foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Where Is Biden’s Cabinet Heading?

Where Is Biden’s Cabinet Heading?

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Taken altogether , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s cabinet is a decidedly mixed bag that has left many Democrats confused as to whether the new administration will really challenge an entrenched economic and political system—or revert to the complacency of the Clinton and Obama years that helped deliver the White House to Donald Trump .
As Biden ’ s picks have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump continues to challenge Biden ’ s historic and resounding victory , the picture has only gotten fuzzier .
Some are familiar faces popping up in strange places .
Former National Security Advisor and United Nations Ambassador Susan Rice , who built her entire career on foreign policy , is to be chief domestic policy advisor .
Denis McDonough , who has never served in the military , will head Veterans Affairs .
And a recently retired U.S. Army general , Lloyd Austin , has been nominated to run a Defense Department meant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other cases , Biden ’ s picks appear like a smoke bomb meant to confuse or perhaps placate dueling progressive and centrist wings within the party .
Some seem savvy choices : Treasury Secretary-designate Janet Yellen is a former Federal Reserve chairwoman with cross-aisle appeal .
But Yellen is also a highly admired progressive economist who has spent her career on increasing income equality for middle-class workers .
At the same time , Biden plans to nominate Adewale Adeyemo , President Barack Obama ’ s international economics advisor who helped negotiate the Trans-Pacific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yellen ’ s deputy secretary .
Others have less impressive records as progressives .
Neera Tanden , slated to take over the Office of Management and Budget , is a centrist aligned with Bill and Hillary Clinton , and she is the president of the Center for American Progress , founded by former Hillary Clinton campaign head John Podesta .
Tanden has often been critical of uber-progressive Sen. Bernie Sanders , who has pushed for universal health care and free college education .
Yet , the person in charge of Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wall Street reformer , Gary Gensler , widely admired by progressives and considered a candidate for some senior position , possibly head of the Securities and Exchange Commission .
Alongside him are left-leaning fellow reformers like Capitol Hill activist Dennis Kelleher , Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Simon Johnson , and others who have , more than a decade after the great financial crisis , been tough on breaking up big banks .
Even one of Biden ’ s most recent picks , Mandarin-speaking House Ways and Means Committee trade lawyer Katherine Tai @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t offer any clear sign of where the administration is heading .
Considered a centrist , Tai could be a signal that Biden intends to negotiate new trade deals with Beijing , if tougher and more multilateral than under Trump , though it ’ s not clear if or how long Trump ’ s trade war with China will linger .
Meanwhile , the leading candidate to be secretary of labor , Patrick Gaspard , recently headed the Open Society Foundations , set up by conservatives ’ favorite boogeyman , George Soros .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ outrage spurred by the George Floyd murder this spring , shepherding $ 220 million in grants to Black communities .
“ What is the agenda ?
What is the overall vision going to be ?
” progressive firebrand Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez asked reporters Wednesday on Capitol Hill .
“ I think that ’ s a little hazy.
” The new cabinet looks like a multicultural dream team—and the realization of Biden ’ s bid to master identity politics .
Rice and Gaspard are Black ; Tai is Asian American ; and Tanden is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kamala Harris .
And Austin would be the first Black American to head the Pentagon .
But some progressives are worried that “ Biden is working backwards from identity , ” as one longtime political observer put it , designing a cabinet stocked with diversity but less focused on making the changes that many progressives see as long overdue , both in terms of domestic and foreign policy .
“ I applaud the formidable progress in the diversity of cabinet and key administration appointments .
It is long overdue for America , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Soros-backed Institute for New Economic Thinking .
“ But it is not a substitute for taking on monied power interests to produce reform leading to broad-based prosperity .
If identity politics is used as a mask to avoid that enormous challenge , it will be very dangerous for the already polarized politics of the USA.
” Rice , for example , is considered a centrist and traditionalist who in the past has been criticized for not being a team player .
As Obama ’ s national security advisor , she was sometimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council , advocating aggressive U.S. interventions abroad , and compiling a record that failed to take on human rights abuses abroad .
Her views on domestic policy and the problems of U.S. inequality—a key indicator of how she would perform as domestic policy advisor—are as yet little known .
Many of the party elite were shocked in particular by the appointment of Tanden , a former aide to Hillary Clinton and television pundit who is not an expert in budget politics but who in the past often pushed back hard against the progressive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under Tanden the Center for American Progress was too beholden to Wall Street and overseas donations from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates .
And the economic direction doesn ’ t get any clearer when considering the rest of Biden ’ s prospective team .
Cecilia Rouse , tapped to head the Council on Economic Advisers , is a known progressive , as is her designated deputy Heather Boushey , who helped found the left-leaning Washington Center for Equitable Growth , which has almost entirely focused on redressing economic inequality .
Others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who was chief economic advisor to Biden during his vice presidency and is a left-leaning , pro-labor economist .
In one way , that adds up to a progressive economic team , said Joseph Stiglitz , a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University .
“ Cecilia Rouse is all about discrimination .
And Janet Yellen was the very first central banker who talked about inequality , ” he said .
Yet , Biden ’ s choice to be head of the National Economic Council , Brian Deese , worked for the giant Wall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some other Biden nominees , including Adeyemo , who was a senior advisor there .
That makes progressives worry they may be more captives of Wall Street than champions of the working class .
“ For the most part , they fit into a consistent pattern that I would say is more progressive than Obama , but less progressive than Sanders , ” Stiglitz said .
“ The real point is , will the Biden team remember how the Democrats lost the working class ?
There ’ s always going to be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bit of clear consistency and vision .
I ’ d say it ’ s going to be a pragmatic progressivism.
” Most of the new nominees worked in some fashion for Obama , who ’ s come under fire again from progressives for the lack of contrition shown in his recent memoir .
McDonough was the former president ’ s chief of staff , while Tai , who could become the first Asian American to become trade representative , served as chief counsel for China trade enforcement from 2011 to 2014 , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond to Chinese dumping of low-wage goods or theft of intellectual property .
One early test will be Biden and Tai ’ s approach to the Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) trade agreement .
Progressives hated the deal , which favored U.S. multinationals , but Democratic centrists and many Republicans believed it would be a way to blunt China ’ s trade strength in the region and eventually coerce Beijing into accepting open trade norms .
Trump withdrew from the TPP as one of his first acts in office , saying it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. sovereignty .
( The other signatories carried on without the United States and formed their own Pacific trade group . )
Biden has said he wants to join the TPP under certain conditions—but it ’ s not clear what those are .
Progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren have criticized the deal for including clauses that give companies the right to sue governments if laws or investment conditions change while giving little attention to workers ’ rights .
Stiglitz called those investor dispute clauses a “ sop to the Business Roundtable.
” Things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes to national security and foreign policy , where progressives have won some early , if perhaps Pyrrhic , victories and where Obama-era alumni are vowing to change their stripes .
Biden ’ s pick of retired Gen. Austin did knock Michèle Flournoy out of the running for defense secretary ; progressives lambasted her ties to defense firms and fondness for foreign interventions .
But Austin will require only the third waiver in history for a recently retired general officer to take up the senior civilian spot atop the Pentagon .
When Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sought a waiver for former Gen. James Mattis , it was readily granted , because Trump clearly needed guidance .
But Biden , a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who cast his first major vote during the Vietnam War , has no such need of national security crutches .
Austin seems to indicate that defense policy will be run more out of the White House than the Pentagon—which leaves progressives to wonder whether that policy will reflect the Biden who supported the Iraq War or the Biden who later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Perhaps the most predictable cabinet choices are Antony Blinken as secretary of state and Jake Sullivan to be national security advisor .
Both served Obama and Biden at senior levels in the past .
Both are , by their own admission , looking to reinvent traditional liberal internationalism and to consider more restrained U.S. deployments overseas .
Most importantly , both are trying to update traditional Democratic thinking about how international relations can work for American workers .
In an article in the Atlantic last year , Sullivan wrote that both Democrats and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else ” and failed to address the troubles of the ailing middle class by not protecting and retraining them in the face of competition from China and other low-wage competitors .
Speaking on background by email , a senior member of the Biden transition team said that this would be a major agenda item of the new administration , breaking with centrist Democratic politics of the past .
Though Trump ’ s neoisolationist approach was “ dangerous , ” Sullivan wrote in his Atlantic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that need clear answers , ” especially regarding the “ hollowing out ” of the middle class .
“ Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role , even if a different role than in the past , have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future .
”

Taken altogether, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s cabinet is a decidedly mixed bag that has left many Democrats confused as to whether the new administration will really challenge an entrenched economic and political system—or revert to the complacency of the Clinton and Obama years that helped deliver the White House to Donald Trump.
Taken altogether, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s cabinet is a decidedly mixed bag that has left many Democrats confused as to whether the new administration will really challenge an entrenched economic and political system—or revert to the complacency of the Clinton and Obama years that helped deliver the White House to Donald Trump.
As Biden’s picks have been trotted out, even while outgoing President Trump continues to challenge Biden’s historic and resounding victory, the picture has only gotten fuzzier. Some are familiar faces popping up in strange places. Former National Security Advisor and United Nations Ambassador Susan Rice, who built her entire career on foreign policy, is to be chief domestic policy advisor. Denis McDonough, who has never served in the military, will head Veterans Affairs. And a recently retired U.S. Army general, Lloyd Austin, has been nominated to run a Defense Department meant to be led by civilians.
In other cases, Biden’s picks appear like a smoke bomb meant to confuse or perhaps placate dueling progressive and centrist wings within the party. Some seem savvy choices: Treasury Secretary-designate Janet Yellen is a former Federal Reserve chairwoman with cross-aisle appeal. But Yellen is also a highly admired progressive economist who has spent her career on increasing income equality for middle-class workers. At the same time, Biden plans to nominate Adewale Adeyemo, President Barack Obama’s international economics advisor who helped negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership—an agreement severely criticized by the left—as Yellen’s deputy secretary.
Others have less impressive records as progressives. Neera Tanden, slated to take over the Office of Management and Budget, is a centrist aligned with Bill and Hillary Clinton, and she is the president of the Center for American Progress, founded by former Hillary Clinton campaign head John Podesta. Tanden has often been critical of uber-progressive Sen. Bernie Sanders, who has pushed for universal health care and free college education.
Yet, the person in charge of Biden’s financial transition task force is a tough-minded Wall Street reformer, Gary Gensler, widely admired by progressives and considered a candidate for some senior position, possibly head of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Alongside him are left-leaning fellow reformers like Capitol Hill activist Dennis Kelleher, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Simon Johnson, and others who have, more than a decade after the great financial crisis, been tough on breaking up big banks.
Even one of Biden’s most recent picks, Mandarin-speaking House Ways and Means Committee trade lawyer Katherine Tai for U.S. trade representative, doesn’t offer any clear sign of where the administration is heading. Considered a centrist, Tai could be a signal that Biden intends to negotiate new trade deals with Beijing, if tougher and more multilateral than under Trump, though it’s not clear if or how long Trump’s trade war with China will linger.
Meanwhile, the leading candidate to be secretary of labor, Patrick Gaspard, recently headed the Open Society Foundations, set up by conservatives’ favorite boogeyman, George Soros. Gaspard was active in responding to the outrage spurred by the George Floyd murder this spring, shepherding $220 million in grants to Black communities.
“What is the agenda? What is the overall vision going to be?” progressive firebrand Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez asked reporters Wednesday on Capitol Hill. “I think that’s a little hazy.”
The new cabinet looks like a multicultural dream team—and the realization of Biden’s bid to master identity politics. Rice and Gaspard are Black; Tai is Asian American; and Tanden is Indian American, as is Vice President-elect Kamala Harris. And Austin would be the first Black American to head the Pentagon.
But some progressives are worried that “Biden is working backwards from identity,” as one longtime political observer put it, designing a cabinet stocked with diversity but less focused on making the changes that many progressives see as long overdue, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy.
“I applaud the formidable progress in the diversity of cabinet and key administration appointments. It is long overdue for America,” said Robert Johnson, the president of the Soros-backed Institute for New Economic Thinking. “But it is not a substitute for taking on monied power interests to produce reform leading to broad-based prosperity. If identity politics is used as a mask to avoid that enormous challenge, it will be very dangerous for the already polarized politics of the USA.”
Rice, for example, is considered a centrist and traditionalist who in the past has been criticized for not being a team player. As Obama’s national security advisor, she was sometimes accused of running an insular National Security Council, advocating aggressive U.S. interventions abroad, and compiling a record that failed to take on human rights abuses abroad. Her views on domestic policy and the problems of U.S. inequality—a key indicator of how she would perform as domestic policy advisor—are as yet little known.
Many of the party elite were shocked in particular by the appointment of Tanden, a former aide to Hillary Clinton and television pundit who is not an expert in budget politics but who in the past often pushed back hard against the progressive plans of Sanders. Progressives fear that under Tanden the Center for American Progress was too beholden to Wall Street and overseas donations from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
And the economic direction doesn’t get any clearer when considering the rest of Biden’s prospective team. Cecilia Rouse, tapped to head the Council on Economic Advisers, is a known progressive, as is her designated deputy Heather Boushey, who helped found the left-leaning Washington Center for Equitable Growth, which has almost entirely focused on redressing economic inequality. Others on the team include Jared Bernstein, who was chief economic advisor to Biden during his vice presidency and is a left-leaning, pro-labor economist. In one way, that adds up to a progressive economic team, said Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University.
“Cecilia Rouse is all about discrimination. And Janet Yellen was the very first central banker who talked about inequality,” he said.
Yet, Biden’s choice to be head of the National Economic Council, Brian Deese, worked for the giant Wall Street hedge fund BlackRock, as did some other Biden nominees, including Adeyemo, who was a senior advisor there. That makes progressives worry they may be more captives of Wall Street than champions of the working class.
“For the most part, they fit into a consistent pattern that I would say is more progressive than Obama, but less progressive than Sanders,” Stiglitz said. “The real point is, will the Biden team remember how the Democrats lost the working class? There’s always going to be a little bit of lack of a little bit of clear consistency and vision. I’d say it’s going to be a pragmatic progressivism.”
Most of the new nominees worked in some fashion for Obama, who’s come under fire again from progressives for the lack of contrition shown in his recent memoir. McDonough was the former president’s chief of staff, while Tai, who could become the first Asian American to become trade representative, served as chief counsel for China trade enforcement from 2011 to 2014, a time when the administration did little to respond to Chinese dumping of low-wage goods or theft of intellectual property.
One early test will be Biden and Tai’s approach to the Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. Progressives hated the deal, which favored U.S. multinationals, but Democratic centrists and many Republicans believed it would be a way to blunt China’s trade strength in the region and eventually coerce Beijing into accepting open trade norms. Trump withdrew from the TPP as one of his first acts in office, saying it was a terrible pact that infringed on U.S. sovereignty. (The other signatories carried on without the United States and formed their own Pacific trade group.)
Biden has said he wants to join the TPP under certain conditions—but it’s not clear what those are. Progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren have criticized the deal for including clauses that give companies the right to sue governments if laws or investment conditions change while giving little attention to workers’ rights. Stiglitz called those investor dispute clauses a “sop to the Business Roundtable.”
Things are only a little clearer when it comes to national security and foreign policy, where progressives have won some early, if perhaps Pyrrhic, victories and where Obama-era alumni are vowing to change their stripes.
Biden’s pick of retired Gen. Austin did knock Michèle Flournoy out of the running for defense secretary; progressives lambasted her ties to defense firms and fondness for foreign interventions. But Austin will require only the third waiver in history for a recently retired general officer to take up the senior civilian spot atop the Pentagon. When Trump, a political and national security neophyte, sought a waiver for former Gen. James Mattis, it was readily granted, because Trump clearly needed guidance. But Biden, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who cast his first major vote during the Vietnam War, has no such need of national security crutches.
Austin seems to indicate that defense policy will be run more out of the White House than the Pentagon—which leaves progressives to wonder whether that policy will reflect the Biden who supported the Iraq War or the Biden who later grew skeptical of U.S. deployments overseas.
Perhaps the most predictable cabinet choices are Antony Blinken as secretary of state and Jake Sullivan to be national security advisor. Both served Obama and Biden at senior levels in the past. Both are, by their own admission, looking to reinvent traditional liberal internationalism and to consider more restrained U.S. deployments overseas. Most importantly, both are trying to update traditional Democratic thinking about how international relations can work for American workers.
In an article in the Atlantic last year, Sullivan wrote that both Democrats and Republicans erred because they “came to treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else” and failed to address the troubles of the ailing middle class by not protecting and retraining them in the face of competition from China and other low-wage competitors. Speaking on background by email, a senior member of the Biden transition team said that this would be a major agenda item of the new administration, breaking with centrist Democratic politics of the past.
Though Trump’s neoisolationist approach was “dangerous,” Sullivan wrote in his Atlantic article, “he has surfaced questions that need clear answers,” especially regarding the “hollowing out” of the middle class.
“Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role, even if a different role than in the past, have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--The Pitiful Endgame of Saudi Arabia’s Qatar Blockade

In a last-ditch effort to unite the Gulf against Iran , outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and President Donald Trump ’ s Middle East advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner have both visited the region in the administration ’ s dying days .
But while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been brought back to the negotiating table , under Kuwait ’ s mediation , little progress was made on resolving the three-year-old dispute ; the trade and travel embargo on Qatar by a quartet of countries—Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Egypt—has not been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talked , and cordially ; the Saudi foreign minister even sent a virtual message that an agreement was “ within reach.
” And yet analysts remain skeptical of a breakthrough .
The outcome of the long-awaited talks to end the blockade of Qatar fell far short of its expectations .
It was also disappointing for the United States , which often struggles to achieve its strategic goals in the region because of the quarrels among its petulant allies .
For instance , while Trump was exerting “ maximum pressure ” on Iran to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forced by the blockade to use Iranian airspace , with the required payments aiding Iran ’ s economy in turn .
The wider region also bore the brunt of the rivalry as Qatar and the UAE backed opposing factions in several conflicts .
Andreas Krieg , a lecturer at King ’ s College London and a Gulf analyst , said that so far the two sides had agreed to tone down their media campaigns against each other to build trust .
“ In a second step , Saudi Arabia might open the air @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goodwill , ” Krieg added .
Some of these confidence-building measures may be announced at the Gulf Cooperation Council ’ s summit later this month , but the differences at the heart of the dispute still seem intractable .
At the core of the crisis are Qatar ’ s ties with Iran ; its alleged support for Islamist groups , particularly the political Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood ; and its alleged use of the state-owned news network Al Jazeera to spread the Brotherhood ’ s message , inciting popular uprisings .
Cutting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamists as well as shutting down Al Jazeera were among Saudi Arabia ’ s 13 demands over the blockade , which read like an infuriated parent ’ s reprimand to a wayward adolescent .
That may indeed be just how the princes in Saudi Arabia and the UAE see their Qatari cousin , who refuses to fall in line .
Doha may throw out some of the Muslim Brotherhood ’ s leaders , as it did back in 2014 when over the same grievance the Saudis and the Emiratis previously severed diplomatic links @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to upend its policy of keeping channels of communication open to all sides of the Middle East ’ s divides .
It is instead trying to present itself as a useful mediator to the West in a region torn between different shades of Islam and riven by violent conflicts .
Pro-Qatar analysts contend that Doha ’ s strong relationship with both Tehran and Washington make it a good potential mediator when U.S. President-elect Joe Biden wishes to rework and rejoin the Iran nuclear deal .
They also say that Qatar ’ s relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Syria and pro-government forces in Libya could be used to end those prolonged conflicts .
There are increasing signs that , especially since it acted as mediator between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan , Qatar fancies itself as Oman ’ s replacement as the region ’ s negotiator-in-chief .
Noha Aboueldahab , a fellow at the Brookings Doha Center , said the cornerstone of Qatari foreign policy was to serve as a hub for diplomacy .
“ This includes unofficial and official talks between groups such as Hezbollah and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban and the Afghan government , most recently in 2020 , Hamas and Fatah , and Darfur rebel groups and the Sudanese government in 2009 , ” she said .
“ Severing ties completely with another country has never really been a typical attribute of Qatari foreign policy , and I don ’ t see this changing even under the current circumstances.
” In possession of the third-biggest natural gas reserves in the world , Qatar has successfully weathered the blockade .
It would , however , like to see the embargo lifted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alternative air , land , and sea trade routes could be channeled instead to preparations for the soccer World Cup in 2022 .
But it regards breaking up with Iran as a nonstarter , and not only because they share a giant gas field .
The blockade paradoxically increased Qatar ’ s dependence on Iran .
As the embargo threatened the supply of basic goods , Iran was the first to send in supplies of necessities such as vegetables , opening its ports and airspace .
Even if the blockade is lifted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t be reimposed , and so it serves Qatar best to keep that door ajar .
Iran , however , has been perceived as a threat by Saudi Arabia since the Islamic revolution in 1979 when it emerged as the model and inspiration for myriad resistance groups scattered around the Middle East .
It is also concerned that a sectarian rival might develop a nuclear weapon , and that the Iran nuclear deal might have been insufficient to obliterate that possibility .
However , dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood acquired urgency owing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab Spring .
The Gulf region ’ s monarchies were terrified that an unimpeded rise of the Brotherhood would create conditions for unrest at home and that they might meet the same fate as toppled autocrats such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt .
Until the Arab Spring , local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were tolerated , but that has changed .
Saudi Arabia , the UAE , Egypt , and Bahrain have proscribed the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization .
So when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman befriended Kushner and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he tried to mitigate both threats by squeezing Qatar .
However , as Biden , who has publicly chastised Saudi Arabia and taken a more charitable look at Iran , takes charge , Qatar imagines itself in a better bargaining position and wishes to brandish its credentials as a peacemaker .
A few days after Gen. Qassem Suleimani , the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ’ s Quds Force , was killed in an American drone strike , and fears of a war between the United States and Iran picked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani traveled to Tehran .
Some analysts are pointing to that visit as proof of Qatar ’ s usefulness to the United States .
According to Krieg of King ’ s College London , the emir ’ s visit came at the United States ’ urging , and he was to advise restraint .
“ The emir was asked by the U.S. to go and mediate so as to avoid an escalation of tensions in the Gulf , ” Krieg said .
Aboueldahab of the Brookings Doha Center added @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iraq with the same message .
“ It ’ s important to remember that when a U.S. strike killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January 2020 , Qatar ’ s foreign minister flew to Iraq in an attempt to de-escalate tensions .
As such , Qatar ’ s approach when it comes to tensions with Iran is to seek de-escalation , rather than isolation , ” she said .
It is possible that Qatar hopes to upstage Oman , but there is little chance it can succeed .
Oman delivered as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when back channels were first activated to discuss the nuclear deal .
There is no reason for Biden to swap Oman for Qatar if there is again a need for a go-between .
Moreover , Qatar is a less palatable option because of its difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE , both of which are demanding to be consulted this time when negotiations over the deal are restarted .
Qatar ’ s bigger foe , perhaps , than Mohammed bin Salman is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ strings from behind the scenes , the man behind policies such as punishing Qatar , mending fences with Syria ’ s Bashar al-Assad , and opening up to Israel .
More than Iran , Mohammed bin Zayed has been worried about the impact of the Brotherhood and other Islamists on regional security as well as on the continuation of monarchies like his .
He is deeply mistrustful of Doha and is not yet ready to forgive its perceived sins , let alone allow its elevation to the position of a mediator between Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retired professor of political science in the UAE , said he regarded the talks between Riyadh and Doha as premature and without “ meat.
” He said Qatar had not changed its behavior and remained loyal to the “ terrorists.
” “ Qatar just does not want to recognize the grievances of its neighbors .
Fine , so be it , ” Abdulla said .
He added , and analysts across the political divide in the Gulf agreed , that while Riyadh and Doha can talk , there will not be a deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t at the moment see that the UAE is on board and it might be a difficult sell for the Saudis to persuade the UAE to sign up to a final agreement or even a preliminary one , ” said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen , a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University ’ s Baker Institute for Public Policy .
“ Qataris want to play a larger and bigger role that annoys Saudi Arabia , it outshines Saudi Arabia , ” Abdulla added .
“ Saudis are saying , do as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the same page .
But Qatar is coordinating with Iran and Turkey and God knows who.
” Saudi , Emirati , and Qatari sheikhs all trace their ancestry to the nomadic tribes of the Arabian Peninsula .
They practice the same religion and have sustained their monarchies by a serendipitous presence of oil and gas underneath their sands .
Their squabbles , however , are much older than their wealth , and none feels they can be seen to be backing down .
While Trump can wish to score a last diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties involved are anything to go by , any resolution would be at best temporary .
It is going to remain up to Biden to bring the U.S. allies together behind a cohesive Iran policy .

In a last-ditch effort to unite the Gulf against Iran, outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and President Donald Trump’s Middle East advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner have both visited the region in the administration’s dying days. But while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been brought back to the negotiating table, under Kuwait’s mediation, little progress was made on resolving the three-year-old dispute; the trade and travel embargo on Qatar by a quartet of countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt—has not been lifted. The Saudis and Qataris have talked, and cordially; the Saudi foreign minister even sent a virtual message that an agreement was “within reach.” And yet analysts remain skeptical of a breakthrough.
In a last-ditch effort to unite the Gulf against Iran, outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and President Donald Trump’s Middle East advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner have both visited the region in the administration’s dying days. But while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been brought back to the negotiating table, under Kuwait’s mediation, little progress was made on resolving the three-year-old dispute; the trade and travel embargo on Qatar by a quartet of countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt—has not been lifted. The Saudis and Qataris have talked, and cordially; the Saudi foreign minister even sent a virtual message that an agreement was “within reach.” And yet analysts remain skeptical of a breakthrough.
The outcome of the long-awaited talks to end the blockade of Qatar fell far short of its expectations. It was also disappointing for the United States, which often struggles to achieve its strategic goals in the region because of the quarrels among its petulant allies. For instance, while Trump was exerting “maximum pressure” on Iran to choke it economically, Qatar Airways was forced by the blockade to use Iranian airspace, with the required payments aiding Iran’s economy in turn. The wider region also bore the brunt of the rivalry as Qatar and the UAE backed opposing factions in several conflicts.
Andreas Krieg, a lecturer at King’s College London and a Gulf analyst, said that so far the two sides had agreed to tone down their media campaigns against each other to build trust. “In a second step, Saudi Arabia might open the air or land border as a sign of goodwill,” Krieg added. Some of these confidence-building measures may be announced at the Gulf Cooperation Council’s summit later this month, but the differences at the heart of the dispute still seem intractable.
At the core of the crisis are Qatar’s ties with Iran; its alleged support for Islamist groups, particularly the political Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood; and its alleged use of the state-owned news network Al Jazeera to spread the Brotherhood’s message, inciting popular uprisings. Cutting off ties with Iran and with the Islamists as well as shutting down Al Jazeera were among Saudi Arabia’s 13 demands over the blockade, which read like an infuriated parent’s reprimand to a wayward adolescent. That may indeed be just how the princes in Saudi Arabia and the UAE see their Qatari cousin, who refuses to fall in line.
Doha may throw out some of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders, as it did back in 2014 when over the same grievance the Saudis and the Emiratis previously severed diplomatic links, but it isn’t ready to upend its policy of keeping channels of communication open to all sides of the Middle East’s divides. It is instead trying to present itself as a useful mediator to the West in a region torn between different shades of Islam and riven by violent conflicts.
Some analysts contend that Doha’s strong relationship with both Tehran and Washington make it a good potential mediator when U.S. President-elect Joe Biden wishes to rework and rejoin the Iran nuclear deal. They also say that Qatar’s relationship with Turkey and its leverage over rebels in Syria and pro-government forces in Libya could be used to end those prolonged conflicts. There are increasing signs that, especially since it acted as mediator between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Qatar fancies itself as Oman’s replacement as the region’s negotiator-in-chief.
Noha Aboueldahab, a fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, said the cornerstone of Qatari foreign policy was to serve as a hub for diplomacy. “This includes unofficial and official talks between groups such as Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008, the Taliban and the Afghan government, most recently in 2020, Hamas and Fatah, and Darfur rebel groups and the Sudanese government in 2009,” she said. “Severing ties completely with another country has never really been a typical attribute of Qatari foreign policy, and I don’t see this changing even under the current circumstances.”
In possession of the third-biggest natural gas reserves in the world, Qatar has successfully weathered the blockade. It would, however, like to see the embargo lifted so the money it is spending on alternative air, land, and sea trade routes could be channeled instead to preparations for the soccer World Cup in 2022. But it regards breaking up with Iran as a nonstarter, and not only because they share a giant gas field. The blockade paradoxically increased Qatar’s dependence on Iran. As the embargo threatened the supply of basic goods, Iran was the first to send in supplies of necessities such as vegetables, opening its ports and airspace. Even if the blockade is lifted, there is no guarantee it won’t be reimposed, and so it serves Qatar best to keep that door ajar.
Iran, however, has been perceived as a threat by Saudi Arabia since the Islamic revolution in 1979 when it emerged as the model and inspiration for myriad resistance groups scattered around the Middle East. It is also concerned that a sectarian rival might develop a nuclear weapon, and that the Iran nuclear deal might have been insufficient to obliterate that possibility.
However, dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood acquired urgency owing to the group’s successes in the Arab Spring. The Gulf region’s monarchies were terrified that an unimpeded rise of the Brotherhood would create conditions for unrest at home and that they might meet the same fate as toppled autocrats such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Until the Arab Spring, local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were tolerated, but that has changed. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain have proscribed the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
So when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman befriended Kushner and found a godsend American ally in Trump, he tried to mitigate both threats by squeezing Qatar. However, as Biden, who has publicly chastised Saudi Arabia and taken a more charitable look at Iran, takes charge, Qatar imagines itself in a better bargaining position and wishes to brandish its credentials as a peacemaker.
A few days after Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s Quds Force, was killed in an American drone strike, and fears of a war between the United States and Iran picked up pace, Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani traveled to Tehran. Some analysts are pointing to that visit as proof of Qatar’s usefulness to the United States.
According to Krieg of King’s College London, the emir’s visit came at the United States’ urging, and he was to advise restraint. “The emir was asked by the U.S. to go and mediate so as to avoid an escalation of tensions in the Gulf,” Krieg said. Aboueldahab of the Brookings Doha Center added that Qatar’s foreign minister flew to Iraq with the same message. “It’s important to remember that when a U.S. strike killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January 2020, Qatar’s foreign minister flew to Iraq in an attempt to de-escalate tensions. As such, Qatar’s approach when it comes to tensions with Iran is to seek de-escalation, rather than isolation,” she said.
It is possible that Qatar hopes to upstage Oman, but there is little chance it can succeed. Oman delivered as an intermediary between the United States and Iran when back channels were first activated to discuss the nuclear deal. There is no reason for Biden to swap Oman for Qatar if there is again a need for a go-between. Moreover, Qatar is a less palatable option because of its difficult relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which are demanding to be consulted this time when negotiations over the deal are restarted.
Qatar’s bigger foe, perhaps, than Mohammed bin Salman is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE. It is he who has been pulling strings from behind the scenes, the man behind policies such as punishing Qatar, mending fences with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and opening up to Israel. More than Iran, Mohammed bin Zayed has been worried about the impact of the Brotherhood and other Islamists on regional security as well as on the continuation of monarchies like his. He is deeply mistrustful of Doha and is not yet ready to forgive its perceived sins, let alone allow its elevation to the position of a mediator between Washington and Tehran.
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a retired professor of political science in the UAE, said he regarded the talks between Riyadh and Doha as premature and without “meat.” He said Qatar had not changed its behavior and remained loyal to the “terrorists.” “Qatar just does not want to recognize the grievances of its neighbors. Fine, so be it,” Abdulla said. He added, and analysts across the political divide in the Gulf agreed, that while Riyadh and Doha can talk, there will not be a deal with Abu Dhabi.
“I don’t at the moment see that the UAE is on board and it might be a difficult sell for the Saudis to persuade the UAE to sign up to a final agreement or even a preliminary one,” said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.
“Qataris want to play a larger and bigger role that annoys Saudi Arabia, it outshines Saudi Arabia,” Abdulla added. “Saudis are saying, do as the Emirates does and let us be on the same page. But Qatar is coordinating with Iran and Turkey and God knows who.”
Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari sheikhs all trace their ancestry to the nomadic tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. They practice the same religion and have sustained their monarchies by a serendipitous presence of oil and gas underneath their sands. Their squabbles, however, are much older than their wealth, and none feels they can be seen to be backing down. While Trump can wish to score a last diplomatic win, if the attitudes of the parties involved are anything to go by, any resolution would be at best temporary. It is going to remain up to Biden to bring the U.S. allies together behind a cohesive Iran policy.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Why Biden Will Lose the Left—and How That Could Help Him

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Barely a day goes by without a new crack appearing .
The left has pushed back faster , and more aggressively , against Biden ’ s cabinet picks than against those of any previous Democratic president .
It already seems to have claimed one victim—Rahm Emanuel , who was reportedly under consideration to lead the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , joined by left-leaning members of Congress , are now fighting to block the nominations of anyone with ties to the defense industry ( such as retired Gen. Lloyd Austin ) , big business ( Jeff Zients , Brian Deese , and Adewale Adeyemo ) , or the aggressive , and in some cases extreme , military policies of past administrations ( Mike Morell ) —never mind the diverse backgrounds of many of the nominees .
Other progressives , meanwhile , have taken to the internet to warn that the not-yet-seated Biden administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And on Nov. 7—the same day that cable networks finally called the election—the socialist magazine Jacobin tweeted , “ It ’ s good that Donald Trump lost .
But the Left now needs to pivot immediately to opposition to the Joe Biden administration.
” The fierce pushback just one month into the transition , coupled with insistence by leaders such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez that Biden abandon his moderation and use his presidency to push for big progressive changes , raise an important question : Can Biden hold on to his party ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
And what will it mean—for him , his presidency , and the country—if he loses the progressives ?
Second , when it comes to staffing , Biden is trying to balance the moderate policy preferences of many of his cabinet choices with an emphasis on diverse backgrounds ( see Austin , Marcia Fudge , Xavier Becerra , Alejandro Mayorkas , Katherine Tai , and Linda Thomas-Greenfield ) .
And he ’ s been careful to pick a number of prominent progressives , such as Janet Yellen , Cecilia Rouse , and Heather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Can Biden hold on to his party ’ s energized left wing for much longer ?
As Matt Bennett , the executive vice president and co-founder of the center-left think tank Third Way , told me , “ Biden did a masterful job during the campaign of suppressing tensions between the left and the center .
The question now is whether he can succeed in doing the same as president.
” The answer to Bennett ’ s very important question depends on which left you ’ re talking about : the online left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ congressional left .
When it comes to the first , the answer seems an obvious no .
Online progressives are itching for a fight .
Jacobin has declared that there will be “ no honeymoon ” for the new president and that “ the incoming Joe Biden administration doesn ’ t deserve an ounce of credit for having the right intentions or a day of progressives patiently waiting to see how it acts.
” Grassroots groups are also mobilized ; this Monday , the organization Code Pink warned on Twitter that it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to his ties to the defense contractor Raytheon .
In Congress , some leftist leaders such as Sen. Bernie Sanders have thus far remained publicly supportive of the president-elect ; one top aide told me that they ’ re planning to give Biden a chance and the benefit of the doubt .
But left-leaning members of the House seem less patient ; Ocasio-Cortez has obliquely warned the incoming administration not to abandon progressive priorities such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal .
So some kind of a break seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are so high— “ even if Biden delivered on another New Deal he ’ d still disappoint the left , because he ’ s not a socialist , ” the Princeton University historian Sean Wilentz told me—and because of the likely makeup of the next Congress .
As a result of the Democrats ’ disappointing down-ballot showing in November , the party now holds only a slim House majority .
In the Senate , either Republicans will retain control , or , if Democrats manage to win both Georgia seats in the January @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will eke out a 50-50 split .
But even that result wouldn ’ t be much of a victory , since it would make cautious moderate senators like Democrat Joe Manchin and Republican Susan Collins the deciding votes on most bills .
Major progressive legislation would never have a chance under either scenario .
Biden could still deliver on some progressive priorities through regulatory changes and executive orders—raising the minimum wage to $ 15 an hour for federal contract workers , offering relief on student loans , and reimposing the many environmental protections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s deeper economic and social problems—and there are many of them—will require actual legislation to address .
And that ’ s just not going to happen .
Add that to Biden ’ s own resolute centrism and his reading of the election results—which showed a strong preference for moderation among the electorate—and the incoming president seems destined to alienate his short-term allies on the left before long .
Again , the answer depends on which left you ’ re talking about .
While historians like Michael Kazin point out that Democrats always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a lack of unity needn ’ t be fatal to Biden .
For starters , he just doesn ’ t care much about what people say about him on Twitter , and his strategy of essentially ignoring the medium has served him very well so far .
As for left-led street protests that could embarrass the administration or scare away voters , those are hard to imagine short of a major war—which Biden is almost guaranteed to avoid .
Obstruction from progressive organizations and members of the House should be a bigger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the president could mean more left-wing primary challenges going into the 2022 midterm elections , which could in turn hurt Democrats ’ ability to hold on to or recover more seats on Election Day itself .
Progressive opposition could also lower voter turnout .
A vengeful left could also try to make Biden ’ s life difficult in Congress .
Progressives won ’ t be able to pass any actual laws the new president opposes , but they could act as spoilers , blocking bills the White House favors—especially compromise deals with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congress are already threatening to do just that to the stimulus bill currently under negotiation .
Bad as all that might sound for Biden , however , there ’ s another , equally plausible scenario in which the left rejects him—and the president does just fine without them .
Progressives ’ ability to block moderate compromises in the House—assuming that Republicans agree to any in the first place , which is far from certain—depends on their actual influence there , which is hard to measure .
The size of the Congressional Progressive Caucus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it boasts nearly 100 members , but a quick look at the roster reveals a lot of moderate names , such as Reps. Lois Frankel and Hakeem Jeffries .
While the November election left the Democrats with a much-reduced majority—which would increase the power of individual spoilers—only a handful or two of House members seem to fit into this category .
And it ’ s far from clear that even these progressives would dare vote against big , if imperfect , spending deals with Republicans , when doing so would place ideological purity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As Third Way ’ s Bennett put it to me , “ Unlike the Tea Party , who are purely anti-government , the Squad ” —as Ocasio-Cortez and her allies are known— “ care deeply about governing and people .
I don ’ t think they ’ ll act like the bomb-throwers on the right.
” What about the 2022 midterms ?
Here again it ’ s unclear how much damage even a very frustrated left could or would do to Biden .
So far , progressives have been careful to only mount @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blue districts , thereby avoiding the risk they might hurt the party ’ s electoral chances in the process .
Meanwhile , if the rollout of the new COVID-19 vaccines go well , if the economy starts to recover , and if Biden manages to rack up a decent number of accomplishments through executive action and on the foreign-policy side ( where he doesn ’ t need Congress for much ) , his popularity—which is already higher than Trump ’ s ever was—could help the Democrats actually retake seats in 2022 , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the left ’ s rhetoric seemed to hurt moderates in tight 2020 races , moreover , a split from progressives could help their odds next time .
The conventional wisdom holds that first-term presidents typically get slaughtered in their first midterm elections .
But that pattern only really holds when their party controls Congress for the first two years and passes major measures that many Americans judge excessive—so they then vote to reduce the majority party ’ s power .
Given the gridlock guaranteed by the makeup of the 117th Congress , no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden or the Democrats of overreach in 2022 .
Biden still has a path to moderate success , both substantively and politically .
Finally , a fight with the left could actually help Biden politically by giving him an excuse for sticking to his pragmatic guns and avoiding saying or doing anything that could alienate his moderate base .
As the New York Times ’ Ross Douthat recently argued , “ He will not be permitted to re-enact the New Deal or the Great Society , but neither will he be tempted into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s failed health care push or even Donald Trump ’ s failed attempt to repeal Obamacare.
” If pundits or voters complain about his failure to do more , he ’ ll be able to blame extremists on both the left and the right for tying his hands .
To be clear : The best outcome for Biden , the Democrats , and the country would still be for the incoming president to find a way to hold on to the left and the rest of his party—by accomplishing enough to satisfy the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using that record and a vaccine-induced economic recovery to build the kind of popular support that would make him very difficult for anyone , on the left or right , to challenge .
But given all the ifs and obstacles embedded in that last sentence , it ’ s important to recognize that even if many of these policies don ’ t pan out , Biden still has a path to moderate success , both substantively and politically .
And that might be the best anyone can hope for given the incredible mess @ @ @ @ @

Scarcely a month after the Democrats came together to help Joe Biden win the U.S. presidential election, the famously fractious party is already splintering at record speed.
Scarcely a month after the Democrats came together to help Joe Biden win the U.S. presidential election, the famously fractious party is already splintering at record speed.
Barely a day goes by without a new crack appearing. The left has pushed back faster, and more aggressively, against Biden’s cabinet picks than against those of any previous Democratic president. It already seems to have claimed one victim—Rahm Emanuel, who was reportedly under consideration to lead the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the Department of Transportation. And activist groups, joined by left-leaning members of Congress, are now fighting to block the nominations of anyone with ties to the defense industry (such as retired Gen. Lloyd Austin), big business (Jeff Zients, Brian Deese, and Adewale Adeyemo), or the aggressive, and in some cases extreme, military policies of past administrations (Mike Morell)—never mind the diverse backgrounds of many of the nominees.
Other progressives, meanwhile, have taken to the internet to warn that the not-yet-seated Biden administration may already be a lost cause. And on Nov. 7—the same day that cable networks finally called the election—the socialist magazine Jacobin tweeted, “It’s good that Donald Trump lost. But the Left now needs to pivot immediately to opposition to the Joe Biden administration.”
The fierce pushback just one month into the transition, coupled with insistence by leaders such as Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez that Biden abandon his moderation and use his presidency to push for big progressive changes, raise an important question: Can Biden hold on to his party’s energized left wing for much longer? And what will it mean—for him, his presidency, and the country—if he loses the progressives?
From top left: Some of President-elect Joe Biden’s high-level picks include retired Gen. Lloyd Austin, Marcia Fudge, Xavier Becerra, Alejandro Mayorkas, Katherine Tai, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Janet Yellen, Cecilia Rouse, and Heather Boushey.
By all accounts, the president-elect recognizes the scope of the challenge and has a three-part strategy to prevent it. The first element involves rhetorically signaling his support for progressive causes: His transition website, for example, ranks the fight for racial justice and against climate change as among his top priorities.
Second, when it comes to staffing, Biden is trying to balance the moderate policy preferences of many of his cabinet choices with an emphasis on diverse backgrounds (see Austin, Marcia Fudge, Xavier Becerra, Alejandro Mayorkas, Katherine Tai, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield). And he’s been careful to pick a number of prominent progressives, such as Janet Yellen, Cecilia Rouse, and Heather Boushey, for key economic roles.
Can Biden hold on to his party’s energized left wing for much longer?
As Matt Bennett, the executive vice president and co-founder of the center-left think tank Third Way, told me, “Biden did a masterful job during the campaign of suppressing tensions between the left and the center. The question now is whether he can succeed in doing the same as president.”
The answer to Bennett’s very important question depends on which left you’re talking about: the online left, the grassroots left, or the congressional left.
When it comes to the first, the answer seems an obvious no. Online progressives are itching for a fight. Jacobin has declared that there will be “no honeymoon” for the new president and that “the incoming Joe Biden administration doesn’t deserve an ounce of credit for having the right intentions or a day of progressives patiently waiting to see how it acts.” Grassroots groups are also mobilized; this Monday, the organization Code Pink warned on Twitter that it was “coming for” Austin, presumably due to his ties to the defense contractor Raytheon.
In Congress, some leftist leaders such as Sen. Bernie Sanders have thus far remained publicly supportive of the president-elect; one top aide told me that they’re planning to give Biden a chance and the benefit of the doubt. But left-leaning members of the House seem less patient; Ocasio-Cortez has obliquely warned the incoming administration not to abandon progressive priorities such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal.
So some kind of a break seems inevitable, both because progressives’ expectations are so high—“even if Biden delivered on another New Deal he’d still disappoint the left, because he’s not a socialist,” the Princeton University historian Sean Wilentz told me—and because of the likely makeup of the next Congress.
As a result of the Democrats’ disappointing down-ballot showing in November, the party now holds only a slim House majority. In the Senate, either Republicans will retain control, or, if Democrats manage to win both Georgia seats in the January runoff election, Biden’s party will eke out a 50-50 split. But even that result wouldn’t be much of a victory, since it would make cautious moderate senators like Democrat Joe Manchin and Republican Susan Collins the deciding votes on most bills. Major progressive legislation would never have a chance under either scenario. Biden could still deliver on some progressive priorities through regulatory changes and executive orders—raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour for federal contract workers, offering relief on student loans, and reimposing the many environmental protections that Trump overturned. But the country’s deeper economic and social problems—and there are many of them—will require actual legislation to address. And that’s just not going to happen.
Add that to Biden’s own resolute centrism and his reading of the election results—which showed a strong preference for moderation among the electorate—and the incoming president seems destined to alienate his short-term allies on the left before long.
Demonstrators are seen during a climate change protest in Washington on Oct. 25, 2019.
But so what? Could an angry left then punish Biden in any significant way?
Again, the answer depends on which left you’re talking about. While historians like Michael Kazin point out that Democrats always perform better when they’re united, a lack of unity needn’t be fatal to Biden. For starters, he just doesn’t care much about what people say about him on Twitter, and his strategy of essentially ignoring the medium has served him very well so far. As for left-led street protests that could embarrass the administration or scare away voters, those are hard to imagine short of a major war—which Biden is almost guaranteed to avoid.
Obstruction from progressive organizations and members of the House should be a bigger worry. A lack of grassroots support for the president could mean more left-wing primary challenges going into the 2022 midterm elections, which could in turn hurt Democrats’ ability to hold on to or recover more seats on Election Day itself. Progressive opposition could also lower voter turnout.
A vengeful left could also try to make Biden’s life difficult in Congress. Progressives won’t be able to pass any actual laws the new president opposes, but they could act as spoilers, blocking bills the White House favors—especially compromise deals with the Republicans. Some left-wing members of Congress are already threatening to do just that to the stimulus bill currently under negotiation.
Bad as all that might sound for Biden, however, there’s another, equally plausible scenario in which the left rejects him—and the president does just fine without them.
Progressives’ ability to block moderate compromises in the House—assuming that Republicans agree to any in the first place, which is far from certain—depends on their actual influence there, which is hard to measure. The size of the Congressional Progressive Caucus isn’t a good proxy; it boasts nearly 100 members, but a quick look at the roster reveals a lot of moderate names, such as Reps. Lois Frankel and Hakeem Jeffries.
While the November election left the Democrats with a much-reduced majority—which would increase the power of individual spoilers—only a handful or two of House members seem to fit into this category. And it’s far from clear that even these progressives would dare vote against big, if imperfect, spending deals with Republicans, when doing so would place ideological purity over the needs of their constituents. As Third Way’s Bennett put it to me, “Unlike the Tea Party, who are purely anti-government, the Squad”—as Ocasio-Cortez and her allies are known—“care deeply about governing and people. I don’t think they’ll act like the bomb-throwers on the right.”
What about the 2022 midterms? Here again it’s unclear how much damage even a very frustrated left could or would do to Biden. So far, progressives have been careful to only mount primary challenges against moderate Democrats in reliably blue districts, thereby avoiding the risk they might hurt the party’s electoral chances in the process. Meanwhile, if the rollout of the new COVID-19 vaccines go well, if the economy starts to recover, and if Biden manages to rack up a decent number of accomplishments through executive action and on the foreign-policy side (where he doesn’t need Congress for much), his popularity—which is already higher than Trump’s ever was—could help the Democrats actually retake seats in 2022, with or without the left. Given how the left’s rhetoric seemed to hurt moderates in tight 2020 races, moreover, a split from progressives could help their odds next time.
The conventional wisdom holds that first-term presidents typically get slaughtered in their first midterm elections. But that pattern only really holds when their party controls Congress for the first two years and passes major measures that many Americans judge excessive—so they then vote to reduce the majority party’s power. Given the gridlock guaranteed by the makeup of the 117th Congress, no one will be able to credibly accuse Biden or the Democrats of overreach in 2022.
Biden still has a path to moderate success, both substantively and politically.
Finally, a fight with the left could actually help Biden politically by giving him an excuse for sticking to his pragmatic guns and avoiding saying or doing anything that could alienate his moderate base. As the New York Times’ Ross Douthat recently argued, “He will not be permitted to re-enact the New Deal or the Great Society, but neither will he be tempted into ideologically driven debacles like Bill Clinton’s failed health care push or even Donald Trump’s failed attempt to repeal Obamacare.” If pundits or voters complain about his failure to do more, he’ll be able to blame extremists on both the left and the right for tying his hands.
To be clear: The best outcome for Biden, the Democrats, and the country would still be for the incoming president to find a way to hold on to the left and the rest of his party—by accomplishing enough to satisfy the majority of his supporters, and by using that record and a vaccine-induced economic recovery to build the kind of popular support that would make him very difficult for anyone, on the left or right, to challenge.
But given all the ifs and obstacles embedded in that last sentence, it’s important to recognize that even if many of these policies don’t pan out, Biden still has a path to moderate success, both substantively and politically. And that might be the best anyone can hope for given the incredible mess the country now faces.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-12--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Barely a day has gone by since the U.S. presidential election without a new crack appearing in the Democratic Party .
Already , this fracture raises important questions : Can President-elect Joe Biden hold on to his party ’ s energized left wing for much longer ?
And what will it mean—for him , his presidency , and the country—if he loses progressives ?
Meanwhile , technology is fundamentally changing the nature of persuasion , already in danger of being mobilized for ill in democratic societies .
Because of this risk , the world needs new rules governing how companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , parties from across the political spectrum that were once fierce rivals have formed an alliance as New Delhi tries to control the region through handpicked local operatives .
1 .
Why Biden Will Lose the Left—and How That Could Help Him The incoming U.S. president seems destined to alienate his short-term allies on the left before long .
But Biden still has a path to moderate success , both substantively and politically , Foreign Policy ’ s Jonathan Tepperman writes .
2 .
The Peril of Persuasion in the Big Tech Age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a frank conversation about the role persuasion plays in them and how tech companies are enabling powerful interests to target audiences , Bruce Schneier and Alicia Wanless write .
3 .
Old Rivals in Kashmir Are Joining Forces Against Modi The formation in Kashmir of the Gupkar Alliance , whose key parties were formerly sworn enemies , marks the beginning of a new chapter in the region ’ s politics in the wake of India ’ s attack on Kashmiri autonomy , Haziq Qadri and Qadri Inzamam write .
4 .
Biden Sees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Biden ’ s new foreign-policy team has won measured praise from experts who rarely , if ever , agree .
But there ’ s reason to be skeptical of the president-elect ’ s national security choices , Foreign Policy ’ s Stephen M. Walt writes .
The outcome of the long-awaited talks between Riyadh and Doha to end the blockade of Qatar under Kuwait ’ s mediation fell far short of its expectations—and was also disappointing for the United States , Foreign Policy ’ s Anchal Vohra writes .

Barely a day has gone by since the U.S. presidential election without a new crack appearing in the Democratic Party. Already, this fracture raises important questions: Can President-elect Joe Biden hold on to his party’s energized left wing for much longer? And what will it mean—for him, his presidency, and the country—if he loses progressives?
Barely a day has gone by since the U.S. presidential election without a new crack appearing in the Democratic Party. Already, this fracture raises important questions: Can President-elect Joe Biden hold on to his party’s energized left wing for much longer? And what will it mean—for him, his presidency, and the country—if he loses progressives?
Meanwhile, technology is fundamentally changing the nature of persuasion, already in danger of being mobilized for ill in democratic societies. Because of this risk, the world needs new rules governing how companies manipulate popular opinion.
And in Kashmir, parties from across the political spectrum that were once fierce rivals have formed an alliance as New Delhi tries to control the region through handpicked local operatives.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden walks off stage in Wilmington, Delaware, on Nov. 16.
The incoming U.S. president seems destined to alienate his short-term allies on the left before long. But Biden still has a path to moderate success, both substantively and politically, Foreign Policy’s Jonathan Tepperman writes.
A graphic artist paints a mural ad for smartphone manufacturer Apple in Berlin on Oct 1.
Democratic societies are in dire need of a frank conversation about the role persuasion plays in them and how tech companies are enabling powerful interests to target audiences, Bruce Schneier and Alicia Wanless write.
Former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Mehbooba Mufti (L) gestures while talking with Jammu and Kashmir National Conference President Farooq Abdullah (C) along with his son and former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah (R) after a meeting in Srinagar on Oct. 15.
The formation in Kashmir of the Gupkar Alliance, whose key parties were formerly sworn enemies, marks the beginning of a new chapter in the region’s politics in the wake of India’s attack on Kashmiri autonomy, Haziq Qadri and Qadri Inzamam write.
Joe Biden announces the members of his health team, including his pick for secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra, at the Queen Theater December 08, 2020 in Wilmington, Delaware.
Biden’s new foreign-policy team has won measured praise from experts who rarely, if ever, agree. But there’s reason to be skeptical of the president-elect’s national security choices, Foreign Policy’s Stephen M. Walt writes.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo prepares to board his plane at the Old Doha International airport in the Qatari capital Doha, on Nov. 21, 2020.
The outcome of the long-awaited talks between Riyadh and Doha to end the blockade of Qatar under Kuwait’s mediation fell far short of its expectations—and was also disappointing for the United States, Foreign Policy’s Anchal Vohra writes.