foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--The Biden-FDR Connection Runs Deeper Than You Think

The Biden-FDR Connection Runs Deeper Than You Think In this season of President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden , another name is invoked with surprising regularity : former President Franklin D. Roosevelt .
Trump tried to embrace FDR ’ s “ nothing to fear ” line to rationalize downplaying a public health crisis—something FDR would never do .
Biden , meanwhile , is finding his inner Roosevelt .
If he wins in November , his Build Back Better agenda could be a less transformational but still historic version of Roosevelt ’ s New Deal .
And his foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ architecture of alliances designed by FDR at the end of the Second World War .
Roosevelt ’ s first national campaign came 100 years ago in the election of 1920 , when the young former assistant secretary of the navy—a year before he was stricken with polio—was the Democratic vice-presidential candidate .
The winner that year was Republican Warren Harding , who promised “ a return to normalcy ” after the Great War and the influenza pandemic of 1918 , which cost about 675,000 Americans their lives .
Biden ’ s campaign seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theme—an argument to lower our voices and restore the soul of America .
But he will do it in the spirit of FDR .
On the surface , the two men have little in common .
Roosevelt was a patrician governor ; Biden , a creature of the Senate , is a self-described middle class Joe .
Roosevelt was elected president on his first try at age 50 ; if Biden wins on his third try , he would be—at 78—the oldest president ever .
While neither struck contemporaries as cerebral , Roosevelt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who never let anyone get too close ; Biden is an often guileless , undisciplined politician with a gift for friendship .
And yet Roosevelt and Biden share a nobility born of personal suffering—and a historic opportunity afforded by national trauma .
That gives Biden a rare chance to make “ hope and history rhyme , ” as he said in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in August .
For years , Biden has used that line from the Irish poet Seamus Heaney to conjure the Kennedys and the idealism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of age .
Now the historical moment he evokes is the 1930s , when Roosevelt pulled the country out of the fetal position with his thrilling first Hundred Days .
“ Nearly a century ago , Franklin Roosevelt pledged a New Deal in a time of massive unemployment , uncertainty , and fear , ” Biden said in his convention speech .
“ Stricken by disease , stricken by a virus , FDR insisted that he would recover and prevail and he believed America could as well .
And he did .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Roosevelt never insisted during the Depression that he would recover from polio ; in fact , he didn ’ t talk about it publicly ( except obliquely in 1945 ) or allow himself to be photographed in the wheelchair he used every day .
But FDR ’ s polio was no secret—his backers founded the March of Dimes , which raised money to find a cure—and his unspoken message was that if he could rise and walk again ( as he seemed to be doing on the arm of his bodyguard and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He frequently used medical metaphors to make his point , explaining , for instance , in 1942 : “ Dr .
New Deal has become Dr. Win-the-War.
” Biden also uses a medical metaphor .
He speaks often of healing the nation from the divisions created by Trump and the stress of coping with Covid-19 .
And like FDR , he fuses his personal suffering and resilience with the character of the American people .
Good leadership requires such character .
Before FDR was stricken with polio ( in 1921 ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his wife and daughter in a car accident ( in 1972 ) , both had been callow , impetuous young men .
Only with tragedy came a deeper , more authentic connection to the pain so many Americans live with every day .
FDR had more enemies than most remember , but his impressive combination of candor and optimism brought him new levels of public approval , even though it took the onset of World War II to end the Depression .
Similarly , after the 2015 death of his son , Beau @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survivors ( and , memorably , counseling 13-year old Brayden Harrington on how to overcome his stutter , as Biden had ) , are showing voters Biden ’ s true character better than any speech .
FDR and Biden are also aligned ideologically .
There ’ s a striking symmetry to their proposals , as if the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. ’ s long-delayed “ cycles of history ” theory were finally coming true .
FDR immediately put 250,000 young men to work clearing trails and planting trees in the Civilian Conservation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S. Public Health Jobs Corps to enlist 100,000 young people to handle COVID-19 tests and other health challenges .
FDR legalized collective bargaining and instituted a minimum wage ; Biden wants new laws to strengthen unions and favors raising the minimum wage to $ 15 an hour .
FDR ’ s Works Progress Administration ( WPA ) and Public Works Administration ( PWA ) were among the alphabet soup of agencies that built schools , hospitals , highways , bridges , dams , post offices , and other projects .
Biden has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan that would make many similar public investments but also pump federal money into new U.S.-based jobs in clean energy technology .
FDR launched Social Security in 1965 ; Biden would secure its funding source , the payroll tax ( which Trump wants to slash ) , add a public option to the Affordable Care Act and lower the age of Medicare eligibility from 65 to 60 .
What else Biden does depends on the nature of the problems he would face next year .
The animating spirit of the New Deal was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for “ bold persistent experimentation .
It is common sense to take a method and try it .
If it fails , admit it frankly and try another .
But above all try something.
” Because he comes out of the moderate wing of the Democratic Party , Biden shares that pragmatic bent and would likely govern in a less partisan way .
Of course , he will need to flip the Senate to get anything done .
Few remember that Roosevelt brought in 97 new House Democrats on his coattails in 1932 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more compliant Senate .
It ’ s true that in the days when Senate filibusters had to be undertaken in person , Huey Long , the fiery Louisiana populist , spent all night on the Senate floor reciting Shakespeare and Southern recipes in an effort to derail the National Recovery Act and , later , the Social Security Act .
But Long ultimately failed , and FDR—though blocked on his 1937 court-packing scheme and several other bills—shepherded most of his program through Congress .
Even if Democrats take the Senate in November , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 60 votes necessary to break the filibuster .
After years supporting the filibuster , Biden , echoing Obama at John Lewis ’ funeral , now says he will “ take a look ” at revising it .
This would be a critical and tough decision for him .
If he relies on his long history of close relations across the aisle and tries to get bipartisan approval for his program , he risks failure—or bills so watered down that the progressive wing of the Democratic party revolts .
But if he uses his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks a future Republican president—a smarter Trump—ramming destructive legislation through .
The best bet is that Biden further reforms the already-weakened filibuster ( it no longer applies to judgeships and executive branch appointments ) without eliminating it entirely .
If he means to take a leaf from the urgency of FDR ’ s First Hundred Days , he would do this immediately and ram as much legislation through as he can in 2021 .
If Biden fall short on the domestic side , he would likely turn his gaze overseas , where presidents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the biggest challenges he would face as president would be renewing America ’ s global standing after the degradations of Trump .
From kissing up to dictators and trashing allies to abandoning the Paris Climate Accords , the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Iran nuclear deal , it ’ s as if Trump chose to undo not only everything that President Obama did but everything President Roosevelt stood for , namely the structure of collective security that has prevented another world war for the last 75 years .
As a former vice president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Foreign Relations , Biden knows many the major actors on the world stage , including Chinese President Xi Jinping .
And he has spent long hours studying the nuances of global politics .
There is little chance of him coloring outside the lines—lines of bipartisanship , coalition-building , and respect for multilateralism that were first laid out by FDR .
When Roosevelt died in 1945 and his funeral train made the long trip north from Warm Springs , Georgia , a reporter in Washington saw a man crying when the train passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
” the reporter asked .
“ No , ” the man said .
“ But he knew me.
” This is the essence of Biden ’ s appeal , too , and it ’ s an effective one .

In this season of President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden, another name is invoked with surprising regularity: former President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Trump tried to embrace FDR’s “nothing to fear” line to rationalize downplaying a public health crisis—something FDR would never do. Biden, meanwhile, is finding his inner Roosevelt. If he wins in November, his Build Back Better agenda could be a less transformational but still historic version of Roosevelt’s New Deal. And his foreign policy would be focused on restoring the architecture of alliances designed by FDR at the end of the Second World War.
In this season of President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden, another name is invoked with surprising regularity: former President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Trump tried to embrace FDR’s “nothing to fear” line to rationalize downplaying a public health crisis—something FDR would never do. Biden, meanwhile, is finding his inner Roosevelt. If he wins in November, his Build Back Better agenda could be a less transformational but still historic version of Roosevelt’s New Deal. And his foreign policy would be focused on restoring the architecture of alliances designed by FDR at the end of the Second World War.
Roosevelt’s first national campaign came 100 years ago in the election of 1920, when the young former assistant secretary of the navy—a year before he was stricken with polio—was the Democratic vice-presidential candidate. The winner that year was Republican Warren Harding, who promised “a return to normalcy” after the Great War and the influenza pandemic of 1918, which cost about 675,000 Americans their lives. Biden’s campaign seems like a Democratic variation on the same theme—an argument to lower our voices and restore the soul of America.
But he will do it in the spirit of FDR. On the surface, the two men have little in common. Roosevelt was a patrician governor; Biden, a creature of the Senate, is a self-described middle class Joe. Roosevelt was elected president on his first try at age 50; if Biden wins on his third try, he would be—at 78—the oldest president ever. While neither struck contemporaries as cerebral, Roosevelt was a canny, even manipulative executive who never let anyone get too close; Biden is an often guileless, undisciplined politician with a gift for friendship.
And yet Roosevelt and Biden share a nobility born of personal suffering—and a historic opportunity afforded by national trauma. That gives Biden a rare chance to make “hope and history rhyme,” as he said in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in August. For years, Biden has used that line from the Irish poet Seamus Heaney to conjure the Kennedys and the idealism of the 1960s, when he came of age. Now the historical moment he evokes is the 1930s, when Roosevelt pulled the country out of the fetal position with his thrilling first Hundred Days.
“Nearly a century ago, Franklin Roosevelt pledged a New Deal in a time of massive unemployment, uncertainty, and fear,” Biden said in his convention speech. “Stricken by disease, stricken by a virus, FDR insisted that he would recover and prevail and he believed America could as well. And he did. And so can we.”
To be accurate, Roosevelt never insisted during the Depression that he would recover from polio; in fact, he didn’t talk about it publicly (except obliquely in 1945) or allow himself to be photographed in the wheelchair he used every day. But FDR’s polio was no secret—his backers founded the March of Dimes, which raised money to find a cure—and his unspoken message was that if he could rise and walk again (as he seemed to be doing on the arm of his bodyguard and son), so could the nation. He frequently used medical metaphors to make his point, explaining, for instance, in 1942: “Dr. New Deal has become Dr. Win-the-War.”
Biden also uses a medical metaphor. He speaks often of healing the nation from the divisions created by Trump and the stress of coping with Covid-19. And like FDR, he fuses his personal suffering and resilience with the character of the American people.
Good leadership requires such character. Before FDR was stricken with polio (in 1921), and before Biden suffered the loss of his wife and daughter in a car accident (in 1972), both had been callow, impetuous young men. Only with tragedy came a deeper, more authentic connection to the pain so many Americans live with every day. FDR had more enemies than most remember, but his impressive combination of candor and optimism brought him new levels of public approval, even though it took the onset of World War II to end the Depression. Similarly, after the 2015 death of his son, Beau, viral videos of Biden comforting cancer survivors (and, memorably, counseling 13-year old Brayden Harrington on how to overcome his stutter, as Biden had), are showing voters Biden’s true character better than any speech.
FDR and Biden are also aligned ideologically. There’s a striking symmetry to their proposals, as if the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s long-delayed “cycles of history” theory were finally coming true. FDR immediately put 250,000 young men to work clearing trails and planting trees in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC); Biden wants a U.S. Public Health Jobs Corps to enlist 100,000 young people to handle COVID-19 tests and other health challenges. FDR legalized collective bargaining and instituted a minimum wage; Biden wants new laws to strengthen unions and favors raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour. FDR’s Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Public Works Administration (PWA) were among the alphabet soup of agencies that built schools, hospitals, highways, bridges, dams, post offices, and other projects. Biden has laid out a “sustainable infrastructure” plan that would make many similar public investments but also pump federal money into new U.S.-based jobs in clean energy technology. FDR launched Social Security in 1935; Biden would secure its funding source, the payroll tax (which Trump wants to slash), add a public option to the Affordable Care Act and lower the age of Medicare eligibility from 65 to 60.
What else Biden does depends on the nature of the problems he would face next year. The animating spirit of the New Deal was practical, not ideological. FDR called for “bold persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all try something.” Because he comes out of the moderate wing of the Democratic Party, Biden shares that pragmatic bent and would likely govern in a less partisan way. Of course, he will need to flip the Senate to get anything done. Few remember that Roosevelt brought in 97 new House Democrats on his coattails in 1932.
More important, FDR faced a more compliant Senate. It’s true that in the days when Senate filibusters had to be undertaken in person, Huey Long, the fiery Louisiana populist, spent all night on the Senate floor reciting Shakespeare and Southern recipes in an effort to derail the National Recovery Act and, later, the Social Security Act. But Long ultimately failed, and FDR—though blocked on his 1937 court-packing scheme and several other bills—shepherded most of his program through Congress.
Even if Democrats take the Senate in November, they will not have anywhere near the 60 votes necessary to break the filibuster. After years supporting the filibuster, Biden, echoing Obama at John Lewis’ funeral, now says he will “take a look” at revising it. This would be a critical and tough decision for him. If he relies on his long history of close relations across the aisle and tries to get bipartisan approval for his program, he risks failure—or bills so watered down that the progressive wing of the Democratic party revolts. But if he uses his influence to lift the filibuster, he risks a future Republican president—a smarter Trump—ramming destructive legislation through. The best bet is that Biden further reforms the already-weakened filibuster (it no longer applies to judgeships and executive branch appointments) without eliminating it entirely. If he means to take a leaf from the urgency of FDR’s First Hundred Days, he would do this immediately and ram as much legislation through as he can in 2021.
If Biden falls short on the domestic side, he would likely turn his gaze overseas, where presidents have more leeway. Biden believes one of the biggest challenges he would face as president would be renewing America’s global standing after the degradations of Trump. From kissing up to dictators and trashing allies to abandoning the Paris Climate Accords, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Iran nuclear deal, it’s as if Trump chose to undo not only everything that President Obama did but everything President Roosevelt stood for, namely the structure of collective security that has prevented another world war for the last 75 years.
As a former vice president and former chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Biden knows many the major actors on the world stage, including Chinese President Xi Jinping. And he has spent long hours studying the nuances of global politics. There is little chance of him coloring outside the lines—lines of bipartisanship, coalition-building, and respect for multilateralism that were first laid out by FDR.
When Roosevelt died in 1945 and his funeral train made the long trip north from Warm Springs, Georgia, a reporter in Washington saw a man crying when the train passed. “Did you know the president?” the reporter asked. “No,” the man said. “But he knew me.” This is the essence of Biden’s appeal, too, and it’s an effective one.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--How to Handle WeChat’s Threat Smartly

How to Handle WeChat’s Threat Smartly

The executive orders relating to WeChat and its parent company Tencent , as well as TikTok and its parent company ByteDance , issued by U.S. President Donald Trump have sparked controversy and debate .
Two of us , Times Wang and Jianli Yang , have previously expressed concern about First Amendment issues and other worries about the WeChat order , and the Electronic Frontier Foundation has done the same with respect to TikTok .
Others have opined in favor of the orders , apparently concluding the risk of a First Amendment violation is low .
China ’ s internet policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
But there are more constitutionally and strategically sound approaches than some of the crude tools the U.S. government may end up using .
From the outset , it is important to recognize that WeChat is part of a larger and deeper threat , namely the self-interested effort by the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) to propagate and control narratives both at home and abroad .
As part of its effort to control the narrative , the one-party state has constructed the most extensive and sophisticated censorship and surveillance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Firewall—though , given its one-way nature , a better descriptor might be the Great Reality Distortion Filter .
The purpose is not to block information so much as it is to reshape it .
When combined with WeChat , which is the primary source of information for countless Chinese-speaking people around the world , the result is a potential ideological weapon .
Of course , WeChat users can think for themselves .
Yet siloed information ecosystems—be it MSNBC , Fox News , or WeChat—also have a well-understood , deleterious effect on accurate perceptions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for authoritarianism , and for the CCP—including in communities in the United States—is almost certainly higher than it would be on a more level informational playing field .
Companies such as Tencent , WeChat ’ s owner , are complicit , if only through necessity .
Tencent would presumably prefer not to have to engage in censorship and surveillance .
But as a PRC company that depends , like all private firms in China , on the sufferance of the CCP , it must do so if it wants to survive .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including Tencent , cooperation can yield extreme benefits , such as virtual monopoly status . )
Indeed , under Chinese President Xi Jinping , the CCP has required that erstwhile private companies open their doors to political cadres , and there is evidence that Tencent affirmatively shares user information with the government—including information about its users outside China , such as users in the United States—without even requiring a formal request for particular data .
But even given these facts , a complete ban is not the way to go .
Preventing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WeChat is likely impossible on a technical level , although it can be made difficult enough , if removed from Android and Apple app stores , to severely reduce usage .
But draconian measures stand on dubious legal ground , given that many use WeChat to engage in protected speech .
Nor would the fact that speech is heavily censored seem to matter , given that many other information channels in the United States are similarly biased , not least state-run or state-affiliated outlets such as China Daily , CGTN , and RT @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amendment to criminalize writing for and reading those outlets ( which it almost certainly would ) , it would likely also violate the First Amendment to criminalize WeChat use .
Even on a practical level , a complete WeChat ban—or as close to it as is possible in the U.S. system—is unlikely to result in positive change .
Some have argued that a complete ban will induce people to use alternative tools .
But given the existence of the Great Firewall , we think that is a miscalculation , because only when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alternatives to WeChat even become possible .
It is true that especially motivated users inside China , such as dissidents , can and do use virtual private networks and apps such as Signal , and that a ban wouldn ’ t significantly affect their ability to connect with the outside world .
But the reality is that most people inside China are not dissidents .
And , while alternate communication tools such as email and phone calls exist , they can not match the convenience of WeChat in terms of maintaining friendships , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moreover , there is every reason to expect that , if forced to choose between permitting large-scale , unmonitored communications versus increasing controls on such communications , the Chinese state will choose the latter , including by shoring up the Great Firewall or by tightening other forms of policing .
The only practical effect of a ban in the foreseeable future is thus to make it even harder for people inside China to connect with the outside world , with no commensurate benefit to free speech or democratization .
The desire to play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but that doesn ’ t have to mean an eye for an eye .
A complete WeChat ban would be a propaganda coup for China , letting it tout the legitimacy and wisdom of its own approach all along .
Refusing to take the bait is not naive , nor does it make the United States a sucker .
To the contrary , it projects strength and confidence of the kind China lacks .
Given the Chinese government ’ s influence over companies such as Tencent , it is certainly not alarmist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pose a security risk .
Thus , the United States should prohibit WeChat use by government employees , people holding security clearances , and the like , extending the existing ban of WeChat on government devices .
It should also analyze whether removing WeChat from U.S. app stores would be a First Amendment violation .
If not , it should consider requiring such removal , though doing so would presumably invite court challenges .
It should also analyze whether and to what extent companies such as Tencent use U.S.-based cloud computing systems , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk .
Tencent and its leadership appear to have a vast array of investments in the United States and presumably travel here from time to time .
Thus , visa restrictions aimed on executives who contribute to the censorship and surveillance of WeChat users in the United States , similar to the restrictions placed on certain Huawei executives , would be an excellent point of leverage .
More broadly , the United States should take direct aim at the Great Firewall .
On a technical level , the United States should strengthen existing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open-source and proprietary technologies to defeat it .
Many U.S. companies supply software , hardware , and technology needed for the Great Firewall .
To be sure , these technologies are used for noncensorship purposes as well .
Nevertheless , given the asymmetrical danger posed by the Great Firewall , the United States can and should require that U.S. companies include contract provisions prohibiting use of their technologies in constructing or maintaining the Great Firewall on national security grounds .
Finally , the Great Firewall should be made an even more critical part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After all , in the digital economy , the Great Firewall is the functional equivalent of a discriminatory , protectionist , one-way trade barrier that allows Chinese media and technology companies to compete worldwide , while preventing foreign media and technology companies from competing in China .
Future trade negotiators should relentlessly hammer on this point .
Companies such as Tencent are understandably caught between a rock and a hard place .
But that is no excuse for avoiding the issue .
If they are unwilling or unable to push for relaxation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they can not expect people in the United States to simply resign themselves to those practices as a condition of using their products .
At a bare minimum , Chinese technology and media companies should be required to publicly admit to their would-be U.S. users that they are subject to the Chinese government ’ s authority , and that content on their platforms is likely to be censored and surveilled .
The time for half-truths , plausible deniability , strategic ambiguity , and soothing words that signify nothing is over .
Warning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Of course , companies such as Tencent also have the option of publicly , forcefully , and credibly refusing to censor , surveil , or share data emanating from the United States .
But that is asking too much of people subject to the Chinese government ’ s rule .
Given that , a last resort for such companies who want to operate in the United States is to divest .
If and when they do , it should be made clear that it was not the U.S. government that put them in @ @ @ @ @ @ @

The executive orders relating to WeChat and its parent company Tencent, as well as TikTok and its parent company ByteDance, issued by U.S. President Donald Trump have sparked controversy and debate. Two of us, Times Wang and Jianli Yang, have previously expressed concern about First Amendment issues and other worries about the WeChat order, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation has done the same with respect to TikTok. Others have opined in favor of the orders, apparently concluding the risk of a First Amendment violation is low.
The executive orders relating to WeChat and its parent company Tencent, as well as TikTok and its parent company ByteDance, issued by U.S. President Donald Trump have sparked controversy and debate. Two of us, Times Wang and Jianli Yang, have previously expressed concern about First Amendment issues and other worries about the WeChat order, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation has done the same with respect to TikTok. Others have opined in favor of the orders, apparently concluding the risk of a First Amendment violation is low.
China’s internet policies offer real security and ideological challenges to the United States. But there are more constitutionally and strategically sound approaches than some of the crude tools the U.S. government may end up using.
From the outset, it is important to recognize that WeChat is part of a larger and deeper threat, namely the self-interested effort by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to propagate and control narratives both at home and abroad.
As part of its effort to control the narrative, the one-party state has constructed the most extensive and sophisticated censorship and surveillance system in history, namely the Great Firewall—though, given its one-way nature, a better descriptor might be the Great Reality Distortion Filter. The purpose is not to block information so much as it is to reshape it. When combined with WeChat, which is the primary source of information for countless Chinese-speaking people around the world, the result is a potential ideological weapon.
Of course, WeChat users can think for themselves. Yet siloed information ecosystems—be it MSNBC, Fox News, or WeChat—also have a well-understood, deleterious effect on accurate perceptions of reality. The result is that support for authoritarianism, and for the CCP—including in communities in the United States—is almost certainly higher than it would be on a more level informational playing field.
Companies such as Tencent, WeChat’s owner, are complicit, if only through necessity. Tencent would presumably prefer not to have to engage in censorship and surveillance. But as a PRC company that depends, like all private firms in China, on the sufferance of the CCP, it must do so if it wants to survive. (In the case of some companies, including Tencent, cooperation can yield extreme benefits, such as virtual monopoly status.) Indeed, under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the CCP has required that erstwhile private companies open their doors to political cadres, and there is evidence that Tencent affirmatively shares user information with the government—including information about its users outside China, such as users in the United States—without even requiring a formal request for particular data.
But even given these facts, a complete ban is not the way to go. Preventing people in the United States from using WeChat is likely impossible on a technical level, although it can be made difficult enough, if removed from Android and Apple app stores, to severely reduce usage. But draconian measures stand on dubious legal ground, given that many use WeChat to engage in protected speech. Nor would the fact that speech is heavily censored seem to matter, given that many other information channels in the United States are similarly biased, not least state-run or state-affiliated outlets such as China Daily, CGTN, and RT. If it would violate the First Amendment to criminalize writing for and reading those outlets (which it almost certainly would), it would likely also violate the First Amendment to criminalize WeChat use.
Even on a practical level, a complete WeChat ban—or as close to it as is possible in the U.S. system—is unlikely to result in positive change. Some have argued that a complete ban will induce people to use alternative tools. But given the existence of the Great Firewall, we think that is a miscalculation, because only when the Great Firewall is torn down will reasonable alternatives to WeChat even become possible.
It is true that especially motivated users inside China, such as dissidents, can and do use virtual private networks and apps such as Signal, and that a ban wouldn’t significantly affect their ability to connect with the outside world. But the reality is that most people inside China are not dissidents. And, while alternate communication tools such as email and phone calls exist, they cannot match the convenience of WeChat in terms of maintaining friendships, professional relationships, and family ties. Moreover, there is every reason to expect that, if forced to choose between permitting large-scale, unmonitored communications versus increasing controls on such communications, the Chinese state will choose the latter, including by shoring up the Great Firewall or by tightening other forms of policing.
The only practical effect of a ban in the foreseeable future is thus to make it even harder for people inside China to connect with the outside world, with no commensurate benefit to free speech or democratization.
The desire to play tit for tat with China is understandable, but that doesn’t have to mean an eye for an eye. A complete WeChat ban would be a propaganda coup for China, letting it tout the legitimacy and wisdom of its own approach all along. Refusing to take the bait is not naive, nor does it make the United States a sucker. To the contrary, it projects strength and confidence of the kind China lacks.
Given the Chinese government’s influence over companies such as Tencent, it is certainly not alarmist to worry that apps like WeChat might pose a security risk. Thus, the United States should prohibit WeChat use by government employees, people holding security clearances, and the like, extending the existing ban of WeChat on government devices. It should also analyze whether removing WeChat from U.S. app stores would be a First Amendment violation. If not, it should consider requiring such removal, though doing so would presumably invite court challenges. It should also analyze whether and to what extent companies such as Tencent use U.S.-based cloud computing systems, and whether such use is a security risk. Tencent and its leadership appear to have a vast array of investments in the United States and presumably travel here from time to time. Thus, visa restrictions aimed on executives who contribute to the censorship and surveillance of WeChat users in the United States, similar to the restrictions placed on certain Huawei executives, would be an excellent point of leverage.
More broadly, the United States should take direct aim at the Great Firewall. On a technical level, the United States should strengthen existing public-private efforts to develop and improve both open-source and proprietary technologies to defeat it.
Many U.S. companies supply software, hardware, and technology needed for the Great Firewall. To be sure, these technologies are used for noncensorship purposes as well. Nevertheless, given the asymmetrical danger posed by the Great Firewall, the United States can and should require that U.S. companies include contract provisions prohibiting use of their technologies in constructing or maintaining the Great Firewall on national security grounds.
Finally, the Great Firewall should be made an even more critical part of trade negotiations than it already is. After all, in the digital economy, the Great Firewall is the functional equivalent of a discriminatory, protectionist, one-way trade barrier that allows Chinese media and technology companies to compete worldwide, while preventing foreign media and technology companies from competing in China. Future trade negotiators should relentlessly hammer on this point.
Companies such as Tencent are understandably caught between a rock and a hard place. But that is no excuse for avoiding the issue. If they are unwilling or unable to push for relaxation of censorship and surveillance practices at home, they cannot expect people in the United States to simply resign themselves to those practices as a condition of using their products.
At a bare minimum, Chinese technology and media companies should be required to publicly admit to their would-be U.S. users that they are subject to the Chinese government’s authority , and that content on their platforms is likely to be censored and surveilled. The time for half-truths, plausible deniability, strategic ambiguity, and soothing words that signify nothing is over. Warning labels are required for dangerous products.
Of course, companies such as Tencent also have the option of publicly, forcefully, and credibly refusing to censor, surveil, or share data emanating from the United States. But that is asking too much of people subject to the Chinese government’s rule. Given that, a last resort for such companies who want to operate in the United States is to divest. If and when they do, it should be made clear that it was not the U.S. government that put them in that position, but the CCP.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Japan’s Suga Will Struggle to Pull off Abe’s Defense Transformation

Japan ’ s Suga Will Struggle to Pull off Abe ’ s Defense Transformation Yoshihide Suga , the low-key son of a farmer who will be named Japan ’ s next prime minister on Wednesday , is in many ways a policy clone of recently resigned Prime Minister Shinzo Abe .
But that doesn ’ t mean Suga will bring anything like the same effort Abe did to bolstering Japan ’ s defense capabilities—a transition in Japanese politics both Beijing and Washington will be watching .
Suga , who overcame two favored party rivals to unexpectedly grab the top of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pedigree or hobnobbing skills that made Abe a fixture on the international political scene .
But he also lacks Abe ’ s compulsion to break the constraints of Japan ’ s post-war defense posture , and is additionally hemmed in by the coronavirus pandemic and the economic damage it ’ s wrought , which will likely push Japan ’ s nascent security awakening to the back seat for now .
“ He ’ s got to focus on economics , ” said Michael Auslin , a distinguished research fellow at Stanford University ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t win elections on foreign policy .
He ’ s got to prioritize reform , he ’ s got to deal with the COVID virus .
He has enormous pressures on him which means those that want to push him into Japan taking a smaller role on the [ world ] stage are going to have a great opportunity.
” Unlike the globe-trotting , glad-handing Abe , who grabbed the spotlight with controversial and conciliatory visits—touring Japanese war shrines as well as Pearl Harbor , then wooing U.S. President Donald Trump—Suga is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ honed by seven years of scandal and intra-party rebellion as Abe ’ s right-hand man .
“ Everyone has underestimated him his entire career , ” said Joshua Walker , the president and CEO of the Japan Society and a former State and Defense Department official .
“ No one would have said two months ago he would have had a chance.
” But when it comes to Japan ’ s more muscular approach to foreign policy , Suga may not be Abe ’ s most aggressive steward .
Allies might expect the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan ’ s regional ambitions and strengthened military posture , which includes more freedom for overseas deployments and higher-end military hardware .
Regional rivals like China might be hoping he doesn ’ t .
Abe tried , though ultimately fell short , to tweak Japan ’ s post-war constitution to allow for a more aggressive security stance .
After unexpectedly resigning for health reasons , Abe issued a parting statement calling on Tokyo to consider developing first-strike capabilities to defend the country from imminent missile attacks , a departure from Japan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spent considerable energy cultivating close ties with Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi , cemented by his commitment to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , a defense grouping of the United States , Australia , India , and Japan aimed at the broader Indo-Pacific region .
There are a pair of upcoming bellwethers to gauge Suga ’ s mettle : a rewritten National Security Strategy set to land on the prime minister ’ s desk before the end of the year , and ongoing talks within Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the nation ’ s arsenal .
While experts said that style , not substance , would mark the major difference between the longtime political allies on foreign policy , Suga likely won ’ t be the disruptive force Abe sought to be .
“ Because Abe ’ s heart was really in the security domain and [ he ] really wanted to make changes there , he was willing to push on the doors and see what would open and wouldn ’ t open , ” said Jeffrey Hornung , a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East Asian security issues .
“ I don ’ t think Suga is going to do that .
I think he sees what doors are open and is going to push on the path of least resistance.
” Suga is likely to maintain a domestic focus , especially when it comes to extending Abe ’ s recipe for goosing the economy , but experts expect he will soon be challenged by North Korea , likely with cyberintrusions , and a resurgent China , which has confronted Japan repeatedly in recent years over disputed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suga ’ s arrival presents Beijing an opportunity for a reprieve—if it wants , Auslin said .
“ If they ’ re smart , [ the Chinese ] will give him leeway and see if they can maneuver him into dropping the more forward leaning of Abe ’ s policies , ” said Auslin .
At a time of uncertainty in U.S. politics , with Trump still an underdog in most polls against former Vice President Joe Biden , and both countries rearing for tough negotiations over Tokyo ’ s payments for American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ onus may be on Washington to extend an olive branch to Suga .
“ The Americans should want to show that the relationship with Abe was not a fluke , ” said Auslin .
The message , he said , should be : “ This new forward learning Japan in the world is a sustainable relationship between Tokyo and Washington .
It doesn ’ t rise and fall with Abe .
”

Yoshihide Suga, the low-key son of a farmer who will be named Japan’s next prime minister on Wednesday, is in many ways a policy clone of recently resigned Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But that doesn’t mean Suga will bring anything like the same effort Abe did to bolstering Japan’s defense capabilities—a transition in Japanese politics both Beijing and Washington will be watching.
Yoshihide Suga, the low-key son of a farmer who will be named Japan’s next prime minister on Wednesday, is in many ways a policy clone of recently resigned Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But that doesn’t mean Suga will bring anything like the same effort Abe did to bolstering Japan’s defense capabilities—a transition in Japanese politics both Beijing and Washington will be watching.
Suga, who overcame two favored party rivals to unexpectedly grab the top of the greasy pole, lacks the political pedigree or hobnobbing skills that made Abe a fixture on the international political scene. But he also lacks Abe’s compulsion to break the constraints of Japan’s post-war defense posture, and is additionally hemmed in by the coronavirus pandemic and the economic damage it’s wrought, which will likely push Japan’s nascent security awakening to the back seat for now.
“He’s got to focus on economics,” said Michael Auslin, a distinguished research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. “You don’t win elections on foreign policy. He’s got to prioritize reform, he’s got to deal with the COVID virus. He has enormous pressures on him which means those that want to push him into Japan taking a smaller role on the [world] stage are going to have a great opportunity.”
Unlike the globe-trotting, glad-handing Abe, who grabbed the spotlight with controversial and conciliatory visits—touring Japanese war shrines as well as Pearl Harbor, then wooing U.S. President Donald Trump—Suga is likely to hew to the low-profile approach honed by seven years of scandal and intra-party rebellion as Abe’s right-hand man.
“Everyone has underestimated him his entire career,” said Joshua Walker, the president and CEO of the Japan Society and a former State and Defense Department official. “No one would have said two months ago he would have had a chance.”
But when it comes to Japan’s more muscular approach to foreign policy, Suga may not be Abe’s most aggressive steward. Allies might expect the new prime minister to double down on Japan’s regional ambitions and strengthened military posture, which includes more freedom for overseas deployments and higher-end military hardware. Regional rivals like China might be hoping he doesn’t.
Abe tried, though ultimately fell short, to tweak Japan’s post-war constitution to allow for a more aggressive security stance. After unexpectedly resigning for health reasons, Abe issued a parting statement calling on Tokyo to consider developing first-strike capabilities to defend the country from imminent missile attacks, a departure from Japan’s historical imperative toward self-defense.
And Abe spent considerable energy cultivating close ties with Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, cemented by his commitment to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a defense grouping of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan aimed at the broader Indo-Pacific region.
There are a pair of upcoming bellwethers to gauge Suga’s mettle: a rewritten National Security Strategy set to land on the prime minister’s desk before the end of the year, and ongoing talks within Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party over whether to add conventional missile strike capabilities to the nation’s arsenal.
While experts said that style, not substance, would mark the major difference between the longtime political allies on foreign policy, Suga likely won’t be the disruptive force Abe sought to be.
“Because Abe’s heart was really in the security domain and [he] really wanted to make changes there, he was willing to push on the doors and see what would open and wouldn’t open,” said Jeffrey Hornung, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation specialising in East Asian security issues.
“I don’t think Suga is going to do that. I think he sees what doors are open and is going to push on the path of least resistance.”
Suga is likely to maintain a domestic focus, especially when it comes to extending Abe’s recipe for goosing the economy, but experts expect he will soon be challenged by North Korea, likely with cyberintrusions, and a resurgent China, which has confronted Japan repeatedly in recent years over disputed islands in the East China Sea. Suga’s arrival presents Beijing an opportunity for a reprieve—if it wants, Auslin said.
“If they’re smart, [the Chinese] will give him leeway and see if they can maneuver him into dropping the more forward leaning of Abe’s policies,” said Auslin.
At a time of uncertainty in U.S. politics, with Trump still an underdog in most polls against former Vice President Joe Biden, and both countries rearing for tough negotiations over Tokyo’s payments for American forces stationed in the country, the onus may be on Washington to extend an olive branch to Suga.
“The Americans should want to show that the relationship with Abe was not a fluke,” said Auslin. The message, he said, should be: “This new forward learning Japan in the world is a sustainable relationship between Tokyo and Washington. It doesn’t rise and fall with Abe.”


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Joe Biden Is Actually Listening

Joe Biden Is Actually Listening

The virtual inevitability of unforeseen and unforeseeable events , whether World War I or Balkan genocide or the coronavirus pandemic , compels humility in anyone hoping to predict the foreign policy of any new president , as I have been doing for the past month in the case of a possible President Joe Biden .
Domestic policy offers much more predictable terrain than foreign policy .
For that very reason , one has to think not only about the course but the driver .
What are his basic intuitions about the world ?
How is he likely to react in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this respect , Joe Biden is the opposite of George W. Bush .
Biden has had his hands in American foreign policy for almost half a century ; his understanding of the world is both shaped and limited by that long experience .
Biden is not a policy intellectual , though he reads and talks to many people who are .
He has the innate pragmatism of the old pro , and the ambitious politician ’ s habit of steering by the Pole star of public sentiment .
Since he arrived in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views have never wandered far from the Democratic mainstream .
And yet his own temperament , and the passage of time , and particular experiences , have shaped him in distinctive ways .
In his memoirs , former Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote that Biden “ had been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issues over the past four decades.
” That ’ s a mighty harsh verdict coming from so impeccably credentialed a figure , but it ’ s instructive to look at the evidence .
As a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposed President Gerald Ford ’ s aid package to keep South Vietnam fighting , welcomed the fall of the Shah of Iran , opposed key elements of President Ronald Reagan ’ s massive defense build-up , and voted against the first Gulf War .
Gates seems to have invented the allegation about the Shah , but it fits well enough with the picture of a liberal Democrat loathe to link America ’ s fortunes to anti-Communist strongmen around the globe .
But unlike figures to his left , Biden never regarded American power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t against the [ Vietnam ] war for moral reasons , ” he told me in 2009 .
“ I just thought it was a stupid policy.
” By the 1990s , with the Cold War over and a Democrat in the White House , Biden , now ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , had come to accept the argument for “ humanitarian intervention , ” as many liberals had .
Biden has a bottomless stock of anecdotes which feature him confronting the world ’ s dictators ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the genocidal ruler of Serbia , that he considers him “ a damn war criminal ” and would like to see him “ tried as such.
” Nevertheless , he told me that his support for intervention in Serbia had as much to do with his fear of spreading instability in the Balkans as with the need to stop mass atrocities .
“ It was within our wheelhouse , ” he said .
The intervention , that is , served American interests , and was doable .
The Democratic party moved to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aftermath of 9/11 , and Biden moved as well .
Biden is unusually willing to be thought politically cold-blooded for someone who regards himself as almost helplessly warm-hearted in personal matters .
One wonders if that cocky toughness would survive the immense obligations that come with the presidency ; perhaps Biden would feel more intensely the consequences of turning his back on countries or peoples that look the United States for succor .
The Democratic party moved to the right on national security in the aftermath of 9/11 , and Biden moved as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change in Iraq , so long as it was carried out with allies , and voted to give President Bush the authorization he used to go to war .
In this case the conventional view turned out to be disastrously mistaken ; and Biden has since gone to great , and thoroughly disingenuous , lengths to obscure that record .
Yet Biden offered a bolder and more creative response to Iraq ’ s collapse than did his colleagues , joining Leslie Gelb , head of the Council on Foreign Relations , to propose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shia , and Kurdish autonomous zones .
The idea generated some interest in the think tank world—and virtually none beyond it .
No mere opportunist would endorse such a thought experiment .
“ I don ’ t know anyone else in politics who would do that , ” Gelb told me .
What , then , is the category to which Biden belongs ?
He is obviously no anti-American peacenik , as Gates seems to have once thought .
Nor is he the kind of realist , like Gates himself , who believes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its values , rather than its geopolitical interests .
Biden ’ s entire campaign is about values .
He pledges to restore “ the soul of a nation ” —to make America noble again .
He believes that America has both the right and the obligation to lead .
That belief includes the patriotic premise that America ’ s national interests are not inimical to the interests of the world .
That is why , in the first article in this series , I compared Biden to “ Cold War liberals ” like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is thus bound to disappoint progressives who believe that American power can be just only when it is wielded on behalf of others .
As I mentioned in my previous column , Biden served as Barack Obama ’ s in-house killjoy on idealistic projects in the Middle East , including the wish to align the administration with the people in the street in the ferment of the Arab Spring .
There is , indeed , a through-line of skepticism that connects Biden ’ s views on Vietnam , Afghanistan , and Libya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States than he is about the remote places in which its power is often exercised .
As a politician , Biden has spent his life operating in the world of compromise , damage-limitation and favor-trading .
As a politician , Biden has spent his life operating in the world of compromise , damage-limitation and favor-trading .
He does not expect , and probably would not try , to shatter traditional limits , as Obama did when he called for an ultimate end to nuclear weapons .
It is impossible to imagine him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as Obama did in Cairo in 2009 .
While Obama made stirring speeches , Biden made phone calls—or house calls .
Biden not only practices politics , but believes in it as an affirmative principle ; it is one of his axioms that you can nudge events in a positive direction by appealing to the self-interest , the political calculations , of other leaders .
He practices foreign policy , as he practices politics , by talking to people , and listening to them .
“ Foreign policy is like human relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ only people know less about each other.
” Biden tries to fill that gap by asking people about themselves , and telling them about himself .
Very few of the advisors I talked to tried to capture Biden ’ s “ worldview , ” but several of them told me about the way Biden talks to world leaders .
“ What I ’ ve seen from Biden again and again , ” says Daniel Benaim , Biden ’ s former foreign policy speechwriter and now co-head of his team of Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ understands what it means to sit across the table from the political leader of another country and to think in an incisive and compelling way about how to reach and persuade that person .
That means understanding somebody ’ s fears , their narrative about themselves in the world , the health of their grandchildren , the nature of their attraction to America and even the figures from the American past who matter to them .
That kind of emotional intelligence runs very deep , and it ’ s what makes him a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign policy.
” William Burns , the long-time diplomat who now heads the Carnegie Endowment , also spoke of Biden ’ s sheer persistence , and his gift of empathy .
“ That ’ s going to be a more important quality than ever , ” he said , “ with allies and partners who are going to be very skeptical .
He ’ s uniquely equipped to help reassure people.
” At 77 , Joe Biden has lost whatever power to inspire he might once have had .
He may not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decade ago .
But he can still reassure .
At this moment in history , that might be what is most needed .

Twenty years ago I interviewed the senior foreign policy advisors around then President George W. Bush and concluded that a Bush foreign policy would be fundamentally “realist,” if also hard-line and unilateral. And so it might have been, had terrorists not attacked the World Trade Center. As British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously said when asked what would determine his policy abroad, “Events, dear boy, events.” But that’s only half an answer, for it was the transformative effect of a particular event—9/11—on a particular leader—an inexperienced man guided by an evangelical sense of mission—that produced the war on terror and the “freedom agenda.”
The virtual inevitability of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, whether World War I or Balkan genocide or the coronavirus pandemic, compels humility in anyone hoping to predict the foreign policy of any new president, as I have been doing for the past month in the case of a possible President Joe Biden. Domestic policy offers much more predictable terrain than foreign policy. For that very reason, one has to think not only about the course but the driver. What are his basic intuitions about the world? How is he likely to react in the face of the unexpected?
In this respect, Joe Biden is the opposite of George W. Bush. Biden has had his hands in American foreign policy for almost half a century; his understanding of the world is both shaped and limited by that long experience. Biden is not a policy intellectual, though he reads and talks to many people who are. He has the innate pragmatism of the old pro, and the ambitious politician’s habit of steering by the Pole star of public sentiment. Since he arrived in the Senate in 1973, Biden’s views have never wandered far from the Democratic mainstream. And yet his own temperament, and the passage of time, and particular experiences, have shaped him in distinctive ways.
In his memoirs, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote that Biden “had been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issues over the past four decades.” That’s a mighty harsh verdict coming from so impeccably credentialed a figure, but it’s instructive to look at the evidence. As a senator, Gates later stipulated, Biden opposed President Gerald Ford’s aid package to keep South Vietnam fighting, welcomed the fall of the Shah of Iran, opposed key elements of President Ronald Reagan’s massive defense build-up, and voted against the first Gulf War.
Gates seems to have invented the allegation about the Shah, but it fits well enough with the picture of a liberal Democrat loathe to link America’s fortunes to anti-Communist strongmen around the globe. But unlike figures to his left, Biden never regarded American power as a malevolent force. “I wasn’t against the [Vietnam] war for moral reasons,” he told me in 2009. “I just thought it was a stupid policy.”
By the 1990s, with the Cold War over and a Democrat in the White House, Biden, now ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had come to accept the argument for “humanitarian intervention,” as many liberals had. Biden has a bottomless stock of anecdotes which feature him confronting the world’s dictators; in one, he tells Slobodan Milosevic, the genocidal ruler of Serbia, that he considers him “a damn war criminal” and would like to see him “tried as such.” Nevertheless, he told me that his support for intervention in Serbia had as much to do with his fear of spreading instability in the Balkans as with the need to stop mass atrocities. “It was within our wheelhouse,” he said. The intervention, that is, served American interests, and was doable.
The Democratic party moved to the right on national security in the aftermath of 9/11, and Biden moved as well.
Biden is unusually willing to be thought politically cold-blooded for someone who regards himself as almost helplessly warm-hearted in personal matters. One wonders if that cocky toughness would survive the immense obligations that come with the presidency; perhaps Biden would feel more intensely the consequences of turning his back on countries or peoples that look the United States for succor.
The Democratic party moved to the right on national security in the aftermath of 9/11, and Biden moved as well. He spoke favorably about regime change in Iraq, so long as it was carried out with allies, and voted to give President Bush the authorization he used to go to war. In this case the conventional view turned out to be disastrously mistaken; and Biden has since gone to great, and thoroughly disingenuous, lengths to obscure that record. Yet Biden offered a bolder and more creative response to Iraq’s collapse than did his colleagues, joining Leslie Gelb, head of the Council on Foreign Relations, to propose that Iraq be divided into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish autonomous zones. The idea generated some interest in the think tank world—and virtually none beyond it. No mere opportunist would endorse such a thought experiment. “I don’t know anyone else in politics who would do that,” Gelb told me.
What, then, is the category to which Biden belongs? He is obviously no anti-American peacenik, as Gates seems to have once thought. Nor is he the kind of realist, like Gates himself, who believes that America goes astray when it pursues its values, rather than its geopolitical interests. Biden’s entire campaign is about values. He pledges to restore “the soul of a nation”—to make America noble again. He believes that America has both the right and the obligation to lead.
That belief includes the patriotic premise that America’s national interests are not inimical to the interests of the world. That is why, in the first article in this series, I compared Biden to “Cold War liberals” like Harry Truman or Hubert Humphrey. Biden is thus bound to disappoint progressives who believe that American power can be just only when it is wielded on behalf of others. As I mentioned in my previous column, Biden served as Barack Obama’s in-house killjoy on idealistic projects in the Middle East, including the wish to align the administration with the people in the street in the ferment of the Arab Spring. There is, indeed, a through-line of skepticism that connects Biden’s views on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Libya. He is far more hopeful about the United States than he is about the remote places in which its power is often exercised.
As a politician, Biden has spent his life operating in the world of compromise, damage-limitation and favor-trading.
As a politician, Biden has spent his life operating in the world of compromise, damage-limitation and favor-trading. He does not expect, and probably would not try, to shatter traditional limits, as Obama did when he called for an ultimate end to nuclear weapons. It is impossible to imagine him delivering a speech to the Islamic world, as Obama did in Cairo in 2009. While Obama made stirring speeches, Biden made phone calls—or house calls.
Biden not only practices politics, but believes in it as an affirmative principle; it is one of his axioms that you can nudge events in a positive direction by appealing to the self-interest, the political calculations, of other leaders. He practices foreign policy, as he practices politics, by talking to people, and listening to them. “Foreign policy is like human relations,” I once heard him say, “only people know less about each other.” Biden tries to fill that gap by asking people about themselves, and telling them about himself.
Very few of the advisors I talked to tried to capture Biden’s “worldview,” but several of them told me about the way Biden talks to world leaders. “What I’ve seen from Biden again and again,” says Daniel Benaim, Biden’s former foreign policy speechwriter and now co-head of his team of Middle East advisors, “is that he understands what it means to sit across the table from the political leader of another country and to think in an incisive and compelling way about how to reach and persuade that person. That means understanding somebody’s fears, their narrative about themselves in the world, the health of their grandchildren, the nature of their attraction to America and even the figures from the American past who matter to them. That kind of emotional intelligence runs very deep, and it’s what makes him a very effective strategizer and implementer of American foreign policy.”
William Burns, the long-time diplomat who now heads the Carnegie Endowment, also spoke of Biden’s sheer persistence, and his gift of empathy. “That’s going to be a more important quality than ever,” he said, “with allies and partners who are going to be very skeptical. He’s uniquely equipped to help reassure people.” At 77, Joe Biden has lost whatever power to inspire he might once have had. He may not be quite as cogent as he was even a decade ago. But he can still reassure. At this moment in history, that might be what is most needed.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Japan’s New Prime Minister Is a Fixer, Not a Leader

Japan ’ s New Prime Minister Is a Fixer , Not a Leader Japan ’ s incoming prime minister , Yoshihide Suga , is a master at getting things done .
As the long-serving head of the powerful Cabinet Office under his predecessor Shinzo Abe , he has helped to formulate and implement many of the most significant initiatives over the last seven years .
At the same time , he is also seen as a policy wonk short on charisma and is best known for the blandness of his daily press briefings .
Unless Suga reveals hidden zest , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its cycle of short-lived and unmemorable prime ministers , maneuvered by factions within the Liberal Democratic Party that has ruled Japan for almost all the last 75 years .
Suga was elected party leader on Monday and will be named prime minister this week , replacing Abe who resigned suddenly two weeks ago due to ill health .
Even the selection process for Suga implies the lack of enthusiasm .
The vote was taken by the lawmakers and officials in the Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) , with a broader vote of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a risk of producing an unacceptable outcome .
But even individual lawmakers had little say , with the powerful heads of the five major party factions deciding to throw their support behind the ultimate establishment candidate .
Suga was handed a one-sided victory with 70 percent of the 534 votes .
The public , which had no direct say , was only enthusiastic about Suga in comparison to his lackluster competitors .
In a matchup against the other two , Suga had a 50.2 percent support rate in a recent survey , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a broader slate of potential candidates , he polled at just 14 percent .
Suga is an unusual presence among Japan ’ s political elite .
While many senior figures such as Abe are born into powerful political families , Suga is the son of a strawberry farmer who worked his way up in the political world , starting as a lawmaker ’ s aid .
He is also a famous workaholic , starting at 5 a.m. seven days a week and sleeping most of the time in a dormitory near his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suga has already made clear that his goal is stability , not innovation .
“ We need to inherit and facilitate policies promoted by Prime Minister Abe in order for us to overcome this crisis and for each and every individual to have a safe and stable life , ” Suga said after the vote .
“ I recognize that I carry that mission.
” The Suga-Abe combination led to real accomplishments , as indicated by the weekend announcement that Japan would be the first to have a broad free-trade agreement with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carried out in near-record time of just three months .
While the main political kudos are expected to go to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , the deal represents a solid run for the outgoing Abe administration , and Suga played a major role .
Suga played a key role in Abe ’ s other trade accomplishments , such as saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and pushing EU trade talks .
Not the least of these was the necessity to first defang Japan ’ s historically powerful farm lobby .
Under the umbrella of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fought all attempts to lower Japan ’ s notoriously high tariffs on imported food , such as the 788 percent tariff on rice .
To become a free trade champion , Abe and Suga saw that they needed to open up Japan ’ s lucrative market to more foreign food products .
It helped that ruling party no longer relied on rural votes to stay in office , thanks to redistricting that reduced the disproportionate power rural seats used to have and increased support for the party in the big cities .
Suga @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be largely on the domestic side .
He wants to help engineer a restructuring of the debt-burdened regional bank system and is pushing to lower mobile phone charges .
He is also expected to show strong support for the massive monetary easing program by the central bank that has been the hallmark of Abenomics .
A record pace of buying not only government debt but also stock funds has put the Bank of Japan ’ s balance sheet well over the size of Japan ’ s economy .
The much-vaunted central target @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for 2015 but not yet achieved ) will remain in place .
But it is in foreign policy where Suga will face some of his biggest challenges , most notably how to deal with the quickly escalating conflicts with China .
Suga speaks little English and has seldom undertaken overseas trips to meet foreign leaders .
“ There is little to indicate that Suga has any real vision when it comes to Japan ’ s place in the world , ” said James D.J .
Brown , an associate professor at Temple University @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under Abe has been to sit firmly on the fence .
Japanese officials like to stress the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and are fond of quoting former U.S .
Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield who called it “ the most important bilateral relationship in the world , bar none.
” At the same time , Japan has not forgotten that China remains vital to its economy .
This is not a new phenomenon .
Japan was among the earliest investors in China , providing $ 30 billion in official development aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 118 billion .
From a trade perspective , China has grown to become Japan ’ s largest trading partner , with two-way flows totaling $ 294 billion in 2018 .
Beyond simple bilateral trade , the two countries are closely intertwined in a regional supply chain that also loops in such partners as South Korea and Thailand .
With these twin goals , the Abe government has tried to walk a fine line .
On the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 2019 , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” that ended with tanks being sent in by the government .
Suga , meanwhile , read out the same statement issued every year that talked of “ a clash resulting from the military resorting to the use of force.
” Similarly , the Japanese government had taken a low-key approach on the rising international condemnations of actions taken against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in western China .
Japan did join the U.N. resolution in July 2019 , the only Asian country to do so , but has declined to take part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese officials .
Similarly , Japan declined to sign on to a U.S.-led statement condemning China ’ s draconian security law for Hong Kong .
It then seemingly switched tracks and announced just a few days later that it wanted a coordinated G-7 statement calling on China to maintain the one country , two systems structure agreed with the U.K. in 1997 .
“ It is important to coordinate closely with relevant countries , including in the G-7 , that share our basic values , ” Suga told reporters at the time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a number of actions to increase Japan ’ s military capabilities , with higher defense spending and a reinterpretation of the rules around its pacifist constitution , measures that are expected to continue under Suga .
The government is now considering a proposal that would for the first time allow attacks on missile sites in other countries if they appeared about ready to launch against Japan .
The target in this case would be North Korea , but such an approach could apply to China as well—something not lost on Beijing ( and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed , however , to appease an increasingly restive faction within the ruling party , which now sees China as having gone too far .
They have pushed for a resolution in parliament to officially cancel the Xi trip .
In response , a Chinese Embassy official in Tokyo seemed to pull out the wrong boilerplate , saying that the resolution represented “ interference in China ’ s internal affairs.
” As elsewhere , China didn ’ t do itself any favors in the controversy , which blew up publicly after Chinese ships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the disputed East China Sea islands .
All of this will give more ammunition to the hard-liners within the party .
There remains , however a more pragmatic and still-powerful wing that sees China as a necessary evil .
In particular , LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai has long worked to maintain ties with China , saying that the move to cancel the trip would “ bring the efforts of our predecessors to nothing.
” The 81-year-old Nikai is a force to be reckoned with , especially since he was the person who maneuvered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suga , virtually handing him the premiership .
“ The fact that Nikai was basically the puppet master , I would expect measures to mend relations or at least not exacerbate tensions , ” said Corey Wallace , a foreign-policy expert at Japan ’ s Kanagawa University in Yokohama .
In the end , Suga may not have to deal with the issues for very long .
His term as party leader is only for a year to fill out the post left by Abe .
By then the factions may have shifted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new—and equally short-lived—face could replace him .

Japan’s incoming prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, is a master at getting things done. As the long-serving head of the powerful Cabinet Office under his predecessor Shinzo Abe, he has helped to formulate and implement many of the most significant initiatives over the last seven years. At the same time, he is also seen as a policy wonk short on charisma and is best known for the blandness of his daily press briefings. Unless Suga reveals hidden zest, Japan may be fated to return to its cycle of short-lived and unmemorable prime ministers, maneuvered by factions within the Liberal Democratic Party that has ruled Japan for almost all the last 75 years.
Japan’s incoming prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, is a master at getting things done. As the long-serving head of the powerful Cabinet Office under his predecessor Shinzo Abe, he has helped to formulate and implement many of the most significant initiatives over the last seven years. At the same time, he is also seen as a policy wonk short on charisma and is best known for the blandness of his daily press briefings. Unless Suga reveals hidden zest, Japan may be fated to return to its cycle of short-lived and unmemorable prime ministers, maneuvered by factions within the Liberal Democratic Party that has ruled Japan for almost all the last 75 years.
Suga was elected party leader on Monday and will be named prime minister this week, replacing Abe who resigned suddenly two weeks ago due to ill health. Even the selection process for Suga implies the lack of enthusiasm. The vote was taken by the lawmakers and officials in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with a broader vote of party members rejected as having too high a risk of producing an unacceptable outcome. But even individual lawmakers had little say, with the powerful heads of the five major party factions deciding to throw their support behind the ultimate establishment candidate. Suga was handed a one-sided victory with 70 percent of the 534 votes. The public, which had no direct say, was only enthusiastic about Suga in comparison to his lackluster competitors. In a matchup against the other two, Suga had a 50.2 percent support rate in a recent survey, but just two weeks previously, when compared with a broader slate of potential candidates, he polled at just 14 percent.
Suga is an unusual presence among Japan’s political elite. While many senior figures such as Abe are born into powerful political families, Suga is the son of a strawberry farmer who worked his way up in the political world, starting as a lawmaker’s aid. He is also a famous workaholic, starting at 5 a.m. seven days a week and sleeping most of the time in a dormitory near his office.
As the ultimate fixer, Suga has already made clear that his goal is stability, not innovation. “We need to inherit and facilitate policies promoted by Prime Minister Abe in order for us to overcome this crisis and for each and every individual to have a safe and stable life,” Suga said after the vote. “I recognize that I carry that mission.”
The Suga-Abe combination led to real accomplishments, as indicated by the weekend announcement that Japan would be the first to have a broad free-trade agreement with a post-Brexit United Kingdom. The negotiations were carried out in near-record time of just three months. While the main political kudos are expected to go to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the deal represents a solid run for the outgoing Abe administration, and Suga played a major role.
Suga played a key role in Abe’s other trade accomplishments, such as saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and pushing EU trade talks. Not the least of these was the necessity to first defang Japan’s historically powerful farm lobby. Under the umbrella of Japan Agriculture, the farmers had successfully fought all attempts to lower Japan’s notoriously high tariffs on imported food, such as the 788 percent tariff on rice. To become a free trade champion, Abe and Suga saw that they needed to open up Japan’s lucrative market to more foreign food products. It helped that ruling party no longer relied on rural votes to stay in office, thanks to redistricting that reduced the disproportionate power rural seats used to have and increased support for the party in the big cities.
Suga’s own policy initiatives are expected to be largely on the domestic side. He wants to help engineer a restructuring of the debt-burdened regional bank system and is pushing to lower mobile phone charges. He is also expected to show strong support for the massive monetary easing program by the central bank that has been the hallmark of Abenomics. A record pace of buying not only government debt but also stock funds has put the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet well over the size of Japan’s economy. The much-vaunted central target of 2 percent inflation (originally targeted for 2015 but not yet achieved) will remain in place.
But it is in foreign policy where Suga will face some of his biggest challenges, most notably how to deal with the quickly escalating conflicts with China. Suga speaks little English and has seldom undertaken overseas trips to meet foreign leaders. “There is little to indicate that Suga has any real vision when it comes to Japan’s place in the world,” said James D.J. Brown, an associate professor at Temple University Japan in Tokyo.
The China policy under Abe has been to sit firmly on the fence. Japanese officials like to stress the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and are fond of quoting former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield who called it “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none.” At the same time, Japan has not forgotten that China remains vital to its economy. This is not a new phenomenon. Japan was among the earliest investors in China, providing $30 billion in official development aid from 1979 with overall investment of $118 billion. From a trade perspective, China has grown to become Japan’s largest trading partner, with two-way flows totaling $294 billion in 2018. Beyond simple bilateral trade, the two countries are closely intertwined in a regional supply chain that also loops in such partners as South Korea and Thailand.
With these twin goals, the Abe government has tried to walk a fine line. On the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo talked of “the heroic protest movement” that ended with tanks being sent in by the government. Suga, meanwhile, read out the same statement issued every year that talked of “a clash resulting from the military resorting to the use of force.” Similarly, the Japanese government had taken a low-key approach on the rising international condemnations of actions taken against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in western China. Japan did join the U.N. resolution in July 2019, the only Asian country to do so, but has declined to take part in stronger U.S. actions aimed at individual Chinese officials.
Similarly, Japan declined to sign on to a U.S.-led statement condemning China’s draconian security law for Hong Kong. It then seemingly switched tracks and announced just a few days later that it wanted a coordinated G-7 statement calling on China to maintain the one country, two systems structure agreed with the U.K. in 1997. “It is important to coordinate closely with relevant countries, including in the G-7, that share our basic values,” Suga told reporters at the time.
In the background, Abe has taken a number of actions to increase Japan’s military capabilities, with higher defense spending and a reinterpretation of the rules around its pacifist constitution, measures that are expected to continue under Suga. The government is now considering a proposal that would for the first time allow attacks on missile sites in other countries if they appeared about ready to launch against Japan. The target in this case would be North Korea, but such an approach could apply to China as well—something not lost on Beijing (and Moscow).
This balancing act has failed, however, to appease an increasingly restive faction within the ruling party, which now sees China as having gone too far. They have pushed for a resolution in parliament to officially cancel the Xi trip. In response, a Chinese Embassy official in Tokyo seemed to pull out the wrong boilerplate, saying that the resolution represented “interference in China’s internal affairs.” As elsewhere, China didn’t do itself any favors in the controversy, which blew up publicly after Chinese ships spent a record 111 days in waters the disputed East China Sea islands.
All of this will give more ammunition to the hard-liners within the party. There remains, however a more pragmatic and still-powerful wing that sees China as a necessary evil. In particular, LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai has long worked to maintain ties with China, saying that the move to cancel the trip would “bring the efforts of our predecessors to nothing.” The 81-year-old Nikai is a force to be reckoned with, especially since he was the person who maneuvered the party’s factions into supporting Suga, virtually handing him the premiership. “The fact that Nikai was basically the puppet master, I would expect measures to mend relations or at least not exacerbate tensions,” said Corey Wallace, a foreign-policy expert at Japan’s Kanagawa University in Yokohama.
In the end, Suga may not have to deal with the issues for very long. His term as party leader is only for a year to fill out the post left by Abe. By then the factions may have shifted their pieces again, and an entirely new—and equally short-lived—face could replace him.