foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Cape Verde Is Emerging as a Global Pivot Point

Cape Verde doesn ’ t often make the news in the West , but since its initial settlement in the late 15th century , the small developing island state has seen it all : colonialization , slavery , piracy , revolution .
And now it finds itself in the middle of a global pandemic and a fierce geopolitical rivalry .
Against that background , Cape Verde is now redefining its long-term strategy known as Ambition 2030 .
The strategy hopes to jump-start a decade of action that leads to a new era of prosperity .
The world ’ s great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s strategic position , about 350 miles off the coast of West Africa .
Now investors should too .
Meanwhile , local inhabitants suffered from poverty and disease .
Recurring droughts and desertification devastated agricultural production , and populations dwindled due to frequent epidemics .
The riches of trade also attracted competitors and pirates .
With Portugal ’ s relative decline , the erstwhile capital , Cidade Velha ( Old City ) , witnessed British and French attempts , some led by the infamous privateers Sir Francis Drake and Jacques Cassard , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Portuguese eventually succumbed to revolt from within .
Shortly following independence in 1975 at the hands of Amilcar Cabral ’ s anti-imperialist , pan-African movement , Cape Verde leaned toward the communist bloc .
To this day , the country ’ s Chinese-built National Assembly building faces massive oceanfront Russian and Chinese embassies , built as Cold War status symbols .
While the country remained in the socialist orbit , stagnation and poverty contributed to large-scale emigration as remittances from abroad offered families a lifeline .
Since the end of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trajectory tacked decisively toward multiparty electoral democracy and a nascent market economy .
Opening up its magnificent beaches to overwhelmingly European tourists , the rapid growth of the tourism industry accounted for over a third of GDP by the end of the first decade of the new century .
This income was supplemented with substantial European aid , mostly from Portugal , Luxembourg , and the European Union .
Largely because of the country ’ s good governance , the EU rewarded Cape Verde with a “ special partnership ” in 2007 and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In many ways , however , Cape Verde became a victim of its own success .
Elevated to middle-income country status in 2007 , the country witnessed sharp declines in international aid , including the retreat of France and Spain as major donors .
This coincided with the macroeconomic shocks of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis , to which Cape Verde was now vulnerable due to market exposure and its monetary peg to the euro .
The confluence of diminished aid and economic crises resulted in sudden shortfalls in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ levels .
The search for new partners and financing was clearly on .
This opened the door to China .
Beijing has come to see the islands as a pit stop along its Belt and Road Initiative—a strategic stopover for vessels destined for European ports .
In one of Cape Verde ’ s islands , St. Vincent , Chinese vessels make use of a maritime repair station inside the island ’ s special economic zone , which was created with Chinese support .
China also ramped up development assistance with lavish spending on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ palace and new university campus .
Huawei IT systems , moreover , have permeated public buildings and provide a “ smart city ” grid in the capital .
The United States , meanwhile , has been less conspicuous .
In 2015 , the State Department listed the country among its African “ anchor states , ” before negotiating a status of forces agreement in 2017 .
The United States still supports Cape Verde through military and law enforcement cooperation , jointly confronting traders in illicit commodities—mostly drugs emanating from Brazil—who make frequent use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa and Europe .
However , most of its development-oriented funding to the country has lapsed since 2017 .
Ambition 2030 , the country ’ s strategic vision for sustainable development—developed with support from the United Nations and completely revamped after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic—now seeks to carve out Cape Verde ’ s place in a new global economy underpinned by an increasingly multipolar geopolitical system challenging the long-established international development and financing architecture .
Specifically , it outlines a strategic path for sustainable and inclusive growth through diversification within the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development of maritime trade and ocean-based commerce ( that is , the blue economy ) , digital innovation , and the green and circular economy .
These economic objectives are further complemented by socially and environmentally aware policies .
To finance Ambition 2030 , Cape Verde will not rely solely on public expenditure but will especially focus on private sector impact investment , capital guarantees , and other forms of sustainable finance .
To achieve all this , Cape Verde will have to pick its partners well , and that will not occur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the new diplomacy must make use of the country ’ s geopolitical situation .
Its operational context goes well beyond the current trade rivalry between the United States and China .
Cape Verde should also look to cultivate ties with the BRICS ( Brazil , Russia , India , China , and South Africa ) , Commonwealth of Independent States , Gulf Cooperation Council , and high net worth individuals .
Indeed , philanthropic initiatives , such as the Gates Foundation ( among the top donors of the World Health Organization ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , increasingly rival traditional donors and are a testament to the impact of private leadership and authority on the world stage .
Rather than leaning East or West , therefore , strategically positioning Cape Verde as a pivot between regions will be essential in maintaining competitiveness .
Through turbulent times , the diplomatic service must continue to consolidate its long-standing partnerships with Portugal , Luxembourg , and the EU while making more of its advantageous trade terms with the United States .
However , arguably the greatest long-term perspectives for autonomy and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rest of Africa .
Given its institutional capacities , Cape Verde can leverage its membership in several regional free trade areas by offering headquarter locations and digital services that bridge continents .
It can also better exploit its position off the West African coast by lowering trade barriers and offering manufacturing value-added along global supply chains .
Just as Britain established itself as an entrepôt between Europe and North America , Cape Verde can position itself as a gateway to and from Africa .
This approach will require institutionalization of common markets and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West African States and the African Continental Free Trade Area .
Building on existing links with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa , Cape Verde could use the advantage of common language and institutional origins to establish itself as a finance hub for blue , green , and other impact investments in these emerging markets .
Meanwhile , given its sizable diaspora , which outnumbers the internal population by a factor of approximately 2 to 1 , public diplomacy may be Cape Verde ’ s most potent , yet underutilized , asset .
Diaspora @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within their host societies than a diplomat can ever hope to in a single tour of duty .
Diaspora enclaves in the metropolitan areas of Boston , Paris , Amsterdam , Luxembourg , Lisbon , and northern Brazil can help bring counterparts to the table and turn ideas into handshakes .
Finally , Cape Verde should also position itself as a leader among the small island developing states , especially when it comes to sustainable finance .
Such initiatives will help vulnerable communities tackle the triple threat of climate change , debt , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by pandemics , financial crises , or other challenges yet unforeseen .
Together , Ambition 2030 , sustainable finance , and diplomacy will allow Cape Verde to navigate the treacherous waters of COVID-19 , economic vacillation , and geopolitical tension .
Achieving the promises of 2030 will require a concerted effort of strategic investment , institutional development , and global partnerships—a great but certainly not insurmountable challenge for this small yet tenacious island state .

Cape Verde doesn’t often make the news in the West, but since its initial settlement in the late 15th century, the small developing island state has seen it all: colonialization, slavery, piracy, revolution. And now it finds itself in the middle of a global pandemic and a fierce geopolitical rivalry.
Cape Verde doesn’t often make the news in the West, but since its initial settlement in the late 15th century, the small developing island state has seen it all: colonialization, slavery, piracy, revolution. And now it finds itself in the middle of a global pandemic and a fierce geopolitical rivalry.
Against that background, Cape Verde is now redefining its long-term strategy known as Ambition 2030. The strategy hopes to jump-start a decade of action that leads to a new era of prosperity. The world’s great powers have long noted Cape Verde’s strategic position, about 350 miles off the coast of West Africa. Now investors should too.
Uninhabited prior to Portuguese settlement, the Cape Verde islands became an international point of interest in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided the world into Portuguese and Spanish spheres 370 leagues west of Cape Verde’s shores. Thereafter, the archipelagic landmass served as a mid-Atlantic outpost for Vasco da Gama, Christopher Columbus, and other explorers. Over ensuing centuries, the island’s colonial elite profited from the spoils of the trans-Atlantic slave trade; Cape Verde’s location at the foot of the trade winds made it a jumping-off point for rapid transport throughout the Americas.
Meanwhile, local inhabitants suffered from poverty and disease. Recurring droughts and desertification devastated agricultural production, and populations dwindled due to frequent epidemics. The riches of trade also attracted competitors and pirates. With Portugal’s relative decline, the erstwhile capital, Cidade Velha (Old City), witnessed British and French attempts, some led by the infamous privateers Sir Francis Drake and Jacques Cassard, to wrest control. Despite repelling external attacks, the Portuguese eventually succumbed to revolt from within.
Shortly following independence in 1975 at the hands of Amilcar Cabral’s anti-imperialist, pan-African movement, Cape Verde leaned toward the communist bloc. To this day, the country’s Chinese-built National Assembly building faces massive oceanfront Russian and Chinese embassies, built as Cold War status symbols. While the country remained in the socialist orbit, stagnation and poverty contributed to large-scale emigration as remittances from abroad offered families a lifeline.
Since the end of the Cold War, Cape Verde’s trajectory tacked decisively toward multiparty electoral democracy and a nascent market economy. Opening up its magnificent beaches to overwhelmingly European tourists, the rapid growth of the tourism industry accounted for over a third of GDP by the end of the first decade of the new century. This income was supplemented with substantial European aid, mostly from Portugal, Luxembourg, and the European Union. Largely because of the country’s good governance, the EU rewarded Cape Verde with a “special partnership” in 2007 and contributes directly to the state budget.
In many ways, however, Cape Verde became a victim of its own success. Elevated to middle-income country status in 2007, the country witnessed sharp declines in international aid, including the retreat of France and Spain as major donors. This coincided with the macroeconomic shocks of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis, to which Cape Verde was now vulnerable due to market exposure and its monetary peg to the euro. The confluence of diminished aid and economic crises resulted in sudden shortfalls in state coffers, leading to exorbitant debt levels. The search for new partners and financing was clearly on.
This opened the door to China. Beijing has come to see the islands as a pit stop along its Belt and Road Initiative—a strategic stopover for vessels destined for European ports. In one of Cape Verde’s islands, St. Vincent, Chinese vessels make use of a maritime repair station inside the island’s special economic zone, which was created with Chinese support. China also ramped up development assistance with lavish spending on prominent projects, including a refurbished presidential palace and new university campus. Huawei IT systems, moreover, have permeated public buildings and provide a “smart city” grid in the capital.
The United States, meanwhile, has been less conspicuous. In 2015, the State Department listed the country among its African “anchor states,” before negotiating a status of forces agreement in 2017. The United States still supports Cape Verde through military and law enforcement cooperation, jointly confronting traders in illicit commodities—mostly drugs emanating from Brazil—who make frequent use of its strategic location for transshipment to Africa and Europe. However, most of its development-oriented funding to the country has lapsed since 2017.
The country’s economic and geopolitical realities have been made clear this year, with the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic fallout. For Cape Verde, which still derived over a third of its GDP from tourism and ancillary services such as transport before COVID-19, the pandemic has served as a stark reminder of the country’s dependence on its links to the outer world. With the U.S. and EU economies shrinking by double digits last quarter, the country is again bracing for significant reductions in aid flows, foreign investment, and domestic revenues.
Ambition 2030, the country’s strategic vision for sustainable development—developed with support from the United Nations and completely revamped after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic—now seeks to carve out Cape Verde’s place in a new global economy underpinned by an increasingly multipolar geopolitical system challenging the long-established international development and financing architecture. Specifically, it outlines a strategic path for sustainable and inclusive growth through diversification within the tourism sector and across sectors, including development of maritime trade and ocean-based commerce (that is, the blue economy), digital innovation, and the green and circular economy. These economic objectives are further complemented by socially and environmentally aware policies. To finance Ambition 2030, Cape Verde will not rely solely on public expenditure but will especially focus on private sector impact investment, capital guarantees, and other forms of sustainable finance.
To achieve all this, Cape Verde will have to pick its partners well, and that will not occur in a vacuum.
To the contrary, the new diplomacy must make use of the country’s geopolitical situation. Its operational context goes well beyond the current trade rivalry between the United States and China. Cape Verde should also look to cultivate ties with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Commonwealth of Independent States, Gulf Cooperation Council, and high net worth individuals. Indeed, philanthropic initiatives, such as the Gates Foundation (among the top donors of the World Health Organization) or the Ted Turner-inspired United Nations Foundation, increasingly rival traditional donors and are a testament to the impact of private leadership and authority on the world stage.
Rather than leaning East or West, therefore, strategically positioning Cape Verde as a pivot between regions will be essential in maintaining competitiveness. Through turbulent times, the diplomatic service must continue to consolidate its long-standing partnerships with Portugal, Luxembourg, and the EU while making more of its advantageous trade terms with the United States.
However, arguably the greatest long-term perspectives for autonomy and economic resilience lie in better integration with the rest of Africa. Given its institutional capacities, Cape Verde can leverage its membership in several regional free trade areas by offering headquarter locations and digital services that bridge continents. It can also better exploit its position off the West African coast by lowering trade barriers and offering manufacturing value-added along global supply chains. Just as Britain established itself as an entrepôt between Europe and North America, Cape Verde can position itself as a gateway to and from Africa.
This approach will require institutionalization of common markets and customs unions within the Economic Community of West African States and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Building on existing links with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, Cape Verde could use the advantage of common language and institutional origins to establish itself as a finance hub for blue, green, and other impact investments in these emerging markets.
Meanwhile, given its sizable diaspora, which outnumbers the internal population by a factor of approximately 2 to 1, public diplomacy may be Cape Verde’s most potent, yet underutilized, asset. Diaspora communities have built deeper networks and bonds within their host societies than a diplomat can ever hope to in a single tour of duty. Diaspora enclaves in the metropolitan areas of Boston, Paris, Amsterdam, Luxembourg, Lisbon, and northern Brazil can help bring counterparts to the table and turn ideas into handshakes.
Finally, Cape Verde should also position itself as a leader among the small island developing states, especially when it comes to sustainable finance. Such initiatives will help vulnerable communities tackle the triple threat of climate change, debt, and exogenous economic shocks, whether caused by pandemics, financial crises, or other challenges yet unforeseen.
Together, Ambition 2030, sustainable finance, and diplomacy will allow Cape Verde to navigate the treacherous waters of COVID-19, economic vacillation, and geopolitical tension. Achieving the promises of 2030 will require a concerted effort of strategic investment, institutional development, and global partnerships—a great but certainly not insurmountable challenge for this small yet tenacious island state.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Moving Beyond a Post-Pandemic World

Moving Beyond a Post-Pandemic World

Ten months in , it ’ s not too soon to write a first rough draft of how COVID-19 became the worst pandemic in a century and what it might mean for the world of the future .
And the pundit extraordinaire Fareed Zakaria is the obvious candidate to take this task on .
In his new book Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World , Zakaria—who in 2017 warned on his CNN show that the biggest threat to the world ’ s lone superpower was now a tiny virus that “ the United States is wholly unprepared to deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic , how it will change the world and how it won ’ t , and how we ’ d better get ready for the next one soon .
Because let ’ s not kid ourselves : The next one is coming .
“ Buckle up , ” Zakaria writes in succinct , clear prose in his 242-page book .
Displaying an impressive mastery of history , economics , long-past health crises , and global cultural trends , Zakaria observes : “ We have created a world that is always in overdrive , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ larger spaces , encroaching on and destroying the natural world .
In response , the pandemics to come will be “ nature ’ s revenge , ” he says .
This is true not least in the once remote habitats of virulent bats , which we have learned are ideal carriers for deadly viruses because they can survive them better than other animals .
But the ever spreading human population is coming in contact more often with bats as well , raising the danger of future unknown viral contact .
In the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to simply blame President Donald Trump and his now well-documented dilatoriness in responding to the first signs of COVID-19 .
The problem is longer term and systemwide : Years of medical health dominance have led to complacency at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other major health centers , Zakaria writes .
What also needs to change—and already is—is a new appreciation that Reaganite market solutions are insufficient and that government needs to play a new , if as-yet-undetermined role .
Zakaria repudiates the new socialism of the Bernie Sanders-Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free markets and command economies .
Instead , he calls for a focus on “ quality ” more than “ quantity ” of government—but in broad terms an acknowledgement that government is necessary .
In the post-COVID-19 world , Denmark , for example , a leading mixed economy that has had unusual success against the virus , is no longer simply dismissed as a socialist demon by the American right .
( Even the Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson , Zakaria notes , has recently said : “ Republican leaders will have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religion .
… You ’ d have to be a fool to worship it .
Our system was created by human beings for the benefit of human beings.
” Sanders , Zakaria observes wryly , “ could not have said it better.
” ) But Zakaria also provides some useful perspective about what isn ’ t going to change .
Amid the mass exodus from cities , he quotes Aristotle ’ s dictum that humans are fundamentally “ social animals.
” Cities are not going to disappear simply because of pandemic panic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of cities have proved wrong , ” he writes , and they will again .
“ Urbanization , especially in developing countries , will likely recover and continue at more or less its pre-pandemic rate .
No rural awakening is at hand.
” Instead what is likely to ensue is cities that are better prepared , like Hong Kong , which has suffered at last recording , in October , only 105 deaths .
Zakaria cites Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo ’ s plan for turning that great , iconic city into a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ —a so-called 15-minute city designed in such a way that stores , parks , schools , doctor ’ s offices , and other essential common spaces are easily accessible within a few minutes by biking or walking , rather than via virus superspreaders like mass transit .
A new concept of zoning that would repudiate a “ hundred years of urban planning orthodoxy , ” in the words of Samuel Kling , an urban expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs , and throw out the old divisions between residential and commercial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achieving this .
Hidalgo has already begun to implement her plan by turning the famous highways along the Seine into walking and biking paths , but Zakaria suggests that the United States is already taking the lead in this endeavor , with many cities putting in restrictive zoning that lowers population density .
The new culture of Zoom meetings from home is no substitute for the reinvention of cities , Zakaria argues , because “ it is becoming increasingly clear that remote work is a fantastic tool but an imperfect substitute for actual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colleagues with established relationships can continue working together smoothly by chatting online .
Yet bringing on new coworkers , and establishing trust and teamwork with them , is extremely hard to do on video .
Not to mention that remote work leaves out all the spontaneous water-cooler conversations and accidental meetings that ultimately create greater productivity and innovation from the collision of minds .
When you teleconference , you are spending social capital rather than building it.
” He only touches on one of the most enervating aspects of the global lockdown : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which just goes to show that Aristotle was right .
This leads Zakaria to another important if counterintuitive conclusion : Globalization isn ’ t dying , despite the widespread call for “ reshoring ” industries and what appears to now be a bipartisan call in the midst of the U.S. presidential election for America to at least partially “ decouple ” from China .
True , U.S. industries are moving plants from China—but rather than returning them to U.S. shores , they are sending them to Southeast Asia .
Despite the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more parochial , ” comparative advantage will continue to shape the outlines of our world .
Globalization is not only not going to disappear , Zakaria says ; its long history dictates that it will and must continue .
“ Human beings don ’ t want to stand still , ” he writes .
“ Movement has been the way of the world for tens of thousands of years .
If we think of globalization as the increasing movement of people , goods and capital , it has been at work ever since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa sometime between 60,000 and 90,000 years ago—most likely as increasing droughts and famines ( and perhaps disease ) forced them to search for new pastures.
” Occasionally , in his rush through history from Aristotle and Plato to the post-pandemic era , Zakaria ’ s message feels a little facile and unsatisfying , as when he proposes a solution to the anti-elitist populism that rules the day by writing , “ We will need more experts , not fewer , to manage the affairs of these times .
… The alternative is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by gut and the celebration of ignorance.
” Yet Zakaria offers no real practical solution to the problem of advanced nations , including the United States , that still appear hopelessly polarized by a mass rejection of so-called expertise and by “ government by gut , ” to the point where the wearing of masks to protect against COVID-19 has turned into a political and cultural flash point .
Even the emerging new bipolar world between the United States and China can be managed , Zakaria says , if we don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calls for a new cold war .
“ Looking at the shape of international politics in the future , it ’ s clear—bipolarity is inevitable .
A Cold War is a choice.
” In the end , while I think Zakaria ’ s diagnosis is mostly correct , his prognosis feels a little optimistic , considering we are still smack in the middle of this pandemic and the global system , to date , has failed to come together to combat it .
Although Zakaria offers up a few savvy proposals—like his idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ akin to the strategic petroleum reserve ” —others are sometimes disappointingly vague .
Our giant corporations appear to be hard at work at a vaccine , but internet rumor has overtaken real science as to when one will be ready , and our lobby-proof food conglomerates continue to promote an obesity epidemic that has only made the depredations of COVID-19 worse .
Zakaria says all that is needed to prepare for the next pandemic is the “ political will ” —including shoring up the much-maligned World Health Organization ( WHO ) and addressing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he predicts ominously “ will cut America in half.
” But he does not really tell us how such political will is to be achieved amid the chaos of country finger-pointing and Trump ’ s defunding of WHO , a system so broken that political philosopher Francis Fukuyama says America has now become a “ vetocracy.
” Globalization was under justified attack long before COVID-19 came along , in large part because the very so-called experts that Zakaria calls on to save us made cavalier choices that in short order devastated the middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other leading countries .
Trump did not come out of nowhere .
Yes , Zakaria is right to say that , after a late start , most nations moved impressively and with widespread public consent to contain a virus that could have killed tens of millions of people but to date has left only a little more than a million dead .
Humanity has demonstrated , once again , that it is capable of making the right choices .
Survival is always a choice .
In his final chapter , Zakaria , typically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bit of romance .
He quotes the famous line from the movie Lawrence of Arabia , when Peter O ’ Toole defies death by bringing back a dying Arab comrade from the desert whom his colleagues had written off as lost .
“ Nothing is written , ” the hero says .
What Zakaria leaves out is the line by the Arab leader played by Anthony Quinn , who after the saved man is executed ( by O ’ Toole himself ) later remarks : “ Ah , it was written then.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand in this wrenching human drama , but Zakaria is right to say we can ’ t simply resign ourselves to it .
And he has performed an invaluable service in starting a necessary conversation about how we , as a species , can make better choices to save ourselves from predictable calamities to come .

Ten months in, it’s not too soon to write a first rough draft of how COVID-19 became the worst pandemic in a century and what it might mean for the world of the future. And the pundit extraordinaire Fareed Zakaria is the obvious candidate to take this task on.
Ten months in, it’s not too soon to write a first rough draft of how COVID-19 became the worst pandemic in a century and what it might mean for the world of the future. And the pundit extraordinaire Fareed Zakaria is the obvious candidate to take this task on.
In his new book Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, Zakaria—who in 2017 warned on his CNN show that the biggest threat to the world’s lone superpower was now a tiny virus that “the United States is wholly unprepared to deal with”—addresses the deeper causes of the pandemic, how it will change the world and how it won’t, and how we’d better get ready for the next one soon.
Because let’s not kid ourselves: The next one is coming. “Buckle up,” Zakaria writes in succinct, clear prose in his 242-page book. Displaying an impressive mastery of history, economics, long-past health crises, and global cultural trends, Zakaria observes: “We have created a world that is always in overdrive,” with people living longer and inhabiting larger spaces, encroaching on and destroying the natural world. In response, the pandemics to come will be “nature’s revenge,” he says. This is true not least in the once remote habitats of virulent bats, which we have learned are ideal carriers for deadly viruses because they can survive them better than other animals. But the ever spreading human population is coming in contact more often with bats as well, raising the danger of future unknown viral contact.
In the United States, it’s too easy to simply blame President Donald Trump and his now well-documented dilatoriness in responding to the first signs of COVID-19. The problem is longer term and systemwide: Years of medical health dominance have led to complacency at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other major health centers, Zakaria writes. What also needs to change—and already is—is a new appreciation that Reaganite market solutions are insufficient and that government needs to play a new, if as-yet-undetermined role. Zakaria repudiates the new socialism of the Bernie Sanders-Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez ilk by reorienting the antiquated debate between free markets and command economies. Instead, he calls for a focus on “quality” more than “quantity” of government—but in broad terms an acknowledgement that government is necessary. In the post-COVID-19 world, Denmark, for example, a leading mixed economy that has had unusual success against the virus, is no longer simply dismissed as a socialist demon by the American right. (Even the Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson, Zakaria notes, has recently said: “Republican leaders will have to acknowledge that market capitalism is not a religion. … You’d have to be a fool to worship it. Our system was created by human beings for the benefit of human beings.” Sanders, Zakaria observes wryly, “could not have said it better.”)
But Zakaria also provides some useful perspective about what isn’t going to change. Amid the mass exodus from cities, he quotes Aristotle’s dictum that humans are fundamentally “social animals.” Cities are not going to disappear simply because of pandemic panic. “All past prophecies of the decay of cities have proved wrong,” he writes, and they will again. “Urbanization, especially in developing countries, will likely recover and continue at more or less its pre-pandemic rate. No rural awakening is at hand.” Instead what is likely to ensue is cities that are better prepared, like Hong Kong, which has suffered at last recording, in October, only 105 deaths.
Zakaria cites Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo’s plan for turning that great, iconic city into a “ville du quart d’ heure”—a so-called 15-minute city designed in such a way that stores, parks, schools, doctor’s offices, and other essential common spaces are easily accessible within a few minutes by biking or walking, rather than via virus superspreaders like mass transit. A new concept of zoning that would repudiate a “hundred years of urban planning orthodoxy,” in the words of Samuel Kling, an urban expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and throw out the old divisions between residential and commercial districts could go a long way toward achieving this.
Hidalgo has already begun to implement her plan by turning the famous highways along the Seine into walking and biking paths, but Zakaria suggests that the United States is already taking the lead in this endeavor, with many cities putting in restrictive zoning that lowers population density.
The new culture of Zoom meetings from home is no substitute for the reinvention of cities, Zakaria argues, because “it is becoming increasingly clear that remote work is a fantastic tool but an imperfect substitute for actual human contact. To be sure, colleagues with established relationships can continue working together smoothly by chatting online. Yet bringing on new coworkers, and establishing trust and teamwork with them, is extremely hard to do on video. Not to mention that remote work leaves out all the spontaneous water-cooler conversations and accidental meetings that ultimately create greater productivity and innovation from the collision of minds. When you teleconference, you are spending social capital rather than building it.” He only touches on one of the most enervating aspects of the global lockdown: the sheer pathological loneliness of it, which just goes to show that Aristotle was right.
This leads Zakaria to another important if counterintuitive conclusion: Globalization isn’t dying, despite the widespread call for “reshoring” industries and what appears to now be a bipartisan call in the midst of the U.S. presidential election for America to at least partially “decouple” from China. True, U.S. industries are moving plants from China—but rather than returning them to U.S. shores, they are sending them to Southeast Asia. Despite the fact that “[n]ations are becoming more parochial,” comparative advantage will continue to shape the outlines of our world. Globalization is not only not going to disappear, Zakaria says; its long history dictates that it will and must continue.
“Human beings don’t want to stand still,” he writes. “Movement has been the way of the world for tens of thousands of years. If we think of globalization as the increasing movement of people, goods and capital, it has been at work ever since the first humans began migrating out of Africa sometime between 60,000 and 90,000 years ago—most likely as increasing droughts and famines (and perhaps disease) forced them to search for new pastures.”
Occasionally, in his rush through history from Aristotle and Plato to the post-pandemic era, Zakaria’s message feels a little facile and unsatisfying, as when he proposes a solution to the anti-elitist populism that rules the day by writing, “We will need more experts, not fewer, to manage the affairs of these times. … The alternative is unthinkable in the modern age: government by gut and the celebration of ignorance.” Yet Zakaria offers no real practical solution to the problem of advanced nations, including the United States, that still appear hopelessly polarized by a mass rejection of so-called expertise and by “government by gut,” to the point where the wearing of masks to protect against COVID-19 has turned into a political and cultural flash point.
Even the emerging new bipolar world between the United States and China can be managed, Zakaria says, if we don’t allow ourselves to get carried by immoderate calls for a new cold war. “Looking at the shape of international politics in the future, it’s clear—bipolarity is inevitable. A Cold War is a choice.”
In the end, while I think Zakaria’s diagnosis is mostly correct, his prognosis feels a little optimistic, considering we are still smack in the middle of this pandemic and the global system, to date, has failed to come together to combat it. Although Zakaria offers up a few savvy proposals—like his idea of creating a strategic medical reserve “akin to the strategic petroleum reserve”—others are sometimes disappointingly vague. Our giant corporations appear to be hard at work at a vaccine, but internet rumor has overtaken real science as to when one will be ready, and our lobby-proof food conglomerates continue to promote an obesity epidemic that has only made the depredations of COVID-19 worse. Zakaria says all that is needed to prepare for the next pandemic is the “political will”—including shoring up the much-maligned World Health Organization (WHO) and addressing the post-pandemic problem of worsening inequality that he predicts ominously “will cut America in half.” But he does not really tell us how such political will is to be achieved amid the chaos of country finger-pointing and Trump’s defunding of WHO, a system so broken that political philosopher Francis Fukuyama says America has now become a “vetocracy.” Globalization was under justified attack long before COVID-19 came along, in large part because the very so-called experts that Zakaria calls on to save us made cavalier choices that in short order devastated the middle classes of the United States and some other leading countries. Trump did not come out of nowhere.
Yes, Zakaria is right to say that, after a late start, most nations moved impressively and with widespread public consent to contain a virus that could have killed tens of millions of people but to date has left only a little more than a million dead. Humanity has demonstrated, once again, that it is capable of making the right choices. Survival is always a choice.
In his final chapter, Zakaria, typically a hardheaded realist, indulges in a bit of romance. He quotes the famous line from the movie Lawrence of Arabia, when Peter O’Toole defies death by bringing back a dying Arab comrade from the desert whom his colleagues had written off as lost. “Nothing is written,” the hero says. What Zakaria leaves out is the line by the Arab leader played by Anthony Quinn, who after the saved man is executed (by O’Toole himself) later remarks: “Ah, it was written then.”
True, fate may play a large hand in this wrenching human drama, but Zakaria is right to say we can’t simply resign ourselves to it. And he has performed an invaluable service in starting a necessary conversation about how we, as a species, can make better choices to save ourselves from predictable calamities to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--The Case Against Big Tech’s Election Strategies

As the remaining days before the U.S. presidential election dwindle , misinformation is approaching a crescendo—and the big digital platforms are racing to keep up .
This week , Twitter will turn off some of its features and Google has changed its search results .
Facebook , meanwhile , will ban all new political advertisements for the week in advance of the election , has blocked the conspiracy theory group , QAnon , and has deleted a post by President Donald Trump claiming COVID-19 is less lethal than the flu .
Most recently , both Facebook and Twitter have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , blocking , and then unblocking—a front page story in the New York Post about Joe Biden .
Inevitably , digital platforms will struggle to keep up .
Fact-checking organizations will do their best to refute untruths , yet after the genie has escaped the bottle , there is little they can do , since untruths travel further and faster than facts .
Witness the New York Times ’ Daily Distortions section devoted to all the news that is , in fact , not fit to print ; it will serve as amusement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure , but it is hard to imagine that it will do much to persuade those who already mistrust the mainstream media .
And that points to what is missing from existing efforts to battle fake news .
The major social media platforms are adopting blunt instruments to tamp down misinformation .
But misinformation , like politics , is local .
It plays to individuals ’ fears , anxieties , predilections , hopes , and desires .
Often , the kernel of misinformation campaigns is a real local incident , which is then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ video that Trump supporters claim shows shredded mail-in ballot applications in Pennsylvania actually seems to show shredded “ print production waste.
” ) Then , there is no getting around the fact that some parts of the United States are more vulnerable to misinformation campaigns than others ; and some parts are also more likely to be targeted with misinformation because they play an outsized role in determining the outcome of elections .
All this points to a new strategy for countering misinformation .
Consider Florida .
A battleground state with 29 of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the most highly contested states in the presidential race .
It has faced a highly specific misinformation campaign focused on issues likely to resonate with state ’ s Latino communities , which both parties are trying to win over .
Spanish-language YouTube channels , WhatsApp message chains , and pro-Trump Facebook groups have been saturated with conspiracies ranging from the existence of a “ deep state ” designed in this case to evoke fears among people from authoritarian regimes like Venezuela and Cuba to rumors that the billionaire investor , George @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans in their attempt to come to the United States , to false allegations of pedophilia associated with Joe Biden—all areas of concern among different constituencies in the Latino community .
A New York Times column pointing out these falsehoods won ’ t work .
Rather , it is smaller-scale campaigns by digital platforms , local media , and Florida residents that are needed .
Just as political ads and outreach are targeted with a local audience in mind , misinformation catch-and-kill campaigns need to do the same .
This would involve identifying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ channels , identifying local influencers and posters who are trusted and can lend credibility to any fact-checking and de-bunking campaigns , along with localized ads and community-level dialogues .
Of course , Florida isn ’ t the only case .
To understand where anti-misinformation campaigns are most needed , Tufts Fletcher School , where I am the Dean of Global Business , put together a Misinformation Vulnerability Index that identifies the states most at risk .
The index was built by incorporating data on several crucial factors that , according to numerous research @ @ @ @ @ @ @ These include status as a swing state , education levels , age , political polarization , left or right leaning news viewership , and trust in news drawn from social media , among others .
All 50 states and the District of Columbia were analyzed using these criteria .
In the resulting categorization , there is a strong correlation between states that are highly vulnerable to misinformation based on factors such as age , polarization , and trust in news and the states that voted for Donald Trump in 2016 .
Ahead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most vulnerable states again skew in favor of Trump in the coming election .
It is also the case that states with highly contested elections are more likely to be vulnerable to misinformation .
Of the top 25 most vulnerable states , 12 have a highly contested race—presidential or Senate—coming up .
In the 25 least vulnerable states and the District of Columbia , there are seven highly contested races ahead .
In an ideal world , social media companies , journalists , and local organizations would train their efforts on all 12 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly contested .
But with time and resources steadily disappearing , it is worth narrowing the area of concern even further to the shortlist of states with high misinformation vulnerability , that are also considered swing or battleground states .
Those are : Florida , Maine , Nebraska , Wisconsin , Iowa , Pennsylvania , Ohio , Michigan , and New Hampshire .
These are the places where local advocacy groups , monitors , and social media companies need to focus their resources to track , capture and resolve misinformation .
In Ohio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Black community in the hopes of suppressing turnout ; perhaps the same creative energies on social media platforms that brought peaceful protestors out into the streets after the killing of George Floyd using geotargeted messaging can be employed to counter such manipulation .
And in Wisconsin , memes and Facebook and Twitter posts by Russian agents impersonating Wisconsin residents were used to create social discord and keep voters at home ; counter-messaging can be developed with genuine locals who can build better awareness and offer tips for good social media hygiene ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” or share posts that seems salacious or outrageous without fact-checking ) .
The same goes for the other states on this list .
In the run-up to next month ’ s vote , there is far too much focus on what the giant platforms , such as Facebook , can and can not do for the nation as a whole .
There is no time for that anymore .
But there is still time to get smart about hunting and correcting misinformation where it is most damaging .
Misinformation , like politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to learn that lesson now .
Today , the very future of U.S. democracy is at stake ; how we combat misinformation will , tomorrow , shape the future of truth , lies , and democracies around the world .

As the remaining days before the U.S. presidential election dwindle, misinformation is approaching a crescendo—and the big digital platforms are racing to keep up. This week, Twitter will turn off some of its features and Google has changed its search results. Facebook, meanwhile, will ban all new political advertisements for the week in advance of the election, has blocked the conspiracy theory group, QAnon, and has deleted a post by President Donald Trump claiming COVID-19 is less lethal than the flu. Most recently, both Facebook and Twitter have been drawn into a fiery controversy for intervening —hiding, blocking, and then unblocking—a front page story in the New York Post about Joe Biden.
As the remaining days before the U.S. presidential election dwindle, misinformation is approaching a crescendo—and the big digital platforms are racing to keep up. This week, Twitter will turn off some of its features and Google has changed its search results. Facebook, meanwhile, will ban all new political advertisements for the week in advance of the election, has blocked the conspiracy theory group, QAnon, and has deleted a post by President Donald Trump claiming COVID-19 is less lethal than the flu. Most recently, both Facebook and Twitter have been drawn into a fiery controversy for intervening—hiding, blocking, and then unblocking—a front page story in the New York Post about Joe Biden.
Inevitably, digital platforms will struggle to keep up. Fact-checking organizations will do their best to refute untruths, yet after the genie has escaped the bottle, there is little they can do, since untruths travel further and faster than facts. Witness the New York Times’ Daily Distortions section devoted to all the news that is, in fact, not fit to print; it will serve as amusement for the Times’ regular readers, sure, but it is hard to imagine that it will do much to persuade those who already mistrust the mainstream media.
And that points to what is missing from existing efforts to battle fake news. The major social media platforms are adopting blunt instruments to tamp down misinformation. But misinformation, like politics, is local. It plays to individuals’ fears, anxieties, predilections, hopes, and desires. Often, the kernel of misinformation campaigns is a real local incident, which is then distorted. (For example, a video that Trump supporters claim shows shredded mail-in ballot applications in Pennsylvania actually seems to show shredded “print production waste.”) Then, there is no getting around the fact that some parts of the United States are more vulnerable to misinformation campaigns than others; and some parts are also more likely to be targeted with misinformation because they play an outsized role in determining the outcome of elections.
All this points to a new strategy for countering misinformation.
Consider Florida. A battleground state with 29 of 270 electoral college votes, it is one of the most highly contested states in the presidential race. It has faced a highly specific misinformation campaign focused on issues likely to resonate with state’s Latino communities, which both parties are trying to win over. Spanish-language YouTube channels, WhatsApp message chains, and pro-Trump Facebook groups have been saturated with conspiracies ranging from the existence of a “deep state” designed in this case to evoke fears among people from authoritarian regimes like Venezuela and Cuba to rumors that the billionaire investor, George Soros, is funding caravans of Central Americans in their attempt to come to the United States, to false allegations of pedophilia associated with Joe Biden—all areas of concern among different constituencies in the Latino community.
A New York Times column pointing out these falsehoods won’t work. Rather, it is smaller-scale campaigns by digital platforms, local media, and Florida residents that are needed. Just as political ads and outreach are targeted with a local audience in mind, misinformation catch-and-kill campaigns need to do the same. This would involve identifying location-specific “dog whistles” and media channels, identifying local influencers and posters who are trusted and can lend credibility to any fact-checking and de-bunking campaigns, along with localized ads and community-level dialogues.
Of course, Florida isn’t the only case. To understand where anti-misinformation campaigns are most needed, Tufts Fletcher School, where I am the Dean of Global Business, put together a Misinformation Vulnerability Index that identifies the states most at risk. The index was built by incorporating data on several crucial factors that, according to numerous research studies, contribute to misinformation vulnerability. These include status as a swing state, education levels, age, political polarization, left or right leaning news viewership, and trust in news drawn from social media, among others. All 50 states and the District of Columbia were analyzed using these criteria.
In the resulting categorization, there is a strong correlation between states that are highly vulnerable to misinformation based on factors such as age, polarization, and trust in news and the states that voted for Donald Trump in 2016. Ahead of this year’s election, the most vulnerable states again skew in favor of Trump in the coming election.
It is also the case that states with highly contested elections are more likely to be vulnerable to misinformation. Of the top 25 most vulnerable states, 12 have a highly contested race—presidential or Senate—coming up. In the 25 least vulnerable states and the District of Columbia, there are seven highly contested races ahead.
In an ideal world, social media companies, journalists, and local organizations would train their efforts on all 12 states that are both highly vulnerable and highly contested. But with time and resources steadily disappearing, it is worth narrowing the area of concern even further to the shortlist of states with high misinformation vulnerability, that are also considered swing or battleground states. Those are: Florida, Maine, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and New Hampshire. These are the places where local advocacy groups, monitors, and social media companies need to focus their resources to track, capture and resolve misinformation.
In Ohio, for example, misinformers have targeted the Black community in the hopes of suppressing turnout; perhaps the same creative energies on social media platforms that brought peaceful protestors out into the streets after the killing of George Floyd using geotargeted messaging can be employed to counter such manipulation. And in Wisconsin, memes and Facebook and Twitter posts by Russian agents impersonating Wisconsin residents were used to create social discord and keep voters at home; counter-messaging can be developed with genuine locals who can build better awareness and offer tips for good social media hygiene (e.g. don’t “like” or share posts that seems salacious or outrageous without fact-checking). The same goes for the other states on this list.
In the run-up to next month’s vote, there is far too much focus on what the giant platforms, such as Facebook, can and cannot do for the nation as a whole. There is no time for that anymore. But there is still time to get smart about hunting and correcting misinformation where it is most damaging. Misinformation, like politics, thrives on microtargeting. Anti-misinformation strategists need to learn that lesson now. Today, the very future of U.S. democracy is at stake; how we combat misinformation will, tomorrow, shape the future of truth, lies, and democracies around the world.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--The U.S. Once Surged into Helmand Province. Now the Taliban Is, Too.

The U.S. Once Surged into Helmand Province .
Now the Taliban Is , Too .
KABUL , Afghanistan—In the last three weeks , Bibi Koh has lost at least three family members to renewed fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces in the southern province of Helmand .
Three weeks ago , her oldest brother was killed in the crossfire between the warring sides .
A few days later , her two sons , aged six and eight , went missing .
“ I don ’ t know where they went .
I don ’ t know if someone took them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clashes between the Taliban and government troops made it impossible to search for them , but not to keep her three remaining children safe .
Last weekend , she gathered the last money she had left—about $ 60—and brought her family to a makeshift refugee camp in Kabul by way of Helmand ’ s neighboring province , Kandahar .
The travails of Bibi Koh and her children are common at Camp Shina , an informal settlement on the eastern outskirts of the capital that houses more than two dozen Helmandi families that have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the arrivals—mostly widows with children—have lost family members in recent fighting ; the men who stayed behind are unreachable thanks to spotty telephone service .
“ We don ’ t know if they ’ ve been martyred or if they fled , too .
We just have to hope for the best , ” said another mother in the camp .
Camp Shina and the ongoing battle for Helmand are emblematic of the many challenges Afghanistan continues to face as U.S. President Donald Trump pushes for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic rival , Joe Biden , also favors pulling out , as does the American public .
With the presidential election fast approaching , and with peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government staggering forward , Helmand has become a dark reminder of the cyclical nature of the Afghan war—and just how delicate the security situation remains .
Ten years ago , more than 15,000 Afghan , U.S. , British , Canadian , and Estonian troops made one of the biggest pushes of the war to dislodge the Taliban from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s last big stronghold in Helmand .
By the end of the year , it was clear the military surge in Marjah had failed .
By the end of the decade , it was clear all the efforts to wrest Helmand , the biggest poppy-producing province in Afghanistan , from the Taliban had also failed .
Various districts and villages in Helmand have been at the past five .
And yet , despite—or because—of those failures , the United States is racing for the exit .
Trump says he wants the troops @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the joint chiefs of staff , however , has made no statements confirming a set date for the U.S. withdrawal , saying instead that Washington should responsibly end the war in Afghanistan .
As of last month , Joe Biden was also in favor of a U.S. pullout , but with the caveat that any withdrawal also have a plan for taking on Islamic State forces in the country .
The mixed messages coming out of Washington have also tested the patience of officials in Kabul .
After years of certainty that their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to abandon once again , the Afghan government is now toiling away at plans for a potential American exit .
A security source in Kabul said the recent upsurge in violence across the country , including in Helmand , is further evidence that the United States must reveal its plans for the country .
“ They can stay or they can go , but whatever they ’ re going to do , they need to decide for themselves .
We are already preparing for our future , even with the zero presence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This month ’ s offensive in Helmand has already led to the displacement of at least 35,000 families within the province , with thousands more pouring into Kandahar and Kabul .
The Helmandis in Kabul say those who remain in the province are literally caught in the crossfire between Afghan and Taliban forces .
“ They are shooting blindly ; people are being killed on their farms and in their homes .
I can ’ t tell the Afghan army not to shoot at us and I can ’ t tell the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Malek Abdul Mohammad , who brought his family to Kabul .
It ’ s not a lot easier in the camps near Kabul .
Most are living in simple , makeshift tents erected on top of dirt fields .
“ Our children are left freezing at night without blankets , ” said Bibi Koh .
Her youngest son was in first grade in Helmand , even though sporadic fighting and financial limitations made it tough for him to attend classes .
Seeing his potential , they pushed him to attend .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Bibi Koh said , looking at her son .
Now , in a camp , he ’ s out of school—like another 3.7 million Afghan children .
But simply getting out of Helmand was hard enough .
Siya Moi , who brought her four children to Kabul , says there were bullets flying almost the entire way to Kandahar .
“ At the checkpoints they would try and wave you through quickly to make sure women and children weren ’ t killed in the gunfire , but what can they do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recalls the road to Kandahar as particularly harrowing .
“ The driver had to drive through fields and side roads , because the Taliban were planting mines on the main roads , ” she said of the journey .
Over the last several months , roadside mines have become an even more prevalent tactic employed by the Taliban across the country .
In August , Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made a plea to the group , asking them to halt their use of such devices , which he called “ the main cause @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Taliban ’ s latest effort to capture Helmand , along with its stepped-up use of roadside bombs , has shaken people ’ s confidence in the peace process .
Since August , the Afghan government has been meeting with the Taliban in Doha , Qatar , trying to chart a future for the country after four decades of war .
“ All we want is peace , an end to the fighting , but what can we tell those sitting in Doha to do ?
We are the ones paying the @ @ @ @ @ @ @

KABUL, Afghanistan—In the last three weeks, Bibi Koh has lost at least three family members to renewed fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces in the southern province of Helmand. Three weeks ago, her oldest brother was killed in the crossfire between the warring sides. A few days later, her two sons, aged six and eight, went missing.
KABUL, Afghanistan—In the last three weeks, Bibi Koh has lost at least three family members to renewed fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces in the southern province of Helmand. Three weeks ago, her oldest brother was killed in the crossfire between the warring sides. A few days later, her two sons, aged six and eight, went missing.
“I don’t know where they went. I don’t know if someone took them,” Bibi said. The ongoing clashes between the Taliban and government troops made it impossible to search for them, but not to keep her three remaining children safe. Last weekend, she gathered the last money she had left—about $60—and brought her family to a makeshift refugee camp in Kabul by way of Helmand’s neighboring province, Kandahar.
The travails of Bibi Koh and her children are common at Camp Shina, an informal settlement on the eastern outskirts of the capital that houses more than two dozen Helmandi families that have arrived in the last week. All the arrivals—mostly widows with children—have lost family members in recent fighting; the men who stayed behind are unreachable thanks to spotty telephone service.
“We don’t know if they’ve been martyred or if they fled, too. We just have to hope for the best,” said another mother in the camp.
Camp Shina and the ongoing battle for Helmand are emblematic of the many challenges Afghanistan continues to face as U.S. President Donald Trump pushes for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of the year. His Democratic rival, Joe Biden, also favors pulling out, as does the American public.
With the presidential election fast approaching, and with peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government staggering forward, Helmand has become a dark reminder of the cyclical nature of the Afghan war—and just how delicate the security situation remains. Ten years ago, more than 15,000 Afghan, U.S., British, Canadian, and Estonian troops made one of the biggest pushes of the war to dislodge the Taliban from the town of Marjah, then the Taliban’s last big stronghold in Helmand.
By the end of the year, it was clear the military surge in Marjah had failed. By the end of the decade, it was clear all the efforts to wrest Helmand, the biggest poppy-producing province in Afghanistan, from the Taliban had also failed. Various districts and villages in Helmand have been at the past five.
And yet, despite—or because—of those failures, the United States is racing for the exit. Trump says he wants the troops home by Christmas. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, however, has made no statements confirming a set date for the U.S. withdrawal, saying instead that Washington should responsibly end the war in Afghanistan. As of last month, Joe Biden was also in favor of a U.S. pullout, but with the caveat that any withdrawal also have a plan for taking on Islamic State forces in the country.
The mixed messages coming out of Washington have also tested the patience of officials in Kabul. After years of certainty that their country was too strategic for the United States to abandon once again, the Afghan government is now toiling away at plans for a potential American exit.
A security source in Kabul said the recent upsurge in violence across the country, including in Helmand, is further evidence that the United States must reveal its plans for the country.
“They can stay or they can go, but whatever they’re going to do, they need to decide for themselves. We are already preparing for our future, even with the zero presence and support,” the source said.
Regular Afghans are left wondering, too.
This month’s offensive in Helmand has already led to the displacement of at least 35,000 families within the province, with thousands more pouring into Kandahar and Kabul. The Helmandis in Kabul say those who remain in the province are literally caught in the crossfire between Afghan and Taliban forces.
“They are shooting blindly; people are being killed on their farms and in their homes. I can’t tell the Afghan army not to shoot at us and I can’t tell the Taliban not to shoot at us,” said Malek Abdul Mohammad, who brought his family to Kabul.
It’s not a lot easier in the camps near Kabul. Most are living in simple, makeshift tents erected on top of dirt fields. “Our children are left freezing at night without blankets,” said Bibi Koh. Her youngest son was in first grade in Helmand, even though sporadic fighting and financial limitations made it tough for him to attend classes. Seeing his potential, they pushed him to attend. “He’s my smart boy,” Bibi Koh said, looking at her son. Now, in a camp, he’s out of school—like another 3.7 million Afghan children.
But simply getting out of Helmand was hard enough. Siya Moi, who brought her four children to Kabul, says there were bullets flying almost the entire way to Kandahar.
“At the checkpoints they would try and wave you through quickly to make sure women and children weren’t killed in the gunfire, but what can they do?” she said.
Bibi Koh recalls the road to Kandahar as particularly harrowing.
“The driver had to drive through fields and side roads, because the Taliban were planting mines on the main roads,” she said of the journey. Over the last several months, roadside mines have become an even more prevalent tactic employed by the Taliban across the country. In August, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made a plea to the group, asking them to halt their use of such devices, which he called “the main cause of civilian casualties” in the country.
The Taliban’s latest effort to capture Helmand, along with its stepped-up use of roadside bombs, has shaken people’s confidence in the peace process. Since August, the Afghan government has been meeting with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, trying to chart a future for the country after four decades of war.
“All we want is peace, an end to the fighting, but what can we tell those sitting in Doha to do? We are the ones paying the price,” said Siya Moi.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--A U.N. Agency Lauded for Its Work Faces a Funding Shortage

Officials at the U.N. agency that won the Nobel Peace Prize this month , the World Food Program ( WFP ) , are worried that dwindling resources and rising needs are making it increasingly difficult for the group to meet its targets this year for feeding millions of people around the world .
The agency has said the number of people on the verge of starvation worldwide could nearly double from 135 to 265 million in 2020—mainly because of the coronavirus pandemic and ongoing wars in Yemen and elsewhere .
At the same time , money pledged by governments , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been enough to meet even the agency ’ s pre-pandemic projections for spending around this year .
The World Food Program derives its budget from voluntary donations—leaving it dependent on the whims of donors whose considerations are not always purely humanitarian .
“ There ’ s much more nationalist tendencies of many of the donors where their domestic policy is affecting their foreign policy , ” said Ertharin Cousin , who headed the WFP from 2012 to 2017 .
The agency originally projected a budget of $ 7.45 billion for 2020 .
Donors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far .
But as the coronavirus pushed millions more into poverty , the WFP estimated it would need an additional $ 4.9 billion to maintain operations in 83 countries—meaning it now faces a shortfall that runs into the billions .
“ International organizations take their cues , and their funding , from the governments that control them , and the future of the WFP depends on how the largest governments choose to use it.
” Last year , donations to the agency surpassed $ 8 billion .
“ We can only hope @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an increase in support for WFP at the global level , as the WFP is the greatest humanitarian actor of the U.N. system , ” said Carlo Scaramella , who heads the agency ’ s relief effort in Colombia .
Ian Hurd , a political scientist at Northwestern University , said it was basically up to the world ’ s richest countries to determine whether the WFP could effectively address global hunger .
“ International organizations take their cues , and their funding , from the governments that control them , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the largest governments choose to use it.
” In its decision to recognize the WFP , the Nobel Prize Committee described it “ as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict , ” a reference to the agency ’ s work in countries like Syria , Somalia , and Yemen—where the organization helps feed nearly half the population every month .
But after six years of civil war in Yemen , a country that remains a global leader in child malnutrition and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insecurity , the WFP struggles to maintain donor interest .
In April the agency announced that donors had decided to scale back aid to northern Yemen because of threats from rebel forces , which would cut by half food aid to 8.5 million people in the region .
“ As challenges become protracted emergencies , where there ’ s been a significant amount of time that has passed since that acute event occurred , donors tend to scale back their investments , ” Cousin said .
Despite the cuts , Yemen remains the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the world .
The agency is calling for additional $ 500 million in funding to continue the aid .
“ Unless the international community steps up with an urgent injection of funds , we are going to find ourselves right back where we were in 2018 , when we had to fight our way back from the brink of a full-scale famine , ” WFP executive director David Beasley said in July .
Other parts of the world have also seen a rise in food insecurity—even when war is not issue .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ donors precisely because armed conflict is rare , the number of people who are food-insecure is expected rise threefold to 16 million this year—largely because of the coronavirus pandemic .
Miguel Barreto , WFP regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean , said the agency needs $ 400 million for the next six months to continue fighting the growing hunger pandemic in the region .
In Colombia , where the pandemic is combined with the second-largest migration crisis in the world , the local WFP office alone is asking for $ 107 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amid the pandemic , the agency transitioned from distributing large portions of aid through community kitchens to relying on food vouchers and electronic cash transfer programs .
A WFP spokesperson in Colombia said it ’ s unclear how many people may be slipping through the cracks with this new model .
In southern Africa , where the majority of households depend on rain-fed agriculture , the climate crisis has become the main driver of starvation .
In a region that has seen just two favorable growing seasons since 2012 , the WFP has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people—mostly women and children .
The unpredictable rain cycle in the region can cause flooding in some areas and droughts in others , both of which destroy crop yields .
“ Each year , we forecast how we think the rain is going to fall .
That lets us know how much severe hunger we can expect to have next year .
That ’ s pretty much how we look at our work in this region , ” said Brian Bogart , a regional program advisor .
In an ordinary season , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ receives 60 percent of the funding it needs to support 12 countries in southern Africa .
In an ordinary season , the WFP sees itself as fortunate if it receives 60 percent of the funding it needs to support 12 countries in southern Africa , Bogart said .
But the coronavirus has increased the funding gap .
While last year it experienced a $ 394 million gap between October and March , this year the WFP ’ s shortfall is $ 814 million in the same period .
Of the $ 2.1 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only $ 261 million went to the region , said Jaspal Gill , who oversees the WFP ’ s southern Africa fundraising efforts .
The challenges southern Africa , Yemen , and Latin America face in raising money is tied in part to the WFP ’ s funding model , which allows donors to contribute either through earmarked or flexible spending .
Major donors , including the United States , the European Commission , and the United Kingdom often earmark their donations .
Unless significant events take place in these regions—wars or natural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neglected .
“ It ’ s always been a bit of a challenge getting visibility unless , you know , we get a cyclone or some of the larger , more complex emergencies , ” Gill said .
Despite these challenges , the WFP continues to feed 138 million people worldwide , and officials are hopeful the Nobel Prize will help bring the organization more attention—and more needed money .
“ It ’ s kind of the best call to action that you could possibly get .
It shone a spotlight on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are facing hunger as a result of conflict , ” WFP Yemen Spokesperson Annabel Symington added .

Officials at the U.N. agency that won the Nobel Peace Prize this month, the World Food Program (WFP), are worried that dwindling resources and rising needs are making it increasingly difficult for the group to meet its targets this year for feeding millions of people around the world.
Officials at the U.N. agency that won the Nobel Peace Prize this month, the World Food Program (WFP), are worried that dwindling resources and rising needs are making it increasingly difficult for the group to meet its targets this year for feeding millions of people around the world.
The agency has said the number of people on the verge of starvation worldwide could nearly double from 135 to 265 million in 2020—mainly because of the coronavirus pandemic and ongoing wars in Yemen and elsewhere.
At the same time, money pledged by governments, corporations, and private donors has not been enough to meet even the agency’s pre-pandemic projections for spending around this year. The World Food Program derives its budget from voluntary donations—leaving it dependent on the whims of donors whose considerations are not always purely humanitarian.
“There’s much more nationalist tendencies of many of the donors where their domestic policy is affecting their foreign policy,” said Ertharin Cousin, who headed the WFP from 2012 to 2017.
The agency originally projected a budget of $7.45 billion for 2020. Donors have responded with about $6.4 billion so far. But as the coronavirus pushed millions more into poverty, the WFP estimated it would need an additional $4.9 billion to maintain operations in 83 countries—meaning it now faces a shortfall that runs into the billions.
“International organizations take their cues, and their funding, from the governments that control them, and the future of the WFP depends on how the largest governments choose to use it.”
Last year, donations to the agency surpassed $8 billion.
“We can only hope that the Nobel Prize will lead to an increase in support for WFP at the global level, as the WFP is the greatest humanitarian actor of the U.N. system,” said Carlo Scaramella, who heads the agency’s relief effort in Colombia.
Ian Hurd, a political scientist at Northwestern University, said it was basically up to the world’s richest countries to determine whether the WFP could effectively address global hunger.
“International organizations take their cues, and their funding, from the governments that control them, and the future of the WFP depends on how the largest governments choose to use it.”
In its decision to recognize the WFP, the Nobel Prize Committee described it “as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict,” a reference to the agency’s work in countries like Syria, Somalia, and Yemen—where the organization helps feed nearly half the population every month.
But after six years of civil war in Yemen, a country that remains a global leader in child malnutrition and where two-thirds of the population faces food insecurity, the WFP struggles to maintain donor interest. In April the agency announced that donors had decided to scale back aid to northern Yemen because of threats from rebel forces, which would cut by half food aid to 8.5 million people in the region.
“As challenges become protracted emergencies, where there’s been a significant amount of time that has passed since that acute event occurred, donors tend to scale back their investments,” Cousin said.
Despite the cuts, Yemen remains the WFP’s largest emergency response anywhere in the world. The agency is calling for additional $500 million in funding to continue the aid.
“Unless the international community steps up with an urgent injection of funds, we are going to find ourselves right back where we were in 2018, when we had to fight our way back from the brink of a full-scale famine,” WFP executive director David Beasley said in July.
Other parts of the world have also seen a rise in food insecurity—even when war is not issue. In Latin America, often neglected by donors precisely because armed conflict is rare, the number of people who are food-insecure is expected rise threefold to 16 million this year—largely because of the coronavirus pandemic.
Miguel Barreto, WFP regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean, said the agency needs $400 million for the next six months to continue fighting the growing hunger pandemic in the region.
In Colombia, where the pandemic is combined with the second-largest migration crisis in the world, the local WFP office alone is asking for $107 million to support around 400,000 people.
Amid the pandemic, the agency transitioned from distributing large portions of aid through community kitchens to relying on food vouchers and electronic cash transfer programs. A WFP spokesperson in Colombia said it’s unclear how many people may be slipping through the cracks with this new model.
In southern Africa, where the majority of households depend on rain-fed agriculture, the climate crisis has become the main driver of starvation. In a region that has seen just two favorable growing seasons since 2012, the WFP has struggled to feed 51 million food insecure people—mostly women and children.
The unpredictable rain cycle in the region can cause flooding in some areas and droughts in others, both of which destroy crop yields.
“Each year, we forecast how we think the rain is going to fall. That lets us know how much severe hunger we can expect to have next year. That’s pretty much how we look at our work in this region,” said Brian Bogart, a regional program advisor.
In an ordinary season, the WFP sees itself as fortunate if it receives 60 percent of the funding it needs to support 12 countries in southern Africa.
In an ordinary season, the WFP sees itself as fortunate if it receives 60 percent of the funding it needs to support 12 countries in southern Africa, Bogart said. But the coronavirus has increased the funding gap. While last year it experienced a $394 million gap between October and March, this year the WFP’s shortfall is $814 million in the same period. Of the $2.1 billion the WFP has received since June, only $261 million went to the region, said Jaspal Gill, who oversees the WFP’s southern Africa fundraising efforts.
The challenges southern Africa, Yemen, and Latin America face in raising money is tied in part to the WFP’s funding model, which allows donors to contribute either through earmarked or flexible spending. Major donors, including the United States, the European Commission, and the United Kingdom often earmark their donations. Unless significant events take place in these regions—wars or natural disasters, for example—they’re often neglected.
“It’s always been a bit of a challenge getting visibility unless, you know, we get a cyclone or some of the larger, more complex emergencies,” Gill said.
Despite these challenges, the WFP continues to feed 138 million people worldwide, and officials are hopeful the Nobel Prize will help bring the organization more attention—and more needed money.
“It’s kind of the best call to action that you could possibly get. It shone a spotlight on the millions of people around the world who are facing hunger as a result of conflict,” WFP Yemen Spokesperson Annabel Symington added.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--‘Crazy Times Are Good Times for Journalists, Unfortunately’

As the United States contends with one of the world ’ s worst coronavirus outbreaks , reels amid a racial reckoning , and braces for the most consequential presidential election in decades , there is no such thing as a slow news day .
What does the world make of this unique moment in U.S. history ?
And how do foreign correspondents explain it to their audiences back home ?
With about two weeks to go until the vote , Foreign Policy spoke to Anna-Sofia Berner , the U.S. correspondent for Finland ’ s largest daily newspaper , Helsingin Sanomat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There .
The following interview has been lightly edited for clarity and brevity .
Foreign Policy : Is there a lot of interest in Finland for stories about what ’ s going on in the U.S. right now ?
Anna-Sofia Berner : Yes , there is enormous interest for sure .
FP : What in particular are people interested in ?
AB : Well of course the main question is whether [ President Donald ] Trump is going to lose or not .
That drives everything .
Then I try and bring some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s definitely the primary reason .
FP : How has it been for you working as a foreign correspondent in America during this time ?
AB : It ’ s great , I can ’ t deny it .
Because our readers are so interested in what ’ s going on .
I think the U.S. is always a great country to be a journalist because there are a lot of things happening , but now especially .
Crazy times are good times for journalists , unfortunately .
FP : Is it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ audiences in Finland the complexities and nuances of U.S. politics and life ?
AB : It is hard .
First of all because the country is so big and there is so much going on , especially these times when everything seems really so black and white and the polarization I think impacts even us and our readers .
And I think it ’ s positive that through this growing interest I have the opportunity to try and bring the complexities to people .
FP : What do you think European audiences , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do you think their most common misconception is about the United States right now ?
AB : I think that they view the country through Trump .
It ’ s a challenge to bring all of the movement and all of the change and shifting that ’ s happening on the Democratic side that Trump is also fueling .
Just how much energy there is on the other side .
Because for five years we ’ ve heard , you know , the Trump voter , their enthusiasm , their flags , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s actually a lot of energy on the other side as well .
FP : What has surprised you most when covering U.S. politics for an international audience ?
AB : Every reporting trip I take I ’ m surprised by the people and how willing they are to talk to a tiny newspaper in a foreign , faraway country in a weird language .
I think it ’ s easier to report here on regular people and on voters than in Europe , in many European countries .
People are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How do people respond when you write or approach them and say , “ I ’ m from a Finnish outlet.
” AB : Often they laugh !
In a good way .
They ’ re like , “ Oh , hey , what are you doing here ?
” And I think that helps a lot .
They ’ re curious about me as well , so it works both ways .
FP : Do you think you get less suspicion among Trump supporters because you don ’ t have that association @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the other mainstream media that he ’ s maligned ?
AB : For sure .
I don ’ t have the experience of being an American journalist , but I do think being an outsider helps a lot in this tense situation .
FP : There ’ s a lot of very bleak discussion about the depths of polarization in America and fears that things could get ugly after the election .
You ’ ve probably traveled more and met a greater range of Americans than many of us .
Do you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
AB : The divides are real , and they ’ re not just about Trump .
This is a power struggle , and it ’ s changing demographics , you know , all of that .
To be honest I don ’ t believe in the “ Kumbaya ” idea of bridging the gap .
But at the same time , I don ’ t think that even those divisions necessarily mean that people can ’ t live together .
A lot of people tell me for sure that they ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t talk to their family members .
But at the same time I talk to people who are on complete opposite ends , and they laugh about it and they get along .
But I think one of the hardest things right now for me is to know how worried we should be .
That ’ s a question I haven ’ t been able to answer myself .
FP : Have you had any conversations with your editors about what happens if things get violent , do you have a procedure for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have , and we should probably talk about it some more .
I ’ ve bought some gear , I ordered a bulletproof vest , but I was thinking , “ I ’ m really not going to use this.
” But I have it in case I need it .
FP : As a European looking in , what do you make of the U.S. media coverage of the Trump White House and the campaigns ?
AB : There ’ s so much of it .
And it ’ s interesting .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and I spent a lot more time on Twitter , and I got sort of immersed in all of that .
And now that I ’ ve been here in Arizona for a week as we ’ ve been out in the desert , I haven ’ t really been on Twitter .
A lot of it feels very distant from when you ’ re not right in the middle , when you ’ re not on Twitter all the time .
A lot of it is very far from what the voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , after Trump was elected , there was a lot of soul-searching in the media especially on the coasts , about “ How didn ’ t we see this coming ?
” Now with both state and national polls showing strongly in favor of Biden , do you think we ’ re at risk of making the same mistake again ?
AB : Not the same mistake .
I realized this past week I feel like maybe we ’ re making the mistake of not seeing a Biden win .
We can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been so much focus on Trump that I realized that a lot of our stories we had planned for this fall were about going back to 2016 , going to Ohio , going to see the [ border ] wall and then I realized , wait a minute .
This is not 2016 .
What is this election about ?

As the United States contends with one of the world’s worst coronavirus outbreaks, reels amid a racial reckoning, and braces for the most consequential presidential election in decades, there is no such thing as a slow news day. What does the world make of this unique moment in U.S. history? And how do foreign correspondents explain it to their audiences back home?
As the United States contends with one of the world’s worst coronavirus outbreaks, reels amid a racial reckoning, and braces for the most consequential presidential election in decades, there is no such thing as a slow news day. What does the world make of this unique moment in U.S. history? And how do foreign correspondents explain it to their audiences back home?
Anna-Sofia Berner, U.S. correspondent for Helsingin Sanomat.
With about two weeks to go until the vote, Foreign Policy spoke to Anna-Sofia Berner, the U.S. correspondent for Finland’s largest daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, for our series The View From There.
The following interview has been lightly edited for clarity and brevity.
Foreign Policy: Is there a lot of interest in Finland for stories about what’s going on in the U.S. right now?
Anna-Sofia Berner: Yes, there is enormous interest for sure.
FP: What in particular are people interested in?
AB: Well of course the main question is whether [President Donald] Trump is going to lose or not. That drives everything. Then I try and bring some nuance and different angles, but that’s definitely the primary reason.
FP: How has it been for you working as a foreign correspondent in America during this time?
AB: It’s great, I can’t deny it. Because our readers are so interested in what’s going on. I think the U.S. is always a great country to be a journalist because there are a lot of things happening, but now especially. Crazy times are good times for journalists, unfortunately.
FP: Is it hard for you to convey to your audiences in Finland the complexities and nuances of U.S. politics and life?
AB: It is hard. First of all because the country is so big and there is so much going on, especially these times when everything seems really so black and white and the polarization I think impacts even us and our readers. And I think it’s positive that through this growing interest I have the opportunity to try and bring the complexities to people.
FP: What do you think European audiences, or your audience in Finland, what do you think their most common misconception is about the United States right now?
AB: I think that they view the country through Trump. It’s a challenge to bring all of the movement and all of the change and shifting that’s happening on the Democratic side that Trump is also fueling. Just how much energy there is on the other side. Because for five years we’ve heard, you know, the Trump voter, their enthusiasm, their flags, and their hats. Trying to show that there’s actually a lot of energy on the other side as well.
FP: What has surprised you most when covering U.S. politics for an international audience?
AB: Every reporting trip I take I’m surprised by the people and how willing they are to talk to a tiny newspaper in a foreign, faraway country in a weird language. I think it’s easier to report here on regular people and on voters than in Europe, in many European countries. People are more open to it.
FP: How do people respond when you write or approach them and say, “I’m from a Finnish outlet.”
AB: Often they laugh! In a good way. They’re like, “Oh, hey, what are you doing here?” And I think that helps a lot. They’re curious about me as well, so it works both ways.
FP: Do you think you get less suspicion among Trump supporters because you don’t have that association with, say, CNN or some of the other mainstream media that he’s maligned?
AB: For sure. I don’t have the experience of being an American journalist, but I do think being an outsider helps a lot in this tense situation.
FP: There’s a lot of very bleak discussion about the depths of polarization in America and fears that things could get ugly after the election. You’ve probably traveled more and met a greater range of Americans than many of us. Do you see any hope in bridging the polarization?
AB: The divides are real, and they’re not just about Trump. This is a power struggle, and it’s changing demographics, you know, all of that. To be honest I don’t believe in the “Kumbaya” idea of bridging the gap. But at the same time, I don’t think that even those divisions necessarily mean that people can’t live together. A lot of people tell me for sure that they’ve lost friendships or that they don’t talk to their family members. But at the same time I talk to people who are on complete opposite ends, and they laugh about it and they get along. But I think one of the hardest things right now for me is to know how worried we should be. That’s a question I haven’t been able to answer myself.
FP: Have you had any conversations with your editors about what happens if things get violent, do you have a procedure for that?
AB: We probably should have, and we should probably talk about it some more. I’ve bought some gear, I ordered a bulletproof vest, but I was thinking, “I’m really not going to use this.” But I have it in case I need it.
FP: As a European looking in, what do you make of the U.S. media coverage of the Trump White House and the campaigns?
AB: There’s so much of it. And it’s interesting. Last week I spent in D.C., and I spent a lot more time on Twitter, and I got sort of immersed in all of that. And now that I’ve been here in Arizona for a week as we’ve been out in the desert, I haven’t really been on Twitter. A lot of it feels very distant from when you’re not right in the middle, when you’re not on Twitter all the time. A lot of it is very far from what the voters are feeling.
FP: After 2016, after Trump was elected, there was a lot of soul-searching in the media especially on the coasts, about “How didn’t we see this coming?” Now with both state and national polls showing strongly in favor of Biden, do you think we’re at risk of making the same mistake again?
AB: Not the same mistake. I realized this past week I feel like maybe we’re making the mistake of not seeing a Biden win. We can’t know, but there’s been so much focus on Trump that I realized that a lot of our stories we had planned for this fall were about going back to 2016, going to Ohio, going to see the [border] wall and then I realized, wait a minute. This is not 2016. What is this election about?