foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--The Postwar Global Order That Never Happened

The Postwar Global Order That Never Happened This year , as we remember the 75th anniversary of World War II ’ s end , we should also remember the road not taken for U.S. foreign affairs .
An alternative vision for global order was developed during the war but lost during its aftermath .
Although this view of world affairs—call it the “ one world ” vision—never cohered around a single set of precepts and never became official policy , many thousands of Americans rallied around its iconoclastic brand of popular internationalism .
The lead exponent of the one-world idea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , business lawyer , world traveler , and bestselling author who had been the surprise Republican nominee for president in 1940 .
Little remembered beyond his ill-fated presidential run , Willkie should be recalled now for the picture of the world that he gave the country in 1942 and ’ 43 , during the darkest months of World War II .
His one-world ideals captured public imagination , only to be scorned as not tough-minded enough for the incipient Cold War .
Recalling them now might help us unlock new ways to see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equal to the complex interdependency that imperils the world today .
In late 1942 , President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Willkie to serve as his emissary on a world tour , carrying a message of American unity to unsure Allies and neutrals .
Forced to avoid occupied Europe , Willkie toured Africa , the Middle East , the Soviet Union , and China , meeting with everyday people but also with luminaries like Bernard Montgomery , Charles de Gaulle , Joseph Stalin , and Chiang Kai-shek .
Willkie discovered that people everywhere were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war might mean a new world order , one in which Western empire no longer shaped the fate of the globe .
Like Willkie , they had thrilled to Woodrow Wilson ’ s message of world freedom a generation before , only to find their hopes crushed when the mandate system erected by his League of Nations perpetuated European imperial power .
They had been newly encouraged in 1941 , when Roosevelt and Winston Churchill ’ s Atlantic Charter seemed to resuscitate those hopes , promising freedom and self-determination to all as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , Churchill had backtracked , and Roosevelt had gone silent , putting off all talk of postwar planning .
From Cairo to Baghdad to Chongqing , no question mattered more to a whole generation of anti-colonial activists .
Moved by this global surge in idealism , Willkie looked to bring it home .
In One World , the bestseller he wrote about his trip , he told Americans he was “ passing on an invitation ” from “ the peoples of the East.
” People everywhere were “ no longer willing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” They recognized that the world was growing ever more interdependent , creating a world society with no place for imperialism .
The global “ war of liberation , ” as Willkie called it , left the United States with a choice .
The country could go one of three ways .
“ Narrow nationalism ” meant the equivalent of prewar isolationism—and ultimately a limited prospect for postwar American life .
Continued “ international imperialism ” meant refusing to welcome the very sort of freedom dreams that floated American independence in the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a just world order based on the fact of global interconnection .
Realizing the full possibilities of interdependence meant recognizing independence everywhere .
It required “ the creation of a world in which there shall be an equality of opportunity for every race and nation.
” But the greatest challenge to realizing this equitable global society lay elsewhere .
During his visit to Moscow , Willkie saw that easing tensions between the United States and Soviet Union was the only way to stave off another age of great-power rivalry .
In his talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Soviet leader , looking for a way to assure him that the two wary allies could cooperate in the world beyond the war .
For Willkie , this was the linchpin of his strategic vision .
Contrary to later detractors who dismissed him as a naive utopian , his interest in U.S.-Soviet cooperation anchored a geopolitical analysis of the world to come .
The best postwar plan , Willkie felt , was clear-eyed cooperation with the Soviets , equal partnership with the Chinese , and a push to get the British and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Avoiding the standoff that would come to be called the Cold War was the way to found a new global society , as well as true peace and national security for the United States .
Willkie ’ s vision found a ready and eager audience .
Over 36 million people listened to the live radio report he delivered on all the major networks after his trip .
More than 4 million bought One World—the fastest-selling book in American history , according to some experts—and many millions more encountered his ideas in his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the summer of 1943 , as his book broke sales records , he gave a July Fourth radio address calling for the United States to add a “ declaration of interdependence among the nations of this one world ” to its own Declaration of Independence .
No such document was forthcoming , of course .
Over the coming years , mutual suspicion between the Americans and Soviets would narrow the terms of debate over foreign affairs—pushing independent national interests above interdependence .
Willkie spent the last act of his life—he succumbed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 52 , after another failed run for the presidency—arguing for a more democratic shape for what would become the United Nations .
But FDR ’ s vision was less democratic .
He wanted a world body controlled by “ Four Policemen ” —the United States , Britain , China , and the Soviet Union .
Smaller nations would advise , discuss , petition , and “ blow off steam.
” The final form of the Security Council—which added France to FDR ’ s original four powers and gave each member a veto over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing U.S.-Soviet conflict .
With the rise of the Cold War , a new consensus took hold , consigning Willkie ’ s vision to the dustbin of history .
One-world internationalism was naive , nascent Cold Warriors argued .
So-called “ globaloney , ” former Willkie ally and member of Congress Clare Boothe Luce sneered , was too trusting in good will between people and not hardheaded enough for a world carved up by sharp ideological divides .
One-worldism was no panacea , to be sure .
As its detractors noticed , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world connection for the existence of global community or the possibility of world political union .
In fact , even Willkie , had he lived , may have ended up as a more or less conventional Cold War liberal .
( He was , near the end of his life , expressing dismay at Stalin ’ s attitude toward Eastern Europe . )
But the eclipse of one-world strategy by hardheaded Cold War thinking ( extended by the global war on terrorism ) has obscured what Willkie discovered as the great problem of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States inherited a hierarchical interdependent world made by European empire .
The United States confronted a choice : continue the imperial great-power politics that had thrown the planet into two successive global conflicts or found something new .
Conventional wisdom holds that the country chose the latter , noble path .
The truth is less heroic .
It split the difference .
The United States set out to renovate that imperial structure for a new national challenge : assuming responsibility for the global capitalist system once overseen by the British Empire .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ markets , and far-flung military power that the United States defended against the Soviet Union in the Cold War and protected by bankrolling a host of new international organizations , such as the United Nations , the International Monetary Fund , the World Bank , and the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
The result was a paternalistic mix of benevolence and coercion .
Strategic favor went to Western Europe and Japan .
Some decolonizing nations were greeted with aid and loans for economic development , others with napalm or covert action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ complex , interdependent world that Willkie discovered in 1942 and 1943 .
But for decades now , our conventional responses to globalization have been mired in Cold War-style thinking : A “ narrow nationalism ” that sees American world leadership as indispensable fuels a modified form of “ international imperialism ” concerned to preserve U.S. power abroad .
The country has accepted the rewards of globalization—low prices on consumer goods and financial returns for the elite—but only the responsibilities that tend to redouble those rewards .
And it has driven the benefits of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many to shoulder its liabilities .
No wonder then that the early stages of America ’ s post-imperial decline have played out as cascading fragmentation amped up by a reckless chief executive and a disastrous response to the pandemic .
Meanwhile , the idea of “ one world ” mostly lives on as a kind of cliché , in “ We Are the World ” -style sentiment .
Take , for instance , the recent One World : Together at Home virtual concert , put on by the NGO Global Citizen , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eilish or Alicia Keys play their hits from lockdown and exhort us to “ wash your damn hands ” or “ take care of one another.
” It ’ s easy to sneer at this sort of thing as Bono-politics , the celebritification of global aid , or just more “ globaloney.
” But events like this raise millions of dollars for the global health response—for WHO , in this case—and one might argue that they reflect the actual shape of the world today better than the usual invocations of lost U.S. world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they suggest how we are all dependent on each other—and they tap into widely held feelings that could be harnessed for deeper political cooperation .
The coronavirus shows us that Willkie ’ s challenge remains ours today .
Some Americans , those who bought One World or logged on for One World : Together at Home or went to work for WHO or organizations like it , have long sensed this dilemma .
Recognizing complex global interdependency requires building a world system in which the United States must cooperate rather than dictate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global institutions could take many forms : for example , giving the U.N. General Assembly greater leverage over the Security Council or even expanding and reforming the Security Council altogether to reduce its power over the world body .
For the United States , it would mean returning to global climate talks and committing to a just transition from fossil fuels , as well as restoring funding to WHO and investing in robust interchange between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and global health officials to improve WHO ’ s performance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean creating a truly multilateral world bank based in multiple reserve currencies ( not just the U.S. dollar ) and dedicated to relieving debt crises across the globe .
But any efforts should take Willkie ’ s lesson to heart .
Just as he urged Americans to listen to anti-imperial insurgents during World War II , true interdependence now means hearing the voices and demands of those in the global south who stand to lose the most from the further erosion of global cooperation on a warming , fragmented planet .
Skeptics will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go unchecked in a world without vigorous U.S. leadership .
Those are real threats , but thinking that only America can tame them would be as shortsighted as dismissing one-world ideals was in 1945 .
American power is in its twilight years—the strife in the country ’ s hospitals and streets makes that clear .
Propping up old notions of American indispensability ensures that we are fighting yesterday ’ s battles .
The deeper challenges unite Russia , China , and the United States alike in shared peril .
Perhaps the greatest legacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the absolute determination of the United States to lead the rest of the capitalist world in the global capture and exploitation of the world ’ s natural resources .
That is the one world we live with today—a planet inescapably joined in a web of commodity chains , petroleum pipelines , greenhouse gases , and the terror of this and future zoonotic diseases gone pandemic .
The sooner we admit this reality the sooner we can build the global , interdependent response our shared crisis demands .

This year, as we remember the 75th anniversary of World War II’s end, we should also remember the road not taken for U.S. foreign affairs. An alternative vision for global order was developed during the war but lost during its aftermath. Although this view of world affairs—call it the “one world” vision—never cohered around a single set of precepts and never became official policy, many thousands of Americans rallied around its iconoclastic brand of popular internationalism.
This year, as we remember the 75th anniversary of World War II’s end, we should also remember the road not taken for U.S. foreign affairs. An alternative vision for global order was developed during the war but lost during its aftermath. Although this view of world affairs—call it the “one world” vision—never cohered around a single set of precepts and never became official policy, many thousands of Americans rallied around its iconoclastic brand of popular internationalism.
The lead exponent of the one-world idea was Wendell Willkie, a charismatic speaker, business lawyer, world traveler, and bestselling author who had been the surprise Republican nominee for president in 1940. Little remembered beyond his ill-fated presidential run, Willkie should be recalled now for the picture of the world that he gave the country in 1942 and ’43, during the darkest months of World War II. His one-world ideals captured public imagination, only to be scorned as not tough-minded enough for the incipient Cold War. Recalling them now might help us unlock new ways to see our current global crisis and find responses equal to the complex interdependency that imperils the world today.
In late 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Willkie to serve as his emissary on a world tour, carrying a message of American unity to unsure Allies and neutrals. Forced to avoid occupied Europe, Willkie toured Africa, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and China, meeting with everyday people but also with luminaries like Bernard Montgomery, Charles de Gaulle, Joseph Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek. Willkie discovered that people everywhere were restive and unsatisfied. They hoped the war might mean a new world order, one in which Western empire no longer shaped the fate of the globe. Like Willkie, they had thrilled to Woodrow Wilson’s message of world freedom a generation before, only to find their hopes crushed when the mandate system erected by his League of Nations perpetuated European imperial power.
They had been newly encouraged in 1941, when Roosevelt and Winston Churchill’s Atlantic Charter seemed to resuscitate those hopes, promising freedom and self-determination to all as the fruits of Allied victory. Soon after, however, Churchill had backtracked, and Roosevelt had gone silent, putting off all talk of postwar planning. From Cairo to Baghdad to Chongqing, no question mattered more to a whole generation of anti-colonial activists.
Moved by this global surge in idealism, Willkie looked to bring it home. In One World, the bestseller he wrote about his trip, he told Americans he was “passing on an invitation” from “the peoples of the East.” People everywhere were “no longer willing to be Eastern slaves for Western profits.” They recognized that the world was growing ever more interdependent, creating a world society with no place for imperialism.
The global “war of liberation,” as Willkie called it, left the United States with a choice. The country could go one of three ways. “Narrow nationalism” meant the equivalent of prewar isolationism—and ultimately a limited prospect for postwar American life. Continued “international imperialism” meant refusing to welcome the very sort of freedom dreams that floated American independence in the first place. The only way forward was a just world order based on the fact of global interconnection. Realizing the full possibilities of interdependence meant recognizing independence everywhere. It required “the creation of a world in which there shall be an equality of opportunity for every race and nation.”
But the greatest challenge to realizing this equitable global society lay elsewhere. During his visit to Moscow, Willkie saw that easing tensions between the United States and Soviet Union was the only way to stave off another age of great-power rivalry. In his talks with Stalin, he tried to woo the Soviet leader, looking for a way to assure him that the two wary allies could cooperate in the world beyond the war. For Willkie, this was the linchpin of his strategic vision. Contrary to later detractors who dismissed him as a naive utopian, his interest in U.S.-Soviet cooperation anchored a geopolitical analysis of the world to come. The best postwar plan, Willkie felt, was clear-eyed cooperation with the Soviets, equal partnership with the Chinese, and a push to get the British and other European allies to commit to decolonization. Avoiding the standoff that would come to be called the Cold War was the way to found a new global society, as well as true peace and national security for the United States.
Willkie’s vision found a ready and eager audience. Over 36 million people listened to the live radio report he delivered on all the major networks after his trip. More than 4 million bought One World—the fastest-selling book in American history, according to some experts—and many millions more encountered his ideas in his editorials, magazine pieces, and speeches. In the summer of 1943, as his book broke sales records, he gave a July Fourth radio address calling for the United States to add a “declaration of interdependence among the nations of this one world” to its own Declaration of Independence.
No such document was forthcoming, of course. Over the coming years, mutual suspicion between the Americans and Soviets would narrow the terms of debate over foreign affairs—pushing independent national interests above interdependence. Willkie spent the last act of his life—he succumbed to heart disease in October 1944 at 52, after another failed run for the presidency—arguing for a more democratic shape for what would become the United Nations. But FDR’s vision was less democratic. He wanted a world body controlled by “Four Policemen”—the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. Smaller nations would advise, discuss, petition, and “blow off steam.” The final form of the Security Council—which added France to FDR’s original four powers and gave each member a veto over majority-approved resolutions—would find itself hamstrung by the growing U.S.-Soviet conflict.
With the rise of the Cold War, a new consensus took hold, consigning Willkie’s vision to the dustbin of history. One-world internationalism was naive, nascent Cold Warriors argued. So-called “globaloney,” former Willkie ally and member of Congress Clare Boothe Luce sneered, was too trusting in good will between people and not hardheaded enough for a world carved up by sharp ideological divides.
One-worldism was no panacea, to be sure. As its detractors noticed, it tended to mistake the technical facts of world connection for the existence of global community or the possibility of world political union. In fact, even Willkie, had he lived, may have ended up as a more or less conventional Cold War liberal. (He was, near the end of his life, expressing dismay at Stalin’s attitude toward Eastern Europe.)
But the eclipse of one-world strategy by hardheaded Cold War thinking (extended by the global war on terrorism) has obscured what Willkie discovered as the great problem of the postwar period: that the United States inherited a hierarchical interdependent world made by European empire. The United States confronted a choice: continue the imperial great-power politics that had thrown the planet into two successive global conflicts or found something new. Conventional wisdom holds that the country chose the latter, noble path. The truth is less heroic. It split the difference.
The United States set out to renovate that imperial structure for a new national challenge: assuming responsibility for the global capitalist system once overseen by the British Empire. It was this new empire of influence, markets, and far-flung military power that the United States defended against the Soviet Union in the Cold War and protected by bankrolling a host of new international organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization (WHO). The result was a paternalistic mix of benevolence and coercion. Strategic favor went to Western Europe and Japan. Some decolonizing nations were greeted with aid and loans for economic development, others with napalm or covert action.
We have long lived in the complex, interdependent world that Willkie discovered in 1942 and 1943. But for decades now, our conventional responses to globalization have been mired in Cold War-style thinking: A “narrow nationalism” that sees American world leadership as indispensable fuels a modified form of “international imperialism” concerned to preserve U.S. power abroad. The country has accepted the rewards of globalization—low prices on consumer goods and financial returns for the elite—but only the responsibilities that tend to redouble those rewards. And it has driven the benefits of globalization to the few and forced the many to shoulder its liabilities.
No wonder then that the early stages of America’s post-imperial decline have played out as cascading fragmentation amped up by a reckless chief executive and a disastrous response to the pandemic. Meanwhile, the idea of “one world” mostly lives on as a kind of cliché, in “We Are the World”-style sentiment. Take, for instance, the recent One World: Together at Home virtual concert, put on by the NGO Global Citizen, where one could log on to hear Billie Eilish or Alicia Keys play their hits from lockdown and exhort us to “wash your damn hands” or “take care of one another.”
It’s easy to sneer at this sort of thing as Bono-politics, the celebritification of global aid, or just more “globaloney.” But events like this raise millions of dollars for the global health response—for WHO, in this case—and one might argue that they reflect the actual shape of the world today better than the usual invocations of lost U.S. world leadership. For all their easy sentiment, they suggest how we are all dependent on each other—and they tap into widely held feelings that could be harnessed for deeper political cooperation.
The coronavirus shows us that Willkie’s challenge remains ours today. Some Americans, those who bought One World or logged on for One World: Together at Home or went to work for WHO or organizations like it, have long sensed this dilemma. Recognizing complex global interdependency requires building a world system in which the United States must cooperate rather than dictate.
New faith in interdependent, democratic global institutions could take many forms: for example, giving the U.N. General Assembly greater leverage over the Security Council or even expanding and reforming the Security Council altogether to reduce its power over the world body. For the United States, it would mean returning to global climate talks and committing to a just transition from fossil fuels, as well as restoring funding to WHO and investing in robust interchange between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and global health officials to improve WHO’s performance. Most of all, it would mean creating a truly multilateral world bank based in multiple reserve currencies (not just the U.S. dollar) and dedicated to relieving debt crises across the globe. But any efforts should take Willkie’s lesson to heart. Just as he urged Americans to listen to anti-imperial insurgents during World War II, true interdependence now means hearing the voices and demands of those in the global south who stand to lose the most from the further erosion of global cooperation on a warming, fragmented planet.
Skeptics will object that Russian and Chinese authoritarianism will go unchecked in a world without vigorous U.S. leadership. Those are real threats, but thinking that only America can tame them would be as shortsighted as dismissing one-world ideals was in 1945. American power is in its twilight years—the strife in the country’s hospitals and streets makes that clear. Propping up old notions of American indispensability ensures that we are fighting yesterday’s battles.
The deeper challenges unite Russia, China, and the United States alike in shared peril. Perhaps the greatest legacy of the last 75 years has been the absolute determination of the United States to lead the rest of the capitalist world in the global capture and exploitation of the world’s natural resources. That is the one world we live with today—a planet inescapably joined in a web of commodity chains, petroleum pipelines, greenhouse gases, and the terror of this and future zoonotic diseases gone pandemic. The sooner we admit this reality the sooner we can build the global, interdependent response our shared crisis demands.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--Finland Has a Plan for Russia’s Little Green Men

A small part of the solution is a 19-minute film , “ Taistelukentta 2020 ” ( “ Battlefield 2020 ” ) , released on YouTube earlier this summer .
This is the latest iteration of a concept first tried during the 1990s , in which an short film , made with the aid of Finland ’ s public broadcaster YLE , is used to show how a modern-day conflict could develop from a crisis to a full-blown war , and how the FDF would handle the situation .
It ’ s an effective and meaningful publicity film—and the implicit enemy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acts as both a model of how to introduce the realities of modern-day conflict to a broad audience , and as an introduction to how the FDF—which is all too aware of its powerful and aggressive neighbor—sees the country ’ s strategic challenges .
The decision to publish the full film on YouTube and not just restrict it to internal training is notable in itself , as otherwise the majority of Finnish reservists would never get to see the material .
But while the basic premises of the video are clear enough to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more subtle aspects to the story that show how the FDF ’ s thinking has changed .
The film begins with a short prelude from FDF Col. Jyri Raitasalo .
Raitasalo , as both a doctor of political science and a military advisor to the minister of defense , is one of the most prolific Finnish military thinkers today .
He is also the face of the FDF throughout the film .
Besides providing the opening and closing thoughts , as part of the film narrative he is “ interviewed ” by YLE @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has done for real several times , on topics such as the INF-treaty , the infamous Airiston Helmi case of 2019 , and about Putin ’ s ambitions in a Foreign Policy piece last year .
Raitasalo acknowledges that recent events have changed how the FDF thinks about a potential conflict , and that war can start in many ways .
The film proper then starts with a depiction of large-scale cyberattacks on financial infrastructure and the power grid , as well as sabotage of local water supplies .
This is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , based in no small part on the crisis leading up to the Winter War , envisioned a “ gray period ” in which temperature was slowly rising .
During this time , the reserve would be mobilized and preparations for an enemy attack would be made .
One of the Finnish traits , however , is a deep respect for laws and regulations .
On the positive side , this translates into some of the highest trust in authorities and lowest levels of corruption measured in the world , but on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if faced with a development that it is not designed to meet .
The Russian annexation of Crimea made it painfully obvious to Finland that a system that relied on army units being mobilized through extra refresher exercises , that legally has to be called up months in advanced , was outdated .
A series of reforms were initiated of both the FDF organization and the legal framework surrounding its procedures .
The results of this reform work are evident in Taistelukentta .
The first hint is relatively minor : a brief mention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ water to areas affected by sabotage .
The Local Forces are similar to a home guard , consisting of volunteer reservists who agree to take part in additional refresher exercises and can be called up to assist civilian authorities in case of natural or man-made disasters .
They predate Crimea , going back to the early years of the millennium , but their importance has grown in recent years .
In wartime they would guard strategic targets and conduct simpler military tasks .
The fact that they are largely staffed with volunteers and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them well-suited to these kinds of missions .
But why would Finland become the target for enemy aggression ?
The film doesn ’ t go into details .
In fact , it doesn ’ t even mention who the attacker is .
However , current geopolitical trends together with the equipment and organization of the film ’ s unnamed adversary make Russia the obvious candidate .
The bigger picture is hinted at through newsreels and interviews with Raitasalo .
The crisis in Finland isn ’ t taking place in isolation , but against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Baltic Region with Russia and NATO as the two antagonists .
In this atmosphere of increased tension , “ someone ” is targeting Finland with increasingly aggressive measures to get the country to act in a certain way , and when this does not happen the measures are escalated .
Finland might not be a formal NATO member , but its status as one of the alliances ’ closest partner countries and its deep roots in the western democratic community means there ’ s not much room for picking sides—or desire to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vibrant business sector , which include both tourism ( Russians being the single largest group of foreign tourists in Finland ) as well as trade .
The general attitude among Finns toward individual Russians is also usually rather neutral ( although cultural shocks does happen ) .
However , based on a widely reported poll from last year , Finns are very critical of the current Russian administration and its foreign-policy choices , which they feel are causing instability both globally and in the Baltic Sea region .
As such , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficult to swallow for most viewers .
Much has been written on the role of Finland in a NATO-Russia showdown , but the key points are that Finnish territory is important for NATO ’ s reinforcement routes to the Baltic countries ( in particular Estonia ) , and as a staging ground for long-range weapons allowing for control of the sea lines between the Russian mainland and Kaliningrad , and affecting the Murmansk region and Russia ’ s nuclear weapons bastion in the far North .
And as usual , it is good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack on Finland , as opposed to neighboring Estonia , a NATO member , would not trigger NATO ’ s Article 5 .
While the film doesn ’ t go into details , you can certainly construct a plausible background scenario from the hints .
Russian aggression directed toward the Baltic countries ( or Poland ) leads to a serious international crisis , in the shadow of which Russia tries to push Finland to side with it in some way .
This could be directly , such as providing basing rights , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ honor EU ’ s mutual defense clause or allow NATO aircraft to use Finnish airspace in case of an outbreak of hostilities .
As Finland resists these demands , the heat is turned up , and the Kremlin ’ s attention is directed more towards Finland to ensure that the right flank is safe in case of a major war .
You may not be interested in war , but war might be interested in you , as the ( likely false ) Trotsky quote goes .
As the measures against Finland are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Finland post-Crimea start to kick into effect .
The importance of these might not be obvious , as they go by in passing throughout the film , but in a real-life crisis they would mark important milestones .
These include the ability to fast-track mobilization of certain units as well as to raise the peacetime limits on the maximum number of days of refresher exercises that can be required from a reservist , changes that were introduced in 2016 .
These kinds of tailored responses are particularly important as a crisis can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ An additional complication for Finland is that the political system relies heavily on the parliament .
The 200-seat chamber currently holds nine parties , five of which have 20 seats or more .
As such , even a single majority will require at least three parties agreeing , leading to worries about disinformation and political partisanship causing delays in the ordinary procedures , meaning that fast tracks are seen as vital .
Once the shooting starts , the changed nature of the FDF itself starts to show .
When an airliner squawking an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Finland , and armed men start streaming out of it , the star of FDF ’ s post-Crimea reforms enters the stage .
The readiness units , known by their Finnish abbreviation VYKS , are set up by all peacetime garrisons to provide a quick reaction force .
These combined arms formations are staffed by a combination of professional soldiers and conscripts volunteering for additional service and are trained to handle everything from “ little green men ” to full-scale war .
As such , while the first step when someone starts shooting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in “ Taistelukentta ” the local police quickly alert the FDF and ask for assistance .
Soon the commander of the local VYKS has taken charge of the whole situation , bringing with him not only infantry , but also tanks , armored personnel carriers , and artillery , as well as a detachment of the Utti Jaeger regiment , the country ’ s leading special forces unit , who are flown in by helicopter .
However , while the Kajaani situation is quickly cleared through an assault on the terminal building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation escalates elsewhere .
“ Taistelukentta ” shows the navy setting up defensive minefields , a tried-and-tested tactic in the shallow Baltic Sea that still is a key part of the Finnish Navy ’ s doctrine , both for stopping hostile forces from landing on Finnish soil and for deterring enemy surface and subsurface units from intercepting merchant shipping .
With Finland reliant on imports for a number of goods , including fuel , food , medicines , and certain high-tech weaponry , keeping the shipping lanes open is a must during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the movie emerges far from Kajaani , when an enemy marine-mechanized company starts rolling off civilian ro-ro vessels ( roll-on , roll-off ) in the port of Hanko as the city ’ s small airfield simultaneously suffers an airborne assault .
Since Hanko is the southernmost point on the Finnish mainland , the peninsula has throughout history provided a base for naval units and coastal artillery that can control the western inlet to the Gulf of Finland .
As such , basing surface vessels and modern anti-ship systems there would allow for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tallinn , and Paldiski , but also St Petersburg and Vyborg , from the Baltic Sea proper and beyond .
As the FDF is mobilized by this stage , it is not the VYKS that get to greet the invaders , but mobilized wartime units manned with a combination of professionals and reservists .
The spearhead of the Finnish wartime army is made up of battlegroups , a catch-all term that describes a unit with integral supporting arms , allowing it to solve missions independently or as part of larger task forces .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ having a lead motorized battlegroup being reinforced with armored and infantry units able to counter the enemy advance from land , while at the same time the elite marine infantry of the Finnish Navy , the coastal jaegers of the Nyland brigade , cut off the enemy supply lines by capturing key islands south of the peninsula .
At the same time , the authorities try to evacuate the civilian population .
This is another aspect that is easily overlooked when speculating about what the next war would look like , but especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as those Finland ( and NATO ) is planning for , minimizing losses to friendly populations is a key issue .
For Finland , which successfully evacuated large parts of the population away from the fighting during the Second World War , large-scale evacuations are still seen as an option , and the evacuation of 600 inhabitants of the real-world village of Degerby was included in a military exercise back in 2018 .
The rest of the film can be best described as B-roll portraying the events along the main front , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Finnish soldiers in the midst of the battle .
These provide additional material with which the young conscript can identify , and provide food for thought for questions such as , “ How would my war look ?
” and “ What would I feel ?
” The short film is a powerful educational tool for creating serious discussions between the officers and the conscripts about many aspects of their training .
But it is also , whether planned as such or not , an important statement to potential adversaries and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against outside pressure .
Strategists , soldiers , and politicians in other nations stuck in lockdown should spare the 20 minutes to familiarize themselves with the Finnish plans .

Most European countries have abandoned conscription, but Finland is stubbornly holding out. While the number of recruits is dwindling, and currently only two-thirds of the young men serve in the armed forces, the system enjoys popular support and seems set to remain. Yet the last time the Finnish Defence Forces saw large-scale action was World War II. The so-called Winter War of 1939-1940, when Finland held out against a Soviet invasion, dominates the popular imagination. That’s tough on the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF), who deal with a large number of conscripts every year for whom war is thought of as a thing of the past. General conscription means that the term “reservists” effectively describes the majority of young and middle-aged Finnish men, as well as a small but rising number of women. Unlike the reserve forces of most volunteer services, the majority of reservists have little to no interaction with the FDF after their mandatory service is done.
A small part of the solution is a 19-minute film, “Taistelukentta 2020” (“Battlefield 2020”), released on YouTube earlier this summer. This is the latest iteration of a concept first tried during the 1990s, in which an short film, made with the aid of Finland’s public broadcaster YLE, is used to show how a modern-day conflict could develop from a crisis to a full-blown war, and how the FDF would handle the situation. It’s an effective and meaningful publicity film—and the implicit enemy is still the Russians. The film acts as both a model of how to introduce the realities of modern-day conflict to a broad audience, and as an introduction to how the FDF—which is all too aware of its powerful and aggressive neighbor—sees the country’s strategic challenges.
The decision to publish the full film on YouTube and not just restrict it to internal training is notable in itself, as otherwise the majority of Finnish reservists would never get to see the material. But while the basic premises of the video are clear enough to the casual viewer, there are several more subtle aspects to the story that show how the FDF’s thinking has changed.
The film begins with a short prelude from FDF Col. Jyri Raitasalo. Raitasalo, as both a doctor of political science and a military advisor to the minister of defense, is one of the most prolific Finnish military thinkers today. He is also the face of the FDF throughout the film. Besides providing the opening and closing thoughts, as part of the film narrative he is “interviewed” by YLE to provide expert commentary about the developments—something he has done for real several times, on topics such as the INF-treaty, the infamous Airiston Helmi case of 2019, and about Putin’s ambitions in a Foreign Policy piece last year. Raitasalo acknowledges that recent events have changed how the FDF thinks about a potential conflict, and that war can start in many ways.
Video clip
The film proper then starts with a depiction of large-scale cyberattacks on financial infrastructure and the power grid, as well as sabotage of local water supplies. This is the first key point. Traditional Finnish thinking, based in no small part on the crisis leading up to the Winter War, envisioned a “gray period” in which temperature was slowly rising. During this time, the reserve would be mobilized and preparations for an enemy attack would be made. One of the Finnish traits, however, is a deep respect for laws and regulations. On the positive side, this translates into some of the highest trust in authorities and lowest levels of corruption measured in the world, but on the flip side the system is extremely inflexible if faced with a development that it is not designed to meet.
The Russian annexation of Crimea made it painfully obvious to Finland that a system that relied on army units being mobilized through extra refresher exercises, that legally has to be called up months in advanced, was outdated. A series of reforms were initiated of both the FDF organization and the legal framework surrounding its procedures. The results of this reform work are evident in Taistelukentta.
The first hint is relatively minor: a brief mention of local forces helping distribute clean drinking water to areas affected by sabotage. The Local Forces are similar to a home guard, consisting of volunteer reservists who agree to take part in additional refresher exercises and can be called up to assist civilian authorities in case of natural or man-made disasters. They predate Crimea, going back to the early years of the millennium, but their importance has grown in recent years. In wartime they would guard strategic targets and conduct simpler military tasks. The fact that they are largely staffed with volunteers and set up on a local basis makes them well-suited to these kinds of missions.
Reservist readiness units have been called up for voluntary refresher exercises in Hanko, Finland.
But why would Finland become the target for enemy aggression? The film doesn’t go into details. In fact, it doesn’t even mention who the attacker is. However, current geopolitical trends together with the equipment and organization of the film’s unnamed adversary make Russia the obvious candidate.
The bigger picture is hinted at through newsreels and interviews with Raitasalo. The crisis in Finland isn’t taking place in isolation, but against a backdrop of increased tension in the Baltic Region with Russia and NATO as the two antagonists. In this atmosphere of increased tension, “someone” is targeting Finland with increasingly aggressive measures to get the country to act in a certain way, and when this does not happen the measures are escalated. Finland might not be a formal NATO member, but its status as one of the alliances’ closest partner countries and its deep roots in the western democratic community means there’s not much room for picking sides—or desire to do so. Finland and Russia do share a vibrant business sector, which include both tourism (Russians being the single largest group of foreign tourists in Finland) as well as trade. The general attitude among Finns toward individual Russians is also usually rather neutral (although cultural shocks does happen). However, based on a widely reported poll from last year, Finns are very critical of the current Russian administration and its foreign-policy choices, which they feel are causing instability both globally and in the Baltic Sea region. As such, the political scene-setting shouldn’t be too difficult to swallow for most viewers.
Much has been written on the role of Finland in a NATO-Russia showdown, but the key points are that Finnish territory is important for NATO’s reinforcement routes to the Baltic countries (in particular Estonia), and as a staging ground for long-range weapons allowing for control of the sea lines between the Russian mainland and Kaliningrad, and affecting the Murmansk region and Russia’s nuclear weapons bastion in the far North. And as usual, it is good to keep in mind that a Russian attack on Finland, as opposed to neighboring Estonia, a NATO member, would not trigger NATO’s Article 5.
While the film doesn’t go into details, you can certainly construct a plausible background scenario from the hints. Russian aggression directed toward the Baltic countries (or Poland) leads to a serious international crisis, in the shadow of which Russia tries to push Finland to side with it in some way. This could be directly, such as providing basing rights, or indirectly through publicly making commitments not to honor EU’s mutual defense clause or allow NATO aircraft to use Finnish airspace in case of an outbreak of hostilities. As Finland resists these demands, the heat is turned up, and the Kremlin’s attention is directed more towards Finland to ensure that the right flank is safe in case of a major war. You may not be interested in war, but war might be interested in you, as the (likely false) Trotsky quote goes.
The air operations center is alerted to a potential missile attack from the sea.
As the measures against Finland are stepped up, the legal changes introduced in Finland post-Crimea start to kick into effect. The importance of these might not be obvious, as they go by in passing throughout the film, but in a real-life crisis they would mark important milestones. These include the ability to fast-track mobilization of certain units as well as to raise the peacetime limits on the maximum number of days of refresher exercises that can be required from a reservist, changes that were introduced in 2016. These kinds of tailored responses are particularly important as a crisis can develop swiftly and in unexpected directions. An additional complication for Finland is that the political system relies heavily on the parliament. The 200-seat chamber currently holds nine parties, five of which have 20 seats or more. As such, even a single majority will require at least three parties agreeing, leading to worries about disinformation and political partisanship causing delays in the ordinary procedures, meaning that fast tracks are seen as vital.
Once the shooting starts, the changed nature of the FDF itself starts to show. When an airliner squawking an emergency lands at Kajaani airport, central Finland, and armed men start streaming out of it, the star of FDF’s post-Crimea reforms enters the stage. The readiness units, known by their Finnish abbreviation VYKS, are set up by all peacetime garrisons to provide a quick reaction force. These combined arms formations are staffed by a combination of professional soldiers and conscripts volunteering for additional service and are trained to handle everything from “little green men” to full-scale war. As such, while the first step when someone starts shooting in Finland is to call the police, in “Taistelukentta” the local police quickly alert the FDF and ask for assistance. Soon the commander of the local VYKS has taken charge of the whole situation, bringing with him not only infantry, but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, as well as a detachment of the Utti Jaeger regiment, the country’s leading special forces unit, who are flown in by helicopter.
The operations center learns that an armed group has landed at the airport and that airport staff have been shot.
However, while the Kajaani situation is quickly cleared through an assault on the terminal building where the gunmen are holed up, the situation escalates elsewhere. “Taistelukentta” shows the navy setting up defensive minefields, a tried-and-tested tactic in the shallow Baltic Sea that still is a key part of the Finnish Navy’s doctrine, both for stopping hostile forces from landing on Finnish soil and for deterring enemy surface and subsurface units from intercepting merchant shipping. With Finland reliant on imports for a number of goods, including fuel, food, medicines, and certain high-tech weaponry, keeping the shipping lanes open is a must during any prolonged conflict.
The next threat in the movie emerges far from Kajaani, when an enemy marine-mechanized company starts rolling off civilian ro-ro vessels (roll-on, roll-off) in the port of Hanko as the city’s small airfield simultaneously suffers an airborne assault. Since Hanko is the southernmost point on the Finnish mainland, the peninsula has throughout history provided a base for naval units and coastal artillery that can control the western inlet to the Gulf of Finland. As such, basing surface vessels and modern anti-ship systems there would allow for cutting off cities such as Helsinki, Tallinn, and Paldiski, but also St Petersburg and Vyborg, from the Baltic Sea proper and beyond.
Video clip
As the FDF is mobilized by this stage, it is not the VYKS that get to greet the invaders, but mobilized wartime units manned with a combination of professionals and reservists. The spearhead of the Finnish wartime army is made up of battlegroups, a catch-all term that describes a unit with integral supporting arms, allowing it to solve missions independently or as part of larger task forces. This is illustrated in the film by having a lead motorized battlegroup being reinforced with armored and infantry units able to counter the enemy advance from land, while at the same time the elite marine infantry of the Finnish Navy, the coastal jaegers of the Nyland brigade, cut off the enemy supply lines by capturing key islands south of the peninsula.
At the same time, the authorities try to evacuate the civilian population. This is another aspect that is easily overlooked when speculating about what the next war would look like, but especially in the case of a defensive war such as those Finland (and NATO) is planning for, minimizing losses to friendly populations is a key issue. For Finland, which successfully evacuated large parts of the population away from the fighting during the Second World War, large-scale evacuations are still seen as an option, and the evacuation of 600 inhabitants of the real-world village of Degerby was included in a military exercise back in 2018.
Video clip
The rest of the film can be best described as B-roll portraying the events along the main front, showing attacks and counterattacks, artillery concentrations, and Finnish soldiers in the midst of the battle. These provide additional material with which the young conscript can identify, and provide food for thought for questions such as, “How would my war look?” and “What would I feel?”
The short film is a powerful educational tool for creating serious discussions between the officers and the conscripts about many aspects of their training. But it is also, whether planned as such or not, an important statement to potential adversaries and friends that Finland plans on defending itself against outside pressure. Strategists, soldiers, and politicians in other nations stuck in lockdown should spare the 20 minutes to familiarize themselves with the Finnish plans.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-15--The UAE-Israel Agreement Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be

The UAE-Israel Agreement Isn ’ t All It ’ s Cracked Up to Be According to conventional wisdom , including several articles in Foreign Policy , the recently announced United Arab Emirates-Israel agreement—also known as the Abraham Accords—is an unambiguous win for Israel and the Trump administration .
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s government challenged the long-held premises of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres ’ s vision of a “ New Middle East , ” because it did not have to make any significant concessions to obtain recognition from an Arab state ( in other words , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right to annex portions of the West Bank , only delay them ) .
Trump can use this agreement in his own reelection campaign to strengthen his deal-making and foreign policy bona fides , allowing him to say that he is the first president to usher in a peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state since 1994 .
After the champagne corks have popped in Washington and Jerusalem , it is important to recognize the potential downsides of this deal .
It is certainly a good thing that more than 25 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel has made peace and obtained recognition from another Arab state .
However , after the champagne corks have popped in Jerusalem , it is important to recognize the potential downsides of this deal .
First , Israeli annexation of the West Bank has been suspended , but it has not been abandoned—and the next U.S. administration will have to deal with it .
Netanyahu hailed the beginning of a “ new era with the Arab world , ” and claimed , using a euphemism for annexation , that “ Extending sovereignty will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Some observers argue that this agreement provides Netanyahu with the political space he needs to climb down from his promises on annexation with minimal consequences .
Others posit that this has brought a sigh of relief to countries like Jordan because it has removed the possibility of a major upheaval that could have brought down the monarchy .
But instead of backing down from the extension of sovereignty , Netanyahu and Trump have simply kicked the can down the road .
Netanyahu can not politically afford to ignore annexation forever .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those of the next U.S. administration because of his commitment to working with Washington on the issue , while unable to afford abandoning one of his own key constituencies : West Bank settlers .
Netanyahu is likely to face a backlash among his supporters in the settlements who favor total annexation of the West Bank .
For these settlers , partial annexation ( say , of the Jordan Valley alone ) was never sufficient ; in their view , only the extension of total Israeli sovereignty would provide for their security .
Instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Trump have simply kicked the can down the road .
Abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop , and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters .
This could lead them to abandon his Likud party and throw their support behind other parties on the right , such as Yamina or Avigdor Lieberman ’ s Yisrael Beitenu .
Alternatively , they could simply stay home and not vote at all .
Netanyahu is unlikely to pick up support from many centrist , center-left , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which means his support among settlers is vital .
It is unclear how either a second Trump or Biden administration would deal with annexation .
Joe Biden has repeatedly stressed his pro-Israel credentials , his opposition to annexation , and his unwillingness to impose sanctions upon Israel ( to the consternation of progressives in the Democratic Party such as Senator Bernie Sanders ) .
Once the issue returns—and it will—the next administration will have to decide how much pressure to apply on Israel and which policies might either compel Netanyahu to back down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the future .
While some countries in the region , such as Egypt and Jordan , have welcomed the agreement , it is likely to worsen the security dilemma between the UAE and Iran .
Although the UAE ’ s leadership was highly critical of the 2015 nuclear deal , over the past year , the UAE has altered its posture toward Iran , signaling that is interested in moving from confrontation toward détente .
Once news arrived of the Abraham Accords , Iran called it a “ dagger that was unjustly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Palestinian people and all Muslims.
” That means the Iran crisis of the past year will worsen .
After all , presidential elections are scheduled for next year in Iran and this agreement could allow a hardline conservative candidate to run on a platform that argues Iran is isolated and surrounded by hostile powers .
Such rhetoric has the potential to increase domestic opposition to a renewal or extension of the nuclear deal and could perpetuate the ongoing nuclear crisis set in motion by the Trump administration ’ s withdrawal from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the agreement , adding it to the series of ongoing disputes it already has with the UAE , from Libya to the blockade of Qatar , and drilling for natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean .
Ankara has now threatened to cut off ties completely with the UAE—further complicating diplomacy in the region as Turkey aligns itself more clearly in opposition to Israel and other U.S. allies .
Rather than seeing how the UAE-Israel deal could antagonize Iran and drive Turkey , a NATO ally , further into the embrace of anti-American forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domino imagery as they celebrate the agreement .
In official remarks , Trump said , “ Now that the ice has been broken , I expect more Arab and Muslim countries to follow the United Arab Emirates ’ lead.
” Netanyahu repeated the theme , declaring “ There will be other Arab and Muslim states that will join the circle of peace with us.
” It ’ s unclear whether other Arab states will actually follow the UAE ’ s lead in fully recognizing Israel .
It is not uncommon for decision-makers to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ examining the consequences of their actions or selling their policies .
However , it ’ s unclear whether other Arab states will actually follow the UAE ’ s lead in fully recognizing Israel .
This would be a welcome outcome , but there is room for caution .
For example , former Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat ’ s Camp David peace treaty with Israel resulted in more than a decade ’ s worth of isolation for Egypt—and his assassination in 1981 ; Jordan ’ s peace treaty forced King Hussein to crack down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The UAE will be treated as a test case for other Arab leaders .
Saudi Arabia , for instance , may find it difficult to fully normalize relations with Israel because of the disputed status of Jerusalem .
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Arab leaders will think twice before pursuing public normalization with Israel .
The Abraham Accords may be the most significant foreign-policy accomplishment of the Trump administration ; it is no small achievement that Israel has been recognized by a non-neighboring Arab country .
However , there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be ignored : Annexation has been delayed rather than taken off the table ; the security dilemma between the UAE and Iran could get worse ; and the Israeli fantasy of falling dominoes could prove short-lived if the new deal isn ’ t as popular in Abu Dhabi as it is in Jerusalem .

According to conventional wisdom, including several articles in Foreign Policy, the recently announced United Arab Emirates-Israel agreement—also known as the Abraham Accords —is an unambiguous win for Israel and the Trump administration .
According to conventional wisdom, including several articles in Foreign Policy, the recently announced United Arab Emirates-Israel agreement—also known as the Abraham Accords—is an unambiguous win for Israel and the Trump administration.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government challenged the long-held premises of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s vision of a “New Middle East,” because it did not have to make any significant concessions to obtain recognition from an Arab state (in other words, it did not have to give up its right to annex portions of the West Bank, only delay them).
Trump can use this agreement in his own reelection campaign to strengthen his deal-making and foreign policy bona fides, allowing him to say that he is the first president to usher in a peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state since 1994.
After the champagne corks have popped in Washington and Jerusalem, it is important to recognize the potential downsides of this deal.
It is certainly a good thing that more than 25 years after its peace agreement with Jordan, Israel has made peace and obtained recognition from another Arab state. However, after the champagne corks have popped in Jerusalem, it is important to recognize the potential downsides of this deal.
First, Israeli annexation of the West Bank has been suspended, but it has not been abandoned—and the next U.S. administration will have to deal with it. Netanyahu hailed the beginning of a “new era with the Arab world,” and claimed, using a euphemism for annexation, that “Extending sovereignty will only be done alongside the United States.”
Some observers argue that this agreement provides Netanyahu with the political space he needs to climb down from his promises on annexation with minimal consequences. Others posit that this has brought a sigh of relief to countries like Jordan because it has removed the possibility of a major upheaval that could have brought down the monarchy.
But instead of backing down from the extension of sovereignty, Netanyahu and Trump have simply kicked the can down the road.
Netanyahu cannot politically afford to ignore annexation forever. He has tied his hands as well as those of the next U.S. administration because of his commitment to working with Washington on the issue, while unable to afford abandoning one of his own key constituencies: West Bank settlers.
Netanyahu is likely to face a backlash among his supporters in the settlements who favor total annexation of the West Bank. For these settlers, partial annexation (say, of the Jordan Valley alone) was never sufficient; in their view, only the extension of total Israeli sovereignty would provide for their security.
Instead of backing down from annexation, Netanyahu and Trump have simply kicked the can down the road.
Abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop, and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters. This could lead them to abandon his Likud party and throw their support behind other parties on the right, such as Yamina or Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu.
Alternatively, they could simply stay home and not vote at all. Netanyahu is unlikely to pick up support from many centrist, center-left, or left-of-center supporters for the Abraham Accords, which means his support among settlers is vital.
It is unclear how either a second Trump or Biden administration would deal with annexation. Joe Biden has repeatedly stressed his pro-Israel credentials, his opposition to annexation, and his unwillingness to impose sanctions upon Israel (to the consternation of progressives in the Democratic Party such as Senator Bernie Sanders).
Once the issue returns—and it will—the next administration will have to decide how much pressure to apply on Israel and which policies might either compel Netanyahu to back down or manage the negative consequences of annexation in the future.
While some countries in the region, such as Egypt and Jordan, have welcomed the agreement, it is likely to worsen the security dilemma between the UAE and Iran. Although the UAE’s leadership was highly critical of the 2015 nuclear deal, over the past year, the UAE has altered its posture toward Iran, signaling that is interested in moving from confrontation toward détente.
Once news arrived of the Abraham Accords, Iran called it a “dagger that was unjustly struck by the UAE in the back of the Palestinian people and all Muslims.” That means the Iran crisis of the past year will worsen. After all, presidential elections are scheduled for next year in Iran and this agreement could allow a hardline conservative candidate to run on a platform that argues Iran is isolated and surrounded by hostile powers.
Such rhetoric has the potential to increase domestic opposition to a renewal or extension of the nuclear deal and could perpetuate the ongoing nuclear crisis set in motion by the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal.
Turkey has also condemned the agreement, adding it to the series of ongoing disputes it already has with the UAE, from Libya to the blockade of Qatar, and drilling for natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has now threatened to cut off ties completely with the UAE—further complicating diplomacy in the region as Turkey aligns itself more clearly in opposition to Israel and other U.S. allies.
Rather than seeing how the UAE-Israel deal could antagonize Iran and drive Turkey, a NATO ally, further into the embrace of anti-American forces, U.S. and Israeli decision-makers have employed domino imagery as they celebrate the agreement. In official remarks, Trump said, “Now that the ice has been broken, I expect more Arab and Muslim countries to follow the United Arab Emirates’ lead.” Netanyahu repeated the theme, declaring “There will be other Arab and Muslim states that will join the circle of peace with us.”
It’s unclear whether other Arab states will actually follow the UAE’s lead in fully recognizing Israel.
It is not uncommon for decision-makers to invoke the image of falling dominoes when examining the consequences of their actions or selling their policies. However, it’s unclear whether other Arab states will actually follow the UAE’s lead in fully recognizing Israel. This would be a welcome outcome, but there is room for caution.
For example, former Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat’s Camp David peace treaty with Israel resulted in more than a decade’s worth of isolation for Egypt—and his assassination in 1981; Jordan’s peace treaty forced King Hussein to crack down on one-time supporters in the Muslim Brotherhood.
The UAE will be treated as a test case for other Arab leaders. Saudi Arabia, for instance, may find it difficult to fully normalize relations with Israel because of the disputed status of Jerusalem. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Arab leaders will think twice before pursuing public normalization with Israel.
The Abraham Accords may be the most significant foreign-policy accomplishment of the Trump administration; it is no small achievement that Israel has been recognized by a non-neighboring Arab country.
However, there are many potential consequences that cannot be ignored: Annexation has been delayed rather than taken off the table; the security dilemma between the UAE and Iran could get worse; and the Israeli fantasy of falling dominoes could prove short-lived if the new deal isn’t as popular in Abu Dhabi as it is in Jerusalem.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-16--Why Protests Threaten Dictatorships but Make Democracies Stronger

Over the last few years , discussions of American decline have become commonplace —but recent events have made them more prominent .
That ’ s because the country that marshalled the resources and resolve to help win two world wars and a cold war has proven unable to deal with the challenges thrown up by the coronavirus .
In light of these events , the eminent historian Harold James wrote that “ like the Soviet Union in its final years , the United States is reeling from failures of leadership and suppressed socioeconomic tensions.
” It is important to remember @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until the moment the Soviet system collapsed , very few thought it could actually happen.
” Critics of the United States and of democracy are even more eager to portray recent events as confirming the debility of both .
As Peter Rough wrote recently in Foreign Policy , “ China in particular has been extremely adept at exploiting the virus for its global propaganda war against the United States.
” It has also portrayed the protests as “ another sign of American decline ” and as a reflection of the weakness and disorder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubt that the Trump administration ’ s response to the pandemic has revealed serious weaknesses .
But recent events also reveal crucial potential strengths of the American political system .
There is no doubt that the Trump administration ’ s response to the pandemic has revealed serious weaknesses in American democracy .
But recent events also reveal crucial potential strengths of the American political system , as well as strengths of democracy in general .
Understanding this , and why the United States might emerge from this period of turmoil stronger rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step back and consider the difference between what political scientists refer to as systemic and performance legitimacy .
This is the type of legitimacy American democracy enjoys : Despite growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions , most Americans continue to believe that democracy is the best or most appropriate system overall .
Because it is anchored in relatively stable political values and identities , rather than in short-term evaluations of particular outcomes , systemic legitimacy is fairly durable .
Beyond this , democracy ’ s legitimacy and durability are enhanced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ express their discontent and demands in myriad ways—through protest , civil society , media—and can make use of an institutionalized method—elections—to hold leaders and governments accountable .
Cumulatively , these mechanisms provide ways for democracy to “ self-correct ” or adapt to new demands and challenges , without needing to get rid of the system itself .
It is possible , although unusual , for nondemocratic regimes to enjoy some systemic legitimacy .
During the early to mid-20th century , for example , a critical minority of citizens in Russia , Eastern Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : It had defeated fascism in Europe and corrupt regimes in Asia , it claimed to be part of the “ forward march ” of history , and it promised to create a fairer version of modernity than the one offered by capitalism .
By the end of the 20th century , however , communist regimes had lost whatever systemic legitimacy they may have had .
Once communist regimes could no longer rely on a reservoir of citizen belief in the inherent legitimacy , or desirability , of communism , they came to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictatorships .
Lacking systemic legitimacy , they increasingly had to rely on what political scientists call “ performance legitimacy ” to justify their hold on power .
Here citizens support a regime not on ideological but practical grounds : the promotion of economic growth ; the maintenance of order ; protecting the interests of a threatened group ; or defeating an external enemy .
Since this type of legitimacy is subject to continual reevaluation , it is less durable or dependable than its systemic counterpart : Should a dictatorship prove unable to produce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for it to remain in power is via force .
This , of course , is the story of the decline of the Soviet Empire .
By the late 1970s or early 1980s , there were few true believers or ideologically committed communists left in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union , even within Communist parties .
To paraphrase the great Czech-born intellectual Ernest Gellner , by this point Russians and Eastern Europeans had largely lost faith in communism ’ s transcendental claims and its continued existence , and therefore increasingly depended on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than the next.
” But by the 1980s , communist economies were too bankrupt to improve citizens ’ living conditions , necessitating the use of force to deal with discontent , most notably in Poland .
Once Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and removed force as the final backstop , lacking both systemic and performance legitimacy , communism ’ s days in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were numbered .
Roberto Stefan Foa , for example , notes that during the postwar period , democracies—primarily North America and Western Europe—easily outperformed dictatorships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracies could rely on systemic and performance legitimacy .
But by the late 20th century this connection had been broken , as the economic performance of democracies declined and that of dictatorships , particularly China ’ s , improved .
As Foa argues , to the extent that citizens value the pursuit of wealth or “ national glory , ” and are willing to trade these for personal liberties , the successful performance of dictatorships can persuade many citizens to support them .
However impressive the economic growth of China and other dictatorships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remains inherently fragile since if performance falters , the main justification for a regime ’ s maintaining a monopoly on political power disappears .
This of course explains why China , as Suzanne Nossel noted in Foreign Policy , has devoted immense resources to an aggressive domestic and international propaganda offensive during the pandemic : The corruption and incompetence of its initial response to the virus threatened its rationale for remaining in power .
If a dictatorship like China ’ s can not convince its citizens of its superior performance , without systemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remain in power .
Force can , of course , be highly effective—but it is expensive and dangerous over the long term .
It increases resentments and divisions in society , necessitating the use of ever-greater repression to maintain power , thereby further raising the stakes for a dictatorship should performance nosedive .
Another tool available to dictatorships to justify their hold on power is nationalism , mixing elements of performance and force to convince citizens that their country is threatened and that dictatorship is necessary to protect them from their enemies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and expensive over the long term .
Nationalism is a difficult beast to tame once unleashed and can easily lead to internal and external conflicts that threaten the regime ’ s existence .
Pre-1914 Germany is the classic and most tragic example of this , as dictatorial German elites whipped up a nationalist frenzy to try to fend off growing calls for liberalization and democratization .
The result was a country that flung itself headlong into the First World War and then , a generation later , a National Socialist terror regime .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with existing leaders and governments , they do not necessarily threaten democracy overall .
Expressing discontent through protest is a legitimate activity within democracies ; indeed , Americans have used it prominently throughout the country ’ s history as a means to force politicians and governments to recognize and respond to demands and grievances .
Dictatorships , of course , lack such mechanisms of adaptation and renewal , which makes growing discontent , and particularly organized expressions of it , mortal threats to them .
As long as citizens ’ mechanisms for influencing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to function , democracies—unlike dictatorships—are not existentially threatened by growing discontent or organized expressions of it .
In contrast to dictatorships , in other words , the real danger to democracy comes not from poor performance but from poor responsiveness .
Seen in this light , there are reasons for both pessimism and optimism .
Population shifts over the past decades have amplified the distorting effects of the Electoral College and the Senate on electoral outcomes—two of the last five presidents were elected despite losing the popular vote and more than half of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the population—and these distortions are expected to worsen over time .
Meanwhile , state and local level voting restrictions discourage historically disadvantaged groups from voting .
And the role of money in American politics has made a mockery of the democratic ideal of political equality by enabling an economic oligarchy to translate its wealth into outsized political power and influence , through lobbying , campaign donations , and the funding of private groups that shape policies .
Unsurprisingly , many Americans on the left and right view the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unaccountable , a perception that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of democracy itself .
Even so , the current protests have already significantly influenced American society and shifted public opinion .
Since the protests began , Americans ’ views on racial justice issues have undergone a remarkable transformation .
Corporations , sports teams , and other organizations that had previously tried to avoid confronting racial justice issues have also shifted course .
And policy changes , particularly regarding policing , are being debated and even implemented at the local , state , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy is supposed to work—citizens mobilized to express their demands and dissatisfaction and institutions and elites have begun to adjust .
Bringing about longer-term structural change , however , requires more than protests ; the upcoming Presidential election is therefore crucial .
It could result in an administration committed to dealing with injustices and inequalities and fixing the political system to make it more responsive to broad cross-section of citizens .
That would allow the United States to emerge from this period of turmoil stronger than ever .
Ultimately , democracy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of better performance—although the more responsive a democracy is , the better performance it is likely to produce , since leaders and governments attuned to citizens ’ needs and demands are more likely to implement policies to deal with them .
Instead , democracy ’ s legitimacy comes from its tenets , principles , and goals : the legal and political equality of all citizens , their right to have their voices heard , choose their own leaders and governments , and shape the development of their country .
Ultimately , democracy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promise of better performance but from its tenets , principles , and goals .
In an essay he wrote just before his death on July 17 , John Lewis , the great civil rights leader , was somewhat optimistic that the current moment would indeed change the country for the better .
He said that those raising their voices and protesting about injustice “ filled me with hope about the next chapter of the great American story , ” while urging them to vote .
“ The vote is the most powerful nonviolent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society .
You must use it because it is not guaranteed .
You can lose it , ” he wrote .
A startling number of Americans seem not to appreciate this basic truth .
After all , many Americans had to fight for the right to vote—a right that citizens of many other nations do not enjoy .
Alongside the recent protests , the November election provides yet another opportunity for U.S. citizens to collectively change their country ’ s trajectory .
Should they do so , we may look back at this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other types of political activity helped the American political system begin correcting its poor performance and adapting to new challenges , thereby reminding the world of one of democracy ’ s crucial strengths and a key potential advantage it has over dictatorships .

Over the last few years, discussions of American decline have become commonplace —but recent events have made them more prominent. That’s because the country that marshalled the resources and resolve to help win two world wars and a cold war has proven unable to deal with the challenges thrown up by the coronavirus.
Over the last few years, discussions of American decline have become commonplace —but recent events have made them more prominent. That’s because the country that marshalled the resources and resolve to help win two world wars and a cold war has proven unable to deal with the challenges thrown up by the coronavirus.
In light of these events, the eminent historian Harold James wrote that “like the Soviet Union in its final years, the United States is reeling from failures of leadership and suppressed socioeconomic tensions.” It is important to remember, he warns, that “up until the moment the Soviet system collapsed, very few thought it could actually happen.”
Critics of the United States and of democracy are even more eager to portray recent events as confirming the debility of both. As Peter Rough wrote recently in Foreign Policy, “China in particular has been extremely adept at exploiting the virus for its global propaganda war against the United States.” It has also portrayed the protests as “another sign of American decline” and as a reflection of the weakness and disorder of democracy.
There’s no doubt that the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic has revealed serious weaknesses. But recent events also reveal crucial potential strengths of the American political system.
There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic has revealed serious weaknesses in American democracy. But recent events also reveal crucial potential strengths of the American political system, as well as strengths of democracy in general.
Understanding this, and why the United States might emerge from this period of turmoil stronger rather than weaker, requires one to take a step back and consider the difference between what political scientists refer to as systemic and performance legitimacy.
Systemic legitimacy comes from citizens believing in a particular political system itself—its tenets, principles, and goals—separately from the ups and downs of government performance, short-term fluctuations in economic conditions, or the particular policies or leaders that characterize it at any given time. The great political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset described this type of legitimacy as involving “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society.”
This is the type of legitimacy American democracy enjoys: Despite growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democratic institutions, most Americans continue to believe that democracy is the best or most appropriate system overall. Because it is anchored in relatively stable political values and identities, rather than in short-term evaluations of particular outcomes, systemic legitimacy is fairly durable.
Beyond this, democracy’s legitimacy and durability are enhanced by the fact that citizens are allowed to express their discontent and demands in myriad ways—through protest, civil society, media—and can make use of an institutionalized method—elections—to hold leaders and governments accountable. Cumulatively, these mechanisms provide ways for democracy to “self-correct” or adapt to new demands and challenges, without needing to get rid of the system itself.
It is possible, although unusual, for nondemocratic regimes to enjoy some systemic legitimacy. During the early to mid-20th century, for example, a critical minority of citizens in Russia, Eastern Europe, and China probably believed in communism: It had defeated fascism in Europe and corrupt regimes in Asia, it claimed to be part of the “forward march” of history, and it promised to create a fairer version of modernity than the one offered by capitalism. By the end of the 20th century, however, communist regimes had lost whatever systemic legitimacy they may have had.
Once communist regimes could no longer rely on a reservoir of citizen belief in the inherent legitimacy, or desirability, of communism, they came to share a potentially dangerous vulnerability with other dictatorships.
Lacking systemic legitimacy, they increasingly had to rely on what political scientists call “performance legitimacy” to justify their hold on power. Here citizens support a regime not on ideological but practical grounds: the promotion of economic growth; the maintenance of order; protecting the interests of a threatened group; or defeating an external enemy.
Since this type of legitimacy is subject to continual reevaluation, it is less durable or dependable than its systemic counterpart: Should a dictatorship prove unable to produce better performance—particularly ever-improving living conditions—the only way for it to remain in power is via force. This, of course, is the story of the decline of the Soviet Empire.
By the late 1970s or early 1980s, there were few true believers or ideologically committed communists left in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, even within Communist parties. To paraphrase the great Czech-born intellectual Ernest Gellner, by this point Russians and Eastern Europeans had largely lost faith in communism’s transcendental claims and its continued existence—and therefore increasingly depended on “promises testable in this world rather than the next.”
But by the 1980s, communist economies were too bankrupt to improve citizens’ living conditions, necessitating the use of force to deal with discontent, most notably in Poland. Once Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and removed force as the final backstop, lacking both systemic and performance legitimacy, communism’s days in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were numbered.
Since the late 20th century, almost all dictatorships, including China’s, have increasingly relied on performance rather than systemic legitimacy. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, China’s economic performance over the past decades has been remarkable. While there is a lively debate among economists and political scientists about whether democracies or dictatorships are better at producing long-term growth, there is no doubt that contemporary dictatorships, particularly China, have improved their performance in comparison to their mid-20th century counterparts.
Roberto Stefan Foa, for example, notes that during the postwar period, democracies—primarily North America and Western Europe—easily outperformed dictatorships. During this period, accordingly, democracies could rely on systemic and performance legitimacy.
But by the late 20th century this connection had been broken, as the economic performance of democracies declined and that of dictatorships, particularly China’s, improved. As Foa argues, to the extent that citizens value the pursuit of wealth or “national glory,” and are willing to trade these for personal liberties, the successful performance of dictatorships can persuade many citizens to support them.
However impressive the economic growth of China and other dictatorships over the past years, performance legitimacy remains inherently fragile since if performance falters, the main justification for a regime’s maintaining a monopoly on political power disappears. This of course explains why China, as Suzanne Nossel noted in Foreign Policy, has devoted immense resources to an aggressive domestic and international propaganda offensive during the pandemic: The corruption and incompetence of its initial response to the virus threatened its rationale for remaining in power.
If a dictatorship like China’s cannot convince its citizens of its superior performance, without systemic legitimacy they must rely on force to remain in power. Force can, of course, be highly effective—but it is expensive and dangerous over the long term. It increases resentments and divisions in society, necessitating the use of ever-greater repression to maintain power, thereby further raising the stakes for a dictatorship should performance nosedive.
Another tool available to dictatorships to justify their hold on power is nationalism, mixing elements of performance and force to convince citizens that their country is threatened and that dictatorship is necessary to protect them from their enemies. This can be effective but is dangerous and expensive over the long term. Nationalism is a difficult beast to tame once unleashed and can easily lead to internal and external conflicts that threaten the regime’s existence.
Pre-1914 Germany is the classic and most tragic example of this, as dictatorial German elites whipped up a nationalist frenzy to try to fend off growing calls for liberalization and democratization. The result was a country that flung itself headlong into the First World War and then, a generation later, a National Socialist terror regime.
The dismal and divisive performance of the Trump administration during the pandemic, combined with the U.S. government’s failure to deal with long-standing legacies of racism and other deep-seated problems, has recently led to some of the largest protests in American history. But rather than being a harbinger of American decline or a sign of democracy’s weakness, these protests represent an opportunity for renewal—for the system to self-correct and adapt.
For while the protests reflect deep dissatisfaction with existing leaders and governments, they do not necessarily threaten democracy overall. Expressing discontent through protest is a legitimate activity within democracies; indeed, Americans have used it prominently throughout the country’s history as a means to force politicians and governments to recognize and respond to demands and grievances. Dictatorships, of course, lack such mechanisms of adaptation and renewal, which makes growing discontent, and particularly organized expressions of it, mortal threats to them.
As long as citizens’ mechanisms for influencing and holding leaders and governments accountable continue to function, democracies—unlike dictatorships—are not existentially threatened by growing discontent or organized expressions of it. In contrast to dictatorships, in other words, the real danger to democracy comes not from poor performance but from poor responsiveness.
Seen in this light, there are reasons for both pessimism and optimism. Population shifts over the past decades have amplified the distorting effects of the Electoral College and the Senate on electoral outcomes—two of the last five presidents were elected despite losing the popular vote and more than half of the Senate is elected by approximately 18 percent of the population—and these distortions are expected to worsen over time.
Meanwhile, state and local level voting restrictions discourage historically disadvantaged groups from voting. And the role of money in American politics has made a mockery of the democratic ideal of political equality by enabling an economic oligarchy to translate its wealth into outsized political power and influence, through lobbying, campaign donations, and the funding of private groups that shape policies.
Unsurprisingly, many Americans on the left and right view the country’s political institutions and elites as corrupt and unaccountable, a perception that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of democracy itself.
Even so, the current protests have already significantly influenced American society and shifted public opinion. Since the protests began, Americans’ views on racial justice issues have undergone a remarkable transformation. Corporations, sports teams, and other organizations that had previously tried to avoid confronting racial justice issues have also shifted course. And policy changes, particularly regarding policing, are being debated and even implemented at the local, state, and national levels.
This is the way democracy is supposed to work—citizens mobilized to express their demands and dissatisfaction and institutions and elites have begun to adjust. Bringing about longer-term structural change, however, requires more than protests; the upcoming Presidential election is therefore crucial.
It could result in an administration committed to dealing with injustices and inequalities and fixing the political system to make it more responsive to broad cross-section of citizens. That would allow the United States to emerge from this period of turmoil stronger than ever.
Ultimately, democracy’s long-term legitimacy comes not from a promise of better performance—although the more responsive a democracy is, the better performance it is likely to produce, since leaders and governments attuned to citizens’ needs and demands are more likely to implement policies to deal with them. Instead, democracy’s legitimacy comes from its tenets, principles, and goals: the legal and political equality of all citizens, their right to have their voices heard, choose their own leaders and governments, and shape the development of their country.
Ultimately, democracy’s long-term legitimacy comes not from a promise of better performance but from its tenets, principles, and goals.
In an essay he wrote just before his death on July 17, John Lewis, the great civil rights leader, was somewhat optimistic that the current moment would indeed change the country for the better. He said that those raising their voices and protesting about injustice “filled me with hope about the next chapter of the great American story,” while urging them to vote. “The vote is the most powerful nonviolent change agent you have in a democratic society. You must use it because it is not guaranteed. You can lose it,” he wrote.
A startling number of Americans seem not to appreciate this basic truth. After all, many Americans had to fight for the right to vote—a right that citizens of many other nations do not enjoy. Alongside the recent protests, the November election provides yet another opportunity for U.S. citizens to collectively change their country’s trajectory.
Should they do so, we may look back at this period as a time when voting and other types of political activity helped the American political system begin correcting its poor performance and adapting to new challenges, thereby reminding the world of one of democracy’s crucial strengths and a key potential advantage it has over dictatorships.