foreignpolicy--2020-10-10--The Case for Climate Reparations

The Case for Climate Reparations

Over the next 30 years , the climate crisis will displace more than 140 million people within their own countries—and many more beyond them .
Global warming doesn ’ t respect lines on a map : It will drive massive waves of displacement across national borders , as it has in Guatemala and Africa ’ s Sahel region in recent years .
The great climate migration that will transform the world is just beginning .
To adapt , the international community will need a different approach to politics .
There are two ways forward : climate reparations or climate colonialism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address inequalities caused or exacerbated by the climate crisis ; it would allow for a way out of the climate catastrophe by tackling both mitigation and migration .
The climate colonialism alternative , on the other hand , would mean the survival of the wealthiest and devastation for the world ’ s most vulnerable people .
The wealthy find ways to insulate themselves from the worst consequences of the climate crisis .
In Lagos , Nigeria , for example , the government cleared hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers to make way for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lagos sea wall will shield a planned luxury community on Victoria Island from sea level rise at the expense of neighboring areas .
The poor , the unemployed , and those who lack stable housing are seeing their living conditions rapidly deteriorate , with little hope for a solution .
Climate colonialism is like climate apartheid on an international scale .
Economic power , location , and access to resources determine how communities can respond to climate impacts .
But these factors are shaped by existing global injustices : the history of slavery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some countries at the expense of others .
Global warming has exacerbated these inequalities , and the climate crisis will lead to new divisions between those who can mitigate its impact and those who can not .
Existing theories of international relations can not provide policymakers with the intellectual resources to respond to the crisis .
The climate crisis is the result of the relentless pursuit of private interests by both multinational corporations and powerful countries : Fossil fuel companies seek profit , governments seek energy security , and private investors seek financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the campaigns of climate denialism that have slowed the international response to climate crisis , and that continue to fuel resource and land grabbing in many parts of Africa , Latin America , and Asia .
Unless these powerful entities abandon financial and political self-interest in favor of the greater good , the pursuit of elite interest in a world where power is distributed so unevenly guarantees climate colonialism—that is , if society survives at all .
In recent decades , an increasing number of private companies have embraced corporate social responsibility as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the goals of profit-seeking corporations with the public good—thus converting the market into a tool for driving positive change .
But when short-term shareholder value faces off against the public good—and it often does—the former tends to win out .
This mismatch of incentives is itself a fundamental cause of the climate crisis .
State actors often bolster these private corporations .
For example , recently publicized documents show that petroleum companies lobbied the United States to demand that Kenya lift its ban on plastic bags as part of a broader trade negotiation—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This kind of lobbying is common ; when a government negotiates trade agreements , it often seeks to protect the interests of the companies that generate wealth for the state .
While some state actors are less nefarious than others , all tend to prioritize their own best interests over those of another country ’ s citizens .
Liberal IR theorists argue that progress is achieved through cooperation and good will in international organizations and seek to resuscitate those international organizations that the United States has neglected since 2017 .
Once U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they believe the United States will return to its helm as the leader of the international rules-based order .
The problem is that a return to the pre-2017 status quo won ’ t save the planet , either .
Long before Trump , international institutions failed the world ’ s most vulnerable people .
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have consistently harmed the countries they claim to help .
After the oil crises of the late 1970s , the two institutions combined to impose “ structural adjustment ” programs in developing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy decisions .
The results were disastrous : Structural adjustment has been associated with large contractions in government services for the poorest in the global south and accelerated ecosystem destruction by extractive agribusiness .
Perhaps most glaring is the example of the international refugee regime .
As the philosopher Serena Parekh explains , this regime , established in the aftermath of World War II , consists of a patchwork of norms and decision-making institutions shaped by the ascendant Western powers of the era , who stood atop a global political system structured by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world .
When refugee flows from non-European countries increased in the second half of the 20th century , many Western powers shifted policy .
While some refugees were accepted and resettled , many others were warehoused , detained , or subject to refoulement—forcible return—in violation of the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees .
Refugee camps proliferated , sold as temporary ways to rescue refugees and sustain them pending resettlement or their decision to return home ( known by the euphemism “ voluntary repatriation ” ) , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the social and financial responsibility of managing large-scale migration , and in particular the political costs of integration and education .
The result has been unconscionable : In 2019 , only 108,700 refugees were resettled out of a total of 26 million .
The continuation of this status quo will make climate colonialism a near certainty , especially considering recent responses to migration in Europe , Australia , and the United States .
Rich Western countries have already responded punitively to migration , holding thousands of migrants in detention centers under horrific conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attempted suicides and protests by the incarcerated for better treatment .
Since 2015 , European countries have reacted aggressively to the plight of asylum seekers ; there is no indication that their response to climate refugees would be any more humane .
Even the institutions charged specifically to protect refugees are failing .
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees ( UNHCR ) has so far refused to grant refugee status—and the protection that comes with it—to the 21.5 million people fleeing their homes as a result of sudden onset weather hazards every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environmental migrants.
” Given these threadbare legal protections , it is unlikely that future climate migrants will fare any better .
What is needed is a bold reimagining of the policies governing climate migration .
A reparations-based approach to the coming wave of climate refugees would address two distinct but interconnected issues : climate change mitigation , which would aim to minimize displacement ; and just climate migration policy , which would respond to the displacement that governments have failed to prevent .
The reparations alternative would substantially increase developed economies ’ contributions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and prevent displacement .
It would also end warehousing of refugees and substantially increase migration from the global south .
Examples of promising mitigation policies include the draft climate law proposed by the European Commission in March 2020 that would make a legally binding commitment for the European Union to reduce its greenhouse-gas emissions to net zero by 2050 .
The Green New Deal proposal , U.S. congressional resolutions that lay out a new approach to tackling climate change , also articulates important mitigation measures .
But to mitigate climate change effectively and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broadly redistribute funds across states to respond to inequalities in resilience capacity and the unjust system underpinning them .
As Mohammed Adow , the director of the Nairobi-based think tank Power Shift Africa , explains , the international community has already designed a mechanism that could perform this task : the Green Climate Fund ( GCF ) , which is the largest international fund aimed at helping developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate impacts .
However , the $ 6 billion currently committed to the GCF is a fraction of the $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per year by 2020 .
Much of the funds committed come by way of private sector financing , reclassification of preexisting aid packages , and loans rather than cash grants or payment-in-kind .
As climate impacts intensify in some of the world ’ s poorest countries , mechanisms like the GCF will become even more important .
A reparatory approach to the climate crisis would require an overhaul of the existing international refugee regime .
With this approach , the international community would reject the framing of refugee policy as rescue and rethink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refugees in camps with international approval .
Parekh writes that as rescuers , Western states may be praised for helping refugees , but they are rarely held accountable by other states or multinational institutions for not doing enough .
But once the issue is reframed so that Western states see themselves as contributing to a “ system that structurally prevents the majority of refugees from finding refuge , ” taking up their share of global refugee resettlement becomes an obligation rather than an act of charity .
In the context of the climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than secondary harms experienced within the international refugee regime .
A reparatory approach seeks to understand which harms were committed and how through structural change , those harms can be addressed .
A historically informed response to climate migration would force Western states to grapple with their role in creating the climate crisis and rendering parts of the world uninhabitable .
The legal scholar E. Tendayi Achiume argues that corrective , distributive justice demands recognition of the entitlement of “ Third World persons ” to “ a form of First World citizenship.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ state sovereignty that challenges the right to exclude political strangers .
This framework is especially pertinent in the context of climate justice .
Developed economies are largely responsible for the climate crisis and have more resources to manage climate impacts , while developing countries are often less responsible and poorly equipped to survive the impacts—rendering the political exclusion of climate refugees unjust .
In this sense , it merits emphasis that the reparatory framework operates on a sliding scale .
Accounting for which parts of the world bear responsibility for structural injustices that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of countries such as China and India relative to the West .
But their policy trajectory could increase their share of the global climate burden relative to other formerly colonized countries .
China , for example , has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060 , which is a step in the right direction .
But it continues to invest in and profit from coal power projects , often in developing countries that are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment .
To implement a climate reparations approach , the United States has much preliminary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 , the Trump administration limited the maximum number of refugees admitted to the United States to just 18,000 .
On Oct. 1 , the day after a Minnesota campaign rally in which Trump leveled insults at Somali American Rep. Ilhan Omar , herself a former refugee , his administration announced intentions to admit fewer refugees than ever before .
As a first step , the United States needs to get back to its own normal .
Leaders from both parties have set significantly higher ceilings than Trump : President Ronald Reagan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Barack Obama set a refugee admissions target of 110,000 for 2017 .
A failure to admit more refugees will accelerate the worst political effects of the climate crisis : fueling the transition of eco-fascism from fringe extremism to ruling ideology .
The recognition of rights to movement and resettlement , and a steady liberalization of rich-country border policies fit under a reparatory framework , especially when paired with more sensible mitigation policies .
However extreme this renegotiation of state sovereignty and citizenship may seem , it ’ s nowhere near as extreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quo ’ s violent alternative : mass famine , region-scale armed conflict , and widespread displacement .
Compared to the horrors of climate apartheid and colonialism , having more neighbors is a small price to pay .

Current estimates put the world on track for as much as a 5°C temperature increase by the end of the century, reshaping the places that humans have lived for thousands of years. Island states such as Haiti, Cape Verde, and Fiji face “ existential risks ” from sea level rise and extreme weather events. By as soon as 2050, large parts of Mumbai, Ho Chi Minh City, and New Orleans may be underwater .
Current estimates put the world on track for as much as a 5°C temperature increase by the end of the century, reshaping the places that humans have lived for thousands of years. Island states such as Haiti, Cape Verde, and Fiji face “existential risks” from sea level rise and extreme weather events. By as soon as 2050, large parts of Mumbai, Ho Chi Minh City, and New Orleans may be underwater.
Over the next 30 years, the climate crisis will displace more than 140 million people within their own countries—and many more beyond them. Global warming doesn’t respect lines on a map: It will drive massive waves of displacement across national borders, as it has in Guatemala and Africa’s Sahel region in recent years.
The great climate migration that will transform the world is just beginning. To adapt, the international community will need a different approach to politics. There are two ways forward: climate reparations or climate colonialism. Reparations would use international resources to address inequalities caused or exacerbated by the climate crisis; it would allow for a way out of the climate catastrophe by tackling both mitigation and migration. The climate colonialism alternative, on the other hand, would mean the survival of the wealthiest and devastation for the world’s most vulnerable people.
As the climate crisis intensifies, social divisions will arise within countries and communities between those who can pay to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and those who cannot—a system of climate apartheid. In Bangladesh, rising sea levels have displaced hundreds of thousands of people, pushing some into poverty and deepening socioeconomic inequality. Increased desertification in Nigeria has caused resource shortages in water and land, leading to conflict between herders and farmers. In the United States, unprecedented wildfires, heat, and smog have hit unhoused people the hardest.
The wealthy find ways to insulate themselves from the worst consequences of the climate crisis. In Lagos, Nigeria, for example, the government cleared hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers to make way for developers. The so-called Great Wall of Lagos sea wall will shield a planned luxury community on Victoria Island from sea level rise at the expense of neighboring areas. The poor, the unemployed, and those who lack stable housing are seeing their living conditions rapidly deteriorate, with little hope for a solution.
Climate colonialism is like climate apartheid on an international scale. Economic power, location, and access to resources determine how communities can respond to climate impacts. But these factors are shaped by existing global injustices: the history of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism that enriched some countries at the expense of others. Global warming has exacerbated these inequalities, and the climate crisis will lead to new divisions between those who can mitigate its impact and those who cannot.
The climate crisis is the result of the relentless pursuit of private interests by both multinational corporations and powerful countries.
Existing theories of international relations cannot provide policymakers with the intellectual resources to respond to the crisis. The climate crisis is the result of the relentless pursuit of private interests by both multinational corporations and powerful countries: Fossil fuel companies seek profit, governments seek energy security, and private investors seek financial security. These pursuits have contributed to the campaigns of climate denialism that have slowed the international response to climate crisis, and that continue to fuel resource and land grabbing in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Unless these powerful entities abandon financial and political self-interest in favor of the greater good, the pursuit of elite interest in a world where power is distributed so unevenly guarantees climate colonialism—that is, if society survives at all. In recent decades, an increasing number of private companies have embraced corporate social responsibility as a ruling ethos, hoping to align the goals of profit-seeking corporations with the public good—thus converting the market into a tool for driving positive change. But when short-term shareholder value faces off against the public good—and it often does—the former tends to win out. This mismatch of incentives is itself a fundamental cause of the climate crisis.
State actors often bolster these private corporations. For example, recently publicized documents show that petroleum companies lobbied the United States to demand that Kenya lift its ban on plastic bags as part of a broader trade negotiation—a move that would boost company profits. This kind of lobbying is common; when a government negotiates trade agreements, it often seeks to protect the interests of the companies that generate wealth for the state. While some state actors are less nefarious than others, all tend to prioritize their own best interests over those of another country’s citizens.
Liberal IR theorists argue that progress is achieved through cooperation and good will in international organizations and seek to resuscitate those international organizations that the United States has neglected since 2017. Once U.S. President Donald Trump is out of office, they believe the United States will return to its helm as the leader of the international rules-based order.
The problem is that a return to the pre-2017 status quo won’t save the planet, either. Long before Trump, international institutions failed the world’s most vulnerable people. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have consistently harmed the countries they claim to help. After the oil crises of the late 1970s, the two institutions combined to impose “structural adjustment” programs in developing countries, conditioning much-needed aid on economic policy decisions. The results were disastrous: Structural adjustment has been associated with large contractions in government services for the poorest in the global south and accelerated ecosystem destruction by extractive agribusiness.
Perhaps most glaring is the example of the international refugee regime. As the philosopher Serena Parekh explains, this regime, established in the aftermath of World War II, consists of a patchwork of norms and decision-making institutions shaped by the ascendant Western powers of the era, who stood atop a global political system structured by their formal colonial rule over much of the world. When refugee flows from non-European countries increased in the second half of the 20th century, many Western powers shifted policy. While some refugees were accepted and resettled, many others were warehoused, detained, or subject to refoulement—forcible return—in violation of the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The continuation of this status quo will make climate colonialism a near certainty.
Refugee camps proliferated, sold as temporary ways to rescue refugees and sustain them pending resettlement or their decision to return home (known by the euphemism “voluntary repatriation”), but actually served to shield Western elites from the social and financial responsibility of managing large-scale migration, and in particular the political costs of integration and education. The result has been unconscionable: In 2019, only 108,700 refugees were resettled out of a total of 26 million.
The continuation of this status quo will make climate colonialism a near certainty, especially considering recent responses to migration in Europe, Australia, and the United States. Rich Western countries have already responded punitively to migration, holding thousands of migrants in detention centers under horrific conditions and responding with indifference or violence to attempted suicides and protests by the incarcerated for better treatment. Since 2015, European countries have reacted aggressively to the plight of asylum seekers; there is no indication that their response to climate refugees would be any more humane.
Even the institutions charged specifically to protect refugees are failing. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has so far refused to grant refugee status—and the protection that comes with it—to the 21.5 million people fleeing their homes as a result of sudden onset weather hazards every year, instead designating them as “environmental migrants.” Given these threadbare legal protections, it is unlikely that future climate migrants will fare any better. What is needed is a bold reimagining of the policies governing climate migration.
Climate reparations provide a way through the climate crisis without doubling down on these dismal precedents. The term reparations refers to making amends and often connotes one-off cash transfers or apologies. But it is difficult to see how these one-off transactions would offer a solution to the disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis. Instead, climate reparations are better understood as a systemic approach to redistributing resources and changing policies and institutions that have perpetuated harm—rather than a discrete exchange of money or of apologies for past wrongdoing.
A reparations-based approach to the coming wave of climate refugees would address two distinct but interconnected issues: climate change mitigation, which would aim to minimize displacement; and just climate migration policy, which would respond to the displacement that governments have failed to prevent. The reparations alternative would substantially increase developed economies’ contributions to global efforts to address climate change and prevent displacement. It would also end warehousing of refugees and substantially increase migration from the global south.
Examples of promising mitigation policies include the draft climate law proposed by the European Commission in March 2020 that would make a legally binding commitment for the European Union to reduce its greenhouse-gas emissions to net zero by 2050. The Green New Deal proposal, U.S. congressional resolutions that lay out a new approach to tackling climate change, also articulates important mitigation measures.
But to mitigate climate change effectively and fairly, the international community needs to broadly redistribute funds across states to respond to inequalities in resilience capacity and the unjust system underpinning them. As Mohammed Adow, the director of the Nairobi-based think tank Power Shift Africa, explains, the international community has already designed a mechanism that could perform this task: the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is the largest international fund aimed at helping developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate impacts. However, the $6 billion currently committed to the GCF is a fraction of the $100 billion initially promised to be distributed per year by 2020. Much of the funds committed come by way of private sector financing, reclassification of preexisting aid packages, and loans rather than cash grants or payment-in-kind. As climate impacts intensify in some of the world’s poorest countries, mechanisms like the GCF will become even more important.
A reparatory approach to the climate crisis would require an overhaul of the existing international refugee regime. With this approach, the international community would reject the framing of refugee policy as rescue and rethink the framework that allows states to confine refugees in camps with international approval. Parekh writes that as rescuers, Western states may be praised for helping refugees, but they are rarely held accountable by other states or multinational institutions for not doing enough. But once the issue is reframed so that Western states see themselves as contributing to a “system that structurally prevents the majority of refugees from finding refuge,” taking up their share of global refugee resettlement becomes an obligation rather than an act of charity.
In the context of the climate crisis, the West is responsible for more than secondary harms experienced within the international refugee regime. A reparatory approach seeks to understand which harms were committed and how through structural change, those harms can be addressed. A historically informed response to climate migration would force Western states to grapple with their role in creating the climate crisis and rendering parts of the world uninhabitable.
The legal scholar E. Tendayi Achiume argues that corrective, distributive justice demands recognition of the entitlement of “Third World persons” to “a form of First World citizenship.” She presents an argument for reconceptualizing state sovereignty that challenges the right to exclude political strangers. This framework is especially pertinent in the context of climate justice. Developed economies are largely responsible for the climate crisis and have more resources to manage climate impacts, while developing countries are often less responsible and poorly equipped to survive the impacts—rendering the political exclusion of climate refugees unjust.
A historically informed response to climate migration would force Western states to grapple with their role in creating the climate crisis.
In this sense, it merits emphasis that the reparatory framework operates on a sliding scale. Accounting for which parts of the world bear responsibility for structural injustices that shape the present order reduces the burden of countries such as China and India relative to the West. But their policy trajectory could increase their share of the global climate burden relative to other formerly colonized countries. China, for example, has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060, which is a step in the right direction. But it continues to invest in and profit from coal power projects, often in developing countries that are increasingly dependent on Chinese investment.
To implement a climate reparations approach, the United States has much preliminary work to do. For fiscal year 2020, the Trump administration limited the maximum number of refugees admitted to the United States to just 18,000. On Oct. 1, the day after a Minnesota campaign rally in which Trump leveled insults at Somali American Rep. Ilhan Omar, herself a former refugee, his administration announced intentions to admit fewer refugees than ever before. As a first step, the United States needs to get back to its own normal. Leaders from both parties have set significantly higher ceilings than Trump: President Ronald Reagan’s highest ceiling was 140,000 refugees and President Barack Obama set a refugee admissions target of 110,000 for 2017.
A failure to admit more refugees will accelerate the worst political effects of the climate crisis: fueling the transition of eco-fascism from fringe extremism to ruling ideology. The recognition of rights to movement and resettlement, and a steady liberalization of rich-country border policies fit under a reparatory framework, especially when paired with more sensible mitigation policies. However extreme this renegotiation of state sovereignty and citizenship may seem, it’s nowhere near as extreme as the logical conclusion of the status quo’s violent alternative: mass famine, region-scale armed conflict, and widespread displacement.
Compared to the horrors of climate apartheid and colonialism, having more neighbors is a small price to pay.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-10--North Korea’s Huge New Missile Sends a Message to Washington

North Korea unveiled a massive new intercontinental ballistic missile Saturday at a parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers ’ Party of Korea , a signal to Washington that the regime is committed to advancing its long-range strike capabilities despite years of on-again , off-again diplomatic outreach with the United States .
The new missile , which capped the early-morning military parade , is believed to be one of the largest liquid-fueled , truck-carried ICBMs in the world , potentially with the ability to carry multiple nuclear warheads as far as the continental United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Bruce Klingner , former CIA Korea deputy chief , now at the Heritage Foundation .
He noted that North Korea had also shown the ability to make more and bigger launchers for the new missiles “ And that ’ s a worrisome development because it would enable North Korea to deploy more ICBMs , which would give it a larger first strike or second strike retaliatory nuclear force , ” he said .
While larger and more capable than its predecessor , the Hwasong-15 , the new missile is still liquid-fueled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solid-fueled rockets at launch .
Still , its rollout serves a double-barreled purpose .
“ It ’ s a warning to [ U.S. President Donald ] Trump that , if he ’ s reelected , he should restart negotiations with North Korea and then at the same time , it ’ s a message to [ Democratic nominee Joe ] Biden that North Korea should be placed at the top of Biden ’ s international policy priorities , ” said Go Myong-hyun , senior fellow at the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very much invested in a personal relationship and diplomacy with Trump , so he ’ d like to see Trump win .
But if they think there ’ s a higher chance of Biden winning , then they have to hedge their bets , so that means rolling out the new ICBM , ” he said .
The parade also showcased advances in North Korea ’ s conventional capabilities , including new body armor and a new main battle tank .
Unlike in years past , North Korea played it coy with this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the cover of darkness at midnight when satellite imagery is less effective and when any foreigners in the capital would likely be asleep .
Observers who tuned into North Korea ’ s state broadcaster Saturday morning saw recycled documentaries about Kim Il Sung , Kim ’ s grandfather and founder of the nation itself .
That gave the regime the ability to show only edited images of the parade rather than a direct feed , allowing editors to highlight the human aspects of the parade , such as onlookers and soldiers crying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parade offered the regime a way to showcase new capabilities without overstepping any international red lines by carrying out testing .
Kim in his speech avoided any reference to the United States , and stressed that the growing arsenal was meant for defensive deterrence .
The U.S. government ’ s initial reaction to the new missile systems was muted , and left the door open to future negotiations on denuclearization following Trump ’ s face to face summits with Kim .
“ We are aware of reports related to the parade .
Our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with our allies in the region , ” said John Supple , a Pentagon spokesman .
But the parade wasn ’ t only directed at Washington .
The massive display of power was equally aimed at reminding the North Korean people of the power of the regime in Pyongyang , after a trying year in which the pandemic left the country even more isolated than usual , sanctions are biting , and several typhoons have hammered rural regions and raised fears of food insecurity .
“ These parades , you see people , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and so forth , and for them it ’ s a sense of pride and nationalism .
And for the people in the countryside , that ’ s a big deal to them , ” said Daniel Pinkston , a professor at Troy University residing in Seoul .
“ I think that domestic signal is a part of the measures taken by the regime to stay in power , ” he added .
That ’ s why the parade celebrates the founding of the Workers ’ Party of Korea , and three generations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nation ’ s birth : Kim ’ s hold on the country is indelibly tied to the party ’ s continued control .
“ It represents the nature of the regime , like other communist regimes .
That ’ s why the celebration of the party ’ s founding is more important ” than the nation ’ s founding , Go said .
Update , Oct. 10 , 2020 : This article was updated to include comments from a State Department spokesperson .

North Korea unveiled a massive new intercontinental ballistic missile Saturday at a parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a signal to Washington that the regime is committed to advancing its long-range strike capabilities despite years of on-again, off-again diplomatic outreach with the United States.
North Korea unveiled a massive new intercontinental ballistic missile Saturday at a parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a signal to Washington that the regime is committed to advancing its long-range strike capabilities despite years of on-again, off-again diplomatic outreach with the United States.
The new missile, which capped the early-morning military parade, is believed to be one of the largest liquid-fueled, truck-carried ICBMs in the world, potentially with the ability to carry multiple nuclear warheads as far as the continental United States.
“It’s very worrisome,” said Bruce Klingner, a former CIA Korea deputy chief, now at the Heritage Foundation. He noted that North Korea had also shown the ability to make more and bigger launchers for the new missiles.
“And that’s a worrisome development because it would enable North Korea to deploy more ICBMs, which would give it a larger first strike or second strike retaliatory nuclear force,” he said.
While larger and more capable than its predecessor, the Hwasong-15, the new missile is still liquid-fueled, which makes it more vulnerable than solid-fueled rockets at launch. Still, its rollout serves a double-barreled purpose.
“It’s a warning to [U.S. President Donald] Trump that, if he’s reelected, he should restart negotiations with North Korea, and then at the same time, it’s a message to [Democratic nominee Joe] Biden that North Korea should be placed at the top of Biden’s international policy priorities,” said Go Myong-hyun, a senior fellow at the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
“Kim Jong Un is very much invested in a personal relationship and diplomacy with Trump, so he’d like to see Trump win. But if they think there’s a higher chance of Biden winning, then they have to hedge their bets, so that means rolling out the new ICBM,” he said.
The parade also showcased advances in North Korea’s conventional capabilities, including new body armor and a new main battle tank.
Unlike in years past, North Korea played it coy with this year’s parade, holding it under the cover of darkness at midnight when satellite imagery is less effective and when any foreigners in the capital would likely be asleep. Observers who tuned into North Korea’s state broadcaster Saturday morning saw recycled documentaries about Kim Il Sung, Kim’s grandfather and founder of the nation itself. That gave the regime the ability to show only edited images of the parade rather than a direct feed, allowing editors to highlight the human aspects of the parade, such as onlookers and soldiers crying during Kim’s speech.
The parade offered the regime a way to showcase new capabilities without overstepping any international red lines by carrying out testing. Kim in his speech avoided any reference to the United States and stressed that the growing arsenal was meant for defensive deterrence.
The U.S. government’s initial reaction to the new missile systems was muted and left the door open to future negotiations on denuclearization following Trump’s face-to-face summits with Kim. “We are aware of reports related to the parade. Our analysis is ongoing, and we are consulting with our allies in the region,” said John Supple, a U.S. Defense Department spokesperson.
“It is disappointing to see the DPRK continuing to prioritize its prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile program,” a State Department spokesperson said. The spokesperson added that the United States “remains guided by the vision President Trump and Chairman Kim set forth in Singapore and calls on the DPRK to engage in sustained and substantive negotiations to achieve complete denuclearization.”
But the parade wasn’t directed only at Washington. The massive display of power was equally aimed at reminding the North Korean people of the power of the regime in Pyongyang, after a trying year in which the pandemic left the country even more isolated than usual, sanctions are biting, and several typhoons have hammered rural regions and raised fears of food insecurity.
“These parades, you see people, mass organizations of citizens, military units, and so forth, and for them it’s a sense of pride and nationalism. And for the people in the countryside, that’s a big deal to them,” said Daniel Pinkston, a lecturer at Troy University residing in Seoul.
“I think that domestic signal is a part of the measures taken by the regime to stay in power,” he added.
That’s why the parade celebrates the founding of the Workers’ Party and three generations of Kim family achievements, rather than the nation’s birth: Kim’s hold on the country is indelibly tied to the party’s continued control.
“It represents the nature of the regime, like other communist regimes. That’s why the celebration of the party’s founding is more important” than the nation’s founding, Go said.
Update, Oct. 10, 2020: This article was updated to include comments from a State Department spokesperson.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-11--The World Needs a New Refugee Convention

With its square white tents perfectly aligned against the yellow sands of the Sahara , Adam ’ s home could be a model refugee camp .
Except it ’ s not .
The government of Niger and the United Nations refugee agency , or UNHCR , call the camp a “ humanitarian site.
” Real refugees , for the government , are those who come from the war-torn zones of neighboring Mali and Nigeria and who are housed temporarily until there is a lull in fighting , at which point they are expected to return to the other side of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humanitarian site are different , caught between journeys .
They fled the conflict in their homeland of Darfur and headed north , crossing various borders to reach Libya—which proved to be as dangerous as the country they had left behind .
Then they went south to Niger , this time fleeing detention centers , slave markets , and arrest by European Union-backed Libyan coast guard units .
Before he came to Niger , on his first journey , Adam had even managed to reach Europe .
He got to Italy but was arrested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sudan .
Since then , he has gone by the nickname “ Italy.
” He isn ’ t happy waiting at the humanitarian site , but the UNHCR staff told him that if he didn ’ t like it there , Niger could send him back to Libya .
In 2019 , there were painfully few resettlement flights from the humanitarian site to Europe , but they did exist , and they gave Adam hope .
He dreams of returning to the country that gave him his name .
Or anywhere in Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibilities .
Getting to Europe is now almost impossible .
The drip feed of resettlement was turned off in early 2020 as the virus reconfigured our world .
In September , he texted us : “ There is no future for me.
” Since the beginning of the pandemic , drawbridges have gone up across the world , limiting the movement of business travelers , vacationers , and asylum-seekers .
But while airlines eagerly anticipate tourism returning to normal , many of the limitations on asylum enacted during the current crisis are likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more than 90 countries have stopped processing asylum claims .
In Bosnia and Herzegovina , thousands of migrants , fleeing wars at home and looking for a route to Northern Europe , were interned in camps , while in Malaysia and Thailand , boats containing Rohingya refugees were turned away .
In the Mediterranean , the virus has proved a potent weapon for politicians seeking ways to justify Europe ’ s blockade of irregular movement from the south .
The right has blamed asylum seekers for the coronavirus , building on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The far-right ’ s political rhetoric blames refugees for carrying COVID-19 .
At the beginning of March , Hungary ’ s nationalist prime minister , Viktor Orban , stated that he is “ fighting a two-front war : One front is called migration , and the other one belongs to the coronavirus.
” The right has conflated the two issues , building on a centuries-long history of scapegoating strangers as diseased .
Asylum-seekers are actually no more likely than anyone else to carry the virus , and its initial spread followed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ irregular migration .
But the pandemic is a useful excuse , according to Susan Fratzke of the Migration Policy Institute , “ for countries to put in place anti-asylum policies they would have pursued anyway.
” The measures taken in the last six months are not exceptional policies pursued in a time of crisis but a crisis put to good use to complete a project already 30 years in the making : an almost total blockade against refugee movement and the end of asylum as a practical possibility .
The right of asylum @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and geopolitics .
When the U.N .
Refugee Convention was first adopted in 1951 , it applied only to Europeans trying to find their place in a new jigsaw of nations following World War II .
All the focus of postwar discussion was on “ non-refoulement , ” the principle that means asylum-seekers can not be sent back to the countries from which they fled if they would continue to be persecuted there .
The enshrining of non-refoulement was a reaction to the original sin to which the convention was a response : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refugees during the war .
That refugees can ’ t legally be sent back to dangerous places , however , doesn ’ t mean that they are guaranteed a place to go—a limitation in the convention that is brutally exposed by stories like Adam ’ s .
Not that Adam was much thought about when the convention was signed .
It would take until 1967 for a protocol to be signed that generalized the right of asylum outside of Europe to anyone with a reasonable fear of persecution on the basis of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group .
Even after the signing of the protocol , the right to asylum remained fragile .
While in theory , signatory countries have to take in asylum-seekers , no one country has a duty to do so , and in reality , asylum policies are always sculpted by the demands of national immigration politics .
In the 1950s and ’ 60s , there were relatively few asylum cases in Europe and the Anglophone world , simply because workers were needed , immigration rules relatively lax , and it was easier to migrate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Those who did apply could be held up as political victories : the victims of communist systems in Hungary and Poland whose failure was evident in their flight .
As the oil crisis unfolded in the 1970s , bringing soaring unemployment to Europe , the demand for immigrant workers slackened , immigration restrictions hardened , and immigrants became useful punching bags for politicians looking for scapegoats for the global economic downturn .
The seeds of popular discontent took root after the guest workers who had come to Europe in the 1950s and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of political anger .
The firming up of immigration policies was accompanied by a rise in the number of people applying for asylum , as those fleeing conflicts in Vietnam , Cambodia , and the wars of Central America tried to get to safety .
From the beginning , the institution of asylum was bound up with the political economy of nation-states .
With the crises of the 1970s came the institutionalization of a new way of keeping asylum-seekers out : the refugee camp .
There is a divided world system for dealing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Didier Fassin has argued .
In vanishingly few countries , there is the possibility of asylum ; in the rest of the world , there is the refugee camp .
In the last 30 years , even those countries that do offer asylum , such as those within the EU , have erected camps within their borders .
With asylum comes the promise of permanent residency , eventual citizenship , and a new life .
However , countries don ’ t allow asylum-seekers to apply at their embassies , meaning that an application @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make a claim .
Over the last 30 years , such a journey has become increasingly difficult , and most refugees now live in camps in countries like Kenya , Lebanon , and Pakistan , next to the war zones from which they have fled .
At the end of 2019 , there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide , and 85 percent of them were hosted in the developing world .
While it is very difficult to get asylum , it is easy to get into a refugee camp .
Building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is nearly impossible .
Residency in such camps is predicated on the idea , enshrined at the heart of UNHCR , that refugees will either be resettled or will return home .
This means that most refugees are not allowed to work , do not get citizenship in their host country , and are provided only minimal services designed to maintain life—but not build a good one .
Camps are supposed to be temporary , but with resettlement increasingly difficult and wars never-ending , many never leave .
The consequence ?
In places @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , hundreds of thousands of people have grown up without citizenship , dependent on handouts , and waiting for futures that will never arrive .
From the perspective of UNHCR , such camps save lives .
In historical perspective , however , such camps are devices to manage uprooted populations .
Effectively , camps function as cages , as the American sociologist David Scott FitzGerald names them , designed to keep people from coming to wealthy countries and applying for asylum .
Since the 1990s , Europe , the United States , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ making applications inside their territories , despite legally remaining signatories to the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol .
The measures they have taken include the tightening of the global visa regime and limitations on travel , as well as the externalization of border controls far from the actual frontiers of the nation-states in question .
Since the 1980s , the U.S. Coast Guard has increasingly intercepted asylum-seekers at sea and forcibly repatriated them without legal hearings , while Australia offshores its asylum-seekers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru much as companies move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are easier to bear if they don ’ t take place in the homeland .
In Europe , the last 30 years have seen the continent ’ s borders moving steadily south , even as North Africans find it increasingly hard to cross the Mediterranean .
In recent years , African and European officials have called Niger , Libya , and Sudan “ Europe ’ s new southern border.
” This new frontier wall is constituted by an expanding set of drones and border fences , sometimes guarded by militia forces subcontracted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where human rights abuses are less visible .
While Australia has built buffers in other countries and constructed a system of offshore processing for asylum , Europe has focused on blocking asylum-seekers south of the Mediterranean .
Amid all its other disagreements , on the necessity of this new frontier , as the writer Thomas Meaney noted last year , Europe is singing from the same hymn sheet .
Adam “ Italy ” lived in the village of Ab Duel in Darfur until 2004 , when it was attacked by Sudanese government militia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 3 million Darfuris displaced into camps surrounded by the very militias that razed Adam ’ s village and stole his family ’ s cattle .
The militias prevented camp residents from leaving to farm or find work , so Adam decided to go to Libya to look for employment .
Life in Libya wasn ’ t easy .
Adam moved between temporary jobs , working in restaurants and for construction firms , being beaten and harassed , and eking out a hard-scrabble existence at the edge of Libya ’ s civil war .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave for Europe .
In 2016—the peak year for sea crossings to Italy , with 181,000 arrivals—he boarded one of four dinghies , each filled with 140 migrants .
He made it to Sicily and traveled to Rome , intent on heading to France , but he was arrested just before the border in Ventimiglia and driven to the Sudanese Embassy , where he was interrogated and deported to Sudan .
On arrival , he was extended the common welcome that Sudanese intelligence customarily affords returnees and was brutally interrogated .
Adam ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Italy—like several other European countries—struck with Sudan that allowed Sudanese intelligence agents to come to Europe and interview asylum-seekers in order to facilitate deportations .
This deal was struck with the very Sudanese regime that Adam fled , effectively ensuring his refoulement .
Following Adam ’ s deportation , a group of Sudanese nationals won an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights against their deportation under the same scheme .
Amid this and other legal challenges , Europe continues to rely on the externalization of its borders as its principal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016 , the EU signed a 6 billion euro ( $ 6.6 billion ) deal for Turkey to keep Syrian refugees on its soil—including those returned from Greece .
In effect , Turkey became a cage , much like the refugee camps farther south .
In the same year , Niger—a major recipient of EU aid , with one billion euros ( about $ 1.18 billion ) earmarked for 2017-2020—enforced a new law that allowed its forces to arrest migrants as early as Agadez—the last sizable town at the edge of the Sahara @ @ @ @ @ @ @ border .
This , according to EU officials , is a model arrangement .
The borders of Europe are moving south , and with this expansion , the border guards are also changing .
In 2009 , then-Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi made an agreement with Libya ’ s leader at the time , Muammar al-Qaddafi , that enabled Italian coast guard units to swiftly deport immigrants to Libya .
In the intervening years , there has been regime change in Libya , but Italy ’ s priorities have remained unchanged .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) was established in Libya in March 2016 , though it barely had control of parts of Tripoli .
The fictional sovereignty of the GNA didn ’ t stop the EU , led by Italy , from training the Libyan coast guard .
Many of those coast guard units had , until recently , been militias involved in migrant smuggling .
Adam had left Libya from a terkina ( corner—a name used for the places that migrants gather before boarding boats ) in Sabratha , thanks to a smuggler connected to Ahmad al-Dabbashi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the uncle , ” who had risen from being a wheelbarrow porter to the most famous migrant smuggler in Libya .
He was shortly to diversify his business and become a coast guardsman as well .
After his interrogation , Adam returned to Darfur , to the same internally displaced persons camp in which he had grown up .
It was still guarded by the same militias that were still killing his people .
“ We haven ’ t seen you for a long time , ” they said .
“ Where have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leave again .
He was fed up with being hunted and chased .
In 2018 , one high-level EU official told us that “ our goal is for the numbers of migrants arriving in Europe to decrease .
Our policies are successful .
We don ’ t care about the consequences in Libya or Niger.
” When Adam returned to Libya in 2017 , the situation had changed .
Al-Ammo was no longer a famous smuggler in command of a militia but the head of an anti-migrant force recognized by the GNA .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ an official detention center for migrants .
Rumors of a 5 million euro ( $ 5.9 million ) grant from the Italians , though , proved blood in the water , and the sharks circled .
Rival smugglers attacked Al-Ammo and expelled him from Sabratha , as 10,000 migrants fled once again , this time from what became known as the Sabratha war , only to be arrested by Al-Ammo ’ s rivals and caged in deportation centers along the coast .
No matter which commander is in charge , the militia forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In 2018 , at the EU ’ s behest , Libya ’ s so-called search and rescue zone was recognized , allowing the coast guard to expand its area of operations away from the coast .
The results were impressive .
The number of arrivals in Italy decreased from 181,000 in 2016 to just 23,000 in 2018 .
Officially , the EU condemns the arbitrary detention of migrants in Libya , which is still not a signatory to the 1951 convention .
In reality , of the approximately 500 million euros ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given to the GNA since 2016 , some proportion has gone to the coast guard .
It ’ s the numbers that matter .
In 2018 , one high-level EU official told us that “ our goal is for the numbers of migrants arriving in Europe to decrease .
Our policies are successful .
We don ’ t care about the consequences in Libya or Niger.
” The pandemic has proved the final nail in the coffin for what was once a cornerstone of the liberal international order .
In Hungary , Orban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to intensify anti-migrant rhetoric and justify closing the country ’ s borders .
In March , the Trump administration issued a blanket ban on asylum claims , resulting in more than 20,000 people being deported who would have otherwise sought asylum .
While that order was struck down by a federal judge on June 30 , the administration issued a new order a week later , barring asylum claims from those countries that have serious outbreaks of COVID-19 , amid a raft of other measures .
In Europe , populist politicians have used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Sicily ’ s regional president , Nello Musumeci , attempted to close all the migrant centers on the island at the end of August—before he was blocked in court—and blamed immigrants for spreading the virus .
Musumeci ’ s rhetoric echoes that of the former interior minister , Matteo Salvini , who is attempting to restart his stalled political career by calling for a halt to all migrant boats landing in Italian waters .
Port after port has been turning away migrant boats during the last few months , with front-line states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vessels carrying migrants disembarking on their shores .
This leaves people like Adam trapped .
When he returned to Libya , he fell into the same cycle , stuck in abusive jobs that refused to pay him .
He resolved to leave , for Niger .
In Agadez , he was pushed into the humanitarian site a few miles away from town .
There he waits , unwilling to return to the government militias waiting for him in Sudan and unable to get to Europe .
The emphasis on non-refoulement in the legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation in which—thankfully—some people are not returned to war , but neither are they able to make new lives .
Instead , they are caged in camps and detention centers and effectively left stateless .
In Libya and Niger , UNHCR has effectively become a proxy for the EU , its second-largest donor .
It ’ s not entirely UNHCR ’ s fault .
Even before the pandemic , of the 50,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya , UNHCR was only able to resettle 2,000 people per year , mainly to Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accept refugees .
In such a mismatch between demand and supply , UNHCR has focused on keeping refugees warehoused .
The 1951 convention is no longer fit for purpose .
In 1949 , a group of intellectuals , including Albert Einstein—himself a refugee—and Bertrand Russell wrote a public letter to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie suggesting a more cosmopolitan way of dealing with refugees .
“ History made them citizens of the world , and they should be treated as such.
” The refugee problem was rather an opportunity , the letter held , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsist not exclusively in theories and programs , but also in courageous experimenting and in a genuine respect for the human person.
” The International Refugee Organization ( IRO ) —the precursor to UNHCR—reacted with hostility to the suggestion of a world passport for the displaced : Refugees were a problem , there were no international rights , and repatriation or resettlement was the only way for refugees to find their place in a world of nation-states .
The result , 70 years later , is a growing population of stateless people across @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and UNHCR were designed to prevent .
Discussions around a Global Compact on Refugees in 2018 might have enabled a real discussion of how to reform the practice of asylum in the 21st century .
Instead , there was little change to the current legal framework , and even those changes were spurned by the United States and Hungary .
On a map of nation-states painted with an increasingly thick brush , there is no room for asylum , and for those like Adam , the future may be a country he shall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several hundred Darfuri refugees walked out of the humanitarian site and organized a protest in front of the UNHCR office in Agadez .
After three weeks , Niger ’ s security forces pushed them back to the camp and arrested more than 300 of them , including Adam , who spent two months in prison .
In July 2020 , the refugees resumed their protests , this time in the humanitarian site itself .
One of their WhatsApp messages this month reads : “ 7 September , the 50th consecutive day of our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decent life , and the UNHCR didn ’ t visit the camp .
They left us in the desert .
”

With its square white tents perfectly aligned against the yellow sands of the Sahara, Adam’s home could be a model refugee camp. Except it’s not. The government of Niger and the United Nations refugee agency, or UNHCR, call the camp a “humanitarian site.” Real refugees, for the government, are those who come from the war-torn zones of neighboring Mali and Nigeria and who are housed temporarily until there is a lull in fighting, at which point they are expected to return to the other side of the border.
With its square white tents perfectly aligned against the yellow sands of the Sahara, Adam’s home could be a model refugee camp. Except it’s not. The government of Niger and the United Nations refugee agency, or UNHCR, call the camp a “humanitarian site.” Real refugees, for the government, are those who come from the war-torn zones of neighboring Mali and Nigeria and who are housed temporarily until there is a lull in fighting, at which point they are expected to return to the other side of the border.
The Sudanese at the humanitarian site are different, caught between journeys. They fled the conflict in their homeland of Darfur and headed north, crossing various borders to reach Libya—which proved to be as dangerous as the country they had left behind. Then they went south to Niger, this time fleeing detention centers, slave markets, and arrest by European Union-backed Libyan coast guard units.
Joshua Craze is a writer in residence at the Embassy of Foreign Artists in Geneva, where he is writing a novel in the UNHCR archive. His work has appeared in N+1, the Guardian, and the Washington Monthly, among other places. Jérôme Tubiana is a researcher and journalist who has covered conflicts in Chad and Sudan for more than 20 years and the author of Guantánamo Kid: The True Story of Mohammed El-Gharani..
Before he came to Niger, on his first journey, Adam had even managed to reach Europe. He got to Italy but was arrested at the French border and deported to Sudan. Since then, he has gone by the nickname “Italy.” He isn’t happy waiting at the humanitarian site, but the UNHCR staff told him that if he didn’t like it there, Niger could send him back to Libya. In 2019, there were painfully few resettlement flights from the humanitarian site to Europe, but they did exist, and they gave Adam hope. He dreams of returning to the country that gave him his name. Or anywhere in Europe, really. The present offers no possibilities.
Getting to Europe is now almost impossible. The drip feed of resettlement was turned off in early 2020 as the virus reconfigured our world. In September, he texted us: “There is no future for me.”
Since the beginning of the pandemic, drawbridges have gone up across the world, limiting the movement of business travelers, vacationers, and asylum-seekers. But while airlines eagerly anticipate tourism returning to normal, many of the limitations on asylum enacted during the current crisis are likely to be become permanent. This year, more than 90 countries have stopped processing asylum claims. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, thousands of migrants, fleeing wars at home and looking for a route to Northern Europe, were interned in camps, while in Malaysia and Thailand, boats containing Rohingya refugees were turned away. In the Mediterranean, the virus has proved a potent weapon for politicians seeking ways to justify Europe’s blockade of irregular movement from the south.
The right has blamed asylum seekers for the coronavirus, building on a centuries-long history of scapegoating strangers as diseased.
The far-right’s political rhetoric blames refugees for carrying COVID-19. At the beginning of March, Hungary’s nationalist prime minister, Viktor Orban, stated that he is “fighting a two-front war: One front is called migration, and the other one belongs to the coronavirus.” The right has conflated the two issues, building on a centuries-long history of scapegoating strangers as diseased. Asylum-seekers are actually no more likely than anyone else to carry the virus, and its initial spread followed the pathways of international air travel rather than irregular migration. But the pandemic is a useful excuse, according to Susan Fratzke of the Migration Policy Institute, “for countries to put in place anti-asylum policies they would have pursued anyway.”
The measures taken in the last six months are not exceptional policies pursued in a time of crisis but a crisis put to good use to complete a project already 30 years in the making: an almost total blockade against refugee movement and the end of asylum as a practical possibility.
A group of young Afghan boys stand outisde a tent supplied by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at a camp in Pakistan on Jan. 1, 1989.
The right of asylum has always been ambiguously positioned between law and geopolitics. When the U.N. Refugee Convention was first adopted in 1951, it applied only to Europeans trying to find their place in a new jigsaw of nations following World War II. All the focus of postwar discussion was on “non-refoulement,” the principle that means asylum-seekers cannot be sent back to the countries from which they fled if they would continue to be persecuted there. The enshrining of non-refoulement was a reaction to the original sin to which the convention was a response: that many countries refused entry to Jewish refugees during the war. That refugees can’t legally be sent back to dangerous places, however, doesn’t mean that they are guaranteed a place to go—a limitation in the convention that is brutally exposed by stories like Adam’s.
Not that Adam was much thought about when the convention was signed. It would take until 1967 for a protocol to be signed that generalized the right of asylum outside of Europe to anyone with a reasonable fear of persecution on the basis of their political opinions or membership of a persecuted group. Even after the signing of the protocol, the right to asylum remained fragile. While in theory, signatory countries have to take in asylum-seekers, no one country has a duty to do so, and in reality, asylum policies are always sculpted by the demands of national immigration politics.
As the oil crisis unfolded in the 1970s, bringing soaring unemployment to Europe, the demand for immigrant workers slackened, immigration restrictions hardened, and immigrants became useful punching bags for politicians looking for scapegoats.
In the 1950s and ’60s, there were relatively few asylum cases in Europe and the Anglophone world, simply because workers were needed, immigration rules relatively lax, and it was easier to migrate than to go through complicated asylum procedures. Those who did apply could be held up as political victories: the victims of communist systems in Hungary and Poland whose failure was evident in their flight.
As the oil crisis unfolded in the 1970s, bringing soaring unemployment to Europe, the demand for immigrant workers slackened, immigration restrictions hardened, and immigrants became useful punching bags for politicians looking for scapegoats for the global economic downturn. The seeds of popular discontent took root after the guest workers who had come to Europe in the 1950s and ’60s stayed, becoming the target of political anger. The firming up of immigration policies was accompanied by a rise in the number of people applying for asylum, as those fleeing conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia, and the wars of Central America tried to get to safety.
From the beginning, the institution of asylum was bound up with the political economy of nation-states. With the crises of the 1970s came the institutionalization of a new way of keeping asylum-seekers out: the refugee camp.
Tents tightly packed together are lit up at night at the Shah Mansoor relief camp in Swabi, Pakistan, on June 21, 2009.
Ethiopian refugee women wait to receiveitems distributed by the Kenyan Red Cross at the newly built Somare refugee camp in Moyale, Kenya, on March 19, 2018.
A Syrian refugee from Aleppo sits with his children in a makeshift tent in a camp in the town of Kab Elias in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on June 20, 2016.
There is a divided world system for dealing with refugees, as the French anthropologist Didier Fassin has argued. In vanishingly few countries, there is the possibility of asylum; in the rest of the world, there is the refugee camp. In the last 30 years, even those countries that do offer asylum, such as those within the EU, have erected camps within their borders. With asylum comes the promise of permanent residency, eventual citizenship, and a new life. However, countries don’t allow asylum-seekers to apply at their embassies, meaning that an application requires difficult irregular journeys in order to make a claim.
Over the last 30 years, such a journey has become increasingly difficult, and most refugees now live in camps in countries like Kenya, Lebanon, and Pakistan, next to the war zones from which they have fled. At the end of 2019, there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, and 85 percent of them were hosted in the developing world.
While it is very difficult to get asylum, it is easy to get into a refugee camp. Building a good life there, however, is nearly impossible. Residency in such camps is predicated on the idea, enshrined at the heart of UNHCR, that refugees will either be resettled or will return home. This means that most refugees are not allowed to work, do not get citizenship in their host country, and are provided only minimal services designed to maintain life—but not build a good one. Camps are supposed to be temporary, but with resettlement increasingly difficult and wars never-ending, many never leave. The consequence? In places like the Darfuri refugee camps in Chad, hundreds of thousands of people have grown up without citizenship, dependent on handouts, and waiting for futures that will never arrive.
From the perspective of UNHCR, such camps save lives. In historical perspective, however, such camps are devices to manage uprooted populations. Effectively, camps function as cages, as the American sociologist David Scott FitzGerald names them, designed to keep people from coming to wealthy countries and applying for asylum.
A man gives water to migrants heading to the border with Guatemala as they travel aboard a truck in Cerro de Hula on June 3. Nearly 100 migrants from Congo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Cuba headed in a caravan from Choluteca, Honduras, to Mexico were stopped by the police for sanitary controls amid the coronavirus pandemic.
Since the 1990s, Europe, the United States, and Australia have tried to prevent asylum-seekers from making applications inside their territories, despite legally remaining signatories to the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol. The measures they have taken include the tightening of the global visa regime and limitations on travel, as well as the externalization of border controls far from the actual frontiers of the nation-states in question. Since the 1980s, the U.S. Coast Guard has increasingly intercepted asylum-seekers at sea and forcibly repatriated them without legal hearings, while Australia offshores its asylum-seekers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru much as companies move factories overseas—it saves money, and horrors are easier to bear if they don’t take place in the homeland.
In recent years, African and European officials have called Niger, Libya, and Sudan “Europe’s new southern border.”
In Europe, the last 30 years have seen the continent’s borders moving steadily south, even as North Africans find it increasingly hard to cross the Mediterranean. In recent years, African and European officials have called Niger, Libya, and Sudan “Europe’s new southern border.” This new frontier wall is constituted by an expanding set of drones and border fences, sometimes guarded by militia forces subcontracted by Europe that can intercept migrants in places where human rights abuses are less visible. While Australia has built buffers in other countries and constructed a system of offshore processing for asylum, Europe has focused on blocking asylum-seekers south of the Mediterranean. Amid all its other disagreements, on the necessity of this new frontier, as the writer Thomas Meaney noted last year, Europe is singing from the same hymn sheet.
A group of migrant men, mainly from Niger and Nigeria, travel across the Air dessert in northern Niger, toward the Libyan border post of Gatrone on Jan. 15, 2019.
Migrants stand on an inflatable boat during a rescue operation by a French NGO in the Mediterranean Sea on Aug. 10, 2019.
Sudanese refugees from Darfur gather amid tents during a sit-in outside the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Jordanian capital Amman on Dec. 12, 2015, demanding better treatment and acceleration of their relocation.
Adam “Italy” lived in the village of Ab Duel in Darfur until 2004, when it was attacked by Sudanese government militia forces. He became one of the 3 million Darfuris displaced into camps surrounded by the very militias that razed Adam’s village and stole his family’s cattle. The militias prevented camp residents from leaving to farm or find work, so Adam decided to go to Libya to look for employment.
Life in Libya wasn’t easy. Adam moved between temporary jobs, working in restaurants and for construction firms, being beaten and harassed, and eking out a hard-scrabble existence at the edge of Libya’s civil war. After a year, he decided to leave for Europe. In 2016—the peak year for sea crossings to Italy, with 181,000 arrivals—he boarded one of four dinghies, each filled with 140 migrants. He made it to Sicily and traveled to Rome, intent on heading to France, but he was arrested just before the border in Ventimiglia and driven to the Sudanese Embassy, where he was interrogated and deported to Sudan. On arrival, he was extended the common welcome that Sudanese intelligence customarily affords returnees and was brutally interrogated.
Europe continues to rely on the externalization of its borders as its principal means of evading legal scrutiny.
Adam’s deportation was enabled by a deal that Italy—like several other European countries—struck with Sudan that allowed Sudanese intelligence agents to come to Europe and interview asylum-seekers in order to facilitate deportations. This deal was struck with the very Sudanese regime that Adam fled, effectively ensuring his refoulement. Following Adam’s deportation, a group of Sudanese nationals won an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights against their deportation under the same scheme. Amid this and other legal challenges, Europe continues to rely on the externalization of its borders as its principal means of evading legal scrutiny.
In 2016, the EU signed a 6 billion euro ($6.6 billion) deal for Turkey to keep Syrian refugees on its soil—including those returned from Greece. In effect, Turkey became a cage, much like the refugee camps farther south. In the same year, Niger—a major recipient of EU aid, with one billion euros (about $1.18 billion) earmarked for 2017-2020—enforced a new law that allowed its forces to arrest migrants as early as Agadez—the last sizable town at the edge of the Sahara, still 700 miles from the Libyan border. This, according to EU officials, is a model arrangement.
The borders of Europe are moving south, and with this expansion, the border guards are also changing. In 2009, then-Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi made an agreement with Libya’s leader at the time, Muammar al-Qaddafi, that enabled Italian coast guard units to swiftly deport immigrants to Libya. In the intervening years, there has been regime change in Libya, but Italy’s priorities have remained unchanged.
A weak Government of National Accord (GNA) was established in Libya in March 2016, though it barely had control of parts of Tripoli. The fictional sovereignty of the GNA didn’t stop the EU, led by Italy, from training the Libyan coast guard. Many of those coast guard units had, until recently, been militias involved in migrant smuggling. Adam had left Libya from a terkina (corner—a name used for the places that migrants gather before boarding boats) in Sabratha, thanks to a smuggler connected to Ahmad al-Dabbashi, otherwise known as Al-Ammo, “the uncle,” who had risen from being a wheelbarrow porter to the most famous migrant smuggler in Libya. He was shortly to diversify his business and become a coast guardsman as well.
After his interrogation, Adam returned to Darfur, to the same internally displaced persons camp in which he had grown up. It was still guarded by the same militias that were still killing his people. “We haven’t seen you for a long time,” they said. “Where have you been?” Adam resolved to leave again. He was fed up with being hunted and chased.
When Adam returned to Libya in 2017, the situation had changed. Al-Ammo was no longer a famous smuggler in command of a militia but the head of an anti-migrant force recognized by the GNA. His terkina—a former Italian tuna factory—was now an official detention center for migrants. Rumors of a 5 million euro ($5.9 million) grant from the Italians, though, proved blood in the water, and the sharks circled. Rival smugglers attacked Al-Ammo and expelled him from Sabratha, as 10,000 migrants fled once again, this time from what became known as the Sabratha war, only to be arrested by Al-Ammo’s rivals and caged in deportation centers along the coast.
No matter which commander is in charge, the militia forces have proved themselves to be adept jailors. In 2018, at the EU’s behest, Libya’s so-called search and rescue zone was recognized, allowing the coast guard to expand its area of operations away from the coast. The results were impressive. The number of arrivals in Italy decreased from 181,000 in 2016 to just 23,000 in 2018.
Officially, the EU condemns the arbitrary detention of migrants in Libya, which is still not a signatory to the 1951 convention. In reality, of the approximately 500 million euros ($590 million) the EU has given to the GNA since 2016, some proportion has gone to the coast guard. It’s the numbers that matter. In 2018, one high-level EU official told us that “our goal is for the numbers of migrants arriving in Europe to decrease. Our policies are successful. We don’t care about the consequences in Libya or Niger.”
The pandemic has proved the final nail in the coffin for what was once a cornerstone of the liberal international order. In Hungary, Orban’s government has used the virus to intensify anti-migrant rhetoric and justify closing the country’s borders. In March, the Trump administration issued a blanket ban on asylum claims, resulting in more than 20,000 people being deported who would have otherwise sought asylum. While that order was struck down by a federal judge on June 30, the administration issued a new order a week later, barring asylum claims from those countries that have serious outbreaks of COVID-19, amid a raft of other measures.
In Europe, populist politicians have used the pandemic to stoke fears of migrants. Sicily’s regional president, Nello Musumeci, attempted to close all the migrant centers on the island at the end of August—before he was blocked in court—and blamed immigrants for spreading the virus. Musumeci’s rhetoric echoes that of the former interior minister, Matteo Salvini, who is attempting to restart his stalled political career by calling for a halt to all migrant boats landing in Italian waters. Port after port has been turning away migrant boats during the last few months, with front-line states like Malta announcing blanket bans on NGO vessels carrying migrants disembarking on their shores.
This leaves people like Adam trapped. When he returned to Libya, he fell into the same cycle, stuck in abusive jobs that refused to pay him. He resolved to leave, for Niger. In Agadez, he was pushed into the humanitarian site a few miles away from town. There he waits, unwilling to return to the government militias waiting for him in Sudan and unable to get to Europe.
The emphasis on non-refoulement in the legal architecture of refugee law has created a situation in which—thankfully—some people are not returned to war, but neither are they able to make new lives. Instead, they are caged in camps and detention centers and effectively left stateless.
In Libya and Niger, UNHCR has effectively become a proxy for the EU, its second-largest donor.
In Libya and Niger, UNHCR has effectively become a proxy for the EU, its second-largest donor. It’s not entirely UNHCR’s fault. Even before the pandemic, of the 50,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya, UNHCR was only able to resettle 2,000 people per year, mainly to Europe, due to governments’ reluctance to accept refugees. In such a mismatch between demand and supply, UNHCR has focused on keeping refugees warehoused.
The 1951 convention is no longer fit for purpose. In 1949, a group of intellectuals, including Albert Einstein—himself a refugee—and Bertrand Russell wrote a public letter to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie suggesting a more cosmopolitan way of dealing with refugees. “History made them citizens of the world, and they should be treated as such.” The refugee problem was rather an opportunity, the letter held, to “let the ideal of world-citizenship subsist not exclusively in theories and programs, but also in courageous experimenting and in a genuine respect for the human person.”
The International Refugee Organization (IRO)—the precursor to UNHCR—reacted with hostility to the suggestion of a world passport for the displaced: Refugees were a problem, there were no international rights, and repatriation or resettlement was the only way for refugees to find their place in a world of nation-states. The result, 70 years later, is a growing population of stateless people across the world—the very situation that the IRO and UNHCR were designed to prevent.
Discussions around a Global Compact on Refugees in 2018 might have enabled a real discussion of how to reform the practice of asylum in the 21st century. Instead, there was little change to the current legal framework, and even those changes were spurned by the United States and Hungary. On a map of nation-states painted with an increasingly thick brush, there is no room for asylum, and for those like Adam, the future may be a country he shall never visit.
In December 2019, several hundred Darfuri refugees walked out of the humanitarian site and organized a protest in front of the UNHCR office in Agadez. After three weeks, Niger’s security forces pushed them back to the camp and arrested more than 300 of them, including Adam, who spent two months in prison.
In July 2020, the refugees resumed their protests, this time in the humanitarian site itself. One of their WhatsApp messages this month reads: “7 September, the 50th consecutive day of our peaceful protest to ask our rights to decent life, and the UNHCR didn’t visit the camp. They left us in the desert.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-12--U.K. and EU Seek Trade Deal as Critical Deadline Nears

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Brexit talks continue as EU leaders prepare for a key summit , North Korea unveils new weapons , and several reported violations of a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The last round of informal negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom before a critical EU summit on Thursday begin today as both sides try to hammer out a post-Brexit trade deal .
Last month , U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson said London would stop participating in trade talks on Oct. 15 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place or didn ’ t appear to be in sight .
Long way to go .
On Sunday , Johnson met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to discuss the state of the negotiations .
Johnson told Merkel that significant gaps between their positions still remained , especially over the issue of fisheries .
The EU ’ s Common Fisheries Policy gave European boats access to British fisheries , but critics of the policy claimed it caused severe damage to the U.K. ’ s fishing industry .
As Laurence Blair wrote in Foreign Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regain exclusive control of the U.K. ’ s fisheries , and this could “ derail the painstaking negotiations to determine what relationship Britain … will have with the EU once it becomes fully independent.
” Northern Ireland won ’ t go away .
The other major issue at stake is the ongoing wrangling over the British government ’ s internal market bill , which is designed to override the Northern Ireland protocol in last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement .
According to the protocol , Northern Ireland will remained aligned with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in order to safeguard key parts of the Good Friday peace agreement .
Johnson faced withering criticism for trying to override the protocol , and the EU recently took legal action against the U.K. government over the bill .
Domestic pressure .
Despite his personal ambivalence toward the possibility of a no-deal Brexit , Johnson is under increasing public pressure to ensure that the United Kingdom leaves the EU with a trade deal in place .
A recent poll found that 64 percent of the British public believes that a no-deal Brexit would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Conservative Party has seen its poll numbers dip in recent months .
Last month , Johnson insisted that a no-deal Brexit would be a good outcome for the country .
Oct. 12 .
The confirmation hearings for U.S. Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett begin .
Oct. 13 .
A U.S. ban on private charter flights to Cuba goes into effect .
Oct. 14-15 .
An Israeli body is expected to approve a series of new settlements in the West Bank .
Oct. 15 .
The British government is expected to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this date .
Oct. 15-16 .
EU leaders convene to discuss the state of the negotiations with the United Kingdom .
New weapons for North Korea .
North Korea has drawn international attention after unveiling what appeared to be a new range of weapons , including a large intercontinental ballistic missile ( ICBM ) , during a military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the country ’ s ruling Workers ’ Party on Saturday .
The ICBM is larger than any of the country ’ s known missiles , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons .
The weapons display caused immediate concern in South Korea .
Officials convened an emergency National Security Council meeting on Sunday at which they agreed to continue to analyze the development of North Korea ’ s weapons systems and to review South Korea ’ s own defense capabilities .
South Korea ’ s foreign ministry urged Pyongyang to return to talks aimed at reducing tensions on the peninsula .
As Morten Soendergaard Larsen wrote in Foreign Policy , the weapons served as “ a signal to Washington that the regime is committed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years of on-again , off-again diplomatic outreach with the United States.
” Iran-backed militias demand U.S. withdrawal in Iraq .
On Sunday , the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission , an umbrella organization consisting of several Iran-backed militias in Iraq , agreed to a ceasefire against U.S. personnel on the condition that Washington fully withdraw its troops from Iraq .
Since the assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January , the United States has come under heavy pressure to reduce its presence in the country .
U.S. forces have since transferred several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reduce the U.S. troop presence in the country to 3,000 .
The move comes amid heightened tension between the United States and the Iraqi government after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad last month in response to attacks on U.S. personnel .
The threat caused concern among Iraqi officials that a U.S. diplomatic withdrawal from the country could spark a military confrontation between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militias .
Elections in Lithuania .
Lithuanian voters went to the polls for parliamentary elections on Sunday against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unrest in neighboring Belarus .
The ruling centrist Farmers and Greens party is battling the center-right Homeland Union for the top spot in the country ’ s legislature , but with the two parties projected to take around 15 percent of the vote each in the latest opinion polls , a coalition government is the most likely outcome .
Voters will elect half of the parliament ’ s 141 seats on Sunday , with the remaining seats to be determined in constituency elections at a later date .
The election is considered a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s handling of the pandemic .
The Farmers and Greens party was swept to power in 2016 as part of the populist wave that hit much of the Western world around that time .
The pandemic is the party ’ s first major crisis since coming to power .
Violence continues in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Azerbaijani and Armenian officials have reported several violations of the Moscow-brokered cease-fire which went into effect on Saturday , although major military operations between the two former Soviet republics are still on hold .
Azerbaijan said seven civilians were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it claimed were attacks conducted by Armenian forces from the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh .
The Armenian defense ministry accused Azerbaijani forces of bombing a settlement in Armenia .
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers on Friday and Saturday to hammer out cease-fire terms , allowing them to recover bodies and discuss prisoner exchanges .
Officials from both sides , however , have accused the other of being unprepared to agree to a compromised settlement , meaning a longer-term solution to the worst outbreak of violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely remain elusive .
But the situation isn ’ t hopeless .
As Lara Setrakian wrote in Foreign Policy , “ the swiftest way to end the fighting may be through a Russian-Turkish agreement , possibly in exchange for interests in Syria and Libya , where the two powers both have a strong hand.
” Controversial Nigerian police unit abolished .
The Nigerian government succumbed to public pressure on Sunday and dissolved a controversial police unit .
The Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( Sars ) has been accused of carrying out a range of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kidnapping , and torture .
Amnesty International claims that the unit acts with complete impunity .
“ The dissolution of Sars is in response to the yearnings of the Nigerian people , ” Nigeria ’ s head of police said in a statement .
Sars was the target of major protests in recent days , with thousands of people taking to the streets of the capital of Lagos over the weekend to protest against police brutality in the country .
The hashtag # EndSARS made the rounds on social media as Nigerians shared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A Canadian tourist returned a series of artifacts stolen from the site of the ancient city of Pompeii near Naples , Italy after claiming they were cursed and were responsible for a long period of misfortune in her life .
In a letter confessing to the act and stating the reason for returning the stolen items , she wrote that since stealing two mosaic tiles , parts of an amphora , and a piece of ceramics in 2005 , she had suffered breast cancer twice and experienced financial difficulty .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curse on to my family or children , ” she wrote .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brexit talks continue as EU leaders prepare for a key summit, North Korea unveils new weapons, and several reported violations of a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brexit talks continue as EU leaders prepare for a key summit, North Korea unveils new weapons, and several reported violations of a cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh.
If you would like receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Fishing for a Deal
The last round of informal negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom before a critical EU summit on Thursday begin today as both sides try to hammer out a post-Brexit trade deal. Last month, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson said London would stop participating in trade talks on Oct. 15 if a deal wasn’t in place or didn’t appear to be in sight.
Long way to go. On Sunday, Johnson met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to discuss the state of the negotiations. Johnson told Merkel that significant gaps between their positions still remained, especially over the issue of fisheries.
The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy gave European boats access to British fisheries, but critics of the policy claimed it caused severe damage to the U.K.’s fishing industry. As Laurence Blair wrote in Foreign Policy, the British government is seeking to regain exclusive control of the U.K.’s fisheries, and this could “derail the painstaking negotiations to determine what relationship Britain … will have with the EU once it becomes fully independent.”
Northern Ireland won’t go away. The other major issue at stake is the ongoing wrangling over the British government’s internal market bill, which is designed to override the Northern Ireland protocol in last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement. According to the protocol, Northern Ireland will remained aligned with the EU’s regulatory framework after Brexit in order to safeguard key parts of the Good Friday peace agreement. Johnson faced withering criticism for trying to override the protocol, and the EU recently took legal action against the U.K. government over the bill.
Domestic pressure. Despite his personal ambivalence toward the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, Johnson is under increasing public pressure to ensure that the United Kingdom leaves the EU with a trade deal in place. A recent poll found that 64 percent of the British public believes that a no-deal Brexit would be a bad outcome, and Johnson’s Conservative Party has seen its poll numbers dip in recent months. Last month, Johnson insisted that a no-deal Brexit would be a good outcome for the country.
The World This Week
Oct. 12. The confirmation hearings for U.S. Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett begin.
Oct. 13-14. The World Trade Organization’s top decision-making council meets.
Oct. 13. A U.S. ban on private charter flights to Cuba goes into effect.
Oct. 14-15. An Israeli body is expected to approve a series of new settlements in the West Bank.
Oct. 15. The British government is expected to end its participation in Brexit talks by this date.
Oct. 15-16. EU leaders convene to discuss the state of the negotiations with the United Kingdom.
Oct. 17. General election in New Zealand takes place.
Oct. 18. Bolivian presidential election takes place.
Oct. 18. Guinean presidential election takes place.
What We’re Following Today
New weapons for North Korea. North Korea has drawn international attention after unveiling what appeared to be a new range of weapons, including a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), during a military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party on Saturday. The ICBM is larger than any of the country’s known missiles, and even surprised many experts on North Korean weapons.
The weapons display caused immediate concern in South Korea. Officials convened an emergency National Security Council meeting on Sunday at which they agreed to continue to analyze the development of North Korea’s weapons systems and to review South Korea’s own defense capabilities. South Korea’s foreign ministry urged Pyongyang to return to talks aimed at reducing tensions on the peninsula. As Morten Soendergaard Larsen wrote in Foreign Policy, the weapons served as “a signal to Washington that the regime is committed to advancing its long-range strike capabilities despite years of on-again, off-again diplomatic outreach with the United States.”
Iran-backed militias demand U.S. withdrawal in Iraq. On Sunday, the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission, an umbrella organization consisting of several Iran-backed militias in Iraq, agreed to a ceasefire against U.S. personnel on the condition that Washington fully withdraw its troops from Iraq. Since the assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January, the United States has come under heavy pressure to reduce its presence in the country. U.S. forces have since transferred several bases to Iraqi personnel, and promised to reduce the U.S. troop presence in the country to 3,000.
The move comes amid heightened tension between the United States and the Iraqi government after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to close the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad last month in response to attacks on U.S. personnel. The threat caused concern among Iraqi officials that a U.S. diplomatic withdrawal from the country could spark a military confrontation between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militias.
Elections in Lithuania. Lithuanian voters went to the polls for parliamentary elections on Sunday against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and ongoing unrest in neighboring Belarus. The ruling centrist Farmers and Greens party is battling the center-right Homeland Union for the top spot in the country’s legislature, but with the two parties projected to take around 15 percent of the vote each in the latest opinion polls, a coalition government is the most likely outcome. Voters will elect half of the parliament’s 141 seats on Sunday, with the remaining seats to be determined in constituency elections at a later date.
The election is considered a referendum on Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis’s handling of the pandemic. The Farmers and Greens party was swept to power in 2016 as part of the populist wave that hit much of the Western world around that time. The pandemic is the party’s first major crisis since coming to power.
Keep an Eye On
Violence continues in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani and Armenian officials have reported several violations of the Moscow-brokered cease-fire which went into effect on Saturday, although major military operations between the two former Soviet republics are still on hold. Azerbaijan said seven civilians were killed and 33 others wounded in what it claimed were attacks conducted by Armenian forces from the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian defense ministry accused Azerbaijani forces of bombing a settlement in Armenia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers on Friday and Saturday to hammer out cease-fire terms, allowing them to recover bodies and discuss prisoner exchanges. Officials from both sides, however, have accused the other of being unprepared to agree to a compromised settlement, meaning a longer-term solution to the worst outbreak of violence between the two states in years will likely remain elusive.
But the situation isn’t hopeless. As Lara Setrakian wrote in Foreign Policy, “the swiftest way to end the fighting may be through a Russian-Turkish agreement, possibly in exchange for interests in Syria and Libya, where the two powers both have a strong hand.”
Controversial Nigerian police unit abolished. The Nigerian government succumbed to public pressure on Sunday and dissolved a controversial police unit. The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Sars) has been accused of carrying out a range of illegal acts, including extrajudicial killings, kidnapping, and torture. Amnesty International claims that the unit acts with complete impunity. “The dissolution of Sars is in response to the yearnings of the Nigerian people,” Nigeria’s head of police said in a statement.
Sars was the target of major protests in recent days, with thousands of people taking to the streets of the capital of Lagos over the weekend to protest against police brutality in the country. The hashtag #EndSARS made the rounds on social media as Nigerians shared their own personal experiences with police brutality.
Odds and Ends
A Canadian tourist returned a series of artifacts stolen from the site of the ancient city of Pompeii near Naples, Italy after claiming they were cursed and were responsible for a long period of misfortune in her life. In a letter confessing to the act and stating the reason for returning the stolen items, she wrote that since stealing two mosaic tiles, parts of an amphora, and a piece of ceramics in 2005, she had suffered breast cancer twice and experienced financial difficulty. “I don’t want to pass this curse on to my family or children,” she wrote.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.