foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Brink of War After Deadly Clashes

Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Brink of War After Deadly Clashes Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Azerbaijan and Armenia clash over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region , Trump ’ s tax returns are released two days before the first debate , and Yemen ’ s warring factions agree to their largest prisoner exchange .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted on Sunday over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh , reigniting a decades-old conflict and raising concerns about the stability of the Caucasus region as well as the possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including Turkey and Russia .
The cause of the outbreak is still unclear .
Azerbaijan claimed its positions in Nagorno-Karabakh had come under fire from Armenian forces , but Armenia said that Azerbaijani forces had staged a military operation near the disputed region .
Nagorno-Karabakh officials said 16 of its personnel were killed and more than 100 wounded in clashes with Azerbaijani forces .
Azerbaijan reported 19 civilians wounded .
Amid the violence , Armenia declared martial law and implemented a full military mobilization .
“ Get ready to defend our sacred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pashinyan said in a post on Facebook .
Azerbaijan ’ s parliament also voted to declare martial law , though it stopped short of full military mobilization .
Source of tension .
Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a vicious war in the 1990s over Nagorno-Karabakh , a majority-ethnic Armenian enclave which nominally falls under Azerbaijan ’ s jurisdiction .
The region gained de facto independence at the end of the war and has developed deep ties with Armenia , but its status remains a source of considerable hostility between the two sides .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in clashes near the Tavush region in the dispute ’ s deadliest bout of violence in years .
International significance .
Regional disputes have larger geopolitical implications due to the Caucasus ’ position as a key transit point for pipelines delivering oil and gas to the world market , and clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan have always had outsized significance due to the possibility of dragging key international actors into a wider conflict .
Turkey getting involved .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , whose country has long been at odds with Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stand against the government ’ s strategy .
“ I call on the Armenian people to take hold of their future against their leadership that is dragging them to catastrophe and those using it like puppets , we also call on the world to stand with Azerbaijan in their battle against invasion and cruelty , ” he said on Twitter .
Days before the clashes took place , Turkey reportedly transferred militants out of Syria and into Azerbaijan .
Russia watching .
Pashinyan spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Putin warned against further escalations of violence and urged against a military confrontation .
“ We are calling on the sides to immediately halt fire and begin talks to stabilise the situation , ” the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement .
Russia is a long-standing ally of Armenia , and it has supplied the country with enormous supplies of arms since the end of its war with Azerbaijan in 1994 .
Sep. 28-Oct. 2 .
The ninth round of Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union takes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Regions of Russia and Belarus takes place .
Sep 29 .
The General Debate of the U.N. General Assembly concludes .
Sep. 29 .
The first debate between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden .
Oct. 1-2 .
EU leaders hold a special summit on the crisis in the eastern Mediterranean .
Trump ’ s tax returns released .
The New York Times published the tax returns of U.S. President Donald Trump in a report that could seriously upend the country ’ s presidential election just over a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The bombshell report showed that Trump , whose net worth is estimated at $ 2.5 billion , paid no income taxes in 10 of the previous 15 years .
He also only paid $ 750 in taxes in 2017 , the year he became president .
Democrats railed against Trump over the revelations .
“ Donald Trump is a liar , a cheater , and a crooked businessman , ” Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren tweeted .
“ But he ’ s also taking advantage of a broken , corrupt , and unequal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like him to do what he did.
” Trump ’ s supporters have mostly dismissed the claims .
Charlie Kirk , founder of the pro-Trump political action committee Turning Point USA , tweeted “ I ’ m far more interested in the tax returns of a politician who became a multimillionaire than the tax returns of a billionaire who became a politician.
” Trump himself called the report “ fake news.
” Belarus protests hit 50th day .
100,000 people flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marking the 50th consecutive day of protests against longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko .
One of the top opposition channels called the demonstrations a symbolic “ people ’ s inauguration of the real president , ” referring to Tikhanovskaya .
Protesters were met with force from the authorities , with around 200 people reportedly being detained .
Lukashenko was inaugurated president in a secret ceremony last week , sparking immediate protests and drawing criticism from several international figures who largely rejected his legitimacy .
EU leaders will meet later this week to discuss sanctions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month ’ s electoral fraud .
Mali has a new prime minister .
Malian interim President Bah Ndaw appointed former Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane as the country ’ s interim prime minister , meeting a key demand of the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) and likely paving the way for the bloc to lift the sanctions it imposed in the aftermath of last month ’ s military coup .
Last week , Mali ’ s military junta appointed Ndaw , a former colonel , as interim president and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vice president , a decision that flew in the face of ECOWAS ’ s initial demand that the transitional government be led by civilians .
But ECOWAS softened those conditions after Ndaw was sworn in on Friday , saying it would lift sanctions if a civilian was installed as prime minister .
With no military background , Ouane appears to meet that criterion .
Progress in Yemen .
Yemen ’ s warring factions agreed to the largest prisoner swap since the outbreak of their civil war in 2014 , raising hopes that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be near .
The Yemeni government met with the leaders of the Houthi rebels and agreed to exchange 1,081 prisoners , including 15 Saudis , with the aim of building trust before further efforts are made to revive the country ’ s peace process .
“ I urge the parties to move forward immediately with the release and to spare no effort in building upon this momentum to swiftly agree to releasing more detainees , ” said Martin Griffiths , the U.N. special envoy for Yemen .
Sunday ’ s move represents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace in recent years .
Both sides agreed to exchange 15,000 prisoners in 2018 , but that pact ultimately bore little fruit .
Swiss snub far-right governing party .
Switzerland voted against a referendum that would have put new limitations on immigration from the European Union .
The result was overwhelming , reflecting the country ’ s broad support for the principle of free movement , and a rejection of the governing Swiss People ’ s Party ’ s anti-immigration stance .
Switzerland , which is known for its neutrality in international relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on several occasions , but Sunday ’ s vote was a sign that the country still wishes to maintain close ties to the bloc .
“ The bilateral path is the right one for Switzerland and for the EU .
The Swiss people have confirmed this path again today , ” Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter told reporters in the capital of Bern .
12 more years .
Just a week after refusing to commit to a peaceful transfer of power , Trump joked at a campaign rally in Atlanta , Georgia , about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two terms as president , inciting chants of “ 12 more years ” from his supporters .
“ He will not give up power !
, ” Trump said , pretending to be a newscaster .
“ Under no circumstances will he give up power .
He intends to serve at least two more terms.
” This wasn ’ t the first time Trump mentioned serving more than two terms .
At a campaign event in Nevada earlier this month , Trump suggested that he might be entitled to a third term .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we ’ ll negotiate , right ?
” he said .
“ Because we ’ re probably—based on the way we were treated—we are probably entitled to another four after that.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Azerbaijan and Armenia clash over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, Trump’s tax returns are released two days before the first debate, and Yemen’s warring factions agree to their largest prisoner exchange.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Azerbaijan and Armenia clash over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, Trump’s tax returns are released two days before the first debate, and Yemen’s warring factions agree to their largest prisoner exchange.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Border Clashes Could Spark a Wider Confrontation
Clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted on Sunday over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, reigniting a decades-old conflict and raising concerns about the stability of the Caucasus region as well as the possibility of wider conflict between key international actors, including Turkey and Russia.
The cause of the outbreak is still unclear. Azerbaijan claimed its positions in Nagorno-Karabakh had come under fire from Armenian forces, but Armenia said that Azerbaijani forces had staged a military operation near the disputed region. Nagorno-Karabakh officials said 16 of its personnel were killed and more than 100 wounded in clashes with Azerbaijani forces. Azerbaijan reported 19 civilians wounded.
Amid the violence, Armenia declared martial law and implemented a full military mobilization. “Get ready to defend our sacred homeland,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said in a post on Facebook. Azerbaijan’s parliament also voted to declare martial law, though it stopped short of full military mobilization.
Source of tension. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a vicious war in the 1990s over Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority-ethnic Armenian enclave which nominally falls under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. The region gained de facto independence at the end of the war and has developed deep ties with Armenia, but its status remains a source of considerable hostility between the two sides. In July, four Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in clashes near the Tavush region in the dispute’s deadliest bout of violence in years.
International significance. Regional disputes have larger geopolitical implications due to the Caucasus’ position as a key transit point for pipelines delivering oil and gas to the world market, and clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan have always had outsized significance due to the possibility of dragging key international actors into a wider conflict.
Turkey getting involved. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose country has long been at odds with Armenia, strongly backed Azerbaijan and urged Armenians to stand against the government’s strategy. “I call on the Armenian people to take hold of their future against their leadership that is dragging them to catastrophe and those using it like puppets, we also call on the world to stand with Azerbaijan in their battle against invasion and cruelty,” he said on Twitter. Days before the clashes took place, Turkey reportedly transferred militants out of Syria and into Azerbaijan.
Russia watching. Pashinyan spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call shortly after the outbreak, during which Putin warned against further escalations of violence and urged against a military confrontation. “We are calling on the sides to immediately halt fire and begin talks to stabilise the situation,” the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement. Russia is a long-standing ally of Armenia, and it has supplied the country with enormous supplies of arms since the end of its war with Azerbaijan in 1994.
The World This Week
Sep. 28-Oct. 2. The ninth round of Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union takes place.
Sep. 28-29. The Forum of the Regions of Russia and Belarus takes place.
Sep 29. The General Debate of the U.N. General Assembly concludes.
Sep. 29. The first debate between U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Joe Biden.
Oct. 1-2. EU leaders hold a special summit on the crisis in the eastern Mediterranean.
Oct. 4. Kyrgyzstan holds parliamentary elections.
What We’re Following Today
Trump’s tax returns released. The New York Times published the tax returns of U.S. President Donald Trump in a report that could seriously upend the country’s presidential election just over a month before voters go to the polls. The bombshell report showed that Trump, whose net worth is estimated at $2.5 billion, paid no income taxes in 10 of the previous 15 years. He also only paid $750 in taxes in 2017, the year he became president.
Democrats railed against Trump over the revelations. “Donald Trump is a liar, a cheater, and a crooked businessman,” Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren tweeted. “But he’s also taking advantage of a broken, corrupt, and unequal system that’s built for people like him to do what he did.”
Trump’s supporters have mostly dismissed the claims. Charlie Kirk, founder of the pro-Trump political action committee Turning Point USA, tweeted “I’m far more interested in the tax returns of a politician who became a multimillionaire than the tax returns of a billionaire who became a politician.” Trump himself called the report “fake news.”
Belarus protests hit 50th day. 100,000 people flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in support of exiled opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, marking the 50th consecutive day of protests against longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko. One of the top opposition channels called the demonstrations a symbolic “people’s inauguration of the real president,” referring to Tikhanovskaya. Protesters were met with force from the authorities, with around 200 people reportedly being detained.
Lukashenko was inaugurated president in a secret ceremony last week, sparking immediate protests and drawing criticism from several international figures who largely rejected his legitimacy. EU leaders will meet later this week to discuss sanctions on top Belarusian officials involved in last month’s electoral fraud.
Mali has a new prime minister. Malian interim President Bah Ndaw appointed former Foreign Minister Moctar Ouane as the country’s interim prime minister, meeting a key demand of the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and likely paving the way for the bloc to lift the sanctions it imposed in the aftermath of last month’s military coup. Last week, Mali’s military junta appointed Ndaw, a former colonel, as interim president and coup leader Col. Assimi Goita as interim vice president, a decision that flew in the face of ECOWAS’s initial demand that the transitional government be led by civilians.
But ECOWAS softened those conditions after Ndaw was sworn in on Friday, saying it would lift sanctions if a civilian was installed as prime minister. With no military background, Ouane appears to meet that criterion.
Keep an Eye On
Progress in Yemen. Yemen’s warring factions agreed to the largest prisoner swap since the outbreak of their civil war in 2014, raising hopes that a ceasefire and an end to the conflict could be near. The Yemeni government met with the leaders of the Houthi rebels and agreed to exchange 1,081 prisoners, including 15 Saudis, with the aim of building trust before further efforts are made to revive the country’s peace process. “I urge the parties to move forward immediately with the release and to spare no effort in building upon this momentum to swiftly agree to releasing more detainees,” said Martin Griffiths, the U.N. special envoy for Yemen.
Sunday’s move represents one of the most promising developments toward peace in recent years. Both sides agreed to exchange 15,000 prisoners in 2018, but that pact ultimately bore little fruit.
Swiss snub far-right governing party. Switzerland voted against a referendum that would have put new limitations on immigration from the European Union. The result was overwhelming, reflecting the country’s broad support for the principle of free movement, and a rejection of the governing Swiss People’s Party’s anti-immigration stance.
Switzerland, which is known for its neutrality in international relations, has rejected joining the European Union on several occasions, but Sunday’s vote was a sign that the country still wishes to maintain close ties to the bloc. “The bilateral path is the right one for Switzerland and for the EU. The Swiss people have confirmed this path again today,” Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter told reporters in the capital of Bern.
Odds and Ends
12 more years. Just a week after refusing to commit to a peaceful transfer of power, Trump joked at a campaign rally in Atlanta, Georgia, about serving more than the constitutional limit of two terms as president, inciting chants of “12 more years” from his supporters. “He will not give up power!,” Trump said, pretending to be a newscaster. “Under no circumstances will he give up power. He intends to serve at least two more terms.”
This wasn’t the first time Trump mentioned serving more than two terms. At a campaign event in Nevada earlier this month, Trump suggested that he might be entitled to a third term. “After [winning in November], we’ll negotiate, right?” he said. “Because we’re probably—based on the way we were treated—we are probably entitled to another four after that.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Ethiopia’s Power Play on the Nile Has Left the Region in a Deadlock

Ethiopia ’ s Power Play on the Nile Has Left the Region in a Deadlock For almost a decade , Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan have been negotiating over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ( GERD ) .
Unfortunately , these negotiations have not led to an agreement .
Reams of technical reports have been written , dozens of statements have been issued , and hundreds of meetings have been held with heads of state and government , foreign ministers and water ministers , hydrologists and engineers , lawyers and litigators , and foreign mediators and international observers .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ treaty that provided a legal framework to govern the negotiations—to show for this diplomatic commotion .
The reason these efforts have failed is that there is a fundamental divergence on the purpose of these negotiations .
Egypt is pursuing an agreement based on a simple and mutually beneficial quid pro quo : Ethiopia should be able to generate hydropower from the GERD while minimizing the harm on downstream communities in Egypt and Sudan .
Ethiopia ’ s objective , however , is to exploit these negotiations to assert control over the Blue Nile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ River , and to reconfigure the political topography of the Nile Basin .
The classic conundrum of transboundary watercourses is that downstream states , with their lush valleys and bountiful deltas , often construct sophisticated riparian-based economies before mountainous upstream states begin to develop the need and capacity to exploit these shared natural resources .
This is particularly true in the Nile Basin .
For its entire history , Egypt , which is essentially a desert oasis of 100 million people , has been entirely dependent on the Nile for its survival .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a water-rich upstream country that has recently begun to utilize its many transboundary rivers as vehicles of development through the construction of hydropower dams .
Reconciling Ethiopia ’ s developmental needs with Egypt ’ s imperative of survival is not an insurmountable challenge.The predicament , however , is that upstream developments invariably affect downstream states and could expose millions of people to the ravaging effects of water shortages .
This danger is especially acute in the case of the GERD , which , when construction is completed , will be Africa ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capacity more than twice that of the United States ’ Hoover Dam .
If it is filled and operated without an agreement with Egypt and Sudan , the GERD could have disastrous impacts on the livelihood of downstream communities .
Indeed , when Ethiopia unilaterally commenced the filling of the GERD in July by rapidly impounding nearly 5 billion cubic meters of water , Sudan experienced disruptions in drinking water supply systems and hydropower production facilities .
( As a sign of mounting concern about Ethiopia ’ s decision to fill the dam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ negotiations , the United States announced a “ temporary pause ” of a portion of U.S. aid to Ethiopia . )
Reconciling Ethiopia ’ s developmental needs with Egypt ’ s imperative of survival is not an insurmountable challenge .
In February , the United States brokered an agreement that did just that .
It enabled Ethiopia to generate hydropower from the GERD expeditiously and sustainably while reducing the harmful effects of the dam .
Yet while Egypt accepted and initialed this agreement , Ethiopia rejected it .
Since then , there have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Ethiopia , and Sudan , which were attended by observers from the African Union , the European Union , and the United States .
During these talks , Egypt and Sudan proposed multiple solutions based on the win-win formula of ensuring that the GERD produces hydropower while minimizing its adverse effects .
Nonetheless , Ethiopia remained implacable .
The reason is that , for Ethiopia , these negotiations are about much more than the GERD and its economic value .
Indeed , the dam is an instrument in an Ethiopian bid to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to free itself of the restraints of international law that apply to all riparian states sharing international watercourses , and to force Egypt and Sudan into apportioning the waters of the Nile on Ethiopia ’ s terms .
These motives are reflected in Ethiopia ’ s proposals throughout the negotiations this year , such as the text that Ethiopia sent to the U.N. Security Council in June .
These proposals demonstrate that Ethiopia is unwilling to conclude a legally binding agreement—it has even refused to call the instrument being negotiated an “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inclusion of any binding dispute resolution mechanism and has instead suggested that disagreements be solved through negotiation and mediation.For Ethiopia , these negotiations are about much more than the GERD and its economic value .
Meanwhile , the Ethiopian government is demanding that Egypt and Sudan sign off on a document that grants it the right to unilaterally adjust the terms of an agreement on the GERD .
It is insisting that any such agreement should give Ethiopia the unrestrained right to undertake more development projects and to alter the GERD agreement to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet that would effectively require Egypt and Sudan to sign away their riparian rights and turn themselves into Ethiopia ’ s hydrological hostages .
Ethiopia is also arguing that Egypt and Sudan must accede to the Cooperative Framework Agreement , an ineffectual and divisive treaty that was designed a decade ago to manage the Nile waters but that has since lacked the requisite support to come into force .
Moreover , Ethiopia insists that any GERD agreement should be terminated if Egypt and Sudan do not agree to apportion specific shares of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the White Nile , the other major tributary of the Nile , within a decade—even though the White Nile doesn ’ t flow through Ethiopia itself .
In short , Ethiopia is seeking to establish a hydrological tabula rasa by dictating the distribution of the river ’ s waters and disregarding the realities of geography that have long made Egypt ’ s survival dependent on the Nile .
Ethiopia is seeking to establish a hydrological tabula rasa.On the other hand , Egypt ’ s position has been principled and pragmatic .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enjoy the benefits of the Blue Nile and to undertake future development projects .
However , Egypt believes that international law should govern any future projects on the Blue Nile .
Moreover , Egypt understands that it will be impossible , in these negotiations on the GERD , to overcome decades of disagreements on the legal and institutional infrastructure that governs the Nile Basin .
Therefore , Egypt is pursuing the attainable by working to reach an agreement exclusively on the GERD .
This would be a technical agreement that regulates a single @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nile River by outlining the details of the filling and operation of the GERD .
It would not foreclose Ethiopia ’ s right to undertake future development projects nor would it undermine the riparian rights of downstream states .
It would also bypass intractable issues , such as that of the Cooperative Framework Agreement , that have bedeviled the Nile Basin for decades .
Behaving as though the management of an international watercourse is a zero-sum game is untenable .
Ethiopia should not seek to establish a fait accompli or exploit the riches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so would only inflame tensions and undermine stability throughout East Africa .
In order to preserve the peace in an already turbulent region , Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan must avoid a scenario where one state threatens the existence of downstream communities or turns a dam into a Damoclean sword .
The AU , the EU , and the United States should prod the parties to exercise flexibility and encourage Ethiopia to conclude a legally binding agreement that enables the country to achieve a return on its investment in the GERD while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would build trust and confidence , thus laying the foundations for broader cooperation on future development projects in the Nile Basin .

For almost a decade, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have been negotiating over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Unfortunately, these negotiations have not led to an agreement. Reams of technical reports have been written, dozens of statements have been issued, and hundreds of meetings have been held with heads of state and government, foreign ministers and water ministers, hydrologists and engineers, lawyers and litigators, and foreign mediators and international observers. Yet there is little—apart from a 2015 treaty that provided a legal framework to govern the negotiations—to show for this diplomatic commotion.
For almost a decade, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have been negotiating over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Unfortunately, these negotiations have not led to an agreement. Reams of technical reports have been written, dozens of statements have been issued, and hundreds of meetings have been held with heads of state and government, foreign ministers and water ministers, hydrologists and engineers, lawyers and litigators, and foreign mediators and international observers. Yet there is little—apart from a 2015 treaty that provided a legal framework to govern the negotiations—to show for this diplomatic commotion.
The reason these efforts have failed is that there is a fundamental divergence on the purpose of these negotiations. Egypt is pursuing an agreement based on a simple and mutually beneficial quid pro quo: Ethiopia should be able to generate hydropower from the GERD while minimizing the harm on downstream communities in Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia’s objective, however, is to exploit these negotiations to assert control over the Blue Nile, the largest tributary of the Nile River, and to reconfigure the political topography of the Nile Basin.
The classic conundrum of transboundary watercourses is that downstream states, with their lush valleys and bountiful deltas, often construct sophisticated riparian-based economies before mountainous upstream states begin to develop the need and capacity to exploit these shared natural resources. This is particularly true in the Nile Basin. For its entire history, Egypt, which is essentially a desert oasis of 100 million people, has been entirely dependent on the Nile for its survival. Ethiopia, on the other hand, is a water-rich upstream country that has recently begun to utilize its many transboundary rivers as vehicles of development through the construction of hydropower dams.
Reconciling Ethiopia’s developmental needs with Egypt’s imperative of survival is not an insurmountable challenge.The predicament, however, is that upstream developments invariably affect downstream states and could expose millions of people to the ravaging effects of water shortages. This danger is especially acute in the case of the GERD, which, when construction is completed, will be Africa’s largest hydropower dam with a storage capacity more than twice that of the United States’ Hoover Dam. If it is filled and operated without an agreement with Egypt and Sudan, the GERD could have disastrous impacts on the livelihood of downstream communities. Indeed, when Ethiopia unilaterally commenced the filling of the GERD in July by rapidly impounding nearly 5 billion cubic meters of water, Sudan experienced disruptions in drinking water supply systems and hydropower production facilities. (As a sign of mounting concern about Ethiopia’s decision to fill the dam and the lack of progress in the negotiations, the United States announced a “temporary pause” of a portion of U.S. aid to Ethiopia.)
Reconciling Ethiopia’s developmental needs with Egypt’s imperative of survival is not an insurmountable challenge. In February, the United States brokered an agreement that did just that. It enabled Ethiopia to generate hydropower from the GERD expeditiously and sustainably while reducing the harmful effects of the dam. Yet while Egypt accepted and initialed this agreement, Ethiopia rejected it. Since then, there have been two rounds of negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, which were attended by observers from the African Union, the European Union, and the United States. During these talks, Egypt and Sudan proposed multiple solutions based on the win-win formula of ensuring that the GERD produces hydropower while minimizing its adverse effects. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remained implacable.
The reason is that, for Ethiopia, these negotiations are about much more than the GERD and its economic value. Indeed, the dam is an instrument in an Ethiopian bid to exercise unrestricted control over the Blue Nile, to free itself of the restraints of international law that apply to all riparian states sharing international watercourses, and to force Egypt and Sudan into apportioning the waters of the Nile on Ethiopia’s terms.
These motives are reflected in Ethiopia’s proposals throughout the negotiations this year, such as the text that Ethiopia sent to the U.N. Security Council in June. These proposals demonstrate that Ethiopia is unwilling to conclude a legally binding agreement—it has even refused to call the instrument being negotiated an “agreement.” It has also rejected the inclusion of any binding dispute resolution mechanism and has instead suggested that disagreements be solved through negotiation and mediation.For Ethiopia, these negotiations are about much more than the GERD and its economic value.
Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government is demanding that Egypt and Sudan sign off on a document that grants it the right to unilaterally adjust the terms of an agreement on the GERD. It is insisting that any such agreement should give Ethiopia the unrestrained right to undertake more development projects and to alter the GERD agreement to accommodate these new waterworks in the future. Yet that would effectively require Egypt and Sudan to sign away their riparian rights and turn themselves into Ethiopia’s hydrological hostages.
Ethiopia is also arguing that Egypt and Sudan must accede to the Cooperative Framework Agreement, an ineffectual and divisive treaty that was designed a decade ago to manage the Nile waters but that has since lacked the requisite support to come into force. Moreover, Ethiopia insists that any GERD agreement should be terminated if Egypt and Sudan do not agree to apportion specific shares of the Nile waters for the riparian states of the White Nile, the other major tributary of the Nile, within a decade—even though the White Nile doesn’t flow through Ethiopia itself.
In short, Ethiopia is seeking to establish a hydrological tabula rasa by dictating the distribution of the river’s waters and disregarding the realities of geography that have long made Egypt’s survival dependent on the Nile.
Ethiopia is seeking to establish a hydrological tabula rasa.On the other hand, Egypt’s position has been principled and pragmatic. It recognizes Ethiopia’s inalienable right to enjoy the benefits of the Blue Nile and to undertake future development projects. However, Egypt believes that international law should govern any future projects on the Blue Nile. Moreover, Egypt understands that it will be impossible, in these negotiations on the GERD, to overcome decades of disagreements on the legal and institutional infrastructure that governs the Nile Basin. Therefore, Egypt is pursuing the attainable by working to reach an agreement exclusively on the GERD. This would be a technical agreement that regulates a single project on a single tributary of the Nile River by outlining the details of the filling and operation of the GERD. It would not foreclose Ethiopia’s right to undertake future development projects nor would it undermine the riparian rights of downstream states. It would also bypass intractable issues, such as that of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, that have bedeviled the Nile Basin for decades.
Behaving as though the management of an international watercourse is a zero-sum game is untenable. Ethiopia should not seek to establish a fait accompli or exploit the riches of the river by diktat. Doing so would only inflame tensions and undermine stability throughout East Africa. In order to preserve the peace in an already turbulent region, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan must avoid a scenario where one state threatens the existence of downstream communities or turns a dam into a Damoclean sword.
The AU, the EU, and the United States should prod the parties to exercise flexibility and encourage Ethiopia to conclude a legally binding agreement that enables the country to achieve a return on its investment in the GERD while protecting downstream communities. Such an agreement would build trust and confidence, thus laying the foundations for broader cooperation on future development projects in the Nile Basin.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Beyond IR’s Ivory Tower

Beyond IR’s Ivory Tower

For years , prominent international relations ( IR ) scholars have openly criticized the field for privileging “ rigor over relevance , ” offering little practical advice to those who live and work outside the ivory tower .
For example , the professor Stephen Van Evera argues that traditional discipline promotes a “ cult of the irrelevant ” — “ an internal discussion of arcane questions that the wider world is not asking.
” On the other hand , scholars such as Ido Oren and Adam Elkus reject the idea that political scientists should make themselves policy-relevant and argue that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ academics to cater to the “ whims of elite governmental policymakers.
” Are these concerns well founded—are IR scholars too removed from the policy world ?
Or should we worry that academics are distorting their findings for policy audiences ?
In 2019 , the Sie Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver ’ s Korbel School of International Studies and the TRIP Project at William & Mary ’ s Global Research Institute collaborated on a survey to gauge IR scholars ’ perceptions of policy engagement within their field .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 971 respondents at U.S. colleges and universities , reveal that IR scholars are more engaged than the “ cult of the irrelevant ” discourse suggests .
The findings highlight a significant gap in perceptions between IR scholars and their employers regarding the importance of engagement for promotion and tenure , with many scholars saying that universities should value policy-engaged activities more than they do .
Though respondents expressed some concern that scholars might distort their beliefs and opinions for policy audiences , few reported doing so themselves .
Overall , it appears that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ despite a lack of professional incentives to do so : Faculty members do not perceive that engaged policy work enhances prospects for tenure and promotion .
Nevertheless , their engagement is deeper and more widespread than might be expected given the prevailing criticism .
If the failed U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic reveals anything , it is that government officials should draw on the knowledge of experts to inform policy decisions .
Policy crafted without attention to expert knowledge has produced avoidable loss of life on a massive scale , a collapse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and an economic crisis .
But a lack of policy engagement by members of the ivory tower doesn ’ t account for practitioners ’ failure to heed expert advice .
The survey data shows that policy engagement among IR scholars is the norm , not the exception—even if universities don ’ t adequately reward it .
A substantial proportion of the experts who participated in the survey had experience in the policy world before entering academia .
Almost half ( 48 percent ) had some work experience in the policy world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy world for six months or more .
Generally , prior policy experience didn ’ t seem to be linked to academic rank , but a larger proportion of chaired professors have more than six months of policy experience .
In short , if the ivory tower were failing to engage with real-world problems , it would be doing so in spite of broad scholarly interest and experience with such issues .
Some form of continued engagement with the policy world—writing op-eds , media appearances , writing reports , consulting activities—was the norm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Only 7 percent reported never engaging in some form of policy-related activity , and there was no evidence of a trend away from engagement among younger scholars .
In fact , while older scholars report more frequent engagement , younger scholars were less likely than their older colleagues to not engage at all over the past five years .
These results accord with the advent of what George Washington University ’ s Marc Lynch calls “ a golden age of academic engagement with the public sphere ” —in part linked to the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their work and the growth in funding and fellowship opportunities available to academics with policy interests .
Publishing bylined pieces in prestigious but non-peer-reviewed outlets is a low-cost , high-reward means of policy engagement .
The readership of outlets like Foreign Policy and the Washington Post ’ s Monkey Cage blog includes policy practitioners as well as the same group of scholars with whom academics want to build a reputation .
Deeper engagement , including consulting for government agencies or nonprofits , often takes a significant amount of time and offers fewer opportunities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or members of the intelligence community , for example , are rarely bylined .
Despite these barriers , 41 percent of respondents had written policy briefs for government agencies , advocacy organizations , or think tanks , and a greater percentage ( 49 percent ) had engaged in consulting activities .
This high degree of policy engagement is consistent with the belief , held by 70 percent of respondents , that policy engagement enhances the quality of their teaching and research—providing real-world examples for the classroom and a policy-practitioner network for interviews , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are more divided over putting country before party .
Despite significant opposition to the Trump administration within academic circles , some scholars reported that they were willing to engage with the policy community regardless of who occupied the Oval Office—even despite the current administration ’ s general hostility toward experts .
The next four years could look quite different for policy engagement depending on who wins in the November election .
When asked whether they considered the identity of the president when deciding whether to engage with the government , 36 percent reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ account , while a slightly larger proportion ( 41 percent ) reported that they did .
Partisanship and low levels of support for the Trump administration may make these responses atypical : Only 17 percent of self-identified Republicans said they took the identity of the president into account compared to almost half of Democrats .
Significantly , the types of engagement reported and the frequency of that engagement were similar regardless of whether the respondent said that they conditioned their engagement with the government in particular on the identity of the president .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ World War II , addressing America ’ s myriad and severe problems—the coronavirus pandemic , climate change , global economic crisis—requires more engagement from experts in general and IR scholars specifically .
Contrary to criticism about the “ cult of the irrelevant , ” many of our colleagues stand ready .

Cullen Hendrix, Julia Macdonald, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney

For years, prominent international relations (IR) scholars have openly criticized the field for privileging “ rigor over relevance ,” offering little practical advice to those who live and work outside the ivory tower. For example, Stephen Van Evera, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argues that traditional academic disciplines and incentives promote a “ cult of the irrelevant ”—“an internal discussion of arcane questions that the wider world is not asking.” On the other hand, scholars such as Ido Oren and Adam Elkus reject the idea that political scientists should make themselves policy-relevant and argue that doing so biases political science by encouraging academics to cater to the “whims of elite governmental policymakers.”
For years, prominent international relations (IR) scholars have openly criticized the field for privileging “rigor over relevance,” offering little practical advice to those who live and work outside the ivory tower. For example, Stephen Van Evera, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argues that traditional academic disciplines and incentives promote a “cult of the irrelevant”—“an internal discussion of arcane questions that the wider world is not asking.” On the other hand, scholars such as Ido Oren and Adam Elkus reject the idea that political scientists should make themselves policy-relevant and argue that doing so biases political science by encouraging academics to cater to the “whims of elite governmental policymakers.”
Are these concerns well founded—are IR scholars too removed from the policy world? Or should we worry that academics are distorting their findings for policy audiences?
In 2019, the Sie Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies and the TRIP Project at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute collaborated on a survey to gauge IR scholars’ perceptions of policy engagement within their field. The results of the survey, from 971 respondents at U.S. colleges and universities, reveal that IR scholars are more engaged than the “cult of the irrelevant” discourse suggests. The findings highlight a significant gap in perceptions between IR scholars and their employers regarding the importance of engagement for promotion and tenure, with many scholars saying that universities should value policy-engaged activities more than they do.
Though respondents expressed some concern that scholars might distort their beliefs and opinions for policy audiences, few reported doing so themselves. Overall, it appears that IR scholars are engaged in policy activities despite a lack of professional incentives to do so: Faculty members do not perceive that engaged policy work enhances prospects for tenure and promotion. Nevertheless, their engagement is deeper and more widespread than might be expected given the prevailing criticism.
If the failed U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic reveals anything, it is that government officials should draw on the knowledge of experts to inform policy decisions. Policy crafted without attention to expert knowledge has produced avoidable loss of life on a massive scale, a collapse in the United States’ international reputation, and an economic crisis. But a lack of policy engagement by members of the ivory tower doesn’t account for practitioners’ failure to heed expert advice. The survey data shows that policy engagement among IR scholars is the norm, not the exception—even if universities don’t adequately reward it.
A substantial proportion of the experts who participated in the survey had experience in the policy world before entering academia. Almost half (48 percent) had some work experience in the policy world, and 38 percent reported working in the policy world for six months or more. Generally, prior policy experience didn’t seem to be linked to academic rank, but a larger proportion of chaired professors have more than six months of policy experience. In short, if the ivory tower were failing to engage with real-world problems, it would be doing so in spite of broad scholarly interest and experience with such issues.

Some form of continued engagement with the policy world—writing op-eds, media appearances, writing reports, consulting activities—was the norm for a large number of respondents. Only 7 percent reported never engaging in some form of policy-related activity, and there was no evidence of a trend away from engagement among younger scholars. In fact, while older scholars report more frequent engagement, younger scholars were less likely than their older colleagues to not engage at all over the past five years.
These results accord with the advent of what George Washington University’s Marc Lynch calls “a golden age of academic engagement with the public sphere”—in part linked to the number of online outlets where scholars increasingly share their work and the growth in funding and fellowship opportunities available to academics with policy interests. Publishing bylined pieces in prestigious but non-peer-reviewed outlets is a low-cost, high-reward means of policy engagement. The readership of outlets like Foreign Policy and the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog includes policy practitioners as well as the same group of scholars with whom academics want to build a reputation.
Deeper engagement, including consulting for government agencies or nonprofits, often takes a significant amount of time and offers fewer opportunities for recognition: Briefings with Senate staffers or members of the intelligence community, for example, are rarely bylined. Despite these barriers, 41 percent of respondents had written policy briefs for government agencies, advocacy organizations, or think tanks, and a greater percentage (49 percent) had engaged in consulting activities.
This high degree of policy engagement is consistent with the belief, held by 70 percent of respondents, that policy engagement enhances the quality of their teaching and research—providing real-world examples for the classroom and a policy-practitioner network for interviews, data, and funding opportunities.
Respondents are more divided over putting country before party. Despite significant opposition to the Trump administration within academic circles, some scholars reported that they were willing to engage with the policy community regardless of who occupied the Oval Office—even despite the current administration’s general hostility toward experts. The next four years could look quite different for policy engagement depending on who wins in the November election.
When asked whether they considered the identity of the president when deciding whether to engage with the government, 36 percent reported that they did not take it into account, while a slightly larger proportion (41 percent) reported that they did. Partisanship and low levels of support for the Trump administration may make these responses atypical: Only 17 percent of self-identified Republicans said they took the identity of the president into account compared to almost half of Democrats. Significantly, the types of engagement reported and the frequency of that engagement were similar regardless of whether the respondent said that they conditioned their engagement with the government in particular on the identity of the president.
More than at any other time since World War II, addressing America’s myriad and severe problems—the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, global economic crisis—requires more engagement from experts in general and IR scholars specifically. Contrary to criticism about the “cult of the irrelevant,” many of our colleagues stand ready.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Why Are Armenia and Azerbaijan Heading to War?

Why Are Armenia and Azerbaijan Heading to War ?
Fighting has intensified along the effective Armenian-Azerbaijani border around the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh , with dozens of people dead and disputed claims about the destruction of helicopters and tanks .
Both countries have called up their reserves and declared martial law at home , as well as a state of war in some regions .
Fighting between the two is normal , with hundreds of incidents over the last few years , but this round of violence threatens to spill over into a full-blown war , as it did in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great forgotten conflict of the Soviet breakup , a war from 1992 to 1994 that both nations still obsess over and that was barely noticed by the public in the West despite at least 20,000 people dead and a million displaced through ethnic cleansing—about 70 percent of them Azerbaijanis fleeing Armenian-held territory , and the rest Armenians fleeing Azerbaijani-held territory .
The heart of the war is Nagorno-Karabakh , a beautiful highland region—its name literally means “ mountainous black garden ” —that plays a powerful role in the romantic imagination of both countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Transcaucasus in 1919-1920 , it was allocated to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic , despite having a largely Armenian population .
That wasn ’ t a huge problem as long as both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the Soviet empire ; many Armenians lived in their neighboring republic and vice versa .
The religious differences between predominantly Christian Orthodox Armenia and predominantly Sunni Muslim Azerbaijan also mattered less in an officially atheist state .
But when ethnic and religious protests became more acceptable in the 1980s , the Armenian residents @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and about an alleged campaign of Azerification by the authorities in Baku .
That exploded into violence in 1989-1990 , both in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku and Sumqayit , where pogroms directed against Armenians resulted in the Soviet military enforcing martial law to try to halt the violence , to little avail .
By 1991 , as the Soviet Union collapsed , war between the two newly emerged nations over the disputed territory—which unilaterally declared its own independence from Azerbaijan—was inevitable , especially as leaders saw jingoism as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power .
The war itself was both tragic and sometimes farcical .
The disintegration of the Soviet army created huge numbers of Russian mercenaries , who fought on both sides , sometimes switching overnight .
Criminals thrived amid the chaos ; the only day that flights took off again between Baku and Yerevan was when an Armenian mobster died in 1993 , since his Azerbaijani colleagues wished to pay their respects at his funeral .
And after an initial retreat , Armenia took the upper hand , eventually resulting in a Moscow-brokered 1994 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of Nagorno-Karabakh .
Did Azerbaijan take the loss well ?
Not at all .
Losing the war caused deep trauma in Azerbaijan , not only because of the territorial loss and the suffering of Azerbaijanis expelled by Armenian troops but also because of the relative size and strength of the two countries—Azerbaijan has three times the population of Armenia .
That led to a huge variety of conspiracy theories around the loss , including the widespread belief that the United States had secretly backed the Armenian side .
In reality , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , less corrupt , and more committed—Armenian volunteers fought far more enthusiastically than demoralized Azerbaijani conscripts .
Russia had also increasingly favored Armenia , sending shipments of weapons and providing military training .
The depth of bitterness can be judged from an infamous murder case .
In 2004 , both Armenia and Azerbaijan sent military officers to an English-language course in Budapest , Hungary , run by NATO for non-NATO members .
In the middle of the night , the Azerbaijani officer , Ramil Safarov , murdered one of the Armenian officers in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tried to kill the other .
Safarov had not served in the Nagorno-Karabakh war but was from a town now occupied by Armenia .
By itself , that might be an individual act of madness .
But after Azerbaijan managed to get Safarov transferred from Hungary to Azerbaijan eight years into his life sentence for murder , the president immediately pardoned him , promoted him to major , gave him an apartment , and awarded him back pay .
The head of the foreign ministry described him as having been “ thrown in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s honor and dignity of the people.
” Why has nothing been resolved ?
In order to keep a stronger position in negotiations and avoid allegations of aggression , Armenia has maintained Nagorno-Karabakh as a nominally independent republic rather than incorporating it into its own territory .
Barely anyone recognizes the puppet state , officially called the Republic of Artsakh .
Both the United States and Russia have played a significant role in the long-running but largely futile attempts at finding a permanent resolution to the issue .
On the U.S. side , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ group , but Azerbaijan has invested heavily in ties with U.S. oil companies .
In theory , the two sides agreed the Madrid Principles in the mid-2000s : Armenia gives up the periphery of territory it occupies around Nagorno-Karabakh itself , displaced peoples return to their homes , both countries and outside powers guarantee the rights of the residents of the disputed region , and eventually the status of the territory is resolved .
But Armenia has no desire to give up its de facto control , and Azerbaijan has no incentive to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critical role in keeping leaders in power in both countries , where both publics heavily oppose compromise .
It ’ s not the only frozen conflict in the region , where the Soviet collapse has left behind many disputed territories .
What caused things to get worse this year ?
Well , it ’ s 2020 and everything is awful , but there were some more specific causes .
2019 saw a lot of fierce rhetoric from both sides about the immutability of their claims , the greatness of the nation , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bloody skirmishes along the border—which both sides blame the other for starting—politicians started wrapping themselves in the flag even more than usual , especially amid the stress and economic failure caused by the coronavirus pandemic .
The conflict is only a day old , but it ’ s hard to see a triumphant Azerbaijani reclamation of Nagorno-Karabakh ahead .
The initial exchanges cost lives on both sides , but also—if Armenian battle footage is to be believed—saw the destruction of far more materiel on the Azerbaijani side than the Armenian .
Armenia holds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the difficult mountain territory extremely hard .
Independent assessments still rank Azerbaijan ’ s military readiness poorly ; the army is unhappy , corrupt , and inefficient , with the desertion rate running at close to 20 percent .
Profits from oil brought massive investment in new equipment between 2008 and 2014 , but the crash in prices has left the country struggling financially amid political tumult and brutal repression , and the army lacks the training and doctrine to make efficient use of the weaponry it has bought .
An unexpected Azerbaijani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervention by Moscow , most likely to enforce a rapid cease-fire .
Both Russia and Iran have offered to negotiate an end to this newest round of hostilities .
There ’ s also the worrying possibility of the conflict spreading—Turkey , for instance , has come heavily out in favor of Baku , thanks to strong ties between Azerbaijanis and Turks and Ankara ’ s long-standing antagonism toward the Armenians , who keep bringing up the matter of the still-denied Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915 .
The religious aspects of the original @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Nagorno-Karabakh never became a jihadi cause in the way that , say , Chechnya did .
( Some 2,000 former mujahideen fought for Azerbaijan , but for almost entirely mercenary reasons . )
That could change this time round .
But the most likely prospect may be a painful , relatively small war followed by another unresolved peace .
According to the casualty lists so far , most of those killed hadn ’ t even been born when the conflict first started .

Fighting has intensified along the effective Armenian-Azerbaijani border around the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, with dozens of people dead and disputed claims about the destruction of helicopters and tanks. Both countries have called up their reserves and declared martial law at home, as well as a state of war in some regions. Fighting between the two is normal, with hundreds of incidents over the last few years, but this round of violence threatens to spill over into a full-blown war, as it did in the 1990s.
Fighting has intensified along the effective Armenian-Azerbaijani border around the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, with dozens of people dead and disputed claims about the destruction of helicopters and tanks. Both countries have called up their reserves and declared martial law at home, as well as a state of war in some regions. Fighting between the two is normal, with hundreds of incidents over the last few years, but this round of violence threatens to spill over into a full-blown war, as it did in the 1990s.
Wait, there was a war?
It’s the great forgotten conflict of the Soviet breakup, a war from 1992 to 1994 that both nations still obsess over and that was barely noticed by the public in the West despite at least 20,000 people dead and a million displaced through ethnic cleansing—about 70 percent of them Azerbaijanis fleeing Armenian-held territory, and the rest Armenians fleeing Azerbaijani-held territory.
The heart of the war is Nagorno-Karabakh, a beautiful highland region—its name literally means “mountainous black garden”—that plays a powerful role in the romantic imagination of both countries. As part of the Soviet takeover of the Transcaucasus in 1919-1920, it was allocated to the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, despite having a largely Armenian population. That wasn’t a huge problem as long as both Armenia and Azerbaijan were part of the Soviet empire; many Armenians lived in their neighboring republic and vice versa. The religious differences between predominantly Christian Orthodox Armenia and predominantly Shia Muslim Azerbaijan also mattered less in an officially atheist state. But when ethnic and religious protests became more acceptable in the 1980s, the Armenian residents began to vigorously complain about their status, and about an alleged campaign of Azerification by the authorities in Baku.
That exploded into violence in 1989-1990, both in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Azerbaijani cities of Baku and Sumqayit, where pogroms directed against Armenians resulted in the Soviet military enforcing martial law to try to halt the violence, to little avail. By 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, war between the two newly emerged nations over the disputed territory—which unilaterally declared its own independence from Azerbaijan—was inevitable, especially as leaders saw jingoism as an easy path to consolidate their own power.
The war itself was both tragic and sometimes farcical. The disintegration of the Soviet army created huge numbers of Russian mercenaries, who fought on both sides, sometimes switching overnight. Criminals thrived amid the chaos; the only day that flights took off again between Baku and Yerevan was when an Armenian mobster died in 1993, since his Azerbaijani colleagues wished to pay their respects at his funeral. And after an initial retreat, Armenia took the upper hand, eventually resulting in a Moscow-brokered 1994 cease-fire that left Armenia in control of most of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Did Azerbaijan take the loss well?
Not at all. Losing the war caused deep trauma in Azerbaijan, not only because of the territorial loss and the suffering of Azerbaijanis expelled by Armenian troops but also because of the relative size and strength of the two countries—Azerbaijan has three times the population of Armenia. That led to a huge variety of conspiracy theories around the loss, including the widespread belief that the United States had secretly backed the Armenian side. In reality, the Armenian forces had simply been better led, less corrupt, and more committed—Armenian volunteers fought far more enthusiastically than demoralized Azerbaijani conscripts. Russia had also increasingly favored Armenia, sending shipments of weapons and providing military training.
The depth of bitterness can be judged from an infamous murder case. In 2004, both Armenia and Azerbaijan sent military officers to an English-language course in Budapest, Hungary, run by NATO for non-NATO members. In the middle of the night, the Azerbaijani officer, Ramil Safarov, murdered one of the Armenian officers in his sleep with an ax and then tried to kill the other. Safarov had not served in the Nagorno-Karabakh war but was from a town now occupied by Armenia.
By itself, that might be an individual act of madness. But after Azerbaijan managed to get Safarov transferred from Hungary to Azerbaijan eight years into his life sentence for murder, the president immediately pardoned him, promoted him to major, gave him an apartment, and awarded him back pay. The head of the foreign ministry described him as having been “thrown in jail after he defended his country’s honor and dignity of the people.”
Why has nothing been resolved?
In order to keep a stronger position in negotiations and avoid allegations of aggression, Armenia has maintained Nagorno-Karabakh as a nominally independent republic rather than incorporating it into its own territory. Barely anyone recognizes the puppet state, officially called the Republic of Artsakh. Both the United States and Russia have played a significant role in the long-running but largely futile attempts at finding a permanent resolution to the issue. On the U.S. side, Armenian Americans are a moderately influential lobbying group, but Azerbaijan has invested heavily in ties with U.S. oil companies.
In theory, the two sides agreed the Madrid Principles in the mid-2000s: Armenia gives up the periphery of territory it occupies around Nagorno-Karabakh itself, displaced peoples return to their homes, both countries and outside powers guarantee the rights of the residents of the disputed region, and eventually the status of the territory is resolved. But Armenia has no desire to give up its de facto control, and Azerbaijan has no incentive to relinquish its claim—especially as nationalism plays a critical role in keeping leaders in power in both countries, where both publics heavily oppose compromise. It’s not the only frozen conflict in the region, where the Soviet collapse has left behind many disputed territories.
What caused things to get worse this year?
Well, it’s 2020 and everything is awful, but there were some more specific causes. 2019 saw a lot of fierce rhetoric from both sides about the immutability of their claims, the greatness of the nation, and so forth. This summer, after bloody skirmishes along the border—which both sides blame the other for starting—politicians started wrapping themselves in the flag even more than usual, especially amid the stress and economic failure caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Will a new war change things?
The conflict is only a day old, but it’s hard to see a triumphant Azerbaijani reclamation of Nagorno-Karabakh ahead. The initial exchanges cost lives on both sides, but also—if Armenian battle footage is to be believed—saw the destruction of far more materiel on the Azerbaijani side than the Armenian. Armenia holds the heights, making Azerbaijani advances into the difficult mountain territory extremely hard. Independent assessments still rank Azerbaijan’s military readiness poorly; the army is unhappy, corrupt, and inefficient, with the desertion rate running at close to 20 percent. Profits from oil brought massive investment in new equipment between 2008 and 2014, but the crash in prices has left the country struggling financially amid political tumult and brutal repression, and the army lacks the training and doctrine to make efficient use of the weaponry it has bought.
An unexpected Azerbaijani surge could also prompt much more direct intervention by Moscow, most likely to enforce a rapid cease-fire. Both Russia and Iran have offered to negotiate an end to this newest round of hostilities. There’s also the worrying possibility of the conflict spreading—Turkey, for instance, has come heavily out in favor of Baku, thanks to strong ties between Azerbaijanis and Turks and Ankara’s long-standing antagonism toward the Armenians, who keep bringing up the matter of the still-denied Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915. The religious aspects of the original conflict remained understated compared to nationalist fervor, and Nagorno-Karabakh never became a jihadi cause in the way that, say, Chechnya did. (Some 2,000 former mujahideen fought for Azerbaijan, but for almost entirely mercenary reasons.) That could change this time round.
But the most likely prospect may be a painful, relatively small war followed by another unresolved peace. According to the casualty lists so far, most of those killed hadn’t even been born when the conflict first started.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Syria’s Forgotten Displaced Aren’t Equipped to Fight the Pandemic

After a brutal battle to oust the Islamic State in 2016 , villages in Shehba , a canton in the Afrin region of northwest Syria , were left in ruins .
Shehba—a triangle between the cities of Afrin , Azez , and Aleppo—had suffered three years of occupation by the terrorist group .
Pro-Islamic State graffiti and bloodstains lined the walls of the villages .
In January 2018 , Turkey launched a cross-border military operation into Afrin to clear the area of the Kurdish-led People ’ s Protection Units ( YPG ) , with support from a Syrian rebel force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey considers the YPG an extension of the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ( PKK ) , which operates inside Turkish borders .
The Turkish incursion displaced 300,000 people—the majority Kurdish—living in the city of Afrin , and about half fled to villages in surrounding Shehba .
Of that group , some 140,000 internally displaced people now live in makeshift housing , including abandoned buildings and bombed-out houses , across the region ’ s villages .
Around 10,000 others live in five camps for internally displaced persons ( IDPs ) set up by local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have cleared the vast majority of unexploded ordnance left behind by is the Islamic State , started growing crops , and in some cases rehabilitated half-destroyed homes .
But more than two years on , some say they feel forgotten—surrounded by Syrian government forces on one side and Turkish-backed rebels on the other .
While the majority of IDPs in Syria are now located in areas held by one warring side , those in Shehba are caught in a precarious position between the Syrian regime , supported by Russia , and the Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ When Turkey launched its Afrin operation , Russia condoned the attack but stopped the Turkish-backed forces from taking Shehba , seeking to maintain a strategic presence .
The Syrian regime aims to restrict humanitarian assistance to areas outside of its control , such as Shehba , which is under Kurdish authority .
The restrictions leave those sheltering there with limited access to basic supplies and medical care , and have placed them especially at risk during the coronavirus pandemic .
“ We live here like a flower among fires.
” As confirmed cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officially recorded—now is the time for the international community to act in Shehba .
“ We live here like a flower among fires , ” said Hasan , an IDP from Afrin who requested to use only his first name .
The regime of President Bashar al-Assad controls checkpoints into and out of Shehba , restricting the freedom of movement and the flow of aid and essential goods through extortion .
Not a single international organization has entered Shehba since April 2018 , according to Shiler Sido , the Kurdish Red Crescent spokesperson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come here who are close to the agenda of the Syrian regime , but other than that they don ’ t let anyone in , ” Sido said .
Each checkpoint has its own way of collecting funds , but those erected by the 4th Armored Division , led by the president ’ s brother , Maher al-Assad , is known to demand the highest sums , Sido said .
Some IDPs in Shehba said the Syrian government neglects them because they are Kurdish , pointing to a history of discrimination by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the government provided few services in Afrin , including education and transportation .
“ I think in the presence of the Syrian government , NGOs never come here … it is a forgotten area , ” Hasan said .
“ They make your existence here political.
” Throughout their displacement , those sheltering in Shehba have had difficulty accessing specialized health care .
The situation has compounded the challenge of containing the coronavirus in the region .
As of Sept. 21 , there were 52 active COVID-19 cases in Shehba , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the true number of cases to be higher : It does not have enough test kits for everyone with symptoms .
There is just one medical facility in Shehba , which is akin to a field hospital .
It has only 50 beds and lacks the specialist staff and adequate medical supplies to meet the needs of thousands of IDPs .
The Kurdish Red Crescent is converting another facility to treat COVID-19 patients , but it only has room for 20 beds .
Others are instructed to quarantine at home .
Those manning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response in Shehba .
Despite a sizable outbreak in nearby Aleppo , security forces allegedly didn ’ t monitor the symptoms of people crossing into Shehba to visit relatives , according to Sido .
And as the coronavirus spread in Shehba in August , the Kurdish-led Health Committee in northeast Syria loaded face masks , gloves , and other personal protective equipment onto trucks bound for Shehba—but none made it through the regime checkpoints .
The Kurdish Red Crescent started making masks using any materials at hand , including old clothes .
Only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the checkpoints , according to Sido .
Without widely available testing , health care workers rely on their knowledge of COVID-19 symptoms to diagnose and isolate patients .
The Kurdish administration also sent a polymerase chain reaction ( PCR ) machine used to test for the coronavirus to Shehba , but it has allegedly been held up in Aleppo by Syrian government authorities .
Those at the Red Crescent in Shehba say they will likely have to pay an extortionate amount of money to regime authorities for the machine , as with other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the security barriers know PCR machines cost a lot of money , so they have to make money out of it , ” Sido said .
Those needing specialist care , such as a cardiologist , a surgeon , or a ventilator , must travel to Aleppo .
But in order to reach the city , IDPs in Shehba must cross through three checkpoints , which sources say can cost up to $ 195 in bribes .
The Syrian security forces only allow their own ambulance to travel into Shehba to pick up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ list .
The Syrian security forces only allow their own ambulance to travel into Shehba to pick up patients who have registered on a waiting list .
An alternative , according to Hasan , is to pay bribes to the Iranian militia groups who are stationed in the west of Shehba and smuggle people to Aleppo and back again , starting at 50,000 Syrian pounds , or around $ 25 .
The Syrian government has long prioritized aid to civilians in regime areas and often blocked the U.N. from accessing regions held by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Food Program provide water and food boxes to the five camps in Shehba , but only through in-country partner organizations affiliated with the regime—namely , the Syrian Arab Red Crescent .
Sido said this is a political move .
“ When Turkey started its war against Afrin in its so-called Olive Branch Operation , the Syrian government turned a blind eye , ” she said .
“ Because of political agendas the U.N. are affected by , they neglect us , too , ” she said .
The spokesperson for the United Nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OCHA ) in Syria , Danielle Moylan , said that the coronavirus pandemic has taken a toll on the humanitarian response in every part of Syria .
“ OCHA and U.N. agencies work to consistently advocate with all parties for humanitarian access so that assistance can reach those who need it in a principled manner , ” she said .
The Assad regime ’ s strategy of restricting humanitarian aid to areas beyond its control goes against the impartial values of the United Nations .
Its agencies say they must strike a delicate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can—or risk being kicked out of Syria if they overstep the regime ’ s line .
Others argue that donors should demand higher standards .
As the IDPs in Shehba continue to call on the international community for humanitarian assistance , Sido said she doesn ’ t expect the regime to suddenly lift its restrictions .
While humanitarian law requires the consent of the government to operate within its borders , states should not have unlimited freedom to refuse humanitarian aid on arbitrary grounds .
Refugees and IDPs across Syria deserve lasting solutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If aid continues to be restricted , then displacement in places such as Shehba risks becoming permanent .

After a brutal battle to oust the Islamic State in 2016, villages in Shehba, a canton in the Afrin region of northwest Syria, were left in ruins. Shehba—a triangle between the cities of Afrin, Azez, and Aleppo—had suffered three years of occupation by the terrorist group. Pro-Islamic State graffiti and bloodstains lined the walls of the villages.
After a brutal battle to oust the Islamic State in 2016, villages in Shehba, a canton in the Afrin region of northwest Syria, were left in ruins. Shehba—a triangle between the cities of Afrin, Azez, and Aleppo—had suffered three years of occupation by the terrorist group. Pro-Islamic State graffiti and bloodstains lined the walls of the villages.
In January 2018, Turkey launched a cross-border military operation into Afrin to clear the area of the Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG), with support from a Syrian rebel force known as the Syrian National Army. Turkey considers the YPG an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which operates inside Turkish borders.
The Turkish incursion displaced 300,000 people—the majority Kurdish—living in the city of Afrin, and about half fled to villages in surrounding Shehba. Of that group, some 140,000 internally displaced people now live in makeshift housing, including abandoned buildings and bombed-out houses, across the region’s villages. Around 10,000 others live in five camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) set up by local Kurdish administrators.
Those sheltering in Shehba have cleared the vast majority of unexploded ordnance left behind by is the Islamic State, started growing crops, and in some cases rehabilitated half-destroyed homes. But more than two years on, some say they feel forgotten—surrounded by Syrian government forces on one side and Turkish-backed rebels on the other.
While the majority of IDPs in Syria are now located in areas held by one warring side, those in Shehba are caught in a precarious position between the Syrian regime, supported by Russia, and the Syrian National Army, supported by Turkey. When Turkey launched its Afrin operation, Russia condoned the attack but stopped the Turkish-backed forces from taking Shehba, seeking to maintain a strategic presence.
The Syrian regime aims to restrict humanitarian assistance to areas outside of its control, such as Shehba, which is under Kurdish authority. The restrictions leave those sheltering there with limited access to basic supplies and medical care, and have placed them especially at risk during the coronavirus pandemic.
“We live here like a flower among fires.”
As confirmed cases of COVID-19 tick up—with many likely not officially recorded—now is the time for the international community to act in Shehba. “We live here like a flower among fires,” said Hasan, an IDP from Afrin who requested to use only his first name.
The regime of President Bashar al-Assad controls checkpoints into and out of Shehba, restricting the freedom of movement and the flow of aid and essential goods through extortion. Not a single international organization has entered Shehba since April 2018, according to Shiler Sido, the Kurdish Red Crescent spokesperson in Shehba. “They let people come here who are close to the agenda of the Syrian regime, but other than that they don’t let anyone in,” Sido said.
Each checkpoint has its own way of collecting funds, but those erected by the 4th Armored Division, led by the president’s brother, Maher al-Assad, is known to demand the highest sums, Sido said.
Some IDPs in Shehba said the Syrian government neglects them because they are Kurdish, pointing to a history of discrimination by the Assad regime. Before the civil war, the government provided few services in Afrin, including education and transportation. “I think in the presence of the Syrian government, NGOs never come here … it is a forgotten area,” Hasan said. “They make your existence here political.”
Throughout their displacement, those sheltering in Shehba have had difficulty accessing specialized health care. The situation has compounded the challenge of containing the coronavirus in the region. As of Sept. 21, there were 52 active COVID-19 cases in Shehba, with seven confirmed deaths. The KRC believes the true number of cases to be higher: It does not have enough test kits for everyone with symptoms.
There is just one medical facility in Shehba, which is akin to a field hospital. It has only 50 beds and lacks the specialist staff and adequate medical supplies to meet the needs of thousands of IDPs. The Kurdish Red Crescent is converting another facility to treat COVID-19 patients, but it only has room for 20 beds. Others are instructed to quarantine at home.
Those manning the regime checkpoints have undermined the pandemic response in Shehba. Despite a sizable outbreak in nearby Aleppo, security forces allegedly didn’t monitor the symptoms of people crossing into Shehba to visit relatives, according to Sido.
And as the coronavirus spread in Shehba in August, the Kurdish-led Health Committee in northeast Syria loaded face masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment onto trucks bound for Shehba—but none made it through the regime checkpoints. The Kurdish Red Crescent started making masks using any materials at hand, including old clothes.
Only three diagnostic test kits have crossed through the checkpoints, according to Sido. Without widely available testing, health care workers rely on their knowledge of COVID-19 symptoms to diagnose and isolate patients.
The Kurdish administration also sent a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) machine used to test for the coronavirus to Shehba, but it has allegedly been held up in Aleppo by Syrian government authorities. Those at the Red Crescent in Shehba say they will likely have to pay an extortionate amount of money to regime authorities for the machine, as with other medical supplies. “The people at the security barriers know PCR machines cost a lot of money, so they have to make money out of it,” Sido said.
Those needing specialist care, such as a cardiologist, a surgeon, or a ventilator, must travel to Aleppo. But in order to reach the city, IDPs in Shehba must cross through three checkpoints, which sources say can cost up to $195 in bribes. The Syrian security forces only allow their own ambulance to travel into Shehba to pick up patients who have registered on a waiting list.
The Syrian security forces only allow their own ambulance to travel into Shehba to pick up patients who have registered on a waiting list.
An alternative, according to Hasan, is to pay bribes to the Iranian militia groups who are stationed in the west of Shehba and smuggle people to Aleppo and back again, starting at 50,000 Syrian pounds, or around $25.
The Syrian government has long prioritized aid to civilians in regime areas and often blocked the U.N. from accessing regions held by the opposition. UNICEF and the World Food Program provide water and food boxes to the five camps in Shehba, but only through in-country partner organizations affiliated with the regime—namely, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.
Sido said this is a political move. “When Turkey started its war against Afrin in its so-called Olive Branch Operation, the Syrian government turned a blind eye,” she said. “Because of political agendas the U.N. are affected by, they neglect us, too,” she said.
The spokesperson for the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Syria, Danielle Moylan, said that the coronavirus pandemic has taken a toll on the humanitarian response in every part of Syria. “OCHA and U.N. agencies work to consistently advocate with all parties for humanitarian access so that assistance can reach those who need it in a principled manner,” she said.
The Assad regime’s strategy of restricting humanitarian aid to areas beyond its control goes against the impartial values of the United Nations. Its agencies say they must strike a delicate balance to continue offering what assistance they can—or risk being kicked out of Syria if they overstep the regime’s line. Others argue that donors should demand higher standards.
As the IDPs in Shehba continue to call on the international community for humanitarian assistance, Sido said she doesn’t expect the regime to suddenly lift its restrictions. While humanitarian law requires the consent of the government to operate within its borders, states should not have unlimited freedom to refuse humanitarian aid on arbitrary grounds.
Refugees and IDPs across Syria deserve lasting solutions to their displacement in the immediate future. If aid continues to be restricted, then displacement in places such as Shehba risks becoming permanent.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-28--Las sanciones están llevando a Irán y Venezuela a los brazos del otro

Washington has no right to impose snapback sanctions on Tehran because it is no longer a participant in the Iran @ @ @

Francisco Rodríguez and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj

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