foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--In Rare Unanimity, Biden Could Double Down on Trump’s Uighur Sanctions

In Rare Unanimity , Biden Could Double Down on Trump ’ s Uighur Sanctions Forced labor has gotten new attention as part of China ’ s horrific repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang , which also includes cultural genocide , imprisonment , and torture .
A number of investigations and reports from the region have shed light on state-sponsored forced-labor camps , with the number of camps only growing with time .
Numbers are hard to come by , but human rights organizations estimate that up to 1.5 million Uighurs , Kazakhs , and other Turkic minorities are being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ camps across Xinjiang .
The beneficiaries of China ’ s abysmal human rights abuses include a long list of companies operating in the region , many of them suppliers to Western corporations .
A report issued by the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China in March included a list of companies “ suspected of directly employing forced labor or sourcing from suppliers that are suspected of using forced labor , ” including Adidas , Coca-Cola , Costco , H & M , Kraft Heinz , Nike , and Patagonia .
With human rights in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which there is bipartisan agreement in the United States , the U.S. House of Representatives in September passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act with almost unanimous support .
Both bills seek to address the growing use of forced labor in global supply chains .
While the first would require U.S.-based companies to provide quarterly reports of operations in the Xinjiang region , the second would expose companies to criminal proceedings should forced labor be found in their supply chains .
Given growing concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President-elect Joe Biden ’ s promise to give human rights greater weight in U.S. foreign policy—eradicating forced labor from the U.S. market may be one of the few issues where Biden could build directly on the outgoing administration ’ s work .
In June , President Donald Trump signed the Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 , which targets Chinese government officials deemed to be responsible for human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region .
Soon after taking effect , the act was applied in July to impose sanctions on Xinjiang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For companies manufacturing in or importing from China , human rights violations could soon turn into a major operational , legal , and financial risk .
While sanctions targeting Chinese officials do not seem to alter Beijing ’ s stance on human rights , there are other measures Washington has been taking on Chinese forced labor .
U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP ) has been swiftly issuing a number of so-called withhold release orders to U.S. companies importing from the Xinjiang region .
These orders halt any imports into the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe the products were produced with forced labor .
And on Oct. 20 , , CBP issued its first finding on forced labor since 1996 , targeting stevia production from China .
This was a significant step , since such a finding requires conclusive evidence that forced labor is involved , while a withhold release order only requires reasonable belief .
As of this writing , 13 such orders have been issued to importers .
One of them , PureCircle , entered into a $ 575,000 settlement with CBP earlier this year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , CBP will play a pivotal role in targeting the private sector , and a substantial increase in these orders can be expected .
For U.S. and other Western companies manufacturing in or importing from China , human rights violations in the country could thus turn out to be a major risk—not just reputational but also operational , legal , and financial .
That may be one reason why Apple and other companies are reported to have lobbied against Xinjiang-related forced labor legislation on Capitol Hill .
Human rights in China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where the outgoing administration has been engaging the international community , despite its focus over the past four years on undermining international institutions and their mandates .
In a far from traditional stance , the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act includes a provision on the determination of whether crimes against humanity or genocide are being committed in Xinjiang .
The United States has had a complicated relationship with the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) —where such crimes are tried—since long before Trump took office .
In 2000 , then-President Bill Clinton signed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the agreement was never submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification .
President George W. Bush then withdrew Clinton ’ s signature .
This would put the U.S. government in the delicate position of condemning crimes determined by a court whose jurisdiction it does not recognize .
If the Senate passes the bills , it would create a truly peculiar precedent .
Previous attempts to include wording on human rights from the Rome Statute in U.S. legislation have failed—such as the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2010 , which never received a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genocide ” shows up in Section 1091 of the U.S. Code , the words “ crimes against humanity ” are nowhere to be seen .
In March , the congressional report on forced labor included two pages highlighting how China ’ s systematic abuses resulted in crimes against humanity , thus showing continued faith by legislators in the international legal framework on these crimes despite the United States not being a party to it .
Unintentionally , the U.S.-Chinese conflict may have progressed Washington ’ s stance on international criminal and human rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-Chinese trade war has unintentionally progressed Washington ’ s stance on international criminal and human rights law .
Although the motives behind forced-labor legislation likely include hurting China economically , the bills take a human rights-based approach .
While many rightfully argue that the outgoing administration has been soft on human rights and a perennial violator of international agreements , the conflict with China has led the United States to use forced labor and human rights violations as a sword against Beijing .
The incoming Biden administration seems to prioritize human rights and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions , and it can be expected to promote the respect of international law .
Besides obvious steps such as rejoining the Paris climate agreement , Biden can further bolster the U.S. position in the international arena by effectively being the lead nation in condemning human rights abuses in China .
It would not be difficult to take this priority one step further and start condemning and targeting other countries for their abuses as well , not just China in Xinjiang .
The effects would be felt worldwide , not just by U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a greater willingness to sanction corporations than most other countries , the U.S. government has already steered foreign and domestic companies away from operating in Xinjiang .
This is especially the case with the current regulations , which allow CBP to presume importers to be guilty until they prove otherwise .
While the two House bills are likely to become law , the big question is whether “ crimes against humanity ” will be included in the final versions ’ wording .
The current bills both contain references to “ the international community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States as a human rights advocate , even if the legislation is myopically focused on China instead of covering forced labor on a global scale .
It may be a little too optimistic to see the terminology included in the new legislation—and the new administration ’ s emphasis on human rights—as a sign of Washington ’ s readiness to embrace international criminal law .
But views do evolve over time , and there is no reason to believe they can ’ t change in the United States as well .
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost two decades since Bush withdrew U.S. support for the ICC .

Forced labor has gotten new attention as part of China’s horrific repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang, which also includes cultural genocide, imprisonment, and torture. A number of investigations and reports from the region have shed light on state-sponsored forced-labor camps, with the number of camps only growing with time. Numbers are hard to come by, but human rights organizations estimate that up to 1.5 million Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic minorities are being detained in as many as 1,000 concentration camps across Xinjiang.
Forced labor has gotten new attention as part of China’s horrific repression of its Uighur minority in Xinjiang, which also includes cultural genocide, imprisonment, and torture. A number of investigations and reports from the region have shed light on state-sponsored forced-labor camps, with the number of camps only growing with time. Numbers are hard to come by, but human rights organizations estimate that up to 1.5 million Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic minorities are being detained in as many as 1,000 concentration camps across Xinjiang.
The beneficiaries of China’s abysmal human rights abuses include a long list of companies operating in the region, many of them suppliers to Western corporations. A report issued by the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China in March included a list of companies “suspected of directly employing forced labor or sourcing from suppliers that are suspected of using forced labor,” including Adidas, Coca-Cola, Costco, H&M, Kraft Heinz, Nike, and Patagonia.
With human rights in China one of the few topics on which there is bipartisan agreement in the United States, the U.S. House of Representatives in September passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act with almost unanimous support. Both bills seek to address the growing use of forced labor in global supply chains. While the first would require U.S.-based companies to provide quarterly reports of operations in the Xinjiang region, the second would expose companies to criminal proceedings should forced labor be found in their supply chains.
Given growing concern and agreement across the aisle—as well as President-elect Joe Biden’s promise to give human rights greater weight in U.S. foreign policy—eradicating forced labor from the U.S. market may be one of the few issues where Biden could build directly on the outgoing administration’s work. In June, President Donald Trump signed the Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, which targets Chinese government officials deemed to be responsible for human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Soon after taking effect, the act was applied in July to impose sanctions on Xinjiang’s Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo.
For companies manufacturing in or importing from China, human rights violations could soon turn into a major operational, legal, and financial risk.
While sanctions targeting Chinese officials do not seem to alter Beijing’s stance on human rights, there are other measures Washington has been taking on Chinese forced labor. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been swiftly issuing a number of so-called withhold release orders to U.S. companies importing from the Xinjiang region. These orders halt any imports into the United States if CBP has reason to believe the products were produced with forced labor. And on Oct. 20,, CBP issued its first finding on forced labor since 1996, targeting stevia production from China. This was a significant step, since such a finding requires conclusive evidence that forced labor is involved, while a withhold release order only requires reasonable belief. As of this writing, 13 such orders have been issued to importers. One of them, PureCircle, entered into a $575,000 settlement with CBP earlier this year. Should the two new congressional bills become law, CBP will play a pivotal role in targeting the private sector, and a substantial increase in these orders can be expected.
For U.S. and other Western companies manufacturing in or importing from China, human rights violations in the country could thus turn out to be a major risk—not just reputational but also operational, legal, and financial. That may be one reason why Apple and other companies are reported to have lobbied against Xinjiang-related forced labor legislation on Capitol Hill.
Human rights in China has also been one of the few issues where the outgoing administration has been engaging the international community, despite its focus over the past four years on undermining international institutions and their mandates. In a far from traditional stance, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act includes a provision on the determination of whether crimes against humanity or genocide are being committed in Xinjiang. The United States has had a complicated relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC)—where such crimes are tried—since long before Trump took office. In 2000, then-President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, but the agreement was never submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. President George W. Bush then withdrew Clinton’s signature. This would put the U.S. government in the delicate position of condemning crimes determined by a court whose jurisdiction it does not recognize.
If the Senate passes the bills, it would create a truly peculiar precedent. Previous attempts to include wording on human rights from the Rome Statute in U.S. legislation have failed—such as the Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2010, which never received a vote. And while the term “genocide” shows up in Section 1091 of the U.S. Code, the words “crimes against humanity” are nowhere to be seen. In March, the congressional report on forced labor included two pages highlighting how China’s systematic abuses resulted in crimes against humanity, thus showing continued faith by legislators in the international legal framework on these crimes despite the United States not being a party to it.
Unintentionally, the U.S.-Chinese conflict may have progressed Washington’s stance on international criminal and human rights law.
Many have wondered whether the U.S.-Chinese trade war has unintentionally progressed Washington’s stance on international criminal and human rights law. Although the motives behind forced-labor legislation likely include hurting China economically, the bills take a human rights-based approach. While many rightfully argue that the outgoing administration has been soft on human rights and a perennial violator of international agreements, the conflict with China has led the United States to use forced labor and human rights violations as a sword against Beijing.
The incoming Biden administration seems to prioritize human rights and reestablishing relations with foreign governments and international institutions, and it can be expected to promote the respect of international law. Besides obvious steps such as rejoining the Paris climate agreement, Biden can further bolster the U.S. position in the international arena by effectively being the lead nation in condemning human rights abuses in China. It would not be difficult to take this priority one step further and start condemning and targeting other countries for their abuses as well, not just China in Xinjiang.
The effects would be felt worldwide, not just by U.S. corporations. With strong customs laws and a greater willingness to sanction corporations than most other countries, the U.S. government has already steered foreign and domestic companies away from operating in Xinjiang. This is especially the case with the current regulations, which allow CBP to presume importers to be guilty until they prove otherwise.
While the two House bills are likely to become law, the big question is whether “crimes against humanity” will be included in the final versions’ wording. The current bills both contain references to “the international community,” signaling an attempt to portray the United States as a human rights advocate, even if the legislation is myopically focused on China instead of covering forced labor on a global scale. It may be a little too optimistic to see the terminology included in the new legislation—and the new administration’s emphasis on human rights—as a sign of Washington’s readiness to embrace international criminal law. But views do evolve over time, and there is no reason to believe they can’t change in the United States as well. After all, it’s now been almost two decades since Bush withdrew U.S. support for the ICC.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Biden Shouldn’t Backtrack on Cuba

Biden Shouldn’t Backtrack on Cuba

As President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office , all signals point to a change in U.S. policy on Cuba .
On the campaign trail , Biden enthusiastically indicated that he would pursue an opening with the dictatorship to reverse course on four years of sanctions under U.S. President Donald Trump .
Trump ’ s policies undid much of the work of the Obama administration to break the long-standing stalemate between the United States and Cuba , such as normalizing relations with the Castro dictatorship , offering concessions , and working closely with Cuban officials to restart economic and diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should reconsider the wisdom of jumping headfirst into another slog to normalize ties with the longtime U.S. foe .
Over the last four years , Cuba ’ s intransigence on human rights domestically and the destructive role it plays beyond its borders have become undeniable .
Meanwhile , far more pressing challenges than U.S.-Cuba relations now face the region , even as arguments for the broader diplomatic benefits of showering Havana with concessions are failing the test of time .
In many ways , the Obama administration prioritized its opening with Havana at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crises .
As U.S. negotiators secured agreements with Havana on issues like oceanic conservation and commercial air travel , the last vestiges of democracy were unraveling in Venezuela and Nicaragua , coca production in Colombia was skyrocketing , and widespread corruption was festering beneath the surface of the region ’ s most apparently stable democracies .
In 2015 , the first year after the announced normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba , nearly a quarter of the State Department ’ s Western Hemisphere press releases focused on Cuba , while just 6 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also the sole destination of one of three trips Secretary of State John Kerry made to the region that year , the other two revolving around international conferences .
The Biden administration must now face the ramifications of these and other pressing challenges , including the COVID-19 pandemic and the worst economic crisis in decades .
Add to that broader geopolitical challenges , such as rising Chinese influence , and Latin America holds no shortage of urgent issues that require active U.S. engagement .
The case for prioritizing another round of normalization with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flurry of high-level negotiations and engagement , is thin , especially after Havana largely flouted U.S. terms by reversing its opening for the island ’ s nascent private sector , continuing its widespread human-rights abuses , and ramping up its support for the authoritarian Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela—all before Trump walked back most key U.S. concessions .
At the same time , the Trump administration ’ s track record in the region largely disproves optimistic predictions about the broader benefits of engaging Cuba .
Proponents for normalizing relations with Havana often argue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ sanctions on Cuba prevented Washington from building deeper relationships with the rest of Latin America .
Biden echoed this sentiment earlier this year , saying that normalization “ is more than about Cuba , it ’ s about all of the Caribbean and it ’ s about all of our friends and allies in Latin America.
” However , the argument that a friendly stance toward Havana is essential to a productive relationship with Latin America has not fared well .
Despite ramping the pressure back up on Cuba , the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ range of issues , including the coordinated diplomatic effort to isolate Venezuela ’ s authoritarian regime .
The administration even successfully encouraged Brazil , Bolivia , and Ecuador to cut off Cuba ’ s overseas medical missions , a key source of revenue for Havana which exploits the labor of Cuban doctors abroad by forcing them to work under arrangements reminiscent of human trafficking .
The administration ’ s active engagement with Latin America is not isolated to right-of-center leaders already hostile toward Havana .
Even Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s regime on multiple occasions , has had little to say about the issue in its dealings with the United States .
Indeed , Lopéz Obrador has maintained a highly active bilateral relationship with the United States and with Trump personally .
In Ecuador , the Trump administration has had laudable success in winning over President Lenín Moreno , the chosen successor and former vice president to the pro-Cuba leftist strongman , former President Rafael Correa .
Even before the Trump presidency , a shift on Cuba began to materialize in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Organization of American States ( OAS ) .
There , in the space of less than a decade , member-states went from actively paving the road for Cuba ’ s restored OAS membership to largely dropping that initiative and pushing ally Venezuela out of the international organization .
Secretary General Luis Almagro is an outspoken critic of the Cuban dictatorship , even accepting human-rights awards from Cuban dissident groups—something his predecessors had declined to do .
These shifts in the region are not merely the result of Trump ’ s lobbying of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region ’ s political leadership .
Rather , Havana ’ s role in supporting the Venezuelan regime ’ s repression has taken a significant toll on the region ’ s historical goodwill and tolerance for Cuba .
It was not lost on many in Latin America that , as Washington negotiated accords with the Cuban dictatorship to combat drug trafficking , Havana fortified its support for Venezuela ’ s narco-dictatorship , propping up institutions that violently crush the Venezuelan people and sparked an unprecedented refugee crisis last year .
However , perhaps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders ’ turn on Cuba is the end of booming economic times in the region and the rise of multiple severe crises .
In many ways , for Latin America ’ s political class , using Cuba as a pretext for limiting engagement with Washington was largely a luxury of booming economies .
With the end of the commodity boom , though , those days are drifting further and further away , and with them , much of the willingness to discard opportunities for economic and political engagement with the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders , even some with a friendly disposition toward the Cuban dictatorship like those in Mexico and Ecuador , have far too much to worry about to jeopardize mutually beneficial U.S. engagement .
Of course , some highly ideological leaders in the region will continue to rebuff the United States and raise the issue of Cuba in doing so , but deeper bilateral irritants often exist in those cases .
There is little doubt that , for most of the region ’ s leaders and populations , it is far more urgent for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and energies into a plan for hemispheric economic recovery , nearshoring of supply chains , environmental protection , and facilitating access to an effective COVID-19 vaccine , than return to another series of negotiations and unrequited concessions with the dictatorship in Havana .
All this does not mean that the United States should ignore Cuba , or cease pressing the dictatorship to respect human rights and release its stranglehold over the island ’ s nascent private sector .
Instead , it means sending a clear message to Havana that the rest of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda of shared prosperity , and the United States will not bend over backwards in a bid to get Cuba ’ s repressive regime to come along .
In the coming weeks and months , Biden and his team will have to make important decisions about its priorities in Latin America .
The events of the last several years—and especially 2020—should make those clear .

As President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office, all signals point to a change in U.S. policy on Cuba. On the campaign trail, Biden enthusiastically indicated that he would pursue an opening with the dictatorship to reverse course on four years of sanctions under U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump’s policies undid much of the work of the Obama administration to break the long-standing stalemate between the United States and Cuba, such as normalizing relations with the Castro dictatorship, offering concessions, and working closely with Cuban officials to restart economic and diplomatic relations.
As President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office, all signals point to a change in U.S. policy on Cuba. On the campaign trail, Biden enthusiastically indicated that he would pursue an opening with the dictatorship to reverse course on four years of sanctions under U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump’s policies undid much of the work of the Obama administration to break the long-standing stalemate between the United States and Cuba, such as normalizing relations with the Castro dictatorship, offering concessions, and working closely with Cuban officials to restart economic and diplomatic relations.
Yet Biden’s team should reconsider the wisdom of jumping headfirst into another slog to normalize ties with the longtime U.S. foe. Over the last four years, Cuba’s intransigence on human rights domestically and the destructive role it plays beyond its borders have become undeniable. Meanwhile, far more pressing challenges than U.S.-Cuba relations now face the region, even as arguments for the broader diplomatic benefits of showering Havana with concessions are failing the test of time.
In many ways, the Obama administration prioritized its opening with Havana at the expense of addressing more pressing regional crises. As U.S. negotiators secured agreements with Havana on issues like oceanic conservation and commercial air travel, the last vestiges of democracy were unraveling in Venezuela and Nicaragua, coca production in Colombia was skyrocketing, and widespread corruption was festering beneath the surface of the region’s most apparently stable democracies. In 2015, the first year after the announced normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba, nearly a quarter of the State Department’s Western Hemisphere press releases focused on Cuba, while just 6 percent centered on Venezuela. The island was also the sole destination of one of three trips Secretary of State John Kerry made to the region that year, the other two revolving around international conferences.
The Biden administration must now face the ramifications of these and other pressing challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the worst economic crisis in decades. Add to that broader geopolitical challenges, such as rising Chinese influence, and Latin America holds no shortage of urgent issues that require active U.S. engagement. The case for prioritizing another round of normalization with Cuba, which would involve a new flurry of high-level negotiations and engagement, is thin, especially after Havana largely flouted U.S. terms by reversing its opening for the island’s nascent private sector, continuing its widespread human-rights abuses, and ramping up its support for the authoritarian Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela—all before Trump walked back most key U.S. concessions.
At the same time, the Trump administration’s track record in the region largely disproves optimistic predictions about the broader benefits of engaging Cuba. Proponents for normalizing relations with Havana often argue that regional disapproval of the United States’ sanctions on Cuba prevented Washington from building deeper relationships with the rest of Latin America. Biden echoed this sentiment earlier this year, saying that normalization “is more than about Cuba, it’s about all of the Caribbean and it’s about all of our friends and allies in Latin America.”
However, the argument that a friendly stance toward Havana is essential to a productive relationship with Latin America has not fared well. Despite ramping the pressure back up on Cuba, the Trump administration actively engaged the region on a range of issues, including the coordinated diplomatic effort to isolate Venezuela’s authoritarian regime. The administration even successfully encouraged Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador to cut off Cuba’s overseas medical missions, a key source of revenue for Havana which exploits the labor of Cuban doctors abroad by forcing them to work under arrangements reminiscent of human trafficking.
The administration’s active engagement with Latin America is not isolated to right-of-center leaders already hostile toward Havana. Even Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador, who expressed solidarity and support for Cuba’s regime on multiple occasions, has had little to say about the issue in its dealings with the United States. Indeed, Lopéz Obrador has maintained a highly active bilateral relationship with the United States and with Trump personally. In Ecuador, the Trump administration has had laudable success in winning over President Lenín Moreno, the chosen successor and former vice president to the pro-Cuba leftist strongman, former President Rafael Correa.
Even before the Trump presidency, a shift on Cuba began to materialize in the region’s premier diplomatic body, the Organization of American States (OAS). There, in the space of less than a decade, member-states went from actively paving the road for Cuba’s restored OAS membership to largely dropping that initiative and pushing ally Venezuela out of the international organization. Secretary General Luis Almagro is an outspoken critic of the Cuban dictatorship, even accepting human-rights awards from Cuban dissident groups—something his predecessors had declined to do.
These shifts in the region are not merely the result of Trump’s lobbying of Latin American leaders or even churn in the region’s political leadership. Rather, Havana’s role in supporting the Venezuelan regime’s repression has taken a significant toll on the region’s historical goodwill and tolerance for Cuba. It was not lost on many in Latin America that, as Washington negotiated accords with the Cuban dictatorship to combat drug trafficking, Havana fortified its support for Venezuela’s narco-dictatorship, propping up institutions that violently crush the Venezuelan people and sparked an unprecedented refugee crisis last year.
However, perhaps the most crucial factor in Latin American leaders’ turn on Cuba is the end of booming economic times in the region and the rise of multiple severe crises. In many ways, for Latin America’s political class, using Cuba as a pretext for limiting engagement with Washington was largely a luxury of booming economies. With the end of the commodity boom, though, those days are drifting further and further away, and with them, much of the willingness to discard opportunities for economic and political engagement with the United States.
Simply put, Latin America’s leaders, even some with a friendly disposition toward the Cuban dictatorship like those in Mexico and Ecuador, have far too much to worry about to jeopardize mutually beneficial U.S. engagement. Of course, some highly ideological leaders in the region will continue to rebuff the United States and raise the issue of Cuba in doing so, but deeper bilateral irritants often exist in those cases. There is little doubt that, for most of the region’s leaders and populations, it is far more urgent for the Biden administration to invest its time and energies into a plan for hemispheric economic recovery, nearshoring of supply chains, environmental protection, and facilitating access to an effective COVID-19 vaccine, than return to another series of negotiations and unrequited concessions with the dictatorship in Havana.
All this does not mean that the United States should ignore Cuba, or cease pressing the dictatorship to respect human rights and release its stranglehold over the island’s nascent private sector. Instead, it means sending a clear message to Havana that the rest of the Western Hemisphere is moving forward toward an agenda of shared prosperity, and the United States will not bend over backwards in a bid to get Cuba’s repressive regime to come along.
In the coming weeks and months, Biden and his team will have to make important decisions about its priorities in Latin America. The events of the last several years—and especially 2020—should make those clear.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--How China Is Buying Up the West’s High-Tech Sector

How China Is Buying Up the West ’ s High-Tech Sector Over the last few years , Western governments and parliaments have ramped up efforts to try to limit the opportunities for companies from certain countries ( read : China ) to buy up their most innovative firms .
The United Kingdom is strengthening its laws curtailing foreign acquisitions , as is Sweden .
France , Germany , and Italy have already done so .
In October this year , the European Union ’ s foreign direct investment screening mechanism became fully operational .
But such laws against foreign purchases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
China taps into start-ups long before they ’ re mature enough to be acquired .
To be sure , the new laws are important .
In Sweden , for example , between 2014 and 2019 , Chinese buyers acquired 51 Swedish firms and bought minority stakes in 14 additional ones .
The acquisitions also included some 100 subsidiaries .
Most worrisome , in 2018 , Chinese outfits—two of them linked to the military—bought three cutting-edge Swedish semiconductor start-ups .
In 2017 , Imagination—a top British chipmaker—was acquired by a firm owned by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , a Chinese firm bought the leading German industrial robot-maker , Kuka .
But acquisitions are only one part of Chinese involvement in Western countries ’ most innovative firms .
At the Cambridge Science Park , which is owned by the University of Cambridge and home to some 120 cutting-edge tech firms , the United Kingdom ’ s first private 5G network is about to be launched .
The two firms behind the network are Cambridge-based Cambridge Wireless and Huawei , the Chinese telecommunications giant .
Despite being banned by the British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s 5G network , the firm is jointly building and deploying the 5G network .
In a statement last month , Simon Mead , Cambridge Wireless ’ s CEO , said in a statement , “ We invite ambitious businesses to get involved and through this exciting 3-year partnership with Huawei , we will support their 5G innovation journey.
” Considering the phenomenal concentration of tech innovation taking place at Cambridge Science Park , and the fact that the British government has excluded Huawei from national public 5G efforts over security concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private 5G network is going ahead .
But since the network is private , it ’ s not illegal .
Huawei is far from the only Chinese entity tapping into the advanced tech being developed in Cambridge .
Perhaps even more worrisome are the Chinese venture-capital firms energetically scouting out the best ideas .
Huawei , for example , works with TusPark UK—the British branch of Tsinghua University ’ s globe-spanning Science Park network—to “ accelerate the digitalisation of The Cambridge Science Park and enable businesses to exploit new capabilities , boost innovation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ towards the adoption of 5G.
” At events in Cambridge and Oxford , the U.K. ’ s other tech innovation hub , start-ups are regularly invited to pitch their ideas to Chinese venture-capital firms .
A recent pitch session was combined with a conference that featured a talk from the master of a Cambridge college and other sessions on “ Cambridge and the Silk Road ” and “ The Cambridge Cluster and China Opportunities.
” As Wei Meng , a Tsinghua graduate with a Ph.D. from Cambridge who is TusPark UK ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newspaper reporting on the event , “ Chinese investors and market are more ready than ever before to work with U.K. businesses .
Innovative approaches of collaboration are invented more frequently.
” Meanwhile , material for an upcoming pitching session advises start-ups wishing to apply for meetings with venture-capital firms that “ the Chinese investors are particularly interested in talking to emerging BioTech , IoT , AI and AgriTech companies.
” The first three—biotechnology , the Internet of Things , and artificial intelligence—are part of China ’ s Made in China 2025 strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is similar in Silicon Valley .
Puhua Capital , one of the Chinese investment firms most active in the United Kingdom ( among its investments are the medical technology firms Perspectum and Congenica ) is also a major funder of start-ups in the Californian high-tech scene .
Danhua Capital , a Palo Alto-based venture-capital firm backed by the Chinese government , has dozens of U.S. start-ups in its portfolio .
According to a 2018 report by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative , by Nov. 15 that year , 151 venture-capital investments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one Chinese investor , up from fewer than 20 in 2010 .
Los Altos-based TSVC , formerly known as TEEC ( Tsinghua Entrepreneur & Executive Club ) , which was jointly launched by the municipal government of Shenzhen and Tsinghua University , has invested in nearly 200 tech start-ups .
But public investments by Chinese venture-capital groups in Western companies are only the visible tip of an iceberg .
Chinese entities also invest in Western start-ups through Western firms , in which they participate as limited partners .
Those limited partnerships allow the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology in which they invest without having their names touted anywhere in the process .
They may not get full say in the form of any given technology , as would be the case if they publicly acquired a company , but the access to the firm and a say in its strategy—especially at the early venture-capital stage—is highly attractive .
Here ’ s the challenge for Western governments : Because these firms are not obliged to disclose their limited partners , nobody knows how many Western start-ups have received Chinese venture-capital funding—much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more worrisome is the fact that the limited partners may well be connected to the Chinese government .
According to a 2018 Reuters investigation , no fewer than 20 Silicon Valley venture-capital firms have Chinese limited partners linked to Chinese government entities .
Limited-partner funding may , in fact , be booming well beyond what Reuters has established .
The United States ’ Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act , passed two years ago , makes it much more difficult for Chinese venture-capital firms to invest in cutting-edge tech—but it doesn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yuan and Art Dicker , a Silicon Valley-based entrepreneur and an investor , respectively , noted in an article last year , the best option for Chinese-backed funds “ is to essentially not be Chinese.
” Under the new law , they explained , “ even if 100 % of the limited partner investors in a fund are Chinese , if the general partners of the fund are US citizens and fully empowered with discretion to make all investment decisions on their own , the fund is considered a US fund .
To @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cambridge , Silicon Valley , and beyond benefit from the Chinese cash—and , by extension , so does the broader economy .
But at what price ?
If the United States and Europe hand over access to their most innovative sectors to their competitors , they have only themselves to blame when they lose the race .
The West urgently needs to regulate foreign venture-capital funding .
Crucially , that includes obliging investors to disclose their limited partners .
Meanwhile , because start-ups will still need venture capital , Western governments could ramp @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the CIA-affiliated In-Q-Tel does for innovation relevant to the agency .
Last month , Lithuania ’ s Ministry of Defense launched what amounts to a small venture-capital fund .
Similarly , the United Kingdom ’ s two-year-old National Security Strategic Investment Fund also operates as a small venture-capital outfit .
Meanwhile , in close cooperation with the British and Australian governments , In-Q-Tel has opened offices in the fellow Five Eyes nations .
NATO is even rumored to be working on its own venture-capital arm .
Margrethe Vestager , the EU ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ member governments invest in key firms at risk of being acquired by entities from outside countries , especially China .
And in the realm of traditional investments , this month the Pentagon is launching Trusted Capital Marketplace , which will match “ cleared investors ” —investors without ties to countries such as China and Russia—with U.S. aerospace and defense companies in need of cash As with any venture-capital investments , many projects will fail while others will be commercially successful .
As the successful ones underwrite the failed ones , it would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practice for national security .

Over the last few years, Western governments and parliaments have ramped up efforts to try to limit the opportunities for companies from certain countries (read: China) to buy up their most innovative firms. The United Kingdom is strengthening its laws curtailing foreign acquisitions, as is Sweden . France, Germany, and Italy have already done so. In October this year, the European Union’s foreign direct investment screening mechanism became fully operational . But such laws against foreign purchases of Western firms may come too late. China taps into start-ups long before they’re mature enough to be acquired.
Over the last few years, Western governments and parliaments have ramped up efforts to try to limit the opportunities for companies from certain countries (read: China) to buy up their most innovative firms. The United Kingdom is strengthening its laws curtailing foreign acquisitions, as is Sweden. France, Germany, and Italy have already done so. In October this year, the European Union’s foreign direct investment screening mechanism became fully operational. But such laws against foreign purchases of Western firms may come too late. China taps into start-ups long before they’re mature enough to be acquired.
To be sure, the new laws are important. In Sweden, for example, between 2014 and 2019, Chinese buyers acquired 51 Swedish firms and bought minority stakes in 14 additional ones. The acquisitions also included some 100 subsidiaries. Most worrisome, in 2018, Chinese outfits—two of them linked to the military—bought three cutting-edge Swedish semiconductor start-ups. In 2017, Imagination—a top British chipmaker—was acquired by a firm owned by a state-controlled Chinese investment outfit. Before that, a Chinese firm bought the leading German industrial robot-maker, Kuka.
But acquisitions are only one part of Chinese involvement in Western countries’ most innovative firms. At the Cambridge Science Park, which is owned by the University of Cambridge and home to some 120 cutting-edge tech firms, the United Kingdom’s first private 5G network is about to be launched. The two firms behind the network are Cambridge-based Cambridge Wireless and Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant. Despite being banned by the British government from providing equipment for the country’s 5G network, the firm is jointly building and deploying the 5G network. In a statement last month, Simon Mead, Cambridge Wireless’s CEO, said in a statement, “We invite ambitious businesses to get involved and through this exciting 3-year partnership with Huawei, we will support their 5G innovation journey.”
Considering the phenomenal concentration of tech innovation taking place at Cambridge Science Park, and the fact that the British government has excluded Huawei from national public 5G efforts over security concerns, it’s odd that the private 5G network is going ahead. But since the network is private, it’s not illegal.
Huawei is far from the only Chinese entity tapping into the advanced tech being developed in Cambridge. Perhaps even more worrisome are the Chinese venture-capital firms energetically scouting out the best ideas. Huawei, for example, works with TusPark UK—the British branch of Tsinghua University’s globe-spanning Science Park network—to “accelerate the digitalisation of The Cambridge Science Park and enable businesses to exploit new capabilities, boost innovation and gain competitive advantage as they shift towards the adoption of 5G.”
At events in Cambridge and Oxford, the U.K.’s other tech innovation hub, start-ups are regularly invited to pitch their ideas to Chinese venture-capital firms. A recent pitch session was combined with a conference that featured a talk from the master of a Cambridge college and other sessions on “Cambridge and the Silk Road” and “The Cambridge Cluster and China Opportunities.” As Wei Meng, a Tsinghua graduate with a Ph.D. from Cambridge who is TusPark UK’s head of innovation, told a local newspaper reporting on the event, “Chinese investors and market are more ready than ever before to work with U.K. businesses. Innovative approaches of collaboration are invented more frequently.” Meanwhile, material for an upcoming pitching session advises start-ups wishing to apply for meetings with venture-capital firms that “the Chinese investors are particularly interested in talking to emerging BioTech, IoT, AI and AgriTech companies.” The first three—biotechnology, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence—are part of China’s Made in China 2025 strategy for economic superpower status.
The situation is similar in Silicon Valley. Puhua Capital, one of the Chinese investment firms most active in the United Kingdom (among its investments are the medical technology firms Perspectum and Congenica) is also a major funder of start-ups in the Californian high-tech scene. Danhua Capital, a Palo Alto-based venture-capital firm backed by the Chinese government, has dozens of U.S. start-ups in its portfolio. According to a 2018 report by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, by Nov. 15 that year, 151 venture-capital investments into U.S. start-ups had featured at least one Chinese investor, up from fewer than 20 in 2010. Los Altos-based TSVC, formerly known as TEEC (Tsinghua Entrepreneur & Executive Club), which was jointly launched by the municipal government of Shenzhen and Tsinghua University, has invested in nearly 200 tech start-ups.
But public investments by Chinese venture-capital groups in Western companies are only the visible tip of an iceberg. Chinese entities also invest in Western start-ups through Western firms, in which they participate as limited partners. Those limited partnerships allow the Chinese entities to get access to the technology in which they invest without having their names touted anywhere in the process. They may not get full say in the form of any given technology, as would be the case if they publicly acquired a company, but the access to the firm and a say in its strategy—especially at the early venture-capital stage—is highly attractive.
Here’s the challenge for Western governments: Because these firms are not obliged to disclose their limited partners, nobody knows how many Western start-ups have received Chinese venture-capital funding—much less what those start-ups are. Even more worrisome is the fact that the limited partners may well be connected to the Chinese government. According to a 2018 Reuters investigation, no fewer than 20 Silicon Valley venture-capital firms have Chinese limited partners linked to Chinese government entities.
Limited-partner funding may, in fact, be booming well beyond what Reuters has established. The United States’ Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, passed two years ago, makes it much more difficult for Chinese venture-capital firms to invest in cutting-edge tech—but it doesn’t apply to limited partners. As Sabrina Yuan and Art Dicker, a Silicon Valley-based entrepreneur and an investor, respectively, noted in an article last year, the best option for Chinese-backed funds “is to essentially not be Chinese.” Under the new law, they explained, “even if 100% of the limited partner investors in a fund are Chinese, if the general partners of the fund are US citizens and fully empowered with discretion to make all investment decisions on their own, the fund is considered a US fund.
To be sure, start-ups in Oxford, Cambridge, Silicon Valley, and beyond benefit from the Chinese cash—and, by extension, so does the broader economy. But at what price? If the United States and Europe hand over access to their most innovative sectors to their competitors, they have only themselves to blame when they lose the race.
The West urgently needs to regulate foreign venture-capital funding. Crucially, that includes obliging investors to disclose their limited partners. Meanwhile, because start-ups will still need venture capital, Western governments could ramp up their own investment, just like the CIA-affiliated In-Q-Tel does for innovation relevant to the agency. Last month, Lithuania’s Ministry of Defense launched what amounts to a small venture-capital fund. Similarly, the United Kingdom’s two-year-old National Security Strategic Investment Fund also operates as a small venture-capital outfit.
Meanwhile, in close cooperation with the British and Australian governments, In-Q-Tel has opened offices in the fellow Five Eyes nations. NATO is even rumored to be working on its own venture-capital arm. Margrethe Vestager, the EU’s competition commissioner, has proposed that EU member governments invest in key firms at risk of being acquired by entities from outside countries, especially China. And in the realm of traditional investments, this month the Pentagon is launching Trusted Capital Marketplace, which will match “cleared investors”—investors without ties to countries such as China and Russia—with U.S. aerospace and defense companies in need of cash
As with any venture-capital investments, many projects will fail while others will be commercially successful. As the successful ones underwrite the failed ones, it would be a good business for the taxpayer—and good practice for national security.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Progressives Target Biden Cabinet Picks

Progressives Target Biden Cabinet Picks

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Progressives weigh their strategy on U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s cabinet picks , President Donald Trump threatens to veto major defense legislation , and Democrats vote for a new House Foreign Affairs chairman .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
A big tent of progressive foreign-policy groups led by the Center for International Policy , Win Without War , Common Defense , and Matt Duss , a top advisor to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ call on Wednesday to map out their strategy to influence President-elect Joe Biden ’ s remaining cabinet picks .
The call , first reported by Politico , showed two clear trends , according to organizers and participants .
Progressives are not opposing Michèle Flournoy , the leading contender to be Biden ’ s defense secretary—but they are dead set against Michael Morrell , who has been floated as a possible pick to lead the CIA .
Though a handful of far-left organizations oppose Flournoy , who turned down the top Pentagon job during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , other groups are not taking a position .
Instead , progressive groups are reportedly trying to push Flournoy , who started the consulting firm WestExec Advisors with Antony Blinken , Biden ’ s Secretary of State pick , to reveal her client lists and to recuse herself from weapons programs with firms she has ties to .
But some participants in the call focused their attention on preventing Morrell , a staunch defender of drone warfare and a critic of the Senate ’ s findings on CIA torture , from becoming the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Times reported on Wednesday that Biden was considering David Cohen , a former CIA deputy director and Treasury Department official seen as less connected to controversial post-9/11 programs .
“ He was a quick study on complex issues when onboarding as [ deputy director ] , ” said Douglas London , a retired 34-year veteran of the CIA ’ s clandestine service who worked with Cohen at both CIA and Treasury .
“ I found him open-minded , inclusive , someone who asked smart questions and provided support when you made a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanting to do the right thing.
” Other names on the list of contenders for the job included Morrell , former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson ( also a contender for defense secretary ) , former Obama counterterrorism advisor Lisa Monaco , former top Pentagon intelligence official and CIA paramilitary officer Michael Vickers , former Defense Intelligence Agency director Ret .
Gen. Vincent Stewart , and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon .
Meanwhile , some progressives are setting their sights on sub-cabinet positions , with organizers of Wednesday ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of potential progressive appointees for roles on the Biden administration ’ s national security team that will be vetted and circulated by left-wing groups .
Breaking the piggy bank .
After months of painstaking negotiations in Congress , Trump is threatening to veto the $ 740 billion Department of Defense authorization bill unless it repeals a decades-old law—which would strip social media companies ’ legal protections from perceived content violations , as FP ’ s Jack Detsch reports .
The official line White House is that it is concerned with Chinese and Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the threat dovetails with complaints by Trump and other conservatives that their posts have been banned or flagged for spreading false or misleading information .
Congress could overturn a potential presidential veto with a two-thirds vote in each chamber , though lawmakers have yet to overturn a Trump veto .
Going on the offensive .
Taking a page out of the U.S. Cyber Command playbook , Britain is investing heavily in its offensive cyber capabilities under the auspices of its National Cyber Force , part of broader reforms to the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Debating how cyber capabilities will alter warfare is all the rage among Western security officials these days .
But former senior British defense and intelligence officials still question whether offensive cyber capabilities have any deterrent effect .
They also have raised concerns that adversaries could identify and reverse engineer offensive cyber capabilities , as when North Korea may have reused U.S. National Security Agency hacking tools in ransomware attacks in 2017 .
Cleaning the boards .
In the latest example of the Trump administration taking parting shots at the foreign-policy establishment , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s White House liaison , Joshua Whitehouse , told employees last week that top figures on the Defense Policy Board , a top outside federal advisory panel to the Pentagon , had been ousted .
Those removed included former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright .
Hat tip to Zack Cooper at the American Enterprise Institute , who flagged the changes made to the Pentagon ’ s website for the board .
One update from last week : Former Treasury official David McCormick , once a contender for Pentagon chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The post-election election .
The Democratic caucus is expected to cast votes on Thursday for the new chairman of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee .
As we reported this week , an unusually competitive and public three-way race for the gavel reflects broader debates in the party over what it should stand for on foreign policy .
Rep. Gregory Meeks , a centrist , is heavily favored to win the gavel , but progressive challenger Rep. Joaquin Castro hasn ’ t given up the fight .
If Meeks wins , he would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committee ’ s nearly 200-year history .
And on the GOP side .
Rep. Michael McCaul was selected as the Republican leader in the House Foreign Affairs Committee again .
McCaul has been a vocal proponent of the Trump administration ’ s hawkish policies toward China .
Top contenders for Biden ’ s USAID chief .
Experts in Biden ’ s foreign policy circles tell Foreign Policy that the president-elect is narrowing down a list of top candidates to head the U.S. Agency for International Development .
The list of leading humanitarian experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the former U.N. World Food Program chief ; Liz Schrayer , head of the U.S .
Global Leadership Coalition ; former senior U.S. diplomat Frederick Barton ; and former USAID official and Biden transition team member Jeremy Konyndyk .
Back again .
A controversial Trump appointee at USAID , Pete Marocco , has quietly returned to a senior leadership post at the agency two months after he took a leave of absence following allegations of mismanagement and hostility toward his employees , as we reported on Tuesday .
Got a tip about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Get in touch with Jack ( jack.detsch @ foreignpolicy.com ) or Robbie ( robbie.gramer @ foreignpolicy.com ) .
“ We believe that now after 20 years—two decades—of consistent effort there , we ’ ve achieved a modicum of success.
” —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley at a think tank event on Wednesday , on what the United States has achieved in Afghanistan , with nearly $ 1 trillion spent “ A lie , a leak , and then a liability.
” NBC ’ s Carol Lee has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Flynn ’ s brief , chaotic tenure as Trump ’ s national security advisor in the early days of the administration .
Trump announced earlier this month he would pardon Flynn , who remains one of his most ardent supporters—this week backing calls for Trump to implement martial law to reverse the outcome of the Nov. 3 vote .
Flynn pleaded guilty twice to charges of lying to the FBI over conversations with the Russian ambassador to the United States in 2016 .
Trump ’ s executive order banning TikTok in the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 4 .
Tuesday , Dec. 8 , is the deadline for U.S. states to determine final results for the November elections .
Wonksteros .
David Cohen , the new reported favorite to be Joe Biden ’ s pick to lead the CIA , was once an extra in an episode of HBO ’ s Game of Thrones .
Don ’ t believe us ?
See for yourself .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos @ @ @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief.
What’s on tap today: Progressives weigh their strategy on U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s cabinet picks, President Donald Trump threatens to veto major defense legislation, and Democrats vote for a new House Foreign Affairs chairman.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Progressives, Moderates Move Toward Truce on Biden Nominees
A big tent of progressive foreign-policy groups led by the Center for International Policy, Win Without War, Common Defense, and Matt Duss, a top advisor to Sen. Bernie Sanders, organized a phone call on Wednesday to map out their strategy to influence President-elect Joe Biden’s remaining cabinet picks.
The call, first reported by Politico, showed two clear trends, according to organizers and participants. Progressives are not opposing Michèle Flournoy, the leading contender to be Biden’s defense secretary—but they are dead set against Michael Morrell, who has been floated as a possible pick to lead the CIA.
Though a handful of far-left organizations oppose Flournoy, who turned down the top Pentagon job during the Obama administration due to family matters, other groups are not taking a position. Instead, progressive groups are reportedly trying to push Flournoy, who started the consulting firm WestExec Advisors with Antony Blinken, Biden’s Secretary of State pick, to reveal her client lists and to recuse herself from weapons programs with firms she has ties to.
But some participants in the call focused their attention on preventing Morrell, a staunch defender of drone warfare and a critic of the Senate’s findings on CIA torture, from becoming the nominee for CIA chief. The New York Times reported on Wednesday that Biden was considering David Cohen, a former CIA deputy director and Treasury Department official seen as less connected to controversial post-9/11 programs.
“He was a quick study on complex issues when onboarding as [deputy director],” said Douglas London, a retired 34-year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service who worked with Cohen at both CIA and Treasury. “I found him open-minded, inclusive, someone who asked smart questions and provided support when you made a good case. He struck me as wanting to do the right thing.”
Other names on the list of contenders for the job included Morrell, former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson (also a contender for defense secretary), former Obama counterterrorism advisor Lisa Monaco, former top Pentagon intelligence official and CIA paramilitary officer Michael Vickers, former Defense Intelligence Agency director Ret. Gen. Vincent Stewart, and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon.
Meanwhile, some progressives are setting their sights on sub-cabinet positions, with organizers of Wednesday’s call floating more than 120 names of potential progressive appointees for roles on the Biden administration’s national security team that will be vetted and circulated by left-wing groups.
What We’re Watching
Breaking the piggy bank. After months of painstaking negotiations in Congress, Trump is threatening to veto the $740 billion Department of Defense authorization bill unless it repeals a decades-old law—which would strip social media companies’ legal protections from perceived content violations, as FP’s Jack Detsch reports.
The official line White House is that it is concerned with Chinese and Russian disinformation on social media platforms. But the threat dovetails with complaints by Trump and other conservatives that their posts have been banned or flagged for spreading false or misleading information. Congress could overturn a potential presidential veto with a two-thirds vote in each chamber, though lawmakers have yet to overturn a Trump veto.
Going on the offensive. Taking a page out of the U.S. Cyber Command playbook, Britain is investing heavily in its offensive cyber capabilities under the auspices of its National Cyber Force, part of broader reforms to the country’s defensive capabilities, as the Economist reports. Debating how cyber capabilities will alter warfare is all the rage among Western security officials these days. But former senior British defense and intelligence officials still question whether offensive cyber capabilities have any deterrent effect.
They also have raised concerns that adversaries could identify and reverse engineer offensive cyber capabilities, as when North Korea may have reused U.S. National Security Agency hacking tools in ransomware attacks in 2017.
Cleaning the boards. In the latest example of the Trump administration taking parting shots at the foreign-policy establishment, Foreign Policy first reported that Defense Department’s White House liaison, Joshua Whitehouse, told employees last week that top figures on the Defense Policy Board, a top outside federal advisory panel to the Pentagon, had been ousted.
Those removed included former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright. Hat tip to Zack Cooper at the American Enterprise Institute, who flagged the changes made to the Pentagon’s website for the board. One update from last week: Former Treasury official David McCormick, once a contender for Pentagon chief, will stay on the board.
Movers and Shakers
The post-election election. The Democratic caucus is expected to cast votes on Thursday for the new chairman of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee. As we reported this week, an unusually competitive and public three-way race for the gavel reflects broader debates in the party over what it should stand for on foreign policy.
Rep. Gregory Meeks, a centrist, is heavily favored to win the gavel, but progressive challenger Rep. Joaquin Castro hasn’t given up the fight. If Meeks wins, he would be the first Black chairman in the committee’s nearly 200-year history.
And on the GOP side. Rep. Michael McCaul was selected as the Republican leader in the House Foreign Affairs Committee again. McCaul has been a vocal proponent of the Trump administration’s hawkish policies toward China.
Top contenders for Biden’s USAID chief. Experts in Biden’s foreign policy circles tell Foreign Policy that the president-elect is narrowing down a list of top candidates to head the U.S. Agency for International Development. The list of leading humanitarian experts and former senior officials includes Ertharin Cousin, the former U.N. World Food Program chief; Liz Schrayer, head of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition; former senior U.S. diplomat Frederick Barton; and former USAID official and Biden transition team member Jeremy Konyndyk.
Back again. A controversial Trump appointee at USAID, Pete Marocco, has quietly returned to a senior leadership post at the agency two months after he took a leave of absence following allegations of mismanagement and hostility toward his employees, as we reported on Tuesday.
Got a tip about recent Trump administration firings or the transition? Get in touch with Jack (jack.detsch@foreignpolicy.com) or Robbie (robbie.gramer@foreignpolicy.com).
Quote of the Week
“We believe that now after 20 years—two decades—of consistent effort there, we’ve achieved a modicum of success.”
—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley at a think tank event on Wednesday, on what the United States has achieved in Afghanistan, with nearly $1 trillion spent
Foreign Policy Recommends
“A lie, a leak, and then a liability.” NBC’s Carol Lee has a richly detailed insider account of Michael Flynn’s brief, chaotic tenure as Trump’s national security advisor in the early days of the administration. Trump announced earlier this month he would pardon Flynn, who remains one of his most ardent supporters—this week backing calls for Trump to implement martial law to reverse the outcome of the Nov. 3 vote.
Flynn pleaded guilty twice to charges of lying to the FBI over conversations with the Russian ambassador to the United States in 2016.
The Week Ahead
Trump’s executive order banning TikTok in the United States takes effect on Friday, Dec. 4.
Tuesday, Dec. 8, is the deadline for U.S. states to determine final results for the November elections.
The Nobel Prize ceremony takes place on Thursday, Dec. 10.
Odds and Ends
Wonksteros. David Cohen, the new reported favorite to be Joe Biden’s pick to lead the CIA, was once an extra in an episode of HBO’s Game of Thrones. Don’t believe us? See for yourself.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Kamala Harris Taps Ex-Diplomat to Be Her National Security Advisor

Kamala Harris Taps Ex-Diplomat to Be Her National Security Advisor This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
U.S. Vice President-elect Kamala Harris has tapped a former senior foreign service officer to serve as her national security advisor , the latest diplomat to join the incoming administration as President-elect Joe Biden and Harris build out their national security team .
Her pick for the job , Nancy McEldowney , served in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including posts as U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria , director of the State Department ’ s Foreign Service Institute , and chargé d ’ affaires and deputy chief of mission in Turkey and Azerbaijan .
McEldowney is one of several former career diplomats expected to join the senior ranks of the Biden administration , signaling a stark shift in staffing from the Trump White House , where the president viewed career diplomats with a mix of suspicion and disdain , particularly after the impeachment trial that put his handling of foreign policy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden picked Linda Thomas-Greenfield , another former senior foreign service officer , as his choice for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations .
In prior interviews with Foreign Policy , McEldowney openly criticized President Donald Trump for alienating close U.S. allies and allowing his son-in-law , White House advisor Jared Kushner , a real estate developer , broad and ill-defined influence over U.S. foreign policy .
She has also joined a chorus of former diplomats who rebuked the Trump administration for mismanaging and weakening America ’ s diplomatic corps and its repeated attempts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the State Department and foreign aid programs .
McEldowney , who taught at Georgetown University from 2017 to 2020 , was more recently involved in a major study by Harvard University calling for an overhaul of U.S. foreign service to confront “ one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.
” The report urged the Biden administration to cut back on the practice of granting political supporters senior State Department and ambassador posts and highlighted other sorely needed structural reforms to the department .
In a statement , Harris @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Service career and leadership abroad will be invaluable as we keep the American people safe and advance our country ’ s interests around the world.
” McEldowney is one of several key appointees Harris announced on Thursday .
Harris also tapped Hartina Flournoy , a longtime Democratic Party operative , as her chief of staff , and Rohini Kosoglu , her former chief of staff in the Senate , as her domestic policy advisor .

U.S. Vice President-elect Kamala Harris has tapped a former senior foreign service officer to serve as her national security advisor, the latest diplomat to join the incoming administration as President-elect Joe Biden and Harris build out their national security team.
U.S. Vice President-elect Kamala Harris has tapped a former senior foreign service officer to serve as her national security advisor, the latest diplomat to join the incoming administration as President-elect Joe Biden and Harris build out their national security team.
Her pick for the job, Nancy McEldowney, served in the foreign service for over 30 years, including posts as U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, director of the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, and chargé d’affaires and deputy chief of mission in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
McEldowney is one of several former career diplomats expected to join the senior ranks of the Biden administration, signaling a stark shift in staffing from the Trump White House, where the president viewed career diplomats with a mix of suspicion and disdain, particularly after the impeachment trial that put his handling of foreign policy and State Department officials in the crosshairs. Biden picked Linda Thomas-Greenfield, another former senior foreign service officer, as his choice for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.
In prior interviews with Foreign Policy, McEldowney openly criticized President Donald Trump for alienating close U.S. allies and allowing his son-in-law, White House advisor Jared Kushner, a real estate developer, broad and ill-defined influence over U.S. foreign policy. She has also joined a chorus of former diplomats who rebuked the Trump administration for mismanaging and weakening America’s diplomatic corps and its repeated attempts to push through steep budget cuts to the State Department and foreign aid programs.
McEldowney, who taught at Georgetown University from 2017 to 2020, was more recently involved in a major study by Harvard University calling for an overhaul of U.S. foreign service to confront “one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.” The report urged the Biden administration to cut back on the practice of granting political supporters senior State Department and ambassador posts and highlighted other sorely needed structural reforms to the department.
In a statement, Harris said McEldowny’s “distinguished Foreign Service career and leadership abroad will be invaluable as we keep the American people safe and advance our country’s interests around the world.”
McEldowney is one of several key appointees Harris announced on Thursday. Harris also tapped Hartina Flournoy, a longtime Democratic Party operative, as her chief of staff, and Rohini Kosoglu, her former chief of staff in the Senate, as her domestic policy advisor.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--The Ghost of Blinken Past

The Ghost of Blinken Past

“ The Atlantic Alliance is showing serious cracks , ” declared President-elect Joe Biden ’ s pick for Secretary of State , Antony Blinken .
“ On a number of seemingly unrelated fronts , the United States and Western Europe are at each other ’ s throats … mounting protectionist sentiment has pushed the allies to the brink of economic warfare … Republicans and Democrats alike are tired of seeing the U.S. devote almost one half of its defense budget to NATO and receive little more than complaints in return … more generally , a new climate of isolationism is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ becoming less relevant , that American attention would be better devoted to the Pacific basin.
” The year : 1987 .
The president : Ronald Reagan .
The dilemma : What to do about the new gas pipeline that Europe was building to Russia , one of America ’ s key foreign policy rivals .
Blinken ’ s first book , Ally Versus Ally : America , Europe , and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis , was published by a then-unknown young writer in 1987 .
But the dilemma it explores bears remarkable similarities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about to face when it takes office .
In fact , looking at Blinken ’ s analysis of U.S. foreign policy during the 1980s provides some tantalizing clues as to how he plans to guide American diplomacy if he is confirmed as Biden ’ s secretary of state .
The “ Siberian pipeline crisis ” that formed the subject of Ally Versus Ally has been forgotten by all but specialists .
During the mid-1980s , though , it was a source of angry debate in U.S.-European relations .
Under the Reagan administration , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the Soviet Union—applying diplomatic pressure and cutting off commerce .
Washington ’ s campaign was unpopular in Western Europe , where the consensus opinion was that the Soviets needed to be engaged , not defeated .
Europeans saw Moscow and its Warsaw Pact satellites as valuable trading partners and wanted to import natural gas from the vast Siberian gas fields that Russia was just then beginning to develop .
To Europe , tapping those seemed like an obvious way for it to diversify its energy supplies .
To Washington , the pipeline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funding the Soviet military machine .
When Europe started laying pipe against U.S. objections , Washington the sanctioned European companies involved .
European governments pushed ahead anyway .
A foreign-policy disagreement was becoming a commercial crisis .
And the alliance that had held the West together since World War II risked fracturing .
It was “ the beginning of the end of the Atlantic Alliance , ” France ’ s foreign minister declared .
When French President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO “ brain dead ” last year , he was far from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alliance into question .
Today ’ s transatlantic divisions have to the crisis of the late 1980s .
Now , Germany is building a new gas pipeline from Russia—Nord Stream 2 .
Washington has again levied sanctions on companies involved , causing German politicians to accuse the United States of “ neo-imperialism , ” “ blackmail , ” and even “ economic war.
” Then as now , the nuclear order in Europe was also in crisis , with the United States and Russia threatening to build up force levels in Europe .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ intensified divisions between Washington and its European allies , many of which were skeptical of the utility of adding nukes on their territory .
And just like today , the West feared that the center of gravity in international politics was shifting toward Asia ; it was the period of “ Japan as Number One , ” as one influential book put it .
This , too , seemed to bode poorly for the Atlantic Alliance .
In Ally Versus Ally , Blinken evinced little sympathy for the Reagan administration ’ s campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though he also thought the Europeans ’ hope that “ expanded economic relations will produce positive change in the Kremlin ’ s foreign and domestic policies ” was “ wishful thinking.
” However , he argued , U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was less important than U.S. policy toward its European allies .
The key geopolitical prize was not changes in Soviet behavior—which were difficult to predict or to shape—but alliance unity .
“ By promoting a more harmonious alliance , rather than one divided over an issue as fundamental as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be in a better position to meet the challenges posed by its adversaries , ” Blinken wrote .
The reason was that the U.S. strategy of containing Soviet influence primarily depended on the durability of the transatlantic alliance .
“ If the Siberian pipeline crisis teaches us anything , it is that the Western alliance must look inward , and not simply outward , if it is to remain secure.
” Alliance management generated less enthusiasm than strategy toward the Soviet Union , Blinken believed , but it was ultimately more important .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Blinken will face a familiar set of challenges upon his arrival in Foggy Bottom in 2021 .
The United States and some European allies are divided not only over Russian gas pipelines but also by debates over strategy toward Iran and China .
Biden ’ s desire to return to a nuclear deal with Iran will remove one major foreign policy irritant .
On China—which is likely to remain as central to Biden ’ s foreign policy as it has been to Trump ’ s—the United States and Europe still have different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge or devising a strategy to respond .
Blinken ’ s predecessor , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , devoted substantial diplomatic energy to encouraging skepticism of China in Europe , especially on Huawei and 5G .
Pompeo scored some successes but also left many in Europe uncomfortable that they were being asked to take sides .
If Blinken ’ s analysis of the 1980s is any guide , he ’ ll place less emphasis on pressuring allies and more on listening to their concerns .
After four years of America First , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treatment from a secretary of state who has written an entire book on the importance of being nice to allies .
The test of Blinken ’ s strategy , though , will be whether he can heal the alliances by making them work better , not simply by asking allies to do less .

“The Atlantic Alliance is showing serious cracks,” declared President-elect Joe Biden’s pick for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken. “On a number of seemingly unrelated fronts, the United States and Western Europe are at each other’s throats … mounting protectionist sentiment has pushed the allies to the brink of economic warfare … Republicans and Democrats alike are tired of seeing the U.S. devote almost one half of its defense budget to NATO and receive little more than complaints in return … more generally, a new climate of isolationism is in the air—a belief that Europe is becoming less relevant, that American attention would be better devoted to the Pacific basin.”
“The Atlantic Alliance is showing serious cracks,” declared President-elect Joe Biden’s pick for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken. “On a number of seemingly unrelated fronts, the United States and Western Europe are at each other’s throats … mounting protectionist sentiment has pushed the allies to the brink of economic warfare … Republicans and Democrats alike are tired of seeing the U.S. devote almost one half of its defense budget to NATO and receive little more than complaints in return … more generally, a new climate of isolationism is in the air—a belief that Europe is becoming less relevant, that American attention would be better devoted to the Pacific basin.”
The year: 1987. The president: Ronald Reagan. The dilemma: What to do about the new gas pipeline that Europe was building to Russia, one of America’s key foreign policy rivals. Blinken’s first book, Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis, was published by a then-unknown young writer in 1987. But the dilemma it explores bears remarkable similarities to the challenges the Biden administration is about to face when it takes office. In fact, looking at Blinken’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy during the 1980s provides some tantalizing clues as to how he plans to guide American diplomacy if he is confirmed as Biden’s secretary of state.
The “Siberian pipeline crisis” that formed the subject of Ally Versus Ally has been forgotten by all but specialists. During the mid-1980s, though, it was a source of angry debate in U.S.-European relations. Under the Reagan administration, the United States was tightening the screws on the Soviet Union—applying diplomatic pressure and cutting off commerce. Washington’s campaign was unpopular in Western Europe, where the consensus opinion was that the Soviets needed to be engaged, not defeated. Europeans saw Moscow and its Warsaw Pact satellites as valuable trading partners and wanted to import natural gas from the vast Siberian gas fields that Russia was just then beginning to develop.
To Europe, tapping those seemed like an obvious way for it to diversify its energy supplies. To Washington, the pipeline was a scheme that would end up funding the Soviet military machine. When Europe started laying pipe against U.S. objections, Washington the sanctioned European companies involved. European governments pushed ahead anyway. A foreign-policy disagreement was becoming a commercial crisis. And the alliance that had held the West together since World War II risked fracturing. It was “the beginning of the end of the Atlantic Alliance,” France’s foreign minister declared.
When French President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO “brain dead” last year, he was far from the first French leader to call the Western alliance into question. Today’s transatlantic divisions have to the crisis of the late 1980s. Now, Germany is building a new gas pipeline from Russia—Nord Stream 2. Washington has again levied sanctions on companies involved, causing German politicians to accuse the United States of “neo-imperialism,” “blackmail,” and even “economic war.”
Then as now, the nuclear order in Europe was also in crisis, with the United States and Russia threatening to build up force levels in Europe. Such threats of escalation, too, intensified divisions between Washington and its European allies, many of which were skeptical of the utility of adding nukes on their territory. And just like today, the West feared that the center of gravity in international politics was shifting toward Asia; it was the period of “Japan as Number One,” as one influential book put it. This, too, seemed to bode poorly for the Atlantic Alliance.
In Ally Versus Ally, Blinken evinced little sympathy for the Reagan administration’s campaign of maximum pressure against the Soviet Union, though he also thought the Europeans’ hope that “expanded economic relations will produce positive change in the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policies” was “wishful thinking.” However, he argued, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was less important than U.S. policy toward its European allies. The key geopolitical prize was not changes in Soviet behavior—which were difficult to predict or to shape—but alliance unity.
“By promoting a more harmonious alliance, rather than one divided over an issue as fundamental as East-West trade relations, the West will be in a better position to meet the challenges posed by its adversaries,” Blinken wrote. The reason was that the U.S. strategy of containing Soviet influence primarily depended on the durability of the transatlantic alliance. “If the Siberian pipeline crisis teaches us anything, it is that the Western alliance must look inward, and not simply outward, if it is to remain secure.” Alliance management generated less enthusiasm than strategy toward the Soviet Union, Blinken believed, but it was ultimately more important.
Assuming he is confirmed by the Senate, Blinken will face a familiar set of challenges upon his arrival in Foggy Bottom in 2021. The United States and some European allies are divided not only over Russian gas pipelines but also by debates over strategy toward Iran and China. Biden’s desire to return to a nuclear deal with Iran will remove one major foreign policy irritant. On China—which is likely to remain as central to Biden’s foreign policy as it has been to Trump’s—the United States and Europe still have different perspectives when it comes to defining the challenge or devising a strategy to respond.
Blinken’s predecessor, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, devoted substantial diplomatic energy to encouraging skepticism of China in Europe, especially on Huawei and 5G. Pompeo scored some successes but also left many in Europe uncomfortable that they were being asked to take sides. If Blinken’s analysis of the 1980s is any guide, he’ll place less emphasis on pressuring allies and more on listening to their concerns. After four years of America First, Europe will be glad to get friendlier treatment from a secretary of state who has written an entire book on the importance of being nice to allies. The test of Blinken’s strategy, though, will be whether he can heal the alliances by making them work better, not simply by asking allies to do less.