foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--Delhi’s Violence Could Presage Something Far Worse

Delhi ’ s Violence Could Presage Something Far Worse Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly South Asia Brief .
The highlights this week : Why India ’ s communal violence could get worse , violence in Afghanistan , Pakistan ’ s coronavirus scare , and Sri Lanka announces early elections .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday , please sign up here .
The law behind it all .
Since India ’ s parliament passed the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act ( CAA ) last December , tens of thousands of Indians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Opponents describe the law as unconstitutional because it differentiates people on the basis of religion .
Put simply , the CAA discriminates against Muslims .
When coupled with the proposed National Register of Citizens ( NRC ) , it could eventually render Muslims stateless if they don ’ t have the paperwork to prove their citizenship .
In recent weeks , there have also been marches in favor of the CAA and NRC .
It was only a matter of time before the two sets of demonstrators clashed .
Clashes… or a pogrom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one group and another creates the impression of a symmetrical fight .
While last week ’ s riots in Delhi may have begun with violence perpetrated by both sides , it certainly didn ’ t end that way .
Varshney said that the “ partisanship of the police became clear ” on the second and third day of the violence .
Hindu mobs “ attacked with abandon , ” he said , because “ the police did not respond to calls for help.
” According to phone logs , the calls for help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on those facts , Varshney said , the Delhi riots can be classified as the beginning of a pogrom—a class of violence in which the police side with one group by looking away or by participating in the violence .
Put more bluntly : The state was complicit in the Delhi riots , in which the victims were mostly Muslim .
What ’ s next ?
Varshney ’ s classification of Delhi ’ s violence as a pogrom suggests dire ramifications : The riots could breed further impunity among Hindu mobs .
States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Bharatiya Janata Party—including Uttar Pradesh , the country ’ s largest state , but also Gujarat and Karnataka—should be seen as potential flash points .
The police in those states may also toe a partisan line and turn a blind eye when majority Hindu groups turn on minority Muslims .
Delhi ’ s violence may have ended , but for the rest of India things could easily get worse .
Read the full Q & A with Ashutosh Varshney here .
Afghan peace deal fallout .
At least three people were killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khost province on Monday , less than 72 hours after the United States and the Taliban signed a deal in Doha , Qatar , aimed at bringing peace to Afghanistan .
The Taliban have denied responsibility for the blast but said they plan to resume fighting against Afghan forces .
On Monday , Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff , said , “ I would caution everybody to think that there ’ s going to be an absolute cessation of violence in Afghanistan .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be an increase in violence once winter ends , Anchal Vohra reports for FP .
Sri Lanka ’ s parliament dissolved .
Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has called legislative elections six months early , dissolving the 225-seat parliament before the end of its five-year term .
The country ’ s opposition holds a majority in parliament .
Rajapaksa , who was elected last November , is likely betting his party can improve its fortunes during a campaign that coincides with the first anniversary of the country ’ s deadly Easter Sunday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people were killed .
The coronavirus crisis .
Pakistan has reported its fifth coronavirus case , making it the South Asian country worst affected by the disease so far .
Most of Pakistan ’ s cases involve patients who have traveled to Iran , which is grappling with a serious outbreak .
The Pakistani province of Balochistan , which borders Iran , has ordered schools closed , as has the larger province of Sindh—home to the country ’ s financial capital , Karachi .
South Asia ’ s countries have yet to report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as shown below .
But it is possible that more cases exist and simply haven ’ t been detected .
The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has proposed creating three capital cities within the state : separate executive , judicial , and legislative centers that could serve as a model for equal development .
The idea is not without precedent .
Which of these countries has a similar system with three capitals ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Apple eyes India .
While China has more than 40 official Apple stores , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon change .
In an interview with Fox Business on Monday , Apple CEO Tim Cook said that the Trump administration had worked with Indian authorities to gain an exception for Apple on retail rules that require sellers to have local partners .
“ We want to maintain control of our brand , ” Cook said .
“ We are very , very positive on entering in online this year and in retail next year.
” Onion crisis ends .
India will begin exporting onions again on March 15 , after a five-month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The country halted onion exports last September after excessive rain resulted in a reduced harvest .
The move will have ripple effects across South Asia .
Bangladesh , which imports 1 million tons of onions—mainly from India—annually , saw steep falls in market prices of the vegetable after the announcement .
Is Modi ditching social media ?
On Monday , Modi posted a mysterious tweet : “ This Sunday , thinking of giving up my social media accounts on Facebook , Twitter , Instagram , and YouTube .
Will keep you all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a social media storm : After all , the prime minister has more than 53 million followers , making his the 18th-most-followed account in the world .
( Former U.S. President Barack Obama ranks first with 113 million , while Trump ranks ninth with 73 million . )
But a day later , Modi clarified that he was only handing over control of his accounts to women for a single day , on Sunday—which happens to be International Women ’ s Day .
It ’ s a worthy cause , but Modi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ranks 112th out of 153 countries on the World Economic Forum ’ s Global Gender Gap Index .
While Pretoria is the country ’ s administrative capital , the judiciary is headquartered in Bloemfontein , and South Africa ’ s Parliament meets in Cape Town .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Why India’s communal violence could get worse, violence in Afghanistan , Pakistan’s coronavirus scare , and Sri Lanka announces early elections .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. The highlights this week: Why India’s communal violence could get worse, violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s coronavirus scare, and Sri Lanka announces early elections.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Tuesday, please sign up here.
Will Delhi’s Communal Violence Spread? While U.S. President Donald Trump was dining at New Delhi’s presidential palace last week, India’s capital witnessed its deadliest communal violence in decades. At least 45 people were killed, most of them Muslims. While Delhi seems to have now calmed down—on the surface, at least—the root causes of the violence remain and could resurface in the coming days and weeks, as Brown University’s Ashutosh Varshney, an expert on Hindu-Muslim violence, said in an interview with FP this week.
The law behind it all. Since India’s parliament passed the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) last December, tens of thousands of Indians have joined protests across the country. Opponents describe the law as unconstitutional because it differentiates people on the basis of religion. Put simply, the CAA discriminates against Muslims. When coupled with the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC), it could eventually render Muslims stateless if they don’t have the paperwork to prove their citizenship. In recent weeks, there have also been marches in favor of the CAA and NRC. It was only a matter of time before the two sets of demonstrators clashed.
Clashes… or a pogrom? Defining interreligious violence as clashes between one group and another creates the impression of a symmetrical fight. While last week’s riots in Delhi may have begun with violence perpetrated by both sides, it certainly didn’t end that way. Varshney said that the “partisanship of the police became clear” on the second and third day of the violence. Hindu mobs “attacked with abandon,” he said, because “the police did not respond to calls for help.”
According to phone logs, the calls for help came mostly from Muslim areas. Based on those facts, Varshney said, the Delhi riots can be classified as the beginning of a pogrom—a class of violence in which the police side with one group by looking away or by participating in the violence. Put more bluntly: The state was complicit in the Delhi riots, in which the victims were mostly Muslim.
What’s next? Varshney’s classification of Delhi’s violence as a pogrom suggests dire ramifications: The riots could breed further impunity among Hindu mobs. States run by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party—including Uttar Pradesh, the country’s largest state, but also Gujarat and Karnataka—should be seen as potential flash points. The police in those states may also toe a partisan line and turn a blind eye when majority Hindu groups turn on minority Muslims.
Delhi’s violence may have ended, but for the rest of India things could easily get worse.
Read the full Q&A with Ashutosh Varshney here.
What We’re Following
Afghan peace deal fallout. At least three people were killed in a blast in Afghanistan’s Khost province on Monday, less than 72 hours after the United States and the Taliban signed a deal in Doha, Qatar, aimed at bringing peace to Afghanistan. The Taliban have denied responsibility for the blast but said they plan to resume fighting against Afghan forces. On Monday, Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “I would caution everybody to think that there’s going to be an absolute cessation of violence in Afghanistan. That is probably not going to happen.” There could be an increase in violence once winter ends, Anchal Vohra reports for FP.
Sri Lanka’s parliament dissolved. Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has called legislative elections six months early, dissolving the 225-seat parliament before the end of its five-year term. The country’s opposition holds a majority in parliament. Rajapaksa, who was elected last November, is likely betting his party can improve its fortunes during a campaign that coincides with the first anniversary of the country’s deadly Easter Sunday bombings, in which more than 250 people were killed.
The coronavirus crisis. Pakistan has reported its fifth coronavirus case, making it the South Asian country worst affected by the disease so far. Most of Pakistan’s cases involve patients who have traveled to Iran, which is grappling with a serious outbreak. The Pakistani province of Balochistan, which borders Iran, has ordered schools closed, as has the larger province of Sindh—home to the country’s financial capital, Karachi.
South Asia’s countries have yet to report a large number of coronavirus cases, as shown below. But it is possible that more cases exist and simply haven’t been detected.
Question of the Week
The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has proposed creating three capital cities within the state: separate executive, judicial, and legislative centers that could serve as a model for equal development. The idea is not without precedent. Which of these countries has a similar system with three capitals?
A) South Africa
B) Brazil
C) Chile
D) Malaysia
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Apple eyes India. While China has more than 40 official Apple stores, India still has none. That could soon change. In an interview with Fox Business on Monday, Apple CEO Tim Cook said that the Trump administration had worked with Indian authorities to gain an exception for Apple on retail rules that require sellers to have local partners. “We want to maintain control of our brand,” Cook said. “We are very, very positive on entering in online this year and in retail next year.”
Onion crisis ends. India will begin exporting onions again on March 15, after a five-month ban and a bumper crop this year. The country halted onion exports last September after excessive rain resulted in a reduced harvest. The move will have ripple effects across South Asia. Bangladesh, which imports 1 million tons of onions—mainly from India—annually, saw steep falls in market prices of the vegetable after the announcement.
Odds and Ends
Cutouts of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are seen at a public rally in Ahmedabad, India, on May 26, 2019.
Is Modi ditching social media? On Monday, Modi posted a mysterious tweet: “This Sunday, thinking of giving up my social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube. Will keep you all posted.” The message caused a bit of a social media storm: After all, the prime minister has more than 53 million followers, making his the 18th-most-followed account in the world. (Former U.S. President Barack Obama ranks first with 113 million, while Trump ranks ninth with 73 million.)
But a day later, Modi clarified that he was only handing over control of his accounts to women for a single day, on Sunday—which happens to be International Women’s Day. It’s a worthy cause, but Modi could probably do much more: India ranks 112th out of 153 countries on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index.
And the Answer Is…
A) South Africa.
While Pretoria is the country’s administrative capital, the judiciary is headquartered in Bloemfontein, and South Africa’s Parliament meets in Cape Town.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--India’s Muslims Accuse Police of Targeted Killings

MEERUT , India—Every evening before dark , Mohammad Asif returned to his parents ’ house after a day ’ s work ferrying commuters on his electric rickshaw .
But on Dec. 20 , 2019 , night had fallen , Asif still wasn ’ t home , and his parents were very worried .
That day in Meerut , the city in northern India where they lived , hundreds of their fellow Muslims had been protesting against India ’ s new citizenship law—which curtails some Muslims ’ access to citizenship—and were clashing with police .
Around 10 p.m. that night , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ photo of their son that had been circulating on WhatsApp—dead , face upturned , and mouth still open , a gaping red hole in his chest .
He had been shot and died on the spot .
“ The man who brought him to the hospital said he saw a policeman shoot my son , ” Asif ’ s father told Foreign Policy .
Aleem Ansari was Asif ’ s neighbor .
When he wasn ’ t taking care of his elderly parents , Ansari worked in a restaurant baking chapatis in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ picking up that day , the restaurant ’ s owner shut down early and sent Ansari home .
On his way there , he was shot in the head .
“ The bullet pierced his skull and came out the other side , ” said his brother , Sallauddin .
In a video he showed Foreign Policy , a bystander in a black leather jacket holds up Ansari ’ s hand and says , “ The police killed this man , he has just died.
” In another clip seen by Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the pavement .
He was just 21 and had recently gotten married .
Asif and Ansari were among more than 20 Muslims whose families say were killed by mainly Hindu police officers that day in the state of Uttar Pradesh , where Meerut is located .
Thousands more were arrested .
Since then , protests against the new citizenship law have continued across India , many of them drawing not just Muslims but Indians of various backgrounds who oppose their country ’ s first-ever law imposing limits on civil rights based solely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the protests have turned into deadly sectarian clashes .
Last week in New Delhi , 34 people were killed as mainly Hindu mobs swept through the city .
If the accounts of witnesses and civil rights activists are true , then the police in Meerut and other cities of Uttar Pradesh played a crucial role in instigating and escalating the violence , drawing increasing numbers of Indians onto the streets , and setting Muslims and Hindus against each other .
Since then , civil rights activists say , police elsewhere have often stood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That the initial bout of police violence took place in Uttar Pradesh carries special significance for Indians .
As India ’ s most populous state , it is a bastion of political power whose affairs echo far beyond its borders .
It is also home to India ’ s largest Muslim population—about one-fifth of the state ’ s 200 million inhabitants—outside disputed Jammu and Kashmir .
In Meerut , almost 40 percent of the city ’ s 1.2 million inhabitants are Muslim , including many Dalit Muslims , whose ancestors converted from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so-called untouchables under the Hindu caste system .
As part of India ’ s complex fabric of religions and ethnicities , the communities have lived largely at peace since Partition in 1947 .
While that peace has sometimes been punctuated by flares of communal violence , the events in Meerut on Dec. 20 had a different quality , because they did not involve a clash with the Hindu majority .
If the allegations are true , Muslims were deliberately targeted by police .
The protests and clashes go back to early December , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationality law that many Muslims see as a threat to their status as equal citizens .
The law gives a special track to Indian citizenship to immigrants from surrounding countries—but only if the applicants are Hindu , Sikh , Buddhist , Parsi , Jain , or Christian .
Critics say that the law is a blatant attempt by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to implement his vision of a Hindu-dominated state , shore up support among the non-Muslim majority , and whip up sectarian tensions .
Critics also say that Modi is using the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from other issues , including a worsening economy that grew at the slowest pace in more than six years during the final quarter of 2019 .
Indian Muslims have always been terrified of Modi ’ s politics .
He was in power in the state of Gujarat in 2002 , when about 1,000 Muslims were killed in a pogrom .
He was accused of condoning the massacre and not doing enough to stop the killings .
In 2005 , the U.S. government denied him a diplomatic visa for his suspected role in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) have publicly approved of the deaths in Uttar Pradesh .
Dilip Ghosh , the leader of the BJP in the state of West Bengal , said the victims had been “ shot like dogs ” —and that “ given a chance , we will do the same here.
” A firebrand BJP politician in Delhi , Kapil Mishra , called on his supporters to “ shoot the traitors.
” Uttar Pradesh ’ s Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath , a saffron-robed Hindu nationalist monk , swore “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breaking the law , which most of his audience took to apply mainly to Muslims .
Critics blame BJP politicians for condoning and even encouraging police violence aimed at Muslims .
Their comments “ indicate an absolute carte blanche given to policemen to silence protests by gunning down people in the vicinity , ” said Sanjay Hegde , a prominent civil rights lawyer who has brought cases before India ’ s Supreme Court .
“ The messaging seems to be that policemen will not be called to account , ” he said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ All India Progressive Women ’ s Association and member of the politburo of the Communist Party of India , told Foreign Policy that most victims were shot above the chest , which to her suggests that the perpetrators ’ intention was not to contain the crowd , but to kill .
Muslims are aware that the road to justice will be tedious .
Sallauddin , the brother of one of the Meerut victims , said there were more than 10 witnesses of his brother ’ s death , but none is willing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He said the family has been looking for the eyewitness speaking in the video , but they have been told he ’ s left town .
Police have arrested hundreds of people for throwing stones and other forms of violence , and they continue to add names to the list of suspects .
Many young men have fled their homes in Muslim-dominated neighborhoods in Meerut and other cities in Uttar Pradesh—not because of any wrongdoing , but because they fear they may be the next to be arrested .
Uttar Pradesh authorities say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deaths on Dec. 20—two protesters in the town of Bijnor , allegedly shot in self-defense .
In Meerut , police said protesters accidentally shot each other or that the victims were killed somewhere else .
But videos of the clashes show police firing at the protesters in plain sight .
Ali Zaidi , a Delhi-based lawyer representing Ansari ’ s family , said police claims that Ansari died elsewhere before being anonymously dropped at the hospital are untrue .
In a video he shared with Foreign Policy , police officers can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a black car .
“ The police are trying to cover their tracks , ” Zaidi said .
Many Muslims in India suspect their government is working to deny them their place in Indian society—and that the new law is just the first step .
Civil rights activists accuse the Modi government of deliberately instilling fear among Muslims in order to pressure them to start leaving the country .
In Uttar Pradesh , Hindu police ransacking some Muslims ’ homes told them that “ their property and their homes would soon belong to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
That leaves the victims ’ families doubly devastated .
They say they have made peace with their status in a Hindu-majority country but can not understand why India should no longer be their home .
“ Why do they keep asking us to go to Pakistan , is Pakistan our uncle ?
” Ansari ’ s brother , Sallauddin , said .
“ We are Indians , we love India , our ancestors chose to stay in India .
It ’ s our homeland too .
”

MEERUT, India—Every evening before dark, Mohammad Asif returned to his parents’ house after a day’s work ferrying commuters on his electric rickshaw. But on Dec. 20, 2019, night had fallen, Asif still wasn’t home, and his parents were very worried. That day in Meerut, the city in northern India where they lived, hundreds of their fellow Muslims had been protesting against India’s new citizenship law—which curtails some Muslims’ access to citizenship—and were clashing with police. Around 10 p.m. that night, someone forwarded Asif’s parents a photo of their son that had been circulating on WhatsApp—dead, face upturned, and mouth still open, a gaping red hole in his chest. He had been shot and died on the spot. “The man who brought him to the hospital said he saw a policeman shoot my son,” Asif’s father told Foreign Policy.
MEERUT, India—Every evening before dark, Mohammad Asif returned to his parents’ house after a day’s work ferrying commuters on his electric rickshaw. But on Dec. 20, 2019, night had fallen, Asif still wasn’t home, and his parents were very worried. That day in Meerut, the city in northern India where they lived, hundreds of their fellow Muslims had been protesting against India’s new citizenship law—which curtails some Muslims’ access to citizenship—and were clashing with police. Around 10 p.m. that night, someone forwarded Asif’s parents a photo of their son that had been circulating on WhatsApp—dead, face upturned, and mouth still open, a gaping red hole in his chest. He had been shot and died on the spot. “The man who brought him to the hospital said he saw a policeman shoot my son,” Asif’s father told Foreign Policy.
Aleem Ansari was Asif’s neighbor. When he wasn’t taking care of his elderly parents, Ansari worked in a restaurant baking chapatis in a tandoori oven. As the protests were picking up that day, the restaurant’s owner shut down early and sent Ansari home. On his way there, he was shot in the head. “The bullet pierced his skull and came out the other side,” said his brother, Sallauddin. In a video he showed Foreign Policy, a bystander in a black leather jacket holds up Ansari’s hand and says, “The police killed this man, he has just died.” In another clip seen by Foreign Policy, Ansari’s brain is spilled on the pavement. He was just 21 and had recently gotten married.
Asif and Ansari were among more than 20 Muslims whose families say were killed by mainly Hindu police officers that day in the state of Uttar Pradesh, where Meerut is located. Thousands more were arrested. Since then, protests against the new citizenship law have continued across India, many of them drawing not just Muslims but Indians of various backgrounds who oppose their country’s first-ever law imposing limits on civil rights based solely on religion. Lately, however, the protests have turned into deadly sectarian clashes. Last week in New Delhi, 34 people were killed as mainly Hindu mobs swept through the city.
If the accounts of witnesses and civil rights activists are true, then the police in Meerut and other cities of Uttar Pradesh played a crucial role in instigating and escalating the violence, drawing increasing numbers of Indians onto the streets, and setting Muslims and Hindus against each other. Since then, civil rights activists say, police elsewhere have often stood by during violence—or actively sided with Hindus.
That the initial bout of police violence took place in Uttar Pradesh carries special significance for Indians. As India’s most populous state, it is a bastion of political power whose affairs echo far beyond its borders. It is also home to India’s largest Muslim population—about one-fifth of the state’s 200 million inhabitants—outside disputed Jammu and Kashmir. In Meerut, almost 40 percent of the city’s 1.2 million inhabitants are Muslim, including many Dalit Muslims, whose ancestors converted from Hinduism to Islam to escape oppression as so-called untouchables under the Hindu caste system. As part of India’s complex fabric of religions and ethnicities, the communities have lived largely at peace since Partition in 1947. While that peace has sometimes been punctuated by flares of communal violence, the events in Meerut on Dec. 20 had a different quality, because they did not involve a clash with the Hindu majority. If the allegations are true, Muslims were deliberately targeted by police.
The protests and clashes go back to early December, when the Indian parliament passed a new nationality law that many Muslims see as a threat to their status as equal citizens. The law gives a special track to Indian citizenship to immigrants from surrounding countries—but only if the applicants are Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Parsi, Jain, or Christian. Critics say that the law is a blatant attempt by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to implement his vision of a Hindu-dominated state, shore up support among the non-Muslim majority, and whip up sectarian tensions. Critics also say that Modi is using the law—and the conflict it has unleashed—to distract from other issues, including a worsening economy that grew at the slowest pace in more than six years during the final quarter of 2019.
Indian Muslims have always been terrified of Modi’s politics. He was in power in the state of Gujarat in 2002, when about 1,000 Muslims were killed in a pogrom. He was accused of condoning the massacre and not doing enough to stop the killings. In 2005, the U.S. government denied him a diplomatic visa for his suspected role in the riots.
Several politicians in Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have publicly approved of the deaths in Uttar Pradesh. Dilip Ghosh, the leader of the BJP in the state of West Bengal, said the victims had been “shot like dogs”—and that “given a chance, we will do the same here.” A firebrand BJP politician in Delhi, Kapil Mishra, called on his supporters to “shoot the traitors.” Uttar Pradesh’s Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, a saffron-robed Hindu nationalist monk, swore “revenge” if any protesters were caught breaking the law, which most of his audience took to apply mainly to Muslims.
Critics blame BJP politicians for condoning and even encouraging police violence aimed at Muslims. Their comments “indicate an absolute carte blanche given to policemen to silence protests by gunning down people in the vicinity,” said Sanjay Hegde, a prominent civil rights lawyer who has brought cases before India’s Supreme Court. “The messaging seems to be that policemen will not be called to account,” he said. Kavita Krishnan, the secretary of the All India Progressive Women’s Association and member of the politburo of the Communist Party of India, told Foreign Policy that most victims were shot above the chest, which to her suggests that the perpetrators’ intention was not to contain the crowd, but to kill.
Muslims are aware that the road to justice will be tedious. Sallauddin, the brother of one of the Meerut victims, said there were more than 10 witnesses of his brother’s death, but none is willing to come forward because they fear reprisal. He said the family has been looking for the eyewitness speaking in the video, but they have been told he’s left town. Police have arrested hundreds of people for throwing stones and other forms of violence, and they continue to add names to the list of suspects. Many young men have fled their homes in Muslim-dominated neighborhoods in Meerut and other cities in Uttar Pradesh—not because of any wrongdoing, but because they fear they may be the next to be arrested.
Uttar Pradesh authorities say police were only responsible for two of the deaths on Dec. 20—two protesters in the town of Bijnor, allegedly shot in self-defense. In Meerut, police said protesters accidentally shot each other or that the victims were killed somewhere else. But videos of the clashes show police firing at the protesters in plain sight. Ali Zaidi, a Delhi-based lawyer representing Ansari’s family, said police claims that Ansari died elsewhere before being anonymously dropped at the hospital are untrue. In a video he shared with Foreign Policy, police officers can be seen carrying Ansari’s body to a black car. “The police are trying to cover their tracks,” Zaidi said.
Many Muslims in India suspect their government is working to deny them their place in Indian society—and that the new law is just the first step. Civil rights activists accuse the Modi government of deliberately instilling fear among Muslims in order to pressure them to start leaving the country. In Uttar Pradesh, Hindu police ransacking some Muslims’ homes told them that “their property and their homes would soon belong to [the Hindus],” Krishnan said.
That leaves the victims’ families doubly devastated. They say they have made peace with their status in a Hindu-majority country but cannot understand why India should no longer be their home. “Why do they keep asking us to go to Pakistan, is Pakistan our uncle?” Ansari’s brother, Sallauddin, said. “We are Indians, we love India, our ancestors chose to stay in India. It’s our homeland too.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak

Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak

The novel coronavirus that started in Wuhan , China , is spreading with wildfire speed .
As cases—and fatalities—grow worldwide , keep track of the numbers—and of Foreign Policy ’ s in-depth coverage—here .
The virus may become universal .
The reaction to it won ’ t be .
From China ’ s lockdown to the hidden spread of the virus in Southeast Asia to the damage done by a gutted pandemic response team in the United States , Foreign Policy is covering the crisis from all angles .
[ The latest stories on the coronavirus from Foreign Policy ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affecting countries around the world : In Iran : Sanctions threaten to turn an outbreak into a catastrophe .
In China : Lockdown affects hundreds of millions of lives , from President Xi Jinping to neighborhood grandmothers .
In Indonesia : Anti-Chinese conspiracy theories are spreading faster than the virus .
In Lebanon : Grappling with economic and political turmoil , Lebanon ’ s government is underequipped for a public health emergency .
In Japan : The Japanese economy was already limping .
Now the coronavirus has left it prone .
In North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borders—but an outbreak would be a chance for the United States to do good .
In South Korea : Cults and conservatives have spread the virus just when it seemed under control .
In the Philippines : Filipinos are looking for someone to blame after the first death .
In Taiwan : The World Health Organization is playing political games instead of letting Taiwan help fight the coronavirus .
In Thailand : Billions of dollars are at stake as Bangkok walks the line between closing borders and angering Beijing .
Dan Haverty , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to this report .

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This article was last updated on May 19. For more recent updates, go to the Johns Hopkins University website for a coronavirus tracking map.
The novel coronavirus that started in Wuhan, China, is spreading with wildfire speed. As cases and fatalities grow worldwide, keep track of the numbers—and of Foreign Policy’s in-depth coverage—here.
[Read FP’s latest stories on the coronavirus.]
4,943,077 confirmed cases 321,998 deaths

The virus may become universal. The reaction to it won’t be. From China’s lockdown to the hidden spread of the virus in Southeast Asia to the damage done by a gutted pandemic response team in the United States, Foreign Policy is covering the crisis from all angles.
Learn more about how the virus is affecting countries around the world:
In Canada: Government preparation is containing the virus for now.
In the United States: The president’s refusal to self-isolate could be infecting everyone around him.
In Australia: Universities dependent on Chinese students are risking infection vectors.
In Italy: Leadership failures show how democracies can mismanage disasters too.
In Japan: The Japanese economy was already limping. Now the coronavirus has left it prone.
In North Korea: The country has sealed its borders—but an outbreak would be a chance for the United States to do good.
In South Korea: Cults and conservatives have spread the virus just when it seemed under control.
In the Philippines: Filipinos are looking for someone to blame after the first death.
In Taiwan: The World Health Organization is playing political games instead of letting Taiwan help fight the coronavirus.
In Thailand: Billions of dollars are at stake as Bangkok walks the line between closing borders and angering Beijing.
Dan Haverty, James Palmer, and Lori Kelley contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--The Whole World Got Hosni Mubarak Wrong

The Whole World Got Hosni Mubarak Wrong

The Whole World Got Hosni Mubarak Wrong Hosni Mubarak , the former Egyptian president who died last week at age 91 , came of age as a young Air Force officer in Gamal Abdel Nasser ’ s Egypt .
He was a witness to Egypt ’ s tilt toward the Soviet Union , the Czech arms deal , the intervention in Yemen , the June 1967 defeat , and the war of attrition .
Well-liked by both superiors and subordinates for his competence and hard work , Mubarak rose through the ranks and at the age of 43 , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The fighters and bombers under his command carried out the opening salvos of the October 1973 war that helped make the famous crossing of the Suez Canal—Egypt ’ s greatest modern military triumph—possible .
When President Anwar Sadat sought to promote an officer from those who fought in 1973 to be his vice president , he chose Mubarak .
The Sadat era was tumultuous as well .
There was the May 1971 Corrective Revolution , the opening to the Muslim Brotherhood , the bread riots of 1977 , and , in quick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jerusalem , Camp David , and the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel .
Then came the summer and autumn of fury , during which Sadat ordered the arrests of his political opponents .
A few months later , Sadat was assassinated .
Sitting next to him as the attack unfolded was Vice President Mubarak , who escaped with only a minor injury to his hand .
This was the history that shaped Mubarak ’ s worldview and laid the groundwork for what became a coda of his three decades in power : stability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had seen up close how the political turbulence , change , and rapid reversals of the previous eras could render Egypt vulnerable , mostly to itself , and was thus determined to steer a middle ground between the excitement and tumult that characterized the Nasser and Sadat years in order to achieve his cherished goals .
Looking back , it is hard to deny how successful he was at both .
By the time the military pushed Mubarak from office in February 2011 , Egyptian life expectancy had reached developed-world levels .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates had dropped significantly , while childhood immunization rates for tuberculosis ; diphtheria , pertussis , and tetanus ; hepatitis B ; measles ; and polio were in the 96 to 98 percent range .
When Mubarak took the oath of office in October 1981 , they had been roughly half that .
Between 1981 and 2011 , Egypt ’ s age dependency ratio—a rough measure of the population financially dependent on others—fell by a third .
Literacy had improved markedly , but not enough , and the percentage of the population working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 30 percent .
Although the level of industrial employment remained steady , the number of workers in the services sector increased significantly .
Of course , these socioeconomic indicators are illustrative , but they and others belie the conventional view that the Mubarak era was one of stagnation and decay .
That is a popular—even understandable—narrative about Egypt , especially in the years before the January 2011 uprising , but it is greatly skewed .
By a variety of measures , Egyptians were collectively better off for the three decades of Mubarak ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have happened under another Egyptian president , but there was no other , and thus there is no denying that these developments are part of Mubarak ’ s legacy .
During his long tenure , Mubarak is reported to have often told interlocutors that he knew Egypt better than anyone else .
His unwillingness to heed suggestions that he move faster on economic reforms , lift the emergency laws , and allow more political freedoms seemed firmly rooted in Egypt ’ s experiences of the past : the Muslim Brotherhood challenge of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decade later , the regime-shaking protests of 1977 , and the insurgency of the 1990s .
In his view , to give in to the demands of domestic activists and well-meaning Americans would risk his related goals of stability and development .
The problem was that a policy of stability for the sake of development was not enough for millions of Egyptians .
It captured no one ’ s imagination ; perhaps that was the point after the ferment of the Nasser and Sadat years .
Not everyone shared in development—Egypt ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many felt they were being left behind .
After all , the development that Mubarak enabled , especially during his final years , was uneven or perceived to be uneven .
It is not hard to understand why , given the proliferation of gated communities , the ubiquity of high-end cars , and all other types of conspicuous consumption among Egypt ’ s elite against the backdrop of a huge population that felt pauperized , forgotten , and disdained .
When workers , journalists , intellectuals , students , and activists of all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abused .
Egyptians never lived under the same level of repression that Iraqis or Syrians experienced during the 1980s , the 1990s , and the 2000s , but stability at all costs became an excuse for state-sponsored brutality .
As the Mubarak period proceeded , there was also a deepening arrogance of power—after all , he believed he knew best—crony capitalism , corruption , and nepotism , all symbolized in Egypt ’ s princeling , the president ’ s son Gamal Mubarak , who was grooming himself for big things .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ existed before , but in those fateful years before the uprising , beginning with the so-called Dream Team government charged with forging ahead with neoliberal economic reforms , these problems seemed more pronounced than ever before .
Then all of the contradictions and dilemmas plaguing Egypt over many years came together in early 2011 and , like lightning in a bottle , brought hundreds of thousands , perhaps millions , of Egyptians into the streets to demand an end to Mubarak ’ s rule .
It was a stunning turn of events during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders were not supposed to fall or outlive their rule—King Farouk and Gen. Mohammed Naguib being notable exceptions .
So how does one fairly evaluate Mubarak , who , whether fashionable or not to acknowledge it , was as consequential in his own ways as Nasser and Sadat before him .
Like them , his legacy is decidedly mixed .
Mubarak ’ s achievements are real and should stand for themselves , but they are nevertheless overshadowed .
Ironically , his almost pathological focus on stability produced the Egypt of today—a country that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis over the last decade .
Analysts and journalists have often made that case that “ Mubarakism ” outlasted Mubarak ’ s three-decade-long tenure .
It ’ s pithy , but it ’ s not true .
It is dead and buried like the man ; in its place is something much worse .

Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president who died last week at age 91, came of age as a young Air Force officer in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. He was a witness to Egypt’s tilt toward the Soviet Union, the Czech arms deal, the intervention in Yemen, the June 1967 defeat, and the war of attrition. Well-liked by both superiors and subordinates for his competence and hard work, Mubarak rose through the ranks and at the age of 43, he was named commander of the Air Force. The fighters and bombers under his command carried out the opening salvos of the October 1973 war that helped make the famous crossing of the Suez Canal—Egypt’s greatest modern military triumph—possible. When President Anwar Sadat sought to promote an officer from those who fought in 1973 to be his vice president, he chose Mubarak.
Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president who died last week at age 91, came of age as a young Air Force officer in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. He was a witness to Egypt’s tilt toward the Soviet Union, the Czech arms deal, the intervention in Yemen, the June 1967 defeat, and the war of attrition. Well-liked by both superiors and subordinates for his competence and hard work, Mubarak rose through the ranks and at the age of 43, he was named commander of the Air Force. The fighters and bombers under his command carried out the opening salvos of the October 1973 war that helped make the famous crossing of the Suez Canal—Egypt’s greatest modern military triumph—possible. When President Anwar Sadat sought to promote an officer from those who fought in 1973 to be his vice president, he chose Mubarak.
The Sadat era was tumultuous as well. There was the May 1971 Corrective Revolution, the opening to the Muslim Brotherhood, the bread riots of 1977, and, in quick succession, Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, Camp David, and the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel. Then came the summer and autumn of fury, during which Sadat ordered the arrests of his political opponents. A few months later, Sadat was assassinated. Sitting next to him as the attack unfolded was Vice President Mubarak, who escaped with only a minor injury to his hand.
This was the history that shaped Mubarak’s worldview and laid the groundwork for what became a coda of his three decades in power: stability for the sake of development. He had seen up close how the political turbulence, change, and rapid reversals of the previous eras could render Egypt vulnerable, mostly to itself, and was thus determined to steer a middle ground between the excitement and tumult that characterized the Nasser and Sadat years in order to achieve his cherished goals.
Looking back, it is hard to deny how successful he was at both. By the time the military pushed Mubarak from office in February 2011, Egyptian life expectancy had reached developed-world levels. During his presidency, birth and infant mortality rates had dropped significantly, while childhood immunization rates for tuberculosis; diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus; hepatitis B; measles; and polio were in the 96 to 98 percent range. When Mubarak took the oath of office in October 1981, they had been roughly half that. Between 1981 and 2011, Egypt’s age dependency ratio—a rough measure of the population financially dependent on others—fell by a third.
Literacy had improved markedly, but not enough, and the percentage of the population working in agriculture fell from approximately 40 to 30 percent. Although the level of industrial employment remained steady, the number of workers in the services sector increased significantly. Of course, these socioeconomic indicators are illustrative, but they and others belie the conventional view that the Mubarak era was one of stagnation and decay. That is a popular—even understandable—narrative about Egypt, especially in the years before the January 2011 uprising, but it is greatly skewed. By a variety of measures, Egyptians were collectively better off for the three decades of Mubarak’s rule. Perhaps the same progress would have happened under another Egyptian president, but there was no other, and thus there is no denying that these developments are part of Mubarak’s legacy.
During his long tenure, Mubarak is reported to have often told interlocutors that he knew Egypt better than anyone else. His unwillingness to heed suggestions that he move faster on economic reforms, lift the emergency laws, and allow more political freedoms seemed firmly rooted in Egypt’s experiences of the past: the Muslim Brotherhood challenge of the 1950s, the student movement a decade later, the regime-shaking protests of 1977, and the insurgency of the 1990s. In his view, to give in to the demands of domestic activists and well-meaning Americans would risk his related goals of stability and development.
The problem was that a policy of stability for the sake of development was not enough for millions of Egyptians. It captured no one’s imagination; perhaps that was the point after the ferment of the Nasser and Sadat years. Not everyone shared in development—Egypt’s overall socioeconomic improvements notwithstanding—and, importantly, many felt they were being left behind. After all, the development that Mubarak enabled, especially during his final years, was uneven or perceived to be uneven. It is not hard to understand why, given the proliferation of gated communities, the ubiquity of high-end cars, and all other types of conspicuous consumption among Egypt’s elite against the backdrop of a huge population that felt pauperized, forgotten, and disdained. When workers, journalists, intellectuals, students, and activists of all stripes and varieties objected, they were abused. Egyptians never lived under the same level of repression that Iraqis or Syrians experienced during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s, but stability at all costs became an excuse for state-sponsored brutality.
As the Mubarak period proceeded, there was also a deepening arrogance of power—after all, he believed he knew best—crony capitalism, corruption, and nepotism, all symbolized in Egypt’s princeling, the president’s son Gamal Mubarak, who was grooming himself for big things. It’s not that these pathologies had not existed before, but in those fateful years before the uprising, beginning with the so-called Dream Team government charged with forging ahead with neoliberal economic reforms, these problems seemed more pronounced than ever before. Then all of the contradictions and dilemmas plaguing Egypt over many years came together in early 2011 and, like lightning in a bottle, brought hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Egyptians into the streets to demand an end to Mubarak’s rule.
It was a stunning turn of events during that surprising season of protest. Egyptian leaders were not supposed to fall or outlive their rule—King Farouk and Gen. Mohammed Naguib being notable exceptions.
So how does one fairly evaluate Mubarak, who, whether fashionable or not to acknowledge it, was as consequential in his own ways as Nasser and Sadat before him. Like them, his legacy is decidedly mixed. Mubarak’s achievements are real and should stand for themselves, but they are nevertheless overshadowed. Ironically, his almost pathological focus on stability produced the Egypt of today—a country that has lurched from political crisis to political crisis over the last decade. Analysts and journalists have often made that case that “Mubarakism” outlasted Mubarak’s three-decade-long tenure. It’s pithy, but it’s not true. It is dead and buried like the man; in its place is something much worse.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--As Coronavirus Spreads, Iranian Doctors Fear the Worst

Iran is often described as an isolated country , but the spread of the coronavirus has made clear that the Islamic Republic is less isolated than often assumed .
Iran ’ s significant trade links with China , where COVID-19 originated , left the country vulnerable to the spread of the virus .
The outbreak in Iran is one of the world ’ s largest , with more than 2,300 confirmed cases and 77 declared deaths .
Many of the first cases registered in other places—including Iraq , Lebanon , Georgia , Qatar , New Zealand , and even New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Iran .
Clearly , notwithstanding the attempts of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration to isolate Iran politically and economically , Iran remains connected to the world .
It follows that Iran ’ s success or failure to manage its coronavirus outbreak will directly impact the threat of a pandemic .
The combination of Iran ’ s physical interconnectivity and its relative political and economic isolation pose unprecedented challenges for international public health .
The first two weeks of Iran ’ s coronavirus outbreak have been similar to those in other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ measures such as closing of schools and universities and canceling of public gatherings , including briefings and government meetings that contributed to the infection of numerous officials .
As the severity of the crisis became clearer , members of the public became anxious , adding to the strain on Iran ’ s health care system .
People rushed to pharmacies and stores to purchase supplies .
They rushed to hospital emergency rooms worried that a persistent cough could be COVID-19 .
These are understandable reactions and are always preferable to indifference—any successful public-health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take responsibility and proactive action .
But as the number of confirmed cases mounted , so too did demand for respiratory masks and contamination suits , symptom relief medication , and immunity-boosting vitamins , as well as disinfectants , detergents , and related hygiene equipment .
Given its sophisticated manufacturing base , Iran produces many of these products domestically , limiting the initial impact of sanctions on the availability of medicine and equipment .
However , inventories in pharmacies and shops are running low .
Importers are struggling to get their hands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ramp up local production to keep up with the rising demand .
U.S. sanctions are largely to blame for these disruptions .
The Iranian companies producing medicine , disinfectants , and protective clothing also have a supply-chain problem ; they are dependent on imported ingredients and materials .
For example , even though antiviral drugs are manufactured in Iran , the raw materials are almost entirely supplied from China and India .
Should Iranian manufacturers run out of these raw materials , it will be very difficult , if not impossible , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
U.S. sanctions are constraining the supply of raw materials and imported goods in two ways .
First , there is the issue of transport links .
Even before the outbreak of the virus , the Trump administration ’ s reimposition of secondary sanctions on Iran in November 2018 saw many airlines and international shipping companies end their presence in the Iranian market .
As a result , for a country of its size , Iran is unusually reliant on regional hubs for both air travel and freight forwarding .
As neighbors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficulties in sustaining imports , particularly for time-sensitive deliveries by air .
The World Health Organization recently faced delays in supplying Iran with coronavirus testing kits “ due to flight restrictions ” that prevented their dispatch from the United Arab Emirates .
The kits were eventually delivered via a commercial flight from Baghdad , but that route may also be closed as Iraq as now announced its first confirmed cases of the virus .
A subsequent delivery of equipment did arrive in Tehran from Dubai—but only after the Emirati government arranged a military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Health Organization .
Second , even if a viable means of delivery can be found , it has been well documented how U.S. secondary sanctions have restricted humanitarian trade with Iran by scaring off most banks from facilitating the necessary payments .
The imports that do take place—from major suppliers such as Germany , Switzerland , and China—reflect long-standing business relationships in which the foreign exporter and Iranian importer have put the facilitating bank ( usually a small merchant bank ) at ease by preparing extensive compliance documentation .
The fact that humanitarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slow , inflexible process—makes it inherently difficult for Iranian entities , particularly governmental entities such as the Ministry of Health and Medical Education , to quickly identify new suppliers and purchase the required goods during a public health crisis .
Moreover , sanctions have both weakened Iran ’ s currency and made it difficult for Iran to access its foreign exchange reserves , further adding to the time and cost of any emergency purchases .
Medical professionals in Iran are seeing the early signs of shortages .
They are calling the Iranian vendors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ventilators only to hear that the goods are out of stock .
They are struggling to get antiviral medication even to those patients exhibiting the most acute symptoms .
While much of the global attention towards Iran ’ s response to coronavirus has focused on the question of whether or not the Iranian government has adequately managed the outbreak , there is a far more urgent concern among Iran ’ s doctors .
If Iranian pharmaceutical companies and medical equipment manufacturers are unable to establish speedy and reliable means to import raw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a humanitarian catastrophe .
The Trump administration has made an offer of humanitarian assistance to Iran—but has provided no detail .
To address the impact of sanctions on Iran ’ s ability to import and manufacture key items , it would be straightforward for the administration to provide greater legal clarity to exporters and the banks on which they rely—for example by expanding the definition of “ humanitarian ” goods so as to include items needed to fight COVID-19 , such as respiratory masks and disinfection equipment , as well as raw materials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ licenses .
Given that it is unlikely that the United States will take any such steps , it is commendable that the governments of France , Germany , and the United Kingdom have dispatched “ equipment for laboratory tests as well as… protective body suits and gloves ” to Iran .
They will also be providing “ urgent additional financial support close to €5 million to fight the COVID-19 epidemic affecting Iran , through the WHO or other UN agencies.
” But these are stopgap measures .
To address the vulnerabilities of Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manufacturers , European governments could utilize the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges ( Instex ) trade mechanism , which was established to ease humanitarian trade between Europe and Iran by creating a standard compliance protocol and by eliminating the need for European banks to receive payments directly from Iranian banks .
The company , which boasts nine European states among its shareholders , has yet to make its first transaction .
Nonetheless , policymakers are adamant that the company is nearly operational .
Aiding Iran in its fight against coronavirus could provide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Of course , Western governments are increasingly preoccupied with their own coronavirus outbreaks , and further assistance may be difficult to coordinate .
The Iranian health care system and the companies that supply the nation ’ s hospitals will continue to fight coronavirus without all the resources they need—a situation that has drawn parallels to the country ’ s experience during the Iran-Iraq War .
Nevertheless , Iran ’ s experience with COVID-19 offers a cautionary tale about the intersection of sanctions policy and international public health .
The economic vulnerabilities that sanctioning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never exist in true isolation .
Just as a virus will attack the most vulnerable members of any given population , the coronavirus is now attacking the global health system at its most vulnerable points—before spreading everywhere else .

Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and  Abbas Kebriaeezadeh

Iran is often described as an isolated country, but the spread of the coronavirus has made clear that the Islamic Republic is less isolated than often assumed. Iran’s significant trade links with China, where COVID-19 originated, left the country vulnerable to the spread of the virus.
Iran is often described as an isolated country, but the spread of the coronavirus has made clear that the Islamic Republic is less isolated than often assumed. Iran’s significant trade links with China, where COVID-19 originated, left the country vulnerable to the spread of the virus.
The outbreak in Iran is one of the world’s largest, with more than 2,300 confirmed cases and 77 declared deaths. Many of the first cases registered in other places—including Iraq, Lebanon, Georgia, Qatar, New Zealand, and even New York—are attributable to individuals who had traveled from Iran. Clearly, notwithstanding the attempts of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to isolate Iran politically and economically, Iran remains connected to the world. It follows that Iran’s success or failure to manage its coronavirus outbreak will directly impact the threat of a pandemic.
The combination of Iran’s physical interconnectivity and its relative political and economic isolation pose unprecedented challenges for international public health. The first two weeks of Iran’s coronavirus outbreak have been similar to those in other countries. Authorities were slow to take measures such as closing of schools and universities and canceling of public gatherings, including briefings and government meetings that contributed to the infection of numerous officials.
As the severity of the crisis became clearer, members of the public became anxious, adding to the strain on Iran’s health care system. People rushed to pharmacies and stores to purchase supplies. They rushed to hospital emergency rooms worried that a persistent cough could be COVID-19.
The combination of Iran’s physical interconnectivity and its relative political and economic isolation pose unprecedented challenges for international public health.
These are understandable reactions and are always preferable to indifference—any successful public-health campaign requires individual members of the public to take responsibility and proactive action. But as the number of confirmed cases mounted, so too did demand for respiratory masks and contamination suits, symptom relief medication, and immunity-boosting vitamins, as well as disinfectants, detergents, and related hygiene equipment.
Given its sophisticated manufacturing base, Iran produces many of these products domestically, limiting the initial impact of sanctions on the availability of medicine and equipment. However, inventories in pharmacies and shops are running low. Importers are struggling to get their hands on new inventory and factories are struggling to ramp up local production to keep up with the rising demand. U.S. sanctions are largely to blame for these disruptions.
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The Iranian companies producing medicine, disinfectants, and protective clothing also have a supply-chain problem; they are dependent on imported ingredients and materials. For example, even though antiviral drugs are manufactured in Iran, the raw materials are almost entirely supplied from China and India. Should Iranian manufacturers run out of these raw materials, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to effectively contain and treat COVID-19 in Iran. U.S. sanctions are constraining the supply of raw materials and imported goods in two ways.
First, there is the issue of transport links. Even before the outbreak of the virus, the Trump administration’s reimposition of secondary sanctions on Iran in November 2018 saw many airlines and international shipping companies end their presence in the Iranian market. As a result, for a country of its size, Iran is unusually reliant on regional hubs for both air travel and freight forwarding.
As neighbors impose travel restrictions, Iran is facing difficulties in sustaining imports, particularly for time-sensitive deliveries by air. The World Health Organization recently faced delays in supplying Iran with coronavirus testing kits “due to flight restrictions” that prevented their dispatch from the United Arab Emirates.
The kits were eventually delivered via a commercial flight from Baghdad, but that route may also be closed as Iraq as now announced its first confirmed cases of the virus. A subsequent delivery of equipment did arrive in Tehran from Dubai—but only after the Emirati government arranged a military transport at the request of the World Health Organization.
Second, even if a viable means of delivery can be found, it has been well documented how U.S. secondary sanctions have restricted humanitarian trade with Iran by scaring off most banks from facilitating the necessary payments. The imports that do take place—from major suppliers such as Germany, Switzerland, and China—reflect long-standing business relationships in which the foreign exporter and Iranian importer have put the facilitating bank (usually a small merchant bank) at ease by preparing extensive compliance documentation.
The fact that humanitarian trade is currently conducted in this manner—a slow, inflexible process—makes it inherently difficult for Iranian entities, particularly governmental entities such as the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, to quickly identify new suppliers and purchase the required goods during a public health crisis. Moreover, sanctions have both weakened Iran’s currency and made it difficult for Iran to access its foreign exchange reserves, further adding to the time and cost of any emergency purchases.
Medical professionals in Iran are seeing the early signs of shortages. They are calling the Iranian vendors of respiratory masks, surgical gowns, and ventilators only to hear that the goods are out of stock. They are struggling to get antiviral medication even to those patients exhibiting the most acute symptoms.
While much of the global attention towards Iran’s response to coronavirus has focused on the question of whether or not the Iranian government has adequately managed the outbreak, there is a far more urgent concern among Iran’s doctors. If Iranian pharmaceutical companies and medical equipment manufacturers are unable to establish speedy and reliable means to import raw materials, the country could soon face a humanitarian catastrophe.
The Trump administration has made an offer of humanitarian assistance to Iran—but has provided no detail. To address the impact of sanctions on Iran’s ability to import and manufacture key items, it would be straightforward for the administration to provide greater legal clarity to exporters and the banks on which they rely—for example by expanding the definition of “humanitarian” goods so as to include items needed to fight COVID-19, such as respiratory masks and disinfection equipment, as well as raw materials, within the scope of existing general licenses.
Given that it is unlikely that the United States will take any such steps, it is commendable that the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have dispatched “equipment for laboratory tests as well as… protective body suits and gloves” to Iran. They will also be providing “urgent additional financial support close to €5 million to fight the COVID-19 epidemic affecting Iran, through the WHO or other UN agencies.” But these are stopgap measures.
To address the vulnerabilities of Iran’s domestic medical and medical equipment manufacturers, European governments could utilize the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (Instex) trade mechanism, which was established to ease humanitarian trade between Europe and Iran by creating a standard compliance protocol and by eliminating the need for European banks to receive payments directly from Iranian banks.
The company, which boasts nine European states among its shareholders, has yet to make its first transaction. Nonetheless, policymakers are adamant that the company is nearly operational. Aiding Iran in its fight against coronavirus could provide Instex a renewed sense of purpose.
Of course, Western governments are increasingly preoccupied with their own coronavirus outbreaks, and further assistance may be difficult to coordinate. The Iranian health care system and the companies that supply the nation’s hospitals will continue to fight coronavirus without all the resources they need—a situation that has drawn parallels to the country’s experience during the Iran-Iraq War.
Nevertheless, Iran’s experience with COVID-19 offers a cautionary tale about the intersection of sanctions policy and international public health. The economic vulnerabilities that sanctioning countries seek to create in target countries never exist in true isolation. Just as a virus will attack the most vulnerable members of any given population, the coronavirus is now attacking the global health system at its most vulnerable points—before spreading everywhere else.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-03--Don’t Count on Disaster Diplomacy as a Path to Peace

Don ’ t Count on Disaster Diplomacy as a Path to Peace As COVID-19 sweeps the world , the coronavirus disease has substantially impacted two U.S.-sanctioned countries .
Iran is trying to curtail its outbreak , with dozens of deaths at minimum and the infected including the vice president and the deputy health minister , who leads the country ’ s taskforce against the coronavirus .
Meanwhile , North Korea has sealed its borders , including with China , effectively isolating the country completely from the movement of people and goods .
This prompts the question of whether there might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epidemic .
Could the worldwide concern and attention lead to political progress with Iran and North Korea ?
Does this so-called disaster diplomacy open up channels for aid and communication , precipitating further rapprochement ?
Numerous previous examples tell us the answer is no .
Indeed , different forms of disaster diplomacy and health diplomacy have not been shown to create new , lasting peace initiatives .
Over the decades , countries from Afghanistan to Liberia to El Salvador have witnessed immunization days and cease-fires for vaccination campaigns .
Neither the efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the actual vaccination programs themselves reduced the violence in the long term .
Instead , the health work has been beneficial to eradicating diseases such as polio and Guinea worm disease , but protracted conflicts continued after the health-related cease-fires in countries from Somalia to the Philippines—and as conflicts resume , diseases often return .
Different forms of disaster diplomacy and health diplomacy have not led to new , lasting peace initiatives .
After Hurricane Katrina ripped through the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005 , many U.S. adversaries offered aid .
Cuba said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tons of medical supplies .
China proffered medical experts , while Russia said that drinking water and health-related items could be sent .
The U.S. government declined almost all the offers , although Mexican Army vehicles crossed the border to deliver medical supplies .
Relations between the U.S. government and those countries showed no change .
Public health diplomacy is not new .
Edward Jenner , the 18th-century English doctor who helped develop the smallpox vaccine , became so respected for his medical work that he mediated exchanges of prisoners between France and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a peaceful foreign policy and developing community cooperation via health-related initiatives similarly have had many benefits .
But from the World Health Organization ’ s Health as a Bridge for Peace program to its work with local religious leaders in Pakistan for polio vaccination , none has been shown to lead to wider peace , even when the health goals are achieved .
Such initiatives will not necessarily lead to a diplomatic thaw with countries such as Iran and North Korea that are now dealing with COVID-19 .
North Korea has frequently accepted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exchange for political concessions that were then withdrawn or deviated from , including in 1995 , 2000 , 2001 , and 2012 .
The same was true after a train explosion in 2004 that some sources estimate killed or injured as many as 3,000 people .
In 2009 , South Korea delivered medicine for North Korea ’ s swine flu outbreak .
For almost the past decade , North Korean , American , and British scientists have been working together to better understand the volcano Mount Paektu—also known as Changbai—on the North Korea-China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long-term diplomatic influences have been absent .
For Iran , major earthquakes in 1990 , 2002 , and 2003 brought U.S. aid , but that assistance had little lasting impact on U.S.-Iranian relations .
Another earthquake in Iran in February 2005 led to the country declining U.S. aid ( and the U.S. government declined aid from Iran after Hurricane Katrina later that year ) .
Deals with Iran on nuclear weapons have waxed and waned according to the politicians in charge rather than the disasters .
Despite ample opportunity , U.S. disaster diplomacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If saving as many lives as possible as quickly as possible is the priority , then perhaps governments must forget about other distractions such as enemy states and multilateral diplomacy .
After all , separating disease management from wider political issues has led to some successes , including the eradication of smallpox and rinderpest .
Similarly , the power of the legally binding International Health Regulations arguably comes from focusing on health outcomes without linking them to wider diplomacy , despite the intense political maneuvering required to promulgate and implement them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t mean there is no prospect for a breakthrough .
Some argue that countries should actively pursue coronavirus diplomacy , using the contagion ’ s spread as an opportunity to force or cajole open doors into North Korea—and so perhaps into Iran and elsewhere .
There is no inevitable link between humanitarian aid during a virus emergency and short-term friendship or long-term diplomacy .
In fact , as with SARS in 2002 and 2003 , China ’ s initial information control and lack of transparency regarding COVID-19 was a factor in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such politics helped to create the epidemic , perhaps actively pursuing peaceful diplomatic outcomes with Iran and North Korea based on COVID-19 has the best chance of success for the short term of stopping the virus and for the long term of ending conflicts with both countries .
But explicitly aiming for disease diplomacy presupposes that peace and reconciliation is the political goal , which has not always been the case for the United States , Iran , and North Korea .
The desire for conflict can boost leaders domestically and might be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will destabilize an unwanted regime—which is what some Cuban Americans and U.S. presidents wanted for Cuba under Fidel Castro .
For these reasons , there is no inevitable link between humanitarian aid during a virus emergency and short-term friendship or long-term diplomacy .
Diplomacy depends on leaders .
If parties seek peace , then they will find a way that could involve the excuse of COVID-19 .
If they do not want peace , then dealing with an emergency can be used to drive the two sides further apart—or the emergency can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Any peace between the United States and North Korea or Iran will require much more than a show of goodwill during the coronavirus outbreak .

As COVID-19 sweeps the world, the coronavirus disease has substantially impacted two U.S.-sanctioned countries. Iran is trying to curtail its outbreak, with dozens of deaths at minimum and the infected including the vice president and the deputy health minister, who leads the country’s taskforce against the coronavirus. Meanwhile, North Korea has sealed its borders, including with China, effectively isolating the country completely from the movement of people and goods.
As COVID-19 sweeps the world, the coronavirus disease has substantially impacted two U.S.-sanctioned countries. Iran is trying to curtail its outbreak, with dozens of deaths at minimum and the infected including the vice president and the deputy health minister, who leads the country’s taskforce against the coronavirus. Meanwhile, North Korea has sealed its borders, including with China, effectively isolating the country completely from the movement of people and goods.
This prompts the question of whether there might be a diplomatic opportunity in this catastrophic epidemic. Could the worldwide concern and attention lead to political progress with Iran and North Korea? Does this so-called disaster diplomacy open up channels for aid and communication, precipitating further rapprochement? Numerous previous examples tell us the answer is no. Indeed, different forms of disaster diplomacy and health diplomacy have not been shown to create new, lasting peace initiatives.
Over the decades, countries from Afghanistan to Liberia to El Salvador have witnessed immunization days and cease-fires for vaccination campaigns. Neither the efforts to achieve a lull in the fighting nor the actual vaccination programs themselves reduced the violence in the long term. Instead, the health work has been beneficial to eradicating diseases such as polio and Guinea worm disease, but protracted conflicts continued after the health-related cease-fires in countries from Somalia to the Philippines—and as conflicts resume, diseases often return.
Different forms of disaster diplomacy and health diplomacy have not led to new, lasting peace initiatives.
After Hurricane Katrina ripped through the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, many U.S. adversaries offered aid. Cuba said it could provide hundreds of doctors alongside tons of medical supplies. China proffered medical experts, while Russia said that drinking water and health-related items could be sent. The U.S. government declined almost all the offers, although Mexican Army vehicles crossed the border to deliver medical supplies. Relations between the U.S. government and those countries showed no change.
Public health diplomacy is not new. Edward Jenner, the 18th-century English doctor who helped develop the smallpox vaccine, became so respected for his medical work that he mediated exchanges of prisoners between France and Britain. Using health interventions to promote a peaceful foreign policy and developing community cooperation via health-related initiatives similarly have had many benefits. But from the World Health Organization’s Health as a Bridge for Peace program to its work with local religious leaders in Pakistan for polio vaccination, none has been shown to lead to wider peace, even when the health goals are achieved.
Such initiatives will not necessarily lead to a diplomatic thaw with countries such as Iran and North Korea that are now dealing with COVID-19. North Korea has frequently accepted disaster-related aid for floods and famines in exchange for political concessions that were then withdrawn or deviated from, including in 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2012.
The same was true after a train explosion in 2004 that some sources estimate killed or injured as many as 3,000 people. In 2009, South Korea delivered medicine for North Korea’s swine flu outbreak. For almost the past decade, North Korean, American, and British scientists have been working together to better understand the volcano Mount Paektu—also known as Changbai—on the North Korea-China border. In all these cases, long-term diplomatic influences have been absent.
For Iran, major earthquakes in 1990, 2002, and 2003 brought U.S. aid, but that assistance had little lasting impact on U.S.-Iranian relations. Another earthquake in Iran in February 2005 led to the country declining U.S. aid (and the U.S. government declined aid from Iran after Hurricane Katrina later that year). Deals with Iran on nuclear weapons have waxed and waned according to the politicians in charge rather than the disasters. Despite ample opportunity, U.S. disaster diplomacy with Iran has not yielded discernible outcomes.
If saving as many lives as possible as quickly as possible is the priority, then perhaps governments must forget about other distractions such as enemy states and multilateral diplomacy. After all, separating disease management from wider political issues has led to some successes, including the eradication of smallpox and rinderpest. Similarly, the power of the legally binding International Health Regulations arguably comes from focusing on health outcomes without linking them to wider diplomacy, despite the intense political maneuvering required to promulgate and implement them.
Yet the lack of past success doesn’t mean there is no prospect for a breakthrough. Some argue that countries should actively pursue coronavirus diplomacy, using the contagion’s spread as an opportunity to force or cajole open doors into North Korea—and so perhaps into Iran and elsewhere.
There is no inevitable link between humanitarian aid during a virus emergency and short-term friendship or long-term diplomacy.
In fact, as with SARS in 2002 and 2003, China’s initial information control and lack of transparency regarding COVID-19 was a factor in the spread of the virus. Given how such politics helped to create the epidemic, perhaps actively pursuing peaceful diplomatic outcomes with Iran and North Korea based on COVID-19 has the best chance of success for the short term of stopping the virus and for the long term of ending conflicts with both countries.
But explicitly aiming for disease diplomacy presupposes that peace and reconciliation is the political goal, which has not always been the case for the United States, Iran, and North Korea. The desire for conflict can boost leaders domestically and might be kindling hopes in Washington that a disaster will destabilize an unwanted regime—which is what some Cuban Americans and U.S. presidents wanted for Cuba under Fidel Castro. For these reasons, there is no inevitable link between humanitarian aid during a virus emergency and short-term friendship or long-term diplomacy.
Diplomacy depends on leaders. If parties seek peace, then they will find a way that could involve the excuse of COVID-19. If they do not want peace, then dealing with an emergency can be used to drive the two sides further apart—or the emergency can be addressed separately without considering long-term reconciliation.
Any peace between the United States and North Korea or Iran will require much more than a show of goodwill during the coronavirus outbreak.