foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--In the Latest Democratic Debate, Finally, Some Foreign Policy

In the Latest Democratic Debate , Finally , Some Foreign Policy For a moment on Tuesday evening , the Democratic presidential race appeared frozen in 2002 , the year that then-Sen. Joe Biden and more than two dozen other Democrats joined Republicans and voted to authorize President George W. Bush ’ s invasion of Iraq , starting a war that has become synonymous with U.S. military overreach , mendacity , and the notion of endless wars .
At the opening of Tuesday ’ s debate in Iowa , the party ’ s oldest candidate , Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden , 77 , for gullibly abetting one of America ’ s “ two great foreign-policy disasters of our lifetimes ” —the other being the Vietnam War .
“ Joe and I listened to what Dick Cheney and George Bush and [ Donald ] Rumsfeld had to say .
I thought they were lying , ” Sanders said .
“ Joe saw it differently.
” Biden acknowledged it was a “ mistake ” to cast his vote in favor of the Iraq War , saying he was led to believe the Bush administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure Iraq to permit greater access to U.N. weapons inspectors , not to actually go to war .
But he said he strove to do all he could under President Barack Obama to get U.S. troops out of Iraq .
The detour through history underscored the enduring trauma that the Iraq War still inflicts on the American psyche , particularly at a time of rising military tensions with Iran .
But it also highlighted the challenges that the Democratic Party faces in moving beyond the past and coalescing around a platform that can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
When it came to foreign policy , the debate produced some signs of an emerging party platform , despite the onstage tension .
Candidates vowed to repair tattered diplomatic relations with allies , restore the role of diplomacy , invigorate international efforts to fight climate change , write protections for workers and the climate into trade agreements , and impose constraints on U.S. military spending .
“ The American people are sick and tired of endless wars , which have cost us trillions of dollars , ” Sanders said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nations , rebuild the State Department , make sure that we have the capability of bringing the world together to resolve international conflict diplomatically , and stop the endless wars that we have experienced.
” The debate featured a slimmed-down slate of six candidates , fostering a more substantive back-and-forth .
Joining Biden and Sanders on the debate stage were Pete Buttigieg , the mayor of South Bend , Indiana ; Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren ; Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar ; and the billionaire philanthropist Tom Steyer .
While virtually all the candidates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home from the Middle East , there were still some important differences .
Sanders and Warren did not say whether they favored an ongoing role for the U.S. military in combating the region ’ s terrorist groups .
Biden made a strong case for continuing the U.S.-led war on the Islamic State , as known as ISIS , and other terrorist organizations , relying on small teams of special operations forces , backed by a coalition of foreign powers .
“ I would leave troops in the Middle East in terms of patrolling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I think it ’ s a mistake to pull out the small number of troops that are there now to deal with ISIS.
” Klobuchar echoed the notion of limited military deployments for training and counterterrorism , arguing for the need to “ leave some troops ” in Afghanistan , where they have been deployed already for more than 18 years .
She also said she opposed U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to withdraw 150 troops from Syria last year , providing a green light for Turkey ’ s invasion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ Kurdish partners .
She also said she ’ d leave troops in Iraq , despite Baghdad ’ s request that Washington begin recalling its forces .
“ When it comes to Iraq , right now I would leave our troops there despite the mess that has been created by Donald Trump.
” Klobuchar joined other Democratic candidates in calling for renewed engagement with Iran and other nations that supported the Iran nuclear deal , even while some Democrats vowed to keep nuclear weapons out of Tehran ’ s hands .
Klobuchar praised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran nuclear deal together in spite of Trump ’ s efforts to kill it .
“ I would start negotiations again , ” she said .
“ Because of the actions of Donald Trump , we are in a situation where … Iran is starting to enrich uranium again in violation of the original agreement.
” Unlike Trump , Democrats seemed far less willing to engage directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un—at least without an upfront commitment to dismantle his nuclear weapons .
“ Absent preconditions , ” Biden said , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ supreme leader , ’ who said , ‘ Joe Biden is a rabid dog .
He should be beaten to death with a stick.
’ ” “ Other than that , you like him ?
” Sanders quipped .
Trump ’ s recent military actions in the Middle East prompted calls for greater congressional constraints on the use of military force , with Buttigieg proposing the need for a new authorization bill for future military interventions .
Warren said that , while she would authorize military action without congressional approval in response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in general Congress needed to authorize the military ’ s use of force “ before we take this nation into combat.
” Buttigieg , who was still a teenager when the United States came under attack on 9/11 , sought to parlay his lack of national political experience into an asset , arguing that the next president will be confronted by new threats , such as “ cybersecurity challenges , climate security challenges , [ and ] foreign interference in our elections.
” Indeed , climate change emerged as a key topic in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as “ my No .
1 priority.
” Steyer said that while he would “ undo ” Trump ’ s trade tariffs on his first day as president , he would not approve any future trade deals that did not include a provision protecting the climate .
Steyer was asked how to square the fact that he had profited handsomely from oil and gas investments with his commitment to battle climate change .
He said he reached a realization in the past decade that something had to be done and divested his fossil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , “ I would declare a state of emergency on day one on climate .
”

For a moment on Tuesday evening, the Democratic presidential race appeared frozen in 2002, the year that then-Sen. Joe Biden and more than two dozen other Democrats joined Republicans and voted to authorize President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, starting a war that has become synonymous with U.S. military overreach, mendacity, and the notion of endless wars.
For a moment on Tuesday evening, the Democratic presidential race appeared frozen in 2002, the year that then-Sen. Joe Biden and more than two dozen other Democrats joined Republicans and voted to authorize President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, starting a war that has become synonymous with U.S. military overreach, mendacity, and the notion of endless wars.
At the opening of Tuesday’s debate in Iowa, the party’s oldest candidate, Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, 78, tore into former Vice President Biden, 77, for gullibly abetting one of America’s “two great foreign-policy disasters of our lifetimes”—the other being the Vietnam War.
“Joe and I listened to what Dick Cheney and George Bush and [Donald] Rumsfeld had to say. I thought they were lying,” Sanders said. “Joe saw it differently.”
Biden acknowledged it was a “mistake” to cast his vote in favor of the Iraq War, saying he was led to believe the Bush administration would use the war authorization bill to pressure Iraq to permit greater access to U.N. weapons inspectors, not to actually go to war. But he said he strove to do all he could under President Barack Obama to get U.S. troops out of Iraq.
The detour through history underscored the enduring trauma that the Iraq War still inflicts on the American psyche, particularly at a time of rising military tensions with Iran. But it also highlighted the challenges that the Democratic Party faces in moving beyond the past and coalescing around a platform that can return it to the White House next year.
When it came to foreign policy, the debate produced some signs of an emerging party platform, despite the onstage tension. Candidates vowed to repair tattered diplomatic relations with allies, restore the role of diplomacy, invigorate international efforts to fight climate change, write protections for workers and the climate into trade agreements, and impose constraints on U.S. military spending.
“The American people are sick and tired of endless wars, which have cost us trillions of dollars,” Sanders said. “Our job is to rebuild the United Nations, rebuild the State Department, make sure that we have the capability of bringing the world together to resolve international conflict diplomatically, and stop the endless wars that we have experienced.”
The debate featured a slimmed-down slate of six candidates, fostering a more substantive back-and-forth. Joining Biden and Sanders on the debate stage were Pete Buttigieg, the mayor of South Bend, Indiana; Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren; Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar; and the billionaire philanthropist Tom Steyer.
While virtually all the candidates called for U.S. combat troops to come home from the Middle East, there were still some important differences. Sanders and Warren did not say whether they favored an ongoing role for the U.S. military in combating the region’s terrorist groups. Biden made a strong case for continuing the U.S.-led war on the Islamic State, as known as ISIS, and other terrorist organizations, relying on small teams of special operations forces, backed by a coalition of foreign powers.
“I would leave troops in the Middle East in terms of patrolling the Gulf,” Biden said. “I think it’s a mistake to pull out the small number of troops that are there now to deal with ISIS.”
Klobuchar echoed the notion of limited military deployments for training and counterterrorism, arguing for the need to “leave some troops” in Afghanistan, where they have been deployed already for more than 18 years. She also said she opposed U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw 150 troops from Syria last year, providing a green light for Turkey’s invasion and subsequent slaughter of the United States’ Kurdish partners. She also said she’d leave troops in Iraq, despite Baghdad’s request that Washington begin recalling its forces.
“When it comes to Iraq, right now I would leave our troops there despite the mess that has been created by Donald Trump.”
Klobuchar joined other Democratic candidates in calling for renewed engagement with Iran and other nations that supported the Iran nuclear deal, even while some Democrats vowed to keep nuclear weapons out of Tehran’s hands. Klobuchar praised European powers for trying to hold the Iran nuclear deal together in spite of Trump’s efforts to kill it. “I would start negotiations again,” she said. “Because of the actions of Donald Trump, we are in a situation where … Iran is starting to enrich uranium again in violation of the original agreement.”
Unlike Trump, Democrats seemed far less willing to engage directly with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un—at least without an upfront commitment to dismantle his nuclear weapons. “Absent preconditions,” Biden said, “I would not meet with the ‘supreme leader,’ who said, ‘Joe Biden is a rabid dog. He should be beaten to death with a stick.’”
“Other than that, you like him?” Sanders quipped.
Trump’s recent military actions in the Middle East prompted calls for greater congressional constraints on the use of military force, with Buttigieg proposing the need for a new authorization bill for future military interventions. Warren said that, while she would authorize military action without congressional approval in response to an “imminent threat,” in general Congress needed to authorize the military’s use of force “before we take this nation into combat.”
Buttigieg, who was still a teenager when the United States came under attack on 9/11, sought to parlay his lack of national political experience into an asset, arguing that the next president will be confronted by new threats, such as “cybersecurity challenges, climate security challenges, [and] foreign interference in our elections.”
Indeed, climate change emerged as a key topic in the debate, with Steyer citing it as “my No. 1 priority.” Steyer said that while he would “undo” Trump’s trade tariffs on his first day as president, he would not approve any future trade deals that did not include a provision protecting the climate.
Steyer was asked how to square the fact that he had profited handsomely from oil and gas investments with his commitment to battle climate change. He said he reached a realization in the past decade that something had to be done and divested his fossil fuel investments.
As president, he said, “I would declare a state of emergency on day one on climate.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--‘Russia’s Political Transition Has Arrived Ahead of Schedule’

MOSCOW—Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly began the country ’ s political transition Wednesday with a constitutional shake-up and the naming of a new prime minister , paving the way for the 67-year-old leader to continue driving Russian politics even after he formally leaves the presidency in 2024 .
In his annual State of the Nation address , Putin proposed changes to the constitution in a series of moves that appear to pave the way for the term-limited president to assume a new position of power after he leaves office .
A few hours after Putin ’ s address , Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he and the entire Russian government would be resigning , saying that the Russian president will choose a new government .
Putin later nominated Mikhail Mishustin , a 53-year-old technocrat who heads the Federal Tax Service and is best known for boosting tax collections and cutting graft , as Medvedev ’ s successor .
Mishustin is a low-profile choice not seen as a power player in Moscow , making his prospects of transitioning into a major political force unlikely .
“ Russia ’ s political transition has arrived ahead of schedule , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center .
“ Putin is trying to make his transition more comfortable for himself , and getting rid of Medvedev , who was toxic for both elites and the people , is necessary.
” The shock statement came shortly after Putin spent most of his 80-minute address pledging to raise living standards and boost economic growth .
Russia ’ s economy has lagged in recent years , and Medvedev and his government have been criticized for their poor performance and faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appeared together in a choreographed announcement on state television , where cabinet ministers were told of Medvedev ’ s departure and the government ’ s resignation .
The Kremlin said that Medvedev will take up a new post as deputy chairman of the Security Council , where he will answer to Putin , who chairs the body as president .
“ We should provide the president of our country with the possibility to take all the necessary measures ” to carry out the changes , Medvedev said .
“ All further decisions will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flurry of changes set the stage for a new era in Russian politics and appear designed to give Putin the option of maintaining a large degree of influence even after leaving the presidency .
During his address , Putin suggested amending the constitution to allow lawmakers to name prime ministers and cabinet members and to introduce a two-term limit for the presidency .
The president currently has the power under the constitution to choose the prime minister , which is subject to approval by parliament , who then goes on to form the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of reforms would be put to a national vote , although he did not specify when .
Observers and Russia ’ s political elites have long ventured guesses about Putin ’ s future plans and how he could look to amend the constitution to maintain power after his term limit ends in four years .
While Putin maintains sweeping authority within the Russian political system , the Kremlin remains concerned about potential popular backlash that extending his power could trigger .
When Putin returned to the presidency after a four-year hiatus , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 2012 , and it caused a rift among elites .
So this time , the Kremlin is treading carefully and looking to enshrine Putin ’ s future hold on the system while maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy .
“ The timing was the surprise factor here , not the substance , ” said Ekaterina Schulmann , a Moscow-based political analyst .
“ Uncertainty can be an advantage for some leaders dealing with succession , but also a risk .
This might mean that intra-elite infighting was heating up so much that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Some had speculated that the Russian leader would press ahead for a merger with neighboring Belarus that would create a new position for Putin as the head of a new unified state , giving him a way to skirt formal term limits .
But Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has rejected such a measure and resisted Kremlin pressure .
Another option for Putin to stay in charge would be increasing the power of parliament and the cabinet and trimming the authority of the president , then shifting into the prime minister ’ s seat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president from 2008 to 2012 .
But the Russian president also hinted toward another potential route during Wednesday ’ s announcement .
Putin proposed enhancing the role of the State Council , a government body with undefined authority , which could be used as a way for the leader to wield significant informal power after stepping down as president in 2024 .
“ Putin will stay inside the system and looks to be planning to stay engaged in strategic policymaking , but he also seems to be setting up a scenario where his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Stanovaya said .
“ [ Putin ] remembers his bad experiences with Medvedev and he knows he will likely have some conflicts with whoever comes next as president .
So , he wants to have mechanisms to manage those disagreements as he sets up his slow transition.
” Putin served two terms as president from 2000 to 2008 before shifting into the prime minister ’ s seat for four years to observe the limit on consecutive terms .
Though Putin continued to call the shots as prime minister , he clashed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Medvedev ’ s moves—particularly Medvedev ’ s decision to abstain during a vote at the United Nations Security Council in 2011 to allow a NATO-led air campaign in Libya that helped oust the dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi and plunge the country into civil war .
The exact motives for Wednesday ’ s decisions remain unclear , though domestic pressures could explain much of it .
In his address , Putin focused on such issues as economic growth , tackling rising poverty , and endemic corruption .
The Kremlin has struggled to boost Putin ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after the 2014 annexation of Crimea .
Real incomes have fallen by half in a decade amid a stagnating economy , under pressure from U.S. sanctions over the Crimean annexation as well as relatively low oil prices .
The summer of 2019 also saw large street protests in Moscow and deepening disenchantment and malaise with the ruling United Russia party ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections slated for 2021 .
“ The succession question has been looming over the public and the elite for some time and Putin is looking to stop that pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Andrea Kendall-Taylor , a former senior U.S. intelligence analyst focused on Russia and Eurasia and now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security .
“ This is obviously something that has been carefully thought about and orchestrated for some time .
”

MOSCOW—Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly began the country’s political transition Wednesday with a constitutional shake-up and the naming of a new prime minister, paving the way for the 67-year-old leader to continue driving Russian politics even after he formally leaves the presidency in 2024.
MOSCOW—Russian President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly began the country’s political transition Wednesday with a constitutional shake-up and the naming of a new prime minister, paving the way for the 67-year-old leader to continue driving Russian politics even after he formally leaves the presidency in 2024.
In his annual State of the Nation address, Putin proposed changes to the constitution in a series of moves that appear to pave the way for the term-limited president to assume a new position of power after he leaves office. A few hours after Putin’s address, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced on live television that he and the entire Russian government would be resigning, saying that the Russian president will choose a new government.
Putin later nominated Mikhail Mishustin, a 53-year-old technocrat who heads the Federal Tax Service and is best known for boosting tax collections and cutting graft, as Medvedev’s successor. Mishustin is a low-profile choice not seen as a power player in Moscow, making his prospects of transitioning into a major political force unlikely.
“Russia’s political transition has arrived ahead of schedule,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, the founder of the political consultancy R.Politik and a scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Putin is trying to make his transition more comfortable for himself, and getting rid of Medvedev, who was toxic for both elites and the people, is necessary.”
The shock statement came shortly after Putin spent most of his 80-minute address pledging to raise living standards and boost economic growth. Russia’s economy has lagged in recent years, and Medvedev and his government have been criticized for their poor performance and faced falling popularity. Both Putin and Medvedev appeared together in a choreographed announcement on state television, where cabinet ministers were told of Medvedev’s departure and the government’s resignation. The Kremlin said that Medvedev will take up a new post as deputy chairman of the Security Council, where he will answer to Putin, who chairs the body as president.
“We should provide the president of our country with the possibility to take all the necessary measures” to carry out the changes, Medvedev said. “All further decisions will be taken by the president.”
The flurry of changes set the stage for a new era in Russian politics and appear designed to give Putin the option of maintaining a large degree of influence even after leaving the presidency. During his address, Putin suggested amending the constitution to allow lawmakers to name prime ministers and cabinet members and to introduce a two-term limit for the presidency. The president currently has the power under the constitution to choose the prime minister, which is subject to approval by parliament, who then goes on to form the cabinet. Putin said that the package of reforms would be put to a national vote, although he did not specify when.
Observers and Russia’s political elites have long ventured guesses about Putin’s future plans and how he could look to amend the constitution to maintain power after his term limit ends in four years. While Putin maintains sweeping authority within the Russian political system, the Kremlin remains concerned about potential popular backlash that extending his power could trigger. When Putin returned to the presidency after a four-year hiatus, it sparked massive protests in Moscow in 2011 and 2012, and it caused a rift among elites. So this time, the Kremlin is treading carefully and looking to enshrine Putin’s future hold on the system while maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy.
“The timing was the surprise factor here, not the substance,” said Ekaterina Schulmann, a Moscow-based political analyst. “Uncertainty can be an advantage for some leaders dealing with succession, but also a risk. This might mean that intra-elite infighting was heating up so much that they needed to eliminate the uncertainty.”
Some had speculated that the Russian leader would press ahead for a merger with neighboring Belarus that would create a new position for Putin as the head of a new unified state, giving him a way to skirt formal term limits. But Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has rejected such a measure and resisted Kremlin pressure. Another option for Putin to stay in charge would be increasing the power of parliament and the cabinet and trimming the authority of the president, then shifting into the prime minister’s seat, as Putin did with Medvedev as president from 2008 to 2012.
But the Russian president also hinted toward another potential route during Wednesday’s announcement. Putin proposed enhancing the role of the State Council, a government body with undefined authority, which could be used as a way for the leader to wield significant informal power after stepping down as president in 2024.
“Putin will stay inside the system and looks to be planning to stay engaged in strategic policymaking, but he also seems to be setting up a scenario where his potential successor can realize their own agenda,” Stanovaya said. “[Putin] remembers his bad experiences with Medvedev and he knows he will likely have some conflicts with whoever comes next as president. So, he wants to have mechanisms to manage those disagreements as he sets up his slow transition.”
Putin served two terms as president from 2000 to 2008 before shifting into the prime minister’s seat for four years to observe the limit on consecutive terms. Though Putin continued to call the shots as prime minister, he clashed with and remained critical of some of Medvedev’s moves—particularly Medvedev’s decision to abstain during a vote at the United Nations Security Council in 2011 to allow a NATO-led air campaign in Libya that helped oust the dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi and plunge the country into civil war.
The exact motives for Wednesday’s decisions remain unclear, though domestic pressures could explain much of it. In his address, Putin focused on such issues as economic growth, tackling rising poverty, and endemic corruption. The Kremlin has struggled to boost Putin’s near-record-low approval ratings, which soared after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Real incomes have fallen by half in a decade amid a stagnating economy, under pressure from U.S. sanctions over the Crimean annexation as well as relatively low oil prices. The summer of 2019 also saw large street protests in Moscow and deepening disenchantment and malaise with the ruling United Russia party ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections slated for 2021.
“The succession question has been looming over the public and the elite for some time and Putin is looking to stop that pressure from building up even more,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former senior U.S. intelligence analyst focused on Russia and Eurasia and now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “This is obviously something that has been carefully thought about and orchestrated for some time.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Immigrants Are Big Fans of Germany’s Anti-Immigrant Party

The German district of Haidach , population 8,500 , in the city of Pforzheim , is seemingly quite ordinary .
With rows of white , pink , and yellow apartment buildings , it resembles many other communities in the southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg : well-kept and peaceful places with elementary schools , supermarkets , bakeries , pharmacies , and public playgrounds .
Reflecting Germany ’ s growing multiculturalism , more than 60 percent of Haidach residents are immigrants or their direct descendents .
A visitor to this quiet suburban environment would not see anything suggesting isolation , anger , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the constituencies where the far-right party Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) performs best .
In Baden-Württemberg ’ s regional elections of 2016 , the party received 43 percent of the vote in Haidach , and in the federal elections of 2017 , 37 percent of the area ’ s residents chose AfD .
Many of these AfD supporters are immigrants : not from Africa or the Middle East , but from Russia .
AfD is generally seen as a xenophobic , nativist force in German politics , and yet one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party claims that one-third of its voters are Russian Germans , and a recent study has shown that although this figure is probably exaggerated , support for the party among Russian Germans is above the national average .
While AfD has a reputation for anti-Semitism , its voters also include a small but growing number of Russian Jews .
In the 2017 elections , AfD fielded six Bundestag candidates who were born in the former Soviet Union , and two of them—Anton Friesen and Waldemar Herdt—are now deputies in that body .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reevaluate what it means to be a far-right party—and a far-right voter .
Because the German government does not publish statistics on ethnicity , it is unknown precisely how many Russian speakers live in Germany .
A conservative estimate from Osnabrück University suggests that about 3 million of the country ’ s 83 million residents were born in the former Soviet Union .
The majority of these are ethnic Germans—also known as Volga Germans or Russlanddeutsche—whose ancestors had emigrated to the Russian Empire in the 18th century .
After the Soviet Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ returned to Germany alongside several hundred thousand Russian Jews , ethnic Russians , and other Soviet peoples .
Although the term “ Russlanddeutsche ” formally refers to ethnic Germans , it is often used as shorthand for the entire Russian-speaking population of Germany .
Immigrants of Russian or Soviet origin are often described as an “ invisible minority.
” As late as 2013 , a report authored by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees identified the community as politically disinterested , and prior to 2017 it received scant attention in German entertainment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalist Nikolai Mitrokhin wrote , “ German TV channels … almost entirely ignore Russophones .
There are no Russians moderators or lead actors in serials , and they seldom participate in talk shows … No documentaries are made about the problems and achievements of Russian speakers.
” Although community members self-report high levels of integration , there are echoes of a Russian German parallel society .
Members of the demographic buy Eastern European cuisine from the Mix Markt supermarket chain , some older immigrants still speak little German , and there is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
Why does AfD appeal to some Russian Germans , and why does the party view them as a potent constituency ?
The evidence suggests three interrelated answers : AfD ’ s search for legitimacy , the combination of social conservatism and contrasting immigration narratives , and the influence of Russian state media .
Like France ’ s National Rally ( formerly National Front ) political party , AfD seeks legitimacy in a system whose mainstream is reflexively hostile to far-right politics .
Since the party first gained representation in three state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an agreement among other German parties that entering into a coalition with AfD is unacceptable .
This has to date been an iron rule that has survived even when AfD holds more than one-quarter of all seats in a legislature , as is currently the case in the states of Saxony and Brandenburg .
The attitude of the German political establishment toward AfD is one of containment and isolation .
AfD has responded to its quarantined status by trying to rebut accusations of bigotry , xenophobia , and anti-Semitism .
The outreach campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this strategy .
Party leaders such as Jörg Meuthen have used Russian German support to counter the notion that AfD is an anti-immigrant organization .
AfD has gone so far as to openly declare itself a champion of immigrant well-being in its Russian-language advertising .
In a June 2018 open letter about pension reform , the Russian German Bundestag deputy Friesen wrote that “ The AfD faction is for equality for immigrants … Russian Germans have the same rights and entitlements as all other citizens of our country.
” The party has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to attract Russian Jews by portraying Muslim immigrants as the true threat to Judaism in Germany .
But much as AfD has taken advantage of its Russian German support to improve its image , that support could not exist without genuine ideological compatibility between the party ’ s platform and the social conservatism of many in the Russian-speaking population .
According to a survey of foreign-born Russian Germans conducted by the Bonn-based Boris Nemtsov Foundation in August and September 2016 , 49 percent of the community members interviewed believe that Germany ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and 72 percent believe that refugees have “ terrorists among them.
” More broadly , less than half of Russian Germans deem living next to a homosexual neighbor “ acceptable , ” and significant numbers across generations believe that the West is “ prejudiced ” against the Russian Federation .
AfD ’ s Russian-language campaign appeals to these views .
In September 2017 , an issue of the newspaper Telegraf NRW featured a front-page advertisement for the Russian German Bundestag candidate Yevgeny Schmidt , which made the following pledges : “ Stopping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our citizens ; achieving decent pensions ; upholding the traditional family ; preserving Christian traditions ; restoring good-neighborly relations with Russia.
” AfD positions itself not only as the natural ideological home for Russian Germans but also as the sole party that appreciates the community ’ s history , problems , and efforts to integrate into German society .
AfD ’ s Meuthen said of this : “ Take a look at who really votes for the AfD , and where we have the strongest numbers … people with an immigrant background who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe what is happening to this country.
” Russian Germans who campaign for the party portray their community ’ s immigration to Germany as a journey of struggle that was confronted quietly , diligently , and successfully .
This is openly contrasted with the denigration or dismissal of North African or Middle Eastern migrants and their experiences .
On a Facebook page called “ Russian Germans for the AfD , ” which was created in June 2016 and has more than 13,000 followers , the description reads : “ We are among the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades ago … Observed suspiciously by the local population , we still managed to integrate successfully here , although not all wounds healed and not all humiliations are forgotten.
” In a political focus group assembled by German academics prior to the 2017 elections , an ethnic German immigrant in his 60s said : “ We had huge problems entering the country .
And other people have it really easy .
They are simply waved through.
” The relationship between Russian Germans and AfD is not an entirely organic phenomenon of German politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and disinformation in generating support for the party can not be ignored , though some Russian German leaders have warned against exaggeration .
The Boris Nemtsov Foundation reports that about 40 percent of those polled turn to Russian television and internet media as a primary source of information .
Heavy users of Russian-language media have harsher beliefs about immigration , greater fear of Islamic terrorism , and more skepticism of German institutions and values .
In January 2016 , Kremlin networks falsely reported that a young Russian girl had been raped in Berlin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protest movement of Russian Germans in 20 cities across the country .
The so-called Lisa case raised awareness in the German public sphere about the threat of Russian propaganda , and a postmortem government study concluded that while “ Berlin state police published a complete denial of the story , most Russian government-controlled media that featured the issue did not correct it or remove it from their websites.
” In the last six years , a symbiosis has developed between AfD and the Kremlin .
AfD receives extremely negative coverage in the German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kremlin outlets , while the Russian state likely views AfD as a useful advocate for Russia in German politics .
The party has made numerous overtures to Moscow in pursuit of external support .
AfD-funded or affiliated publications such as Zuerst !
, Compact magazine , Epoch Times Germany , and Junge Freiheit are generally positive about Russia ’ s government and geopolitical positions .
A recent study has shown that there is some reciprocation : Kremlin outlets such as RT Deutsch and Sputnik Deutschland systematically promote AfD and denigrate all other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agencies are far from universally trusted among Russian Germans , they are known to have a strong foothold in areas with high concentrations of post-Soviet migrants , such as Pforzheim , Osnabrück , and eastern Berlin .
What does it mean when immigrants support an anti-immigrant party ?
Few Germans would consider AfD a plausible political home for immigrants , but this is what the party represents for a sizable segment of the country ’ s Russian-speaking population .
If there is a lesson from this fact , it is that the interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not always mutually exclusive .
AfD seeks the credibility and success that have eluded every other far-right party in postwar Germany , and Russian Germans are a key to shedding its neo-Nazi image .
Immigrants , meanwhile , are not single-issue voters and should not be stereotyped as such .
Like most people , they vote for a complex array of reasons , in which immigrant status is one—and not necessarily the most important—factor .
Russian Germans who campaign for AfD cite culture , religion , family , and economy as components @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Russian-language advertising covers all of these themes .
That should be a warning for those who seek simplistic explanations for the success of far-right parties : In the world of right-wing populism , not all immigrants are the enemy .

The German district of Haidach, population 8,500, in the city of Pforzheim, is seemingly quite ordinary. With rows of white, pink, and yellow apartment buildings, it resembles many other communities in the southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg: well-kept and peaceful places with elementary schools, supermarkets, bakeries, pharmacies, and public playgrounds. Reflecting Germany’s growing multiculturalism, more than 60 percent of Haidach residents are immigrants or their direct descendents.
The German district of Haidach, population 8,500, in the city of Pforzheim, is seemingly quite ordinary. With rows of white, pink, and yellow apartment buildings, it resembles many other communities in the southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg: well-kept and peaceful places with elementary schools, supermarkets, bakeries, pharmacies, and public playgrounds. Reflecting Germany’s growing multiculturalism, more than 60 percent of Haidach residents are immigrants or their direct descendents.
A visitor to this quiet suburban environment would not see anything suggesting isolation, anger, or political extremism. But Haidach is one of the constituencies where the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) performs best. In Baden-Württemberg’s regional elections of 2016, the party received 43 percent of the vote in Haidach, and in the federal elections of 2017, 37 percent of the area’s residents chose AfD. Many of these AfD supporters are immigrants: not from Africa or the Middle East, but from Russia.
AfD is generally seen as a xenophobic, nativist force in German politics, and yet one of its key constituencies is foreign-born. The party claims that one-third of its voters are Russian Germans, and a recent study has shown that although this figure is probably exaggerated, support for the party among Russian Germans is above the national average. While AfD has a reputation for anti-Semitism, its voters also include a small but growing number of Russian Jews. In the 2017 elections, AfD fielded six Bundestag candidates who were born in the former Soviet Union, and two of them—Anton Friesen and Waldemar Herdt—are now deputies in that body. These emerging phenomena suggest it may be time to reevaluate what it means to be a far-right party—and a far-right voter.
Because the German government does not publish statistics on ethnicity, it is unknown precisely how many Russian speakers live in Germany. A conservative estimate from Osnabrück University suggests that about 3 million of the country’s 83 million residents were born in the former Soviet Union. The majority of these are ethnic Germans—also known as Volga Germans or Russlanddeutsche—whose ancestors had emigrated to the Russian Empire in the 18th century. After the Soviet Union collapsed 1991, more than 2 million returned to Germany alongside several hundred thousand Russian Jews, ethnic Russians, and other Soviet peoples. Although the term “Russlanddeutsche” formally refers to ethnic Germans, it is often used as shorthand for the entire Russian-speaking population of Germany.
Immigrants of Russian or Soviet origin are often described as an “invisible minority.” As late as 2013, a report authored by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees identified the community as politically disinterested, and prior to 2017 it received scant attention in German entertainment or news media. In 2017 the journalist Nikolai Mitrokhin wrote, “German TV channels … almost entirely ignore Russophones. There are no Russians moderators or lead actors in serials, and they seldom participate in talk shows … No documentaries are made about the problems and achievements of Russian speakers.” Although community members self-report high levels of integration, there are echoes of a Russian German parallel society. Members of the demographic buy Eastern European cuisine from the Mix Markt supermarket chain, some older immigrants still speak little German, and there is a large locally produced Russian-language press throughout the country.
Why does AfD appeal to some Russian Germans, and why does the party view them as a potent constituency? The evidence suggests three interrelated answers: AfD’s search for legitimacy, the combination of social conservatism and contrasting immigration narratives, and the influence of Russian state media.
Like France’s National Rally (formerly National Front) political party, AfD seeks legitimacy in a system whose mainstream is reflexively hostile to far-right politics. Since the party first gained representation in three state parliaments in 2014, there has been an agreement among other German parties that entering into a coalition with AfD is unacceptable. This has to date been an iron rule that has survived even when AfD holds more than one-quarter of all seats in a legislature, as is currently the case in the states of Saxony and Brandenburg. The attitude of the German political establishment toward AfD is one of containment and isolation.
AfD has responded to its quarantined status by trying to rebut accusations of bigotry, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. The outreach campaign in the Russian German population forms part of this strategy. Party leaders such as Jörg Meuthen have used Russian German support to counter the notion that AfD is an anti-immigrant organization. AfD has gone so far as to openly declare itself a champion of immigrant well-being in its Russian-language advertising. In a June 2018 open letter about pension reform, the Russian German Bundestag deputy Friesen wrote that “The AfD faction is for equality for immigrants … Russian Germans have the same rights and entitlements as all other citizens of our country.” The party has also tried, with some success, to attract Russian Jews by portraying Muslim immigrants as the true threat to Judaism in Germany.
But much as AfD has taken advantage of its Russian German support to improve its image, that support could not exist without genuine ideological compatibility between the party’s platform and the social conservatism of many in the Russian-speaking population. According to a survey of foreign-born Russian Germans conducted by the Bonn-based Boris Nemtsov Foundation in August and September 2016, 49 percent of the community members interviewed believe that Germany’s borders should be completely closed to refugees, and 72 percent believe that refugees have “terrorists among them.”
More broadly, less than half of Russian Germans deem living next to a homosexual neighbor “acceptable,” and significant numbers across generations believe that the West is “prejudiced” against the Russian Federation. AfD’s Russian-language campaign appeals to these views. In September 2017, an issue of the newspaper Telegraf NRW featured a front-page advertisement for the Russian German Bundestag candidate Yevgeny Schmidt, which made the following pledges: “Stopping migrant chaos; securing the safety of our citizens; achieving decent pensions; upholding the traditional family; preserving Christian traditions; restoring good-neighborly relations with Russia.”
AfD positions itself not only as the natural ideological home for Russian Germans but also as the sole party that appreciates the community’s history, problems, and efforts to integrate into German society. AfD’s Meuthen said of this: “Take a look at who really votes for the AfD, and where we have the strongest numbers … people with an immigrant background who lead integrated lives here … cannot believe what is happening to this country.” Russian Germans who campaign for the party portray their community’s immigration to Germany as a journey of struggle that was confronted quietly, diligently, and successfully. This is openly contrasted with the denigration or dismissal of North African or Middle Eastern migrants and their experiences. On a Facebook page called “Russian Germans for the AfD,” which was created in June 2016 and has more than 13,000 followers, the description reads: “We are among the much-scolded Russian Germans who came to Germany decades ago … Observed suspiciously by the local population, we still managed to integrate successfully here, although not all wounds healed and not all humiliations are forgotten.” In a political focus group assembled by German academics prior to the 2017 elections, an ethnic German immigrant in his 60s said: “We had huge problems entering the country. And other people have it really easy. They are simply waved through.”
The relationship between Russian Germans and AfD is not an entirely organic phenomenon of German politics. The role of Russian state media and disinformation in generating support for the party cannot be ignored, though some Russian German leaders have warned against exaggeration. The Boris Nemtsov Foundation reports that about 40 percent of those polled turn to Russian television and internet media as a primary source of information. Heavy users of Russian-language media have harsher beliefs about immigration, greater fear of Islamic terrorism, and more skepticism of German institutions and values. In January 2016, Kremlin networks falsely reported that a young Russian girl had been raped in Berlin by Arab migrants, generating a brief protest movement of Russian Germans in 20 cities across the country. The so-called Lisa case raised awareness in the German public sphere about the threat of Russian propaganda, and a postmortem government study concluded that while “Berlin state police published a complete denial of the story, most Russian government-controlled media that featured the issue did not correct it or remove it from their websites.”
In the last six years, a symbiosis has developed between AfD and the Kremlin. AfD receives extremely negative coverage in the German press and has sought a better portrayal in Kremlin outlets, while the Russian state likely views AfD as a useful advocate for Russia in German politics. The party has made numerous overtures to Moscow in pursuit of external support. AfD-funded or affiliated publications such as Zuerst!, Compact magazine, Epoch Times Germany, and Junge Freiheit are generally positive about Russia’s government and geopolitical positions. A recent study has shown that there is some reciprocation: Kremlin outlets such as RT Deutsch and Sputnik Deutschland systematically promote AfD and denigrate all other German parties. While these and similar agencies are far from universally trusted among Russian Germans, they are known to have a strong foothold in areas with high concentrations of post-Soviet migrants, such as Pforzheim, Osnabrück, and eastern Berlin.
What does it mean when immigrants support an anti-immigrant party? Few Germans would consider AfD a plausible political home for immigrants, but this is what the party represents for a sizable segment of the country’s Russian-speaking population. If there is a lesson from this fact, it is that the interests of right-wing populist parties and immigrant voters are not always mutually exclusive. AfD seeks the credibility and success that have eluded every other far-right party in postwar Germany, and Russian Germans are a key to shedding its neo-Nazi image. Immigrants, meanwhile, are not single-issue voters and should not be stereotyped as such. Like most people, they vote for a complex array of reasons, in which immigrant status is one—and not necessarily the most important—factor. Russian Germans who campaign for AfD cite culture, religion, family, and economy as components of their decision-making, and the party’s Russian-language advertising covers all of these themes. That should be a warning for those who seek simplistic explanations for the success of far-right parties: In the world of right-wing populism, not all immigrants are the enemy.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Giuliani Associates May Have Surveilled U.S. Ambassador, New Evidence Shows

Giuliani Associates May Have Surveilled U.S .
Ambassador , New Evidence Shows Associates of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s personal lawyer appeared to physically , and perhaps electronically , surveil the then-U.S. ambassador to Ukraine last spring as they dialed up their pressure campaign on authorities in Kyiv , according to new evidence released by House Democrats on Tuesday .
The new revelations came on the eve of Wednesday ’ s House vote to hand over articles of impeachment to the Senate , and it could increase pressure on Republicans to call for further evidence and witness testimony as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trial , which is expected to get underway next week .
The trove of documents includes notes and messages provided to lawmakers by Lev Parnas , a Republican donor and associate of Trump ’ s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani .
Parnas was indicted in October for campaign finance violations .
The documents corroborate evidence that emerged during the House impeachment investigation that the president ’ s personal lawyer spearheaded a campaign to pressure officials in Ukraine to open probes into former Vice President Joe Biden and his son ’ s activities in Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 2020 reelection campaign .
Parnas ’ s handwritten notes on stationary from the Ritz-Carlton Vienna lay out the conspiracy targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the bluntest terms : “ get Zalensky to Announce to announce that the Biden case will Be Investigated.
” But the documents also contain a number of new threads for lawmakers to pull on , such as the involvement of Robert F. Hyde , a Republican congressional candidate from Connecticut who made headlines last year over his obscene tweets about former presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure campaign was not previously known , but a string of text messages exchanged with Parnas suggest that he may have had then-Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch under physical , and possibly electronic , surveillance .
“ She ’ s talked to three people .
Her phone is off .
Computer is off , ” he wrote to Parnas in March last year , later adding “ They will let me know when she ’ s on the move.
” Parnas replied to say , “ Perfect.
” Later in the same conversation , Hyde @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help if we/you would like a price .
… Guess you can do anything in Ukraine with money … what I was told.
” A former State Department official who worked with Yovanovitch told Foreign Policy that they felt sick when they read the messages , “ I didn ’ t think I had the capacity to be shocked any more and yet here we are.
” The revelations were “ Not just insane , but deeply chilling , ” said a current State Department official .
“ Needless to say , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monitoring Ambassador Yovanovitch ’ s movements for unknown purposes is disturbing , ” Lawrence S. Robbins , Yovanovitch ’ s attorney , said in a statement to CNN .
“ We trust that the appropriate authorities will conduct an investigation to determine what happened.
” During Yovanovitch ’ s testimony on Nov. 15 , 2019 , Hyde sent a tweet calling the former ambassador a “ traitor ” and a “ scumbag.
” Hyde told NBC News that he had been drinking when he sent the text messages to Parnas .
For U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surveillance by foreign powers is expected , said John Herbst , a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine whose own phone calls were tapped and then leaked by Russian intelligence services .
If the claims made in the messages aren ’ t just empty boasting , it would be “ outrageous ” for an ambassador to be surveilled by an American citizen , Herbst said .
In another series of messages exchanged between Parnas and then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko , who served as a source for many of Giuliani ’ s unevidenced claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ambassador to be removed .
“ It ’ s just that if you don ’ t make a decision about Madam—you are bringing into question all my allegations .
Including about B.
” It ’ s not clear whether B is a reference to Biden or Burisma , the gas company where the junior Biden sat on the board .
Trump ’ s claims that Giuliani was not acting on his behalf in Ukraine have long strained credulity , as the U.S .
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland testified before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials to work with Giuliani on Ukraine matters in a meeting in the oval office last May .
A letter from Giuliani to Zelensky , contained in the tranche of documents released Tuesday , raises further questions about Trump ’ s knowledge of the pressure campaign .
In the May 10 , 2019 , letter , Giuliani requests a personal meeting in Ukraine with Zelensky , who was president-elect at the time , and states that he was acting “ In my capacity as personal counsel to President Trump and with his knowledge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the day after the New York Times reported that Giuliani was planning to visit Ukraine to push the new government to open investigations that could help Trump ’ s re-election .
“ All of this new evidence confirms what we already know : the president and his associates pressured Ukrainian officials to announce investigations that would benefit the president politically , ” the chairs of four committees in the Democratic-controlled House said in a statement released alongside the documents .
The State Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ranks of foreign service officers , the State Department will be under pressure to respond to news that a serving ambassador may have been surveilled by Americans working with allies of the president ’ s personal lawyer .
Molly Montgomery , a former U.S. diplomat who worked on European issues during the Trump administration and served with Yovanovitch , said the latest round of revelations will further sap morale at the State Department as it finds itself at the center of the impeachment investigation .
“ It ’ s difficult to believe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department , but there ’ s no doubt our diplomats will view the targeting of a U.S. ambassador by the cronies of her own political leadership as a shocking and unprecedented attack against the Foreign Service , ” she said .
“ These revelations cry out for a response from Secretary of State [ Mike ] Pompeo , who despite promises to bring back his department ’ s swagger , has failed even to protect his employees from these appalling attacks.
” As a congressman , Pompeo made his name as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House investigation of the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Benghazi , peppering his predecessor Hillary Clinton with questions about security arrangements on the ground .
Pompeo has also defended the Jan. 3 U.S. airstrike on the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani , which pushed the United States and Iran to the brink of war , after Trump said that the United States had received information that the Quds Force leader was plotting imminent attacks on four U.S. embassies .
After a lull during the winter break , the release of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impeachment investigation as the House is due to hand over impeachment articles to the Senate .
On Wednesday morning , Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi is expected to name the House managers , Democrats who will effectively serve as the prosecution during the Senate trial .
Later in the day , the House is set to vote on the resolution to appoint the managers and to send the articles of impeachment to the Senate .
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he expects the Senate trial will get underway as early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet revealed the procedures that will govern the trial , only the third of its kind in U.S. history , but he has said he plans to follow the blueprint set by the impeachment trial of then-President Bill Clinton in 1999 , which unfolded over five dramatic weeks and saw senators , who act as a jury , sit for hearings six days a week .
During the Clinton trial , witnesses were deposed in closed-door videotaped sessions .
While Democrats have been keen to call new witnesses , it ’ s unclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four Republicans to join with them in a vote to do so .
Press access is likely to be more limited than during the Clinton impeachment trial , according to a letter of complaint sent to Senate leaders from an organization that represents Capitol Hill reporters .
Capitol security officials are weighing measures that could prohibit the use of electronics inside the Senate , limiting the ability of reporters to cover the trial in full as well as restrictions to their movements , which could prevent journalists from putting their questions to Senators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These potential restrictions fail to acknowledge what currently works on Capitol Hill , or the way the American public expects to be able to follow a vital news event about their government in the digital age , ” said the statement from the Standing Committee of Correspondents .

Associates of U.S. President Donald Trump’s personal lawyer appeared to physically, and perhaps electronically, surveil the then-U.S. ambassador to Ukraine last spring as they dialed up their pressure campaign on authorities in Kyiv, according to new evidence released by House Democrats on Tuesday.
Associates of U.S. President Donald Trump’s personal lawyer appeared to physically, and perhaps electronically, surveil the then-U.S. ambassador to Ukraine last spring as they dialed up their pressure campaign on authorities in Kyiv, according to new evidence released by House Democrats on Tuesday.
The new revelations came on the eve of Wednesday’s House vote to hand over articles of impeachment to the Senate, and it could increase pressure on Republicans to call for further evidence and witness testimony as part of the president’s Senate trial, which is expected to get underway next week.
The trove of documents includes notes and messages provided to lawmakers by Lev Parnas, a Republican donor and associate of Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani. Parnas was indicted in October for campaign finance violations.
The documents corroborate evidence that emerged during the House impeachment investigation that the president’s personal lawyer spearheaded a campaign to pressure officials in Ukraine to open probes into former Vice President Joe Biden and his son’s activities in Ukraine in a bid to aid Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign. Parnas’s handwritten notes on stationary from the Ritz-Carlton Vienna lay out the conspiracy targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the bluntest terms: “get Zalensky to Announce to announce that the Biden case will Be Investigated.”
But the documents also contain a number of new threads for lawmakers to pull on, such as the involvement of Robert F. Hyde, a Republican congressional candidate from Connecticut who made headlines last year over his obscene tweets about former presidential candidate Sen. Kamala Harris.
Hyde’s involvement in the Ukraine pressure campaign was not previously known, but a string of text messages exchanged with Parnas suggest that he may have had then-Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch under physical, and possibly electronic, surveillance.
“She’s talked to three people. Her phone is off. Computer is off,” he wrote to Parnas in March last year, later adding “They will let me know when she’s on the move.” Parnas replied to say, “Perfect.” Later in the same conversation, Hyde said, “They are willing to help if we/you would like a price. … Guess you can do anything in Ukraine with money … what I was told.”
A former State Department official who worked with Yovanovitch told Foreign Policy that they felt sick when they read the messages, “I didn’t think I had the capacity to be shocked any more and yet here we are.”
The revelations were “Not just insane, but deeply chilling,” said a current State Department official.
“Needless to say, the notion that American citizens and others were monitoring Ambassador Yovanovitch’s movements for unknown purposes is disturbing,” Lawrence S. Robbins, Yovanovitch’s attorney, said in a statement to CNN. “We trust that the appropriate authorities will conduct an investigation to determine what happened.”
During Yovanovitch’s testimony on Nov. 15, 2019, Hyde sent a tweet calling the former ambassador a “traitor” and a “scumbag.” Hyde told NBC News that he had been drinking when he sent the text messages to Parnas.
For U.S. diplomats serving abroad, a degree of surveillance by foreign powers is expected, said John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine whose own phone calls were tapped and then leaked by Russian intelligence services. If the claims made in the messages aren’t just empty boasting, it would be “outrageous” for an ambassador to be surveilled by an American citizen, Herbst said.
In another series of messages exchanged between Parnas and then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, who served as a source for many of Giuliani’s unevidenced claims about the Bidens, Lutsenko pushed for the ambassador to be removed.
“It’s just that if you don’t make a decision about Madam—you are bringing into question all my allegations. Including about B.” It’s not clear whether B is a reference to Biden or Burisma, the gas company where the junior Biden sat on the board.
Trump’s claims that Giuliani was not acting on his behalf in Ukraine have long strained credulity, as the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland testified before Congress that the president directed senior U.S. officials to work with Giuliani on Ukraine matters in a meeting in the oval office last May.
A letter from Giuliani to Zelensky, contained in the tranche of documents released Tuesday, raises further questions about Trump’s knowledge of the pressure campaign. In the May 10, 2019, letter, Giuliani requests a personal meeting in Ukraine with Zelensky, who was president-elect at the time, and states that he was acting “In my capacity as personal counsel to President Trump and with his knowledge and consent.” The letter was sent the day after the New York Times reported that Giuliani was planning to visit Ukraine to push the new government to open investigations that could help Trump’s re-election.
“All of this new evidence confirms what we already know: the president and his associates pressured Ukrainian officials to announce investigations that would benefit the president politically,” the chairs of four committees in the Democratic-controlled House said in a statement released alongside the documents.
The State Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment. But amid reports of falling morale among the ranks of foreign service officers, the State Department will be under pressure to respond to news that a serving ambassador may have been surveilled by Americans working with allies of the president’s personal lawyer.
Molly Montgomery, a former U.S. diplomat who worked on European issues during the Trump administration and served with Yovanovitch, said the latest round of revelations will further sap morale at the State Department as it finds itself at the center of the impeachment investigation.
“It’s difficult to believe morale could get any lower at the State Department, but there’s no doubt our diplomats will view the targeting of a U.S. ambassador by the cronies of her own political leadership as a shocking and unprecedented attack against the Foreign Service,” she said.
“These revelations cry out for a response from Secretary of State [Mike] Pompeo, who despite promises to bring back his department’s swagger, has failed even to protect his employees from these appalling attacks.”
As a congressman, Pompeo made his name as an ostensible defender of U.S. diplomats during the House investigation of the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Benghazi, peppering his predecessor Hillary Clinton with questions about security arrangements on the ground.
Pompeo has also defended the Jan. 3 U.S. airstrike on the Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, which pushed the United States and Iran to the brink of war, after Trump said that the United States had received information that the Quds Force leader was plotting imminent attacks on four U.S. embassies.
After a lull during the winter break, the release of the documents dialed up the drama on the impeachment investigation as the House is due to hand over impeachment articles to the Senate. On Wednesday morning, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi is expected to name the House managers, Democrats who will effectively serve as the prosecution during the Senate trial. Later in the day, the House is set to vote on the resolution to appoint the managers and to send the articles of impeachment to the Senate. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he expects the Senate trial will get underway as early as next Tuesday.
McConnell has not yet revealed the procedures that will govern the trial, only the third of its kind in U.S. history, but he has said he plans to follow the blueprint set by the impeachment trial of then-President Bill Clinton in 1999, which unfolded over five dramatic weeks and saw senators, who act as a jury, sit for hearings six days a week.
During the Clinton trial, witnesses were deposed in closed-door videotaped sessions. While Democrats have been keen to call new witnesses, it’s unclear whether they will be able to persuade four Republicans to join with them in a vote to do so.
Press access is likely to be more limited than during the Clinton impeachment trial, according to a letter of complaint sent to Senate leaders from an organization that represents Capitol Hill reporters. Capitol security officials are weighing measures that could prohibit the use of electronics inside the Senate, limiting the ability of reporters to cover the trial in full as well as restrictions to their movements, which could prevent journalists from putting their questions to Senators as they leave the chamber.
“These potential restrictions fail to acknowledge what currently works on Capitol Hill, or the way the American public expects to be able to follow a vital news event about their government in the digital age,” said the statement from the Standing Committee of Correspondents.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--In Turkey, a Battle Over Infrastructure Could Shape the Next Presidential Race

In Turkey , a Battle Over Infrastructure Could Shape the Next Presidential Race ISTANBUL—The debate over the Istanbul Canal infrastructure project has the potential to turn into an existential one between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu .
In politics , emotional arguments hold sway just as much as rational ones .
For now , Imamoglu has all the emotional ones .
His motto against the project reads : “ Either the canal or Istanbul.
” If Erdogan loses this debate , it could be very costly for him .
In 2011 , Erdogan announced his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara in a second location .
The Bosphorus strait , which divides the European and Asian sides of Istanbul , already connects the two seas , and the passage of ships through the strait is regulated by the Montreux Convention .
A new canal to the west of the city is expected to reduce traffic through the Bosphorus and mitigate the risks that arise from such traffic .
Turkish Transport Minister Mehmet Cahit Turhan claimed that initial revenue from ships passing through the canal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This number is hard to justify particularly because the reason why vessels would prefer the canal over the Bosphorus remains unknown .
The government claims that the canal will reduce waiting times and thus freight companies will prefer paying the premium .
Erdogan has a fascination with megaprojects .
He built a third bridge over the Bosphorus , the third and largest airport in Istanbul , and many other large-scale infrastructure projects .
These helped him win elections in the past , but now he is advocating what could become a white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In a shaky economy with a 14 percent unemployment rate , increasing taxes , and no fiscal room for maneuver , Erdogan will have to convince an increasingly environmentally aware Turkish public that resources should indeed be allocated to this project now .
The environmental impact assessment for the canal , on the other hand , suggests that 200,878 trees alone will be affected by the project .
In the expected seven-year process of realizing the project , an average of 360 explosions a year will take place , and approximately 4,000 tons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used , according to geological experts .
This is a hard sell .
And this time , he has a formidable opponent ; Imamoglu is putting up a tough fight against the project .
Massive infrastructure projects have helped Erdogan win elections in the past , but now he is advocating what could become a white elephant at the worst of times.The debate over the canal project reignited when Turhan declared on Nov. 28 that awarding contracts for the construction of the canal would begin soon .
The project , which is envisaged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decade , includes settlements along the canal banks , which would create a new city of around 500,000 people .
( The opposition claims 2 million people would move in . )
Replaced soil is planned to be used in creating artificial islands .
The budget is estimated at $ 15 billion , according to Turhan .
A project of this magnitude will have long-lasting and irreversible consequences on the environment and the economy—not to mention repercussions from a military standpoint .
After all , once the canal is dug , the old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ island , which , Imamoglu recently claimed , would render the city defenseless .
In the case of a military threat , troops will have to be deployed to the “ island ” either through the bridges over the canal or the Bosphorus .
Yet the debate in Turkey is far from a technical one .
The most salient argument of the pro-canal camp is the revenue that could be generated as ships pay for passage .
It is not clear yet why ships would pay to use the canal when there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ east , through the Bosphorus .
The assumptions are feeble , and calculations are vague .
In a nationwide survey conducted in December 2019 by Istanbul Economy Research , a polling firm , 49 percent of the public did not agree with the statement that the project will generate new sources of revenue .
The government is aiming to gather support strictly along political lines ; amid partisan bickering over the project , Imamoglu has chosen to rely mostly on technical and environmental counterarguments instead .
The mayor ’ s concerns include the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outcomes in the case of the long-expected Istanbul earthquake , and destruction of the city ’ s flora .
He will need to provide more detailed evidence in the future , but for now his arguments seem to be sticking .
Thousands of Istanbulites rushed to the Istanbul Provincial Environment and Urbanization Directorate to file appeals against the project ’ s environmental impact assessment .
In addition , the public in general is not informed .
The same poll from Istanbul Economy Research shows that public knowledge regarding the project is staggeringly low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indicated that they had no information on the project , whereas 40 percent said they were “ somewhat informed ” about the project .
Only 11 percent claimed that they were “ well informed.
” With 12.5 percent of locals claiming to be well informed , Istanbul residents are only slightly more aware of the key issues .
Erdogan has described the project as his dream and has once again based his strategy on ideological polarization .
His coalition partner , Devlet Bahceli , the head of the Nationalist Movement Party , followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opponents of the project as unpatriotic .
Paradoxically , both leaders were against the project at different points in history .
Former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had introduced the idea in 1994 , when he was a member of Parliament , and Erdogan was a staunch opponent at the time , when he was a mayoral candidate in Istanbul .
Likewise , Bahceli had described the canal as a “ crazy project that will enable theft ” back in 2011 when it was first introduced by Erdogan and Bahceli was still in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a wider trend .
The Turkish public is becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental issues .
In the past decade , countless protests have taken place across Anatolia , particularly in opposition to hydroelectric power plant construction .
Most recently , thousands of people gathered in the province of Canakkale to protest gold mining projects that would harm the environment .
The common thread of these protests is that they include people from all political denominations .
Imamoglu has seized the opportunity to position himself against Erdogan in a debate of national significance in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next presidential elections .
He is pressuring the president on both the economic and environmental repercussions of the project .
Both resonate with the public .
On the economic front , it is not clear how the project will be financed .
If it is indeed through public funds , voters will ask if this is the right allocation of resources when the budget deficit increased by 70 percent in 2019 to reach $ 21 billion and the recent raise to the minimum wage was a measly 15 percent , leaving those who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So far , the government is standing firm .
Erdogan announced that “ the canal will be built whether they like it or not.
” But it is far from certain that his usual rhetoric will suffice to win over the crowd this time , particularly when the debate concerns issues of genuine importance to voters .
After the repeat Istanbul municipal elections , which Erdogan ’ s party lost twice , Imamoglu is gearing up for a second win against Erdogan—this time on the national scene .
If Imamoglu can manage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over the canal project , it could deal a deadly blow to Erdogan in the run-up to 2023 presidential elections .

ISTANBUL—The debate over the Istanbul Canal infrastructure project has the potential to turn into an existential one between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. In politics, emotional arguments hold sway just as much as rational ones. For now, Imamoglu has all the emotional ones. His motto against the project reads: “Either the canal or Istanbul.” If Erdogan loses this debate, it could be very costly for him.
ISTANBUL—The debate over the Istanbul Canal infrastructure project has the potential to turn into an existential one between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. In politics, emotional arguments hold sway just as much as rational ones. For now, Imamoglu has all the emotional ones. His motto against the project reads: “Either the canal or Istanbul.” If Erdogan loses this debate, it could be very costly for him.
In 2011, Erdogan announced his seemingly crazy project to dig a canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara in a second location. The Bosphorus strait, which divides the European and Asian sides of Istanbul, already connects the two seas, and the passage of ships through the strait is regulated by the Montreux Convention.
A new canal to the west of the city is expected to reduce traffic through the Bosphorus and mitigate the risks that arise from such traffic. Turkish Transport Minister Mehmet Cahit Turhan claimed that initial revenue from ships passing through the canal would be $1 billion per year. This number is hard to justify particularly because the reason why vessels would prefer the canal over the Bosphorus remains unknown. The government claims that the canal will reduce waiting times and thus freight companies will prefer paying the premium.
Erdogan has a fascination with megaprojects. He built a third bridge over the Bosphorus, the third and largest airport in Istanbul, and many other large-scale infrastructure projects. These helped him win elections in the past, but now he is advocating what could become a white elephant at the worst of times. In a shaky economy with a 14 percent unemployment rate, increasing taxes, and no fiscal room for maneuver, Erdogan will have to convince an increasingly environmentally aware Turkish public that resources should indeed be allocated to this project now.
Massive infrastructure projects have helped Erdogan win elections in the past, but now he is advocating what could become a white elephant at the worst of times.
The environmental impact assessment for the canal, on the other hand, suggests that 200,878 trees alone will be affected by the project. In the expected seven-year process of realizing the project, an average of 360 explosions a year will take place, and approximately 4,000 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil will be used, according to geological experts. This is a hard sell. And this time, he has a formidable opponent; Imamoglu is putting up a tough fight against the project.
The debate over the canal project reignited when Turhan declared on Nov. 28 that awarding contracts for the construction of the canal would begin soon. The project, which is envisaged to be completed in less than a decade, includes settlements along the canal banks, which would create a new city of around 500,000 people. (The opposition claims 2 million people would move in.) Replaced soil is planned to be used in creating artificial islands. The budget is estimated at $15 billion, according to Turhan.
A project of this magnitude will have long-lasting and irreversible consequences on the environment and the economy—not to mention repercussions from a military standpoint. After all, once the canal is dug, the old city of Istanbul will effectively become an island, which, Imamoglu recently claimed, would render the city defenseless. In the case of a military threat, troops will have to be deployed to the “island” either through the bridges over the canal or the Bosphorus.
Yet the debate in Turkey is far from a technical one. The most salient argument of the pro-canal camp is the revenue that could be generated as ships pay for passage. It is not clear yet why ships would pay to use the canal when there is free passage available 25 miles to the east, through the Bosphorus. The assumptions are feeble, and calculations are vague. In a nationwide survey conducted in December 2019 by Istanbul Economy Research, a polling firm, 49 percent of the public did not agree with the statement that the project will generate new sources of revenue.
The government is aiming to gather support strictly along political lines; amid partisan bickering over the project, Imamoglu has chosen to rely mostly on technical and environmental counterarguments instead. The mayor’s concerns include the loss of agricultural fields, possible negative outcomes in the case of the long-expected Istanbul earthquake, and destruction of the city’s flora. He will need to provide more detailed evidence in the future, but for now his arguments seem to be sticking. Thousands of Istanbulites rushed to the Istanbul Provincial Environment and Urbanization Directorate to file appeals against the project’s environmental impact assessment.
In addition, the public in general is not informed. The same poll from Istanbul Economy Research shows that public knowledge regarding the project is staggeringly low. About 49 percent of the participants indicated that they had no information on the project, whereas 40 percent said they were “somewhat informed” about the project. Only 11 percent claimed that they were “well informed.” With 12.5 percent of locals claiming to be well informed, Istanbul residents are only slightly more aware of the key issues.
Erdogan has described the project as his dream and has once again based his strategy on ideological polarization. His coalition partner, Devlet Bahceli, the head of the Nationalist Movement Party, followed suit and described the “irrational” opponents of the project as unpatriotic. Paradoxically, both leaders were against the project at different points in history. Former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit had introduced the idea in 1994, when he was a member of Parliament, and Erdogan was a staunch opponent at the time, when he was a mayoral candidate in Istanbul. Likewise, Bahceli had described the canal as a “crazy project that will enable theft” back in 2011 when it was first introduced by Erdogan and Bahceli was still in the opposition ranks.
It is part of a wider trend. The Turkish public is becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental issues. In the past decade, countless protests have taken place across Anatolia, particularly in opposition to hydroelectric power plant construction. Most recently, thousands of people gathered in the province of Canakkale to protest gold mining projects that would harm the environment. The common thread of these protests is that they include people from all political denominations.
Imamoglu has seized the opportunity to position himself against Erdogan in a debate of national significance in order to strengthen his bid in the next presidential elections. He is pressuring the president on both the economic and environmental repercussions of the project. Both resonate with the public. On the economic front, it is not clear how the project will be financed. If it is indeed through public funds, voters will ask if this is the right allocation of resources when the budget deficit increased by 70 percent in 2019 to reach $21 billion and the recent raise to the minimum wage was a measly 15 percent, leaving those who earn it well below the poverty line.
So far, the government is standing firm. Erdogan announced that “the canal will be built whether they like it or not.” But it is far from certain that his usual rhetoric will suffice to win over the crowd this time, particularly when the debate concerns issues of genuine importance to voters.
After the repeat Istanbul municipal elections, which Erdogan’s party lost twice, Imamoglu is gearing up for a second win against Erdogan—this time on the national scene. If Imamoglu can manage to win the crowd in the debate over the canal project, it could deal a deadly blow to Erdogan in the run-up to 2023 presidential elections.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-16--Did Putin Just Extend His Rule?

Did Putin Just Extend His Rule?

Did Putin Just Extend His Rule ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Russian President Vladimir Putin sets a plan in motion to retain his grip on power after 2024 , various foreign ministers meet in London today to discuss legal action against Iran after it mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian airliner , and the U.S. Senate is expected to pass Trump ’ s replacement of NAFTA .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s sudden constitutional shake-up on Wednesday appears to set him up to maintain his grip @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2024 .
In his annual State of the Nation address , Putin unexpectedly proposed changes to the constitution to weaken the presidency and strengthen the prime minister ’ s powers .
Hours later , Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the government cabinet had resigned .
Putin has led Russia either as president or prime minister continuously since 1999 .
Though he is required to step down as president in 2024 , Wednesday ’ s move charts a path for him to keep leading , FP ’ s Reid Standish reports .
Under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again as a powerful prime minister or as the head of a new State Council .
Putin said the reforms would be put to a national vote , though it ’ s not clear when that would happen .
Why now ?
It ’ s not totally clear why Putin decided to announce the constitutional changes now , though he has been facing growing domestic pressure over Russia ’ s economy and endemic corruption .
The decision comes after a year in which Putin ’ s approval ratings hit a 13-year low and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates were stopped from running in city council elections .
Who is the new PM ?
Putin has nominated Mikhail Mishustin , an unknown technocrat with little political experience or clout—certainly not someone who was predicted to succeed Medvedev .
Mishustin has led the Federal Tax Service since 2010 .
Russia ’ s lower house of parliament votes today on whether to approve the nomination .
Countries mull legal action after Tehran plane disaster .
The foreign ministers of five countries whose citizens were killed when Iran ’ s military mistakenly shot down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in London today to discuss potential legal action against Iran and demands for compensation .
All 176 passengers on board died , including many people of Iranian descent and at least 57 Canadian citizens .
Iran said the plane flew outside its normal route—a claim that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko called “ nonsense.
” On Wednesday , Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked Germany for political support to seek justice for the victims ’ families .
Canadian investigators visited the site of the crash in Tehran on Wednesday , but they have not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data recorders .
Meanwhile , some Iranians have called for more anti-government protests , though a regime crackdown seems to have slowed the unrest .
What new impeachment evidence shows .
Evidence released by U.S. House Democrats on Wednesday appears to show that people associated with U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani surveilled then-U.S .
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch last year , FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer report .
A State Department official called the notes and messages submitted as evidence “ Not just insane @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has promised to investigate the messages , which will be presented during the Senate impeachment trial set to begin next week .
U.S. Senate votes on North American trade deal .
The Senate votes today on the Trump administration ’ s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement , which is expected to pass overwhelmingly before heading to the president ’ s desk .
After months of deliberations , the bill won bipartistan support after Democrats added changes regarding labor , the environment , and rules on prescription drugs .
Trump has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next week , though it won ’ t enter into force until Canada ’ s Parliament ratifies it .
Turkey ’ s next Gulenists .
After the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey , the government blamed the Gulenist sect and purged thousands of Gulenists from its ranks .
Now , suspicions that the government is allotting top jobs to members of another sect—the Menzil—have captivated Turkey ’ s media .
There is now concern that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might not have learned from his mistakes , Killian Cogan argues in FP .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ severe respiratory virus that emerged in Wuhan , China , has recorded its first case abroad , after a Chinese woman with the illness was quarantined in Thailand .
With the Lunar New Year approaching—when hundreds of thousands of Chinese visitors travel to Thailand—authorities there have been put on high alert .
Who ’ s voting for Germany ’ s AfD .
The far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party is seen as a xenophobic , nativist force in the country ’ s politics , but one of its key constituencies is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly strong among Russian Germans , who tend toward social conservatism , Philip Decker writes in FP .
Japan ’ s environmental minister , Shinjiro Koizumi , announced that he will take two weeks off when his child is born soon—marking the first time a Japanese cabinet member has ever taken paternity leave .
In Japan , both parents are allowed up to one year of parental leave when a child is born , though men rarely take it .
Koizumi , the son of a former prime minister , is seen as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian President Vladimir Putin sets a plan in motion to retain his grip on power after 2024, various foreign ministers meet in London today to discuss legal action against Iran after it mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian airliner , and the U.S. Senate is expected to pass Trump’s replacement of NAFTA .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russian President Vladimir Putin sets a plan in motion to retain his grip on power after 2024, various foreign ministers meet in London today to discuss legal action against Iran after it mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian airliner, and the U.S. Senate is expected to pass Trump’s replacement of NAFTA.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Putin Could Stay in Power Past 2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s sudden constitutional shake-up on Wednesday appears to set him up to maintain his grip on power after he leaves the presidency in 2024. In his annual State of the Nation address, Putin unexpectedly proposed changes to the constitution to weaken the presidency and strengthen the prime minister’s powers. Hours later, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the government cabinet had resigned.
Putin has led Russia either as president or prime minister continuously since 1999. Though he is required to step down as president in 2024, Wednesday’s move charts a path for him to keep leading, FP’s Reid Standish reports. Under the proposed reforms, Putin could serve again as a powerful prime minister or as the head of a new State Council. Putin said the reforms would be put to a national vote, though it’s not clear when that would happen.
Why now? It’s not totally clear why Putin decided to announce the constitutional changes now, though he has been facing growing domestic pressure over Russia’s economy and endemic corruption. The decision comes after a year in which Putin’s approval ratings hit a 13-year low and mass anti-government protests disrupted Moscow after opposition candidates were stopped from running in city council elections.
Who is the new PM? Putin has nominated Mikhail Mishustin, an unknown technocrat with little political experience or clout—certainly not someone who was predicted to succeed Medvedev. Mishustin has led the Federal Tax Service since 2010. Russia’s lower house of parliament votes today on whether to approve the nomination.
What We’re Following Today
Countries mull legal action after Tehran plane disaster. The foreign ministers of five countries whose citizens were killed when Iran’s military mistakenly shot down a Ukrainian passenger jet last week are in London today to discuss potential legal action against Iran and demands for compensation. All 176 passengers on board died, including many people of Iranian descent and at least 57 Canadian citizens. Iran said the plane flew outside its normal route—a claim that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko called “nonsense.” On Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked Germany for political support to seek justice for the victims’ families.
Canadian investigators visited the site of the crash in Tehran on Wednesday, but they have not yet been given access to the flight data recorders. Meanwhile, some Iranians have called for more anti-government protests, though a regime crackdown seems to have slowed the unrest.
What new impeachment evidence shows. Evidence released by U.S. House Democrats on Wednesday appears to show that people associated with U.S. President Donald Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani surveilled then-U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch last year, FP’s Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer report. A State Department official called the notes and messages submitted as evidence “Not just insane, but deeply chilling.” The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has promised to investigate the messages, which will be presented during the Senate impeachment trial set to begin next week.
U.S. Senate votes on North American trade deal. The Senate votes today on the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which is expected to pass overwhelmingly before heading to the president’s desk. After months of deliberations, the bill won bipartistan support after Democrats added changes regarding labor, the environment, and rules on prescription drugs. Trump has indicated he’ll sign the deal next week, though it won’t enter into force until Canada’s Parliament ratifies it.
Keep an Eye On
Turkey’s next Gulenists. After the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the government blamed the Gulenist sect and purged thousands of Gulenists from its ranks. Now, suspicions that the government is allotting top jobs to members of another sect—the Menzil—have captivated Turkey’s media. There is now concern that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might not have learned from his mistakes, Killian Cogan argues in FP.
China’s mystery virus. The severe respiratory virus that emerged in Wuhan, China, has recorded its first case abroad, after a Chinese woman with the illness was quarantined in Thailand. With the Lunar New Year approaching—when hundreds of thousands of Chinese visitors travel to Thailand—authorities there have been put on high alert.
Who’s voting for Germany’s AfD. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is seen as a xenophobic, nativist force in the country’s politics, but one of its key constituencies is foreign-born: Support for the AfD is particularly strong among Russian Germans, who tend toward social conservatism, Philip Decker writes in FP.
Odds and Ends
Japan’s environmental minister, Shinjiro Koizumi, announced that he will take two weeks off when his child is born soon—marking the first time a Japanese cabinet member has ever taken paternity leave. In Japan, both parents are allowed up to one year of parental leave when a child is born, though men rarely take it. Koizumi, the son of a former prime minister, is seen as a possible future leader of Japan.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.