foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--Lebanon’s Ruined Port Is a Nightmare to Rebuild

When the dust settled , the crater was obvious .
Where previously a warehouse stood on a dock jutting into the water , there remained ruin , debris , water , and contaminated grain .
The Beirut port explosion of Aug. 4 has already claimed more than 200 lives , injured thousands , damaged thousands of buildings , and , after protests , prompted the resignation of Lebanon ’ s government .
What comes next hinges mostly on logistics—and on the ability of an already overstretched country to repair a critical part of its infrastructure .
The Beirut explosion not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to receive cargo , but also caused significant damage to the Beirut Port Silos , which have a total grain storage capacity of 120,000 metric tons ( 132,000 tons ) , though they reportedly only held 15,000 metric tons at the time of the blast .
Local news reported that the blast also damaged two ships unloading grain at the time of the explosion and hurt a local flour mill .
Compared to the port , though , that damage is minor .
Beirut ’ s port is responsible for 85 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while parts of the port may be operational by the end of the month , ensuring the steady supply of aid to the country means leaning on other channels for transport .
The most immediate of those other channels is the port of Tripoli , 43 miles up the coast as the crow flies .
Tripoli has limitations : It ’ s a smaller port with a shallower draft , but those can mostly be accounted for and planned around .
More important , as supplies that once flowed through Beirut are routed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and accommodate the new strain placed upon these routes .
“ It ’ s not about the workaround on the port .
It ’ s about bottleneck prevention on the sudden surge , ” said Nathaniel Raymond , a lecturer at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University .
“ It ’ s logistics management capability , in the customs capability of the home government.
” That ’ s tricky given the general lack of state capacity in Lebanon right now—a crisis reflected in the conditions that created the blast itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a carefully articulated political balance hinged on the country ’ s last official census , which was taken in 1932 , when Lebanon was still governed under French mandate .
Power-sharing agreements worked out since then maintain certain positions as fixed for particular ethnoreligious groups—the prime minister is always a Sunni Muslim , the president always a Maronite Christian—but are increasingly detached from the present demographics of the country .
Instead , they have created durable and mutually beneficial systems of state plunder and customs evasion , with income that could go toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ siphoned off by internal factions to support their own power structures .
Customs is the intermediary between goods delivered to the country and the local government , which signs off on the approval of those goods for distribution internally .
That makes it a prime focus for graft and negligence—and makes the business of reestablishing the port all the trickier , as the public demands a clean hand while politicians hand out new positions as plums to political supporters .
Complicating matters even further is Lebanon ’ s neighbor , Israel .
Just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ port of Haifa in Israel .
“ Haifa is the biggest port in the region .
Is Israel going to open the blue line ?
That ’ s a United Nations patrolled border , but there ’ s only one checkpoint between Haifa and Beirut , ” said Raymond .
“ So the question is , we want to use Haifa over Tripoli , but what ’ s basically the cost benefit analysis on the bureaucracy and getting across that checkpoint.
” Complicating matters even further is Lebanon ’ s neighbor , Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Israel ’ s present government , to say nothing of the long-standing tensions and history of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon , make resupply through Haifa a politically difficult proposition .
If it is to be managed , it will likely come under the auspices of the United Nations .
The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon has been present since 1978 , and part of its continuing mandate is to assure humanitarian assistance makes it to civilians .
By Aug. 6 , Beirut ’ s airport had already received @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Central Command announcing that a C-17 Globemaster had delivered 11 pallets of food , water , and medical supplies .
Air routes can supplement delivery by sea , especially if continuously maintained , but can not accommodate anything near the same volume at the same cost .
Beirut ’ s airport is also a microcosm of the multifaceted security situation in Lebanon , with different parts of airport security linked to different political camps in the country “ Lebanon was already facing a humanitarian crisis , ” said Bujar Hoxha , country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Lebanon since 2006 , and increased work in the country after the start of the civil war in neighboring Syria .
“ So add to that Syrian refugee crisis .
Add to that COVID-19 .
We had a triple crisis going on in Lebanon .
And then we ask , can it get worse ?
Yes , it can .
The explosion occurred.
” Managing those overlapping humanitarian crises before the explosion meant managing the provision of housing , food , and medical aid .
Approaches that worked before the pandemic shifted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to distance work by telecommunications , which required a lot of change in practice to meet the same needs .
And meeting housing needs , already a crisis , was hard when many of the most vulnerable were already living in cramped conditions and food-insecure .
“ What often can be really bad especially in a rapid onset like this is people start sending stuff , ” said Raymond .
“ The last thing that ’ s needed here is stuff unless , we ’ re talking about direct specific requests for things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hospitals , etc.
” Getting cash to the organizations distributing help on the ground is commonly recognized as the most effective way for people outside the country to help , but there are going to be some particular hurdles in how that money for aid gets distributed .
“ The OFAC questions are going to be massive , ” said Raymond , specifically highlighting how U.S. sanctions restrictions , run through the Office of Foreign Assets Control , pose a challenge to any aid that might end up distributed through Hezbollah , one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics .
The Treasury Department currently sanctions a number of specific Hezbollah members and the organization as a whole , as well as maintaining the option of secondary sanctions for any person or group that does transactions with Hezbollah .
“ You ’ re gon na have different types of assistance in different pools of money coming in , ” said Raymond .
“ And we ’ ve got to make sure that there ’ s no hang up on being able to move cash quickly when one of the biggest factors in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At the best of times , managing the governance issues around aid and existing legal and physical barriers is tricky , even assuming all parties are doing so in good faith .
Managing an influx of cash for aid into this will fall on an economy that was already struggling , and on a political dynamic about to be shaken up even further by the verdict in the case of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri ’ s 2005 assassination , of which Hezbollah agents are accused .
“ The people in Lebanon are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trauma as we speak now .
It ’ s much greater after the explosion , but it was vulnerable to economic crises , ” said Hoxha .
“ The purchasing power faded rapidly over the past five months .
Half a million jobs have been lost over the past five months .
50 % live below the poverty line , this is without having exposure.
” Purchasing power is a metric not just of money on hand , but of how far that money can go relative to the prices of local goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ directly affect aid that is donated , it does make it harder for people to buy goods transported in for purchase , especially when those goods are flown in instead of delivered by sea .
That is all exacerbated by what risks becoming further COVID-19 outbreaks stemming from immediate recovery efforts after the blast .
“ It ’ s a bad day on the high seas , ” said Raymond , referencing the Brandon Bird painting Bad Day on the High Sea .
“ It is a giant squid .
It is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And right now , this is a giant explosion .
What this really is , is a logistical riddle wrapped in a political nightmare.
” Untangling that logistical puzzle , and the politics around it , will be the work of Lebanon ’ s strong civil society .
“ If you look at the post explosion effect , ” said Hoxha , “ you see that the most proactive initiatives have been taken by citizens themselves by community based organizations , grassroot organizations , local NGOs , and as CARE we have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organizations have shown that they are quite vibrant and they have very solid leadership.
” As nations seek to respond to the aftermath of the explosion in the coming weeks and months , if they choose to work with those directly on the ground , who already have experience in aid distribution , it should help overcome many of the hurdles that naturally come from a multinational response in a country as carefully structured as Lebanon .
If disaster awaits , it will come in the form of introduced friction , exploitation that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the expenses of others .
Or it will come from seeing the explosion as a wholly standalone crisis , and not one in a series of hardships that are interlinked and must be managed together .

When the dust settled, the crater was obvious. Where previously a warehouse stood on a dock jutting into the water, there remained ruin, debris, water, and contaminated grain. The Beirut port explosion of Aug. 4 has already claimed more than 200 lives, injured thousands, damaged thousands of buildings, and, after protests, prompted the resignation of Lebanon’s government.
When the dust settled, the crater was obvious. Where previously a warehouse stood on a dock jutting into the water, there remained ruin, debris, water, and contaminated grain. The Beirut port explosion of Aug. 4 has already claimed more than 200 lives, injured thousands, damaged thousands of buildings, and, after protests, prompted the resignation of Lebanon’s government.
What comes next hinges mostly on logistics—and on the ability of an already overstretched country to repair a critical part of its infrastructure.
The Beirut explosion not only crippled the port’s ability to receive cargo, but also caused significant damage to the Beirut Port Silos, which have a total grain storage capacity of 120,000 metric tons (132,000 tons), though they reportedly only held 15,000 metric tons at the time of the blast. Local news reported that the blast also damaged two ships unloading grain at the time of the explosion and hurt a local flour mill. Compared to the port, though, that damage is minor. Beirut’s port is responsible for 85 percent of the country’s grain, and while parts of the port may be operational by the end of the month, ensuring the steady supply of aid to the country means leaning on other channels for transport.
The most immediate of those other channels is the port of Tripoli, 43 miles up the coast as the crow flies. Tripoli has limitations: It’s a smaller port with a shallower draft, but those can mostly be accounted for and planned around. More important, as supplies that once flowed through Beirut are routed from other locations, is to manage and accommodate the new strain placed upon these routes.
“It’s not about the workaround on the port. It’s about bottleneck prevention on the sudden surge,” said Nathaniel Raymond, a lecturer at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University. “It’s logistics management capability, in the customs capability of the home government.”
That’s tricky given the general lack of state capacity in Lebanon right now—a crisis reflected in the conditions that created the blast itself. Lebanon’s present politics reflect a carefully articulated political balance hinged on the country’s last official census, which was taken in 1932, when Lebanon was still governed under French mandate. Power-sharing agreements worked out since then maintain certain positions as fixed for particular ethnoreligious groups—the prime minister is always a Sunni Muslim, the president always a Maronite Christian—but are increasingly detached from the present demographics of the country. Instead, they have created durable and mutually beneficial systems of state plunder and customs evasion, with income that could go toward building the state’s capacities instead siphoned off by internal factions to support their own power structures.
Customs is the intermediary between goods delivered to the country and the local government, which signs off on the approval of those goods for distribution internally. That makes it a prime focus for graft and negligence—and makes the business of reestablishing the port all the trickier, as the public demands a clean hand while politicians hand out new positions as plums to political supporters.
A Devastated Port
Complicating matters even further is Lebanon’s neighbor, Israel. Just 80 miles south of Beirut is the port of Haifa in Israel.
“Haifa is the biggest port in the region. Is Israel going to open the blue line? That’s a United Nations patrolled border, but there’s only one checkpoint between Haifa and Beirut,” said Raymond. “So the question is, we want to use Haifa over Tripoli, but what’s basically the cost benefit analysis on the bureaucracy and getting across that checkpoint.”
Complicating matters even further is Lebanon’s neighbor, Israel.
The U.N. checkpoint and the posture of Israel’s present government, to say nothing of the long-standing tensions and history of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, make resupply through Haifa a politically difficult proposition. If it is to be managed, it will likely come under the auspices of the United Nations. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon has been present since 1978, and part of its continuing mandate is to assure humanitarian assistance makes it to civilians.
By Aug. 6, Beirut’s airport had already received aid from the United States, with U.S. Central Command announcing that a C-17 Globemaster had delivered 11 pallets of food, water, and medical supplies. Air routes can supplement delivery by sea, especially if continuously maintained, but cannot accommodate anything near the same volume at the same cost. Beirut’s airport is also a microcosm of the multifaceted security situation in Lebanon, with different parts of airport security linked to different political camps in the country
“Lebanon was already facing a humanitarian crisis,” said Bujar Hoxha, country director for CARE. CARE has been in Lebanon since 2006, and increased work in the country after the start of the civil war in neighboring Syria. “So add to that Syrian refugee crisis. Add to that COVID-19. We had a triple crisis going on in Lebanon. And then we ask, can it get worse? Yes, it can. The explosion occurred.”
Managing those overlapping humanitarian crises before the explosion meant managing the provision of housing, food, and medical aid. Approaches that worked before the pandemic shifted as organizations moved away from in-person contact to distance work by telecommunications, which required a lot of change in practice to meet the same needs. And meeting housing needs, already a crisis, was hard when many of the most vulnerable were already living in cramped conditions and food-insecure.
“What often can be really bad especially in a rapid onset like this is people start sending stuff,” said Raymond. “The last thing that’s needed here is stuff unless, we’re talking about direct specific requests for things like plasma, like mobile stand up hospitals, etc.”
Getting cash to the organizations distributing help on the ground is commonly recognized as the most effective way for people outside the country to help, but there are going to be some particular hurdles in how that money for aid gets distributed.
“The OFAC questions are going to be massive,” said Raymond, specifically highlighting how U.S. sanctions restrictions, run through the Office of Foreign Assets Control, pose a challenge to any aid that might end up distributed through Hezbollah, one of the most powerful factions in Lebanese politics. The Treasury Department currently sanctions a number of specific Hezbollah members and the organization as a whole, as well as maintaining the option of secondary sanctions for any person or group that does transactions with Hezbollah.
“You’re gonna have different types of assistance in different pools of money coming in,” said Raymond. “And we’ve got to make sure that there’s no hang up on being able to move cash quickly when one of the biggest factors in this is going to be Hezbollah.”
At the best of times, managing the governance issues around aid and existing legal and physical barriers is tricky, even assuming all parties are doing so in good faith. Managing an influx of cash for aid into this will fall on an economy that was already struggling, and on a political dynamic about to be shaken up even further by the verdict in the case of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s 2005 assassination, of which Hezbollah agents are accused.
“The people in Lebanon are living in a state of shock and trauma as we speak now. It’s much greater after the explosion, but it was vulnerable to economic crises,” said Hoxha. “The purchasing power faded rapidly over the past five months. Half a million jobs have been lost over the past five months. 50% live below the poverty line, this is without having exposure.”
Purchasing power is a metric not just of money on hand, but of how far that money can go relative to the prices of local goods. While purchasing power doesn’t directly affect aid that is donated, it does make it harder for people to buy goods transported in for purchase, especially when those goods are flown in instead of delivered by sea. That is all exacerbated by what risks becoming further COVID-19 outbreaks stemming from immediate recovery efforts after the blast.
“It’s a bad day on the high seas,” said Raymond, referencing the Brandon Bird painting Bad Day on the High Sea. “It is a giant squid. It is a whale. It is a Tyrannosaurus Rex. And right now, this is a giant explosion. What this really is, is a logistical riddle wrapped in a political nightmare.”
Untangling that logistical puzzle, and the politics around it, will be the work of Lebanon’s strong civil society.
“If you look at the post explosion effect,” said Hoxha, “you see that the most proactive initiatives have been taken by citizens themselves by community based organizations, grassroot organizations, local NGOs, and as CARE we have rapidly responded to that. Civil society organizations have shown that they are quite vibrant and they have very solid leadership.”
As nations seek to respond to the aftermath of the explosion in the coming weeks and months, if they choose to work with those directly on the ground, who already have experience in aid distribution, it should help overcome many of the hurdles that naturally come from a multinational response in a country as carefully structured as Lebanon.
If disaster awaits, it will come in the form of introduced friction, exploitation that seeks to magnify some internal forces at the expenses of others. Or it will come from seeing the explosion as a wholly standalone crisis, and not one in a series of hardships that are interlinked and must be managed together.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--Could Libya Be Partitioned?

Could Libya Be Partitioned?

Libyan National Army ( LNA ) leader Khalifa Haftar ’ s 14-month offensive to capture the Libyan capital of Tripoli and unseat the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA ) failed in June , and his forces lost territory that had taken him over six years to seize .
His defeat began when Russian mercenaries backing the LNA were seen abandoning the front lines , before Haftar ’ s entire rear line stretching from Tripoli to the city of Sirte suddenly collapsed .
Faced with outright military defeat , wavering international backers , and a political process in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s seat , Haftar ’ s future—and the future of Libya as a unified state—is now in serious doubt .
As Haftar began losing ground , his political behavior looked increasingly desperate , and his focus turned to his own political survival and relevance .
In a matter of weeks , Haftar staged a failed military coup over his political allies in eastern Libya and promised to launch the largest air campaign in Libyan history against the GNA , before abruptly backtracking and announcing his desire for a new , inclusive peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Behind Haftar ’ s erratic actions is a combination of international and local factors that have exposed his weakness and which could ultimately spell his demise .
For Haftar , the Tripoli campaign was supposed to be a swift ground operation to overthrow a weakened GNA that would end with him as Libya ’ s de facto leader.As Haftar began losing ground , his political behavior looked increasingly desperate .
Instead , it dragged on for over 14 months , during which time the GNA ’ s position strengthened as it received @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became incredibly costly for Haftar ’ s military sponsors , who supplied thousands of tons of weapons , air defenses , and airstrikes without being able to gain ground .
The consequent total loss of military support from the United Arab Emirates and Russia swiftly ended his Tripoli adventure but also caused him to panic and turn against elected political allies in his own stronghold out of fear that they could sideline him in future negotiations with the GNA .
The loss of international support also exposed the fragmented nature of the LNA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ army , and he doesn ’ t even trust the troops he controls enough to ask them to fight on his behalf .
The LNA was initially established in 2014 using mostly tribal armed groups and separatists who were focused more on carving out local power—making it incredibly difficult for Haftar to exert his authority over them .
This stands in sharp contrast to his claim that he had spent years building a national professional army that could be mobilized and deployed across the country at will , which the progress of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farce .
By the end of the campaign , only Russian and Syrian mercenaries were found fighting on the front lines , and the bulk of Haftar ’ s forces had either disappeared or were still squabbling with each other in eastern Libya .
Even in the eastern part of the country ( which is considered his stronghold ) , Haftar ’ s control is very fragile .
Elements of the LNA have already tried to overthrow him , and he previously arrested key commanders , had important tribal figures assassinated , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to weed out disloyal commanders .
This basic lack of trust between Haftar and his army and his inability to conquer Tripoli with them convinced his international backers that their interests lay elsewhere .
Despite the waning influence of Haftar , neither the UAE , Russia , nor Egypt have abandoned their interests in Libya .
After withdrawing from Tripoli , Russian mercenaries took control of Libya ’ s oil fields to block the GNA from resuming energy exports , and Moscow deployed 16 jets from Syria to an air base it now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has used its covert air base in eastern Libya to launch drone strikes against the GNA ’ s forces advancing on Sirte , drawing a line in the sand to prevent further territorial losses .
And Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ’ s latest threat to deploy Egyptian ground forces into Libyan territory is perhaps the clearest sign that Haftar ’ s allies no longer trust him to lead military operations .
Sisi even hosted Libyan tribesmen in Cairo to give political cover to that decision .
All three military powers have shown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alone , without Haftar.It appears that the best option for Haftar ’ s erstwhile backers is to partition the country .
Despite their efforts , however , the situation on the ground remains deadlocked .
Washington has taken steps this week to de-escalate the situation and push for a start to negotiations , which could be the final nail in the coffin for Haftar as a dominant force in Libyan politics .
The GNA and Turkey have already refused to negotiate with Haftar , and now that he has lost all credibility , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be forced to back an alternative figure to represent the LNA in talks , such as Haftar ’ s political and tribal ally Aguila Saleh , the chief of Libya ’ s parliament who is close to the eastern tribal groups within the LNA .
But there are still no clear candidates for a replacement .
Reports that Haftar is secretly depositing gold to the UAE and Switzerland out of concern that he will be sanctioned could suggest he has accepted this eventuality .
With Haftar gone and the military deadlock unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best option for his erstwhile backers is to partition the country .
The tribal and militia groups that form the substructure of the LNA already declared self-rule in 2013 , so there is certainly an appetite for partition on the ground .
Since the United Nations established the GNA in 2016 , eastern Libya has crept toward autonomy through the use of a parallel central bank that uses counterfeit Russian-printed currency , the creation of its own government , and even the formation of separate diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Haftar ’ s former backers in the UAE have a track record of supporting separatist groups , namely in Yemen , so that option will certainly be at the forefront of Emirati policymakers ’ minds .
Haftar ’ s defeat in Tripoli will open a new round of political uncertainty in Libya , and the goal posts appear to have shifted markedly .
Egypt , Russia , and the UAE are committed to retaining their foothold in the country , but their loss of confidence in Haftar means they have little hope @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
Peace talks await , but expect Haftar ’ s former allies to cut their losses and work toward partitioning off eastern Libya .

Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar’s 14-month offensive to capture the Libyan capital of Tripoli and unseat the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) failed in June, and his forces lost territory that had taken him over six years to seize. His defeat began when Russian mercenaries backing the LNA were seen abandoning the front lines, before Haftar’s entire rear line stretching from Tripoli to the city of Sirte suddenly collapsed. Faced with outright military defeat, wavering international backers, and a political process in which he is no longer in the driver’s seat, Haftar’s future—and the future of Libya as a unified state—is now in serious doubt.
Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar’s 14-month offensive to capture the Libyan capital of Tripoli and unseat the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) failed in June, and his forces lost territory that had taken him over six years to seize. His defeat began when Russian mercenaries backing the LNA were seen abandoning the front lines, before Haftar’s entire rear line stretching from Tripoli to the city of Sirte suddenly collapsed. Faced with outright military defeat, wavering international backers, and a political process in which he is no longer in the driver’s seat, Haftar’s future—and the future of Libya as a unified state—is now in serious doubt.
As Haftar began losing ground, his political behavior looked increasingly desperate, and his focus turned to his own political survival and relevance. In a matter of weeks, Haftar staged a failed military coup over his political allies in eastern Libya and promised to launch the largest air campaign in Libyan history against the GNA, before abruptly backtracking and announcing his desire for a new, inclusive peace process and a return to political talks.
Behind Haftar’s erratic actions is a combination of international and local factors that have exposed his weakness and which could ultimately spell his demise. For Haftar, the Tripoli campaign was supposed to be a swift ground operation to overthrow a weakened GNA that would end with him as Libya’s de facto leader.As Haftar began losing ground, his political behavior looked increasingly desperate.
Instead, it dragged on for over 14 months, during which time the GNA’s position strengthened as it received military support from Turkey. The operation became incredibly costly for Haftar’s military sponsors, who supplied thousands of tons of weapons, air defenses, and airstrikes without being able to gain ground. The consequent total loss of military support from the United Arab Emirates and Russia swiftly ended his Tripoli adventure but also caused him to panic and turn against elected political allies in his own stronghold out of fear that they could sideline him in future negotiations with the GNA.
The loss of international support also exposed the fragmented nature of the LNA. Haftar never actually commanded a proper army, and he doesn’t even trust the troops he controls enough to ask them to fight on his behalf. The LNA was initially established in 2014 using mostly tribal armed groups and separatists who were focused more on carving out local power—making it incredibly difficult for Haftar to exert his authority over them. This stands in sharp contrast to his claim that he had spent years building a national professional army that could be mobilized and deployed across the country at will, which the progress of the Tripoli campaign ultimately revealed to be a farce. By the end of the campaign, only Russian and Syrian mercenaries were found fighting on the front lines, and the bulk of Haftar’s forces had either disappeared or were still squabbling with each other in eastern Libya.
Even in the eastern part of the country (which is considered his stronghold), Haftar’s control is very fragile. Elements of the LNA have already tried to overthrow him, and he previously arrested key commanders, had important tribal figures assassinated, and even faked his own death in 2018 to weed out disloyal commanders. This basic lack of trust between Haftar and his army and his inability to conquer Tripoli with them convinced his international backers that their interests lay elsewhere.
Despite the waning influence of Haftar, neither the UAE, Russia, nor Egypt have abandoned their interests in Libya. After withdrawing from Tripoli, Russian mercenaries took control of Libya’s oil fields to block the GNA from resuming energy exports, and Moscow deployed 16 jets from Syria to an air base it now controls near Sirte. The UAE also has used its covert air base in eastern Libya to launch drone strikes against the GNA’s forces advancing on Sirte, drawing a line in the sand to prevent further territorial losses. And Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s latest threat to deploy Egyptian ground forces into Libyan territory is perhaps the clearest sign that Haftar’s allies no longer trust him to lead military operations. Sisi even hosted Libyan tribesmen in Cairo to give political cover to that decision. All three military powers have shown they are prepared to go at it alone, without Haftar.It appears that the best option for Haftar’s erstwhile backers is to partition the country.
Despite their efforts, however, the situation on the ground remains deadlocked. Washington has taken steps this week to de-escalate the situation and push for a start to negotiations, which could be the final nail in the coffin for Haftar as a dominant force in Libyan politics. The GNA and Turkey have already refused to negotiate with Haftar, and now that he has lost all credibility, the UAE, Egypt, and Russia may be forced to back an alternative figure to represent the LNA in talks, such as Haftar’s political and tribal ally Aguila Saleh, the chief of Libya’s parliament who is close to the eastern tribal groups within the LNA. But there are still no clear candidates for a replacement. Reports that Haftar is secretly depositing gold to the UAE and Switzerland out of concern that he will be sanctioned could suggest he has accepted this eventuality.
With Haftar gone and the military deadlock unlikely to be broken, it appears that the best option for his erstwhile backers is to partition the country. The tribal and militia groups that form the substructure of the LNA already declared self-rule in 2013, so there is certainly an appetite for partition on the ground.
Since the United Nations established the GNA in 2016, eastern Libya has crept toward autonomy through the use of a parallel central bank that uses counterfeit Russian-printed currency, the creation of its own government, and even the formation of separate diplomatic relations with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. More than that, Haftar’s former backers in the UAE have a track record of supporting separatist groups, namely in Yemen, so that option will certainly be at the forefront of Emirati policymakers’ minds.
Haftar’s defeat in Tripoli will open a new round of political uncertainty in Libya, and the goal posts appear to have shifted markedly. Egypt, Russia, and the UAE are committed to retaining their foothold in the country, but their loss of confidence in Haftar means they have little hope of extending their influence over the entire country. Peace talks await, but expect Haftar’s former allies to cut their losses and work toward partitioning off eastern Libya.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--After Another Mining Disaster, Ethnic Minorities Lose Patience With Myanmar’s Leadership

YANGON , Myanmar—On July 2 , a landslide in the jade mines of the Hpakant region in Myanmar ’ s Kachin state claimed around 200 lives .
Myanmar is the world ’ s largest single source of jade , most of which comes from Hpakant , and its extraction comes at a high human cost .
While the July 2 disaster was the deadliest on record , fatal incidents occur annually .
Each one brings renewed calls from rights groups and transparency advocates to reform Myanmar ’ s jade industry , which is dominated by powerful military generals , military-linked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is plagued by scant regulation .
Shortly after the National League for Democracy ( NLD ) —the party of Aung San Suu Kyi , now the country ’ s civilian leader—won national elections in November 2015 , it pledged to tighten its enforcement of safety regulations in the industry .
For many , the latest disaster is a symptom of the government ’ s empty promises and failed accountability .
The landslide in Hpakant compounds a growing list of affronts for the Kachin ethnic group during the NLD ’ s term , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under total military rule .
Policies that place land and resource management in the hands of the central government have long disenfranchised ethnic minorities , contributing to decades of civil war in Myanmar ’ s borderlands .
During its 2015 election campaign , the NLD vowed to work toward peace between Myanmar ’ s ethnic armed organizations , including the Kachin Independence Organization ( KIO ) , and the Myanmar military , known as the Tatmadaw .
The KIO is one of numerous ethnic armed organizations that has sought political autonomy in Myanmar—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources—since the country gained independence from Britain in 1948 .
More than 100,000 Kachin have been displaced by conflict since a 17-year cease-fire collapsed in 2011 .
When the NLD came to power , many Kachin and other ethnic minorities were optimistic that steps toward decentralization would follow and that ethnic minorities would gain a greater voice in decisions affecting them , including more equitable access to resource wealth in their states .
But the NLD is nearing the end of its term , with general elections on Nov. 8 , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resource management .
Meanwhile , fighting has intensified on multiple fronts .
With disillusionment mounting among ethnic minorities , the NLD faces an uphill battle to repeat its resounding 2015 victory in Myanmar ’ s seven ethnic minority states .
“ The NLD failed us miserably , ” San Htoi , the joint general secretary of the Kachin Women ’ s Association Thailand , told Foreign Policy , referring to the lack of progress on ethnic representation and human rights .
“ We have seen enough.
” For many Kachin , the jade-mining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reminder of the NLD ’ s lack of serious action on long-overdue reforms , adding to existing feelings of disenchantment with the party .
“ We don ’ t think the [ current ] government will listen to us or take serious action even if we give recommendations ” regarding jade-mining reform , said Htingnan Ja Naw , the joint deputy secretary of the Kachin National Social and Development Foundation in Hpakant .
“ We will only vote for a government that can protect and serve the lives , well-being , livelihoods , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Estimates for the value of Kachin ’ s jade industry vary widely .
In 2014 , when low production rates and rising prices of jade exports contributed to a peak year for the industry , Global Witness estimates that profits were worth over $ 30 billion , while Open Data : Myanmar Jade calculated the value at closer to $ 6 billion .
Most of Kachin ’ s jade is sold illicitly to China , and the value of legal sales is often underreported to minimize tax obligations .
Little of that revenue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitution mandates that the central government holds claim to the country ’ s land and natural resources , and maintains the authority to decide how revenue will be collected and disbursed .
Military-run conglomerates claim some of the largest concessions .
The state-owned Myanmar Gems Enterprise is both an active player in the industry and tied to licensing , regulating , and collecting tax revenues on jade mining .
Myanmar signed onto a global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2014 , but watchdog groups have voiced concerns with the pace of progress under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information on the beneficial ownership of registered extractive corporations in December 2019 , but it has struggled to enforce company compliance with data disclosure .
A Gemstone Law passed in 2019 did not mandate a vetting process to exclude companies guilty of environmental damage , human rights abuses , or illegal activities .
While those at the top of Kachin ’ s jade industry profit enormously , most of the landslide victims are among approximately 300,000 unlicensed freelance miners sifting through piles of discarded material , known as tailings , and searching for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of resounding calls for reform , the government ’ s response to the July 2 landslide has again drawn criticism , in part because its investigation committee included one appointee who is a direct shareholder in the industry through a military conglomerate .
Although the government offered compensation to victims ’ families , it deflected the blame for the conditions that led to their deaths .
Myanmar ’ s minister of natural resources and environmental conservation , who chaired the investigation committee , said that the victims ’ greed led to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kyi highlighted that most were working illegally and emphasized the need to create legal work opportunities .
“ These statements are not good to hear for people who live in Hpakant or who lost their family members , ” Gam Maw , a Hpakant native who works as a freelance miner , told Foreign Policy .
“ Neither companies nor governments are taking responsibility , and that is why landslides are happening.
” In 2018 , the military completed its takeover of much of Kachin state ’ s lucrative amber- and gold-mining region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the government initially blocked humanitarian access or safe passage for displaced civilians .
Chinese-backed banana plantations have encroached on many villagers ’ farmland .
Locals have also been displaced without compensation under a Belt and Road Initiative scheme to construct an industrial zone , while they ’ re largely left in the dark about its details .
Among the biggest concerns for Kachin ahead of the elections , however , may be the deadlocked peace process .
Since early 2019 , momentum to close camps for internally displaced persons has accelerated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ KIO , but the Tatmadaw ’ s continued small-scale attacks , including during a unilateral cease-fire due to the coronavirus pandemic , have done little to foster trust .
The next round of union-level peace talks—the last before the general election—is scheduled for Aug. 19-21 .
But the government declined to include the Arakan Army , a rebel force in the borderlands state of Rakhine , after which its allies including the KIO withdrew their participation .
By-elections in 2018 showed a significant decline in the NLD ’ s popularity among ethnic minorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needed to do more to engage minority voters .
But many feel that it hasn ’ t followed through in practice , including its approach to the 2020 elections .
The NLD formed a committee in late 2019 to engage with ethnic political parties , but it has since stated it will contest all available constituencies and not make alliances with ethnic parties .
While military appointees are allocated 25 percent of seats in Myanmar ’ s parliament , the remaining parliamentarians are elected .
In 2015 , 55 ethnic parties contested the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won 59 percent of seats , and ethnic parties less than 9 percent .
This time around , smaller parties competing for the same constituents within ethnic groups have merged and are rapidly gaining momentum .
At the national level , several ethnic parties have formed a coalition board , announcing goals of forming a federal union , achieving self-determination , and guaranteeing equal rights .
Despite a sense of optimism among ethnic parties , some have voiced concerns that voter registration policies may create a formidable obstacle to increasing their representation in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ migrant workers in ethnic states have the right to vote in a location if they have been working there for 90 days , while ethnic minority states have seen influxes of migrants—largely from the ethnic Bamar majority .
Areas under ethnic armed organization control , where nearly 40,000 internally displaced Kachin live , or considered insecure are likely to be excluded from voter registration , as happened in 2015 .
In parts of Rakhine state , where the NLD fared poorly in 2015 , the government announced it will postpone elections if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state has been racked by armed conflict between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw since late 2018 , causing mass displacement and human rights violations .
Even if ethnic parties make significant gains in November and the NLD falls short of winning a majority of elected seats in parliament , ethnic parties face major barriers to significant political advancement .
Myanmar ’ s president is selected by members of parliament in a first-past-the-post race in which the candidate with the most votes wins .
With the president responsible for appointing the cabinet , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional governments , the struggle for ethnic parties to see meaningful representation will continue .
But Doi Bu expressed concern that regardless of how many seats the party wins , significant political advancement for those living in Kachin state will require constitutional reform .
Doi Bu said her party will seek to reintroduce a bill allowing chief ministers—the highest-level officials in states and regions—to be elected and advocate for constitutional reform to increase the legislative authority of state parliaments .
A federal union built upon the principles of equal rights for ethnic groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distant hope .
Time is running out for the NLD to make good on its pledge to make peace a priority .
For those in Kachin state and beyond , the government ’ s response to the recent landslide is yet another squandered opportunity to salvage broken trust among disenfranchised ethnic minorities .
If the ruling party is seriously committed to engaging with minorities ahead of November ’ s elections , holding itself accountable for the deaths in Hpakant and taking bold steps toward reform would be a good place to start .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting .

YANGON, Myanmar—On July 2, a landslide in the jade mines of the Hpakant region in Myanmar’s Kachin state claimed around 200 lives . Myanmar is the world’s largest single source of jade, most of which comes from Hpakant, and its extraction comes at a high human cost. While the July 2 disaster was the deadliest on record , fatal incidents occur annually.
YANGON, Myanmar—On July 2, a landslide in the jade mines of the Hpakant region in Myanmar’s Kachin state claimed around 200 lives. Myanmar is the world’s largest single source of jade, most of which comes from Hpakant, and its extraction comes at a high human cost. While the July 2 disaster was the deadliest on record, fatal incidents occur annually.
Each one brings renewed calls from rights groups and transparency advocates to reform Myanmar’s jade industry, which is dominated by powerful military generals, military-linked conglomerates, and ethnic armed organizations, and is plagued by scant regulation. Shortly after the National League for Democracy (NLD)—the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, now the country’s civilian leader—won national elections in November 2015, it pledged to tighten its enforcement of safety regulations in the industry.
For many, the latest disaster is a symptom of the government’s empty promises and failed accountability. The landslide in Hpakant compounds a growing list of affronts for the Kachin ethnic group during the NLD’s term, echoing grievances from when the country was under total military rule. Policies that place land and resource management in the hands of the central government have long disenfranchised ethnic minorities, contributing to decades of civil war in Myanmar’s borderlands.
During its 2015 election campaign, the NLD vowed to work toward peace between Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations, including the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw. The KIO is one of numerous ethnic armed organizations that has sought political autonomy in Myanmar—and with it the ability to manage natural resources—since the country gained independence from Britain in 1948. More than 100,000 Kachin have been displaced by conflict since a 17-year cease-fire collapsed in 2011.
When the NLD came to power, many Kachin and other ethnic minorities were optimistic that steps toward decentralization would follow and that ethnic minorities would gain a greater voice in decisions affecting them, including more equitable access to resource wealth in their states. But the NLD is nearing the end of its term, with general elections on Nov. 8, and the government has not meaningfully addressed land and resource management. Meanwhile, fighting has intensified on multiple fronts.
A team of freelance miners cart away stones from a jade mine in Hpakant on July 17.
With disillusionment mounting among ethnic minorities, the NLD faces an uphill battle to repeat its resounding 2015 victory in Myanmar’s seven ethnic minority states. “The NLD failed us miserably,” San Htoi, the joint general secretary of the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, told Foreign Policy, referring to the lack of progress on ethnic representation and human rights. “We have seen enough.”
For many Kachin, the jade-mining disaster last month served as another dark reminder of the NLD’s lack of serious action on long-overdue reforms, adding to existing feelings of disenchantment with the party.
“We don’t think the [current] government will listen to us or take serious action even if we give recommendations” regarding jade-mining reform, said Htingnan Ja Naw, the joint deputy secretary of the Kachin National Social and Development Foundation in Hpakant. “We will only vote for a government that can protect and serve the lives, well-being, livelihoods, and health of the local people.”
Company trucks dot a massive government-licensed jade mining site in Hpakant on Oct. 16, 2018.
The transition of Kachin’s jade mines began in the 1990s, when the Tatmadaw took control of the area from the KIO and state-licensed companies pushed out small-scale mining operations run mostly by local Kachin. Heavy machinery followed, and the Ministry of Mines set three- to five-year limits on permit duration that prompted a rush to extract.
Estimates for the value of Kachin’s jade industry vary widely. In 2014, when low production rates and rising prices of jade exports contributed to a peak year for the industry, Global Witness estimates that profits were worth over $30 billion, while Open Data: Myanmar Jade calculated the value at closer to $6 billion. Most of Kachin’s jade is sold illicitly to China, and the value of legal sales is often underreported to minimize tax obligations.
Little of that revenue reaches Kachin. Myanmar’s 2008 constitution mandates that the central government holds claim to the country’s land and natural resources, and maintains the authority to decide how revenue will be collected and disbursed. Military-run conglomerates claim some of the largest concessions. The state-owned Myanmar Gems Enterprise is both an active player in the industry and tied to licensing, regulating, and collecting tax revenues on jade mining.
Myanmar signed onto a global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2014, but watchdog groups have voiced concerns with the pace of progress under the NLD. The government began publishing information on the beneficial ownership of registered extractive corporations in December 2019, but it has struggled to enforce company compliance with data disclosure. A Gemstone Law passed in 2019 did not mandate a vetting process to exclude companies guilty of environmental damage, human rights abuses, or illegal activities.
While those at the top of Kachin’s jade industry profit enormously, most of the landslide victims are among approximately 300,000 unlicensed freelance miners sifting through piles of discarded material, known as tailings, and searching for jade on expired company sites. In the face of resounding calls for reform, the government’s response to the July 2 landslide has again drawn criticism, in part because its investigation committee included one appointee who is a direct shareholder in the industry through a military conglomerate.
Although the government offered compensation to victims’ families, it deflected the blame for the conditions that led to their deaths. Myanmar’s minister of natural resources and environmental conservation, who chaired the investigation committee, said that the victims’ greed led to their deaths, while Aung San Suu Kyi highlighted that most were working illegally and emphasized the need to create legal work opportunities.
“These statements are not good to hear for people who live in Hpakant or who lost their family members,” Gam Maw, a Hpakant native who works as a freelance miner, told Foreign Policy. “Neither companies nor governments are taking responsibility, and that is why landslides are happening.”
The situation in Kachin’s jade mines is just one example of how central government control over land and natural resources has continued under the NLD and at times expanded concurrently with formal peace negotiations. As in other parts of the country, a sense of dispossession has left bitterness among many Kachin that will be hard to reconcile in the coming elections.
In 2018, the military completed its takeover of much of Kachin state’s lucrative amber- and gold-mining region from the KIO. Airstrikes displaced thousands, and the government initially blocked humanitarian access or safe passage for displaced civilians. Chinese-backed banana plantations have encroached on many villagers’ farmland. Locals have also been displaced without compensation under a Belt and Road Initiative scheme to construct an industrial zone, while they’re largely left in the dark about its details.
Among the biggest concerns for Kachin ahead of the elections, however, may be the deadlocked peace process. Since early 2019, momentum to close camps for internally displaced persons has accelerated bilateral peace talks between the Tatmadaw and KIO, but the Tatmadaw’s continued small-scale attacks, including during a unilateral cease-fire due to the coronavirus pandemic, have done little to foster trust. The next round of union-level peace talks—the last before the general election—is scheduled for Aug. 19-21. But the government declined to include the Arakan Army, a rebel force in the borderlands state of Rakhine, after which its allies including the KIO withdrew their participation.
By-elections in 2018 showed a significant decline in the NLD’s popularity among ethnic minorities, and the party conceded that it needed to do more to engage minority voters. But many feel that it hasn’t followed through in practice, including its approach to the 2020 elections. The NLD formed a committee in late 2019 to engage with ethnic political parties, but it has since stated it will contest all available constituencies and not make alliances with ethnic parties.
Miners use jackhammers and headlamps to search for jade at night in Hpakant on Aug. 15, 2018.
While military appointees are allocated 25 percent of seats in Myanmar’s parliament, the remaining parliamentarians are elected. In 2015, 55 ethnic parties contested the general elections, in which the NLD won 59 percent of seats, and ethnic parties less than 9 percent. This time around, smaller parties competing for the same constituents within ethnic groups have merged and are rapidly gaining momentum. At the national level, several ethnic parties have formed a coalition board, announcing goals of forming a federal union, achieving self-determination, and guaranteeing equal rights.
Despite a sense of optimism among ethnic parties, some have voiced concerns that voter registration policies may create a formidable obstacle to increasing their representation in parliament. According to existing policies, migrant workers in ethnic states have the right to vote in a location if they have been working there for 90 days, while ethnic minority states have seen influxes of migrants—largely from the ethnic Bamar majority.
Areas under ethnic armed organization control, where nearly 40,000 internally displaced Kachin live, or considered insecure are likely to be excluded from voter registration, as happened in 2015. In parts of Rakhine state, where the NLD fared poorly in 2015, the government announced it will postpone elections if the military declares the area unsafe. Rakhine state has been racked by armed conflict between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw since late 2018, causing mass displacement and human rights violations.
Even if ethnic parties make significant gains in November and the NLD falls short of winning a majority of elected seats in parliament, ethnic parties face major barriers to significant political advancement. Myanmar’s president is selected by members of parliament in a first-past-the-post race in which the candidate with the most votes wins. With the president responsible for appointing the cabinet, the chief ministers of state, and regional governments, the struggle for ethnic parties to see meaningful representation will continue.
In Kachin, several parties merged in late 2018 to form the Kachin State People’s Party, which is contesting all eligible constituencies in the state. The party has developed a natural resource management and revenue-sharing policy, its spokesperson Daw Doi Bu told Foreign Policy. The party will also promote dialogue regarding the peace process, with a focus on decentralization and increasing ethnic Kachin’s political representation.
But Doi Bu expressed concern that regardless of how many seats the party wins, significant political advancement for those living in Kachin state will require constitutional reform. Doi Bu said her party will seek to reintroduce a bill allowing chief ministers—the highest-level officials in states and regions—to be elected and advocate for constitutional reform to increase the legislative authority of state parliaments.
A federal union built upon the principles of equal rights for ethnic groups, self-determination, and resource-sharing remains a distant hope. Time is running out for the NLD to make good on its pledge to make peace a priority. For those in Kachin state and beyond, the government’s response to the recent landslide is yet another squandered opportunity to salvage broken trust among disenfranchised ethnic minorities.
If the ruling party is seriously committed to engaging with minorities ahead of November’s elections, holding itself accountable for the deaths in Hpakant and taking bold steps toward reform would be a good place to start.
This story was made possible with support from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--A Coup Won’t End Mali’s Corruption and Insecurity

Tuesday ’ s arrest of Mali ’ s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita by mutinous soldiers may have been the kind of climax many of the president ’ s opponents hoped for , but it will not solve the country ’ s problems .
Mali ’ s West African neighbors , and the entire international community , know that a leadership crisis could create more turmoil and destabilize the entire region .
That ’ s why the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) , the African Union , and the European Union rushed to condemn the uprising and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Malian president , as well as Prime Minister Boubou Cissé , the president of the National Assembly , and the finance minister .
Mali risks repeating history .
A similar coup in 2012 that originated from the army base in the town of Kati , where Keita and Cissé are currently being held , toppled then-president Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants .
Tuesday ’ s uprising by mutinying soldiers , who may have been irked by widespread protests against Keita in recent weeks , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chaos .
A similar coup in 2012 contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants .
Since early June , Mali has seen thousands of its citizens pour into the streets of major cities demanding the resignation of Keita ’ s government .
Opposition politicians , trade unions , civil society organizations , religious associations , and even personnel from security agencies came together under the June 5 Movement , or M5-RFP , to express their anger at the government ’ s poor response to the coronavirus outbreak , unemployment , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Northern and Central Mali by local extremist groups affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State .
Their anger is justified .
Too many Malians—particularly the young , who make up a third of the country ’ s workforce—have no work .
Unemployment among young people has reached almost 15 percent , up from 7 percent eight years ago before Keita took office .
The country ’ s poverty rate has increased from 45 percent in 2013 to almost 50 percent today .
More Malians were displaced by insecurity in 2019 than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s history .
The healthcare system is in shambles and the threat of violence has left millions of kids without schools .
Despite French military intervention , violent extremist groups—one of which kidnapped a perpetual runner-up in presidential elections—are still very active in parts of the country .
It was clear for weeks that the protesters , who named their movement after the date of the first demonstration , weren ’ t going to stop until the president left office .
Although Keita offered some concessions , including the dissolution of the Constitutional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of overturning this year ’ s legislative election results in order to install candidates loyal to Keita , they weren ’ t enough to quench the demonstrators ’ bitterness .
They wanted his resignation and were not going to end their protests until he relinquished power , or at least pledged to do so .
The Keita administration ’ s response to the demonstrations made matters even worse .
A brutal crackdown by security forces in mid-July left nearly a dozen people dead and , rather than scare the protesters , reinforced their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Keita ’ s resignation , the protesters further demanded an independent investigation of arbitrary arrests and deaths linked to the protests and the resignation of the president ’ s son , Karim Keita , from his legislative seat for a perceived extravagant lifestyle despite having quit his position as National Assembly deputy in the early days of the protests .
But that wasn ’ t going to come easily from a 75-year-old leader with a reputation for not giving up on anything easily .
One thing the plotters of Tuesday ’ s coup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two men at the center of the crisis : Keita and Mahmoud Dicko , the outspoken and widely popular imam who led the protests .
The soldiers may have worried that the never-say-die attitude of both men could bring ruin to Mali .
Keita , who was sworn in as Malian leader seven years ago , has been involved in government since the early 1990s and fought tooth and nail to become president , including two failed attempts at becoming leader in 2002 and 2007 , before being elected in 2013 .
Keita @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his authority , and only a forceful eviction—as happened on Tuesday—was ever going to get him out of power .
Dicko , on the other hand , has a history of mobilizing Malians and winning the support of those fed up with the government .
Last year , he mobilized tens of thousands to force Mali ’ s prime minister to quit his job .
Not all of his successes have been for progressive causes : A decade ago , he successfully protested against legislation promoting gender equality and later led a successful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the removal of a textbook about homosexuality from schools .
While the news of the president ’ s arrest may please Dicko , who had vowed the protests wouldn ’ t end until Keita left office , the highly vocal imam knows too well that if Keita ’ s supporters—including those loyal to him in the military—decide to protest against his forceful removal , Mali ’ s political crisis could inflict economic and humanitarian pain on the fragile country .
For now , Mali ’ s best bet is to embrace ECOWAS ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bloc , which last month proposed a unity government that includes the opposition and demanded the resignation of dozens of lawmakers installed by the Constitutional Court , must come up with a more practical plan than the last one it put on the table , which was not fully embraced by the opposition .
History shows that a unified national government under a presidential system hasn ’ t succeeded in addressing underlying political problems in other African countries that have previously embraced the model .
If anything , it has escalated tensions .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to incorporate an aggrieved opposition into government was in Zimbabwe , when Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangarai unsuccessfully tried to solve the political crisis in the country by working together .
Even Mali has had its own bitter experience with a government of national unity .
Between 2002 and 2012 , the unity government of Amadou Toumani Touré , Keita ’ s predecessor , undermined a once-vibrant opposition by offering government positions to figures from other parties and interest groups and overlooking their excesses .
The political class then became notorious for enriching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turning a blind eye as top military and intelligence officers got involved in drug trafficking .
As the opposition , which refrained from criticizing Touré , became compromised , Mali became perhaps the most corrupt country in West Africa , a position that pushed angry military officers into overthrowing the Touré regime in 2012 .
The experience proved that national unity politics in a country like Mali , where poverty is high and corruption is rife , could tempt those in the opposition into becoming corrupt themselves in the very government they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a dangerous risk because Mali needs to have strong voices putting checks on the government .
As Susanna D. Wing , a political scientist at Haverford College noted in her 2013 report on democracy and conflicts in Mali for the United States Institute for Peace , “ dialogue and a healthy democracy are rooted in a vibrant opposition ” and “ opposition parties allow citizens to share ideas and challenge viewpoints in the hopes of building consensus or , at a bare minimum , having their own views heard and acknowledged , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best way the opposition can play that role is through the parliament , and achieving that will mean the country needs to elect a new national assembly that is truly independent and composed of members freely and fairly elected .
Adherence to the electoral law and ensuring the security of candidates , local leaders , election officials , and election observers—all of which were basically lacking during March ’ s parliamentary elections—is what the government of the day must guarantee to ensure a truly free vote .
ECOWAS has a major role to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international community that has stood strongly in support of Keita could return the ousted president to office .
And if by any chance the embattled president regains power , the regional bloc must ensure that the national assembly is not only dissolved , but that the June 5 Movement plays a part in the emergence of a new parliament by convincing it to back reputable and popular candidates who would not fear standing up to the government of the day when elected into parliament .
Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit , thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented .
The June 5 Movement must also realize that having a robust presence in the national assembly is the best route to a vibrant opposition that can hold the executive accountable .
They can draw an example from South Africa where initial threats from the Democratic Alliance ( DA ) , a small but vocal opposition party , to have then-President Jacob Zuma impeached for violating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broader opposition to Zuma ’ s rule—including within his own party—paving the way for his eventual departure from office .
In fact , DA parliamentarians have long held the government—led by the African National Congress with an absolute majority—accountable through excellent oversight functions within committees in the upper and lower houses of South Africa ’ s bicameral parliament .
Insisting that Keita , a legitimately elected president , does not return to office would not end Mali ’ s problems .
The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country , it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament .
What comes out of any dialogue is vital not just for the future of Mali but also for the stability of the entire Sahel region , which has suffered from years of jihadist insurgency .
If Keita , the military , and the opposition fail to reach an understanding , Mali is likely to face more turmoil and bloodshed .

Tuesday’s arrest of Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita by mutinous soldiers may have been the kind of climax many of the president’s opponents hoped for, but it will not solve the country’s problems.
Tuesday’s arrest of Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita by mutinous soldiers may have been the kind of climax many of the president’s opponents hoped for, but it will not solve the country’s problems.
Mali’s West African neighbors, and the entire international community, know that a leadership crisis could create more turmoil and destabilize the entire region. That’s why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the European Union rushed to condemn the uprising and called for the swift release of the Malian president, as well as Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, the president of the National Assembly, and the finance minister.
Mali risks repeating history. A similar coup in 2012 that originated from the army base in the town of Kati, where Keita and Cissé are currently being held, toppled then-President Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants. Tuesday’s uprising by mutinying soldiers, who may have been irked by widespread protests against Keita in recent weeks, could throw the fragile country into further chaos.
A similar coup in 2012 contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants.
Since early June, Mali has seen thousands of its citizens pour into the streets of major cities demanding the resignation of Keita’s government. Opposition politicians, trade unions, civil society organizations, religious associations, and even personnel from security agencies came together under the June 5 Movement, or M5-RFP, to express their anger at the government’s poor response to the coronavirus outbreak, unemployment, rising inequality, and the unending violence in Northern and Central Mali by local extremist groups affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Their anger is justified. Too many Malians—particularly the young, who make up a third of the country’s workforce—have no work. Unemployment among young people has reached almost 15 percent, up from 7 percent eight years ago before Keita took office. The country’s poverty rate has increased from 45 percent in 2013 to almost 50 percent today. More Malians were displaced by insecurity in 2019 than at any time in the country’s history. The health care system is in shambles, and the threat of violence has left millions of kids without schools. Despite French military intervention, violent extremist groups—one of which kidnapped a perpetual runner-up in presidential elections—are still very active in parts of the country.
It was clear for weeks that the protesters, who named their movement after the date of the first demonstration, weren’t going to stop until the president left office. Although Keita offered some concessions, including the dissolution of the Constitutional Court which the June 5 Movement accused of overturning this year’s legislative election results in order to install candidates loyal to Keita, they weren’t enough to quench the demonstrators’ bitterness. They wanted his resignation and were not going to end their protests until he relinquished power, or at least pledged to do so.
The Keita administration’s response to the demonstrations made matters even worse. A brutal crackdown by security forces in mid-July left nearly a dozen people dead and, rather than scare the protesters, reinforced their call for change. In addition to Keita’s resignation, the protesters further demanded an independent investigation of arbitrary arrests and deaths linked to the protests and the resignation of the president’s son, Karim Keita, from his legislative seat for a perceived extravagant lifestyle despite having quit his position as National Assembly deputy in the early days of the protests. But that wasn’t going to come easily from a 75-year-old leader with a reputation for not giving up on anything easily.
One thing the plotters of Tuesday’s coup probably considered was the stubbornness of the two men at the center of the crisis: Keita and Mahmoud Dicko, the outspoken and widely popular imam who led the protests. The soldiers may have worried that the never-say-die attitude of both men could bring ruin to Mali.
Keita, who was sworn in as Malian leader seven years ago, has been involved in government since the early 1990s and fought tooth and nail to become president, including two failed attempts at becoming leader in 2002 and 2007, before being elected in 2013. Keita was certainly going to fight to preserve his authority, and only a forceful eviction—as happened on Tuesday—was ever going to get him out of power.
Dicko, on the other hand, has a history of mobilizing Malians and winning the support of those fed up with the government. Last year, he mobilized tens of thousands to force Mali’s prime minister to quit his job. Not all of his successes have been for progressive causes: A decade ago, he successfully protested against legislation promoting gender equality and later led a successful campaign that forced the government to order the removal of a textbook about homosexuality from schools.
While the news of the president’s arrest may please Dicko, who had vowed the protests wouldn’t end until Keita left office, the highly vocal imam knows too well that if Keita’s supporters—including those loyal to him in the military—decide to protest against his forceful removal, Mali’s political crisis could inflict economic and humanitarian pain on the fragile country.
For now, Mali’s best bet is to embrace ECOWAS’s mediation efforts. But the regional bloc, which last month proposed a unity government that includes the opposition and demanded the resignation of dozens of lawmakers installed by the Constitutional Court, must come up with a more practical plan than the last one it put on the table, which was not fully embraced by the opposition.
History shows that a unified national government under a presidential system hasn’t succeeded in addressing underlying political problems in other African countries that have previously embraced the model. If anything, it has escalated tensions. The best-known example of a failed attempt to incorporate an aggrieved opposition into government was in Zimbabwe, when Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangarai unsuccessfully tried to solve the political crisis in the country by working together. Even Mali has had its own bitter experience with a government of national unity.
Between 2002 and 2012, the unity government of Amadou Toumani Touré, Keita’s predecessor, undermined a once-vibrant opposition by offering government positions to figures from other parties and interest groups and overlooking their excesses. The political class then became notorious for enriching themselves at the expense of citizens and turning a blind eye as top military and intelligence officers got involved in drug trafficking.
As the opposition, which refrained from criticizing Touré, became compromised, Mali became perhaps the most corrupt country in West Africa, a position that pushed angry military officers into overthrowing the Touré regime in 2012. The experience proved that national unity politics in a country like Mali, where poverty is high and corruption is rife, could tempt those in the opposition into becoming corrupt themselves in the very government they are supposed to keep in check.
That is a dangerous risk because Mali needs to have strong voices putting checks on the government. As Susanna D. Wing, a political scientist at Haverford College noted in her 2013 report on democracy and conflicts in Mali for the United States Institute for Peace, “dialogue and a healthy democracy are rooted in a vibrant opposition” and “opposition parties allow citizens to share ideas and challenge viewpoints in the hopes of building consensus or, at a bare minimum, having their own views heard and acknowledged, if not accepted or adopted.”
The best way the opposition can play that role is through the parliament, and achieving that will mean the country needs to elect a new national assembly that is truly independent and composed of members freely and fairly elected. Adherence to the electoral law and ensuring the security of candidates, local leaders, election officials, and election observers—all of which were basically lacking during March’s parliamentary elections—is what the government of the day must guarantee to ensure a truly free vote.
ECOWAS has a major role to play here. Severe pressure from the international community that has stood strongly in support of Keita could return the ousted president to office. And if by any chance the embattled president regains power, the regional bloc must ensure that the national assembly is not only dissolved, but that the June 5 Movement plays a part in the emergence of a new parliament by convincing it to back reputable and popular candidates who would not fear standing up to the government of the day when elected into parliament.
Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit, thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented.
The June 5 Movement must also realize that having a robust presence in the national assembly is the best route to a vibrant opposition that can hold the executive accountable. They can draw an example from South Africa where initial threats from the Democratic Alliance (DA), a small but vocal opposition party, to have then-President Jacob Zuma impeached for violating the constitution played an important role in building broader opposition to Zuma’s rule—including within his own party—paving the way for his eventual departure from office. In fact, DA parliamentarians have long held the government—led by the African National Congress with an absolute majority—accountable through excellent oversight functions within committees in the upper and lower houses of South Africa’s bicameral parliament.
Insisting that Keita, a legitimately elected president, does not return to office would not end Mali’s problems. The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and more patient. For the stability of the country, it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament.
What comes out of any dialogue is vital not just for the future of Mali but also for the stability of the entire Sahel region, which has suffered from years of jihadist insurgency. If Keita, the military, and the opposition fail to reach an understanding, Mali is likely to face more turmoil and bloodshed.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-19--The United Nations Isn’t Jeopardizing Children in Conflict Zones. It’s Protecting Them.

The United Nations Isn ’ t Jeopardizing Children in Conflict Zones .
It ’ s Protecting Them .
In 2019 , the United Nations verified more than 25,000 grave violations against children , according to the report of the secretary-general on children and armed conflict published in June 2020 .
A recent article in these pages by Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch alleged that the U.N. secretary-general is letting some countries get away with killing children .
This is not the case .
In fact , the secretary-general has repeatedly expressed his consternation at the continued high level of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violations against children , and advocated for the protection of children by all .
Yet despite this grave situation , there are signs of hope .
Some 13,200 child soldiers were freed and released from nonstate actors and armed forces globally in 2019 following U.N. advocacy .
U.N. engagement with governments and armed groups led to improvements in age screening procedures and the introduction of legislation to better protect children ’ s rights .
U.N. advocacy , including the ACT to Protect Children Affected by Conflict campaign , a global call for peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improved the protection of children .
Under the leadership of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres , record numbers of action plans , joint commitments , and command orders have been either signed , issued , or updated with governments and armed groups during 2019—many of them including prevention and not just protection measures .
As a result of continuous proactive work with U.N. member states , regional and subregional organizations , and nonstate armed groups , new legislation criminalizing grave violations against children has been developed and put in place in countries such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Myanmar , and governments have launched accountability mechanisms .
The secretary-general ’ s latest report is a clear example of the U.N. ’ s commitment to protecting children ’ s rights : It provides information verified by the United Nations , identifies perpetrators of violations , makes recommendations to various parties to conflicts , and includes time-bound joint action plans and commitments .
Since the publication of the latest report , my office has actively engaged with parties mentioned in the report , including the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or new commitments to end and prevent violations , and on ways to follow up on implementation that make a concrete difference for children in the short , medium , and long term .
Since 2001 , the U.N. Security Council has asked the secretary-general to attach to this report a list of parties to conflict that commit grave violations against children .
Successive secretaries-general have used this tool to promote accountability , to identify perpetrators , and to engage with them to protect children .
The list is a call for action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effective , it must be accompanied by concrete and practical engagement between the United Nations and listed parties .
Engagement goes hand in hand with the listing and delisting of parties and is part of a wider process that ensures the effective delivery of the mandate while encouraging changes of behavior .
While the listing alerts parties to violations and stresses the need to end these violations , engagement promotes dialogue and sustainable change , and provides the necessary space to build on the recommendations of the report and effectively ensure better protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Engagement ultimately leads to changes in behavior and to significant improvement in the protection of children , as we witnessed in former situations in the Ivory Coast and Nepal , and as we are currently witnessing in Colombia , the Democratic Republic of the Congo , and Sudan .
Since monitoring of violations against children in situations of conflict is constant , the parties concerned have an incentive to engage because they do not wish to be listed in the first place , because they want to be delisted , or because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should they renege on their commitments .
In addition to the secretary-general ’ s annual report , the U.N. has an array of powerful tools at its disposal to defend the rights of children .
These include its monitoring and reporting mechanism ; its promotion of accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict ; its promotion of respect for international humanitarian rights law and international human rights law ; its advocacy messages and global campaigns ; and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ road maps with perpetrators .
As armed conflicts evolve and as children face multiple new threats , the framework for the protection of children must also adapt to adequately respond to these challenges .
By shining a light on parties to conflict and simultaneously reaching out to engage with them , the secretary-general can improve the security of children in situations of armed conflict .
While many violations occur against children each year , even more children escape tragedy thanks to this dual approach .
Contrary to what Becker ’ s article claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gave to the secretary-general remains one of the United Nations ’ proven and most effective tools for protecting the world ’ s children .
Its credibility remains intact , and its ability to effect positive change will continue to increase as it evolves to meet new challenges .
But the secretary-general can not do this alone .
Member states , civil society , and human rights organizations all have a critical role to play .
We may all take different paths and focus on different tools , but we are all working toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of children during armed conflict a reality and not an aspiration .

In 2019, the United Nations verified more than 25,000 grave violations against children, according to the report of the secretary-general on children and armed conflict published in June 2020. A recent article in these pages by Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch alleged that the U.N. secretary-general is letting some countries get away with killing children. This is not the case. In fact, the secretary-general has repeatedly expressed his consternation at the continued high level of violations, called for parties to end violations against children, and advocated for the protection of children by all.
In 2019, the United Nations verified more than 25,000 grave violations against children, according to the report of the secretary-general on children and armed conflict published in June 2020. A recent article in these pages by Jo Becker of Human Rights Watch alleged that the U.N. secretary-general is letting some countries get away with killing children. This is not the case. In fact, the secretary-general has repeatedly expressed his consternation at the continued high level of violations, called for parties to end violations against children, and advocated for the protection of children by all.
Yet despite this grave situation, there are signs of hope. Some 13,200 child soldiers were freed and released from nonstate actors and armed forces globally in 2019 following U.N. advocacy. U.N. engagement with governments and armed groups led to improvements in age screening procedures and the introduction of legislation to better protect children’s rights. U.N. advocacy, including the ACT to Protect Children Affected by Conflict campaign, a global call for peace processes and reductions in hostilities, further improved the protection of children.
Under the leadership of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, record numbers of action plans, joint commitments, and command orders have been either signed, issued, or updated with governments and armed groups during 2019—many of them including prevention and not just protection measures. As a result of continuous proactive work with U.N. member states, regional and subregional organizations, and nonstate armed groups, new legislation criminalizing grave violations against children has been developed and put in place in countries such as Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, and Myanmar, and governments have launched accountability mechanisms.
The secretary-general’s latest report is a clear example of the U.N.’s commitment to protecting children’s rights: It provides information verified by the United Nations, identifies perpetrators of violations, makes recommendations to various parties to conflicts, and includes time-bound joint action plans and commitments. Since the publication of the latest report, my office has actively engaged with parties mentioned in the report, including the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen and Myanmar’s Tatmadaw, on existing or new commitments to end and prevent violations, and on ways to follow up on implementation that make a concrete difference for children in the short, medium, and long term.
Since 2001, the U.N. Security Council has asked the secretary-general to attach to this report a list of parties to conflict that commit grave violations against children. Successive secretaries-general have used this tool to promote accountability, to identify perpetrators, and to engage with them to protect children.
The list is a call for action, but for it to be thoroughly effective, it must be accompanied by concrete and practical engagement between the United Nations and listed parties. Engagement goes hand in hand with the listing and delisting of parties and is part of a wider process that ensures the effective delivery of the mandate while encouraging changes of behavior. While the listing alerts parties to violations and stresses the need to end these violations, engagement promotes dialogue and sustainable change, and provides the necessary space to build on the recommendations of the report and effectively ensure better protection for children immediately and in the future.
Engagement ultimately leads to changes in behavior and to significant improvement in the protection of children, as we witnessed in former situations in the Ivory Coast and Nepal, and as we are currently witnessing in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. Since monitoring of violations against children in situations of conflict is constant, the parties concerned have an incentive to engage because they do not wish to be listed in the first place, because they want to be delisted, or because they do not wish to be relisted should they renege on their commitments.
In addition to the secretary-general’s annual report, the U.N. has an array of powerful tools at its disposal to defend the rights of children. These include its monitoring and reporting mechanism; its promotion of accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict; its promotion of respect for international humanitarian rights law and international human rights law; its advocacy messages and global campaigns; and its adoption and implementation of action plans and road maps with perpetrators.
As armed conflicts evolve and as children face multiple new threats, the framework for the protection of children must also adapt to adequately respond to these challenges. By shining a light on parties to conflict and simultaneously reaching out to engage with them, the secretary-general can improve the security of children in situations of armed conflict. While many violations occur against children each year, even more children escape tragedy thanks to this dual approach.