foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Inside the Massive Foreign-Policy Team Advising Biden’s Campaign

Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden ’ s team of informal foreign-policy and national security advisors has expanded to over 2,000 people , including 20 working groups spanning issues from diversity in national security to arms control , defense , intelligence , and homeland security , according to campaign officials and an internal list of the co-chairs of those groups obtained by Foreign Policy .
The organization of the group offers insights into how Biden would seek to mold his foreign-policy agenda and turn back some of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s most controversial foreign policies , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ women ’ s sexual and reproductive rights around the world , should he win the November presidential election .
It also sheds light on the coterie of behind-the-scenes advisors , such as the East Asia expert Ely Ratner and Daniel Benaim , a Middle East specialist with deep ties to Biden , who are likely to take up top and midlevel posts in the Pentagon , State Department , intelligence community , and other agencies if Biden is elected .
Ratner and Benaim are among 49 working group co-chairs who act as gatekeepers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense , homeland security , and national security experts who are feeding ideas , policy papers , and resumes into the Biden campaign ’ s maw .
Officials familiar with the advisory groups say they are not an official part of the campaign but work in parallel with the campaign to provide informal advice to Biden and his key decision-makers on a volunteer basis .
Most have sought to keep their activities under wraps .
The co-chairs ’ backgrounds span government , consulting , think tanks , and the defense industry , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the State Department , Department of Defense , and Department of Homeland Security .
Politico previously reported that the Biden camp had built a team of at least 1,000 national security experts working in the 20 working groups .
Foreign Policy reviewed an internal document that identifies the specific names of the working groups and the chairs who lead them .
Each of those working groups oversees multiple subgroups addressing such issues as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , humanitarian relief , and refugees .
For instance , the Defense working group , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a former undersecretary of defense for acquisition , technology , and logistics ; Rosa Brooks , a former senior Pentagon advisor who previously wrote a column for Foreign Policy ; and Christine Wormuth , a former undersecretary of defense for policy , oversees between 100 and 200 specialists and includes about a half a dozen subgroups focused on the budget and regional commands .
The Europe team has over 100 people on its roster , according to several people familiar with the matter .
It is co-led by three former national security officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who until recently co-edited Foreign Policy ’ s “ Shadow Government ” column ; Michael Carpenter ; and Spencer Boyer .
The ideas and advice are then sent up to a small inner circle of Biden loyalists , including Antony Blinken , Jake Sullivan , Avril Haines , Brian McKeon , and Julie Smith , who are likely to serve as the national security brain trust for a Biden administration .
What happens with that advice is a mystery to many of those who supply it , with one official saying it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disappear into a black hole .
“ The working groups have no real decision-making authority , but they oversee this massive machinery that is churning stuff out all the time , ” said one official who has interacted with the working groups .
Many of those volunteering for Biden ’ s campaign don ’ t advertise it or speak to the media about it , save for a few influential advisors at the top .
Others who volunteer for the campaign have been prompted by their employers , including think tanks , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This means that most of the work they do is behind the scenes and shrouded in secrecy—a practice that was not uncommon for past presidential campaigns .
Foreign Policy reached out to more than two dozen people who have been officially or unofficially proffering advice to Biden ’ s campaign for this story .
Many did not respond to requests for comment ; several only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity .
The Biden campaign did not respond to several requests for comment .
The structure of Biden ’ s foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the traditional interagency decision-making process run out of the National Security Council that Trump ’ s White House has dismantled , instead delegating key decisions to a close circle of loyalists , outside associates , and family members .
But several Democratic foreign-policy experts who have been in contact with the Biden campaign say the process remains opaque , and it ’ s hard to know whether the advice they provide is being heeded by Biden ’ s top advisors or if the massive advisory structure is a way to make everyone , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ It ’ s organized like a government , and it ’ s hierarchical and bureaucratic like a government , ” said one working group member .
“ One primary purpose is to make people feel like they are included .
Another purpose is that it creates a proving ground for people who might be hoping to be considered for various jobs in a Biden administration .
It ’ s a chance to show your work.
” The sprawling structure of the working groups acts in part as a “ motivator to get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so they are not dumping on them from the outside , ” said one Democratic foreign-policy advisor .
“ It ’ s not that it isn ’ t genuine , but there is a tactical element of getting people on board from the progressive camp.
” Some foreign-policy experts who have become disenchanted with American foreign policy under the Trump administration described an eagerness to help whoever won the Democratic primaries ; experts who advised former presidential hopefuls such as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg have since joined Biden ’ s team @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trails Biden by at least six points nationally , according to polls released this month , and the Democratic candidate is leading by several points in key swing states including Michigan , Wisconsin and Pennsylvania .
If Biden wins , many in the working groups are expected to jockey for positions in the administration , according to several people involved in the working groups .
There are working groups that cover each region of the world led by veteran foreign-policy experts , including the group on Europe ; a group on Africa led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Michael Battle ; a group on the Middle East led by Mara Rudman , Daniel Benaim , and Dafna Rand ; a group on East Asia led by Ely Ratner and Jung Pak ; a group on South Asia led by Sumona Guha and Tom West ; and a group on Western Hemisphere affairs led by Dan Erikson , Juan Gonzalez , and Julissa Reynoso , according to a roster of experts advising the campaign seen by Foreign Policy .
The team has also added two new working groups : One on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another in the wake of nationwide protests for racial justice after the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody this spring .
The working group responsible for a COVID-19 task force to coordinate international efforts is led by Beth Cameron , who helmed the White House pandemic office under President Barack Obama ; Brad Belzak , a business consultant and former national security official ; and Linda Etim , a former assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) .
Biden ’ s presidential campaign has also established @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America ’ s national security apparatus .
It is chaired by Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley , an African American diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Malta , and Shawn Skelly , an LGBTQ rights advocate who served in the Defense and Transportation departments as the first transgender veteran appointed by the Obama administration .
The creation of the group reflects concern in the Biden camp about long-standing diversity challenges in America ’ s national security establishment—issues that predate Trump but have been exacerbated by the president ’ s largely homogenous group of top advisors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an acknowledgement that minorities , with some prominent exceptions , have long been underrepresented in top government echelons under both Republican and Democratic presidents .
Biden is considering a number of prominent African American women for vice president , including Susan Rice , who served as Obama ’ s national security advisor and U.N. ambassador , and Sen. Kamala Harris , who competed with Biden for the Democratic presidential nomination .
Some outside advocates and Biden supporters are looking to the 2020 election to help break the glass ceiling in the national security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in senior administration posts .
Just over half of the 49 co-chairs of the working groups in Biden ’ s foreign-policy team are women .
A working group on women ’ s and girls ’ issues is led by Carla Koppell , former chief strategy officer at USAID ; Anne Witkowsky , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability and humanitarian affairs in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy ; and Julia Santucci , a former CIA and State Department official .
Biden ’ s priorities also illustrate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s most controversial policies , with working groups dedicated to slowing climate change , protecting refugees , and reinforcing human rights .
There is also a U.N. working group , headed by Isobel Coleman , a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for management and reform , and Peter Yeo , the president of the U.N. advocacy group Better World Campaign , aimed at rebuilding relations with the U.N. and other international organizations .
The working groups appear crafted to win over progressive followers of Sens .
Warren and Bernie Sanders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden team .
The Democratic Party platform , which was produced with input from the Sanders camp , includes a series of pledges sought by progressives .
It calls for scaling back open-ended counterterrorism conflicts and ending the so-called forever wars , abandoning the Trump administration ’ s pursuit of regime change in Iran and elsewhere , and ending U.S. military support for the Saudi Arabian-led military campaign in Yemen .
“ There are good commitments , ” said Matt Duss , Sanders ’ top foreign-policy advisor .
“ There is no denying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a very positive direction on these questions .
”

Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer and Darcy Palder

Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s team of informal foreign-policy and national security advisors has expanded to over 2,000 people, including 20 working groups spanning issues from diversity in national security to arms control, defense, intelligence, and homeland security, according to campaign officials and an internal list of the co-chairs of those groups obtained by Foreign Policy .
Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s team of informal foreign-policy and national security advisors has expanded to over 2,000 people, including 20 working groups spanning issues from diversity in national security to arms control, defense, intelligence, and homeland security, according to campaign officials and an internal list of the co-chairs of those groups obtained by Foreign Policy.
The organization of the group offers insights into how Biden would seek to mold his foreign-policy agenda and turn back some of U.S. President Donald Trump’s most controversial foreign policies, including the demonization of refugees and the curtailing of women’s sexual and reproductive rights around the world, should he win the November presidential election. It also sheds light on the coterie of behind-the-scenes advisors, such as the East Asia expert Ely Ratner and Daniel Benaim, a Middle East specialist with deep ties to Biden, who are likely to take up top and midlevel posts in the Pentagon, State Department, intelligence community, and other agencies if Biden is elected.
Ratner and Benaim are among 49 working group co-chairs who act as gatekeepers for a broader community of foreign-policy, defense, homeland security, and national security experts who are feeding ideas, policy papers, and resumes into the Biden campaign’s maw. Officials familiar with the advisory groups say they are not an official part of the campaign but work in parallel with the campaign to provide informal advice to Biden and his key decision-makers on a volunteer basis. Most have sought to keep their activities under wraps.
The co-chairs’ backgrounds span government, consulting, think tanks, and the defense industry, and they include former senior Obama administration officials in the State Department, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Politico previously reported that the Biden camp had built a team of at least 1,000 national security experts working in the 20 working groups. Foreign Policy reviewed an internal document that identifies the specific names of the working groups and the chairs who lead them.
Each of those working groups oversees multiple subgroups addressing such issues as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, humanitarian relief, and refugees. For instance, the Defense working group, which is led by Frank Kendall III, a former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics; Rosa Brooks, a former senior Pentagon advisor who previously wrote a column for Foreign Policy; and Christine Wormuth, a former undersecretary of defense for policy, oversees between 100 and 200 specialists and includes about a half a dozen subgroups focused on the budget and regional commands.
The Europe team has over 100 people on its roster, according to several people familiar with the matter. It is co-led by three former national security officials in the Obama administration: Julie Smith, who until recently co-edited Foreign Policy’s “Shadow Government” column; Michael Carpenter; and Spencer Boyer.
The ideas and advice are then sent up to a small inner circle of Biden loyalists, including Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Avril Haines, Brian McKeon, and Julie Smith, who are likely to serve as the national security brain trust for a Biden administration. What happens with that advice is a mystery to many of those who supply it, with one official saying it seems like much of the policy initiatives disappear into a black hole.
“The working groups have no real decision-making authority, but they oversee this massive machinery that is churning stuff out all the time,” said one official who has interacted with the working groups.
Many of those volunteering for Biden’s campaign don’t advertise it or speak to the media about it, save for a few influential advisors at the top. Others who volunteer for the campaign have been prompted by their employers, including think tanks, to disclose the affiliation in their online biographies. This means that most of the work they do is behind the scenes and shrouded in secrecy—a practice that was not uncommon for past presidential campaigns.
Foreign Policy reached out to more than two dozen people who have been officially or unofficially proffering advice to Biden’s campaign for this story. Many did not respond to requests for comment; several only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity.
The Biden campaign did not respond to several requests for comment.
The structure of Biden’s foreign-policy team in many ways seeks to mimic the traditional interagency decision-making process run out of the National Security Council that Trump’s White House has dismantled, instead delegating key decisions to a close circle of loyalists, outside associates, and family members.
But several Democratic foreign-policy experts who have been in contact with the Biden campaign say the process remains opaque, and it’s hard to know whether the advice they provide is being heeded by Biden’s top advisors or if the massive advisory structure is a way to make everyone, including potential critics, feel included.
“It’s organized like a government, and it’s hierarchical and bureaucratic like a government,” said one working group member. “One primary purpose is to make people feel like they are included. Another purpose is that it creates a proving ground for people who might be hoping to be considered for various jobs in a Biden administration. It’s a chance to show your work.”
The sprawling structure of the working groups acts in part as a “motivator to get people theoretically feeding ideas to the campaign so they are not dumping on them from the outside,” said one Democratic foreign-policy advisor. “It’s not that it isn’t genuine, but there is a tactical element of getting people on board from the progressive camp.”
Some foreign-policy experts who have become disenchanted with American foreign policy under the Trump administration described an eagerness to help whoever won the Democratic primaries; experts who advised former presidential hopefuls such as Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg have since joined Biden’s team of volunteer foreign-policy advisors.
Trump currently trails Biden by at least six points nationally, according to polls released this month, and the Democratic candidate is leading by several points in key swing states including Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. If Biden wins, many in the working groups are expected to jockey for positions in the administration, according to several people involved in the working groups.
There are working groups that cover each region of the world led by veteran foreign-policy experts, including the group on Europe; a group on Africa led by Nicole Wilett, Allison Lombardo, and Michael Battle; a group on the Middle East led by Mara Rudman, Daniel Benaim, and Dafna Rand; a group on East Asia led by Ely Ratner and Jung Pak; a group on South Asia led by Sumona Guha and Tom West; and a group on Western Hemisphere affairs led by Dan Erikson, Juan Gonzalez, and Julissa Reynoso, according to a roster of experts advising the campaign seen by Foreign Policy.
The team has also added two new working groups: One on the challenges of pandemic response, and another in the wake of nationwide protests for racial justice after the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody this spring.
The working group responsible for a COVID-19 task force to coordinate international efforts is led by Beth Cameron, who helmed the White House pandemic office under President Barack Obama; Brad Belzak, a business consultant and former national security official; and Linda Etim, a former assistant administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Biden’s presidential campaign has also established a working group to promote diversity in America’s national security apparatus. It is chaired by Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, an African American diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Malta, and Shawn Skelly, an LGBTQ rights advocate who served in the Defense and Transportation departments as the first transgender veteran appointed by the Obama administration.
The creation of the group reflects concern in the Biden camp about long-standing diversity challenges in America’s national security establishment—issues that predate Trump but have been exacerbated by the president’s largely homogenous group of top advisors and cabinet members. It’s an acknowledgement that minorities, with some prominent exceptions, have long been underrepresented in top government echelons under both Republican and Democratic presidents. Biden is considering a number of prominent African American women for vice president, including Susan Rice, who served as Obama’s national security advisor and U.N. ambassador, and Sen. Kamala Harris, who competed with Biden for the Democratic presidential nomination.
Some outside advocates and Biden supporters are looking to the 2020 election to help break the glass ceiling in the national security establishment and boost the number of women in senior administration posts. Just over half of the 49 co-chairs of the working groups in Biden’s foreign-policy team are women. A working group on women’s and girls’ issues is led by Carla Koppell, former chief strategy officer at USAID; Anne Witkowsky, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability and humanitarian affairs in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and Julia Santucci, a former CIA and State Department official.
Biden’s priorities also illustrate his focus on reversing some of Trump’s most controversial policies, with working groups dedicated to slowing climate change, protecting refugees, and reinforcing human rights. There is also a U.N. working group, headed by Isobel Coleman, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for management and reform, and Peter Yeo, the president of the U.N. advocacy group Better World Campaign, aimed at rebuilding relations with the U.N. and other international organizations.
The working groups appear crafted to win over progressive followers of Sens. Warren and Bernie Sanders, who have been working with the Biden team. The Democratic Party platform, which was produced with input from the Sanders camp, includes a series of pledges sought by progressives. It calls for scaling back open-ended counterterrorism conflicts and ending the so-called forever wars, abandoning the Trump administration’s pursuit of regime change in Iran and elsewhere, and ending U.S. military support for the Saudi Arabian-led military campaign in Yemen.
“There are good commitments,” said Matt Duss, Sanders’ top foreign-policy advisor. “There is no denying the fact that the party is moving in a very positive direction on these questions.”
Staff writer Jack Detsch contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump

The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump The lack of any significant U.S. response to the revelation that Russia has offered money to the Taliban for killing U.S. troops shines yet another ugly spotlight on the foreign policy of U.S. President Donald Trump—or , more precisely , the utter lack of one .
As the presidential election season heats up , Trump ’ s latest failure should remind American voters that his administration has failed on the most important global threats—not least the COVID-19 pandemic , Russia , China , Iran , and North Korea .
All these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as much at the center of the debate as the crush of domestic policy concerns .
Trump ’ s latest failure should remind American voters that his administration has failed on the most important global threats.Many months after the Russian bounties first became known to the White House , and weeks after they became public , Trump still has taken no action and expressed no empathy for soldiers or their families , claiming that this issue , too , is just a hoax cooked up by his enemies .
On this issue as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy mainly consists of a series of marginally coherent tweets with no discernible objective or strategy .
Indeed , after three and a half years in office , Trump has developed no foreign policy at all .
What we do see are haphazard assertions , “ maximum pressure ” campaigns , boundless admiration for and obsequious pandering to authoritarian leaders , disparaging of democratic allies , and so-called trade deals that cost thousands of American jobs and lack any strategic objective .
As a result of Trump ’ s failures , the Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the next Palestinian uprising than when he took office , the people of Cuba and Venezuela face a bitter future , the promise of African renewal is sidelined , and there is no real challenge to either Russia or China .
Trump ’ s approach to Iran is another painful and costly example .
Over three years after the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal , Iran has more highly enriched uranium available for a nuclear weapon , more operating nuclear facilities , more sophisticated technology , and a shorter breakout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Its malign behavior in the Middle East has not ceased , Americans remain detained by Tehran , and human rights in Iran have worsened .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Iran envoy Brian Hook advertise this as a campaign of “ maximum pressure , ” but their ultimate objective—which they insist is not regime change—remains a mystery .
A similar lack of clear objectives and coherent policies features in virtually every area of foreign policy and national security .
On the issue of North Korea ’ s nuclear weapons , what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nothing but a series of photo opportunities with dictator Kim Jong Un .
Other than stating the need for “ complete , verifiable denuclearization ” by North Korea , there appears to be no strategy for even a single incremental step on the way to such a goal .
As Trump has done with European allies on Iran , Washington has left allies in Seoul and Tokyo blindsided and out of the loop , dangerously exposed both to North Korea and to the erratic policies of the United States , and with no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pyongyang .
Years from now , we will hopefully discover the exact nature of Trump ’ s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin beyond mere envy of power .
In the Middle East , the administration ’ s mysterious , so-called peace plan between the Israelis and Palestinians—developed by Trump ’ s son-in-law Jared Kushner—was so secret that it never really made an appearance before being shrugged off .
As the November election approaches , there is no discernible objective of Trump ’ s policies other than currying personal favor with Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ importantly , with Trump ’ s evangelical Christian base—while undermining the long-standing bipartisan nature of U.S. support for Israel .
Even U.S. allies such as the United Arab Emirates and Jordan are now so opposed to Israel ’ s Trump-backed plan to annex parts of the West Bank that stability in the Middle East is further undermined .
Perhaps most damaging to U.S. strategic interests and global stability is Trump ’ s complete mishandling of Russia and China , where he has veered between mere transactional tactics and his desire for photo-ops with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we will hopefully discover the exact nature of Trump ’ s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin beyond mere envy of power .
Trump has already voiced his envy of Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s status of president for life .
And in both cases yet again , there appears to be no overarching objective , no strategy for getting there , no coherent policy process .
There is no evidence , for example , of a desire to preserve arms control with Russia or to stop Russia ’ s ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persistent disinformation campaigns that are now looming as an ever-larger threat to the integrity of the U.S. election .
And by scoffing at Russian bounties on the heads of American soldiers in Afghanistan , Trump underscores his continued stance of putting Russia above U.S. interests and American lives .
At the same time , the Trump administration has made no effort to find areas of cooperation with China , such as climate change , even as the United States challenges and confronts China on issues such as intellectual property theft , unfair trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Sea .
What remains after all these failures is a clear effort by Trump and his allies to obtain Russian and Chinese help for his reelection.What remains after all these failures is a clear effort by Trump and his allies to obtain Russian and Chinese help for his reelection .
We should all remember Trump ’ s shocking plea for Russia to interfere in the U.S. election when he was still a candidate in 2016 : “ Russia , if you ’ re listening , I hope you ’ re able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” This time around , we know from former National Security Advisor John Bolton that Trump , at the June 2019 G-20 summit in Japan , pleaded with Xi to help him win reelection .
At the same summit , during his meeting with Putin , Trump laughed off Russian interference in U.S. elections .
And this week , at a congressional hearing that followed a senior counterintelligence official ’ s warning that Russia , China , and Iran are actively trying to influence the November election , Attorney General William Barr hesitated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a presidential campaign to solicit or accept foreign assistance .
The only possible conclusion is that the objective in Trump ’ s relations with other countries is not national security but Trump ’ s security .
Nothing else explains the vacuous and vain approach of a foreign policy without objectives , without strategy , without any indication that it protects and advances U.S. interests .
As the United States enters the final months of the presidential election campaign , Americans are understandably preoccupied with the coronavirus pandemic , issues of racial injustice , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy with a dismal outlook .
But if the virus has taught us anything , it is that the fate of the United States is inseparable from the world ’ s .
The United States ’ recovery from the pandemic and the economic collapse is dependent on other countries for public health , for trade , and for peace and security .
As November approaches , Trump ’ s disastrous lack of any coherent policy to advance U.S. interests and to keep Americans healthy , prosperous , and safe—as well as his still-accumulating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the country ’ s debate .

The lack of any significant U.S. response to the revelation that Russia has offered money to the Taliban for killing U.S. troops shines yet another ugly spotlight on the foreign policy of U.S. President Donald Trump—or, more precisely, the utter lack of one. As the presidential election season heats up, Trump’s latest failure should remind American voters that his administration has failed on the most important global threats—not least the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. All these and other foreign-policy failures should be just as much at the center of the debate as the crush of domestic policy concerns.
The lack of any significant U.S. response to the revelation that Russia has offered money to the Taliban for killing U.S. troops shines yet another ugly spotlight on the foreign policy of U.S. President Donald Trump—or, more precisely, the utter lack of one. As the presidential election season heats up, Trump’s latest failure should remind American voters that his administration has failed on the most important global threats—not least the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. All these and other foreign-policy failures should be just as much at the center of the debate as the crush of domestic policy concerns.
Trump’s latest failure should remind American voters that his administration has failed on the most important global threats.Many months after the Russian bounties first became known to the White House, and weeks after they became public, Trump still has taken no action and expressed no empathy for soldiers or their families, claiming that this issue, too, is just a hoax cooked up by his enemies. On this issue as on so many others, his foreign policy mainly consists of a series of marginally coherent tweets with no discernible objective or strategy. Indeed, after three and a half years in office, Trump has developed no foreign policy at all. What we do see are haphazard assertions, “maximum pressure” campaigns, boundless admiration for and obsequious pandering to authoritarian leaders, disparaging of democratic allies, and so-called trade deals that cost thousands of American jobs and lack any strategic objective.
As a result of Trump’s failures, the Middle East is further from peace and closer to the next Palestinian uprising than when he took office, the people of Cuba and Venezuela face a bitter future, the promise of African renewal is sidelined, and there is no real challenge to either Russia or China.
Trump’s approach to Iran is another painful and costly example. Over three years after the Trump administration withdrew from the nuclear deal, Iran has more highly enriched uranium available for a nuclear weapon, more operating nuclear facilities, more sophisticated technology, and a shorter breakout time to build a nuclear weapon. Its malign behavior in the Middle East has not ceased, Americans remain detained by Tehran, and human rights in Iran have worsened. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Iran envoy Brian Hook advertise this as a campaign of “maximum pressure,” but their ultimate objective—which they insist is not regime change—remains a mystery.
A similar lack of clear objectives and coherent policies features in virtually every area of foreign policy and national security. On the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, what masquerades as Trump’s policy is nothing but a series of photo opportunities with dictator Kim Jong Un. Other than stating the need for “complete, verifiable denuclearization” by North Korea, there appears to be no strategy for even a single incremental step on the way to such a goal. As Trump has done with European allies on Iran, Washington has left allies in Seoul and Tokyo blindsided and out of the loop, dangerously exposed both to North Korea and to the erratic policies of the United States, and with no hope of any de-escalation of tensions with Pyongyang.
Years from now, we will hopefully discover the exact nature of Trump’s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin beyond mere envy of power.
In the Middle East, the administration’s mysterious, so-called peace plan between the Israelis and Palestinians—developed by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner—was so secret that it never really made an appearance before being shrugged off. As the November election approaches, there is no discernible objective of Trump’s policies other than currying personal favor with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and, more importantly, with Trump’s evangelical Christian base—while undermining the long-standing bipartisan nature of U.S. support for Israel. Even U.S. allies such as the United Arab Emirates and Jordan are now so opposed to Israel’s Trump-backed plan to annex parts of the West Bank that stability in the Middle East is further undermined.
Perhaps most damaging to U.S. strategic interests and global stability is Trump’s complete mishandling of Russia and China, where he has veered between mere transactional tactics and his desire for photo-ops with authoritarian strongmen. Years from now, we will hopefully discover the exact nature of Trump’s personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin beyond mere envy of power. Trump has already voiced his envy of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s status of president for life. And in both cases yet again, there appears to be no overarching objective, no strategy for getting there, no coherent policy process. There is no evidence, for example, of a desire to preserve arms control with Russia or to stop Russia’s (or any other country’s) persistent disinformation campaigns that are now looming as an ever-larger threat to the integrity of the U.S. election. And by scoffing at Russian bounties on the heads of American soldiers in Afghanistan, Trump underscores his continued stance of putting Russia above U.S. interests and American lives.
At the same time, the Trump administration has made no effort to find areas of cooperation with China, such as climate change, even as the United States challenges and confronts China on issues such as intellectual property theft, unfair trade practices, and control over the South China Sea.
What remains after all these failures is a clear effort by Trump and his allies to obtain Russian and Chinese help for his reelection.What remains after all these failures is a clear effort by Trump and his allies to obtain Russian and Chinese help for his reelection. We should all remember Trump’s shocking plea for Russia to interfere in the U.S. election when he was still a candidate in 2016: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing.” This time around, we know from former National Security Advisor John Bolton that Trump, at the June 2019 G-20 summit in Japan, pleaded with Xi to help him win reelection. At the same summit, during his meeting with Putin, Trump laughed off Russian interference in U.S. elections. And this week, at a congressional hearing that followed a senior counterintelligence official’s warning that Russia, China, and Iran are actively trying to influence the November election, Attorney General William Barr hesitated to say that it was inappropriate for a presidential campaign to solicit or accept foreign assistance.
The only possible conclusion is that the objective in Trump’s relations with other countries is not national security but Trump’s security. Nothing else explains the vacuous and vain approach of a foreign policy without objectives, without strategy, without any indication that it protects and advances U.S. interests.
As the United States enters the final months of the presidential election campaign, Americans are understandably preoccupied with the coronavirus pandemic, issues of racial injustice, and their own challenges in a collapsed economy with a dismal outlook. But if the virus has taught us anything, it is that the fate of the United States is inseparable from the world’s. The United States’ recovery from the pandemic and the economic collapse is dependent on other countries for public health, for trade, and for peace and security. As November approaches, Trump’s disastrous lack of any coherent policy to advance U.S. interests and to keep Americans healthy, prosperous, and safe—as well as his still-accumulating string of failures—should be at the center of the country’s debate.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--The End of Immigration Detention Doesn’t Mean the End of Fortress Europe

The End of Immigration Detention Doesn ’ t Mean the End of Fortress Europe Nacho Hernandez Moreno , an attorney in Alicante , Spain , has spent the past two years pushing for Spain to end its detention of migrants and asylum-seekers .
When the coronavirus pandemic hit , he feared that overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions would fuel the spread of COVID-19 inside facilities .
That has been the case in detention centers in the United States , France , Malaysia , the United Kingdom , and elsewhere , which have emerged as hot spots for COVID-19 .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state of emergency and closed its borders , making it unlawful to keep people in detention ; according to national law , migrants can be held for a maximum of 60 days while awaiting deportation .
But with deportations frozen , detention became illegal immediately .
On March 18 , judges therefore began ordering the country to empty its detention centers .
“ They ’ re still empty , ” Moreno said in a phone interview in June , calling the move “ unprecedented.
” Undocumented migrants were connected with nonprofit organizations such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and residents were released into the community to return to their families .
“ It ended up working as a de facto alternative to detention , ” he explained .
“ It wasn ’ t designed that way , but it worked.
” The pandemic is prompting two parallel trends when it comes to global migration : on the one hand , mounting legal challenges to detention and , on the other , a significant reduction in immigration and asylum .
Although the particularities of Spanish law—its 60-day maximum is lower than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU law , detention can not exceed 18 months—played a part in the sweeping halt , it ’ s hardly the only country where immigration detention has decreased since the pandemic began : Courts in Portugal , France , the U.K. , Japan , Indonesia , and the Netherlands have ordered facilities to release immigrants .
( Although in some instances judges have ordered facilities in the United States to release detainees , it has been far rarer than in other countries , even as the virus ravages U.S. centers , infecting and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could now prompt a reckoning for the broader system of immigration detention , advocates say , which has become central to immigration policies in much of the world—whether in wealthy European countries or major migration transit points such as Morocco and Malaysia .
With no end in sight for the spread of the coronavirus , they hope that temporary shifts away from detention could influence future policy and create space for more humane—and less costly—alternatives , such as GPS monitoring , supervised release , or parole .
But others fear that governments could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ releases—border closures , concern over infection , and a drop in asylum—to restrict immigration entirely .
The pandemic , then , is prompting two parallel trends when it comes to global migration : on the one hand , mounting legal challenges to detention and , on the other , a significant reduction in immigration and asylum .
“ COVID-19 means there ’ s no way to keep people in detention , due to humanitarian concerns , and we could build on this momentum as the basis for future advocacy , ” Moreno said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judges have said they would not consider further detentions until a vaccine becomes widely available .
“ It ’ s clear as day that it ’ s a system that ’ s been flawed and ill-conceived from the get-go , ” said Donald Kerwin , the executive director of the Center for Migration Studies , a New York-based think tank .
“ It ’ s used as a means to an end , to remove people .
But it ought to be the last resort , because it ’ s so punitive , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ensure the integrity of the enforcement system.
” The pandemic has drawn attention to the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding that are the norm in immigration facilities around the world .
Even in normal times , detention centers have seen outbreaks of diseases that have otherwise become rare .
Last September , a mumps outbreak swept U.S. facilities ; nearly a decade ago , research from holding facilities on the Greek-Turkish border pointed to high rates of respiratory disease and infection .
In 2018 , the World Health Organization argued that crowded refugee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , posing a serious threat to public health .
“ The pandemic puts the entire strategy of systematic use of detention as a form of migration control in question , ” Magdalena Majkowska-Tomkin , the division director for migration at Open Society Europe , said by email , adding that “ detention undermines the public health objective.
” Spain , she wrote in an op-ed , showed that “ within a matter of weeks , almost all of [ a ] nation ’ s detention system can be closed due to health risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Alternatives to detention include GPS or mobile-phone monitoring and community support programs , which research shows have been successful in encouraging migrants to comply with immigration proceedings and court appearances .
In some cases , the pandemic has even led countries to regularize undocumented migrants altogether , avoiding detention and deportation .
Even Italy , which has in recent years become notorious for its anti-immigration policies—though the country ’ s stance has softened somewhat since the far-right League party lost its place in the governing coalition late last year—regularized over 500,000 agriculture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their central role in restoring the country ’ s lagging economy .
Portugal expedited residency permits to migrants awaiting regularization and extended full citizenship rights to migrants and asylum-seekers until June 30 .
“ There are clearly alternative ways to manage migration , which benefit everyone , without having to imprison people at great financial and human cost , ” Majkowska-Tomkin said .
Court-ordered releases , experts say , will likely see continued success ; as long as the virus is spreading—which could be for years—judges will be more inclined to force detention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce the number of people being held .
And while advocates admit that detention in some form will continue to exist , it will be difficult to return to the overcrowded facilities that have become the norm .
While advocates admit that detention in some form will likely continue to exist , it will be difficult for governments to return to the overcrowded facilities that have become the norm .
“ Detention levels have gone down in most places , and it ’ s going to be a challenge for those systems to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ near future , ” said Michael Flynn , the executive director of the Geneva-based Global Detention Project .
“ The pandemic creates a structural barrier , which gives the space to say , this isn ’ t something we have to be doing , ” he said .
Still , “ if and when things do return to some sort of normal , it ’ s challenging to think that the kinds of pressures that caused the system to emerge are simply going to go away.
” Even Spain , which has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to detain hundreds of migrants in packed transit centers on its island enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla .
“ There ’ s all this great press about Spain emptying its internment centers on the mainland , but in the enclaves the opposite is happening , ” Flynn said , calling the situation a “ potential humanitarian nightmare.
” France , which began closing detention centers or drastically reducing detainee populations in March , started reopening some in late June as part of a broader easing of restrictions , generating outcry from immigrant advocacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries will be forced to decide what to do with people who were released during the pandemic .
“ Governments will have to ask , can they be redetained , and if so , will they want to do that , with the costs it would entail ?
” In the past , however , exorbitant costs have hardly dissuaded governments that pursue expensive detention operations largely to pander to anti-immigration voters .
With that in mind , a move away from detention could simply be part and parcel of a reduction in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further curbs on migratory and asylum systems .
In other words , if countries simply refuse to accept new migrants or asylum-seekers at their borders , there will ultimately be fewer people to detain .
“ If the EU moves away from detention , it will still be focused on control , control , control , ” said Moreno , the Spanish attorney .
“ We might be avoiding detention , but that doesn ’ t mean providing for migrants—it could mean a shift toward deportation.
” That could entail immediate deportation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those on Ceuta and Melilla , or a hardened border approach that would curtail the number of migrants allowed onto European shores at all .
That attitude seems to underscore a new EU migration pact released in April , according to an analysis by the European Policy Centre , with a focus on hardened external borders and a stronger push to return migrants to their home countries .
France—which has progressively tightened its immigration policies since Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017—began chartering planes to deport migrants this month Hard-line policies are already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as advocates make headway in forcing the release of detainees .
In May , Hungary released 300 asylum-seekers from its so-called migrant transit zones on its borders with Serbia , which had gained notoriety for their prisonlike conditions .
At the same time , it enacted legal changes to make asylum all but impossible moving forward , notably by requiring asylum-seekers to submit applications at consulates in neighboring countries .
Nationalist governments , Moreno said , “ will always oppose our type of advocacy effort.
” If the pandemic does force a rethink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward preventing migrants from coming to Europe , not finding ways to provide for them.
” It ’ s not limited to countries like Hungary that are already notorious for their hostility to migrants .
France—which has progressively tightened its immigration policies since Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017—began chartering planes to deport migrants this month , the advocacy group La Cimade reported .
Thousands of migrants and asylum-seekers are sleeping in encampments across the country , even as coronavirus infection rates rise ; in early July , the European Court of Human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their duties ” to protect asylum-seekers—the fourth such condemnation in a one-month period .
Public health concerns will likely embolden leaders already searching for any pretext to curb resettlement and asylum .
Xenophobic governments in Poland , Hungary , and the United States have seized on the pandemic ; nationalist parties in France and Italy have lauded border closures , tapping into tropes that foreigners will bring disease .
“ Once normalcy returns , that politics of fear will come to the fore , ” Flynn said .
“ It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , and we ’ re not going to see a change in mentality.
” Nationalist parties in France and Italy have lauded border closures , tapping into tropes that foreigners will bring disease .
In the United States , for example , the Trump administration has expedited deportations and stopped processing asylum claims—a policy that advocacy organizations call unlawful but have failed to successfully challenge in court .
Over the past month , Malta has repeatedly used private ships to push migrants back to Libya , citing public health concerns ; Greece @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while France briefly extended residence permits , it has also made it more difficult to apply for asylum .
“ What we ’ re seeing in many of these instances is a lot of evidence that governments who have openly expressed their intention to deflect or prevent asylum-seekers from lodging claims now have found the pretext to do that , ” said Bill Frelick , the refugee and migration rights division director at Human Rights Watch .
Current releases might benefit migrants and asylum-seekers who were already in detention , but for everyone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever reaching European shores , lodging an asylum claim , and seeing a judge .
“ They ’ re basically throwing all that out the window , ” Frelick said .
“ They ’ re just expelling people summarily and saying , ‘ Tough luck .
’ ”

Nacho Hernandez Moreno, an attorney in Alicante, Spain, has spent the past two years pushing for Spain to end its detention of migrants and asylum-seekers. When the coronavirus pandemic hit, he feared that overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions would fuel the spread of COVID-19 inside facilities. That has been the case in detention centers in the United States , France , Malaysia , the United Kingdom , and elsewhere, which have emerged as hot spots for COVID-19.
Nacho Hernandez Moreno, an attorney in Alicante, Spain, has spent the past two years pushing for Spain to end its detention of migrants and asylum-seekers. When the coronavirus pandemic hit, he feared that overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions would fuel the spread of COVID-19 inside facilities. That has been the case in detention centers in the United States, France, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, which have emerged as hot spots for COVID-19.
By March 14, Spain had declared a state of emergency and closed its borders, making it unlawful to keep people in detention; according to national law, migrants can be held for a maximum of 60 days while awaiting deportation. But with deportations frozen, detention became illegal immediately. On March 18, judges therefore began ordering the country to empty its detention centers.
“They’re still empty,” Moreno said in a phone interview in June, calling the move “unprecedented.” Undocumented migrants were connected with nonprofit organizations such as Fundación Cepaim, where Moreno works, and residents were released into the community to return to their families. “It ended up working as a de facto alternative to detention,” he explained. “It wasn’t designed that way, but it worked.”
The pandemic is prompting two parallel trends when it comes to global migration: on the one hand, mounting legal challenges to detention and, on the other, a significant reduction in immigration and asylum.
Although the particularities of Spanish law—its 60-day maximum is lower than many other EU countries; according to EU law, detention cannot exceed 18 months—played a part in the sweeping halt, it’s hardly the only country where immigration detention has decreased since the pandemic began: Courts in Portugal, France, the U.K., Japan, Indonesia, and the Netherlands have ordered facilities to release immigrants. (Although in some instances judges have ordered facilities in the United States to release detainees, it has been far rarer than in other countries, even as the virus ravages U.S. centers, infecting and killing detainees.)
These pandemic-driven releases could now prompt a reckoning for the broader system of immigration detention, advocates say, which has become central to immigration policies in much of the world—whether in wealthy European countries or major migration transit points such as Morocco and Malaysia.
With no end in sight for the spread of the coronavirus, they hope that temporary shifts away from detention could influence future policy and create space for more humane—and less costly—alternatives, such as GPS monitoring, supervised release, or parole. But others fear that governments could seize on the same conditions driving court-ordered releases—border closures, concern over infection, and a drop in asylum—to restrict immigration entirely.
The pandemic, then, is prompting two parallel trends when it comes to global migration: on the one hand, mounting legal challenges to detention and, on the other, a significant reduction in immigration and asylum.
“COVID-19 means there’s no way to keep people in detention, due to humanitarian concerns, and we could build on this momentum as the basis for future advocacy,” Moreno said, noting that in Spain, numerous judges have said they would not consider further detentions until a vaccine becomes widely available.
“It’s clear as day that it’s a system that’s been flawed and ill-conceived from the get-go,” said Donald Kerwin, the executive director of the Center for Migration Studies, a New York-based think tank. “It’s used as a means to an end, to remove people. But it ought to be the last resort, because it’s so punitive, so expensive, and a harsh way to ensure the integrity of the enforcement system.”
The pandemic has drawn attention to the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding that are the norm in immigration facilities around the world. Even in normal times, detention centers have seen outbreaks of diseases that have otherwise become rare.
Last September, a mumps outbreak swept U.S. facilities; nearly a decade ago, research from holding facilities on the Greek-Turkish border pointed to high rates of respiratory disease and infection. In 2018, the World Health Organization argued that crowded refugee facilities increased the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant diseases, posing a serious threat to public health.
“The pandemic puts the entire strategy of systematic use of detention as a form of migration control in question,” Magdalena Majkowska-Tomkin, the division director for migration at Open Society Europe, said by email, adding that “detention undermines the public health objective.” Spain, she wrote in an op-ed, showed that “within a matter of weeks, almost all of [a] nation’s detention system can be closed due to health risks, human rights concerns and legal uncertainty.”
Alternatives to detention include GPS or mobile-phone monitoring and community support programs, which research shows have been successful in encouraging migrants to comply with immigration proceedings and court appearances. In some cases, the pandemic has even led countries to regularize undocumented migrants altogether, avoiding detention and deportation.
Even Italy, which has in recent years become notorious for its anti-immigration policies—though the country’s stance has softened somewhat since the far-right League party lost its place in the governing coalition late last year—regularized over 500,000 agriculture and care workers in May, recognizing their central role in restoring the country’s lagging economy.
Portugal expedited residency permits to migrants awaiting regularization and extended full citizenship rights to migrants and asylum-seekers until June 30. “There are clearly alternative ways to manage migration, which benefit everyone, without having to imprison people at great financial and human cost,” Majkowska-Tomkin said.
Court-ordered releases, experts say, will likely see continued success; as long as the virus is spreading—which could be for years—judges will be more inclined to force detention centers to release detainees or at least reduce the number of people being held. And while advocates admit that detention in some form will continue to exist, it will be difficult to return to the overcrowded facilities that have become the norm.
While advocates admit that detention in some form will likely continue to exist, it will be difficult for governments to return to the overcrowded facilities that have become the norm.
“Detention levels have gone down in most places, and it’s going to be a challenge for those systems to pick back up any time in the near future,” said Michael Flynn, the executive director of the Geneva-based Global Detention Project.
“The pandemic creates a structural barrier, which gives the space to say, this isn’t something we have to be doing,” he said. Still, “if and when things do return to some sort of normal, it’s challenging to think that the kinds of pressures that caused the system to emerge are simply going to go away.”
Even Spain, which has been praised for its significant releases, continues to detain hundreds of migrants in packed transit centers on its island enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. “There’s all this great press about Spain emptying its internment centers on the mainland, but in the enclaves the opposite is happening,” Flynn said, calling the situation a “potential humanitarian nightmare.”
France, which began closing detention centers or drastically reducing detainee populations in March, started reopening some in late June as part of a broader easing of restrictions, generating outcry from immigrant advocacy groups.
Still, Flynn said, countries will be forced to decide what to do with people who were released during the pandemic. “Governments will have to ask, can they be redetained, and if so, will they want to do that, with the costs it would entail?” In the past, however, exorbitant costs have hardly dissuaded governments that pursue expensive detention operations largely to pander to anti-immigration voters.
With that in mind, a move away from detention could simply be part and parcel of a reduction in migration entirely, against a backdrop of further curbs on migratory and asylum systems. In other words, if countries simply refuse to accept new migrants or asylum-seekers at their borders, there will ultimately be fewer people to detain.
“If the EU moves away from detention, it will still be focused on control, control, control,” said Moreno, the Spanish attorney. “We might be avoiding detention, but that doesn’t mean providing for migrants—it could mean a shift toward deportation.” That could entail immediate deportation, a doubling down of offshore facilities like those on Ceuta and Melilla, or a hardened border approach that would curtail the number of migrants allowed onto European shores at all.
That attitude seems to underscore a new EU migration pact released in April, according to an analysis by the European Policy Centre, with a focus on hardened external borders and a stronger push to return migrants to their home countries.
France—which has progressively tightened its immigration policies since Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017—began chartering planes to deport migrants this month
Hard-line policies are already playing out on the ground, even as advocates make headway in forcing the release of detainees. In May, Hungary released 300 asylum-seekers from its so-called migrant transit zones on its borders with Serbia, which had gained notoriety for their prisonlike conditions. At the same time, it enacted legal changes to make asylum all but impossible moving forward, notably by requiring asylum-seekers to submit applications at consulates in neighboring countries.
Nationalist governments, Moreno said, “will always oppose our type of advocacy effort.” If the pandemic does force a rethink of policy, “it will lean toward preventing migrants from coming to Europe, not finding ways to provide for them.”
It’s not limited to countries like Hungary that are already notorious for their hostility to migrants. France—which has progressively tightened its immigration policies since Emmanuel Macron took office in 2017—began chartering planes to deport migrants this month, the advocacy group La Cimade reported. Thousands of migrants and asylum-seekers are sleeping in encampments across the country, even as coronavirus infection rates rise; in early July, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that authorities had “failed in their duties” to protect asylum-seekers—the fourth such condemnation in a one-month period.
Public health concerns will likely embolden leaders already searching for any pretext to curb resettlement and asylum. Xenophobic governments in Poland, Hungary, and the United States have seized on the pandemic; nationalist parties in France and Italy have lauded border closures, tapping into tropes that foreigners will bring disease.
“Once normalcy returns, that politics of fear will come to the fore,” Flynn said. “It’s such low-hanging fruit on the path to power, and we’re not going to see a change in mentality.”
Nationalist parties in France and Italy have lauded border closures, tapping into tropes that foreigners will bring disease.
In the United States, for example, the Trump administration has expedited deportations and stopped processing asylum claims—a policy that advocacy organizations call unlawful but have failed to successfully challenge in court. Over the past month, Malta has repeatedly used private ships to push migrants back to Libya, citing public health concerns; Greece suspended its asylum system entirely. And while France briefly extended residence permits, it has also made it more difficult to apply for asylum.
“What we’re seeing in many of these instances is a lot of evidence that governments who have openly expressed their intention to deflect or prevent asylum-seekers from lodging claims now have found the pretext to do that,” said Bill Frelick, the refugee and migration rights division director at Human Rights Watch.
Current releases might benefit migrants and asylum-seekers who were already in detention, but for everyone else there may be little chance of ever reaching European shores, lodging an asylum claim, and seeing a judge. “They’re basically throwing all that out the window,” Frelick said. “They’re just expelling people summarily and saying, ‘Tough luck.’”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Is This the Beginning of a New Cold War With China?

Is This the Beginning of a New Cold War With China ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma .
Is it really almost August ?
Usually Washington , D.C. , would be slowing down for summer this time of year , but things seem as busy as ever .
Emma Ashford : We ’ re around day 30 of a heat wave , so is it any wonder everyone is staying inside ?
Another change from the average summer : Unlike most election years , there won ’ t be any big party conventions .
When Joe Biden finally decides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I guess we ’ ll learn about it on Zoom ?
MK : He was recently photographed holding notes with bullet points about Kamala Harris , increasing speculation that the California senator will be the pick .
Guessing the next VP makes for a fun parlor game , but the running mate doesn ’ t usually matter much in elections beyond their home state , and the leading candidates are mostly from places like California and Massachusetts or Washington , D.C. , that are already safely in the Democrats ’ camp .
EA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ride on the VP choice !
There ’ s just too much else going on .
But from the point of foreign policy , it ’ s hard to know what to think about the two supposed top choices .
Susan Rice might have a lot of experience in foreign policy , but it ’ s not clear what her actual views are : She was at the table for Obama administration decisions that tended toward hawkishness and toward restraint .
And Kamala Harris has no foreign-policy experience at all .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hawks , but I don ’ t have a lot of evidence to back that up .
MK : It is interesting , however , that there is a national security policy wonk in the mix .
There is hope for one of us to become VP yet !
EA : I suspect this column wouldn ’ t help either of us in confirmation hearings .
But why don ’ t we move on to the big issue of the week ?
The Trump administration is taking further steps toward a confrontational China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House demanded that the Chinese close their Houston consulate , claiming it was a den of espionage .
MK : It was Chinese President Xi Jinping who turned this into a confrontational relationship .
China has been engaged in sharp power practices against democracies around the world , and its decades of intellectual property theft from the West may have been the biggest illicit transfer of wealth in history .
I am glad the United States , under Donald Trump , is finally pushing back , including by closing down the Houston consulate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no doubt that the Chinese were engaged in espionage out of the Houston consulate .
They have a pretty bad track record of intellectual property theft at this point .
Houston ’ s the center of the oil industry , so it ’ s a great place for spies to build connections with researchers working on fuels and extraction technologies .
But here ’ s the problem : Everyone knows that this is happening already .
It ’ s not a new problem .
Washington might have closed down the consulate and undermined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Chinese government made the United States close its Chengdu consulate and withdraw some diplomats from China .
So the spat damages American intelligence-gathering capabilities , too .
Surely it ’ s better to stick with the devil we know ?
MK : The problem isn ’ t new but , thank goodness , the U.S. approach is .
For years , U.S. officials turned a blind eye to this behavior because they hoped China was going to become a big Germany in Asia .
But that strategy didn ’ t work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a one-off move .
The Trump administration has a new , more combative strategy for dealing with China .
EA : Funny you should mention Germany .
I view this diplomatic spat with China a bit like the furor a few years back over U.S. intelligence agencies tapping Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s phone .
States spy on each other .
It ’ s what they do .
And , frankly , we should be happy that they do , since it helps avoid misunderstandings and conflict .
It doesn ’ t mean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theft , but there are ways to deal with it that don ’ t involve hurting the United States ’ own intelligence-gathering capabilities .
And let ’ s be honest , with this administration , it ’ s as likely that this decision was driven by a political desire to look tough on China as it was by actual concerns about espionage .
It ’ s part of a much broader pattern .
MK : I ’ d agree if this were an isolated incident , but the broader pattern I see is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tougher line with China across the board .
The White House released a China strategy in May , vowing to stop China ’ s “ trade secrets theft … and economic espionage.
” And four cabinet officials have given big China speeches—most recently there was a good speech from Secretary Mike Pompeo last Friday .
EA : It was certainly an interesting speech .
I see that Pompeo is back to describing the Chinese as “ communists ” again ; I guess it plays better than just calling them “ authoritarian ” in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Cold War practice of calling them the Chicoms ?
EA : Pompeo seemed to be trying to draw on a Cold War-era ideal of democracies fighting against a communist threat .
But I thought that Tom Wright of the Brookings Institution made a good point : Pompeo ’ s rhetoric is wholly at odds with the Trump administration ’ s actual strategy .
Pompeo called for an alliance of democracies to resist China .
Trump has repeatedly dismissed those countries and told Xi that he could do whatever he wants .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ take this speech seriously .
Much of the criticism of the Pompeo speech was about politics , not policy .
People of all political stripes should recognize and welcome good policy when they see it .
MK : I think much of the criticism of the speech was about politics , not policy .
Left-leaning foreign-policy experts ( some working on the Biden team ) rushed to publish their negative appraisals .
I understand they don ’ t like the Trump administration and think that Pompeo is the wrong messenger for this proposal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal with China makes a lot of sense .
After all , Biden has also called for a Summit for Democracy .
Colleagues and I at the Atlantic Council have been calling for an Alliance of Free Nations ( here , here , here , and here ) for some time , and we were pleased to see this recommendation advanced by the U.S. Secretary of State .
People of all political stripes should recognize and welcome good policy when they see it .
EA : I don ’ t see a threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I see a series of smaller issues that should concern Western governments : intellectual property theft , Chinese infiltration of telecommunication networks , China ’ s moves to buy off neighboring states with the Belt and Road Initiative .
But they ’ re not all equally concerning .
Just look at the failures of the Belt and Road : None of its Indian Ocean ports is likely to turn a profit , and a lot of states are increasingly concerned about ending up indebted to Beijing .
The whole thing has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all these issues affect all democracies in the same way .
That ’ s why democracies are reacting to them in such different ways .
MK : On the contrary , I see a global China challenge and a free world increasingly coming together to meet it .
Japan , the European Union , and the United States have all complained about China ’ s unfair trading practices .
Democracies in Europe , Asia , and North America have banned Huawei ’ s 5G technology .
The Chinese military challenge is most pressing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ navies are now sailing ships through the South China Sea to contest China ’ s illegal territorial claims .
Democracies are also concerned about the Chinese Communist Party ’ s threat to freedom and human rights .
This is an ideological challenge .
The free world is concerned about China ’ s autocratic nature .
At home , the party is engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Uighurs and cracking down on Hong Kong ’ s traditional freedoms .
EA : The China challenge is about power , not ideology : managing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that doesn ’ t allow it to dominate Asia , doesn ’ t harm U.S. vital interests , and doesn ’ t start a war .
That ’ s all .
Turning this into some ideological battle doesn ’ t help with that .
MK : I disagree .
This is an ideological challenge .
The free world is concerned about China ’ s autocratic nature .
At home , the party is engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Uighurs and cracking down on Hong Kong ’ s traditional freedoms .
Overseas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ silence free speech critical of China and exporting facial recognition technologies that help dictators repress their populations .
And whether intentionally promoted or not , dictators around the world cite China ’ s “ state-led capitalist ” model as justification for how autocratic control can be consistent with economic development .
EA : But that really misses the key distinction between the Soviet Union and China .
The challenge from China isn ’ t ideological in the same way as the Cold War was .
Frankly , the Chinese today have no distinct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of old Communist Party structures , capitalist markets , and kleptocratic elite networks .
Perhaps Chinese surveillance technology might be attractive to dictators , but the country itself is not the early Soviet Union , wielding a Comintern in an attempt to turn nearby states to Marxism .
Chinese leaders prefer autocracies , I ’ m sure , but they ’ re willing to work with anything from absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia to democratic states like Indonesia .
A different situation needs a different response .
The Soviet Union ’ s approach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crushed .
China presents states with a very different choice : Trade with us if you like , but we don ’ t care too much about your domestic politics .
MK : A new democratic alliance would not only be about ideology , however , but also about power .
We are in a much stronger position on trade , technology , human rights , and many other issues if it is a global alliance of democracies on one side of the negotiating table and China isolated on the other .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy , China won ’ t build a countervailing alliance of autocracies and , even if it does , it will be no match for the 75 percent of global GDP that the free world can bring to bear .
EA : So you ’ re basically arguing that we ’ re in a new cold war ?
MK : It was only a Cold War because it never went hot .
Unfortunately , that is still a real possibility with this rivalry , as the National Defense Strategy Commission report bluntly warned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I hate these analogies , even without making the flippant response that I thought we were already in Cold War 2.0 with Russia .
You ’ re right that it was defined that way in part because it never became a conflict ; John Lewis Gaddis famously described it as the “ Long Peace.
” Whatever you call it , though , it was structurally very different than today .
Two big superpowers and the rest of the world in tatters following World War II is a very different situation than today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s strategy is about building power and regime preservation , not about building clones of itself .
The analogy just doesn ’ t hold at anything other than a superficial level .
MK : But even if this is about regime preservation , it is still ideological .
Xi knows that if democracy comes to Beijing , he is out of a job .
So , he does want to make the world safe for autocracy .
But we agree on the analogies !
There was a good book on this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reasoning , people cling to superficial similarities and overlook the underlying differences .
But it is often the underlying differences that really matter .
Not everything can be boiled down to the next Munich Agreement , the next Cold War , or everybody ’ s new favorite : the Peloponnesian War .
EA : Yeah , if I hear the phrase “ Thucydides Trap ” one more time , I ’ ll scream .
The basic concept is drawn from the rivalry between Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece .
In a nutshell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a declining state are likely to end up in a war .
But Graham Allison of Harvard did us all a disservice by introducing the concept to the masses and by suggesting that it ’ s inevitable .
To paraphrase James Palmer ’ s article here in Foreign Policy the other day , read another damn book .
At the risk of beating a dead horse here , it ’ s not ideological .
The Chinese ( and the Russians ) do want to avoid democratization .
Resisting color revolutions has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their national security strategies .
But that ’ s not the same as wanting to spread autocracy .
One is defensive , the other offensive .
It sounds to me like you ’ re simply ascribing U.S. goals—spreading democracy—to them .
Perhaps the United States is the revisionist state here ?
MK : Yes .
Shame on the United States for making the world a more peaceful , prosperous , and free place over the past 75 years .
We should really knock that off .
And speaking of avoiding overreliance on analogies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a problem , even if it is different from the Cold War .
Which relates to the Thucydides Trap .
I have another reason for disliking this argument .
It presumes that there is an inevitable power transition between Washington and Beijing , but I doubt that China will ever overtake the United States .
As I argue in my new book , I think the Chinese Communist Party will run out of steam and the United States and its allies will successfully renew their global leadership position .
The Chinese ( and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratization .
But that ’ s not the same as wanting to spread autocracy .
EA : It ’ s possible .
But it ’ s worth asking the people of Iraq or Libya how they feel about a more peaceful and free American-led world .
The point is that there are ways to promote democracy or human rights that don ’ t involve military action .
Take the problem of the Uighurs in China , for example .
Every time the world learns something new about their plight , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s still no option for a military solution .
Instead , Western leaders should be thinking creatively about ways to tie trade to human rights improvements in China .
Or how they might push China to allow Uighur emigration .
Or at the very least , barring the import of products from that region .
My point is that it ’ s not going to help the situation if the United States pursues an overtly confrontational approach to China .
The Trump administration ’ s approach to China is just posturing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MK : That is a good set of issues to explore .
We should put the new Alliance of Democracies right on it !

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma. Is it really almost August?
Usually Washington, D.C., would be slowing down for summer this time of year, but things seem as busy as ever.
Emma Ashford: We’re around day 30 of a heat wave, so is it any wonder everyone is staying inside?
Another change from the average summer: Unlike most election years, there won’t be any big party conventions. When Joe Biden finally decides on his choice for vice president, I guess we’ll learn about it on Zoom?
MK: He was recently photographed holding notes with bullet points about Kamala Harris, increasing speculation that the California senator will be the pick. Guessing the next VP makes for a fun parlor game, but the running mate doesn’t usually matter much in elections beyond their home state, and the leading candidates are mostly from places like California and Massachusetts or Washington, D.C., that are already safely in the Democrats’ camp.
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
EA: I doubt this election is going to ride on the VP choice! There’s just too much else going on. But from the point of foreign policy, it’s hard to know what to think about the two supposed top choices.
Susan Rice might have a lot of experience in foreign policy, but it’s not clear what her actual views are: She was at the table for Obama administration decisions that tended toward hawkishness and toward restraint.
And Kamala Harris has no foreign-policy experience at all. I suspect both are pretty classic liberal internationalist hawks, but I don’t have a lot of evidence to back that up.
MK: It is interesting, however, that there is a national security policy wonk in the mix. There is hope for one of us to become VP yet!
EA: I suspect this column wouldn’t help either of us in confirmation hearings. But why don’t we move on to the big issue of the week? The Trump administration is taking further steps toward a confrontational China policy. Last week, the White House demanded that the Chinese close their Houston consulate, claiming it was a den of espionage.
MK: It was Chinese President Xi Jinping who turned this into a confrontational relationship. China has been engaged in sharp power practices against democracies around the world, and its decades of intellectual property theft from the West may have been the biggest illicit transfer of wealth in history. I am glad the United States, under Donald Trump, is finally pushing back, including by closing down the Houston consulate.
EA: Look, I have no doubt that the Chinese were engaged in espionage out of the Houston consulate. They have a pretty bad track record of intellectual property theft at this point. Houston’s the center of the oil industry, so it’s a great place for spies to build connections with researchers working on fuels and extraction technologies.
But here’s the problem: Everyone knows that this is happening already. It’s not a new problem. Washington might have closed down the consulate and undermined some ongoing operations. But in retaliation, the Chinese government made the United States close its Chengdu consulate and withdraw some diplomats from China. So the spat damages American intelligence-gathering capabilities, too. Surely it’s better to stick with the devil we know?
MK: The problem isn’t new but, thank goodness, the U.S. approach is. For years, U.S. officials turned a blind eye to this behavior because they hoped China was going to become a big Germany in Asia. But that strategy didn’t work. So, this isn’t a one-off move. The Trump administration has a new, more combative strategy for dealing with China.
EA: Funny you should mention Germany. I view this diplomatic spat with China a bit like the furor a few years back over U.S. intelligence agencies tapping Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone. States spy on each other. It’s what they do. And, frankly, we should be happy that they do, since it helps avoid misunderstandings and conflict.
It doesn’t mean I’m happy about Chinese IP theft, but there are ways to deal with it that don’t involve hurting the United States’ own intelligence-gathering capabilities.
And let’s be honest, with this administration, it’s as likely that this decision was driven by a political desire to look tough on China as it was by actual concerns about espionage. It’s part of a much broader pattern.
MK: I’d agree if this were an isolated incident, but the broader pattern I see is one of the Trump administration pursuing a tougher line with China across the board.
The White House released a China strategy in May, vowing to stop China’s “trade secrets theft … and economic espionage.” And four cabinet officials have given big China speeches—most recently there was a good speech from Secretary Mike Pompeo last Friday.
EA: It was certainly an interesting speech. I see that Pompeo is back to describing the Chinese as “communists” again; I guess it plays better than just calling them “authoritarian” in political ads?
MK: Whatever happened to the Cold War practice of calling them the Chicoms?
EA: Pompeo seemed to be trying to draw on a Cold War-era ideal of democracies fighting against a communist threat. But I thought that Tom Wright of the Brookings Institution made a good point: Pompeo’s rhetoric is wholly at odds with the Trump administration’s actual strategy. Pompeo called for an alliance of democracies to resist China.
Trump has repeatedly dismissed those countries and told Xi that he could do whatever he wants. So it’s pretty hard to take this speech seriously.
Much of the criticism of the Pompeo speech was about politics, not policy. People of all political stripes should recognize and welcome good policy when they see it.
MK: I think much of the criticism of the speech was about politics, not policy. Left-leaning foreign-policy experts (some working on the Biden team) rushed to publish their negative appraisals.
I understand they don’t like the Trump administration and think that Pompeo is the wrong messenger for this proposal. But organizing the free world to deal with China makes a lot of sense.
After all, Biden has also called for a Summit for Democracy. Colleagues and I at the Atlantic Council have been calling for an Alliance of Free Nations (here, here, here, and here) for some time, and we were pleased to see this recommendation advanced by the U.S. Secretary of State. People of all political stripes should recognize and welcome good policy when they see it.
EA: I don’t see a threat to the so-called free world from China. I see a series of smaller issues that should concern Western governments: intellectual property theft, Chinese infiltration of telecommunication networks, China’s moves to buy off neighboring states with the Belt and Road Initiative.
But they’re not all equally concerning. Just look at the failures of the Belt and Road: None of its Indian Ocean ports is likely to turn a profit, and a lot of states are increasingly concerned about ending up indebted to Beijing. The whole thing has become a massive money sink. Nor do all these issues affect all democracies in the same way. That’s why democracies are reacting to them in such different ways.
MK: On the contrary, I see a global China challenge and a free world increasingly coming together to meet it. Japan, the European Union, and the United States have all complained about China’s unfair trading practices. Democracies in Europe, Asia, and North America have banned Huawei’s 5G technology.
The Chinese military challenge is most pressing for Indo-Pacific democracies, but even European navies are now sailing ships through the South China Sea to contest China’s illegal territorial claims. Democracies are also concerned about the Chinese Communist Party’s threat to freedom and human rights.
This is an ideological challenge. The free world is concerned about China’s autocratic nature. At home, the party is engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Uighurs and cracking down on Hong Kong’s traditional freedoms.
EA: The China challenge is about power, not ideology: managing the country’s rise in a way that doesn’t allow it to dominate Asia, doesn’t harm U.S. vital interests, and doesn’t start a war. That’s all. Turning this into some ideological battle doesn’t help with that.
MK: I disagree. This is an ideological challenge. The free world is concerned about China’s autocratic nature. At home, the party is engaged in ethnic cleansing against the Uighurs and cracking down on Hong Kong’s traditional freedoms.
Overseas, the CCP is using its power to silence free speech critical of China and exporting facial recognition technologies that help dictators repress their populations. And whether intentionally promoted or not, dictators around the world cite China’s “state-led capitalist” model as justification for how autocratic control can be consistent with economic development.
EA: But that really misses the key distinction between the Soviet Union and China. The challenge from China isn’t ideological in the same way as the Cold War was. Frankly, the Chinese today have no distinct ideology: It’s a mix of old Communist Party structures, capitalist markets, and kleptocratic elite networks.
Perhaps Chinese surveillance technology might be attractive to dictators, but the country itself is not the early Soviet Union, wielding a Comintern in an attempt to turn nearby states to Marxism. Chinese leaders prefer autocracies, I’m sure, but they’re willing to work with anything from absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia to democratic states like Indonesia.
A different situation needs a different response. The Soviet Union’s approach to the world was convert or be crushed. China presents states with a very different choice: Trade with us if you like, but we don’t care too much about your domestic politics.
MK: A new democratic alliance would not only be about ideology, however, but also about power. We are in a much stronger position on trade, technology, human rights, and many other issues if it is a global alliance of democracies on one side of the negotiating table and China isolated on the other.
As I’ve argued before in Foreign Policy, China won’t build a countervailing alliance of autocracies and, even if it does, it will be no match for the 75 percent of global GDP that the free world can bring to bear.
EA: So you’re basically arguing that we’re in a new cold war?
MK: It was only a Cold War because it never went hot. Unfortunately, that is still a real possibility with this rivalry, as the National Defense Strategy Commission report bluntly warned.
EA: I have to say, I hate these analogies, even without making the flippant response that I thought we were already in Cold War 2.0 with Russia. You’re right that it was defined that way in part because it never became a conflict; John Lewis Gaddis famously described it as the “Long Peace.”
Whatever you call it, though, it was structurally very different than today. Two big superpowers and the rest of the world in tatters following World War II is a very different situation than today’s near-multipolarity. And ideologically, China’s strategy is about building power and regime preservation, not about building clones of itself. The analogy just doesn’t hold at anything other than a superficial level.
MK: But even if this is about regime preservation, it is still ideological. Xi knows that if democracy comes to Beijing, he is out of a job. So, he does want to make the world safe for autocracy.
But we agree on the analogies! There was a good book on this a few years ago. With analogical reasoning, people cling to superficial similarities and overlook the underlying differences. But it is often the underlying differences that really matter. Not everything can be boiled down to the next Munich Agreement, the next Cold War, or everybody’s new favorite: the Peloponnesian War.
EA: Yeah, if I hear the phrase “Thucydides Trap” one more time, I’ll scream. The basic concept is drawn from the rivalry between Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece.
In a nutshell, it suggests that a rising power and a declining state are likely to end up in a war. But Graham Allison of Harvard did us all a disservice by introducing the concept to the masses and by suggesting that it’s inevitable. To paraphrase James Palmer’s article here in Foreign Policy the other day, read another damn book.
At the risk of beating a dead horse here, it’s not ideological. The Chinese (and the Russians) do want to avoid democratization. Resisting color revolutions has become a core stated component of each of their national security strategies. But that’s not the same as wanting to spread autocracy. One is defensive, the other offensive.
It sounds to me like you’re simply ascribing U.S. goals—spreading democracy—to them. Perhaps the United States is the revisionist state here?
MK: Yes. Shame on the United States for making the world a more peaceful, prosperous, and free place over the past 75 years. We should really knock that off.
And speaking of avoiding overreliance on analogies, the Chinese ideological threat is still a problem, even if it is different from the Cold War.
Which relates to the Thucydides Trap. I have another reason for disliking this argument. It presumes that there is an inevitable power transition between Washington and Beijing, but I doubt that China will ever overtake the United States. As I argue in my new book, I think the Chinese Communist Party will run out of steam and the United States and its allies will successfully renew their global leadership position.
The Chinese (and the Russians) do want to avoid democratization. But that’s not the same as wanting to spread autocracy.
EA: It’s possible. But it’s worth asking the people of Iraq or Libya how they feel about a more peaceful and free American-led world.
The point is that there are ways to promote democracy or human rights that don’t involve military action. Take the problem of the Uighurs in China, for example. Every time the world learns something new about their plight, it’s worse than the time before. But there’s still no option for a military solution.
Instead, Western leaders should be thinking creatively about ways to tie trade to human rights improvements in China. Or how they might push China to allow Uighur emigration. Or at the very least, barring the import of products from that region.
My point is that it’s not going to help the situation if the United States pursues an overtly confrontational approach to China. The Trump administration’s approach to China is just posturing and confrontation without any realistic solutions.
MK: That is a good set of issues to explore. We should put the new Alliance of Democracies right on it!