foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--No, China Has Not Bought Central and Eastern Europe

No , China Has Not Bought Central and Eastern Europe In recent years , opprobrium over Beijing ’ s incursions on Central and Eastern Europe has reached a fevered pitch .
China planned to buy the region “ on the cheap , ” Forbes reported ; it planned to influence the region “ one business deal at a time , ” noted the New York Times .
The region is “ in bed ” with Beijing , happily taking its investments and loans , A. Wess Mitchell— a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs —opined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the region ’ s allegedly growing economic dependency on China has overshadowed the reality , in which a few well-positioned politicians and businesspeople have hijacked the relationship for personal gain .
In truth , Central and Eastern Europe is far less economically dependent on China than perhaps any other region in the world—and especially compared to the rest of the European Union .
A common allegation from pundits is that Beijing is trying to divide and conquer Europe , as evidenced by its deal-making with Europe ’ s poorer countries .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Central and Eastern Europe began holding annual summits .
( Widely known as the 16+1 , the platform expanded to 17+1 last year , with the addition of Greece . )
Past summits were grand occasions for Beijing to highlight its economic promises of increasing trade and investments—a particularly attractive premise following the 2008 financial crisis .
But these promises rarely came to fruition .
In fact , as time went on , leaders grew frustrated with how few economic opportunities came about from their cooperation with China .
Rather than being a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe , as Czech President Milos Zeman boasted of his country , Beijing more often bypassed the region altogether—taking its investments straight into wealthier Western Europe .
Four years after making that boast , Zeman was threatening to boycott this year ’ s 17+1 summit over the lack of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic .
For years now , the vast majority of Chinese investment into Europe has gone to Western , Northern , and Southern Europe , according to the Mercator Institute for China Studies , a German think tank .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment in Europe went to the United Kingdom , France , and Germany alone , although that number dropped to 34 percent in 2019 .
But that year , only 3 percent of Chinese investment in Europe went to Eastern Europe , the think tank found , despite the region accounting for about a tenth of the EU ’ s GDP .
Meanwhile , products and services from Germany , the U.K. , France , Italy , and the Netherlands made up 78 percent of the EU exports to China in 2018 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asian Studies , an independent think tank .
Germany alone accounted for 45 percent of all EU exports to China in 2018 and it is , by far , the EU country most reliant on exports to China , comprising 7.07 percent of Germany ’ s overall export figures .
Some Central and Eastern European states have , at times , taken overly pro-Beijing steps .
The Czech Republic ’ s Zeman was the only EU head of state present in Beijing for the military parade in 2015 and is famous for his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggested that his country is China ’ s “ unsinkable aircraft carrier ” in Europe .
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic made his fondness even more explicit when he kissed the Chinese flag while receiving medical supplies from China in March , during the early days of Europe ’ s coronavirus crisis .
He said at the time that “ China is the only country that can help , ” while calling Chinese President Xi Jinping his “ friend and brother.
” More crucially , those friendly gestures have at times resembled overt signs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary and Greece blocked separate efforts by the EU to condemn China for human rights violations .
Both countries were among the few within the EU that opposed a strong position after the 2016 South China Sea arbitration .
But even here , these actions—held up as proof of Central and Eastern Europe ’ s suzerainty—fail to tell the full story .
First , only a minority of states from Central and Eastern Europe ever indulged in such gestures .
Second , these are highly symbolic public statements that are meant to attract @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the coronavirus crisis .
Furthermore , praise is often lavished on Beijing to signal dissatisfaction with Brussels .
This is especially true for populist Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe .
When Serbia ’ s Vucic praised China in March , he also highlighted the lack of EU response .
The leaders who are the drivers of their countries ’ relations with China tend to have strong personalities .
In Western Europe , ties with China have become institutionalized over the decades of intense relations with Beijing .
But in Central and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much later and often from scratch .
Much of the Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe stems from personal relationships between the region ’ s politicians and Chinese officials or businesspeople .
In the Czech Republic , for instance , the highly touted Chinese leverage is tied directly to Zeman—a divisive personality whose popularity derives from the more traditional , rural population , which is comparatively less fond of the EU and NATO .
While the president is not the head of the government in the Czech parliamentary system , his role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Zeman to receive presidential treatment—which China is more than happy to provide .
Zeman has distinguished himself by becoming the first Czech president to establish such dynamic relations with China , while also signaling his position to the pro-Western sections of the Czech society .
Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Hungary and Vucic in Serbia share similarities with the Czech case , where political and economic interests of the leaders are in the forefront of the countries ’ engagements with China .
Meanwhile , politicians from Western European states have also been acquiescent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Merkel has made 12 visits to Beijing since 2005 , far more than almost any other European leader .
Earlier this year , the new British government under Prime Minister Boris Johnson just managed to avert a full-blown diplomatic spat with the United States after reaffirming London ’ s commitment to allowing controversial Chinese tech giant Huawei to build parts of the U.K. ’ s 5G network .
In the past , Germany was criticized for preventing a united EU response to Russia ’ s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 , because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and gas imports from Russia .
It ’ s a similar story for China today .
Noah Barkin , a senior visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund , wrote in March that “ the Merkel government ’ s reluctance to antagonize Beijing risks undermining the EU ’ s push for a common policy toward China and perpetuating a situation where member states look out for their own interests , often to the detriment of a common European front.
” Philippe Le Corre , of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , noted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ quasi-unanimity ” between the French and German positions on China .
For the first time , the EU ’ s “ strategic outlook ” on China in March 2019 referred to the country as a “ systemic rival , ” and French President Emmanuel Macron invited his German and European Commission counterparts to talks with Xi that were meant to be bilateral .
In the intervening months , however , Germany and France instead “ ploughed their own separate paths , ” wrote Le Corre , proving that when it comes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevail.
” While it ’ s easy to focus in on Central and Eastern Europe , such attention misses the broader plot .
The narrative of Central and Eastern Europe being bought up by China fits neatly with historical images of an Eastern Europe dominated by communism .
In reality , it is the rest of Europe that is economically far more dependent on China and that has , too , put national interests above the common EU position .
Pointing fingers at Central and Eastern Europe with the easily refutable claims of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western European dealings with China have impacted the ability of the EU to form a common position .
The intra-EU blame game can poison the relations among various European regions and is certainly not helping the EU in reaching unity on the issue .

In recent years, opprobrium over Beijing’s incursions on Central and Eastern Europe has reached a fevered pitch. China planned to buy the region “on the cheap, ” Forbes reported; it planned to influence the region “one business deal at a time,” noted the New York Times . The region is “in bed” with Beijing, happily taking its investments and loans, A. Wess Mitchell— a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs — opined last month.
In recent years, opprobrium over Beijing’s incursions on Central and Eastern Europe has reached a fevered pitch. China planned to buy the region “on the cheap, ” Forbes reported; it planned to influence the region “one business deal at a time,” noted the New York Times. The region is “in bed” with Beijing, happily taking its investments and loans, A. Wess Mitchell— a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs —opined last month.
The excess of attention on the region’s allegedly growing economic dependency on China has overshadowed the reality, in which a few well-positioned politicians and businesspeople have hijacked the relationship for personal gain. In truth, Central and Eastern Europe is far less economically dependent on China than perhaps any other region in the world—and especially compared to the rest of the European Union.
A common allegation from pundits is that Beijing is trying to divide and conquer Europe, as evidenced by its deal-making with Europe’s poorer countries. In 2012, China and post-communist governments of Central and Eastern Europe began holding annual summits. (Widely known as the 16+1, the platform expanded to 17+1 last year, with the addition of Greece.) Past summits were grand occasions for Beijing to highlight its economic promises of increasing trade and investments—a particularly attractive premise following the 2008 financial crisis.
But these promises rarely came to fruition. In fact, as time went on, leaders grew frustrated with how few economic opportunities came about from their cooperation with China. Rather than being a “gateway” for Chinese investment into Europe, as Czech President Milos Zeman boasted of his country, Beijing more often bypassed the region altogether—taking its investments straight into wealthier Western Europe. Four years after making that boast, Zeman was threatening to boycott this year’s 17+1 summit over the lack of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic.
For years now, the vast majority of Chinese investment into Europe has gone to Western, Northern, and Southern Europe, according to the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a German think tank. In 2017, 71 percent of Chinese investment in Europe went to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany alone, although that number dropped to 34 percent in 2019. But that year, only 3 percent of Chinese investment in Europe went to Eastern Europe, the think tank found, despite the region accounting for about a tenth of the EU’s GDP.
Meanwhile, products and services from Germany, the U.K., France, Italy, and the Netherlands made up 78 percent of the EU exports to China in 2018, according to the Central European Institute of Asian Studies, an independent think tank. Germany alone accounted for 45 percent of all EU exports to China in 2018 and it is, by far, the EU country most reliant on exports to China, comprising 7.07 percent of Germany’s overall export figures.
Some Central and Eastern European states have, at times, taken overly pro-Beijing steps. The Czech Republic’s Zeman was the only EU head of state present in Beijing for the military parade in 2015 and is famous for his China-friendly comments, such as when he suggested that his country is China’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in Europe. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic made his fondness even more explicit when he kissed the Chinese flag while receiving medical supplies from China in March, during the early days of Europe’s coronavirus crisis. He said at the time that “China is the only country that can help,” while calling Chinese President Xi Jinping his “friend and brother.”
More crucially, those friendly gestures have at times resembled overt signs of fealty. In 2017, both Hungary and Greece blocked separate efforts by the EU to condemn China for human rights violations. Both countries were among the few within the EU that opposed a strong position after the 2016 South China Sea arbitration.
But even here, these actions—held up as proof of Central and Eastern Europe’s suzerainty—fail to tell the full story. First, only a minority of states from Central and Eastern Europe ever indulged in such gestures. Second, these are highly symbolic public statements that are meant to attract attention—such as when receiving well-needed surgical masks during the coronavirus crisis. Furthermore, praise is often lavished on Beijing to signal dissatisfaction with Brussels. This is especially true for populist Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe. When Serbia’s Vucic praised China in March, he also highlighted the lack of EU response.
The leaders who are the drivers of their countries’ relations with China tend to have strong personalities. In Western Europe, ties with China have become institutionalized over the decades of intense relations with Beijing. But in Central and Eastern Europe, relations with China started much later and often from scratch. Much of the Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe stems from personal relationships between the region’s politicians and Chinese officials or businesspeople. In the Czech Republic, for instance, the highly touted Chinese leverage is tied directly to Zeman—a divisive personality whose popularity derives from the more traditional, rural population, which is comparatively less fond of the EU and NATO.
While the president is not the head of the government in the Czech parliamentary system, his role as a formal head of state allows Zeman to receive presidential treatment—which China is more than happy to provide. Zeman has distinguished himself by becoming the first Czech president to establish such dynamic relations with China, while also signaling his position to the pro-Western sections of the Czech society.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Hungary and Vucic in Serbia share similarities with the Czech case, where political and economic interests of the leaders are in the forefront of the countries’ engagements with China.
Meanwhile, politicians from Western European states have also been acquiescent toward Chinese leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made 12 visits to Beijing since 2005, far more than almost any other European leader. Earlier this year, the new British government under Prime Minister Boris Johnson just managed to avert a full-blown diplomatic spat with the United States after reaffirming London’s commitment to allowing controversial Chinese tech giant Huawei to build parts of the U.K.’s 5G network.
In the past, Germany was criticized for preventing a united EU response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014, because of Berlin’s reliance on oil and gas imports from Russia. It’s a similar story for China today. Noah Barkin, a senior visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund, wrote in March that “the Merkel government’s reluctance to antagonize Beijing risks undermining the EU’s push for a common policy toward China and perpetuating a situation where member states look out for their own interests, often to the detriment of a common European front.”
Philippe Le Corre, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted last year that there was hope of “quasi-unanimity” between the French and German positions on China. For the first time, the EU’s “strategic outlook” on China in March 2019 referred to the country as a “systemic rival,” and French President Emmanuel Macron invited his German and European Commission counterparts to talks with Xi that were meant to be bilateral. In the intervening months, however, Germany and France instead “ploughed their own separate paths,” wrote Le Corre, proving that when it comes to China policy, “national interests still prevail.”
While it’s easy to focus in on Central and Eastern Europe, such attention misses the broader plot. The narrative of Central and Eastern Europe being bought up by China fits neatly with historical images of an Eastern Europe dominated by communism. In reality, it is the rest of Europe that is economically far more dependent on China and that has, too, put national interests above the common EU position. Pointing fingers at Central and Eastern Europe with the easily refutable claims of economic dependency distracts from the fact that Western European dealings with China have impacted the ability of the EU to form a common position. The intra-EU blame game can poison the relations among various European regions and is certainly not helping the EU in reaching unity on the issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--America’s Guns Fuel Mexico’s Domestic Violence Epidemic

On Nov. 25 , 2019 , while thousands of women took to the streets of Mexico City to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women , Abril Pérez was shot to death by a hitman .
The 48-year-old executive of a Mexican online retail store and mother of three was on her way to the airport to return home to Monterrey after a custody hearing .
She ’ d recently divorced Juan Carlos García , a former Amazon Mexico CEO and the father of her children , whom she had accused of attempted murder 11 months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the middle of the night and beating her with a baseball bat .
The gunman and his driver were arrested in March , but García , the suspected mastermind behind Pérez ’ s death , has reportedly fled to the United States .
What remains an open question is what role the United States played in the murder itself .
As coronavirus-related lockdowns worsen the threat of domestic violence for women around the world , women in Mexico face an additional danger : the flood of American guns into the country .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and migrants cross the border from Mexico , ” said Maura Roldán , a researcher on gun violence from Mexico City .
“ But it hasn ’ t recognized its role in the rise in violence in Mexico .
It doesn ’ t mention the fact that it ’ s providing the guns.
” While it ’ s impossible to know the provenance of the murder weapon in Pérez ’ s case—Mexican homicide databases do not include this information—what is certain is that a steady stream , or torrent , of American firearms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spike in gun-related deaths in Mexico , in turn transforming and exacerbating gender violence .
Seventy percent of guns recovered as part of a criminal investigation in Mexico are traced back to the United States , according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol , Tobacco , Firearms and Explosives .
That influx of guns has taken a toll on women ’ s safety .
Ten women were killed each day , according to Mexico ’ s national statistics agency .
Roldán and a handful of other researchers and activists , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statistic : In 2018 , six in 10 of those women were fatally shot .
“ The proliferation of guns , the huge presence of guns , including in homes , is changing the nature of domestic violence , ” said Ana Pecova , the director of the human rights organization Equis .
“ In the past , a fight would descend into punches .
Now , a gun gets pulled out , and a woman ends up dead.
” Not only has gender violence become more lethal , but it has also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ streets .
Since 2009 , more women have been killed in public spaces than in domestic settings , according to a 2015 report by Data Civica .
While fewer women than men die of gun violence , the rates at which women are dying from firearms are growing faster : Between 2007 and 2018 , gun violence rates for women rose 357 percent ( compared to 311 percent for men ) , and 500 percent in public spaces ( 347 percent for men ) , according to Estefanía Vela Barba , one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who continues to research the link between gun violence and femicide .
Gun-fueled gender violence in public spaces is multifaceted .
It can be outsourced intimate partner violence , as is suspected in Pérez ’ s case .
Or it can be cartel messaging .
The scale of violence in Mexico , which abets both forms of public gender violence , comes down to the country ’ s drug war and the militarization of public security , local experts and activists said .
Then-President Felipe Calderón ’ s mission to uproot organized crime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2006 , spectacularly failed , fracturing and multiplying cartels , and leading to soaring levels of violence , the most prominent evidence of which is the disappearance of some 61,000 people .
While the violence can be blind to gender—stray bullets are indiscriminate—it is often targeted .
There are clues in the swirl of statistics : rape , mutilations such as cut off breasts , or shots to the genital region all point to violence against women specifically .
But many bodies are hidden or destroyed , or mistabulated .
While government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ activists say the number is likely much higher .
The data in Mexico correlates neatly with a short history of increasingly relaxed gun control laws in the United States and the steady growth of both a legal and illegal firearm trade .
The 2004 expiration of the assault weapon ban in the United States ramped up the production and sale of military-grade weapons .
By the time Mexico declared its drug war two years later , American manufacturers were ready to pump these high-grade weapons into Mexican military arsenals .
Organized crime responded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ buying more weapons through its own channels : third-party straw purchases ; buying on the extensive black market , which lately consists of bringing gun parts in piecemeal fashion across the border and assembling them in Mexico ; and even obtaining weapons directly from Mexican security forces .
Some 20,000 firearms were reported lost or stolen from state and federal police between 2006 and 2017 .
Citizens , caught in the middle of a bloody turf war , armed themselves too .
Though Mexico boasts some of the world ’ s strictest gun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ estimated to be in civilian hands in 2017 , according to the Small Arms Survey .
Only a small fraction of these were registered .
Due to the vast illegal trade , it ’ s impossible to know exactly how many American guns are sold into Mexico .
But the numbers are large enough that Mexican authorities are concerned and even more so recently .
A slump in domestic sales since 2017 has further turned U.S. gun manufacturers ’ attention toward Mexico .
In a bid to support the industry , the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the State Department to the Commerce Department , in what John Lindsay-Poland , the director of Stop U.S. Arms to Mexico , said is designed to loosen oversight and increase the number of firearm exports .
“ For the U.S. , I contend that the assault weapons ban is a foreign-policy issue , ” said Lindsay-Poland .
“ U.S.-sourced assault weapons are used in many more crimes in Mexico than in the U.S. ” In addition to reinstating the assault weapons ban , Eugenio Weigend Vargas , the associate director for gun violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think tank , said the United States should implement universal background checks and ensure stricter regulation of American gun stores .
“ The measures we advocate for won ’ t just reduce violence in the U.S. , but will also reduce gun traffic to Mexico and Central America , ” Vargas said .
“ The more guns there are , the more domestic violence .
”

On Nov. 25, 2019, while thousands of women took to the streets of Mexico City to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Abril Pérez was shot to death by a hitman. The 48-year-old executive of a Mexican online retail store and mother of three was on her way to the airport to return home to Monterrey after a custody hearing. She’d recently divorced Juan Carlos García, a former Amazon Mexico CEO and the father of her children, whom she had accused of attempted murder 11 months prior for allegedly creeping into her home in the middle of the night and beating her with a baseball bat. The gunman and his driver were arrested in March, but García, the suspected mastermind behind Pérez’s death, has reportedly fled to the United States.
On Nov. 25, 2019, while thousands of women took to the streets of Mexico City to mark the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Abril Pérez was shot to death by a hitman. The 48-year-old executive of a Mexican online retail store and mother of three was on her way to the airport to return home to Monterrey after a custody hearing. She’d recently divorced Juan Carlos García, a former Amazon Mexico CEO and the father of her children, whom she had accused of attempted murder 11 months prior for allegedly creeping into her home in the middle of the night and beating her with a baseball bat. The gunman and his driver were arrested in March, but García, the suspected mastermind behind Pérez’s death, has reportedly fled to the United States.
What remains an open question is what role the United States played in the murder itself. As coronavirus-related lockdowns worsen the threat of domestic violence for women around the world, women in Mexico face an additional danger: the flood of American guns into the country. “The U.S. talks about how drugs and migrants cross the border from Mexico,” said Maura Roldán, a researcher on gun violence from Mexico City. “But it hasn’t recognized its role in the rise in violence in Mexico. It doesn’t mention the fact that it’s providing the guns.”
While it’s impossible to know the provenance of the murder weapon in Pérez’s case—Mexican homicide databases do not include this information—what is certain is that a steady stream, or torrent, of American firearms since the early 2000s has contributed to a spike in gun-related deaths in Mexico, in turn transforming and exacerbating gender violence. Seventy percent of guns recovered as part of a criminal investigation in Mexico are traced back to the United States, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
That influx of guns has taken a toll on women’s safety. Ten women were killed each day in 2018 , according to Mexico’s national statistics agency. Roldán and a handful of other researchers and activists, almost all women, point to another statistic: In 2018, six in 10 of those women were fatally shot.
“The proliferation of guns, the huge presence of guns, including in homes, is changing the nature of domestic violence,” said Ana Pecova, the director of the human rights organization Equis. “In the past, a fight would descend into punches. Now, a gun gets pulled out, and a woman ends up dead.”
Not only has gender violence become more lethal, but it has also spilled out of homes and into the streets. Since 2009, more women have been killed in public spaces than in domestic settings, according to a 2015 report by Data Civica. While fewer women than men die of gun violence, the rates at which women are dying from firearms are growing faster: Between 2007 and 2018, gun violence rates for women rose 357 percent (compared to 311 percent for men), and 500 percent in public spaces (347 percent for men), according to Estefanía Vela Barba, one of the authors of the Data Civica report who continues to research the link between gun violence and femicide. Gun-fueled gender violence in public spaces is multifaceted. It can be outsourced intimate partner violence, as is suspected in Pérez’s case. Or it can be cartel messaging.
The scale of violence in Mexico, which abets both forms of public gender violence, comes down to the country’s drug war and the militarization of public security, local experts and activists said. Then-President Felipe Calderón’s mission to uproot organized crime in Mexico has, since its start in 2006, spectacularly failed, fracturing and multiplying cartels, and leading to soaring levels of violence, the most prominent evidence of which is the disappearance of some 61,000 people. While the violence can be blind to gender—stray bullets are indiscriminate—it is often targeted. There are clues in the swirl of statistics: rape, mutilations such as cut off breasts, or shots to the genital region all point to violence against women specifically. But many bodies are hidden or destroyed, or mistabulated. While government registries counted 1,012 femicides last year, activists say the number is likely much higher.
The data in Mexico correlates neatly with a short history of increasingly relaxed gun control laws in the United States and the steady growth of both a legal and illegal firearm trade. The 2004 expiration of the assault weapon ban in the United States ramped up the production and sale of military-grade weapons. By the time Mexico declared its drug war two years later, American manufacturers were ready to pump these high-grade weapons into Mexican military arsenals. Organized crime responded by ratcheting up its own caches, buying more weapons through its own channels: third-party straw purchases; buying on the extensive black market, which lately consists of bringing gun parts in piecemeal fashion across the border and assembling them in Mexico; and even obtaining weapons directly from Mexican security forces. Some 20,000 firearms were reported lost or stolen from state and federal police between 2006 and 2017.
Citizens, caught in the middle of a bloody turf war, armed themselves too. Though Mexico boasts some of the world’s strictest gun control laws, 16.8 million firearms were estimated to be in civilian hands in 2017, according to the Small Arms Survey. Only a small fraction of these were registered. Due to the vast illegal trade, it’s impossible to know exactly how many American guns are sold into Mexico. But the numbers are large enough that Mexican authorities are concerned — and even more so recently.
A slump in domestic sales since 2017 has further turned U.S. gun manufacturers’ attention toward Mexico. In a bid to support the industry, the Trump administration recently moved firearm export oversight from the State Department to the Commerce Department, in what John Lindsay-Poland, the director of Stop U.S. Arms to Mexico, said is designed to loosen oversight and increase the number of firearm exports. “For the U.S., I contend that the assault weapons ban is a foreign-policy issue,” said Lindsay-Poland. “U.S.-sourced assault weapons are used in many more crimes in Mexico than in the U.S.”
In addition to reinstating the assault weapons ban, Eugenio Weigend Vargas, the associate director for gun violence prevention at the Center for American Progress think tank, said the United States should implement universal background checks and ensure stricter regulation of American gun stores. “The measures we advocate for won’t just reduce violence in the U.S., but will also reduce gun traffic to Mexico and Central America,” Vargas said. “The more guns there are, the more domestic violence.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--Yes, Blame WHO for Its Disastrous Coronavirus Response

Yes , Blame WHO for Its Disastrous Coronavirus Response Time was when the World Health Organization ( WHO ) was the least controversial of multilateral bodies .
Its parent organization , the United Nations , is idealized by some but vilified by others .
The International Monetary Fund inspires riots when it meets .
The World Trade Organization has become a political punching bag .
And the less said about the U.N. Human Rights Council , the better.Much of the circumstantial evidence surrounding WHO ’ s coronavirus response points toward complicity .
Yet from its founding in 1948 until the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was mainly known for defeating smallpox , fighting polio and tuberculosis , and providing support to poor countries that lacked sufficient health infrastructure .
However , under the leadership of Margaret Chan , appointed director-general in 2006 , and her successor since 2017 , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , WHO has bounced from scandal to scandal .
Widely panned for mishandling the swine flu in 2009 and Ebola in 2014 , it has also been embroiled in expenses scandals .
Then came the coronavirus .
Tedros , who previously served as Ethiopia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was elected to head WHO with Chinese behind-the-scenes support , reflecting China ’ s close relationship with Addis Ababa , which has become China ’ s bridgehead in Africa .
WHO has been accused of acting as China ’ s accomplice in initially suppressing information about the coronavirus , with Tedros repeatedly lauding China ’ s “ transparency ” when Beijing had hid information about the virus ’ s origins , infectiousness , spread , and deadliness for more than a month .
Although WHO ’ s professional staff have faced some criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response to be dictated from Beijing ( particularly in regard to WHO ’ s exclusion of Taiwan ) , most of the anti-WHO ire has focused on Tedros himself .
It was Tedros , after all , who on Jan. 11 complemented the director of China ’ s National Health Commission , Ma Xiaowei—whom Tedros called “ brother ” in a tweet—for “ sharing information [ on the genetic sequencing of the coronavirus ] in a timely manner , ” when in fact Beijing had delayed passing on this lifesaving information for 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
When China announced no new cases of the coronavirus between Jan. 5 and Jan. 17—a period when we now know the outbreak in Wuhan was in full swing—WHO took this at face value .
Based on the information it received from China , WHO assured the world on Jan. 12 that there was “ no clear evidence of human to human transmission.
” In reality , a Chinese doctor had already concluded that the new disease was “ probably infectious ” as early as Dec. 27 .
Was WHO complicit in China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Only the promised “ impartial , independent ” investigation commissioned by WHO ’ s governing body of member-state representatives , the World Health Assembly , can say for sure .
But given the influence of China over the body and the dependence of the investigation on evidence supplied by Beijing , the investigation may never shed much light on the matter .
Much of the circumstantial evidence surrounding WHO ’ s coronavirus response points toward complicity .
And that complicity seems to have come from Tedros himself.WHO already knew at this point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Chinese doctors were taking full precautions against possible infection .
Immediately after the first reports on Dec. 31 that something was amiss in Wuhan , Hong Kong and Taiwan started temperature screening at airport arrivals halls and alerted hospitals to be on the lookout for acute respiratory illnesses .
Singapore followed suit on Jan. 3 .
Yet on Jan. 5 , WHO reassured the world that such precautions were an overreaction .
In an announcement that would be relied on by many countries deciding on their initial public health responses , WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant human-to-human transmission and no health care worker infections have been reported.
” Whether WHO was merely negligent in obtaining the information , or knew but didn ’ t want to displease the Chinese by announcing it to the world , will be up to an investigation to find out .
But WHO already knew at this point that Wuhan hospitals were isolating patients and that Chinese doctors were taking full precautions against possible infection .
After all , that was what Chinese newspapers were already reporting ( and may help explain the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers ) .
When a WHO team eventually conducted site visits to ground zero in Wuhan on Jan. 20 and 21 , they found that at least 16 health care workers had been infected .
Not publicly reported at the time , one of them was the whistleblowing doctor Li Wenliang , who later died of the illness .
Had Tedros been reading the news from the BBC , he would have known as early as Jan. 3 that Chinese authorities had punished eight doctors for “ publishing or forwarding false information on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ false information , as described by the BBC , included warnings on Chinese social media that the emerging Wuhan pneumonia resembled the 2002-2003 outbreak of SARS .
In addition to the description of the new disease , the punishment of doctors for sharing information should have rung alarm bells at WHO about China ’ s vaunted transparency .
Instead , the report and incident went unnoted .
On Jan. 22 , the Chinese Centers for Disease Control finally admitted that the novel coronavirus was “ highly infectious ” —though it maintained , again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as SARS .
By then , it had already spread from Hubei province to 12 other Chinese districts , plus Japan , South Korea , Taiwan , and Thailand .
And those were just the confirmed cases that had been reported to WHO .
By Jan. 24 , it had also been reported in Hong Kong , Macao , Vietnam , Singapore , and the United States .
Yet on that same day , WHO reaffirmed its advice “ against the application of any restrictions of international traffic.
” Strangely , although WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at international airports and ports in the affected areas , ” it did not recommend entry screening by other countries receiving passengers from China .
It recommended temperature checks upon departure from China , but remained oddly vague about entry checks , warning that they “ may miss travelers incubating the disease or travelers concealing fever during travel and may require substantial investments.
” Yet in the very next sentence , WHO admitted that “ the majority of exported cases were detected through entry screening.
” Reading between the lines , WHO ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do anything .
Let China handle this.Reading between the lines , WHO ’ s message was : Don ’ t do anything , let China handle this .
That message was taken up by other countries .
For example , Australia ’ s chief medical officer , Brendan Murphy , explicitly cited WHO advice when he concluded that “ they will stop exits from China which is a more effective way ” to fight the virus than “ banning direct flights from China.
” The latter , WHO advice had led him to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health measure.
” In the United States , the Washington Post published an op-ed chastising the United States and other countries for undermining global health cooperation by pandering to public demands for action .
On Jan. 30 , WHO ’ s Emergency Committee reluctantly declared the coronavirus outbreak a “ Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
” That the declaration was reluctant can clearly be read between the lines of the statement , in which WHO emphasized that the declaration “ should be seen in the spirit of support and appreciation for China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China has taken on the frontlines of this outbreak , with transparency.
” WHO recommended that other countries “ put in place strong measures to detect disease early , isolate and treat cases , trace contacts , and promote social distancing measures.
” But once again , WHO recommended against “ any travel or trade restriction , ” implying that such actions could “ promote stigma or discrimination.
” But this time it went even further , reminding countries that “ interfere with international traffic ” that they must “ send to WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 48 hours of their implementation.
” When the United States banned noncitizens from entering the country from China on Jan. 31 , academic critics and a WHO spokesperson duly condemned the restrictions as “ counterproductive ” and likely to cause “ social disruption.
” When Australia and Singapore followed the United States ’ lead , a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the United States had “ unceasingly manufactured and spread panic.
” On Feb. 3 , Tedros reiterated WHO ’ s advice against restricting travel from China .
He said that if “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of cases outside China would have been very much higher , ” again implying that other countries should rely on China to control the outward spread of coronavirus , instead of imposing restrictions of their own .
The next day , Tedros called on countries to reverse their travel restrictions , which he claimed “ can have the effect of increasing fear and stigma , with little public health benefit.
” Many countries followed WHO ’ s guidance , including many poor ones with insufficient public health infrastructure and dependent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO .
Pakistan , an ally of China which had suspended flights from various Chinese cities on Jan. 31 , reinstated flights on Feb. 3 , only to suspend them again on March 21 .
Ethiopia continued flights to and from China despite the pleas of other East African countries desperate to prevent the introduction of the virus into Africa via Addis Ababa ’ s airport , the continent ’ s main gateway to China .
As late as Feb. 26 , Tedros gave a speech in which , beggaring belief , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustained and intensive community transmission of this virus , and we are not witnessing large-scale severe disease or death.
” On the same day , his own organization reported 81,109 confirmed coronavirus cases in 38 countries and Taiwan , including 2,762 recorded deaths , and a risk assessment of “ high ” for the entire world .
Yet once again , on Feb. 29 , WHO confirmed that it “ continues to advise against the application of travel or trade restrictions to countries experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks.
” In a bizarre case of self-contradiction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement of people and goods during public health emergencies is ineffective in most situations and may divert resources from other interventions , ” even as one of its chief epidemiologists , Bruce Aylward , praised China for its “ bold approach to the rapid spread of this new respiratory pathogen ” that had “ changed the course of what was a rapidly escalating , and continues to be , deadly epidemic.
” WHO ’ s odd message seemed to be that China was right to lock down its population , but other countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Of course , China now has some of the world ’ s tightest travel restrictions on international travel , barring entry by nearly all foreigners ( including those with residence permits ) since March 28 .
Perhaps in a nod to WHO guidance that such restrictions should “ be short in duration , and be reconsidered regularly as the situation evolves , ” China characterized its move as a “ temporary measure ” that “ will be calibrated in light of the evolving situation.
” As of late May , the situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to lift its global travel ban .
There ’ s been no word from Tedros or WHO about the appropriateness of China excluding the world now that China itself is relatively virus-free—the reverse of the situation at the beginning of the pandemic .
U.S. President Donald Trump and his supporters aren ’ t alone in thinking that “ the World Health Organization has been curiously insistent on praising China , ” as Trump wrote in a May 18 letter to Tedros that threatened to permanently cut U.S. funding and withdraw from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now demanded an investigation into WHO ’ s handling of the coronavirus crisis .
Time will tell just how impartial and independent that investigation turns out to be .
The World Health Assembly ’ s official resolution establishing the investigation , tellingly , does not mention China , which may be why China ultimately agreed to co-sponsor it .
The resolution also suggests that the investigation might take advantage of “ existing mechanisms , as appropriate.
” Translation : Don ’ t be surprised if WHO ends up evaluating itself .
And be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pins no blame for the coronavirus pandemic on WHO—or on China .

Time was when the World Health Organization (WHO) was the least controversial of multilateral bodies. Its parent organization, the United Nations, is idealized by some but vilified by others. The International Monetary Fund inspires riots when it meets. The World Trade Organization has become a political punching bag. And the less said about the U.N. Human Rights Council, the better.Much of the circumstantial evidence surrounding WHO’s coronavirus response points toward complicity.
Time was when the World Health Organization (WHO) was the least controversial of multilateral bodies. Its parent organization, the United Nations, is idealized by some but vilified by others. The International Monetary Fund inspires riots when it meets. The World Trade Organization has become a political punching bag. And the less said about the U.N. Human Rights Council, the better.Much of the circumstantial evidence surrounding WHO’s coronavirus response points toward complicity.
Yet from its founding in 1948 until the first decade of this century, WHO was mainly known for defeating smallpox, fighting polio and tuberculosis, and providing support to poor countries that lacked sufficient health infrastructure. However, under the leadership of Margaret Chan, appointed director-general in 2006, and her successor since 2017, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO has bounced from scandal to scandal. Widely panned for mishandling the swine flu in 2009 and Ebola in 2014, it has also been embroiled in expenses scandals.
Then came the coronavirus.
Tedros, who previously served as Ethiopia’s health minister and then foreign minister, was elected to head WHO with Chinese behind-the-scenes support, reflecting China’s close relationship with Addis Ababa, which has become China’s bridgehead in Africa. WHO has been accused of acting as China’s accomplice in initially suppressing information about the coronavirus, with Tedros repeatedly lauding China’s “transparency” when Beijing had hid information about the virus’s origins, infectiousness, spread, and deadliness for more than a month. Although WHO’s professional staff have faced some criticism for allowing the organization’s coronavirus response to be dictated from Beijing (particularly in regard to WHO’s exclusion of Taiwan), most of the anti-WHO ire has focused on Tedros himself.
It was Tedros, after all, who on Jan. 11 complemented the director of China’s National Health Commission, Ma Xiaowei—whom Tedros called “brother” in a tweet—for “sharing information [on the genetic sequencing of the coronavirus] in a timely manner,” when in fact Beijing had delayed passing on this lifesaving information for 10 days after Chinese doctors completed the research. When China announced no new cases of the coronavirus between Jan. 5 and Jan. 17—a period when we now know the outbreak in Wuhan was in full swing—WHO took this at face value. Based on the information it received from China, WHO assured the world on Jan. 12 that there was “no clear evidence of human to human transmission.” In reality, a Chinese doctor had already concluded that the new disease was “probably infectious” as early as Dec. 27.
Was WHO complicit in China’s deception, or merely credulous? Only the promised “impartial, independent” investigation commissioned by WHO’s governing body of member-state representatives, the World Health Assembly, can say for sure. But given the influence of China over the body and the dependence of the investigation on evidence supplied by Beijing, the investigation may never shed much light on the matter.
Much of the circumstantial evidence surrounding WHO’s coronavirus response points toward complicity. And that complicity seems to have come from Tedros himself.WHO already knew at this point that Wuhan hospitals were isolating patients and that Chinese doctors were taking full precautions against possible infection.
Immediately after the first reports on Dec. 31 that something was amiss in Wuhan, Hong Kong and Taiwan started temperature screening at airport arrivals halls and alerted hospitals to be on the lookout for acute respiratory illnesses. Singapore followed suit on Jan. 3. Yet on Jan. 5, WHO reassured the world that such precautions were an overreaction. In an announcement that would be relied on by many countries deciding on their initial public health responses, WHO insisted there was “no evidence of significant human-to-human transmission and no health care worker infections have been reported.”
Whether WHO was merely negligent in obtaining the information, or knew but didn’t want to displease the Chinese by announcing it to the world, will be up to an investigation to find out. But WHO already knew at this point that Wuhan hospitals were isolating patients and that Chinese doctors were taking full precautions against possible infection. After all, that was what Chinese newspapers were already reporting (and may help explain the supposed lack of infections among health care workers). When a WHO team eventually conducted site visits to ground zero in Wuhan on Jan. 20 and 21, they found that at least 16 health care workers had been infected. Not publicly reported at the time, one of them was the whistleblowing doctor Li Wenliang, who later died of the illness.
Had Tedros been reading the news from the BBC, he would have known as early as Jan. 3 that Chinese authorities had punished eight doctors for “publishing or forwarding false information on the internet without verification.” That supposed false information, as described by the BBC, included warnings on Chinese social media that the emerging Wuhan pneumonia resembled the 2002-2003 outbreak of SARS. In addition to the description of the new disease, the punishment of doctors for sharing information should have rung alarm bells at WHO about China’s vaunted transparency. Instead, the report and incident went unnoted.
On Jan. 22, the Chinese Centers for Disease Control finally admitted that the novel coronavirus was “highly infectious”—though it maintained, again minimizing the danger, not as virulent as SARS. By then, it had already spread from Hubei province to 12 other Chinese districts, plus Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. And those were just the confirmed cases that had been reported to WHO. By Jan. 24, it had also been reported in Hong Kong, Macao, Vietnam, Singapore, and the United States. Yet on that same day, WHO reaffirmed its advice “against the application of any restrictions of international traffic.”
Strangely, although WHO recommended that China “conduct exit screening at international airports and ports in the affected areas,” it did not recommend entry screening by other countries receiving passengers from China. It recommended temperature checks upon departure from China, but remained oddly vague about entry checks, warning that they “may miss travelers incubating the disease or travelers concealing fever during travel and may require substantial investments.” Yet in the very next sentence, WHO admitted that “the majority of exported cases were detected through entry screening.” Reading between the lines, WHO’s message was: Don’t do anything. Let China handle this.Reading between the lines, WHO’s message was: Don’t do anything, let China handle this.
That message was taken up by other countries. For example, Australia’s chief medical officer, Brendan Murphy, explicitly cited WHO advice when he concluded that “they will stop exits from China which is a more effective way” to fight the virus than “banning direct flights from China.” The latter, WHO advice had led him to believe, was “not a public health measure.” In the United States, the Washington Post published an op-ed chastising the United States and other countries for undermining global health cooperation by pandering to public demands for action.
On Jan. 30, WHO’s Emergency Committee reluctantly declared the coronavirus outbreak a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern.” That the declaration was reluctant can clearly be read between the lines of the statement, in which WHO emphasized that the declaration “should be seen in the spirit of support and appreciation for China, its people, and the actions China has taken on the frontlines of this outbreak, with transparency.” WHO recommended that other countries “put in place strong measures to detect disease early, isolate and treat cases, trace contacts, and promote social distancing measures.”
But once again, WHO recommended against “any travel or trade restriction,” implying that such actions could “promote stigma or discrimination.” But this time it went even further, reminding countries that “interfere with international traffic” that they must “send to WHO the public health rationale and justification within 48 hours of their implementation.” When the United States banned noncitizens from entering the country from China on Jan. 31, academic critics and a WHO spokesperson duly condemned the restrictions as “counterproductive” and likely to cause “social disruption.” When Australia and Singapore followed the United States’ lead, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the United States had “unceasingly manufactured and spread panic.”
On Feb. 3, Tedros reiterated WHO’s advice against restricting travel from China. He said that if “it weren’t for China, the number of cases outside China would have been very much higher,” again implying that other countries should rely on China to control the outward spread of coronavirus, instead of imposing restrictions of their own. The next day, Tedros called on countries to reverse their travel restrictions, which he claimed “can have the effect of increasing fear and stigma, with little public health benefit.”
Many countries followed WHO’s guidance, including many poor ones with insufficient public health infrastructure and dependent on the support of international organizations such as WHO. Pakistan, an ally of China which had suspended flights from various Chinese cities on Jan. 31, reinstated flights on Feb. 3, only to suspend them again on March 21. Ethiopia continued flights to and from China despite the pleas of other East African countries desperate to prevent the introduction of the virus into Africa via Addis Ababa’s airport, the continent’s main gateway to China.
As late as Feb. 26, Tedros gave a speech in which, beggaring belief, he claimed that “we are not witnessing sustained and intensive community transmission of this virus, and we are not witnessing large-scale severe disease or death.” On the same day, his own organization reported 81,109 confirmed coronavirus cases in 38 countries and Taiwan, including 2,762 recorded deaths, and a risk assessment of “high” for the entire world. Yet once again, on Feb. 29, WHO confirmed that it “continues to advise against the application of travel or trade restrictions to countries experiencing COVID-19 outbreaks.”
In a bizarre case of self-contradiction, WHO reasoned that “restricting the movement of people and goods during public health emergencies is ineffective in most situations and may divert resources from other interventions,” even as one of its chief epidemiologists, Bruce Aylward, praised China for its “bold approach to the rapid spread of this new respiratory pathogen” that had “changed the course of what was a rapidly escalating, and continues to be, deadly epidemic.” WHO’s odd message seemed to be that China was right to lock down its population, but other countries shouldn’t dare lock out China.
Of course, China now has some of the world’s tightest travel restrictions on international travel, barring entry by nearly all foreigners (including those with residence permits) since March 28. Perhaps in a nod to WHO guidance that such restrictions should “be short in duration, and be reconsidered regularly as the situation evolves,” China characterized its move as a “temporary measure” that “will be calibrated in light of the evolving situation.” As of late May, the situation still hasn’t evolved sufficiently for China to lift its global travel ban. There’s been no word from Tedros or WHO about the appropriateness of China excluding the world now that China itself is relatively virus-free—the reverse of the situation at the beginning of the pandemic.
U.S. President Donald Trump and his supporters aren’t alone in thinking that “the World Health Organization has been curiously insistent on praising China,” as Trump wrote in a May 18 letter to Tedros that threatened to permanently cut U.S. funding and withdraw from the organization. More than 110 countries have now demanded an investigation into WHO’s handling of the coronavirus crisis. Time will tell just how impartial and independent that investigation turns out to be. The World Health Assembly’s official resolution establishing the investigation, tellingly, does not mention China, which may be why China ultimately agreed to co-sponsor it. The resolution also suggests that the investigation might take advantage of “existing mechanisms, as appropriate.” Translation: Don’t be surprised if WHO ends up evaluating itself. And be even less surprised if that evaluation ultimately pins no blame for the coronavirus pandemic on WHO—or on China.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Will the U.S. Sanction China over Hong Kong Law?

Will the U.S .
Sanction China over Hong Kong Law ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. government prepares a response to China ’ s Hong Kong national security law , the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan , and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “ move on ” from Dominic Cummings scandal .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
China ’ s National People ’ s Congress approved a draft decision today to impose national security laws directly on Hong Kong , beginning the formal legal process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laws coming into effect by September .
As Foreign Policy ’ s James Palmer wrote in his weekly China Brief on Wednesday , the new law “ will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges , a crackdown on free speech , and the unleashing of China ’ s security organs , such as the Ministry of State Security and the People ’ s Armed Police.
” U.S. President Donald Trump now has an opportunity to turn his anti-China rhetoric into action , although it ’ s still not clear what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he hinted at a White House announcement by the end of this week , with sanctions the likely avenue .
His most senior diplomat , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , laid the groundwork on Wednesday by certifying to the U.S. Congress that Hong Kong ’ s fate as a fully Chinese entity was all but sealed .
“ No reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China , given facts on the ground , ” Pompeo said .
David Stilwell , the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , told reporters on Wednesday that the U.S. response “ will be as targeted as possible to change behavior , ” while adding that he still hoped for China to reverse its decision .
Just how much is the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship worth ?
Any sanctions or tariffs the United States proposes will have to reckon with the close economic ties between the U.S. economy and the territory .
In 2018 , Hong Kong was the 21st largest U.S. trading partner .
Also in 2018 , the United States enjoyed its largest trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 31.1 billion , according to the Congressional Research Service .
It is also home to the regional headquarters of almost 300 U.S. companies , and a regional office for another 434 .
Regardless of U.S. actions , Palmer argues , its status as a safe financial hub is under threat .
“ For businesses , the main value of the city is that its financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland ’ s , making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove @ @ @ @ @ @ @ erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that .
And on the ground , increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates.
” Don ’ t go it alone .
Also writing in FP , Doug Bandow advises that the best course of action is a unified one , and recommends that the United States bring together its European and Asian allies to present a “ a quiet demarche to Beijing : Continue down this path and the world ’ s most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory ’ s special economic status.
” EU proposes dramatic recovery plan .
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed an ambitious economic recovery program for the bloc—funded by raising approximately 750 billion euros ( $ 825 billion ) .
Raising that amount would be a marked departure from EU policy and the first time a common debt would be shared among member states .
The funds would be split , with roughly two-thirds going toward grants and another one-third in loans .
“ We either all go it alone , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and accepting a union of haves and have-nots , or we walk that road together , ” Von der Leyen said upon unveiling the plan , called “ Europe ’ s Moment : Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation.
” The program is not yet finalized and must be ratified by all 27 EU member states to go forward .
The so called Frugal Four of Austria , the Netherlands , Sweden , and Denmark have previously been opposed to a grant mechanism funded by EU-wide bonds , favoring a system of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure .
Although British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has attempted to draw a line under the scandal regarding his advisor Dominic Cummings , who violated lockdown measures , lawmakers in his own party are still calling for the advisor ’ s removal .
As Johnson urged the country to “ move on , ” at least 44 MPs , or 12 percent of the Conservative Party ’ s representation in Parliament , have either called for his resignation or removal according to the Guardian ; more than 60 Tories have expressed some form @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have reportedly started using Cummings ’ s behavior as an excuse when being questioned by police for possible lockdown breaches .
In FP on Tuesday , Owen Matthews explained why public anger has turned so quickly on British government , and why Johnson ’ s refusal to fire Cummings could be his undoing .
U.S. planning to indict wife of Venezuelan leader .
The United States is planning to charge Cilia Flores , the wife of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro , with crimes that could include drug trafficking and corruption according to Reuters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escalation in the U.S. pressure campaign on the Venezuelan government , after Maduro and over a dozen other officials were indicted by the Justice Ddepartment in April on charges of a drug trafficking and narco-terrorism .
Venezuela ’ s Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez called Reuters questioning about the story “ nauseating , slanderous , and offensive.
” Huawei executive trial to continue .
A Canadian judge has ruled that the extradition case against Meng Wanzhou , the Huawei chief financial officer can move forward , saying the case against Meng met the conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Meng is charged with allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran , in a case that is seen as part of the broader struggle between China and the United States for control of the global 5G telecommunications market .
Meng is currently held under house arrest in Vancouver while her case proceeds .
China has detained two Canadian nationals since late 2018 , Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig , on suspicion of espionage in what Canadians see as a way to pressure the Canadian government .
A laywer for Kovrig said his client @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a “ pawn.
” U.S. out of WTO ?
U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization has become a rare bipartisan point of agreement on Capitol Hill , FP ’ s Keith Johnson reports , as frustrations with globalization and China ’ s actions threaten to boil over .
A Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives , Rep. Peter DeFazio , and Republican Senator Josh Hawley have both introduced legislation to leave the WTO in the past month .
The legislation is not expected to pass in either chamber , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved , highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.
” An academic ’ s sifting through the results of a Freedom of Information Act request has yielded a previously unknown nugget of recent history .
Tim Gill , a sociologist at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington , uncovered a 2011 plan by the U.S. government to fund rock bands in Venezuela @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way “ to promote greater reflection among Venezuelan youth about freedom of expression , their connection with democracy , and the state of democracy in the country , ” according to a grant application .
The roughly $ 22,000 grant was ultimately approved by the National Endowment for Democracy .
U.S. government-funded musical projects are becoming something of a genre : a USAID-funded plan to infiltrate the Cuban underground hip-hop scene was revealed in 2014 , and the question of whether the CIA funded a popular post-Cold War power ballad is the subject @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares a response to China’s Hong Kong national security law, the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “move on” from Dominic Cummings scandal.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares a response to China’s Hong Kong national security law, the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “move on” from Dominic Cummings scandal.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Says Hong Kong Is No Longer Autonomous
China’s National People’s Congress approved a draft decision today to impose national security laws directly on Hong Kong, beginning the formal legal process that will likely result in the finalized laws coming into effect by September. As Foreign Policy’s James Palmer wrote in China Brief on Wednesday, the new law “will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges, a crackdown on free speech, and the unleashing of China’s security organs, such as the Ministry of State Security and the People’s Armed Police.”
U.S. President Donald Trump now has an opportunity to turn his anti-China rhetoric into action, although it’s still not clear what form that will take. On Tuesday, he hinted at a White House announcement by the end of this week, with sanctions the likely avenue. His most senior diplomat, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, laid the groundwork on Wednesday by certifying to the U.S. Congress that Hong Kong’s fate as a fully Chinese entity was all but sealed. “No reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China, given facts on the ground,” Pompeo said.
David Stilwell, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia, told reporters on Wednesday that the U.S. response “will be as targeted as possible to change behavior,” while adding that he still hoped for China to reverse its decision.
Just how much is the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship worth? Any sanctions or tariffs the United States proposes will have to reckon with the close economic ties between the U.S. economy and the territory. In 2018, Hong Kong was the 21st largest U.S. trading partner. Also in 2018, the United States enjoyed its largest trade surplus with Hong Kong, at $31.1 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service. It is also home to the regional headquarters of almost 300 U.S. companies, and a regional office for another 434.
Regardless of U.S. actions, Palmer argues, its status as a safe financial hub is under threat. “For businesses, the main value of the city is that its financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland’s, making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove their credibility in the region. The erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that. And on the ground, increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates.”
Don’t go it alone. Also writing in FP, Doug Bandow advises that the best course of action is a unified one, and recommends that the United States bring together its European and Asian allies to present a “a quiet demarche to Beijing: Continue down this path and the world’s most important economic powers together will revoke the territory’s special economic status.”
What We’re Following Today
EU proposes dramatic recovery plan. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed an ambitious economic recovery program for the bloc—funded by raising approximately 750 billion euros ($825 billion). Raising that amount would be a marked departure from EU policy and the first time a common debt would be shared among member states. The funds would be split, with roughly two-thirds going toward grants and another one-third in loans. “We either all go it alone, leaving countries, regions and people behind and accepting a union of haves and have-nots, or we walk that road together,” Von der Leyen said upon unveiling the plan, called “Europe’s Moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation.”
The program is not yet finalized and must be ratified by all 27 EU member states to go forward. The so called Frugal Four of Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark have previously been opposed to a grant mechanism funded by EU-wide bonds, favoring a system of loans instead.
Cummings under Conservative Party pressure. Although British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has attempted to draw a line under the scandal regarding his advisor Dominic Cummings, who violated lockdown measures, lawmakers in his own party are still calling for the advisor’s removal. As Johnson urged the country to “move on,” at least 44 MPs, or 12 percent of the Conservative Party’s representation in Parliament, have either called for his resignation or removal according to the Guardian; more than 60 Tories have expressed some form of criticism. Meanwhile, lockdown-weary Brits have reportedly started using Cummings’s behavior as an excuse when being questioned by police for possible lockdown breaches.
In FP on Tuesday, Owen Matthews explained why public anger has turned so quickly on British government, and why Johnson’s refusal to fire Cummings could be his undoing.
U.S. planning to indict wife of Venezuelan leader. The United States is planning to charge Cilia Flores, the wife of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, with crimes that could include drug trafficking and corruption according to Reuters. The move would represent a further escalation in the U.S. pressure campaign on the Venezuelan government, after Maduro and over a dozen other officials were indicted by the Justice Ddepartment in April on charges of a drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. Venezuela’s Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez called Reuters questioning about the story “nauseating, slanderous, and offensive.”
Keep an Eye On
Huawei executive trial to continue. A Canadian judge has ruled that the extradition case against Meng Wanzhou, the Huawei chief financial officer can move forward, saying the case against Meng met the conditions necessary for extradition to the United States. Meng is charged with allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran, in a case that is seen as part of the broader struggle between China and the United States for control of the global 5G telecommunications market.
Meng is currently held under house arrest in Vancouver while her case proceeds. China has detained two Canadian nationals since late 2018, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, on suspicion of espionage in what Canadians see as a way to pressure the Canadian government. A laywer for Kovrig said his client was being held by the Chinese government as a “pawn.”
U.S. out of WTO? U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization has become a rare bipartisan point of agreement on Capitol Hill, FP’s Keith Johnson reports, as frustrations with globalization and China’s actions threaten to boil over. A Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Peter DeFazio, and Republican Senator Josh Hawley have both introduced legislation to leave the WTO in the past month. The legislation is not expected to pass in either chamber, however, Johnson writes, “the rush for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved, highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Odds and Ends
An academic sifting through the results of a Freedom of Information Act request has yielded a previously unknown nugget of recent history. Tim Gill, a sociologist at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, uncovered a 2011 plan by the U.S. government to fund rock bands in Venezuela to record and distribute songs as a way “to promote greater reflection among Venezuelan youth about freedom of expression, their connection with democracy, and the state of democracy in the country,” according to a grant application. The roughly $22,000 grant was ultimately approved by the National Endowment for Democracy.
U.S. government-funded musical projects are becoming something of a genre: A USAID-funded plan to infiltrate the Cuban underground hip-hop scene was revealed in 2014, and the question of whether the CIA funded a popular post-Cold War power ballad is the subject of a new podcast series.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Hong Kong Ensnared in U.S.-China Showdown

The Trump administration ’ s declaration on Wednesday that the United States no longer considers Hong Kong autonomous from China , given Beijing ’ s increasingly aggressive policies there , could pave the way for reprisals from Washington and a potentially dramatic reshaping of Asia ’ s economic geography .
The U.S. announcement was made a day before China ’ s parliament approved a new security law for the semi-autonomous region on Thursday that gave Beijing broad powers to crush dissent there .
For more than 20 years , Hong Kong has enjoyed special privileges that differentiate it from mainland @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major questions : Will the Trump administration seek to hammer Hong Kong as a way to pressure Beijing , and who will ultimately pay the price for such measures ?
Bristling at what it sees as continued Chinese aggression , the administration aimed to deter Beijing from undermining what had been Hong Kong ’ s special status .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s top diplomatic envoy for East Asia , David Stilwell , floated the prospect of visa or economic sanctions as a next step if China didn ’ t alter course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be as targeted as possible to change behavior ” but said the State Department was “ not hopeful that Beijing will reverse itself.
” The decision on what to do next now rests with the White House , with more announcements expected as soon as Friday , several officials told CNN .
Additional measures could range from revoking Hong Kong ’ s special trade relationship with the United States , including levying higher tariffs and tougher export controls , to targeting its role as a vital financial window for Beijing .
Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the U.S. measures in the coming weeks—and by Beijing ’ s response .
Hong Kong isn ’ t quite as important economically to China as it was when the British handed over the former colony in 1997 , when it alone accounted for more than 16 percent of greater China ’ s GDP .
The number today is less than 3 percent .
But it still plays a crucial role in giving Chinese banks and companies access to financing in dollars , and enabling the inflow of foreign investment to China .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is potentially a soft underbelly for a Chinese regime that desperately needs economic stability to shore up its political support .
“ If the United States wanted to ensure that Beijing gets the raw end of this deal , so that they felt some pain , restricting Hong Kong ’ s ability to act as a global financial center would be the way to do it , ” said George Magnus , an expert on the Chinese economy at the University of Oxford .
“ I ’ m not saying it would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ re in a financial war , that ’ s the way to do it.
” Other experts believe that the United States isn ’ t trying to use Hong Kong to open up a new front in the showdown against Beijing ; it is merely trying to preserve Hong Kong ’ s independence and relative freedoms as best it can .
“ I don ’ t think this is about using Hong Kong to beat up China on a range of other issues , ” said Bonnie Glaser of the Center for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think this is very specifically about China violating a treaty , ” she said , referring to the agreement between China and Great Britain on authority over Hong Kong .
The United States and its allies could influence China to at least tamp down how it implements its new law on Hong Kong , Glaser said .
Washington ’ s warning shots could convince Beijing to refrain from a full-fledged offensive on Hong Kong ’ s protesters or completely roll back the territory ’ s comparative freedoms .
“ I don ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ending , ” she said .
“ But there are worst cases and there are less-than-worst cases.
” The problem for the United States is that Hong Kong is caught in the crossfire , after a year of pro-democracy protests have already rattled the stability of the island and raised questions about its suitability as a hub for global business .
Some analysts believe attacking Beijing through Hong Kong makes some sense for the United States—but is a destroy-the-village-to-save-it kind of strategy .
“ The big question the administration is going to face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that enables them to apply enough pressure on the Chinese Communist Party that deters them from acting against Hong Kong , and ensures that those steps hurt the CCP and not the people of Hong Kong , ” said Michael Fuchs , a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Obama administration official focused on Asia affairs .
Trade between the United States and Hong Kong is estimated at $ 38 billion a year .
The territory also hosts some 1,300 U.S. companies , including nearly every major financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that 85,000 U.S. citizens reside in Hong Kong .
But it may be too late for the United States to do anything to salvage Hong Kong ’ s status either as a financial hub or an island of freedom in China .
The new Chinese security law , which would still require implementing legislation to give it teeth , could make the place untenable as a center for global trade and finance even without any U.S. measures .
“ People will leave , companies will move their headquarters elsewhere , probably places like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Manning , an expert on Asian security issues at the Atlantic Council , a Washington-based think tank .
“ What the U.S. does might hasten the pace of it , but once you swing that wrecking ball , it ’ s gon na hit , and it ’ s just a question of how it plays out , ” he said .
“ But Hong Kong is not going to be Hong Kong anymore.
” For Magnus , the U.S. determination—required by law—essentially means that the administration has given up on trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has enjoyed since 1997 .
“ The United States thinks this is lost now .
The acceleration of the integration of Hong Kong into the mainland has reached the point of no return , ” Magnus said .
“ The goal of the United States is no longer to preserve Hong Kong as a financial center , it ’ s just to punish China.
” It ’ s not clear that even tough U.S. measures against Hong Kong would be enough to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping .
Xi sees defeating threats to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s rule as more important than preserving China ’ s access to the global ATM .
That ’ s doubly true given Hong Kong ’ s primordial role in the narrative of the “ century of humiliation ” that the Chinese Communist Party has used to justify its rule .
“ Part of the CCP ’ s raison d ’ etre is to correct the errors of the past .
Hong Kong is of great symbolic importance to China historically , ” said Magnus .
Rewriting the verdict of the 19th-century Opium @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory the British took—it ’ s about reasserting Chinese control over what it considers its core interests , and one of the world ’ s premier economic hubs .
“ It ’ s more than just a symbol , ” he said , “ it ’ s a symbol that means something .
”

The Trump administration’s declaration on Wednesday that the United States no longer considers Hong Kong autonomous from China, given Beijing’s increasingly aggressive policies there, could pave the way for reprisals from Washington and a potentially dramatic reshaping of Asia’s economic geography.
The Trump administration’s declaration on Wednesday that the United States no longer considers Hong Kong autonomous from China, given Beijing’s increasingly aggressive policies there, could pave the way for reprisals from Washington and a potentially dramatic reshaping of Asia’s economic geography.
The U.S. announcement was made a day before China’s parliament approved a new security law for the semi-autonomous region on Thursday that gave Beijing broad powers to crush dissent there. For more than 20 years, Hong Kong has enjoyed special privileges that differentiate it from mainland China.
The American position raises two major questions: Will the Trump administration seek to hammer Hong Kong as a way to pressure Beijing, and who will ultimately pay the price for such measures?
Bristling at what it sees as continued Chinese aggression, the administration aimed to deter Beijing from undermining what had been Hong Kong’s special status. U.S. President Donald Trump’s top diplomatic envoy for East Asia, David Stilwell, floated the prospect of visa or economic sanctions as a next step if China didn’t alter course. He said the actions “will be as targeted as possible to change behavior” but said the State Department was “not hopeful that Beijing will reverse itself.”
The decision on what to do next now rests with the White House, with more announcements expected as soon as Friday, several officials told CNN. Additional measures could range from revoking Hong Kong’s special trade relationship with the United States, including levying higher tariffs and tougher export controls, to targeting its role as a vital financial window for Beijing. Hong Kong’s future will be largely shaped by the U.S. measures in the coming weeks—and by Beijing’s response.
Hong Kong isn’t quite as important economically to China as it was when the British handed over the former colony in 1997, when it alone accounted for more than 16 percent of greater China’s GDP. The number today is less than 3 percent. But it still plays a crucial role in giving Chinese banks and companies access to financing in dollars, and enabling the inflow of foreign investment to China.
Hong Kong, in other words, is potentially a soft underbelly for a Chinese regime that desperately needs economic stability to shore up its political support.
“If the United States wanted to ensure that Beijing gets the raw end of this deal, so that they felt some pain, restricting Hong Kong’s ability to act as a global financial center would be the way to do it,” said George Magnus, an expert on the Chinese economy at the University of Oxford. “I’m not saying it would be a good thing, but if you’re in a financial war, that’s the way to do it.”
Other experts believe that the United States isn’t trying to use Hong Kong to open up a new front in the showdown against Beijing; it is merely trying to preserve Hong Kong’s independence and relative freedoms as best it can.
“I don’t think this is about using Hong Kong to beat up China on a range of other issues,” said Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “I think this is very specifically about China violating a treaty,” she said, referring to the agreement between China and Great Britain on authority over Hong Kong.
The United States and its allies could influence China to at least tamp down how it implements its new law on Hong Kong, Glaser said. Washington’s warning shots could convince Beijing to refrain from a full-fledged offensive on Hong Kong’s protesters or completely roll back the territory’s comparative freedoms.
“I don’t think there’s any real happy ending,” she said. “But there are worst cases and there are less-than-worst cases.”
The problem for the United States is that Hong Kong is caught in the crossfire, after a year of pro-democracy protests have already rattled the stability of the island and raised questions about its suitability as a hub for global business. Some analysts believe attacking Beijing through Hong Kong makes some sense for the United States—but is a destroy-the-village-to-save-it kind of strategy.
“The big question the administration is going to face is whether there is a sweet spot that enables them to apply enough pressure on the Chinese Communist Party that deters them from acting against Hong Kong, and ensures that those steps hurt the CCP and not the people of Hong Kong,” said Michael Fuchs, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Obama administration official focused on Asia affairs.
Trade between the United States and Hong Kong is estimated at $38 billion a year. The territory also hosts some 1,300 U.S. companies, including nearly every major financial institution. The State Department also estimates that 85,000 U.S. citizens reside in Hong Kong.
But it may be too late for the United States to do anything to salvage Hong Kong’s status either as a financial hub or an island of freedom in China. The new Chinese security law, which would still require implementing legislation to give it teeth, could make the place untenable as a center for global trade and finance even without any U.S. measures.
“People will leave, companies will move their headquarters elsewhere, probably places like Singapore, regardless,” said Robert Manning, an expert on Asian security issues at the Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank. “What the U.S. does might hasten the pace of it, but once you swing that wrecking ball, it’s gonna hit, and it’s just a question of how it plays out,” he said.
“But Hong Kong is not going to be Hong Kong anymore.”
For Magnus, the U.S. determination—required by law—essentially means that the administration has given up on trying to defend the special status that Hong Kong has enjoyed since 1997.
“The United States thinks this is lost now. The acceleration of the integration of Hong Kong into the mainland has reached the point of no return,” Magnus said. “The goal of the United States is no longer to preserve Hong Kong as a financial center, it’s just to punish China.”
It’s not clear that even tough U.S. measures against Hong Kong would be enough to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi sees defeating threats to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule as more important than preserving China’s access to the global ATM. That’s doubly true given Hong Kong’s primordial role in the narrative of the “century of humiliation” that the Chinese Communist Party has used to justify its rule.
“Part of the CCP’s raison d’etre is to correct the errors of the past. Hong Kong is of great symbolic importance to China historically,” said Magnus. Rewriting the verdict of the 19th-century Opium Wars isn’t just about retaking territory the British took—it’s about reasserting Chinese control over what it considers its core interests, and one of the world’s premier economic hubs.
“It’s more than just a symbol,” he said, “it’s a symbol that means something.”