foreignpolicy--2020-02-28--What Washington Can Learn About Elections—From Abroad

What Washington Can Learn About Elections—From Abroad Competitive elections may be a hallmark of democracy , but in severely polarized political contexts they can exacerbate tensions that end up ripping apart democratic norms and institutions .
They can trigger unfounded accusations of fraud , fuel claims of an election that has been stolen , and drive losing candidates and their supporters to reject legitimate results—sometimes violently .
Those dangers are unfortunately evident in the United States as the country moves into what is likely to be the most divisive presidential election in decades .
Political attacks across the partisan divide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and fights over basic procedural issues , such as voter registration and the purging of voter rolls , are intensifying .
In a recent poll , nearly 40 percent of Americans said that if the candidate they supported lost , they would have little or no confidence in the integrity of the election process .
As part of its democracy promotion work over the past several decades , the United States has often helped polarized countries ’ electorates navigate fraught contests .
In contexts as diverse as Kenya , Malawi , North Macedonia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. election experts have crafted assistance efforts and diplomacy to de-escalate the drivers of division and bolster institutional safeguards to help keep democracy on the rails .
The question then is how those same experts would attempt to fix problems within American democracy .
Given the success the United States has had with supporting democracy around the world , why does it seem incapable of applying those lessons at home ?
When confronting highly polarized electoral processes , U.S. democracy promoters typically respond with five types of action : Strengthening key elements of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ helps election administrators in other countries to ensure that elections are conducted in an orderly and fair manner .
In contexts of severe polarization , such assistance focuses on building trust by establishing transparent voter registration processes and accurate voter rolls .
The process usually also includes guaranteeing airtight procedures for vote counting and reporting and clear processes of dispute resolution .
U.S. diplomatic engagement complements this technical assistance by quietly urging electoral administrators to execute their responsibilities faithfully and emphasizing the negative reputational and practical consequences that may result from a flawed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the world , when vote-counting processes are in doubt , the United States often helps domestic civic groups carry out a parallel vote count to provide an independent validation of the accuracy of results .
It also supports international observers , who can help bolster the incentives for the electoral management body and key political actors to carry off a successful election .
Ideally , international observer missions deploy as early as a year before the election to monitor critical inflection points of the process and then send a large observing team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the transmission of results .
Political party dialogues and dispute resolution .
The United States and other external democracy supporters often work with the contending political parties in a fraught electoral context to alleviate tensions and foster cooperation over basic electoral procedures .
Such efforts may include pushing the parties to agree on a code of ethics for the elections that establishes guidelines for fair campaigning and prohibits specific negative electoral behaviors such as hate speech and disrupting campaign events .
In cases where contesting parties refuse to accept election results , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actors together and mediate a resolution .
This can also include encouraging the losing candidate , when election results are verified , to step aside .
Civic education campaigns .
The United States frequently supports large-scale civic education campaigns carried out by the electoral management body or nonpartisan civic groups .
In polarized contexts , these campaigns go beyond just informing citizens about how to register or what to expect at their polling station to include messages of nonviolence and conflict avoidance , as well as information on the appropriate channels to register @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assistance in polarized contexts often includes training for journalists , editors , regulatory bodies , and media organizations on how to report on elections in a fair and unbiased manner and how to avoid discriminatory or inflammatory language .
It can also include support for media watchdog groups whose monitoring efforts can help reduce rumors , hate speech , and misinformation .
Each of these areas are clearly relevant in the United States , yet concerted and coordinated efforts to address them are strikingly limited .
Partisan fights over election administration issues , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , are a chronic problem .
Some domestic and international election observation takes place , but its limited scale inhibits observers ’ ability to make comprehensive assessments that could lessen public doubts about the integrity of the process .
Dialogues between the main political parties to reduce tensions and underline agreement on basic campaign behavior are infrequent and inadequate .
Civic education efforts sponsored by electoral administration bodies to address issues like intentional voter misinformation and the importance of nonviolence are weak , at best .
So , too , is any governmental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media organizations—and social media—are intensifying polarization .
The U.S. government has proved it knows how to tackle these issues through its extensive international record of help in other polarized electoral contexts .
Why , then , does it struggle so much at home with the same challenges ?
Part of the answer lies with the unique role that the United States and other democracy promoters can play overseas , as external actors within severely polarized contexts .
If an external actor is credible in its pro-democratic intentions , it can exercise an “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is badly needed in severely polarized situations .
U.S. democracy groups that work on foreign elections have built significant credibility over the years to function above the partisan fray in many challenging contexts .
This is true even though they are funded by the U.S. government and deployed as part of Washington ’ s democracy policy .
At home , however , U.S. government actors are unable to play an unbiased role in core democratic disputes .
The pull of polarization is simply too intense , a fact that was demonstrated by Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Supreme Court in some key cases , such as Bush v. Gore in 2000 .
The U.S. Federal Election Commission , mired in partisan politics , has lacked a decision-making quorum for months .
Another part of the answer lies with the deep skepticism in large parts of the U.S. body politic about the value of strong central state institutions .
The unusual decentralized nature of the U.S. election administration system ( with thousands of separate bodies responsible for administering a national election ) can work when cross-party trust and cooperation are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a highly polarized environment and decentralized election administration infrastructure—with a multitude of different procedures , equipment , and training protocols and limited oversight and accountability—one gets a breeding ground for uncertainty and mistrust .
By contrast , in most developing democracies where the United States provides electoral support , including very polarized ones , there is usually significant acceptance across the political spectrum of the need for strong central election administration , even if it is a struggle to achieve it in practice .
As a result , the United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it provides assistance to strengthen central electoral processes—a path that is largely blocked at home .
Similarly , a pattern of weak institutional centralism works against the main U.S. political parties in playing any depolarizing role .
The decentralization of political power within the Democratic and Republican parties that has taken place since the 1970s makes it difficult for them to take actions that might contribute to reducing the harsh division afflicting U.S. politics , such as choosing more centrist candidates , reining in the more extreme parts of their political bases , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributors at the edges of the political spectrum .
In contrast , when the United States works with political party systems in other countries to address polarization , the parties tend to be relatively top-down institutions .
Despite their many other organizational shortcomings , these parties are sometimes able to cooperate effectively in assistance programs aimed at political dialogue and conflict de-escalation that require top-down action .
Additionally , because the United States has a deep tradition of rejecting political influence or judgment from abroad , and particularly now in the context of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American elections , it is difficult to imagine the main U.S. political players accepting a non-U.S. actor or international body of standards and norms to help mediate differences between two competing sides.Civil society organizations could also learn from the coalition-building efforts successfully launched in other countries .
Of course , many nongovernmental civic groups in the United States—including national activist organizations , local community groups , and philanthropic foundations—are working valiantly all around the country to foster depolarizing reforms across these various issue areas .
This community of civic democracy reformers is swelling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratic crisis .
They are winning some battles here and there , such as the fight to try alternative voting methods in some places or reduce gerrymandering , though they are often overwhelmed by the negative tide of polarization .
Given that it is unlikely one will see government-led electoral reforms in the short term , there are nevertheless ways to harness this civic energy into meaningful efforts to improve the upcoming presidential election .
First , civil society organizations could deploy a targeted domestic election observation effort in highly competitive states .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ least 35 states have provisions that allow for nonpartisan election observers , including the closely contested states of Michigan and Wisconsin .
A large observation effort could translate into greater public engagement across the electoral cycle to include scrutiny of voter registration , polling officer selection and training , media and campaign finance monitoring , tabulation and results transmission procedures , and dispute resolution .
Boosting public confidence in the quality of the electoral process overall could help assuage voters who may be disappointed by the ultimate outcome .
Civil society organizations could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launched in other countries , which can create bottom-up pressure on parties , candidates , and electoral bodies .
In particular , a strong campaign from civil society across the political spectrum calling for party and candidate commitments against negative campaign behavior—hate speech or other negative rhetoric directed at political opponents—could help reassert rhetorical norms that were eroded in 2016 .
Ironically , the folks who know how to execute these approaches—U.S .
specialists experienced in navigating the challenges of severely polarized elections—are walled off in a part of the government that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not within the United States itself .
And so , U.S. citizens may need to take the reins in applying some of these global lessons to domestic elections .
The United States is a capable and consequential actor in helping to reduce the risks of polarized elections elsewhere .
Now is the time to leverage that expertise at home .

Competitive elections may be a hallmark of democracy, but in severely polarized political contexts they can exacerbate tensions that end up ripping apart democratic norms and institutions. They can trigger unfounded accusations of fraud, fuel claims of an election that has been stolen, and drive losing candidates and their supporters to reject legitimate results—sometimes violently. Those dangers are unfortunately evident in the United States as the country moves into what is likely to be the most divisive presidential election in decades. Political attacks across the partisan divide are conducted with an extraordinary rancor, and fights over basic procedural issues, such as voter registration and the purging of voter rolls, are intensifying. In a recent poll , nearly 40 percent of Americans said that if the candidate they supported lost, they would have little or no confidence in the integrity of the election process.
Competitive elections may be a hallmark of democracy, but in severely polarized political contexts they can exacerbate tensions that end up ripping apart democratic norms and institutions. They can trigger unfounded accusations of fraud, fuel claims of an election that has been stolen, and drive losing candidates and their supporters to reject legitimate results—sometimes violently. Those dangers are unfortunately evident in the United States as the country moves into what is likely to be the most divisive presidential election in decades. Political attacks across the partisan divide are conducted with an extraordinary rancor, and fights over basic procedural issues, such as voter registration and the purging of voter rolls, are intensifying. In a recent poll, nearly 40 percent of Americans said that if the candidate they supported lost, they would have little or no confidence in the integrity of the election process.
As part of its democracy promotion work over the past several decades, the United States has often helped polarized countries’ electorates navigate fraught contests. In contexts as diverse as Kenya, Malawi, North Macedonia, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, U.S. election experts have crafted assistance efforts and diplomacy to de-escalate the drivers of division and bolster institutional safeguards to help keep democracy on the rails. The question then is how those same experts would attempt to fix problems within American democracy. Given the success the United States has had with supporting democracy around the world, why does it seem incapable of applying those lessons at home?
When confronting highly polarized electoral processes, U.S. democracy promoters typically respond with five types of action:
Strengthening key elements of election administration. The United States frequently helps election administrators in other countries to ensure that elections are conducted in an orderly and fair manner. In contexts of severe polarization, such assistance focuses on building trust by establishing transparent voter registration processes and accurate voter rolls. The process usually also includes guaranteeing airtight procedures for vote counting and reporting and clear processes of dispute resolution. U.S. diplomatic engagement complements this technical assistance by quietly urging electoral administrators to execute their responsibilities faithfully and emphasizing the negative reputational and practical consequences that may result from a flawed election.
Supporting observers. In countries around the world, when vote-counting processes are in doubt, the United States often helps domestic civic groups carry out a parallel vote count to provide an independent validation of the accuracy of results. It also supports international observers, who can help bolster the incentives for the electoral management body and key political actors to carry off a successful election. Ideally, international observer missions deploy as early as a year before the election to monitor critical inflection points of the process and then send a large observing team for the voting, counting, and the transmission of results.
Political party dialogues and dispute resolution. The United States and other external democracy supporters often work with the contending political parties in a fraught electoral context to alleviate tensions and foster cooperation over basic electoral procedures. Such efforts may include pushing the parties to agree on a code of ethics for the elections that establishes guidelines for fair campaigning and prohibits specific negative electoral behaviors such as hate speech and disrupting campaign events. In cases where contesting parties refuse to accept election results, the United States often steps in to bring actors together and mediate a resolution. This can also include encouraging the losing candidate, when election results are verified, to step aside.
Civic education campaigns. The United States frequently supports large-scale civic education campaigns carried out by the electoral management body or nonpartisan civic groups. In polarized contexts, these campaigns go beyond just informing citizens about how to register or what to expect at their polling station to include messages of nonviolence and conflict avoidance, as well as information on the appropriate channels to register electoral disputes.
Media training. Electoral assistance in polarized contexts often includes training for journalists, editors, regulatory bodies, and media organizations on how to report on elections in a fair and unbiased manner and how to avoid discriminatory or inflammatory language. It can also include support for media watchdog groups whose monitoring efforts can help reduce rumors, hate speech, and misinformation.
Each of these areas are clearly relevant in the United States, yet concerted and coordinated efforts to address them are strikingly limited. Partisan fights over election administration issues, such as voter registration and voter access, are a chronic problem. Some domestic and international election observation takes place, but its limited scale inhibits observers’ ability to make comprehensive assessments that could lessen public doubts about the integrity of the process. Dialogues between the main political parties to reduce tensions and underline agreement on basic campaign behavior are infrequent and inadequate. Civic education efforts sponsored by electoral administration bodies to address issues like intentional voter misinformation and the importance of nonviolence are weak, at best. So, too, is any governmental role in addressing the way various U.S. media organizations—and social media—are intensifying polarization.
The U.S. government has proved it knows how to tackle these issues through its extensive international record of help in other polarized electoral contexts. Why, then, does it struggle so much at home with the same challenges?
Part of the answer lies with the unique role that the United States and other democracy promoters can play overseas, as external actors within severely polarized contexts. If an external actor is credible in its pro-democratic intentions, it can exercise an “above the chessboard” arbiter function that is badly needed in severely polarized situations. U.S. democracy groups that work on foreign elections have built significant credibility over the years to function above the partisan fray in many challenging contexts. This is true even though they are funded by the U.S. government and deployed as part of Washington’s democracy policy.
At home, however, U.S. government actors are unable to play an unbiased role in core democratic disputes. The pull of polarization is simply too intense, a fact that was demonstrated by Congress in the recent impeachment process and by the Supreme Court in some key cases, such as Bush v. Gore in 2000. The U.S. Federal Election Commission, mired in partisan politics, has lacked a decision-making quorum for months.
Another part of the answer lies with the deep skepticism in large parts of the U.S. body politic about the value of strong central state institutions. The unusual decentralized nature of the U.S. election administration system (with thousands of separate bodies responsible for administering a national election) can work when cross-party trust and cooperation are robust. But when elections take place in a highly polarized environment and decentralized election administration infrastructure—with a multitude of different procedures, equipment, and training protocols and limited oversight and accountability—one gets a breeding ground for uncertainty and mistrust.
By contrast, in most developing democracies where the United States provides electoral support, including very polarized ones, there is usually significant acceptance across the political spectrum of the need for strong central election administration, even if it is a struggle to achieve it in practice. As a result, the United States is usually pushing on an open door when it provides assistance to strengthen central electoral processes—a path that is largely blocked at home.
Similarly, a pattern of weak institutional centralism works against the main U.S. political parties in playing any depolarizing role. The decentralization of political power within the Democratic and Republican parties that has taken place since the 1970s makes it difficult for them to take actions that might contribute to reducing the harsh division afflicting U.S. politics, such as choosing more centrist candidates, reining in the more extreme parts of their political bases, or avoiding the polarizing agendas of big contributors at the edges of the political spectrum. In contrast, when the United States works with political party systems in other countries to address polarization, the parties tend to be relatively top-down institutions. Despite their many other organizational shortcomings, these parties are sometimes able to cooperate effectively in assistance programs aimed at political dialogue and conflict de-escalation that require top-down action.
Additionally, because the United States has a deep tradition of rejecting political influence or judgment from abroad, and particularly now in the context of the increase in nefarious foreign influence on American elections, it is difficult to imagine the main U.S. political players accepting a non-U.S. actor or international body of standards and norms to help mediate differences between two competing sides.Civil society organizations could also learn from the coalition-building efforts successfully launched in other countries.
Of course, many nongovernmental civic groups in the United States—including national activist organizations, local community groups, and philanthropic foundations—are working valiantly all around the country to foster depolarizing reforms across these various issue areas. This community of civic democracy reformers is swelling in response to the growing sense of democratic crisis. They are winning some battles here and there, such as the fight to try alternative voting methods in some places or reduce gerrymandering, though they are often overwhelmed by the negative tide of polarization.
Given that it is unlikely one will see government-led electoral reforms in the short term, there are nevertheless ways to harness this civic energy into meaningful efforts to improve the upcoming presidential election. First, civil society organizations could deploy a targeted domestic election observation effort in highly competitive states. According to the Carter Center, at least 35 states have provisions that allow for nonpartisan election observers, including the closely contested states of Michigan and Wisconsin. A large observation effort could translate into greater public engagement across the electoral cycle to include scrutiny of voter registration, polling officer selection and training, media and campaign finance monitoring, tabulation and results transmission procedures, and dispute resolution. Boosting public confidence in the quality of the electoral process overall could help assuage voters who may be disappointed by the ultimate outcome.
Civil society organizations could also learn from the coalition-building efforts successfully launched in other countries, which can create bottom-up pressure on parties, candidates, and electoral bodies. In particular, a strong campaign from civil society across the political spectrum calling for party and candidate commitments against negative campaign behavior—hate speech or other negative rhetoric directed at political opponents—could help reassert rhetorical norms that were eroded in 2016.
Ironically, the folks who know how to execute these approaches—U.S. specialists experienced in navigating the challenges of severely polarized elections—are walled off in a part of the government that is only allowed to engage with other countries and not within the United States itself. And so, U.S. citizens may need to take the reins in applying some of these global lessons to domestic elections. The United States is a capable and consequential actor in helping to reduce the risks of polarized elections elsewhere. Now is the time to leverage that expertise at home.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-28--Marian Kotleba Wants to Make Slovakia Fascist Again

Marian Kotleba Wants to Make Slovakia Fascist Again BRATISLAVA , Slovakia—It ’ s hard to imagine a political party with a more unabashed neo-Nazi past than Marian Kotleba ’ s People ’ s Party-Our Slovakia ( LSNS ) .
The party ’ s current spokesperson once headed up a neo-Nazi band ; there ’ s audio online of him shouting “ Sieg Heil ” from the stage in the 1990s .
The party has prominent members who have been convicted of hate crimes for shouting Nazi-era slogans , and has a party vice chair who beat up a black man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As for the party ’ s leader , Kotleba once called life under Slovakia ’ s Nazi puppet state “ like being in heaven.
” He also used to parade around in public wearing a uniform modeled on the puppet state ’ s militia and once called Jews “ devils in human skin.
” It ’ s a résumé that might be expected to sink the party ’ s chances .
But Kotleba and his crew of barely concealed extremists are riding high ahead of Slovakia ’ s parliamentary elections on Saturday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ third place , Kotleba and his far-right fanboys could well be kingmakers after Saturday ’ s elections , with observers worried Kotleba and friends could become part of a coalition government with the current ruling party—and bring down Slovakia ’ s democracy in the process .
Kotleba ’ s LSNS has been operating from the increasingly accurate assumption that a broad swath of voters in this country of 5.4 million have grown sick of their sclerotic political class .
By softening its rhetoric , the party is targeting Slovakia ’ s alienated voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the unsolved 2018 murder of a crusading journalist who had exposed high-level government corruption and criminality .
It ’ s a far cry from the beginnings of Kotleba ’ s public life .
He first made a name for himself almost 20 years ago in his hometown of Banska Bystrica in central Slovakia .
It was there where the schoolteacher grabbed attention for his open praise of the Slovak State and its Nazi-collaborating leader , Jozef Tiso , and his penchant for parading about with friends in uniforms inspired by the Hlinka @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s militia .
Kotleba ’ s first attempt at a political party , Slovak Brotherhood , was banned by the country ’ s highest court in 2006 for violating democratic principles and the constitution ; to date , it ’ s the only party to have been banned in Slovakia .
In response , Kotleba and friends took over an almost-defunct fringe party called the Party of the Friends of Wine and reshaped it into LSNS .
The officially registered name of the current party— “ Kotlebists-People ’ s Party Our Slovakia ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They ditched the ominous black uniforms for green polo shirts , and Kotleba ran to become governor of the Banska Bystrica region in 2013—and won .
Buoyed by this success , LSNS defied expectations and won 8 percent of the vote in 2016 ’ s parliamentary elections , good enough for fifth place .
While Kotleba was trounced from his governorship in 2017 , he wasn ’ t down for long .
In May 2019 his party garnered 12 percent of the vote in Slovakia ’ s European Parliament elections , winning two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Direction-Social Democracy ( Smer ) , the party that has governed Slovakia for 12 of the past 14 years , is still predicted to come first in this weekend ’ s election , though with a significantly reduced vote share .
The party has lurched from scandal to scandal , including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kusnirova in February 2018 , which shocked the nation and forced Prime Minister Robert Fico to resign after massive protests .
Kuciak ’ s investigations into widespread criminality and corruption implicated senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most parties have rejected the idea of forming a coalition with Kotleba , analysts have speculated that Smer may well form a formal or informal coalition with LSNS after the elections .
The party has coordinated with and relied on votes from LSNS in the last parliament , and Fico has defended the party and its members in the past .
With polls suggesting that as many as nine parties may make it into the country ’ s fractured National Council on Saturday , the parliamentary math remains unpredictable .
But the prospect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s next government is suddenly very real .
LSNS ’ s rhetoric and messaging has become less overtly extreme over time , but they still express open contempt for Muslims , Roma , George Soros , and the European Union , to name a few of their primary targets .
Despite the party ’ s continuing claims it ’ s not a neo-Nazi party ( they ’ ve even sued a Slovak media outlet who called them neo-Nazis ) , the party ’ s hardcore roots are still evident in its personnel .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ party spokesperson Ondrej Durica , who once headed up a neo-Nazi band called Biely Odpor ( White Resistance ) .
High up on their list of candidates for this year ’ s election is Andrej Medvecky , who was convicted for assaulting a black man while shouting racial slurs at him .
Another candidate , Anton Grno , was fined 5,000 euros last month for giving a fascist salute , while former member of parliament Milan Mazurek lost his seat last year after being convicted of making racist statements ; he was also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family in Bratislava .
LSNS ’ s messaging continues to make nods to its hardcore roots .
The party still celebrates the anniversary of the founding of the Nazi-allied Slovak State every March .
To celebrate the occasion in 2017 , Kotleba gave checks for exactly 1,488 euros to families at a party event , referencing a neo-Nazi numerical hate symbol .
A few months later he donated the same amount to a youth hockey team .
Despite all this , LSNS continues to poll well in advance of Saturday ’ s elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as high as second place with 12 percent of the vote , with some worrying that LSNS could even win the elections .
More recent polls suggest though that a first-place finish is extremely unlikely .
Still , the party is set to gain around 10 percent of the vote and finish in third place on Saturday , a significant result in a European country for a party with not just an openly neo-Nazi past but a thinly disguised neo-Nazi present .
On the streets of Bratislava , Kotleba and company are far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4 percent of the vote in the capital in 2016 , and stickers condemning Kotleba and LSNS in fairly obscene language aren ’ t hard to find .
But this isn ’ t where Kotleba and his party focus their attention .
It ’ s in Slovakia ’ s smaller towns , hours away from the capital , where LSNS has long tried to plant deep roots .
Martina Strmenova has long seen the simplistic , carefully packaged message of Kotleba garner support in the small towns in the Banska Bystrica region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ where he has struck a chord with a significant minority of voters with his railing against the country ’ s “ elites ” and scapegoating Slovakia ’ s Roma population .
In 2014 , Strmenova and others formed the Not in Our Town civic initiative in response not only to Kotleba ’ s victory the previous year in regional elections , but to what they saw as a slow slide in the region toward far-right radicalization and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas .
Strmenova and her colleagues are working overtime in Kotleba ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his progress .
Not in Our Town has chosen 60 villages and towns in the Banska Bystrica region , Strmenova told Foreign Policy , where Kotleba garnered more than 20 per cent of the vote in 2019 ’ s presidential elections ( he garnered 10 percent nationwide and fourth place in a race won by anti-corruption lawyer and progressive candidate Zuzana Caputova ) .
They travel around the region , focusing on speaking directly to voters and “ explaining to them why far right parties are not a good option , ” she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had some success , being part of efforts to build an ultimately successful unified front against Kotleba in the 2017 regional elections .
Stopping Kotleba and LSNS this time won ’ t be easy—and Strmenova is especially worried about what might happen after the elections .
LSNS , she says , has already been successful in mainstreaming a far-right narrative in the country , and their results on Saturday won ’ t change that .
“ People are getting used to it and consider it ‘ normal ’ or OK , ” she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Slovakia ’ s young people who are most likely to give Kotleba a chance .
One recent survey suggested that almost 20 percent of Slovaks under the age of 33 would vote for Kotleba ’ s party .
This is consistent with results from a survey in the fall of 2019 that suggested 19 percent of Slovaks under the age of 30 would vote for Kotleba ’ s party—more than any other party .
The country ’ s mainstream parties , especially Smer , may have the power to decide whether LSNS will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they decide to cooperate or form a coalition with LSNS , Strmenova fears it may be something the country won ’ t be able to walk back from .
“ LSNS has had many ups and downs , ” Strmenova said .
“ But it takes only one strong victory for them , and democracy won ’ t be able to fight it anymore .
”

BRATISLAVA, Slovakia—It’s hard to imagine a political party with a more unabashed neo-Nazi past than Marian Kotleba’s People’s Party-Our Slovakia (LSNS). The party’s current spokesperson once headed up a neo-Nazi band; there’s audio online of him shouting “Sieg Heil” from the stage in the 1990s. The party has prominent members who have been convicted of hate crimes for shouting Nazi-era slogans, and has a party vice chair who beat up a black man while shouting racial slurs at him.
BRATISLAVA, Slovakia—It’s hard to imagine a political party with a more unabashed neo-Nazi past than Marian Kotleba’s People’s Party-Our Slovakia (LSNS). The party’s current spokesperson once headed up a neo-Nazi band; there’s audio online of him shouting “Sieg Heil” from the stage in the 1990s. The party has prominent members who have been convicted of hate crimes for shouting Nazi-era slogans, and has a party vice chair who beat up a black man while shouting racial slurs at him.
As for the party’s leader, Kotleba once called life under Slovakia’s Nazi puppet state “like being in heaven.” He also used to parade around in public wearing a uniform modeled on the puppet state’s militia and once called Jews “devils in human skin.”
It’s a résumé that might be expected to sink the party’s chances. But Kotleba and his crew of barely concealed extremists are riding high ahead of Slovakia’s parliamentary elections on Saturday. Polling at around 10 percent and in third place, Kotleba and his far-right fanboys could well be kingmakers after Saturday’s elections, with observers worried Kotleba and friends could become part of a coalition government with the current ruling party—and bring down Slovakia’s democracy in the process.
Kotleba’s LSNS has been operating from the increasingly accurate assumption that a broad swath of voters in this country of 5.4 million have grown sick of their sclerotic political class. By softening its rhetoric, the party is targeting Slovakia’s alienated voters, especially the young people most concerned by the unsolved 2018 murder of a crusading journalist who had exposed high-level government corruption and criminality.
It’s a far cry from the beginnings of Kotleba’s public life. He first made a name for himself almost 20 years ago in his hometown of Banska Bystrica in central Slovakia. It was there where the schoolteacher grabbed attention for his open praise of the Slovak State and its Nazi-collaborating leader, Jozef Tiso, and his penchant for parading about with friends in uniforms inspired by the Hlinka Guard, the Nazi puppet state’s militia.
Kotleba’s first attempt at a political party, Slovak Brotherhood, was banned by the country’s highest court in 2006 for violating democratic principles and the constitution; to date, it’s the only party to have been banned in Slovakia. In response, Kotleba and friends took over an almost-defunct fringe party called the Party of the Friends of Wine and reshaped it into LSNS. The officially registered name of the current party—“Kotlebists-People’s Party Our Slovakia”—makes clear who runs the show.
They ditched the ominous black uniforms for green polo shirts, and Kotleba ran to become governor of the Banska Bystrica region in 2013—and won. Buoyed by this success, LSNS defied expectations and won 8 percent of the vote in 2016’s parliamentary elections, good enough for fifth place.
While Kotleba was trounced from his governorship in 2017, he wasn’t down for long. In May 2019 his party garnered 12 percent of the vote in Slovakia’s European Parliament elections, winning two of Slovakia’s 14 seats.
Direction-Social Democracy (Smer), the party that has governed Slovakia for 12 of the past 14 years, is still predicted to come first in this weekend’s election, though with a significantly reduced vote share. The party has lurched from scandal to scandal, including the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kusnirova in February 2018, which shocked the nation and forced Prime Minister Robert Fico to resign after massive protests. Kuciak’s investigations into widespread criminality and corruption implicated senior figures close to the government.
While most parties have rejected the idea of forming a coalition with Kotleba, analysts have speculated that Smer may well form a formal or informal coalition with LSNS after the elections. The party has coordinated with and relied on votes from LSNS in the last parliament, and Fico has defended the party and its members in the past. With polls suggesting that as many as nine parties may make it into the country’s fractured National Council on Saturday, the parliamentary math remains unpredictable.
But the prospect of an extremist party joining Slovakia’s next government is suddenly very real. LSNS’s rhetoric and messaging has become less overtly extreme over time, but they still express open contempt for Muslims, Roma, George Soros, and the European Union, to name a few of their primary targets. Despite the party’s continuing claims it’s not a neo-Nazi party (they’ve even sued a Slovak media outlet who called them neo-Nazis), the party’s hardcore roots are still evident in its personnel.
Aside from Kotleba himself there’s party spokesperson Ondrej Durica, who once headed up a neo-Nazi band called Biely Odpor (White Resistance). High up on their list of candidates for this year’s election is Andrej Medvecky, who was convicted for assaulting a black man while shouting racial slurs at him. Another candidate, Anton Grno, was fined 5,000 euros last month for giving a fascist salute, while former member of parliament Milan Mazurek lost his seat last year after being convicted of making racist statements; he was also involved in an assault on an Arab family in Bratislava.
LSNS’s messaging continues to make nods to its hardcore roots. The party still celebrates the anniversary of the founding of the Nazi-allied Slovak State every March. To celebrate the occasion in 2017, Kotleba gave checks for exactly 1,488 euros to families at a party event, referencing a neo-Nazi numerical hate symbol. A few months later he donated the same amount to a youth hockey team.
Despite all this, LSNS continues to poll well in advance of Saturday’s elections. Polls several weeks ago had LSNS as high as second place with 12 percent of the vote, with some worrying that LSNS could even win the elections. More recent polls suggest though that a first-place finish is extremely unlikely. Still, the party is set to gain around 10 percent of the vote and finish in third place on Saturday, a significant result in a European country for a party with not just an openly neo-Nazi past but a thinly disguised neo-Nazi present.
On the streets of Bratislava, Kotleba and company are far from popular. The party gained only 4 percent of the vote in the capital in 2016, and stickers condemning Kotleba and LSNS in fairly obscene language aren’t hard to find. But this isn’t where Kotleba and his party focus their attention. It’s in Slovakia’s smaller towns, hours away from the capital, where LSNS has long tried to plant deep roots.
Martina Strmenova has long seen the simplistic, carefully packaged message of Kotleba garner support in the small towns in the Banska Bystrica region. It’s in towns like these where he has struck a chord with a significant minority of voters with his railing against the country’s “elites” and scapegoating Slovakia’s Roma population. In 2014, Strmenova and others formed the Not in Our Town civic initiative in response not only to Kotleba’s victory the previous year in regional elections, but to what they saw as a slow slide in the region toward far-right radicalization and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas.
Strmenova and her colleagues are working overtime in Kotleba’s home region to try and stymie his progress. Not in Our Town has chosen 60 villages and towns in the Banska Bystrica region, Strmenova told Foreign Policy, where Kotleba garnered more than 20 per cent of the vote in 2019’s presidential elections (he garnered 10 percent nationwide and fourth place in a race won by anti-corruption lawyer and progressive candidate Zuzana Caputova). They travel around the region, focusing on speaking directly to voters and “explaining to them why far right parties are not a good option,” she said. The initiative has arguably already had some success, being part of efforts to build an ultimately successful unified front against Kotleba in the 2017 regional elections.
Stopping Kotleba and LSNS this time won’t be easy—and Strmenova is especially worried about what might happen after the elections. LSNS, she says, has already been successful in mainstreaming a far-right narrative in the country, and their results on Saturday won’t change that. “People are getting used to it and consider it ‘normal’ or OK,” she said. Worse, it’s Slovakia’s young people who are most likely to give Kotleba a chance. One recent survey suggested that almost 20 percent of Slovaks under the age of 33 would vote for Kotleba’s party. This is consistent with results from a survey in the fall of 2019 that suggested 19 percent of Slovaks under the age of 30 would vote for Kotleba’s party—more than any other party.
The country’s mainstream parties, especially Smer, may have the power to decide whether LSNS will become even more “normal.” If they decide to cooperate or form a coalition with LSNS, Strmenova fears it may be something the country won’t be able to walk back from. “LSNS has had many ups and downs,” Strmenova said. “But it takes only one strong victory for them, and democracy won’t be able to fight it anymore.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-28--Airstrike Against Turkish Troops Could Reshape the Syrian War

Airstrike Against Turkish Troops Could Reshape the Syrian War Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Dozens of Turkish soldiers are killed by an airstrike in northwest Syria , the World Health Organization warns all countries to brace for a coronavirus outbreak—without calling it a pandemic , and Canada ’ s government is meeting with indigenous leaders over a railway blockade .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
At least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike on Thursday in Syria ’ s Idlib province—the highest death toll in a single day for Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in northwestern Syria to slow a Russia-backed Syrian offensive against the country ’ s last rebel holdout .
Turkey responded by killing 16 Syrian soldiers on the battlefield in Idlib on Friday while Turkish drone and artillery strikes hit Syrian army positions throughout Idlib province .
The escalation could dramatically alter the Syrian conflict , which in its final stages has turned into a confrontation between Ankara , Damascus , and Moscow .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for an end to the Syrian government offensive .
He held an emergency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late on Thursday , and Turkey repeated its demands for support from its NATO allies .
Turkish officials maintain that Syrian government forces conducted the airstrike , though it is Russian jets that have recently been active in the area .
The strike hit a military observation post just south of Idlib city .
Refugee crisis .
After the attack , a Turkish official announced that Turkey would no longer prevent migrants from reaching Europe—part of a deal agreed in 2016 in exchange for financial support .
The move is expected to put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to aid Ankara .
Turkey , which already hosts around 3.7 million Syrians , fears an influx of refugees fleeing the government offensive in Idlib .
The violence has displaced more than 900,000 civilians—mostly women and children .
Will anyone intervene ?
The international community has so far looked the other way .
The United Nations won ’ t intervene because Russia and China have vetoed new routes for U.N. aid .
But European powers and the United States could help alleviate the humanitarian crisis .
Indeed , Idlib is precisely the sort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humanitarian intervention , Sinan Ulgen argues in FP .
WHO tells countries to prepare for coronavirus .
On Thursday , the World Health Organization ( WHO ) warned that all countries need to be prepared for a coronavirus outbreak , as cases rise in Europe and the Middle East .
New cases around the world have now overtaken those in mainland China .
“ No country should assume it won ’ t get cases , that would be a fatal mistake , quite literally , ” WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ reaction to the news , with Wall Street on track for its biggest weekly drop since the 2008-2009 financial crisis .
Economists are forecasting a global recession .
In the United States , California is monitoring more than 8,400 people for possible coronavirus symptoms , but it lacks the diagnostic test kits to confirm that many cases .
California is the first state to confirm a case of unknown origin—meaning the virus could be spreading within U.S. communities .
But U.S. Vice President Mike Pence , put in charge of the coronavirus response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday , saying that the threat to Americans “ remains low.
” Canada holds talks with indigenous protesters .
Canadian government representatives are in the midst of two-day talks with an indigenous group in an attempt to end three weeks of railway blockades in protest of the construction a gas pipeline that would run through the Wet ’ suwet ’ en nation .
Activists across the country have disrupted traffic in solidarity with the group , which has threatened to damage the economy .
The talks come after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory .
Greta Thunberg speaks at rally in Britain .
The teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg will address a student protest in the British city of Bristol today , with police issuing a safety warning because of the size of the protest .
Between 15,000 and 60,000 people are expected to attend .
The students , who are expected to come from across the country , are demanding decisive action from the government .
The rally comes about a month after Britain left the European Union , potentially threatening joint efforts to combat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advisor .
Sen. Bernie Sanders is seeking to reinvent progressive foreign policy .
He ’ s backed up by advisor Matt Duss , who has courted the online spotlight and used controversy—like Sanders ’ s comments on Cuba this week—to point out hypocrisy among the foreign-policy establishment , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reports—part of a series on the Democratic candidates ’ foreign-policy experts .
Read our coverage of foreign policy in the 2020 U.S. election here .
Slovakia ’ s elections .
Slovakia ’ s parliamentary elections on Saturday present voters with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ruled the country for most of the last 14 years and a revived liberal democratic bloc .
A historic murder trial , in which an oligarch is accused of ordering a hit on an investigative journalist , could push the coalition of liberal democrats over the finish line , Tim Gosling writes in FP .
Thailand ’ s student protests .
Students in Thailand are protesting against Prime Minister Payuth Chan-ocha after the country ’ s Constitutional Court disbanded a pro-democracy party last week .
Chan-ocha took over by military coup in 2014 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disputed vote last year .
Analysts say the criticism could weaken the prime minister , Bloomberg reports .
Russian President Vladimir Putin has denied a long-running conspiracy theory : that he uses a body double for security purposes .
The question was raised by a journalist with a Russian news agency— “ Are you real ?
” he asked .
Putin said the idea had been proposed in the early 2000s , during Russia ’ s conflict with separatists in Chechnya , but he rejected it .
Can pets get coronavirus ?
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dog has tested a “ weak positive ” for the disease .
Authorities said the dog has no symptoms and may not actually be infected .
There is not yet “ evidence that pet animals can be infected with COVID-19 virus or can be a source of infection to people , ” Hong Kong officials said in a press release .
The dog is now quarantined alone in an animal shelter .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Dozens of Turkish soldiers are killed by an airstrike in northwest Syria , the World Health Organization warns all countries to brace for a coronavirus outbreak —without calling it a pandemic, and Canada’s government is meeting with indigenous leaders over a railway blockade.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Dozens of Turkish soldiers are killed by an airstrike in northwest Syria, the World Health Organization warns all countries to brace for a coronavirus outbreak—without calling it a pandemic, and Canada’s government is meeting with indigenous leaders over a railway blockade.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Syrian Airstrike Marks a Major Escalation
At least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike on Thursday in Syria’s Idlib province—the highest death toll in a single day for Turkish troops this month since thousands were deployed in northwestern Syria to slow a Russia-backed Syrian offensive against the country’s last rebel holdout.
Turkey responded by killing 16 Syrian soldiers on the battlefield in Idlib on Friday while Turkish drone and artillery strikes hit Syrian army positions throughout Idlib province. The escalation could dramatically alter the Syrian conflict, which in its final stages has turned into a confrontation between Ankara, Damascus, and Moscow.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for an end to the Syrian government offensive. He held an emergency meeting with top military and intelligence officials late on Thursday, and Turkey repeated its demands for support from its NATO allies. Turkish officials maintain that Syrian government forces conducted the airstrike, though it is Russian jets that have recently been active in the area. The strike hit a military observation post just south of Idlib city.
Refugee crisis. After the attack, a Turkish official announced that Turkey would no longer prevent migrants from reaching Europe—part of a deal agreed in 2016 in exchange for financial support. The move is expected to put pressure on European leaders and NATO allies to aid Ankara. Turkey, which already hosts around 3.7 million Syrians, fears an influx of refugees fleeing the government offensive in Idlib. The violence has displaced more than 900,000 civilians—mostly women and children.
Will anyone intervene? The international community has so far looked the other way. The United Nations won’t intervene because Russia and China have vetoed new routes for U.N. aid. But European powers and the United States could help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Indeed, Idlib is precisely the sort of situation that warrants joint European Union-NATO humanitarian intervention, Sinan Ulgen argues in FP.
What We’re Following Today
WHO tells countries to prepare for coronavirus. On Thursday, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned that all countries need to be prepared for a coronavirus outbreak, as cases rise in Europe and the Middle East. New cases around the world have now overtaken those in mainland China. “No country should assume it won’t get cases, that would be a fatal mistake, quite literally,” WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said. Global markets fell further on Thursday in reaction to the news, with Wall Street on track for its biggest weekly drop since the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Economists are forecasting a global recession.
In the United States, California is monitoring more than 8,400 people for possible coronavirus symptoms, but it lacks the diagnostic test kits to confirm that many cases. California is the first state to confirm a case of unknown origin—meaning the virus could be spreading within U.S. communities. But U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, put in charge of the coronavirus response, sought to reassure the public on Thursday, saying that the threat to Americans “remains low.”
Canada holds talks with indigenous protesters. Canadian government representatives are in the midst of two-day talks with an indigenous group in an attempt to end three weeks of railway blockades in protest of the construction a gas pipeline that would run through the Wet’suwet’en nation. Activists across the country have disrupted traffic in solidarity with the group, which has threatened to damage the economy. The talks come after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police withdrew from We’suwet’en territory.
Greta Thunberg speaks at rally in Britain. The teenage climate activist Greta Thunberg will address a student protest in the British city of Bristol today, with police issuing a safety warning because of the size of the protest. Between 15,000 and 60,000 people are expected to attend. The students, who are expected to come from across the country, are demanding decisive action from the government. The rally comes about a month after Britain left the European Union, potentially threatening joint efforts to combat climate change.
Keep an Eye On
Bernie’s foreign-policy advisor. Sen. Bernie Sanders is seeking to reinvent progressive foreign policy. He’s backed up by advisor Matt Duss, who has courted the online spotlight and used controversy—like Sanders’s comments on Cuba this week—to point out hypocrisy among the foreign-policy establishment, FP’s Robbie Gramer reports—part of a series on the Democratic candidates’ foreign-policy experts.
Read our coverage of foreign policy in the 2020 U.S. election here.
Slovakia’s elections. Slovakia’s parliamentary elections on Saturday present voters with the choice between the populists who have ruled the country for most of the last 14 years and a revived liberal democratic bloc. A historic murder trial, in which an oligarch is accused of ordering a hit on an investigative journalist, could push the coalition of liberal democrats over the finish line, Tim Gosling writes in FP.
Thailand’s student protests. Students in Thailand are protesting against Prime Minister Payuth Chan-ocha after the country’s Constitutional Court disbanded a pro-democracy party last week. Chan-ocha took over by military coup in 2014 and became an elected leader in a disputed vote last year. Analysts say the criticism could weaken the prime minister, Bloomberg reports.
Odds and Ends
Russian President Vladimir Putin has denied a long-running conspiracy theory: that he uses a body double for security purposes. The question was raised by a journalist with a Russian news agency—“Are you real?” he asked. Putin said the idea had been proposed in the early 2000s, during Russia’s conflict with separatists in Chechnya, but he rejected it.
Can pets get coronavirus? A Hong Kong coronavirus patient’s pet dog has tested a “weak positive” for the disease. Authorities said the dog has no symptoms and may not actually be infected. There is not yet “evidence that pet animals can be infected with COVID-19 virus or can be a source of infection to people,” Hong Kong officials said in a press release. The dog is now quarantined alone in an animal shelter.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Trump’s Plan for Palestine Looks a Lot Like Apartheid

Trump ’ s Plan for Palestine Looks a Lot Like Apartheid In the heyday of South Africa ’ s apartheid regime , the country ’ s white minority government planned to create 10 so-called homelands—also known as Bantustans—where black South Africans could live far away from the cities it hoped to keep white .
It was the culmination of what the regime called “ separate development ” —an effort to deflect attention from racial oppression by claiming black people had been granted independence in their own states and weren ’ t second-class citizens in South Africa .
The apartheid government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Bophuthatswana , Venda , Ciskei , and Transkei ) and six supposedly self-governing territories .
Foreign governments for the most part dismissed the puppet states for what they were ; South Africa was the only country in the world to officially recognize the Bantustans , and the major decisions regarding their affairs were made exclusively in Pretoria .
I ’ ve devoted decades of my life to Israel ’ s foreign service , including serving as the Israeli ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1994 .
I have devoted decades of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service , including serving as a South Africa desk officer in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the apartheid era and as the Israeli ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1994 , during the country ’ s transition to democracy .
During these years , I learned , to my dismay , that no country in the world ( with the exception of South Africa ) contributed more to the economy of the Bantustans than Israel .
Israelis built factories , neighborhoods , a hospital , and even a soccer stadium @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African puppet states .
Israel went so far as to allow one of them , Bophuthatswana , to maintain a diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv , and its leader , Lucas Mangope—shunned by the entire world for advancing and legitimizing apartheid by cooperating with the South African regime—was a frequent guest in Israel .
As the entire world boycotted the Bantustan sham , Israel—motivated by the desire for security cooperation and an export market for its arms industry—mobilized to support the apartheid regime .
Israel ’ s security cooperation with South Africa began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 .
The 20-year relationship was wide-ranging in scope and included joint development of arms between the two countries and Israeli supply of military training and arms to South Africa .
In fact , South Africa was at times the largest buyer of Israeli arms .
This cooperation had been going on for almost two decades by the time I became ambassador and was so intricate that even I , as ambassador , was not privy to its details—which was coordinated in large part by the Ministry of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Affairs .
Through this cooperation , Israel became one of South Africa ’ s closest allies—economically , militarily , and diplomatically—and heeded its request to help develop the Bantustans .
Attempts to whitewash a discriminatory , oppressive regime by creating fictitious autonomous states inhabited by subjects who have no real political rights did not work in South Africa and they will not work elsewhere .
Ultimately , of course , these Bantustans fell , along with the apartheid regime , thanks in part to international organizing and nonrecognition , including pressure and boycotts—despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until the dying days of apartheid .
It is now , of course , clear that attempts to whitewash a discriminatory , oppressive regime by creating fictitious autonomous states inhabited by subjects who have no real political rights did not work in South Africa and they will not work elsewhere .
This lesson , however , is now being tested .
With active support from the United States in the form of President Donald Trump ’ s so-called “ deal of the century , ” Israel is seeking to introduce and develop the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ old South Africa ’ s deplorable policy .
Recently at the White House , Trump bestowed yet another gift on his close friend Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of the upcoming March 2 election in Israel , presenting a plan that his son-in-law and emissaries devised without any Palestinians present .
The details of the proposal , and the rhetoric used by both Trump and Netanyahu , made it clear that this was not a deal but rather the implementation of Netanyahu ’ s long-standing plan to further entrench Israel ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its residents disconnected enclaves of territory without granting them real freedom or basic political rights .
That was precisely the goal of the old South African government ’ s Bantustan policy , too .
Trump did not just try to hand his friend almost a third of the West Bank , but he also—and perhaps primarily—tried to provide Netanyahu with a route toward international acceptance .
Similar to U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem , Trump continues to signal that he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the international community with his own diktats .
This is bad news for millions of Palestinians—but not for them alone .
Over the years , the United Nations has established that partitioning the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea into two independent states is the only just and sustainable solution .
This solution is predicated on the belief that all 14 million people currently living on that land have a right to independence , equality , and dignity and that the best way to ensure this outcome is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in place for more than half a century , and partition based on the pre-1967 borders .
Prominent institutions such as the European Union and the Arab League have repeatedly expressed their support for and commitment to this model , as have previous U.S. administrations , led by both Republicans and Democrats .
Unfortunately , the international community ’ s professed commitment to the two-state solution has yet to manifest itself in any substantive way , which seems to have led Netanyahu and Trump to the conclusion that the coast is clear for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Trump plan is an imitation of the Bantustan model , with Palestinian fragments surrounded by territory fully under Israeli control , making permanent the domination of one ethnic or religious group over another .
It thus violates the principles of the rules-based international order , signaling that Trump believes he can disregard international law and legitimize a new 21st-century model of apartheid .
This arrogant show of force must be met with a clear answer .
It was just three years ago that the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2334 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territories are unlawful and that no unilateral changes to the pre-1967 borders would be recognized .
To respond to Trump and Netanyahu—and given the latter ’ s announcement of plans to annex territory within a few months—regional and Western leaders and major international institutions must once again speak up loudly and clearly .
No one must give even tacit approval to this new form of apartheid and the ideology undergirding it .
Doing so would betray not only the legacy and efficacy of international resistance to South African apartheid but also the fate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and what should be a truly independent Palestine .

In the heyday of South Africa’s apartheid regime, the country’s white minority government planned to create 10 so-called homelands—also known as Bantustans—where black South Africans could live far away from the cities it hoped to keep white. It was the culmination of what the regime called “separate development”—an effort to deflect attention from racial oppression by claiming black people had been granted independence in their own states and weren’t second-class citizens in South Africa.
In the heyday of South Africa’s apartheid regime, the country’s white minority government planned to create 10 so-called homelands—also known as Bantustans—where black South Africans could live far away from the cities it hoped to keep white. It was the culmination of what the regime called “separate development”—an effort to deflect attention from racial oppression by claiming black people had been granted independence in their own states and weren’t second-class citizens in South Africa.
The apartheid government ultimately created only four ostensibly independent Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, and Transkei) and six supposedly self-governing territories. Foreign governments for the most part dismissed the puppet states for what they were; South Africa was the only country in the world to officially recognize the Bantustans, and the major decisions regarding their affairs were made exclusively in Pretoria.
I’ve devoted decades of my life to Israel’s foreign service, including serving as the Israeli ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1994.
I have devoted decades of my life to Israel’s foreign service, including serving as a South Africa desk officer in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the apartheid era and as the Israeli ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1994, during the country’s transition to democracy.
During these years, I learned, to my dismay, that no country in the world (with the exception of South Africa) contributed more to the economy of the Bantustans than Israel. Israelis built factories, neighborhoods, a hospital, and even a soccer stadium and an alligator farm in these South African puppet states. Israel went so far as to allow one of them, Bophuthatswana, to maintain a diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv, and its leader, Lucas Mangope—shunned by the entire world for advancing and legitimizing apartheid by cooperating with the South African regime—was a frequent guest in Israel.
As the entire world boycotted the Bantustan sham, Israel—motivated by the desire for security cooperation and an export market for its arms industry—mobilized to support the apartheid regime. Israel’s security cooperation with South Africa began in 1974 and ended only with the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994.
The 20-year relationship was wide-ranging in scope and included joint development of arms between the two countries and Israeli supply of military training and arms to South Africa. In fact, South Africa was at times the largest buyer of Israeli arms. This cooperation had been going on for almost two decades by the time I became ambassador and was so intricate that even I, as ambassador, was not privy to its details—which was coordinated in large part by the Ministry of Defense rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through this cooperation, Israel became one of South Africa’s closest allies—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—and heeded its request to help develop the Bantustans.
Attempts to whitewash a discriminatory, oppressive regime by creating fictitious autonomous states inhabited by subjects who have no real political rights did not work in South Africa and they will not work elsewhere.
Ultimately, of course, these Bantustans fell, along with the apartheid regime, thanks in part to international organizing and nonrecognition, including pressure and boycotts—despite white supremacist Afrikaner groups defending the Bantustans until the dying days of apartheid.
It is now, of course, clear that attempts to whitewash a discriminatory, oppressive regime by creating fictitious autonomous states inhabited by subjects who have no real political rights did not work in South Africa and they will not work elsewhere.
This lesson, however, is now being tested. With active support from the United States in the form of President Donald Trump’s so-called “deal of the century,” Israel is seeking to introduce and develop the new millennium’s version of the old South Africa’s deplorable policy.
Recently at the White House, Trump bestowed yet another gift on his close friend Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of the upcoming March 2 election in Israel, presenting a plan that his son-in-law and emissaries devised without any Palestinians present.
The details of the proposal, and the rhetoric used by both Trump and Netanyahu, made it clear that this was not a deal but rather the implementation of Netanyahu’s long-standing plan to further entrench Israel’s control of the West Bank by giving its residents disconnected enclaves of territory without granting them real freedom or basic political rights. That was precisely the goal of the old South African government’s Bantustan policy, too.
Trump did not just try to hand his friend almost a third of the West Bank, but he also—and perhaps primarily—tried to provide Netanyahu with a route toward international acceptance. Similar to U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, Trump continues to signal that he can and will erase the time-honored policies of the international community with his own diktats.
This is bad news for millions of Palestinians—but not for them alone. Over the years, the United Nations has established that partitioning the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea into two independent states is the only just and sustainable solution.
This solution is predicated on the belief that all 14 million people currently living on that land have a right to independence, equality, and dignity and that the best way to ensure this outcome is an end to the Israeli occupation, now in place for more than half a century, and partition based on the pre-1967 borders.
Prominent institutions such as the European Union and the Arab League have repeatedly expressed their support for and commitment to this model, as have previous U.S. administrations, led by both Republicans and Democrats. Unfortunately, the international community’s professed commitment to the two-state solution has yet to manifest itself in any substantive way, which seems to have led Netanyahu and Trump to the conclusion that the coast is clear for their annexationist vision.
The map attached to the Trump plan is an imitation of the Bantustan model, with Palestinian fragments surrounded by territory fully under Israeli control, making permanent the domination of one ethnic or religious group over another. It thus violates the principles of the rules-based international order, signaling that Trump believes he can disregard international law and legitimize a new 21st-century model of apartheid. This arrogant show of force must be met with a clear answer.
It was just three years ago that the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2334, asserting that settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories are unlawful and that no unilateral changes to the pre-1967 borders would be recognized. To respond to Trump and Netanyahu—and given the latter’s announcement of plans to annex territory within a few months—regional and Western leaders and major international institutions must once again speak up loudly and clearly.
No one must give even tacit approval to this new form of apartheid and the ideology undergirding it. Doing so would betray not only the legacy and efficacy of international resistance to South African apartheid but also the fate of millions of people living in Israel and what should be a truly independent Palestine.