foreignpolicy--2020-08-12--Why Belarus Is Not Ukraine

Why Belarus Is Not Ukraine

Why Belarus Is Not Ukraine Scenes in Belarus of protesters erecting crude barricades while fending off the attacks of heavily armored riot police have evoked memories of another uprising in the borderlands between Russia and the European Union : the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that erupted in Kyiv ’ s Maidan square , an uprising that drove out the country ’ s kleptocrat president and ushered in a new , if complicated , era in Ukraine .
The similarities certainly have not escaped Belarus ’ s authoritarian leader , Aleksandr Lukashenko , who claimed a sixth presidential term Sunday in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ As I have warned , there will be no Maidan , no matter how much anyone wants one , ” he said on Monday , just as the protests began picking up steam .
But despite the similar , gruesome optics , the differences between the two uprisings far outweigh their similarities , though the two countries may both be neighbors and former Soviet Republics .
Those differences make it harder to look to Ukraine as a potential road map for how the events in Belarus may unfold .
For starters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than Ukraine was or is .
In his quarter-century in power , Lukashenko has built a machine of repression that is a lot bigger , more pervasive , and nastier than anything in post-Soviet Ukraine—making the risks faced by protesters in Minsk and other cities a lot higher than they were six years ago in Ukraine .
In the three days since the presidential elections , deemed neither free nor fair by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the European Union ’ s Foreign Minister Josep Borrell , 6,000 people have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deaths have been reported in relation to the crackdown .
While the Ukrainian revolution ultimately claimed around 100 lives ( not including over 13,000 people who died in years of low-intensity armed conflict in the eastern part of the country ) , the first deaths in Ukraine didn ’ t come until after protesters had been on the street for two months .
Lukashenko didn ’ t wait two nights .
That highlights just how determined the Belarus authorities are to crush the incipient protests before they gain momentum—and the courage of protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , tear gas , and flash grenades .
On Wednesday , the police in Belarus confirmed that they had used live ammunition against protesters in the city of Brest and that one person was injured .
“ I didn ’ t expect such resilience from Belarusians , they ’ re amazing , simply amazing .
Going and knowing they ’ re risking their lives , it ’ s simply beautiful , ” said Andrei Sannikov , who ran against Lukashenko in the presidential election in 2010 and was later imprisoned for 16 months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sham vote .
“ You watch it with pride and tears in your eyes , ” he said .
On Wednesday , protesters gathered outside a detention center in Minsk , where they could hear the screams of detainees being beaten inside .
“ Hang in there , ” the protesters chanted , according to the independent Russian media outlet MediaZona .
During his 26 years in power , Lukashenko has in many ways replicated the brute-force , centralized system of his Soviet predecessors .
( Lukashenko was the manager of a collective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The country ’ s security services still go by their Soviet-era era name , the KGB , whose elite Alpha Unit was deployed on the streets of Minsk amid the unrest .
Despite the risks , independent media outlets and civil society groups do operate in Belarus , but they face routine harassment by the authorities , stifling red tape , and the threat of arbitrary arrest .
The main opposition candidate , Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , had to flee the country after the vote , following an apparent threat against her children .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of democratic when the Maidan protests broke out .
In 2014 , Ukraine was rated as partly free by Freedom House .
It was a problematic , backsliding democracy where corruption was endemic and violence against journalists was on the rise , but dissent was possible—and politics was not a one-man show .
“ In 2013 [ in Ukraine ] , you had a relatively vibrant civil society .
You had a government which was a very soft authoritarian government , ” said John Herbst , a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of such civic resistance.
” Crucially , elections were largely free and fair in a way they have never been in Lukashenko ’ s Belarus .
While the parliament was stacked with supporters of then-President Viktor Yanukovych , there was a lively opposition that quickly threw its support behind the protests .
Even the downside of Ukrainian politics offered more space for maneuver .
Ukraine ’ s oligarchs , who have long had an outsized and often troublesome role in the country ’ s politics , nevertheless served as an alternative base of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus ’ s wealthy business leaders have negligible political clout .
On the other hand , independent Ukraine was built on a ready-made fault line .
Belarus isn ’ t .
The Ukrainian revolution strained historic and linguistic divides , which were only exacerbated by Russian disinformation and military support as the Kremlin helped foment war in eastern Ukraine , dispatching troops in unmarked uniforms as well as tanks and artillery .
Western Ukraine , once part of the Austro-Hungarian empire , usually looked to the West—as evidenced in the strong support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in that part of the country , the very agreement that sparked the Maidan protests and crackdown in the first place .
In contrast , the eastern part of the country , never gobbled up by the Habsburgs , has almost always been Russian-speaking and oriented toward Moscow .
After the uprisings in 2014 that forced Yanukovych to flee to Russia , pro-Russian separatists in eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk staged independence referendums , going on to form proto-states highly dependent on Moscow ’ s muscle and financial backing .
Belarus , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way of linguistic , religious , or ethnic divides for foreign actors like Russia to exploit .
“ Belarus almost never was split in terms of being part of different countries , ” said Artyom Shraibman , a founder of the Minsk-based political consultancy Sense Analytics , save for the period after World War I when the country was split between Poland and the Soviet Union .
“ Before that , for centuries , Belarus was always part of one single nation , ” he said , creating a fairly homogeneous population with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters had a clear goal .
All that Belarusians have right now is anger and outrage .
The Ukrainian protesters had a clear aim : to steer the country in the direction of Europe and , by extension , toward a more democratic and prosperous future .
The EU Association Agreement that caused the whole uproar would have made Ukraine , if not an EU member state , a trading partner with Western-style rules and regulations .
In consequence , leaders of the protest movement quickly emerged .
A key distinction in Belarus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader , Shraibman said .
“ This is more a protest of anger , than a conscious attempt at toppling the regime , ” he said .
What coordination there is has largely centered around the secure messaging app Telegram , where popular channels share messages that warn protesters of police movements , guide demonstrators to certain neighborhoods , and encourage them to use their cars to deliver supplies and block police vehicles .
This diffuse coordination could actually make it harder for the security services to quash , said Katsiaryna Shmatsina , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Strategic Studies .
“ If we had one clear leader , especially if this leader was in Belarus , we don ’ t know how long he or she would have lasted , ” Shmatsina said .
For all the differences between the two dramatic upheavals , there are some constants .
Should Moscow decide to wade in , it has plenty of points of leverage—many of the same ones it has used against Ukraine—whether cutting off energy supplies , launching cyberattacks , or exploiting Russian-language media in a place where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s a lot of pressure points there , ” said Ben Hodges , who served from 2014 to 2017 as the commanding general of U.S. military forces in Europe .
Update , Aug. 12 , 2020 : This article has been updated to include news of a second death related to the Belarus anti-government protests .

Scenes in Belarus of protesters erecting crude barricades while fending off the attacks of heavily armored riot police have evoked memories of another uprising in the borderlands between Russia and the European Union: the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan square, an uprising that drove out the country’s kleptocrat president and ushered in a new, if complicated, era in Ukraine.
Scenes in Belarus of protesters erecting crude barricades while fending off the attacks of heavily armored riot police have evoked memories of another uprising in the borderlands between Russia and the European Union: the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that erupted in Kyiv’s Maidan square, an uprising that drove out the country’s kleptocrat president and ushered in a new, if complicated, era in Ukraine.
The similarities certainly have not escaped Belarus’s authoritarian leader, Aleksandr Lukashenko, who claimed a sixth presidential term Sunday in an election nearly universally condemned as a farce. “As I have warned, there will be no Maidan, no matter how much anyone wants one,” he said on Monday, just as the protests began picking up steam.
But despite the similar, gruesome optics, the differences between the two uprisings far outweigh their similarities, though the two countries may both be neighbors and former Soviet Republics. Those differences make it harder to look to Ukraine as a potential road map for how the events in Belarus may unfold.
For starters, Belarus is a lot more authoritarian than Ukraine was or is.
In his quarter-century in power, Lukashenko has built a machine of repression that is a lot bigger, more pervasive, and nastier than anything in post-Soviet Ukraine—making the risks faced by protesters in Minsk and other cities a lot higher than they were six years ago in Ukraine.
In the three days since the presidential elections, deemed neither free nor fair by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the European Union’s Foreign Minister Josep Borrell, 6,000 people have been arrested, 250 injured, and two deaths have been reported in relation to the crackdown. While the Ukrainian revolution ultimately claimed around 100 lives (not including over 13,000 people who died in years of low-intensity armed conflict in the eastern part of the country), the first deaths in Ukraine didn’t come until after protesters had been on the street for two months. Lukashenko didn’t wait two nights.
That highlights just how determined the Belarus authorities are to crush the incipient protests before they gain momentum—and the courage of protesters who are braving batons, rubber bullets, tear gas, and flash grenades. On Wednesday, the police in Belarus confirmed that they had used live ammunition against protesters in the city of Brest and that one person was injured.
“I didn’t expect such resilience from Belarusians, they’re amazing, simply amazing. Going and knowing they’re risking their lives, it’s simply beautiful,” said Andrei Sannikov, who ran against Lukashenko in the presidential election in 2010 and was later imprisoned for 16 months for organizing an anti-government protest following the sham vote. “You watch it with pride and tears in your eyes,” he said.
On Wednesday, protesters gathered outside a detention center in Minsk, where they could hear the screams of detainees being beaten inside. “Hang in there,” the protesters chanted, according to the independent Russian media outlet MediaZona.
During his 26 years in power, Lukashenko has in many ways replicated the brute-force, centralized system of his Soviet predecessors. (Lukashenko was the manager of a collective pig farm in Soviet days). The country’s security services still go by their Soviet-era name, the KGB, whose elite Alpha Unit was deployed on the streets of Minsk amid the unrest.
Despite the risks, independent media outlets and civil society groups do operate in Belarus, but they face routine harassment by the authorities, stifling red tape, and the threat of arbitrary arrest. The main opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, had to flee the country after the vote, following an apparent threat against her children.
For another, Ukraine was actually sort of democratic when the Maidan protests broke out.
In 2014, Ukraine was rated as partly free by Freedom House. It was a problematic, backsliding democracy where corruption was endemic and violence against journalists was on the rise, but dissent was possible—and politics was not a one-man show.
“In 2013 [in Ukraine], you had a relatively vibrant civil society. You had a government which was a very soft authoritarian government,” said John Herbst, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. “Belarus does not have a history of such civic resistance.”
Crucially, elections were largely free and fair in a way they have never been in Lukashenko’s Belarus. While the parliament was stacked with supporters of then-President Viktor Yanukovych, there was a lively opposition that quickly threw its support behind the protests. Even the downside of Ukrainian politics offered more space for maneuver. Ukraine’s oligarchs, who have long had an outsized and often troublesome role in the country’s politics, nevertheless served as an alternative base of power as they jockeyed for influence. Belarus’s wealthy business leaders have negligible political clout.
On the other hand, independent Ukraine was built on a ready-made fault line. Belarus isn’t.
The Ukrainian revolution strained historic and linguistic divides, which were only exacerbated by Russian disinformation and military support as the Kremlin helped foment war in eastern Ukraine, dispatching troops in unmarked uniforms as well as tanks and artillery. Western Ukraine, once part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, usually looked to the West—as evidenced in the strong support for an association agreement with the European Union in that part of the country, the very agreement that sparked the Maidan protests and crackdown in the first place. In contrast, the eastern part of the country, never gobbled up by the Habsburgs, has almost always been Russian-speaking and oriented toward Moscow. After the uprisings in 2014 that forced Yanukovych to flee to Russia, pro-Russian separatists in eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk staged independence referendums, going on to form proto-states highly dependent on Moscow’s muscle and financial backing.
Belarus, in contrast, has little in the way of linguistic, religious, or ethnic divides for foreign actors like Russia to exploit. “Belarus almost never was split in terms of being part of different countries,” said Artyom Shraibman, a founder of the Minsk-based political consultancy Sense Analytics, save for the period after World War I when the country was split between Poland and the Soviet Union. “Before that, for centuries, Belarus was always part of one single nation,” he said, creating a fairly homogeneous population with a long-shared history.
Ukraine’s protesters had a clear goal. All that Belarusians have right now is anger and outrage.
The Ukrainian protesters had a clear aim: to steer the country in the direction of Europe and, by extension, toward a more democratic and prosperous future. The EU Association Agreement that caused the whole uproar would have made Ukraine, if not an EU member state, a trading partner with Western-style rules and regulations. In consequence, leaders of the protest movement quickly emerged.
A key distinction in Belarus is that the protests have no clear leader, Shraibman said. “This is more a protest of anger, than a conscious attempt at toppling the regime,” he said.
What coordination there is has largely centered around the secure messaging app Telegram, where popular channels share messages that warn protesters of police movements, guide demonstrators to certain neighborhoods, and encourage them to use their cars to deliver supplies and block police vehicles. This diffuse coordination could actually make it harder for the security services to quash, said Katsiaryna Shmatsina, a political analyst with the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies.
“If we had one clear leader, especially if this leader was in Belarus, we don’t know how long he or she would have lasted,” Shmatsina said.
For all the differences between the two dramatic upheavals, there are some constants. Should Moscow decide to wade in, it has plenty of points of leverage—many of the same ones it has used against Ukraine—whether cutting off energy supplies, launching cyberattacks, or exploiting Russian-language media in a place where the Russian language still predominates.
“There’s a lot of pressure points there,” said Ben Hodges, who served from 2014 to 2017 as the commanding general of U.S. military forces in Europe.
Update, Aug. 12, 2020: This article has been updated to include news of a second death related to the Belarus anti-government protests.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-12--In the New Cold War, Deindustrialization Means Disarmament

Since March alone , China has threatened to withhold medical equipment from the United States and Europe during the coronavirus pandemic ; launched the biggest cyberattack against Australia in the country ’ s history ; hacked U.S. firms to acquire secrets related to the coronavirus vaccine ; and engaged in massive disinformation campaigns on a global scale .
China even hacked the Vatican .
These incidents reflect the power China wields through its control of supply chains and information hardware .
They show the peril of ceding control of vast swaths of the world ’ s manufacturing to a regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad , a model of governance that is fundamentally in conflict with American values and democracies everywhere .
And they pale in comparison to what China will have the capacity to do as its confrontation with the United States sharpens .
The question today is not whether America ’ s manufacturing jobs can return , but whether America can afford not to bring them back .
In this new cold war , a deindustrialized United States is a disarmed United States—a country that is precariously vulnerable to coercion , espionage , and foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reconstituting a national manufacturing arrangement that is both safe and reliable—particularly in critical high-tech sectors .
If the United States is to secure its supply chains and information networks against Chinese attacks , it needs to reindustrialize .
The question today is not whether America ’ s manufacturing jobs can return , but whether America can afford not to bring them back .
America ’ s superpower might was made on the factory floor .
The nation ’ s vast industrial capacity carried it to victory in World War II and gave it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As recently as the early 2000s , iMacs—a symbol of American high-tech dominance—were still made in Elk Grove , California .
But since the 1970s , more than 7 million American manufacturing jobs have evaporated—over a third of the country ’ s entire manufacturing workforce .
In the first decade of the 21st century , more than 66,000 manufacturing facilities closed down or moved overseas .
America ’ s share of the world ’ s printed circuit board production has dropped 70 percent since 2000 ; China accounts for around half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is hardly exempt : As of 2015 , Chinese factories produced 28 percent of the world ’ s cars , 41 percent of ships , more than 60 percent of TVs , and a staggering 90 percent of the world ’ s mobile phones .
Indeed , Apple ’ s Elk Grove plant is now an AppleCare call center .
At the same time , a new Silicon Curtain has begun to descend .
As FBI Director Christopher Wray recently pointed out , China does not seek a world where its companies lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its companies exploit a domestic monopoly at home to drive other companies out of business everywhere else .
In the energy sector , China ’ s vast web of state subsidies supporting its domestic solar-electric industry dropped world prices of solar panels by 80 percent between 2008 and 2013 .
A report by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee echoed this trend in more cutting-edge technologies : “ Foreign technology platforms are restricted from operating in China , allowing Chinese platforms that offer similar services to thrive and expand into new markets.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ national champions ” expanding internationally thanks to unfair government support and subsidies , noting , “ Huawei ’ s price was so low that , absent the subsidies the company had been provided , Huawei would have been unable to even produce the necessary network parts.
” Beijing ’ s “ Made in China 2025 ” initiative outlines in blunt terms China ’ s ambitions for dominance in artificial intelligence , robotics , aerospace equipment , and biopharmaceuticals—high-tech industries that represent the future of the global economy .
The United States ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ national security threats .
The first is about access to the supply of critical goods .
As I warned in June , U.S.-China relations are now more volatile than at any time since Tiananmen , and it is an open question whether decoupling will be slow and soft or hard and fast .
As the bilateral relationship further deteriorates , American companies face a growing risk of experiencing sudden delays or disruptions to their supply chains , either as an overt retaliation by the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) to U.S. policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to kneecap U.S. companies and promote Chinese alternatives to fill the void in the global supply for key goods .
This risk , once deemed far-fetched , recently came to life when Arm , a U.K.-based chip designer , recently appeared to have suddenly lost control of its China-based joint-venture subsidiary , Arm China .
As Business Insider reported , “ Arm fired Allen Wu , the head of Arm China , but Wu refused to acknowledge the decision and has continued overseeing operations of the business unit , according to Bloomberg .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ let members of the UK parent entity onto its premises.
” It has been seven years since the Alliance for American Manufacturing released a list of critical military hardware , with both offensive and defensive applications , that are susceptible to supply chain interference .
American missiles depend on Chinese propellant ; American night-vision goggles depend on Chinese metal .
During the pandemic , the Chinese government is also believed to have given preferential treatment to its domestic semiconductor companies , allowing Yangtze Memory Technologies to continue operating , all the while requiring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Samsung , to completely halt their operations .
This is what political scientists have dubbed “ weaponized interdependence ” —exploiting control of critical nodes in the global economy to exert geopolitical leverage over one ’ s competitors .
The second risk of U.S. industrial dependence on China is about the integrity of powerful dual-use commercial technology products : civilian goods such as information platforms , social network technology , facial recognition systems , cellphones , and computers that also have powerful military or intelligence implications .
These products are increasingly becoming a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Russia and China that continuously seek asymmetric ways to weaken the United States .
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted , “ the suites of new and emergent digital technologies … —including 5G infrastructure , social media , block-chain , digital surveillance , and genomics and biotechnology—are all widely acknowledged as being on the cutting edge of this new competition.
” China ’ s command over critical nodes of the world ’ s supply chains provides it with vast strategic leverage over the integrity of critical hardware products .
A 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inserted a miniscule microchip into the servers of Supermicro , a company whose systems are used by institutions ranging from major banks to the Pentagon .
Though all parties involved denied that such a breach occurred , even the possibility of such a hardware hack sent shudders through Silicon Valley and the U.S. national security apparatus .
Even if disputed , the report laid bare the dangers of outsourcing American manufacturing to an American adversary .
Public concerns over the integrity of Chinese-built technology systems recently reached a boiling point in the software @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on ByteDance , a Beijing-based global technology company , to divest from TikTok , its U.S. subsidiary .
In some cases , senior government officials , ranging from President Donald Trump to Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer , went as far as floating the possibility of a complete suspension of the app .
The public ’ s justified concerns trace back to China ’ s civil-military fusion doctrine , which blurs the line between the CCP and China ’ s private sector .
Under China ’ s 2017 National Intelligence Law , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at TikTok based in China to provide the party with intelligence assistance and keep that assistance entirely confidential , without any of TikTok ’ s U.S.-based executives even being aware .
In effect , this means companies based in China could be subject to a dual reporting and corporate governance structure—their company ’ s executives on the one hand , and , on the other , a shadow governance structure reporting to officials from the Chinese Communist Party .
China-based companies must effectively answer to two masters .
Arm ’ s U.K.-based executives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the principles were spelled out in broad daylight by Chinese President Xi Jinping himself when he compared the relationship between Chinese citizens and the CPP to “ stars revolving around the revered moon.
” “ Listen to what they say , ” the Taiwan-based analyst Ben Thompson cautioned .
The United States ’ slow drift toward deindustrialization is not a threat to Democrats or a threat to Republicans—it ’ s a threat to the United States .
The United States ’ slow drift toward deindustrialization is not a threat to Democrats or a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States .
Addressing it will require an American solution that transcends party lines .
It will require an extensive collaborative effort between the government and private sector to take inventory of the products salient to national security—determining which high-tech and vital goods must be produced domestically , which can safely be sourced from allies and friendly democracies , and which can still be imported from the global market , including from authoritarian states like China .
Carrying out this strategy and operationalizing it will take time and substantial resources .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strategy are worth highlighting .
Before the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the 1970s , the United States was vulnerable to geopolitical blackmail by OPEC nations .
Eventually , public investments in expanding the country ’ s domestic alternative sources of energy helped move the country toward energy independence .
Similarly , the United States must define and reconstitute a “ minimum viable industrial capacity , ” based on the production capacity it needs not simply to meet a national emergency but to wage a long-term competition .
A potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort could be the production of semiconductors and microchips , given that high-performing chips are indispensable to make headway on nearly every other front—AI development , robotics , computers , cellphones , and more .
Currently , Taiwan—which China dubs a renegade province—is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company , which accounts for half the global supply of computer chips used in everything from F-35 fighter jets to Apple devices .
The United States can not afford to ignore China ’ s plans to eventually seize control of Taiwan and the consequences this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industry .
Reconstituting America ’ s domestic production capacity will be contingent on procuring a reliable , abundant supply of key natural resources at a low cost , building up a large talent pool of skilled industrial workers , and making substantial investments in fostering hotbeds of innovation .
For starters , the goal of reopening factories won ’ t be economically sustainable if the United States can ’ t ensure cost-effective access to natural resources and raw materials those factories need to produce finished , manufactured products .
China has made acquiring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , cobalt , and titanium a national priority .
By making investments and loans worth hundreds of billions of dollars across the developing world—particularly in Africa—it has established a model of trading technology and infrastructure for resources .
In one such case , China struck a deal with a Congolese mining consortium , Sicomines , to secure access to critical minerals for electronics like copper and cobalt in exchange for investing in essential infrastructure projects like hospitals and highways .
To compete , the United States and its allies will need to play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offering their own funding for infrastructure and development , but without the predatory debt-trap qualities that often accompany Chinese funding .
Many African countries have interlocked their economic futures with China because they see little alternative—if Chinese loans once came with few strings attached , they now often require adherence to a variety of CCP norms .
Last month , the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered one idea : an International Digital Infrastructure Corporation that would offer these countries the financial incentive and support to buy and install American-made hardware .
Providing that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments and benefit the local population—could shift the economic orientations of nations that would prefer to be less entwined with an expansionist authoritarian power .
It could also serve as a powerful tool to supply U.S. and allied manufacturers with critical raw materials needed for the production of strategic hardware .
Like a tech startup taking on an incumbent company , if the United States is to take on China ’ s dominance in global manufacturing , it will also need to staff the so-called American team with a skilled and innovative workforce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on H-1B visas to once again enlist the world ’ s best and brightest minds .
This also means addressing the so-called trade skills gap , which has left vital manufacturing roles—such as machinery and welding—unfilled .
In a 2019 survey by the National Association of Manufacturers , almost 3 in 4 manufacturing employers cited “ the inability to attract and retain a quality workforce ” as their most significant business challenge .
“ We shouldn ’ t be criticized for using Chinese workers , ” one Apple executive told the New York @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has stopped producing people with the skills we need.
” Washington must take note of these realities and invest in low-cost and specialized , skill-based workforce training for employees in vital industries , in addition to deepening its pool of advanced scientists and engineers .
Bureaucratic reorganization could help focus government attention and cohesion on this problem : Consolidating the Department of Education and Department of Labor into a Department of Education and the Workforce would create a single entity dedicated to endowing Americans with the skills they need throughout the full continuum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s true that not all jobs will return , focusing training on high-tech manufacturing will prepare a workforce that attracts new , potentially higher-paying jobs to U.S. shores .
Although policymakers ’ natural instincts—and political incentives—might push them to spread reshoring investments in a large number of cities across the country , some of America ’ s most successful global hubs of economic activity have been geographically concentrated : Wall Street , Hollywood , Silicon Valley , the Motor City .
Geographically concentrated regional hubs unlock network effects from the powerful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growth engines for their state and the rest of the country .
Much like magnets , hubs attract , in a self-reinforcing loop , talented individuals from around the world who self-select to relocate closer to their industry ’ s center of gravity .
This clustering of specialized expertise increases the connections between the participants of the ecosystem , allowing them to compound the institutional knowledge of the companies they work for and pattern-match problems and solutions more quickly than elsewhere .
Together , the government and private sector could work to build @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Shenzhen .
Once this new baseline is established , the United States and friendly democratic states must create an Allied Industrial Free Trade Area that maintains America ’ s industrial base and strengthens it across democracies , forming a new democratic bloc that preserves the benefits of efficiency and competition while helping American global companies ’ wean themselves off their demand-side dependence on the Chinese market .
The foundations for such a bloc are already becoming apparent through ideas like U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s proposal to expand the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10-nation democratic coalition that can collaboratively fund and create alternatives to reliance on Chinese 5G technology .
For a long time , we assumed U.S. deindustrialization was inevitable—today , the coronavirus crisis has given Americans a small taste of the sour realities that result from decades of industrial neglect and disrepair .
The United States ’ supply chains and information networks are precariously dependent on , and exposed to intrusions by , a hostile foreign government bent on undoing liberal democracies .
U.S. policymakers and technology executives should consider what might happen if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ Beijing knows the entire medical and personal history of every politician , every judge and every journalist in your country , including all their sexual escapades , all their mental weaknesses and all their corrupt dealings ?
” Neglecting to quickly safeguard the access and integrity of American supply chains and information networks in the face of successive warnings would be a costly strategic mistake and a blow to U.S. national sovereignty .

In 2011, then-President Barack Obama attended an intimate dinner in Silicon Valley. At one point, he turned to the man on his left. What would it take, Obama asked Steve Jobs, for Apple to manufacture its iPhones in the United States instead of China? Jobs was unequivocal: “Those jobs aren’t coming back.” Jobs’s prognostication has become almost an article of faith among policymakers and corporate leaders throughout the United States. Yet China’s recent weaponization of supply chains and information networks exposes the grave dangers of the American deindustrialization that Jobs accepted as inevitable.
Since March alone, China has threatened to withhold medical equipment from the United States and Europe during the coronavirus pandemic; launched the biggest cyberattack against Australia in the country’s history; hacked U.S. firms to acquire secrets related to the coronavirus vaccine; and engaged in massive disinformation campaigns on a global scale. China even hacked the Vatican. These incidents reflect the power China wields through its control of supply chains and information hardware. They show the peril of ceding control of vast swaths of the world’s manufacturing to a regime that builds at home, and exports abroad, a model of governance that is fundamentally in conflict with American values and democracies everywhere. And they pale in comparison to what China will have the capacity to do as its confrontation with the United States sharpens.
The question today is not whether America’s manufacturing jobs can return, but whether America can afford not to bring them back.
In this new cold war, a deindustrialized United States is a disarmed United States—a country that is precariously vulnerable to coercion, espionage, and foreign interference. Preserving American preeminence will require reconstituting a national manufacturing arrangement that is both safe and reliable—particularly in critical high-tech sectors. If the United States is to secure its supply chains and information networks against Chinese attacks, it needs to reindustrialize. The question today is not whether America’s manufacturing jobs can return, but whether America can afford not to bring them back.
America’s superpower might was made on the factory floor. The nation’s vast industrial capacity carried it to victory in World War II and gave it a commanding advantage over the Soviet Union. As recently as the early 2000s, iMacs—a symbol of American high-tech dominance—were still made in Elk Grove, California. But since the 1970s, more than 7 million American manufacturing jobs have evaporated—over a third of the country’s entire manufacturing workforce. In the first decade of the 21st century, more than 66,000 manufacturing facilities closed down or moved overseas. America’s share of the world’s printed circuit board production has dropped 70 percent since 2000; China accounts for around half of global production today. The high-tech industry is hardly exempt: As of 2015, Chinese factories produced 28 percent of the world’s cars, 41 percent of ships, more than 60 percent of TVs, and a staggering 90 percent of the world’s mobile phones. Indeed, Apple’s Elk Grove plant is now an AppleCare call center.
At the same time, a new Silicon Curtain has begun to descend. As FBI Director Christopher Wray recently pointed out, China does not seek a world where its companies lead alongside other global companies but one where its companies exploit a domestic monopoly at home to drive other companies out of business everywhere else. In the energy sector, China’s vast web of state subsidies supporting its domestic solar-electric industry dropped world prices of solar panels by 80 percent between 2008 and 2013. A report by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee echoed this trend in more cutting-edge technologies: “Foreign technology platforms are restricted from operating in China, allowing Chinese platforms that offer similar services to thrive and expand into new markets.” The report also highlighted examples of Chinese “national champions” expanding internationally thanks to unfair government support and subsidies, noting, “Huawei’s price was so low that, absent the subsidies the company had been provided, Huawei would have been unable to even produce the necessary network parts.” Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” initiative outlines in blunt terms China’s ambitions for dominance in artificial intelligence, robotics, aerospace equipment, and biopharmaceuticals—high-tech industries that represent the future of the global economy.
The United States’ industrial overdependence on China poses profound national security threats.
The United States’ industrial overdependence on China poses two profound national security threats. The first is about access to the supply of critical goods. As I warned in June, U.S.-China relations are now more volatile than at any time since Tiananmen, and it is an open question whether decoupling will be slow and soft or hard and fast. As the bilateral relationship further deteriorates, American companies face a growing risk of experiencing sudden delays or disruptions to their supply chains, either as an overt retaliation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to U.S. policies or in the form of gray-zone tactics to kneecap U.S. companies and promote Chinese alternatives to fill the void in the global supply for key goods.
This risk, once deemed far-fetched, recently came to life when Arm, a U.K.-based chip designer, recently appeared to have suddenly lost control of its China-based joint-venture subsidiary, Arm China. As Business Insider reported, “Arm fired Allen Wu, the head of Arm China, but Wu refused to acknowledge the decision and has continued overseeing operations of the business unit, according to Bloomberg. Arm China also reportedly won’t let members of the UK parent entity onto its premises.” It has been seven years since the Alliance for American Manufacturing released a list of critical military hardware, with both offensive and defensive applications, that are susceptible to supply chain interference. American missiles depend on Chinese propellant; American night-vision goggles depend on Chinese metal.
During the pandemic, the Chinese government is also believed to have given preferential treatment to its domestic semiconductor companies, allowing Yangtze Memory Technologies to continue operating, all the while requiring all foreign-based chip makers, such as Samsung, to completely halt their operations. This is what political scientists have dubbed “weaponized interdependence”—exploiting control of critical nodes in the global economy to exert geopolitical leverage over one’s competitors.
The second risk of U.S. industrial dependence on China is about the integrity of powerful dual-use commercial technology products: civilian goods such as information platforms, social network technology, facial recognition systems, cellphones, and computers that also have powerful military or intelligence implications. These products are increasingly becoming a “perfect weapon” for U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China that continuously seek asymmetric ways to weaken the United States. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted, “the suites of new and emergent digital technologies … —including 5G infrastructure, social media, block-chain, digital surveillance, and genomics and biotechnology—are all widely acknowledged as being on the cutting edge of this new competition.” China’s command over critical nodes of the world’s supply chains provides it with vast strategic leverage over the integrity of critical hardware products.
A 2018 Bloomberg investigation reported that Chinese operatives had inserted a miniscule microchip into the servers of Supermicro, a company whose systems are used by institutions ranging from major banks to the Pentagon. Though all parties involved denied that such a breach occurred, even the possibility of such a hardware hack sent shudders through Silicon Valley and the U.S. national security apparatus. Even if disputed, the report laid bare the dangers of outsourcing American manufacturing to an American adversary.
Public concerns over the integrity of Chinese-built technology systems recently reached a boiling point in the software world, with the U.S. government calling on ByteDance, a Beijing-based global technology company, to divest from TikTok, its U.S. subsidiary. In some cases, senior government officials, ranging from President Donald Trump to Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer, went as far as floating the possibility of a complete suspension of the app.
The public’s justified concerns trace back to China’s civil-military fusion doctrine, which blurs the line between the CCP and China’s private sector. Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, the CCP could compel an individual engineering employee at TikTok based in China to provide the party with intelligence assistance and keep that assistance entirely confidential, without any of TikTok’s U.S.-based executives even being aware.
In effect, this means companies based in China could be subject to a dual reporting and corporate governance structure—their company’s executives on the one hand, and, on the other, a shadow governance structure reporting to officials from the Chinese Communist Party. China-based companies must effectively answer to two masters. Arm’s U.K.-based executives learned this the hard way. But the principles were spelled out in broad daylight by Chinese President Xi Jinping himself when he compared the relationship between Chinese citizens and the CPP to “stars revolving around the revered moon.” “Listen to what they say,” the Taiwan-based analyst Ben Thompson cautioned.
The United States’ slow drift toward deindustrialization is not a threat to Democrats or a threat to Republicans—it’s a threat to the United States.
The United States’ slow drift toward deindustrialization is not a threat to Democrats or a threat to Republicans—it’s a threat to the United States. Addressing it will require an American solution that transcends party lines. It will require an extensive collaborative effort between the government and private sector to take inventory of the products salient to national security—determining which high-tech and vital goods must be produced domestically, which can safely be sourced from allies and friendly democracies, and which can still be imported from the global market, including from authoritarian states like China. Carrying out this strategy and operationalizing it will take time and substantial resources. Still, a few elements for such a strategy are worth highlighting.
Before the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the 1970s, the United States was vulnerable to geopolitical blackmail by OPEC nations. Eventually, public investments in expanding the country’s domestic alternative sources of energy helped move the country toward energy independence. Similarly, the United States must define and reconstitute a “minimum viable industrial capacity,” based on the production capacity it needs not simply to meet a national emergency but to wage a long-term competition. A potential initial area of focus for such an effort could be the production of semiconductors and microchips, given that high-performing chips are indispensable to make headway on nearly every other front—AI development, robotics, computers, cellphones, and more. Currently, Taiwan—which China dubs a renegade province—is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which accounts for half the global supply of computer chips used in everything from F-35 fighter jets to Apple devices. The United States cannot afford to ignore China’s plans to eventually seize control of Taiwan and the consequences this would entail for the entire U.S. technology industry.
Reconstituting America’s domestic production capacity will be contingent on procuring a reliable, abundant supply of key natural resources at a low cost, building up a large talent pool of skilled industrial workers, and making substantial investments in fostering hotbeds of innovation.
For starters, the goal of reopening factories won’t be economically sustainable if the United States can’t ensure cost-effective access to natural resources and raw materials those factories need to produce finished, manufactured products. China has made acquiring premium access to resources such as zinc, cobalt, and titanium a national priority. By making investments and loans worth hundreds of billions of dollars across the developing world—particularly in Africa—it has established a model of trading technology and infrastructure for resources. In one such case, China struck a deal with a Congolese mining consortium, Sicomines, to secure access to critical minerals for electronics like copper and cobalt in exchange for investing in essential infrastructure projects like hospitals and highways.
To compete, the United States and its allies will need to play a shrewd game of macroeconomic chess, offering their own funding for infrastructure and development, but without the predatory debt-trap qualities that often accompany Chinese funding. Many African countries have interlocked their economic futures with China because they see little alternative—if Chinese loans once came with few strings attached, they now often require adherence to a variety of CCP norms. Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered one idea: an International Digital Infrastructure Corporation that would offer these countries the financial incentive and support to buy and install American-made hardware. Providing that alternative—assistance and financing that authentically empower recipient governments and benefit the local population—could shift the economic orientations of nations that would prefer to be less entwined with an expansionist authoritarian power. It could also serve as a powerful tool to supply U.S. and allied manufacturers with critical raw materials needed for the production of strategic hardware.
Like a tech startup taking on an incumbent company, if the United States is to take on China’s dominance in global manufacturing, it will also need to staff the so-called American team with a skilled and innovative workforce. This means reversing the current suspension on H-1B visas to once again enlist the world’s best and brightest minds. This also means addressing the so-called trade skills gap, which has left vital manufacturing roles—such as machinery and welding—unfilled. In a 2019 survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, almost 3 in 4 manufacturing employers cited “the inability to attract and retain a quality workforce” as their most significant business challenge. “We shouldn’t be criticized for using Chinese workers,” one Apple executive told the New York Times in 2012. “The U.S. has stopped producing people with the skills we need.”
An employee welds pipe at Pioneer Pipe in Marietta, Ohio, on Oct. 25, 2016. The construction, maintenance, and fabrication company supplies products to the oil and gas industry.
Washington must take note of these realities and invest in low-cost and specialized, skill-based workforce training for employees in vital industries, in addition to deepening its pool of advanced scientists and engineers. Bureaucratic reorganization could help focus government attention and cohesion on this problem: Consolidating the Department of Education and Department of Labor into a Department of Education and the Workforce would create a single entity dedicated to endowing Americans with the skills they need throughout the full continuum of their professional lives. And while it’s true that not all jobs will return, focusing training on high-tech manufacturing will prepare a workforce that attracts new, potentially higher-paying jobs to U.S. shores.
Although policymakers’ natural instincts—and political incentives—might push them to spread reshoring investments in a large number of cities across the country, some of America’s most successful global hubs of economic activity have been geographically concentrated: Wall Street, Hollywood, Silicon Valley, the Motor City. Geographically concentrated regional hubs unlock network effects from the powerful forces of platform economics and could become growth engines for their state and the rest of the country.
Much like magnets, hubs attract, in a self-reinforcing loop, talented individuals from around the world who self-select to relocate closer to their industry’s center of gravity. This clustering of specialized expertise increases the connections between the participants of the ecosystem, allowing them to compound the institutional knowledge of the companies they work for and pattern-match problems and solutions more quickly than elsewhere. Together, the government and private sector could work to build manufacturing centers to rival those of China’s Shenzhen.
Once this new baseline is established, the United States and friendly democratic states must create an Allied Industrial Free Trade Area that maintains America’s industrial base and strengthens it across democracies, forming a new democratic bloc that preserves the benefits of efficiency and competition while helping American global companies’ wean themselves off their demand-side dependence on the Chinese market. The foundations for such a bloc are already becoming apparent through ideas like U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s proposal to expand the G-7 to a new D-10, a 10-nation democratic coalition that can collaboratively fund and create alternatives to reliance on Chinese 5G technology.
For a long time, we assumed U.S. deindustrialization was inevitable—today, the coronavirus crisis has given Americans a small taste of the sour realities that result from decades of industrial neglect and disrepair. The United States’ supply chains and information networks are precariously dependent on, and exposed to intrusions by, a hostile foreign government bent on undoing liberal democracies. U.S. policymakers and technology executives should consider what might happen if, as the historian Yuval Harari warned, “Beijing knows the entire medical and personal history of every politician, every judge and every journalist in your country, including all their sexual escapades, all their mental weaknesses and all their corrupt dealings?” Neglecting to quickly safeguard the access and integrity of American supply chains and information networks in the face of successive warnings would be a costly strategic mistake and a blow to U.S. national sovereignty.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-12--Trump Misses Being Part of the Iran Deal

Trump Misses Being Part of the Iran Deal The Trump administration is planning to forge ahead this week with a move aimed at extending the arms embargo on Iran waged by the U.N. Security Council .
Otherwise , the sanctions would be set to expire in October .
His move is likely to fail , since it lacks the backing of key countries with the power to veto the initiative , chiefly Russia and China .
But that hasn ’ t deterred Washington , which has declared that , should its resolution fail , it would trigger the “ snapback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
The snapback mechanism is intended to automatically restore the U.N. sanctions on Iran that existed prior to 2015 in case of violations .
For those who wish to see the JCPOA ’ s limits on the Iranian nuclear program sustained , the U.S. move is a bad idea .
Here ’ s why .
For one , China and Russia are not on board .
They would likely veto such a resolution .
The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact , stating last week that the United States had little hope it could bring Russia and China around .
The two countries would likely benefit should the arms embargo expire , since they would be key candidates to supply Iran with new arms and weapons systems .
Moscow and Beijing have long-standing relationships with Tehran that include joint military initiatives and technological transfer .
In late 2019 , amid rising tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic , China , Iran , and Russia held joint military drills in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country is in a rush to renew sanctions on Iran .
In early July , Tehran announced that it was negotiating a 25-year strategic partnership with Beijing , which ( if finalized and implemented ) would include massive Chinese long-term investment of up to $ 400 billion .
Similarly , the Iranians and the Russians are also developing an arrangement that would include the extension of an existing agreement facilitating the Russian transfer of weapons and other goods to Iran for years to come .
In any event , Russia and China may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to veto the resolution since , as of now , it does not enjoy a simple majority of 9 out of 15 .
France , Germany , and the United Kingdom also stand opposed to the U.S. move .
These three actors , known as the E3 , have a more complicated approach to the question of the embargo and its extension .
Although E3 members are concerned with Iranian violations of the JCPOA , as well as the implementation of the nuclear safeguards the country agreed to , they are also fed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal .
The E3 are eager to preserve the JCPOA , or its legal shell , possibly until a new U.S. administration is sworn in .
As such , they ’ ve tried to find a common ground on key disputes regarding the JCPOA when possible .
They aren ’ t likely to support the U.S. resolution , although they ’ ve worked around the clock to find a middle ground pleasing to both Washington and the Beijing-Moscow bloc .
Significantly , the European Union ’ s embargoes on conventional arms exports and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until 2023 regardless of what happens by October .
The Trump administration is likely to learn a lesson the Reagan administration was taught in 1982 : Regardless of how flawed an international institution may be , once a country withdraws from that institution , it loses any ability to influence it from within .
There ’ s also the issue of whether the United States even has a right to trigger the JCPOA ’ s snapback mechanism , since it left the deal in 2018 .
The United States says that it does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security Council ( Germany is currently a nonpermanent member ) dispute this claim .
It is possible that they will simply ignore such a U.S. move .
The Trump administration is thus likely to learn a lesson the Reagan administration was taught in 1982 : Regardless of how flawed an international institution may be , once a country withdraws from that institution , it loses any ability to influence it from within .
In 1982 , the United States , under Ronald Reagan , suspended its participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made to reassess participation in the agency following a vote at the IAEA General Conference that September to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegates .
The Iraqi delegation instigated the vote in retaliation for an Israeli raid the previous year that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak .
Operation Babylon , as the raid was code-named , significantly set back the Iraqi nuclear program and did so as what would become a devastating eight-year war with Iran was in its initial stages .
Two hours before the vote to reject the Israelis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ orders to leave the building should the vote pass .
The vote passed , and the Americans left .
Once out of the agency , the administration quickly regretted it .
For the agency , Washington ’ s withdrawal translated into the suspension of U.S. financial contributions to the IAEA , jeopardizing its ability to function .
Washington ’ s contribution was expected to cover 25 percent of the agency ’ s total annual budget of $ 82 million planned for 1983— $ 52 million of which was allocated to overseeing safeguards .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It was followed by the establishment of an interagency group tasked with performing a three-month policy reassessment , which was never concluded .
Instead , Washington resumed full participation in the IAEA in February 1983 , once its Board of Governors clarified Israel ’ s status .
In a report to Congress , the administration explained that it took leave from the agency due to “ the seriously disturbing trend by some IAEA member states to introduce extraneous and divisive political issues ” to the agency .
However , the administration argued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role , and the lack of alternatives for its safeguards system , it had decided to resume participation .
Although Trump promised to make deals , it is in fact withdrawing from international organizations and agreements , not building them , that has become a hallmark of his foreign policy .
Iran serves as a case in point .
After withdrawing from the JCPOA without a Plan B , the Trump administration is at a loss now that it needs to extend the arms embargo .
Some analysts believe that the Trump team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Security Council , is in fact racing to create “ facts on the ground ” ahead of a possible presidential victory by Democratic candidate Joe Biden , aiming to make it as difficult as possible to revive a thoroughly beaten Iran deal .
A major problem with Trump ’ s approach is the price tag it might create .
In addition to potentially leading Iran to further dial up its nuclear activities and shrink the breakout time—the amount of time needed to build enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—Trump risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and damaging the ability of the Security Council to function .

The Trump administration is planning to forge ahead this week with a move aimed at extending the arms embargo on Iran waged by the U.N. Security Council. Otherwise, the sanctions would be set to expire in October. His move is likely to fail , since it lacks the backing of key countries with the power to veto the initiative, chiefly Russia and China. But that hasn’t deterred Washington, which has declared that, should its resolution fail, it would trigger the “snapback” mechanism embedded within the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The snapback mechanism is intended to automatically restore the U.N. sanctions on Iran that existed prior to 2015 in case of violations. For those who wish to see the JCPOA’s limits on the Iranian nuclear program sustained, the U.S. move is a bad idea. Here’s why.
The Trump administration is planning to forge ahead this week with a move aimed at extending the arms embargo on Iran waged by the U.N. Security Council. Otherwise, the sanctions would be set to expire in October. His move is likely to fail, since it lacks the backing of key countries with the power to veto the initiative, chiefly Russia and China. But that hasn’t deterred Washington, which has declared that, should its resolution fail, it would trigger the “snapback” mechanism embedded within the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The snapback mechanism is intended to automatically restore the U.N. sanctions on Iran that existed prior to 2015 in case of violations. For those who wish to see the JCPOA’s limits on the Iranian nuclear program sustained, the U.S. move is a bad idea. Here’s why.
For one, China and Russia are not on board. They would likely veto such a resolution. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Kelly Craft, has acknowledged this fact, stating last week that the United States had little hope it could bring Russia and China around. The two countries would likely benefit should the arms embargo expire, since they would be key candidates to supply Iran with new arms and weapons systems. Moscow and Beijing have long-standing relationships with Tehran that include joint military initiatives and technological transfer. In late 2019, amid rising tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic, China, Iran, and Russia held joint military drills in the Persian Gulf. More generally, neither country is in a rush to renew sanctions on Iran. In early July, Tehran announced that it was negotiating a 25-year strategic partnership with Beijing, which (if finalized and implemented) would include massive Chinese long-term investment of up to $400 billion. Similarly, the Iranians and the Russians are also developing an arrangement that would include the extension of an existing agreement facilitating the Russian transfer of weapons and other goods to Iran for years to come.
In any event, Russia and China may not even be put in a position to veto the resolution since, as of now, it does not enjoy a simple majority of 9 out of 15. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom also stand opposed to the U.S. move. These three actors, known as the E3, have a more complicated approach to the question of the embargo and its extension. Although E3 members are concerned with Iranian violations of the JCPOA, as well as the implementation of the nuclear safeguards the country agreed to, they are also fed up with American efforts to torpedo the deal. The E3 are eager to preserve the JCPOA, or its legal shell, possibly until a new U.S. administration is sworn in. As such, they’ve tried to find a common ground on key disputes regarding the JCPOA when possible. They aren’t likely to support the U.S. resolution, although they’ve worked around the clock to find a middle ground pleasing to both Washington and the Beijing-Moscow bloc. Significantly, the European Union’s embargoes on conventional arms exports and missile technology to Iran remain in place until 2023 regardless of what happens by October.
The Trump administration is likely to learn a lesson the Reagan administration was taught in 1982: Regardless of how flawed an international institution may be, once a country withdraws from that institution, it loses any ability to influence it from within.
There’s also the issue of whether the United States even has a right to trigger the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism, since it left the deal in 2018. The United States says that it does, but other JCPOA members in the Security Council (Germany is currently a nonpermanent member) dispute this claim. It is possible that they will simply ignore such a U.S. move. The Trump administration is thus likely to learn a lesson the Reagan administration was taught in 1982: Regardless of how flawed an international institution may be, once a country withdraws from that institution, it loses any ability to influence it from within.
In 1982, the United States, under Ronald Reagan, suspended its participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decision was made to reassess participation in the agency following a vote at the IAEA General Conference that September to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegates. The Iraqi delegation instigated the vote in retaliation for an Israeli raid the previous year that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak. Operation Babylon, as the raid was code-named, significantly set back the Iraqi nuclear program and did so as what would become a devastating eight-year war with Iran was in its initial stages. Two hours before the vote to reject the Israelis’ credentials, the U.S. delegation received orders to leave the building should the vote pass. The vote passed, and the Americans left.
Once out of the agency, the administration quickly regretted it. For the agency, Washington’s withdrawal translated into the suspension of U.S. financial contributions to the IAEA, jeopardizing its ability to function. Washington’s contribution was expected to cover 25 percent of the agency’s total annual budget of $82 million planned for 1983—$52 million of which was allocated to overseeing safeguards. But the U.S. withdrawal was surprisingly short-lived. It was followed by the establishment of an interagency group tasked with performing a three-month policy reassessment, which was never concluded. Instead, Washington resumed full participation in the IAEA in February 1983, once its Board of Governors clarified Israel’s status. In a report to Congress, the administration explained that it took leave from the agency due to “the seriously disturbing trend by some IAEA member states to introduce extraneous and divisive political issues” to the agency. However, the administration argued, given the IAEA’s unique role, and the lack of alternatives for its safeguards system, it had decided to resume participation.
Although Trump promised to make deals, it is in fact withdrawing from international organizations and agreements, not building them, that has become a hallmark of his foreign policy. Iran serves as a case in point. After withdrawing from the JCPOA without a Plan B, the Trump administration is at a loss now that it needs to extend the arms embargo. Some analysts believe that the Trump team, well aware of the likely failure at the Security Council, is in fact racing to create “facts on the ground” ahead of a possible presidential victory by Democratic candidate Joe Biden, aiming to make it as difficult as possible to revive a thoroughly beaten Iran deal. A major problem with Trump’s approach is the price tag it might create. In addition to potentially leading Iran to further dial up its nuclear activities and shrink the breakout time—the amount of time needed to build enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—Trump risks further eroding American credibility, creating chaos, and damaging the ability of the Security Council to function.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-12--Why Israel’s Political Odd Couple Could Be Headed for an Early Divorce

Why Israel ’ s Political Odd Couple Could Be Headed for an Early Divorce TEL AVIV , Israel—The political marriage of Israel ’ s two Benjamins—Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz—was rocky from the start .
Now it might be unraveling .
A governing coalition the two men formed just four months ago , with Netanyahu serving as prime minister and his rival Gantz as defense minister , was supposed to give Israel the stability required to tackle the coronavirus pandemic .
But the infection rate has surged in recent weeks , and the two men have squabbled over large and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passage of Israel ’ s budget .
Though the dispute might seem technical—Gantz wants a two-year financial plan , while Netanyahu is pushing for a shorter one—analysts say the budget battle signals something broader : an attempt by Netanyahu to dodge his corruption trial , which kicks into high gear in January 2021 , and renege on a rotation agreement that would make Gantz prime minister late next year .
If the two men can ’ t settle their differences by Aug. 24 , the deadline for a budget bill , the parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be set for yet another national election , Israel ’ s fourth in less than two years .
Netanyahu already seems to be gearing up , making two campaign-style visits to local food shops in the past week .
“ [ Netanyahu ] is not happy with the marriage , and that he has to rotate [ the premiership ] in a year from now .
There ’ s a competition with Gantz on everything .
He has a backseat driver , and he can ’ t stand it , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Netanyahu .
“ They don ’ t trust each other .
They don ’ t work well together .
It ’ s horrific.
” Gantz and Netanyahu have clashed over everything from Netanyahu ’ s push to unilaterally annex the occupied West Bank to a wave of protests around the country and outside Netanyahu ’ s official residence in Jerusalem calling for his resignation .
While Netanyahu described the Jerusalem demonstrations as an attempt to trample democracy , Gantz called them the “ lifeblood ” of democracy .
Their partnership was forged in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Likud party nor Gantz ’ s Blue and White with a clear majority .
With cases of the coronavirus surging daily and the country headed for lockdown , Netanyahu appealed to Gantz to team up in an emergency coalition .
Gantz consented , breaking his promise to refrain from any partnership with Netanyahu as long as the Israeli leader faced indictments for fraud and bribery .
By May , the two sides concluded an elaborate agreement that allowed Netanyahu to remain in office while his trial proceeded and promised Gantz a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next year .
But the agreement left an exit option for the prime minister : Israeli law stipulates that the new government must pass a budget for the current fiscal year in parliament within its first 100 days or face a new election .
Though Netanyahu and Gantz agreed in May to pass a two-year spending plan covering both 2020 and 2021—to ensure coalition survival through the end of next year—Netanyahu now insists on a one-year plan .
“ The budget is not the reason for the political crisis , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the easiest available way out of the [ coalition ] agreement and dodge the rotation .
If they pass the budget , Netanyahu won ’ t have any easy way out , ” said Yohanan Plesner , the president of the Israel Democracy Institute .
A survey by the institute found only 28 percent of the public supports dissolving the government and holding a new election .
As in other countries buffeted by the pandemic and the attendant economic shutdowns , Israel ’ s unemployment has surged in recent months .
Earlier this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yaron called on the government to pass a fiscal plan and cautioned that a new election would hurt the economy .
Despite the economic crisis and unrest in the streets , Netanyahu is focused on avoiding his trial and a possible ruling by Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit that would force the prime minister to take a leave of absence , Plesner said .
“ Netanyahu ’ s personal interests are not compatible with the national interest .
He fears that the public will see him sitting in court three days a week , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bring home the point that , rather than being a full-time prime minister , he ’ ll be a part-time prime minister.
” Netanyahu has denied suggestions that he ’ s steering the country toward another vote .
A snap election could play in Netanyahu ’ s favor .
Gantz appears to have suffered politically from his decision to join the government , according to opinion polls .
One conducted by Israel ’ s public broadcaster KAN this month found that only 10 percent of Israelis consider Gantz to be the most suitable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Netanyahu .
Another recent poll conducted by Israel ’ s Channel 13 television news predicted that Netanyahu ’ s alliance of right-wing and religious parties would win an absolute majority in the 120-member parliament , a goal it fell short of in the previous three votes .
Such a narrow-based coalition could potentially pass laws insulating Netanyahu from prosecution .
One proposal Likud members have floated is a bill that would make it impossible to convict a sitting prime minister .
Another one would enable the parliament to override decisions of Israel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firm so far on the budget fight but has much to lose if no compromise is reached—including his turn as prime minister next year .
“ His whole reason for going to the government is because of corona , and not dragging everyone to elections , so Bibi is taking advantage of that , ” said Jonathan Rynhold , a political science professor at Bar-Ilan University , referring to Netanyahu by his nickname .
“ Because Bibi is prepared to impose more damage on the country than Gantz to advance his political interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” To be sure , a new election would be no cakewalk for Netanyahu either .
Public approval of his handling of the pandemic has plummeted as second-wave infections surged over the summer .
Polls show Netanyahu ’ s Likud party losing seats in the event of a new vote .
“ It ’ s not the time to go to elections when people are in the streets , and there ’ s a high unemployment rate , and people can ’ t afford their bills , and the economic future of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mitchell Barak , an Israeli American public opinion expert and a former advisor to Netanyahu .
On the other hand , Netanyahu seems to be at his strongest when he has the rest of Israel ’ s parliament guessing what his next move will be .
“ He thrives in an environment of political chaos , ” Barak said .

TEL AVIV, Israel—The political marriage of Israel’s two Benjamins—Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz—was rocky from the start. Now it might be unraveling.
TEL AVIV, Israel—The political marriage of Israel’s two Benjamins—Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz—was rocky from the start. Now it might be unraveling.
A governing coalition the two men formed just four months ago, with Netanyahu serving as prime minister and his rival Gantz as defense minister, was supposed to give Israel the stability required to tackle the coronavirus pandemic. But the infection rate has surged in recent weeks, and the two men have squabbled over large and small matters, including most recently the passage of Israel’s budget.
Though the dispute might seem technical—Gantz wants a two-year financial plan, while Netanyahu is pushing for a shorter one—analysts say the budget battle signals something broader: an attempt by Netanyahu to dodge his corruption trial, which kicks into high gear in January 2021, and renege on a rotation agreement that would make Gantz prime minister late next year.
If the two men can’t settle their differences by Aug. 24, the deadline for a budget bill, the parliament would automatically be dissolved and a date would be set for yet another national election, Israel’s fourth in less than two years. Netanyahu already seems to be gearing up, making two campaign-style visits to local food shops in the past week.
“[Netanyahu] is not happy with the marriage, and that he has to rotate [the premiership] in a year from now. There’s a competition with Gantz on everything. He has a backseat driver, and he can’t stand it,” said Aviv Bushinsky, a former spokesperson for Netanyahu. “They don’t trust each other. They don’t work well together. It’s horrific.”
Gantz and Netanyahu have clashed over everything from Netanyahu’s push to unilaterally annex the occupied West Bank to a wave of protests around the country and outside Netanyahu’s official residence in Jerusalem calling for his resignation. While Netanyahu described the Jerusalem demonstrations as an attempt to trample democracy, Gantz called them the “lifeblood” of democracy.
Their partnership was forged in March after a vote left neither Netanyahu’s Likud party nor Gantz’s Blue and White with a clear majority. With cases of the coronavirus surging daily and the country headed for lockdown, Netanyahu appealed to Gantz to team up in an emergency coalition.
Gantz consented, breaking his promise to refrain from any partnership with Netanyahu as long as the Israeli leader faced indictments for fraud and bribery. By May, the two sides concluded an elaborate agreement that allowed Netanyahu to remain in office while his trial proceeded and promised Gantz a turn as prime minister starting in November next year.
But the agreement left an exit option for the prime minister: Israeli law stipulates that the new government must pass a budget for the current fiscal year in parliament within its first 100 days or face a new election. Though Netanyahu and Gantz agreed in May to pass a two-year spending plan covering both 2020 and 2021—to ensure coalition survival through the end of next year—Netanyahu now insists on a one-year plan.
“The budget is not the reason for the political crisis, it’s just a pretext. It’s the easiest available way out of the [coalition] agreement and dodge the rotation. If they pass the budget, Netanyahu won’t have any easy way out,” said Yohanan Plesner, the president of the Israel Democracy Institute.
A survey by the institute found only 28 percent of the public supports dissolving the government and holding a new election. As in other countries buffeted by the pandemic and the attendant economic shutdowns, Israel’s unemployment has surged in recent months. Earlier this week, Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron called on the government to pass a fiscal plan and cautioned that a new election would hurt the economy. Despite the economic crisis and unrest in the streets, Netanyahu is focused on avoiding his trial and a possible ruling by Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit that would force the prime minister to take a leave of absence, Plesner said.
“Netanyahu’s personal interests are not compatible with the national interest. He fears that the public will see him sitting in court three days a week,” he said. “It will bring home the point that, rather than being a full-time prime minister, he’ll be a part-time prime minister.”
Netanyahu has denied suggestions that he’s steering the country toward another vote.
A snap election could play in Netanyahu’s favor. Gantz appears to have suffered politically from his decision to join the government, according to opinion polls. One conducted by Israel’s public broadcaster KAN this month found that only 10 percent of Israelis consider Gantz to be the most suitable candidate for prime minister—while 37 percent favored Netanyahu. Another recent poll conducted by Israel’s Channel 13 television news predicted that Netanyahu’s alliance of right-wing and religious parties would win an absolute majority in the 120-member parliament, a goal it fell short of in the previous three votes.
Such a narrow-based coalition could potentially pass laws insulating Netanyahu from prosecution. One proposal Likud members have floated is a bill that would make it impossible to convict a sitting prime minister. Another one would enable the parliament to override decisions of Israel’s Supreme Court.
Gantz has stood firm so far on the budget fight but has much to lose if no compromise is reached—including his turn as prime minister next year.
“His whole reason for going to the government is because of corona, and not dragging everyone to elections, so Bibi is taking advantage of that,” said Jonathan Rynhold, a political science professor at Bar-Ilan University, referring to Netanyahu by his nickname. “Because Bibi is prepared to impose more damage on the country than Gantz to advance his political interests, that gives him room for maneuver.”
To be sure, a new election would be no cakewalk for Netanyahu either. Public approval of his handling of the pandemic has plummeted as second-wave infections surged over the summer. Polls show Netanyahu’s Likud party losing seats in the event of a new vote.
“It’s not the time to go to elections when people are in the streets, and there’s a high unemployment rate, and people can’t afford their bills, and the economic future of the country is in question,” said Mitchell Barak, an Israeli American public opinion expert and a former advisor to Netanyahu.
On the other hand, Netanyahu seems to be at his strongest when he has the rest of Israel’s parliament guessing what his next move will be. “He thrives in an environment of political chaos,” Barak said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-12--The Importance of Kamala Harris’s South Asian Heritage

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden ’ s choice of Kamala Harris as his running mate has been rightly hailed as historic : If elected , she would be the first female vice president of the United States as well as the first Black woman to hold that office .
But what ’ s getting less attention in global media is the fact that Harris will also be the first vice president of South Asian heritage—and to Indian Americans like myself that is inspiring but also instructive .
How might Harris ’ s South Asian identity shape a Biden administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global problems , the United States needs a leader with a global mindset .
As the daughter of an immigrant from Chennai , in southern India , it ’ s likely that Harris will share a perspective on foreign policy that looks at the world ’ s two largest democracies as critical allies .
And while that lens of partnership could play a role in U.S.-China relations , on matters related to immigration , technology , trade , and defense , it will perhaps be most important in confronting the urgent threat of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. governments have not achieved enough on and that the United States has regressed on under the administration of President Donald Trump .
There are more than 4 million people of Indian origin in the United States , and while they are not a monolith , they share a common heritage and many experiences that shape their perspective .
Most are relatively new to the country and retain ties to family and loved ones in India .
On the whole , they tend to be a highly educated and scientifically oriented demographic—many Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ H-1B visas for highly skilled tech workers .
Indian Americans comprise one of the highest-earning demographics in the United States , with a median household income of around $ 100,000 , according to the Pew Research Center .
These immigrants have generally voted Democratic in recent elections : About 77 percent voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
But more importantly , they tend to care deeply about climate change , not only because they believe in science but because they hear the stories of the devastating effects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its neighboring countries .
They also know that climate change was the biggest challenge confronting the planet before the coronavirus pandemic and that it will be the biggest challenge facing the world once COVID-19 is—eventually—behind us.Harris will share a perspective on foreign policy that looks at the world ’ s two largest democracies as critical allies Indian Americans see , perhaps more than most , how the world has changed over the past two decades .
When I was growing up , trips with my family to India meant me and my sisters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ my grandmother ’ s home that had air conditioning .
Today , I can order a latte from a Starbucks in Mumbai with the air conditioning blasting so hard it gives me the chills .
The growing Indian middle class is an economic miracle in many ways .
But Indian Americans also share an acute understanding that if rapidly developing countries like India and China burn cheap coal to fuel their growth the way the United States did , there won ’ t be a world for children in any country to inherit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States to lead the path to a clean energy future that serves them at home and also leads to sustainable development abroad .
They want an administration that cooperates with India and China on these critical issues and supports policies that improve living conditions around the world .
A Biden-Harris administration would build on the successes of the Obama-Biden administration , undo the damages of the Trump administration , and work to reestablish and strengthen the Paris climate agreement .
Consider also the Trump administration ’ s policies regarding immigrants .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the U.S. southern border and banning Muslims , the Trump administration enacted a slew of policies hostile to immigrants from all parts of the world , including India .
This summer , the Trump administration suspended H-1B visas , pulling the rug out from under 525,000 workers , most of them of South Asian origin .
In every instance , Harris confronted Trump ’ s nativism , criticizing his policies of putting “ babies in cages ” and reminding us that “ their children are our children , ” as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ H-1B visas that lead to lengthy delays for Indian immigrants seeking green cards.Indian Americans know that sensible immigration reform will also be integral to addressing major global challenges Indian Americans know—just as a Biden-Harris administration will—that sensible immigration reform will also be integral to addressing major global challenges such as climate change , because the United States can not lead the world when it is turning its back on its best talent , and because the only way for the country to succeed in building a future resilient to climate change is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have great ideas and the work ethic to make them a reality .
Harris understands these issues personally .
Her mother came to the United States to do cancer research and earn her doctorate at the University of California , Berkeley .
She is part of the generation of Indians—like my father—who came to the United States because they saw it as a place to learn , a place to grow , a place to improve the world , and a place to work hard and have a good life .
Harris also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global problems like climate change , inequality , or the externalities stemming from globalization is to reverse the Trump administration ’ s policies of retrenching from the world and instead to bring countries closer together .
During her own presidential campaign , Harris proposed an unprecedented $ 10 trillion plan to create a carbon-neutral economy in the United States , alongside billions in aid to countries that meet the goals of the Paris accords .
“ Climate change is an existential threat to our species , and the United States must lead the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future and protect our planet , ” Harris has said .
Growing up in an immigrant family in Pennsylvania ’ s coal country , not far from Biden ’ s hometown of Scranton , I ’ ve seen the environmental devastation that underlaid the United States ’ great postwar expansion , as well as the opportunity that the coal era provided .
In Kamala Harris , I see someone who looks like me , who shares in my experiences , and who knows that we simply can not treat the planet in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As an Indian American , as someone who wants to see a safe , prosperous , and healthy world , I can ’ t wait for her to be my vice president , and I can ’ t wait to see her represent my country on the world stage .

Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s choice of Kamala Harris as his running mate has been rightly hailed as historic: If elected, she would be the first female vice president of the United States as well as the first Black woman to hold that office. But what’s getting less attention in global media is the fact that Harris will also be the first vice president of South Asian heritage—and to Indian Americans like myself that is inspiring but also instructive.
Presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s choice of Kamala Harris as his running mate has been rightly hailed as historic: If elected, she would be the first female vice president of the United States as well as the first Black woman to hold that office. But what’s getting less attention in global media is the fact that Harris will also be the first vice president of South Asian heritage—and to Indian Americans like myself that is inspiring but also instructive.
How might Harris’s South Asian identity shape a Biden administration’s foreign-policy agenda? To tackle global problems, the United States needs a leader with a global mindset. As the daughter of an immigrant from Chennai, in southern India, it’s likely that Harris will share a perspective on foreign policy that looks at the world’s two largest democracies as critical allies. And while that lens of partnership could play a role in U.S.-China relations, on matters related to immigration, technology, trade, and defense, it will perhaps be most important in confronting the urgent threat of climate change, a challenge that previous U.S. governments have not achieved enough on and that the United States has regressed on under the administration of President Donald Trump.
There are more than 4 million people of Indian origin in the United States, and while they are not a monolith, they share a common heritage and many experiences that shape their perspective. Most are relatively new to the country and retain ties to family and loved ones in India. On the whole, they tend to be a highly educated and scientifically oriented demographic—many Indian immigrants arrived in the United States on H-1B visas for highly skilled tech workers. Indian Americans comprise one of the highest-earning demographics in the United States, with a median household income of around $100,000, according to the Pew Research Center.
These immigrants have generally voted Democratic in recent elections: About 77 percent voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. But more importantly, they tend to care deeply about climate change, not only because they believe in science but because they hear the stories of the devastating effects of extreme weather from relatives in India and its neighboring countries. They also know that climate change was the biggest challenge confronting the planet before the coronavirus pandemic and that it will be the biggest challenge facing the world once COVID-19 is—eventually—behind us.Harris will share a perspective on foreign policy that looks at the world’s two largest democracies as critical allies
Indian Americans see, perhaps more than most, how the world has changed over the past two decades. When I was growing up, trips with my family to India meant me and my sisters packing ourselves into the single room in my grandmother’s home that had air conditioning. Today, I can order a latte from a Starbucks in Mumbai with the air conditioning blasting so hard it gives me the chills. The growing Indian middle class is an economic miracle in many ways. But Indian Americans also share an acute understanding that if rapidly developing countries like India and China burn cheap coal to fuel their growth the way the United States did, there won’t be a world for children in any country to inherit.
What Indian Americans want is for the United States to lead the path to a clean energy future that serves them at home and also leads to sustainable development abroad. They want an administration that cooperates with India and China on these critical issues and supports policies that improve living conditions around the world.
A Biden-Harris administration would build on the successes of the Obama-Biden administration, undo the damages of the Trump administration, and work to reestablish and strengthen the Paris climate agreement.
Consider also the Trump administration’s policies regarding immigrants. After campaigning on building a medieval wall on the U.S. southern border and banning Muslims, the Trump administration enacted a slew of policies hostile to immigrants from all parts of the world, including India. This summer, the Trump administration suspended H-1B visas, pulling the rug out from under 525,000 workers, most of them of South Asian origin. In every instance, Harris confronted Trump’s nativism, criticizing his policies of putting “babies in cages” and reminding us that “their children are our children,” as well as introducing legislation to remove national caps on H-1B visas that lead to lengthy delays for Indian immigrants seeking green cards.Indian Americans know that sensible immigration reform will also be integral to addressing major global challenges
Indian Americans know—just as a Biden-Harris administration will—that sensible immigration reform will also be integral to addressing major global challenges such as climate change, because the United States cannot lead the world when it is turning its back on its best talent, and because the only way for the country to succeed in building a future resilient to climate change is to welcome those from around the world who have great ideas and the work ethic to make them a reality.
Harris understands these issues personally. Her mother came to the United States to do cancer research and earn her doctorate at the University of California, Berkeley. She is part of the generation of Indians—like my father—who came to the United States because they saw it as a place to learn, a place to grow, a place to improve the world, and a place to work hard and have a good life.
Harris also knows that the only way to solve global problems like climate change, inequality, or the externalities stemming from globalization is to reverse the Trump administration’s policies of retrenching from the world and instead to bring countries closer together. During her own presidential campaign, Harris proposed an unprecedented $10 trillion plan to create a carbon-neutral economy in the United States, alongside billions in aid to countries that meet the goals of the Paris accords. “Climate change is an existential threat to our species, and the United States must lead the world with bold action to safeguard our future and protect our planet,” Harris has said.
Growing up in an immigrant family in Pennsylvania’s coal country, not far from Biden’s hometown of Scranton, I’ve seen the environmental devastation that underlaid the United States’ great postwar expansion, as well as the opportunity that the coal era provided. In Kamala Harris, I see someone who looks like me, who shares in my experiences, and who knows that we simply cannot treat the planet in the future as we have in the past. As an Indian American, as someone who wants to see a safe, prosperous, and healthy world, I can’t wait for her to be my vice president, and I can’t wait to see her represent my country on the world stage.