foreignpolicy--2020-07-28--Trump Doesn’t Love Modi Back

Trump Doesn’t Love Modi Back

U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi both love rallies , and so do their followers—some of whom are supporters of both leaders .
Parallel rallies in Gujarat and Texas—Howdy Modi Namaste Trump—were held on Sept. 22 , 2019 , and Feb. 24 and 25 this year .
Each rally drew thousands of attendees in person and many more on online streams .
Pundits have frequently noted the similarities between Trump and Modi , and the closeness of their relationship .
The growing ties between China and Pakistan and the recent bloody clashes between Indian and Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in both the United States and India clamoring for a stronger bond .
But it ’ s the nationalistic and isolationist policies promoted by the two leaders , especially Trump , that offer the most formidable barriers to a stronger U.S.-India relationship .
Trump rose to office on promises to put “ America first , ” and a big part of this was related to trade .
While flashy moves such as dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and renegotiating NAFTA drew most of the attention , India also faced major new obstacles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Preferences ( GSP ) is a U.S. trade preference program that dates to the early 1970s that allows developing countries to sell to the United States without tariffs on a number of different products—everything from buffalo hide to AC motors .
India was a part of this program since the mid 1970s—but a review of its membership in 2018 ended with the Trump administration removing India from the GSP list .
At the time , the justification given was that India wasn ’ t providing sufficient market access to American products .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. exports and the Trump administration planned to leverage the revocation in a new trade deal that is yet to be drafted and agreed upon by the United States and India .
Within India , the revocation was seen as indicative of an unwillingness to compromise as well as unilateral action despite forward motion on a trade deal .
But the most damaging element may have been Trump ’ s immigration restrictions .
The H-1B visa program allows U.S. companies to hire foreign workers for certain occupations .
A majority of these visas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make up around three-quarters of those with the visa .
The recipients of this visa are not from all over the world in equal numbers : Between 2007 and 2017 , a disproportionate share of recipients were from India .
The numbers weren ’ t close—more Indians received the visa than nationals of the next five countries each year combined .
U.S. presidents from both parties have traditionally been sensitive to this issue and have each played a role in expanding the program .
Bill Clinton called for an increase in the cap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ George W. Bush signed an expansion of the visa cap into law ; and then , around a decade after that , Barack Obama further expanded the amount of people eligible for one of the visas .
Trump , however , chose the opposite route .
For years he has spoken of the importance of slashing immigration , and on June 22 he moved to suspend these visas until 2021—an extension of a policy first announced in April .
Though both moves were ostensibly related to the coronavirus pandemic , it is hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Trump advisor Stephen Miller and a yearslong devotion to slashing immigration—skilled and unskilled , and particularly of nonwhite migrants .
In addition , the U.S. failure to cope with the pandemic has meant that many American universities are unlikely to reopen en masse .
Consequently , the Department of Homeland Security has just reiterated its assertion that any student whose campus doesn ’ t offer in-person classes will not be allowed to enter the United States—an effective suspension of the F-1 and J-1 visa programs .
Hundreds of universities announced plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ban , which applied to all students , and many plan to allow some in-person classes to ensure students can avoid deportation .
The lawsuits have resulted in a partial reversal of the policy—it will now only apply to incoming freshmen .
F , people of Indian origin were the second most represented group in the F-1 program .
More than 150,000 Indian students put more than $ 5 billion into the U.S. economy from tuition and living expenses alone .
Around 70 percent of them pursue science or math-related degrees , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headed for a master ’ s degree or higher .
Indian people are also well represented in the J-1 program—in fiscal 2019 , nearly 10 percent of all such “ exchange visitor ” visas issued to Asian immigrants went to Indian nationals .
Back in India , the pandemic has also forced change in policy .
Modi has called for an “ Atmanirbhar Bharat ” or “ self-reliant India.
” Recent policy moves have also included attempts to slash foreign direct investment as a result of Chinese tensions .
However , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t stop there .
India has only had a liberalized economy since the 1990s—before that , FDI was limited , and tariffs along with the License Raj , a complex web of regulations and red tape that governed most aspects of setting up and running businesses , ruled the day .
Though these were initially schemes from the socialist school started under the country ’ s first prime minister , Jawaharlal Nehru , support for them didn ’ t come just from the hard left .
It took until the late 1980s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to slash regulation—a process that is still continuing today .
Furthermore , the parent organization of Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party , the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh , has long been wary of increased FDI .
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh affiliates were sounding the alarm on FDI expansion policies since 2015 , and it is unlikely a pandemic , resulting in billions of dollars in economic loss , will make them more open to it .
However , this time there is more support for economic nationalism—Modi ’ s calls for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Home Minister Amit Shah , which is something of a reversal from Shah ’ s ( and other cabinet officials ’ ) statements from earlier this year .
While both Trump and Modi have called for a stronger U.S.-India relationship , their desire to put their countries first at all times is taking a toll .
India still needs American capital to continue to grow economically .
Beyond this , as India confronts an increasingly combative China , U.S. aid and support will be important—and the United States needs India , not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partner , but as a potential bulwark against Chinese influence in Asia .
Trump has offered some sweet—for him—words to India , but little else .
At his address at “ Humanity United Against Terror , ” an event hosted by the Republican Hindu Coalition during Trump ’ s presidential campaign in 2016 , he said that the “ Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House , that I can guarantee.
” Indian and Hindu supporters who signed on in the name of an anti-Pakistan agenda have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of his long-standing goals such as slashing immigration levels .
Trump ’ s loyalty is to his base and his nationalism first , and no number of rallies nor praise will change that .

U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi both love rallies, and so do their followers—some of whom are supporters of both leaders. Parallel rallies in Gujarat and Texas— Howdy Modi and Namaste Trump —were held on Sept. 22, 2019, and Feb. 24 and 25 this year. Each rally drew thousands of attendees in person and many more on online streams.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi both love rallies, and so do their followers—some of whom are supporters of both leaders. Parallel rallies in Gujarat and Texas—Howdy Modi and Namaste Trump—were held on Sept. 22, 2019, and Feb. 24 and 25 this year. Each rally drew thousands of attendees in person and many more on online streams.
Pundits have frequently noted the similarities between Trump and Modi, and the closeness of their relationship. The growing ties between China and Pakistan and the recent bloody clashes between Indian and Chinese forces on the border have had many in both the United States and India clamoring for a stronger bond. But it’s the nationalistic and isolationist policies promoted by the two leaders, especially Trump, that offer the most formidable barriers to a stronger U.S.-India relationship.
Trump rose to office on promises to put “America first,” and a big part of this was related to trade. While flashy moves such as dropping out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and renegotiating NAFTA drew most of the attention, India also faced major new obstacles in U.S. trade. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a U.S. trade preference program that dates to the early 1970s that allows developing countries to sell to the United States without tariffs on a number of different products—everything from buffalo hide to AC motors. India was a part of this program since the mid 1970s—but a review of its membership in 2018 ended with the Trump administration removing India from the GSP list.
At the time, the justification given was that India wasn’t providing sufficient market access to American products. GSP accounted for billions of dollars of U.S. exports , and the Trump administration planned to leverage the revocation in a new trade deal that is yet to be drafted and agreed upon by the United States and India. Within India, the revocation was seen as indicative of an unwillingness to compromise as well as unilateral action despite forward motion on a trade deal.
But the most damaging element may have been Trump’s immigration restrictions. The H-1B visa program allows U.S. companies to hire foreign workers for certain occupations. A majority of these visas are for the tech industry—computer science workers make up around three-quarters of those with the visa. The recipients of this visa are not from all over the world in equal numbers: Between 2007 and 2017, a disproportionate share of recipients were from India. The numbers weren’t close—more Indians received the visa than nationals of the next five countries each year combined.
U.S. presidents from both parties have traditionally been sensitive to this issue and have each played a role in expanding the program. Bill Clinton called for an increase in the cap in 2000; four years later, George W. Bush signed an expansion of the visa cap into law; and then, around a decade after that, Barack Obama further expanded the amount of people eligible for one of the visas. Trump, however, chose the opposite route. For years he has spoken of the importance of slashing immigration, and on June 22 he moved to suspend these visas until 2021—an extension of a policy first announced in April. Though both moves were ostensibly related to the coronavirus pandemic, it is hard to separate this policy from racist officials such as Trump advisor Stephen Miller and a yearslong devotion to slashing immigration—skilled and unskilled, and particularly of nonwhite migrants.
In addition, the U.S. failure to cope with the pandemic has meant that many American universities are unlikely to reopen en masse. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security has just reiterated its assertion that any student whose campus doesn’t offer in-person classes will not be allowed to enter the United States—an effective suspension of the F-1 and J-1 visa programs. Hundreds of universities announced plans to sue the administration over the initial ban, which applied to all students, and many plan to allow some in-person classes to ensure students can avoid deportation. The lawsuits have resulted in a partial reversal of the policy—it will now only apply to incoming freshmen.
F rom 2004 to 2012 , people of Indian origin were the second most represented group in the F-1 program. More than 150,000 Indian students put more than $5 billion into the U.S. economy from tuition and living expenses alone. Around 70 percent of them pursue science or math-related degrees, and more than 80 percent of them are headed for a master’s degree or higher. Indian people are also well represented in the J-1 program—in fiscal 2019, nearly 10 percent of all such “exchange visitor” visas issued to Asian immigrants went to Indian nationals.
Back in India, the pandemic has also forced change in policy. Modi has called for an “Atmanirbhar Bharat” or “self-reliant India.” Recent policy moves have also included attempts to slash foreign direct investment as a result of Chinese tensions. However, there is good reason to worry that it won’t stop there. India has only had a liberalized economy since the 1990s—before that, FDI was limited, and tariffs along with the License Raj, a complex web of regulations and red tape that governed most aspects of setting up and running businesses, ruled the day.
Though these were initially schemes from the socialist school started under the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, support for them didn’t come just from the hard left. It took until the late 1980s and 1990s before there were serious attempts to slash regulation—a process that is still continuing today. Furthermore, the parent organization of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, has long been wary of increased FDI. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh affiliates were sounding the alarm on FDI expansion policies since 2015, and it is unlikely a pandemic, resulting in billions of dollars in economic loss, will make them more open to it. However, this time there is more support for economic nationalism—Modi’s calls for a self-reliant India have seen agreement and support from Home Minister Amit Shah, which is something of a reversal from Shah’s (and other cabinet officials’) statements from earlier this year.
While both Trump and Modi have called for a stronger U.S.-India relationship, their desire to put their countries first at all times is taking a toll. India still needs American capital to continue to grow economically. Beyond this, as India confronts an increasingly combative China, U.S. aid and support will be important—and the United States needs India, not just as a major cultural and economic partner, but as a potential bulwark against Chinese influence in Asia.
Trump has offered some sweet—for him—words to India, but little else. At his address at “Humanity United Against Terror,” an event hosted by the Republican Hindu Coalition during Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016, he said that the “Indian and Hindu community will have a true friend in the White House, that I can guarantee.” Indian and Hindu supporters who signed on in the name of an anti-Pakistan agenda have thus been left behind as Trump pursues some of his long-standing goals such as slashing immigration levels. Trump’s loyalty is to his base and his nationalism first, and no number of rallies nor praise will change that.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-28--Congress Pushes for Sanctions on Turkey, Russia Over Libyan War

Congress Pushes for Sanctions on Turkey , Russia Over Libyan War U.S. lawmakers are advancing a bill that would compel the Trump administration to levy sanctions on Russia and Turkey for fueling an escalation in the civil war in Libya , as the Defense Department has warned about the deployment of foreign mercenaries into the war zone .
The Libya Stabilization Act , which is expected to pass out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee this week , would impose mandatory sanctions on both countries within six months , giving the White House wide leeway to revoke U.S. visas or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bid to keep Russia in particular from establishing a bridgehead across the Mediterranean .
“ We don ’ t want Russia to establish a foothold on what is essentially the soft underbelly of NATO in Europe , ” a House aide familiar with the legislation told Foreign Policy .
“ Other than chastising them there haven ’ t been significant penalties.
” “ With [ Recep Tayyip ] Erdogan and [ Vladimir ] Putin and more broadly , they act when there ’ s a stick involved or a penalty held above their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ referring to the Turkish and Russian presidents .
The legislation comes as the conflict in Libya is intensifying , with Egypt the latest country to consider wading into the fight , which pits an internationally recognized government in Tripoli—the Government of National Accord , which is supported by Turkey—against Russia-backed rebels in the eastern part of the country .
Aides said the legislation would allow for sanctions on Egypt if President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi goes ahead with his threat to send the Egyptian military into Libya in support of the so-called Libyan National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also backed by the United Arab Emirates .
The decision by the Egyptian parliament this month to approve a troop deployment to Libya could put Ankara and Cairo on a collision course and further aggravate the proxy conflict .
But despite pressure from allies like the UAE to enter the conflict , Egypt may not be eager to take on a resurgent Turkey—and open the door to U.S. sanctions .
On a recent call with U.S. President Donald Trump , Sisi appeared to back off a pledge to intervene in the war-torn country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Cairo is very hesitant and skeptical when it comes to facing off against the GNA ’ s coalition knowing that it is backed by a very assertive Turkey that is officially in western Libya , ” said Jalel Harchaoui , a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague .
While parties to the conflict have doubled down on their military presence—the U.S. military has called out the use of Russian mercenaries and the deployment of more than a dozen Russian MiG-29 and Su-24 fighter aircraft to the country—there is little @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Galip Dalay , a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy .
“ All the actors in Libya are consolidating their military presence on the ground , but at the same time they ’ re all open to talks too , ” he said .
The bill , first floated in the House last year by Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch and in the Senate by Democratic Sen. Chris Coons , would further crack down on human rights abusers and oil thieves .
Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jim Risch , a Republican , is also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has done before , Congress is trying to get the Trump administration to take action against Russia and Turkey for their foreign-policy missteps .
Trump pushed back against a near-unanimous Senate vote in 2017 to pass sweeping sanctions against Russia , and he has not imposed penalties on Turkey for taking delivery of a $ 2.5 billion Russian-made air defense system last summer .
Congress is seeing more appetite for punishing Russia as U.S. Africa Command has released satellite imagery showing paramilitaries from Russia ’ s quasi-public military contractors the Wagner Group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consolidating their position in the city of Sirte .
In a quarterly report to Congress issued last week , the Defense Department ’ s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in North Africa estimated that between 800 and 2,500 Wagner mercenaries had been deployed to Libya in support of Haftar .
Africa Command also released images of Russian advanced fighter jets deployed in violation of a nine-year-old United Nations arms embargo and operated by mercenaries from Russia ’ s Wagner Group .
“ There are pretty strong indications that [ as ] these violations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more talk in the administration about sanctioning Russia , ” the House aide added .
“ There ’ s a growing acceptance in the administration that sanctions might be necessary [ and ] we want to codify them [ to ] strengthen the administration ’ s hand.
” The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that the Treasury Department threatened a round of sanctions against Haftar over the recent seizure of two key Libyan oil fields by the Wagner Group .
In June , 28,000 more Libyans were displaced from Tripoli , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mercy Corps , a nongovernmental humanitarian organization .
Several countries including the UAE , Turkey , and Egypt have also been accused of flouting the arms embargo .
In February , a senior U.N. official said that the embargo has become a “ joke ” and called for stricter monitoring and enforcement of the ban .
The new legislation would continue using U.S. sanctions against Wagner , after Washington previously hit the group ’ s affiliates with sanctions , freezing any U.S. assets they may have and barring them from doing business in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eastern Ukraine and Syria .
Earlier this month , the Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting Wagner affiliates operating in Sudan for collaborating with the country ’ s former President Omar al-Bashir in efforts to suppress pro-democracy protests .
But sanctions , while a tougher response than seen so far , are a blunt tool to try to change Russia ’ s behavior .
“ As we ’ ve seen with other types of Russian sanctions , it sort of becomes a game of whack-a-mole , where one side is constantly looking to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Borshchevskaya , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute .
Still , the new legislation would go some way toward creating a U.S. Libya policy , even if it ’ s a purely punitive one .
The Trump administration has largely deferred to European powers to haggle over a settlement to the yearslong conflict .
France had backed Haftar until he was pushed out of the city of Tarhuna in June , while Italy has floated a naval blockade to help the Government of National Accord enforce the U.N.-backed arms embargo .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States is increasingly concerned about Russian activity in Libya , ” Borshchevskaya said .
“ But the missing piece is broader American leadership with regards to resolving the broader conflict in Libya , as opposed to only talking about sanctions.
” Though Trump called for a cease-fire in the country last month , efforts to kick-start the administration ’ s policy appear to have stalled out , even as Libya faces huge humanitarian challenges from the conflict and the coronavirus pandemic—infections now stand at around 3,000 after doubling in the past two weeks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Security Council-led review of U.S. policy begun last year still has yet to produce a final product , while diplomats on the ground have been mostly concerned about trying to get peace talks back on track .
“ This bill would be the closest we ’ ve been to a coherent U.S. Libya policy that we ’ ve been in a long time , ” said a former U.S. official familiar with the matter .

U.S. lawmakers are advancing a bill that would compel the Trump administration to levy sanctions on Russia and Turkey for fueling an escalation in the civil war in Libya, as the Defense Department has warned about the deployment of foreign mercenaries into the war zone.
U.S. lawmakers are advancing a bill that would compel the Trump administration to levy sanctions on Russia and Turkey for fueling an escalation in the civil war in Libya, as the Defense Department has warned about the deployment of foreign mercenaries into the war zone.
The Libya Stabilization Act, which is expected to pass out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee this week, would impose mandatory sanctions on both countries within six months, giving the White House wide leeway to revoke U.S. visas or freeze funds in American banks, a bid to keep Russia in particular from establishing a bridgehead across the Mediterranean.
“We don’t want Russia to establish a foothold on what is essentially the soft underbelly of NATO in Europe,” a House aide familiar with the legislation told Foreign Policy. “Other than chastising them there haven’t been significant penalties.”
“With [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan and [Vladimir] Putin and more broadly, they act when there’s a stick involved or a penalty held above their head,” the aide added, referring to the Turkish and Russian presidents.
The legislation comes as the conflict in Libya is intensifying, with Egypt the latest country to consider wading into the fight, which pits an internationally recognized government in Tripoli—the Government of National Accord, which is supported by Turkey—against Russia-backed rebels in the eastern part of the country.
Aides said the legislation would allow for sanctions on Egypt if President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi goes ahead with his threat to send the Egyptian military into Libya in support of the so-called Libyan National Army in the east, which is also backed by the United Arab Emirates. The decision by the Egyptian parliament this month to approve a troop deployment to Libya could put Ankara and Cairo on a collision course and further aggravate the proxy conflict.
But despite pressure from allies like the UAE to enter the conflict, Egypt may not be eager to take on a resurgent Turkey—and open the door to U.S. sanctions. On a recent call with U.S. President Donald Trump, Sisi appeared to back off a pledge to intervene in the war-torn country, instead calling for a cease-fire.
“Cairo is very hesitant and skeptical when it comes to facing off against the GNA’s coalition knowing that it is backed by a very assertive Turkey that is officially in western Libya,” said Jalel Harchaoui, a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague.
While parties to the conflict have doubled down on their military presence—the U.S. military has called out the use of Russian mercenaries and the deployment of more than a dozen Russian MiG-29 and Su-24 fighter aircraft to the country—there is little appetite to escalate the conflict, said Galip Dalay, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy.
“All the actors in Libya are consolidating their military presence on the ground, but at the same time they’re all open to talks too,” he said.
The bill, first floated in the House last year by Democratic Rep. Ted Deutch and in the Senate by Democratic Sen. Chris Coons, would further crack down on human rights abusers and oil thieves. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Jim Risch, a Republican, is also considering taking up the legislation.
As it has done before, Congress is trying to get the Trump administration to take action against Russia and Turkey for their foreign-policy missteps. Trump pushed back against a near-unanimous Senate vote in 2017 to pass sweeping sanctions against Russia, and he has not imposed penalties on Turkey for taking delivery of a $2.5 billion Russian-made air defense system last summer.
Congress is seeing more appetite for punishing Russia as U.S. Africa Command has released satellite imagery showing paramilitaries from Russia’s quasi-public military contractors the Wagner Group backing the eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar and consolidating their position in the city of Sirte. In a quarterly report to Congress issued last week, the Defense Department’s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in North Africa estimated that between 800 and 2,500 Wagner mercenaries had been deployed to Libya in support of Haftar. Africa Command also released images of Russian advanced fighter jets deployed in violation of a nine-year-old United Nations arms embargo and operated by mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group.
“There are pretty strong indications that [as] these violations are occurring there has been a lot more talk in the administration about sanctioning Russia,” the House aide added. “There’s a growing acceptance in the administration that sanctions might be necessary [and] we want to codify them [to] strengthen the administration’s hand.” The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that the Treasury Department threatened a round of sanctions against Haftar over the recent seizure of two key Libyan oil fields by the Wagner Group. In June, 28,000 more Libyans were displaced from Tripoli, Tarhuna, and Sirte, according to Mercy Corps, a nongovernmental humanitarian organization.
Several countries including the UAE, Turkey, and Egypt have also been accused of flouting the arms embargo. In February, a senior U.N. official said that the embargo has become a “joke” and called for stricter monitoring and enforcement of the ban.
The new legislation would continue using U.S. sanctions against Wagner, after Washington previously hit the group’s affiliates with sanctions, freezing any U.S. assets they may have and barring them from doing business in the United States for their activities in eastern Ukraine and Syria. Earlier this month, the Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting Wagner affiliates operating in Sudan for collaborating with the country’s former President Omar al-Bashir in efforts to suppress pro-democracy protests.
But sanctions, while a tougher response than seen so far, are a blunt tool to try to change Russia’s behavior. “As we’ve seen with other types of Russian sanctions, it sort of becomes a game of whack-a-mole, where one side is constantly looking to evade the sanctions,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute.
Still, the new legislation would go some way toward creating a U.S. Libya policy, even if it’s a purely punitive one. The Trump administration has largely deferred to European powers to haggle over a settlement to the yearslong conflict. France had backed Haftar until he was pushed out of the city of Tarhuna in June, while Italy has floated a naval blockade to help the Government of National Accord enforce the U.N.-backed arms embargo.
“It’s clear that the United States is increasingly concerned about Russian activity in Libya,” Borshchevskaya said. “But the missing piece is broader American leadership with regards to resolving the broader conflict in Libya, as opposed to only talking about sanctions.”
Though Trump called for a cease-fire in the country last month, efforts to kick-start the administration’s policy appear to have stalled out, even as Libya faces huge humanitarian challenges from the conflict and the coronavirus pandemic—infections now stand at around 3,000 after doubling in the past two weeks, according to Mercy Corps. A National Security Council-led review of U.S. policy begun last year still has yet to produce a final product, while diplomats on the ground have been mostly concerned about trying to get peace talks back on track.
“This bill would be the closest we’ve been to a coherent U.S. Libya policy that we’ve been in a long time,” said a former U.S. official familiar with the matter.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-28--To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the World

To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression , the U.S. Can ’ t Afford to Alienate the World Assuming the United States finally gets the coronavirus pandemic under control , the long road to economic recovery will require two things : a lot of money , and a cooperative global economy .
The first part isn ’ t too hard if the U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress keep their eyes on the ball .
The second part is a problem , especially after last week ’ s disappointing jobs numbers , which underscored the extent of the economic damage .
Even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worst phase of the pandemic in March and April , extending that bounce will require strong demand for U.S. products and services abroad , ample global financial flows to underwrite ballooning U.S. debts , and a more predictable geopolitical outlook that doesn ’ t subject the market to continuous shocks .
The good news is that the United States can help ensure the global economy plays along .
The bad news is that Washington must be prepared to engage in some deft economic diplomacy , if not a reset of relations with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ priority for the administration of Donald Trump ( and whoever wins the November election ) is to ensure that other major economies remain generous with fiscal and monetary stimulus until the global recovery is well entrenched .
During the last financial and economic crisis , which lasted from the collapse of the subprime bubble in 2008 to the European debt crisis in 2010 , most governments and central banks took their foot off the pedal far too soon .
Given the depth of this downturn—and with the fundamental shape of the global economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowed to happen again .
Beyond this immediate prerequisite for recovery , the United States must also contain the mounting tensions with China , which could easily derail the upturn , as well as repair relations with Europe , whose cooperation remains vital to shaping global markets , as well as help craft the next phase of globalization so that the benefits of the world ’ s growth are better shared at home .
The bad news is that Washington must be prepared to engage in some deft economic diplomacy , if not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the world .
Unfortunately , social distancing started creeping into U.S. foreign policy long before the appearance of COVID-19 .
The administration of former President Barack Obama began to question the wisdom of U.S. engagement abroad and pull back—a process that has accelerated as the Trump administration casts doubt on a whole range of commitments to allies , international organizations , and existing trade deals .
Regardless of who prevails in November , he will be leading a country that has turned decidedly more uncertain and introspective .
Yet if a top @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pulling back from the world can not be the answer .
Nor can Trump ’ s narrow , transactional approach that unapologetically puts “ America First.
” Nor , in fact , can we simply return to more traditional economic diplomacy that promoted free markets everywhere on the assumption they would create U.S. jobs along the way .
First , a word about this important notion of economic diplomacy—or economic statecraft , as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called it when she ran Foggy Bottom .
Sometimes the term means applying economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , sanctions to stop Iran ’ s nuclear program , or a trade deal to help preserve a key base in Bahrain ) .
At other times , it means taking political or military measures for clear economic goals ( engaging Saudi Arabia to keep the oil price low , or patrolling the Straits of Malacca to ensure that sea lanes stay open . )
Often , the tools of economic diplomacy are deployed to more than one end , and naturally there are trade-offs .
And because the goal of promoting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it ’ s often easy to lose focus in the face of more immediate political or national security crises .
Rarely are the political tradeoffs and the economic benefits explicitly weighed , which means that objectives inevitably get muddled .
We can ’ t send troops to Mordor , so let ’ s sanction even more of its banks and government officials .
We have no money for Freedonia , but we can pretend to negotiate better trade arrangements .
For all its inconsistencies , the Trump administration ’ s economic statecraft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jobs , often at the expense of other traditional priorities .
Trump ’ s earliest messages to Beijing were that “ everything is on the table , ” implying that issues around Taiwan and North Korea would all be negotiable in the pursuit of a better trade deal .
In much the same way , complaints about European steel and auto exports were joined , in Trump ’ s mind , with questions surrounding European defense spending and military commitments to NATO .
The result has been deteriorating relations that weaken the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tariffs .
We can ’ t send troops to Mordor , so let ’ s sanction even more of its banks and government officials .
If this approach is too narrow to be effective and sustainable , the bipartisan postwar consensus around economic policy may have been too broad .
It centered on bolstering free markets everywhere—both as a bulwark against communism and as a destination for U.S. exports and investment , including more recently the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing .
But as everyone has learned , those gains were not widely shared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technological innovation , and trade deals that focused on boosting the volume of commerce without regard to the distribution of the gains .
The United States ’ unipolar moment following the collapse of the Soviet Union has long since passed , but Washington still has powerful financial , commercial , and other economic tools at hand to shape the global recovery .
The Federal Reserve ’ s ability to offer dollar swap lines and other liquidity arrangements to other central banks around the world during the financial market collapse this spring were crucial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to spendthrift U.S. consumers offers important leverage , too .
Amid many economic priorities—from aligning financial incentives to better managing climate change to addressing poverty in the developing world—the global recovery might last a little longer if the United States ’ economic diplomacy focused on just three .
The first priority is to manage the fast-deteriorating relationship with China .
This will require much more than economic diplomacy , but it can not be done without progress on knotty economic questions .
Even as the Trump administration has tried to keep trade talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the heat of domestic politics .
Progress will require both sides keeping negotiations about state subsidies and intellectual property separate from differences over consulate closures , Xinjiang ’ s so-called reeducation camps , Taiwan , or the South China Sea .
Trade is not a favor that one country does for the other ; it is a relationship that requires constant management , not erratic bluster .
Second , fraying economic relations with Europe desperately need attention .
Fractious disputes around airplane subsidies and Iran sanctions will not be easy to address @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compartmentalized in world that needs the framework of trans-Atlantic cooperation more than ever .
Boeing and Airbus are both in need of large subsidies to survive the next few years , and it ’ s inexcusable that the two sides haven ’ t been able to negotiate a settlement or live with their differences .
( A new overture over subsidized loans by Airbus and the European Commission last week is a rare positive sign , but the two sides have a history of rejecting each other ’ s peace offerings . )
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tensions , Washington should tolerate some European commerce with Iran as the Trump administration ’ s strategy of maximum pressure has so obviously failed to yield progress .
New U.S. trade deals with either the European Union or Britain seem a stretch at the moment , but abandoning tariff threats and reinforcing cooperation on financial and technology regulation would be an important start .
New U.S. trade deals with either the European Union or Britain seem a stretch , but abandoning tariff threats would be an important start .
Third , the recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of global economic growth .
This depends primarily on sound domestic policy , but Washington should frame a more ambitious international agenda to ensure that global technology giants compete fairly , that rules on data protection balance the privacy of individuals with the flexibility for innovation , and that multinationals pay their fair share of taxes across the jurisdictions in which they operate .
From Amazon ’ s market share , to Facebook ’ s data policy to Apple ’ s tax bill , all these will require a better relationship with Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tall order , but the pandemic will require economic policy ambition on a par with the money the United States is spending and the debts it is running up .
The last time the United States pulled out of a global crisis in late 2008 , then-President George W. Bush made an explicit request to Chinese President Hu Jintao for Beijing ’ s help to stabilize financial markets and underpin demand .
It ’ s difficult to imagine such a conversation today—let alone China ’ s massive support during that crisis .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conversation alone would not be enough .
The United States is going to need a much broader and more sophisticated global economic agenda to dig itself out of its current hole .

Assuming the United States finally gets the coronavirus pandemic under control, the long road to economic recovery will require two things: a lot of money, and a cooperative global economy. The first part isn’t too hard if the U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress keep their eyes on the ball. The second part is a problem, especially after last week’s disappointing jobs numbers , which underscored the extent of the economic damage. Even if some businesses have bounced back since the worst phase of the pandemic in March and April, extending that bounce will require strong demand for U.S. products and services abroad, ample global financial flows to underwrite ballooning U.S. debts, and a more predictable geopolitical outlook that doesn’t subject the market to continuous shocks.
Assuming the United States finally gets the coronavirus pandemic under control, the long road to economic recovery will require two things: a lot of money, and a cooperative global economy. The first part isn’t too hard if the U.S. Federal Reserve and Congress keep their eyes on the ball. The second part is a problem, especially after last week’s disappointing jobs numbers, which underscored the extent of the economic damage. Even if some businesses have bounced back since the worst phase of the pandemic in March and April, extending that bounce will require strong demand for U.S. products and services abroad, ample global financial flows to underwrite ballooning U.S. debts, and a more predictable geopolitical outlook that doesn’t subject the market to continuous shocks.
The good news is that the United States can help ensure the global economy plays along. The bad news is that Washington must be prepared to engage in some deft economic diplomacy, if not a reset of relations with the rest of the world. The immediate priority for the administration of Donald Trump (and whoever wins the November election) is to ensure that other major economies remain generous with fiscal and monetary stimulus until the global recovery is well entrenched. During the last financial and economic crisis, which lasted from the collapse of the subprime bubble in 2008 to the European debt crisis in 2010, most governments and central banks took their foot off the pedal far too soon. Given the depth of this downturn—and with the fundamental shape of the global economy in such dramatic flux—that cannot be allowed to happen again.
Beyond this immediate prerequisite for recovery, the United States must also contain the mounting tensions with China, which could easily derail the upturn, as well as repair relations with Europe, whose cooperation remains vital to shaping global markets, as well as help craft the next phase of globalization so that the benefits of the world’s growth are better shared at home.
The bad news is that Washington must be prepared to engage in some deft economic diplomacy, if not a reset of relations with the rest of the world.
Unfortunately, social distancing started creeping into U.S. foreign policy long before the appearance of COVID-19. The administration of former President Barack Obama began to question the wisdom of U.S. engagement abroad and pull back—a process that has accelerated as the Trump administration casts doubt on a whole range of commitments to allies, international organizations, and existing trade deals. Regardless of who prevails in November, he will be leading a country that has turned decidedly more uncertain and introspective.
Yet if a top priority is to restore economic health, pulling back from the world cannot be the answer. Nor can Trump’s narrow, transactional approach that unapologetically puts “America First.” Nor, in fact, can we simply return to more traditional economic diplomacy that promoted free markets everywhere on the assumption they would create U.S. jobs along the way.
First, a word about this important notion of economic diplomacy—or economic statecraft, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called it when she ran Foggy Bottom. Sometimes the term means applying economic tools to solve diplomatic questions (for example, sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear program, or a trade deal to help preserve a key base in Bahrain). At other times, it means taking political or military measures for clear economic goals (engaging Saudi Arabia to keep the oil price low, or patrolling the Straits of Malacca to ensure that sea lanes stay open.)
Often, the tools of economic diplomacy are deployed to more than one end, and naturally there are trade-offs. And because the goal of promoting economic growth can be a little diffuse, it’s often easy to lose focus in the face of more immediate political or national security crises. Rarely are the political tradeoffs and the economic benefits explicitly weighed, which means that objectives inevitably get muddled. We can’t send troops to Mordor, so let’s sanction even more of its banks and government officials. We have no money for Freedonia, but we can pretend to negotiate better trade arrangements.
For all its inconsistencies, the Trump administration’s economic statecraft has been focused on bringing back manufacturing jobs, often at the expense of other traditional priorities. Trump’s earliest messages to Beijing were that “everything is on the table,” implying that issues around Taiwan and North Korea would all be negotiable in the pursuit of a better trade deal. In much the same way, complaints about European steel and auto exports were joined, in Trump’s mind, with questions surrounding European defense spending and military commitments to NATO. The result has been deteriorating relations that weaken the United States and U.S. jobs lost to rising tariffs.
We can’t send troops to Mordor, so let’s sanction even more of its banks and government officials.
If this approach is too narrow to be effective and sustainable, the bipartisan postwar consensus around economic policy may have been too broad. It centered on bolstering free markets everywhere—both as a bulwark against communism and as a destination for U.S. exports and investment, including more recently the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing. But as everyone has learned, those gains were not widely shared, due to domestic tax policy, technological innovation, and trade deals that focused on boosting the volume of commerce without regard to the distribution of the gains.
The United States’ unipolar moment following the collapse of the Soviet Union has long since passed, but Washington still has powerful financial, commercial, and other economic tools at hand to shape the global recovery. The Federal Reserve’s ability to offer dollar swap lines and other liquidity arrangements to other central banks around the world during the financial market collapse this spring were crucial in stabilizing global markets. Negotiating access to spendthrift U.S. consumers offers important leverage, too.
Amid many economic priorities—from aligning financial incentives to better managing climate change to addressing poverty in the developing world—the global recovery might last a little longer if the United States’ economic diplomacy focused on just three.
The first priority is to manage the fast-deteriorating relationship with China. This will require much more than economic diplomacy, but it cannot be done without progress on knotty economic questions. Even as the Trump administration has tried to keep trade talks separate, the lines tend to blur in the heat of domestic politics. Progress will require both sides keeping negotiations about state subsidies and intellectual property separate from differences over consulate closures, Xinjiang’s so-called reeducation camps, Taiwan, or the South China Sea. Trade is not a favor that one country does for the other; it is a relationship that requires constant management, not erratic bluster.
Second, fraying economic relations with Europe desperately need attention. Fractious disputes around airplane subsidies and Iran sanctions will not be easy to address, but they must be contained and compartmentalized in world that needs the framework of trans-Atlantic cooperation more than ever. Boeing and Airbus are both in need of large subsidies to survive the next few years, and it’s inexcusable that the two sides haven’t been able to negotiate a settlement or live with their differences. (A new overture over subsidized loans by Airbus and the European Commission last week is a rare positive sign, but the two sides have a history of rejecting each other’s peace offerings.) Similarly, as part of defusing trade tensions, Washington should tolerate some European commerce with Iran as the Trump administration’s strategy of maximum pressure has so obviously failed to yield progress. New U.S. trade deals with either the European Union or Britain seem a stretch at the moment, but abandoning tariff threats and reinforcing cooperation on financial and technology regulation would be an important start.
New U.S. trade deals with either the European Union or Britain seem a stretch, but abandoning tariff threats would be an important start.
Third, the recovery will demand more attention to the distribution of global economic growth. This depends primarily on sound domestic policy, but Washington should frame a more ambitious international agenda to ensure that global technology giants compete fairly, that rules on data protection balance the privacy of individuals with the flexibility for innovation, and that multinationals pay their fair share of taxes across the jurisdictions in which they operate. From Amazon’s market share, to Facebook’s data policy to Apple’s tax bill, all these will require a better relationship with Europe as well.
It’s a tall order, but the pandemic will require economic policy ambition on a par with the money the United States is spending and the debts it is running up.
The last time the United States pulled out of a global crisis in late 2008, then-President George W. Bush made an explicit request to Chinese President Hu Jintao for Beijing’s help to stabilize financial markets and underpin demand. It’s difficult to imagine such a conversation today—let alone China’s massive support during that crisis. But even if it were conceivable, that conversation alone would not be enough. The United States is going to need a much broader and more sophisticated global economic agenda to dig itself out of its current hole.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-28--The End of the Middle East’s Trickle-Down Economy

The End of the Middle East ’ s Trickle-Down Economy To walk their dogs , to clean their houses , or even to hand them towels as they exit their restrooms , Lebanese have traditionally depended on Ethiopians .
To drive their cars , to build their stadiums , and to dig for their natural resources , the six oil-rich Gulf nations have traditionally hired South Asians .
Both of these sizable immigrant groups were often overworked and underpaid .
But they suffered through it all just to be able to earn enough to send money back home to help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus pandemic , however , has collapsed this economic model .
The long lockdowns and resulting economic slump in host countries have put tens of millions of immigrants in the Middle East out of work , or on unpaid leave , and forced many to return to countries already grappling with poverty and high unemployment .
Experts fear this reverse migration will have debilitating consequences for the workers and their home countries , as well as their host nations .
The salaries that Asian and African migrant workers earned in the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to siblings to open small businesses , homes for aging parents , and school fees for children .
Now , their joblessness is bound to have a ripple effect , too , as a decline in remittances reduces consumption and plunges local businesses into hardship .
In an April report , the World Bank estimated that remittances to low- and middle-income nations will drop by 20 percent this year , a steeper dive than the 5 percent witnessed after the global recession in 2009 .
The case of Lebanon ’ s domestic workers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day last month , Bakalo , a 25-year-old domestic worker in Beirut who requested anonymity to preserve her employability , was squatting on the pavement outside the Ethiopian Embassy with her head in her hands , sobbing .
Two suitcases , hurriedly stuffed with her belongings , were lying next to her .
Wearing a black T-shirt imprinted with “ I Love You ” written in multiple European languages , and her hair tied with a pink plastic hair band , Bakalo tearfully told me that her employers dumped her outside the embassy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they withheld her wages and even her passport .
( Migrant workers are typically brought to Arab countries through the kafala system , which binds them to their employers . )
Several of her compatriots have been meted similar treatment over the last few months .
An unknown number of distressed women have died by suicide as a result .
“ I worked 16 hours a day , ” Bakalo said as other Ethiopian women outside the embassy offered consolation .
And yet , such was her desperation that she would not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , hoping that one day , after the coronavirus crisis is over , she may get back her job and the arrears she is owed .
The $ 300 a month she earned was a major chunk of the money her whole family in Ethiopia survived on .
Lebanon ’ s economy was in shambles even before the coronavirus hit and expedited its collapse .
The workers had been paid in U.S. dollars , to which the Lebanese currency had previously been pegged , but as the local currency plummeted by 80 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impossible to maintain their lifestyles and started to fire their staff en masse .
But Lebanon is not an outlier .
The ax is also falling on the foreign workers of nearby petrostates .
A fast-changing business landscape owing to the coronavirus-related restrictions , in conjunction with dropping oil prices , is expected to cause 13 percent unemployment in the Gulf , with the burden expected to fall mostly on foreign nationals , as Gulf nationals are hired mainly by the public sector .
In a recent paper , the Scott Livermore says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be lost in the United Arab Emirates , an overwhelming 835,000 belong to the expatriates .
In Saudi Arabia , the number jumps to 1.5 million out-of-work foreign residents .
It is not just the blue-collar workers at the receiving end , said Rima Kalush , the director of Migrant , a nongovernmental organization .
“ Migrant workers of all incomes have been heavily impacted by the pandemic and largely excluded from government responses , ” she said .
The airline Emirates made the UAE a global hub of air travel , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to essential commuting for at least the foreseeable future , the airline decided to lay off thousands of employees to save cash .
One flight attendant from India , was among them and spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity because he worried that speaking openly may make him less employable .
Based in Dubai , the father of one is struggling to pay his rent while his retired parents and a physically disabled sister wait for his monthly check in central India .
“ Emirates is a global , profit-making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And they just fired us , it was cruel , ” he said , distraught that 14 years of service was ended without compunction .
“ And I speak for thousands , even my friends employed in hotels are worried they may lose their jobs , many already have.
” The flight attendant said he may have no option but to join hundreds of thousands of people who have registered with the Indian embassies to be flown back by the government in its biggest-ever repatriation mission .
India deployed the national carrier and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ However , among all of the human capital exporters , India has particular reason to be worried about return migration .
There are 8.5 million Indians working in the Gulf , and 500,000 are expected to return to just one state or province , Kerala .
On India ’ s southernmost coastline along the Arabian Sea , Kerala was one of the first outposts of Islam in the subcontinent , long before the invasion of the Mughals .
Then as now , it was trade that bridged the distance between Kerala and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , not spices but migrant labor has been Kerala ’ s biggest export to the oil-rich region .
Nearly 10 percent of Keralites , over 2 million people , earn their livelihood in Persian Gulf countries .
Between 2014 and 2018 , their remittances accounted for 35 percent of the state ’ s GDP and 39 percent of its bank deposits .
In many ways , Kerala is a prime example of both the benefits home countries derive when a large number of their citizens find employment abroad and the challenges the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Mahendra Nath Pandey , the Indian minister for skill development and entrepreneurship , told the national press that data was being collected from Indians upon arrival to help them find employment matching their skill set .
Analysts , however , brushed it aside as mere talk and wishful thinking at best .
They say India has more pressing concerns as it reports the third-highest number of coronavirus infections , and millions of internal migrants literally walk back from the cities to their villages , empty-handed and unemployed .
Irudaya Rajan , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kerala , has been monitoring migration to the Gulf for decades .
“ The government is underestimating the numbers , and I think at least 1.5 million Indians will return , ” Rajan said .
“ One migrant supports four or five people back home , we are looking at a big unemployment catastrophe unfolding , but real policymakers are not taking it seriously.
” Lydia Bwiite , the manager of a Ugandan NGO called Platform for Labour Action , shared a similar concern .
“ In 2017 , we received $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5 trillion Ugandan shillings , that is more than we make by exporting anything else , ” she said , adding that according to government estimates “ at least 2 million more Ugandans may be pushed into poverty ” as remittances drop .
said that policymakers in the Gulf may have thought that firing expats would solve the problem of a local surge in unemployment .
But that may be shortsighted .
He said the exodus of foreign nationals will magnify a downward trend in property and rental prices in the Gulf region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retail and hospitality sectors .
Meanwhile , the International Labour Organization has advised home countries to gear up and get ready to deploy the skills of the returnees toward national development and growth .
The transition may be most difficult for the migrants themselves .
For millions who made it in the Gulf and climbed up the social ladder there , the coronavirus has ushered in the end of an era .
“ If there was a job that paid me as much in India , ” said the flight attendant , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
”

To walk their dogs, to clean their houses, or even to hand them towels as they exit their restrooms, Lebanese have traditionally depended on Ethiopians. To drive their cars, to build their stadiums, and to dig for their natural resources, the six oil-rich Gulf nations have traditionally hired South Asians. Both of these sizable immigrant groups were often overworked and underpaid. But they suffered through it all just to be able to earn enough to send money back home to help their families.
To walk their dogs, to clean their houses, or even to hand them towels as they exit their restrooms, Lebanese have traditionally depended on Ethiopians. To drive their cars, to build their stadiums, and to dig for their natural resources, the six oil-rich Gulf nations have traditionally hired South Asians. Both of these sizable immigrant groups were often overworked and underpaid. But they suffered through it all just to be able to earn enough to send money back home to help their families.
The onset of the coronavirus pandemic, however, has collapsed this economic model. The long lockdowns and resulting economic slump in host countries have put tens of millions of immigrants in the Middle East out of work, or on unpaid leave, and forced many to return to countries already grappling with poverty and high unemployment. Experts fear this reverse migration will have debilitating consequences for the workers and their home countries, as well as their host nations.
The salaries that Asian and African migrant workers earned in the Middle East trickled home in the form of loans to siblings to open small businesses, homes for aging parents, and school fees for children. Now, their joblessness is bound to have a ripple effect, too, as a decline in remittances reduces consumption and plunges local businesses into hardship. In an April report, the World Bank estimated that remittances to low- and middle-income nations will drop by 20 percent this year, a steeper dive than the 5 percent witnessed after the global recession in 2009.
The case of Lebanon’s domestic workers from Africa is especially stark. One day last month, Bakalo, a 25-year-old domestic worker in Beirut who requested anonymity to preserve her employability, was squatting on the pavement outside the Ethiopian Embassy with her head in her hands, sobbing. Two suitcases, hurriedly stuffed with her belongings, were lying next to her. Wearing a black T-shirt imprinted with “I Love You” written in multiple European languages, and her hair tied with a pink plastic hair band, Bakalo tearfully told me that her employers dumped her outside the embassy gates without any further explanation. Moreover, they withheld her wages and even her passport. (Migrant workers are typically brought to Arab countries through the kafala system, which binds them to their employers.) Several of her compatriots have been meted similar treatment over the last few months. An unknown number of distressed women have died by suicide as a result.
“I worked 16 hours a day,” Bakalo said as other Ethiopian women outside the embassy offered consolation. And yet, such was her desperation that she would not give up the names of her employers, hoping that one day, after the coronavirus crisis is over, she may get back her job and the arrears she is owed. The $300 a month she earned was a major chunk of the money her whole family in Ethiopia survived on.
Lebanon’s economy was in shambles even before the coronavirus hit and expedited its collapse. The workers had been paid in U.S. dollars, to which the Lebanese currency had previously been pegged, but as the local currency plummeted by 80 percent, Lebanese with domestic help found it impossible to maintain their lifestyles and started to fire their staff en masse. But Lebanon is not an outlier. The ax is also falling on the foreign workers of nearby petrostates.
A fast-changing business landscape owing to the coronavirus-related restrictions, in conjunction with dropping oil prices, is expected to cause 13 percent unemployment in the Gulf, with the burden expected to fall mostly on foreign nationals, as Gulf nationals are hired mainly by the public sector. In a recent paper, the University of Oxford economist Scott Livermore says that of the 900,000 jobs anticipated to be lost in the United Arab Emirates, an overwhelming 835,000 belong to the expatriates. In Saudi Arabia, the number jumps to 1.5 million out-of-work foreign residents.
It is not just the blue-collar workers at the receiving end, said Rima Kalush, the director of Migrant -Rights.org , a nongovernmental organization. “Migrant workers of all incomes have been heavily impacted by the pandemic and largely excluded from government responses,” she said.
The airline Emirates made the UAE a global hub of air travel, but as flying was suspended and remains limited to essential commuting for at least the foreseeable future, the airline decided to lay off thousands of employees to save cash. One flight attendant from India, was among them and spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity because he worried that speaking openly may make him less employable. Based in Dubai, the father of one is struggling to pay his rent while his retired parents and a physically disabled sister wait for his monthly check in central India. “Emirates is a global, profit-making company. We made it profitable. And they just fired us, it was cruel,” he said, distraught that 14 years of service was ended without compunction. “And I speak for thousands, even my friends employed in hotels are worried they may lose their jobs, many already have.” The flight attendant said he may have no option but to join hundreds of thousands of people who have registered with the Indian embassies to be flown back by the government in its biggest-ever repatriation mission.
India deployed the national carrier and naval ships to extract stranded citizens. However, among all of the human capital exporters, India has particular reason to be worried about return migration. There are 8.5 million Indians working in the Gulf, and 500,000 are expected to return to just one state or province, Kerala. On India’s southernmost coastline along the Arabian Sea, Kerala was one of the first outposts of Islam in the subcontinent, long before the invasion of the Mughals. Then as now, it was trade that bridged the distance between Kerala and the Middle East. Since the 1980s, however, not spices but migrant labor has been Kerala’s biggest export to the oil-rich region. Nearly 10 percent of Keralites, over 2 million people, earn their livelihood in Persian Gulf countries. Between 2014 and 2018, their remittances accounted for 35 percent of the state’s GDP and 39 percent of its bank deposits. In many ways, Kerala is a prime example of both the benefits home countries derive when a large number of their citizens find employment abroad and the challenges the nation confronts when reverse migration takes place.
Mahendra Nath Pandey, the Indian minister for skill development and entrepreneurship, told the national press that data was being collected from Indians upon arrival to help them find employment matching their skill set. Analysts, however, brushed it aside as mere talk and wishful thinking at best. They say India has more pressing concerns as it reports the third-highest number of coronavirus infections, and millions of internal migrants literally walk back from the cities to their villages, empty-handed and unemployed.
Irudaya Rajan, a professor at the Centre for Development Studies in Kerala, has been monitoring migration to the Gulf for decades. “The government is underestimating the numbers, and I think at least 1.5 million Indians will return,” Rajan said. “One migrant supports four or five people back home, we are looking at a big unemployment catastrophe unfolding, but real policymakers are not taking it seriously.” Lydia Bwiite, the manager of a Ugandan NGO called Platform for Labour Action, shared a similar concern. “In 2017, we received $1.3 billion in remittances, that is 5 trillion Ugandan shillings, that is more than we make by exporting anything else,” she said, adding that according to government estimates “at least 2 million more Ugandans may be pushed into poverty” as remittances drop.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-28--Oh God, Not the Peloponnesian War Again

Oh God, Not the Peloponnesian War Again

Oh God , Not the Peloponnesian War Again Last Thursday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on the U.S.-China relationship , so naturally one of the first questions , from the president of the Nixon Foundation , Hugh Hewitt , referred to ancient Greece .
“ But we are , like Athens was , a naval power .
America is a naval power .
And as like Sparta [ was ] , China is a land power .
Do we not have to change how we approach defense spending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resources than on our Army resources ?
” Hewitt asked Pompeo .
Like Hewitt , Trump ’ s advisors are reportedly obsessed with ancient Greece , but they aren ’ t alone .
The Peloponnesian War mesmerizes strategists and international relations scholars .
When it comes to ancient Greece and the U.S.-China relationship , the most prominent comparison is the “ Thucydides Trap , ” made famous by the political scientist Graham Allison , which uses the relationship between Athens and Sparta to draw an analogy between a rising China and the threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But conflicts between city-states in a backwater Eurasian promontory 2,400 years ago are an unreliable guide to modern geopolitics—and they neglect a vast span of world history that may be far more relevant .
To be sure , Greek history is fascinating .
But so is everyone else ’ s .
Even for elites who believe themselves heirs of the classical world , the fixation on the Peloponnesian War is especially narrow .
Other lessons from Greek history are strangely never mentioned ; Thebes , the great power of the fourth century B.C.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ no strategist has called for the formation of an elite Sacred Band of American warriors , each fighting alongside his lover so as not to appear shameful in his eyes .
Thucydides is great .
But he doesn ’ t have to hold the same grip on IR scholars that Harry Potter does on millennial readers .
Even when strategists move beyond Athens , they ’ re still writing about Europe .
In all the takes on the U.S.-China relationship , the history of Chinese warfare itself—and the vast span of Asian conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the last 3,000 years—goes virtually unmentioned .
The British historian Thomas Babington Macaulay ’ s claim that “ a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia ” is still unconsciously followed .
There are more articles referencing the fictional European-esque conflict of Game of Thrones than the real conflicts of medieval Asia .
Even that favorite of U.S. Army lieutenants , Sun Tzu , is referenced more as aphorism than history .
Historical analogies aren ’ t always relevant .
As useful as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the parallels drawn can say more about the priorities of the pundit than the messy realities of ancient empires that bore little resemblance to our own challenges .
With that caveat , then , here are excerpts from eight imagined pieces based on Asian history , of varying degrees of plausibility and relevance .
Some of these are topics I have an in-depth knowledge of .
Others , with the sure confidence of the true pundit , I got my research assistant to look up on Wikipedia .
They suggest at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slice of European history , whether for a detailed argument or a hot take .
“ Western history remembers the invasions of Asia by Alexander the Great ; it forgets the losses of his successors .
The victory of Asian powers over European ones is presented as a historical anomaly , whether the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese or the French and Americans by the Vietnamese .
But Asian empires have been beating Western ones for millenniums : The crucible of war against the Seleucids was an integral part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and of the ideology of total war outlined in the Arthashastra , the great classic of Indian warfare and statecraft .
That bears directly on the crisis of strategy facing the United States today.
” “ For China ’ s first true historian , Sima Qian , the Xiongnu , the rival power that forced subservience from the young Han Empire , existed as a parallel to the Chinese .
When they were weak , the Chinese would be strong and vice versa .
We might dub this the ‘ Sima Qian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign enemy as a mirror to your own culture , rather than an economic , political , and military opponent in its own right and with its own challenges .
Future Chinese writers would look to the Xiongnu to explain new enemies emerging from the West , such as the Turks and Uighurs ; in the same fashion , the United States is constantly seeking parallels with past opponents like the Soviet Union in its dealing with China.
” “ As tempting as infrastructure spending is , the rewards must be immediate and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ became a source of national prosperity for centuries , but its initial construction was a disaster .
It was built to expand Chinese power along a contentious northern frontier and later to ferry men and weapons to the meat grinder of the war against the Korean kingdom of Goguryeo .
The costs led to mass rebellion , toppling the short-lived Sui Empire .
In similar fashion , China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative of today looks mostly to flatter the ruler ’ s ambitions , rather than to bring genuine prosperity on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , the Song Empire believed itself to be the natural master of the world order , dealing with subject states and peripheral challengers .
The sudden emergence of the Jin disrupted those illusions , and while Washington has faced no catastrophe as stark as the fall of the Song capital of Kaifeng , the shared sense of outrage at the disruption of the natural way of things resonates between Song and American elites .
Just as the Song negotiated an uneasy peace with the Jin and were forced to learn the norms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States must find its own understanding with a newly empowered China.
” The Fall of the Chola Empire ( 1027-1279 ) “ When we consider the United States as a sea power , one historical example immediately springs to mind : the great fleets of the Chola Empire , which dominated the Indian Ocean and neighboring seas for centuries .
Like the United States , the Chola portrayed themselves as a guarantor of stability and free trade .
But their colonial efforts spurred resentment among the peoples they had forced into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the land-based Pandya Empire when it challenged the Chola in their own heartlands .
That cycle of protection and antagonism is one that Washington needs to heed.
” The Disturbance of the Three Ports ( 1510 ) “ American and Chinese policymakers attempting to tackle the intricacies of China ’ s entangled economic relationship with the United States should heed the lessons of 16th-century Korea .
In dealing with Japan , Korea faced a dilemma : Its neighbor was a rich source both of trade and of piracy that preyed on Korea .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ abuses only prompted greater antagonism , as well as resentment by the Japanese population in Korea , destroying a productive relationship entirely and ending all trade between the nations for decades .
So too may American attempts backfire.
” “ U.S .
President Donald Trump is famously unwilling to read or heed briefing documents , leaving his views to be swayed by whomever he talked to last—or saw on television .
That ’ s a stark contrast with the Mughal Emperor Akbar , even though Akbar , unlike Trump , was literally illiterate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on his coterie of advisors—the so-called Nine Jewels , including poets , ministers , scientists , and musicians—and his respect for their breadth of learning .
The next American president will need to have , and to heed , his own Nine Jewels , drawn from all walks of life .
Let me suggest a few names.
” “ When Korean Adm. Yi Sun-shin invented—or reinvented , since he claimed to be copying antique designs—what may have been the world ’ s first ironclad warships , they devastated unprepared Japanese navies .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ were , sudden Korean technological supremacy at sea was only one element in dissuading Japan ’ s assaults .
It took the long stalemate caused by Ming military intervention to ultimately end the Imjin war .
In similar fashion , strategists should be wary of overhyping single technologies , such as China ’ s ship-killer missiles , when it comes to any potential conflict in the South China Sea.
” To be sure , Asian history is harder to access in English than Europe ’ s , and the continent ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the materials are out there—and they are far more geographically , culturally , and historically relevant to the continent that is defining the 21st century than dipping into Thucydides again .

Last Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on the U.S.-China relationship, so naturally one of the first questions, from the president of the Nixon Foundation, Hugh Hewitt, referred to ancient Greece.
Last Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a major speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on the U.S.-China relationship, so naturally one of the first questions, from the president of the Nixon Foundation, Hugh Hewitt, referred to ancient Greece.
“But we are, like Athens was, a naval power. America is a naval power. And as like Sparta [was], China is a land power. Do we not have to change how we approach defense spending to put more emphasis on our naval resources than on our Army resources?” Hewitt asked Pompeo.
Like Hewitt, Trump’s advisors are reportedly obsessed with ancient Greece, but they aren’t alone. The Peloponnesian War mesmerizes strategists and international relations scholars. When it comes to ancient Greece and the U.S.-China relationship, the most prominent comparison is the “Thucydides Trap,” made famous by the political scientist Graham Allison, which uses the relationship between Athens and Sparta to draw an analogy between a rising China and the threat felt by the United States today. But conflicts between city-states in a backwater Eurasian promontory 2,400 years ago are an unreliable guide to modern geopolitics—and they neglect a vast span of world history that may be far more relevant.
To be sure, Greek history is fascinating. But so is everyone else’s. Even for elites who believe themselves heirs of the classical world, the fixation on the Peloponnesian War is especially narrow. Other lessons from Greek history are strangely never mentioned; Thebes, the great power of the fourth century B.C., barely gets a mention. And no strategist has called for the formation of an elite Sacred Band of American warriors, each fighting alongside his lover so as not to appear shameful in his eyes. Thucydides is great. But he doesn’t have to hold the same grip on IR scholars that Harry Potter does on millennial readers.
Even when strategists move beyond Athens, they’re still writing about Europe. In all the takes on the U.S.-China relationship, the history of Chinese warfare itself—and the vast span of Asian conflict, warfare, and political contention over the last 3,000 years—goes virtually unmentioned. The British historian Thomas Babington Macaulay’s claim that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia” is still unconsciously followed. There are more articles referencing the fictional European-esque conflict of Game of Thrones than the real conflicts of medieval Asia. Even that favorite of U.S. Army lieutenants, Sun Tzu, is referenced more as aphorism than history.
Historical analogies aren’t always relevant. As useful as the past’s lessons can be, the parallels drawn can say more about the priorities of the pundit than the messy realities of ancient empires that bore little resemblance to our own challenges. With that caveat, then, here are excerpts from eight imagined pieces based on Asian history, of varying degrees of plausibility and relevance. Some of these are topics I have an in-depth knowledge of. Others, with the sure confidence of the true pundit, I got my research assistant to look up on Wikipedia. They suggest at least the possibility of looking beyond a narrow slice of European history, whether for a detailed argument or a hot take.
The Seleucid-Mauryan War (305-303 B.C.)
“Western history remembers the invasions of Asia by Alexander the Great; it forgets the losses of his successors. The victory of Asian powers over European ones is presented as a historical anomaly, whether the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese or the French and Americans by the Vietnamese. But Asian empires have been beating Western ones for millenniums: The crucible of war against the Seleucids was an integral part of the triumph of Chandragupta, the Mauryan founder, and of the ideology of total war outlined in the Arthashastra, the great classic of Indian warfare and statecraft. That bears directly on the crisis of strategy facing the United States today.”
The Han-Xiongnu Conflict (209-60 B.C.)
“For China’s first true historian, Sima Qian, the Xiongnu, the rival power that forced subservience from the young Han Empire, existed as a parallel to the Chinese. When they were weak, the Chinese would be strong and vice versa. We might dub this the ‘Sima Qian Trap,’ the construction of a foreign enemy as a mirror to your own culture, rather than an economic, political, and military opponent in its own right and with its own challenges. Future Chinese writers would look to the Xiongnu to explain new enemies emerging from the West, such as the Turks and Uighurs; in the same fashion, the United States is constantly seeking parallels with past opponents like the Soviet Union in its dealing with China.”
The Sui-Goguryeo War (A.D. 598-614)
“As tempting as infrastructure spending is, the rewards must be immediate and visible. China’s Grand Canal became a source of national prosperity for centuries, but its initial construction was a disaster. It was built to expand Chinese power along a contentious northern frontier and later to ferry men and weapons to the meat grinder of the war against the Korean kingdom of Goguryeo. The costs led to mass rebellion, toppling the short-lived Sui Empire. In similar fashion, China’s Belt and Road Initiative of today looks mostly to flatter the ruler’s ambitions, rather than to bring genuine prosperity on the ground.”
The Jin-Song Conflict (1125-1234)
“Like the United States, the Song Empire believed itself to be the natural master of the world order, dealing with subject states and peripheral challengers. The sudden emergence of the Jin disrupted those illusions, and while Washington has faced no catastrophe as stark as the fall of the Song capital of Kaifeng, the shared sense of outrage at the disruption of the natural way of things resonates between Song and American elites. Just as the Song negotiated an uneasy peace with the Jin and were forced to learn the norms of a new multilateral order, so the United States must find its own understanding with a newly empowered China.”
The Fall of the Chola Empire (1027-1279)
“When we consider the United States as a sea power, one historical example immediately springs to mind: the great fleets of the Chola Empire, which dominated the Indian Ocean and neighboring seas for centuries. Like the United States, the Chola portrayed themselves as a guarantor of stability and free trade. But their colonial efforts spurred resentment among the peoples they had forced into compliance, leading them to side with the land-based Pandya Empire when it challenged the Chola in their own heartlands. That cycle of protection and antagonism is one that Washington needs to heed.”
The Disturbance of the Three Ports (1510)
“American and Chinese policymakers attempting to tackle the intricacies of China’s entangled economic relationship with the United States should heed the lessons of 16th-century Korea. In dealing with Japan, Korea faced a dilemma: Its neighbor was a rich source both of trade and of piracy that preyed on Korea. Korean attempts to crack down on Japanese abuses only prompted greater antagonism, as well as resentment by the Japanese population in Korea, destroying a productive relationship entirely and ending all trade between the nations for decades. So too may American attempts backfire.”
Akbar’s Nine Jewels (1556-1605)
“U.S. President Donald Trump is famously unwilling to read or heed briefing documents, leaving his views to be swayed by whomever he talked to last—or saw on television. That’s a stark contrast with the Mughal Emperor Akbar, even though Akbar, unlike Trump, was literally illiterate. Akbar’s success was built on his coterie of advisors—the so-called Nine Jewels, including poets, ministers, scientists, and musicians—and his respect for their breadth of learning. The next American president will need to have, and to heed, his own Nine Jewels, drawn from all walks of life. Let me suggest a few names.”
The Turtle Ships (1590)
“When Korean Adm. Yi Sun-shin invented—or reinvented, since he claimed to be copying antique designs—what may have been the world’s first ironclad warships, they devastated unprepared Japanese navies. But radically effective though the ‘turtle ships’ were, sudden Korean technological supremacy at sea was only one element in dissuading Japan’s assaults. It took the long stalemate caused by Ming military intervention to ultimately end the Imjin war. In similar fashion, strategists should be wary of overhyping single technologies, such as China’s ship-killer missiles, when it comes to any potential conflict in the South China Sea.”
To be sure, Asian history is harder to access in English than Europe’s, and the continent’s military history is shamefully underwritten. But the materials are out there—and they are far more geographically, culturally, and historically relevant to the continent that is defining the 21st century than dipping into Thucydides again.