foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--Poland Needs Migrant Workers. The Pandemic Has Kept Them Away.

Poland Needs Migrant Workers .
The Pandemic Has Kept Them Away .
WARSAW , Poland—In late May , a Ukrainian plane landed on the Warsaw airport ’ s idle runway .
An ambulance hurried across the apron .
Each of the arriving 178 Ukrainians were ushered through checks—temperatures first , then papers .
Six buses were waiting to take the workers to houses and hostels around Poland , where they would spend a mandatory two weeks in quarantine before taking up jobs in manufacturing and logistics .
After the Polish government introduced some of Europe ’ s toughest lockdown measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the million or so Ukrainians living in Poland—its largest migrant group—left the country .
But now , as the Polish economy begins to recover from the recession induced by the pandemic , businesses are scrambling for the foreign workers they have come to rely on , seeking ways to either bring them back or find replacements .
The difficulties they are facing in doing so have exposed the limitations of Poland ’ s short-sighted migration model .
In recent years , Poland has become the European Union ’ s largest importer of foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent year on record , Poland issued 635,000 first-residence permits , a fifth of all such documents issued in the bloc .
Since 2014 , nearly 2 million Ukrainians have taken up roles in agriculture , construction , production , and logistics.Businesses are scrambling for the foreign workers they have come to rely on , seeking ways to either bring them back or find replacements .
They are the ones who have kept Poland ’ s economy humming , despite an aging society , plummeting birth rates , and large numbers of Poles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for work .
As a result , the unprecedented wave of arrivals has been widely accepted by Poles—in contrast to other Western countries where immigration has conjured up native resentment .
These economic imperatives have at times clashed with the hostile anti-immigrant attitude taken by members of the nationalist ruling Law and Justice ( PiS ) party .
The Polish government under PiS has been at loggerheads with the EU over Brussels ’ position on accepting asylum-seekers within the bloc .
In early June , along with six other member states in Eastern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cultural experiment ” of relocating “ illegal immigrants ” inside Europe ahead of the EU ’ s new Pact on Asylum and Migration expected this summer .
But after borders closed this year , many have had trouble entering Poland .
International air and rail travel , which have been suspended since mid-March , are only gradually being restored .
Many land border crossings remain sealed off , and open ones often allow only passenger cars to come through , said Tomas Bogdevic , director of Gremi Personal , the recruitment agency that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you know , not everyone has a car , ” he said .
Other crossings have been costly to reach with much of Ukraine ’ s internal connections suspended , and many migrants are grappling with the problem of where to spend the two weeks of mandatory quarantine upon arrival .
The Polish consular system has also halted the flow of workers , having only resumed issuing visas May 4 and prioritizing a handful of sectors .
Some businesses have leaned on idle workers already in Poland .
“ Heading , gutting , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources chief Martyna Lukomska said , listing jobs at the BG Production salmon processing plant .
The company in the seaside village of Ustronie Morskie has plugged gaps with 180 workers from Indonesia and the Philippines who were let go from warehouses and restaurants during the pandemic .
“ The agencies we work with transferred the workers from IKEA , KFC , and McDonald ’ s to us , ” Lukomska said .
She has also been working with the seaside hoteliers chamber to borrow furloughed cooks and cleaners .
Farmers have felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
One blueberry producer from the southern village of Olchowiec hires 800 workers every year .
Back in 2014 , 90 percent of them were Polish and just 10 percent were Ukrainian .
By last year , almost all came from Ukraine , the company ’ s hiring specialist , Yosyp Gusak , told Foreign Policy .
This year , a completely new group has joined the berry farm : A 10th of current pickers are students from India , Nigeria , Zimbabwe , and Rwanda who had their university courses moved online @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have classes , they leave the field for an hour or two and then return to work , ” Gusak said .
More than a quarter of foreign workers in Poland met the growing demand by changing their employment sector during the first month of the pandemic , according to a survey by EWL recruitment agency .
But replacement workers are only some consolation .
“ It is not just numbers that matter but also the skills , ” said Agnieszka Kulesa , a labor economist at Warsaw ’ s Center for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Poles travel to Germany year on year to pick asparagus , they become more efficient than a novice German worker would be , ” she said .
British farmers have flown in planes of Romanians to train their green native pickers this year .
“ Speed really is of the essence when it comes to strawberries , ” Kulesa said.The pandemic also laid bare some of the deeper issues of Poland ’ s management of migration .
The Polish government appears to have taken note and recently loosened quarantine rules for foreign farmhands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ away under special sanitary conditions .
On May 28 , a drive-thru testing site opened for seasonal workers in Grójec , the apple-growing capital of Poland .
Seasonal workers will receive state-funded tests , which have not even been granted to teachers , who returned to schools in late May .
“ I think this emphatically shows the situation on the labor market , ” Kulesa told Foreign Policy .
While the gaping seasonal holes have been plugged , the pandemic has also laid bare some of the deeper issues of Poland ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system is geared primarily toward short-term work .
Citizens of Ukraine and five other former Soviet countries can work in Poland for up to six months without a visa .
This has always been a concern for business leaders .
The country ’ s overreliance on a single source of foreign workers meant that its labor force could easily dry up if the political , economic , or social conditions changed .
This is precisely the problem that the pandemic exposed .
When the pandemic broke out , many foreign nationals rushed home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobless and penniless .
The potential impact on businesses that rely on short-term labor forced the government to extend legal stays .
“ Poland is repeating the mistakes of Germany ’ s guest-worker programs in the 1970s by treating migrants as [ temporary ] labor , ” said Cezary Kaźmierczak , president of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers .
But the nature of migration to Poland is changing .
Last year , the government granted almost 40 percent more work permits to Ukrainians than the previous year , allowing for stays of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those migrant workers , however , are moving into higher-paid sectors such as industry and services , and the share of Ukrainians working in agriculture in Poland halved in the four years after 2014 .
“ Many of them are working below their qualifications , which leaves them with a lot of room for promotion , ” said Tomasz Wróblewski , president of the think tank Warsaw Enterprise Institute .
Last year , a record number of the new companies registered in Poland were set up by foreigners .
“ Such workers are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be doing all it can to retain them in Poland , ” said Wróblewski , who suggests creating a path to achieving full settlement rights .
Yet the question of integrating newcomers continues to be swept under the rug .
After coming to power in 2016 , PiS annulled the previous government ’ s migration policy document and began working on its own blueprint , with a focus on repatriating the Polish diaspora .
However , a leaked draft of the interior ministry ’ s new migration policy stirred up controversy over extensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks of Islam , and the suggestion of a special tax for the childless .
“ Everything was meant to happen quietly , ” Kulesa said .
“ When the project became loud , the government abandoned its plans .
Since then , it has fallen silent on migration.
” Meanwhile , according to Wróblewski , German companies are beginning to reach out for Ukrainian workers trained and working in Poland .
“ We are repeating the same mistakes made with our own citizens ” —who went westward after Poland joined the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then letting them go , ” said Wróblewski , referring to foreign student visas lapsing once they conclude their studies at Polish universities .
Administrative bottlenecks have also stopped more workers coming from further afield .
Poland has taken in 36,000 Nepalese , 20,000 Indians , and 18,000 Bangladeshis in the past three years , but recruitment agencies are reluctant to bring over more because of the cost and logistical difficulties of importing workers from so far away .
“ We wait long for documents , and then there are the cultural and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Bogdevic , the director of recruitment agency Gremi Personal .
Poland has six consulates to service around 40 million Ukrainians but just two in India to service the 1.5 billion people there and in neighboring Bangladesh and Nepal .
Whereas some regional governments have mediated between employers and the countries that send workers , Kulesa said , in Poland , the drawn-out process is still the domain of recruitment agencies.Poland will rely on its migrant workers more than its conservative government would like to admit .
For the foreseeable future , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than its conservative government would like to admit .
“ The economic growth over the past decade may not have been possible without these foreign workers , ” Kulesa said .
A new report by the National Bank of Poland estimates that Ukrainian workers have increased the effective labor supply in Poland by 0.8 percent each year between 2013 and 2018 .
That has translated into 0.5 percentage points more growth per year , or 13 percent of Poland ’ s economic growth in that period .
A popular line of argument @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers are kept out , then Polish wages will rise .
However , for as long as Poland ’ s economy remains labor intensive , cheap work has kept its exports competitive .
That has helped to cushion the blow of the latest crisis .
After the pandemic , there will still be plenty of such jobs that Poles simply do not want to fill , Kulesa said .
“ The 3 D jobs : dirty , dangerous , and difficult.
” Even as Poland ’ s migration politics remain a mixture of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to continue coming .
Ukraine ’ s recovering war-torn economy has been hard-hit by the pandemic .
“ A lot of medium-sized companies have gone bust , ” Bogdevic said .
“ Wages are still up to six times lower than here .
Many people still want to leave for work.
” Four out of 10 passengers on the first flight came to Poland for the first time , and the agency has since flown in two more planes of workers .
“ We decided at noon , ” Bogdevic said , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had already signed up .
”

WARSAW, Poland—In late May, a Ukrainian plane landed on the Warsaw airport’s idle runway. An ambulance hurried across the apron. Each of the arriving 178 Ukrainians were ushered through checks—temperatures first, then papers. Six buses were waiting to take the workers to houses and hostels around Poland, where they would spend a mandatory two weeks in quarantine before taking up jobs in manufacturing and logistics.
WARSAW, Poland—In late May, a Ukrainian plane landed on the Warsaw airport’s idle runway. An ambulance hurried across the apron. Each of the arriving 178 Ukrainians were ushered through checks—temperatures first, then papers. Six buses were waiting to take the workers to houses and hostels around Poland, where they would spend a mandatory two weeks in quarantine before taking up jobs in manufacturing and logistics.
After the Polish government introduced some of Europe’s toughest lockdown measures in mid-March, an estimated 150,000 of the million or so Ukrainians living in Poland—its largest migrant group—left the country. But now, as the Polish economy begins to recover from the recession induced by the pandemic, businesses are scrambling for the foreign workers they have come to rely on, seeking ways to either bring them back or find replacements. The difficulties they are facing in doing so have exposed the limitations of Poland’s short-sighted migration model.
In recent years, Poland has become the European Union’s largest importer of foreign workers. In 2018, the most recent year on record, Poland issued 635,000 first-residence permits, a fifth of all such documents issued in the bloc. Since 2014, nearly 2 million Ukrainians have taken up roles in agriculture, construction, production, and logistics.Businesses are scrambling for the foreign workers they have come to rely on, seeking ways to either bring them back or find replacements.
They are the ones who have kept Poland’s economy humming, despite an aging society, plummeting birth rates, and large numbers of Poles emigrating to other parts of the EU for work. As a result, the unprecedented wave of arrivals has been widely accepted by Poles—in contrast to other Western countries where immigration has conjured up native resentment.
These economic imperatives have at times clashed with the hostile anti-immigrant attitude taken by members of the nationalist ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. The Polish government under PiS has been at loggerheads with the EU over Brussels’ position on accepting asylum-seekers within the bloc. In early June, along with six other member states in Eastern Europe, Poland railed against the “cultural experiment” of relocating “illegal immigrants” inside Europe ahead of the EU’s new Pact on Asylum and Migration expected this summer.
But after borders closed this year, many have had trouble entering Poland. International air and rail travel, which have been suspended since mid-March, are only gradually being restored. Many land border crossings remain sealed off, and open ones often allow only passenger cars to come through, said Tomas Bogdevic, director of Gremi Personal, the recruitment agency that organized the recent flight. “As you know, not everyone has a car,” he said. Other crossings have been costly to reach with much of Ukraine’s internal connections suspended, and many migrants are grappling with the problem of where to spend the two weeks of mandatory quarantine upon arrival. The Polish consular system has also halted the flow of workers, having only resumed issuing visas May 4 and prioritizing a handful of sectors.
Some businesses have leaned on idle workers already in Poland. “Heading, gutting, filleting, and smoking,” human resources chief Martyna Lukomska said, listing jobs at the BG Production salmon processing plant. The company in the seaside village of Ustronie Morskie has plugged gaps with 180 workers from Indonesia and the Philippines who were let go from warehouses and restaurants during the pandemic. “The agencies we work with transferred the workers from IKEA, KFC, and McDonald’s to us,” Lukomska said. She has also been working with the seaside hoteliers chamber to borrow furloughed cooks and cleaners.
Farmers have felt even greater urgency to recruit seasonal farmhands. One blueberry producer from the southern village of Olchowiec hires 800 workers every year. Back in 2014, 90 percent of them were Polish and just 10 percent were Ukrainian. By last year, almost all came from Ukraine, the company’s hiring specialist, Yosyp Gusak, told Foreign Policy. This year, a completely new group has joined the berry farm: A 10th of current pickers are students from India, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda who had their university courses moved online because of the coronavirus. “When they have classes, they leave the field for an hour or two and then return to work,” Gusak said.
More than a quarter of foreign workers in Poland met the growing demand by changing their employment sector during the first month of the pandemic, according to a survey by EWL recruitment agency. But replacement workers are only some consolation. “It is not just numbers that matter but also the skills,” said Agnieszka Kulesa, a labor economist at Warsaw’s Center for Social and Economic Research. “When Poles travel to Germany year on year to pick asparagus, they become more efficient than a novice German worker would be,” she said. British farmers have flown in planes of Romanians to train their green native pickers this year. “Speed really is of the essence when it comes to strawberries,” Kulesa said.The pandemic also laid bare some of the deeper issues of Poland’s management of migration.
The Polish government appears to have taken note and recently loosened quarantine rules for foreign farmhands, allowing them to begin work right away under special sanitary conditions. On May 28, a drive-thru testing site opened for seasonal workers in Grójec, the apple-growing capital of Poland. Seasonal workers will receive state-funded tests, which have not even been granted to teachers, who returned to schools in late May. “I think this emphatically shows the situation on the labor market,” Kulesa told Foreign Policy.
While the gaping seasonal holes have been plugged, the pandemic has also laid bare some of the deeper issues of Poland’s management of migration.
The current system is geared primarily toward short-term work. Citizens of Ukraine and five other former Soviet countries can work in Poland for up to six months without a visa. This has always been a concern for business leaders. The country’s overreliance on a single source of foreign workers meant that its labor force could easily dry up if the political, economic, or social conditions changed. This is precisely the problem that the pandemic exposed.
When the pandemic broke out, many foreign nationals rushed home over fears of being stranded in Poland jobless and penniless. The potential impact on businesses that rely on short-term labor forced the government to extend legal stays. “Poland is repeating the mistakes of Germany’s guest-worker programs in the 1970s by treating migrants as [temporary] labor,” said Cezary Kaźmierczak, president of the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers.
But the nature of migration to Poland is changing. Last year, the government granted almost 40 percent more work permits to Ukrainians than the previous year, allowing for stays of up to three years. Many of those migrant workers, however, are moving into higher-paid sectors such as industry and services, and the share of Ukrainians working in agriculture in Poland halved in the four years after 2014.
“Many of them are working below their qualifications, which leaves them with a lot of room for promotion,” said Tomasz Wróblewski, president of the think tank Warsaw Enterprise Institute. Last year, a record number of the new companies registered in Poland were set up by foreigners. “Such workers are incredibly valuable, and the government should be doing all it can to retain them in Poland,” said Wróblewski, who suggests creating a path to achieving full settlement rights.
Yet the question of integrating newcomers continues to be swept under the rug. After coming to power in 2016, PiS annulled the previous government’s migration policy document and began working on its own blueprint, with a focus on repatriating the Polish diaspora. However, a leaked draft of the interior ministry’s new migration policy stirred up controversy over extensive assimilation plans, a chapter on the risks of Islam, and the suggestion of a special tax for the childless. “Everything was meant to happen quietly,” Kulesa said. “When the project became loud, the government abandoned its plans. Since then, it has fallen silent on migration.”
Meanwhile, according to Wróblewski, German companies are beginning to reach out for Ukrainian workers trained and working in Poland. “We are repeating the same mistakes made with our own citizens”—who went westward after Poland joined the EU in 2004—“by educating them and then letting them go,” said Wróblewski, referring to foreign student visas lapsing once they conclude their studies at Polish universities.
Administrative bottlenecks have also stopped more workers coming from further afield. Poland has taken in 36,000 Nepalese, 20,000 Indians, and 18,000 Bangladeshis in the past three years, but recruitment agencies are reluctant to bring over more because of the cost and logistical difficulties of importing workers from so far away. “We wait long for documents, and then there are the cultural and linguistic differences that make contact harder,” said Bogdevic, the director of recruitment agency Gremi Personal. Poland has six consulates to service around 40 million Ukrainians but just two in India to service the 1.5 billion people there and in neighboring Bangladesh and Nepal. Whereas some regional governments have mediated between employers and the countries that send workers, Kulesa said, in Poland, the drawn-out process is still the domain of recruitment agencies.Poland will rely on its migrant workers more than its conservative government would like to admit.
For the foreseeable future, Poland will rely on its migrant workers more than its conservative government would like to admit. “The economic growth over the past decade may not have been possible without these foreign workers,” Kulesa said. A new report by the National Bank of Poland estimates that Ukrainian workers have increased the effective labor supply in Poland by 0.8 percent each year between 2013 and 2018. That has translated into 0.5 percentage points more growth per year, or 13 percent of Poland’s economic growth in that period.
A popular line of argument in many corners goes that if cheaper workers are kept out, then Polish wages will rise. However, for as long as Poland’s economy remains labor intensive, cheap work has kept its exports competitive. That has helped to cushion the blow of the latest crisis. After the pandemic, there will still be plenty of such jobs that Poles simply do not want to fill, Kulesa said. “The 3 D jobs: dirty, dangerous, and difficult.”
Even as Poland’s migration politics remain a mixture of short-termism and naivety, Ukrainians look set to continue coming. Ukraine’s recovering war-torn economy has been hard-hit by the pandemic. “A lot of medium-sized companies have gone bust,” Bogdevic said. “Wages are still up to six times lower than here. Many people still want to leave for work.” Four out of 10 passengers on the first flight came to Poland for the first time, and the agency has since flown in two more planes of workers. “We decided at noon,” Bogdevic said, and “a day later, 100 people had already signed up.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--The Imagined Threats of 5G Conspiracy Theorists Are Causing Real-World Harm

The Imagined Threats of 5G Conspiracy Theorists Are Causing Real-World Harm Just before 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning last month , police in the British town of Derby were called to a 5G cellular network tower .
The country was under lockdown to combat the coronavirus pandemic ; even criminals stayed home .
But someone had set the newly installed tower ablaze .
All over the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe , 5G towers are being targeted in a bizarre crime spree .
The perpetrators ?
People who—having consumed disinformation spread on YouTube , TikTok , Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ users , and even the pro-Kremlin Russian channel RT—have convinced themselves that 5G causes COVID-19 and other maladies .
The attacks are giving cities cold feet as to whether they should even host 5G antennas .
Disinformation is no longer a mere inconvenience ; it ’ s having real-life impact .
After the Derby attack , a town councilor told the local newspaper that “ whatever reason people have to burn a phone mast , they must really look in the mirror and think , was it worth it ?
Putting people ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first responders or innocent people locally .
It ’ s simply not acceptable in civil society to do such a thing.
” The local official was right , of course—but his commonsense argument is unlikely to impress the arsonists .
That ’ s because the 5G arsonists are acting on highly compelling disinformation .
So compelling , in fact , that it has inspired citizens all around Europe to attack 5G masts and the workers installing or repairing them .
According to the European Telecommunications Network Operators ’ Association ( ETNO ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mobile network operators , between January and early June this year there had been 87 arson attacks in the U.K. , 30 arson attacks in the Netherlands , harassment of Dutch telecoms engineers , threats to industry and government representatives in Sweden and the Netherlands , three arson attacks in Ireland , two in Sweden , and further attacks in France , Germany , Belgium , Italy , and Cyprus .
Disinformation is no longer a mere inconvenience ; it ’ s having real-life impact .
Coronavirus-5G conspiracy theories generally promote one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immune system and therefore leads to COVID-19 , the droplets by which the coronavirus travels are spread by 5G airwaves , or the coronavirus pandemic is a cover for the effects of 5G exposure .
While none of the theories is true , that hasn ’ t stopped celebrities including the American actor Woody Harrelson from spreading them .
In fact , according to an April report by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford , celebrities , politicians , and other public figures account for 20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus .
While relatively few celebrities spread such coronavirus falsehoods , their posts unsurprisingly have enormous impact .
Social media is full of the stuff ( including people filming themselves attacking 5G masts ) .
Even TikTok , the video-snippet service popular with teenagers , has featured challenges encouraging users to film themselves committing 5G sabotage .
There are legitimate concerns regarding 5G , especially about the role of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei .
Virtually every Western government is agonizing over whether to allow Huawei to participate in its new 5G network @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposed to Huawei , arguing that the firm could facilitate snooping by the Chinese government , the U.K. government last year decided to permit Huawei ’ s participation in as much as 35 percent of the country ’ s 5G infrastructure , and only in nonsensitive parts , while the German government remains undecided .
After an outcry by British members of Parliament concerned by the national security implications of Huawei ’ s participation in critical national infrastructure , in May the U.K. government launched a review into whether it should ban Huawei @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regarding 5G , especially about the role of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei .
But falsely linking 5G to the coronavirus is another matter altogether .
But falsely linking 5G to the coronavirus is , of course , another matter altogether .
Alarmingly , a government hostile to the West appears to be helping to spread the lies .
Researchers at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar and the New York-based social media monitoring firm Blackbird.AI have independently established that parts of the coronavirus-5G conspiracy are boosted by the use of bots .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ bots originated , Marc Owen Jones of Hamad Bin Khalifa University told Bloomberg that the campaign shows similarities to the one orchestrated by Russia ’ s Internet Research Agency during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign .
“ Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency ( IRA ) used social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States , ” the Senate Intelligence Committee later concluded .
“ Masquerading as Americans , these operatives used targeted advertisements , intentionally falsified news @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media users in the United States.
” It ’ s easy to dismiss disinformation as an inconvenience rather than a national security threat .
After all , people are aware it exists : In a June Ipsos poll , a shocking 86 percent of people polled in 25 countries ( including the United States ) said they ’ d been exposed to disinformation .
And last year , 72 percent of Germans told the pollster Forsa that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the internet .
But despite the spread of falsehoods by hostile countries , their proxies , and ordinary citizens , liberal democracies have managed to keep functioning .
Few dispute the legitimacy of recent elections .
The anti-vaccination movement , another group fueled by disinformation spread by celebrities and social media , helped trigger an outbreak of measles in the United States last year , and the anti-vaxxers could cause another coronavirus outbreak if they convince themselves and enough others that a coronavirus vaccine is harmful .
In fact , in a recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ d refuse such a vaccine .
Such opt-out rates would render a vaccine ineffective .
But there ’ s a delay between not getting vaccinated and contracting a disease .
The coronavirus-5G campaign is different : The damage is immediately obvious .
In large cities , nearby antennas may pick up the traffic from a destroyed one , leaving users with slower service .
Residents of smaller towns face worse disruption .
The Midlands , the region where Derby is located , ranks only behind London in number of coronavirus infections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , its residents may not be able to bid farewell to dying family members , Vodafone ’ s CEO Nick Jeffrey warned .
“ It ’ s even more upsetting that even the small solace of a phone or video call may now be denied them because of the selfish actions of a few deluded conspiracy theorists , ” he told Sky News .
And the attacks could discourage towns from approving new towers .
Few cities will want to endure the painstaking process of approving and installing 5G towers , only for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left unhappy .
Perhaps unsurprisingly , local politicians are getting cold feet .
In Wallonia , the French-speaking part of Belgium , several towns and cities are now shelving their plans for the planned 5G rollout .
And Italy has seen a veritable explosion of 5G cancellations linked to the recent attacks , with mayors and city councils deciding that the convenience of speedy 5G connections is not worth the risk of having to cope with sabotage .
Last June , just one mayor had banned 5G masts .
This April , 128 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that in most Western countries 5G can ’ t be halted .
Productivity and innovation hinge on it , especially in a post-coronavirus era when more office work will be conducted from home .
That infrastructure rollout is now being delayed or even canceled as a result not of technical or logistical concerns but due to disinformation .
“ Sure , today we ’ re able to function , ” said Alessandro Gropelli , ETNO ’ s deputy director-general .
“ But if no action is taken against these false claims , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be very visible.
” With disinformation now directly harming business and everyday life , countering it is becoming not just a luxury but an imperative .
China , meanwhile , is speeding ahead with its 5G rollout , and thanks to the government ’ s close surveillance of the public , cities don ’ t have to worry that citizens fed by disinformation will stymie the effort .
Liberal democracies , however , face an unpalatable situation .
With disinformation now directly harming business and everyday life , countering it is becoming not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To be sure , democracy is far more important than 5G .
But because 5G is tangible , tackling the disinformation spread around it offers an opportunity not just to prevent further arson sprees but also to start tackling the rapidly spreading virus of disinformation in wealthy democracies with widespread internet access .
If current trends continue , only the affluent and the ambitious will still subscribe to established publications with rigorous editorial standards .
And while public-service radio and television enjoy high approval ratings , their audiences are declining .
According to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Institute , public-service broadcasters in a range of European countries are accessed online by small percentages of people under the age of 25 : 19 percent of young Germans get news online from the national public broadcasters ARD and ZDF , for example , and only 14 of young Italians use the national broadcaster RAI online ; the figure is similar for people with low levels of education .
Younger and less educated people , meanwhile , will get most of their information via sources verified by no one .
Twitter ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t go far .
Karl Marx spoke dismissively of what he labeled the lumpenproletariat—the unthinking underclass who toiled away in industrial purgatory , unwilling to participate in the revolution .
Today , a new lumpenproletariat , an unthinking underclass reading away in information purgatory , is emerging , and unlike in Marx ’ s day , it seems eager to engage in revolution .
But because it lives on a diet of falsehoods and half-truths , the “ information lumpenproletariat ” is dangerous .
Cell phone towers are simply the latest edifice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platforms should do their part to make sure there isn ’ t another .

Just before 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning last month, police in the British town of Derby were called to a 5G cellular network tower. The country was under lockdown to combat the coronavirus pandemic; even criminals stayed home . But someone had set the newly installed tower ablaze. All over the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, 5G towers are being targeted in a bizarre crime spree. The perpetrators? People who—having consumed disinformation spread on YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter by celebrities, other users, and even the pro-Kremlin Russian channel RT —have convinced themselves that 5G causes COVID-19 and other maladies. The attacks are giving cities cold feet as to whether they should even host 5G antennas. Disinformation is no longer a mere inconvenience; it’s having real-life impact.
Just before 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning last month, police in the British town of Derby were called to a 5G cellular network tower. The country was under lockdown to combat the coronavirus pandemic; even criminals stayed home. But someone had set the newly installed tower ablaze. All over the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, 5G towers are being targeted in a bizarre crime spree. The perpetrators? People who—having consumed disinformation spread on YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter by celebrities, other users, and even the pro-Kremlin Russian channel RT—have convinced themselves that 5G causes COVID-19 and other maladies. The attacks are giving cities cold feet as to whether they should even host 5G antennas. Disinformation is no longer a mere inconvenience; it’s having real-life impact.
After the Derby attack, a town councilor told the local newspaper that “whatever reason people have to burn a phone mast, they must really look in the mirror and think, was it worth it? Putting people’s lives at risk, whether the first responders or innocent people locally. It’s simply not acceptable in civil society to do such a thing.” The local official was right, of course—but his commonsense argument is unlikely to impress the arsonists. That’s because the 5G arsonists are acting on highly compelling disinformation. So compelling, in fact, that it has inspired citizens all around Europe to attack 5G masts and the workers installing or repairing them.
According to the European Telecommunications Network Operators’ Association (ETNO) and the GSMA, the global association of mobile network operators, between January and early June this year there had been 87 arson attacks in the U.K., 30 arson attacks in the Netherlands, harassment of Dutch telecoms engineers, threats to industry and government representatives in Sweden and the Netherlands, three arson attacks in Ireland, two in Sweden, and further attacks in France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Cyprus.
Disinformation is no longer a mere inconvenience; it’s having real-life impact.
Coronavirus-5G conspiracy theories generally promote one of the following arguments: 5G weakens the immune system and therefore leads to COVID-19, the droplets by which the coronavirus travels are spread by 5G airwaves, or the coronavirus pandemic is a cover for the effects of 5G exposure. While none of the theories is true, that hasn’t stopped celebrities including the American actor Woody Harrelson from spreading them.
In fact, according to an April report by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, celebrities, politicians, and other public figures account for 20 percent of all disinformation about 5G and coronavirus. While relatively few celebrities spread such coronavirus falsehoods, their posts unsurprisingly have enormous impact. Social media is full of the stuff (including people filming themselves attacking 5G masts). Even TikTok, the video-snippet service popular with teenagers, has featured challenges encouraging users to film themselves committing 5G sabotage.
There are legitimate concerns regarding 5G, especially about the role of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei. Virtually every Western government is agonizing over whether to allow Huawei to participate in its new 5G network. While the U.S. government is firmly opposed to Huawei, arguing that the firm could facilitate snooping by the Chinese government, the U.K. government last year decided to permit Huawei’s participation in as much as 35 percent of the country’s 5G infrastructure, and only in nonsensitive parts, while the German government remains undecided.
After an outcry by British members of Parliament concerned by the national security implications of Huawei’s participation in critical national infrastructure, in May the U.K. government launched a review into whether it should ban Huawei after all.
There are legitimate concerns regarding 5G, especially about the role of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei. But falsely linking 5G to the coronavirus is another matter altogether.
But falsely linking 5G to the coronavirus is, of course, another matter altogether. Alarmingly, a government hostile to the West appears to be helping to spread the lies. Researchers at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar and the New York-based social media monitoring firm Blackbird.AI have independently established that parts of the coronavirus-5G conspiracy are boosted by the use of bots. Though neither team has established where the bots originated, Marc Owen Jones of Hamad Bin Khalifa University told Bloomberg that the campaign shows similarities to the one orchestrated by Russia’s Internet Research Agency during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.
“Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States,” the Senate Intelligence Committee later concluded. “Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-generated content, and social media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media users in the United States.”
It’s easy to dismiss disinformation as an inconvenience rather than a national security threat. After all, people are aware it exists: In a June Ipsos poll, a shocking 86 percent of people polled in 25 countries (including the United States) said they’d been exposed to disinformation. And last year, 72 percent of Germans told the pollster Forsa that they’ve encountered politically motivated disinformation on the internet. But despite the spread of falsehoods by hostile countries, their proxies, and ordinary citizens, liberal democracies have managed to keep functioning. Few dispute the legitimacy of recent elections.
The anti-vaccination movement, another group fueled by disinformation spread by celebrities and social media, helped trigger an outbreak of measles in the United States last year, and the anti-vaxxers could cause another coronavirus outbreak if they convince themselves and enough others that a coronavirus vaccine is harmful. In fact, in a recent poll 29 percent of New Yorkers said they’d refuse such a vaccine. Such opt-out rates would render a vaccine ineffective.
But there’s a delay between not getting vaccinated and contracting a disease. The coronavirus-5G campaign is different: The damage is immediately obvious. In large cities, nearby antennas may pick up the traffic from a destroyed one, leaving users with slower service. Residents of smaller towns face worse disruption. The Midlands, the region where Derby is located, ranks only behind London in number of coronavirus infections. If more 5G towers are sabotaged, its residents may not be able to bid farewell to dying family members, Vodafone’s CEO Nick Jeffrey warned. “It’s even more upsetting that even the small solace of a phone or video call may now be denied them because of the selfish actions of a few deluded conspiracy theorists,” he told Sky News. And the attacks could discourage towns from approving new towers.
Few cities will want to endure the painstaking process of approving and installing 5G towers, only for the masts to be destroyed and residents left unhappy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, local politicians are getting cold feet. In Wallonia, the French-speaking part of Belgium, several towns and cities are now shelving their plans for the planned 5G rollout. And Italy has seen a veritable explosion of 5G cancellations linked to the recent attacks, with mayors and city councils deciding that the convenience of speedy 5G connections is not worth the risk of having to cope with sabotage. Last June, just one mayor had banned 5G masts. This April, 128 did so.
But the reality is that in most Western countries 5G can’t be halted. Productivity and innovation hinge on it, especially in a post-coronavirus era when more office work will be conducted from home. That infrastructure rollout is now being delayed or even canceled as a result not of technical or logistical concerns but due to disinformation. “Sure, today we’re able to function,” said Alessandro Gropelli, ETNO’s deputy director-general. “But if no action is taken against these false claims, in five years’ time the effects will be very visible.”
With disinformation now directly harming business and everyday life, countering it is becoming not just a luxury but an imperative.
China, meanwhile, is speeding ahead with its 5G rollout, and thanks to the government’s close surveillance of the public, cities don’t have to worry that citizens fed by disinformation will stymie the effort. Liberal democracies, however, face an unpalatable situation. With disinformation now directly harming business and everyday life, countering it is becoming not just a luxury but an imperative. To be sure, democracy is far more important than 5G. But because 5G is tangible, tackling the disinformation spread around it offers an opportunity not just to prevent further arson sprees but also to start tackling the rapidly spreading virus of disinformation in wealthy democracies with widespread internet access.
If current trends continue, only the affluent and the ambitious will still subscribe to established publications with rigorous editorial standards. And while public-service radio and television enjoy high approval ratings, their audiences are declining. According to a September 2019 report by the Reuters Institute, public-service broadcasters in a range of European countries are accessed online by small percentages of people under the age of 25: 19 percent of young Germans get news online from the national public broadcasters ARD and ZDF, for example, and only 14 of young Italians use the national broadcaster RAI online; the figure is similar for people with low levels of education. Younger and less educated people, meanwhile, will get most of their information via sources verified by no one. Twitter’s and Facebook’s warning labels don’t go far.
Karl Marx spoke dismissively of what he labeled the lumpenproletariat—the unthinking underclass who toiled away in industrial purgatory, unwilling to participate in the revolution. Today, a new lumpenproletariat, an unthinking underclass reading away in information purgatory, is emerging, and unlike in Marx’s day, it seems eager to engage in revolution. But because it lives on a diet of falsehoods and half-truths, the “information lumpenproletariat” is dangerous. Cell phone towers are simply the latest edifice to come under attack. Social media platforms should do their part to make sure there isn’t another.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--After India’s Skirmish With China, Is Pakistan Next?

After India ’ s Skirmish With China , Is Pakistan Next ?
The worst border skirmish between India and China in the Himalayas in decades has abated for now , but the potential for crisis still looms large over a nuclear-armed South Asia .
Last week , India announced it was formally downgrading relations with its other adversary and neighbor , Pakistan , by reducing the staff at its High Commission by 50 percent .
The last time India asked for a similar reduction of embassy staff was in 2001 , following an attack on the Indian Parliament .
Bilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shunted since New Delhi unilaterally revoked the special status of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir on Aug. 5 , 2019 , and intensified a heavy-handed crackdown in the valley .
So what exactly does the dust-up with China have to do with Pakistan ’ s relationship with India ?
In short , there are five reasons why this month ’ s Himalayan standoff increases the likelihood of a fresh India-Pakistan crisis .
First : India ’ s muted response to China in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley skirmish has raised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Delhi ’ s much-touted role as counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific .
Although New Delhi adopted a position of nonalignment for much of the Cold War , its potential as a regional diplomatic and military bulwark against a rising China took on new significance after U.S. President George W. Bush sought to enlist it as a strategic partner and approved the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to the country .
More recently , New Delhi and Washington announced an expanded defense partnership , including $ 3 billion in arms sales .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2017 and again this year have underscored for Indian policymakers the need to get along with Beijing if only to sustain a mutually feasible cohabitation ; informal summits such as those in 2018 and 2019 were driven by this strategic necessity .
In the aftermath of the most recent crisis , corps commander-level talks and diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and New Delhi mean India is likely to prioritize a minimum-working engagement with China over an unambiguous geopolitical rivalry that would come with fully partnering with the United States .
Meanwhile , the political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face of a conventional balance of forces that has shifted in China ’ s favor—may impel India to look elsewhere to offset suggestions of strategic impotency .
If military capabilities drive policy choices , then the theater with Pakistan is a suitable foil for perceived Indian weaknesses compared to China .
Second , since coming to power in 2014 , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has demonstrated both a willingness and a capability to deliver on nationalistic pledges at home , especially when his government ’ s ability to deliver on the economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has seen its GDP growth fall to its lowest rate in the last 11 years , Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) has sought to consolidate its political base by doubling down on its nationalistic pledges—from revoking the special status for Jammu and Kashmir ( disputed between India and Pakistan since 1947 ) to building a Hindu temple to the god Ram on a disputed holy site where the Babri Masjid once stood .
Research shows that leaders looking to divert attention tend to target traditional enemies and enduring rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is most likely to promote in-group solidarity ) , and diversionary conflicts are particularly likely to take the form of territorial disputes .
Since the controversial measures in Kashmir last year , India ’ s politicians have systematically upped the bilateral ante with Pakistan by declaring intent to “ secure ” the Pakistani administrative areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan .
Earlier this year , India ’ s new Army chief said the Indian Army was “ ready to seize control ” of Pakistan-administered Kashmir if directed by the Indian government ; the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seven to 10 days to defeat Pakistan in war .
Two weeks ago , India ’ s defense minister reiterated that taking Pakistani Kashmir was now a “ stated goal of India ’ s Parliament.
” Ordinarily , such statements might be put down to cheap talk—except , in this case , the BJP ’ s own track record of follow-through suggests these threats should be taken seriously .
Operationally , the Indian Army has begun to set up artillery strikes deep into Kashmiri villages to launch long-distance fire into Pakistan-administered territory .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the India Meteorological Department began to list several areas on the Pakistani side of the border , in its own internal weather reports—an unprecedented development .
Third , while tempers and temperatures arguably cool on the Sino-Indian front , memories of a short but tense air duel between India and Pakistan last February are still fresh in both Islamabad and New Delhi .
While Pakistan shot down an aging , Soviet-era Indian MiG-21 Bison and captured and returned an Indian pilot in the dogfight , India claimed it had downed a Pakistani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quickly escalated into a war of narratives : Pakistan rejected India ’ s allegations and asserted it had lost no jets .
In the days after the dogfight , the New York Times ran a story about the implications of India losing a plane to a country whose military was half the size and received a quarter of the funding .
India ’ s right-wing Shiv Sena has since called for more “ surgical strikes ” on Pakistan to consolidate the BJP ’ s grip on Kashmir .
Furthermore , when Indian papers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 300-400 terrorists ” in an airstrike on Balakot last February , Pakistan countered that the targets had been “ little more than rocks and trees.
” Since last year , India ’ s opposition too has on various occasion taken swipes at Modi for the Balakot episode ; pollsters meanwhile have disputed the extent to which the Balakot strikes actually buoyed the BJP in its 2019 electoral victory .
The “ decider ’ s dilemma ” for Modi is that the unfinished business from the Balakot standoff needs a less ambiguous final chapter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being domestically perceived as having backed away prematurely from a weaker enemy .
This leads to a fourth and crucial point : Successive regional crises under the BJP mean that the domestic costs for India ’ s leaders to not be seen as backing down against external adversaries are growing , not diminishing .
In the standoff with China , losses incurred by the Indian Army have been a shot in the arm for India ’ s opposition politicians , who have been quick to condemn the BJP for its lack of preparation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Conflict with Pakistan could be a much-needed salve for a disheartened Indian media that is largely controlled by the Indian ruling party : According to analysis conducted after an attack on a military convoy in Kashmir last February , Modi got near-total media coverage despite energetic campaigning by India ’ s opposition at the same time .
Bringing up the threat of a salient out-group could help the BJP reenergize its patriotic and supportive base and paper over divisions in its coalition .
A final factor that explains why the China-India standoff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has to do with the White House ’ s current occupant : President Donald Trump .
Proponents of a strong Indo-U.S. relationship have lobbied hard to present a positive image of bilateral ties , buoyed largely by symbolic spectacles .
On the critical economic front leading up to the COVID-19 crisis , however , both the Indian economy and U.S.-Indian economic relations were on a downward trajectory .
Trump has at least thrice offered to mediate the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir , the highest U.S. official to do so since President Bill Clinton @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war over Kargil .
New Delhi has traditionally been allergic to the idea of third-party mediation , referring to the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan under which both sides agreed to bilaterally resolve outstanding disputes .
Ironically , the same Simla Agreement also held that neither party would unilaterally alter the situation in Jammu and Kashmir—a position India itself compromised by revoking Kashmir ’ s special status last August .
Ties between the United States and Pakistan , meanwhile , have seen a steadying in recent years , in part because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States reach a truce with the Taliban in Afghanistan .
The absence of guaranteed validation from Washington on New Delhi ’ s position toward Pakistan thus makes India less , not more , secure and likely more convinced that it will need to rely on its own strength and power to clearly delineate its territorial and political interests for the foreseeable future .
While an India-Pakistan crisis so soon after India ’ s standoff with China is by no means a forgone conclusion , current trends suggests it could .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pursued risky , high-variance strategies of initiating another conflict to gloss over the failings of earlier scrambles .
With the domestic and regional environment ripe for the taking , South Asia ’ s next crisis may happen sooner than we expect .

The worst border skirmish between India and China in the Himalayas in decades has abated for now, but the potential for crisis still looms large over a nuclear-armed South Asia. Last week, India announced it was formally downgrading relations with its other adversary and neighbor, Pakistan, by reducing the staff at its High Commission by 50 percent. The last time India asked for a similar reduction of embassy staff was in 2001, following an attack on the Indian Parliament. Bilateral ties between the two states have been shunted since New Delhi unilaterally revoked the special status of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir on Aug. 5, 2019, and intensified a heavy-handed crackdown in the valley.
The worst border skirmish between India and China in the Himalayas in decades has abated for now, but the potential for crisis still looms large over a nuclear-armed South Asia. Last week, India announced it was formally downgrading relations with its other adversary and neighbor, Pakistan, by reducing the staff at its High Commission by 50 percent. The last time India asked for a similar reduction of embassy staff was in 2001, following an attack on the Indian Parliament. Bilateral ties between the two states have been shunted since New Delhi unilaterally revoked the special status of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir on Aug. 5, 2019, and intensified a heavy-handed crackdown in the valley.
So what exactly does the dust-up with China have to do with Pakistan’s relationship with India? In short, there are five reasons why this month’s Himalayan standoff increases the likelihood of a fresh India-Pakistan crisis.
First: India’s muted response to China in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley skirmish has raised difficult logistical questions and reputational concerns about New Delhi’s much-touted role as counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific. Although New Delhi adopted a position of nonalignment for much of the Cold War, its potential as a regional diplomatic and military bulwark against a rising China took on new significance after U.S. President George W. Bush sought to enlist it as a strategic partner and approved the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to the country. More recently, New Delhi and Washington announced an expanded defense partnership, including $3 billion in arms sales.
Yet hostile encounters with China in both 2017 and again this year have underscored for Indian policymakers the need to get along with Beijing if only to sustain a mutually feasible cohabitation; informal summits such as those in 2018 and 2019 were driven by this strategic necessity. In the aftermath of the most recent crisis, corps commander-level talks and diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and New Delhi mean India is likely to prioritize a minimum-working engagement with China over an unambiguous geopolitical rivalry that would come with fully partnering with the United States. Meanwhile, the political compulsion to demonstrate military capability—especially in the face of a conventional balance of forces that has shifted in China’s favor—may impel India to look elsewhere to offset suggestions of strategic impotency. If military capabilities drive policy choices, then the theater with Pakistan is a suitable foil for perceived Indian weaknesses compared to China.
Second, since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has demonstrated both a willingness and a capability to deliver on nationalistic pledges at home, especially when his government’s ability to deliver on the economic front has hit snags. Although India has seen its GDP growth fall to its lowest rate in the last 11 years, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has sought to consolidate its political base by doubling down on its nationalistic pledges—from revoking the special status for Jammu and Kashmir (disputed between India and Pakistan since 1947) to building a Hindu temple to the god Ram on a disputed holy site where the Babri Masjid once stood.
Research shows that leaders looking to divert attention tend to target traditional enemies and enduring rivals (as conflict against such persistent adversaries is most likely to promote in-group solidarity), and diversionary conflicts are particularly likely to take the form of territorial disputes. Since the controversial measures in Kashmir last year, India’s politicians have systematically upped the bilateral ante with Pakistan by declaring intent to “secure” the Pakistani administrative areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Earlier this year, India’s new Army chief said the Indian Army was “ready to seize control” of Pakistan-administered Kashmir if directed by the Indian government; the same month, Modi said India needed seven to 10 days to defeat Pakistan in war. Two weeks ago, India’s defense minister reiterated that taking Pakistani Kashmir was now a “stated goal of India’s Parliament.”
Ordinarily, such statements might be put down to cheap talk—except, in this case, the BJP’s own track record of follow-through suggests these threats should be taken seriously. Operationally, the Indian Army has begun to set up artillery strikes deep into Kashmiri villages to launch long-distance fire into Pakistan-administered territory. In May, after months of deliberation, the India Meteorological Department began to list several areas on the Pakistani side of the border, in its own internal weather reports—an unprecedented development.
Third, while tempers and temperatures arguably cool on the Sino-Indian front, memories of a short but tense air duel between India and Pakistan last February are still fresh in both Islamabad and New Delhi. While Pakistan shot down an aging, Soviet-era Indian MiG-21 Bison and captured and returned an Indian pilot in the dogfight, India claimed it had downed a Pakistani F-16. The air duel over Kashmir quickly escalated into a war of narratives: Pakistan rejected India’s allegations and asserted it had lost no jets.
In the days after the dogfight, the New York Times ran a story about the implications of India losing a plane to a country whose military was half the size and received a quarter of the funding. India’s right-wing Shiv Sena has since called for more “surgical strikes” on Pakistan to consolidate the BJP’s grip on Kashmir. Furthermore, when Indian papers ran headlines of India having killed “300-400 terrorists” in an airstrike on Balakot last February, Pakistan countered that the targets had been “little more than rocks and trees.” Since last year, India’s opposition too has on various occasion taken swipes at Modi for the Balakot episode; pollsters meanwhile have disputed the extent to which the Balakot strikes actually buoyed the BJP in its 2019 electoral victory. The “decider’s dilemma” for Modi is that the unfinished business from the Balakot standoff needs a less ambiguous final chapter, short of which the BJP risks being domestically perceived as having backed away prematurely from a weaker enemy.
This leads to a fourth and crucial point: Successive regional crises under the BJP mean that the domestic costs for India’s leaders to not be seen as backing down against external adversaries are growing, not diminishing. In the standoff with China, losses incurred by the Indian Army have been a shot in the arm for India’s opposition politicians, who have been quick to condemn the BJP for its lack of preparation and in some cases for surrendering entirely. Conflict with Pakistan could be a much-needed salve for a disheartened Indian media that is largely controlled by the Indian ruling party: According to analysis conducted after an attack on a military convoy in Kashmir last February, Modi got near-total media coverage despite energetic campaigning by India’s opposition at the same time. Bringing up the threat of a salient out-group could help the BJP reenergize its patriotic and supportive base and paper over divisions in its coalition.
A final factor that explains why the China-India standoff may spill over into tensions with Pakistan has to do with the White House’s current occupant: President Donald Trump. Proponents of a strong Indo-U.S. relationship have lobbied hard to present a positive image of bilateral ties, buoyed largely by symbolic spectacles. On the critical economic front leading up to the COVID-19 crisis, however, both the Indian economy and U.S.-Indian economic relations were on a downward trajectory. Trump has at least thrice offered to mediate the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, the highest U.S. official to do so since President Bill Clinton after the two sides fought a short war over Kargil. New Delhi has traditionally been allergic to the idea of third-party mediation, referring to the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan under which both sides agreed to bilaterally resolve outstanding disputes. Ironically, the same Simla Agreement also held that neither party would unilaterally alter the situation in Jammu and Kashmir—a position India itself compromised by revoking Kashmir’s special status last August. Ties between the United States and Pakistan, meanwhile, have seen a steadying in recent years, in part because of Pakistan’s facilitation in helping the United States reach a truce with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The absence of guaranteed validation from Washington on New Delhi’s position toward Pakistan thus makes India less, not more, secure and likely more convinced that it will need to rely on its own strength and power to clearly delineate its territorial and political interests for the foreseeable future.
While an India-Pakistan crisis so soon after India’s standoff with China is by no means a forgone conclusion, current trends suggests it could. In the past, troubled leaders have rationally pursued risky, high-variance strategies of initiating another conflict to gloss over the failings of earlier scrambles. With the domestic and regional environment ripe for the taking, South Asia’s next crisis may happen sooner than we expect.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--China’s Online Warriors Want More Gates in the Firewall

China ’ s Online Warriors Want More Gates in the Firewall For the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry ’ s information department , winning an information war against the West isn ’ t going to happen by itself .
“ In order to win the right to speak , we must take the initiative and actively shape it , ” Hua Chunying wrote in the Central Party School-linked publication the Study Times shortly before she was promoted to her new position in July 2019 .
And take the initiative she has , along with her fellow “ Wolf Warrior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sarcasm , and conspiracy theories in their attempt to shape the global discourse .
But they ’ ve been doing so on platforms banned inside China itself—ones that other ambitious careerists inside the Chinese system are now desperate to get permission to use .
In late May , Hua fired off a salvo .
“ I can ’ t breathe , ” she wrote on Twitter , with a screenshot of a tweet by U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus that had criticized the Chinese government over its Hong Kong policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationalistic tabloid owned by the People ’ s Daily , reported on the message on Weibo—China ’ s heavily censored ersatz version of Twitter—hundreds , if not thousands , of Chinese citizens were quick to fire back “ I can ’ t tweet , ” reminding everyone that Twitter is blocked in China .
Just a few weeks earlier , Weibo erupted with protest after an internet user was fined by authorities in the northern province of Shaanxi for jumping the Great Firewall .
Many commented that the use of a virtual private @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be illegal , as the Chinese Foreign Ministry ’ s frequent use of Twitter attests , reported Radio Free Asia .
That argument has garnered support from some surprising corners in China , including from Hu Xijin , the editor in chief of the Global Times .
On Weibo , Hu objected to the punishment , stating that there was nothing illegal about scaling the Great Firewall for information , and argued that the law should be administered “ flexibly ” and that it was necessary in some cases to circumvent internet controls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” But a crackdown on commercially available VPNs in recent years has meant it ’ s getting more difficult for Chinese people to circumvent internet censorship .
In 2017 , Beijing shut down most domestic commercial VPN services , and Apple removed VPNs from its online stores in accordance with Chinese government regulations stipulating that all VPNs in China require a government license .
Authorities have also been applying pressure on multinationals to buy and use insecure state-approved VPNs .
In June , Twitter took down thousands of accounts that it said were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign that it attributed to Beijing .
In their analysis of the Twitter takedown , my colleagues pointed out that the posting patterns of tweets “ mapped cleanly to working hours at Beijing time ” and that Beijing “ appears to be allowing for experimentation across the apparatus of government in how to promote the CCP ’ s view of its place in the world.
” Plenty of others , including Chinese think tankers , media professionals , nationalist trolls , and even the People ’ s Liberation Army ( PLA ) are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of the experimentation .
Each group is jostling for the chance to demonstrate its fealty to the party and its willingness to take the fight to Western imperialists .
But that means allowing ladders over the firewall , which the authorities aren ’ t eager to offer , especially in a climate of paranoia at home where signing off on contact with foreignness has become dangerous in itself .
In May , the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences ( CASS ) , a prominent think tank , offered a number of strategies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including the capability to monitor Western media around the clock and draw on the expertise of state media , private media , diplomats , enterprises , and think tankers in a quick-response media team .
“ In the face of malicious slander and sharp criticism from foreign media , we should improve our media response methods .
We should not just sneer at each other but be calm and objective and convince people through reason , ” the CASS scholars wrote , adding that their messages should “ use foreign audiences ’ favorite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” —especially on social media .
Soon after , Cao Kefan , a media personality at Shanghai Media Group and a National People ’ s Congress delegate , told reporters that he had submitted a bill that would allow a specially trained and trusted cadre of media workers to effectively have a VIP pass so they could jump over the Great Firewall and “ speak China ’ s voice ” to foreigners .
Cao pointed to the example of Liu Xin , a presenter from China ’ s state broadcaster , who sparred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fox Business Network , first on Twitter and then in a historic if tedious televised debate in May 2019 .
“ The Sino-U.S. anchor debate was a good attempt , ” Cao told reporters .
“ In the future , we can gradually expand these opportunities to even more people .
We should encourage more influential people in different fields to represent themselves in international media , spread their ideas , and engage with others , showing the world China ’ s tolerance and openness.
” Many aren ’ t waiting for permission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long taken it upon themselves to jump the Great Firewall to defend China , have seen in their representatives in the Foreign Ministry , or MOFA , a mirror of themselves .
“ At home , we rely on ‘ ziganwu ’ [ literally , “ 50 Cent Party ” commenters who “ bring their own food ” ] .
Overseas , we rely on MOFA , ” as one of them put it on Weibo recently .
Several pro-China Twitter users contacted by the New York Times in June said they had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Warrior diplomats .
It ’ s unlikely that these nationalist Twitter newbies will be content to just retweet their representatives .
Even the PLA is eyeing Western social media platforms like Twitter .
There is , according to scholars at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies , “ substantial evidence the PLA is considering the opening of social media accounts on Western platforms , most likely Twitter.
” Writing in Foreign Policy in late March , I argued that Twitter should add a disclaimer to the accounts and posts of China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fellow citizens aren ’ t allowed to use the platform .
But what happens when Beijing does allow more of its citizens—albeit ones who are willing to toe the party line—to have a VIP pass through the Great Firewall ?
With Chinese internet users relegated to government-approved VPNs , Beijing could ensure that whomever it allowed through the Great Firewall stayed on their best behavior .
After all , why limit yourself to a small pack of Wolf Warriors when there ’ s a whole knot of toadies waiting in the wings ?

For the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s information department, winning an information war against the West isn’t going to happen by itself.
For the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s information department, winning an information war against the West isn’t going to happen by itself.
“In order to win the right to speak, we must take the initiative and actively shape it,” Hua Chunying wrote in the Central Party School-linked publication the Study Times shortly before she was promoted to her new position in July 2019.
And take the initiative she has, along with her fellow “Wolf Warrior” colleagues who have been deploying scorn, sarcasm, and conspiracy theories in their attempt to shape the global discourse. But they’ve been doing so on platforms banned inside China itself—ones that other ambitious careerists inside the Chinese system are now desperate to get permission to use.
In late May, Hua fired off a salvo. “I can’t breathe,” she wrote on Twitter, with a screenshot of a tweet by U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus that had criticized the Chinese government over its Hong Kong policy.
But when the Global Times, the nationalistic tabloid owned by the People’s Daily, reported on the message on Weibo—China’s heavily censored ersatz version of Twitter—hundreds, if not thousands, of Chinese citizens were quick to fire back “I can’t tweet,” reminding everyone that Twitter is blocked in China.
Just a few weeks earlier, Weibo erupted with protest after an internet user was fined by authorities in the northern province of Shaanxi for jumping the Great Firewall. Many commented that the use of a virtual private network (VPN) couldn’t be illegal, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s frequent use of Twitter attests, reported Radio Free Asia.
That argument has garnered support from some surprising corners in China, including from Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times.
On Weibo, Hu objected to the punishment, stating that there was nothing illegal about scaling the Great Firewall for information, and argued that the law should be administered “flexibly” and that it was necessary in some cases to circumvent internet controls, especially during such “unusual times.”
But a crackdown on commercially available VPNs in recent years has meant it’s getting more difficult for Chinese people to circumvent internet censorship. In 2017, Beijing shut down most domestic commercial VPN services, and Apple removed VPNs from its online stores in accordance with Chinese government regulations stipulating that all VPNs in China require a government license. Authorities have also been applying pressure on multinationals to buy and use insecure state-approved VPNs.
In June, Twitter took down thousands of accounts that it said were part of a persistent, large-scale influence campaign that it attributed to Beijing. In their analysis of the Twitter takedown, my colleagues pointed out that the posting patterns of tweets “mapped cleanly to working hours at Beijing time” and that Beijing “appears to be allowing for experimentation across the apparatus of government in how to promote the CCP’s view of its place in the world.”
Plenty of others, including Chinese think tankers, media professionals, nationalist trolls, and even the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are pushing for their own opportunity to be part of the experimentation. Each group is jostling for the chance to demonstrate its fealty to the party and its willingness to take the fight to Western imperialists. But that means allowing ladders over the firewall, which the authorities aren’t eager to offer, especially in a climate of paranoia at home where signing off on contact with foreignness has become dangerous in itself.
In May, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a prominent think tank, offered a number of strategies for Beijing’s external communications, including the capability to monitor Western media around the clock and draw on the expertise of state media, private media, diplomats, enterprises, and think tankers in a quick-response media team.
“In the face of malicious slander and sharp criticism from foreign media, we should improve our media response methods. We should not just sneer at each other but be calm and objective and convince people through reason,” the CASS scholars wrote, adding that their messages should “use foreign audiences’ favorite expressions and narrative forms to affect them”—especially on social media.
Soon after, Cao Kefan, a media personality at Shanghai Media Group and a National People’s Congress delegate, told reporters that he had submitted a bill that would allow a specially trained and trusted cadre of media workers to effectively have a VIP pass so they could jump over the Great Firewall and “speak China’s voice” to foreigners.
Cao pointed to the example of Liu Xin, a presenter from China’s state broadcaster, who sparred with Trish Regan, a host on Fox Business Network, first on Twitter and then in a historic if tedious televised debate in May 2019.
“The Sino-U.S. anchor debate was a good attempt,” Cao told reporters. “In the future, we can gradually expand these opportunities to even more people. We should encourage more influential people in different fields to represent themselves in international media, spread their ideas, and engage with others, showing the world China’s tolerance and openness.”
Many aren’t waiting for permission. Chinese nationalist trolls, who have long taken it upon themselves to jump the Great Firewall to defend China, have seen in their representatives in the Foreign Ministry, or MOFA, a mirror of themselves. “At home, we rely on ‘ziganwu’ [literally, “50 Cent Party” commenters who “bring their own food”]. Overseas, we rely on MOFA,” as one of them put it on Weibo recently.
Several pro-China Twitter users contacted by the New York Times in June said they had joined Twitter specifically to follow the Wolf Warrior diplomats. It’s unlikely that these nationalist Twitter newbies will be content to just retweet their representatives.
Even the PLA is eyeing Western social media platforms like Twitter. There is, according to scholars at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “substantial evidence the PLA is considering the opening of social media accounts on Western platforms, most likely Twitter.”
Writing in Foreign Policy in late March, I argued that Twitter should add a disclaimer to the accounts and posts of China’s Wolf Warrior diplomats that their fellow citizens aren’t allowed to use the platform. But what happens when Beijing does allow more of its citizens—albeit ones who are willing to toe the party line—to have a VIP pass through the Great Firewall?
With Chinese internet users relegated to government-approved VPNs, Beijing could ensure that whomever it allowed through the Great Firewall stayed on their best behavior. After all, why limit yourself to a small pack of Wolf Warriors when there’s a whole knot of toadies waiting in the wings?


foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--Republicans Demand Trump Answer on Alleged Russian Bounties

Explosive new reports that Russia offered bounties to Afghan militants to kill U.S. and coalition forces are creating new fissures between the White House and its Republican allies on Capitol Hill as Republican lawmakers vow to get to the bottom of the allegations .
The White House , bowing to pressure from Congress , briefed a select group of Republican House members on the alleged intelligence reports on Monday after President Donald Trump initially denied the reports as possibly fabricated .
The White House briefed a group of Democrats on Tuesday morning .
While Republicans have not criticized the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taking the president ’ s denials at face value as the White House ’ s public statements shift in the face of new revelations about the alleged intelligence .
In a tweet on Sunday night , Trump himself said the U.S. intelligence community reported to him over the weekend “ they did not find this info credible ” and did not previously report it to the White House .
“ Possibly another fabricated Russia Hoax , maybe by the Fake News @ nytimesbooks , wanting to make Republicans look bad !
!
!
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany changed tack , saying there was “ no consensus ” in the intelligence community on the use of Russian bounties to incentivize the targeting of American troops , meaning the issue was not elevated to the president ’ s daily intelligence brief .
On Monday evening , the Associated Press reported that the White House was aware of Russian bounties on U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan as early as 2019 , and the information was included in at least one of the president ’ s daily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Adam Kinzinger , both on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , released a statement on Monday evening after receiving a classified briefing at the White House indicating they need more information on the allegations .
Top administration officials “ informed us there is an ongoing review to determine the accuracy of these reports , and we believe it is important to let this review take place before any retaliatory actions are taken , ” they said .
“ There are already those who are politicizing this issue , however we can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Democrats alike can agree on : the Putin regime can not be trusted , ” they said .
“ If the intelligence review process verifies the reports , we strongly encourage the administration to take swift and serious action to hold the Putin regime accountable.
” Rep. Mac Thornberry of Texas , the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee who is retiring after this fall ’ s elections , called the White House ’ s initial statement that President Donald Trump was not briefed on the reported intelligence “ very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know what the intelligence says , but if there were bounties put on— ‘ We ’ ll pay you so much if you kill an American ’ —I think that is a different level from providing weapons , ” Thornberry said .
“ It is so egregious that if , in my view , if there were a hint of credibility to it , then you need to bring it to the president ’ s attention and there needs to be a plan on what you ’ re going to do about it.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pushed for an aggressive response to reporting from the New York Times and other outlets that indicated that Trump had been briefed on the information in March and had taken no action .
The revelations stand poised to worsen already strained relations between Washington and Moscow despite repeated efforts from the president to improve bilateral ties .
While Republican lawmakers have been reluctant to run afoul of Trump in past policy disagreements , they have pushed the administration to take a hard-line approach to Russia , including passing sweeping sanctions legislation on Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members of Congress briefed on Tuesday morning at the White House told reporters they were perplexed that Trump hadn ’ t offered a stronger condemnation of allegations or sent intelligence officials to explain the situation to lawmakers .
“ I would have preferred that the briefing be given by intelligence personnel , ” said House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer , who led the group of nine Democrats who visited the White House .
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff said Democrats are still demanding an all-member briefing from agency officials such as CIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the underlying documentary evidence for the allegations .
Some veteran intelligence officials are skeptical of the White House ’ s explanation that Trump wasn ’ t briefed on the issue because there were dissenting opinions on the veracity of the reporting within the intelligence community .
David Priess , a former CIA officer who served as a daily intelligence briefer during presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush said having consensus across the intelligence community on items in the brief “ has not traditionally been a requirement ” for including information for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ temporarily served as acting director of national intelligence until May , said he had never heard of this intelligence assessment in a statement on Twitter responding to criticism from Democratic Rep. Ted Lieu .
“ I never heard this .
And it ’ s disgusting how you continue to politicize intelligence , ” he wrote .
“ You clearly don ’ t understand how raw intel gets verified .
Leaks of partial information to reporters from anonymous sources is dangerous because people like you manipulate it for political gain.
” Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ratcliffe , said in a statement the intelligence community is “ still investigating the alleged intelligence referenced in recent media reporting and we will brief the president and congressional leaders at the appropriate time.
” “ This is the analytic process working the way it should .
Unfortunately , unauthorized disclosures now jeopardize our ability to ever find out the full story with respect to these allegations , ” he added .
The unit of Russia ’ s foreign military intelligence service , the GRU , which is reported to have spearheaded the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in Russia ’ s efforts to destabilize Western countries , from efforts to orchestrate a coup in Montenegro in 2016 to the attempted assassination of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 2018 .
Individual operatives within the GRU ’ s Unit 29155 , which U.S. intelligence allegedly pointed to as being behind the bounties , have been identified by open-source investigators with the research collective Bellingcat .
“ The U.S. clearly has a lot of sufficient intelligence on this unit and its personnel , ” said Michael Weiss , a reporter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the history of the GRU .
In a statement on Monday night , Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said the Defense Department had “ no corroborating evidence ” to validate the reports of the intelligence first reported in the New York Times , but he said it is continuing to evaluate whether GRU operatives placed bounties on U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan .
“ Regardless , we always take the safety and security of our forces in Afghanistan–and around the world—most seriously and therefore continuously adopt measures to prevent harm from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The New York Times reported that the discovery of large amounts of U.S. dollars in a Taliban hideout and interrogation of militants were central in informing U.S. intelligence reporting of the Russian plot .
Given that identities of several members of Unit 29155 are already well known to Western intelligence agencies , Weiss said it was highly likely that U.S. intelligence agencies were able to cross-reference the operatives ’ movements with that of the Taliban militants .
The Associated Press reported on Monday that the United States is still investigating whether any American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bounties , and the investigation has focused on an April 2019 explosion that killed three Marines near Bagram Air Base .
But while the Trump administration has held in place sanctions against Russia and slapped erstwhile allies , such as Turkey , on the wrist for investing in Russian defense programs , some former administration officials saw the report as another sign of danger in the president ’ s personal coziness and praise for Russian leader Vladimir Putin .
In a meeting with Putin in Helsinki in 2018 , Trump suggested he believed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moscow interfered in the 2016 presidential elections , undercutting conclusions from the U.S. intelligence community .
He later walked those comments back .
John Sipher , a former member of the CIA ’ s Senior Intelligence Service , said that it was “ inconceivable ” that Putin would have been unaware of the offer to the Taliban .
“ From my time in CIA , it was very clear that he was intimately involved and signing off on anything that could blow back on the Kremlin – namely assassinations , support to violent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sipher , who ran Russia operations for the CIA in Moscow .
“ Certainly , some people have over-hyped his influence and treat him like some sort of master chess player making all the moves , ” he said .
“ However , when it comes to the intelligence services , he is acting as the de facto Director.
” Late last month , Trump called for Russia to return to the G-7 in a September summit , and he told Putin of his plans to invite Moscow to rejoin the club of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after annexing Crimea in 2014 .
The suggestion prompted backlash from close U.S. allies in Europe , and U.S. officials who served under Trump say the White House should take that offer off the table .
“ Russia is an enemy of the United States .
We identify them as such in our national security strategy , but treat them as if they are allies , ” said Mick Mulroy , a former Pentagon and CIA official who is now an ABC News national security analyst .
“ Why else would we be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ G8 that invaded another and is now killing our soldiers.
” Update , June 30 , 2020 : This article was updated with new statements and information on the developing story .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Amy Mackinnon

Explosive new reports that Russia offered bounties to Afghan militants to kill U.S. and coalition forces are creating new fissures between the White House and its Republican allies on Capitol Hill as Republican lawmakers vow to get to the bottom of the allegations.
Explosive new reports that Russia offered bounties to Afghan militants to kill U.S. and coalition forces are creating new fissures between the White House and its Republican allies on Capitol Hill as Republican lawmakers vow to get to the bottom of the allegations.
The White House, bowing to pressure from Congress, briefed a select group of Republican House members on the alleged intelligence reports on Monday after President Donald Trump initially denied the reports as possibly fabricated. The White House briefed a group of Democrats on Tuesday morning.
While Republicans have not criticized the president openly, they appear to not be taking the president’s denials at face value as the White House’s public statements shift in the face of new revelations about the alleged intelligence.
In a tweet on Sunday night, Trump himself said the U.S. intelligence community reported to him over the weekend “they did not find this info credible” and did not previously report it to the White House. “Possibly another fabricated Russia Hoax, maybe by the Fake News @nytimesbooks, wanting to make Republicans look bad!!!” Trump added.
On Monday, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany changed tack, saying there was “no consensus” in the intelligence community on the use of Russian bounties to incentivize the targeting of American troops, meaning the issue was not elevated to the president’s daily intelligence brief. On Monday evening, the Associated Press reported that the White House was aware of Russian bounties on U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan as early as 2019, and the information was included in at least one of the president’s daily intelligence briefings.
Republican Reps. Michael McCaul and Adam Kinzinger, both on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, released a statement on Monday evening after receiving a classified briefing at the White House indicating they need more information on the allegations. Top administration officials “informed us there is an ongoing review to determine the accuracy of these reports, and we believe it is important to let this review take place before any retaliatory actions are taken,” they said.
“There are already those who are politicizing this issue, however we cannot let politics overshadow a truth that Republicans and Democrats alike can agree on: the Putin regime cannot be trusted,” they said. “If the intelligence review process verifies the reports, we strongly encourage the administration to take swift and serious action to hold the Putin regime accountable.”
Rep. Mac Thornberry of Texas, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee who is retiring after this fall’s elections, called the White House’s initial statement that President Donald Trump was not briefed on the reported intelligence “very concerning.”
“I don’t know what the intelligence says, but if there were bounties put on—‘We’ll pay you so much if you kill an American’—I think that is a different level from providing weapons,” Thornberry said. “It is so egregious that if, in my view, if there were a hint of credibility to it, then you need to bring it to the president’s attention and there needs to be a plan on what you’re going to do about it.”
Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers have pushed for an aggressive response to reporting from the New York Times and other outlets that indicated that Trump had been briefed on the information in March and had taken no action. The revelations stand poised to worsen already strained relations between Washington and Moscow despite repeated efforts from the president to improve bilateral ties. While Republican lawmakers have been reluctant to run afoul of Trump in past policy disagreements, they have pushed the administration to take a hard-line approach to Russia, including passing sweeping sanctions legislation on Russia in 2017 with veto-proof majorities.
Democratic members of Congress briefed on Tuesday morning at the White House told reporters they were perplexed that Trump hadn’t offered a stronger condemnation of allegations or sent intelligence officials to explain the situation to lawmakers.
“I would have preferred that the briefing be given by intelligence personnel,” said House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, who led the group of nine Democrats who visited the White House. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff said Democrats are still demanding an all-member briefing from agency officials such as CIA Director Gina Haspel and want to see the underlying documentary evidence for the allegations.
Some veteran intelligence officials are skeptical of the White House’s explanation that Trump wasn’t briefed on the issue because there were dissenting opinions on the veracity of the reporting within the intelligence community. David Priess, a former CIA officer who served as a daily intelligence briefer during presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush said having consensus across the intelligence community on items in the brief “has not traditionally been a requirement” for including information for the president.
Richard Grenell, who temporarily served as acting director of national intelligence until May, said he had never heard of this intelligence assessment in a statement on Twitter responding to criticism from Democratic Rep. Ted Lieu. “I never heard this. And it’s disgusting how you continue to politicize intelligence,” he wrote. “You clearly don’t understand how raw intel gets verified. Leaks of partial information to reporters from anonymous sources is dangerous because people like you manipulate it for political gain.”
Trump’s new director of national intelligence, John Ratcliffe, said in a statement the intelligence community is “still investigating the alleged intelligence referenced in recent media reporting and we will brief the president and congressional leaders at the appropriate time.”
“This is the analytic process working the way it should. Unfortunately, unauthorized disclosures now jeopardize our ability to ever find out the full story with respect to these allegations,” he added.
The unit of Russia’s foreign military intelligence service, the GRU, which is reported to have spearheaded the Afghan operation, has played a leading role in Russia’s efforts to destabilize Western countries, from efforts to orchestrate a coup in Montenegro in 2016 to the attempted assassination of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 2018. Individual operatives within the GRU’s Unit 29155, which U.S. intelligence allegedly pointed to as being behind the bounties, have been identified by open-source investigators with the research collective Bellingcat. “The U.S. clearly has a lot of sufficient intelligence on this unit and its personnel,” said Michael Weiss, a reporter who is currently working on a book about the history of the GRU.
In a statement on Monday night, Chief Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said the Defense Department had “no corroborating evidence” to validate the reports of the intelligence first reported in the New York Times, but he said it is continuing to evaluate whether GRU operatives placed bounties on U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. “Regardless, we always take the safety and security of our forces in Afghanistan–and around the world—most seriously and therefore continuously adopt measures to prevent harm from potential threats,” Hoffman added.
The New York Times reported that the discovery of large amounts of U.S. dollars in a Taliban hideout and interrogation of militants were central in informing U.S. intelligence reporting of the Russian plot. Given that identities of several members of Unit 29155 are already well known to Western intelligence agencies, Weiss said it was highly likely that U.S. intelligence agencies were able to cross-reference the operatives’ movements with that of the Taliban militants. The Associated Press reported on Monday that the United States is still investigating whether any American troops died as a result of the bounties, and the investigation has focused on an April 2019 explosion that killed three Marines near Bagram Air Base.
But while the Trump administration has held in place sanctions against Russia and slapped erstwhile allies, such as Turkey, on the wrist for investing in Russian defense programs, some former administration officials saw the report as another sign of danger in the president’s personal coziness and praise for Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
In a meeting with Putin in Helsinki in 2018, Trump suggested he believed the Russian president’s denials that Moscow interfered in the 2016 presidential elections, undercutting conclusions from the U.S. intelligence community. He later walked those comments back.
Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, refuted the allegations as “lies.”
John Sipher, a former member of the CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service, said that it was “inconceivable” that Putin would have been unaware of the offer to the Taliban.
“From my time in CIA, it was very clear that he was intimately involved and signing off on anything that could blow back on the Kremlin – namely assassinations, support to violent groups and paramilitary action,” said Sipher, who ran Russia operations for the CIA in Moscow.
“Certainly, some people have over-hyped his influence and treat him like some sort of master chess player making all the moves,” he said. “However, when it comes to the intelligence services, he is acting as the de facto Director.”
Late last month, Trump called for Russia to return to the G-7 in a September summit, and he told Putin of his plans to invite Moscow to rejoin the club of major economies it was booted out of after annexing Crimea in 2014. The suggestion prompted backlash from close U.S. allies in Europe, and U.S. officials who served under Trump say the White House should take that offer off the table.
“Russia is an enemy of the United States. We identify them as such in our national security strategy, but treat them as if they are allies,” said Mick Mulroy, a former Pentagon and CIA official who is now an ABC News national security analyst. “Why else would we be pushing to include a country in the G8 that invaded another and is now killing our soldiers.”
Update, June 30, 2020: This article was updated with new statements and information on the developing story.