foreignpolicy--2020-02-04--An Eye for an Eye Doesn’t Make Americans Safer

An Eye for an Eye Doesn ’ t Make Americans Safer In the aftermath of the United States ’ assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Jan. 3 , Iran ’ s supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei , promised “ forceful revenge , ” while Iraqi militias chanted “ revenge is coming.
” The Iranian regime took revenge with missile attacks on two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops on Jan. 8 but appeared to indicate that it did not seek further escalation .
It is tempting to see revenge as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Muslim adversaries generally , while seeing U.S. policy as directed by more rational aims .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s actions and public remarks , however , make clear that there is a parallel desire for vengeance in Washington .
In order to avoid escalation of war with Iran in this situation as well as to create the conditions for more just relations between the United States and the Middle East , U.S. decision-makers must understand the role vengeance plays in the United States ’ Middle East policy and how American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ endless war .
In the public discussion since Jan. 3 , three general positions have emerged regarding Trump ’ s decision to assassinate Suleimani .
The first—that of the administration and other supporters of the strike—holds that killing Suleimani in Iraq by drone was both necessary for preventing an imminent attack and justified because of Suleimani ’ s history of violence against Americans .
Trump ’ s statements also suggested that Suleimani ’ s fate would have a deterrent effect on U.S. adversaries .
According to the administration , the strike was thus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Subsequently , Trump indicated that the retributive element was all that was needed to justify the killing , tweeting on Jan. 13 : “ [ I ] t doesn ’ t really matter [ whether or not Suleimani had planned an imminent attack ] because of his horrible past !
” It was an open expression of American vengeance and nothing more .
In this respect , it mirrored the killings of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , Hamza bin Laden , Osama bin Laden , Abu Musab al-Zarqawi , and others .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security experts , and other commentators—targeting Suleimani was strategically misguided because it risked an uncontrollable escalatory spiral with Iran that might set off a regional war .
But many who took this position still believed the strike had value as an act of retribution .
The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman admitted that he had “ no idea whether this was wise or what will be the long-term implications ” after he celebrated Trump ’ s assassination of “ possibly the dumbest man in Iran and the most overrated strategist in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delight that could be taken in the killing of Suleimani .
As former U.S .
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker put it , for example , it was a moment of “ quiet satisfaction ” for him when Suleimani ’ s death was confirmed .
It was “ vindication ” for the “ hundreds of American lives he had taken over the years.
” Many who adopted this position appeared unconvinced that the assassination would deter Iran , with some contending that , at the very least , U.S. citizens were at greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the strike—but they nevertheless saw vengeance as having value in itself .
( Of course , they would likely understand the strike as legitimate retaliation rather than vengeance , but that is a difficult distinction to make in this context . )
A third position , taken by some of the most ardent critics of the strike , criticized Trump on the grounds that by authorizing this assassination he set a dangerous precedent in international relations .
These critics argued that the assassination was reckless in the way that it violated international norms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ banning assassination as a tool of foreign policy that has remained in force since the mid- 1970s .
Trump , according to these critics , revived this tool in killing Suleimani , possibly in order to distract attention from the ongoing impeachment proceedings against him .
Former National Security Council director Steven Simon , for example , observed that the executive order banning assassinations had been adopted by every administration from Gerald Ford ’ s to Barack Obama ’ s “ because no one has thought it would be a good idea to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is to protect US public figures.
” In line with Simon ’ s critique , the assassinations of Suleimani and Muhandis , as well as the attempted assassination of Abdul Reza Shahlai in Yemen on the same day , should all be criticized as rogue actions .
But Trump ’ s decision was not isolated ; it was part of a broader trajectory that included the reinterpretation of the executive ban on assassination beginning under the Clinton administration .
In the late 1990s , President Bill Clinton authorized the CIA to kill Osama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Clinton ’ s national security team determined that because of the threat bin Laden represented to the United States , killing him would be an act of self-defense under the laws of war and therefore not an assassination .
Even if his administration failed to carry out the operation he ’ d authorized , Clinton had asserted an exception to the ban on assassination mandated by the executive order .
The post-9/11 global war on terrorism greatly expanded the scope of such actions , as President George W. Bush began targeted killings outside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Yemen , justified also as defensive and legal under Congress ’ s post 9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) as attacks on al Qaeda and allied forces .
Obama intensified the executive branch ’ s embrace of targeted killing from Libya to Pakistan , arguing these killings were neither assassinations nor acts of retaliation but rather self-defense in war .
Trump ’ s decision was not isolated ; it was part of a broader trajectory that included the reinterpretation of the executive ban on assassination beginning under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all that was required to justify these strikes—whether they targeted state officials or non-state actors—was the U.S. president ’ s determination that the target represented an imminent threat to the United States .
Trump has simply continued and extended this policy while more openly expressing the vengeful impulses behind it .
It is notable that preceding the assassination of Suleimani the U.S. government officially designated Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps , including the Quds Force that Suleimani led , as a “ foreign terrorist organization.
” This more directly connected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s AUMF , forging another link between Iran and U.S. retaliation for 9/11 , already evident , for example , in Bush ’ s 2002 inclusion of Iran in the “ axis of evil.
” Vice President Mike Pence tried to make this connection explicit when he tweeted that Suleimani had helped 10 of the 9/11 hijackers .
Pence ’ s inaccuracies , like Bush ’ s conflations during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq 18 years ago , sow confusion , whether deliberately or not .
The fact that Iran , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is obscured in the resulting confusion .
Supporters of Trump ’ s assassination of Suleimani argue that the killing had value as an act of vengeance .
It was American justice , whether or not it was also preventative or would deter future terrorism .
They rationalize the retributive element in this strike as an end in itself .
Recent history suggests , however , that vengeance is most likely to beget more vengeance and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Middle East is both morally questionable and strategically bankrupt .
But how seriously can one take the element of deterrence ?
And who precisely was the attack meant to deter ?
By showing that he could execute a terrorist leader whenever and wherever he wanted , Trump—as had Bush and Obama—intended to send the message that terrorists would never get away .
As Trump put it : “ If you value your own life , you will not threaten the lives of our people.
” His audience ought to be suspicious of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , since every “ world ’ s top terrorist ” eliminated by the U.S. military is swiftly replaced by the next in the American imagination , creating an endless series of Islamic terrorists to kill ( who often have little connection to one another ) .
Announcing the killing of Baghdadi in October 2019 , for example , Trump anticipated the next top terrorists to go after when he said , “ These savage monsters will not escape their fate , and they will not escape the final judgment of God.
” Yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance the Trump administration ’ s policy of deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons .
Some commentators have correctly pointed out that killing Suleimani , along with Trump ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign against Iran and withdrawal from the nuclear deal , has if anything hastened Iran ’ s drive to acquire a nuclear weapon .
The position that equates vengeance with deterrence , then , is not just mistaken ; it dangerously ignores the extent to which vengeance propagates violence and puts Americans ( and many others ) at greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argue that killing a high-ranking Iranian official was a rogue act are correct to criticize Trump ’ s assassination , but they should do so as part of a broader critique of American vengeance in the Middle East .
By overemphasizing Trump ’ s impulsiveness as the root of the problem , the history of targeted killings in the region is forgotten .
Indeed , this tendency was on the ascent long before Trump took office and will undoubtedly persist as a problem after he has left the White House .
Trump can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of the structures of American vengeance are already in place .
These structures have durable foundations because the United States ’ pursuit of vengeance in the Middle East reaches back decades .
In the 1980s , for example , the CIA attempted to kill the Shiite religious leader Muhammad Fadlallah to avenge attacks on Americans in Lebanon .
An intricate plot involving CIA Director William Casey and Saudi intelligence agents led to a car bombing that killed scores of civilians but missed Fadlallah .
The attempted assassination of Fadlallah spurred Hezbollah ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Flight 847 and the killing of a U.S. Navy diver on board .
In 1986 , the Reagan administration decided to avenge attacks against U.S. military personnel with a strike against Libya intended to kill Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and his family .
The bombing failed to kill Qaddafi and likewise failed to deter him .
But it did set an important precedent .
Eventually , in 2011 , the United States helped ensure that Qaddafi got his just deserts .
In the words of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton : “ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” And American vengeance has been manifested in many other ways : the endorsement of torture , the abuse of prisoners , the so-called Muslim ban , to name several .
But assassination deserves particular attention because it has become such a widely accepted instrument of vengeance within U.S. political culture .
The rising importance of vengeance in American political rhetoric is a troubling symptom of a U.S. foreign policy that has been emptied of any attempt to make real progress in favor of the political expedience of emotional release .
U.S. leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolve , and credibility in order to stay in power , which means maintaining the threat to Americans , not eliminating it .
While there has not been another 9/11-like attack in the United States , terrorism has not only spread but evolved .
The U.S. response to 9/11 helped spawn new jihadi movements , such as the Islamic State .
And the threat of attacks by self-proclaimed jihadis remains .
Suleimani ’ s death , then , is one more act of vengeance in the long war on terrorism , in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deem to be a terrorist , in some cases even if they are a top foreign official , whatever the consequences .
It is notable that Trump called Suleimani the “ No .
1 terrorist anywhere in the world , ” a designation that Trump had previously given Baghdadi when he was killed in October .
The United States is more freely using the tools honed during its war on terrorism to take revenge against an ever-expanding cast of enemies .
Vengeance is not unique to Trump , though his style has highlighted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States is acting as the arbiter of justice in such payback killings has become increasingly powerful , just as the strategic logic of U.S. intervention in the Middle East becomes more confused .
Indeed , in the absence of a coherent strategy , exacting vengeance has become one of the only markers of progress for U.S. policy in the Middle East .
But retribution tends to encourage never-ending cycles of retaliation , and when the blowback arrives , Americans will find that Trump ’ s vengeance doctrine—despite its promises of restored deterrence—has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

In the aftermath of the United States’ assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Jan. 3, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, promised “forceful revenge,” while Iraqi militias chanted “revenge is coming.” The Iranian regime took revenge with missile attacks on two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops on Jan. 8 but appeared to indicate that it did not seek further escalation.
In the aftermath of the United States’ assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis on Jan. 3, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, promised “forceful revenge,” while Iraqi militias chanted “revenge is coming.” The Iranian regime took revenge with missile attacks on two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops on Jan. 8 but appeared to indicate that it did not seek further escalation.
It is tempting to see revenge as an impulse that guides Iranian foreign policy, or Muslim adversaries generally, while seeing U.S. policy as directed by more rational aims. U.S. President Donald Trump’s actions and public remarks, however, make clear that there is a parallel desire for vengeance in Washington.
In order to avoid escalation of war with Iran in this situation as well as to create the conditions for more just relations between the United States and the Middle East, U.S. decision-makers must understand the role vengeance plays in the United States’ Middle East policy and how American vengeance has become institutionalized and helps perpetuate endless war.
In the public discussion since Jan. 3, three general positions have emerged regarding Trump’s decision to assassinate Suleimani. The first—that of the administration and other supporters of the strike—holds that killing Suleimani in Iraq by drone was both necessary for preventing an imminent attack and justified because of Suleimani’s history of violence against Americans. Trump’s statements also suggested that Suleimani’s fate would have a deterrent effect on U.S. adversaries. According to the administration, the strike was thus simultaneously preventative, retributive, and deterrent.
Subsequently, Trump indicated that the retributive element was all that was needed to justify the killing, tweeting on Jan. 13: “[I]t doesn’t really matter [whether or not Suleimani had planned an imminent attack] because of his horrible past!” It was an open expression of American vengeance and nothing more. In this respect, it mirrored the killings of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and others.
According to a second position—taken by diplomats, security experts, and other commentators—targeting Suleimani was strategically misguided because it risked an uncontrollable escalatory spiral with Iran that might set off a regional war. But many who took this position still believed the strike had value as an act of retribution. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman admitted that he had “no idea whether this was wise or what will be the long-term implications” after he celebrated Trump’s assassination of “possibly the dumbest man in Iran and the most overrated strategist in the Middle East.”
Indeed, there was delight that could be taken in the killing of Suleimani. As former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker put it, for example, it was a moment of “quiet satisfaction” for him when Suleimani’s death was confirmed. It was “vindication” for the “hundreds of American lives he had taken over the years.”
Many who adopted this position appeared unconvinced that the assassination would deter Iran, with some contending that, at the very least, U.S. citizens were at greater risk across a wider area than before the strike—but they nevertheless saw vengeance as having value in itself. (Of course, they would likely understand the strike as legitimate retaliation rather than vengeance, but that is a difficult distinction to make in this context.)
A third position, taken by some of the most ardent critics of the strike, criticized Trump on the grounds that by authorizing this assassination he set a dangerous precedent in international relations. These critics argued that the assassination was reckless in the way that it violated international norms. They pointed to the executive order banning assassination as a tool of foreign policy that has remained in force since the mid- 1970s. Trump, according to these critics, revived this tool in killing Suleimani, possibly in order to distract attention from the ongoing impeachment proceedings against him.
Former National Security Council director Steven Simon, for example, observed that the executive order banning assassinations had been adopted by every administration from Gerald Ford’s to Barack Obama’s “because no one has thought it would be a good idea to legitimize assassination, given how hard it is to protect US public figures.” In line with Simon’s critique, the assassinations of Suleimani and Muhandis, as well as the attempted assassination of Abdul Reza Shahlai in Yemen on the same day, should all be criticized as rogue actions.
But Trump’s decision was not isolated; it was part of a broader trajectory that included the reinterpretation of the executive ban on assassination beginning under the Clinton administration. In the late 1990s, President Bill Clinton authorized the CIA to kill Osama bin Laden and his top deputies. Clinton’s national security team determined that because of the threat bin Laden represented to the United States, killing him would be an act of self-defense under the laws of war and therefore not an assassination. Even if his administration failed to carry out the operation he’d authorized, Clinton had asserted an exception to the ban on assassination mandated by the executive order.
The post-9/11 global war on terrorism greatly expanded the scope of such actions, as President George W. Bush began targeted killings outside of war theaters in 2002, beginning in Yemen, justified also as defensive and legal under Congress’s post 9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as attacks on al Qaeda and allied forces. Obama intensified the executive branch’s embrace of targeted killing from Libya to Pakistan, arguing these killings were neither assassinations nor acts of retaliation but rather self-defense in war.
Trump’s decision was not isolated; it was part of a broader trajectory that included the reinterpretation of the executive ban on assassination beginning under the Clinton administration.
According to this logic, all that was required to justify these strikes—whether they targeted state officials or non-state actors—was the U.S. president’s determination that the target represented an imminent threat to the United States. Trump has simply continued and extended this policy while more openly expressing the vengeful impulses behind it.
It is notable that preceding the assassination of Suleimani the U.S. government officially designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Quds Force that Suleimani led, as a “foreign terrorist organization.” This more directly connected Iran to the logic of Congress’s AUMF, forging another link between Iran and U.S. retaliation for 9/11, already evident, for example, in Bush’s 2002 inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil.”
Vice President Mike Pence tried to make this connection explicit when he tweeted that Suleimani had helped 10 of the 9/11 hijackers. Pence’s inaccuracies, like Bush’s conflations during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq 18 years ago, sow confusion, whether deliberately or not. The fact that Iran, and Suleimani in particular, worked alongside the United States in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is obscured in the resulting confusion.
Supporters of Trump’s assassination of Suleimani argue that the killing had value as an act of vengeance. It was American justice, whether or not it was also preventative or would deter future terrorism. They rationalize the retributive element in this strike as an end in itself.
Recent history suggests, however, that vengeance is most likely to beget more vengeance and that retributive violence by the United States in the Middle East is both morally questionable and strategically bankrupt. But how seriously can one take the element of deterrence? And who precisely was the attack meant to deter? By showing that he could execute a terrorist leader whenever and wherever he wanted, Trump—as had Bush and Obama—intended to send the message that terrorists would never get away.
As Trump put it: “If you value your own life, you will not threaten the lives of our people.” His audience ought to be suspicious of this trope in presidential rhetoric, however, since every “world’s top terrorist” eliminated by the U.S. military is swiftly replaced by the next in the American imagination, creating an endless series of Islamic terrorists to kill (who often have little connection to one another).
Announcing the killing of Baghdadi in October 2019, for example, Trump anticipated the next top terrorists to go after when he said, “These savage monsters will not escape their fate, and they will not escape the final judgment of God.” Yet killing Suleimani was also ostensibly supposed to advance the Trump administration’s policy of deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Some commentators have correctly pointed out that killing Suleimani, along with Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran and withdrawal from the nuclear deal, has if anything hastened Iran’s drive to acquire a nuclear weapon.
The position that equates vengeance with deterrence, then, is not just mistaken; it dangerously ignores the extent to which vengeance propagates violence and puts Americans (and many others) at greater risk of future attacks.
Those who argue that killing a high-ranking Iranian official was a rogue act are correct to criticize Trump’s assassination, but they should do so as part of a broader critique of American vengeance in the Middle East. By overemphasizing Trump’s impulsiveness as the root of the problem, the history of targeted killings in the region is forgotten. Indeed, this tendency was on the ascent long before Trump took office and will undoubtedly persist as a problem after he has left the White House. Trump can so easily act on his impulses only because of the structures of American vengeance are already in place.
These structures have durable foundations because the United States’ pursuit of vengeance in the Middle East reaches back decades. In the 1980s, for example, the CIA attempted to kill the Shiite religious leader Muhammad Fadlallah to avenge attacks on Americans in Lebanon. An intricate plot involving CIA Director William Casey and Saudi intelligence agents led to a car bombing that killed scores of civilians but missed Fadlallah.
The attempted assassination of Fadlallah spurred Hezbollah’s 1985 hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847 and the killing of a U.S. Navy diver on board. In 1986, the Reagan administration decided to avenge attacks against U.S. military personnel with a strike against Libya intended to kill Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and his family. The bombing failed to kill Qaddafi and likewise failed to deter him. But it did set an important precedent.
Eventually, in 2011, the United States helped ensure that Qaddafi got his just deserts. In the words of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “We came, we saw, he died.” And American vengeance has been manifested in many other ways: the endorsement of torture, the abuse of prisoners, the so-called Muslim ban, to name several. But assassination deserves particular attention because it has become such a widely accepted instrument of vengeance within U.S. political culture.
The rising importance of vengeance in American political rhetoric is a troubling symptom of a U.S. foreign policy that has been emptied of any attempt to make real progress in favor of the political expedience of emotional release. U.S. leaders need to continually perform with strength, resolve, and credibility in order to stay in power, which means maintaining the threat to Americans, not eliminating it. While there has not been another 9/11-like attack in the United States, terrorism has not only spread but evolved. The U.S. response to 9/11 helped spawn new jihadi movements, such as the Islamic State. And the threat of attacks by self-proclaimed jihadis remains.
Suleimani’s death, then, is one more act of vengeance in the long war on terrorism, in which presidents are willing to kill whomever they deem to be a terrorist, in some cases even if they are a top foreign official, whatever the consequences. It is notable that Trump called Suleimani the “No. 1 terrorist anywhere in the world,” a designation that Trump had previously given Baghdadi when he was killed in October.
The United States is more freely using the tools honed during its war on terrorism to take revenge against an ever-expanding cast of enemies. Vengeance is not unique to Trump, though his style has highlighted the impulse. The idea that the United States is acting as the arbiter of justice in such payback killings has become increasingly powerful, just as the strategic logic of U.S. intervention in the Middle East becomes more confused.
Indeed, in the absence of a coherent strategy, exacting vengeance has become one of the only markers of progress for U.S. policy in the Middle East. But retribution tends to encourage never-ending cycles of retaliation, and when the blowback arrives, Americans will find that Trump’s vengeance doctrine—despite its promises of restored deterrence—has in fact made them far less safe.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-04--India’s New Laws Hurt Women Most of All

India’s New Laws Hurt Women Most of All

India ’ s New Laws Hurt Women Most of All On the evening of Dec. 16 , 2019 , a group of conservative , middle-aged Muslim women in hijabs and burqas began a peaceful sit-in at Shaheen Bagh—a Muslim-majority , working-class neighborhood in South Delhi—blocking a major road that connects the Indian capital to its suburbs .
A few days earlier , on Dec. 12 , the Indian government had passed a law that fast-tracked citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Bangladesh , Afghanistan , and Pakistan who moved to India before 2015 .
The new law , which essentially made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim citizenship , was just the latest move by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) to determine who was or wasn ’ t Indian .
And it came just months after the Narendra Modi-led government renewed a National Register of Citizens ( NRC ) to identify immigrants living illegally in the state of Assam , promising to soon implement it across the country .
Students in universities and colleges had protested against the NRC for several months , but their demonstrations gathered momentum after the new Citizenship Amendment Act ( CAA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On the night of Dec. 15 , there were brutal crackdowns by the police in two elite , Muslim-majority universities .
The Delhi police , which answer to the central BJP government , stormed Jamia Millia Islamia , while police in neighboring BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh cracked down on Aligarh Muslim University .
The police brutality gave further impetus to national protests , and quietly , the women of Shaheen Bagh joined in .
Today , those women have become the face of the resistance .
They are also the face of the uncertainty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Modi government began updating the NRC .
Their fears are not unfounded .
After the implementation of the NRC in Assam , 1.9 million people were found to be lacking papers for citizenship and , according to activists , 69 percent of them were women .
“ I have no idea where my birth certificate is or where my degrees are , ” said Nusrat Ara , one of the conveners of the protest at Shaheen Bagh .
“ Most women don ’ t even have these documents.
” Ara has broken @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shoulder to shoulder with men on the streets because she knows instinctively what the NRC would mean for women like her across the country .
In India , a woman ’ s life is defined not by papers and documents but by dispossessions .
Under the NRC process , people are required to submit documents proving their ownership of land , their lineage , and their education .
Most women in India do not have their names on those kinds of documents .
“ Women in this country have the vaguest ideas about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were born , ” said Kavita Krishnan , a gender activist and secretary of the All India Progressive Women ’ s Association .
“ And documents are , of course , totally nonexistent.
” That , however , is to be expected in a country where only 66 percent of women are literate as compared with 82 percent of men .
And among the women who begin an education , most are unable to finish because of the prevalence of child marriages .
According to UNICEF , one in every three of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India .
Of the 223 million child brides in the country , 102 million were married before the age of 15 .
India failed almost all the indicators of gender equality in the World Economic Forum ’ s latest Global Gender Gap Report , showcasing how the condition of women is precarious in the country especially when it comes to inheritance rights for daughters and women ’ s access to land use , control , and ownership .
The NRC makes things worse .
Women have been historically “ excluded from entitlements to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost no documentation to prove their existence as citizens , ” according to a statement by Women Against Sexual Violence and State Repression , a countrywide group of women activists who conducted a fact-finding mission in Assam after the NRC .
Suchitra Vijayan , a lawyer and founder of the Polis Project , a New York-based research and journalism organization , traveled to Assam just before the NRC was implemented .
A majority of the women she spoke with had no documentation or educational certificates or , if they ever had them at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from their place of birth—often because of domestic violence or climate change .
According to reports in the Indian media , after the Assam NRC was implemented the documents of around 150,000 married women were sent to West Bengal from Assam , out of which only 15,000 were verified .
Following the uproar over the NRC , the Modi government quietly backtracked and shifted its focus to a National Population Register ( NPR ) that can become an easy weapon in the hands of men in a society that continues to be deeply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first introduced by the opposition Indian National Congress when it was in power in 2010 as a local register of residents in line with United Nations guidelines .
Congress leaders had pointed out that the BJP government added at least seven more questions to the exercise , including the date and place of birth of both parents , and alleged that the NPR was being used to collect data for NRC .
The NPR will also identify so-called “ doubtful voters , ” who will then be stripped of their right to vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizenship under the NRC .
Under the NPR , anyone can complain about a citizen , and it will be left to the discretion of officials to demand certain types of paperwork before relegating people to the list of doubtful voters .
The NPR will be a permanent fear hanging over women ’ s heads , according to Krishnan .
Even if a woman clears the stipulations in the NRC , it will take just one unverified complaint for her to be relegated to the doubtful voters list , stripped of the rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Men will of course abuse this power .
They will threaten women into submission to stay quiet in the face of abuse , ” Krishnan said .
“ Now , imagine the consequences for single women ?
What chance do they stand against this larger witch hunt ?
” For Muslim women , if the NRC and NPR can strip them of their rights , the CAA will ensure they never regain it because the CAA is not open to Muslim refugees.Once stripped of their rights … hundreds of thousands of women from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communities could be held in detention camps .
Once stripped of their rights under these exercises , hundreds of thousands of women from across social classes , religions , and communities could be held in detention camps .
And that worries Vijayan , who has worked with the U.N. war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as an attorney .
Nowhere in the world , Vijayan said , are camps safe spaces for women .
“ We know exactly what happens in detention camps .
There ’ s no reason for us to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benign to these women , ” Vijayan said .
“ The constitution is in danger , and all of us—especially the women—are on thin ice .
All our rights and freedoms are endangered .
It ’ s a catastrophe .
We are looking ahead at a gender crisis like no other , ” Krishnan said .
And Indian women know that instinctively .
Which is why the women of Shaheen Bagh have not budged from their sit-in after nearly two months .
Inspired by them , hundreds of thousands of women have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
“ Over the last two years , there has been a lot of fear among women , ” Krishnan said .
“ But now there ’ s a remarkable possibility of us coming together and fighting this—and that ’ s what we are doing .
”

On the evening of Dec. 16, 2019, a group of conservative, middle-aged Muslim women in hijabs and burqas began a peaceful sit-in at Shaheen Bagh—a Muslim-majority, working-class neighborhood in South Delhi—blocking a major road that connects the Indian capital to its suburbs.
On the evening of Dec. 16, 2019, a group of conservative, middle-aged Muslim women in hijabs and burqas began a peaceful sit-in at Shaheen Bagh—a Muslim-majority, working-class neighborhood in South Delhi—blocking a major road that connects the Indian capital to its suburbs.
A few days earlier, on Dec. 12, the Indian government had passed a law that fast-tracked citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Pakistan who moved to India before 2015. The new law, which essentially made it more difficult for Muslim refugees to claim citizenship, was just the latest move by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to determine who was or wasn’t Indian. And it came just months after the Narendra Modi-led government renewed a National Register of Citizens (NRC) to identify immigrants living illegally in the state of Assam, promising to soon implement it across the country.
Students in universities and colleges had protested against the NRC for several months, but their demonstrations gathered momentum after the new Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was approved by the parliament. On the night of Dec. 15, there were brutal crackdowns by the police in two elite, Muslim-majority universities. The Delhi police, which answer to the central BJP government, stormed Jamia Millia Islamia, while police in neighboring BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh cracked down on Aligarh Muslim University.
The police brutality gave further impetus to national protests, and quietly, the women of Shaheen Bagh joined in. Today, those women have become the face of the resistance. They are also the face of the uncertainty that women across India have felt since the Modi government began updating the NRC. Their fears are not unfounded. After the implementation of the NRC in Assam, 1.9 million people were found to be lacking papers for citizenship and, according to activists, 69 percent of them were women.
“I have no idea where my birth certificate is or where my degrees are,” said Nusrat Ara, one of the conveners of the protest at Shaheen Bagh. “Most women don’t even have these documents.”
Ara has broken from years of conservative upbringing to stand shoulder to shoulder with men on the streets because she knows instinctively what the NRC would mean for women like her across the country. In India, a woman’s life is defined not by papers and documents but by dispossessions. Under the NRC process, people are required to submit documents proving their ownership of land, their lineage, and their education. Most women in India do not have their names on those kinds of documents.
“Women in this country have the vaguest ideas about when they were born or where they were born,” said Kavita Krishnan, a gender activist and secretary of the All India Progressive Women’s Association. “And documents are, of course, totally nonexistent.”
That, however, is to be expected in a country where only 66 percent of women are literate as compared with 82 percent of men. And among the women who begin an education, most are unable to finish because of the prevalence of child marriages. According to UNICEF, one in every three of the world’s child brides lives in India. Of the 223 million child brides in the country, 102 million were married before the age of 15.
India failed almost all the indicators of gender equality in the World Economic Forum’s latest Global Gender Gap Report, showcasing how the condition of women is precarious in the country especially when it comes to inheritance rights for daughters and women’s access to land use, control, and ownership.
The NRC makes things worse. Women have been historically “excluded from entitlements to land and access to education and have almost no documentation to prove their existence as citizens,” according to a statement by Women Against Sexual Violence and State Repression, a countrywide group of women activists who conducted a fact-finding mission in Assam after the NRC.
Suchitra Vijayan, a lawyer and founder of the Polis Project, a New York-based research and journalism organization, traveled to Assam just before the NRC was implemented. A majority of the women she spoke with had no documentation or educational certificates or, if they ever had them at all, had lost them while migrating from their place of birth—often because of domestic violence or climate change. According to reports in the Indian media, after the Assam NRC was implemented the documents of around 150,000 married women were sent to West Bengal from Assam, out of which only 15,000 were verified.
Following the uproar over the NRC, the Modi government quietly backtracked and shifted its focus to a National Population Register (NPR) that can become an easy weapon in the hands of men in a society that continues to be deeply misogynistic and patriarchal.
The NPR was first introduced by the opposition Indian National Congress when it was in power in 2010 as a local register of residents in line with United Nations guidelines. Congress leaders had pointed out that the BJP government added at least seven more questions to the exercise, including the date and place of birth of both parents, and alleged that the NPR was being used to collect data for NRC. The NPR will also identify so-called “doubtful voters,” who will then be stripped of their right to vote and own property until they can prove citizenship under the NRC. Under the NPR, anyone can complain about a citizen, and it will be left to the discretion of officials to demand certain types of paperwork before relegating people to the list of doubtful voters.
The NPR will be a permanent fear hanging over women’s heads, according to Krishnan. Even if a woman clears the stipulations in the NRC, it will take just one unverified complaint for her to be relegated to the doubtful voters list, stripped of the rights to own property or vote.
“Men will of course abuse this power. They will threaten women into submission to stay quiet in the face of abuse,” Krishnan said. “Now, imagine the consequences for single women? What chance do they stand against this larger witch hunt?”
For Muslim women, if the NRC and NPR can strip them of their rights, the CAA will ensure they never regain it because the CAA is not open to Muslim refugees.Once stripped of their rights … hundreds of thousands of women from across social classes, religions, and communities could be held in detention camps.
Once stripped of their rights under these exercises, hundreds of thousands of women from across social classes, religions, and communities could be held in detention camps. And that worries Vijayan, who has worked with the U.N. war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as an attorney. Nowhere in the world, Vijayan said, are camps safe spaces for women.
“We know exactly what happens in detention camps. There’s no reason for us to believe our state will be any more benign to these women,” Vijayan said.
“The constitution is in danger, and all of us—especially the women—are on thin ice. All our rights and freedoms are endangered. It’s a catastrophe. We are looking ahead at a gender crisis like no other,” Krishnan said.
And Indian women know that instinctively. Which is why the women of Shaheen Bagh have not budged from their sit-in after nearly two months. Inspired by them, hundreds of thousands of women have been occupying roads and streets all across the country.
“Over the last two years, there has been a lot of fear among women,” Krishnan said. “But now there’s a remarkable possibility of us coming together and fighting this—and that’s what we are doing.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-04--Trump Finally Has the Dangerous Foreign-Policy Process He Always Wanted

Trump Finally Has the Dangerous Foreign-Policy Process He Always Wanted In the days after the drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani , President Donald Trump took to working the club rooms at his Mar-a-Lago resort .
More than new year holiday greetings , reports suggest the commander-in-chief was looking for approbation about the decisiveness behind the drone strike .
It ’ s safe to assume Trump ’ s will continue to fish for compliments in tonight ’ s State of the Union address .
Grading on a curve weighted by the president ’ s mismanagement of U.S.-Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheme for political dirt on a rival and the impeachment trial that ’ s scheduled to end tomorrow in the U.S. Senate , the revelations to date about the Soleimani decision suggest a policy process that is improved in at least one respect .
For one thing , National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien appears to have been in the loop while Rudy Giuliani , the president ’ s personal lawyer , does not .
But as Trump ’ s seeks credit and his fractious and frustrating relationship with those serving in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final , year , it ’ s worth seriously exploring what the Soleimani strike reveals about the president ’ s decision-making .
A review of what ’ s been reported so far suggests some of the same pathologies that led to so much trouble in Ukraine are not a bug but a feature of Trump ’ s statesmanship .
Unfortunately , as the president escapes punishment in the Senate , that flawed process risks becoming more dangerous .
The Trump team struggled from the start with so-called “ interagency relations , ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other departments .
As leery officials waited in government conference rooms in 2016 , the president-elect ’ s transition teams arrived late and unprepared when they showed up at all .
Trump ’ s first attempts to put his stamp on government , like the ill-fated plan to put controversial political advisor Steve Bannon on the vaunted interagency Principals Committee , or PC , that ’ s typically the domain of cabinet-level appointees , deeply concerned those used to the way Washington had worked for decades .
Trump and the government struggled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of one of their few agreements about process .
At the administration ’ s start , he and many in the bureaucracy shared a belief that a heavy-handed President Barack Obama had micromanaged national security in interagency meeting after meeting .
Reducing the schedule of sessions fit Trump ’ s attention span and preference for delegating even as it offered some freedom to the bureaucracy ; but no one could really formulate a process to fill the void .
Upon the quick resignation National Security Advisor Michael Flynn , H.R .
McMaster tried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a firmer foundation , including the removal of Bannon from the PC .
Before his first day , McMaster asked every living former national security advisor for advice on how the regular order might serve an irregular president .
Unfortunately , their recommendation— “ honest brokering , ” ensuring Trump heard everyone ’ s views—put McMaster in the middle of the fight between a resistant government and a recalcitrant Trump and in the position of advocating for unwelcome convenings and compromises .
After tiring of McMaster ’ s attempts to broker , Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security adviser in April 2018 .
Though it ’ s an open question what advice Bolton sought before his first day , he went about finally breaking the president loose from the government .
The national security advisor became the only tenuous connection between a shrinking , informal circle of aides who met with Trump and the rest of permanent government .
The result was a “ zombie ” interagency that went through the motions and some of the meetings but without the animating pulse of presidential intent .
But when Bolton fell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( and , if one believes hints from his leaked book manuscript , resisting the early hints of the Ukraine scheme ) , that already tenuous connection was lost .
The government shattered : the president and a few aides pursued one scheme , the career bureaucracy implemented another policy all together , and the national security advisor was powerless to improve either effort .
Leaving aside questions of legality and impeachment , this is no way to run government—or confront the vast challenges posed by Iran , China , North Korea and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the few agreements that came out of the House ’ s impeachment hearings and Senate ’ s trial , which exposed the fundamental governing challenge of the Trump era .
After three years in office , Trump continues to see the presidency as a guarantee of personal fealty from the federal bureaucracy rather than an invitation to the grinding work of getting the government in line with his preferred policies .
Meanwhile , with few opportunities to have a say or influence the commander in chief , some of the permanent government appears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ try to wait until Trump ’ s fate is decided on Election Day .
Even as some of Bolton ’ s charges testified on the Hill , his replacement Robert O ’ Brien , a California attorney who had served in the Trump State Department , was trying to pick up the pieces of government .
In a Washington Post op-ed , the new national security advisor made clear the goal was not interagency business as usual .
In order to pursue Trump ’ s “ vision for a lean , efficient government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cut the NSC staff , the president ’ s representatives to the interagency , by a third or 60-70 staffers—a target he ’ ll reportedly meet this month .
That staff design reflects the sort of process the Soleimani reporting reveals .
In addition to the president and O ’ Brien , the decision-making circle on Iran earlier this year was small , including in secure calls and discrete meetings Vice President Mike Pence , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , Defense Secretary Mark Esper , and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes many statutory members of the National Security council , it resembles an informal , ad-hoc gang in which members share views and keep secrets—including from their own agencies .
That sort of gang appears to be a good fit for Trump , who has spent all of his adult life in a family business driven by his whims and staffed by obedient children .
It also allows for the president to organize little coalitions of the willing , advisers keen to pursue relatively discreet , one-off objectives like shaking down Ukraine or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like-minded , agreeable circle gives the president an inflated perception of his own power and flexibility , in part by limiting input from the government ’ s bureaucrats , lawyers , and more .
For that reason , despite the messy days after the strike , the whole experience appears to have inspired some confidence about the president ’ s new team and its approach .
One senior official told the Post the hit on Soleimani was “ tremendously bold.
” O ’ Brien has been out front , doing rounds of press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to write up the tick-tocks of the process .
An ally of the president said the new team “ understand the president .
They have chemistry among themselves.
” The result , according to one former official is “ less introspection , less debate and faster action.
” The whole thing , at least to O ’ Brien , feels ( John ) Kennedy-esque .
The 35th president was also sure his predecessor Dwight Eisenhower had been too deliberative and government too sclerotic .
Kennedy wanted to make bold , imaginative , flexible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ give-and-take sessions with a small club of educated , ambitious advisers .
What was Camelot , after all , if not a glamorous gang ?
Some of its members even called themselves the “ Irish Mafia.
” Although some warned the young president about such an approach , it has some fans .
Turns out , they include O ’ Brien , who points to Kennedy ’ s approach as a model for the new Trump team .
Even though many blamed the Kennedy gang for the Bay of Pigs fiasco that almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days , O ’ Brien sees their later handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as proof of a concept for a smaller foreign-policy team .
Kennedy of course did find a way down from the brink in October 1962 , but it is more appropriate to judge his process on an episode less than a year later .
On Saturday , August 24 , 1963 , Michael Forrestal , a NSC staffer , encouraged the president on vacation at Hyannis Port via telegram to signal support for a coup being planned against Ngo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president .
After the assent was cabled to Saigon and everyone returned to work on Monday , it was clear neither the National Security Advisor or chairman of the joint chiefs of staff had signed off on the idea .
Though Forrestal offered to resign and Kennedy admitted , “ We fucked that up , ” little effort was made to repeal the approval or avoid repeating the process foul .
Within three months , Diem was shot in the back of an armored personnel carrier and Kennedy himself assassinated in the back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But his successor Lyndon Johnson made his most fateful , disastrous decisions about Vietnam in the casual , clubby process Kennedy had established and alongside many of the same gang members .
That history is important to remember today .
The problem is not that Trump is doing things differently than Washington has done them in recent decades—the problem is that he ’ s doing things the way we know leads to disaster .
“ Group think , ” the tendency for like-minded advisors to conform that drove so many Kennedy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the decision Trump made on Soleimani and why it was so hard to explain to anyone outside the gang .
Government by gang is better than no government at all but risky just the same .

In the days after the drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, President Donald Trump took to working the club rooms at his Mar-a-Lago resort. More than new year holiday greetings, reports suggest the commander-in-chief was looking for approbation about the decisiveness behind the drone strike. It’s safe to assume Trump’s will continue to fish for compliments in tonight’s State of the Union address.
In the days after the drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, President Donald Trump took to working the club rooms at his Mar-a-Lago resort. More than new year holiday greetings, reports suggest the commander-in-chief was looking for approbation about the decisiveness behind the drone strike. It’s safe to assume Trump’s will continue to fish for compliments in tonight’s State of the Union address.
Grading on a curve weighted by the president’s mismanagement of U.S.-Ukraine relations, which resulted in a pressure scheme for political dirt on a rival and the impeachment trial that’s scheduled to end tomorrow in the U.S. Senate, the revelations to date about the Soleimani decision suggest a policy process that is improved in at least one respect. For one thing, National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien appears to have been in the loop while Rudy Giuliani, the president’s personal lawyer, does not.
But as Trump’s seeks credit and his fractious and frustrating relationship with those serving in government enters its fourth, and potentially final, year, it’s worth seriously exploring what the Soleimani strike reveals about the president’s decision-making. A review of what’s been reported so far suggests some of the same pathologies that led to so much trouble in Ukraine are not a bug but a feature of Trump’s statesmanship. Unfortunately, as the president escapes punishment in the Senate, that flawed process risks becoming more dangerous.
The Trump team struggled from the start with so-called “interagency relations,” the traditional give-and-take with the state, defense and other departments. As leery officials waited in government conference rooms in 2016, the president-elect’s transition teams arrived late and unprepared when they showed up at all. Trump’s first attempts to put his stamp on government, like the ill-fated plan to put controversial political advisor Steve Bannon on the vaunted interagency Principals Committee, or PC, that’s typically the domain of cabinet-level appointees, deeply concerned those used to the way Washington had worked for decades. Trump and the government struggled to overcome their differences in part because of one of their few agreements about process. At the administration’s start, he and many in the bureaucracy shared a belief that a heavy-handed President Barack Obama had micromanaged national security in interagency meeting after meeting. Reducing the schedule of sessions fit Trump’s attention span and preference for delegating even as it offered some freedom to the bureaucracy; but no one could really formulate a process to fill the void. Upon the quick resignation National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, H.R. McMaster tried valiantly to put the interagency relations on a firmer foundation, including the removal of Bannon from the PC. Before his first day, McMaster asked every living former national security advisor for advice on how the regular order might serve an irregular president. Unfortunately, their recommendation—“honest brokering,” ensuring Trump heard everyone’s views—put McMaster in the middle of the fight between a resistant government and a recalcitrant Trump and in the position of advocating for unwelcome convenings and compromises. After tiring of McMaster’s attempts to broker, Trump named former UN Ambassador John Bolton national security adviser in April 2018. Though it’s an open question what advice Bolton sought before his first day, he went about finally breaking the president loose from the government. The national security advisor became the only tenuous connection between a shrinking, informal circle of aides who met with Trump and the rest of permanent government. The result was a “zombie” interagency that went through the motions and some of the meetings but without the animating pulse of presidential intent. But when Bolton fell out of favor for pushing hawkish views (and, if one believes hints from his leaked book manuscript, resisting the early hints of the Ukraine scheme), that already tenuous connection was lost. The government shattered: the president and a few aides pursued one scheme, the career bureaucracy implemented another policy all together, and the national security advisor was powerless to improve either effort. Leaving aside questions of legality and impeachment, this is no way to run government—or confront the vast challenges posed by Iran, China, North Korea and more. That may be one of the few agreements that came out of the House’s impeachment hearings and Senate’s trial, which exposed the fundamental governing challenge of the Trump era. After three years in office, Trump continues to see the presidency as a guarantee of personal fealty from the federal bureaucracy rather than an invitation to the grinding work of getting the government in line with his preferred policies. Meanwhile, with few opportunities to have a say or influence the commander in chief, some of the permanent government appears as resistant as ever, willing to try to wait until Trump’s fate is decided on Election Day.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Legacy U.S. Air Force Fighters, Bombers Are on the Chopping Block

Legacy U.S. Air Force Fighters , Bombers Are on the Chopping Block The U.S. Department of Defense plans to propose retiring hundreds of the Air Force ’ s aging fighter jets and bomber aircraft over the next five years to shift resources toward building new capabilities to counter China and Russia , sources tell Foreign Policy .
On the chopping block are a significant chunk of the older F-15s and F-16s , 17 of roughly 60 nonnuclear B-1 bombers , along with 21 of the service ’ s unarmed RQ-4 Global Hawk drones .
The proposed cuts over what is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be included in the White House ’ s annual budget submission for fiscal year 2021 , which is set to be released on Feb. 10 .
Congress must approve the plan before it goes into effect .
As the legacy aircraft retire , the Air Force will bring on new capabilities : Boeing ’ s new F-15EX , Lockheed Martin ’ s F-35 , and Northrop Grumman ’ s B-21 stealth bomber .
But despite Defense Secretary Mark Esper ’ s push to tighten the Pentagon ’ s belt , his office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , actually rejected a series of even deeper cuts proposed by the Air Force—including its armed MQ-9 Predator drones—according to four sources with knowledge of the discussions .
The Air Force ’ s original proposal was designed to shift money toward new capabilities , including new fighters , bombers , and building a sophisticated network that will provide more accurate real-time data to operators .
But “ they were trying to take tremendous near-term risk to do that , ” said one source with knowledge of the discussions .
The final proposal includes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slower migration ” to new capabilities , the source said .
The Air Force has tried to retire its 250 aging F-15Cs and two-seat F-15Ds over the years due to structural issues with the aircraft , including most recently in 2017 .
Now , instead of paying to upgrade the older aircraft in the fleet , the Air Force hopes to use that money to buy Boeing ’ s F-15EX , a new and improved variant .
Meanwhile , a number of the Block 25 F-16Cs , which were introduced in 1984 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , replaced by the F-35 .
As for the B-1 , the Air Force has previously said the aircraft would retire as Northrop Grumman ’ s new B-21 stealth bomber comes online , starting in around 2025 .
The 2021 budget proposal appears to be an acceleration of this plan .
The Air Force ’ s then-top civilian previewed the cuts in September 2019 , saying that the service planned to slash certain legacy programs to invest in advanced technology .
“ The Air Force is leading the way with bold and likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Matthew Donovan , who at the time was serving as the acting Air Force Secretary .
“ There ’ s no way around it.
” During initial budget discussions this year , the Air Force also proposed retiring its fleet of armed MQ-9 Predator drones , its RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft , additional B-1 bombers , and the storied U-2 spy planes .
However , those cuts were rejected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the geographic combatant commanders , who argued they couldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capability .
The Pentagon has been saying since 2018 that it intends to shift focus away from the counterterrorism fights of the last two decades toward building new capabilities for a future conflict with “ near-peer adversaries ” Russia and China .
Both countries are increasingly able to challenge the U.S. military ’ s superiority through a wide variety of sophisticated missiles , air defenses , and electronic capabilities that could destroy key U.S. and allied forces—even U.S. aircraft carriers .
But the persistent threat of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tensions with Iran , has slowed the effort .
Just in the past few months , the U.S. military has deployed more than 10,000 additional troops , along with an aircraft carrier , fighters , bombers , missile defenses , and other capabilities to the Middle East .
It is becoming clear that legacy U.S. aircraft are increasingly vulnerable , even in the comparatively permissive airspace in the Middle East .
Iran shot down a Global Hawk drone operated by the U.S. Navy in June 2019 .
And news emerged last week that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to link troops in the field to headquarters and described as “ Wi-Fi in the sky , ” crashed in Afghanistan , killing two service members .
The White House will release its budget proposal next week , but Congress still has to approve the changes as part of annual budget negotiations .
As in years past , it ’ s likely lawmakers will push back on some of the proposals , and not all of them will make it into law .
Update , Feb. 4 , 2020 : This article has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fleet retirements became available .

The U.S. Department of Defense plans to propose retiring hundreds of the Air Force’s aging fighter jets and bomber aircraft over the next five years to shift resources toward building new capabilities to counter China and Russia, sources tell Foreign Policy .
The U.S. Department of Defense plans to propose retiring hundreds of the Air Force’s aging fighter jets and bomber aircraft over the next five years to shift resources toward building new capabilities to counter China and Russia, sources tell Foreign Policy.
On the chopping block are a significant chunk of the older F-15s and F-16s, 17 of roughly 60 nonnuclear B-1 bombers, along with 21 of the service’s unarmed RQ-4 Global Hawk drones. The proposed cuts over what is called the “five-year defense plan” will be included in the White House’s annual budget submission for fiscal year 2021, which is set to be released on Feb. 10. Congress must approve the plan before it goes into effect.
As the legacy aircraft retire, the Air Force will bring on new capabilities: Boeing’s new F-15EX, Lockheed Martin’s F-35, and Northrop Grumman’s B-21 stealth bomber.
But despite Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s push to tighten the Pentagon’s belt, his office, along with the military combatant commanders, actually rejected a series of even deeper cuts proposed by the Air Force—including its armed MQ-9 Predator drones—according to four sources with knowledge of the discussions.
The Air Force’s original proposal was designed to shift money toward new capabilities, including new fighters, bombers, and building a sophisticated network that will provide more accurate real-time data to operators. But “they were trying to take tremendous near-term risk to do that,” said one source with knowledge of the discussions.
The final proposal includes “less money shifted, and a slower migration” to new capabilities, the source said.
The Air Force has tried to retire its 250 aging F-15Cs and two-seat F-15Ds over the years due to structural issues with the aircraft, including most recently in 2017. Now, instead of paying to upgrade the older aircraft in the fleet, the Air Force hopes to use that money to buy Boeing’s F-15EX, a new and improved variant.
Meanwhile, a number of the Block 25 F-16Cs, which were introduced in 1984, will retire in the next five years, replaced by the F-35.
As for the B-1, the Air Force has previously said the aircraft would retire as Northrop Grumman’s new B-21 stealth bomber comes online, starting in around 2025. The 2021 budget proposal appears to be an acceleration of this plan.
The Air Force’s then-top civilian previewed the cuts in September 2019, saying that the service planned to slash certain legacy programs to invest in advanced technology.
“The Air Force is leading the way with bold and likely controversial changes to our future budgets,” said Matthew Donovan, who at the time was serving as the acting Air Force Secretary. “There’s no way around it.”
During initial budget discussions this year, the Air Force also proposed retiring its fleet of armed MQ-9 Predator drones, its RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft, additional B-1 bombers, and the storied U-2 spy planes. However, those cuts were rejected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the geographic combatant commanders, who argued they couldn’t afford to lose any more surveillance capability.
The Pentagon has been saying since 2018 that it intends to shift focus away from the counterterrorism fights of the last two decades toward building new capabilities for a future conflict with “near-peer adversaries” Russia and China. Both countries are increasingly able to challenge the U.S. military’s superiority through a wide variety of sophisticated missiles, air defenses, and electronic capabilities that could destroy key U.S. and allied forces—even U.S. aircraft carriers.
But the persistent threat of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Shabab, as well as new tensions with Iran, has slowed the effort.
Just in the past few months, the U.S. military has deployed more than 10,000 additional troops, along with an aircraft carrier, fighters, bombers, missile defenses, and other capabilities to the Middle East.
It is becoming clear that legacy U.S. aircraft are increasingly vulnerable, even in the comparatively permissive airspace in the Middle East. Iran shot down a Global Hawk drone operated by the U.S. Navy in June 2019. And news emerged last week that an Air Force Bombardier E-11A, used to link troops in the field to headquarters and described as “Wi-Fi in the sky,” crashed in Afghanistan, killing two service members.
The White House will release its budget proposal next week, but Congress still has to approve the changes as part of annual budget negotiations. As in years past, it’s likely lawmakers will push back on some of the proposals, and not all of them will make it into law.
Update, Feb. 4, 2020: This article has been updated as further information about the fleet retirements became available.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-05--Trump’s Impeachment Trial Ends as U.S. Election Season Begins

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Trump ’ s impeachment trial comes to a close in the U.S. Senate , the latest on the Wuhan virus outbreak , and Nigeria pledges to meet requirements to get off the U.S. travel ban list .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial concludes in the Senate today , with the Republican-held chamber nearly certain to acquit the president on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress .
( To convict him would require a two-thirds supermajority .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid to pressure Ukraine into investigating his potential Democratic rival , former Vice President Joe Biden .
Today ’ s vote will formally end the impeachment investigation , but questions remain that could follow Trump into the 2020 campaign season , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon report .
Both Democrats and Republicans are likely to invoke the trial record over the coming months , and a few Democratic senators from states where Trump is popular haven ’ t yet said if they ’ ll vote to acquit him—giving him the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The State of the Union .
On the eve of his likely acquittal , Trump laid out the case for his reelection in his third State of the Union speech , delivered to Congress on Tuesday evening in Washington .
In the dramatic 90-minute address , Trump took credit for what he called the “ Great American Comeback.
” He touted the strength of the U.S. economy , his immigration policies , and his foreign policy—highlighting the partial trade deal with China and recognizing Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó , his guest , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and legitimate president.
” Waiting for Iowa .
Meanwhile , the Democratic candidates were still waiting to hear who had won the first primary contest .
The outcome of the Iowa caucuses , held on Monday , remained uncertain on Tuesday after technical delays .
By early Wednesday , the state Democratic party had released results from just 71 percent of precincts in the state .
The partial results showed former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg with a narrow lead in state delegates , followed closely by Sen. Bernie Sanders .
( Sen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden were third and fourth . )
The rise of Sanders ’ s brand of progressive politics will shape the future of the Democratic party , as well as U.S. foreign policy , FP ’ s Michael Hirsh writes .
Hong Kong records coronavirus death , WHO meets over travel .
On Tuesday , Hong Kong reported its first death from the 2019-nCoV outbreak that originated in Wuhan—the second death from the new coronavirus outside of mainland China .
The victim had visited Wuhan .
Thousands of Hong Kong ’ s medical workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government to close its borders with the mainland .
Meanwhile , the World Health Organization ( WHO ) is expected to put out new recommendations today to protect international airline staff so that they can resume flights to China .
Dozens of airlines have suspended or reduced flights to the mainland as the outbreak spreads beyond China .
The WHO has already urged countries not to impose unnecessary travel restrictions on China .
Nigeria seeks to get off U.S. travel ban list .
Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Oyeama said Tuesday that his government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a travel ban on potential immigrants to the United States from Nigeria .
The comments came at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Washington .
The Trump administration expanded its travel ban last Friday to stop certain visas being issued to nationals from Nigeria and five other countries that don ’ t meet U.S. security and information sharing requirements .
Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún argues in FP that there is little evidence to support the claim that the Nigerian immigration ban is about security issues .
“ It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who look a certain type of way coming from a certain type of place , ” he writes .
Russia-Turkey tensions rise in Syria .
After an attack by Russian-backed Syrian government forces in Idlib province killed seven Turkish soldiers on Monday , tensions between Russia and Turkey have escalated .
The two countries support opposing sides in Syria ’ s civil war , with Idlib one of the last remaining areas not under government control .
Though they brokered a cease-fire last month , fighting continues and Turkey is concerned that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ push more Syrian refugees over its border .
Turkey has said it does not plan to withdraw soldiers from the area .
What ’ s missing from Trump ’ s peace plan .
Among the many problems with the Trump administration ’ s recently announced Middle East peace plan is water politics .
Access to water has long been at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and disagreements in the region more broadly .
Trump ’ s plan barely gave the issue any attention—one key reason that the Palestinians rejected it out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reports .
The future of cars in the U.K. Britain has announced plans to stop the sale of new gas , diesel , and hybrid cars by 2035—or earlier if possible .
Speaking in London on Tuesday , Prime Minister Boris Johnson used the announcement to tout the U.K. ’ s climate action credentials ahead of the U.N. COP26 to be held in Glasgow in November .
Though it ’ s 15 years away , the ban threatens German car manufacturers : Britain is their biggest export market .
Imran Khan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prime minister travels today to Pakistani-administered Kashmir , where he will deliver a speech to mark Kashmir Solidarity Day .
Khan has been vocal in criticizing India ’ s treatment of Kashmiris , particularly since it revoked the region ’ s special status last year—despite not speaking out against China ’ s internment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang .
FP editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman interviewed Khan at the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos , Switzerland , last month .
The Russian Orthodox Church is considering a proposal that would stop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military submarines , and space rockets with holy water—a longstanding practice , though the Orthodox Church has cultivated closer ties with Russia ’ s ministry of defense during President Vladimir Putin ’ s years in power .
“ The blessing of military weapons is not reflected in the tradition of the Orthodox Church , ” the proposal reads .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s impeachment trial comes to a close in the U.S. Senate, the latest on the Wuhan virus outbreak , and Nigeria pledges to meet requirements to get off the U.S. travel ban list.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s impeachment trial comes to a close in the U.S. Senate, the latest on the Wuhan virus outbreak, and Nigeria pledges to meet requirements to get off the U.S. travel ban list.
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Trump’s Acquittal in the Senate Is All but Certain
U.S. President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial concludes in the Senate today, with the Republican-held chamber nearly certain to acquit the president on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. (To convict him would require a two-thirds supermajority.) Trump is accused of withholding military aid to pressure Ukraine into investigating his potential Democratic rival, former Vice President Joe Biden.
Today’s vote will formally end the impeachment investigation, but questions remain that could follow Trump into the 2020 campaign season, FP’s Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon report. Both Democrats and Republicans are likely to invoke the trial record over the coming months, and a few Democratic senators from states where Trump is popular haven’t yet said if they’ll vote to acquit him—giving him the chance to claim a bipartisan victory.
The State of the Union. On the eve of his likely acquittal, Trump laid out the case for his reelection in his third State of the Union speech, delivered to Congress on Tuesday evening in Washington. In the dramatic 90-minute address, Trump took credit for what he called the “Great American Comeback.” He touted the strength of the U.S. economy, his immigration policies, and his foreign policy—highlighting the partial trade deal with China and recognizing Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, his guest, as the country’s “true and legitimate president.”
Waiting for Iowa. Meanwhile, the Democratic candidates were still waiting to hear who had won the first primary contest. The outcome of the Iowa caucuses, held on Monday, remained uncertain on Tuesday after technical delays. By early Wednesday, the state Democratic party had released results from just 71 percent of precincts in the state. The partial results showed former South Bend Mayor Pete Buttigieg with a narrow lead in state delegates, followed closely by Sen. Bernie Sanders. (Sen. Elizabeth Warren and former Vice President Joe Biden were third and fourth.)
The rise of Sanders’s brand of progressive politics will shape the future of the Democratic party, as well as U.S. foreign policy, FP’s Michael Hirsh writes.
What We’re Following Today
Hong Kong records coronavirus death, WHO meets over travel. On Tuesday, Hong Kong reported its first death from the new coronavirus outbreak that originated in Wuhan—the second death from the virus outside of mainland China. The victim had visited Wuhan. Thousands of Hong Kong’s medical workers are still striking to push the city government to close its borders with the mainland. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO) is expected to put out new recommendations today to protect international airline staff so that they can resume flights to China.
Dozens of airlines have suspended or reduced flights to the mainland as the outbreak spreads beyond China. The WHO has already urged countries not to impose unnecessary travel restrictions on China.
Nigeria seeks to get off U.S. travel ban list. Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Oyeama said Tuesday that his government was working to meet requirements to lift a travel ban on potential immigrants to the United States from Nigeria. The comments came at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Washington. The Trump administration expanded its travel ban last Friday to stop certain visas being issued to nationals from Nigeria and five other countries that don’t meet U.S. security and information sharing requirements.
Kọ́lá Túbọ̀sún argues in FP that there is little evidence to support the claim that the Nigerian immigration ban is about security issues. “It was always about curbing certain types of immigrants who look a certain type of way coming from a certain type of place,” he writes.
Russia-Turkey tensions rise in Syria. After an attack by Russian-backed Syrian government forces in Idlib province killed seven Turkish soldiers on Monday, tensions between Russia and Turkey have escalated. The two countries support opposing sides in Syria’s civil war, with Idlib one of the last remaining areas not under government control. Though they brokered a cease-fire last month, fighting continues and Turkey is concerned that the Syrian military campaign and Russian airstrikes will push more Syrian refugees over its border. Turkey has said it does not plan to withdraw soldiers from the area.
Keep an Eye On
What’s missing from Trump’s peace plan. Among the many problems with the Trump administration’s recently announced Middle East peace plan is water politics. Access to water has long been at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and disagreements in the region more broadly. Trump’s plan barely gave the issue any attention—one key reason that the Palestinians rejected it out of hand, FP’s Keith Johnson reports.
The future of cars in the U.K. Britain has announced plans to stop the sale of new gas, diesel, and hybrid cars by 2035—or earlier if possible. Speaking in London on Tuesday, Prime Minister Boris Johnson used the announcement to tout the U.K.’s climate action credentials ahead of the U.N. COP26 to be held in Glasgow in November. Though it’s 15 years away, the ban threatens German car manufacturers: Britain is their biggest export market.
Imran Khan’s visit to Kashmir. Pakistan’s prime minister travels today to Pakistani-administered Kashmir, where he will deliver a speech to mark Kashmir Solidarity Day. Khan has been vocal in criticizing India’s treatment of Kashmiris, particularly since it revoked the region’s special status last year—despite not speaking out against China’s internment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.
FP editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman interviewed Khan at the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, last month.
Odds and Ends
The Russian Orthodox Church is considering a proposal that would stop its priests from blessing nuclear weapons, military submarines, and space rockets with holy water—a longstanding practice, though the Orthodox Church has cultivated closer ties with Russia’s ministry of defense during President Vladimir Putin’s years in power. “The blessing of military weapons is not reflected in the tradition of the Orthodox Church,” the proposal reads.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.