foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--What Does Beijing Believe About the Coronavirus?

What Does Beijing Believe About the Coronavirus ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : China ’ s government says things are getting back to normal , but Beijing ’ s coronavirus lockdown is tightening , South Korea ’ s outbreak is now the worst beyond mainland China , and questions remain about the number of asymptomatic cases .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
What to Make of China ’ s Virus Messaging As the coronavirus spreads globally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world that things are getting back to normal within its borders .
But the message that all is well is undercut by the tightening lockdown in Beijing , where streets remain empty and many offices and factories are required to have no more than 30 percent of their employees physically at work at any given time .
For Chinese officials , protecting the party leadership from infection is clearly the highest priority .
Deaths in Beijing appear to matter more than deaths elsewhere , so the response there is a telling vision of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus .
The economic outlook in China remains dire .
The services sector may be hit just as hard as manufacturing , with new data showing an all-time low in consumer confidence .
The figures look very bad , especially considering that long delay times caused by inactivity are still factored into the index as a sign of positive growth—usually , delays are the result of busy factories .
There is little sign of recovery yet , and migrant workers are still stranded and unlikely to return to work anytime soon .
Data @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that business activity is resuming has produced surreal scenes , with some local officials ordering factories to turn on machines to make it look like production is taking place and reporting fictitious data to top officials .
Such distortion is a part of the Chinese system that the central government is well aware of but finds hard to fight .
What ’ s critical : Similar distortions are likely taking place with the coronavirus epidemic data itself .
Propaganda push .
The Chinese government has shifted toward tacitly endorsing conspiracy theories that blame @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Monday , I wrote about the theories being circulated—not censored—on social media .
Today , the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian said during a press conference that though the first cases were detected in China , it ’ s not clear that the virus originated in China .
China wants to promote itself as the savior—not the cause—of the virus .
It is even looking to fund an alternative to the World Health Organization to push that idea .
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak : Follow our daily updates on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the world here .
South Korean outbreak grows .
With over 5,000 coronavirus cases , South Korea is officially the hardest-hit country outside of mainland China .
But its government is trying a very different approach , relying on civil society and voluntary cooperation instead of lockdowns .
South Korea has deployed state power against members of the religious cult at the center of the outbreak to get them to hand over information .
South Korea ’ s data is far more transparent than China ’ s , making it difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asymptomatic cases are there ?
China ’ s official figures leave a major unanswered question : How many asymptomatic cases of the virus are there , and is the country recording them properly ?
Asymptomatic patients are not included in the tally of cases , and the Chinese government claims that they are only 1.5 percent of total infections .
But figures from Japan and South Korea suggest the real figure may be closer to between 10 and 20 percent , and data obtained by the media outlet Caixin suggests that Chinese provinces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t migrant workers returning to work ?
China ’ s quarantine measures have put anyone who travels under the eye of the state , which is the last place the average rural worker—often without official ID—wants to be .
For those migrating for factory work , the risks are increased : It is difficult to find accommodation , there is chance of being quarantined for weeks without income , and health care access is limited .
Plus , the crowded living conditions for most workers are like a petri dish .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ staying in the villages .
A decline in enrollment .
U.S. colleges have relied on income from Chinese students for decades .
But with U.S. visas harder to come by and the coronavirus restricting travel , continued enrollment is looking shaky .
The number of Chinese students in the United States was falling before the virus .
The outbreak has already resulted in some courses that aimed at mainlanders being slashed entirely .
Digital quarantine .
China has rolled out a color-coded quarantine system across the country , with citizens ’ movements now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the government and the e-commerce giant Alibaba .
This type of system could end up staying in place and being used for other purposes beyond the virus outbreak .
As the United States showed after 9/11 , governments are reluctant to roll back security measures once enforced .
But China ’ s new measures could be full of errors , as Yuan Yang reports for the Financial Times .
Airline impacts .
China ’ s shady Hainan Airlines , already facing financial difficulties , has been taken over by a special government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely the first of many : China has had a recent air travel boom , and airlines are the primary victims of travel fears .
The virus is already hitting the global industry , with bookings falling sharply worldwide last week following a downturn in Asia .
Real estate plummets .
Since Wuhan ’ s quarantine began on Jan. 23 , home sales in China have plummeted by 90 percent compared with the same time last year .
Nobody is moving house , nobody is looking for new office space , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s a big problem , because every Chinese company of scale is really a real estate company : Firms from airlines to film studios tie up their wealth in property .
This short story is a taste of the past from the man often considered China ’ s greatest 20th-century writer , the reform-minded cynic and doctor Lu Xun .
Illness and its treatment is a recurring theme in his work .
“ Medicine ” is about a couple seeking a cure for their son , who has tuberculosis , in an executed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was published in 1919—at the height of the Spanish flu outbreak that cost 20 million lives worldwide , including millions in China .
Read it in Julia Lovell ’ s complete translation of Lu ’ s work .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: China’s government says things are getting back to normal, but Beijing’s coronavirus lockdown is tightening, South Korea’s outbreak is now the worst beyond mainland China, and questions remain about the number of asymptomatic cases .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: China’s government says things are getting back to normal, but Beijing’s coronavirus lockdown is tightening, South Korea’s outbreak is now the worst beyond mainland China, and questions remain about the number of asymptomatic cases.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
What to Make of China’s Virus Messaging As the coronavirus spreads globally, China is keen to convince the world that things are getting back to normal within its borders. But the message that all is well is undercut by the tightening lockdown in Beijing, where streets remain empty and many offices and factories are required to have no more than 30 percent of their employees physically at work at any given time. For Chinese officials, protecting the party leadership from infection is clearly the highest priority. Deaths in Beijing appear to matter more than deaths elsewhere, so the response there is a telling vision of what the government really believes about the virus.
The economic outlook in China remains dire. The services sector may be hit just as hard as manufacturing, with new data showing an all-time low in consumer confidence. The figures look very bad, especially considering that long delay times caused by inactivity are still factored into the index as a sign of positive growth—usually, delays are the result of busy factories. There is little sign of recovery yet, and migrant workers are still stranded and unlikely to return to work anytime soon.
Data faking. The government pressure to show that business activity is resuming has produced surreal scenes, with some local officials ordering factories to turn on machines to make it look like production is taking place and reporting fictitious data to top officials. Such distortion is a part of the Chinese system that the central government is well aware of but finds hard to fight. What’s critical: Similar distortions are likely taking place with the coronavirus epidemic data itself.
Propaganda push. The Chinese government has shifted toward tacitly endorsing conspiracy theories that blame the United States for the coronavirus. On Monday, I wrote about the theories being circulated—not censored—on social media. Today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian said during a press conference that though the first cases were detected in China, it’s not clear that the virus originated in China.
China wants to promote itself as the savior—not the cause—of the virus. It is even looking to fund an alternative to the World Health Organization to push that idea.
Mapping the coronavirus outbreak: Follow our daily updates on the epidemic and how it is affecting countries around the world here.
What We’re Following
South Korean outbreak grows. With over 5,000 coronavirus cases, South Korea is officially the hardest-hit country outside of mainland China. But its government is trying a very different approach, relying on civil society and voluntary cooperation instead of lockdowns. South Korea has deployed state power against members of the religious cult at the center of the outbreak to get them to hand over information. South Korea’s data is far more transparent than China’s, making it difficult to compare the two cases.
How many asymptomatic cases are there? China’s official figures leave a major unanswered question: How many asymptomatic cases of the virus are there, and is the country recording them properly? Asymptomatic patients are not included in the tally of cases, and the Chinese government claims that they are only 1.5 percent of total infections. But figures from Japan and South Korea suggest the real figure may be closer to between 10 and 20 percent, and data obtained by the media outlet Caixin suggests that Chinese provinces are fixing the real figures.
Why aren’t migrant workers returning to work? China’s quarantine measures have put anyone who travels under the eye of the state, which is the last place the average rural worker—often without official ID—wants to be. For those migrating for factory work, the risks are increased: It is difficult to find accommodation, there is chance of being quarantined for weeks without income, and health care access is limited. Plus, the crowded living conditions for most workers are like a petri dish. It’s no wonder people are staying in the villages.
A decline in enrollment. U.S. colleges have relied on income from Chinese students for decades. But with U.S. visas harder to come by and the coronavirus restricting travel, continued enrollment is looking shaky. The number of Chinese students in the United States was falling before the virus. The outbreak has already resulted in some courses that aimed at mainlanders being slashed entirely.
Tech and Business
Digital quarantine. China has rolled out a color-coded quarantine system across the country, with citizens’ movements now restricted by an opaque algorithm and shared between the government and the e-commerce giant Alibaba. This type of system could end up staying in place and being used for other purposes beyond the virus outbreak. As the United States showed after 9/11, governments are reluctant to roll back security measures once enforced. But China’s new measures could be full of errors, as Yuan Yang reports for the Financial Times.
Airline impacts. China’s shady Hainan Airlines, already facing financial difficulties, has been taken over by a special government group amid the coronavirus outbreak. Hainan is likely the first of many: China has had a recent air travel boom, and airlines are the primary victims of travel fears. The virus is already hitting the global industry, with bookings falling sharply worldwide last week following a downturn in Asia.
Real estate plummets. Since Wuhan’s quarantine began on Jan. 23, home sales in China have plummeted by 90 percent compared with the same time last year. Nobody is moving house, nobody is looking for new office space, and nothing is being built. That’s a big problem, because every Chinese company of scale is really a real estate company: Firms from airlines to film studios tie up their wealth in property.
What We’re Reading The Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China: The Complete Fiction of Lu Xun, Lu Xun, trans. Julia Lovell, Penguin, 461 pp., 2009.
“Medicine,” by Lu Xun
This short story is a taste of the past from the man often considered China’s greatest 20th-century writer, the reform-minded cynic and doctor Lu Xun. Illness and its treatment is a recurring theme in his work. “Medicine” is about a couple seeking a cure for their son, who has tuberculosis, in an executed revolutionary’s blood. The story was published in 1919—at the height of the Spanish flu outbreak that cost 20 million lives worldwide, including millions in China. Read it in Julia Lovell’s complete translation of Lu’s work.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Turkey Is Forcing the West to Look at Idlib

Turkey Is Forcing the West to Look at Idlib On Sunday , the European Union called an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the conflict in Syria .
The urgency was not related to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib province , but instead the growing crisis at the borders between Turkey and Europe .
Though Russian-backed Syrian regime forces have been on a rampage against opposition forces and civilians since last April , the attacks have intensified since Dec. 1 , 2019 .
By the end of February , the Syrian Network for Human Rights ( SNHR ) said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians .
Around 948,000 people have been displaced , according to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR ) .
The Syrian regime systematically targeted health care facilities .
The only place left for civilians to run was to the Turkish border , and many were bombed during their flight .
Most families sheltered in the open , and children were particularly vulnerable , with some dying in the subfreezing temperatures .
None of this has stirred the EU or the U.N. into action .
On U.N. Secretary-General António @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most recent mention of Idlib is from June 2019 .
Of the 1.64 million people who received so-called core relief items from UNHCR in Syria from November 2019 to January , only 13,710 people—less than 1 percent—were in Idlib , where much of Syria ’ s internally displaced population is located .
( By contrast , 10 times as many people were reached in the regime-held governorate of Latakia . )
Idlib was excluded from the UNHCR ’ s winter relief , shelter activities , and health interventions .
None of this raised @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the government offensive in Idlib has caused David Miliband , the president of the International Rescue Committee and Britain ’ s former foreign secretary , to lament the “ utter failure of diplomacy and abandonment by the international community of Syrian civilians.
” This follows a recent pattern : Last August , when the world ’ s major industrial powers gathered for the G-7 summit in France , Syria was not even on the agenda .
It hadn ’ t featured at all in the U.S. presidential election until the Feb. 25 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Idlib drew desultory responses from two candidates .
Last week ’ s events have shaken this inertia .
In 2016 , after the biggest spike in migration to Europe , the EU bribed Turkey to keep refugees there by pledging 6 billion euros , equivalent to $ 6.6 billion at the time , in support .
But as the Syrian conflict kept displacing people , Europe saw no reason to update its policy .
Turkey , however , was directly affected : It currently hosts 4.1 million refugees , including 3.7 million from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it could have to accommodate up to 1.3 million more .
The EU and the United States have offered nothing beyond expressions of concern .
With anti-refugee sentiment growing at home , Turkey faced a choice : to stop the Syrian regime ’ s advance or facilitate the exit of those trapped in Idlib to the West .
The brazen attack on a Turkish outpost in Idlib last Thursday rendered such debates moot .
The attack raised the stakes for the Turkish government : It could either withdraw its troops and face domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force .
Mindful of the balance of power , Turkey is reluctant to confront Russia directly .
It chose to humiliate Moscow by proxy instead : Over three days of relentless drone strikes beginning on Friday , Turkey inflicted more damage on the Syrian regime forces than they had suffered in years of fighting—targeting tanks , artillery , aircraft , and Russian-made anti-aircraft systems .
Still facing Western indifference toward Idlib , Ankara announced it would no longer stop refugees from crossing into Europe .
Turkey is now forcing the West to address @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its effects .
Predictably , this decision has caused panic within the EU .
By Monday , Greece had militarized its border , with soldiers firing tear gas at refugees .
Witnesses and Turkish officials have said that Greek forces also fired bullets , killing at least one migrant—which Athens denies .
European leaders have responded with sympathy for the EU countries bordering Turkey .
French President Emmanuel Macron has shown little concern for those facing slaughter in Idlib , but he has sent a message of solidarity to the Greek and Bulgarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Commission president , visited the Greek-Turkish border on Tuesday alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis .
“ The situation at our border is not only an issue for Greece to manage , it is the responsibility of Europe as a whole , ” she said .
“ We will hold the line and our unity will prevail.
” Von der Leyen has threatened to deploy the European Border and Coast Guard Agency , known as Frontex .
The Greek Coast Guard has already faced criticism for its response after a Greek @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carrying refugees and firing warning shots .
The refugees are a symptom of the mass crimes the West has tolerated , particularly in Syria , but it views them as a threat .
One way for wealthy European countries to show solidarity with Greece , a country that currently hosts between 50,000 and 90,000 refugees , is to accept a greater number of refugees themselves , reducing the strain on the Greek economy .
If the EU wants Turkey to host millions of migrants , then why can ’ t it accept tens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ symptom of the mass crimes the West has tolerated , particularly in Syria , but it views them as a threat .
And now , it has an opportunity to address the cause and prevent people from becoming refugees in the first place .
For the three days that the intense Turkish operations lasted , Syrian and Russian planes remained grounded .
When the regime air force tried to resume operations on Sunday , a Turkish F-16 fighter jet quickly shot down two Syrian Su-24s .
Without air cover , the regime appeared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Syrian rebels made major advances .
Uprisings even erupted in fallen regions like Daraa , where rebels captured several regime positions .
The operations brought brief respite to the displaced Syrians in Idlib .
If before these advances the Syrian government ’ s victory appeared inexorable , it now appeared less than certain .
Russia stood down .
Whether this was to avoid further provoking the Turks or to rein in its Syrian allies , it remains unclear—but it doesn ’ t matter .
Russia ’ s prestige had suffered .
Events @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are high , dynamic shifts have magnified impacts .
As the Turkish operations wound down , Russia took immediate advantage of the lull and put its jets back in the air , killing at least 10 people in the town of al-Fuah .
The Syrian regime also renewed its attacks , recapturing the strategic town of Saraqeb under Russian air cover .
Russia deployed forces to Saraqeb to thwart any Turkish counteroffensive .
Still , the situation in Idlib presents an opportunity for Europe and the United States to redress mistakes and be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow , where he aims to get Russia to slow Assad ’ s offensive .
Instead of leaving the outcome of the conflict to Erdogan and Putin , the West can resolve it in the interests of the Syrian people—the morally and strategically preferable outcome .
The West could raise the costs of Russia ’ s intransigence by enforcing a no-fly zone over Idlib .
Backed by NATO air defense systems , Turkey could deter Russia .
And by providing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is vulnerable , the West would gain critical leverage to demand respect for democracy and protection for the Kurds in Syria ’ s northeast .
Turkey ’ s use of refugees to command Western attention is cynical .
But without it , the West refused to care about the Syrian conflict or its impact on neighboring states .
When a no-fly zone was demanded by Syrians in 2012 , the West balked .
Now , German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok are calling for a safe zone in Idlib @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have been to ground Assad ’ s air force—something that would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives and prevented Syria ’ s mass exodus had it happened earlier .
It is tragic that fear has ultimately proved a more effective motivator than empathy .
Had the West abided by its own human rights values , its ministers wouldn ’ t be quaking today at the sight of refugees .

On Sunday, the European Union called an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the conflict in Syria. The urgency was not related to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib province, but instead the growing crisis at the borders between Turkey and Europe.
On Sunday, the European Union called an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the conflict in Syria. The urgency was not related to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib province, but instead the growing crisis at the borders between Turkey and Europe.
Though Russian-backed Syrian regime forces have been on a rampage against opposition forces and civilians since last April, the attacks have intensified since Dec. 1, 2019. By the end of February, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) said the government assault had killed nearly 800 civilians. Around 948,000 people have been displaced, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Syrian regime systematically targeted health care facilities. The only place left for civilians to run was to the Turkish border, and many were bombed during their flight. Most families sheltered in the open, and children were particularly vulnerable, with some dying in the subfreezing temperatures.
None of this has stirred the EU or the U.N. into action. On U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres’s Twitter account, the most recent mention of Idlib is from June 2019. Of the 1.64 million people who received so-called core relief items from UNHCR in Syria from November 2019 to January, only 13,710 people—less than 1 percent—were in Idlib, where much of Syria’s internally displaced population is located. (By contrast, 10 times as many people were reached in the regime-held governorate of Latakia.) Idlib was excluded from the UNHCR’s winter relief, shelter activities, and health interventions. None of this raised alarm in Western capitals.
The response to the government offensive in Idlib has caused David Miliband, the president of the International Rescue Committee and Britain’s former foreign secretary, to lament the “utter failure of diplomacy and abandonment by the international community of Syrian civilians.” This follows a recent pattern: Last August, when the world’s major industrial powers gathered for the G-7 summit in France, Syria was not even on the agenda. It hadn’t featured at all in the U.S. presidential election until the Feb. 25 Democratic debate, where a question about Idlib drew desultory responses from two candidates.
Last week’s events have shaken this inertia. In 2016, after the biggest spike in migration to Europe, the EU bribed Turkey to keep refugees there by pledging 6 billion euros, equivalent to $6.6 billion at the time, in support. But as the Syrian conflict kept displacing people, Europe saw no reason to update its policy. Turkey, however, was directly affected: It currently hosts 4.1 million refugees, including 3.7 million from Syria alone. Should Idlib fall, it could have to accommodate up to 1.3 million more. The EU and the United States have offered nothing beyond expressions of concern. With anti-refugee sentiment growing at home, Turkey faced a choice: to stop the Syrian regime’s advance or facilitate the exit of those trapped in Idlib to the West.
The brazen attack on a Turkish outpost in Idlib last Thursday rendered such debates moot. The attack raised the stakes for the Turkish government: It could either withdraw its troops and face domestic anger, or it could respond with force. Mindful of the balance of power, Turkey is reluctant to confront Russia directly. It chose to humiliate Moscow by proxy instead: Over three days of relentless drone strikes beginning on Friday, Turkey inflicted more damage on the Syrian regime forces than they had suffered in years of fighting—targeting tanks, artillery, aircraft, and Russian-made anti-aircraft systems.
Still facing Western indifference toward Idlib, Ankara announced it would no longer stop refugees from crossing into Europe. Turkey is now forcing the West to address the causes of displacement or deal with its effects. Predictably, this decision has caused panic within the EU. By Monday, Greece had militarized its border, with soldiers firing tear gas at refugees. Witnesses and Turkish officials have said that Greek forces also fired bullets, killing at least one migrant—which Athens denies.
European leaders have responded with sympathy for the EU countries bordering Turkey. French President Emmanuel Macron has shown little concern for those facing slaughter in Idlib, but he has sent a message of solidarity to the Greek and Bulgarian governments. Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, visited the Greek-Turkish border on Tuesday alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. “The situation at our border is not only an issue for Greece to manage, it is the responsibility of Europe as a whole,” she said. “We will hold the line and our unity will prevail.” Von der Leyen has threatened to deploy the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, known as Frontex. The Greek Coast Guard has already faced criticism for its response after a Greek boat was filmed apparently ramming a boat carrying refugees and firing warning shots.
The refugees are a symptom of the mass crimes the West has tolerated, particularly in Syria, but it views them as a threat.
One way for wealthy European countries to show solidarity with Greece, a country that currently hosts between 50,000 and 90,000 refugees, is to accept a greater number of refugees themselves, reducing the strain on the Greek economy. If the EU wants Turkey to host millions of migrants, then why can’t it accept tens of thousands? The refugees are a symptom of the mass crimes the West has tolerated, particularly in Syria, but it views them as a threat. And now, it has an opportunity to address the cause and prevent people from becoming refugees in the first place.
For the three days that the intense Turkish operations lasted, Syrian and Russian planes remained grounded. When the regime air force tried to resume operations on Sunday, a Turkish F-16 fighter jet quickly shot down two Syrian Su-24s. Without air cover, the regime appeared less than formidable. On the ground, Syrian rebels made major advances. Uprisings even erupted in fallen regions like Daraa, where rebels captured several regime positions. The operations brought brief respite to the displaced Syrians in Idlib. If before these advances the Syrian government’s victory appeared inexorable, it now appeared less than certain. Russia stood down. Whether this was to avoid further provoking the Turks or to rein in its Syrian allies, it remains unclear—but it doesn’t matter. Russia’s prestige had suffered.
Events on Monday revealed that when the stakes are high, dynamic shifts have magnified impacts. As the Turkish operations wound down, Russia took immediate advantage of the lull and put its jets back in the air, killing at least 10 people in the town of al-Fuah. The Syrian regime also renewed its attacks, recapturing the strategic town of Saraqeb under Russian air cover. Russia deployed forces to Saraqeb to thwart any Turkish counteroffensive.
Still, the situation in Idlib presents an opportunity for Europe and the United States to redress mistakes and be relevant again. On Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where he aims to get Russia to slow Assad’s offensive. Instead of leaving the outcome of the conflict to Erdogan and Putin, the West can resolve it in the interests of the Syrian people—the morally and strategically preferable outcome. The West could raise the costs of Russia’s intransigence by enforcing a no-fly zone over Idlib. Backed by NATO air defense systems, Turkey could deter Russia. And by providing meaningful support at a time when Turkey is vulnerable, the West would gain critical leverage to demand respect for democracy and protection for the Kurds in Syria’s northeast.
Turkey’s use of refugees to command Western attention is cynical. But without it, the West refused to care about the Syrian conflict or its impact on neighboring states. When a no-fly zone was demanded by Syrians in 2012, the West balked. Now, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok are calling for a safe zone in Idlib. Turkey has demonstrated how easy it would have been to ground Assad’s air force—something that would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives and prevented Syria’s mass exodus had it happened earlier.
It is tragic that fear has ultimately proved a more effective motivator than empathy. Had the West abided by its own human rights values, its ministers wouldn’t be quaking today at the sight of refugees.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--The Joe Biden Juggernaut

The Joe Biden Juggernaut

Former Vice President Joe Biden continued his remarkable comeback from political near-oblivion when he won the endorsement of his last remaining moderate rival , Michael Bloomberg , who dropped out of the Democratic race Wednesday after Biden clobbered him in a series of dramatic victories on Super Tuesday .
The sudden alignment of the multibillionaire former New York mayor—who had spent an unheard-of amount of money on his brief , failed campaign—with the formerly cash-strapped Biden only further disrupted a Democratic race that has seen stunning upheavals in just the last few days .
Since his big turnaround victory in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counted out because of poor showings in Iowa and New Hampshire—Biden has gained the endorsement of all his moderate rivals , swept to triumph in at least nine states on Super Tuesday and surged into the delegate lead over progressive Sen. Bernie Sanders , his only serious challenger .
And now , with Bloomberg ’ s backing , Biden won ’ t have to worry as much about money .
Bloomberg , who had bet and lost on a long-shot strategy of skipping the early states and pouring an unprecedented half-billion dollars into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Super Tuesday , indicated in a statement that for him the task was all about removing President Donald Trump from office after one term .
“ I ’ ve always believed that defeating Donald Trump starts with uniting behind the candidate with the best shot to do it .
After yesterday ’ s vote , it is clear that candidate is my friend and a great American , Joe Biden , ” he wrote in a press release .
In an uncharacteristically antic bit of humor , Bloomberg later tweeted a video @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the movie Star Wars and wrote , “ See you soon , Donald.
” The swift consolidation of the party mainstream around Biden suggests that the Democratic establishment—and many voters—were suddenly motivated by the prospect that they might be handing off the party to Sanders , a self-described democratic socialist ( who is not even technically a Democrat ) , in much the same way that Trump , another outsider , seized control of the Republican Party in 2016 .
And that , as Biden , Bloomberg , and other leading Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amy Klobuchar ( both of whom also endorsed Biden a day before Super Tuesday ) have warned , nominating a candidate with views as left-wing as Sanders ’ s would guarantee a loss in November .
But with much of the party base , especially younger people , still energized by Sanders , the outcome of the race is far from decided .
The Vermont senator captured Tuesday ’ s biggest delegate prize in California , and also won Utah , Colorado , and his home state of Vermont .
While final results @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s initial total delegate count was 382 , while Biden pushed ahead with 453 after winning the other big prize of the night , Texas .
Progressives such as former Labor Secretary Robert Reich expressed concern that , as happened in 2016 after Hillary Clinton won the nomination over Sanders , the party establishment might once again ignore the sentiments of the base .
“ The fact that Bloomberg has thrown his support to Biden should remove any lingering doubts about where the big money is going and what the Democratic establishment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t want — a wealth tax , Medicare for All , and a Green New Deal , ” Reich tweeted .
The sudden movement to Biden also sent a message to the rest of the world .
As with past elections , foreign policy wasn ’ t the top issue on voters ’ minds , but Biden ’ s rise signals a shift in the battle over ideas playing out in the Democratic Party in Trump ’ s Washington .
Sanders , fueled by a groundswell of grassroots support on the left , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have held for decades , bashing U.S. Israel policy and even praising literacy programs under communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba as he condemned the authoritarian bent of his rule , leaving Democrats in the battleground state of Florida bristling .
Biden ’ s ascension breathes life back into a foreign-policy establishment on the defensive since Trump came into office .
“ The blob is back , ” Brett Bruen , a longtime former U.S. diplomat , told Foreign Policy .
“ The moderate , centrist foreign policy world is feeling , after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both by Trump but also the progressive wing of the party … reenergized .
”

Former Vice President Joe Biden continued his remarkable comeback from political near-oblivion when he won the endorsement of his last remaining moderate rival, Michael Bloomberg, who dropped out of the Democratic race Wednesday after Biden clobbered him in a series of dramatic victories on Super Tuesday.
Former Vice President Joe Biden continued his remarkable comeback from political near-oblivion when he won the endorsement of his last remaining moderate rival, Michael Bloomberg, who dropped out of the Democratic race Wednesday after Biden clobbered him in a series of dramatic victories on Super Tuesday.
The sudden alignment of the multibillionaire former New York mayor—who had spent an unheard-of amount of money on his brief, failed campaign—with the formerly cash-strapped Biden only further disrupted a Democratic race that has seen stunning upheavals in just the last few days.
Since his big turnaround victory in South Carolina on Saturday—after being all but counted out because of poor showings in Iowa and New Hampshire—Biden has gained the endorsement of all his moderate rivals, swept to triumph in at least nine states on Super Tuesday and surged into the delegate lead over progressive Sen. Bernie Sanders, his only serious challenger. And now, with Bloomberg’s backing, Biden won’t have to worry as much about money.
Bloomberg, who had bet and lost on a long-shot strategy of skipping the early states and pouring an unprecedented half-billion dollars into advertising, mainly in states that voted on Super Tuesday, indicated in a statement that for him the task was all about removing President Donald Trump from office after one term.
“I’ve always believed that defeating Donald Trump starts with uniting behind the candidate with the best shot to do it. After yesterday’s vote, it is clear that candidate is my friend and a great American, Joe Biden,” he wrote in a press release. In an uncharacteristically antic bit of humor, Bloomberg later tweeted a video clip of Obi-Wan Kenobi battling Darth Vader in the movie Star Wars and wrote, “See you soon, Donald.”
The swift consolidation of the party mainstream around Biden suggests that the Democratic establishment—and many voters—were suddenly motivated by the prospect that they might be handing off the party to Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist (who is not even technically a Democrat), in much the same way that Trump, another outsider, seized control of the Republican Party in 2016. And that, as Biden, Bloomberg, and other leading Democratic moderates such as Pete Buttigieg and Sen. Amy Klobuchar (both of whom also endorsed Biden a day before Super Tuesday) have warned, nominating a candidate with views as left-wing as Sanders’s would guarantee a loss in November.
But with much of the party base, especially younger people, still energized by Sanders, the outcome of the race is far from decided. The Vermont senator captured Tuesday’s biggest delegate prize in California, and also won Utah, Colorado, and his home state of Vermont. While final results aren’t in, Sanders’’s initial total delegate count was 382, while Biden pushed ahead with 453 after winning the other big prize of the night, Texas. Progressives such as former Labor Secretary Robert Reich expressed concern that, as happened in 2016 after Hillary Clinton won the nomination over Sanders, the party establishment might once again ignore the sentiments of the base.
“The fact that Bloomberg has thrown his support to Biden should remove any lingering doubts about where the big money is going and what the Democratic establishment wants.
And what it doesn’t want — a wealth tax, Medicare for All, and a Green New Deal,” Reich tweeted.
The sudden movement to Biden also sent a message to the rest of the world. As with past elections, foreign policy wasn’t the top issue on voters’ minds, but Biden’s rise signals a shift in the battle over ideas playing out in the Democratic Party in Trump’s Washington.
Sanders, fueled by a groundswell of grassroots support on the left, has challenged traditional foreign-policy orthodoxies that Democrats have held for decades, bashing U.S. Israel policy and even praising literacy programs under communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba as he condemned the authoritarian bent of his rule, leaving Democrats in the battleground state of Florida bristling.
Biden’s ascension breathes life back into a foreign-policy establishment on the defensive since Trump came into office. “The blob is back,” Brett Bruen, a longtime former U.S. diplomat, told Foreign Policy. “The moderate, centrist foreign policy world is feeling, after years of being battered and bruised, both by Trump but also the progressive wing of the party … reenergized.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Vucic: Most Serbs Prefer a ‘Frozen Conflict’ with Kosovo

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic traveled to Washington this week for meetings with top U.S. officials .
The Balkans is seen as blind spot in U.S. foreign policy , but in recent years it has been the scene of increased interest by U.S. rivals Russia and China .
Countries in Western Balkans are pushing to join the European Union and NATO , a major political and economic draw for many of the region ’ s leaders .
But Belgrade faces a major diplomatic hurdle before the EU would begin accession discussions : its ongoing dispute with Kosovo , a former Serbian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States and about 100 other countries recognize Kosovo ’ s independence , while Russia , China , and five EU countries are among those that do not .
The ongoing Serbia-Kosovo dispute has continued to fuel tensions in the region after it emerged from a bloody series of wars in the 1990s .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s envoy dispatched to help resolve the deadlocked dispute , Richard Grenell , was recently named acting head of U.S. intelligence .
On Monday , Vucic met with the Kosovo President Hashim Thaci @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien .
During his visit to Washington , Vucic sat down for a wide-ranging interview with Foreign Policy , to discuss Serbia-Kosovo relations , Serbia ’ s relationships with China and Russia , and his country ’ s appetite to buy U.S. weapons systems .
This interview has been edited for length and clarity .
Foreign Policy : What are the next steps you see in talks with Kosovo ?
President Aleksandar Vucic : Hopefully they ’ re going to revoke tariffs , and that will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Otherwise , they would never drop it .
I think the most important issue is to establish , as we discussed with the American side , is better flights between Belgrade and Pristina and to focus ourselves on everything that we have already reached through our negotiating process under the auspices of the EU as well .
I don ’ t see how the entire process should end , what the substance would be of a possible final settlement that someone might propose to us .
I ’ m looking forward to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we ’ ll start understanding each other better .
And we need a dialogue to achieve that .
We need more talks .
FP : If Kosovo were to lift the tariffs , would you consider ending the campaign of nonrecognition as they ’ ve asked ?
AV : You can not be rewarded because you impose tariffs against Serbia .
You can not be rewarded for saying “ and now we need some concessions from your side.
” We just need to come back to the same positions that we had before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think it ’ s very logical , to tell you the truth .
I do understand [ the ] necessity for a real dialogue , and I do understand the necessity of resolving the problem , which is not easy for me to say because if you ask the vast majority of people in Serbia , they would prefer a frozen conflict to any single solution .
I don ’ t belong to that vast majority .
FP : What would be a resolution to the situation with Kosovo that you think would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you think you could sell to the Serbian public ?
AV : We need to carry on with the dialogue and with all necessary attempts to find a possible compromise .
And once again , I don ’ t know what that might look like , but it has to be done in a way that would be a defeat for both sides , in order for it to be a small win for both sides .
We both should get guarantees for a much better , much better future .
FP : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while you ’ re here in Washington ?
AV : Yes , yes , of course .
FP : He has now not two day jobs , but three day jobs .
He ’ s the acting director of national intelligence , the ambassador to Berlin , and the special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo negotiations .
That ’ s a lot of work for one person .
Are you worried that U.S. involvement in Serbia-Kosovo talks will slip ?
AV : He ’ s a man of great energy , very enthusiastic about his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ haven ’ t met so many people so far in my entire life at that level with that type of energy .
FP : The EU has faced criticism from experts and former European officials for not focusing enough on the Western Balkans .
What do you make of those criticisms ?
Do you think they ’ re valid ?
AV : We are fully committed to keep on working together with them on finding a possible solution , which is not going to be easily reachable .
But I would say our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this .
We can not have two negotiating processes , one with Thaci in Washington and another one with Kurti in Brussels , right ?
You don ’ t know who to speak to .
FP : Did you meet with President Thaci and Prime Minister Kurti of Kosovo at the Munich Security Conference last month ?
AV : I saw them both .
FP : And how did that go ?
AV : Well , it was not a real discussion .
It was a public meeting , and then Kurti wanted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but also against Thaci .
And I said , “ Okay , you ’ re like Hegel , the best philosopher of the world .
You know everything.
” And that ’ s the end of the story .
Nothing good , rational , and nothing really helpful to the process .
There is another issue which I wanted to emphasize in our interview if possible .
And that ’ s what I said to [ U.S. Secretary of State ] Mike Pompeo [ that ] morning as well .
You criticize us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons , armaments , and everything else .
Okay , I want to buy your weapons , I want to buy your armaments .
But I don ’ t need to listen to those stories , “ Why would you take this and why don ’ t you take that ?
” Do you want to sell it or not ?
Do you want our money ?
And then I heard for the first time , “ Okay , we ’ re open for that.
” And now we ’ re going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. in the future , from Great Britain as well .
That ’ s what I discussed with [ British Prime Minister ] Boris Johnson as well two days ago .
I said to him , “ Do you want to sell that ?
” Just to stop complaining always , all of you .
Just let me buy it .
If it ’ s okay , we ’ ll do it .
That ’ s it .
FP : So Pompeo indicated to you that the United States would be open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AV : He said to me that they think that it ’ s all about the economy in our region , that they would boost their investments in our region , and I ’ m profoundly grateful to them .
But when we came to that , I said to him , “ But you always have something against us because of Russian weaponry and Russian armaments .
Okay , we want to buy yours.
” He said , “ Okay , we ’ ll discuss it.
” FP : How did you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and with the European Union and the United States ?
AV : It ’ s not about balancing .
Just to analyze our situation , we have the problem of Kosovo .
Who hasn ’ t recognized Kosovo so far ?
Do we need their support during our negotiating process with Pristina , with the United Nations Security Council ?
Yes , we do .
I still think that it ’ s inevitable that we are on our EU path , and that ’ s what I say even to [ Russian President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with him .
Every single time I go there I say , “ Okay , we have a great relationship , but as always I need to emphasize that Serbia is on its EU path and will continue on its EU path.
” And that ’ s it .
We have 40 percent bigger trade exchange with Germany .
Just with Germany , I ’ m not speaking about European Union , just with Germany than with Russia .
It ’ s the same with China .
[ The EU ] started recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s investors , China ’ s investments .
But we are , it ’ s peanuts compared to your level of cooperation with China .
Your trade turnover with China is 1,000 times greater than ours .
Or is it okay if you do that and it ’ s forbidden if we do it the same , only a thousand times less ?
And then there are no responses .
FP : But Serbia ’ s the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese FDI in Europe .
That ’ s also a major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Huawei ’ s investment in Europe ’ s telecommunications infrastructure .
Have you received warnings about Chinese investment during your meetings here in Washington ?
AV : Not in that way , to tell you the truth .
I had good talks in Washington .
But I heard more about this from the Europeans , particularly about China .
Not anymore about Russia .
The main focus is becoming more and more about China , that ’ s what I noticed .
We ’ ll do a very open and transparent procedure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe is cooperating with Huawei .
Starting with Britain , continuing with Germany and all the others .
But I spoke to Ericsson people , spoke to Nokia people , and we spoke to Huawei people who have a very open and transparent procedure , tender procedure .
Just tell me what would you do if you were me ?
We had that steel mill in Smederevo .
U.S. Steel left the plant for $ 1 and then 5,200 people were left without their jobs .
And then no one wanted to help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ [ Chinese President ] Xi Jinping to be supportive , to be helpful .
He helped us .
Do you really want me to undermine what they did ?
No , I can not .
You would do the same .
And that ’ s why I was saying to our American friends , we want to boost our cooperation .
We would like to see more of your engagement and more of your investments in our region .
FP : France had previously blocked accession talks for North Macedonia and Albania to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Emmanuel Macron has indicated that he would be open to unblocking that and having the EU start those accession talks .
What would North Macedonia and Albania joining the EU mean for Serbia and its aspirations ?
AV : We ’ ll be jubilant seeing them start the negotiating process .
They are our friends , we wish them all the best .
We would like to see real plans for Serbia and Montenegro next .
FP : You said you feel that Serbia ’ s accession to the European Union is now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ downgraded its ranking of Serbia from free to partly free .
Reporters Without Borders has raised a lot of concerns about attacks on the press , both physical but also verbal .
How do you think this could affect your hopes to join the European Union ?
AV : It harmed hugely the image of Serbia .
We did a lot of things in the meantime .
There was one big attack against a guy that was organized by the local mayor .
We arrested the local mayor and there is a trial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There were no big physical attacks again .
FP : Have you taken any concrete steps to try and improve these ratings ?
AV : Yes , we did everything [ the EU ] asked from us .
That ’ s why I ’ m saying to you I think we will do it , that we ’ ll improve our ratings this year .
FP : What did they ask you to do ?
AV : To do a media strategy , to do a lot of regulations , and [ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Some of these NGOs that track press freedom and democracy issues blame your government and its political allies for the increased pressure on journalists .
AV : Please , one example .
FP : There was a journalist from [ Serbian media outlet ] N1 .
Reporters Without Borders said in November this journalist was the “ target of an unprecedented explosion of public anger stirred up by the president ’ s allies and pro-government media.
” AV : No , you can see that .
He was attacking me , and I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ single word to him , just showing that he was not saying the truth .
Please , you can find that video .
If that ’ s something we didn ’ t know—if that ’ s something that I did wrong , please send me a text message , “ You did something very wrong against that guy.
” FP : But the concerns were not about that interaction with the journalist , but the response that happened afterward .
Reporters Without Borders said this journalist suffered verbal assaults and threats from members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your allies .
Do you stand by these actions ?
AV : It ’ s stupid and it ’ s wrong .
I think that I dealt with that in an easy way .
It was good fun for me to tell you the truth , because I saw that people from his office were sending text messages to him on what to ask me and how to ask me .
And I said to him , “ Don ’ t worry , I ’ m not going to say who is giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ’ m not going to reveal it.
” That ’ s it .
That is all .
If I was rude , that was it .
But no , I was not cursing anyone , I was not threatening anyone , nothing .

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foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak

Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak

The novel coronavirus that started in Wuhan , China , is spreading with wildfire speed .
As cases and fatalities grow worldwide , keep track of the numbers—and of Foreign Policy ’ s in-depth coverage—here .
The virus may become universal .
The reaction to it won ’ t be .
From China ’ s lockdown to the hidden spread of the virus in Southeast Asia to the damage done by a gutted pandemic response team in the United States , Foreign Policy is covering the crisis from all angles .
Learn more about how the virus is affecting countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sanctions threaten to turn an outbreak into a catastrophe .
In China : Lockdown affects hundreds of millions of lives , from President Xi Jinping to neighborhood grandmothers .
In Indonesia : Anti-Chinese conspiracy theories are spreading faster than the virus .
In Lebanon : Grappling with economic and political turmoil , Lebanon ’ s government is underequipped for a public health emergency .
In Japan : The Japanese economy was already limping .
Now the coronavirus has left it prone .
In North Korea : The country has sealed its borders—but an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States to do good .
In South Korea : Cults and conservatives have spread the virus just when it seemed under control .
In the Philippines : Filipinos are looking for someone to blame after the first death .
In Taiwan : The World Health Organization is playing political games instead of letting Taiwan help fight the coronavirus .
In Thailand : Billions of dollars are at stake as Bangkok walks the line between closing borders and angering Beijing .
Dan Haverty , James Palmer , and Lori Kelley contributed to this @ @

Get the latest coronavirus epidemic coverage from Foreign Policy in your inbox. Sign up now to receive Editors' Picks, a curated selection of FP's must-read stories. Delivered daily. Enter your email By signing up, I agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to occasionally receive special offers from Foreign Policy. By signing up, I agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to occasionally receive special offers from Foreign Policy. Sign Up ✓ Signed Up
This article was last updated on May 19. For more recent updates, go to the Johns Hopkins University website for a coronavirus tracking map.
The novel coronavirus that started in Wuhan, China, is spreading with wildfire speed. As cases and fatalities grow worldwide, keep track of the numbers—and of Foreign Policy’s in-depth coverage—here.
[Read FP’s latest stories on the coronavirus.]
4,943,077 confirmed cases 321,998 deaths

The virus may become universal. The reaction to it won’t be. From China’s lockdown to the hidden spread of the virus in Southeast Asia to the damage done by a gutted pandemic response team in the United States, Foreign Policy is covering the crisis from all angles.
Learn more about how the virus is affecting countries around the world:
In Canada: Government preparation is containing the virus for now.
In the United States: The president’s refusal to self-isolate could be infecting everyone around him.
In Australia: Universities dependent on Chinese students are risking infection vectors.
In Italy: Leadership failures show how democracies can mismanage disasters too.
In Japan: The Japanese economy was already limping. Now the coronavirus has left it prone.
In North Korea: The country has sealed its borders—but an outbreak would be a chance for the United States to do good.
In South Korea: Cults and conservatives have spread the virus just when it seemed under control.
In the Philippines: Filipinos are looking for someone to blame after the first death.
In Taiwan: The World Health Organization is playing political games instead of letting Taiwan help fight the coronavirus.
In Thailand: Billions of dollars are at stake as Bangkok walks the line between closing borders and angering Beijing.
Dan Haverty, James Palmer, and Lori Kelley contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--Coronavirus Fears Are a National Security Crisis

The arrival in the United States of the new human coronavirus ( which causes the coronavirus disease , COVID-19 ) certainly qualifies as a national security crisis .
It is also a cause of widespread anxiety .
The latter deserves to be a concern for policymakers , and the public , too .
As someone who has made a career of studying foreign policy from the perspective of threat perception , I have spent years observing and analyzing how people and organizations respond to crises—and how those responses , especially ones marked by fear , can themselves contribute to catastrophe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reasonable perspective amid the current public panic .
( This isn ’ t intended as public health advice—but national security expertise can nevertheless help keep you healthy . )
First , you should recognize that media is overwhelmingly incentivized to produce negative and alarmist headlines , without the accompanying historical context and analytical expertise needed for the average person to evaluate the severity of those headlines .
This is especially problematic for the new coronavirus , because Americans have significantly poor health literacy relative to their knowledge of other public policy issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be responsible and balanced , most are operated on business models that privilege sensationalism and deem positive news and positive trends to be not newsworthy .
Meanwhile , as several studies of the Ebola crisis demonstrated , it ’ s best to stay off of social media unless you want to be misinformed or terrified .
The second point follows from the first : You should seek out clarifying information from the most reputable and unbiased sources available , including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too wonky for your taste , try the more readable reporting at Science , the Journal of the American Medical Association , and Scientific American .
Whatever credible source you ultimately decide to read to learn about the coronavirus , recognize that it will represent an outdated snapshot of reality .
This is due to the inevitable time lag between testing , analysis , and reporting , as well as the fact that health communication specialists are overly cautious of declarative statements about improvements in tackling disease outbreaks .
Third , accept that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judgments based upon initial impressions .
A 2010 study , “ Sneezing in Times of a Flu Pandemic : Public Sneezing Increases Perception of Unrelated Risks and Shifts Preferences for Federal Spending , ” found that when people see someone sneezing before answering questions involving risk perception they are more likely to believe they will die from contracting the flu , heart disease , or a criminal act .
Thus , if you are surrounded by a majority of people wearing face masks or apparent examples of preparing for an epidemic , you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse .
Appreciate also that if you are wearing a surgical mask or exhibiting the actions of a panicked prepper , you are raising the anxiety levels of nearly everyone you encounter .
Fourth , you should understand that your enthusiasm to change behaviors in productive ways ( such as adopting a better personal hygiene regimen , including hand-washing ) will be highly influenced by “ immediacy ” —that is , the perceived distance in space and time of victims .
Even learning basic biographical information about victims spurs empathy and has a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the donation of money to charity .
A 2018 study of major media Ebola reporting in 2014 found that human interest stories of U.S. citizen fatalities were especially popular in the United States , as opposed to stories focused on victims in West Africa or the economic impact of the outbreak .
The takeaway is that , given the apparent ability of the coronavirus to spread even in the absence of immediate human contact—and the world ’ s general geographical interconnectedness—you shouldn ’ t wait until confirmed cases are at your doorstep to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the CDC .
Fifth , there will be governmental and societal mitigation efforts to reduce the spread of virus cases , some of which will succeed , others of which will fail outright , and all of which will yield unintended consequences .
For example , after the 9/11 attacks , Americans drove more frequently than normal flying , which resulted in an estimated 1,600 additional traffic fatalities .
And after the Fukushima meltdown and nuclear energy production ceased , Japanese citizens reduced their energy use due to the increased cost of imported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an additional 1,280 cold-weather deaths .
In response to the coronavirus , federal , state , and local governments ; businesses and trade associations ; and various community groups in the United States are already attempting a range of public-health interventions ( including information campaigns , telecommuting , social distancing ) .
We should expect these interventions to have a range of outcomes—but the goal should always be to do the minimum disruptive harm , collect reliable data , learn quickly , and adjust .
Finally , the present always feels more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past , because , with hindsight , we know how things ultimately turned out .
As nobody has information about the future , during periods of heightened anxiety we tend to project forward with near-worst-case scenarios in our heads .
Thus , the atmosphere may feel especially chaotic right now given the escalating number of COVID-19 cases around the world and unusual volatility in financial markets .
Undoubtedly , some pessimistic forecasters will be accurate in their predictions .
Nonetheless , in such uncertainty , an intentional and conscious exposition of both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stronger defenses against coronavirus fears .
The broad public application of these six insights—or the failure to do so—will likely help decide how the coronavirus epidemic unfolds .
But even as purely personal advice , they can enhance your critical thinking during this outbreak—and during the next crisis to create headlines and public anxiety .

The arrival in the United States of the new human coronavirus (which causes the coronavirus disease, COVID-19) certainly qualifies as a national security crisis. It is also a cause of widespread anxiety.
The arrival in the United States of the new human coronavirus (which causes the coronavirus disease, COVID-19) certainly qualifies as a national security crisis. It is also a cause of widespread anxiety.
The latter deserves to be a concern for policymakers, and the public, too. As someone who has made a career of studying foreign policy from the perspective of threat perception, I have spent years observing and analyzing how people and organizations respond to crises—and how those responses, especially ones marked by fear, can themselves contribute to catastrophe.
Here are some pointers for maintaining a reasonable perspective amid the current public panic. (This isn’t intended as public health advice—but national security expertise can nevertheless help keep you healthy.)
First, you should recognize that media is overwhelmingly incentivized to produce negative and alarmist headlines, without the accompanying historical context and analytical expertise needed for the average person to evaluate the severity of those headlines. This is especially problematic for the new coronavirus, because Americans have significantly poor health literacy relative to their knowledge of other public policy issues. And while some news publications may be responsible and balanced, most are operated on business models that privilege sensationalism and deem positive news and positive trends to be not newsworthy. Meanwhile, as several studies of the Ebola crisis demonstrated, it’s best to stay off of social media unless you want to be misinformed or terrified.
The second point follows from the first: You should seek out clarifying information from the most reputable and unbiased sources available, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the World Health Organization. If those are too wonky for your taste, try the more readable reporting at Science, the Journal of the American Medical Association, and Scientific American. Whatever credible source you ultimately decide to read to learn about the coronavirus, recognize that it will represent an outdated snapshot of reality. This is due to the inevitable time lag between testing, analysis, and reporting, as well as the fact that health communication specialists are overly cautious of declarative statements about improvements in tackling disease outbreaks.
Third, accept that you have been primed to make biased judgments based upon initial impressions. A 2010 study, “Sneezing in Times of a Flu Pandemic: Public Sneezing Increases Perception of Unrelated Risks and Shifts Preferences for Federal Spending,” found that when people see someone sneezing before answering questions involving risk perception they are more likely to believe they will die from contracting the flu, heart disease, or a criminal act. Thus, if you are surrounded by a majority of people wearing face masks or apparent examples of preparing for an epidemic, you will perceive the coronavirus threat as being worse. Appreciate also that if you are wearing a surgical mask or exhibiting the actions of a panicked prepper, you are raising the anxiety levels of nearly everyone you encounter.
Fourth, you should understand that your enthusiasm to change behaviors in productive ways (such as adopting a better personal hygiene regimen, including hand-washing) will be highly influenced by “immediacy”—that is, the perceived distance in space and time of victims. Even learning basic biographical information about victims spurs empathy and has a vast impact on public behavior, including the donation of money to charity. A 2018 study of major media Ebola reporting in 2014 found that human interest stories of U.S. citizen fatalities were especially popular in the United States, as opposed to stories focused on victims in West Africa or the economic impact of the outbreak. The takeaway is that, given the apparent ability of the coronavirus to spread even in the absence of immediate human contact—and the world’s general geographical interconnectedness—you shouldn’t wait until confirmed cases are at your doorstep to undertake the common-sense mitigation steps recommended by the CDC.
Fifth, there will be governmental and societal mitigation efforts to reduce the spread of virus cases, some of which will succeed, others of which will fail outright, and all of which will yield unintended consequences. For example, after the 9/11 attacks, Americans drove more frequently than normal flying, which resulted in an estimated 1,600 additional traffic fatalities. And after the Fukushima meltdown and nuclear energy production ceased, Japanese citizens reduced their energy use due to the increased cost of imported fossil fuels—this, in turn, resulted in an additional 1,280 cold-weather deaths. In response to the coronavirus, federal, state, and local governments; businesses and trade associations; and various community groups in the United States are already attempting a range of public-health interventions (including information campaigns, telecommuting, social distancing). We should expect these interventions to have a range of outcomes—but the goal should always be to do the minimum disruptive harm, collect reliable data, learn quickly, and adjust.
Finally, the present always feels more chaotic, unpredictable, and unstable than the past, because, with hindsight, we know how things ultimately turned out. As nobody has information about the future, during periods of heightened anxiety we tend to project forward with near-worst-case scenarios in our heads. Thus, the atmosphere may feel especially chaotic right now given the escalating number of COVID-19 cases around the world and unusual volatility in financial markets. Undoubtedly, some pessimistic forecasters will be accurate in their predictions. Nonetheless, in such uncertainty, an intentional and conscious exposition of both individual and societal biases is among the stronger defenses against coronavirus fears.
The broad public application of these six insights—or the failure to do so—will likely help decide how the coronavirus epidemic unfolds. But even as purely personal advice, they can enhance your critical thinking during this outbreak—and during the next crisis to create headlines and public anxiety.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-04--U.S. Congress Moves to Restrain Pentagon Over Africa Drawdown Plans

U.S. Congress Moves to Restrain Pentagon Over Africa Drawdown Plans A bipartisan group of lawmakers is maneuvering to prevent the Trump administration from reducing the U.S. military footprint in Africa , an issue that has sparked political blowback on Capitol Hill against Defense Secretary Mark Esper .
Democratic Rep. Jimmy Panetta , Republican Rep. Richard Hudson , and Democratic Rep. Jason Crow are expected to introduce legislation in the House this week that would prevent the administration from cutting U.S. forces deployed under U.S. Africa Command ( Africom ) unless the Pentagon issues detailed reports to Congress on the moves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the legislation was obtained by Foreign Policy .
The legislation reflects growing congressional backlash against the potential reduction in U.S. troops on the continent at a time when terrorist groups are gaining ground in East Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa .
It also previews the uphill battle Esper could face in his efforts to push through a series of ambitious military reforms as the Trump administration works to reposition the military for an era of what it calls “ great power competition ” with China and Russia .
Esper has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reductions have been made , and the military would not fully withdraw troops from Africa amid a review of the United States ’ global military posture .
Top Pentagon officials have pointed to the recent decision to dispatch the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to Africom as a sign of its commitment to training and advising partner governments in Africa .
Those reassurances haven ’ t been enough to quell pushback from Capitol Hill , including from some of the Trump administration ’ s top political allies such as Republican Sens .
Lindsey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee , has called for an increase in the number of U.S. troops deployed to Africa .
The Trump administration ’ s ongoing review is meant to ready the U.S. military for a new era of competition to confront Russia and China .
The Pentagon has reportedly floated cutting several hundred troops in West Africa and leaving a base in Niger to redirect resources toward Russia and China .
Lawmakers contend that such moves would be counterproductive , given those countries ’ glowing clout and military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond as well as increase the geopolitical influence of competitors like Russia and China , ” Graham and Sen. Chris Coons , a Democrat , wrote in a letter to Esper in January .
( Graham later denied a report that he threatened to make Esper ’ s life “ hell ” if he directed troop reductions in West Africa . )
If passed , the new bill—called the U.S.-Africa Strategic Security Act—would throw yet another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ redeploy Africom resources .
The bill calls on the defense secretary to submit reports to congressional committees on the strategic and operational risks of withdrawing U.S. forces from the region .
Esper has insisted he won ’ t shut out Congress from the process .
“ Once we get through the reviews of Africom , at the appropriate place and time , I will … update Congress , ” he told reporters on Jan. 22 .
He added : “ Mission No .
1 is compete with Russia and China.
” Africom has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advising partner governments and conducting counterterrorism operations .
It accounts for just about 3 percent of the overall number of U.S. troops deployed abroad , with some 200,000 U.S. troops based in the Middle East , Asia , and Europe .
Terrorist groups in the Sahel , including branches of al Qaeda and the Islamic State , are rapidly expanding and ramping up deadly terrorist attacks aimed at both military and civilian targets despite international counterterrorism campaigns .
The Trump administration is expected to name a special envoy to the Sahel region to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in violence in Mali , Niger , and Burkina Faso .
But governments in West Africa and France—which has nearly 4,000 troops deployed across the region—say they rely on U.S. military support .
“ U.S .
support is critical to our operations and … its reduction would severely limit our effectiveness against terrorists , ” French Armed Services Minister Florence Parly said during a visit to Washington last month .

A bipartisan group of lawmakers is maneuvering to prevent the Trump administration from reducing the U.S. military footprint in Africa, an issue that has sparked political blowback on Capitol Hill against Defense Secretary Mark Esper.
A bipartisan group of lawmakers is maneuvering to prevent the Trump administration from reducing the U.S. military footprint in Africa, an issue that has sparked political blowback on Capitol Hill against Defense Secretary Mark Esper.
Democratic Rep. Jimmy Panetta, Republican Rep. Richard Hudson, and Democratic Rep. Jason Crow are expected to introduce legislation in the House this week that would prevent the administration from cutting U.S. forces deployed under U.S. Africa Command (Africom) unless the Pentagon issues detailed reports to Congress on the moves’ impacts. An advanced draft of the legislation was obtained by Foreign Policy.
The legislation reflects growing congressional backlash against the potential reduction in U.S. troops on the continent at a time when terrorist groups are gaining ground in East Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa. It also previews the uphill battle Esper could face in his efforts to push through a series of ambitious military reforms as the Trump administration works to reposition the military for an era of what it calls “great power competition” with China and Russia.
Esper has insisted repeatedly that no decisions on force reductions have been made, and the military would not fully withdraw troops from Africa amid a review of the United States’ global military posture. Top Pentagon officials have pointed to the recent decision to dispatch the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to Africom as a sign of its commitment to training and advising partner governments in Africa.
Those reassurances haven’t been enough to quell pushback from Capitol Hill, including from some of the Trump administration’s top political allies such as Republican Sens. Lindsey Graham and Jim Inhofe. Inhofe, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has called for an increase in the number of U.S. troops deployed to Africa.
The Trump administration’s ongoing review is meant to ready the U.S. military for a new era of competition to confront Russia and China. The Pentagon has reportedly floated cutting several hundred troops in West Africa and leaving a base in Niger to redirect resources toward Russia and China.
Lawmakers contend that such moves would be counterproductive, given those countries’ glowing clout and military footprints in Africa itself. “Any withdrawal or reduction would likely result in a surge in violent extremist attacks on the continent and beyond as well as increase the geopolitical influence of competitors like Russia and China,” Graham and Sen. Chris Coons, a Democrat, wrote in a letter to Esper in January. (Graham later denied a report that he threatened to make Esper’s life “hell” if he directed troop reductions in West Africa.)
If passed, the new bill—called the U.S.-Africa Strategic Security Act—would throw yet another roadblock in front of any plans to redeploy Africom resources. The bill calls on the defense secretary to submit reports to congressional committees on the strategic and operational risks of withdrawing U.S. forces from the region.
Esper has insisted he won’t shut out Congress from the process. “Once we get through the reviews of Africom, at the appropriate place and time, I will … update Congress,” he told reporters on Jan. 22. He added: “Mission No. 1 is compete with Russia and China.”
Africom has about 6,000 troops, most training and advising partner governments and conducting counterterrorism operations. It accounts for just about 3 percent of the overall number of U.S. troops deployed abroad, with some 200,000 U.S. troops based in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
Terrorist groups in the Sahel, including branches of al Qaeda and the Islamic State, are rapidly expanding and ramping up deadly terrorist attacks aimed at both military and civilian targets despite international counterterrorism campaigns. The Trump administration is expected to name a special envoy to the Sahel region to help coordinate a response to the surge in violence in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. But governments in West Africa and France—which has nearly 4,000 troops deployed across the region—say they rely on U.S. military support.
“U.S. support is critical to our operations and … its reduction would severely limit our effectiveness against terrorists,” French Armed Services Minister Florence Parly said during a visit to Washington last month.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-05--A Netanyahu Victory Would Be Bad News for Peace and the Rule of Law

A Netanyahu Victory Would Be Bad News for Peace and the Rule of Law In Israel , winning elections is all about who forms the next government .
As the dust settles from Israel ’ s third election in a year , election night projections of a clear victory for the right-wing parties backing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been somewhat tempered since the March 2 vote .
Results now show Netanyahu ’ s bloc holding 58 seats , short of the 61-seat majority needed to form a coalition out 120 seats in the Knesset , Israel ’ s parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the upper hand .
His Likud party has a three-seat lead over Benny Gantz ’ s Blue and White party , the closest competitor .
The parties that oppose him may hold 62 seats , but they are an ideological hodgepodge ranging from the ultranationalist right-wing party of Avigdor Lieberman to the Joint List , comprising four Arab and Arab-Jewish parties .
The large , centrist Blue and White and the fading Zionist left represented by the Labor Party and Meretz only amount to 40 of those 62 seats .
Given the ideological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well be asked to form the next government .
The permutations of how 58 seats can become 61 are already the subject of feverish speculation .
Netanyahu would need to either find defectors from the opposition or negotiate a unity government with Blue and White .
Both will be difficult ; all coalition negotiations have failed following two earlier votes in the past year .
The process will be especially fraught as the curtain opens on the Jerusalem District Court on March 17 , when Netanyahu ’ s corruption trial officially begins .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ still seems more likely than a fourth election .
If Netanyahu does end up forming and leading a coalition of 58 right-wing and religious loyalists , with a few additional members who are amenable to this base , it is reasonable to assess what such a government might do .
A new right-wing government will almost surely prioritize two things : annexation of Palestinian land and limitations on Israeli courts ’ judicial independence .
With a year ’ s worth of urgent national social and economic priorities waiting to be addressed , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right-wing government will almost surely prioritize two other areas : annexation of Palestinian land and limitations on Israeli courts ’ judicial independence .
Neither policy direction is new for Netanyahu , but the policies could now move at a fast pace .
Netanyahu is known to be obsessive about security , terrorism , and Iran—but is considered less ideologically driven regarding de jure annexation in the West Bank .
While his far-right coalition partner Naftali Bennett has advocated annexing all of Area C ( 60 percent of the West Bank ) since 2012 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more a decade , no such initiative came to fruition .
His policies indicate he prefers quiet expansion on the ground : de facto , creeping annexation .
Campaigns can change everything .
Ahead of the April 2019 election , Netanyahu announced his intention to annex all settlements .
One week before the September 2019 election , he unveiled his plan to annex the Jordan Valley .
Following the release of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , Netanyahu insisted that annexation of the Jordan Valley would begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington ’ s consent .
But he incorporated the mantra of annexation ( or “ extending sovereignty ” ) into his campaign stump speech from that point on .
These promises can no longer be dismissed as political posturing .
In January , his rival Benny Gantz promised to annex the Jordan Valley as well , clearly in order to keep up .
One path to a coalition for Netanyahu involves wrenching Gantz away from Blue and White and bringing his faction into the coalition .
In that case , Gantz , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to sit with Netanyahu while the prime minister was under indictment , will surely focus all negotiation demands on ensuring that Netanyahu can not avoid prosecution , or insisting on limitations to Netanyahu ’ s term .
Gantz would at that point have no grounds for resisting far-right pressure to advance annexation given his own stated position during the campaign .
Moreover , the legal groundwork is already being laid .
A plethora of bills already exist that would advance formal declared annexation over starting points such as a single settlement—Maale Adumim , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and air of a Jerusalem suburb .
Annexing Maale Adumim would be a tasty appetizer for the far-right , and it would be unlikely to face resistance from the public ; in surveys I conducted from 2017 , nearly three-quarters of Israelis supported it , including over 80 percent of Jews .
Other laws and bills—a long list , actually—advance quiet harmonization of laws between the West Bank and Israel proper , with special laws for occupied areas .
These incremental forms of annexation , more limited and technical in nature , are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ versions , which would risk severe international penalties .
By contrast , if Israel advances annexation bit by bit , its 53 years of experience since 1967 show that it can get away with that .
And a right-wing Israeli government , therefore , is likely to do it .
A second essential target for the next government will be the Israeli judiciary .
What happens in the legal sphere will affect everything from government formation to the future of Israeli democracy .
These changes are also directly linked to possible annexation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ him from forming a coalition while under indictment .
( Israeli law allows him to serve as prime minister , but apparently the framers never imagined an indicted defendant being asked to create a government , generating a legal conundrum . )
Any ruling would place the Supreme Court in a bind .
If the court favors Netanyahu , the entire opposition camp will be inflamed ; if it rules against him , the pro-Netanyahu camp will view it as a brutal suppression of the will of the voters and could well take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attorney general—could also bow out of issuing a ruling , as it already did this past December .
But if Netanyahu clears these hurdles , there is little need to speculate what a new right-heavy coalition would do about the judiciary .
The direction can be discerned based on past precedent and present pressures .
The courts represent one of the country ’ s few forces balancing the Knesset ’ s power in the absence of a constitution or formal bill of rights .
Netanyahu ’ s last two justice ministers have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next will likely have a similar profile .
His right-wing coalition partners and the Sheldon Adelson-funded daily freebie newspaper Israel Hayom denounce the judiciary daily , portraying it as a rapacious band of elites crushing the people ’ s will .
The police , the state prosecutor , and the attorney general are described in right-wing circles—and selectively by Netanyahu himself—as agents of unelected , embittered left-wing aristocrats persecuting the prime minister instead of winning elections .
In 2017 , Netanyahu ’ s government sought to pass a law curtailing the transparency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases .
His governments have been deliberating bills to end judicial review for years .
Although Netanyahu has stated more than once that he will not advance an immunity law to shield himself from prosecution , his presumed coalition partners considered doing just that during the coalition negotiation following the April elections .
To be sure , Netanyahu asked for immunity in the framework of existing laws , then withdrew his request .
He continues to deny that he would advance such a law .
But times have changed .
Netanyahu is now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fear of a future verdict .
Israeli commentators have wondered whether he will try to reach a plea bargain to avoid court , or even fire the attorney general ( whom he appointed ) .
In the hours after being indicted , Netanyahu himself went on a screed in which he demanded that authorities “ investigate the investigators.
” Netanyahu has not ruled out a judicial override law , which would strip the Supreme Court of its judicial oversight powers More worrying is that Netanyahu has not ruled out a judicial override law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its judicial oversight powers and was also reportedly part of earlier coalition negotiations .
His Likud allies have stated that the idea is still in play—specifically in response to a question of what would happen if the Supreme Court rules that Netanyahu can not form a government while under indictment .
An override law also leads full circle back to annexation .
Any law designed to annex territory can be challenged in court ; the same is true for human or civil rights violations as a result of annexation .
But if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the court rules against annexation laws , the Knesset would not need to back down .
None of this is inevitable yet .
Every day brings new and unexpected developments in the fractious political scene .
The anti-Netanyahu parties still hold a 62-seat majority , and on Wednesday Gantz floated passing a law to limit Netanyahu ’ s ability to form a government under indictment .
Naturally , such a law is vulnerable to accusations of being personally tailored to Netanyahu .
But the greatest limitation remains the voters themselves ; a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ getting Netanyahu out .

In Israel, winning elections is all about who forms the next government. As the dust settles from Israel’s third election in a year, election night projections of a clear victory for the right-wing parties backing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been somewhat tempered since the March 2 vote. Results now show Netanyahu’s bloc holding 58 seats, short of the 61-seat majority needed to form a coalition out 120 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament.
In Israel, winning elections is all about who forms the next government. As the dust settles from Israel’s third election in a year, election night projections of a clear victory for the right-wing parties backing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been somewhat tempered since the March 2 vote. Results now show Netanyahu’s bloc holding 58 seats, short of the 61-seat majority needed to form a coalition out 120 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament.
Still, Netanyahu seems to have the upper hand. His Likud party has a three-seat lead over Benny Gantz’s Blue and White party, the closest competitor. The parties that oppose him may hold 62 seats, but they are an ideological hodgepodge ranging from the ultranationalist right-wing party of Avigdor Lieberman to the Joint List, comprising four Arab and Arab-Jewish parties. The large, centrist Blue and White and the fading Zionist left represented by the Labor Party and Meretz only amount to 40 of those 62 seats. Given the ideological incoherence of the opposition, Netanyahu could well be asked to form the next government.
The permutations of how 58 seats can become 61 are already the subject of feverish speculation. Netanyahu would need to either find defectors from the opposition or negotiate a unity government with Blue and White. Both will be difficult; all coalition negotiations have failed following two earlier votes in the past year. The process will be especially fraught as the curtain opens on the Jerusalem District Court on March 17, when Netanyahu’s corruption trial officially begins.
Despite these pitfalls, a new government still seems more likely than a fourth election. If Netanyahu does end up forming and leading a coalition of 58 right-wing and religious loyalists, with a few additional members who are amenable to this base, it is reasonable to assess what such a government might do.
A new right-wing government will almost surely prioritize two things: annexation of Palestinian land and limitations on Israeli courts’ judicial independence.
With a year’s worth of urgent national social and economic priorities waiting to be addressed, including a worrying budget deficit, a new right-wing government will almost surely prioritize two other areas: annexation of Palestinian land and limitations on Israeli courts’ judicial independence. Neither policy direction is new for Netanyahu, but the policies could now move at a fast pace.
Netanyahu is known to be obsessive about security, terrorism, and Iran—but is considered less ideologically driven regarding de jure annexation in the West Bank. While his far-right coalition partner Naftali Bennett has advocated annexing all of Area C (60 percent of the West Bank) since 2012, under Netanyahu’s term of more a decade, no such initiative came to fruition. His policies indicate he prefers quiet expansion on the ground: de facto, creeping annexation.
Campaigns can change everything. Ahead of the April 2019 election, Netanyahu announced his intention to annex all settlements. One week before the September 2019 election, he unveiled his plan to annex the Jordan Valley. Following the release of U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Netanyahu insisted that annexation of the Jordan Valley would begin forthwith, then acknowledged he would await Washington’s consent. But he incorporated the mantra of annexation (or “extending sovereignty”) into his campaign stump speech from that point on.
These promises can no longer be dismissed as political posturing. In January, his rival Benny Gantz promised to annex the Jordan Valley as well, clearly in order to keep up. One path to a coalition for Netanyahu involves wrenching Gantz away from Blue and White and bringing his faction into the coalition. In that case, Gantz, who campaigned for a whole year on refusing to sit with Netanyahu while the prime minister was under indictment, will surely focus all negotiation demands on ensuring that Netanyahu cannot avoid prosecution, or insisting on limitations to Netanyahu’s term. Gantz would at that point have no grounds for resisting far-right pressure to advance annexation given his own stated position during the campaign.
Moreover, the legal groundwork is already being laid. A plethora of bills already exist that would advance formal declared annexation over starting points such as a single settlement—Maale Adumim, for example, with its all-Jewish population and air of a Jerusalem suburb. Annexing Maale Adumim would be a tasty appetizer for the far-right, and it would be unlikely to face resistance from the public; in surveys I conducted from 2017, nearly three-quarters of Israelis supported it, including over 80 percent of Jews.
Other laws and bills—a long list, actually—advance quiet harmonization of laws between the West Bank and Israel proper, with special laws for occupied areas. These incremental forms of annexation, more limited and technical in nature, are a convenient substitute for the more dramatic versions, which would risk severe international penalties. By contrast, if Israel advances annexation bit by bit, its 53 years of experience since 1967 show that it can get away with that. And a right-wing Israeli government, therefore, is likely to do it.
A second essential target for the next government will be the Israeli judiciary. What happens in the legal sphere will affect everything from government formation to the future of Israeli democracy. These changes are also directly linked to possible annexation.
Netanyahu is already facing calls to bar him from forming a coalition while under indictment. (Israeli law allows him to serve as prime minister, but apparently the framers never imagined an indicted defendant being asked to create a government, generating a legal conundrum.)
Any ruling would place the Supreme Court in a bind. If the court favors Netanyahu, the entire opposition camp will be inflamed; if it rules against him, the pro-Netanyahu camp will view it as a brutal suppression of the will of the voters and could well take to the streets. The court—and the attorney general—could also bow out of issuing a ruling, as it already did this past December.
But if Netanyahu clears these hurdles, there is little need to speculate what a new right-heavy coalition would do about the judiciary. The direction can be discerned based on past precedent and present pressures. The courts represent one of the country’s few forces balancing the Knesset’s power in the absence of a constitution or formal bill of rights. Netanyahu’s last two justice ministers have been sworn opponents of judicial activism, and the next will likely have a similar profile.
His right-wing coalition partners and the Sheldon Adelson-funded daily freebie newspaper Israel Hayom denounce the judiciary daily, portraying it as a rapacious band of elites crushing the people’s will. The police, the state prosecutor, and the attorney general are described in right-wing circles—and selectively by Netanyahu himself—as agents of unelected, embittered left-wing aristocrats persecuting the prime minister instead of winning elections.
In 2017, Netanyahu’s government sought to pass a law curtailing the transparency of the investigations into his own corruption cases. His governments have been deliberating bills to end judicial review for years. Although Netanyahu has stated more than once that he will not advance an immunity law to shield himself from prosecution, his presumed coalition partners considered doing just that during the coalition negotiation following the April elections. To be sure, Netanyahu asked for immunity in the framework of existing laws, then withdrew his request. He continues to deny that he would advance such a law.
But times have changed. Netanyahu is now facing the optics of standing trial—and the fear of a future verdict. Israeli commentators have wondered whether he will try to reach a plea bargain to avoid court, or even fire the attorney general (whom he appointed). In the hours after being indicted, Netanyahu himself went on a screed in which he demanded that authorities “investigate the investigators.”
Netanyahu has not ruled out a judicial override law, which would strip the Supreme Court of its judicial oversight powers
More worrying is that Netanyahu has not ruled out a judicial override law, which would strip the Supreme Court of its judicial oversight powers and was also reportedly part of earlier coalition negotiations. His Likud allies have stated that the idea is still in play—specifically in response to a question of what would happen if the Supreme Court rules that Netanyahu cannot form a government while under indictment.
An override law also leads full circle back to annexation. Any law designed to annex territory can be challenged in court; the same is true for human or civil rights violations as a result of annexation. But if an override law is on the books and the court rules against annexation laws, the Knesset would not need to back down.
None of this is inevitable yet. Every day brings new and unexpected developments in the fractious political scene. The anti-Netanyahu parties still hold a 62-seat majority, and on Wednesday Gantz floated passing a law to limit Netanyahu’s ability to form a government under indictment. Naturally, such a law is vulnerable to accusations of being personally tailored to Netanyahu. But the greatest limitation remains the voters themselves; a majority voted for parties that campaigned on getting Netanyahu out.