foreignpolicy--2020-05-20--Why the WHO Investigation Won’t Work

Why the WHO Investigation Won’t Work

Why the WHO Investigation Won ’ t Work Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Beijing backs a WHO investigation , tensions rise along the China-India border , and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen begins her second term .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
China ’ s participation in a “ comprehensive review ” of the origins of the coronavirus led by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) is unlikely to produce any real results .
While WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of its member states , China ’ s influence within the organization means that the results are likely to come late—and to be compromised .
An actual investigation would require a level of access and transparency that is now unthinkable as China ’ s party-state system reaches new peaks of paranoia .
Only Chinese officials possess the bureaucratic knowledge and coercive power required to meaningfully investigate the possibilities , such as a covered-up biosafety accident or deliberate delays by the local authorities seeking to protect themselves .
That ’ s why even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a WHO investigation : Moscow is confident that the odds of the organization producing a result unfavorable to Beijing are low .
Meanwhile , the Trump administration has effectively abandoned any possible U.S. leverage with WHO by cutting funding .
On Wednesday , President Donald Trump accused China of blaming “ anyone but itself ” for the coronavirus .
The blatant domestic politicization of the crisis—by a president who is desperate to evade responsibility for the world ’ s worst outbreak—leaves U.S. government calls for accountability as lacking in credibility as China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric in the United States increasingly turns on the idea of punishing China for the coronavirus .
But there are very few mechanisms by which the United States could effectively accomplish this without significant coalition-building .
The pandemic instead looks like the deciding push toward a new cold war—but one in which neither side holds much ideological appeal for other countries .
Indian border tensions .
Both China and India have downplayed recent clashes between their forces on the Himalayan border .
Even though 11 soldiers—four Indian and seven Chinese—were injured during a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frequent site of fistfights between border patrols , neither Beijing nor New Delhi has the stomach for another standoff while handling the pandemic .
Both sides have deployed more troops to the disputed area but seem inclined to handle the matter diplomatically .
India and China have a long history of border skirmishes , which produced the short Sino-Indian War of 1962 , when China advanced deep into Indian territory before retreating to its own chosen border lines .
But despite the frequent scuffles , neither side has fired a bullet across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s second term .
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen , who won a landslide reelection victory in January , was inaugurated for her second term today .
Tsai , a careful advocate of Taiwanese independence , has become a bête noire for Beijing , which both overtly and covertly backed her opponent , the pro-Chinese populist Han Kuo-yu .
Beijing ’ s hopes of peaceful reunification have been dashed by Taiwanese public opinion , with Taiwanese increasingly distrusting China ’ s aggression and ideological rigidity .
Hong Kong crackdown .
One reason why Taiwan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actions in Hong Kong .
Under the cover of the pandemic ’ s restrictions on protest , Hong Kong ’ s government continues to squeeze away the city ’ s limited democracy and freedom of speech .
The latest move came this week after the public broadcaster shut down a popular satirical TV show for making fun of the city ’ s now-notorious police force .
Meanwhile in the legislative chamber , pro-democracy lawmakers were dragged out by those on the pro-Beijing side , who outnumber them thanks only to the city ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a vaccine .
Beijing is leading the global race for a coronavirus vaccine : Half of the vaccines approved for human trials have been developed inside China .
But early results for vaccines in the United States and Britain are showing promise that hasn ’ t yet been reported in China , where the vaccine industry is troubled by safety and ethical issues .
Even if a vaccine is found within the next six to 12 months—which would be record-breaking—production and distribution will prove tricky for whichever country gets its hands on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and China have pockets of anti-vaccine sentiment .
Online education fraud ?
After successfully taking down Luckin Coffee—which announced it would be delisted from Nasdaq this week—the due diligence firm Muddy Waters Research is going after a huge online education firm , GSX Techedu .
Muddy Waters accuses 80 percent of the firm ’ s users of being bots created to artificially raise numbers .
Even before the pandemic , online learning was big business in China—with parents often signing up for initial cheap deals and then dropping programs in favor of newer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Hotels struggling .
Hilton is the latest hotel chain to reopen its locations in China , following domestic competitors who have begun welcoming guests in the last few weeks .
Overall hotel occupancy fell to as low as 10 percent during the worst of the pandemic and has been recovering gradually since .
It is now at around the 40 percent mark—very low in ordinary times , but now a sign of hope for a struggling industry .
Ironically , hotels in Wuhan retained over 60 percent occupancy throughout the outbreak due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials flown in from elsewhere .
Robert Bickers , a British historian , is one of the finest writers on Chinese history .
Empire Made Me , his account of an English thug ’ s life and death in colonial Shanghai , is an essential read .
His new book dives deep into John Swire & Sons , a firm born out of British imperial interests in China that is now a global corporation .
Bickers turns what could have been a dry read into a tale of intrigue , war , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last few decades , in which the firm remained a serious player in Asia .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing backs a WHO investigation , tensions rise along the China-India border , and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen begins her second term.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing backs a WHO investigation, tensions rise along the China-India border, and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen begins her second term.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
China’s Influence Will Derail WHO Investigation
China’s participation in a “comprehensive review” of the origins of the coronavirus led by the World Health Organization (WHO) is unlikely to produce any real results. While WHO agreed to launch an investigation backed by most of its member states, China’s influence within the organization means that the results are likely to come late—and to be compromised. An actual investigation would require a level of access and transparency that is now unthinkable as China’s party-state system reaches new peaks of paranoia.
Only Chinese officials possess the bureaucratic knowledge and coercive power required to meaningfully investigate the possibilities, such as a covered-up biosafety accident or deliberate delays by the local authorities seeking to protect themselves. That’s why even Russia—an ally of China—backed the call for a WHO investigation: Moscow is confident that the odds of the organization producing a result unfavorable to Beijing are low.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has effectively abandoned any possible U.S. leverage with WHO by cutting funding. On Wednesday, President Donald Trump accused China of blaming “anyone but itself” for the coronavirus. The blatant domestic politicization of the crisis—by a president who is desperate to evade responsibility for the world’s worst outbreak—leaves U.S. government calls for accountability as lacking in credibility as China’s.
“Punish China.” Right-wing rhetoric in the United States increasingly turns on the idea of punishing China for the coronavirus. But there are very few mechanisms by which the United States could effectively accomplish this without significant coalition-building. The pandemic instead looks like the deciding push toward a new cold war—but one in which neither side holds much ideological appeal for other countries.
What We’re Following
Indian border tensions. Both China and India have downplayed recent clashes between their forces on the Himalayan border. Even though 11 soldiers—four Indian and seven Chinese—were injured during a scuffle at Pangong Tso Lake, a frequent site of fistfights between border patrols, neither Beijing nor New Delhi has the stomach for another standoff while handling the pandemic. Both sides have deployed more troops to the disputed area but seem inclined to handle the matter diplomatically.
India and China have a long history of border skirmishes, which produced the short Sino-Indian War of 1962, when China advanced deep into Indian territory before retreating to its own chosen border lines. But despite the frequent scuffles, neither side has fired a bullet across the border in four decades.
Tsai’s second term. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, who won a landslide reelection victory in January, was inaugurated for her second term today. Tsai, a careful advocate of Taiwanese independence, has become a bête noire for Beijing, which both overtly and covertly backed her opponent, the pro-Chinese populist Han Kuo-yu. Beijing’s hopes of peaceful reunification have been dashed by Taiwanese public opinion, with Taiwanese increasingly distrusting China’s aggression and ideological rigidity.
Hong Kong crackdown. One reason why Taiwan doesn’t trust Beijing is its actions in Hong Kong. Under the cover of the pandemic’s restrictions on protest, Hong Kong’s government continues to squeeze away the city’s limited democracy and freedom of speech. The latest move came this week after the public broadcaster shut down a popular satirical TV show for making fun of the city’s now-notorious police force. Meanwhile in the legislative chamber, pro-democracy lawmakers were dragged out by those on the pro-Beijing side, who outnumber them thanks only to the city’s rigged electoral system.
Tech and Business
The race for a vaccine. Beijing is leading the global race for a coronavirus vaccine: Half of the vaccines approved for human trials have been developed inside China. But early results for vaccines in the United States and Britain are showing promise that hasn’t yet been reported in China, where the vaccine industry is troubled by safety and ethical issues. Even if a vaccine is found within the next six to 12 months—which would be record-breaking—production and distribution will prove tricky for whichever country gets its hands on doses first. Both the United States and China have pockets of anti-vaccine sentiment.
Online education fraud? After successfully taking down Luckin Coffee—which announced it would be delisted from Nasdaq this week—the due diligence firm Muddy Waters Research is going after a huge online education firm, GSX Techedu. Muddy Waters accuses 80 percent of the firm’s users of being bots created to artificially raise numbers. Even before the pandemic, online learning was big business in China—with parents often signing up for initial cheap deals and then dropping programs in favor of newer competitors, leading firms to crash out.
Hotels struggling. Hilton is the latest hotel chain to reopen its locations in China, following domestic competitors who have begun welcoming guests in the last few weeks. Overall hotel occupancy fell to as low as 10 percent during the worst of the pandemic and has been recovering gradually since. It is now at around the 40 percent mark—very low in ordinary times, but now a sign of hope for a struggling industry. Ironically, hotels in Wuhan retained over 60 percent occupancy throughout the outbreak due to the needs of health workers and officials flown in from elsewhere.
What We’re Reading
China Bound: John Swire & Sons and Its World, 1816-1980, Robert Bickers, Bloomsbury Business, 544 pp., March 2020
Robert Bickers, a British historian, is one of the finest writers on Chinese history. Empire Made Me, his account of an English thug’s life and death in colonial Shanghai, is an essential read. His new book dives deep into John Swire & Sons, a firm born out of British imperial interests in China that is now a global corporation. Bickers turns what could have been a dry read into a tale of intrigue, war, and greed—though sadly he stops short of the last few decades, in which the firm remained a serious player in Asia.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-20--How to End the Special Relationship With Israel

How to End the Special Relationship With Israel Anyone who has ever spent time in Washington is sure to have heard a panel moderator ask : “ If you were sitting next to the president , what would be your policy recommendation ?
” It is a tough question , especially because analysts are often better at the art of the thoughtful critique than generating genuinely new policy proposals that have not already been litigated in various government agencies .
The ideas industry is hardly irrelevant ; there are manifold examples of how it does contribute policy-changing ideas ( for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Strategic and International Studies , to cite just one example , laid the intellectual groundwork for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act—an important reform that changed the way the armed forces conducted operations .
But it ’ s a challenge for outside analysts to break through with innovative ideas , especially when—like their counterparts in the bureaucracy—they become too heavily vested in a particular issue to see a clear way forward .
The paradigmatic case of this problem is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
It should be clear by now that the United States needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognizes that there is no two-state solution or any solution to the conflict and that treats Israel as a normal country .
All the strum und drang about the conflict in Washington ( and Europe ) serves no purpose and only delays reckoning with reality .
I am not sure I understand why officials , former officials , and analysts continue to invest so much time in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
Even if we assume that both sides want peace , it remains the case that : 1 ) Israel can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace , 2 ) the Palestinians can not satisfy Israel ’ s minimal demands for peace , and 3 ) the United States does not have the resources or political will to alter the interests of either the Palestinians or Israel .
The many analysts and officials who continue to work toward a two-state solution , however admirable their tenacity , can ’ t do much to clear this fundamental impasse .
The next question is whether the impasse much matters for the United States .
Through the last seven decades , Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East : the free flow of energy resources , helping to ensure Israeli security , and U.S. predominance so no state or combination of states could threaten the other two interests .
( There was also counterterrorism and nonproliferation , though a case could be made that they were—at least until 9/11—derivative of the other interests . )
U.S. policymakers have long believed that a two-state solution was the best way to ensure Israel ’ s security , and U.S. presidents from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama to Donald Trump himself have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mostly unacknowledged fact about the two-state impasse—and perhaps the reason Washington hasn ’ t summoned the political will to overcome it—is that it has helped the United States achieve one its core interests in the region : helping to ensure Israeli security .
That ’ s not to doubt the sincerity of U.S. officials and analysts when they argue that they believe an Israeli annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank would be bad for Israeli security and offend the sensibilities of many Americans .
But what should the United States do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chorus of folks who want to punish Israel and others who will want to wring their hands but otherwise shield Israel from opprobrium and carry on as business as usual .
The latter seems more likely than the former , but neither seems appropriate for the moment .
The combination of Israel ’ s success and its annexation provides an opportunity to alter the terms of the bilateral relationship in ways that disentangle Washington from peacemaking .
By any measure , Israel is an advanced country with an economy that is well integrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially in the information technology sector .
Its per capita GDP is roughly on par with the United Kingdom ’ s and France ’ s .
On security , Israel has a more capable and sophisticated military than all of its neighbors , and its strategic position has never been better .
Iraq and Syria are a shambles , Hezbollah is bogged down in the Syrian conflict as Lebanon crumbles around it , and the Egyptians rely on Israel to support their security operation in the Sinai Peninsula .
Jordan has warned about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but even so , King Abdullah is in a difficult spot given how important Israel has been to Jordanian stability .
Iran remains a threat , of course , but the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) has demonstrated the ability to deter the Iranians and their allied forces , particularly in Syria but also in Iraq .
Iran ’ s nuclear activities will continue to be a major challenge to Israel ’ s security , and the Israelis will need to continue to be vigilant confronting this problem both on their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially with the United States .
Israel ’ s diplomatic relations now span the globe , including good relations with Russia , China , and India .
In the Middle East , in addition to its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan , the Israelis have developed ties ( though not normal diplomatic relations ) with Oman , the United Arab Emirates , and Saudi Arabia , even as it has continued its decades-long effort to tighten its grip on the West Bank .
This is quite an achievement .
Of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the regional security environment could deteriorate , but even so , it is hard to make the case that Israel is an isolated and embattled ally .
Given the reality of Israel ’ s achievements and the coming annexation of West Bank territory , U.S. officials must communicate that it is time for the relationship to change .
Israel ’ s security is ensured , and the country has prospered , which was always Washington ’ s goal .
And although Israel and the United States have both benefited from the more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , it is hard to make the case for a continuation of this generous assistance .
As the United States and Israel did with economic assistance , it is time for an agreed-on path to phase out military aid .
This is not punishment but rather recognition that the United States has been successful in achieving its goal , assistance is not an entitlement , and the United States does not think that annexation is in Israel ’ s interest and thus does not want to be associated with it .
Critics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the form of peremptorily cutting off assistance—is the best course of action .
This policy prescription is predicated on the idea that Israel still needs U.S. military assistance and that cutting it off will bring the Israelis to heel .
The evidence does not support either proposition .
It also overlooks the fact that there would be little political support for their preferred approach and would only invite an ugly political fight .
At least an agreement to phase out the assistance has a chance of gaining traction .
The tragedy in all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestinians , who will no doubt be outraged at Washington ’ s washing its hands of the conflict , sealing their fate to live forever under the boot of the IDF or shoved into Bantustans .
They would be justified in their anger .
They have also misread core U.S. interests in the Middle East , which really are not concerned with the Palestinians , who , against all evidence , trusted the United States .
Normalizing ties between the United States and Israel is an acknowledgement of both success and failure .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensured , but peace between Israelis and Palestinians , which analysts and officials made a U.S. responsibility , remains beyond the grasp—most likely permanently .
At least the United States will no longer have to bear the contradictions and burdens of peacemaking that unnecessarily raised expectation that Washington could deliver the Israelis or pressure the Palestinians in the service of goals neither side shared .
That is not normal .

Anyone who has ever spent time in Washington is sure to have heard a panel moderator ask: “If you were sitting next to the president, what would be your policy recommendation?” It is a tough question, especially because analysts are often better at the art of the thoughtful critique than generating genuinely new policy proposals that have not already been litigated in various government agencies.
Anyone who has ever spent time in Washington is sure to have heard a panel moderator ask: “If you were sitting next to the president, what would be your policy recommendation?” It is a tough question, especially because analysts are often better at the art of the thoughtful critique than generating genuinely new policy proposals that have not already been litigated in various government agencies.
The ideas industry is hardly irrelevant; there are manifold examples of how it does contribute policy-changing ideas (for good and bad). The Center for Strategic and International Studies, to cite just one example, laid the intellectual groundwork for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act—an important reform that changed the way the armed forces conducted operations. But it’s a challenge for outside analysts to break through with innovative ideas, especially when—like their counterparts in the bureaucracy—they become too heavily vested in a particular issue to see a clear way forward.
The paradigmatic case of this problem is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It should be clear by now that the United States needs a new approach to this issue—one that recognizes that there is no two-state solution or any solution to the conflict and that treats Israel as a normal country. All the sturm und drang about the conflict in Washington (and Europe) serves no purpose and only delays reckoning with reality.
I am not sure I understand why officials, former officials, and analysts continue to invest so much time in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even if we assume that both sides want peace, it remains the case that: 1) Israel cannot satisfy the Palestinians’ minimal demands for peace, 2) the Palestinians cannot satisfy Israel’s minimal demands for peace, and 3) the United States does not have the resources or political will to alter the interests of either the Palestinians or Israel. The many analysts and officials who continue to work toward a two-state solution, however admirable their tenacity, can’t do much to clear this fundamental impasse.
The next question is whether the impasse much matters for the United States. Through the last seven decades, Washington has had several core interests in the Middle East: the free flow of energy resources, helping to ensure Israeli security, and U.S. predominance so no state or combination of states could threaten the other two interests. (There was also counterterrorism and nonproliferation, though a case could be made that they were—at least until 9/11—derivative of the other interests.) U.S. policymakers have long believed that a two-state solution was the best way to ensure Israel’s security, and U.S. presidents from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama to Donald Trump himself have repeatedly pursued that goal. But the mostly unacknowledged fact about the two-state impasse—and perhaps the reason Washington hasn’t summoned the political will to overcome it—is that it has helped the United States achieve one its core interests in the region: helping to ensure Israeli security.
That’s not to doubt the sincerity of U.S. officials and analysts when they argue that they believe an Israeli annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank would be bad for Israeli security and offend the sensibilities of many Americans. But what should the United States do about it? There will be a chorus of folks who want to punish Israel and others who will want to wring their hands but otherwise shield Israel from opprobrium and carry on as business as usual. The latter seems more likely than the former, but neither seems appropriate for the moment. The combination of Israel’s success and its annexation provides an opportunity to alter the terms of the bilateral relationship in ways that disentangle Washington from peacemaking.
By any measure, Israel is an advanced country with an economy that is well integrated with the rest of the world, especially in the information technology sector. Its per capita GDP is roughly on par with the United Kingdom’s and France’s. On security, Israel has a more capable and sophisticated military than all of its neighbors, and its strategic position has never been better. Iraq and Syria are a shambles, Hezbollah is bogged down in the Syrian conflict as Lebanon crumbles around it, and the Egyptians rely on Israel to support their security operation in the Sinai Peninsula. Jordan has warned about the consequences of annexation on bilateral relations, but even so, King Abdullah is in a difficult spot given how important Israel has been to Jordanian stability.
Iran remains a threat, of course, but the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has demonstrated the ability to deter the Iranians and their allied forces, particularly in Syria but also in Iraq. Iran’s nuclear activities will continue to be a major challenge to Israel’s security, and the Israelis will need to continue to be vigilant confronting this problem both on their own and in partnership with other countries, especially with the United States.
Israel’s diplomatic relations now span the globe, including good relations with Russia, China, and India. In the Middle East, in addition to its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the Israelis have developed ties (though not normal diplomatic relations) with Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, even as it has continued its decades-long effort to tighten its grip on the West Bank. This is quite an achievement. Of course, the economy could crash, and the regional security environment could deteriorate, but even so, it is hard to make the case that Israel is an isolated and embattled ally.
Given the reality of Israel’s achievements and the coming annexation of West Bank territory, U.S. officials must communicate that it is time for the relationship to change. Israel’s security is ensured, and the country has prospered, which was always Washington’s goal. And although Israel and the United States have both benefited from the more than $142 billion Washington has invested in it, it is hard to make the case for a continuation of this generous assistance. As the United States and Israel did with economic assistance, it is time for an agreed-on path to phase out military aid. This is not punishment but rather recognition that the United States has been successful in achieving its goal, assistance is not an entitlement, and the United States does not think that annexation is in Israel’s interest and thus does not want to be associated with it.
Critics will no doubt argue that actual punishment—in the form of peremptorily cutting off assistance—is the best course of action. This policy prescription is predicated on the idea that Israel still needs U.S. military assistance and that cutting it off will bring the Israelis to heel. The evidence does not support either proposition. It also overlooks the fact that there would be little political support for their preferred approach and would only invite an ugly political fight. At least an agreement to phase out the assistance has a chance of gaining traction. The tragedy in all this is the permanent dispossession of the Palestinians, who will no doubt be outraged at Washington’s washing its hands of the conflict, sealing their fate to live forever under the boot of the IDF or shoved into Bantustans. They would be justified in their anger. They have also misread core U.S. interests in the Middle East, which really are not concerned with the Palestinians, who, against all evidence, trusted the United States.
Normalizing ties between the United States and Israel is an acknowledgement of both success and failure. Israel’s security and existence are ensured, but peace between Israelis and Palestinians, which analysts and officials made a U.S. responsibility, remains beyond their grasp—most likely permanently. At least the United States will no longer have to bear the contradictions and burdens of peacemaking that unnecessarily raised expectation that Washington could deliver the Israelis or pressure the Palestinians in the service of goals neither side shared. That is not normal.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-20--Britain’s Conservatives Sold Out to Beijing Too Cheaply

Britain ’ s Conservatives Sold Out to Beijing Too Cheaply “ We went to a bar last night , ” a senior Conservative member of the British Parliament vouchsafed to a group gathered in a private club in Beijing .
“ And the young people were all dancing .
I couldn ’ t believe it !
” Nor could some of his audience .
It was 2011 , 22 years after the first modern bar opened in Beijing , and the U.K. government ’ s representative in China , Nigel Evans , was still shocked that Chinese people enjoyed dancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ delivered a bombastic speech about the need for further engagement .
Other than slathering over the GDP figures , though ( notoriously “ man-made , ” according to Premier Li Keqiang ) , Evans displayed little understanding of those he ’ d come to court .
The evening offered an unfortunate insight into how little Britain ’ s Conservative government gets about China—and how desperately it still wanted to heap praise on the country .
That tendency is still in full force among some sections of the party today , as a squabble @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei amid the fallout from COVID-19 threatens alienation from long-standing allies—and more dissent among a party still nursing the divisions over Brexit .
Privately , diplomatic staff in Beijing often confide that their masters can appear clueless—a senior British press officer , taken on a visit to Tiananmen Square , once pointed at the portrait of Mao Zedong that still adorns the entrance to the Forbidden City and wondered , “ Who ’ s that ?
” The Beijing Blue Club , to its credit , had managed to lure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inaugural reception that night , including Evans , deputy speaker of the House of Commons ; Andrew Griffiths , then-MP for Burton ; and Maurice Bennett , an ex-Tory treasurer and businessman with a history of bankrolling so-called fact-finding missions to China in conjunction with the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
The invitation , which sported a half-full martini glass , promised “ free flow of imported wine , cocktails and snacks ” for “ Conservative supporters ” and drew a wide crowd of thirsty foreigners and putative right-wingers , all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speeches in exchange for some canapés and blue-hued cocktails .
In Evans ’ s keynote address , in which he made his observations about Chinese nightlife , the parliamentarian quipped about having to cut his holiday short to deal with “ yobbos ” in London ( the city had been hit by riots over the summer ) , expressed his enthusiasm for China ’ s markets , and concluded on an unapologetically avaricious note : “ We just want our fair share of the pie.
” The last time Britain decided it wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” of course , its buccaneering excursions ended in national tragedy—for the Chinese .
Two Opium Wars claimed nearly 60,000 lives and left an ash heap of resentment that smolders to this day .
The modern approach is less bullish , compelled to be sensitive to this checkered past .
As a former imperial power , Britain is a diminished force , unable to rest on past glories or the days when “ Perfidious Albion ” was less a nickname than a policy .
( Even something as seemingly trivial as politicians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Britain ’ s war dead , is fraught with diplomatic anxieties . )
Often , this newfound willingness to address CCP grievances can lead to uncomfortable accommodations .
The arrests of protesters during a 2015 state visit to London by Chinese President Xi Jinping , for “ conspiracy to commit threatening behavior , ” was one embarrassing example .
Then-Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne ’ s publicity tour of Xinjiang , a border region in continuous clampdown that now hosts numerous so-called reeducation camps for its Uighur population , was another .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese critic and artist Ai Weiwei ’ s visa .
After officials at the British Embassy in Beijing initially declined Ai ’ s application in 2015 , citing his failure to declare a “ criminal record , ” human rights advocates argued that Ai had never been formally charged with any crime and that his initial arrest was politically motivated .
At the time , a former embassy official described the consular officer responsible as a “ joke , ” telling me that the decision was “ probably a politically motivated move to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ my God , they are just crap.
” Then-Home Secretary Theresa May swiftly reversed the decision , but the damage was done .
Meanwhile , China ’ s own motivations—to “ construct a socialism superior to capitalism ” that sees Beijing “ win the initiative and have the dominant position ” —are hiding in plain sight .
Some argue that the risks of engagement are outweighed by the rewards .
In 2013 , David Cameron ’ s government announced a $ 74 million deal to ship premium pig semen to China .
Two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambitious trade tour to Xinjiang , seeking investment in the planned HS2 railway , the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant , and real estate projects for the chancellor ’ s flagship Northern Powerhouse project .
Xi ’ s return visit in 2015 was hailed as the start of a “ golden era ” between the two nations .
The headline-grabbing pork deal proved less seminal than it seemed : One of the two producers whose business the deal was supposed to invigorate went bust in 2015 , while rivals JSR Genetics managed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stuff over the same period .
Another order was signed in 2018 , but a nationwide outbreak of African swine fever in China last year , and subsequent mass cullings , has left little demand due to the loss of breeding sows .
( Other , less newsworthy agreements , including a $ 368 million desalination deal and the sale of more than $ 7 million ’ s worth of Cantonese sauce , have fared better . )
It ’ s not unusual to see a shortfall between the sizzle of a big @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal .
But the golden era ’ s signature agreements have proved distinctly underwhelming—or , in some cases , downright dodgy .
A multimillion-dollar property development intended to stimulate the market in the Northern Powerhouse cities of Manchester and Liverpool has unraveled amid allegations of fraud and incompetence .
The Hinkley Point power plant , meanwhile , might end up being one of the worst business decisions in modern British history—by the time the “ dreadful deal ” is completed , experts say , the world ’ s most expensive power plant may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ benefit from Chinese investment ?
The Beijing-based scholar Michael Pettis concluded last year that it does not ; there is no Chinese equivalent to Nissan ’ s Sunderland plant , for example .
Prestigious universities such as the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics stand accused of curtailing academic freedoms to appease Chinese investors , while the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has pointed to worrying levels of unprecedented cooperation between U.K. academia and the Chinese military .
Perhaps the only U.K. sector that can boast benefits free of any controversy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fawning has little benefit—just ask any Chinese official who has started frantically loyalty-signaling before a crackdown .
When Cameron met the Dalai Lama in 2012 , Beijing considered the former prime minister ’ s “ political error ” grave enough to freeze relations for over a year .
Overall exports and tourism were unaffected , but the official junketeering suffered a blow .
Ex-Chancellor Kenneth Clarke had to cancel a visit , with junior minister Oliver Letwin sent in his stead .
Letwin duly met with executives from Huawei in Nanjing , immediately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for investment in Britain.
” It ’ s this wide-eyed “ let ’ s do business ” enthusiasm for the likes of Huawei—a company credibly accused of spying on foreign partners and enabling human rights abuses in Xinjiang—that has helped create the current crisis for Brexit Britain ’ s relations with the United States , European Union , and China .
This shouldn ’ t have been a surprise : Back in 2013 , an Intelligence and Security Committee report titled “ Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure ” had already observed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s inward investment policy and its national security policy.
” Outspoken Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat has been less circumspect , expressing the “ dire need ” for a proper China strategy and describing the decision to allow Huawei further into 5G phone networks as letting a “ fox in the hen house.
” In the United States , the FBI now has a unit dedicated to countering China ’ s “ subversive , undeclared , criminal and coercive ” political influence , which ranges from proxy groups such as the Chinese Students and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Front Work Department , to appointments of directorships in Chinese companies , research grants , and subsidized trips of the sort frequently favored by Conservative MPs .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has warned that adopting Huawei ’ s technology would be “ choosing autocracy over democracy , ” while U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called state-linked tech companies like Huawei and ZTE “ Trojan horses for Chinese intelligence.
” With the coronavirus causing a further crash in U.S. opinions on China , the messaging from Washington is displaying a rare form @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accusing the other of being too close to Beijing .
The red flags are finally starting to fly in parts of Europe , too : A recent Norwegian intelligence report mentions China 173 times over 126 pages .
( Only Russia , with 225 references , merits more concern . )
A similar 82-page report from Estonia brings up China ’ s covert operations more than 100 times , while Czech spooks consider Beijing the most aggressive threat to national security alongside Russia .
Why , then , have successive Tory administrations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Boris Johnson , seemingly failed to grasp the issue ?
They have , argued Rupert Allason , who writes as Nigel West , an intelligence expert and former Tory MP , who said Tugendhat ’ s remarks were “ alarmist ” but “ intended to be.
” “ If we [ Britain ] walk into this deal with eyes open , then so be it , ” Allason told me , pointing out that “ we have a very different relationship with the Chinese ” than the United States does : “ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on national security charges , whereas there are dozens in the United States.
” Perhaps reflecting a mainstream Tory view , Allason also claimed the Chinese are “ contemptuous of smelly Westerners ” and “ have a commitment to their own ascendancy , ” meaning the government has “ to deal with them with a very long spoon.
” A willingness to hold one ’ s nose when dealing with certain regimes , of course , is part of the political landscape : Overlooking blood in return for the prospect of treasure has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Margaret Thatcher ’ s relations with Chile and apartheid-era Pretoria to long-standing Conservative chumminess with Saudi rulers .
Augusto Pinochet was many things—embezzler , torturer , dictator , potential client—but he was never a threat to Britain ’ s national security .
But China isn ’ t just another promising partner wearing a blood-splattered business suit ; it ’ s the world ’ s second-largest economy , with a long history of weaponizing that spending power in defense of its deeds and defiance of international norms .
There are signs that the more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their hands .
Since the pandemic , the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday—Conservative Party newsletters , to all intents and purposes—have run numerous headlines ( “ No 10 Fury at China ’ s Lies , ” “ China Faces Reckoning ” ) suggesting the argot of Sinophobia has replaced the golden era among a powerful constituency of members .
Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has alluded to a “ deep dive ” into U.K.-China relations so things don ’ t revert to “ business as usual.
” The final decision on Huawei still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected within months .
Already , Johnson—who purged his party of Brexit rebels before last year ’ s general election—has faced his first revolt , after 38 Conservative MPs voted against Huawei ’ s plans in March .
It was a rare sign of dissent within a majority party already stuffed with obeisant loyalists and a telling sign of how the China threat now has the ability to rally consensus among unlikely allies in Western democracies .
If an amateur historian such as Johnson plans to handle the CCP with a mixture of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should refer to the Dutch mission that submitted itself to a “ ceremony of adoration ” two years after Lord Macartney ’ s fateful snub in 1793 ; despite believing himself a success , the Dutch envoy was sent away with laughter and a flea in his ear .
Beijing demands fealty but only respects power .
If things do go belly up for the British , there ’ ll be no sending gunboats up the Huangpu : Beijing ’ s Trojan horses will already be galloping through critical infrastructure .

“We went to a bar last night,” a senior Conservative member of the British Parliament vouchsafed to a group gathered in a private club in Beijing. “And the young people were all dancing. I couldn’t believe it!”
“We went to a bar last night,” a senior Conservative member of the British Parliament vouchsafed to a group gathered in a private club in Beijing. “And the young people were all dancing. I couldn’t believe it!”
Nor could some of his audience. It was 2011, 22 years after the first modern bar opened in Beijing, and the U.K. government’s representative in China, Nigel Evans, was still shocked that Chinese people enjoyed dancing. Earlier that evening, Evans had delivered a bombastic speech about the need for further engagement. Other than slathering over the GDP figures, though (notoriously “man-made,” according to Premier Li Keqiang), Evans displayed little understanding of those he’d come to court.
The evening offered an unfortunate insight into how little Britain’s Conservative government gets about China—and how desperately it still wanted to heap praise on the country. That tendency is still in full force among some sections of the party today, as a squabble over Britain’s future with the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei amid the fallout from COVID-19 threatens alienation from long-standing allies—and more dissent among a party still nursing the divisions over Brexit.
Privately, diplomatic staff in Beijing often confide that their masters can appear clueless—a senior British press officer, taken on a visit to Tiananmen Square, once pointed at the portrait of Mao Zedong that still adorns the entrance to the Forbidden City and wondered, “Who’s that?”
The Beijing Blue Club, to its credit, had managed to lure a veritable embarrassment of Tories to the inaugural reception that night, including Evans, deputy speaker of the House of Commons; Andrew Griffiths, then-MP for Burton; and Maurice Bennett, an ex-Tory treasurer and businessman with a history of bankrolling so-called fact-finding missions to China in conjunction with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The invitation, which sported a half-full martini glass, promised “free flow of imported wine, cocktails and snacks” for “Conservative supporters” and drew a wide crowd of thirsty foreigners and putative right-wingers, all willing to put up with a few speeches in exchange for some canapés and blue-hued cocktails.
In Evans’s keynote address, in which he made his observations about Chinese nightlife, the parliamentarian quipped about having to cut his holiday short to deal with “yobbos” in London (the city had been hit by riots over the summer), expressed his enthusiasm for China’s markets, and concluded on an unapologetically avaricious note: “We just want our fair share of the pie.”
The last time Britain decided it wanted a “fair share of the pie,” of course, its buccaneering excursions ended in national tragedy—for the Chinese. Two Opium Wars claimed nearly 60,000 lives and left an ash heap of resentment that smolders to this day.
The modern approach is less bullish, compelled to be sensitive to this checkered past. As a former imperial power, Britain is a diminished force, unable to rest on past glories or the days when “Perfidious Albion” was less a nickname than a policy. (Even something as seemingly trivial as politicians wearing a poppy, in remembrance of Britain’s war dead, is fraught with diplomatic anxieties.)
Often, this newfound willingness to address CCP grievances can lead to uncomfortable accommodations. The arrests of protesters during a 2015 state visit to London by Chinese President Xi Jinping, for “conspiracy to commit threatening behavior,” was one embarrassing example. Then-Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne’s publicity tour of Xinjiang, a border region in continuous clampdown that now hosts numerous so-called reeducation camps for its Uighur population, was another.
Then there was the fiasco over the Chinese critic and artist Ai Weiwei’s visa. After officials at the British Embassy in Beijing initially declined Ai’s application in 2015, citing his failure to declare a “criminal record,” human rights advocates argued that Ai had never been formally charged with any crime and that his initial arrest was politically motivated. At the time, a former embassy official described the consular officer responsible as a “joke,” telling me that the decision was “probably a politically motivated move to curry favor with the Chinese, but my God, they are just crap.” Then-Home Secretary Theresa May swiftly reversed the decision, but the damage was done. Meanwhile, China’s own motivations—to “construct a socialism superior to capitalism” that sees Beijing “win the initiative and have the dominant position”—are hiding in plain sight.
Some argue that the risks of engagement are outweighed by the rewards. In 2013, David Cameron’s government announced a $74 million deal to ship premium pig semen to China. Two years later, Osborne embarked on his ambitious trade tour to Xinjiang, seeking investment in the planned HS2 railway, the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant, and real estate projects for the chancellor’s flagship Northern Powerhouse project. Xi’s return visit in 2015 was hailed as the start of a “golden era” between the two nations.
The headline-grabbing pork deal proved less seminal than it seemed: One of the two producers whose business the deal was supposed to invigorate went bust in 2015, while rivals JSR Genetics managed to ship only about $60,000 of the stuff over the same period. Another order was signed in 2018, but a nationwide outbreak of African swine fever in China last year, and subsequent mass cullings, has left little demand due to the loss of breeding sows. (Other, less newsworthy agreements, including a $368 million desalination deal and the sale of more than $7 million’s worth of Cantonese sauce, have fared better.)
It’s not unusual to see a shortfall between the sizzle of a big announcement and the actual meat of the deal. But the golden era’s signature agreements have proved distinctly underwhelming—or, in some cases, downright dodgy.
A multimillion-dollar property development intended to stimulate the market in the Northern Powerhouse cities of Manchester and Liverpool has unraveled amid allegations of fraud and incompetence. The Hinkley Point power plant, meanwhile, might end up being one of the worst business decisions in modern British history—by the time the “dreadful deal” is completed, experts say, the world’s most expensive power plant may already be obsolete.
Does the U.K. benefit from Chinese investment? The Beijing-based scholar Michael Pettis concluded last year that it does not; there is no Chinese equivalent to Nissan’s Sunderland plant, for example. Prestigious universities such as the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics stand accused of curtailing academic freedoms to appease Chinese investors, while the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has pointed to worrying levels of unprecedented cooperation between U.K. academia and the Chinese military. Perhaps the only U.K. sector that can boast benefits free of any controversy is tourism.
Meanwhile, all the fawning has little benefit—just ask any Chinese official who has started frantically loyalty-signaling before a crackdown. When Cameron met the Dalai Lama in 2012, Beijing considered the former prime minister’s “political error” grave enough to freeze relations for over a year. Overall exports and tourism were unaffected, but the official junketeering suffered a blow. Ex-Chancellor Kenneth Clarke had to cancel a visit, with junior minister Oliver Letwin sent in his stead. Letwin duly met with executives from Huawei in Nanjing, immediately hailing the company as a “model for investment in Britain.”
It’s this wide-eyed “let’s do business” enthusiasm for the likes of Huawei—a company credibly accused of spying on foreign partners and enabling human rights abuses in Xinjiang—that has helped create the current crisis for Brexit Britain’s relations with the United States, European Union, and China.
This shouldn’t have been a surprise: Back in 2013, an Intelligence and Security Committee report titled “Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure” had already observed a “disconnect between the UK’s inward investment policy and its national security policy.” Outspoken Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat has been less circumspect, expressing the “dire need” for a proper China strategy and describing the decision to allow Huawei further into 5G phone networks as letting a “fox in the hen house.”
In the United States, the FBI now has a unit dedicated to countering China’s “subversive, undeclared, criminal and coercive” political influence, which ranges from proxy groups such as the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, an arm of the United Front Work Department, to appointments of directorships in Chinese companies, research grants, and subsidized trips of the sort frequently favored by Conservative MPs. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has warned that adopting Huawei’s technology would be “choosing autocracy over democracy,” while U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called state-linked tech companies like Huawei and ZTE “Trojan horses for Chinese intelligence.” With the coronavirus causing a further crash in U.S. opinions on China, the messaging from Washington is displaying a rare form of bipartisanship—in that both sides have begun accusing the other of being too close to Beijing.
The red flags are finally starting to fly in parts of Europe, too: A recent Norwegian intelligence report mentions China 173 times over 126 pages. (Only Russia, with 225 references, merits more concern.) A similar 82-page report from Estonia brings up China’s covert operations more than 100 times, while Czech spooks consider Beijing the most aggressive threat to national security alongside Russia.
Why, then, have successive Tory administrations, from David Cameron to Theresa May and Boris Johnson, seemingly failed to grasp the issue?
They have, argued Rupert Allason, who writes as Nigel West, an intelligence expert and former Tory MP, who said Tugendhat’s remarks were “alarmist” but “intended to be.” “If we [Britain] walk into this deal with eyes open, then so be it,” Allason told me, pointing out that “we have a very different relationship with the Chinese” than the United States does: “We do not have PRC citizens in jail on national security charges, whereas there are dozens in the United States.” Perhaps reflecting a mainstream Tory view, Allason also claimed the Chinese are “contemptuous of smelly Westerners” and “have a commitment to their own ascendancy,” meaning the government has “to deal with them with a very long spoon.”
A willingness to hold one’s nose when dealing with certain regimes, of course, is part of the political landscape: Overlooking blood in return for the prospect of treasure has long been Tory foreign policy, from Margaret Thatcher’s relations with Chile and apartheid-era Pretoria to long-standing Conservative chumminess with Saudi rulers. Augusto Pinochet was many things—embezzler, torturer, dictator, potential client—but he was never a threat to Britain’s national security. But China isn’t just another promising partner wearing a blood-splattered business suit; it’s the world’s second-largest economy, with a long history of weaponizing that spending power in defense of its deeds and defiance of international norms.
There are signs that the more mutinous MPs will no longer sit on their hands. Since the pandemic, the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday—Conservative Party newsletters, to all intents and purposes—have run numerous headlines (“No 10 Fury at China’s Lies,” “China Faces Reckoning”) suggesting the argot of Sinophobia has replaced the golden era among a powerful constituency of members. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has alluded to a “deep dive” into U.K.-China relations so things don’t revert to “business as usual.”
The final decision on Huawei still belongs to Parliament, with a vote expected within months. Already, Johnson—who purged his party of Brexit rebels before last year’s general election—has faced his first revolt, after 38 Conservative MPs voted against Huawei’s plans in March. It was a rare sign of dissent within a majority party already stuffed with obeisant loyalists and a telling sign of how the China threat now has the ability to rally consensus among unlikely allies in Western democracies.
If an amateur historian such as Johnson plans to handle the CCP with a mixture of public deference and backstage management, he should refer to the Dutch mission that submitted itself to a “ceremony of adoration” two years after Lord Macartney’s fateful snub in 1793; despite believing himself a success, the Dutch envoy was sent away with laughter and a flea in his ear. Beijing demands fealty but only respects power. If things do go belly up for the British, there’ll be no sending gunboats up the Huangpu: Beijing’s Trojan horses will already be galloping through critical infrastructure.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-20--Coronavirus Brings Mexico’s Governors to the Fore

MEXICO CITY—As Mexico ’ s states forge their own responses to the ongoing public health and economic crisis , the coronavirus pandemic threatens to sour an already distant relationship between state governments and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador before pivotal midterm elections next year .
Several governors have felt the need to put in place stricter protective measures than those of the federal government .
Eighteen states have imposed a mix of measures , such as obligatory stay-at-home orders , the mandatory use of face masks , and fines for social gatherings .
Twenty-five of Mexico ’ s 32 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tax incentives and credits beyond the limited fiscal stimulus provided by the federal government .
A few state leaders suspended schools and universities before the federal government and , together with business groups , have called López Obrador ’ s response insufficient .
Now , the governors of nine states have said they will not follow the federal government ’ s timetable to start lifting some coronavirus restrictions and reopen schools .
“ Do not abandon Mexicans , ” Michoacán Gov .
Silvano Aureoles wrote in a tweet directed at the president last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your government will be able to respond to this crisis before it ’ s too late , ” he added .
And in a letter to the president , nine opposition party state leaders declared that the federal economic relief promised to businesses would “ not be enough.
” Experts say the rift between state and federal leadership over the coronavirus crisis could alter Mexico ’ s political landscape by weakening López Obrador ’ s coalition , known as Morena , which currently has a majority in both houses of Congress , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hold legislative midterm elections in 2021 to choose 500 seats in the lower chamber of Congress , 16 governorships , and other local races .
“ Within [ Morena ] , this is raising tensions and threatens to fracture the party even more than it is already , ” said Duncan Wood , director of the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center .
“ The country will be severely divided after the pandemic , ” said Rodrigo Montes de Oca , a researcher at Rice University ’ s Baker Institute Center for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have found the loudest opportunity yet to voice disapproval of the president , he said , which could bolster opposition parties before next year ’ s election .
So far , the pandemic shows no sign of slowing in the country .
Mexico has registered some 51,000 coronavirus cases , but the government believes the real number may be eight times higher than the official count , a theory that seems plausible given the low number of tests available .
As of Sunday , 5,177 people had so far died of COVID-19 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s GDP could shrink by 6.6 percent this year .
But López Obrador , who in late April earmarked $ 26 billion of reallocated funds for social spending on programs for the poor and older people and infrastructure projects on an airport and refinery , has ruled out raising public debt or issuing tax breaks to combat the crisis .
Instead , he has cut salaries for top-level bureaucrats and offered small loans to 3 million businesses .
Some lawmakers welcomed the package , but the efforts lag behind those of regional peers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mexico announced a health emergency in late March—closing schools and shutting down nonessential businesses—the gulf between state and federal policy has only widened .
Mexico ’ s deputy health secretary , Hugo López-Gatell , who is leading the federal response to the outbreak , has questioned the efficacy of face masks as a primary measure , although he recommended their use when outside .
And López Obrador has resisted enforcing stay-at-home measures with sanctions , calling the practice unnecessary .
“ No to authoritarianism , ” he said in a press conference last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust in people.
” State leaders felt differently .
In April , the governors of Michoacán , Jalisco , and Sonora declared mandatory stay-at-home measures in their states , even though they have struggled to actually police them .
Some states ordered liquor stores shut .
At least five governors have required the use of face masks in public .
Even state leaders who belong to López Obrador ’ s Morena coalition have taken measures beyond those of the federal government .
In Mexico City , Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum mandated the use of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as in other states , announced a deferment on some tax payments .
Elsewhere , the governors of Puebla and Baja California accused the federal government of lying about the amount of medical supplies it provided and cast doubt on its health data .
“ No one has helped us , ” said Miguel Barbosa , the governor of Puebla state , in a press conference in early May .
“ We will help ourselves alone here.
” In some ways , the rift between the president and his state leaders predates the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accuse him of centralizing power through his signature social programs and controversial infrastructure projects .
Several states also received less money from the central government in 2020 than in the previous year ’ s budget .
Local governments have at times chafed at these changes ; the coronavirus is bringing these divisions into relief , experts say .
“ There ’ s a void of a federal coordinated response .
That creates this sort of political opportunity and necessity for governors to take measures by themselves , ” said Carlos Bravo Regidor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ City ’ s Center for Research and Teaching in Economics .
The subdued federal response may also result in more organized long-term opposition from powerful states .
In Mexico ’ s industrial heartland , governors from three prosperous states—Nuevo León , Tamaulipas , and Coahuila—ratcheted up their complaints against the federal government ’ s pandemic response plan by calling for revisions to a state tax deal .
Under the agreement , which dictates how states receive federal tax revenue , Mexico ’ s 32 states remit oil and sales taxes to the federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which comprise nearly 80 percent of their income .
The governors , who belong to a mix of opposition parties , say states lack fiscal autonomy under the pact and that richer states contribute more to federal revenue than what they receive in return .
Since then , the governors from Chihuahua , Michoacán , Durango , and Jalisco also backed calls to revise the pact .
“ We ’ ve had enough of abuses toward states that produce wealth , work , and opportunities for people , ” Jalisco Governor Enrique Alfaro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Martín Orozco , the governor of Aguascalientes , who heads a governors ’ association of opposition party leaders , said the deal , which was last revised in 2007 , “ doesn ’ t fit Mexico today and much less after the pandemic , ” according to the Mexican paper El Financiero .
Since taking office , López Obrador ’ s once sky-high approval rating has steadily dropped , falling 11 percent over the past year .
Fifty percent of Mexicans currently support the president , according to the pollster Consulta Mitofsky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s economy and the federal response to the health crisis could worsen an already cloudy outlook for López Obrador .
The coronavirus arrived at a moment of particular vulnerability in Mexico ’ s health sector due to budget cuts and the botched implementation of López Obrador ’ s health care reforms .
Under the previous Seguro Popular system , the federal government delivered resources to states , which administered health care to Mexico ’ s poor .
In January , López Obrador ’ s government replaced it with the new Institute of Health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the provision of health care , which is free at point of service .
The drug procurement changes and shaky rollout of the new system resulted in medicine shortages even before the coronavirus reached Mexico .
State leaders , many of whom did not approve of the new system , have piled on criticism about the government ’ s lack of preparedness to combat the crisis .
And as the contagion spreads , Mexico ’ s hospitals are growing overwhelmed .
In recent weeks , doctors and nurses across the country have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health care workers .
That could have lasting effects on how Mexico emerges from the crisis .
“ After the pandemic ends , I think we are going to see that federalism in Mexico in some areas is completely broken , ” said Montes de Oca , the Rice researcher .
The country ’ s worsening economic outlook adds to the mounting challenges López Obrador and his coalition will face ahead of next year ’ s elections .

MEXICO CITY—As Mexico’s states forge their own responses to the ongoing public health and economic crisis, the coronavirus pandemic threatens to sour an already distant relationship between state governments and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador before pivotal midterm elections next year.
MEXICO CITY—As Mexico’s states forge their own responses to the ongoing public health and economic crisis, the coronavirus pandemic threatens to sour an already distant relationship between state governments and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador before pivotal midterm elections next year.
Several governors have felt the need to put in place stricter protective measures than those of the federal government. Eighteen states have imposed a mix of measures, such as obligatory stay-at-home orders, the mandatory use of face masks, and fines for social gatherings. Twenty-five of Mexico’s 32 states are offering small and medium-sized businesses tax incentives and credits beyond the limited fiscal stimulus provided by the federal government. A few state leaders suspended schools and universities before the federal government and, together with business groups, have called López Obrador’s response insufficient. Now, the governors of nine states have said they will not follow the federal government’s timetable to start lifting some coronavirus restrictions and reopen schools.
“Do not abandon Mexicans,” Michoacán Gov. Silvano Aureoles wrote in a tweet directed at the president last month. “We hope you and your government will be able to respond to this crisis before it’s too late,” he added. And in a letter to the president, nine opposition party state leaders declared that the federal economic relief promised to businesses would “not be enough.”
Experts say the rift between state and federal leadership over the coronavirus crisis could alter Mexico’s political landscape by weakening López Obrador’s coalition, known as Morena, which currently has a majority in both houses of Congress, and by emboldening opposition parties. Mexico will hold legislative midterm elections in 2021 to choose 500 seats in the lower chamber of Congress, 16 governorships, and other local races.
“Within [Morena], this is raising tensions and threatens to fracture the party even more than it is already,” said Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center.
“The country will be severely divided after the pandemic,” said Rodrigo Montes de Oca, a researcher at Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for the United States and Mexico. Local leaders have found the loudest opportunity yet to voice disapproval of the president, he said, which could bolster opposition parties before next year’s election.
So far, the pandemic shows no sign of slowing in the country. Mexico has registered some 51,000 coronavirus cases, but the government believes the real number may be eight times higher than the official count, a theory that seems plausible given the low number of tests available. As of Sunday, 5,177 people had so far died of COVID-19.
The International Monetary Fund predicts Mexico’s GDP could shrink by 6.6 percent this year. But López Obrador, who in late April earmarked $26 billion of reallocated funds for social spending on programs for the poor and older people and infrastructure projects on an airport and refinery, has ruled out raising public debt or issuing tax breaks to combat the crisis. Instead, he has cut salaries for top-level bureaucrats and offered small loans to 3 million businesses. Some lawmakers welcomed the package, but the efforts lag behind those of regional peers such as Peru and Chile.
Since Mexico announced a health emergency in late March—closing schools and shutting down nonessential businesses—the gulf between state and federal policy has only widened. Mexico’s deputy health secretary, Hugo López-Gatell, who is leading the federal response to the outbreak, has questioned the efficacy of face masks as a primary measure, although he recommended their use when outside. And López Obrador has resisted enforcing stay-at-home measures with sanctions, calling the practice unnecessary. “No to authoritarianism,” he said in a press conference last week, adding that he had “trust in people.”
State leaders felt differently. In April, the governors of Michoacán, Jalisco, and Sonora declared mandatory stay-at-home measures in their states, even though they have struggled to actually police them. Some states ordered liquor stores shut. At least five governors have required the use of face masks in public. Even state leaders who belong to López Obrador’s Morena coalition have taken measures beyond those of the federal government. In Mexico City, Mayor Claudia Sheinbaum mandated the use of face masks on the metro and, as in other states, announced a deferment on some tax payments. Elsewhere, the governors of Puebla and Baja California accused the federal government of lying about the amount of medical supplies it provided and cast doubt on its health data. “No one has helped us,” said Miguel Barbosa, the governor of Puebla state, in a press conference in early May. “We will help ourselves alone here.”
In some ways, the rift between the president and his state leaders predates the pandemic. López Obrador’s critics accuse him of centralizing power through his signature social programs and controversial infrastructure projects. Several states also received less money from the central government in 2020 than in the previous year’s budget. Local governments have at times chafed at these changes; the coronavirus is bringing these divisions into relief, experts say.
“There’s a void of a federal coordinated response. That creates this sort of political opportunity and necessity for governors to take measures by themselves,” said Carlos Bravo Regidor, a political analyst and professor at Mexico City’s Center for Research and Teaching in Economics.
The subdued federal response may also result in more organized long-term opposition from powerful states. In Mexico’s industrial heartland, governors from three prosperous states—Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Coahuila—ratcheted up their complaints against the federal government’s pandemic response plan by calling for revisions to a state tax deal. Under the agreement, which dictates how states receive federal tax revenue, Mexico’s 32 states remit oil and sales taxes to the federal government in exchange for government transfers, which comprise nearly 80 percent of their income. The governors, who belong to a mix of opposition parties, say states lack fiscal autonomy under the pact and that richer states contribute more to federal revenue than what they receive in return. Since then, the governors from Chihuahua, Michoacán, Durango, and Jalisco also backed calls to revise the pact.
“We’ve had enough of abuses toward states that produce wealth, work, and opportunities for people,” Jalisco Governor Enrique Alfaro said in a press conference last month. Martín Orozco, the governor of Aguascalientes, who heads a governors’ association of opposition party leaders, said the deal, which was last revised in 2007, “doesn’t fit Mexico today and much less after the pandemic,” according to the Mexican paper El Financiero.
Since taking office, López Obrador’s once sky-high approval rating has steadily dropped, falling 11 percent over the past year. Fifty percent of Mexicans currently support the president, according to the pollster Consulta Mitofsky, but the headwinds facing Mexico’s economy and the federal response to the health crisis could worsen an already cloudy outlook for López Obrador.
The coronavirus arrived at a moment of particular vulnerability in Mexico’s health sector due to budget cuts and the botched implementation of López Obrador’s health care reforms. Under the previous Seguro Popular system, the federal government delivered resources to states, which administered health care to Mexico’s poor. In January, López Obrador’s government replaced it with the new Institute of Health for Well-Being and centralized drug purchases along with the provision of health care, which is free at point of service. The drug procurement changes and shaky rollout of the new system resulted in medicine shortages even before the coronavirus reached Mexico.
State leaders, many of whom did not approve of the new system, have piled on criticism about the government’s lack of preparedness to combat the crisis. And as the contagion spreads, Mexico’s hospitals are growing overwhelmed. In recent weeks, doctors and nurses across the country have protested the lack of protective gear for health care workers. That could have lasting effects on how Mexico emerges from the crisis. “After the pandemic ends, I think we are going to see that federalism in Mexico in some areas is completely broken,” said Montes de Oca, the Rice researcher. The country’s worsening economic outlook adds to the mounting challenges López Obrador and his coalition will face ahead of next year’s elections.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-20--Are the Germans Edging Closer to True Fiscal Union?

Are the Germans Edging Closer to True Fiscal Union ?
For the second time in the last three years , France and Germany have teamed up on an ambitious plan to rescue Europe—but this time their big road map looks likely to actually go someplace .
The Franco-German declaration this week , “ A French-German Initiative for European Recovery From the Coronavirus Crisis , ” comes as the European Union finds itself immersed in a political and economic crisis in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and just a week before the European Commission is set to unveil its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Franco-German plan is a bold , 500 billion-euro fund ( about $ 550 billion ) to help out ailing economies that are struggling to rebuild after the economic carnage from months of near-total shutdowns .
The big question is whether naysayers like Austria and the Netherlands , which have long opposed picking up the tab for what they see as profligate Southern Europeans , will be persuaded to go along with such an ambitious , pan-European rescue .
And an even bigger question is whether the powerful endorsement of Germany , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU closer to the sort of fiscal integration that the more frugal Northern European countries , led by Berlin , have resisted in the past .
The Franco-German proposal for the European Commission to issue debt and then give grants where needed isn ’ t quite the straight-up debt-sharing that southern countries had asked for , dubbed “ coronabonds ” —but it ’ s a step in that direction , marking a turnabout for Germany .
And proposing to offer troubled regions grants rather than loans is a way to make the recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a little bit closer to fiscal transfers , another taboo subject .
“ You can call it what you want , but it ’ s large-scale mutualized debt , it ’ s a different form of coronabonds , ” said J.H.H .
Weiler , an expert on the European Union at New York University Law School .
“ It crosses a certain line.
” What exactly are the French and the Germans proposing ?
The proposal is a four-pronged recovery plan , including more pan-European health measures , and a repackaging of plenty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around Paris , Berlin , and Brussels in recent years , including speeding up the green and digital transitions and getting tougher about screening Chinese and other non-EU investment in strategic sectors such as energy and ports .
But the heart of the proposal is a 500 billion-euro “ recovery fund ” which would allow the European Commission to borrow huge sums from the market , then channel that money in the form of grants to sectors and regions most in need of money for rebuilding .
“ They ’ re basically using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but putting it on steroids , ” said Mij Rahman , the managing director for Europe at Eurasia Group .
Why is this such a big deal ?
Even though it ’ s just a proposal by two of the EU ’ s 27 member states , it ’ s a huge step for many reasons .
First , it ’ s a Franco-German proposal—and when those two giants at the heart of the European Union row in the same direction , it ’ s hard for other member states to resist their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ projects that have been backed by Germany and France that are rejected outright , ” Weiler said .
And the joint proposal lays down a marker for just what Europe ’ s recovery plan should look like , and how economic aid should be structured and handed out , right as the European Commission prepares its own plan .
“ The French and Germans are nudging the commission in that direction .
There ’ s a lot of good stagecraft and choreography going on here , ” Rahman said .
Importantly , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a possible way out of an impasse that has divided Europe since the outbreak of the pandemic .
More indebted , hard-hit Southern European countries including Spain and Italy pressed for some form of pan-European debt , or “ coronabonds , ” to help finance their economic recovery .
But less indebted Northern European countries , including the Netherlands but also Germany , flatly rejected that idea—leaving Southern European countries seething with anger at the north and souring on the whole idea of Europe .
Why is Germany doing this , if it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
There are several reasons for the new direction .
Earlier this month , in a shocking ruling , the German Constitutional Court opened the door for legal challenges against the European Central Bank ’ s big bond-buying programs .
That meant Europe ’ s biggest single financial tool to deal with the ravages of the pandemic could be made unavailable altogether , which would create an even bigger North-South crisis in Europe .
By joining France with this new proposal , German Chancellor Angela Merkel can make amends for the German court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the catalyst , ” Rahman said .
“ It changed her calculation.
” But there ’ s also the immediate economic ruin that needs to be dealt with , something that is increasingly tough for budget-strapped countries with higher borrowing costs than Germany .
By joining France to propose a huge , debt-funded grant program , Germany is taking aim at the biggest short-term danger to the EU .
“ Merkel looked at the situation in Europe and said , something has to be done , there needs to be a way to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not add to their deficit , ” said Eileen Keller , an expert on European economic integration at the German-French Institute .
But there ’ s plenty of self-interest in Germany ’ s move , as well .
It ’ s by far the biggest economy in the EU and has benefited greatly from the common currency and single market .
Protecting that over the long term—even at the cost of angering some frugal German voters in the short term—fits Merkel ’ s strategic view , Weiler said .
“ What ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular politics .
She is head and shoulders above her counterparts in terms of statesmanship , in terms of protecting the real German national interest , ” he said .
So what are the real prospects for this big proposal ?
There are still plenty of questions—above all , what the details are of just how the recovery fund would work , and how the commission would distribute money .
The immediate challenge is to get countries like Austria ( which has already criticized the Franco-German proposal and said it would pitch its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some Scandinavians to drop their objections to something that looks a bit like shared debt and smells a lot like fiscal transfers from rich to poor .
“ Now it ’ s up to the ‘ frugal four , ’ can they afford not to go where Germany has gone now ?
How long can the Austrians , Swedes , and Danes hold out if Germany is no longer backing them ?
” Rahman said .
Most likely , the Franco-German proposal will get whittled down and reshaped as the commission puts its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four ” will want to see more loans than grants in the relief package , while Southern European countries will seek in vain for even more than 500 billion euros .
The outcome will most likely be a “ typical European compromise ” that pleases nobody but at least moves the ball forward , Weiler said .
And one big question will determine not just the political viability of the new proposal , but also its real effectiveness at disbursing funds where they are needed : the strings that come attached to recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a trillion euros in funds available for pandemic relief under the European Stability Mechanism .
But tapping money in that fund traditionally came with strict conditions about economic policy , budget management , and economic reform , as Greece discovered during the last big crisis a decade ago .
As a result , the funds have a deep stigma—such that Spain , Italy , Portugal , and Greece have refused to use even the pandemic funds that have hardly any onerous conditions at all .
“ Conditionality has become a very bitter pill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
In their proposal , France and Germany alluded to some form of conditionality , noting that access to the recovery fund “ will be based on a clear commitment of member States to follow sound economic policies and an ambitious reform agenda.
” Figuring out just what strings to attach to the next big recovery fund will be a big part of the upcoming tussle between member states .
“ We will see in the negotiations what conditions they attach to the grants—it won ’ t be a totally free lunch @ @ @ @ @

For the second time in the last three years, France and Germany have teamed up on an ambitious plan to rescue Europe—but this time their big road map looks likely to actually go someplace. The Franco-German declaration this week, “A French-German Initiative for European Recovery From the Coronavirus Crisis,” comes as the European Union finds itself immersed in a political and economic crisis in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and just a week before the European Commission is set to unveil its own blueprint for recovery.
For the second time in the last three years, France and Germany have teamed up on an ambitious plan to rescue Europe—but this time their big road map looks likely to actually go someplace. The Franco-German declaration this week, “A French-German Initiative for European Recovery From the Coronavirus Crisis,” comes as the European Union finds itself immersed in a political and economic crisis in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and just a week before the European Commission is set to unveil its own blueprint for recovery.
The headline part of the Franco-German plan is a bold, 500 billion-euro fund (about $550 billion) to help out ailing economies that are struggling to rebuild after the economic carnage from months of near-total shutdowns. The big question is whether naysayers like Austria and the Netherlands, which have long opposed picking up the tab for what they see as profligate Southern Europeans, will be persuaded to go along with such an ambitious, pan-European rescue.
And an even bigger question is whether the powerful endorsement of Germany, along with France, could edge the EU closer to the sort of fiscal integration that the more frugal Northern European countries, led by Berlin, have resisted in the past. The Franco-German proposal for the European Commission to issue debt and then give grants where needed isn’t quite the straight-up debt-sharing that southern countries had asked for, dubbed “coronabonds”—but it’s a step in that direction, marking a turnabout for Germany. And proposing to offer troubled regions grants rather than loans is a way to make the recovery less painful—another important departure that brings Europe a little bit closer to fiscal transfers, another taboo subject.
“You can call it what you want, but it’s large-scale mutualized debt, it’s a different form of coronabonds,” said J.H.H. Weiler, an expert on the European Union at New York University Law School. “It crosses a certain line.”
What exactly are the French and the Germans proposing?
The proposal is a four-pronged recovery plan, including more pan-European health measures, and a repackaging of plenty of big ideas that have been kicking around Paris, Berlin, and Brussels in recent years, including speeding up the green and digital transitions and getting tougher about screening Chinese and other non-EU investment in strategic sectors such as energy and ports. But the heart of the proposal is a 500 billion-euro “recovery fund” which would allow the European Commission to borrow huge sums from the market, then channel that money in the form of grants to sectors and regions most in need of money for rebuilding.
“They’re basically using something the EU has done before, but putting it on steroids,” said Mij Rahman, the managing director for Europe at Eurasia Group.
Why is this such a big deal?
Even though it’s just a proposal by two of the EU’s 27 member states, it’s a huge step for many reasons. First, it’s a Franco-German proposal—and when those two giants at the heart of the European Union row in the same direction, it’s hard for other member states to resist their pull.
“There are very few projects that have been backed by Germany and France that are rejected outright,” Weiler said. And the joint proposal lays down a marker for just what Europe’s recovery plan should look like, and how economic aid should be structured and handed out, right as the European Commission prepares its own plan.
“The French and Germans are nudging the commission in that direction. There’s a lot of good stagecraft and choreography going on here,” Rahman said.
Importantly, the idea for the recovery fund also offers a possible way out of an impasse that has divided Europe since the outbreak of the pandemic. More indebted, hard-hit Southern European countries including Spain and Italy pressed for some form of pan-European debt, or “coronabonds,” to help finance their economic recovery. But less indebted Northern European countries, including the Netherlands but also Germany, flatly rejected that idea—leaving Southern European countries seething with anger at the north and souring on the whole idea of Europe.
Why is Germany doing this, if it just shot down the idea of eurobonds?
There are several reasons for the new direction. Earlier this month, in a shocking ruling, the German Constitutional Court opened the door for legal challenges against the European Central Bank’s big bond-buying programs. That meant Europe’s biggest single financial tool to deal with the ravages of the pandemic could be made unavailable altogether, which would create an even bigger North-South crisis in Europe. By joining France with this new proposal, German Chancellor Angela Merkel can make amends for the German court.
“The court ruling was ultimately the catalyst,” Rahman said. “It changed her calculation.”
But there’s also the immediate economic ruin that needs to be dealt with, something that is increasingly tough for budget-strapped countries with higher borrowing costs than Germany. By joining France to propose a huge, debt-funded grant program, Germany is taking aim at the biggest short-term danger to the EU.
“Merkel looked at the situation in Europe and said, something has to be done, there needs to be a way to channel funds to the south that does not add to their deficit,” said Eileen Keller, an expert on European economic integration at the German-French Institute.
But there’s plenty of self-interest in Germany’s move, as well. It’s by far the biggest economy in the EU and has benefited greatly from the common currency and single market. Protecting that over the long term—even at the cost of angering some frugal German voters in the short term—fits Merkel’s strategic view, Weiler said.
“What’s good for the country may not be popular politics. She is head and shoulders above her counterparts in terms of statesmanship, in terms of protecting the real German national interest,” he said.
So what are the real prospects for this big proposal?
There are still plenty of questions—above all, what the details are of just how the recovery fund would work, and how the commission would distribute money. The immediate challenge is to get countries like Austria (which has already criticized the Franco-German proposal and said it would pitch its own), the Netherlands, and some Scandinavians to drop their objections to something that looks a bit like shared debt and smells a lot like fiscal transfers from rich to poor.
“Now it’s up to the ‘frugal four,’ can they afford not to go where Germany has gone now? How long can the Austrians, Swedes, and Danes hold out if Germany is no longer backing them?” Rahman said.
Most likely, the Franco-German proposal will get whittled down and reshaped as the commission puts its own package together. The “frugal four” will want to see more loans than grants in the relief package, while Southern European countries will seek in vain for even more than 500 billion euros. The outcome will most likely be a “typical European compromise” that pleases nobody but at least moves the ball forward, Weiler said.
And one big question will determine not just the political viability of the new proposal, but also its real effectiveness at disbursing funds where they are needed: the strings that come attached to recovery money. Europe already has almost half a trillion euros in funds available for pandemic relief under the European Stability Mechanism. But tapping money in that fund traditionally came with strict conditions about economic policy, budget management, and economic reform, as Greece discovered during the last big crisis a decade ago. As a result, the funds have a deep stigma—such that Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece have refused to use even the pandemic funds that have hardly any onerous conditions at all.
“Conditionality has become a very bitter pill, especially for Greece,” Keller said.
In their proposal, France and Germany alluded to some form of conditionality, noting that access to the recovery fund “will be based on a clear commitment of member States to follow sound economic policies and an ambitious reform agenda.” Figuring out just what strings to attach to the next big recovery fund will be a big part of the upcoming tussle between member states.
“We will see in the negotiations what conditions they attach to the grants—it won’t be a totally free lunch,” Weiler said.