foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Biden Thinks He’s Tough on China. He’s Just Complacent.

The conventional wisdom these days is that U.S. policy on China will not change when President-elect Joe Biden replaces President Donald Trump .
The policy , it ’ s claimed , is bipartisan : Washington has woken up to the Chinese threat ; a new Cold War may have already started and if not , one is inevitable sooner or later .
The conventional wisdom is wrong .
There is a fundamental choice to be made on how to deal with China , and Biden is very close to picking one alternative .
There ’ s good reason to fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In every China policy , two elements have to be distinguished .
First , there ’ s the values question .
There is not a lot of disagreement on this .
Yes , former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg once said that China is a democracy or something close to a democracy , but most people know better .
The regime in China is fundamentally opposed to Western values .
That Biden understands this better than Trump is not a surprise : Trump was never much interested in promoting human rights and democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cold Warriors—invariably starts from there .
At the tenth Democratic debate back in February , when asked if he would allow China to build critical infrastructure in the United States , Biden was much blunter on President Xi Jinping than Trump ever managed to be : “ This is a guy who does not have a democratic bone in his body .
This is a guy who is a thug , who in fact has a million Uighurs in … concentration camps.
” That takes us to the second element : power or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ view .
Perhaps as a result of his business encounters with Chinese partners and competitors , he knew more or less instinctively that China is a genuine peer competitor of the United States .
Worse , he realized that China could soon leave America behind , particularly if the latter does not radically mend its ways .
For Trump , it was China ’ s clout in global trade and finance that impressed him most of all , but that clout has deeper roots .
Whether the Chinese economy continues on the same @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period of malaise , few with knowledge of local realities will doubt its ability to master the sources of technological growth .
It is precisely on this question that contemporary China has issued a serious challenge to liberal ideas .
If China is able to demonstrate that Western society is not the only model capable of developing and controlling the key technologies of the future , global political competition will take place between different models and historical development will no longer follow a predetermined path .
Does Biden know this ?
He does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iowa in 2019 he famously mocked China ’ s power and capacities : “ China is going to eat our lunch ?
Come on , man … They ’ re not competition for us.
” When he later described Russia as an opponent of the United States while identifying China as a “ serious competitor , ” he seems to have meant that the confrontation with China happens under a framework of rules , while Russia operates outside it .
Some obvious prejudices blind him on just this point .
First , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the less you are willing to accept that contemporary China can pose a genuine challenge to the American-led global order .
The reasoning goes something like this : China is an evil dictatorship , and we know that only freedom can unleash the creative energies of individuals .
Ergo China is backward , it may soon collapse , and we have nothing to worry about .
In fact , if you think China can compete with us , there must be something wrong with you because you are in fact arguing that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One might have expected Washington to have been more aware of China ’ s ambitions , but so far the iron logic of great-power rivalry has been obscured by American triumphalism , itself a predictable consequence of the victory in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union , which bred the hope that the whole world might be unified under American leadership .
Remember that when the Cold War started there was much doubt over whom the march of history would favor .
Many prominent intellectuals regarded communism as inevitable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not exactly desirable .
The situation is very different today .
Those who think that the West has been too soft on China do so , for the most part , because in their understanding Chinese authorities and Chinese companies have been given a free pass on whether they are subject to Western rules .
That those rules must win in the end is taken as a truism .
I should add that this has been my experience every time I discuss China in Washington .
People in think tanks and the State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is anything but an economic and political disaster waiting to happen .
Some of my interlocutors get very annoyed if I suggest otherwise .
Others look at me with thinly disguised suspicion .
Biden and his team of advisors are part of this world .
Trump was not .
What does this mean for the new China policy ?
Biden will quickly recover the language of human rights and numerous commentators will applaud it as a toughening up of the American policy on China .
In practice , this toughening up will mean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but little else .
That seems to be the concept behind the so-called summit of democracies that Biden wants to organize—possibly in the first hundred days of his presidency .
India , Japan , and South Korea would sit at the table .
China would be the main topic of discussion .
If you believe in the international liberal order , your tendency is to think that those not sharing the same values should be left out , isolated—not legitimized , as they say in the State Department .
As Jake Sullivan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ published last year , the new policy will marshal the soft coercion of the global order : “ If China hopes to enjoy equal access to this new economic community , its own economic and regulatory frameworks must meet the same standards .
The combined gravitational pull of this community would present China with a choice : either curb its free-riding and start complying with trade rules , or accept less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy.
” Similarly , China ’ s growing technological clout will require some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment and trade in both directions , but these efforts should be carefully targeted to prevent permanent damage to the global liberal order .
“ Failing to do so , ” Sullian and Campbell write , “ could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent.
” In a second essay , this time co-authored with Hal Brands , Sullivan returns to the notion of the global order as the arena where the contest between China and the United States will be decided .
Sullivan and Brands are less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left its flank in the Pacific vulnerable than with the possibility that China could leap directly to the role of managing and leading the global order .
Its efforts came at a time when the United States , during the Trump administration , stepped back from its traditional role as guarantor of the international order .
Whoever occupies that role has the critical advantage .
But the critical point is that , according to the authors , China is not tailored for the role : “ China may well be less capable of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , both because it is less powerful and because its authoritarian political system makes it harder to exercise the comparatively enlightened , positive-sum leadership that has distinguished U.S. primacy.
” Biden will try to use the “ global liberal order ” against China .
Trump always favored a direct clash , one taking place in a fundamentally anarchic or disordered world .
For Biden , world politics still follows an organized set of values and rules .
China will be asked to at least pay formal tribute to that order or then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Trump of course never cared much about rules .
He saw them less as a tool than as an obstacle .
Biden ’ s approach has two obvious disadvantages .
First , it is transformational rather than transactional .
Its rationale is to bring about changes in either Chinese behaviour or even the Chinese regime itself .
Such changes may be impossible to obtain and their pursuit utopian .
Trump was more interested in bringing about changes in the relative balance of power .
Despite the chaos and conflict inside the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some results , as evidenced by the growing difficulties of Huawei and other leading Chinese companies .
In an ideal world China would be subject to genuinely global norms .
The question is what the enforcement mechanisms are .
Do the United States and its allies still have the ability to bring about the necessary level of compliance with liberal norms ?
Indeed , the limits to American power have only grown since the Iraq invasion—the global financial crisis and the current pandemic continued the process—and seem increasingly connected to the worldwide diffusion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rival economic powers and ideological models .
The age of global empires—even a liberal one—may turn out to have been strictly confined in time , dependent on imbalances of technology and knowledge of an inexorably transitory character .
Second , why should you want to tie your own hands ?
Yes , global liberal order can sometimes be used as a tool to project American power , but it does nonetheless impose constraints on the United States .
For example , the outright ban on a Chinese company might be regarded as incompatible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principles .
Forms of economic coercion against allies might be excluded , but without them the United States might not be able to force those allies to reduce economic links with China .
Trump did not prima facie exclude any method or tactic , because the contest did not take place under a normative order .
In Beijing , the change will be very much welcome .
In fact , it is already being enthused .
Just as the new National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained in his first public comments about how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ list of threats included racial inequality and climate change but not China—an influential Chinese strategist took to the pages of the New York Times to argue that the two countries can both compete and cooperate .
Former Secretary of State John Kerry ’ s appointment as climate envoy was especially applauded by the foreign-policy blob in Beijing .
It shows that Washington will be desperate for China ’ s cooperation on the issue and less able to continue a strategy of active confrontation .
If there is something Chinese strategists regret it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , bide your time , ” the guiding philosophy of Deng Xiaoping ’ s foreign policy .
According to Deng , what China needed was to be left alone , as it grew stronger both politically and economically , in preparation of the time when it could actively challenge America in each and every dimension of global power .
In his 2002 report to the National Congress , General Secretary Jiang Zemin foresaw a “ 20-year period of strategic opportunity , ” during which China would benefit from good relations with the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic growth and full-scale modernization.
” The period was cut short by a few , critical years .
Beijing will now be offered a reprieve .
“ Biden your time.
” Not even Deng could have come up with that one .

The conventional wisdom these days is that U.S. policy on China will not change when President-elect Joe Biden replaces President Donald Trump. The policy, it’s claimed, is bipartisan: Washington has woken up to the Chinese threat; a new Cold War may have already started and if not, one is inevitable sooner or later.
The conventional wisdom these days is that U.S. policy on China will not change when President-elect Joe Biden replaces President Donald Trump. The policy, it’s claimed, is bipartisan: Washington has woken up to the Chinese threat; a new Cold War may have already started and if not, one is inevitable sooner or later.
The conventional wisdom is wrong. There is a fundamental choice to be made on how to deal with China, and Biden is very close to picking one alternative. There’s good reason to fear it’s the wrong one.
In every China policy, two elements have to be distinguished. First, there’s the values question. There is not a lot of disagreement on this. Yes, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg once said that China is a democracy or something close to a democracy, but most people know better. The regime in China is fundamentally opposed to Western values.
That Biden understands this better than Trump is not a surprise: Trump was never much interested in promoting human rights and democracy abroad, while Biden—the last of the Cold Warriors—invariably starts from there. At the tenth Democratic debate back in February, when asked if he would allow China to build critical infrastructure in the United States, Biden was much blunter on President Xi Jinping than Trump ever managed to be: “This is a guy who does not have a democratic bone in his body. This is a guy who is a thug, who in fact has a million Uighurs in … concentration camps.”
That takes us to the second element: power or capacities. Here Trump had the sharper view. Perhaps as a result of his business encounters with Chinese partners and competitors, he knew more or less instinctively that China is a genuine peer competitor of the United States. Worse, he realized that China could soon leave America behind, particularly if the latter does not radically mend its ways.
For Trump, it was China’s clout in global trade and finance that impressed him most of all, but that clout has deeper roots. Whether the Chinese economy continues on the same path of fast growth or enters a period of malaise, few with knowledge of local realities will doubt its ability to master the sources of technological growth. It is precisely on this question that contemporary China has issued a serious challenge to liberal ideas. If China is able to demonstrate that Western society is not the only model capable of developing and controlling the key technologies of the future, global political competition will take place between different models and historical development will no longer follow a predetermined path.
Does Biden know this? He does not. At a campaign stop in Iowa in 2019 he famously mocked China’s power and capacities: “China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man … They’re not competition for us.” When he later described Russia as an opponent of the United States while identifying China as a “serious competitor,” he seems to have meant that the confrontation with China happens under a framework of rules, while Russia operates outside it.
Some obvious prejudices blind him on just this point. First, the more you care about the values question, the less you are willing to accept that contemporary China can pose a genuine challenge to the American-led global order. The reasoning goes something like this: China is an evil dictatorship, and we know that only freedom can unleash the creative energies of individuals. Ergo China is backward, it may soon collapse, and we have nothing to worry about. In fact, if you think China can compete with us, there must be something wrong with you because you are in fact arguing that a dictatorship can produce positive outcomes.
One might have expected Washington to have been more aware of China’s ambitions, but so far the iron logic of great-power rivalry has been obscured by American triumphalism, itself a predictable consequence of the victory in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which bred the hope that the whole world might be unified under American leadership. Remember that when the Cold War started there was much doubt over whom the march of history would favor. Many prominent intellectuals regarded communism as inevitable, including some for whom this was not exactly desirable. The situation is very different today. Those who think that the West has been too soft on China do so, for the most part, because in their understanding Chinese authorities and Chinese companies have been given a free pass on whether they are subject to Western rules. That those rules must win in the end is taken as a truism.
I should add that this has been my experience every time I discuss China in Washington. People in think tanks and the State Department simply cannot accept that China is anything but an economic and political disaster waiting to happen. Some of my interlocutors get very annoyed if I suggest otherwise. Others look at me with thinly disguised suspicion. Biden and his team of advisors are part of this world. Trump was not.
What does this mean for the new China policy? Biden will quickly recover the language of human rights and numerous commentators will applaud it as a toughening up of the American policy on China. In practice, this toughening up will mean that Beijing will get a cold shoulder but little else. That seems to be the concept behind the so-called summit of democracies that Biden wants to organize—possibly in the first hundred days of his presidency. India, Japan, and South Korea would sit at the table. China would be the main topic of discussion. If you believe in the international liberal order, your tendency is to think that those not sharing the same values should be left out, isolated—not legitimized, as they say in the State Department.
As Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell put it in an essay published last year, the new policy will marshal the soft coercion of the global order: “If China hopes to enjoy equal access to this new economic community, its own economic and regulatory frameworks must meet the same standards. The combined gravitational pull of this community would present China with a choice: either curb its free-riding and start complying with trade rules, or accept less favorable terms from more than half of the global economy.” Similarly, China’s growing technological clout will require some enhanced restrictions on the flow of technology investment and trade in both directions, but these efforts should be carefully targeted to prevent permanent damage to the global liberal order. “Failing to do so,” Sullian and Campbell write, “could Balkanize the global technology ecosystem by impeding flows of knowledge and talent.”
In a second essay, this time co-authored with Hal Brands, Sullivan returns to the notion of the global order as the arena where the contest between China and the United States will be decided. Sullivan and Brands are less worried that the United States might have left its flank in the Pacific vulnerable than with the possibility that China could leap directly to the role of managing and leading the global order. Its efforts came at a time when the United States, during the Trump administration, stepped back from its traditional role as guarantor of the international order. Whoever occupies that role has the critical advantage.
But the critical point is that, according to the authors, China is not tailored for the role: “China may well be less capable of providing global public goods than the United States, both because it is less powerful and because its authoritarian political system makes it harder to exercise the comparatively enlightened, positive-sum leadership that has distinguished U.S. primacy.”
Biden will try to use the “global liberal order” against China. Trump always favored a direct clash, one taking place in a fundamentally anarchic or disordered world. For Biden, world politics still follows an organized set of values and rules. China will be asked to at least pay formal tribute to that order or then be sanctioned in accordance with the rules. Trump of course never cared much about rules. He saw them less as a tool than as an obstacle.
Biden’s approach has two obvious disadvantages. First, it is transformational rather than transactional. Its rationale is to bring about changes in either Chinese behaviour or even the Chinese regime itself. Such changes may be impossible to obtain and their pursuit utopian. Trump was more interested in bringing about changes in the relative balance of power. Despite the chaos and conflict inside the administration, the policy was able to produce some results, as evidenced by the growing difficulties of Huawei and other leading Chinese companies.
In an ideal world China would be subject to genuinely global norms. The question is what the enforcement mechanisms are. Do the United States and its allies still have the ability to bring about the necessary level of compliance with liberal norms? Indeed, the limits to American power have only grown since the Iraq invasion—the global financial crisis and the current pandemic continued the process—and seem increasingly connected to the worldwide diffusion of technological power and the growth of rival economic powers and ideological models. The age of global empires—even a liberal one—may turn out to have been strictly confined in time, dependent on imbalances of technology and knowledge of an inexorably transitory character.
Second, why should you want to tie your own hands? Yes, global liberal order can sometimes be used as a tool to project American power, but it does nonetheless impose constraints on the United States. For example, the outright ban on a Chinese company might be regarded as incompatible with the upholding of certain rules and principles. Forms of economic coercion against allies might be excluded, but without them the United States might not be able to force those allies to reduce economic links with China. Trump did not prima facie exclude any method or tactic, because the contest did not take place under a normative order.
In Beijing, the change will be very much welcome. In fact, it is already being enthused. Just as the new National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan explained in his first public comments about how the new administration will reimagine national security—his list of threats included racial inequality and climate change but not China—an influential Chinese strategist took to the pages of the New York Times to argue that the two countries can both compete and cooperate. Former Secretary of State John Kerry’s appointment as climate envoy was especially applauded by the foreign-policy blob in Beijing. It shows that Washington will be desperate for China’s cooperation on the issue and less able to continue a strategy of active confrontation.
If there is something Chinese strategists regret it is the end of “hide your strength, bide your time,” the guiding philosophy of Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy. According to Deng, what China needed was to be left alone, as it grew stronger both politically and economically, in preparation of the time when it could actively challenge America in each and every dimension of global power. In his 2002 report to the National Congress, General Secretary Jiang Zemin foresaw a “20-year period of strategic opportunity,” during which China would benefit from good relations with the United States, allowing it to concentrate on economic growth and full-scale modernization.” The period was cut short by a few, critical years. Beijing will now be offered a reprieve. “Biden your time.” Not even Deng could have come up with that one.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--The Trump State Department’s Swan Song? A Strange, Flawed China Paper.

The U.S. State Department ’ s new China strategy paper , released on Nov. 20 , brings to mind an old line from British playwright Tom Stoppard : “ It ’ s half as long as Das Kapital and only twice as funny.
” The document is a slog .
It is a mix of a bill of particulars about China ’ s aggressive tactics , often-strained explanations of Marxist-Leninist theory that recall a college political science paper , ideological jingoism , and , ultimately , 10 ideas for what the United States should do going forward—recommendations that are most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The topic of the paper is an urgent one .
The world has , as the Trump administration ’ s 2017 National Security Strategy put it , reentered an age of “ great power competition.
” It is common to talk about relations with Russia and China in this regard , but while Russia ’ s destructive power—both its arsenal of nuclear weapons and Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s penchant for invading neighbors and propping up autocrats—must be taken seriously , the country is a waning power .
China is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing economy and variegated assertions of influence beyond its borders , as well as its revisionist approach to the international order , make it the key actor in precipitating a new era of global competition .
The behavior of China ’ s dictatorial regime and its intended medium-term trajectory are relatively clear .
The response of the world ’ s democracies , and U.S. leadership within that response , is the central geopolitical question of our time .
The State Department paper rightly notes that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump disrupted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach to China since the Richard Nixon era .
That approach was premised on two ideas : first , that the best policy outcome , from a U.S. national interest perspective , was to knit a rising China into the international system ; second , that measured and incremental engagement would—over time—produce that outcome once China saw the benefits of its participation in such a system .
By the end of the Obama administration , rising concern with China ’ s unfair economic practices , Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s increasing repression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s more aggressive international posture had increasingly undermined confidence in this approach .
A new bipartisan consensus emerged relatively quickly : It was time for a different tack .
The Trump administration has indeed brought a change in approach , but , like so much else , its execution has been what can be charitably described as a mess .
To the extent that anyone in the administration has made efforts to identify and lay out a coherent strategy , these have been obscured by Trump ’ s oscillations between , on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and endorsing his use of concentration camps in Xinjiang and , on the other , calling the novel coronavirus the “ China virus ” in an attempt to distract from his own lamentable mismanagement of the pandemic .
While the Trump administration called attention to China ’ s unfair trade policies , it also alienated U.S. allies and launched a unilateral tariff war that led to higher consumer prices in the United States and forced American taxpayers to underwrite tens of billions of dollars of subsidies for the country ’ s farmers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the promised outcomes of the first phase of a trade deal that was supposed to mitigate the damage of the tariff war caused him to downplay the pandemic in the early months of 2020 .
The Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural goods that were supposed to follow that deal didn ’ t happen .
Over at the State Department , Secretary Mike Pompeo went on a jingoistic world tour warning of China ’ s ambitions ; it ’ s hard to point to any partners or allies who have found his vituperative message @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s arms control lead , Marshall Billingslea , went through a mortifying weekslong public song-and-dance in a futile attempt to shame the Chinese into showing up for nuclear arms control negotiations .
They did not , and Billingslea and his team didn ’ t just waste precious time that could have been spent negotiating with the Russians—they also made the United States look pathetic and weak .
It ’ s hard to point to any partners or allies who have found Pompeo ’ s vituperative message illuminating .
Against this backdrop of erratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the administration , the Policy Planning Staff—sometimes referred to as the State Department ’ s internal think tank—released its paper .
Near the beginning , the authors declare that their purpose “ is to step back and take a long-term view , elaborate the elements of the China challenge , and sketch a framework for the fashioning of sturdy policies that stand above bureaucratic squabbles and interagency turf battles and transcend short-term election cycles.
” From the outset , a reader is wont to marvel at their apparent lack of a sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s authors attempt to elaborate a consistent framework for the United States ’ defining geopolitical challenge in the 21st century , all the while working inside an administration whose most salient consistency is its inconsistency .
It is not surprising , therefore , that the paper ’ s recommendations include doing things that the Trump administration has failed to do and advancing policies that Trump himself has repeatedly sabotaged .
For example , the paper ’ s first recommendation is that “ the nation must preserve the Constitutional order.
” Never mind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s futile , ongoing effort to deny that he lost his reelection bid and to sabotage the constitutional transfer of power .
Three of the other report recommendations revolve around the “ rules-based international order ” —shorthand for the international system , designed and underwritten in significant measure by the United States and its allies after World War II , that includes international law , various international institutions and organizations , and the U.S. system of alliances .
The paper ’ s authors call for the United States to strengthen this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alliances to make sure that they are fit for 21st-century purposes .
All well and good , but by any measure Trump has undermined both the universal principles that underpin that order ( by , among other things , cozying up to dictators and human rights abusers ) and the organizations that sustain it ( where U.S. withdrawal from these organizations has , in many cases , created a vacuum that the Chinese are all too happy to exploit ) .
Trump ’ s self-described “ America first ” policy has embraced an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in general , deprioritizes the kind of relationship-building that leads to stable long-term expectations and instead prefers a transactional approach that leverages U.S. power one interaction at a time .
The paper seems , in part , to call for scrapping Trump ’ s misguided approach and instead reassessing and embracing the value of alliances and partnerships .
This is good .
But the way in which the State Department authors talk about the closest U.S. partners raises questions .
Particularly striking was a passage about Europe ( which oddly refers to “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might not be part of the European Union , but while its political arrangements have changed , its geography has not ) .
“ Europe and the UK have emerged as an important front in the strategic competition between the United States and China , ” the authors write .
China , they continue , “ wields its economic power to divide Europe and the UK from the United States and pull European nations and the British toward Beijing.
” Of course , it should be a strategic priority of the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to devise , as much as possible , a shared response to China ’ s behavior .
But this framing does not advance that objective .
Instead , it reifies an unhelpful and increasingly common narrative that depicts Europeans as stuck in the middle of a tug of war between Beijing and Washington .
To buy into that framing is to do the Chinese government ’ s work for it—it would like nothing better than for Europeans to draw an equivalence between the United States and China .
But there is no equivalence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a tug of war—it is the largest group of consolidated , modern , industrialized democracies in the world , and the EU is the second-largest economic actor in the world after the United States .
Washington should not regard European nations as a front in a bipolar struggle but as fellow stewards of the rules-based order .
At the same time , Europeans who say that they don ’ t want to be asked to choose between the United States and China should be reminded that there is , in fact , no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to remain Europeans , they must remain committed to European values , including those of democracy and human rights , and see themselves as part of the global community that will stand in defense of those values .
If Americans are going to find the partners they need in Europe , the United States can not see , or treat , Europe as a battleground or a collection of pawns .
A new report by the Republican majority on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee , chaired by Sen. James Risch , demonstrates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point .
“ Neither side of the Atlantic can respond to the China challenge alone , ” the report states .
“ The only successful path forward is to work together.
” Washington should not regard European nations as a front in a bipolar struggle but as fellow stewards of the rules-based order .
Much of the paper is premised on the idea that Americans do not sufficiently understand the nature of the Chinese government , the ideological underpinnings of the Chinese Communist Party , and the way that these determine the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is no doubt true that U.S. policymakers should seek to develop more nuanced and accurate understandings of China ’ s politics and society in the years to come .
And the State Department paper is , unintentionally , evidence of this dire need .
Its authors assign too much weight to what they alternately call “ Marxist-Leninist ” or “ socialist ” ideology as the ideological underpinning of China ’ s global ambitions .
“ The communism that the CCP professes is more than a mode of authoritarian domestic governance .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ universal society , the ultimate goal of which is to bring about a socialist international order , ” the paper declares .
But today ’ s Chinese Communist Party Central Committee is not made up of revolutionary partisans philosophically committed to the international triumph of the proletariat ; they are the quisling kleptocrats who inherited a repressive regime from the previous two generations and are trying to maintain their grip on power for as long as possible .
In general , their professions of commitment to communism—like their increasingly virulent nationalism—are more of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far more problematic than the way that the paper misunderstands China is the way that it misunderstands the United States , its present challenges , and the likely sources of its future strength .
Three of the paper ’ s recommendations focus on U.S. education with the aim of improving the quality of public servants and citizens .
This section of the report pays appropriate homage to America ’ s founding values , its Constitution , and its institutions—even if it also takes petty swipes .
“ America ’ s grade schools , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colleges and universities have to a dismaying degree abandoned well-rounded presentations of America ’ s founding ideas and constitutional traditions in favor of propaganda aimed at vilifying the nation , ” the authors write with Trumpian flair .
However , the promotion of liberal values is necessary but not sufficient to strengthen the United States in the 21st century .
The paper calls for “ serious study of the history of America ’ s efforts down to the present day to live up to [ principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preservation of a constitution of limited powers.
” It further asserts that “ this will enable American citizens to grasp the nation ’ s interest in maintaining an international order that favors free and sovereign nation-states.
” Really ?
There is no question that there is value in civic education that teaches the nation ’ s history , but to the extent that Americans—and members of other democratic societies—have come to doubt their governments , this can be traced less to the fact that they do not know their history and more to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their present circumstance .
Chinese authoritarianism can not win the era unless the United States forfeits the fight for a more perfect union at home .
Nowhere in the paper can one find a call for resetting U.S. capitalism so that it more closely reflects the free and fair competition that is meant to create the shared benefits of a market economy .
Nowhere does it call for investing in education , health , caregiving , and other aspects of human capital—or in infrastructure and technology so that citizens may contribute to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and be free to engage in the pursuit of happiness in the 21st century .
Nowhere does it highlight how systemic racism is not just a source of injustice but a gross distortion that breeds inefficiency and impairs U.S. moral standing and economic competitiveness .
Nowhere does it identify the need for the United States to best China in the race to transform the sustainability of the economy through innovation and green energy .
Nowhere does it address the collapse of the American middle class , whose strength and productivity led to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies in the last decadeslong geopolitical contest .
Chinese authoritarianism can not win the era unless the United States forfeits the fight for a more perfect union at home .
A strategy for competing with China—or any other authoritarian country—must include not only maintaining sufficient military power and reaffirming the values that underpin a free and democratic society , but also ensuring that democratic societies deliver for citizens better than any other form of government .
The superiority of the democratic model must not only be asserted , it must also be demonstrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ought to see itself not as a solitary superpower curbing the threatening behaviors of an authoritarian behemoth but as the leading member of a community of nations .
And Americans should recognize that in order to prevail , they must maintain not only their military might but also their moral power , as measured by the way in which they uphold—in reality , not just in rhetoric—the equal dignity of individuals .
The State Department ’ s paper can be acknowledged as an attempt to fill a real gap : The United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ framework for understanding the challenge China poses , or a single phrase or term for organizing its response to that challenge .
Axios , which broke the story of the forthcoming paper before its release , reported that it was inspired by the U.S. diplomat George Kennan .
( For a foreign-policy thinker to present themselves as Kennan-esque is a little like a novelist presenting themselves as Tolstoy-esque . )
Kennan ’ s post-World War II era-defining analysis of the Soviet Union still holds up .
Kennan ’ s heirs on the Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parsimony—Kennan ’ s famous “ X ” article was 16 pages , and his equally famous “ Long Telegram ” was 19 pages , while the State Department ’ s China paper contains 50 pages of text and more than 20 of end notes .
What ’ s worse , they have not produced a comprehensive strategic framework , either .

The U.S. State Department’s new China strategy paper , released on Nov. 20, brings to mind an old line from British playwright Tom Stoppard: “It’s half as long as Das Kapital and only twice as funny.” The document is a slog. It is a mix of a bill of particulars about China’s aggressive tactics, often-strained explanations of Marxist-Leninist theory that recall a college political science paper, ideological jingoism, and, ultimately, 10 ideas for what the United States should do going forward—recommendations that are most notable for what they fail to address.
The U.S. State Department’s new China strategy paper, released on Nov. 20, brings to mind an old line from British playwright Tom Stoppard: “It’s half as long as Das Kapital and only twice as funny.” The document is a slog. It is a mix of a bill of particulars about China’s aggressive tactics, often-strained explanations of Marxist-Leninist theory that recall a college political science paper, ideological jingoism, and, ultimately, 10 ideas for what the United States should do going forward—recommendations that are most notable for what they fail to address.
The topic of the paper is an urgent one. The world has, as the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy put it, reentered an age of “great power competition.” It is common to talk about relations with Russia and China in this regard, but while Russia’s destructive power—both its arsenal of nuclear weapons and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s penchant for invading neighbors and propping up autocrats—must be taken seriously, the country is a waning power. China is a waxing one, and its dynamic and growing economy and variegated assertions of influence beyond its borders, as well as its revisionist approach to the international order, make it the key actor in precipitating a new era of global competition. The behavior of China’s dictatorial regime and its intended medium-term trajectory are relatively clear. The response of the world’s democracies, and U.S. leadership within that response, is the central geopolitical question of our time.
The State Department paper rightly notes that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump disrupted what had been a relatively consistent bipartisan approach to China since the Richard Nixon era. That approach was premised on two ideas: first, that the best policy outcome, from a U.S. national interest perspective, was to knit a rising China into the international system; second, that measured and incremental engagement would—over time—produce that outcome once China saw the benefits of its participation in such a system. By the end of the Obama administration, rising concern with China’s unfair economic practices, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s increasing repression and centralization of power, and China’s more aggressive international posture had increasingly undermined confidence in this approach. A new bipartisan consensus emerged relatively quickly: It was time for a different tack.
The Trump administration has indeed brought a change in approach, but, like so much else, its execution has been what can be charitably described as a mess. To the extent that anyone in the administration has made efforts to identify and lay out a coherent strategy, these have been obscured by Trump’s oscillations between, on the one hand, fawning over Xi and endorsing his use of concentration camps in Xinjiang and, on the other, calling the novel coronavirus the “China virus” in an attempt to distract from his own lamentable mismanagement of the pandemic.
While the Trump administration called attention to China’s unfair trade policies, it also alienated U.S. allies and launched a unilateral tariff war that led to higher consumer prices in the United States and forced American taxpayers to underwrite tens of billions of dollars of subsidies for the country’s farmers. Then, Trump’s desperation for the promised outcomes of the first phase of a trade deal that was supposed to mitigate the damage of the tariff war caused him to downplay the pandemic in the early months of 2020. The Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural goods that were supposed to follow that deal didn’t happen. Over at the State Department, Secretary Mike Pompeo went on a jingoistic world tour warning of China’s ambitions; it’s hard to point to any partners or allies who have found his vituperative message illuminating. Meanwhile, the administration’s arms control lead, Marshall Billingslea, went through a mortifying weekslong public song-and-dance in a futile attempt to shame the Chinese into showing up for nuclear arms control negotiations. They did not, and Billingslea and his team didn’t just waste precious time that could have been spent negotiating with the Russians—they also made the United States look pathetic and weak.
It’s hard to point to any partners or allies who have found Pompeo’s vituperative message illuminating.
Against this backdrop of erratic U.S. behavior, in the waning days of the administration, the Policy Planning Staff—sometimes referred to as the State Department’s internal think tank—released its paper. Near the beginning, the authors declare that their purpose “is to step back and take a long-term view, elaborate the elements of the China challenge, and sketch a framework for the fashioning of sturdy policies that stand above bureaucratic squabbles and interagency turf battles and transcend short-term election cycles.” From the outset, a reader is wont to marvel at their apparent lack of a sense of irony.
Undeterred, the paper’s authors attempt to elaborate a consistent framework for the United States’ defining geopolitical challenge in the 21st century, all the while working inside an administration whose most salient consistency is its inconsistency. It is not surprising, therefore, that the paper’s recommendations include doing things that the Trump administration has failed to do and advancing policies that Trump himself has repeatedly sabotaged. For example, the paper’s first recommendation is that “the nation must preserve the Constitutional order.” Never mind that the report was issued weeks into Trump’s futile, ongoing effort to deny that he lost his reelection bid and to sabotage the constitutional transfer of power.
Three of the other report recommendations revolve around the “rules-based international order”—shorthand for the international system, designed and underwritten in significant measure by the United States and its allies after World War II, that includes international law, various international institutions and organizations, and the U.S. system of alliances. The paper’s authors call for the United States to strengthen this international order and to evaluate institutions and alliances to make sure that they are fit for 21st-century purposes. All well and good, but by any measure Trump has undermined both the universal principles that underpin that order (by, among other things, cozying up to dictators and human rights abusers) and the organizations that sustain it (where U.S. withdrawal from these organizations has, in many cases, created a vacuum that the Chinese are all too happy to exploit).
Trump’s self-described “America first” policy has embraced an antiquated approach to international politics that, in general, deprioritizes the kind of relationship-building that leads to stable long-term expectations and instead prefers a transactional approach that leverages U.S. power one interaction at a time. The paper seems, in part, to call for scrapping Trump’s misguided approach and instead reassessing and embracing the value of alliances and partnerships. This is good. But the way in which the State Department authors talk about the closest U.S. partners raises questions.
Particularly striking was a passage about Europe (which oddly refers to “Europe and the UK”—post-Brexit Britain might not be part of the European Union, but while its political arrangements have changed, its geography has not). “Europe and the UK have emerged as an important front in the strategic competition between the United States and China,” the authors write. China, they continue, “wields its economic power to divide Europe and the UK from the United States and pull European nations and the British toward Beijing.”
Of course, it should be a strategic priority of the United States to work with European allies and partners to devise, as much as possible, a shared response to China’s behavior. But this framing does not advance that objective. Instead, it reifies an unhelpful and increasingly common narrative that depicts Europeans as stuck in the middle of a tug of war between Beijing and Washington. To buy into that framing is to do the Chinese government’s work for it—it would like nothing better than for Europeans to draw an equivalence between the United States and China.
But there is no equivalence. Nor is Europe the rope in a tug of war—it is the largest group of consolidated, modern, industrialized democracies in the world, and the EU is the second-largest economic actor in the world after the United States. Washington should not regard European nations as a front in a bipolar struggle but as fellow stewards of the rules-based order. At the same time, Europeans who say that they don’t want to be asked to choose between the United States and China should be reminded that there is, in fact, no choice to make: If they are to remain Europeans, they must remain committed to European values, including those of democracy and human rights, and see themselves as part of the global community that will stand in defense of those values. If Americans are going to find the partners they need in Europe, the United States cannot see, or treat, Europe as a battleground or a collection of pawns. A new report by the Republican majority on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Sen. James Risch, demonstrates a much more robust understanding of this point. “Neither side of the Atlantic can respond to the China challenge alone,” the report states. “The only successful path forward is to work together.”
Washington should not regard European nations as a front in a bipolar struggle but as fellow stewards of the rules-based order.
Much of the paper is premised on the idea that Americans do not sufficiently understand the nature of the Chinese government, the ideological underpinnings of the Chinese Communist Party, and the way that these determine the most pernicious aspects of Chinese government behavior. It is no doubt true that U.S. policymakers should seek to develop more nuanced and accurate understandings of China’s politics and society in the years to come. And the State Department paper is, unintentionally, evidence of this dire need. Its authors assign too much weight to what they alternately call “Marxist-Leninist” or “socialist” ideology as the ideological underpinning of China’s global ambitions. “The communism that the CCP professes is more than a mode of authoritarian domestic governance. It is also a theory of a globe-spanning universal society, the ultimate goal of which is to bring about a socialist international order,” the paper declares. But today’s Chinese Communist Party Central Committee is not made up of revolutionary partisans philosophically committed to the international triumph of the proletariat; they are the quisling kleptocrats who inherited a repressive regime from the previous two generations and are trying to maintain their grip on power for as long as possible. In general, their professions of commitment to communism—like their increasingly virulent nationalism—are more of a means than an end.
But far more problematic than the way that the paper misunderstands China is the way that it misunderstands the United States, its present challenges, and the likely sources of its future strength. Three of the paper’s recommendations focus on U.S. education with the aim of improving the quality of public servants and citizens. This section of the report pays appropriate homage to America’s founding values, its Constitution, and its institutions—even if it also takes petty swipes. “America’s grade schools, middle schools, high schools, and colleges and universities have to a dismaying degree abandoned well-rounded presentations of America’s founding ideas and constitutional traditions in favor of propaganda aimed at vilifying the nation,” the authors write with Trumpian flair.
However, the promotion of liberal values is necessary but not sufficient to strengthen the United States in the 21st century. The paper calls for “serious study of the history of America’s efforts down to the present day to live up to [principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence] … not least through the establishment and preservation of a constitution of limited powers.” It further asserts that “this will enable American citizens to grasp the nation’s interest in maintaining an international order that favors free and sovereign nation-states.” Really? There is no question that there is value in civic education that teaches the nation’s history, but to the extent that Americans—and members of other democratic societies—have come to doubt their governments, this can be traced less to the fact that they do not know their history and more to the fact that they are unsatisfied by their present circumstance.
Chinese authoritarianism cannot win the era unless the United States forfeits the fight for a more perfect union at home.
Nowhere in the paper can one find a call for resetting U.S. capitalism so that it more closely reflects the free and fair competition that is meant to create the shared benefits of a market economy. Nowhere does it call for investing in education, health, caregiving, and other aspects of human capital—or in infrastructure and technology so that citizens may contribute to the national competitiveness of an advanced industrial economy and be free to engage in the pursuit of happiness in the 21st century. Nowhere does it highlight how systemic racism is not just a source of injustice but a gross distortion that breeds inefficiency and impairs U.S. moral standing and economic competitiveness. Nowhere does it identify the need for the United States to best China in the race to transform the sustainability of the economy through innovation and green energy. Nowhere does it address the collapse of the American middle class, whose strength and productivity led to the triumph of the United States and its allies in the last decadeslong geopolitical contest.
Chinese authoritarianism cannot win the era unless the United States forfeits the fight for a more perfect union at home. A strategy for competing with China—or any other authoritarian country—must include not only maintaining sufficient military power and reaffirming the values that underpin a free and democratic society, but also ensuring that democratic societies deliver for citizens better than any other form of government. The superiority of the democratic model must not only be asserted, it must also be demonstrated. And in this quest the United States ought to see itself not as a solitary superpower curbing the threatening behaviors of an authoritarian behemoth but as the leading member of a community of nations. And Americans should recognize that in order to prevail, they must maintain not only their military might but also their moral power, as measured by the way in which they uphold—in reality, not just in rhetoric—the equal dignity of individuals.
The State Department’s paper can be acknowledged as an attempt to fill a real gap: The United States has not yet landed on a framework for understanding the challenge China poses, or a single phrase or term for organizing its response to that challenge. Axios, which broke the story of the forthcoming paper before its release, reported that it was inspired by the U.S. diplomat George Kennan. (For a foreign-policy thinker to present themselves as Kennan-esque is a little like a novelist presenting themselves as Tolstoy-esque.) Kennan’s post-World War II era-defining analysis of the Soviet Union still holds up. Kennan’s heirs on the Policy Planning Staff have certainly not emulated his parsimony—Kennan’s famous “X” article was 16 pages, and his equally famous “Long Telegram” was 19 pages, while the State Department’s China paper contains 50 pages of text and more than 20 of end notes. What’s worse, they have not produced a comprehensive strategic framework, either.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--Biden’s Pentagon Nominee Faces Stiff Challenges

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Biden names Lloyd Austin as nominee for secretary of defense , the White House hosts a vaccine summit , and Liberia goes to the polls .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
According to multiple news reports , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will name Retired Gen. Lloyd Austin as his secretary of defense .
Although hurdles to his confirmation remain , the former Centcom commander would be the first Black person to lead the defense department in U.S. history , should his nomination gain Senate approval .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history-making choice in Michèle Flournoy .
The former Pentagon policy chief had been considered the frontrunner for the position as soon as Biden ’ s victory was confirmed and would have been the first woman in the role .
There is some speculation that Biden ’ s past policy differences with Flournoy were an obstacle , as Michael Hirsh wrote in FP last month .
Although the nomination is historic , it comes with its own set of problems .
Austin ’ s military career is so recent ( he only retired in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Congressional waiver in order to surmount a law barring military officers heading the Pentagon less than 7 years after they have left the service .
Such a waiver has only been granted twice : In 1950 for Gen. George Marshall , who served as Army chief of staff during World War II , and in 2017 , to elevate retired Gen. James Mattis .
The Raytheon problem .
Another significant hurdle , especially from the point of view of the Democratic party ’ s progressive wing , is Austin ’ s post-military career @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of directors of the weapons maker Raytheon ever since he left the military .
The company has recently profited from arms sales to Saudi Arabia and stands to gain further from a $ 23 billion weapons deal with the United Arab Emirates , should it withstand Congressional scrutiny .
Supporters of Flournoy will be quick to point out that her link to defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton was one of the reasons why progressives united to oppose her nomination .
The antiwar group Codepink has since tweeted that it was now “ coming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch report , the choice of Austin may be less about optics and more about relationships ( or at least Biden ’ s long memory ) .
Biden knows Austin from his time as vice president , when he handled the Iraq portfolio during the Obama administration .
Austin then backed Biden ’ s plan to reduce troop numbers in Iraq while Flournoy and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen opposed it .
His management of the Iraq troop drawdown could be useful as Americans tire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the civil-military divide .
Writing in the New York Times , former Biden adviser Jim Golby advises strongly against the nomination of Austin .
“ Even if a retired general like Mr. Mattis was the right person for the Trump era , that era is over , ” Golby writes .
“ A legislative exception granted at an exceptional moment should not become the new rule.
” Writing in Foreign Policy in 2018 , Mara E. Karlin and Alice Hunt Friend argue that the “ gap in civilian and military experiences in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since 9/11 has led to persuasive , persistent , and unrealistic myths that have eroded faith in civilian leadership of defense policy.
” They call on U.S. society to “ build better politics and politicians , not simply outsource nonmilitary roles to military professionals.
” Vaccine summit .
The White House hosts a “ Vaccine Summit ” today in an event largely seen as a means to pressure regulators into approving vaccines that have shown promising results according to internal data .
Representatives from Moderna and Pfizer , the two companies whose vaccines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be in attendance .
The summit comes as a Food and Drug Administration committee meets on Thursday to evaluate Pfizer ’ s vaccine data ahead of possible emergency approval .
On Monday the New York Times reported that the United States will have to wait to get more than the 50 million vaccine doses it has already ordered after it declined an offer to buy more over the summer .
Liberia votes .
Voters go to the polls in Liberia today in midterm elections that could serve as an indicator of support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Democratic Change ( CDC ) .
The CDC faces competition from the Collaborating Political Parties coalition ( CPP ) , opposition parties who have unified to oppose the Weah ’ s government .
Voters will also cast their ballots in referendums on eight constitutional modifications , including on presidential term limits and the right to dual citizenship .
Ghana results .
Ghanaians are awaiting the results of Monday ’ s presidential election in which incumbent President Nana Addo Akufo-Addo faced off against John Mahama , a former president , along with 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Akufo-Addo promised to accept the verdict of the voters no matter the outcome and electoral authorities have predicted a result within 24 hours of polls closing .
Writing in Foreign Policy on Dec. 3 , Noble Kofi Nazzah explained why the former leader Jerry Rawlings , who died last month , still looms large over Ghanaian politics .
Tightening the Belt ( and Road ) .
China has dramatically cut its overseas lending in two of its major development banks , in a sign of shifting priorities .
Data compiled by Boston @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times , shows lending from the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China plummeted from a high of $ 75 billion in 2016 to just $ 4 billion in 2019 .
Kevin Gallagher , director of the Boston University Global Development Policy Center , says the drop may be due to the uncertainties caused by the U.S.-China trade war .
Sporting diplomacy .
A member of Abu Dhabi ’ s ruling family has bought a 50 percent stake in Israeli Premier League soccer team Beitar Jerusalem , a club known for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israeli team never to sign an Arab player .
( The team ’ s notoriously racist fan group “ La Familia ” —historically known for chanting “ Death to Arabs ” in the stands—also recently opposed the signing of a player named Ali Mohamed , until it emerged that Mohamed was actually a devout Christian . )
As part of the deal , Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Nahyan plans to invest roughly $ 92 million into the club over the next ten years and his son will join the club ’ s board @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the new arrangement is an attempt to recast the club ’ s image .
“ Our message is that we are all equal , ” Hogeg said .
“ We want to show to young kids that we are all equal and that we can work and do beautiful things together.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Biden names Lloyd Austin as nominee for secretary of defense, the White House hosts a vaccine summit, and Liberia goes to the polls.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Biden names Lloyd Austin as nominee for secretary of defense, the White House hosts a vaccine summit, and Liberia goes to the polls.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Biden Nominates Ex-General To Lead Pentagon
According to multiple news reports, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden will name Ret. Gen. Lloyd Austin as his secretary of defense. Although hurdles to his confirmation remain, the former Centcom commander would be the first Black person to lead the defense department in U.S. history, should his nomination gain Senate approval.
The choice of Austin edges out another potentially history-making choice in Michèle Flournoy. The former Pentagon policy chief had been considered the frontrunner for the position as soon as Biden’s victory was confirmed and would have been the first woman in the role. There is some speculation that Biden’s past policy differences with Flournoy were an obstacle, as FP’s Michael Hirsh wrote last month.
Although the nomination is historic, it comes with its own set of problems. Austin’s military career is so recent (he only retired in 2016) that he would need a congressional waiver in order to surmount a law barring military officers heading the Pentagon less than 7 years after they have left the service. Such a waiver has only been granted twice: In 1950 for Gen. George Marshall, who served as Army chief of staff during World War II, and in 2017, to elevate Ret. Gen. James Mattis.
The Raytheon problem. Another significant hurdle, especially from the point of view of the Democratic party’s progressive wing, is Austin’s post-military career. He has served on the board of directors of the weapons maker Raytheon ever since he left the military. The company has recently profited from arms sales to Saudi Arabia and stands to gain further from a $23 billion weapons deal with the United Arab Emirates, should it withstand congressional scrutiny.
Supporters of Flournoy will be quick to point out that her link to defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton was one of the reasons why progressives united to oppose her nomination. The antiwar group Codepink has since tweeted that it was now “coming for” Austin.
As my colleagues Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch report, the choice of Austin may be less about optics and more about relationships (or at least Biden’s long memory). Biden knows Austin from his time as vice president, when he handled the Iraq portfolio during the Obama administration. Austin then backed Biden’s plan to reduce troop numbers in Iraq while Flournoy and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen opposed it. His management of the Iraq troop drawdown could be useful as Americans tire of so-called forever wars.
A challenge to the civil-military divide. Writing in the New York Times, former Biden advisor Jim Golby advises strongly against the nomination of Austin. “Even if a retired general like Mr. Mattis was the right person for the Trump era, that era is over,” Golby writes. “A legislative exception granted at an exceptional moment should not become the new rule.”
Writing in Foreign Policy in 2018, Mara E. Karlin and Alice Hunt Friend argue that the “gap in civilian and military experiences in the United States over the 17 years since 9/11 has led to persuasive, persistent, and unrealistic myths that have eroded faith in civilian leadership of defense policy.” They call on U.S. society to “build better politics and politicians, not simply outsource nonmilitary roles to military professionals.”
What We’re Following Today
Vaccine summit. The White House hosts a “Vaccine Summit” today, an event largely seen as a means to pressure regulators into approving vaccines that have shown promising results according to internal data. Representatives from Moderna and Pfizer, the two companies whose vaccines have shown the most promise, will not be in attendance. The summit comes as a Food and Drug Administration committee meets on Thursday to evaluate Pfizer’s vaccine data ahead of possible emergency approval. On Monday the New York Times reported that the United States will have to wait to get more than the 50 million vaccine doses it has already ordered after it declined an offer to buy more over the summer.
Liberia votes. Voters go to the polls in Liberia today in midterm elections that could serve as an indicator of support for President George Weah and his Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC). The CDC faces competition from the Collaborating Political Parties coalition (CPP), opposition parties who have unified to oppose the Weah’s government. Voters will also cast their ballots in referendums on eight constitutional modifications, including on presidential term limits and the right to dual citizenship.
Ghana results. Ghanaians are awaiting the results of Monday’s presidential election in which incumbent President Nana Addo Akufo-Addo faced off against John Mahama, a former president, along with 10 other candidates. On Dec. 4, President Akufo-Addo promised to accept the verdict of the voters no matter the outcome and electoral authorities have predicted a result within 24 hours of polls closing. Writing in Foreign Policy on Dec. 3, Noble Kofi Nazzah explained why the former leader Jerry Rawlings, who died last month, still looms large over Ghanaian politics.
Keep an Eye On Boris to Brussels. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will travel to Brussels to meet in-person with European Commission Chief Ursula von der Leyen in an attempt to salvage Brexit talks. It has not been confirmed when Johnson will make the journey, although Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney said Wednesday Dec. 9 is the expected deadline for negotiators.
Tightening the Belt (and Road). China has dramatically cut its overseas lending in two of its major development banks, in a sign of shifting priorities. Data compiled by Boston University researchers and reported in the Financial Times, shows lending from the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China plummeted from a high of $75 billion in 2016 to just $4 billion in 2019. Kevin Gallagher, the director of the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, says the drop may be due to the uncertainties caused by the U.S.-China trade war.
Sporting diplomacy. A member of Abu Dhabi’s ruling family has bought a 50 percent stake in Israeli Premier League soccer team Beitar Jerusalem, a club known for its right-wing fanbase and as the only Israeli team never to sign an Arab player. (The team’s notoriously racist fan group La Familia—historically known for chanting “Death to Arabs” in the stands—also recently opposed the signing of a player named Ali Mohamed, until it emerged that Mohamed was actually a devout Christian.)
As part of the deal, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Nahyan plans to invest roughly $92 million into the club over the next ten years and his son will join the club’s board of directors. Co-owner Moshe Hogeg, said the new arrangement is an attempt to recast the club’s image. “Our message is that we are all equal,” Hogeg said. “We want to show to young kids that we are all equal and that we can work and do beautiful things together.”
Odds and Ends The son of Farkhad Akhmedov, a Russian oligarch, has claimed to have lost $50 million pursuing “risky” trades while a student at the London School of Economics. The loss of the princely sum is the subject of the United Kingdom’s largest divorce case. Tatiana Akhmedova is suing her son Temur as she believes that he conspired to shield his father’s assets. Temur’s attorney, Robert Levy, tried to play down the apparent disappearance of the funds in a legal filing. “That the sums were astronomical is nothing to the point,” Levy said. “Some of the extremely rich lavish their children with unimaginable sums. That is what Farkhad and Tatiana did during their marriage.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-08--Biden to Name Former General as Defense Secretary

Biden to Name Former General as Defense Secretary This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
President-elect Joe Biden is edging toward choosing retired U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Lloyd Austin to serve as his defense secretary in a surprise pick that would mark the first time a Black person has been tapped to run the Pentagon , several people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
Austin appeared to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contest for the job with former Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy—who was seen as the initial front-runner for the job—and former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson , another Black contender who was backed by members of the Congressional Black Caucus .
Biden ’ s inclination to choose Austin was first reported by Politico on Monday .
He told reporters earlier today that he intended to announce the pick on Friday .
Biden informed Austin of his choice on Sunday , according to a person familiar with the matter .
One factor that tipped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was his relationship with the president-elect going back about a decade , the person said .
As vice president , Biden got to know Austin during countless hours in the situation room , particularly when the general led Centcom .
Austin—who has been out of the military for less than five years—would need a waiver from Congress to serve in the role due to regulations protecting civilian control of the military , a move that has typically been considered extraordinary in U.S. history .
Only two former generals before Austin have been granted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Staff George Marshall , picked to lead the agency during the Truman administration , and James Mattis , whom President Donald Trump chose as his defense secretary four years after he stepped down as head of Centcom .
Flournoy , a favorite among many in the Democratic foreign-policy establishment , would have been the first female secretary of defense had Biden selected her for the post .
While she was widely seen as the favored candidate for the job during the campaign , in recent weeks the Biden transition team has faced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party .
Progressive groups signaled opposition to Flournoy over her role in U.S. military interventions in Libya and the Middle East in prior government positions , as well as her ties to the defense industry once she left government .
Flournoy served on the board of directors of Booz Allen Hamilton and also co-founded the consulting firm WestExec Advisors .
But Austin may not help the Biden team ’ s optics on that front either .
He is currently on the board of directors at Raytheon—a major defense contractor and a leading manufacturer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria , and Yemen .
Choosing Austin would also call into question Biden ’ s pledge of gender diversity in his cabinet .
“ For women in the field , who heard the president-elect promise to appoint a gender-balanced national security team , it ’ s a slap in the face , ” a former defense official in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations told Foreign Policy .
“ The Democratic field should be proud of the huge bench of diverse civilian leadership it can field at all levels .
What made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ general ?
” “ When I see a retired general who is statutorily ineligible for the role nominated for the most important job in national security , it is hard for me to feel like the natsec glass ceiling for women is anything but impossible , ” the former defense official added .
Lawmakers and other Biden political allies have also pressured the president-elect to tap more people of color for top administration posts .
Some members of the powerful Congressional Black Caucus ( CBC ) , including its chair , Democratic Rep. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pushed for Austin .
But other members of the CBC endorsed Flournoy for the role .
Having Austin in the job would also raise concerns among some security experts who were already worried about the direction of civil-military relations at the Pentagon under Trump .
When Mattis served as Trump ’ s defense secretary , some civilians felt cut out of key military and policy decisions .
In the Democrats ’ 2020 platform , the party promised to help fix the state of civil-military relations , which they saw as badly damaged under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden ’ s presidential campaign voiced disappointment that he had selected a former general for the job given this issue .
“ I just don ’ t see how tapping another retired general is acceptable , ” one expert , speaking on condition of anonymity , told Foreign Policy .
But Biden enjoys a shared history with his defense pick that may have helped influence the decision .
When Biden pushed to draw down troops from Iraq while vice president , Flournoy , then Pentagon policy chief , and then-Chairman of the Joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea .
Austin did not .
A West Point graduate who served in elite Army units including the 82nd Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division , Austin worked his way up the ranks to the top echelons of the U.S. military during his four decades of service , retiring as a four-star general .
Austin served as the commander of U.S. Central Command overseeing all U.S. military operations in the Middle East from 2013 to 2016 , including when the Islamic State first surged to power and took over large parts of Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign drew some criticism , when he admitted in Congress in 2015 that a $ 500 million budget to train Syrian rebels had turned out only four or five fighters .
But during that time , he also drew accolades for helping form and coordinate a global alliance , comprised of dozens of countries , against the Islamic State .
Austin , whose top postings were in the Middle East , would be tasked with leading a Pentagon that is now largely focused on strategic competition with China .
It ’ s not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ congressional scrutiny .
Numerous progressive foreign-policy experts said Congress should not grant a waiver for Austin or any other retired general or admiral .
Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed , a Democrat , has previously said he would refuse another waiver for a recently retired military officer , and three Democrats who are still in the Senate previously voted against Mattis ’ s waiver and confirmation .
But unlike several of Biden ’ s other cabinet picks , Austin did not draw immediate criticism from Senate Republicans , whose support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the GOP retains control of the Senate .
One progressive advocate who spoke to Foreign Policy said this would not necessarily be viewed as a win for the left wing of the party .
“ This is more about personal views Biden had about Flournoy , not being comfortable with her and not being able to turn to Jeh [ Johnson ] , ” the person said .
“ So that left him with Austin , who CBC was also lobbying for.
” But other progressives celebrated the decision .
“ Civilian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Austin ’ s record shows that he ’ s more likely to achieve the intent of that principle , as he is respected for keeping a low profile and following the direction of elected officials , ” said Erik Sperling , the executive director of Just Foreign Policy and a former congressional staffer .
“ Progressives should prefer that to a longtime Pentagon official who promoted interventionism at every key moment in the past two decades and has opaque ties to defense contractors and foreign regimes , ” he said , referring to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monday , House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith , a Democrat , said he had pushed the Biden team to strongly consider Flournoy as the pick .

President-elect Joe Biden is edging toward choosing retired U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Lloyd Austin to serve as his defense secretary in a surprise pick that would mark the first time a Black person has been tapped to run the Pentagon, several people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
President-elect Joe Biden is edging toward choosing retired U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Lloyd Austin to serve as his defense secretary in a surprise pick that would mark the first time a Black person has been tapped to run the Pentagon, several people familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
Austin appeared to gain a late edge in a three-way contest for the job with former Pentagon policy chief Michèle Flournoy—who was seen as the initial front-runner for the job—and former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, another Black contender who was backed by members of the Congressional Black Caucus.
Biden’s inclination to choose Austin was first reported by Politico on Monday. He told reporters earlier today that he intended to announce the pick on Friday.
Biden informed Austin of his choice on Sunday, according to a person familiar with the matter. One factor that tipped the scales in Austin’s favor was his relationship with the president-elect going back about a decade, the person said. As vice president, Biden got to know Austin during countless hours in the situation room, particularly when the general led Centcom.
Austin—who has been out of the military for less than five years—would need a waiver from Congress to serve in the role due to regulations protecting civilian control of the military, a move that has typically been considered extraordinary in U.S. history. Only two former generals before Austin have been granted such leeway: former U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, picked to lead the agency during the Truman administration, and James Mattis, whom President Donald Trump chose as his defense secretary four years after he stepped down as head of Centcom.
Flournoy, a favorite among many in the Democratic foreign-policy establishment, would have been the first female secretary of defense had Biden selected her for the post. While she was widely seen as the favored candidate for the job during the campaign, in recent weeks the Biden transition team has faced pushback from the left wing of the party. Progressive groups signaled opposition to Flournoy over her role in U.S. military interventions in Libya and the Middle East in prior government positions, as well as her ties to the defense industry once she left government.
Flournoy served on the board of directors of Booz Allen Hamilton and also co-founded the consulting firm WestExec Advisors. But Austin may not help the Biden team’s optics on that front either. He is currently on the board of directors at Raytheon—a major defense contractor and a leading manufacturer of smart bombs used in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Choosing Austin would also call into question Biden’s pledge of gender diversity in his cabinet. “For women in the field, who heard the president-elect promise to appoint a gender-balanced national security team, it’s a slap in the face,” a former defense official in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations told Foreign Policy. “The Democratic field should be proud of the huge bench of diverse civilian leadership it can field at all levels. What made it necessary to turn to a retired general?”
“When I see a retired general who is statutorily ineligible for the role nominated for the most important job in national security, it is hard for me to feel like the natsec glass ceiling for women is anything but impossible,” the former defense official added.
Lawmakers and other Biden political allies have also pressured the president-elect to tap more people of color for top administration posts. Some members of the powerful Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), including its chair, Democratic Rep. Karen Bass, and other Democratic lawmakers pushed for Austin. But other members of the CBC endorsed Flournoy for the role.
Having Austin in the job would also raise concerns among some security experts who were already worried about the direction of civil-military relations at the Pentagon under Trump. When Mattis served as Trump’s defense secretary, some civilians felt cut out of key military and policy decisions. In the Democrats’ 2020 platform, the party promised to help fix the state of civil-military relations, which they saw as badly damaged under Trump. Several foreign-policy experts who advised Biden’s presidential campaign voiced disappointment that he had selected a former general for the job given this issue. “I just don’t see how tapping another retired general is acceptable,” one expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Foreign Policy.
But Biden enjoys a shared history with his defense pick that may have helped influence the decision. When Biden pushed to draw down troops from Iraq while vice president, Flournoy, then Pentagon policy chief, and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen opposed the idea. Austin did not.
A West Point graduate who served in elite Army units including the 82nd Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division, Austin worked his way up the ranks to the top echelons of the U.S. military during his four decades of service, retiring as a four-star general.
Austin served as the commander of U.S. Central Command overseeing all U.S. military operations in the Middle East from 2013 to 2016, including when the Islamic State first surged to power and took over large parts of Iraq and Syria. His management of that campaign drew some criticism, when he admitted in Congress in 2015 that a $500 million budget to train Syrian rebels had turned out only four or five fighters. But during that time, he also drew accolades for helping form and coordinate a global alliance, comprised of dozens of countries, against the Islamic State.
Austin, whose top postings were in the Middle East, would be tasked with leading a Pentagon that is now largely focused on strategic competition with China.
It’s not clear how Austin would hold up under congressional scrutiny. Numerous progressive foreign-policy experts said Congress should not grant a waiver for Austin or any other retired general or admiral. Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed, a Democrat, has previously said he would refuse another waiver for a recently retired military officer, and three Democrats who are still in the Senate previously voted against Mattis’s waiver and confirmation. But unlike several of Biden’s other cabinet picks, Austin did not draw immediate criticism from Senate Republicans, whose support during the confirmation process could be crucial if the GOP retains control of the Senate.
One progressive advocate who spoke to Foreign Policy said this would not necessarily be viewed as a win for the left wing of the party. “This is more about personal views Biden had about Flournoy, not being comfortable with her and not being able to turn to Jeh [Johnson],” the person said. “So that left him with Austin, who CBC was also lobbying for.”
But other progressives celebrated the decision. “Civilian control of the military is important. Austin’s record shows that he’s more likely to achieve the intent of that principle, as he is respected for keeping a low profile and following the direction of elected officials,” said Erik Sperling, the executive director of Just Foreign Policy and a former congressional staffer.
“Progressives should prefer that to a longtime Pentagon official who promoted interventionism at every key moment in the past two decades and has opaque ties to defense contractors and foreign regimes,” he said, referring to Flournoy.
In a press call on Monday, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, a Democrat, said he had pushed the Biden team to strongly consider Flournoy as the pick.