Reintegrating Terrorists

“ You ’ re not scared of me ?
” Yusuf sked half-jokingly as he tossed his burnt pizza crust on the plate .
“ No , ” I told him , but I probably should have been .
Yusuf was convicted on terrorism charges for his connection to the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people .
He spent 10 years in an Indonesian prison , fought with al Qaeda , and personally knew Osama bin Laden .
In his crowded restaurant in Surakarta , Indonesia , all that seemed very far away .
But to him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I built my business the same way I built my teams in Afghanistan , ” he explained .
“ I fundraise , recruit people , track spending , monitor competition—it ’ s the same game.
” In the United States , someone like Yusuf might never walk free once in prison due to fears that he might return to militancy .
The November 2019 terrorist attack in London , in which two people were stabbed to death by a man released from jail after serving half of his 16-year sentence for terrorism offenses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public eye .
Those concerns were deepened in February after another stabbing in which two people were killed by a man who had recently been released from prison for terrorism offenses .
But in reality , these incidents were outliers .
A recent study released by West Point ’ s Combating Terrorism Center , which examined nearly 30 years of U.S. data , demonstrates that recidivism rates among the most dangerous category of jihadi offenders , namely people directly involved in violent terrorist plots , are far below traditional criminal recidivism rates .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ little choice but to release such prisoners anyway .
They simply don ’ t possess the resources to indefinitely incarcerate all their citizens who have been convicted of terrorism charges .
The United States is relatively unique in this regard , with fewer terrorism convictions and far more resources .
As of last spring , the United States had released only about 250 people who had been convicted of terrorism-related offenses after 9/11 .
By contrast , the Colombian government was tasked with demobilizing approximately 13,000 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forging a peace accord with the group in 2016 .
Countries with larger numbers of people affiliated with terrorist or militia groups have a pressing need to develop effective reintegration programs for those who are released from prison .
Some of their success stories can offer insights for how reentry might work—both for people who served prison time for terrorism crimes , and those in for other types of offenses .
Entrepreneurship can often help people who were formerly incarcerated reintegrate into civil society , the job market , and mainstream economies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ former members of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka , al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Indonesia , the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC ) , and the Lord ’ s Resistance Army in Uganda , as well as 30 people involved in their reintegration—business owners who hired them , victims , NGOs , and government officials—it is clear that entrepreneurship can often help people who were formerly incarcerated reintegrate into civil society , the job market , and mainstream economies .
The success rate for entrepreneurs of any demographic is low .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ entrepreneurship .
In fact , they face additional hurdles like gaining access to start-up capital because of their records .
And there are few credible statistics on successful ex-terrorist entrepreneurial ventures due to underreporting , difficulty in measuring informal economies , and access issues in remote areas where many of the ventures are based .
Still , for many of those I interviewed between 2014 and 2016 , starting their own businesses was integral to their transition back into society .
Indeed , even after ex-terrorists have served time , undergone rehabilitation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be disassociated from a terrorist group , their pasts often make them unattractive candidates to employers .
Consequently , some are lured back into their former groups by salaries that can reach thousands of dollars per month .
In the types of poverty-stricken areas many terrorist groups typically recruit , those salaries are a means of survival .
Entrepreneurship helps circumvent the cycle : Generating revenue depends on individuals ’ skills , business acumen , and quality of service—not their pasts .
Former terrorists may also be particularly suited to entrepreneurship because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rafiq used to manufacture weapons in his garage for various al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Poso , Indonesia .
Following a stint in prison , he created what he called a “ peace radio station , ” devoted to broadcasting messages that aim to reduce tensions and foster unity among Christians , Muslims , and members of other religions .
He gradually expanded it to include a cafe , karaoke space , billiard area , dance hall , and study clubs .
At his multifloor facility , people from different religions , ethnicities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employs members of different faiths to encourage friendship and unity among them .
Next , he intends to launch a vocational skill-building program for women .
Although his business initially faced threats from extremists , marginalization from the government , and skepticism from the community , over time he won the public ’ s trust and support .
The fluctuations , high stakes , and unpredictability of life in a terrorist organization are more analogous to life in a start-up than working a 9-to-5 job .
Some ex-terrorists said they have had a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same employer for an extended period of time—they ’ re simply not used to the monotony of routine .
Starting an entrepreneurial venture typically involves the kind of unstructured lifestyle with which they ’ re familiar .
Entrepreneurship can also moderate extreme beliefs .
Yusuf spent five years in prison in connection with the 2002 Bali bombings .
Post-release , he launched a successful restaurant after receiving seed funding from the government and entrepreneurship training from a local university .
“ When my former prison guards first showed up for a meal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflicted in my heart .
I hated them , but it was my job to serve them , to be charming and smile.
” Over time , he had to start seeing them as real people .
“ I started chatting and joking with them : ‘ You used to give me food for free , and now you have to pay me for it.
’ They loved my jokes .
Eventually , having to continually serve and converse with them made our relationship and feelings toward each other warmer.
” He has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years spent espousing hostile views toward people who do not share their worldview , starting an entrepreneurial venture requires ex-terrorists to engage with customers from diverse backgrounds .
They have to treat each customer with respect because revenue depends on it .
Over time , such constant engagement can reduce stereotypes and moderate perceptions on both sides .
Research scientists have long held that interaction with opponents and exposure to diversity can reduce tensions , foster empathy , and ultimately change the way people think .
Finally , entrepreneurship can help reintegrate extended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jalber , a former FARC member , started a sports clothing retail chain , supplying team uniforms to schools and sports clubs in Colombia .
He also organizes local sports tournaments to turn at-risk youth away from drugs , crime , and gangs .
He built 25 clothing workshops and employs ex-FARC members and their mothers in the production process .
He also gave jobs to 40 single mothers in the community .
In 2010 , the Colombian government recognized Jalber for his peace efforts in helping to reintegrate former FARC members and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ entrepreneurs hire other ex-terrorists struggling to find jobs .
In doing so , they help reduce the risk of recidivism among those who might otherwise return to their former groups .
Some regular employers are willing to hire ex-terrorists , but there ’ s far less explaining to do when you ’ re hired by one of your own .
Ultimately , lower recidivism rates increase public safety .
And if economic reintegration can work for even ex-terrorists overseas , surely there are lessons that can be applied to people who were formerly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country should provide people who are released from prison a pathway out of crime , access to quality jobs , and a genuine opportunity to join the legal economy .
That pathway must equip them with the tools to become economic assets in the communities to which they return .
According to a 2018 Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 401,288 people released from state prison between 2005 and 2014 , national prisoner recidivism rates are strikingly high : 44 percent of people were rearrested within one year , 68 percent within three @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and 83 percent within nine years .
The overall numbers contrast sharply with those from U.S.-based organizations like the Prison Entrepreneurship Program and Defy Ventures , which support the entrepreneurial businesses of people who were formerly incarcerated .
Recidivism rates among participants of these programs hover below 10 percent .
No single solution will achieve perfect results .
But in our efforts to address reentry challenges in the criminal justice system , entrepreneurship is one promising option that ought to be more deeply explored .

“You’re not scared of me?” Yusuf asked half-jokingly as he tossed his burnt pizza crust on the plate. “No,” I told him, but I probably should have been. Yusuf was convicted on terrorism charges for his connection to the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people. He spent 10 years in an Indonesian prison, fought with al Qaeda, and personally knew Osama bin Laden. In his crowded restaurant in Surakarta, Indonesia, all that seemed very far away. But to him, perhaps it did not. “I built my business the same way I built my teams in Afghanistan,” he explained. “I fundraise, recruit people, track spending, monitor competition—it’s the same game.”
“You’re not scared of me?” Yusuf asked half-jokingly as he tossed his burnt pizza crust on the plate. “No,” I told him, but I probably should have been. Yusuf was convicted on terrorism charges for his connection to the 2002 Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people. He spent 10 years in an Indonesian prison, fought with al Qaeda, and personally knew Osama bin Laden. In his crowded restaurant in Surakarta, Indonesia, all that seemed very far away. But to him, perhaps it did not. “I built my business the same way I built my teams in Afghanistan,” he explained. “I fundraise, recruit people, track spending, monitor competition—it’s the same game.”
In the United States, someone like Yusuf might never walk free once in prison due to fears that he might return to militancy. The November 2019 terrorist attack in London, in which two people were stabbed to death by a man released from jail after serving half of his 16-year sentence for terrorism offenses, catapulted fears about recidivism into the public eye. Those concerns were deepened in February after another stabbing in which two people were killed by a man who had recently been released from prison for terrorism offenses.
But in reality, these incidents were outliers. A recent study released by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, which examined nearly 30 years of U.S. data, demonstrates that recidivism rates among the most dangerous category of jihadi offenders, namely people directly involved in violent terrorist plots, are far below traditional criminal recidivism rates.
And for most countries, there is little choice but to release such prisoners anyway. They simply don’t possess the resources to indefinitely incarcerate all their citizens who have been convicted of terrorism charges. The United States is relatively unique in this regard, with fewer terrorism convictions and far more resources. As of last spring, the United States had released only about 250 people who had been convicted of terrorism-related offenses after 9/11. By contrast, the Colombian government was tasked with demobilizing approximately 13,000 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerilla militia after forging a peace accord with the group in 2016. Countries with larger numbers of people affiliated with terrorist or militia groups have a pressing need to develop effective reintegration programs for those who are released from prison. Some of their success stories can offer insights for how reentry might work—both for people who served prison time for terrorism crimes, and those in for other types of offenses.
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, almost 1.5 million people were in prison by the end of 2017, ranging from people who committed violent offenses to those who were wrongfully convicted. That means for every 100,000 U.S. residents, approximately 440 people were in prison. An estimated $80 billion is spent each year to run correctional facilities, according to the Brookings Institution. Additionally, 95 percent of all state prisoners will eventually be released at some point. Therefore, policymakers should examine successful reintegration models globally and identify best practices to reduce recidivism rates.
Entrepreneurship can often help people who were formerly incarcerated reintegrate into civil society, the job market, and mainstream economies.
Based on interviews with more than 50 former members of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Indonesia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, as well as 30 people involved in their reintegration—business owners who hired them, victims, NGOs, and government officials—it is clear that entrepreneurship can often help people who were formerly incarcerated reintegrate into civil society, the job market, and mainstream economies.
The success rate for entrepreneurs of any demographic is low. Not every ex-terrorist will be suited for entrepreneurship. In fact, they face additional hurdles like gaining access to start-up capital because of their records. And there are few credible statistics on successful ex-terrorist entrepreneurial ventures due to underreporting, difficulty in measuring informal economies, and access issues in remote areas where many of the ventures are based. Still, for many of those I interviewed between 2014 and 2016, starting their own businesses was integral to their transition back into society.
Yaldan is a former bomb-maker for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Southeast Asia. In 2012, he created a lucrative disposable medical products business. He coordinates with manufacturers in neighboring countries and, after hitting record sales in 2015, became his country’s sole distributor of those products to hospitals. “One of our concerns as I grew the business was that people might stigmatize the company because of my past,” Yaldan said. “It’s very dangerous to my business for people to know. When others returned from prison to their communities, it’s been a huge challenge. The stigma is so great.”
Indeed, even after ex-terrorists have served time, undergone rehabilitation, and are considered by their own governments to be disassociated from a terrorist group, their pasts often make them unattractive candidates to employers. Consequently, some are lured back into their former groups by salaries that can reach thousands of dollars per month. In the types of poverty-stricken areas many terrorist groups typically recruit, those salaries are a means of survival. Entrepreneurship helps circumvent the cycle: Generating revenue depends on individuals’ skills, business acumen, and quality of service—not their pasts.
Former terrorists may also be particularly suited to entrepreneurship because they are familiar with taking risks.
Rafiq used to manufacture weapons in his garage for various al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Poso, Indonesia. Following a stint in prison, he created what he called a “peace radio station,” devoted to broadcasting messages that aim to reduce tensions and foster unity among Christians, Muslims, and members of other religions. He gradually expanded it to include a cafe, karaoke space, billiard area, dance hall, and study clubs. At his multifloor facility, people from different religions, ethnicities, and professional backgrounds interact. He deliberately employs members of different faiths to encourage friendship and unity among them. Next, he intends to launch a vocational skill-building program for women. Although his business initially faced threats from extremists, marginalization from the government, and skepticism from the community, over time he won the public’s trust and support.
The fluctuations, high stakes, and unpredictability of life in a terrorist organization are more analogous to life in a start-up than working a 9-to-5 job. Some ex-terrorists said they have had a hard time doing the same work for the same employer for an extended period of time—they’re simply not used to the monotony of routine. Starting an entrepreneurial venture typically involves the kind of unstructured lifestyle with which they’re familiar.
Entrepreneurship can also moderate extreme beliefs. Yusuf spent five years in prison in connection with the 2002 Bali bombings. Post-release, he launched a successful restaurant after receiving seed funding from the government and entrepreneurship training from a local university. “When my former prison guards first showed up for a meal at my restaurant, I was so conflicted in my heart. I hated them, but it was my job to serve them, to be charming and smile.” Over time, he had to start seeing them as real people. “I started chatting and joking with them: ‘You used to give me food for free, and now you have to pay me for it.’ They loved my jokes. Eventually, having to continually serve and converse with them made our relationship and feelings toward each other warmer.” He has since disavowed his extremist beliefs.
After years spent espousing hostile views toward people who do not share their worldview, starting an entrepreneurial venture requires ex-terrorists to engage with customers from diverse backgrounds. They have to treat each customer with respect because revenue depends on it. Over time, such constant engagement can reduce stereotypes and moderate perceptions on both sides. Research scientists have long held that interaction with opponents and exposure to diversity can reduce tensions, foster empathy, and ultimately change the way people think.
Finally, entrepreneurship can help reintegrate extended communities of ex-terrorists. In 2008, Jalber, a former FARC member, started a sports clothing retail chain, supplying team uniforms to schools and sports clubs in Colombia. He also organizes local sports tournaments to turn at-risk youth away from drugs, crime, and gangs. He built 25 clothing workshops and employs ex-FARC members and their mothers in the production process. He also gave jobs to 40 single mothers in the community. In 2010, the Colombian government recognized Jalber for his peace efforts in helping to reintegrate former FARC members and at-risk individuals into society.
Many ex-terrorist entrepreneurs hire other ex-terrorists struggling to find jobs. In doing so, they help reduce the risk of recidivism among those who might otherwise return to their former groups. Some regular employers are willing to hire ex-terrorists, but there’s far less explaining to do when you’re hired by one of your own.
To be sure, entrepreneurship won’t be the best method to reintegrate all ex-terrorists. Supporting their ventures doesn’t discount the need to monitor their progress or ensure that their business profits aren’t used to fund the same illegal activities that led to their imprisonment. And supporting their reentry doesn’t negate the necessity to respect the pain and trauma of victims and communities who’ve been harmed by crime and violence.
Ultimately, lower recidivism rates increase public safety. And if economic reintegration can work for even ex-terrorists overseas, surely there are lessons that can be applied to people who were formerly incarcerated in the United States. The country should provide people who are released from prison a pathway out of crime, access to quality jobs, and a genuine opportunity to join the legal economy. That pathway must equip them with the tools to become economic assets in the communities to which they return.
According to a 2018 Bureau of Justice Statistics study of 401,288 people released from state prison between 2005 and 2014, national prisoner recidivism rates are strikingly high: 44 percent of people were rearrested within one year, 68 percent within three years, 79 percent within six years, and 83 percent within nine years. The overall numbers contrast sharply with those from U.S.-based organizations like the Prison Entrepreneurship Program and Defy Ventures, which support the entrepreneurial businesses of people who were formerly incarcerated. Recidivism rates among participants of these programs hover below 10 percent.
No single solution will achieve perfect results. But in our efforts to address reentry challenges in the criminal justice system, entrepreneurship is one promising option that ought to be more deeply explored.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-23--Virus Travel Bans Are Inevitable But Ineffective

When the World Health Organization ( WHO ) declared the coronavirus epidemic “ a public health emergency of international concern ” ( PHEIC ) , more than 70 countries responded by imposing travel restrictions against China .
Global health experts overwhelmingly decry travel and trade restrictions as bad policy and irresponsible violations of international law .
Yet governments continue to implement them , even though scientific evidence—and economic self-interest—advises otherwise .
If experts can ’ t reliably prevent such restrictions , they must take steps to mitigating their most harmful effects .
Travel and trade restrictions take various forms .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ citizens not travel to China , and instructing those already there to leave ; closing borders and banning flights ; barring visitors who have recently been to China from entering the country ; and implementing mandatory quarantines for returning residents .
In past epidemics , governments have also imposed trade restrictions , such as bans on importing pork during the 2009 swine flu pandemic .
Such restrictions are ineffective and economically costly for all sides .
Initial estimates are that U.S. travel restrictions against China will cost the U.S. economy $ 10.3 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : incentivizing countries to conceal outbreaks , hindering response efforts , infringing on human rights , and fueling the spread of xenophobia .
In calmer times , governments recognize that trade and travel restrictions are highly problematic .
In 2005 , after the SARS epidemic , WHO member states adopted a revised International Health Regulations ( IHR ) , the international legal framework that governs how countries prepare for and respond to outbreaks .
A core purpose of the new framework is to “ avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether restrictions are necessary .
Countries committed not to impose “ more restrictive ” measures than WHO recommends ( without providing scientific justification ) .
Since then , WHO has declared six PHEICs , each time advising that trade and travel restrictions were unwarranted .
Yet in half those cases—H1N1 in 2009 , Ebola in 2014 , and the ongoing coronavirus outbreak—countries ignored WHO ’ s recommendations and imposed large-scale restrictions anyway .
( There were fewer restrictions imposed in response to 2019 Ebola epidemic , which has remained largely confined to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ none for Zika , which is transmitted by mosquitoes , or polio , which a vaccine can prevent . )
Unfortunately , governments ’ behavior demonstrates that PHEIC declarations are more likely to provoke travel restrictions than to prevent them .
( The restraint of the administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama during the 2014 Ebola epidemic stands out as a rare exception . )
A principle of good leadership and public health practice is to meet people where they are .
In this spirit , we need to recognize why policymakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their reasoning might be difficult to overcome .
For one thing , the combination of common sense and fear generates strong public support for travel restrictions .
Coronavirus travels in people , so in theory , anything that reduces the movement of people should help reduce the spread of the virus .
In practice , travel restrictions prove ineffective because they are imposed too late or because people circumvent them .
Perversely , the timing problem may simply drive policymakers to impose restrictions more quickly .
And people frequently evade general immigration restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments to dispense with visas or border checks .
Modeling studies show that travel restrictions might slow , but can not prevent , an epidemic .
However , policymakers may well decide that slowing it is better than not slowing it .
( Even the authors of one such study demonstrating that the Hubei quarantine is unlikely to be effective are unwilling to give up on travel restrictions entirely .
They conclude by advising that to “ possibly succeed , substantial , even draconian measures that limit population mobility should be seriously and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gravitate towards travel restrictions is the lack of politically viable alternatives .
In the face of a pandemic threat , governments are under substantial pressure .
They must be seen to take proactive , robust steps to protect their citizens or else they pay a price .
From a public-health standpoint , encouraging people to wash their hands and cough into their elbows is good policy .
But politically , it ’ s insufficient to instill public confidence in health authorities ; more dramatic action is needed .
This kind of security theater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ theater can be dangerous too .
Apparent inaction ( or insufficient action ) erodes trust in public health authorities , which undermines response efforts .
Pragmatically , policymakers may be damned if they do and damned if they don ’ t .
Efforts to prevent trade and travel restrictions often refer to governments ’ obligation to comply with the IHR , a binding international treaty .
But this argument misses key dynamics that strain the reach of the IHR .
The first is the role of the private sector .
During this coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposed its own set of trade and travel restrictions .
Numerous airlines have halted flights to China due to lack of demand or because pilots refuse to fly .
Retailers such as Starbucks and Apple have closed their stores , while multinational firms have suspended employee travel .
The repercussions of these measures will be every bit as severe—if not more so—as restrictions imposed by governments .
Yet the private sector is not bound by the IHR .
And as WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus acknowledged , “ it will be very difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act against their perceived business interests .
Second , the IHR focus on international travel and travel restrictions .
But during this coronavirus epidemic , the most significant travel bans have been imposed within China , by the Chinese government .
China has quarantined over 50 million people , suspended interprovincial buses , closed tourist destinations , and ordered travel agencies to halt tours abroad .
Macau ’ s casinos are dark .
Hong Kong has closed most border crossings and is quarantining visitors from the mainland .
The fact that China is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO is not challenging those restrictions—makes it difficult to convince policymakers in other countries not follow suit .
China ’ s domestic response complicates arguments against travel restrictions on another level too .
Numerous countries have evacuated their citizens from Wuhan , rather than leaving them stranded behind a cordon sanitaire indefinitely .
Given the possibility of further quarantines , it ’ s reasonable for governments to warn against travel to China , lest additional evacuations become necessary .
Steps that governments take to ensure the safety of citizens abroad are also beyond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short , travel restrictions are both harmful and difficult to prevent .
Global health experts , led by WHO , should continue to discourage such measures .
But once they are imposed , the critical question becomes : What can be done to mitigate their harms ?
Travel restrictions inflict significant economic losses on affected countries , particularly low-income countries ( which have a more difficult time rebounding ) .
One approach might be to embrace the insurance principle of indemnification—making whole after a loss .
Financing mechanisms such as the World Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies already help countries respond to public health emergencies .
Policymakers should explore whether these funds can be expanded , or other funds created , to directly indemnify countries for losses incurred as a result of travel restrictions imposed against WHO ’ s recommendation .
Fear of incurring trade and travel restrictions can also discourage governments from reporting potential PHEICs .
There are two ways to mitigate this risk .
WHO has broad but seldom-used latitude to act on information from sources other than governments .
Making greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nonreporting by reducing the likelihood that governments will be able to hide an outbreak .
Additionally , policymakers can give countries an economic incentive to report by expanding and fully financing the Contingency Fund for Emergencies .
When WHO is notified about a possible PHEIC , it can immediately release funds to help affected governments assess and respond to the situation .
Yet since its creation in 2015 , the Contingency Fund for Emergencies has been consistently underfunded , which weakens its potential as a reliable incentive for reporting .
And finally , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epidemic response efforts by making it more difficult to get medical supplies and health care workers into affected countries .
One way of mitigating this harm is by creating a system of exceptions to the restrictions .
Examples might include chartering special flights and shipments , less stringent quarantine measures for returning responders ( e.g .
self-monitored , home-based quarantines ) , or even exempting medical supplies from preexisting tariffs .
WHO already sends teams of international experts to respond to PHEICs and coordinates efforts to ensure that affected countries have access to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could expand its authority to coordinate those exceptions—and vitally needed spaces could be carved out to help keep people alive even as borders close .

When the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus epidemic “a public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC), more than 70 countries responded by imposing travel restrictions against China. Global health experts overwhelmingly decry travel and trade restrictions as bad policy and irresponsible violations of international law. Yet governments continue to implement them, even though scientific evidence—and economic self-interest—advises otherwise. If experts can’t reliably prevent such restrictions, they must take steps to mitigating their most harmful effects.
When the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the coronavirus epidemic “a public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC), more than 70 countries responded by imposing travel restrictions against China. Global health experts overwhelmingly decry travel and trade restrictions as bad policy and irresponsible violations of international law. Yet governments continue to implement them, even though scientific evidence—and economic self-interest—advises otherwise. If experts can’t reliably prevent such restrictions, they must take steps to mitigating their most harmful effects.
Travel and trade restrictions take various forms. With this coronavirus, governments are warning citizens not travel to China, and instructing those already there to leave; closing borders and banning flights; barring visitors who have recently been to China from entering the country; and implementing mandatory quarantines for returning residents. In past epidemics, governments have also imposed trade restrictions, such as bans on importing pork during the 2009 swine flu pandemic. Such restrictions are ineffective and economically costly for all sides. Initial estimates are that U.S. travel restrictions against China will cost the U.S. economy $10.3 billion. They also have more insidious downsides: incentivizing countries to conceal outbreaks, hindering response efforts, infringing on human rights, and fueling the spread of xenophobia.
In calmer times, governments recognize that trade and travel restrictions are highly problematic. In 2005, after the SARS epidemic, WHO member states adopted a revised International Health Regulations (IHR), the international legal framework that governs how countries prepare for and respond to outbreaks. A core purpose of the new framework is to “avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade” by empowering WHO to make recommendations about whether restrictions are necessary. Countries committed not to impose “more restrictive” measures than WHO recommends (without providing scientific justification).
Since then, WHO has declared six PHEICs, each time advising that trade and travel restrictions were unwarranted. Yet in half those cases—H1N1 in 2009, Ebola in 2014, and the ongoing coronavirus outbreak—countries ignored WHO’s recommendations and imposed large-scale restrictions anyway. (There were fewer restrictions imposed in response to 2019 Ebola epidemic, which has remained largely confined to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and none for Zika, which is transmitted by mosquitoes, or polio, which a vaccine can prevent.)
Unfortunately, governments’ behavior demonstrates that PHEIC declarations are more likely to provoke travel restrictions than to prevent them. (The restraint of the administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama during the 2014 Ebola epidemic stands out as a rare exception.) A principle of good leadership and public health practice is to meet people where they are. In this spirit, we need to recognize why policymakers keep opting for travel restrictions and why their reasoning might be difficult to overcome.
For one thing, the combination of common sense and fear generates strong public support for travel restrictions. Coronavirus travels in people, so in theory, anything that reduces the movement of people should help reduce the spread of the virus. In practice, travel restrictions prove ineffective because they are imposed too late or because people circumvent them. Perversely, the timing problem may simply drive policymakers to impose restrictions more quickly. And people frequently evade general immigration restrictions too, yet this does not persuade governments to dispense with visas or border checks.
Modeling studies show that travel restrictions might slow, but cannot prevent, an epidemic. However, policymakers may well decide that slowing it is better than not slowing it. (Even the authors of one such study demonstrating that the Hubei quarantine is unlikely to be effective are unwilling to give up on travel restrictions entirely. They conclude by advising that to “possibly succeed, substantial, even draconian measures that limit population mobility should be seriously and immediately considered.”)
Another reason policymakers gravitate towards travel restrictions is the lack of politically viable alternatives. In the face of a pandemic threat, governments are under substantial pressure. They must be seen to take proactive, robust steps to protect their citizens or else they pay a price. From a public-health standpoint, encouraging people to wash their hands and cough into their elbows is good policy. But politically, it’s insufficient to instill public confidence in health authorities; more dramatic action is needed. This kind of security theater can be dangerous—but the absence of security theater can be dangerous too. Apparent inaction (or insufficient action) erodes trust in public health authorities, which undermines response efforts. Pragmatically, policymakers may be damned if they do and damned if they don’t.
Efforts to prevent trade and travel restrictions often refer to governments’ obligation to comply with the IHR, a binding international treaty. But this argument misses key dynamics that strain the reach of the IHR. The first is the role of the private sector. During this coronavirus epidemic, the private sector has effectively imposed its own set of trade and travel restrictions. Numerous airlines have halted flights to China due to lack of demand or because pilots refuse to fly. Retailers such as Starbucks and Apple have closed their stores, while multinational firms have suspended employee travel. The repercussions of these measures will be every bit as severe—if not more so—as restrictions imposed by governments. Yet the private sector is not bound by the IHR. And as WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus acknowledged, “it will be very difficult” for WHO to convince companies to act against their perceived business interests.
Second, the IHR focus on international travel and travel restrictions. But during this coronavirus epidemic, the most significant travel bans have been imposed within China, by the Chinese government. China has quarantined over 50 million people, suspended interprovincial buses, closed tourist destinations, and ordered travel agencies to halt tours abroad. Macau’s casinos are dark. Hong Kong has closed most border crossings and is quarantining visitors from the mainland. The fact that China is implementing travel restrictions on its own citizens—and WHO is not challenging those restrictions—makes it difficult to convince policymakers in other countries not follow suit.
China’s domestic response complicates arguments against travel restrictions on another level too. Numerous countries have evacuated their citizens from Wuhan, rather than leaving them stranded behind a cordon sanitaire indefinitely. Given the possibility of further quarantines, it’s reasonable for governments to warn against travel to China, lest additional evacuations become necessary. Steps that governments take to ensure the safety of citizens abroad are also beyond the scope of the IHR.
In short, travel restrictions are both harmful and difficult to prevent. Global health experts, led by WHO, should continue to discourage such measures. But once they are imposed, the critical question becomes: What can be done to mitigate their harms?
Travel restrictions inflict significant economic losses on affected countries, particularly low-income countries (which have a more difficult time rebounding). One approach might be to embrace the insurance principle of indemnification—making whole after a loss. Financing mechanisms such as the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility and the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies already help countries respond to public health emergencies. Policymakers should explore whether these funds can be expanded, or other funds created, to directly indemnify countries for losses incurred as a result of travel restrictions imposed against WHO’s recommendation.
Fear of incurring trade and travel restrictions can also discourage governments from reporting potential PHEICs. There are two ways to mitigate this risk. WHO has broad but seldom-used latitude to act on information from sources other than governments. Making greater use of this authority can help discourage nonreporting by reducing the likelihood that governments will be able to hide an outbreak. Additionally, policymakers can give countries an economic incentive to report by expanding and fully financing the Contingency Fund for Emergencies. When WHO is notified about a possible PHEIC, it can immediately release funds to help affected governments assess and respond to the situation. Yet since its creation in 2015, the Contingency Fund for Emergencies has been consistently underfunded, which weakens its potential as a reliable incentive for reporting.
And finally, trade and travel restrictions interfere with international epidemic response efforts by making it more difficult to get medical supplies and health care workers into affected countries. One way of mitigating this harm is by creating a system of exceptions to the restrictions. Examples might include chartering special flights and shipments, less stringent quarantine measures for returning responders (e.g. self-monitored, home-based quarantines), or even exempting medical supplies from preexisting tariffs. WHO already sends teams of international experts to respond to PHEICs and coordinates efforts to ensure that affected countries have access to essential commodities. WHO’s members could expand its authority to coordinate those exceptions—and vitally needed spaces could be carved out to help keep people alive even as borders close.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-24--In West Africa, U.S. Military Struggles for Scarce Resources as Terrorism Threat Grows

In West Africa , U.S. Military Struggles for Scarce Resources as Terrorism Threat Grows NOUAKCHOTT , MAURITANIA—Every February , hundreds of special operations forces from around the world gather in West Africa for Flintlock , a unique U.S.-led exercise that provides critical training for regional militaries struggling to counter growing terrorist activity in the Sahel .
This year , the threat is more urgent than ever .
Despite the presence of 4,500 French troops and a 13,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force , violent extremist attacks in the region have skyrocketed in the last 18 months .
The Sahel saw the most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African region in 2019 , with roughly 2,600 fatalities from 800 attacks—a number which has nearly doubled every year since 2015 .
Burkina Faso bore the brunt of the new violence , primarily from groups linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara , as the locus of terrorist activity shifted from Mali across the border .
But even as terrorist activity explodes in the Sahel , the United States is considering withdrawing some or all of its roughly 5,000 troops across the continent—including approximately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources toward preparing for a potential future conflict with China or Russia , a concept the Pentagon calls “ great power competition.
” While the U.S. military no longer accompanies West African forces on combat missions—a practice that was largely halted after a fatal ambush in Niger killed four U.S. service members in October 2017—the United States plays a key role in facilitating French and other Western military operations here , providing air refueling , transportation , and drone surveillance .
The so-called G5 Sahel Joint Force , a framework of about 5,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Faso , Chad , Mali , Mauritania , and Niger—was created in 2017 with French and international backing to address the growing terrorism threat .
But French officials say the U.S. military ’ s support to their operations here is irreplaceable .
At the same time , tensions with Iran have put unforeseen strain on U.S. military resources in the Sahel .
Due to the increased demand in the Middle East , only one U.S. Air Force C-130 airlift plane could be spared for Flintlock this year , U.S officials said—and it broke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-week exercise , leaving reporters as well as U.S. and foreign officers stranded for four days in Senegal .
In fact , if the Moroccans had not offered additional C-130s to support the exercise , Flintlock might not have happened at all , U.S. officials said .
Critics , including influential lawmakers such as Republican Sen. Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma , have spoken out against the potential drawdown , warning that such a move would further degrade the security situation in this region of West Africa , where deep religious and ethnic divisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vast ungoverned spaces provide an ideal breeding ground for extremism .
Prompted in part by talk of a potential U.S. withdrawal , French President Emmanuel Macron convened a G5 Sahel summit in January to discuss the fight against armed groups and reiterate French commitment to the mission .
As violent activity increases , U.S. and foreign officials in the region are concerned that the Sahel may become the next major front in the global war on terrorism .
As the Islamic State struggles for relevance in the Middle East , particularly after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al–Baghdadi , in a U.S. raid last year , the group has increasingly leaned on its African affiliates for new recruits , said Brig .
Gen. Dagvin Anderson , commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa , during an interview here ahead of the exercise .
Due to long–standing ethnic and tribal ties , leaders from al Qaeda and the Islamic State cooperate here in ways they do not anywhere else in the world , enabling more sophisticated attacks .
“ When you put all that together , these random acts of terrorism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and nuanced campaign , ” said Anderson .
“ I ’ m concerned about what al-Qaeda will be able to develop into and that ’ s something that is troubling.
” For Flintlock , which has occurred each year since 2005 , the United States is largely responsible for transporting foreign soldiers in and out of the host country , including arranging visas and other logistics requirements .
U.S. special-operations forces also serve in advisory roles , overseeing training and liaising between the different units .
“ No single country can fight violent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Capt .
Nate , from the 3rd Special Forces Group , who oversees the U.S. team at the Thiès , Senegal , outpost for Flintlock .
The United States , with its large defense budget and experience in counterterrorism operations , is “ uniquely suited ” to facilitate a large-scale exercise such as Flintlock , he noted .
Like others interviewed for this story , Capt .
Nate requested reporters publish only his rank and first name .
The U.S. military does not need a large footprint to have an outsize impact in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs to be here in some form .
Defense Secretary Mark Esper has indicated the United States will not completely withdraw from Africa , but he is still reviewing U.S. military presence on the continent as part of an ongoing review of troop deployments worldwide .
“ One of the low-cost things the United States can provide is that convening power , ” said Anderson .
“ We can provide and exercise a framework for other countries to come into , without having to be the sole provider of security.
” Many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Flintlock have long–standing relationships with their counterparts in the Sahel , including participating in bilateral training exercises .
But the Americans bring expertise and resources to the fight , foreign officers here said .
Capt .
Tom , a British Army officer , and Capt .
Samuel , from the Nigerian Special Forces , agreed that while a U.S. military drawdown in Africa would not scuttle the U.K.-Nigeria military relationship , which stretches back to 2008 , such a move would “ degrade the standard of training.
” One important outcome of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is that regional militaries learn how to combine forces to better combat terrorist activity .
Throughout the exercise , which took place at four hubs in Mauritania and Senegal , more advanced forces were paired with West African units—for example , the Dutch and the Senegalese—for basic combat training , ranging from simple firearm handling to more complex close-quarters battles .
Flintlock this year will culminate in a fictitious scenario in which all the participants must work together to analyze intelligence from a variety of sources , ultimately leading to a major urban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Brett , from the 3rd Special Forces Group , who oversees the U.S. team at Nouakchott for the exercise .
Flintlock allows all the partners to identify and manage challenges that crop up related to logistics , communications , or capabilities , a skill that will be critical as the different nations in the region counter the growing threat from violent extremists , Capt .
Brett said .
“ They are going to have to work through these exact same friction points ” in real–life operations , he said .
This year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , one of the poorest countries in the world , is particularly grim .
Lt. Daouba Ilboudo , who commands a Burkinabé unit of 34 soldiers , said through a translator at the Thiès outpost that his men face attacks as often as once a week .
The militants have developed a sophisticated campaign in Burkina Faso , drawn from the well-documented Mali plays , over the last eight months .
In July 2019 , they began a more forceful push into the country from Mali , targeting infrastructure and economic centers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isolating local populations .
Next , they targeted military bases , forcing security forces to flee , and executed local leaders , including the mayor of Djibo , who was killed while traveling along the highway to the capital , Ouagadougou .
In November , the militants began moving south , attacking major urban areas .
Once the militants established control over the local populations , they gained access to local resources , such as gold mines , and criminal networks , allowing them to expand their influence over key economic corridors .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ local civilians , much as the Islamic State did in Iraq and Syria when it took over vast swaths of those countries in 2014 .
“ If you start giving them a regular source of funding , you start getting the ingredients for something that could get much worse , ” said Anderson .
“ It is incumbent upon the international community to keep them off balance.
” In Mali , extremists continue to mount devastating attacks .
There , al Qaeda deliberately stays below the radar , marrying into local tribes and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to penetrate the population and avoid the attention of the West .
Northern Mali , in particular , has been a hotbed for violent extremist activity since the area fell to a mixture of jihadist groups and Tuareg rebels in 2012 .
The Malian army has been unable to regain control of the area , even with French intervention .
“ For the moment , every time we have an attack , our team always wins , ” said one Malian special forces officer , who was in Nouakchott for training with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through a translator .
“ But we don ’ t know the enemy during the day.
” In neighboring Mauritania , the host of Flintlock this year , the military has been able to keep violent extremists at bay .
After a precursor to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb conducted a major attack in northern Mauritania in 2005 , killing 17 soldiers and catching the government off guard , the military redoubled its counterterrorism efforts , said Maj. Sidi Mohamed Hedeid , spokesperson for the Mauritanian Army .
Since the first attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security forces , training to understand the militants ’ tactics and buying more advanced aircraft and other equipment .
The military also works hard to maintain control over even the most remote parts of the country , conducting frequent ground and air patrols and tightening the borders .
Meanwhile , the Mauritanian government is also trying to counter violent extremism at its roots , creating deradicalization programs and building trust with local populations by providing basic services .
The country last year elected a new president , Mohamed Ould Ghazouani , the former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military and son of a respected Islamic spiritual leader , who officials here hope can root out corruption and implement key social and political reforms .
U.S. and Mauritanian officials here said they hope the Islamic nation , which is set next week to take over G5 Sahel leadership , can serve as a security model for the other nations in the Sahel working to counter the growing threat .
“ In the other four countries of the G5 Sahel , there are attacks almost daily , ” said Hedeid , noting that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mauritania since 2011 .
“ It is proof that our strategy is the best.
” Providing counterterrorism assistance to nations in the Sahel has other benefits for the United States as it tries to counter Russian and Chinese influence .
U.S. officials here noted that both countries are investing in the region , militarily and economically .
Both Moscow and Beijing have offered military equipment and training to the besieged state forces in the Sahel , particularly since the United States began signaling it may pull support .
Russia in particular often misrepresents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ They are more than happy to tell the partners in Africa that they were the ones that tipped the tables in Syria , that they were involved in killing al-Baghdadi , ” Anderson said .
“ They bring a corrosive effect.
” French officials also suspect Moscow is conducting a disinformation campaign , spreading conspiracy theories on social media that the French government is in league with terrorists .
China is also investing economically in the region .
In Senegal , Beijing has been paying local farmers a premium to buy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading to food shortages .
Meanwhile in Mauritania , China is building ports and other infrastructure , as well as investing in local fisheries , an effort U.S. officials suspect has led to overfishing .
Providing counterterrorism assistance is just another way the United States can counter Chinese and Russian influence in the Sahel , said Anderson .
“ What are the security concerns of these nations ?
For most of them , it is violent extremism , ” said Anderson .
“ Being able to engage with counterterrorism efforts with counterterrorism training @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be that preferred partner .
”

NOUAKCHOTT, MAURITANIA — Every February, hundreds of special operations forces from around the world gather in West Africa for Flintlock, a unique U.S.-led exercise that provides critical training for regional militaries struggling to counter growing terrorist activity in the Sahel.
NOUAKCHOTT, MAURITANIA—Every February, hundreds of special operations forces from around the world gather in West Africa for Flintlock, a unique U.S.-led exercise that provides critical training for regional militaries struggling to counter growing terrorist activity in the Sahel.
This year, the threat is more urgent than ever. Despite the presence of 4,500 French troops and a 13,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force, violent extremist attacks in the region have skyrocketed in the last 18 months. The Sahel saw the most rapid increase of such events of any African region in 2019, with roughly 2,600 fatalities from 800 attacks—a number which has nearly doubled every year since 2015. Burkina Faso bore the brunt of the new violence, primarily from groups linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, as the locus of terrorist activity shifted from Mali across the border.
But even as terrorist activity explodes in the Sahel, the United States is considering withdrawing some or all of its roughly 5,000 troops across the continent—including approximately 1,000 in West Africa—in order to move resources toward preparing for a potential future conflict with China or Russia, a concept the Pentagon calls “great power competition.”
While the U.S. military no longer accompanies West African forces on combat missions—a practice that was largely halted after a fatal ambush in Niger killed four U.S. service members in October 2017—the United States plays a key role in facilitating French and other Western military operations here, providing air refueling, transportation, and drone surveillance. The so-called G5 Sahel Joint Force, a framework of about 5,000 troops from five countries in the region—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—was created in 2017 with French and international backing to address the growing terrorism threat. But French officials say the U.S. military’s support to their operations here is irreplaceable.
At the same time, tensions with Iran have put unforeseen strain on U.S. military resources in the Sahel. Due to the increased demand in the Middle East, only one U.S. Air Force C-130 airlift plane could be spared for Flintlock this year, U.S officials said—and it broke down on the second day of the two-week exercise, leaving reporters as well as U.S. and foreign officers stranded for four days in Senegal.
In fact, if the Moroccans had not offered additional C-130s to support the exercise, Flintlock might not have happened at all, U.S. officials said.
Critics, including influential lawmakers such as Republican Sen. Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, have spoken out against the potential drawdown, warning that such a move would further degrade the security situation in this region of West Africa, where deep religious and ethnic divisions, climate change, poverty, and vast ungoverned spaces provide an ideal breeding ground for extremism. Prompted in part by talk of a potential U.S. withdrawal, French President Emmanuel Macron convened a G5 Sahel summit in January to discuss the fight against armed groups and reiterate French commitment to the mission.
As violent activity increases, U.S. and foreign officials in the region are concerned that the Sahel may become the next major front in the global war on terrorism. As the Islamic State struggles for relevance in the Middle East, particularly after the killing of its leader, Abu Bakr al–Baghdadi, in a U.S. raid last year, the group has increasingly leaned on its African affiliates for new recruits, said Brig. Gen. Dagvin Anderson, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, during an interview here ahead of the exercise.
Due to long–standing ethnic and tribal ties, leaders from al Qaeda and the Islamic State cooperate here in ways they do not anywhere else in the world, enabling more sophisticated attacks.
“When you put all that together, these random acts of terrorism, you start seeing a more complex and nuanced campaign,” said Anderson. “I’m concerned about what al-Qaeda will be able to develop into and that’s something that is troubling.”
Outsize impact
For Flintlock, which has occurred each year since 2005, the United States is largely responsible for transporting foreign soldiers in and out of the host country, including arranging visas and other logistics requirements. U.S. special-operations forces also serve in advisory roles, overseeing training and liaising between the different units.
“No single country can fight violent extremism alone,” said U.S. Army Capt. Nate, from the 3rd Special Forces Group, who oversees the U.S. team at the Thiès, Senegal, outpost for Flintlock. The United States, with its large defense budget and experience in counterterrorism operations, is “uniquely suited” to facilitate a large-scale exercise such as Flintlock, he noted. Like others interviewed for this story, Capt. Nate requested reporters publish only his rank and first name.
The U.S. military does not need a large footprint to have an outsize impact in the Sahel, officials here said—but it needs to be here in some form. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has indicated the United States will not completely withdraw from Africa, but he is still reviewing U.S. military presence on the continent as part of an ongoing review of troop deployments worldwide.
“One of the low-cost things the United States can provide is that convening power,” said Anderson. “We can provide and exercise a framework for other countries to come into, without having to be the sole provider of security.”
Many of the Western special-operations forces on the ground for Flintlock have long–standing relationships with their counterparts in the Sahel, including participating in bilateral training exercises. But the Americans bring expertise and resources to the fight, foreign officers here said. Capt. Tom, a British Army officer, and Capt. Samuel, from the Nigerian Special Forces, agreed that while a U.S. military drawdown in Africa would not scuttle the U.K.-Nigeria military relationship, which stretches back to 2008, such a move would “degrade the standard of training.”
One important outcome of the annual exercise, officials hope, is that regional militaries learn how to combine forces to better combat terrorist activity. Throughout the exercise, which took place at four hubs in Mauritania and Senegal, more advanced forces were paired with West African units—for example, the Dutch and the Senegalese—for basic combat training, ranging from simple firearm handling to more complex close-quarters battles.
Flintlock this year will culminate in a fictitious scenario in which all the participants must work together to analyze intelligence from a variety of sources, ultimately leading to a major urban counterterrorism mission, explained U.S. Army Capt. Brett, from the 3rd Special Forces Group, who oversees the U.S. team at Nouakchott for the exercise.
Flintlock allows all the partners to identify and manage challenges that crop up related to logistics, communications, or capabilities, a skill that will be critical as the different nations in the region counter the growing threat from violent extremists, Capt. Brett said.
“They are going to have to work through these exact same friction points” in real–life operations, he said.
The Mali playbook
This year, the security situation in Burkina Faso, one of the poorest countries in the world, is particularly grim. Lt. Daouba Ilboudo, who commands a Burkinabé unit of 34 soldiers, said through a translator at the Thiès outpost that his men face attacks as often as once a week.
The militants have developed a sophisticated campaign in Burkina Faso, drawn from the well-documented Mali plays, over the last eight months. In July 2019, they began a more forceful push into the country from Mali, targeting infrastructure and economic centers, such as crops and bridges, and isolating local populations. Next, they targeted military bases, forcing security forces to flee, and executed local leaders, including the mayor of Djibo, who was killed while traveling along the highway to the capital, Ouagadougou. In November, the militants began moving south, attacking major urban areas.
Once the militants established control over the local populations, they gained access to local resources, such as gold mines, and criminal networks, allowing them to expand their influence over key economic corridors. The strategy also enabled them to tax local civilians, much as the Islamic State did in Iraq and Syria when it took over vast swaths of those countries in 2014.
“If you start giving them a regular source of funding, you start getting the ingredients for something that could get much worse,” said Anderson. “It is incumbent upon the international community to keep them off balance.”
In Mali, extremists continue to mount devastating attacks. There, al Qaeda deliberately stays below the radar, marrying into local tribes and becoming part of the community in order to penetrate the population and avoid the attention of the West. Northern Mali, in particular, has been a hotbed for violent extremist activity since the area fell to a mixture of jihadist groups and Tuareg rebels in 2012. The Malian army has been unable to regain control of the area, even with French intervention.
“For the moment, every time we have an attack, our team always wins,” said one Malian special forces officer, who was in Nouakchott for training with the Czech special forces during Flintlock, speaking through a translator. “But we don’t know the enemy during the day.”
In neighboring Mauritania, the host of Flintlock this year, the military has been able to keep violent extremists at bay. After a precursor to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb conducted a major attack in northern Mauritania in 2005, killing 17 soldiers and catching the government off guard, the military redoubled its counterterrorism efforts, said Maj. Sidi Mohamed Hedeid, spokesperson for the Mauritanian Army.
Since the first attack, Mauritania has significantly built up its security forces, training to understand the militants’ tactics and buying more advanced aircraft and other equipment. The military also works hard to maintain control over even the most remote parts of the country, conducting frequent ground and air patrols and tightening the borders.
Meanwhile, the Mauritanian government is also trying to counter violent extremism at its roots, creating deradicalization programs and building trust with local populations by providing basic services. The country last year elected a new president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the former chief of staff of Mauritania’s military and son of a respected Islamic spiritual leader, who officials here hope can root out corruption and implement key social and political reforms.
U.S. and Mauritanian officials here said they hope the Islamic nation, which is set next week to take over G5 Sahel leadership, can serve as a security model for the other nations in the Sahel working to counter the growing threat.
“In the other four countries of the G5 Sahel, there are attacks almost daily,” said Hedeid, noting that there have been no successful attacks in Mauritania since 2011. “It is proof that our strategy is the best.”
Great power competition
Providing counterterrorism assistance to nations in the Sahel has other benefits for the United States as it tries to counter Russian and Chinese influence. U.S. officials here noted that both countries are investing in the region, militarily and economically.
Both Moscow and Beijing have offered military equipment and training to the besieged state forces in the Sahel, particularly since the United States began signaling it may pull support. Russia in particular often misrepresents its own counterterrorism expertise, said Anderson.
“They are more than happy to tell the partners in Africa that they were the ones that tipped the tables in Syria, that they were involved in killing al-Baghdadi,” Anderson said. “They bring a corrosive effect.”
French officials also suspect Moscow is conducting a disinformation campaign, spreading conspiracy theories on social media that the French government is in league with terrorists.
China is also investing economically in the region. In Senegal, Beijing has been paying local farmers a premium to buy the bulk of their harvest, potentially leading to food shortages. Meanwhile in Mauritania, China is building ports and other infrastructure, as well as investing in local fisheries, an effort U.S. officials suspect has led to overfishing.
Providing counterterrorism assistance is just another way the United States can counter Chinese and Russian influence in the Sahel, said Anderson.
“What are the security concerns of these nations? For most of them, it is violent extremism,” said Anderson. “Being able to engage with counterterrorism efforts with counterterrorism training, equipment, education … allows us to be that preferred partner.”
“In Africa, [counterterrorism] is great power competition.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-24--Global Fears Rise as Coronavirus Spreads Beyond China

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Several countries report a significant rise in coronavirus cases beyond China , Trump makes his first presidential visit to India , and what to watch in the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Fears of a global coronavirus pandemic are growing after Italy and South Korea reported steep rises in the number of cases over the weekend .
Italian officials have confirmed 152 cases and four deaths in the northern regions of Lombardy and Veneto—the biggest outbreak in Europe .
Authorities have closed schools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two days of Venice ’ s Carnival celebrations .
French Health Minister Olivier Véran said he would work with his European counterparts to grapple with the possibility of a virus epidemic in Europe .
In South Korea , meanwhile , 231 new coronavirus cases were reported on Monday .
That brings the total to 833 , with many of the cases traced to a church community in the city of Daegu .
Seven people have died of the virus .
On Sunday , President Moon Jae-in officially put the country on high alert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and take other emergency measures .
The outbreak will test South Korea ’ s advanced health care system , but the country ’ s more transparent government data could reveal more about the virus than China ’ s somewhat opaque figures .
Over the weekend , Iran confirmed 43 cases and 12 deaths—and on Monday morning , an Iranian lawmaker claimed 50 people had died in the holy city of Qom—leading Turkey , Pakistan , Afghanistan , and Armenia to close their borders with the country .
But such blanket travel bans may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ epidemic , as Mara Pillinger argues in FP .
What will the WHO do ?
The World Health Organization ( WHO ) has not yet declared the coronavirus a pandemic , as it did with the H1N1 influenza outbreak in 2009 .
But WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus warned last Friday that the “ window of opportunity is narrowing ” to contain the epidemic .
Health experts are particularly concerned by untraceable virus clusters beyond China—marking a different phase of the virus outbreak .
Trump goes to India , expects a crowd .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ trip to India today , where he is expecting a big crowd : He is appearing with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a rally called “ Namaste Trump ” in the world ’ s biggest cricket stadium before an estimated 110,000 people .
During the two-day visit , the leaders are scheduled to discuss a limited trade deal to alleviate economic tensions—though Trump has downplayed expectations of a signed agreement .
The U.S. president is also likely to raise the issue of religious freedom in India after a new law that eases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minorities from neighboring Muslim countries .
Germany ’ s CDU holds leadership meeting .
National leaders from German Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) are meeting today in Berlin .
The meeting comes just a day after the CDU suffered its worst-ever defeat in Hamburg ’ s state elections .
The party has recently been thrown into turmoil .
Today , current party leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbaeur—once Merkel ’ s chosen successor as chancellor—is expected to shape the process for choosing a new CDU chief after she announced she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will not seek reelection after her fourth term ends in 2021 .
Earthquake on Turkey-Iran border kills nine .
A magnitude 5.7 earthquake struck the Turkey-Iran border region on Sunday , killing nine people in southeastern Turkey as more than 1,000 buildings collapsed , according to officials .
More than 100 people were injured in both countries .
The tremor was the third in either country in recent months : An earthquake killed 40 people in eastern Turkey last month , and another did major structural damage in Iran .
Located on major @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world .
Arguments over WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange ’ s extradition begin today in London .
The court will consider whether to send Assange to the United States , where he faces trial on espionage charges for publishing secret documents related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan .
Lawyers say a final decision is not likely anytime soon : A verdict isn ’ t expected until later this year and is likely to be appealed .
Today , Chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier presents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade negotiations with the United Kingdom .
The European Union is expected to remain tough in defending its single market , even as British negotiators could try to take advantage of the bloc ’ s divisions .
EU member states are expected to sign off on the directives on Tuesday .
The U.S. Democratic presidential candidates take the debate stage for the third time this month on Tuesday in Charleston , South Carolina .
( The qualifying candidates are likely to be the same as in last week ’ s Las Vegas debate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saturday , like the Nevada caucuses on Feb. 22 , is one of the first contests with significant representation from nonwhite voters .
Sen. Bernie Sanders won the Nevada caucuses last Saturday by a large margin .
The U.S.-Taliban peace agreement is supposed to be signed on Saturday , as long as the agreed seven-day reduction in violence across Afghanistan holds .
The draft deal is almost identical to the one reached in September , when Trump called off secret talks after a Taliban attack killed a U.S. contractor .
Once signed , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government .
The next U.S. ambassador to Germany .
After appointing diplomat Richard Grenell as the acting U.S. intelligence chief , Trump says he ’ s seeking a new U.S. ambassador to Germany—though it ’ s unclear how long Grenell will be in the senior intelligence role .
Grenell has earned Trump ’ s favor through partisanship , and his appointment has raised fears that the administration is politicizing intelligence , FP ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report .
Authorities in Colombia are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem : the growing hippopotamus population around the Rio Magdalena , a few hours away from Medellín .
The hippos , descended from animals that belonged to the drug lord Pablo Escobar , currently number 80 and the population could quadruple over the next 10 years .
Researchers say the hippos are negatively affecting the ecosystem , including displacing some local species .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to @ @ @ @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Several countries report a significant rise in coronavirus cases beyond China , Trump makes his first presidential visit to India , and what to watch in the world this week.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Several countries report a significant rise in coronavirus cases beyond China, Trump makes his first presidential visit to India, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Is the Coronavirus a Pandemic?
Fears of a global coronavirus pandemic are growing after Italy and South Korea reported steep rises in the number of cases over the weekend. Italian officials have confirmed 152 cases and four deaths in the northern regions of Lombardy and Veneto—the biggest outbreak in Europe. Authorities have closed schools and public places and canceled the last two days of Venice’s Carnival celebrations. French Health Minister Olivier Véran said he would work with his European counterparts to grapple with the possibility of a virus epidemic in Europe.
In South Korea, meanwhile, 231 new coronavirus cases were reported on Monday. That brings the total to 833, with many of the cases traced to a church community in the city of Daegu. Seven people have died of the virus. On Sunday, President Moon Jae-in officially put the country on high alert, allowing the government to quarantine cities and take other emergency measures. The outbreak will test South Korea’s advanced health care system, but the country’s more transparent government data could reveal more about the virus than China’s somewhat opaque figures.
Over the weekend, Iran confirmed 43 cases and 12 deaths—and on Monday morning, an Iranian lawmaker claimed 50 people had died in the holy city of Qom—leading Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Armenia to close their borders with the country. But such blanket travel bans may not be effective in completely stopping an epidemic, as Mara Pillinger argues in FP.
What will the WHO do? The World Health Organization (WHO) has not yet declared the coronavirus a pandemic, as it did with the H1N1 influenza outbreak in 2009. But WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus warned last Friday that the “window of opportunity is narrowing” to contain the epidemic. Health experts are particularly concerned by untraceable virus clusters beyond China—marking a different phase of the virus outbreak.
What We’re Following Today
Trump goes to India, expects a crowd. U.S. President Donald Trump makes his first trip to India today, where he is expecting a big crowd: He is appearing with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a rally called “Namaste Trump” in the world’s biggest cricket stadium before an estimated 110,000 people. During the two-day visit, the leaders are scheduled to discuss a limited trade deal to alleviate economic tensions—though Trump has downplayed expectations of a signed agreement. The U.S. president is also likely to raise the issue of religious freedom in India after a new law that eases the pathway to Indian citizenship for religious minorities from neighboring Muslim countries.
Germany’s CDU holds leadership meeting. National leaders from German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) are meeting today in Berlin. The meeting comes just a day after the CDU suffered its worst-ever defeat in Hamburg’s state elections. The party has recently been thrown into turmoil. Today, current party leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbaeur—once Merkel’s chosen successor as chancellor—is expected to shape the process for choosing a new CDU chief after she announced she would resign earlier this month. Merkel will not seek reelection after her fourth term ends in 2021.
Earthquake on Turkey-Iran border kills nine. A magnitude 5.7 earthquake struck the Turkey-Iran border region on Sunday, killing nine people in southeastern Turkey as more than 1,000 buildings collapsed, according to officials. More than 100 people were injured in both countries. The tremor was the third in either country in recent months: An earthquake killed 40 people in eastern Turkey last month, and another did major structural damage in Iran. Located on major fault lines, Iran and Turkey are two of the most earthquake-prone countries in the world.
The World This Week
Arguments over WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s extradition begin today in London. The court will consider whether to send Assange to the United States, where he faces trial on espionage charges for publishing secret documents related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lawyers say a final decision is not likely anytime soon: A verdict isn’t expected until later this year and is likely to be appealed.
Today, Chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier presents to the public draft directives for post-Brexit trade negotiations with the United Kingdom. The European Union is expected to remain tough in defending its single market, even as British negotiators could try to take advantage of the bloc’s divisions. EU member states are expected to sign off on the directives on Tuesday.
The U.S. Democratic presidential candidates take the debate stage for the third time this month on Tuesday in Charleston, South Carolina. (The qualifying candidates are likely to be the same as in last week’s Las Vegas debate.) The South Carolina primary on Saturday, like the Nevada caucuses on Feb. 22, is one of the first contests with significant representation from nonwhite voters. Sen. Bernie Sanders won the Nevada caucuses last Saturday by a large margin.
The U.S.-Taliban peace agreement is supposed to be signed on Saturday, as long as the agreed seven-day reduction in violence across Afghanistan holds. The draft deal is almost identical to the one reached in September, when Trump called off secret talks after a Taliban attack killed a U.S. contractor. Once signed, the agreement will pave the way for peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
Keep an Eye On
The next U.S. ambassador to Germany. After appointing diplomat Richard Grenell as the acting U.S. intelligence chief, Trump says he’s seeking a new U.S. ambassador to Germany—though it’s unclear how long Grenell will be in the senior intelligence role. Grenell has earned Trump’s favor through partisanship, and his appointment has raised fears that the administration is politicizing intelligence, FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report.
Odds and Ends
Authorities in Colombia are scrambling for a solution to a strange problem: the growing hippopotamus population around the Rio Magdalena, a few hours away from Medellín. The hippos, descended from animals that belonged to the drug lord Pablo Escobar, currently number 80 and the population could quadruple over the next 10 years. Researchers say the hippos are negatively affecting the ecosystem, including displacing some local species.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-02-24--State Department Struggling on Diversity, New Report Finds

The U.S. State Department ’ s efforts to increase diversity in its ranks have fallen short and in some cases resulted in an actual decline in the percentage of women and ethnic and racial minorities employed there , according to a new study from a U.S. federal watchdog .
This week , the U.S. Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) , an independent federal watchdog , will release a comprehensive study on diversity at the State Department in a first-of-its-kind analysis that will publicize data on the department ’ s efforts to recruit and retain a diverse talent pool .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is falling short in many categories , despite recent public statements from senior department officials to the contrary , according to a draft copy of the study reviewed by Foreign Policy .
The study will likely ramp up pressure on the State Department from lawmakers on Capitol Hill , who originally requested the GAO study , to invest more in retaining a diverse workforce .
The study appears to contradict statements from senior State Department officials .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , along with his predecessors , touted the importance of recruiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department that extends beyond white men , who have dominated the institution for most of its existence .
In an email to employees in November 2019 , he said the department was “ building an increasingly diverse team , ” saying diverse candidates applying for the two fellowships aimed at recruiting racial and ethnic minorities—the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Fellowship and the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellowship—had doubled from 844 to more than 1,600 applicants .
In September 2018 , then-Policy Planning Director Kiron Skinner said in an interview that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against diversity—especially racial diversity—the State Department is doing much better.
” Skinner , one of the most senior-ranking African American women in the Trump administration , was removed from her post in August 2019 .
Senior State Department officials have repeatedly said in public that they are prioritizing diversity at the department and that it is a work in progress .
The State Department has several long-standing initiatives to do so , including a diplomat-in-residence program in which ambassadors serve as recruiters at universities , and an emphasis on recruiting from historically black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critics say those initiatives are falling short , particularly on the matter of retaining employees from racially and ethnically diverse backgrounds once they ’ re hired .
“ You don ’ t need a GAO report to tell you that .
Anyone who has sat in a meeting with [ the ] State Department can tell you that , ” said Francisco Bencosme , a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer for the top Democrat on the committee , Sen. Bob Menendez .
“ But now the data exists to show that and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the findings of the GAO report : Between fiscal years 2002 and 2018 , the proportion of racial or ethnic minorities working at the State Department full time did increase but only by 4 percent—from 28 to 32 percent—below the overall average of the overall federal workforce .
The proportion of racial or ethnic minorities in the foreign service increased from 17 to 24 percent during that time period but decreased from 44 to 43 percent in the civil service , the study found .
Additionally , racial or ethnic minority men and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statistically significantly lower odds of promotion ” than white men , according to the study .
The proportion of women working at the State Department slightly decreased during that time period , from 44 to 43 percent of State ’ s overall full-time workforce .
Women ’ s promotion rates compared with their male counterparts were lower in the civil service and higher in the foreign service .
The proportion of African Americans working at the State Department fell from 17 to 15 percent between the 2002 and 2018 time period of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 16,570 to 22,806 .
The proportion of African Americans in the foreign service increased only from 6 to 7 percent between fiscal years 2002 and 2018 .
The proportion of African American women at State overall decreased from 13 to 9 percent and within the foreign service increased from 2 to 3 percent .

The U.S. State Department’s efforts to increase diversity in its ranks have fallen short and in some cases resulted in an actual decline in the percentage of women and ethnic and racial minorities employed there, according to a new study from a U.S. federal watchdog.
The U.S. State Department’s efforts to increase diversity in its ranks have fallen short and in some cases resulted in an actual decline in the percentage of women and ethnic and racial minorities employed there, according to a new study from a U.S. federal watchdog.
This week, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent federal watchdog, will release a comprehensive study on diversity at the State Department in a first-of-its-kind analysis that will publicize data on the department’s efforts to recruit and retain a diverse talent pool.
With several exceptions, the State Department is falling short in many categories, despite recent public statements from senior department officials to the contrary, according to a draft copy of the study reviewed by Foreign Policy. The study will likely ramp up pressure on the State Department from lawmakers on Capitol Hill, who originally requested the GAO study, to invest more in retaining a diverse workforce.
The study appears to contradict statements from senior State Department officials. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, along with his predecessors, touted the importance of recruiting a pool of talent for the State Department that extends beyond white men, who have dominated the institution for most of its existence. In an email to employees in November 2019, he said the department was “building an increasingly diverse team,” saying diverse candidates applying for the two fellowships aimed at recruiting racial and ethnic minorities—the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Fellowship and the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellowship—had doubled from 844 to more than 1,600 applicants.
In September 2018, then-Policy Planning Director Kiron Skinner said in an interview that “given some the trends in the U.S. against diversity—especially racial diversity—the State Department is doing much better.” Skinner, one of the most senior-ranking African American women in the Trump administration, was removed from her post in August 2019.
Senior State Department officials have repeatedly said in public that they are prioritizing diversity at the department and that it is a work in progress. The State Department has several long-standing initiatives to do so, including a diplomat-in-residence program in which ambassadors serve as recruiters at universities, and an emphasis on recruiting from historically black colleges and Hispanic-serving universities.
But some critics say those initiatives are falling short, particularly on the matter of retaining employees from racially and ethnically diverse backgrounds once they’re hired.
“You don’t need a GAO report to tell you that. Anyone who has sat in a meeting with [the] State Department can tell you that,” said Francisco Bencosme, a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer for the top Democrat on the committee, Sen. Bob Menendez. “But now the data exists to show that and hopefully push for progress internally.”
Among the findings of the GAO report: Between fiscal years 2002 and 2018, the proportion of racial or ethnic minorities working at the State Department full time did increase but only by 4 percent—from 28 to 32 percent—below the overall average of the overall federal workforce.
The proportion of racial or ethnic minorities in the foreign service increased from 17 to 24 percent during that time period but decreased from 44 to 43 percent in the civil service, the study found. Additionally, racial or ethnic minority men and women in the civil service “had statistically significantly lower odds of promotion” than white men, according to the study.
The proportion of women working at the State Department slightly decreased during that time period, from 44 to 43 percent of State’s overall full-time workforce. Women’s promotion rates compared with their male counterparts were lower in the civil service and higher in the foreign service.
The proportion of African Americans working at the State Department fell from 17 to 15 percent between the 2002 and 2018 time period of the study—though the overall number of employees increased from 16,570 to 22,806. The proportion of African Americans in the foreign service increased only from 6 to 7 percent between fiscal years 2002 and 2018. The proportion of African American women at State overall decreased from 13 to 9 percent and within the foreign service increased from 2 to 3 percent.