foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Slaughter in the East China Sea

Slaughter in the East China Sea

The year is 2030 .
Chinese troops seize a Japanese island in the South China Sea .
Japan dispatches an amphibious task force to retake the island .
Soon , U.S. warships and aircraft arrive , accompanying a Japanese flotilla .
Their orders are to support Japan while trying to avoid combat with Chinese forces .
That plan soon falls apart .
According to a wargame run by the Washington-based Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) , it is impossible for the U.S. military to step in without American and Chinese troops firing on each other .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Game : East China Sea Crisis 2030 , ” was run on July 20 ( you can watch the video here ) .
And it had an unusual twist : It was crowdsourced through Zoom , with CNAS staff presenting options to the public participants who would then vote to decide which strategies the Chinese and U.S./Japanese teams would implement .
“ The stakes are high , ” said Susanna Blume , CNAS ’ s defense director , to about 400 members of the public who were participating , mostly from the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kingdom .
“ Whoever wins this standoff has the potential to shape the Asia-Pacific region for the next decade.
” The Japanese invasion force ( or liberation force , depending on your team ) consists of amphibious assault ships , surface escorts , submarines , and special forces and marines , backed by aircraft in Okinawa .
Steaming nearby are two U.S. carrier strike groups , as well as submarines , stealth fighters , and bombers .
The initial rules of engagement are almost suffocating .
The American rules are to support Japan—with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pact—while avoiding combat with Chinese forces .
For Chinese commanders , the orders are to attack any Japanese forces entering the exclusion zone without hitting American targets .
What ensued over several game turns—each simulating about four hours of real time—was a series of moves and countermoves fought over a virtual game map , as both sides warily navigated the fine line between deterrence and belligerence .
Both the Red ( China ) and Blue ( United States and Japan ) sides staked out their goals : Red would send a forceful message @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Blue aimed to compel a Red withdrawal .
But how to balance goals and rules of engagement that are almost contradictory ?
The first choice for Blue was how to prepare for a likely mass salvo of Chinese anti-ship missiles when the Japanese fleet enters the exclusion zone : Should U.S. Aegis air defense ships hug the Japanese fleet to shield it from anti-ship missiles , or should the United States use cyberwarfare and jamming to disrupt Chinese command and control links ?
By a 60-40 percent vote , the public opts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cautious approach : Given a choice between a missile strike on the Japanese fleet and using cyberwarfare to disrupt Japanese command links , 54 percent of the public vote for cyberwarfare .
The umpire rules that Blue forces suffer more from the gambit than their Red counterparts , because the multinational team is more dependent on smoothly functioning communications .
In an all-too familiar pattern of history , escalation takes on a life of its own .
When Japanese destroyers enter the exclusion zone , Chinese warships begin hostilities by sinking many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retaliate by destroying a Chinese sub , while other subs play hide-and-seek .
“ The Chinese submarine is trying to find the Japanese submarine , and the U.S. submarine is trying to find the Chinese submarine , ” quipped umpire Ed McGrady .
Rather than closing for a surface battle with the Red fleet , Blue opts for airpower with U.S. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters , joining Japanese F-35s and F-15s , to destroy Chinese aircraft flying near the Senkakus , including Chinese drones relaying targeting data to land-based “ carrier killer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ships and aircraft taking heavy losses , Chinese leaders eventually opt to attack the two U.S. carriers with missiles , badly damaging one of them .
Then on the last turn , China makes a decisive move .
Throughout the game , the airfields on Okinawa—an island that is a part of the Japanese homeland—were packed with American and Japanese aircraft .
Beijing could no longer resist the temptation : Salvoes of missiles devastate the runways , severely damaging Blue airpower .
At that point , the game was called for time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ subjective or arbitrary factors in these simulations to simply declare that Nation X using Strategy Y would win in real life .
For example , in the interests of simplicity and playability the CNAS wargame omitted factors such as logistics , information operations to shape public opinion , and political tensions within the Chinese leadership and the U.S.-Japanese alliance .
Oddly absent were China ’ s growing fleet of aircraft carriers , as well as Japanese pseudo-carriers armed with F-35 fighters .
And , of course , there is the fact that real-life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibility of nuclear involvement .
Instead , the value of these simulations is more about process and insight : How did events flow , why did players make the decisions they did , and what weaknesses and capabilities were revealed ?
In terms of weaponry , “ both sides have aces in the hole , ” Blue Team leader Chris Dougherty told me .
“ For China , it ’ s their land-based bombers and missiles .
For the United States , it ’ s their subs and bombers.
” China enjoys the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ massive salvoes of missiles , and then rearm its bombers and land-based missile launchers from bases conveniently located on the mainland .
For U.S. aircraft operating from bases as distant as Guam—1,600 miles from the Senkakus—or flying from crowded and vulnerable Okinawan airbases , when to expend their ordnance was a tricky decision : Once a B-52 or F-35 fired its missiles , it would take hours to return to base , rearm , and get back to the combat zone .
That ’ s one reason U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pacific .
“ The United States can pulse striking power from its bombers , but without reliable airbases in the region , which would be under threat from Chinese aircraft and missiles , timing becomes a big issue , ” Dougherty noted .
“ You saw that in this game—pretty much every big strike package for Blue was a one-shot deal.
” Further , a key aspect of modern combat is that what can be seen be destroyed , and what remains undetected can survive .
Even the most sophisticated anti-ship missiles can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ocean without targeting data relayed from satellites , drones , and surveillance aircraft .
“ This critical path creates an enormous incentive to conduct major counter-C4ISRK [ command , control , communications , computers , intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance ] attacks as early as possible in the conflict , which both teams did here , ” Dougherty says .
“ In past run-throughs of this game , if one team doesn ’ t pick ‘ attack command and information ’ in their first move , things usually go quite poorly for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the CNAS East China Sea wargame was how hostilities steadily escalated .
China and the United States entered the conflict intent on not attacking each other : By game ’ s end , they were destroying each other ’ s ships and planes .
Both sides started wanting to localize the conflict to a few barren rocks in the ocean .
But after a few turns , China felt compelled to lob missiles at Okinawa .
“ We used the Rules of Engagement to control this in the game to some degree , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s questionable how well that would hold when push comes to shove.
” This raises troubling questions for whoever occupies the White House next year .
The Trump administration has pledged U.S. support to Japan over the Senkaku Islands dispute , and it ’ s more than likely a new administration would also opt to support one of America ’ s most important allies .
Yet as the CNAS wargame illustrates , backing Japan in a Sino-Japanese conflict risks the dangerous possibility of combat between American and Chinese forces .
And once hostilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they may be difficult to stop .

The year is 2030. Chinese troops seize a Japanese island in the South China Sea. Japan dispatches an amphibious task force to retake the island. Soon, U.S. warships and aircraft arrive, accompanying a Japanese flotilla. Their orders are to support Japan while trying to avoid combat with Chinese forces.
The year is 2030. Chinese troops seize a Japanese island in the South China Sea. Japan dispatches an amphibious task force to retake the island. Soon, U.S. warships and aircraft arrive, accompanying a Japanese flotilla. Their orders are to support Japan while trying to avoid combat with Chinese forces.
That plan soon falls apart. According to a wargame run by the Washington-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS), it is impossible for the U.S. military to step in without American and Chinese troops firing on each other.
The simulation, titled “A Deadly Game: East China Sea Crisis 2030,” was run on July 20 (you can watch the video here). And it had an unusual twist: It was crowdsourced through Zoom, with CNAS staff presenting options to the public participants who would then vote to decide which strategies the Chinese and U.S./Japanese teams would implement.
“The stakes are high,” said Susanna Blume, CNAS’s defense director, to about 400 members of the public who were participating, mostly from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. “Whoever wins this standoff has the potential to shape the Asia-Pacific region for the next decade.”
Almost like a Tom Clancy novel, the scenario ran as follows: In 2030, a Chinese flotilla lands 50 soldiers on Uotsuri Jima, an island in the East China Sea that is part of the Senkakus, an island chain owned by Japan but also claimed by China. Declaring a 50-mile exclusion zone around the Senkakus, Beijing deploys a ring of surface ships, submarines, warplanes, and drones—backed by ballistic missiles based on the Chinese mainland.
The Japanese invasion force (or liberation force, depending on your team) consists of amphibious assault ships, surface escorts, submarines, and special forces and marines, backed by aircraft in Okinawa. Steaming nearby are two U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as submarines, stealth fighters, and bombers.
The initial rules of engagement are almost suffocating. The American rules are to support Japan—with which the United States has a defense pact—while avoiding combat with Chinese forces. For Chinese commanders, the orders are to attack any Japanese forces entering the exclusion zone without hitting American targets.
What ensued over several game turns—each simulating about four hours of real time—was a series of moves and countermoves fought over a virtual game map, as both sides warily navigated the fine line between deterrence and belligerence. Both the Red (China) and Blue (United States and Japan) sides staked out their goals: Red would send a forceful message that Blue should back off, while Blue aimed to compel a Red withdrawal.
But how to balance goals and rules of engagement that are almost contradictory? The first choice for Blue was how to prepare for a likely mass salvo of Chinese anti-ship missiles when the Japanese fleet enters the exclusion zone: Should U.S. Aegis air defense ships hug the Japanese fleet to shield it from anti-ship missiles, or should the United States use cyberwarfare and jamming to disrupt Chinese command and control links? By a 60-40 percent vote, the public opts to disrupt command links.
China mirrors this cautious approach: Given a choice between a missile strike on the Japanese fleet and using cyberwarfare to disrupt Japanese command links, 54 percent of the public vote for cyberwarfare. The umpire rules that Blue forces suffer more from the gambit than their Red counterparts, because the multinational team is more dependent on smoothly functioning communications.
In an all-too familiar pattern of history, escalation takes on a life of its own. When Japanese destroyers enter the exclusion zone, Chinese warships begin hostilities by sinking many of them with cruise missiles. Japanese destroyers retaliate by destroying a Chinese sub, while other subs play hide-and-seek. “The Chinese submarine is trying to find the Japanese submarine, and the U.S. submarine is trying to find the Chinese submarine,” quipped umpire Ed McGrady.
Rather than closing for a surface battle with the Red fleet, Blue opts for airpower with U.S. F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, joining Japanese F-35s and F-15s, to destroy Chinese aircraft flying near the Senkakus, including Chinese drones relaying targeting data to land-based “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles.
With their ships and aircraft taking heavy losses, Chinese leaders eventually opt to attack the two U.S. carriers with missiles, badly damaging one of them. Then on the last turn, China makes a decisive move. Throughout the game, the airfields on Okinawa—an island that is a part of the Japanese homeland—were packed with American and Japanese aircraft. Beijing could no longer resist the temptation: Salvoes of missiles devastate the runways, severely damaging Blue airpower.
At that point, the game was called for time.
By end of the game, the situation seemed stalemated: China had sustained heavy losses, but still retained control of Uotsori Jima. And at any rate, focusing on who won isn’t the main purpose of these Pentagon-esque defense planning games.
For one, there are too many subjective or arbitrary factors in these simulations to simply declare that Nation X using Strategy Y would win in real life. For example, in the interests of simplicity and playability the CNAS wargame omitted factors such as logistics, information operations to shape public opinion, and political tensions within the Chinese leadership and the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Oddly absent were China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers, as well as Japanese pseudo-carriers armed with F-35 fighters. And, of course, there is the fact that real-life leaders would be acutely aware of the possibility of nuclear involvement.
Instead, the value of these simulations is more about process and insight: How did events flow, why did players make the decisions they did, and what weaknesses and capabilities were revealed?
In terms of weaponry, “both sides have aces in the hole,” Blue Team leader Chris Dougherty told me. “For China, it’s their land-based bombers and missiles. For the United States, it’s their subs and bombers.” China enjoys the home field advantage: It can fire massive salvoes of missiles, and then rearm its bombers and land-based missile launchers from bases conveniently located on the mainland.
For U.S. aircraft operating from bases as distant as Guam—1,600 miles from the Senkakus—or flying from crowded and vulnerable Okinawan airbases, when to expend their ordnance was a tricky decision: Once a B-52 or F-35 fired its missiles, it would take hours to return to base, rearm, and get back to the combat zone. That’s one reason U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper advocates building additional American bases in the Pacific.
“The United States can pulse striking power from its bombers, but without reliable airbases in the region, which would be under threat from Chinese aircraft and missiles, timing becomes a big issue,” Dougherty noted. “You saw that in this game—pretty much every big strike package for Blue was a one-shot deal.”
Further, a key aspect of modern combat is that what can be seen be destroyed, and what remains undetected can survive. Even the most sophisticated anti-ship missiles can’t locate ships on the immense ocean without targeting data relayed from satellites, drones, and surveillance aircraft. “This critical path creates an enormous incentive to conduct major counter-C4ISRK [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] attacks as early as possible in the conflict, which both teams did here,” Dougherty says. “In past run-throughs of this game, if one team doesn’t pick ‘attack command and information’ in their first move, things usually go quite poorly for them.”
What was most significant about the CNAS East China Sea wargame was how hostilities steadily escalated. China and the United States entered the conflict intent on not attacking each other: By game’s end, they were destroying each other’s ships and planes. Both sides started wanting to localize the conflict to a few barren rocks in the ocean. But after a few turns, China felt compelled to lob missiles at Okinawa.
“We used the Rules of Engagement to control this in the game to some degree,” says Dougherty. “It’s questionable how well that would hold when push comes to shove.”
This raises troubling questions for whoever occupies the White House next year. The Trump administration has pledged U.S. support to Japan over the Senkaku Islands dispute, and it’s more than likely a new administration would also opt to support one of America’s most important allies. Yet as the CNAS wargame illustrates, backing Japan in a Sino-Japanese conflict risks the dangerous possibility of combat between American and Chinese forces. And once hostilities between the United States and China begin, they may be difficult to stop.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--India Doesn’t Want to Be a Pawn in a U.S.-China Great Game

India Doesn ’ t Want to Be a Pawn in a U.S.-China Great Game China ’ s increasingly strident territorial claims and economic coercion have forced startled governments such as those in India , Japan , Taiwan , and Vietnam to strengthen relations with friends that can help them respond effectively .
In recent months , India has arguably suffered the most from China ’ s lack of restraint : New Delhi is trapped in a slow-moving border stand-off with Beijing that has already left more than 20 troops dead .
The possibility of greater international coordination to rein in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi .
When it comes to potential partners , India enjoys a big geopolitical advantage over China—most of the West roots for a rising , democratic country .
Meanwhile , China ’ s list of allies isn ’ t very long and includes problematic governments such as those of North Korea and Pakistan .
Countries may instinctively prefer India , but depending on how its current border stand-off with China is resolved , New Delhi ’ s traditional aversion to security and trade alliances could complicate partnerships .
To encourage Indian choices that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States need to be a more consistent friend , and sometimes to be prepared to play the long game when interests diverge on issues such as partnering with Russia .
If India makes the right decisions , its democratic institutions , market potential , and demographics position it as a leading power that can make a difference in managing China and the global commons .
Even casual observers of India are aware of its postcolonial outlook : New Delhi famously adopted a strategy of so-called nonalignment to maximize its options and minimize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar recently described this policy as comprising a fierce independent streak intended to preserve decision-making autonomy , coupled with a more cautious and at times passive approach as a nascent power .
Proponents of nonalignment have a preference for a multipolar world with several different power centers .
Times have substantially changed .
For more than a decade , a stronger , more confident India has shed its reluctance about defense collaboration with the United States and U.S. allies such as Japan .
India ’ s own aspirations and concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propelled this evolution , and Beijing ’ s recent overreaching could accelerate it .
After last month ’ s lethal border brawl , several developments show that China is pushing India toward the United States and its allies .
India seems poised to invite Australia to the annual military exercises that include Japan and the United States .
Much to the Trump administration ’ s delight , the Indian government is signaling that it may exclude Huawei from national 5G trials .
And the globally disseminated images of the Indian navy sailing alongside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indian Ocean showed a changed relationship .
But growing security coordination shouldn ’ t mask the reality of a deliberate process that has so far fallen short of balancing China .
In fact , India ’ s acute sense of a power asymmetry with China may help explain why it tread carefully with Beijing after their last major border confrontation in 2017 .
This military and financial gap may not close quickly , as India has fared worse in the early stages of the pandemic .
But the imbalance will likely accelerate Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happening .
New Delhi could decide against a closer alignment with Washington and its allies , especially if it constrains other relationships .
Consider recent developments in India ’ s longstanding relationship with Russia .
Barely a week after India ’ s deadly border skirmish with China , Jaishankar kept a virtual appointment with his Russian and Chinese counterparts .
Meanwhile , despite the domestic crises sparked by the pandemic , India ’ s defense minister rushed off to Moscow for consultations with India ’ s largest weapons supplier .
More recently , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia joining the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific framework to maintain a rules-based region .
That would be consistent with the view often articulated by India ’ s top diplomats that today ’ s increasingly multipolar world offers opportunities for New Delhi to maneuver .
Lingering questions about the reliability of the United States , the European Union ’ s cohesion ( at least until recently ) , and fears of Western retrenchment that predated the global populist wave could also activate latent Indian concerns about abandonment .
The Trump administration ’ s visible support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ registered in New Delhi , but the capital also isn ’ t blind to how the White House has treated its closest friends .
At the moment , Indian officials may be able to shrug off the latter precisely because their country is not a military ally , but a significantly closer relationship could raise the stakes and possibly change New Delhi ’ s strategy .
Even if China ’ s assertiveness continues to push India closer to like-minded countries , New Delhi ’ s trade policies , particularly pending rules in digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India has taken a series of steps in recent years to protect its markets from Chinese imports .
But when aiming at China , India has sometimes hit friends .
Trade restrictions have included tariffs and tax hikes , local content requirements , and other policies that apply globally , including to U.S. firms .
Despite trade differences , countries want India inside the room when cutting deals , for reasons beyond its market size .
They value its influence and role in setting rules and building regional architecture .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledged—the countries negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership “ hope that India will join one day.
” Yet India withdrew from talks last November , while its trade negotiations with Australia , Canada , the European Union , and others have sputtered or stalled .
So far , even a long-promised , limited trade agreement has eluded India and the United States .
Countries want India inside the room when cutting deals .
Shared concerns over China will likely encourage countries to isolate trade disagreements with India .
But Washington ’ s protectionist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matters is not easy in practice .
The Trump administration backed out of a landmark Pacific trade pact with U.S. partners , imposed duties on trusted allies under the guise of national security , hogtied the World Trade Organization , and went after China alone .
Importantly , in the process , the president alienated the same friends who find fault with China ’ s “ market-distorting state capitalism ” —and took a step towards Beijing ’ s economic model .
Depending on when and how countries emerge from the pandemic , exhausted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for trade reforms that could hurt domestic businesses in the short term .
In such an environment , New Delhi would be under greater pressure to skillfully juggle competing domestic and international imperatives , including keeping critical partnerships on track .
New Delhi ’ s friends , of course , will have a say in how their relationships with India grow to shape China ’ s choices .
In a recent virtual session with his American counterpart this month , Jaishankar offered some candid advice : “ I think the United States really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more multipolar world with more plurilateral arrangements , go beyond alliances with which it has grown up over the last two generations.
” His words could be a plea for more flexible thinking .
Leaning into the strategic opportunity that China has created means not taking India for granted or forcing its hand .
Washington may need to work harder to earn New Delhi ’ s support at the outset of collaboration , and also manage its own expectations for the relationship .
It needs to be prepared for when India ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the United States and its allies , such as on opening markets or Russia ’ s international role .
The good news is that there is yet tremendous room for growth in U.S.-India ties ; a partnership that does not resemble a traditional U.S. alliance would nevertheless offer considerable shared benefits , not the least of which is helping ensure no one country dominates Asia ’ s future .
To find common ground , India ’ s like-minded partners will need to demonstrate reliability , exhibit patience and care in addressing New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but firm approach to handling trade disagreements—one that is ideally guided by a broader vision that can help bridge immediate differences .
Relaunching the moribund Trade Policy Forum would be a good beginning .
As India and other democracies engage more purposefully on a larger agenda , New Delhi may find there is far more on offer than in its circumscribed relationship with Moscow .
Recent moves like banning scores of Chinese apps or tweaking FDI rules indicate India may be increasingly resigned to strategic competition .
But partners should be mindful New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ space to manage relations with Beijing—a neighbor with whom India must find ways to coexist and benefit more from China ’ s prosperity .
Amid growing nationalism , India has made it clear it doesn ’ t want to be a pawn in someone else ’ s Great Game and openly chafes at the idea of being regarded as “ a counterweight.
” Over the past 70 plus years , the United States has grappled with the underacknowledged difficulties of managing alliances .
India and its partners may similarly find that long-distance friendships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s continuing need for a degree of independence introduces more complexity , with or without Beijing flexing its muscles .

China’s increasingly strident territorial claims and economic coercion have forced startled governments such as those in India, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam to strengthen relations with friends that can help them respond effectively. In recent months, India has arguably suffered the most from China’s lack of restraint: New Delhi is trapped in a slow-moving border stand-off with Beijing that has already left more than 20 troops dead.
China’s increasingly strident territorial claims and economic coercion have forced startled governments such as those in India, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam to strengthen relations with friends that can help them respond effectively. In recent months, India has arguably suffered the most from China’s lack of restraint: New Delhi is trapped in a slow-moving border stand-off with Beijing that has already left more than 20 troops dead.
The possibility of greater international coordination to rein in Beijing should be especially appealing to New Delhi. When it comes to potential partners, India enjoys a big geopolitical advantage over China—most of the West roots for a rising, democratic country. Meanwhile, China’s list of allies isn’t very long and includes problematic governments such as those of North Korea and Pakistan.
Countries may instinctively prefer India, but depending on how its current border stand-off with China is resolved, New Delhi’s traditional aversion to security and trade alliances could complicate partnerships. To encourage Indian choices that facilitate alignment, countries such as the United States need to be a more consistent friend, and sometimes to be prepared to play the long game when interests diverge on issues such as partnering with Russia. If India makes the right decisions, its democratic institutions, market potential, and demographics position it as a leading power that can make a difference in managing China and the global commons.
Even casual observers of India are aware of its postcolonial outlook: New Delhi famously adopted a strategy of so-called nonalignment to maximize its options and minimize potential restraints. India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar recently described this policy as comprising a fierce independent streak intended to preserve decision-making autonomy, coupled with a more cautious and at times passive approach as a nascent power. Proponents of nonalignment have a preference for a multipolar world with several different power centers.
Times have substantially changed. For more than a decade, a stronger, more confident India has shed its reluctance about defense collaboration with the United States and U.S. allies such as Japan. India’s own aspirations and concerns about China’s growing ambitions have propelled this evolution, and Beijing’s recent overreaching could accelerate it.
After last month’s lethal border brawl, several developments show that China is pushing India toward the United States and its allies. India seems poised to invite Australia to the annual military exercises that include Japan and the United States. Much to the Trump administration’s delight, the Indian government is signaling that it may exclude Huawei from national 5G trials. And the globally disseminated images of the Indian navy sailing alongside a U.S. carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean showed a changed relationship.
But growing security coordination shouldn’t mask the reality of a deliberate process that has so far fallen short of balancing China. In fact, India’s acute sense of a power asymmetry with China may help explain why it tread carefully with Beijing after their last major border confrontation in 2017. This military and financial gap may not close quickly, as India has fared worse in the early stages of the pandemic. But the imbalance will likely accelerate Indian defense purchases, as apparently is already happening.
New Delhi could decide against a closer alignment with Washington and its allies, especially if it constrains other relationships. Consider recent developments in India’s longstanding relationship with Russia. Barely a week after India’s deadly border skirmish with China, Jaishankar kept a virtual appointment with his Russian and Chinese counterparts. Meanwhile, despite the domestic crises sparked by the pandemic, India’s defense minister rushed off to Moscow for consultations with India’s largest weapons supplier. More recently, Indian officials reportedly have renewed interest in Russia joining the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific framework to maintain a rules-based region. That would be consistent with the view often articulated by India’s top diplomats that today’s increasingly multipolar world offers opportunities for New Delhi to maneuver.
Lingering questions about the reliability of the United States, the European Union’s cohesion (at least until recently), and fears of Western retrenchment that predated the global populist wave could also activate latent Indian concerns about abandonment. The Trump administration’s visible support for India during the ongoing border crisis has registered in New Delhi, but the capital also isn’t blind to how the White House has treated its closest friends. At the moment, Indian officials may be able to shrug off the latter precisely because their country is not a military ally, but a significantly closer relationship could raise the stakes and possibly change New Delhi’s strategy.
Even if China’s assertiveness continues to push India closer to like-minded countries, New Delhi’s trade policies, particularly pending rules in digital commerce, pose a potential challenge. India has taken a series of steps in recent years to protect its markets from Chinese imports. But when aiming at China, India has sometimes hit friends. Trade restrictions have included tariffs and tax hikes, local content requirements, and other policies that apply globally, including to U.S. firms.
Despite trade differences, countries want India inside the room when cutting deals, for reasons beyond its market size. They value its influence and role in setting rules and building regional architecture. It’s why—as Singapore’s prime minister recently acknowledged—the countries negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership “hope that India will join one day.” Yet India withdrew from talks last November, while its trade negotiations with Australia, Canada, the European Union, and others have sputtered or stalled. So far, even a long-promised, limited trade agreement has eluded India and the United States.
Countries want India inside the room when cutting deals.
Shared concerns over China will likely encourage countries to isolate trade disagreements with India. But Washington’s protectionist turn suggests that segregating trade and security matters is not easy in practice. The Trump administration backed out of a landmark Pacific trade pact with U.S. partners, imposed duties on trusted allies under the guise of national security, hogtied the World Trade Organization, and went after China alone. Importantly, in the process, the president alienated the same friends who find fault with China’s “market-distorting state capitalism”—and took a step towards Beijing’s economic model.
Depending on when and how countries emerge from the pandemic, exhausted and long-suffering publics may have limited patience for trade reforms that could hurt domestic businesses in the short term. In such an environment, New Delhi would be under greater pressure to skillfully juggle competing domestic and international imperatives, including keeping critical partnerships on track.
New Delhi’s friends, of course, will have a say in how their relationships with India grow to shape China’s choices. In a recent virtual session with his American counterpart this month, Jaishankar offered some candid advice: “I think the United States really has to learn to work with a more multipolar world with more plurilateral arrangements, go beyond alliances with which it has grown up over the last two generations.” His words could be a plea for more flexible thinking. Leaning into the strategic opportunity that China has created means not taking India for granted or forcing its hand. Washington may need to work harder to earn New Delhi’s support at the outset of collaboration, and also manage its own expectations for the relationship. It needs to be prepared for when India’s near-term interests and ambitions diverge from time-to-time with the United States and its allies, such as on opening markets or Russia’s international role.
The good news is that there is yet tremendous room for growth in U.S.-India ties; a partnership that does not resemble a traditional U.S. alliance would nevertheless offer considerable shared benefits, not the least of which is helping ensure no one country dominates Asia’s future.
To find common ground, India’s like-minded partners will need to demonstrate reliability, exhibit patience and care in addressing New Delhi-Moscow defense ties, and a far-sighted but firm approach to handling trade disagreements—one that is ideally guided by a broader vision that can help bridge immediate differences. Relaunching the moribund Trade Policy Forum would be a good beginning. As India and other democracies engage more purposefully on a larger agenda, New Delhi may find there is far more on offer than in its circumscribed relationship with Moscow.
Recent moves like banning scores of Chinese apps or tweaking FDI rules indicate India may be increasingly resigned to strategic competition. But partners should be mindful New Delhi will also want to preserve diplomatic space to manage relations with Beijing—a neighbor with whom India must find ways to coexist and benefit more from China’s prosperity. Amid growing nationalism, India has made it clear it doesn’t want to be a pawn in someone else’s Great Game and openly chafes at the idea of being regarded as “a counterweight.”
Over the past 70 plus years, the United States has grappled with the underacknowledged difficulties of managing alliances. India and its partners may similarly find that long-distance friendships demand assiduous cultivation. New Delhi’s continuing need for a degree of independence introduces more complexity, with or without Beijing flexing its muscles.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Brent Scowcroft, Former U.S. National Security Advisor, Dies at 95

Brent Scowcroft , Former U.S. National Security Advisor , Dies at 95 I never had the privilege of working directly with Brent Scowcroft .
He was of a different generation and political party .
But like every U.S. national security advisor over the past 30 years , I was the direct beneficiary of the processes , structures , principles , and values that he put in place during his two tours in that office .
Scowcroft was a modest man of immense integrity and determination .
An Air Force lieutenant general and the son of a four-generation Utah family , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place where your enemies stab you in the back and your friends stab you in the chest .
But he established himself as a skilled policymaker and manager , and he is rightly seen today as the master of effective and principled national security policymaking .
During the presidency of George H.W .
Bush , Scowcroft and his deputy , Robert Gates , put in place the core system that has been used by every National Security Council ( NSC ) since—up until the current administration .
Scowcroft started by devising a structure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proposals on any given issue and systematically channeling them up the chain to the president .
The system operates through layers of interagency committees centrally coordinated from the White House .
At its heart stands the Deputies Committee , which is chaired by the deputy national security advisor and attended by second- or third-ranking officials from all the key national security agencies .
These deputies meet several times a week to formulate day-to-day policy options , develop strategies , and—critically—manage crises .
They also report up to the cabinet-level Principals Committee , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And sitting atop the process is the National Security Council itself , chaired by the president .
The NSC staff coordinates these interagency debates and , once the president makes a decision , helps ensure they are properly executed .
Prior to the creation of this system by Scowcroft and Gates , interagency coordination was ad hoc and the subject of competition and controversy among the president ’ s most senior advisors .
For example , James Baker , who served as President Ronald Reagan ’ s treasury secretary , described that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ witches ’ brew of intrigue , elbows , egos , and separate agendas ” ; indeed , Reagan ’ s long-serving secretary of state , George Shultz , refused to attend interagency meetings he didn ’ t chair .
Faithful and rigorous adherence to the Scowcroft-Gates system would have prevented some of the United States ’ most costly foreign-policy errors .
Scowcroft set an example for how a national security advisor should steward the decision-making process .
Scowcroft also set an example for how a national security advisor should steward the decision-making process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broker , and with good reason : Scowcroft promised an even-handed consideration of the policy options prepared for the president—and ensured the quality of those options being presented .
And he demonstrated immense confidence by deciding to hire Gates , a deputy who could at any point function as national security advisor himself .
Scowcroft and Gates ran the NSC as a genuine partnership .
Part of the reason Scowcroft was able to be so successful was the nature of his relationship with his boss .
Bush and Scowcroft were similar in age @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the Nixon administration and had become close friends .
This friendship allowed Scowcroft to be candid with the president .
A World Transformed , the extraordinary memoir they wrote together , demonstrates the honesty of the advice Scowcroft gave the president—and his willingness to squarely address their failures .
Scowcroft ’ s closeness to Bush also helped ensure that when he spoke within or outside of the administration , people understood him to be speaking on behalf of the president .
But Scowcroft always let the cabinet be the public face of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the national security advisor should be seen infrequently and heard even less .
Even though Scowcroft had more foreign-policy experience than Baker , who served as Bush ’ s first secretary of state , at the outset of the administration , Scowcroft made clear that the latter should be the president ’ s public foreign-policy emissary .
This willingness to play a behind-the-scenes role helped avoid much of the tension that can arise between the White House and various agencies .
Of course , even the best national security process is only as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out .
But Scowcroft also excelled at assembling a team .
He understood that an effective national security team should not just be a collection of stars but a well-functioning unit .
The players should be aligned with the president ’ s policies and overall approach , faithful to the process put in place , and willing to deal with one another in a direct and respectful manner .
Above all , Scowcroft performed a grueling job with an enormous amount of integrity , setting an example for all who succeeded him .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the small club of national security advisors a treasure trove of wisdom .
I wish that President Donald Trump would have spent some time with Scowcroft—and that Trump ’ s national security team would spend some time reflecting on Scowcroft ’ s example and legacy .
The current geopolitical environment is more volatile and uncertain than any since the end of the second World War .
Yet this time around , we don ’ t have the benefit of Brent Scowcroft to help us navigate it .
His wisdom and guidance is @ @ @

I never had the privilege of working directly with Brent Scowcroft. He was of a different generation and political party. But like every U.S. national security advisor over the past 30 years, I was the direct beneficiary of the processes, structures, principles, and values that he put in place during his two tours in that office.
I never had the privilege of working directly with Brent Scowcroft. He was of a different generation and political party. But like every U.S. national security advisor over the past 30 years, I was the direct beneficiary of the processes, structures, principles, and values that he put in place during his two tours in that office.
Scowcroft was a modest man of immense integrity and determination. An Air Force lieutenant general and the son of a four-generation Utah family, he occasionally joked that Washington is a place where your enemies stab you in the back and your friends stab you in the chest. But he established himself as a skilled policymaker and manager, and he is rightly seen today as the master of effective and principled national security policymaking.
During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert Gates, put in place the core system that has been used by every National Security Council (NSC) since—up until the current administration.
Scowcroft started by devising a structure for vetting the full range of policy proposals on any given issue and systematically channeling them up the chain to the president. The system operates through layers of interagency committees centrally coordinated from the White House. At its heart stands the Deputies Committee, which is chaired by the deputy national security advisor and attended by second- or third-ranking officials from all the key national security agencies. These deputies meet several times a week to formulate day-to-day policy options, develop strategies, and—critically—manage crises. They also report up to the cabinet-level Principals Committee, which is chaired by the national security advisor. And sitting atop the process is the National Security Council itself, chaired by the president. The NSC staff coordinates these interagency debates and, once the president makes a decision, helps ensure they are properly executed.
Prior to the creation of this system by Scowcroft and Gates, interagency coordination was ad hoc and the subject of competition and controversy among the president’s most senior advisors. For example, James Baker, who served as President Ronald Reagan’s treasury secretary, described that administration’s NSC as “a witches’ brew of intrigue, elbows, egos, and separate agendas”; indeed, Reagan’s long-serving secretary of state, George Shultz, refused to attend interagency meetings he didn’t chair. Faithful and rigorous adherence to the Scowcroft-Gates system would have prevented some of the United States’ most costly foreign-policy errors.
Scowcroft set an example for how a national security advisor should steward the decision-making process.
Scowcroft also set an example for how a national security advisor should steward the decision-making process. Bush called Scowcroft the perfect honest broker, and with good reason: Scowcroft promised an even-handed consideration of the policy options prepared for the president—and ensured the quality of those options being presented. And he demonstrated immense confidence by deciding to hire Gates, a deputy who could at any point function as national security advisor himself. Scowcroft and Gates ran the NSC as a genuine partnership.
Part of the reason Scowcroft was able to be so successful was the nature of his relationship with his boss. Bush and Scowcroft were similar in age and disposition; they had worked together since the Nixon administration and had become close friends. This friendship allowed Scowcroft to be candid with the president. A World Transformed, the extraordinary memoir they wrote together, demonstrates the honesty of the advice Scowcroft gave the president—and his willingness to squarely address their failures. Scowcroft’s closeness to Bush also helped ensure that when he spoke within or outside of the administration, people understood him to be speaking on behalf of the president.
But Scowcroft always let the cabinet be the public face of U.S. foreign policy. He believed that the national security advisor should be seen infrequently and heard even less. Even though Scowcroft had more foreign-policy experience than Baker, who served as Bush’s first secretary of state, at the outset of the administration, Scowcroft made clear that the latter should be the president’s public foreign-policy emissary. This willingness to play a behind-the-scenes role helped avoid much of the tension that can arise between the White House and various agencies.
Scowcroft excelled at assembling a team.
Of course, even the best national security process is only as good as the people who carry it out. But Scowcroft also excelled at assembling a team. He understood that an effective national security team should not just be a collection of stars but a well-functioning unit. The players should be aligned with the president’s policies and overall approach, faithful to the process put in place, and willing to deal with one another in a direct and respectful manner.
Above all, Scowcroft performed a grueling job with an enormous amount of integrity, setting an example for all who succeeded him. And he bequeathed to the subsequent members of the small club of national security advisors a treasure trove of wisdom.
I wish that President Donald Trump would have spent some time with Scowcroft—and that Trump’s national security team would spend some time reflecting on Scowcroft’s example and legacy. The current geopolitical environment is more volatile and uncertain than any since the end of the second World War. Yet this time around, we don’t have the benefit of Brent Scowcroft to help us navigate it. His wisdom and guidance is sorely missed.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Iraq’s Indigenous Peoples Can’t Face Another Conflict

Elishwa never thought she would return to Bartella .
She fled the village in northern Iraq four hours before an Islamic State attack in August 2014 , and she never thought she would see its sand-washed masonry again .
But after three and a half years in exile , she returned in January 2018 from Duhok in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq .
She does not regret coming back but considers the future of her community to be precarious .
“ We fear a conflict is coming , ” Elishwa , who requested the use of a pseudonym out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ May , referring to the presence of Iran-backed militias .
Elishwa , like most of Bartella ’ s population before the 2014 Islamic State offensive , is Assyrian—part of an ethnic community indigenous to northern Iraq that is predominantly Christian and the last Aramaic-speaking group in the world .
Over the last two decades , punctuated by the Iraq War and rise of the Islamic State , the population of Assyrians in Iraq has declined by a staggering 90 percent : from an estimated 1.5 million in 2003 to just over 150,000 today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus on the coronavirus pandemic and reports of troop withdrawals could augur an era of disengagement with Iraq .
Yet this drawdown could not come at a more critical juncture for Assyrians , who face increasing persecution from both Iran-backed militias and Kurdistan Democratic Party ( KDP ) security forces seeking control of the last region in Iraq where Assyrians are a plurality : the Nineveh Plains .
The Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq have been the linchpin of Assyrian life for centuries .
While it has always been a diverse area—many Yazidis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major concentration of Assyrians in Iraq before 2014 .
In the period immediately following the defeat of the Islamic State , Iraq ’ s central government could have prioritized the return of its Indigenous peoples .
Instead , it returned to the same security arrangement that led to an Assyrian exodus from the plains in 2014 : a U.S.-supported balance of Arab and Kurdish forces claiming the plains as their own .
Iran ’ s territorial influence extends to part of the western and southern Nineveh Plains .
Two Iran-backed paramilitaries are actively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 30th Brigade , a militia comprising primarily members of the Shabak ethnoreligious group , and the 50th Brigade , a nominally Christian but predominantly Shiite Arab militia .
Both are closely associated with the Badr Organization , an Iran-backed Shiite faction , and Iran .
The brigades ’ leaders were sanctioned by the United States last year for corruption and human rights violations .
Iran ’ s militias have adopted a strategy utilized by the Iraqi state since the 1930s : forced demographic change through the settlement of Shabaks from outside villages , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Nineveh Plains .
“ All we know is that they are building housing complexes in which they bring in people from outside the region , ” Elishwa said .
This policy appears to be enshrined in law .
On June 3 , the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Commission—which oversees Iran-backed militias—issued a statement containing a purposefully ambiguous yet dangerous provision that would possibly lead to housing militia members in combat areas where they served , potentially exacerbating the demographic shift in the plains .
Over the last year , Assyrians living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have experienced significant intimidation and violence , from a priest having a pistol pointed to his head to two elderly women being stabbed by Shabaks with unknown affiliations in May 2019 .
Last fall , the Iran-backed militias even imposed a curfew on Christians on a Shiite holiday .
Admond , an Assyrian from Bartella , which is primarily controlled by the 30th Brigade , said the Assyrian community feels increasingly threatened and he thinks the curfews will become more frequent .
“ You feel [ the fear ] through their behavior , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ They force you to feel that they are the masters of the area now , or they remind you that they are the ones that liberated the region , when , in fact , the anti-terrorism forces liberated it , ” he added , referring to a division of the Iraqi Army .
( Admond also requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns . )
While Iran seeks to carve out a Shiite buffer zone and facilitate arms exports to Syria , the KDP ’ s presence in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventual annexation of the territory into the Kurdistan Region .
The role the KDP has played in destabilizing the Nineveh Plains has largely evaded censure from its Western allies .
It can be traced to 2006 , when , in its draft constitution , the Kurdistan Regional Government ( KRG ) suddenly claimed the plains as one of many “ disputed territories , ” meaning it should be administered by Erbil .
From the KRG ’ s perspective , the status of the plains as part of the Kurdistan Region was a fait @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Islamic State invasion , the KRG created the appearance of security in the plains through the harassment of locals and a system of political and financial patronage .
Throughout 2017 and 2018 , the mayor of Alqosh , Faiz Jahwareh , was detained , beaten , and harassed by Kurdish security forces in politically motivated attacks .
He was removed from office on spurious corruption charges twice dismissed by an Iraqi federal court and was barred from returning to office by the KDP .
Kurdish officials replaced him with an Assyrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zara .
Alqosh residents who protested Zara ’ s installation were threatened with their lives by Kurdish security forces .
Last year , Zara was dispatched as an emissary to Washington to burnish the KRG ’ s reputation , meeting with State Department officials , including Sam Brownback , the U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom , to discuss religious freedom in Iraq .
Meanwhile , Kurdish security forces have stifled opposition to KDP rule in towns such as Alqosh , detaining and torturing protesters and creating an environment where even social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an Assyrian advocate from Alqosh .
Kado said there has been a gradual reduction in anyone speaking out against the mayor or Kurdish forces .
Kado is familiar with the intimidation : He says he has been threatened by Kurdish forces on three occasions over the last six years and was beaten by Zara ’ s husband ’ s relatives last year for opposing her appointment as mayor .
That U.S. officials continue to legitimize Zara and the KDP ’ s rule in the Nineveh Plains despite popular opposition has undermined the idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saddam ’ s time we ’ d say , ‘ Don ’ t speak .
The walls have ears !
’ It ’ s the same now , ” Kado said .
“ Maybe they ’ re not killing , but it ’ s bad—not just for Assyrians but also for Kurds who stand against [ the KDP ] .
There ’ s no future for us if the KDP isn ’ t removed from Alqosh .
They want everybody to be controlled by them , either by force or money.
” If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continued existence of Iraq ’ s Indigenous peoples , they must give immediate support to the only force proven to promote the return of Assyrians to their villages : the Nineveh Plain Protection Units ( NPU ) , an Assyrian-led force .
Reporting to Iraq ’ s National Security Council , the NPU was formed in response to the disarmament and abandonment of the Assyrians of the plains by the Kurdish Peshmerga when the Islamic State invaded in 2014 .
The force received training from U.S.-led coalition forces and fought alongside them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the southern Nineveh Plains .
Internally displaced Assyrians cite mistrust of security forces as the primary impediment to their return , so it is no surprise that the NPU—the only force made up of locals from the plains—has return rates in areas it controls significantly higher than in areas secured by Kurdish forces or Iran-backed militias alone and higher return rates than all areas controlled by other forces in the plains combined , according to a June assessment by the Assyrian Policy Institute ( API ) .
The NPU is not backed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only tepid support from the Iraqi central government .
Washington and Baghdad should make their support for the NPU explicit .
It would address mistrust held by minority communities due to the Peshmerga ’ s 2014 retreat , shift a burden from Baghdad to a trustworthy force without a record of human rights abuses , and could alleviate the region ’ s refugee crisis .
Tens of thousands of Assyrians from the plains remain displaced in Jordan and Lebanon , and the API ’ s fieldwork suggests that a significant proportion would consider @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facilitated by the NPU .
Finally , Baghdad should work toward implementing federalism by revisiting the Iraqi Council of Ministers ’ January 2014 decision to establish a Nineveh Plains province for minorities like Assyrians and Yazidis .
Iraq ’ s Assyrians can not endure another conflict .
If Iraq ’ s Indigenous peoples are to have a future , there must be a reckoning with both Iran-backed militias and the KDP ’ s role in undermining the only option that has yielded results : empowering local Assyrians to defend themselves within proper legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survival in a land devoid of equality for generations .

Elishwa never thought she would return to Bartella. She fled the village in northern Iraq four hours before an Islamic State attack in August 2014, and she never thought she would see its sand-washed masonry again. But after three and a half years in exile, she returned in January 2018 from Duhok in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She does not regret coming back but considers the future of her community to be precarious. “We fear a conflict is coming,” Elishwa, who requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns, told Foreign Policy in May, referring to the presence of Iran-backed militias.
Elishwa never thought she would return to Bartella. She fled the village in northern Iraq four hours before an Islamic State attack in August 2014, and she never thought she would see its sand-washed masonry again. But after three and a half years in exile, she returned in January 2018 from Duhok in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She does not regret coming back but considers the future of her community to be precarious. “We fear a conflict is coming,” Elishwa, who requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns, told Foreign Policy in May, referring to the presence of Iran-backed militias.
Elishwa, like most of Bartella’s population before the 2014 Islamic State offensive, is Assyrian—part of an ethnic community indigenous to northern Iraq that is predominantly Christian and the last Aramaic-speaking group in the world. Over the last two decades, punctuated by the Iraq War and rise of the Islamic State, the population of Assyrians in Iraq has declined by a staggering 90 percent: from an estimated 1.5 million in 2003 to just over 150,000 today.
The U.S. government’s current focus on the coronavirus pandemic and reports of troop withdrawals could augur an era of disengagement with Iraq. Yet this drawdown could not come at a more critical juncture for Assyrians, who face increasing persecution from both Iran-backed militias and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) security forces seeking control of the last region in Iraq where Assyrians are a plurality: the Nineveh Plains.
The Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq have been the linchpin of Assyrian life for centuries. While it has always been a diverse area—many Yazidis live in the region—it was the last major concentration of Assyrians in Iraq before 2014. In the period immediately following the defeat of the Islamic State, Iraq’s central government could have prioritized the return of its Indigenous peoples. Instead, it returned to the same security arrangement that led to an Assyrian exodus from the plains in 2014: a U.S.-supported balance of Arab and Kurdish forces claiming the plains as their own.
Iran’s territorial influence extends to part of the western and southern Nineveh Plains. Two Iran-backed paramilitaries are actively obstructing the return of Assyrians: the 30th Brigade, a militia comprising primarily members of the Shabak ethnoreligious group, and the 50th Brigade, a nominally Christian but predominantly Shiite Arab militia. Both are closely associated with the Badr Organization, an Iran-backed Shiite faction, and Iran. The brigades’ leaders were sanctioned by the United States last year for corruption and human rights violations.
Iran’s militias have adopted a strategy utilized by the Iraqi state since the 1930s: forced demographic change through the settlement of Shabaks from outside villages, leading to a surge in their population in the Nineveh Plains. “All we know is that they are building housing complexes in which they bring in people from outside the region,” Elishwa said. This policy appears to be enshrined in law. On June 3, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Commission—which oversees Iran-backed militias—issued a statement containing a purposefully ambiguous yet dangerous provision that would possibly lead to housing militia members in combat areas where they served, potentially exacerbating the demographic shift in the plains.
Over the last year, Assyrians living under these militias in the Nineveh Plains have experienced significant intimidation and violence, from a priest having a pistol pointed to his head to two elderly women being stabbed by Shabaks with unknown affiliations in May 2019. Last fall, the Iran-backed militias even imposed a curfew on Christians on a Shiite holiday.
Admond, an Assyrian from Bartella, which is primarily controlled by the 30th Brigade, said the Assyrian community feels increasingly threatened and he thinks the curfews will become more frequent. “You feel [the fear] through their behavior,” he said of the 30th Brigade. “They force you to feel that they are the masters of the area now, or they remind you that they are the ones that liberated the region, when, in fact, the anti-terrorism forces liberated it,” he added, referring to a division of the Iraqi Army. (Admond also requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns.)
While Iran seeks to carve out a Shiite buffer zone and facilitate arms exports to Syria, the KDP’s presence in the plains serves as pretext for its eventual annexation of the territory into the Kurdistan Region. The role the KDP has played in destabilizing the Nineveh Plains has largely evaded censure from its Western allies. It can be traced to 2006, when, in its draft constitution, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) suddenly claimed the plains as one of many “disputed territories,” meaning it should be administered by Erbil. From the KRG’s perspective, the status of the plains as part of the Kurdistan Region was a fait accompli. In the decade leading up to the Islamic State invasion, the KRG created the appearance of security in the plains through the harassment of locals and a system of political and financial patronage.
Throughout 2017 and 2018, the mayor of Alqosh, Faiz Jahwareh, was detained, beaten, and harassed by Kurdish security forces in politically motivated attacks. He was removed from office on spurious corruption charges twice dismissed by an Iraqi federal court and was barred from returning to office by the KDP. Kurdish officials replaced him with an Assyrian member of the KDP, Lara Yousif Zara. Alqosh residents who protested Zara’s installation were threatened with their lives by Kurdish security forces. Last year, Zara was dispatched as an emissary to Washington to burnish the KRG’s reputation, meeting with State Department officials, including Sam Brownback, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, to discuss religious freedom in Iraq.
Meanwhile, Kurdish security forces have stifled opposition to KDP rule in towns such as Alqosh, detaining and torturing protesters and creating an environment where even social media is monitored, said Athra Kado, an Assyrian advocate from Alqosh. Kado said there has been a gradual reduction in anyone speaking out against the mayor or Kurdish forces. Kado is familiar with the intimidation: He says he has been threatened by Kurdish forces on three occasions over the last six years and was beaten by Zara’s husband’s relatives last year for opposing her appointment as mayor.
That U.S. officials continue to legitimize Zara and the KDP’s rule in the Nineveh Plains despite popular opposition has undermined the idea of a democratic Iraq. “In Saddam’s time we’d say, ‘Don’t speak. The walls have ears!’ It’s the same now,” Kado said. “Maybe they’re not killing, but it’s bad—not just for Assyrians but also for Kurds who stand against [the KDP]. There’s no future for us if the KDP isn’t removed from Alqosh. They want everybody to be controlled by them, either by force or money.”
If Washington and Baghdad want to ensure the continued existence of Iraq’s Indigenous peoples, they must give immediate support to the only force proven to promote the return of Assyrians to their villages: the Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU), an Assyrian-led force. Reporting to Iraq’s National Security Council, the NPU was formed in response to the disarmament and abandonment of the Assyrians of the plains by the Kurdish Peshmerga when the Islamic State invaded in 2014. The force received training from U.S.-led coalition forces and fought alongside them. Today, it controls a sizable portion of the southern Nineveh Plains.
Internally displaced Assyrians cite mistrust of security forces as the primary impediment to their return, so it is no surprise that the NPU—the only force made up of locals from the plains—has return rates in areas it controls significantly higher than in areas secured by Kurdish forces or Iran-backed militias alone and higher return rates than all areas controlled by other forces in the plains combined, according to a June assessment by the Assyrian Policy Institute (API).
The NPU is not backed by the United States and currently receives only tepid support from the Iraqi central government. Washington and Baghdad should make their support for the NPU explicit. It would address mistrust held by minority communities due to the Peshmerga’s 2014 retreat, shift a burden from Baghdad to a trustworthy force without a record of human rights abuses, and could alleviate the region’s refugee crisis.
Tens of thousands of Assyrians from the plains remain displaced in Jordan and Lebanon, and the API’s fieldwork suggests that a significant proportion would consider returning home under security conditions like those facilitated by the NPU. Finally, Baghdad should work toward implementing federalism by revisiting the Iraqi Council of Ministers’ January 2014 decision to establish a Nineveh Plains province for minorities like Assyrians and Yazidis.
Iraq’s Assyrians cannot endure another conflict. If Iraq’s Indigenous peoples are to have a future, there must be a reckoning with both Iran-backed militias and the KDP’s role in undermining the only option that has yielded results: empowering local Assyrians to defend themselves within proper legal authority, providing them a chance at survival in a land devoid of equality for generations.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Oslo Is Dead, the Two-State Solution Isn’t

After years of dismissing the idea , many American progressives—especially Jewish progressives—seem to have reached the conclusion that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become impossible and are now having serious conversations about a one-state solution .
The current flurry was sparked by Peter Beinart ’ s New York Times op-ed , “ I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State.
” However , these discussions are largely about justice for the Palestinians and about Jewish identity .
They are not really serious conversations about new policy approaches for ending the conflict .
Support for the two-state solution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the ways to accommodate two peoples between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea , the division of their common homeland into two states would be the most ennobled vision .
Rather , the two-state concept was embraced because it is the most , and perhaps the only , viable option for ending the conflict .
The two-state concept wasn ’ t embraced because it is the most noble solution , but because it is the only viable option for ending the conflict .
In arguing over whether or not the two-state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tendency to confuse the status of the two-state solution with that of the Oslo Peace Process .
Oslo was a very specific sequenced process with timetables and interim institutions .
The heart of Oslo is its commitment to direct Israel-PLO negotiations , and its prohibition of unilateral steps to “ change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
” While Oslo specified key issues for those permanent status negotiations—borders , settlements , refugees , security arrangements , and Jerusalem—it did not commit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s current dead end has historical precedent .
In 1947 , British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin , following the failure of multiple diplomatic efforts , announced to Parliament , “ it has become clear that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties.
” After declaring further negotiations pointless , he went on to say , “ We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course open to us is to submit the problem to the United Nations.
” The United Nations General Assembly responded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and creating a special committee , UNSCOP , which developed a fully detailed proposal for the division of Palestine into two states , with a map , an international regime for Jerusalem , a plan for economic union , and a process of implementation .
Months later , the General Assembly embodied this plan in the historic Partition Resolution .
The Partition Plan was accepted by the Zionist movement , but rejected by the Arab states and the Palestinians .
In May of 1948 , citing the Partition Resolution , the State of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new country found itself at war with five Arab states .
In 1988 , the PLO issued its own Declaration of Independence , also based on the Partition Resolution , which for the first time it accepted as legitimate—and as the basis for two states , one Arab and one Jewish .
Today , a new form of the 1947 U.N. process is possible .
One such approach , discussed below , was put forward in 2012 by former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami , former EU top diplomat Javier Solana , Nobel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rather than trying to develop an agreement through negotiations , it would re-establish UNSCOP , which would lay out a two-state plan with proposed solutions to all of the permanent status issues .
Then the parties would be asked to negotiate mutually agreed improvements .
This falls short of an imposed solution of the sort envisioned by the UN in 1947 .
Rather , it is a hybrid between Oslo and a new Partition Resolution .
Many observers , including EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell , contend that substantial annexation would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ questionable .
While annexation does violate the core principle of Oslo , it does not foreclose the possibility of Israel relinquishing or trading annexed territory .
After all , in 1981 , Israel annexed East Jerusalem , yet Ehud Barak in the 2001 Taba negotiations and Ehud Olmert in 2008 , agreed to transfer substantial parts of East Jerusalem to a future Palestinian state .
Similarly , Israel negotiated with Syria over the Golan Heights in 1994 , despite having annexed the territory in 1981 .
The most frequently cited factor in proclaiming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the presence of about 640,000 Israelis living east of the Green Line—the 1949 Armistice line .
Their presence is a major problem , but not an insurmountable one .
Approximately one-third of them ( 210,000 ) live in East Jerusalem , and the PLO accepts that they will remain .
Various land swap proposals , including those the PLO has supported and those that Israel has supported on past occasions , have shown that 70-80 percent of the West Bank settlers can be accommodated by an exchange of territory .
The remaining population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 30,000 families .
Many will respond to financial incentives to relocate either to Israel proper or to those settlements that will fall under Israeli sovereignty ; others could remain as permanent residents living inside the State of Palestine .
While annexation does violate the core principle of Oslo , it does not foreclose the possibility of Israel relinquishing or trading annexed territory .
Much of the despair over achieving a two-state end-of-conflict agreement ignores or misunderstands the specifics of the history of the negotiations .
There were only two short periods in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was serious about negotiating two states : Ehud Barak ( from 1999-2001 ) and Ehud Olmert ( from 2006-2009 ) .
In both cases the negotiations were cut short because of internal Israeli political developments .
Barak held productive negotiations at Taba in January 2001 , six months after the failed Camp David talks , but they could not be pursued because in February he lost an election to Ariel Sharon .
The Abbas-Olmert negotiations process ended because of Olmert ’ s criminal indictment .
Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister again in 2009 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a two-state solution .
Before Netanyahu ’ s return to the helm , the gap between Israel and the PLO narrowed on most issues—including Jerusalem , borders , land swaps , and security .
The one exception was refugees , and even here the Palestinian position moderated , but Olmert refused to agree to levels that had been acceptable to Israel at Taba .
Today , there are new ideas on some of these issues , including refugees , that could close the gap .
Some of these were discussed in high-level Track @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-state solution endures because there is no other viable option .
The primary alternative being proposed now , a one-state solution , has zero possibility of ending the conflict because it has zero support in Israel , and has no prospect of gaining such support .
Its proponents make reference to the importance of a compelling vision , such as a democracy with true equality , and how with such a vision a mass movement might be built .
But that mass movement , if it were to crystallize , would only emerge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be politically significant , but its chance of bringing any Israeli government to agree ( even under U.S. pressure ) to adding 5 million Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to the Israeli voter rolls is zero .
It is as fanciful as the idea that in a referendum Israel will , someday , agree to the return of 7 million Palestinian refugees .
While a two-state solution is still possible if there is another Oslo-like attempt to achieve it , with a Biden-Gantz-Abbas line-up , the effort is most likely to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process—in particular , one that can rekindle a belief among Israelis that maybe it really is possible to end the conflict .
To bring that about , there must be a fully detailed end-of-conflict proposal to which the Palestinian people , not just the PLO , says “ Yes.
” Getting to this Palestinian “ Yes ” is more likely to emerge from a U.N. or Quartet-led process than from one led by the United States—and it is certainly more likely via the U.N. than through more “ from the ground up ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a variant of the Solana/Ben-Ami proposal .
The U.N. Security Council ( or the General Assembly , if the U.S. government will not agree ) could draft a detailed peace agreement that is consistent with the Arab Peace Initiative , which offered Israel normalization contingent on its agreeing to a Palestinian state based on the June 4 , 1967 lines , a capital in East Jerusalem and a just solution to the refugee issue .
Rather than aiming to close the gap between Israel and the PLO ’ s positions , diplomats could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ win the strongest support of the two peoples .
Then , with a PLO endorsement , even if moderately tweaked , the U.N. plan would be put to a Palestinian referendum .
Responding to the 2006 Prisoners ’ Document on National Reconciliation , Hamas pledged that even if it disagrees , it would abide by a Palestinian referendum .
If such agreement is affirmed by the Palestinian people , then under U.N. auspices it could be presented to the Israelis , either in their own referendum or for six months of PLO-Israel negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can be agreed upon .
If Joe Biden becomes president , rather than pursuing the Oslo efforts of the Clinton and Obama administrations , he should do as Bevin did in 1947 and announce that there is little likelihood that further efforts based on the existing framework would yield a solution .
He could then balance Trump ’ s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital by recognizing a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem .
He could work to deepen Hamas ’ s commitment to abide by a Palestinian referendum .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. Security Council to re-establish UNSCOP to propose a comprehensive solution .

After years of dismissing the idea, many American progressives—especially Jewish progressives—seem to have reached the conclusion that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become impossible and are now having serious conversations about a one-state solution. The current flurry was sparked by Peter Beinart’s New York Times op-ed, “ I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State .”
After years of dismissing the idea, many American progressives—especially Jewish progressives—seem to have reached the conclusion that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become impossible and are now having serious conversations about a one-state solution. The current flurry was sparked by Peter Beinart’s New York Times op-ed, “I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State.”
However, these discussions are largely about justice for the Palestinians and about Jewish identity. They are not really serious conversations about new policy approaches for ending the conflict.
Support for the two-state solution never rested on the judgment that of all the ways to accommodate two peoples between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, the division of their common homeland into two states would be the most ennobled vision. Rather, the two-state concept was embraced because it is the most, and perhaps the only, viable option for ending the conflict.
The two-state concept wasn’t embraced because it is the most noble solution, but because it is the only viable option for ending the conflict.
In arguing over whether or not the two-state solution is dead, there is a tendency to confuse the status of the two-state solution with that of the Oslo Peace Process. Oslo was a very specific sequenced process with timetables and interim institutions. The heart of Oslo is its commitment to direct Israel-PLO negotiations, and its prohibition of unilateral steps to “change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” While Oslo specified key issues for those permanent status negotiations—borders, settlements, refugees, security arrangements, and Jerusalem—it did not commit to a two-state outcome.
Oslo’s current dead end has historical precedent. In 1947, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, following the failure of multiple diplomatic efforts, announced to Parliament, “it has become clear that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties.” After declaring further negotiations pointless, he went on to say, “We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course open to us is to submit the problem to the United Nations.”
The United Nations General Assembly responded by convening its first Special Session, and creating a special committee, UNSCOP, which developed a fully detailed proposal for the division of Palestine into two states, with a map, an international regime for Jerusalem, a plan for economic union, and a process of implementation. Months later, the General Assembly embodied this plan in the historic Partition Resolution.
The Partition Plan was accepted by the Zionist movement, but rejected by the Arab states and the Palestinians. In May of 1948, citing the Partition Resolution, the State of Israel was unilaterally declared. Immediately the new country found itself at war with five Arab states. In 1988, the PLO issued its own Declaration of Independence, also based on the Partition Resolution, which for the first time it accepted as legitimate—and as the basis for two states, one Arab and one Jewish.
Today, a new form of the 1947 U.N. process is possible. One such approach, discussed below, was put forward in 2012 by former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, former EU top diplomat Javier Solana, Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling, and myself. Rather than trying to develop an agreement through negotiations, it would re-establish UNSCOP, which would lay out a two-state plan with proposed solutions to all of the permanent status issues. Then the parties would be asked to negotiate mutually agreed improvements. This falls short of an imposed solution of the sort envisioned by the UN in 1947. Rather, it is a hybrid between Oslo and a new Partition Resolution.
Many observers, including EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, contend that substantial annexation would kill the two-state solution. This is questionable. While annexation does violate the core principle of Oslo, it does not foreclose the possibility of Israel relinquishing or trading annexed territory. After all, in 1981, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, yet Ehud Barak in the 2001 Taba negotiations and Ehud Olmert in 2008, agreed to transfer substantial parts of East Jerusalem to a future Palestinian state. Similarly, Israel negotiated with Syria over the Golan Heights in 1994, despite having annexed the territory in 1981.
The most frequently cited factor in proclaiming the death of the two-state solution is the presence of about 640,000 Israelis living east of the Green Line—the 1949 Armistice line. Their presence is a major problem, but not an insurmountable one. Approximately one-third of them (210,000) live in East Jerusalem, and the PLO accepts that they will remain.
Various land swap proposals, including those the PLO has supported and those that Israel has supported on past occasions, have shown that 70-80 percent of the West Bank settlers can be accommodated by an exchange of territory. The remaining population of around 120,000 people represents fewer than 30,000 families. Many will respond to financial incentives to relocate either to Israel proper or to those settlements that will fall under Israeli sovereignty; others could remain as permanent residents living inside the State of Palestine.
While annexation does violate the core principle of Oslo, it does not foreclose the possibility of Israel relinquishing or trading annexed territory.
Much of the despair over achieving a two-state end-of-conflict agreement ignores or misunderstands the specifics of the history of the negotiations. There were only two short periods in which there was an Israeli prime minister who was serious about negotiating two states: Ehud Barak (from 1999-2001) and Ehud Olmert (from 2006-2009).
In both cases the negotiations were cut short because of internal Israeli political developments. Barak held productive negotiations at Taba in January 2001, six months after the failed Camp David talks, but they could not be pursued because in February he lost an election to Ariel Sharon. The Abbas-Olmert negotiations process ended because of Olmert’s criminal indictment. Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister again in 2009, ending any serious attempt to reach a two-state solution.
Before Netanyahu’s return to the helm, the gap between Israel and the PLO narrowed on most issues—including Jerusalem, borders, land swaps, and security. The one exception was refugees, and even here the Palestinian position moderated, but Olmert refused to agree to levels that had been acceptable to Israel at Taba. Today, there are new ideas on some of these issues, including refugees, that could close the gap. Some of these were discussed in high-level Track Two sessions in 2014.
Ultimately the two-state solution endures because there is no other viable option. The primary alternative being proposed now, a one-state solution, has zero possibility of ending the conflict because it has zero support in Israel, and has no prospect of gaining such support.
Its proponents make reference to the importance of a compelling vision, such as a democracy with true equality, and how with such a vision a mass movement might be built. But that mass movement, if it were to crystallize, would only emerge in the United States. It would be politically significant, but its chance of bringing any Israeli government to agree (even under U.S. pressure) to adding 5 million Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to the Israeli voter rolls is zero. It is as fanciful as the idea that in a referendum Israel will, someday, agree to the return of 7 million Palestinian refugees.
While a two-state solution is still possible if there is another Oslo-like attempt to achieve it, with a Biden-Gantz-Abbas line-up, the effort is most likely to fail. All parties need a different process—in particular, one that can rekindle a belief among Israelis that maybe it really is possible to end the conflict. To bring that about, there must be a fully detailed end-of-conflict proposal to which the Palestinian people, not just the PLO, says “Yes.”
Getting to this Palestinian “Yes” is more likely to emerge from a U.N. or Quartet-led process than from one led by the United States—and it is certainly more likely via the U.N. than through more “from the ground up” Israel-PLO direct negotiations.
One possibility is a variant of the Solana/Ben-Ami proposal. The U.N. Security Council (or the General Assembly, if the U.S. government will not agree) could draft a detailed peace agreement that is consistent with the Arab Peace Initiative, which offered Israel normalization contingent on its agreeing to a Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967 lines, a capital in East Jerusalem and a just solution to the refugee issue.
Rather than aiming to close the gap between Israel and the PLO’s positions, diplomats could craft a peace plan most likely to win the strongest support of the two peoples. Then, with a PLO endorsement, even if moderately tweaked, the U.N. plan would be put to a Palestinian referendum. Responding to the 2006 Prisoners’ Document on National Reconciliation, Hamas pledged that even if it disagrees, it would abide by a Palestinian referendum. If such agreement is affirmed by the Palestinian people, then under U.N. auspices it could be presented to the Israelis, either in their own referendum or for six months of PLO-Israel negotiations, to see if a final draft can be agreed upon.
If Joe Biden becomes president, rather than pursuing the Oslo efforts of the Clinton and Obama administrations, he should do as Bevin did in 1947 and announce that there is little likelihood that further efforts based on the existing framework would yield a solution.
He could then balance Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital by recognizing a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. He could work to deepen Hamas’s commitment to abide by a Palestinian referendum. And most importantly, he could ask the U.N. Security Council to re-establish UNSCOP to propose a comprehensive solution.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-08--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Europe has taken a great leap forward in response to economic crisis—but now it needs to keep it up .
Meanwhile , presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has refused to condemn Israeli occupation , disappointing the party ’ s progressive wing .
And Colombian armed groups are capitalizing on the coronavirus pandemic , causing anguish and unrest in remote parts of the country .
1 .
It ’ s a New Europe—if You Can Keep It Europe has enjoyed a few good months , but it is far from being out of the woods .
The European Union should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems and the novelty of the crisis we face in 2020 , Foreign Policy ’ s Adam Tooze writes .
2 .
Europe Must Stand Up for Belarus The protests in Minsk , Belarus , ahead of the Aug. 9 presidential election come as Western powers are distracted .
But it is time for European democracies to take responsibility and provide their own strategic leadership , Benjamin Haddad and Ben Judah write .
The Beirut blast , which was strong enough to register as an earthquake two countries away , reopened old wounds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the country ’ s political elite , Rebecca Collard writes .
The most progressive wing of the U.S. Democratic Party has scored recent victories .
But when it comes to Israel , the Biden campaign refuses to take a stance against occupation , Foreign Policy ’ s Colum Lynch reports .
5 .
In Colombia , the Pandemic Provides Fertile Ground for Illegal Armed Groups Rather than granting a pause in violence , the pandemic has fueled Colombia ’ s conflict .
Armed groups are using the lockdown to expand their control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ report .

Europe has taken a great leap forward in response to economic crisis—but now it needs to keep it up.
Europe has taken a great leap forward in response to economic crisis—but now it needs to keep it up.
Meanwhile, presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has refused to condemn Israeli occupation, disappointing the party’s progressive wing.
And Colombian armed groups are capitalizing on the coronavirus pandemic, causing anguish and unrest in remote parts of the country.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks with newly-elected French President Emmanuel Macron on the terrace, with a view of the television tower in the background during his visit to the chancellor's office on May 15, 2017 in Berlin, Germany.
Europe has enjoyed a few good months, but it is far from being out of the woods. The European Union should not diminish the scale of its economic problems and the novelty of the crisis we face in 2020, Foreign Policy’s Adam Tooze writes.
Crowds gather for an opposition rally in Minsk, Belarus, on Aug. 6.
The protests in Minsk, Belarus, ahead of the Aug. 9 presidential election come as Western powers are distracted. But it is time for European democracies to take responsibility and provide their own strategic leadership, Benjamin Haddad and Ben Judah write.
A picture shows the destruction at Beirut port in the aftermath of a massive explosion.
The Beirut blast, which was strong enough to register as an earthquake two countries away, reopened old wounds. The Lebanese are blaming the government and the country’s political elite, Rebecca Collard writes.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks past then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden as he prepares to sign the guest book at the prime minister's residence in Jerusalem on March 9, 2010.
The most progressive wing of the U.S. Democratic Party has scored recent victories. But when it comes to Israel, the Biden campaign refuses to take a stance against occupation, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch reports.
Children talk with soldiers in a municipality of Chocó, Colombia, on June 9, 2017. The area has grown used to the sight of heavily armed soldiers and continues to see swarms of villagers displaced by clashes between armed groups.
Rather than granting a pause in violence, the pandemic has fueled Colombia’s conflict. Armed groups are using the lockdown to expand their control, Erika Piñeros and Carolina Loza León report.