foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--Should the United States Punish China for Aggression Toward India and Hong Kong?

Should the United States Punish China for Aggression Toward India and Hong Kong ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma !
I hope you had a good long weekend .
Did you venture out of the house and , if so , did you wear a mask ?
Emma Ashford : Well , I ’ ve been told it isn ’ t manly to wear a mask , but luckily that doesn ’ t seem to be a problem for me .
I got a cute pink one with spots just in case there was any doubt .
But even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you escape politics these days .
We ’ ve had the U.S. president slamming his rival Joe Biden for his choice to wear a mask at Memorial Day services .
Are the benefits of masks really so hard to grasp ?
MK : I never deluded myself into thinking foreign policy was going to be the biggest issue this election year , but I never expected facewear to be a central political divide .
It was good , however , to see both candidates out paying their respects on Memorial Day .
Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Do you think he should be out and about challenging the president more visibly as some of his supporters advocate ?
EA : Well , he hardly needs to weigh in .
The ad that the Biden campaign put out over the weekend really said it all : the president golfing on the day we passed 100,000 dead Americans due to the coronavirus .
It ’ s worse than incompetence .
As the mask issue shows , the president is actively politicizing issues that could save lives .
After all , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know that masks are one reason why outbreaks in Asia have been less severe .
MK : It is amazing how much the norms around this have shifted .
A few weeks ago , we were told not to wear masks unless we are sick , and now I feel like a pariah on the occasion or two I forgot mine at home .
The White House did have a busy week before Memorial Day , however , releasing a new China strategy .
Did you get a chance to read it ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is about as much time as I can devote to anything these days !
It ’ s a strange document , like an updated National Security Strategy , but just for China .
It ’ s not unheard of for the White House to release this kind of document , but I ’ ve never seen one that ’ s so explicitly hostile to just one country .
I got the distinct impression reading it that the administration didn ’ t want to put out a whole new NSS but wanted to try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last year with its less hostile approach from late 2017 .
The new report is pretty hair-raising : It openly calls out Beijing ’ s “ broken and empty promises ” and argues that China poses a challenge to Americans ’ fundamental belief in the “ right of every person to life , liberty , and the pursuit of happiness.
” It talks about screening Chinese students who want to study in the United States for “ malign intent , ” commits to maintaining tariffs on Chinese goods , and focuses on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hegemonic assertions.
” Is it really sensible to be putting out this kind of diatribe in the current circumstances ?
MK : The NSS and National Defense Strategy were statements of priority , not real strategies .
This is a more fully formed strategy with two major elements .
The first is strengthening the resilience of the United States and its allies to deal with the challenges China presents .
This includes , for example , increased FBI efforts to identify and prosecute economic espionage and upgrading defense capabilities to deal with China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is imposing costs to compel China to cease threatening behavior , such as tariffs in response to unfair trade practices .
I guess my major criticism is that it was still somewhat vague on the ultimate goal of the competition .
It says , “ Our approach is not premised on determining a particular end state for China.
” The document left me thinking that this competition could go on for eternity and the strategy could still be considered a success .
EA : Now that ’ s an interesting question : What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ competing over ?
It seems like every strategy document for the last four years has emphasized the “ era of great-power competition ” without ever defining what that means .
So what is “ great-power competition ” ?
Is it simply a return to a multipolar world ?
Is it the embrace of a new Cold War-style conflict with China ?
Is it an attempt to build spheres of influence ?
Do you have a take ?
MK : Defining goals is hard , and from my discussions it is clear that many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear objective in mind—and those who do disagree with each other .
It is much easier to agree on certain actions ( we should protect our intellectual property from China , for example ) than it is to agree on an ultimate objective .
The long-term U.S. goal should be for Beijing to become a responsible stakeholder in a functioning rules-based international system , but that will not be possible with the current generation of Chinese leadership .
President Xi Jinping has cracked down on dissent at home and launched China on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in the short-to-medium term , the United States needs to work with allies and like-minded countries to defend itself from these threats and impose meaningful costs on the Chinese Communist Party government everywhere it violates international standards .
If successful over the long run , this approach could convince a future generation of Chinese leaders to go in a different direction .
It is not about appealing to the better angels of their nature but about showing them that directly challenging the United States and its allies is simply too costly and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ served acquiescing to , or playing along within , a rules-based system .
EA : So , basically , the answer is regime change again , Matt ?
The document explicitly says that “ United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC ’ s domestic governance model.
” I ’ m not so sure that ’ s true .
I think it clearly was the goal in the 1990s and 2000s , even if it was only to nudge it toward a more Western system .
And I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and unspoken goal of many in Washington today to make Beijing more like us politically .
MK : My preferred goal could conceivably be achieved either with a more cooperative CCP or a post-CCP government in China .
But I think you are correct that many on the right and the left think this competition can only be resolved to the satisfaction of the United States with the removal of the CCP .
EA : I ’ d honestly like to reject the competition framework entirely .
There are things about China that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ addressed , from concentration camps in Xinjiang to Chinese hacking of U.S. companies .
But I view those as discrete issues , not as part of some larger “ competition ” the United States can win .
And that ’ s my biggest problem with this strategy document .
It lumps all those real problems together with the Trump administration ’ s hatred of free trade or its xenophobia about Chinese students to make a big , unwieldy mess of a strategy .
Take this week ’ s announcement about the expulsion of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it about security or hatred of immigration ?
It ’ s impossible to tell .
It ’ s a legacy of the Cold War , I suspect , that strategists view every issue involving a foreign rival as intrinsically linked .
But in this case , whether the U.S. government can cooperate with Asian states to avoid Chinese territorial expansion is not necessarily linked to whether their technology is a spying threat , or to their human rights violations , or to nuclear testing .
MK : In defense of the competition framework @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all coming from the same source .
So why compartmentalize them , when you can deal directly with the government ( and dictator ) doing all of these things ?
We haven ’ t even begun to list the problems posed by China just this week , from threatening India to cracking down on Hong Kong .
There aren ’ t many good policy options for the United States or the U.K. on Hong Kong , but there would be more if things like trade hadn ’ t already been weaponized by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EA : What ’ s going on in Hong Kong should concern us .
The Chinese government is imposing a law that effectively strips Hong Kong ’ s citizens of their special status .
I remember as a child in the United Kingdom watching the return of Hong Kong to China after 100 years of British control ; it was very emotional , and there was a lot of talk about defending Hong Kong ’ s special political status ; the treaty clearly specifies that it is to remain self-governed until at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violates that treaty .
Unfortunately , there aren ’ t many good policy options for the United States or the U.K. , but there would be more if things like trade hadn ’ t already been weaponized by the Trump administration for no good reason .
Compartmentalization doesn ’ t mean that issues can never be linked , just that the United States ( and the U.K. ) should recognize that their problems with China are primarily in certain issue areas .
Expanding the competition to everything today just cuts off certain options @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Hong Kong ?
MK : Pompeo ’ s announcement on Wednesday that the U.S. government will no longer recognize a special status for Hong Kong is a good start .
It is telling of Xi ’ s leadership that he is prioritizing political control over economic growth .
He backtracked on promised economic reforms , and now he is killing the goose that laid the golden egg .
Already , firms and money are looking to flee Hong Kong to other parts of Asia , including Singapore .
And this move by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic pain Xi feels from this decision .
What is your view ?
EA : Actually , I kind of like the idea of revoking Hong Kong ’ s special trade status .
If it ’ s no longer independent in any way , why should it get that benefit ?
And there are other outside-the-box ideas we could embrace : granting Hong Kongers citizenship , for example .
That ’ s been debated on and off in the U.K. for years , and though the government has been quiet about it post-Brexit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be expanding visa access and a possible path to full U.K. citizenship for Hong Kong residents .
I expect we ’ ll see an exodus of highly educated Hong Kongers over the next few years , and the countries that look most attractive—good governance , easy visa access—will benefit from that inflow of talent .
Or why not recognize Taiwan at the WHO ?
There are lots of similar ideas .
All of them signal displeasure and cost China something , but without ratcheting up military tensions .
MK : All good ideas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution for the China-India border dispute , too ?
They have long fought over disputed territory high in the Himalayas , including a war in 1962 .
Things have been mostly quiet recently , but they heated up earlier this month when Chinese and Indian soldiers got into a fistfight .
Now , according to the latest reports , Chinese forces have penetrated several miles across the Line of Actual Control , destroyed Indian fortifications , and dug in .
It looks like China is in the process of once again getting away @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a fait accompli .
EA : What a mess .
We ’ ve got two nuclear powers in a high-tension border dispute , both blasting domestic propaganda , and no real sign of backing down .
This could get out of hand , and Washington is not doing much to help .
This is the kind of situation that we ’ d usually see shuttle diplomacy from high-ranking U.S. officials , and instead , the secretary of state is at home dealing with potential corruption charges , and the president is tweeting conspiracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be taking sides ?
MK : Yes .
China is America ’ s foremost rival .
And India is a potentially valuable strategic partner .
Along with Australia , Japan , and the United States , it is part of the emerging “ Quad ” framework of leading Asian democracies balancing against China in the Indo-Pacific .
I also worry about the precedent of allowing revisionist autocracies like Russia and China to encroach on the territory of their neighbors and get away with it : Georgia , Ukraine , the South China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This list is getting too long , and where does it stop ?
The United States should lead an international diplomatic response to demand that China withdraw back across to its side of the Line of Actual Control .
And it should offer to provide India with diplomatic and military aid ( such as intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance ) , at New Delhi ’ s request , to help shore up its position .
EA : Yes , it would be a terrible precedent to simply allow states to invade others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Thank goodness the United States has never done anything like that !
It would really undermine the Liberal International Order .
U.S. hypocrisy aside , I think the bigger question that emerges is whether India is truly a U.S. partner .
Washington has been courting Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a while and even redefined the Pacific as the Indo-Pacific to work with India against China .
But India is historically unwilling to align with any great power—even with its tensions with China , I doubt it ’ d be willing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This seems like another situation where the putative ally gets far more from their relationship with the United States than Washington gets from it .
MK : The United States and India share the same rival—and the enemy of your enemy makes a good friend .
Washington has been hoping that India would become a closer partner for years , and , while it has been slow , there has been good recent progress .
Supporting India in this case is the principled move under international law , but it could also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deter future Chinese aggression .
Of course , there are still things U.S. officials don ’ t like , such as India buying military hardware from Russia .
Speaking of Russia , we haven ’ t even mentioned the Open Skies Treaty , which the U.S. government is withdrawing from .
EA : Indeed , the world is more complex than a U.S.-China competition .
There aren ’ t just two sides .
India buys weapons from Russia and from the United States .
Russia and China have been moving closer together , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Open Skies , however , is a much easier problem .
Joe Cirincione , the head of the Ploughshares Fund , once wrote an article entitled “ John Bolton is a serial arms control killer.
” Now that the former national security advisor is busy trying to sneak his tell-all book past government pre-publication review , I think we could broaden that honor to include the whole Trump administration .
Like every previous case , killing Open Skies doesn ’ t really improve anything .
MK : Arms control is a means , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor when it advances U.S. national security , but this treaty no longer did that .
Russia was using Open Skies flights to map U.S. critical infrastructure in order to plan attacks .
And the United States has other means , more effective than airplanes , for collecting intelligence .
It would have been better if the U.S. government had made this a coordinated announcement in lockstep with European allies ( as it did when it pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ) , but it was time to withdraw .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ debate about whether Open Skies yielded the Russians any intelligence advantage ?
After all , they have satellites , too .
MK : U.S. satellites are more sophisticated , so Russia was gaining an asymmetric advantage .
Russian collection needs met through Open Skies flights freed up their satellites to do other things .
Speaking of being freed up to do other things , I think we are unfortunately out of time .
EA : Good .
I have to go resolve a border dispute between my kids .
I wouldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I hope you had a good long weekend. Did you venture out of the house and, if so, did you wear a mask?
Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma! I hope you had a good long weekend. Did you venture out of the house and, if so, did you wear a mask?
Emma Ashford: Well, I’ve been told it isn’t manly to wear a mask, but luckily that doesn’t seem to be a problem for me. I got a cute pink one with spots just in case there was any doubt. But even a cute mask won’t help you escape politics these days. We’ve had the U.S. president slamming his rival Joe Biden for his choice to wear a mask at Memorial Day services. Are the benefits of masks really so hard to grasp?
MK: I never deluded myself into thinking foreign policy was going to be the biggest issue this election year, but I never expected facewear to be a central political divide. It was good, however, to see both candidates out paying their respects on Memorial Day. Biden had been in hiding for so long. Do you think he should be out and about challenging the president more visibly as some of his supporters advocate?
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
EA: Well, he hardly needs to weigh in. The ad that the Biden campaign put out over the weekend really said it all: the president golfing on the day we passed 100,000 dead Americans due to the coronavirus. It’s worse than incompetence. As the mask issue shows, the president is actively politicizing issues that could save lives. After all, as global observers, you and I both know that masks are one reason why outbreaks in Asia have been less severe.
MK: It is amazing how much the norms around this have shifted. A few weeks ago, we were told not to wear masks unless we are sick, and now I feel like a pariah on the occasion or two I forgot mine at home. The White House did have a busy week before Memorial Day, however, releasing a new China strategy. Did you get a chance to read it?
EA: I skimmed it, which is about as much time as I can devote to anything these days! It’s a strange document, like an updated National Security Strategy, but just for China. It’s not unheard of for the White House to release this kind of document, but I’ve never seen one that’s so explicitly hostile to just one country. I got the distinct impression reading it that the administration didn’t want to put out a whole new NSS but wanted to try to reconcile its actions on China in the last year with its less hostile approach from late 2017.
The new report is pretty hair-raising: It openly calls out Beijing’s “broken and empty promises” and argues that China poses a challenge to Americans’ fundamental belief in the “right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It talks about screening Chinese students who want to study in the United States for “malign intent,” commits to maintaining tariffs on Chinese goods, and focuses on “pushing back on Beijing’s hegemonic assertions.”
Is it really sensible to be putting out this kind of diatribe in the current circumstances?
MK: The NSS and National Defense Strategy were statements of priority, not real strategies. This is a more fully formed strategy with two major elements. The first is strengthening the resilience of the United States and its allies to deal with the challenges China presents. This includes, for example, increased FBI efforts to identify and prosecute economic espionage and upgrading defense capabilities to deal with China’s military threat. The second is imposing costs to compel China to cease threatening behavior, such as tariffs in response to unfair trade practices.
I guess my major criticism is that it was still somewhat vague on the ultimate goal of the competition. It says, “Our approach is not premised on determining a particular end state for China.” The document left me thinking that this competition could go on for eternity and the strategy could still be considered a success.
EA: Now that’s an interesting question: What exactly are the United States and China competing over? It seems like every strategy document for the last four years has emphasized the “era of great-power competition” without ever defining what that means.
So what is “great-power competition”? Is it simply a return to a multipolar world? Is it the embrace of a new Cold War-style conflict with China? Is it an attempt to build spheres of influence? Do you have a take?
MK: Defining goals is hard, and from my discussions it is clear that many senior U.S. officials do not have a clear objective in mind—and those who do disagree with each other. It is much easier to agree on certain actions (we should protect our intellectual property from China, for example) than it is to agree on an ultimate objective.
The long-term U.S. goal should be for Beijing to become a responsible stakeholder in a functioning rules-based international system, but that will not be possible with the current generation of Chinese leadership. President Xi Jinping has cracked down on dissent at home and launched China on a much more confrontational path internationally.
So, in the short-to-medium term, the United States needs to work with allies and like-minded countries to defend itself from these threats and impose meaningful costs on the Chinese Communist Party government everywhere it violates international standards. If successful over the long run, this approach could convince a future generation of Chinese leaders to go in a different direction. It is not about appealing to the better angels of their nature but about showing them that directly challenging the United States and its allies is simply too costly and that Beijing’s interests are better served acquiescing to, or playing along within, a rules-based system.
EA: So, basically, the answer is regime change again, Matt? The document explicitly says that “United States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.” I’m not so sure that’s true. I think it clearly was the goal in the 1990s and 2000s, even if it was only to nudge it toward a more Western system. And I think it’s a widely held and unspoken goal of many in Washington today to make Beijing more like us politically.
MK: My preferred goal could conceivably be achieved either with a more cooperative CCP or a post-CCP government in China. But I think you are correct that many on the right and the left think this competition can only be resolved to the satisfaction of the United States with the removal of the CCP.
EA: I’d honestly like to reject the competition framework entirely. There are things about China that are problematic and that need to be addressed, from concentration camps in Xinjiang to Chinese hacking of U.S. companies. But I view those as discrete issues, not as part of some larger “competition” the United States can win. And that’s my biggest problem with this strategy document. It lumps all those real problems together with the Trump administration’s hatred of free trade or its xenophobia about Chinese students to make a big, unwieldy mess of a strategy. Take this week’s announcement about the expulsion of Chinese students from U.S. universities: Is it about security or hatred of immigration? It’s impossible to tell.
It’s a legacy of the Cold War, I suspect, that strategists view every issue involving a foreign rival as intrinsically linked. But in this case, whether the U.S. government can cooperate with Asian states to avoid Chinese territorial expansion is not necessarily linked to whether their technology is a spying threat, or to their human rights violations, or to nuclear testing.
MK: In defense of the competition framework, these different and serious threats are all coming from the same source. So why compartmentalize them, when you can deal directly with the government (and dictator) doing all of these things? We haven’t even begun to list the problems posed by China just this week, from threatening India to cracking down on Hong Kong.
There aren’t many good policy options for the United States or the U.K. on Hong Kong, but there would be more if things like trade hadn’t already been weaponized by the Trump administration for no good reason.
EA: What’s going on in Hong Kong should concern us. The Chinese government is imposing a law that effectively strips Hong Kong’s citizens of their special status. I remember as a child in the United Kingdom watching the return of Hong Kong to China after 100 years of British control; it was very emotional, and there was a lot of talk about defending Hong Kong’s special political status; the treaty clearly specifies that it is to remain self-governed until at least 2047.
The new Chinese law explicitly violates that treaty. Unfortunately, there aren’t many good policy options for the United States or the U.K., but there would be more if things like trade hadn’t already been weaponized by the Trump administration for no good reason.
Compartmentalization doesn’t mean that issues can never be linked, just that the United States (and the U.K.) should recognize that their problems with China are primarily in certain issue areas. Expanding the competition to everything today just cuts off certain options later on. What do you propose on Hong Kong?
MK: Pompeo’s announcement on Wednesday that the U.S. government will no longer recognize a special status for Hong Kong is a good start. It is telling of Xi’s leadership that he is prioritizing political control over economic growth. He backtracked on promised economic reforms, and now he is killing the goose that laid the golden egg. Already, firms and money are looking to flee Hong Kong to other parts of Asia, including Singapore. And this move by the United States will increase further the economic pain Xi feels from this decision. What is your view?
EA: Actually, I kind of like the idea of revoking Hong Kong’s special trade status. If it’s no longer independent in any way, why should it get that benefit? And there are other outside-the-box ideas we could embrace: granting Hong Kongers citizenship, for example. That’s been debated on and off in the U.K. for years, and though the government has been quiet about it post-Brexit, it just confirmed it’ll be expanding visa access and a possible path to full U.K. citizenship for Hong Kong residents. I expect we’ll see an exodus of highly educated Hong Kongers over the next few years, and the countries that look most attractive—good governance, easy visa access—will benefit from that inflow of talent.
Or why not recognize Taiwan at the WHO? There are lots of similar ideas. All of them signal displeasure and cost China something, but without ratcheting up military tensions.
MK: All good ideas. Does this mean you have a solution for the China-India border dispute, too? They have long fought over disputed territory high in the Himalayas, including a war in 1962. Things have been mostly quiet recently, but they heated up earlier this month when Chinese and Indian soldiers got into a fistfight. Now, according to the latest reports, Chinese forces have penetrated several miles across the Line of Actual Control, destroyed Indian fortifications, and dug in. It looks like China is in the process of once again getting away with taking contested territory from neighbors through a fait accompli.
EA: What a mess. We’ve got two nuclear powers in a high-tension border dispute, both blasting domestic propaganda, and no real sign of backing down. This could get out of hand, and Washington is not doing much to help. This is the kind of situation that we’d usually see shuttle diplomacy from high-ranking U.S. officials, and instead, the secretary of state is at home dealing with potential corruption charges, and the president is tweeting conspiracy theories. Or do you think we should be taking sides?
MK: Yes. China is America’s foremost rival. And India is a potentially valuable strategic partner. Along with Australia, Japan, and the United States, it is part of the emerging “Quad” framework of leading Asian democracies balancing against China in the Indo-Pacific. I also worry about the precedent of allowing revisionist autocracies like Russia and China to encroach on the territory of their neighbors and get away with it: Georgia, Ukraine, the South China Sea—and now Ladakh in northern India. This list is getting too long, and where does it stop? The United States should lead an international diplomatic response to demand that China withdraw back across to its side of the Line of Actual Control. And it should offer to provide India with diplomatic and military aid (such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), at New Delhi’s request, to help shore up its position.
EA: Yes, it would be a terrible precedent to simply allow states to invade others and change borders or governments by force. Thank goodness the United States has never done anything like that! It would really undermine the Liberal International Order.
U.S. hypocrisy aside, I think the bigger question that emerges is whether India is truly a U.S. partner. Washington has been courting Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a while and even redefined the Pacific as the Indo-Pacific to work with India against China. But India is historically unwilling to align with any great power—even with its tensions with China, I doubt it’d be willing to work too closely with the United States. This seems like another situation where the putative ally gets far more from their relationship with the United States than Washington gets from it.
MK: The United States and India share the same rival—and the enemy of your enemy makes a good friend. Washington has been hoping that India would become a closer partner for years, and, while it has been slow, there has been good recent progress. Supporting India in this case is the principled move under international law, but it could also help strengthen the relationship with India and deter future Chinese aggression.
Of course, there are still things U.S. officials don’t like, such as India buying military hardware from Russia. Speaking of Russia, we haven’t even mentioned the Open Skies Treaty, which the U.S. government is withdrawing from.
EA: Indeed, the world is more complex than a U.S.-China competition. There aren’t just two sides. India buys weapons from Russia and from the United States. Russia and China have been moving closer together, but they still have border disputes.
Open Skies, however, is a much easier problem. Joe Cirincione, the head of the Ploughshares Fund, once wrote an article entitled “John Bolton is a serial arms control killer.” Now that the former national security advisor is busy trying to sneak his tell-all book past government pre-publication review, I think we could broaden that honor to include the whole Trump administration. Like every previous case, killing Open Skies doesn’t really improve anything.
MK: Arms control is a means, not an end. I am in favor when it advances U.S. national security, but this treaty no longer did that. Russia was using Open Skies flights to map U.S. critical infrastructure in order to plan attacks. And the United States has other means, more effective than airplanes, for collecting intelligence.
It would have been better if the U.S. government had made this a coordinated announcement in lockstep with European allies (as it did when it pulled out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), but it was time to withdraw.
EA: Isn’t there a debate about whether Open Skies yielded the Russians any intelligence advantage? After all, they have satellites, too.
MK: U.S. satellites are more sophisticated, so Russia was gaining an asymmetric advantage. Russian collection needs met through Open Skies flights freed up their satellites to do other things.
Speaking of being freed up to do other things, I think we are unfortunately out of time.
EA: Good. I have to go resolve a border dispute between my kids. I wouldn’t want it to turn nuclear.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--The Decline and Fall of British Lying

The Decline and Fall of British Lying

The Decline and Fall of British Lying Lying , ultimately , is an exercise of power , which is why the styles of lying practiced in different countries can tell us something useful about how they are governed .
At one extreme are the lies that are not meant to be believed .
These come from pure tyrannies , like Vladimir Putin ’ s Russia .
The purpose of lies there is not even to spread confusion but to make it plain that the liar has power and the lied-to can do nothing about it .
Black is white , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : These slogans may work to some extent because they are believed , but their real force comes when they are not believed and the people are compelled to repeat them anyway .
That ’ s how naked power is expressed .
At the other end of the spectrum are reasonably egalitarian , high-trust societies where politicians really do try to explain themselves honestly and people expect to believe them .
They are not always telling the truth , of course , but for the most part they are unconscious of this .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ or 40 years ago and to some extent still is .
In the middle are countries like Britain , which are governed through a recognizable class hierarchy and where lying among the upper classes is governed by an accepted code .
Watching Dominic Cummings and Boris Johnson over the last week has been a wonderful illustration of this , not least because both have violated the code .
In Johnson ’ s case , he does not even pretend very hard to tell the truth .
Colleagues and competitors of his from his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gasp and stretch their eyes at the memory of some of the stories he wrote from there .
This is not how a responsible liar behaves , and if you learn one thing at a British elite school , it is how to lie responsibly and with a grave face , as if it were done for the good of the people who believe you .
Johnson ’ s intoxicating schtick has always been that to believe him will make you feel good , not that it will do you any good at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of behaving as if he were merely carrying out his duty .
His performance in the Rose Garden was extraordinary because he behaved throughout as if he were , like a Swede , entitled to a sympathetic hearing .
A man who has for years maintained an extensive blog to prove that he is cleverer and more farsighted than almost everyone else in public life seems genuinely to have expected that the world would sympathize with his lonely predicament .
The accomplished liar needs to understand the expectations of his audience rather better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s wife , Mary Wakefield , who has an advice column in the Spectator that consists , week after week , of people writing to her asking how to get out of tricky social problems and her replying with the correct lie or evasion of the truth , always calibrated to preserve appearances and remain plausibly deniable .
This , it is implied , is what you need to know to be part of the upper classes .
The distinctive quality of traditional British political lying , though , is the understanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two .
One is made up of the other members of the elite minority who understand the truth and who deserve to do so , and the other is everyone else .
They may take your words at face value—and if they do , they also deserve what they get .
This consciousness of a double audience is related to the distinction between public and private truth that has to be maintained in a hierarchical society .
It is revealed again by the convention that the one unforgivable sin in a minister is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What you tell the press or even your constituents is one thing , but you have to tell the strict truth , when that can be established , to your equals in Parliament .
My favorite example comes from the heart of the old establishment , in a row over whether the Church of England should allow women to become bishops .
Since the church is an established part of the constitution , and some bishops sit in the House of Lords as of right , this is not just an internal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some parliamentarians take a keen , legitimate influence .
After two decades of wrangling between supporters and opponents of female priests , a compromise had been reached in 2012 , which the General Synod at the last moment rejected .
At this , the member of Parliament whose job it is to liaise between the synod and Parliament rose in the synod and said politicians would not tolerate such an offense against equality .
Twenty minutes later , in response to a direct question at a press conference , the person appointed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that he was unaware of any pressure from the government on the matter .
Archbishop Justin Welby is a man who is , in other contexts , appallingly vivid and truthful in his language—but he is also an Etonian , and when he saw the curtain drawn away to reveal political reality , he did not hesitate to drag it back into place .
Let the problem be dealt with by grown-ups twisting arms behind the scenes while the play goes on as usual on the stage .
This kind of concealment is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life , and the people who practice it believe they are serving their nation .
To quote the otherwise distinguished judge Lord Denning , when he turned down the appeal of six innocent Irishmen who had been fitted up by the police for an Irish Republican Army bombing , “ If they won , it would mean that the police were guilty of perjury ; that they were guilty of violence and threats ; that the confessions were involuntary and improperly admitted into evidence and that the convictions were erroneous .
… That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sensible person would say , ‘ It can not be right that these actions should go any further.
’ ” The Denning doctrine is that for lies to do their necessary work of holding society together , it must never be admitted in public that they are in fact lies .
This is a very different attitude to that of Putin or Donald Trump or , for that matter , Johnson .
It follows that under the British code the only thing worse than lying is getting caught .
This goes all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kipling ’ s classic , Stalky & Co. , the schoolboy heroes are constantly outwitting the masters by leading them to believe things that are not true without ever quite committing themselves to any outright untruth—except to their inferiors , of course .
It is allowed to be “ economical with the actualité ” as a senior civil servant once explained when caught in a fantastically misleading obfuscation .
It is allowed , and even admired , to get away with marvelously far-fetched excuses , as when a Conservative politician explained that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ wanted ” something not in the vulgar sense of desiring or wishing for it , heaven forfend , but in the 18th-century sense of “ lacking ” it—and his party comrades affected to believe him .
Perhaps it is all a question of what you can get away with .
Another Etonian politician , the late Alan Clark , recorded in his diary his gushing admiration for Margaret Thatcher when she appeared cornered in a scandal about defense procurement and he was shown by the chief whip the statement she was to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a few paragraphs , started [ to giggle ] .
I couldn ’ t help it .
‘ I ’ m sorry , John .
I simply can ’ t keep a straight face.
’ The paper passed from hand to hand .
Others agreed , but were too polite to say so .
How can she say these things without faltering ?
But she did .
Kept her nerve beautifully .
I was sitting close by , and could see her riffling her notes , and turning the pages of the speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all .
It was almost as if the House , half horrified , half dumb with admiration , was cowed.
” The difficulty with judging lies solely by their success is that you have no defense when they appear to fail .
Tony Blair was destroyed by the belief that he had lied over the Iraq War , whether it was technically ever true or not .
Once trust is lost , you can ’ t appeal to the truth of the matter .
This is what Cummings and Johnson in their different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a free society , lying works only by consent of the lied-to , and people who tolerate liars who lie by the rules will never forgive a cheat .

Lying, ultimately, is an exercise of power, which is why the styles of lying practiced in different countries can tell us something useful about how they are governed. At one extreme are the lies that are not meant to be believed. These come from pure tyrannies, like Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The purpose of lies there is not even to spread confusion but to make it plain that the liar has power and the lied-to can do nothing about it. Black is white, war is peace, freedom is slavery: These slogans may work to some extent because they are believed, but their real force comes when they are not believed and the people are compelled to repeat them anyway. That’s how naked power is expressed.
Lying, ultimately, is an exercise of power, which is why the styles of lying practiced in different countries can tell us something useful about how they are governed. At one extreme are the lies that are not meant to be believed. These come from pure tyrannies, like Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The purpose of lies there is not even to spread confusion but to make it plain that the liar has power and the lied-to can do nothing about it. Black is white, war is peace, freedom is slavery: These slogans may work to some extent because they are believed, but their real force comes when they are not believed and the people are compelled to repeat them anyway. That’s how naked power is expressed.
At the other end of the spectrum are reasonably egalitarian, high-trust societies where politicians really do try to explain themselves honestly and people expect to believe them. They are not always telling the truth, of course, but for the most part they are unconscious of this. Sweden was a country like that 30 or 40 years ago and to some extent still is.
In the middle are countries like Britain, which are governed through a recognizable class hierarchy and where lying among the upper classes is governed by an accepted code. Watching Dominic Cummings and Boris Johnson over the last week has been a wonderful illustration of this, not least because both have violated the code.
In Johnson’s case, he does not even pretend very hard to tell the truth. Colleagues and competitors of his from his time as a correspondent in Brussels still gasp and stretch their eyes at the memory of some of the stories he wrote from there. This is not how a responsible liar behaves, and if you learn one thing at a British elite school, it is how to lie responsibly and with a grave face, as if it were done for the good of the people who believe you. Johnson’s intoxicating schtick has always been that to believe him will make you feel good, not that it will do you any good at all.
Cummings is even less capable of behaving as if he were merely carrying out his duty. His performance in the Rose Garden was extraordinary because he behaved throughout as if he were, like a Swede, entitled to a sympathetic hearing. A man who has for years maintained an extensive blog to prove that he is cleverer and more farsighted than almost everyone else in public life seems genuinely to have expected that the world would sympathize with his lonely predicament. The accomplished liar needs to understand the expectations of his audience rather better than that.
Compare and contrast Cummings’s wife, Mary Wakefield, who has an advice column in the Spectator that consists, week after week, of people writing to her asking how to get out of tricky social problems and her replying with the correct lie or evasion of the truth, always calibrated to preserve appearances and remain plausibly deniable. This, it is implied, is what you need to know to be part of the upper classes.
The distinctive quality of traditional British political lying, though, is the understanding that there is not one audience but two. One is made up of the other members of the elite minority who understand the truth and who deserve to do so, and the other is everyone else. They may take your words at face value—and if they do, they also deserve what they get.
This consciousness of a double audience is related to the distinction between public and private truth that has to be maintained in a hierarchical society. It is revealed again by the convention that the one unforgivable sin in a minister is to lie to the House of Commons. What you tell the press or even your constituents is one thing, but you have to tell the strict truth, when that can be established, to your equals in Parliament.
My favorite example comes from the heart of the old establishment, in a row over whether the Church of England should allow women to become bishops. Since the church is an established part of the constitution, and some bishops sit in the House of Lords as of right, this is not just an internal, theological question but one in which some parliamentarians take a keen, legitimate influence.
After two decades of wrangling between supporters and opponents of female priests, a compromise had been reached in 2012, which the General Synod at the last moment rejected. At this, the member of Parliament whose job it is to liaise between the synod and Parliament rose in the synod and said politicians would not tolerate such an offense against equality. Twenty minutes later, in response to a direct question at a press conference, the person appointed to become the next archbishop of Canterbury responded that he was unaware of any pressure from the government on the matter. Archbishop Justin Welby is a man who is, in other contexts, appallingly vivid and truthful in his language—but he is also an Etonian, and when he saw the curtain drawn away to reveal political reality, he did not hesitate to drag it back into place.
Let the problem be dealt with by grown-ups twisting arms behind the scenes while the play goes on as usual on the stage.
This kind of concealment is built into the structure of British public life, and the people who practice it believe they are serving their nation. To quote the otherwise distinguished judge Lord Denning, when he turned down the appeal of six innocent Irishmen who had been fitted up by the police for an Irish Republican Army bombing, “If they won, it would mean that the police were guilty of perjury; that they were guilty of violence and threats; that the confessions were involuntary and improperly admitted into evidence and that the convictions were erroneous. … That was such an appalling vista that every sensible person would say, ‘It cannot be right that these actions should go any further.’”
The Denning doctrine is that for lies to do their necessary work of holding society together, it must never be admitted in public that they are in fact lies. This is a very different attitude to that of Putin or Donald Trump or, for that matter, Johnson.
It follows that under the British code the only thing worse than lying is getting caught. This goes all the way back to school. In Rudyard Kipling’s classic, Stalky & Co., the schoolboy heroes are constantly outwitting the masters by leading them to believe things that are not true without ever quite committing themselves to any outright untruth—except to their inferiors, of course. It is allowed to be “economical with the actualité” as a senior civil servant once explained when caught in a fantastically misleading obfuscation. It is allowed, and even admired, to get away with marvelously far-fetched excuses, as when a Conservative politician explained that he had written in a memo that he “wanted” something not in the vulgar sense of desiring or wishing for it, heaven forfend, but in the 18th-century sense of “lacking” it—and his party comrades affected to believe him.
Perhaps it is all a question of what you can get away with. Another Etonian politician, the late Alan Clark, recorded in his diary his gushing admiration for Margaret Thatcher when she appeared cornered in a scandal about defense procurement and he was shown by the chief whip the statement she was to make to Parliament: “I read a few paragraphs, started [to giggle]. I couldn’t help it. ‘I’m sorry, John. I simply can’t keep a straight face.’ The paper passed from hand to hand. Others agreed, but were too polite to say so. How can she say these things without faltering? But she did. Kept her nerve beautifully. I was sitting close by, and could see her riffling her notes, and turning the pages of the speech. Her hand did not shake at all. It was almost as if the House, half horrified, half dumb with admiration, was cowed.”
The difficulty with judging lies solely by their success is that you have no defense when they appear to fail. Tony Blair was destroyed by the belief that he had lied over the Iraq War, whether it was technically ever true or not. Once trust is lost, you can’t appeal to the truth of the matter. This is what Cummings and Johnson in their different ways have failed to understand. In a free society, lying works only by consent of the lied-to, and people who tolerate liars who lie by the rules will never forgive a cheat.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--Forget Hamilton. This Is Europe’s Calonne Moment.

On May 18 , French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced a proposal for a €500 billion ( $ 543 billion ) European Union coronavirus recovery fund , in which the European Commission would borrow in capital markets to support grants and EU-level spending , rather than loans to national governments .
That plan was echoed and expanded nine days later , when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a proposal to borrow €750 billion ( $ 823 billion ) , €500 billion of which would be distributed as grants , funded by future EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a surprise , and marked a shift in policy driven by Olaf Scholz , a senior member of the Social Democratic Party ( SPD ) , at the Finance Ministry .
Since taking up the post in March 2018 , Scholz and his team have slowly been bending the German role in EU economic policy away from the long reign of conservatism and austerity under the Christian Democratic Union ’ s Wolfgang Schäuble , and this surprise is a barometer of their success .
The new fund has been widely characterized as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hamilton ’ s successful effort in 1790 to have the newly formed U.S. federal government assume all of the outstanding debts of the individual states , thereby creating a single fiscal union .
In an interview with Die Ziet , Scholz himself invoked Hamilton and reaffirmed the SPD ’ s long-standing goal of establishing a United States of Europe .
A counterargument emerged immediately .
A fiscal union involves not just common borrowing but common taxation .
Scholz hopes for taxes on financial transactions and carbon emissions , but the fund has no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s plan will be followed by proposals for new EU-level levies and duties to be applied between 2028 and 2058 .
Nor has either proposal been accepted by all EU member states : Germany and France are still trying to persuade the recalcitrant Netherlands , Austria , Denmark , and Sweden , so it is unclear what the final product will look like .
Germany and France want the proceeds to be distributed as grants , while the so-called “ frugal four ” insist on loans .
Further , the fund is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Funding Act , it does not include the mutualization of debt .
Under full mutualization , Germans could find themselves on the hook to repay debt issued by or for Greeks and Italians , whereas under the current proposal , they are only required to contribute to repayment in amounts equivalent to their share of the EU budget .
( Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union forbids debt mutualization . )
The fund might simply be an extension of the now politically toxic European Stability Mechanism—the 2012 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for fiscal austerity .
Both the Merkel-Macron plan and the commission plan are focused on grants rather than loans , but grants could still come with domestic policy conditions , and Southern European countries have already been burned by ostensible bailout provisions before .
The fund could also be an end run around the recent decision by the German Constitutional Court on European Central Bank ( ECB ) bond-buying , allowing the bank to direct support to the most affected countries .
If the German court ruling holds and is actually taken seriously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ easing program will become untenable .
The bonds of this common relief fund will take over , allowing the ECB to continue doing the heavy lifting of European economic policy .
The debate over how to interpret this new fund could be improved with a wider repertoire of examples drawn from 18th-century economic history .
The Hamilton comparison is familiar to our historical imaginations and is validated by a subsequent record of success .
But Hamilton is not the only available historical analogy to Europe ’ s current constitutional moment—and success is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before Hamilton ’ s moment , Charles-Alexandre de Calonne became controller-general of finances under King Louis XVI .
By then , Old Regime France had been stumbling through a perpetual debt crisis for nearly a century .
Despite the ostensible absolutism of the king , French governance was a ramshackle bureaucratic nightmare full of overlapping and contradictory jurisdictions .
The administration of justice and tax collection were held as private offices , provincial elites had wide discretion and their own privileged sources of revenue , and there was no such thing as common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , France ’ s first experiment with a central bank and unified economic policy ended in disaster , when the Scottish gambler , convicted murderer , and banking theorist John Law precipitated the world ’ s first international financial crisis and the world ’ s first paper money hyperinflation .
From then on , each controller-general did their best to muddle through without daring to attempt any major reforms .
Nobody had the slightest idea how much revenue the crown controlled or how much debt it owed or to whom until the publication @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finances in 1781 .
By 1787 , the French crown was on the brink of default , overburdened by the debts accumulated during its intervention in the American Revolutionary War .
In that moment of crisis , Calonne realized that the messy thicket of public-private bureaucracy was incapable of agreeing to any meaningful reforms , let alone reforms that would raise taxes .
Previous attempts at tax reform had consistently been blocked by regional courts .
Calonne convened an emergency council called the Assembly of Notables and proposed a wide-ranging package of reforms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create a single tax structure , and set up a central bank .
The Calonne moment was a last-ditch attempt at reforms that would save and preserve the fundamental constitutional structure of Old Regime France .
It failed .
Calonne was implicated in a financial scandal connected to a boom and bust on the Paris stock exchange , which cost him his position and cost his reforms their legitimacy .
News of the scandal was driven by a series of salacious pamphlets published by Calonne ’ s political enemies , who also happened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divided over whether Calonne really was as corrupt as the pamphlets claimed or just naive enough to think he could win a public dispute against a coordinated campaign of defamation .
But even without the scandal , the assembly could not and would not agree on universal direct taxation , and provincial courts loudly proclaimed that they would refuse to accept the legality of any new taxes .
The failure of Calonne ’ s reforms left no option but to attempt to rewrite the constitutional basis of the French fiscal system .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do just that , and ended up doing considerably more .
One of the first things this meeting did was nationalize the royal debt , making it the permanent responsibility of the nation as a whole and forbidding any mention of default in its proceedings .
Many of the holders of the royal debt were exactly the same financiers and holders of venal offices who had comprised the Assembly of Notables and later arrived in Paris as delegates to the Estates-General .
They found that solving questions of taxation and spending entailed first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereignty and power , and principles of property and law .
Once the possibility of radical social transformation existed , there were no inherent limits governing who could direct that transformation or how far .
The result was the French Revolution .
None of the delegates who met in Paris in May 1789 had any idea that by August they would have utterly abolished the legal institutions of the Old Regime , let alone that four years and two constitutions later , France would be a republic with universal male suffrage and legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Europe and fashioning public virtue under a Reign of Terror .
Nor could they have predicted the economic fallout .
In a 1794 report on the Old Regime ’ s debt crisis , the delegate Pierre-Joseph Cambon concluded that the old government had been outsmarted by the markets , with their greater technical knowledge and opaque strategies .
Much of Cambon ’ s career during the French Revolution was dedicated to breaking the political power of these early “ bond vigilantes , ” and by 1794 everything had changed , especially the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 1796 , the post-Terror government defaulted on the remainder of the Old Regime ’ s debt , but by then the decision was almost moot .
The bond vigilantes of 1787 had fled into exile and had their property confiscated or had been guillotined in the Place de la Révolution , and the nominal value of the debt had been eroded by the hyperinflation of the revolution ’ s paper money .
There is more than one way to resolve a fiscal crisis .
There are many differences between the EU in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as there are between the EU and the United States in 1790—although political corruption like Calonne ’ s appears to spring eternal and , like Hamilton , sometimes people are still shot by vice presidents .
But in New York in 1790 , Paris in 1787 , and Brussels today , an urgent fiscal crisis is the manifestation of an underlying set of constitutional dilemmas about representation , sovereignty , and legitimacy .
Invoking the Hamilton parallel alone risks tricking ourselves into thinking that if we know what happens in the immediate crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be resolved .
The Calonne moment is a reminder that radical changes that in the future will seem in retrospect to have been inevitable are exactly those that are currently unimaginable .
The Hamilton analogy suggests a peculiarly American idea of constitution-writing : one that ends a revolution and establishes a unified federal structure .
That experience has not been the norm in most times and places .
The Calonne moment is more common : the delegitimization of the old world does not imply a consensus on the new , so attempts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin revolutions than end them .
We can hope for the Scholz-Hamilton future , with a European fiscal union funded through taxes on capital and carbon , redistributing funds to the poorest people and places , all driven by a commitment to internationalist solidarity .
That is a future consistent with Adam Tooze ’ s recent call for a new constitutional purpose for the European monetary and financial system , anchored on a new social role for the ECB .
But it is difficult to look at the political landscape of contemporary Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without a prior radical redistribution of power .
It is possible that we will look back on the past decade of EU governance , with its inequality and austerity and resentment , the way we look back on the Articles of Confederation .
But an interregnum is given meaning by what follows , either as necessary prologue or tragic missed opportunity .
If the fund fails , or is diluted beyond recognition , it may not be possible to continue muddling through this crisis on the ECB ’ s power alone .
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be yet another mechanism for enforcing austerity on the southern periphery—as in Calonne ’ s case , an ostensibly necessary technical reform that conceals ( or appears to conceal ) a narrow sectional interest would accelerate the EU ’ s ongoing crisis of legitimacy .
The message of the recovery fund may well be toward a “ more perfect Union , ” as Scholz suggests .
But it may also be “ Après nous , le déluge .
”

On May 18, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced a proposal for a €500 billion ($543 billion) European Union coronavirus recovery fund , in which the European Commission would borrow in capital markets to support grants and EU-level spending, rather than loans to national governments. That plan was echoed and expanded nine days later, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a proposal to borrow €750 billion ($823 billion), €500 billion of which would be distributed as grants, funded by future EU taxes. The participation of Germany was a surprise, and marked a shift in policy driven by Olaf Scholz, a senior member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), at the Finance Ministry. Since taking up the post in March 2018, Scholz and his team have slowly been bending the German role in EU economic policy away from the long reign of conservatism and austerity under the Christian Democratic Union’s Wolfgang Schäuble, and this surprise is a barometer of their success. The new fund has been widely characterized as a “Hamiltonian moment,” after Alexander Hamilton’s successful effort in 1790 to have the newly formed U.S. federal government assume all of the outstanding debts of the individual states, thereby creating a single fiscal union. In an interview with Die Ziet, Scholz himself invoked Hamilton and reaffirmed the SPD’s long-standing goal of establishing a United States of Europe.
On May 18, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced a proposal for a €500 billion ($543 billion) European Union coronavirus recovery fund, in which the European Commission would borrow in capital markets to support grants and EU-level spending, rather than loans to national governments. That plan was echoed and expanded nine days later, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issued a proposal to borrow €750 billion ($823 billion), €500 billion of which would be distributed as grants, funded by future EU taxes. The participation of Germany was a surprise, and marked a shift in policy driven by Olaf Scholz, a senior member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), at the Finance Ministry. Since taking up the post in March 2018, Scholz and his team have slowly been bending the German role in EU economic policy away from the long reign of conservatism and austerity under the Christian Democratic Union’s Wolfgang Schäuble, and this surprise is a barometer of their success. The new fund has been widely characterized as a “Hamiltonian moment,” after Alexander Hamilton’s successful effort in 1790 to have the newly formed U.S. federal government assume all of the outstanding debts of the individual states, thereby creating a single fiscal union. In an interview with Die Ziet, Scholz himself invoked Hamilton and reaffirmed the SPD’s long-standing goal of establishing a United States of Europe.
A counterargument emerged immediately. A fiscal union involves not just common borrowing but common taxation. Scholz hopes for taxes on financial transactions and carbon emissions, but the fund has no taxation elements as yet. The commission’s plan will be followed by proposals for new EU-level levies and duties to be applied between 2028 and 2058. Nor has either proposal been accepted by all EU member states: Germany and France are still trying to persuade the recalcitrant Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden, so it is unclear what the final product will look like. Germany and France want the proceeds to be distributed as grants, while the so-called “frugal four” insist on loans. Further, the fund is temporary, and unlike Hamilton’s Funding Act, it does not include the mutualization of debt. Under full mutualization, Germans could find themselves on the hook to repay debt issued by or for Greeks and Italians, whereas under the current proposal, they are only required to contribute to repayment in amounts equivalent to their share of the EU budget. (Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union forbids debt mutualization.) The fund might simply be an extension of the now politically toxic European Stability Mechanism—the 2012 relief effort that supplied loans in exchange for fiscal austerity. Both the Merkel-Macron plan and the commission plan are focused on grants rather than loans, but grants could still come with domestic policy conditions, and Southern European countries have already been burned by ostensible bailout provisions before.
The fund could also be an end run around the recent decision by the German Constitutional Court on European Central Bank (ECB) bond-buying, allowing the bank to direct support to the most affected countries. If the German court ruling holds and is actually taken seriously, the ECB’s current quantitative easing program will become untenable. The bonds of this common relief fund will take over, allowing the ECB to continue doing the heavy lifting of European economic policy.
The debate over how to interpret this new fund could be improved with a wider repertoire of examples drawn from 18th-century economic history. The Hamilton comparison is familiar to our historical imaginations and is validated by a subsequent record of success. But Hamilton is not the only available historical analogy to Europe’s current constitutional moment—and success is not the only available outcome.
Seven years before Hamilton’s moment, Charles-Alexandre de Calonne became controller-general of finances under King Louis XVI. By then, Old Regime France had been stumbling through a perpetual debt crisis for nearly a century. Despite the ostensible absolutism of the king, French governance was a ramshackle bureaucratic nightmare full of overlapping and contradictory jurisdictions. The administration of justice and tax collection were held as private offices, provincial elites had wide discretion and their own privileged sources of revenue, and there was no such thing as common, universal public law. In 1720, France’s first experiment with a central bank and unified economic policy ended in disaster, when the Scottish gambler, convicted murderer, and banking theorist John Law precipitated the world’s first international financial crisis and the world’s first paper money hyperinflation. From then on, each controller-general did their best to muddle through without daring to attempt any major reforms. Nobody had the slightest idea how much revenue the crown controlled or how much debt it owed or to whom until the publication of a scandalous report on the state finances in 1781.
By 1787, the French crown was on the brink of default, overburdened by the debts accumulated during its intervention in the American Revolutionary War. In that moment of crisis, Calonne realized that the messy thicket of public-private bureaucracy was incapable of agreeing to any meaningful reforms, let alone reforms that would raise taxes. Previous attempts at tax reform had consistently been blocked by regional courts. Calonne convened an emergency council called the Assembly of Notables and proposed a wide-ranging package of reforms designed to unify borrowing and spending, create a single tax structure, and set up a central bank.
The Calonne moment was a last-ditch attempt at reforms that would save and preserve the fundamental constitutional structure of Old Regime France. It failed. Calonne was implicated in a financial scandal connected to a boom and bust on the Paris stock exchange, which cost him his position and cost his reforms their legitimacy. News of the scandal was driven by a series of salacious pamphlets published by Calonne’s political enemies, who also happened to be financial speculators. Historians remain divided over whether Calonne really was as corrupt as the pamphlets claimed or just naive enough to think he could win a public dispute against a coordinated campaign of defamation. But even without the scandal, the assembly could not and would not agree on universal direct taxation, and provincial courts loudly proclaimed that they would refuse to accept the legality of any new taxes.
The failure of Calonne’s reforms left no option but to attempt to rewrite the constitutional basis of the French fiscal system. In 1789, the Estates-General was convened to do just that, and ended up doing considerably more. One of the first things this meeting did was nationalize the royal debt, making it the permanent responsibility of the nation as a whole and forbidding any mention of default in its proceedings. Many of the holders of the royal debt were exactly the same financiers and holders of venal offices who had comprised the Assembly of Notables and later arrived in Paris as delegates to the Estates-General. They found that solving questions of taxation and spending entailed first solving questions of representation and legitimacy, sovereignty and power, and principles of property and law. Once the possibility of radical social transformation existed, there were no inherent limits governing who could direct that transformation or how far. The result was the French Revolution.
None of the delegates who met in Paris in May 1789 had any idea that by August they would have utterly abolished the legal institutions of the Old Regime, let alone that four years and two constitutions later, France would be a republic with universal male suffrage and legal equality, at war with the rest of Europe and fashioning public virtue under a Reign of Terror. Nor could they have predicted the economic fallout. In a 1794 report on the Old Regime’s debt crisis, the delegate Pierre-Joseph Cambon concluded that the old government had been outsmarted by the markets, with their greater technical knowledge and opaque strategies. Much of Cambon’s career during the French Revolution was dedicated to breaking the political power of these early “bond vigilantes,” and by 1794 everything had changed, especially the political power of the old elites. In 1796, the post-Terror government defaulted on the remainder of the Old Regime’s debt, but by then the decision was almost moot. The bond vigilantes of 1787 had fled into exile and had their property confiscated or had been guillotined in the Place de la Révolution, and the nominal value of the debt had been eroded by the hyperinflation of the revolution’s paper money. There is more than one way to resolve a fiscal crisis.
There are many differences between the EU in 2020 and France in 1787, just as there are between the EU and the United States in 1790—although political corruption like Calonne’s appears to spring eternal and, like Hamilton, sometimes people are still shot by vice presidents. But in New York in 1790, Paris in 1787, and Brussels today, an urgent fiscal crisis is the manifestation of an underlying set of constitutional dilemmas about representation, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Invoking the Hamilton parallel alone risks tricking ourselves into thinking that if we know what happens in the immediate crisis, we know how the bigger questions will be resolved.
The Calonne moment is a reminder that radical changes that in the future will seem in retrospect to have been inevitable are exactly those that are currently unimaginable. The Hamilton analogy suggests a peculiarly American idea of constitution-writing: one that ends a revolution and establishes a unified federal structure. That experience has not been the norm in most times and places. The Calonne moment is more common: the delegitimization of the old world does not imply a consensus on the new, so attempts to reshape a constitutional order more often begin revolutions than end them.
We can hope for the Scholz-Hamilton future, with a European fiscal union funded through taxes on capital and carbon, redistributing funds to the poorest people and places, all driven by a commitment to internationalist solidarity. That is a future consistent with Adam Tooze’s recent call for a new constitutional purpose for the European monetary and financial system, anchored on a new social role for the ECB. But it is difficult to look at the political landscape of contemporary Europe and think that will be the result without a prior radical redistribution of power.
It is possible that we will look back on the past decade of EU governance, with its inequality and austerity and resentment, the way we look back on the Articles of Confederation. But an interregnum is given meaning by what follows, either as necessary prologue or tragic missed opportunity. If the fund fails, or is diluted beyond recognition, it may not be possible to continue muddling through this crisis on the ECB’s power alone. Even worse, the fund could turn out to be yet another mechanism for enforcing austerity on the southern periphery—as in Calonne’s case, an ostensibly necessary technical reform that conceals (or appears to conceal) a narrow sectional interest would accelerate the EU’s ongoing crisis of legitimacy.
The message of the recovery fund may well be toward a “more perfect Union,” as Scholz suggests. But it may also be “Après nous, le déluge.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--Is Climate Action About to Take a Back Seat to COVID-19?

Is Climate Action About to Take a Back Seat to COVID-19 ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Global climate talks are postponed until late 2021 , the White House plans to announce a response to China ’ s Hong Kong moves , and Yemen ’ s aid funds are running out .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
The COP26 summit—the most important climate conference since the 2015 meeting that led to the Paris agreement—has been delayed until late 2021 because of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Thursday .
It ’ s easy to see how climate change policy could be pushed down the priority list during a global recession , as lawmakers reach for short-term solutions .
Consumer preferences after the pandemic could also reverse any reductions in emissions from lockdown measures ; Wuhan saw car sales jump after reopening as residents opted for a more personal form of transport .
U.K. Business Secretary and COP26 president Alok Sharma said that the delay would not mean a shift in focus .
“ While we rightly focus on fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we must not lose sight of the huge challenges of climate change , ” he said .
“ We are working with our international partners on an ambitious roadmap for global climate action between now and November 2021 .
Everyone will need to raise their ambitions to tackle climate change.
” What is Europe doing ?
In Europe , at least , the goal of an environmentally sound economic recovery has been moved to the top of spending plans .
The European Commission ’ s economic recovery plan , released earlier this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 166 billion ) toward greener transport , more energy efficient homes , and cleaner industry .
The EU plan also includes a 40 billion euro ( $ 44 billion ) “ just transition fund ” aimed at weaning countries off dirty fuels like coal through a grant program .
Will leaders repeat the mistakes of 2008 ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on May 21 , Paul Hockenos looked back at the 2008 financial crisis and the missteps made then .
“ Though the post-financial-crisis measures lifted many European countries out of recession—and rescued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in debt—they did very little to accelerate the transition to more sustainable , climate-friendly economies.
” He argued that French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel must resist the lobbying from the automobile and airline industries and make sure any prospective bailout comes with clear climate commitments .
U.S. response on Hong Kong expected today .
U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce U.S. actions in response to China imposing national security laws on Hong Kong .
The White House has been quiet on what such moves might entail , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told CNBC yesterday that the “ phase one ” trade deal with China was still on and “ we may be making progress there.
” He added that China ’ s actions on Hong Kong are “ a very , very big mistake.
” FP ’ s Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer reported on Thursday on the possible measures the White House could adopt , and whether sanctions would end up hurting Hong Kong more than China .
“ Additional measures could range from revoking Hong Kong ’ s special trade relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tariffs and tougher export controls , to targeting its role as a vital financial window for Beijing .
Hong Kong ’ s future will be largely shaped by the U.S. measures in the coming weeks—and by Beijing ’ s response , ” they write .
North Koreans charged with evading sanctions .
The U.S. Justice Department has charged 28 North Koreans and five Chinese citizens along with North Korea ’ s national bank with evading U.S. sanctions .
The United States accuses North Korea ’ s Foreign Trade Bank ( FTB ) with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least $ 2.5 billion in illegal payments via over 250 front companies.
” Many of the individuals charged are current or former employees of FTB and the suspicious transactions took place in Russia , Libya , China , and Thailand .
U.S. officials said that some of the $ 2.5 billion went toward North Korea ’ s nuclear and ballistic missile programs .
Minneapolis in flames .
Police were forced to retreat as the Minneapolis Police Third Precinct building was set alight in the third night of protests following the killing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , by a local police officer .
Similar protests have now taken place in Louisville and Denver .
President Trump called the demonstrators “ thugs ” on Twitter and threatened to send in National Guard troops to silence public anger .
“ When the looting starts , the shooting starts , ” Trump wrote .
Britain ’ s stance on Venezuela .
Britain ’ s recognition of Juan Guaidó as the rightful leader of Venezuela is in jeopardy after an English court said it would have to decide between acknowledging either Venezulean President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involving the country ’ s gold reserves .
The Bank of England holds some of Venezuela ’ s gold as part of a deal with the United Nations Development Programme , and Venezuela ’ s central bank has requested the release of roughly $ 1 billion worth of gold to help with its coronavirus response .
The court will hear both sides make their case later this summer .
Germany wants sanctions on Russian spy chief .
Germany is pushing for the European Union to impose economic sanctions on the head of Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kostyukov , for his role in a 2015 cyberattack on the German parliament .
The move would be the first time an EU sanctions mechanism designed to retaliate against cyberattacks would be used since it was adopted last year .
All 27 EU member states must agree on the measure for it to proceed .
U.N. warns Yemen fund running out .
United Nations relief agencies working on the ground in Yemen are almost broke , according to United Nations humanitarian aid chief Mark Lowcock .
Lowcock has launched a campaign to raise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of Yemen ’ s population now reliant on aid .
He said the U.N. received $ 3.2 billion in aid for Yemen last year , but so far in 2020 that figure was only $ 474 million .
“ There ’ s no way to describe this situation other than alarming , ” he said .
“ Is the world ready simply to watch Yemen fall off the cliff ?
” If social media companies are feeling pressured by the Trump administration ’ s latest executive order , Germany has offered a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made an open plea for Twitter to move their operations to his country on—where else—Twitter .
“ Here you are free to criticize the government as well as to fight fake news .
We have a great startup and tech ecosystem , your company would be a perfect fit and I will open any doors for you !
” he wrote .
Ironically , considering President Trump ’ s threat to make social media companies legally responsible for posts on their sites , Germany already has very strict policies on policing misinformation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ can be fined up to $ 55 million if they fail to remove hateful content from their sites .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Global climate talks are postponed until late 2021, the White House plans to announce a response to China’s Hong Kong moves, and Yemen ’s aid funds are running out.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Global climate talks are postponed until late 2021, the White House plans to announce a response to China’s Hong Kong moves, and Yemen’s aid funds are running out.
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UN Delays Climate Conference Until 2021
The COP26 summit—the most important climate conference since the 2015 meeting that led to the Paris agreement—has been delayed until late 2021 because of the coronavirus pandemic, United Nations officials confirmed on Thursday.
It’s easy to see how climate change policy could be pushed down the priority list during a global recession, as lawmakers reach for short-term solutions. Consumer preferences after the pandemic could also reverse any reductions in emissions from lockdown measures; Wuhan saw car sales jump after reopening as residents opted for a more personal form of transport.
U.K. Business Secretary and COP26 president Alok Sharma said that the delay would not mean a shift in focus. “While we rightly focus on fighting the immediate crisis of the coronavirus, we must not lose sight of the huge challenges of climate change,” he said. “We are working with our international partners on an ambitious roadmap for global climate action between now and November 2021. Everyone will need to raise their ambitions to tackle climate change.”
What is Europe doing? In Europe, at least, the goal of an environmentally sound economic recovery has been moved to the top of spending plans. The European Commission’s economic recovery plan, released earlier this week, includes 150 billion euro ($166 billion) toward greener transport, more energy efficient homes, and cleaner industry. The EU plan also includes a 40 billion euro ($44 billion) “just transition fund” aimed at weaning countries off dirty fuels like coal through a grant program.
Will leaders repeat the mistakes of 2008? Writing in Foreign Policy on May 21, Paul Hockenos looked back at the 2008 financial crisis and the missteps made then. “Though the post-financial-crisis measures lifted many European countries out of recession—and rescued others from insolvency, though burying them in debt—they did very little to accelerate the transition to more sustainable, climate-friendly economies.” He argued that French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel must resist the lobbying from the automobile and airline industries and make sure any prospective bailout comes with clear climate commitments.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. response on Hong Kong expected today. U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce U.S. actions in response to China imposing national security laws on Hong Kong. The White House has been quiet on what such moves might entail, but National Economic Council director Larry Kudlow told CNBC yesterday that the “phase one” trade deal with China was still on and “we may be making progress there.” He added that China’s actions on Hong Kong are “a very, very big mistake.”
FP’s Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer reported on Thursday on the possible measures the White House could adopt, and whether sanctions would end up hurting Hong Kong more than China. “Additional measures could range from revoking Hong Kong’s special trade relationship with the United States, including levying higher tariffs and tougher export controls, to targeting its role as a vital financial window for Beijing. Hong Kong’s future will be largely shaped by the U.S. measures in the coming weeks—and by Beijing’s response,” they write.
North Koreans charged with evading sanctions. The U.S. Justice Department has charged 28 North Koreans and five Chinese citizens along with North Korea’s national bank with evading U.S. sanctions. The United States accuses North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) with conspiring with bank workers “to process at least $2.5 billion in illegal payments via over 250 front companies.” Many of the individuals charged are current or former employees of FTB and the suspicious transactions took place in Russia, Libya, China, and Thailand. U.S. officials said that some of the $2.5 billion went toward North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Minneapolis in flames. Police were forced to retreat as the Minneapolis Police Third Precinct building was set alight in the third night of protests following the killing of George Floyd, a 46-year-old black man, by a local police officer. Similar protests have now taken place in Louisville and Denver. President Trump called the demonstrators “thugs” on Twitter and threatened to send in National Guard troops to silence public anger. “When the looting starts, the shooting starts,” Trump wrote.
Keep an Eye On
Britain’s stance on Venezuela. Britain’s recognition of Juan Guaidó as the rightful leader of Venezuela is in jeopardy after an English court said it would have to decide between acknowledging either Venezulean President Nicolás Maduro or Guaidó in a case involving the country’s gold reserves. The Bank of England holds some of Venezuela’s gold as part of a deal with the United Nations Development Programme, and Venezuela’s central bank has requested the release of roughly $1 billion worth of gold to help with its coronavirus response. The court will hear both sides make their case later this summer.
Germany wants sanctions on Russian spy chief. Germany is pushing for the European Union to impose economic sanctions on the head of Russia’s military intelligence agency, Igor Kostyukov, for his role in a 2015 cyberattack on the German parliament. The move would be the first time an EU sanctions mechanism designed to retaliate against cyberattacks would be used since it was adopted last year. All 27 EU member states must agree on the measure for it to proceed.
U.N. warns Yemen fund running out. United Nations relief agencies working on the ground in Yemen are almost broke, according to United Nations humanitarian aid chief Mark Lowcock. Lowcock has launched a campaign to raise $2.4 billion to support the 80 percent of Yemen’s population now reliant on aid. He said the U.N. received $3.2 billion in aid for Yemen last year, but so far in 2020 that figure was only $474 million. “There’s no way to describe this situation other than alarming,” he said. “Is the world ready simply to watch Yemen fall off the cliff?”
Odds and Ends
If social media companies are feeling pressured by the Trump administration’s latest executive order, Germany has offered a release valve. Bundestag member Thomas Jarzombek made an open plea for Twitter to move their operations to his country on—where else—Twitter. “Here you are free to criticize the government as well as to fight fake news. We have a great startup and tech ecosystem, your company would be a perfect fit and I will open any doors for you!” he wrote.
Ironically, considering President Trump’s threat to make social media companies legally responsible for posts on their sites, Germany already has very strict policies on policing misinformation. Under German law, social media companies can be fined up to $55 million if they fail to remove hateful content from their sites.
That’s it for today.
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