foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--House Democrats Pledge to Continue Investigations Into Pompeo—Regardless of Election Outcome

House Democrats Pledge to Continue Investigations Into Pompeo—Regardless of Election Outcome All the leading contenders to take up chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee next year vowed that investigations into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s alleged misdeeds at the State Department would continue regardless of the results of next month ’ s presidential election , setting the stage for protracted investigations into the Trump administration ’ s handling of U.S. foreign policy .
The three contenders to head the powerful panel—Reps .
Gregory Meeks of New York , Brad Sherman of California , and Joaquin Castro of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bid to fix what ails the State Department , which has been plagued by plummeting morale , attrition of career officials , alleged misuse of official resources , and charges of increasing politicization at the highest ranks .
Their three-way race won ’ t be decided until January , assuming the Democrats maintain control of the House of Representatives , as polls suggest .
Pompeo , who catapulted to national prominence as a Kansas congressman by investigating the Obama-era State Department , has denied wrongdoing , and his aides have accused Democrats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading investigations for political purposes .
“ The country needs to know how this administration has politicized the State Department , ” said Sherman , who emerged as one of the leading candidates for the gavel after the current chairman , New York Rep. Eliot Engel , was defeated in a June primary .
“ That will be a little less relevant to people if Trump is ex-president , it will be even more important if , God forbid , he gets reelected.
” “ Chairman Engel didn ’ t start these investigations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the truth is crucial to our democracy , ” Meeks said .
“ That is why the investigations should continue regardless of who is president.
” The State Department did not respond to a request for comment .
Republicans on the committee—considered unlikely to retake the House majority in the next Congress—have mostly tried to stay out of the fray .
The office of Rep. Michael McCaul , the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , declined to comment .
Whether or not President Donald Trump is reelected , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the move could further entrench partisan rancor between Pompeo and the committee ’ s leadership that has spilled out into the open over the past two years .
It also puts Pompeo—who first gained national recognition for his role in grilling the State Department and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over the 2011 Benghazi terrorist attacks—in the crosshairs of potential legal battles beyond the 2020 election .
One of Trump ’ s most loyal cabinet secretaries , Pompeo has faced growing complaints by Democrats of misusing State Department resources for personal use and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also said they have unresolved questions about why Pompeo pushed to fire the State Department ’ s inspector general , his alleged misuse of taxpayer dollars on travel for his wife , a series of extravagant so-called Madison dinners at the State Department ’ s Foggy Bottom headquarters with deep-pocketed Republican donors , and directing a senior advisor to run personal errands .
Pompeo , in a sharp break with State Department tradition , appeared at the Republican National Convention in a prerecorded video during an official visit to Jerusalem this summer , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy speeches to audiences in battleground states such as Wisconsin and Florida .
“ He ’ s practically kept a campaign schedule for the last few months , ” said one House aide .
The State Department said its legal office first reviewed and cleared Pompeo ’ s plan to address the Republican National Convention , and that no taxpayer resources were used .
But Castro , who is leading the inquiry into the speech as head of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on oversight and investigations , said the State Department has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the committee ’ s effort to request documents on the matter .
“ We intend to continue looking into this beyond November and beyond January , regardless of who ’ s in the White House and who the secretary of state is , ” Castro said .
“ And so if we have to request those documents from a new administration in January , then we will.
” Internal emails sent to political appointees at the State Department by his deputy Stephen Biegun and obtained by Politico earlier this year instructed political appointees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ events .
Earlier this month , Pompeo also drew fire from Democratic lawmakers for vowing to release more of Hillary Clinton ’ s emails from her tenure as secretary of state at the urging of Trump—despite it being unclear if there are more emails to release .
His pledge triggered an investigation from the federal government ’ s independent watchdog , the Office of Special Counsel , to determine whether such a move would violate the Hatch Act that prevents partisan political activities in federal office .
“ Releasing emails for the sake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a violation of the Hatch Act .
That ’ s a ridiculous question , ” Pompeo said in an Oct. 14 press conference when asked about the matter .
“ We ’ ll continue to do the right thing .
We ’ ll make sure that all these emails get to the right place and we will do everything we can to make sure that the American people get a chance to see as much as we can equitably produce.
” The row between House Democrats and Pompeo reached a fever pitch in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watchdog Steve Linick , who had been investigating the alleged misuse of official resources by Pompeo and his wife at the time of Linick ’ s ouster .
In the wake of his firing , the State Department balked at providing documents and key witnesses to the committee over the administration ’ s decision to use an emergency declaration to sell precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates last year over bipartisan objections on Capitol Hill .
Last month , three senior department officials testified on the matters before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the expedited arms sales .
“ No president should be abusing the word of emergency , and we need to make it plain to any new secretary of state that you don ’ t cut Congress out of the process because three years from now you want to deliver certain munitions to Riyadh , ” Sherman said .
Pompeo and his senior aides argued that the emergency declaration was necessary to better help its Gulf allies deter Iran in the region and combat Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the war in Yemen .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on urgent documents and testimonies that date back even further .
Committee aides said the State Department is stonewalling most of their major oversight requests , including on matters from over a year ago .
The unfulfilled oversight requests include : Trump ’ s communications with Russian President Vladimir Putin ; the role of Jared Kushner , Trump ’ s son-in-law , in diplomacy ; State Department spending of taxpayer funds at Trump properties ; evidence that associates of Trump threatened Marie Yovanovitch , the career ambassador ousted from her post in Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration ’ s decisions to cut funding to the World Health Organization .
The State Department can be forthcoming—when it serves Trump ’ s political interests , Democratic committee members charge .
The State Department furnished documents to Senate Republicans on presidential candidate Joe Biden ’ s son Hunter Biden ’ s role as a board member in a major Ukrainian natural gas company—an investigation that Democrats say is purely political—and witnesses for hearings on the controversial emergency declaration to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
But committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears to offer up documents or testimony when Democrats ratchet up pressure on the administration—including threatening to hold Pompeo in contempt or , on the Senate side , blocking confirmation votes on senior Trump appointees—and not as a matter of routine process .
And that pressure has triggered retaliation from the State Department .
When the committee was pushing for answers in its investigation into Linick ’ s firing , for instance , Pompeo ordered staff-level briefings on totally unrelated matters to be halted .
House aides said that the State Department has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress justifying the Republican National Convention address in Jerusalem , as well as recent speeches in Wisconsin and Florida , must-win swing states for Trump .
Democrats jostling for the gavel are hoping a Biden administration would be more cooperative in doing a post-mortem of the State Department ’ s politicization under Trump .
Though Democrats promise the investigations will continue apace even if Trump wins a second term , they would likely face even greater headwinds from an administration that has been determined to keep top officials away from congressional scrutiny—an issue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In August , a federal appeals court dismissed a lawsuit aiming to force former White House counsel Donald McGahn to obey a subpoena from Congress—but one judge also dismissed a claim that McGahn was entitled to “ absolute immunity.
” On the other hand , Pompeo is not likely to face increased legal liability if he steps down or Trump is defeated , experts said .
But a Biden victory in November could remove many potential hurdles to the Democrats ’ probe into alleged wrongdoing , with a new secretary of state likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ documents and provide witnesses—and some are worried that Congress could go too far .
“ I think Republicans and Pompeo themselves set a pretty damning trend on the Benghazi investigation with a very myopic and politically focused [ inquiry ] , ” said Scott Anderson , a former State Department official now at the Brookings Institution .
“ I don ’ t know if it ’ s good for the Democrats to give in to those instincts .
”

All the leading contenders to take up chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee next year vowed that investigations into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s alleged misdeeds at the State Department would continue regardless of the results of next month’s presidential election, setting the stage for protracted investigations into the Trump administration’s handling of U.S. foreign policy.
All the leading contenders to take up chairmanship of the House Foreign Affairs Committee next year vowed that investigations into Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s alleged misdeeds at the State Department would continue regardless of the results of next month’s presidential election, setting the stage for protracted investigations into the Trump administration’s handling of U.S. foreign policy.
The three contenders to head the powerful panel—Reps. Gregory Meeks of New York, Brad Sherman of California, and Joaquin Castro of Texas—all pledged to extend oversight requests in a bid to fix what ails the State Department, which has been plagued by plummeting morale, attrition of career officials, alleged misuse of official resources, and charges of increasing politicization at the highest ranks. Their three-way race won’t be decided until January, assuming the Democrats maintain control of the House of Representatives, as polls suggest.
Pompeo, who catapulted to national prominence as a Kansas congressman by investigating the Obama-era State Department, has denied wrongdoing, and his aides have accused Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee of leading investigations for political purposes.
“The country needs to know how this administration has politicized the State Department,” said Sherman, who emerged as one of the leading candidates for the gavel after the current chairman, New York Rep. Eliot Engel, was defeated in a June primary. “That will be a little less relevant to people if Trump is ex-president, it will be even more important if, God forbid, he gets reelected.”
“Chairman Engel didn’t start these investigations for political reasons. They were started because the truth is crucial to our democracy,” Meeks said. “That is why the investigations should continue regardless of who is president.”
The State Department did not respond to a request for comment. Republicans on the committee—considered unlikely to retake the House majority in the next Congress—have mostly tried to stay out of the fray. The office of Rep. Michael McCaul, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declined to comment.
Whether or not President Donald Trump is reelected, with Democrats expected to hold the House, the move could further entrench partisan rancor between Pompeo and the committee’s leadership that has spilled out into the open over the past two years. It also puts Pompeo—who first gained national recognition for his role in grilling the State Department and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over the 2011 Benghazi terrorist attacks—in the crosshairs of potential legal battles beyond the 2020 election.
One of Trump’s most loyal cabinet secretaries, Pompeo has faced growing complaints by Democrats of misusing State Department resources for personal use and alleged politicking. Aides on Capitol Hill also said they have unresolved questions about why Pompeo pushed to fire the State Department’s inspector general, his alleged misuse of taxpayer dollars on travel for his wife, a series of extravagant so-called Madison dinners at the State Department’s Foggy Bottom headquarters with deep-pocketed Republican donors, and directing a senior advisor to run personal errands.
Pompeo, in a sharp break with State Department tradition, appeared at the Republican National Convention in a prerecorded video during an official visit to Jerusalem this summer, and he’s spent months giving policy speeches to audiences in battleground states such as Wisconsin and Florida.
“He’s practically kept a campaign schedule for the last few months,” said one House aide.
The State Department said its legal office first reviewed and cleared Pompeo’s plan to address the Republican National Convention, and that no taxpayer resources were used. But Castro, who is leading the inquiry into the speech as head of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on oversight and investigations, said the State Department has been “uncooperative so far” in the committee’s effort to request documents on the matter.
“We intend to continue looking into this beyond November and beyond January, regardless of who’s in the White House and who the secretary of state is,” Castro said. “And so if we have to request those documents from a new administration in January, then we will.”
Internal emails sent to political appointees at the State Department by his deputy Stephen Biegun and obtained by Politico earlier this year instructed political appointees not to attend party conventions or related events.
Earlier this month, Pompeo also drew fire from Democratic lawmakers for vowing to release more of Hillary Clinton’s emails from her tenure as secretary of state at the urging of Trump—despite it being unclear if there are more emails to release. His pledge triggered an investigation from the federal government’s independent watchdog, the Office of Special Counsel, to determine whether such a move would violate the Hatch Act that prevents partisan political activities in federal office.
“Releasing emails for the sake of transparency can’t possibly be a violation of the Hatch Act. That’s a ridiculous question,” Pompeo said in an Oct. 14 press conference when asked about the matter. “We’ll continue to do the right thing. We’ll make sure that all these emails get to the right place and we will do everything we can to make sure that the American people get a chance to see as much as we can equitably produce.”
The row between House Democrats and Pompeo reached a fever pitch in June, after Trump fired State Department watchdog Steve Linick, who had been investigating the alleged misuse of official resources by Pompeo and his wife at the time of Linick’s ouster.
In the wake of his firing, the State Department balked at providing documents and key witnesses to the committee over the administration’s decision to use an emergency declaration to sell precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates last year over bipartisan objections on Capitol Hill. Last month, three senior department officials testified on the matters before the committee and defended Linick’s firing and the expedited arms sales.
“No president should be abusing the word of emergency, and we need to make it plain to any new secretary of state that you don’t cut Congress out of the process because three years from now you want to deliver certain munitions to Riyadh,” Sherman said. Pompeo and his senior aides argued that the emergency declaration was necessary to better help its Gulf allies deter Iran in the region and combat Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the war in Yemen.
But Congress is still waiting for answers on urgent documents and testimonies that date back even further. Committee aides said the State Department is stonewalling most of their major oversight requests, including on matters from over a year ago. The unfulfilled oversight requests include: Trump’s communications with Russian President Vladimir Putin; the role of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, in diplomacy; State Department spending of taxpayer funds at Trump properties; evidence that associates of Trump threatened Marie Yovanovitch, the career ambassador ousted from her post in Ukraine ahead of the impeachment investigation; and the administration’s decisions to cut funding to the World Health Organization.
The State Department can be forthcoming—when it serves Trump’s political interests, Democratic committee members charge. The State Department furnished documents to Senate Republicans on presidential candidate Joe Biden’s son Hunter Biden’s role as a board member in a major Ukrainian natural gas company—an investigation that Democrats say is purely political—and witnesses for hearings on the controversial emergency declaration to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
But committee aides said that the State Department only appears to offer up documents or testimony when Democrats ratchet up pressure on the administration—including threatening to hold Pompeo in contempt or, on the Senate side, blocking confirmation votes on senior Trump appointees—and not as a matter of routine process.
And that pressure has triggered retaliation from the State Department. When the committee was pushing for answers in its investigation into Linick’s firing, for instance, Pompeo ordered staff-level briefings on totally unrelated matters to be halted. House aides said that the State Department has blown through deadlines to provide documents to Congress justifying the Republican National Convention address in Jerusalem, as well as recent speeches in Wisconsin and Florida, must-win swing states for Trump. Democrats jostling for the gavel are hoping a Biden administration would be more cooperative in doing a post-mortem of the State Department’s politicization under Trump.
Though Democrats promise the investigations will continue apace even if Trump wins a second term, they would likely face even greater headwinds from an administration that has been determined to keep top officials away from congressional scrutiny—an issue that is moving through U.S. courts. In August, a federal appeals court dismissed a lawsuit aiming to force former White House counsel Donald McGahn to obey a subpoena from Congress—but one judge also dismissed a claim that McGahn was entitled to “absolute immunity.”
On the other hand, Pompeo is not likely to face increased legal liability if he steps down or Trump is defeated, experts said. But a Biden victory in November could remove many potential hurdles to the Democrats’ probe into alleged wrongdoing, with a new secretary of state likely to be more willing to hand over documents and provide witnesses—and some are worried that Congress could go too far.
“I think Republicans and Pompeo themselves set a pretty damning trend on the Benghazi investigation with a very myopic and politically focused [inquiry],” said Scott Anderson, a former State Department official now at the Brookings Institution. “I don’t know if it’s good for the Democrats to give in to those instincts.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Peacekeeping Missions and a Marshall Plan Won’t Save Mali

Even on a slow news day , stories about Africa rarely attract much attention in the United States .
With an upcoming election , the economy , and the coronavirus to worry about , the continent is not even a blip on most Americans ’ radar screen .
That is unfortunate , in part because events there often reveal important truths about the world at large .
Such is the case of the recent military coup in the West African nation of Mali , which demonstrates why United Nations peacekeeping today is destined to fail and why much of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will fare no better .
Prior to the August coup , tens of thousands of Malians had been protesting for months against their government over poverty , a lack of jobs and education , and a long-running conflict with violent extremists .
They wanted the president , Ibrahim Boubacar Keita , to step down , but he refused and instead employed maneuvers such as using the country ’ s Constitutional Court to keep more members of his political party in parliament in an attempt to maintain his grip on power .
Mali has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for years , including attacks by terrorist groups .
Efforts to negotiate a resolution to the conflict included providing more regional autonomy so people at the local level could feel more in control .
But this and other reform measures were never implemented , and those responsible for the abuses were never brought to justice .
Believing their government was unwilling or unable to improve their lives , many Malians took to the streets to demonstrate against it , and the appeal of groups that promised change , even if through the use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point , the army stepped in and , with wide popular support , detained Keita and forced him from office .
A transitional government has been established , with military officers as president and vice president and a civilian chosen as prime minister .
They are supposed to guide the country to new elections in the next year and a half .
The overthrow of an elected government brought the predictable reaction from leaders in Africa and abroad .
They demanded that Keita be reinstated , and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A mediation effort was undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States , which did not restore Keita to power but did result in the formation of the interim government with some civilian participation .
While international pressure urged the swift restoration of democracy , it seemed to be based on the assumption that occasional elections are the only requirement for democracy to function .
Condemnation of incumbent presidents who rig the system to keep themselves , or their parties , in power is rarely heard .
The upheaval is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , but of international efforts—including U.N. peacekeeping—to improve the situation .
In 2013 , the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping mission to Mali and tasked it with protecting civilians and helping the government extend its control over its own territory .
Following a 2015 reconciliation agreement between various Malian factions , implementing this accord was added to the mission ’ s mandate .
The U.N. Security Council authorized the peacekeepers to use “ all necessary means ” to carry out their assignment “ with a proactive , robust flexible and agile posture.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ little besides becoming one of the most deadly of the U.N. ’ s peacekeeping operations , with 220 fatalities and counting .
Peacekeeping was not always so dangerous .
When the U.N. first got into peacekeeping in 1948 , it was to help resolve wars over territory between countries .
As that kind of conflict became rare , peacekeeping evolved into dealing with the aftermath of civil wars in newly independent countries .
Those operations have largely ended , and peacekeeping has evolved into a third phase .
That phase consists of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all in Africa and include the one in Mali .
They are supposed to help governments protect civilians and stabilize the country .
To accomplish that would require the peacekeepers to become warfighters , however , and that is something they are not willing or able to do successfully .
In Mali , for instance , fewer than 6 percent of the troops are from wealthy countries ; the United States contributes only nine staff officers to the over 13,000 soldiers in the mission .
The lack of troops from rich countries severely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the wealth of a troop-contributing country matters .
With soldiers—as with most things in life—you get what you pay for .
The level of funding an army receives translates directly into how well trained , equipped , and led the troops will be .
That peacekeeping has been left to the poor countries is demonstrated by the fact that over three-quarters of the U.N. troops in Mali come from Chad , Bangladesh , Egypt , Senegal , Togo , Niger , Guinea , Burkina Faso , and Ivory Coast .
Military capability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fundamental reason why the peacekeepers will not succeed in Mali .
The refusal of the country ’ s leaders to compromise , work together , and govern honestly means there is no actual peace to keep .
If Malian soldiers not only won ’ t fight to defend their government , but are also willing to overthrow it , how can peacekeepers from Chad or Bangladesh be convinced to put their lives on the line in order to assist that government ?
The peacekeepers failed on the political front as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ successfully encourage implementation of the 2015 reconciliation agreement .
They could not do that because they lack the leverage over the local political elites , and the international community was content to simply send in the blue helmets and transfer responsibility for not solving the problem to the U.N .
Despite the exhortations from U.N. headquarters in New York , peacekeepers from a dozen different poor countries can not successfully engage in combat operations .
They should never be asked to do so unless they have the ability and will to win , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. ’ s budget .
Because of the way U.N. peacekeeping forces are currently constituted , they will never have that ability , especially given the side on which they are asked to play .
As the U.S. military has demonstrated for many years in Afghanistan , an insurgency can not be eliminated even by the best military forces if the local government is corrupt , is incompetent , and does not earn the support of its own people .
If the peacekeepers are given a political objective , the international community , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic aid , must also be prepared to use “ all necessary means ” —including withholding that aid—to help the peacekeepers succeed .
Otherwise , the only objective the Security Council will achieve will be to widen the gap between the expectations and the abilities of any given peacekeeping operation .
International actors do have leverage if they choose to use it .
Half of the Malian government ’ s budget comes from foreign aid , and nearly half the country ’ s population lives in abject poverty .
Two Africa experts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Mali , urged that a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan be created for Mali and neighboring countries .
There are two problems with such a course of action .
It is unlikely ever to happen , because foreign aid is unpopular in donor countries even in the best of times .
Public opinion polls have shown it is the only federal program that a majority of Americans want to cut .
That is because the public overestimates the percentage of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And at a time when donor countries are dealing with the economic devastation caused by the coronavirus pandemic , suggestions for sending massive amounts of new aid abroad will go nowhere .
Even if attempted , such a plan is unlikely to succeed , because the analogy itself is flawed .
The Marshall Plan rebuilt countries in Western Europe whose infrastructure was destroyed in World War II , but whose human capital and organizational skills were largely still intact .
One can ’ t rebuild a country that was never really built @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on an already shaky foundation .
So providing development aid and believing things will improve will be no more effective than assuming peacekeepers can impose peace .
Throwing a few dollars and a few peacekeepers at the problem is not enough to secure the right outcome .
Democracy means more than just elections ; in an extremely poor country like Mali , the institutions that are fundamental to its functioning are weak and easily controlled by a government run by people determined to keep themselves in power .
If some restraints on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not imposed from abroad , much of the aid will be wasted .
The solution to the crisis in Mali is better governance and giving the Malian people confidence in their own institutions and the hope that it can actually improve their lives .
If the policy of the United States and other countries continues to seek only stability , looking the other way when elections are stolen , and providing aid without bothering to insist on a less corrupt and more inclusive government , Washington will join the peacekeepers on their @ @ @ @

Even on a slow news day, stories about Africa rarely attract much attention in the United States. With an upcoming election, the economy, and the coronavirus to worry about, the continent is not even a blip on most Americans’ radar screen. That is unfortunate, in part because events there often reveal important truths about the world at large. Such is the case of the recent military coup in the West African nation of Mali, which demonstrates why United Nations peacekeeping today is destined to fail and why much of the policy of the United States toward Africa will fare no better.
Even on a slow news day, stories about Africa rarely attract much attention in the United States. With an upcoming election, the economy, and the coronavirus to worry about, the continent is not even a blip on most Americans’ radar screen. That is unfortunate, in part because events there often reveal important truths about the world at large. Such is the case of the recent military coup in the West African nation of Mali, which demonstrates why United Nations peacekeeping today is destined to fail and why much of the policy of the United States toward Africa will fare no better.
Prior to the August coup, tens of thousands of Malians had been protesting for months against their government over poverty, a lack of jobs and education, and a long-running conflict with violent extremists. They wanted the president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, to step down, but he refused and instead employed maneuvers such as using the country’s Constitutional Court to keep more members of his political party in parliament in an attempt to maintain his grip on power.
Mali has been beset by intercommunal and ethnic violence for years, including attacks by terrorist groups. Efforts to negotiate a resolution to the conflict included providing more regional autonomy so people at the local level could feel more in control. But this and other reform measures were never implemented, and those responsible for the abuses were never brought to justice. Believing their government was unwilling or unable to improve their lives, many Malians took to the streets to demonstrate against it, and the appeal of groups that promised change, even if through the use of violence, grew.
At that point, the army stepped in and, with wide popular support, detained Keita and forced him from office. A transitional government has been established, with military officers as president and vice president and a civilian chosen as prime minister. They are supposed to guide the country to new elections in the next year and a half.
The overthrow of an elected government brought the predictable reaction from leaders in Africa and abroad. They demanded that Keita be reinstated, and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a strong condemnation of the action. A mediation effort was undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States, which did not restore Keita to power but did result in the formation of the interim government with some civilian participation. While international pressure urged the swift restoration of democracy, it seemed to be based on the assumption that occasional elections are the only requirement for democracy to function. Condemnation of incumbent presidents who rig the system to keep themselves, or their parties, in power is rarely heard.
The upheaval is not just a failure of the Malian political system, but of international efforts—including U.N. peacekeeping—to improve the situation. In 2013, the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping mission to Mali and tasked it with protecting civilians and helping the government extend its control over its own territory. Following a 2015 reconciliation agreement between various Malian factions, implementing this accord was added to the mission’s mandate.
The U.N. Security Council authorized the peacekeepers to use “all necessary means” to carry out their assignment “with a proactive, robust flexible and agile posture.” Thus far the mission has accomplished little besides becoming one of the most deadly of the U.N.’s peacekeeping operations, with 220 fatalities and counting.
Peacekeeping was not always so dangerous. When the U.N. first got into peacekeeping in 1948, it was to help resolve wars over territory between countries. As that kind of conflict became rare, peacekeeping evolved into dealing with the aftermath of civil wars in newly independent countries. Those operations have largely ended, and peacekeeping has evolved into a third phase.
That phase consists of the six youngest ongoing operations, which are all in Africa and include the one in Mali. They are supposed to help governments protect civilians and stabilize the country. To accomplish that would require the peacekeepers to become warfighters, however, and that is something they are not willing or able to do successfully.
The peacekeepers will not succeed in defeating the insurgents in Mali or in the other five operations because of how peacekeeping has changed over time: Rich countries have largely abandoned it as a viable strategy. The wealthy countries do pay 86 percent of the financial cost of peacekeeping, with the United States picking up 28 percent of the tab. But they provide very few of the troops, especially for the dangerous protection and stabilization missions.
In Mali, for instance, fewer than 6 percent of the troops are from wealthy countries; the United States contributes only nine staff officers to the over 13,000 soldiers in the mission. The lack of troops from rich countries severely reduces the capabilities of the peacekeepers, because the wealth of a troop-contributing country matters. With soldiers—as with most things in life—you get what you pay for. The level of funding an army receives translates directly into how well trained, equipped, and led the troops will be. That peacekeeping has been left to the poor countries is demonstrated by the fact that over three-quarters of the U.N. troops in Mali come from Chad, Bangladesh, Egypt, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast.
Military capability notwithstanding, there is an even more fundamental reason why the peacekeepers will not succeed in Mali. The refusal of the country’s leaders to compromise, work together, and govern honestly means there is no actual peace to keep. If Malian soldiers not only won’t fight to defend their government, but are also willing to overthrow it, how can peacekeepers from Chad or Bangladesh be convinced to put their lives on the line in order to assist that government?
The peacekeepers failed on the political front as well as the military one because they were unable to successfully encourage implementation of the 2015 reconciliation agreement. They could not do that because they lack the leverage over the local political elites, and the international community was content to simply send in the blue helmets and transfer responsibility for not solving the problem to the U.N.
Despite the exhortations from U.N. headquarters in New York, peacekeepers from a dozen different poor countries cannot successfully engage in combat operations. They should never be asked to do so unless they have the ability and will to win, but that is not included in the U.N.’s budget. Because of the way U.N. peacekeeping forces are currently constituted, they will never have that ability, especially given the side on which they are asked to play. As the U.S. military has demonstrated for many years in Afghanistan, an insurgency cannot be eliminated even by the best military forces if the local government is corrupt, is incompetent, and does not earn the support of its own people.
If the peacekeepers are given a political objective, the international community, especially the countries and multilateral organizations providing economic aid, must also be prepared to use “all necessary means”—including withholding that aid—to help the peacekeepers succeed. Otherwise, the only objective the Security Council will achieve will be to widen the gap between the expectations and the abilities of any given peacekeeping operation.
International actors do have leverage if they choose to use it. Half of the Malian government’s budget comes from foreign aid, and nearly half the country’s population lives in abject poverty. Two Africa experts, writing in Foreign Policy about the situation in Mali, urged that a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan be created for Mali and neighboring countries.
There are two problems with such a course of action.
It is unlikely ever to happen, because foreign aid is unpopular in donor countries even in the best of times. Public opinion polls have shown it is the only federal program that a majority of Americans want to cut. That is because the public overestimates the percentage of the federal budget devoted to foreign aid by about 20 times what it actually is. And at a time when donor countries are dealing with the economic devastation caused by the coronavirus pandemic, suggestions for sending massive amounts of new aid abroad will go nowhere.
Even if attempted, such a plan is unlikely to succeed, because the analogy itself is flawed. The Marshall Plan rebuilt countries in Western Europe whose infrastructure was destroyed in World War II, but whose human capital and organizational skills were largely still intact. One can’t rebuild a country that was never really built either economically or politically and therefore rests on an already shaky foundation.
So providing development aid and believing things will improve will be no more effective than assuming peacekeepers can impose peace. Throwing a few dollars and a few peacekeepers at the problem is not enough to secure the right outcome.
Democracy means more than just elections; in an extremely poor country like Mali, the institutions that are fundamental to its functioning are weak and easily controlled by a government run by people determined to keep themselves in power. If some restraints on the government’s power to misuse resources are not imposed from abroad, much of the aid will be wasted.
The solution to the crisis in Mali is better governance and giving the Malian people confidence in their own institutions and the hope that it can actually improve their lives. If the policy of the United States and other countries continues to seek only stability, looking the other way when elections are stolen, and providing aid without bothering to insist on a less corrupt and more inclusive government, Washington will join the peacekeepers on their road to failure.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--The Game That Ruins Friendships and Shapes Careers

In the absence of parties and happy hours and date nights , millions of Americans living under lockdown have regressed into pastimes like playing Animal Crossing , reading War and Peace , baking sourdough bread , or attempting to learn Romanian .
For me and around two dozen friends , the diversion of choice has been Diplomacy , the strategy board game invented by a Harvard University undergraduate named Allan B. Calhamer in the 1950s , mass-marketed by the game company Avalon Hill , and eventually developed into an elaborate ( and mostly free ) online hobby .
My friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before the COVID-19 pandemic , have quickly become hopeless addicts .
For me , Diplomacy has been an on-and-off obsession since high school , when I played it at the home of one Michael Ellis , then a young conservative , and now an obscure but potent player in the Trump administration .
The lessons the game taught both of us stuck , but in very different ways .
If you ’ ve never played Diplomacy , it might be hard to explain its appeal .
The game is not for everyone , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of nerd who has a deep interest in international relations , geopolitics , or really politics of any kind—Foreign Policy ’ s readership , in other words .
This is a game for people who dream about power in its purest form and how they might effectively wield it .
Beloved by President John F. Kennedy and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger , Diplomacy models the realist view of international relations—in which sovereign states rationally compete for spheres of influence , eventually achieving a stable balance of power .
The classic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a simplified map of Europe in 1901 , at the height of the rivalry among the great imperial powers—England , France , Germany , Italy , Austria-Hungary , Russia , and Ottoman Turkey—that would eventually culminate in World War I .
There are no dice , unlike in other classic strategy games like Risk or Axis & Allies , and there are only two types of game pieces : armies and fleets .
Everything about Diplomacy is simple and easy to learn , but the actual gameplay is fiendishly complex , built around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ each pursuing their own selfish interests through a series of ephemeral military pacts .
Part of what keeps Diplomacy interesting is its versatility—there are dozens if not hundreds of variant maps spanning regions and eras .
In recent months , my friends and I have played variants set in the Western Hemisphere of the 1840s and in a near-future post-apocalyptic New York City , and we are currently deep into a 21-player global-scale variant set in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars ( we designed the last two of those ourselves ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ rooted in that pre-World War I moment when the Western imperial powers coldly , amorally divided up the rest of the world between them while maneuvering for strategic advantage in Europe—a fun , gentlemanly board game for them and a series of massacres , genocides , and myriad other oppressions for millions of people on every continent who didn ’ t get to play .
There are no moral or ideological distinctions among the great powers ; aside from geographic circumstances , one plays the German kaiser , the British prime minister , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way .
Diplomacy encourages its players to imagine themselves as grand negotiators redrawing borders with international peers at a summit , not as rulers charged with upholding any set of religious , national , or democratic values .
I bring all this up not to “ cancel ” Diplomacy , without which my quarantine would be a great deal more monotonous , but simply to note why it might be considered good preparation for being a political operative in Washington .
I bring all this up not to “ cancel ” Diplomacy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great deal more monotonous , but simply to note why it might be considered good preparation for being a political operative in Washington .
As the name implies , most of the game is spent negotiating—forming secret alliances , divvying up proposed territorial gains , playing rival powers off one another , and spreading disinformation .
Each player submits secret orders , which are then revealed and executed simultaneously , after which negotiations resume ( repeat ad nauseam ) .
There are no formal penalties for lying to another player , though one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the damage can outlast any one game .
Diplomacy is famous for ending friendships ; as a group activity , it requires opt-in from players who are comfortable casually manipulating one another .
It ’ s certainly possible to possess such skills without deploying them in one ’ s career—as a freelance writer , my own manipulations extend only to guilting my editor when I see he ’ s playing online video games on Steam .
But should one wish to enter the upper echelons of Beltway politics—the cynical world of This Town @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump pledged to drain and instead naturally adapted to—Diplomacy is an ideal training ground .
In a satisfying game of Diplomacy , where nobody flakes out because of other commitments , shifting great-power blocs will gradually whittle Europe down from seven powers to a more manageable four or three , who will then agree to a draw—or fail to do so , thus paving the way for a solo victory by the most ruthless player .
Classic Diplomacy requires exactly seven players , no more and no less , and each must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time to the game .
In person , this might mean a chaotic afternoon at a house big enough for multiple players to pair off in separate rooms for scheming .
The combination of a global pandemic and the internet makes setting this up much easier .
There are free websites , such as PlayDiplomacy or Backstabbr , where strangers or groups of friends can arrange games to be played out over multiple weeks , with orders submitted every 12 or 24 hours and thus plenty of time for lengthy correspondences by email @ @ @ @ @ @ @ message .
But if you ’ re a teenager , the time commitment needed for an in-person game is a lot more plausible .
My own teenage Diplomacy frenzy took place two decades ago and almost exactly a century after the classic game is set .
Our little clique , spread out among several D.C.-area high schools , would meet at Michael Ellis ’ s house in suburban Maryland and spend whole weekend afternoons plotting and backstabbing while totally sober .
( We were very cool . )
I ’ m still friends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but not with our host , who in a narrow sense has gone on to greater success and influence than the rest of us—an achievement reached , perhaps , by fully internalizing Diplomacy ’ s cynical realpolitik .
Michael Ellis has mostly stayed out of the spotlight .
He was briefly mentioned in a front-page New York Times story in March 2017 , as one of two Trump administration officials who allegedly leaked classified intelligence reports to Ellis ’ s former employer Rep. Devin Nunes .
This kicked off the “ unmasking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies now refer to as “ Obamagate ” —a semi-conspiratorial narrative in which the Obama administration supposedly surveilled Trump ’ s presidential transition team .
The other official , Ezra Cohen-Watnick , also grew up in Montgomery County , Maryland , and is 34 years old , two years behind me and Ellis .
Cohen-Watnick has been the subject of some detailed reporting , but for whatever reason , Ellis has not received a similar hard look , despite the fact that he has had a hand in a number of more recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been some routine coverage of his career . )
Ellis is mentioned in the second article of impeachment against the president last year , as one of nine administration officials who defied subpoenas from congressional investigative committees , making him a party to Trump ’ s obstruction of Congress .
According to testimony from now-retired Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman last fall , it was Ellis , then a White House legal advisor , who came up with the idea of moving the transcript of Trump ’ s fateful June 25 phone call with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ server .
Trump was acquitted on party lines in the Senate in February ; the only Republican senator to vote for the first article of impeachment , though not the second , was Mitt Romney , who employed Ellis as his deputy director of strategy in Boston during his failed 2008 presidential primary campaign .
Trump ’ s impeachment didn ’ t slow Ellis ’ s rise but resulted in a far more powerful—though still behind-the-scenes—position .
A month after the acquittal , he was promoted to senior director for intelligence on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Richard Grenell , who recently completed a brief stint as acting director of national intelligence .
It ’ s an extremely powerful role , in which he serves as a gatekeeper between the intelligence community and the White House , a job that has traditionally been filled by senior intelligence officers rather than political loyalists , and one that entails direct oversight on covert action .
As one former holder of the office described it , it involves everything from “ setting the president ’ s intelligence priorities and providing guidance to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who in the U.S. government is granted access to covert action programs and other sensitive operations.
” The one thing Ellis has done at the National Security Council that has been reported on was to review the manuscript of former National Security Advisor John Bolton ’ s recent tell-all memoir—after which , despite lacking the relevant training at the time , he determined that the book contained classified information and recommended that its publication be blocked .
As Ellis himself put it in his declaration during the White House lawsuit against Bolton : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not have access to the same quantity of classified intelligence reporting that I do .
Neither do most NSC staff routinely attend senior-level meetings related to national security and foreign policy decisions , as I do.
” I can only speculate why nobody has chosen to profile Ellis yet—it wouldn ’ t shock me if he ’ s been a valuable source for reporters—but there was a time when I knew him about as well as anybody outside the small , backbiting circle of Trumpian officials does today .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Ellis ’ s house , and I can ’ t claim to remember the specifics of any of our games .
I do remember that he had a nervous tic when he lied , and that provinces like Silesia and Galicia weren ’ t abstractions on a board to him ; as a European history buff and an admirer of Otto von Bismarck , he knew the lands of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs intimately .
I remember he wrote a high school senior paper on the Battle of Caporetto , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World War I , which was a hell of a thing for a 17-year-old American to know or care about .
I assume we must have double-crossed one another on more than one occasion , and I ’ m sure I took it personally .
We haven ’ t interacted since 2004 , when he was working for Karl Rove to reelect President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney ; in our last conversation , he claimed he had no idea who was behind the so-called swift boating of Democratic nominee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or so preceding years , aged 15 to 20 , we were , if not friends , at least frenemies .
We disagreed on politics ; he was always a staunch conservative , and I was a liberal , though not yet the leftist I ’ ve since evolved into .
But we had a group of nerdy ( and overwhelmingly liberal ) friends in common , and , if nothing else , we both enjoyed board games .
The writer Emily Gould recently tweeted that “ there is a specific nerdy type @ @ @ @ @ @ @ County , MD seem to attain.
” Gould , herself a MoCo native , was on to something : Ellis and I can both be understood as products of the D.C. suburbs , a unique region of the country where upper-middle-class liberals with advanced degrees are wildly overrepresented .
It ’ s a milieu where political operatives , defense contractors , lawyers , and federal bureaucrats are completely normalized professions—many of our parents worked in them , and many of us would follow suit .
At the same time , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic that an ambitious teenager can distinguish himself simply by batting for the other team .
Ellis was awkward and gangly , like the rest of us , but he had a certain old-fashioned gallantry ; always well-mannered , always chivalrous .
He was intelligent , a star student at Richard Montgomery High School ’ s competitive international baccalaureate program , from which he would go on to Dartmouth University ( where he edited the Dartmouth Review ) and Yale Law School .
He was an Eagle Scout , a classical music aficionado @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subscribed to National Review and once chided me for reading Entertainment Weekly , and he made a point of not listening to any contemporary popular music—no alternative rock or hip-hop for him .
He sometimes wore bowties ; he rotated daily between vintage Dwight Eisenhower , Barry Goldwater , and Richard Nixon campaign buttons ; and he carried a pocket Constitution to deploy during arguments .
He was by far the more competent and hard-working of the two of us , and his reward for that has been to carry water for both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lifetime .
As our cohort became more politically conscious toward the end of high school , some of the women we knew began questioning how Michael could support a party opposed to their reproductive rights .
“ Michael ’ s response was that he didn ’ t really care one way or another about abortion rights and just enjoyed politics and thought that you could have more fun as a Republican , ” one friend and fellow veteran of our Diplomacy games told me .
“ Growing up around D.C. , you would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work in government or politics—some of them because they liked being near power , some of them because they wanted to make a difference , ” another friend we played Diplomacy with recalled .
“ But I always had the sense that Michael liked being the cleverest one in the room , liked winning at the game—and it was a game .
I never had a clear sense where his Republicanism came from , if it came from any place other than contrarianism in affluent-liberal Montgomery County , but clearly at a certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would give him ample opportunity to win at the game as nastily as possible.
” In hindsight , I see Ellis as a conservative ’ s conservative , an aspirational William F. Buckley or George Will , instinctively deferential to authority , tradition , and hierarchy .
He was working for Bush before he was 20 ; by 27 , he was married with a law degree and a commission in the U.S. Navy ; now , at 36 , he is quietly one of the most powerful officials in Washington .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respects Donald Trump on a personal level , or that serving someone of Trump ’ s intellect was what he had in mind at the start of his career .
But it was entirely predictable that he would eventually serve in a Republican White House and protect the power of the executive without any regard for morality or decency .
Ellis was a born operative , not an idealistic policymaker ; he spent his formative years preparing for a culture that celebrates the culture of former Trump strategist Roger Stone and Attorney General @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s career path are pretty standard as far as political wunderkinds go , but my high school friends and I do find ourselves wondering how someone so obsessed with honor and cultural refinement could find himself consciously enabling the current occupant of the White House .
While I have no wish to let any of them off the hook for their past or present sins , plenty of highly educated , D.C.-based former Republican operatives—David Frum , Bill Kristol , Stuart Stevens—have chosen to disavow the Republican Party over Trump .
Ellis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ m not going to argue that Diplomacy alone set him on that path , but one thing the game does is capture the low cunning , petty backstabbing , and total lack of scruples that underlay the competition among fin de siècle European empires .
I believe Ellis understands at an intuitive level that there is no contradiction between his civilized pretensions and the sordid business of politics , in the Trump era or in any other .
Trumpism is uniquely grotesque in its excesses , but Ellis demonstrates that the mentality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t fundamentally different from what the reactionary governments of previous empires required .
I love Diplomacy because I love staring at maps and designing my own ; to me , it ’ s the first step to knowing a place and to learning more about its history .
These days , I also love it because it helps me stave off loneliness under quarantine by keeping me in touch with like-minded friends who , notwithstanding their many cold-blooded betrayals , I ’ m inclined to think still respect me .
Recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and encouraged several players in the southern cone of South America—including my cousin , playing as Chile—to join forces in order to crush the various Caribbean-centered powers between us .
Once they accomplished that goal , they immediately went on to steamroll me , which they did so efficiently that I can ’ t even get mad .
After all , it ’ s just a game .
But I suspect it was more than a game to Ellis , and more than a celebration of gentlemanly 19th-century imperialism , though Diplomacy is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was a socially sanctioned way to hone his skills at deceit and subterfuge , skills that continue to serve him—and , more to the point , to serve Donald Trump .
Ellis has served the president longer and with more loyalty than many other White House apparatchiks .
This is a guy who would rather be powerful than popular , and who is willing to debase himself to win .
“ I remember feeling like you could never trust him , ” a friend told me .
“ If you did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grinning at you over the board as the moves were resolved and he stabbed you in the back.
” Trump ’ s presidency may end next January , but Ellis ’ s career will likely endure any temporary reversal in Republican fortunes .
The perpetrators of Iran-Contra and the Iraq War have prospered in Washington under administrations from both parties , and I expect Ellis and his Trump administration colleagues will prosper too .
They ’ ll likely stab many rivals in the back along the way—and form many alliances with people who @ @ @ @

In the absence of parties and happy hours and date nights, millions of Americans living under lockdown have regressed into pastimes like playing Animal Crossing, reading War and Peace, baking sourdough bread, or attempting to learn Romanian.
For me and around two dozen friends, the diversion of choice has been Diplomacy, the strategy board game invented by a Harvard University undergraduate named Allan B. Calhamer in the 1950s, mass-marketed by the game company Avalon Hill, and eventually developed into an elaborate (and mostly free) online hobby. My friends, some of whom had never played before the COVID-19 pandemic, have quickly become hopeless addicts. For me, Diplomacy has been an on-and-off obsession since high school, when I played it at the home of one Michael Ellis, then a young conservative, and now an obscure but potent player in the Trump administration. The lessons the game taught both of us stuck, but in very different ways.
If you’ve never played Diplomacy, it might be hard to explain its appeal. The game is not for everyone, but it is ideally suited for the kind of nerd who has a deep interest in international relations, geopolitics, or really politics of any kind—Foreign Policy’s readership, in other words. This is a game for people who dream about power in its purest form and how they might effectively wield it.
Beloved by President John F. Kennedy and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy models the realist view of international relations—in which sovereign states rationally compete for spheres of influence, eventually achieving a stable balance of power. The classic version of the game is set on a simplified map of Europe in 1901, at the height of the rivalry among the great imperial powers—England, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Ottoman Turkey—that would eventually culminate in World War I. There are no dice, unlike in other classic strategy games like Risk or Axis & Allies, and there are only two types of game pieces: armies and fleets. Everything about Diplomacy is simple and easy to learn, but the actual gameplay is fiendishly complex, built around social interactions between seven committed players, each pursuing their own selfish interests through a series of ephemeral military pacts.
From left: a classic Diplomacy board; a January 1974 cover of Games & Puzzles magazine featuring the creator of the strategy game, Allan B. Calhamer; and a version of the game designed by David Klion and Manoli Strecker set in a near-future post-apocalyptic New York City.
Part of what keeps Diplomacy interesting is its versatility—there are dozens if not hundreds of variant maps spanning regions and eras. In recent months, my friends and I have played variants set in the Western Hemisphere of the 1840s and in a near-future post-apocalyptic New York City, and we are currently deep into a 21-player global-scale variant set in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (we designed the last two of those ourselves). But the spirit of the game is rooted in that pre-World War I moment when the Western imperial powers coldly, amorally divided up the rest of the world between them while maneuvering for strategic advantage in Europe—a fun, gentlemanly board game for them and a series of massacres, genocides, and myriad other oppressions for millions of people on every continent who didn’t get to play. There are no moral or ideological distinctions among the great powers; aside from geographic circumstances, one plays the German kaiser, the British prime minister, or the Ottoman sultan exactly the same way. Diplomacy encourages its players to imagine themselves as grand negotiators redrawing borders with international peers at a summit, not as rulers charged with upholding any set of religious, national, or democratic values.
I bring all this up not to “cancel” Diplomacy, without which my quarantine would be a great deal more monotonous, but simply to note why it might be considered good preparation for being a political operative in Washington.
I bring all this up not to “cancel” Diplomacy, without which my quarantine would be a great deal more monotonous, but simply to note why it might be considered good preparation for being a political operative in Washington. As the name implies, most of the game is spent negotiating—forming secret alliances, divvying up proposed territorial gains, playing rival powers off one another, and spreading disinformation. Each player submits secret orders, which are then revealed and executed simultaneously, after which negotiations resume (repeat ad nauseam). There are no formal penalties for lying to another player, though one’s reputation may suffer, and the damage can outlast any one game. Diplomacy is famous for ending friendships; as a group activity, it requires opt-in from players who are comfortable casually manipulating one another. It’s certainly possible to possess such skills without deploying them in one’s career—as a freelance writer, my own manipulations extend only to guilting my editor when I see he’s playing online video games on Steam. But should one wish to enter the upper echelons of Beltway politics—the cynical world of This Town, the proverbial swamp that President Donald Trump pledged to drain and instead naturally adapted to—Diplomacy is an ideal training ground.
In a satisfying game of Diplomacy, where nobody flakes out because of other commitments, shifting great-power blocs will gradually whittle Europe down from seven powers to a more manageable four or three, who will then agree to a draw—or fail to do so, thus paving the way for a solo victory by the most ruthless player. Classic Diplomacy requires exactly seven players, no more and no less, and each must be willing to commit a large block of time to the game. In person, this might mean a chaotic afternoon at a house big enough for multiple players to pair off in separate rooms for scheming. The combination of a global pandemic and the internet makes setting this up much easier. There are free websites, such as PlayDiplomacy or Backstabbr, where strangers or groups of friends can arrange games to be played out over multiple weeks, with orders submitted every 12 or 24 hours and thus plenty of time for lengthy correspondences by email, phone, text, or direct message.
But if you’re a teenager, the time commitment needed for an in-person game is a lot more plausible. My own teenage Diplomacy frenzy took place two decades ago and almost exactly a century after the classic game is set. Our little clique, spread out among several D.C.-area high schools, would meet at Michael Ellis’s house in suburban Maryland and spend whole weekend afternoons plotting and backstabbing while totally sober. (We were very cool.) I’m still friends with a few members of that crowd, but not with our host, who in a narrow sense has gone on to greater success and influence than the rest of us—an achievement reached, perhaps, by fully internalizing Diplomacy’s cynical realpolitik.
Global Diplomacy 1821 map created by David Klion and Manoli Strecker
Michael Ellis has mostly stayed out of the spotlight. He was briefly mentioned in a front-page New York Times story in March 2017, as one of two Trump administration officials who allegedly leaked classified intelligence reports to Ellis’s former employer Rep. Devin Nunes. This kicked off the “unmasking” scandal and what Trump and his allies now refer to as “Obamagate”—a semi-conspiratorial narrative in which the Obama administration supposedly surveilled Trump’s presidential transition team. (The government probe into it quietly fizzled last week.) The other official, Ezra Cohen-Watnick, also grew up in Montgomery County, Maryland, and is 34 years old, two years behind me and Ellis. Cohen-Watnick has been the subject of some detailed reporting, but for whatever reason, Ellis has not received a similar hard look, despite the fact that he has had a hand in a number of more recent Trump administration scandals. (There has been some routine coverage of his career.)
Ellis is mentioned in the second article of impeachment against the president last year, as one of nine administration officials who defied subpoenas from congressional investigative committees, making him a party to Trump’s obstruction of Congress. According to testimony from now-retired Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman last fall, it was Ellis, then a White House legal advisor, who came up with the idea of moving the transcript of Trump’s fateful June 25 phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to a classified server. Trump was acquitted on party lines in the Senate in February; the only Republican senator to vote for the first article of impeachment, though not the second, was Mitt Romney, who employed Ellis as his deputy director of strategy in Boston during his failed 2008 presidential primary campaign.
Trump’s impeachment didn’t slow Ellis’s rise but resulted in a far more powerful—though still behind-the-scenes—position. A month after the acquittal, he was promoted to senior director for intelligence on the National Security Council, working closely with Richard Grenell, who recently completed a brief stint as acting director of national intelligence. It’s an extremely powerful role, in which he serves as a gatekeeper between the intelligence community and the White House, a job that has traditionally been filled by senior intelligence officers rather than political loyalists, and one that entails direct oversight on covert action.
As one former holder of the office described it, it involves everything from “setting the president’s intelligence priorities and providing guidance to the DNI on policy matters, to determining who in the U.S. government is granted access to covert action programs and other sensitive operations.” The one thing Ellis has done at the National Security Council that has been reported on was to review the manuscript of former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s recent tell-all memoir—after which, despite lacking the relevant training at the time, he determined that the book contained classified information and recommended that its publication be blocked.
As Ellis himself put it in his declaration during the White House lawsuit against Bolton: “Most others of the NSC staff do not have access to the same quantity of classified intelligence reporting that I do. Neither do most NSC staff routinely attend senior-level meetings related to national security and foreign policy decisions, as I do.”
Trump administration official Michael Ellis (right) is pictured with Jeopardy! host Alex Trebek after Ellis appeared on the game show in April 2013.
I can only speculate why nobody has chosen to profile Ellis yet—it wouldn’t shock me if he’s been a valuable source for reporters—but there was a time when I knew him about as well as anybody outside the small, backbiting circle of Trumpian officials does today .
It’s been many years since I played Diplomacy at Ellis’s house, and I can’t claim to remember the specifics of any of our games. I do remember that he had a nervous tic when he lied, and that provinces like Silesia and Galicia weren’t abstractions on a board to him; as a European history buff and an admirer of Otto von Bismarck, he knew the lands of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs intimately. I remember he wrote a high school senior paper on the Battle of Caporetto, the main theater on the Italian-Austrian border during World War I, which was a hell of a thing for a 17-year-old American to know or care about. I assume we must have double-crossed one another on more than one occasion, and I’m sure I took it personally.
We haven’t interacted since 2004 — although I reached out to him for comment well ahead of this article’s publication; he did not respond — when he was working for Karl Rove to reelect President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney; in our last conversation, he claimed he had no idea who was behind the so-called swift boating of Democratic nominee John Kerry. But for the five or so preceding years, aged 15 to 20, we were, if not friends, at least frenemies. We disagreed on politics; he was always a staunch conservative, and I was a liberal, though not yet the leftist I’ve since evolved into. But we had a group of nerdy (and overwhelmingly liberal) friends in common, and, if nothing else, we both enjoyed board games.
The writer Emily Gould recently tweeted that “there is a specific nerdy type of fame that only people from Montgomery County, MD seem to attain.” Gould, herself a MoCo native, was on to something: Ellis and I can both be understood as products of the D.C. suburbs, a unique region of the country where upper-middle-class liberals with advanced degrees are wildly overrepresented. It’s a milieu where political operatives, defense contractors, lawyers, and federal bureaucrats are completely normalized professions—many of our parents worked in them, and many of us would follow suit. At the same time, it’s an area so conformist and so hegemonically Democratic that an ambitious teenager can distinguish himself simply by batting for the other team.
Ellis was awkward and gangly, like the rest of us, but he had a certain old-fashioned gallantry; always well-mannered, always chivalrous. He was intelligent, a star student at Richard Montgomery High School’s competitive international baccalaureate program, from which he would go on to Dartmouth College(where he edited the Dartmouth Review) and Yale Law School. He was an Eagle Scout, a classical music aficionado, and an unabashed snob. He subscribed to National Review and once chided me for reading Entertainment Weekly, and he made a point of not listening to any contemporary popular music—no alternative rock or hip-hop for him. He sometimes wore bowties; he rotated daily between vintage Dwight Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon campaign buttons; and he carried a pocket Constitution to deploy during arguments.
He was by far the more competent and hard-working of the two of us, and his reward for that has been to carry water for both of the most destructive presidents of our lifetime. As our cohort became more politically conscious toward the end of high school, some of the women we knew began questioning how Michael could support a party opposed to their reproductive rights. “Michael’s response was that he didn’t really care one way or another about abortion rights and just enjoyed politics and thought that you could have more fun as a Republican,” one friend and fellow veteran of our Diplomacy games told me.
“Growing up around D.C., you would know lots of people who wanted to work in government or politics—some of them because they liked being near power, some of them because they wanted to make a difference,” another friend we played Diplomacy with recalled. “But I always had the sense that Michael liked being the cleverest one in the room, liked winning at the game—and it was a game. I never had a clear sense where his Republicanism came from, if it came from any place other than contrarianism in affluent-liberal Montgomery County, but clearly at a certain point he found that the political right would give him ample opportunity to win at the game as nastily as possible.”
In hindsight, I see Ellis as a conservative’s conservative, an aspirational William F. Buckley or George Will, instinctively deferential to authority, tradition, and hierarchy. He was working for Bush before he was 20; by 27, he was married with a law degree and a commission in the U.S. Navy; now, at 36, he is quietly one of the most powerful officials in Washington.
It’s impossible to imagine that Ellis respects Donald Trump on a personal level, or that serving someone of Trump’s intellect was what he had in mind at the start of his career. But it was entirely predictable that he would eventually serve in a Republican White House and protect the power of the executive without any regard for morality or decency. Ellis was a born operative, not an idealistic policymaker; he spent his formative years preparing for a culture that celebrates the culture of former Trump strategist Roger Stone and Attorney General Bill Barr.
The specifics of Ellis’s career path are pretty standard as far as political wunderkinds go, but my high school friends and I do find ourselves wondering how someone so obsessed with honor and cultural refinement could find himself consciously enabling the current occupant of the White House. While I have no wish to let any of them off the hook for their past or present sins, plenty of highly educated, D.C.-based former Republican operatives—David Frum, Bill Kristol, Stuart Stevens—have chosen to disavow the Republican Party over Trump. Ellis has chosen a different path.
I’m not going to argue that Diplomacy alone set him on that path, but one thing the game does is capture the low cunning, petty backstabbing, and total lack of scruples that underlay the competition among fin de siècle European empires. I believe Ellis understands at an intuitive level that there is no contradiction between his civilized pretensions and the sordid business of politics, in the Trump era or in any other. Trumpism is uniquely grotesque in its excesses, but Ellis demonstrates that the mentality required to succeed in the Trump administration isn’t fundamentally different from what the reactionary governments of previous empires required.
I love Diplomacy because I love staring at maps and designing my own; to me, it’s the first step to knowing a place and to learning more about its history. These days, I also love it because it helps me stave off loneliness under quarantine by keeping me in touch with like-minded friends who, notwithstanding their many cold-blooded betrayals, I’m inclined to think still respect me. Recently, I played as the United States and encouraged several players in the southern cone of South America—including my cousin, playing as Chile—to join forces in order to crush the various Caribbean-centered powers between us. Once they accomplished that goal, they immediately went on to steamroll me, which they did so efficiently that I can’t even get mad. After all, it’s just a game.
But I suspect it was more than a game to Ellis, and more than a celebration of gentlemanly 19th-century imperialism, though Diplomacy is inescapably that as well. For Ellis, it was a socially sanctioned way to hone his skills at deceit and subterfuge, skills that continue to serve him—and, more to the point, to serve Donald Trump. Ellis has served the president longer and with more loyalty than many other White House apparatchiks. This is a guy who would rather be powerful than popular, and who is willing to debase himself to win. “I remember feeling like you could never trust him,” a friend told me. “If you did, you’d invariably find him grinning at you over the board as the moves were resolved and he stabbed you in the back.”
Trump’s presidency may end next January, but Ellis’s career will likely endure any temporary reversal in Republican fortunes. The perpetrators of Iran-Contra and the Iraq War have prospered in Washington under administrations from both parties, and I expect Ellis and his Trump administration colleagues will prosper too. They’ll likely stab many rivals in the back along the way—and form many alliances with people who should know better.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Asian Nationalists Hold the Key to a More Effective U.S. China Strategy

Asian Nationalists Hold the Key to a More Effective U.S. China Strategy This article is part of Election 2020 : What We ’ re Missing , FP ’ s series of daily takes by leading global thinkers on the most important foreign-policy issues not being talked about during the presidential election campaign .
Top Trump administration officials have in recent months unveiled the framework for a comprehensive confrontation with China .
The Democrats , on the other hand , say they don ’ t want to pursue a cold war with China—but are deeply divided over what their policy should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the question of Asian nationalism and how the United States could profitably align with it .
“ Nationalism ” is not a popular term in the lexicon of the Western foreign-policy establishment .
In Asia , however , nationalism is not only considered a virtue , but is deeply entrenched thanks to the living memory of the anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century .
Asian nationalists are natural allies for the United States in preventing China ’ s rise as a regional hegemon .
If Chinese nationalism is widely seen as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia , equally strong and similar national sentiments in other Asian countries ought to be an integral part of constructing regional stability .
Asian nationalists are natural allies for the United States in preventing the rise of a regional hegemon .
During the World War II , the United States inspired Asian nationalists with the promise of supporting their liberation from European colonialism .
But after the war , the United States abandoned the Asian nationalists when it backed the European colonial powers—such as France in Indochina—against the Soviet Union .
Asia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alliances during the Cold War as an external imposition .
But the nationalists prevailed against European colonialism , Japanese imperialism , and Communist internationalism .
They are not likely to be simply rolled over by China ’ s growing power .
If the United States is looking for an Asia strategy that is inexpensive , sustainable , rooted in regional realities , and able to mobilize enthusiastic partners ready to share the burden , it must empower Asian nationalists .
Rather than letting Beijing continue to pose as the harbinger of an “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States as the external source of trouble , Washington must bet on the strong instincts of Asian elites to defend their territorial sovereignty and national identity .
The rest—how the United States supports Asian nationalists to defend themselves against hegemony—is a matter of detail .

Top Trump administration officials have in recent months unveiled the framework for a comprehensive confrontation with China . The Democrats, on the other hand, say they don’t want to pursue a cold war with China—but are deeply divided over what their policy should be instead.
Top Trump administration officials have in recent months unveiled the framework for a comprehensive confrontation with China. The Democrats, on the other hand, say they don’t want to pursue a cold war with China—but are deeply divided over what their policy should be instead.
Missing from this debate is the question of Asian nationalism and how the United States could profitably align with it. “Nationalism” is not a popular term in the lexicon of the Western foreign-policy establishment. In Asia, however, nationalism is not only considered a virtue, but is deeply entrenched thanks to the living memory of the anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century.
Asian nationalists are natural allies for the United States in preventing China’s rise as a regional hegemon.
If Chinese nationalism is widely seen as a major threat to stability and security in Asia, equally strong and similar national sentiments in other Asian countries ought to be an integral part of constructing regional stability. Asian nationalists are natural allies for the United States in preventing the rise of a regional hegemon.
During the World War II, the United States inspired Asian nationalists with the promise of supporting their liberation from European colonialism. But after the war, the United States abandoned the Asian nationalists when it backed the European colonial powers—such as France in Indochina—against the Soviet Union. Asia’s nationalists viewed the United States’ alliances during the Cold War as an external imposition. But the nationalists prevailed against European colonialism, Japanese imperialism, and Communist internationalism. They are not likely to be simply rolled over by China’s growing power.
If the United States is looking for an Asia strategy that is inexpensive, sustainable, rooted in regional realities, and able to mobilize enthusiastic partners ready to share the burden, it must empower Asian nationalists. Rather than letting Beijing continue to pose as the harbinger of an “Asia for Asians” and paint the United States as the external source of trouble, Washington must bet on the strong instincts of Asian elites to defend their territorial sovereignty and national identity. The rest—how the United States supports Asian nationalists to defend themselves against hegemony—is a matter of detail.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Pompeo Hosts Foreign Ministers From Both Sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.

Pompeo Hosts Foreign Ministers From Both Sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict .
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan , Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister , and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The United States is trying its hand at mediating between the two warring sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington today .
Both ministers are scheduled to meet with Pompeo separately , and no plans for a trilateral meeting have been announced .
Speaking at a State Department briefing on Wednesday , Pompeo demurred when asked whether he would be brokering a cease-fire today , but he did give some indication of the words he would have for the two men , saying that “ the right path forward is to cease the conflict , tell them to de-escalate , that every country should stay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict , no weapons systems , no support.
” A rising death toll .
On Thursday , Russian President Vladimir Putin reported a significantly higher death toll in the conflict than either Armenia or Azerbaijan have reported .
Speaking at a televised meeting , Putin said the number of dead was “ nearing 5,000 , ” five times more than official estimates have suggested .
Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s ethnic Armenian authorities have said at least 874 military personnel have died since the end of September , along with 37 civilians .
Azerbaijan has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not disclosed the number of military dead .
Military gains .
As diplomats make their way to Washington , Azerbaijan ’ s military is making gains on the ground .
On Thursday , Azerbaijan ’ s President Ilham Aliyev claimed that his military had regained control of all territory on Azerbaijan ’ s border with Iran previously under Armenian control .
Armenia denies the claim , yet Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted this week that his military faced “ a difficult situation , ” going up against Azerbaijan ’ s far better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seemingly outgunned , Armenia does have one significant card to play in the information wars : its diaspora .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Rebecca Collard highlights how Armenians around the world are rallying support for their homeland as the conflict worsens .
“ Whether it ’ s Kardashian West and her fellow Armenian Americans in California or Lebanese Armenians lobbying their government and calling for cyberattacks on Azerbaijan , the usually well-off and well-educated diaspora is a strategic asset , ” Collard writes .
Lebanon ’ s “ new ” PM .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ new prime minister on Thursday , the fourth time he has held the position and a year after he resigned from the same post as the country was gripped by protests .
Hariri has promised to name a technocratic cabinet , with a pressing task of reforming Lebanon ’ s ailing economy .
FP explains the reasons for Hariri ’ s return , namely “ there ’ s not really anybody else whom Lebanon ’ s political parties would agree on.
” About last night .
U.S. President Donald Trump and his Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , squared off in their final debate before the presidential election on November 3 .
Debate moderator Kristin Welker came away with her reputation enhanced and , although there were few memorable moments , the debate was more orderly and substantive than last month ’ s clash .
FP ’ s Michael Hirsh provided snap analysis of a debate where “ foreign-policy played only a small part ” and where Trump “ failed to deliver the knockout blow most of his advisors believed that he needed.
” Condé landslide .
Preliminary results published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Condé scored a decisive victory in the country ’ s presidential election last Sunday , winning almost twice as many votes as his rival , Cellou Dalein Diallo .
Opposition supporters are likely to contest the results .
Diallo already claimed victory earlier in the week , citing his own internal calculations , sparking clashes between security forces and protesters in which 13 people have died so far .
Israel warms to Sudan .
An Israeli government delegation visited Sudan on Thursday , in the latest sign of warming ties between the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abdel Fattah al-Burhan , Sudan ’ s head of state during its transitional government .
Reuters reported on Thursday that Sudan ’ s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is ready to normalize relations with Israel as long as the country ’ s parliament approves the move .
That approval may be some time in coming , as Sudan has yet to form a transitional parliament .
Chile goes to the polls .
Chileans vote on Sunday in a referendum on whether to replace their Pinochet-era constitution .
If voters agree to a change , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ October to choose to confirm those who will draft the document , followed by another vote on whether to approve the new constitution .
U.S. pondering anti-Semitic label for human rights groups .
The U.S. State Department is considering labelling a number of prominent human rights groups as anti-Semitic , and encouraging national governments to avoid supporting them .
The groups in question include household names such as Amnesty International , Human Rights Watch , and Oxfam .
According to reporting in Politico , the United States is planning to use the groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Divestment , and Sanctions movement as evidence of anti-Semitic leanings .
A Dutch “ white hat ” —or ethical hacker—claims to have logged in to the Twitter account of U.S. President Donald Trump … simply by guessing his password .
Victor Gevers , a security researcher , discovered the vulnerability last Friday before alerting U.S. security authorities .
Gevers allegedly gained access using the password “ maga2020 !
” but did not succumb to the temptation of tweeting to the president ’ s 87 million followers .
Gevers attributes the lack of account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ ‘ Trump is over 70—elderly people often switch off two-step verification because they find it too complicated .
My own mother , for instance.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister, and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister, and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Hosts His Armenian and Azerbaijani Counterparts As Hopes For Peace Fade
The United States is trying its hand at mediating between the two warring sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington today.
Both ministers are scheduled to meet with Pompeo separately, and no plans for a trilateral meeting have been announced.
Speaking at a State Department briefing on Wednesday, Pompeo demurred when asked whether he would be brokering a cease-fire today, but he did give some indication of the words he would have for the two men, saying that “the right path forward is to cease the conflict, tell them to de-escalate, that every country should stay out, provide no fuel for this conflict, no weapons systems, no support.”
A rising death toll. On Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin reported a significantly higher death toll in the conflict than either Armenia or Azerbaijan have reported. Speaking at a televised meeting, Putin said the number of dead was “nearing 5,000,” five times more than official estimates have suggested. Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian authorities have said at least 874 military personnel have died since the end of September, along with 37 civilians. Azerbaijan has reported 61 civilian deaths, but has not disclosed the number of military dead.
Military gains. As diplomats make their way to Washington, Azerbaijan’s military is making gains on the ground. On Thursday, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev claimed that his military had regained control of all territory on Azerbaijan’s border with Iran previously under Armenian control. Armenia denies the claim, yet Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted this week that his military faced “a difficult situation,” going up against Azerbaijan’s far better equipped forces.
Diaspora diplomacy. Although seemingly outgunned, Armenia does have one significant card to play in the information wars: its diaspora. Writing in Foreign Policy, Rebecca Collard highlights how Armenians around the world are rallying support for their homeland as the conflict worsens. “Whether it’s Kardashian West and her fellow Armenian Americans in California or Lebanese Armenians lobbying their government and calling for cyberattacks on Azerbaijan, the usually well-off and well-educated diaspora is a strategic asset,” Collard writes.
What We’re Following Today
Lebanon’s “new” PM. Saad Hariri was named Lebanon’s new prime minister on Thursday, the fourth time he has held the position and a year after he resigned from the same post as the country was gripped by protests. Hariri has promised to name a technocratic cabinet, with a pressing task of reforming Lebanon’s ailing economy. FP explains the reasons for Hariri’s return, namely “there’s not really anybody else whom Lebanon’s political parties would agree on.”
About last night. U.S. President Donald Trump and his Democratic challenger, former Vice President Joe Biden, squared off in their final debate before the presidential election on November 3. Debate moderator Kristin Welker came away with her reputation enhanced and, although there were few memorable moments, the debate was more orderly and substantive than last month’s clash. FP’s Michael Hirsh provided snap analysis of a debate where “foreign-policy played only a small part” and where Trump “failed to deliver the knockout blow most of his advisors believed that he needed.”
Condé landslide. Preliminary results published on Thursday suggest that Guinean President Alpha Condé scored a decisive victory in the country’s presidential election last Sunday, winning almost twice as many votes as his rival, Cellou Dalein Diallo. Opposition supporters are likely to contest the results. Diallo already claimed victory earlier in the week, citing his own internal calculations, sparking clashes between security forces and protesters in which 13 people have died so far.
Keep an Eye On
Israel warms to Sudan. An Israeli government delegation visited Sudan on Thursday, in the latest sign of warming ties between the two countries. Israeli officials reportedly met with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s head of state during its transitional government. Reuters reported on Thursday that Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is ready to normalize relations with Israel as long as the country’s parliament approves the move. That approval may be some time in coming, as Sudan has yet to form a transitional parliament.
Chile goes to the polls. Chileans vote on Sunday in a referendum on whether to replace their Pinochet-era constitution. If voters agree to a change, a further vote will take place in October to choose to confirm those who will draft the document, followed by another vote on whether to approve the new constitution.
U.S. pondering anti-Semitic label for human rights groups. The U.S. State Department is considering labelling a number of prominent human rights groups as anti-Semitic, and encouraging national governments to avoid supporting them. The groups in question include household names such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Oxfam. According to reporting in Politico, the United States is planning to use the groups’ alleged support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement as evidence of anti-Semitic leanings.
Odds and Ends
A Dutch “white hat”—or ethical hacker—claims to have logged in to the Twitter account of U.S. President Donald Trump … simply by guessing his password. Victor Gevers, a security researcher, discovered the vulnerability last Friday before alerting U.S. security authorities. Gevers allegedly gained access using the password “maga2020!” but did not succumb to the temptation of tweeting to the president’s 87 million followers.
Gevers attributes the lack of account security to Trump’s age. “‘Trump is over 70—elderly people often switch off two-step verification because they find it too complicated. My own mother, for instance.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.