foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Child Soldiers Are Helping End a Forever War

BANGUI , Central African Republic—Gone are the black-magic amulets that promised invincibility in the heat of battle .
So too are the machetes and homemade rifles , once used to hunt civilians like game .
Khaki berets and menacing face scarves have been swapped for rainboots and high-visibility jackets .
An unlikely crew of maintenance workers , made up of former child soldiers and other vulnerable youngsters in the Central African Republic ( CAR ) , was hard at work in June 2019 .
Deployed to an impoverished suburb of the capital , Bangui , they were digging a well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ water supplies .
During years of civil war , whether by choice or by force , these young individuals joined militias that brought the country to its knees .
But now , splattered with red-brown mud , elbow-deep in water , and free from the grip of armed groups , they are spearheading the push to protect their fellow citizens from the coronavirus pandemic .
“ Our response plan for COVID-19 includes the provision of safe water for drinking and hygiene , particularly hand-washing , ” said Olivier Sieyadji , a sanitation specialist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers are more mobilized than ever to construct new water points in the field.
” By drilling for water , they were also drilling for peace .
Before the novel coronavirus emerged late last year , this sanitation scheme had been set up to help dozens of teenagers move on from their violent past by giving them new skills and paid work to rebuild CAR from the ruins of a devastating conflict .
By hiring ex-militants to do the job , the project supported their rehabilitation , offering them a new stake in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of children are estimated to be in armed groups and , while the exact figure is uncertain , the number is growing , having more than doubled since 2012 , according to a report published last year by Child Soldiers International , a U.K.-based nonprofit .
The changing nature of 21st-century conflict is putting children onto front lines in new and atrocious ways ; wars are becoming longer , more urban , and increasingly irregular , drawing in greater numbers of insurgent and militia groups .
The Overseas Development Institute , a London-based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the global cost resulting from the consequences of all physical , psychological , and sexual violence against children could be as high as $ 7 trillion , surpassing the institute ’ s estimate of how much it would cost to prevent much of this violence .
The results have been catastrophic for places like CAR , which is ranked among the worst conflict-affected countries for children to grow up in and which still suffers interethnic hostility and clashes over diamond mines , gold reserves and lucrative cattle migration routes .
And that was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for fresh conflict .
While recent fighting in CAR has generally appeared unconnected to the lockdown , such measures could trigger a sharp increase in food prices , disrupt peacekeeping operations , and hamper the supply of aid , pushing hard-up communities to the edge .
The virus has already featured as a possible factor in one serious security incident .
In late March , militants entered a camp holding around 8,000 internally displaced people who had fled earlier fighting in Ndele , a rebel-held town in northern CAR .
These soldiers forcibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to return to their homes , “ blaming them for the potential spread of COVID-19 , ” according to a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees .
Soldiers forcibly evicted all the camp ’ s inhabitants and ordered them to return to their homes , “ blaming them for the potential spread of COVID-19.
” Another official with detailed knowledge of the incident confirmed that the armed group responsible for the illegal eviction did raise concerns to aid workers about the heightened virus risk posed by the displacement site ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the militants ’ desire to dismantle and eradicate an unseemly camp was more likely driven by political anxieties than health concerns .
Following scenes of fighting and displacement , the official added , rebel commanders in charge of the town now “ wanted to show they were in control of the situation ” and that under their authority “ life in Ndele was normalizing ” —even if achieving that dubious impression required storming a displacement camp in violation of international law .
With its long history of coups , conflicts , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recurrent cycles of violence that expose communities to horrific attacks , promote the recruitment of child soldiers , and impede the country ’ s economic development , leaving it acutely vulnerable to public health crises like the coronavirus pandemic .
Grassroots peace-building initiatives such as the well-drilling project for former child soldiers—as well as accompanying judicial endeavors to impose the rule of law in the country—may offer CAR an opportunity to break with the past .
Without this kind of work , former child soldiers are more likely to face stigma and rejection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their chances of being recruited again , in turn fueling new violence .
This is not just a human rights issue ; it ’ s a security concern , too .
The use of child soldiers may prolong wars by increasing the strength of a rebel group and its ability to keep fighting .
Likewise , these youngsters become socialized into conflict , acquiring militant values that make them more prone to aggression .
“ Interventions that help children to be accepted by their families and communities are key for a successful rehabilitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s chief of child protection in CAR .
Of course , digging wells in itself is not enough to treat complex cases of post-traumatic stress disorder .
Given their repeated exposure to warfare , sexual violence , and other traumas during the critical years of childhood development , many of these young people need specialized therapy , so this project runs alongside counseling and other psychiatric interventions .
However , overwhelming caseloads of patients coupled with massive shortfalls in humanitarian funding can put that kind of support out of reach , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s aid plan for CAR was 30 percent unfunded ; 2020 ’ s appeal is currently short by about $ 420 million—a gap amounting to 76 percent of the total target .
Given their repeated exposure to traumas during the critical years of childhood development , many of these young people need specialized therapy , so this project runs alongside counseling and other psychiatric interventions .
Instead , projects like the well-drilling one offer a redemptive process that helps former child solders move past their wartime activities .
Transforming them into constructive citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-loathing , and guilt while allowing them to regain self-esteem , social status , and a sense of normality .
“ The population faces a critical water situation , ” said Maxime Yandjia , the country director in CAR for a continent-wide organization called Water and Sanitation for Africa , which works alongside UNICEF .
“ This project tackles that problem while also bringing these former child soldiers together and reintegrating them into the community after the war.
” The pandemic has given their hygiene-boosting efforts new urgency , putting these young former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public health initiative .
Following the detection of CAR ’ s first case of COVID-19 in March , the number of confirmed cases has climbed to over 1,800—lower than in some neighboring countries , though that is likely due to less testing and patchy state control .
Meanwhile , almost 80 percent of households in CAR lack hand-washing facilities , and more than half face substandard sanitation , forcing people to use rudimentary latrines or dispose of human waste in the open .
As one of the world ’ s poorest countries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cope with a widespread coronavirus outbreak .
Against this troubling backdrop , the well-drilling teams coordinated by UNICEF and Water and Sanitation for Africa have raced to install 20 new wells since the start of the year , bringing improved water supplies to around 10,000 people , with more planned for Bangui and Paoua in the northwest .
“ The team can be deployed promptly to improve water coverage in affected areas , ” added Sieyadji , of UNICEF .
“ The tools are light and can easily be transported to remote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ child soldiers was Emmanuel , whose blank expression and unnerving intensity hint at a history of violence that still haunts him .
In 2013 , as a mainly Muslim coalition of rebel groups known as the Séléka rampaged through the capital and seized power in a coup , several soldiers from this unruly alliance entered Emmanuel ’ s home and killed his parents and older sister .
Grieving , angry , and just 13 years old , he joined a militia .
His group belonged to the anti-balaka movement that , in response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , was rapidly recruiting vigilantes from Christian and animist communities .
Targeting Séléka rebels and Muslim civilians alike , their revenge attacks plunged the country deeper into turmoil .
At first Emmanuel ran errands for his superiors , shopping for food or cooking meals in the group ’ s camp beyond the city limits .
Soon he was handed an AK-47 and deployed to street battles around a Muslim quarter of the capital .
“ They attacked us , so we fought back , ” said Emmanuel , whose name has been changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and stigma .
“ Life was hard .
When we weren ’ t fighting , we slept in the bush .
I did many bad things during that time.
” Over the coming years , the warring parties fragmented into smaller sectarian factions as the broad religious divide splintered into a convoluted ethnic conflict , compounded by clashes over control of mineral reserves .
This prolonged the violence and ravaged CAR ’ s weak health care system , leaving it utterly unprepared for the pandemic today .
Hospitals were raided by militants .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ended up treating wounded civilians and rape survivors .
Many health care personnel fled , while those who stayed behind faced attacks , even murder , making CAR one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers .
In 2017 , as part of UNICEF-led efforts to free child soldiers , the anti-balaka allowed Emmanuel to leave .
He was just one of 3,066 children released that year from CAR ’ s multitude of militias , which still control around three-quarters of CAR ’ s territory .
Between 2014 and the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers have left these groups , including almost 4,000 girls .
Today , Emmanuel and around 50 other former child soldiers and street kids have built wells for some 25,000 people living in areas around Bangui as well as in Sibut to the north and in Bangassou to the east .
By the time Emmanuel joined , the program had already been running since 2015 , when manual-drilling specialists from Laos were flown into CAR .
They shared inexpensive techniques that have provided clean water and convenient hand pumps in the Southeast Asian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the price of mechanical methods to drill boreholes .
For Emmanuel , now aged 18 , the benefits of his new job are twofold .
He ’ s making a living and paying back a debt to society .
“ This work could change my life , ” he said .
“ I finally have some money .
And I ’ m helping these communities and my country.
” As the government in CAR has tightened measures to slow the spread of the coronavirus—and aid groups have tried to encourage practices like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state control—the well-drilling task force of former child soldiers has continued its crucial work to bring water to the people .
They have reduced the size of their teams and received masks , soap , and training to mitigate the risks of COVID-19 .
Building more wells not only promotes hand-washing ; it also reduces congestion around existing taps , making it easier for people to keep their distance from each other while waiting in line .
This last bit is crucial .
Densely populated slums and an internally displaced population of more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overcrowded camps—add to CAR ’ s cocktail of conditions in which the coronavirus can thrive .
While digging wells offers income , purpose , and stability to former fighters , some 5,550 children remain trapped in armed groups nationwide .
Some are combatants , while others act as cooks , guards , porters , messengers , or lookouts .
Negotiations to release these children are ongoing and can last between two months and two years .
During these tentative talks , UNICEF staff talk with rebel commanders about the responsibility to protect civilians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and clarify the definition of a child .
Some commanders , for example , may only regard a child as someone under 5 years old , leaving older children and teenagers at risk of recruitment .
Densely populated slums and an internally displaced population of more than 600,000 people add to CAR ’ s cocktail of conditions in which the coronavirus can thrive .
Child-protection activities in CAR receive far less funding than similar work in Syria , in South Sudan , and on the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh , according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In 2018 , a global average of just $ 3 were spent on each child in need of protection for the entire year , falling way short of what is needed .
Mental-health activities can cost $ 50 per child , let alone the additional cash needed for food , education , and other kinds of relief .
According to official U.N. figures , there are some 798,000 children in need of protection and psychotherapy in CAR , but a lack of funding means that the target for this year is just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the total .
Meanwhile , a shaky cease-fire between the CAR government and 14 armed groups signed last year is failing to hold .
Last month , thousands fled fighting in the southeast , while , in April , dozens of people were killed and wounded in renewed clashes between rival rebel factions in Ndele to the north—grim reminders of the bloodshed that has blighted this country for years .
Persistent outbreaks of violence mean that some commanders will be unwilling to lose personnel , no matter how young .
Child fighters may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders .
Less able to assess risk and to withstand indoctrination , children recruited into armed groups can be manipulated to terrorize rivals and inflict atrocities that older , more resistant individuals may shun .
“ These children are among the most vulnerable in the country , ” said Christine Muhigana , UNICEF ’ s representative in CAR .
“ Their fate remains unclear.
” Meanwhile , worried that the pandemic may postpone the elections , some politicians have tried rallying support for a controversial alternative : extending the term of the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has said that any such move would amount to a destabilizing and unconstitutional power grab .
Their objection to it was vindicated last week by a ruling at the country ’ s highest court , which rejected the proposed changes to the constitution that would have allowed Touadéra to stay in power .
If CAR ’ s tentative peace collapses , the progress made by peace-building efforts like the well-drilling project could be wrecked , and its young participants could be among the first to return to the aegis of armed groups .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ children are in urgent need of aid , lacking access to food , health care , and other basic needs .
On average , one in five do not attend school .
In areas worst affected by conflict and poverty , that figure is closer to four in five .
More than 500 grave violations of child rights were reported last year .
These include killing , maiming , abducting , recruiting , and sexually abusing children ; attacking their schools ; and denying them aid .
The real numbers are almost certainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tentative peace collapses , the progress made by peace-building efforts like the well-drilling project could be wrecked , and its young participants could be among the first to return to the aegis of armed groups .
The problem in CAR is that those committing these crimes are unlikely to face justice .
Impunity is widespread , and a dysfunctional judicial system denies victims redress .
There is nothing to stop perpetrators from repeating the same violations without facing accountability , and that damages the chances of winning a sustainable peace .
Recent months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depressing rule .
While many former combatants like Emmanuel go through a more constructive process of restorative justice , helping them build new relationships and repair harm in their communities , a more retributive strategy is running alongside this to put the worst offenders on trial , whether in national or international systems , or indeed a hybrid of the two .
At the International Criminal Court in The Hague , two alleged anti-balaka chiefs are awaiting trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity .
In Bangui , a national court prosecuted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muslim civilians in 2017 .
Jail sentences ranged from 10 to 15 years , with five senior figures given life sentences .
For some observers , these convictions were bittersweet , serving only to highlight the impunity enjoyed by those even higher up the chain of command .
“ The massacre would not have been possible without the ideological and financial support of some Bangui-based politicians , ” said Enrica Picco , a lawyer and researcher specializing in conflict and justice in the region .
“ The convictions hit only the perpetrators of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The initiative of the national courts to investigate war crimes has to be welcomed , but there is no political will to go further.
” After a slow start , prosecutors at another institution in Bangui called the Special Criminal Court have started investigations into suspected war criminals ; the first trials are expected to be held next year .
Last month , 18 militants from two different rebel groups—the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic ( UPC ) and the Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peacekeepers at the court ’ s request in areas outside of the state ’ s control .
Similar U.N.-backed tribunals have dealt with atrocities committed in Cambodia , Rwanda , Sierra Leone , and the former Yugoslavia .
However , based on the premise that accountability will deter attacks and foster peace , this is the first such tribunal to be established inside a country where fighting continues .
This month marks the five-year anniversary since the founding of this much-vaunted court .
It holds plenty of promise but has been slow off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ symbol of hope for many victims , the establishment of the Special Criminal Court was a response to a unanimous call for justice and accountability , ” said Tity Agbahey , Amnesty International ’ s Central Africa campaigner , who has urged Western governments and the U.N. to boost the court ’ s funding .
“ More effort must be made to get the court fully operational and ensure victims of the heinous crimes that have taken place will soon see the first trials .
Last year , one of CAR ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrested across the border in Chad in a promising development for putting warlords in the dock .
It emerged last week that Miskine—whose armed group , the Democratic Front of the Central African People ( FDPC ) , was a signatory to last year ’ s peace deal — is being held in the Chadian capital , N ’ Djamena , accused of overseeing rape and an “ insurrectional movement.
” The U.N. Security Council has put him under sanctions including an asset freeze and travel ban ( as Washington did in 2014 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s justice minister , the ICC has given an “ expression of interest ” in this incarcerated commander .
It ’ s not clear , however , whether he ’ ll ever end up in the dock .
Attempts by the CAR government to secure his extradition from Chad have so far failed .
Finally , CAR ’ s long-awaited Truth , Justice , Reparation , and Reconciliation Commission is touted as another tool to help bring about a sustainable peace .
However , this South Africa-style body has been dogged by delays @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to political pressure .
On top of this , its mandate—to “ establish the truth about serious national events since 1959 ” —is worryingly broad , and key witnesses living in far-off , poorly connected provinces could be left out of the process .
Even with the best intentions , it may prove ineffective against CAR ’ s powerful elites as “ an empty commitment that could bring all parties in conflict to an agreement without affecting their interests , ” said Picco , the lawyer .
Despite these challenges , the desire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong .
One of the few women in Bangui ’ s extraordinary well-drilling crew is Josephine , formerly a teenage member of the anti-balaka who is now helping to build a new peace and bolster her country ’ s resilience to coronavirus .
Six years ago , aged 14 , Josephine was staying with relatives when the Séléka attacked and killed her uncle , having already slain her parents a few months earlier .
She joined the anti-balaka and spent the next three years with the militia , guarding prisoners and cooking for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to me , ” said Josephine , whose name has been changed to protect her identity .
“ They didn ’ t pay us but gave food and soap for showering.
” The camaraderie and handouts came at a price .
“ I saw many people killed , ” she added .
“ They would execute them right in front of me .
Sometimes they shot them , sometimes they stabbed them.
” During a lull , Josephine moved back to Bangui and heard that UNICEF was training former militants in well-drilling .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ signed up .
For Josephine—now in her early twenties and raising two children—the job ’ s tough , but the rewards are worth it .
As the pandemic looms over this fragile country in the heart of Africa , the weight of her task has grown .
“ When I was in the anti-balaka , I didn ’ t do anything to help the country , ” she said .
“ Now I ’ m contributing to the community .
The work is hard .
The men don ’ t think I can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prove them wrong .
”

BANGUI, Central African Republic—Gone are the black-magic amulets that promised invincibility in the heat of battle. So too are the machetes and homemade rifles, once used to hunt civilians like game. Khaki berets and menacing face scarves have been swapped for rainboots and high-visibility jackets.
BANGUI, Central African Republic—Gone are the black-magic amulets that promised invincibility in the heat of battle. So too are the machetes and homemade rifles, once used to hunt civilians like game. Khaki berets and menacing face scarves have been swapped for rainboots and high-visibility jackets.
An unlikely crew of maintenance workers, made up of former child soldiers and other vulnerable youngsters in the Central African Republic (CAR), was hard at work in June 2019. Deployed to an impoverished suburb of the capital, Bangui, they were digging a well for a community otherwise cut off from water supplies.
During years of civil war, whether by choice or by force, these young individuals joined militias that brought the country to its knees. But now, splattered with red-brown mud, elbow-deep in water, and free from the grip of armed groups, they are spearheading the push to protect their fellow citizens from the coronavirus pandemic.
“Our response plan for COVID-19 includes the provision of safe water for drinking and hygiene, particularly hand-washing,” said Olivier Sieyadji, a sanitation specialist with UNICEF. “These former child soldiers are more mobilized than ever to construct new water points in the field.”
By drilling for water, they were also drilling for peace. Before the novel coronavirus emerged late last year, this sanitation scheme had been set up to help dozens of teenagers move on from their violent past by giving them new skills and paid work to rebuild CAR from the ruins of a devastating conflict. By hiring ex-militants to do the job, the project supported their rehabilitation, offering them a new stake in society.
Worldwide, tens of thousands of children are estimated to be in armed groups and, while the exact figure is uncertain, the number is growing, having more than doubled since 2012, according to a report published last year by Child Soldiers International, a U.K.-based nonprofit. The changing nature of 21st-century conflict is putting children onto front lines in new and atrocious ways; wars are becoming longer, more urban, and increasingly irregular, drawing in greater numbers of insurgent and militia groups. The Overseas Development Institute, a London-based think tank, estimated in 2014 that the global cost resulting from the consequences of all physical, psychological, and sexual violence against children could be as high as $7 trillion, surpassing the institute’s estimate of how much it would cost to prevent much of this violence.
“Children not soldiers” reads a roadside sign in Bossangoa on June 9, 2019, advocating against using children in armed militias.
The results have been catastrophic for places like CAR, which is ranked among the worst conflict-affected countries for children to grow up in and which still suffers interethnic hostility and clashes over diamond mines, gold reserves and lucrative cattle migration routes. And that was before the coronavirus pandemic created new conditions for fresh conflict. While recent fighting in CAR has generally appeared unconnected to the lockdown, such measures could trigger a sharp increase in food prices, disrupt peacekeeping operations, and hamper the supply of aid, pushing hard-up communities to the edge.
The virus has already featured as a possible factor in one serious security incident. In late March, militants entered a camp holding around 8,000 internally displaced people who had fled earlier fighting in Ndele, a rebel-held town in northern CAR. These soldiers forcibly evicted all the inhabitants and ordered them to return to their homes, “blaming them for the potential spread of COVID-19,” according to a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Soldiers forcibly evicted all the camp’s inhabitants and ordered them to return to their homes, “blaming them for the potential spread of COVID-19.”
Another official with detailed knowledge of the incident confirmed that the armed group responsible for the illegal eviction did raise concerns to aid workers about the heightened virus risk posed by the displacement site’s cramped and unsanitary conditions. However, the militants’ desire to dismantle and eradicate an unseemly camp was more likely driven by political anxieties than health concerns. Following scenes of fighting and displacement, the official added, rebel commanders in charge of the town now “wanted to show they were in control of the situation” and that under their authority “life in Ndele was normalizing”—even if achieving that dubious impression required storming a displacement camp in violation of international law.
With its long history of coups, conflicts, and civil unrest, CAR continues to face recurrent cycles of violence that expose communities to horrific attacks, promote the recruitment of child soldiers, and impede the country’s economic development, leaving it acutely vulnerable to public health crises like the coronavirus pandemic. Grassroots peace-building initiatives such as the well-drilling project for former child soldiers—as well as accompanying judicial endeavors to impose the rule of law in the country—may offer CAR an opportunity to break with the past.
Back in the drizzly suburb of Bangui, a crowd of young children gathered to watch the well-digging crew in action. One of the workers hoisted himself onto the drill to apply pressure to it as four others manually turned it around to bore deep into the ground. The community’s curiosity about their activities was a positive sign.
Without this kind of work, former child soldiers are more likely to face stigma and rejection, which can impede recovery and increase their chances of being recruited again, in turn fueling new violence. This is not just a human rights issue; it’s a security concern, too. The use of child soldiers may prolong wars by increasing the strength of a rebel group and its ability to keep fighting. Likewise, these youngsters become socialized into conflict, acquiring militant values that make them more prone to aggression.
“Interventions that help children to be accepted by their families and communities are key for a successful rehabilitation,” said Zihalirwa Nalwage, UNICEF’s chief of child protection in CAR.
Of course, digging wells in itself is not enough to treat complex cases of post-traumatic stress disorder. Given their repeated exposure to warfare, sexual violence, and other traumas during the critical years of childhood development, many of these young people need specialized therapy, so this project runs alongside counseling and other psychiatric interventions. However, overwhelming caseloads of patients coupled with massive shortfalls in humanitarian funding can put that kind of support out of reach, leaving mental scars unhealed. Last year’s aid plan for CAR was 30 percent unfunded; 2020’s appeal is currently short by about $420 million—a gap amounting to 76 percent of the total target.
Given their repeated exposure to traumas during the critical years of childhood development, many of these young people need specialized therapy, so this project runs alongside counseling and other psychiatric interventions.
Instead, projects like the well-drilling one offer a redemptive process that helps former child solders move past their wartime activities. Transforming them into constructive citizens can reduce their feelings of shame, self-loathing, and guilt while allowing them to regain self-esteem, social status, and a sense of normality.
“The population faces a critical water situation,” said Maxime Yandjia, the country director in CAR for a continent-wide organization called Water and Sanitation for Africa, which works alongside UNICEF. “This project tackles that problem while also bringing these former child soldiers together and reintegrating them into the community after the war.”
The pandemic has given their hygiene-boosting efforts new urgency, putting these young former militants at the center of a critical public health initiative. Following the detection of CAR’s first case of COVID-19 in March, the number of confirmed cases has climbed to over 1,800—lower than in some neighboring countries, though that is likely due to less testing and patchy state control. Meanwhile, almost 80 percent of households in CAR lack hand-washing facilities, and more than half face substandard sanitation, forcing people to use rudimentary latrines or dispose of human waste in the open. As one of the world’s poorest countries, CAR simply does not have the wherewithal to cope with a widespread coronavirus outbreak.
Against this troubling backdrop, the well-drilling teams coordinated by UNICEF and Water and Sanitation for Africa have raced to install 20 new wells since the start of the year, bringing improved water supplies to around 10,000 people, with more planned for Bangui and Paoua in the northwest. “The team can be deployed promptly to improve water coverage in affected areas,” added Sieyadji, of UNICEF. “The tools are light and can easily be transported to remote areas.”
Among his crew of former child soldiers was Emmanuel, whose blank expression and unnerving intensity hint at a history of violence that still haunts him. In 2013, as a mainly Muslim coalition of rebel groups known as the Séléka rampaged through the capital and seized power in a coup, several soldiers from this unruly alliance entered Emmanuel’s home and killed his parents and older sister. Grieving, angry, and just 13 years old, he joined a militia.
His group belonged to the anti-balaka movement that, in response to the Séléka’s horrific regime, was rapidly recruiting vigilantes from Christian and animist communities. Targeting Séléka rebels and Muslim civilians alike, their revenge attacks plunged the country deeper into turmoil.
Two men walk past unmarked graves on the outskirts of Bossangoa on June 9, 2019, where civilians who were massacred earlier in the conflict are buried.
At first Emmanuel ran errands for his superiors, shopping for food or cooking meals in the group’s camp beyond the city limits. Soon he was handed an AK-47 and deployed to street battles around a Muslim quarter of the capital.
“They attacked us, so we fought back,” said Emmanuel, whose name has been changed because former child soldiers can face reprisals and stigma. “Life was hard. When we weren’t fighting, we slept in the bush. I did many bad things during that time.”
Over the coming years, the warring parties fragmented into smaller sectarian factions as the broad religious divide splintered into a convoluted ethnic conflict, compounded by clashes over control of mineral reserves. This prolonged the violence and ravaged CAR’s weak health care system, leaving it utterly unprepared for the pandemic today. Hospitals were raided by militants. Doctors trying to offer routine health care ended up treating wounded civilians and rape survivors. Many health care personnel fled, while those who stayed behind faced attacks, even murder, making CAR one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers.
In 2017, as part of UNICEF-led efforts to free child soldiers, the anti-balaka allowed Emmanuel to leave. He was just one of 3,066 children released that year from CAR’s multitude of militias, which still control around three-quarters of CAR’s territory. Between 2014 and the end of last year, more than 14,500 child soldiers have left these groups, including almost 4,000 girls.
Today, Emmanuel and around 50 other former child soldiers and street kids have built wells for some 25,000 people living in areas around Bangui as well as in Sibut to the north and in Bangassou to the east. By the time Emmanuel joined, the program had already been running since 2015, when manual-drilling specialists from Laos were flown into CAR. They shared inexpensive techniques that have provided clean water and convenient hand pumps in the Southeast Asian country for decades, costing a quarter of the price of mechanical methods to drill boreholes.
For Emmanuel, now aged 18, the benefits of his new job are twofold. He’s making a living and paying back a debt to society. “This work could change my life,” he said. “I finally have some money. And I’m helping these communities and my country.”
As the government in CAR has tightened measures to slow the spread of the coronavirus—and aid groups have tried to encourage practices like social distancing in the areas outside of state control—the well-drilling task force of former child soldiers has continued its crucial work to bring water to the people. They have reduced the size of their teams and received masks, soap, and training to mitigate the risks of COVID-19. Building more wells not only promotes hand-washing; it also reduces congestion around existing taps, making it easier for people to keep their distance from each other while waiting in line.
This last bit is crucial. Densely populated slums and an internally displaced population of more than 600,000 people—many of whom live in overcrowded camps—add to CAR’s cocktail of conditions in which the coronavirus can thrive.
While digging wells offers income, purpose, and stability to former fighters, some 5,550 children remain trapped in armed groups nationwide. Some are combatants, while others act as cooks, guards, porters, messengers, or lookouts. Negotiations to release these children are ongoing and can last between two months and two years.
During these tentative talks, UNICEF staff talk with rebel commanders about the responsibility to protect civilians, inform them of international law, and clarify the definition of a child. Some commanders, for example, may only regard a child as someone under 5 years old, leaving older children and teenagers at risk of recruitment.
Densely populated slums and an internally displaced population of more than 600,000 people add to CAR’s cocktail of conditions in which the coronavirus can thrive.
Child-protection activities in CAR receive far less funding than similar work in Syria, in South Sudan, and on the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh, according to a Save the Children report last year. In 2018, a global average of just $3 were spent on each child in need of protection for the entire year, falling way short of what is needed.
Mental-health activities can cost $50 per child, let alone the additional cash needed for food, education, and other kinds of relief. According to official U.N. figures, there are some 798,000 children in need of protection and psychotherapy in CAR, but a lack of funding means that the target for this year is just 150,000, less than 20 percent of the total.
Meanwhile, a shaky cease-fire between the CAR government and 14 armed groups signed last year is failing to hold. Last month, thousands fled fighting in the southeast, while, in April, dozens of people were killed and wounded in renewed clashes between rival rebel factions in Ndele to the north—grim reminders of the bloodshed that has blighted this country for years.
Persistent outbreaks of violence mean that some commanders will be unwilling to lose personnel, no matter how young. Child fighters may even be particularly attractive to these militia leaders. Less able to assess risk and to withstand indoctrination, children recruited into armed groups can be manipulated to terrorize rivals and inflict atrocities that older, more resistant individuals may shun.
“These children are among the most vulnerable in the country,” said Christine Muhigana, UNICEF’s representative in CAR. “Their fate remains unclear.”
Women and children watch a football game in Bossangoa on June 7, 2019. The tournament was organized by the charity War Child to bring the community together and encourage social cohesion following years of fighting.
This is a critical year for CAR. Its former authoritarian leader, François Bozizé, has returned from exile ahead of presidential elections due in December, even though he is under U.N. Security Council sanctions for supporting anti-balaka attacks. His unexpected return to the country was followed by that of Michel Djotodia, the former rebel leader who had ousted Bozizé in 2013 in a bloody coup. With peace in CAR on a knife-edge, their critics fear that their potential return to the country’s febrile political stage could ratchet up tensions in the run-up to elections.
Meanwhile, worried that the pandemic may postpone the elections, some politicians have tried rallying support for a controversial alternative: extending the term of the current president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra. The opposition has said that any such move would amount to a destabilizing and unconstitutional power grab. Their objection to it was vindicated last week by a ruling at the country’s highest court, which rejected the proposed changes to the constitution that would have allowed Touadéra to stay in power.
If CAR’s tentative peace collapses, the progress made by peace-building efforts like the well-drilling project could be wrecked, and its young participants could be among the first to return to the aegis of armed groups.
Across the country, two-thirds of all children are in urgent need of aid, lacking access to food, health care, and other basic needs. On average, one in five do not attend school. In areas worst affected by conflict and poverty, that figure is closer to four in five. More than 500 grave violations of child rights were reported last year. These include killing, maiming, abducting, recruiting, and sexually abusing children; attacking their schools; and denying them aid. The real numbers are almost certainly far higher.
If CAR’s tentative peace collapses, the progress made by peace-building efforts like the well-drilling project could be wrecked, and its young participants could be among the first to return to the aegis of armed groups.
The problem in CAR is that those committing these crimes are unlikely to face justice. Impunity is widespread, and a dysfunctional judicial system denies victims redress. There is nothing to stop perpetrators from repeating the same violations without facing accountability, and that damages the chances of winning a sustainable peace.
Recent months have offered some promising exceptions to this depressing rule. While many former combatants like Emmanuel go through a more constructive process of restorative justice, helping them build new relationships and repair harm in their communities, a more retributive strategy is running alongside this to put the worst offenders on trial, whether in national or international systems, or indeed a hybrid of the two.
At the International Criminal Court in The Hague, two alleged anti-balaka chiefs are awaiting trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Bangui, a national court prosecuted 28 anti-balaka militants in February for massacring Muslim civilians in 2017. Jail sentences ranged from 10 to 15 years, with five senior figures given life sentences. For some observers, these convictions were bittersweet, serving only to highlight the impunity enjoyed by those even higher up the chain of command.
“The massacre would not have been possible without the ideological and financial support of some Bangui-based politicians,” said Enrica Picco, a lawyer and researcher specializing in conflict and justice in the region. “The convictions hit only the perpetrators of those crimes, not their instigators. The initiative of the national courts to investigate war crimes has to be welcomed, but there is no political will to go further.”
After a slow start, prosecutors at another institution in Bangui called the Special Criminal Court have started investigations into suspected war criminals; the first trials are expected to be held next year. Last month, 18 militants from two different rebel groups—the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and the Popular Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic (FPRC)—were arrested by U.N. peacekeepers at the court’s request in areas outside of the state’s control. Similar U.N.-backed tribunals have dealt with atrocities committed in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia. However, based on the premise that accountability will deter attacks and foster peace, this is the first such tribunal to be established inside a country where fighting continues.
This month marks the five-year anniversary since the founding of this much-vaunted court. It holds plenty of promise but has been slow off the mark. “Seen as a symbol of hope for many victims, the establishment of the Special Criminal Court was a response to a unanimous call for justice and accountability,” said Tity Agbahey, Amnesty International’s Central Africa campaigner, who has urged Western governments and the U.N. to boost the court’s funding. “More effort must be made to get the court fully operational and ensure victims of the heinous crimes that have taken place will soon see the first trials.
Last year, one of CAR’s rebel leaders, Abdoulaye Miskine, was arrested across the border in Chad in a promising development for putting warlords in the dock. It emerged last week that Miskine—whose armed group, the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), was a signatory to last year’s peace deal — is being held in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, accused of overseeing rape and an “insurrectional movement.” The U.N. Security Council has put him under sanctions including an asset freeze and travel ban (as Washington did in 2014) while, according to Chad’s justice minister, the ICC has given an “expression of interest” in this incarcerated commander. It’s not clear, however, whether he’ll ever end up in the dock. Attempts by the CAR government to secure his extradition from Chad have so far failed.
Finally, CAR’s long-awaited Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Reconciliation Commission is touted as another tool to help bring about a sustainable peace. However, this South Africa-style body has been dogged by delays while centralized control in Bangui exposes it to political pressure. On top of this, its mandate—to “establish the truth about serious national events since 1959”—is worryingly broad, and key witnesses living in far-off, poorly connected provinces could be left out of the process. Even with the best intentions, it may prove ineffective against CAR’s powerful elites as “an empty commitment that could bring all parties in conflict to an agreement without affecting their interests,” said Picco, the lawyer.
Two teenage boys—who were recruited as child soldiers in 2013 by a mainly Muslim coalition of rebel groups known as Séléka—meet on the outskirts of the rebel-held town of Kaga-Bandoro in northern Central African Republic on Jan. 22, 2018, as part of UNICEF-led efforts to support vulnerable children and train them with new skills.
Despite these challenges, the desire for peace among ordinary Central Africans remains strong. One of the few women in Bangui’s extraordinary well-drilling crew is Josephine, formerly a teenage member of the anti-balaka who is now helping to build a new peace and bolster her country’s resilience to coronavirus.
Six years ago, aged 14, Josephine was staying with relatives when the Séléka attacked and killed her uncle, having already slain her parents a few months earlier. She joined the anti-balaka and spent the next three years with the militia, guarding prisoners and cooking for the commander. “They were friendly to me,” said Josephine, whose name has been changed to protect her identity. “They didn’t pay us but gave food and soap for showering.”
The camaraderie and handouts came at a price. “I saw many people killed,” she added. “They would execute them right in front of me. Sometimes they shot them, sometimes they stabbed them.” During a lull, Josephine moved back to Bangui and heard that UNICEF was training former militants in well-drilling. Eager for a fresh start, she signed up.
For Josephine—now in her early twenties and raising two children—the job’s tough, but the rewards are worth it. As the pandemic looms over this fragile country in the heart of Africa, the weight of her task has grown.
“When I was in the anti-balaka, I didn’t do anything to help the country,” she said. “Now I’m contributing to the community. The work is hard. The men don’t think I can do it. But every day I prove them wrong.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--American Cops Could Learn a Lesson from Italy’s Carabinieri

Italy ’ s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute , operating jointly under Italy ’ s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior .
They carry arms and conduct the country ’ s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists .
But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly .
The Carabinieri are highly trained officers—and masters of de-escalation .
As law enforcement officers respond to protests against police brutality across the United States with further violence , U.S. police forces could learn from Italy ’ s skilled force .
“ A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and wisdom , called the Royal Carabinieri Corps … [ is incepted ] for the purpose of contributing to the overall prosperity of the State , that can ’ t be separated from the protection and defense of our good and loyal Subjects , and from the punishment of the guilty , ” wrote King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia in the royal decree that established the Carabinieri 206 years ago .
On festive occasions , the Carabinieri still wear their distinctly regal-looking uniforms—and that ’ s how most foreigners picture the force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are far from pomp and circumstance .
They investigate Mafia groups and other organized crime , arrest hardened criminals , seize illicit drugs , conduct peacekeeping in complex environments ( such as Kosovo ) , and train other countries ’ police forces in the use of firearms .
They are , in other words , the real deal : highly skilled officers who take on the toughest cases .
Three years ago , members of the Carabinieri arrested the legendary ’ Ndrangheta mafia boss Giuseppe Giorgi , also known as The Goat , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police commander .
Earlier this year , hundreds of Carabinieri , working with Italy ’ s financial police , the Guardia di Finanza , arrested nearly 100 people in Sicily who—led by two Mafia clans—had systematically pillaged EU funds .
Last December , they arrested more than 300 members of the vicious ’ Ndrangheta .
And last month , a team of Carabinieri seized 6 million euros ( $ 6.5 million ) in a raid on a drug-trafficking syndicate , while another team discovered a large weapons cache including a bomb with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are , it ’ s rare to see a Carabinieri officer brandishing a gun .
“ Even during arrests of Mafia leaders , the officers only rarely use their weapons , ” said Brig .
Gen. Massimo Mennitti , the Carabinieri ’ s chief of external relations .
“ We simply make clear to them that they have no option but to give up.
” But how to communicate that to an extremely dangerous mafioso without , say , pointing a weapon at him ?
“ As they say in Sicily , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you receive respect , ’ ” Mennitti explained .
“ That ’ s obviously easy to say .
It ’ s harder when you ’ re arresting somebody in a dark street .
But your first instinct should be to remain calm.
” It doesn ’ t always work .
In one incident in 1992 , three Carabinieri lost their lives in the bombing attack on prosecutor Giovanni Falcone when a bomb was detonated as they traveled on a Sicilian motorway .
Last year , three Carabinieri officers were killed on duty , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unarmed officer stabbed to death by an American teenager when he intercepted the U.S. national , who had stolen a backpack during a botched drug deal .
Another 2,033 officers were injured last year , according to figures provided by the Carabinieri .
Still , considering the often highly dangerous nature of the 110,000-strong force ’ s duties , that ’ s a relatively small number .
Indeed , while the number of officers injured has increased in recent years , the number of deaths has declined .
The Carabinieri ’ s approach—military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rare use of weapons—is worlds away from U.S. policing .
Even though U.S. police officers are not a military force with corresponding training , since 1997 they have bought $ 7.2 billion worth of heavily discounted military surplus equipment .
Between 2006 and 2014 , that included 79,288 assault rifles , 205 grenade launchers , and 11,959 bayonets from the Pentagon .
The influx of equipment has had consequences : A 2017 academic study found that use of the program ’ s equipment “ increases civilian deaths by roughly 129 % .
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both the defense of the country and the investigation of serious crime , also specialize in community policing .
During the coronavirus crisis , Carabinieri have been bringing food to older people , homeless people , and others who are struggling .
In some towns , they have even teamed up with local priests to buy food for needy families .
And because locked-down elderly Italians have been unable to collect their pensions at the post office—as is customary—local Carabinieri have delivered the money to them .
There have been bad apples : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of manslaughter in the case of Stefano Cucchi , who died in 2009 after having been beaten in police custody .
But on the whole , the Carabinieri enjoy enormous respect in Italian society .
Though that may seem natural today , matters could have turned out very differently .
“ In the 1970s we had a combination of [ domestic ] terrorism and widespread student protests , ” recalled Stefano Stefanini , a former Italian ambassador to NATO and advisor to ex-President Giorgio Napolitano .
“ That ’ s where the Carabinieri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The situation was often violent , but the Carabinieri responded with extreme caution.
” That period , often referred to as the Years of Lead , came at a staggering human cost , with more than 400 people killed , according to most estimates .
The majority were civilians , but civil servants were killed too , as were military officers and more than a dozen Carabinieri .
But if they had employed more confrontational U.S.-style policing tactics back then , it ’ s likely many more lives would have been lost .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , could make a promising model for police forces everywhere—and it ’ s one that U.S. police forces should study .
Indeed , the Carabinieri teach their model at NATO ’ s Stability Policing center in the Italian town of Vicenza .
There are clearly differences between the legal systems in the United States and Italy ; the American system is a federal one with local police forces , while the Italian government is more centralized .
The Carabinieri are a national force , where officers change assignments every few years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Carabinieri ’ s head of external relations , for example , transferred to headquarters after commanding the force in the Trentino region .
He told me that the regular transfers between duties instilled a culture among officers of constant learning .
That learning includes foreign deployments : The Carabinieri are much in demand as trainers of police forces in Iraq , Afghanistan , and other countries .
And it includes regular training at the Carabinieri ’ s academies .
Militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the FBI are , of course , national forces—but ones tasked with intelligence and investigations , not patrolling and community policing .
Even if it could be constitutionally arranged , few Americans would want the FBI turned into a federally run police force .
What needs fixing is instead the deterioration in trust between police forces and parts of the community .
Not all U.S. police officers are confrontational and violent .
Many conduct phenomenal detective work based on sleuthing and instinct , not use of weapons , and others excel in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to contend with a level of civilian weapons use that far exceeds European levels .
But as the events of recent weeks make clear , militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing .
If Carabinieri can apprehend mafia kingpins without heavy artillery , it should be possible for U.S. police officers to apprehend garden-variety offenders without killing them and without using bullets , helicopters , and armored vehicles .
Dysfunctional though it often is , there are a few things Italy can teach the United States .
Forceful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ surely one of them .

Italy’s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute, operating jointly under Italy’s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. They carry arms and conduct the country’s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists. But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly.
Italy’s Carabinieri are a police force with a military statute, operating jointly under Italy’s Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. They carry arms and conduct the country’s most dangerous investigations—like arresting Mafia bosses and investigating terrorists. But they also deliver food and necessities to the elderly.
The Carabinieri are highly trained officers—and masters of de-escalation. As law enforcement officers respond to protests against police brutality across the United States with further violence, U.S. police forces could learn from Italy’s skilled force.
“A military Corps known for its good conduct and wisdom, called the Royal Carabinieri Corps … [is incepted] for the purpose of contributing to the overall prosperity of the State, that can’t be separated from the protection and defense of our good and loyal Subjects, and from the punishment of the guilty,” wrote King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia in the royal decree that established the Carabinieri 206 years ago. On festive occasions, the Carabinieri still wear their distinctly regal-looking uniforms—and that’s how most foreigners picture the force.
But on most days, Carabinieri are far from pomp and circumstance. They investigate Mafia groups and other organized crime, arrest hardened criminals, seize illicit drugs, conduct peacekeeping in complex environments (such as Kosovo), and train other countries’ police forces in the use of firearms. They are, in other words, the real deal: highly skilled officers who take on the toughest cases.
Three years ago, members of the Carabinieri arrested the legendary ’Ndrangheta mafia boss Giuseppe Giorgi, also known as The Goat, a nickname reportedly coined by a local police commander. Earlier this year, hundreds of Carabinieri, working with Italy’s financial police, the Guardia di Finanza, arrested nearly 100 people in Sicily who—led by two Mafia clans—had systematically pillaged EU funds. Last December, they arrested more than 300 members of the vicious ’Ndrangheta. And last month, a team of Carabinieri seized 6 million euros ($6.5 million) in a raid on a drug-trafficking syndicate, while another team discovered a large weapons cache including a bomb with its fuse connected.
As highly trained as they are, it’s rare to see a Carabinieri officer brandishing a gun. “Even during arrests of Mafia leaders, the officers only rarely use their weapons,” said Brig. Gen. Massimo Mennitti, the Carabinieri’s chief of external relations. “We simply make clear to them that they have no option but to give up.” But how to communicate that to an extremely dangerous mafioso without, say, pointing a weapon at him? “As they say in Sicily, ‘If you act with respect, you receive respect,’” Mennitti explained. “That’s obviously easy to say. It’s harder when you’re arresting somebody in a dark street. But your first instinct should be to remain calm.” It doesn’t always work.
In one incident in 1992, three Carabinieri lost their lives in the bombing attack on prosecutor Giovanni Falcone when a bomb was detonated as they traveled on a Sicilian motorway. Last year, three Carabinieri officers were killed on duty, among them Mario Cerciello Rega, an unarmed officer stabbed to death by an American teenager when he intercepted the U.S. national, who had stolen a backpack during a botched drug deal. Another 2,033 officers were injured last year, according to figures provided by the Carabinieri. Still, considering the often highly dangerous nature of the 110,000-strong force’s duties, that’s a relatively small number. Indeed, while the number of officers injured has increased in recent years, the number of deaths has declined.
The Carabinieri’s approach—military duties and advanced weapons skills, but rare use of weapons—is worlds away from U.S. policing. Even though U.S. police officers are not a military force with corresponding training, since 1997 they have bought $7.2 billion worth of heavily discounted military surplus equipment. Between 2006 and 2014, that included 79,288 assault rifles, 205 grenade launchers, and 11,959 bayonets from the Pentagon. The influx of equipment has had consequences: A 2017 academic study found that use of the program’s equipment “increases civilian deaths by roughly 129%.”
The Carabinieri, meanwhile, tasked with both the defense of the country and the investigation of serious crime, also specialize in community policing. During the coronavirus crisis, Carabinieri have been bringing food to older people, homeless people, and others who are struggling. In some towns, they have even teamed up with local priests to buy food for needy families. And because locked-down elderly Italians have been unable to collect their pensions at the post office—as is customary—local Carabinieri have delivered the money to them. There have been bad apples: last year two Carabinieri were found guilty of manslaughter in the case of Stefano Cucchi, who died in 2009 after having been beaten in police custody.
But on the whole, the Carabinieri enjoy enormous respect in Italian society. Though that may seem natural today, matters could have turned out very differently. “In the 1970s we had a combination of [domestic] terrorism and widespread student protests,” recalled Stefano Stefanini, a former Italian ambassador to NATO and advisor to ex-President Giorgio Napolitano. “That’s where the Carabinieri learned their skills in crowd control. The situation was often violent, but the Carabinieri responded with extreme caution.”
That period, often referred to as the Years of Lead, came at a staggering human cost, with more than 400 people killed, according to most estimates. The majority were civilians, but civil servants were killed too, as were military officers and more than a dozen Carabinieri. But if they had employed more confrontational U.S.-style policing tactics back then, it’s likely many more lives would have been lost.
Capable of force, but rarely using it, could make a promising model for police forces everywhere—and it’s one that U.S. police forces should study. Indeed, the Carabinieri teach their model at NATO’s Stability Policing center in the Italian town of Vicenza. There are clearly differences between the legal systems in the United States and Italy; the American system is a federal one with local police forces, while the Italian government is more centralized. The Carabinieri are a national force, where officers change assignments every few years, much like armed forces everywhere.
Mennitti, the Carabinieri’s head of external relations, for example, transferred to headquarters after commanding the force in the Trentino region. He told me that the regular transfers between duties instilled a culture among officers of constant learning. That learning includes foreign deployments: The Carabinieri are much in demand as trainers of police forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. And it includes regular training at the Carabinieri’s academies.
Militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing.
In the United States, the CIA and the FBI are, of course, national forces—but ones tasked with intelligence and investigations, not patrolling and community policing. Even if it could be constitutionally arranged, few Americans would want the FBI turned into a federally run police force. What needs fixing is instead the deterioration in trust between police forces and parts of the community.
Not all U.S. police officers are confrontational and violent. Many conduct phenomenal detective work based on sleuthing and instinct, not use of weapons, and others excel in community relations. And all American officers have to contend with a level of civilian weapons use that far exceeds European levels. But as the events of recent weeks make clear, militarization and the excessive use of force have poisoned U.S. policing.
If Carabinieri can apprehend mafia kingpins without heavy artillery, it should be possible for U.S. police officers to apprehend garden-variety offenders without killing them and without using bullets, helicopters, and armored vehicles. Dysfunctional though it often is, there are a few things Italy can teach the United States. Forceful policing without the use of force is surely one of them.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Want to Avoid U.S.-Russian Conflict? Keep the Lines Open

Want to Avoid U.S.-Russian Conflict ?
Keep the Lines Open With little fanfare , U.S. President Donald Trump last month delivered another dangerous blow to keeping international peace when he announced the United States would leave the Open Skies Treaty ( OST ) .
The agreement—signed in 1992—allows mutual reconnaissance flights over the territories of 34 states .
It was designed to allow countries to monitor military activities from the sky and thereby build confidence that neither side is preparing for war or for a surprise attack .
So far , more than 1,500 unarmed surveillance flights have been conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect in 2002 .
Trump pulled out citing Russian nonadherence , and the exit goes into effect in six months , barring an unlikely about-face .
Trump and his team argue that Russian violations undermine the treaty ’ s goals of transparency , cooperation , and trust-building , and they believe that there must be consequences for noncompliance .
The United States also believes that Russia is using OST flights to collect sensitive information about civilian infrastructure in the United States .
( The counterargument here is that OST images can not detect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ satellites . )
But in reality , the United States will suffer the most—losing out on a critical way of keeping open communication channels with Moscow .
The impacts will be felt outside U.S. borders , too .
Withdrawing from the treaty further erodes the conventional arms control regime and significantly increases the risks of conflict in Europe and beyond .
By withdrawing from the OST , the United States weakens the last functioning pillar of the conventional arms control architecture .
The treaty is the final element of a carefully crafted framework @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of the Cold War .
U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower first put forward the idea of an Open Skies Treaty in 1955 , but it only materialized later , when President George H.W .
Bush took advantage of easing tensions between East and West and initiated a negotiation process that led to the signing of the treaty .
The two other main international documents of the post-Cold War era are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ( CFE Treaty ) and the 2011 Vienna @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limits on conventional weapons and provided for military transparency measures , respectively .
Both , however , have been undermined in recent years .
Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007 , after other state parties refused to let the adapted CFE Treaty enter into force .
And the Vienna Document is outdated because Moscow is resisting its modernization .
In addition , the U.S. withdrawal from the OST will most likely have negative effects on possible negotiations to prolong New START , the last remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At the beginning of June , Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that “ the negotiations on that crucial issue , important not just for us but for the entire world , have failed to start.
” As other treaties have diminished in force , the OST has become increasingly critical .
It now represents one of the very few remaining opportunities for military-to-military contacts between Washington and Moscow .
This is crucial because other communication channels between the militaries have run dry in recent years , particularly since the 2014 Ukraine conflict .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ considered less of an intelligence-gathering tool for the United States and more of a trust-building instrument—particularly with Russia .
Dialogue between the militaries is fundamental to the OST : During surveillance flights , military officers from both the observing state and the observed state sit together in one aircraft , sometimes joined by several other officers from other countries .
This builds crucial personal relationships , helping to avoid military misunderstandings .
One of the key advantages of images taken during Open Skies flights is that they can be shared with all signatories @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence data that states usually want to protect .
European diplomats in Vienna who are familiar with the topic told Foreign Policy that it is much easier to act diplomatically ( and politically ) on images taken during Open Skies flights than on secretly collected data , as OST images can not be discarded as fake or unreliable .
( Every Open Skies aircraft and its cameras are examined by experts from treaty members as part of a strict certification process . )
Questions that arise as a result of the OST images—for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being built along NATO ’ s borders—can be raised within the Open Skies Consultative Commission ( OSCC ) , the treaty ’ s implementing body , which meets on a monthly basis at the headquarters of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) in Vienna .
This is also the place where states can clear up any misunderstandings , avoiding military tensions and conflict .
This is particularly useful in times of crisis , for example in 2014 when OST flights showed Russian military buildup along Ukraine ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources in Vienna , the Russian treaty violations have also been discussed in the OSCC in Vienna .
In previous years , violations related , for example , to Russian flight restrictions over Chechnya were solved there successfully .
The current Russian treaty violations relate mainly to Moscow blocking Open Skies flights over the highly militarized Russian exclave of Kaliningrad , where Moscow has imposed a flight length restriction of 500 kilometers ( 311 miles ) , citing safety concerns for other civilian aircraft in the area .
Russia has also blocked flights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia .
While these regions are considered to be within the borders of Georgia , Moscow sees them as independent states and therefore not parties to the treaty .
Russia in the past also banned flights over major Russian military exercises .
The United States , in turn , blocked requests to fly over certain military facilities in Alaska and Hawaii and closed down airfields for overnight stops .
In Vienna , European diplomats said they agreed with Trump that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goals of cooperation and transparency .
But they had hopes that the frictions could eventually have been resolved on a diplomatic level within the OSCC and other formats .
Even James Gilmore , the U.S. ambassador to the OSCE , noted some progress in early March when he said Moscow was apparently ready to allow overflights of military exercises and conceded that even one of the recent OST flights near Kaliningrad was very “ cooperative.
” Yet , with the announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in six months from now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now coming “ close to zero , ” as one diplomat put it , given a further hardening of positions in Moscow and Washington .
The U.S. withdrawal doesn ’ t just undermine Washington ’ s ability to negotiate with Moscow .
It risks driving a wedge between NATO allies and could ultimately undermine unity .
In the long run , this will play into Russia ’ s hands .
European NATO states , including France , Germany , and the United Kingdom , highly value the treaty not only as a confidence-building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because they do not possess the same kinds of sophisticated intelligence sources as the United States .
For instance , European NATO states want to monitor Russian troop movements along their borders , something that is of particular importance to the Baltic nations .
The data helps them identify deployment of military equipment and provides an early warning of troop movements .
What are the options of the remaining state parties ?
So far , no other nations have indicated any intention to leave the treaty .
Late last month , 11 states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stressed their intention to continue engaging Russia .
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on May 26 that Russia would “ analyze the situation in an even-handed manner based primarily on our national interests and the interests of our allies.
” For Europe and Canada , Russia ’ s continued membership is crucial since most of their flights take place over Russian territory , as research by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg shows .
In turn , Russia—even if it loses the ability to fly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right to fly over European states and Canada , which together account for more than 87 percent of its flights .
Moscow has also invested financially in new Open Skies planes and will want to make use of them .
The remaining state parties will decide how to proceed at a conference that has to take place within the next 60 days .
Keeping the treaty alive is in their shared interest as it constitutes the last viable multilateral option of avoiding conflict and military tensions between Russia and the West—even without U.S. @ @

With little fanfare, U.S. President Donald Trump last month delivered another dangerous blow to keeping international peace when he announced the United States would leave the Open Skies Treaty (OST).
With little fanfare, U.S. President Donald Trump last month delivered another dangerous blow to keeping international peace when he announced the United States would leave the Open Skies Treaty (OST).
The agreement—signed in 1992—allows mutual reconnaissance flights over the territories of 34 states. It was designed to allow countries to monitor military activities from the sky and thereby build confidence that neither side is preparing for war or for a surprise attack. So far, more than 1,500 unarmed surveillance flights have been conducted under the treaty since it went into effect in 2002. Trump pulled out citing Russian nonadherence, and the exit goes into effect in six months, barring an unlikely about-face.
Trump and his team argue that Russian violations undermine the treaty’s goals of transparency, cooperation, and trust-building, and they believe that there must be consequences for noncompliance. The United States also believes that Russia is using OST flights to collect sensitive information about civilian infrastructure in the United States. (The counterargument here is that OST images cannot detect anything that is not already available from satellites.)
But in reality, the United States will suffer the most—losing out on a critical way of keeping open communication channels with Moscow. The impacts will be felt outside U.S. borders, too. Withdrawing from the treaty further erodes the conventional arms control regime and significantly increases the risks of conflict in Europe and beyond.
By withdrawing from the OST, the United States weakens the last functioning pillar of the conventional arms control architecture. The treaty is the final element of a carefully crafted framework that has helped maintain peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of the Cold War. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower first put forward the idea of an Open Skies Treaty in 1955, but it only materialized later, when President George H.W. Bush took advantage of easing tensions between East and West and initiated a negotiation process that led to the signing of the treaty. The two other main international documents of the post-Cold War era are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures—which established limits on conventional weapons and provided for military transparency measures, respectively. Both, however, have been undermined in recent years. Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007, after other state parties refused to let the adapted CFE Treaty enter into force. And the Vienna Document is outdated because Moscow is resisting its modernization.
In addition, the U.S. withdrawal from the OST will most likely have negative effects on possible negotiations to prolong New START, the last remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreement that expires in February 2021. At the beginning of June, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that “the negotiations on that crucial issue, important not just for us but for the entire world, have failed to start.”
As other treaties have diminished in force, the OST has become increasingly critical. It now represents one of the very few remaining opportunities for military-to-military contacts between Washington and Moscow. This is crucial because other communication channels between the militaries have run dry in recent years, particularly since the 2014 Ukraine conflict.
In truth, the OST should be considered less of an intelligence-gathering tool for the United States and more of a trust-building instrument—particularly with Russia. Dialogue between the militaries is fundamental to the OST: During surveillance flights, military officers from both the observing state and the observed state sit together in one aircraft, sometimes joined by several other officers from other countries. This builds crucial personal relationships, helping to avoid military misunderstandings.
One of the key advantages of images taken during Open Skies flights is that they can be shared with all signatories of the treaty, unlike secretly collected intelligence data that states usually want to protect. European diplomats in Vienna who are familiar with the topic told Foreign Policy that it is much easier to act diplomatically (and politically) on images taken during Open Skies flights than on secretly collected data, as OST images cannot be discarded as fake or unreliable. (Every Open Skies aircraft and its cameras are examined by experts from treaty members as part of a strict certification process.)
Questions that arise as a result of the OST images—for example, those showing Russian military infrastructure being built along NATO’s borders—can be raised within the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC), the treaty’s implementing body, which meets on a monthly basis at the headquarters of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna. This is also the place where states can clear up any misunderstandings, avoiding military tensions and conflict. This is particularly useful in times of crisis, for example in 2014 when OST flights showed Russian military buildup along Ukraine’s borders.
Indeed, according to diplomatic sources in Vienna, the Russian treaty violations have also been discussed in the OSCC in Vienna. In previous years, violations related, for example, to Russian flight restrictions over Chechnya were solved there successfully.
The current Russian treaty violations relate mainly to Moscow blocking Open Skies flights over the highly militarized Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, where Moscow has imposed a flight length restriction of 500 kilometers (311 miles), citing safety concerns for other civilian aircraft in the area. Russia has also blocked flights within a 10-kilometer (6-mile) zone along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While these regions are considered to be within the borders of Georgia, Moscow sees them as independent states and therefore not parties to the treaty. Russia in the past also banned flights over major Russian military exercises. The United States, in turn, blocked requests to fly over certain military facilities in Alaska and Hawaii and closed down airfields for overnight stops.
In Vienna, European diplomats said they agreed with Trump that the Russian violations undermined the treaty’s goals of cooperation and transparency. But they had hopes that the frictions could eventually have been resolved on a diplomatic level within the OSCC and other formats.
Even James Gilmore, the U.S. ambassador to the OSCE, noted some progress in early March when he said Moscow was apparently ready to allow overflights of military exercises and conceded that even one of the recent OST flights near Kaliningrad was very “cooperative.”
Yet, with the announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in six months from now, the chances for a diplomatic solution are now coming “close to zero,” as one diplomat put it, given a further hardening of positions in Moscow and Washington.
The U.S. withdrawal doesn’t just undermine Washington’s ability to negotiate with Moscow. It risks driving a wedge between NATO allies and could ultimately undermine unity. In the long run, this will play into Russia’s hands. European NATO states, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, highly value the treaty not only as a confidence-building tool but also as an intelligence-gathering tool because they do not possess the same kinds of sophisticated intelligence sources as the United States. For instance, European NATO states want to monitor Russian troop movements along their borders, something that is of particular importance to the Baltic nations. The data helps them identify deployment of military equipment and provides an early warning of troop movements.
What are the options of the remaining state parties? So far, no other nations have indicated any intention to leave the treaty. Late last month, 11 states took aim at the U.S. withdrawal and stressed their intention to continue engaging Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on May 26 that Russia would “analyze the situation in an even-handed manner based primarily on our national interests and the interests of our allies.” For Europe and Canada, Russia’s continued membership is crucial since most of their flights take place over Russian territory, as research by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg shows.
In turn, Russia—even if it loses the ability to fly over the United States—would still retain the right to fly over European states and Canada, which together account for more than 87 percent of its flights. Moscow has also invested financially in new Open Skies planes and will want to make use of them.
The remaining state parties will decide how to proceed at a conference that has to take place within the next 60 days. Keeping the treaty alive is in their shared interest as it constitutes the last viable multilateral option of avoiding conflict and military tensions between Russia and the West—even without U.S. participation.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--Pentagon Won’t Disclose Cost of D.C. Troops

The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington , D.C. , area amid protests last week , Foreign Policy has learned , another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon .
The office of Sen. Chris Van Hollen , which also asked Defense Secretary Mark Esper to explain why he reversed a decision to redeploy several hundred U.S. troops out of Washington after a reportedly fiery exchange with President Donald Trump last week , told Foreign Policy that the Pentagon had not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monday evening .
“ The President ’ s use of military force against American citizens peacefully protesting is plainly unconstitutional , ” Van Hollen and six other Democratic senators wrote to Esper last week .
“ To add insult to injury , the American people will have to foot the bill for these violations of their First Amendment rights.
” The Defense Department acknowledged the request last week , Van Hollen ’ s office told Foreign Policy , but has not followed up with the Maryland Democrat and his colleagues , including Ben @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senator .
“ We are working [ on ] the response to the senators and will respond directly to them , ” said Jessica Maxwell , a Defense Department spokesperson .
Over the weekend , chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman contradicted reports that Esper and Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , had refused a request from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith to testify in open session about the Pentagon ’ s response .
The Trump administration ultimately decided not to deploy active-duty U.S. troops @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proceeded peacefully for the past week since looting erupted on Washington ’ s streets during the last weekend of May following the death of George Floyd , a 46-year-old black man , at the hands of Minneapolis police .
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters on Sunday that the Trump administration came “ right up to the edge ” of deploying U.S. troops amid the protests , though Esper ultimately came out publicly against using the 1807 Insurrection Act on Tuesday that would have allowed active-duty units to cross the bridge from Virginia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We postured them outside [ of Washington ] on the other side of the river , ” McCarthy said on Sunday .
“ They did not cross the river into the capital .
They were on the outskirts.
” Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division had been waiting at Fort Belvoir , Virginia , and Joint Base Andrews in Maryland but were never called up , along with active-duty rapid response and military police units from Fort Bragg , North Carolina , and Fort Drum , New York .
Esper ordered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Washington area on Friday , and McCarthy said out-of-state National Guardsmen who remained in D.C. to potentially respond to Saturday ’ s protests were set to leave by the middle of this week .
But even with the deployments scrapped , lawmakers insist that the fight to drag Defense Department leaders to Capitol Hill for testimony will continue , though McCarthy participated in a telephone call with the House Armed Services Committee this week alongside uniformed Army and D.C. National Guard leaders .
“ The Chairman [ Adam Smith ] remains adamant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley testify before the committee to give an on-the-record account leading up to the events in the military ’ s response in the District , including the clearing of demonstrators in Lafayette Square and the helicopter response in the area , as well as engage in a more broad policy discussion about the use of military service members during civil unrest , ” Monica Matoush , a Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee , told Foreign Policy .
Yet news this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Risch , a Trump ally , will not press for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to publicly defend his agency ’ s budget has watchdog groups worried that the Trump administration is having success in stonewalling oversight requests .
“ I think systemically with the White House we ’ re seeing a low point with the administration failing to provide [ witnesses ] , ” said Mandy Smithberger , the director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight .
There is a track record for the Pentagon sidestepping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Obama administration , to which lawmakers have responded with stern condemnation and threats to withhold money .
In 2015 , the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee accused the White House of breaking federal law by failing to notify Congress in advance of the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap with the Taliban , a finding supported by the Government Accountability Office .
But amid threats from House progressives to slash the Pentagon ’ s budget as the coronavirus pandemic forced the U.S. economy into a recession—ending more than 10 straight years of economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far , by threatening to vote “ no ” on the Defense Department ’ s authorization bill .
The annual bill gives lawmakers the ability to force the agency to respond to oversight requests through reporting requirements and the power of the purse .
“ That would be weakening Congress ’ s own power , ” Smithberger said .
“ It would be like setting off a bomb in your own house.
” Update , June 9 , 2020 : This article previously stated that Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy visited Capitol Hill for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee this week .
The engagement was an informal telephone call .

The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington, D.C., area amid protests last week, Foreign Policy has learned, another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon.
The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington, D.C., area amid protests last week, Foreign Policy has learned, another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon.
The office of Sen. Chris Van Hollen, which also asked Defense Secretary Mark Esper to explain why he reversed a decision to redeploy several hundred U.S. troops out of Washington after a reportedly fiery exchange with President Donald Trump last week, told Foreign Policy that the Pentagon had not provided a response, which was due Monday evening.
“The President’s use of military force against American citizens peacefully protesting is plainly unconstitutional,” Van Hollen and six other Democratic senators wrote to Esper last week. “To add insult to injury, the American people will have to foot the bill for these violations of their First Amendment rights.”
The Defense Department acknowledged the request last week, Van Hollen’s office told Foreign Policy, but has not followed up with the Maryland Democrat and his colleagues, including Ben Cardin, the state’s senior senator.
“We are working [on] the response to the senators and will respond directly to them,” said Jessica Maxwell, a Defense Department spokesperson.
Over the weekend, chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman contradicted reports that Esper and Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had refused a request from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith to testify in open session about the Pentagon’s response.
The Trump administration ultimately decided not to deploy active-duty U.S. troops to quash the demonstrations, which have proceeded peacefully for the past week since looting erupted on Washington’s streets during the last weekend of May following the death of George Floyd, a 46-year-old black man, at the hands of Minneapolis police.
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters on Sunday that the Trump administration came “right up to the edge” of deploying U.S. troops amid the protests, though Esper ultimately came out publicly against using the 1807 Insurrection Act on Tuesday that would have allowed active-duty units to cross the bridge from Virginia and Maryland into the District of Columbia.
“We postured them outside [of Washington] on the other side of the river,” McCarthy said on Sunday. “They did not cross the river into the capital. They were on the outskirts.” Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division had been waiting at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Joint Base Andrews in Maryland but were never called up, along with active-duty rapid response and military police units from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Drum, New York.
Esper ordered the last of the units to depart the Washington area on Friday, and McCarthy said out-of-state National Guardsmen who remained in D.C. to potentially respond to Saturday’s protests were set to leave by the middle of this week.
But even with the deployments scrapped, lawmakers insist that the fight to drag Defense Department leaders to Capitol Hill for testimony will continue, though McCarthy participated in a telephone call with the House Armed Services Committee this week alongside uniformed Army and D.C. National Guard leaders.
“The Chairman [Adam Smith] remains adamant that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley testify before the committee to give an on-the-record account leading up to the events in the military’s response in the District, including the clearing of demonstrators in Lafayette Square and the helicopter response in the area, as well as engage in a more broad policy discussion about the use of military service members during civil unrest,” Monica Matoush, a Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee, told Foreign Policy.
Yet news this week that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch, a Trump ally, will not press for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to publicly defend his agency’s budget has watchdog groups worried that the Trump administration is having success in stonewalling oversight requests.
“I think systemically with the White House we’re seeing a low point with the administration failing to provide [witnesses],” said Mandy Smithberger, the director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight.
There is a track record for the Pentagon sidestepping Congress on specific oversight requests dating back to the Obama administration, to which lawmakers have responded with stern condemnation and threats to withhold money.
In 2015, the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee accused the White House of breaking federal law by failing to notify Congress in advance of the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap with the Taliban, a finding supported by the Government Accountability Office.
But amid threats from House progressives to slash the Pentagon’s budget as the coronavirus pandemic forced the U.S. economy into a recession—ending more than 10 straight years of economic growth—experts say that Democrats could go too far, by threatening to vote “no” on the Defense Department’s authorization bill. The annual bill gives lawmakers the ability to force the agency to respond to oversight requests through reporting requirements and the power of the purse.
“That would be weakening Congress’s own power,” Smithberger said. “It would be like setting off a bomb in your own house.”
Update, June 9, 2020: This article previously stated that Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy visited Capitol Hill for a briefing with the House Armed Services Committee this week. The engagement was an informal telephone call.