foreignpolicy--2020-12-05--Pakistan Has Its Problems, but It Won’t Perish

Pakistan Has Its Problems , but It Won ’ t Perish A decade before the arrival of New York Times correspondent Declan Walsh ’ s The Nine Lives of Pakistan : Dispatches from a Precarious State—which was released in the United States on Nov. 23—another major book of long-form reportage about the country ’ s chaotic post-9/11 years was published : Nicholas Schmidle ’ s To Live or to Perish Forever .
The two books open with anecdotes of the authors being suddenly ordered to pack their bags and expelled from the country after reporting stories that crossed a red @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for reporting on the Pakistani mutation of the Taliban and Walsh for his coverage of the insurgency in the vast , rural Balochistan province .
Walsh ’ s book comes more than seven years after he was kicked out of Pakistan in May 2013 .
In news reporting , most of the work must frustratingly remain in a journalist ’ s notebook .
Walsh draws on these notebooks to write his book , finally able to give previous reporting trips the full literary treatment that they deserve .
But it raises the question @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of it nearly 20 years old , gives readers new insights into a uniquely complex society .
Walsh himself claims he will take the reader with him , retracing his steps , on a journey “ deep into the psyche of the country.
” Walsh ’ s book is better than Schmidle ’ s , but the nearly identical opening scenes are a metaphor for a larger problem with writing about Pakistan , an ethnically diverse nation of more than 200 million people that is in constant flux .
In the decade between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of reportage that purport to explain Pakistan , the country itself has grown and evolved rapidly .
The Pakistan discourse has still not caught up .
The best chapters are those whose subjects and stories , while famous , are less well known outside of Pakistan , drawn out with new details and anecdotes .
Walsh profiles the retired Inter-Services Intelligence officer Sultan Amir Tarar , known as Col. Imam , who was a key field liaison with the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and then the Afghan Taliban movement in the 1990s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Muslim cold warrior as a source over the years allow him to go behind the screen of the man ’ s true belief—eventually , inevitably , his demise—and witness moments of disenchantment and doubt .
“ In a way , we are all mercenaries , ” Col. Imam tells Walsh , while holding a piece of the Berlin Wall given to him by a U.S. counterpart in the 1980s .
On one last mission , this time as a fixer for a journalist , Col. Imam is taken captive by a jihadist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which was in the midst of a terrorist campaign against Pakistan ’ s cities .
Walsh is one of the recipients of the group ’ s ransom demands .
Ultimately , Col. Imam is executed on camera .
He , like Pakistan , is a “ Frankenstein confronted by his monster.
” Students of Pakistan will find compelling new details , however minor , even when drawn from already well-covered personalities such as Asma Jahangir , the indefatigable human rights activist and critic of the military ’ s domestic power .
Subjects already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with enjoyable scenes captured by Walsh ’ s gimlet eye , including a surreal state dinner thrown by then military ruler Pervez Musharraf on the eve of his resignation .
“ And although the musicians of the state orchestra appeared to be vigorously thrashing their instruments , the music was coming from a recorded soundtrack , ” Walsh writes .
“ It seemed an apt coda to the Musharraf years : the ship was going down , the deckchairs were empty and the band was only pretending to play.
” There are Pakistanis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attended by Walsh in the Islamabad churn that capture subtleties of elite psychology that others might miss .
“ We hate her … because she is like us , ” one diplomat ’ s daughter tells him , of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto .
He takes us on a neon-lit tour of the cosmopolis on the Arabian Sea , Karachi , circa 2012 , from parties at the crumbling mansion of a princess to a noir sketch of the city ’ s corrupt but crime-fighting anti-Taliban top cop .
As a result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pakistan , there is certainly a great deal to enjoy and much about the book that surpasses other writing in this genre .
However , Walsh ’ s book still suffers from many of the same pathologies and omissions that plague reporting about Pakistan in the 21st century .
Walsh ’ s chapters on the Bhutto ’ s return from exile and the Lal Masjid siege in 2007 that marked the beginning of a deluge of violence in Pakistan offer little that hasn ’ t already been covered .
Through a profile of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Walsh writes about the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban and the violent changes wrought on Pashtun society in northwestern Pakistan after foreign jihadis flooded across the border from Afghanistan in 2002 .
This dynamic is also well known .
Less has been written about the major socioeconomic changes in majority-Pashtun areas of Pakistan by labor-remittance flows from the Persian Gulf and other parts of the country , internal migration , and the rise of economic power in part through control of transportation and logistics across much of Pakistan—and , as a result , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shame that Walsh was expelled at that moment , just ahead of a dramatic reduction in violence nationwide that may have allowed for a focus on the understudied structural changes in Pakistan that aren ’ t easily explained by the well-worn narratives .
In part fueled by this growing Pashtun middle class , a grassroots political protest movement has erupted among young men from the tribal areas who grew up amid the punishing violence and counterinsurgency by the Pakistani military and represents a further significant development .
Since Walsh departed , so much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shame that a new book will frame these questions in an outdated way , eliding much of the past decade .
Walsh ’ s focus on well-known high-profile elites—rather than newer , understudied ones such as the real estate billionaire Malik Riaz—is also frustrating .
There is a chapter on Salman Taseer , the larger-than-life , complicated tycoon who became a principled critic of Pakistan ’ s poisonous blasphemy laws and paid the ultimate price for it .
It ’ s based primarily on interviews with Taseer and his family and friends .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s assassin , Mumtaz Qadri , who was celebrated by many people in urban Pakistan , and thus we don ’ t learn much more about the intractability of the issue .
We are told that the law is instrumentalized by those in power to serve their interests or can be a “ frustrated howl ” by resentful lower classes .
But Qadri ’ s middle-class background and the outpouring of support from certain constituencies indicate that there is something deeper to learn about society through the issue .
I couldn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeply reported a profile of Qadri , his family , and his community in Rawalpindi instead .
This kind of reporting from the grassroots would be a first step toward apprehending the psyche of society .
Walsh uses the case of Balochistan to illustrate this overburnished existential framing .
The reporting on the conflict there that would result in his expulsion is the single largest topic in the book , almost in inverse proportion to Balochistan ’ s small population ( and the Pakistani military ’ s attempts to hide the insurgency there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offer a profile of Akbar Khan Bugti , the tribal lord whose dispute with , and then killing by , Musharraf in 2006 sparked an insurgency against the state by Bugti tribesmen and a brutal counterinsurgency and proxy war that continues to this day .
In the end , Walsh states that “ not for the first time , Pakistan ’ s army was trying to hold the nation together by force … in squeezing it too hard , there was a distinct danger that it might break entirely.
” Later , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Balochi militant video filmed in 2013 in which a group of men trash and then set alight Jinnah ’ s old summer residence near Quetta : “ A window shatters .
Dogs bark .
The masked men vanish into the night as the house of Jinnah burns silently.
” It ’ s a neat metaphor to illustrate the conclusion that Pakistan is still suffering from an existential crisis , more than 70 years after independence , and that this might lead to Pakistan ’ s disintegration as a nation-state .
But it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In a final chapter set partly in Mumbai , Walsh compares Pakistan to India .
Through the narrative of Jinnah and Partition , he measures Pakistan , again , by a psychological yardstick , while India ’ s policies are assessed through its perceived interests .
“ The trauma of partition , and the confusions of faith and identity it created , lurked behind the most enduring pathologies I encountered , ” Walsh writes .
“ Although Pakistan was built on faith , Islam offered an incomplete identity .
Negation of India filled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ course , equally apply to India .
Even in Indian state and local elections far from the border , Indian politicians invoke Pakistan and smear their rivals as being in league with the enemy—a platform that apparently is successful .
“ If BJP loses Bihar elections … crackers will be burst in Pakistan , ” Amit Shah , the second-most powerful official in India , claimed at a 2015 rally in the eastern state .
Three paragraphs are tacked on toward the end of the chapter that admit to India ’ s “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but the relevance of this argument to the broader region is left largely unexplored .
After all , this “ negation ” of the other is not a uniquely Pakistani problem .
The current administration in New Delhi has unilaterally annexed the portion of Kashmir under its control and begun settling the disputed territory with non-Muslim Indians , and its defense minister has said Pakistan-administered Kashmir is next .
The government that is enacting these policies is driven by a fascistic anti-Muslim religious ideology that fuels pogroms , lynchings , and the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Indians .
But in the pages of The Nine Lives of Pakistan , and to South Asia watchers in Washington and elsewhere , Pakistan alone is presented as a “ land of broken maps ” —as Walsh describes it—that is suffering from a destabilizing religious identity crisis rooted in resentment and colonial history .
Walsh ’ s book is a laudable addition to writing on Pakistan .
It is of course not his fault that he was forced to leave in 2013 and has not worked on the region since .
However @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major writers about the country , when they are published they hold an outsized weight .
It is a missed opportunity that even a new book is focused on a previous era that only partially explains Pakistan in 2020 .

A decade before the arrival of New York Times correspondent Declan Walsh’s The Nine Lives of Pakistan: Dispatches from a Precarious State—which was released in the United States on Nov. 23—another major book of long-form reportage about the country’s chaotic post-9/11 years was published: Nicholas Schmidle’s To Live or to Perish Forever. The two books open with anecdotes of the authors being suddenly ordered to pack their bags and expelled from the country after reporting stories that crossed a red line for Pakistan’s security services—Schmidle for reporting on the Pakistani mutation of the Taliban and Walsh for his coverage of the insurgency in the vast, rural Balochistan province. Walsh’s book comes more than seven years after he was kicked out of Pakistan in May 2013.
A decade before the arrival of New York Times correspondent Declan Walsh’s The Nine Lives of Pakistan: Dispatches from a Precarious State—which was released in the United States on Nov. 23—another major book of long-form reportage about the country’s chaotic post-9/11 years was published: Nicholas Schmidle’s To Live or to Perish Forever. The two books open with anecdotes of the authors being suddenly ordered to pack their bags and expelled from the country after reporting stories that crossed a red line for Pakistan’s security services—Schmidle for reporting on the Pakistani mutation of the Taliban and Walsh for his coverage of the insurgency in the vast, rural Balochistan province. Walsh’s book comes more than seven years after he was kicked out of Pakistan in May 2013.
The Nine Lives of Pakistan: Dispatches from a Precarious State, Declan Walsh, W.W. Norton, 360 pp., , November 2020
In news reporting, most of the work must frustratingly remain in a journalist’s notebook. Walsh draws on these notebooks to write his book, finally able to give previous reporting trips the full literary treatment that they deserve. But it raises the question of whether reporting from Pakistan, some of it nearly 20 years old, gives readers new insights into a uniquely complex society. Walsh himself claims he will take the reader with him, retracing his steps, on a journey “deep into the psyche of the country.”
Walsh’s book is better than Schmidle’s, but the nearly identical opening scenes are a metaphor for a larger problem with writing about Pakistan, an ethnically diverse nation of more than 200 million people that is in constant flux. In the decade between the publication of these two major books of reportage that purport to explain Pakistan, the country itself has grown and evolved rapidly. The Pakistan discourse has still not caught up.
It would be unfair to dismiss Walsh’s efforts. He spent nine years reporting from Pakistan, at least twice as long as a normal foreign correspondent’s tenure. He covers Islamist militancy, radicalization, terrorism; liberal reformers and elite subjects; the military’s reach into domestic politics and foreign policy; and, uniquely for Walsh, the hidden unrest in Balochistan. His lively portraits of a range of Pakistani political figures (almost all of whom are now dead, either through violence or natural causes) are imbued with qualities that only time and experience in a society can produce.
The best chapters are those whose subjects and stories, while famous, are less well known outside of Pakistan, drawn out with new details and anecdotes. Walsh profiles the retired Inter-Services Intelligence officer Sultan Amir Tarar, known as Col. Imam, who was a key field liaison with the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and then the Afghan Taliban movement in the 1990s. Walsh’s many sessions with the Muslim cold warrior as a source over the years allow him to go behind the screen of the man’s true belief—eventually, inevitably, his demise—and witness moments of disenchantment and doubt.
“In a way, we are all mercenaries,” Col. Imam tells Walsh, while holding a piece of the Berlin Wall given to him by a U.S. counterpart in the 1980s. On one last mission, this time as a fixer for a journalist, Col. Imam is taken captive by a jihadist group allied with the Pakistani Taliban, which was in the midst of a terrorist campaign against Pakistan’s cities. Walsh is one of the recipients of the group’s ransom demands. Ultimately, Col. Imam is executed on camera. He, like Pakistan, is a “Frankenstein confronted by his monster.”
Students of Pakistan will find compelling new details, however minor, even when drawn from already well-covered personalities such as Asma Jahangir, the indefatigable human rights activist and critic of the military’s domestic power.
Subjects already saturated by ink are also filled out with enjoyable scenes captured by Walsh’s gimlet eye, including a surreal state dinner thrown by then military ruler Pervez Musharraf on the eve of his resignation. “And although the musicians of the state orchestra appeared to be vigorously thrashing their instruments, the music was coming from a recorded soundtrack,” Walsh writes. “It seemed an apt coda to the Musharraf years: the ship was going down, the deckchairs were empty and the band was only pretending to play.”
There are Pakistanis’ unguarded moments at dinners and parties attended by Walsh in the Islamabad churn that capture subtleties of elite psychology that others might miss. “We hate her … because she is like us,” one diplomat’s daughter tells him, of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He takes us on a neon-lit tour of the cosmopolis on the Arabian Sea, Karachi, circa 2012, from parties at the crumbling mansion of a princess to a noir sketch of the city’s corrupt but crime-fighting anti-Taliban top cop.
As a result of his experience and time spent in Pakistan, there is certainly a great deal to enjoy and much about the book that surpasses other writing in this genre. However, Walsh’s book still suffers from many of the same pathologies and omissions that plague reporting about Pakistan in the 21st century.
Part of the problem is how far removed much of the book is from the current moment. The “unplanned revolution,” in the words of eminent researcher Arif Hasan, at the intersection of demographic change, urbanization and its attendant economic shifts, and the erosion of traditional structures in Pakistani society were well underway during Walsh’s time in Pakistan. But the political expression of many of these changes, the emergence of the middle class and a post-ethnic politics that would carry Imran Khan to the prime minister’s office in 2018, in particular, was brought into focus in the 2013 election. So it is a shame that Walsh was expelled at that moment, just ahead of a dramatic reduction in violence nationwide that may have allowed for a focus on the understudied structural changes in Pakistan that aren’t easily explained by the well-worn narratives.
Walsh’s chapters on the Bhutto’s return from exile and the Lal Masjid siege in 2007 that marked the beginning of a deluge of violence in Pakistan offer little that hasn’t already been covered. Through a profile of a Pashtun tribal chief and parliamentarian, Walsh writes about the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban and the violent changes wrought on Pashtun society in northwestern Pakistan after foreign jihadis flooded across the border from Afghanistan in 2002. This dynamic is also well known.
Less has been written about the major socioeconomic changes in majority-Pashtun areas of Pakistan by labor-remittance flows from the Persian Gulf and other parts of the country, internal migration, and the rise of economic power in part through control of transportation and logistics across much of Pakistan—and, as a result, growing political influence.
It is a shame that Walsh was expelled at that moment, just ahead of a dramatic reduction in violence nationwide that may have allowed for a focus on the understudied structural changes in Pakistan that aren’t easily explained by the well-worn narratives.
In part fueled by this growing Pashtun middle class, a grassroots political protest movement has erupted among young men from the tribal areas who grew up amid the punishing violence and counterinsurgency by the Pakistani military and represents a further significant development. Since Walsh departed, so much has happened, and it is a shame that a new book will frame these questions in an outdated way, eliding much of the past decade.
Walsh’s focus on well-known high-profile elites—rather than newer, understudied ones such as the real estate billionaire Malik Riaz—is also frustrating. There is a chapter on Salman Taseer, the larger-than-life, complicated tycoon who became a principled critic of Pakistan’s poisonous blasphemy laws and paid the ultimate price for it. It’s based primarily on interviews with Taseer and his family and friends. But there is very little about Taseer’s assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, who was celebrated by many people in urban Pakistan, and thus we don’t learn much more about the intractability of the issue.
We are told that the law is instrumentalized by those in power to serve their interests or can be a “frustrated howl” by resentful lower classes. But Qadri’s middle-class background and the outpouring of support from certain constituencies indicate that there is something deeper to learn about society through the issue. I couldn’t help but wish that Walsh had deeply reported a profile of Qadri, his family, and his community in Rawalpindi instead. This kind of reporting from the grassroots would be a first step toward apprehending the psyche of society.
There is a persistent trope in Western writing about Pakistan that involves questions about the viability of Pakistan as a country and whether it will be able to survive as such. Pakistan’s first leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, “failed to pull together the fraying fabric of his creation, held together by the thinnest of threads,” Walsh writes. “Six decades later, they would be close to snapping.”
Walsh uses the case of Balochistan to illustrate this overburnished existential framing. The reporting on the conflict there that would result in his expulsion is the single largest topic in the book, almost in inverse proportion to Balochistan’s small population (and the Pakistani military’s attempts to hide the insurgency there from public view). These chapters offer a profile of Akbar Khan Bugti, the tribal lord whose dispute with, and then killing by, Musharraf in 2006 sparked an insurgency against the state by Bugti tribesmen and a brutal counterinsurgency and proxy war that continues to this day.
In the end, Walsh states that “not for the first time, Pakistan’s army was trying to hold the nation together by force … in squeezing it too hard, there was a distinct danger that it might break entirely.” Later, he ends the book with a scene from a Balochi militant video filmed in 2013 in which a group of men trash and then set alight Jinnah’s old summer residence near Quetta: “A window shatters. Dogs bark. The masked men vanish into the night as the house of Jinnah burns silently.” It’s a neat metaphor to illustrate the conclusion that Pakistan is still suffering from an existential crisis, more than 70 years after independence, and that this might lead to Pakistan’s disintegration as a nation-state. But it’s also a tired one.
In a final chapter set partly in Mumbai, Walsh compares Pakistan to India. Through the narrative of Jinnah and Partition, he measures Pakistan, again, by a psychological yardstick, while India’s policies are assessed through its perceived interests. “The trauma of partition, and the confusions of faith and identity it created, lurked behind the most enduring pathologies I encountered,” Walsh writes. “Although Pakistan was built on faith, Islam offered an incomplete identity. Negation of India filled the void.”
These descriptions, of course, equally apply to India. Even in Indian state and local elections far from the border, Indian politicians invoke Pakistan and smear their rivals as being in league with the enemy—a platform that apparently is successful. “If BJP loses Bihar elections … crackers will be burst in Pakistan,” Amit Shah, the second-most powerful official in India, claimed at a 2015 rally in the eastern state. Three paragraphs are tacked on toward the end of the chapter that admit to India’s “lurch into belligerent Hindu nationalism,” but the relevance of this argument to the broader region is left largely unexplored.
After all, this “negation” of the other is not a uniquely Pakistani problem. The current administration in New Delhi has unilaterally annexed the portion of Kashmir under its control and begun settling the disputed territory with non-Muslim Indians, and its defense minister has said Pakistan-administered Kashmir is next. The government that is enacting these policies is driven by a fascistic anti-Muslim religious ideology that fuels pogroms, lynchings, and the election of terrorism suspects—and it is overwhelmingly popular with Indians. But in the pages of The Nine Lives of Pakistan, and to South Asia watchers in Washington and elsewhere, Pakistan alone is presented as a “land of broken maps”—as Walsh describes it—that is suffering from a destabilizing religious identity crisis rooted in resentment and colonial history.
Walsh’s book is a laudable addition to writing on Pakistan. It is of course not his fault that he was forced to leave in 2013 and has not worked on the region since. However, given the scarcity of books by major writers about the country, when they are published they hold an outsized weight. It is a missed opportunity that even a new book is focused on a previous era that only partially explains Pakistan in 2020.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-05--U.S. Diplomats and Spies Likely Targeted by Radio Frequency Energy, Long-Withheld Report Determines

U.S. Diplomats and Spies Likely Targeted by Radio Frequency Energy , Long-Withheld Report Determines Mysterious brain injuries sustained by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers serving overseas in Cuba , China , and Russia were likely caused by directed , pulsed radio frequency energy , according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences , Engineering , and Medicine .
“ [ A ] fter considering the information available to it and a set of possible mechanisms , the committee felt that many of the distinctive and acute signs , symptoms , and observations reported by DOS [ Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the effects of directed , pulsed radio frequency ( RF ) energy , ” the report said , noting that further studies were required .
The confidential government study , released to Congress after four months of being kept under wraps and obtained by Foreign Policy , presents the most comprehensive account to date of what could be causing mysterious health problems of American diplomats and intelligence officials .
The U.S. government has not publicly disclosed the cause of the possible attacks—or even if it knows from where the radio frequency energy could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suspected the Russian government of being behind the attacks , which have strained Washington ’ s relations with Havana and Beijing , but they do not have conclusive intelligence implicating the Kremlin .
The Russian and Cuban governments have denied any knowledge of or involvement in the purported attacks .
The 66-page report does not attempt to answer who may have been behind the attacks , if that is indeed the cause of the diplomats ’ health issues , or the mechanisms used to train radio frequencies on U.S. diplomats .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vexing problem for the U.S. government and its ability—or lack thereof—to protect government personnel against potential future attacks .
“ The mere consideration of such a scenario raises grave concerns about a world with disinhibited malevolent actors and new tools for causing harm to others , ” David Relman , a Stanford University professor and microbiologist who led the committee that conducted the study , wrote in the preface to the report , which was first reported by NBC News .
Beginning in 2016 , State Department and CIA officials in Cuba @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sharp headaches , dizziness , vertigo , and memory loss .
While senior Trump administration officials vowed to identify the cause and perpetrators , the issue has stumped top investigators and scientists from across the U.S. government .
The set of symptoms , dubbed “ Havana syndrome , ” impacted at least several dozen U.S. officials .
In the years since the health problems first began , State Department and CIA officials afflicted by them have voiced anger and frustration about the U.S. response , saying they aren ’ t receiving adequate medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government .
Relman previously told Foreign Policy he was frustrated by the government ’ s refusal to release the report .
“ While I ’ m encouraged by the progress we ’ re seeing , much more must be done to uncover the source of these incidents and ensure that no other public servant suffers in this way , ” Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen said in a statement on Saturday .
Shaheen included a provision in the new defense authorization bill to provide long-term emergency care benefits to the government employees affected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , commissioned by the State Department , convened leading neurologists , experts in electrical engineering , toxicologists , and epidemiologists to examine four possible explanations for the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials .
Possible causes included exposure to directed radio frequency energy , exposure to insecticides , infectious diseases , and psychological factors .
Ultimately , the study concluded that the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials across a number of locations was consistent with the use of directed , pulsed radio frequency energy .
The report doesn ’ t rule out the possibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by officials may have had other causes “ including psychological and social factors.
” A State Department spokesperson said the department was “ pleased ” that the report was released and it “ is still working to determine what happened to our staff and their families.
” “ The investigation is ongoing , and each possible cause remains speculative , ” the spokesperson said .
“ Among a number of conclusions , the report notes that the ‘ constellation of signs and symptoms ’ is consistent with the effects of pulsed radiofrequency energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with ’ is a term of art in medicine and science that allows plausibility but does not assign cause.
” The spokesperson did not directly respond to questions on why the department kept the study under wraps up to this point , nor questions on whether its investigations into the health problems have made any progress in recent months In October , the New York Times and GQ reported that American officials suspected the health incidents were part of a coordinated attack from a U.S. adversary .
While the CIA has not commented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks , an agency investigation using cellphone location data found that individuals linked with Russian security services were in the vicinity of U.S. officials before they began experiencing symptoms , GQ reported .
The Russian foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment .

Mysterious brain injuries sustained by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers serving overseas in Cuba, China, and Russia were likely caused by directed, pulsed radio frequency energy, according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
Mysterious brain injuries sustained by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers serving overseas in Cuba, China, and Russia were likely caused by directed, pulsed radio frequency energy, according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
“[A]fter considering the information available to it and a set of possible mechanisms, the committee felt that many of the distinctive and acute signs, symptoms, and observations reported by DOS [Department of State] employees are consistent with the effects of directed, pulsed radio frequency (RF) energy,” the report said, noting that further studies were required.
The confidential government study, released to Congress after four months of being kept under wraps and obtained by Foreign Policy, presents the most comprehensive account to date of what could be causing mysterious health problems of American diplomats and intelligence officials. The U.S. government has not publicly disclosed the cause of the possible attacks—or even if it knows from where the radio frequency energy could have originated.
U.S. officials have long suspected the Russian government of being behind the attacks, which have strained Washington’s relations with Havana and Beijing, but they do not have conclusive intelligence implicating the Kremlin. The Russian and Cuban governments have denied any knowledge of or involvement in the purported attacks.
The 66-page report does not attempt to answer who may have been behind the attacks, if that is indeed the cause of the diplomats’ health issues, or the mechanisms used to train radio frequencies on U.S. diplomats. But the report authors note that their findings present a vexing problem for the U.S. government and its ability—or lack thereof—to protect government personnel against potential future attacks.
“The mere consideration of such a scenario raises grave concerns about a world with disinhibited malevolent actors and new tools for causing harm to others,” David Relman, a Stanford University professor and microbiologist who led the committee that conducted the study, wrote in the preface to the report, which was first reported by NBC News.
Beginning in 2016, State Department and CIA officials in Cuba and China began reporting mysterious ailments including sharp headaches, dizziness, vertigo, and memory loss. While senior Trump administration officials vowed to identify the cause and perpetrators, the issue has stumped top investigators and scientists from across the U.S. government. The set of symptoms, dubbed “Havana syndrome,” impacted at least several dozen U.S. officials.
In the years since the health problems first began, State Department and CIA officials afflicted by them have voiced anger and frustration about the U.S. response, saying they aren’t receiving adequate medical support or information on the investigations from the government. Relman previously told Foreign Policy he was frustrated by the government’s refusal to release the report.
“While I’m encouraged by the progress we’re seeing, much more must be done to uncover the source of these incidents and ensure that no other public servant suffers in this way,” Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen said in a statement on Saturday. Shaheen included a provision in the new defense authorization bill to provide long-term emergency care benefits to the government employees affected by “Havana syndrome.”
The study, commissioned by the State Department, convened leading neurologists, experts in electrical engineering, toxicologists, and epidemiologists to examine four possible explanations for the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials. Possible causes included exposure to directed radio frequency energy, exposure to insecticides, infectious diseases, and psychological factors.
Ultimately, the study concluded that the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials across a number of locations was consistent with the use of directed, pulsed radio frequency energy. The report doesn’t rule out the possibility that some variation in the symptoms experienced by officials may have had other causes “including psychological and social factors.”
A State Department spokesperson said the department was “pleased” that the report was released and it “is still working to determine what happened to our staff and their families.”
“The investigation is ongoing, and each possible cause remains speculative,” the spokesperson said. “Among a number of conclusions, the report notes that the ‘constellation of signs and symptoms’ is consistent with the effects of pulsed radiofrequency energy. We would note that ‘consistent with’ is a term of art in medicine and science that allows plausibility but does not assign cause.”
The spokesperson did not directly respond to questions on why the department kept the study under wraps up to this point, nor questions on whether its investigations into the health problems have made any progress in recent months
In October, the New York Times and GQ reported that American officials suspected the health incidents were part of a coordinated attack from a U.S. adversary. While the CIA has not commented on whether the Kremlin is behind the attacks, an agency investigation using cellphone location data found that individuals linked with Russian security services were in the vicinity of U.S. officials before they began experiencing symptoms, GQ reported.
Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry, has previously denied that Russia played any role in the incidents and has described any insinuation as such as “absolutely absurd and bizarre.”
Update, Dec. 6, 2020: This article was updated to include previous comments made by the spokeswoman of the Russian foreign ministry.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-05--America’s Diplomats Should Look Like America

America ’ s Diplomats Should Look Like America The stereotype that the State Department is overwhelmingly “ pale , male , and Yale ” has persisted through both Democratic and Republican administrations .
Even as the United States—and the federal government—has grown more diverse , the State Department has remained behind the times .
Between 2002 and 2018 , the proportion of State Department staff identifying as racial or ethnic minorities increased by only 4 percent , well below the federal workforce average .
The proportion of Black employees actually fell .
When President-elect Joe Biden and Kamala Harris take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed as secretary of state—they will inherit a State Department and a foreign service that has been both demoralized and diminished over the course of the Trump administration .
To rebuild it—and to reassert America ’ s leadership and values abroad—they must make diversity a priority across the board , and especially within the State Department and foreign service .
The lack of diversity at the State Department predates the Trump administration—although the past four years haven ’ t helped .
In late October , the department confirmed it had suspended employee training @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ambassadors serving overseas today , just four are Black career foreign service officers and only another four are Latino .
The career pipeline of future ambassadors of color is running low , too—in 2008 , 8.6 percent of senior foreign service officers were Black ; this March , that figure stood at just 2.8 percent .
And the Trump administration has made a number of highly questionable ambassadorial appointments to important countries—like the white South African-born handbag designer and Mar-a-Lago member who has been representing the United States in post-apartheid South Africa for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t any better in the lower ranks , either .
Racial and ethnic minority staff are up to 29 percent less likely to be promoted within the State Department , compared to their white counterparts , according to a Government Accountability Office study released earlier this year .
And stories of hostile work environments abound .
Black foreign service officers posted to consulates in northern Mexico have reported being harassed by Border Patrol officials , despite carrying State Department credentials .
Others report enduring racist comments from colleagues , and , if they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ onus put on them to educate their colleagues .
So it ’ s not surprising that during the Trump administration , foreign service applications have seen their biggest decline in more than a decade .
Throughout my career in Congress , I ’ ve traveled to 30 African nations .
On those trips , my colleagues and I have often been disappointed to find that the foreign service staff of our embassies in Africa are overwhelmingly made up of white men and occasionally a smattering of white women .
This lack of diversity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermines the power of the United States ’ example , it also suffocates the potential of the country ’ s diplomacy , ” in the words of former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield , who is now Biden ’ s nominee to serve as U.S .
Ambassador to the United Nations .
The fact is , foreign service personnel are often the first—and sometimes the only—Americans whom citizens of other countries meet in person .
Those meetings create openings for education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nations .
When foreign service officers actually reflect the diversity of the U.S. population—and look more like the locals than like the cast of “ Leave it to Beaver ” —they have the opportunity to explain that in the United States , no matter your race , religion , creed , or even national origin , you , too , can become the face of America abroad .
As foreign service veteran Uzra Zeya wrote , “ A young Syrian ’ s reaction captured the usual outcome of such exchanges : ‘ The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomat is what I love about America.
’ ” That is why my colleagues in the House of Representatives and I introduced the Represent America Abroad Act of 2020 to create mid-career pathways into the State Department and the foreign service Instead of having to start at the entry level—and stomach huge cuts in pay and responsibility as a result—our idea is to create a program to recruit accomplished professionals from underrepresented groups , so they can bring their experience and expertise to bear from their first day on the job .
Building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also help expand the pool of diverse candidates for posting to U.S. embassies overseas and could even help improve retention of entry-level staff of color by expanding mentorship and coaching opportunities .
These mid-career pathways will complement the successes of the Rangel and Pickering Fellowships , which have helped increase diversity at the entry level where traditional recruitment measures have fallen short .
Mid-career recruits will , of course , need to receive training to bring them up to speed in the duties and practical knowledge that are essential for success in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill provides flexibility for the department to design training programs for these recruits , so they become familiar with the duties of serving overseas and in Washington , D.C. in their first years on the job .
Some State Department traditionalists might think this approach is misguided , preferring instead to focus on recruiting entry-level diplomats or retaining existing staff .
But our bill isn ’ t an either-or proposition .
The decimation of the State Department and the foreign service under outgoing President Donald Trump has been widespread and devastating—especially for employees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups , like LGBTQ staff .
The agency will need to exercise considerable creativity to rebuild the ranks , especially at the mid-career and senior levels , to meet the diplomatic priorities of the incoming Biden-Harris administration .
In a recent article , Burns and Thomas-Greenfield—both of whom devoted decades of their lives to the State Department—write that the department needs a “ top-to-bottom diplomatic surge ” that “ will have to incorporate ideas that in the past have seemed heretical … but that today are inescapable.
” Offering mid-career pathways to qualified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department and Foreign service is one piece of the solution—one the agency will need new legal authority to launch .
That ’ s what our bill provides .
But Blinken should also retool existing entry-level programs—not just the Rangel and Pickering Fellowships—to prioritize diversity and to take more innovative approaches to recruiting candidates for career positions .
Existing flexible hiring authorities could provide pathways back into the State Department and foreign service for career staff from underrepresented groups who resigned in recent years , and the Secretary can immediately move to reinstate the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ programs that were scuttled by the Trump administration .
And the new secretary should order an internal review of past promotion decisions , to identify systemic barriers to advancement for underrepresented groups and make appropriate reforms , including restarting review and promotion processes for qualified staff who were previously passed over .
Taken together , our bill and these administrative reforms will increase diversity at all levels of the State Department and foreign service within a matter of years , rather than decades—to the benefit of the agency , its employees , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the Represent America Abroad Act will pass the House before the end of the year .
It won ’ t solve all of the problems at the State Department—not by a long shot .
But passing this bill is a vital step for building diversity , restoring the career ranks , and enabling better U.S. diplomacy .
And the face America presents abroad—including , crucially , in Africa , Asia , and Latin America—will at last begin to look more like the country we actually are .

The stereotype that the State Department is overwhelmingly “pale, male, and Yale” has persisted through both Democratic and Republican administrations. Even as the United States—and the federal government—has grown more diverse, the State Department has remained behind the times. Between 2002 and 2018, the proportion of State Department staff identifying as racial or ethnic minorities increased by only 4 percent, well below the federal workforce average. The proportion of Black employees actually fell.
The stereotype that the State Department is overwhelmingly “pale, male, and Yale” has persisted through both Democratic and Republican administrations. Even as the United States—and the federal government—has grown more diverse, the State Department has remained behind the times. Between 2002 and 2018, the proportion of State Department staff identifying as racial or ethnic minorities increased by only 4 percent, well below the federal workforce average. The proportion of Black employees actually fell.
When President-elect Joe Biden and Kamala Harris take office in January—and when Antony Blinken is confirmed as secretary of state—they will inherit a State Department and a foreign service that has been both demoralized and diminished over the course of the Trump administration. To rebuild it—and to reassert America’s leadership and values abroad—they must make diversity a priority across the board, and especially within the State Department and foreign service.
The lack of diversity at the State Department predates the Trump administration—although the past four years haven’t helped. In late October, the department confirmed it had suspended employee training on diversity and inclusion. Of 189 ambassadors serving overseas today, just four are Black career foreign service officers and only another four are Latino. The career pipeline of future ambassadors of color is running low, too—in 2008, 8.6 percent of senior foreign service officers were Black; this March, that figure stood at just 2.8 percent. And the Trump administration has made a number of highly questionable ambassadorial appointments to important countries—like the white South African-born handbag designer and Mar-a-Lago member who has been representing the United States in post-apartheid South Africa for the last year.
Things aren’t any better in the lower ranks, either. Racial and ethnic minority staff are up to 29 percent less likely to be promoted within the State Department, compared to their white counterparts, according to a Government Accountability Office study released earlier this year. And stories of hostile work environments abound. Black foreign service officers posted to consulates in northern Mexico have reported being harassed by Border Patrol officials, despite carrying State Department credentials. Others report enduring racist comments from colleagues, and, if they complain to their supervisors, having the onus put on them to educate their colleagues. So it’s not surprising that during the Trump administration, foreign service applications have seen their biggest decline in more than a decade.
Throughout my career in Congress, I’ve traveled to 30 African nations. On those trips, my colleagues and I have often been disappointed to find that the foreign service staff of our embassies in Africa are overwhelmingly made up of white men and occasionally a smattering of white women. This lack of diversity in our diplomatic ranks “not only undermines the power of the United States’ example, it also suffocates the potential of the country’s diplomacy,” in the words of former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who is now Biden’s nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
The fact is, foreign service personnel are often the first—and sometimes the only—Americans whom citizens of other countries meet in person. Those meetings create openings for education, exchange, and increased understanding between nations. When foreign service officers actually reflect the diversity of the U.S. population—and look more like the locals than like the cast of “Leave it to Beaver”—they have the opportunity to explain that in the United States, no matter your race, religion, creed, or even national origin, you, too, can become the face of America abroad. As foreign service veteran Uzra Zeya wrote, “A young Syrian’s reaction captured the usual outcome of such exchanges: ‘The fact that you’re an American diplomat is what I love about America.’”
That is why my colleagues in the House of Representatives and I introduced the Represent America Abroad Act of 2020 to create mid-career pathways into the State Department and the foreign service Instead of having to start at the entry level—and stomach huge cuts in pay and responsibility as a result—our idea is to create a program to recruit accomplished professionals from underrepresented groups, so they can bring their experience and expertise to bear from their first day on the job.
Building more diversity in the mid-career ranks will also help expand the pool of diverse candidates for posting to U.S. embassies overseas and could even help improve retention of entry-level staff of color by expanding mentorship and coaching opportunities. These mid-career pathways will complement the successes of the Rangel and Pickering Fellowships, which have helped increase diversity at the entry level where traditional recruitment measures have fallen short. Mid-career recruits will, of course, need to receive training to bring them up to speed in the duties and practical knowledge that are essential for success in the State Department and foreign service. Our bill provides flexibility for the department to design training programs for these recruits, so they become familiar with the duties of serving overseas and in Washington, D.C. in their first years on the job.
Some State Department traditionalists might think this approach is misguided, preferring instead to focus on recruiting entry-level diplomats or retaining existing staff. But our bill isn’t an either-or proposition. The decimation of the State Department and the foreign service under outgoing President Donald Trump has been widespread and devastating—especially for employees of color and those from other marginalized groups, like LGBTQ staff. The agency will need to exercise considerable creativity to rebuild the ranks, especially at the mid-career and senior levels, to meet the diplomatic priorities of the incoming Biden-Harris administration. In a recent article, Burns and Thomas-Greenfield—both of whom devoted decades of their lives to the State Department—write that the department needs a “top-to-bottom diplomatic surge” that “will have to incorporate ideas that in the past have seemed heretical … but that today are inescapable.”
Offering mid-career pathways to qualified, diverse candidates to enter the State Department and Foreign service is one piece of the solution—one the agency will need new legal authority to launch. That’s what our bill provides. But Blinken should also retool existing entry-level programs—not just the Rangel and Pickering Fellowships—to prioritize diversity and to take more innovative approaches to recruiting candidates for career positions. Existing flexible hiring authorities could provide pathways back into the State Department and foreign service for career staff from underrepresented groups who resigned in recent years, and the Secretary can immediately move to reinstate the diversity, equity, and inclusion training programs that were scuttled by the Trump administration.
And the new secretary should order an internal review of past promotion decisions, to identify systemic barriers to advancement for underrepresented groups and make appropriate reforms, including restarting review and promotion processes for qualified staff who were previously passed over.
Taken together, our bill and these administrative reforms will increase diversity at all levels of the State Department and foreign service within a matter of years, rather than decades—to the benefit of the agency, its employees, and our nation.
It is our hope that the Represent America Abroad Act will pass the House before the end of the year. It won’t solve all of the problems at the State Department—not by a long shot. But passing this bill is a vital step for building diversity, restoring the career ranks, and enabling better U.S. diplomacy. And the face America presents abroad—including, crucially, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—will at last begin to look more like the country we actually are.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-06--Biden Can’t Ostracize Riyadh

Biden Can’t Ostracize Riyadh

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman took his time before congratulating U.S. President-elect Joe Biden on his recent election victory .
This wasn ’ t a fluke : Over the course of the past four years , the crown prince led a fruitless bombing campaign in Yemen , may have gotten away with murder , and initiated a secret program with China to process uranium .
Progressive members of the U.S. Democratic caucus will soon urge Biden to abandon the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia , but Biden should resist this plea ; abandoning allies rarely leads them to better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a coalition of Western allies and Middle Eastern states—including Saudi Arabia—that gives the United States more leverage to prevent the kingdom from acquiring nuclear weapons and violating human rights .
Republican and Democratic members of Congress are fed up with Saudi Arabia .
Last year , President Donald Trump vetoed bipartisan legislation that would have blocked arms sales to the country in response to its bombing campaign in Yemen .
Every Democrat in Congress who voted supported the bill , but , notably , so did Trump allies such as Republican Sen. Lindsey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia , Biden has gone even further than most members of Congress .
In November 2019 , during a Democratic primary debate , Biden said he “ would make it very clear we were not going to … sell more weapons ” to Saudi Arabia , which would “ make them … the pariah that they are.
” Holding Saudi Arabia accountable for pursuing nuclear weapons and committing human rights violations makes sense .
The question is how to do it .
Making the kingdom a pariah state will not curb its nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If Washington wants reform in Riyadh , it should consider what worries Saudi Arabia most—abandonment by the United States .
The Saudi government ’ s fear of abandonment has its roots in the Arab Spring , which began nearly a decade ago .
At the time , the administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama supported pro-democracy protestors in Egypt as ostensible U.S. ally—and dictator—Hosni Mubarak clung tenuously to power .
Members of the Saudi monarchy recognized it was within the realm of possibility that they , too , could be betrayed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Iran nuclear deal of 2015 was regarded inside the kingdom as a U.S. attempt to betray Saudi Arabia and befriend Iran .
Riyadh prefers Trump to Obama , in part because Trump has ignored its human rights violations and has proved more aggressive against Iran .
But even Trump taunts King Salman over his country ’ s dependence on the United States : “ King—we ’ re protecting you , ” he told the leader in 2018 .
“ You might not be there for two weeks without us.
” If Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consider what worries Saudi Arabia most—abandonment by the United States .
The recent push in Congress to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia merely cemented Riyadh ’ s fears of abandonment .
It ’ s no coincidence , then , that the crown prince has launched a secret , Chinese-backed nuclear program and views continued Iranian influence in Yemen as an existential threat .
He , along with many Saudi elites , increasingly feels that a relationship with China—particularly one that allows Saudi Arabia to procure a nuclear weapons arsenal of its own—makes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the United States does not forge a new approach , this scenario could easily precipitate a regional nuclear standoff : Saudi nuclear weapons pointed at Iran , Iranian nuclear weapons aimed at Saudi Arabia , Turkey and Egypt manufacturing nuclear technologies of their own , and Israel nervously eyeing its nuclear button .
If the Biden administration makes Saudi Arabia a pariah state , it ’ s unlikely that the kingdom ’ s behavior would improve—even if it doesn ’ t immediately acquire a nuclear bomb .
The other U.S.-sanctioned pariah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Cuba—are some of the worst human rights abusers ( and nuclear proliferators ) on earth .
Ostracism hasn ’ t changed them , and it won ’ t change Saudi Arabia .
If turning the United States ’ back on Saudi Arabia won ’ t cool its nuclear weapons ambitions or its human rights violations , showing a long-term commitment to the region just might .
What could ease Saudi insecurities is encouraging Riyadh to join a new league of Western and Middle Eastern states that cooperate multilaterally on matters of military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development .
Even if the coalition started somewhat small—just the United States , United Kingdom , European Union , Saudi Arabia , and smaller Arab states such as Jordan , Oman , the United Arab Emirates , Bahrain , and Tunisia—it would demonstrate that the United States and its Western allies will not soon leave the kingdom at the mercy of Iran or other outside powers .
This alone should placate Riyadh ’ s fears enough to make nuclear weapons and indiscriminate bombing campaigns far less attractive .
Through a new joint regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and equip the armed forces of member states to make them more militarily self-sufficient .
If a member state were to come under attack , the West would promise to support them with reconnaissance , air power , and special operators—but not ground forces .
Washington has already used this leaner approach effectively in the first Persian Gulf War and in its successful fight against the Islamic State in Syria .
Such an agreement should also focus U.S. and European private-sector financing and expertise on large-scale infrastructure , development , and entrepreneurship projects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States ’ International Development Finance Corporation can now tie loan guarantees and financing directly to Washington ’ s foreign-policy goals , large investment plans of this nature are more feasible than in the past .
Western countries could also use development banks to back investments in non-nuclear energy alternatives such as renewables , natural gas , and pipeline projects .
In the sun- and gas-soaked Middle East , these are far cheaper sources of electricity than nuclear power reactors .
Diplomatically , the coalition would create a forum for coalition members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In exchange , Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern coalition members would commit not to withdraw from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , to forswear activities that could be used to make nuclear explosive materials , and to conform to an agreed set of human rights norms for military operations .
While it may start small , the coalition should have grander aspirations .
Israel ’ s rapprochements with Arab states might open the door for it to become the group ’ s first nonfounding member , and the courting of Egypt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Marshall Plan ’ s invitation to the Soviet Union , the door must also remain open for Iran to join the group .
To join , however , Iran—and all other prospective member states in the region—would have to commit to rolling back enrichment or reprocessing activities , ceasing military operations against fellow member states , and supporting proxy warfare .
So far , Tehran has shown no interest in meeting the latter two conditions .
Nonetheless , the coalition should highlight the economic advantages of a non-nuclear future and the security benefits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the pact would enable the sort of multilateral approach that Arab states and Israel need to effectively counter Iranian adventurism .
Finally , to make the coalition truly succeed , Washington must prove the pact can survive regardless of who ’ s in the White House .
In an ideal world , the U.S. Senate would secure the pact as a treaty .
Whether or not that happens , Congress should fund the United States ’ contribution to the pact in perpetuity .
Members of Congress might get the ball rolling by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the plan .
If Saudi Arabia were to become convinced that the United States will remain dedicated to stability in the Middle East , Washington would find itself in a far better position to pull Riyadh , and other capitals , away from their worst instincts .
When it ’ s all said and done , the crown prince might even regret waiting so long to congratulate Biden on his recent electoral victory .

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman took his time before congratulating U.S. President-elect Joe Biden on his recent election victory. This wasn’t a fluke: Over the course of the past four years, the crown prince led a fruitless bombing campaign in Yemen, may have gotten away with murder , and initiated a secret program with China to process uranium. Progressive members of the U.S. Democratic caucus will soon urge Biden to abandon the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, but Biden should resist this plea; abandoning allies rarely leads them to better behavior. Instead, Biden should form a coalition of Western allies and Middle Eastern states—including Saudi Arabia—that gives the United States more leverage to prevent the kingdom from acquiring nuclear weapons and violating human rights.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman took his time before congratulating U.S. President-elect Joe Biden on his recent election victory. This wasn’t a fluke: Over the course of the past four years, the crown prince led a fruitless bombing campaign in Yemen, may have gotten away with murder, and initiated a secret program with China to process uranium. Progressive members of the U.S. Democratic caucus will soon urge Biden to abandon the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, but Biden should resist this plea; abandoning allies rarely leads them to better behavior. Instead, Biden should form a coalition of Western allies and Middle Eastern states—including Saudi Arabia—that gives the United States more leverage to prevent the kingdom from acquiring nuclear weapons and violating human rights.
Republican and Democratic members of Congress are fed up with Saudi Arabia. Last year, President Donald Trump vetoed bipartisan legislation that would have blocked arms sales to the country in response to its bombing campaign in Yemen. Every Democrat in Congress who voted supported the bill, but, notably, so did Trump allies such as Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham. In his criticism of Saudi Arabia, Biden has gone even further than most members of Congress. In November 2019, during a Democratic primary debate, Biden said he “would make it very clear we were not going to … sell more weapons” to Saudi Arabia, which would “make them … the pariah that they are.”
Holding Saudi Arabia accountable for pursuing nuclear weapons and committing human rights violations makes sense. The question is how to do it. Making the kingdom a pariah state will not curb its nuclear ambitions or its human rights violations.
If Washington wants reform in Riyadh, it should consider what worries Saudi Arabia most—abandonment by the United States. The Saudi government’s fear of abandonment has its roots in the Arab Spring, which began nearly a decade ago. At the time, the administration of then U.S. President Barack Obama supported pro-democracy protestors in Egypt as ostensible U.S. ally—and dictator—Hosni Mubarak clung tenuously to power. Members of the Saudi monarchy recognized it was within the realm of possibility that they, too, could be betrayed.
Saudi anxieties have metastasized since then. The Iran nuclear deal of 2015 was regarded inside the kingdom as a U.S. attempt to betray Saudi Arabia and befriend Iran. Riyadh prefers Trump to Obama, in part because Trump has ignored its human rights violations and has proved more aggressive against Iran. But even Trump taunts King Salman over his country’s dependence on the United States: “King—we’re protecting you,” he told the leader in 2018. “You might not be there for two weeks without us.”
If Washington wants reform in Riyadh, it should consider what worries Saudi Arabia most—abandonment by the United States.
The recent push in Congress to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia merely cemented Riyadh’s fears of abandonment. It’s no coincidence, then, that the crown prince has launched a secret, Chinese-backed nuclear program and views continued Iranian influence in Yemen as an existential threat. He, along with many Saudi elites, increasingly feels that a relationship with China—particularly one that allows Saudi Arabia to procure a nuclear weapons arsenal of its own—makes more sense than continued dependence on Washington.
If the United States does not forge a new approach, this scenario could easily precipitate a regional nuclear standoff: Saudi nuclear weapons pointed at Iran, Iranian nuclear weapons aimed at Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt manufacturing nuclear technologies of their own, and Israel nervously eyeing its nuclear button.
If the Biden administration makes Saudi Arabia a pariah state, it’s unlikely that the kingdom’s behavior would improve—even if it doesn’t immediately acquire a nuclear bomb. The other U.S.-sanctioned pariah states—Syria, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba—are some of the worst human rights abusers (and nuclear proliferators) on earth. Ostracism hasn’t changed them, and it won’t change Saudi Arabia.
If turning the United States’ back on Saudi Arabia won’t cool its nuclear weapons ambitions or its human rights violations, showing a long-term commitment to the region just might. What could ease Saudi insecurities is encouraging Riyadh to join a new league of Western and Middle Eastern states that cooperate multilaterally on matters of military, energy, economics, and social development. Even if the coalition started somewhat small—just the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Saudi Arabia, and smaller Arab states such as Jordan, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Tunisia—it would demonstrate that the United States and its Western allies will not soon leave the kingdom at the mercy of Iran or other outside powers. This alone should placate Riyadh’s fears enough to make nuclear weapons and indiscriminate bombing campaigns far less attractive.
Through a new joint regional training center, the pact would train and equip the armed forces of member states to make them more militarily self-sufficient. If a member state were to come under attack, the West would promise to support them with reconnaissance, air power, and special operators—but not ground forces. Washington has already used this leaner approach effectively in the first Persian Gulf War and in its successful fight against the Islamic State in Syria.
Such an agreement should also focus U.S. and European private-sector financing and expertise on large-scale infrastructure, development, and entrepreneurship projects enticing to Middle Eastern states. Because the United States’ International Development Finance Corporation can now tie loan guarantees and financing directly to Washington’s foreign-policy goals, large investment plans of this nature are more feasible than in the past.
Western countries could also use development banks to back investments in non-nuclear energy alternatives such as renewables, natural gas, and pipeline projects. In the sun- and gas-soaked Middle East, these are far cheaper sources of electricity than nuclear power reactors.
Diplomatically, the coalition would create a forum for coalition members to settle regional energy and territorial disputes. In exchange, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern coalition members would commit not to withdraw from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to forswear activities that could be used to make nuclear explosive materials, and to conform to an agreed set of human rights norms for military operations.
While it may start small, the coalition should have grander aspirations. Israel’s rapprochements with Arab states might open the door for it to become the group’s first nonfounding member, and the courting of Egypt and Turkey would follow.
Like the Marshall Plan’s invitation to the Soviet Union, the door must also remain open for Iran to join the group. To join, however, Iran—and all other prospective member states in the region—would have to commit to rolling back enrichment or reprocessing activities, ceasing military operations against fellow member states, and supporting proxy warfare. So far, Tehran has shown no interest in meeting the latter two conditions. Nonetheless, the coalition should highlight the economic advantages of a non-nuclear future and the security benefits of greater restraint. In the meantime, the pact would enable the sort of multilateral approach that Arab states and Israel need to effectively counter Iranian adventurism.
Finally, to make the coalition truly succeed, Washington must prove the pact can survive regardless of who’s in the White House. In an ideal world, the U.S. Senate would secure the pact as a treaty. Whether or not that happens, Congress should fund the United States’ contribution to the pact in perpetuity. Members of Congress might get the ball rolling by penning a bipartisan resolution in support of the plan. If Saudi Arabia were to become convinced that the United States will remain dedicated to stability in the Middle East, Washington would find itself in a far better position to pull Riyadh, and other capitals, away from their worst instincts. When it’s all said and done, the crown prince might even regret waiting so long to congratulate Biden on his recent electoral victory.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-07--Will There Be a Brexit Breakthrough?

Will There Be a Brexit Breakthrough?

Will There Be a Brexit Breakthrough ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : No-deal Brexit looms as negotiating teams attempt to salvage talks , the U.S. Congress enters “ hell week , ” and the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Death , taxes—and disagreements over a level playing field , governance , and fisheries .
The list of life ’ s inevitabilities for EU and U.K. negotiators has grown longer over months of talks that have yet to yield a resolution .
With just 26 days before the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transition period from the European Union , those three sticking points have kept talks at a stalemate .
A ray of hope was seen on Sunday , when the Guardian reported that an agreement was reached on the level of access allowed to EU fishing boats in British waters ( British officials attempted to swiftly dim any optimism , saying that “ nothing new ” had been achieved ) .
Move slowly and break things .
In what has been labeled a “ negotiating tactic ” by Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Internal Market Bill before the House of Commons with clauses that would break a previous Brexit deal and that the British government has admitted breaks international law .
A previous version of the bill had been amended by the upper House of Lords and the controversial clauses removed .
All eyes will be on British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as their phone call , scheduled for this afternoon Washington time , will give the best update on whether talks will press on , or whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ good ” deal ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on Oct. 14 , Joseph de Weck argued that Britain will remain on the backfoot in Europe , regardless of how negotiations go .
“ Deal or no deal , on Jan. 1 , 2021 , the U.K. will become the European country with the weakest trade links to the 27 EU member states , ” de Weck wrote .
“ The free trade agreement under negotiation does not even come close to the arrangements that Norway , Switzerland , Turkey , and even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID built .
It ’ s not just Brexit , the coronavirus pandemic has helped build a sense of internal cohesion among EU members on a philosophical level not seen since the days of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires , Caroline de Gruyter writes : “ A marked difference between ‘ us ’ and ‘ others ’ is slowly emerging.
” Voters in Ghana go to the polls in presidential and legislative elections .
On Tuesday , Dec. 8 , A trade agreement between the U.S. and Ecuador will be signed in Quito @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lighthizer .
The White House hosts a COVID-19 vaccine summit with state governors and representatives from pharmaceutical companies ahead of a Food and Drug Administration meeting to authorize the use of the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines .
Liberians vote in Senate elections .
The vote includes referendums on reducing the length of presidential and Senate terms and whether to allow dual citizenship .
Alexander Gauland of the far-right Alternative for Germany party ( AfD ) arrives in Moscow at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov .
EU-mediated negotiations between Kosovo and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dec. 11 , the U.S. House of Representatives adjourns .
Government funding is also set to expire .
On Saturday , Dec. 12 , the United Kingdom and United Nations host the Climate Ambition Summit , calling on U.N. members to make stronger commitments to climate action , coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the Paris climate accord .
COVID roars back in South Korea .
South Korea , one of the early leaders in stopping the spread of COVID-19 , is dealing with its largest outbreak of the virus in nine months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saturday .
Park Neung-hoo , a health ministry official , said the current number of infections is “ is exceeding the level that we can control in our hospital system.
” With cases rising , South Korea is implementing new restrictions for the next three weeks that include banning gatherings of more than 50 people as well as closing gyms and places of worship .
Romania ’ s Orban weathers tight election .
Romanian Prime Minister Ludovic Orban is scrambling to form a coalition after shock early election results saw his ruling National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic Party .
The election was marred by turnout of just 32 percent , the lowest since Communism ended in the country .
Despite the results , Orban has declared his party “ both the moral winner and the winner at the end of the counting process.
” Partial official election results are expected today .
Rules of engagement .
A new report by Brown University ’ s Costs of War Project finds that a 2017 U.S. Department of Defense relaxation of rules of engagement in Afghanistan coincided with a 95 percent increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by U.S. and allied airstrikes compared to the previous ten years .
The report also found that 700 Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes in 2019 , the most killed in any year since the war began in 2001 .
Iranian tankers to Venezuela .
Around ten Iranian fuel tankers are headed to Venezuela in the latest delivery to defy U.S. sanctions on the country .
Bloomberg reports that the tankers will also collect fuel in Venezuela for export .
The fleet is roughly twice the size of one that traveled from Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Francisco Rodríguez argued in Foreign Policy that the two isolated and sanctioned states were increasingly helping each other out .
“ The simple fact that Iran , which has faced a broad campaign of sanctions for more than a decade , has recently come to the aid of Venezuela , which has been under concerted sanctions pressure for only a few years , suggests a remarkable degree of economic resilience , ” they wrote .
“ When comparing the two economies , the most salient question is not whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rather whether Venezuela will become more like Iran.
” Turkey sanctions .
European Union foreign ministers will discuss whether to impose sanctions on Turkey over its gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean .
The European Union maintains that Turkey has been operating exploration and drilling vessels in waters contested by Greece and Cyprus .
Greece has offered to negotiate with Turkey on the issue , but has refused to do so as long as Turkish vessels are still working in the area .
A Turkish seismic exploration vessel returned to port on Nov. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10,995 km of 2D seismic data , according to the Turkish energy ministry .
Israel-Saudi relations .
Saudi Arabia ’ s Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud , a former ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom , issued fiery remarks highly critical of Israel ’ s treatment of Palestinians at an international security conference immediately before Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi took the stage .
The comments come as hopes are high for a normalization agreement between the two countries .
Prince Turki accused Israel of hypocrisy and lamented the incarceration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the flimsiest of security accusations—young and old , women and men , who are rotting there without recourse to justice , ” he said .
“ They are demolishing homes as they wish and they assassinate whomever they want , ” he added .
Following Prince Turki ’ s speech , Ashkenazi attempted to defuse the situation .
“ I would like to express my regret on the comments of the Saudi representative .
I don ’ t believe that they reflect the spirit and the changes taking place in the Middle East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time when government programs to improve people ’ s lives inevitably come tangled in red tape , a political candidate in the southwestern Indian state of Goa has offered a simple proposition : mandatory siestas for all .
Vijai Sardesai of the Goa Forward party has suggested the policy both as a symbol of Goa ’ s laidback “ susegad ” lifestyle and an answer to outsiders who don ’ t show the same respect for the culture .
“ The siesta is part of susegad and susegad is the chilled , easygoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to respect the ritual , I want to make it a law .
For us Goans , it is the quality of life , not the quantity of money , that matters .
We love what we have , ” Sardesai said .
Sardesai maintains that science is on his side , and the midday nap helps keep energy levels stable .
“ The siesta relaxes you .
I find that if I skip it , I feel tired , I can ’ t function .
And then I can ’ t enjoy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the point ?
” he added .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A no-deal Brexit looms as negotiating teams attempt to salvage talks, the U.S. Congress enters “hell week,” and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A no-deal Brexit looms as negotiating teams attempt to salvage talks, the U.S. Congress enters “hell week,” and what to watch in the world this week.
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EU and British Teams Enter Last Ditch Brexit Talks
Death, taxes—and disagreements over a level playing field, governance, and fisheries. The list of life’s inevitabilities for EU and U.K. negotiators has grown longer over months of talks that have yet to yield a resolution. With just 26 days before the United Kingdom is due to exit its 11-month transition period from the European Union, those three sticking points have kept talks at a stalemate.
A ray of hope was seen on Sunday, when the Guardian reported that an agreement was reached on the level of access allowed to EU fishing boats in British waters (British officials attempted to swiftly dim any optimism, saying that “nothing new” had been achieved).
Move slowly and break things. In what has been labeled a “negotiating tactic” by Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney, the British government intends to reinstate its Internal Market Bill before the House of Commons with clauses that would break a previous Brexit deal and that the British government has admitted breaks international law. A previous version of the bill had been amended by the upper House of Lords and the controversial clauses removed.
All eyes will be on British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as their phone call, scheduled for this afternoon Washington time, will give the best update on whether talks will press on, or whether a no-deal outcome is imminent.
A “good” deal? Writing in Foreign Policy on Oct. 14, Joseph de Weck argued that Britain will remain on the back foot in Europe, regardless of how negotiations go. “Deal or no deal, on Jan. 1, 2021, the U.K. will become the European country with the weakest trade links to the 27 EU member states,” de Weck wrote. “The free trade agreement under negotiation does not even come close to the arrangements that Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and even Ukraine have with Brussels.”
The borders COVID built. It’s not just Brexit. The coronavirus pandemic has helped build a sense of internal cohesion among EU members on a philosophical level not seen since the days of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, Caroline de Gruyter writes: “A marked difference between ‘us’ and ‘others’ is slowly emerging.”
The World This Week On Monday, Nov. 7, Mark Lowcock, the United Nations under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, discusses the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on humanitarian action at the Brookings Institution.
Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya speaks at an Atlantic Council forum.
French President Emmanuel Macron hosts Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for talks.
Voters in Ghana go to the polls in presidential and legislative elections.
On Tuesday, Dec. 8, A trade agreement between the U.S. and Ecuador will be signed in Quito, attended by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.
The White House hosts a COVID-19 vaccine summit with state governors and representatives from pharmaceutical companies ahead of a Food and Drug Administration meeting to authorize the use of the Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vaccines.
Liberians vote in Senate elections. The vote includes referendums on reducing the length of presidential and Senate terms and whether to allow dual citizenship.
Alexander Gauland of the far-right Alternative for Germany party (AfD) arrives in Moscow at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
On Wednesday, Dec. 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan begins a two-day visit to Azerbaijan.
On Thursday, Dec. 10, The European Council leaders summit begins.
EU-mediated negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia take place.
On Friday, Dec. 11, the U.S. House of Representatives adjourns. Government funding is also set to expire.
The Nobel Peace Prize Forum begins in Oslo.
On Saturday, Dec. 12, the United Kingdom and United Nations host the Climate Ambition Summit, calling on U.N. members to make stronger commitments to climate action, coinciding with the fifth anniversary of the Paris climate accord.
What We’re Following Today Congressional crunch time. The U.S. Congress heads into what Politico has described as “hell week” as lawmakers attempt to pass a coronavirus relief act, defense bill, and reach a government funding agreement before a Dec. 11 deadline. A $908 billion coronavirus relief bill, negotiated over the weekend by a bipartisan group, will include a $300 weekly federal unemployment benefit, but stops short of reissuing $1,200 checks, last seen in May. Congress is expected to pass a defense spending bill on Tuesday. However, since it does not repeal Section 230 of the Communications Act as President Trump has demanded, it may face a presidential veto.
COVID roars back in South Korea. South Korea, one of the early leaders in stopping the spread of COVID-19, is dealing with its largest outbreak of the virus in nine months, with 631 new cases reported on Saturday. Park Neung-hoo, a health ministry official, said the current number of infections is “is exceeding the level that we can control in our hospital system.” With cases rising, South Korea is implementing new restrictions for the next three weeks that include banning gatherings of more than 50 people as well as closing gyms and places of worship.
Romania’s Orban weathers tight election. Romanian Prime Minister Ludovic Orban is scrambling to form a coalition after shock early election results saw his ruling National Liberal Party slip behind the rival Social Democratic Party. The election was marred by turnout of just 32 percent, the lowest since Communism ended in the country. Despite the results, Orban has declared his party “both the moral winner and the winner at the end of the counting process.” Partial official election results are expected today.
Keep an Eye On
Rules of engagement. A new report by Brown University’s Costs of War Project finds that a 2017 U.S. Department of Defense relaxation of rules of engagement in Afghanistan coincided with a 95 percent increase in the number of civilian deaths caused by U.S. and allied airstrikes compared to the previous ten years. The report also found that 700 Afghan civilians were killed by airstrikes in 2019, the most killed in any year since the war began in 2001.
Iranian tankers to Venezuela. Around ten Iranian fuel tankers are headed to Venezuela in the latest delivery to defy U.S. sanctions on the country. Bloomberg reports that the tankers will also collect fuel in Venezuela for export. The fleet is roughly twice the size of one that traveled from Iran to Venezuela in May. In September, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Francisco Rodríguez argued in Foreign Policy that the two isolated and sanctioned states were increasingly helping each other out.
“The simple fact that Iran, which has faced a broad campaign of sanctions for more than a decade, has recently come to the aid of Venezuela, which has been under concerted sanctions pressure for only a few years, suggests a remarkable degree of economic resilience,” they wrote. “When comparing the two economies, the most salient question is not whether Iran will become like Venezuela, but rather whether Venezuela will become more like Iran.”
Turkey sanctions. European Union foreign ministers will discuss whether to impose sanctions on Turkey over its gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. The European Union maintains that Turkey has been operating exploration and drilling vessels in waters contested by Greece and Cyprus. Greece has offered to negotiate with Turkey on the issue, but has refused to do so as long as Turkish vessels are still working in the area. A Turkish seismic exploration vessel returned to port on Nov. 29 after a 111-day mission that collected 10,995 km of 2D seismic data, according to the Turkish energy ministry.
Israel-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud, a former ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, issued fiery remarks highly critical of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians at an international security conference immediately before Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi took the stage. The comments come as hopes are high for a normalization agreement between the two countries. Prince Turki accused Israel of hypocrisy and lamented the incarceration of Palestinians “in concentration camps under the flimsiest of security accusations—young and old, women and men, who are rotting there without recourse to justice,” he said. “They are demolishing homes as they wish and they assassinate whomever they want,” he added.
Following Prince Turki’s speech, Ashkenazi attempted to defuse the situation. “I would like to express my regret on the comments of the Saudi representative. I don’t believe that they reflect the spirit and the changes taking place in the Middle East,” he said.
Odds and Ends
At a time when government programs to improve people’s lives inevitably come tangled in red tape, a political candidate in the southwestern Indian state of Goa has offered a simple proposition: mandatory siestas for all. Vijai Sardesai of the Goa Forward party has suggested the policy both as a symbol of Goa’s laidback susegad lifestyle and an answer to outsiders who don’t show the same respect for the culture. “The siesta is part of susegad and susegad is the chilled, easygoing identity of Goa. With outsiders failing to respect the ritual, I want to make it a law. For us Goans, it is the quality of life, not the quantity of money, that matters. We love what we have,” Sardesai said.
Sardesai maintains that science is on his side, and the midday nap helps keep energy levels stable. “The siesta relaxes you. I find that if I skip it, I feel tired, I can’t function. And then I can’t enjoy my evening, so what’s the point?” he added.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.