foreignpolicy--2020-07-13--After Decades of Wrong Predictions, Oil May Finally Be Peaking

After Decades of Wrong Predictions , Oil May Finally Be Peaking After one of the most dramatic stretches in its history , the oil industry is slowly recovering .
March and April saw the toxic combination of depressed demand , excessive supply , limited storage capacity , and intense financial speculation that turned prices on one index negative .
Although concerns about a second wave of coronavirus infections remain high , demand is now back on the rise , and supply is in check .
But that doesn ’ t mean that the industry is out of the woods .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ source of uncertainty for oil producers is structural in nature , not cyclical .
In fact , there is an increasing sense that peak oil—the moment when oil production reaches its point of maximum before starting a structural decline—has finally arrived .
Since the 1950s , there has been plenty of speculation about an imminent shortage of crude oil .
Such speculation has proved consistently wrong , as all predictions tended to underestimate both the true amount of global oil reserves and the ability of technology to overcome physical constraints .
Now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be accelerating trends—greener economies and decreased mobility—that until February seemed to be at least one decade away , might finally break the mold .
This time , though , peak oil could come on the demand side of the market rather than on the supply one .
Such change would mark a shift from perceived oil scarcity to oil abundance that could radically transform the structure of the oil market—even more than the shale revolution itself .
Nevertheless , despite the widespread consensus that such trends existed , there has always been a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and shape of the oil-demand plateau .
Small changes in the assumptions about the numerous factors that determine long-term oil demand—such as population growth , economic activity , mobility , or energy efficiency—can generate very different paths .
Last year , for example , the International Energy Agency ( IEA ) released two possible scenarios for long-term oil demand .
In its sustainable development scenario , which was predicated on a sharp tightening of climate policies , oil demand was expected to start declining substantially in the next decade and to drop by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to around 70 million barrels per day .
In the other scenario , which is based on current policies , oil demand keeps growing for the next 10 years , before stabilizing in the subsequent decade as a result of downward pressure on energy consumption due to electrification balanced out by higher energy consumption from the poorest regions of the world .
To be sure , in this scenario , the world would still consume a significant amount of crude oil even after the plateau—around 100 million barrels per day , close to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the No .
1 factor that could change the calculations .
Although tourist activity is likely to rebound and return to pre-crisis levels in a couple of years , especially if a coronavirus vaccine is found , remote work arrangements might drastically reduce commuting mileage for millions of workers .
According to some estimates , in the eurozone , over a quarter of jobs can , at least in theory , be performed from home .
Similar estimates apply to the United States , too .
In Europe , the average one-way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , whereas in the United States it is above 11 miles .
Imagine the gasoline saved if millions of people stop commuting .
Moreover , COVID-19 might lead to a significant decline in business trips in favor of videoconferencing that would not only reduce operational costs but could also lead to productivity gains thanks to more time spent at the desk than in an airport .
Some industrial activities might even be reshored to reduce vulnerability to shocks that affect business partners located elsewhere around the globe , particularly for the production of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or national security .
The shortage of face masks , which had primarily been produced in China , during the early days of the pandemic forced governments not only to find new suppliers but also to suddenly encourage the conversion of some domestic firms into mask producers .
And new digital technologies that tend to reduce reliance on low-skilled workers will lower the incentives for companies to slice and dice their production around the world .
The Fourth Industrial Revolution could significantly compress the length of global value chains .
Finally , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quality might incentivize greener behavior in the future .
In April , when around 4 billion people were stuck at home , air pollution suddenly dropped across the world , suggesting to policymakers a clear direction for seriously reducing carbon dioxide emissions .
Voters might strongly push in this direction .
Clearly , the solution is not shutting down entire economies .
But governments might introduce tax incentives to induce companies to rely more on flexible arrangements for those jobs that can be efficiently performed remotely .
Moreover , the cycling routes that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce the use of public transportation may well remain permanently .
All these behavior changes would have a big impact on oil demand .
In the United States , around 80 percent of demand for crude oil is fuel-related—petroleum , diesel , or jet fuel .
It would be enough to see oil demand permanently dropping by 5 million barrels per day ( 5 percent below the pre-coronavirus global demand ) , due to changed transportation habits , to force a drastic supply adjustment .
Let ’ s not forget that Russia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in March over the unwillingness of OPEC+ to agree cuts of just around 2 million barrels a day , whose effect was the collapse not just of oil prices but of financial markets more generally .
Yet , unlike in the past , energy companies are taking the peak demand scenario very seriously .
According to the IEA , this uncertainty , coupled with the economic losses caused by the current recession , will lead to a 30 percent contraction in global energy-related investment in 2020 .
American producers , in particular , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they need the benchmark West Texas Intermediate price for oil close to $ 50 per barrel to cover the costs of activation of new fields .
Marketwise , the price implications will be sizable .
The average life of U.S. shale wells is around 18 months .
With drilling activity at new fields having been partly curtailed , prices might drift upward by 2022 , when production in North America is likely to have come down as a result of a lack of investment .
But over the long term , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In an extreme case involving a rapid drop in oil demand , like the one envisaged by the IEA ’ s sustainable development scenario , prices will likely come down , creating a hyper-competitive environment in which only the most cost-efficient producers survive—and American shale firms will not necessarily be among them .
In other words , absent major geopolitical tensions , over the next five years oil prices might follow an inverted U-shape trajectory : first up toward $ 60 per barrel and then down to $ 40 .
Countries will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a shrinking market , but politics in the region could also shift as many generous welfare programs are drastically revised down .
Clearly , vast changes in the energy economy are not something that will happen overnight .
But COVID-19 might speed up the process .
And , as in March , when oil prices went negative , producers may discover that their biggest asset is a liability .

After one of the most dramatic stretches in its history, the oil industry is slowly recovering. March and April saw the toxic combination of depressed demand, excessive supply, limited storage capacity, and intense financial speculation that turned prices on one index negative. Although concerns about a second wave of coronavirus infections remain high, demand is now back on the rise, and supply is in check.
After one of the most dramatic stretches in its history, the oil industry is slowly recovering. March and April saw the toxic combination of depressed demand, excessive supply, limited storage capacity, and intense financial speculation that turned prices on one index negative. Although concerns about a second wave of coronavirus infections remain high, demand is now back on the rise, and supply is in check.
But that doesn’t mean that the industry is out of the woods. For now, though, the greatest source of uncertainty for oil producers is structural in nature, not cyclical. In fact, there is an increasing sense that peak oil—the moment when oil production reaches its point of maximum before starting a structural decline—has finally arrived. Since the 1950s, there has been plenty of speculation about an imminent shortage of crude oil. Such speculation has proved consistently wrong, as all predictions tended to underestimate both the true amount of global oil reserves and the ability of technology to overcome physical constraints.
Now, the coronavirus pandemic, which appears to be accelerating trends—greener economies and decreased mobility—that until February seemed to be at least one decade away, might finally break the mold. This time, though, peak oil could come on the demand side of the market rather than on the supply one. Such change would mark a shift from perceived oil scarcity to oil abundance that could radically transform the structure of the oil market—even more than the shale revolution itself.
Over the last 60 years, oil demand has grown almost unabated, first in advanced economies and then in emerging economies. At the moment, global oil demand is almost five times as high as it was in 1960. In the past, particularly until the U.S. shale gas revolution, the challenge was always how to satisfy a growing demand in the face of an apparently rigid supply—especially when the energy-thirsty Chinese economy started to rise to prominence 20 years ago. However, even before the coronavirus outbreak, a number of structural factors were expected to weigh down oil consumption, from energy-efficiency gains in emerging economies and the mass commercialization of electric vehicles to sociopolitical pressure to reduce carbon emissions and the retrenchment of globalization.
Nevertheless, despite the widespread consensus that such trends existed, there has always been a high degree of uncertainty about the timing and shape of the oil-demand plateau. Small changes in the assumptions about the numerous factors that determine long-term oil demand—such as population growth, economic activity, mobility, or energy efficiency—can generate very different paths.
Last year, for example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released two possible scenarios for long-term oil demand. In its sustainable development scenario, which was predicated on a sharp tightening of climate policies, oil demand was expected to start declining substantially in the next decade and to drop by more than 30 percent by 2040, to around 70 million barrels per day. In the other scenario, which is based on current policies, oil demand keeps growing for the next 10 years, before stabilizing in the subsequent decade as a result of downward pressure on energy consumption due to electrification balanced out by higher energy consumption from the poorest regions of the world. To be sure, in this scenario, the world would still consume a significant amount of crude oil even after the plateau—around 100 million barrels per day, close to what it is currently consumed.
Given the variety of long-term demand scenarios, energy companies have typically brushed off peak-demand arguments. However, COVID-19 might change that if it permanently transforms individuals’ behavior and societal priorities.
Mobility is the No. 1 factor that could change the calculations. Although tourist activity is likely to rebound and return to pre-crisis levels in a couple of years, especially if a coronavirus vaccine is found, remote work arrangements might drastically reduce commuting mileage for millions of workers. According to some estimates, in the eurozone, over a quarter of jobs can, at least in theory, be performed from home. Similar estimates apply to the United States, too. In Europe, the average one-way work commute is just over 9 miles, whereas in the United States it is above 11 miles. Imagine the gasoline saved if millions of people stop commuting.
Moreover, COVID-19 might lead to a significant decline in business trips in favor of videoconferencing that would not only reduce operational costs but could also lead to productivity gains thanks to more time spent at the desk than in an airport. Some industrial activities might even be reshored to reduce vulnerability to shocks that affect business partners located elsewhere around the globe, particularly for the production of goods in sensitive sectors such as health or national security. The shortage of face masks, which had primarily been produced in China, during the early days of the pandemic forced governments not only to find new suppliers but also to suddenly encourage the conversion of some domestic firms into mask producers. And new digital technologies that tend to reduce reliance on low-skilled workers will lower the incentives for companies to slice and dice their production around the world. The Fourth Industrial Revolution could significantly compress the length of global value chains.
Finally, the positive impact of the lockdowns on air quality might incentivize greener behavior in the future. In April, when around 4 billion people were stuck at home, air pollution suddenly dropped across the world, suggesting to policymakers a clear direction for seriously reducing carbon dioxide emissions. Voters might strongly push in this direction. Clearly, the solution is not shutting down entire economies. But governments might introduce tax incentives to induce companies to rely more on flexible arrangements for those jobs that can be efficiently performed remotely. Moreover, the cycling routes that were built across the major cities to reduce the use of public transportation may well remain permanently.
All these behavior changes would have a big impact on oil demand. In the United States, around 80 percent of demand for crude oil is fuel-related—petroleum, diesel, or jet fuel. It would be enough to see oil demand permanently dropping by 5 million barrels per day (5 percent below the pre-coronavirus global demand), due to changed transportation habits, to force a drastic supply adjustment. Let’s not forget that Russia and Saudi Arabia fought a price war back in March over the unwillingness of OPEC+ to agree cuts of just around 2 million barrels a day, whose effect was the collapse not just of oil prices but of financial markets more generally.
Nobody knows whether peak demand is actually right around the corner. At least in the short term, the health crisis might actually boost oil consumption if people shy away from public transportation to avoid potential infections. A survey in China conducted by the market research firm Ipsos showed that the share of bus and metro rides had fallen by 57 percent but that made by private car had doubled.
Yet, unlike in the past, energy companies are taking the peak demand scenario very seriously. According to the IEA, this uncertainty, coupled with the economic losses caused by the current recession, will lead to a 30 percent contraction in global energy-related investment in 2020. American producers, in particular, are keen to downsize their investment plans as they need the benchmark West Texas Intermediate price for oil close to $50 per barrel to cover the costs of activation of new fields.
Marketwise, the price implications will be sizable. The average life of U.S. shale wells is around 18 months. With drilling activity at new fields having been partly curtailed, prices might drift upward by 2022, when production in North America is likely to have come down as a result of a lack of investment. But over the long term, the trends might go the opposite way. In an extreme case involving a rapid drop in oil demand, like the one envisaged by the IEA’s sustainable development scenario, prices will likely come down, creating a hyper-competitive environment in which only the most cost-efficient producers survive—and American shale firms will not necessarily be among them. In other words, absent major geopolitical tensions, over the next five years oil prices might follow an inverted U-shape trajectory: first up toward $60 per barrel and then down to $40. Countries will not only fiercely compete to gain shares of a shrinking market, but politics in the region could also shift as many generous welfare programs are drastically revised down.
Clearly, vast changes in the energy economy are not something that will happen overnight. But COVID-19 might speed up the process. And, as in March, when oil prices went negative, producers may discover that their biggest asset is a liability.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--Will America’s Alliances Survive the Trump Era?

On Sept. 19 , 1796 , George Washington ’ s Farewell Address appeared in the American Daily Advertiser , the first successful daily newspaper in the United States .
Much of the text concerned the new country ’ s domestic affairs , with the outgoing president warning Americans against the dangers of political parties and sectionalism .
But he did not refrain from airing his views on foreign policy , stating in no uncertain terms that the country should “ steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.
” “ The nation which indulges toward another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is in some degree a slave , ” Washington wrote .
“ It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection , either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.
” In his inaugural address , President Thomas Jefferson sounded a similar note , pledging “ peace , commerce , and honest friendship with all nations , entangling alliances with none.
” It should come as little surprise , then , that for its first 165 years , the United States had only one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , under which France provided badly needed military supplies to the new nation as it fought for its independence .
It was not until after World War II that the United States came to see alliances as critical to its national security : Between 1948 and 1955 , Washington formed security guarantees with nearly two dozen countries in Europe and Asia .
Today , the United States has defense pacts with more than 60 countries , accounting for one-quarter of the world ’ s population and nearly three-quarters of global GDP .
Despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the alliance system , President Donald Trump seems determined to upend it , as Mira Rapp-Hooper observes in her astute new book defending U.S. alliances , Shields of the Republic : The Triumph and Peril of America ’ s Alliances .
Like much else in Trump ’ s America , alliances are now partisan : The president and his supporters denounce them , while his critics struggle to defend them .
Rapp-Hooper aims to come to the aid of these embattled defenders—to explain , convincingly , “ why America has alliances , what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remain valuable.
” Throughout the 19th century , the United States had little need for alliances , thanks to its favorable geography and its lack of overseas colonies .
But in the aftermath of two world wars , technological breakthroughs such as long-range air power , missiles , and nuclear weapons left the United States newly exposed .
U.S. policymakers embraced a new approach .
“ Never again can we count on the luxury of time with which to arm ourselves , ” President Harry Truman told Congress in October 1945 .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1950 , the United States could no longer “ pull down the blinds and sit in the parlor with a loaded shotgun , waiting.
” The United States had an enduring interest in deterring a hostile adversary from dominating Europe and Asia .
Alliances offered U.S. policymakers a solution to these challenges .
They would allow Washington to confront threats—such as those posed by Moscow , Beijing , or Pyongyang—far from U.S. shores .
In exchange for security guarantees , the United States would gain access to bases ideal for deterrence and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first island chain , the string of islands that includes Japan , Taiwan , and the Philippines .
Alliances would increase U.S. leverage over weaker allies , restraining them from provoking their neighbors .
And extended deterrence—the ability of the United States to deter attacks on its allies as well as itself—would help prevent the outbreak of wars in the first place .
By 1953 , the National Security Council had concluded that alliances were “ essential , ” since the United States could not “ meet its defense needs , even at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies.
” The strategy paid off , Rapp-Hooper argues .
Throughout the Cold War , no U.S. treaty allies were ever attacked .
U.S. alliances helped rehabilitate Germany and Japan as consolidated democracies with dynamic economies while reassuring other European and Asian allies that their former adversaries would be restored as benign actors .
The alliance system also helped Washington keep its allies in check : For example , it restrained anti-communist allies in Asia from starting wars to shore up their domestic legitimacy .
As Victor Cha , a political scientist and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , writes , each of America ’ s East Asian alliances was a “ ‘ powerplay ’ … designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally ’ s actions.
” U.S. security guarantees also helped to convince South Korea , Taiwan , and West Germany to abandon nascent nuclear weapons programs .
But isolating the role of alliances in preserving peace is not easy .
If alliances work properly , their success should manifest in crises that never materialize and wars that never come to pass .
Without access to the counterfactual—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no alliances after World War II—it is difficult to prove that the country would be better off with alliances than without them .
Realizing this , Rapp-Hooper offers several thought experiments , imagining , for example , how the Berlin crisis of 1961 might have unfolded without NATO .
“ The United States would have had a far more difficult time defending its position in West Berlin , ” she writes , “ if not for its alliance commitments.
” That may not be enough to mollify the alliance system ’ s critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been emboldened by Trump , whose criticisms of the alliance system are different in both kind and degree from his predecessors .
From the beginning , he has questioned the value of NATO , cozied up to dictators , and berated long-standing U.S. allies such as Australia , Canada , and Germany .
He rejects the United States ’ postwar internationalist strategy of forward defense and deterrence through prepositioned forces .
And his hostility is not just rhetorical : In June , Trump blindsided the German government by approving a plan to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reduction of more than one-quarter .
Rapp-Hooper writes , correctly , that Trump ’ s tactics are unlikely to coerce U.S. allies to spend significantly more on defense .
And the costs of Trump ’ s antipathy could be significant : reduced U.S. control over the actions of its allies , undermined military effectiveness , and the erosion of deterrence .
She also dismisses the argument that alliances risk dragging the United States into costly wars it would otherwise avoid .
As she points out , the United States mitigated this risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rejecting requests for overly risky security pacts .
The United States has never extended formal security guarantees to Israel or Saudi Arabia , for example .
Few , if any , of the United States ’ ill-advised wars in recent years can be blamed on its allies .
But if U.S. alliances are to survive the current onslaught from the Trump administration , it is not enough merely to extoll their virtues .
The bipolar world that gave rise to the alliance system no longer exists .
U.S. alliances need to adapt to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global power .
For Rapp-Hooper , this means recognizing that warfare has moved beyond large military incursions and updating current defense pacts to include plans for responding to information warfare and cyberattacks .
Here , she offers two particularly smart suggestions .
One is for NATO to alert members at risk of election interference and to coordinate a response , learning from countries , such as France , that have warded off Russian meddling in the past .
The other is for the United States to take a more sophisticated approach to burden-sharing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s unique capabilities : Estonia , for example , could provide needed expertise on cyberlaw and cybersecurity .
It also requires recognizing the challenge that China ’ s rapid ascent poses to U.S. interests , which might entail securing buy-in from allies like Japan to install land- and ship-based missiles along the first island chain .
In Europe , Rapp-Hooper advises NATO “ to hold the line while Russia declines , ” ensuring that it is able to respond rapidly to a Russian military attack or disinformation campaign .
Notably , she says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s recent expansion to countries like Montenegro and North Macedonia , which are militarily weak , geographically vulnerable , and politically fragile .
But for Rapp-Hooper , the overarching purpose of alliances has not changed : They should help the United States prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia .
Many of these recommendations are sensible .
But Rapp-Hooper doesn ’ t have much to say about one significant threat to the alliance system .
Democracy has eroded , if not collapsed , in several NATO member countries , including Hungary , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States have taken a sharp nosedive in the last year .
Rapp-Hooper ’ s response to this trend is frustratingly vague : She calls for NATO to put in place regular monitoring procedures for member states at risk of democratic backsliding .
The European Union has struggled to implement similar monitoring , and Rapp-Hooper could have provided more detail on how such a system might work—and , more broadly , how the alliance system can remain cohesive in the absence of the shared democratic values that have helped bind it together .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ no doubt it would have something to say about the coronavirus pandemic .
The threat of COVID-19 has bolstered her argument , making plain both the importance of the alliance system and the imperative to adapt alliances to new ends .
The pandemic offers a chance for the United States to renew its emphasis on allied coordination : to make its alliances the focal point in addressing common threats , whether traditional military challenges or global health initiatives .
If the United States seeks continued security and prosperity , especially now , strengthening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start .

On Sept. 19, 1796, George Washington’s Farewell Address appeared in the American Daily Advertiser, the first successful daily newspaper in the United States. Much of the text concerned the new country’s domestic affairs, with the outgoing president warning Americans against the dangers of political parties and sectionalism. But he did not refrain from airing his views on foreign policy, stating in no uncertain terms that the country should “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”
On Sept. 19, 1796, George Washington’s Farewell Address appeared in the American Daily Advertiser, the first successful daily newspaper in the United States. Much of the text concerned the new country’s domestic affairs, with the outgoing president warning Americans against the dangers of political parties and sectionalism. But he did not refrain from airing his views on foreign policy, stating in no uncertain terms that the country should “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”
“The nation which indulges toward another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave,” Washington wrote. “It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.” In his inaugural address, President Thomas Jefferson sounded a similar note, pledging “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”
Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Harvard University Press, 272 pp., .95, June 2020
It should come as little surprise, then, that for its first 165 years, the United States had only one alliance: its 1778 pact with France, under which France provided badly needed military supplies to the new nation as it fought for its independence. It was not until after World War II that the United States came to see alliances as critical to its national security: Between 1948 and 1955, Washington formed security guarantees with nearly two dozen countries in Europe and Asia. Today, the United States has defense pacts with more than 60 countries, accounting for one-quarter of the world’s population and nearly three-quarters of global GDP.
Despite enduring support among the U.S. public for the alliance system, President Donald Trump seems determined to upend it, as Mira Rapp-Hooper observes in her astute new book defending U.S. alliances, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances. Like much else in Trump’s America, alliances are now partisan: The president and his supporters denounce them, while his critics struggle to defend them. Rapp-Hooper aims to come to the aid of these embattled defenders—to explain, convincingly, “why America has alliances, what they have accomplished, and why they remain valuable.”
Throughout the 19th century, the United States had little need for alliances, thanks to its favorable geography and its lack of overseas colonies. But in the aftermath of two world wars, technological breakthroughs such as long-range air power, missiles, and nuclear weapons left the United States newly exposed. U.S. policymakers embraced a new approach. “Never again can we count on the luxury of time with which to arm ourselves,” President Harry Truman told Congress in October 1945. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it in 1950, the United States could no longer “pull down the blinds and sit in the parlor with a loaded shotgun, waiting.” The United States had an enduring interest in deterring a hostile adversary from dominating Europe and Asia.
Alliances offered U.S. policymakers a solution to these challenges. They would allow Washington to confront threats—such as those posed by Moscow, Beijing, or Pyongyang—far from U.S. shores. In exchange for security guarantees, the United States would gain access to bases ideal for deterrence and forward defense in Europe and along the first island chain, the string of islands that includes Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Alliances would increase U.S. leverage over weaker allies, restraining them from provoking their neighbors. And extended deterrence—the ability of the United States to deter attacks on its allies as well as itself—would help prevent the outbreak of wars in the first place. By 1953, the National Security Council had concluded that alliances were “essential,” since the United States could not “meet its defense needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the support of allies.”
The strategy paid off, Rapp-Hooper argues. Throughout the Cold War, no U.S. treaty allies were ever attacked. U.S. alliances helped rehabilitate Germany and Japan as consolidated democracies with dynamic economies while reassuring other European and Asian allies that their former adversaries would be restored as benign actors. The alliance system also helped Washington keep its allies in check: For example, it restrained anti-communist allies in Asia from starting wars to shore up their domestic legitimacy. As Victor Cha, a political scientist and former National Security Council director for Asia, writes, each of America’s East Asian alliances was a “‘powerplay’ … designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions.” U.S. security guarantees also helped to convince South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany to abandon nascent nuclear weapons programs.
But isolating the role of alliances in preserving peace is not easy. If alliances work properly, their success should manifest in crises that never materialize and wars that never come to pass. Without access to the counterfactual—a world in which the United States pursued no alliances after World War II—it is difficult to prove that the country would be better off with alliances than without them. Realizing this, Rapp-Hooper offers several thought experiments, imagining, for example, how the Berlin crisis of 1961 might have unfolded without NATO. “The United States would have had a far more difficult time defending its position in West Berlin,” she writes, “if not for its alliance commitments.” That may not be enough to mollify the alliance system’s critics.
In recent years, those critics have been emboldened by Trump, whose criticisms of the alliance system are different in both kind and degree from his predecessors. From the beginning, he has questioned the value of NATO, cozied up to dictators, and berated long-standing U.S. allies such as Australia, Canada, and Germany. He rejects the United States’ postwar internationalist strategy of forward defense and deterrence through prepositioned forces. And his hostility is not just rhetorical: In June, Trump blindsided the German government by approving a plan to cut 9,500 troops stationed in Germany, a reduction of more than one-quarter.
Rapp-Hooper writes, correctly, that Trump’s tactics are unlikely to coerce U.S. allies to spend significantly more on defense. And the costs of Trump’s antipathy could be significant: reduced U.S. control over the actions of its allies, undermined military effectiveness, and the erosion of deterrence. She also dismisses the argument that alliances risk dragging the United States into costly wars it would otherwise avoid. As she points out, the United States mitigated this risk in the past by being selective and rejecting requests for overly risky security pacts. The United States has never extended formal security guarantees to Israel or Saudi Arabia, for example. Few, if any, of the United States’ ill-advised wars in recent years can be blamed on its allies.
But if U.S. alliances are to survive the current onslaught from the Trump administration, it is not enough merely to extoll their virtues. The bipolar world that gave rise to the alliance system no longer exists. U.S. alliances need to adapt to new military threats and new loci of global power.
For Rapp-Hooper, this means recognizing that warfare has moved beyond large military incursions and updating current defense pacts to include plans for responding to information warfare and cyberattacks. Here, she offers two particularly smart suggestions. One is for NATO to alert members at risk of election interference and to coordinate a response, learning from countries, such as France, that have warded off Russian meddling in the past. The other is for the United States to take a more sophisticated approach to burden-sharing, focusing more on each country’s unique capabilities: Estonia, for example, could provide needed expertise on cyberlaw and cybersecurity.
It also requires recognizing the challenge that China’s rapid ascent poses to U.S. interests, which might entail securing buy-in from allies like Japan to install land- and ship-based missiles along the first island chain. In Europe, Rapp-Hooper advises NATO “to hold the line while Russia declines,” ensuring that it is able to respond rapidly to a Russian military attack or disinformation campaign. Notably, she says relatively little about the wisdom of NATO’s recent expansion to countries like Montenegro and North Macedonia, which are militarily weak, geographically vulnerable, and politically fragile. But for Rapp-Hooper, the overarching purpose of alliances has not changed: They should help the United States prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia.
Many of these recommendations are sensible. But Rapp-Hooper doesn’t have much to say about one significant threat to the alliance system. Democracy has eroded, if not collapsed, in several NATO member countries, including Hungary, Poland, and Turkey—whose relations with the United States have taken a sharp nosedive in the last year. Rapp-Hooper’s response to this trend is frustratingly vague: She calls for NATO to put in place regular monitoring procedures for member states at risk of democratic backsliding. The European Union has struggled to implement similar monitoring, and Rapp-Hooper could have provided more detail on how such a system might work—and, more broadly, how the alliance system can remain cohesive in the absence of the shared democratic values that have helped bind it together.
Were Rapp-Hooper writing the book now, no doubt it would have something to say about the coronavirus pandemic. The threat of COVID-19 has bolstered her argument, making plain both the importance of the alliance system and the imperative to adapt alliances to new ends. The pandemic offers a chance for the United States to renew its emphasis on allied coordination: to make its alliances the focal point in addressing common threats, whether traditional military challenges or global health initiatives. If the United States seeks continued security and prosperity, especially now, strengthening its alliances is a good place to start.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--As the U.S. Exports Coronavirus, Trump Is Blaming Mexicans

As the U.S. Exports Coronavirus , Trump Is Blaming Mexicans Since the beginning of his administration ’ s abysmal response to COVID-19 , U.S. President Donald Trump has cast about for someone else to blame for the devastation the pandemic has wrought .
It was only a matter of time before he returned to his favorite scapegoat : Mexicans .
Indeed , reporting by the Associated Press confirms that the Trump administration is looking for ways to connect the surge in cases to Mexico .
Never mind that Trump himself has encouraged states to reopen and loosen public health orders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s not hard to see Trump ’ s plan for what it is : When the disease inevitably continues to spread in the United States , he will say Latinos are to blame .
It ’ s not just Trump .
Other Republicans have followed suit .
Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar asked officials in the Department of Homeland Security if a rise in cases might be connected to Cinco de Mayo celebrations .
In Florida , Gov .
Ron DeSantis has said that it is “ overwhelmingly Hispanic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Florida ’ s surge in cases .
It ’ s a misleading and disingenuous move by the Florida governor : First , deny COVID-19 protections to the farmworkers feeding the United States , then blame them when they get sick .
Scapegoating Latinos for COVID-19 isn ’ t just insulting and racist .
It ’ s part of a long history of blaming “ dirty ” Mexicans for spreading disease .
This trend of scapegoating Latinos for COVID-19 isn ’ t just insulting and racist .
It ’ s part of a long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for spreading disease .
In the 1910s , border guards in El Paso , Texas , forced Mexicans crossing the border to take “ baths ” in kerosene tubs , a practice which sparked a riot in 1917 .
The 1920s saw Mexican homes in Los Angeles burned down after an outbreak of bubonic plague was deemed “ Mexican disease.
” In the 1940s and 1950s , Mexican bracero farmworkers coming to the United States would be sprayed with DDT , a toxic pesticide that was later banned .
And in 2020 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end any semblance of asylum at the border , worsening an already urgent humanitarian crisis .
But Trump ’ s smear campaign against Latinos today is particularly insidious .
Latinos are disproportionately infected with COVID-19 in part because they are disproportionately among the essential workers keeping the United States running , with only 16 percent of Latino workers able to work remotely .
From the janitors disinfecting hospitals to the farmworkers picking crops , this is the finest hour of the Latino workers so often dismissed as “ unskilled ” labor .
Furthermore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is effectively exporting COVID-19 to its neighbors in Mexico and the rest of Latin America—via deportations .
Indeed , it is the Trump administration that has allowed Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention centers to become vectors of disease .
And it ’ s the Trump administration that has insisted on continuing to deport people to countries across the region that are ill-equipped to deal with a major outbreak .
It is Mexico that should complain about it ’ s neighbor spreading COVID-19 , not the United States .
Latinos are disproportionately infected with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among the essential workers keeping the United States running The Trump administration ’ s unhelpfulness to its neighbors in the midst of the pandemic is all the more offensive because Mexico is the United States ’ most crucial ally in the fight against COVID-19 .
The U.S. medical supply chain relies on Mexico for ventilators thermometers , and hospital beds—lifesaving products that Mexicans will not be able to use themselves .
Mexican workers have been exposed to and died from COVID-19 working to continue supplying the United States with everything from auto parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continued operating , putting Mexican workers at risk , at the explicit request of U.S. corporations and the Trump administration itself .
Meanwhile , despite his border shutdowns and immigration bans , Trump continues to allow farmworkers on H-2A visas to come from Mexico to work on U.S. farms , implicitly recognizing that without these Mexican workers , Americans wouldn ’ t eat .
The Trump administration knows it is acting in bad faith when it blames Mexico for an outbreak in the United States .
That bad faith makes it all the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ López Obrador agreed to come to Washington to meet with Trump for the first foreign trip of his presidency .
López Obrador stood in the Rose Garden and , amazingly , told Americans that Trump had treated Mexico with “ kindness and respect.
” The cringe-inducing clip is guaranteed to appear in a Trump campaign advertisement .
This is obviously what Trump wanted out of the visit all along , and the Mexican president is smart enough to know it .
López Obrador ’ s decision to praise a man who once called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the humiliating culmination of his complicity in Trump ’ s anti-immigrant policies .
The 2019 El Paso massacre , in which 8 Mexican citizens were killed alongside more than a dozen Americans , should have taught him the danger of providing any aid to the most anti-Mexican president in recent U.S. history .
Yet despite promising during his campaign to not do the United States ’ “ dirty work ” on migration , López Obrador has gone as far as ordering the Mexican National Guard to assist in Trump ’ s crackdown on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , he has crossed the line into U.S. domestic politics .
Yet despite López Obrador ’ s diplomatic own goal , Democrats will surely continue to seek a positive relationship with Mexico .
The real victims of the Mexican leader ’ s visit are ultimately not the Democrats .
They are the millions of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who live in the United States for whom a Trump reelection would be catastrophic .
It is these populations that have borne the brunt of the Trump administration ’ s disastrous response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric and policies .
The millions of Mexican Americans in the United States could someday prove a powerful tool for Mexican influence in the United States .
For now , however , López Obrador has abandoned the Mexican diaspora in the United States at a truly desperate hour .
In return , Trump appears set to insult Mexico again by deploying troops along the border in October , just as he did before the 2018 midterm campaign .
Another caravan panic is no doubt in store for the general election .
The Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is already clear : Double down on racial resentment and try to pin the coronavirus crisis on someone else .
With the outbreak in Mexico likely to continue worsening , thanks in large part to the Trump administration ’ s own actions , Trump ’ s scapegoating of Mexico and Latino immigrants for the United States ’ out-of-control pandemic has only just begun—and a campaign season full of bigotry is likely to follow .
Tragically , this will undermine the U.S.-Mexico cooperation that is necessary for both countries to defeat COVID-19 .

Since the beginning of his administration’s abysmal response to COVID-19, U.S. President Donald Trump has cast about for someone else to blame for the devastation the pandemic has wrought. It was only a matter of time before he returned to his favorite scapegoat: Mexicans.
Since the beginning of his administration’s abysmal response to COVID-19, U.S. President Donald Trump has cast about for someone else to blame for the devastation the pandemic has wrought. It was only a matter of time before he returned to his favorite scapegoat: Mexicans.
Indeed, reporting by the Associated Press confirms that the Trump administration is looking for ways to connect the surge in cases to Mexico. Never mind that Trump himself has encouraged states to reopen and loosen public health orders that prevent the spread of COVID-19. It’s not hard to see Trump’s plan for what it is: When the disease inevitably continues to spread in the United States, he will say Latinos are to blame.
It’s not just Trump. Other Republicans have followed suit. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar asked officials in the Department of Homeland Security if a rise in cases might be connected to Cinco de Mayo celebrations. In Florida, Gov. Ron DeSantis has said that it is “overwhelmingly Hispanic” farmworkers who are to blame for Florida’s surge in cases. It’s a misleading and disingenuous move by the Florida governor: First, deny COVID-19 protections to the farmworkers feeding the United States, then blame them when they get sick.
Scapegoating Latinos for COVID-19 isn’t just insulting and racist. It’s part of a long history of blaming “dirty” Mexicans for spreading disease.
This trend of scapegoating Latinos for COVID-19 isn’t just insulting and racist. It’s part of a long history of blaming “dirty” Mexicans for spreading disease. In the 1910s, border guards in El Paso, Texas, forced Mexicans crossing the border to take “baths” in kerosene tubs, a practice which sparked a riot in 1917. The 1920s saw Mexican homes in Los Angeles burned down after an outbreak of bubonic plague was deemed “Mexican disease.”
In the 1940s and 1950s, Mexican bracero farmworkers coming to the United States would be sprayed with DDT, a toxic pesticide that was later banned. And in 2020, COVID-19 has allowed Donald Trump to finally end any semblance of asylum at the border, worsening an already urgent humanitarian crisis.
But Trump’s smear campaign against Latinos today is particularly insidious. Latinos are disproportionately infected with COVID-19 in part because they are disproportionately among the essential workers keeping the United States running, with only 16 percent of Latino workers able to work remotely. From the janitors disinfecting hospitals to the farmworkers picking crops, this is the finest hour of the Latino workers so often dismissed as “unskilled” labor. Furthermore, it is the United States that is effectively exporting COVID-19 to its neighbors in Mexico and the rest of Latin America—via deportations.
Indeed, it is the Trump administration that has allowed Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention centers to become vectors of disease. And it’s the Trump administration that has insisted on continuing to deport people to countries across the region that are ill-equipped to deal with a major outbreak. It is Mexico that should complain about it’s neighbor spreading COVID-19, not the United States.
Latinos are disproportionately infected with COVID-19 in part because they are disproportionately among the essential workers keeping the United States running
The Trump administration’s unhelpfulness to its neighbors in the midst of the pandemic is all the more offensive because Mexico is the United States’ most crucial ally in the fight against COVID-19. The U.S. medical supply chain relies on Mexico for ventilators , thermometers, and hospital beds—lifesaving products that Mexicans will not be able to use themselves. Mexican workers have been exposed to and died from COVID-19 working to continue supplying the United States with everything from auto parts to medical gear.
These factories have continued operating, putting Mexican workers at risk, at the explicit request of U.S. corporations and the Trump administration itself. Meanwhile, despite his border shutdowns and immigration bans, Trump continues to allow farmworkers on H-2A visas to come from Mexico to work on U.S. farms, implicitly recognizing that without these Mexican workers, Americans wouldn’t eat.
The Trump administration knows it is acting in bad faith when it blames Mexico for an outbreak in the United States. That bad faith makes it all the more remarkable that Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador agreed to come to Washington to meet with Trump for the first foreign trip of his presidency. López Obrador stood in the Rose Garden and, amazingly, told Americans that Trump had treated Mexico with “kindness and respect.” The cringe-inducing clip is guaranteed to appear in a Trump campaign advertisement. This is obviously what Trump wanted out of the visit all along, and the Mexican president is smart enough to know it.
López Obrador’s decision to praise a man who once called Mexicans “rapists and killers” is the humiliating culmination of his complicity in Trump’s anti-immigrant policies. The 2019 El Paso massacre, in which 8 Mexican citizens were killed alongside more than a dozen Americans, should have taught him the danger of providing any aid to the most anti-Mexican president in recent U.S. history. Yet despite promising during his campaign to not do the United States’ “dirty work” on migration, López Obrador has gone as far as ordering the Mexican National Guard to assist in Trump’s crackdown on Central American migrants.
This time, however, he has crossed the line into U.S. domestic politics. Yet despite López Obrador’s diplomatic own goal, Democrats will surely continue to seek a positive relationship with Mexico.
The real victims of the Mexican leader’s visit are ultimately not the Democrats. They are the millions of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who live in the United States for whom a Trump reelection would be catastrophic. It is these populations that have borne the brunt of the Trump administration’s disastrous response to the pandemic, as well as his racist rhetoric and policies. The millions of Mexican Americans in the United States could someday prove a powerful tool for Mexican influence in the United States. For now, however, López Obrador has abandoned the Mexican diaspora in the United States at a truly desperate hour.
In return, Trump appears set to insult Mexico again by deploying troops along the border in October, just as he did before the 2018 midterm campaign. Another caravan panic is no doubt in store for the general election. The Trump campaign’s strategy for the fall is already clear: Double down on racial resentment and try to pin the coronavirus crisis on someone else.
With the outbreak in Mexico likely to continue worsening, thanks in large part to the Trump administration’s own actions, Trump’s scapegoating of Mexico and Latino immigrants for the United States’ out-of-control pandemic has only just begun—and a campaign season full of bigotry is likely to follow. Tragically, this will undermine the U.S.-Mexico cooperation that is necessary for both countries to defeat COVID-19.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--U.S. Hardens Stance on Beijing’s Activities in South China Sea

U.S. Hardens Stance on Beijing ’ s Activities in South China Sea Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo talks tough on the South China Sea , the United Kingdom is expected to announce its ban on Huawei from future 5G infrastructure projects , and a Taliban attack in Afghanistan kills 11 and wounds 63 .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The United States has declared Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea unlawful , marking a change in the U.S. approach to a region where it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We are making clear : Beijing ’ s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful , as is its campaign of bullying to control them , ” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement on Monday .
China has built up artificial islands in territorially disputed waters in recent years , prompting fears that the country would seek to dominate the area—home to one of the world ’ s busiest shipping lanes as well as a potential oil and gas bonanza @ @ @ @ @ @ @ away from describing Chinese activities in the region , preferring the U.S. Navy to do the talking .
The United States has regularly undertaken “ freedom of navigation ” operations by sending warships within the waters China claims as its own .
Chinese officials have called the U.S. operations “ provocative.
” Unlike some of the Trump administration ’ s foreign-policy decisions , the move is not unilateral : It brings the United States in line with the 2016 ruling of a United Nations tribunal in a case brought by the Philippines against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The timing—four years and one day following the ruling—suggests the decision was not made hastily .
A pretext for conflict ?
It ’ s not clear whether the new designation will change U.S. actions in the region , but one area for concern is a lack of mutual understanding between the United States and China on what actions are permissible in the South China Sea .
As FP ’ s Jack Detsch reports , some organizations have called for the United States to adopt a code of conduct to prevent or mitigate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hits back over sanctions .
Pompeo ’ s announcement comes as tensions between the two countries remain high .
On Monday , China announced sanctions on top Republican politicians , including Sens .
Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz in retaliation for U.S. sanctions imposed on Chinese officials linked to abuse of China ’ s Uighur population in its Xinjiang region last week .
China has yet to detail what kind of punishment has been imposed on the U.S. political leaders .
At least there ’ s trade ?
Despite problems elsewhere in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-China trade deal is still on , according to White House Economic Adviser Larry Kudlow .
“ We are still engaging on the phase one trade deal .
I think that ’ s an important point : we are still engaging there , ” Kudlow told Fox Business .
Less than a month ago , White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said the deal was “ over , ” prompting a swift denial from U.S. President Donald Trump .
Writing in Foreign Policy on May 22 , Jason Bordoff preempted Navarro ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the trade deal ’ s terms being met during the global economic downturn .
Fate of foreign students hangs on court decision .
A judge will hear arguments today in a lawsuit brought by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ( ICE ) .
Harvard and MIT are seeking to block a rule announced last week that would revoke visas held by foreign students studying at universities that are offering online-only tuition in the upcoming fall semester @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rule , colleges will have until Wednesday to inform ICE whether they plan to teach online only or offer some in-person classes this fall .
In Foreign Policy on July 10 , Amy Mackinnon and Augusta Saraiva reported on the impact the visa threat has already had on students and the historical basis for the United States hosting over one million foreign students today .
U.K. to wind down Huawei use .
The British government is set to bow to U.S. pressure and block Huawei from further involvement in the United Kingdom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s equipment currently in use expected to be phased out over a number of years .
Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden will make the formal announcement today following a meeting of the U.K. Security Council .
The move means all members of the “ Five Eyes ” intelligence sharing alliance—which also includes the United States , Canada , Australia and New Zealand—are now either blocking or moving to block the Chinese company from providing infrastructure for their 5G networks .
Taliban attacks in northern Afghanistan .
At least 11 people were killed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack on an intelligence compound in the northern Afghan town of Aybak on Monday .
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the assault , which involved both a suicide bombing and a machine gun attack .
The incident follows attacks on government checkpoints in Kunduz on Sunday which killed 14 Afghan security forces .
President Ashraf Ghani condemned the attack and said the Taliban were trying to exert pressure ahead of future negotiations .
Middle East downturn .
Oil producing countries in the Middle East are expected to see their economies contract by 7.3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in oil revenue this year , according to a forecast by the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .
Driving the steep decline is the estimate for Saudi Arabia : In April , the IMF projected the country ’ s economy would contract by 2.3 percent this year ; that figure has now been revised to 6.8 percent .
Saudi Arabia is not only facing declining revenues from low oil prices but will take a further hit now that the hajj pilgrimage is closed to overseas travelers .
Google makes India bet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are being kicked out of India , Google is being welcomed in .
In “ a reflection of our confidence in the future of India and its digital economy , ” Google CEO Sundar Pichai announced a $ 10 billion investment in the country , to be spread out over the next five to seven years .
The funds will go toward improving digital infrastructure including expanding language options and bringing more businesses online .
Richardson to Venezuela .
Former Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson is to travel to Venezuela to meet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens detained there , according to his foundation .
The Maduro government currently holds two former U.S. soldiers after a botched incursion attempt in May as well as six executives from the oil refiner Citgo , five of whom are U.S. citizens .
The U.S. State Department , while underlining the private nature of the trip , said it hoped for a “ positive outcome.
” Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has reported he “ can ’ t stand ” the routine of having to remain in place during his coronavirus-induced isolation in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” While strolling in the confines of the palace , the president fell upon more bad luck after he was reportedly bitten by an emu , one of many such birds who roam the grounds .
Bolsonaro may be free of isolation soon , as a coronavirus test scheduled for today could give him a clean bill of health .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo talks tough on the South China Sea , the United Kingdom is expected to announce its ban on Huawei from future 5G infrastructure projects, and a Taliban attack in Afghanistan kills 11 and wounds 63.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo talks tough on the South China Sea, the United Kingdom is expected to announce its ban on Huawei from future 5G infrastructure projects, and a Taliban attack in Afghanistan kills 11 and wounds 63.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Toughens Stance On Chinese Claims In South China Sea
The United States has declared Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea unlawful, marking a change in the U.S. approach to a region where it had previously avoided such a blunt assessment.
“We are making clear: Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement on Monday. China has built up artificial islands in territorially disputed waters in recent years, prompting fears that the country would seek to dominate the area—home to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes as well as a potential oil and gas bonanza.
The United States has previously stayed away from describing Chinese activities in the region, preferring the U.S. Navy to do the talking. The United States has regularly undertaken “freedom of navigation” operations by sending warships within the waters China claims as its own. Chinese officials have called the U.S. operations “provocative.”
Unlike some of the Trump administration’s foreign-policy decisions, the move is not unilateral: It brings the United States in line with the 2016 ruling of a United Nations tribunal in a case brought by the Philippines against China that ultimately found Chinese island-building unlawful. The timing—four years and one day following the ruling—suggests the decision was not made hastily.
A pretext for conflict? It’s not clear whether the new designation will change U.S. actions in the region, but one area for concern is a lack of mutual understanding between the United States and China on what actions are permissible in the South China Sea. As FP’s Jack Detsch reports, some organizations have called for the United States to adopt a code of conduct to prevent or mitigate confrontations between the two powers.
China hits back over sanctions. Pompeo’s announcement comes as tensions between the two countries remain high. On Monday, China announced sanctions on top Republican politicians, including Sens. Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz in retaliation for U.S. sanctions imposed on Chinese officials linked to abuse of China’s Uighur population in its Xinjiang region last week. China has yet to detail what kind of punishment has been imposed on the U.S. political leaders.
At least there’s trade? Despite problems elsewhere in the relationship, the “phase one” U.S.-China trade deal is still on, according to White House Economic Adviser Larry Kudlow. “We are still engaging on the phase one trade deal. I think that’s an important point: we are still engaging there,” Kudlow told Fox Business. Less than a month ago, White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said the deal was “over,” prompting a swift denial from U.S. President Donald Trump. Writing in Foreign Policy on May 22, Jason Bordoff preempted Navarro’s take, citing the implausibility of any of the trade deal’s terms being met during the global economic downturn.
What We’re Following Today
Fate of foreign students hangs on court decision. A judge will hear arguments today in a lawsuit brought by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Harvard and MIT are seeking to block a rule announced last week that would revoke visas held by foreign students studying at universities that are offering online-only tuition in the upcoming fall semester. If the judge fails to suspend the rule, colleges will have until Wednesday to inform ICE whether they plan to teach online only or offer some in-person classes this fall.
In Foreign Policy on July 10, Amy Mackinnon and Augusta Saraiva reported on the impact the visa threat has already had on students and the historical basis for the United States hosting over one million foreign students today.
U.K. to wind down Huawei use. The British government is set to bow to U.S. pressure and block Huawei from further involvement in the United Kingdom’s 5G network, with Huawei’s equipment currently in use expected to be phased out over a number of years. Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden will make the formal announcement today following a meeting of the U.K. Security Council. The move means all members of the “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing alliance—which also includes the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are now either blocking or moving to block the Chinese company from providing infrastructure for their 5G networks.
Taliban attacks in northern Afghanistan. At least 11 people were killed and a further 63 were wounded in an attack on an intelligence compound in the northern Afghan town of Aybak on Monday. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the assault, which involved both a suicide bombing and a machine gun attack. The incident follows attacks on government checkpoints in Kunduz on Sunday which killed 14 Afghan security forces. President Ashraf Ghani condemned the attack and said the Taliban were trying to exert pressure ahead of future negotiations.
Keep an Eye On
Middle East downturn. Oil producing countries in the Middle East are expected to see their economies contract by 7.3 percent and make $270 billion less in oil revenue this year, according to a forecast by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Driving the steep decline is the estimate for Saudi Arabia: In April, the IMF projected the country’s economy would contract by 2.3 percent this year; that figure has now been revised to 6.8 percent. Saudi Arabia is not only facing declining revenues from low oil prices but will take a further hit now that the hajj pilgrimage is closed to overseas travelers.
Google makes India bet. While Chinese tech companies TikTok and WeChat are being kicked out of India, Google is being welcomed in. In “a reflection of our confidence in the future of India and its digital economy,” Google CEO Sundar Pichai announced a $10 billion investment in the country, to be spread out over the next five to seven years. The funds will go toward improving digital infrastructure including expanding language options and bringing more businesses online.
Richardson to Venezuela. Former Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson is to travel to Venezuela to meet with President Nicolás Maduro to discuss U.S. citizens detained there, according to his foundation. The Maduro government currently holds two former U.S. soldiers after a botched incursion attempt in May as well as six executives from the oil refiner Citgo, five of whom are U.S. citizens. The U.S. State Department, while underlining the private nature of the trip, said it hoped for a “positive outcome.”
Odds and Ends
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has reported he “can’t stand” the routine of having to remain in place during his coronavirus-induced isolation in the presidential palace, calling it “horrible.” While strolling in the confines of the palace, the president fell upon more bad luck after he was reportedly bitten by an emu, one of many such birds who roam the grounds. Bolsonaro may be free of isolation soon, as a coronavirus test scheduled for today could give him a clean bill of health.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.