foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Afghan Warlord’s Promotion Highlights the Bankruptcy of America’s Longest War

When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah , his main political opponent , signed a power-sharing deal in May , it ended eight months of bitter post-election dispute .
It also came with a disturbing price tag , one hashed out among rounds of backroom deals , tense negotiations , and desperate U.S. attempts to keep the government from imploding .
Abdul Rashid Dostum , Ghani ’ s vice president until last year and one of the country ’ s most notorious warlords , demanded a promotion to the rank of marshal , only awarded twice before in Afghan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long vowed to clean out the warlords , complied .
Dostum , whose militias are believed to have carried out one of the most notorious war crimes in modern Afghan history during the early days of the U.S.-led invasion , embodies much of what ’ s gone wrong in contemporary Afghanistan—and especially the failed promise that the U.S. invasion would help create a cleaner , more transparent , more democratic state .
Dostum still stands accused of torturing and ordering the rape of a political rival while in office as recently as 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fled to Turkey , where he enjoys a good relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
It wasn ’ t his first flight to Turkey : In 2008 , too , he ’ d sheltered in Ankara amid similar accusations that his men had abducted , beaten , and sexually assaulted a political opponent .
But instead of being prosecuted , Dostum is being promoted : His ascent to marshal became effective this week .
While many critics , both Afghans and non-Afghans , observed the ceremony with indignation , Afghan media shrugged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ celebrated the promotion .
“ I send congratulations to all of Afghanistan , ” said Mawlavi Baharuddin Jowzjani , a cleric and high-ranking official of Dostum ’ s party , in an interview with Tolo News about the warlord ’ s promotion .
On social media , Dostum ’ s son Batur Dostum bristled at criticism and said , “ such accusations will not harm the Marshal.
” According to an official of Ghani ’ s government , “ the President issued Dostum ’ s promotion , but it was not his [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was part of an agreement which was proposed by Abdullah , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ Bestowing on Dostum the title of marshal—after President Ghani vowed to have him prosecuted—illustrates yet again the complete failure of the Afghan government to deliver justice , ” said Patricia Gossman , an associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch .
“ Dostum is only part of the sordid picture of impunity in Afghanistan , as no powerful political figures have been held accountable for crimes including torture , rape and murder .
These cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should carry out its investigation in Afghanistan.
” Dostum ’ s career , and this week ’ s crowning promotion , illustrate the role that warlords have played in shaping—and distorting—the fabric of modern Afghanistan .
Dostum , an ethnic Uzbek , made his career in the 1980s , during the presidency of Mohammad Najibullah , Afghanistan ’ s last communist leader .
Najibullah , locked in a bitter fight against mujahideen , outsourced security in large parts of the country to armed militias—such as Dostum ’ s—with negligible government oversight .
Warlords @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but they reached a peak in the 1990s as different factions , including Dostum ’ s , fought each other for control of territory and resources .
Warlords and their abuses even helped create the Taliban : After one local warlord and his militiamen captured and repeatedly raped two young girls , a mullah gathered some of his students to attack the warlord ’ s fort .
The then-unknown man was Mullah Mohammad Omar , who soon became the supreme leader of the newly formed group of militant students , or Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon on full display .
In the early 1990s , Dostum and his militia were an effective , bloody force targeting rural communities with ties to the mujahideen .
Then , in 1992 , Dostum turned on his former boss Najibullah , preventing the recently ousted president from leaving the country .
As Afghanistan became mired in a bloody civil war that later gave rise to the Taliban , Dostum allied abruptly with each of the factions in turn .
His militia , the Junbish-e-Milli , became notorious for looting , raping , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his own personal fiefdom in the country ’ s north until the Taliban dismantled it in 1998 .
Three years later , he seized his chance to return—and to rebuild his power .
After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 , 2001—carried out by al Qaeda , which was under Taliban protection at the time—Dostum , like many other returning warlords , embraced the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan .
It was in the early days of the subsequent U.S.-led war that Dostum and his men allegedly carried out the massacre of Dasht-e-Leili , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , of Taliban prisoners were reportedly tortured and executed while in transit to Sheberghan prison , Dostum ’ s stronghold in northern Afghanistan .
Sealed containers held 200 to 300 prisoners each .
Reports from survivors of the transports described bound men , locked in the containers for several days without food or drink , resorting to licking the sweat off each other ’ s bodies and even biting into other prisoners ’ bodies in their desperation to obtain fluids from any source .
Few survived .
The veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outrageous and brutal human rights violation of the entire war.
” The next year , Dostum received not censure , but his first big promotion to general , a gift from the pro-American government in Kabul led by then-President Hamid Karzai .
That helped usher in a new era of warlordism in a country still recovering from the civil war , and it helped undermine trust and belief in the government , which ultimately helped pave the way for the recent resurgence of the Taliban , who are gaining in numbers and audacity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the departing Americans .
Apart from accusations of torture and rape against political opponents , Dostum ’ s militia continued to attack civilians in northern Afghanistan .
In several cases , Pashtun villagers were murdered and injured under the pretext of “ anti-Taliban operations ” by Dostum ’ s men .
According to witnesses , several villages were terrorized by the militiamen who faced total impunity thanks to Dostum ’ s position as vice president .
Then , in mid-May , Ghani made clear that one of the prices of securing political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a man who littered Afghanistan with so many .
While large parts of the country are controlled or contested by a resurgent Taliban , high-ranking politicians gathered in Jowzjan , Dostum ’ s home province in northern Afghanistan , to pin on Dostum ’ s new gold-braid shoulder boards .
Oddly , the only man missing from the ceremony was Ghani himself—perhaps because Dostum ’ s latest act of political rehabilitation was a direct repudiation of the very visions of governance that the professor-turned-president laid out in his 2008 book , Fixing Failed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan had a rare opportunity to found a functioning state , ” he and his co-author wrote .
“ Most of them , however , chose to put private before public interest and carried on with their faction agendas and seizure of private gain.
” Of course , many observers argue that Dostum ’ s promotion , while jarring , simply reveals a much broader pattern of war crimes and impunity in Afghanistan , where warlords like Dostum are celebrated and their histories whitewashed by the country ’ s political elite .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dostum has committed war crimes and had former or current political allies brutally assaulted , ” said Thomas Ruttig , a co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network .
“ But among the warlords active in the 1990s , he has often been singled out as particularly bad .
From my point of view , he was just an easier target as he had been associated with the former Communist government.
” Other warlords have been beyond any public criticism in Afghanistan , while some of them have more real power than Dostum ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But for many jaundiced observers , men like Dostum would not have seen such an upswing in their fortunes without years of U.S. intervention in the country .
“ How can anyone have faith in a government that overlooks war crimes , or worse , elevates its war criminals to the highest positions of public office ?
” said Erik Edstrom , a former U.S. soldier and author of the recently published book Un-American : A Soldier ’ s Reckoning of Our Longest War .
Edstrom , who deployed in 2009 as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become an outspoken critic of the legacy of American intervention , and he links the promotion of the likes of Dostum directly to Washington ’ s involvement in the country .
“ A government that coddles war criminals and turns a blind eye towards atrocities is a government that promotes hypocrisy , cynicism , and distrust , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ The hypocrisy around war crimes is a feeling that unites Americans and Afghans , alike .
”

When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, his main political opponent, signed a power-sharing deal in May, it ended eight months of bitter post-election dispute. It also came with a disturbing price tag, one hashed out among rounds of backroom deals, tense negotiations, and desperate U.S. attempts to keep the government from imploding. Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ghani’s vice president until last year and one of the country’s most notorious warlords, demanded a promotion to the rank of marshal, only awarded twice before in Afghan history. Ghani, who’d long vowed to clean out the warlords, complied.
When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, his main political opponent, signed a power-sharing deal in May, it ended eight months of bitter post-election dispute. It also came with a disturbing price tag, one hashed out among rounds of backroom deals, tense negotiations, and desperate U.S. attempts to keep the government from imploding. Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ghani’s vice president until last year and one of the country’s most notorious warlords, demanded a promotion to the rank of marshal, only awarded twice before in Afghan history. Ghani, who’d long vowed to clean out the warlords, complied.
Dostum, whose militias are believed to have carried out one of the most notorious war crimes in modern Afghan history during the early days of the U.S.-led invasion, embodies much of what’s gone wrong in contemporary Afghanistan—and especially the failed promise that the U.S. invasion would help create a cleaner, more transparent, more democratic state. Dostum still stands accused of torturing and ordering the rape of a political rival while in office as recently as 2016. After swift Western condemnation, Dostum fled to Turkey, where he enjoys a good relationship with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It wasn’t his first flight to Turkey: In 2008, too, he’d sheltered in Ankara amid similar accusations that his men had abducted, beaten, and sexually assaulted a political opponent.
But instead of being prosecuted, Dostum is being promoted: His ascent to marshal became effective this week. While many critics, both Afghans and non-Afghans, observed the ceremony with indignation, Afghan media shrugged, while the warlord’s supporters celebrated the promotion.
“I send congratulations to all of Afghanistan,” said Mawlavi Baharuddin Jowzjani, a cleric and high-ranking official of Dostum’s party, in an interview with Tolo News about the warlord’s promotion. On social media, Dostum’s son Batur Dostum bristled at criticism and said, “such accusations will not harm the Marshal.”
According to an official of Ghani’s government, “the President issued Dostum’s promotion, but it was not his [Ghani’s] decision. It was part of an agreement which was proposed by Abdullah,” he told Foreign Policy.
“Bestowing on Dostum the title of marshal—after President Ghani vowed to have him prosecuted—illustrates yet again the complete failure of the Afghan government to deliver justice,” said Patricia Gossman, an associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Dostum is only part of the sordid picture of impunity in Afghanistan, as no powerful political figures have been held accountable for crimes including torture, rape and murder. These cases make clear why the International Criminal Court should carry out its investigation in Afghanistan.”
Dostum’s career, and this week’s crowning promotion, illustrate the role that warlords have played in shaping—and distorting—the fabric of modern Afghanistan. Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, made his career in the 1980s, during the presidency of Mohammad Najibullah, Afghanistan’s last communist leader. Najibullah, locked in a bitter fight against mujahideen, outsourced security in large parts of the country to armed militias—such as Dostum’s—with negligible government oversight.
Warlords have existed throughout Afghanistan’s history, but they reached a peak in the 1990s as different factions, including Dostum’s, fought each other for control of territory and resources. Warlords and their abuses even helped create the Taliban: After one local warlord and his militiamen captured and repeatedly raped two young girls, a mullah gathered some of his students to attack the warlord’s fort. The then-unknown man was Mullah Mohammad Omar, who soon became the supreme leader of the newly formed group of militant students, or Taliban.
Dostum’s kaleidoscopic loyalties were soon on full display. In the early 1990s, Dostum and his militia were an effective, bloody force targeting rural communities with ties to the mujahideen. Then, in 1992, Dostum turned on his former boss Najibullah, preventing the recently ousted president from leaving the country. As Afghanistan became mired in a bloody civil war that later gave rise to the Taliban, Dostum allied abruptly with each of the factions in turn. His militia, the Junbish-e-Milli, became notorious for looting, raping, torturing, and killing. He ruled his own personal fiefdom in the country’s north until the Taliban dismantled it in 1998.
Three years later, he seized his chance to return—and to rebuild his power. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001—carried out by al Qaeda, which was under Taliban protection at the time—Dostum, like many other returning warlords, embraced the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. It was in the early days of the subsequent U.S.-led war that Dostum and his men allegedly carried out the massacre of Dasht-e-Leili, in which hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of Taliban prisoners were reportedly tortured and executed while in transit to Sheberghan prison, Dostum’s stronghold in northern Afghanistan. Sealed containers held 200 to 300 prisoners each. Reports from survivors of the transports described bound men, locked in the containers for several days without food or drink, resorting to licking the sweat off each other’s bodies and even biting into other prisoners’ bodies in their desperation to obtain fluids from any source. Few survived. The veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid described the massacre as “the most outrageous and brutal human rights violation of the entire war.”
The next year, Dostum received not censure, but his first big promotion to general, a gift from the pro-American government in Kabul led by then-President Hamid Karzai. That helped usher in a new era of warlordism in a country still recovering from the civil war, and it helped undermine trust and belief in the government, which ultimately helped pave the way for the recent resurgence of the Taliban, who are gaining in numbers and audacity just months after signing a peace deal with the departing Americans.
Apart from accusations of torture and rape against political opponents, Dostum’s militia continued to attack civilians in northern Afghanistan. In several cases, Pashtun villagers were murdered and injured under the pretext of “anti-Taliban operations” by Dostum’s men. According to witnesses, several villages were terrorized by the militiamen who faced total impunity thanks to Dostum’s position as vice president.
Then, in mid-May, Ghani made clear that one of the prices of securing political peace was to throw another bone to a man who littered Afghanistan with so many. While large parts of the country are controlled or contested by a resurgent Taliban, high-ranking politicians gathered in Jowzjan, Dostum’s home province in northern Afghanistan, to pin on Dostum’s new gold-braid shoulder boards. Oddly, the only man missing from the ceremony was Ghani himself—perhaps because Dostum’s latest act of political rehabilitation was a direct repudiation of the very visions of governance that the professor-turned-president laid out in his 2008 book, Fixing Failed States.
“The political elite of Afghanistan had a rare opportunity to found a functioning state,” he and his co-author wrote. “Most of them, however, chose to put private before public interest and carried on with their faction agendas and seizure of private gain.”
Of course, many observers argue that Dostum’s promotion, while jarring, simply reveals a much broader pattern of war crimes and impunity in Afghanistan, where warlords like Dostum are celebrated and their histories whitewashed by the country’s political elite.
“There is not the slightest doubt that Dostum has committed war crimes and had former or current political allies brutally assaulted,” said Thomas Ruttig, a co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. “But among the warlords active in the 1990s, he has often been singled out as particularly bad. From my point of view, he was just an easier target as he had been associated with the former Communist government.”
Other warlords have been beyond any public criticism in Afghanistan, while some of them have more real power than Dostum’s often ceremonial titles, Ruttig said.
But for many jaundiced observers, men like Dostum would not have seen such an upswing in their fortunes without years of U.S. intervention in the country.
“How can anyone have faith in a government that overlooks war crimes, or worse, elevates its war criminals to the highest positions of public office?” said Erik Edstrom, a former U.S. soldier and author of the recently published book Un-American: A Soldier’s Reckoning of Our Longest War.
Edstrom, who deployed in 2009 as an infantry lieutenant in Afghanistan, has become an outspoken critic of the legacy of American intervention, and he links the promotion of the likes of Dostum directly to Washington’s involvement in the country.
“A government that coddles war criminals and turns a blind eye towards atrocities is a government that promotes hypocrisy, cynicism, and distrust,” he told Foreign Policy. “The hypocrisy around war crimes is a feeling that unites Americans and Afghans, alike.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Hungary’s Democracy Is Still Under Threat

Hungary ’ s Democracy Is Still Under Threat The coronavirus pandemic has exposed some of the fundamental problems with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban ’ s illiberal tools of governance , particularly the blurred distinction between a state of emergency and state of normalcy .
On March 30 , the National Assembly passed a special authorization law allowing the prime minister to rule by decree—enabling the government to pass any regulations without a parliamentary vote and even to suspend parliament .
At the time , observers said that it had destroyed Hungary ’ s democracy .
But the harm to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state ’ s response is more nuanced .
The National Assembly later unanimously voted to end the sweeping powers , and the special authorization act was lifted on June 18 with new legislation .
Under the new law , the government can reintroduce rule by decree whenever it declares a state of public health emergency without a parliamentary vote .
That decision instead falls under the primary discretion of the Hungarian chief medical officer , who is appointed by the Ministry of Human Capacities .
Based on the recommendation of the medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a state of public health emergency by decree .
Under these circumstances , the distinction between a state of emergency and a state of normalcy is hazy .
The governing coalition already dominates parliament—something that was the case in the years before the pandemic .
The new legal category of a state of public health emergency poses a threat to Hungarian democracy in a particular way .
The legal and political framework for addressing an emergency laid out at the end of the special authorization act is fluid and unpredictable .
These tools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public sphere , mean the so-called return to normalcy enriches the illiberal government .
The special authorization law was rooted in the idea that , until the imminent danger of the coronavirus passed in Hungary , assembling the parliament for further decisions was unnecessary .
The law passed at the end of the special authorization act brought about new anxieties .
The opposition expressed concerns that the state of public health emergency could be used for further abuses of power .
That is because there is no explicit time limit : The legislation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which the state of public health emergency was initially invoked—so the state of the pandemic—the government can extend its sweeping power without a vote .
The unwillingness of the Hungarian government to set a deadline to review the law after the first six months suggests it could lead to abuses of power .
The special authorization law enabled immediate government overreach : It not only allowed Orban to rule by decree , but it also brought about new restrictions—such as potential jail time for those who did not follow state-ordered quarantines as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deemed to be “ fake news ” or disruptive to the government response .
The legislation put state efficiency above public concerns regarding collective care , trust , and accountability .
The new legislation remains vague , giving the government the power to incite fear and deter citizens and journalists from speaking out .
The part of the law targeting news reports could encourage self-censorship , particularly regarding coverage of the government ’ s pandemic response .
Furthermore , the special authorization law emphasized that the state of public health emergency would enhance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disturbing the peace .
Under the law , any activity that “ actively prevents ” state measures to fight the pandemic could be penalized as disturbing the peace .
The state of public health emergency category also enables Orban ’ s government to pass all sorts of unrelated measures .
The day after the special authorization act was passed , a series of unrelated measures supporting the ruling coalition ’ s agenda were passed in an omnibus bill .
The bill included regulations on sex classification at birth , making it nearly impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gender on official documents , and measures that seemed to further assert the government ’ s influence in various cultural institutions .
These unrelated laws were passed during a public health crisis and the ensuing economic crisis , when people were preoccupied with the uncertainties of the pandemic—including lost income .
With the opportunity for protest restricted , the government took advantage of the crisis to pass the laws .
The omnibus bill showed how institutional processes reinforce the underlying power of the regime , which changes laws depending on the political circumstances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the special authorization law was enacted , the distinction between rule by decree and regular lawmaking practices entered a fluid stage as well .
The state ’ s coronavirus response became dependent on justifying the special authorization act , as if the government did not already have sufficient legal and political power to manage the pandemic without ruling by decree .
After the vote to lift the act , the government spokesperson Zoltan Kovacs tweeted about the government “ maintaining the epidemiological preparedness ” to again declare the state of public health emergency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus wave .
This position revealed the government ’ s ongoing intent to bend its narratives of these legal categories based on its own political calculations .
The Hungarian political system is now in a period of fluidity in which the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a lightbulb .
The legislation legitimizes Orban ’ s rule , whether it occurs by decree or not .
The prime minister symbolically returning power to the National Assembly , which his party dominates , is part of his playbook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the opposition and Western observers .
It is yet another government tactic to normalize its so-called illiberal democracy .
After the government ended the special authorization act , the opposition found itself accepting the lesser evil by voting in agreement to temporarily return to the regular state of affairs .
So far , Hungary has had significantly fewer COVID-19 cases than many Western European countries , but the legal and political situation—with illiberal democracy legitimized—could become dangerous if there is another surge .
It could also have consequences for migration if there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary ’ s borders .
Senior government advisor Gyorgy Bakondi said in March that “ there is a certain relationship between the coronavirus and illegal immigration.
” And Orban recently echoed him , saying that the coronavirus pandemic “ invaded us.
” The government could use this public health argument to further tighten its border policies in the near future .
The fluidity of the government ’ s new legal tools makes Orban ’ s political enemies an even easier target .
The authorities could deem anyone to be an obstacle to protecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meaningful checks and balances under the new law .
The political opposition is also constrained : Opposition lawmakers voted to end the special authorization—giving them a voice in Orban ’ s political theater—but their amendments to the subsequent regulations were voted down .
A ruling party official called the opposition shameful for calling the current system a dictatorship or a nondemocracy , and Kovacs sent out messages to international researchers and media platforms demanding public apologies for their criticism .
In this political theater , the government is the tamer who decides when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not acknowledge the danger it poses either way .
By momentarily calling the lion back to its cage , he gives the audience the impression that it can influence the show—except this lion tamer already removed the door years ago .

The coronavirus pandemic has exposed some of the fundamental problems with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s illiberal tools of governance, particularly the blurred distinction between a state of emergency and state of normalcy. On March 30, the National Assembly passed a special authorization law allowing the prime minister to rule by decree—enabling the government to pass any regulations without a parliamentary vote and even to suspend parliament. At the time, observers said that it had destroyed Hungary’s democracy. But the harm to democratic institutions caused by the pandemic and the state’s response is more nuanced.
The coronavirus pandemic has exposed some of the fundamental problems with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s illiberal tools of governance, particularly the blurred distinction between a state of emergency and state of normalcy. On March 30, the National Assembly passed a special authorization law allowing the prime minister to rule by decree—enabling the government to pass any regulations without a parliamentary vote and even to suspend parliament. At the time, observers said that it had destroyed Hungary’s democracy. But the harm to democratic institutions caused by the pandemic and the state’s response is more nuanced.
The National Assembly later unanimously voted to end the sweeping powers, and the special authorization act was lifted on June 18 with new legislation. Under the new law, the government can reintroduce rule by decree whenever it declares a state of public health emergency without a parliamentary vote. That decision instead falls under the primary discretion of the Hungarian chief medical officer, who is appointed by the Ministry of Human Capacities.
Based on the recommendation of the medical officer, the government can again declare a state of public health emergency by decree. Under these circumstances, the distinction between a state of emergency and a state of normalcy is hazy. The governing coalition already dominates parliament—something that was the case in the years before the pandemic.
The new legal category of a state of public health emergency poses a threat to Hungarian democracy in a particular way. The legal and political framework for addressing an emergency laid out at the end of the special authorization act is fluid and unpredictable. These tools, based on the domination of the public sphere, mean the so-called return to normalcy enriches the illiberal government.
The special authorization law was rooted in the idea that, until the imminent danger of the coronavirus passed in Hungary, assembling the parliament for further decisions was unnecessary. The law passed at the end of the special authorization act brought about new anxieties. The opposition expressed concerns that the state of public health emergency could be used for further abuses of power. That is because there is no explicit time limit: The legislation only states that depending on the conditions in which the state of public health emergency was initially invoked—so the state of the pandemic—the government can extend its sweeping power without a vote. The unwillingness of the Hungarian government to set a deadline to review the law after the first six months suggests it could lead to abuses of power.
The special authorization law enabled immediate government overreach: It not only allowed Orban to rule by decree, but it also brought about new restrictions—such as potential jail time for those who did not follow state-ordered quarantines as well as for those who published reporting deemed to be “fake news” or disruptive to the government response. The legislation put state efficiency above public concerns regarding collective care, trust, and accountability.
The new legislation remains vague, giving the government the power to incite fear and deter citizens and journalists from speaking out. The part of the law targeting news reports could encourage self-censorship, particularly regarding coverage of the government’s pandemic response. Furthermore, the special authorization law emphasized that the state of public health emergency would enhance the government’s power against people disturbing the peace. Under the law, any activity that “actively prevents” state measures to fight the pandemic could be penalized as disturbing the peace.
The state of public health emergency category also enables Orban’s government to pass all sorts of unrelated measures. The day after the special authorization act was passed, a series of unrelated measures supporting the ruling coalition’s agenda were passed in an omnibus bill. The bill included regulations on sex classification at birth, making it nearly impossible for transgender people to change their legal gender on official documents, and measures that seemed to further assert the government’s influence in various cultural institutions.
These unrelated laws were passed during a public health crisis and the ensuing economic crisis, when people were preoccupied with the uncertainties of the pandemic—including lost income. With the opportunity for protest restricted, the government took advantage of the crisis to pass the laws. The omnibus bill showed how institutional processes reinforce the underlying power of the regime, which changes laws depending on the political circumstances and its own convenience. Even when the special authorization law was enacted, the distinction between rule by decree and regular lawmaking practices entered a fluid stage as well.
The state’s coronavirus response became dependent on justifying the special authorization act, as if the government did not already have sufficient legal and political power to manage the pandemic without ruling by decree. After the vote to lift the act, the government spokesperson Zoltan Kovacs tweeted about the government “maintaining the epidemiological preparedness” to again declare the state of public health emergency in the future—such as during a second coronavirus wave. This position revealed the government’s ongoing intent to bend its narratives of these legal categories based on its own political calculations.
The Hungarian political system is now in a period of fluidity in which the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a lightbulb. The legislation legitimizes Orban’s rule, whether it occurs by decree or not. The prime minister symbolically returning power to the National Assembly, which his party dominates, is part of his playbook: It counters the narrative of both the opposition and Western observers. It is yet another government tactic to normalize its so-called illiberal democracy. After the government ended the special authorization act, the opposition found itself accepting the lesser evil by voting in agreement to temporarily return to the regular state of affairs.
So far, Hungary has had significantly fewer COVID-19 cases than many Western European countries, but the legal and political situation—with illiberal democracy legitimized—could become dangerous if there is another surge. It could also have consequences for migration if there is another rise in refugees and migrants crossing Hungary’s borders. Senior government advisor Gyorgy Bakondi said in March that “there is a certain relationship between the coronavirus and illegal immigration.” And Orban recently echoed him, saying that the coronavirus pandemic “invaded us.” The government could use this public health argument to further tighten its border policies in the near future.
The fluidity of the government’s new legal tools makes Orban’s political enemies an even easier target. The authorities could deem anyone to be an obstacle to protecting the public, because there are no meaningful checks and balances under the new law. The political opposition is also constrained: Opposition lawmakers voted to end the special authorization—giving them a voice in Orban’s political theater—but their amendments to the subsequent regulations were voted down. A ruling party official called the opposition shameful for calling the current system a dictatorship or a nondemocracy, and Kovacs sent out messages to international researchers and media platforms demanding public apologies for their criticism.
In this political theater, the government is the tamer who decides when the lion can leave its cage—but does not acknowledge the danger it poses either way. By momentarily calling the lion back to its cage, he gives the audience the impression that it can influence the show—except this lion tamer already removed the door years ago.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--Is Sri Lanka Becoming a De Facto Junta?

Is Sri Lanka Becoming a De Facto Junta?

When Gotabaya Rajapaksa launched his campaign for president of Sri Lanka last year , he presented democracy and human rights as the core elements of his manifesto .
“ I propose to lead a future government that will always revere and uphold democracy , and always safeguard the rights of the public , ” he stressed in an August 2019 speech .
Such reassurances may have seemed at odds with the reputation of the powerful , well-connected , and deeply divisive former defense minister .
Rajapaksa won the election in November , taking the seat once held by his brother @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Independence Day celebration , he declared , once again , his respect for human rights : “ The responsibilities of the civilian and military establishments need to be clearly understood , and we must always remember that citizens have individual as well as collective rights.
” Dressed in civilian attire , Rajapaksa nonetheless donned badges awarded to him during his long military career .
Perhaps it was a hint of what was to come .
In the last several months , Rajapaksa has embarked on rapidly militarizing the state administration .
He has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to key positions in the civil administration , and his government has moved more than 30 agencies under the remit of the defense ministry .
Moves such as his lengthy dissolution of Parliament and his shock pardon of a sergeant recently sentenced to death for killing eight civilians , including children , during the country ’ s civil war suggest a disdain for the legal system and constitution .
With each passing day , Sri Lanka appears to be edging closer toward military totalitarianism .
Rajapaksa ’ s authoritarian transition should not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ served as president from 2005 to 2015 and has since been appointed as prime minister—Gotabaya Rajapaksa is best known for defeating the separatist Tamil Tigers and bringing an end to a three-decade-long civil war in 2009 .
An estimated 40,000 Tamil civilians died during the final months , and as many as 100,000 civilians from both sides were killed since the start of the war in 1983 .
Tens of thousands more forced disappearances took place during and after the civil war , and efforts to provide justice for the victims have stalled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrew altogether from a co-sponsored United Nations Human Rights Council resolution to investigate and prosecute those responsible for civil war atrocities .
There is little chance that such justice will be forthcoming .
Speaking at a remembrance ceremony for fallen soldiers in Colombo on May 19 , Rajapaksa vowed to protect those who fought in the civil war and said that he would not hesitate to withdraw from international organizations that target them .
Already , the president appears to be signaling that security forces and police can act with impunity .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ratnayake , a former Sri Lankan army staff sergeant convicted of the brutal murder of eight Tamil civilians , including three children—one of the very few soldiers to face trial .
Rajapaksa himself has faced , and denied , repeated accusations of war crimes and atrocities .
In his eight months in office , he has appointed a series of military commanders who have been accused of serious alleged international crimes during the civil war—commanders who currently hold high-level government positions .
Sri Lanka is “ intentionally and deliberately promoting … impunity by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , ” the International Truth and Justice Project said in a recent investigation .
Former senior military officials have been put in charge of the Ministry of Law and Order , the Ministry of Human Resources , the Ministry of Finance , and , now , with the COVID-19 crisis , the Ministry of Health .
In addition to appointing ex-military officers into civil sector positions , the government has also started handing civil administrative functions to the military .
Reporting by the Tamil Guardian shows that at least 37 agencies including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the nongovernmental organization secretariat have been wholly placed under the Ministry of Defense .
Separately , the president has set up at least seven new task forces , with vague and far-reaching mandates , staffed heavily by military officials .
Recent wrangling in Parliament , meanwhile , shows the extent to which Rajapaksa is willing to bend Sri Lanka ’ s constitution to his will .
Recent wrangling in Parliament , meanwhile , shows the extent to which Rajapaksa is willing to bend Sri Lanka ’ s constitution to his will .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ but six months ahead of schedule ) dissolved Parliament , setting the election date to April 25 .
Since then , in response to the coronavirus crisis , he has repeatedly pushed the date back , with elections now planned for Aug. 5 .
The constitution mandates that Parliament meet again within three months of its dissolution , but Rajapaksa has denied requests by opposition parties urging to reconvene .
The Supreme Court has also refused petitions to order Parliament be reconvened and has ignored challenges on the delayed poll date , although @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet reconvening Parliament is now even more urgent thanks to the coronavirus pandemic .
The only legal way for the government to formalize budgets for fighting the virus is to go through the legislature .
Finances are now being appropriated and disbursed by the President ’ s Fund , which is allocating nearly $ 2 billion in pledged foreign assistance to combat the coronavirus—though without parliamentary oversight there is little transparency to the process .
While Rajapaksa ’ s machinations over the past months may have drawn withering criticism from watchdogs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this has affected his popularity among the wider public .
Rajapaksa is hoping the Aug. 5 vote will seal his grip on power after he won last year ’ s election on a seemingly popular national security agenda .
If his Sri Lanka People ’ s Front party can obtain a two-thirds majority , he has promised that one of his first efforts will be to repeal the 19th Amendment , which limits executive power .
The brutality of Sri Lanka ’ s civil war , the devastating number of civilian casualties , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the lack of accountability for atrocities committed have left deep-rooted scars on the population .
If the latest efforts to expand the militarization of Sri Lanka succeed , the nation ’ s democracy will be diminished—and victims of its long civil war will have less recourse to justice than ever .

When Gotabaya Rajapaksa launched his campaign for president of Sri Lanka last year, he presented democracy and human rights as the core elements of his manifesto. “I propose to lead a future government that will always revere and uphold democracy, and always safeguard the rights of the public,” he stressed in an August 2019 speech . Such reassurances may have seemed at odds with the reputation of the powerful, well-connected, and deeply divisive former defense minister.
When Gotabaya Rajapaksa launched his campaign for president of Sri Lanka last year, he presented democracy and human rights as the core elements of his manifesto. “I propose to lead a future government that will always revere and uphold democracy, and always safeguard the rights of the public,” he stressed in an August 2019 speech. Such reassurances may have seemed at odds with the reputation of the powerful, well-connected, and deeply divisive former defense minister.
Rajapaksa won the election in November, taking the seat once held by his brother. In February, at his first Independence Day celebration, he declared, once again, his respect for human rights: “The responsibilities of the civilian and military establishments need to be clearly understood, and we must always remember that citizens have individual as well as collective rights.” Dressed in civilian attire, Rajapaksa nonetheless donned badges awarded to him during his long military career. Perhaps it was a hint of what was to come.
In the last several months, Rajapaksa has embarked on rapidly militarizing the state administration. He has appointed a number of retired military officers to key positions in the civil administration, and his government has moved more than 30 agencies under the remit of the defense ministry. Moves such as his lengthy dissolution of Parliament and his shock pardon of a sergeant recently sentenced to death for killing eight civilians, including children, during the country’s civil war suggest a disdain for the legal system and constitution. With each passing day, Sri Lanka appears to be edging closer toward military totalitarianism.
Rajapaksa’s authoritarian transition should not be surprising. A brother of Mahinda Rajapaksa—who served as president from 2005 to 2015 and has since been appointed as prime minister—Gotabaya Rajapaksa is best known for defeating the separatist Tamil Tigers and bringing an end to a three-decade-long civil war in 2009. An estimated 40,000 Tamil civilians died during the final months, and as many as 100,000 civilians from both sides were killed since the start of the war in 1983. Tens of thousands more forced disappearances took place during and after the civil war, and efforts to provide justice for the victims have stalled. Earlier this year, the government withdrew altogether from a co-sponsored United Nations Human Rights Council resolution to investigate and prosecute those responsible for civil war atrocities.
There is little chance that such justice will be forthcoming. Speaking at a remembrance ceremony for fallen soldiers in Colombo on May 19, Rajapaksa vowed to protect those who fought in the civil war and said that he would not hesitate to withdraw from international organizations that target them. Already, the president appears to be signaling that security forces and police can act with impunity. In March, Rajapaksa pardoned and released Sunil Ratnayake, a former Sri Lankan army staff sergeant convicted of the brutal murder of eight Tamil civilians, including three children—one of the very few soldiers to face trial. Rajapaksa himself has faced, and denied, repeated accusations of war crimes and atrocities. In his eight months in office, he has appointed a series of military commanders who have been accused of serious alleged international crimes during the civil war—commanders who currently hold high-level government positions. Sri Lanka is “intentionally and deliberately promoting … impunity by appointing alleged war criminals to positions of power,” the International Truth and Justice Project said in a recent investigation.
Former senior military officials have been put in charge of the Ministry of Law and Order, the Ministry of Human Resources, the Ministry of Finance, and, now, with the COVID-19 crisis, the Ministry of Health. In addition to appointing ex-military officers into civil sector positions, the government has also started handing civil administrative functions to the military. Reporting by the Tamil Guardian shows that at least 37 agencies including the police, the telecommunications regulator, and the nongovernmental organization secretariat have been wholly placed under the Ministry of Defense. Separately, the president has set up at least seven new task forces, with vague and far-reaching mandates, staffed heavily by military officials.
Recent wrangling in Parliament, meanwhile, shows the extent to which Rajapaksa is willing to bend Sri Lanka’s constitution to his will.
Recent wrangling in Parliament, meanwhile, shows the extent to which Rajapaksa is willing to bend Sri Lanka’s constitution to his will. On March 2, Rajapaksa legally (but six months ahead of schedule) dissolved Parliament, setting the election date to April 25. Since then, in response to the coronavirus crisis, he has repeatedly pushed the date back, with elections now planned for Aug. 5. The constitution mandates that Parliament meet again within three months of its dissolution, but Rajapaksa has denied requests by opposition parties urging to reconvene. The Supreme Court has also refused petitions to order Parliament be reconvened and has ignored challenges on the delayed poll date, although it has yet to explain its reasoning.
Yet reconvening Parliament is now even more urgent thanks to the coronavirus pandemic. The only legal way for the government to formalize budgets for fighting the virus is to go through the legislature. Finances are now being appropriated and disbursed by the President’s Fund, which is allocating nearly $2 billion in pledged foreign assistance to combat the coronavirus—though without parliamentary oversight there is little transparency to the process.
While Rajapaksa’s machinations over the past months may have drawn withering criticism from watchdogs and rights activists, it is unclear how this has affected his popularity among the wider public. Rajapaksa is hoping the Aug. 5 vote will seal his grip on power after he won last year’s election on a seemingly popular national security agenda. If his Sri Lanka People’s Front party can obtain a two-thirds majority, he has promised that one of his first efforts will be to repeal the 19th Amendment, which limits executive power.
The brutality of Sri Lanka’s civil war, the devastating number of civilian casualties, the ruthless conduct of the military, and the lack of accountability for atrocities committed have left deep-rooted scars on the population. If the latest efforts to expand the militarization of Sri Lanka succeed, the nation’s democracy will be diminished—and victims of its long civil war will have less recourse to justice than ever.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-17--In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia’s Afghan Strategy

Iran has established covert ties with the Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group well known for its attacks in the Horn of Africa .
Following Russia ’ s playbook in Afghanistan and the surrounding regions , Tehran is allegedly using al-Shabab to attack the U.S. military and other foreign forces in Somalia and in the region , according to senior Somali government and security officials familiar with intelligence and briefed on the matter .
Using financial inducements as their means for recruitment , Iran has a proxy network in Somalia and uses facilitators to provide support to violent extremist organizations to counter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Persian Gulf states , including using Somalia to funnel weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen and to transit weapons to other countries such as Kenya , Tanzania , South Sudan , Mozambique , and Central African Republic .
Iranian engagement on the African continent is not new .
In particular , Iranian religious groups and intelligence agencies have worked for decades to establish missionary and influence operations on the African continent .
These include providing religious scholarship opportunities throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in the Horn region competing and countering Gulf states ’ influences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed Africans to study in Shiite religious centers such as Qom in Iran , and then go back to their countries to engage in both direct and indirect proselytizing in favor of Tehran ’ s activities , making many of them witting or unwitting accomplices to those pursuing Tehran ’ s intelligence objectives in the region .
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the main Iranian organization in Somalia , and its Quds Force has established relations with extremist groups and criminal networks , according to Somali officials .
Somali police and finance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions , with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia .
Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia , providing sophisticated weapons , improvised explosive devices , mortars , and chemicals used to make bombs .
The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military , Somali forces , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A senior military official involved in operations against al-Shabab in south-central Somalia alleges that al-Shabab has received financial and material support from Iran and may have paid bounties to militants to attack U.S. forces in Somalia and the region .
According to Somali defense ministry and security officials , Iranian money , weapons , and ammunition may have been used in 2019 and 2020 al-Shabab attacks on U.S. military bases in Somalia and northern Kenya , as well as the European Union military convoy in Mogadishu .
Security forces involved in operations against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as bomb-making materials and chemicals from Iran .
These officials claim that al-Shabab attacks since 2017 have become more lethal and attribute the group ’ s increased capabilities to foreign-sourced weapons , with the majority coming from Iran and Yemen .
On Jan. 5 , al-Shabab carried out a pre-dawn attack at Manda Airstrip on Camp Simba in northern Kenya .
The attack killed three Americans ( one soldier and two contractors ) and destroyed U.S. military equipment , including surveillance equipment used to support intelligence operations in the region .
Al-Shabab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. drone strike killed Qassem Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s Quds Force , and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , a senior Iraqi politician and the deputy chairman of Popular Mobilization Units , an Iraqi paramilitary force .
( Although the group claimed there was no link between Suleimani ’ s killing and its attack , the timing and al-Shabab ’ s history of opportunistic strikes suggests that the two events may have been linked . )
On Sept. 30 , 2019 , al-Shabab carried out a large car bomb and gun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S. service member at the base , according to news reports .
The Baledogle base , about 60 miles northwest of Mogadishu , hosts hundreds of U.S. military and civilian personnel supporting Somali government operations against al-Shabab .
The U.S.-trained Somali forces and U.S. military repelled the coordinated attack and inflicted heavy casualties on al-Shabab .
Also on Sept. 30 , an al-Shabab car bomb hit the European Union military convoy in Mogadishu .
The Italian military convoy was part of the European Union Training Mission in Somalia .
The attack damaged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in any injuries .
Despite U.S. and Somali counterterrorism operations , al-Shabab remains the largest active al Qaeda network in the world , and the Iranian Quds Force ’ s financial and material support to the militant group represents a new escalation and a morphing threat to U.S. and Western interests in Somalia and the region .
Although the number of U.S. forces in Somalia has increased over the past three years , there has been a steady increase in attacks by al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia in south-central Somalia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to Gen. Stephen Townsend , “ After a series of complex attacks targeting Somali and U.S. bases last year , ” the leaders of al-Shabab “ publicly identified Americans and U.S. interests worldwide as priority targets , ” a stance similar to Osama bin Laden ’ s 1996 declaration of war against the United States .
In addition to Iran , Russia has expanded its contact and influence in Somalia , sending an ambassador for the first time in 30 years and establishing ties with extremist groups in the fragile state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western allies in the region .
According to senior defense ministry and national and regional security officials in Somalia , Russia ’ s intelligence service and the Wagner Group—a paramilitary mercenary company with ties to the Kremlin—are active in Somalia , where have they established ties with al-Shabab while also trying to offer the Somali government and regional governments training and equipment , without oversight or accountability and avoiding compliance with U.N. sanctions .
Over the past two years , Russia and Iran have shown renewed interest in the Horn of Africa , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military official , Russia has been working with Iran to push the United States out of Somalia—especially Baledogle , a base built by the Soviet Union that formerly served as Moscow ’ s main hub in the region .
According to officials , Russians have expressed interest in Baledogle and the port of Berbera .
The officials are concerned that the 2019 attack on Baledogle was influenced and supported by Iranian or Russian proxies seeking to force the U.S. military out of the base .
Given that Iran has engaged with and supported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region , it ’ s not surprising that Tehran and its proxy agents are supporting al-Shabab .
The reality is that Tehran has on countless occasions in recent years engaged with a wide range of Islamist elements in Somalia .
Iran uses these actors in Africa to project its influence and spread its extremist doctrine wherever and however it can .
Tehran continues to use proxy allies and violent extremist groups in Somalia , undermining the U.S. administration ’ s counterterrorism strategy in Somalia and international efforts to stabilize the country .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ government should first focus on reducing al-Shabab ’ s access to financial and material support from foreign sources such as Iran .
This can be done by expanding the use of sanctions to identify and target individuals or groups in Somalia and the region facilitating Iranian proxy activities in Somalia , as well as identifying how violent extremist organizations in Somalia procure weapons and chemicals used to attack civilians , government institutions , and security forces in Somalia and the region .
It should then use the Combined Task Force 150 and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on disrupting the flow of weapons and chemicals to Somalia , while helping the federal government of Somalia and federal member states to build naval , coast guard , and other maritime capabilities to protect Africa ’ s second-longest coast .
Al-Shabab ’ s aspiration to attack the United States in the region and beyond poses a direct threat to the United States ’ national-security and foreign-policy interests .
Second , the U.S. government should work toward reducing Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa , making it challenging for Iran and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can reduce Iranian influence by increasing intelligence collection on proxy allies of Tehran , their facilitators , and support structures , as well as by monitoring Iranian trade with countries in the region .
Additionally , the United States can use sanctions to go after individuals and organizations engaging with sanctioned elements of the Iranian regime .
Finally , to counter Iran , Russia , and other rogue states , the U.S. government should increase military , security , and economic assistance to Somalia , supporting the Somali government ’ s efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s security forces as they wage counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations to dislodge al-Shabab and other violent extremist groups from areas they control .
Al-Shabab ’ s aspiration to attack the United States in the region and beyond poses a direct threat to the United States ’ national-security and foreign-policy interests .
To defeat al-Shabab and limit Iran ’ s and other foreign agents ’ involvement in Somalia requires the U.S. government to use all instruments of national power—including economic , military , security , and financial tools , to defeat the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and enduring al Qaeda affiliate .

Iran has established covert ties with the Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group well known for its attacks in the Horn of Africa. Following Russia’s playbook in Afghanistan and the surrounding regions, Tehran is allegedly using al-Shabab to attack the U.S. military and other foreign forces in Somalia and in the region, according to senior Somali government and security officials familiar with intelligence and briefed on the matter.
Iran has established covert ties with the Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group well known for its attacks in the Horn of Africa. Following Russia’s playbook in Afghanistan and the surrounding regions, Tehran is allegedly using al-Shabab to attack the U.S. military and other foreign forces in Somalia and in the region, according to senior Somali government and security officials familiar with intelligence and briefed on the matter.
Using financial inducements as their means for recruitment, Iran has a proxy network in Somalia and uses facilitators to provide support to violent extremist organizations to counter the influence of the United States and Persian Gulf states, including using Somalia to funnel weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen and to transit weapons to other countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, Mozambique, and Central African Republic.
Iranian engagement on the African continent is not new. In particular, Iranian religious groups and intelligence agencies have worked for decades to establish missionary and influence operations on the African continent. These include providing religious scholarship opportunities throughout sub-Saharan Africa and in the Horn region competing and countering Gulf states’ influences.
Furthermore, these educational efforts have allowed Africans to study in Shiite religious centers such as Qom in Iran, and then go back to their countries to engage in both direct and indirect proselytizing in favor of Tehran’s activities, making many of them witting or unwitting accomplices to those pursuing Tehran’s intelligence objectives in the region.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the main Iranian organization in Somalia, and its Quds Force has established relations with extremist groups and criminal networks, according to Somali officials. Somali police and finance ministry officials claim the Quds Force uses these networks to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell cheap oil across Africa to subvert U.S. sanctions, with some of the proceeds used to support militants in Yemen and Somalia.
Somali military officials maintain that Iran has been running secret operations to undermine the United States in Somalia, providing sophisticated weapons, improvised explosive devices, mortars, and chemicals used to make bombs. The military officials allege that Iran and its proxies are complicit in al-Shabab attacks on the U.S. military, Somali forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia. A senior military official involved in operations against al-Shabab in south-central Somalia alleges that al-Shabab has received financial and material support from Iran and may have paid bounties to militants to attack U.S. forces in Somalia and the region.
According to Somali defense ministry and security officials, Iranian money, weapons, and ammunition may have been used in 2019 and 2020 al-Shabab attacks on U.S. military bases in Somalia and northern Kenya, as well as the European Union military convoy in Mogadishu.
Security forces involved in operations against al-Shabab in south-central Somalia discovered weapons as well as bomb-making materials and chemicals from Iran. These officials claim that al-Shabab attacks since 2017 have become more lethal and attribute the group’s increased capabilities to foreign-sourced weapons, with the majority coming from Iran and Yemen.
On Jan. 5, al-Shabab carried out a pre-dawn attack at Manda Airstrip on Camp Simba in northern Kenya. The attack killed three Americans (one soldier and two contractors) and destroyed U.S. military equipment, including surveillance equipment used to support intelligence operations in the region.
Al-Shabab attacked Camp Simba two days after a U.S. drone strike killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a senior Iraqi politician and the deputy chairman of Popular Mobilization Units, an Iraqi paramilitary force. (Although the group claimed there was no link between Suleimani’s killing and its attack, the timing and al-Shabab’s history of opportunistic strikes suggests that the two events may have been linked.)
On Sept. 30, 2019, al-Shabab carried out a large car bomb and gun attack on the Baledogle facility, wounding a U.S. service member at the base, according to news reports. The Baledogle base, about 60 miles northwest of Mogadishu, hosts hundreds of U.S. military and civilian personnel supporting Somali government operations against al-Shabab. The U.S.-trained Somali forces and U.S. military repelled the coordinated attack and inflicted heavy casualties on al-Shabab.
Also on Sept. 30, an al-Shabab car bomb hit the European Union military convoy in Mogadishu. The Italian military convoy was part of the European Union Training Mission in Somalia. The attack damaged convoy vehicles, but did not result in any injuries.
Despite U.S. and Somali counterterrorism operations, al-Shabab remains the largest active al Qaeda network in the world, and the Iranian Quds Force’s financial and material support to the militant group represents a new escalation and a morphing threat to U.S. and Western interests in Somalia and the region.
Although the number of U.S. forces in Somalia has increased over the past three years, there has been a steady increase in attacks by al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia in south-central Somalia, Puntland, and increasingly in northern Kenya. According to Gen. Stephen Townsend, “After a series of complex attacks targeting Somali and U.S. bases last year,” the leaders of al-Shabab “publicly identified Americans and U.S. interests worldwide as priority targets,” a stance similar to Osama bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of war against the United States.
In addition to Iran, Russia has expanded its contact and influence in Somalia, sending an ambassador for the first time in 30 years and establishing ties with extremist groups in the fragile state to pressure and bleed U.S. forces and Western allies in the region.
According to senior defense ministry and national and regional security officials in Somalia, Russia’s intelligence service and the Wagner Group—a paramilitary mercenary company with ties to the Kremlin—are active in Somalia, where have they established ties with al-Shabab while also trying to offer the Somali government and regional governments training and equipment, without oversight or accountability and avoiding compliance with U.N. sanctions.
Over the past two years, Russia and Iran have shown renewed interest in the Horn of Africa, and, according to a senior Somali military official, Russia has been working with Iran to push the United States out of Somalia—especially Baledogle, a base built by the Soviet Union that formerly served as Moscow’s main hub in the region.
According to officials, Russians have expressed interest in Baledogle and the port of Berbera. The officials are concerned that the 2019 attack on Baledogle was influenced and supported by Iranian or Russian proxies seeking to force the U.S. military out of the base.
Given that Iran has engaged with and supported violent extremist groups in Somalia and across the region, it’s not surprising that Tehran and its proxy agents are supporting al-Shabab. The reality is that Tehran has on countless occasions in recent years engaged with a wide range of Islamist elements in Somalia. Iran uses these actors in Africa to project its influence and spread its extremist doctrine wherever and however it can. Tehran continues to use proxy allies and violent extremist groups in Somalia, undermining the U.S. administration’s counterterrorism strategy in Somalia and international efforts to stabilize the country.
To counter this threat, the U.S. government should first focus on reducing al-Shabab’s access to financial and material support from foreign sources such as Iran. This can be done by expanding the use of sanctions to identify and target individuals or groups in Somalia and the region facilitating Iranian proxy activities in Somalia, as well as identifying how violent extremist organizations in Somalia procure weapons and chemicals used to attack civilians, government institutions, and security forces in Somalia and the region.
It should then use the Combined Task Force 150 and the European Union Capacity Building Mission to focus on disrupting the flow of weapons and chemicals to Somalia, while helping the federal government of Somalia and federal member states to build naval, coast guard, and other maritime capabilities to protect Africa’s second-longest coast.
Al-Shabab’s aspiration to attack the United States in the region and beyond poses a direct threat to the United States’ national-security and foreign-policy interests.
Second, the U.S. government should work toward reducing Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa, making it challenging for Iran and its proxies to operate. The U.S. government can reduce Iranian influence by increasing intelligence collection on proxy allies of Tehran, their facilitators, and support structures, as well as by monitoring Iranian trade with countries in the region. Additionally, the United States can use sanctions to go after individuals and organizations engaging with sanctioned elements of the Iranian regime.
Finally, to counter Iran, Russia, and other rogue states, the U.S. government should increase military, security, and economic assistance to Somalia, supporting the Somali government’s efforts to increase the size and capabilities of Somalia’s security forces as they wage counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations to dislodge al-Shabab and other violent extremist groups from areas they control .
Al-Shabab’s aspiration to attack the United States in the region and beyond poses a direct threat to the United States’ national-security and foreign-policy interests. To defeat al-Shabab and limit Iran’s and other foreign agents’ involvement in Somalia requires the U.S. government to use all instruments of national power—including economic, military, security, and financial tools, to defeat the world’s most active, effective, and enduring al Qaeda affiliate.


What American Century?

One problem with arguments that bemoan or cheer the end of the “ American Century ” is that there never was one .
Despite the United States ’ moment of economic and atomic predominance after World War II , the United States immediately faced strategic challenges from the Soviet Union , and soon from Communist China , among others .
If anything , American citizens felt less safe from foreign adversaries in 1945 than they had a decade earlier .
The Cold War meant that deadly conflict continued .
Five years after the Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay , American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Between 1950 and 1953 more than 33,000 Americans died on the Korean Peninsula , which remained divided near where the conflict had started .
Hostile , aggressive governments in North Korea , China , and North Vietnam redoubled their efforts to undermine U.S. interests , especially around Japan .
U.S. Sen. Joseph McCarthy frightened a majority of Americans into believing that communists were infiltrating all aspects of domestic society .
Some American Century .
The reality is that , throughout the Cold War , American military power rarely produced the battlefield dominance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often than not , American soldiers and their proxies fought to a standstill against smaller , determined adversaries in Korea , Lebanon , Cuba , Vietnam , Angola , and elsewhere .
Similarly , generous foreign aid rarely gave U.S. leaders the leverage they wanted .
Cold War historians have chronicled in detail how allies from Paris and Bonn to Tokyo , Tehran , and Tel Aviv resisted and manipulated Washington while benefiting from American protection , markets , and resources .
The allies realized that the United States needed them , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fears , hopes , and hubris among American leaders .
There was always a threatening adversary to justify continuing to send aid to allies , despite their resistance to Washington ’ s demands for reform and loyalty .
Very often , smaller partners pulled the United States into projects and conflicts that did not serve American interests .
Vietnam , a former French colony , was the most infamous of many examples .
Washington ’ s international leadership was always limited , uncertain , and contested .
It was most effective when it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group of allies and former adversaries .
In Western Europe , the United States helped to build institutions for economic integration and collective security through the Marshall Plan , the European Coal and Steel Community ( later the Common Market and the European Union ) , and NATO .
In East Asia , Washington nurtured economic development , trade , and security cooperation among Japan , South Korea , and Taiwan .
On a more global scale , the United States helped create the United Nations and its associated agencies that constructed webs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from atomic energy and peacekeeping to health , education , and communications .
Through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund , also U.S.-led institutions , the United States helped to bring numerous countries together to address global poverty and economic instability .
Postwar internationalism served American interests by making the world safer and more stable—for the prosperity of U.S. citizens , as well as many others .
American diplomacy and foreign assistance supported alternatives to communism , war , and depression .
Every high-ranking American foreign-policy maker before 1980 remembered how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War II contributed to that cataclysm .
These chastened officials—Democrats and Republicans—sought to prevent a recurrence , in a nuclear age , at almost all costs .
“ Never again ” did not mean the United States had to dominate the world ; it could not .
“ Never again ” meant the United States must lead a diverse group of nations to work together toward common interests .
This postwar commitment to international engagement and cooperation had many flaws .
It was intolerant of communist and many nationalist alternatives .
It presumed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And it gave disproportionate voice to figures ( “ the establishment ” ) with access to capital , prestigious institutions , and specialized knowledge .
Many voices , at home and abroad , were locked out of U.S. policy discussions .
Despite incessant claims about democratization , American postwar leadership often encouraged a kind of fraternal cooperation among like-minded trans-Atlantic figures who fit the stereotypical descriptor “ pale , male , and Yale.
” These serious limitations notwithstanding , American leadership in the second half of the 20th century still worked because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on improving the lives of their citizens .
Instead of war , societies that allied with the United States increased their trade and consumption .
Many allies , especially in Europe and East Asia , became more open and democratic .
Others , especially in the Middle East and Latin America , remained repressive , but they also had to grapple with rising calls for reform , openness , and human rights that the United States legitimized , even if it did not always support them in practice .
Frequently , U.S.-supported institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national independence and human rights , despite Washington ’ s own abandonment of those priorities .
The postwar international ecosystem seeded by U.S. leadership made repression harder to justify or ignore , and American realists did not control the narrative .
American claims about freedom and justice abroad reverberated at home , fueling civil rights activism and forcing Jim Crow Cold Warriors on the defensive .
The infrastructure that grew around this ecosystem was both American and global at the same time , giving Washington unique influence , but not full control .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ international order .
The emergence of a dollar-based global financial regime is a perfect example .
From the earliest postwar years , American-printed currency lubricated commerce in the most vibrant economies .
By the end of the 20th century , international finance was denominated almost entirely in dollars , depending on the ability of the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve to both circulate sufficient money , especially during crises , and prevent inflation from spending and borrowing excesses .
This delicate balance required cooperation between the printers of the currency in Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the governing powers in large economies .
The great and enduring success of American leadership was to manage this process , even when the circulation of dollars created new competitors , including Japan and then China .
Americans were better served by a global capitalist system they could help regulate , but not control , rather than the alternatives .
Although U.S. policy in recent years has undermined postwar internationalism—and also faced renewed challenges from foreign rivals—real American leadership remains vital .
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how essential international cooperation is for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serving suffering populations , and stimulating weakened economies .
The pandemic has become more contagious and deadly , particularly in the United States , because American-led international cooperation has been lacking .
And the countries that have managed well on their own will still suffer from the pandemic ’ s deepening damage to the U.S. and world economies .
No other country has the resources , networks , and history to support cooperation on the scale of the United States .
American leaders , because of their global media presence , frequently set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is simply impossible to imagine the core foundations for international cooperation holding around economy , science , health , and environment without contemporary U.S. leadership .
There ’ s no other country that could step forward and stand up effectively against destructive actors .
All international orders have a life cycle .
They rise and fall , but they do not disappear overnight .
The American postwar international order has long shown signs of decline , identified by Henry Kissinger and others more than 50 years ago .
Until there is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of nations would be wise to continue to support U.S. leadership in bringing openness and stability to a very dangerous , conflict-ridden world .
One country can not guarantee security and justice , but someone must lead .
Debates about renewing or abandoning the pretenses of a mythical “ American Century ” are distractions .
The real work is in renewing the cooperative American international leadership that insured so much peace and prosperity for 70 years .

One problem with arguments that bemoan or cheer the end of the “American Century” is that there never was one. Despite the United States’ moment of economic and atomic predominance after World War II, the United States immediately faced strategic challenges from the Soviet Union, and soon from Communist China, among others. If anything, American citizens felt less safe from foreign adversaries in 1945 than they had a decade earlier.
One problem with arguments that bemoan or cheer the end of the “American Century” is that there never was one. Despite the United States’ moment of economic and atomic predominance after World War II, the United States immediately faced strategic challenges from the Soviet Union, and soon from Communist China, among others. If anything, American citizens felt less safe from foreign adversaries in 1945 than they had a decade earlier.
The Cold War meant that deadly conflict continued. Five years after the Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay, American soldiers were again in combat in Asia. Between 1950 and 1953 more than 33,000 Americans died on the Korean Peninsula, which remained divided near where the conflict had started. Hostile, aggressive governments in North Korea, China, and North Vietnam redoubled their efforts to undermine U.S. interests, especially around Japan. U.S. Sen. Joseph McCarthy frightened a majority of Americans into believing that communists were infiltrating all aspects of domestic society. Some American Century.
The reality is that, throughout the Cold War, American military power rarely produced the battlefield dominance that leaders and citizens expected. More often than not, American soldiers and their proxies fought to a standstill against smaller, determined adversaries in Korea, Lebanon, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and elsewhere. Similarly, generous foreign aid rarely gave U.S. leaders the leverage they wanted. Cold War historians have chronicled in detail how allies from Paris and Bonn to Tokyo, Tehran, and Tel Aviv resisted and manipulated Washington while benefiting from American protection, markets, and resources. The allies realized that the United States needed them, and they could play to a mix of fears, hopes, and hubris among American leaders. There was always a threatening adversary to justify continuing to send aid to allies, despite their resistance to Washington’s demands for reform and loyalty. Very often, smaller partners pulled the United States into projects and conflicts that did not serve American interests. Vietnam, a former French colony, was the most infamous of many examples.
Washington’s international leadership was always limited, uncertain, and contested. It was most effective when it facilitated cooperation, often among a diverse group of allies and former adversaries. In Western Europe, the United States helped to build institutions for economic integration and collective security through the Marshall Plan, the European Coal and Steel Community (later the Common Market and the European Union), and NATO. In East Asia, Washington nurtured economic development, trade, and security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On a more global scale, the United States helped create the United Nations and its associated agencies that constructed webs of technical and political cooperation across issues from atomic energy and peacekeeping to health, education, and communications. Through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also U.S.-led institutions, the United States helped to bring numerous countries together to address global poverty and economic instability.
Postwar internationalism served American interests by making the world safer and more stable—for the prosperity of U.S. citizens, as well as many others. American diplomacy and foreign assistance supported alternatives to communism, war, and depression. Every high-ranking American foreign-policy maker before 1980 remembered how the isolated and conflictual environment before World War II contributed to that cataclysm. These chastened officials—Democrats and Republicans—sought to prevent a recurrence, in a nuclear age, at almost all costs. “Never again” did not mean the United States had to dominate the world; it could not. “Never again” meant the United States must lead a diverse group of nations to work together toward common interests.
This postwar commitment to international engagement and cooperation had many flaws. It was intolerant of communist and many nationalist alternatives. It presumed Western, and especially American, superiority. And it gave disproportionate voice to figures (“the establishment”) with access to capital, prestigious institutions, and specialized knowledge. Many voices, at home and abroad, were locked out of U.S. policy discussions. Despite incessant claims about democratization, American postwar leadership often encouraged a kind of fraternal cooperation among like-minded trans-Atlantic figures who fit the stereotypical descriptor “pale, male, and Yale.”
These serious limitations notwithstanding, American leadership in the second half of the 20th century still worked because it brought numerous countries together to cooperate on improving the lives of their citizens. Instead of war, societies that allied with the United States increased their trade and consumption. Many allies, especially in Europe and East Asia, became more open and democratic. Others, especially in the Middle East and Latin America, remained repressive, but they also had to grapple with rising calls for reform, openness, and human rights that the United States legitimized, even if it did not always support them in practice. Frequently, U.S.-supported institutions, especially the United Nations, promoted national independence and human rights, despite Washington’s own abandonment of those priorities.
The postwar international ecosystem seeded by U.S. leadership made repression harder to justify or ignore, and American realists did not control the narrative. American claims about freedom and justice abroad reverberated at home, fueling civil rights activism and forcing Jim Crow Cold Warriors on the defensive.
The infrastructure that grew around this ecosystem was both American and global at the same time, giving Washington unique influence, but not full control. That was the genius of the postwar international order. The emergence of a dollar-based global financial regime is a perfect example. From the earliest postwar years, American-printed currency lubricated commerce in the most vibrant economies. By the end of the 20th century, international finance was denominated almost entirely in dollars, depending on the ability of the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve to both circulate sufficient money, especially during crises, and prevent inflation from spending and borrowing excesses. This delicate balance required cooperation between the printers of the currency in Washington, the bankers around the world, and the governing powers in large economies. The great and enduring success of American leadership was to manage this process, even when the circulation of dollars created new competitors, including Japan and then China. Americans were better served by a global capitalist system they could help regulate, but not control, rather than the alternatives.
Although U.S. policy in recent years has undermined postwar internationalism—and also faced renewed challenges from foreign rivals—real American leadership remains vital. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how essential international cooperation is for monitoring threats, managing supply chains, serving suffering populations, and stimulating weakened economies. The pandemic has become more contagious and deadly, particularly in the United States, because American-led international cooperation has been lacking. And the countries that have managed well on their own will still suffer from the pandemic’s deepening damage to the U.S. and world economies.
No other country has the resources, networks, and history to support cooperation on the scale of the United States. American leaders, because of their global media presence, frequently set the tone for interactions between societies. It is simply impossible to imagine the core foundations for international cooperation holding around economy, science, health, and environment without contemporary U.S. leadership. There’s no other country that could step forward and stand up effectively against destructive actors.
All international orders have a life cycle. They rise and fall, but they do not disappear overnight. The American postwar international order has long shown signs of decline, identified by Henry Kissinger and others more than 50 years ago. Until there is a viable replacement, Americans and the plurality of nations would be wise to continue to support U.S. leadership in bringing openness and stability to a very dangerous, conflict-ridden world. One country cannot guarantee security and justice, but someone must lead.
Debates about renewing or abandoning the pretenses of a mythical “American Century” are distractions. The real work is in renewing the cooperative American international leadership that insured so much peace and prosperity for 70 years.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-18--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Russia is actively trying to undermine attempts by neighboring Georgia to strengthen its ties to Europe and the United States .
Meanwhile , Iran is covertly funding terrorist groups in Somalia as a way of attacking U.S. troops in the region .
And it ’ s time for world leaders to call the systematic repression of the Uighurs in China ’ s Xinjiang region what it is—a genocide .
1 .
U.S. Sees Russian Push to Consolidate Foothold in Georgia Russia is using frozen conflicts in Georgia ’ s breakaway regions to further undermine the Caucasian nation ’ s stability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ join the European community , Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch reports .
2 .
Populism Isn ’ t Always Xenophobic .
Just Ask Ontario ’ s Premier .
Doug Ford , the premier of Canada ’ s most populous province , is utilizing a more inclusive and malleable brand of populist politics to hold on to power , Simon Lewsen writes .
Iran has established covert ties with the Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group , allegedly to attack the U.S. military and other foreign forces in Somalia and in the region , Muhammad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The World ’ s Most Technologically Sophisticated Genocide Is Happening in Xinjiang The overwhelming evidence of the Chinese government ’ s deliberate and systematic campaign to destroy the Uighur people clearly meets the definition of genocide , Rayhan Asat and Yonah Diamond write .
5 .
To Pay for the Pandemic , Dry Out the Tax Havens The COVID-19 pandemic has given world leaders a chance to learn from their mistakes and shut down offshore tax havens once and for all , David L. Carden writes .

Russia is actively trying to undermine attempts by neighboring Georgia to strengthen its ties to Europe and the United States.
Russia is actively trying to undermine attempts by neighboring Georgia to strengthen its ties to Europe and the United States.
Meanwhile, Iran is covertly funding terrorist groups in Somalia as a way of attacking U.S. troops in the region.
And it’s time for world leaders to call the systematic repression of the Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang region what it is—a genocide.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives for a meeting with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka on June 28, 2019.
Russia is using frozen conflicts in Georgia’s breakaway regions to further undermine the Caucasian nation’s stability and the viability of its bid to join the European community, Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch reports.
Ontario Premier Doug Ford shakes hands at the end of a government session in Toronto on April 11, 2019.
Doug Ford, the premier of Canada’s most populous province, is utilizing a more inclusive and malleable brand of populist politics to hold on to power, Simon Lewsen writes.
Al-Qaeda linked al-Shabab recruits walk down a street on March 5, 2012 in the Deniile district of Somalian capital, Mogadishu, following their graduation.
Iran has established covert ties with the Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group, allegedly to attack the U.S. military and other foreign forces in Somalia and in the region, Muhammad Fraser-Rahim and Mo Fatah write.
A man walks past a screen showing images of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kashgar in China's northwest Xinjiang region on June 4, 2019.
The overwhelming evidence of the Chinese government’s deliberate and systematic campaign to destroy the Uighur people clearly meets the definition of genocide, Rayhan Asat and Yonah Diamond write.
offshore tax havens coronavirus money
Foreign Policy illustration
The COVID-19 pandemic has given world leaders a chance to learn from their mistakes and shut down offshore tax havens once and for all, David L. Carden writes.