foreignpolicy--2020-12-19--How the Western Sahara Became the Key to North Africa

How the Western Sahara Became the Key to North Africa Fighting erupted last month between Morocco and separatists in the disputed Western Sahara , a territory claimed by Morocco .
The sparsely populated region is bordered by Algeria to the east , Mauritania to the east and south , the Atlantic Ocean to the west , and Morocco to the north .
First , Morocco launched a military operation in a U.N.-controlled buffer zone in a village called Guerguerat .
The soldiers removed a camp of 60 peaceful protesters who were blocking traffic between the Moroccan-controlled side of Western Sahara @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Algeria-backed Polisario Front declared an end to the 1991 cease-fire with Morocco and promised a full resumption of fighting .
Although the United Nations and the international community have called for restraint on both sides and for the maintenance of the cease-fire , on Nov. 15 , the Polisario Front said it was mobilizing “ thousands of volunteers ” to join its fighters .
Since then , there have been reports of exchanges of fire between the two sides .
Meanwhile , U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s announcement this month that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco normalizing ties with Israel , upending decades of U.N.-led mediation and U.S. diplomatic efforts that aimed to resolve the regional dispute .
This U.S. policy shift further increases the likelihood for a resumption of large-scale fighting and intensifies growing regional instability in North Africa .
Much is at stake in the Western Sahara conflict .
Beyond the threat of fighting between Morocco and the pro-independence forces , there is the potential ( albeit unlikely ) for direct military clashes between Morocco and Algeria , two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Africa .
Moreover , many other regional and global actors have vested economic and political interests in the outcome of the conflict , given Western Sahara ’ s strategic position on the Atlantic coastline and its natural resources .
If the conflict heats up , in other words , the Western Sahara won ’ t be the only prize at stake .
The Western Sahara conflict is more than four decades old , resulting from a dispute over territory that arose after the Spanish colonizers withdrew in 1975 .
The Moroccan monarchy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moroccans into the region , which became known as the Green March .
The participants claimed that they were taking back sovereign Moroccan territory .
In short order , a war broke out between neighboring Morocco and Mauritania , as well as the Algeria-backed Sahrawi independence movement , later called the Polisario Front .
Fighting stopped after a U.N.-brokered cease-fire in 1991 , and a plan was set to hold a referendum for self-determination for the Sahrawis , the Indigenous people of Western Sahara .
However , no such referendum has ever come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the questions the referendum would cover ( would full independence be an option ? )
and who would be allowed to vote ( would Moroccans who moved to Western Sahara after 1975 be eligible ? )
.
In the meantime , Morocco was able to assert its de facto control over around 75 percent of the disputed land and has invested heavily there in recent decades .
The kingdom offers tax breaks and high salaries for civil servants there .
While Morocco may have agreed to the 1991 U.N. cease-fire stipulation to hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its position in practice .
It has rejected any referendum that would include full independence as an option .
Instead , it has proposed an autonomy plan for the region .
Many of the country ’ s Western allies welcomed the move , even though it directly undermines the U.N. promise of self-determination for the Sahrawi people .
And so , the conflict remains unresolved , thousands of refugees remain stranded outside the region , and tensions flare up regularly .
Political negotiations started back up last year , but they , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reason for the deadlock is that the Western Sahara is strategically placed on the Atlantic coast and has vast natural resource wealth , including phosphate and shale gas .
Since phosphates are a key , and finite , ingredient for synthetic fertilizer , they are a core resource in global food production .
The region is also believed to have significant offshore oil and gas reserves , but due to the unresolved conflict , these waters are officially off-limits to exploration .
Morocco maintains control over most of the disputed land , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major economic and investment hub .
The kingdom has plans for the construction of a $ 1 billon port in the Western Sahara coastal city of Dakhla .
In January 2020 , the Moroccan parliament passed two draft laws to expand the country ’ s territorial waters and to establish an exclusive economic zone that includes waters along the disputed Western Sahara , a move that angered Spain , which controls the waters surrounding the neighboring Canary Islands , and the Polisario Front , which rejects all exploitation of resources by Morocco off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has every reason to push forward .
It has been pursuing a significant economics-driven foreign-policy shift toward sub-Saharan Africa , especially since it rejoined the African Union after a 33-year hiatus .
It is seeking to become a member of the Economic Community of Western African States and is investing in ambitious projects such as a Morocco-Nigeria trans-African gas pipeline , a project that could help reduce European reliance on Russian gas .
All of this is part of the North African kingdom ’ s ambitions to become an economic hub connecting Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory is an integral piece of land in this puzzle .
China , meanwhile , views the northwest African hub as a major partner for expanding its flagship project , the Belt and Road Initiative .
Morocco has embarked on major infrastructure projects , such as a high-speed train connecting financial hub Casablanca to Tangier , a city less than 10 miles from Europe and home to the Mediterranean ’ s and Africa ’ s largest port by capacity .
Morocco ’ s King Mohammed VI has also publicly called for expanding the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and even further into the disputed Western Sahara territory to connect the cities of Laayoune and the coastal port city of Dakhla .
Chinese and French companies are already competing to build the Marrakech-Agadir leg of the railway .
The Mohamed VI Tangier Tech City is set to receive $ 1 billion of financing from China ’ s Haite group and will host more than 200 Chinese businesses .
Chinese companies , along with European , Japanese , and American ones , are also gravitating toward Morocco ’ s growing automotive manufacturing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has even been talk of building an undersea transportation tunnel between Morocco and Spain .
Russia is also seeking to expand its influence across North Africa .
Moscow has engaged with both Morocco and the Polisario Front and supports a U.N. solution to the conflict .
Although Russia has historically maintained closer ties with Algeria , a function of the Cold War era alliance system , and provides most of Algeria ’ s weapons , Russia is also increasingly interested in Morocco and the Western Sahara coastlines and energy exploration .
Last month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreement on maritime fisheries cooperation , allowing 10 Russian trawlers to fish in Moroccan waters , replacing a similar 2016 deal ( and the eighth such agreement since 1992 ) .
Sources such as Western Sahara Resource Watch say that that deal primarily includes waters off the coast of Western Sahara , a violation of international law .
In 2019 , meanwhile , the European Parliament approved a four-year Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Morocco .
This agreement explicitly includes Western Sahara waters , which violates European Court of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two of Morocco ’ s most important economic partners , though , and are eager to find a solution to the conflict and dispel many of the diplomatic blocks lying in the way of fully exploiting Western Sahara waters and resources .
Morocco is a valuable economic partner , as well as a major defense ally .
It plays a significant role in regional counterterrorism efforts and in managing migration flows between Africa and Europe , a top priority for Europe .
The United States has traditionally acted as a mediator in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for Morocco ’ s autonomy plan on the grounds that it represents a realistic compromise “ that could satisfy the aspirations of Western Sahara.
” The Trump administration , under the direction of then National Security Advisor John Bolton , stepped up diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict at the end of 2018 , helping to organize the first direct talks in six years between Morocco , the Polisario Front , Algeria , and Mauritania .
After two rounds of talks held in Geneva , however , the U.N. envoy resigned , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as from France on the Security Council .
Morocco was concerned about these talks because of the involvement of Bolton , a well-known supporter of self-determination for the Sahrawis .
After the resignation , negotiations stalled again .
Trump ’ s 11th-hour decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara only weeks after the resumption of hostilities ignited yet another foreign-policy fire that the Biden administration will have to put out in January .
No matter how you spin it , Trump ’ s decision was a win for Morocco—and it will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden administration will not want to risk Morocco-Israel normalization , which is now directly tied to U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara .
However much the new administration promises to restore human rights to U.S. foreign policy , the self-determination of Sahrawis will likely not be considered a high priority .
Morocco ’ s autonomy plan , for which the United States and its European allies had already expressed support even before Trump ’ s decision , will be presented as the only realistic way forward .
Given the geopolitical and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will probably get its way .
But it ’ s important to remember that the Sahrawis and their supporters won ’ t give in without a fight .

Fighting erupted last month between Morocco and separatists in the disputed Western Sahara, a territory claimed by Morocco. The sparsely populated region is bordered by Algeria to the east, Mauritania to the east and south, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and Morocco to the north.
Fighting erupted last month between Morocco and separatists in the disputed Western Sahara, a territory claimed by Morocco. The sparsely populated region is bordered by Algeria to the east, Mauritania to the east and south, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and Morocco to the north.
First, Morocco launched a military operation in a U.N.-controlled buffer zone in a village called Guerguerat. The soldiers removed a camp of 60 peaceful protesters who were blocking traffic between the Moroccan-controlled side of Western Sahara and Mauritania. Then, the pro-independence, Algeria-backed Polisario Front declared an end to the 1991 cease-fire with Morocco and promised a full resumption of fighting. Although the United Nations and the international community have called for restraint on both sides and for the maintenance of the cease-fire, on Nov. 15, the Polisario Front said it was mobilizing “thousands of volunteers” to join its fighters.
Since then, there have been reports of exchanges of fire between the two sides. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement this month that the United States would officially recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco normalizing ties with Israel, upending decades of U.N.-led mediation and U.S. diplomatic efforts that aimed to resolve the regional dispute. This U.S. policy shift further increases the likelihood for a resumption of large-scale fighting and intensifies growing regional instability in North Africa.
Much is at stake in the Western Sahara conflict. Beyond the threat of fighting between Morocco and the pro-independence forces, there is the potential (albeit unlikely) for direct military clashes between Morocco and Algeria, two of the largest and most well-equipped militaries in Africa. Moreover, many other regional and global actors have vested economic and political interests in the outcome of the conflict, given Western Sahara’s strategic position on the Atlantic coastline and its natural resources. If the conflict heats up, in other words, the Western Sahara won’t be the only prize at stake.
The Western Sahara conflict is more than four decades old, resulting from a dispute over territory that arose after the Spanish colonizers withdrew in 1975. The Moroccan monarchy organized a mass gathering of nearly 350,000 Moroccans into the region, which became known as the Green March. The participants claimed that they were taking back sovereign Moroccan territory. In short order, a war broke out between neighboring Morocco and Mauritania, as well as the Algeria-backed Sahrawi independence movement, later called the Polisario Front. Fighting stopped after a U.N.-brokered cease-fire in 1991, and a plan was set to hold a referendum for self-determination for the Sahrawis, the Indigenous people of Western Sahara. However, no such referendum has ever come to pass, due to disagreements over the questions the referendum would cover (would full independence be an option?) and who would be allowed to vote (would Moroccans who moved to Western Sahara after 1975 be eligible?).
In the meantime, Morocco was able to assert its de facto control over around 75 percent of the disputed land and has invested heavily there in recent decades. The kingdom offers tax breaks and high salaries for civil servants there. While Morocco may have agreed to the 1991 U.N. cease-fire stipulation to hold a referendum, the kingdom has changed its position in practice. It has rejected any referendum that would include full independence as an option. Instead, it has proposed an autonomy plan for the region. Many of the country’s Western allies welcomed the move, even though it directly undermines the U.N. promise of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.
And so, the conflict remains unresolved, thousands of refugees remain stranded outside the region, and tensions flare up regularly. Political negotiations started back up last year, but they, too, have stalled.
Part of the reason for the deadlock is that the Western Sahara is strategically placed on the Atlantic coast and has vast natural resource wealth, including phosphate and shale gas. Since phosphates are a key, and finite, ingredient for synthetic fertilizer, they are a core resource in global food production. The region is also believed to have significant offshore oil and gas reserves, but due to the unresolved conflict, these waters are officially off-limits to exploration.
Morocco maintains control over most of the disputed land, and is aiming to turn it into a major economic and investment hub. The kingdom has plans for the construction of a $1 billon port in the Western Sahara coastal city of Dakhla. In January 2020, the Moroccan parliament passed two draft laws to expand the country’s territorial waters and to establish an exclusive economic zone that includes waters along the disputed Western Sahara, a move that angered Spain, which controls the waters surrounding the neighboring Canary Islands, and the Polisario Front, which rejects all exploitation of resources by Morocco off the Western Sahara coastline.
But Morocco has every reason to push forward. It has been pursuing a significant economics-driven foreign-policy shift toward sub-Saharan Africa, especially since it rejoined the African Union after a 33-year hiatus. It is seeking to become a member of the Economic Community of Western African States and is investing in ambitious projects such as a Morocco-Nigeria trans-African gas pipeline, a project that could help reduce European reliance on Russian gas. All of this is part of the North African kingdom’s ambitions to become an economic hub connecting Europe and Africa. The disputed Western Sahara territory is an integral piece of land in this puzzle.
The conflict concerns more than just regional rivals Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. Other regional and global powers are closely following the dispute. Morocco’s main trade and investment partners include European countries, the United States, Persian Gulf Arab states, and, increasingly, China. All of the Gulf states, in a rare show of unity, expressed solidarity and support for Morocco’s position. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have taken this a step further by establishing consulates in the disputed territory. Groups such as the UAE’s Dubai Port World are likely eyeing significant investment opportunities in the Dakhla port, as well as the fruits of greater connectivity between European and African markets through Morocco’s infrastructure projects.
China, meanwhile, views the northwest African hub as a major partner for expanding its flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative. Morocco has embarked on major infrastructure projects, such as a high-speed train connecting financial hub Casablanca to Tangier, a city less than 10 miles from Europe and home to the Mediterranean’s and Africa’s largest port by capacity. Morocco’s King Mohammed VI has also publicly called for expanding the railways south, toward Marrakech and Agadir, and even further into the disputed Western Sahara territory to connect the cities of Laayoune and the coastal port city of Dakhla. Chinese and French companies are already competing to build the Marrakech-Agadir leg of the railway.
The Mohamed VI Tangier Tech City is set to receive $1 billion of financing from China’s Haite group and will host more than 200 Chinese businesses. Chinese companies, along with European, Japanese, and American ones, are also gravitating toward Morocco’s growing automotive manufacturing industry. Over the years, there has even been talk of building an undersea transportation tunnel between Morocco and Spain.
Russia is also seeking to expand its influence across North Africa. Moscow has engaged with both Morocco and the Polisario Front and supports a U.N. solution to the conflict. Although Russia has historically maintained closer ties with Algeria, a function of the Cold War era alliance system, and provides most of Algeria’s weapons, Russia is also increasingly interested in Morocco and the Western Sahara coastlines and energy exploration. Last month, Morocco and Russia signed a new agreement on maritime fisheries cooperation, allowing 10 Russian trawlers to fish in Moroccan waters, replacing a similar 2016 deal (and the eighth such agreement since 1992). Sources such as Western Sahara Resource Watch say that that deal primarily includes waters off the coast of Western Sahara, a violation of international law.
In 2019, meanwhile, the European Parliament approved a four-year Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Morocco. This agreement explicitly includes Western Sahara waters, which violates European Court of Justice rulings. France and Spain are two of Morocco’s most important economic partners, though, and are eager to find a solution to the conflict and dispel many of the diplomatic blocks lying in the way of fully exploiting Western Sahara waters and resources. Morocco is a valuable economic partner, as well as a major defense ally. It plays a significant role in regional counterterrorism efforts and in managing migration flows between Africa and Europe, a top priority for Europe.
The United States has traditionally acted as a mediator in the Western Sahara dispute, and has expressed support for Morocco’s autonomy plan on the grounds that it represents a realistic compromise “that could satisfy the aspirations of Western Sahara.” The Trump administration, under the direction of then National Security Advisor John Bolton, stepped up diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict at the end of 2018, helping to organize the first direct talks in six years between Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria, and Mauritania. After two rounds of talks held in Geneva, however, the U.N. envoy resigned, allegedly over pressure from Morocco, as well as from France on the Security Council. Morocco was concerned about these talks because of the involvement of Bolton, a well-known supporter of self-determination for the Sahrawis. After the resignation, negotiations stalled again.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe

The CIA had been taking advantage of China ’ s own growing presence overseas to meet or recruit sources , according to one of these former officials .
“ We can ’ t get to them in Beijing , but can in Djibouti .
Heat map Belt and Road ” —China ’ s trillion-dollar infrastructure and influence initiative— “ and you ’ d see our activity happening .
It ’ s where the targets are.
” The CIA recruits “ Russians and Chinese hard in Africa , ” said a former agency official .
“ And they know that.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ track U.S. operatives were likely a response to these U.S. efforts .
At the CIA , these anomalies “ alarmed chiefs of station and division leadership , ” said the first former intelligence official .
The Chinese “ never should have known ” who or where these undercover CIA personnel were .
U.S. officials , lacking a smoking gun , puzzled over how China had managed to expose their spies .
In a previous age , they might have begun a mole hunt , looking for a single traitor in a position to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ side , or perhaps scoured their records for a breach in a secret communications platform .
But instead , CIA officials believed the answer was likely data-driven—and related to a Chinese cyberespionage campaign devoted to stealing vast troves of sensitive personal private information , like travel and health data , as well as U.S. government personnel records .
U.S. officials believed Chinese intelligence operatives had likely combed through and synthesized information from these massive , stolen caches to identify the undercover U.S. intelligence officials .
It was very likely a “ suave and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the same former intelligence official .
This “ was not random or generic , ” this source said .
“ It ’ s a big-data problem.
” The battle over data—who controls it , who secures it , who can steal it , and how it can be used for economic and security objectives—is defining the global conflict between Washington and Beijing .
Data has already critically shaped the course of Chinese politics , and it is altering the course of U.S. foreign policy and intelligence gathering around the globe .
Just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a sword and shield against the United States , America ’ s spy agencies have tried to penetrate Chinese data streams and to use their own big-data capabilities to try to pinpoint exactly what China knows about U.S. personnel and operations .
This series , based on extensive interviews with over three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence and national security officials , tells the story of that battle between the United States and China—a conflict in which many believe China possesses critical advantages , because of Beijing ’ s panopticon-like digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies ’ networks ; its world-spanning cyberspying , which has included the successful theft of multiple huge U.S. datasets ; and China ’ s ability to rapidly synthesize—and potentially weaponize—all this vast information from diverse sources .
China is “ one of the leading collectors of bulk personal data around the globe , using both illegal and legal means , ” William Evanina , the United States ’ top counterintelligence official , told Foreign Policy .
“ Just through its cyberattacks alone , the PRC has vacuumed up the personal data of much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on our health , finances , travel and other sensitive information.
” This war over data has taken on particularly critical importance for the United States ’ —and China ’ s—spy agencies .
In the intelligence world , “ information is king , and the more information , the better , ” said Steve Ryan , who served until 2016 as deputy director of the National Security Agency ’ s Threat Operations Center and is now the CEO of the cybersecurity service Trinity Cyber .
In the U.S.-Soviet Cold War , intelligence largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an electronic intercept here , a report from a secret human source there .
Today , the data-driven nature of everyday life creates vast clusters of information that can be snatched in a single move—and then potentially used by Beijing to fuel everything from targeting individual American intelligence officers to bolstering Chinese state-backed businesses .
Fundamentally , current and former U.S. officials say , China believes data provides security : It ensures regime stability in the face of internal and external threats to the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the impetus for China ’ s most aggressive counterintelligence campaign against the United States yet .
The CIA declined to comment for this story .
The Chinese Embassy in Washington , D.C. , did not respond to multiple requests for comment .
Exploiting a flaw in the online system CIA operatives used to secretly communicate with their agents—a flaw first identified in Iran , which Tehran likely shared with Beijing—from 2010 to roughly 2012 , Chinese intelligence officials ruthlessly uprooted the CIA ’ s human source network in China , imprisoning and killing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China ’ s seething , retaliatory response wasn ’ t entirely surprising , said a former senior agency official .
“ We often had [ a ] conversation internally , on how U.S. policymakers would react to the degree of penetration CIA had of China ” —that is , how angry U.S. officials would have been if they discovered , as the Chinese did , that a global adversary had so thoroughly infiltrated their ranks .
The anger in Beijing wasn ’ t just because of the penetration by the CIA but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ degree of corruption in China .
When the CIA recruits an asset , the further this asset rises within a county ’ s power structure , the better .
During the Cold War it had been hard to guarantee the rise of the CIA ’ s Soviet agents ; the very factors that made them vulnerable to recruitment—greed , ideology , blackmailable habits , and ego—often impeded their career prospects .
And there was only so much that money could buy in the Soviet Union , especially with no sign of where it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newly rich China of the 2000s , dirty money was flowing freely .
The average income remained under 2,000 yuan a month ( approximately $ 240 at contemporary exchange rates ) , but officials ’ informal earnings vastly exceeded their formal salaries .
An official who wasn ’ t participating in corruption was deemed a fool or a risk by his colleagues .
Cash could buy anything , including careers , and the CIA had plenty of it .
At the time , CIA assets were often handsomely compensated .
“ In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of station ” —that is , the top spy in a foreign diplomatic facility— “ for certain hard target services , you could make a million a year for working for us , ” said a former agency official .
( “ Hard target services ” generally refers to Chinese , Russia , Iranian , and North Korean intelligence agencies . )
Over the course of their investigation into the CIA ’ s China-based agent network , Chinese officials learned that the agency was secretly paying the “ promotion fees ” —in other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up within the Chinese bureaucracy , according to four current and former officials .
It was how the CIA got “ disaffected people up in the ranks .
But this was not done once , and wasn ’ t done just in the [ Chinese military ] , ” recalled a current Capitol Hill staffer .
“ Paying their bribes was an example of long-term thinking that was extraordinary for us , ” said a former senior counterintelligence official .
“ Recruiting foreign military officers is nearly impossible .
It was a way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” At the time , “ promotion fees ” sometimes ran into the millions of dollars , according to a former senior CIA official : “ It was quite amazing the level of corruption that was going on.
” The compensation sometimes included paying tuition and board for children studying at expensive foreign universities , according to another CIA officer .
Chinese officials took notice .
“ They were forced to see their problems , and our mistakes helped them see what their problems were , ” recalled a former CIA executive .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ they theoretically were scared of , ” said the Capitol Hill staffer .
“ We scared the shit out of them.
” Corruption was increasingly seen as the chief threat to the regime at home ; as then-Party Secretary Hu Jintao told the Party Congress in 2012 , “ If we fail to handle this issue well , it could … even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state , ” he said .
Even in China ’ s heavily controlled media environment , corruption scandals were breaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CCP among the Chinese people .
Party corruption was becoming a public problem , acknowledged by the CCP leadership itself .
But privately , U.S. officials believe , Chinese leaders also feared the degree to which corruption had allowed the CIA to penetrate its inner circles .
The CIA ’ s incredible recruiting successes “ showed the institutional rot of the party , ” said the former senior CIA official .
“ They ought to [ have been ] upset.
” The leadership realized that unchecked corruption wasn ’ t just an existential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was also a major counterintelligence threat , providing a window for enemy intelligence services like the CIA to crawl through .
This was a global problem for the CCP .
Corrupt officials , even if they hadn ’ t been recruited by the CIA while in office , also often sought refuge overseas—where they could then be tapped for information by enterprising spy services .
In late 2012 , party head Xi Jinping announced a new anti-corruption campaign that would lead to the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of Chinese officials .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , bordering on kidnapping , to return from living abroad .
“ The anti-corruption drive was about consolidating power—but also about how Americans could take advantage of [ the corruption ] .
And that had to do with the bribe and promotion process , ” said the former senior counterintelligence official .
The 2013 leaks from Edward Snowden , which revealed the NSA ’ s deep penetration of the telecommunications company Huawei ’ s China-based servers , also jarred Chinese officials , according to a former senior intelligence analyst .
“ Chinese officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ internet and technology has been so thoroughly used against them , in ways they didn ’ t conceptualize until then , ” the former analyst said .
“ At the intelligence level , it was driven by this fundamental [ revelation ] that , ‘ This is what we ’ ve been missing : This internet system we didn ’ t create is being weaponized against us.
’ ” Under Xi ’ s crackdown , these activities became increasingly untenable .
But the discovery of the CIA networks in China helped supercharge this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ caused China to place a greater focus on external counterespionage work .
“ As they learned these things , ” the Chinese realized they “ needed to start defending themselves , ” said the former CIA executive .
By about 2010 , two former CIA officials recalled , the Chinese security services had instituted a sophisticated travel intelligence program , developing databases that tracked flights and passenger lists for espionage purposes .
“ We looked at it very carefully , ” said the former senior CIA official .
China ’ s spies “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offensive intelligence .
The capability was there and was being utilized.
” China had also stepped up its hacking efforts targeting biometric and passenger data from transit hubs , former intelligence officials say—including a successful hack by Chinese intelligence of biometric data from Bangkok ’ s international airport .
To be sure , China had stolen plenty of data before discovering how deeply infiltrated it was by U.S. intelligence agencies .
However , the shake-up between 2010 and 2012 gave Beijing an impetus not only to go after bigger , riskier targets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needed to process the purloined information .
It was around this time , said a former senior NSA official , that Chinese intelligence agencies transitioned from merely being able to steal large datasets en masse to actually rapidly sifting through information from within them for use .
U.S. officials also began to observe that intelligence facilities within China were being physically co-located near language and data processing centers , said this person .
For U.S. intelligence personnel , these new capabilities made China ’ s successful hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chilling .
During the OPM breach , Chinese hackers stole detailed , often highly sensitive personnel data from 21.5 million current and former U.S. officials , their spouses , and job applicants , including health , residency , employment , fingerprint , and financial data .
In some cases , details from background investigations tied to the granting of security clearances—investigations that can delve deeply into individuals ’ mental health records , their sexual histories and proclivities , and whether a person ’ s relatives abroad may be subject to government blackmail—were stolen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not disclose the breach until 2015 , U.S. intelligence officials became aware of the initial OPM hack in 2012 , said the former counterintelligence executive .
( It ’ s not clear precisely when the compromise actually happened . )
When paired with travel details and other purloined data , information from the OPM breach likely provided Chinese intelligence potent clues about unusual behavior patterns , biographical information , or career milestones that marked individuals as likely U.S. spies , officials say .
Now , these officials feared , China could search @ @ @ @ @ @ @ certain locations—and potentially also meeting secretly with their Chinese sources .
China “ collects bulk personal data to help it track dissidents or other perceived enemies of China around the world , ” Evanina , the top U.S. counterintelligence official , said .
Many felt the ground give way immediately .
For some at the CIA , recalled Gail Helt , a former CIA China analyst , the reaction to the OPM breach was , “ Oh my God , what is this going to mean for everybody who had ever traveled to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to mean for people who we had formally recruited , people who might be suspected of talking to us , people who had family members there ?
And what will this mean for agency efforts to recruit people in the future ?
It was terrifying .
Absolutely terrifying.
” Many feared the aftershocks would be widespread .
“ The concern just wasn ’ t that [ the OPM hack ] would curtail info inside China , ” said a former senior national security official .
“ The U.S. and China bump up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It opened up a global Pandora ’ s box of problems.
” Others were more resigned , if no less disturbed .
“ You operate under the assumption that good tradecraft ” —and not the secrecy provided , in theory , by cover— “ will protect your assets and operations , ” said Duyane Norman , a former senior CIA official .
“ So OPM wasn ’ t some kind of eye-opener .
It was confirmation of new threats we already knew existed.
” There were other bad omens .
During this same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence officials , likely exploiting a difference in payroll payments between real State Department employees and undercover CIA officers , had identified some of the CIA personnel working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow .
Officials thought that this insight may have come from data derived from the OPM hack , provided by the Chinese to their Russian counterparts .
U.S. officials also wondered whether the OPM hack could be related to an uptick in attempted recruitments by Chinese intelligence of Chinese American translators working for U.S. intelligence agencies when they visited family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they were trying to get Mandarin speakers to apply for jobs as translators ” within the U.S. intelligence community , recalled the former senior counterintelligence official .
U.S. officials believed that Chinese intelligence was giving their agents “ instructions on how to pass a polygraph.
” But after the OPM breach , anomalies began to multiply .
In 2012 , senior U.S. spy hunters began to puzzle over some “ head-scratchers ” : In a few cases , spouses of U.S. officials whose sensitive work should have been difficult to discern were being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abroad , according to the former counterintelligence executive .
In one case , Chinese operatives tried to harass and entrap a U.S. official ’ s wife while she accompanied her children on a school field trip to China .
“ The MO is that , usually at the end of the trip , the lightbulb goes on [ and the foreign intelligence service identifies potential persons of interest ] .
But these were from day one , from the airport onward , ” the former official said .
Worries about what the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment surrounding the OPM and other hacks , recalled Douglas Wise , a former senior CIA official who served deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2014 to 2016 .
Some worried that China might have purposefully secretly altered data in individuals ’ OPM files to later use as leverage in recruitment attempts .
Officials also believed that the Chinese might sift through the OPM data to try and craft the most ideal profiles for Chinese intelligence assets seeking to infiltrate the U.S. government—since they now had granular knowledge of what the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it didn ’ t , while considering applicants for sensitive positions .
U.S. intelligence agencies altered their screening procedures to anticipate new , more finely tuned Chinese attempts at human spying , Wise said .
The Chinese now had unprecedented insight into the workings of the U.S. system .
The United States , meanwhile , was flying with one eye closed when dealing with China .
With the CIA ’ s carefully built network of Chinese agents utterly destroyed , the debate over how to handle China would become increasingly contentious—even as China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Note : This is the first in a three-part series .
The second part , to be published Dec. 22 , covers how U.S. intelligence under Barack Obama struggled as Xi Jinping consolidated his power .
The third part , to be published on Dec. 23 , covers the Donald Trump era and the growing cooperation between Chinese intelligence and tech giants .

Around 2013, U.S. intelligence began noticing an alarming pattern: Undercover CIA personnel, flying into countries in Africa and Europe for sensitive work, were being rapidly and successfully identified by Chinese intelligence, according to three former U.S. officials. The surveillance by Chinese operatives began in some cases as soon as the CIA officers had cleared passport control. Sometimes, the surveillance was so overt that U.S. intelligence officials speculated that the Chinese wanted the U.S. side to know they had identified the CIA operatives, disrupting their missions; other times, however, it was much more subtle and only detected through U.S. spy agencies’ own sophisticated technical countersurveillance capabilities.
Around 2013, U.S. intelligence began noticing an alarming pattern: Undercover CIA personnel, flying into countries in Africa and Europe for sensitive work, were being rapidly and successfully identified by Chinese intelligence, according to three former U.S. officials. The surveillance by Chinese operatives began in some cases as soon as the CIA officers had cleared passport control. Sometimes, the surveillance was so overt that U.S. intelligence officials speculated that the Chinese wanted the U.S. side to know they had identified the CIA operatives, disrupting their missions; other times, however, it was much more subtle and only detected through U.S. spy agencies’ own sophisticated technical countersurveillance capabilities.
The CIA had been taking advantage of China’s own growing presence overseas to meet or recruit sources, according to one of these former officials. “We can’t get to them in Beijing, but can in Djibouti. Heat map Belt and Road”—China’s trillion-dollar infrastructure and influence initiative—“and you’d see our activity happening. It’s where the targets are.” The CIA recruits “Russians and Chinese hard in Africa,” said a former agency official. “And they know that.” China’s new aggressive moves to track U.S. operatives were likely a response to these U.S. efforts.
This series, based on interviews with over three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence and national security officials, tells the story of China’s assault on U.S. personal data over the last decade—and its consequences. Part 2: Beijing Ransacked Data as U.S. Sources Went Dark in China
Part 3: As Trump’s Trade War Raged, Chinese Spy Agencies Enlisted Private Firms
At the CIA, these anomalies “alarmed chiefs of station and division leadership,” said the first former intelligence official. The Chinese “never should have known” who or where these undercover CIA personnel were. U.S. officials, lacking a smoking gun, puzzled over how China had managed to expose their spies. In a previous age, they might have begun a mole hunt, looking for a single traitor in a position to share this critical information with the other side, or perhaps scoured their records for a breach in a secret communications platform.
But instead, CIA officials believed the answer was likely data-driven—and related to a Chinese cyberespionage campaign devoted to stealing vast troves of sensitive personal private information, like travel and health data, as well as U.S. government personnel records. U.S. officials believed Chinese intelligence operatives had likely combed through and synthesized information from these massive, stolen caches to identify the undercover U.S. intelligence officials. It was very likely a “suave and professional utilization” of these datasets, said the same former intelligence official. This “was not random or generic,” this source said. “It’s a big-data problem.”
The battle over data—who controls it, who secures it, who can steal it, and how it can be used for economic and security objectives—is defining the global conflict between Washington and Beijing. Data has already critically shaped the course of Chinese politics, and it is altering the course of U.S. foreign policy and intelligence gathering around the globe. Just as China has sought to wield data as a sword and shield against the United States, America’s spy agencies have tried to penetrate Chinese data streams and to use their own big-data capabilities to try to pinpoint exactly what China knows about U.S. personnel and operations.
This series, based on extensive interviews with over three dozen current and former U.S. intelligence and national security officials, tells the story of that battle between the United States and China—a conflict in which many believe China possesses critical advantages, because of Beijing’s panopticon-like digital penetration of its own citizens and Chinese companies’ networks; its world-spanning cyberspying, which has included the successful theft of multiple huge U.S. datasets; and China’s ability to rapidly synthesize—and potentially weaponize—all this vast information from diverse sources.
China is “one of the leading collectors of bulk personal data around the globe, using both illegal and legal means,” William Evanina, the United States’ top counterintelligence official, told Foreign Policy. “Just through its cyberattacks alone, the PRC has vacuumed up the personal data of much of the American population, including data on our health, finances, travel and other sensitive information.”
This war over data has taken on particularly critical importance for the United States’—and China’s—spy agencies. In the intelligence world, “information is king, and the more information, the better,” said Steve Ryan, who served until 2016 as deputy director of the National Security Agency’s Threat Operations Center and is now the CEO of the cybersecurity service Trinity Cyber. In the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, intelligence largely came in piecemeal and partial form: an electronic intercept here, a report from a secret human source there. Today, the data-driven nature of everyday life creates vast clusters of information that can be snatched in a single move—and then potentially used by Beijing to fuel everything from targeting individual American intelligence officers to bolstering Chinese state-backed businesses.
Fundamentally, current and former U.S. officials say, China believes data provides security: It ensures regime stability in the face of internal and external threats to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was a combination of those threats that created the impetus for China’s most aggressive counterintelligence campaign against the United States yet.
The CIA declined to comment for this story. The Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
In 2010, a new decade was dawning, and Chinese officials were furious. The CIA, they had discovered, had systematically penetrated their government over the course of years, with U.S. assets embedded in the military, the CCP, the intelligence apparatus, and elsewhere. The anger radiated upward to “the highest levels of the Chinese government,” recalled a former senior counterintelligence executive.
Exploiting a flaw in the online system CIA operatives used to secretly communicate with their agents—a flaw first identified in Iran, which Tehran likely shared with Beijing—from 2010 to roughly 2012, Chinese intelligence officials ruthlessly uprooted the CIA’s human source network in China, imprisoning and killing dozens of people.
Within the CIA, China’s seething, retaliatory response wasn’t entirely surprising, said a former senior agency official. “We often had [a] conversation internally, on how U.S. policymakers would react to the degree of penetration CIA had of China”—that is, how angry U.S. officials would have been if they discovered, as the Chinese did, that a global adversary had so thoroughly infiltrated their ranks.
The anger in Beijing wasn’t just because of the penetration by the CIA but because of what it exposed about the degree of corruption in China. When the CIA recruits an asset, the further this asset rises within a county’s power structure, the better. During the Cold War it had been hard to guarantee the rise of the CIA’s Soviet agents; the very factors that made them vulnerable to recruitment—greed, ideology, blackmailable habits, and ego—often impeded their career prospects. And there was only so much that money could buy in the Soviet Union, especially with no sign of where it had come from.
But in the newly rich China of the 2000s, dirty money was flowing freely. The average income remained under 2,000 yuan a month (approximately $240 at contemporary exchange rates), but officials’ informal earnings vastly exceeded their formal salaries. An official who wasn’t participating in corruption was deemed a fool or a risk by his colleagues. Cash could buy anything, including careers, and the CIA had plenty of it.
“PAYING THEIR BRIBES WAS AN EXAMPLE OF LONG-TERM THINKING THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY FOR US,” SAID A FORMER SENIOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL.
At the time, CIA assets were often handsomely compensated. “In the 2000s, if you were a chief of station”—that is, the top spy in a foreign diplomatic facility—“for certain hard target services, you could make a million a year for working for us,” said a former agency official. (“Hard target services” generally refers to Chinese, Russia, Iranian, and North Korean intelligence agencies.)
Over the course of their investigation into the CIA’s China-based agent network, Chinese officials learned that the agency was secretly paying the “promotion fees” —in other words, the bribes—regularly required to rise up within the Chinese bureaucracy, according to four current and former officials. It was how the CIA got “disaffected people up in the ranks. But this was not done once, and wasn’t done just in the [Chinese military],” recalled a current Capitol Hill staffer. “Paying their bribes was an example of long-term thinking that was extraordinary for us,” said a former senior counterintelligence official. “Recruiting foreign military officers is nearly impossible. It was a way to exploit the corruption to our advantage.” At the time, “promotion fees” sometimes ran into the millions of dollars, according to a former senior CIA official: “It was quite amazing the level of corruption that was going on.” The compensation sometimes included paying tuition and board for children studying at expensive foreign universities, according to another CIA officer.
Chinese officials took notice. “They were forced to see their problems, and our mistakes helped them see what their problems were,” recalled a former CIA executive. “We helped bring to fruition what they theoretically were scared of,” said the Capitol Hill staffer. “We scared the shit out of them.” Corruption was increasingly seen as the chief threat to the regime at home; as then-Party Secretary Hu Jintao told the Party Congress in 2012, “If we fail to handle this issue well, it could … even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state,” he said. Even in China’s heavily controlled media environment, corruption scandals were breaking daily, tainting the image of the CCP among the Chinese people. Party corruption was becoming a public problem, acknowledged by the CCP leadership itself.
“THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE WAS ABOUT CONSOLIDATING POWER—BUT ALSO ABOUT HOW AMERICANS COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF [THE CORRUPTION]. AND THAT HAD TO DO WITH THE BRIBE AND PROMOTION PROCESS,” SAID THE FORMER SENIOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL.
But privately, U.S. officials believe, Chinese leaders also feared the degree to which corruption had allowed the CIA to penetrate its inner circles. The CIA’s incredible recruiting successes “showed the institutional rot of the party,” said the former senior CIA official. “They ought to [have been] upset.” The leadership realized that unchecked corruption wasn’t just an existential threat for the party at home; it was also a major counterintelligence threat, providing a window for enemy intelligence services like the CIA to crawl through.
This was a global problem for the CCP. Corrupt officials, even if they hadn’t been recruited by the CIA while in office, also often sought refuge overseas—where they could then be tapped for information by enterprising spy services. In late 2012, party head Xi Jinping announced a new anti-corruption campaign that would lead to the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of Chinese officials. Thousands were subject to extreme coercive pressure, bordering on kidnapping, to return from living abroad. “The anti-corruption drive was about consolidating power—but also about how Americans could take advantage of [the corruption]. And that had to do with the bribe and promotion process,” said the former senior counterintelligence official.
The 2013 leaks from Edward Snowden, which revealed the NSA’s deep penetration of the telecommunications company Huawei’s China-based servers, also jarred Chinese officials, according to a former senior intelligence analyst. “Chinese officials were just beginning to learn how the internet and technology has been so thoroughly used against them, in ways they didn’t conceptualize until then,” the former analyst said. “At the intelligence level, it was driven by this fundamental [revelation] that, ‘This is what we’ve been missing: This internet system we didn’t create is being weaponized against us.’”
There were other ripple effects. By the late 2000s, U.S. intelligence officials had observed a notable professionalizing of the Ministry of State Security, China’s main civilian intelligence agency. Before Xi’s purges, petty corruption within the agency was ubiquitous, former U.S. intelligence officials say, with China’s spies sometimes funneling money from operations into their own “nest eggs”; Chinese government-affiliated hackers operating under the protection of the Ministry of State Security would also sometimes moonlight as cybercriminals, passing a cut of their work to their bosses at the intelligence agency.
Under Xi’s crackdown, these activities became increasingly untenable. But the discovery of the CIA networks in China helped supercharge this process, said current and former officials—and caused China to place a greater focus on external counterespionage work. “As they learned these things,” the Chinese realized they “needed to start defending themselves,” said the former CIA executive.
BUT THE DISCOVERY OF THE CIA NETWORKS IN CHINA HELPED SUPERCHARGE THIS PROCESS, SAID CURRENT AND FORMER OFFICIALS—AND CAUSED CHINA TO PLACE A GREATER FOCUS ON EXTERNAL COUNTERESPIONAGE WORK.
By about 2010, two former CIA officials recalled, the Chinese security services had instituted a sophisticated travel intelligence program, developing databases that tracked flights and passenger lists for espionage purposes. “We looked at it very carefully,” said the former senior CIA official. China’s spies “were actively using that for counterintelligence and offensive intelligence. The capability was there and was being utilized.” China had also stepped up its hacking efforts targeting biometric and passenger data from transit hubs, former intelligence officials say—including a successful hack by Chinese intelligence of biometric data from Bangkok’s international airport.
To be sure, China had stolen plenty of data before discovering how deeply infiltrated it was by U.S. intelligence agencies. However, the shake-up between 2010 and 2012 gave Beijing an impetus not only to go after bigger, riskier targets, but also to put together the infrastructure needed to process the purloined information. It was around this time, said a former senior NSA official, that Chinese intelligence agencies transitioned from merely being able to steal large datasets en masse to actually rapidly sifting through information from within them for use. U.S. officials also began to observe that intelligence facilities within China were being physically co-located near language and data processing centers, said this person.
For U.S. intelligence personnel, these new capabilities made China’s successful hack of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that much more chilling. During the OPM breach, Chinese hackers stole detailed, often highly sensitive personnel data from 21.5 million current and former U.S. officials, their spouses, and job applicants, including health, residency, employment, fingerprint, and financial data. In some cases, details from background investigations tied to the granting of security clearances—investigations that can delve deeply into individuals’ mental health records, their sexual histories and proclivities, and whether a person’s relatives abroad may be subject to government blackmail—were stolen as well. Though the United States did not disclose the breach until 2015, U.S. intelligence officials became aware of the initial OPM hack in 2012, said the former counterintelligence executive. (It’s not clear precisely when the compromise actually happened.)
When paired with travel details and other purloined data, information from the OPM breach likely provided Chinese intelligence potent clues about unusual behavior patterns, biographical information, or career milestones that marked individuals as likely U.S. spies, officials say. Now, these officials feared, China could search for when suspected U.S. spies were in certain locations—and potentially also meeting secretly with their Chinese sources. China “collects bulk personal data to help it track dissidents or other perceived enemies of China around the world,” Evanina, the top U.S. counterintelligence official, said.
Many felt the ground give way immediately. For some at the CIA, recalled Gail Helt, a former CIA China analyst, the reaction to the OPM breach was, “Oh my God, what is this going to mean for everybody who had ever traveled to China? But also what is it going to mean for people who we had formally recruited, people who might be suspected of talking to us, people who had family members there? And what will this mean for agency efforts to recruit people in the future? It was terrifying. Absolutely terrifying.” Many feared the aftershocks would be widespread. “The concern just wasn’t that [the OPM hack] would curtail info inside China,” said a former senior national security official. “The U.S. and China bump up against each other around the world. It opened up a global Pandora’s box of problems.”
“THE U.S. AND CHINA BUMP UP AGAINST EACH OTHER AROUND THE WORLD. IT OPENED UP A GLOBAL PANDORA’S BOX OF PROBLEMS.”
Others were more resigned, if no less disturbed. “You operate under the assumption that good tradecraft”—and not the secrecy provided, in theory, by cover—“will protect your assets and operations,” said Duyane Norman, a former senior CIA official. “So OPM wasn’t some kind of eye-opener. It was confirmation of new threats we already knew existed.”
There were other bad omens. During this same period, U.S. officials concluded that Russian intelligence officials, likely exploiting a difference in payroll payments between real State Department employees and undercover CIA officers, had identified some of the CIA personnel working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Officials thought that this insight may have come from data derived from the OPM hack, provided by the Chinese to their Russian counterparts. U.S. officials also wondered whether the OPM hack could be related to an uptick in attempted recruitments by Chinese intelligence of Chinese American translators working for U.S. intelligence agencies when they visited family in China. “We also thought they were trying to get Mandarin speakers to apply for jobs as translators” within the U.S. intelligence community, recalled the former senior counterintelligence official. U.S. officials believed that Chinese intelligence was giving their agents “instructions on how to pass a polygraph.”
But after the OPM breach, anomalies began to multiply. In 2012, senior U.S. spy hunters began to puzzle over some “head-scratchers”: In a few cases, spouses of U.S. officials whose sensitive work should have been difficult to discern were being approached by Chinese and Russian intelligence operatives abroad, according to the former counterintelligence executive. In one case, Chinese operatives tried to harass and entrap a U.S. official’s wife while she accompanied her children on a school field trip to China. “The MO is that, usually at the end of the trip, the lightbulb goes on [and the foreign intelligence service identifies potential persons of interest]. But these were from day one, from the airport onward,” the former official said.
SOME WORRIED THAT CHINA MIGHT HAVE PURPOSEFULLY SECRETLY ALTERED DATA IN INDIVIDUALS’ OPM FILES TO LATER USE AS LEVERAGE IN RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS.
Worries about what the Chinese now knew precipitated an intelligence community-wide damage assessment surrounding the OPM and other hacks, recalled Douglas Wise, a former senior CIA official who served deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2014 to 2016. Some worried that China might have purposefully secretly altered data in individuals’ OPM files to later use as leverage in recruitment attempts. Officials also believed that the Chinese might sift through the OPM data to try and craft the most ideal profiles for Chinese intelligence assets seeking to infiltrate the U.S. government—since they now had granular knowledge of what the U.S. government looked for, and what it didn’t, while considering applicants for sensitive positions. U.S. intelligence agencies altered their screening procedures to anticipate new, more finely tuned Chinese attempts at human spying, Wise said.
The Chinese now had unprecedented insight into the workings of the U.S. system. The United States, meanwhile, was flying with one eye closed when dealing with China. With the CIA’s carefully built network of Chinese agents utterly destroyed, the debate over how to handle China would become increasingly contentious—even as China’s ambitions grew.
Editor’s Note: This is the first in a three-part series. The second part covers how U.S. intelligence under Barack Obama struggled as Xi Jinping consolidated his power. The third part covers the Donald Trump era and the growing cooperation between Chinese intelligence and tech giants.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-22--The Global News Stories You Missed in 2020

The Global News Stories You Missed in 2020 Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly update on emerging global stories .
Below is a look back at some of the biggest stories of the year—that weren ’ t Trump- or coronavirus-related .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Not since World War II has a single event so dominated an entire year as the coronavirus pandemic did 2020 .
The virus monopolized global headlines and brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shuttered and public spaces emptied .
But not everything came to a standstill .
People still took to the streets in protest , wars continued despite the U.N. secretary-general ’ s plea for a global cease-fire , and new conflicts erupted .
From wildfires to hurricanes , natural disasters wreaked havoc—a looming reminder of the coming climate crisis .
Here ’ s a look back at some of the biggest non-coronavirus stories of 2020 .
In early November , Ethiopia ’ s Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s north .
Long-simmering tensions between the federal government and regional authorities came to a head as Abiy accused the region ’ s ruling party , the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front , of attempting to raid a federal military base .
Amid reports of ethnically and religiously motivated violence , the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect issued warnings about the risk of genocide and ethnic cleansing .
In the town of Mai Kadra , some 600 people from the Amhara and Wolkait ethnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were strangled and hacked to death on Nov. 9 , according to the Washington Post .
The three-week conflict culminated with heavy shelling of the regional capital , Mekelle , by Ethiopian forces before Abiy declared victory on Nov. 28 .
Almost 1 million people were displaced by the fighting , with some 50,000 seeking refuge in neighboring Sudan .
While the war is over for now , the conflict was a symptom of the long-standing battle over the country ’ s ethno-federal system—one that could have profound implications for peace and stability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as Teferi Mergo wrote for Foreign Policy .
In late September , war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region .
It was the worst flare-up in fighting since a 1994 cease-fire left much of the territory in Armenian hands .
Tensions have simmered between the two countries for decades , but they reached a head this year after the self-declared government of Karabakh held elections in the spring , much to Azerbaijan ’ s displeasure .
At least 16 people were killed in border clashes over the summer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streets of the Azerbaijani capital calling for a war .
A Russian-brokered agreement brought the war to an end on Nov. 9 and enabled Azerbaijan to maintain control of land seized during the conflict , with Armenia withdrawing from parts of the disputed territory .
As part of the deal , the Kremlin will maintain a force of 2,000 peacekeepers along the road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia .
While most countries sought to stay on top of the unfolding health and economic crisis at home , 2020 saw Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project Turkish power across the Eastern Mediterranean and into the Middle East .
In January , Turkish troops were deployed to Libya to shore up support for the embattled U.N.-backed Government of National Accord as it faced off against forces loyal to the renegade Gen. Khalifa Haftar .
Over the summer , tensions flared in the Eastern Mediterranean over Turkey ’ s energy exploration—culminating in the European Union approving plans to sanction an unspecified number of Turkish officials and businesses involved in the drilling .
The decision came just days before the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO ally , for its 2017 purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense system .
And in Nagorno-Karabakh , Ankara quickly pledged its “ unconditional ” support for Baku , supplying weapons , drones , and mercenaries allegedly recruited in Syria—helping to win the war for Azerbaijan , at least for now .
Elections in Belarus , a country often described as Europe ’ s last dictatorship , are usually predictable affairs .
Not this year : Teacher-turned-opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya capitalized on growing discontent with longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko to mount a formidable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected , Lukashenko was declared the winner of elections that were widely believed to be rigged .
But for several weeks after the vote , Belarusians took to the streets almost daily in mass protests that at times exceeded an estimated 100,000 people—a once unthinkable sight in the police state .
Over 30,000 people are thought to have been arrested since the election on Aug. 9 , and human rights advocates have documented harrowing reports of torture and police brutality within prisons .
With neither side backing down , Lukashenko has clung onto @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looks like a government-in-exile in Lithuania , meeting with foreign heads of state .
It wasn ’ t all bad news for public health in 2020 .
In August , Africa was declared free from wild type polio by the independent Africa Regional Certification Commission after a decadeslong campaign to stamp out the virus , which once paralyzed some 75,000 children in Africa annually .
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , the director-general of the World Health Organization , described the declaration as “ one of the greatest public health achievements of our time.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the worst economic crisis in decades when the largest explosion in the country ’ s history ripped through Beirut ’ s port on Aug. 4 , leaving 200 people dead and thousands injured .
Thousands of tons of the explosive ammonium nitrate had been stored in a warehouse , alongside 15 tons of fireworks and jugs of oil and kerosene .
The blast itself was likely triggered by accident , albeit one enabled by years of corruption and government dysfunction .
Four months since the explosion , no one has been held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fester in a warehouse for six years .
In late November , farmers in India mounted what some have described as the largest protest in human history as millions took part in a solidarity strike over controversial changes to the country ’ s agriculture laws .
Farmers fear the legislation , passed by parliament in September , could leave them open to exploitation from larger corporations .
With some 60 percent of the Indian population dependent on agriculture , the new laws have struck a nerve among huge swaths of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in northern India have vowed to keep on protesting through the winter , even as temperatures plunge .
Central America was battered by Hurricanes Eta and Iota , which made landfall less than two weeks apart in November—the first recorded instance of two Category 4 storms striking within 15 miles of each other in a two-week period , according to the Washington Post .
The disasters also came off the back of an already record-breaking hurricane season .
More than half a million people were internally displaced in Guatemala , Honduras , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left underwater .
With the region already grappling with the economic impact of coronavirus-related lockdowns , the damage wrought by the storms is expected to drive new waves of migrants north to the U.S. border in search of work .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly update on emerging global stories. Below is a look back at some of the biggest stories of the year—that weren’t Trump- or coronavirus-related.
Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly update on emerging global stories. Below is a look back at some of the biggest stories of the year—that weren’t Trump- or coronavirus-related.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
The Stories You May Have Missed
Not since World War II has a single event so dominated an entire year as the coronavirus pandemic did 2020. The virus monopolized global headlines and brought an unprecedented slowdown in activity as offices shuttered and public spaces emptied. But not everything came to a standstill. People still took to the streets in protest, wars continued despite the U.N. secretary-general’s plea for a global cease-fire, and new conflicts erupted. From wildfires to hurricanes, natural disasters wreaked havoc—a looming reminder of the coming climate crisis.
Here’s a look back at some of the biggest non-coronavirus stories of 2020.
Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict
A young man pushes a cart in front of Tigrayan flags at Martyrs Square in the city of Mekelle, on Sept. 9, 2020.
In early November, Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive in the restive Tigray region in the country’s north. Long-simmering tensions between the federal government and regional authorities came to a head as Abiy accused the region’s ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, of attempting to raid a federal military base.
Amid reports of ethnically and religiously motivated violence, the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect issued warnings about the risk of genocide and ethnic cleansing. In the town of Mai Kadra, some 600 people from the Amhara and Wolkait ethnic groups, minorities in the region, were strangled and hacked to death on Nov. 9, according to the Washington Post.
The three-week conflict culminated with heavy shelling of the regional capital, Mekelle, by Ethiopian forces before Abiy declared victory on Nov. 28. Almost 1 million people were displaced by the fighting, with some 50,000 seeking refuge in neighboring Sudan. While the war is over for now, the conflict was a symptom of the long-standing battle over the country’s ethno-federal system—one that could have profound implications for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond, as Teferi Mergo wrote for Foreign Policy.
Nagorno-Karabakh
A Russian peacekeeper in Nagorno-Karabakh
In late September, war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. It was the worst flare-up in fighting since a 1994 cease-fire left much of the territory in Armenian hands. Tensions have simmered between the two countries for decades, but they reached a head this year after the self-declared government of Karabakh held elections in the spring, much to Azerbaijan’s displeasure.
At least 16 people were killed in border clashes over the summer, prompting thousands to take to the streets of the Azerbaijani capital calling for a war. A Russian-brokered agreement brought the war to an end on Nov. 9 and enabled Azerbaijan to maintain control of land seized during the conflict, with Armenia withdrawing from parts of the disputed territory. As part of the deal, the Kremlin will maintain a force of 2,000 peacekeepers along the road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.
Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman Ambitions
While most countries sought to stay on top of the unfolding health and economic crisis at home, 2020 saw Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan double down on his neo-Ottoman ambitions to project Turkish power across the Eastern Mediterranean and into the Middle East.
In January, Turkish troops were deployed to Libya to shore up support for the embattled U.N.-backed Government of National Accord as it faced off against forces loyal to the renegade Gen. Khalifa Haftar. Over the summer, tensions flared in the Eastern Mediterranean over Turkey’s energy exploration—culminating in the European Union approving plans to sanction an unspecified number of Turkish officials and businesses involved in the drilling. The decision came just days before the Trump administration issued sanctions against Turkey, a NATO ally, for its 2017 purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense system.
And in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ankara quickly pledged its “unconditional” support for Baku, supplying weapons, drones, and mercenaries allegedly recruited in Syria—helping to win the war for Azerbaijan, at least for now.
Protests in Belarus
Elections in Belarus, a country often described as Europe’s last dictatorship, are usually predictable affairs. Not this year: Teacher-turned-opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya capitalized on growing discontent with longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko to mount a formidable challenge in elections in August.
As expected, Lukashenko was declared the winner of elections that were widely believed to be rigged. But for several weeks after the vote, Belarusians took to the streets almost daily in mass protests that at times exceeded an estimated 100,000 people—a once unthinkable sight in the police state.
Over 30,000 people are thought to have been arrested since the election on Aug. 9, and human rights advocates have documented harrowing reports of torture and police brutality within prisons. With neither side backing down, Lukashenko has clung onto power as Tikhanovskaya has established what increasingly looks like a government-in-exile in Lithuania, meeting with foreign heads of state.
Africa Declared Polio-Free
It wasn’t all bad news for public health in 2020. In August, Africa was declared free from wild type polio by the independent Africa Regional Certification Commission after a decadeslong campaign to stamp out the virus, which once paralyzed some 75,000 children in Africa annually. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director-general of the World Health Organization, described the declaration as “one of the greatest public health achievements of our time.”
Multiple Crises in Lebanon
Lebanon was already contending with the pandemic and the worst economic crisis in decades when the largest explosion in the country’s history ripped through Beirut’s port on Aug. 4, leaving 200 people dead and thousands injured. Thousands of tons of the explosive ammonium nitrate had been stored in a warehouse, alongside 15 tons of fireworks and jugs of oil and kerosene.
The blast itself was likely triggered by accident, albeit one enabled by years of corruption and government dysfunction. Four months since the explosion, no one has been held accountable for allowing such a deadly concoction to fester in a warehouse for six years.
Indian Farmers’ Protests
In late November, farmers in India mounted what some have described as the largest protest in human history as millions took part in a solidarity strike over controversial changes to the country’s agriculture laws. Farmers fear the legislation, passed by parliament in September, could leave them open to exploitation from larger corporations.
With some 60 percent of the Indian population dependent on agriculture, the new laws have struck a nerve among huge swaths of the country. Farmers camped out on key highways in northern India have vowed to keep on protesting through the winter, even as temperatures plunge.
Hurricanes Eta and Iota
Central America was battered by Hurricanes Eta and Iota, which made landfall less than two weeks apart in November—the first recorded instance of two Category 4 storms striking within 15 miles of each other in a two-week period, according to the Washington Post. The disasters also came off the back of an already record-breaking hurricane season. More than half a million people were internally displaced in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and entire communities have been left underwater.
With the region already grappling with the economic impact of coronavirus-related lockdowns, the damage wrought by the storms is expected to drive new waves of migrants north to the U.S. border in search of work.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--Post-Trump America Needs the Courts, Not Truth and Reconciliation

Post-Trump America Needs the Courts , Not Truth and Reconciliation Hours after Joe Biden was declared the U.S. president-elect , an article was published in the British newspaper the Independent arguing that , as “ an act of mercy , ” he should issue a presidential pardon for “ a corrupt former commander-in-chief ” : i.e.
, outgoing President Donald Trump .
It ’ s a benevolent sentiment—admirable , even , in many ways—but ultimately , this wouldn ’ t be an act of mercy .
It wouldn ’ t heal the United States , and it might even harm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the outset : The idea of a compassionate , noble leader , triumphant in his victory , pardoning his erstwhile opponent isn ’ t an ignoble one .
On the contrary , if Trump had insulted or harmed Biden personally , then Biden would most certainly be well advised to forgive him .
There ’ s a long precedent for magnanimity , after all , in different political contexts , albeit with different results .
In South Africa , there was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission , following the fall of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights abuses were invited to give testimony about what had happened to them , and perpetrators could request amnesty .
It was , by its nature , outside of the normal legal processes .
In Tunisia , there was the Truth and Dignity Commission , established following the fall of the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime during the Arab Spring uprising era .
Again , this was specifically set up outside of normal legal processes , precisely to address the crimes of the Ben Ali era—to turn the page .
That meant , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights violations and using judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms to address them .
The whole point of these types of processes has been to bring about healing to populations who had undergone a great national trauma , at a time when new political systems were being forged .
That language could be used to describe the last four years in the United States , especially the word “ trauma.
” But making an analogy to these cases is misplaced .
In countries like South Africa and Tunisia , it was a transition to democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa , this meant minority white rule over a majority black population , and in Tunisia , an autocratic dictatorship .
In both cases , they were moving not simply from one leader to another but from one whole system to another .
The systems had been so rotten they could only be overcome by extrajudicial means—in South Africa ’ s case , an armed struggle , and in Tunisia ’ s , mass protests that destabilized the regime to the point Ben Ali had to flee the country .
South Africans and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against systems that had left them with no other choice but to seek extranormal means , and , thus , new systems were going to be built .
As a part of that flux , many things were indeed possible , and necessary , to heal and establish a new norm altogether .
But while people may want to throw around words like “ revolution ” in discussing the victory of the Joe Biden-Kamala Harris campaign over Donald Trump , it isn ’ t an apt description—at least not in terms of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far too much credit .
Trump was elected in as much of a democratic election in 2016 as Barack Obama was in 2012 , or indeed Biden was in 2020 .
For all the faults of the American state—and there are many—it isn ’ t an authoritarian one comparable to Tunisia under Ben Ali , nor to South Africa under apartheid .
It wasn ’ t under Obama , it won ’ t be under Biden , and it wasn ’ t under Trump .
This isn ’ t to say Trump didn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He did .
I ’ ve studied authoritarian regimes in the Arab world for a decade , and in comparing Trump ’ s rhetoric to that of many authoritarian leaders in that timeframe , there are startling similarities .
Trump was dangerous for American democracy , particularly for its most vulnerable members .
But he was hemmed in by that system ; he couldn ’ t simply wave it away , even as president with all the powers that came with that office .
The system continued to work—even as Trump and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s why , frankly , Biden and the Democratic Party were able to emerge successful .
Their victory doesn ’ t represent a revolution over the system ; it represents the system working , such as it is .
Perhaps Trump wanted to be an authoritarian , but the United States isn ’ t an authoritarian state .
( Case in point : If it were , a lot of Trump opponents would be in jail , and I wouldn ’ t be able to publish this article in a U.S .
publication @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reality is quite simple .
There is simply no justification for pardoning Trump for the numerous crimes he ’ s likely to be accused of following his—hard-fought—departure from office .
There is no healing taking place amid some massive national struggle against apartheid , authoritarianism , or anything like that .
As euphoric as so many might feel against the background of the Biden victory , this is a standard occurrence in American politics : An election happened , and the other guy won .
On the contrary , a pardon is likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are likely to promote the idea that it would be sending a message of healing to the nation writ large , but that ’ s not the message it sends at all .
A pardon sends another message , one that ’ s been all too common in the United States : Accountability for corruption can be avoided if you do it from the top .
That doesn ’ t heal anyone or anything ; rather , it furthers , widens , and deepens the corruption itself .
The message it sends isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one that insists you can be rewarded for corruption and not held to account for it .
It will be the normalization of corruption , not the healing of wounds .
There is , nevertheless , a way to engage in healing that does involve Donald Trump : He stands trial for any crimes he ’ s accused of if there ’ s the evidence for them .
At the conclusion of any such trials , if he is found guilty—and that ’ s a big if—the courts can decide at their discretion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , to grant clemency .
But that ’ s if Trump , just like any other defendant , expresses contrition and remorse .
If he does , that will heal a lot of the societal wounds that he has been responsible for , and it would be grounds for clemency , to be sure .
But that would assume Trump is remorseful .
And considering his track record thus far since losing the election , when he seems to have invested more energy than any previous American president in sowing doubt in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dubious to consider Trump might be remorseful about anything .
Except , of course , that he lost .

Hours after Joe Biden was declared the U.S. president-elect, an article was published in the British newspaper the Independent arguing that, as “an act of mercy,” he should issue a presidential pardon for “a corrupt former commander-in-chief”: i.e., outgoing President Donald Trump. It’s a benevolent sentiment—admirable, even, in many ways—but ultimately, this wouldn’t be an act of mercy. It wouldn’t heal the United States, and it might even harm it much further.
Hours after Joe Biden was declared the U.S. president-elect, an article was published in the British newspaper the Independent arguing that, as “an act of mercy,” he should issue a presidential pardon for “a corrupt former commander-in-chief”: i.e., outgoing President Donald Trump. It’s a benevolent sentiment—admirable, even, in many ways—but ultimately, this wouldn’t be an act of mercy. It wouldn’t heal the United States, and it might even harm it much further.
Let me state from the outset: The idea of a compassionate, noble leader, triumphant in his victory, pardoning his erstwhile opponent isn’t an ignoble one. On the contrary, if Trump had insulted or harmed Biden personally, then Biden would most certainly be well advised to forgive him. There’s a long precedent for magnanimity, after all, in different political contexts, albeit with different results.
In South Africa, there was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, following the fall of the apartheid regime. The victims of human rights abuses were invited to give testimony about what had happened to them, and perpetrators could request amnesty. It was, by its nature, outside of the normal legal processes.
In Tunisia, there was the Truth and Dignity Commission, established following the fall of the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime during the Arab Spring uprising era. Again, this was specifically set up outside of normal legal processes, precisely to address the crimes of the Ben Ali era—to turn the page. That meant, as in South Africa, investigating human rights violations and using judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms to address them.
The whole point of these types of processes has been to bring about healing to populations who had undergone a great national trauma, at a time when new political systems were being forged. That language could be used to describe the last four years in the United States, especially the word “trauma.”
But making an analogy to these cases is misplaced. In countries like South Africa and Tunisia, it was a transition to democracy from decidedly nondemocratic systems. In South Africa, this meant minority white rule over a majority black population, and in Tunisia, an autocratic dictatorship. In both cases, they were moving not simply from one leader to another but from one whole system to another.
The systems had been so rotten they could only be overcome by extrajudicial means—in South Africa’s case, an armed struggle, and in Tunisia’s, mass protests that destabilized the regime to the point Ben Ali had to flee the country. South Africans and Tunisians assessed that these were revolutionary acts against systems that had left them with no other choice but to seek extranormal means, and, thus, new systems were going to be built. As a part of that flux, many things were indeed possible, and necessary, to heal and establish a new norm altogether.
But while people may want to throw around words like “revolution” in discussing the victory of the Joe Biden-Kamala Harris campaign over Donald Trump, it isn’t an apt description—at least not in terms of the system. That would be giving Trump far too much credit.
Trump was elected in as much of a democratic election in 2016 as Barack Obama was in 2012, or indeed Biden was in 2020. For all the faults of the American state—and there are many—it isn’t an authoritarian one comparable to Tunisia under Ben Ali, nor to South Africa under apartheid. It wasn’t under Obama, it won’t be under Biden, and it wasn’t under Trump.
This isn’t to say Trump didn’t act like an authoritarian. He did. I’ve studied authoritarian regimes in the Arab world for a decade, and in comparing Trump’s rhetoric to that of many authoritarian leaders in that timeframe, there are startling similarities. Trump was dangerous for American democracy, particularly for its most vulnerable members. But he was hemmed in by that system; he couldn’t simply wave it away, even as president with all the powers that came with that office.
The system continued to work—even as Trump and his acolytes chipped away at it—and that’s why, frankly, Biden and the Democratic Party were able to emerge successful. Their victory doesn’t represent a revolution over the system; it represents the system working, such as it is. Perhaps Trump wanted to be an authoritarian, but the United States isn’t an authoritarian state. (Case in point: If it were, a lot of Trump opponents would be in jail, and I wouldn’t be able to publish this article in a U.S. publication.)
But the corollary of that reality is quite simple. There is simply no justification for pardoning Trump for the numerous crimes he’s likely to be accused of following his—hard-fought—departure from office. There is no healing taking place amid some massive national struggle against apartheid, authoritarianism, or anything like that. As euphoric as so many might feel against the background of the Biden victory, this is a standard occurrence in American politics: An election happened, and the other guy won.
On the contrary, a pardon is likely to be completely counterproductive. Its proponents are likely to promote the idea that it would be sending a message of healing to the nation writ large, but that’s not the message it sends at all. A pardon sends another message, one that’s been all too common in the United States: Accountability for corruption can be avoided if you do it from the top. That doesn’t heal anyone or anything; rather, it furthers, widens, and deepens the corruption itself. The message it sends isn’t one of healing—it’s one that insists you can be rewarded for corruption and not held to account for it. It will be the normalization of corruption, not the healing of wounds.
There is, nevertheless, a way to engage in healing that does involve Donald Trump: He stands trial for any crimes he’s accused of if there’s the evidence for them. At the conclusion of any such trials, if he is found guilty—and that’s a big if—the courts can decide at their discretion, through the normal standards of the law, to grant clemency. But that’s if Trump, just like any other defendant, expresses contrition and remorse. If he does, that will heal a lot of the societal wounds that he has been responsible for, and it would be grounds for clemency, to be sure.
But that would assume Trump is remorseful. And considering his track record thus far since losing the election, when he seems to have invested more energy than any previous American president in sowing doubt in the democratic process, it seems somewhat dubious to consider Trump might be remorseful about anything. Except, of course, that he lost.