foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--The Victims Femicide Leaves Behind

The Victims Femicide Leaves Behind

On Oct. 6 , 2015 , 20-year-old Giordana Di Stefano was murdered in her hometown of Nicolosi , Sicily , by her ex-boyfriend .
She left behind a young daughter , Asia .
The period immediately after Di Stefano ’ s death was excruciating .
Di Stefano ’ s mother , Vera Squatrito , struggled to explain to Asia that she would not be coming home .
At first , Asia ’ s grandmother told her that her mother was an angel or a star in the sky .
Asia , now nine years old , is one of Italy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ orphans—children and adults whose mothers were killed by their husbands , partners , ex-partners , or stalkers .
Researchers estimate that between 2000 and 2015 , around 1,600 children and adults were orphaned by domestic violence in Italy .
In January 2018 , Italy became the first country in Europe and one of the first in the world to pass a law providing for these orphans ’ specific needs : scholarships , legal aid , and funding for medical and psychological care .
About $ 13.5 million in funds for Italy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in November 2019 , and the money was allocated and made available in early July this year .
A law that provides specifically for these orphans is a novel concept .
Except for a few sporadic studies , little data has been collected on the children who are left behind by domestic violence or femicide .
While there are issues that Italy ’ s law does not address—it can ’ t speed up the judicial process—it is nonetheless an important victory for the orfani speciali and their advocates .
The legislation could also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Over the past decade , many states—particularly in Europe—have begun recording data on femicide and implemented laws that punish the perpetrators .
But almost none have codified ways for dealing with the consequences of these crimes on their living victims .
Italy ’ s law is unique in considering nearly every aspect of the orphans ’ lives : assisting them through civil proceedings , providing them with free therapy , and giving them the means to become educated and enter the workforce .
At the same time , the law ensures the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the perpetrator—if it ’ s a spouse—from receiving a survivor ’ s pension .
The law also allows them to change their surname , which some adult orphans who bear the name of the father who murdered their mother say is more important than the economic assistance .
Italy ’ s government has released the funds for orfani speciali amid growing concerns about femicide worldwide .
Restrictions on movement because of the coronavirus pandemic have caused a spike in domestic violence incidents .
A study by the Violence Policy Center showed that murders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States steadily increased from 2014 to 2017 after declining for decades .
The other three countries with laws on the books to care for those orphaned by femicide are in Latin America .
Argentina , Peru , and Uruguay have also passed decrees that offer monthly allowances and medical and psychological care for orphans of femicide .
( More recently , Luis Abinader , sworn in in August as president of the Dominican Republic , proposed a program that would support orphans of domestic violence . )
But Italy ’ s law goes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the orphans ’ right to inherit property and state pension funds from their mothers .
Furthermore , it clearly defines a femicide as the killing of a woman by a husband , ex-husband , partner , ex-partner , or anyone with whom she has cohabited—preventing the exclusion of orphans whose mothers were not killed by their fathers .
Italy ’ s public funding for orfani speciali amounts to 14.5 million euros for 2020 and 12 million euros for each successive year until 2024 that will be directed toward scholarship funds , medical and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ along with a 300 euro monthly support stipend for families caring for the orphans .
The law earmarks 70 percent of the funds for minors , while 30 percent will go toward adult orphans who are not economically self-sufficient .
The legislation was inspired in part by the experience of its author , the lawyer Anna Maria Busia .
In 1998 , a woman in Busia ’ s hometown in the province of Nuora was murdered by her husband , leaving behind a six-year-old daughter , Vanessa .
Busia said she took on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” and the next 20 years of legal battles—first to receive Vanessa ’ s mother ’ s survivor ’ s pension , and then to obtain the right to her family ’ s house—showed Busia that Italy lacked the legal instruments to help victims like Vanessa , who eventually won both cases .
“ Our [ legal ] system looks at the perpetrator of the crime .
… It ’ s not concerned with protecting the victims.
” “ Our [ legal ] system looks at the perpetrator of the crime , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerned with punishment , it ’ s concerned with sentencing , it ’ s concerned with detention , but it ’ s not concerned with protecting the victims.
” Busia , then the regional counselor in Sardinia , drafted the orfani speciali bill in 2017 , at first seeking to close the loopholes that allowed perpetrators to inherit from their deceased spouses .
Roberto Capelli , a lawmaker from Busia ’ s party , the Democratic Center , became the bill ’ s first signatory and others soon pledged their support .
During @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that drew on the pioneering research of the Italian psychologist Anna Costanza Baldry , who died in 2019 .
She found that only one-third of orphans she and her team interviewed had received psychological help .
More than 60 percent of caregivers said they had received little or no support , economic or otherwise .
Based on Baldry ’ s guidelines , the changes provided the funding for medical and psychological expenses , scholarship funds , and job training .
Lazio was the first of only a few regions in Italy to create @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speciali .
Instituted by a 2014 law , the money became available in 2016 .
( Emilia-Romagna , Veneto , Campania , Piedmont , and Lombardy now have similar provisions . )
Lazio ’ s fund disperses 10,000 euros per child the first year after the mother ’ s death , and 5,000 euro for each year up to the age of 29 .
In 2015 , when Patrizia Schiarizza founded il Giardino Segreto , a Rome-based organization that assists the orphans and their families , she planned to provide legal and psychological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their needs were varied : One needed a job , another a place to stay , and a nervous grandmother needed reassurance over the phone .
Orfani speciali often fall into the care of grandparents , aunts , and uncles .
One of the grandparents receiving assistance from Schiarizza ’ s organization was Squatrito , now raising Asia .
“ She thought that [ her mother ] had abandoned her because she had been a brat , ” Squatrito said , adding that Asia became rebellious and emotionally closed off .
In Lazio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her two granddaughters—now ages nine and six—since 2015 , when her daughter ’ s partner killed her before killing himself .
The grandmother came to il Giardino Segreto for advice about her elder granddaughter , who was afraid to detach herself from her grandmother .
Raising orphans of femicide also presents financial difficulties .
The cost of school and extracurricular activities adds up , and both grandmothers paid for private therapists .
Squatrito said that although the state had briefly provided them with psychological support after her daughter ’ s death , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treatment ] , they abandon you.
” While the regional funding is a help to Rossana , she still worries about money .
After her daughter died , she requested her retirement pension in advance .
“ I emptied all of my savings , ” she said .
“ If I retire soon , I ’ ll get a ridiculous sum , and I don ’ t know how I ’ ll raise these girls .
And this is an extremely serious problem.
” Both grandmothers wanted to ensure their granddaughters were treated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia asked for dance lessons , Squatrito said yes , although it added financial strain .
For Asia , it was a connection to her mother , who was also a dancer .
And after discovering that her seven-year-old grandchild was searching her mother ’ s name online , Rossana requested the “ right to be forgotten ” —an EU provision that allows people to delete personal information from search engines .
Some advocates already foresee issues with Italy ’ s law , particularly the cumbersome process for obtaining the funds from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ submit a request to a local government before it is sent to Rome and approved by the central government .
There is no standard form through which the orphans can apply for the funds , Schiarizza said .
Additionally , the funds must be formally renewed each year , with paperwork signed by the “ parent exercising parental responsibility ” —in many cases , the father who is in prison .
Since the law passed , il Giardino Segreto has received many requests about the promised funds .
For more than two years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the money wasn ’ t accessible , and now she is still figuring out how to navigate the system set up in July .
“ These funds , modest as they may be , are still useful , ” said Schiarizza .
“ These families have so , so many needs that any sum at this point is good.
” Mara Carfagna , the vice president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies , published a letter in July expressing similar concerns about the bureaucratic process .
“ There should not have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paper , reimbursements for medical loans , ” Carfagna wrote .
The government has said it is working to simplify the process .
Italy ’ s law could be adapted for other countries , particularly those in the European Union .
Italy ’ s law could be adapted for other countries , according to experts , particularly those in the European Union .
The Italian law could also serve as a model for other countries where laws have also presented issues with implementation .
For example , a report earlier this year found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Argentina ’ s 2018 law , a result of “ bad interpretation of the law , failures of justice , confused or misogynistic sentences , bureaucratic labyrinths and a lack of support and access to rights.
” Since the report was published , the monthly allowance has increased to about $ 218 , but only a fraction of Argentina ’ s estimated 3,000 children orphaned by femicide during the past decade have received any funds .
Busia said that a “ common defect ” of other countries ’ laws is “ the lack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crime.
” She said that she hopes Italy will inspire other countries to create instruments that will prioritize the unique needs of these “ special victims , ” including the specific provisions to change their surname and the guarantee of receiving a survivor ’ s pension .
Meanwhile , many adult orphans and their families have dedicated their lives to speaking out against domestic violence .
Squatrito travels around Italy telling her murdered daughter ’ s story and educating children about domestic abuse .
At times , her emotions still overwhelm her .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ yourself are living a parallel life , ” Squatrito said .
“ From that moment on , for me , it was another life .
”

On Oct. 6, 2015, 20-year-old Giordana Di Stefano was murdered in her hometown of Nicolosi, Sicily, by her ex-boyfriend. She left behind a young daughter, Asia. The period immediately after Di Stefano’s death was excruciating. Di Stefano’s mother, Vera Squatrito, struggled to explain to Asia that she would not be coming home. At first, Asia’s grandmother told her that her mother was an angel or a star in the sky.
On Oct. 6, 2015, 20-year-old Giordana Di Stefano was murdered in her hometown of Nicolosi, Sicily, by her ex-boyfriend. She left behind a young daughter, Asia. The period immediately after Di Stefano’s death was excruciating. Di Stefano’s mother, Vera Squatrito, struggled to explain to Asia that she would not be coming home. At first, Asia’s grandmother told her that her mother was an angel or a star in the sky.
Asia, now nine years old, is one of Italy’s orfani speciali, or special orphans—children and adults whose mothers were killed by their husbands, partners, ex-partners, or stalkers. Researchers estimate that between 2000 and 2015, around 1,600 children and adults were orphaned by domestic violence in Italy.
In January 2018, Italy became the first country in Europe and one of the first in the world to pass a law providing for these orphans’ specific needs: scholarships, legal aid, and funding for medical and psychological care. About $13.5 million in funds for Italy’s orfani speciali were released with a decree in November 2019, and the money was allocated and made available in early July this year.
A law that provides specifically for these orphans is a novel concept. Except for a few sporadic studies, little data has been collected on the children who are left behind by domestic violence or femicide. While there are issues that Italy’s law does not address—it can’t speed up the judicial process—it is nonetheless an important victory for the orfani speciali and their advocates. The legislation could also serve as a model for other countries. Over the past decade, many states—particularly in Europe—have begun recording data on femicide and implemented laws that punish the perpetrators. But almost none have codified ways for dealing with the consequences of these crimes on their living victims.
Italy’s law is unique in considering nearly every aspect of the orphans’ lives: assisting them through civil proceedings, providing them with free therapy, and giving them the means to become educated and enter the workforce. At the same time, the law ensures the orfani speciali receive their inheritance and prevents the perpetrator—if it’s a spouse—from receiving a survivor’s pension. The law also allows them to change their surname, which some adult orphans who bear the name of the father who murdered their mother say is more important than the economic assistance.
Italy’s government has released the funds for orfani speciali amid growing concerns about femicide worldwide. Restrictions on movement because of the coronavirus pandemic have caused a spike in domestic violence incidents. A study by the Violence Policy Center showed that murders related to intimate-partner violence in the United States steadily increased from 2014 to 2017 after declining for decades.
The other three countries with laws on the books to care for those orphaned by femicide are in Latin America. Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay have also passed decrees that offer monthly allowances and medical and psychological care for orphans of femicide. (More recently, Luis Abinader, sworn in in August as president of the Dominican Republic, proposed a program that would support orphans of domestic violence.) But Italy’s law goes a step further in its protection of the orphans’ right to inherit property and state pension funds from their mothers. Furthermore, it clearly defines a femicide as the killing of a woman by a husband, ex-husband, partner, ex-partner, or anyone with whom she has cohabited—preventing the exclusion of orphans whose mothers were not killed by their fathers.
Italy’s public funding for orfani speciali amounts to 14.5 million euros for 2020 and 12 million euros for each successive year until 2024 that will be directed toward scholarship funds, medical and psychological assistance, and job training, along with a 300 euro monthly support stipend for families caring for the orphans. The law earmarks 70 percent of the funds for minors, while 30 percent will go toward adult orphans who are not economically self-sufficient.
The legislation was inspired in part by the experience of its author, the lawyer Anna Maria Busia. In 1998, a woman in Busia’s hometown in the province of Nuora was murdered by her husband, leaving behind a six-year-old daughter, Vanessa. Busia said she took on the case “practically for free,” and the next 20 years of legal battles—first to receive Vanessa’s mother’s survivor’s pension, and then to obtain the right to her family’s house—showed Busia that Italy lacked the legal instruments to help victims like Vanessa, who eventually won both cases.
“Our [legal] system looks at the perpetrator of the crime. … It’s not concerned with protecting the victims.”
“Our [legal] system looks at the perpetrator of the crime,” Busia said. “It’s concerned with punishment, it’s concerned with sentencing, it’s concerned with detention, but it’s not concerned with protecting the victims.”
Busia, then the regional counselor in Sardinia, drafted the orfani speciali bill in 2017, at first seeking to close the loopholes that allowed perpetrators to inherit from their deceased spouses. Roberto Capelli, a lawmaker from Busia’s party, the Democratic Center, became the bill’s first signatory and others soon pledged their support.
During the parliamentary debate, amendments were added that drew on the pioneering research of the Italian psychologist Anna Costanza Baldry, who died in 2019. She found that only one-third of orphans she and her team interviewed had received psychological help. More than 60 percent of caregivers said they had received little or no support, economic or otherwise. Based on Baldry’s guidelines, the changes provided the funding for medical and psychological expenses, scholarship funds, and job training.
Long before the national government approved the legislation, regional governments and local, privately funded organizations were already filling the gap.
Lazio was the first of only a few regions in Italy to create a fund for the families of orfani speciali. Instituted by a 2014 law, the money became available in 2016. (Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Campania, Piedmont, and Lombardy now have similar provisions.) Lazio’s fund disperses 10,000 euros per child the first year after the mother’s death, and 5,000 euro for each year up to the age of 29.
In 2015, when Patrizia Schiarizza founded il Giardino Segreto, a Rome-based organization that assists the orphans and their families, she planned to provide legal and psychological help. But she quickly realized that their needs were varied: One needed a job, another a place to stay, and a nervous grandmother needed reassurance over the phone.
Orfani speciali often fall into the care of grandparents, aunts, and uncles. One of the grandparents receiving assistance from Schiarizza’s organization was Squatrito, now raising Asia. “She thought that [her mother] had abandoned her because she had been a brat,” Squatrito said, adding that Asia became rebellious and emotionally closed off.
In Lazio, Rossana—who requested anonymity—has taken care of her two granddaughters—now ages nine and six—since 2015, when her daughter’s partner killed her before killing himself. The grandmother came to il Giardino Segreto for advice about her elder granddaughter, who was afraid to detach herself from her grandmother.
Raising orphans of femicide also presents financial difficulties. The cost of school and extracurricular activities adds up, and both grandmothers paid for private therapists. Squatrito said that although the state had briefly provided them with psychological support after her daughter’s death, “Once you finish the course [of treatment], they abandon you.”
While the regional funding is a help to Rossana, she still worries about money. After her daughter died, she requested her retirement pension in advance. “I emptied all of my savings,” she said. “If I retire soon, I’ll get a ridiculous sum, and I don’t know how I’ll raise these girls. And this is an extremely serious problem.”
Giordana Di Stefano and Asia in 2014 (L); and Vera Squatrito and Asia in Sept. 2020.
Both grandmothers wanted to ensure their granddaughters were treated the same as their peers. When Asia asked for dance lessons, Squatrito said yes, although it added financial strain. For Asia, it was a connection to her mother, who was also a dancer. And after discovering that her seven-year-old grandchild was searching her mother’s name online, Rossana requested the “right to be forgotten”—an EU provision that allows people to delete personal information from search engines.
Some advocates already foresee issues with Italy’s law, particularly the cumbersome process for obtaining the funds from the government: Victims or their guardians must submit a request to a local government before it is sent to Rome and approved by the central government. There is no standard form through which the orphans can apply for the funds, Schiarizza said. Additionally, the funds must be formally renewed each year, with paperwork signed by the “parent exercising parental responsibility”—in many cases, the father who is in prison.
Since the law passed, il Giardino Segreto has received many requests about the promised funds. For more than two years, Schiarizza had to tell the families that the money wasn’t accessible, and now she is still figuring out how to navigate the system set up in July. “These funds, modest as they may be, are still useful,” said Schiarizza. “These families have so, so many needs that any sum at this point is good.”
Mara Carfagna, the vice president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, published a letter in July expressing similar concerns about the bureaucratic process. “There should not have to be complicated procedures, requests on stamped paper, reimbursements for medical loans,” Carfagna wrote. The government has said it is working to simplify the process.
Italy’s law could be adapted for other countries, particularly those in the European Union.
Italy’s law could be adapted for other countries, according to experts, particularly those in the European Union. The Italian law could also serve as a model for other countries where laws have also presented issues with implementation. For example, a report earlier this year found that few families received their provisions under Argentina’s 2018 law, a result of “bad interpretation of the law, failures of justice, confused or misogynistic sentences, bureaucratic labyrinths and a lack of support and access to rights.” Since the report was published, the monthly allowance has increased to about $218, but only a fraction of Argentina’s estimated 3,000 children orphaned by femicide during the past decade have received any funds.
Busia said that a “common defect” of other countries’ laws is “the lack of protection for the victims of a crime.” She said that she hopes Italy will inspire other countries to create instruments that will prioritize the unique needs of these “special victims,” including the specific provisions to change their surname and the guarantee of receiving a survivor’s pension.
Meanwhile, many adult orphans and their families have dedicated their lives to speaking out against domestic violence. Squatrito travels around Italy telling her murdered daughter’s story and educating children about domestic abuse. At times, her emotions still overwhelm her. “It’s as if you yourself are living a parallel life,” Squatrito said. “From that moment on, for me, it was another life.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Nigeria’s Protests Push Authorities to the Edge

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Protesters shut down Lagos as demonstrations continue in Nigeria , the United States removes Sudan from its state sponsors of terror list , and opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo declares victory in Guinea ’ s presidential election .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Over the past two weeks , the protests have grown from a movement focused on disbanding the country ’ s Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) —accused of extortion and committing extra-judicial killings—to encompass anti-corruption and governance issues .
Like recent protests in Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no central leader but are undoubtedly youth led , with the hashtag # EndSARS becoming shorthand for the movement .
Shaky foundations .
Beyond anger at the SARS unit , which was dissolved on Oct. 11 , Nigeria ’ s problems go even deeper .
As the country with the highest break-even price for oil production , falling oil prices have spelled disaster : 60 percent of government revenue comes from oil and the industry accounts for 70 percent of exports .
On top of that , more than 55 percent of Nigerians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s economy is projected to contract by 4.3 percent this year .
A crackdown coming ?
The national government has indicated it will soon take a harder line against the protests , during which at least 15 people have been killed so far .
“ We are no longer dealing with # EndSARS but a volatile situation that can lead to anarchy if government does not take some very firm steps to protect the lives and livelihood of innocent Nigerians , ” Minister of Information and Culture Lai Mohammed told state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police have already used excessive force in at least six Nigerian cities .
The threat of violence has become so genuine that some groups have crowd-funded private security guards to protect them against attacks .
Meanwhile , the country ’ s armed forces , who have threatened to intervene in the protests , are conducting a nationwide military exercise , Operation Crocodile Smile .
“ The biggest strength of the protests has also become its biggest liability , which is total absence of centralized leadership , ” David Huneydin , a local journalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ A military intervention is now highly likely.
” Sudan removed from state sponsors of terror list .
The United States has removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism after agreeing to a deal that provides $ 355 million to the American victims of the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of a U.S. naval vessel in 2000 .
Although the attacks were carried out by al Qaeda , the United States holds Sudan ’ s previous government responsible for its part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time of the attacks .
As FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reports , part of the deal involved U.S. pressure on Sudan to officially recognize Israel , something Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok ’ s transitional government is expected to announce shortly .
The deal does not , however , resolve all outstanding issues between the United States and Sudan , as Cameron Hudson argued recently in FP ; Sudan still faces other legal claims and hostility from key figures in the U.S. Congress that could stand in the way of an economic recovery @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to appear in L.A. court .
Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda , who served as Mexico ’ s secretary of defense as recently as two years ago , will appear in court in Los Angeles today for a detention hearing .
Cienfuegos Zepeda is charged with drug trafficking , money laundering , and accepting bribes from the Mexican H-2 cartel in return for turning a blind eye to their activities during his time in office .
Current Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has defended his country ’ s armed forces following Cienfuegos Zepeda ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ neoliberal period ” presided over by previous governments .
Guinea ’ s presidential race .
Opposition candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo has declared himself the victor of Sunday ’ s Guinean presidential elections ahead of official results .
Without citing specifics , Diallo said his victory was confirmed by internal figures compiled by his party .
Bakary Mansare , the vice president of the country ’ s electoral authority , called Diallo ’ s declaration both “ premature ” and “ void.
” Official results are expected within a week .
Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s latest forecast for the Middle East , North Africa , and Central Asia projects larger economic contractions in the region than the global average .
Overall , the IMF projects countries in the Middle East to contract by 5 percent , slightly higher than the global figure of 4.4 percent .
Libya ’ s economy is predicted to be the worst hit—declining by 66.7 percent , followed by Lebanon with a 25 percent drop .
Egypt ’ s economy is expected to fare best in the region , seeing an economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Democracy in the dumps .
Young people are more disillusioned and less satisfied with democracy than at any point in the past 100 years , according to a study by the University of Cambridge .
The study—which assembled data from 4.8 million respondents in 160 countries collected between 1973 and 2020—pointed to income inequality and the high rate of youth unemployment as the driving reasons behind the disillusionment .
Tussle in Fiji .
Officials from Taiwan and China have accused each other of assaulting diplomats after a Taiwanese trade reception at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 8 .
Taiwan maintains that two Chinese officials gatecrashed the event and proceeded to photograph attendees , a practice considered intimidating and provocative , leading to a scuffle when the two Chinese diplomats were asked to leave .
China claims that the diplomats were in the area on official duties and complained that the event featured a cake in the style of the Taiwanese flag .
Both sides have asked Fijian police to investigate the incident .
Here ’ s the beef .
Europe ’ s farmers are pushing the European parliament to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other appetizingly named meatless foods off the continent ’ s menus as part of a proposed amendment to a farming bill .
The European farmers association Copa Cogeca argues the European Union should ban “ surrealistic ” descriptions of meatless foods , saying they confuse consumers and are detrimental to farmers .
Farmers have precedent on their side , as the European Court of Justice recently ruled that terms like “ milk ” and “ cheese ” can only be used in reference to dairy products .
Those in favor of plant-based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s actions “ disproportionate and out of step with the current climate.
” Muscular diplomacy .
The 1990s-era Belgian action hero Jean-Claude Van Damme proved to be a skilled diplomat as he helped repatriate a Chihuahua that had fallen victim to a fake passport scam .
The dog , Raya , had originally been adopted in Norway after traveling there on a Bulgarian passport .
Once the document was found to be a fake , the dog was unable to be registered in Norway , while Bulgaria refused its return , citing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After finding out the dog would be put down instead , Van Damme launched a campaign on social media for the dog ’ s return to Bulgaria , posting pictures of his own Chihuahua on social media to drum up support .
Pressured by the Muscles from Brussels , Bulgaria relented .
Raya will now be put up for adoption upon her return .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or @ @ @ @ @ @

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protesters shut down Lagos as demonstrations continue in Nigeria , the United States removes Sudan from its state sponsors of terror list, and opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo declares victory in Guinea ’s presidential election.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Protesters shut down Lagos as demonstrations continue in Nigeria, the United States removes Sudan from its state sponsors of terror list, and opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo declares victory in Guinea’s presidential election.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Nigeria Erupts As Lagos Comes to A Standstill Two weeks of demonstrations in Nigeria came to a head yesterday as protesters effectively shut down Lagos, the country’s largest city. As part of the mass demonstrations, the city’s airport was blockaded by protesters along with the country’s main highway, the Ibadan expressway.
Over the past two weeks, the protests have grown from a movement focused on disbanding the country’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)—accused of extortion and committing extra-judicial killings—to encompass anti-corruption and governance issues. Like recent protests in Hong Kong and Thailand, the protests have no central leader but are undoubtedly youth led, with the hashtag #EndSARS becoming shorthand for the movement.
Shaky foundations. Beyond anger at the SARS unit, which was dissolved on Oct. 11, Nigeria’s problems go even deeper. As the country with the highest break-even price for oil production, falling oil prices have spelled disaster: 60 percent of government revenue comes from oil and the industry accounts for 70 percent of exports. On top of that, more than 55 percent of Nigerians are either unemployed or underemployed and the country’s economy is projected to contract by 4.3 percent this year.
A crackdown coming? The national government has indicated it will soon take a harder line against the protests, during which at least 15 people have been killed so far. “We are no longer dealing with #EndSARS but a volatile situation that can lead to anarchy if government does not take some very firm steps to protect the lives and livelihood of innocent Nigerians,” Minister of Information and Culture Lai Mohammed told state television.
According to Amnesty International, police have already used excessive force in at least six Nigerian cities. The threat of violence has become so genuine that some groups have crowd-funded private security guards to protect them against attacks.
Meanwhile, the country’s armed forces, who have threatened to intervene in the protests, are conducting a nationwide military exercise, Operation Crocodile Smile. “The biggest strength of the protests has also become its biggest liability, which is total absence of centralized leadership,” David Huneydin, a local journalist, told the Wall Street Journal. “A military intervention is now highly likely.”
What We’re Following Today Sudan removed from state sponsors of terror list. The United States has removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism after agreeing to a deal that provides $355 million to the American victims of the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of a U.S. naval vessel in 2000. Although the attacks were carried out by al Qaeda, the United States holds Sudan’s previous government responsible for its part in harboring Osama bin Laden at the time of the attacks. As FP’s Robbie Gramer reports, part of the deal involved U.S. pressure on Sudan to officially recognize Israel, something Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s transitional government is expected to announce shortly. The deal does not, however, resolve all outstanding issues between the United States and Sudan, as Cameron Hudson argued recently in FP; Sudan still faces other legal claims and hostility from key figures in the U.S. Congress that could stand in the way of an economic recovery.
Mexico’s former military chief to appear in L.A. court. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, who served as Mexico’s secretary of defense as recently as two years ago, will appear in court in Los Angeles today for a detention hearing. Cienfuegos Zepeda is charged with drug trafficking, money laundering, and accepting bribes from the Mexican H-2 cartel in return for turning a blind eye to their activities during his time in office. Current Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has defended his country’s armed forces following Cienfuegos Zepeda’s arrest, blaming any corruption on the “neoliberal period” presided over by previous governments.
Guinea’s presidential race. Opposition candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo has declared himself the victor of Sunday’s Guinean presidential elections ahead of official results. Without citing specifics, Diallo said his victory was confirmed by internal figures compiled by his party. Bakary Mansare, the vice president of the country’s electoral authority, called Diallo’s declaration both “premature” and “void.” Official results are expected within a week.
Keep an Eye On
Middle East economies. The International Monetary Fund’s latest forecast for the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia projects larger economic contractions in the region than the global average. Overall, the IMF projects countries in the Middle East to contract by 5 percent, slightly higher than the global figure of 4.4 percent. Libya’s economy is predicted to be the worst hit—declining by 66.7 percent, followed by Lebanon with a 25 percent drop. Egypt’s economy is expected to fare best in the region, seeing an economic growth rate of 3.5 percent in 2020.
Democracy in the dumps. Young people are more disillusioned and less satisfied with democracy than at any point in the past 100 years, according to a study by the University of Cambridge. The study—which assembled data from 4.8 million respondents in 160 countries collected between 1973 and 2020—pointed to income inequality and the high rate of youth unemployment as the driving reasons behind the disillusionment.
Tussle in Fiji. Officials from Taiwan and China have accused each other of assaulting diplomats after a Taiwanese trade reception at a hotel in Fiji turned violent on Oct. 8. Taiwan maintains that two Chinese officials gatecrashed the event and proceeded to photograph attendees, a practice considered intimidating and provocative, leading to a scuffle when the two Chinese diplomats were asked to leave. China claims that the diplomats were in the area on official duties and complained that the event featured a cake in the style of the Taiwanese flag. Both sides have asked Fijian police to investigate the incident.
Odds and Ends
Here’s the beef. Europe’s farmers are pushing the European parliament to take veggie burgers, vegan sausage, and other appetizingly named meatless foods off the continent’s menus as part of a proposed amendment to a farming bill. The European farmers association Copa Cogeca argues the European Union should ban “surrealistic” descriptions of meatless foods, saying they confuse consumers and are detrimental to farmers. Farmers have precedent on their side, as the European Court of Justice recently ruled that terms like “milk” and “cheese” can only be used in reference to dairy products. Those in favor of plant-based alternatives to meat have called the farmer’s actions “disproportionate and out of step with the current climate.”
Muscular diplomacy. The 1990s-era Belgian action hero Jean-Claude Van Damme proved to be a skilled diplomat as he helped repatriate a Chihuahua that had fallen victim to a fake passport scam. The dog, Raya, had originally been adopted in Norway after traveling there on a Bulgarian passport. Once the document was found to be a fake, the dog was unable to be registered in Norway, while Bulgaria refused its return, citing European Union regulations on live animal transport. After finding out the dog would be put down instead, Van Damme launched a campaign on social media for the dog’s return to Bulgaria, posting pictures of his own Chihuahua on social media to drum up support. Pressured by the Muscles from Brussels, Bulgaria relented. Raya will now be put up for adoption upon her return.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--The UAE Is Turning Into the World Capital for Weapons Makers

The UAE Is Turning Into the World Capital for Weapons Makers At Defence and Security Equipment International , the world ’ s largest arms fair , held last year in London , the organizers reported a record demand for space .
A large chunk of that demand was from the United Arab Emirates , which reserved the corner with the most foot traffic .
But its pavilion looked empty next to the life-size prototypes that surrounded it , and its delegate was too busy to talk to the press .
Still , the creators of the nearby surveillance equipment were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United Kingdom , Sweden , and Australia , and they said they were pleased with how much room their new patrons gave them to explore .
One of them had made a voice recognition system that cross-indexes international databases of police interrogations .
Another displayed an internet-of-things radar system mounted on a police car that takes orders from intelligence officers .
The UAE has not released data on its defense budget since 2014 , but back then it already outspent the United States in per capita terms , according to the Stockholm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that money goes to buying the flashiest items on the market .
But if a sale is not approved , the UAE is not at much of a loss ; a growing portion of its budget is going toward developing its own technologies .
The debate over whether the United States will sell the Gulf country the F-35 fighter jet , then , misses the larger picture .
If the UAE can ’ t get the jet , it might negotiate to join the F-16 supply chain and gain skills and contacts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to Shana Marshall , an assistant research professor at George Washington University .
Over the past decade , the small Gulf state has built a reputation for splurging its petrodollars on soccer teams , museums , dairy and produce farms , real estate , tech start-ups , and banks—whether to claim a stake in rising markets , diversify its economy , or buy political clout .
The logic is similar with defense production , but more than simply adding a logo and funneling proceeds , it is moving much of the creation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multinational companies already have unclear jurisdiction , that may not seem significant .
But in one where rich countries are reprioritizing spending , where regional powers are shifting , and where warfare is prioritizing brain over brawn , Abu Dhabi is “ a defense executive ’ s absolute dream , ” Marshall said .
It pays quickly , generously , and without bureaucratic oversight .
Boosted by its recent agreement with Israel to normalize diplomatic relations , the monarchy could become the pumping heart of an unbridled defense industry sooner rather than later @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technology transfers to unfriendly countries will find their efforts lost .
Those looking to cash in on the military industrial complex will get to know a new pole beyond the United States and China—one that literally considers itself at the center of the world .
The Emirates ’ approach to these deals was different .
The standard agreement since the Cold War , known as an “ offset , ” holds that the defense contractor does not just sell a weapon but also pays for infrastructure around it .
The buying country can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sale , like a factory for small parts or training in maintenance , or in something not related at all , like factories for civilian goods , real estate , universities , industrial parks , or shrimp farms .
Both profit : One side provides cheap labor , another subsidizes development .
In 1997 , as price tags got bigger , the U.S. Department of Commerce advised governments to manage the offsets through investment funds .
The UAE was the only country that listened .
Its offset bureau helped establish two sovereign wealth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dumped before it was invested .
Run by well-connected merchant families and their financial consultants , these funds favor high-return portfolios like financial services , oil-related infrastructure and a shipyard for yachts and warships .
But the commerce department ’ s own Bureau of Industry and Security turned against the previous advice in the late 1990s to use investment funds because it found the practice to be corruption-prone .
The U.S. Government Accountability Office also criticized offsets as an opaque form of offshoring and warned of the risks of technological transfer .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S.-Soviet arms race petered out , the United States consolidated its military bureaucracy , shaving the budget of those who monitored these kinds of deals .
Mohammed bin Zayed , the UAE ’ s de facto ruler and deputy commander of its armed forces , also has friends in think tanks and lobbying circles to push deals through .
Still , offsets had their limits .
They are known to be slow , to be rarely completed , and to keep the buying country dependent .
The Emirates set tight rules to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was too impatient to build indigenous military infrastructure from the ground up .
Instead , by streamlining and scaling up its investment funds , it has been pooling money to bring foreign projects—and with them , their engineers and patents—to Abu Dhabi .
Self-sufficiency is less about the nationality of the developers or the origin of every part ; what matters more is that the UAE owns , assembles , maintains , and services a growing share of the technologies it uses .
In 2014 , it brought together the Tawazun and Mubadala @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which then merged with two dozen other subsidiaries last year to form the defense conglomerate Edge .
Its CEO manages a $ 5 billion budget to develop what he calls “ sovereign capability.
” In practice , that means partnering with big foreign defense firms , buying out small ones and hiring midsize ones to open shop in Abu Dhabi , registered under a local name .
Since the intellectual property belongs to the Emiratis , export controls to limit the exchange of technological know-how do not apply .
The UAE will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industry—nor , with global supply chains , does it need to .
Emiratis will likely never run the whole show , given that the country has few native workers and many foreign ones .
But , the way global supply chains work , self-sufficiency is less about the nationality of the developers or the origin of every part ; what matters more is that the UAE owns , assembles , maintains , and services a growing share of the technologies it uses .
Its full arsenal is kept confidential , but the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offensive said to have triggered the world ’ s worst humanitarian disaster , the 2015 blockade of the Hodeida port , was enforced by the Baynunah corvette , a small warship manufactured at Abu Dhabi Ship Building .
Observers of the war also spotted UAE-branded missiles , drones , machine guns , and armored vehicles .
These arms may not be the highest grade , but they do the job in battle .
They are now tested , advertised , and on the market for export .
Gulf states that haven ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense drive , like Kuwait and Bahrain , are reliable customers , both in weapons and services .
Saudi Arabia has tried to follow suit but is nowhere near the Emirates in exports or innovation .
Its target to localize up to half of its military industry by 2030 is more talk than walk ; it still puts most of its money in joint projects rather than research and training , which the Emiratis count on for bigger and longer-term returns .
With a pandemic raging and economic priorities shifting , it may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an arms deal .
Global military spending relative to GDP—notably in research and development—has already been falling for a decade , and the Gulf states in particular have been losing their shine in Western capitals .
Due to its intervention in Yemen , the UAE has also had sales blocked or suspended , pushing it to decrease its arms dependency on the West .
But all of this works in the UAE ’ s favor .
As conventional defense giants are struggling with problems at home , smaller countries are looking to buy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ biggest customers are the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Mali , Nigeria , Jordan , Algeria , South Sudan , and Egypt , which may have a tough time accessing certain weapons from the United States or European countries .
The UAE ’ s products cater to their needs , with cheaper prices and features such as adaptability to desert weather and minefields .
It already sells to nearly two dozen countries , according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ; it has joint projects with such powers as Russia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for free to U.N.-embargoed countries including Somalia and Libya .
Edge ’ s CEO recently said that despite the global economic slowdown , the conglomerate is preparing an order of armored vehicles for Algeria and is discussing new projects with several other countries .
One of those countries , he said , is Israel .
Even before they normalized relations , the two had reportedly collaborated in defense , especially in drone surveillance , and announced in July that their defense and intelligence firms would partner to combat the COVID-19 pandemic , likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The UAE-Israel match is ideal for the pair : Both countries are small , urbanized , and specialize in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity .
Now that they have a direct channel , they can sell and share technologies that the United States had blocked .
The Israeli defense ministry is not likely to object to a close partnership , since the two countries ’ strategies—to counter Iran , curb the Muslim Brotherhood , and refine domestic surveillance—align .
The respective defense firms are also eager for big-ticket deals , which will fund Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ status in the market .
The way it ’ s headed , the UAE is hoping to become the center of gravity of an industry in need of deep pockets .
It does not need to copy the United States to prove it has succeeded .
“ The Emiratis find a niche because they know that they are small , and that if they want to matter , they have to not play the game according to others ’ rules , ” said Florence Gaub of the European Union Institute for Security Studies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subsidizing is planning less for wars on land or sea , and more in cyberspace and urban airspace .
That ’ s a market projected to grow and an area that particularly concerns a monarchy intent on holding onto power .
And that means the world ’ s elite engineers , retired officers and mercenaries , private equity managers , defense contractors , and brand consultants are likely to continue packing for Abu Dhabi .

At Defence and Security Equipment International, the world’s largest arms fair, held last year in London, the organizers reported a record demand for space. A large chunk of that demand was from the United Arab Emirates, which reserved the corner with the most foot traffic. But its pavilion looked empty next to the life-size prototypes that surrounded it, and its delegate was too busy to talk to the press.
At Defence and Security Equipment International, the world’s largest arms fair, held last year in London, the organizers reported a record demand for space. A large chunk of that demand was from the United Arab Emirates, which reserved the corner with the most foot traffic. But its pavilion looked empty next to the life-size prototypes that surrounded it, and its delegate was too busy to talk to the press.
Still, the creators of the nearby surveillance equipment were keen to chat. They came from the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia, and they said they were pleased with how much room their new patrons gave them to explore. One of them had made a voice recognition system that cross-indexes international databases of police interrogations. Another displayed an internet-of-things radar system mounted on a police car that takes orders from intelligence officers.
The UAE has not released data on its defense budget since 2014, but back then it already outspent the United States in per capita terms, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Most of that money goes to buying the flashiest items on the market. But if a sale is not approved, the UAE is not at much of a loss; a growing portion of its budget is going toward developing its own technologies.
The debate over whether the United States will sell the Gulf country the F-35 fighter jet, then, misses the larger picture. If the UAE can’t get the jet, it might negotiate to join the F-16 supply chain and gain skills and contacts to help it build other sophisticated systems, according to Shana Marshall, an assistant research professor at George Washington University.
Over the past decade, the small Gulf state has built a reputation for splurging its petrodollars on soccer teams, museums, dairy and produce farms, real estate, tech start-ups, and banks—whether to claim a stake in rising markets, diversify its economy, or buy political clout. The logic is similar with defense production, but more than simply adding a logo and funneling proceeds, it is moving much of the creation process onshore.
In a world where multinational companies already have unclear jurisdiction, that may not seem significant. But in one where rich countries are reprioritizing spending, where regional powers are shifting, and where warfare is prioritizing brain over brawn, Abu Dhabi is “a defense executive’s absolute dream,” Marshall said. It pays quickly, generously, and without bureaucratic oversight.
Boosted by its recent agreement with Israel to normalize diplomatic relations, the monarchy could become the pumping heart of an unbridled defense industry sooner rather than later. Those working to ban arms and technology transfers to unfriendly countries will find their efforts lost. Those looking to cash in on the military industrial complex will get to know a new pole beyond the United States and China—one that literally considers itself at the center of the world.
The way here was neither long nor conventional. Most countries that produce arms today—or at least parts for foreign ones—kick-started their industries during the Cold War, with the help of U.S. firms looking to buy consumer and political loyalty. The UAE only broke free from British protection in 1971; it took the Emirati government until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and then the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, to take interest. Those wars signaled to the Gulf monarchies that they had to be strong and self-reliant. They subsequently signed deals with foreign defense firms to start investing in their own industries and promised to boost one another’s. Saudi Arabia stepped up, but the clear leader was the UAE.
The Emirates’ approach to these deals was different. The standard agreement since the Cold War, known as an “offset,” holds that the defense contractor does not just sell a weapon but also pays for infrastructure around it. The buying country can demand investment either directly related to the sale, like a factory for small parts or training in maintenance, or in something not related at all, like factories for civilian goods, real estate, universities, industrial parks, or shrimp farms.
Both profit: One side provides cheap labor, another subsidizes development. In 1997, as price tags got bigger, the U.S. Department of Commerce advised governments to manage the offsets through investment funds. The UAE was the only country that listened. Its offset bureau helped establish two sovereign wealth funds—Tawazun and Mubadala—where offset money would be dumped before it was invested. Run by well-connected merchant families and their financial consultants, these funds favor high-return portfolios like financial services, oil-related infrastructure , and a shipyard for yachts and warships.
But the commerce department’s own Bureau of Industry and Security turned against the previous advice in the late 1990s to use investment funds because it found the practice to be corruption-prone. The U.S. Government Accountability Office also criticized offsets as an opaque form of offshoring and warned of the risks of technological transfer. But their words had little effect. As the U.S.-Soviet arms race petered out, the United States consolidated its military bureaucracy, shaving the budget of those who monitored these kinds of deals. Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE’s de facto ruler and deputy commander of its armed forces, also has friends in think tanks and lobbying circles to push deals through.
Still, offsets had their limits. They are known to be slow, to be rarely completed, and to keep the buying country dependent. The Emirates set tight rules to wring the most out of them but was too impatient to build indigenous military infrastructure from the ground up. Instead, by streamlining and scaling up its investment funds, it has been pooling money to bring foreign projects—and with them, their engineers and patents—to Abu Dhabi.
Self-sufficiency is less about the nationality of the developers or the origin of every part; what matters more is that the UAE owns, assembles, maintains, and services a growing share of the technologies it uses.
In 2014, it brought together the Tawazun and Mubadala funds under the Emirates Defence Industries Company, which then merged with two dozen other subsidiaries last year to form the defense conglomerate Edge. Its CEO manages a $5 billion budget to develop what he calls “sovereign capability.” In practice, that means partnering with big foreign defense firms, buying out small ones , and hiring midsize ones to open shop in Abu Dhabi, registered under a local name. Since the intellectual property belongs to the Emiratis, export controls to limit the exchange of technological know-how do not apply.
The UAE will likely never build an entirely sovereign defense industry—nor, with global supply chains, does it need to. Emiratis will likely never run the whole show, given that the country has few native workers and many foreign ones. But, the way global supply chains work, self-sufficiency is less about the nationality of the developers or the origin of every part; what matters more is that the UAE owns, assembles, maintains, and services a growing share of the technologies it uses.
Its full arsenal is kept confidential, but the war in Yemen offered a preview. The offensive said to have triggered the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, the 2015 blockade of the Hodeida port, was enforced by the Baynunah corvette, a small warship manufactured at Abu Dhabi Ship Building. Observers of the war also spotted UAE-branded missiles, drones, machine guns, and armored vehicles. These arms may not be the highest grade, but they do the job in battle. They are now tested, advertised, and on the market for export.
Gulf states that haven’t been able to emulate the Emirates’ defense drive, like Kuwait and Bahrain, are reliable customers, both in weapons and services. Saudi Arabia has tried to follow suit but is nowhere near the Emirates in exports or innovation. Its target to localize up to half of its military industry by 2030 is more talk than walk; it still puts most of its money in joint projects rather than research and training, which the Emiratis count on for bigger and longer-term returns.
With a pandemic raging and economic priorities shifting, it may not be the best time to secure an arms deal. Global military spending relative to GDP—notably in research and development—has already been falling for a decade, and the Gulf states in particular have been losing their shine in Western capitals. Due to its intervention in Yemen, the UAE has also had sales blocked or suspended, pushing it to decrease its arms dependency on the West. But all of this works in the UAE’s favor.
As conventional defense giants are struggling with problems at home, smaller countries are looking to buy elsewhere; among the UAE’s biggest customers are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Jordan, Algeria, South Sudan, and Egypt, which may have a tough time accessing certain weapons from the United States or European countries.
The UAE’s products cater to their needs, with cheaper prices and features such as adaptability to desert weather and minefields. It already sells to nearly two dozen countries, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; it has joint projects with such powers as Russia and Saudi Arabia; and it sends equipment for free to U.N.-embargoed countries including Somalia and Libya. Edge’s CEO recently said that despite the global economic slowdown, the conglomerate is preparing an order of armored vehicles for Algeria and is discussing new projects with several other countries.
One of those countries, he said, is Israel. Even before they normalized relations, the two had reportedly collaborated in defense, especially in drone surveillance, and announced in July that their defense and intelligence firms would partner to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, likely involving technologies led by artificial intelligence. The UAE-Israel match is ideal for the pair: Both countries are small, urbanized, and specialize in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Now that they have a direct channel, they can sell and share technologies that the United States had blocked.
The Israeli defense ministry is not likely to object to a close partnership, since the two countries’ strategies—to counter Iran, curb the Muslim Brotherhood, and refine domestic surveillance—align. The respective defense firms are also eager for big-ticket deals, which will fund Israeli experimentation in advanced technologies and boost Emirati status in the market.
The way it’s headed, the UAE is hoping to become the center of gravity of an industry in need of deep pockets. It does not need to copy the United States to prove it has succeeded. “The Emiratis find a niche because they know that they are small, and that if they want to matter, they have to not play the game according to others’ rules,” said Florence Gaub of the European Union Institute for Security Studies.
The defense industry the UAE is subsidizing is planning less for wars on land or sea, and more in cyberspace and urban airspace. That’s a market projected to grow and an area that particularly concerns a monarchy intent on holding onto power. And that means the world’s elite engineers, retired officers and mercenaries, private equity managers, defense contractors, and brand consultants are likely to continue packing for Abu Dhabi.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Why Action Against Google Is Not Enough

Why Action Against Google Is Not Enough

Why Action Against Google Is Not Enough The U.S. Justice Department ’ s latest move to sue Google for allegations that its search and advertising functions violate federal antitrust laws is unsurprisingly making headlines .
The world should welcome much-needed scrutiny of a dominant platform that has , as the Department contends , monopolized the search sector and exploited society through that commercial domination .
But the reality is that the United States—and its global partners—must take a comprehensive approach to internet regulation to address the biggest and most persistent challenges that the internet has surfaced over the past decade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant development , lawmakers ’ regulatory intent can ’ t end with Google , or simply the enforcement of antitrust provisions against the firm .
The coronavirus pandemic has only increased the importance of regulation across the internet .
COVID-19 has accelerated the world ’ s transition to a virtual economy : Work and school have largely shifted online ; telehealth services have expanded ; online shopping has soared ; apps for food and grocery delivery , fitness , and social meetups have proliferated .
Each of these trends was already underway , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the pandemic have dramatically sped up these changes .
Will our way of life change forever ?
What will the new normal look like ?
The answers may be unknown , but in the short term , it is clear that people around the world are exchanging more information online , sharing more personal information with various companies , health insurance providers , employers , schools , and other networks .
And all this is happening over mostly unregulated online platforms .
As digital communication increasingly becomes a fundamental service upon which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be asking who has access to our information and how it is being used .
More and more , communication over the internet resembles a utility-like service ; we turn to the same platforms every day to access social media , video conferencing , and to search the Internet .
As a result , the companies behind these services have driven out competition and become economically stronger .
Meanwhile , the dominant digital platforms are sucking up data , wielding it to develop proprietary insights , and steering the media landscape toward a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profit .
Put another way , they are building unilateral power over what we see and consume in the digital media ecosystem .
Consumers of any online media or data should be asking if the information they are reading is accurate and safe .
People have a right to know that their data is not being used to exploit them.People have a right to know that their data is not being used to exploit them—economically , intellectually , or politically .
Whether President Donald Trump is reelected or Democratic contender Joe Biden is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the urgency that the coronavirus pandemic has brought in the context of the digital media ecosystem .
Congress and the administration must work together to pass meaningful legislation to regulate the internet .
But how , exactly ?
And how can a regulator curb firms such as Facebook whose business models are necessarily exploitative in nature ?
A smart and future-ready regulatory reform agenda will have to start by looking directly at the dominant business model in the internet sector—one that centers on the uninhibited collection of tremendous amounts of personal and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly opaque but sophisticated algorithms deployed for content curation and ad-targeting , and the inclination across the industry to focus on aggressive platform growth at the expense of all other considerations , including adherence to democratic norms .
The next U.S. administration must respond to these commercial overreaches in tandem .
The first step is to pass a comprehensive privacy law at the federal level .
The 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act represented a meaningful step forward in advancing consumer protection at the state level , but without a cohesive federal approach , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inconsistent patchwork of state laws .
In any case , the United States needs to take an even stronger approach than California at the federal level , with a framework akin to Europe ’ s General Data Protection Regulation ( GDPR ) to protect the privacy of individuals online .
The GDPR effectively gives individual consumers control over their personal data and simplifies the regulatory environment for international business across the European Union .
Privacy is about giving consumers control of their data—their digital currency—as well as the ability to opt out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turns consumers into products sold to digital advertisers .
The technology sector represents more than 10 percent of the U.S. economy .
The United States should be leading the way on innovation in technology regulation—but it has fallen far behind.The United States should be leading the way on innovation in technology regulation—but it has fallen far behind .
And while some might suggest that we do not need an American privacy law since the industry must already comply with the GDPR globally , the reality is that we need something—a law on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face of a rapidly changing industry .
Second , U.S regulators must advance transparency—in every sense—on the internet .
The leading technology firms collect users ’ information but do not tell them what they are gathering in real time .
They process users ’ data to derive behavioral insights but do not reveal what those insights are or how they were developed .
And they target those same users with organic and paid content based on who they think they are—and in the process induce vicious biases in the media ecosystem that have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as foreign disinformation operations .
According to the Pew Research Center , 79 percent of American adults are concerned by how data is collected on them by companies , 81 percent believe the risks of collecting data outweigh the benefits , and 81 percent feel they lack control over the data that is collected on them by companies .
It is not technologically unfeasible for companies to offer greater transparency into how the algorithms behind these decision-making systems work ; it is simply the fact that the industry has no incentive to undertake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can—and should—force them to do it .
Third , we must rethink the way we enforce market competition in the United States to challenge the platforms ’ powerful incentive toward growth at the expense of the public interest .
As a recent U.S. antitrust report suggests , lawmakers must consider ways in which to invigorate market competition , as well as strengthen antitrust law and enforcement .
For too long , Americans have witnessed the courts establish a precedent focused on consumer harm—a metric that can not effectively be computed and regulated in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suggest time and again that their services are “ free ” for their users .
Regulators must think about ways to rein in the monopoly power of these platforms .
As one of us has suggested in the past , these platforms increasingly show signs of being natural monopolies and should be regulated as such .
This is a crucial moment in technology policy .
There is , in fact , a tremendous amount of political will to rein in the economic power that an exploitative industry has amassed over decades .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be a step in the right direction , but the next Congress accordingly has a powerful opportunity to advance a meaningful and comprehensive reform agenda to regulate Big Tech once and for all .
The next administration—whether led by Biden or Trump—should seize this opportunity and work across the aisle to pass meaningful legislation to protect consumers online .

The U.S. Justice Department’s latest move to sue Google for allegations that its search and advertising functions violate federal antitrust laws is unsurprisingly making headlines. The world should welcome much-needed scrutiny of a dominant platform that has, as the Department contends, monopolized the search sector and exploited society through that commercial domination. But the reality is that the United States—and its global partners—must take a comprehensive approach to internet regulation to address the biggest and most persistent challenges that the internet has surfaced over the past decade. While action against Google represents a significant development, lawmakers’ regulatory intent can’t end with Google, or simply the enforcement of antitrust provisions against the firm.
The U.S. Justice Department’s latest move to sue Google for allegations that its search and advertising functions violate federal antitrust laws is unsurprisingly making headlines. The world should welcome much-needed scrutiny of a dominant platform that has, as the Department contends, monopolized the search sector and exploited society through that commercial domination. But the reality is that the United States—and its global partners—must take a comprehensive approach to internet regulation to address the biggest and most persistent challenges that the internet has surfaced over the past decade. While action against Google represents a significant development, lawmakers’ regulatory intent can’t end with Google, or simply the enforcement of antitrust provisions against the firm.
The coronavirus pandemic has only increased the importance of regulation across the internet. COVID-19 has accelerated the world’s transition to a virtual economy: Work and school have largely shifted online; telehealth services have expanded; online shopping has soared; apps for food and grocery delivery, fitness, and social meetups have proliferated. Each of these trends was already underway, of course, but global lockdowns because of the pandemic have dramatically sped up these changes.
Will our way of life change forever? What will the new normal look like? The answers may be unknown, but in the short term, it is clear that people around the world are exchanging more information online, sharing more personal information with various companies, health insurance providers, employers, schools, and other networks. And all this is happening over mostly unregulated online platforms. As digital communication increasingly becomes a fundamental service upon which society depends, consumers and citizens should be asking who has access to our information and how it is being used. More and more, communication over the internet resembles a utility-like service; we turn to the same platforms every day to access social media, video conferencing, and to search the Internet. As a result, the companies behind these services have driven out competition and become economically stronger. Meanwhile, the dominant digital platforms are sucking up data, wielding it to develop proprietary insights, and steering the media landscape toward a system that is designed to maximize their profit. Put another way, they are building unilateral power over what we see and consume in the digital media ecosystem.
Consumers of any online media or data should be asking if the information they are reading is accurate and safe. People have a right to know that their data is not being used to exploit them.People have a right to know that their data is not being used to exploit them—economically, intellectually, or politically.
Whether President Donald Trump is reelected or Democratic contender Joe Biden is victorious, the next administration must respond to the urgency that the coronavirus pandemic has brought in the context of the digital media ecosystem. Congress and the administration must work together to pass meaningful legislation to regulate the internet.
But how, exactly? And how can a regulator curb firms such as Facebook whose business models are necessarily exploitative in nature?
A smart and future-ready regulatory reform agenda will have to start by looking directly at the dominant business model in the internet sector—one that centers on the uninhibited collection of tremendous amounts of personal and proprietary network information, the use of highly opaque but sophisticated algorithms deployed for content curation and ad-targeting, and the inclination across the industry to focus on aggressive platform growth at the expense of all other considerations, including adherence to democratic norms.
The next U.S. administration must respond to these commercial overreaches in tandem. The first step is to pass a comprehensive privacy law at the federal level. The 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act represented a meaningful step forward in advancing consumer protection at the state level, but without a cohesive federal approach, businesses will be forced to navigate an inconsistent patchwork of state laws. In any case, the United States needs to take an even stronger approach than California at the federal level, with a framework akin to Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to protect the privacy of individuals online. The GDPR effectively gives individual consumers control over their personal data and simplifies the regulatory environment for international business across the European Union. Privacy is about giving consumers control of their data—their digital currency—as well as the ability to opt out of the internet’s commercial regime that turns consumers into products sold to digital advertisers. The technology sector represents more than 10 percent of the U.S. economy. The United States should be leading the way on innovation in technology regulation—but it has fallen far behind.The United States should be leading the way on innovation in technology regulation—but it has fallen far behind. And while some might suggest that we do not need an American privacy law since the industry must already comply with the GDPR globally, the reality is that we need something—a law on the books—to give American consumers rights in the face of a rapidly changing industry.
Second, U.S regulators must advance transparency—in every sense—on the internet. The leading technology firms collect users’ information but do not tell them what they are gathering in real time. They process users’ data to derive behavioral insights but do not reveal what those insights are or how they were developed. And they target those same users with organic and paid content based on who they think they are—and in the process induce vicious biases in the media ecosystem that have brought us to deep social harms such as foreign disinformation operations. According to the Pew Research Center, 79 percent of American adults are concerned by how data is collected on them by companies, 81 percent believe the risks of collecting data outweigh the benefits, and 81 percent feel they lack control over the data that is collected on them by companies. It is not technologically unfeasible for companies to offer greater transparency into how the algorithms behind these decision-making systems work; it is simply the fact that the industry has no incentive to undertake such a practice. Lawmakers and regulators can—and should—force them to do it.
Third, we must rethink the way we enforce market competition in the United States to challenge the platforms’ powerful incentive toward growth at the expense of the public interest. As a recent U.S. antitrust report suggests, lawmakers must consider ways in which to invigorate market competition, as well as strengthen antitrust law and enforcement. For too long, Americans have witnessed the courts establish a precedent focused on consumer harm—a metric that cannot effectively be computed and regulated in an industry whose leading corporate executives wrongly suggest time and again that their services are “free” for their users. Regulators must think about ways to rein in the monopoly power of these platforms. As one of us has suggested in the past, these platforms increasingly show signs of being natural monopolies and should be regulated as such.
This is a crucial moment in technology policy. There is, in fact, a tremendous amount of political will to rein in the economic power that an exploitative industry has amassed over decades. The Trump administration’s lawsuit against Google may be a step in the right direction, but the next Congress accordingly has a powerful opportunity to advance a meaningful and comprehensive reform agenda to regulate Big Tech once and for all. The next administration—whether led by Biden or Trump—should seize this opportunity and work across the aisle to pass meaningful legislation to protect consumers online.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-20--Angst and Denial in India as It’s Now Officially Poorer Than Bangladesh

Angst and Denial in India as It ’ s Now Officially Poorer Than Bangladesh Mirror , mirror on the wall , who ’ s the poorest of them all ?
When Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971 , it was arguably the poorest country in the world—or close to it .
Today , the country is still poor but growing rapidly .
Real economic growth exceeded 8 percent in 2019 , and although the coronavirus crisis has slowed the pace , growth is expected to continue at a more modest pace of around 4 percent in both 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2020 GDP per capita of $ 1,888 now places the country far above many of the desperately poor countries of tropical Africa with which it used to be compared .
And it puts Bangladesh exactly one spot above neighboring India in the latest economic league tables from the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .
When the news broke , the Indian press went wild in a paroxysm of angst , finger-pointing , and denial .
In Bangladesh , the response was more measured .
In China , unsurprisingly , the state-run media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on “ the Indian government ’ s refusal to rectify relations with its neighbors ” and its recent ban of Chinese social media apps .
The international press hardly noticed at all , although Bloomberg ’ s Andy Mukherjee did chide India for not promoting low-wage manufacturing exports as Bangladesh has , citing a paper from the economists Shoumitro Chatterjee and Arvind Subramanian .
But even if India stole all of Bangladesh ’ s low-wage exports , it would create barely a blip in India ’ s GDP figures .
India doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs higher incomes for ordinary workers , both in rural areas and in urban slums , and these can only come from economic reforms that benefit the millions , not the millionaires .
That said , the GDP figures that shocked India are less shocking than they appear .
The IMF projects that Bangladesh will produce exactly $ 11.45 more per person than India in 2020 , when their economies are compared in U.S. dollar terms , using average exchange rates as a guide , and assuming that population estimates for both countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Bangladesh ’ s population differ by several million and of India ’ s by more than 50 million .
And unlike the Indian rupee , the Bangladeshi taka does not trade freely and is widely believed to be overvalued .
The IMF itself does not primarily make international comparisons based on exchange rates ( often called “ nominal ” comparisons ) , preferring instead to use purchasing power parities ( PPPs ) , which adjust for the cost of living in a country .
Evaluated on a PPP basis , India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is still well above Bangladesh ’ s $ 5,139 .
And even in nominal terms , Bangladesh didn ’ t actually overtake India ; India dipped below Bangladesh due to the economic impact of the coronavirus .
That ’ s a lot of ifs , ands , and buts .
Bangladesh ’ s accomplishments shouldn ’ t be minimized , and despite the many controversies surrounding its garment industry , clothing exports have been the backbone of Bangladesh ’ s export economy .
Still , despite Bangladesh ’ s export boom and its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the successes and the failures of export-led industrialization , exports account for only 15 percent of GDP , compared with 19 percent for India .
Export statistics are highly variable , but India ’ s export levels began to exceed Bangladesh ’ s in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and have remained higher ever since .
That is all the more remarkable since larger countries usually trade less ( as a proportion of GDP ) because they have larger home markets .
India ’ s exports as a proportion of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s , which is certainly no mean feat .
Those who call for India to follow Bangladesh ( and looking further back , China ) in the development of a low-skill , low-wage manufacturing export sector also neglect the realities of India ’ s economic geography .
The two poorest states in India are also the two largest : Uttar Pradesh ( with a population of around 238 million ) and Bihar ( around 125 million ) .
Together they account for more than a quarter of India ’ s population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a par with some of the poorest countries in the world .
They are probably the only states in India where the development of export-oriented , low-wage manufacturing industries would represent a step up on the value chain .
But they lack the necessary port access to support the emergence of such industries , especially given the poor state of India ’ s infrastructure and logistics capacity .
The razor-thin margins on the manufacturing of shoes , apparel , toys , accessories , and other light goods mean that transportation costs matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are just too far inland to compete .
The truly pressing need in these two states—and in the North Eastern Region , India ’ s second poorest—is for higher farm incomes .
India is still a country of farmers , with 40 percent of the population employed in agriculture ( down from 60 percent at the turn of the millennium ) .
Uttar Pradesh , Bihar , and the North Eastern Region all tend to have a multiplicity of small farms that support a large part of the population @ @ @ @ @ @ @ governments have squeezed farmers to ensure an affordable supply of food for urban consumers .
In the latest example of this , in September the government of Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) banned the export of onions to combat rising prices that might have benefited farmers , once again forcing them to subsidize much richer city dwellers .
A few days later , the BJP performed a spectacular somersault , pushing major agricultural reform legislation through the upper house of India ’ s parliament on a controversial voice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow farmers to circumvent purchasing cooperatives to sell their produce to the highest bidder .
The new law will also allow farmers to sell their crops upfront , before planting .
Minimum price supports will remain in place , but farmers will now be able to seek higher prices—and earn higher incomes .
The key to growth is income , not jobs .
Too often , development economists look for a single , visible source of employment to soak up excess farm labor and inevitably hit on large-scale , low-wage manufacturing .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it in all sorts of low-visibility niches .
Whether they buy fertilizer or flip-flops , the important thing is that they ’ re spending , and by spending they create jobs for others .
Rising mass incomes generate mass employment , and as the German economist Hartmut Elsenhans argues , they do so while preserving the political conditions for future growth .
By relying on wage suppression to fuel export growth , Bangladesh has entered a self-limiting blind alley from which it will be difficult to emerge .
India ’ s more open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chance of success , not least because the farm reforms will make it politically difficult for any future government to restrict agricultural prices , as the BJP itself did just last month .
The first practical test of the popularity of Modi ’ s farm reforms will come over the next few weeks as Bihar goes to the polls in multistage legislative assembly elections .
Of course , agriculture is hardly the only issue in the news , with the coronavirus , corruption , colorful personalities , and the police cover-up of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also grabbing voters ’ attention .
But in the long run , the staying power of the BJP ’ s reform agenda may be the most important issue for the future development of India .
It was India ’ s last BJP prime minister , Atal Bihari Vajpayee , who pushed through the privatization of state-owned firms that led to India ’ s first export boom 20 years ago .
Those reforms were controversial at the time , but they stuck , and they changed India ’ s economy forever .
Having previously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monopolies at the top of India ’ s industrial hierarchy , the BJP is now promising to undermine the petty powers of the local agricultural monopolies at the bottom .
If they succeed , the results could be transformative for poor farmers .
But if the government can ’ t help crying over the price of onions , it might as well throw in the towel and give someone else a shot at reform .

Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the poorest of them all? When Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971, it was arguably the poorest country in the world—or close to it. Today, the country is still poor but growing rapidly. Real economic growth exceeded 8 percent in 2019, and although the coronavirus crisis has slowed the pace, growth is expected to continue at a more modest pace of around 4 percent in both 2020 and 2021. Bangladesh’s estimated 2020 GDP per capita of $1,888 now places the country far above many of the desperately poor countries of tropical Africa with which it used to be compared. And it puts Bangladesh exactly one spot above neighboring India in the latest economic league tables from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the poorest of them all? When Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971, it was arguably the poorest country in the world—or close to it. Today, the country is still poor but growing rapidly. Real economic growth exceeded 8 percent in 2019, and although the coronavirus crisis has slowed the pace, growth is expected to continue at a more modest pace of around 4 percent in both 2020 and 2021. Bangladesh’s estimated 2020 GDP per capita of $1,888 now places the country far above many of the desperately poor countries of tropical Africa with which it used to be compared. And it puts Bangladesh exactly one spot above neighboring India in the latest economic league tables from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
When the news broke, the Indian press went wild in a paroxysm of angst, finger-pointing, and denial. In Bangladesh, the response was more measured. In China, unsurprisingly, the state-run media blamed India’s fall from grace on “the Indian government’s refusal to rectify relations with its neighbors” and its recent ban of Chinese social media apps. The international press hardly noticed at all, although Bloomberg’s Andy Mukherjee did chide India for not promoting low-wage manufacturing exports as Bangladesh has, citing a paper from the economists Shoumitro Chatterjee and Arvind Subramanian. But even if India stole all of Bangladesh’s low-wage exports, it would create barely a blip in India’s GDP figures. India doesn’t need more low-wage jobs. It needs higher incomes for ordinary workers, both in rural areas and in urban slums, and these can only come from economic reforms that benefit the millions, not the millionaires.
That said, the GDP figures that shocked India are less shocking than they appear. The IMF projects that Bangladesh will produce exactly $11.45 more per person than India in 2020, when their economies are compared in U.S. dollar terms, using average exchange rates as a guide, and assuming that population estimates for both countries are accurate. However, international estimates of Bangladesh’s population differ by several million and of India’s by more than 50 million. And unlike the Indian rupee, the Bangladeshi taka does not trade freely and is widely believed to be overvalued. The IMF itself does not primarily make international comparisons based on exchange rates (often called “nominal” comparisons), preferring instead to use purchasing power parities (PPPs), which adjust for the cost of living in a country. Evaluated on a PPP basis, India’s GDP per capita of $6,284 is still well above Bangladesh’s $5,139. And even in nominal terms, Bangladesh didn’t actually overtake India; India dipped below Bangladesh due to the economic impact of the coronavirus.
That’s a lot of ifs, ands, and buts. Bangladesh’s accomplishments shouldn’t be minimized, and despite the many controversies surrounding its garment industry, clothing exports have been the backbone of Bangladesh’s export economy. Still, despite Bangladesh’s export boom and its status as a textbook case for both the successes and the failures of export-led industrialization, exports account for only 15 percent of GDP, compared with 19 percent for India. Export statistics are highly variable, but India’s export levels began to exceed Bangladesh’s in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and have remained higher ever since. That is all the more remarkable since larger countries usually trade less (as a proportion of GDP) because they have larger home markets. India’s exports as a proportion of GDP are now on a par with China’s, which is certainly no mean feat.
Those who call for India to follow Bangladesh (and looking further back, China) in the development of a low-skill, low-wage manufacturing export sector also neglect the realities of India’s economic geography. The two poorest states in India are also the two largest: Uttar Pradesh (with a population of around 238 million) and Bihar (around 125 million). Together they account for more than a quarter of India’s population, and in economic terms they are on a par with some of the poorest countries in the world. They are probably the only states in India where the development of export-oriented, low-wage manufacturing industries would represent a step up on the value chain. But they lack the necessary port access to support the emergence of such industries, especially given the poor state of India’s infrastructure and logistics capacity. The razor-thin margins on the manufacturing of shoes, apparel, toys, accessories, and other light goods mean that transportation costs matter much more than in other sectors. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are just too far inland to compete.
The truly pressing need in these two states—and in the North Eastern Region, India’s second poorest—is for higher farm incomes. India is still a country of farmers, with 40 percent of the population employed in agriculture (down from 60 percent at the turn of the millennium). Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and the North Eastern Region all tend to have a multiplicity of small farms that support a large part of the population at poverty-level incomes. Historically, Indian governments have squeezed farmers to ensure an affordable supply of food for urban consumers. In the latest example of this, in September the government of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) banned the export of onions to combat rising prices that might have benefited farmers, once again forcing them to subsidize much richer city dwellers. A few days later, the BJP performed a spectacular somersault, pushing major agricultural reform legislation through the upper house of India’s parliament on a controversial voice vote. The 2020 Farm Acts will allow farmers to circumvent purchasing cooperatives to sell their produce to the highest bidder. The new law will also allow farmers to sell their crops upfront, before planting. Minimum price supports will remain in place, but farmers will now be able to seek higher prices—and earn higher incomes.
The key to growth is income, not jobs. Too often, development economists look for a single, visible source of employment to soak up excess farm labor and inevitably hit on large-scale, low-wage manufacturing. But when farmers have money, they spend it in all sorts of low-visibility niches. Whether they buy fertilizer or flip-flops, the important thing is that they’re spending, and by spending they create jobs for others. Rising mass incomes generate mass employment, and as the German economist Hartmut Elsenhans argues, they do so while preserving the political conditions for future growth. By relying on wage suppression to fuel export growth, Bangladesh has entered a self-limiting blind alley from which it will be difficult to emerge. India’s more open, more flexible economy stands a better chance of success, not least because the farm reforms will make it politically difficult for any future government to restrict agricultural prices, as the BJP itself did just last month.
The first practical test of the popularity of Modi’s farm reforms will come over the next few weeks as Bihar goes to the polls in multistage legislative assembly elections. Of course, agriculture is hardly the only issue in the news, with the coronavirus, corruption, colorful personalities, and the police cover-up of a horrific gang rape in neighboring Uttar Pradesh also grabbing voters’ attention. But in the long run, the staying power of the BJP’s reform agenda may be the most important issue for the future development of India. It was India’s last BJP prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who pushed through the privatization of state-owned firms that led to India’s first export boom 20 years ago. Those reforms were controversial at the time, but they stuck, and they changed India’s economy forever. Having previously broken up many of the most moribund monopolies at the top of India’s industrial hierarchy, the BJP is now promising to undermine the petty powers of the local agricultural monopolies at the bottom. If they succeed, the results could be transformative for poor farmers. But if the government can’t help crying over the price of onions, it might as well throw in the towel and give someone else a shot at reform.