foreignpolicy--2020-02-11--Low-Yield Nukes Are a Danger, Not a Deterrent

Low-yield nuclear weapons are being manufactured and deployed again in the United States , for the first time since the end of the Cold War .
They are not the lowest-yield nuclear weapons ever manufactured , and they still can destroy a city .
The justification for this step , as for many others , is that it enhances deterrence .
A detailed look at that argument shows how polymorphous and poorly supported arguments on deterrence can be .
The advocates of those lower-yield nuclear weapons rely on firm assertions about deterrence , a foundation of nuclear war strategy—which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ balances adversaries ’ judgments of unacceptable harm to themselves against the gains they might make .
The calculation includes conventional military power as well as nuclear .
It depends on the opponent ’ s state of mind .
Arguments based on deterrence are necessarily deductive .
The world has never fought a nuclear war , so we don ’ t know how one would play out .
The entire history of nuclear weapon use in anger is the two bombs dropped on Japan by the United States in 1945 .
At that time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so there was no possibility of retaliation or escalation .
Game theory and the history of devastating battles provide hints , but analyses of nuclear war are in a different domain than other military theory .
Additionally , much of the strategy of nuclear war was developed in the 1960s and 1970s , when the belief in a rational economic man was firmer than it is today .
Decisions to balance hundreds of thousands of deaths against a national interest would be made dispassionately as the missiles flew .
Those decisions could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the worst happened .
The decision-makers were men of principle .
There are a few negative examples .
The United States and the Soviet Union faced off over Cuba in 1962 , and both nations found a way not to use nuclear weapons—just as India and Pakistan explicitly rejected first use of nuclear weapons in their crisis of 2001 to 2002 .
It is possible that India and Pakistan were influenced by the Americans and Soviets backing away from the brink .
A few false alarms teach us some things about human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ built on ideas about psychology , especially the psychology of adversaries .
It ’ s worth asking how much of that foundation of deterrence thinking dates back to 1950s psychology and hasn ’ t been updated .
All this renders deterrence a deeply uncertain art , not a carefully formulated science .
Nevertheless , advocates assure us that those lower-yield nuclear weapons are an essential step to stabilize deterrence by matching weapons .
A Russian nuclear cruise missile , promoted by President Vladimir Putin as being able to stay aloft for long periods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killed seven people when it was tested , means the United States must have nuclear cruise missiles ; if Russia is developing maneuverable hypersonic missiles to avoid missile defenses , the United States must have hypersonic missiles too .
If the United States matches every Russian weapon , if every move is potentially countered , advocates argue , deterrence exists .
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recognized the tendency to shrink nuclear strategy to comparison of weapons .
Thus the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz ’ s classical postulate is turned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics drive preparations for war .
The doctrine that is to be countered with lower-yield nuclear weapons is called “ escalate to de-escalate ” —using a small nuclear weapon as a warning to an opponent to stand down as a larger conventional conflict appears to be going badly .
Advocates for lower-yield nuclear weapons such as Matthew Kroenig and Elbridge Colby assert that escalate to de-escalate is part of Russian war plans .
The basis for this belief is a single sentence in an obscure part of a Russian strategy document , along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smaller nuclear weapons .
The advocates argue that Americans would hesitate to respond to escalate to de-escalate with the nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal .
Their term for this is “ self-deterrence.
” However , they ignore already-existing nuclear weapons that offer options for yields in the sub- and low-kiloton range , such as already-deployed B61 bombs whose yield can be adjusted down to 0.3 kilotons , or air-launched cruise missiles with variable yields down to 5 kilotons .
Whether escalate to de-escalate in fact is Russian doctrine is disputed ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Olga Oliker , Michael Krepon , and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard ) , but it is the easiest way to develop a scenario in which a conventional war goes nuclear .
The assumptions of how a conventional war might develop are equally shaky .
For example , here ’ s an assessment of Russian decision-making in a Nordic crisis .
Going by that assessment and others , it ’ s hard to see how a Russian attack comes about , much less escalate to de-escalate .
But say that Russia ’ s strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beyond the comparison of hardware to the strategic moves involved .
Escalate to de-escalate would come after a war in progress presents a danger to the Russian homeland .
For the United States to be involved , that war would most likely be in Europe—such as a Ukraine-like intrusion into Estonia or Latvia , or a conflict over Russian activity in the Swedish or Finnish archipelagoes , or perhaps an Arctic confrontation between Russia and Norway or Finland .
All of those possibilities involve NATO nations or nations cooperating with NATO .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a decision for an escalate to de-escalate strike .
It would strike Amari Air Base in Estonia , where NATO planes are stationed .
Amari is fairly isolated , but even with a lower-yield nuclear weapon , there would be civilian casualties along with military .
Fallout over Tallinn could be serious .
The use of a nuclear weapon , NATO casualties , and the obvious possibility of further Russian incursion into Estonia would be considered threatening in Washington , Brussels , and other European capitals .
Pressure would mount for retaliation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nuclear-armed cruise missile to destroy the Seshcha Air Base , also isolated and somewhat equivalent in absolute size , although much less important relatively .
Now two nuclear weapons would have been dropped .
Emotions would be high across the Northern Hemisphere .
Would a country willing to drop the first nuclear weapon in an escalate to de-escalate scenario stand down after a nuclear response ?
Would NATO stand back if Russia overran the Baltic States ?
Or if Moscow grabbed critical islands in the archipelagoes to control shipping to Stockholm and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Poland , population 1.7 million ?
Hundreds of thousands of people would be killed or maimed .
And then would NATO choose Rostov-on-Don , Russia , population 1.1 million ?
At that point , everyone would be on hair-trigger alert , increasing the probability of mistakes .
Has an escalation ladder been gamed out for the use of these weapons ?
Do we know that the two sides take the meanings intended in each strike ?
Civilians don ’ t know .
Even those involved in nuclear planning know only their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons have provided no answers beyond the assumption that being able to respond in kind to an escalate to de-escalate strike will deter the first strike from happening at all .
But deterrence is far broader than this .
We need to know whether this is in fact Russian doctrine , how Russia values situations that could lead to war , and how they think about existing American weapons and defenses .
The nonproliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis has done a partial analysis of such factors .
A justification for introducing new nuclear weapons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Another argument for more deterrence lies in the speed of communications .
That speed , via technological advances , erodes the capability for the devastating second strikes on which the logic of deterrence currently rests .
This argument also devolves to technology versus technology .
Once again , the logic is taken to false extremes .
Thus , a dead-hand system with decision-making by artificial intelligence after human decision-makers are killed has been proposed , citing the implied arguments against such practices in the movies Dr. Strangelove , WarGames , and Terminator , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ detailed refutation of both the idea that speed of communications is an issue and the use of artificial intelligence can be found here .
Nations abstain from war for many reasons .
The concept of deterrence has come to represent that abstention , while at the same time shrinking it to the matching of weapons , one for one .
Although the arguments for that sort of deterrence are flimsy , the magic of the term justifies spending enormous sums—for purely theoretical gains , and the likely ratcheting up of nuclear danger .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to this piece .

Low-yield nuclear weapons are being manufactured and deployed again in the United States, for the first time since the end of the Cold War. They are not the lowest-yield nuclear weapons ever manufactured, and they still can destroy a city. The justification for this step, as for many others, is that it enhances deterrence. A detailed look at that argument shows how polymorphous and poorly supported arguments on deterrence can be.
Low-yield nuclear weapons are being manufactured and deployed again in the United States, for the first time since the end of the Cold War. They are not the lowest-yield nuclear weapons ever manufactured, and they still can destroy a city. The justification for this step, as for many others, is that it enhances deterrence. A detailed look at that argument shows how polymorphous and poorly supported arguments on deterrence can be.
The advocates of those lower-yield nuclear weapons rely on firm assertions about deterrence, a foundation of nuclear war strategy—which is mostly concerned with averting it. Deterrence balances adversaries’ judgments of unacceptable harm to themselves against the gains they might make. The calculation includes conventional military power as well as nuclear. It depends on the opponent’s state of mind.
Arguments based on deterrence are necessarily deductive. The world has never fought a nuclear war, so we don’t know how one would play out. The entire history of nuclear weapon use in anger is the two bombs dropped on Japan by the United States in 1945. At that time, no other nation possessed nuclear weapons, so there was no possibility of retaliation or escalation.
Game theory and the history of devastating battles provide hints, but analyses of nuclear war are in a different domain than other military theory. Additionally, much of the strategy of nuclear war was developed in the 1960s and 1970s, when the belief in a rational economic man was firmer than it is today. Decisions to balance hundreds of thousands of deaths against a national interest would be made dispassionately as the missiles flew. Those decisions could be gamed out in advance for guidance if the worst happened. The decision-makers were men of principle.
There are a few negative examples. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off over Cuba in 1962, and both nations found a way not to use nuclear weapons—just as India and Pakistan explicitly rejected first use of nuclear weapons in their crisis of 2001 to 2002. It is possible that India and Pakistan were influenced by the Americans and Soviets backing away from the brink. A few false alarms teach us some things about human reactions—an essential part of a strategy fundamentally built on ideas about psychology, especially the psychology of adversaries. It’s worth asking how much of that foundation of deterrence thinking dates back to 1950s psychology and hasn’t been updated.
All this renders deterrence a deeply uncertain art, not a carefully formulated science. Nevertheless, advocates assure us that those lower-yield nuclear weapons are an essential step to stabilize deterrence by matching weapons. A Russian nuclear cruise missile, promoted by President Vladimir Putin as being able to stay aloft for long periods of time and real enough to have killed seven people when it was tested, means the United States must have nuclear cruise missiles; if Russia is developing maneuverable hypersonic missiles to avoid missile defenses, the United States must have hypersonic missiles too. If the United States matches every Russian weapon, if every move is potentially countered, advocates argue, deterrence exists. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recognized the tendency to shrink nuclear strategy to comparison of weapons. Thus the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s classical postulate is turned on its head; weapons rather than politics drive preparations for war.
The doctrine that is to be countered with lower-yield nuclear weapons is called “escalate to de-escalate”—using a small nuclear weapon as a warning to an opponent to stand down as a larger conventional conflict appears to be going badly. Advocates for lower-yield nuclear weapons such as Matthew Kroenig and Elbridge Colby assert that escalate to de-escalate is part of Russian war plans. The basis for this belief is a single sentence in an obscure part of a Russian strategy document, along with Russia’s large number of smaller nuclear weapons.
The advocates argue that Americans would hesitate to respond to escalate to de-escalate with the nuclear weapons currently in the U.S. arsenal. Their term for this is “self-deterrence.” However, they ignore already-existing nuclear weapons that offer options for yields in the sub- and low-kiloton range, such as already-deployed B61 bombs whose yield can be adjusted down to 0.3 kilotons, or air-launched cruise missiles with variable yields down to 5 kilotons.
Whether escalate to de-escalate in fact is Russian doctrine is disputed (see: to research by Amy Woolf, Olga Oliker, Michael Krepon, and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard), but it is the easiest way to develop a scenario in which a conventional war goes nuclear. The assumptions of how a conventional war might develop are equally shaky. For example, here’s an assessment of Russian decision-making in a Nordic crisis. Going by that assessment and others, it’s hard to see how a Russian attack comes about, much less escalate to de-escalate.
But say that Russia’s strategy does include escalate to de-escalate—or even go beyond the comparison of hardware to the strategic moves involved.
Escalate to de-escalate would come after a war in progress presents a danger to the Russian homeland. For the United States to be involved, that war would most likely be in Europe—such as a Ukraine-like intrusion into Estonia or Latvia, or a conflict over Russian activity in the Swedish or Finnish archipelagoes, or perhaps an Arctic confrontation between Russia and Norway or Finland. All of those possibilities involve NATO nations or nations cooperating with NATO.
One way or another, Russia would arrive at a decision for an escalate to de-escalate strike. It would strike Amari Air Base in Estonia, where NATO planes are stationed. Amari is fairly isolated, but even with a lower-yield nuclear weapon, there would be civilian casualties along with military. Fallout over Tallinn could be serious.
The use of a nuclear weapon, NATO casualties, and the obvious possibility of further Russian incursion into Estonia would be considered threatening in Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals. Pressure would mount for retaliation.
In response, NATO would use a nuclear-armed cruise missile to destroy the Seshcha Air Base, also isolated and somewhat equivalent in absolute size, although much less important relatively.
Now two nuclear weapons would have been dropped. Emotions would be high across the Northern Hemisphere. Would a country willing to drop the first nuclear weapon in an escalate to de-escalate scenario stand down after a nuclear response? Would NATO stand back if Russia overran the Baltic States? Or if Moscow grabbed critical islands in the archipelagoes to control shipping to Stockholm and Helsinki?
Or would Russia strike Warsaw, Poland, population 1.7 million? Hundreds of thousands of people would be killed or maimed. And then would NATO choose Rostov-on-Don, Russia, population 1.1 million? At that point, everyone would be on hair-trigger alert, increasing the probability of mistakes.
Has an escalation ladder been gamed out for the use of these weapons? Do we know that the two sides take the meanings intended in each strike?
Civilians don’t know. Even those involved in nuclear planning know only their own side. Yet the advocates of these weapons have provided no answers beyond the assumption that being able to respond in kind to an escalate to de-escalate strike will deter the first strike from happening at all. But deterrence is far broader than this. We need to know whether this is in fact Russian doctrine, how Russia values situations that could lead to war, and how they think about existing American weapons and defenses. The nonproliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis has done a partial analysis of such factors. A justification for introducing new nuclear weapons should go beyond his initial take.
Another argument for more deterrence lies in the speed of communications. That speed, via technological advances, erodes the capability for the devastating second strikes on which the logic of deterrence currently rests. This argument also devolves to technology versus technology.
Once again, the logic is taken to false extremes. Thus, a dead-hand system with decision-making by artificial intelligence after human decision-makers are killed has been proposed, citing the implied arguments against such practices in the movies Dr. Strangelove, WarGames, and Terminator, but forging ahead anyway. A more detailed refutation of both the idea that speed of communications is an issue and the use of artificial intelligence can be found here. Nations abstain from war for many reasons. The concept of deterrence has come to represent that abstention, while at the same time shrinking it to the matching of weapons, one for one. Although the arguments for that sort of deterrence are flimsy, the magic of the term justifies spending enormous sums—for purely theoretical gains, and the likely ratcheting up of nuclear danger.
Anne I. Harrington and Marty Pfeiffer contributed to this piece.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-10--Desperate, Thousands of Syrians Flee Toward Turkish Border

As snow fell on northern Syria this past week , it covered thousands of fleeing families unable to find even a piece of tarp to shelter themselves .
The wintry weather , along with the bloody onslaught by the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad , has turned the flight of displaced civilians in Idlib and Aleppo toward the Turkish border into the biggest humanitarian crisis yet in a war that for almost a decade has normalized mass atrocities .
“ No one prepared camps ahead of time , there are no tents , people are sleeping in cars and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a resident of northern Aleppo , who is attempting to help the displaced .
( Like many of those interviewed for this story on WhatsApp , Ahmad wants only his first name used for fear of retribution . )
The lucky among them stay with relatives or rent a home , but very few can afford this .
Homeowners in areas abutting the Turkish border are charging the displaced exorbitant sums in rent—a common price is $ 350 per month for a two-bedroom house , when an average salary in the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about $ 50 .
According to new data from the United Nations , since Dec. 1 , 2019 , 689,000 civilians have been displaced by the government ’ s offensive against the last rebel holdout in Idlib , most of them women and children .
Some 100,000 have been displaced only in the past week .
The rapid progress of regime forces and waves of displacement it produced escalated tensions between Turkey and the Syrian forces backed by Russia .
Another five Turkish soldiers were killed in recent days in an attack carried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ precipitating retaliation against Syrian army targets by Turkish forces dispatched to northwestern Syria .
“ I think there are now more Turkish soldiers in Idlib than armed revolutionaries , ” said Yasser , a tracker of regime airstrikes and military movement in Idlib , referring to the mass influx of Turkish soldiers and heavy weaponry into Idlib , the last bastion of the Syrian armed opposition .
In early February , Turkey began dispatching multiple convoys made up of hundreds of jeeps , armored personnel carriers , tanks , multiple rocket launchers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an effort to prevent the collapse of the last rebel-held pocket in Syria , amid rapid regime advances against it .
The fate of Idlib ’ s 3 million to 4 million residents now depends on Turkey ’ s ability to deter further regime advances .
In Ankara ’ s eyes , a mass influx of refugees would be politically destabilizing .
Turkey ’ s willingness to send in thousands of troops and heavy weaponry with no air cover and against Russia ’ s wishes shows that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent the last rebel pocket from collapsing .
Turkey established several new observation posts manned by newly arrived troops .
After its observation posts came under attack in early February , Turkey began firing artillery at advancing regime forces on several occasions .
Thus far , Turkey has not attempted to enter the fray with its air force , which has been significantly weakened due to purges after the 2016 attempted coup .
Russia and the Assad regime still control the skies and use this dominance to destroy hospitals , bakeries , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be the purposeful depopulation of entire towns , pushing civilians to flee toward the shuttered Turkish border .
About 1 million civilians have been displaced in Idlib , northwestern Syria , since the start of the Syrian regime ’ s offensive in late April 2019 , according to U.N. data .
“ These are people who ’ ve been displaced time and time again .
People are completely exhausted , and the capacities of NGOs are also exhausted , ” said Asmahan Dehny , the emergency response program coordinator at the Syrian humanitarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impoverished families unable to afford their escape and recently established communal tents to receive them .
The prospect of returning to live under the Assad regime terrifies most Idlib residents , even as the rebels ruling over them lost much of their popular support due to their abusiveness .
A majority of Idlib ’ s up to 4 million residents were displaced from their homes by the regime and expect to be executed or jailed and tortured if they fall into the regime ’ s hands .
“ Even people who have nothing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ factions feel that they are the target , ” said Maher , a displaced novelist residing in Idlib .
Similarly to many others in Idlib with whom Foreign Policy spoke in recent days , he pointed to the case of Ahmad al-Jifal , a 69-year-old man with mental health issues , who refused to leave Maarat al-Numan .
After the city was captured by a Russian-backed militia in January , the fighters executed him and set fire to his corpse .
But very few who are left can afford to escape Idlib .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Turkey costs $ 350 and usually ends in being caught , beaten , and sent back by Turkish border guards .
Despite the risks , a greater number of Idlib residents are making this trip , usually by borrowing from friends and relatives living abroad .
According to Maher , “ the fence along the border and the border police reinforcements on the Turkish side of the border are making smuggling incredibly difficult .
There are people who ’ ve tried six , seven times to cross into Turkey , getting arrested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expecting death.
” He said he hopes to finish a novel he ’ s writing about a French and Syrian archeologist digging in the ancient city of Ugarit before the regime reaches his border village .
Veteran humanitarian NGO workers are at a loss about how to handle this unprecedented crisis .
“ Even if we manage to secure food and water for all the displaced , we can not provide them with shelter or areas that are safe from the torrential rains to set up a tent , ” said Ziad al-Sebai @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Syrian humanitarian NGO Watan .
“ Imagine how many babies from the previously displaced and the new waves will get sick and die due to the cold and malnutrition.
” A series of agreements between Russia and Turkey , which called for establishing a demilitarized zone in Idlib and allowed Turkey to erect observation posts in Idlib starting in late 2017 , broke down in April 2019 ; negotiations between Russia and Turkey to revive it have not been successful .
Russia is determined to achieve a decisive military solution for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accept a cease-fire , even with significant concessions from the rebels .
This uncompromising position was pushed by the Russian Ministry of Defense , overriding less gung-ho elements in the Russian administration .
To make matters worse , in January , Iran became much more actively involved in the campaign against the last rebel-held pocket .
Previously , Iranian officials promised Turkey to stay out of the fighting in the area , wishing to preserve their relationship with Turkey .
The reopening of the dormant front in western Aleppo , manned by pro-Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Pakistani fighters overseen by the Quds Force ) and units within the Syrian army that are close to Iran ( such as the 4th Division ) , signaled a shift .
The rebels , forced to rebuff attacks both in southern Idlib and western and southern Aleppo , could not hold their ground .
The headway of the regime turned into an all-out stampede .
“ Just being able to repel attacks has become a victory in an of itself , ” said Mannar , a rebel with the National Liberation Front @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a small group of fighters , to withdraw from his village of Kafr Halab , ceding it to the Iranian-backed militias .
“ The regime annihilated the village.
” Mannar has been fighting the regime since the age of 15 .
He is determined to return to the front after evacuating his family to the border .
The regime ’ s advances on the ground also stemmed from Russian support : Training and guidance from Russian officers and mercenaries boosted the capabilities of pro-regime militias , and night vision equipment provided by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to advance during the night .
In 2019 , Russia altered its targeting policy in Idlib .
While previously , the regime and Russia relied on indiscriminate fire across the rebel-held territory to terrorize the population , break its spirit , kill , and destroy , they now concentrate their indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery shelling on stretches of territory close to the front lines , leading nearly all civilians to escape .
At the same time , Russia began relying more heavily on surveillance drones that call in airstrikes by jets .
These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and from the front lines are targeted and killed .
Even groups as small as two fighters on a single motorcycle have been hit in these precise strikes .
“ We have lost many [ fighters ] because of the drones .
When we hear them , we truly feel immense fear , ” said Qusay , a veteran fighter in the ranks of the Islamist jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham .
“ The central fighter in their ranks is the drone , ” he said , describing how he and a group of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the front lines and could not go out to even procure food for over a day because “ the drones are always in the skies , searching , and unlike the jets , there is no warning when they take off ” from military air bases .
Speaking to Foreign Policy over the messaging app Telegram , the communications director of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham , Taqi al-Din Omar , said that “ when the Russian occupier and Iranian occupier ( and particularly Lebanese Hezbollah ) launched a large-scale offensive on Idlib , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from six directions at the same time ) , using incredibly intense air strikes and artillery .
The occupiers were able to achieve superiority over the mujahideen , forcing them to retreat from bombed-out areas.
” While the regime is able to rely on a large army , with many of its soldiers press-ganged into service , as well as local and foreign Shiite militias , the rebels have been unable to properly compensate for their attrition .
The armed opposition factions do not publicize their losses , but daily observation of death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of rebels indicate that the numbers have long ago exceeded 1,000 who are not easily replaceable , as many were hardened fighters with years of experience in combat under heavy fire .
Recognizing their inability to resist the advancing pro-regime forces and wishing to avoid further attrition , the factions chose to withdraw much of their fighting force from the front lines when faced with the fierce regime onslaught .
Amir , a fighter with Jaysh al-Nasr , a Free Syrian Army group , who was injured in the latest offensive , said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still have strength , but we can ’ t attrition all of it .
If all of us go down [ to the front lines ] we will not be able to resist for more than a month , while the regime can fight for years.
” Echoing conversations with many rebels in recent months , he said , “ I started losing hope .
My morale is zero.
” The rapid losses of the opposition and the decisive role played by the foreign actors intervening in Idlib are making the population lose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willingness to resist .
Those removed from the battlefield—and often resentful of the leading rebel group in Idlib , the authoritarian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—insist that a secret deal exists between Russia and Turkey under which certain areas will be “ sold ” or “ surrendered ” to the regime .
By this logic , widely accepted in Idlib , resistance is futile .
As a result , pleas by rebel leaders , rebel commanders , and preachers close to the factions for civilian men to remain in their homes and fight rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The regime ’ s progress deprived hundreds of thousands of their homes , now thoroughly looted and at times torched by the conquering forces .
The immense poverty of the population in Idlib meant that many could not afford to even hire a car to take them toward the Turkish border and had to be rescued by the Syria Civil Defense in large convoys , able to carry only a few belongings with them .
Those more well-off left with the entire contents of their houses , knowing they will not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This story has been updated with comment .

As snow fell on northern Syria this past week, it covered thousands of fleeing families unable to find even a piece of tarp to shelter themselves.
The wintry weather, along with the bloody onslaught by the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has turned the flight of displaced civilians in Idlib and Aleppo toward the Turkish border into the biggest humanitarian crisis yet in a war that for almost a decade has normalized mass atrocities. “No one prepared camps ahead of time, there are no tents, people are sleeping in cars and in the streets,” said Ahmad, a resident of northern Aleppo, who is attempting to help the displaced. (Like many of those interviewed for this story on WhatsApp, Ahmad wants only his first name used for fear of retribution.)
The lucky among them stay with relatives or rent a home, but very few can afford this. Homeowners in areas abutting the Turkish border are charging the displaced exorbitant sums in rent—a common price is $350 per month for a two-bedroom house, when an average salary in the region, which has rampant unemployment, is about $50.
According to new data from the United Nations, since Dec. 1, 2019, 689,000 civilians have been displaced by the government’s offensive against the last rebel holdout in Idlib, most of them women and children. Some 100,000 have been displaced only in the past week. The rapid progress of regime forces and waves of displacement it produced escalated tensions between Turkey and the Syrian forces backed by Russia. Another five Turkish soldiers were killed in recent days in an attack carried out by Assad’s forces, precipitating retaliation against Syrian army targets by Turkish forces dispatched to northwestern Syria.
“I think there are now more Turkish soldiers in Idlib than armed revolutionaries,” said Yasser, a tracker of regime airstrikes and military movement in Idlib, referring to the mass influx of Turkish soldiers and heavy weaponry into Idlib, the last bastion of the Syrian armed opposition. In early February, Turkey began dispatching multiple convoys made up of hundreds of jeeps, armored personnel carriers, tanks, multiple rocket launchers, and electronic warfare equipment into Idlib, in an effort to prevent the collapse of the last rebel-held pocket in Syria, amid rapid regime advances against it.
The fate of Idlib’s 3 million to 4 million residents now depends on Turkey’s ability to deter further regime advances. In Ankara’s eyes, a mass influx of refugees would be politically destabilizing. Turkey’s willingness to send in thousands of troops and heavy weaponry with no air cover and against Russia’s wishes shows that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is willing to take significant risks to prevent the last rebel pocket from collapsing. Turkey established several new observation posts manned by newly arrived troops. After its observation posts came under attack in early February, Turkey began firing artillery at advancing regime forces on several occasions. Thus far, Turkey has not attempted to enter the fray with its air force, which has been significantly weakened due to purges after the 2016 attempted coup.
Russia and the Assad regime still control the skies and use this dominance to destroy hospitals, bakeries, and other civilian areas in what appears to be the purposeful depopulation of entire towns, pushing civilians to flee toward the shuttered Turkish border. About 1 million civilians have been displaced in Idlib, northwestern Syria, since the start of the Syrian regime’s offensive in late April 2019, according to U.N. data.
“These are people who’ve been displaced time and time again. People are completely exhausted, and the capacities of NGOs are also exhausted,” said Asmahan Dehny, the emergency response program coordinator at the Syrian humanitarian nongovernmental organization Violet, which helped evacuate impoverished families unable to afford their escape and recently established communal tents to receive them.
The prospect of returning to live under the Assad regime terrifies most Idlib residents, even as the rebels ruling over them lost much of their popular support due to their abusiveness. A majority of Idlib’s up to 4 million residents were displaced from their homes by the regime and expect to be executed or jailed and tortured if they fall into the regime’s hands. “Even people who have nothing to do with the revolution or the factions feel that they are the target,” said Maher, a displaced novelist residing in Idlib. Similarly to many others in Idlib with whom Foreign Policy spoke in recent days, he pointed to the case of Ahmad al-Jifal, a 69-year-old man with mental health issues, who refused to leave Maarat al-Numan. After the city was captured by a Russian-backed militia in January, the fighters executed him and set fire to his corpse.
But very few who are left can afford to escape Idlib. The cheapest and most perilous smuggling attempt to Turkey costs $350 and usually ends in being caught, beaten, and sent back by Turkish border guards. Despite the risks, a greater number of Idlib residents are making this trip, usually by borrowing from friends and relatives living abroad. According to Maher, “the fence along the border and the border police reinforcements on the Turkish side of the border are making smuggling incredibly difficult. There are people who’ve tried six, seven times to cross into Turkey, getting arrested and deported each time. People are expecting death.” He said he hopes to finish a novel he’s writing about a French and Syrian archeologist digging in the ancient city of Ugarit before the regime reaches his border village.
Veteran humanitarian NGO workers are at a loss about how to handle this unprecedented crisis. “Even if we manage to secure food and water for all the displaced, we can not provide them with shelter or areas that are safe from the torrential rains to set up a tent,” said Ziad al-Sebai, the director of the media office of the Syrian humanitarian NGO Watan. “Imagine how many babies from the previously displaced and the new waves will get sick and die due to the cold and malnutrition.”
A series of agreements between Russia and Turkey, which called for establishing a demilitarized zone in Idlib and allowed Turkey to erect observation posts in Idlib starting in late 2017, broke down in April 2019; negotiations between Russia and Turkey to revive it have not been successful. Russia is determined to achieve a decisive military solution for Idlib and told Turkey it would not accept a cease-fire, even with significant concessions from the rebels. This uncompromising position was pushed by the Russian Ministry of Defense, overriding less gung-ho elements in the Russian administration.
To make matters worse, in January, Iran became much more actively involved in the campaign against the last rebel-held pocket. Previously, Iranian officials promised Turkey to stay out of the fighting in the area, wishing to preserve their relationship with Turkey. The reopening of the dormant front in western Aleppo, manned by pro-Iranian militias (including Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters overseen by the Quds Force) and units within the Syrian army that are close to Iran (such as the 4th Division), signaled a shift. The rebels, forced to rebuff attacks both in southern Idlib and western and southern Aleppo, could not hold their ground. The headway of the regime turned into an all-out stampede.
“Just being able to repel attacks has become a victory in an of itself,” said Mannar, a rebel with the National Liberation Front, hours after he was forced, with a small group of fighters, to withdraw from his village of Kafr Halab, ceding it to the Iranian-backed militias. “The regime annihilated the village.” Mannar has been fighting the regime since the age of 15. He is determined to return to the front after evacuating his family to the border.
The regime’s advances on the ground also stemmed from Russian support: Training and guidance from Russian officers and mercenaries boosted the capabilities of pro-regime militias, and night vision equipment provided by Russia allowed the regime’s forces to advance during the night. In 2019, Russia altered its targeting policy in Idlib. While previously, the regime and Russia relied on indiscriminate fire across the rebel-held territory to terrorize the population, break its spirit, kill, and destroy, they now concentrate their indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery shelling on stretches of territory close to the front lines, leading nearly all civilians to escape. At the same time, Russia began relying more heavily on surveillance drones that call in airstrikes by jets. These precise strikes ensured that fighters heading to and from the front lines are targeted and killed. Even groups as small as two fighters on a single motorcycle have been hit in these precise strikes.
“We have lost many [fighters] because of the drones. When we hear them, we truly feel immense fear,” said Qusay, a veteran fighter in the ranks of the Islamist jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. “The central fighter in their ranks is the drone,” he said, describing how he and a group of fighters got stuck in a house near the front lines and could not go out to even procure food for over a day because “the drones are always in the skies, searching, and unlike the jets, there is no warning when they take off” from military air bases.
Speaking to Foreign Policy over the messaging app Telegram, the communications director of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Taqi al-Din Omar, said that “when the Russian occupier and Iranian occupier (and particularly Lebanese Hezbollah) launched a large-scale offensive on Idlib, they attacked from multiple directions (at times from six directions at the same time), using incredibly intense air strikes and artillery. The occupiers were able to achieve superiority over the mujahideen, forcing them to retreat from bombed-out areas.”
While the regime is able to rely on a large army, with many of its soldiers press-ganged into service, as well as local and foreign Shiite militias, the rebels have been unable to properly compensate for their attrition. The armed opposition factions do not publicize their losses, but daily observation of death notices on Facebook pages and WhatsApp groups of rebels indicate that the numbers have long ago exceeded 1,000 who are not easily replaceable, as many were hardened fighters with years of experience in combat under heavy fire.
Recognizing their inability to resist the advancing pro-regime forces and wishing to avoid further attrition, the factions chose to withdraw much of their fighting force from the front lines when faced with the fierce regime onslaught. Amir, a fighter with Jaysh al-Nasr, a Free Syrian Army group, who was injured in the latest offensive, said that “right now, the factions still have strength, but we can’t attrition all of it. If all of us go down [to the front lines] we will not be able to resist for more than a month, while the regime can fight for years.” Echoing conversations with many rebels in recent months, he said, “I started losing hope. My morale is zero.”
The rapid losses of the opposition and the decisive role played by the foreign actors intervening in Idlib are making the population lose faith in the rebels’ ability and willingness to resist. Those removed from the battlefield—and often resentful of the leading rebel group in Idlib, the authoritarian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham—insist that a secret deal exists between Russia and Turkey under which certain areas will be “sold” or “surrendered” to the regime. By this logic, widely accepted in Idlib, resistance is futile. As a result, pleas by rebel leaders, rebel commanders, and preachers close to the factions for civilian men to remain in their homes and fight rather than retreat are met with a lackluster response.
The regime’s progress deprived hundreds of thousands of their homes, now thoroughly looted and at times torched by the conquering forces. The immense poverty of the population in Idlib meant that many could not afford to even hire a car to take them toward the Turkish border and had to be rescued by the Syria Civil Defense in large convoys, able to carry only a few belongings with them. Those more well-off left with the entire contents of their houses, knowing they will not be able to return.
Feb. 11: This story has been updated with comment.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-12--Crisis Grows in Northwest Syria

Crisis Grows in Northwest Syria

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Tensions rise between Turkey and Syria as Ankara launches attacks in Idlib , NATO defense ministers convene in Brussels , and Sudan ’ s government could hand over its ousted president to the ICC .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Turkey said at least 51 Syrian government soldiers were killed in northwestern Idlib province on Tuesday , after rebel fighters and Turkish forces launched an attack in retaliation after five Turkish troops were killed on Monday—a major escalation between Ankara and Damascus .
On Tuesday , fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government for the first time since 2012—that runs from Aleppo to Damascus .
Turkey has sent thousands of soldiers across the border in recent days as government troops advance in Idlib , Syria ’ s last rebel holdout .
Already hosting around 3.6 million Syrians , Turkey fears another influx of refugees across the border , something that seems increasingly likely as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s government keeps up its campaign .
Thousands fleeing .
The Syrian campaign is fueling the biggest humanitarian crisis of the nine-year civil war : More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 , than at any other point , according to the United Nations .
Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced , including 100,000 in the last week , Elizabeth Tsurkov reports for FP .
“ The fate of Idlib ’ s 3 million to 4 million residents now depends on Turkey ’ s ability to deter further regime advances , ” she writes .
Russia ’ s role .
At this crucial stage in the conflict , tensions between Russia—which backs Assad ’ s forces—and Turkey—which backs some rebel groups—remain high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian and Syrian forces to stop .
Despite being on opposite sides , the two countries have worked toward a political solution together , but representatives from Russia and Turkey held talks in Ankara that ended without an agreement on Monday .
NATO holds ministerial meeting .
Brussels hosts a summit of NATO defense ministers today , with the deployment of troops in Iraq and the broader Middle East at the center of the talks .
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper will ask NATO allies for more forces to help combat the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. efforts in the region , where tensions are running high in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani last month .
Esper is expected to face questions over nuclear arms control , particularly as the New START treaty between the United States and Russia is set to expire next year .
Sudan could hand ex-president to ICC .
Sudan ’ s government has suggested that it would hand over Sudanese suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court , including former President Omar al-Bashir—who was ousted last April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bashir is wanted on charges of war crimes , genocide , and crimes against humanity in Darfur .
The decision came on Tuesday amid an agreement between the government and rebel groups in the region , and the timeline for the handover depends on the final peace deal between the government and the rebels .
A lawyer for Bashir said the ex-leader will not cooperate with the ICC .
Experts see an end in sight to coronavirus .
China ’ s senior medical advisor , Zhong Nanshan , said Tuesday that the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country recorded the lowest number of new cases since Jan. 31 .
Still , the World Health Organization ( WHO ) warned that the virus is “ public enemy number one , ” with China recording more than 1,100 deaths .
Global markets surged after Zhong ’ s comments , but the coronavirus has already wreaked havoc on China ’ s domestic economy , which is expected to slow in the first quarter .
Several international airlines have suspended flights to China through April .
Trump ’ s Middle East Peace Plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. government of making “ Swiss cheese ” of the land Palestinians claim for a state and seeking “ to put an end to the question of Palestine.
” But the Trump administration succeeded in heading off a U.N. Security Council vote that could have led to condemnation of the plan and an eventual U.S. veto .
Although Trump and his advisors like to present their peace plan as original and untraditional , it is actually as traditional as it gets , Yehuda Shaul writes in Foreign Policy .
The Trump plan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategic thinking at the center of an old Israeli proposal from 1979 .
The only difference between today ’ s proposal and the one four decades ago is that the author of the 1979 plan “ was honest enough to admit what he was doing , ” argues Shaul .
“ He was explicit that what his map described was not a Palestinian state but the means to prevent one.
” The Scottish National Party .
After Britain left the European Union on Jan. 31 , the main policy goal of the Scottish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another independence referendum .
But the SNP has some personal reasons to get another vote as soon as possible .
Despite leader Nicola Sturgeon ’ s popularity , the party faces scandal : A former leader is standing trial for sex offenses and its governance has come under fire , Azeem Ibrahim writes for FP .
Spain ’ s euthanasia bill .
Spain ’ s parliament voted on Tuesday to bring a bill that would allow euthanasia and assisted suicide under certain circumstances to the floor for debate .
Previous attempts to change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but the situation could be different under the new left-wing government .
Euthanasia is currently allowed in certain cases in Switzerland , the Netherlands , and Belgium .
Deforestation in the Amazon .
New research based on a decade-long study in the Amazon basin shows that up to 20 percent of the rainforest is emitting more carbon dioxide than it absorbs .
The main cause is deforestation : While living trees take in carbon dioxide from the atmosphere , dead trees release it .
The findings suggest that the Amazon rainforest is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than previously understood .
The city council of Prague is planning to rename a square in front of the capital ’ s Russian embassy after Boris Nemtsov , the Russian opposition politician murdered near the Kremlin in 2015 .
The ceremony would take place later this month and follows similar moves in Washington , Kyiv , and Vilnius .
The symbolic name change could increase tensions between Prague and its Russian embassy .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Tensions rise between Turkey and Syria as Ankara launches attacks in Idlib, NATO defense ministers convene in Brussels, and Sudan’s government could hand over its ousted president to the ICC.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Tensions rise between Turkey and Syria as Ankara launches attacks in Idlib, NATO defense ministers convene in Brussels, and Sudan’s government could hand over its ousted president to the ICC.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Turkey Strikes Back in Syria
Turkey said at least 51 Syrian government soldiers were killed in northwestern Idlib province on Tuesday, after rebel fighters and Turkish forces launched an attack in retaliation after five Turkish troops were killed on Monday—a major escalation between Ankara and Damascus. On Tuesday, fighting continued along the M5 highway—seized by the government for the first time since 2012—that runs from Aleppo to Damascus.
Turkey has sent thousands of soldiers across the border in recent days as government troops advance in Idlib, Syria’s last rebel holdout. Already hosting around 3.6 million Syrians, Turkey fears another influx of refugees across the border, something that seems increasingly likely as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government keeps up its campaign.
Thousands fleeing. The Syrian campaign is fueling the biggest humanitarian crisis of the nine-year civil war: More people have fled since Dec. 1, 2019, than at any other point, according to the United Nations. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, including 100,000 in the last week, Elizabeth Tsurkov reports for FP. “The fate of Idlib’s 3 million to 4 million residents now depends on Turkey’s ability to deter further regime advances,” she writes.
Russia’s role. At this crucial stage in the conflict, tensions between Russia—which backs Assad’s forces—and Turkey—which backs some rebel groups—remain high. Moscow has called for attacks against Russian and Syrian forces to stop. Despite being on opposite sides, the two countries have worked toward a political solution together, but representatives from Russia and Turkey held talks in Ankara that ended without an agreement on Monday.
What We’re Following Today
NATO holds ministerial meeting. Brussels hosts a summit of NATO defense ministers today, with the deployment of troops in Iraq and the broader Middle East at the center of the talks. U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper will ask NATO allies for more forces to help combat the Islamic State in Iraq and to bolster U.S. efforts in the region, where tensions are running high in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani last month. Esper is expected to face questions over nuclear arms control, particularly as the New START treaty between the United States and Russia is set to expire next year.
Sudan could hand ex-president to ICC. Sudan’s government has suggested that it would hand over Sudanese suspects wanted by the International Criminal Court, including former President Omar al-Bashir—who was ousted last April and remains in jail in Khartoum. Bashir is wanted on charges of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The decision came on Tuesday amid an agreement between the government and rebel groups in the region, and the timeline for the handover depends on the final peace deal between the government and the rebels. A lawyer for Bashir said the ex-leader will not cooperate with the ICC.
Experts see an end in sight to coronavirus. China’s senior medical advisor, Zhong Nanshan, said Tuesday that the coronavirus outbreak could end in April, as the country recorded the lowest number of new cases since Jan. 31. Still, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned that the virus is “public enemy number one,” with China recording more than 1,100 deaths. Global markets surged after Zhong’s comments, but the coronavirus has already wreaked havoc on China’s domestic economy, which is expected to slow in the first quarter. Several international airlines have suspended flights to China through April.
Keep an Eye On A portion of the 1979 Drobles Plan map. Foreign Policy illustration/Drobles Plan
Trump’s Middle East peace plan. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas accused the U.S. government of making “Swiss cheese” of the land Palestinians claim for a state and seeking “to put an end to the question of Palestine.” But the Trump administration succeeded in heading off a U.N. Security Council vote that could have led to condemnation of the plan and an eventual U.S. veto.
Although Trump and his advisors like to present their peace plan as original and untraditional, it is actually as traditional as it gets, Yehuda Shaul writes in Foreign Policy. The Trump plan has effectively plagiarized the map and the strategic thinking at the center of an old Israeli proposal from 1979. The only difference between today’s proposal and the one four decades ago is that the author of the 1979 plan “was honest enough to admit what he was doing,” argues Shaul. “He was explicit that what his map described was not a Palestinian state but the means to prevent one.”
The Scottish National Party. After Britain left the European Union on Jan. 31, the main policy goal of the Scottish National Party (SNP) is holding another independence referendum. But the SNP has some personal reasons to get another vote as soon as possible. Despite leader Nicola Sturgeon’s popularity, the party faces scandal: A former leader is standing trial for sex offenses and its governance has come under fire, Azeem Ibrahim writes for FP.
Spain’s euthanasia bill. Spain’s parliament voted on Tuesday to bring a bill that would allow euthanasia and assisted suicide under certain circumstances to the floor for debate. Previous attempts to change a law that criminalizes assisted suicide failed, but the situation could be different under the new left-wing government. Euthanasia is currently allowed in certain cases in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Deforestation in the Amazon. New research based on a decade-long study in the Amazon basin shows that up to 20 percent of the rainforest is emitting more carbon dioxide than it absorbs. The main cause is deforestation: While living trees take in carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, dead trees release it. The findings suggest that the Amazon rainforest is becoming a source of carbon dioxide faster than previously understood.
Odds and Ends
The city council of Prague is planning to rename a square in front of the capital’s Russian embassy after Boris Nemtsov, the Russian opposition politician murdered near the Kremlin in 2015. The ceremony would take place later this month and follows similar moves in Washington, Kyiv, and Vilnius. The symbolic name change could increase tensions between Prague and its Russian embassy.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-13--Europe Puts What Remains of the JCPOA in Limbo

Europe Puts What Remains of the JCPOA in Limbo About a year and a half after the United States left the Iran nuclear deal , also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) , the agreement is nearing collapse .
For months after U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s decision to depart , the remaining parties to the JCPOA tried to keep it alive .
But it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to do so .
One sign came on Jan. 14 , in the form of a joint statement from three European signatories to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Together , they announced that they had formally activated the deal ’ s dispute resolution mechanism , the process through which a complaint about a potential violation of the deal would be resolved .
According to the text of the JCPOA , the dispute could end up at the U.N. Security Council , which could decide to place international sanctions back on Iran .
The whole process takes about two months .
During this two-month period , the dispute could resolve itself in a few different ways .
Iran could decisively return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the three European countries could backtrack on taking the case to the U.N. Security Council .
At present , there is no indication that Iran or the European countries will back down .
Iran has repeatedly stated that it will uphold its nuclear obligations only if it starts seeing the economic benefits the agreement promised .
It has called on Europe for guarantees that the continent will continue buying Iranian oil and grant Tehran access to the revenues .
On the one hand , Iran knows that Europe is unable to meet these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ automakers , and big refineries that used to buy Iranian oil have extensive commercial and financial relations with the United States and do not want to put their commercial interests at risk under the U.S. sanctions .
European governments have no way to force them to change their minds .
On the other hand , the three European countries can point out in turn that the JCPOA is on the brink of collapse and that if they can not convince Iran to reverse course , the Iranian nuclear case will inevitably return to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get much worse for the country .
There could also be a third scenario , in which Europe repeatedly extends the one-month deadline for the JCPOA Joint Commission to look into the case before taking the file to the U.N .
The commission could bide time as it waits to see how Iran responds , tries to cajole the United States and Iran back into negotiations , looks to the results of continuing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) in Iran , and perhaps tries offering the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief Josep Borrell has already indicated as much .
He has announced that the timeline for the dispute mechanism could be extended indefinitely , although he has not specified a time for the extension .
So long as Iran does not go beyond the latest infractions , it makes sense for Europe to try to kick the can down the road .
For now , although Iran has resumed uranium enrichment at the Fordow nuclear site and walked back on its commitments regarding uranium enrichment , research and development , and the amount @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its nuclear program still has a long way to go before reaching the capacity it had the year before it signed the JCPOA .
So long as Iran does not go beyond the latest infractions , it makes sense for Europe to try to kick the can down the road , especially if there are signs that United States could come back to the negotiating table for fear of possible Iranian blowback .
Tensions between the United States and Iran are as high as ever .
In May 2019 , on the one-year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ JCPOA and reintroduction of sanctions , Iran first started taking gradual steps away from its commitments under the deal .
In its fifth and final step , on Jan. 5—days after the United States killed Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani—Iran announced in a statement that it would observe absolutely no operational limitations on its nuclear industry .
Tehran also vowed that , from now on , its nuclear program would be developed solely based on its technical needs .
It is worth taking Iran at its word .
Consider how , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran developed its current nuclear doctrine .
In 2011 , it successfully completed the nuclear fuel cycle , meaning it could handle all stages of exploration , extraction , enrichment , reactor operation , and ultimately the destruction of radioactive waste .
Soon , Tehran started enriching uranium to 20 percent as a bargaining chip at future negotiating tables .
As many as six Security Council resolutions and the imposition of tough sanctions did not deter Iran from its pursuits .
After bringing nuclear facilities online in Natanz , Arak , and Fordow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not want to pay any additional costs for its program—it was ready to talk .
In 2015 , the JCPOA , which recognized Iran ’ s right to enrich uranium and preserve the core of its nuclear program , was signed .
In exchange for the lifting of sanctions , Iran gave up on 20 percent enrichment , shipped the bulk of its nuclear stockpiles out , stopped uranium enrichment at Fordow site , and agreed to redesign the Arak heavy reactor .
Iran is again in a position similar to that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States ’ decision to leave the JCPOA , the reimposition of harsh sanctions , and the killing of Suleimani , Iran has had reason to reconsider the deterrent aspects of its nuclear program .
In this regard , Iran ’ s prime motivation is leverage in future negotiations .
Beyond continued recognition of its right to enrich uranium , Iran hopes that by ramping its nuclear program back up , it can also get European countries to intensify their efforts to secure the economic benefits that were meant to flow to Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries argue that they have lived up to their obligations under the JCPOA and even launched the Instex financial mechanism—which enables European firms to get around U.S. sanctions to do business with Iran .
But since the inception of the Instex in early 2019 , Iran has continued to insist that it has not benefited from the JCPOA at all since it is still unable to sell its oil .
As long as pieces of the JCPOA stay intact and the dispute is not kicked over to the Security Council , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear doctrine—for example , by fully pulling back from the JCPOA , putting an end to IAEA inspections , and resuming uranium enrichment at levels above 20 percent .
But if the Security Council does reinstate its resolutions against Iran and if the United States continues to insist on forcing Iran to make more concessions on its missile capabilities and network of proxy militias—including Hezbollah in Lebanon , Hamas in the Palestinian territories , and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—that may change .
Iran has repeatedly declared that reexercising Security Council resolutions crosses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issued under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter , which paves the way for serious measures against Iran such as a war , and thus pose a military and security threat .
Beyond that , Iran will not negotiate over its missile program or efforts to exercise its influence in the Middle East ; it considers those programs to be essential parts of its national security and deterrence .
Tehran has never conducted any negotiations on these issues , and it is very unlikely that it will do so in the future .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ end to the IAEA inspections and deny inspectors access to its nuclear facilities and activities .
It might also take leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ( NPT ) into consideration , which would make its nuclear program even less transparent .
Iran has made clear that it would be within its rights to leave and has invoked Article 10 of the NPT , which states : “ Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events , related to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
” In such circumstances , the line between war and negotiation will be thin .
If Iran and the West fail to reach an agreement through talks , the risk of a military conflict would increase .
And there is little reason to be optimistic .
When the JCPOA was first signed , U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to separate Iran ’ s nuclear program from its missile capabilities and its regional activities .
By contrast , Trump insists that those are grievous flaws in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t likely to back off either .

About a year and a half after the United States left the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement is nearing collapse. For months after U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to depart, the remaining parties to the JCPOA tried to keep it alive. But it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to do so.
About a year and a half after the United States left the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement is nearing collapse. For months after U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to depart, the remaining parties to the JCPOA tried to keep it alive. But it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to do so.
One sign came on Jan. 14, in the form of a joint statement from three European signatories to the JCPOA—France, Britain, and Germany. Together, they announced that they had formally activated the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, the process through which a complaint about a potential violation of the deal would be resolved. According to the text of the JCPOA, the dispute could end up at the U.N. Security Council, which could decide to place international sanctions back on Iran. The whole process takes about two months.
During this two-month period, the dispute could resolve itself in a few different ways. Iran could decisively return to its commitments under the JCPOA or the three European countries could backtrack on taking the case to the U.N. Security Council. At present, there is no indication that Iran or the European countries will back down. Iran has repeatedly stated that it will uphold its nuclear obligations only if it starts seeing the economic benefits the agreement promised. It has called on Europe for guarantees that the continent will continue buying Iranian oil and grant Tehran access to the revenues. On the one hand, Iran knows that Europe is unable to meet these demands because many large European firms, automakers, and big refineries that used to buy Iranian oil have extensive commercial and financial relations with the United States and do not want to put their commercial interests at risk under the U.S. sanctions. European governments have no way to force them to change their minds. On the other hand, the three European countries can point out in turn that the JCPOA is on the brink of collapse and that if they cannot convince Iran to reverse course, the Iranian nuclear case will inevitably return to the U.N. Security Council—where things are sure to get much worse for the country.
There could also be a third scenario, in which Europe repeatedly extends the one-month deadline for the JCPOA Joint Commission to look into the case before taking the file to the U.N. The commission could bide time as it waits to see how Iran responds, tries to cajole the United States and Iran back into negotiations, looks to the results of continuing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iran, and perhaps tries offering the country some economic incentives. European Union foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell has already indicated as much. He has announced that the timeline for the dispute mechanism could be extended indefinitely, although he has not specified a time for the extension.
So long as Iran does not go beyond the latest infractions, it makes sense for Europe to try to kick the can down the road.
For now, although Iran has resumed uranium enrichment at the Fordow nuclear site and walked back on its commitments regarding uranium enrichment, research and development, and the amount of enriched materials it will stockpile, its nuclear program still has a long way to go before reaching the capacity it had the year before it signed the JCPOA. So long as Iran does not go beyond the latest infractions, it makes sense for Europe to try to kick the can down the road, especially if there are signs that United States could come back to the negotiating table for fear of possible Iranian blowback.
Tensions between the United States and Iran are as high as ever. In May 2019, on the one-year anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and reintroduction of sanctions, Iran first started taking gradual steps away from its commitments under the deal. In its fifth and final step, on Jan. 5—days after the United States killed Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani—Iran announced in a statement that it would observe absolutely no operational limitations on its nuclear industry. Tehran also vowed that, from now on, its nuclear program would be developed solely based on its technical needs.
It is worth taking Iran at its word. Consider how, in the pre-JCPOA era between 2004 and 2012, Iran developed its current nuclear doctrine. In 2011, it successfully completed the nuclear fuel cycle, meaning it could handle all stages of exploration, extraction, enrichment, reactor operation, and ultimately the destruction of radioactive waste. Soon, Tehran started enriching uranium to 20 percent as a bargaining chip at future negotiating tables. As many as six Security Council resolutions and the imposition of tough sanctions did not deter Iran from its pursuits.
After bringing nuclear facilities online in Natanz, Arak, and Fordow, Tehran reached the conclusion that it did not want to pay any additional costs for its program—it was ready to talk. In 2015, the JCPOA, which recognized Iran’s right to enrich uranium and preserve the core of its nuclear program, was signed. In exchange for the lifting of sanctions, Iran gave up on 20 percent enrichment, shipped the bulk of its nuclear stockpiles out, stopped uranium enrichment at Fordow site, and agreed to redesign the Arak heavy reactor.
Iran is again in a position similar to that of the pre-JCPOA era. With the United States’ decision to leave the JCPOA, the reimposition of harsh sanctions, and the killing of Suleimani, Iran has had reason to reconsider the deterrent aspects of its nuclear program. In this regard, Iran’s prime motivation is leverage in future negotiations.
Beyond continued recognition of its right to enrich uranium, Iran hopes that by ramping its nuclear program back up, it can also get European countries to intensify their efforts to secure the economic benefits that were meant to flow to Iran as part of the deal. European countries argue that they have lived up to their obligations under the JCPOA and even launched the Instex financial mechanism—which enables European firms to get around U.S. sanctions to do business with Iran. But since the inception of the Instex in early 2019, Iran has continued to insist that it has not benefited from the JCPOA at all since it is still unable to sell its oil.
As long as pieces of the JCPOA stay intact and the dispute is not kicked over to the Security Council, it is unlikely that Iran will drastically change its nuclear doctrine—for example, by fully pulling back from the JCPOA, putting an end to IAEA inspections, and resuming uranium enrichment at levels above 20 percent.
But if the Security Council does reinstate its resolutions against Iran and if the United States continues to insist on forcing Iran to make more concessions on its missile capabilities and network of proxy militias—including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—that may change. Iran has repeatedly declared that reexercising Security Council resolutions crosses a red line because the resolutions are issued under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which paves the way for serious measures against Iran such as a war, and thus pose a military and security threat. Beyond that, Iran will not negotiate over its missile program or efforts to exercise its influence in the Middle East; it considers those programs to be essential parts of its national security and deterrence. Tehran has never conducted any negotiations on these issues, and it is very unlikely that it will do so in the future.
If pushed, Iran may put an end to the IAEA inspections and deny inspectors access to its nuclear facilities and activities. It might also take leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) into consideration, which would make its nuclear program even less transparent. Iran has made clear that it would be within its rights to leave and has invoked Article 10 of the NPT, which states: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”
In such circumstances, the line between war and negotiation will be thin. If Iran and the West fail to reach an agreement through talks, the risk of a military conflict would increase. And there is little reason to be optimistic. When the JCPOA was first signed, U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to separate Iran’s nuclear program from its missile capabilities and its regional activities. By contrast, Trump insists that those are grievous flaws in the JCPOA, indicating that he isn’t likely to back off either.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-12--Sudan Is Remaking Its Relationship With the Rest of the World

Sudan Is Remaking Its Relationship With the Rest of the World Sudan ’ s ruling Sovereign Council made a landmark announcement this week .
It plans to cooperate with the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) in prosecuting former President Omar al-Bashir and four of his henchmen , who were indicted for atrocities and genocide in Darfur , as part of an eventual peace deal with the country ’ s armed movements .
This is a watershed moment in Sudan ’ s rapidly evolving political environment .
But it is only the latest in a dizzying series of major policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential to fundamentally remake the country ’ s relationship with the rest of the world .
In this case , the government ’ s offer could transform Sudan from the court ’ s leading international opponent to an ally by delivering its biggest and most important case in its brief history .
It was only a week ago that heads were already spinning in Sudan when details emerged of a secret meeting between the leader of Sudan ’ s transitional Sovereign Council , Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan , and Israeli Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations between the two enemies—and undoing a history of combative relations that saw Sudan targeted with Israeli airstrikes as recently as a decade ago for its role in funneling weapons into the West Bank and Gaza—makes good on Sudan ’ s new leaders ’ promise to pursue a balanced foreign policy and play a positive role in the region and beyond .
This comes on the heels of a leaked letter from Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres last month proposing a sweeping new U.N. political mission in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from one of conflict to abiding cooperation in helping to “ consolidate gains in peacebuilding … and provide technical support on judicial and security sector reform.
” It ’ s a far cry from when the U.N. was labeled a colonizing and invading force by Bashir and its peacekeepers were forced to virtually fight their way into the country in an only modestly successful attempt to protect Darfuri civilians against government bombs and the janjaweed , the notorious Arab militia responsible for some of the Bashir regime ’ s worst abuses .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people , killed at least another 300,000 more , and cast a shadow over the country that the new government is only now trying to erase .
The 2008 indictment that the ICC aims to prosecute does not name Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo , known as Hemeti , the head of the former janjaweed militia who in his political second act now serves as the second-in-command on the Sovereign Council .
Another senior janjaweed commander , Ali Kushayb , is named in the ICC indictment , suggesting that any cooperation with the court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This astonishing array of policy reversals is all the more impressive given the divided nature of government in the country .
As part of a hastily agreed deal last summer , which walked the country back from the brink of severe violence , a civilian cabinet was brought in to share governing responsibility with a Sovereign Council that the military would , at least initially , control .
Since assuming power only six months ago , many skeptics viewed this “ uniquely Sudanese model of transition , ” as the prime minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort by the military to put a civilian face on its effort to attract outside investment and remove remaining international sanctions .
Many observers still believe that civilians will be unable to alter the fundamental power dynamics of a state where military interests and assets are protected and prioritized over all else .
Under this assumption , many governments , including the Trump administration in the United States , have taken a wait-and-see approach to the governing dynamics in the country—praising civilian rule but remaining circumspect in their approach to the big policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relief for fear that the military will reassert total control once all of Sudan ’ s penalties are erased .
Indeed , frustration is growing inside and outside Sudan over the cabinet ’ s timid approach to policy implementation and its fear of upsetting the country ’ s political and military leaders on issues large and small .
Delaying the replacement of state-level military governors with new civilian officials and walking back the decision to remove treasury-draining subsidies show that the unelected government is not eager to make enemies of these powerful forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the dramatic moves by the civilian government in the last few weeks— such as turning over senior leaders to the ICC and radically expanding U.N. operations in the country , both of which seem to run counter to the military ’ s interests .
Indeed , these moves suggest that the military shares the government ’ s desire to see the country reintegrated into the international community .
After all , the announcement this week that Sudan would ensure those sought by the ICC saw justice served came from a spokesman of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the peace talks in South Sudan that the military is leading on behalf of the government .
It seems doubtful and out of character for the prime minister to force the military ’ s hand and box it in on the issue of transitional justice , as some Sudanese commentators have suggested .
And even on the question of Israel , knowing that there would surely be some popular outrage and a political cost in any Arab country from meeting with Netanyahu , why would Sudan ’ s military leader take the meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hopes of both advancing Sudan ’ s chances of being removed from the U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism and advancing the ideals of the revolution ?
The reasons for a cooperative approach between military and civilian leaders become clearer when a third leg of Sudan ’ s power structure is factored into the equation .
Hemeti ’ s militia , the Rapid Support Forces , arguably remains the single most powerful force in the country and a threat to the military ’ s traditional role .
The RSF controls gold mines and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commanding tens of thousands of new recruits .
Sudan ’ s military ’ s forces have long resented and feared the RSF as a competing power center and an undisciplined force lacking the formal training of a professional military .
If the country pursues a relationship with the ICC , it will be a direct threat to Hemeti : From his view , prosecuting the five indicted parties could lead the ICC lawyers to look into his past transgressions .
If he feels that his freedom is threatened , he could use his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the still-fragile government .
By allying itself with the country ’ s civilian leaders , Sudan ’ s military leaders may well be playing the strategic long game that marginalizes the Rapid Support Forces , secures their survival under a new political dispensation , and advances the revolution ’ s overall goal of reforming the state and coming in from the cold .
Their hope is that those on the outside are not too blind to see it .

Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council made a landmark announcement this week. It plans to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in prosecuting former President Omar al-Bashir and four of his henchmen, who were indicted for atrocities and genocide in Darfur, as part of an eventual peace deal with the country’s armed movements. This is a watershed moment in Sudan’s rapidly evolving political environment.
Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council made a landmark announcement this week. It plans to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in prosecuting former President Omar al-Bashir and four of his henchmen, who were indicted for atrocities and genocide in Darfur, as part of an eventual peace deal with the country’s armed movements. This is a watershed moment in Sudan’s rapidly evolving political environment.
But it is only the latest in a dizzying series of major policy reversals in recent weeks that have the potential to fundamentally remake the country’s relationship with the rest of the world. In this case, the government’s offer could transform Sudan from the court’s leading international opponent to an ally by delivering its biggest and most important case in its brief history.
It was only a week ago that heads were already spinning in Sudan when details emerged of a secret meeting between the leader of Sudan’s transitional Sovereign Council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The potential for normalizing relations between the two enemies—and undoing a history of combative relations that saw Sudan targeted with Israeli airstrikes as recently as a decade ago for its role in funneling weapons into the West Bank and Gaza—makes good on Sudan’s new leaders’ promise to pursue a balanced foreign policy and play a positive role in the region and beyond.
This comes on the heels of a leaked letter from Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres last month proposing a sweeping new U.N. political mission in Sudan that would transform that fundamental relationship from one of conflict to abiding cooperation in helping to “consolidate gains in peacebuilding … and provide technical support on judicial and security sector reform.”
It’s a far cry from when the U.N. was labeled a colonizing and invading force by Bashir and its peacekeepers were forced to virtually fight their way into the country in an only modestly successful attempt to protect Darfuri civilians against government bombs and the janjaweed, the notorious Arab militia responsible for some of the Bashir regime’s worst abuses. That conflict ultimately displaced more than 2 million people, killed at least another 300,000 more, and cast a shadow over the country that the new government is only now trying to erase.
The 2008 indictment that the ICC aims to prosecute does not name Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, the head of the former janjaweed militia who in his political second act now serves as the second-in-command on the Sovereign Council. Another senior janjaweed commander, Ali Kushayb, is named in the ICC indictment, suggesting that any cooperation with the court could surface new evidence to indict Hemeti.
This astonishing array of policy reversals is all the more impressive given the divided nature of government in the country. As part of a hastily agreed deal last summer, which walked the country back from the brink of severe violence, a civilian cabinet was brought in to share governing responsibility with a Sovereign Council that the military would, at least initially, control.
Since assuming power only six months ago, many skeptics viewed this “uniquely Sudanese model of transition,” as the prime minister refers to it, as merely an effort by the military to put a civilian face on its effort to attract outside investment and remove remaining international sanctions.
Many observers still believe that civilians will be unable to alter the fundamental power dynamics of a state where military interests and assets are protected and prioritized over all else.
Under this assumption, many governments, including the Trump administration in the United States, have taken a wait-and-see approach to the governing dynamics in the country—praising civilian rule but remaining circumspect in their approach to the big policy incentives such as sanctions removal and debt relief for fear that the military will reassert total control once all of Sudan’s penalties are erased.
Indeed, frustration is growing inside and outside Sudan over the cabinet’s timid approach to policy implementation and its fear of upsetting the country’s political and military leaders on issues large and small. Delaying the replacement of state-level military governors with new civilian officials and walking back the decision to remove treasury-draining subsidies show that the unelected government is not eager to make enemies of these powerful forces.
It is thus hard to explain the dramatic moves by the civilian government in the last few weeks— such as turning over senior leaders to the ICC and radically expanding U.N. operations in the country, both of which seem to run counter to the military’s interests. Indeed, these moves suggest that the military shares the government’s desire to see the country reintegrated into the international community.
After all, the announcement this week that Sudan would ensure those sought by the ICC saw justice served came from a spokesman of the military-run Sovereign Council at the site of the peace talks in South Sudan that the military is leading on behalf of the government. It seems doubtful and out of character for the prime minister to force the military’s hand and box it in on the issue of transitional justice, as some Sudanese commentators have suggested.
And even on the question of Israel, knowing that there would surely be some popular outrage and a political cost in any Arab country from meeting with Netanyahu, why would Sudan’s military leader take the meeting if it wasn’t in the hopes of both advancing Sudan’s chances of being removed from the U.S. list of states sponsoring terrorism and advancing the ideals of the revolution?
The reasons for a cooperative approach between military and civilian leaders become clearer when a third leg of Sudan’s power structure is factored into the equation.
Hemeti’s militia, the Rapid Support Forces, arguably remains the single most powerful force in the country and a threat to the military’s traditional role. The RSF controls gold mines and a sizable financial reserve, along with commanding tens of thousands of new recruits. Sudan’s military’s forces have long resented and feared the RSF as a competing power center and an undisciplined force lacking the formal training of a professional military.
If the country pursues a relationship with the ICC, it will be a direct threat to Hemeti: From his view, prosecuting the five indicted parties could lead the ICC lawyers to look into his past transgressions. If he feels that his freedom is threatened, he could use his financial power and fighting force to undermine the still-fragile government.
By allying itself with the country’s civilian leaders, Sudan’s military leaders may well be playing the strategic long game that marginalizes the Rapid Support Forces, secures their survival under a new political dispensation, and advances the revolution’s overall goal of reforming the state and coming in from the cold. Their hope is that those on the outside are not too blind to see it.