foreignpolicy--2020-11-13--America Is Drifting Toward an Iraqi Future

America Is Drifting Toward an Iraqi Future During a trip to Iraq a few years ago , I spent some time in Sulaymaniyah , where , among a variety of interesting people , I met with a group of Kurdish university students .
At one point in our conversation , I asked the students , “ What set of ideas , principles , history , and national narrative do you share with university students in Baghdad or Basra ?
” Their collective answer was , “ Nothing.
” It struck me that this was the heart of Iraq ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a shared set of ideas about what it meant to be Iraqi , the country seemed fated to exist in an extended condition of terminal collapse .
This is not a piece about how the United States is just like Iraq .
But Americans have never been as different from the rest of the world as they reflexively believe .
And just like many other countries , in the Middle East and elsewhere , the United States must confront the pathological state of its identity .
Specifically , I ’ m referring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ define themselves , their relationship to the state , and their relationships to each other .
Of course , we all have what social scientists call “ identity repertoires , ” parts of which we emphasize at different times based on circumstance .
Instructive here is an old friend ’ s Twitter display name , “ abu el gamecock , ” which reflects that he is an American of Egyptian heritage who grew up in South Carolina and is a die-hard fan of the University of South Carolina ’ s Gamecocks .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he is an American when he is among Egyptians , an Arab among Americans , and an Egyptian among Arabs .
Political leaders often use identity to advance their own interests or those of their country .
After coming to power in Egypt , Abdel Fattah al-Sisi sought to recast Egyptian nationalism in a way that exiled his archenemy , the Muslim Brotherhood , from national belonging .
Saudi and Iranian leaders have at times framed their regional competition in terms of religious identity .
The problem , of course , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiate and resolve conflicts when they are expressed as a struggle between Sunni and Shiite .
What does this all have to do with the United States ?
Quite a lot .
When I was in Sulaymaniyah chatting with the Kurdish university students , I remember thinking about how different the outlook among Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs was from Americans .
It was an article of faith for me that even though I came from a distinct region of the United States and had my own distinct family history , I still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be an American with people around the country .
Of course , I ’ ve come to realize that this was a little naive and itself a product of my unique experiences and education , given how people of color , women , immigrants , and others continue to confront injustice .
Still , I don ’ t think I was being too credulous to believe ( or maybe it was hope ) that large numbers of Americans could agree on the founding ethos of the country and the sense that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to them , we wanted nevertheless to strive to achieve them .
That was proved by the friendships I had with people with whom I otherwise had little in common and with whom I disagree on almost all political issues .
Take , for example , a colleague of mine from the Upper Midwest .
At first our only means of communication were the cultural touchstones of being teenagers in the 1980s—part of our identity repertoire .
In time , however , we have discovered that we believe in many of the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity as Americans—freedom , the rule of law , and equal opportunity , to name a few—even though we vote in very different ways .
Yet recently , I have come to question whether this is true in a general sense .
Do enough Americans share a sense of national belonging that we can even still refer to a common national identity ?
Did we ever ?
Over the last four years President Donald Trump has revealed—and deepened—aspects of American society that sow doubt in my mind .
I have recently been reading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to and through the Civil War .
The parallels between our current situation and the antebellum period are stark and disturbing .
But I ’ d long believed that the country ’ s subsequent trials and triumphs—Reconstruction , World War I , the Great Depression , World War II , the civil rights movement , the Cold War , globalization , and the technology revolution—knit the country together by forging a common identity .
That history produced myths about America ’ s national project that everyone could share in .
Of course , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ always the sun-drenched stuff of President Ronald Reagan ’ s “ morning in America.
” Reconstruction failed , and we are still living with the legacies of Jim Crow .
America ’ s present immigration policies are a stain on the country .
And despite the inspiring success of Vice President-elect Kamala Harris , women remain underpaid , underappreciated , and often abused in too many spheres of American life .
But the myth-imbued narrative that became central to American identity served an important unifying purpose .
Among the best physical manifestations of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be—the Arlington Memorial Bridge linking Washington , D.C. , to Virginia with the Lincoln Memorial at one end and the Arlington National Cemetery and Robert E. Lee ’ s home at the other .
Again , while many Americans are left out by the bridge ’ s intended symbolism , it is the form of this gesture toward unity and common identity that is important to preserve .
The bridge has been undergoing construction work for the last few years , but what it means symbolically seems to have been lost .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is an open question whether Americans even want to forge a common identity .
This has worrying similarities with how those I spoke to in Sulaymaniyah thought about their country .
They and their fellow citizens elsewhere in the country have suffered dire consequences as a result of their inability to agree on what it means to be Iraqi , to the point of rejecting the idea itself in the case of many Kurds .
Contested identity in the Middle East has manifested itself in political instability , violence , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ourselves about our exceptionalism—are not immune to a similar fate .

During a trip to Iraq a few years ago, I spent some time in Sulaymaniyah, where, among a variety of interesting people, I met with a group of Kurdish university students. At one point in our conversation, I asked the students, “What set of ideas, principles, history, and national narrative do you share with university students in Baghdad or Basra?” Their collective answer was, “Nothing.” It struck me that this was the heart of Iraq’s problem. If Iraqis could not agree on a shared set of ideas about what it meant to be Iraqi, the country seemed fated to exist in an extended condition of terminal collapse.
During a trip to Iraq a few years ago, I spent some time in Sulaymaniyah, where, among a variety of interesting people, I met with a group of Kurdish university students. At one point in our conversation, I asked the students, “What set of ideas, principles, history, and national narrative do you share with university students in Baghdad or Basra?” Their collective answer was, “Nothing.” It struck me that this was the heart of Iraq’s problem. If Iraqis could not agree on a shared set of ideas about what it meant to be Iraqi, the country seemed fated to exist in an extended condition of terminal collapse.
This is not a piece about how the United States is just like Iraq. But Americans have never been as different from the rest of the world as they reflexively believe. And just like many other countries, in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States must confront the pathological state of its identity.
Specifically, I’m referring to national identity—the ways in which Americans define themselves, their relationship to the state, and their relationships to each other. Of course, we all have what social scientists call “identity repertoires,” parts of which we emphasize at different times based on circumstance. Instructive here is an old friend’s Twitter display name, “abu el gamecock,” which reflects that he is an American of Egyptian heritage who grew up in South Carolina and is a die-hard fan of the University of South Carolina’s Gamecocks. As he explained to me many years ago, he is an American when he is among Egyptians, an Arab among Americans, and an Egyptian among Arabs.
Political leaders often use identity to advance their own interests or those of their country. After coming to power in Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi sought to recast Egyptian nationalism in a way that exiled his archenemy, the Muslim Brotherhood, from national belonging. Saudi and Iranian leaders have at times framed their regional competition in terms of religious identity. The problem, of course, is that it’s much harder to negotiate and resolve conflicts when they are expressed as a struggle between Sunni and Shiite.
What does this all have to do with the United States? Quite a lot. When I was in Sulaymaniyah chatting with the Kurdish university students, I remember thinking about how different the outlook among Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs was from Americans. It was an article of faith for me that even though I came from a distinct region of the United States and had my own distinct family history, I still shared basic ideas about what it meant to be an American with people around the country. Of course, I’ve come to realize that this was a little naive and itself a product of my unique experiences and education, given how people of color, women, immigrants, and others continue to confront injustice. Still, I don’t think I was being too credulous to believe (or maybe it was hope) that large numbers of Americans could agree on the founding ethos of the country and the sense that, even if we had not lived up to them, we wanted nevertheless to strive to achieve them.
That was proved by the friendships I had with people with whom I otherwise had little in common and with whom I disagree on almost all political issues. Take, for example, a colleague of mine from the Upper Midwest. At first our only means of communication were the cultural touchstones of being teenagers in the 1980s—part of our identity repertoire. In time, however, we have discovered that we believe in many of the same core principles and ideas that undergird our identity as Americans—freedom, the rule of law, and equal opportunity, to name a few—even though we vote in very different ways.
Yet recently, I have come to question whether this is true in a general sense. Do enough Americans share a sense of national belonging that we can even still refer to a common national identity? Did we ever? Over the last four years President Donald Trump has revealed—and deepened—aspects of American society that sow doubt in my mind.
I have recently been reading a book about the United States up to and through the Civil War. The parallels between our current situation and the antebellum period are stark and disturbing. But I’d long believed that the country’s subsequent trials and triumphs—Reconstruction, World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, the civil rights movement, the Cold War, globalization, and the technology revolution—knit the country together by forging a common identity. That history produced myths about America’s national project that everyone could share in.
Of course, America’s national story was not always the sun-drenched stuff of President Ronald Reagan’s “morning in America.” Reconstruction failed, and we are still living with the legacies of Jim Crow. America’s present immigration policies are a stain on the country. And despite the inspiring success of Vice President-elect Kamala Harris, women remain underpaid, underappreciated, and often abused in too many spheres of American life. But the myth-imbued narrative that became central to American identity served an important unifying purpose. Among the best physical manifestations of that identity is—as its builders intended it to be—the Arlington Memorial Bridge linking Washington, D.C., to Virginia with the Lincoln Memorial at one end and the Arlington National Cemetery and Robert E. Lee’s home at the other.
Again, while many Americans are left out by the bridge’s intended symbolism, it is the form of this gesture toward unity and common identity that is important to preserve. The bridge has been undergoing construction work for the last few years, but what it means symbolically seems to have been lost. Given our inability to have a dialogue, it is an open question whether Americans even want to forge a common identity.
This has worrying similarities with how those I spoke to in Sulaymaniyah thought about their country. They and their fellow citizens elsewhere in the country have suffered dire consequences as a result of their inability to agree on what it means to be Iraqi, to the point of rejecting the idea itself in the case of many Kurds. Contested identity in the Middle East has manifested itself in political instability, violence, and civil conflict. Americans—despite what we tell ourselves about our exceptionalism—are not immune to a similar fate.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-13--The Biden Administration Needs a Fresh Approach to Huawei and 5G

The Biden Administration Needs a Fresh Approach to Huawei and 5G China ’ s growing clout in 5G telecommunications and other digital technologies , much of it achieved through unfair competition , presents many risks to democracies , including espionage and the spread of disinformation .
But the penetration of Western markets by companies that are instruments of an authoritarian state is only one of the risks in our connected and data-driven world .
Digital technologies , for all their benefits to society , present risks no matter who owns or operates them—even if the risks are compounded when companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all these risks , U.S. policy falls short : Despite the United States ’ leadership in the global digital economy , Washington lacks a vision for governing digital risk even as evidence mounts that the laissez-faire experiment of outsourcing this responsibility to a handful of profit-maximizing technology giants has failed .
Some U.S. states have attempted to fill the policy vacuum , with California standing out for its consumer privacy and Internet of Things security laws .
But fragmented action by individual states is no substitute for coherent national leadership .
Only with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be high on the agenda of President-elect Joe Biden ’ s administration—can the United States manage the growing risks to society and to national security emanating from the sector .
By now , Americans have learned that market forces alone will not produce the incentives for the private sector to care enough about digital risks .
In 2017 , for example , the credit rating company Equifax had such lax security in place on its web servers that the Chinese military allegedly exploited an obvious vulnerability to steal the intimate financial details @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 , Facebook failed to act against Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election , spent the following year denying and obfuscating that fact , and since then has played—or claims to be playing—whack-a-mole against the many propaganda and hate campaigns being waged against liberal democracy on its platform , including the conspiracy theories currently being spread on Facebook about the 2020 U.S. presidential election .
Facebook was also charged with misleading customers about its privacy practices by the Federal Trade Commission and paid a $ 5 billion penalty to settle the charges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decade , Silicon Valley executives embraced capital from and partnerships with Chinese investors and companies , with scant regard for how the Chinese government might abuse these relationships to access the crown jewels of U.S. innovation .
Silicon Valley executives have embraced Chinese investors and companies with scant regard for the consequences .
Other countries take a different approach to digital risks .
Chinese regulation prioritizes the state ’ s interests—and although details remain thin , Beijing ’ s recently announced Global Data Security Initiative is likely to serve the interests of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The European tradition , with its emphasis on fundamental individual rights and the rule of law , has far more in common with that of the United States .
That said , European regulators tend to be much quicker than their U.S. counterparts to intervene in the marketplace .
Europe has pursued an active regulatory and enforcement agenda , including the General Data Protection Regulation , the proposed ePrivacy Regulation , the EU Cybersecurity Act , and antitrust action aimed at quasi-monopolistic U.S. tech companies .
The shortcomings of U.S. digital policy have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decade-plus effort to stymie the global ambitions of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure providers such as Huawei and ZTE .
Already in 2011 , the U.S. House of Representatives ’ intelligence committee initiated a bipartisan investigation into the two companies .
In a 2012 report , the committee warned that “ Huawei ’ s and ZTE ’ s provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.
” Despite these warnings , Huawei and ZTE managed to penetrate the U.S. telecommunications market .
As of 2019 , according to data from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rural internet service providers , up to one-quarter of its members have purchased equipment from either Huawei or ZTE—mainly because their products are far less expensive than their competitors ’ .
“ [ W ] ith nothing to tell us not to do it we chose them , ” said John Nettles , the president of the Alabama-based Pine Belt Communications , in a filing with the Federal Communications Commission .
With such laxity at home , it ’ s no surprise that U.S. attempts to persuade allies to stop doing business with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faced stiff headwinds—even if allied governments generally agree on the strategic importance of the 5G network and understand the risk that a foreign government might compel a company under its jurisdiction to conduct surveillance and other cyberoperations on its behalf .
But many allies have a different threat perception of China , often informed by their own strategic interests .
This leads them to different conclusions about the risks , benefits , and acceptable trade-offs .
Is avoiding the risk of surveillance worth paying 20 or 30 percent more to a non-Chinese supplier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that non-Chinese equipment would be significantly more secure ?
Without a yardstick to measure how the risks that come with Chinese equipment compare to those of other suppliers ’ , Washington is left with the difficult task of persuading allies to adopt the U.S. threat perception of China—a perception that reflects unique strategic , geographic , cultural , historical , and economic factors .
Washington ’ s complex relationship with Beijing is marked by deep economic interdependence and unapologetic nationalism on both sides , against a backdrop of U.S. security commitments in Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including costly wars in which the two countries fought each other—in Korea and Vietnam .
More unilateral action would deepen the global leadership vacuum that China is well positioned to fill .
Many allies see things differently .
French President Emmanuel Macron said in August after meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that France would not ban Huawei .
( French regulatory authorities have announced licensing and other restrictions . )
Germany is torn , with German parliamentarians pushing for an outright ban , Deutsche Telekom pressing ahead on a rollout of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany this year , and Chancellor Angela Merkel delaying a proposed IT security law that would restrict—but not ban—Huawei .
In Britain , Huawei equipment has operated since at least 2005—at first unrestricted and then , beginning in 2010 , under the ostensible supervision of a Huawei-owned Cyber Security Evaluation Centre .
The U.K. instituted a partial ban of Huawei 5G technology in 2019 and expanded it in 2020 to ban the purchase of Huawei equipment beginning next year and to require all existing Huawei equipment to be ripped out by 2027 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington ’ s preference for a hard ban .
The incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Joe Biden should pivot away from Washington ’ s game of whack-a-mole against Huawei and other Chinese technology companies and develop a comprehensive digital risk strategy instead .
In the case of 5G , this means supporting research and development , creating incentives for carriers to bring state-of-the-art connectivity to rural and underserved communities , and supporting competition all across the sector .
It means pushing ahead with a federal data protection law , similar to those that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ establishes privacy and security obligations for companies handling personal data , regardless of a company ’ s nationality .
It also means defining legal liability and penalties for grossly negligent security practices across the entire spectrum of technology products and services , from app developers to infrastructure providers .
Some of this was tentatively begun by the Trump administration , including its endorsement of digital risk principles in March 2019 and the administration ’ s National Strategy to Secure 5G a year later .
On the other hand , a spate of actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Clean Network initiative , expanded sanctions against Huawei , and the measures targeting TikTok and WeChat—have been mostly unilateral and focused only on China .
When and if the Biden administration moves forward , it must do so in cooperation with allies in Europe , Asia , and elsewhere .
More unilateral action would deepen the global leadership vacuum that China is well positioned to fill .
The chances for cooperation are good , now that the Europeans are increasingly attuned to the elevated risk that Huawei and other Chinese companies pose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coincides with a shift toward a more critical view of China in much of Europe over the past half-decade , especially when it comes to trade , the environment , and human rights .
There is an opportunity here to forge consensus on multilateral approaches to managing digital risks , including those associated with China , while managing inevitable differences .
That will require Washington , under the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden , to give up its penchant for unilateralism and be responsive to allies ’ different risk profiles and exposure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end goal of U.S. policy in the digital arena should be to reduce global risk , rather than to alienate allies .

China’s growing clout in 5G telecommunications and other digital technologies, much of it achieved through unfair competition, presents many risks to democracies, including espionage and the spread of disinformation. But the penetration of Western markets by companies that are instruments of an authoritarian state is only one of the risks in our connected and data-driven world. Digital technologies, for all their benefits to society, present risks no matter who owns or operates them—even if the risks are compounded when companies are influenced by authoritarian governments.
China’s growing clout in 5G telecommunications and other digital technologies, much of it achieved through unfair competition, presents many risks to democracies, including espionage and the spread of disinformation. But the penetration of Western markets by companies that are instruments of an authoritarian state is only one of the risks in our connected and data-driven world. Digital technologies, for all their benefits to society, present risks no matter who owns or operates them—even if the risks are compounded when companies are influenced by authoritarian governments.
On all these risks, U.S. policy falls short: Despite the United States’ leadership in the global digital economy, Washington lacks a vision for governing digital risk even as evidence mounts that the laissez-faire experiment of outsourcing this responsibility to a handful of profit-maximizing technology giants has failed. Some U.S. states have attempted to fill the policy vacuum, with California standing out for its consumer privacy and Internet of Things security laws. But fragmented action by individual states is no substitute for coherent national leadership. Only with a strong national set of digital policies—which should be high on the agenda of President-elect Joe Biden’s administration—can the United States manage the growing risks to society and to national security emanating from the sector.
By now, Americans have learned that market forces alone will not produce the incentives for the private sector to care enough about digital risks. In 2017, for example, the credit rating company Equifax had such lax security in place on its web servers that the Chinese military allegedly exploited an obvious vulnerability to steal the intimate financial details of nearly 150 million Americans. In 2016, Facebook failed to act against Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election, spent the following year denying and obfuscating that fact, and since then has played—or claims to be playing—whack-a-mole against the many propaganda and hate campaigns being waged against liberal democracy on its platform, including the conspiracy theories currently being spread on Facebook about the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Facebook was also charged with misleading customers about its privacy practices by the Federal Trade Commission and paid a $5 billion penalty to settle the charges. And for most of the past decade, Silicon Valley executives embraced capital from and partnerships with Chinese investors and companies, with scant regard for how the Chinese government might abuse these relationships to access the crown jewels of U.S. innovation.
Silicon Valley executives have embraced Chinese investors and companies with scant regard for the consequences.
Other countries take a different approach to digital risks. Chinese regulation prioritizes the state’s interests—and although details remain thin, Beijing’s recently announced Global Data Security Initiative is likely to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party above all else. The European tradition, with its emphasis on fundamental individual rights and the rule of law, has far more in common with that of the United States. That said, European regulators tend to be much quicker than their U.S. counterparts to intervene in the marketplace. Europe has pursued an active regulatory and enforcement agenda, including the General Data Protection Regulation, the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, the EU Cybersecurity Act, and antitrust action aimed at quasi-monopolistic U.S. tech companies.
The shortcomings of U.S. digital policy have been especially obvious in Washington’s decade-plus effort to stymie the global ambitions of Chinese telecommunications infrastructure providers such as Huawei and ZTE. Already in 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives’ intelligence committee initiated a bipartisan investigation into the two companies. In a 2012 report, the committee warned that “Huawei’s and ZTE’s provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.”
Despite these warnings, Huawei and ZTE managed to penetrate the U.S. telecommunications market. As of 2019, according to data from the Rural Wireless Association, which represents rural internet service providers, up to one-quarter of its members have purchased equipment from either Huawei or ZTE—mainly because their products are far less expensive than their competitors’. “[W]ith nothing to tell us not to do it we chose them,” said John Nettles, the president of the Alabama-based Pine Belt Communications, in a filing with the Federal Communications Commission.
With such laxity at home, it’s no surprise that U.S. attempts to persuade allies to stop doing business with Huawei and other Chinese technology companies have faced stiff headwinds—even if allied governments generally agree on the strategic importance of the 5G network and understand the risk that a foreign government might compel a company under its jurisdiction to conduct surveillance and other cyberoperations on its behalf.
But many allies have a different threat perception of China, often informed by their own strategic interests. This leads them to different conclusions about the risks, benefits, and acceptable trade-offs. Is avoiding the risk of surveillance worth paying 20 or 30 percent more to a non-Chinese supplier? How confident can the purchaser be that non-Chinese equipment would be significantly more secure?
Without a yardstick to measure how the risks that come with Chinese equipment compare to those of other suppliers’, Washington is left with the difficult task of persuading allies to adopt the U.S. threat perception of China—a perception that reflects unique strategic, geographic, cultural, historical, and economic factors. Washington’s complex relationship with Beijing is marked by deep economic interdependence and unapologetic nationalism on both sides, against a backdrop of U.S. security commitments in Asia and a history of past conflict, including costly wars in which the two countries fought each other—in Korea and Vietnam.
More unilateral action would deepen the global leadership vacuum that China is well positioned to fill.
Many allies see things differently. French President Emmanuel Macron said in August after meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that France would not ban Huawei. (French regulatory authorities have announced licensing and other restrictions.) Germany is torn, with German parliamentarians pushing for an outright ban, Deutsche Telekom pressing ahead on a rollout of basic 5G services using Huawei technology in Germany this year, and Chancellor Angela Merkel delaying a proposed IT security law that would restrict—but not ban—Huawei.
In Britain, Huawei equipment has operated since at least 2005—at first unrestricted and then, beginning in 2010, under the ostensible supervision of a Huawei-owned Cyber Security Evaluation Centre. The U.K. instituted a partial ban of Huawei 5G technology in 2019 and expanded it in 2020 to ban the purchase of Huawei equipment beginning next year and to require all existing Huawei equipment to be ripped out by 2027. Several Eastern European countries have also endorsed Washington’s preference for a hard ban.
The incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Joe Biden should pivot away from Washington’s game of whack-a-mole against Huawei and other Chinese technology companies and develop a comprehensive digital risk strategy instead. In the case of 5G, this means supporting research and development, creating incentives for carriers to bring state-of-the-art connectivity to rural and underserved communities, and supporting competition all across the sector. It means pushing ahead with a federal data protection law, similar to those that have been enacted in Europe, that establishes privacy and security obligations for companies handling personal data, regardless of a company’s nationality. It also means defining legal liability and penalties for grossly negligent security practices across the entire spectrum of technology products and services, from app developers to infrastructure providers.
Some of this was tentatively begun by the Trump administration, including its endorsement of digital risk principles in March 2019 and the administration’s National Strategy to Secure 5G a year later. On the other hand, a spate of actions targeting Chinese companies over recent months—such as the Clean Network initiative, expanded sanctions against Huawei, and the measures targeting TikTok and WeChat—have been mostly unilateral and focused only on China.
When and if the Biden administration moves forward, it must do so in cooperation with allies in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. More unilateral action would deepen the global leadership vacuum that China is well positioned to fill. The chances for cooperation are good, now that the Europeans are increasingly attuned to the elevated risk that Huawei and other Chinese companies pose to European data protection norms. This coincides with a shift toward a more critical view of China in much of Europe over the past half-decade, especially when it comes to trade, the environment, and human rights. There is an opportunity here to forge consensus on multilateral approaches to managing digital risks, including those associated with China, while managing inevitable differences.
That will require Washington, under the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden, to give up its penchant for unilateralism and be responsive to allies’ different risk profiles and exposure to China. After all, the end goal of U.S. policy in the digital arena should be to reduce global risk, rather than to alienate allies.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-13--Meet the World’s Largest Free Trade Area

Leaders from around the world , including many in Africa , have been sending congratulatory messages to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris .
After four years of a U.S. administration that waged war on multilateral institutions , African hopes are high for a reset .
And it couldn ’ t come at a better time .
As a collective , the continent is embarking on a new economic path .
In 2018 , African heads of state signed an agreement that would bring to life the African Continental Free Trade Area ( AfCFTA ) —a game-changer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When it comes into effect in stages over the next several months and years , the AfCFTA will cover a market of more than 1.2 billion people and up to $ 3 trillion in combined GDP , with the potential of increasing intra-African trade by over 50 percent , according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa .
According to the World Bank , meanwhile , the agreement could add $ 76 billion in income to the rest of the world .
On its completion , the AfCFTA will become the largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the establishment of the World Trade Organization .
Fundamentally , the AfCFTA will put African economies—and African citizens—on a better economic footing .
The agreement will enhance competitiveness and stimulate investment , innovation , and economic growth by increasing efficiency and eliminating barriers to trade .
In fact , it will eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of goods and incrementally apply the same to services—this at a time when other regions of the world are rethinking trade agreements and economic integration .
The removal of tariffs on goods in particular is projected to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15 to 25 percent by 2040 .
This would translate to between $ 50 billion and $ 70 billion in dollar value .
But to give the AfCFTA the best chance of delivering on its promises , the continent will need help and investment for updating its infrastructure .
The incoming Biden administration should take note .
Beyond the impact of the pandemic , there is also the continent ’ s existing trade architecture to overcome .
Today ’ s regional trade arrangements “ exhibit narrow patterns of trade , depend on primary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade , ” according to William Amponsah , a trade expert quoted by the U.N .
Indeed , intra-African trade is dominated by a handful of countries selling a handful of products .
While this situation is improving , it remains a problem that simply increasing intra-African trade would not solve .
In fact , Africa will derive even greater benefits from diversification of trade and moving up the value chain than through a free trade agreement alone .
As it stands , the bulk of African exports are raw materials : agriculture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of value addition occurring outside the continent .
The limited value-add is in part a result of trade agreements that punish processed products from Africa in favor of raw products .
And those agreements need to be amended for the continent to gain the most benefit from the AfCFTA .
Africa ’ s underdeveloped infrastructure is another challenge .
To move up the value chain , it would need more capacity for processing , packaging , and the like .
But the power needed to conduct those operations is often inadequate , expensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even though the Democratic Republic of the Congo banned export of concentrates of certain strategic minerals in an effort to encourage domestic refinement and production using those minerals , the country has had little choice but to issue indefinite waivers of the bans because it does not have the smelting capacity to make use of them itself .
Africa also has a labor force issue .
Given a growing population and rapid urbanization , the continent ’ s agro-processing capacity will need an upgrade to make enough food .
Although over 50 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agriculture , Africa imports $ 72 billion in food and agricultural products a year , according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization .
The continent needs more efficiency in agro-processing so that it can be more self-sufficient .
In short , the AfCFTA will be most valuable if Africa is able to diversify its exports and increase the sophistication of its products , and that will only be possible with a functional infrastructure spine—including food , power , and transportation .
Financing these large ticket items was a challenge before the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given today ’ s debt crisis and collapse of revenues .
To be sure , Africa ’ s challenges make its economic integration project significantly harder than it might be elsewhere .
But they do not diminish the economic opportunities on the continent .
African markets still “ present investors with attractive opportunities , ” the report ’ s authors write , “ for returns in a broad range of sectors , from emerging industries such as financial , education , and health technology , to more traditional sectors including energy and agribusiness.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase its economic partnership with the continent to the mutual benefit of both Africans and Americans .
Using existing development tools and co-investing with other bilateral and multilateral agencies , the United States should provide support to Africa ’ s regional integration project .
In 2018 , Washington launched Prosper Africa to coordinate U.S. government resources and expand business opportunities in Africa with a goal of doubling two-way trade between the country and the continent .
It is still unclear how this project , which seems great in principle , will be implemented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official U.S. response to the AfCFTA has been ambivalent at best .
To the chagrin of African leadership , the United States continues to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Kenya in the hope of developing a model that could later be applied to other countries in Africa .
This effort follows a period of decline in two-way trade between the United States and Africa : Between 2014 and 2018 , U.S. exports to Africa have decreased by 32 percent , while exports from Africa to the United States have decreased by 55 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden administration now has an opportunity to strengthen its strategic partnership with Africa by driving investment toward the AfCFTA .
The United States already has a suite of policy tools and institutions that make such a role viable .
Among them are Power Africa , Prosper Africa , the Millennium Challenge Corp. ( MCC ) , and the recently launched U.S. International Development Finance Corp. ( DFC ) .
Power Africa has a goal to add more than 30,000 megawatts of cleaner , more efficient electricity generation capacity and 60 million new home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The DFC , which replaced the Overseas Private Investment Corp. , has an expanded mandate and greater resources .
The MCC , which provides large grants ( in the hundreds of millions of dollars ) to promote economic growth , reduce poverty , and strengthen institutions , is embarking on regional projects involving two or more countries .
All of these , which could help Africa address its infrastructure issues , are a step in the right direction .
These ventures , acting in concert with European , Japanese , and Indian partners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic growth in Africa and the expansion of Africa as a market for outside goods and services .
As currently imagined , Prosper Africa will be a one-stop shop to facilitate increased trade and investment between U.S. and African businesses .
The initiative has clear linkages with the AfCFTA , and if implemented fully and embraced , it could generate benefits for both actors .
Both Africa and the United States have an opportunity to increase the quality and scope of their economic exchange , but to do so would require coherent U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provides a platform to achieve that .

Leaders from around the world, including many in Africa, have been sending congratulatory messages to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris. After four years of a U.S. administration that waged war on multilateral institutions, African hopes are high for a reset.
Leaders from around the world, including many in Africa, have been sending congratulatory messages to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris. After four years of a U.S. administration that waged war on multilateral institutions, African hopes are high for a reset.
And it couldn’t come at a better time. As a collective, the continent is embarking on a new economic path. In 2018, African heads of state signed an agreement that would bring to life the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)—a game-changer in African regional and international trade. When it comes into effect in stages over the next several months and years, the AfCFTA will cover a market of more than 1.2 billion people and up to $3 trillion in combined GDP, with the potential of increasing intra-African trade by over 50 percent, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. According to the World Bank, meanwhile, the agreement could add $76 billion in income to the rest of the world. On its completion, the AfCFTA will become the largest free trade area in the world since the establishment of the World Trade Organization.
Fundamentally, the AfCFTA will put African economies—and African citizens—on a better economic footing. The agreement will enhance competitiveness and stimulate investment, innovation, and economic growth by increasing efficiency and eliminating barriers to trade. In fact, it will eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of goods and incrementally apply the same to services—this at a time when other regions of the world are rethinking trade agreements and economic integration. The removal of tariffs on goods in particular is projected to increase the value of intra-African trade by 15 to 25 percent by 2040. This would translate to between $50 billion and $70 billion in dollar value.
But to give the AfCFTA the best chance of delivering on its promises, the continent will need help and investment for updating its infrastructure. The incoming Biden administration should take note.
The implementation of the AfCFTA, although delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, is set to begin anew in January 2021, with a focus first on easing trade for small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for 90 percent of jobs created on the continent. Yet the world the AfCFTA will confront in January will be markedly different from the one in which it was conceived. There are more challenges than ever, particularly thanks to the economic destruction wrought by the pandemic—“an unprecedented health and economic crisis,” noted the International Monetary Fund, “that threatens to throw the region off its stride, reversing the development progress of recent years and slow the region’s growth prospects in the years to come.”
Beyond the impact of the pandemic, there is also the continent’s existing trade architecture to overcome. Today’s regional trade arrangements “exhibit narrow patterns of trade, depend on primary products and involve low levels of inter-country trade,” according to William Amponsah, a trade expert quoted by the U.N. Indeed, intra-African trade is dominated by a handful of countries selling a handful of products. While this situation is improving, it remains a problem that simply increasing intra-African trade would not solve.
In fact, Africa will derive even greater benefits from diversification of trade and moving up the value chain than through a free trade agreement alone. As it stands, the bulk of African exports are raw materials: agriculture and mineral products with approximately 70 percent of value addition occurring outside the continent. The limited value-add is in part a result of trade agreements that punish processed products from Africa in favor of raw products. And those agreements need to be amended for the continent to gain the most benefit from the AfCFTA.
Africa’s underdeveloped infrastructure is another challenge. To move up the value chain, it would need more capacity for processing, packaging, and the like. But the power needed to conduct those operations is often inadequate, expensive, and unreliable. For example, even though the Democratic Republic of the Congo banned export of concentrates of certain strategic minerals in an effort to encourage domestic refinement and production using those minerals, the country has had little choice but to issue indefinite waivers of the bans because it does not have the smelting capacity to make use of them itself.
Africa also has a labor force issue. Given a growing population and rapid urbanization, the continent’s agro-processing capacity will need an upgrade to make enough food. Although over 50 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, Africa imports $72 billion in food and agricultural products a year, according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. The continent needs more efficiency in agro-processing so that it can be more self-sufficient.
In short, the AfCFTA will be most valuable if Africa is able to diversify its exports and increase the sophistication of its products, and that will only be possible with a functional infrastructure spine—including food, power, and transportation. Financing these large ticket items was a challenge before the pandemic. It will be even more difficult given today’s debt crisis and collapse of revenues.
This is where leadership under the incoming Biden administration can play an important role. A successful AfCFTA will be contingent on a rapid recovery after the pandemic. As a report from the management firm Palladium notes, “An unprecedented mobilization of global private capital would drive mutually beneficial economic growth that addresses key priorities including job creation, infrastructure development, and improved social services.” The Biden administration can collaborate with other partners and drive private finance to Africa’s single market.
To be sure, Africa’s challenges make its economic integration project significantly harder than it might be elsewhere. But they do not diminish the economic opportunities on the continent.
African markets still “present investors with attractive opportunities,” the report’s authors write, “for returns in a broad range of sectors, from emerging industries such as financial, education, and health technology, to more traditional sectors including energy and agribusiness.” That means the United States could increase its economic partnership with the continent to the mutual benefit of both Africans and Americans. Using existing development tools and co-investing with other bilateral and multilateral agencies, the United States should provide support to Africa’s regional integration project.
In 2018, Washington launched Prosper Africa to coordinate U.S. government resources and expand business opportunities in Africa with a goal of doubling two-way trade between the country and the continent. It is still unclear how this project, which seems great in principle, will be implemented and how quickly. Meanwhile, the official U.S. response to the AfCFTA has been ambivalent at best. To the chagrin of African leadership, the United States continues to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Kenya in the hope of developing a model that could later be applied to other countries in Africa. This effort follows a period of decline in two-way trade between the United States and Africa: Between 2014 and 2018, U.S. exports to Africa have decreased by 32 percent, while exports from Africa to the United States have decreased by 55 percent in the same period.
The Biden administration now has an opportunity to strengthen its strategic partnership with Africa by driving investment toward the AfCFTA. The United States already has a suite of policy tools and institutions that make such a role viable. Among them are Power Africa, Prosper Africa, the Millennium Challenge Corp. (MCC), and the recently launched U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC). Power Africa has a goal to add more than 30,000 megawatts of cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity and 60 million new home and business connections through private-public partnerships. The DFC, which replaced the Overseas Private Investment Corp., has an expanded mandate and greater resources. The MCC, which provides large grants (in the hundreds of millions of dollars) to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions, is embarking on regional projects involving two or more countries. All of these, which could help Africa address its infrastructure issues, are a step in the right direction.
These ventures, acting in concert with European, Japanese, and Indian partners, could have a significant impact on economic growth in Africa and the expansion of Africa as a market for outside goods and services. As currently imagined, Prosper Africa will be a one-stop shop to facilitate increased trade and investment between U.S. and African businesses. The initiative has clear linkages with the AfCFTA, and if implemented fully and embraced, it could generate benefits for both actors.
Both Africa and the United States have an opportunity to increase the quality and scope of their economic exchange, but to do so would require coherent U.S. policy toward the continent. The AfCFTA provides a platform to achieve that.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-13--Liberal Chinese Americans Are Fighting Right-Wing WeChat Disinformation

The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought attention to right-wing Chinese Americans effectively using WeChat to spread strident and divisive messages , conspiracy theories , and disinformation among Chinese-language speakers .
This year , unfounded conspiracy theories made their way into hundreds of thousands of chat groups on WeChat again .
Chinese supporters of Donald Trump who follow pro-Trump platforms believe the lies that the election was a fraud and that Hunter Biden is a pedophile who has molested many girls in China .
A media network associated with the billionaire Guo Wengui and former Trump strategist Steve Bannon was among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Biden family and their business dealings in China .
But unlike in 2016 , liberal Chinese voices have taken up the WeChat battleground to counterbalance right-wing conspiracy content , engaging a monolingual audience that ’ s part of a fast-growing minority bloc with the ability to possibly determine the outcome of future U.S. elections .
Most Chinese Americans vote Democrat , but there ’ s a substantial bloc of Trump supporters among new immigrants .
In the weeks leading up to this year ’ s election , these liberal accounts published—sometimes cross-published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese readers about the U.S. election system , debunking right-wing conspiracies , analyzing how a second Trump term might affect Chinese Americans , and pointing directly to the rifts between first- and second-generation immigrants caused by politics .
Some of the liberal platforms are run by former Chinese journalists who now reside in North America , others by community volunteers , and many by individual political news junkies .
In stark contrast to the pro-Trump Chinese-language WeChat platforms , most of these accounts are unwaveringly pro-feminism , pro-civil rights movement , and anti-racism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when we saw the ‘ Chinese Americans for Trump ’ group being extremely vocal on WeChat in 2016 , and we felt we shouldn ’ t be represented by them , ” said Wu Bo , the editor in chief of Chinese American , one of the prominent liberal-leaning WeChat accounts that has 120,000 followers .
Wu , a software engineer in his 50s and based in the Bay Area , started the platform in 2014 , with two other volunteer editors .
In a Zoom meeting before this year ’ s election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt beleaguered among friends in their age group between 40 and 60 , most of whom supported Trump , though not all of them can vote .
And most of the comments they receive on each article come from Trump supporters .
After the 2016 presidential election , Wu ’ s site , Chinese American , started to gain influence among first-generation Chinese immigrants who moved to the United States after the 1990s by publishing articles on social and political issues concerning this community .
It rose to fame this summer , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the United States .
A series of essays written by second-generation Chinese Americans urging their parents to support the movement and responses from the older generation went viral after appearing on Chinese American .
In the election season , editors published another series of letters fostering conversations between liberal young Chinese Americans and their parents , who are often conservative .
Instead of directly rebutting rumors spread by conservative Chinese , Chinese American published a series of profiles of prominent Chinese Americans—left and right—taking readers through the journey of the formation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on thorny issues that Chinese Americans care deeply about : educational attainment , racism , safety .
“ Debunking rumors takes way too much energy .
We don ’ t have that much time , ” Wu said .
“ I think it ’ s more effective to combat rumors by telling stories of real people and what they have to say about politics.
” To be sure , conservative Chinese Americans are a minority .
Only 12 percent of Chinese Americans identified as Republicans in 2018 .
An AAPI Data survey carried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Chinese American voters thought they would vote for Trump .
Many Chinese Trump supporters moved to the United States in the 1990s or later for a better future for both themselves and their children .
The most vocal ones , though many of whom can ’ t or don ’ t vote , put much emphasis on personal mobility , educational attainment , and stability over larger issues affecting the community as a whole .
They tend to be against affirmative action and pro-police .
But even this group is not a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the AAPIs for Civic Empowerment Education Fund on suburban Chinese Americans in California found that quite a large number of them were undecided on a range of political issues .
Twenty-two percent of survey respondents weren ’ t sure whether they supported a proposition to restore affirmative action , and 41 percent neither agreed nor disagreed that race should be considered a factor in college admissions .
Community organizers and politicians haven ’ t really engaged the new Chinese immigrants , who are often isolated and even alienated , said Alex Tom , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Empowered Politics Education Fund , an advocacy group in California .
Tom believes that liberal-leaning WeChat publications can be one important channel of an ecosystem to tap the group that hasn ’ t yet developed informed political opinions .
“ It ’ s still an uphill battle , ” Tom said .
“ But I think these are the kind of experiments that are needed.
” North America Headlines , another liberal Chinese site , has taken a different approach to election coverage .
The account , run by a professional editorial team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them and providing truth to readers ; translates key information about the elections from English into Chinese ; and publishes in-depth political analysis and commentaries .
Its executive editor , surnamed Chen , a former journalist who now lives in Canada , said the outlet ’ s readership spiked 20 percent in the six months leading up to the election , and many of them were conservatives .
“ Trump frequently targeted China on his campaign trails , and his rhetoric conflating the government and the people has instigated hate crimes against many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ This , plus his mishandling of the pandemic , has turned many Chinese supporters away .
But this doesn ’ t mean that their general politics has changed.
” North America Headlines is also present on Weibo .
It pushed out live alerts about election results to its 120,000 Weibo followers during election week .
In the absence of reliable Chinese media coverage of the U.S. elections ( Chinese media were largely prohibited from close coverage ) , North America Headlines became a crucial news source for readers in China who followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is such that you can ’ t discuss Chinese politics in China , ” Chen said .
“ Discussions about American politics are insofar allowed .
I hope that what we publish can educate our readers about how democracy works.
” Others see the United States as a chance to do honest journalism , increasingly impossible in China itself .
Cheng Yizhong , the former editor in chief of two prominent liberal publications known for their investigative reporting , Southern Metropolis Weekly and Beijing News , now runs a New York-based media company @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” and “ New York Chinaren , ” two WeChat-based publications that have 190,000 followers combined .
Their election content , similar to that of North America Headlines , leaned toward news coverage .
Cheng , who moved to the United States in 2016 , said he was saddened and shocked by the rumor-filled overseas Chinese-language media and that he also saw a market for ethical Chinese-language journalism .
At the end of 2019 , Cheng put together a team of 15 journalists to serve the Chinese-speaking community in their adopted home .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ all , ” Cheng said , referring to the misinformation commonly seen in other popular Chinese-language media and on WeChat .
“ I will never pander to the ridiculous rumormongering and fearmongering .
I go back to the simple stuff : facts .
If the Biden scandal were factual , I ’ d run it.
” Though he admits that misinformation and baseless , sensational content will always grab more attention than serious journalism , Cheng sees value in what he does : Not only is it serving the Chinese immigrant community in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his colleagues and friends in China a rare window to peek into American society and politics .
“ What I ’ m doing is upholding the self-respect of the news industry , or at least the bottom line , which is telling the truth , ” Cheng said .

The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought attention to right-wing Chinese Americans effectively using WeChat to spread strident and divisive messages, conspiracy theories, and disinformation among Chinese-language speakers.
The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought attention to right-wing Chinese Americans effectively using WeChat to spread strident and divisive messages, conspiracy theories, and disinformation among Chinese-language speakers.
This year, unfounded conspiracy theories made their way into hundreds of thousands of chat groups on WeChat again. Chinese supporters of Donald Trump who follow pro-Trump platforms believe the lies that the election was a fraud and that Hunter Biden is a pedophile who has molested many girls in China. A media network associated with the billionaire Guo Wengui and former Trump strategist Steve Bannon was among the chief sources of false stories about the Biden family and their business dealings in China. But unlike in 2016, liberal Chinese voices have taken up the WeChat battleground to counterbalance right-wing conspiracy content, engaging a monolingual audience that’s part of a fast-growing minority bloc with the ability to possibly determine the outcome of future U.S. elections.
Most Chinese Americans vote Democrat, but there’s a substantial bloc of Trump supporters among new immigrants. In the weeks leading up to this year’s election, these liberal accounts published—sometimes cross-published on different platforms—a plethora of content educating Chinese readers about the U.S. election system, debunking right-wing conspiracies, analyzing how a second Trump term might affect Chinese Americans, and pointing directly to the rifts between first- and second-generation immigrants caused by politics.
Some of the liberal platforms are run by former Chinese journalists who now reside in North America, others by community volunteers, and many by individual political news junkies. In stark contrast to the pro-Trump Chinese-language WeChat platforms, most of these accounts are unwaveringly pro-feminism, pro-civil rights movement, and anti-racism.
“It was a real shock when we saw the ‘Chinese Americans for Trump’ group being extremely vocal on WeChat in 2016, and we felt we shouldn’t be represented by them,” said Wu Bo, the editor in chief of Chinese American, one of the prominent liberal-leaning WeChat accounts that has 120,000 followers.
Wu, a software engineer in his 50s and based in the Bay Area, started the platform in 2014, with two other volunteer editors. In a Zoom meeting before this year’s election, the editors told me that they felt beleaguered among friends in their age group between 40 and 60, most of whom supported Trump, though not all of them can vote. And most of the comments they receive on each article come from Trump supporters.
After the 2016 presidential election, Wu’s site, Chinese American, started to gain influence among first-generation Chinese immigrants who moved to the United States after the 1990s by publishing articles on social and political issues concerning this community. It rose to fame this summer, when the Black Lives Matter movement was sweeping across the United States. A series of essays written by second-generation Chinese Americans urging their parents to support the movement and responses from the older generation went viral after appearing on Chinese American. In the election season, editors published another series of letters fostering conversations between liberal young Chinese Americans and their parents, who are often conservative.
Instead of directly rebutting rumors spread by conservative Chinese, Chinese American published a series of profiles of prominent Chinese Americans—left and right—taking readers through the journey of the formation of their politics and peeking into their views on thorny issues that Chinese Americans care deeply about: educational attainment, racism, safety.
“Debunking rumors takes way too much energy. We don’t have that much time,” Wu said. “I think it’s more effective to combat rumors by telling stories of real people and what they have to say about politics.”
To be sure, conservative Chinese Americans are a minority. Only 12 percent of Chinese Americans identified as Republicans in 2018. An AAPI Data survey carried out this summer showed that 20 percent of Chinese American voters thought they would vote for Trump.
Many Chinese Trump supporters moved to the United States in the 1990s or later for a better future for both themselves and their children. The most vocal ones, though many of whom can’t or don’t vote, put much emphasis on personal mobility, educational attainment, and stability over larger issues affecting the community as a whole. They tend to be against affirmative action and pro-police. But even this group is not a monolith. A recent survey conducted by the AAPIs for Civic Empowerment Education Fund on suburban Chinese Americans in California found that quite a large number of them were undecided on a range of political issues. Twenty-two percent of survey respondents weren’t sure whether they supported a proposition to restore affirmative action, and 41 percent neither agreed nor disagreed that race should be considered a factor in college admissions.
Community organizers and politicians haven’t really engaged the new Chinese immigrants, who are often isolated and even alienated, said Alex Tom, the executive director of the Center for Empowered Politics Education Fund, an advocacy group in California. Tom believes that liberal-leaning WeChat publications can be one important channel of an ecosystem to tap the group that hasn’t yet developed informed political opinions.
“It’s still an uphill battle,” Tom said. “But I think these are the kind of experiments that are needed.”
North America Headlines, another liberal Chinese site, has taken a different approach to election coverage. The account, run by a professional editorial team, tackles popular conspiracy theories by fact-checking them and providing truth to readers; translates key information about the elections from English into Chinese; and publishes in-depth political analysis and commentaries. Its executive editor, surnamed Chen, a former journalist who now lives in Canada, said the outlet’s readership spiked 20 percent in the six months leading up to the election, and many of them were conservatives.
“Trump frequently targeted China on his campaign trails, and his rhetoric conflating the government and the people has instigated hate crimes against many Chinese people,” Chen said. “This, plus his mishandling of the pandemic, has turned many Chinese supporters away. But this doesn’t mean that their general politics has changed.”
North America Headlines is also present on Weibo. It pushed out live alerts about election results to its 120,000 Weibo followers during election week. In the absence of reliable Chinese media coverage of the U.S. elections (Chinese media were largely prohibited from close coverage), North America Headlines became a crucial news source for readers in China who followed the contested race.
“The reality is such that you can’t discuss Chinese politics in China,” Chen said. “Discussions about American politics are insofar allowed. I hope that what we publish can educate our readers about how democracy works.”
Others see the United States as a chance to do honest journalism, increasingly impossible in China itself. Cheng Yizhong, the former editor in chief of two prominent liberal publications known for their investigative reporting, Southern Metropolis Daily and Beijing News, now runs a New York-based media company that publishes “New York and Beyond” and “New York Chinaren,” two WeChat-based publications that have 190,000 followers combined. Their election content, similar to that of North America Headlines, leaned toward news coverage.
Cheng, who moved to the United States in 2016, said he was saddened and shocked by the rumor-filled overseas Chinese-language media and that he also saw a market for ethical Chinese-language journalism. At the end of 2019, Cheng put together a team of 15 journalists to serve the Chinese-speaking community in their adopted home.
“It’s not news at all,” Cheng said, referring to the misinformation commonly seen in other popular Chinese-language media and on WeChat. “I will never pander to the ridiculous rumormongering and fearmongering. I go back to the simple stuff: facts. If the Biden scandal were factual, I’d run it.”
Though he admits that misinformation and baseless, sensational content will always grab more attention than serious journalism, Cheng sees value in what he does: Not only is it serving the Chinese immigrant community in the United States, but it provides his colleagues and friends in China a rare window to peek into American society and politics.
“What I’m doing is upholding the self-respect of the news industry, or at least the bottom line, which is telling the truth,” Cheng said.


Biden’s Putin Challenge

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will face tremendous challenges when he enters office , starting with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout .
When it comes to foreign policy , China will be at the top of the to-do list along with restoring and reinvigorating badly frayed alliances .
Dealing with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin should be high on that list , too .
Russia under Putin poses an existential threat to the United States and other countries of the West , Russia ’ s neighbors , and his own people .
Biden seems to understand that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the target of Russian interference in the 2020 election , including a disinformation campaign tied to Russia that was designed to smear him and his son Hunter .
Earlier this year , Biden wrote , “ To counter Russian aggression , we must keep [ NATO ’ s ] military capabilities sharp while also expanding its capacity to take on nontraditional threats , such as weaponized corruption , disinformation , and cybertheft.
” He continued : “ We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms and stand with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stood up time and again against President Vladimir Putin ’ s kleptocratic authoritarian system.
” In an interview with CBS News ’ 60 Minutes before the election , Biden said he considered Russia “ the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances.
” These instincts are sound , and Biden likely will appoint officials who think the same way he does when it comes to Putin ’ s Russia .
And yet there are some , such as the signatories of an open letter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who advocate for a “ rethink ” of U.S. policy toward Russia and propose having “ a serious and sustained strategic dialogue that addresses the deeper sources of mistrust and hostility and at the same time focuses on the large and urgent security challenges facing both countries.
” Putin is more interested in portraying the United States as Russia ’ s greatest enemy—to justify his repressive control at home .
There should be no confusion about the sources of mistrust and hostility in the U.S.-Russian relationship .
For starters , Putin came to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bombings in Russia in the fall of 1999 that killed some 300 Russians .
In power , he oversaw the brutal campaign in Chechnya that led to tens of thousands of casualties and eventually elevated Ramzan Kadyrov , one of the most brutal regional leaders in the world , to run Chechnya .
Under Putin ’ s leadership , Russia invaded neighboring Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 .
It illegally annexed Crimea and occupies further territory in those two countries along with the Transnistria region of Moldova .
Putin bears ultimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine that killed 298 people on board .
He supports like-minded authoritarian leaders , including Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko , Syria ’ s murderous President Bashar al-Assad , and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro .
Russian forces reportedly placed bounties on U.S. soldiers ’ heads in Afghanistan .
In the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic , Russian hackers launched ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals and medical research institutions .
Putin is more interested in portraying the United States as Russia ’ s greatest enemy—to justify his repressive control at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He blames the United States for protests against his rule in Russia and for protest movements in neighboring countries .
Putin views democratic systems of government as a threat to the authoritarian , kleptocratic system he oversees in Russia .
Not only does he not mean the United States well—he actually means real harm to the United States and its allies .
The past several U.S. administrations have been tempted to try to get along with Russia .
Former President George W. Bush famously said he looked into Putin ’ s soul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward the end of his second term , Bush sought to patch up relations with Putin—but then Putin invaded Georgia .
Former President Barack Obama tried a “ reset ” with then-President Dmitry Medvedev—but Putin invaded Ukraine in Obama ’ s second term .
President Donald Trump tried personal diplomacy with Putin—and U.S.-Russian relations arguably are at their lowest point in decades .
The problem is Putin .
He simply is not interested in any rethink in U.S.-Russian relations unless that was to involve a capitulation on the part of Washington .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is little point in spending precious U.S. diplomatic and presidential time and effort in trying to improve U.S.-Russian relations .
There is one exception , however : arms control , where the United States and Russia have a mutual interest in renewing the New START agreement , which is set to expire next February .
Just as the United States was able to sign several arms control agreements with the Soviet Union while the two countries were rivals during the Cold War , Washington can today find common ground with Moscow while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat on virtually every other issue .
Neither country wants or can afford to engage in an expensive , destabilizing arms race .
Putin is simply not interested in any rethink in U.S.-Russian relations unless that was to involve a capitulation on the part of Washington .
In thinking about Russia , the Biden administration would be wise to learn from the mistakes of previous administrations in dealing with the country .
The harm Putin has done along Russia ’ s periphery and beyond requires serious pushback from the West , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working closely with allies in Europe and elsewhere .
Essentially , the Biden administration should develop a policy of containment .
Step one in such a containment policy requires the United States to treat its allies as allies , not as targets to undermine .
While there may be disagreements between allies , the European Union and Germany are not threats to the United States , despite what Trump might think of them .
Fighting between the United States and its European friends gives Putin openings to widen and divisions to exploit .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Nord Stream 2 pipeline , but a U.S. administration should not view German Chancellor Angela Merkel , one of the key leaders holding Europe together , in the same way it views Putin .
Pushback against Putin will be much more effective if the United States and Europe work closely together .
Too often , Washington seems to want better relations with Moscow than Moscow wants with Washington .
That often makes the United States look desperate and weak when it should wait until Russia is serious about addressing problems constructively .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ long time , but it is Russia that needs the West more than the other way around .
Trump repeatedly said how great it would be if he and Putin got along .
Great for whom ?
Biden should resist personalizing relations as Trump tried with Putin and Obama tried with Medvedev .
No good will come of it .
The Biden administration should be mindful not to conflate the Russian regime and Putin with the Russian people as a whole .
Putin pursues policies and actions that benefit him and his corrupt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Whereas Putin views the United States as an enemy , only 3 percent of Russians shared that opinion earlier this year , according to a Levada Center survey ( though that percentage inexplicably shot up to 70 percent in a more recent poll ) .
Biden ’ s aim to “ impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms and stand with Russian civil society , ” as he wrote , reveals a readiness to pursue a long-overdue policy based on principles and values .
Given Russia ’ s appalling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden administration should aggressively implement the Magnitsky Act , which penalizes Russian officials who engage in gross human rights abuses .
The list of victims of the Putin regime ’ s brutal treatment of its perceived enemies is long .
It includes the assassination or poisoning , either in Russia or on Western soil , of the former spies Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal , the journalist Anna Politkovskaya , and the opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov , Vladimir Kara-Murza , and Alexei Navalny .
While the EU recently imposed sanctions on several Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Navalny , for example , the United States has done nothing about the case , and Trump has said nothing .
Biden must clearly condemn these actions and impose consequences .
Ignoring Putin ’ s abuses only encourages him .
Corruption is Putin ’ s most nefarious and successful export , and the West greedily imports it .
Biden should ignore advice to ease or remove sanctions on Russia until Putin withdraws Russia ’ s forces from Ukraine , including Crimea .
Biden should also pursue sanctions and countermeasures against Russian hacking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he should ramp them up periodically—ideally with the EU in lockstep—and make clear that such measures will continue until Putin changes his behavior .
Biden also should reject any advice to sell out Russia ’ s neighbors , for example by ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine or Georgia .
Washington must respect the aspirations of the people in these countries to join the Euro-Atlantic community .
The citizens of the Baltic states , which joined NATO in 2004 , sleep better at night knowing they have the alliance ’ s security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggression .
The people of Georgia and Ukraine should be entitled to the same .
Otherwise , NATO would grant Russia de facto veto power over countries ’ interest in joining Euro-Atlantic institutions—and even encourage Putin to engage in further territorial aggrandizement to block other countries ’ aspirations .
Biden should show his support personally .
Neither Obama nor Trump visited Ukraine or Georgia during their presidency to demonstrate U.S. support at the highest levels for these fledgling democracies .
Biden has been to both countries numerous times , and he should include @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Investing in the success of these countries is a good way to solidify their defense against Moscow .
He should also be unequivocal in his support for the people of Belarus in their struggle against Lukashenko .
Finally , the United States must stop enabling Russian corruption .
Corruption is Putin ’ s most nefarious and successful export , and the West greedily imports it .
It is encouraging to see Biden stress the need “ to tackle the self-dealing , conflicts of interest , dark money , and rank corruption that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign agendas and undermining our democracy.
” Cutting off dirty Russian money that enjoys the safety of the U.S. financial system and real estate market , and removing its anonymity , would send a strong signal that there is a new sheriff in town .
There is no need for Washington to rethink , reset , or make overtures to Moscow .
Clear-eyed analysis and a policy of containment are the best way to deal with the threat posed by Putin ’ s Russia .
Biden ’ s instincts are sound—let ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them .

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will face tremendous challenges when he enters office, starting with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout. When it comes to foreign policy, China will be at the top of the to-do list along with restoring and reinvigorating badly frayed alliances. Dealing with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin should be high on that list, too.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will face tremendous challenges when he enters office, starting with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout. When it comes to foreign policy, China will be at the top of the to-do list along with restoring and reinvigorating badly frayed alliances. Dealing with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin should be high on that list, too.
Russia under Putin poses an existential threat to the United States and other countries of the West, Russia’s neighbors, and his own people. Biden seems to understand that, not least because he has been the target of Russian interference in the 2020 election, including a disinformation campaign tied to Russia that was designed to smear him and his son Hunter.
Earlier this year, Biden wrote, “To counter Russian aggression, we must keep [NATO’s] military capabilities sharp while also expanding its capacity to take on nontraditional threats, such as weaponized corruption, disinformation, and cybertheft.” He continued: “We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms and stand with Russian civil society, which has bravely stood up time and again against President Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian system.” In an interview with CBS News’ 60 Minutes before the election, Biden said he considered Russia “the biggest threat to America right now in terms of breaking up our security and our alliances.”
These instincts are sound, and Biden likely will appoint officials who think the same way he does when it comes to Putin’s Russia. And yet there are some, such as the signatories of an open letter published by Politico earlier this year, who advocate for a “rethink” of U.S. policy toward Russia and propose having “a serious and sustained strategic dialogue that addresses the deeper sources of mistrust and hostility and at the same time focuses on the large and urgent security challenges facing both countries.”
Putin is more interested in portraying the United States as Russia’s greatest enemy—to justify his repressive control at home.
There should be no confusion about the sources of mistrust and hostility in the U.S.-Russian relationship. For starters, Putin came to power under the cloud of four suspicious bombings in Russia in the fall of 1999 that killed some 300 Russians. In power, he oversaw the brutal campaign in Chechnya that led to tens of thousands of casualties and eventually elevated Ramzan Kadyrov, one of the most brutal regional leaders in the world, to run Chechnya.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia invaded neighboring Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. It illegally annexed Crimea and occupies further territory in those two countries along with the Transnistria region of Moldova. Putin bears ultimate responsibility for the 2014 shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine that killed 298 people on board. He supports like-minded authoritarian leaders, including Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Syria’s murderous President Bashar al-Assad, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Russian forces reportedly placed bounties on U.S. soldiers’ heads in Afghanistan. In the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russian hackers launched ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals and medical research institutions.
Putin is more interested in portraying the United States as Russia’s greatest enemy—to justify his repressive control at home—than he is in improving bilateral relations. He blames the United States for protests against his rule in Russia and for protest movements in neighboring countries. Putin views democratic systems of government as a threat to the authoritarian, kleptocratic system he oversees in Russia. Not only does he not mean the United States well—he actually means real harm to the United States and its allies.
The past several U.S. administrations have been tempted to try to get along with Russia. Former President George W. Bush famously said he looked into Putin’s soul after their first meeting in 2001; toward the end of his second term, Bush sought to patch up relations with Putin—but then Putin invaded Georgia. Former President Barack Obama tried a “reset” with then-President Dmitry Medvedev—but Putin invaded Ukraine in Obama’s second term. President Donald Trump tried personal diplomacy with Putin—and U.S.-Russian relations arguably are at their lowest point in decades.
The problem is Putin. He simply is not interested in any rethink in U.S.-Russian relations unless that was to involve a capitulation on the part of Washington. As long as Putin remains in power, there is little point in spending precious U.S. diplomatic and presidential time and effort in trying to improve U.S.-Russian relations. There is one exception, however: arms control, where the United States and Russia have a mutual interest in renewing the New START agreement, which is set to expire next February. Just as the United States was able to sign several arms control agreements with the Soviet Union while the two countries were rivals during the Cold War, Washington can today find common ground with Moscow while seeing Putin’s Russia as a threat on virtually every other issue. Neither country wants or can afford to engage in an expensive, destabilizing arms race.
Putin is simply not interested in any rethink in U.S.-Russian relations unless that was to involve a capitulation on the part of Washington.
In thinking about Russia, the Biden administration would be wise to learn from the mistakes of previous administrations in dealing with the country. The harm Putin has done along Russia’s periphery and beyond requires serious pushback from the West, and the United States must lead this effort, working closely with allies in Europe and elsewhere. Essentially, the Biden administration should develop a policy of containment.
Step one in such a containment policy requires the United States to treat its allies as allies, not as targets to undermine. While there may be disagreements between allies, the European Union and Germany are not threats to the United States, despite what Trump might think of them. Fighting between the United States and its European friends gives Putin openings to widen and divisions to exploit. Washington can disagree strongly with Berlin over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but a U.S. administration should not view German Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the key leaders holding Europe together, in the same way it views Putin. Pushback against Putin will be much more effective if the United States and Europe work closely together.
Too often, Washington seems to want better relations with Moscow than Moscow wants with Washington. That often makes the United States look desperate and weak when it should wait until Russia is serious about addressing problems constructively. That day may not come for a long time, but it is Russia that needs the West more than the other way around. Trump repeatedly said how great it would be if he and Putin got along. Great for whom? Biden should resist personalizing relations as Trump tried with Putin and Obama tried with Medvedev. No good will come of it.
The Biden administration should be mindful not to conflate the Russian regime and Putin with the Russian people as a whole. Putin pursues policies and actions that benefit him and his corrupt circle, not the Russian population. Whereas Putin views the United States as an enemy, only 3 percent of Russians shared that opinion earlier this year, according to a Levada Center survey (though that percentage inexplicably shot up to 70 percent in a more recent poll).
Biden’s aim to “impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms and stand with Russian civil society,” as he wrote, reveals a readiness to pursue a long-overdue policy based on principles and values. Given Russia’s appalling track record on human rights, the Biden administration should aggressively implement the Magnitsky Act, which penalizes Russian officials who engage in gross human rights abuses. The list of victims of the Putin regime’s brutal treatment of its perceived enemies is long. It includes the assassination or poisoning, either in Russia or on Western soil, of the former spies Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal, the journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Alexei Navalny.
While the EU recently imposed sanctions on several Russian officials suspected of involvement in the poisoning of Navalny, for example, the United States has done nothing about the case, and Trump has said nothing. Biden must clearly condemn these actions and impose consequences. Ignoring Putin’s abuses only encourages him.
Corruption is Putin’s most nefarious and successful export, and the West greedily imports it.
Biden should ignore advice to ease or remove sanctions on Russia until Putin withdraws Russia’s forces from Ukraine, including Crimea. Biden should also pursue sanctions and countermeasures against Russian hacking and trolling. Instead of easing sanctions, he should ramp them up periodically—ideally with the EU in lockstep—and make clear that such measures will continue until Putin changes his behavior.
Biden also should reject any advice to sell out Russia’s neighbors, for example by ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine or Georgia. Washington must respect the aspirations of the people in these countries to join the Euro-Atlantic community. The citizens of the Baltic states, which joined NATO in 2004, sleep better at night knowing they have the alliance’s security guarantees protecting them from Putin’s aggression. The people of Georgia and Ukraine should be entitled to the same. Otherwise, NATO would grant Russia de facto veto power over countries’ interest in joining Euro-Atlantic institutions—and even encourage Putin to engage in further territorial aggrandizement to block other countries’ aspirations.
Biden should show his support personally. Neither Obama nor Trump visited Ukraine or Georgia during their presidency to demonstrate U.S. support at the highest levels for these fledgling democracies. Biden has been to both countries numerous times, and he should include stops there on a trip to Europe. Investing in the success of these countries is a good way to solidify their defense against Moscow. He should also be unequivocal in his support for the people of Belarus in their struggle against Lukashenko.
Finally, the United States must stop enabling Russian corruption. Corruption is Putin’s most nefarious and successful export, and the West greedily imports it. It is encouraging to see Biden stress the need “to tackle the self-dealing, conflicts of interest, dark money, and rank corruption that are serving narrow, private, or foreign agendas and undermining our democracy.” Cutting off dirty Russian money that enjoys the safety of the U.S. financial system and real estate market, and removing its anonymity, would send a strong signal that there is a new sheriff in town.
There is no need for Washington to rethink, reset, or make overtures to Moscow. Clear-eyed analysis and a policy of containment are the best way to deal with the threat posed by Putin’s Russia. Biden’s instincts are sound—let’s hope he and his administration stick with them.