2009 , when it placed 22nd on the list .
Then it began slipping , though owing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tenure as president than to policy initiatives and Supreme Court rulings backed by conservatives that amped up the power of money in politics , gerrymandered electoral districts , and imposed restrictions on registration and voting .
By 2016 , the United States had fallen to 28th place , with a score of 89 .
Over the three years of Trump ’ s tenure , the United States has now plummeted to 33rd place and lost three more points , which Sarah Repucci , Freedom House ’ s vice president for research and analysis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a stable democracy.
” She also notes that the United States ’ score of two points , out of a maximum of four , on the question of equitable treatment for different groups is almost unheard-of among democracies .
Freedom House ’ s analysis on this subject highlights long-standing issues of structural inequality but also Trump ’ s sustained campaign against immigrants and refugees .
Repucci is not prepared to make any predictions for the 2021 report , but she does note that the steady erosion of norms that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decline in scores , as has been the case , for example , with Hungary .
“ Many people think that there could be problems here and there but that the fundamentals of our democracy are not at risk , ” Repucci said , “ and I think we need to see that they are.
” Already the United States rates as less free not only than almost all of Western Europe but also than most of the tiny island nations of the Caribbean .
It ’ s a good bet that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fall below Belize , with which it is now tied .
Freedom House can hardly be accused of anti-American bias .
Founded with the backing of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 , the organization , and then its rating system , evolved into a Cold War tool designed to mark the categorical difference between the American and Soviet spheres of influence .
The current chairman is Michael Chertoff , who served as head of the Department of Homeland Security under George W. Bush and is credited , if that ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the USA Patriot Act .
What ’ s more , Freedom House ’ s judgment tracks with that of other groups .
The United States ranks 25th , just ahead of Malta , on the Economist Intelligence Unit ’ s Democracy Index , where it is counted as a “ flawed democracy.
” On the Civicus Monitor , which rates the conditions for “ civic space , ” the United States counts as “ narrowed ” rather than “ open.
” On the press freedom index maintained by Reporters Without Borders , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Senegal .
Americans can take some credit for the growth of democratic nations in the generation after World War II , and again after the end of the Cold War .
Thus the fact that the United States no longer tops the league tables could count as success , not failure .
But the poor scores on the national report card are a mark of shame and a summons to humility .
The United States has no business issuing preachments to anyone when it finds itself at this level .
I do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vindication for a morally neutral policy .
It was the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s that made me turn from domestic to foreign policy .
I did not think Albright was wrong in 1998 when she called the United States “ the indispensable nation.
” I have written a book ( The Freedom Agenda ) endorsing the doctrine of democracy promotion , though not the Bush administration ’ s bellicose version of it .
I would be unhappy if a President Joe Biden dispensed with the language of human rights in the name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no longer imagine that it will do much good .
Tyrants will be safe in shrugging off American criticism , because it will carry so little weight with others .
Human rights activists abroad might still look to private American organizations like the Open Society Foundations or the National Democratic Institute , but not to official organs of the United States .
If elected president , Biden could rejoin the United Nations ’ Human Rights Council , but he can not expect to exercise the kind of leadership there that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump somehow be reelected , the United States will descend into a savage brawl that other nations will look upon aghast .
A Biden victory would—ideally—usher in an era of painful self-reflection , like someone waking up from a wild drinking spree to find himself bankrupt but sober .
It will take years just to sweep up the shattered crockery .
In the meanwhile , American political leaders will need to conduct themselves with a very un-American circumspection .
The United States remains indispensable because it is the world ’ s greatest military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it for guidance .

Virtually everything good, and everything bad, that American leaders have done in the world over the last century—both the establishment of the liberal order after World War II and the prosecution of ruinous wars in Vietnam and Iraq—has been carried out in the name of a mission to promote America’s liberal and democratic values. “American exceptionalism,” as that faith was once known, in turn presupposed that the nation was uniquely endowed with those values.
Virtually everything good, and everything bad, that American leaders have done in the world over the last century—both the establishment of the liberal order after World War II and the prosecution of ruinous wars in Vietnam and Iraq—has been carried out in the name of a mission to promote America’s liberal and democratic values. “American exceptionalism,” as that faith was once known, in turn presupposed that the nation was uniquely endowed with those values.
Critics on the left always regarded that claim as evidence of national hubris. Yet 20 years ago it was still possible to say, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did, that “we stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.” After the events of the last four months, however, that premise has tipped over into the laughable. America plainly does not see further. The national response to the coronavirus pandemic has been short-sighted and incoherent; in the face of crisis the nation has become more polarized rather than less. And now the killing of George Floyd and the violent response to the subsequent demonstrations have shown that American policing is shot through with racism and brutality. President Donald Trump is determined to pour salt into every fresh wound. America now seems exceptional almost entirely in a pejorative sense.
Of course the polarization and paralysis, institutional racism, and contempt for democratic norms predate the election of Donald Trump. One can argue about when the downward trajectory began; in How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt trace the rot back to the Republican revolution sparked by Newt Gingrich in the 1980s. (I make a similar claim in What Was Liberalism?) One useful way to reduce the question to numbers is to study the relative and absolute decline of the United States in Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World Index.
While the index has existed since 1972, only starting in 2003 did Freedom House develop a 1-100 scale that made it possible to rank countries. The United States initially clocked in at 94, where it remained through 2009, when it placed 22nd on the list. Then it began slipping, though owing far less to Barack Obama’s tenure as president than to policy initiatives and Supreme Court rulings backed by conservatives that amped up the power of money in politics, gerrymandered electoral districts, and imposed restrictions on registration and voting. By 2016, the United States had fallen to 28th place, with a score of 89.
Over the three years of Trump’s tenure, the United States has now plummeted to 33rd place and lost three more points, which Sarah Repucci, Freedom House’s vice president for research and analysis, told me is “very unusual for a stable democracy.” She also notes that the United States’ score of two points, out of a maximum of four, on the question of equitable treatment for different groups is almost unheard-of among democracies. Freedom House’s analysis on this subject highlights long-standing issues of structural inequality but also Trump’s sustained campaign against immigrants and refugees.
Repucci is not prepared to make any predictions for the 2021 report, but she does note that the steady erosion of norms that the United States has experienced in recent years often presages a decline in scores, as has been the case, for example, with Hungary. “Many people think that there could be problems here and there but that the fundamentals of our democracy are not at risk,” Repucci said, “and I think we need to see that they are.” Already the United States rates as less free not only than almost all of Western Europe but also than most of the tiny island nations of the Caribbean. It’s a good bet that by next year the United States will fall below Belize, with which it is now tied.
Freedom House can hardly be accused of anti-American bias. Founded with the backing of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, the organization, and then its rating system, evolved into a Cold War tool designed to mark the categorical difference between the American and Soviet spheres of influence. The current chairman is Michael Chertoff, who served as head of the Department of Homeland Security under George W. Bush and is credited, if that’s the word, with being a co-author the USA Patriot Act.
What’s more, Freedom House’s judgment tracks with that of other groups. The United States ranks 25th, just ahead of Malta, on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, where it is counted as a “flawed democracy.” On the Civicus Monitor, which rates the conditions for “civic space,” the United States counts as “narrowed” rather than “open.” On the press freedom index maintained by Reporters Without Borders, the United States ranks 45, barely ahead of Senegal.
Americans can take some credit for the growth of democratic nations in the generation after World War II, and again after the end of the Cold War. Thus the fact that the United States no longer tops the league tables could count as success, not failure. But the poor scores on the national report card are a mark of shame and a summons to humility. The United States has no business issuing preachments to anyone when it finds itself at this level.
I do not write this as a realist seeking vindication for a morally neutral policy. It was the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s that made me turn from domestic to foreign policy. I did not think Albright was wrong in 1998 when she called the United States “the indispensable nation.” I have written a book (The Freedom Agenda) endorsing the doctrine of democracy promotion, though not the Bush administration’s bellicose version of it. I would be unhappy if a President Joe Biden dispensed with the language of human rights in the name of so-called national interests.
Yet I no longer imagine that it will do much good. Tyrants will be safe in shrugging off American criticism, because it will carry so little weight with others. Human rights activists abroad might still look to private American organizations like the Open Society Foundations or the National Democratic Institute, but not to official organs of the United States. If elected president, Biden could rejoin the United Nations’ Human Rights Council, but he cannot expect to exercise the kind of leadership there that the United States had even four years ago.
Should Trump somehow be reelected, the United States will descend into a savage brawl that other nations will look upon aghast. A Biden victory would—ideally—usher in an era of painful self-reflection, like someone waking up from a wild drinking spree to find himself bankrupt but sober. It will take years just to sweep up the shattered crockery. In the meanwhile, American political leaders will need to conduct themselves with a very un-American circumspection. The United States remains indispensable because it is the world’s greatest military power—but not because other nations look to it for guidance.