foreignpolicy--2020-02-15--How China’s Incompetence Endangered the World

The novel coronavirus epidemic has reached a critical juncture .
Steps taken over the next few days , particularly by Beijing ’ s leadership , will decide the fate of the virus and whether spreads internationally to become a genuine pandemic .
Time is short for the Chinese government to prevent a catastrophe .
Are China ’ s official reports , including claims that its control efforts are succeeding and the epidemic will soon peak , credible ?
Omens look bad .
Once praised by the World Health Organization ( WHO ) and scientists worldwide for its quick , transparent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China now faces international vilification and potential domestic unrest as it blunders through continued cover-ups , lies , and repression that have already failed to stop the virus and may well be fanning the flames of its spread .
Since the epidemic came to the world ’ s attention in early January it has been marked by startling moments when China ’ s health authorities announced dramatic surges in apparent cases of the disease , none more surprising than the sudden Feb. 12 adjustment that saw case numbers in Hubei province swell by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the national total to 59,804 cases .
The adjustment , according to government officials , was due to a widening definition of the disease for just one place , Hubei Province , while authorities continue to limit their COVID-19 case descriptions elsewhere in China by a prior approach , counting smaller numbers .
The pneumonia death last week of China ’ s real epidemic hero , the ophthalmologist Li Wenliang , has revealed the ugliest side of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) and its terrible effort to rewrite the history of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ patients in December in Wuhan , where the outbreak originated , who looked like SARS cases , he told colleagues on Dec. 30 via a doctors ’ social media chatroom .
Days later , for the so-called crime of rumormongering , Li and seven other physicians were brought before China ’ s security police and compelled to sign a document admitting to “ spreading lies.
” For days , Wuhan authorities sought to stifle Li ’ s voice , but even after he caught the virus while treating his patients and was confined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he continued to sound epidemic alarms on the BBC World Service .
On Feb. 6 , the once-robust 34-year-old physician died .
Li ’ s death opened the gates of political rage across China , sparking an unprecedented outpouring of grief and outrage , denouncing the government cover-up .
Some China watchers have likened the coronavirus crisis for Chinese President Xi Jinping to the threat the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown in 1986 posed to Mikhail Gorbachev ’ s hold on the Soviet Union .
Others have likened the young martyred physician ’ s brave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” an anonymous citizen who stood , grocery bags in hand , before a line of Chinese tanks , blocking their entry into Beijing ’ s Tiananmen Square and their use to quell the 1989 pro-democracy student protests .
As the China expert Bill Bishop wrote last week in his daily Sinocism newsletter , “ The Party ’ s social contract with the people—ensuring the people ’ s well being and providing ever-increasing economic prosperity—is being stressed on a nationwide level in ways I don ’ t recall in the past several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ‘ this is as close to an existential crisis for Xi and the Party that I think we have seen since [ the Tiananmen massacre of ] 1989 ’ , and I think it is even more so a week later.
” Just before I read Bishop ’ s assessment , I did a CBS News podcast with my former Council on Foreign Relations colleague Elizabeth Economy , one of the world ’ s top experts on Chinese politics .
She , too , labeled Li ’ s death and apparent splits inside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the epidemic as the most significant threat to his power Xi has faced and a critical test of the viability of the entire current leadership of the CCP .
No leader since Mao Zedong has consolidated as much power and control as Xi , which leaves China ’ s leader vulnerable to blame in times of catastrophe .
This is much more than inside-baseball Chinese politics .
It matters deeply for businesses wondering how long the pain of China ’ s shutdown will last and for public health leaders worried about how they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inside their countries , states , or cities .
It has spilled over onto WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , who has faced sharp criticism—even a recall petition—for his meetings with Xi and other Chinese leaders and his apparent reluctance to declare the outbreak a global health emergency .
For his part , Xi disappeared from public view the day after his January 27 meeting the WHO ’ s Ghebreyesus , not to be seen again for twelve days , when he briefly strolled through the Chaoyang district of Beijing , wearing a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is prompting global concern about the reliability of epidemic data released by the Chinese government , the usefulness of Chinese guidance regarding how the virus is spread and who is at risk for death , and the measures best taken to protect health care workers from falling victim to the disease they are trying to treat .
Since the first Dec. 30 announcement of a new disease in Wuhan , the CCP has woven a tapestry of narratives , primarily for domestic political purposes , aligning official case and death numbers with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health community , from WHO all the way down to academic statisticians and infectious diseases analysts , has tried to infer from the dubious official daily tallies just how dangerous the coronavirus disease may be for the rest of the world .
The bottom line is trust , which appears to be waning inside China and is increasingly unraveling across the public health world .
An epidemic can not be fought and won unless the bonds of trust between governments and people can survive the grief , confusions , emotions , and medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , in its negligence , has jeopardized those bonds , perhaps beyond all repair .
As anxiety rose , Xi tried to shift blame , naming to head up the epidemic response and dispatching Premier Li Keqiang to Wuhan .
Xi lashed out against “ untruthful speech , ” focusing on those who were using Weibo and other social media to cast doubts on the containment policy and bemoan their confinements .
And he forwarded an added narrative , blaming the U.S. government for China ’ s plight .
On Jan. 30 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the epidemic a public health emergency of international concern , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a travel advisory to Americans , warning against visiting China .
During the first week of February , the restrictions placed on U.S. airlines , airports , Chinese immigrants , travelers reentering the United States , and trade in key goods between the nations mounted .
By Feb. 3 , hospitals all over China were reporting shortages of test kits , forcing a large reduction in diagnosis and the reporting of cases .
A medical academic and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put together by the Chinese National Health Commission warned : “ Early detection , early diagnosis , early isolation , and early treatment can not be done in Wuhan at this time .
I hope that the country will support Wuhan.
” That same day , the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee held a meeting , formulating a new narrative : that the epidemic was out of control because of poor management .
The CCP would now lead a “ people ’ s war ” against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quarantines and rumors .
The epidemic ought to be easy to control , given 80 percent of its victims were over 60 years of age , 75 percent had bodies weakened by some other health condition , and , curiously , very few were children and 66 percent were men , according to the new official datasets .
In a plea for patriotism , the CCP urged people to identify ailing neighbors and turn them into authorities .
Eventually , in at least one town , payments were promised , equivalent to about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s monthly income .
The identified were removed—sometimes forcibly—from their homes and placed in makeshift field hospitals set up in schools and sports facilities .
As international experts questioned whether the virus could be stopped , Beijing threw more resources to the warehousing of suspected cases and hospitalization of those with pneumonia .
But by Feb. 5 , the funeral parlors and crematoriums were reported to be having problems keeping up with the disposal of the dead in Wuhan .
Though no data was provided to address the matter , Wuhan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lives of coronavirus-infected individuals but also those of thousands of people who required medications and occasional treatment for such things as HIV infection , kidney disease , diabetes , and hypertension .
Hospitals no longer welcomed them , medicines were running out , yet there is no count of their numbers or deaths .
Across Hubei , hospitals were by the end of the first week of February running out of beds , respirators , and oxygen and pneumonia support equipment .
As more cities saw their case numbers soar , they followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On Feb. 14 , China ’ s National Health Commission finally acknowledged the toll COVID-19 was taking on healthcare workers , saying 1,716 of them had been infected on the job , and six had died of the pneumonia disease .
A photo of the late ophthalmologist Li Wenliang rests among bouquets at the Houhu Branch of Wuhan Central Hospital on Feb. 7 .
STR/AFP via Getty Images Then , on Feb. 6 , Li Wenliang died of the coronavirus disease , sparking an outcry from across the nation , filled with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the outpouring of grief and anger by censoring social media posting and blocking accounts .
Cecilia Wang—a Shanghai-based reporter for the Economist—tweeted in real time a scrubbing operation unfolding on Chinese social media , as comments about the government ’ s handling of the epidemic were erased from digital history .
On Feb. 8 , it was reported that Xi had appointed his protégé Chen Yixin , a man with no medical or scientific background , as second in command of the team in charge of handling the epidemic crisis in Hubei .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and he heads China ’ s most powerful domestic security commission .
As Chen swept into Wuhan , heads rolled among the preexisting Hubei and Wuhan epidemic leadership .
On Feb. 9 , the official numbers showed a slowing in new case reports—a trend that would persist until the enormous Feb. 12 spike in numbers .
During this three-day window , two new narratives emerged .
First , that the epidemic had reached its peak .
And second , that it was time for the nation to get back to work , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was hardly anywhere to be found across the country .
In one of the hardest-hit cities in China , Huanggang , the local CCP leader said the municipality could test only 900 people a day .
A citywide search identified 13,000 fever patients .
Fatality rates , according to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) , varied across the nation , with 4 percent of those sick with the coronavirus disease dying in Wuhan and 5 percent of cases proving lethal in Tianmen .
But it was difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nobody really knew the baseline—how many people were infected .
Not only were too few people getting tested , but the diagnostic kits were so difficult to execute properly that there was a false negative rate as high as 50 percent , meaning some labs were missing half of all infections .
As the makeshift quarantine facilities filled , questions arose about their safety , as people were stacked side by side and shared toilet facilities .
There was clear evidence that the coronavirus disease could be spread via feces or the off-gassing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Feb. 10 , Xi sacked two of Hubei ’ s top health officials , amid claims that the virus could sicken 5 percent of Wuhan ’ s population , or half a million people .
Three days later , Hubei ’ s party secretary was replaced by a Xi loyalist .
Robert Redfield , who heads the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , told CNN this week that he was far less optimistic .
“ Right now we ’ re in an aggressive containment mode , ” Redfield said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot about this virus .
This virus is probably with us beyond this season , beyond this year , and I think eventually the virus will find a foothold and we will get community-based transmission.
” In Geneva this week , some 400 top infectious diseases experts gathered to help WHO solve the many mysteries that still surround the virus .
One of them was Hong Kong University ’ s Gabriel Leung , who does not think China ’ s strategy will succeed and fears that as schools reopen and millions of people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the virus could , once again , surge .
And it could spread far beyond China ’ s borders , possibly infecting more than 60 percent of the world population .
The new coronavirus could spread far beyond China ’ s borders , possibly infecting more than 60 percent of the world population .
Even if the coronavirus disease kills only 1 percent of its victims , 1 percent of 60 percent of 7 billion people is a staggering death toll , placing the coronavirus alongside the three biggest pandemics of human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the current HIV/AIDS toll .
I prefer to believe that humanity will contain the coronavirus to a far less horrible level for long enough to develop an effective vaccine .
But this will require a massive effort over long stretches of time .
Novel vaccines require years of research and testing .
Unfortunately , China is showing how all this can go wrong , making a crisis into a catastrophe .
Xi ’ s government has provided the world with reams of data , but their credibility , or lack thereof @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s methods of governance , censorship , intimidation , and toadyism .
The rest of the world is left to prognosticate and prepare without really knowing what havoc the coronavirus enemy is capable of wreaking .

The novel coronavirus epidemic has reached a critical juncture. Steps taken over the next few days, particularly by Beijing’s leadership, will decide the fate of the virus and whether it spreads internationally to become a genuine pandemic . Time is short for the Chinese government to prevent a catastrophe.
The novel coronavirus epidemic has reached a critical juncture. Steps taken over the next few days, particularly by Beijing’s leadership, will decide the fate of the virus and whether it spreads internationally to become a genuine pandemic. Time is short for the Chinese government to prevent a catastrophe.
Are China’s official reports, including claims that its control efforts are succeeding and the epidemic will soon peak, credible? Omens look bad. Once praised by the World Health Organization (WHO) and scientists worldwide for its quick, transparent response to the newly named COVID-19, China now faces international vilification and potential domestic unrest as it blunders through continued cover-ups, lies, and repression that have already failed to stop the virus and may well be fanning the flames of its spread.
Since the epidemic came to the world’s attention in early January it has been marked by startling moments when China’s health authorities announced dramatic surges in apparent cases of the disease, none more surprising than the sudden Feb. 12 adjustment that saw case numbers in Hubei province swell by 14,840 in a single day, pushing the national total to 59,804 cases. The adjustment, according to government officials, was due to a widening definition of the disease for just one place, Hubei Province, while authorities continue to limit their COVID-19 case descriptions elsewhere in China by a prior approach, counting smaller numbers.
The pneumonia death last week of China’s real epidemic hero, the ophthalmologist Li Wenliang, has revealed the ugliest side of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its terrible effort to rewrite the history of a seemingly out-of-control epidemic. Li treated patients in December in Wuhan, where the outbreak originated, who looked like SARS cases, he told colleagues on Dec. 30 via a doctors’ social media chatroom. Days later, for the so-called crime of rumormongering, Li and seven other physicians were brought before China’s security police and compelled to sign a document admitting to “spreading lies.” For days, Wuhan authorities sought to stifle Li’s voice, but even after he caught the virus while treating his patients and was confined to an intensive care unit bed, he continued to sound epidemic alarms on the BBC World Service. On Feb. 6, the once-robust 34-year-old physician died. Li’s death opened the gates of political rage across China, sparking an unprecedented outpouring of grief and outrage, denouncing the government cover-up.
Some China watchers have likened the coronavirus crisis for Chinese President Xi Jinping to the threat the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown in 1986 posed to Mikhail Gorbachev’s hold on the Soviet Union. Others have likened the young martyred physician’s brave truth-telling to the legendary “Tank Man,” an anonymous citizen who stood, grocery bags in hand, before a line of Chinese tanks, blocking their entry into Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and their use to quell the 1989 pro-democracy student protests.
As the China expert Bill Bishop wrote last week in his daily Sinocism newsletter, “The Party’s social contract with the people—ensuring the people’s well being and providing ever-increasing economic prosperity—is being stressed on a nationwide level in ways I don’t recall in the past several decades.” He added: “Last Friday I wrote that ‘this is as close to an existential crisis for Xi and the Party that I think we have seen since [the Tiananmen massacre of] 1989’, and I think it is even more so a week later.” Just before I read Bishop’s assessment, I did a CBS News podcast with my former Council on Foreign Relations colleague Elizabeth Economy, one of the world’s top experts on Chinese politics. She, too, labeled Li’s death and apparent splits inside the CCP over how best to handle the epidemic as the most significant threat to his power Xi has faced and a critical test of the viability of the entire current leadership of the CCP. No leader since Mao Zedong has consolidated as much power and control as Xi, which leaves China’s leader vulnerable to blame in times of catastrophe.
This is much more than inside-baseball Chinese politics. It matters deeply for businesses wondering how long the pain of China’s shutdown will last and for public health leaders worried about how they might handle the coronavirus should it spread inside their countries, states, or cities. It has spilled over onto WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who has faced sharp criticism—even a recall petition—for his meetings with Xi and other Chinese leaders and his apparent reluctance to declare the outbreak a global health emergency.
For his part, Xi disappeared from public view the day after his January 27 meeting the WHO’s Ghebreyesus, not to be seen again for twelve days, when he briefly strolled through the Chaoyang district of Beijing, wearing a medical mask.
The political crisis in China is prompting global concern about the reliability of epidemic data released by the Chinese government, the usefulness of Chinese guidance regarding how the virus is spread and who is at risk for death, and the measures best taken to protect health care workers from falling victim to the disease they are trying to treat. Since the first Dec. 30 announcement of a new disease in Wuhan, the CCP has woven a tapestry of narratives, primarily for domestic political purposes, aligning official case and death numbers with the storylines. Meanwhile, the international health community, from WHO all the way down to academic statisticians and infectious diseases analysts, has tried to infer from the dubious official daily tallies just how dangerous the coronavirus disease may be for the rest of the world.
The bottom line is trust, which appears to be waning inside China and is increasingly unraveling across the public health world. An epidemic cannot be fought and won unless the bonds of trust between governments and people can survive the grief, confusions, emotions, and medical challenges of the battle. The Chinese government, in its negligence, has jeopardized those bonds, perhaps beyond all repair.
A security guard sits outside the closed Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, which was linked to cases of coronavirus, in Wuhan, China, on Jan. 17.
Workers set up beds at an exhibition center that was converted into a hospital in preparation for coronavirus patients in Wuhan on Feb. 4.
As anxiety rose, Xi tried to shift blame, naming to head up the epidemic response and dispatching Premier Li Keqiang to Wuhan. Xi lashed out against “untruthful speech,” focusing on those who were using Weibo and other social media to cast doubts on the containment policy and bemoan their confinements. And he forwarded an added narrative, blaming the U.S. government for China’s plight. On Jan. 30, the same day that WHO declared the epidemic a public health emergency of international concern, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a travel advisory to Americans, warning against visiting China. During the first week of February, the restrictions placed on U.S. airlines, airports, Chinese immigrants, travelers reentering the United States, and trade in key goods between the nations mounted. By Feb. 3, hospitals all over China were reporting shortages of test kits, forcing a large reduction in diagnosis and the reporting of cases. A medical academic and a member of the high-level expert team put together by the Chinese National Health Commission warned: “Early detection, early diagnosis, early isolation, and early treatment cannot be done in Wuhan at this time. I hope that the country will support Wuhan.” That same day, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee held a meeting, formulating a new narrative: that the epidemic was out of control because of poor management. The CCP would now lead a “people’s war” against the virus, clamping down even harder on quarantines and rumors. The epidemic ought to be easy to control, given 80 percent of its victims were over 60 years of age, 75 percent had bodies weakened by some other health condition, and, curiously, very few were children and 66 percent were men, according to the new official datasets. In a plea for patriotism, the CCP urged people to identify ailing neighbors and turn them into authorities. Eventually, in at least one town, payments were promised, equivalent to about a third of an average Chinese adult’s monthly income. The identified were removed—sometimes forcibly—from their homes and placed in makeshift field hospitals set up in schools and sports facilities. As international experts questioned whether the virus could be stopped, Beijing threw more resources to the warehousing of suspected cases and hospitalization of those with pneumonia. But by Feb. 5, the funeral parlors and crematoriums were reported to be having problems keeping up with the disposal of the dead in Wuhan. Though no data was provided to address the matter, Wuhan’s lockdown was endangering not only the lives of coronavirus-infected individuals but also those of thousands of people who required medications and occasional treatment for such things as HIV infection, kidney disease, diabetes, and hypertension. Hospitals no longer welcomed them, medicines were running out, yet there is no count of their numbers or deaths. Across Hubei, hospitals were by the end of the first week of February running out of beds, respirators, and oxygen and pneumonia support equipment. As more cities saw their case numbers soar, they followed Wuhan’s lockdown and quarantine strategy. On Feb. 14, China’s National Health Commission finally acknowledged the toll COVID-19 was taking on healthcare workers, saying 1,716 of them had been infected on the job, and six had died of the pneumonia disease. A photo of the late ophthalmologist Li Wenliang rests among bouquets at the Houhu Branch of Wuhan Central Hospital on Feb. 7. A photo of the late ophthalmologist Li Wenliang rests among bouquets at the Houhu Branch of Wuhan Central Hospital on Feb. 7. STR/AFP via Getty Images
Then, on Feb. 6, Li Wenliang died of the coronavirus disease, sparking an outcry from across the nation, filled with undeniable rage. The government responded to the outpouring of grief and anger by censoring social media posting and blocking accounts. Cecilia Wang—a Shanghai-based reporter for the Economist—tweeted in real time a scrubbing operation unfolding on Chinese social media, as comments about the government’s handling of the epidemic were erased from digital history. On Feb. 8, it was reported that Xi had appointed his protégé Chen Yixin, a man with no medical or scientific background, as second in command of the team in charge of handling the epidemic crisis in Hubei. Chen’s expertise is law enforcement, and he heads China’s most powerful domestic security commission. As Chen swept into Wuhan, heads rolled among the preexisting Hubei and Wuhan epidemic leadership.
On Feb. 9, the official numbers showed a slowing in new case reports—a trend that would persist until the enormous Feb. 12 spike in numbers. During this three-day window, two new narratives emerged. First, that the epidemic had reached its peak. And second, that it was time for the nation to get back to work, restoring the Chinese economy.
But stability was hardly anywhere to be found across the country. In one of the hardest-hit cities in China, Huanggang, the local CCP leader said the municipality could test only 900 people a day. A citywide search identified 13,000 fever patients. Fatality rates, according to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), varied across the nation, with 4 percent of those sick with the coronavirus disease dying in Wuhan and 5 percent of cases proving lethal in Tianmen. But it was difficult to ascribe credibility to those estimates because nobody really knew the baseline—how many people were infected. Not only were too few people getting tested, but the diagnostic kits were so difficult to execute properly that there was a false negative rate as high as 50 percent, meaning some labs were missing half of all infections.
As the makeshift quarantine facilities filled, questions arose about their safety, as people were stacked side by side and shared toilet facilities. There was clear evidence that the coronavirus disease could be spread via feces or the off-gassing from overused toilets and taxed plumbing.
On Feb. 10, Xi sacked two of Hubei’s top health officials, amid claims that the virus could sicken 5 percent of Wuhan’s population, or half a million people. Three days later, Hubei’s party secretary was replaced by a Xi loyalist.
A train attendant gestures support to medical staff as they leave for Wuhan in Nanchang, in China's Jiangxi province, on Feb. 13.
Wu Zunyou is the chief epidemiologist for China’s CDC, ultimately responsible for estimating and counting the toll of the coronavirus epidemic. On Feb. 13, he spoke with Howard Bauchner, the editor in chief of the Journal of the American Medical Association, defending the accuracy of China’s epidemic numbers. Admitting that diagnostic kits were in short supply and could be difficult to use, he nevertheless insisted that the epidemic was winding down. As more of the infected come to the end of their incubation periods, Wu argued, transmission will slow, and it will be clear that China’s control methods have, indeed, worked.
Robert Redfield, who heads the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, told CNN this week that he was far less optimistic. “Right now we’re in an aggressive containment mode,” Redfield said. “We don’t know a lot about this virus. This virus is probably with us beyond this season, beyond this year, and I think eventually the virus will find a foothold and we will get community-based transmission.”
In Geneva this week, some 400 top infectious diseases experts gathered to help WHO solve the many mysteries that still surround the virus. One of them was Hong Kong University’s Gabriel Leung, who does not think China’s strategy will succeed and fears that as schools reopen and millions of people return to Wuhan and other locked-down cities, the virus could, once again, surge. And it could spread far beyond China’s borders, possibly infecting more than 60 percent of the world population.
The new coronavirus could spread far beyond China’s borders, possibly infecting more than 60 percent of the world population.
Even if the coronavirus disease kills only 1 percent of its victims, 1 percent of 60 percent of 7 billion people is a staggering death toll, placing the coronavirus alongside the three biggest pandemics of human history—the 14th-century plague, the 1918 influenza, and the current HIV/AIDS toll.
I prefer to believe that humanity will contain the coronavirus to a far less horrible level for long enough to develop an effective vaccine. But this will require a massive effort over long stretches of time. Novel vaccines require years of research and testing.
Unfortunately, China is showing how all this can go wrong, making a crisis into a catastrophe. Xi’s government has provided the world with reams of data, but their credibility, or lack thereof, is inextricably bound to the CCP’s methods of governance, censorship, intimidation, and toadyism. The rest of the world is left to prognosticate and prepare without really knowing what havoc the coronavirus enemy is capable of wreaking.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-15--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

As part of his effort to build a wall along the United States ’ southern border with Mexico , U.S. President Donald Trump is planning to divert key funding away from the Department of Defense .
Meanwhile , confusion surrounding the Iowa caucus , the first primary of the U.S. presidential election , has led to a surge of conspiracy theories claiming that candidate Pete Buttigieg is a CIA asset .
And Trump ’ s Middle East peace plan is little more than a Cold War-era blueprint repurposed for modern realities .
Trump is preparing to divert $ 3.8 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Defense to help build his long-promised wall along the southern border , Foreign Policy ’ s Lara Seligman reports .
Angela Merkel ’ s anointed successor as German chancellor , Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , will now preemptively pass the position to someone eager to use it as a weapon against Merkel and the entire era of German politics she presided over , Peter Kuras writes .
3 .
Ireland ’ s Populists Are Not Really Populist Ireland ’ s Sinn Fein party scored a shocking victory in what many pundits are now calling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look casts doubt on the party ’ s populist label , Mary C. Murphy writes .
4 .
No , Pete Buttigieg Is Not a CIA Asset Supporters of the U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders are right to be critical of American involvement in coups and regime change , but thumping the CIA as the ever-present bogeyman can become a meaningless crutch , Justin Ling writes .
Trump and his top aides pride themselves on thinking outside the box and boldly challenging conventional wisdom , but the administration ’ s Middle East peace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by an Israeli politician in 1979 , Yehuda Shaul writes .

As part of his effort to build a wall along the United States’ southern border with Mexico, U.S. President Donald Trump is planning to divert key funding away from the Department of Defense.
As part of his effort to build a wall along the United States’ southern border with Mexico, U.S. President Donald Trump is planning to divert key funding away from the Department of Defense.
Meanwhile, confusion surrounding the Iowa caucus, the first primary of the U.S. presidential election, has led to a surge of conspiracy theories claiming that candidate Pete Buttigieg is a CIA asset.
And Trump’s Middle East peace plan is little more than a Cold War-era blueprint repurposed for modern realities.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. soldiers reinforce the U.S.-Mexico border fence
Trump is preparing to divert $3.8 billion in total from programs across the Department of Defense to help build his long-promised wall along the southern border, Foreign Policy’s Lara Seligman reports.
Angela Merkel and Friedrich Merz
Angela Merkel’s anointed successor as German chancellor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, will now preemptively pass the position to someone eager to use it as a weapon against Merkel and the entire era of German politics she presided over, Peter Kuras writes.
Sinn Fein’s Donnchadh O Laoghaire
Ireland’s Sinn Fein party scored a shocking victory in what many pundits are now calling a populist surge, but a closer look casts doubt on the party’s populist label, Mary C. Murphy writes.
Supporters of Democratic presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg
Supporters of the U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders are right to be critical of American involvement in coups and regime change, but thumping the CIA as the ever-present bogeyman can become a meaningless crutch, Justin Ling writes.
A portion of the 1979 Drobles plan map.
Trump and his top aides pride themselves on thinking outside the box and boldly challenging conventional wisdom, but the administration’s Middle East peace plan bears striking resemblance to one endorsed by an Israeli politician in 1979, Yehuda Shaul writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-17--The First Steps Toward an Afghan Peace Deal

The First Steps Toward an Afghan Peace Deal Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The United States and the Taliban take preliminary steps toward an Afghan peace deal , Turkey and Russia hold talks over the situation in northwest Syria , what to watch in the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The United States and the Taliban again appear to be taking steps toward peace in Afghanistan after U.S. officials announced a seven-day reduction of violence on Friday at the Munich Security Conference .
The temporary truce is “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including Afghan government forces .
If successful , it will mark the first steps toward a deal to bring an end to the 18-year war in Afghanistan , where around 13,000 U.S. troops remain .
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres and U.S. Afghanistan envoy Zalmay Khalilzad are in Pakistan today for a conference addressing the future of Afghan refugees after decades of war .
The possibility of a peace deal raises questions about reintegration and international support for host countries .
Around 3 million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan and more in Iran—which has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori reported for FP in January .
Will the truce hold ?
If the reduction of violence lasts , it will be a shift after a violent year in Afghanistan .
In September , the United States and Taliban leaders were close to a deal but U.S. President Donald Trump called off secret negotiations after a Taliban attack killed a U.S. service member in Kabul .
The signing of a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement has been scheduled tentatively for Feb. 29 , according to an Afghan official .
What @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreement between the United States and the Taliban would create a 135-day timetable for a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and call for a complete withdrawal within three to five years .
It would also kickstart negotiations including the Taliban and the Afghan government next month .
U.S. citizens evacuated from quarantined cruise ship .
U.S. passengers on a cruise ship quarantined off the coast of Japan for two weeks due to the coronavirus have been evacuated to the United States , with 40 people remaining in Japan for treatment .
( Those returning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force bases . )
Officials have confirmed 355 cases on board the cruise ship—the largest cluster outside of China .
Canada , Italy , South Korea , and Hong Kong are expected to repatriate their passengers in the coming days .
Another cruise , another coronavirus case .
Meanwhile , hundreds of passengers on another cruise ship that was barred from docking in several countries have now disembarked in Cambodia .
Although the cruise company and Cambodian officials insisted there was no risk on the ship , one passenger who left Holland America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Malaysia , raising fears that she may have infected others who have now flown home to various countries , allowing the virus to spread .
The coronavirus remains an epidemic , meaning it hasn ’ t spread significantly beyond China .
Even if containment limits the spread of the disease , pandemics—when diseases spread rapidly across continents—remain the world ’ s single biggest threat , Annie Sparrow writes for FP .
Turkey , Russia hold talks over Syria .
Turkish officials are in Russia today for talks on the escalating situation in Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian government forces—backed by Russia—are waging a campaign to take back the country ’ s last rebel stronghold that has displaced hundreds of thousands of people .
Turkey supports some rebel groups , who have launched their own operations in Idlib .
Meanwhile , Syrian forces have seized most of Aleppo province , which borders Idlib , after making significant gains on Sunday .
Macron picks new candidate for Paris mayor .
French President Emmanuel Macron tapped his health minister , Agnès Buzyn , to represent the ruling La République En Marche party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The party ’ s initial candidate , Benjamin Greveaux , dropped out of the race on Friday amid a sex scandal .
Macron ’ s party sees the Paris municipal elections as an opportunity to build a local base , even though it ’ s not likely to win .
The incumbent Socialist mayor , Anne Hidalgo , is leading in the polls .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in Africa this week , making a stop in Angola today before heading to Ethiopia for talks with Prime Minister Abiy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prize last year .
Pompeo visited Senegal over the weekend .
The trip comes amid rising tensions over U.S. visa restrictions on four African countries , but Pompeo ’ s meetings have so far focused on deepening business ties—a counter to Chinese economic influence in the region .
Another U.S. Democratic presidential debate is set for Wednesday in Las Vegas , with at least five candidates expected to take the stage .
Due to a rule change , late entrant and former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg could join them if he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appear on the ballot in the Nevada caucuses on Saturday , where volunteers are concerned about the possibility of technological glitches—which plagued the caucuses in Iowa earlier this month .
Check out our coverage of foreign policy and the 2020 election campaign here .
Iran holds parliamentary elections on Friday , with thousands of moderate or conservative candidates barred from running .
Though the vote won ’ t affect Iran ’ s foreign policy or nuclear program , which are determined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei , the disqualifications mean the next parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The election comes at a moment of extreme tension between Tehran and Washington .
Saudi Arabia hosts a G-20 summit on Saturday and Sunday , with the world ’ s finance officials meeting to discuss the state of the global economy and threats to growth—in particular the coronavirus outbreak .
China , Hong Kong , and Singapore have already committed to stimulus packages in response to the unexpected economic hit .
Taiwan ’ s military .
As China ’ s military poses an increasing threat to Taiwan , it needs its own deterrent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military is in crisis : The transition to an all-volunteer military has led to the hollowing out of front-line troops—a development that has been downplayed by Taiwan ’ s political leadership , Paul Huang writes for FP .
A drug shortage in Mexico .
Due to a government effort to revamp the public health system , Mexico is experiencing a shortage of cancer medications , the Wall Street Journal reports .
The shortages have caused families of cancer patients to protest—something that could damage President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his campaign against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pyrenees has airlifted snow onto its slopes after losing business due to a lack of snow during a period of unusually mild weather .
The decision enabled the resort to stay open during school holidays .
Officials said the operation was “ exceptional , ” but it has angered French ecologists .
“ It is the world upside down , ” one told French television .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States and the Taliban take preliminary steps toward an Afghan peace deal , Turkey and Russia hold talks over the situation in northwest Syria , what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States and the Taliban take preliminary steps toward an Afghan peace deal, Turkey and Russia hold talks over the situation in northwest Syria, what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S., Taliban Move Toward Deal
The United States and the Taliban again appear to be taking steps toward peace in Afghanistan after U.S. officials announced a seven-day reduction of violence on Friday at the Munich Security Conference. The temporary truce is “very specific,” applying nationwide and including Afghan government forces. If successful, it will mark the first steps toward a deal to bring an end to the 18-year war in Afghanistan, where around 13,000 U.S. troops remain.
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres and U.S. Afghanistan envoy Zalmay Khalilzad are in Pakistan today for a conference addressing the future of Afghan refugees after decades of war. The possibility of a peace deal raises questions about reintegration and international support for host countries. Around 3 million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan and more in Iran—which has increased deportations over the last year, as Ruchi Kumar and Hikmat Noori reported for FP in January.
Will the truce hold? If the reduction of violence lasts, it will be a shift after a violent year in Afghanistan. In September, the United States and Taliban leaders were close to a deal but U.S. President Donald Trump called off secret negotiations after a Taliban attack killed a U.S. service member in Kabul. The signing of a U.S.-Taliban peace agreement has been scheduled tentatively for Feb. 29, according to an Afghan official.
What’s in the deal? The agreement between the United States and the Taliban would create a 135-day timetable for a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and call for a complete withdrawal within three to five years. It would also kickstart negotiations including the Taliban and the Afghan government next month.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. citizens evacuated from quarantined cruise ship. U.S. passengers on a cruise ship quarantined off the coast of Japan for two weeks due to the coronavirus have been evacuated to the United States, with 40 people remaining in Japan for treatment. (Those returning home will be quarantined on U.S. air force bases.) Officials have confirmed 355 cases on board the cruise ship—the largest cluster outside of China. Canada, Italy, South Korea, and Hong Kong are expected to repatriate their passengers in the coming days.
Another cruise, another coronavirus case. Meanwhile, hundreds of passengers on another cruise ship that was barred from docking in several countries have now disembarked in Cambodia. Although the cruise company and Cambodian officials insisted there was no risk on the ship, one passenger who left Holland America’s Westerdam later tested positive in Malaysia, raising fears that she may have infected others who have now flown home to various countries, allowing the virus to spread.
The coronavirus remains an epidemic, meaning it hasn’t spread significantly beyond China. Even if containment limits the spread of the disease, pandemics—when diseases spread rapidly across continents—remain the world’s single biggest threat, Annie Sparrow writes for FP.
Turkey, Russia hold talks over Syria. Turkish officials are in Russia today for talks on the escalating situation in Syria’s northwest Idlib province, where Syrian government forces—backed by Russia—are waging a campaign to take back the country’s last rebel stronghold that has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Turkey supports some rebel groups, who have launched their own operations in Idlib. Meanwhile, Syrian forces have seized most of Aleppo province, which borders Idlib, after making significant gains on Sunday.
Macron picks new candidate for Paris mayor. French President Emmanuel Macron tapped his health minister, Agnès Buzyn, to represent the ruling La République En Marche party in the Paris mayoral election next month. The party’s initial candidate, Benjamin Greveaux, dropped out of the race on Friday amid a sex scandal. Macron’s party sees the Paris municipal elections as an opportunity to build a local base, even though it’s not likely to win. The incumbent Socialist mayor, Anne Hidalgo, is leading in the polls.
The World This Week
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is in Africa this week, making a stop in Angola today before heading to Ethiopia for talks with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year. Pompeo visited Senegal over the weekend. The trip comes amid rising tensions over U.S. visa restrictions on four African countries, but Pompeo’s meetings have so far focused on deepening business ties—a counter to Chinese economic influence in the region.
Another U.S. Democratic presidential debate is set for Wednesday in Las Vegas, with at least five candidates expected to take the stage. Due to a rule change, late entrant and former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg could join them if he qualifies through polling. Bloomberg does not appear on the ballot in the Nevada caucuses on Saturday, where volunteers are concerned about the possibility of technological glitches—which plagued the caucuses in Iowa earlier this month.
Check out our coverage of foreign policy and the 2020 election campaign here.
Iran holds parliamentary elections on Friday, with thousands of moderate or conservative candidates barred from running. Though the vote won’t affect Iran’s foreign policy or nuclear program, which are determined by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the disqualifications mean the next parliament will likely be stacked with hardliners. The election comes at a moment of extreme tension between Tehran and Washington.
Saudi Arabia hosts a G-20 summit on Saturday and Sunday, with the world’s finance officials meeting to discuss the state of the global economy and threats to growth—in particular the coronavirus outbreak. China, Hong Kong, and Singapore have already committed to stimulus packages in response to the unexpected economic hit.
Keep an Eye On
Taiwan’s military. As China’s military poses an increasing threat to Taiwan, it needs its own deterrent more than ever. But the Taiwanese military is in crisis: The transition to an all-volunteer military has led to the hollowing out of front-line troops—a development that has been downplayed by Taiwan’s political leadership, Paul Huang writes for FP.
A drug shortage in Mexico. Due to a government effort to revamp the public health system, Mexico is experiencing a shortage of cancer medications, the Wall Street Journal reports. The shortages have caused families of cancer patients to protest—something that could damage President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his campaign against corruption.
Odds and Ends
A French ski resort in the Pyrenees has airlifted snow onto its slopes after losing business due to a lack of snow during a period of unusually mild weather. The decision enabled the resort to stay open during school holidays. Officials said the operation was “exceptional,” but it has angered French ecologists. “It is the world upside down,” one told French television.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-17--Is Trump Putting U.S.-India Partnership at Risk Ahead of Visit?

Is Trump Putting U.S.-India Partnership at Risk Ahead of Visit ?
India and the United States hope to reach a limited trade agreement in time for U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s first visit to the country this month , but experts question whether the larger strategic relationship both sides have cultivated for more than a decade is being sacrificed to Trump ’ s niggling trade demands .
On the one hand , U.S. administrations beginning with George W. Bush and continuing under Barack Obama have indicated they need India as a strategic partner to help counter China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , under Trump , Washington is now publicly browbeating India over the price of walnuts and Harley-Davidsons .
“ The administration does not have an integrated policy toward India or anyone else for that matter , ” said Ashley Tellis , an India expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
U.S. national security officials have their own view of India ’ s place in America ’ s Indo-Pacific strategy and have built on the Obama administration ’ s efforts with closer defense cooperation , especially in the navy , and through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials , obsessed by trade deficits , have their own narrow agenda focused on prying open parts of the Indian market—a view entirely divorced from the bigger picture .
“ The fruits of a schizophrenic policy are becoming evident , ” said Carnegie ’ s Ashley Tellis .
“ The fruits of a schizophrenic policy are becoming evident , ” Tellis said .
Ahead of Trump ’ s big state visit on Feb. 24-25 , U.S. trade officials led by Robert Lighthizer have been trying to secure a tiny trade breakthrough with India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade victory with a country long known for hardball negotiations and a reluctance to open its market .
The trade talks are the culmination of three years of escalating tension between the United States and India , which kicked off when the Trump administration levied tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from India ( and many other countries , especially allies ) .
India eventually responded with higher tariffs on agricultural goods and restrictions on U.S. medical devices—prompting the United States to retaliate by removing India from a decades-old preferential trade program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ export on favorable terms to the world ’ s biggest market .
Just last week , the Trump administration went further , removing India from another program that shielded low-income countries from U.S. trade reprisals .
The Trump administration ’ s approach to trade talks with India , like those with China , Europe , and others , is driven by the president ’ s obsession with the trade balance : Countries that export more goods to America than they buy in return , he feels , are cheating the United States .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for America , and the United States runs a trade deficit of about $ 25 billion—a small fraction of the huge trade gap with China .
To remedy that , U.S. trade officials have tried to force open the Indian market to more U.S. exports , including farm goods , medical devices , and dairy products .
The mini trade deal taking shape this month appears to include some Indian concessions on agricultural tariffs and a slight reduction in tariffs on industrial goods like motorcycles—but is a far cry from any sort of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ underlying issues like India ’ s penchant for protectionism or its treatment of data and e-commerce .
“ I get the impression the idea is to just have some wins .
We haven ’ t had any wins with India in a long time , ” said Alyssa Ayres , an India and South Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who called the small-bore nature of the current trade negotiations “ dispiriting.
” The trade discussions come at a critical time for India , which faces an economic crunch .
Unemployment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ growth is sluggish ; the International Monetary Fund just slashed India ’ s growth forecast to 4.8 percent this year—well below the growth levels the country needs to provide jobs for a young and growing population .
In response , rather than seeking to open the country to more trade and kick-start the competitiveness of India Inc. , Narendra Modi ’ s administration has turned back to the old protectionist playbook of higher tariffs and a flirtation with autarky .
( The latest budget includes a big increase in all sorts of tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and vehicles . )
That skepticism of free trade was on full display when India late last year bailed out of the huge Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership , a trade bloc that groups all of Asia ’ s big economies , including China .
It ’ s part and parcel of Modi ’ s own “ India first ” brand of nationalism that mirrors Trump ’ s—which explains in part their personal affinity—but which is at odds with long-standing U.S. hopes of a freer Indian economy .
“ India is feeling like they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industries , ” Ayres said .
“ But that is not how export economies in Asia have prospered.
” In years past , the United States would have tried to counter India ’ s protectionist turn , as the Bush and Obama administrations sought to do .
But Trump has spent years attacking free trade in general and the U.S.-built international trading order in particular , repeatedly reaching for tariffs of his own to try to mollify U.S. industries like steel .
That makes the current administration uniquely unsuited to coax India toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States is hoist on its own petard—we are no longer free traders , ” Tellis said .
And that trade myopia could have bigger consequences than just encouraging more protectionism : It could also jeopardize America ’ s increasingly close strategic relationship with a country that is the linchpin of the Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China .
In administrations past , especially under Obama Defense Secretary Ash Carter , little trade disputes were deliberately kept under the radar in order to prioritize the more important strategic and defense relationship ; under Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ center stage in the bilateral relationship , essentially burying that Carter doctrine , said Kashish Parpiani , an Asia-Pacific expert at the Observer Research Foundation in Mumbai .
“ Trump has upended all that , ” said Kashish Parpiani of the Observer Research Foundation .
“ Trump has upended all that , ” he said .
The growing trade tensions haven ’ t derailed the strategic relationship yet , with defense ties with India growing even under Trump .
The two countries are expected to announce a $ 2.5 billion deal for U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cooperation on important issues such as naval logistics and maritime domain awareness continues apace .
The fear is that Trump ’ s transactional approach to relations even with allies—like shaking down South Korea and Japan for billions of dollars to offset the cost of U.S. troops stationed in the region—could bleed into the broader relationship with India .
“ There is some fear that Trump is going to link the two : If there is no progress on trade , he might stall on ” enhanced defense sales and cooperation , Parpiani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while a closer strategic relationship with India is a U.S. goal , it ’ s not clear that it ’ s an objective Trump shares , beyond his high-profile glad-handing with Modi .
He has denigrated the European Union ( a pillar of trans-Atlantic security ) for its alleged trade abuses , demanded more money from Asian allies , levied tariffs on NATO allies , and called into question U.S. commitments in the Middle East .
When it comes to India , his main concerns seem to be forcing India to buy more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ products—whatever the costs to the broader relationship .
“ The United States has an Indo-Pacific policy where India is a huge building block , and that dimension is going on quite well .
But Trump ’ s investment in that policy is unclear , ” Tellis said .
That ambivalence was on clear display last week , when Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte told Trump that he was ending a decades-old agreement that allowed U.S. forces to use the Philippines as an advanced base in the Pacific .
While the sudden announcement horrified U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it harder to push back against China , Trump welcomed the rebuff because , he said , it will save some money .
“ Trump supposedly has an Indo-Pacific policy , and then he tells the Philippines to go ahead and walk away ” from defense cooperation , Tellis said .
Ultimately , during the trade talks and Trump ’ s visit , both Indian and U.S. officials share a similar goal : mollify Trump with small symbolic moves on issues like dairy access in order to avoid an unpredictable , potentially catastrophic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ play ball despite few concessions from Washington on areas that New Delhi wanted is because “ India sees the writing on the wall , ” Parpiani said .
Acquitted by the Senate in his impeachment probe , and having wrapped up some new trade arrangements favorable to the United States , Trump is unleashed .
“ This is the time when you appease him politically so that Trump 2.0 will be a little less aggressive—that is the calculation from the Indian perspective , ” he said .
That balancing act of trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoid his wrath is becoming a standard playbook for countries around the world .
China promised to buy more soybeans and oil to buy peace in the trade war ; Japan , South Korea , and Europe have made token trade concessions to avoid deadly auto tariffs .
None of those agreements have addressed long-standing , fundamental American trade concerns , and none have advanced U.S. security interests—but they were never meant to .
“ If the president of the United States were truly strategic about what he wanted in terms of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be approaching the question of how we treat these countries in a very different way , ” Tellis said .
“ But everybody knows that what this president wants is not strategic : He has pet peeves , and those pet peeves need to be satisfied , and it doesn ’ t take much to satisfy them .
”

India and the United States hope to reach a limited trade agreement in time for U.S. President Donald Trump’s first visit to the country this month, but experts question whether the larger strategic relationship both sides have cultivated for more than a decade is being sacrificed to Trump’s niggling trade demands.
India and the United States hope to reach a limited trade agreement in time for U.S. President Donald Trump’s first visit to the country this month, but experts question whether the larger strategic relationship both sides have cultivated for more than a decade is being sacrificed to Trump’s niggling trade demands.
On the one hand, U.S. administrations beginning with George W. Bush and continuing under Barack Obama have indicated they need India as a strategic partner to help counter China’s growing influence. On the other hand, under Trump, Washington is now publicly browbeating India over the price of walnuts and Harley-Davidsons.
“The administration does not have an integrated policy toward India or anyone else for that matter,” said Ashley Tellis, an India expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
U.S. national security officials have their own view of India’s place in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and have built on the Obama administration’s efforts with closer defense cooperation, especially in the navy, and through increased arms sales. But U.S. trade officials, obsessed by trade deficits, have their own narrow agenda focused on prying open parts of the Indian market—a view entirely divorced from the bigger picture.
“The fruits of a schizophrenic policy are becoming evident,” said Carnegie’s Ashley Tellis.
“The fruits of a schizophrenic policy are becoming evident,” Tellis said.
Ahead of Trump’s big state visit on Feb. 24-25, U.S. trade officials led by Robert Lighthizer have been trying to secure a tiny trade breakthrough with India that will give Trump some sort of trade victory with a country long known for hardball negotiations and a reluctance to open its market.
The trade talks are the culmination of three years of escalating tension between the United States and India, which kicked off when the Trump administration levied tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from India (and many other countries, especially allies). India eventually responded with higher tariffs on agricultural goods and restrictions on U.S. medical devices—prompting the United States to retaliate by removing India from a decades-old preferential trade program that gives developing economies a chance to export on favorable terms to the world’s biggest market. Just last week, the Trump administration went further, removing India from another program that shielded low-income countries from U.S. trade reprisals.
The Trump administration’s approach to trade talks with India, like those with China, Europe, and others, is driven by the president’s obsession with the trade balance: Countries that export more goods to America than they buy in return, he feels, are cheating the United States. India is a top 10 trading partner for America, and the United States runs a trade deficit of about $25 billion—a small fraction of the huge trade gap with China.
To remedy that, U.S. trade officials have tried to force open the Indian market to more U.S. exports, including farm goods, medical devices, and dairy products. The mini trade deal taking shape this month appears to include some Indian concessions on agricultural tariffs and a slight reduction in tariffs on industrial goods like motorcycles—but is a far cry from any sort of comprehensive trade agreement that would address big underlying issues like India’s penchant for protectionism or its treatment of data and e-commerce.
“I get the impression the idea is to just have some wins. We haven’t had any wins with India in a long time,” said Alyssa Ayres, an India and South Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who called the small-bore nature of the current trade negotiations “dispiriting.”
The trade discussions come at a critical time for India, which faces an economic crunch. Unemployment is near a half-century high, and growth is sluggish; the International Monetary Fund just slashed India’s growth forecast to 4.8 percent this year—well below the growth levels the country needs to provide jobs for a young and growing population.
In response, rather than seeking to open the country to more trade and kick-start the competitiveness of India Inc., Narendra Modi’s administration has turned back to the old protectionist playbook of higher tariffs and a flirtation with autarky. (The latest budget includes a big increase in all sorts of tariffs, from footwear and toys to appliances and vehicles.) That skepticism of free trade was on full display when India late last year bailed out of the huge Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade bloc that groups all of Asia’s big economies, including China. It’s part and parcel of Modi’s own “India first” brand of nationalism that mirrors Trump’s—which explains in part their personal affinity—but which is at odds with long-standing U.S. hopes of a freer Indian economy.
“India is feeling like they need to close down and protect their industries,” Ayres said. “But that is not how export economies in Asia have prospered.”
In years past, the United States would have tried to counter India’s protectionist turn, as the Bush and Obama administrations sought to do. But Trump has spent years attacking free trade in general and the U.S.-built international trading order in particular, repeatedly reaching for tariffs of his own to try to mollify U.S. industries like steel. That makes the current administration uniquely unsuited to coax India toward more constructive trade policies.
“The United States is hoist on its own petard—we are no longer free traders,” Tellis said.
And that trade myopia could have bigger consequences than just encouraging more protectionism: It could also jeopardize America’s increasingly close strategic relationship with a country that is the linchpin of the Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China.
In administrations past, especially under Obama Defense Secretary Ash Carter, little trade disputes were deliberately kept under the radar in order to prioritize the more important strategic and defense relationship; under Trump, fights over stents and walnuts take center stage in the bilateral relationship, essentially burying that Carter doctrine, said Kashish Parpiani, an Asia-Pacific expert at the Observer Research Foundation in Mumbai.
“Trump has upended all that,” said Kashish Parpiani of the Observer Research Foundation.
“Trump has upended all that,” he said.
The growing trade tensions haven’t derailed the strategic relationship yet, with defense ties with India growing even under Trump. The two countries are expected to announce a $2.5 billion deal for U.S. helicopters during Trump’s visit, and cooperation on important issues such as naval logistics and maritime domain awareness continues apace. The fear is that Trump’s transactional approach to relations even with allies—like shaking down South Korea and Japan for billions of dollars to offset the cost of U.S. troops stationed in the region—could bleed into the broader relationship with India.
“There is some fear that Trump is going to link the two: If there is no progress on trade, he might stall on” enhanced defense sales and cooperation, Parpiani said.
At issue is that, while a closer strategic relationship with India is a U.S. goal, it’s not clear that it’s an objective Trump shares, beyond his high-profile glad-handing with Modi.
He has denigrated the European Union (a pillar of trans-Atlantic security) for its alleged trade abuses, demanded more money from Asian allies, levied tariffs on NATO allies, and called into question U.S. commitments in the Middle East. When it comes to India, his main concerns seem to be forcing India to buy more American farm, dairy, and energy products—whatever the costs to the broader relationship.
“The United States has an Indo-Pacific policy where India is a huge building block, and that dimension is going on quite well. But Trump’s investment in that policy is unclear,” Tellis said.
That ambivalence was on clear display last week, when Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte told Trump that he was ending a decades-old agreement that allowed U.S. forces to use the Philippines as an advanced base in the Pacific. While the sudden announcement horrified U.S. defense officials, who will now find it harder to push back against China, Trump welcomed the rebuff because, he said, it will save some money.
“Trump supposedly has an Indo-Pacific policy, and then he tells the Philippines to go ahead and walk away” from defense cooperation, Tellis said.
Ultimately, during the trade talks and Trump’s visit, both Indian and U.S. officials share a similar goal: mollify Trump with small symbolic moves on issues like dairy access in order to avoid an unpredictable, potentially catastrophic decision. India’s willingness to play ball despite few concessions from Washington on areas that New Delhi wanted is because “India sees the writing on the wall,” Parpiani said.
Acquitted by the Senate in his impeachment probe, and having wrapped up some new trade arrangements favorable to the United States, Trump is unleashed. “This is the time when you appease him politically so that Trump 2.0 will be a little less aggressive—that is the calculation from the Indian perspective,” he said.
That balancing act of trying to offer Trump minor victories in order to avoid his wrath is becoming a standard playbook for countries around the world. China promised to buy more soybeans and oil to buy peace in the trade war; Japan, South Korea, and Europe have made token trade concessions to avoid deadly auto tariffs. None of those agreements have addressed long-standing, fundamental American trade concerns, and none have advanced U.S. security interests—but they were never meant to.
“If the president of the United States were truly strategic about what he wanted in terms of a renegotiation of our economic ties, we would be approaching the question of how we treat these countries in a very different way,” Tellis said.
“But everybody knows that what this president wants is not strategic: He has pet peeves, and those pet peeves need to be satisfied, and it doesn’t take much to satisfy them.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-17--Afghans Fear Yet Another Civil War

Afghans Fear Yet Another Civil War

Last week , the anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal was commemorated in Afghanistan : Thirty-one years ago , the last Soviet soldier left the country through the Amu Darya River .
But Afghans know that was only the beginning of a new nightmare—the start of civil war—and many people in this war-haunted land fear something similar could happen after the withdrawal of all NATO troops .
Yet they know withdrawal must—and will—happen .
“ The Americans have to leave .
We Afghans just don ’ t like foreign invaders , ” said Mohammad Naseem , who was a mujahideen commander @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Logar , where he fought the communist government and its Soviet backers .
“ We kill one another for foreign forces and foreign ideologies .
This has to end , ” Naseem said while eating dried mulberries at the Mandai , Kabul ’ s largest open-air market .
“ But it [ the withdrawal ] has to take place systematically and with responsibility.
” Most of all , said Naseem , who supports Afghan President Ashraf Ghani , the Taliban need to talk with his government too , not just with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remaining issue following the announcement of a seven-day truce between U.S. forces and the Taliban in recent days .
If the reduction in violence is successful , a first-stage agreement is expected to be signed by the end of February .
The deal would stipulate a 135-day timetable for a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners but also the opening of intra-Afghan talks among different political factions .
During the Munich Security Conference , which ended Sunday , the final phase of the U.S.-Taliban deal was confirmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration and U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad , who carved the deal together with the Taliban delegation in Doha .
Ghani expressed his concern that the Taliban could be using the peace process as a “ Trojan horse strategy ” to undermine his government but also underlined the fact that the war could not be ended without engaging in a process and testing the insurgents .
The most frequent gripe of the average Afghan is that , until now , they ’ ve been cut out of any process .
“ Basically , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official government , don ’ t know about anything , ” said Idrees Stanikzai , a political activist and the leader of Youth Trend Afghanistan , a political movement for young Afghans .
“ The whole deal has been made without us in hidden chambers , and that ’ s a big problem we should continue talking about .
Last but not least , I ’ m sure that the Taliban , a terrorist group , will come to Kabul considering themselves as ‘ winners ’ and behave like that.
” Like many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Stanikzai believes that the Taliban will not accept the positive change and development that took place during the last 18 years in their absence .
Also in terms of the violence reduction , Stanikzai appears pessimistic .
“ I think that both sides aren ’ t trustable .
Remember , last time President Trump just canceled via Twitter everything after months of negotiations .
Who can guarantee that this will not happen again ?
Also , who will be the judge if U.S. airstrikes or Taliban attacks still take place ?
” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monthslong negotiations between Washington and the Taliban delegation in Qatar , the Afghan government was completely excluded .
While Khalilzad repeatedly stated that intra-Afghan talks and an inclusion of Ghani ’ s government would be crucial to the success of any deal , critics believed that Washington was mainly appeasing the Taliban , which still question the legitimacy of the so-called “ puppet government ” in Kabul .
“ Afghans are being killed every day .
Their lives have become worthless .
At the same time , these very people were not represented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Americans .
This small group , which wants to reach its goals mainly through terrorism , does not represent an Afghan society which consists of 30 million people , ” said Orzala Nemat , a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit , an independent research organization based in Kabul .
Many Afghan observers also see the seven-day cease-fire as a significant test that will not only reveal the good will of both sides but should also prove whether the Taliban have an organized structure and hierarchy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once before during the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha in 2018 , when the militant group stopped fighting and laid its weapons down for three days all over the country .
Back then , many observers and analysts said that , contrary to how the group is constantly being portrayed , the Taliban have a strict hierarchy in every Afghan province .
Signing a new deal will not end the 40-year war , but it would enable a larger peace process among all different kinds of political factions within Afghanistan , its large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But many observers fear the deal between the Americans and the Taliban could be interrupted by different sides .
“ The Taliban want to sign this deal .
It ’ s not their interest to disturb it , ” said Zakir Jalaly , a university lecturer and political analyst who studies the Taliban movement .
“ However , there are other players who are not happy about the U.S.-Taliban peace deal .
Obviously , one of them is the Afghan government .
Another big opponent of the deal is [ the Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s possible that both could work separately against the deal to sabotage it .
Already in the past , many attacks and incidents have been staged and blamed on the Taliban or the other way around .
“ At the moment , there are certain groups not interested in peace , for many reasons .
You could find them in the Afghan government , with all its militias , and also inside the Taliban with their stubborn shadow governors or commanders on the ground , ” said Bette Dam , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The real question is : If something happens , are we ready to find out , rather quick , what the real story is ?
I don ’ t think we are , and I think this is very dangerous .
”

Last week, the anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal was commemorated in Afghanistan: Thirty-one years ago, the last Soviet soldier left the country through the Amu Darya River. But Afghans know that was only the beginning of a new nightmare—the start of civil war—and many people in this war-haunted land fear something similar could happen after the withdrawal of all NATO troops.
Last week, the anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal was commemorated in Afghanistan: Thirty-one years ago, the last Soviet soldier left the country through the Amu Darya River. But Afghans know that was only the beginning of a new nightmare—the start of civil war—and many people in this war-haunted land fear something similar could happen after the withdrawal of all NATO troops.
Yet they know withdrawal must—and will—happen. “The Americans have to leave. We Afghans just don’t like foreign invaders,” said Mohammad Naseem, who was a mujahideen commander in the 1980s in the eastern province of Logar, where he fought the communist government and its Soviet backers.
“We kill one another for foreign forces and foreign ideologies. This has to end,” Naseem said while eating dried mulberries at the Mandai, Kabul’s largest open-air market. “But it [the withdrawal] has to take place systematically and with responsibility.” Most of all, said Naseem, who supports Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, the Taliban need to talk with his government too, not just with the Americans.
That is likely the biggest remaining issue following the announcement of a seven-day truce between U.S. forces and the Taliban earlier this month and, on Saturday, the formal signing of a first-stage agreement by U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban delegation in Doha. The deal stipulates a 135-day timetable for a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan and total withdrawal in 14 months. It also calls for the release of thousands of Taliban prisoners but also the opening of intra-Afghan talks between different political factions, which the U.S. side said is a necessary condition for withdrawal.
But earlier in February, Ghani expressed his concern that the Taliban could be using the peace process as a “Trojan horse strategy” to undermine his government but also underlined the fact that the war could not be ended without engaging in a process and testing the insurgents.
The most frequent gripe of the average Afghan is that, until now, they’ve been cut out of any process. “Basically, we, the Afghan people and our official government, don’t know about anything,” said Idrees Stanikzai, a political activist and the leader of Youth Trend Afghanistan, a political movement for young Afghans.
“The whole deal has been made without us in hidden chambers, and that’s a big problem we should continue talking about. Last but not least, I’m sure that the Taliban, a terrorist group, will come to Kabul considering themselves as ‘winners’ and behave like that.”
Like many other young people from urban areas, Stanikzai believes that the Taliban will not accept the positive change and development that took place during the last 18 years in their absence. Also in terms of the violence reduction, Stanikzai appears pessimistic. “I think that both sides aren’t trustable. Remember, last time President Trump just canceled via Twitter everything after months of negotiations. Who can guarantee that this will not happen again? Also, who will be the judge if U.S. airstrikes or Taliban attacks still take place?” he said in an interview.
During the monthslong negotiations between Washington and the Taliban delegation in Qatar, the Afghan government was completely excluded. While Khalilzad repeatedly stated that intra-Afghan talks and an inclusion of Ghani’s government would be crucial to the success of any deal, critics believed that Washington was mainly appeasing the Taliban, which still question the legitimacy of the so-called “puppet government” in Kabul.
“Afghans are being killed every day. Their lives have become worthless. At the same time, these very people were not represented during all the talks between the Taliban and the Americans. This small group, which wants to reach its goals mainly through terrorism, does not represent an Afghan society which consists of 30 million people,” said Orzala Nemat, a political ethnographer and head of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research organization based in Kabul.
Many Afghan observers also see the seven-day cease-fire as a significant test that will not only reveal the good will of both sides but should also prove whether the Taliban have an organized structure and hierarchy on the ground. This was demonstrated once before during the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha in 2018, when the militant group stopped fighting and laid its weapons down for three days all over the country. Back then, many observers and analysts said that, contrary to how the group is constantly being portrayed, the Taliban have a strict hierarchy in every Afghan province.
Signing a new deal will not end the 40-year war, but it would enable a larger peace process among all different kinds of political factions within Afghanistan, its large diaspora, and its civil society. But many observers fear the deal between the Americans and the Taliban could be interrupted by different sides. “The Taliban want to sign this deal. It’s not their interest to disturb it,” said Zakir Jalaly, a university lecturer and political analyst who studies the Taliban movement. “However, there are other players who are not happy about the U.S.-Taliban peace deal. Obviously, one of them is the Afghan government. Another big opponent of the deal is [the Islamic State].” According to Jalaly, it’s possible that both could work separately against the deal to sabotage it.
Already in the past, many attacks and incidents have been staged and blamed on the Taliban or the other way around. “At the moment, there are certain groups not interested in peace, for many reasons. You could find them in the Afghan government, with all its militias, and also inside the Taliban with their stubborn shadow governors or commanders on the ground,” said Bette Dam, a journalist and author focusing on Afghanistan. “The real question is: If something happens, are we ready to find out, rather quick, what the real story is? I don’t think we are, and I think this is very dangerous.”
Feb. 29: This story has been updated to account for the signing of the peace agreement.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-18--China Could Postpone Top Political Meeting

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : China ’ s leadership could postpone a critical legislative meeting due to the coronavirus , the EU announces a new naval mission to enforce the U.N. arms embargo on Libya , and Taliban commanders are still waiting for orders to reduce violence .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
State media reported Monday that China ’ s legislature may postpone its biggest political meeting of the year—its annual congress , set for March 5 in Beijing—due to the coronavirus .
The gathering usually lasts at least 10 days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic targets .
One-third of National People ’ s Congress ( NPC ) delegates are provincial or city officials working to slow the outbreak .
This year ’ s annual congress is particularly critical , with delegates set to ratify China ’ s first civil code as part of President Xi Jinping ’ s legal reforms and expected to discuss the anti-government protests in Hong Kong .
The March NPC meeting has not been postponed since 1995 .
The announcement about the delay came as Chinese authorities reported a decline in new virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confirmed over 72,000 cases and 1,870 deaths .
What to make of the new data .
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , the head of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , noted that the apparent decline should be interpreted with caution .
“ It ’ s too early to tell if this reported decline will continue , ” he said .
“ Every scenario is still on the table.
” Still , the new data seem to show that four out of five people infected have only a mild case of the disease @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China release Xi ’ s speech ?
Over the weekend , a party publication released a speech that indicated Xi was managing containment efforts as early as Jan. 7—two weeks before his first public comments .
The timing of the publication is odd , but it could be intended to support the central leadership ’ s narrative that local officials were slow to respond to the outbreak , Bloomberg reports .
EU steps up enforcement as arms flow into Libya .
The European Union reached an agreement on Monday to deploy warships and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. arms embargo on Libya .
It also decided to end Operation Sophia , the maritime patrols set up to counter human smuggling off the Libyan coast .
As weapons continue to flow into Libya , combatants on all sides of the civil war seem to be digging in .
The U.N. Security Council held a vote on a cease-fire in Libya last Thursday , but Russia abstained—suggesting it might not be committed to a U.N.-led political solution .
Apple projects lower revenue .
On Monday , Apple became the first major U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t meet its quarterly revenue projections due to slower iPhone production amid the coronavirus outbreak in China , which is rippling through the global economy .
While Apple ’ s factories in China are reopening , there is still a shortage of components that will affect revenues in the short term .
Apple had projected record revenue for this quarter—between $ 63 and $ 67 billion .
It hasn ’ t yet released an updated estimate .
No reduction of violence yet in Afghanistan .
Militant commanders in Afghanistan say they are waiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their attacks on government targets , days after a U.S. official said that a seven-day reduction of violence had been agreed .
Attacks against Afghan government forces continued on Sunday night , despite a Taliban official in Doha confirming the deal .
Meanwhile , Afghan observers worry because the government is on the sidelines—and they fear more violence as a result , Emran Feroz reports for FP .
The U.S.-India partnership .
Ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s first visit to India next week , some experts worry that his administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strategic partner .
That ’ s because Trump ’ s approach to trade talks with India—as elsewhere—is driven by his obsession with trade balance , FP ’ s Keith Johnson reports .
Pompeo in Ethiopia .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continues his first African trip today in Ethiopia , where he will meet Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year .
Pompeo spoke with Angola ’ s president on Monday , condemning corruption as he promoted U.S. business interests .
A ghost ship abandoned by its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Sunday in County Cork , Ireland , during Storm Dennis , which caused damage in the United Kingdom over the weekend .
The cargo vessel , the MV Alta , was traveling from Greece to Haiti in 2018 when it became disabled and was left by its crew .
It was then towed to Guyana , hijacked , and left unmanned in the mid-Atlantic before apparently drifting to Ireland .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China’s leadership could postpone a critical legislative meeting due to the coronavirus, the EU announces a new naval mission to enforce the U.N. arms embargo on Libya , and Taliban commanders are still waiting for orders to reduce violence.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China’s leadership could postpone a critical legislative meeting due to the coronavirus, the EU announces a new naval mission to enforce the U.N. arms embargo on Libya, and Taliban commanders are still waiting for orders to reduce violence.
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China May Delay Top Political Meeting
State media reported Monday that China’s legislature may postpone its biggest political meeting of the year—its annual congress, set for March 5 in Beijing—due to the coronavirus. The gathering usually lasts at least 10 days, with delegates passing legislation and setting economic targets. One-third of National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates are provincial or city officials working to slow the outbreak.
This year’s annual congress is particularly critical, with delegates set to ratify China’s first civil code as part of President Xi Jinping’s legal reforms and expected to discuss the anti-government protests in Hong Kong. The March NPC meeting has not been postponed since 1995. The announcement about the delay came as Chinese authorities reported a decline in new virus cases. So far, China has confirmed over 72,000 cases and 1,870 deaths.
What to make of the new data. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the head of the World Health Organization (WHO), noted that the apparent decline should be interpreted with caution. “It’s too early to tell if this reported decline will continue,” he said. “Every scenario is still on the table.” Still, the new data seem to show that four out of five people infected have only a mild case of the disease, the WHO said.
Why did China release Xi’s speech? Over the weekend, a party publication released a speech that indicated Xi was managing containment efforts as early as Jan. 7—two weeks before his first public comments. The timing of the publication is odd, but it could be intended to support the central leadership’s narrative that local officials were slow to respond to the outbreak, Bloomberg reports.
What We’re Following Today
EU steps up enforcement as arms flow into Libya. The European Union reached an agreement on Monday to deploy warships and planes in the Mediterranean to enforce the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. It also decided to end Operation Sophia, the maritime patrols set up to counter human smuggling off the Libyan coast. As weapons continue to flow into Libya, combatants on all sides of the civil war seem to be digging in. The U.N. Security Council held a vote on a cease-fire in Libya last Thursday, but Russia abstained—suggesting it might not be committed to a U.N.-led political solution.
Apple projects lower revenue. On Monday, Apple became the first major U.S. company to announce that it won’t meet its quarterly revenue projections due to slower iPhone production amid the coronavirus outbreak in China, which is rippling through the global economy. While Apple’s factories in China are reopening, there is still a shortage of components that will affect revenues in the short term. Apple had projected record revenue for this quarter—between $63 and $67 billion. It hasn’t yet released an updated estimate.
No reduction of violence yet in Afghanistan. Militant commanders in Afghanistan say they are waiting for orders from Taliban leadership before stopping their attacks on government targets, days after a U.S. official said that a seven-day reduction of violence had been agreed. Attacks against Afghan government forces continued on Sunday night, despite a Taliban official in Doha confirming the deal. Meanwhile, Afghan observers worry because the government is on the sidelines—and they fear more violence as a result, Emran Feroz reports for FP.
Keep an Eye On
The U.S.-India partnership. Ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s first visit to India next week, some experts worry that his administration is weakening efforts to make the country a strategic partner. That’s because Trump’s approach to trade talks with India—as elsewhere—is driven by his obsession with trade balance, FP’s Keith Johnson reports.
Pompeo in Ethiopia. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continues his first African trip today in Ethiopia, where he will meet Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year. Pompeo spoke with Angola’s president on Monday, condemning corruption as he promoted U.S. business interests.
Odds and Ends
A ghost ship abandoned by its crew for over a year washed ashore on Sunday in County Cork, Ireland, during Storm Dennis, which caused damage in the United Kingdom over the weekend. The cargo vessel, the MV Alta, was traveling from Greece to Haiti in 2018 when it became disabled and was left by its crew. It was then towed to Guyana, hijacked, and left unmanned in the mid-Atlantic before apparently drifting to Ireland.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.