foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Betrayed by Their Leaders, Failed by the West, Arabs Still Want Democracy

Betrayed by Their Leaders , Failed by the West , Arabs Still Want Democracy On Dec. 17 , 2010 , the world was changed forever by the actions of one man .
A Tunisian fruit seller named Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire outside the provincial headquarters of Sidi Bouzid in protest against local police officials who had seized his fruit cart .
Just 28 days later , Tunisia ’ s Jasmine Revolution had ousted President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali , driven by the righteous fury of a population who had witnessed enough , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subjugation of a 26-year-old street vendor , but to the routine humiliation and oppression of many decades .
One question frequently asked during the early days of the Arab Spring was whether the Arab world was ready for democracy .
After 10 years , it is clear that it was always the wrong question .
The Arab public systematically dismantled decades of oppressive silence overnight .
The question was always whether the rest of the world was ready to support them .
The answer to that question should be clear from the decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ total indifference from world powers .
For generations , Middle Eastern dictatorships had grown bloated and complacent , consoled by the false belief that their security apparatus could intimidate their populations into subservience in perpetuity .
But by 2010 , those dictatorships no longer held a monopoly over information .
Greater access to the internet in the Middle East brought social media , and with it access to the kind of platforms for ideas and debate that many of these same dictatorships had so effectively prohibited , repressed , and criminalized in previous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the suicide of a young Tunisian man in the small city of Sidi Bouzid was no longer a local story reduced to a footnote dismissed in a state-controlled newspaper , it was a tragedy that triggered widespread outrage and a civilian uprising that would result in the downfall of a 23-year-dictatorship in the space of just 28 days .
Tunisians were not alone .
Witnessing events in Tunisia , civil protests broke out across the Middle East in a series of uprisings that became known as the Arab Spring .
The Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ culture of fear and silence , where even mild public criticism of political authorities resulted in arbitrary arrest , torture , and even death .
For the first time in the lifetimes of many , that silence had finally been broken , and it was now the tyrants who were trembling with fear .
After Ben Ali , Egypt ’ s Hosni Mubarak , Yemen ’ s Ali Abdullah Saleh , and eventually , Libya ’ s Muammar al-Qaddafi fell .
The uprisings spread as far as Bahrain and Syria , where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four decades .
However , the Arab Spring and the political movements it created were less united by collective democratic goals than they were by a rejection of decades of failed governments .
The uprising in Syria , for example , began as small regional protests calling for political reforms , not the downfall of the dictatorship .
It was only after the initial calls were met with overwhelming violence that those calls eventually changed .
But other than geographic proximity and a shared history of living under dictatorship , the Middle Eastern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ besides the chant that spread collectively across the region : “ The people want the downfall of the regime.
” This sense of optimism , this palpable feeling that democratic freedoms could finally be in reach for people across the Middle East , was so dangerous to the hereditary dictatorships and monarchies that governed them that they spent the next nine years at war against their own populations , salting the earth to make sure the democratic movements that terrified them could never take root again .
Hundreds of protesters were killed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first few weeks of the uprisings .
Bahrain ’ s protests were crushed , Libya ’ s death toll began to spiral out of control , prompting a U.N.-Security Council response , mandating a NATO no-fly zone , eventually leading to Qaddafi ’ s downfall and extrajudicial execution by Libyan rebels on the streets of Sirte on Oct. 20 , 2011 .
By December 2011 , the Assad regime had murdered more than 5,000 civilians , many of them protestors gunned down on the streets of Syria , or arrested and tortured @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has become the worst war of the 21st century , with the U.N. officially giving up on counting the death toll in 2014 , with the last estimate put at more than 400,000 dead in April 2016 , with the true figure expected to have risen substantially since then .
There is no way to neatly package the impact of the Arab uprisings into comforting lessons for the future .
While the death toll and infrastructure damage in Libya has remained several orders of magnitude below the bloodshed in Syria , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western-imposed no-fly-zone reduced civilian suffering and was never intended as state-building , the civil war , migrant slave markets , and deteriorating human-rights situation remains a shameful legacy for the international community that intervened , but failed to follow through .
Things are little better elsewhere .
Revolutions were crushed , or fell under the weight of nationalist or Islamist counterrevolutions .
In many cases , especially Syria , the uprising was not crushed from within , but from without , only falling after the full-scale military intervention of Iran and Russia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , co-opted , and corrupted by Qatar and Turkey .
The dictatorships in Egypt , Yemen , and Bahrain continue to receive legitimacy and support from the Gulf monarchies , just as the Gulf states continue to provide legitimacy and support to Libya ’ s embattled warlord Khalifa Haftar in his goal to take control of the country from the barely functioning Turkish-backed , U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord .
The Gulf States are not the only culprit .
The grotesque embrace of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi ’ s junta by the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama , even after killing 1,000 civilians during the Rabaa Square massacre , was perfectly encapsulated by outgoing President Donald Trump referring to Sisi as his “ favorite dictator ” at an international summit late last year .
France , which has played a crucial role in legitimizing Libya ’ s Haftar alongside its Gulf allies , has also embraced the Sisi regime , with French President Emmanuel Macron handing the dictator France ’ s highest award , the Légion d ’ honneur , last week .
This cycle of conflict is far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic difficulties in Lebanon and Iraq show that the public appetite for democratic change is still burning strongly , even after a decade of crushed regional protests , mass displacement , and Western indifference .
Iran ’ s regional Shiite paramilitary organizations and their brutal techniques continue to escalate tensions , and non-state Sunni fundamentalist organizations are finding fertile ground throughout the chaos .
The economic and sociopolitical factors that triggered the Arab Spring uprisings are significantly worse than they were in 2011 , and that ’ s before the region has fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
The Arab Spring may be over , but the civilian uprisings in the Middle East have barely begun .
The Middle East now finds itself in the state of flux that Karl Marx described as permanent revolution , the aspirations of its people permanently churning but never fulfilled There is no way for dictatorships to turn the clock back to 2011 , and there is no desire from their populations to accept a status quo that permanently disenfranchises them .
The powder is drier than it has ever been ; all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spark .

On Dec. 17, 2010, the world was changed forever by the actions of one man. A Tunisian fruit seller named Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire outside the provincial headquarters of Sidi Bouzid in protest against local police officials who had seized his fruit cart.
On Dec. 17, 2010, the world was changed forever by the actions of one man. A Tunisian fruit seller named Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in petrol and set himself on fire outside the provincial headquarters of Sidi Bouzid in protest against local police officials who had seized his fruit cart.
Just 28 days later, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution had ousted President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, driven by the righteous fury of a population who had witnessed enough, a reaction not just to the desperation and subjugation of a 26-year-old street vendor, but to the routine humiliation and oppression of many decades.
One question frequently asked during the early days of the Arab Spring was whether the Arab world was ready for democracy. After 10 years, it is clear that it was always the wrong question. The Arab public systematically dismantled decades of oppressive silence overnight. The question was always whether the rest of the world was ready to support them. The answer to that question should be clear from the decade of Middle Eastern blood spilled to almost total indifference from world powers.
For generations, Middle Eastern dictatorships had grown bloated and complacent, consoled by the false belief that their security apparatus could intimidate their populations into subservience in perpetuity.
But by 2010, those dictatorships no longer held a monopoly over information. Greater access to the internet in the Middle East brought social media, and with it access to the kind of platforms for ideas and debate that many of these same dictatorships had so effectively prohibited, repressed, and criminalized in previous decades.
Under those new conditions, the suicide of a young Tunisian man in the small city of Sidi Bouzid was no longer a local story reduced to a footnote dismissed in a state-controlled newspaper, it was a tragedy that triggered widespread outrage and a civilian uprising that would result in the downfall of a 23-year-dictatorship in the space of just 28 days.
Tunisians were not alone. Witnessing events in Tunisia, civil protests broke out across the Middle East in a series of uprisings that became known as the Arab Spring. The Middle East had previously lived for generations in a culture of fear and silence, where even mild public criticism of political authorities resulted in arbitrary arrest, torture, and even death. For the first time in the lifetimes of many, that silence had finally been broken, and it was now the tyrants who were trembling with fear.
After Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, and eventually, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi fell. The uprisings spread as far as Bahrain and Syria, where the Assad regime had been in power for four decades.
However, the Arab Spring and the political movements it created were less united by collective democratic goals than they were by a rejection of decades of failed governments. The uprising in Syria, for example, began as small regional protests calling for political reforms, not the downfall of the dictatorship. It was only after the initial calls were met with overwhelming violence that those calls eventually changed.
But other than geographic proximity and a shared history of living under dictatorship, the Middle Eastern uprisings had very little in common, besides the chant that spread collectively across the region: “The people want the downfall of the regime.”
This sense of optimism, this palpable feeling that democratic freedoms could finally be in reach for people across the Middle East, was so dangerous to the hereditary dictatorships and monarchies that governed them that they spent the next nine years at war against their own populations, salting the earth to make sure the democratic movements that terrified them could never take root again.
Hundreds of protesters were killed by security forces in Bahrain and Libya in the first few weeks of the uprisings. Bahrain’s protests were crushed, Libya’s death toll began to spiral out of control, prompting a U.N.-Security Council response, mandating a NATO no-fly zone, eventually leading to Qaddafi’s downfall and extrajudicial execution by Libyan rebels on the streets of Sirte on Oct. 20, 2011.
By December 2011, the Assad regime had murdered more than 5,000 civilians, many of them protestors gunned down on the streets of Syria, or arrested and tortured to death. By 2020, Syria has become the worst war of the 21st century, with the U.N. officially giving up on counting the death toll in 2014, with the last estimate put at more than 400,000 dead in April 2016, with the true figure expected to have risen substantially since then.
There is no way to neatly package the impact of the Arab uprisings into comforting lessons for the future. While the death toll and infrastructure damage in Libya has remained several orders of magnitude below the bloodshed in Syria, it is still no success story. While the Western-imposed no-fly-zone reduced civilian suffering and was never intended as state-building, the civil war, migrant slave markets, and deteriorating human-rights situation remains a shameful legacy for the international community that intervened, but failed to follow through.
Things are little better elsewhere. Revolutions were crushed, or fell under the weight of nationalist or Islamist counterrevolutions.
In many cases, especially Syria, the uprising was not crushed from within, but from without, only falling after the full-scale military intervention of Iran and Russia. Syrian revolutionary interests were also further destabilized, co-opted, and corrupted by Qatar and Turkey.
The dictatorships in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain continue to receive legitimacy and support from the Gulf monarchies, just as the Gulf states continue to provide legitimacy and support to Libya’s embattled warlord Khalifa Haftar in his goal to take control of the country from the barely functioning Turkish-backed, U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord.
The Gulf States are not the only culprit. The grotesque embrace of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi’s junta by the United States government that began under former President Obama, even after killing 1,000 civilians during the Rabaa Square massacre, was perfectly encapsulated by outgoing President Donald Trump referring to Sisi as his “favorite dictator” at an international summit late last year. France, which has played a crucial role in legitimizing Libya’s Haftar alongside its Gulf allies, has also embraced the Sisi regime, with French President Emmanuel Macron handing the dictator France’s highest award, the Légion d’honneur, last week.
This cycle of conflict is far from over. The protests and ongoing economic difficulties in Lebanon and Iraq show that the public appetite for democratic change is still burning strongly, even after a decade of crushed regional protests, mass displacement, and Western indifference. Iran’s regional Shiite paramilitary organizations and their brutal techniques continue to escalate tensions, and non-state Sunni fundamentalist organizations are finding fertile ground throughout the chaos. The economic and sociopolitical factors that triggered the Arab Spring uprisings are significantly worse than they were in 2011, and that’s before the region has fully realized the financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
The Arab Spring may be over, but the civilian uprisings in the Middle East have barely begun. The Middle East now finds itself in the state of flux that Karl Marx described as permanent revolution, the aspirations of its people permanently churning but never fulfilled. There is no way for dictatorships to turn the clock back to 2011, and there is no desire from their populations to accept a status quo that permanently disenfranchises them. The powder is drier than it has ever been; all that is missing now is the next spark.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Bellingcat Can Say What U.S. Intelligence Can’t

Bellingcat Can Say What U.S. Intelligence Can ’ t Not for the first time , an open-source investigation published by Bellingcat revealed the identities of Russian intelligence operatives , with a report published on Monday naming several members of a hit squad accused of trailing Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny for three years before he was poisoned in August with the lethal nerve agent Novichok .
The work of Bellingcat , an open-source investigative outfit , has been instrumental in exposing years of nefarious Russian activity .
But , perhaps more importantly , it has also enabled U.S. officials and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ openly without revealing the sources and methods of the U.S. intelligence agencies .
“ I don ’ t want to be too dramatic , but we love this , ” said Marc Polymeropolous , the CIA ’ s former deputy chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia .
When former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned , it was Bellingcat that was first to publicly identify the two Russian military intelligence operatives that had traveled to the U.K. to spritz the door handle of the Skripals ’ home with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had to talk to our liaison partners about it , instead of trying to have things cleared or worry about classification issues , you could just reference their work , ” said Polymeropolous , who retired from the CIA in 2019 .
Unlike intelligence agencies which often rely on anonymous sources for sensitive investigations , Bellingcat and their Russian partners The Insider base their work on cell-phone metadata and flight records which are readily available in Russia ’ s thriving black market of stolen data .
And unlike most major media organizations that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ draw the line at buying information , Bellingcat and their partners have proven willing to go a step further and pay for information from data merchants which often originates from low-level employees in banks , telecoms companies , and government agencies looking to make a quick buck .
These steps are detailed in a meticulous methodology , published alongside the investigation which notes , “ While there are obvious and terrifying privacy implications from this data market , it is clear how this environment of petty corruption and loose government enforcement can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officers.
” Bellingcat ’ s transparency about their investigative process also makes it difficult to refute and harder for Russia to dodge responsibility .
Plausible deniability has long been a cornerstone of Russian activity , whether the invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 , the Kremlin ’ s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election , or the poisoning of Navalny .
In the wake of the Skripal poisoning , Russia launched a major disinformation counteroffensive advancing more than 40 different conspiracy theories intended to obfuscate their involvement .
Most memorably , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a pair of innocent fitness instructors who had travelled from Moscow to Salisbury to see the city ’ s cathedral .
“ The Russians routinely deny , and say , well present us the facts , ” said Daniel Hoffman , a former CIA Chief of Station .
“ The greatest value of Bellingcat is that we can then go to the Russians and then say , there you go.
” Russian state media have repeatedly sought to portray Bellingcat as working on behalf of the CIA or other Western intelligence agencies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ We have no ties to them , ” he said .
The other benefit of the very public nature of Bellingcat ’ s findings is that it can free up U.S. officials and legislators to discuss the issue when formulating a response—which can be tough to do otherwise .
“ It ’ s a significant policy challenge when you make a decision based on intelligence , and you don ’ t want to risk your sources and methods , ” said Hoffman .
The U.S. intelligence community will periodically release short statements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keeping information about how they were able to reach these conclusions tightly under wraps .
Open-source intelligence gets around that .
“ The advantage of having Bellingcat doing it is that you don ’ t have to have a sources-and-methods debate within your government , ” said Daniel Fried , a retired diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs under former President George W. Bush .
And that holds true for lawmakers as well .
“ The fact that it ’ s open-sourced is so important because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the public , ” said Democratic Rep. Bill Keating , chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia .
“ So many times we can ’ t do that—we get information and we can ’ t talk about it and what the public gets in this regard sometimes is very gray , widespread responses that aren ’ t on point.
” Keating said he hopes through his work on the subcommittee to make Russia ’ s destabilizing actions a priority for the Biden administration .

Not for the first time, an open-source investigation published by Bellingcat revealed the identities of Russian intelligence operatives, with a report published on Monday naming several members of a hit squad accused of trailing Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny for three years before he was poisoned in August with the lethal nerve agent Novichok.
Not for the first time, an open-source investigation published by Bellingcat revealed the identities of Russian intelligence operatives, with a report published on Monday naming several members of a hit squad accused of trailing Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny for three years before he was poisoned in August with the lethal nerve agent Novichok.
The work of Bellingcat, an open-source investigative outfit, has been instrumental in exposing years of nefarious Russian activity. But, perhaps more importantly, it has also enabled U.S. officials and lawmakers to discuss Moscow’s skullduggery openly without revealing the sources and methods of the U.S. intelligence agencies.
“I don’t want to be too dramatic, but we love this,” said Marc Polymeropolous, the CIA’s former deputy chief of operations for Europe and Eurasia.
When former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned, it was Bellingcat that was first to publicly identify the two Russian military intelligence operatives that had traveled to the U.K. to spritz the door handle of the Skripals’ home with the Soviet-era nerve agent.
“Whenever we had to talk to our liaison partners about it, instead of trying to have things cleared or worry about classification issues, you could just reference their work,” said Polymeropolous, who retired from the CIA in 2019.
Unlike intelligence agencies which often rely on anonymous sources for sensitive investigations, Bellingcat and their Russian partners The Insider base their work on cell-phone metadata and flight records which are readily available in Russia’s thriving black market of stolen data.
And unlike most major media organizations that are willing to accept leaked data but draw the line at buying information, Bellingcat and their partners have proven willing to go a step further and pay for information from data merchants which often originates from low-level employees in banks, telecoms companies, and government agencies looking to make a quick buck.
These steps are detailed in a meticulous methodology, published alongside the investigation which notes, “While there are obvious and terrifying privacy implications from this data market, it is clear how this environment of petty corruption and loose government enforcement can be turned against Russia’s security service officers.”
Bellingcat’s transparency about their investigative process also makes it difficult to refute and harder for Russia to dodge responsibility. Plausible deniability has long been a cornerstone of Russian activity, whether the invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, or the poisoning of Navalny.
In the wake of the Skripal poisoning, Russia launched a major disinformation counteroffensive advancing more than 40 different conspiracy theories intended to obfuscate their involvement. Most memorably, the suspected assailants said that they were just a pair of innocent fitness instructors who had travelled from Moscow to Salisbury to see the city’s cathedral.
“The Russians routinely deny, and say, well present us the facts,” said Daniel Hoffman, a former CIA Chief of Station. “The greatest value of Bellingcat is that we can then go to the Russians and then say, there you go.”
Russian state media have repeatedly sought to portray Bellingcat as working on behalf of the CIA or other Western intelligence agencies. Polymeropoulos was unequivocal on this point. “We have no ties to them,” he said.
The other benefit of the very public nature of Bellingcat’s findings is that it can free up U.S. officials and legislators to discuss the issue when formulating a response—which can be tough to do otherwise.
“It’s a significant policy challenge when you make a decision based on intelligence, and you don’t want to risk your sources and methods,” said Hoffman. The U.S. intelligence community will periodically release short statements about threats to the nation, while keeping information about how they were able to reach these conclusions tightly under wraps.
Open-source intelligence gets around that. “The advantage of having Bellingcat doing it is that you don’t have to have a sources-and-methods debate within your government,” said Daniel Fried, a retired diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs under former President George W. Bush.
And that holds true for lawmakers as well. “The fact that it’s open-sourced is so important because we can talk about it more to the public,” said Democratic Rep. Bill Keating, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia.
“So many times we can’t do that—we get information and we can’t talk about it and what the public gets in this regard sometimes is very gray, widespread responses that aren’t on point.”
Keating said he hopes through his work on the subcommittee to make Russia’s destabilizing actions a priority for the Biden administration.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Tunisia’s Decade of Democracy

Tunisia’s Decade of Democracy

On Dec. 17 , 2010 , Mohamed Bouazizi , a 26-year-old street vendor in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid , poured a bottle of gasoline over his head and body and set himself on fire .
The act came after his goods and cart were confiscated by municipal officers and he was refused a meeting by the local governor .
He died from his burns a few weeks later .
His wasn ’ t the first self-immolation in North Africa that year , but his act of desolation resonated with millions of other young Tunisians who , like him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ existences under the autocratic rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali .
They took to the streets in protest until Ben Ali ’ s 23-year rule collapsed and he was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia the next month .
Bouazizi ’ s lonely gesture changed the course of Tunisia and the Middle East at large .
But a decade later , the same flames that killed him burn today .
And in Tunisia , they risk incinerating so many of the positive changes that emerged out of that singularly violent event .
Bouazizi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , leading to uprisings in Egypt , Libya , Syria , Yemen , and the Gulf .
Compared to the misery and conflict that visited other countries shaken by his gesture , Tunisia has moved toward a notably better future .
But the standard by which political transitions are measured—especially those that put an end to autocratic regimes—should be higher than simply avoiding civil war or the clutches of an even worse despot .
Yes , Tunisia has become a democracy .
But if this is the only criterion that counts , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fragile one .
After decades of being tucked away in a corner , billed as one of the Arab region ’ s most stable and socially progressive nations , Tunisia has gotten a bitter taste of the tragedies that have stalked other Middle Eastern countries for generations through its own revolution .
At times throughout the country ’ s strenuous transition into democracy , it has seemed that the same forces that were unleashed by the revolution might swallow it .
Since 2011 , for example , Tunisians have endured substantial economic turmoil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become familiar with the recurring threat of terrorism .
Corruption , previously confined to the highest spheres of power , seems to have infected most levels of society .
On the mountainous regions along Tunisia ’ s border with Algeria , Islamist insurgent groups—affiliated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda—have waged a low-level insurgency , killing scores of security personnel and civilians .
Multiple short-lived and mostly ineffective governments since 2011 have stalled economic and political reform .
In fact , Tunisian lawmakers are so rarely in agreement that a few of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parliament just last week .
It was a new low for an already discredited body , prompting public calls for the president , Kais Saied , to dissolve the assembly .
But embedded in the seemingly endless chaos of the past decade , daily life has continued .
A constitutional assembly was voted in by Tunisians and approved a new constitution that allowed for long sought-after freedoms .
Fair and largely peaceful elections have let Tunisians choose new presidents , national deputies , and local officials .
Power has alternated between religiously inspired @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this tight balance risked toppling completely , calls for consensus were heeded and the country moved forward .
The army , initially weak and unexperienced , has been an apolitical force of stability in a country surrounded by volatility .
When President Beji Caid Essebsi died in office in the summer of 2019 , the new constitution kicked into gear and allowed for a procedural transition period and new presidential elections .
Through all of its trials , the country has traded a dictatorship for a parliamentary system and swapped the orderly artificiality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cacophony of a dynamic society Despite these achievements , something critical has been missing .
Revolution and political freedoms have not brought economic equality .
Government debt increased from 41 percent in 2010 to over 70 percent in 2019 .
Unemployment grew from 12 percent to 15 percent over the same period .
In the southern regions , where lack of jobs affects 30 percent of the population in some towns , clashes between protesters and police often paralyze economic activity .
And this was before COVID-19 .
The global pandemic , albeit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shrink the economy by 7 percent this year and double Tunisia ’ s budget deficit to 14 percent in 2020 , its highest level in almost 40 years .
This will only add to existing strain .
It is this pressure , the daily toll of struggling to make ends meet , that many Tunisians associate with the past 10 years .
Unsurprisingly , it is not uncommon to meet many who are unashamedly nostalgic for the orderly years of Ben Ali .
The same rage that pushed Bouazizi to the brink 10 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of society , encouraging many other Tunisians to rebel in their own ways .
Those who can , attempt to emigrate abroad in search of a better life .
Many have joined the ranks of the estimated 20,000 migrants who have died since 2014 trying to cross the Mediterranean , according to figures from the United Nations .
Others have sought extremist groups at home or abroad .
The majority of the disenchanted , a whole generation of them , are still waiting for things to get better , hoping that the events @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new government system , freedom of expression , and changed street names .
Ten years after Bouazizi ’ s death and the disorder it unleashed , it is up to Tunisians to decide whether or not it was all worth it .
If there is one thing that the country ’ s transition underscores—especially in this age of renewed authoritarianism—is that political freedom without economic opportunity amounts to little in the long term .

On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi , a 26-year-old street vendor in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, poured a bottle of gasoline over his head and body and set himself on fire. The act came after his goods and cart were confiscated by municipal officers and he was refused a meeting by the local governor. He died from his burns a few weeks later.
On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, poured a bottle of gasoline over his head and body and set himself on fire. The act came after his goods and cart were confiscated by municipal officers and he was refused a meeting by the local governor. He died from his burns a few weeks later.
His wasn’t the first self-immolation in North Africa that year, but his act of desolation resonated with millions of other young Tunisians who, like him, lacked stable jobs and lived meager existences under the autocratic rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. They took to the streets in protest until Ben Ali’s 23-year rule collapsed and he was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia the next month. Bouazizi’s lonely gesture changed the course of Tunisia and the Middle East at large. But a decade later, the same flames that killed him burn today. And in Tunisia, they risk incinerating so many of the positive changes that emerged out of that singularly violent event.
Bouazizi’s self-immolation sparked unrest across the region, leading to uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf. Compared to the misery and conflict that visited other countries shaken by his gesture, Tunisia has moved toward a notably better future. But the standard by which political transitions are measured—especially those that put an end to autocratic regimes—should be higher than simply avoiding civil war or the clutches of an even worse despot. Yes, Tunisia has become a democracy. But if this is the only criterion that counts, then the victory will always be a fragile one.
After decades of being tucked away in a corner, billed as one of the Arab region’s most stable and socially progressive nations, Tunisia has gotten a bitter taste of the tragedies that have stalked other Middle Eastern countries for generations through its own revolution. At times throughout the country’s strenuous transition into democracy, it has seemed that the same forces that were unleashed by the revolution might swallow it.
Since 2011, for example, Tunisians have endured substantial economic turmoil. They have witnessed political assassinations and become familiar with the recurring threat of terrorism. Corruption, previously confined to the highest spheres of power, seems to have infected most levels of society. On the mountainous regions along Tunisia’s border with Algeria, Islamist insurgent groups—affiliated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda—have waged a low-level insurgency, killing scores of security personnel and civilians. Multiple short-lived and mostly ineffective governments since 2011 have stalled economic and political reform. In fact, Tunisian lawmakers are so rarely in agreement that a few of them got into a physical fight in parliament just last week. It was a new low for an already discredited body, prompting public calls for the president, Kais Saied, to dissolve the assembly.
But embedded in the seemingly endless chaos of the past decade, daily life has continued. A constitutional assembly was voted in by Tunisians and approved a new constitution that allowed for long sought-after freedoms. Fair and largely peaceful elections have let Tunisians choose new presidents, national deputies, and local officials. Power has alternated between religiously inspired politicians and secular parties, and when this tight balance risked toppling completely, calls for consensus were heeded and the country moved forward. The army, initially weak and unexperienced, has been an apolitical force of stability in a country surrounded by volatility. When President Beji Caid Essebsi died in office in the summer of 2019, the new constitution kicked into gear and allowed for a procedural transition period and new presidential elections. Through all of its trials, the country has traded a dictatorship for a parliamentary system and swapped the orderly artificiality of a police state for the jumbled cacophony of a dynamic society
Despite these achievements, something critical has been missing. Revolution and political freedoms have not brought economic equality. Government debt increased from 41 percent in 2010 to over 70 percent in 2019. Unemployment grew from 12 percent to 15 percent over the same period. In the southern regions, where lack of jobs affects 30 percent of the population in some towns, clashes between protesters and police often paralyze economic activity. And this was before COVID-19. The global pandemic, albeit an exceptional occurrence, is expected to shrink the economy by 7 percent this year and double Tunisia’s budget deficit to 14 percent in 2020, its highest level in almost 40 years. This will only add to existing strain.
It is this pressure, the daily toll of struggling to make ends meet, that many Tunisians associate with the past 10 years. Unsurprisingly, it is not uncommon to meet many who are unashamedly nostalgic for the orderly years of Ben Ali. The same rage that pushed Bouazizi to the brink 10 years ago has festered in many corners of society, encouraging many other Tunisians to rebel in their own ways. Those who can, attempt to emigrate abroad in search of a better life. Many have joined the ranks of the estimated 20,000 migrants who have died since 2014 trying to cross the Mediterranean, according to figures from the United Nations. Others have sought extremist groups at home or abroad. The majority of the disenchanted, a whole generation of them, are still waiting for things to get better, hoping that the events of 2011 will translate to more than a new government system, freedom of expression, and changed street names.
Ten years after Bouazizi’s death and the disorder it unleashed, it is up to Tunisians to decide whether or not it was all worth it. If there is one thing that the country’s transition underscores—especially in this age of renewed authoritarianism—is that political freedom without economic opportunity amounts to little in the long term.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Top Pentagon General Meets With Taliban to Salvage Peace Deal

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : The top U.S. general makes a surprise visit to Afghanistan , the U.S. government reels from a suspected Russian hack , and the U.S. Army is looking for some catchy new slogans .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
“ The most important part of the discussions that I had with both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan was the need for an immediate reduction in violence .
Everything else @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a traveling press contingent , which agreed to hold off on reporting about the trip until it ended .
While Milley ’ s behind-the-scenes trip is likely to grab headlines , it ’ s not clear how much leverage the United States has to move the talks forward .
The Doha agreement calls for the United States to zero out troop levels in Afghanistan by mid-2021 if the Taliban upholds commitments to halt the violence .
But the U.S. President Donald Trump has opted for a quicker time frame , drawing down to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon is drawing fire from U.S. government watchdogs who say that the agency failed to properly keep track of sensitive defense equipment provided to the Afghans that went missing on the battlefield .
Experts have urged President-elect Joe Biden to stay the course on talks by allowing Trump ’ s envoy for the Afghan talks , Zalmay Khalilzad , to stay in place .
But the incoming administration may have little patience for the negotiations , as so-called “ forever wars ” are likely to take a back seat to bigger foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focus to Asia and the fight against the coronavirus at home .
In the latest round of talks , the Taliban has made 24 significant demands , including a new constitution and a return to Islamic government , as both sides work toward a renewed cease-fire .
Change your password .
A slow-rolling disaster is unfurling within U.S. national security agencies , as new details emerge of a massive hack that targeted the federal government , likely engineered by Russian intelligence services .
The Defense , State , Commerce , Treasury , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the highly sophisticated attack , as the New York Times reports .
The U.S. government didn ’ t detect the attack , until a private cybersecurity company , FireEye , alerted them to the matter in recent weeks .
An IT network software provider unwittingly pushed out malware through an update to about 18,000 users , including at federal agencies .
“ It will take years to know for certain which networks the Russians control and which ones they just occupy , ” Trump ’ s former homeland security advisor , Tom Bossert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assume that communications about this matter are being read by Russia and assume that any government data or email could be falsified , ” Bossert warned .
Wilkie in the hot seat .
Top veterans advocacy groups are calling on Trump to fire Veterans Affairs Secretary Robert Wilkie , following the release of an internal watchdog report that criticized how he handled a sexual assault allegation last year .
The watchdog report accused Wilkie and other political appointees at the department of working behind-the-scenes to discredit the sexual assault survivor , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and verbally abused by a veteran at a VA medical center last year .
Wilkie dismissed the report ’ s conclusions and said the watchdog ’ s report was “ more dedicated to scoring political points than improving the department.
” Over the moon .
A Chinese lunar capsule carrying the first fresh rock samples in over four decades returned to Earth on Thursday , in a major achievement for Beijing ’ s growing space program—and a reminder to the United States that its top geopolitical rivals are increasing their activities in space @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vice President Mike Pence declared , “ We ’ re in a space race today , just as we were in the 1960s , and the stakes are even higher , ” adding that China had “ ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground.
” Speaking of which , administration officials ’ newest space policy document , released on Wednesday , outlines a roadmap for nuclear-powered rockets and reactors on the moon , as Breaking Defense reports , reflecting grander long-term ambitions for U.S. activities in space .
( Officials stressed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear weapons in space . )
Fresh energy .
Biden is selecting former Michigan Gov .
Jennifer Granholm to be his energy secretary .
Arun Majumdar , a scientist who led the Energy Department ’ s cutting-edge research agency under Obama , is in the running to be picked as deputy secretary , the Washington Post reports .
If confirmed , Granholm and Majumdar would be in charge of maintaining the United States ’ massive nuclear arms arsenal and network of national laboratories .
Stacking the boards .
Trump is tapping more allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waning days of his administration , naming Andrew Giuliani , the son of his personal lawyer and a White House aide , to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council .
Trump also reconstituted the Defense Policy Board this week , naming allies such as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Air Force fighter pilot Scott O ’ Grady to the panel .
Got a tip about recent Trump administration firings or the transition ?
Get in touch with Jack ( jack.detsch @ foreignpolicy.com ) or Robbie ( robbie.gramer @ foreignpolicy.com ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and forced to flee our homes .
But we are not broken .
We have not lost our hope and will for change .
Even if we had the chance to go back in time , to the time prior to our revolution , to the time prior to the killing and torturing of our families , loved ones , and hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians , we would still choose to break our cage of fear that has locked us for over 40 years.
” —Omar Alshogre , a Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , reflecting on the 10-year anniversary of the Arab Spring Bolton on Trump ’ s Morocco-Israel deal .
John Bolton , Trump ’ s former national security advisor , unleashed on his former boss for agreeing to recognize the Western Sahara , a disputed territory , as sovereign Moroccan territory in exchange for Morocco recognizing Israel .
“ This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy , and it is sadly typical of Trump ’ s nakedly transactional approach during his tenure , ” Bolton writes in Foreign Policy .
Today marks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Arab Spring protests .
The U.S. Senate is set to go home for the holidays on Friday , though Congress is clearing last-minute hurdle—including a second coronavirus stimulus package and Trump ’ s threat to veto the Pentagon ’ s authorization act .
Kyrgyzstan is set to hold fresh parliamentary elections on Sunday , after massive street protests earlier this year .
The Army needs your help .
U.S. Army Europe had things more or less figured out when it was just handling Europe—with a clear , if simple , slogan : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Pentagon merged the Army ’ s Europe and Africa commands , meaning the newly formed U.S. Army Europe-Africa ( or USAEUR-AF , for the acronym-inclined ) needs a new slogan .
Have a good idea ?
The Army wants to hear from you .
It will be accepting pitches on a new slogan through Feb. 1 .
Slogan ideas can be submitted here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief.
What’s on tap today: The top U.S. general makes a surprise visit to Afghanistan, the U.S. government reels from a suspected Russian hack, and the U.S. Army is looking for some catchy new slogans.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Milley Makes a Move The Trump administration may be intent on drawing down U.S. forces in Afghanistan before Inauguration Day—but don’t tell that to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley. In an unannounced trip this week, the top military officer visited Taliban negotiators in Qatar to urge the group to cut down on violent attacks, which have risen as the White House has pushed for a faster withdrawal than advised by military officials.
“The most important part of the discussions that I had with both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan was the need for an immediate reduction in violence. Everything else hinges on that,” Milley told a traveling press contingent, which agreed to hold off on reporting about the trip until it ended.
While Milley’s behind-the-scenes trip is likely to grab headlines, it’s not clear how much leverage the United States has to move the talks forward. The Doha agreement calls for the United States to zero out troop levels in Afghanistan by mid-2021 if the Taliban upholds commitments to halt the violence. But the U.S. President Donald Trump has opted for a quicker time frame, drawing down to 2,500 troops by January. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is drawing fire from U.S. government watchdogs who say that the agency failed to properly keep track of sensitive defense equipment provided to the Afghans that went missing on the battlefield.
Experts have urged President-elect Joe Biden to stay the course on talks by allowing Trump’s envoy for the Afghan talks, Zalmay Khalilzad, to stay in place. But the incoming administration may have little patience for the negotiations, as so-called “forever wars” are likely to take a back seat to bigger foreign policy priorities, such as pivoting U.S. focus to Asia and the fight against the coronavirus at home.
In the latest round of talks, the Taliban has made 24 significant demands, including a new constitution and a return to Islamic government, as both sides work toward a renewed cease-fire.
What We’re Watching
Change your password. A slow-rolling disaster is unfurling within U.S. national security agencies, as new details emerge of a massive hack that targeted the federal government, likely engineered by Russian intelligence services. The Defense, State, Commerce, Treasury, and Homeland Security departments were all compromised by the highly sophisticated attack, as the New York Times reports.
The U.S. government didn’t detect the attack, until a private cybersecurity company, FireEye, alerted them to the matter in recent weeks. An IT network software provider unwittingly pushed out malware through an update to about 18,000 users, including at federal agencies. “It will take years to know for certain which networks the Russians control and which ones they just occupy,” Trump’s former homeland security advisor, Tom Bossert wrote.
Incoming President-elect Biden “has to assume that communications about this matter are being read by Russia and assume that any government data or email could be falsified,” Bossert warned.
Wilkie in the hot seat. Top veterans advocacy groups are calling on Trump to fire Veterans Affairs Secretary Robert Wilkie, following the release of an internal watchdog report that criticized how he handled a sexual assault allegation last year. The watchdog report accused Wilkie and other political appointees at the department of working behind-the-scenes to discredit the sexual assault survivor, a congressional aide who said she was groped and verbally abused by a veteran at a VA medical center last year.
Wilkie dismissed the report’s conclusions and said the watchdog’s report was “more dedicated to scoring political points than improving the department.”
Over the moon. A Chinese lunar capsule carrying the first fresh rock samples in over four decades returned to Earth on Thursday, in a major achievement for Beijing’s growing space program—and a reminder to the United States that its top geopolitical rivals are increasing their activities in space. Flashback to a 2019 speech: Vice President Mike Pence declared, “We’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher,” adding that China had “ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground.”
Speaking of which, administration officials’ newest space policy document, released on Wednesday, outlines a roadmap for nuclear-powered rockets and reactors on the moon, as Breaking Defense reports, reflecting grander long-term ambitions for U.S. activities in space. (Officials stressed that this had nothing to do with building nuclear weapons in space.)
Movers and Shakers
Fresh energy. Biden is selecting former Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm to be his energy secretary. Arun Majumdar, a scientist who led the Energy Department’s cutting-edge research agency under Obama, is in the running to be picked as deputy secretary, the Washington Post reports. If confirmed, Granholm and Majumdar would be in charge of maintaining the United States’ massive nuclear arms arsenal and network of national laboratories.
Stacking the boards. Trump is tapping more allies to advisory boards and commissions in the waning days of his administration, naming Andrew Giuliani, the son of his personal lawyer and a White House aide, to the United States Holocaust Memorial Council. Trump also reconstituted the Defense Policy Board this week, naming allies such as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Air Force fighter pilot Scott O’Grady to the panel.
Got a tip about recent Trump administration firings or the transition? Get in touch with Jack (jack.detsch@foreignpolicy.com) or Robbie (robbie.gramer@foreignpolicy.com).
Quote of the Week
“We have been tortured, killed, and forced to flee our homes. But we are not broken. We have not lost our hope and will for change. Even if we had the chance to go back in time, to the time prior to our revolution, to the time prior to the killing and torturing of our families, loved ones, and hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, we would still choose to break our cage of fear that has locked us for over 40 years.”
—Omar Alshogre, a Syrian protester, former prisoner, and refugee, reflecting on the 10-year anniversary of the Arab Spring
Foreign Policy Recommends
Bolton on Trump’s Morocco-Israel deal. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security advisor, unleashed on his former boss for agreeing to recognize the Western Sahara, a disputed territory, as sovereign Moroccan territory in exchange for Morocco recognizing Israel. “This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy, and it is sadly typical of Trump’s nakedly transactional approach during his tenure,” Bolton writes in Foreign Policy.
The Week Ahead
Today marks the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the Arab Spring protests.
The U.S. Senate is set to go home for the holidays on Friday, though Congress is clearing last-minute hurdle—including a second coronavirus stimulus package and Trump’s threat to veto the Pentagon’s authorization act.
Kyrgyzstan is set to hold fresh parliamentary elections on Sunday, after massive street protests earlier this year.
Odds and Ends
The Army needs your help. U.S. Army Europe had things more or less figured out when it was just handling Europe—with a clear, if simple, slogan: “Europe Strong.” But last month, the Pentagon merged the Army’s Europe and Africa commands, meaning the newly formed U.S. Army Europe-Africa (or USAEUR-AF, for the acronym-inclined) needs a new slogan.
Have a good idea? The Army wants to hear from you. It will be accepting pitches on a new slogan through Feb. 1. Slogan ideas can be submitted here.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--The Arab Spring Let the People Shout, Not Whisper

The Arab Spring Let the People Shout , Not Whisper I was in fifth grade when the school ’ s officials ordered all the teachers at my school to end the day early and take us to march the streets of Damascus singing songs of admiration about the Syrian president , Bashar al-Assad .
I arrived home from the daylong rally , excited to tell my father—a successful army officer—my realization : Our president had big ears like a monkey .
He didn ’ t laugh with me .
Rather , my father slapped my face and taught me a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said : “ The walls , windows , doors—all you see , smell , or feel around you , everything and everywhere—have ears .
They can hear your words when you talk about the president , his friends , or politics .
They can even hear your whispers.
” I was 10 years old when I was first introduced to dictatorship .
Ten years later , when I was 15 years old , on Dec. 17 , 2010 , the thrones started to shake .
The Arab world woke up to the news @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself to death after authorities banned him from trading vegetables in the city—his only source of income .
His name , Mohamed Bouazizi , would be remembered as one of the martyrs of what would soon become a new Middle Eastern revolution .
At a time when most people believed that it was impossible for the Arab dictators to fall , Tunisian street merchants and their supporters gathered in demonstrations and forced President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country .
The Tunisian people defeated their dictator , who had been ruling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 28 days of demonstrations—and with minimal bloodshed .
What casualties there were came largely as a result of police brutality .
The Tunisian people rose up and called for freedom , sparking a new phase in world history , the Arab Spring .
Shortly after the Tunisian movement began , the people of Libya , Egypt , and Yemen also rose up .
My family watched the Egyptian revolution on TV as millions of people marched for freedom .
I remember my father whispering to me : “ Could we see these great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He was excited but afraid to say it out loud .
The walls could still hear whispers .
Eventually the Arab Spring did reach Syria .
It started after 15 young children were arrested after writing on a wall “ your turn is coming , doctor , ” which was interpreted as an anti-Assad message .
The children were taken by intelligence officers and endured torture : They were beaten , and their fingernails were ripped off .
Among the children was Hamza al-Khatib , a 13-year-old boy who died under torture , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days , the reaction of their families and the people of their city created a storm that soon reached my hometown , Baniyas and sparked our own revolution .
My father drove me to the demonstrations himself .
Although he still only whispered , I understood that by driving me to the protests he was telling me that now was the time to take a step forward , because any step back would mean death .
We were scared , but there was joy in the souls of everyone who joined the demonstrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt I could jump and touch the sky when we yelled “ Oh , freedom !
” Little did I know that in just a couple of years I would be in prison , while my father and brothers would be murdered in the same living room that was once filled with our excitement as we watched the demonstrations across Syria on our TV screens .
Like more than 500,000 other Syrians , my family members would become victims of the Assad regime and the subsequent wars .
A massacre took place in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wanted to commit an act of ethnic cleansing of the Sunni people in the Alawite-majority area .
In every conflict there must be winners , losers , and victims .
The Arab Spring , whether you consider it successful or not , has taught the people of the Middle East the difference between dictatorship and leadership .
It has freed the minds of the people , at least , by showing them the beauty of calling for freedom after years of tyranny .
It has also shown the West that the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and proved to the Arab regimes that violent suppression is not a solution , only a desperate delaying action .
The Tunisian , Libyan , Egyptian , and Yemeni people managed to get rid of their presidents , but they were not successful in toppling their regimes .
Now , after 10 years of suffering and loss , people are facing the same struggles they faced before .
In Tunisia , the motherland of the Arab Spring , the democratic presidential election of 2014 was a source of hope , but it soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ systematic corruption remained .
Egypt has removed two presidents since the revolution began , only to end up with a new dictator : Abdel Fattah al-Sisi .
Today in Syria , 11.5 percent of the population has been killed or injured since March 2011 , and more than 12 million—more than half the population—are internally or externally displaced .
Nearly 100,000 Syrians have disappeared in that period , mostly at the hands of the Syrian regime , according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights .
The Assad regime , with the help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ managed to retake most of the parts of Syria that were liberated by opposition forces , leaving more than 4 million people—a majority of them children—gathered in the small city of Idlib , the opposition ’ s last stronghold , fighting for their daily survival .
The opposition groups have had to survive by relying on sponsorship from other countries , such as Turkey and Qatar , which have their own ideas of what Syria should look like and have shaped the way these groups operate—leading them to turn on each other instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2014 , the Islamic State established itself in Syria and soon became the biggest danger that the Syrian revolution faced .
The militant group did not hesitate to spend its resources killing opposition forces .
It has turned the focus of Western countries from the brutalities of the Assad regime to the brutalities of terrorist groups .
This has resulted in a lack of hope and trust in the Syrian opposition groups , and all that is left today is the hope people had when they went to the first demonstrations in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabs have grown up during the Arab Spring learning how corrupt their governments are , and how dangerous the security services that protect them are in turn , they had the chance to engage with people they disagree with , to find common ground .
They have shaped a new idea of what the future should look like .
They will keep fighting until they gain freedom , for the sake of those who died , fled , or were tortured under the regime ’ s control .
Millions of refugees have fled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Today , tens of thousands of them are studying at universities , and thousands are advocating for freedom and democracy , speaking for equality , dignity , and human rights .
They managed to create new successes that contribute to the future of the region , shaped by their lives in Europe .
I wanted to attend the first demonstration to prove myself to my father .
Changing how my father perceived me was my first revolution , but after 10 years I have ended up somewhere bigger .
Like the estimated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , I saw what the regime was like in its darkest places .
When I made it to Europe I was given my first taste of democracy .
I experienced freedom .
I could talk without having to whisper .
If , like in Egypt , the Syrian revolution had ended in less than a month , we would not have learned so much about freedom , democracy , and human rights .
Ten years of unrest will make Syrians the most capable people in the Middle East at rebuilding their country in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same mistakes of other countries that have rid themselves of their dictators but are still trapped in corrupt systems .
We have been tortured , killed , and forced to flee our homes .
But we are not broken .
We have not lost our hope and will for change .
Even if we had the chance to go back in time , to the time prior to our revolution , to the time prior to the killing and torturing of our families , loved ones , and hundreds of thousands of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to break our cage of fear that has locked us for over 40 years .
We would still choose to chant under our skies for democracy .
The revolution we started was the first step on our long walk to freedom .

I was in fifth grade when the school’s officials ordered all the teachers at my school to end the day early and take us to march the streets of Damascus singing songs of admiration about the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. I arrived home from the daylong rally, excited to tell my father—a successful army officer—my realization: Our president had big ears like a monkey. He didn’t laugh with me. Rather, my father slapped my face and taught me a lesson I will never forget. He said: “The walls, windows, doors—all you see, smell, or feel around you, everything and everywhere—have ears. They can hear your words when you talk about the president, his friends, or politics. They can even hear your whispers.” I was 10 years old when I was first introduced to dictatorship.
I was in fifth grade when the school’s officials ordered all the teachers at my school to end the day early and take us to march the streets of Damascus singing songs of admiration about the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. I arrived home from the daylong rally, excited to tell my father—a successful army officer—my realization: Our president had big ears like a monkey. He didn’t laugh with me. Rather, my father slapped my face and taught me a lesson I will never forget. He said: “The walls, windows, doors—all you see, smell, or feel around you, everything and everywhere—have ears. They can hear your words when you talk about the president, his friends, or politics. They can even hear your whispers.” I was 10 years old when I was first introduced to dictatorship.
Ten years later, when I was 15 years old, on Dec. 17, 2010, the thrones started to shake. The Arab world woke up to the news that a 26-year-old Tunisian man had burned himself to death after authorities banned him from trading vegetables in the city—his only source of income. His name, Mohamed Bouazizi, would be remembered as one of the martyrs of what would soon become a new Middle Eastern revolution.
At a time when most people believed that it was impossible for the Arab dictators to fall, Tunisian street merchants and their supporters gathered in demonstrations and forced President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country. The Tunisian people defeated their dictator, who had been ruling Tunisia for over 23 years, after 28 days of demonstrations—and with minimal bloodshed. What casualties there were came largely as a result of police brutality. The Tunisian people rose up and called for freedom, sparking a new phase in world history, the Arab Spring. Shortly after the Tunisian movement began, the people of Libya, Egypt, and Yemen also rose up.
My family watched the Egyptian revolution on TV as millions of people marched for freedom. I remember my father whispering to me: “Could we see these great demonstrations in Syria as well?” He was excited but afraid to say it out loud. The walls could still hear whispers.
Eventually the Arab Spring did reach Syria. It started after 15 young children were arrested after writing on a wall “your turn is coming, doctor,” which was interpreted as an anti-Assad message. The children were taken by intelligence officers and endured torture: They were beaten, and their fingernails were ripped off. Among the children was Hamza al-Khatib, a 13-year-old boy who died under torture, slaughtered by Syrian prison guards. Within days, the reaction of their families and the people of their city created a storm that soon reached my hometown, Baniyas , and sparked our own revolution.
My father drove me to the demonstrations himself. Although he still only whispered, I understood that by driving me to the protests he was telling me that now was the time to take a step forward, because any step back would mean death. We were scared, but there was joy in the souls of everyone who joined the demonstrations. I remember my excitement. I felt I could jump and touch the sky when we yelled “Oh, freedom!”
Little did I know that in just a couple of years I would be in prison, while my father and brothers would be murdered in the same living room that was once filled with our excitement as we watched the demonstrations across Syria on our TV screens. Like more than 500,000 other Syrians, my family members would become victims of the Assad regime and the subsequent wars. A massacre took place in my hometown, Baniyas, and my village, Bayda, where the regime wanted to commit an act of ethnic cleansing of the Sunni people in the Alawite-majority area.
In every conflict there must be winners, losers, and victims. The Arab Spring, whether you consider it successful or not, has taught the people of the Middle East the difference between dictatorship and leadership. It has freed the minds of the people, at least, by showing them the beauty of calling for freedom after years of tyranny. It has also shown the West that the Middle East is open to democracy and change, and proved to the Arab regimes that violent suppression is not a solution, only a desperate delaying action.
The Tunisian, Libyan, Egyptian, and Yemeni people managed to get rid of their presidents, but they were not successful in toppling their regimes. Now, after 10 years of suffering and loss, people are facing the same struggles they faced before. In Tunisia, the motherland of the Arab Spring, the democratic presidential election of 2014 was a source of hope, but it soon became apparent that much of the same systematic corruption remained. Egypt has removed two presidents since the revolution began, only to end up with a new dictator: Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Today in Syria, 11.5 percent of the population has been killed or injured since March 2011, and more than 12 million—more than half the population—are internally or externally displaced. Nearly 100,000 Syrians have disappeared in that period, mostly at the hands of the Syrian regime, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.
The Assad regime, with the help of Russian and Iranian allies, has managed to retake most of the parts of Syria that were liberated by opposition forces, leaving more than 4 million people—a majority of them children—gathered in the small city of Idlib, the opposition’s last stronghold, fighting for their daily survival.
The opposition groups have had to survive by relying on sponsorship from other countries, such as Turkey and Qatar, which have their own ideas of what Syria should look like and have shaped the way these groups operate—leading them to turn on each other instead of focusing on the real enemy. In 2014, the Islamic State established itself in Syria and soon became the biggest danger that the Syrian revolution faced. The militant group did not hesitate to spend its resources killing opposition forces. It has turned the focus of Western countries from the brutalities of the Assad regime to the brutalities of terrorist groups. This has resulted in a lack of hope and trust in the Syrian opposition groups, and all that is left today is the hope people had when they went to the first demonstrations in early 2011.
As millions of young Arabs have grown up during the Arab Spring learning how corrupt their governments are, and how dangerous the security services that protect them are in turn, they had the chance to engage with people they disagree with, to find common ground. They have shaped a new idea of what the future should look like. They will keep fighting until they gain freedom, for the sake of those who died, fled, or were tortured under the regime’s control.
Millions of refugees have fled their countries to seek safety in Europe. Today, tens of thousands of them are studying at universities, and thousands are advocating for freedom and democracy, speaking for equality, dignity, and human rights. They managed to create new successes that contribute to the future of the region, shaped by their lives in Europe.
I wanted to attend the first demonstration to prove myself to my father. Changing how my father perceived me was my first revolution, but after 10 years I have ended up somewhere bigger. Like the estimated 215,000 other Syrians who have been detained, I saw what the regime was like in its darkest places. When I made it to Europe I was given my first taste of democracy. I experienced freedom. I could talk without having to whisper. If, like in Egypt, the Syrian revolution had ended in less than a month, we would not have learned so much about freedom, democracy, and human rights. Ten years of unrest will make Syrians the most capable people in the Middle East at rebuilding their country in the future. We will not make the same mistakes of other countries that have rid themselves of their dictators but are still trapped in corrupt systems.
We have been tortured, killed, and forced to flee our homes. But we are not broken. We have not lost our hope and will for change. Even if we had the chance to go back in time, to the time prior to our revolution, to the time prior to the killing and torturing of our families, loved ones, and hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, we would still choose to break our cage of fear that has locked us for over 40 years. We would still choose to chant under our skies for democracy. The revolution we started was the first step on our long walk to freedom.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-17--Refugees Can’t Live in Limbo Forever

Refugees Can’t Live in Limbo Forever

As of this year , a full 1 percent of humanity ( 80 million people ) is living in displacement—as refugees , internally displaced persons , or asylum-seekers—because of conflict or persecution .
To put the number in context , it is similar to the population of Germany ( about 83 million ) and greater than the population of the United Kingdom ( about 67 million ) .
Forced displacement has doubled in the past decade , and it is likely to rise still faster in the coming years as people are pushed to leave their homes because of climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , widely cited estimate of climate migration is 200 million migrants by 2050 .
The world ’ s existing strategies for managing the displaced are no longer sufficient , but the next U.S. administration has an opportunity to lead the world in creating a new way forward .
There are five fundamental problems with how displaced people are managed today .
This is the case for all of the 80 million forcibly displaced , and in particular among the nearly 30 million of them who have crossed a border to another country as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ballooning numbers of people who live in exile in limbo for decades or generations , without a solution that permits them to restart stable lives .
Although the United Nations promotes helping displaced people find “ durable solutions ” —returning home , integrating into their new host community or country , or resettling to a third country—the vast majority stay in limbo .
Returns are rare , as conflicts remain unresolved and as those who fled are reluctant to return to dangerous situations .
Although some host countries allow refugees to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that limit integration or keep displaced people in camps .
Resettlement to other countries—a process by which a third country accepts a refugee—has not kept pace with displacement .
Less than 1 percent of refugees are resettled in another country .
( With the exception of the past few years , the United States has taken in the vast majority .
In 2015 , the United States accepted 62 percent of all refugees resettled globally . )
But the most common and enduring solution is extended exile .
Millions live this way indefinitely—not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ roots elsewhere .
Second , existing refugee policy puts enormous strains on host communities and host countries .
Around 85 percent of refugees live in developing countries , which are themselves often struggling to provide for their own populations .
The countries hosting the most refugees are Turkey , Colombia , Pakistan , Uganda , and Germany .
Refugee influxes are so large in some cases that they cause demographic changes ; crowd housing , schools , and hospitals ; and strain public services .
Host communities worry that their jobs will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for less , and sometimes locals resent the refugees for receiving aid even as they themselves live in poverty .
Such circumstances strain stability and security in host countries .
Surges of new residents have led to political backlash .
The 2015 migrant crisis in the European Union led to the rise of far-right political parties in multiple countries and was a contributing factor to Brexit .
And among the refugee populations , poor conditions have sometimes led to radicalization .
Risks are highest when refugees face poor opportunities in education and jobs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alienation from the societies in which they live .
Third , policy solutions designed for the near term in refugee crises establish fundamentally problematic structures that last into the future , leading to high human costs .
Forty percent of the world ’ s refugees live in camps .
Camps are meant as temporary solutions for an urgent short-term humanitarian need .
Yet they often grow into towns that endure for decades , trapping people in substandard , squalid conditions .
Human beings who have committed no crimes should not live confined to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set up for Palestinians in Middle Eastern countries in 1948 and 1967 endure to this day .
The Dadaab camps in Kenya were established in 1991 and 1992 , yet people there still live in tents , face restrictions in leaving the camps , survive on food rations provided by multilaterals , and have few education opportunities past elementary school .
Fourth , the current approach is economically unsustainable , keeping displaced people in grinding poverty and in dependence upon aid , and draining government budgets of both host countries and donor governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lack or have limited rights to work , as host country leaders fear refugees will take citizens ’ jobs .
At the same time , there is not enough donor money to support many millions of people indefinitely .
Caught in a Catch-22 of not being allowed to work while not receiving enough aid to survive , refugees often work under the table , under minimum wage , and without social protections .
When parents can not earn enough to support families , it leads to higher rates of child labor and early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtain citizenship or required documentation in new locations , refugees often can not obtain bank accounts , access credit , save , or borrow .
When refugees live outside of camps in urban areas , they depend upon host government public services , such as education and health .
Developing country host governments absorb these costs , without tax revenues from refugees ( who are not working legally ) and with most donor money going toward U.N.-managed services .
Meanwhile , the United States provides more than the next nine donors combined to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
With coronavirus pandemic expenses to pay in coming years , it is not clear how willing or able it and the other main donor countries will be to continue increasing contributions .
Fifth , outcomes in terms of human development and human rights are worse for refugees than local populations , creating a global underclass of people .
In many countries , refugees have much lower educational and job prospects—a huge waste of human capital and potential .
Indeed , over half of refugee children globally are not in school , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their education systems .
Those in urban areas often struggle with access to housing , basic public services , and using their skills in jobs .
Since then , there have been incremental changes made to existing structures and legal principles .
The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees has been the biggest update , laying out principles that donor countries should support host countries in provision of public services and promoting the self-sufficiency of refugees instead of the current often indefinite dependency .
However , it is not legally binding , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it does not provide concrete mechanisms for implementing such new principles .
In short , new—and practical—solutions are needed to address this growing global problem .
Under incoming President Joe Biden , American leadership is particularly called for , given the United States ’ role as the primary humanitarian funder for refugee situations globally and , for most of recent history , the main recipient of resettled refugees .
One solution is to put more effort into the diplomacy of conflict prevention and resolution so people are not displaced at this scale in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and others could also offer more types of legal , flexible visa pathways for refugees to migrate .
The United States has an opportunity both to increase the numbers of refugees it accepts—as Biden has pledged to do—and to encourage other countries to take additional refugees , including in other regions , such as Latin America , Asia , and Africa .
The United Nations could work with host countries to gradually close camps or lift restrictions to freedom of movement for those within the camps .
If refugees are legally allowed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to pay taxes , which could help finance their own public services such as education or health care .
Donor funding could be prioritized to help host countries expand existing national public services , rather than supporting parallel services run by multilaterals in perpetuity .
And finally , the United States could lead an initiative with other donor countries , the United Nations , and refugee host countries to promote self-sufficiency and human capital development for refugees , by enabling better access to education , access to banking and the internet , better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allowing refugees to use their skills in their occupations in their host countries .
Existing systems are dysfunctional , harmful , and poorly suited to the needs of displaced people and their host countries .
Fixing them may seem like a big task , but it is an urgent one .
Permanent refugee populations strain stability in multiple countries , deplete government budgets , create a global underclass of people not able to partake in the normal activities of human life , and does not meet global humanitarian values .
The next administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in solving one of the biggest human development issues of our era—it should run with it .

As of this year, a full 1 percent of humanity (80 million people) is living in displacement—as refugees, internally displaced persons, or asylum-seekers—because of conflict or persecution. To put the number in context, it is similar to the population of Germany (about 83 million) and greater than the population of the United Kingdom (about 67 million). Forced displacement has doubled in the past decade, and it is likely to rise still faster in the coming years as people are pushed to leave their homes because of climate change or natural disasters; a midrange, widely cited estimate of climate migration is 200 million migrants by 2050.
As of this year, a full 1 percent of humanity (80 million people) is living in displacement—as refugees, internally displaced persons, or asylum-seekers—because of conflict or persecution. To put the number in context, it is similar to the population of Germany (about 83 million) and greater than the population of the United Kingdom (about 67 million). Forced displacement has doubled in the past decade, and it is likely to rise still faster in the coming years as people are pushed to leave their homes because of climate change or natural disasters; a midrange, widely cited estimate of climate migration is 200 million migrants by 2050.
The world’s existing strategies for managing the displaced are no longer sufficient, but the next U.S. administration has an opportunity to lead the world in creating a new way forward.
There are five fundamental problems with how displaced people are managed today. This is the case for all of the 80 million forcibly displaced, and in particular among the nearly 30 million of them who have crossed a border to another country as refugees.
First, current approaches lead to ballooning numbers of people who live in exile in limbo for decades or generations, without a solution that permits them to restart stable lives. Although the United Nations promotes helping displaced people find “durable solutions”—returning home, integrating into their new host community or country, or resettling to a third country—the vast majority stay in limbo.
Returns are rare, as conflicts remain unresolved and as those who fled are reluctant to return to dangerous situations. Although some host countries allow refugees to be naturalized as citizens, many have policies that limit integration or keep displaced people in camps. Resettlement to other countries—a process by which a third country accepts a refugee—has not kept pace with displacement. Less than 1 percent of refugees are resettled in another country. (With the exception of the past few years, the United States has taken in the vast majority. In 2015, the United States accepted 62 percent of all refugees resettled globally.) But the most common and enduring solution is extended exile. Millions live this way indefinitely—not able to return home or put down roots elsewhere.
Second, existing refugee policy puts enormous strains on host communities and host countries. Around 85 percent of refugees live in developing countries, which are themselves often struggling to provide for their own populations. The countries hosting the most refugees are Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda, and Germany. Refugee influxes are so large in some cases that they cause demographic changes; crowd housing, schools, and hospitals; and strain public services. Host communities worry that their jobs will be taken by desperate newcomers who will work for less, and sometimes locals resent the refugees for receiving aid even as they themselves live in poverty.
Such circumstances strain stability and security in host countries. Surges of new residents have led to political backlash. The 2015 migrant crisis in the European Union led to the rise of far-right political parties in multiple countries and was a contributing factor to Brexit. And among the refugee populations, poor conditions have sometimes led to radicalization. Risks are highest when refugees face poor opportunities in education and jobs, restricted freedom of movement, and alienation from the societies in which they live.
Third, policy solutions designed for the near term in refugee crises establish fundamentally problematic structures that last into the future, leading to high human costs. Forty percent of the world’s refugees live in camps. Camps are meant as temporary solutions for an urgent short-term humanitarian need. Yet they often grow into towns that endure for decades, trapping people in substandard, squalid conditions. Human beings who have committed no crimes should not live confined to camps without freedom of movement. Camps set up for Palestinians in Middle Eastern countries in 1948 and 1967 endure to this day. The Dadaab camps in Kenya were established in 1991 and 1992, yet people there still live in tents, face restrictions in leaving the camps, survive on food rations provided by multilaterals, and have few education opportunities past elementary school.
Fourth, the current approach is economically unsustainable, keeping displaced people in grinding poverty and in dependence upon aid, and draining government budgets of both host countries and donor governments. In many host countries, refugees lack or have limited rights to work, as host country leaders fear refugees will take citizens’ jobs. At the same time, there is not enough donor money to support many millions of people indefinitely. Caught in a Catch-22 of not being allowed to work while not receiving enough aid to survive, refugees often work under the table, under minimum wage, and without social protections. When parents cannot earn enough to support families, it leads to higher rates of child labor and early marriage for girls. Not able to obtain citizenship or required documentation in new locations, refugees often cannot obtain bank accounts, access credit, save, or borrow. When refugees live outside of camps in urban areas, they depend upon host government public services, such as education and health. Developing country host governments absorb these costs, without tax revenues from refugees (who are not working legally) and with most donor money going toward U.N.-managed services. Meanwhile, the United States provides more than the next nine donors combined to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. With coronavirus pandemic expenses to pay in coming years, it is not clear how willing or able it and the other main donor countries will be to continue increasing contributions.
Fifth, outcomes in terms of human development and human rights are worse for refugees than local populations, creating a global underclass of people. In many countries, refugees have much lower educational and job prospects—a huge waste of human capital and potential. Indeed, over half of refugee children globally are not in school, and host countries struggle to absorb them into their education systems. Those in urban areas often struggle with access to housing, basic public services, and using their skills in jobs.
Leadership to reform this global system is lacking, and there are few mechanisms to improve it. Established after World War II in response to displacement in Europe, the 1951 Refugee Convention established basic principles to manage refugee situations. It was not set up to handle numbers of this magnitude or time frames of this duration, and many developing country refugee host countries are not signatories to it.
Since then, there have been incremental changes made to existing structures and legal principles. The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees has been the biggest update, laying out principles that donor countries should support host countries in provision of public services and promoting the self-sufficiency of refugees instead of the current often indefinite dependency. However, it is not legally binding, the United States is not a signatory, and it does not provide concrete mechanisms for implementing such new principles.
In short, new—and practical—solutions are needed to address this growing global problem. Under incoming President Joe Biden, American leadership is particularly called for, given the United States’ role as the primary humanitarian funder for refugee situations globally and, for most of recent history, the main recipient of resettled refugees.
One solution is to put more effort into the diplomacy of conflict prevention and resolution so people are not displaced at this scale in the first place. The United States and others could also offer more types of legal, flexible visa pathways for refugees to migrate. The United States has an opportunity both to increase the numbers of refugees it accepts—as Biden has pledged to do—and to encourage other countries to take additional refugees, including in other regions, such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The United Nations could work with host countries to gradually close camps or lift restrictions to freedom of movement for those within the camps. If refugees are legally allowed to work, they could also be expected to pay taxes, which could help finance their own public services such as education or health care. Donor funding could be prioritized to help host countries expand existing national public services, rather than supporting parallel services run by multilaterals in perpetuity. And finally, the United States could lead an initiative with other donor countries, the United Nations, and refugee host countries to promote self-sufficiency and human capital development for refugees, by enabling better access to education, access to banking and the internet, better tools for providing identity documents, and allowing refugees to use their skills in their occupations in their host countries.
Existing systems are dysfunctional, harmful, and poorly suited to the needs of displaced people and their host countries. Fixing them may seem like a big task, but it is an urgent one. Permanent refugee populations strain stability in multiple countries, deplete government budgets, create a global underclass of people not able to partake in the normal activities of human life, and does not meet global humanitarian values. The next administration has the opportunity to exercise American leadership in solving one of the biggest human development issues of our era—it should run with it.