foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Taiwan Set for Critical Vote

Taiwan Set for Critical Vote

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Taiwan prepares for weekend elections , U.S. and Canadian officials say Iran shot down the Ukrainian passenger plane above Tehran , and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s Brexit deal passes the House of Commons .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Taiwan ’ s voters go to the polls in parliamentary and presidential elections on Saturday , with incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen expected to win .
Despite his quick rise , the main challenger Han Kuo-yu is polling far behind .
Still , Tsai ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggle to keep its majority in parliament .
It currently has 68 of 113 seats , while Han ’ s Kuomintang ( KMT ) holds 35 seats .
Tsai has framed the elections as a referendum on self-ruled Taiwan ’ s relationship with mainland China , running on the slogan “ Resist China , Defend Taiwan.
” Beijing ’ s reaction to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has likely shaped voters ’ opinions in Taiwan , where the “ one country , two systems ” model has been pushed by China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ disinformation , allegedly spread by Chinese cyber operatives .
Han , seen as the pro-Beijing candidate , received a boost from some of these social media manipulation campaigns , as Paul Huang reported for FP last June .
Still , analysts say the disinformation campaigns aren ’ t likely to have a significant effect on the elections .
‘ Don ’ t read into it.
’ Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said on Thursday that China shouldn ’ t see the election results as a win or loss for Beijing .
“ If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ … there might be a likely scenario that China will engage in military intimidation or diplomatic isolation or using economic measures as punishment against Taiwan , ” he said .
For more news and analysis on stories like this , sign up for China Brief , delivered on Wednesdays .
Western officials say Iran shot down plane .
U.S. and Canadian officials believe that Iran shot down the Ukrainian airliner that crashed after taking off in Tehran on Wednesday .
The disaster may have been a mistake , as Iranian air defenses were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on U.S. military installations in Iraq , FP reports .
( Iran denies that the plane was hit by a missile . )
The crash killed all 176 people on board the flight from Tehran to Kyiv , including at least 63 Canadian citizens .
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has vowed to seek answers and justice , though Canada has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 2012 .
Johnson ’ s Brexit bill is nearly official .
On Thursday , British lawmakers in the House of Commons voted ( 330 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson ’ s plan to leave the European Union on Jan. 31 with a deal , after months of political deadlock over the legislation .
The bill now heads to the House of Lords , where it is expected to become law within weeks .
Then , the focus will turn to Britain ’ s negotiations with the EU over future trade arrangements , which must be settled by Dec. 31 .
With the Brexit withdrawal bill passing the House of Commons , the argument for Irish unification is gaining ground .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t go quietly , FP ’ s Dan Haverty reports .
Syrian cross-border aid could end today .
A United Nations operation that delivers aid across the Syrian border from Turkey , Iraq , and Jordan will expire at midnight if the U.N. Security Council doesn ’ t reach a last minute deal to extend it .
For six years , the U.N. has provided 3 million Syrian citizens with vital aid , but last month Russia vetoed a draft resolution to renew its authorization .
Western powers have proposed a compromise , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Bushfire backlash in Australia .
Today thousands are expected to protest in nine cities against Prime Minister Scott Morrison ’ s response to the devastating bushfires in Australia .
Morrison , who has downplayed the fires ’ links to climate change , has long advocated for Australia ’ s coal industry .
Still the fires could hamper some protesters ’ plans : Officials in Victoria have called on protesters to cancel their march due to dangerous conditions .
Mexico ’ s asylum seekers .
Mexico ’ s interior minister said Thursday that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ repatriate Mexican asylum seekers sent from the United States to Guatemala under a deal signed between the United States and Guatemala in July .
Outgoing Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has said Mexican asylum seekers weren ’ t part of the deal but U.S. officials said this week that Mexican migrants would be included in the deportations .
Puerto Rico ’ s biggest power plant .
Though Puerto Rico ’ s electricity is expected to be restored by Monday , its largest power plant could be down for at least a year after a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The earthquake has compounded Puerto Rico ’ s recovery from hurricanes in 2017 , for which it is still awaiting U.S. federal funding .
FP Conference Call—On Monday , Jan. 13 , at 10 a.m .
ET , join us for an early look at the cover story from the upcoming Winter 2020 print issue of Foreign Policy magazine with a special conference call on the revival of socialism : why it ’ s back and what it means .
Featuring FP editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman and Barnard College professor Sheri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brazil ’ s Education Minister Abraham Weintraub is being criticized for a series of spelling mistakes he has made in tweets and official documents .
Academics are calling for Weintraub—one of President Jair Bolsonaro ’ s most loyal ministers—to be removed from office .
Speaking in a classroom last year , he also appeared to mix up the author Franz Kafka with kofta , the meatball dish .
“ The spelling mistakes are the least of his problems , ” one professor told the Guardian .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Taiwan prepares for weekend elections, U.S. and Canadian officials say Iran shot down the Ukrainian passenger plane above Tehran , and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal passes the House of Commons.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Taiwan prepares for weekend elections, U.S. and Canadian officials say Iran shot down the Ukrainian passenger plane above Tehran, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal passes the House of Commons.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Taiwan Set for General Elections
Taiwan’s voters go to the polls in parliamentary and presidential elections on Saturday, with incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen expected to win. Despite his quick rise, the main challenger Han Kuo-yu is polling far behind. Still, Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could struggle to keep its majority in parliament. It currently has 68 of 113 seats, while Han’s Kuomintang (KMT) holds 35 seats.
Tsai has framed the elections as a referendum on self-ruled Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China, running on the slogan “Resist China, Defend Taiwan.” Beijing’s reaction to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has likely shaped voters’ opinions in Taiwan, where the “one country, two systems” model has been pushed by China.
Disinformation. Tsai has also cautioned against disinformation, allegedly spread by Chinese cyber operatives. Han, seen as the pro-Beijing candidate, received a boost from some of these social media manipulation campaigns, as Paul Huang reported for FP last June. Still, analysts say the disinformation campaigns aren’t likely to have a significant effect on the elections.
‘Don’t read into it.’ Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said on Thursday that China shouldn’t see the election results as a win or loss for Beijing. “If China reads too much into our election … there might be a likely scenario that China will engage in military intimidation or diplomatic isolation or using economic measures as punishment against Taiwan,” he said.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for China Brief, delivered on Wednesdays.
What We’re Following Today
Western officials say Iran shot down plane. U.S. and Canadian officials believe that Iran shot down the Ukrainian airliner that crashed after taking off in Tehran on Wednesday. The disaster may have been a mistake, as Iranian air defenses were on high alert after launching an attack on U.S. military installations in Iraq, FP reports. (Iran denies that the plane was hit by a missile.) The crash killed all 176 people on board the flight from Tehran to Kyiv, including at least 63 Canadian citizens. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has vowed to seek answers and justice, though Canada has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 2012.
Johnson’s Brexit bill is nearly official. On Thursday, British lawmakers in the House of Commons voted (330 to 231) to approve Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s plan to leave the European Union on Jan. 31 with a deal, after months of political deadlock over the legislation. The bill now heads to the House of Lords, where it is expected to become law within weeks. Then, the focus will turn to Britain’s negotiations with the EU over future trade arrangements, which must be settled by Dec. 31.
With the Brexit withdrawal bill passing the House of Commons, the argument for Irish unification is gaining ground. But Northern Ireland’s unionists won’t go quietly, FP’s Dan Haverty reports.
Syrian cross-border aid could end today. A United Nations operation that delivers aid across the Syrian border from Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan will expire at midnight if the U.N. Security Council doesn’t reach a last minute deal to extend it. For six years, the U.N. has provided 3 million Syrian citizens with vital aid, but last month Russia vetoed a draft resolution to renew its authorization. Western powers have proposed a compromise, with the council due to vote today.
Keep an Eye On
Bushfire backlash in Australia. Today thousands are expected to protest in nine cities against Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s response to the devastating bushfires in Australia. Morrison, who has downplayed the fires’ links to climate change, has long advocated for Australia’s coal industry. Still the fires could hamper some protesters’ plans: Officials in Victoria have called on protesters to cancel their march due to dangerous conditions.
Mexico’s asylum seekers. Mexico’s interior minister said Thursday that the country was considering a plan to repatriate Mexican asylum seekers sent from the United States to Guatemala under a deal signed between the United States and Guatemala in July. Outgoing Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales has said Mexican asylum seekers weren’t part of the deal but U.S. officials said this week that Mexican migrants would be included in the deportations.
Puerto Rico’s biggest power plant. Though Puerto Rico’s electricity is expected to be restored by Monday, its largest power plant could be down for at least a year after a major earthquake hit the island this week. The earthquake has compounded Puerto Rico’s recovery from hurricanes in 2017, for which it is still awaiting U.S. federal funding.
FP Conference Call—On Monday, Jan. 13, at 10 a.m. ET, join us for an early look at the cover story from the upcoming Winter 2020 print issue of Foreign Policy magazine with a special conference call on the revival of socialism: why it’s back and what it means. Featuring FP editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman and Barnard College professor Sheri Berman. Secure your spot today.
Odds and Ends
Brazil’s Education Minister Abraham Weintraub is being criticized for a series of spelling mistakes he has made in tweets and official documents. Academics are calling for Weintraub—one of President Jair Bolsonaro’s most loyal ministers—to be removed from office. Speaking in a classroom last year, he also appeared to mix up the author Franz Kafka with kofta, the meatball dish. “The spelling mistakes are the least of his problems,” one professor told the Guardian.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--Middle Eastern Voices Deserve to Be Heard in Western Media

Middle Eastern Voices Deserve to Be Heard in Western Media As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in , the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear .
As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted , the voices of Syrians , Iraqis , and Lebanese—the “ main victims ” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television .
That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani ’ s role and the impact his death is having .
I ’ ve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Arab discourse , as a British think tanker in U.S. and British policy institutions , of English and Arab origins , who has spent the better part of the past decade working in the Arab world .
In the aftermath of Suleimani ’ s death , it ’ s high time to center on voices from within the region , rather than exclude them .
They , after all , are the ones who will pay the cost in blood of this action and Iran ’ s retaliation .
Indeed , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along , while being kept on the margins of Western discussion .
Suleimani ’ s main impact should be judged by how he was perceived by the peoples of the region—not Americans or Westerners .
And that perception , by and large , was negative .
Suleimani was the leader of the Quds Force—a division within Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps primarily dedicated to overseas operations and covert action of this deeply ideological outfit .
It was for that reason that Arab journalists like Kareem Shaheen , who spent years as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Kim Ghattas focused , likewise , on how Syrians , Iraqis , and other victims of Suleimani ’ s Quds Force were going to interpret the news .
That ’ s why the initial flurry of responses to his death from Arab media and from Arab figures was largely positive .
Suleimani ’ s activities in Syria , Iraq , and Lebanon had targeted scores of Arabs who were either fighting against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad or protesting against their leaders in Beirut or Baghdad .
The Palestinian activist Iyad el-Baghdadi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggles of movements dedicated to good governance and accountability in the region , rather than supporting or centering on the designs of Washington , Riyadh , Tehran , or really anyone else : Suleimani “ was a war criminal and nobody in the communities that were subjected to his brutality will shed a tear for him .
But we also *know* for fact Trump has no plan other than one-upmanship .
Iraqis and Iranians will be left to pay the price.
” There were , of course , many who mourned his death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as acolytes elsewhere .
You saw that among officials of the Iranian regime , as well as allies and their proxies elsewhere .
And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that he also had a genuine base of support , primarily in Iran , even while many Iranians also felt differently .
Mistaken support for a terrible political leader is hardly unique to the Middle East .
If nothing else , history teaches us—including rather recent history—that normally reasonable people can support truly outrageous political figures .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not a Sunni-Shiite divide , despite Suleimani ’ s appalling use of sectarianism to further the fortunes of the Iranian regime .
Many within Assad ’ s regime are Sunni , and they wanted Suleimani ’ s assistance .
Many protesters in Iraq are Shiite , and they were targeted by Suleimani ’ s allies , as were protesters in Iran .
Arab activists like Joey Ayoub put it succinctly : “ The ‘ problem ’ is that us anti-sectarians refuse to use that ‘ card ’ as opposed to actual sectarians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pretending to be anti-sectarian.
” When I tried to follow discussions in Washington and Western media outlets , the focus was rather different .
There was very little discussion about the peoples of the region , only the fortunes of the West .
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies , for example , led with : The killing of Suleimani “ has removed a huge threat to U.S. national security , ” continuing to warn against threats to “ U.S .
interests.
” Bild , Germany ’ s most popular newspaper , went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freed the world of a monster whose aim in life was an atomic cloud over Tel Aviv .
Trump has acted in self-defense.
” Hypothetical Israeli and American victims weighed much heavier in the scale than the Arabs and others who died because of Suleimani ’ s actions .
For those who supported Trump ’ s ordering of the strike , it was about Suleimani ’ s impact on Americans or about supporting the U.S. president .
For those who opposed Trump ’ s move , it was about the stability of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic purposes .
Indeed , even in the immediate reporting around Iraqi protests following the killing , the Western media focused on grassroots opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq—ignoring that the protests also called for Iranian forces to leave .
Nowhere was that more visible than in the initial media focus , after Iran ’ s retaliation in Iraq , only on the possibility of American casualties .
( In the end , thankfully , nobody was killed at all . )
On one level , perhaps that ’ s understandable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Beltway and the Western media writ large isn ’ t necessarily of the region or from the region .
Their audience is domestic—so , naturally , they ’ ll talk about issues that are most relevant domestically .
And surely , that ’ s what every country will do—focus on their own interests .
But that shouldn ’ t be accepted as the norm , especially for the West and particularly the United States—because the impact the West has on the wider Arab world far outstrips anything in reverse .
For far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been viewed without due consideration for how that same region looks at itself and understands itself .
That gives us an analysis that can often be dangerously distant and sometimes even callous .
To be sure , Middle Eastern depictions of the West can also be distorted .
But the consequences of narrow Western thinking are far starker than in reverse—because like it or not , the West in general , and the United States in particular , has far more power in the Arab world than vice versa .
But listening to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victims will also help the West avoid catastrophes—for itself , as well as the Arab world , and arguably far beyond .
The Islamic State , for example , was not really considered a major problem for Western policymakers when it was rampaging against the peoples of the region—it became one when it began to target Westerners .
It ’ s not just a moral and ethical failure of the highest proportions that the West engages in this region with minimal or little care for the perspectives of the people there .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proportions .
At every step of the way , the record of catastrophic Western involvement in the region could have been averted by better local understanding .
There is no better way of doing that than by engaging with voices of the region more widely and with more seriousness .
Some Western media has sought out local voices and commentators , and broadened its coverage .
Yet we ’ re still at a point where a major news network such as CNN can hold programs on the impacts of Suleimani ’ s death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the region .
There are better ways of going about this .
Commentators on France , say , are expected to be French , know French , or at least to have spent long amounts of time there .
That ’ s not the case for the Middle East .
It ’ s true that finding people who actually know the region is the harder option .
Those engaged in forming the nature of the debate in analytical circles and the media arena are often under a great deal of stress , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s easy to go to the regular talking head that we know on the basis of previous work , even if that work is only tangentially related to the subject at hand .
It will make for satisfying television , or a certain number of retweets on Twitter , and so forth .
But it is far more rewarding for listeners to benefit from years of experience and in-depth cultural understanding , even if the vision presented might be more complex than an easy soundbite .
There are scores of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; who have spent years within it ; who engaged in a lot of effort to understand it ; who know the languages of it ; and who , ultimately , see the people there as complicated and complex as any Western population .
And as noted : It ’ s a grave responsibility .
Informed policymakers are less likely to make reckless decisions that will engage their countries in turmoil abroad—or worse , take them to war .
It ’ s not a guarantee , of course—but it ’ s certainly better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cast of interpreters who are fumbling in their own outdated phrasebooks .

As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear. As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted , the voices of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese—the “main victims” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television. That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani’s role and the impact his death is having.
As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear. As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted, the voices of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese—the “main victims” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television. That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani’s role and the impact his death is having.
I’ve been keenly listening to both the Western and Arab discourse, as a British think tanker in U.S. and British policy institutions, of English and Arab origins, who has spent the better part of the past decade working in the Arab world. In the aftermath of Suleimani’s death, it’s high time to center on voices from within the region, rather than exclude them. They, after all, are the ones who will pay the cost in blood of this action and Iran’s retaliation. Indeed, they’ve been paying that cost all along, while being kept on the margins of Western discussion.
Suleimani’s main impact should be judged by how he was perceived by the peoples of the region—not Americans or Westerners. And that perception, by and large, was negative. Suleimani was the leader of the Quds Force—a division within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps primarily dedicated to overseas operations and covert action of this deeply ideological outfit. It was for that reason that Arab journalists like Kareem Shaheen, who spent years as a Guardian reporter throughout the Middle East, and Kim Ghattas focused, likewise, on how Syrians, Iraqis, and other victims of Suleimani’s Quds Force were going to interpret the news.
That’s why the initial flurry of responses to his death from Arab media and from Arab figures was largely positive. Suleimani’s activities in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon had targeted scores of Arabs who were either fighting against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad or protesting against their leaders in Beirut or Baghdad. The Palestinian activist Iyad el-Baghdadi spoke out strongly, centering on the struggles of movements dedicated to good governance and accountability in the region, rather than supporting or centering on the designs of Washington, Riyadh, Tehran, or really anyone else: Suleimani “was a war criminal and nobody in the communities that were subjected to his brutality will shed a tear for him. But we also *know* for fact Trump has no plan other than one-upmanship. Iraqis and Iranians will be left to pay the price.”
There were, of course, many who mourned his death in the region, primarily in Iran, as well as acolytes elsewhere. You saw that among officials of the Iranian regime, as well as allies and their proxies elsewhere. And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that he also had a genuine base of support, primarily in Iran, even while many Iranians also felt differently. Mistaken support for a terrible political leader is hardly unique to the Middle East. If nothing else, history teaches us—including rather recent history—that normally reasonable people can support truly outrageous political figures.
But the reactions also make it clear that this was not a Sunni-Shiite divide, despite Suleimani’s appalling use of sectarianism to further the fortunes of the Iranian regime. Many within Assad’s regime are Sunni, and they wanted Suleimani’s assistance. Many protesters in Iraq are Shiite, and they were targeted by Suleimani’s allies, as were protesters in Iran. Arab activists like Joey Ayoub put it succinctly: “The ‘problem’ is that us anti-sectarians refuse to use that ‘card’ as opposed to actual sectarians who do it all the time while pretending to be anti-sectarian.”
When I tried to follow discussions in Washington and Western media outlets, the focus was rather different. There was very little discussion about the peoples of the region, only the fortunes of the West. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, for example, led with: The killing of Suleimani “has removed a huge threat to U.S. national security,” continuing to warn against threats to “U.S. interests.” Bild, Germany’s most popular newspaper, went with: “[Trump] has freed the world of a monster whose aim in life was an atomic cloud over Tel Aviv. Trump has acted in self-defense.”
Hypothetical Israeli and American victims weighed much heavier in the scale than the Arabs and others who died because of Suleimani’s actions. For those who supported Trump’s ordering of the strike, it was about Suleimani’s impact on Americans or about supporting the U.S. president. For those who opposed Trump’s move, it was about the stability of the region for American interests—or opposing Trump for domestic purposes. Indeed, even in the immediate reporting around Iraqi protests following the killing, the Western media focused on grassroots opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq—ignoring that the protests also called for Iranian forces to leave. Nowhere was that more visible than in the initial media focus, after Iran’s retaliation in Iraq, only on the possibility of American casualties. (In the end, thankfully, nobody was killed at all.)
On one level, perhaps that’s understandable. After all, the audience that the Beltway and the Western media writ large isn’t necessarily of the region or from the region. Their audience is domestic—so, naturally, they’ll talk about issues that are most relevant domestically. And surely, that’s what every country will do—focus on their own interests.
But that shouldn’t be accepted as the norm, especially for the West and particularly the United States—because the impact the West has on the wider Arab world far outstrips anything in reverse. For far too long, the wider region has been viewed without due consideration for how that same region looks at itself and understands itself. That gives us an analysis that can often be dangerously distant and sometimes even callous, such as the notion that “One day they may name a street after President Trump in Tehran,” as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman recently claimed. To be sure, Middle Eastern depictions of the West can also be distorted. But the consequences of narrow Western thinking are far starker than in reverse—because like it or not, the West in general, and the United States in particular, has far more power in the Arab world than vice versa.
But listening to informed voices in the region who highlight victims will also help the West avoid catastrophes—for itself, as well as the Arab world, and arguably far beyond. The Islamic State, for example, was not really considered a major problem for Western policymakers when it was rampaging against the peoples of the region—it became one when it began to target Westerners. It’s not just a moral and ethical failure of the highest proportions that the West engages in this region with minimal or little care for the perspectives of the people there. It’s a strategic disaster of untold proportions.
At every step of the way, the record of catastrophic Western involvement in the region could have been averted by better local understanding. There is no better way of doing that than by engaging with voices of the region more widely and with more seriousness. Some Western media has sought out local voices and commentators, and broadened its coverage. Yet we’re still at a point where a major news network such as CNN can hold programs on the impacts of Suleimani’s death with a wide-ranging panel—none of whom are from the region.
There are better ways of going about this. Commentators on France, say, are expected to be French, know French, or at least to have spent long amounts of time there. That’s not the case for the Middle East.
It’s true that finding people who actually know the region is the harder option. Those engaged in forming the nature of the debate in analytical circles and the media arena are often under a great deal of stress, particularly against the backdrop of fast-moving stories. It’s easy to go to the regular talking head that we know on the basis of previous work, even if that work is only tangentially related to the subject at hand. It will make for satisfying television, or a certain number of retweets on Twitter, and so forth.
But it is far more rewarding for listeners to benefit from years of experience and in-depth cultural understanding, even if the vision presented might be more complex than an easy soundbite. There are scores of such figures who do know the region; who have spent years within it; who engaged in a lot of effort to understand it; who know the languages of it; and who, ultimately, see the people there as complicated and complex as any Western population.
And as noted: It’s a grave responsibility. Informed policymakers are less likely to make reckless decisions that will engage their countries in turmoil abroad—or worse, take them to war. It’s not a guarantee, of course—but it’s certainly better than the alternative of relying on a cast of interpreters who are fumbling in their own outdated phrasebooks.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Big in Japan, ‘Le Cost Killer’ Comes Home

BEIRUT—In a two-hour press conference here on Wednesday , Carlos Ghosn , the former Nissan CEO who escaped house arrest in Japan , reiterated his innocence , and outlined what he says is a conspiracy against him by his former employer and the Japanese judiciary .
But if the 100-odd journalists who jostled for a place at the press conference came to hear details of his Houdini-esque escape from Japan via Turkey , they were disappointed .
Instead , Ghosn gave an impassioned presentation including documents he said prove his innocence and a dramatic recount of his surprise arrest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which he compared to the Japanese surprise attack on the United States in 1941 , which caught the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor , Hawaii , with its guard down .
“ Some people ask me … you didn ’ t suspect this ?
” Ghosn said .
“ What happened in Pearl Harbor ?
” Ghosn has been well-received by Lebanon ’ s political elite , even reportedly meeting with the country ’ s President Michel Aoun shortly after his shock arrival in Beirut on Dec. 30 .
But his reception among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with some questioning whether a country embroiled in protests against an entrenched political elite and corruption needs a man accused of stealing millions of dollars .
After Ghosn was first arrested , accused of under-reporting his income and siphoning off money from Nissan , brightly lit billboards went up in Beirut with his face and the slogan “ We Are All Carlos Ghosn.
” Many in the country where Ghosn spent much of his childhood see him as a success story , becoming one of the world ’ s top CEOs known for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profits.
“ If there is one country that ’ s stood by me through this difficult time , it ’ s Lebanon.
” “ Today , I am proud to be Lebanese , ” he said to a round of applause at the press conference .
“ If there is one country that ’ s stood by me through this difficult time , it ’ s Lebanon.
” Ghosn also has Brazilian and French nationalities , the latter of which he is thought to have used to escape from house arrest in Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taken from him , but he held on to one French passport in a locked case .
Ghosn ’ s arrival in Lebanon , which faces a looming economic and energy crisis , has sparked some calls for him to play a role in salvaging the country .
With devastating debt , a wobbly currency , and daily blackouts , Lebanon seems headed for an economic implosion .
Many see the man who is sometimes called “ Le Cost Killer ” as a potential fixer of the economy which—on top of corruption—suffers from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all levels .
Walid Jumblatt , a leader of the country ’ s Druze sect , took to Twitter to suggest that Ghosn could help save the country .
“ I propose appointing him as a minister of energy to replace the mafia in control that have caused this huge deficit and reject any reform , ” Jumblatt wrote .
“ Carlos Ghosn built an empire—perhaps we can benefit from his expertise.
” “ I would vote for him , ” said Ziko Khoury , who owns a stationary shop up the street @ @ @ @ @ @ @ residences .
“ He ’ s a good businessman .
He loves Lebanon .
He should become a minister.
” Asked at Wednesday ’ s press conference if he had a role to play in solving Lebanon ’ s problems , Ghosn gave an astute answer .
‘ ” I am not a politician nor have a political ambition , ” he said , “ but if I were asked to put my expertise to serve the country , I am ready.
’ ” Some Lebanese , like Khoury , think the charges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I don ’ t understand the big deal , ” said Khoury , standing in his shop , lit by electric generator amid one of the daily power cuts .
“ Everyone does this with their taxes .
They don ’ t put you in jail.
” But after months of anti-government protests demanding that the corrupt political class that has ruled since the end of Lebanon ’ s civil war step down , his case is being scrutinized online and in the streets in a way it wasn ’ t when he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a surplus of corrupt people and traitors .
You want us to start importing them from outside ?
” one Lebanese Twitter user responded to Jumblatt .
At a protest earlier this week , demonstrators adapted a chant for Ghosn , usually reserved for the country ’ s politicians and governor of the central bank : “ Thief , thief , Carlos Ghosn , he ’ s a thief.
” Taxes aren ’ t Ghosn ’ s only problem .
He also took a trip to Israel in 2008 , where he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ehud Olmert , who led Israel through the 2006 war with Hezbollah—which left around 1,200 Lebanese dead .
Visiting Israel is illegal for Lebanese citizens , let alone meeting the prime minister .
While a pair of Lebanese lawyers have brought a case against him for the visit , Lebanon ’ s top leaders seem sanguine ; not even Hezbollah has brought up Ghosn ’ s very public digression in the enemy state.Demonstrators adapted a chant for Ghosn , usually reserved for the country ’ s politicians and governor of the central bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Lebanon will bring him some legal relief .
On Thursday , he was summoned for investigation by Lebanon ’ s state prosecutor , a questioning that lasted barely longer than his press conference .
Lebanon has asked Japan for files pertaining to the charges against Ghosn , but it has been clear it has no plans to extradite him , despite an Interpol Red Notice looking for his arrest .
Lebanon , which says Ghosn entered the country legally on a French passport , put a travel ban on him Thursday .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmation of his safety here than a restriction .
Ghosn says he escaped persecution , not justice , in Japan .
He says he was held in solitary confinement , questioned for hours without his lawyer present , and prevented from even speaking to his wife , Carole Ghosn , whom he embraced tightly at the press conference in Beirut .
She is now also facing charges in Japan .
Ghosn said he ’ s ready to stand trial anywhere he could get a fair hearing , repeatedly referring to Japan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ !
” He has pledged to cooperate with the Lebanese judiciary .
“ I ’ m much more comfortable with the Lebanese judicial system than I was with the Japanese system , ” he said in an interview with Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International this week .
And that ’ s just the problem for many Lebanese fed up with corrupt elites .
Lack of independence in the judiciary is one of the key criticisms of the protest movement .
Legal rights groups say the system is heavily influenced by political and financial elites—the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ghosn ’ s side .
“ Of course you ’ re going to be more comfortable here , ” tweeted another Lebanese user , “ They are going to make this so easy for you .
”

BEIRUT—In a two-hour press conference here on Wednesday, Carlos Ghosn, the former Nissan CEO who escaped house arrest in Japan, reiterated his innocence, and outlined what he says is a conspiracy against him by his former employer and the Japanese judiciary.
BEIRUT—In a two-hour press conference here on Wednesday, Carlos Ghosn, the former Nissan CEO who escaped house arrest in Japan, reiterated his innocence, and outlined what he says is a conspiracy against him by his former employer and the Japanese judiciary.
But if the 100-odd journalists who jostled for a place at the press conference came to hear details of his Houdini-esque escape from Japan via Turkey, they were disappointed.
Instead, Ghosn gave an impassioned presentation including documents he said prove his innocence and a dramatic recount of his surprise arrest in a Tokyo airport in November 2018, which he compared to the Japanese surprise attack on the United States in 1941, which caught the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with its guard down.
“Some people ask me … you didn’t suspect this?” Ghosn said. “What happened in Pearl Harbor?”
Ghosn has been well-received by Lebanon’s political elite, even reportedly meeting with the country’s President Michel Aoun shortly after his shock arrival in Beirut on Dec. 30. But his reception among regular Lebanese has been less all-embracing, with some questioning whether a country embroiled in protests against an entrenched political elite and corruption needs a man accused of stealing millions of dollars.
After Ghosn was first arrested, accused of under-reporting his income and siphoning off money from Nissan, brightly lit billboards went up in Beirut with his face and the slogan “We Are All Carlos Ghosn.” Many in the country where Ghosn spent much of his childhood see him as a success story, becoming one of the world’s top CEOs known for lifting companies out of peril and into profits.“If there is one country that’s stood by me through this difficult time, it’s Lebanon.”
“Today, I am proud to be Lebanese,” he said to a round of applause at the press conference. “If there is one country that’s stood by me through this difficult time, it’s Lebanon.” Ghosn also has Brazilian and French nationalities, the latter of which he is thought to have used to escape from house arrest in Japan to Lebanon—all his other passports had been taken from him, but he held on to one French passport in a locked case.
Ghosn’s arrival in Lebanon, which faces a looming economic and energy crisis, has sparked some calls for him to play a role in salvaging the country. With devastating debt, a wobbly currency, and daily blackouts, Lebanon seems headed for an economic implosion. Many see the man who is sometimes called “Le Cost Killer” as a potential fixer of the economy which—on top of corruption—suffers from an inefficient bureaucracy and government mismanagement at all levels.
Walid Jumblatt, a leader of the country’s Druze sect, took to Twitter to suggest that Ghosn could help save the country.
“I propose appointing him as a minister of energy to replace the mafia in control that have caused this huge deficit and reject any reform,” Jumblatt wrote. “Carlos Ghosn built an empire—perhaps we can benefit from his expertise.”
“I would vote for him,” said Ziko Khoury, who owns a stationary shop up the street from one of Ghosn’s Beirut residences. “He’s a good businessman. He loves Lebanon. He should become a minister.”
Asked at Wednesday’s press conference if he had a role to play in solving Lebanon’s problems, Ghosn gave an astute answer.
‘”I am not a politician nor have a political ambition,” he said, “but if I were asked to put my expertise to serve the country, I am ready.’”
Some Lebanese, like Khoury, think the charges against Ghosn are trumped up. “I don’t understand the big deal,” said Khoury, standing in his shop, lit by electric generator amid one of the daily power cuts. “Everyone does this with their taxes. They don’t put you in jail.”
But after months of anti-government protests demanding that the corrupt political class that has ruled since the end of Lebanon’s civil war step down, his case is being scrutinized online and in the streets in a way it wasn’t when he was first detained.
“We already have a surplus of corrupt people and traitors. You want us to start importing them from outside?” one Lebanese Twitter user responded to Jumblatt.
At a protest earlier this week, demonstrators adapted a chant for Ghosn, usually reserved for the country’s politicians and governor of the central bank: “Thief, thief, Carlos Ghosn, he’s a thief.”
Taxes aren’t Ghosn’s only problem. He also took a trip to Israel in 2008, where he met the Israeli president and then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who led Israel through the 2006 war with Hezbollah—which left around 1,200 Lebanese dead. Visiting Israel is illegal for Lebanese citizens, let alone meeting the prime minister. While a pair of Lebanese lawyers have brought a case against him for the visit, Lebanon’s top leaders seem sanguine; not even Hezbollah has brought up Ghosn’s very public digression in the enemy state.Demonstrators adapted a chant for Ghosn, usually reserved for the country’s politicians and governor of the central bank.
Ghosn is hopeful that his flight to Lebanon will bring him some legal relief. On Thursday, he was summoned for investigation by Lebanon’s state prosecutor, a questioning that lasted barely longer than his press conference. Lebanon has asked Japan for files pertaining to the charges against Ghosn, but it has been clear it has no plans to extradite him, despite an Interpol Red Notice looking for his arrest.
Lebanon, which says Ghosn entered the country legally on a French passport, put a travel ban on him Thursday. Some have joked it seems more like confirmation of his safety here than a restriction.
Ghosn says he escaped persecution, not justice, in Japan. He says he was held in solitary confinement, questioned for hours without his lawyer present, and prevented from even speaking to his wife, Carole Ghosn, whom he embraced tightly at the press conference in Beirut. She is now also facing charges in Japan.
Ghosn said he’s ready to stand trial anywhere he could get a fair hearing, repeatedly referring to Japan’s high conviction rate: “99.4 percent!” He has pledged to cooperate with the Lebanese judiciary.
“I’m much more comfortable with the Lebanese judicial system than I was with the Japanese system,” he said in an interview with Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International this week.
And that’s just the problem for many Lebanese fed up with corrupt elites. Lack of independence in the judiciary is one of the key criticisms of the protest movement. Legal rights groups say the system is heavily influenced by political and financial elites—the very people who seem to be on Ghosn’s side.
“Of course you’re going to be more comfortable here,” tweeted another Lebanese user, “They are going to make this so easy for you.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Canada’s Path to Justice from Iran Over Shot-Down Flight Will Be Hard

Canada ’ s Path to Justice from Iran Over Shot-Down Flight Will Be Hard Just after dawn on July 3 , 1988 , the USS Vincennes misread signals from a plane taking off from the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas .
Capt .
William C. Rogers concluded that the plane was a F-14 fighter jet preparing for an attack run .
The U.S. naval ship fired two surface-to-air missiles , one of which hit the jet .
Rogers soon learned that the plane he hit was not an F-14 .
It was Iran Air Flight 655 .
Onboard were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all civilian .
Iran Air 655 was an unspeakable tragedy for Iran .
History repeated itself this Wednesday when , once again , a civilian plane , destined for Ukraine and ultimately Toronto , was downed shortly after takeoff .
As in 1988 , the vast majority of the dead are Iranian or of Iranian descent—but this time it appears that Iran itself was the culprit .
At a Thursday afternoon press conference , Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed that Western intelligence , both from the United States and other allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Airlines flight was shot down by Iranian surface-to-air missiles , likely the Russian-made Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile system .
Videos posted by civilians seem to back up that theory .
According to the Canadians , the missile strike may well have been accidental—likely a byproduct of the revenge attack on American bases in Iraq—but the investigation is ongoing .
Of the 176 people on board the Ukraine International Airlines flight , 63 were Canadian citizens—many others were transferring through Toronto .
The 1988 shootdown carries useful lessons .
Since then , international law has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largely toothless when it comes to the downing of civilian aircraft—and it may be up to Canada and Ukraine to seek justice for the dead .
In 1988 , the Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters , patrolling the Strait of Hormuz on guard against Iranian aggression .
The Iran-Iraq War , already in its eighth year , had disrupted international shipping in the region , pushing a U.S. deployment to protect commercial traffic in the area .
Flight 655 , the Pentagon initially claimed , had made an unusual descent that resembled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maneuver , regardless of the considerable evidence that the jet was a commercial airliner , was enough to justify the missile strike .
Later intelligence suggested that the plane was flying higher than first thought and that the error had been entirely on the American side .
Even so , in the days after the Iranian jet was shot down , then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan expressed his “ deep regret ” over the incident in a cable to Tehran .
The months that followed were less amicable .
Iran sought a resolution from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s actions , which it did not get .
The next year , Tehran went to the International Court of Justice , From the outset , however , the United States argued that the international court had no jurisdiction to hear the case and that the incident could not be decided under the two treaties .
Washington eventually offered to settle with Tehran , with the case still before the court .
The two sides signed a settlement agreement in 1996 for $ 131.8 million .
As part of the settlement , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ terrible human tragedy and expressed deep regret over the loss of lives caused by the incident.
” It did not , however , accept responsibility .
Even before the Ukrainian jet was shot down on Wednesday , the memory of Flight 655 was back in the news—invoked by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Monday as threats escalated between Tehran and Washington .
Beyond the downing of Flight 655 , there have been numerous instances in which states have been found responsible for attacks on civil aircraft .
The results of trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mixed bag .
In 1983 , Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 fighter jet , killing 269 people .
Soviet military personnel concluded the flight , which had drifted into protected airspace east of Russia , was a U.S. spy plane .
A full investigation into the incident was made nearly impossible due to Soviet obfuscation at the time—the black box recording was not made public until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union .
It was the second Korean plane struck by the Soviets in five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lines 902 in 1978 , managed to make an emergency landing with only two deaths .
At the time , the international community slapped sanctions on the USSR for the disaster , and a U.N. Security Council resolution stating the use of force on civilian aircraft was “ incompatible with the norms governing international behavior ” was introduced but vetoed by Moscow .
The disaster prompted the International Civil Aviation Organization to adopt a measure now known as Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention , stating that “ every state must refrain from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civil aircraft in flight.
” The article didn ’ t take effect , as it wasn ’ t ratified by a sufficient number of member states .
Just five months after the Iran Air flight was shot down in 1988 , Pan Am Flight 103 exploded and crashed near Lockerbie , Scotland , killing all 270 people on board—mostly Americans .
Investigators found evidence that plastic explosives had been packed into a boombox , blowing a hole in the plane ’ s fuselage .
U.S. intelligence identified two suspects , identifying them as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muammar al-Qaddafi initially refused to hand over the two men for trial before acquiescing .
One of the two accused was convicted , although there was a belief that other more senior officials ultimately escaped justice .
In the end , Qaddafi agreed to pay $ 2.7 billion in compensation to the victims ’ families .
Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention would eventually be ratified , in 1998 .
Initially , it seemed to create a standard for how military downings of civilian aircraft should be handled .
When Ukraine in 2001 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , en route from Israel to Russia , it initially denied responsibility .
After an investigation found its military responsible , it accepted full responsibility and signed a settlement agreement with both Israel and Russia .
But the more recent shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shows that international law is still ill equipped to handle states that refuse to take responsibility for their own actions .
The flight was shot down by surface-to-air missiles in eastern Ukraine in 2014 , landing in a field in Donetsk , the site of intense fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supported by the Russian military .
The Netherlands handled the primary investigation , as the flight had departed from Amsterdam and the majority of passengers were Dutch .
The investigation concluded that a Buk surface-to-air missile was responsible for the crash , and evidence points to the missile being launched from rebel-held territory .
As a result of the Dutch report , the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted new rules for how civil aircraft operate in or near conflict zones .
Those new rules hold the state responsible for safety in airspace it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of communication between aircraft and local military assets is functional and communicating risks to airlines and airports .
It ’ s unclear if Russia will face charges in the International Court of Justice for its role in the strike , though it has thus far denied any responsibility .
If it goes forward , it will likely be the first real test of how the Chicago Convention governs these shorts of cases .
However , even if Article 3bis is a major step forward for legal accountability , it contains a massive loophole @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on states ’ right , under the U.N. Charter , to self-defense .
There are differing views in academia as to whether that clause , in effect , permits the shooting down of civilian aircraft if a state can invoke its own self-defense as justification .
Even still , given Tehran ’ s past insistence that international law should govern the shooting down of civilian aircraft , be it accidental or intentional , it may be difficult for the regime to now skirt culpability if a claim is filed with the International Court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Canada are all parties to the Chicago Convention .
But it may well fall on Trudeau to hold Iran accountable in a way that the Dutch were unable to do with Russia , at least to date .
On Thursday , Trudeau called Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to discuss his country ’ s experience with Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 .
Trudeau told reporters that Rutte highlighted the need to build “ direct and real relationships with all different elements involved in the crash , ” including those who possibly downed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insisted that the flight recorders must stay in Iran , although it has agreed to let Ukrainian investigators study their contents .
Iran has also said it would allow Canadian officials to join the investigation .
But Iranian officials are disputing the conclusion that a surface-to-air missile was responsible for the crash .
“ We can say that the airplane , considering the kind of the crash and the pilot ’ s efforts to return it to Imam Khomeini airport , didn ’ t explode in the air .
So , the allegation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ totally ruled out , ” Ali Abedzadeh , the head of the Iran Civil Aviation Organization , told state-owned PressTV on Thursday .
Should a final Iranian report conclude that mechanical failure was responsible for the crash , it ’ s unclear whether Tehran can really be held to account through international law .
Ottawa is eager to press the matter .
Trudeau , speaking with reporters Thursday , iterated that a “ credible ” investigation is a first step before Canada can consider legal action or diplomatic penalties for Iran .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we will contemplate as things move forward if it doesn ’ t appear that there is a credible , complete investigation , but right now , we continue to work with partners and , and direct Iran with our requests that we have a credible and complete investigation , ” he said .
A Canadian official told Foreign Policy that the Canadian government intends to see the investigation through .
Should Iran be found responsible , however , the official confirmed that the International Court of Justice would be the body responsible for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko also suggested , on Friday , that Kyiv could pursue legal recourse , potentially through the U.N .
There are good reasons for Iran to admit culpability—and Canada is in a novel position to force the issue , should it refuse .
With tensions still high in the region , Tehran can not afford to alienate other Western nations , especially those trying desperately to hold together the Iran nuclear deal .
Canada , in particular , has inched toward normalizing relations with Tehran .
While it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it has , in recent years , eliminated many of its own sanctions on the Iranian state .
The Trudeau government also committed to reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iran , beginning with high-level meetings with the theocratic regime , though that has yet to happen—and now seems unlikely , given the current climate .
As the investigation goes on , Canada is represented by the Italian Embassy in Tehran .
The Iranian regime is keen to reestablish Western relations , as reintegrating into the global community will ease pressures on the Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of living have rocked the regime , leading to a harsh crackdown .
Now the state is sure to face internal questions over its downing of the jet , given that the majority of those killed either lived in Iran or were of Iranian descent .
But should Iran continue to skirt responsibility and hamper an independent investigation , Ottawa may look to further isolate Tehran from the international community—and the toothlessness of air law may be reinforced .

Just after dawn on July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes misread signals from a plane taking off from the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas. Capt. William C. Rogers concluded that the plane was a F-14 fighter jet preparing for an attack run. The U.S. naval ship fired two surface-to-air missiles , one of which hit the jet.
Just after dawn on July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes misread signals from a plane taking off from the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas. Capt. William C. Rogers concluded that the plane was a F-14 fighter jet preparing for an attack run. The U.S. naval ship fired two surface-to-air missiles, one of which hit the jet.
Rogers soon learned that the plane he hit was not an F-14. It was Iran Air Flight 655. Onboard were 290 passengers and crew, mostly Iranian, all civilian.
Iran Air 655 was an unspeakable tragedy for Iran. History repeated itself this Wednesday when, once again, a civilian plane, destined for Ukraine and ultimately Toronto, was downed shortly after takeoff. As in 1988, the vast majority of the dead are Iranian or of Iranian descent—but this time it appears that Iran itself was the culprit.
At a Thursday afternoon press conference, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau confirmed that Western intelligence, both from the United States and other allies, strongly indicated that the Ukraine International Airlines flight was shot down by Iranian surface-to-air missiles, likely the Russian-made Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile system. Videos posted by civilians seem to back up that theory.
According to the Canadians, the missile strike may well have been accidental—likely a byproduct of the revenge attack on American bases in Iraq—but the investigation is ongoing. Of the 176 people on board the Ukraine International Airlines flight, 57 (initially believed to be 63) were Canadian citizens —many others were transferring through Toronto.
The 1988 shootdown carries useful lessons. Since then, international law has evolved substantially, but it still remains largely toothless when it comes to the downing of civilian aircraft—and it may be up to Canada and Ukraine to seek justice for the dead.
In 1988, the Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters, patrolling the Strait of Hormuz on guard against Iranian aggression. The Iran-Iraq War, already in its eighth year, had disrupted international shipping in the region, pushing a U.S. deployment to protect commercial traffic in the area.
Flight 655, the Pentagon initially claimed, had made an unusual descent that resembled that of an attacking jet. That maneuver, regardless of the considerable evidence that the jet was a commercial airliner, was enough to justify the missile strike. Later intelligence suggested that the plane was flying higher than first thought and that the error had been entirely on the American side.
Even so, in the days after the Iranian jet was shot down, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan expressed his “deep regret” over the incident in a cable to Tehran.
The months that followed were less amicable.
Iran sought a resolution from the United Nations Security Council condemning America’s actions, which it did not get. The next year, Tehran went to the International Court of Justice, starting proceedings under a pair of international conventions governing civil air travel.
From the outset, however, the United States argued that the international court had no jurisdiction to hear the case and that the incident could not be decided under the two treaties.
Washington eventually offered to settle with Tehran, with the case still before the court. The two sides signed a settlement agreement in 1996 for $131.8 million. As part of the settlement, the United States recognized the downing as a “terrible human tragedy and expressed deep regret over the loss of lives caused by the incident.” It did not, however, accept responsibility.
Even before the Ukrainian jet was shot down on Wednesday, the memory of Flight 655 was back in the news—invoked by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Monday as threats escalated between Tehran and Washington.
Beyond the downing of Flight 655, there have been numerous instances in which states have been found responsible for attacks on civil aircraft. The results of trying to hold them responsible has been a mixed bag.
In 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 fighter jet, killing 269 people. Soviet military personnel concluded the flight, which had drifted into protected airspace east of Russia, was a U.S. spy plane. A full investigation into the incident was made nearly impossible due to Soviet obfuscation at the time—the black box recording was not made public until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was the second Korean plane struck by the Soviets in five years – the first, Korean Air Lines 902 in 1978, managed to make an emergency landing with only two deaths.
At the time, the international community slapped sanctions on the USSR for the disaster, and a U.N. Security Council resolution stating the use of force on civilian aircraft was “incompatible with the norms governing international behavior” was introduced but vetoed by Moscow.
The disaster prompted the International Civil Aviation Organization to adopt a measure now known as Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, stating that “every state must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.” The article didn’t take effect, as it wasn’t ratified by a sufficient number of member states.
Just five months after the Iran Air flight was shot down in 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded and crashed near Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 270 people on board—mostly Americans. Investigators found evidence that plastic explosives had been packed into a boombox, blowing a hole in the plane’s fuselage.
U.S. intelligence identified two suspects, identifying them as working for Libyan intelligence. Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi initially refused to hand over the two men for trial before acquiescing. One of the two accused was convicted, although there was a belief that other more senior officials ultimately escaped justice. In the end, Qaddafi agreed to pay $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims’ families.
Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention would eventually be ratified, in 1998. Initially, it seemed to create a standard for how military downings of civilian aircraft should be handled. When Ukraine in 2001 inadvertently shot down a Tupolev Tu-154 plane, en route from Israel to Russia, it initially denied responsibility. After an investigation found its military responsible, it accepted full responsibility and signed a settlement agreement with both Israel and Russia.
But the more recent shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shows that international law is still ill equipped to handle states that refuse to take responsibility for their own actions. The flight was shot down by surface-to-air missiles in eastern Ukraine in 2014, landing in a field in Donetsk, the site of intense fighting between the Ukrainian military and Russian-speaking separatists supported by the Russian military.
The Netherlands handled the primary investigation, as the flight had departed from Amsterdam and the majority of passengers were Dutch. The investigation concluded that a Buk surface-to-air missile was responsible for the crash, and evidence points to the missile being launched from rebel-held territory.
As a result of the Dutch report, the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted new rules for how civil aircraft operate in or near conflict zones. Those new rules hold the state responsible for safety in airspace it controls, which includes ensuring that lines of communication between aircraft and local military assets is functional and communicating risks to airlines and airports.
It’s unclear if Russia will face charges in the International Court of Justice for its role in the strike, though it has thus far denied any responsibility. If it goes forward, it will likely be the first real test of how the Chicago Convention governs these shorts of cases.
However, even if Article 3bis is a major step forward for legal accountability, it contains a massive loophole, recognizing that it does not infringe on states’ right, under the U.N. Charter, to self-defense. There are differing views in academia as to whether that clause, in effect, permits the shooting down of civilian aircraft if a state can invoke its own self-defense as justification.
Even still, given Tehran’s past insistence that international law should govern the shooting down of civilian aircraft, be it accidental or intentional, it may be difficult for the regime to now skirt culpability if a claim is filed with the International Court of Justice. Iran, Ukraine, and Canada are all parties to the Chicago Convention.
But it may well fall on Trudeau to hold Iran accountable in a way that the Dutch were unable to do with Russia, at least to date. On Thursday, Trudeau called Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to discuss his country’s experience with Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. Trudeau told reporters that Rutte highlighted the need to build “direct and real relationships with all different elements involved in the crash,” including those who possibly downed the plane.
Thus far, Iran has insisted that the flight recorders must stay in Iran, although it has agreed to let Ukrainian investigators study their contents. Iran has also said it would allow Canadian officials to join the investigation.
But Iranian officials are disputing the conclusion that a surface-to-air missile was responsible for the crash. “We can say that the airplane, considering the kind of the crash and the pilot’s efforts to return it to Imam Khomeini airport, didn’t explode in the air. So, the allegation that it was hit by missiles is totally ruled out,” Ali Abedzadeh, the head of the Iran Civil Aviation Organization, told state-owned PressTV on Thursday. (Update: Iran admitted responsibility for the crash early in the morning on Saturday, after initial denials.)
Should a final Iranian report conclude that mechanical failure was responsible for the crash, it’s unclear whether Tehran can really be held to account through international law.
Ottawa is eager to press the matter. Trudeau, speaking with reporters Thursday, iterated that a “credible” investigation is a first step before Canada can consider legal action or diplomatic penalties for Iran. “I think those are conversations and steps we will contemplate as things move forward if it doesn’t appear that there is a credible, complete investigation, but right now, we continue to work with partners and, and direct Iran with our requests that we have a credible and complete investigation,” he said.
A Canadian official told Foreign Policy that the Canadian government intends to see the investigation through. Should Iran be found responsible, however, the official confirmed that the International Court of Justice would be the body responsible for handling any international legal action. Ukraine’s Foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko also suggested, on Friday, that Kyiv could pursue legal recourse, potentially through the U.N.
There are good reasons for Iran to admit culpability—and Canada is in a novel position to force the issue, should it refuse. With tensions still high in the region, Tehran cannot afford to alienate other Western nations, especially those trying desperately to hold together the Iran nuclear deal.
Canada, in particular, has inched toward normalizing relations with Tehran. While it is not party to the 2015 deal, it has, in recent years, eliminated many of its own sanctions on the Iranian state. The Trudeau government also committed to reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iran, beginning with high-level meetings with the theocratic regime , though that has yet to happen—and now seems unlikely, given the current climate. As the investigation goes on, Canada is represented by the Italian Embassy in Tehran.
The Iranian regime is keen to reestablish Western relations, as reintegrating into the global community will ease pressures on the Iranian economy. Popular protests over the cost of living have rocked the regime, leading to a harsh crackdown. Now the state is sure to face internal questions over its downing of the jet, given that the majority of those killed either lived in Iran or were of Iranian descent.
But should Iran continue to skirt responsibility and hamper an independent investigation, Ottawa may look to further isolate Tehran from the international community—and the toothlessness of air law may be reinforced.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Assassination, Extrajudicial Execution, or Targeted Killing—What’s the Difference?

The premeditated killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3 has sown confusion in the foreign-policy community about the legality of the act .
Was it an assassination , an extrajudicial execution , or a targeted killing ?
How are these terms different , and what does it matter what we call it ?
Are any of these acts ever legal ?
Perhaps no foreign-policy concept causes—indeed relies on—more confusion about the nature of international law than the practice of targeted killings , which is what the United States often calls its strikes against alleged terrorists abroad .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ assassination and extrajudicial execution , there is no such concept in international law .
The term was originally coined by a human rights organization to distinguish El Salvador death squads ’ assassination of individuals from the squads ’ wider indiscriminate killings of civilians .
Both acts , Americas Watch correctly argued , violated human rights standards as well as the international laws surrounding war .
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s , the United States agreed with Americas Watch ’ s assessment .
It even condemned its ally Israel ’ s political targeting of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently , the term “ targeted killings ” has seeped into political and public discourse to legitimize the United States ’ use of the very same tactic : the extrajudicial execution of nonstate political adversaries .
The rhetorical sleight of hand has been convenient ; political assassination has long been seen as taboo in war and is explicitly prohibited by the 1907 Hague Convention , which set out the basic laws for the conduct of hostilities , and 1998 Rome Statute , which articulated which war crimes could be prosecuted by the International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the extrajudicial execution of political opponents—or anyone else—is illegal .
It is considered a violation of the human right to life enshrined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .
The term “ targeted killing , ” though , implies that U.S. counterterrorism strikes are something different—something not covered by existing norms .
The Suleimani killing , however , may put that idea to rest while also demonstrating precisely why political murder is simply a terrible idea .
In times of peace , the extrajudicial killing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of human rights .
Criminals , terrorists , and gang members must be properly arrested , tried , and convicted of a capital offense before they can be put to death .
According to human rights experts , any extrajudicial killings in peacetime thus violate the human right to life , except in situations where there is an imminent threat and no arrest is possible , such as a SWAT team shooting a hostage-taker .
Even so , in such law enforcement situations , targets are not selected in advance or placed on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missions with an aim to capture and put suspects to a fair trial .
On these grounds , organizations like Human Rights Watch , Amnesty International , and the United Nations Office of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial , Summary , or Arbitrary Executions have repeatedly stated that targeted killings violate international human rights law .
In times of war , however , different rules prevail .
For parties to an armed conflict , within some limits , the premeditated killing of adversaries without trial is permitted .
But here , it depends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interstate wars , the parties may kill only armed forces of the enemy state who are neither sick , wounded , detained , or surrendering .
In noninternational wars , fought by or against nonstate adversaries who may live civilian lives when not fighting , killing is permitted only when the targets are directly engaged in hostilities .
Hunting them down when they are going about their everyday business is prohibited—targeting particular individuals rather than armed groups in general , even more so .
In short , in neither times of peace nor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States now labels targeted killings—generally considered acceptable .
U.S. domestic law bans the practice in peacetime , and it has long been viewed and treated as a violation of the laws and norms of war as well .
To be sure , there is some ambiguity .
Assassination per se is not defined in international treaty : The prohibition found in the Hague Conventions is against “ treacherously killing or wounding individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.
” In military manuals , that rule has long been interpreted as banning assassination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ differently .
In the 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual , for example , the definition hinged on whether a specific individual was selected for execution ; soldiers must be targeted not because they are personally guilty but only because and as long as they pose a threat to the enemy army .
On assuming office , the Barack Obama administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to international law but picked up on Bush-era logic to articulate a legal rationale for expanding his targeted killing policy .
Obama lawyers argued that a conflict zone existed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrest jihadis .
Allowing suspected militants to live posed a continuing , imminent danger to civilian life and limb .
In short , targeted killings were , in Obama ’ s mind , not extrajudicial executions because wartime law , not human rights law , applied .
They were not assassinations , either , according to an internal memo leaked to the press in 2013 .
The reason for that determination is not made clear , but perhaps it was based on the administration ’ s assertion that the rules of noninternational armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ban on treacherous killing is found primarily in the interstate law of war .
Yet human rights activists and scholars have repeatedly critiqued these formulations .
They argue that terrorists should not be dealt with as war combatants but as criminals , using a law enforcement paradigm .
Obama ’ s overly broad definition of imminent danger also troubled his critics .
And even if he was correct that the war on terrorism was a global , never-ending , noninternational armed conflict during which taboos against assassination don ’ t apply , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still be at play .
According to those , only the very highest-ranking militia leaders could be considered combatants at all times—and even then , under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions , those people should not be attacked when sick , wounded , or surrendering .
This standard was likely not met during the mission that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden : He died unarmed in front of his family .
For lower-level militants , the relevant rules say they can be attacked only when directly participating in hostilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their daily civilian business or supporting hostilities indirectly .
The drone killing in 2011 of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was likely illegal on these grounds .
Awlaki ’ s propagandizing for al Qaeda does not fit the International Committee of the Red Cross ’ s definition of “ direct participation ” in armed conflict , and at any rate , he was simply riding down the highway in a car with his son in Yemen when he died .
Many other targets of drone strikes in Pakistan , Somalia , and Yemen were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ description or profile of terrorist suspects but who were in reality civilians going about their business—like Tariq Aziz , a teen Pakistani soccer player and human rights activist who died when his car was hit by an American missile in 2012 .
A final problem is that , even if these particular men and boys had all been legitimate combatant targets in a bona fide global war , the laws of war require proportionality : a balance between the military value of a killing and the incidental harm to civilians as a result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ precision and accuracy , but in reality an estimated 90 percent of the deaths they cause are among civilians .
One strike in October 2006 killed 69 children—and while Obama reduced civilian casualties with more stringent rules of engagement , they have risen under President Donald Trump .
All this for a strategy whose military value is disputed : As the political scientist Stephanie Carvin and the criminologist Jennifer Carson show , evidence is quite mixed as to whether targeted killings are effective or in fact counterproductive , which further undermines the proportionality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups and scholars have concluded that targeted killing is generally problematic if not outright illegal .
But perhaps because of the rhetoric surrounding the practice , many in the United States believe that it is a legitimate tactic .
Polls as recent as 2015 show majority support among the U.S. public for targeted killing policy .
The killing of Suleimani shuffled the deck .
First , as a high-ranking official of an actual government , he can not as easily be cast as a terrorist renegade as nonstate actors like bin Laden .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ official such as Suleimani could arguably be lawfully killed but only if an international armed conflict already existed between Iran and the United States .
And even then , it would not be legal to single him out as an individual , least of all in a third country not party to the war .
To be sure , as the political scientist Ian Hurd argues , international law is flexible enough for savvy lawyers to justify almost any act : The “ self ” in “ self-defense ” in the U.N. Charter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has the concept of imminence .
But that doesn ’ t mean such justifications will convince others .
Bush attempted to reinterpret the meaning of “ torture ” to excuse his interrogation policy , but as the political scientist Jamal Barnes shows , he convinced no one .
Similarly , Americans may be willing to tell pollsters they think targeted killings are legal , but global public opinion skews the other direction .
The way that Obama carefully sidestepped the assassination taboo without contesting it indicates that the taboo still has power , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration and its supporters have tried to frame Suleimani ’ s death as a “ targeted killing ” of a “ terrorist ” analogous to Obama-era drone strikes suggests they hope for the same cover .
That strategy is unlikely to work .
Already new reports cast doubt on this claim .
Overall , the Suleimani killing ( and reactions to it ) shows why we have rules against political murder in the first place .
As the political scientist Ward Thomas points out , the ethics of the ban on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seem odd to forbid the targeting of a culpable leader but condone the slaughter of conscript multitudes in war .
But ethics aside , the taboo against the assassination of political leaders in war or peace has served an important political function : It has protected the leaders of powerful states against harm by weaker adversaries , who may be tempted to deploy assassination because they could not defeat more powerful armies in the field .
As such , until recently , powerful countries have been loath to use assassination as a tool @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have benefited their interests and forestalled greater bloodshed—because the norm protects U.S. officials as well .
But the norm is slowly weakening , creating a slippery slope .
The United States should not be surprised if other nations pick up the practice , too .

The premeditated killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3 has sown confusion in the foreign-policy community about the legality of the act . Was it an assassination, an extrajudicial execution, or a targeted killing? How are these terms different, and what does it matter what we call it? Are any of these acts ever legal?
The premeditated killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Jan. 3 has sown confusion in the foreign-policy community about the legality of the act. Was it an assassination, an extrajudicial execution, or a targeted killing? How are these terms different, and what does it matter what we call it? Are any of these acts ever legal?
Perhaps no foreign-policy concept causes—indeed relies on—more confusion about the nature of international law than the practice of targeted killings, which is what the United States often calls its strikes against alleged terrorists abroad. That is because, in contrast to assassination and extrajudicial execution, there is no such concept in international law. The term was originally coined by a human rights organization to distinguish El Salvador death squads’ assassination of individuals from the squads’ wider indiscriminate killings of civilians. Both acts, Americas Watch correctly argued, violated human rights standards as well as the international laws surrounding war.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States agreed with Americas Watch’s assessment. It even condemned its ally Israel’s political targeting of Hamas leaders as illegal. But more recently, the term “targeted killings” has seeped into political and public discourse to legitimize the United States’ use of the very same tactic: the extrajudicial execution of nonstate political adversaries.
The rhetorical sleight of hand has been convenient; political assassination has long been seen as taboo in war and is explicitly prohibited by the 1907 Hague Convention, which set out the basic laws for the conduct of hostilities, and 1998 Rome Statute, which articulated which war crimes could be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. In peacetime, too, the extrajudicial execution of political opponents—or anyone else—is illegal. It is considered a violation of the human right to life enshrined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The term “targeted killing,” though, implies that U.S. counterterrorism strikes are something different—something not covered by existing norms. The Suleimani killing, however, may put that idea to rest while also demonstrating precisely why political murder is simply a terrible idea.
Americans often think about the legality of specific targeted killings in terms of congressional approval or the sovereignty of foreign governments. Republican Sen. Tom Cotton made his argument for the Suleimani killing in these terms in a Jan. 10 New York Times op-ed. But even in cases where both the U.S. Congress and a foreign government give consent for such an operation, the legality of kill missions against specific individuals is hotly contested. There is a variety of international treaties against them that the United States is bound to follow under Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution. The problem is that these treaties apply in different contexts.
In times of peace, the extrajudicial killing of citizens is prohibited as a fundamental tenet of human rights. Criminals, terrorists, and gang members must be properly arrested, tried, and convicted of a capital offense before they can be put to death. According to human rights experts, any extrajudicial killings in peacetime thus violate the human right to life, except in situations where there is an imminent threat and no arrest is possible, such as a SWAT team shooting a hostage-taker. Even so, in such law enforcement situations, targets are not selected in advance or placed on kill lists. Police officers begin their missions with an aim to capture and put suspects to a fair trial. On these grounds, organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Office of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions have repeatedly stated that targeted killings violate international human rights law.
In times of war, however, different rules prevail. For parties to an armed conflict, within some limits, the premeditated killing of adversaries without trial is permitted. But here, it depends on what kind of war. In interstate wars, the parties may kill only armed forces of the enemy state who are neither sick, wounded, detained, or surrendering. In noninternational wars, fought by or against nonstate adversaries who may live civilian lives when not fighting, killing is permitted only when the targets are directly engaged in hostilities. Hunting them down when they are going about their everyday business is prohibited—targeting particular individuals rather than armed groups in general, even more so.
In short, in neither times of peace nor times of war is assassination—what the United States now labels targeted killings—generally considered acceptable. U.S. domestic law bans the practice in peacetime, and it has long been viewed and treated as a violation of the laws and norms of war as well.
To be sure, there is some ambiguity. Assassination per se is not defined in international treaty: The prohibition found in the Hague Conventions is against “treacherously killing or wounding individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.” In military manuals, that rule has long been interpreted as banning assassination, but different nations define it slightly differently. In the 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual, for example, the definition hinged on whether a specific individual was selected for execution; soldiers must be targeted not because they are personally guilty but only because and as long as they pose a threat to the enemy army.
Prohibitions against assassination began to break down after 9/11, when the George W. Bush administration conceptualized the fight against a group of terrorists as a war. In such a battle, fought not against states but networks, the old rules of war—including policies about prisoners of war and prohibitions on torture—were argued not to apply. Similarly, the United States began to argue that the ban on assassination applied only to political leaders and only in peacetime. Thus, the first counterterrorism drone strike was carried out by Bush in 2002 in Yemen against Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole. His guilt had never been established in a court of law. Five other suspected al Qaeda members died with him.
On assuming office, the Barack Obama administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to international law but picked up on Bush-era logic to articulate a legal rationale for expanding his targeted killing policy. Obama lawyers argued that a conflict zone existed everywhere states were unable or unwilling to arrest jihadis. Allowing suspected militants to live posed a continuing, imminent danger to civilian life and limb. In short, targeted killings were, in Obama’s mind, not extrajudicial executions because wartime law, not human rights law, applied. They were not assassinations, either, according to an internal memo leaked to the press in 2013. The reason for that determination is not made clear, but perhaps it was based on the administration’s assertion that the rules of noninternational armed conflict—rather than international armed conflict—applied, whereas the ban on treacherous killing is found primarily in the interstate law of war.
Yet human rights activists and scholars have repeatedly critiqued these formulations. They argue that terrorists should not be dealt with as war combatants but as criminals, using a law enforcement paradigm. Obama’s overly broad definition of imminent danger also troubled his critics. And even if he was correct that the war on terrorism was a global, never-ending, noninternational armed conflict during which taboos against assassination don’t apply, other laws of noninternational armed conflict would still be at play. According to those, only the very highest-ranking militia leaders could be considered combatants at all times—and even then, under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, those people should not be attacked when sick, wounded, or surrendering. This standard was likely not met during the mission that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden: He died unarmed in front of his family.
For lower-level militants, the relevant rules say they can be attacked only when directly participating in hostilities, not when they are going about their daily civilian business or supporting hostilities indirectly. The drone killing in 2011 of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was likely illegal on these grounds. Awlaki’s propagandizing for al Qaeda does not fit the International Committee of the Red Cross’s definition of “direct participation” in armed conflict, and at any rate, he was simply riding down the highway in a car with his son in Yemen when he died. Many other targets of drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen were young men who happened to fit the description or profile of terrorist suspects but who were in reality civilians going about their business—like Tariq Aziz, a teen Pakistani soccer player and human rights activist who died when his car was hit by an American missile in 2012.
A final problem is that, even if these particular men and boys had all been legitimate combatant targets in a bona fide global war, the laws of war require proportionality: a balance between the military value of a killing and the incidental harm to civilians as a result. The language of targeted killings implies precision and accuracy, but in reality an estimated 90 percent of the deaths they cause are among civilians. One strike in October 2006 killed 69 children—and while Obama reduced civilian casualties with more stringent rules of engagement, they have risen under President Donald Trump. All this for a strategy whose military value is disputed: As the political scientist Stephanie Carvin and the criminologist Jennifer Carson show, evidence is quite mixed as to whether targeted killings are effective or in fact counterproductive, which further undermines the proportionality principle.
Ultimately, many human rights groups and scholars have concluded that targeted killing is generally problematic if not outright illegal. But perhaps because of the rhetoric surrounding the practice, many in the United States believe that it is a legitimate tactic. Polls as recent as 2015 show majority support among the U.S. public for targeted killing policy.
As the political scientist Simon Pratt has argued, Obama’s rhetorical arguments shifted Americans’ understanding of assassination just far enough to accommodate targeted killings as something different. Until this month, the popular understanding was that assassination was only assassination if directed at state political leaders; strikes were only extrajudicial execution if they occurred in peacetime not in war; and that the U.S. war on terrorism extended everywhere at all times, even to nonconflict zones like Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and certainly to Iraq.
The killing of Suleimani shuffled the deck. First, as a high-ranking official of an actual government, he cannot as easily be cast as a terrorist renegade as nonstate actors like bin Laden. Second, in wartime, a military official such as Suleimani could arguably be lawfully killed but only if an international armed conflict already existed between Iran and the United States. And even then, it would not be legal to single him out as an individual, least of all in a third country not party to the war.
To be sure, as the political scientist Ian Hurd argues, international law is flexible enough for savvy lawyers to justify almost any act: The “self” in “self-defense” in the U.N. Charter has been stretched over time, as has the concept of imminence. But that doesn’t mean such justifications will convince others. Bush attempted to reinterpret the meaning of “torture” to excuse his interrogation policy, but as the political scientist Jamal Barnes shows, he convinced no one. Similarly, Americans may be willing to tell pollsters they think targeted killings are legal, but global public opinion skews the other direction. The way that Obama carefully sidestepped the assassination taboo without contesting it indicates that the taboo still has power, including in the United States. That the Trump administration and its supporters have tried to frame Suleimani’s death as a “targeted killing” of a “terrorist” analogous to Obama-era drone strikes suggests they hope for the same cover. That strategy is unlikely to work. Already new reports cast doubt on this claim.
Overall, the Suleimani killing (and reactions to it) shows why we have rules against political murder in the first place. As the political scientist Ward Thomas points out, the ethics of the ban on political assassination have long been sketchy—it might seem odd to forbid the targeting of a culpable leader but condone the slaughter of conscript multitudes in war. But ethics aside, the taboo against the assassination of political leaders in war or peace has served an important political function: It has protected the leaders of powerful states against harm by weaker adversaries, who may be tempted to deploy assassination because they could not defeat more powerful armies in the field. As such, until recently, powerful countries have been loath to use assassination as a tool themselves, even where it may well have benefited their interests and forestalled greater bloodshed—because the norm protects U.S. officials as well.
But the norm is slowly weakening, creating a slippery slope. The United States should not be surprised if other nations pick up the practice, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-10--Record U.S. Oil Production Is Keeping Crude Prices From Spiking

Despite the unrest in the Middle East over the past week—including the killing of Iran ’ s most powerful commander and missile strikes on military bases in Iraq—oil prices have remained relatively stable .
As the chart below shows , West Texas Intermediate ( WTI ) crude closed at $ 59.56 a barrel on Thursday , around the same price as where it traded a month ago .
Previous Middle East crises resulted in greater disruptions of the oil market .
The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to a surge in the price of oil from $ 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by October ( $ 65.68 adjusted for inflation as of 2019 ) .
In February 2003 , the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq once again led to a spike in prices to nearly $ 40 a barrel , or around $ 55 in today ’ s dollars , a level that hadn ’ t been seen since the Gulf War .
Since then , a boom in U.S. shale oil drilling has loosened the connection between major geopolitical events and the cost of energy .
The growth of the shale oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the U.S. decision to repeal an oil export ban in 2015 , has created slack in the global oil supply chain .
As a result , the United States has become less dependent on foreign oil , while members of the OPEC oil cartel , have curtailed production .
As seen in the chart below , U.S. monthly crude oil exports have exploded since 2012 , while imports steadily declined .
The reasons for steadier oil prices also include a global economic slowdown , particularly in China and emerging markets , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demand for energy .
But a decreased reliance on foreign oil helps create some room for Washington to act more aggressively in the Middle East than it could in years past .

A pumpjack sits on the outskirts of town at dawn in the Permian Basin oil field on Jan. 21, 2016 in the oil town of Midland, Texas.Spencer Platt/Getty Images
Despite the unrest in the Middle East over the past week—including the killing of Iran’s most powerful commander and missile strikes on military bases in Iraq—oil prices have remained relatively stable. As the chart below shows, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude closed at $59.56 a barrel on Thursday, around the same price as where it traded a month ago.
WTI Crude Prices Since December 2019 In USD per barrel
Source: oilprice.com
Previous Middle East crises resulted in greater disruptions of the oil market. The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to a surge in the price of oil from $15 a barrel that month to $40 by October ($65.68 adjusted for inflation as of 2019). In February 2003, the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq once again led to a spike in prices to nearly $40 a barrel, or around $55 in today’s dollars, a level that hadn’t been seen since the Gulf War.
Since then, a boom in U.S. shale oil drilling has loosened the connection between major geopolitical events and the cost of energy. The growth of the shale oil market over the past decade, combined with the U.S. decision to repeal an oil export ban in 2015, has created slack in the global oil supply chain. As a result, the United States has become less dependent on foreign oil, while members of the OPEC oil cartel, have curtailed production. As seen in the chart below, U.S. monthly crude oil exports have exploded since 2012, while imports steadily declined.
Monthly U.S. Crude Oil Exports and Imports From OPEC Countries In Thousand Barrels per day, as of October 2019
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
The reasons for steadier oil prices also include a global economic slowdown, particularly in China and emerging markets, which has slowed the rate of growth in demand for energy. But a decreased reliance on foreign oil helps create some room for Washington to act more aggressively in the Middle East than it could in years past.