foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Will Trump’s Case of COVID-19 Endanger U.S. National Security?

Will Trump ’ s Case of COVID-19 Endanger U.S. National Security ?
Officials and veteran national security experts in the United States warn that President Donald Trump ’ s positive coronavirus test raises the specter of new aggressive moves from foreign adversaries and exposes the upper echelons of the U.S. government , including national security officials who surround Trump , to possible infection .
Administration officials insisted that Trump ’ s symptoms were mild , but on Friday afternoon the president was transported to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to be hospitalized for several days , the White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ good spirits , has mild symptoms , and has been working throughout the day , ” White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany said in a statement .
President Vladimir Putin was among those world leaders to send get-well-soon telegrams to Pennsylvania Avenue .
But Russia and adversaries like North Korea , China , and Iran are among the countries that administration officials and lawmakers will be watching closely to see if they exploit the news in Washington , particularly if Trump ’ s symptoms worsen .
“ With the President ’ s illness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not discount the possibility that China will step up pressure on Taiwan or Russia [ will ] seek to take advantage in Eastern Europe .
Important [ is ] the U.S. signal to both that we are watching and remain fully capable , ” Nicholas Burns , a former senior State Department official and foreign-policy advisor to Joe Biden ’ s campaign , said on Twitter .
Trump ’ s positive COVID-19 test—coupled with his age and weight , both high-risk factors—creates the potential for even more confusion in the weeks ahead for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dismantled or bypassed many of the normal systems and processes that keep Washington ’ s national security machinery in sync ; for four years , senior officials at the Defense and State departments have been blindsided by Trump ’ s habit of announcing major foreign-policy decisions with little or no consultation .
“ The whole way the U.S. government makes national security decisions was built because of infirm or injured presidents , ” said John Gans , a former Pentagon official and author of White House Warriors : How the National Security Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The National Security Council was created because people were scared to death of the way Franklin Roosevelt made decisions during World War II while keeping information from everybody in government … and then he died and they were left in the dark.
” “ The systems , the process , the meetings , and communications that were all created as a result of these fears of what could happen—Trump has let it all fall into disuse , ” Gans said .
Trump ’ s positive test also presented Washington with stark conversations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidency—a discussion that is potentially jarring to both U.S. allies and adversaries alike .
Vice President Mike Pence , first in the line of succession , tested negative on Friday for the virus , according to Pence ’ s spokesperson .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi , second in line , said in an interview on MSNBC that she had not been contacted by the White House but that plans for the continuity of government were in place .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , fourth in line , said both he and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while he is traveling in Europe .
It ’ s likely that senior officials around Pence and Pompeo have recently come into contact with the president and his top aides , putting more people in the National Security Council and other agencies at risk of contagion .
Pompeo said his team was planning for that .
“ We ’ re measuring , trying to make sure we get some additional contact tracing on folks that have been to the White House , ” he told reporters traveling with him .
Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vice president had tested negative for the virus .
His running mate , Sen. Kamala Harris , also tested negative .
The campaign said it learned about Trump testing positive from news reports and didn ’ t get any heads-up from the White House or the Trump campaign .
Foreign intelligence services could also be monitoring a possible U.S. succession process , experts said .
Coming amid another campaign rife with high-level warnings of Russian election interference , Moscow may also be looking to seize on U.S. uncertainty over Trump ’ s health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ They want to know what ’ s going to happen and how , ” said Douglas London , a retired CIA officer who now teaches at Georgetown University .
U.S. adversaries like Russia will be looking to see which members of the cabinet are likely to assert themselves if Trump is temporarily incapacitated with virus symptoms .
“ They want to know if there are going to be any differences in positions in power rivalries .
Particularly for a country like Russia , they ’ re going to want to know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” London added .
But London said there ’ s a risk of miscalculation by foreign adversaries because the chain of command could become less predictable if Trump ’ s condition worsens .
“ They ’ re looking for where they might be able to seize the advantage , ” he said .
“ There ’ s a lot of wild cards.
” But some former Trump administration officials said the chain of command is robust for precisely these types of contingencies , even if the president is incapacitated .
“ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any military , and they are empowered to make the decision to protect the force if necessary , ” said Mick Mulroy , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst .
“ It is unlikely that any adversary would use this as an opportunity to test us .
If they did , we would pass the test.
” Top U.S. lawmakers issued that same message on Friday shortly after Trump ’ s announcement .
“ Any adversary who views news of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to test the United States would be making a grave mistake , ” tweeted Republican Sen. Marco Rubio , the acting chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is in North Africa this week , but a spokesperson said the Pentagon chief tested negative for the virus , along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Gen. Mark Milley , who met with Trump at the White House on Sunday .
“ There has been no change to our alert levels , ” a spokesperson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The U.S. military stands ready to defend our country and its citizens .
There is no change to the readiness and capability of our armed forces.
” Update , Oct. 2 , 2020 : This article was updated to include information on Trump being transported to Walter Reed and comments from Sen. Marco Rubio .

Officials and veteran national security experts in the United States warn that President Donald Trump’s positive coronavirus test raises the specter of new aggressive moves from foreign adversaries and exposes the upper echelons of the U.S. government, including national security officials who surround Trump, to possible infection.
Officials and veteran national security experts in the United States warn that President Donald Trump’s positive coronavirus test raises the specter of new aggressive moves from foreign adversaries and exposes the upper echelons of the U.S. government, including national security officials who surround Trump, to possible infection.
Administration officials insisted that Trump’s symptoms were mild, but on Friday afternoon the president was transported to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to be hospitalized for several days, the White House announced. “President Trump remains in good spirits, has mild symptoms, and has been working throughout the day,” White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany said in a statement.
President Vladimir Putin was among those world leaders to send get-well-soon telegrams to Pennsylvania Avenue. But Russia and adversaries like North Korea, China, and Iran are among the countries that administration officials and lawmakers will be watching closely to see if they exploit the news in Washington, particularly if Trump’s symptoms worsen.
“With the President’s illness amid a divisive campaign, we should not discount the possibility that China will step up pressure on Taiwan or Russia [will] seek to take advantage in Eastern Europe. Important [is] the U.S. signal to both that we are watching and remain fully capable,” Nicholas Burns, a former senior State Department official and foreign-policy advisor to Joe Biden’s campaign, said on Twitter.
Trump’s positive COVID-19 test—coupled with his age and weight, both high-risk factors—creates the potential for even more confusion in the weeks ahead for the U.S. security apparatus. Trump has dismantled or bypassed many of the normal systems and processes that keep Washington’s national security machinery in sync; for four years, senior officials at the Defense and State departments have been blindsided by Trump’s habit of announcing major foreign-policy decisions with little or no consultation.
“The whole way the U.S. government makes national security decisions was built because of infirm or injured presidents,” said John Gans, a former Pentagon official and author of White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War. “The National Security Council was created because people were scared to death of the way Franklin Roosevelt made decisions during World War II while keeping information from everybody in government … and then he died and they were left in the dark.”
“The systems, the process, the meetings, and communications that were all created as a result of these fears of what could happen—Trump has let it all fall into disuse,” Gans said.
Trump’s positive test also presented Washington with stark conversations about lines of succession to the U.S. presidency—a discussion that is potentially jarring to both U.S. allies and adversaries alike.
Vice President Mike Pence, first in the line of succession, tested negative on Friday for the virus, according to Pence’s spokesperson. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, second in line, said in an interview on MSNBC that she had not been contacted by the White House but that plans for the continuity of government were in place. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, fourth in line, said both he and his wife had tested negative for the coronavirus while he is traveling in Europe. It’s likely that senior officials around Pence and Pompeo have recently come into contact with the president and his top aides, putting more people in the National Security Council and other agencies at risk of contagion.
Pompeo said his team was planning for that. “We’re measuring, trying to make sure we get some additional contact tracing on folks that have been to the White House,” he told reporters traveling with him.
Biden’s presidential campaign told reporters that the former vice president had tested negative for the virus. His running mate, Sen. Kamala Harris, also tested negative. The campaign said it learned about Trump testing positive from news reports and didn’t get any heads-up from the White House or the Trump campaign.
Foreign intelligence services could also be monitoring a possible U.S. succession process, experts said. Coming amid another campaign rife with high-level warnings of Russian election interference, Moscow may also be looking to seize on U.S. uncertainty over Trump’s health to gain even greater leverage over Washington.
“They want to know what’s going to happen and how,” said Douglas London, a retired CIA officer who now teaches at Georgetown University. U.S. adversaries like Russia will be looking to see which members of the cabinet are likely to assert themselves if Trump is temporarily incapacitated with virus symptoms. “They want to know if there are going to be any differences in positions in power rivalries. Particularly for a country like Russia, they’re going to want to know what they can do to influence it,” London added.
But London said there’s a risk of miscalculation by foreign adversaries because the chain of command could become less predictable if Trump’s condition worsens. “They’re looking for where they might be able to seize the advantage,” he said. “There’s a lot of wild cards.”
But some former Trump administration officials said the chain of command is robust for precisely these types of contingencies, even if the president is incapacitated.
“The U.S. military has the best leadership of any military, and they are empowered to make the decision to protect the force if necessary,” said Mick Mulroy, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration and now an ABC News national security analyst. “It is unlikely that any adversary would use this as an opportunity to test us. If they did, we would pass the test.”
Top U.S. lawmakers issued that same message on Friday shortly after Trump’s announcement. “Any adversary who views news of @POTUS testing positive as an opportunity to test the United States would be making a grave mistake,” tweeted Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, the acting chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is in North Africa this week, but a spokesperson said the Pentagon chief tested negative for the virus, along with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, who met with Trump at the White House on Sunday.
“There has been no change to our alert levels,” a spokesperson for the Joint Chiefs said on Friday. “The U.S. military stands ready to defend our country and its citizens. There is no change to the readiness and capability of our armed forces.”
Update, Oct. 2, 2020: This article was updated to include information on Trump being transported to Walter Reed and comments from Sen. Marco Rubio.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Gorbachev Was Right About German Reunification

Gorbachev Was Right About German Reunification At 7 p.m. local time on Oct. 2 , 1990 , East Germany ’ s national anthem was played as the country ’ s women ’ s handball team squared off against West Germany .
They won 24-20 .
But at midnight , their country was no more : Germany was reunited .
Prior to that event , world leaders had so feared German reunification that it nearly didn ’ t happen .
But 30 years later , it can only be described as a phenomenal success .
Around the same time the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off , I arrived in the small East German town of Demmin to visit friends of my family .
Located near what would become Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s voting district in Germany ’ s northeast corner , Demmin doesn ’ t particularly stand out .
Like the rest of East Germany , it was about to undergo a fundamental transformation by becoming part of another country .
Reunification celebrations there were restrained .
Some people hung German flags from their balconies .
Others did not .
Some 330 miles away in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East Germany ’ s border with Bavaria , the situation was divided between joyful residents and fearful ones .
As the clock struck 12 , the pianist Karin Blechschmidt and her family put on Beethoven ’ s Ninth Symphony and called their friends .
“ Oct .
3 was a relief , ” Blechschmidt said .
In Berlin , too , Beethoven ’ s Ninth with its famous “ Ode to Joy ” was a popular choice .
Richard von Weizsäcker , the West German-turned-reunified German president , spoke .
“ History has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said to the assembled potentates , including Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East Germany ’ s short-serving and now departing head Lothar de Maizière .
Farther back in the crowd sat Richard Schröder , a Lutheran pastor who had been serving as the leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party in East Germany ’ s first and last democratically elected parliament .
The election that brought him to power just months before had resulted in Christian Democrat de Maizière being elected prime minister on a platform of speedy reunification .
Like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s cabinet , including Foreign Minister Markus Meckel and Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann , were Lutheran pastors , a reflection of the strength of the church-based opposition that toppled the Communist regime .
The deputy spokesperson for de Maizière ’ s government was one pastor ’ s daughter named Angela Merkel .
“ People had been saying , ‘ When do we join , when do we join ?
’ ” Schröder recalled .
“ Everyone ’ s feeling was that we had to hurry up before Gorbachev changed his mind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev—who stood to lose a socialist ally if East Germany joined the West—courageously supported reunification .
Meanwhile , Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze advised East Germans not to wait .
When Soviet hard-liners staged a coup against Gorbachev less than a year after Germany ’ s reunification , many East Germans realized how lucky they had been .
That ’ s especially true because reunification was not up to the two Germanies and the Soviet Union alone .
Rather , all four World War II victors played a role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Western powers was not a given .
Britain ’ s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , for one , was profoundly skeptical .
In March 1990 , she told the French ambassador to London that Kohl “ sees himself as the master and is starting to act like it.
” The same month , she convened a group of British and American historians , who cautioned that Germans tend toward “ angst , aggressiveness , bullying , egotism , inferiority complex , and sentimentality.
” The so-called 2+4 negotiations also saw France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thwart reunification ; both he and Thatcher were alarmed over the prospect of what a reunited Germany could to do Europe .
U.S. President George H.W .
Bush , however , vigorously supported the Germans ’ right to reunite .
And in the end , Thatcher and Mitterrand had to give in not just to Bush but to the massive shift that was taking place in East Germany—and indeed elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact countries , too .
The year before , Poland ’ s Communist regime had collapsed and new elections resulted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Solidarity trade union .
Czechoslovaks , too , had brought down their Communist regime and made the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel their president .
It would have been absurd for the Western powers to trample on East German aspirations and kill the momentum toward democracy .
As for the East Germans , “ many were expecting a miracle , ” Schröder told me .
“ It began with the currency union.
” In July 1990 , prior to formal reunification , West Germany ’ s Deutsche mark was introduced in East Germany .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ West currency we ’ ll live like they do in the West.
” No such thing happened , at least not immediately , even though Kohl had promised East Germans “ blossoming landscapes ” in the summer of 1990 .
Instead they found themselves facing confusion , closing factories , unemployment , and what they perceived as West German arrogance toward 16 million people now learning a completely different way of life .
“ You can ’ t imagine what it was like for a GDR [ East German ] citizen to have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Gerhard Gabriel , another Lutheran pastor and opposition activist during Communist times .
To be sure , reunification was also liberation .
“ For me , reunification was simply a fantastic outcome , ” Blechschmidt said .
“ I immediately got a job in Bavaria , and people there were incredibly welcoming to me .
In the GDR , I had been told that my daughter would not be going to university because I was critical of the government .
Reunification meant she was able to get not just one university @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be willing to seize the opportunity , perhaps look for slightly different work .
Many were simply incapable of that.
” But among the many East Germans who did show vocational flexibility was Angela Merkel , whose East German party , the Democratic Awakening , joined the Christian Democrats , whereupon the former physicist Merkel stood for , and won , a Bundestag seat in her home region .
In practice , reunification meant absorbing the undemocratic planned economy of East Germany into the democratic market economy of the new Federal Republic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with East Germans choosing health insurance , learning Western words for items such as “ overhead projector , ” and learning the ropes from Western politicians , bureaucrats , and business leaders now arriving en masse in the East continued with the resented but largely successful sale of East Germany ’ s government-owned industry to private investors and the establishment of new city councils and state parliaments .
The former enemy army , the Bundeswehr , spread to the East , where it replaced the National People ’ s Army .
East Germans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along the way .
Large signs produced by the government proclaiming “ Aufschwung Ost ” ( “ Boom East ” ) seemed a cruel joke when most were struggling .
In a 1992 poll about their perceptions of East Germany , 62 percent of ex-East Germans said they ’ d had big hopes for socialism , and 42 percent highlighted the calming sense of belonging to a community .
As the reality of what reunification entailed set in , it began losing its luster .
“ But what so many people called a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Schröder , referencing the process of changing from communism to capitalism .
After being elected to the Bundestag , Schröder became a theology professor at Berlin ’ s famous Humboldt University .
“ We would have had a transformation shock even without reunification , just like other former Warsaw Pact states did .
And for them the transformation was much more brutal.
” Indeed , after the painful early 1990s , the economy in the so-called new states began to improve .
People adjusted to their new lives , which despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ With building supplies now available , Blechschmidt and her husband renovated their home ; for the first time in their lives , they didn ’ t need to heat it with coal bricks .
Countless other East Germans , too , renovated and built , as did cities .
East Germany ’ s infamously drab cities turned colorful .
As the German government notes in the 2020 edition of its annual report on the state of German reunification , since 1990 the GDP per capita in the new states , excluding Berlin , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out , “ people get used to good things very easily .
Now some are complaining that we ’ ve got fewer millionaires here in the former East than they have in the West .
But how would having more millionaires in my part of the country improve my life ?
” He may be right , but a permanent unhappiness does seem to have taken root in the former East Germany .
According to the German government ’ s 2020 reunification report , in both halves of German less than 1 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea of democracy .
However , in the Eastern states , 12.7 percent of people are opposed to the way it works in Germany , compared to 6.3 percent in the Western ones , and the percentage in the new states is rising .
This unhappiness may explain the disproportionate support for the populist Alternative for Germany party in the former East .
For the rest of the world , though , Germany ’ s reunification was the most audacious—and perhaps successful—geopolitical experiment to have been attempted for decades ; a failure would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany itself but for Europe as a whole .
From her retirement perch in the U.K. House of Lords , Thatcher saw little German angst , aggressiveness , bullying , egotism , inferiority complex , or sentimentality .
On the contrary , reunited Germany turned out to be a moderate , sometimes even modest , nation .
Much like the old West Germany , it established itself as an economic powerhouse , a staunch supporter of European integration—Kohl ’ s swan song was the introduction of the euro—and a nation exceptionally hesitant to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its distaste for military adventures , Germany has developed into the world ’ s cornerstone of sensible power .
It has survived economic downturns better than other countries and has led the European Union through emergencies including the 2010 debt crisis .
It has dealt with the 2015 refugee crisis .
Financially , the former East Germany is now at the same level of GDP as many French regions , while even Poland—considered a post-Cold War economic success story—is much further behind .
Federally structured though it is , Germany has even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 crisis .
“ I ’ m a little bit proud of Germany , ” Gabriel said .
“ Mrs .
Merkel is the most respected leader in the world , and many people want to come and live here.
” Except for its charming pedestrian-crossing signals , known as the Ampelmännchen ; a few museums ; and people ’ s nostalgia , little of East Germany remains .
This Oct. 3 , as every Oct. 3 , reunification will be celebrated with an official tribute in Berlin and lots of celebrations around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of course ) .
Because of the COVID-19 pandemic , Schröder and other East German deputies from 30 years ago won ’ t be able to attend , but they will commemorate the day on their own .
And Gabriel will gather people outside his church in a village east of Berlin , where they will join with people all over the country in singing songs including the Scorpions ’ “ Wind of Change , ” Martin Luther ’ s “ Now Thank We All Our God , ” and the Jewish song @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ridiculed the thing about blossoming landscapes , but it has become reality , ” Gabriel reflected .
Germany ’ s reunification may not yet be complete , but this Oct. 3 is a day to celebrate—not just for the Germans .

At 7 p.m. local time on Oct. 2, 1990, East Germany’s national anthem was played as the country’s women’s handball team squared off against West Germany. They won 24-20. But at midnight, their country was no more: Germany was reunited. Prior to that event, world leaders had so feared German reunification that it nearly didn’t happen. But 30 years later, it can only be described as a phenomenal success.
At 7 p.m. local time on Oct. 2, 1990, East Germany’s national anthem was played as the country’s women’s handball team squared off against West Germany. They won 24-20. But at midnight, their country was no more: Germany was reunited. Prior to that event, world leaders had so feared German reunification that it nearly didn’t happen. But 30 years later, it can only be described as a phenomenal success.
Around the same time the two women’s handball teams were squaring off, I arrived in the small East German town of Demmin to visit friends of my family. Located near what would become Chancellor Angela Merkel’s voting district in Germany’s northeast corner, Demmin doesn’t particularly stand out. Like the rest of East Germany, it was about to undergo a fundamental transformation by becoming part of another country. Reunification celebrations there were restrained. Some people hung German flags from their balconies. Others did not.
Some 330 miles away in the town of Mengersgereuth-Hämmern, just north of East Germany’s border with Bavaria, the situation was divided between joyful residents and fearful ones. As the clock struck 12, the pianist Karin Blechschmidt and her family put on Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and called their friends. “Oct. 3 was a relief,” Blechschmidt said. In Berlin, too, Beethoven’s Ninth with its famous “Ode to Joy” was a popular choice. Richard von Weizsäcker, the West German-turned-reunified German president, spoke. “History has been kind to us Germans this time,” he said to the assembled potentates, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East Germany’s short-serving and now departing head Lothar de Maizière.
Farther back in the crowd sat Richard Schröder, a Lutheran pastor who had been serving as the leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party in East Germany’s first and last democratically elected parliament. The election that brought him to power just months before had resulted in Christian Democrat de Maizière being elected prime minister on a platform of speedy reunification. Like Schröder, key members of Maizière’s cabinet, including Foreign Minister Markus Meckel and Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann, were Lutheran pastors, a reflection of the strength of the church-based opposition that toppled the Communist regime. The deputy spokesperson for de Maizière’s government was one pastor’s daughter named Angela Merkel.
“People had been saying, ‘When do we join, when do we join?’” Schröder recalled. “Everyone’s feeling was that we had to hurry up before Gorbachev changed his mind or something happened to him.” Indeed, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev—who stood to lose a socialist ally if East Germany joined the West—courageously supported reunification. Meanwhile, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze advised East Germans not to wait. When Soviet hard-liners staged a coup against Gorbachev less than a year after Germany’s reunification, many East Germans realized how lucky they had been.
That’s especially true because reunification was not up to the two Germanies and the Soviet Union alone. Rather, all four World War II victors played a role in the negotiations, and the support of the Western powers was not a given.
Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for one, was profoundly skeptical. In March 1990, she told the French ambassador to London that Kohl “sees himself as the master and is starting to act like it.” The same month, she convened a group of British and American historians, who cautioned that Germans tend toward “angst, aggressiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, and sentimentality.”
The so-called 2+4 negotiations also saw France’s President François Mitterrand trying to thwart reunification; both he and Thatcher were alarmed over the prospect of what a reunited Germany could to do Europe. U.S. President George H.W. Bush, however, vigorously supported the Germans’ right to reunite. And in the end, Thatcher and Mitterrand had to give in not just to Bush but to the massive shift that was taking place in East Germany—and indeed elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact countries, too. The year before, Poland’s Communist regime had collapsed and new elections resulted in a landslide victory for the dissident Solidarity trade union. Czechoslovaks, too, had brought down their Communist regime and made the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel their president. It would have been absurd for the Western powers to trample on East German aspirations and kill the momentum toward democracy.
As for the East Germans, “many were expecting a miracle,” Schröder told me. “It began with the currency union.” In July 1990, prior to formal reunification, West Germany’s Deutsche mark was introduced in East Germany. “People thought, when we get West currency we’ll live like they do in the West.” No such thing happened, at least not immediately, even though Kohl had promised East Germans “blossoming landscapes” in the summer of 1990. Instead they found themselves facing confusion, closing factories, unemployment, and what they perceived as West German arrogance toward 16 million people now learning a completely different way of life. “You can’t imagine what it was like for a GDR [East German] citizen to have to choose a health insurance provider,” said Gerhard Gabriel, another Lutheran pastor and opposition activist during Communist times.
To be sure, reunification was also liberation. “For me, reunification was simply a fantastic outcome,” Blechschmidt said. “I immediately got a job in Bavaria, and people there were incredibly welcoming to me. In the GDR, I had been told that my daughter would not be going to university because I was critical of the government. Reunification meant she was able to get not just one university degree but two. But you had to be willing to seize the opportunity, perhaps look for slightly different work. Many were simply incapable of that.” But among the many East Germans who did show vocational flexibility was Angela Merkel, whose East German party, the Democratic Awakening, joined the Christian Democrats, whereupon the former physicist Merkel stood for, and won, a Bundestag seat in her home region.
In practice, reunification meant absorbing the undemocratic planned economy of East Germany into the democratic market economy of the new Federal Republic of Germany. The process that began with East Germans choosing health insurance, learning Western words for items such as “overhead projector,” and learning the ropes from Western politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders now arriving en masse in the East continued with the resented but largely successful sale of East Germany’s government-owned industry to private investors and the establishment of new city councils and state parliaments. The former enemy army, the Bundeswehr, spread to the East, where it replaced the National People’s Army.
East Germans’ sense of self took some hits along the way. Large signs produced by the government proclaiming “Aufschwung Ost” (“Boom East”) seemed a cruel joke when most were struggling. In a 1992 poll about their perceptions of East Germany, 62 percent of ex-East Germans said they’d had big hopes for socialism, and 42 percent highlighted the calming sense of belonging to a community. As the reality of what reunification entailed set in, it began losing its luster. “But what so many people called a reunification shock was a transformation shock,” said Schröder, referencing the process of changing from communism to capitalism. After being elected to the Bundestag, Schröder became a theology professor at Berlin’s famous Humboldt University. “We would have had a transformation shock even without reunification, just like other former Warsaw Pact states did. And for them the transformation was much more brutal.”
Indeed, after the painful early 1990s, the economy in the so-called new states began to improve. People adjusted to their new lives, which despite the struggle were considerably more comfortable. With building supplies now available, Blechschmidt and her husband renovated their home; for the first time in their lives, they didn’t need to heat it with coal bricks. Countless other East Germans, too, renovated and built, as did cities. East Germany’s infamously drab cities turned colorful. As the German government notes in the 2020 edition of its annual report on the state of German reunification, since 1990 the GDP per capita in the new states, excluding Berlin, has quadrupled.
But as Schröder pointed out, “people get used to good things very easily. Now some are complaining that we’ve got fewer millionaires here in the former East than they have in the West. But how would having more millionaires in my part of the country improve my life?” He may be right, but a permanent unhappiness does seem to have taken root in the former East Germany. According to the German government’s 2020 reunification report, in both halves of German less than 1 percent of the population is opposed to the idea of democracy. However, in the Eastern states, 12.7 percent of people are opposed to the way it works in Germany, compared to 6.3 percent in the Western ones, and the percentage in the new states is rising. This unhappiness may explain the disproportionate support for the populist Alternative for Germany party in the former East.
For the rest of the world, though, Germany’s reunification was the most audacious—and perhaps successful—geopolitical experiment to have been attempted for decades; a failure would have massive implications, not just for Germany itself but for Europe as a whole. From her retirement perch in the U.K. House of Lords, Thatcher saw little German angst, aggressiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, or sentimentality. On the contrary, reunited Germany turned out to be a moderate, sometimes even modest, nation. Much like the old West Germany, it established itself as an economic powerhouse, a staunch supporter of European integration—Kohl’s swan song was the introduction of the euro—and a nation exceptionally hesitant to use its armed forces.
Perhaps because of its distaste for military adventures, Germany has developed into the world’s cornerstone of sensible power. It has survived economic downturns better than other countries and has led the European Union through emergencies including the 2010 debt crisis. It has dealt with the 2015 refugee crisis. Financially, the former East Germany is now at the same level of GDP as many French regions, while even Poland—considered a post-Cold War economic success story—is much further behind. Federally structured though it is, Germany has even put in a stellar performance during the COVID-19 crisis. “I’m a little bit proud of Germany,” Gabriel said. “Mrs. Merkel is the most respected leader in the world, and many people want to come and live here.”
Except for its charming pedestrian-crossing signals, known as the Ampelmännchen; a few museums; and people’s nostalgia, little of East Germany remains. This Oct. 3, as every Oct. 3, reunification will be celebrated with an official tribute in Berlin and lots of celebrations around the country (all socially distanced, of course). Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Schröder and other East German deputies from 30 years ago won’t be able to attend, but they will commemorate the day on their own. And Gabriel will gather people outside his church in a village east of Berlin, where they will join with people all over the country in singing songs including the Scorpions’ “Wind of Change,” Martin Luther’s “Now Thank We All Our God,” and the Jewish song “Hevenu Shalom Aleichem.” “People ridiculed the thing about blossoming landscapes, but it has become reality,” Gabriel reflected. Germany’s reunification may not yet be complete, but this Oct. 3 is a day to celebrate—not just for the Germans.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--South Korea Doesn’t Need U.S. Military Babysitting

The U.S. Defense Department has reportedly given President Donald Trump options for reducing America ’ s force levels in South Korea .
When asked about the report , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper carefully sidestepped the issue , saying that he had ordered no reduction .
With the United States and South Korea deadlocked in negotiations over host nation support , a troop withdrawal of some level seems the logical next step for the Trump administration .
The proposal has naturally horrified official Washington , as did the president ’ s insistence on drawing down forces in such diverse nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost universal agreement across partisan and ideological lines that in foreign policy whatever is must forever be .
No matter how the international environment changes , no U.S. defense commitment or deployment can ever be reduced—only , at most , mildly shuffled .
There were good reasons for Americans ending up on the Korean Peninsula .
Continued U.S. support was essential for the South ’ s survival in the aftermath of the Korean War .
Seoul remained vulnerable to both subversion and invasion .
The ravaged country was desperately poor and suffered under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syngman Rhee .
In contrast , the North enjoyed a fuller economic recovery and retained support from both the Soviet Union and China .
However , that world soon disappeared .
After Rhee ’ s overthrow , Gen. Park Chung-hee eventually took control and set the South Korean economy on a course of reform .
Political freedom took longer to arrive , but today South Korea is a stable democracy with an economy that ranks in the world ’ s top dozen .
It is the North that is an economic wreck .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ visited Pyongyang , the regime ’ s showcase , in 1992 .
At least half a million North Koreans died of starvation later that decade .
Although the capital was free of oxen and more colorful when I returned three years ago , no one would confuse the two nations .
The South ’ s GDP is estimated to be more than 50 times bigger and population to be twice as large .
Moreover , no one imagines Russian or Chinese military intervention to back the North in war .
North Korean leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
South Korea leads on every measure of national power except the military—and even that is a quantitative advantage .
South Korea ’ s soldiers are better trained , and its weapons are more advanced .
Any difference in numbers is a matter of choice .
There is no special gravitational anomaly that prevents the nation to the south from building a larger military than the one in the north .
Only the temptation to rely on the United States to cover the gap .
President Richard Nixon began the drawdown process , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ half-century later , there is no military reason to maintain U.S. forces on the peninsula .
Instead , the response seems to be mostly emotional and symbolic .
Consider U.S. Sen. Ben Sasse ’ s strange outburst : “ Our aim is to give the Chinese communist leadership and the nuclear nut tyrannizing his North Korean subjects something to think about before they mess with us.
” The North has never been interested in “ messing ” with America .
It is an evil regime but one largely obsessed with maintaining its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ glories .
Kim is not interested in leaving this world in a radioactive funeral pyre in Pyongyang .
It is because he understands the threat of U.S. action against North Korea that he almost certainly will never yield his nuclear arsenal .
He saw all too well what happened to Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya .
U.S. troops in the South are not defending the United States .
As for South Korea , why can ’ t it provide the force necessary to stop the North from “ messing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Seoul just proposed its largest military budget ever for next year , and there is talk of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines .
Duyeon Kim of the International Crisis Group has noted that many South Koreans believe the alliance should be based on “ common values.
” No doubt , sharing the latter is useful , but U.S. defense commitments should be based on necessity , not charity .
On the Korean Peninsula , the balance of power has shifted irrevocably .
The U.S. presence has turned from security guarantee to military subsidy , essentially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defend itself .
American forces also do nothing to deter North Korea ’ s reliance on nuclear weapons .
To the contrary , U.S. units are essentially nuclear hostages , within easy reach of the North .
Historically the United States maintained a tripwire to ensure involvement in any war on the peninsula , but such a deployment loses its raison d ’ être if Seoul takes over its conventional defense .
As for China , a U.S. army division in South Korea is but an annoyance .
The United States is unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holds for U.S.-China relations .
Moreover , anyone who imagines that Seoul will allow Washington to use South Korean bases for operations against China for anything other than defense of the South , a very unlikely target for Beijing , is living in an alternate universe .
Seoul refused to criticize China over the crackdown in Hong Kong .
No South Korean government would make itself a military target by supporting U.S. military operations to defend Taiwan , the Senkaku Islands , or Scarborough Shoal .
China has a long memory , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States eventually leaves , whether in five or 50 years ’ time .
So if Beijing decides to “ mess ” with America , U.S. policymakers should not plan on using forces based in South Korea .
If Uncle Sam were not essentially bankrupt , lavishing largesse on friends might not be so bad .
But Washington entered 2020 having borrowed nearly $ 1 trillion last year .
This year , the red ink likely will exceed $ 4 trillion , and that is before the third bailout that an election-minded president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Next year , the federal government will borrow at least $ 2 trillion .
In succeeding years , entitlement spending will burgeon as more baby boomers retire .
Even the Pentagon will have to start setting priorities .
Of course , the military commitment to South Korea is not the only one that warrants review .
If war between China and Japan is a real responsibility , why does Tokyo continue to limit its military spending to an anemic 1 percent of GDP ?
The historical issues are real but 75 years in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected to carry the burden of wealthy nations that perpetually underinvest in their defense .
The case of Europe is similar .
Most European states feel little threat from Russia , and those that do expect America to deal with any problems .
Hence even the most vulnerable nations to the east that loudly clamor for U.S. troops devote barely 2 percent of their GDPs to their armed forces .
The continent enjoys an enormous edge over Russia : 11 to 1 in economic strength , 5 to 1 in military outlays , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Why must the United States babysit the continent decades after the Soviet Union ’ s collapse ?
Circumstances change .
So should U.S. security guarantees and force deployments .
The Cold War is over .
South Korea has raced ahead of the North .
The United States faces severe financial distress that will only worsen .
Seven decades after the start of the Korean War would be a good time to rethink America ’ s many overseas commitments , including to Seoul , and adjust them to the changing world around us .

The U.S. Defense Department has reportedly given President Donald Trump options for reducing America’s force levels in South Korea. When asked about the report, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper carefully sidestepped the issue, saying that he had ordered no reduction. With the United States and South Korea deadlocked in negotiations over host nation support, a troop withdrawal of some level seems the logical next step for the Trump administration.
The U.S. Defense Department has reportedly given President Donald Trump options for reducing America’s force levels in South Korea. When asked about the report, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper carefully sidestepped the issue, saying that he had ordered no reduction. With the United States and South Korea deadlocked in negotiations over host nation support, a troop withdrawal of some level seems the logical next step for the Trump administration.
The proposal has naturally horrified official Washington, as did the president’s insistence on drawing down forces in such diverse nations as Syria and Germany. There is almost universal agreement across partisan and ideological lines that in foreign policy whatever is must forever be. No matter how the international environment changes, no U.S. defense commitment or deployment can ever be reduced—only, at most, mildly shuffled.
There were good reasons for Americans ending up on the Korean Peninsula. Continued U.S. support was essential for the South’s survival in the aftermath of the Korean War. Seoul remained vulnerable to both subversion and invasion. The ravaged country was desperately poor and suffered under the unpopular, despotic, and aged Syngman Rhee. In contrast, the North enjoyed a fuller economic recovery and retained support from both the Soviet Union and China.
However, that world soon disappeared.
After Rhee’s overthrow, Gen. Park Chung-hee eventually took control and set the South Korean economy on a course of reform. Political freedom took longer to arrive, but today South Korea is a stable democracy with an economy that ranks in the world’s top dozen.
It is the North that is an economic wreck. I saw ox carts when I first visited Pyongyang, the regime’s showcase, in 1992. At least half a million North Koreans died of starvation later that decade. Although the capital was free of oxen and more colorful when I returned three years ago, no one would confuse the two nations. The South’s GDP is estimated to be more than 50 times bigger and population to be twice as large.
Moreover, no one imagines Russian or Chinese military intervention to back the North in war. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is on his own. South Korea leads on every measure of national power except the military—and even that is a quantitative advantage. South Korea’s soldiers are better trained, and its weapons are more advanced. Any difference in numbers is a matter of choice. There is no special gravitational anomaly that prevents the nation to the south from building a larger military than the one in the north. Only the temptation to rely on the United States to cover the gap.
President Richard Nixon began the drawdown process, withdrawing a U.S. Army division. A half-century later, there is no military reason to maintain U.S. forces on the peninsula. Instead, the response seems to be mostly emotional and symbolic. Consider U.S. Sen. Ben Sasse’s strange outburst: “Our aim is to give the Chinese communist leadership and the nuclear nut tyrannizing his North Korean subjects something to think about before they mess with us.”
The North has never been interested in “messing” with America. It is an evil regime but one largely obsessed with maintaining its own power and status, not suicidal ideological glories. Kim is not interested in leaving this world in a radioactive funeral pyre in Pyongyang. It is because he understands the threat of U.S. action against North Korea that he almost certainly will never yield his nuclear arsenal. He saw all too well what happened to Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya. U.S. troops in the South are not defending the United States.
As for South Korea, why can’t it provide the force necessary to stop the North from “messing” with it? After all, Seoul just proposed its largest military budget ever for next year, and there is talk of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. Duyeon Kim of the International Crisis Group has noted that many South Koreans believe the alliance should be based on “common values.” No doubt, sharing the latter is useful, but U.S. defense commitments should be based on necessity, not charity.
On the Korean Peninsula, the balance of power has shifted irrevocably. The U.S. presence has turned from security guarantee to military subsidy, essentially welfare to a well-heeled friend able to defend itself. American forces also do nothing to deter North Korea’s reliance on nuclear weapons. To the contrary, U.S. units are essentially nuclear hostages, within easy reach of the North. Historically the United States maintained a tripwire to ensure involvement in any war on the peninsula, but such a deployment loses its raison d’être if Seoul takes over its conventional defense.
As for China, a U.S. army division in South Korea is but an annoyance. The United States is unlikely to invade Manchuria, whatever the future holds for U.S.-China relations. Moreover, anyone who imagines that Seoul will allow Washington to use South Korean bases for operations against China for anything other than defense of the South, a very unlikely target for Beijing, is living in an alternate universe.
Seoul refused to criticize China over the crackdown in Hong Kong. No South Korean government would make itself a military target by supporting U.S. military operations to defend Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, or Scarborough Shoal. China has a long memory, and it will remain a neighbor when the United States eventually leaves, whether in five or 50 years’ time. So if Beijing decides to “mess” with America, U.S. policymakers should not plan on using forces based in South Korea.
If Uncle Sam were not essentially bankrupt, lavishing largesse on friends might not be so bad. But Washington entered 2020 having borrowed nearly $1 trillion last year. This year, the red ink likely will exceed $4 trillion, and that is before the third bailout that an election-minded president and Congress seem certain to approve. Next year, the federal government will borrow at least $2 trillion. In succeeding years, entitlement spending will burgeon as more baby boomers retire. Even the Pentagon will have to start setting priorities.
Of course, the military commitment to South Korea is not the only one that warrants review. If war between China and Japan is a real responsibility, why does Tokyo continue to limit its military spending to an anemic 1 percent of GDP? The historical issues are real but 75 years in the past. Washington should not be expected to carry the burden of wealthy nations that perpetually underinvest in their defense.
The case of Europe is similar. Most European states feel little threat from Russia, and those that do expect America to deal with any problems. Hence even the most vulnerable nations to the east that loudly clamor for U.S. troops devote barely 2 percent of their GDPs to their armed forces. The continent enjoys an enormous edge over Russia: 11 to 1 in economic strength, 5 to 1 in military outlays, 3 to 1 in population size. Why must the United States babysit the continent decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse?
Circumstances change. So should U.S. security guarantees and force deployments. The Cold War is over. South Korea has raced ahead of the North. The United States faces severe financial distress that will only worsen. Seven decades after the start of the Korean War would be a good time to rethink America’s many overseas commitments, including to Seoul, and adjust them to the changing world around us.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Saudi Arabia Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Rejoin the U.N. Human Rights Council

Saudi Arabia Shouldn ’ t Be Allowed to Rejoin the U.N. Human Rights Council This week , Saudi Arabia is bidding to rejoin the United Nations Human Rights Council .
After leaving the institution on Jan. 1 upon serving the maximum number of consecutive terms , the country is once again tossing its hat in the ring for a seat on the council .
If Saudi Arabia succeeds , it will show the world that as long as a state has powerful friends and a limitless public relations budget , it can torture and execute its people , including children @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s poor track record on human rights is no secret .
Last month , the killers of Jamal Khashoggi , the Washington Post columnist who was murdered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018 , saw their sentences reduced—something U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard called the final act of a “ well-rehearsed parody of justice.
” ( The individuals who ordered the execution continue to walk free . )
Meanwhile , the women ’ s rights defender Loujain al-Hathloul and her fellow activists remain in prison , awaiting trial for the supposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the right to drive .
Hathloul ’ s family hasn ’ t been able to talk to her for two months , and they are terrified that she is being tortured again , after being whipped , electrocuted , and sexually assaulted upon her arrest in 2018 .
This much alone should disqualify Saudi Arabia from membership in the Human Rights Council .
But in the testimony I submitted to the council ’ s 45th regular session in Geneva as a capital defense lawyer , I focused on my own area of expertise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalty to crush dissent .
Despite recent reports to the contrary , the kingdom is still a country where children can be executed for attending peaceful protests .
The gulf between rhetoric and reality is a key feature of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ’ s Saudi Arabia , and especially Vision 2030—his plan to diversify the economy , make it less dependent upon oil revenue , and promote tolerance and moderation in Saudi society .
While the Vision 2030 brochure talks of becoming “ an exemplary and leading nation in all aspects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still forbidden from forming trade unions , political parties , or human rights groups .
While the Twitter account for the Saudi Human Rights Commission showcases pioneering female engineers , doctors and diplomats , women who dare to speak up for themselves suffer appalling consequences .
The gulf between rhetoric and reality is a key feature of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ’ s Saudi Arabia .
Nothing illustrates the contrast between the regime ’ s words and actions more than its use of the death penalty .
In 2018 , on his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Mohammed bin Salman told Time that he planned to “ minimize ” the use of capital punishment .
That same year , the government introduced the 2018 Juvenile Law , which would ostensibly limit the kingdom ’ s ability to execute minors .
The Saudis told the U.N. Human Rights Council in November 2018 , with no room for misinterpretation , that the Juvenile Law would protect children from execution .
The following year , there were 185 executions in Saudi Arabia , the most ever during King Salman ’ s reign—including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least three of whom were children at the time of their alleged crimes .
Under Saudi criminal law , there are three categories of death sentences : hudud death sentences are mandated by the interpretation of the sharia legal system favored in Saudi Arabia ; qisas sentences are sought in retribution by the family of a murder victim ; and tazir sentences are handed down by a judge .
The 2018 Juvenile Law only applies to tazir death sentences .
And while the royal decree announced this year has not been published @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a similarly limited scope .
So prosecutors are still able to charge children with capital crimes .
In one ongoing case , prosecutors are seeking hudud death sentences for five young men , including Mohammed al-Faraj , whose alleged offenses took place when they were minors .
Faraj and his friends were arrested outside of a bowling alley in Medina when he was 15 while on vacation with seven friends , four of whom were also underage .
The charges against him include sending text messages to a man supposedly wanted by Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hometown of Awamiyah , including that of his uncle , when he was just 9 years old .
The crimes , according to the prosecutors , amount to waging war against God .
Sources indicate that Faraj could begin his trial in late October .
I have witnessed the cruelty of Saudi Arabia ’ s criminal justice system in my own work .
My client Ali al-Nimr was arrested in 2012 at the age of 17 .
He was tortured into giving a false confession , convicted of supposed terrorism offenses for taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to death .
Since exhausting his appeals , Nimr has spent five years wondering whether each day will be his last .
The Saudi Human Rights Commission announced in August that his death sentence will be reviewed , along with those of two others convicted of childhood crimes , Dawood al-Marhoon and Abdullah al-Zaher .
But the statement didn ’ t provide details on when or how this review will occur , and instead peddled platitudes about human rights being a “ key pillar of the Vision 2030 platform for transformation.
” For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prestige on the international stage without facing adequate scrutiny .
Although the COVID-19 pandemic has constrained Saudi Arabia ’ s presidency of the G-20 , heads of state are due to gather in Riyadh in November .
The same day that Khashoggi ’ s five killers had their sentences commuted , Mohammed bin Salman called French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin to make arrangements for the summit .
Some progress finally came when the session to assess Saudi Arabia ’ s candidacy for the Human Rights Council got underway in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 29 countries led by Denmark released a joint statement expressing concern that “ civil society , human rights defenders , journalists and political opposition still face persecution , detention and intimidation ” in the kingdom .
This was an important step , but it did not go far enough .
As long as the Mohammed bin Salman regime enjoys the United States ’ apparently unconditional support , it will continue to violate human rights without punishment .
As the 29 countries noted in their statement , members of the Human Rights Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human rights record.
” Scrutiny without consequences is meaningless .
A country that tortures and executes its citizens for exercising their right to free expression should not be on the council .

This week, Saudi Arabia is bidding to rejoin the United Nations Human Rights Council. After leaving the institution on Jan. 1 upon serving the maximum number of consecutive terms, the country is once again tossing its hat in the ring for a seat on the council. If Saudi Arabia succeeds, it will show the world that as long as a state has powerful friends and a limitless public relations budget, it can torture and execute its people, including children, with impunity.
This week, Saudi Arabia is bidding to rejoin the United Nations Human Rights Council. After leaving the institution on Jan. 1 upon serving the maximum number of consecutive terms, the country is once again tossing its hat in the ring for a seat on the council. If Saudi Arabia succeeds, it will show the world that as long as a state has powerful friends and a limitless public relations budget, it can torture and execute its people, including children, with impunity.
Saudi Arabia’s poor track record on human rights is no secret. Last month, the killers of Jamal Khashoggi, the Washington Post columnist who was murdered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018, saw their sentences reduced—something U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard called the final act of a “well-rehearsed parody of justice.” (The individuals who ordered the execution continue to walk free.)
Meanwhile, the women’s rights defender Loujain al-Hathloul and her fellow activists remain in prison, awaiting trial for the supposed crime of advocating for women to have the right to drive. Hathloul’s family hasn’t been able to talk to her for two months, and they are terrified that she is being tortured again, after being whipped, electrocuted, and sexually assaulted upon her arrest in 2018.
This much alone should disqualify Saudi Arabia from membership in the Human Rights Council. But in the testimony I submitted to the council’s 45th regular session in Geneva as a capital defense lawyer, I focused on my own area of expertise: how Saudi Arabia uses the death penalty to crush dissent. Despite recent reports to the contrary, the kingdom is still a country where children can be executed for attending peaceful protests.
In April, it was widely reported that Saudi Arabia had eliminated the death penalty for minors. Four months later, the royal decree that supposedly mandates this reform remains unpublished. And while the kingdom’s Human Rights Commission has told journalists and diplomats that the decree will be applied retroactively, the families of young men on death row have been kept in the dark. This is just another expression of the secrecy built into the judicial system—after all, parents receive no warning when their children are executed, and the bodies are not returned.
The gulf between rhetoric and reality is a key feature of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia, and especially Vision 2030—his plan to diversify the economy, make it less dependent upon oil revenue, and promote tolerance and moderation in Saudi society. While the Vision 2030 brochure talks of becoming “an exemplary and leading nation in all aspects” within a decade, Saudis are still forbidden from forming trade unions, political parties, or human rights groups. While the Twitter account for the Saudi Human Rights Commission showcases pioneering female engineers, doctors , and diplomats, women who dare to speak up for themselves suffer appalling consequences.
The gulf between rhetoric and reality is a key feature of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia.
Nothing illustrates the contrast between the regime’s words and actions more than its use of the death penalty. In 2018, on his highly publicized tour of the United States, Mohammed bin Salman told Time that he planned to “minimize” the use of capital punishment. That same year, the government introduced the 2018 Juvenile Law, which would ostensibly limit the kingdom’s ability to execute minors. The Saudis told the U.N. Human Rights Council in November 2018, with no room for misinterpretation, that the Juvenile Law would protect children from execution. The following year, there were 185 executions in Saudi Arabia, the most ever during King Salman’s reign—including 37 people on a single day, at least three of whom were children at the time of their alleged crimes.
Under Saudi criminal law, there are three categories of death sentences: hudud death sentences are mandated by the interpretation of the sharia legal system favored in Saudi Arabia; qisas sentences are sought in retribution by the family of a murder victim; and tazir sentences are handed down by a judge. The 2018 Juvenile Law only applies to tazir death sentences. And while the royal decree announced this year has not been published, an unofficial version posted online has a similarly limited scope. So prosecutors are still able to charge children with capital crimes.
In one ongoing case, prosecutors are seeking hudud death sentences for five young men, including Mohammed al-Faraj, whose alleged offenses took place when they were minors. Faraj and his friends were arrested outside of a bowling alley in Medina when he was 15 while on vacation with seven friends, four of whom were also underage. The charges against him include sending text messages to a man supposedly wanted by Saudi security services and attending funerals in his hometown of Awamiyah, including that of his uncle, when he was just 9 years old. The crimes, according to the prosecutors, amount to waging war against God. Sources indicate that Faraj could begin his trial in late October.
I have witnessed the cruelty of Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system in my own work. My client Ali al-Nimr was arrested in 2012 at the age of 17. He was tortured into giving a false confession, convicted of supposed terrorism offenses for taking part in anti-government protests, and sentenced to death. Since exhausting his appeals, Nimr has spent five years wondering whether each day will be his last. The Saudi Human Rights Commission announced in August that his death sentence will be reviewed, along with those of two others convicted of childhood crimes, Dawood al-Marhoon and Abdullah al-Zaher. But the statement didn’t provide details on when or how this review will occur, and instead peddled platitudes about human rights being a “key pillar of the Vision 2030 platform for transformation.”
There are surely powerful people within Saudi Arabia who recognize that fundamental criminal justice reform is essential to achieving the kingdom’s Vision 2030 goals, but that sort of transformation still seems beyond reach. Indeed, Faisal al-Fadil, a member of the Shura Council, the kingdom’s formal advisory body, recently called for tazir death sentences to be scrapped—a change that would halve the number of executions—but this was in a private briefing, not public policy, and it is impossible to know whether it will lead to change.
For now, Saudi Arabia continues to enjoy prestige on the international stage without facing adequate scrutiny. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has constrained Saudi Arabia’s presidency of the G-20, heads of state are due to gather in Riyadh in November. The same day that Khashoggi’s five killers had their sentences commuted, Mohammed bin Salman called French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin to make arrangements for the summit.
Some progress finally came when the session to assess Saudi Arabia’s candidacy for the Human Rights Council got underway in Geneva on Sept. 14. A group of 29 countries led by Denmark released a joint statement expressing concern that “civil society, human rights defenders, journalists and political opposition still face persecution, detention and intimidation” in the kingdom. This was an important step, but it did not go far enough. As long as the Mohammed bin Salman regime enjoys the United States’ apparently unconditional support, it will continue to violate human rights without punishment.
As the 29 countries noted in their statement, members of the Human Rights Council “must expect public scrutiny of their human rights record.” Scrutiny without consequences is meaningless. A country that tortures and executes its citizens for exercising their right to free expression should not be on the council.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-03--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

U.S. President Donald Trump has run the United States ’ foreign policy and military for almost four years .
Despite—or because of—that , his reelection campaign ’ s newly released list of former national security officials who support the president features perhaps the most unimpressive slate of endorsements ever assembled by a U.S. presidential candidate , let alone an incumbent Republican .
Meanwhile , the United States risks falling behind China and Europe in the clean energy race as it continues to rely on the shale revolution while maintaining a shortsighted approach to energy innovation .
And the Narendra Modi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Amnesty International—the latest target of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ’ s crackdown on independent scrutiny of India ’ s human rights problems .
1 .
Where Are the Trump Loyalists ?
After almost four years in the White House , U.S. President Donald Trump still has few respected foreign-policy supporters .
That much is clear from a letter released by the president ’ s reelection campaign that was intended to have the opposite effect , Garrett M. Graff writes .
2 .
No , Biden Will Not End Trade Wars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the international trade system is collapsing .
But Joe Biden would likely make trade conflicts worse if he becomes president—at least in the short run , Foreign Policy ’ s Edward Alden writes .
3 .
Saudi Arabia Shouldn ’ t Be Allowed to Rejoin the U.N. Human Rights Council Saudi Arabia is once again tossing its hat in the ring for a seat on the international human rights council , but the kingdom is still a country where children can be tortured and executed , the Saudi Arabian capital defense lawyer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is winning the global race to invent and manufacture the technologies to build new green economies .
Europe is at its heels .
The United States , meanwhile , risks falling behind , Sarah Ladislaw and Nikos Tsafos write .
5 .
The Death of Human Rights in India ?
The Modi government appears to be in the midst of an orchestrated campaign to undermine any independent scrutiny of India ’ s human rights record—and Amnesty International is its latest target ,

U.S. President Donald Trump has run the United States’ foreign policy and military for almost four years. Despite—or because of—that, his reelection campaign’s newly released list of former national security officials who support the president features perhaps the most unimpressive slate of endorsements ever assembled by a U.S. presidential candidate, let alone an incumbent Republican.
U.S. President Donald Trump has run the United States’ foreign policy and military for almost four years. Despite—or because of—that, his reelection campaign’s newly released list of former national security officials who support the president features perhaps the most unimpressive slate of endorsements ever assembled by a U.S. presidential candidate, let alone an incumbent Republican.
Meanwhile, the United States risks falling behind China and Europe in the clean energy race as it continues to rely on the shale revolution while maintaining a shortsighted approach to energy innovation.
And the Narendra Modi government in India has frozen the assets of Amnesty International—the latest target of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s crackdown on independent scrutiny of India’s human rights problems.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. President Donald Trump and National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien walk along the Rose Garden colonnade before departing the White House on Sept. 21 in Washington.
After almost four years in the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump still has few respected foreign-policy supporters. That much is clear from a letter released by the president’s reelection campaign that was intended to have the opposite effect, Garrett M. Graff writes.
The German container ship Bremen Express prepares to dock in Miami on June 10, 2019.
After four years of the Trump administration, the international trade system is collapsing. But Joe Biden would likely make trade conflicts worse if he becomes president—at least in the short run, Foreign Policy’s Edward Alden writes.
Young Saudis walk next to a portrait of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Riyadh Season Boulevard in the Saudi capital on Jan. 31.
Saudi Arabia is once again tossing its hat in the ring for a seat on the international human rights council, but the kingdom is still a country where children can be tortured and executed, the Saudi Arabian capital defense lawyer Taha al-Hajji writes.
Chinese workers ride a boat through a large floating solar farm project in Anhui province on June 13, 2017.
For now, China is winning the global race to invent and manufacture the technologies to build new green economies. Europe is at its heels. The United States, meanwhile, risks falling behind, Sarah Ladislaw and Nikos Tsafos write.
A pedestrian walks past the Amnesty International office in Bengaluru on Oct. 26, 2018.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-03--What Happens When Presidents Get Sick?

What Happens When Presidents Get Sick?

What Happens When Presidents Get Sick ?
We have all been living with the uncertainties of the coronavirus for nearly eight months .
Now the twin COVID-19 diagnoses of President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump have propelled the United States—which was already suffering from political bewilderment—into a fraught new reality .
This reality has two dimensions .
In human terms , the United States has entered uncharted waters .
Presidential couples have gotten sick before : In the early 1990s , for example , both President George H.W .
Bush and Barbara Bush struggled with Graves ’ disease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same time—though the disease was treatable and both went on to live very long lives .
President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan also both got sick , with cancer , during their White House years—but these health scares did not occur at the same time .
Never before has a first couple been simultaneously threatened as seriously as today .
Despite White House chief of staff Mark Meadows ’ s statement Friday that Trump was experiencing mild COVID-19 symptoms , and the president ’ s transfer later in the day to the Walter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all likelihood no one—not even Trump—will know the severity of his illness for some time .
Besides the emotional toll this uncertainty will exact , Trump ’ s diagnosis raises a whole set of other , thorny questions about leadership and how to ensure the continuity of government .
If that didn ’ t make the moment alarming enough , all this is also happening in the last month of a bitterly contested presidential election campaign .
If the past is a guide , the complete truth about the president ’ s health—once @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closely held secret .
Most modern White Houses have been excessively parsimonious about sharing information regarding the health of the chief executive .
The absolute nadir of transparency occurred the last time the world suffered a catastrophic pandemic .
In April 1919 , White House doctors covered up President Woodrow Wilson ’ s bout with the flu—even when his fever spiked to 103 degrees for four days—as well as the mild stroke he suffered later that month and the massive stroke that debilitated him that October .
Hiding behind a cloak of lies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ associates , first lady Edith Wilson went on to run the country from the shadows for the remaining 17 months of the president ’ s term .
Wilson ’ s case , while extreme , wasn ’ t that exceptional .
In March 1944 , seven months before that year ’ s election , President Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s doctors concluded that he was suffering from “ acute congestive heart failure ” and began giving him a barbiturate sedative to reduce his stress .
Yet they never told him or the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowing him to seek and win an unprecedented fourth term .
None of that ultimately helped FDR , however ; he died in office just three months after his inauguration .
Things improved somewhat under President Dwight Eisenhower when he suffered a serious heart attack and a small bowel obstruction in his first term and a minor stroke in his second .
Unlike Roosevelt ’ s , Eisenhower ’ s doctors didn ’ t cover up the severity of his heart attack ( though they downplayed the stroke ) .
But this transparency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of President John F. Kennedy , whose doctors never shared the extent of his chronic Addison ’ s disease—an adrenal deficiency that can lead to life-threatening crises under stress—or disclosed the cocktail of steroids , and , likely , amphetamines , that he took as a remedy .
Starting with the dawn of the nuclear age , in 1947 the U.S. government began creating protocols to ensure the continuity of government in the event of a catastrophic nuclear attack .
But the potential for dishonesty about the health of the commander in chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Eisenhower ’ s illnesses and Kennedy ’ s assassination led to the adoption of the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in February 1967 ; in addition to clarifying the constitutional provision that , on the death of the president , the vice president would become president ( and not just an acting chief executive ) , the measure laid out , for the first time , the method by which an ailing president could voluntarily transfer power to the vice president .
To deal with the possibility that the president and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nature of his disability or illness , the amendment also outlined a complex system for an involuntary transfer of power .
If the vice president and a majority of cabinet members inform Congress in writing that the president is no longer able to discharge his duties , the amendment specifies that the vice president becomes acting president .
If , however , the president is well enough to express his disagreement with his cabinet ’ s judgment , the matter then goes to Congress , which must decide it by a two-thirds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amendment ’ s voluntary system has been used three times .
In 1985 , when he was operated on to remove a malignant tumor on his colon , Reagan transferred power to his vice president , George H.W .
Bush .
In 2002 and 2007 , his son , President George W. Bush , briefly transferred power to Vice President Dick Cheney when he underwent colonoscopies .
The involuntary system , however , has never been tested .
Not since 1944 has the United States faced the realistic possibility that the president could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voting has already begun , Republican Party regulations would permit the party to replace Trump as their candidate in the event of death or serious incapacity .
It is likely , though not automatic , that the party ’ s choice would be Vice President Mike Pence .
Should the president ’ s illness worsen after Nov. 3 , then the 20th Amendment provides some as yet untested guidance on what should happen next .
Were Trump to win but die before the inauguration , Vice President-elect Pence would become president .
Were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in November but die before members of the Electoral College voted in December , then the Republican Party would have to try to encourage electors pledged to Trump to vote for Pence or to give the choice to Congress .
Were Trump to die after the Electoral College vote but before Congress counts the vote and formally declares the winner on Jan. 6 , then Pence would become acting president on Jan. 20 , a position he ’ d hold until Congress chose a new president .
Were the president-elect to merely become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 25th Amendment provides any guidance for what would happen next .
To help reduce this massive uncertainty , Americans deserve daily updates on Trump ’ s health .
The president may not welcome the idea of sharing information that does not seem to promise a quick and full recovery , but any attempt to spin the truth now will only increase the likelihood that good news about the president ’ s recovery won ’ t be believed later .
Presidential illnesses always put vice presidents in an awkward position , but the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to show that the top of the ticket is robust has historically blocked any demonstrations of leadership from the bottom of the ticket .
But the country can ill afford such reticence now .
Millions of Americans are sick or recovering from COVID-19 .
The country desperately needs steady leadership .
Allies and adversaries also require clear signals that the business of the U.S. government will continue regardless of the health of the president .
The best solution , of course , would be for Trump and the first lady to get better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deepen the mistrust , anger , and trepidation many Americans already feel about the November election and the future of the country .
If , however , the president ’ s illness lingers and becomes debilitating , then he will need to acknowledge , for the first time since 2016 , that he can not govern alone and voluntarily relinquish power—if only temporarily—to Pence .
No presidential candidate , let alone a sitting president seeking reelection , has ever faced such a dilemma before .
We can only hope that Trump proves up @ @ @ @

We have all been living with the uncertainties of the coronavirus for nearly eight months. Now the twin COVID-19 diagnoses of President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump have propelled the United States—which was already suffering from political bewilderment—into a fraught new reality. This reality has two dimensions. In human terms, the United States has entered uncharted waters. Presidential couples have gotten sick before: In the early 1990s, for example, both President George H.W. Bush and Barbara Bush struggled with Graves’ disease, an autoimmune disorder, at the same time—though the disease was treatable and both went on to live very long lives. President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan also both got sick, with cancer, during their White House years—but these health scares did not occur at the same time. Never before has a first couple been simultaneously threatened as seriously as today.
We have all been living with the uncertainties of the coronavirus for nearly eight months. Now the twin COVID-19 diagnoses of President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump have propelled the United States—which was already suffering from political bewilderment—into a fraught new reality. This reality has two dimensions. In human terms, the United States has entered uncharted waters. Presidential couples have gotten sick before: In the early 1990s, for example, both President George H.W. Bush and Barbara Bush struggled with Graves’ disease, an autoimmune disorder, at the same time—though the disease was treatable and both went on to live very long lives. President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan also both got sick, with cancer, during their White House years—but these health scares did not occur at the same time. Never before has a first couple been simultaneously threatened as seriously as today.
Despite White House chief of staff Mark Meadows’s statement Friday that Trump was experiencing mild COVID-19 symptoms, and the president’s transfer later in the day to the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, in all likelihood no one—not even Trump—will know the severity of his illness for some time. Besides the emotional toll this uncertainty will exact, Trump’s diagnosis raises a whole set of other, thorny questions about leadership and how to ensure the continuity of government. If that didn’t make the moment alarming enough, all this is also happening in the last month of a bitterly contested presidential election campaign.
If the past is a guide, the complete truth about the president’s health—once it becomes clear to insiders—will remain a closely held secret. Most modern White Houses have been excessively parsimonious about sharing information regarding the health of the chief executive. The absolute nadir of transparency occurred the last time the world suffered a catastrophic pandemic. In April 1919, White House doctors covered up President Woodrow Wilson’s bout with the flu—even when his fever spiked to 103 degrees for four days—as well as the mild stroke he suffered later that month and the massive stroke that debilitated him that October. Hiding behind a cloak of lies and relying on a phalanx of enabling associates, first lady Edith Wilson went on to run the country from the shadows for the remaining 17 months of the president’s term.
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson goes over papers at his desk with his wife, Edith Wilson in the mid-910s. Edith was sometimes referred to as the “secret president" because of the role she played in Wilson's presidency during his debilitating illness following a stroke.
Wilson’s case, while extreme, wasn’t that exceptional. In March 1944, seven months before that year’s election, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s doctors concluded that he was suffering from “acute congestive heart failure” and began giving him a barbiturate sedative to reduce his stress. Yet they never told him or the country the full extent of his disability, allowing him to seek and win an unprecedented fourth term. None of that ultimately helped FDR, however; he died in office just three months after his inauguration.
Things improved somewhat under President Dwight Eisenhower when he suffered a serious heart attack and a small bowel obstruction in his first term and a minor stroke in his second. Unlike Roosevelt’s, Eisenhower’s doctors didn’t cover up the severity of his heart attack (though they downplayed the stroke). But this transparency didn’t last into the administration of President John F. Kennedy, whose doctors never shared the extent of his chronic Addison’s disease—an adrenal deficiency that can lead to life-threatening crises under stress—or disclosed the cocktail of steroids, and, likely, amphetamines, that he took as a remedy.
Starting with the dawn of the nuclear age, in 1947 the U.S. government began creating protocols to ensure the continuity of government in the event of a catastrophic nuclear attack. But the potential for dishonesty about the health of the commander in chief remained a glaring problem. The mishandling of Eisenhower’s illnesses and Kennedy’s assassination led to the adoption of the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in February 1967; in addition to clarifying the constitutional provision that, on the death of the president, the vice president would become president (and not just an acting chief executive), the measure laid out, for the first time, the method by which an ailing president could voluntarily transfer power to the vice president. To deal with the possibility that the president and his doctors might not be honest about the nature of his disability or illness, the amendment also outlined a complex system for an involuntary transfer of power. If the vice president and a majority of cabinet members inform Congress in writing that the president is no longer able to discharge his duties, the amendment specifies that the vice president becomes acting president. If, however, the president is well enough to express his disagreement with his cabinet’s judgment, the matter then goes to Congress, which must decide it by a two-thirds vote.
So far, the 25th Amendment’s voluntary system has been used three times. In 1985, when he was operated on to remove a malignant tumor on his colon, Reagan transferred power to his vice president, George H.W. Bush. In 2002 and 2007, his son, President George W. Bush, briefly transferred power to Vice President Dick Cheney when he underwent colonoscopies. The involuntary system, however, has never been tested.
Not since 1944 has the United States faced the realistic possibility that the president could become incapacitated during an election. Although voting has already begun, Republican Party regulations would permit the party to replace Trump as their candidate in the event of death or serious incapacity. It is likely, though not automatic, that the party’s choice would be Vice President Mike Pence. Should the president’s illness worsen after Nov. 3, then the 20th Amendment provides some as yet untested guidance on what should happen next. Were Trump to win but die before the inauguration, Vice President-elect Pence would become president. Were Trump to amass a majority of votes in November but die before members of the Electoral College voted in December, then the Republican Party would have to try to encourage electors pledged to Trump to vote for Pence or to give the choice to Congress. Were Trump to die after the Electoral College vote but before Congress counts the vote and formally declares the winner on Jan. 6, then Pence would become acting president on Jan. 20, a position he’d hold until Congress chose a new president. Were the president-elect to merely become incapacitated, neither the 20th nor the 25th Amendment provides any guidance for what would happen next.
To help reduce this massive uncertainty, Americans deserve daily updates on Trump’s health. The president may not welcome the idea of sharing information that does not seem to promise a quick and full recovery, but any attempt to spin the truth now will only increase the likelihood that good news about the president’s recovery won’t be believed later.
Presidential illnesses always put vice presidents in an awkward position, but the election has complicated that too. The desire to show that the top of the ticket is robust has historically blocked any demonstrations of leadership from the bottom of the ticket. But the country can ill afford such reticence now. Millions of Americans are sick or recovering from COVID-19. The country desperately needs steady leadership. Allies and adversaries also require clear signals that the business of the U.S. government will continue regardless of the health of the president.
The best solution, of course, would be for Trump and the first lady to get better quickly. Any other outcome will only deepen the mistrust, anger, and trepidation many Americans already feel about the November election and the future of the country. If, however, the president’s illness lingers and becomes debilitating, then he will need to acknowledge, for the first time since 2016, that he cannot govern alone and voluntarily relinquish power—if only temporarily—to Pence. No presidential candidate, let alone a sitting president seeking reelection, has ever faced such a dilemma before. We can only hope that Trump proves up to the challenge.