foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--In Fight for Florida’s Young Latinos, Social Media Becomes the Battleground

In Fight for Florida ’ s Young Latinos , Social Media Becomes the Battleground When it comes to the largest Latino community in South Florida , President Donald Trump is well ahead : 71 percent of Cuban Americans of all ages across Florida intend to vote for the president .
And despite years of talk that generational change would turn younger Cubans into a less-reliable Republican vote , that doesn ’ t seem to be the case .
That ’ s a big deal : An estimated 440,000 Cuban American voters in Florida are under 40 , over four times @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state four years ago .
Even voters who are too young to remember the Cuban Revolution remain wary of Fidel Castro ’ s legacy and worry some brand of socialist politics might reach Florida ’ s shores if Biden wins next week .
“ There is this whole narrative that Cuban American youth are more liberal than their parents because they aren ’ t beholden to the politics of the Cold War , ” said Geraldo Cadava , the author of The Hispanic Republican , a history of Latino conservatism in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuances to that.
” In comparison to other Latino groups , Cuban Americans have a unique immigration story .
While Sen. Bernie Sanders , a democratic socialist , witnessed a surge in support from Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans during the Democratic primaries , acquiring the nickname “ Tío Bernie , ” and Biden has a lead with Latinos overall , some Cuban Americans have emphatically refused to support even centrist Democrats like Biden—and are turning even more toward Trump .
Ahead of the 2016 election , only 21 percent of Cuban American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they would vote for Trump , according to that year ’ s Florida International University ( FIU ) Cuba Poll .
This year , that number is surging : The 2020 FIU Cuba Poll shows 55 percent intend to do so , and an even higher percentage approve of Trump ’ s handling of key issues such as immigration and health care .
Even though younger Cuban Americans didn ’ t witness socialism first hand , their upbringing was still “ shaped by the trauma of exile , ” Jorge Duany , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ FIU , said .
“ They feel very strongly about not offending their parents and grandparents by traveling to Cuba , or by taking certain stances about Cuba , ” Duany , a Cuban-born anthropologist , said .
“ It ’ s a personal and a family issue , not just an abstract question .
They ’ re very aware that they ’ re here precisely because their families were forced to come to the United States because of the Cuban Revolution.
” Though the divides seem clear , in a year in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every 30 seconds in the United States , younger voters have turned digital spaces like the video-sharing app TikTok into electoral battlegrounds .
Many Cuban American millennials and Gen Zers are taking to the platform to mock their older conservative relatives , given persistent homophobia and racism within the Cuban American community in recent years .
The latest viral phenomenon is a recent Trump Spanish-language campaign jingle that features a salsa trio singing , “ Yo voy a votar por Donald Trump ” ( “ I will vote for Donald Trump ” ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6,000 videos on TikTok that have racked up hundreds of thousands of hits combined .
An overwhelming majority of these videos feature young Latinos mocking their Trump supporter relatives , a way Cuban American liberals have found to engage politically with fellow progressives in their overwhelmingly conservative community .
“ I have no choice but to talk about politics since my whole entity within this society is political , ” said Carlos Fariñas , a 27-year-old queer content creator and South Florida native whose videos on TikTok have been liked by more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ social media wave and trying to increase the margin among young voters , Democrats seem intent on chipping away at the Cold War narratives that still motivate especially older Cuban Americans .
A recent Spanish-language ad paid by former New York Mayor Mike Bloomberg features a 78-year-old Bay of Pigs veteran arguing that “ we either vote for Biden or we bury democracy in this country.
” To the extent that Biden has addressed the Cuban American community , it ’ s essentially been to rehash the Obama administration ’ s effort to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. policies and encourage a democratic opening on the island .
During a campaign rally in Miami earlier this month , Biden recognized Cuban Americans as the “ best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba.
” “ We also need a new Cuba policy , ” the Democratic candidate said .
“ Empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future is central to a national security interest in the United States.
” But the online electoral fight within the Cuban American community is also taking place against a backdrop of election-related disinformation .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Facebook and WhatsApp disinformation campaigns were targeting Spanish-speaking communities in South Florida to spread conspiracy theories and other false information .
In September , the Miami Herald apologized for running a racist and homophobic insert for eight months alongside its Spanish-language version El Nuevo Herald .
And Miami-based Radio Caracol , a station of Colombia ’ s largest radio network , gave airtime to a conspiracy theorist who said a Biden victory would lead to a dictatorship led by “ Jews and Blacks.
” Many of those campaigns—which go beyond the level @ @ @ @ @ @ @ almost unnoticed because there is a significant overlap between South Florida ’ s immigrant community and conservatives back home in Latin America , said Eduardo Gamarra , a specialist in Latino public opinion at FIU .
“ So some of the racist and anti-Semitic messaging is not foreign to them , ” he added .
This behavior is precisely what has motivated many young Cuban Americans to engage politically online , calling out conservative relatives “ for their privilege.
” “ I remember my first viral video was of my frustration toward racist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are relatives of mine , ” said Fariñas , who is half Cuban and half Colombian .
“ I pretty much talked about the hypocrisy and manipulation within the Cuban community .
There ’ s clearly a problem , and it needs to be called out .
”

Looking over the electoral map ahead of next week’s U.S. presidential election, Democrats are excited about a youth Latino bulge in Florida. A new Telemundo poll released today shows Democratic nominee Joe Biden polling slightly ahead among Florida Latinos, with a nine-point lead among Latinos under 50. But in a state dominated by conservative Cuban Americans, that’s due largely to support from more liberal communities such as Puerto Ricans in Central Florida.
Looking over the electoral map ahead of next week’s U.S. presidential election, Democrats are excited about a youth Latino bulge in Florida. A new Telemundo poll released today shows Democratic nominee Joe Biden polling slightly ahead among Florida Latinos, with a nine-point lead among Latinos under 50. But in a state dominated by conservative Cuban Americans, that’s due largely to support from more liberal communities such as Puerto Ricans in Central Florida.
When it comes to the largest Latino community in South Florida, President Donald Trump is well ahead: 71 percent of Cuban Americans of all ages across Florida intend to vote for the president. And despite years of talk that generational change would turn younger Cubans into a less-reliable Republican vote, that doesn’t seem to be the case. That’s a big deal: An estimated 440,000 Cuban American voters in Florida are under 40, over four times Trump’s margin of victory in the state four years ago.
Even voters who are too young to remember the Cuban Revolution remain wary of Fidel Castro’s legacy and worry some brand of socialist politics might reach Florida’s shores if Biden wins next week.
“There is this whole narrative that Cuban American youth are more liberal than their parents because they aren’t beholden to the politics of the Cold War,” said Geraldo Cadava, the author of The Hispanic Republican, a history of Latino conservatism in the United States. “But there are nuances to that.”
In comparison to other Latino groups, Cuban Americans have a unique immigration story. While Sen. Bernie Sanders, a democratic socialist, witnessed a surge in support from Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans during the Democratic primaries, acquiring the nickname “Tío Bernie,” and Biden has a lead with Latinos overall, some Cuban Americans have emphatically refused to support even centrist Democrats like Biden—and are turning even more toward Trump.
Ahead of the 2016 election, only 21 percent of Cuban American voters under 40 in Miami-Dade County said they would vote for Trump, according to that year’s Florida International University (FIU) Cuba Poll. This year, that number is surging: The 2020 FIU Cuba Poll shows 55 percent intend to do so, and an even higher percentage approve of Trump’s handling of key issues such as immigration and health care.
Even though younger Cuban Americans didn’t witness socialism first hand, their upbringing was still “shaped by the trauma of exile,” Jorge Duany, the director of the Cuban Research Institute at FIU, said.
“They feel very strongly about not offending their parents and grandparents by traveling to Cuba, or by taking certain stances about Cuba,” Duany, a Cuban-born anthropologist, said. “It’s a personal and a family issue, not just an abstract question. They’re very aware that they’re here precisely because their families were forced to come to the United States because of the Cuban Revolution.”
Though the divides seem clear, in a year in which a Latino becomes eligible to vote every 30 seconds in the United States, younger voters have turned digital spaces like the video-sharing app TikTok into electoral battlegrounds. Many Cuban American millennials and Gen Zers are taking to the platform to mock their older conservative relatives, given persistent homophobia and racism within the Cuban American community in recent years.
The latest viral phenomenon is a recent Trump Spanish-language campaign jingle that features a salsa trio singing, “Yo voy a votar por Donald Trump” (“I will vote for Donald Trump”). The audio clip has appeared in 6,000 videos on TikTok that have racked up hundreds of thousands of hits combined. An overwhelming majority of these videos feature young Latinos mocking their Trump supporter relatives, a way Cuban American liberals have found to engage politically with fellow progressives in their overwhelmingly conservative community.
“I have no choice but to talk about politics since my whole entity within this society is political,” said Carlos Fariñas, a 27-year-old queer content creator and South Florida native whose videos on TikTok have been liked by more than 350,000 people.
Instead of riding the social media wave and trying to increase the margin among young voters, Democrats seem intent on chipping away at the Cold War narratives that still motivate especially older Cuban Americans. A recent Spanish-language ad paid by former New York Mayor Mike Bloomberg features a 78-year-old Bay of Pigs veteran arguing that “we either vote for Biden or we bury democracy in this country.”
To the extent that Biden has addressed the Cuban American community, it’s essentially been to rehash the Obama administration’s effort to overturn more than a half-century of failed U.S. policies and encourage a democratic opening on the island. During a campaign rally in Miami earlier this month, Biden recognized Cuban Americans as the “best ambassadors for freedom in Cuba.”
“We also need a new Cuba policy,” the Democratic candidate said. “Empowering the Cuban people to determine their own future is central to a national security interest in the United States.”
But the online electoral fight within the Cuban American community is also taking place against a backdrop of election-related disinformation. Last month, a Politico investigation indicated that Facebook and WhatsApp disinformation campaigns were targeting Spanish-speaking communities in South Florida to spread conspiracy theories and other false information. In September, the Miami Herald apologized for running a racist and homophobic insert for eight months alongside its Spanish-language version El Nuevo Herald. And Miami-based Radio Caracol, a station of Colombia’s largest radio network, gave airtime to a conspiracy theorist who said a Biden victory would lead to a dictatorship led by “Jews and Blacks.”
Many of those campaigns—which go beyond the level of disinformation seen in Florida in 2016—go almost unnoticed because there is a significant overlap between South Florida’s immigrant community and conservatives back home in Latin America, said Eduardo Gamarra, a specialist in Latino public opinion at FIU. “So some of the racist and anti-Semitic messaging is not foreign to them,” he added.
This behavior is precisely what has motivated many young Cuban Americans to engage politically online, calling out conservative relatives “for their privilege.”
“I remember my first viral video was of my frustration toward racist, homophobic, Cuban white supremacists who are relatives of mine,” said Fariñas, who is half Cuban and half Colombian. “I pretty much talked about the hypocrisy and manipulation within the Cuban community. There’s clearly a problem, and it needs to be called out.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--Wilbur Ross Remained on Chinese Joint Venture Board While Running U.S.-China Trade War

Wilbur Ross , an investor-turned-U.S. commerce secretary , has long been accused of ethical violations because of his failure to extricate himself from his business ties .
Documents obtained by Foreign Policy show that Ross ’ s potential conflicts of interest around Chinese business are greater than previously known .
In Chinese corporate documents obtained by Foreign Policy , Ross is listed as serving on the board of a Chinese joint venture until January 2019—nearly two years into his term as commerce secretary .
That joint venture , now called Huaneng Invesco WLR ( Beijing ) Investment Fund Management Co. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ September 2008 between Huaneng Capital Services , the U.S. management company Invesco , and a firm Ross founded , WL Ross & Co. Huaneng Capital Services is an arm of China Huaneng Group , a major state-owned power producer .
The documents correspond to the information found on Chinese corporate data sites , such as Qichacha and Qixinbao , including the dates of board membership .
The documents don ’ t say if Ross was paid for his board seat or whether there is any current financial relationship between Ross and the joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Ross knew that he remained on the board seat : The more recent documents don ’ t include the signatures or seals of the individual board members .
That Chinese documents state Ross was on the board of a Chinese joint venture until 2019 has not been previously reported .
The U.S.-China trade war started heating up in the summer of 2018 , as Beijing and Washington levied increasingly onerous tariffs on each other .
At the same time as Ross was overseeing the trade war as U.S. commerce secretary , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , on the board of a joint venture that was a partnership with a Chinese state-owned firm .
“ Instead of reporting on well-documented facts , including a dated and signed letter of resignation that I provided them , Foreign Policy Magazine is purporting a false narrative that I remained on the board of a Chinese company , citing Chinese documentation , ” Ross replied in a statement sent by the U.S. Commerce Department .
“ It is clear which foreign policies Foreign Policy Magazine actually support and the American public deserves better.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy is dated Feb. 27 , 2017 , marked “ Confidential , ” and has as its subject line “ Re : Resignation from WLR Entities.
” In the letter , addressed to WL Ross & Co. , Ross writes that he “ shall be deemed to have retired , resigned or withdrawn ” from every entity affiliated with WL Ross & Co. Ross lists dozens of companies that he claims the letter applies to , including those affiliated with Huaneng .
But Chinese corporate law experts consulted by Foreign Policy say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private letter to a U.S. parent company does not remove one from Chinese corporate boards .
( Invesco , which owns WL Ross & Co. , declined to comment for this story . )
“ The failure to withdraw from the board may have just been an inadvertent slip , but what you said is clearly not a ‘ false narrative , ’ ” said Fred Rocafort , an attorney at the international law firm Harris Bricken .
“ Chinese corporate records establish , without a doubt , that he was officially on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Ross ’ s position as commerce secretary allowed him to influence the direction of the U.S.-China trade war and America ’ s global trade policies .
While there is no evidence that Ross directly benefited from the joint venture while serving as commerce secretary , entanglements like this have traditionally been seen as potential violations of the national interest .
“ Public trust demands that all employees act in the public ’ s interest , and are free from any actual or perceived conflicts when fulfilling the governmental responsibilities entrusted to them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Office of Government Ethics wrote to Ross in a July 2018 letter , about other inadvertent ethical violations .
On March 20 , 2017 , less than a month after Ross was confirmed as commerce secretary , the joint venture entered into a partnership with the parent company Huaneng and Taikang Assets Management Co. , a subsidiary of the major Chinese insurance firm Taikang .
The companies agreed to raise 5 billion RMB ( $ 745 million ) to invest in renewable energy projects—a market that Ross had influence over at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by trade tariffs .
Ross ’ s relationship to the Taikang partnership has not been previously reported .
( Taikang Assets and Huaneng didn ’ t respond to requests for comment .
A representative of the Huaneng joint venture , Catherine Han , didn ’ t respond to requests for comment . )
One set of documents that Foreign Policy obtained , dated March 2018 , show that the joint venture filed paperwork stating which of its previous board members would continue to serve on the board .
Ross ’ s name is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from January 2019 , removes Ross from the board and appoints the investor Nadim Qureshi as a new board member .
Qureshi served on the board until September 2020 .
( At the time , Qureshi was a managing partner at WL Ross & Co. , according to his LinkedIn profile ; he didn ’ t respond to a request for comment . )
The joint venture affixed its seal to the document .
Under Chinese law , a seal is generally seen as more official than a signature .
Ross attended a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an agreement with other directors to , among other changes , increase the company ’ s registered capital to 170 million RMB ( $ 25 million ) and its total investment to 510 million RMB ( $ 76 million ) and to change the name of the joint venture from Huaneng Invesco WLR Investment Consulting Co. to its current name .
Long bullish about investing in China , Ross and his firm WL Ross & Co. , along with Invesco , formed the joint venture to “ tap into private equity investments in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firm said in a 2008 press release .
In 2000 , Ross founded the private equity firm WL Ross & Co. , which focused on distressed assets .
He sold the firm to the money manager Amvescap ( now Invesco ) in 2006 .
Ross continued serving as the CEO of Invesco ’ s private equity groups until joining the government in February 2017 .
But Ross only sold his shares in Invesco in December 2017—nearly a year into his tenure as commerce secretary .
He was supposed to sell his shares , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50 million , before the end of May 2017 .
But the nonprofit Center for Public Integrity found that , because Invesco ’ s stock rose in the meantime , the delay netted Ross between $ 1.2 million and $ 6 million .
“ I discovered that the previously held stock had not been sold .
I then promptly sold these shares , ” he later wrote in a disclosure .
Ross has been repeatedly warned about ethics violations .
In his December 2016 ethics disclosure forms , Ross disclosed that he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ venture , from 2008 until “ present.
” In March 2018 , the nonprofit liberal advocacy group Public Citizen released a report titled “ Follow the Money : Did Administration Officials ’ Financial Entanglements with China Delay Trump ’ s Promised Tough-on-China Trade Policy ?
” The report discusses many of Ross ’ s alleged conflicts of interest with China , including his relationship with Diamond S Shipping , a Connecticut-headquartered firm that at the time was partially owned by the Chinese government .
The report also mentions Ross ’ s relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interview with the Washington Post , Ross denied ever having any conflicts of interest while in government . )
In July 2018 , the Office of Government Ethics wrote a scathing public letter to Ross , criticizing him for “ various omissions and inaccurate statements ” in his disclosure forms and compliance documents .
“ [ E ] ven inadvertent errors regarding compliance with your ethical obligations can undermine public trust in both you and the overall ethics program , ” the letter states .
In response , Ross filed an extensive annual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In February 2019 , the director of the Office of Government Ethics refused to certify the report because Ross didn ’ t sell all his shares in the Florida-based bank BankUnited .
But there was another possible error in Ross ’ s 2018 financial disclosure report .
In the report , Ross claims that he had left the Huaneng joint venture in February 2017 .
But according to Chinese law , he was still a director of the joint venture until 2019 .
This error , however inadvertent , on Ross ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported .
Having close ties with the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) is seen as a requisite for succeeding in private equity in China , especially in the power sector , which is dominated by well-connected state-owned firms .
For example , Li Xiaopeng , the son of former Chinese Premier Li Peng , ran Huaneng from 1999 until the summer of 2008 , when he left to become vice governor of the province of Shanxi .
He ’ s now China ’ s transportation minister .
Of the five other people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ board with Ross from 2018 to 2019 , at least two are members of the CCP , according to their bios on a Chinese corporate registry site .
Invesco ’ s press release about the joint venture has been removed from its website , but it ’ s still available on the Wayback Machine , a nonprofit digital web archive .
“ This unique collaboration , ” Ross said in the release , benefits from the “ skillsets and relationships of a powerful Chinese partner , one of the largest state-owned enterprises.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ living proof of the financial and intellectual interconnectedness of two of the world ’ s great powers , China and the United States .
”

Wilbur Ross, an investor-turned-U.S. commerce secretary, has long been accused of ethical violations because of his failure to extricate himself from his business ties. Documents obtained by Foreign Policy show that Ross’s potential conflicts of interest around Chinese business are greater than previously known.
Wilbur Ross, an investor-turned-U.S. commerce secretary, has long been accused of ethical violations because of his failure to extricate himself from his business ties. Documents obtained by Foreign Policy show that Ross’s potential conflicts of interest around Chinese business are greater than previously known.
In Chinese corporate documents obtained by Foreign Policy, Ross is listed as serving on the board of a Chinese joint venture until January 2019—nearly two years into his term as commerce secretary. That joint venture, now called Huaneng Invesco WLR (Beijing) Investment Fund Management Co., is an investment partnership formed in September 2008 between Huaneng Capital Services, the U.S. management company Invesco, and a firm Ross founded, WL Ross & Co. Huaneng Capital Services is an arm of China Huaneng Group, a major state-owned power producer.
The documents correspond to the information found on Chinese corporate data sites, such as Qichacha and Qixinbao, including the dates of board membership. The documents don’t say if Ross was paid for his board seat or whether there is any current financial relationship between Ross and the joint venture. It’s also unclear if Ross knew that he remained on the board seat: The more recent documents don’t include the signatures or seals of the individual board members. That Chinese documents state Ross was on the board of a Chinese joint venture until 2019 has not been previously reported.
The U.S.-China trade war started heating up in the summer of 2018, as Beijing and Washington levied increasingly onerous tariffs on each other. At the same time as Ross was overseeing the trade war as U.S. commerce secretary, he was still, according to the paperwork, on the board of a joint venture that was a partnership with a Chinese state-owned firm. “Instead of reporting on well-documented facts, including a dated and signed letter of resignation that I provided them, Foreign Policy Magazine is purporting a false narrative that I remained on the board of a Chinese company, citing Chinese documentation,” Ross replied in a statement sent by the U.S. Commerce Department. “It is clear which foreign policies Foreign Policy Magazine actually support and the American public deserves better.”
The letter that Ross provided to Foreign Policy is dated Feb. 27, 2017, marked “Confidential,” and has as its subject line “Re: Resignation from WLR Entities.” In the letter, addressed to WL Ross & Co., Ross writes that he “shall be deemed to have retired, resigned or withdrawn” from every entity affiliated with WL Ross & Co. Ross lists dozens of companies that he claims the letter applies to, including those affiliated with Huaneng. But Chinese corporate law experts consulted by Foreign Policy say that under Chinese law, writing a private letter to a U.S. parent company does not remove one from Chinese corporate boards. (Invesco, which owns WL Ross & Co., declined to comment for this story.) “The failure to withdraw from the board may have just been an inadvertent slip, but what you said is clearly not a ‘false narrative,’” said Fred Rocafort, an attorney at the international law firm Harris Bricken. “Chinese corporate records establish, without a doubt, that he was officially on the board until February 1, 2019.”
Ross’s position as commerce secretary allowed him to influence the direction of the U.S.-China trade war and America’s global trade policies. While there is no evidence that Ross directly benefited from the joint venture while serving as commerce secretary, entanglements like this have traditionally been seen as potential violations of the national interest. “Public trust demands that all employees act in the public’s interest, and are free from any actual or perceived conflicts when fulfilling the governmental responsibilities entrusted to them,” the then-acting director of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics wrote to Ross in a July 2018 letter, about other inadvertent ethical violations.
On March 20, 2017, less than a month after Ross was confirmed as commerce secretary, the joint venture entered into a partnership with the parent company Huaneng and Taikang Assets Management Co., a subsidiary of the major Chinese insurance firm Taikang. The companies agreed to raise 5 billion RMB ($745 million) to invest in renewable energy projects—a market that Ross had influence over at the Commerce Department and which was directly affected by trade tariffs. Ross’s relationship to the Taikang partnership has not been previously reported. (Taikang Assets and Huaneng didn’t respond to requests for comment. A representative of the Huaneng joint venture, Catherine Han, didn’t respond to requests for comment.)
One set of documents that Foreign Policy obtained, dated March 2018, show that the joint venture filed paperwork stating which of its previous board members would continue to serve on the board. Ross’s name is on that list. Another document, from January 2019, removes Ross from the board and appoints the investor Nadim Qureshi as a new board member. Qureshi served on the board until September 2020. (At the time, Qureshi was a managing partner at WL Ross & Co., according to his LinkedIn profile; he didn’t respond to a request for comment.) The joint venture affixed its seal to the document. Under Chinese law, a seal is generally seen as more official than a signature.
Ross attended a board meeting in September 2012 and signed an agreement with other directors to, among other changes, increase the company’s registered capital to 170 million RMB ($25 million) and its total investment to 510 million RMB ($76 million) and to change the name of the joint venture from Huaneng Invesco WLR Investment Consulting Co. to its current name.
Long bullish about investing in China, Ross and his firm WL Ross & Co., along with Invesco, formed the joint venture to “tap into private equity investments in power generation in China,” the firm said in a 2008 press release. In 2000, Ross founded the private equity firm WL Ross & Co., which focused on distressed assets. He sold the firm to the money manager Amvescap (now Invesco) in 2006.
Ross continued serving as the CEO of Invesco’s private equity groups until joining the government in February 2017. But Ross only sold his shares in Invesco in December 2017—nearly a year into his tenure as commerce secretary. He was supposed to sell his shares, valued between $10 million and $50 million, before the end of May 2017. But the nonprofit Center for Public Integrity found that, because Invesco’s stock rose in the meantime, the delay netted Ross between $1.2 million and $6 million. “I discovered that the previously held stock had not been sold. I then promptly sold these shares,” he later wrote in a disclosure.
Ross has been repeatedly warned about ethics violations. In his December 2016 ethics disclosure forms, Ross disclosed that he was on the board of the Huaneng joint venture, from 2008 until “present.” In March 2018, the nonprofit liberal advocacy group Public Citizen released a report titled “Follow the Money: Did Administration Officials’ Financial Entanglements with China Delay Trump’s Promised Tough-on-China Trade Policy?” The report discusses many of Ross’s alleged conflicts of interest with China, including his relationship with Diamond S Shipping, a Connecticut-headquartered firm that at the time was partially owned by the Chinese government. The report also mentions Ross’s relationship with Huaneng. (In a September 2019 interview with the Washington Post, Ross denied ever having any conflicts of interest while in government.)
In July 2018, the Office of Government Ethics wrote a scathing public letter to Ross, criticizing him for “various omissions and inaccurate statements” in his disclosure forms and compliance documents. “[E]ven inadvertent errors regarding compliance with your ethical obligations can undermine public trust in both you and the overall ethics program,” the letter states. In response, Ross filed an extensive annual financial disclosure report for that year. In February 2019, the director of the Office of Government Ethics refused to certify the report because Ross didn’t sell all his shares in the Florida-based bank BankUnited.
But there was another possible error in Ross’s 2018 financial disclosure report. In the report, Ross claims that he had left the Huaneng joint venture in February 2017. But according to Chinese law, he was still a director of the joint venture until 2019. This error, however inadvertent, on Ross’s financial disclosure report has not been previously reported.
Having close ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is seen as a requisite for succeeding in private equity in China, especially in the power sector, which is dominated by well-connected state-owned firms. For example, Li Xiaopeng, the son of former Chinese Premier Li Peng, ran Huaneng from 1999 until the summer of 2008, when he left to become vice governor of the province of Shanxi. He’s now China’s transportation minister. Of the five other people who the documents show served on the board with Ross from 2018 to 2019, at least two are members of the CCP, according to their bios on a Chinese corporate registry site.
Invesco’s press release about the joint venture has been removed from its website, but it’s still available on the Wayback Machine, a nonprofit digital web archive. “This unique collaboration,” Ross said in the release, benefits from the “skillsets and relationships of a powerful Chinese partner, one of the largest state-owned enterprises.” And it represents, he added, “living proof of the financial and intellectual interconnectedness of two of the world’s great powers, China and the United States.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--Beirut Is a Shambles, and Only Refugees Are Helping

Beirut Is a Shambles , and Only Refugees Are Helping Syrian workers are rebuilding blast-hit areas in Beirut , one window at a time .
Often reviled by politicians for allegedly burdening the civic infrastructure , stealing jobs , and living off subsidies meant for the Lebanese , Syrian refugees have shown up in Lebanon ’ s hour of need .
They are building windows , repairing doors , painting houses , and replacing glass in high-rise apartment buildings—some of which belong to the same Lebanese who have long rooted for the refugees to leave .
For all their manual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pittance—payment further devalued by a plummeting Lebanese pound that has lost 80 percent of its value since a year ago .
But more bothersome for many is the continued lack of respect .
Hardly any of the refugees toiling to resurrect Beirut to its former glory believe their contribution will be remembered when the story of the city ’ s resurgence is told .
Almost three months after thousands of tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut ’ s port and damaged many districts popular with locals and tourists , much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The international community has so far only provided minimal emergency aid , including basic help with housing .
“ Shelter rehabilitation works are the last step in UNHCR ’ s response , ” said Lisa Abou Khaled , the spokesperson of the U.N. refugee agency managing the humanitarian response of several of its international and local partners .
“ While UNHCR recognizes the impact of the blast on businesses and challenges business owners face , UNHCR ’ s current response is focusing on ensuring people have safe and secure living conditions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Abou Khaled said .
The international agency has provided 6,500 weatherproofing kits and $ 600 in cash assistance to over a thousand families ( about 4,000 people ) and intends to reach out to 10 times more .
The U.S. government has routed medical and food aid through agencies while the Germans are supporting a soup kitchen and promised to spend a million euros on a farmers market .
“ Rebuilding the market secures the livelihoods of around 100 smallholders , ” a spokesperson for the German development agency GIZ said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , fall far short of what is required to rebuild and revive the city .
The United Nations estimates that 219,000 individuals living in 73,000 apartments located across 9,100 buildings were directly impacted by the explosion .
None has received any help from the government , and most have yet to receive support from international agencies to rebuild their homes and shops .
A senior diplomatic source told Foreign Policy that the international community , led by the French , is currently searching for potential partners with which to coordinate the major reconstruction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since the government is the biggest administrator and answerable to its people , funds are directed through it .
But in Lebanon people have lost trust in the political elite and don ’ t want any aid or investment to be channeled through the government .
“ To fund the next phase of reconstruction , there needs to be a local entity approved by someone in authority—that will have to be the government of the day , I ’ m afraid .
We can ’ t think of who else it could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on possible alternative mechanisms , ” the diplomat said , “ but the international community certainly wants political activists from the civil society to be a part of this entity.
” Moreover , the international funding for the next phase of reconstruction is intricately linked to reforms that the government has been asked to usher in .
Saad Hariri , who returned as prime minister last week , has promised to unveil reforms , but he has still failed to present his cabinet , and further details have not been forthcoming .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the international community scrambles to help , Syrian workers are visible on the streets .
They have proved to be more reliable for home- and business owners who have , on their own , started to slowly repair their damaged properties .
Syrians , too , died in the catastrophe and left behind desperate families .
At least 40 were killed in the blast , hundreds were injured , and eight are still hospitalized .
Ayman al-Homsi , a delivery boy for a restaurant , was killed by a huge shard of glass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Gemmayze Street .
His uncle , Akram al-Homsi , has been grappling with many long-term ailments and said Ayman was the sole breadwinner of the family .
He provided for Akram ’ s five children , his parents in Syria , and a newlywed wife .
“ Now my 13-year-old daughter is forced to work at a sewing shop to earn for us , ” Akram said .
The living conditions of Syrians in Lebanon deteriorated in tandem with their hosts , but since they were already the bottom rung of society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently released study by the International Labour Organization said Syrians were worst off during the coronavirus lockdown too .
Sixty percent of Syrian respondents were laid off during the lockdown , and higher layoffs were found among self-employed workers , the study found .
Many like Akram find themselves trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea : The Lebanese want them gone , and Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime is discouraging their return by making it more expensive .
“ It costs each person a PCR test [ for COVID-19 ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria , in addition to the transportation costs .
We are six people .
It will cost me a fortune to return.
” Activists fear that the pre-blast meager earnings of 200,000 Syrians who live in the capital have downgraded sharply as the explosion punctured a gaping hole in the pockets of the Lebanese .
According to UNHCR , the proportion of refugees living in extreme poverty jumped from 55 percent to 80 percent in recent months .
Abdul Latif has been painting damaged houses in Geitawi , another area in East Beirut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
His home in Deir Ezzor in Syria was destroyed by regime shelling , and while he thought he found safety in Lebanon , the port explosion smashed the doors and windows of his rented accommodation in Karantina , next to the harbor .
For Latif , it was like losing his home all over again .
He earned 45,000 Lebanese pounds a day , which used to be about $ 30 before the economic crisis in Lebanon ; now it is roughly between $ 5 and $ 6 .
He says he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home in Syria , but painting the homes of his hosts gives him solace .
“ At such a time , it ’ s not about what the Lebanese pay us , but it would be nice if our Lebanese landlord would repair his house that we live in.
” Some Lebanese , however , take the Syrians ’ hard work for granted , seeing it as purely transactional .
A manager at a pub that is among the very few to rebuild and reopen , thanks to online donations and the long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Syrians have always been construction workers in Lebanon and for their own benefit .
“ They get paid for it .
That is why they do it , ” he said .
Nasser Yassin , a professor at the American University of Beirut and a political analyst , said that even though the refugees have been adding productively to Lebanon ’ s economy and stand ready to contribute whatever skills they are allowed to exhibit , wider public perception is unlikely to change .
“ Anti-refugee narratives are constructed over time by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to stop using the anti-refugee card even though it is the refugees rebuilding the destroyed homes , ” Yassin said .
There is , of course , nothing unusual about the views of the pub manager .
They are common in Beirut , where discrimination is a daily part of Syrians ’ lives .
But the hidden roots of this hostility are political .
Lebanon ’ s fate has always been inextricably intertwined with its Syrian neighbor , but the recent record of machinations by Syrian governments to control Lebanon—by deploying boots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ propping up proponents of a unified greater Syria , and exerting influence through its ally Hezbollah—has infuriated many Lebanese .
The long Syrian civil war led 1.5 million Syrians to flee to Lebanon , further straining the relationship .
“ It is the Syrian regime we oppose , ” the pub manager said , “ because it works with forces inside Lebanon that have ruined our country.
” There is hope that the Beirut blast might allow the neighbors to rebuild a renewed understanding of one another .
Mohammad Ahmad , a mason @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an art deco house near the port minutes before the explosion hit .
He escaped with his life , but the blast triggered some haunting memories .
“ It was as if I was back in Syria .
Beirut resembled a bombed Syrian city , ” he said .
“ I know what it feels like to lose your neighborhood .
”

Syrian workers are rebuilding blast-hit areas in Beirut, one window at a time. Often reviled by politicians for allegedly burdening the civic infrastructure, stealing jobs, and living off subsidies meant for the Lebanese, Syrian refugees have shown up in Lebanon’s hour of need. They are building windows, repairing doors, painting houses, and replacing glass in high-rise apartment buildings—some of which belong to the same Lebanese who have long rooted for the refugees to leave.
Syrian workers are rebuilding blast-hit areas in Beirut, one window at a time. Often reviled by politicians for allegedly burdening the civic infrastructure, stealing jobs, and living off subsidies meant for the Lebanese, Syrian refugees have shown up in Lebanon’s hour of need. They are building windows, repairing doors, painting houses, and replacing glass in high-rise apartment buildings—some of which belong to the same Lebanese who have long rooted for the refugees to leave.
For all their manual labor, they have received only a pittance—payment further devalued by a plummeting Lebanese pound that has lost 80 percent of its value since a year ago. But more bothersome for many is the continued lack of respect. Hardly any of the refugees toiling to resurrect Beirut to its former glory believe their contribution will be remembered when the story of the city’s resurgence is told.
Almost three months after thousands of tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded at Beirut’s port and damaged many districts popular with locals and tourists, much of the city still lies in ruins. The international community has so far only provided minimal emergency aid, including basic help with housing. “Shelter rehabilitation works are the last step in UNHCR’s response,” said Lisa Abou Khaled, the spokesperson of the U.N. refugee agency managing the humanitarian response of several of its international and local partners.
“While UNHCR recognizes the impact of the blast on businesses and challenges business owners face, UNHCR’s current response is focusing on ensuring people have safe and secure living conditions, particularly prior to the winter season,” Abou Khaled said. The international agency has provided 6,500 weatherproofing kits and $600 in cash assistance to over a thousand families (about 4,000 people) and intends to reach out to 10 times more. The U.S. government has routed medical and food aid through agencies while the Germans are supporting a soup kitchen and promised to spend a million euros on a farmers market. “Rebuilding the market secures the livelihoods of around 100 smallholders,” a spokesperson for the German development agency GIZ said.
The efforts, numerous and well meant, fall far short of what is required to rebuild and revive the city. The United Nations estimates that 219,000 individuals living in 73,000 apartments located across 9,100 buildings were directly impacted by the explosion. None has received any help from the government, and most have yet to receive support from international agencies to rebuild their homes and shops.
A senior diplomatic source told Foreign Policy that the international community, led by the French, is currently searching for potential partners with which to coordinate the major reconstruction projects. In most other countries, since the government is the biggest administrator and answerable to its people, funds are directed through it. But in Lebanon people have lost trust in the political elite and don’t want any aid or investment to be channeled through the government. “To fund the next phase of reconstruction, there needs to be a local entity approved by someone in authority—that will have to be the government of the day, I’m afraid. We can’t think of who else it could be, although the World Bank is working on possible alternative mechanisms,” the diplomat said, “but the international community certainly wants political activists from the civil society to be a part of this entity.”
Moreover, the international funding for the next phase of reconstruction is intricately linked to reforms that the government has been asked to usher in. Saad Hariri, who returned as prime minister last week, has promised to unveil reforms, but he has still failed to present his cabinet, and further details have not been forthcoming.
As the political elite quarrels over ministries and the international community scrambles to help, Syrian workers are visible on the streets. They have proved to be more reliable for home- and business owners who have, on their own, started to slowly repair their damaged properties.
Syrians, too, died in the catastrophe and left behind desperate families. At least 40 were killed in the blast, hundreds were injured, and eight are still hospitalized. Ayman al-Homsi, a delivery boy for a restaurant, was killed by a huge shard of glass that slashed him while he was driving on Gemmayze Street. His uncle, Akram al-Homsi, has been grappling with many long-term ailments and said Ayman was the sole breadwinner of the family. He provided for Akram’s five children, his parents in Syria, and a newlywed wife. “Now my 13-year-old daughter is forced to work at a sewing shop to earn for us,” Akram said.
The living conditions of Syrians in Lebanon deteriorated in tandem with their hosts, but since they were already the bottom rung of society, it pinched them harder. A recently released study by the International Labour Organization said Syrians were worst off during the coronavirus lockdown too. Sixty percent of Syrian respondents were laid off during the lockdown, and higher layoffs were found among self-employed workers, the study found.
Many like Akram find themselves trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea: The Lebanese want them gone, and Bashar al-Assad’s regime is discouraging their return by making it more expensive. “It costs each person a PCR test [for COVID-19], then $100 entry fees to Syria, in addition to the transportation costs. We are six people. It will cost me a fortune to return.”
Activists fear that the pre-blast meager earnings of 200,000 Syrians who live in the capital have downgraded sharply as the explosion punctured a gaping hole in the pockets of the Lebanese. According to UNHCR, the proportion of refugees living in extreme poverty jumped from 55 percent to 80 percent in recent months.
Abdul Latif has been painting damaged houses in Geitawi, another area in East Beirut that bore the brunt of the blast. His home in Deir Ezzor in Syria was destroyed by regime shelling, and while he thought he found safety in Lebanon, the port explosion smashed the doors and windows of his rented accommodation in Karantina, next to the harbor. For Latif, it was like losing his home all over again. He earned 45,000 Lebanese pounds a day, which used to be about $30 before the economic crisis in Lebanon; now it is roughly between $5 and $6. He says he does not make enough to rebuild his home in Syria, but painting the homes of his hosts gives him solace. “At such a time, it’s not about what the Lebanese pay us, but it would be nice if our Lebanese landlord would repair his house that we live in.”
Some Lebanese, however, take the Syrians’ hard work for granted, seeing it as purely transactional. A manager at a pub that is among the very few to rebuild and reopen, thanks to online donations and the long hours put in by Syrian workers, said Syrians have always been construction workers in Lebanon and for their own benefit. “They get paid for it. That is why they do it,” he said.
Nasser Yassin, a professor at the American University of Beirut and a political analyst, said that even though the refugees have been adding productively to Lebanon’s economy and stand ready to contribute whatever skills they are allowed to exhibit, wider public perception is unlikely to change. “Anti-refugee narratives are constructed over time by populist politicians, and they are not going to stop using the anti-refugee card even though it is the refugees rebuilding the destroyed homes,” Yassin said.
There is, of course, nothing unusual about the views of the pub manager. They are common in Beirut, where discrimination is a daily part of Syrians’ lives. But the hidden roots of this hostility are political. Lebanon’s fate has always been inextricably intertwined with its Syrian neighbor, but the recent record of machinations by Syrian governments to control Lebanon—by deploying boots on the ground in the 1970s, propping up proponents of a unified greater Syria, and exerting influence through its ally Hezbollah—has infuriated many Lebanese. The long Syrian civil war led 1.5 million Syrians to flee to Lebanon, further straining the relationship. “It is the Syrian regime we oppose,” the pub manager said, “because it works with forces inside Lebanon that have ruined our country.”
There is hope that the Beirut blast might allow the neighbors to rebuild a renewed understanding of one another. Mohammad Ahmad, a mason, was busy restoring a pillar in an art deco house near the port minutes before the explosion hit. He escaped with his life, but the blast triggered some haunting memories. “It was as if I was back in Syria. Beirut resembled a bombed Syrian city,” he said. “I know what it feels like to lose your neighborhood.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--How Brazil Was ‘Ukrainized’

How Brazil Was ‘Ukrainized’

In March 2016 , when the Twitter user @ fabranquinho predicted that right-wing militias in Brazil might “ Ukrainize ” —that is , radicalize a nascent protest movement against left-wing President Dilma Rousseff in order to provoke government repression , which would then spur further protest—he seemed to introduce Twitter a neologism that would soon spread .
Countless tweets and videos later , by 2020 , the idea spiraled out of control .
The protests against Rousseff , which attracted millions of people , were successful ; the president was eventually ousted in August of that year .
Calls to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement remained largely peaceful in contrast to the Euromaidan in Ukraine a couple of years before , which had its moments of bloodshed and had eventually given way to a war with Russia in the country ’ s eastern stretches .
The protest movement and calls to Ukrainize the conflict did fuel the ambitions of the nascent far-right , however .
In fact , even after the 2018 election of populist President Jair Bolsonaro , the term “ Ukrainize ” has remained , invoking a revolutionary spirit that paints followers as justified combatants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for example , a popular comedic pair called Brasileirinhos ( a diminutive of “ Brazilians ” ) called for their audience to “ Ukrainize ” in a popular video .
The conservative Catholic duo is heavily reliant on anti-politically correct comedy , irony , and retro cultural references .
When asked what they meant by the term , Elton Mesquita , one of the Brasileirinhos duo , responded that “ abusive relationships have to be dealt with with a firm grip.
” For him and his partner , to Ukrainize is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exhaustion with their political class .
Mesquita admitted his limited knowledge of Ukraine .
“ Nonetheless , we believe we ’ ve accomplished our objective to reorient the right ’ s thought toward this frequency , ” he said .
“ The psychological Ukrainization already happened.
” For Andreas Umland , a senior research fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv , Ukraine , the “ Ukrainize ” metaphor is confusing .
“ People know so little about the country that you can take a few dramatic images and then sort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” he said , referring to a meme based on a picture of Ukrainian Member of Parliament Vitaly Zhuravsky , which had become a template for angry Bolsonaro supporters on which to paste the head of their most hated politicians .
Umland also pointed out that Ukraine is highly politically pluralistic , far from the kind of authoritarian state that many who use the term “ Ukrainize ” seem to have in mind .
One benefit of the idea of Ukrainization for Brazil ’ s far-right movement is that it connects them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Accuracy aside , one benefit of the idea of Ukrainization for Brazil ’ s far-right movement is that it connects them to similar movements around the world , especially the American alt-right , which is big departure from the traditional institutionalized right , mostly linked to established political parties .
According to the political scientist Paulo Cassimiro , who studies conservative thought at the University of São Paulo , Brazil ’ s new right does posit “ core ideas of similar American groups , like the concept that there is a ‘ Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being destroyed by the political ‘ elites ’ or the ‘ leftists.
’ ” Another way the term serves Brazil ’ s far-right , according to João Castro Rocha , a comparative literature professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro , is that “ Ukrainize ” circumvents the inconvenient fact that the right is actually in power now .
The term , after all , calls for popular uprising that would lead to a direct democracy government without norm-setting institutions such as courts .
“ This word , ” he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to amplify their digital campaign in support of Bolsonaro.
” Powerful is correct .
This spring , the word shifted from concept to reality when the Brazilian conservative activist Sara Winter created the civilian group “ Brazil ’ s 300.
” Its main objective was to support Bolsonaro ’ s government by putting pressure on democratic institutions through militant and supposedly peaceful means .
When calling for new recruits , Winter used the verb “ Ukrainize ” constantly and said in an interview that “ They are going to have to start being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who has close government ties , has suggested that she was trained—and arrested—in Ukraine years ago .
She was apparently a Nazi sympathizer in her youth : “ Sara Winter ” is a pseudonym apparently inspired by a famous British Nazi .
( Her real name is Sara Giromini . )
She eventually made headlines when her group marched to Congress and set off fireworks in the direction of the Supreme Court buildings .
She and others were arrested a few weeks after that episode due to threats against Supreme Court judges .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ still lingering among Bolsonaro ’ s supporters , even though the president himself has reduced his aggressive stoking of the culture wars in recent months .
Federal investigations loom over his family , and the pandemic is pushing him to reconcile with Congress and the Supreme Court in order to normalize the political landscape and enact emergency rescue measures that are helping him in an unexpected way .
He has seen a popularity boost after approving emergency pandemic aid .
In fact , in recent weeks , Bolsonaro has polled his highest approval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ municipal election year like 2020 , the populist president has no option other than to back away from the tensions that he once stoked—at least until the next crisis arrives and his supporters can once again pull “ Ukrainize ” out of their back pockets .

In March 2016, when the Twitter user @fabranquinho predicted that right-wing militias in Brazil might “Ukrainize”—that is, radicalize a nascent protest movement against left-wing President Dilma Rousseff in order to provoke government repression, which would then spur further protest—he seemed to introduce Twitter a neologism that would soon spread. Countless tweets and videos later, by 2020, the idea spiraled out of control .
In March 2016, when the Twitter user @fabranquinho predicted that right-wing militias in Brazil might “Ukrainize”—that is, radicalize a nascent protest movement against left-wing President Dilma Rousseff in order to provoke government repression, which would then spur further protest—he seemed to introduce Twitter a neologism that would soon spread. Countless tweets and videos later, by 2020, the idea spiraled out of control.
The protests against Rousseff, which attracted millions of people, were successful; the president was eventually ousted in August of that year. Calls to Ukrainize—ucranizar in Portuguese—aside, however, the movement remained largely peaceful in contrast to the Euromaidan in Ukraine a couple of years before, which had its moments of bloodshed and had eventually given way to a war with Russia in the country’s eastern stretches.
The protest movement and calls to Ukrainize the conflict did fuel the ambitions of the nascent far-right, however. In fact, even after the 2018 election of populist President Jair Bolsonaro, the term “Ukrainize” has remained, invoking a revolutionary spirit that paints followers as justified combatants against an oppressive elite.
In 2019, for example, a popular comedic pair called Brasileirinhos (a diminutive of “Brazilians”) called for their audience to “Ukrainize” in a popular video. The conservative Catholic duo is heavily reliant on anti-politically correct comedy, irony, and retro cultural references. When asked what they meant by the term, Elton Mesquita, one of the Brasileirinhos duo, responded that “abusive relationships have to be dealt with with a firm grip.” For him and his partner, to Ukrainize is a symbolic expression of the people’s exhaustion with their political class. Mesquita admitted his limited knowledge of Ukraine. “Nonetheless, we believe we’ve accomplished our objective to reorient the right’s thought toward this frequency,” he said. “The psychological Ukrainization already happened.”
For Andreas Umland, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, Ukraine, the “Ukrainize” metaphor is confusing. “People know so little about the country that you can take a few dramatic images and then sort of interpret it on your own way,” he said, referring to a meme based on a picture of Ukrainian Member of Parliament Vitaly Zhuravsky being thrown in a dumpster , which had become a template for angry Bolsonaro supporters on which to paste the head of their most hated politicians. Umland also pointed out that Ukraine is highly politically pluralistic, far from the kind of authoritarian state that many who use the term “Ukrainize” seem to have in mind.
One benefit of the idea of Ukrainization for Brazil’s far-right movement is that it connects them to similar movements around the world.
Accuracy aside, one benefit of the idea of Ukrainization for Brazil’s far-right movement is that it connects them to similar movements around the world, especially the American alt-right, which is big departure from the traditional institutionalized right, mostly linked to established political parties. According to the political scientist Paulo Cassimiro, who studies conservative thought at the University of São Paulo, Brazil’s new right does posit “core ideas of similar American groups, like the concept that there is a ‘Western civilization’ that is at risk of being destroyed by the political ‘elites’ or the ‘leftists.’”
Another way the term serves Brazil’s far-right, according to João Castro Rocha, a comparative literature professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, is that “Ukrainize” circumvents the inconvenient fact that the right is actually in power now. The term, after all, calls for popular uprising that would lead to a direct democracy government without norm-setting institutions such as courts. “This word,” he said, “is a powerful narrative symbol to amplify their digital campaign in support of Bolsonaro.”
Powerful is correct. This spring, the word shifted from concept to reality when the Brazilian conservative activist Sara Winter created the civilian group “Brazil’s 300.” Its main objective was to support Bolsonaro’s government by putting pressure on democratic institutions through militant and supposedly peaceful means. When calling for new recruits, Winter used the verb “Ukrainize” constantly and said in an interview that “They are going to have to start being afraid of us!”
Winter, who has close government ties, has suggested that she was trained—and arrested—in Ukraine years ago. She was apparently a Nazi sympathizer in her youth: “Sara Winter” is a pseudonym apparently inspired by a famous British Nazi. (Her real name is Sara Giromini.) She eventually made headlines when her group marched to Congress and set off fireworks in the direction of the Supreme Court buildings. She and others were arrested a few weeks after that episode due to threats against Supreme Court judges.
For now, pleas to Ukrainize are still lingering among Bolsonaro’s supporters, even though the president himself has reduced his aggressive stoking of the culture wars in recent months. Federal investigations loom over his family, and the pandemic is pushing him to reconcile with Congress and the Supreme Court in order to normalize the political landscape and enact emergency rescue measures that are helping him in an unexpected way. He has seen a popularity boost after approving emergency pandemic aid.
In fact, in recent weeks, Bolsonaro has polled his highest approval rating of his term. In a municipal election year like 2020, the populist president has no option other than to back away from the tensions that he once stoked—at least until the next crisis arrives and his supporters can once again pull “Ukrainize” out of their back pockets.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--The U.S. Finally Has a Sputnik Moment With China

The U.S .
Finally Has a Sputnik Moment With China As I researched global innovation over the past four years , the more I looked into China ’ s amazing ascent as a technological power—amid growing U.S. angst and anti-China anger—the more one puzzling question constantly jumped out at me : Why has there been no “ Sputnik moment ” with China , as occurred early in the Cold War when the Soviet Union launched a satellite into space in 1957 ?
Then , U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower elevated science and technology to a national mission , creating NASA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and development .
True , there ’ s been no single Chinese achievement that made headlines—save perhaps Beijing ’ s recent victory over the coronavirus , muted by having helped spread the virus in the first place .
The fields where China is ahead of the United States , such as financial technology , are largely matters of everyday life , not grand and singular achievements .
But for all the febrile fear and loathing of China , a panoply of tariffs , tech bans , and an unraveling U.S.-China relationship , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about China than competing with it .
Huawei as a national security threat , intellectual property theft , bans on Chinese apps—America ’ s ( mostly legitimate ) grievances against predatory Chinese industrial policies seem to mount by the day .
Yet beyond sanctions and tariffs , there has been little idea how the United States would meet the challenge .
That ’ s no longer the case .
Fears of the United States losing its competitive edge to China have proved so powerful that they have begun to transcend America ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laissez-faire views into a fervent techno-nationalism that may end up looking like Beijing ’ s approach itself .
Much of this exists only in potential at the moment , but it ’ s becoming the new norm .
Sinophobia has turned traditional free market Republicans into advocates , captured in Sen. Marco Rubio ’ s call for a “ pro-American industrial policy.
” This is evident in a flood of legislation in the U.S. Congress : 366 pieces of China-focused legislation filed in 2019-2020—much on trade , investment , and tech—though only a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The mostly bipartisan legislation is also mirrored in Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden ’ s manufacturing plans that look a lot like President Donald Trump ’ s .
Major pending bipartisan tech legislation seeks to boost U.S. manufacturing , promote R & D in key tech sectors , diversify and expand U.S. tech hubs now concentrated on the East Coast and West Coast , and forge a national tech strategy .
Most prominently , a bill likely to soon become law—the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America Act ( CHIPS for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ semiconductor industry .
The CHIPS bill passed as an amendment to the current Defense Authorization Act and may become law before the end of the year .
This is a very big deal .
Why ?
Because semiconductors , a $ 470 billion global industry , are core drivers of all things digital , the foundation and lifeblood of the entire knowledge economy .
China itself , currently dependent on imported chips ( many from Taiwan ) , has been attempting to domesticize its own production—failing to make a 40 percent domestic target @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit a 70 percent target by 2025 .
The CHIPS bill aims to boost and reshore semiconductor manufacturing with a 40 percent tax credit to 2024 for investments in semiconductor equipment or manufacturing facilities ; creates a $ 10 billion matching fund for states and cities to incentivize investment in advanced semiconductor manufacturing ; includes measures for bolstering STEM workforce development ; and parcels out $ 12 billion in R & D to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency , the Department of Energy , the Department of Commerce , and the National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ establish an advanced manufacturing institute .
It also mandates that the administration develop a semiconductor R & D strategy and a public-private national semiconductor technology center .
One provision in the CHIPS bill that moves beyond narrow techno-nationalism seeks to build multilateral cooperation among democracies in supply chain security .
It creates a $ 750 million trust fund to be allocated upon reaching agreement with foreign governments to form a consortium to harmonize policies related to microelectronics , transparency in microelectronics , and greater alignment in policies toward non-market economies .
There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bolster U.S. tech competitiveness , beef up R & D in high tech , incentivize private sector investment , and change the geography of innovation—80 percent of venture capital and 90 percent of tech employment is concentrated in major tech hubs .
For example , several bills would rename the National Science Foundation as the National Science and Technology Foundation , creating a center for technology and authorizing $ 100 billion in R & D funds to support work on artificial intelligence , boost semiconductors , and incentivize geographic diversity , with $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ build tech innovation centers .
The flurry of legislation and the rhetoric of both presidential candidates underscore the degree to which the fear of Chinese tech dominance has animated a newfound bipartisan eagerness to sustain and advance the eroding U.S. innovation edge .
While industrial policies have had mixed success in the United States , the sheer breadth and scope of new resources and public and private collaboration will no doubt have a considerable impact on U.S. tech capacity .
What unintended consequences all the positive and negative aspects of this energized techno-nationalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another question .
In the best-case scenario , the results of the new U.S. zeitgeist may better position Washington—if it can mobilize like-minded partners—to compete with China and pressure Beijing to move back toward promised economic reforms , rolling back many of its state-driven forms of capitalist measures .
In the worst case , it may lead to a bifurcated global economy with conflicting rules , norms , and standards .
One big fear is that the victim of the techno-nationalism trend will be global innovation , which thrives on openness and transparency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stages of what has been dubbed the Fourth Industrial Revolution .
The converging new technologies—AI , big data , robotics , biotech , nanoengineering , new materials , the Internet of Things , 3D printing—merge the digital and physical worlds and will drive economic growth and shape geopolitics in the decades ahead .
It should have been obvious to U.S. officialdom long ago that tech innovation was the fulcrum of the future , but they mostly just paid lip service to it .
Instead , it has taken an existential fear of being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get changes done .
The price may be innovation constrained by techno-nationalism—but the next Sputnik moment is finally here .

As I researched global innovation over the past four years, the more I looked into China’s amazing ascent as a technological power—amid growing U.S. angst and anti-China anger—the more one puzzling question constantly jumped out at me: Why has there been no “Sputnik moment” with China, as occurred early in the Cold War when the Soviet Union launched a satellite into space in 1957? Then, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower elevated science and technology to a national mission, creating NASA and dramatically ramping up support for research and development.
As I researched global innovation over the past four years, the more I looked into China’s amazing ascent as a technological power—amid growing U.S. angst and anti-China anger—the more one puzzling question constantly jumped out at me: Why has there been no “Sputnik moment” with China, as occurred early in the Cold War when the Soviet Union launched a satellite into space in 1957? Then, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower elevated science and technology to a national mission, creating NASA and dramatically ramping up support for research and development.
True, there’s been no single Chinese achievement that made headlines—save perhaps Beijing’s recent victory over the coronavirus, muted by having helped spread the virus in the first place. The fields where China is ahead of the United States, such as financial technology, are largely matters of everyday life, not grand and singular achievements. But for all the febrile fear and loathing of China, a panoply of tariffs, tech bans, and an unraveling U.S.-China relationship, the United States has done far more whining about China than competing with it. Huawei as a national security threat, intellectual property theft, bans on Chinese apps—America’s (mostly legitimate) grievances against predatory Chinese industrial policies seem to mount by the day. Yet beyond sanctions and tariffs, there has been little idea how the United States would meet the challenge.
That’s no longer the case. Fears of the United States losing its competitive edge to China have proved so powerful that they have begun to transcend America’s bitter tribal politics, transforming traditional U.S. laissez-faire views into a fervent techno-nationalism that may end up looking like Beijing’s approach itself. Much of this exists only in potential at the moment, but it’s becoming the new norm.
Sinophobia has turned traditional free market Republicans into advocates, captured in Sen. Marco Rubio’s call for a “pro-American industrial policy.” This is evident in a flood of legislation in the U.S. Congress: 366 pieces of China-focused legislation filed in 2019-2020—much on trade, investment, and tech—though only a handful are likely to become law. The mostly bipartisan legislation is also mirrored in Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden’s manufacturing plans that look a lot like President Donald Trump’s.
Major pending bipartisan tech legislation seeks to boost U.S. manufacturing, promote R&D in key tech sectors, diversify and expand U.S. tech hubs now concentrated on the East Coast and West Coast, and forge a national tech strategy. Most prominently, a bill likely to soon become law—the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America Act (CHIPS for America Act)—aims to subsidize the semiconductor industry. The CHIPS bill passed as an amendment to the current Defense Authorization Act and may become law before the end of the year.
This is a very big deal. Why? Because semiconductors, a $470 billion global industry, are core drivers of all things digital, the foundation and lifeblood of the entire knowledge economy. China itself, currently dependent on imported chips (many from Taiwan), has been attempting to domesticize its own production—failing to make a 40 percent domestic target this year, but redoubling efforts to hit a 70 percent target by 2025.
The CHIPS bill aims to boost and reshore semiconductor manufacturing with a 40 percent tax credit to 2024 for investments in semiconductor equipment or manufacturing facilities; creates a $10 billion matching fund for states and cities to incentivize investment in advanced semiconductor manufacturing; includes measures for bolstering STEM workforce development; and parcels out $12 billion in R&D to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the National Science Foundation, as well as to establish an advanced manufacturing institute. It also mandates that the administration develop a semiconductor R&D strategy and a public-private national semiconductor technology center.
One provision in the CHIPS bill that moves beyond narrow techno-nationalism seeks to build multilateral cooperation among democracies in supply chain security. It creates a $750 million trust fund to be allocated upon reaching agreement with foreign governments to form a consortium to harmonize policies related to microelectronics, transparency in microelectronics, and greater alignment in policies toward non-market economies.
There is an array of other legislation designed to bolster U.S. tech competitiveness, beef up R&D in high tech, incentivize private sector investment, and change the geography of innovation—80 percent of venture capital and 90 percent of tech employment is concentrated in major tech hubs. For example, several bills would rename the National Science Foundation as the National Science and Technology Foundation, creating a center for technology and authorizing $100 billion in R&D funds to support work on artificial intelligence, boost semiconductors, and incentivize geographic diversity, with $80 billion for cities to compete to build tech innovation centers.
The flurry of legislation and the rhetoric of both presidential candidates underscore the degree to which the fear of Chinese tech dominance has animated a newfound bipartisan eagerness to sustain and advance the eroding U.S. innovation edge. While industrial policies have had mixed success in the United States, the sheer breadth and scope of new resources and public and private collaboration will no doubt have a considerable impact on U.S. tech capacity.
What unintended consequences all the positive and negative aspects of this energized techno-nationalism in the United States will have is another question. In the best-case scenario, the results of the new U.S. zeitgeist may better position Washington—if it can mobilize like-minded partners—to compete with China and pressure Beijing to move back toward promised economic reforms, rolling back many of its state-driven forms of capitalist measures. In the worst case, it may lead to a bifurcated global economy with conflicting rules, norms, and standards. One big fear is that the victim of the techno-nationalism trend will be global innovation, which thrives on openness and transparency.
The world is in the early stages of what has been dubbed the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The converging new technologies—AI, big data, robotics, biotech, nanoengineering, new materials, the Internet of Things, 3D printing—merge the digital and physical worlds and will drive economic growth and shape geopolitics in the decades ahead. It should have been obvious to U.S. officialdom long ago that tech innovation was the fulcrum of the future, but they mostly just paid lip service to it. Instead, it has taken an existential fear of being overtaken by China to create an impetus to get changes done. The price may be innovation constrained by techno-nationalism—but the next Sputnik moment is finally here.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--Why Britain’s Labour Party Kicked Out Jeremy Corbyn

On Oct. 29 , 2019 , the British Parliament voted in favor of an early general election , which pitted Conservative Boris Johnson against Labour party leader Jeremy Corbyn .
One year later to the day , Corbyn was suspended by his party , and now sits in Parliament as an independent MP .
Though Westminster has had its fair share of shocking twists and turns since the Brexit vote , the move was a particularly jaw-dropping one .
How can a man go from leading a party to being expelled from it in such a short time ?
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which it festered in the left-wing party , and how willing Corbyn was to put an end to it .
It is not a new problem ; stories about Labour members sharing anti-Semitic posts and conspiracy theories on social media had been bubbling to the surface since his election as leader in 2015 .
By November 2019 , in fact , polling firm DeltaPoll had found that 42 percent of British adults thought that Jeremy Corbyn was anti-Semitic .
That belief played a part in Labour losing dozens of seats less than a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a long-standing British Jewish shift away from Labour but in painting the party as the home of cranks and extremists .
Still , the beginning of the end for Corbyn came in May last year , when the Equality and Human Rights Commission , a non-partisan national equality body empowered to protect equal rights in the UK , decided to launch an investigation “ to determine whether The Labour Party [ had ] unlawfully discriminated against , harassed , or victimized people because they are Jewish.
” At this point , the controversy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members , but on allegations that the party itself was downplaying complaints of anti-Semitism , with the direct involvement of the leader ’ s office .
As often happens in left-of-center parties , the debate also became a proxy fight over the direction Labour was taking .
Corbyn ’ s election had been controversial to begin with , as he had always been on the party ’ s staunch left , and his supporters argued that the issue was overplayed by centrists keen to get rid of him .
Other factions , on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Corbyn ’ s lack of decisive action on anti-Semitism was symptomatic of his unwillingness to condemn those he saw as well-meaning political allies .
He is known as a stubborn man with questionable political instincts—notably suggesting the suspected substance used by Russia to poison former spy Sergei Skripal on British soil should be sent back to Russia for testing—and , they thought , could not be trusted to rid the party of its anti-Semitic members .
A particularly low point was the hounding of Jewish MP Luciana Berger , who left Labour in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutionally anti-Semitic.
” It didn ’ t help that Corbyn had supported ( without , he said , realizing the implications ) an anti-Semitic mural , and that his enthusiasm for Palestinian causes had sometimes put him in the company of Holocaust deniers .
Things took a sharp turn earlier this year , when Corbyn stood down and members elected Sir Keir Starmer in his place , a former barrister and politician from a more traditional center-left background .
Starmer ’ s first order of business was , as the Labour center saw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Corbyn ’ s legacy .
One of his first acts was to apologize for having “ failed the Jewish community on anti-Semitism , ” and promising to do better from day one—which brings us to today .
On Oct. 29 , 2020 , the Equality and Human Rights Commission published the results of its investigation .
In the 130-page document , it concluded that the party could have tackled anti-Semitism more effectively “ if the leadership had chosen to do so.
” It also found that “ there was political interference in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader ’ s office , and noted two instances of party agents “ committing unlawful harassment ” against Jewish people .
In his press conference , Starmer said that “ if after all the pain , all the grief , and all the evidence in this report , there are still those who think there ’ s no problem with anti-Semitism in the Labour Party , that it ’ s all exaggerated , or a factional attack , then , frankly , you are part of the problem too .
And you should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Westminster watchers wondered if he had his predecessor in mind .
He claimed it didn ’ t—at least not then , despite multiple journalists asking at the conference .
This changed when Corbyn said , in his own response , that though he wished he ’ d acted more swiftly on anti-Semitism , “ the scale of the problem was also dramatically overstated for political reasons by our opponents inside and outside the party , ” which arguably sounded close to purposely minimizing the issue .
He also repeatedly denied being “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an hour later , a Labour spokesperson announced that , “ in light of his comments made today and his failure to retract them subsequently , ” he was suspended from the party pending investigation , and that he would have the whip removed—the British term for kicking a MP out of a Parliamentary party .
Corbyn now sits in the House of Commons as an independent MP , and currently can not stand for further reelection as a Labour candidate .
It is not obvious what will come next ; Corbyn has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contest the political intervention to suspend [ him ] , ” and his supporters have flooded social media with fury at what they see as a blatant injustice—the only outlet available at a time when the pandemic has shut down the local party meetings that often turned into shouting matches in the past .
The Jewish Labour Movement , on the other hand , has welcomed the decision , after previously withdrawing campaign support for the party .
Labour will now spend the next few days and weeks engulfed in civil war .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ party , which , even before Corbyn , spent the 1980s dealing with the splittist centrist Social Democratic Party headed by four of its own senior former leaders , and fighting the Trotskyite Militant Tendency in its own city councils .
Whatever comes next , today will also be remembered as one of the turning points in Keir Starmer ’ s leadership—whether in its decisive reckoning with an ugly past , or as a descent back into fighting each other rather than the ruling Conservative Party .
As for Jeremy Corbyn , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Labour benches eventually , but it is hard not to see this as the end of a chapter .
After decades spent on the sidelines followed by five years in the center of it all , it seems fitting that he has been cast back into the wilderness .
Hopefully , Jewish Labour members can finally get some rest .

On Oct. 29, 2019, the British Parliament voted in favor of an early general election, which pitted Conservative Boris Johnson against Labour party leader Jeremy Corbyn. One year later to the day, Corbyn was suspended by his party, and now sits in Parliament as an independent MP.
On Oct. 29, 2019, the British Parliament voted in favor of an early general election, which pitted Conservative Boris Johnson against Labour party leader Jeremy Corbyn. One year later to the day, Corbyn was suspended by his party, and now sits in Parliament as an independent MP.
Though Westminster has had its fair share of shocking twists and turns since the Brexit vote, the move was a particularly jaw-dropping one. How can a man go from leading a party to being expelled from it in such a short time?
The answer is anti-Semitism: the extent to which it festered in the left-wing party, and how willing Corbyn was to put an end to it. It is not a new problem; stories about Labour members sharing anti-Semitic posts and conspiracy theories on social media had been bubbling to the surface since his election as leader in 2015.
By November 2019, in fact, polling firm DeltaPoll had found that 42 percent of British adults thought that Jeremy Corbyn was anti-Semitic. That belief played a part in Labour losing dozens of seats less than a month later, not just in solidifying a long-standing British Jewish shift away from Labour , but in painting the party as the home of cranks and extremists.
Still, the beginning of the end for Corbyn came in May last year, when the Equality and Human Rights Commission, a non-partisan national equality body empowered to protect equal rights in the UK, decided to launch an investigation “to determine whether The Labour Party [had] unlawfully discriminated against, harassed, or victimized people because they are Jewish.”
At this point, the controversy was no longer focused on individual party members, but on allegations that the party itself was downplaying complaints of anti-Semitism, with the direct involvement of the leader’s office.
As often happens in left-of-center parties, the debate also became a proxy fight over the direction Labour was taking. Corbyn’s election had been controversial to begin with, as he had always been on the party’s staunch left, and his supporters argued that the issue was overplayed by centrists keen to get rid of him.
Other factions, on the other hand, felt certain that Corbyn’s lack of decisive action on anti-Semitism was symptomatic of his unwillingness to condemn those he saw as well-meaning political allies. He is known as a stubborn man with questionable political instincts—notably suggesting the suspected substance used by Russia to poison former spy Sergei Skripal on British soil should be sent back to Russia for testing—and, they thought, could not be trusted to rid the party of its anti-Semitic members. A particularly low point was the hounding of Jewish MP Luciana Berger, who left Labour in February 2019 and called the party “institutionally anti-Semitic.” It didn’t help that Corbyn had supported (without, he said, realizing the implications) an anti-Semitic mural, and that his enthusiasm for Palestinian causes had sometimes put him in the company of Holocaust deniers.
Things took a sharp turn earlier this year, when Corbyn stood down and members elected Sir Keir Starmer in his place, a former barrister and politician from a more traditional center-left background. Starmer’s first order of business was, as the Labour center saw it, to detoxify the party from Corbyn’s legacy. One of his first acts was to apologize for having “failed the Jewish community on anti-Semitism,” and promising to do better from day one—which brings us to today.
On Oct. 29, 2020, the Equality and Human Rights Commission published the results of its investigation. In the 130-page document, it concluded that the party could have tackled anti-Semitism more effectively “if the leadership had chosen to do so.” It also found that “there was political interference in the handling of anti-Semitism complaints” from the leader’s office, and noted two instances of party agents “committing unlawful harassment” against Jewish people.
In his press conference, Starmer said that “if after all the pain, all the grief, and all the evidence in this report, there are still those who think there’s no problem with anti-Semitism in the Labour Party, that it’s all exaggerated, or a factional attack, then, frankly, you are part of the problem too. And you should be nowhere near the Labour Party either.”
Westminster watchers wondered if he had his predecessor in mind. He claimed it didn’t—at least not then, despite multiple journalists asking at the conference. This changed when Corbyn said, in his own response, that though he wished he’d acted more swiftly on anti-Semitism, “the scale of the problem was also dramatically overstated for political reasons by our opponents inside and outside the party,” which arguably sounded close to purposely minimizing the issue. He also repeatedly denied being “part of the problem.”
Less than an hour later, a Labour spokesperson announced that, “in light of his comments made today and his failure to retract them subsequently,” he was suspended from the party pending investigation, and that he would have the whip removed—the British term for kicking a MP out of a Parliamentary party. Corbyn now sits in the House of Commons as an independent MP, and currently cannot stand for further reelection as a Labour candidate.
It is not obvious what will come next; Corbyn has already announced that he would “strongly contest the political intervention to suspend [him],” and his supporters have flooded social media with fury at what they see as a blatant injustice—the only outlet available at a time when the pandemic has shut down the local party meetings that often turned into shouting matches in the past. The Jewish Labour Movement, on the other hand, has welcomed the decision, after previously withdrawing campaign support for the party.
Labour will now spend the next few days and weeks engulfed in civil war. That’s familiar territory for a party, which, even before Corbyn, spent the 1980s dealing with the splittist centrist Social Democratic Party headed by four of its own senior former leaders, and fighting the Trotskyite Militant Tendency in its own city councils. Whatever comes next, today will also be remembered as one of the turning points in Keir Starmer’s leadership—whether in its decisive reckoning with an ugly past, or as a descent back into fighting each other rather than the ruling Conservative Party.
As for Jeremy Corbyn, he may well find his way back to the Labour benches eventually, but it is hard not to see this as the end of a chapter. After decades spent on the sidelines followed by five years in the center of it all, it seems fitting that he has been cast back into the wilderness. Hopefully, Jewish Labour members can finally get some rest.