foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--Countries Rolling Out Coronavirus Tracking Apps Show Why They Can’t Work

Countries Rolling Out Coronavirus Tracking Apps Show Why They Can ’ t Work If there ’ s one thing we all wish our phones could do , it ’ s protect us from coronavirus .
After all , they seem to be able to do just about everything else .
Over the past three months , they have replaced schools , movie theaters , and family get-togethers .
Once this is all over , who will even want to go back to the legacy reality of holding business meetings in conference rooms when we can use Zoom instead ?
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s office when smartphone-based telemedicine can diagnose and treat many ordinary ailments perfectly well ?
Despite the techno-optimists ’ best efforts , smartphone apps will not get us out of the coronavirus crisis.But the coronavirus is no ordinary ailment , and despite the techno-optimists ’ best efforts , smartphone apps will not get us out of this crisis .
Public health authorities in many countries have pinned their hopes on the development of coronavirus tracking apps , which in theory could allow governments to quickly identify and notify people who have come into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been exposed to the virus could then be tested and isolated , potentially breaking the chain of further transmission .
As the United States debates the merits of turning telephones into personal trackers , other countries have already moved forward .
South Korea early on created a public database of coronavirus cases that provides extraordinarily detailed information about every infected individual , including their exact movements around the country .
The database is constantly updated using location information from payment card transactions , mobile phone signal data , and closed-circuit TV footage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development of apps such as Corona 100m , which maps infected individuals and provides information about their age , sex , and nationality .
It ’ s hard to imagine many Western countries taking such a cavalier approach to patient privacy , but the app seems to be popular in South Korea .
Singapore ’ s TraceTogether , released on March 20 , is a more limited coronavirus tracking app that keeps a record of close contacts between the phones of registered individuals without registering where those interactions occurred .
Unlike South Korea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and in fact only about 25 percent of the population has signed up .
It uses a phone ’ s Bluetooth function to detect and log every instance when two people ( or at least their phones ) come close enough to each other for Bluetooth to recognize the signal .
It is Singapore ’ s app , not the South Korean ones , that has become the model for other countries .
This includes Australia ’ s COVIDSafe , which was rolled out on April 26 .
Although take-up of Singapore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australians have flocked to COVIDSafe , with more than 4 million downloads in the first week—even though the underlying government monitoring system is not yet operational .
When it is , users who test positive for coronavirus will be asked ( not ordered ) to let the government warn others that they have encountered someone with the virus , without telling those notified who the infected individual was .
It is unclear how much of Singapore ’ s source code was built into Australia ’ s app , but analysts note a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encryption .
The relative success in the take-up of the Australian app even before it is functional might have something to do with the fact that the Australian government is effectively holding the country ’ s economy ransom to COVIDSafe .
Prime Minister Scott Morrison has made the widespread adoption of COVIDSafe the key condition for reopening offices , restaurants , and other amenities .
How widespread would be widespread enough ?
The government won ’ t say .
The requirement comes despite Australia ’ s relatively benign experience with the virus—there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infections a day—and the fact that more than 90 percent of all known cases can already be traced back to an identified source .
If Australia won ’ t be specific about how widespread app use should be , that ’ s probably because it doesn ’ t know .
Tracking apps are an unproven solution that rely heavily on “ if only ” reasoning : If only everyone would install the app , if only people would carry their phones at all times , if only phones wouldn ’ t run out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t turn off Bluetooth , if only tracking apps didn ’ t interfere with other software .
Finally and most importantly : if only the virus would spread in ways that can be detected using the app.Tracking apps rely heavily on “ if only ” reasoning : if only the virus would spread in ways that can be detected using the app .
Scientists are still unsure how the coronavirus spreads , but the firm consensus is that most people catch the disease either by being in close proximity to a cough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up from a surface .
The first could happen in an instant , say in a supermarket aisle , while the second could occur hours later when you unpack your groceries .
That ’ s why health workers wear face masks and wash their hands : They have to protect against both direct and indirect transmission .
Neither transmission route fits the logic of tracking apps .
When a person tests positive for the coronavirus , tracking apps notify other people who have been near the infected person in recent weeks .
Singapore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ notify all people who have been within 2 meters of an infected person for at least 30 minutes , while Australia ’ s app claims to notify people who have been within 1.5 meters for at least 15 minutes .
Since Bluetooth can ’ t actually be used reliably to measure distances , these figures suggest an illusory precision .
The inconsistency between what the apps measure and how the virus spreads puts governments in a bind .
Set the time window too narrow , and the app will classify millions of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to track down everyone who has ever passed a coronavirus carrier on the street .
Set the time window too wide , and the app will flag too few exposures to the virus .
There is no “ Goldilocks ” zone in the middle of these two extremes .
Set the threshold at 15 or 20 minutes of close proximity to an infected person , and the coronavirus app will identify a moderate number of people for health authorities to contact .
But most of the people who have contracted the disease from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to mind—will be missed .
The other problem is that actual transmission events are rare compared to the number of interactions people have .
To find those transmissions , you have to wade through an enormous number of casual contacts , and that means tracking down virtually everyone .
Once governments reach that point , they ’ re no better off than if they had simply relied on effective but labor-intensive human contact tracing in the first place , without the app .
The only way to make coronavirus tracking apps really work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every person , all the time , everywhere.Unfortunately , the coronavirus simply does not spread in the way that epidemiologists model it statistically .
That ’ s not necessarily a problem—for our understanding of broader progress of the pandemic .
But the models usually simplify reality in ways that work on average , even if they don ’ t apply to any particular case .
We ’ re therefore making a grave methodological error when we expect reality at the level of individual cases to reflect our models for the numbers overall , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Any technological solution to the coronavirus pandemic has to be grounded in the reality of one-on-one transmission , not epidemiological statistics .
The only way to make coronavirus tracking apps really work is to accept the burden of false alarms and track every person , all the time , everywhere .
This is only possible in a totalitarian state such as China , yet even the Chinese government doesn ’ t have the resources to implement such extreme levels of monitoring .
With advances in artificial intelligence , it is possible that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China will be prepared for the next pandemic .
The rest of the world will probably take the virus over the cure .

If there’s one thing we all wish our phones could do, it's protect us from coronavirus. After all, they seem to be able to do just about everything else. Over the past three months, they have replaced schools, movie theaters, and family get-togethers. Once this is all over, who will even want to go back to the legacy reality of holding business meetings in conference rooms when we can use Zoom instead? And why go to a germ-infested doctor's office when smartphone-based telemedicine can diagnose and treat many ordinary ailments perfectly well?
If there’s one thing we all wish our phones could do, it’s protect us from coronavirus. After all, they seem to be able to do just about everything else. Over the past three months, they have replaced schools, movie theaters, and family get-togethers. Once this is all over, who will even want to go back to the legacy reality of holding business meetings in conference rooms when we can use Zoom instead? And why go to a germ-infested doctor’s office when smartphone-based telemedicine can diagnose and treat many ordinary ailments perfectly well?
But the coronavirus is no ordinary ailment, and despite the techno-optimists’ best efforts, smartphone apps will not get us out of this crisis. Public health authorities in many countries have pinned their hopes on the development of coronavirus tracking apps, which in theory could allow governments to quickly identify and notify people who have come into contact with infected individuals. Those who have been exposed to the virus could then be tested and isolated, potentially breaking the chain of further transmission.
Despite the techno-optimists’ best efforts, smartphone apps will not get us out of the coronavirus crisis.
As the United States debates the merits of turning telephones into personal trackers, other countries have already moved forward. South Korea early on created a public database of coronavirus cases that provides extraordinarily detailed information about every infected individual, including their exact movements around the country. The database is constantly updated using location information from payment card transactions, mobile phone signal data, and closed-circuit TV footage. This government database made possible the development of apps such as Corona 100m, which maps infected individuals and provides information about their age, sex, and nationality. It’s hard to imagine many Western countries taking such a cavalier approach to patient privacy, but the app seems to be popular in South Korea.
Singapore’s TraceTogether, released on March 20, is a more limited coronavirus tracking app that keeps a record of close contacts between the phones of registered individuals without registering where those interactions occurred. Unlike South Korea’s database, it is optional, and in fact only about 25 percent of the population has signed up. It uses a phone’s Bluetooth function to detect and log every instance when two people (or at least their phones) come close enough to each other for Bluetooth to recognize the signal.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
It is Singapore’s app, not the South Korean ones, that has become the model for other countries. This includes Australia’s COVIDSafe, which was rolled out on April 26. Although take-up of Singapore’s TraceTogether has been poor, Australians have flocked to COVIDSafe, with more than 4 million downloads in the first week—even though the underlying government monitoring system is not yet operational. When it is, users who test positive for coronavirus will be asked (not ordered) to let the government warn others that they have encountered someone with the virus, without telling those notified who the infected individual was. It is unclear how much of Singapore’s source code was built into Australia’s app, but analysts note a few tweaks to the Bluetooth implementation and data encryption.
The relative success in the take-up of the Australian app even before it is functional might have something to do with the fact that the Australian government is effectively holding the country’s economy ransom to COVIDSafe. Prime Minister Scott Morrison has made the widespread adoption of COVIDSafe the key condition for reopening offices, restaurants, and other amenities. How widespread would be widespread enough? The government won’t say. The requirement comes despite Australia’s relatively benign experience with the virus—there are currently only two dozen or fewer new infections a day—and the fact that more than 90 percent of all known cases can already be traced back to an identified source.
If Australia won’t be specific about how widespread app use should be, that’s probably because it doesn’t know. Tracking apps are an unproven solution that rely heavily on “if only” reasoning: If only everyone would install the app, if only people would carry their phones at all times, if only phones wouldn’t run out of power, if only people wouldn’t turn off Bluetooth, if only tracking apps didn’t interfere with other software. Finally and most importantly: if only the virus would spread in ways that can be detected using the app.
Scientists are still unsure how the coronavirus spreads, but the firm consensus is that most people catch the disease either by being in close proximity to a cough or sneeze, or by picking it up from a surface. The first could happen in an instant, say in a supermarket aisle, while the second could occur hours later when you unpack your groceries. That’s why health workers wear face masks and wash their hands: They have to protect against both direct and indirect transmission.
Tracking apps rely heavily on “if only” reasoning: if only the virus would spread in ways that can be detected using the app.
Neither transmission route fits the logic of tracking apps. When a person tests positive for the coronavirus, tracking apps notify other people who have been near the infected person in recent weeks. Singapore’s tracking app is supposed to notify all people who have been within 2 meters of an infected person for at least 30 minutes, while Australia’s app claims to notify people who have been within 1.5 meters for at least 15 minutes. Since Bluetooth can’t actually be used reliably to measure distances, these figures suggest an illusory precision.
The inconsistency between what the apps measure and how the virus spreads puts governments in a bind. Set the time window too narrow, and the app will classify millions of people as possibly infected, requiring the government to track down everyone who has ever passed a coronavirus carrier on the street. Set the time window too wide, and the app will flag too few exposures to the virus. There is no “Goldilocks” zone in the middle of these two extremes.
Set the threshold at 15 or 20 minutes of close proximity to an infected person, and the coronavirus app will identify a moderate number of people for health authorities to contact. But most of the people who have contracted the disease from the infected person casually—that supermarket sneeze comes to mind—will be missed. The other problem is that actual transmission events are rare compared to the number of interactions people have. To find those transmissions, you have to wade through an enormous number of casual contacts, and that means tracking down virtually everyone. Once governments reach that point, they’re no better off than if they had simply relied on effective but labor-intensive human contact tracing in the first place, without the app.
The only way to make coronavirus tracking apps really work is to accept false alarms and track every person, all the time, everywhere.Unfortunately, the coronavirus simply does not spread in the way that epidemiologists model it statistically. That’s not necessarily a problem—for our understanding of broader progress of the pandemic. But the models usually simplify reality in ways that work on average, even if they don’t apply to any particular case. We’re therefore making a grave methodological error when we expect reality at the level of individual cases to reflect our models for the numbers overall, instead of the other way around. Any technological solution to the coronavirus pandemic has to be grounded in the reality of one-on-one transmission, not epidemiological statistics.
The only way to make coronavirus tracking apps really work is to accept the burden of false alarms and track every person, all the time, everywhere. This is only possible in a totalitarian state such as China, yet even the Chinese government doesn’t have the resources to implement such extreme levels of monitoring. With advances in artificial intelligence, it is possible that it soon will—and when that day comes, China will be prepared for the next pandemic. The rest of the world will probably take the virus over the cure.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--How Russia Became the New Coronavirus Hotspot

How Russia Became the New Coronavirus Hotspot Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Russia closes in on the global top three of coronavirus cases , Mexico orders military to maintain public safety , and Venezuela ’ s opposition sees two resignations after botched invasion .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
When the U.S. Department of Defense announced in January 2018 that the United States was now in an era of “ great power competition ” with China and Russia , Pentagon officials probably didn ’ t think they would be competing to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anything .
While China has seen its global reputation badly damaged as a result of the coronavirus pandemic , the United States is still recording thousands of new cases daily—and watches on as China and European countries begin to lift restrictions on their residents .
Now , after recording a relatively low number of coronavirus cases in March , Russia has the second-fastest rate of new infections globally .
Did Putin fail ?
Like many of his counterparts at the outset of the pandemic , Russian President Vladimir Putin may have underestimated how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ get .
“ The situation is on the whole under control , ” Putin said on March 18 .
“ Russia looks much better compared with other countries.
” Since then , coronavirus cases have steadily increased .
Russia now has approximately 220,000 cases .
Only the United States , Spain , and the United Kingdom have more .
If trends continue , Russia will have overtaken the United Kingdom by the end of today .
Who ’ s counting ?
Despite such a high number of infections , its death toll is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similar numbers of cases .
Russia has recorded roughly 2,000 deaths so far , a small fraction of the 32,000 recorded in Britain .
This is due to Russia ’ s classification methods : In the United States , if a patient dies while testing positive for the coronavirus , the death is added to the official toll—in Russia , the cause of death has to be directly related to the virus , such as lung failure , for it to qualify for the official count .
“ I believe Russia is counting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States are over counting , ” Andrei Chernyayev , a physician who helped the Moscow Health Department write the rules for classifying coronavirus deaths , told the Moscow Times .
Where does Putin go from here ?
A relatively low death rate aside , Russia ’ s handling of the coronavirus has not helped Putin , who was planning for his next few terms in power just before the pandemic struck .
While still high by Western standards , his support has declined to its lowest levels since he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Levada Center showed a 59 percent approval rating among the Russian public .
The Kremlin said it was “ not inclined to fully trust ” the poll results .
It ’ s perhaps with these ratings in mind that Putin has ordered an easing of the country ’ s lockdown restrictions , starting today .
On May 7 , Foreign Policy asked 11 Russia experts for an assessment of Putin ’ s 20 years in charge and what the future holds .
Susan Glasser sums up how quickly things have changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 was meant to be a 20th anniversary party for Putinism , but the party has been canceled , ” she writes .
The Teaching , Research , and International Policy project at William & Mary , in collaboration with Foreign Policy , surveyed 982 international relations scholars at U.S. universities in the first week of May to gauge their feelings on the U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic .
The snap poll showed broad support for international health institutions , but widespread dismay at the U.S. role in coordinating a global response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico ’ s military takes to the streets .
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has ordered the country ’ s armed forces to assist in maintaining public safety as levels of violence reach record levels .
Mexico reported roughly 3,000 homicides in March alone , the second highest monthly total ever recorded .
The order is in effect until 2024 , effectively the length of López Obrador presidential term .
Juan Ibarrola , a security analyst , said the move is indicative of a flailing response to escalating violence .
“ His @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is why he has had to order with this decree for the armed forces to support public security , ” Ibarrola told the newspaper Milenio .
Venezuela opposition figures resign after botched raid .
Heads have begun to roll in Venezuela ’ s opposition as Juan Rendon and Sergio Vergara both tendered their resignations to opposition leader Juan Guaidó , following the botched invasion attempt to which both men were linked .
Rendon and Vergara ’ s signatures , along with Guaidó ’ s , appeared on a contract allegedly signed between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Florida-based security contractor , who led the operation .
Rendon has admitted to initially contracting with Goudreau , but says he ended their working relationship in November of last year .
Venezuela ’ s chief prosecutor has called for the extradition of Goudreau , Rendon , and Vergara for their involvement in the foiled incursion .
U.S. opens door to prisoner exchange .
In its own unique way , the Trump administration has publicly signaled its willingness to work with Iran on repatriating Iranian nationals currently in U.S. custody .
“ We have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aliens who we have been trying to return to your country .
You suddenly SAY you want them back , so how about you send a charter plane over and we ’ ll return all 11 at once ?
” Ken Cuccinelli , the acting deputy secretary of U.S .
Homeland Security wrote on Twitter on Monday in response to Iran ’ s call for a prisoner exchange .
Iranian sources told Reuters that negotiations on such a move between the two countries have been ongoing “ for some time.
” Democratic party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make their presence felt in the Joe Biden presidential campaign by calling for an annual $ 200 billion reduction in the U.S. defense budget should Biden succeed in ousting U.S. President Donald Trump in the upcoming November election .
Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch reported on Monday that a coalition of 50 progressive groups have called on the former vice president to reduce U.S. military spending in a letter to his campaign .
In the letter , the authors say the increased military focus of U.S. foreign policy has left the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the growing transnational threats to human security we face today that do not have military solutions.
” It ’ s unclear how much of an impact such pressure will have on Biden , who succeeded in the Democratic primary contest while largely ceding the progressive lane to other candidates .
“ It ’ s been challenging getting specific commitments on many of these issues from the Biden campaign , ” Yasmine Taeb , a senior policy counsel at Demand Progress and organizer of the letter , told Foreign Policy .
Swine fever detected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s agriculture ministry on Monday reported an outbreak of African Swine Fever at a pig breeding farm near the capital Lomé ; 44 pigs have died from the disease on the farm to date , and the government said preventive measures—including slaughtering pigs in the affected area—were being taken .
On Sunday , South Africa reported an outbreak of the disease at a communal farm in the Eastern Cape province .
A golf course on the border of England and Wales has found itself caught in the crosshairs of conflicting advice surrounding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The unique layout of Llanymynech golf course has 15 holes in Wales and two in England , with another hole straddling both jurisdictions .
Lockdown rules have been relaxed in England but still very much in place in neighboring Wales , which has a devolved government separate from the U.K. government in Westminster .
The club is under the governance of English Golf , which expects the sport to resume on Wednesday , further complicating matters .
“ We ’ re trying to work it out .
We have some holes in England @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we don ’ t know what we can do , ” said Sian Whiteoak , the club ’ s secretary .
Welsh minister Jeremy Miles has warned English residents to avoid travelling to Wales , even if restrictions are lifted in their own locality , saying the Welsh authorities “ absolutely have the power to fine ” those who take non-essential journeys—which likely include rounds of golf .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russia closes in on the global top three of coronavirus cases, Mexico orders military to maintain public safety, and Venezuela’s opposition sees two resignations after botched invasion.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Russia closes in on the global top three of coronavirus cases, Mexico orders military to maintain public safety, and Venezuela’s opposition sees two resignations after botched invasion.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Another Great Power Humbled by Coronavirus
When the U.S. Department of Defense announced in January 2018 that the United States was now in an era of “great power competition” with China and Russia, Pentagon officials probably didn’t think they would be competing to avoid being the world’s worst at anything.
While China has seen its global reputation badly damaged as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, the United States is still recording thousands of new cases daily—and watches on as China and European countries begin to lift restrictions on their residents.
Now, after recording a relatively low number of coronavirus cases in March, Russia has the second-fastest rate of new infections globally.
Did Putin fail? Like many of his counterparts at the outset of the pandemic, Russian President Vladimir Putin may have underestimated how bad his country’s outbreak could get. “The situation is on the whole under control,” Putin said on March 18. “Russia looks much better compared with other countries.”
Since then, coronavirus cases have steadily increased. Russia now has approximately 220,000 cases. Only the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom have more. If trends continue, Russia will have overtaken the United Kingdom by the end of today.
Who’s counting? Despite such a high number of infections, its death toll is surprisingly low compared to other countries with similar numbers of cases. Russia has recorded roughly 2,000 deaths so far, a small fraction of the 32,000 recorded in Britain. This is due to Russia’s classification methods: In the United States, if a patient dies while testing positive for the coronavirus, the death is added to the official toll—in Russia, the cause of death has to be directly related to the virus, such as lung failure, for it to qualify for the official count.
“I believe Russia is counting accurately while others like Italy, Belgium and the United States are over counting,” Andrei Chernyayev, a physician who helped the Moscow Health Department write the rules for classifying coronavirus deaths, told the Moscow Times.
Where does Putin go from here? A relatively low death rate aside, Russia’s handling of the coronavirus has not helped Putin, who was planning for his next few terms in power just before the pandemic struck. While still high by Western standards, his support has declined to its lowest levels since he was first elected president. A recent poll by the Levada Center showed a 59 percent approval rating among the Russian public. The Kremlin said it was “not inclined to fully trust” the poll results.
It’s perhaps with these ratings in mind that Putin has ordered an easing of the country’s lockdown restrictions, starting today.
On May 7, Foreign Policy asked 11 Russia experts for an assessment of Putin’s 20 years in charge and what the future holds. Susan Glasser sums up how quickly things have changed for the Russian leader. “May 2020 was meant to be a 20th anniversary party for Putinism, but the party has been canceled,” she writes.
How Has the Coronavirus Damaged U.S. Prestige?
The Teaching, Research, and International Policy project at William & Mary, in collaboration with Foreign Policy, surveyed 982 international relations scholars at U.S. universities in the first week of May to gauge their feelings on the U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic. The snap poll showed broad support for international health institutions, but widespread dismay at the U.S. role in coordinating a global response. Find more survey responses here.
What We’re Following Today
Mexico’s military takes to the streets. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has ordered the country’s armed forces to assist in maintaining public safety as levels of violence reach record levels. Mexico reported roughly 3,000 homicides in March alone, the second highest monthly total ever recorded. The order is in effect until 2024, effectively the length of López Obrador presidential term.
Juan Ibarrola, a security analyst, said the move is indicative of a flailing response to escalating violence. “His security strategy is not working and that is why he has had to order with this decree for the armed forces to support public security,” Ibarrola told the newspaper Milenio.
Venezuela opposition figures resign after botched raid. Heads have begun to roll in Venezuela’s opposition as Juan Rendon and Sergio Vergara both tendered their resignations to opposition leader Juan Guaidó, following the botched invasion attempt to which both men were linked.
Rendon and Vergara’s signatures, along with Guaidó’s, appeared on a contract allegedly signed between the Venezuelan opposition and Jordan Goudreau, the Florida-based security contractor, who led the operation. Rendon has admitted to initially contracting with Goudreau, but says he ended their working relationship in November of last year.
Venezuela’s chief prosecutor has called for the extradition of Goudreau, Rendon, and Vergara for their involvement in the foiled incursion.
U.S. opens door to prisoner exchange. In its own unique way, the Trump administration has publicly signaled its willingness to work with Iran on repatriating Iranian nationals currently in U.S. custody. “We have 11 of your citizens who are illegal aliens who we have been trying to return to your country. You suddenly SAY you want them back, so how about you send a charter plane over and we’ll return all 11 at once?” Ken Cuccinelli, the acting deputy secretary of U.S. Homeland Security wrote on Twitter on Monday in response to Iran’s call for a prisoner exchange. Iranian sources told Reuters that negotiations on such a move between the two countries have been ongoing “for some time.”
Keep an Eye On
Democratic party pre-convention jostling. American progressives are trying to make their presence felt in the Joe Biden presidential campaign by calling for an annual $200 billion reduction in the U.S. defense budget should Biden succeed in ousting U.S. President Donald Trump in the upcoming November election. Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch reported on Monday that a coalition of 50 progressive groups have called on the former vice president to reduce U.S. military spending in a letter to his campaign. In the letter, the authors say the increased military focus of U.S. foreign policy has left the United States “woefully ill-prepared to confront the growing transnational threats to human security we face today that do not have military solutions.”
It’s unclear how much of an impact such pressure will have on Biden, who succeeded in the Democratic primary contest while largely ceding the progressive lane to other candidates. “It’s been challenging getting specific commitments on many of these issues from the Biden campaign,” Yasmine Taeb, a senior policy counsel at Demand Progress and organizer of the letter, told Foreign Policy.
Swine fever detected in Togo and South Africa. Togo’s agriculture ministry on Monday reported an outbreak of African Swine Fever at a pig breeding farm near the capital Lomé; 44 pigs have died from the disease on the farm to date, and the government said preventive measures—including slaughtering pigs in the affected area—were being taken. On Sunday, South Africa reported an outbreak of the disease at a communal farm in the Eastern Cape province.
Odds and Ends
A golf course on the border of England and Wales has found itself caught in the crosshairs of conflicting advice surrounding coronavirus restrictions within the United Kingdom. The unique layout of Llanymynech golf course has 15 holes in Wales and two in England, with another hole straddling both jurisdictions. Lockdown rules have been relaxed in England but still very much in place in neighboring Wales, which has a devolved government separate from the U.K. government in Westminster. The club is under the governance of English Golf, which expects the sport to resume on Wednesday, further complicating matters.
“We’re trying to work it out. We have some holes in England and some holes in Wales, so we don’t know what we can do,” said Sian Whiteoak, the club’s secretary.
Welsh minister Jeremy Miles has warned English residents to avoid travelling to Wales, even if restrictions are lifted in their own locality, saying the Welsh authorities “absolutely have the power to fine” those who take non-essential journeys—which likely include rounds of golf.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-13--Leaked Chinese Virus Database Covers 230 Cities, 640,000 Updates

Beijing claims that since the coronavirus pandemic began at the end of last year , there have been only 82,919 confirmed cases and 4,633 deaths in mainland China .
Those numbers could be roughly accurate , and in that case a detailed account would be an important tool in judging the spread of the virus .
But it ’ s also possible that the numbers presented to the rest of the world are vastly understated compared to Beijing ’ s private figures .
The opaqueness and mistrust of outsiders in the Chinese Communist Party ’ s system makes it hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data used directly by Chinese officials is invaluable for governments elsewhere .
A dataset of coronavirus cases and deaths from the military ’ s National University of Defense Technology , leaked to Foreign Policy , offers insight into how Beijing has gathered coronavirus data on its population .
The source of the leak , who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of sharing Chinese military data , said that the data came from the university .
The school publishes a data tracker for the coronavirus : The online version matches with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far less detailed—it shows just the map of cases , not the distinct data .
The dataset , though it contains inconsistencies—and though it may not be comprehensive enough to contradict Beijing ’ s official numbers—is the most extensive dataset proved to exist about coronavirus cases in China .
But more importantly , it can serve as a valuable trove of information for epidemiologists and public health experts around the globe—a dataset that Beijing has almost certainly not shared with U.S. officials or doctors .
( The World Health Organization and the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not immediately respond to requests for comment . )
While not fully comprehensive , the data is incredibly rich : There are more than 640,000 updates of information , covering at least 230 cities—in other words , 640,000 rows purporting to show the number of cases in a specific location at the time the data was gathered .
Each update includes the latitude , longitude , and “ confirmed ” number of cases at the location , for dates ranging from early February to late April .
For locations in and around the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hubei province , the data also includes deaths and those who “ recovered.
” It ’ s unclear how the dataset ’ s authors define “ confirmed ” and “ recovered ” : Like other countries , China has updated its counting methods , as demonstrated in mid-February when Hubei ’ s reported cases spiked because officials announced they were including patients diagnosed with CT scans .
Unlike in other countries , China ’ s outbreak peaked before rigorous testing methods were widely available , and the Communist Party often manipulates data for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy includes hospital locations , but it also includes place names corresponding to apartment compounds , hotels , supermarkets , railway stations , restaurants , and schools across the breadth of the country .
The dataset reports one case of coronavirus in a KFC in the eastern city of Zhenjiang on March 14 , for example , while a church in the northeastern provincial capital of Harbin saw two cases on March 17 .
( The data does not include the names of the individuals who contracted or died from the disease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the dataset could not be independently verified . )
It ’ s unclear as yet how the university gathered the data .
The online version says that they aggregated the data from China ’ s health ministry , the National Health Commission , media reports , and other public sources .
According to its website , the university , based in the central Chinese city of Changsha , is “ under the direct leadership of the Central Military Commission , ” the body that oversees China ’ s military .
The military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the virus : It has helped enforce quarantines , transport supplies , and treat patients .
A propaganda message on a prominent military website in China reads , “ In the fight against the epidemic , the people ’ s army is on the move !
” The man most responsible for building the database appears to be Zhang Haisu , a director at the school ’ s Information and Communication Department .
In a May press release , the university credits Zhang for building the “ Fight the Virus to Return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dedication .
A note on the data tracker ’ s website reads , “ Currently our country is taking forceful measures , and the epidemic situation is being strictly managed and controlled .
Please correctly understand that to use the relevant data.
” The site features a contact email for a Zhang Haisu ; no one responded when Foreign Policy reached out .
The university did not respond to a request for comment .
Foreign Policy and 100Reporters , who are co-publishing this piece , are not making the database publicly available for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are exploring ways to make the data available for researchers studying the spread of the coronavirus .
For its popular coronavirus tracker , John Hopkins University its data on Chin from DXY , a Chinese medical platform that aggregates cases in the country .
But DXY provides information at only the provincial level .
Richer information would benefit researchers , and ordinary people who are eager to know more about how the disease has affected other countries and spread .
Patterns in the data could add to what is known about the disease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers .
Medical researchers expressed skepticism in mid-April , after Wuhan revised the number of coronavirus deaths from 2,579 to 3,869—an increase of exactly 50 percent .
Why does Beijing restrict access to its coronavirus data ?
Possibly because of malice or mistrust toward the United States , at a time when tensions are running high .
Possibly because of bureaucratic errors .
And possibly because Beijing fears that outside researchers will learn of its extensive cover-up , destroying the narrative that an authoritarian nation like China is better equipped to protect its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public version of the National University of Defense Technology dataset sporadically restricts American IP addresses .
To access the military university ’ s website hosting the map for the first time , one of the present authors had to use a virtual private network to pretend he was browsing in Uruguay .
This piece was co-published with 100Reporters .

Isaac Stone Fish and Maria Krol Sinclair

Beijing claims that since the coronavirus pandemic began at the end of last year, there have been only 82,919 confirmed cases and 4,633 deaths in mainland China . Those numbers could be roughly accurate, and in that case a detailed account would be an important tool in judging the spread of the virus. But it’s also possible that the numbers presented to the rest of the world are vastly understated compared to Beijing’s private figures. The opaqueness and mistrust of outsiders in the Chinese Communist Party’s system makes it hard to judge—but learning more about the coronavirus data used directly by Chinese officials is invaluable for governments elsewhere. A dataset of coronavirus cases and deaths from the military’s National University of Defense Technology, leaked to Foreign Policy, offers insight into how Beijing has gathered coronavirus data on its population. The source of the leak, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of sharing Chinese military data, said that the data came from the university. The school publishes a data tracker for the coronavirus: The online version matches with the leaked information, except it is far less detailed—it shows just the map of cases, not the distinct data.
Beijing claims that since the coronavirus pandemic began at the end of last year, there have been only 82,919 confirmed cases and 4,633 deaths in mainland China. Those numbers could be roughly accurate, and in that case a detailed account would be an important tool in judging the spread of the virus. But it’s also possible that the numbers presented to the rest of the world are vastly understated compared to Beijing’s private figures. The opaqueness and mistrust of outsiders in the Chinese Communist Party’s system makes it hard to judge—but learning more about the coronavirus data used directly by Chinese officials is invaluable for governments elsewhere. A dataset of coronavirus cases and deaths from the military’s National University of Defense Technology, leaked to Foreign Policy, offers insight into how Beijing has gathered coronavirus data on its population. The source of the leak, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of sharing Chinese military data, said that the data came from the university. The school publishes a data tracker for the coronavirus: The online version matches with the leaked information, except it is far less detailed—it shows just the map of cases, not the distinct data.
The dataset, though it contains inconsistencies—and though it may not be comprehensive enough to contradict Beijing’s official numbers—is the most extensive dataset proved to exist about coronavirus cases in China. But more importantly, it can serve as a valuable trove of information for epidemiologists and public health experts around the globe—a dataset that Beijing has almost certainly not shared with U.S. officials or doctors. (The World Health Organization and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention did not immediately respond to requests for comment.)
While not fully comprehensive, the data is incredibly rich: There are more than 640,000 updates of information, covering at least 230 cities—in other words, 640,000 rows purporting to show the number of cases in a specific location at the time the data was gathered. Each update includes the latitude, longitude, and “confirmed” number of cases at the location, for dates ranging from early February to late April.
For locations in and around the center of the outbreak in Wuhan, Hubei province, the data also includes deaths and those who “recovered.” It’s unclear how the dataset’s authors define “confirmed” and “recovered”: Like other countries, China has updated its counting methods, as demonstrated in mid-February when Hubei’s reported cases spiked because officials announced they were including patients diagnosed with CT scans. Unlike in other countries, China’s outbreak peaked before rigorous testing methods were widely available, and the Communist Party often manipulates data for political purposes.
The data reviewed by Foreign Policy includes hospital locations, but it also includes place names corresponding to apartment compounds, hotels, supermarkets, railway stations, restaurants, and schools across the breadth of the country. The dataset reports one case of coronavirus in a KFC in the eastern city of Zhenjiang on March 14, for example, while a church in the northeastern provincial capital of Harbin saw two cases on March 17. (The data does not include the names of the individuals who contracted or died from the disease, and the reports of the cases in the dataset could not be independently verified.)
It’s unclear as yet how the university gathered the data. The online version says that they aggregated the data from China’s health ministry, the National Health Commission, media reports, and other public sources. According to its website, the university, based in the central Chinese city of Changsha, is “under the direct leadership of the Central Military Commission,” the body that oversees China’s military. The military has played a large role in mobilizing against the virus: It has helped enforce quarantines, transport supplies, and treat patients. A propaganda message on a prominent military website in China reads, “In the fight against the epidemic, the people’s army is on the move!”
The man most responsible for building the database appears to be Zhang Haisu, a director at the school’s Information and Communication Department. In a May press release, the university credits Zhang for building the “Fight the Virus to Return to Work Database” and praises his dedication. A note on the data tracker’s website reads, “Currently our country is taking forceful measures, and the epidemic situation is being strictly managed and controlled. Please correctly understand that to use the relevant data.” The site features a contact email for a Zhang Haisu; no one responded when Foreign Policy reached out. The university did not respond to a request for comment.
Foreign Policy and 100Reporters, who are co-publishing this piece, are not making the database publicly available for now for reasons of security, but are exploring ways to make the data available for researchers studying the spread of the coronavirus.
For its popular coronavirus tracker, John Hopkins University gathers its data on Chin from DXY, a Chinese medical platform that aggregates cases in the country. But DXY provides information at only the provincial level. Richer information would benefit researchers, and ordinary people who are eager to know more about how the disease has affected other countries and spread. Patterns in the data could add to what is known about the disease, and the ways Beijing manipulates its numbers. Medical researchers expressed skepticism in mid-April, after Wuhan revised the number of coronavirus deaths from 2,579 to 3,869—an increase of exactly 50 percent.
Why does Beijing restrict access to its coronavirus data? Possibly because of malice or mistrust toward the United States, at a time when tensions are running high. Possibly because of bureaucratic errors. And possibly because Beijing fears that outside researchers will learn of its extensive cover-up, destroying the narrative that an authoritarian nation like China is better equipped to protect its people against a pandemic. Even the public version of the National University of Defense Technology dataset sporadically restricts American IP addresses. To access the military university’s website hosting the map for the first time, one of the present authors had to use a virtual private network to pretend he was browsing in Uruguay.
This piece was co-published with 100Reporters.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--Why Experts Break Their Own Lockdown Rules

Why Experts Break Their Own Lockdown Rules In 1992 , a South Korean preacher called Lee Jang-rim convinced 10,000 people that the apocalypse was imminent .
After believers had given up jobs , possessions , and even taken their own lives , it was revealed that Lee had used the money from his followers to make investments that would not pay out until well after the supposed date of the rapture .
For most of the public , the leader of a doomsday cult couldn ’ t be further from a credible source of advice .
Inconsistent behavior like this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harder in the case of authority figures who are more widely trusted , like public policy experts .
What does it mean when experts act in ways at odds with what they ’ re telling everyone else—and does it mean that their advice can ’ t be trusted ?
Last week , Britain ’ s Daily Telegraph reported that Neil Ferguson , an epidemiologist instrumental in developing the British government ’ s coronavirus lockdown , had flouted rules that he himself had helped compose by inviting a romantic partner to visit him at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ couldn ’ t have been better for the government , drawing attention from the release of official data on the same day showing that the United Kingdom had the highest death toll from the coronavirus in Europe .
Despite this news , the government has been considering a relaxation of its lockdown in the hope of limiting damage to the country ’ s economy .
Ferguson , who resigned as a result of the story , now serves as a titillating—and politically convenient—example of how burdensome the current lockdown can be , even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pandemic response is not a straightforward subject , and , as for so many other aspects of our lives , we rely on external authorities to help us make decisions about our behavior .
But choosing who to trust puts us in a bind , as our lack of expertise leaves us unable to directly judge an expert ’ s reliability .
One of the few ways that we can assess the credibility of experts is by their consistency in following their own advice .
Yet Ferguson is not the only authority figure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules of the lockdown .
Catherine Calderwood , Scotland ’ s chief medical officer , resigned in early April after details of her visits to a second home came to light .
Robert Jenrick , a cabinet minister , drew fire in the same month for moving house from his London residence to a property in Herefordshire and for subsequently visiting his parents .
The problem of inconsistent experts isn ’ t peculiar to the U.K. , either .
Bruce Aylward , a veteran of the World Health Organization ’ s response to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joint mission on the coronavirus , appeared to ignore the mandatory quarantine period for visitors to Wuhan during its outbreak , justifying his actions to a Washington Post reporter on the grounds that he hadn ’ t visited any high-risk areas and that he had tested negative for the virus .
Nor are inconsistencies limited to questions of public health .
In 2014 , Pascal Husting , the international program director for Greenpeace , was heavily criticized for commuting between Luxembourg and Amsterdam on short-haul flights , a form of transport that his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ environmentally damaging ways to travel .
If specialists on pandemics and climate change disregard their own advice when inconvenient , at best this suggests a degree of arrogance .
At worst , they appear cynical about the seriousness of the problems that they have spent their professional lives working to address .
The obvious danger is that their behavior will result in lower levels of public compliance with the measures needed in the face of these enormous challenges .
So , what drives experts to break their own rules ?
David Dunning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is popularly known for his role in documenting the Dunning-Kruger effect , a phenomenon that relates to people ’ s skewed perceptions of their own capabilities .
The Dunning-Kruger effect has entered popular culture as shorthand for inept people who overestimate their abilities , lacking the metacognition to recognize their own shortcomings .
But Dunning observes that incompetents are not the only ones swayed by the Dunning-Kruger effect—experts are susceptible , too .
For experts , the issue is not an inflated sense of their own skills but rather the “ curse of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everybody else shares at least a baseline understanding of their subject .
“ Experts know how well they are doing in an objective sense .
It ’ s just that they think everybody else has this knowledge as well , and so they underestimate themselves relative to other people , ” Dunning told Foreign Policy .
A conclusion that might be reasonable , even obvious , to an expert could seem counterintuitive to a layperson .
A conclusion like : If I ’ m certain I have a tolerable level of risk , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an exception .
Conclusions like this may even be correct in a technical sense .
For example , Aylward in Wuhan and Ferguson in London were both privileged to have access to coronavirus testing at times when few tests were available .
While all tests have a risk of false positives or false negatives , both experts undoubtably had more information about their level of risk than the rest of us , having both professional expertise and individual test results to inform their judgments .
However , it ’ s more likely is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to “ motivated reasoning , ” our tendency to think our way to conclusions that—not coincidentally—match our preferred outcomes .
Dunning , who specializes in motivated reasoning , explained the process as follows : “ Motivated reasoning is self-affirmational .
You ’ re trying to come to some sort of conclusion that you favor that is benign or at least not threatening .
Part of what fuels that is that we know about special circumstances for ourselves , and we overweight those circumstances to exempt ourselves from what might be true for other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a conflict between experts providing the general population with a simple , unambiguous message and their considering individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis .
Edge cases exist , after all .
The problem comes when experts start wondering if they themselves might be an edge case .
As Dunning noted : “ If you ’ re a doctor talking to a patient about risk for surgery , it ’ s a bunch of percentages in your head .
As soon as you become a patient , suddenly it ’ s not percentages ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anymore .
It ’ s you .
It ’ s a completely different way of thinking.
” Doctors do in fact make notoriously bad patients , and that ’ s despite experience in treating other individual patients and with the benefit of a colleague on hand to provide unbiased advice .
Switching gears from population-level models to one ’ s own situation is an order of magnitude more difficult .
“ You very often see a disconnect between people ’ s judgments about what people in general should do and what I myself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Dunning said .
The difficulty for experts is that they can not know whether they are making a completely objective judgment or allowing a subconscious thumb on the scale .
As Dunning put it : “ Intelligence and education don ’ t spare you .
It ’ s not the case that intelligent or highly educated people are necessarily going to engage in less motivated reasoning than others , and we find that across the board .
It doesn ’ t fuel motivated reasoning .
It doesn ’ t prevent motivated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human at the end of the day.
” While it ’ s interesting to understand what leads experts into making these decisions , in an important sense it ’ s immaterial whether or not they have an excuse for treating themselves differently .
The damage is done either way .
An exception for an expert , even when justified , will inevitably become an example that the rest of us will factor into our own choices .
Given our universal susceptibility to motivated reasoning , the expert ’ s behavior is certain to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justified exceptions among their audience .
Therefore , given their place in the British public eye , it ’ s not open to question that Ferguson and Calderwood made very serious errors of judgment .
In some ways , however , it ’ s hard not to feel that they were treated a little unfairly .
Of the three authority figures accused of flouting Britain ’ s lockdown , both of the scientists resigned .
Whereas the cabinet minister—a politician , someone we might reasonably expect to be an expert in how his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Experts working behind the scenes and providing advice to governments are vital .
It ’ s less clear whether anyone benefits from bringing them to the center of the story and focusing on their individual choices .
This approach sanitizes the messy process of reaching scientific consensus , as well as turning a fallible individual into a single point of failure for important ideas like “ stay at home during a pandemic , ” a message that epidemiologists—not only Ferguson—overwhelmingly agree on .
Being the center of a story , brushing off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ecological niches for politicians , and they thrive in them .
Experts on the other hand thrive in their own fields , and there ’ s no reason to expect them to be media personalities as well .
Dunning put it this way : “ Often , being competent at a task is knowing what the task is .
Part of the reason that people may be incompetent is that they don ’ t know exactly what tasks they ’ re engaged in or they haven ’ t recognized a different task that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thrusts policy experts onto the front pages of newspapers , they have to face a new reality : However expert they might think they are , when it comes to public relations and politics , they ’ re amateurs , and they need to play it as safe as possible .

In 1992, a South Korean preacher called Lee Jang-rim convinced 10,000 people that the apocalypse was imminent. After believers had given up jobs, possessions, and even taken their own lives, it was revealed that Lee had used the money from his followers to make investments that would not pay out until well after the supposed date of the rapture.
In 1992, a South Korean preacher called Lee Jang-rim convinced 10,000 people that the apocalypse was imminent. After believers had given up jobs, possessions, and even taken their own lives, it was revealed that Lee had used the money from his followers to make investments that would not pay out until well after the supposed date of the rapture.
For most of the public, the leader of a doomsday cult couldn’t be further from a credible source of advice. Inconsistent behavior like this just confirms our expectations. Things get harder in the case of authority figures who are more widely trusted, like public policy experts. What does it mean when experts act in ways at odds with what they’re telling everyone else—and does it mean that their advice can’t be trusted?
Last week, Britain’s Daily Telegraph reported that Neil Ferguson, an epidemiologist instrumental in developing the British government’s coronavirus lockdown, had flouted rules that he himself had helped compose by inviting a romantic partner to visit him at home.
The timing of the scoop couldn’t have been better for the government, drawing attention from the release of official data on the same day showing that the United Kingdom had the highest death toll from the coronavirus in Europe. Despite this news, the government has been considering a relaxation of its lockdown in the hope of limiting damage to the country’s economy. Ferguson, who resigned as a result of the story, now serves as a titillating—and politically convenient—example of how burdensome the current lockdown can be, even for one of its own architects.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Pandemic response is not a straightforward subject, and, as for so many other aspects of our lives, we rely on external authorities to help us make decisions about our behavior. But choosing who to trust puts us in a bind, as our lack of expertise leaves us unable to directly judge an expert’s reliability. One of the few ways that we can assess the credibility of experts is by their consistency in following their own advice.
Yet Ferguson is not the only authority figure in the U.K. to have bent the rules of the lockdown.
Catherine Calderwood, Scotland’s chief medical officer, resigned in early April after details of her visits to a second home came to light. Robert Jenrick, a cabinet minister, drew fire in the same month for moving house from his London residence to a property in Herefordshire and for subsequently visiting his parents.
The problem of inconsistent experts isn’t peculiar to the U.K., either. Bruce Aylward, a veteran of the World Health Organization’s response to Ebola and the leader of the WHO-China joint mission on the coronavirus, appeared to ignore the mandatory quarantine period for visitors to Wuhan during its outbreak, justifying his actions to a Washington Post reporter on the grounds that he hadn’t visited any high-risk areas and that he had tested negative for the virus.
Nor are inconsistencies limited to questions of public health. In 2014, Pascal Husting, the international program director for Greenpeace, was heavily criticized for commuting between Luxembourg and Amsterdam on short-haul flights, a form of transport that his organization recognizes as one of the most environmentally damaging ways to travel.
If specialists on pandemics and climate change disregard their own advice when inconvenient, at best this suggests a degree of arrogance. At worst, they appear cynical about the seriousness of the problems that they have spent their professional lives working to address. The obvious danger is that their behavior will result in lower levels of public compliance with the measures needed in the face of these enormous challenges.
So, what drives experts to break their own rules?
David Dunning of the University of Michigan studies decision-making and is popularly known for his role in documenting the Dunning-Kruger effect, a phenomenon that relates to people’s skewed perceptions of their own capabilities. The Dunning-Kruger effect has entered popular culture as shorthand for inept people who overestimate their abilities, lacking the metacognition to recognize their own shortcomings. But Dunning observes that incompetents are not the only ones swayed by the Dunning-Kruger effect—experts are susceptible, too.
For experts, the issue is not an inflated sense of their own skills but rather the “curse of knowledge,” a mistaken assumption that everybody else shares at least a baseline understanding of their subject.
For experts, the issue is not an inflated sense of their own skills but rather the “curse of knowledge,” a mistaken assumption that everybody else shares at least a baseline understanding of their subject. “Experts know how well they are doing in an objective sense. It’s just that they think everybody else has this knowledge as well, and so they underestimate themselves relative to other people,” Dunning told Foreign Policy.
A conclusion that might be reasonable, even obvious, to an expert could seem counterintuitive to a layperson. A conclusion like: If I’m certain I have a tolerable level of risk, there’s little danger in making an exception.
Conclusions like this may even be correct in a technical sense. For example, Aylward in Wuhan and Ferguson in London were both privileged to have access to coronavirus testing at times when few tests were available. While all tests have a risk of false positives or false negatives, both experts undoubtably had more information about their level of risk than the rest of us, having both professional expertise and individual test results to inform their judgments.
However, it’s more likely is that they were treating themselves differently due to “motivated reasoning,” our tendency to think our way to conclusions that—not coincidentally—match our preferred outcomes. Dunning, who specializes in motivated reasoning, explained the process as follows: “Motivated reasoning is self-affirmational. You’re trying to come to some sort of conclusion that you favor that is benign or at least not threatening. Part of what fuels that is that we know about special circumstances for ourselves, and we overweight those circumstances to exempt ourselves from what might be true for other people.”
There isn’t necessarily a conflict between experts providing the general population with a simple, unambiguous message and their considering individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Edge cases exist, after all. The problem comes when experts start wondering if they themselves might be an edge case.
As Dunning noted: “If you’re a doctor talking to a patient about risk for surgery, it’s a bunch of percentages in your head. As soon as you become a patient, suddenly it’s not percentages; it’s not a long-run thing anymore. It’s you. It’s a completely different way of thinking.” Doctors do in fact make notoriously bad patients, and that’s despite experience in treating other individual patients and with the benefit of a colleague on hand to provide unbiased advice. Switching gears from population-level models to one’s own situation is an order of magnitude more difficult. “You very often see a disconnect between people’s judgments about what people in general should do and what I myself should do, especially when communicating risks,” Dunning said.
The difficulty for experts is that they cannot know whether they are making a completely objective judgment or allowing a subconscious thumb on the scale. As Dunning put it: “Intelligence and education don’t spare you. It’s not the case that intelligent or highly educated people are necessarily going to engage in less motivated reasoning than others, and we find that across the board. It doesn’t fuel motivated reasoning. It doesn’t prevent motivated reasoning. We’re all just human at the end of the day.”
While it’s interesting to understand what leads experts into making these decisions, in an important sense it’s immaterial whether or not they have an excuse for treating themselves differently. The damage is done either way.
An exception for an expert, even when justified, will inevitably become an example that the rest of us will factor into our own choices. Given our universal susceptibility to motivated reasoning, the expert’s behavior is certain to increase the rate of other, poorly justified exceptions among their audience.
Therefore, given their place in the British public eye, it’s not open to question that Ferguson and Calderwood made very serious errors of judgment. In some ways, however, it’s hard not to feel that they were treated a little unfairly. Of the three authority figures accused of flouting Britain’s lockdown, both of the scientists resigned. Whereas the cabinet minister—a politician, someone we might reasonably expect to be an expert in how his actions appear to others—remains in his post.
Experts working behind the scenes and providing advice to governments are vital. It’s less clear whether anyone benefits from bringing them to the center of the story and focusing on their individual choices. This approach sanitizes the messy process of reaching scientific consensus, as well as turning a fallible individual into a single point of failure for important ideas like “stay at home during a pandemic,” a message that epidemiologists—not only Ferguson—overwhelmingly agree on.
Being the center of a story, brushing off scandals, and selling newspapers are important ecological niches for politicians, and they thrive in them. Experts on the other hand thrive in their own fields, and there’s no reason to expect them to be media personalities as well.
Dunning put it this way: “Often, being competent at a task is knowing what the task is. Part of the reason that people may be incompetent is that they don’t know exactly what tasks they’re engaged in or they haven’t recognized a different task that matters, too.”
As the media thrusts policy experts onto the front pages of newspapers, they have to face a new reality: However expert they might think they are, when it comes to public relations and politics, they’re amateurs, and they need to play it as safe as possible.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-12--State Department Parts Ways With White House Optimism Over Reopening

As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown , his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach , even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips .
The State Department this month rolled out a phased plan to bring diplomats back to work , dubbed “ Diplomacy Strong , ” which has built-in plans for potential second waves of the coronavirus outbreak in the United States and posts around the world , according to interviews with officials and documents obtained by Foreign Policy .
In recent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various State Department bureaus on the plan to incrementally bring officials back to work while cautioning that the process could drag on for months—even in the United States—and even reverse if infections spike again .
The plan highlights how federal agencies are much less sanguine about bringing employees back to work than the president himself , who has pushed states and businesses to reopen to quickly reverse a sharp recession fueled by the coronavirus lockdown .
“ I want our country open , ” Trump said at a news conference on Monday afternoon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but I want it open.
” Some State employees feel that while Pompeo has been leading the administration ’ s diplomatic offensive on China , he has been virtually silent on internal communications to lead the diplomatic corps through the crisis .
Most internal management for the crisis has come from Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao , officials say .
Some current and former officials also knocked Pompeo for pushing international travel before the heightened pandemic risk had subsided .
Pompeo on Tuesday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz , the speaker of the Knesset , as Israel eyes plans to potentially annex parts of the West Bank .
“ Pompeo is personally pushing people to get back to work .
The secretary ’ s trip to Israel reflects the brazen disregard for the health of his team , ” said Brett Bruen , the head of the consulting firm Global Situation Room and a former career U.S. diplomat .
“ There ’ s just no need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s a case of swagger over safety.
” The pandemic has forced the State Department ’ s notoriously sclerotic bureaucracy to swiftly adapt to a new era of lockdowns .
After a very rocky start , the department had to scramble to help repatriate tens of thousands of Americans abroad , and leaders had to rapidly shift diplomats to work from home—a situation that is anathema to the tradecraft of diplomacy , which is reliant on face-to-face meetings and secret government communication channels that can ’ t be accessed from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity said they were wary of returning to the office prematurely but praised the department for issuing a plan that allows flexibility for those based in Washington and abroad .
“ There ’ s an awareness that the White House would like to move toward reopening , but I think , with the guidance that ’ s been issued , the plan is pretty clear that it has to be based on local conditions , ” said one senior U.S. diplomat , speaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local conditions [ in Washington ] would not warrant by any means bringing more people back in now.
” The State Department has also taken actions to correct controversial missteps in the early phase of the crisis .
The department now has a small fleet of around half a dozen planes prepositioned around the world on standby in case U.S. officials posted abroad need medical evacuations , according to one senior diplomat , speaking on condition of anonymity .
Following backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats , the department has also agreed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomats for training later this month , according to two officials .
The new class of foreign service officers were initially told in late March that their onboarding was indefinitely postponed without access to benefits or pay , until backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats prompted the State Department to change course .
Others say diplomacy—including Pompeo ’ s routine trips abroad—needs to get back on track despite the risk from the virus .
The State Department insists the secretary ’ s trip to Israel , which came at the request of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the proper precautions in place .
“ This is a tightly controlled movement in a highly screened environment that we feel is very , very safe , ” William Walters , a top medical official at the State Department , told reporters in a briefing last week .
The State Department did not respond to requests for comment .
The department ’ s overall plan to return diplomats to the field , obtained by Foreign Policy , makes clear that there ’ s no across-the-board timeline for reopening U.S. embassies and consulates abroad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work routine depends on the individual country .
Axios and other media outlets first reported on the plan .
It divides recovery into four incremental phases—Phase 0 , 1 , 2 , and 3—of bringing officials back to work , based on two-week blocks of monitoring downward trends in infection rates .
If infection rates spike , the State Department will have its employees return to a previous phase , where fewer workers will come into the office and those who come in will adhere to stricter social distancing and hygiene measures .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for quite a while .
We could sit in Phase 1 for quite a while .
If the situation gets worse , if we have any kind of second bounce or peak on this , we could go from Phase 2 to Phase 1 , we could go from Phase 1 to Phase 0 , ” one State Department official said in a conference call briefing to others this month , according to an account of the briefing from employees on the call provided to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all.
” The official also said the State Department was waiting to see how other federal agencies would handle their reopening first .
“ We are not looking to be the absolute first movers in coming back to work .
We are looking to learn the lessons from other departments , other agencies , and move back when it ’ s more safe to do so , ” the official said , according to the account .

As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown, his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach, even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips.
As President Donald Trump pushes to reopen U.S. businesses and reverse a lingering pandemic lockdown, his own State Department is taking a much more cautious approach, even as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo moves to restart international trips.
The State Department this month rolled out a phased plan to bring diplomats back to work, dubbed “Diplomacy Strong,” which has built-in plans for potential second waves of the coronavirus outbreak in the United States and posts around the world, according to interviews with officials and documents obtained by Foreign Policy.
In recent weeks, senior U.S. officials have briefed various State Department bureaus on the plan to incrementally bring officials back to work while cautioning that the process could drag on for months—even in the United States—and even reverse if infections spike again.
The plan highlights how federal agencies are much less sanguine about bringing employees back to work than the president himself, who has pushed states and businesses to reopen to quickly reverse a sharp recession fueled by the coronavirus lockdown. “I want our country open,” Trump said at a news conference on Monday afternoon. “I want it open safely, but I want it open.”
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A State Department spokeswoman, however, insisted there was no daylight between the White House and State Department. “Diplomacy Strong aligns with [Centers for Disease Control] and White House guidelines, allows for flexibility to adjust among the phases, accounts for different environments, and easily incorporates updated information as it becomes available,” the spokeswoman said.
Some State employees feel that while Pompeo has been leading the administration’s diplomatic offensive on China, he has been virtually silent on internal communications to lead the diplomatic corps through the crisis. Most internal management for the crisis has come from Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun and Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao, officials say.
Some current and former officials also knocked Pompeo for pushing international travel before the heightened pandemic risk had subsided. Pompeo on Tuesday departed for a short trip to Israel to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz, the speaker of the Knesset, as Israel eyes plans to potentially annex parts of the West Bank.
“Pompeo is personally pushing people to get back to work. The secretary’s trip to Israel reflects the brazen disregard for the health of his team,” said Brett Bruen, the head of the consulting firm Global Situation Room and a former career U.S. diplomat. “There’s just no need to get on a plane at this point. It’s a case of swagger over safety.”
The pandemic has forced the State Department’s notoriously sclerotic bureaucracy to swiftly adapt to a new era of lockdowns. After a very rocky start, the department had to scramble to help repatriate tens of thousands of Americans abroad, and leaders had to rapidly shift diplomats to work from home—a situation that is anathema to the tradecraft of diplomacy, which is reliant on face-to-face meetings and secret government communication channels that can’t be accessed from insecure houses and apartments.
Six State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity said they were wary of returning to the office prematurely but praised the department for issuing a plan that allows flexibility for those based in Washington and abroad.
“There’s an awareness that the White House would like to move toward reopening, but I think, with the guidance that’s been issued, the plan is pretty clear that it has to be based on local conditions,” said one senior U.S. diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. “And local conditions [in Washington] would not warrant by any means bringing more people back in now.”
The State Department has also taken actions to correct controversial missteps in the early phase of the crisis. The department now has a small fleet of around half a dozen planes prepositioned around the world on standby in case U.S. officials posted abroad need medical evacuations, according to one senior diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. Following backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats, the department has also agreed to virtually bring onboard a new class of diplomats for training later this month, according to two officials. The new class of foreign service officers were initially told in late March that their onboarding was indefinitely postponed without access to benefits or pay, until backlash from lawmakers and former diplomats prompted the State Department to change course.
Others say diplomacy—including Pompeo’s routine trips abroad—needs to get back on track despite the risk from the virus. The State Department insists the secretary’s trip to Israel, which came at the request of the Israeli government, was planned with all the proper precautions in place. “This is a tightly controlled movement in a highly screened environment that we feel is very, very safe,” William Walters, a top medical official at the State Department, told reporters in a briefing last week.
The department’s overall plan to return diplomats to the field, obtained by Foreign Policy, makes clear that there’s no across-the-board timeline for reopening U.S. embassies and consulates abroad and that going back to a normal work routine depends on the individual country. Axios and other media outlets first reported on the plan. It divides recovery into four incremental phases—Phase 0, 1, 2, and 3—of bringing officials back to work, based on two-week blocks of monitoring downward trends in infection rates. If infection rates spike, the State Department will have its employees return to a previous phase, where fewer workers will come into the office and those who come in will adhere to stricter social distancing and hygiene measures.
“This guidance provides senior leaders at domestic offices and overseas posts the framework they need to prioritize the health and safety of our workforce, mitigate risks, and continue to achieve our diplomatic mission,” the State Department spokeswoman said.
Read the full plan here:
“We could sit in Phase 2 for quite a while. We could sit in Phase 1 for quite a while. If the situation gets worse, if we have any kind of second bounce or peak on this, we could go from Phase 2 to Phase 1, we could go from Phase 1 to Phase 0,” one State Department official said in a conference call briefing to others this month, according to an account of the briefing from employees on the call provided to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity. “This is not a linear progression at all.”
The official also said the State Department was waiting to see how other federal agencies would handle their reopening first. “We are not looking to be the absolute first movers in coming back to work. We are looking to learn the lessons from other departments, other agencies, and move back when it’s more safe to do so,” the official said, according to the account.
Update, May 13, 2020: This article was updated with comments from a State Department spokeswoman.