foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Biden Can’t Free Palestine

Biden Can’t Free Palestine

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Palestinians let out a collective sigh of relief after U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s election defeat .
Like much of the rest of the world , they had been anxiously awaiting the outcome—and lamenting the fact that a political process halfway around the world continues to have an undue impact on the trajectory of their lives .
While President-elect Joe Biden ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s impending exit—offers Palestinians a brief reprieve , it also presents them with a sobering reality with which they must now contend .
The Biden administration may prove less threatening to the Palestinian cause than its predecessor , but it is not likely to facilitate a path toward Palestinian freedom or rights .
Far from it , Biden will likely usher in a return to the suffocating pre-Trump normal of the Oslo paradigm—the framework , based on the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords , that advocates for a two-state solution through bilateral negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for numerous reasons—not the least of which being that it is sorely outdated—the dormant Oslo peace process renders the United States the playmaker in Palestinians ’ collective fate .
Pursuing a political strategy rooted in dependency on a rotating slew of U.S. presidents—and now , the Biden administration—won ’ t deliver Palestinians their freedom .
To achieve liberation , Palestinians must take the next four years to look internally and revive a national movement that has been on its deathbed for decades .
Under Trump , the United States moreover cut diplomatic ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements between Arab states and Israel so as to isolate the Palestinian leadership .
The president ’ s strategy , in effect , was to force Palestinians into capitulation as millions suffered .
Now , as a lame-duck president , Trump has enabled the demolition and displacement of entire Palestinian communities , labeled the global Boycott , Divestment , and Sanctions movement as anti-Semitic , and normalized Israel ’ s illegal settlements on Palestinian land .
This week , Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit an illegal Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decades-long taboo in Washington .
To make matters worse , Pompeo announced that wine made in the illegal settlement—including a red wine named after him—would be labeled as “ Made in Israel , ” thereby recognizing Israel ’ s de facto annexation of the West Bank .
What made Trump ’ s approach all the more flagrant to the architects—and enablers—of the Oslo process was that it violated the paradigm ’ s rules , which have come to define the last 30 years of policy paralysis .
Trump defied the Oslo proponents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ service to the two-state solution while in practice acquiescing to the very one-state reality Israel is shaping on the ground .
With his so-called “ deal of the century , ” Trump rightly recognized that the two-state solution under the Oslo paradigm was no longer feasible because Israel had deliberately turned a prospective Palestinian state into a series of Bantustans .
Rather than further the illusory rhetoric in favor of a two-state solution heralded by previous U.S. administrations , Trump ’ s deal merely formalized the reality on the ground—which resembles a fragmented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Israeli control .
For the first time , a U.S. president openly endorsed the vision of “ Greater Israel , ” in which Palestinians would be second- and third-tier subjects in a system of perpetual supremacy of one people over another , otherwise known as apartheid .
Trump and his so-called “ peace plan ” exposed the facade of a system—Oslo—that is structurally flawed .
For the last three decades , the foreign policies espoused by countries around the world have been unable to end Israel ’ s systems of oppression and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solution from oblivion .
Yet the Oslo paradigm persisted because it offered policymakers a tolerable equilibrium that removed the imperative to act and hold Israel accountable .
This system has been propped up by foreign aid poured into a state-building project—the Palestinian Authority—that allows Palestinians to maintain just enough of a standard of living so as not to provoke an uprising or humanitarian crisis .
It moreover allows Israel to “ manage the conflict ” with no real cost by subcontracting the occupation to the Palestinian Authority through security cooperation and service provision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ held this charade together is the empty mantra of trying to “ get both sides back to the negotiating table ” in a U.S.-brokered “ peace process , ” as if we were on the doorstep of 1991 rather than 2021 .
The Oslo paradigm is dangerous—a purgatory that shackles and suffocates any real progress toward addressing the systemic injustices Israel inflicts against the Palestinian people .
Instead of envisioning a new path forward—one that reflects the realities of all that has changed over the past three decades—Oslo ’ s proponents are busy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Titanic as the ship itself sinks .
These same individuals then feign surprise at the ever worsening status quo faced by millions who live under a one-state reality where freedom and rights are afforded by ethnonational identity .
Palestinians are in dire need of a radically different approach—one that Oslo , by design , can not provide .
Nor can the Biden administration .
In many ways , Trump ’ s approach to the conflict was less a departure from standard U.S. policy than a culmination of it—coming on the heels of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bipartisan policy consensus in Washington at which Biden and Harris were front and center .
The single-most critical failure of that policy was not challenging Israel .
Today , there are growing calls by the U.S. progressive movement—led by Sen. Bernie Sanders and Reps. Ilhan Omar , Rashida Tlaib , and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—to condition military funding to Israel .
But , if the past is any indication , the Biden-Harris administration will seek to bolster the U.S. relationship with Israel rather than challenge it .
In 1986 , Biden famously said on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel was “ the best $ 3 billion investment we make.
” He added : “ Were there not an Israel , the United States of America would have to invent an Israel to protect its interests.
” Palestinians can not afford to return to the hamster wheel of Oslo and engage in a political strategy of dependency for the next four years—or more .
Biden won ’ t deliver Palestinian liberation or even the so-called state many seek within the Oslo paradigm .
For now , the best Palestinians can hope for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s harmful policies .
Even then , those expectations must be tempered .
A new political space should bring with it new visions for the future of Palestine .
The majority of Palestinian society is under 30 years of age , meaning they are part of the Oslo generation : those who were promised a state but never got one .
These Palestinians are solution-agnostic with no ideological leanings toward two states or one .
All they want is to be free and have their full rights , but the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the future must center the need to dismantle the system of ethnonational supremacy in the one-state reality and offer a new social contract for all people who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea that is built on freedom , equity , justice , and rights not contingent on ethnic or religious identity .
Achieving this aim will require a movement of like-minded Palestinians and Israeli Jews intent on building a better future for all .
But this new vision can not take shape without the global community creating a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unfortunately , the Oslo process rendered many countries complicit in Israel ’ s oppression of Palestinians .
But it has also given many countries the power to sway Palestinians ’ lived realities—for better or for worse .
Now , they can either choose more of the same or opt to support a new path toward systemic justice .
The latter option requires holding Israel accountable for its violations of human rights , civil rights , and international law .
What would this accountability look like ?
First , countries must condition and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Israel as a result of its human rights abuses .
Second , countries , especially the United States , must end charity tax exemptions offered to its citizens over financial support to illegal Israeli settlements .
Third , privileges such as open visas , travel , and trade offered to settlers living on occupied land must be stopped .
Fourth , countries must ban products and services produced in illegal settlements within the occupied Palestinian territories—and hold accountable entities that either operate in or have relations with those who operate in occupied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wine .
The European Court of Justice has taken a good first step by mandating that products made in settlements and sold within the European Union must be labeled accordingly .
Finally , foreign aid must be leveraged to make sure democracy is being respected—and ensure the suffocating political structures of Oslo aren ’ t reinforced or exacerbated .
Of course , these policies are only a start toward ensuring a more promising future for all .
But even a start is a radical shift away from stagnancy .
Palestinians understand that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it does have the power to choose either to support or impede the Palestinian people in their quest for it .

Palestinians let out a collective sigh of relief after U.S. President Donald Trump’s election defeat. Like much of the rest of the world, they had been anxiously awaiting the outcome—and lamenting the fact that a political process halfway around the world continues to have an undue impact on the trajectory of their lives.
Palestinians let out a collective sigh of relief after U.S. President Donald Trump’s election defeat. Like much of the rest of the world, they had been anxiously awaiting the outcome—and lamenting the fact that a political process halfway around the world continues to have an undue impact on the trajectory of their lives.
While President-elect Joe Biden’s win—or, rather, Trump’s impending exit—offers Palestinians a brief reprieve, it also presents them with a sobering reality with which they must now contend. The Biden administration may prove less threatening to the Palestinian cause than its predecessor, but it is not likely to facilitate a path toward Palestinian freedom or rights.
Far from it, Biden will likely usher in a return to the suffocating pre-Trump normal of the Oslo paradigm—the framework, based on the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords, that advocates for a two-state solution through bilateral negotiations mediated by the United States. Flawed for numerous reasons—not the least of which being that it is sorely outdated—the dormant Oslo peace process renders the United States the playmaker in Palestinians’ collective fate.
Pursuing a political strategy rooted in dependency on a rotating slew of U.S. presidents—and now, the Biden administration—won’t deliver Palestinians their freedom. To achieve liberation, Palestinians must take the next four years to look internally and revive a national movement that has been on its deathbed for decades.
Over the course of the past four years, the Trump administration relentlessly assaulted the Palestinian right to self-determination—essentially seeking its outright erasure. The White House targeted pillars of Palestinian society and politics: recognizing Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem, pressuring the Palestinian Authority to cut welfare payments to the families of political prisoners, and eliminating funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. This week, Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit an illegal Israeli settlement in the West Bank, breaking a decades-long taboo in Washington.
Under Trump, the United States moreover cut diplomatic ties with the PLO and pushed for normalization agreements between Arab states and Israel so as to isolate the Palestinian leadership. The president’s strategy, in effect, was to force Palestinians into capitulation as millions suffered. Now, as a lame-duck president, Trump has enabled the demolition and displacement of an entire Palestinian community, labeled the global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement as anti-Semitic, and normalized Israel’s illegal settlements on Palestinian land.
This week, Mike Pompeo became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit an illegal Israeli settlement in the West Bank, breaking a decades-long taboo in Washington. To make matters worse, Pompeo announced that wine made in the illegal settlement—including a red wine named after him—would be labeled as “Made in Israel,” thereby recognizing Israel’s de facto annexation of the West Bank.
What made Trump’s approach all the more flagrant to the architects—and enablers—of the Oslo process was that it violated the paradigm’s rules, which have come to define the last 30 years of policy paralysis. Trump defied the Oslo proponents’ unspoken holy grail: paying lip service to the two-state solution while in practice acquiescing to the very one-state reality Israel is shaping on the ground.
With his so-called “deal of the century,” Trump rightly recognized that the two-state solution under the Oslo paradigm was no longer feasible because Israel had deliberately turned a prospective Palestinian state into a series of Bantustans.
Rather than further the illusory rhetoric in favor of a two-state solution heralded by previous U.S. administrations, Trump’s deal merely formalized the reality on the ground—which resembles a fragmented Palestinian archipelago sinking in an encroaching sea of Israeli control. For the first time, a U.S. president openly endorsed the vision of “Greater Israel,” in which Palestinians would be second- and third-tier subjects in a system of perpetual supremacy of one people over another, otherwise known as apartheid.
Trump and his so-called “peace plan” exposed the facade of a system—Oslo—that is structurally flawed. For the last three decades, the foreign policies espoused by countries around the world have been unable to end Israel’s systems of oppression and injustice, let alone safeguard the two-state solution from oblivion. Yet the Oslo paradigm persisted because it offered policymakers a tolerable equilibrium that removed the imperative to act and hold Israel accountable.
This system has been propped up by foreign aid poured into a state-building project—the Palestinian Authority—that allows Palestinians to maintain just enough of a standard of living so as not to provoke an uprising or humanitarian crisis. It moreover allows Israel to “manage the conflict” with no real cost by subcontracting the occupation to the Palestinian Authority through security cooperation and service provision agreements. The political glue that has held this charade together is the empty mantra of trying to “get both sides back to the negotiating table” in a U.S.-brokered “peace process,” as if we were on the doorstep of 1991 rather than 2021.
The Oslo paradigm is dangerous—a purgatory that shackles and suffocates any real progress toward addressing the systemic injustices Israel inflicts against the Palestinian people. Instead of envisioning a new path forward—one that reflects the realities of all that has changed over the past three decades—Oslo’s proponents are busy rearranging chairs on the deck of the Titanic as the ship itself sinks. These same individuals then feign surprise at the ever worsening status quo faced by millions who live under a one-state reality where freedom and rights are afforded by ethnonational identity.
Palestinians are in dire need of a radically different approach—one that Oslo, by design, cannot provide. Nor can the Biden administration. In many ways, Trump’s approach to the conflict was less a departure from standard U.S. policy than a culmination of it—coming on the heels of a decades-long trajectory set by U.S. presidents and bipartisan policy consensus in Washington at which Biden and Harris were front and center. The single-most critical failure of that policy was not challenging Israel.
Today, there are growing calls by the U.S. progressive movement—led by Sen. Bernie Sanders and Reps. Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez—to condition military funding to Israel. But, if the past is any indication, the Biden-Harris administration will seek to bolster the U.S. relationship with Israel rather than challenge it. In 1986, Biden famously said on the Senate floor that U.S. military funding to Israel was “the best $3 billion investment we make.” He added: “Were there not an Israel, the United States of America would have to invent an Israel to protect its interests.”
Palestinians cannot afford to return to the hamster wheel of Oslo and engage in a political strategy of dependency for the next four years—or more. Biden won’t deliver Palestinian liberation or even the so-called state many seek within the Oslo paradigm. For now, the best Palestinians can hope for is Biden reversing or remedying some of Trump’s harmful policies. Even then, those expectations must be tempered.
With the best-case scenario in Washington being stasis, it’s time for Palestinians to look internally for solutions—reawakening a national movement that has suffered one of its darkest chapters in history. Palestinians must invest in an inclusive, representative, and democratic political system that can offer millions of disenfranchised individuals a voice to shape their future. This could be through reform and elections to the PLO, or it could take the shape of a new political system designed to bring Palestinians together—ending the political, social, and geographic fragmentation that has until now stood in the way of a unified national project.
A new political space should bring with it new visions for the future of Palestine. The majority of Palestinian society is under 30 years of age, meaning they are part of the Oslo generation: those who were promised a state but never got one. These Palestinians are solution-agnostic with no ideological leanings toward two states or one. All they want is to be free and have their full rights, but the current system denies them both.
A vision for the future must center the need to dismantle the system of ethnonational supremacy in the one-state reality and offer a new social contract for all people who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea that is built on freedom, equity, justice, and rights not contingent on ethnic or religious identity. Achieving this aim will require a movement of like-minded Palestinians and Israeli Jews intent on building a better future for all.
But this new vision cannot take shape without the global community creating a hospitable environment in which it can flourish. Unfortunately, the Oslo process rendered many countries complicit in Israel’s oppression of Palestinians. But it has also given many countries the power to sway Palestinians’ lived realities—for better or for worse. Now, they can either choose more of the same or opt to support a new path toward systemic justice. The latter option requires holding Israel accountable for its violations of human rights, civil rights, and international law.
What would this accountability look like? First, countries must condition and ultimately end military funding and arms sales to Israel as a result of its human rights abuses. Second, countries, especially the United States, must end charity tax exemptions offered to its citizens over financial support to illegal Israeli settlements. Third, privileges such as open visas, travel, and trade offered to settlers living on occupied land must be stopped. Fourth, countries must ban products and services produced in illegal settlements within the occupied Palestinian territories—and hold accountable entities that either operate in or have relations with those who operate in occupied territory, such as Airbnb and Psagot wine.
The European Court of Justice has taken a good first step by mandating that products made in settlements and sold within the European Union must be labeled accordingly. Finally, foreign aid must be leveraged to make sure democracy is being respected—and ensure the suffocating political structures of Oslo aren’t reinforced or exacerbated.
Of course, these policies are only a start toward ensuring a more promising future for all. But even a start is a radical shift away from stagnancy. Palestinians understand that the global community cannot deliver them freedom, but it does have the power to choose either to support or impede the Palestinian people in their quest for it.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--For Ghana’s Democracy to Thrive, Citizens Need to Engage

For Ghana ’ s Democracy to Thrive , Citizens Need to Engage Ghana has often been heralded as a model of democracy .
Political violence is rare , and since transitioning from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1992 , the West African country has undergone successive peaceful transfers of power between its two main rival political parties .
According to the country ’ s electoral commission , the last general election , which was held in 2016 , saw a voter turnout of nearly 70 percent .
Aside from voting during elections , however , Ghanaian citizens rarely participate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polling .
The 2019 Afrobarometer Round 8 survey , which measured the quality of democracy and governance in African countries , showed that during the previous year 85 percent of respondents in Ghana never contacted a member of parliament about an important problem or to share their views , while 71 percent never contacted an assembly member .
According to the survey , 84 percent of respondents did not participate in a demonstration during the previous year , and 64 percent indicated that they would never attend a demonstration .
According to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Round 8 surveys for Namibia and Botswana , citizens ’ interactions with members of parliament and the assembly were similarly low , but , compared with Ghana , far fewer respondents indicated that they would never attend a protest .
That ’ s a lost opportunity for Ghana—because greater political participation , including public protests , would likely bring results for the country .
Indeed , politicians would take heed if Ghanaians persistently demanded comprehensive , long-term programs .
The ultracompetitive nature of Ghana ’ s politics makes politicians bend to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the extent that campaign promises contradict party ideologies , notably in the case of the New Patriotic Party ( NPP ) , a center-right party that continuously shows a bent for social interventionist policies .
As the country prepares for elections next month and mourns the death of Jerry Rawlings , a onetime military ruler who restored presidential democracy and then stepped down in 2001 , much is at stake .
Ghanaians ’ limited participation in democracy has dire consequences for the governance and development of their country .
Rather than ordinary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policies that will transform their quality of life and benefit future generations , politicians have been allowed to set development priorities and therefore promise interventions that would be most likely to win them votes .
While infrastructure development and social interventions like teacher and nursing trainee allowances , access to government loans for youth , and free senior high school ( for ages 15-18 ) provide immediate relief and are relatively easier to implement , longer-term challenges to development , such as the ballooning youth unemployment and underemployment rates—currently at 12 percent and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attention , and citizens must ensure that politicians put them at the forefront of the national debate .
One casualty of Ghana ’ s low citizen participation is the senior high school system .
The NPP and its main rival , the National Democratic Congress ( NDC ) , continue to introduce opposing reforms to the system following from their campaign promises .
The parties ’ alternation in the length of the program , between three years and four years , and the NPP ’ s introduction of a double-track attendance system in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ school in different months due to the huge increase in enrollment as a result of the NPP ’ s free senior high school policy ) have reduced the quality of education and the confidence most parents have in the system .
As a result , many parents with the financial means to do so now enroll their children in expensive international schools—a rejection of the government ’ s education policies that the less well-off can not exercise .
Low citizen participation during elections has also engendered a winner-take-all system in Ghana ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics , it has become uncommon for ordinary Ghanaians to volunteer for political parties or candidates , much less donate money to support candidates .
In fact , quite a number of voters , including party delegates , expect to be paid to cast ballots for candidates .
Candidates therefore pay party foot soldiers to campaign on their behalf , draw crowds , and buy votes .
This trend makes political campaigns an extremely expensive affair in Ghana .
Funding for campaigns typically comes from the candidates themselves and their wealthy benefactors .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ often prioritize recouping the huge amounts they and their benefactors spent .
Politicians award inflated contracts to benefactors and appoint them to lucrative and influential positions as heads of public institutions and diplomatic missions abroad , sometimes regardless of merit .
While the practice of appointing campaign donors to leadership positions also occurs in more advanced democracies , it is highly inimical to the development of a lower-middle-income country like Ghana when incompetent benefactors run the nation ’ s institutions .
Meanwhile , when power changes hands , members of opposition parties are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Existing contracts of opposition party members also get terminated or renegotiated in most cases .
New governments are often sued for wrongfully terminating those contracts and then end up draining the public purse further to pay huge penalties mandated by the courts .
It is also common for succeeding governments to discontinue the development projects the opposition started .
If more constituents called their MPs or demonstrated to demand that these development projects be continued , the political leadership would be likely to listen .
After all , MPs campaign by undertaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to lobby for projects to be carried out when they get elected .
In assessing their MPs ’ performance , constituents weigh the level of development that accrued to their constituencies during the MPs ’ tenure .
Ghanaians often voice their displeasure for politicians ’ wanton corruption and mismanagement over the airwaves , social media , and in discussions with each other .
The right to freedom of speech is enshrined in Ghana ’ s constitution and is respected , so Ghanaians speak freely without fear of intimidation or prosecution .
( The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Index ranks Ghana 30th worldwide—ahead of France and the United Kingdom . )
Unfortunately , Ghanaians ’ attention span for political scandals tends to be rather short .
Politicians know and expect this , so they patiently wait for the furor to die down and continue with their unabated corruption .
The current president , Nana Akufo-Addo , has shown some resolve in addressing the public ’ s disaffection with public officials .
In 2018 , he fired the erstwhile energy minister , Boakye Agyarko , after it was reported that a power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ losses instead of savings .
And this July , following public outcry , the president demanded the resignation of Carlos Ahenkorah from his position as the deputy minister for trade and industry after allegations that he recklessly breached coronavirus protocols by going to monitor a voter registration exercise in his constituency , when he should have been quarantining after a positive diagnosis .
Perhaps most significantly , Akufo-Addo mandated the creation of an Office of the Special Prosecutor in 2018 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases .
His choice of Martin Amidu , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prosecutor was welcomed by the public .
Amidu , a former attorney general and justice minister , had earned a reputation for himself as a “ citizen vigilante , ” blowing the lid on corruption in his party .
But Ghanaians repeatedly expressed frustration and disappointment with Amidu ’ s performance as special prosecutor .
Ghanaians were perplexed as to why his office did not initiate legal proceedings over major corruption scandals .
Amidu , for his part , accused the heads of partner institutions of not cooperating with his office and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He also claimed that his office was under-resourced .
This week , Amidu resigned , alleging presidential interference with his anti-corruption assessment of a controversial gold royalties monetization deal .
This week , the country ’ s top anti-corruption official—Martin Amidu—resigned , alleging presidential interference with his assessment of a controversial gold royalties monetization deal .
Meanwhile , a group of civil society organizations recently sued the attorney-general over Akufo-Addo ’ s directive to the auditor general , Daniel Domelevo , pressuring him to step down—a move many believe was politically motivated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was appointed by the former president , from exposing corruption among current administration officials .
Civil society organizations in Ghana actively promote transparency and accountability in the governance of the country .
The 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks Ghana eighth among African countries for participation of civil society organizations .
Working collaboratively , these organizations pressured the Ghanaian parliament into finally passing the Right to Information Act last year and are pushing for the total enforcement of the Declaration of Assets and Disqualification Act to check corruption among public office holders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will always eclipse that from civil society groups , which governments may attempt to discredit by accusing them of having ulterior motives or foreign backing .
Until many more ordinary Ghanaians become active citizens , the country will continue to be at the mercy of self-interested politicians .
When the electorate places high demands on public officials , Ghana ’ s politics will attract more experienced candidates who are truly dedicated to public service .
Power belongs to the people .
Ghanaians must take back their power now .

Ghana has often been heralded as a model of democracy. Political violence is rare, and since transitioning from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1992, the West African country has undergone successive peaceful transfers of power between its two main rival political parties. According to the country’s electoral commission, the last general election, which was held in 2016, saw a voter turnout of nearly 70 percent.
Ghana has often been heralded as a model of democracy. Political violence is rare, and since transitioning from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1992, the West African country has undergone successive peaceful transfers of power between its two main rival political parties. According to the country’s electoral commission, the last general election, which was held in 2016, saw a voter turnout of nearly 70 percent.
Aside from voting during elections, however, Ghanaian citizens rarely participate in their democracy, according to recent polling. The 2019 Afrobarometer Round 8 survey, which measured the quality of democracy and governance in African countries, showed that during the previous year 85 percent of respondents in Ghana never contacted a member of parliament about an important problem or to share their views, while 71 percent never contacted an assembly member. According to the survey, 84 percent of respondents did not participate in a demonstration during the previous year, and 64 percent indicated that they would never attend a demonstration.
According to the Afrobarometer Round 7 survey for South Africa and the Round 8 surveys for Namibia and Botswana, citizens’ interactions with members of parliament and the assembly were similarly low, but, compared with Ghana, far fewer respondents indicated that they would never attend a protest.
That’s a lost opportunity for Ghana—because greater political participation, including public protests, would likely bring results for the country. Indeed, politicians would take heed if Ghanaians persistently demanded comprehensive, long-term programs. The ultracompetitive nature of Ghana’s politics makes politicians bend to the demands of the electorate, even to the extent that campaign promises contradict party ideologies, notably in the case of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), a center-right party that continuously shows a bent for social interventionist policies.
As the country prepares for elections next month and mourns the death of Jerry Rawlings, a onetime military ruler who restored presidential democracy and then stepped down in 2001, much is at stake. Ghanaians’ limited participation in democracy has dire consequences for the governance and development of their country. Rather than ordinary Ghanaians influencing development priorities and lobbying for policies that will transform their quality of life and benefit future generations, politicians have been allowed to set development priorities and therefore promise interventions that would be most likely to win them votes.
While infrastructure development and social interventions like teacher and nursing trainee allowances, access to government loans for youth, and free senior high school (for ages 15-18) provide immediate relief and are relatively easier to implement, longer-term challenges to development, such as the ballooning youth unemployment and underemployment rates—currently at 12 percent and more than 50 percent, respectively—require urgent attention, and citizens must ensure that politicians put them at the forefront of the national debate.
One casualty of Ghana’s low citizen participation is the senior high school system. The NPP and its main rival, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), continue to introduce opposing reforms to the system following from their campaign promises. The parties’ alternation in the length of the program, between three years and four years, and the NPP’s introduction of a double-track attendance system in 2018 (meaning that students now attend school in different months due to the huge increase in enrollment as a result of the NPP’s free senior high school policy) have reduced the quality of education and the confidence most parents have in the system. As a result, many parents with the financial means to do so now enroll their children in expensive international schools—a rejection of the government’s education policies that the less well-off cannot exercise.
Low citizen participation during elections has also engendered a winner-take-all system in Ghana’s politics. Due to increased disaffection with politics, it has become uncommon for ordinary Ghanaians to volunteer for political parties or candidates, much less donate money to support candidates. In fact, quite a number of voters, including party delegates, expect to be paid to cast ballots for candidates. Candidates therefore pay party foot soldiers to campaign on their behalf, draw crowds, and buy votes.
This trend makes political campaigns an extremely expensive affair in Ghana. Funding for campaigns typically comes from the candidates themselves and their wealthy benefactors. When political parties win power, they often prioritize recouping the huge amounts they and their benefactors spent.
Politicians award inflated contracts to benefactors and appoint them to lucrative and influential positions as heads of public institutions and diplomatic missions abroad, sometimes regardless of merit. While the practice of appointing campaign donors to leadership positions also occurs in more advanced democracies, it is highly inimical to the development of a lower-middle-income country like Ghana when incompetent benefactors run the nation’s institutions.
Meanwhile, when power changes hands, members of opposition parties are often excluded from political appointments and contracts. Existing contracts of opposition party members also get terminated or renegotiated in most cases. New governments are often sued for wrongfully terminating those contracts and then end up draining the public purse further to pay huge penalties mandated by the courts. It is also common for succeeding governments to discontinue the development projects the opposition started.
If more constituents called their MPs or demonstrated to demand that these development projects be continued, the political leadership would be likely to listen. After all, MPs campaign by undertaking development projects in their constituencies and promising to lobby for projects to be carried out when they get elected. In assessing their MPs’ performance, constituents weigh the level of development that accrued to their constituencies during the MPs’ tenure.
Ghanaians often voice their displeasure for politicians’ wanton corruption and mismanagement over the airwaves, social media, and in discussions with each other. The right to freedom of speech is enshrined in Ghana’s constitution and is respected, so Ghanaians speak freely without fear of intimidation or prosecution. (The Reporters Without Borders 2020 World Press Freedom Index ranks Ghana 30th worldwide—ahead of France and the United Kingdom.) Unfortunately, Ghanaians’ attention span for political scandals tends to be rather short. Politicians know and expect this, so they patiently wait for the furor to die down and continue with their unabated corruption.
The current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, has shown some resolve in addressing the public’s disaffection with public officials. In 2018, he fired the erstwhile energy minister, Boakye Agyarko, after it was reported that a power deal he was renegotiating would generate huge losses instead of savings. And this July, following public outcry, the president demanded the resignation of Carlos Ahenkorah from his position as the deputy minister for trade and industry after allegations that he recklessly breached coronavirus protocols by going to monitor a voter registration exercise in his constituency, when he should have been quarantining after a positive diagnosis.
Perhaps most significantly, Akufo-Addo mandated the creation of an Office of the Special Prosecutor in 2018 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. His choice of Martin Amidu, an opposition member, as the special prosecutor was welcomed by the public. Amidu, a former attorney general and justice minister, had earned a reputation for himself as a “citizen vigilante,” blowing the lid on corruption in his party.
But Ghanaians repeatedly expressed frustration and disappointment with Amidu’s performance as special prosecutor. Ghanaians were perplexed as to why his office did not initiate legal proceedings over major corruption scandals. Amidu, for his part, accused the heads of partner institutions of not cooperating with his office and not supplying the information and documents he requested. He also claimed that his office was under-resourced. This week, Amidu resigned, alleging presidential interference with his anti-corruption assessment of a controversial gold royalties monetization deal.
This week, the country’s top anti-corruption official—Martin Amidu—resigned, alleging presidential interference with his assessment of a controversial gold royalties monetization deal.
Meanwhile, a group of civil society organizations recently sued the attorney-general over Akufo-Addo’s directive to the auditor general, Daniel Domelevo, pressuring him to step down—a move many believe was politically motivated and calculated to prevent Domelevo, who was appointed by the former president, from exposing corruption among current administration officials.
Civil society organizations in Ghana actively promote transparency and accountability in the governance of the country. The 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks Ghana eighth among African countries for participation of civil society organizations. Working collaboratively, these organizations pressured the Ghanaian parliament into finally passing the Right to Information Act last year and are pushing for the total enforcement of the Declaration of Assets and Disqualification Act to check corruption among public office holders.
But sustained pressure from the masses will always eclipse that from civil society groups, which governments may attempt to discredit by accusing them of having ulterior motives or foreign backing. Until many more ordinary Ghanaians become active citizens, the country will continue to be at the mercy of self-interested politicians.
When the electorate places high demands on public officials, Ghana’s politics will attract more experienced candidates who are truly dedicated to public service. Power belongs to the people. Ghanaians must take back their power now.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--For Armenians Fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh, ‘Losing It Is Everything’

People who could not afford to transport their livestock simply killed them , beheading chickens and gutting horses , the hot steam rising through the cold air .
Others walked their herds for miles along narrow mountain roads , hoping they would not succumb to exhaustion or an oncoming car .
This was the tragic face of an exodus , a large-scale migration of people from a land that has literally changed owners overnight .
Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced an end to the war with Azerbaijan over this small , mountainous enclave , thousands of ethnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lands , which have been handed back to Azerbaijan .
In the district of Kalbajar , history was on rewind .
Almost exclusively populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis before they were expelled by Armenians after the armed clashes of the early 1990s , Kalbajar again became part of Azerbaijan , sending all the people who had raised their children and animals and houses there looking for a new home and a new life .
Even before Pashinyan announced the end of the war in the wee hours on Facebook , bringing an end to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1,400 Armenians dead , Armenians had a pervasive sense of loss .
For a Christian country surrounded by Muslim neighbors on three sides , and for a people still struggling to come to grips with genocide more than a century ago , the national psyche is dominated by existential fears .
Everywhere , people fret that Turkey—which backed Azerbaijan in this conflict and has never officially recognized the 1915 slaughter of about 1.5 million Armenians—is trying to wipe them out .
Now that Armenians are pouring out of Nagorno-Karabakh , they are leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they had nothing more to lose , set their houses on fire , finding solace in knowing their enemies could never sleep there .
“ How can I leave it here for a Muslim to live there ?
In the place I made , and I created ?
” said Arsen Mnatsakanyan , 34 , his hands soot-blackened and bleeding .
The farmer and volunteer soldier had lived in the house for 20 years and raised his children there .
He said he would go to Armenia , or perhaps Russia—he didn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know was that he could not live with the thought of another man looking through the window he had installed , or under the roof he had fitted .
“ Here the villagers live with their land , the animals , the soil , ” he said .
“ Losing it is everything , ” he said .
On the last day before handover , hardly a single home along Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s northern road , a winding mountain pass that connects the enclave ’ s capital of Stepanakert to Armenia , was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , leaving open beams like the skeleton of a decayed leaf as autumn turns to winter .
In other places , buildings were charred—or still in flames .
Azerbaijani officials branded the destruction “ ecoterrorism.
” The conflict was tough .
What came after may have been tougher .
The conflict was tough .
What came after may have been tougher .
There was barely any phone signal , no internet , no hot water , no heat , and little food other than bread and instant noodles .
Confusion reigned : Where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijan now ?
If the northern road is no longer Armenian territory , and the Lachin corridor road that leads to Russia closed so that Russian peacekeepers could clear away corpses , was everybody trapped ?
There were always lots of questions .
There weren ’ t many answers .
Some of the most visceral fears were saved for the ancient hillside monastery of Dadivank , thought at first to have been passed over to the other side under the agreement .
People traveled for hundreds of miles from around Armenia to take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fingertips over the brickwork to divine every crevice .
Some kissed the Armenian flag , hoping for some sort of divine intervention .
“ I have said before I am staying , and I will stay , ” priest Hovhannes Hovhannisyan said .
“ We are the first Christian nation , but we ’ ve always been tortured , ” he said .
“ But I am telling you with certainty Christians will be back here.
” As the priest conducted one last baptism , dripping oil from a bird-shaped decanter into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people , tanks full of Russian peacekeepers arrived in a sign that there was , after all , some hope .
Dadivank , at least for now , seems saved .
Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Azerbaijan ’ s President Ilham Aliyev on Saturday to take care of the territory ’ s Christian shrines .
“ These buildings , ancient buildings , are important to the people here , so we are here to protect them , ” said a Russian peacekeeper at Dadivank , who asked not to be identified as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the press .
The Russian troops—and soon , perhaps , Turkish ones too—see their job as peacekeepers .
But not everyone is ready for peace .
Though the fighting was over , Ardak and Ararat , mechanics in their normal life , are still ready to offer their services on the front line .
They fried potatoes and processed sausage to fortify themselves for a bitter night in the biting cold of a mountain military outpost .
They fear Azerbaijani forces may yet try to seize more land .
Like them , many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal that strongly favored Baku after more than a thousand died to keep the whole enclave Armenian .
Protesters in Armenia ’ s capital of Yerevan stormed parliament last week , demanding Pashinyan ’ s resignation , even though the president of Nagorno-Karabakh acknowledged that it had been unavoidable due to six weeks of unremitting losses .
“ He should resign , or he should kill himself .
Or commit harakiri , ” said Ardak .
“ If he resigns , the old regime will come back and that ’ s not good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the elites in power prior to the 2018 Velvet Revolution .
Ardak had what seemed to him a better idea .
“ I should just take over , ” he said .

Armenians pack their belongings while leaving their house in the town of Kalbajar, one of the seven districts to be transferred to Azerbaijan as part of a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh, on Nov. 12. ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images
KALBAJAR, Azerbaijan—As a steady stream of cars piled high with belongings waited in long queues to exit Nagorno-Karabakh after six weeks of bitter fighting, a truck struggled past. It was burdened with an entire shop on top, corrugated roof intact and wires protruding from the side, lifted wholesale from where it stood, still unsure where it would end up.
People who could not afford to transport their livestock simply killed them, beheading chickens and gutting horses, the hot steam rising through the cold air. Others walked their herds for miles along narrow mountain roads, hoping they would not succumb to exhaustion or an oncoming car.
This was the tragic face of an exodus, a large-scale migration of people from a land that has literally changed owners overnight. Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced an end to the war with Azerbaijan over this small, mountainous enclave, thousands of ethnic Armenians have been forced to flee their lands, which have been handed back to Azerbaijan.
Armenians sit in gridlocked traffic in Kalbajar on Nov. 14 as they flee the territories in Nagorno-Karabakh that will be handed over to Azerbaijan.
In the district of Kalbajar, history was on rewind. Almost exclusively populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis before they were expelled by Armenians after the armed clashes of the early 1990s, Kalbajar again became part of Azerbaijan, sending all the people who had raised their children and animals and houses there looking for a new home and a new life.
Even before Pashinyan announced the end of the war in the wee hours on Facebook, bringing an end to six weeks of bitter fighting that left 1,400 Armenians dead, Armenians had a pervasive sense of loss. For a Christian country surrounded by Muslim neighbors on three sides, and for a people still struggling to come to grips with genocide more than a century ago, the national psyche is dominated by existential fears. Everywhere, people fret that Turkey—which backed Azerbaijan in this conflict and has never officially recognized the 1915 slaughter of about 1.5 million Armenians—is trying to wipe them out.
Now that Armenians are pouring out of Nagorno-Karabakh, they are leaving little behind. Some villagers, feeling they had nothing more to lose, set their houses on fire, finding solace in knowing their enemies could never sleep there.
A house burns in a village outside the town of Kalbajar on Nov. 14.
Residents look at burning houses in the village of Charektar outside the town of Kalbajar on Nov. 14. Villagers set fire to their houses before fleeing to Armenia as parts of the territory are handed over to Azerbaijan.
“How can I leave it here for a Muslim to live there? In the place I made, and I created?” said Arsen Mnatsakanyan, 34, his hands soot-blackened and bleeding. The farmer and volunteer soldier had lived in the house for 20 years and raised his children there. He said he would go to Armenia, or perhaps Russia—he didn’t know yet. What he did know was that he could not live with the thought of another man looking through the window he had installed, or under the roof he had fitted.
“Here the villagers live with their land, the animals, the soil,” he said. “Losing it is everything,” he said.
On the last day before handover, hardly a single home along Nagorno-Karabakh’s northern road, a winding mountain pass that connects the enclave’s capital of Stepanakert to Armenia, was left intact. Roofs were stripped bare, leaving open beams like the skeleton of a decayed leaf as autumn turns to winter. In other places, buildings were charred—or still in flames. Azerbaijani officials branded the destruction “ecoterrorism.”
The conflict was tough. What came after may have been tougher.
The conflict was tough. What came after may have been tougher. There was barely any phone signal, no internet, no hot water, no heat, and little food other than bread and instant noodles. Confusion reigned: Where, exactly, are the borders with Azerbaijan now? If the northern road is no longer Armenian territory, and the Lachin corridor road that leads to Armenia closed so that Russian peacekeepers could clear away corpses, was everybody trapped? There were always lots of questions. There weren’t many answers.
Some of the most visceral fears were saved for the ancient hillside monastery of Dadivank, thought at first to have been passed over to the other side under the agreement. People traveled for hundreds of miles from around Armenia to take a last tear-blurred look, running their fingertips over the brickwork to divine every crevice. Some kissed the Armenian flag, hoping for some sort of divine intervention.
A child is baptized at Nagorno-Karabakh's Dadivank monastery as Russian peacekeepers arrive to oversee the transfer of the nearby province of Kalbajar to Azerbaijan on Nov. 14.
“I have said before I am staying, and I will stay,” priest Hovhannes Hovhannisyan said.
“We are the first Christian nation, but we’ve always been tortured,” he said. “But I am telling you with certainty Christians will be back here.”
As the priest conducted one last baptism, dripping oil from a bird-shaped decanter into a low altar and chanting to a crowd of people, tanks full of Russian peacekeepers arrived in a sign that there was, after all, some hope.
Dadivank, at least for now, seems saved. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev on Saturday to take care of the territory’s Christian shrines.
Volunteer fighters pose with well-known rebel fighter Pavel Manukyan (second from right) in the town of Askeran, near what was the front line in Nagorno-Karabakh on Nov. 15.
“These buildings, ancient buildings, are important to the people here, so we are here to protect them,” said a Russian peacekeeper at Dadivank, who asked not to be identified as he was not authorized to speak to the press.
The Russian troops—and soon, perhaps, Turkish ones too—see their job as peacekeepers. But not everyone is ready for peace. Though the fighting was over, Ardak and Ararat, mechanics in their normal life, are still ready to offer their services on the front line. They fried potatoes and processed sausage to fortify themselves for a bitter night in the biting cold of a mountain military outpost.
Refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh region get in a bus in Yerevan, Armenia, heading to Stepanakert, the region's main city, on Nov. 17.
They fear Azerbaijani forces may yet try to seize more land. Like them, many are angry at Pashinyan for signing a deal that strongly favored Baku after more than a thousand died to keep the whole enclave Armenian. Protesters in Armenia’s capital of Yerevan stormed parliament last week, demanding Pashinyan’s resignation, even though the president of Nagorno-Karabakh acknowledged that it had been unavoidable due to six weeks of unremitting losses.
“He should resign, or he should kill himself. Or commit harakiri,” said Ardak. “If he resigns, the old regime will come back and that’s not good either,” he said, referring to the elites in power prior to the 2018 Velvet Revolution.
Ardak had what seemed to him a better idea. “I should just take over,” he said.
Correction, Dec. 1, 2020: The Lachin corridor road leads to Armenia. A previous version of this article misstated the road’s destination.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--By Ignoring African Leaders, the West Paved the Way for Chaos in Libya

By Ignoring African Leaders , the West Paved the Way for Chaos in Libya If the American public is aware at all that the United States intervened in Libya , that consciousness stems from the so-called Benghazi affair that congressional Republicans used as a cudgel against Hillary Clinton before and during the 2016 presidential election campaign .
The apparent insignificance of such a consequential event as the Libya intervention in the American consciousness is not in itself racist .
Yet race and the racialization of Africa and Africans took center stage in so-called Western deliberations leading up to the intervention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role in the Libyan intervention .
First , it shaped perceptions of what was permissible and who could mediate in Libya in a manner that is commonplace in international relations today .
Second , race was one of the factors that authorized the marginalization of African leaders , African intellectuals , and non-Western governments when it came to making decisions about seeking peace or waging war .
The chaos engulfing Libya today seems to vindicate the African view that inclusive peace talks and a constitutional transition were preferable to waging the kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ What happened in Libya is not new .
In 2003 , following U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell ’ s direct appeal to African countries on the U.N. Security Council , there was a similar scorn heaped on African leaders and elites for their near-uniform opposition to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq .
In these and other instances , African leaders are routinely faulted for moral weakness , corruption , or lack of appreciation of the stakes in global politics .
It never seems to matter that in many regards , from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to opposition to apartheid , Africans have either taken the lead or their arguments have been vindicated in later years .
Similarly , the chaos engulfing Libya today seems to vindicate the African view that inclusive peace talks and a constitutional transition were preferable to waging the kind of total war whose end was unpredictable .
This mistrust of Africa led France and other Western nations favoring regime change in Libya to sideline Africa altogether .
This marginalization was presented in the press as “ Africa ’ s loss of influence ” while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Berlin .
In fact , France and its Western and Arab allies deliberately marginalized Africa by effectively preventing the African Union , its proposed mediators , and other prominent Africans—heads of state or not—from playing any significant role in mediating the Libyan transition supposedly demanded by the Arab street , which would somehow miraculously lead from Qaddafi ’ s tyranny to democratic rule .
Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso , the AU point man on Libya , was nearly omitted from the list of invitees at the Berlin summit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yoweri Museveni told the BBC that Sassou Nguesso was merely invited as “ tokenism to show that Africa was also involved.
” The marginalization of Africa occurred in tandem with the Arabization of the Libyan conflict when the Arab League , rather than the AU , was given a key role in the resolution of the conflict under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 , adopted on March 17 , 2011 .
That resolution gave preeminence to “ the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the no-fly zone—the injunction to the Libyan army then not to fly warplanes toward Benghazi .
This move opened the door to competing Arab governments , whose presence is still felt even today between Qatar , on one hand , and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia ( aided by Egypt ) on the other .
These antagonists have now mobilized powers like Russia , France , Turkey , and others as allies and sponsors of different sides of the Libya imbroglio .
Consequently , the individuals who emerged as influencers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Libyans and the international community did not include Africans .
It was merely the latest chapter in what has been dubbed “ the white man ’ s burden ” —a colonial mindset that has viewed Africa as a place for Europe to act out its wishes .
Indeed , from the 1884-85 Berlin Conference to the 1944 Brazzaville Conference to the 2011 Libyan intervention , Europe found comfort and justification in deciding the fate of Africa without consulting Africans .
In lieu of Africans themselves , Europe has long relied on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Henry Morton Stanley , who was the chief counsel on Congo to King Leopold II of Belgium .
The Libya intervention shows that little has changed .
Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy selected Bernard-Henri Lévy as his lead counsel on Libya .
The selection of a non-African specialist by Sarkozy did not come as a surprise .
After all , on July 27 , 2007 , Sarkozy delivered a speech at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar , Senegal , in which he declared that “ the tragedy of Africa is that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history.
” Lévy , in the colonial tradition of depicting the white man as savior , has taken credit for the downfall of Qaddafi and for furthering the U.N.-endorsed responsibility to protect victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity .
Lévy ’ s own account of his role reminds one of Lawrence of Arabia , a British colonel who emerged as counsel and played a central role in the 1918 Arab revolt against the Ottomans .
This account is synthesized in a documentary written , directed , and produced by Lévy himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tobruk .
Western leaders like Sarkozy and their advisors like Lévy have long acted on the no-longer-utterable belief that Africans lack coherent moral and intellectual systems that require attention .
It is an antiquated and dangerous view .
Decolonization opened space for Africans to formulate their own views on international morality—including the right to self-determination , universal citizenship , and reconciliation as a means of making peace .
The well-established African approaches to these issues may be gleaned from debates , resolutions , and debates in postcolonial Africa extending from the 1960 Congo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Algeria and the former Portuguese colonies to arguments advanced by African front-line states in confronting South African apartheid .
Throughout these crises , African diplomats routinely put forward arguments in favor of self-determination and reconciliation as a condition of peace while generating a moral vision that has been lost on many observers on account of race and a colonial worldview—the inability to entertain the possibility of moral horizons and ethical principles on any significant scale in Africa .
The obstinacy of African leaders and elites—with exceptions of course—on questions of conflict and conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to near-canonical statements , iconic actions , and awe-inspiring gestures from the likes of Nelson Mandela in South Africa , Patrice Lumumba in Congo , and Amílcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau , among others .
Even if only in cynical attempts to retain power and legitimacy , few African leaders would publicly disagree with or endorse a policy that seems to violate the kernel truth in Mandela ’ s famous speech during his 1964 trial .
In it , Mandela enunciated a view that progressives in Africa today understand as an ethical principle : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including those of our oppressors : “ During my lifetime , I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people .
I have fought against white domination , and I have fought against Black domination , ” Mandela declared to the judge who would sentence him to life imprisonment until his release nearly 27 years later .
“ I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities .
It is an ideal which I hope to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if needs be , it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
” Cabral took up Mandela ’ s pronouncement as his own creed in relation to Portuguese colonialists in Africa , whose right to full citizenship in postcolonial Africa he defended , and the examples abound elsewhere across the continent .
When then-South African President Jacob Zuma traveled to Tripoli in 2011 to negotiate an inclusive diplomatic solution , Western media and policymakers doubted his motives .
While Zuma is no hero and his tenure as president exposed many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward Libya was based on Mandela ’ s principles .
Indeed , the solution Zuma proposed was predicated on the idea that the responsibility to protect applied to all .
Just as Mandela and Zuma ’ s African National Congress had long envisaged universal protection in relation to white South Africans—rather than domination by the victors—Zuma imagined it was possible to bring about an end to Qaddafi ’ s regime while demanding that his children , family , and clan be protected against an impending onslaught by their opponents .
Without bothering to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s proposals , many critics simply cast suspicions on his motives .
Others , including human rights advocates , faulted him for lack of moral clarity and political decisiveness .
In contrast , they promoted a policy that would have been anathema to the principle of Mandela ’ s trial speech : a total war that risked physical and moral annihilation of a category of sinners ( Qaddafi ’ s entire clan ) by supposedly saintly people ( those opposing him ) .
The undeclared total war was seized on by many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to wage it today in their respective struggles over power , territory , and resources .
The cost of ignoring the moral clarity and political decisiveness that Africa supposedly lacked has now become clear .
Libya lives with the consequences nearly a decade later , with no end in sight .
The ensuing chaos has once again supplied racial stereotypes of life on the “ coast of Barbary , ” driven by imagined African , Arab , and Berber infighting .
The racialized subtext prevails in reporting on the country despite the fact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arab Gulf states are the primary sponsors of the fighting forces on the ground .
It also hampers coherent thought and upholds demeaning and antiquated beliefs—including the notion of a permanent European mandate over Africa .
This is conjoined with the mistaken impression that Europe is always justified in that trusteeship ; that military and political power bestows reason ; that self-righteousness necessarily affords wisdom ; and that Africa does not possess operable and plausible moral and ethical systems .
That is the curse of race .
The good news is that , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be dispelled .
That is up to those in its throes .

If the American public is aware at all that the United States intervened in Libya, that consciousness stems from the so-called Benghazi affair that congressional Republicans used as a cudgel against Hillary Clinton before and during the 2016 presidential election campaign.
If the American public is aware at all that the United States intervened in Libya, that consciousness stems from the so-called Benghazi affair that congressional Republicans used as a cudgel against Hillary Clinton before and during the 2016 presidential election campaign.
The apparent insignificance of such a consequential event as the Libya intervention in the American consciousness is not in itself racist. Yet race and the racialization of Africa and Africans took center stage in so-called Western deliberations leading up to the intervention in Libya. Race played a dual role in the Libyan intervention. First, it shaped perceptions of what was permissible and who could mediate in Libya in a manner that is commonplace in international relations today. Second, race was one of the factors that authorized the marginalization of African leaders, African intellectuals, and non-Western governments when it came to making decisions about seeking peace or waging war.
The chaos engulfing Libya today seems to vindicate the African view that inclusive peace talks and a constitutional transition were preferable to waging the kind of total war whose end was unpredictable.
What happened in Libya is not new. In 2003, following U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s direct appeal to African countries on the U.N. Security Council, there was a similar scorn heaped on African leaders and elites for their near-uniform opposition to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In these and other instances, African leaders are routinely faulted for moral weakness, corruption, or lack of appreciation of the stakes in global politics.
It never seems to matter that in many regards, from the 1960s Congo crisis to Namibian independence to opposition to apartheid, Africans have either taken the lead or their arguments have been vindicated in later years. Similarly, the chaos engulfing Libya today seems to vindicate the African view that inclusive peace talks and a constitutional transition were preferable to waging the kind of total war whose end was unpredictable.
To grasp how race shaped the views of foreign-policy makers during the Libya crisis, one has only to note two constants in the discourse around the eventual intervention: The first was the active erasure of Africa and African specialists from deliberations leading to the invasion. The second was the explanation given for this apparent slight—that African leaders and others could not be trusted to be impartial toward Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi due to his presumed gifts to them and his supposed influence over African populations. Western leaders never stopped to consider that perhaps Libya’s immediate neighbors and leaders who’d known Qaddafi for decades might have something to offer.
This mistrust of Africa led France and other Western nations favoring regime change in Libya to sideline Africa altogether. This marginalization was presented in the press as “Africa’s loss of influence” while decisions were made in Istanbul, Moscow, and Berlin. In fact, France and its Western and Arab allies deliberately marginalized Africa by effectively preventing the African Union, its proposed mediators, and other prominent Africans—heads of state or not—from playing any significant role in mediating the Libyan transition supposedly demanded by the Arab street, which would somehow miraculously lead from Qaddafi’s tyranny to democratic rule. Republic of Congo President Denis Sassou Nguesso, the AU point man on Libya, was nearly omitted from the list of invitees at the Berlin summit on Libya in January. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni told the BBC that Sassou Nguesso was merely invited as “tokenism to show that Africa was also involved.”
The marginalization of Africa occurred in tandem with the Arabization of the Libyan conflict when the Arab League, rather than the AU, was given a key role in the resolution of the conflict under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011. That resolution gave preeminence to “the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region” and the implementation of the no-fly zone—the injunction to the Libyan army then not to fly warplanes toward Benghazi. This move opened the door to competing Arab governments, whose presence is still felt even today between Qatar, on one hand, and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (aided by Egypt) on the other. These antagonists have now mobilized powers like Russia, France, Turkey, and others as allies and sponsors of different sides of the Libya imbroglio.
Consequently, the individuals who emerged as influencers, advisors to decision-makers, and spokespeople for Libyans and the international community did not include Africans. It was merely the latest chapter in what has been dubbed “the white man’s burden”—a colonial mindset that has viewed Africa as a place for Europe to act out its wishes. Indeed, from the 1884-85 Berlin Conference to the 1944 Brazzaville Conference to the 2011 Libyan intervention, Europe found comfort and justification in deciding the fate of Africa without consulting Africans. In lieu of Africans themselves, Europe has long relied on the advice of so-called humanitarians and colonial entrepreneurs like Henry Morton Stanley, who was the chief counsel on Congo to King Leopold II of Belgium.
The Libya intervention shows that little has changed. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy selected Bernard-Henri Lévy as his lead counsel on Libya. The selection of a non-African specialist by Sarkozy did not come as a surprise. After all, on July 27, 2007, Sarkozy delivered a speech at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, in which he declared that “the tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history.”
Lévy, in the colonial tradition of depicting the white man as savior, has taken credit for the downfall of Qaddafi and for furthering the U.N.-endorsed responsibility to protect victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Lévy’s own account of his role reminds one of Lawrence of Arabia, a British colonel who emerged as counsel and played a central role in the 1918 Arab revolt against the Ottomans. This account is synthesized in a documentary written, directed, and produced by Lévy himself under the title of The Oath of Tobruk.
Western leaders like Sarkozy and their advisors like Lévy have long acted on the no-longer-utterable belief that Africans lack coherent moral and intellectual systems that require attention. It is an antiquated and dangerous view.
Decolonization opened space for Africans to formulate their own views on international morality—including the right to self-determination, universal citizenship, and reconciliation as a means of making peace. The well-established African approaches to these issues may be gleaned from debates, resolutions, and debates in postcolonial Africa extending from the 1960 Congo crisis to the wars of independence in Algeria and the former Portuguese colonies to arguments advanced by African front-line states in confronting South African apartheid.
Throughout these crises, African diplomats routinely put forward arguments in favor of self-determination and reconciliation as a condition of peace while generating a moral vision that has been lost on many observers on account of race and a colonial worldview—the inability to entertain the possibility of moral horizons and ethical principles on any significant scale in Africa.
The underlying skepticism toward African leaders runs deep. Before the invasion of Iraq, an American journalist asked me during a radio interview if the politically dependent African leaders of the financially dependent countries of Cameroon, Angola, and Guinea would cave to Powell’s demand to support the U.S. position against Saddam Hussein at the U.N. The reporter was stunned by my brief answer, which was no.
The obstinacy of African leaders and elites—with exceptions of course—on questions of conflict and conflict resolution baffles only observers who are oblivious to near-canonical statements, iconic actions, and awe-inspiring gestures from the likes of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Patrice Lumumba in Congo, and Amílcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, among others. Even if only in cynical attempts to retain power and legitimacy, few African leaders would publicly disagree with or endorse a policy that seems to violate the kernel truth in Mandela’s famous speech during his 1964 trial.
In it, Mandela enunciated a view that progressives in Africa today understand as an ethical principle: to stand in defense of all lives, including those of our oppressors: “During my lifetime, I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against Black domination,” Mandela declared to the judge who would sentence him to life imprisonment until his release nearly 27 years later. “I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”
Cabral took up Mandela’s pronouncement as his own creed in relation to Portuguese colonialists in Africa, whose right to full citizenship in postcolonial Africa he defended, and the examples abound elsewhere across the continent.
When then-South African President Jacob Zuma traveled to Tripoli in 2011 to negotiate an inclusive diplomatic solution, Western media and policymakers doubted his motives. While Zuma is no hero and his tenure as president exposed many moral and ethical shortcomings, his policy toward Libya was based on Mandela’s principles.
Indeed, the solution Zuma proposed was predicated on the idea that the responsibility to protect applied to all. Just as Mandela and Zuma’s African National Congress had long envisaged universal protection in relation to white South Africans—rather than domination by the victors—Zuma imagined it was possible to bring about an end to Qaddafi’s regime while demanding that his children, family, and clan be protected against an impending onslaught by their opponents.
Without bothering to look for the moral principles underlying Zuma’s proposals, many critics simply cast suspicions on his motives. Others, including human rights advocates, faulted him for lack of moral clarity and political decisiveness. In contrast, they promoted a policy that would have been anathema to the principle of Mandela’s trial speech: a total war that risked physical and moral annihilation of a category of sinners (Qaddafi’s entire clan) by supposedly saintly people (those opposing him).
The undeclared total war was seized on by many Libyan political factions and militias that continue to wage it today in their respective struggles over power, territory, and resources. The cost of ignoring the moral clarity and political decisiveness that Africa supposedly lacked has now become clear. Libya lives with the consequences nearly a decade later, with no end in sight. The ensuing chaos has once again supplied racial stereotypes of life on the “coast of Barbary,” driven by imagined African, Arab, and Berber infighting. The racialized subtext prevails in reporting on the country despite the fact that France, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states are the primary sponsors of the fighting forces on the ground.
What happened during the Libya crisis is not racism. Racism is a premeditated epithet that is instrumentalized to inflict deliberate harm. Race is another matter. In the Libya context, it appeared more like a curse that cast its spell over the Western-Arab alliance in Libya, thereby clouding both thought and policy. The curse of race has a long history, dating from the time of enslavement to the postcolonial era. Its spell operates like magic—an illusion staged for an audience waiting to believe or be entertained. Yet, as Libya proves, the spell has a stench: mindlessness and destruction.
It also hampers coherent thought and upholds demeaning and antiquated beliefs—including the notion of a permanent European mandate over Africa. This is conjoined with the mistaken impression that Europe is always justified in that trusteeship; that military and political power bestows reason; that self-righteousness necessarily affords wisdom; and that Africa does not possess operable and plausible moral and ethical systems.
That is the curse of race. The good news is that, like every curse, it too can be dispelled. That is up to those in its throes.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--China Is Fishing for Trouble at Sea

China Is Fishing for Trouble at Sea

China Is Fishing for Trouble at Sea The People ’ s Republic of China leads the world in illegal , unreported , and unregulated fishing ( IUUF ) .
With a fishing fleet that numbers up to 800,000 boats by some estimates , China depleted its own domestic fisheries long ago .
Through generous subsidies and government direction , the Chinese Communist Party has subsequently incentivized part of its fleet to travel further afield to satisfy both China ’ s domestic consumption and the international market .
Despite this , China has avoided any tangible consequences for its actions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with international standards and maritime law .
With a growing number of fishing-related policy announcements , it appears that the United States is preparing the groundwork for launching a new salvo in the U.S.-China competition as the time runs out for President Donald Trump ’ s administration .
Globally , economic losses from illegal fishing are difficult to quantify , but there is little disagreement that the overall economic loss totals tens of billions of dollars yearly , encompassing lost tax revenue , onshore fishing industry jobs , and depletion of food supplies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the exclusive economic zones of states such as Guinea , the Philippines , and North Korea that are impoverished and can not exercise sufficient control of their maritime areas—the same states that Chinese fishermen often end up targeting .
Fishery collapse due to overfishing in those areas poses a very real risk of food insecurity for millions in the developing world .
How does this affect the United States ?
Past studies estimate that up to one-third of the wild-caught seafood imported into the United States was illegally harvested , in violation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Lacey Act was the United States ’ first federal law signed to protect wildlife and prohibits the import or export of any animal or plant products taken by illegal means .
Evading regulation leads to the degradation of the global food supply as well as environmental damage in many cases .
But at the center of Trump ’ s thrust is likely to be the negative impact on the American economy and detrimental effects on the American fishing industry .
It may seem counterintuitive that illegal fishing outside American waters hurts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do not observe national maritime boundaries .
Migratory fish are some of the most economically valuable and are thus extensively targeted .
As illegal catch increases , there are fewer fish reproducing each year and the often-destructive practices employed by illegal fishing organizations wreak havoc on the ocean ecosystem .
Thus , widespread illegal fishing creates a cycle of destruction that results in fewer fish growing to maturity and shrinking numbers of fish available for harvest by American fishermen .
Illegal products entering the U.S. marketplace also disadvantage American producers whose bottom lines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law and domestic regulation .
The lack of consequences in China ’ s case is not for a lack of available measures .
The European Union implemented an indirect enforcement system in 2010 that has proven effective in prompting sweeping changes in many states guilt of illegal fishing practices , but that system has only been used against less powerful countries that could not challenge the Europeans .
Cambodia , Thailand , Philippines , Taiwan , and Vietnam have all been recipients of yellow or red cards while China has escaped all censure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of misbehavior and illegal activities .
In 2020 , the Trump administration produced several policies that set the stage for a head-on confrontation with the world ’ s most infamous perpetrator of fisheries crime .
In May , Trump issued an executive order , “ Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth.
” At first blush , the order is very much in line with the “ America First ” credo espoused by the present administration , clearing perceived bureaucratic hurdles to American industries and promoting American businesses .
However , close to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secretary of commerce and administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to explore ways to implement the United Nations Agreement on Port State Measures “ to prevent , deter , and eliminate IUUF.
” Following the issuance of that order , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a press statement in response to the enormous Chinese fishing fleet that logged 73,000 hours of fishing along Ecuador ’ s exclusive economic zone from July to August .
He pointed out China ’ s subsidization of the world ’ s largest commercial fishing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for illegal practices , notably calling for the international community to stand in opposition to China ’ s disregard for the rule of law and poor environmental stewardship .
In September , the U.S. Coast Guard released its own IUUF Strategic Outlook , naming illegal , unreported , and unregulated fishing as the “ leading global maritime security threat.
” Among its three lines of effort is the call to “ Counter Predatory and Irresponsible State Behavior.
” China is the only country that receives specific attention in the report , which highlights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as calls for it to exercise appropriate responsibility as a flag state .
Unfortunately , this push comes in what appears to be the last year of this administration , creating the potential for the initiative to lose inertia during the transition of power .
While it ’ s fair to expect a good deal of change in a potential Biden administration , holding China to account for its blatant abuse of the world ’ s common food supply is worth retaining .
The incoming administration should make a concerted effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instance , the corporations and individuals involved with China ’ s massive distant water fishing fleet are prime candidates for targeted sanctions .
Unraveling the networks of ownership may be difficult , but it is not impossible .
Commercially available satellite data offers an affordable , accessible supply of evidence to support the case , as evidenced by campaigns by organizations like Global Fishing Watch and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative to highlight malign activities using publicly available imagery .
While the U.S. government certainly does not lack for sophisticated space-based imagery , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entirely avoid issues of classification that might hamper official government efforts .
Additionally , shipbuilders , exporters , fish processing , and equipment manufacturers supporting China ’ s distant water fishing fleet should all be considered within the realm of possibility for sanction .
The flag state regime offers another opportunity .
According to international law , all merchant vessels must be registered in a state of the owner ’ s choice .
The state where the ship is registered is known as the flag state , and the ship assumes the nationality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The flag state is responsible for ensuring that their vessels adhere to international law .
Some states have offered their flag with the understanding that requirements and regulation are relaxed and are known as “ flags of convenience.
” The majority of Chinese distant water fishing vessels are Chinese-flagged , but the US and its allies could , and should , put pressure on other flag states to either enforce international law or de-list those Chinese ships committing violations under their respective flags .
States like Panama and Fiji may offer flags @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to account for the behavior of ships operating under their flag .
The Trump administration ’ s haphazard approach to diplomacy has left the United States ill-equipped to bring an effective case against China at the United Nations for violations committed under its flag .
However , a Biden administration might find action under the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) , an attractive and available avenue for mobilizing multilateral support .
Biden ’ s incoming team should also plan to encourage the European Union to exercise its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ card notice to China .
With China ranking as the largest country of origin for fishery products consumed in the EU , and first in the world for total trade in fisheries and aquaculture , the EU can ’ t turn a blind eye to its illegal practices .
As Biden ’ s team seeks to rebuild bridges with Europe during its first months in office , this issue should be prioritized for discussion .
Finally , Biden ’ s administration should fully support increased funding of the U.S. Coast Guard to enable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort in its IUUF strategy : namely , enabling global fishing enforcement and mobilizing multilateral efforts to combat illegal practices .
U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Karl Schultz has publicly warned the U.S. congress that his organization is under-resourced for even its current set of missions , thus necessitating a larger conversation about the coast guard budget if a global IUUF campaign is going to be successful .
Fishing may not strike many as an issue worthy of immediate concern to an incoming Biden administration confronting not only a dynamic international landscape and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well .
However , the prospect of collapse for a primary source of protein for more than 10 percent of the world ’ s population is worthy of attention .
The new administration must resist the urge to throw out all Trump-era policies in a return to the status quo .
It may seem improbable , but by utilizing the elements of policy put into place during the last year of Trump ’ s presidency , the Biden administration could positively impact the lives of hundreds of millions across the globe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within the framework of international law .

The People’s Republic of China leads the world in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF). With a fishing fleet that numbers up to 800,000 boats by some estimates, China depleted its own domestic fisheries long ago. Through generous subsidies and government direction , the Chinese Communist Party has subsequently incentivized part of its fleet to travel further afield to satisfy both China’s domestic consumption and the international market. Despite this, China has avoided any tangible consequences for its actions, while smaller states are strong-armed into compliance with international standards and maritime law. With a growing number of fishing-related policy announcements, it appears that the United States is preparing the groundwork for launching a new salvo in the U.S.-China competition as the time runs out for President Donald Trump’s administration.
The People’s Republic of China leads the world in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF). With a fishing fleet that numbers up to 800,000 boats by some estimates, China depleted its own domestic fisheries long ago. Through generous subsidies and government direction, the Chinese Communist Party has subsequently incentivized part of its fleet to travel further afield to satisfy both China’s domestic consumption and the international market. Despite this, China has avoided any tangible consequences for its actions, while smaller states are strong-armed into compliance with international standards and maritime law. With a growing number of fishing-related policy announcements, it appears that the United States is preparing the groundwork for launching a new salvo in the U.S.-China competition as the time runs out for President Donald Trump’s administration.
Globally, economic losses from illegal fishing are difficult to quantify, but there is little disagreement that the overall economic loss totals tens of billions of dollars yearly, encompassing lost tax revenue, onshore fishing industry jobs, and depletion of food supplies. Much of that illegal catch comes from the exclusive economic zones of states such as Guinea, the Philippines, and North Korea that are impoverished and cannot exercise sufficient control of their maritime areas—the same states that Chinese fishermen often end up targeting. Fishery collapse due to overfishing in those areas poses a very real risk of food insecurity for millions in the developing world.
How does this affect the United States? Past studies estimate that up to one-third of the wild-caught seafood imported into the United States was illegally harvested, in violation of the Lacey Act (1990). The Lacey Act was the United States’ first federal law signed to protect wildlife and prohibits the import or export of any animal or plant products taken by illegal means. Evading regulation leads to the degradation of the global food supply as well as environmental damage in many cases. But at the center of Trump’s thrust is likely to be the negative impact on the American economy and detrimental effects on the American fishing industry. It may seem counterintuitive that illegal fishing outside American waters hurts the United States. However, fish do not observe national maritime boundaries. Migratory fish are some of the most economically valuable and are thus extensively targeted. As illegal catch increases, there are fewer fish reproducing each year and the often-destructive practices employed by illegal fishing organizations wreak havoc on the ocean ecosystem. Thus, widespread illegal fishing creates a cycle of destruction that results in fewer fish growing to maturity and shrinking numbers of fish available for harvest by American fishermen. Illegal products entering the U.S. marketplace also disadvantage American producers whose bottom lines reflect the costs of adherence to international law and domestic regulation.
The lack of consequences in China’s case is not for a lack of available measures. The European Union implemented an indirect enforcement system in 2010 that has proven effective in prompting sweeping changes in many states guilt of illegal fishing practices, but that system has only been used against less powerful countries that could not challenge the Europeans. Cambodia, Thailand, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have all been recipients of yellow or red cards while China has escaped all censure, despite its extensive, documented pattern of misbehavior and illegal activities.
In 2020, the Trump administration produced several policies that set the stage for a head-on confrontation with the world’s most infamous perpetrator of fisheries crime. In May, Trump issued an executive order, “Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth.” At first blush, the order is very much in line with the “America First” credo espoused by the present administration, clearing perceived bureaucratic hurdles to American industries and promoting American businesses. However, close to the top is a mandate for the secretary of commerce and administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to explore ways to implement the United Nations Agreement on Port State Measures “to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUUF.”
Following the issuance of that order, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a press statement in response to the enormous Chinese fishing fleet that logged 73,000 hours of fishing along Ecuador’s exclusive economic zone from July to August. He pointed out China’s subsidization of the world’s largest commercial fishing fleet as well as its widely-accepted reputation for illegal practices, notably calling for the international community to stand in opposition to China’s disregard for the rule of law and poor environmental stewardship.
In September, the U.S. Coast Guard released its own IUUF Strategic Outlook, naming illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as the “leading global maritime security threat.” Among its three lines of effort is the call to “Counter Predatory and Irresponsible State Behavior.” China is the only country that receives specific attention in the report, which highlights its violations of sovereignty and international law as well as calls for it to exercise appropriate responsibility as a flag state.
Unfortunately, this push comes in what appears to be the last year of this administration, creating the potential for the initiative to lose inertia during the transition of power. While it’s fair to expect a good deal of change in a potential Biden administration, holding China to account for its blatant abuse of the world’s common food supply is worth retaining.
The incoming administration should make a concerted effort to operationalize these policy actions. For instance, the corporations and individuals involved with China’s massive distant water fishing fleet are prime candidates for targeted sanctions. Unraveling the networks of ownership may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Commercially available satellite data offers an affordable, accessible supply of evidence to support the case, as evidenced by campaigns by organizations like Global Fishing Watch and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative to highlight malign activities using publicly available imagery. While the U.S. government certainly does not lack for sophisticated space-based imagery, commercial solutions circumvent slow dissemination processes and entirely avoid issues of classification that might hamper official government efforts. Additionally, shipbuilders, exporters, fish processing, and equipment manufacturers supporting China’s distant water fishing fleet should all be considered within the realm of possibility for sanction.
The flag state regime offers another opportunity. According to international law, all merchant vessels must be registered in a state of the owner’s choice. The state where the ship is registered is known as the flag state, and the ship assumes the nationality of the flag under which it sails. The flag state is responsible for ensuring that their vessels adhere to international law. Some states have offered their flag with the understanding that requirements and regulation are relaxed and are known as “flags of convenience.”
The majority of Chinese distant water fishing vessels are Chinese-flagged, but the US and its allies could, and should, put pressure on other flag states to either enforce international law or de-list those Chinese ships committing violations under their respective flags. States like Panama and Fiji may offer flags of convenience but can still be held to account for the behavior of ships operating under their flag. The Trump administration’s haphazard approach to diplomacy has left the United States ill-equipped to bring an effective case against China at the United Nations for violations committed under its flag. However, a Biden administration might find action under the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an attractive and available avenue for mobilizing multilateral support.
Biden’s incoming team should also plan to encourage the European Union to exercise its own mechanism of enforcement by issuing a yellow card notice to China. With China ranking as the largest country of origin for fishery products consumed in the EU, and first in the world for total trade in fisheries and aquaculture, the EU can’t turn a blind eye to its illegal practices. As Biden’s team seeks to rebuild bridges with Europe during its first months in office, this issue should be prioritized for discussion.
Finally, Biden’s administration should fully support increased funding of the U.S. Coast Guard to enable its execution of the other lines of effort in its IUUF strategy: namely, enabling global fishing enforcement and mobilizing multilateral efforts to combat illegal practices. U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Karl Schultz has publicly warned the U.S. congress that his organization is under-resourced for even its current set of missions, thus necessitating a larger conversation about the coast guard budget if a global IUUF campaign is going to be successful.
Fishing may not strike many as an issue worthy of immediate concern to an incoming Biden administration confronting not only a dynamic international landscape and global pandemic, but tumult at home as well. However, the prospect of collapse for a primary source of protein for more than 10 percent of the world’s population is worthy of attention. The new administration must resist the urge to throw out all Trump-era policies in a return to the status quo. It may seem improbable, but by utilizing the elements of policy put into place during the last year of Trump’s presidency, the Biden administration could positively impact the lives of hundreds of millions across the globe, as well as confront illegal Chinese activity within the framework of international law.