foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Team Biden Should Start With an Asia Pivot 2.0

Team Biden Should Start With an Asia Pivot 2.0 The recent meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Tokyo revealed many of the dilemmas the United States faces in its attempt to contain China—no matter who wins the race for the White House .
On one level , it was remarkable that the meeting of foreign ministers from Australia , India , Japan , and the United States happened at all , given India ’ s traditional reluctance to antagonize China .
But the meeting itself produced scant evidence of new cooperation between the four countries , underlining how hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even with allies and partners who share its concerns about China ’ s rising sway in Asia .
Getting more out of this fledgling partnership would be an important challenge for Democratic nominee Joe Biden , if he wins , given his emphasis on a more traditional , multilateral foreign policy .
At the same time , he has also promised a tougher approach to China , whose president , Xi Jinping , has adopted a more assertive international posture in recent months—all this means that U.S. policy in the region will require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s tenure than Biden ’ s backers would like to admit .
But there is no denying that much of Washington ’ s Asia policy is in a mess .
A broader rethink is needed , similar in many respects to the much-derided “ pivot ” strategy unveiled by then-President Barack Obama back in 2011 .
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed that the Quad at least retains its capacity to ruffle feathers in Beijing .
Speaking during a trip to Malaysia , Wang accused its members of building “ an Indo-Pacific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stoke geopolitical competition.
” Such a description is fanciful .
The United States recognized after World War II that a NATO-like body was poorly suited to Asia , where U.S. friends and allies are widely dispersed and have divergent interests .
Since its rebirth in 2017 following an earlier failed attempt to establish the new quasi-alliance , the Quad has mostly restricted itself to low-level meetings discussing inoffensive areas like counterterrorism , cybersecurity , and coast guard services .
This does not mean it is useless , however , or indeed that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy by Salvatore Babones .
In fact , despite its slow start , the grouping is set to take on gradually greater significance .
There is no denying that much of Washington ’ s Asia policy is in a mess and that a broader rethink is needed .
India ’ s changing views lie at the heart of this .
Following its recent clashes with China in the Himalayas , New Delhi has largely abandoned its policy of balancing between the United States and China and stepped more firmly into the anti-Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they once avoided as being provocative toward China .
Holding the Quad meeting in Tokyo at a time of rising geopolitical tension is one obvious example .
Another indication is set to come with the annual Malabar naval exercise , traditionally a trilateral affair between India , Japan , and the United States .
This is now set to expand to include Australia—a step India had previously blocked as needlessly inflammatory toward of Beijing .
The United States and India are also deepening military cooperation in areas such as anti-submarine warfare , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capabilities .
Even Quad enthusiasts recognize the group ’ s limitations , however .
Diplomatic readouts from the recent meeting suggest a wide-ranging agenda , much of it slanted toward China , covering topics including disinformation and managing COVID-19 .
But the four powers could not agree on a formal joint statement .
Probably they did not even try .
Given this , the idea they might now move forward with plans to develop a NATO-like institution seems especially improbable .
Viewed from Beijing , the Quad looks like an aggressive plan to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remains cautious and reactive : So far , only the perception of Chinese aggression has pushed its members to cooperate .
In the future , too , China ’ s actions are most likely to spur cooperation further .
This is where the dilemmas for U.S. policy begin .
Speaking in August , U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun put his finger on the main problem of the Quad ’ s development .
“ I don ’ t think responding to the threat of China in and of itself , or any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself , would be enough of a driver , ” he said .
“ It also has to have a positive agenda.
” Biegun ’ s boss , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , however , has adopted a far more confrontational posture toward Beijing .
So far , Pompeo has managed to do this without spooking the other Quad partners .
But there are limits to how far this approach can go , given the three other members still seek to cooperate with China in one form or another .
The Quad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its behavior .
All want to avoid a future in which China becomes the dominant actor in the Indo-Pacific region .
But they do not share a prescription about what should be done .
Even with New Delhi ’ s recent shift , neither India nor Australia nor Japan wants to annoy China without good reason .
All worry about the risks of coercive Chinese diplomacy .
Australia and Japan , in particular , have important economic ties to preserve .
And all this is doubly true for nations in Southeast Asia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s role in private but wary of supporting public actions to counter Beijing .
“ If you talk about hard containment like Pompeo does , no one will join—not even Japan and Australia , ” as retired Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan put it recently in an interview with The Australian .
What remains is an imbalanced approach that relies on military competition but little else .
In all of this , the true danger for Washington is thinking that its approach to Asia is going better than it actually is .
Robert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , recently wrote a scathing article suggesting that Trump ’ s China policy had been a “ total failure , ” especially on trade .
Even beyond this , the list of problems is long .
Ties with the three other Quad nations are improving , but relations with traditional U.S. partners such as South Korea and the Philippines are in disrepair .
The United States lacks anything approaching an economic agenda that would allow it to build deeper ties with a broader range of Asian nations beyond narrower security concerns .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has led it to imitate Beijing , sabotaging America ’ s premier strength : fair , innovative and competitive markets governed by the rule of law , ” Zoellick wrote in the Washington Post .
What remains is an imbalanced approach that relies on military competition but little else .
In early October , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the United States planned to expand its navy to more than 500 manned and unmanned ships by mid-century .
This would mark an aggressive attempt to maintain maritime superiority over China , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. Navy ’ s 293 ships , according to a recent Pentagon study .
Military expansion is also something of a bipartisan consensus .
Michèle Flournoy , a plausible candidate to succeed Esper if Biden wins , recently mused that the United States should develop the capability to “ sink all of China ’ s military vessels , submarines , and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours.
” Whoever the next U.S. president turns out to be , he will need to enhance U.S. military capacity in Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proceeding rapidly and soon risks outstripping the United States ’ ability to respond .
Yet previous attempts to rebalance the U.S. military toward Asia and away from the Middle East and Europe have moved slowly .
Extra resources will be hard to find in the aftermath of COVID-19 .
Under any realistic scenario , Washington is going to have to develop a different kind of military relationship with its partners .
Even as it does so , it is hard to believe that the Quad is going to be the primary vehicle for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its many critics , Obama ’ s 2011 pivot at least attempted to hit many of the objectives where U.S. policy is currently absent .
A focus on military power and anti-Chinese diplomacy also leaves U.S. Asia policy unbalanced .
The former U.S. diplomat Evan Feigenbaum has warned that Americans could become the “ Hessians of Asia , ” a reference to the German mercenaries hired by the British to fight in the American Revolutionary War .
By this , Feigenbaum means that the United States ’ allies and partners may come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterweight to China but with little else to offer toward solving the region ’ s many other political and economic challenges .
Such an approach would be especially shortsighted given the many pressing concerns that could add up to the “ positive agenda ” that Biegun mentioned .
Should the United States seek to build a collective security system in Asia as effective as NATO has been in Europe , it must do so with partnerships that reflect shared nonmilitary ties , goals , and values .
Measures to help speed up the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example of cooperation that could deepen and solidify ties .
Repairing the global trading system is another , an area where the United States has struggled to lead since its abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and which has been impeded by Trump ’ s generally disruptive and inconsistent policies .
From cybersecurity to rules governing emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and electric vehicles , there is plenty of ground for nonmilitary cooperation .
But again , it is unlikely that the Quad will be the best venue for this to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs a broader approach .
For all of its many critics , Obama ’ s 2011 pivot at least attempted to hit many of the objectives where U.S. policy is currently absent .
It pushed greater military heft in Asia while seeking to repair traditional alliances and build deeper economic cooperation .
It might have been poorly executed , but the basic idea was sound .
If Biden becomes president , crafting an Asia Pivot 2.0 would be an excellent place to start .

The recent meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Tokyo revealed many of the dilemmas the United States faces in its attempt to contain China—no matter who wins the race for the White House. On one level, it was remarkable that the meeting of foreign ministers from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States happened at all, given India’s traditional reluctance to antagonize China. But the meeting itself produced scant evidence of new cooperation between the four countries, underlining how hard it is for Washington to coordinate actions even with allies and partners who share its concerns about China’s rising sway in Asia.
The recent meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Tokyo revealed many of the dilemmas the United States faces in its attempt to contain China—no matter who wins the race for the White House. On one level, it was remarkable that the meeting of foreign ministers from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States happened at all, given India’s traditional reluctance to antagonize China. But the meeting itself produced scant evidence of new cooperation between the four countries, underlining how hard it is for Washington to coordinate actions even with allies and partners who share its concerns about China’s rising sway in Asia.
Getting more out of this fledgling partnership would be an important challenge for Democratic nominee Joe Biden, if he wins, given his emphasis on a more traditional, multilateral foreign policy. At the same time, he has also promised a tougher approach to China, whose president, Xi Jinping, has adopted a more assertive international posture in recent months—all this means that U.S. policy in the region will require more continuity with U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach than many Democrats would like to admit. But there is no denying that much of Washington’s Asia policy is in a mess. A broader rethink is needed, similar in many respects to the much-derided “pivot” strategy unveiled by then-President Barack Obama back in 2011.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed that the Quad at least retains its capacity to ruffle feathers in Beijing. Speaking during a trip to Malaysia, Wang accused its members of building “an Indo-Pacific NATO” whose aim was to “stoke geopolitical competition.” Such a description is fanciful. The United States recognized after World War II that a NATO-like body was poorly suited to Asia, where U.S. friends and allies are widely dispersed and have divergent interests. Since its rebirth in 2017 following an earlier failed attempt to establish the new quasi-alliance, the Quad has mostly restricted itself to low-level meetings discussing inoffensive areas like counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and coast guard services. This does not mean it is useless, however, or indeed that it should be scrapped, as argued in Foreign Policy by Salvatore Babones. In fact, despite its slow start, the grouping is set to take on gradually greater significance.
There is no denying that much of Washington’s Asia policy is in a mess and that a broader rethink is needed.
India’s changing views lie at the heart of this. Following its recent clashes with China in the Himalayas, New Delhi has largely abandoned its policy of balancing between the United States and China and stepped more firmly into the anti-Chinese camp. Indian policymakers now undertake actions they once avoided as being provocative toward China. Holding the Quad meeting in Tokyo at a time of rising geopolitical tension is one obvious example. Another indication came today with Australia’s announcement that it would join the annual Malabar naval exercise, traditionally a trilateral affair between India, Japan, and the United States—a step India had previously blocked as needlessly inflammatory toward of Beijing. The United States and India are also deepening military cooperation in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, where both nations are worried about rising Chinese capabilities.
Even Quad enthusiasts recognize the group’s limitations, however. Diplomatic readouts from the recent meeting suggest a wide-ranging agenda, much of it slanted toward China, covering topics including disinformation and managing COVID-19. But the four powers could not agree on a formal joint statement. Probably they did not even try. Given this, the idea they might now move forward with plans to develop a NATO-like institution seems especially improbable. Viewed from Beijing, the Quad looks like an aggressive plan to contain China. But in truth it remains cautious and reactive: So far, only the perception of Chinese aggression has pushed its members to cooperate. In the future, too, China’s actions are most likely to spur cooperation further.
This is where the dilemmas for U.S. policy begin. Speaking in August, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun put his finger on the main problem of the Quad’s development. “I don’t think responding to the threat of China in and of itself, or any potential challenge from China in and of itself, would be enough of a driver,” he said. “It also has to have a positive agenda.” Biegun’s boss, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, however, has adopted a far more confrontational posture toward Beijing. So far, Pompeo has managed to do this without spooking the other Quad partners. But there are limits to how far this approach can go, given the three other members still seek to cooperate with China in one form or another.
The Quad nations share common concerns about China and its behavior. All want to avoid a future in which China becomes the dominant actor in the Indo-Pacific region. But they do not share a prescription about what should be done. Even with New Delhi’s recent shift, neither India nor Australia nor Japan wants to annoy China without good reason. All worry about the risks of coercive Chinese diplomacy. Australia and Japan, in particular, have important economic ties to preserve. And all this is doubly true for nations in Southeast Asia, many of which are anxious about China’s role in private but wary of supporting public actions to counter Beijing. “If you talk about hard containment like Pompeo does, no one will join—not even Japan and Australia,” as retired Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan put it recently in an interview with The Australian.
What remains is an imbalanced approach that relies on military competition but little else.
In all of this, the true danger for Washington is thinking that its approach to Asia is going better than it actually is. Robert Zoellick, a former U.S. trade representative, recently wrote a scathing article suggesting that Trump’s China policy had been a “total failure,” especially on trade. Even beyond this, the list of problems is long. Ties with the three other Quad nations are improving, but relations with traditional U.S. partners such as South Korea and the Philippines are in disrepair. The United States lacks anything approaching an economic agenda that would allow it to build deeper ties with a broader range of Asian nations beyond narrower security concerns. “The administration’s fear of China has led it to imitate Beijing, sabotaging America’s premier strength: fair, innovative and competitive markets governed by the rule of law,” Zoellick wrote in the Washington Post.
What remains is an imbalanced approach that relies on military competition but little else. In early October, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the United States planned to expand its navy to more than 500 manned and unmanned ships by mid-century. This would mark an aggressive attempt to maintain maritime superiority over China, which currently has 350 ships, compared with the U.S. Navy’s 293 ships, according to a recent Pentagon study. Military expansion is also something of a bipartisan consensus. Michèle Flournoy, a plausible candidate to succeed Esper if Biden wins, recently mused that the United States should develop the capability to “sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours.”
Whoever the next U.S. president turns out to be, he will need to enhance U.S. military capacity in Asia. China’s naval modernization is likely to continue at a pace that the United States acting alone will struggle to match. Yet previous attempts to rebalance the U.S. military toward Asia and away from the Middle East and Europe have moved slowly. Extra resources will be hard to find in the aftermath of COVID-19. Under any realistic scenario, Washington is going to have to develop a different kind of military relationship with its partners. Even as it does so, it is hard to believe that the Quad is going to be the primary vehicle for this enhanced military cooperation.
For all of its many critics, Obama’s 2011 pivot at least attempted to hit many of the objectives where U.S. policy is currently absent.
A focus on military power and anti-Chinese diplomacy also leaves U.S. Asia policy unbalanced. The former U.S. diplomat Evan Feigenbaum has warned that Americans could become the “Hessians of Asia,” a reference to the German mercenaries hired by the British to fight in the American Revolutionary War. By this, Feigenbaum means that the United States’ allies and partners may come to view it as a useful military counterweight to China but with little else to offer toward solving the region’s many other political and economic challenges. Such an approach would be especially shortsighted given the many pressing concerns that could add up to the “positive agenda” that Biegun mentioned. Should the United States seek to build a collective security system in Asia as effective as NATO has been in Europe, it must do so with partnerships that reflect shared nonmilitary ties, goals, and values.
Measures to help speed up the recovery from the pandemic are one pressing example of cooperation that could deepen and solidify ties. Repairing the global trading system is another, an area where the United States has struggled to lead since its abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal and which has been impeded by Trump’s generally disruptive and inconsistent policies. From cybersecurity to rules governing emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and electric vehicles, there is plenty of ground for nonmilitary cooperation. But again, it is unlikely that the Quad will be the best venue for this to happen. Instead, the United States needs a broader approach. For all of its many critics, Obama’s 2011 pivot at least attempted to hit many of the objectives where U.S. policy is currently absent. It pushed greater military heft in Asia while seeking to repair traditional alliances and build deeper economic cooperation. It might have been poorly executed, but the basic idea was sound. If Biden becomes president, crafting an Asia Pivot 2.0 would be an excellent place to start.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--China Keeps Inching Closer to Taiwan

China Keeps Inching Closer to Taiwan

Since early September , China has been carrying out the most provocative and sustained show of force in the Taiwan Strait in nearly a quarter century .
Chinese military patrols , some involving more than 30 combat aircraft and a half-dozen naval ships , have roamed the strait roughly every other day .
Many of them have breached the median line between Taiwan and China , a boundary that—until last year—both sides had respected for decades .
With cross-strait tensions rising , a growing number of American policymakers and pundits , mostly on the political right and center , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan ’ s security—a firm commitment that the United States has avoided making for more than four decades .
These calls build on a series of bipartisan laws passed over the past two years that strengthen America ’ s moral and diplomatic support for Taiwan in the face of Chinese pressure .
But can Taiwan actually be defended ?
On paper , the task looks impossible .
China ’ s military is 10 times as large as Taiwan ’ s and includes Asia ’ s biggest air force and the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coast guard , and navy by number of ships .
China ’ s long-range air-defense systems can shoot down aircraft over Taiwan , and China ’ s land-based missiles and combat aircraft could potentially wipe out Taiwan ’ s air force and navy and destroy U.S. bases in East Asia in a preemptive strike .
China has built several times more naval ships than the United States since 2015 , and it now outspends Taiwan 25-to-1 annually on defense .
The cross-strait military balance is clearly shifting in China ’ s favor .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ make the island virtually unconquerable—provided that Taipei and Washington capitalize on them .
Armadas of the kind China would need to invade or blockade Taiwan are extremely vulnerable to modern missiles and mines .
Meanwhile , the Taiwan Strait is perilous—typhoons and 20-foot waves are common most of the year—and Taiwan itself is a natural fortress .
Its east coast consists of steep cliffs , and its west coast is dominated by mud flats that extend miles out to sea and are buffeted by severe tides .
As a result , there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an invading force could even land .
Taiwan ’ s defenders also have history on their side .
No blockade in the past 200 years has coerced a country into surrendering its sovereignty , and there has been only one successful amphibious invasion of a developed nation in modern history ( the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943 ) .
All other successful amphibious assaults were against overstretched forces defending hastily dug positions on foreign or contested territory with small arms .
If China invaded Taiwan today , it would be attacking massed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with precision-guided munitions .
Given these advantages , a consensus has emerged among many defense experts about how Taiwan should defend itself—and what the United States needs to do to be ready to help .
According to this consensus , Taiwan should devote its limited defense budget to acquiring huge arsenals of mobile missile launchers , armed drones , and mines ; developing an army that can surge tens of thousands of troops to any beach in an hour backed by a million-strong reserve force trained to fight guerrilla-style in Taiwan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and massive stockpiles of fuel , medical supplies , food , and water for a population psychologically prepared to ride out a bloody conflict for months .
Meanwhile , the United States should disperse and harden its base infrastructure in East Asia and pre-position networks of missile launchers and armed drones near Taiwan .
These forces would act as high-tech minefields , capable of decimating a Chinese invasion or blockade force early in a war .
Both governments have already taken important steps to implement these recommendations .
For example , Taiwan has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent next year and prioritize asymmetric capabilities ; the United States has developed plans to string missile launchers and austere airfields along islands opposite China ’ s coast ; and Taiwan and the United States are bringing online sophisticated drones , mines , and missiles .
It could take a decade to retool the Taiwanese and U.S. militaries to mount an effective defense of the island .
But these measures could end up being too little too late .
The Taiwanese and U.S. militaries still consist predominantly of small numbers of advanced aircraft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large bases—precisely the kind of forces that China can now destroy with a surprise air and missile barrage .
Given present trends , it could take a decade to retool the Taiwanese and U.S. militaries to mount an effective defense of the island .
With China ’ s rapid military buildup , that may be time that Taiwan does not have .
The list of Taiwan ’ s military shortcomings is long .
More than a quarter of Taiwan ’ s annual defense budget is earmarked for domestically made ships and submarines that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fighter aircraft that may not make it off the ground in a war , and tanks that can not easily maneuver on beaches or in jungles or cities .
As part of its ongoing transition to an all-volunteer military , Taiwan has cut its active-duty force from 275,000 to 175,000 troops and reduced the length of conscription from one year to four months .
Recruits receive only a few weeks of basic training , and reservists are called up for just a few days every two years .
Taiwan also has gutted its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilian maintenance or management worker per 20 troops .
By comparison , the U.S. military has one civilian worker supporting every two troops .
Taiwan ’ s depleted logistics teams routinely fail to resupply combat units or perform basic maintenance .
Consequently , soldiers avoid training with their weapons for fear of accidents or of wasting precious ammunition .
Some estimates suggest that Taiwan ’ s pilots fly for less than 10 hours per month and that more than half of Taiwan ’ s tanks and attack helicopters are dysfunctional .
Many Taiwanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rarely practiced firing their weapons , and suffer low morale .
Despite these manpower deficiencies , however , Taiwan ’ s spending on soldiers ’ salaries and benefits has risen steadily and now consumes nearly half the defense budget .
The problems have been apparent for years , but political constraints have stymied major reform .
Taiwanese politicians are naturally incentivized to overinvest in battleships and fighter jets and underinvest in well-trained and fully equipped soldiers .
Infantry and logistics are boring .
But submarines and F-16s are exciting .
Meanwhile , reinstating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bigger army would likely spark public outrage .
Given these electoral realities , Taiwan ’ s leaders have gravitated toward military showpieces—while hoping that the United States will save the day if China ever attacks .
At present , however , the United States may not be up to the task .
The U.S. military has only two bases within 500 miles of Taiwan—which is also the maximum unrefueled combat radius of U.S. fighter aircraft—and both are easy targets for China ’ s land-based missiles .
If China disables those bases , U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable aircraft carriers and from Guam , located 1,800 miles from Taiwan .
The extra distance and midair refueling would cut the number of U.S. air sorties in half , giving China an opportunity to dominate the skies over Taiwan and inflict heavy losses on U.S. forces that try to fight their way into the combat theater .
The overall result is tragic : Taiwan has enormous geographic advantages over China , and the United States has the most powerful military in the world , but their combined legacy forces are routinely routed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The good news is that Taiwan and the United States have developed sound strategies to shore up their defenses , and these strategies have been endorsed by top policymakers in both governments .
In war games where Taiwan and the United States follow these plans and use weapons currently under development , the island wins .
The question , therefore , is not whether Taiwan can be defended—it definitely can—but whether Taiwan and the United States can revamp their militaries in time to deter a Chinese attack .
Rapid reform requires the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sense of urgency in their publics .
Last year , only 20 percent of Taiwan ’ s citizens said they were worried that a war with China was imminent , nearly 60 percent of Americans wanted to reduce U.S. forces in East Asia , and only 35 percent of Americans were in favor of defending Taiwan .
China ’ s recent belligerence is unnerving , but it offers an opportunity for Taiwan and the United States to have national conversations about the growing Chinese threat and the sacrifices both societies will have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not seize this opportunity , they may not get another .

Since early September, China has been carrying out the most provocative and sustained show of force in the Taiwan Strait in nearly a quarter century. Chinese military patrols, some involving more than 30 combat aircraft and a half-dozen naval ships, have roamed the strait roughly every other day. Many of them have breached the median line between Taiwan and China, a boundary that—until last year—both sides had respected for decades.
Since early September, China has been carrying out the most provocative and sustained show of force in the Taiwan Strait in nearly a quarter century. Chinese military patrols, some involving more than 30 combat aircraft and a half-dozen naval ships, have roamed the strait roughly every other day. Many of them have breached the median line between Taiwan and China, a boundary that—until last year—both sides had respected for decades.
With cross-strait tensions rising, a growing number of American policymakers and pundits, mostly on the political right and center, are calling on the United States to guarantee Taiwan’s security—a firm commitment that the United States has avoided making for more than four decades. These calls build on a series of bipartisan laws passed over the past two years that strengthen America’s moral and diplomatic support for Taiwan in the face of Chinese pressure. But can Taiwan actually be defended?
On paper, the task looks impossible. China’s military is 10 times as large as Taiwan’s and includes Asia’s biggest air force and the world’s largest army, conventional missile force, coast guard, and navy by number of ships. China’s long-range air-defense systems can shoot down aircraft over Taiwan, and China’s land-based missiles and combat aircraft could potentially wipe out Taiwan’s air force and navy and destroy U.S. bases in East Asia in a preemptive strike. China has built several times more naval ships than the United States since 2015, and it now outspends Taiwan 25-to-1 annually on defense. The cross-strait military balance is clearly shifting in China’s favor.
Yet Taiwan retains enduring advantages that could make the island virtually unconquerable—provided that Taipei and Washington capitalize on them. Armadas of the kind China would need to invade or blockade Taiwan are extremely vulnerable to modern missiles and mines. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Strait is perilous—typhoons and 20-foot waves are common most of the year—and Taiwan itself is a natural fortress. Its east coast consists of steep cliffs, and its west coast is dominated by mud flats that extend miles out to sea and are buffeted by severe tides. As a result, there are only a dozen beaches on Taiwan where an invading force could even land.
Taiwan’s defenders also have history on their side. No blockade in the past 200 years has coerced a country into surrendering its sovereignty, and there has been only one successful amphibious invasion of a developed nation in modern history (the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943). All other successful amphibious assaults were against overstretched forces defending hastily dug positions on foreign or contested territory with small arms. If China invaded Taiwan today, it would be attacking massed forces defending fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions.
Given these advantages, a consensus has emerged among many defense experts about how Taiwan should defend itself—and what the United States needs to do to be ready to help. According to this consensus, Taiwan should devote its limited defense budget to acquiring huge arsenals of mobile missile launchers, armed drones, and mines; developing an army that can surge tens of thousands of troops to any beach in an hour backed by a million-strong reserve force trained to fight guerrilla-style in Taiwan’s cities and jungles; and maintaining shelters and massive stockpiles of fuel, medical supplies, food, and water for a population psychologically prepared to ride out a bloody conflict for months. Meanwhile, the United States should disperse and harden its base infrastructure in East Asia and pre-position networks of missile launchers and armed drones near Taiwan. These forces would act as high-tech minefields, capable of decimating a Chinese invasion or blockade force early in a war.
Both governments have already taken important steps to implement these recommendations. For example, Taiwan has pledged to increase defense spending by 10 percent next year and prioritize asymmetric capabilities; the United States has developed plans to string missile launchers and austere airfields along islands opposite China’s coast; and Taiwan and the United States are bringing online sophisticated drones, mines, and missiles.
It could take a decade to retool the Taiwanese and U.S. militaries to mount an effective defense of the island.
But these measures could end up being too little too late. The Taiwanese and U.S. militaries still consist predominantly of small numbers of advanced aircraft, ships, and tanks operating from large bases—precisely the kind of forces that China can now destroy with a surprise air and missile barrage. Given present trends, it could take a decade to retool the Taiwanese and U.S. militaries to mount an effective defense of the island. With China’s rapid military buildup, that may be time that Taiwan does not have.
The list of Taiwan’s military shortcomings is long. More than a quarter of Taiwan’s annual defense budget is earmarked for domestically made ships and submarines that will not be deployed for years, fighter aircraft that may not make it off the ground in a war, and tanks that cannot easily maneuver on beaches or in jungles or cities. As part of its ongoing transition to an all-volunteer military, Taiwan has cut its active-duty force from 275,000 to 175,000 troops and reduced the length of conscription from one year to four months. Recruits receive only a few weeks of basic training, and reservists are called up for just a few days every two years.
Taiwan also has gutted its logistics force and may employ only one civilian maintenance or management worker per 20 troops. By comparison, the U.S. military has one civilian worker supporting every two troops. Taiwan’s depleted logistics teams routinely fail to resupply combat units or perform basic maintenance. Consequently, soldiers avoid training with their weapons for fear of accidents or of wasting precious ammunition. Some estimates suggest that Taiwan’s pilots fly for less than 10 hours per month and that more than half of Taiwan’s tanks and attack helicopters are dysfunctional. Many Taiwanese soldiers lack basic tactical knowledge, have rarely practiced firing their weapons, and suffer low morale. Despite these manpower deficiencies, however, Taiwan’s spending on soldiers’ salaries and benefits has risen steadily and now consumes nearly half the defense budget.
The problems have been apparent for years, but political constraints have stymied major reform. Taiwanese politicians are naturally incentivized to overinvest in battleships and fighter jets and underinvest in well-trained and fully equipped soldiers. Infantry and logistics are boring. But submarines and F-16s are exciting. Meanwhile, reinstating conscription and raising taxes to fund a bigger army would likely spark public outrage. Given these electoral realities, Taiwan’s leaders have gravitated toward military showpieces—while hoping that the United States will save the day if China ever attacks.
At present, however, the United States may not be up to the task. The U.S. military has only two bases within 500 miles of Taiwan—which is also the maximum unrefueled combat radius of U.S. fighter aircraft—and both are easy targets for China’s land-based missiles. If China disables those bases, U.S. air forces would have to operate from vulnerable aircraft carriers and from Guam, located 1,800 miles from Taiwan. The extra distance and midair refueling would cut the number of U.S. air sorties in half, giving China an opportunity to dominate the skies over Taiwan and inflict heavy losses on U.S. forces that try to fight their way into the combat theater.
The overall result is tragic: Taiwan has enormous geographic advantages over China, and the United States has the most powerful military in the world, but their combined legacy forces are routinely routed in war games by a Chinese assault.
The good news is that Taiwan and the United States have developed sound strategies to shore up their defenses, and these strategies have been endorsed by top policymakers in both governments. In war games where Taiwan and the United States follow these plans and use weapons currently under development, the island wins. The question, therefore, is not whether Taiwan can be defended—it definitely can—but whether Taiwan and the United States can revamp their militaries in time to deter a Chinese attack.
Rapid reform requires the Taiwanese and U.S. governments to instill a sense of urgency in their publics. Last year, only 20 percent of Taiwan’s citizens said they were worried that a war with China was imminent, nearly 60 percent of Americans wanted to reduce U.S. forces in East Asia, and only 35 percent of Americans were in favor of defending Taiwan. China’s recent belligerence is unnerving, but it offers an opportunity for Taiwan and the United States to have national conversations about the growing Chinese threat and the sacrifices both societies will have to make to contain it. If they do not seize this opportunity, they may not get another.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--The Water War on the U.S.-Mexico Border Has Just Begun

The Water War on the U.S.-Mexico Border Has Just Begun Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly update on emerging global stories .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : A blockade by farmers in Chihuahua could preview the coming water wars on the U.S.-Mexico border , why Kyrgyzstan has a new dual president-prime minister , and tens of thousands of Thai pro-democracy protesters break a ban on large gatherings in the capital .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Drought-hit farmers in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua have refused to end their occupation of La Boquilla Dam , which they seized in early September , ahead of the looming Oct. 24 deadline for Mexico to pay its annual water debt to the United States .
The two countries share the waters of the cross-border Colorado and Rio Grande rivers as part of a landmark treaty signed in 1944 .
Mexico receives four times more water from the Colorado than it gives to the United States via the Rio Grande .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ repays the United States by releasing 512 million cubic meters of water each year from dams in the country ’ s north .
But Mexico has fallen behind on its obligations to send a certain amount of water north as part of a five-year cycle that ends later this month .
As increased demand and rising temperatures have strained water resources , farmers fear that sending the water north now could devastate their livelihoods .
Throughout the year , farmers have periodically clashed with Mexican military troops at dams in Chihuahua , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Mexico ’ s National Guard .
Battles over water use have long plagued the arid states of the American West .
But the cross-border clash with Mexico is likely a preview of the water conflicts to come , as population growth and climate change increase competition over the vital resource .
Dry regions where a body of freshwater straddles international boundaries , such as the U.S.-Mexico border , are most at risk .
Keen to avoid being dragged into the contentious U.S. presidential election , Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador vowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s water debt to the United States and has said that he would appeal to U.S. President Donald Trump for “ understanding ” if Mexico fails to meet the deadline .
In September , Texas Gov .
Greg Abbott wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , calling on him to enforce Mexico ’ s obligations under the international treaty and warning that it could disrupt farming operations in Texas ’ s Rio Grande Valley .
The treaty does not include any enforcement mechanisms or penalties for noncompliance , and it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could take if the water is not released .
An ultimatum for Lukashenko .
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , the leader of the Belarusian opposition , has set a deadline for President Aleksandr Lukashenko : to step down by Sunday , Oct. 25 , or face a paralyzing general strike .
The move comes after riot police cracked down on peaceful protesters on Oct. 11 with a brutality not seen since the days immediately after the rigged Aug. 9 presidential election .
Last week , Deputy Interior Minister Gennady Kazakevich said police were willing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than two months since the vote , a stalemate appeared to be settling in , but Tikhanovskaya ’ s ultimatum could escalate the situation once more .
“ Tikhanovskaya on one hand must prevent violent escalation , but on the other hand she must give people hope and a task , an instruction to do , ” her international relations advisor , Franak Viacorka , told me last week .
Chile ’ s constitutional referendum .
Chileans go to the polls on Sunday , Oct. 25 , to vote on whether to overhaul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1980 during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet , although frequently modified since the country returned to democracy .
The referendum is the result of the widespread street protests over inequality last year that left more than 30 people dead .
Pinochet ’ s neoliberal reforms in the 1970s , which were codified in the country ’ s constitution , have been credited with transforming Chile into an economic powerhouse , but they also made it one of the most unequal countries in the OECD group of wealthy nations .
Opinion polls show that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitution .
Meet Kyrgyzstan ’ s new president-prime minister .
At the beginning of October , the Kyrgyz politician Sadyr Japarov was serving a 11-year jail sentence for kidnapping a provincial governor in 2013 .
In a remarkable turnaround , Japarov is now serving as both president and prime minister , as disputed parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 have plunged the country into chaos .
After the vote , protesters released Japarov and several other imprisoned political figures .
Japarov was appointed prime minister last week , and his dizzying rise from prison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friday , Kyrgyz lawmakers also appointed him interim president , after President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on Thursday when Japarov supporters threatened to launch an assault on the presidential residence .
The European Union ’ s chief diplomat , Josep Borrell , said Japarov ’ s dual role “ raises serious questions ” about the country ’ s commitment to the rule of law and human rights .
Japarov has pledged that new elections will be held in the coming months .
Pro-democracy protests in Thailand .
Tens of thousands of pro-democracy protesters took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thailand over the weekend , as the government stepped up its efforts to quash the movement .
Gatherings of more than a handful of people are already banned in the capital , and public transport was shut down and water cannons deployed in a bid to disperse weekend demonstrations .
The protests have roiled Thailand in recent months , calling for reforms to limit the power of the monarchy , a new constitution , and new elections .
The country has some of the world ’ s strictest lèse-majesté laws—punishing criticism of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not deterred some protesters .
Socialists are back in Bolivia .
Exit polls after Sunday ’ s presidential election in Bolivia show Luis Arce , the left-wing candidate from former President Evo Morales ’ s Movimiento al Socialismo party , with a double-digit lead .
Morales , who took power in 2006 , fled Bolivia following last year ’ s presidential elections , when the opposition , protesters , and observers accused him of rigging the vote .
Morales ’ s supporters then described his ouster as a right-wing coup .
If confirmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a remarkable comeback for Morales ’ s party and could bolster left-wing movements across Latin America , Jaime Aparicio-Otero writes in Foreign Policy .
Electoral violence in the Ivory Coast .
The home of former Ivory Coast Prime Minister Pascal Affi N ’ Guessan was burned down during clashes in his hometown of Bongouanou on Saturday as tensions escalated ahead of the presidential election on Oct. 31 .
N ’ Guessan and former President Henri Konan Bédié , the two main opposition candidates , have called for a boycott of the vote , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ electoral coup.
” Fears are mounting that the election could spiral into violence , as in 2010 when a disputed vote triggered a civil war that left over 3,000 people dead .
The election has been mired in controversy since Ouattara announced that he would run for a third term after his preferred successor died unexpectedly in July .
While the constitution imposes a two-term limit , Ouattara has argued that his first two terms in office don ’ t count because Ivory Coast adopted a new constitution in 2016 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rainforest could pave the way for new diseases with the potential to become epidemics , the Thomson Reuters Foundation reports .
As insects and wildlife are displaced and humans move deeper into the forest , the diseases could more easily jump from animals to humans .
Brazil ’ s Evandro Chagas Institute , which promotes public health , has already identified 37 viruses in the Amazon that can cause disease in humans , 15 of which could have the potential to cause epidemics .
Renaming convention .
A court in Tunisia ruled on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his name to remove a word that signifies he is the descendant of slaves .
The word atig , which means “ liberated by , ” was added to names of formerly enslaved people , but the landmark court ruling could pave the way for many families to drop the word from their names .
In 2018 , Tunisia became the first Arab country to criminalize racial discrimination , but activists say Black Tunisians , who make up 10 to 15 percent of the population , still face discrimination and socioeconomic marginalization .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly update on emerging global stories.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: A blockade by farmers in Chihuahua could preview the coming water wars on the U.S.-Mexico border, why Kyrgyzstan has a new dual president-prime minister, and tens of thousands of Thai pro-democracy protesters break a ban on large gatherings in the capital.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Mondays, please sign up here.
Clash With Mexico Signals Future Water Conflict
Drought-hit farmers in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua have refused to end their occupation of La Boquilla Dam, which they seized in early September, ahead of the looming Oct. 24 deadline for Mexico to pay its annual water debt to the United States.
The two countries share the waters of the cross-border Colorado and Rio Grande rivers as part of a landmark treaty signed in 1944. Mexico receives four times more water from the Colorado than it gives to the United States via the Rio Grande. As part of the agreement, Mexico repays the United States by releasing 512 million cubic meters of water each year from dams in the country’s north.
But Mexico has fallen behind on its obligations to send a certain amount of water north as part of a five-year cycle that ends later this month. As increased demand and rising temperatures have strained water resources, farmers fear that sending the water north now could devastate their livelihoods. Throughout the year, farmers have periodically clashed with Mexican military troops at dams in Chihuahua, and at least one protester has been killed by Mexico’s National Guard.
Battles over water use have long plagued the arid states of the American West. But the cross-border clash with Mexico is likely a preview of the water conflicts to come, as population growth and climate change increase competition over the vital resource. Dry regions where a body of freshwater straddles international boundaries, such as the U.S.-Mexico border, are most at risk.
Keen to avoid being dragged into the contentious U.S. presidential election, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador vowed last month to repay the country’s water debt to the United States and has said that he would appeal to U.S. President Donald Trump for “understanding” if Mexico fails to meet the deadline.
In September, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, calling on him to enforce Mexico’s obligations under the international treaty and warning that it could disrupt farming operations in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley. The treaty does not include any enforcement mechanisms or penalties for noncompliance, and it’s not clear what steps the United States could take if the water is not released.
The Week Ahead
An ultimatum for Lukashenko. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, has set a deadline for President Aleksandr Lukashenko: to step down by Sunday, Oct. 25, or face a paralyzing general strike.
The move comes after riot police cracked down on peaceful protesters on Oct. 11 with a brutality not seen since the days immediately after the rigged Aug. 9 presidential election. Last week, Deputy Interior Minister Gennady Kazakevich said police were willing to use lethal force against protesters. More than two months since the vote, a stalemate appeared to be settling in, but Tikhanovskaya’s ultimatum could escalate the situation once more.
“Tikhanovskaya on one hand must prevent violent escalation, but on the other hand she must give people hope and a task, an instruction to do,” her international relations advisor, Franak Viacorka, told me last week.
Chile’s constitutional referendum. Chileans go to the polls on Sunday, Oct. 25, to vote on whether to overhaul the country’s constitution—first drafted in 1980 during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, although frequently modified since the country returned to democracy.
The referendum is the result of the widespread street protests over inequality last year that left more than 30 people dead. Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms in the 1970s, which were codified in the country’s constitution, have been credited with transforming Chile into an economic powerhouse, but they also made it one of the most unequal countries in the OECD group of wealthy nations. Opinion polls show that over three-quarters of Chileans support a new constitution.
What We’re Following
Meet Kyrgyzstan’s new president-prime minister. At the beginning of October, the Kyrgyz politician Sadyr Japarov was serving a 11-year jail sentence for kidnapping a provincial governor in 2013. In a remarkable turnaround, Japarov is now serving as both president and prime minister, as disputed parliamentary elections on Oct. 4 have plunged the country into chaos. After the vote, protesters released Japarov and several other imprisoned political figures. Japarov was appointed prime minister last week, and his dizzying rise from prison to power has baffled observers.
On Friday, Kyrgyz lawmakers also appointed him interim president, after President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on Thursday when Japarov supporters threatened to launch an assault on the presidential residence. The European Union’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, said Japarov’s dual role “raises serious questions” about the country’s commitment to the rule of law and human rights. Japarov has pledged that new elections will be held in the coming months.
Pro-democracy protests in Thailand. Tens of thousands of pro-democracy protesters took to the streets in Bangkok and across Thailand over the weekend, as the government stepped up its efforts to quash the movement. Gatherings of more than a handful of people are already banned in the capital, and public transport was shut down and water cannons deployed in a bid to disperse weekend demonstrations.
The protests have roiled Thailand in recent months, calling for reforms to limit the power of the monarchy, a new constitution, and new elections. The country has some of the world’s strictest lèse-majesté laws—punishing criticism of the monarchy with lengthy prison sentences—though that has not deterred some protesters.
Keep an Eye On
Socialists are back in Bolivia. Exit polls after Sunday’s presidential election in Bolivia show Luis Arce, the left-wing candidate from former President Evo Morales’s Movimiento al Socialismo party, with a double-digit lead. Morales, who took power in 2006, fled Bolivia following last year’s presidential elections, when the opposition, protesters, and observers accused him of rigging the vote.
Morales’s supporters then described his ouster as a right-wing coup. If confirmed, Sunday’s results would mark a remarkable comeback for Morales’s party and could bolster left-wing movements across Latin America, Jaime Aparicio-Otero writes in Foreign Policy.
Electoral violence in the Ivory Coast. The home of former Ivory Coast Prime Minister Pascal Affi N’Guessan was burned down during clashes in his hometown of Bongouanou on Saturday as tensions escalated ahead of the presidential election on Oct. 31. N’Guessan and former President Henri Konan Bédié, the two main opposition candidates, have called for a boycott of the vote, accusing President Alassane Ouattara of plotting an “electoral coup.” Fears are mounting that the election could spiral into violence, as in 2010 when a disputed vote triggered a civil war that left over 3,000 people dead.
The election has been mired in controversy since Ouattara announced that he would run for a third term after his preferred successor died unexpectedly in July. While the constitution imposes a two-term limit, Ouattara has argued that his first two terms in office don’t count because Ivory Coast adopted a new constitution in 2016.
The next pandemic? Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest could pave the way for new diseases with the potential to become epidemics, the Thomson Reuters Foundation reports. As insects and wildlife are displaced and humans move deeper into the forest, the diseases could more easily jump from animals to humans.
Brazil’s Evandro Chagas Institute, which promotes public health, has already identified 37 viruses in the Amazon that can cause disease in humans, 15 of which could have the potential to cause epidemics.
Odds and Ends
Renaming convention. A court in Tunisia ruled on Wednesday that an 81-year-old man can change his name to remove a word that signifies he is the descendant of slaves. The word atig, which means “liberated by,” was added to names of formerly enslaved people, but the landmark court ruling could pave the way for many families to drop the word from their names.
In 2018, Tunisia became the first Arab country to criminalize racial discrimination, but activists say Black Tunisians, who make up 10 to 15 percent of the population, still face discrimination and socioeconomic marginalization.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Trump to Remove Sudan From Terrorist List, Following Behind-the-Scenes Pressure on Israel

Trump to Remove Sudan From Terrorist List , Following Behind-the-Scenes Pressure on Israel President Donald Trump announced on Monday that the United States will remove Sudan from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism , paving the way for the East African country to join the global financial system after nearly three decades as an international pariah and setting the stage for Khartoum to normalize relations with Israel .
The United States had already agreed in principle to lift Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list , after it agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of a U.S. naval vessel in Yemen in 2000 .
The United States accused the former Sudanese regime of supporting those attacks , carried out by al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden .
But in recent weeks , the Trump administration balked on the agreement , refusing to announce it unless Sudan first agreed to recognize Israel , thereby netting the Trump administration another diplomatic victory ahead of the 2020 elections , according to current and former officials familiar with the matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of behind-the-scenes negotiations that cut the State Department ’ s Africa bureau largely out of deliberations , according to current and former officials and congressional aides familiar with the matter .
In a final agreement that came together over the weekend , officials said , Trump would announce that Sudan would be taken off the terrorism list .
In exchange , in addition to a plan to pay more than $ 300 million for terrorism restitution , Sudan ’ s transitional government is expected to announce it will begin the process of normalizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That ’ s a top priority for the Trump administration after laying the groundwork for the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to reestablish formal diplomatic relations with Israel earlier this year .
Officials familiar with the matter described negotiations between the United States and Sudan as fraught and tense given the Trump administration ’ s pressure on Sudan to recognize Israel—a politically delicate move in the Arab country , as its post-revolution government struggles with political fragility and an economy on the brink of collapse .
To sweeten the deal , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raft of economic and political inducements , current and former officials said .
This includes additional humanitarian assistance , a U.S. trade and investment conference along with organizing a high-level trade delegation to Sudan led by the Development Finance Corporation , a pledge from the United States to expedite discussions with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for sorely needed economic relief , and U.S. assistance on debt relief .
A popular revolution in Sudan in 2019 ousted the country ’ s longtime authoritarian leader , Omar al-Bashir , after nearly three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his government was accused of supporting terrorist groups , widespread human rights abuses , and crimes against humanity and genocide in the country ’ s Darfur region .
“ From a symbolic sense , it really is a definitive end of the Bashir era , and it is resetting the relationship with the United States which had been on a very antagonistic track for the better part of 30 years , ” said Cameron Hudson , an expert on East Africa with the Atlantic Council and a former diplomat .
“ From a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political win to the transitional government and it opens up new channels for financing and economic support that the country desperately needs.
” The new transitional government , led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok , has faltered amid political disputes and a poor economy , along with internal power struggles , as elements of Bashir ’ s former regime still retain power .
Sudan , North Korea , Syria , and Iran are the only four countries on the State Department ’ s list of state sponsors of terrorism .
Sudan was first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s announcement begins a process in which Sudan will transfer $ 335 million into escrow accounts , which would then in turn be distributed to victims and families of victims of the terrorist attacks in the 1990s as Congress reaches a deal to grant Sudan “ legal peace ” and resolve the legal claims against it ; negotiations on Capitol Hill are still ongoing .
The president will notify Congress of his intent to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism , and from there , unless Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through .
“ By any objective metric , this is a historic step forward for Sudan , ” said Ed Royce , a former Republican congressman who served as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and now represents some of the families of victims of the 1998 embassy bombings .
“ But it only happens if this Congress ratifies this deal .
Whatever your political stripes are , doing right by the victims and families of those who lost their lives in terror attacks like the 1998 Nairobi bombing is something both parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encourage the leaders in both the Senate and House to act.
” The Trump administration made sure to cut career diplomats out of the talks , keeping only the National Security Council and some senior State Department officials in the loop .
Both the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s own special envoy to Sudan , Donald Booth , were largely sidelined during the negotiations , current and former officials said .
The State Department declined to comment , referring the matter to the White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a request for comment .
But even Trump ’ s announcement may not be the end of Sudan ’ s headaches—or give it full access to global financial markets .
Sudan still faces outstanding legal claims from families of victims of terrorism , including those of the 9/11 attacks .
Congress has for months worked to advance legislation that would grant Sudan “ legal peace ” —thereby absolving it of further legal claims in American courts as a sovereign country .
Some families of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have launched @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such a move , saying they want their day in court to determine whether Sudan bears any responsibility for the attacks .
Privately , some U.S. officials cast doubt on whether Sudan ’ s former regime played any role in those attacks , since bin Laden had left Sudan and was in Afghanistan at the time .
Without legal peace , lawyers who represent the families of victims of terrorist attacks could still impede business dealings between the United States and Sudan by pursuing any Sudanese assets found in the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ This article was updated to clarify the terms of deal under which the families of victims of terrorist attacks would receive compensation from Sudan .

President Donald Trump announced on Monday that the United States will remove Sudan from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism, paving the way for the East African country to join the global financial system after nearly three decades as an international pariah and setting the stage for Khartoum to normalize relations with Israel.
President Donald Trump announced on Monday that the United States will remove Sudan from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism, paving the way for the East African country to join the global financial system after nearly three decades as an international pariah and setting the stage for Khartoum to normalize relations with Israel.
The United States had already agreed in principle to lift Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list, after it agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to the families of victims of terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of a U.S. naval vessel in Yemen in 2000. The United States accused the former Sudanese regime of supporting those attacks, carried out by al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden.
But in recent weeks, the Trump administration balked on the agreement, refusing to announce it unless Sudan first agreed to recognize Israel, thereby netting the Trump administration another diplomatic victory ahead of the 2020 elections, according to current and former officials familiar with the matter.
The announcement Monday came after months of behind-the-scenes negotiations that cut the State Department’s Africa bureau largely out of deliberations, according to current and former officials and congressional aides familiar with the matter. In a final agreement that came together over the weekend, officials said, Trump would announce that Sudan would be taken off the terrorism list. In exchange, in addition to a plan to pay more than $300 million for terrorism restitution, Sudan’s transitional government is expected to announce it will begin the process of normalizing ties with Israel in the coming week. That’s a top priority for the Trump administration after laying the groundwork for the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to reestablish formal diplomatic relations with Israel earlier this year.
Officials familiar with the matter described negotiations between the United States and Sudan as fraught and tense given the Trump administration’s pressure on Sudan to recognize Israel—a politically delicate move in the Arab country, as its post-revolution government struggles with political fragility and an economy on the brink of collapse.
To sweeten the deal, the United States has quietly offered Sudan a raft of economic and political inducements, current and former officials said. This includes additional humanitarian assistance, a U.S. trade and investment conference along with organizing a high-level trade delegation to Sudan led by the Development Finance Corporation, a pledge from the United States to expedite discussions with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank for sorely needed economic relief, and U.S. assistance on debt relief.
A popular revolution in Sudan in 2019 ousted the country’s longtime authoritarian leader, Omar al-Bashir, after nearly three decades in power, during which time his government was accused of supporting terrorist groups, widespread human rights abuses, and crimes against humanity and genocide in the country’s Darfur region.
“From a symbolic sense, it really is a definitive end of the Bashir era, and it is resetting the relationship with the United States which had been on a very antagonistic track for the better part of 30 years,” said Cameron Hudson, an expert on East Africa with the Atlantic Council and a former diplomat. “From a practical side, it is a huge political win to the transitional government and it opens up new channels for financing and economic support that the country desperately needs.”
The new transitional government, led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, has faltered amid political disputes and a poor economy, along with internal power struggles, as elements of Bashir’s former regime still retain power.
Sudan, North Korea, Syria, and Iran are the only four countries on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Sudan was first placed on the list in 1993.
Trump’s announcement begins a process in which Sudan will transfer $335 million into escrow accounts, which would then in turn be distributed to victims and families of victims of the terrorist attacks in the 1990s as Congress reaches a deal to grant Sudan “legal peace” and resolve the legal claims against it; negotiations on Capitol Hill are still ongoing. The president will notify Congress of his intent to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and from there, unless Congress voices its disapproval, the arrangement goes through.
“By any objective metric, this is a historic step forward for Sudan,” said Ed Royce, a former Republican congressman who served as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and now represents some of the families of victims of the 1998 embassy bombings. “But it only happens if this Congress ratifies this deal. Whatever your political stripes are, doing right by the victims and families of those who lost their lives in terror attacks like the 1998 Nairobi bombing is something both parties should agree must be done and I encourage the leaders in both the Senate and House to act.”
The Trump administration made sure to cut career diplomats out of the talks, keeping only the National Security Council and some senior State Department officials in the loop. Both the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s own special envoy to Sudan, Donald Booth, were largely sidelined during the negotiations, current and former officials said.
The State Department declined to comment, referring the matter to the White House. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
But even Trump’s announcement may not be the end of Sudan’s headaches—or give it full access to global financial markets. Sudan still faces outstanding legal claims from families of victims of terrorism, including those of the 9/11 attacks. Congress has for months worked to advance legislation that would grant Sudan “legal peace”—thereby absolving it of further legal claims in American courts as a sovereign country. Some families of victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have launched a campaign to convince lawmakers to oppose such a move, saying they want their day in court to determine whether Sudan bears any responsibility for the attacks. Privately, some U.S. officials cast doubt on whether Sudan’s former regime played any role in those attacks, since bin Laden had left Sudan and was in Afghanistan at the time.
Without legal peace, lawyers who represent the families of victims of terrorist attacks could still impede business dealings between the United States and Sudan by pursuing any Sudanese assets found in the United States.
Update, Oct. 19, 2020: This article was updated to clarify the terms of deal under which the families of victims of terrorist attacks would receive compensation from Sudan.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--‘Tired of the Game’: Palestinian Americans Want Trump Out but Have Issues With Biden

‘ Tired of the Game ’ : Palestinian Americans Want Trump Out but Have Issues With Biden Many Palestinian community leaders in Dearborn , Michigan—home to the small but vocal Palestinian American community that helped elect Rep. Rashida Tlaib to Congress—are urging voters to turn out for Joe Biden next month with two simple pleas .
First , vote out President Donald Trump .
Then , after Election Day , begin holding the Democratic ticket ’ s feet to the fire on Palestinian issues .
The first part of that recipe doesn ’ t seem too hard .
Resentment among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy has been characterized by unyielding support for Israel , the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid .
Palestinians , who say Trump has rewritten the rules on U.S. Israel policy , are particularly frustrated with Trump ’ s move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and his 2018 decision to withdraw funding from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency .
They ’ re also feeling energized after the George Floyd protests this summer , seeing reflections of Palestinians ’ treatment under Israeli occupation in Black Americans ’ oft-deadly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ question in this Detroit suburb of nearly 100,000 people—known as the “ Arab capital of America ” —is whether the cynical message of harm reduction will resonate for the Democratic challenger in must-win Michigan , where some feel that Democrats have long taken Palestinian votes for granted despite doing little to earn them .
“ [ We ’ re ] just kind of tired of the game , ” said Ahmad Abuznaid , a Palestinian American lawyer and activist born in Jerusalem and now based in Dearborn .
“ I think most of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at this moment … but also , none of us are fooled by Biden .
Biden is particularly bad on some of our biggest issues.
” Abuznaid mentioned Biden ’ s support for the Iraq War and his “ unapologetic Zionism ” as red flags for the Palestinian American community .
Biden ’ s official platform markets a “ stalwart support for Israel ” that is “ deeply personal and spans his entire career ” ; the former vice president has also said he ’ d leave the embassy in Jerusalem .
Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Harris to the ticket—who has strong ties to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and has pledged to provide unconditional support for Israel—as a sign that these norms won ’ t be changing anytime soon .
Still , some Dearborn residents worry that focusing too much on their own disappointments with the Democratic ticket could hand Trump a second term , which they feel would be worse than anything a Biden-Harris administration could do .
“ We can ’ t risk having the nuanced conversations right now because there are people looking for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Tariq Luthun , a Palestinian American data consultant , poet , and community organizer whose family is from Gaza .
Even Palestinian leaders in the Palestinian territories , who have traditionally refrained from taking a public stance on U.S. presidential elections , are getting worried about the implications of four more years of Trump .
Last week , Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh told European leaders that “ God help the whole world ” if Trump is reelected .
Most of Dearborn ’ s Palestinian immigrants came to Michigan in waves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and 1967 .
The two episodes of massive displacement are known to Palestinians as the nakba and the naksa , respectively .
In Palestinian eyes , the nakba , which means “ catastrophe , ” was only the first of further catastrophes yet to come : Many consider the U.S.-brokered 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO to be a turning point that essentially normalized Israeli settlements on Palestinian land , thereby jeopardizing any hopes of a two-state solution .
Today , though the United Nations and European Union have declared Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still controls more than 60 percent of the West Bank .
This trend is only accelerating : Just last week , Israel announced plans to build 4,430 new housing units on Palestinian land .
With only 18 percent of the West Bank under full Palestinian control ( the remaining 21 percent is under joint Israeli-Palestinian control ) , most younger Palestinian Americans see a two-state solution as obsolete and favor a single , secular state—the solution initially advocated by the PLO in its 1964 charter .
And they ’ re not alone : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Maryland found that roughly the same percentage of Americans ( 35 percent ) supported a one-state solution as they did a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
“ A lot of people don ’ t know the story of Palestine .
They don ’ t know about our occupation .
They don ’ t know what happened , ” said a 23-year-old social worker born and raised in Dearborn who spoke on the condition of anonymity because she does not want to jeopardize her ability to enter Israel and the Palestinian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s two parties that were [ always ] there are now fighting over land .
… I have to explain to [ people ] all the time : ‘ No , Israel was not a country before ’ 48 !
’ ” The social worker , whose family is from the village of Beit Hanina , said she simply wants to be able to “ go home ” —and for all Palestinians to be able to “ go back to our land and our roots , ” whether in Haifa or Hebron—that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ [ As ] we ’ ve seen in America , ‘ separate but equal ’ will never work .
If you ’ re indigenous to the land , you have every right to be there.
” She considers Israel ’ s bifurcated system of rights and land allocation to be tantamount to apartheid .
But Dearborn ’ s Palestinians don ’ t expect their right of return to be granted anytime soon , even with a Biden victory .
Despite pressure from the progressive wing of the party , the Democratic Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Israel as an occupying power in the Palestinian territories , making it unlikely any future Biden administration would take decisive action against Israeli settlement expansion—like conditioning aid—much less call for a military withdrawal from the Palestinian territories .
As a result , most Palestinians regard U.S. politics as an exercise in futility .
The United States has been at the forefront of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Israel ’ s inception—and Palestinians ’ mass displacement—in 1948 , yet U.S. leaders ’ reluctance to stand up to Israel has borne little fruit in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 72 years later , Palestinians still aren ’ t free .
“ It ’ s like people arguing over a piece of pizza , but as you ’ re arguing somebody ’ s literally eating the pizza , ” Luthun said of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land .
“ There ’ s no slices left .
”

Many Palestinian community leaders in Dearborn, Michigan—home to the small but vocal Palestinian American community that helped elect Rep. Rashida Tlaib to Congress—are urging voters to turn out for Joe Biden next month with two simple pleas. First, vote out President Donald Trump. Then, after Election Day, begin holding the Democratic ticket’s feet to the fire on Palestinian issues.
Many Palestinian community leaders in Dearborn, Michigan—home to the small but vocal Palestinian American community that helped elect Rep. Rashida Tlaib to Congress—are urging voters to turn out for Joe Biden next month with two simple pleas. First, vote out President Donald Trump. Then, after Election Day, begin holding the Democratic ticket’s feet to the fire on Palestinian issues.
The first part of that recipe doesn’t seem too hard. Resentment among Palestinians here runs high against Trump—whose foreign policy has been characterized by unyielding support for Israel, the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Palestinians, who say Trump has rewritten the rules on U.S. Israel policy, are particularly frustrated with Trump’s move of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and his 2018 decision to withdraw funding from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. They’re also feeling energized after the George Floyd protests this summer, seeing reflections of Palestinians’ treatment under Israeli occupation in Black Americans’ oft-deadly experiences with law enforcement.
But the question in this Detroit suburb of nearly 100,000 people—known as the “Arab capital of America”—is whether the cynical message of harm reduction will resonate for the Democratic challenger in must-win Michigan, where some feel that Democrats have long taken Palestinian votes for granted despite doing little to earn them.
“[We’re] just kind of tired of the game,” said Ahmad Abuznaid, a Palestinian American lawyer and activist born in Jerusalem and now based in Dearborn. “I think most of us are in line with defeating fascism at this moment … but also, none of us are fooled by Biden. Biden is particularly bad on some of our biggest issues.”
Abuznaid mentioned Biden’s support for the Iraq War and his “unapologetic Zionism” as red flags for the Palestinian American community. Biden’s official platform markets a “stalwart support for Israel” that is “deeply personal and spans his entire career”; the former vice president has also said he’d leave the embassy in Jerusalem. Many see the addition of California Sen. Kamala Harris to the ticket—who has strong ties to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and has pledged to provide unconditional support for Israel—as a sign that these norms won’t be changing anytime soon.
Still, some Dearborn residents worry that focusing too much on their own disappointments with the Democratic ticket could hand Trump a second term, which they feel would be worse than anything a Biden-Harris administration could do.
“There’s a general sentiment that we can’t risk having the nuanced conversations right now because there are people looking for any reason not to support Biden,” said Tariq Luthun, a Palestinian American data consultant, poet, and community organizer whose family is from Gaza. Even Palestinian leaders in the Palestinian territories, who have traditionally refrained from taking a public stance on U.S. presidential elections, are getting worried about the implications of four more years of Trump. Last week, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh told European leaders that “God help the whole world” if Trump is reelected.
Most of Dearborn’s Palestinian immigrants came to Michigan in waves, after the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967. The two episodes of massive displacement are known to Palestinians as the nakba and the naksa, respectively. In Palestinian eyes, the nakba, which means “catastrophe,” was only the first of further catastrophes yet to come: Many consider the U.S.-brokered 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO to be a turning point that essentially normalized Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, thereby jeopardizing any hopes of a two-state solution.
Today, though the United Nations and European Union have declared Israeli settlements illegal under international law, Israel still controls more than 60 percent of the West Bank. This trend is only accelerating: Just last week, Israel announced plans to build 4,430 new housing units on Palestinian land.
With only 18 percent of the West Bank under full Palestinian control (the remaining 21 percent is under joint Israeli-Palestinian control), most younger Palestinian Americans see a two-state solution as obsolete and favor a single, secular state—the solution initially advocated by the PLO in its 1964 charter. And they’re not alone: A 2018 poll conducted by the University of Maryland found that roughly the same percentage of Americans (35 percent) supported a one-state solution as they did a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“A lot of people don’t know the story of Palestine. They don’t know about our occupation. They don’t know what happened,” said a 23-year-old social worker born and raised in Dearborn who spoke on the condition of anonymity because she does not want to jeopardize her ability to enter Israel and the Palestinian territories. “They think it’s two parties that were [always] there are now fighting over land. … I have to explain to [people] all the time: ‘No, Israel was not a country before ’48!’”
The social worker, whose family is from the village of Beit Hanina, said she simply wants to be able to “go home”—and for all Palestinians to be able to “go back to our land and our roots,” whether in Haifa or Hebron—that is, the areas of pre-1948 Palestine. “[As] we’ve seen in America, ‘separate but equal’ will never work. If you’re indigenous to the land, you have every right to be there.” She considers Israel’s bifurcated system of rights and land allocation to be tantamount to apartheid.
But Dearborn’s Palestinians don’t expect their right of return to be granted anytime soon, even with a Biden victory. Despite pressure from the progressive wing of the party, the Democratic Party’s official platform does not refer to Israel as an occupying power in the Palestinian territories, making it unlikely any future Biden administration would take decisive action against Israeli settlement expansion—like conditioning aid—much less call for a military withdrawal from the Palestinian territories.
As a result, most Palestinians regard U.S. politics as an exercise in futility. The United States has been at the forefront of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since Israel’s inception—and Palestinians’ mass displacement—in 1948, yet U.S. leaders’ reluctance to stand up to Israel has borne little fruit in the way of Palestinian self-determination. Now, 72 years later, Palestinians still aren’t free.
“It’s like people arguing over a piece of pizza, but as you’re arguing somebody’s literally eating the pizza,” Luthun said of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land. “There’s no slices left.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-19--Document of the Week: When Ordering the Assassination of a World Leader Required Secrecy

Document of the Week : When Ordering the Assassination of a World Leader Required Secrecy There was a time when ordering the overthrow or assassination of a foreign head of state was a top-secret affair , not something the so-called leader of the free world would boast about on morning television .
But U.S. President Donald Trump did just that last month , complaining on Fox & Friends that his plans to assassinate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were ultimately nixed by then-Defense Secretary James Mattis .
“ I would ’ ve rather taken him out .
I had him all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do it , ” Trump said .
But while Trump may be the first U.S. president to brag publicly about putting another world leader in the crosshairs , he is hardly the first to do so .
Fifty years ago , President Richard Nixon triggered a series of covert actions aimed at either preventing Chilean leftist politician Salvador Allende ’ s from being inaugurated president of Chile or overthrowing him if he took office , which he did on Nov. 3 , 1970 .
The White House ultimately triggered a military coup @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the presidential palace in 1973 , shooting himself with an AK-47 rifle that was reportedly give to him by the Cuban leader Fidel Castro .
The episode , which tarnished Washington ’ s reputation in Latin America and beyond , provides a good opportunity to reflect on the impact U.S. regime change has had on American standing in the world .
In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the beginnings of the U.S. plot , the National Security Archive assembled a collection of previously declassified documents detailing Nixon ’ s fevered attempts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15 , 1970 , Nixon ordered the CIA to help instigate a military coup against Allende during a closed-door Oval Office meeting with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and CIA Director Richard Helms , whose notes from that meeting we will be highlighting as part of our Document of the Week series .
“ Fifty years after it was written , Helm ’ s cryptic memorandum of conversation with Nixon remains the only known record of a U.S. president ordering the covert overthrow of a democratically elected leader abroad , ” according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Archives .
The notes , which Helms scrawled in barely legible script , do not explicitly call for Allende ’ s overthrow .
But they make clear that shady business is afoot , that it ’ s going to be expensive , and that there is not a high degree of confidence that it is going to succeed .
“ 1 in 10 chance perhaps , but save Chile !
” Helms wrote .
“ [ N ] ot concerned risks involved .
no involvement of embassy .
$ 10,000,000 available , more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have .
Game plan .
Make the economy scream.
” The meeting came several months after Nixon had requested an “ urgent review ” of U.S. interests and options in the country , according to the archive .
That review , which was concluded in August 1970 , included a top-secret annex that outlined plans for a covert operation effort to foment a military coup .
The annex , titled “ Extreme Option—Overthrow Allende , ” relied on the willingness of the Chilean military brass to move against a democratically elected president , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do .
The effort would also pose risks to America ’ s standing in Chile and abroad .
“ An unsuccessful attempt , involving as it probably would revelation of U.S. participation , would have grave consequences for our relations with Chile , in the hemisphere , in the United States and elsewhere in the world , ” according to the top-secret annex .
“ Were the overthrow effort to be successful , and even were U.S. participation to remain covert—which we can not assure—the United States would become hostage to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would probably be cut off for years from most other political forces in the country.
” By the second week of September 1970 , the CIA was instructing its operatives to foment economic , political , and psychological warfare in an effort to create a climate for a coup .
Following the election , the CIA developed a two-pronged strategy .
It first pressed the outgoing Chilean President Eduardo Frei to annul the election result , appoint a military cabinet , and appoint a transitional figurehead president , but Frei wouldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ chaos formula ” and involved creating a “ coup climate ” that would “ provide the Chilean military with the pretext for seizing power , ” according to the National Security Archives .
The plan faced stiff resistance from within the U.S. government , including the State Department and the CIA station chief in Chile , who argued that the effort stood little chance of success and would harm long-term U.S. interests .
But the plot moved ahead with its efforts to destabilize Chile , funneling money and weapons to anti-Allende @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the commander in chief of Chile ’ s armed forces , Gen. René Schneider , in October 1970 .
The efforts didn ’ t prevent Allende from taking office , but they ultimately laid the groundwork for Gen. Augusto Pinochet to seize power in a military coup on Sept. 11 , 1973 .
The CIA-backed overthrow of Allende ’ s government , which followed earlier CIA plots that helped topple democratic governments in Guatemala and Iran , left a stain on America ’ s self-styled reputation as a champion of democracy .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more years of Trump , who has sought to undercut and ultimately oust governments in Iran and Venezuela , might restore America ’ s taste for taking out foreign leaders who stand in its way .

There was a time when ordering the overthrow or assassination of a foreign head of state was a top-secret affair, not something the so-called leader of the free world would boast about on morning television. But U.S. President Donald Trump did just that last month, complaining on Fox & Friends that his plans to assassinate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were ultimately nixed by then-Defense Secretary James Mattis. “I would’ve rather taken him out. I had him all set. Mattis didn’t want to do it,” Trump said .
There was a time when ordering the overthrow or assassination of a foreign head of state was a top-secret affair, not something the so-called leader of the free world would boast about on morning television. But U.S. President Donald Trump did just that last month, complaining on Fox & Friends that his plans to assassinate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were ultimately nixed by then-Defense Secretary James Mattis. “I would’ve rather taken him out. I had him all set. Mattis didn’t want to do it,” Trump said.
But while Trump may be the first U.S. president to brag publicly about putting another world leader in the crosshairs, he is hardly the first to do so.
Fifty years ago, President Richard Nixon triggered a series of covert actions aimed at either preventing Chilean leftist politician Salvador Allende’s from being inaugurated president of Chile or overthrowing him if he took office, which he did on Nov. 3, 1970. The White House ultimately triggered a military coup against Allende, who died by suicide in the presidential palace in 1973, shooting himself with an AK-47 rifle that was reportedly give to him by the Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
The episode, which tarnished Washington’s reputation in Latin America and beyond, provides a good opportunity to reflect on the impact U.S. regime change has had on American standing in the world. In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the beginnings of the U.S. plot, the National Security Archive assembled a collection of previously declassified documents detailing Nixon’s fevered attempts to take Allende down.
On Sept. 15, 1970, Nixon ordered the CIA to help instigate a military coup against Allende during a closed-door Oval Office meeting with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and CIA Director Richard Helms, whose notes from that meeting we will be highlighting as part of our Document of the Week series. “Fifty years after it was written, Helm’s cryptic memorandum of conversation with Nixon remains the only known record of a U.S. president ordering the covert overthrow of a democratically elected leader abroad,” according to an account by the National Security Archives.
The notes, which Helms scrawled in barely legible script, do not explicitly call for Allende’s overthrow. But they make clear that shady business is afoot, that it’s going to be expensive, and that there is not a high degree of confidence that it is going to succeed. “1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!” Helms wrote. “[N]ot concerned risks involved. no involvement of embassy. $10,000,000 available, more if necessary. Full-time job—best men we have. Game plan. Make the economy scream.”
The meeting came several months after Nixon had requested an “urgent review” of U.S. interests and options in the country, according to the archive. That review, which was concluded in August 1970, included a top-secret annex that outlined plans for a covert operation effort to foment a military coup. The annex, titled “Extreme Option—Overthrow Allende,” relied on the willingness of the Chilean military brass to move against a democratically elected president, something U.S. diplomats believed they were prepared to do. The effort would also pose risks to America’s standing in Chile and abroad.
“An unsuccessful attempt, involving as it probably would revelation of U.S. participation, would have grave consequences for our relations with Chile, in the hemisphere, in the United States and elsewhere in the world,” according to the top-secret annex. “Were the overthrow effort to be successful, and even were U.S. participation to remain covert—which we cannot assure—the United States would become hostage to the elements we backed in the overthrow and would probably be cut off for years from most other political forces in the country.”
By the second week of September 1970, the CIA was instructing its operatives to foment economic, political, and psychological warfare in an effort to create a climate for a coup. Following the election, the CIA developed a two-pronged strategy. It first pressed the outgoing Chilean President Eduardo Frei to annul the election result, appoint a military cabinet, and appoint a transitional figurehead president, but Frei wouldn’t do it. Option B was dubbed the “chaos formula” and involved creating a “coup climate” that would “provide the Chilean military with the pretext for seizing power,” according to the National Security Archives.
The plan faced stiff resistance from within the U.S. government, including the State Department and the CIA station chief in Chile, who argued that the effort stood little chance of success and would harm long-term U.S. interests. But the plot moved ahead with its efforts to destabilize Chile, funneling money and weapons to anti-Allende elements and aiding in the assassination of the commander in chief of Chile’s armed forces, Gen. René Schneider, in October 1970. The efforts didn’t prevent Allende from taking office, but they ultimately laid the groundwork for Gen. Augusto Pinochet to seize power in a military coup on Sept. 11, 1973.
The CIA-backed overthrow of Allende’s government, which followed earlier CIA plots that helped topple democratic governments in Guatemala and Iran, left a stain on America’s self-styled reputation as a champion of democracy. It has also fueled concerns that another four more years of Trump, who has sought to undercut and ultimately oust governments in Iran and Venezuela, might restore America’s taste for taking out foreign leaders who stand in its way.