foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--Australia Is Having a Strategic Revolution, and It’s All About China

Australia Is Having a Strategic Revolution , and It ’ s All About China At the beginning of July , Australia ’ s Prime Minister Scott Morrison declared that “ our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War.
” He wrote that in the introduction to his government ’ s “ Defence Strategic Update ” and “ Force Structure Plan , ” which many are hailing as a fundamental shift in Australia ’ s strategic approach .
Australian defense planning might seem remote , but the shift could alter the basic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S. approach to competition in this region .
The questions now is whether Washington will notice the significant change in its most trusted Pacific ally ’ s posture , whether it will choose to cooperate with Canberra ’ s efforts to pull off its new strategy , and whether it will treat this as a useful model for other allies and partners .
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update is a revision of Australia ’ s 2016 Defence White Paper .
The quick revision signifies that Australian leaders believe their security environment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seldom call out Beijing specifically , the cause of the erosion is hardly a mystery .
The strategic update notes : “ Military modernisation in the Indo-Pacific has accelerated faster than envisaged.
” Asian defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product has actually decreased over the last five years .
Only in China has there been a serious increase in overall defense spending .
It is not only China ’ s military capabilities , which it has been building for decades , that have caused anxiety .
Rather , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a growing sense of alarm .
In just the last few months , Beijing has asserted control over Hong Kong , intruded into Taiwan ’ s airspace , trained guns on the Philippine Navy , harassed Malaysian vessels , sunk a Vietnamese fishing ship , rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel , reignited a deadly border conflict with India , and conducted cyberattacks and economic coercion against Australia .
It was against this backdrop that Morrison took the stage late last month to argue that Australians can not afford to ignore what is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
At a time when governments have pumped massive resources into economic stabilization efforts , calling for more defense spending presents a challenging case .
Yet given China ’ s aggression around its periphery , Morrison argued that investing in defense is both necessary and stabilizing .
The Australian government has therefore promised additional investment into defense , greater capability to deter hostile states , and more focus on Australia ’ s immediate region .
Morrison laid out 270 billion Australian dollars ( $ 190 billion ) in defense spending over the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grow defense spending to 2 percent of Australia ’ s GDP by 2020-2021 .
This announcement promises to reorient Australia ’ s strategy around enhanced deterrent capabilities , particularly longer-range striking capabilities .
This approach also acknowledges increasing risks—that might result in Australia having to go to war and fight on its own for a prolonged period ( hence , a call for stockpiling more fuel and munitions ) .
Other key initiatives include enhancing cybersecurity and space capabilities , fielding underwater surveillance systems , growing the military ’ s size , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combines political and military forms of coercion .
American leaders should pay close attention to Australia ’ s new approach .
Canberra ’ s strategic shift has the potential to significantly change Australian capabilities , geographic orientation , and regional commitments .
It could also fundamentally alter the dynamics and responsibilities within the Australian-U.S. alliance .
Canberra ’ s strategic update should remind Americans of three pressing needs : devoting more resources to Asia , intensifying capability development with allies and partners , and clarifying geographic priorities across alliances .
Both the Obama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” with U.S. allies , so Washington should be pleased that Canberra is stepping up and sharing more of the burden .
Although 73 percent of Australians disapprove of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s criticism of allied defense spending , Australia ’ s leaders have committed to a major spending increase and explicitly promised to “ take greater responsibility for our own security.
” This has more to do with China ’ s increasingly aggressive behavior than with U.S. pleas .
Regardless , Australia is putting resources behind its strategy .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ committing more of its own resources to Asia .
In 2011 , then-President Barack Obama promised “ to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.
” Today , however , leading defense expert Michèle Flournoy acknowledges that “ Washington has not delivered on its promised ‘ pivot ’ to Asia .
U.S. troop levels in the region remain similar to what they were a decade ago.
” Australia ’ s efforts to match its resources to its rhetoric should inspire the United States and other countries to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ considering several options that would shift defense resources to the region—including a Pacific Deterrence Initiative and an Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative .
Both have merit , as getting America ’ s regional posture right will require a more robust deterrent against China and renewed efforts to reassure allies and partners about America ’ s commitment .
Reinvesting in deterrence capabilities demands that the United States follow Australia ’ s lead by investing in new types of forces .
For years , America and its allies have worried that China ’ s growing arsenal of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ships .
Yet , the United States has been too slow to embrace effective counters , particularly dispersed air and sea denial systems , which would complicate China ’ s ability to threaten U.S. and allied assets .
Canberra has signaled its intent to neutralize Beijing ’ s emerging power projection systems by using its own area denial capabilities to “ hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia.
” That is why Australian plans call for “ submarines , advanced long-range strike weapons , remotely piloted combat aircraft , sea-mining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , these acquisitions have the potential to constrict Beijing ’ s ability to project power by turning China ’ s strategy of anti-access and area denial on its head .
The U.S. military—particularly the Marine Corps—is pursuing similar capabilities .
Australia ’ s strategic update should serve as additional impetus to prioritize these efforts and resource them appropriately .
Moreover , the allies should work together to develop these systems and concepts of operations .
After all , if Beijing wants to change the territorial status quo in East Asia , it must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ air and sea denial capabilities could neutralize China ’ s power projection forces , but maximizing their effectiveness will require close allied coordination .
Finally , the United States should take note of Australia ’ s revised geographic focus .
Canberra has made the decision to emphasize its “ immediate region : ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean , through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.
” Australia has spent much of the last two decades operating alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today lie in its own neighborhood .
And that is also where the United States needs Australia most .
Refocusing the alliance ’ s geographic emphasis necessitates some difficult and overdue alliance discussions .
Australia ’ s renewed focus on its immediate region is logical , but it has serious implications for alliance coordination .
Will this approach diminish Australia ’ s ability to operate elsewhere in Asia ?
For example , what would Australia ’ s role be in potential contingencies inside the first island chain—the first set of archipelagos around the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought maritime control ?
In particular , what should the United States expect of Australia in a potential conflict over Taiwan ?
This question goes to a critical debate about U.S. strategy in Asia : Can the United States federate the region ’ s defenses ?
In Europe , the United States benefits from largely unified allied capabilities .
American leaders have attempted to do something similar in Asia by building out the Quad—through which it partners with Japan , Australia , and India—and other small multilateral groupings .
But the Indo-Pacific is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ally and partner worries about and prioritizes different contingencies .
Some aspects of U.S. policy have further incentivized this behavior .
The Trump administration ’ s “ America first ” approach has forced other countries to think more about building their own independent capabilities and acclimatized them to a narrower definition of self-interest .
Such an approach can have advantages , but insufficient coordination makes capability duplication or gaps more likely .
If Washington is to build regional support to put collective pressure on Beijing , it will have to play a more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its allies and partners .
What does this mean for the alliance moving forward ?
Australia and the United States need to have a series of strategic dialogues to address the implications of Australia ’ s new approach .
These discussions should start next week at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations ( AUSMIN ) , which include the allies ’ leading diplomats and defense officials .
Jumpstarting this discussion is critical if the United States is to fully appreciate and take advantage of Australia ’ s strategic update .
It is also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s trust in the United States .
The United States has long asked its Asian allies to do more—for themselves , throughout the region , and with regards to China .
Australia is responding , and the United States should work with Canberra to achieve its ambitious agenda .
Australia ’ s updated strategy should alter alliance roles and missions , lead to more equitable burden-sharing , and reward greater Australian leadership in the alliance .
It should also be seen as a model for what other states could do to redress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assets , and hold Chinese forces at greater risk .
Such efforts could constrain the Communist Party ’ s push outward and thereby stabilize the region .
All of this is born out of a tragic sensibility about how much the foundations of prosperity , security , and stability have eroded .
Morrison declared that “ the institutions [ and ] patterns of cooperation that have benefited our prosperity and security for decades are now under increasing , and I would suggest almost irreversible strain.
” He conceded that looking back to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the abyss of war , and thinking about their resonance today “ can be very haunting.
” That dark period saw democracies insufficiently aligned , poorly armed , and unwilling to meaningfully resist acts of aggression .
That should not be a counsel of despair but rather a charge to act in a situation that “ requires a response.
” Changing circumstances demand adaptive policies .
Neither the United States nor Australia can afford stasis or drift .
Nor , for that matter , can other states alarmed by China ’ s increasing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points in the right direction for Australia , for the United States , and for the regional more generally .

At the beginning of July, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison declared that “our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War.” He wrote that in the introduction to his government’s “ Defence Strategic Update ” and “ Force Structure Plan ,” which many are hailing as a fundamental shift in Australia’s strategic approach.
At the beginning of July, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison declared that “our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War.” He wrote that in the introduction to his government’s “Defence Strategic Update” and “Force Structure Plan,” which many are hailing as a fundamental shift in Australia’s strategic approach.
Australian defense planning might seem remote, but the shift could alter the basic security dynamic in the Indo-Pacific region—and correspondingly, the U.S. approach to competition in this region. The questions now is whether Washington will notice the significant change in its most trusted Pacific ally’s posture, whether it will choose to cooperate with Canberra’s efforts to pull off its new strategy, and whether it will treat this as a useful model for other allies and partners.
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update is a revision of Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper. The quick revision signifies that Australian leaders believe their security environment has rapidly deteriorated. Although the documents seldom call out Beijing specifically, the cause of the erosion is hardly a mystery. The strategic update notes: “Military modernisation in the Indo-Pacific has accelerated faster than envisaged.” Asian defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product has actually decreased over the last five years. Only in China has there been a serious increase in overall defense spending.
It is not only China’s military capabilities, which it has been building for decades, that have caused anxiety. Rather, it is their increasingly aggressive use that has caused a growing sense of alarm. In just the last few months, Beijing has asserted control over Hong Kong, intruded into Taiwan’s airspace, trained guns on the Philippine Navy, harassed Malaysian vessels, sunk a Vietnamese fishing ship, rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, reignited a deadly border conflict with India, and conducted cyberattacks and economic coercion against Australia.
It was against this backdrop that Morrison took the stage late last month to argue that Australians cannot afford to ignore what is occurring around, and to, them. At a time when governments have pumped massive resources into economic stabilization efforts, calling for more defense spending presents a challenging case. Yet given China’s aggression around its periphery, Morrison argued that investing in defense is both necessary and stabilizing.
The Australian government has therefore promised additional investment into defense, greater capability to deter hostile states, and more focus on Australia’s immediate region. Morrison laid out 270 billion Australian dollars ($190 billion) in defense spending over the next 10 years, a commitment that will grow defense spending to 2 percent of Australia’s GDP by 2020-2021.
This announcement promises to reorient Australia’s strategy around enhanced deterrent capabilities, particularly longer-range striking capabilities. This approach also acknowledges increasing risks—that might result in Australia having to go to war and fight on its own for a prolonged period (hence, a call for stockpiling more fuel and munitions). Other key initiatives include enhancing cybersecurity and space capabilities, fielding underwater surveillance systems, growing the military’s size, and boosting capabilities to counter hybrid warfare that combines political and military forms of coercion.
American leaders should pay close attention to Australia’s new approach. Canberra’s strategic shift has the potential to significantly change Australian capabilities, geographic orientation, and regional commitments. It could also fundamentally alter the dynamics and responsibilities within the Australian-U.S. alliance. Canberra’s strategic update should remind Americans of three pressing needs: devoting more resources to Asia, intensifying capability development with allies and partners, and clarifying geographic priorities across alliances.
Both the Obama and Trump administrations criticized “unfair burden-sharing” with U.S. allies, so Washington should be pleased that Canberra is stepping up and sharing more of the burden. Although 73 percent of Australians disapprove of U.S. President Donald Trump’s criticism of allied defense spending, Australia’s leaders have committed to a major spending increase and explicitly promised to “take greater responsibility for our own security.” This has more to do with China’s increasingly aggressive behavior than with U.S. pleas. Regardless, Australia is putting resources behind its strategy.
Now the United States should follow suit by committing more of its own resources to Asia. In 2011, then-President Barack Obama promised “to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.” Today, however, leading defense expert Michèle Flournoy acknowledges that “Washington has not delivered on its promised ‘pivot’ to Asia. U.S. troop levels in the region remain similar to what they were a decade ago.”
Australia’s efforts to match its resources to its rhetoric should inspire the United States and other countries to do the same. The U.S. Congress is considering several options that would shift defense resources to the region—including a Pacific Deterrence Initiative and an Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative. Both have merit, as getting America’s regional posture right will require a more robust deterrent against China and renewed efforts to reassure allies and partners about America’s commitment.
Reinvesting in deterrence capabilities demands that the United States follow Australia’s lead by investing in new types of forces. For years, America and its allies have worried that China’s growing arsenal of long-range missiles threatens forward bases and surface ships. Yet, the United States has been too slow to embrace effective counters, particularly dispersed air and sea denial systems, which would complicate China’s ability to threaten U.S. and allied assets. Canberra has signaled its intent to neutralize Beijing’s emerging power projection systems by using its own area denial capabilities to “hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia.” That is why Australian plans call for “submarines, advanced long-range strike weapons, remotely piloted combat aircraft, sea-mining and offensive cyber capabilities.” Taken together, these acquisitions have the potential to constrict Beijing’s ability to project power by turning China’s strategy of anti-access and area denial on its head.
The U.S. military—particularly the Marine Corps—is pursuing similar capabilities. Australia’s strategic update should serve as additional impetus to prioritize these efforts and resource them appropriately. Moreover, the allies should work together to develop these systems and concepts of operations. After all, if Beijing wants to change the territorial status quo in East Asia, it must cross large bodies of water. Reliable air and sea denial capabilities could neutralize China’s power projection forces, but maximizing their effectiveness will require close allied coordination.
Finally, the United States should take note of Australia’s revised geographic focus. Canberra has made the decision to emphasize its “immediate region: ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.” Australia has spent much of the last two decades operating alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Australia’s greatest threats today lie in its own neighborhood. And that is also where the United States needs Australia most.
Refocusing the alliance’s geographic emphasis necessitates some difficult and overdue alliance discussions. Australia’s renewed focus on its immediate region is logical, but it has serious implications for alliance coordination. Will this approach diminish Australia’s ability to operate elsewhere in Asia? For example, what would Australia’s role be in potential contingencies inside the first island chain—the first set of archipelagos around the East Asian coast—within which China has increasingly sought maritime control? In particular, what should the United States expect of Australia in a potential conflict over Taiwan?
This question goes to a critical debate about U.S. strategy in Asia: Can the United States federate the region’s defenses? In Europe, the United States benefits from largely unified allied capabilities. American leaders have attempted to do something similar in Asia by building out the Quad—through which it partners with Japan, Australia, and India—and other small multilateral groupings. But the Indo-Pacific is a maritime theater, and each U.S. ally and partner worries about and prioritizes different contingencies.
Some aspects of U.S. policy have further incentivized this behavior. The Trump administration’s “America first” approach has forced other countries to think more about building their own independent capabilities and acclimatized them to a narrower definition of self-interest. Such an approach can have advantages, but insufficient coordination makes capability duplication or gaps more likely. If Washington is to build regional support to put collective pressure on Beijing, it will have to play a more active role integrating its strategy and those of its allies and partners.
What does this mean for the alliance moving forward? Australia and the United States need to have a series of strategic dialogues to address the implications of Australia’s new approach. These discussions should start next week at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), which include the allies’ leading diplomats and defense officials. Jumpstarting this discussion is critical if the United States is to fully appreciate and take advantage of Australia’s strategic update. It is also necessary to start rebuilding the Australian public’s trust in the United States.
The United States has long asked its Asian allies to do more—for themselves, throughout the region, and with regards to China. Australia is responding, and the United States should work with Canberra to achieve its ambitious agenda. Australia’s updated strategy should alter alliance roles and missions, lead to more equitable burden-sharing, and reward greater Australian leadership in the alliance. It should also be seen as a model for what other states could do to redress current power trends, acquire more lethal assets, and hold Chinese forces at greater risk. Such efforts could constrain the Communist Party’s push outward and thereby stabilize the region.
All of this is born out of a tragic sensibility about how much the foundations of prosperity, security, and stability have eroded. Morrison declared that “the institutions [and] patterns of cooperation that have benefited our prosperity and security for decades are now under increasing, and I would suggest almost irreversible strain.” He conceded that looking back to the 1930s, before the world plunged into the abyss of war, and thinking about their resonance today “can be very haunting.” That dark period saw democracies insufficiently aligned, poorly armed, and unwilling to meaningfully resist acts of aggression. That should not be a counsel of despair but rather a charge to act in a situation that “requires a response.”
Changing circumstances demand adaptive policies. Neither the United States nor Australia can afford stasis or drift. Nor, for that matter, can other states alarmed by China’s increasing belligerence. Canberra’s recent announcement points in the right direction for Australia, for the United States, and for the regional more generally.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--To Secure His Legacy, Khamenei Is Packing Iran’s Government With Young Radicals

To Secure His Legacy , Khamenei Is Packing Iran ’ s Government With Young Radicals In just under a year , Iran will elect a new president .
Coming after the U.S. election this November , there is some hope that the occasion could usher in improved U.S.-Iranian relations .
Yet , given the way Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been narrowing the field of candidates , that seems unlikely .
Khamenei set the scene for the upcoming vote with a manifesto published in February 2019 with the title “ The Second Phase of the Revolution.
” In it , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1979 Islamic Revolution and charts a vision for the next 40 .
Khamenei appears to understand that , at age 81 , he will not remain leader forever , and so he seeks to ensure that his principles outlive him .
The predominant strategy the manifesto puts forth is “ javangarayi va javansazi modiriyat-e keshvar ” or the “ youthfulness and rejuvenation of the country ’ s management , ” through which young supporters “ prepare the ground for the formation of a young and pious government.
” In government , this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of stocking unelected political offices with people who are either younger or more hard-line .
Since 2019 , Khamenei has replaced several military elites in the armed forces ( Joint Staff ) , conventional military ( Artesh ) , and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) to inject new blood into the veins of the regime .
His old representatives in the state bureaucracy , local governments , and universities have likewise been replaced by a young and even more radical generation .
For example , in March 2019 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sadeq Larijani as chief justice of Iran .
Raisi previously lost to President Hassan Rouhani in Iran ’ s 2017 presidential election and played a prominent role in the mass execution of thousands of leftist political prisoners as deputy prosecutor general of Tehran in 1988 .
After he became the head of Iran ’ s judiciary , the use of the death penalty in the country has escalated .
Since late June , 11 Iranian citizens—three in Tehran and eight in Isfahan—have been sentenced to death for taking part in mass anti-government protests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam , who was accused of fueling anti-government protests through a popular Telegram channel in 2017 , received a death sentence last month .
He had fled to exile in France before being arrested by Iranian authorities in Iraq .
Iran ’ s parliament , the Majlis , an elected body , was also significantly influenced by Khamenei ’ s political project this year .
In May , Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf , an IRGC technocrat , three-time loser in previous presidential elections , and close friend of Khamenei ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ascended to the position of speaker of parliament .
He is known for a series of corruption cases and his ardent support of using live fire against student protesters .
Meanwhile , the Guardian Council , a 12-person body appointed by the supreme leader , vets every candidate for national office .
Since 2019 , the council has favored only candidates who display total loyalty to the supreme leader and his so-called revolutionary politics .
In the latest parliamentary election , 90 previous members of parliament were disqualified from running again .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ final piece of the puzzle in Khamenei ’ s “ Second Phase of the Revolution , ” regardless of whether the Iranian people share his vision .
For his purposes , the candidates must have revolutionary loyalty he seeks , the management skills to run a regime under internal and external pressure , and , less importantly , some degree of popularity among the people .
Such candidates would be in the political vein of popular hard-liner and ex-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , yet even more loyal to Khamenei .
On its own , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ severely restricts the spectrum of ideology presidential candidates may hold .
Left-leaning groups including the Reformists ( such as former President Mohammad Khatami ) and centrist pragmatists ( such as current President Rouhani ) no longer have a place in an election that seeks the formation of a secure , young , “ revolutionary ” administration .
Although such figures previously marked a divide between the state ’ s elected bodies and its unelected bodies , Khamenei is now laser-focused on ensuring the consolidation of hard-liner power and a smooth succession upon his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or tolerate any duality that creates a potential impasse for the regime .
Reformists and centrists are now liabilities when internal dissent is more dangerous than ever .
The regime does not admit to insecurity , of course , but nonetheless there is considerable fear that any misstep could sabotage a system already in distress .
Meanwhile , Khamenei ’ s job in purging his undesirables from the competition is easier than before , since reformists and pragmatists have lost much of their credibility among Iranians due to immense mismanagement , incompetency , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2017-2018 protests on , the slogan “ Reformists , hard-liners , it is over for all of you !
” has become increasingly popular .
Traditional principlists such as the Islamic Coalition Party advocate for conservative social policies and are mostly connected to the bazaaris , the traditional middle and upper class with roots in the marketplaces .
These groups advocate for economic advancement through increased trade , rather than further domestic industrialization .
They have a small social base and lack presence and support among IRGC—a must for success in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting of the principlists , the traditionalists ’ main parliamentary candidate , Mostafa Mirsalim , received only 5 votes out of 240 in the selection for speaker of parliament .
On the other end of the principlist spectrum are the radical principlists who favor isolationism from the West and expansionism in the Middle East .
They are the most anti-Western and anti-American faction on the right side of the political spectrum .
They are mostly allies of Ayatollah Taqi Misbah Yazdi , the leader of a fundamentalist political group called the Front of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the support of younger and more radical members of the Basij , Iran ’ s voluntary paramilitary militia , but not of the more status quo-oriented majority .
Any candidate from this camp would be a staunch hard-liner and consistent challenge to any remaining centrists , let alone reformers , within the regime .
Ahmadinejad , who was president from 2005 to 2013 , was very close to this group .
His return is the subject of much speculation , but his candidacy would be nonviable due to a fallout with Khamenei in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seize control over the Ministry of Intelligence , among other maneuvers .
In 2017 , Ahmadinejad allegedly applied for a third term that Khamenei rejected .
The former president ’ s close allies Hamid Baghaei and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei , both former vice presidents , were likewise disqualified by the Guardian Council before being sentenced to prison for embezzlement and economic corruption .
Ahmadinejad is still popular among some poorer Iranians , but there is no hope for his return .
Saeed Jalili , potentially a promising equivalent in Khamenei ’ s eyes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principlists .
A failed 2013 presidential candidate , he is the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and acted as one of Iran ’ s hard-liner nuclear negotiators .
He is both an extreme loyalist—he even lost a leg as a volunteer fighter in the Iran-Iraq War—and a well-versed diplomat with a Ph.D. in political science .
The strongest political subgroup among the principlists is the neo-principlist camp , whose base is the middle class and higher echelons of the IRGC .
This includes politicians such as Qalibaf , the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former commander of the IRGC air force , head of Iran ’ s police , and mayor of Tehran .
Candidates from this ideological stream generally tout technocratic experience and strong relations with the IRGC .
They are less isolationist but promote a self-sufficient economy , called the “ resistance economy , ” and are confrontational toward the West and the United States .
One of the rising stars of this group is Parviz Fattah , a former IRGC member and former minister of energy under Ahmadinejad .
The Middle East Institute ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as the head of the Mostazafan Foundation , a charitable foundation controlled by the supreme leader , Fattah might be able to ease concerns among Iran ’ s poor .
Another potential candidate in this group is Saeed Mohammad , head of Khatam al-Anbiya , Iran ’ s largest military contractor .
Between his high rank in the IRGC and Ph.D. in engineering , he strikes a balance between extreme loyalism and a modern intellectual bent that can appeal both domestically and internationally .
As for the rest of the world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two possible scenarios .
Domestic analysts such as Sadegh Zibakalam , a professor of political science at the University of Tehran , and Ali Motahari , a former deputy speaker of the Majlis , argue that the homogenization of the regime will reduce internal dissent and ultimately lead to smoother negotiations with the West .
Beyond Iran , Michael Tanchum , a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies , likewise posits that “ Iran ’ s hard-liners may offer the U.S. concessions for the sake of the regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was direct conflict , not internal dissent , that sabotaged diplomatic efforts .
In Iran , all strategic decisions ultimately flow from the supreme leader , who is deeply suspicious toward the West , and especially the United States .
Khamenei never fully supported Rouhani ’ s negotiations with the West , and the breakdown of the deal will only have strengthened that stance .
In his 40-year plan , Khamenei has clearly articulated the regime ’ s totalitarian aspirations , and the leadership he is putting in place ensures that his stringency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be dangerous : As Khamenei engineers his absolute control , his supporters have no one else to blame should his vision fail .

In just under a year, Iran will elect a new president. Coming after the U.S. election this November, there is some hope that the occasion could usher in improved U.S.-Iranian relations. Yet, given the way Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been narrowing the field of candidates, that seems unlikely.
In just under a year, Iran will elect a new president. Coming after the U.S. election this November, there is some hope that the occasion could usher in improved U.S.-Iranian relations. Yet, given the way Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been narrowing the field of candidates, that seems unlikely.
Khamenei set the scene for the upcoming vote with a manifesto published in February 2019 with the title “The Second Phase of the Revolution.” In it, he reflects on the 40 years since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and charts a vision for the next 40. Khamenei appears to understand that, at age 81, he will not remain leader forever, and so he seeks to ensure that his principles outlive him. The predominant strategy the manifesto puts forth is “javangarayi va javansazi modiriyat-e keshvar” or the “youthfulness and rejuvenation of the country’s management,” through which young supporters “prepare the ground for the formation of a young and pious government.”
In government, this so-called youth-washing project has taken the form of stocking unelected political offices with people who are either younger or more hard-line. Since 2019, Khamenei has replaced several military elites in the armed forces (Joint Staff), conventional military (Artesh), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to inject new blood into the veins of the regime. His old representatives in the state bureaucracy, local governments, and universities have likewise been replaced by a young and even more radical generation.
For example, in March 2019, the ultraconservative hard-liner Ebrahim Raisi stepped in for Sadeq Larijani as chief justice of Iran. Raisi previously lost to President Hassan Rouhani in Iran’s 2017 presidential election and played a prominent role in the mass execution of thousands of leftist political prisoners as deputy prosecutor general of Tehran in 1988. After he became the head of Iran’s judiciary, the use of the death penalty in the country has escalated. Since late June, 11 Iranian citizens—three in Tehran and eight in Isfahan—have been sentenced to death for taking part in mass anti-government protests in November 2019. Meanwhile, the Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam, who was accused of fueling anti-government protests through a popular Telegram channel in 2017, received a death sentence last month. He had fled to exile in France before being arrested by Iranian authorities in Iraq.
Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, an elected body, was also significantly influenced by Khamenei’s political project this year. In May, Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, an IRGC technocrat, three-time loser in previous presidential elections, and close friend of Khamenei’s son and potential successor Mojtaba Khamenei, ascended to the position of speaker of parliament. He is known for a series of corruption cases and his ardent support of using live fire against student protesters. Meanwhile, the Guardian Council, a 12-person body appointed by the supreme leader, vets every candidate for national office. Since 2019, the council has favored only candidates who display total loyalty to the supreme leader and his so-called revolutionary politics. In the latest parliamentary election, 90 previous members of parliament were disqualified from running again.
The 2021 presidential election will be the final piece of the puzzle in Khamenei’s “Second Phase of the Revolution,” regardless of whether the Iranian people share his vision. For his purposes, the candidates must have revolutionary loyalty he seeks, the management skills to run a regime under internal and external pressure, and, less importantly, some degree of popularity among the people. Such candidates would be in the political vein of popular hard-liner and ex-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, yet even more loyal to Khamenei.
On its own, the political landscape engineered by Khamenei already severely restricts the spectrum of ideology presidential candidates may hold. Left-leaning groups including the Reformists (such as former President Mohammad Khatami) and centrist pragmatists (such as current President Rouhani) no longer have a place in an election that seeks the formation of a secure, young, “revolutionary” administration.
Although such figures previously marked a divide between the state’s elected bodies and its unelected bodies, Khamenei is now laser-focused on ensuring the consolidation of hard-liner power and a smooth succession upon his death; he will no longer need or tolerate any duality that creates a potential impasse for the regime. Reformists and centrists are now liabilities when internal dissent is more dangerous than ever.
The regime does not admit to insecurity, of course, but nonetheless there is considerable fear that any misstep could sabotage a system already in distress. Meanwhile, Khamenei’s job in purging his undesirables from the competition is easier than before, since reformists and pragmatists have lost much of their credibility among Iranians due to immense mismanagement, incompetency, and corruption in recent administration. From the 2017-2018 protests on, the slogan “Reformists, hard-liners, it is over for all of you!” has become increasingly popular.
With all of Khamenei’s political calculations in mind, there are a few possible contenders for the presidency. They come from the right of the political spectrum and are generally known as the principlists, or osoulgarayan. Among the osoulgarayan, there are roughly three factions: traditional principlists (closest to the center), neo-principlists (further right), and radical principlists (furthest right). The ideal president for Khamenei would lean as far to the right as possible, while still articulating a modern economic vision.
Traditional principlists such as the Islamic Coalition Party advocate for conservative social policies and are mostly connected to the bazaaris, the traditional middle and upper class with roots in the marketplaces. These groups advocate for economic advancement through increased trade, rather than further domestic industrialization. They have a small social base and lack presence and support among IRGC—a must for success in the Iranian political system. In an internal meeting of the principlists, the traditionalists’ main parliamentary candidate, Mostafa Mirsalim, received only 5 votes out of 240 in the selection for speaker of parliament.
On the other end of the principlist spectrum are the radical principlists who favor isolationism from the West and expansionism in the Middle East. They are the most anti-Western and anti-American faction on the right side of the political spectrum. They are mostly allies of Ayatollah Taqi Misbah Yazdi, the leader of a fundamentalist political group called the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability. His associates have the support of younger and more radical members of the Basij, Iran’s voluntary paramilitary militia, but not of the more status quo-oriented majority. Any candidate from this camp would be a staunch hard-liner and consistent challenge to any remaining centrists, let alone reformers, within the regime.
Ahmadinejad, who was president from 2005 to 2013, was very close to this group. His return is the subject of much speculation, but his candidacy would be nonviable due to a fallout with Khamenei in 2011 over Ahmadinejad’s attempt to seize control over the Ministry of Intelligence, among other maneuvers. In 2017, Ahmadinejad allegedly applied for a third term that Khamenei rejected. The former president’s close allies Hamid Baghaei and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, both former vice presidents, were likewise disqualified by the Guardian Council before being sentenced to prison for embezzlement and economic corruption. Ahmadinejad is still popular among some poorer Iranians, but there is no hope for his return.
Saeed Jalili, potentially a promising equivalent in Khamenei’s eyes, is also very close to radical principlists. A failed 2013 presidential candidate, he is the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and acted as one of Iran’s hard-liner nuclear negotiators. He is both an extreme loyalist—he even lost a leg as a volunteer fighter in the Iran-Iraq War—and a well-versed diplomat with a Ph.D. in political science.
The strongest political subgroup among the principlists is the neo-principlist camp, whose base is the middle class and higher echelons of the IRGC. This includes politicians such as Qalibaf, the new speaker of parliament, who is a former commander of the IRGC air force, head of Iran’s police, and mayor of Tehran. Candidates from this ideological stream generally tout technocratic experience and strong relations with the IRGC. They are less isolationist but promote a self-sufficient economy, called the “resistance economy,” and are confrontational toward the West and the United States.
One of the rising stars of this group is Parviz Fattah, a former IRGC member and former minister of energy under Ahmadinejad. The Middle East Institute’s Kasra Aarabi has written about how, as the head of the Mostazafan Foundation, a charitable foundation controlled by the supreme leader, Fattah might be able to ease concerns among Iran’s poor. Another potential candidate in this group is Saeed Mohammad, head of Khatam al-Anbiya, Iran’s largest military contractor. Between his high rank in the IRGC and Ph.D. in engineering, he strikes a balance between extreme loyalism and a modern intellectual bent that can appeal both domestically and internationally.
Given Iran’s economic problems—now worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic—the need for some semblance of growth advantages the neo-principlist, technocratic camp, which can promote itself as both loyal and able to fix the broken bureaucratic system. This group would also be most able to mobilize parts of the middle class by playing up its candidates’ technocratic rather than radical backgrounds. But it will be careful not to drum up too much popular support; the future president cannot pose any challenges to Khamenei’s vision, as Ahmadinejad did.
As for the rest of the world, the installation of a neo-principlist president presents two possible scenarios. Domestic analysts such as Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran, and Ali Motahari, a former deputy speaker of the Majlis, argue that the homogenization of the regime will reduce internal dissent and ultimately lead to smoother negotiations with the West. Beyond Iran, Michael Tanchum, a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies, likewise posits that “Iran’s hard-liners may offer the U.S. concessions for the sake of the regime’s survival.”
However, it was direct conflict, not internal dissent, that sabotaged diplomatic efforts. In Iran, all strategic decisions ultimately flow from the supreme leader, who is deeply suspicious toward the West, and especially the United States. Khamenei never fully supported Rouhani’s negotiations with the West, and the breakdown of the deal will only have strengthened that stance.
In his 40-year plan, Khamenei has clearly articulated the regime’s totalitarian aspirations, and the leadership he is putting in place ensures that his stringency will outlive him. Still, that could be dangerous: As Khamenei engineers his absolute control, his supporters have no one else to blame should his vision fail.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-22--The Time for America to Embrace Industrial Policy Has Arrived

The Time for America to Embrace Industrial Policy Has Arrived For years , if you wanted to be dismissed in debates over how to help the U.S. economy , you merely had to utter the words “ industrial policy.
” This is the idea that in pursuit of a national goal , the government can and should choose particular industries for targeted help—which can take the form of low-cost loans , grants , subsidies , tax breaks , or direct purchases of goods and services using the government ’ s $ 600 billion annual procurement budget .
Critics—especially , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as government eggheads “ picking winners ” and pointed to socialist planned economies as proof that such efforts were doomed to fail .
That consensus is rapidly changing .
In December 2019 , Republican Sen. Marco Rubio called for “ revitalizing American industrial policy ” to counter China ’ s aggressive brand of state capitalism .
In discussing new proposals from Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden , the Wall Street Journal ’ s Gerald Seib wrote that while conservatives once recoiled at the idea of industrial policy as a “ harmful interference with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them “ explicitly argue for helping American manufacturers.
” ( Disclosure : I was then-Vice President Biden ’ s chief economist during President Barack Obama ’ s first term and informally advise his current campaign . )
In fact , the shifting consensus has less to do with new ideas for policy than with finally opening one ’ s eyes .
The United States , along with every other advanced and emerging economy , has always pursued industrial policies .
The question is not whether the country should have such policies , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about them .
And , more importantly , whether it is willing to implement smart policies promoting useful and inclusive national goals—or counterproductive ones at the behest of well-connected lobbyists .
Consider the privileges the U.S. government bestows on the finance industry .
The assets and deals the industry markets to its customers are deeply subsidized through the tax code ( capital gains get favorable tax treatment , including deferred taxation at a lower rate than paychecks ) , deregulation has hugely boosted the industry ’ s size and profitability , and when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as it did during the housing bubble leading up to the global financial crisis , it is quickly made whole through taxpayer-funded bailouts .
The financial industry isn ’ t the only sector that has been coddled by the U.S. government—others include Big Agriculture , the sugar industry , defense and aerospace , and even Silicon Valley.This is industrial policy of the worst kind and has been happening right under our noses .
But it ’ s not the only sector that has been coddled by the U.S. government—others include Big Agriculture , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and even Silicon Valley , which would not exist if the government hadn ’ t subsidized and purchased its output long before laptops and mobile phones even existed .
Support for industrial policy has deep roots in U.S. history .
Americans ’ “ safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential , particularly military , supplies , ” President George Washington told the U.S. Congress in his first State of the Union address in 1790 .
The need to onshore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even if policies that made sense in the 18th century don ’ t necessary make sense now .
And yet the rationale for industrial policy is as strong as ever .
Consider , for example , climate change induced by human activity .
It must be reversed by policies that invest in renewable energy sources ; electric vehicles ( and their charging stations ) ; a new , efficient grid ; and conservation efforts such as mass transit .
Some of these are classic public goods that no private enterprise will undertake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are tax incentives to produce and purchase clean energy , renewable portfolio standards ( rules that require utilities to produce a given share of energy from renewable sources ) , border adjustment taxes that force countries to internalize the environmental costs they ’ re imposing on the rest of the world with their manufacturing methods and energy mix , and direct government support to clean-energy producers .
This international dimension provides yet another rationale for industrial policy .
For many years , certain other countries , including China and Germany , suppressed consumer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s case , managed the value of its currency in the service of boosting competitiveness and generating trade surpluses .
The inevitable flip side was trade deficits in manufactured goods for countries such as the United States that consumed more than they produced .
In the U.S. case , the flood of foreign loans to finance these imbalances helped feed destructive credit cycles in the U.S. financial sector , including the subprime mortgage crisis .
These are the inevitable results of not having a smart industrial policy .
While competitors are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shores and positioning themselves to meet the next big focus of global demand , the United States is eschewing strategic industrial policy in favor of sweeping tariffs that cost U.S. consumers and manufacturers , dampen global trade as a whole , and don ’ t help anyone .
This is the context to understand Biden ’ s plans for boosting U.S. manufacturing and supporting clean energy , including his “ Buy American ” plan for government procurement .
Of course , industrial policy must go well beyond manufacturing , which only accounts for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employment .
In services , the most fertile ground for targeted industrial policy is the child care sector .
Here , the United States is also behind many other advanced economies , with the pandemic drawing back the curtain on the severe lack of policies to grow and nurture this critical industry .
Approaches include direct provision of care by creating public child care centers , subsidies to parents and providers , and introducing universal prekindergarten for all children between 3 and 4 years of age .
The clear goal of these policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the job market while holding down the cost of child care .
( U.S. working families with low to moderate incomes who pay for child care spend 35 percent of their take-home pay on it , more than double the share in most of Europe . )
Jennifer Harris and Jake Sullivan wrote in Foreign Policy earlier this year that “ advocating industrial policy … was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious.
” As long as the United States has been a nation , it has implemented industrial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it will continue to do so .
The United States might as well get it right by being transparent and smart about these policies in order to support good jobs , rising living standards , and globally competitive industries while offsetting market failures such as those affecting child care and climate change .
Anything else would not only be embarrassing and naive—it would also be bad for Americans and the U.S. economy .

For years, if you wanted to be dismissed in debates over how to help the U.S. economy, you merely had to utter the words “industrial policy.” This is the idea that in pursuit of a national goal, the government can and should choose particular industries for targeted help—which can take the form of low-cost loans, grants, subsidies, tax breaks, or direct purchases of goods and services using the government’s $600 billion annual procurement budget. Critics—especially, but not only, conservative ones—ridiculed industrial policy as government eggheads “picking winners” and pointed to socialist planned economies as proof that such efforts were doomed to fail.
For years, if you wanted to be dismissed in debates over how to help the U.S. economy, you merely had to utter the words “industrial policy.” This is the idea that in pursuit of a national goal, the government can and should choose particular industries for targeted help—which can take the form of low-cost loans, grants, subsidies, tax breaks, or direct purchases of goods and services using the government’s $600 billion annual procurement budget. Critics—especially, but not only, conservative ones—ridiculed industrial policy as government eggheads “picking winners” and pointed to socialist planned economies as proof that such efforts were doomed to fail.
That consensus is rapidly changing. In December 2019, Republican Sen. Marco Rubio called for “revitalizing American industrial policy” to counter China’s aggressive brand of state capitalism. In discussing new proposals from Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, the Wall Street Journal’s Gerald Seib wrote that while conservatives once recoiled at the idea of industrial policy as a “harmful interference with free markets,” now some of them “explicitly argue for helping American manufacturers.” (Disclosure: I was then-Vice President Biden’s chief economist during President Barack Obama’s first term and informally advise his current campaign.)
In fact, the shifting consensus has less to do with new ideas for policy than with finally opening one’s eyes. The United States, along with every other advanced and emerging economy, has always pursued industrial policies. The question is not whether the country should have such policies, but whether it is willing to be transparent about them. And, more importantly, whether it is willing to implement smart policies promoting useful and inclusive national goals—or counterproductive ones at the behest of well-connected lobbyists.
Consider the privileges the U.S. government bestows on the finance industry. The assets and deals the industry markets to its customers are deeply subsidized through the tax code (capital gains get favorable tax treatment, including deferred taxation at a lower rate than paychecks), deregulation has hugely boosted the industry’s size and profitability, and when this unregulated industry systematically underprices risk, as it did during the housing bubble leading up to the global financial crisis, it is quickly made whole through taxpayer-funded bailouts.
The financial industry isn’t the only sector that has been coddled by the U.S. government—others include Big Agriculture, the sugar industry, defense and aerospace, and even Silicon Valley.This is industrial policy of the worst kind and has been happening right under our noses. But it’s not the only sector that has been coddled by the U.S. government—others include Big Agriculture, the sugar industry, defense and aerospace, and even Silicon Valley, which would not exist if the government hadn’t subsidized and purchased its output long before laptops and mobile phones even existed.
Support for industrial policy has deep roots in U.S. history. Americans’ “safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies,” President George Washington told the U.S. Congress in his first State of the Union address in 1790. The need to onshore vital supply chains was apparent even then, even if policies that made sense in the 18th century don’t necessary make sense now.
And yet the rationale for industrial policy is as strong as ever. Consider, for example, climate change induced by human activity. It must be reversed by policies that invest in renewable energy sources; electric vehicles (and their charging stations); a new, efficient grid; and conservation efforts such as mass transit. Some of these are classic public goods that no private enterprise will undertake.
The tools of such industrial policy are tax incentives to produce and purchase clean energy, renewable portfolio standards (rules that require utilities to produce a given share of energy from renewable sources), border adjustment taxes that force countries to internalize the environmental costs they’re imposing on the rest of the world with their manufacturing methods and energy mix, and direct government support to clean-energy producers.
This international dimension provides yet another rationale for industrial policy. For many years, certain other countries, including China and Germany, suppressed consumer spending to help exporters and, in China’s case, managed the value of its currency in the service of boosting competitiveness and generating trade surpluses. The inevitable flip side was trade deficits in manufactured goods for countries such as the United States that consumed more than they produced. In the U.S. case, the flood of foreign loans to finance these imbalances helped feed destructive credit cycles in the U.S. financial sector, including the subprime mortgage crisis.
These are the inevitable results of not having a smart industrial policy. While competitors are investing in keeping good jobs on their shores and positioning themselves to meet the next big focus of global demand, the United States is eschewing strategic industrial policy in favor of sweeping tariffs that cost U.S. consumers and manufacturers, dampen global trade as a whole, and don’t help anyone. This is the context to understand Biden’s plans for boosting U.S. manufacturing and supporting clean energy, including his “Buy American” plan for government procurement.
Of course, industrial policy must go well beyond manufacturing, which only accounts for about 10 percent of U.S. output and employment. In services, the most fertile ground for targeted industrial policy is the child care sector. Here, the United States is also behind many other advanced economies, with the pandemic drawing back the curtain on the severe lack of policies to grow and nurture this critical industry. Approaches include direct provision of care by creating public child care centers, subsidies to parents and providers, and introducing universal prekindergarten for all children between 3 and 4 years of age. The clear goal of these policies is to allow parents to participate in the job market while holding down the cost of child care. (U.S. working families with low to moderate incomes who pay for child care spend 35 percent of their take-home pay on it, more than double the share in most of Europe.)
Jennifer Harris and Jake Sullivan wrote in Foreign Policy earlier this year that “advocating industrial policy … was once considered embarrassing—now it should be considered something close to obvious.” As long as the United States has been a nation, it has implemented industrial policy just like every other country, and it will continue to do so. The United States might as well get it right by being transparent and smart about these policies in order to support good jobs, rising living standards, and globally competitive industries while offsetting market failures such as those affecting child care and climate change. Anything else would not only be embarrassing and naive—it would also be bad for Americans and the U.S. economy.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--Asian Countries Are Waking Up to the Dangers of Social Media

Asian Countries Are Waking Up to the Dangers of Social Media Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
This week : Bangladesh moves toward net neutrality while Pakistan threatens to ban China ’ s TikTok , regional coronavirus cases surge past 1.8 million , and a government airstrike in Afghanistan kills civilians .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Bangladesh ’ s telecommunications regulator quietly announced last week it would prohibit so-called zero rating of social media apps , a process in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of particular apps .
The move is significant because it represents a victory for net neutrality—the principle by which internet providers must not regulate bandwidth to favor one company over another .
( Without net neutrality , your internet provider could strike up a high-speed deal with Netflix , while slowing down a competitor such as Hulu . )
Strangely , as the website Medianama reports , Bangladesh ’ s decision did not explicitly mention net neutrality , instead focusing on how zero rating was “ used by dishonest persons to carry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creating unhealthy competition in the market.
” A blow for Facebook .
Bangladesh ’ s decision will hurt Facebook most of all by shutting down its Free Basics program , which offered free internet to access Facebook and WhatsApp through a network of local partnerships .
Other than India , which banned Free Basics in 2016 , most other South Asian countries have yet to put net neutrality regulations in place .
Users of the program in Bangladesh will now have to pay regular internet costs to access Facebook , likely reducing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WhatsApp , and Instagram .
The larger question is why Bangladesh acted as it did , especially during a pandemic .
One reason could be that Facebook has dwarfed other local e-commerce platforms in Bangladesh .
According to a report in Rest of World , a new technology website , Facebook is responsible for about 80 percent of internet commerce .
Islamabad ’ s censorship .
Meanwhile in Pakistan , the national telecoms regulator has issued a “ final warning ” over explicit content on the video app TikTok , owned by China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last month , along with 58 other Chinese-owned apps , in a move that was widely seen as retaliation for China ’ s incursions into its territory .
Pakistan is a close ally of China ’ s , making its move more surprising , especially as TikTok comes under fire from other countries over security concerns .
Bumbling motivations .
The strange thing about the recent spate of technology policy decisions in South Asia is that countries seem to be making the right decisions—but for the wrong reasons .
Pakistan ’ s move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of whack-a-mole .
If internet users want to find racy content , there is no shortage of ways to access it .
India ’ s decision to ban Chinese apps was motivated by nationalism , but the cybersecurity concerns posed by Chinese software and hardware should have been a larger national issue years ago .
And in Bangladesh , the move to curb zero rating without explicitly championing net neutrality suggests a decision based on domestic pressure , not a considered move regarding the ethics around freedom on the internet .
When it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emerged as a regional leader of sorts , given its high-profile 2016 decision to stop Facebook from launching Free Basics and a 2017 Supreme Court decision enshrining privacy as a fundamental right .
But there are several pockmarks on this reputation , not least the fact that New Delhi administered the world ’ s longest internet shutdown in Kashmir last August .
Ultimately , as countries realize the value and importance of their citizens ’ digital data , they will put in place more measures to safeguard them from other countries .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are thorough , coordinated , transparent , properly debated and disseminated , and followed up by further consistent regulation .
But civil society will still have to fight for democratic safeguards .
The coronavirus crisis .
South Asia now has more than 1.8 million known cases of the coronavirus .
India has recorded more than two-thirds of those , with 1.28 million cases , and its total number is doubling every 20 days or so .
The incidence of new cases in neighboring Pakistan , Bangladesh , and Afghanistan has begun to slow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because those countries have slowed down testing .
It remains somewhat of a mystery why South Asia hasn ’ t recorded more than 40,000 deaths so far , but experts suggest that a large number are not accounted for .
Afghan attack draws criticism .
An Afghan government airstrike against the Taliban killed 45 people , including civilians , on Wednesday .
U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad criticized the move , pointing out that children were among the victims .
Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government have yet to begin , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ release of prisoners .
Pakistani journalist freed .
A top Pakistani journalist and government critic has been released by his abductors after being held in captivity for 12 hours .
Matiullah Jan , 51 , was picking up his wife from work when he was abducted .
Jan has in the past criticized the Army for its outsized role in politics .
As Michael Kugelman writes in Foreign Policy , “ Jan ’ s brief disappearance comes at a moment when Islamabad is stepping up efforts to stifle dissent , thereby exposing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggling to shake off the legacy of military rule.
” Nepal opens up .
Kathmandu is planning to allow regular international flights starting on Aug. 17 , about four months after shutting down foreign travel because of the coronavirus pandemic .
Nepal ’ s economy is heavily dependent on international tourism , and Kathmandu ’ s airport is its only international airport .
Just this week , the country ended its lockdown after 120 days , citing a decline in the number of coronavirus cases .
Modi ’ s speech .
Indian Prime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the U.S.-India Business Council ’ s annual India Ideas Summit on Wednesday .
Modi argued for stronger domestic markets , after making the concession that countries had become too obsessed with market forces .
“ Ease of living is as important as ease of business , ” he said .
“ Recent experience has taught us that the global economy has been too focused on efficiency and optimization .
Efficiency is a good thing .
But on the way we forgot to focus on something equally important : resilience against external shocks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to remind us how important resilience is.
” [ The full speech is available here . ]
As a way to counter China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative , India is planning to set up a solar power park in a neighboring country .
Which one ?
Scroll down for the answer .
What do people watch most on Netflix ?
The answer to this question has long been a mystery , in large part because the streaming service does not release its data to the public or to ratings agencies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 10 most-watched original movies on its platform in its quarterly financial results , according to Bloomberg .
The list includes some predictable titles such as Bird Box , starring Sandra Bullock , and Martin Scorsese ’ s The Irishman .
But the surprise number 1 is Extraction , an action thriller released last April starring Chris Hemsworth .
According to Netflix , a record 99 million people have watched the movie on its platform .
Extraction is set mostly in Bangladesh , which is why it ’ s of interest to this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Economist pointed out—and I felt the same—the directors don ’ t seem to care much for nuance : “ Bar a few details—such as the green auto rickshaws which whiz down every road—the fictional Dhaka bears little resemblance to its real-life counterpart .
The gangsters ’ slum lair is improbably spacious , and when the characters ’ fighting tears through flats , their occupants are listening to out-of-date Bollywood music and wearing saris tied in an Indian fashion .
Only a few of the actors playing Bangladeshis , none of whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to speak Bangla convincingly .
‘ It ’ s like watching a film set in London , about Londoners , but all the characters sound French , ’ grimaces one disappointed Dhakaite.
” As the Indian newspaper Mint reports , citing government sources , India ’ s largest power generation utility , NTPC Limited , is working on plans for a solar park in Sri Lanka .
The move comes after NTPC ’ s plan to build a coal plant there was scrapped .
That ’ s it for this week .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: Bangladesh moves toward net neutrality while Pakistan threatens to ban China’s TikTok , regional coronavirus cases surge past 1.8 million, and a government airstrike in Afghanistan kills civilians.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week: Bangladesh moves toward net neutrality while Pakistan threatens to ban China’s TikTok, regional coronavirus cases surge past 1.8 million, and a government airstrike in Afghanistan kills civilians.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Why Is South Asia Pushing Back Against Social Media?
Bangladesh’s telecommunications regulator quietly announced last week it would prohibit so-called zero rating of social media apps, a process in which cellular firms provide free internet for the use of particular apps. The move is significant because it represents a victory for net neutrality—the principle by which internet providers must not regulate bandwidth to favor one company over another. (Without net neutrality, your internet provider could strike up a high-speed deal with Netflix, while slowing down a competitor such as Hulu.)
Strangely, as the website Medianama reports, Bangladesh’s decision did not explicitly mention net neutrality, instead focusing on how zero rating was “used by dishonest persons to carry out unnecessary criminal activities” and “creating unhealthy competition in the market.”
A blow for Facebook. Bangladesh’s decision will hurt Facebook most of all by shutting down its Free Basics program, which offered free internet to access Facebook and WhatsApp through a network of local partnerships. Other than India, which banned Free Basics in 2016, most other South Asian countries have yet to put net neutrality regulations in place. Users of the program in Bangladesh will now have to pay regular internet costs to access Facebook, likely reducing the number of hours spent on Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram.
The larger question is why Bangladesh acted as it did, especially during a pandemic. One reason could be that Facebook has dwarfed other local e-commerce platforms in Bangladesh. According to a report in Rest of World, a new technology website, Facebook is responsible for about 80 percent of internet commerce.
Islamabad’s censorship. Meanwhile in Pakistan, the national telecoms regulator has issued a “final warning” over explicit content on the video app TikTok, owned by China’s ByteDance. India banned TikTok last month, along with 58 other Chinese-owned apps, in a move that was widely seen as retaliation for China’s incursions into its territory. Pakistan is a close ally of China’s, making its move more surprising, especially as TikTok comes under fire from other countries over security concerns.
Bumbling motivations. The strange thing about the recent spate of technology policy decisions in South Asia is that countries seem to be making the right decisions—but for the wrong reasons. Pakistan’s move to warn TikTok is essentially a game of whack-a-mole. If internet users want to find racy content, there is no shortage of ways to access it.
India’s decision to ban Chinese apps was motivated by nationalism, but the cybersecurity concerns posed by Chinese software and hardware should have been a larger national issue years ago. And in Bangladesh, the move to curb zero rating without explicitly championing net neutrality suggests a decision based on domestic pressure, not a considered move regarding the ethics around freedom on the internet.
When it comes to net neutrality, India has emerged as a regional leader of sorts, given its high-profile 2016 decision to stop Facebook from launching Free Basics and a 2017 Supreme Court decision enshrining privacy as a fundamental right. But there are several pockmarks on this reputation, not least the fact that New Delhi administered the world’s longest internet shutdown in Kashmir last August.
Ultimately, as countries realize the value and importance of their citizens’ digital data, they will put in place more measures to safeguard them from other countries. The sooner the better—as long as those moves are thorough, coordinated, transparent, properly debated and disseminated, and followed up by further consistent regulation. But civil society will still have to fight for democratic safeguards.
What We’re Following
The coronavirus crisis. South Asia now has more than 1.8 million known cases of the coronavirus. India has recorded more than two-thirds of those, with 1.28 million cases, and its total number is doubling every 20 days or so. The incidence of new cases in neighboring Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan has begun to slow down, but that could also be because those countries have slowed down testing. It remains somewhat of a mystery why South Asia hasn’t recorded more than 40,000 deaths so far, but experts suggest that a large number are not accounted for.
Afghan attack draws criticism. An Afghan government airstrike against the Taliban killed 45 people, including civilians, on Wednesday. U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad criticized the move, pointing out that children were among the victims. Talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government have yet to begin, amid continued violence and disagreements over the release of prisoners.
Pakistani journalist freed. A top Pakistani journalist and government critic has been released by his abductors after being held in captivity for 12 hours. Matiullah Jan, 51, was picking up his wife from work when he was abducted. Jan has in the past criticized the Army for its outsized role in politics. As Michael Kugelman writes in Foreign Policy, “Jan’s brief disappearance comes at a moment when Islamabad is stepping up efforts to stifle dissent, thereby exposing the fragility of democracy in a nation still struggling to shake off the legacy of military rule.”
Nepal opens up. Kathmandu is planning to allow regular international flights starting on Aug. 17, about four months after shutting down foreign travel because of the coronavirus pandemic. Nepal’s economy is heavily dependent on international tourism, and Kathmandu’s airport is its only international airport. Just this week, the country ended its lockdown after 120 days, citing a decline in the number of coronavirus cases.
Modi’s speech. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave the keynote address at the U.S.-India Business Council’s annual India Ideas Summit on Wednesday. Modi argued for stronger domestic markets, after making the concession that countries had become too obsessed with market forces. “Ease of living is as important as ease of business,” he said.
“Recent experience has taught us that the global economy has been too focused on efficiency and optimization. Efficiency is a good thing. But on the way we forgot to focus on something equally important: resilience against external shocks. It has taken a global pandemic to remind us how important resilience is.”
[The full speech is available here.]
Question of the Week
As a way to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, India is planning to set up a solar power park in a neighboring country. Which one?
A) Nepal
B) Sri Lanka
C) The Maldives
D) Afghanistan
Scroll down for the answer.
Don’t Watch This
What do people watch most on Netflix? The answer to this question has long been a mystery, in large part because the streaming service does not release its data to the public or to ratings agencies. Last week, however, Netflix disclosed the 10 most-watched original movies on its platform in its quarterly financial results, according to Bloomberg. The list includes some predictable titles such as Bird Box, starring Sandra Bullock, and Martin Scorsese’s The Irishman.
But the surprise number 1 is Extraction, an action thriller released last April starring Chris Hemsworth. According to Netflix, a record 99 million people have watched the movie on its platform. Extraction is set mostly in Bangladesh, which is why it’s of interest to this newsletter. But as a recent review in the Economist pointed out—and I felt the same—the directors don’t seem to care much for nuance:
“Bar a few details—such as the green auto rickshaws which whiz down every road—the fictional Dhaka bears little resemblance to its real-life counterpart. The gangsters’ slum lair is improbably spacious, and when the characters’ fighting tears through flats, their occupants are listening to out-of-date Bollywood music and wearing saris tied in an Indian fashion. Only a few of the actors playing Bangladeshis, none of whom actually hail from Bangladesh, are able to speak Bangla convincingly. ‘It’s like watching a film set in London, about Londoners, but all the characters sound French,’ grimaces one disappointed Dhakaite.”
And the Answer Is…
B) Sri Lanka.
As the Indian newspaper Mint reports, citing government sources, India’s largest power generation utility, NTPC Limited, is working on plans for a solar park in Sri Lanka. The move comes after NTPC’s plan to build a coal plant there was scrapped.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-23--Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact

Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact With the clock ticking to extend the Obama-era New START agreement that sets limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces , the Trump administration is favoring a fresh arms control deal that includes China over a straight-ahead reauthorization of the agreement , officials said .
The Trump administration fears that China will more than double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade , senior defense officials said , as it is likely to move away from its traditional “ minimum deterrence ” approach toward a full array of nuclear-armed bombers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Extending New START at this point would probably be the easy thing to do , but it may not be the right thing to do , ” a senior defense official told Foreign Policy on a press call this week .
“ Getting China involved in some sort of an arms control framework is what ’ s needed today in order to stave off a potential three-way arms race in the future.
” “ Why not agree to some restraint today instead of spending all the money [ to ] build up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense official added .
“ At the end of the day you ’ re no better off because now you ’ ve forced Russia and the United States to build up its capabilities.
” But China has been reluctant to come to the table , failing to appear for talks arranged last month by State Department arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea .
Some experts fear that by seeking to expand the scope of the talks , the Trump administration is seeking to blow up a third major arms-control treaty .
Last year , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reagan-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that slashed the number of midrange missiles held by both Russia and the United States .
Earlier this year , at the urging of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper , the United States ditched the Open Skies Treaty that allows 35 nations to conduct unarmed overflights to survey one another ’ s weapons stockpiles .
At a time of heightened international tensions , some arms control experts wonder about the wisdom of trying to rope in China rather than renew the deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear rival .
“ Is holding New START hostage the way to get China to come to the table and give up something ?
” said Pranay Vaddi , a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official .
“ What incentive does China have to stay a smaller nuclear power relative to the U.S. ?
” Billingslea , the arms control negotiator , said in May that the United States would be prepared to spend Russia and China “ into oblivion ” to win an arms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at shrinking Pentagon budgets in the future as the coronavirus pandemic has taken a toll on the U.S. economy .
But Washington acknowledged that Moscow remains in compliance with the 2010 New START deal in a report to Congress earlier this year .
Though the treaty sets limits on each country ’ s long-range nuclear weapons , administration officials concerned with the rise of China appeared to openly question the utility of a bilateral pact that doesn ’ t include Beijing .
“ Whether or not New START is extended or not , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States is the growth of China , ” the senior defense official said .
“ Even if it is extended , you ’ re dealing with a Russia-U.S. problem , ” the official added , making the case that the current treaty would not address China ’ s growing nuclear arsenal .
The seeming solidification of the U.S. approach toward China comes as the Trump administration is still adding new officials , amid anger from Congress over perceived administration stonewalling of transparency requirements .
It also comes as Esper , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of checking on U.S. nuclear forces amid the spread of the coronavirus pandemic , which forced the Defense Department to institute a stop-movement order for all American troops earlier this year .
On Wednesday , Esper visited Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri , home to the Pentagon ’ s B-2 bomber fleet , for a classified update on the impact of COVID-19 on American nuclear forces .
While the B-2 is set to be retired as the Air Force fields sufficient B-21 stealth bombers to replace it , the Pentagon plans to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1980s-era bomber with modernized digital displays , a second senior defense official said .
The Air Force plans to deliver the first operational B-21s by the middle of this decade , the official said , with the first flight planned for the fall of 2022 .
Meanwhile , the United States is hoping to use the New START negotiations to make the case to China that it can rise as a responsible great power .
“ We would argue that China has a responsibility , even under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just haven ’ t done so up until today , ” the first senior defense official said .
“ Whether that ’ s persuasive to the Chinese , we ’ ll have to see .
”

With the clock ticking to extend the Obama-era New START agreement that sets limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the Trump administration is favoring a fresh arms control deal that includes China over a straight-ahead reauthorization of the agreement, officials said.
With the clock ticking to extend the Obama-era New START agreement that sets limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the Trump administration is favoring a fresh arms control deal that includes China over a straight-ahead reauthorization of the agreement, officials said.
The Trump administration fears that China will more than double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, senior defense officials said, as it is likely to move away from its traditional “minimum deterrence” approach toward a full array of nuclear-armed bombers, submarines, and ballistic missiles.
“Extending New START at this point would probably be the easy thing to do, but it may not be the right thing to do,” a senior defense official told Foreign Policy on a press call this week. “Getting China involved in some sort of an arms control framework is what’s needed today in order to stave off a potential three-way arms race in the future.”
“Why not agree to some restraint today instead of spending all the money [to] build up your nuclear capabilities,” the senior defense official added. “At the end of the day you’re no better off because now you’ve forced Russia and the United States to build up its capabilities.”
But China has been reluctant to come to the table, failing to appear for talks arranged last month by State Department arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea. Some experts fear that by seeking to expand the scope of the talks, the Trump administration is seeking to blow up a third major arms-control treaty.
Last year, the Trump administration pulled out of the Reagan-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that slashed the number of midrange missiles held by both Russia and the United States. Earlier this year, at the urging of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the United States ditched the Open Skies Treaty that allows 35 nations to conduct unarmed overflights to survey one another’s weapons stockpiles.
At a time of heightened international tensions, some arms control experts wonder about the wisdom of trying to rope in China rather than renew the deal with Russia, America’s major nuclear rival.
“Is holding New START hostage the way to get China to come to the table and give up something?” said Pranay Vaddi, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official. “What incentive does China have to stay a smaller nuclear power relative to the U.S.?”
Billingslea, the arms control negotiator, said in May that the United States would be prepared to spend Russia and China “into oblivion” to win an arms race, despite Democrats in Congress hinting at shrinking Pentagon budgets in the future as the coronavirus pandemic has taken a toll on the U.S. economy.
But Washington acknowledged that Moscow remains in compliance with the 2010 New START deal in a report to Congress earlier this year. Though the treaty sets limits on each country’s long-range nuclear weapons, administration officials concerned with the rise of China appeared to openly question the utility of a bilateral pact that doesn’t include Beijing.
“Whether or not New START is extended or not, we believe that the real problem facing the United States is the growth of China,” the senior defense official said. “Even if it is extended, you’re dealing with a Russia-U.S. problem,” the official added, making the case that the current treaty would not address China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
The seeming solidification of the U.S. approach toward China comes as the Trump administration is still adding new officials, amid anger from Congress over perceived administration stonewalling of transparency requirements.
It also comes as Esper, the Pentagon chief, has made a point of checking on U.S. nuclear forces amid the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, which forced the Defense Department to institute a stop-movement order for all American troops earlier this year.
On Wednesday, Esper visited Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, home to the Pentagon’s B-2 bomber fleet, for a classified update on the impact of COVID-19 on American nuclear forces. While the B-2 is set to be retired as the Air Force fields sufficient B-21 stealth bombers to replace it, the Pentagon plans to spend nearly $1.4 billion to upgrade the 1980s-era bomber with modernized digital displays, a second senior defense official said. The Air Force plans to deliver the first operational B-21s by the middle of this decade, the official said, with the first flight planned for the fall of 2022.
Meanwhile, the United States is hoping to use the New START negotiations to make the case to China that it can rise as a responsible great power.
“We would argue that China has a responsibility, even under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to negotiate in good faith and they just haven’t done so up until today,” the first senior defense official said. “Whether that’s persuasive to the Chinese, we’ll have to see.”