foreignpolicy--2020-02-14--Trump Is Failing His Dictatorship Test

Trump Is Failing His Dictatorship Test

Shortly after Donald Trump was elected , I wrote up a list of the “ 10 Ways to Tell if Your President Is a Dictator.
” I wasn ’ t saying Trump was in fact an aspiring autocrat ; it was merely a list of warning signs to keep track of as his presidency preceded .
In 2017 , I offered an updated assessment and concluded that the danger of creeping autocracy was pretty serious .
Now that Trump has been acquitted by a Republican-controlled Senate that couldn ’ t even be bothered to interview any witnesses with personal knowledge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it seems appropriate to revisit my list once again .
Spoiler alert : There are some flashing red lights on the dashboard .
This aspect of Trump ’ s behavior has been a constant feature of his presidency , and it shows no signs of easing up .
On the contrary , the White House ’ s contempt for the press has gradually extended to other parts of the executive branch , most notably in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s childish tantrum against NPR reporter Mary Louise Kelly and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secretary ’ s press pool on his recent trip to Ukraine , an all-too-obvious attempt at payback .
Trump has continued his own efforts to degrade and intimidate the press , repeatedly referring to the media and journalists as “ enemies of the people.
” Formal press briefings have become an endangered species across the administration , and there ’ s no sign that any of this is letting up .
Not surprisingly , other U.S. politicians are beginning to adopt the Trump playbook , and foreign governments are using Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalists .
For anyone who understands that a healthy democracy requires well-informed citizens and therefore also requires a vigorous and independent press , this is deeply troubling .
Back in 2016 , there were rumors that Trump was thinking of starting a media company of his own if he had lost the election .
And last October , Trump told a crowd at an event in Florida that “ we ought to start our own network and put some real news out there.
” But to date , there ’ s no sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and floating ideas like this is just another way of undermining the legitimate news organizations that still exist .
And with Fox News , Sinclair , and other far-right networks firmly in his camp , with millions of Twitter followers , and the bully pulpit of the presidency itself , creating his own media company isn ’ t really necessary .
Giving the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a vicious blowhard like Rush Limbaugh is just icing a cake that ’ s already well-baked .
Trump has railed against the so-called Deep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for one simple reason : He objects to any institution that might serve as a check on his own actions .
That ’ s not how presidents behave ; it ’ s what dictators do .
Look what happened last year : Following well-established legal procedures , patriotic civil service members brought a case of questionable presidential conduct to light , beginning with the whistleblower ’ s report about Trump ’ s attempt to get the government of Ukraine to dig up dirt on former Vice President Joe Biden ’ s son .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ impeachment , where we learned that he had relieved the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine , Marie Yovanovitch , because she objected to Trump ’ s politically motivated machinations in that country .
Since his acquittal by Senate Republicans , Trump has launched a vicious campaign of payback .
He fired former U.S .
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland ( whom Trump had appointed ) because Sondland reluctantly gave damaging testimony to the House impeachment inquiry .
He fired National Security Council staffer ( and Purple Heart recipient ) Lt. Col. Alexander @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be disciplined further by the U.S. Army .
In proper mafialike fashion , his vengeance also extended to Vindman ’ s twin brother ( also a serving Army officer ) , even though the latter wasn ’ t involved in any of these machinations .
And let ’ s not forget his personal interference in the military ’ s disciplinary proceedings against former Navy SEAL Edward Gallagher , who was accused of serious war crimes by numerous other SEALs and convicted by the military justice system for lesser offenses .
The unifying purpose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What matters to Trump is not someone ’ s expertise , professionalism , loyalty to the country , or dedication to the Constitution .
What matters to Trump is whether members of the foreign service , the civil service , or the military are personally loyal to him .
That ’ s the demand he made of former FBI Director James Comey , and when he didn ’ t get it , Comey was fired , too .
Right out of the dictator ’ s playbook .
As far as we know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as some previous presidents ( e.g.
, Richard Nixon ) in using the FBI or CIA to investigate his political adversaries .
As I noted in my last assessment of Trump ’ s dictatorial tendencies , this is no doubt because his own relations with some of these agencies have been problematic ; it ’ s doubtful he trusts these agencies to do his bidding ( yet ) .
Instead , Trump has used his personal lawyer , Rudy Giuliani , and a bunch of other sleazy types—most notably the Ukrainian American businessman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patriots were also behind the removal of Yovanovitch , whom they deemed insufficiently loyal to the president himself .
Compliant Attorney-General William Barr recently announced that the Justice Department will look into whatever so-called evidence Giuliani has dug up , which means that Giuliani ’ s efforts to aid Trump ’ s reelection campaign are now part of the official U.S. government agenda .
Why do I suspect that the department won ’ t conclude that Giuliani ’ s got nothing until after the election in November ?
The good news—such as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to mobilize the full investigative powers of the U.S. surveillance state on his own behalf .
The bad news is that he has still found a way to get his henchmen to look for dirt on anyone he chooses .
This problem didn ’ t begin with Trump ; to some degree it is baked into the present U.S. political system .
All presidents take actions favoring groups that have supported them and are more likely to enact policies that harm the interests of those who opposed them .
In an electoral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role and where money talks as loudly as it does in America , some degree of favoritism is to be expected .
That said , Trump has taken this institutionalized corruption to a new level .
He or his appointees have repeatedly intervened to revise regulations so as to benefit political donors or act in ways that benefit Trump ’ s own companies .
It ’ s hard to keep track of all the conflicts of interest—simply because there are so many .
As Adam Serwer of the Atlantic warns , “ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they ’ re all elements of one massive tale of corruption.
” This phenomenon undermines democracy in several ways .
First , those who benefit from it become co-opted and more likely to support whoever is dishing out benefits no matter how badly he or she is governing .
Second , policies that are good for these fat cats may not be good for the country as a whole , which means that ordinary people will suffer .
Third , and most importantly , when such behavior becomes commonplace , we begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cease to be outraged , and people conclude that the only way to succeed is to become corrupt ourselves .
Do I really need to spell this one out ?
Trump has now appointed two Supreme Court justices , both of whom hold expansive views about executive power and one of whom—Brett Kavanaugh—was an extremely divisive appointment on other grounds .
He got to do this because Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell established norms and refused to even schedule a hearing on Obama-era nominee Merrick Garland , in effect holding a Supreme Court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
Meanwhile , the Republican Party has continued its long-standing effort to pack the rest of the judiciary with sympathetic jurists .
This strategy makes good sense for a minority party : When you know that most voters favor Democrats , you have to do whatever it takes to retain control over the other branches of government .
Why does this matter for the issue of democracy versus dictatorship ?
For many reasons but especially because we have an election coming up .
Although Democrats are doing a pretty good job of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point one can not rule out a tightly contested election where the result comes down to narrow outcomes in a couple of key states .
What if we have a replay of Florida in 2000 , with Trump on the losing end , and he refuses to acknowledge defeat or leave the White House ?
What if the outcome goes to a Supreme Court that is now heavily stacked in his favor ?
Even if that scenario is avoided , a judiciary that is consciously selected to favor one side in an increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unwilling to block executive actions that violate the Constitution , is a textbook definition of a failing democracy .
Even before he became president , Trump thought the law was merely a weapon to be used against one ’ s opponents and not a critical linchpin of a civilized order .
Just look at his deeply litigious business career or the “ lock her up ” chants he used to direct against Hillary Clinton during the 2016 campaign .
Becoming president didn ’ t temper these instincts ; on the contrary , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believes he is above the law , and opportunistic publicity hounds like Alan Dershowitz have been willing to invent dubious rationales to justify that position .
Trump has repeatedly criticized judges with whom he disagrees , in one case provoking a rare rebuke from conservative Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts .
Emboldened by his acquittal by the Republican-dominated Senate , Trump intervened this week in the legal case of longtime ally Roger Stone , with the assistance of Attorney General Barr .
Stone was convicted of the serious charges of witness tampering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prosecutors recommended that he be given a seven-to-nine-year sentence .
Barr overruled the government prosecutors , however , leading all four to resign from the case ( and one to resign entirely from the department ) .
But Trump didn ’ t stop there .
He took to Twitter to accuse the sentencing judge of being biased , which led the normally compliant Barr to tell an interviewer that Trump ’ s repeated tweets were making it “ impossible ” to do his job .
Barr denied that the White House had told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but that denial means little , as Barr surely knew that Trump thought Stone was innocent and wanted him let off easy .
Very importantly , Barr didn ’ t say Trump ’ s interference was inappropriate—only that the public nature of his comments made it hard for the Justice Department not to look like the obedient lap dog it has become under this president and this attorney general .
Bottom line : In Trump ’ s America , there ’ s one set of rules if you ’ re one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rules for everyone else .
Trump eked out a narrow victory in 2016 , and as noted above , a majority of the population favors the other party most of the time .
Not surprisingly , voter suppression has been an important element in keeping the Republican Party in the game , which is why Trump previously backed efforts like the “ voter fraud commission ” headed by Kris Kobach .
Although Kobach ’ s effort ultimately foundered—in part because no serious scholar of U.S. voting behavior thinks the electoral rolls are filled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make it hard for eligible citizens to actually vote continue .
In November 2019 , for example , Trump campaign advisor Justin Clark told a private group : “ Traditionally it ’ s always been Republicans suppressing votes in places .
… Let ’ s start protecting our voters .
We know where they are .
… Let ’ s start playing offense a little bit .
That ’ s what you ’ re going to see in 2020 .
It ’ s going to be a much bigger program , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better-funded program.
” Similar efforts are underway in places like Florida and Texas .
To be clear , it ’ s entirely possible that Trump will win legitimately in 2020 and that Republican candidates for the House and Senate will do better than they did in 2018 .
But rigging the game as they are trying to do is antithetical to genuine democracy and more in line with what happens in authoritarian countries .
Fearmongering and threat inflation have a long history in U.S. politics , and Trump is hardly the first president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policies by exaggerating foreign dangers .
But in his case , the instrumental nature of this tactic is especially apparent .
His inaugural address painted a grim ( and unwarranted ) picture of “ American carnage , ” and he continues to dwell on alleged threats from foreign refugees or immigrants , despite the abundant evidence that such groups pose little or no danger to Americans .
Trump does this because it plays well with his older , predominantly white base and because it helps justify vanity projects like his border wall .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ dangers from white supremacists and right-wing terrorists ( even though they are responsible for most terrorist attacks in the United States today ) and taken a rather sanguine view of groups like the Islamic State , as well as of expanding Sino-Russian cooperation , the erosion of America ’ s strategic position in Asia , North Korea ’ s continued missile tests , the brain injuries suffered by U.S. soldiers , or other national security matters that might deserve a bit of presidential attention .
He ’ s even willing to divert money @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his silly wall .
In sum , Trump views threats through a narrow personal prism : dangers he can hype to bolster his own power are good ; threats that might require adjustments in U.S. policy aren ’ t worth discussing .
And that leads us directly to the last warning sign .
Vicious , demeaning , irresponsible , and wildly inaccurate attacks on domestic political rivals have been part of Trump ’ s playbook from day one .
Apart from his penchant for lying , demonizing the opposition is the defining quality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s partly his adolescent habit of giving his opponents demeaning nicknames or the harsh rhetoric he uses to describe his political opponents , such as calling Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff a “ vicious , horrible person.
” Other presidents have used such rhetoric sparingly and confined it to criminals or foreign enemies ; Trump uses it against anyone who displeases him .
Revealingly , these scorched-earth attacks on opponents are not limited to members of the Democratic Party .
On the contrary , they also extend to his very own hand-picked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they serve his every whim and then demeans and disparages as soon as they have lost his favor .
A partial list of the targets of Trumpian eruptions includes former Attorney General Jeff Sessions ; former White House chief of staff John Kelly ; former National Security Advisor John Bolton ; Sondland , the former U.S. ambassador to the EU ; former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ; former Defense Secretary James Mattis ; and many , many more .
For someone who promised he ’ d appoint only “ the best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems to have spent his first three years appointing a lot of officials who he subsequently decided were small-minded , incompetent , mean-spirited , or just “ terrible.
” But the point is not his administration ’ s historically unprecedented turnover rate ; the point is that if anyone who works for him shows any sign of independence or moral backbone , it is open season on them .
If your goal as president is to inspire genuine loyalty , and to create an atmosphere where competing policy options are carefully vetted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if your goal is to get everyone to suck up to you , to convince qualified experts to support policies they know are misguided , and to discredit former officials who are firsthand witnesses to your malfeasance , then it makes perfect sense .
Which is why dictators do it .
At this stage in Trump ’ s presidency , some may argue that concerns about the parlous state of American democracy are overblown .
After hearing repeated warnings that Trump is a threat to the country ’ s constitutional order and being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is how democracy dies , ” one might be tempted to see pessimists as Chicken Littles who keep repeating that the sky is falling .
If one takes that view , then the warning signs listed above might seem alarmist .
But the key point to remember is that healthy democracies don ’ t sicken and die overnight ; they collapse gradually , from a thousand tiny cuts , each of which seems inconsequential at the time .
That is what Donald Trump is doing , aided and abetted by the once proud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I didn ’ t warn you .

Shortly after Donald Trump was elected, I wrote up a list of the “ 10 Ways to Tell if Your President Is a Dictator .” I wasn’t saying Trump was in fact an aspiring autocrat; it was merely a list of warning signs to keep track of as his presidency preceded. In 2017, I offered an updated assessment and concluded that the danger of creeping autocracy was pretty serious.
Shortly after Donald Trump was elected, I wrote up a list of the “10 Ways to Tell if Your President Is a Dictator.” I wasn’t saying Trump was in fact an aspiring autocrat; it was merely a list of warning signs to keep track of as his presidency preceded. In 2017, I offered an updated assessment and concluded that the danger of creeping autocracy was pretty serious.
Now that Trump has been acquitted by a Republican-controlled Senate that couldn’t even be bothered to interview any witnesses with personal knowledge of his possible high crimes and misdemeanors, it seems appropriate to revisit my list once again. Spoiler alert: There are some flashing red lights on the dashboard.
1. Systematic efforts to intimidate the media. CHECK.
This aspect of Trump’s behavior has been a constant feature of his presidency, and it shows no signs of easing up. On the contrary, the White House’s contempt for the press has gradually extended to other parts of the executive branch, most notably in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s childish tantrum against NPR reporter Mary Louise Kelly and his subsequent decision to exclude NPR from the secretary’s press pool on his recent trip to Ukraine, an all-too-obvious attempt at payback. Trump has continued his own efforts to degrade and intimidate the press, repeatedly referring to the media and journalists as “enemies of the people.” Formal press briefings have become an endangered species across the administration, and there’s no sign that any of this is letting up.
Not surprisingly, other U.S. politicians are beginning to adopt the Trump playbook, and foreign governments are using Trump’s behavior to legitimate their own attacks on journalists. For anyone who understands that a healthy democracy requires well-informed citizens and therefore also requires a vigorous and independent press, this is deeply troubling.
2. Building an official pro-Trump media network. PARTIAL CHECK.
Back in 2016, there were rumors that Trump was thinking of starting a media company of his own if he had lost the election. And last October, Trump told a crowd at an event in Florida that “we ought to start our own network and put some real news out there.” But to date, there’s no sign he has actually tried to do so, and floating ideas like this is just another way of undermining the legitimate news organizations that still exist. And with Fox News, Sinclair, and other far-right networks firmly in his camp, with millions of Twitter followers, and the bully pulpit of the presidency itself, creating his own media company isn’t really necessary. Giving the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a vicious blowhard like Rush Limbaugh is just icing a cake that’s already well-baked.
3. Politicizing the civil service, military, National Guard, or domestic security agencies. FLASHING RED LIGHT.
Trump has railed against the so-called Deep State ever since he became president, for one simple reason: He objects to any institution that might serve as a check on his own actions. That’s not how presidents behave; it’s what dictators do. Look what happened last year: Following well-established legal procedures, patriotic civil service members brought a case of questionable presidential conduct to light, beginning with the whistleblower’s report about Trump’s attempt to get the government of Ukraine to dig up dirt on former Vice President Joe Biden’s son. This revelation led to Trump’s impeachment, where we learned that he had relieved the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, because she objected to Trump’s politically motivated machinations in that country.
Since his acquittal by Senate Republicans, Trump has launched a vicious campaign of payback. He fired former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland (whom Trump had appointed) because Sondland reluctantly gave damaging testimony to the House impeachment inquiry. He fired National Security Council staffer (and Purple Heart recipient) Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman and then suggested Vindman ought to be disciplined further by the U.S. Army. In proper mafialike fashion, his vengeance also extended to Vindman’s twin brother (also a serving Army officer), even though the latter wasn’t involved in any of these machinations. And let’s not forget his personal interference in the military’s disciplinary proceedings against former Navy SEAL Edward Gallagher, who was accused of serious war crimes by numerous other SEALs and convicted by the military justice system for lesser offenses.
The unifying purpose behind all of these actions is obvious. What matters to Trump is not someone’s expertise, professionalism, loyalty to the country, or dedication to the Constitution. What matters to Trump is whether members of the foreign service, the civil service, or the military are personally loyal to him. That’s the demand he made of former FBI Director James Comey, and when he didn’t get it, Comey was fired, too. Right out of the dictator’s playbook.
4. Using government surveillance against domestic political opponents. PARTIAL CHECK.
As far as we know, Trump has not gone as far as some previous presidents (e.g., Richard Nixon) in using the FBI or CIA to investigate his political adversaries. As I noted in my last assessment of Trump’s dictatorial tendencies, this is no doubt because his own relations with some of these agencies have been problematic; it’s doubtful he trusts these agencies to do his bidding (yet).
Instead, Trump has used his personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, and a bunch of other sleazy types—most notably the Ukrainian American businessman Lev Parnas—for similar purposes. These stalwart patriots were also behind the removal of Yovanovitch, whom they deemed insufficiently loyal to the president himself. Compliant Attorney-General William Barr recently announced that the Justice Department will look into whatever so-called evidence Giuliani has dug up, which means that Giuliani’s efforts to aid Trump’s reelection campaign are now part of the official U.S. government agenda. Why do I suspect that the department won’t conclude that Giuliani’s got nothing until after the election in November?
The good news—such as it is—is that Trump hasn’t been able to mobilize the full investigative powers of the U.S. surveillance state on his own behalf. The bad news is that he has still found a way to get his henchmen to look for dirt on anyone he chooses.
5. Using state power to reward corporate backers and punish opponents. CHECK.
This problem didn’t begin with Trump; to some degree it is baked into the present U.S. political system. All presidents take actions favoring groups that have supported them and are more likely to enact policies that harm the interests of those who opposed them. In an electoral democracy where interest groups play a substantial role and where money talks as loudly as it does in America, some degree of favoritism is to be expected.
That said, Trump has taken this institutionalized corruption to a new level. He or his appointees have repeatedly intervened to revise regulations so as to benefit political donors or act in ways that benefit Trump’s own companies. It’s hard to keep track of all the conflicts of interest—simply because there are so many. As Adam Serwer of the Atlantic warns, “The myriad Trump scandals can obscure the fact that they’re all elements of one massive tale of corruption.”
This phenomenon undermines democracy in several ways. First, those who benefit from it become co-opted and more likely to support whoever is dishing out benefits no matter how badly he or she is governing. Second, policies that are good for these fat cats may not be good for the country as a whole, which means that ordinary people will suffer. Third, and most importantly, when such behavior becomes commonplace, we begin to see it as normal, we cease to be outraged, and people conclude that the only way to succeed is to become corrupt ourselves.
6. Stacking the Supreme Court. FLASHING RED LIGHT.
Do I really need to spell this one out? Trump has now appointed two Supreme Court justices, both of whom hold expansive views about executive power and one of whom—Brett Kavanaugh—was an extremely divisive appointment on other grounds. He got to do this because Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell established norms and refused to even schedule a hearing on Obama-era nominee Merrick Garland, in effect holding a Supreme Court seat open until a Republican could fill it. Meanwhile, the Republican Party has continued its long-standing effort to pack the rest of the judiciary with sympathetic jurists. This strategy makes good sense for a minority party: When you know that most voters favor Democrats, you have to do whatever it takes to retain control over the other branches of government.
Why does this matter for the issue of democracy versus dictatorship? For many reasons but especially because we have an election coming up. Although Democrats are doing a pretty good job of undermining their own chances, at this point one cannot rule out a tightly contested election where the result comes down to narrow outcomes in a couple of key states. What if we have a replay of Florida in 2000, with Trump on the losing end, and he refuses to acknowledge defeat or leave the White House? What if the outcome goes to a Supreme Court that is now heavily stacked in his favor? Even if that scenario is avoided, a judiciary that is consciously selected to favor one side in an increasingly polarized country, and which is increasingly unwilling to block executive actions that violate the Constitution, is a textbook definition of a failing democracy.
7. Enforcing the law for only one side. FLASHING RED LIGHT.
Even before he became president, Trump thought the law was merely a weapon to be used against one’s opponents and not a critical linchpin of a civilized order. Just look at his deeply litigious business career or the “lock her up” chants he used to direct against Hillary Clinton during the 2016 campaign.
Becoming president didn’t temper these instincts; on the contrary, it has made them worse. Trump clearly believes he is above the law, and opportunistic publicity hounds like Alan Dershowitz have been willing to invent dubious rationales to justify that position. Trump has repeatedly criticized judges with whom he disagrees, in one case provoking a rare rebuke from conservative Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts.
Emboldened by his acquittal by the Republican-dominated Senate, Trump intervened this week in the legal case of longtime ally Roger Stone, with the assistance of Attorney General Barr. Stone was convicted of the serious charges of witness tampering and lying to Congress, and federal prosecutors recommended that he be given a seven-to-nine-year sentence. Barr overruled the government prosecutors, however, leading all four to resign from the case (and one to resign entirely from the department).
But Trump didn’t stop there. He took to Twitter to accuse the sentencing judge of being biased, which led the normally compliant Barr to tell an interviewer that Trump’s repeated tweets were making it “impossible” to do his job. Barr denied that the White House had told him to overrule the lead prosecutors, but that denial means little, as Barr surely knew that Trump thought Stone was innocent and wanted him let off easy. Very importantly, Barr didn’t say Trump’s interference was inappropriate—only that the public nature of his comments made it hard for the Justice Department not to look like the obedient lap dog it has become under this president and this attorney general.
Bottom line: In Trump’s America, there’s one set of rules if you’re one of the president’s buddies—and another set of rules for everyone else.
8. Really rigging the system CHECK.
Trump eked out a narrow victory in 2016, and as noted above, a majority of the population favors the other party most of the time. Not surprisingly, voter suppression has been an important element in keeping the Republican Party in the game, which is why Trump previously backed efforts like the “voter fraud commission” headed by Kris Kobach.
Although Kobach’s effort ultimately foundered—in part because no serious scholar of U.S. voting behavior thinks the electoral rolls are filled with voters who should be ineligible—Republican efforts to make it hard for eligible citizens to actually vote continue. In November 2019, for example, Trump campaign advisor Justin Clark told a private group: “Traditionally it’s always been Republicans suppressing votes in places. … Let’s start protecting our voters. We know where they are. … Let’s start playing offense a little bit. That’s what you’re going to see in 2020. It’s going to be a much bigger program, a much more aggressive program, a much better-funded program.” Similar efforts are underway in places like Florida and Texas.
To be clear, it’s entirely possible that Trump will win legitimately in 2020 and that Republican candidates for the House and Senate will do better than they did in 2018. But rigging the game as they are trying to do is antithetical to genuine democracy and more in line with what happens in authoritarian countries.
9. Fearmongering. CHECK.
Fearmongering and threat inflation have a long history in U.S. politics, and Trump is hardly the first president to try to build support for his policies by exaggerating foreign dangers. But in his case, the instrumental nature of this tactic is especially apparent. His inaugural address painted a grim (and unwarranted) picture of “American carnage,” and he continues to dwell on alleged threats from foreign refugees or immigrants, despite the abundant evidence that such groups pose little or no danger to Americans. Trump does this because it plays well with his older, predominantly white base and because it helps justify vanity projects like his border wall.
Meanwhile, he has persistently downplayed the dangers from white supremacists and right-wing terrorists (even though they are responsible for most terrorist attacks in the United States today) and taken a rather sanguine view of groups like the Islamic State, as well as of expanding Sino-Russian cooperation, the erosion of America’s strategic position in Asia, North Korea’s continued missile tests, the brain injuries suffered by U.S. soldiers, or other national security matters that might deserve a bit of presidential attention. He’s even willing to divert money from legitimate defense priorities to pay for his silly wall.
In sum, Trump views threats through a narrow personal prism: dangers he can hype to bolster his own power are good; threats that might require adjustments in U.S. policy aren’t worth discussing. And that leads us directly to the last warning sign.
10. Demonizing the opposition. WELL, DUH.
Vicious, demeaning, irresponsible, and wildly inaccurate attacks on domestic political rivals have been part of Trump’s playbook from day one. Apart from his penchant for lying, demonizing the opposition is the defining quality of his entire approach to politics. It’s partly his adolescent habit of giving his opponents demeaning nicknames or the harsh rhetoric he uses to describe his political opponents, such as calling Democratic Rep. Adam Schiff a “vicious, horrible person.” Other presidents have used such rhetoric sparingly and confined it to criminals or foreign enemies; Trump uses it against anyone who displeases him.
Revealingly, these scorched-earth attacks on opponents are not limited to members of the Democratic Party. On the contrary, they also extend to his very own hand-picked advisors, whom he defends as long as they serve his every whim and then demeans and disparages as soon as they have lost his favor. A partial list of the targets of Trumpian eruptions includes former Attorney General Jeff Sessions; former White House chief of staff John Kelly; former National Security Advisor John Bolton; Sondland, the former U.S. ambassador to the EU; former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson; former Defense Secretary James Mattis; and many, many more.
For someone who promised he’d appoint only “the best and most serious people,” Trump seems to have spent his first three years appointing a lot of officials who he subsequently decided were small-minded, incompetent, mean-spirited, or just “terrible.” But the point is not his administration’s historically unprecedented turnover rate; the point is that if anyone who works for him shows any sign of independence or moral backbone, it is open season on them.
If your goal as president is to inspire genuine loyalty, and to create an atmosphere where competing policy options are carefully vetted, this approach is a disaster. But if your goal is to get everyone to suck up to you, to convince qualified experts to support policies they know are misguided, and to discredit former officials who are firsthand witnesses to your malfeasance, then it makes perfect sense. Which is why dictators do it.
At this stage in Trump’s presidency, some may argue that concerns about the parlous state of American democracy are overblown. After hearing repeated warnings that Trump is a threat to the country’s constitutional order and being told over and over that “this is how democracy dies,” one might be tempted to see pessimists as Chicken Littles who keep repeating that the sky is falling. If one takes that view, then the warning signs listed above might seem alarmist. But the key point to remember is that healthy democracies don’t sicken and die overnight; they collapse gradually, from a thousand tiny cuts, each of which seems inconsequential at the time. That is what Donald Trump is doing, aided and abetted by the once proud Republican Party. Don’t say I didn’t warn you.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-14--Coronavirus Crisis Pushes States to Quarantine Online Information

Viruses are apolitical objects , infecting bodies without regard for their hosts ’ underlying ideologies and belief systems .
Epidemics , on the other hand , are a different story .
The way that we respond to epidemics creates large , political questions about control : how to control the spread of a disease , of a people , of information .
And those questions create a unique , if temporary , type of disaster diplomacy—one where states , using extraordinary powers , exert social control over their people toward achieving a common goal : containment and cure .
Disaster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the shared response to disease , but it can also reveal fissures—and those fissures in state power shape not only the coverage of the current coronavirus outbreak spreading outward from China but also the internet and state emergency powers themselves .
We call that dynamic “ digitalpolitik ” —the way that states exert realpolitik to expand and adapt sovereign control via technological means .
Information and misinformation cross platform and national boundaries , all the while revealing the inherently political nature of a globalized internet .
From WhatsApp to Weibo , from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has sparked a wave of searches , posts , shares , and comments , distributing everything from uncertain or unverified findings to conspiracy theories .
Memes gather in multiple languages , spreading both humor to help relieve the tension around this disease and misinformation that exacerbates it .
The fear is global , but the panics and rumors are often local , from anti-Chinese rumors in Indonesia to the runs on stores in Hong Kong .
And the varied responses of governments and media to the crisis have mirrored the strategies of online @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approaches to the internet as a whole .
The passage of information during an epidemic is more sensitive and important than the usual news cycle , often because the political impact is so much higher , and because normal due process protections can be almost entirely absent .
In most countries , when a government declares a state of emergency , it does two primary things : It grants itself exceptional powers to do things like seize and use property , limit freedom of mobility , and take action without civil liberties limits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process , either by law enforcement or the legislature , to ensure those powers are necessary and finite .
The abuse of rights under the cover of security—whether against terrorism or against disease—can become normalized .
This epidemic comes at a time when there are powerful cultural clashes around political speech , surveillance powers , telecommunications infrastructure , and the evolution of digital surveillance .
Perhaps the most public version of the geopolitical dimension of information flows is the selective application of travel bans—despite significant expert concern that they ’ re ineffective—limiting fundamental @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impacts on national economies .
The coronavirus has already taken a toll on the yuan , trimmed China ’ s annual GDP projections , and led to a significant amount of supply chain refactoring .
And , of course , the panic of epidemic often gives way to its own markets—reorganizing investment , catalyzing an influx of international actors , and directing institutional focus to response—often at the cost of other vital needs .
Last year , we wrote about digitalpolitik , the idea that governments , in particular , are using their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies , markets , and rights connect us online .
In the context of the coronavirus , the most immediate and talked-about example of digitalpolitik started at the beginning , when Wuhan police began arresting people for discussing the novel coronavirus online .
This form of censorship of speech is a familiar one by now in China—online censorship accompanied by arrests of key nodes in the distribution of what the government defines as a “ rumor.
” It ’ s unclear whether the authorities hoped to control rumor or the system was just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thought or planning .
Unlike many of the points of origin of recent outbreaks , China ’ s government wields significant control over its domestic internet .
Indeed , a significant amount of the international reporting on the coronavirus has focused on the role , capacity , and control of the Chinese state in shaping digital content about the virus .
This reporting often misses the extraordinarily complex , multilayered politics playing out in China , but it reveals something else important : There ’ s very little international agreement on the appropriate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the context of health emergencies and the use of digital technologies .
There are wildly different ideas about the appropriate interaction between the state and the internet .
The dynamics of digitalpolitik that we raised last year are playing out in real time across the headlines and trending posts , not just in terms of what ’ s happening but also in the ways in which it ’ s being used by various states and platforms .
Domestically , both the Chinese attempts to control initial reports of the outbreak and the quarantine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described in earlier work as “ Nationalist ( Consolidator ) ” tactics , i.e.
, using control over the internet to extend domestic power .
By contrast , the Chinese government ’ s inconsistent approach to publicly reporting cases and coordinating with international authorities , as well as its use of platforms to control information , are attempts to control the international community ’ s perception of what ’ s happening in Hubei , which is what we describe as “ Nationalist ( Projector ) .
” And China ’ s not the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ score political points—Russian state television recently presented a conspiracy theory that attributed the coronavirus to U.S. President Donald Trump , suggesting a connection through his distribution of Miss Universe crowns .
That ’ s an example of what we have described as “ Digital Influencer ” behavior from Russia , using its media and online misinformation resources to sow conflict between powerful rivals .
And , of course , the companies that own these online platforms are also playing a role—from taking extraordinary content moderation steps to forming direct partnerships with the World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , enforcing state censorship mandates .
How should private firms handle these state demands ?
Today , there aren ’ t any internationally agreed-upon public health communication guidelines , and certainly not on the internet .
That puts platforms in the difficult position of having to balance competing political mandates from different countries , while ensuring that they don ’ t enable their platforms or users to exacerbate the problem—which isn ’ t an exact science in the best of cases .
While platforms like Google are commendably working with the WHO to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alert , for instance , on searches of “ coronavirus , ” these alerts are uneven across languages , infrastructure , and borders .
The WHO holds no institutional authority over platforms ; consequently , private platforms must make decisions that affect public health .
One source of criticism in the way that the world manages epidemics is that the limits imposed in response to the pathogen are often prioritized over practical approaches to healing people .
For example , epidemic responses like travel bans and quarantines aren ’ t designed to heal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the transmission of the disease by keeping people apart .
Ultimately , though , people resist those social controls—and often long before any cure is in sight .
In Wuhan , hundreds of thousands of people rushed to leave the city when the travel ban was announced , but before it was imposed .
Elsewhere in China , villages have been imposing their own arbitrary quarantines on people from Hubei , while migrants attempt to keep finding work or return to their families .
This practice sometimes spills over into the digital world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently banned over 200 passengers from using its service when it analyzed their ride-hailing data to see who had come in contact with one patient .
This form of social control , as some public health experts argued , may have actually increased the risk of spread by forcing people banned from Uber ’ s service to take public transit , where they would expose far more people to the highly contagious virus .
In many ways , coverage of the coronavirus makes these same mistakes by trying to treat misinformation as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead of pressuring institutions to create credible sources of information .
It is , of course , not a binary—but it is striking—and the behavior of tech companies is also revealing their political contexts .
The Chinese government is viewed as exerting its control over domestically owned platforms , like WeChat and Weibo , to not only limit the flow of information about coronavirus , but also punish the people trying to share information .
By contrast , a number of American platforms are publicizing their efforts to control misinformation and coordinate with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of travel bans and isolationism .
Despite all of this , there are ongoing concerns and doubts about the veracity of the current estimates of those infected and dead .
It ’ s an appropriate , if damning , commentary on the state of international diplomatic relations that it ’ s easier to close borders than to negotiate information-sharing .
Ultimately , epidemics represent a critical balance of state-implemented social control and problem-solving—we expedite vaccine trials and treatment experimentation protocols alongside quarantines .
As the internet becomes increasingly pervasive and continues to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , different platforms ’ approaches to managing misinformation will be equally state-influenced .
That ’ s especially dangerous in the circumstances of using technology for social control , as once governments and platforms develop digital emergency powers , they tend to reuse them in other contexts .
If the normal state of affairs in internet governance gives way to raw digitalpolitik , then epidemics are stress tests for the public , sovereign , and institutional controls over the exertion of emergency powers by governments and platforms .
One of the defining characteristics of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ necessity drives codependence .
If there ’ s an upside to the exigency created by epidemic response , it ’ s that public health systems acknowledge and have operational mechanisms to cope with international codependence .
That ’ s important because , at this stage , there seems very little likelihood that any one state will manage to contain the coronavirus by itself .
The same could be said of the way states are seeking to shape , control , or otherwise alter the narrative around coronavirus .
When the WHO declared the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Concern late last month , it mobilized , among other things , a number of international response efforts and authorities—many without strong institutional or democratic checks .
And just as these authorities seek to control borders , people , and property , they are also making decisions about how to use their powers to compel access to data , control digital platforms , and shape the narrative around state power .
As digital technologies blur the boundaries around jurisdiction , influence , and state power , we ’ ll likely see governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tools , legal authorities , and public-private partnerships to inform the response .
Already , the U.S. and Australian governments are using mobile phones to track people suspected of infection , using privately collected data to surveil their own citizens .
These things are now commonplace during response efforts—and the ways they shape information ecosystems and disaster response are having increasingly destabilizing effects on humanitarian response .
The objects that governments set up during disaster often get compromised and redeployed for political means—and here , whether led by China ’ s example or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ practices , legal justifications , and emergency powers that governments deploy now are likely to meaningfully shape the debate on international data and digital governance .
The internet , of course , has also enabled a remarkably quick response to the virus , allowing researchers and responders to share information as much as possible .
The disease was sequenced in a record three days , and for-profit publishers have opened access to research related to the diseases .
And while those signs of progress are significant , they also come amid news that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to raise the alarm about the coronavirus , died of it .
It ’ s hard to predict whether the digitalpolitik of a global epidemic will help the world ’ s digital superpowers to realize their interdependence or deepen the political , economic , and sovereign conflicts digitization fuels .
What seems more obvious is that the information ecosystem is , in and of itself , suffering its own public health emergency of international concern .

Viruses are apolitical objects, infecting bodies without regard for their hosts’ underlying ideologies and belief systems. Epidemics, on the other hand, are a different story. The way that we respond to epidemics creates large, political questions about control: how to control the spread of a disease, of a people, of information.
Viruses are apolitical objects, infecting bodies without regard for their hosts’ underlying ideologies and belief systems. Epidemics, on the other hand, are a different story. The way that we respond to epidemics creates large, political questions about control: how to control the spread of a disease, of a people, of information.
And those questions create a unique, if temporary, type of disaster diplomacy—one where states, using extraordinary powers, exert social control over their people toward achieving a common goal: containment and cure. Disaster diplomacy can reveal huge opportunities and commonalities in the shared response to disease, but it can also reveal fissures—and those fissures in state power shape not only the coverage of the current coronavirus outbreak spreading outward from China but also the internet and state emergency powers themselves. We call that dynamic “digitalpolitik”—the way that states exert realpolitik to expand and adapt sovereign control via technological means.
Information and misinformation cross platform and national boundaries, all the while revealing the inherently political nature of a globalized internet. From WhatsApp to Weibo, from YouTube to Yandex, the new outbreak has sparked a wave of searches, posts, shares, and comments, distributing everything from uncertain or unverified findings to conspiracy theories. Memes gather in multiple languages, spreading both humor to help relieve the tension around this disease and misinformation that exacerbates it. The fear is global, but the panics and rumors are often local, from anti-Chinese rumors in Indonesia to the runs on stores in Hong Kong. And the varied responses of governments and media to the crisis have mirrored the strategies of online persuasion and control that mark wildly different approaches to the internet as a whole.
The passage of information during an epidemic is more sensitive and important than the usual news cycle, often because the political impact is so much higher, and because normal due process protections can be almost entirely absent. In most countries, when a government declares a state of emergency, it does two primary things: It grants itself exceptional powers to do things like seize and use property, limit freedom of mobility, and take action without civil liberties limits, and it sets a regular review process, either by law enforcement or the legislature, to ensure those powers are necessary and finite. The abuse of rights under the cover of security—whether against terrorism or against disease—can become normalized.
This epidemic comes at a time when there are powerful cultural clashes around political speech, surveillance powers, telecommunications infrastructure, and the evolution of digital surveillance. Perhaps the most public version of the geopolitical dimension of information flows is the selective application of travel bans—despite significant expert concern that they’re ineffective—limiting fundamental freedoms.
Similarly, epidemics have large impacts on national economies. The coronavirus has already taken a toll on the yuan, trimmed China’s annual GDP projections, and led to a significant amount of supply chain refactoring. And, of course, the panic of epidemic often gives way to its own markets—reorganizing investment, catalyzing an influx of international actors, and directing institutional focus to response—often at the cost of other vital needs.
Last year, we wrote about digitalpolitik, the idea that governments, in particular, are using their influence to shape the ways that digital companies, markets, and rights connect us online. In the context of the coronavirus, the most immediate and talked-about example of digitalpolitik started at the beginning, when Wuhan police began arresting people for discussing the novel coronavirus online. This form of censorship of speech is a familiar one by now in China—online censorship accompanied by arrests of key nodes in the distribution of what the government defines as a “rumor.” It’s unclear whether the authorities hoped to control rumor or the system was just automatically reacting against negative information, without thought or planning.
Unlike many of the points of origin of recent outbreaks, China’s government wields significant control over its domestic internet. Indeed, a significant amount of the international reporting on the coronavirus has focused on the role, capacity, and control of the Chinese state in shaping digital content about the virus. This reporting often misses the extraordinarily complex, multilayered politics playing out in China, but it reveals something else important: There’s very little international agreement on the appropriate checks of state power, especially in the context of health emergencies and the use of digital technologies.
There are wildly different ideas about the appropriate interaction between the state and the internet. The dynamics of digitalpolitik that we raised last year are playing out in real time across the headlines and trending posts, not just in terms of what’s happening but also in the ways in which it’s being used by various states and platforms. Domestically, both the Chinese attempts to control initial reports of the outbreak and the quarantine itself were examples of what we have described in earlier work as “Nationalist (Consolidator)” tactics, i.e., using control over the internet to extend domestic power.
By contrast, the Chinese government’s inconsistent approach to publicly reporting cases and coordinating with international authorities, as well as its use of platforms to control information, are attempts to control the international community’s perception of what’s happening in Hubei, which is what we describe as “Nationalist (Projector).” And China’s not the only information actor using the crisis to score political points—Russian state television recently presented a conspiracy theory that attributed the coronavirus to U.S. President Donald Trump, suggesting a connection through his distribution of Miss Universe crowns. That’s an example of what we have described as “Digital Influencer” behavior from Russia, using its media and online misinformation resources to sow conflict between powerful rivals. And, of course, the companies that own these online platforms are also playing a role—from taking extraordinary content moderation steps to forming direct partnerships with the World Health Organization to, in some cases, enforcing state censorship mandates.
How should private firms handle these state demands? Today, there aren’t any internationally agreed-upon public health communication guidelines, and certainly not on the internet. That puts platforms in the difficult position of having to balance competing political mandates from different countries, while ensuring that they don’t enable their platforms or users to exacerbate the problem—which isn’t an exact science in the best of cases. While platforms like Google are commendably working with the WHO to coordinate responses, setting up an SOS alert, for instance, on searches of “coronavirus,” these alerts are uneven across languages, infrastructure, and borders. The WHO holds no institutional authority over platforms; consequently, private platforms must make decisions that affect public health.
One source of criticism in the way that the world manages epidemics is that the limits imposed in response to the pathogen are often prioritized over practical approaches to healing people. For example, epidemic responses like travel bans and quarantines aren’t designed to heal the sick—they’re designed to limit the transmission of the disease by keeping people apart. Ultimately, though, people resist those social controls—and often long before any cure is in sight. In Wuhan, hundreds of thousands of people rushed to leave the city when the travel ban was announced, but before it was imposed. Elsewhere in China, villages have been imposing their own arbitrary quarantines on people from Hubei, while migrants attempt to keep finding work or return to their families.
This practice sometimes spills over into the digital world: Uber Mexico, for instance, recently banned over 200 passengers from using its service when it analyzed their ride-hailing data to see who had come in contact with one patient. This form of social control, as some public health experts argued, may have actually increased the risk of spread by forcing people banned from Uber’s service to take public transit, where they would expose far more people to the highly contagious virus.
In many ways, coverage of the coronavirus makes these same mistakes by trying to treat misinformation as a problem of platform and content control, instead of pressuring institutions to create credible sources of information. It is, of course, not a binary—but it is striking—and the behavior of tech companies is also revealing their political contexts. The Chinese government is viewed as exerting its control over domestically owned platforms, like WeChat and Weibo, to not only limit the flow of information about coronavirus, but also punish the people trying to share information. By contrast, a number of American platforms are publicizing their efforts to control misinformation and coordinate with international agencies—while also administering their own versions of travel bans and isolationism. Despite all of this, there are ongoing concerns and doubts about the veracity of the current estimates of those infected and dead. It’s an appropriate, if damning, commentary on the state of international diplomatic relations that it’s easier to close borders than to negotiate information-sharing.
Ultimately, epidemics represent a critical balance of state-implemented social control and problem-solving—we expedite vaccine trials and treatment experimentation protocols alongside quarantines. As the internet becomes increasingly pervasive and continues to be an implement of state and social control, different platforms’ approaches to managing misinformation will be equally state-influenced. That’s especially dangerous in the circumstances of using technology for social control, as once governments and platforms develop digital emergency powers, they tend to reuse them in other contexts. If the normal state of affairs in internet governance gives way to raw digitalpolitik, then epidemics are stress tests for the public, sovereign, and institutional controls over the exertion of emergency powers by governments and platforms.
One of the defining characteristics of digitalpolitik is that, amid conflict, necessity drives codependence. If there’s an upside to the exigency created by epidemic response, it’s that public health systems acknowledge and have operational mechanisms to cope with international codependence. That’s important because, at this stage, there seems very little likelihood that any one state will manage to contain the coronavirus by itself. The same could be said of the way states are seeking to shape, control, or otherwise alter the narrative around coronavirus.
When the WHO declared the novel coronavirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern late last month, it mobilized, among other things, a number of international response efforts and authorities—many without strong institutional or democratic checks. And just as these authorities seek to control borders, people, and property, they are also making decisions about how to use their powers to compel access to data, control digital platforms, and shape the narrative around state power.
As digital technologies blur the boundaries around jurisdiction, influence, and state power, we’ll likely see governments and platforms develop a host of surveillance tools, legal authorities, and public-private partnerships to inform the response. Already, the U.S. and Australian governments are using mobile phones to track people suspected of infection, using privately collected data to surveil their own citizens. These things are now commonplace during response efforts—and the ways they shape information ecosystems and disaster response are having increasingly destabilizing effects on humanitarian response. The objects that governments set up during disaster often get compromised and redeployed for political means—and here, whether led by China’s example or supplied by their companies, the surveillance practices, legal justifications, and emergency powers that governments deploy now are likely to meaningfully shape the debate on international data and digital governance.
The internet, of course, has also enabled a remarkably quick response to the virus, allowing researchers and responders to share information as much as possible. The disease was sequenced in a record three days, and for-profit publishers have opened access to research related to the diseases. And while those signs of progress are significant, they also come amid news that Li Wenliang, a doctor who tried to raise the alarm about the coronavirus, died of it.
It’s hard to predict whether the digitalpolitik of a global epidemic will help the world’s digital superpowers to realize their interdependence or deepen the political, economic, and sovereign conflicts digitization fuels. What seems more obvious is that the information ecosystem is, in and of itself, suffering its own public health emergency of international concern.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-14--Duterte Terminates U.S. Defense Pact, Pleasing Trump but Few Others

Duterte Terminates U.S. Defense Pact , Pleasing Trump but Few Others Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte decided on Tuesday to end a long-standing defense agreement with the United States , signaling a major break in a U.S.-Philippines military alliance that the United States has long seen as essential to countering the rise of China .
The Philippine president officially filed to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement ( VFA ) , which gives U.S. troops a legal basis to be present for bilateral exercises in the country , after he had threatened for weeks to end the 21-year-old agreement .
Duterte ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a senator and former police chief who oversaw the Philippines ’ deadly drug war at its peak , saw his U.S. visa canceled .
U.S. President Donald Trump shrugged off the move , saying it will “ save a lot of money ” for the United States .
But defense officials and analysts in both countries expressed grave concern the termination would fuel Beijing ’ s aggressive position in the South China Sea , where it asserts sovereignty over areas claimed by other countries , including the Philippines .
U.S. Defense Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense pact was a “ move in the wrong direction , ” away from American goals to contain Chinese regional expansionism , while two senior officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines told Rappler the move is unpopular within the military , with one general calling it “ disadvantageous.
” The termination of the VFA has been interpreted as a move toward other powers , such as China and Russia , which a diplomat said Wednesday is discussing a joint military technical cooperation agreement with the Philippines .
Duterte has come under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing—a sentiment that boiled over in response to his handling of the novel coronavirus , along with moves to sign high-interest loan agreements for infrastructure projects with Chinese companies and allow China to build artificial islands in Philippine areas of the disputed South China Sea .
The Philippine military in particular is highly distrustful of China and values the established relationship with the United States .
“ The U.S. military ’ s forward-deployed presence through the VFA is critical ” to deterring China in the South China Sea , said Jeffrey Ordaniel , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Tokyo International University , who called the agreement ’ s termination “ a welcome development for China.
” Along with concerns over Chinese expansionism , Ordaniel said the termination could harm counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and the Philippines , especially in areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Sea where the Armed Forces of the Philippines “ will lose important intelligence and reconnaissance information ” in operations targeting extremists .
The move will also impact U.S. support for Philippine counterinsurgency operations targeting the communist New People ’ s Army , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadly government campaign against legal activists , including journalists and environmental defenders , who are critical of the Duterte administration .
The United States has historically assisted the Armed Forces in operations against the New People ’ s Army by training Philippine officials , applying “ modern counterinsurgency doctrines ” and providing “ continued military and assistance and weaponry , ” said Bobby Tuazon , the director for policy studies at the Manila-based research think tank Center for People Empowerment in Governance .
In 2018 , the Armed Forces established an anti-communist task @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading to killings and arrests of activists without ties to the New People ’ s Army .
The operations have drawn condemnation from global rights groups and U.S. politicians , including Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders .
Washington ’ s level of tolerance for rights abuses has long been part of a delicate balancing act as the United States forges alliances with Asian states susceptible to rising Chinese influence , said Jeremy Huai-che Chiang , a research associate at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation .
The United States “ does not want to alienate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ against China ] and by pushing too hard on human rights concerns , ” Chiang said .
“ But it also doesn ’ t want to be too lenient toward countries moving closer [ to ] China , and [ toward ] less liberal and democratic practices.
” Trump has given support to the brutal Philippine war on drugs , but the United States has since canceled the visa of dela Rosa—notorious for his role when anti-drug operations reached their bloodiest peak—and the U.S. Senate passed a resolution in January seeking Magnitsky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the detention of Sen. Leila de Lima , a vocal drug war critic .
These moves appeared to trigger Duterte ’ s desire to terminate the VFA , which was made suddenly in a speech without consultation with his defense and foreign secretaries .
“ It was likely an outburst brought about by his deep-seated unfavorable opinion of [ the United States ] , ” Ordaniel , the Tokyo International University professor , said .
Duterte has criticized Philippine-U.S. ties in the past .
On Thursday , his spokesperson said that “ reading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s clear the president wishes to terminate remaining defense agreements with the United States , including the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and subsequent pacts including the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement .
The United States has always retained broad trust among Filipinos , many of whom fear the termination of the VFA will push the country closer to Beijing .
But the U.S. military presence in the Philippines has also come under periodic fire , especially from progressives who see the troops as a vestige of decades of American colonialism in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left has been hesitant about celebrating the end of the VFA .
“ The Philippine government ’ s pivot closer to China will defeat the purpose of the termination of the VFA , ” said Tinay Palabay , the secretary-general of the progressive rights group alliance Karapatan , while calling the agreement ’ s end “ a positive step to assert our sovereignty ” —which the left fears is threatened by both the United States and China .
Under the VFA , U.S. troops accused of crimes in the Philippines usually stand trial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prison time in the country if found guilty .
In 2006 , a U.S. serviceman convicted of rape was transferred to the U.S. Embassy before being controversially acquitted in 2009 , sparking outrage in the Philippines .
This has led to a “ public perception regarding unjust treatment on the Philippines ” by the United States , said Tuazon of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance .
Analysts also question whether the United States has done enough to strengthen the military capability of the Philippines .
The Duterte administration has said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Armed Forces dependent on U.S. assistance , an argument that Tuazon said “ has gained traction , including among the military.
” The Philippine military , Ordaniel said , “ lacks deterrent capability ” —and that may compel Beijing to interpret the termination of the VFA as an open invitation to solidify its claims on the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands , which an international tribunal ruled in 2016 were part of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines .
However , a more assertive Chinese position in the South China Sea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggressive role by the U.S. in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region , ” Tuazon said , especially as any loss of Manila as a reliable U.S. defense ally would break the so-called first island chain encompassing Japan , Taiwan , the Philippines , and Borneo .
Analysts have long warned that Duterte ’ s turn toward China is more complex than it appears to be at the surface—the Philippine military has always valued its ties with the United States , Duterte has strengthened his own power by forging warm relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Washington gives Manila a degree of latitude to keep it out of the clutches of Beijing .
It ’ s no wonder this sudden lurch has left few people happy : Even for those Filipinos who see the United States as a threat to their country ’ s sovereignty , they fear the Philippines will only be left exposed to another great power .

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte decided on Tuesday to end a long-standing defense agreement with the United States, signaling a major break in a U.S.-Philippines military alliance that the United States has long seen as essential to countering the rise of China.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte decided on Tuesday to end a long-standing defense agreement with the United States, signaling a major break in a U.S.-Philippines military alliance that the United States has long seen as essential to countering the rise of China.
The Philippine president officially filed to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which gives U.S. troops a legal basis to be present for bilateral exercises in the country, after he had threatened for weeks to end the 21-year-old agreement. Duterte’s threats began after Ronald dela Rosa, a senator and former police chief who oversaw the Philippines’ deadly drug war at its peak, saw his U.S. visa canceled.
U.S. President Donald Trump shrugged off the move, saying it will “save a lot of money” for the United States. But defense officials and analysts in both countries expressed grave concern the termination would fuel Beijing’s aggressive position in the South China Sea, where it asserts sovereignty over areas claimed by other countries, including the Philippines.
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said Tuesday that ending the defense pact was a “move in the wrong direction,” away from American goals to contain Chinese regional expansionism, while two senior officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines told Rappler the move is unpopular within the military, with one general calling it “disadvantageous.”
The termination of the VFA has been interpreted as a move toward other powers, such as China and Russia, which a diplomat said Wednesday is discussing a joint military technical cooperation agreement with the Philippines.
Duterte has come under fire domestically for his unpopular embrace of Beijing—a sentiment that boiled over in response to his handling of the novel coronavirus, along with moves to sign high-interest loan agreements for infrastructure projects with Chinese companies and allow China to build artificial islands in Philippine areas of the disputed South China Sea. The Philippine military in particular is highly distrustful of China and values the established relationship with the United States.
“The U.S. military’s forward-deployed presence through the VFA is critical” to deterring China in the South China Sea, said Jeffrey Ordaniel, an assistant professor of international security studies at Tokyo International University, who called the agreement’s termination “a welcome development for China.”
Along with concerns over Chinese expansionism, Ordaniel said the termination could harm counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and the Philippines, especially in areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Sea where the Armed Forces of the Philippines “will lose important intelligence and reconnaissance information” in operations targeting extremists.
The move will also impact U.S. support for Philippine counterinsurgency operations targeting the communist New People’s Army, which rights groups allege has expanded into a deadly government campaign against legal activists, including journalists and environmental defenders, who are critical of the Duterte administration.
The United States has historically assisted the Armed Forces in operations against the New People’s Army by training Philippine officials, applying “modern counterinsurgency doctrines” and providing “continued military and assistance and weaponry,” said Bobby Tuazon, the director for policy studies at the Manila-based research think tank Center for People Empowerment in Governance.
In 2018, the Armed Forces established an anti-communist task force that has since conducted counterinsurgency raids leading to killings and arrests of activists without ties to the New People’s Army. The operations have drawn condemnation from global rights groups and U.S. politicians, including Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders.
Washington’s level of tolerance for rights abuses has long been part of a delicate balancing act as the United States forges alliances with Asian states susceptible to rising Chinese influence, said Jeremy Huai-che Chiang, a research associate at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation.
The United States “does not want to alienate partners by pressuring them to close ranks [against China] and by pushing too hard on human rights concerns,” Chiang said. “But it also doesn’t want to be too lenient toward countries moving closer [to] China, and [toward] less liberal and democratic practices.”
Trump has given support to the brutal Philippine war on drugs, but the United States has since canceled the visa of dela Rosa—notorious for his role when anti-drug operations reached their bloodiest peak—and the U.S. Senate passed a resolution in January seeking Magnitsky Act sanctions against Philippine officials involved in the detention of Sen. Leila de Lima, a vocal drug war critic.
These moves appeared to trigger Duterte’s desire to terminate the VFA, which was made suddenly in a speech without consultation with his defense and foreign secretaries. “It was likely an outburst brought about by his deep-seated unfavorable opinion of [the United States],” Ordaniel, the Tokyo International University professor, said.
Duterte has criticized Philippine-U.S. ties in the past. On Thursday, his spokesperson said that “reading the body language” of Duterte, it’s clear the president wishes to terminate remaining defense agreements with the United States, including the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and subsequent pacts including the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
The United States has always retained broad trust among Filipinos, many of whom fear the termination of the VFA will push the country closer to Beijing. But the U.S. military presence in the Philippines has also come under periodic fire, especially from progressives who see the troops as a vestige of decades of American colonialism in the archipelago.
Still, the Philippine left has been hesitant about celebrating the end of the VFA. “The Philippine government’s pivot closer to China will defeat the purpose of the termination of the VFA,” said Tinay Palabay, the secretary-general of the progressive rights group alliance Karapatan, while calling the agreement’s end “a positive step to assert our sovereignty”—which the left fears is threatened by both the United States and China.
Under the VFA, U.S. troops accused of crimes in the Philippines usually stand trial in domestic courts but do not spend prison time in the country if found guilty. In 2006, a U.S. serviceman convicted of rape was transferred to the U.S. Embassy before being controversially acquitted in 2009, sparking outrage in the Philippines. This has led to a “public perception regarding unjust treatment on the Philippines” by the United States, said Tuazon of the Center for People Empowerment in Governance.
Analysts also question whether the United States has done enough to strengthen the military capability of the Philippines. The Duterte administration has said that the U.S. defense alliance has only rendered the Armed Forces dependent on U.S. assistance, an argument that Tuazon said “has gained traction, including among the military.”
The Philippine military, Ordaniel said, “lacks deterrent capability”—and that may compel Beijing to interpret the termination of the VFA as an open invitation to solidify its claims on the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands, which an international tribunal ruled in 2016 were part of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. However, a more assertive Chinese position in the South China Sea could also lead to “a more aggressive role by the U.S. in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region,” Tuazon said, especially as any loss of Manila as a reliable U.S. defense ally would break the so-called first island chain encompassing Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo.
Analysts have long warned that Duterte’s turn toward China is more complex than it appears to be at the surface—the Philippine military has always valued its ties with the United States, Duterte has strengthened his own power by forging warm relations with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Washington gives Manila a degree of latitude to keep it out of the clutches of Beijing. It’s no wonder this sudden lurch has left few people happy: Even for those Filipinos who see the United States as a threat to their country’s sovereignty, they fear the Philippines will only be left exposed to another great power.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-14--Ireland’s Populists Are Not Really Populist

Ireland ’ s Populists Are Not Really Populist Ireland just witnessed a historically transformative general election .
Sinn Fein—a left-wing party historically linked to the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army ( IRA ) —won more first preference votes than Fianna Fail and Fine Gael—the two parties that had dominated Irish politics since 1932—and secured almost a quarter of the seats in Ireland ’ s national parliament .
Sinn Fein openly supported the IRA ’ s guerrilla campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland during 25 years of conflict from 1969 to 1994 .
The IRA was responsible for the deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ innocent civilians .
Now , Sinn Fein can realistically expect to be part of the next government—or even lead it .
It ’ s tempting to think Sinn Fein ’ s rise is part of the populist surge that has destabilized European politics in recent years .
That would be a mistake , however .
Without abandoning its nationalist principles , Sinn Fein managed to shed radicalism from its political platform .
It ’ s an open question , however , if Sinn Fein ’ s rise can be replicated by populist parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political beast .
It spent most of the 1970s and 1980s on the margins of Irish politics , widely condemned for its deep association with political violence .
Many of its activists were simultaneously members of the IRA , and they were frequently shuttled in and out of prison .
Some were even the targets of assassination attempts .
During that period , Sinn Fein was regarded as little more than a mouthpiece for the IRA.It ’ s an open question … if Sinn Fein ’ s rise can be replicated by populist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the party began to develop its own political program , initiating a slow electoral rise .
The party formally decided to end its support for armed struggle during the 1990s Northern Ireland peace process , a decision that was highly controversial at the time and led some groups to break away from Sinn Fein .
The decision paid off : The party earned gradual electoral success in the 2000s .
In part , that ’ s also because Sinn Fein adopted a clear political profile that contrasted with the establishment .
Its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the left of the political spectrum .
In the most recent election , the party proposed tax hikes for the wealthy , tax cuts for those on lower incomes , and a massive program of public spending .
It has promised the largest public housing program in the history of the country ; 1,500 additional hospital beds ; hiring thousands more nurses and midwives ; 1 billion euros of increased spending on public transport ; cutting the cost of child care ; and reducing the pension age to 65 .
Fianna Fail and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s “ tax and spend ” agenda , accusing the party of a form of economic recklessness that will inflict serious damage on the Irish economy .
But 24 percent of voters chose not to heed the warnings , opting for Sinn Fein ’ s fresh approach to economic and social problems .
The increased receptiveness of voters to Sinn Fein ’ s positions and messaging is perhaps best understood as a delayed reaction to the 2008 global economic crisis .
Although Ireland endured a profound period of crisis after 2008 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift away from the dominant center-right continuum in Irish politics .
Now , more than 10 years later , the residual effects of the economic crisis are still being felt , despite some signs of economic recovery .
According to the election exit poll , 63 percent of Irish voters said they did not believe that they had benefited from the economic recovery .
There is deep dissatisfaction with the inability of recent governments to address quality of life issues related to housing , health care , child care costs , and pensions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has translated into an appetite for change , and voters readily identified Sinn Fein as the main vehicle to deliver that change .
Sinn Fein was able to translate widespread public grievance into electoral gain—but , unlike populists elsewhere in Europe , they have mostly done so in constructive , rather than destructive , fashion.The increased receptiveness of voters to Sinn Fein ’ s positions and messaging is perhaps best understood as a delayed reaction to the 2008 global economic crisis .
To be sure , in addition to its radical policy proposals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Sinn Fein ’ s rhetoric .
The party ’ s messaging typically places a morally pure “ people ” against a hopelessly corrupt “ elite , ” both of whom are always defined by the party itself .
Sinn Fein leader Mary Lou McDonald regularly depicts the mainstream political parties as being aligned with the elite—bankers , property developers , landlords , etc.—and claims that Sinn Fein is the true representative of the people ’ s will .
But below this populist veneer , Sinn Fein diverges significantly from other European populists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its position on the European Union .
Populists tend to oppose globalization because it undermines domestic industry and outsources jobs ( and wealth ) to foreigners—a classic case , in their view , of the elite selling out the people .
Sinn Fein was staunchly opposed to EU membership for much of its early history , and it could still have accurately been described as Euroskeptic well into the 21st century .
Now it is a self-styled “ Euro-critical ” party : It supports deep-rooted reforms of the bloc , but it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ireland ’ s membership .
The party opposed earlier efforts at further integration , but it supported the Remain campaign during the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom .
True , this was motivated more by its desire to keep the entire island of Ireland inside the EU ( which is itself rooted in its position on the constitutional question , the issue of Irish unification ) , but the consequence is that Sinn Fein is now firmly in the pro-EU camp .
Sinn Fein is also distinct from other populists on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dilutes the national character and threatens the inherited culture of a society—even left-wing populists tend to oppose immigration as a way of protecting domestic jobs .
But Sinn Fein is decidedly pro-immigration ; it regularly makes its progressive and multicultural views known , and anti-immigration rhetoric has never formed part of the party narrative , even when weighed against its strong adherence to Irish nationalism .
The party is defined , first and foremost , by its position on Ireland ’ s constitutional question .
Its election manifesto affirms that the party ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achieve Irish Unity , ” unification of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland , and it proposes preparing for a referendum on Irish unification .
This emphasis on nationalist Ireland ’ s highest aspiration coupled with the party ’ s claim to be the vanguard of the fight for Irish freedom lends Sinn Fein an ethno-nationalist character similar to that of several other European populists.Sinn Fein did not win because of its marginal standing or its paramilitary past—it won despite these things .
But the issue of Irish unity was not pushed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election campaign , and the appeal to nationalism was seldom used to gain votes .
Instead , social and economic issues were placed at the forefront , and the election was fought on core bread-and-butter concerns such as health care and housing .
Although Sinn Fein will nevertheless seek to advance its Irish unity agenda if it enters government , the party will not have the power to call a unity referendum on its own .
According to the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement—which largely brought the IRA ’ s campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British government alone .
So , while Sinn Fein can put unification on its agenda , the political realities will make it a secondary concern , at least in Dublin .
Some pundits suggest that the 2020 election results are a sign that Ireland has finally succumbed to the nationalist populist scourge .
But while Sinn Fein started its journey as a political pariah and still places its aims within the basic populist framework , the party is now firmly in the mainstream .
It shares widely held views on the EU and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Irish unification is not dissimilar from the general views of other parties .
Sinn Fein ’ s electoral success is better understood as a case of a broad shift to the left in a country that has long been dominated by center-right politics that had grown increasingly unresponsive .
For that reason , the normalization of Sinn Fein in Irish politics offers few lessons for the future of populism in other countries .
People voted for Sinn Fein because they want genuine , sweeping reform of the political and social system , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system to remain relatively the same .
The party has had to temper many of its older , genuinely populist stances to attract the broader audience that it did , and if Sinn Fein touted the same type of Euroskeptic and anti-immigrant rhetoric popular among right-wing populists , it is doubtful it would have performed as well .
Sinn Fein did not win because of its marginal standing or its paramilitary past—it won despite these things .

Ireland just witnessed a historically transformative general election. Sinn Fein—a left-wing party historically linked to the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)—won more first preference votes than Fianna Fail and Fine Gael—the two parties that had dominated Irish politics since 1932—and secured almost a quarter of the seats in Ireland’s national parliament. Sinn Fein openly supported the IRA’s guerrilla campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland during 25 years of conflict from 1969 to 1994. The IRA was responsible for the deaths of over 1,700 people, including many innocent civilians. Now, Sinn Fein can realistically expect to be part of the next government—or even lead it.
Ireland just witnessed a historically transformative general election. Sinn Fein—a left-wing party historically linked to the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)—won more first preference votes than Fianna Fail and Fine Gael—the two parties that had dominated Irish politics since 1932—and secured almost a quarter of the seats in Ireland’s national parliament. Sinn Fein openly supported the IRA’s guerrilla campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland during 25 years of conflict from 1969 to 1994. The IRA was responsible for the deaths of over 1,700 people, including many innocent civilians. Now, Sinn Fein can realistically expect to be part of the next government—or even lead it.
It’s tempting to think Sinn Fein’s rise is part of the populist surge that has destabilized European politics in recent years. That would be a mistake, however. Without abandoning its nationalist principles, Sinn Fein managed to shed radicalism from its political platform. It’s an open question, however, if Sinn Fein’s rise can be replicated by populist parties elsewhere.
Sinn Fein is an unusual political beast. It spent most of the 1970s and 1980s on the margins of Irish politics, widely condemned for its deep association with political violence. Many of its activists were simultaneously members of the IRA, and they were frequently shuttled in and out of prison. Some were even the targets of assassination attempts. During that period, Sinn Fein was regarded as little more than a mouthpiece for the IRA.It’s an open question … if Sinn Fein’s rise can be replicated by populist parties elsewhere.
Beginning in the 1980s, the party began to develop its own political program, initiating a slow electoral rise. The party formally decided to end its support for armed struggle during the 1990s Northern Ireland peace process, a decision that was highly controversial at the time and led some groups to break away from Sinn Fein. The decision paid off: The party earned gradual electoral success in the 2000s.
In part, that’s also because Sinn Fein adopted a clear political profile that contrasted with the establishment. Its broader policy platform is firmly located on the left of the political spectrum. In the most recent election, the party proposed tax hikes for the wealthy, tax cuts for those on lower incomes, and a massive program of public spending. It has promised the largest public housing program in the history of the country; 1,500 additional hospital beds; hiring thousands more nurses and midwives; 1 billion euros of increased spending on public transport; cutting the cost of child care; and reducing the pension age to 65.
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have both condemned Sinn Fein’s “tax and spend” agenda, accusing the party of a form of economic recklessness that will inflict serious damage on the Irish economy. But 24 percent of voters chose not to heed the warnings, opting for Sinn Fein’s fresh approach to economic and social problems.
The increased receptiveness of voters to Sinn Fein’s positions and messaging is perhaps best understood as a delayed reaction to the 2008 global economic crisis. Although Ireland endured a profound period of crisis after 2008, electoral volatility did not produce a marked shift away from the dominant center-right continuum in Irish politics. Now, more than 10 years later, the residual effects of the economic crisis are still being felt, despite some signs of economic recovery. According to the election exit poll, 63 percent of Irish voters said they did not believe that they had benefited from the economic recovery. There is deep dissatisfaction with the inability of recent governments to address quality of life issues related to housing, health care, child care costs, and pensions, particularly among younger voters. This has translated into an appetite for change, and voters readily identified Sinn Fein as the main vehicle to deliver that change. Sinn Fein was able to translate widespread public grievance into electoral gain—but, unlike populists elsewhere in Europe, they have mostly done so in constructive, rather than destructive, fashion.The increased receptiveness of voters to Sinn Fein’s positions and messaging is perhaps best understood as a delayed reaction to the 2008 global economic crisis.
To be sure, in addition to its radical policy proposals, there is clearly a populist slant to Sinn Fein’s rhetoric. The party’s messaging typically places a morally pure “people” against a hopelessly corrupt “elite,” both of whom are always defined by the party itself. Sinn Fein leader Mary Lou McDonald regularly depicts the mainstream political parties as being aligned with the elite—bankers, property developers, landlords, etc.—and claims that Sinn Fein is the true representative of the people’s will.
But below this populist veneer, Sinn Fein diverges significantly from other European populists. Where it is most distinct is its position on the European Union. Populists tend to oppose globalization because it undermines domestic industry and outsources jobs (and wealth) to foreigners—a classic case, in their view, of the elite selling out the people. Sinn Fein was staunchly opposed to EU membership for much of its early history, and it could still have accurately been described as Euroskeptic well into the 21st century.
Now it is a self-styled “Euro-critical” party: It supports deep-rooted reforms of the bloc, but it is no longer against its existence or even Ireland’s membership. The party opposed earlier efforts at further integration, but it supported the Remain campaign during the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom. True, this was motivated more by its desire to keep the entire island of Ireland inside the EU (which is itself rooted in its position on the constitutional question, the issue of Irish unification), but the consequence is that Sinn Fein is now firmly in the pro-EU camp.
Sinn Fein is also distinct from other populists on immigration. For right-wing populists, immigration dilutes the national character and threatens the inherited culture of a society—even left-wing populists tend to oppose immigration as a way of protecting domestic jobs. But Sinn Fein is decidedly pro-immigration; it regularly makes its progressive and multicultural views known, and anti-immigration rhetoric has never formed part of the party narrative, even when weighed against its strong adherence to Irish nationalism.
The party is defined, first and foremost, by its position on Ireland’s constitutional question. Its election manifesto affirms that the party’s “core political objective is to achieve Irish Unity,” unification of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and it proposes preparing for a referendum on Irish unification. This emphasis on nationalist Ireland’s highest aspiration coupled with the party’s claim to be the vanguard of the fight for Irish freedom lends Sinn Fein an ethno-nationalist character similar to that of several other European populists.Sinn Fein did not win because of its marginal standing or its paramilitary past—it won despite these things.
But the issue of Irish unity was not pushed by the party as forcefully during the election campaign, and the appeal to nationalism was seldom used to gain votes. Instead, social and economic issues were placed at the forefront, and the election was fought on core bread-and-butter concerns such as health care and housing. Although Sinn Fein will nevertheless seek to advance its Irish unity agenda if it enters government, the party will not have the power to call a unity referendum on its own. According to the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement—which largely brought the IRA’s campaign to an end—that power lies with the British government alone. So, while Sinn Fein can put unification on its agenda, the political realities will make it a secondary concern, at least in Dublin.
Some pundits suggest that the 2020 election results are a sign that Ireland has finally succumbed to the nationalist populist scourge. But while Sinn Fein started its journey as a political pariah and still places its aims within the basic populist framework, the party is now firmly in the mainstream. It shares widely held views on the EU and immigration, and even its emphasis on Irish unification is not dissimilar from the general views of other parties. Sinn Fein’s electoral success is better understood as a case of a broad shift to the left in a country that has long been dominated by center-right politics that had grown increasingly unresponsive.
For that reason, the normalization of Sinn Fein in Irish politics offers few lessons for the future of populism in other countries. People voted for Sinn Fein because they want genuine, sweeping reform of the political and social system, but they want the basic confines of that system to remain relatively the same. The party has had to temper many of its older, genuinely populist stances to attract the broader audience that it did, and if Sinn Fein touted the same type of Euroskeptic and anti-immigrant rhetoric popular among right-wing populists, it is doubtful it would have performed as well. Sinn Fein did not win because of its marginal standing or its paramilitary past—it won despite these things.