foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--If There’s a Vaccine, Who Gets It First?

If There ’ s a Vaccine , Who Gets It First ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The White House is expected to announce details on its coronavirus vaccine development plans , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delays the swearing-in of Israel ’ s unity government , and the U.S. House of Representatives is set to approve a rule change to allow proxy voting .
I ’ m filling in for Colm Quinn , who has the day off .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
If there is a coronavirus vaccine , will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After controversial comments by the CEO of a French pharmaceutical company , French Prime Minister Édouard Philippe took the opportunity on Thursday to say that equal access to any vaccine that is developed is “ non-negotiable.
” Paul Hudson , the head of Sanofi , told Bloomberg on Wednesday that the United States would get the “ largest pre-order ” of a successful vaccine because it was the first to fund the firm ’ s research—a statement he later walked back .
The comments reportedly angered French President Emmanuel Macron , who is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sanofi is just one of dozens of companies working to develop a vaccine around the world .
While other countries committed to an $ 8 billion global pledge to support vaccine development and equitable distribution , the United States did not pledge any funds .
Some experts have raised concerns over nationalism taking precedence .
The White House has announced its own vaccine development initiative , called Operation Warp Speed , and tapped a former executive at GlaxoSmithKline to lead the effort .
More details are expected today .
Whistleblower says no plans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ congressional committee heard testimony from Rick Bright , a scientist who in April was removed from his position as head of the U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority—a federal agency responsible for vaccines .
Bright told lawmakers that the United States still has no plan for how to distribute a potential vaccine effectively and equitably—even within its borders .
If there is a second wave of the virus , the United States may face “ the darkest winter in modern history , ” Bright said .
“ Our window of opportunity is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump has said he believes a vaccine could come by the end of this year , conflicting with statements from Anthony Fauci , the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—who says that fall availability is unlikely .
A STAT tracker shows 14 high-profile vaccines in development around the world , with six in phase-one human trials .
Israel ’ s unity government swearing-in postponed .
Israel will wait until at least Sunday for the new unity government to be sworn in .
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delayed a vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his right-wing Likud party and former rival Benny Gantz ’ s centrist Blue and White party at the last minute .
The vote was expected on Thursday evening local time , but some senior Likud members threatened to boycott the vote unless they were offered top government positions .
To avoid a fourth election after a year of political uncertainty , the new government must be sworn in by next Thursday—days before Netanyahu ’ s criminal corruption trial begins .
U.S. House to approve voting by proxy .
The U.S. House of Representatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its rules to allow lawmakers to serve as proxies for others who are quarantined or unable to make it to the chamber to vote .
The move , which is backed by House Democrats and Speaker Nancy Pelosi , would break with 200 years of precedent—allowing individual lawmakers to vote on behalf up to 10 other members .
At least six U.S. representatives have tested positive or were presumed positive for COVID-19 , and dozens of lawmakers have self-quarantined as a precaution .
COVID-19 confirmed in world ’ s largest refugee settlement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ people had tested positive for the coronavirus in the refugee camps that host more than 1 million Rohingya refugees .
Both individuals have been placed in an isolation center .
Bangladesh has reported nearly 19,000 COVID-19 across the country but had not yet confirmed any cases in the camps near Cox ’ s Bazar , where aid workers have warned that a significant outbreak would be a humanitarian disaster .
The camps are more densely populated than most of the world ’ s major cities .
U.S.-Cuba relations on ice .
Reuters reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cuba to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in large part because of its continued support for the regime of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela .
The move would be a major step in the administration ’ s ongoing rollback of the opening between the United States and Cuba initiated by President Barack Obama in 2015 .
Japan ’ s state of emergency .
The Japanese government has decided to lift its state of emergency for 80 percent of the country ahead of schedule , citing the low number of new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in effect in Tokyo and Osaka .
That Japan has such low figures is a surprise as its diagnostic testing has been limited and social distancing halfhearted .
But its measures still appear to be working , as William Sposato argues in Foreign Policy .
Burundi ’ s ill-advised election .
Burundi has ordered its World Health Organization country head and three other experts to leave the country by today , determined to go ahead with its presidential election next week in which opposition candidates are seeking to defeat President Pierre Nkurunziza , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights abuses .
Campaign events have drawn large crowds given that there are no social distancing regulations in place .
Burundi has recorded few cases of COVID-19 , but testing remains low .
The vote is set for May 20 .
A zoo in Calgary , Canada , has decided to return its two giant pandas on loan from China three years early because they are running low on food .
Flight disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic have limited its supply of fresh bamboo—first from China , then from California .
Bamboo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Alberta , makes up 99 percent of a panda ’ s diet .
The animals are among the zoo ’ s most popular attractions and were supposed to stay in Calgary until 2023 .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The White House is expected to announce details on its coronavirus vaccine development plans , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delays the swearing-in of Israel’s unity government , and the U.S. House of Representatives is set to approve a rule change to allow proxy voting .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The White House is expected to announce details on its coronavirus vaccine development plans, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delays the swearing-in of Israel’s unity government, and the U.S. House of Representatives is set to approve a rule change to allow proxy voting.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Vaccine Distribution Could Reflect Existing Inequalities
If there is a coronavirus vaccine, will the United States get it first?
After controversial comments by the CEO of a French pharmaceutical company, French Prime Minister Édouard Philippe took the opportunity on Thursday to say that equal access to any vaccine that is developed is “non-negotiable.” Paul Hudson, the head of Sanofi, told Bloomberg on Wednesday that the United States would get the “largest pre-order” of a successful vaccine because it was the first to fund the firm’s research—a statement he later walked back. The comments reportedly angered French President Emmanuel Macron, who is expected to meet Hudson next week.
Sanofi is just one of dozens of companies working to develop a vaccine around the world. While other countries committed to an $8 billion global pledge to support vaccine development and equitable distribution, the United States did not pledge any funds. Some experts have raised concerns over nationalism taking precedence. The White House has announced its own vaccine development initiative, called Operation Warp Speed, and tapped a former executive at GlaxoSmithKline to lead the effort. More details are expected today.
Whistleblower says no plans in place. On Thursday, a congressional committee heard testimony from Rick Bright, a scientist who in April was removed from his position as head of the U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority—a federal agency responsible for vaccines. Bright told lawmakers that the United States still has no plan for how to distribute a potential vaccine effectively and equitably—even within its borders.
If there is a second wave of the virus, the United States may face “the darkest winter in modern history,” Bright said. “Our window of opportunity is closing.”
What about the timeline? Trump has said he believes a vaccine could come by the end of this year, conflicting with statements from Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—who says that fall availability is unlikely. A STAT tracker shows 14 high-profile vaccines in development around the world, with six in phase-one human trials.
What We’re Following Today
Israel’s unity government swearing-in postponed. Israel will wait until at least Sunday for the new unity government to be sworn in. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delayed a vote of confidence on the proposed coalition between his right-wing Likud party and former rival Benny Gantz’s centrist Blue and White party at the last minute. The vote was expected on Thursday evening local time, but some senior Likud members threatened to boycott the vote unless they were offered top government positions. To avoid a fourth election after a year of political uncertainty, the new government must be sworn in by next Thursday—days before Netanyahu’s criminal corruption trial begins.
U.S. House to approve voting by proxy. The U.S. House of Representatives is expected to vote today to change its rules to allow lawmakers to serve as proxies for others who are quarantined or unable to make it to the chamber to vote. The move, which is backed by House Democrats and Speaker Nancy Pelosi, would break with 200 years of precedent—allowing individual lawmakers to vote on behalf up to 10 other members. At least six U.S. representatives have tested positive or were presumed positive for COVID-19, and dozens of lawmakers have self-quarantined as a precaution.
COVID-19 confirmed in world’s largest refugee settlement. Bangladeshi officials said on Thursday that two people had tested positive for the coronavirus in the refugee camps that host more than 1 million Rohingya refugees. Both individuals have been placed in an isolation center. Bangladesh has reported nearly 19,000 COVID-19 across the country but had not yet confirmed any cases in the camps near Cox’s Bazar, where aid workers have warned that a significant outbreak would be a humanitarian disaster. The camps are more densely populated than most of the world’s major cities.
Keep an Eye On
U.S.-Cuba relations on ice. Reuters reports that the Trump administration is mulling returning Cuba to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in large part because of its continued support for the regime of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The move would be a major step in the administration’s ongoing rollback of the opening between the United States and Cuba initiated by President Barack Obama in 2015.
Japan’s state of emergency. The Japanese government has decided to lift its state of emergency for 80 percent of the country ahead of schedule, citing the low number of new cases in 39 prefectures. It remains in effect in Tokyo and Osaka. That Japan has such low figures is a surprise as its diagnostic testing has been limited and social distancing halfhearted. But its measures still appear to be working, as William Sposato argues in Foreign Policy.
Burundi’s ill-advised election. Burundi has ordered its World Health Organization country head and three other experts to leave the country by today, determined to go ahead with its presidential election next week in which opposition candidates are seeking to defeat President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose administration has been accused of human rights abuses. Campaign events have drawn large crowds given that there are no social distancing regulations in place. Burundi has recorded few cases of COVID-19, but testing remains low. The vote is set for May 20.
Odds and Ends
A zoo in Calgary, Canada, has decided to return its two giant pandas on loan from China three years early because they are running low on food. Flight disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic have limited its supply of fresh bamboo—first from China, then from California. Bamboo, which cannot be grown abundantly in Alberta, makes up 99 percent of a panda’s diet. The animals are among the zoo’s most popular attractions and were supposed to stay in Calgary until 2023.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--China’s Diplomats Are Going on the Offensive in Brazil

China ’ s Diplomats Are Going on the Offensive in Brazil In April , the major Brazilian newspaper O Globo published an op-ed by Li Yang , China ’ s consul general in Rio de Janeiro , in response to comments made by Member of Congress Eduardo Bolsonaro , President Jair Bolsonaro ’ s son , in which he referred to the novel coronavirus as the “ China virus.
” Readers likely expected a run-of-the-mill article underlining the importance of China-Brazil ties , perhaps with a light slap on the wrist .
But Li had something else in mind entirely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese diplomat wondered whether Bolsonaro had been “ brainwashed by the United States , ” a nation that , Li pointed out , had offered a “ horrible performance ” in the combat against the pandemic .
The author then threatened the member of Congress , writing that “ should any country insist on being China ’ s enemy , we will be its most sophisticated enemy !
” Until very recently , it would have been unthinkable for a Chinese government envoy to publish such a broadside against an elected official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomats are traditionally formal and have generated virtually no visibility—the exact opposite of Li ’ s bombshell , which circulated widely .
China has notably been supportive of Bolsonaro and pursued closer economic ties during his administration .
Last year , fearing that an important Brazilian oil auction in November would fail to attract bidders , Bolsonaro personally asked China for help .
Two Chinese companies came to the rescue .
During the height of the Amazon fires in August 2019 , Qu Yuhui , the Chinese Embassy ’ s second-highest-ranking diplomat in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quoted in a newspaper interview lauding Brazil ’ s environmental record , a stance fiercely criticized by Brazilian environmental nongovernmental organizations .
On Twitter , the Chinese Embassy in Brazil—which during the recent spats with the president ’ s son briefly overtook its U.S. counterpart in terms of the number of followers—now directly lashes out against anyone who dares to criticize China and , in an unmistakable swipe against President Bolsonaro , publicized a meeting in early April between Ambassador Yang Wanming and Brazil ’ s then-Minister of Health Luiz Henrique Mandetta , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president ’ s most formidable political foes .
( Mandetta was sacked 10 days later . )
The ambassador ’ s decision to meet the minister of health to discuss the pandemic at a moment when Mandetta was publicly clashing with Brazil ’ s president on how to combat the coronavirus was widely interpreted as Beijing taking a clear stance against Bolsonaro ’ s denialism .
To grasp how dramatic this shift in China ’ s diplomatic strategy is , it is worth remembering Beijing ’ s very different response to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then-presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro visited Taiwan and attacked China on the campaign trail in early 2018—promising , via Twitter , to break with , as he described it , previous governments ’ habit of being “ friendly with communists ” —the Chinese Embassy in Brasília opted for a measured response and issued a letter of protest typical for such occasions .
What , then , explains the radical shift toward a more abrasive diplomatic style ?
After Bolsonaro won the election runoff later that year and promised to closely align with U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern but seemed confident the new government would adopt a more pragmatic posture vis-à-vis China , Brazil ’ s most important trading partner by far .
And indeed , Brazil ’ s Vice President Hamilton Mourão , the government ’ s chief pragmatist , assiduously worked behind the scenes—building a powerful coalition including Brazil ’ s agricultural industry , business elites , and governors whose states depend on Chinese investments—to make up for Bolsonaro ’ s anti-China rhetoric and publicly underline the importance of strengthening bilateral ties .
When the Brazilian president visited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the 11th BRICS Summit in Brasília a few months later , the relationship seemed stronger than ever .
China ’ s decision not to make a public fuss about Bolsonaro ’ s previous attacks seemed to have paid off .
What , then , explains the radical shift toward a more abrasive diplomatic style ?
Above all , Beijing has realized that keeping China off the public radar in Brazil is no longer an option .
China has become a constant and divisive topic in public debate .
Today , the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s economic dependence on China has grown dramatically—even though many do not yet express strong opinions about the country .
Eduardo Bolsonaro has been attacked from many sides—governors , mayors , business associations , and policy analysts—for endangering the partnership precisely at a moment when Brazil is beginning to rely on Chinese ventilators and masks to address the pandemic .
Over the past few weeks alone , several governors ordered ventilators from China , and São Paulo Gov .
João Doria placed an order worth almost $ 100 million .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic elites are keenly aware that the country will strongly depend on China for its economic recovery after the pandemic subsides—memories are still fresh of how crucial Chinese investors , lenders , and buyers of commodities were to helping Latin America weather the storm of the 2008 economic crisis .
Yet predictably , China ’ s global rise has also turned it into a convenient scapegoat for populist politicians seeking to place the blame for all sorts of problems—including the pandemic , unemployment , or a supposed moral decay—on foreign enemies .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing in public , his supporters have never stopped stoking Sinophobia on social media since he became president .
That is beginning to have an impact : pro-Bolsonaro groups on WhatsApp are now teeming with xenophobic , anti-China , and anti-communist rhetoric , and the most fervent Bolsonaro supporters commonly describe the coronavirus as a Chinese plot against Bolsonaro , capitalism , and the West .
The president is likely to increasingly depend on this radical base in light of recent corruption allegations against him .
Brazil ’ s government is deeply divided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and military officials and free-market advocates who are aware of its importance for Brazil ’ s economy .
Both Vice President Mourão and Minister of Agriculture Tereza Cristina , seen as a guarantor of solid Brazil-China ties , are regularly vilified by Bolsonaro supporters as closet communists .
Despite their best efforts , both have failed to control anti-China rhetoric by high-level officials close to Brazil ’ s president .
It seems that anti-China sentiment in Bolsonaro ’ s inner circle has reached a point of no return .
As a result , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s inner circle has reached a point of no return .
As a consequence , Beijing decided it was time to go on the offensive—and that it may actually extract some concessions by doing so .
By taking a more aggressive approach , Beijing has been able to play these factions within the Bolsonaro administration against each other .
After Eduardo Bolsonaro ’ s decision to blame China for the pandemic , numerous Brazilian authorities—governors , mayors , and business leaders—contacted the Chinese ambassador to apologize .
While the Brazilian government ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal with China , Beijing has now successfully quashed any U.S. attempts to convince Brazil to exclude Huawei from the bidding process to build its 5G telecommunication network .
China ’ s more active approach may generate other short-term gains for Beijing , and the Chinese government ’ s capacity to readily provide medical equipment in the midst of the crisis is likely to improve its image in a country where the president so far refuses to recognize the threat the coronavirus poses to public health .
Even so , its newly combative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a day after the publication of the consul general ’ s controversial op-ed , Brazil ’ s Minister of Education Abraham Weintraub taunted Beijing by imitating a Chinese accent on Twitter , accusing China of unduly profiting from the pandemic .
It revealed a dynamic that should worry China : By attacking Beijing , Weintraub—whose position had seemed at risk due to his poor job performance—consolidated his position in the Bolsonaro government .
After all , the president ’ s radical base now regards attacking China as proof of loyalty to Bolsonaro and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elites worry over whether each attack may affect bilateral ties .
The Supreme Court ’ s decision to initiate an investigation about whether Weintraub ’ s tweet constitutes racism only consolidates their support—pro-regime protests routinely call on the president to shut down both the Supreme Court and Congress .
Even in the case of Bolsonaro ’ s premature political demise—he is facing unprecedented criticism over his coronavirus denialism , talk of impeachment is growing , and Brazil ’ s Supreme Court has authorized an investigation into allegations of interference with the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy in Brazil is unlikely to go away .
If the president is impeached , other right-wing leaders will eagerly embrace Sinophobia to attract Bolsonaro ’ s base .
If anything , growing pressure on Bolsonaro could cause a rise in scapegoating .
It seems likely that Trump will only ramp up anti-China rhetoric ahead of the November U.S. election—possibly even asking China for reparations for economic damage caused by the virus .
Brazil ’ s government may feel tempted to employ similar strategies to divert public attention from the looming economic crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ options .
It is reluctant to leave accusations by Brazilian government officials unanswered , to ensure that policymakers know that attacking China risks straining the bilateral relationship .
Yet by reacting to every single provocation , it risks falling into a trap , as any populist politician in Brazil in need of gaining visibility—and unconcerned about the negative consequences—will consider badmouthing China .
At the same time , policymakers and analysts calling for greater cooperation with China may increasingly worry about inciting hatred from far-right nationalists and being labeled “ communists ” acting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rhetoric is unlikely to change the overall trend of China ’ s ever-growing economic and political influence in Brazil , however .
Even Bolsonaro , the most pro-U.S. president in Brazil ’ s modern history , has been unable to reduce the country ’ s remarkable dependence on China—quite to the contrary .
Over the past two years , Latin America ’ s largest country has become more dependent on China than ever .
China is the destination for nearly 30 percent of Brazil ’ s exports , while less than 15 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
Going forward , the nature of the Brazil-China relationship will be far more volatile and vulnerable to internal political dynamics in Brazil , which may come to pose risks for large-scale projects that would have previously caused little public attention .
For example , after the recent acrimonious collapse of the Boeing-Embraer tie-up—which involved accusations from the Brazilian jetmaker that Boeing had been looking for excuses to back out given the macroeconomic impact of the pandemic—Embraer is now likely to consider alternatives in China , which may cause resistance among Bolsonaro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely also be at the center of a growing number of conspiracy theories , fueled by the opacity of Chinese politics , a profound lack of knowledge in Brazilian society about China , and the very limited number of China specialists able to provide a more nuanced picture of Asia ’ s largest economy to the public or the government .
What was once a tranquil and easy-to-manage bilateral relationship has now become the biggest test for Chinese diplomacy in Latin America .

In April, the major Brazilian newspaper O Globo published an op-ed by Li Yang, China’s consul general in Rio de Janeiro, in response to comments made by Member of Congress Eduardo Bolsonaro, President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, in which he referred to the novel coronavirus as the “China virus.” Readers likely expected a run-of-the-mill article underlining the importance of China-Brazil ties, perhaps with a light slap on the wrist.
In April, the major Brazilian newspaper O Globo published an op-ed by Li Yang, China’s consul general in Rio de Janeiro, in response to comments made by Member of Congress Eduardo Bolsonaro, President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, in which he referred to the novel coronavirus as the “China virus.” Readers likely expected a run-of-the-mill article underlining the importance of China-Brazil ties, perhaps with a light slap on the wrist.
But Li had something else in mind entirely. Attacking the Brazilian lawmaker harshly, the Chinese diplomat wondered whether Bolsonaro had been “brainwashed by the United States,” a nation that, Li pointed out, had offered a “horrible performance” in the combat against the pandemic. The author then threatened the member of Congress, writing that “should any country insist on being China’s enemy, we will be its most sophisticated enemy!”
Until very recently, it would have been unthinkable for a Chinese government envoy to publish such a broadside against an elected official in Brazil. Newspaper interviews with Chinese diplomats are traditionally formal and have generated virtually no visibility—the exact opposite of Li’s bombshell, which circulated widely.
China has notably been supportive of Bolsonaro and pursued closer economic ties during his administration. Last year, fearing that an important Brazilian oil auction in November would fail to attract bidders, Bolsonaro personally asked China for help. Two Chinese companies came to the rescue. During the height of the Amazon fires in August 2019, Qu Yuhui, the Chinese Embassy’s second-highest-ranking diplomat in Brasília, raised eyebrows when he was quoted in a newspaper interview lauding Brazil’s environmental record, a stance fiercely criticized by Brazilian environmental nongovernmental organizations.
On Twitter, the Chinese Embassy in Brazil—which during the recent spats with the president’s son briefly overtook its U.S. counterpart in terms of the number of followers—now directly lashes out against anyone who dares to criticize China and, in an unmistakable swipe against President Bolsonaro, publicized a meeting in early April between Ambassador Yang Wanming and Brazil’s then-Minister of Health Luiz Henrique Mandetta, who was at the time one of the president’s most formidable political foes. (Mandetta was sacked 10 days later.) The ambassador’s decision to meet the minister of health to discuss the pandemic at a moment when Mandetta was publicly clashing with Brazil’s president on how to combat the coronavirus was widely interpreted as Beijing taking a clear stance against Bolsonaro’s denialism.
To grasp how dramatic this shift in China’s diplomatic strategy is, it is worth remembering Beijing’s very different response to a previous crisis two years ago. When then-presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro visited Taiwan and attacked China on the campaign trail in early 2018—promising, via Twitter, to break with, as he described it, previous governments’ habit of being “friendly with communists”—the Chinese Embassy in Brasília opted for a measured response and issued a letter of protest typical for such occasions.
What, then, explains the radical shift toward a more abrasive diplomatic style?
After Bolsonaro won the election runoff later that year and promised to closely align with U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese diplomats privately voiced concern but seemed confident the new government would adopt a more pragmatic posture vis-à-vis China, Brazil’s most important trading partner by far. And indeed, Brazil’s Vice President Hamilton Mourão, the government’s chief pragmatist, assiduously worked behind the scenes—building a powerful coalition including Brazil’s agricultural industry, business elites, and governors whose states depend on Chinese investments—to make up for Bolsonaro’s anti-China rhetoric and publicly underline the importance of strengthening bilateral ties.
When the Brazilian president visited Beijing and hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for the 11th BRICS Summit in Brasília a few months later, the relationship seemed stronger than ever. China’s decision not to make a public fuss about Bolsonaro’s previous attacks seemed to have paid off.
What, then, explains the radical shift toward a more abrasive diplomatic style? Above all, Beijing has realized that keeping China off the public radar in Brazil is no longer an option. China has become a constant and divisive topic in public debate. Today, the number of Brazilians who are aware of their country’s economic dependence on China has grown dramatically—even though many do not yet express strong opinions about the country.
Eduardo Bolsonaro has been attacked from many sides—governors, mayors, business associations, and policy analysts—for endangering the partnership precisely at a moment when Brazil is beginning to rely on Chinese ventilators and masks to address the pandemic. Over the past few weeks alone, several governors ordered ventilators from China, and São Paulo Gov. João Doria placed an order worth almost $100 million. In the same way, Brazil’s economic elites are keenly aware that the country will strongly depend on China for its economic recovery after the pandemic subsides—memories are still fresh of how crucial Chinese investors, lenders, and buyers of commodities were to helping Latin America weather the storm of the 2008 economic crisis.
Yet predictably, China’s global rise has also turned it into a convenient scapegoat for populist politicians seeking to place the blame for all sorts of problems—including the pandemic, unemployment, or a supposed moral decay—on foreign enemies. While Bolsonaro embraced a more prudent stance toward Beijing in public, his supporters have never stopped stoking Sinophobia on social media since he became president. That is beginning to have an impact: pro-Bolsonaro groups on WhatsApp are now teeming with xenophobic, anti-China, and anti-communist rhetoric, and the most fervent Bolsonaro supporters commonly describe the coronavirus as a Chinese plot against Bolsonaro, capitalism, and the West. The president is likely to increasingly depend on this radical base in light of recent corruption allegations against him.
Brazil’s government is deeply divided between nationalist pro-Trump ideologues who despise China and military officials and free-market advocates who are aware of its importance for Brazil’s economy. Both Vice President Mourão and Minister of Agriculture Tereza Cristina, seen as a guarantor of solid Brazil-China ties, are regularly vilified by Bolsonaro supporters as closet communists. Despite their best efforts, both have failed to control anti-China rhetoric by high-level officials close to Brazil’s president.
It seems that anti-China sentiment in Bolsonaro’s inner circle has reached a point of no return.
As a result, it seems that anti-China sentiment in Bolsonaro’s inner circle has reached a point of no return. As a consequence, Beijing decided it was time to go on the offensive—and that it may actually extract some concessions by doing so. By taking a more aggressive approach, Beijing has been able to play these factions within the Bolsonaro administration against each other.
After Eduardo Bolsonaro’s decision to blame China for the pandemic, numerous Brazilian authorities—governors, mayors, and business leaders—contacted the Chinese ambassador to apologize. While the Brazilian government’s factions are battling about how to deal with China, Beijing has now successfully quashed any U.S. attempts to convince Brazil to exclude Huawei from the bidding process to build its 5G telecommunication network.
China’s more active approach may generate other short-term gains for Beijing, and the Chinese government’s capacity to readily provide medical equipment in the midst of the crisis is likely to improve its image in a country where the president so far refuses to recognize the threat the coronavirus poses to public health.
Even so, its newly combative approach may already be backfiring. Merely a day after the publication of the consul general’s controversial op-ed, Brazil’s Minister of Education Abraham Weintraub taunted Beijing by imitating a Chinese accent on Twitter, accusing China of unduly profiting from the pandemic. It revealed a dynamic that should worry China: By attacking Beijing, Weintraub—whose position had seemed at risk due to his poor job performance—consolidated his position in the Bolsonaro government.
After all, the president’s radical base now regards attacking China as proof of loyalty to Bolsonaro and often celebrates how traditional media and business elites worry over whether each attack may affect bilateral ties. The Supreme Court’s decision to initiate an investigation about whether Weintraub’s tweet constitutes racism only consolidates their support—pro-regime protests routinely call on the president to shut down both the Supreme Court and Congress.
Even in the case of Bolsonaro’s premature political demise—he is facing unprecedented criticism over his coronavirus denialism, talk of impeachment is growing, and Brazil’s Supreme Court has authorized an investigation into allegations of interference with the country’s federal police force—Sinophobia as a political strategy in Brazil is unlikely to go away. If the president is impeached, other right-wing leaders will eagerly embrace Sinophobia to attract Bolsonaro’s base. If anything, growing pressure on Bolsonaro could cause a rise in scapegoating. It seems likely that Trump will only ramp up anti-China rhetoric ahead of the November U.S. election—possibly even asking China for reparations for economic damage caused by the virus. Brazil’s government may feel tempted to employ similar strategies to divert public attention from the looming economic crisis.
This leaves Beijing with few good options. It is reluctant to leave accusations by Brazilian government officials unanswered, to ensure that policymakers know that attacking China risks straining the bilateral relationship. Yet by reacting to every single provocation, it risks falling into a trap, as any populist politician in Brazil in need of gaining visibility—and unconcerned about the negative consequences—will consider badmouthing China. At the same time, policymakers and analysts calling for greater cooperation with China may increasingly worry about inciting hatred from far-right nationalists and being labeled “communists” acting on Beijing’s behalf.
Sinophobic rhetoric is unlikely to change the overall trend of China’s ever-growing economic and political influence in Brazil, however. Even Bolsonaro, the most pro-U.S. president in Brazil’s modern history, has been unable to reduce the country’s remarkable dependence on China—quite to the contrary. Over the past two years, Latin America’s largest country has become more dependent on China than ever. China is the destination for nearly 30 percent of Brazil’s exports, while less than 15 percent of Brazilian exports go to the United States.
Going forward, the nature of the Brazil-China relationship will be far more volatile and vulnerable to internal political dynamics in Brazil, which may come to pose risks for large-scale projects that would have previously caused little public attention. For example, after the recent acrimonious collapse of the Boeing-Embraer tie-up—which involved accusations from the Brazilian jetmaker that Boeing had been looking for excuses to back out given the macroeconomic impact of the pandemic—Embraer is now likely to consider alternatives in China, which may cause resistance among Bolsonaro’s radical supporters.
China will likely also be at the center of a growing number of conspiracy theories, fueled by the opacity of Chinese politics, a profound lack of knowledge in Brazilian society about China, and the very limited number of China specialists able to provide a more nuanced picture of Asia’s largest economy to the public or the government. What was once a tranquil and easy-to-manage bilateral relationship has now become the biggest test for Chinese diplomacy in Latin America.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--The Sane Way to Challenge Xi Jinping’s China

The Sane Way to Challenge Xi Jinping ’ s China The White House believes that the best reelection strategy for U.S. President Donald Trump is to demonize China .
Proposals are multiplying to declare economic war , to which Beijing would inevitably retaliate .
Such an approach would drive other nations away from the United States and toward an increasingly repressive China .
Although the ongoing pandemic understandably dominates attention today , the U.S.-China relationship is not a short-term problem .
Relations between the world ’ s two most important countries are likely to be difficult for decades , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge , not just the current moment .
China is not the same as the Soviet Union .
The relationship between Beijing and Washington—and the rest of the world—is vastly more substantive and complex , and it has been more beneficial than relationships between the Soviet and American blocs ever were .
Fighting a new Cold War would be much more difficult , badly dividing the so-called free world and posing serious danger of armed conflict .
Washington needs to develop a policy that targets specific threats while preserving cooperation when possible .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ pushing to militarize U.S. policy toward Beijing and isolate it from the United States and the West blame engagement for failing to transform China .
They are correct that the international opening resulting from Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping ’ s economic reforms did not deliver democracy .
But engagement did help destroy Maoism , creating a much more open China with greater personal autonomy , freedom of thought , and civil society institutions .
( Hundreds of millions of people also escaped devastating poverty , a notable good . )
Moreover , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CCP ) a stake in a generally peaceful , stable , and prosperous global order ; military aggression would come at serious cost .
Unfortunately , Chinese President Xi Jinping is turning back this progress .
Yet the social media eruption over his government ’ s brutal repression involving COVID-19 demonstrated that many Chinese are unhappy and willing to express themselves .
Preserving international links with the Chinese people is vitally important .
Hosting Chinese students is particularly important , as is providing alternate channels of news and information in Chinese languages , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to aiding those who want to breach the Great Firewall .
Contrary to pessimistic assessments of China , current policies may be no more permanent than those that came before .
To be sure , Xi ’ s abandonment of effective term limits suggests a desire to rule for life , but the best-laid plans often go awry .
There have been notable liberals , such as Zhao Ziyang , in leadership positions , and there may still be many more elsewhere in Chinese society .
Xi has made many enemies inside and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither live nor rule forever .
There could be great , and positive , changes in the future .
Adopting policies that inflame nationalist sentiments and unify people against the United States and the West would be counterproductive .
Washington should aim for the opposite effect , adopting firm but targeted measures Finally , China is for now only a 400-pound gorilla , not a 800-pound one .
It can throw its weight around , but not without consequences .
The country remains poor , with a vast gulf between the coastal cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effects of the one-child policy linger : The People ’ s Republic of China may well grow old before it grows rich .
The country ’ s economic challenges were serious even before the new coronavirus arrived , and a prolonged failure to deliver economic growth would seriously undermine the CCP ’ s credibility , even as the regime threatens to spur nationalism .
Increasingly oppressive policies , ranging from political controls on business to restrictions on speech and thought , are likely to hinder innovation and entrepreneurship in the future .
Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , enough so to take to social media or other means and criticize their leaders even at considerable risk to themselves .
The international reputation of the Xi regime has suffered even more , especially after Beijing attempted to block criticism by and manipulate aid to other nations .
Unfortunately , the Trump administration appears determined to toss away its advantage .
First , it is attempting to turn China into an election issue , blaming former Vice President Joe Biden , Trump ’ s reelection rival , for being soft on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claimed Xi , who increasingly looks like a rough reincarnation of Mao Zedong , as a friend .
Moreover , the partisan nature of the attacks undermine the credibility of the president and his officials .
Even friendly foreign governments do not trust Washington .
Trying to force other nations to choose between the United States and China is especially counterproductive .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s claims regarding the origins of the coronavirus are backed by neither American nor foreign intelligence agencies .
That put the administration on par @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus and intentionally spread it around the world .
The fact that the Xi government is capable of malign conduct does not justify spreading falsehoods .
This has further undermined Washington ’ s credibility .
The administration ’ s painfully botched response to the crisis makes China look competent in comparison .
Beijing mishandled its response , failing to give timely reports on its burgeoning health crisis , provide accurate information about the virus ’ s characteristics , and expeditiously halt travel from the initial epicenter in Wuhan .
Had Beijing acted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic might have been avoided .
However , the United States had plenty of time to prepare as it watched the viral explosion in China and did nothing other than shut off travel from the country—a useful but limited step .
The federal government prepared tests that didn ’ t work while preventing private laboratories and firms from providing ones that did , putting the United States weeks behind .
The president continued to downplay the threat even as cases multiplied , and he gave contradictory instructions and advice as the problem grew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no better with age .
Washington did its best to alienate even close allies .
Few governments distinguished themselves as they closed borders , barred export of medical equipment , and elbowed aside nominal friends in search of supplies .
The Trump administration did the same after spending three years insulting , chastising , and penalizing other states , with few positive results to show for its efforts .
Then it demanded that governments preoccupied with the pandemic support its political attacks on Beijing .
Finally , even when addressing serious issues , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy , including tact , nuance , judgment , and timing .
Using the G-7 summit to mount rhetorical assaults on Beijing when other members were desperately attempting to surmount the ongoing pandemic was maladroit at best .
Seeking to co-opt the widespread desire for an accounting of the pandemic discouraged allied cooperation .
Suspending funding for the World Health Organization ( WHO ) while COVID-19 ravaged countries around the globe won no one ’ s support .
Washington desperately needs a policy reset .
The objective should be to capitalize on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strengths .
The United States should work with allied states and other nations that have been angered or disappointed by Beijing ’ s behavior to propose an international inquiry into the virus ’ s origin and the international response .
The initiative should be a multilateral effort conducted through an international body , perhaps a specially created commission to avoid well-founded suspicions of WHO ’ s biases .
The effort should not be presented as targeting the PRC , which would ensure Beijing ’ s nonparticipation and noncooperation .
Even European states have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Union ’ s lack of aid and correspondingly appreciative of China ’ s assistance .
Rather , the investigation should be directed at helping the world learn lessons from what happened to prevent a recurrence .
That requires a full , open , and honest review , with criticism of any country when appropriate .
The inquiry would go ahead with or without Beijing ’ s assistance .
The administration also should work with likeminded governments to propose new international guidelines and requirements for dealing with the spread of infectious diseases .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but would highlight actions that exacerbated the crisis .
Both WHO and the United Nations Security Council would be appropriate venues for action—or perhaps a special international commission on COVID-19 .
If China and Russia attempted to block such efforts , they should be isolated , with willing governments moving ahead nonetheless as much as possible .
No doubt , China would be inclined to resist ; however , the Xi regime might hesitate before reinforcing its loss of reputation .
Reuters reported on a recent report from a think tank associated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern about the damage done to the Chinese brand .
Looking to the future , Washington should suggest regular consultations with Asian and European governments to develop united responses to Chinese misbehavior .
It would help if the administration learned how to better play with others—or if a more competent administration replaced it .
Still , other nations may be willing to cooperate , having experienced significant losses from China ’ s authoritarian system—particularly the suppression of information and punishment of those seeking to inform colleagues and report on the disease ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behavior can no longer be dismissed as a purely internal concern .
COVID-19 has made the diversification of supply chains an imperative ; a serious allied commitment to cooperate could help link together like-minded , democratic Asian and European states as stable investment locations .
Other trade and economic issues , such as the role of Huawei and Chinese investment , also bedevil the European states as well as America .
Working with rather than against the European Union on trade would have gotten Washington a better trade deal with China , emphasizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transitory objectives such as increased purchases of American goods .
There is no uniform or easy solution for tough geopolitical challenges posed by Beijing .
Democracy in Hong Kong is inconceivable right now , but continued autonomy is a realistic objective .
Chinese pressure on Taiwan is inevitable ; invasion is not .
The independence of the Philippines and Japan is more important than Manila ’ s claim to Scarborough Shoal and Japan ’ s control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands .
Different aspects of different issues warrant very different strategies .
However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
Multilateral action , backed by a collective willingness to rupture relations with Beijing and isolate it economically in the worst cases , would better shape its behavior .
Absent a Chinese collapse , U.S. economic threats alone will not force the Xi government to concede fundamental political objectives .
For instance , Congress indiscriminately imposes economic sanctions even on nominal allies , such as Germany .
Various forms of so-called maximum pressure have failed to change the behavior of a gaggle of administration targets , including Russia , North Korea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even less likely to surrender .
Military action is a much worse option .
Endless saber-rattling and idle threats have come to characterize U.S. diplomacy and aren ’ t likely to impress Beijing .
More important , war can not be justified absent compelling circumstances not present today .
Notably , the United States—its territory , population , and system of constitutional liberties—is not threatened with attack .
At issue is Washington ’ s continued treatment of East Asia as America ’ s sphere of interest .
Threat-mongering is more likely to spur @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be vulnerable to U.S. coercion .
American policymakers must be willing to accommodate China ’ s increasing influence while attempting to temper its impact and moderate the underlying nature of the CCP regime .
Nations facing China should take the lead in relations .
This means carefully assessing the impact of economic dependence on Beijing , risk of relying on Chinese technologies and firms for critical infrastructure , and need to develop competent even if still modest militaries .
Just as the Chinese military is working on anti-access/area denial capabilities to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s neighbors should similarly raise the price of aggression by Beijing .
Washington ’ s role should be limited , backstopping the independence of important friendly states , not guaranteeing their many interests .
Such an approach undoubtedly would trigger screams of “ appeasement ” by Republican hawks , defined as refusing to bomb , invade , and occupy an antagonist at will .
However , in the future it will be easier for China to deter than for the United States to coerce .
Given Washington ’ s extraordinary economic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 4 trillion in 2020 and $ 2 trillion in 2021—it is unrealistic to expect the United States to forever maintain a military capable of defeating every nation on earth on its home territory .
U.S.-China policy requires a serious , sustained strategy , not something cobbled together in a presidential campaign to save a failing administration .
That strategy seems attractive , because public hostility is increasing—nearly a quarter of Americans see China as America ’ s main enemy , just behind Russia .
Even if this approach has the desired political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the United States and other nations is likely to be high .
Treating China like an enemy risks turning the Chinese people into one for years to come .
Neither Americans nor Chinese can afford a new war , either cold or hot .
U.S. policymakers must do better .

The White House believes that the best reelection strategy for U.S. President Donald Trump is to demonize China. Proposals are multiplying to declare economic war, to which Beijing would inevitably retaliate. Such an approach would drive other nations away from the United States and toward an increasingly repressive China.
The White House believes that the best reelection strategy for U.S. President Donald Trump is to demonize China. Proposals are multiplying to declare economic war, to which Beijing would inevitably retaliate. Such an approach would drive other nations away from the United States and toward an increasingly repressive China.
Although the ongoing pandemic understandably dominates attention today, the U.S.-China relationship is not a short-term problem. Relations between the world’s two most important countries are likely to be difficult for decades, and policymakers need to be thinking about this challenge, not just the current moment.
China is not the same as the Soviet Union. The relationship between Beijing and Washington—and the rest of the world—is vastly more substantive and complex, and it has been more beneficial than relationships between the Soviet and American blocs ever were. Fighting a new Cold War would be much more difficult, badly dividing the so-called free world and posing serious danger of armed conflict. Washington needs to develop a policy that targets specific threats while preserving cooperation when possible.
The latter point is critical. Those pushing to militarize U.S. policy toward Beijing and isolate it from the United States and the West blame engagement for failing to transform China. They are correct that the international opening resulting from Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms did not deliver democracy. But engagement did help destroy Maoism, creating a much more open China with greater personal autonomy, freedom of thought, and civil society institutions. (Hundreds of millions of people also escaped devastating poverty, a notable good.) Moreover, this process gave the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a stake in a generally peaceful, stable, and prosperous global order; military aggression would come at serious cost.
Unfortunately, Chinese President Xi Jinping is turning back this progress. Yet the social media eruption over his government’s brutal repression involving COVID-19 demonstrated that many Chinese are unhappy and willing to express themselves. Preserving international links with the Chinese people is vitally important. Hosting Chinese students is particularly important, as is providing alternate channels of news and information in Chinese languages, from preserving the independence of diaspora newspapers to aiding those who want to breach the Great Firewall.
Contrary to pessimistic assessments of China, current policies may be no more permanent than those that came before. To be sure, Xi’s abandonment of effective term limits suggests a desire to rule for life, but the best-laid plans often go awry. There have been notable liberals, such as Zhao Ziyang, in leadership positions, and there may still be many more elsewhere in Chinese society. Xi has made many enemies inside and outside the CCP. The 66-year-old will neither live nor rule forever. There could be great, and positive, changes in the future. Adopting policies that inflame nationalist sentiments and unify people against the United States and the West would be counterproductive. Washington should aim for the opposite effect, adopting firm but targeted measures
Finally, China is for now only a 400-pound gorilla, not a 800-pound one. It can throw its weight around, but not without consequences. The country remains poor, with a vast gulf between the coastal cities and an impoverished inland. The demographic effects of the one-child policy linger: The People’s Republic of China may well grow old before it grows rich. The country’s economic challenges were serious even before the new coronavirus arrived, and a prolonged failure to deliver economic growth would seriously undermine the CCP’s credibility, even as the regime threatens to spur nationalism. Increasingly oppressive policies, ranging from political controls on business to restrictions on speech and thought, are likely to hinder innovation and entrepreneurship in the future.
Many Chinese are angry with the Xi government, enough so to take to social media or other means and criticize their leaders even at considerable risk to themselves. The international reputation of the Xi regime has suffered even more, especially after Beijing attempted to block criticism by and manipulate aid to other nations.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration appears determined to toss away its advantage. First, it is attempting to turn China into an election issue, blaming former Vice President Joe Biden, Trump’s reelection rival, for being soft on China. Yet unlike Trump, Biden never claimed Xi, who increasingly looks like a rough reincarnation of Mao Zedong, as a friend. Moreover, the partisan nature of the attacks undermine the credibility of the president and his officials. Even friendly foreign governments do not trust Washington. Trying to force other nations to choose between the United States and China is especially counterproductive.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s claims regarding the origins of the coronavirus are backed by neither American nor foreign intelligence agencies. That put the administration on par with conspiracy-mongers who claim that Beijing created the virus and intentionally spread it around the world. The fact that the Xi government is capable of malign conduct does not justify spreading falsehoods. This has further undermined Washington’s credibility.
The administration’s painfully botched response to the crisis makes China look competent in comparison. Beijing mishandled its response, failing to give timely reports on its burgeoning health crisis, provide accurate information about the virus’s characteristics, and expeditiously halt travel from the initial epicenter in Wuhan. Had Beijing acted more quickly and transparently, the global pandemic might have been avoided.
However, the United States had plenty of time to prepare as it watched the viral explosion in China and did nothing other than shut off travel from the country—a useful but limited step. The federal government prepared tests that didn’t work while preventing private laboratories and firms from providing ones that did, putting the United States weeks behind. The president continued to downplay the threat even as cases multiplied, and he gave contradictory instructions and advice as the problem grew more serious. His performance has gotten no better with age.
Washington did its best to alienate even close allies. Few governments distinguished themselves as they closed borders, barred export of medical equipment, and elbowed aside nominal friends in search of supplies. The Trump administration did the same after spending three years insulting, chastising, and penalizing other states, with few positive results to show for its efforts. Then it demanded that governments preoccupied with the pandemic support its political attacks on Beijing.
Finally, even when addressing serious issues, America’s chief diplomat demonstrates little diplomacy, including tact, nuance, judgment, and timing. Using the G-7 summit to mount rhetorical assaults on Beijing when other members were desperately attempting to surmount the ongoing pandemic was maladroit at best. Seeking to co-opt the widespread desire for an accounting of the pandemic discouraged allied cooperation. Suspending funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) while COVID-19 ravaged countries around the globe won no one’s support.
Washington desperately needs a policy reset. The objective should be to capitalize on China’s weaknesses and America’s strengths. The United States should work with allied states and other nations that have been angered or disappointed by Beijing’s behavior to propose an international inquiry into the virus’s origin and the international response. The initiative should be a multilateral effort conducted through an international body, perhaps a specially created commission to avoid well-founded suspicions of WHO’s biases.
The effort should not be presented as targeting the PRC, which would ensure Beijing’s nonparticipation and noncooperation. Even European states have divided, some angry over the European Union’s lack of aid and correspondingly appreciative of China’s assistance. Rather, the investigation should be directed at helping the world learn lessons from what happened to prevent a recurrence. That requires a full, open, and honest review, with criticism of any country when appropriate. The inquiry would go ahead with or without Beijing’s assistance.
The administration also should work with likeminded governments to propose new international guidelines and requirements for dealing with the spread of infectious diseases. This effort would be prospective, not punitive, but would highlight actions that exacerbated the crisis. Both WHO and the United Nations Security Council would be appropriate venues for action—or perhaps a special international commission on COVID-19.
If China and Russia attempted to block such efforts, they should be isolated, with willing governments moving ahead nonetheless as much as possible. No doubt, China would be inclined to resist; however, the Xi regime might hesitate before reinforcing its loss of reputation. Reuters reported on a recent report from a think tank associated with the Ministry of State Security expressing concern about the damage done to the Chinese brand.
Looking to the future, Washington should suggest regular consultations with Asian and European governments to develop united responses to Chinese misbehavior. It would help if the administration learned how to better play with others—or if a more competent administration replaced it. Still, other nations may be willing to cooperate, having experienced significant losses from China’s authoritarian system—particularly the suppression of information and punishment of those seeking to inform colleagues and report on the disease’s spread. The Chinese government’s behavior can no longer be dismissed as a purely internal concern.
COVID-19 has made the diversification of supply chains an imperative; a serious allied commitment to cooperate could help link together like-minded, democratic Asian and European states as stable investment locations. Other trade and economic issues, such as the role of Huawei and Chinese investment, also bedevil the European states as well as America. Working with rather than against the European Union on trade would have gotten Washington a better trade deal with China, emphasizing structural issues, rather than superficial and transitory objectives such as increased purchases of American goods.
There is no uniform or easy solution for tough geopolitical challenges posed by Beijing. Democracy in Hong Kong is inconceivable right now, but continued autonomy is a realistic objective. Chinese pressure on Taiwan is inevitable; invasion is not. The independence of the Philippines and Japan is more important than Manila’s claim to Scarborough Shoal and Japan’s control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Different aspects of different issues warrant very different strategies.
However, Washington alone has limited ability to coerce China. Multilateral action, backed by a collective willingness to rupture relations with Beijing and isolate it economically in the worst cases, would better shape its behavior.
Absent a Chinese collapse, U.S. economic threats alone will not force the Xi government to concede fundamental political objectives. For instance, Congress indiscriminately imposes economic sanctions even on nominal allies, such as Germany. Various forms of so-called maximum pressure have failed to change the behavior of a gaggle of administration targets, including Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela. China is even less likely to surrender.
Military action is a much worse option. Endless saber-rattling and idle threats have come to characterize U.S. diplomacy and aren’t likely to impress Beijing. More important, war cannot be justified absent compelling circumstances not present today.
Notably, the United States—its territory, population, and system of constitutional liberties—is not threatened with attack. At issue is Washington’s continued treatment of East Asia as America’s sphere of interest. Threat-mongering is more likely to spur Chinese armament, since no country wants to be vulnerable to U.S. coercion. American policymakers must be willing to accommodate China’s increasing influence while attempting to temper its impact and moderate the underlying nature of the CCP regime.
Nations facing China should take the lead in relations. This means carefully assessing the impact of economic dependence on Beijing, risk of relying on Chinese technologies and firms for critical infrastructure, and need to develop competent even if still modest militaries. Just as the Chinese military is working on anti-access/area denial capabilities to prevent U.S. intervention in the region, China’s neighbors should similarly raise the price of aggression by Beijing. Washington’s role should be limited, backstopping the independence of important friendly states, not guaranteeing their many interests.
Such an approach undoubtedly would trigger screams of “appeasement” by Republican hawks, defined as refusing to bomb, invade, and occupy an antagonist at will. However, in the future it will be easier for China to deter than for the United States to coerce. Given Washington’s extraordinary economic and financial challenges—the annual federal deficit could exceed $4 trillion in 2020 and $2 trillion in 2021—it is unrealistic to expect the United States to forever maintain a military capable of defeating every nation on earth on its home territory.
U.S.-China policy requires a serious, sustained strategy, not something cobbled together in a presidential campaign to save a failing administration. That strategy seems attractive, because public hostility is increasing—nearly a quarter of Americans see China as America’s main enemy, just behind Russia. Even if this approach has the desired political effect, however, the price paid by the United States and other nations is likely to be high. Treating China like an enemy risks turning the Chinese people into one for years to come. Neither Americans nor Chinese can afford a new war, either cold or hot. U.S. policymakers must do better.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--China Launches Counterattack Against U.S. Effort to Restore Taiwan’s Status at WHO

China Launches Counterattack Against U.S. Effort to Restore Taiwan ’ s Status at WHO In recent weeks , in the latest iteration of U.S.-China tensions , Washington has led a diplomatic campaign aimed at restoring Taiwan ’ s status as an observer at the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
Now China has launched its own diplomatic counterattack , asking governments to co-sign a letter urging the WHO director-general , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , not to raise the matter in next week ’ s meeting .
“ The participation of Taiwan , China in WHA [ the World Health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the one-China principle , ” according to the confidential letter , which we are posting as Foreign Policy ’ s Document of the Week .
“ However we are very concerned to learn that certain member states may intend to raise the so-called Taiwan ’ s participation issue during its opening , which runs counter to the general agreement among member states that no controversial issues shall be considered during the virtual Assembly.
” “ In [ the ] face of unprecedented challenges , we should focus on saving lives and not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to the letter .
Last week , Washington , backed by Tokyo , notched an initial success , persuading half a dozen key Western allies , including Australia , Britain , Canada , France , Germany , and New Zealand , to issue a joint request to Tedros to invite Taiwan to attend a May 18-19 virtual meeting of the WHA , WHO ’ s decision-making body .
But there were signs that European governments , keen to avoid an ugly fight at the U.N. health agency in the midst of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ postponing any consideration of Taiwan ’ s status until the Fall , according to a well-placed diplomatic source .
Beijing—which considers Taiwan a renegade province of China—responded angrily to the initiative .
Asked about New Zealand ’ s decision to support the initiative , Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said this week that “ China deplores ” the decision and “ has lodged representations with the New Zealand side.
” “ On the Taiwan region ’ s participation in WHO activities , China ’ s position is clear and consistent .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he added .
“ The Taiwan authorities chose to play up its so-called participation in WHO events and return to the WHA at this moment .
The timing reveals its true motive , which is to use the current outbreak to seek ‘ Taiwan independence.
’ It is out-and-out political manipulation.
” The Chinese remarks come weeks after Beijing threatened to boycott Australian imports after Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison proposed opening an independent investigation to examine China ’ s initial response to the virus .
Taiwan first attended the WHA as an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its participation in 2016 following the election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen , who pledged to preserve the island ’ s sovereignty despite Chinese efforts to exercise ever greater control .
Tsai was reelected in January in what was seen as a rebuke to China ’ s increasingly heavy-handed policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan .
The U.S. move to support Taiwan ’ s return to the WHA comes more than a month after President Donald Trump signed legislation urging the U.S. government to advocate greater Taiwanese participation in international organizations .

In recent weeks, in the latest iteration of U.S.-China tensions, Washington has led a diplomatic campaign aimed at restoring Taiwan’s status as an observer at the World Health Organization (WHO). Now China has launched its own diplomatic counterattack, asking governments to co-sign a letter urging the WHO director-general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, not to raise the matter in next week’s meeting.
In recent weeks, in the latest iteration of U.S.-China tensions, Washington has led a diplomatic campaign aimed at restoring Taiwan’s status as an observer at the World Health Organization (WHO). Now China has launched its own diplomatic counterattack, asking governments to co-sign a letter urging the WHO director-general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, not to raise the matter in next week’s meeting.
“The participation of Taiwan, China in WHA [the World Health Assembly] should be handled in accordance to the one-China principle,” according to the confidential letter, which we are posting as Foreign Policy’s Document of the Week. “However we are very concerned to learn that certain member states may intend to raise the so-called Taiwan’s participation issue during its opening, which runs counter to the general agreement among member states that no controversial issues shall be considered during the virtual Assembly.”
“In [the] face of unprecedented challenges, we should focus on saving lives and not be distracted by political manipulation,” according to the letter.
Last week, Washington, backed by Tokyo, notched an initial success, persuading half a dozen key Western allies, including Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and New Zealand, to issue a joint request to Tedros to invite Taiwan to attend a May 18-19 virtual meeting of the WHA, WHO’s decision-making body. But there were signs that European governments, keen to avoid an ugly fight at the U.N. health agency in the midst of a pandemic, were exploring the possibility of postponing any consideration of Taiwan’s status until the Fall, according to a well-placed diplomatic source.
Beijing—which considers Taiwan a renegade province of China—responded angrily to the initiative. Asked about New Zealand’s decision to support the initiative, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said this week that “China deplores” the decision and “has lodged representations with the New Zealand side.”
“On the Taiwan region’s participation in WHO activities, China’s position is clear and consistent. The one-China principle must be observed,” he added. “The Taiwan authorities chose to play up its so-called participation in WHO events and return to the WHA at this moment. The timing reveals its true motive, which is to use the current outbreak to seek ‘Taiwan independence.’ It is out-and-out political manipulation.”
The Chinese remarks come weeks after Beijing threatened to boycott Australian imports after Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison proposed opening an independent investigation to examine China’s initial response to the virus.
Taiwan first attended the WHA as an observer in 2009, but Beijing blocked its participation in 2016 following the election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, who pledged to preserve the island’s sovereignty despite Chinese efforts to exercise ever greater control. Tsai was reelected in January in what was seen as a rebuke to China’s increasingly heavy-handed policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The U.S. move to support Taiwan’s return to the WHA comes more than a month after President Donald Trump signed legislation urging the U.S. government to advocate greater Taiwanese participation in international organizations.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-15--Will the United States Sanction China Over Xinjiang?

Will the United States Sanction China Over Xinjiang ?
Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : The U.S. Senate passes the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act , meaning Chinese officials could be hit with U.S. sanctions ; shocking violence in Afghanistan threatens to derail the fragile peace process ; and Iran scales back its presence in Syria as its economic woes grow worse .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sign up here .
The U.S. Senate passed a bipartisan bill on Thursday that could bring sanctions against Chinese officials involved in the mass detention of Uighurs and other Muslims in the country ’ s Xinjiang region .
The move is the latest signal of U.S. lawmakers ’ appetite for a more hard-line approach to China , and it is likely to provoke Beijing ’ s ire .
The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act requires the president to submit to Congress a list of senior Chinese officials involved in human rights abuses in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could see their assets in the United States frozen and be subjected to visa bans under the Global Magnitsky Act .
The bill leaves significant discretion in the president ’ s hands to hold off on imposing sanctions if it would damage U.S. national interests .
The Trump administration already has the power to sanction Chinese officials for human rights abuses but has so far delayed any action over fears that it could disrupt trade talks .
As I reported last year , U.S. officials told human rights advocates that the Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials in late 2018 , but concerns were sidelined in favor of trade talks .
With the trade deal derailed by the pandemic , action may be more likely .
“ This is the first piece of legislation to explicitly recognize gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang and set out U.S. policy responses to those , ” said Sophie Richardson , the China director at Human Rights Watch .
“ A lot depends on how enthusiastically this is enforced.
” Over a million Uighurs and other members of predominantly Muslim minorities have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ camps in China ’ s western Xinjiang region , part of Beijing ’ s so-called reeducation campaign , which has been described as a cultural genocide .
Those living outside of the camps are subject to round-the-clock surveillance enabled by a vast network of facial recognition cameras , cell-phone monitoring apps , and police checkpoints , while hundreds of thousands of others have been dispatched to forced labor elsewhere in China Broad support .
Despite intractable partisan divides in Congress , the Uighur human rights bill received overwhelming bipartisan support .
Introduced by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advocate for Uighurs , and Sen. Bob Menendez , the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee , the bill was co-sponsored by over 50 senators from both parties and passed with unanimous consent .
It will now return to the House , where an earlier version passed with 407 votes last December .
On Thursday , Rubio tweeted he hoped the House would vote on the bill as soon as today .
Decoupling ?
Beijing ’ s handling of the coronavirus outbreak has fueled calls for an economic decoupling from China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Robbie Gramer reported this week .
While the bill likely would have passed with bipartisan support regardless , the pandemic has increased awareness of the global ramifications of China ’ s oppressive practices .
“ I do think that more people now see quite visibly what a lack of respect for freedom of expression in China can mean for the rest of the world , ” Richardson said .
The nine-dash line .
The United States sent three Navy ships to patrol near oil and gas projects off the coast of Malaysia this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , which has dialed up its efforts in the South China Sea .
In April , a Chinese survey ship harassed an exploration ship that belonged to the Malaysian energy company Petronas .
Beijing has long sought sovereignty over clusters of islands to justify its claim to some 85 percent of the sea under the “ nine-dash line , ” which is recognized by none of its maritime neighbors .
On April 18 , China announced the establishment of two new administrative districts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands .
“ These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and the countries in the region , will determine whether the region ’ s future will be one of openness and shared prosperity or coercion and conflict , ” Robert A. Manning and Patrick M. Cronin argue in FP .
Violence , from cradle to grave .
Gunmen stormed a maternity ward in Kabul on Tuesday , killing 24 people including two newborns in an attack that left the war-torn city shaken to its core .
Among the dead was a baby boy born just four hours before the assault began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trying to conceive .
“ We gave him the name Omid [ “ hope ” in Dari ] .
Hope for a better future , hope for a better Afghanistan , and hope for a mother who has been struggling to have a child for years , ” the infant ’ s grandmother told Reuters .
The same day , 32 people were killed in a suicide attack on a funeral in Nangarhar province .
That attack was claimed by the Islamic State , and the assault on the maternity hospital also bears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban have denied involvement in either attack , but Afghan President Ashraf Ghani ordered the military to resume offensive operations against the group and other armed militants , a move that will likely spell the end of the country ’ s fragile peace process .
Ukraine ’ s banking bill .
Lawmakers in Ukraine have passed a landmark banking bill that could pave the way for the country to unlock $ 5 billion in International Monetary Fund loans .
The law prevents nationalized banks from being returned to their former owners .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kolomoisky , once a close associate of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky .
In 2016 , the government bailed out Kolomoisky ’ s PrivatBank—the country ’ s biggest—after he and another owner were accused of siphoning away $ 5.5 billion , pushing it to the brink of collapse .
Kolomoisky has since sued to regain control of the bank , but the law passed on Wednesday makes that impossible .
Zelensky was elected last year on an anti-corruption platform , and the new law is an important test of his willingness to take on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controls significant assets in Ukraine including an airline and television channel .
“ This is hardly the end for Kolomoisky , but it should be the end of his alliance with Zelensky , ” Anders Aslund of the Atlantic Council told the Washington Post .
Iran ’ s tactical drawdown in Syria .
U.S. Special Envoy for Syria James Jeffrey confirmed reports that Iran has begun withdrawing some forces from Syria as Tehran feels the double squeeze of U.S. sanctions and the economic turmoil brought on by the pandemic .
“ We do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Some of that is tactical , because they are not fighting right now , but it also is a lack of money , ” Jeffrey said , speaking at a virtual think tank event on Tuesday .
Earlier this month , Israeli defense officials said that they had seen a reduction in Iranian forces in Syria and that Tehran began evacuating military bases near the border with Israel as the pandemic began .
Lesotho ’ s prime minister in trouble ?
Lesotho ’ s coalition government collapsed on Monday , giving embattled Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tender his resignation .
A fixture of Lesotho ’ s political scene for decades , the 80-year-old is no stranger to controversy , but when his second wife Maesaiah Thabane was charged with the 2017 murder of his ex-wife , calls for him to step down grew .
The prime minister is suspected of involvement in the plot , but no charges have been filed .
The claims have divided Thabane ’ s All Basotho Convention party .
A party spokesman told the BBC that the prime minister would not receive immunity from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like all citizens , he must stand trial and clear his name there , ” he said .
There ’ s an app for that .
A smartphone app developed by a business consultant in Mosul , Iraq , aims to help patients find which pharmacies have the medications they need at the best price .
With many hospitals destroyed by years of conflict , Iraqis have come to depend on private clinics that often rent space from pharmacies .
Doctors direct their patients to the partner pharmacy , but prices are often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Pharx app , said he got the idea when his father underwent heart surgery in 2015 , when Mosul was ruled by the Islamic State .
“ I had to look for hours for a pharmacy that had the specific medicine while my father is in [ the ] surgery room suffering , ” he told Oxfam , which supported the project .
“ That day , I promised myself and my dad that I will one day do something to address this issue in our country.
” That ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: The U.S. Senate passes the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, meaning Chinese officials could be hit with U.S. sanctions; shocking violence in Afghanistan threatens to derail the fragile peace process; and Iran scales back its presence in Syria as its economic woes grow worse.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Fridays, please sign up here.
U.S. Senate Passes Uighur Human Rights Bill
The U.S. Senate passed a bipartisan bill on Thursday that could bring sanctions against Chinese officials involved in the mass detention of Uighurs and other Muslims in the country’s Xinjiang region. The move is the latest signal of U.S. lawmakers’ appetite for a more hard-line approach to China, and it is likely to provoke Beijing’s ire.
The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act requires the president to submit to Congress a list of senior Chinese officials involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Those named on the list could see their assets in the United States frozen and be subjected to visa bans under the Global Magnitsky Act. The bill leaves significant discretion in the president’s hands to hold off on imposing sanctions if it would damage U.S. national interests.
The Trump administration already has the power to sanction Chinese officials for human rights abuses but has so far delayed any action over fears that it could disrupt trade talks. As I reported last year, U.S. officials told human rights advocates that the Trump administration was poised to unveil sanctions on Chinese officials in late 2018, but concerns were sidelined in favor of trade talks. With the trade deal derailed by the pandemic, action may be more likely.
“This is the first piece of legislation to explicitly recognize gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang and set out U.S. policy responses to those,” said Sophie Richardson, the China director at Human Rights Watch. “A lot depends on how enthusiastically this is enforced.”
Over a million Uighurs and other members of predominantly Muslim minorities have been detained arbitrarily in a vast network of camps in China’s western Xinjiang region, part of Beijing’s so-called reeducation campaign, which has been described as a cultural genocide. Those living outside of the camps are subject to round-the-clock surveillance enabled by a vast network of facial recognition cameras, cell-phone monitoring apps, and police checkpoints, while hundreds of thousands of others have been dispatched to forced labor elsewhere in China
Broad support. Despite intractable partisan divides in Congress, the Uighur human rights bill received overwhelming bipartisan support. Introduced by Republican Sen. Marco Rubio, a longtime advocate for Uighurs, and Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, the bill was co-sponsored by over 50 senators from both parties and passed with unanimous consent. It will now return to the House, where an earlier version passed with 407 votes last December. On Thursday, Rubio tweeted he hoped the House would vote on the bill as soon as today.
Decoupling? Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak has fueled calls for an economic decoupling from China, as FP’s Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer reported this week. While the bill likely would have passed with bipartisan support regardless, the pandemic has increased awareness of the global ramifications of China’s oppressive practices. “I do think that more people now see quite visibly what a lack of respect for freedom of expression in China can mean for the rest of the world,” Richardson said.
What We’re Following
The nine-dash line. The United States sent three Navy ships to patrol near oil and gas projects off the coast of Malaysia this week, the latest move to deter China, which has dialed up its efforts in the South China Sea. In April, a Chinese survey ship harassed an exploration ship that belonged to the Malaysian energy company Petronas. Beijing has long sought sovereignty over clusters of islands to justify its claim to some 85 percent of the sea under the “nine-dash line,” which is recognized by none of its maritime neighbors. On April 18, China announced the establishment of two new administrative districts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. “These actions, and the response by the United States and the countries in the region, will determine whether the region’s future will be one of openness and shared prosperity or coercion and conflict,” Robert A. Manning and Patrick M. Cronin argue in FP.
Disputed Claims in the South China Sea
Violence, from cradle to grave. Gunmen stormed a maternity ward in Kabul on Tuesday, killing 24 people including two newborns in an attack that left the war-torn city shaken to its core. Among the dead was a baby boy born just four hours before the assault began. His mother had spent seven years trying to conceive. “We gave him the name Omid [“hope” in Dari]. Hope for a better future, hope for a better Afghanistan, and hope for a mother who has been struggling to have a child for years,” the infant’s grandmother told Reuters. The same day, 32 people were killed in a suicide attack on a funeral in Nangarhar province. That attack was claimed by the Islamic State, and the assault on the maternity hospital also bears the hallmarks of the group.
The Taliban have denied involvement in either attack, but Afghan President Ashraf Ghani ordered the military to resume offensive operations against the group and other armed militants, a move that will likely spell the end of the country’s fragile peace process.
Ukraine’s banking bill. Lawmakers in Ukraine have passed a landmark banking bill that could pave the way for the country to unlock $5 billion in International Monetary Fund loans. The law prevents nationalized banks from being returned to their former owners. It takes direct aim at the oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, once a close associate of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In 2016, the government bailed out Kolomoisky’s PrivatBank—the country’s biggest—after he and another owner were accused of siphoning away $5.5 billion, pushing it to the brink of collapse. Kolomoisky has since sued to regain control of the bank, but the law passed on Wednesday makes that impossible.
Zelensky was elected last year on an anti-corruption platform, and the new law is an important test of his willingness to take on an influential former ally, who still controls significant assets in Ukraine including an airline and television channel. “This is hardly the end for Kolomoisky, but it should be the end of his alliance with Zelensky,” Anders Aslund of the Atlantic Council told the Washington Post.
Keep an Eye On
Iran’s tactical drawdown in Syria. U.S. Special Envoy for Syria James Jeffrey confirmed reports that Iran has begun withdrawing some forces from Syria as Tehran feels the double squeeze of U.S. sanctions and the economic turmoil brought on by the pandemic. “We do see some withdrawal of Iranian-commanded forces. Some of that is tactical, because they are not fighting right now, but it also is a lack of money,” Jeffrey said, speaking at a virtual think tank event on Tuesday. Earlier this month, Israeli defense officials said that they had seen a reduction in Iranian forces in Syria and that Tehran began evacuating military bases near the border with Israel as the pandemic began.
Lesotho’s prime minister in trouble? Lesotho’s coalition government collapsed on Monday, giving embattled Prime Minister Thomas Thabane until next Friday to tender his resignation. A fixture of Lesotho’s political scene for decades, the 80-year-old is no stranger to controversy, but when his second wife Maesaiah Thabane was charged with the 2017 murder of his ex-wife, calls for him to step down grew. The prime minister is suspected of involvement in the plot, but no charges have been filed. The claims have divided Thabane’s All Basotho Convention party. A party spokesman told the BBC that the prime minister would not receive immunity from prosecution: “Our stance is that like all citizens, he must stand trial and clear his name there,” he said.
Odds and Ends
There’s an app for that. A smartphone app developed by a business consultant in Mosul, Iraq, aims to help patients find which pharmacies have the medications they need at the best price. With many hospitals destroyed by years of conflict, Iraqis have come to depend on private clinics that often rent space from pharmacies. Doctors direct their patients to the partner pharmacy, but prices are often inflated. Ameen Hadeed, the creator of the Pharx app, said he got the idea when his father underwent heart surgery in 2015, when Mosul was ruled by the Islamic State.
“I had to look for hours for a pharmacy that had the specific medicine while my father is in [the] surgery room suffering,” he told Oxfam, which supported the project. “That day, I promised myself and my dad that I will one day do something to address this issue in our country.”
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.