foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--When the Coronavirus Reaches the Top

When the Coronavirus Reaches the Top

Trump is now one of many world leaders and other top officials to be infected with COVID-19 since the World Health Organization declared the virus a pandemic more than six months ago .
From Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , the cases have varied in health and political effects—but each infection has intensified questions about the leader ’ s handling of the pandemic .
For Trump ’ s campaign , much depends on the days ahead and the severity of his symptoms .
Below is a list of the top leaders who tested positive for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s announcement came just hours after Bloomberg News reported that Hope Hicks , a senior advisor who traveled with the president this week , had tested positive .
The line of transmission remains unclear , and the administration appears to have bungled official communications about potential exposure .
The White House did not alert Biden ’ s campaign before the Friday announcement , even though the two candidates appeared together maskless at the Tuesday debate .
Trump held a scheduled fundraiser in Bedminster , New Jersey , on Thursday , despite learning of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
With Trump under quarantine , his infection has already jolted the presidential race , but the ultimate political outcome could rest on what happens over the next few days .
As a 74-year-old man with obesity , the president is at elevated risk for serious illness , but most people with COVID-19 recover quickly with minimal symptoms , which tend to appear within a few days of infection .
The White House has confirmed that both the president and first lady are experiencing mild symptoms of COVID-19 .
Still , Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health threat to a sitting president since the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 , and certainly the most serious so close to an election .
If Trump is hospitalized or otherwise incapacitated , he could invoke the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—temporarily transferring power to Vice President Mike Pence .
For the moment , the news has effectively suspended White House events , Trump ’ s campaigning , and any future debates .
In addition to the Trumps and Hicks , at least two others who attended the White @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s nomination to the Supreme Court—Sen .
Mike Lee and the president of the University of Notre Dame , John Jenkins—have tested positive .
( Barrett , who had COVID-19 earlier this year , tested negative on Friday . )
The revelations have also heightened fears among state officials that Trump ’ s massive rallies across the country in the final stretch of the campaign , including in Pennsylvania and Minnesota this week , could be superspreader events , increasing the number of COVID-19 cases across the country .
Pence , his wife @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo , and Attorney General Bill Barr all tested negative for COVID-19 on Friday morning .
Both Biden and his running mate , California Sen. Kamala Harris , have also tested negative , according to their campaign advisors .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , 56 , is thought to be the first major world leader to test positive for COVID-19 .
On March 27 , Johnson announced in a video on Twitter that he had contracted the virus , just over a week after his government dropped its herd immunity approach to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a high risk for coronavirus complications , Johnson nearly died of COVID-19 .
After experiencing mild symptoms at first , he was hospitalized for a week and spent three days in intensive care .
Johnson later said , it “ could have gone either way.
” Johnson ’ s contraction of COVID-19 garnered him sympathy as the British death toll rose rapidly in early April .
Even those opposed to his politics wished him a speedy recovery , and his brush with death gave him a boost in the polls—his popularity ratings this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the hospital .
Prince Charles , 71 , the heir to the British throne , also contracted COVID-19 in March .
After testing positive , he self-isolated with his wife , Camilla , the Duchess of Cornwall—who tested negative—in Scotland .
In June , Charles said that he was lucky he experienced only mild symptoms .
He told Sky News that he “ got away with it quite lightly ” and used COVID-19 as a springboard to address broader environmental issues .
“ The more we erode the natural world , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we expose ourselves to this kind of danger , ” he said .
On March 19 , Prince Albert II of Monaco , 62 , became the first reigning monarch or head of state to announce that they had tested positive for COVID-19 .
In the statement , the palace said that Prince Albert ’ s symptoms weren ’ t worrying and that he would work from home , and he urged the people of Monaco to follow coronavirus restrictions .
Within two weeks , the palace confirmed that Prince Albert had recovered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an Aug. 2 Facebook post that he had contracted the coronavirus and that he would self-isolate for two weeks .
Hoti , 44 , said he had “ no symptoms , except for a very mild cough.
” The unwelcome shock came only two months into Hoti ’ s tenure at the country ’ s helm .
Hoti ’ s Democratic League of Kosovo had actually initially gained power on June 3 after an intra-government rift over Kosovo ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic precipitated a vote of no confidence for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refused to declare a state of emergency amid the pandemic .
As the new prime minister wrestled with the virus , Kosovars again expressed frustration with their government ’ s inaction ; the country of 1.8 million people has seen over 12,000 cases of COVID-19 .
Hoti , for his part , was well enough to make a visit to Washington to meet Trump in early September .
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan , 45 , announced on June 1 that he and his family had contracted the coronavirus .
In a Facebook @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not yet experiencing symptoms and assumed he was infected by a gloveless waiter who delivered him a glass of water during a meeting .
Armenia , now engulfed in a probable war with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh , has suffered over 50,000 cases and nearly 1,000 deaths .
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said in July that he had experienced an asymptomatic case of the coronavirus .
“ The most surprising thing is that today you are seeing a person who managed to power through coronavirus standing on his feet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to the state-owned news agency Belta .
Lukashenko , who has refused to impose a strict lockdown , previously dismissed the threat of COVID-19 as a “ psychosis ” and suggested that drinking vodka and regular visits to the sauna would keep citizens healthy .
Lukashenko ’ s handling of the coronavirus crisis has contributed to the public discontent driving ongoing protests in Minsk that accelerated after the Aug. 9 presidential election .
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin , 54 , self-isolated in the hospital after testing positive for COVID-19 in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who took office in January , temporarily stepped back from his duties until he recovered .
Several other ministers , including Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov , tested positive around the same time .
Russia , which soon plans to share the initial results of its vaccine trial , has recorded over 1 million cases of COVID-19 but lifted its strict lockdown restrictions in June .
Despite life largely returning to normal in Russia , President Vladimir Putin reportedly rarely leaves home and conducts most senior-level meetings over video .
After spending months dismissing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro , 65 , tested positive for COVID-19 in early July .
The president , who had compared the virus to a “ little flu ” and had carried out large political demonstrations that went against public health guidelines , announced he was taking hydroxychloroquine , which health experts have warned is not an appropriate COVID-19 treatment , after showing mild symptoms .
“ For those who root against hydroxychloroquine , but don ’ t present alternatives , I regret to inform you that I ’ m very well with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s grace , I will live for a long time still , ” Bolsonaro said .
When announcing his test results to the press , Bolsonaro took off his mask to show that he was doing “ perfectly well , ” which prompted a group of journalists to sue the far-right president .
At least 11 Brazilian governors , as well as top government officials and first lady Michelle Bolsonaro , tested positive for the virus .
Brazil , which has confirmed nearly 35 million COVID-19 cases and at least a million deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disease in Latin America since at least June .
Globally criticized for his handling of the pandemic , Bolsonaro has fired two health ministers since March out of the belief that their approach was too extreme , more recently appointing an army general for the position .
“ We have a military occupation with no expertise whatsoever in the management of the public health system , ” Luiz Henrique Mandetta , one of the fired ministers , said .
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández , 51 , and his wife tested positive for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hospitalized and treated for pneumonia , the president announced that he would continue to carry out his duties remotely .
“ I feel enough strength and energy to continue forward and beat this pandemic , ” Hernández said in a televised statement .
Interim Bolivian President Jeanine Áñez , 53 , tested positive for the coronavirus in July , a moment when her country was experiencing turmoil due to the postponement of the presidential elections .
Many of her government officials , including Health Minister María Eidy Roca , who was appointed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for corruption , also contracted the virus .
With protests growing increasingly violent in the country after that , Áñez opted to drop out from the upcoming presidential election scheduled for Oct. 18 .
The decision came one day after a highly regarded poll ranked her fourth in the race .
“ I ’ m doing this because of a risk that the vote gets divided between various candidates , ” Áñez , who is trying to garner support for the conservative bloc , said .
“ If we don ’ t get @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 18 , Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei , 64 , became the latest Latin American leader to test positive for COVID-19 .
The president , who has multiple sclerosis and uses crutches to walk , had previously said that he was a high-risk patient .
Despite presenting mild symptoms , Giammattei said that he would keep himself “ busy working from home.
” The announcement came on the same day Guatemala reopened its borders and reinstated international flights after a six-month lockdown .
On June 8 , the government of Burundi announced that President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a heart attack after a brief illness .
But according to accounts from local news outlets and diplomats , he was the first head of state killed by COVID-19 .
Senior officials have denied the reports as rumors , and at the time Burundi had limited testing and only 83 reported cases .
In the weeks before his death , Nkurunziza downplayed the pandemic and allowed campaigning for the May 20 election to replace him to go ahead with limited social distancing at rallies .
Elected successor Évariste Ndayishimiye took office two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , inheriting a public health crisis , an ailing economy , and a country in need of wide-ranging reforms after Nkurunziza ’ s 15-year rule .
Michel Barnier , the EU ’ s chief Brexit negotiator , tested positive for the coronavirus on March 19 , just as the virus was making its first sweep across Europe .
In a tweet , Barnier , 69 , said he was “ doing well and in good spirits , ” offering a message of solidarity to all impacted by the virus and lockdown .
Barnier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 14 .
In September , Barnier ’ s name again began trending with “ coronavirus ” as he suggested that the latest twists in the Brexit saga—Westminster ’ s efforts to veto certain aspects of the withdrawal agreement it signed in 2019—may have been motivated by the British government ’ s efforts to detract from its domestic failings in dealing with the coronavirus .
Italy ’ s notorious media mogul and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi , beset by sex and corruption scandals as he headed four different governments , tested positive for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 83 , was hospitalized two days later and remained in treatment until his release on Sept. 14 .
Berlusconi called his infection “ the most dangerous test of [ his ] life , ” and said he “ dodged a bullet once again ” by not succumbing to COVID-19 .
While hospitalized—and then from his villa in Arcore—Berlusconi campaigned for his party , Forza Italia , in regional elections that took place on Sept. 20 and 21 .
Its candidates did not perform well .
Sophie Grégoire Trudeau , 45 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , tested positive for COVID-19 following a trip to the United Kingdom in March .
“ Being in quarantine at home is nothing compared to other Canadian families who might be going through this and for those facing more serious health concerns , ” she said .
Neither the prime minister nor their three children contracted the virus .
Former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev , 80 , self-isolated in June after testing positive for the coronavirus and had recovered within three weeks , according to his spokesperson .
Central Asia experienced a surge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries eased restrictions , and Kazakhstan imposed a second lockdown in July .
Nazarbayev resigned as president in 2019 after nearly three decades in power but has retained political influence in Kazakhstan as the chairman of the Security Council .
Audrey Wilson and Robbie Gramer contributed to this report .

Augusta Saraiva, Allison Meakem and Chloe Hadavas

On Friday, in a post-midnight tweet, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he and his wife, Melania Trump, had tested positive for the coronavirus. The news comes just 32 days before the presidential election and at the end of one of the busiest weeks of Trump’s campaign. Since last Saturday, he has attended two rallies, a fundraiser, and the first of three scheduled presidential debates with Democratic nominee and former Vice President Joe Biden in Cleveland. The president and the first lady are now in quarantine at the White House.
Trump is now one of many world leaders and other top officials to be infected with COVID-19 since the World Health Organization declared the virus a pandemic more than six months ago. From Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the cases have varied in health and political effects—but each infection has intensified questions about the leader’s handling of the pandemic. For Trump’s campaign, much depends on the days ahead and the severity of his symptoms.
Below is a list of the top leaders who tested positive for COVID-19—and what came next.
President Donald Trump, United States
Trump’s announcement came just hours after Bloomberg News reported that Hope Hicks, a senior advisor who traveled with the president this week, had tested positive. The line of transmission remains unclear, and the administration appears to have bungled official communications about potential exposure. The White House did not alert Biden’s campaign before the Friday announcement, even though the two candidates appeared together maskless at the Tuesday debate. Trump held a scheduled fundraiser in Bedminster, New Jersey, on Thursday, despite learning of Hicks’s test results that morning.
With Trump under quarantine, his infection has already jolted the presidential race, but the ultimate political outcome could rest on what happens over the next few days. As a 74-year-old man with obesity, the president is at elevated risk for serious illness, though most people with COVID-19 recover quickly with minimal symptoms, which tend to appear within a few days of infection. The White House has confirmed that both the president and first lady are experiencing mild symptoms of COVID-19.
Still, Trump’s infection marks perhaps the most serious health threat to a sitting president since the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981, and certainly the most serious so close to an election. If Trump is hospitalized or otherwise incapacitated, he could invoke the 25th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—temporarily transferring power to Vice President Mike Pence.
For the moment, the news has effectively suspended White House events, Trump’s campaigning, and any future debates. In addition to the Trumps and Hicks, at least two others who attended the White House ceremony announcing Amy Coney Barrett’s nomination to the Supreme Court—Sen. Mike Lee and the president of the University of Notre Dame, John Jenkins—have tested positive. (Barrett, who had COVID-19 earlier this year, tested negative on Friday.) The revelations have also heightened fears among state officials that Trump’s massive rallies across the country in the final stretch of the campaign, including in Pennsylvania and Minnesota this week, could be superspreader events, increasing the number of COVID-19 cases across the country.
Pence, his wife Karen Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Attorney General Bill Barr all tested negative for COVID-19 on Friday morning. Both Biden and his running mate, California Sen. Kamala Harris, have also tested negative, according to their campaign advisors.
A man reads a newspaper story about Boris Johnson outside St Thomas' Hospital in Westminster, where the British prime minister was transferred to the intensive care unit after persistent symptoms of COVID-19, on April 7.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson, United Kingdom
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, 56, is thought to be the first major world leader to test positive for COVID-19. On March 27, Johnson announced in a video on Twitter that he had contracted the virus, just over a week after his government dropped its herd immunity approach to the pandemic.
Despite not being at a high risk for coronavirus complications, Johnson nearly died of COVID-19. After experiencing mild symptoms at first, he was hospitalized for a week and spent three days in intensive care. Johnson later said, it “could have gone either way.”
Johnson’s COVID-19 infection garnered him sympathy as the British death toll rose rapidly in early April. Even those opposed to his politics wished him a speedy recovery, and his brush with death gave him a boost in the polls—his popularity ratings this year peaked the week he was discharged from the hospital.
Prince Charles, United Kingdom
Prince Charles, 71, the heir to the British throne, also contracted COVID-19 in March. After testing positive, he self-isolated with his wife, Camilla, the Duchess of Cornwall—who tested negative—in Scotland.
In June, Charles said that he was lucky he experienced only mild symptoms. He told Sky News that he “got away with it quite lightly” and used COVID-19 as a springboard to address broader environmental issues. “The more we erode the natural world, the more we destroy biodiversity, the more we expose ourselves to this kind of danger,” he said.
French director Claude Lelouch films Monaco’s Prince Albert II as he gets in a Ferrari while filming a short movie in Monaco on May 24.
Prince Albert II, Monaco
On March 19, Prince Albert II of Monaco, 62, became the first reigning monarch or head of state to announce that they had tested positive for COVID-19. In the statement, the palace said that Prince Albert’s symptoms weren’t worrying and that he would work from home, and he urged the people of Monaco to follow coronavirus restrictions. Within two weeks, the palace confirmed that Prince Albert had recovered.
Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti, Kosovo
Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti announced in an Aug. 2 Facebook post that he had contracted the coronavirus and that he would self-isolate for two weeks. Hoti, 44, said he had “no symptoms, except for a very mild cough.”
The unwelcome shock came only two months into Hoti’s tenure at the country’s helm. Hoti’s Democratic League of Kosovo had actually initially gained power on June 3 after an intra-government rift over Kosovo’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic precipitated a vote of no confidence for his predecessor, Albin Kurti, who refused to declare a state of emergency amid the pandemic.
As the new prime minister wrestled with the virus, Kosovars again expressed frustration with their government’s inaction; the country of 1.8 million people has seen over 12,000 cases of COVID-19. Hoti, for his part, was well enough to make a visit to Washington to meet Trump in early September.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, 45, announced on June 1 that he and his family had contracted the coronavirus. In a Facebook Live video, Pashinyan said that he was not yet experiencing symptoms and assumed he was infected by a gloveless waiter who delivered him a glass of water during a meeting. Armenia, now engulfed in a probable war with Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, has suffered over 50,000 cases and nearly 1,000 deaths.
President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Belarus
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said in July that he had experienced an asymptomatic case of the coronavirus. “The most surprising thing is that today you are seeing a person who managed to power through coronavirus standing on his feet,” Lukashenko said after he recovered, according to the state-owned news agency Belta. Lukashenko, who has refused to impose a strict lockdown, previously dismissed the threat of COVID-19 as a “psychosis” and suggested that drinking vodka and regular visits to the sauna would keep citizens healthy. Lukashenko’s handling of the coronavirus crisis has contributed to the public discontent driving ongoing protests in Minsk that accelerated after the Aug. 9 presidential election.
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Russia
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, 54, self-isolated in the hospital after testing positive for COVID-19 in late April. The prime minister, who took office in January, temporarily stepped back from his duties until he recovered. Several other ministers, including Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, tested positive around the same time.
Russia, which soon plans to share the initial results of its vaccine trial, has recorded over 1 million cases of COVID-19 but lifted its strict lockdown restrictions in June. Despite life largely returning to normal in Russia, President Vladimir Putin reportedly rarely leaves home and conducts most senior-level meetings over video.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro takes off his protective mask to speak to journalists during a news conference about the coronavirus outbreak at the Planalto Palace in Brasilia on March 20.
President Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil
After spending months dismissing the seriousness of the coronavirus pandemic, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, 65, tested positive for COVID-19 in early July. The president, who had compared the virus to a “little flu” and had carried out large political demonstrations that went against public health guidelines, announced he was taking hydroxychloroquine, which health experts have warned is not an appropriate COVID-19 treatment, after showing mild symptoms.
“For those who root against hydroxychloroquine, but don’t present alternatives, I regret to inform you that I’m very well with its use and, with God’s grace, I will live for a long time still,” Bolsonaro said.
When announcing his test results to the press, Bolsonaro took off his mask to show that he was doing “perfectly well,” which prompted a group of journalists to sue the far-right president. At least 11 Brazilian governors, as well as top government officials and first lady Michelle Bolsonaro, tested positive for the virus.
Brazil, which has confirmed nearly 35 million COVID-19 cases and at least a million deaths, has been the epicenter of the disease in Latin America since at least June. Globally criticized for his handling of the pandemic, Bolsonaro has fired two health ministers since March out of the belief that their approach was too extreme, more recently appointing an army general for the position. “We have a military occupation with no expertise whatsoever in the management of the public health system,” Luiz Henrique Mandetta, one of the fired ministers, said.
President Juan Orlando Hernández, Honduras
Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, 51, and his wife tested positive for COVID-19 back in June. Despite being hospitalized and treated for pneumonia, the president announced that he would continue to carry out his duties remotely. “I feel enough strength and energy to continue forward and beat this pandemic,” Hernández said in a televised statement.
Jeanine Añez, Bolivia’s interim president, signs a law further delaying the 2020 general elections at Government's Palace in La Pas on Aug. 13.
Interim President Jeanine Áñez, Bolivia
Interim Bolivian President Jeanine Áñez, 53, tested positive for the coronavirus in July, a moment when her country was experiencing turmoil due to the postponement of the presidential elections. Many of her government officials, including Health Minister María Eidy Roca, who was appointed in late May after her predecessor was arrested for corruption, also contracted the virus.
With protests growing increasingly violent in the country after that, Áñez opted to drop out from the upcoming presidential election scheduled for Oct. 18. The decision came one day after a highly regarded poll ranked her fourth in the race. “I’m doing this because of a risk that the vote gets divided between various candidates,” Áñez, who is trying to garner support for the conservative bloc, said. “If we don’t get together, democracy loses.”
President Alejandro Giammattei, Guatemala
On Sept. 18, Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei, 64, became the latest Latin American leader to test positive for COVID-19. The president, who has multiple sclerosis and uses crutches to walk, had previously said that he was a high-risk patient. Despite presenting mild symptoms, Giammattei said that he would keep himself “busy working from home.” The announcement came on the same day Guatemala reopened its borders and reinstated international flights after a six-month lockdown.
President Pierre Nkurunziza, Burundi
On June 8, the government of Burundi announced that President Pierre Nkurunziza, 55, had died of a heart attack after a brief illness. But according to accounts from local news outlets and diplomats, he was the first head of state killed by COVID-19. Senior officials have denied the reports as rumors, and at the time Burundi had limited testing and only 83 reported cases. In the weeks before his death, Nkurunziza downplayed the pandemic and allowed campaigning for the May 20 election to replace him to go ahead with limited social distancing at rallies.
Elected successor Évariste Ndayishimiye took office two months ahead of schedule on June 18, inheriting a public health crisis, an ailing economy, and a country in need of wide-ranging reforms after Nkurunziza’s 15-year rule.
Michel Barnier, European Union chief Brexit negotiator
Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, tested positive for the coronavirus on March 19, just as the virus was making its first sweep across Europe. In a tweet, Barnier, 69, said he was “doing well and in good spirits,” offering a message of solidarity to all impacted by the virus and lockdown. Barnier returned to his Brussels office on April 14.
In September, Barnier’s name again began trending with “coronavirus” as he suggested that the latest twists in the Brexit saga—Westminster’s efforts to veto certain aspects of the withdrawal agreement it signed in 2019—may have been motivated by the British government’s efforts to detract from its domestic failings in dealing with the coronavirus.
Former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is discharged from the San Raffaele hospital in Milan on Sept. 14 after being treated for COVID-19.
Silvio Berlusconi, former Italian prime minister
Italy’s notorious media mogul and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, beset by sex and corruption scandals as he headed four different governments, tested positive for the coronavirus on Sept. 2. Berlusconi, 83, was hospitalized two days later and remained in treatment until his release on Sept. 14.
Berlusconi called his infection “the most dangerous test of [his] life,” and said he “dodged a bullet once again” by not succumbing to COVID-19. While hospitalized—and then from his villa in Arcore—Berlusconi campaigned for his party, Forza Italia, in regional elections that took place on Sept. 20 and 21. Its candidates did not perform well.
Sophie Grégoire Trudeau, wife of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
Sophie Grégoire Trudeau, 45, the wife of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, tested positive for COVID-19 following a trip to the United Kingdom in March. “Being in quarantine at home is nothing compared to other Canadian families who might be going through this and for those facing more serious health concerns,” she said. Neither the prime minister nor their three children contracted the virus.
Nursultan Nazarbayev, former Kazakh president
Former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, 80, self-isolated in June after testing positive for the coronavirus and had recovered within three weeks, according to his spokesperson. Central Asia experienced a surge in cases over the summer after some countries eased restrictions, and Kazakhstan imposed a second lockdown in July.
Nazarbayev resigned as president in 2019 after nearly three decades in power but has retained political influence in Kazakhstan as the chairman of the Security Council.
Audrey Wilson and Robbie Gramer contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Tinder Is the Latest Social Media Battleground in Thai Protests

Tinder Is the Latest Social Media Battleground in Thai Protests Thailand ’ s rising pro-democracy movement has seen hundreds of thousands of protestors take to the streets in fierce opposition to the military government and the royal establishment this year .
A key part of the movement ’ s unprecedented growth is the popularity of social media in the country , where about 75 percent of people are active social media users .
But platforms like Twitter and Facebook are subject to increasing pressure by the government and authorities , posing a threat to a young movement that heavily relies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Perhaps the most surprising targets are dating apps such as Tinder , where government power is intruding into even relatively private online spaces .
The recent wave of protests has three core demands : the dissolution of the parliament , ending the intimidation of citizens , and a new constitution .
Some protesters have issued a more controversial set of 10 demands for reforming the monarchy and its highly patriarchal structures .
But the silencing of dissenting voices is a long-lasting tradition in Thailand .
Social media and other forms of digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military , security agencies and private ultra-royalist groups .
In a number of cases , publishing content online that “ causes public unrest ” or “ threatens national security ” has led to public harassment , arbitrary detention , and even enforced disappearances .
The current military regime , which took power in the 2014 coup under Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha , has increasingly enforced its strict cybersecurity , sedition , and lèse-majesté laws .
Offenses recently added include posting a satirical comment of the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej ’ s dog , sharing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Facebook , and producing an anti-government rap music video that reached nearly 100 million views on YouTube .
Last month , the Thai government attempted to block more than 2,200 websites and social media accounts ahead of pro-democracy protests in one weekend alone .
Some of these platforms have implemented stricter moderation regimes to comply with the Thai government , while others have risked the legal consequences of challenging such restrictions .
Despite the threats , protestors are utilizing every means possible to promote their pro-democracy message—including Tinder .
Recently , several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or suspended after sharing pro-democracy content .
Tinder profiles are publicly accessible , and some young Thais have been using them to spread the cause by leaving messages such as “ no royalists here ” and “ freedom for Thailand ” on their bios .
One user revealed that they were banned by Tinder after sharing a link to the movement ’ s 10 pro-democracy demands .
Another said an image containing a QR code linked to a constitutional amendment petition was censored for violating the dating app ’ s terms of service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tinder has yet to provide an official statement on its actions .
According to Tinder ’ s community guidelines , profiles may be removed if they are found to be set up for the sole purpose of “ political campaign , ” but the app also states that its goal is to “ allow users to express themselves freely as long as it doesn ’ t offend others.
” This may be a new development for Tinder , but it ’ s an old challenge for other platforms .
Twitter has arguably been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young Thais to spread their message via tweets and hashtags due to its virality , despite distrust and evidence that the platform is collaborating with the authorities to reveal user identities and help facilitate arrests .
Twitter has allowed the Thai government to request the censorship of “ culturally sensitive ” content back when it introduced a censorship initiative specific to selected countries in 2012 .
Similarly , Thai activists have been utilizing Facebook ’ s private group feature .
This placed the platform at odds with the Thai government when the authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with over 1 million members , be taken down .
After conceding victory to the authorities by banning the group and geoblocking other dissenting content , Facebook announced that it would legally challenge the request .
A media statement by the company said : “ Requests like this are severe , contravene international human rights law , and have a chilling effect on people ’ s ability to express themselves.
” While this is the first time formal legal action is being pursued between the government and a global social media company @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to block sensitive content over the years and often succeeded .
A recent report , co-written by one of us , by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute highlights how the Chinese video-streaming app TikTok has also not been immune to Thailand ’ s strict internet restrictions .
The report includes a collection of hashtags related to the Thai royal establishment that are restricted globally on the platform .
For instance , hashtags such as # IWon ’ tGraduateWithTheMonarchy and # WhyDoWeNeedAKing in Thai are widely used to promote the cause of protest but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media platforms wield significant power to shape political discussion , not only in Thailand but across the globe .
As political turning points like the Thai protests take place , these platforms are powerful instruments to influence social processes and should be accountable for protecting the rights of their users .
The public is increasingly wary of these tech giants ’ hypocrisies and inconsistencies with content moderation , as they often struggle to contain harmful content or hate speech but are quick to act under governmental pressures .
Censorship has not deterred protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breaking their silence on the government—and on the monarchy , a line that was uncrossable until very recently .
However many social media platforms it might draft into repression , the Thai establishment is facing a national legitimacy crisis that will not be easy to overcome .

Thailand’s rising pro-democracy movement has seen hundreds of thousands of protestors take to the streets in fierce opposition to the military government and the royal establishment this year. A key part of the movement’s unprecedented growth is the popularity of social media in the country, where about 75 percent of people are active social media users . But platforms like Twitter and Facebook are subject to increasing pressure by the government and authorities, posing a threat to a young movement that heavily relies on digital activism to spread and thrive. Perhaps the most surprising targets are dating apps such as Tinder, where government power is intruding into even relatively private online spaces.
Thailand’s rising pro-democracy movement has seen hundreds of thousands of protestors take to the streets in fierce opposition to the military government and the royal establishment this year. A key part of the movement’s unprecedented growth is the popularity of social media in the country, where about 75 percent of people are active social media users. But platforms like Twitter and Facebook are subject to increasing pressure by the government and authorities, posing a threat to a young movement that heavily relies on digital activism to spread and thrive. Perhaps the most surprising targets are dating apps such as Tinder, where government power is intruding into even relatively private online spaces.
The recent wave of protests has three core demands: the dissolution of the parliament, ending the intimidation of citizens, and a new constitution. Some protesters have issued a more controversial set of 10 demands for reforming the monarchy and its highly patriarchal structures. But the silencing of dissenting voices is a long-lasting tradition in Thailand. Social media and other forms of digital communications are strictly monitored by police, military, security agencies and private ultra-royalist groups. In a number of cases, publishing content online that “causes public unrest” or “threatens national security” has led to public harassment, arbitrary detention, and even enforced disappearances.
The current military regime, which took power in the 2014 coup under Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, has increasingly enforced its strict cybersecurity, sedition, and lèse-majesté laws. Offenses recently added include posting a satirical comment of the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s dog, sharing a BBC profile of King Maha Vajiralongkorn on Facebook, and producing an anti-government rap music video that reached nearly 100 million views on YouTube. Last month, the Thai government attempted to block more than 2,200 websites and social media accounts ahead of pro-democracy protests in one weekend alone.
Some of these platforms have implemented stricter moderation regimes to comply with the Thai government, while others have risked the legal consequences of challenging such restrictions. Despite the threats, protestors are utilizing every means possible to promote their pro-democracy message—including Tinder.
Recently, several Thais claimed their Tinder profiles were restricted or suspended after sharing pro-democracy content. Tinder profiles are publicly accessible, and some young Thais have been using them to spread the cause by leaving messages such as “no royalists here” and “freedom for Thailand” on their bios. One user revealed that they were banned by Tinder after sharing a link to the movement’s 10 pro-democracy demands. Another said an image containing a QR code linked to a constitutional amendment petition was censored for violating the dating app’s terms of service. The examples are many, but Tinder has yet to provide an official statement on its actions. According to Tinder’s community guidelines, profiles may be removed if they are found to be set up for the sole purpose of “political campaign,” but the app also states that its goal is to “allow users to express themselves freely as long as it doesn’t offend others.”
This may be a new development for Tinder, but it’s an old challenge for other platforms. Twitter has arguably been the most popular social media platform for young Thais to spread their message via tweets and hashtags due to its virality, despite distrust and evidence that the platform is collaborating with the authorities to reveal user identities and help facilitate arrests. Twitter has allowed the Thai government to request the censorship of “culturally sensitive” content back when it introduced a censorship initiative specific to selected countries in 2012.
Similarly, Thai activists have been utilizing Facebook’s private group feature. This placed the platform at odds with the Thai government when the authorities requested that the anti-establishment Royalist Marketplace group, with over 1 million members, be taken down. After conceding victory to the authorities by banning the group and geoblocking other dissenting content, Facebook announced that it would legally challenge the request. A media statement by the company said: “Requests like this are severe, contravene international human rights law, and have a chilling effect on people’s ability to express themselves.” While this is the first time formal legal action is being pursued between the government and a global social media company, Thai authorities have repeatedly pressured Facebook to block sensitive content over the years and often succeeded.
A recent report, co-written by one of us, by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute highlights how the Chinese video-streaming app TikTok has also not been immune to Thailand’s strict internet restrictions. The report includes a collection of hashtags related to the Thai royal establishment that are restricted globally on the platform. For instance, hashtags such as #IWon’tGraduateWithTheMonarchy and #WhyDoWeNeedAKing in Thai are widely used to promote the cause of protest but have been censored on TikTok.
Social media platforms wield significant power to shape political discussion, not only in Thailand but across the globe. As political turning points like the Thai protests take place, these platforms are powerful instruments to influence social processes and should be accountable for protecting the rights of their users. The public is increasingly wary of these tech giants’ hypocrisies and inconsistencies with content moderation, as they often struggle to contain harmful content or hate speech but are quick to act under governmental pressures.
Censorship has not deterred protesters in Thailand from risking their livelihoods and breaking their silence on the government—and on the monarchy, a line that was uncrossable until very recently. However many social media platforms it might draft into repression, the Thai establishment is facing a national legitimacy crisis that will not be easy to overcome.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--The End of the Age of Insurgency

The End of the Age of Insurgency

The End of the Age of Insurgency This week marks 20 years since the outbreak of the Second Intifada .
The years that followed witnessed bus and café bombings perpetrated by organizations wrapped in the banners of insurgent political Islam , most importantly Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad ( PIJ ) .
Their tactics—including suicide bombings and the deliberate targeting of civilians—were borrowed from an earlier generation of Islamists , the Shiite jihadis of the Lebanese group Hezbollah .
The history of the past 20 years marks the rise of the revolutionary political idea of insurgent political Islam—but also its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , bottom-up Islamism was the most vital political ideology in the Middle East , capturing the energy that was once invested in pan-Arab nationalism in an earlier era .
Islamism ’ s ongoing eclipse is no less stark than the similar decline of its predecessor ideology .
The Second Intifada was the first eruption of political Islam in its insurgent form against a Western democracy ( Sunni Islamism had already risen against and been defeated by the Syrian and Algerian regimes in the 1980s and ‘ 90s , respectively . )
It felt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become a harbinger .
One year later , as Israel was still in the middle of its assault of suicide bombings , al Qaeda destroyed the twin towers in New York .
That attack—together with subsequent ones in Madrid , London , and Paris—ushered in a global focus on the issue of insurgent political Islam .
From 2010 to 2014 , Islamist popular mobilization and insurgency arrived in mass form in the heartland of the Arab Islamic world itself .
This was evident in the rapid takeover of the Syrian rebellion by Sunni @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s brief triumph in Egypt , and reaching its purest , most unalloyed expression in the shape of the Islamic State ’ s self-declared caliphate .
This marked the high point of the Arab world ’ s insurgent Islamism—and also the start of its downfall .
The Muslim Brotherhood ’ s long-awaited period of rule proved a brief interlude .
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s powerful allies , Iran and Russia , held back the Islamist-dominated revolt in Syria .
The Islamic State provoked a massive reaction against itself and initiated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Look around the Arabic-speaking world today .
Where does one find an insurgency led from below—a jihad , a popular revolt—of the kind premiered by Hamas and PIJ during the Second Intifada and then witnessed on a vastly larger scale by the Syrian Sunni Arab rebellion and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq , the Islamist-dominated insurgency against former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi , and the mass civil revolts in Egypt and Tunisia ?
Nowhere .
There is certainly disorder .
The end result of the past 10 years of political chaos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swaths of the Arabic-speaking world are smoking ruins .
Today , across that ruin , with its semi- or nonfunctioning governments in Libya , Yemen , and across the single space still officially referred to as Iraq , Syria , and Lebanon , what one finds is not popular insurgency , but rather the machinations of states and their obedient clients .
The main legacy of Islamist insurgency ’ s tearing asunder of the Arab world , paradoxically , is the terminal weakening of a number of Arab states , and their penetration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-Arab powers .
These powers—Iran , Turkey , Russia , and the United States—make use of the remnant organizations of the insurgents as contractors and cannon fodder for their own designs .
Political Islam , meanwhile , has itself entered a new phase .
No longer an insurgent banner , it is now a decoration used by powerful states as part of their justification of themselves .
Today , it is borne along by Turkey and Iran , and this is its main remaining relevance .
But in both these cases , political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of imperial revanchism as the main justifying idea of the regimes .
This is largely a top-down affair , with insurgents remustered as military contractors .
The former Sunni Islamist rebels of northern Syria , for example , are now trucked and flown to Libya and Azerbaijan by the Turkish state and Adnan Tanriverdi ’ s SADAT company .
The various militias that Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps raises—such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Zeinabiyoun Brigade—labor in return for tiny salaries and residency rights to the Shiite refugees who make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you of anything , it should .
It is a phase that both Arab nationalism and Soviet-style communism also passed through before they finally dissolved .
Long after its existence as a revolutionary idea , Arab nationalism became the empty excuse offered by a series of Arab police states for their existence and their repression .
And long after the days when it inspired millions , Soviet-style communism remained as the justifying ideology of a number of harsh and airless dictatorships in Europe , Asia , and Africa .
Political Islam has now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Which means that as an idea , it hardly matters anymore .
The states have returned .
The Middle East is entering a phase of great-power competition .
The recent deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates was an important event in this process of alliance crystallization .
Three power blocs are now set to compete in the Persian Gulf , the Mediterranean , and across the semi-governed spaces of the Arabic-speaking world .
Two of these—those led by Iran and Turkey—present political Islam in its post-insurgent phase .
The third , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egypt , and the UAE , constitutes the camp of the reaction against insurgent political Islam , which defeated it .
So we are , it appears , at the end or in the closing stages of a trajectory .
The trajectory is that of an idea , which came , rose , and was conquered , and the legacy of which is a broken region and two decades of insurgency and civil war .
We didn ’ t know what was coming then , in the summer of 2000 , in Jerusalem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end of the bright hopes of the 1990s and the thing that was going to replace them .
We know now .
As to what will follow , there will be winners and losers .
Iran and Turkey will continue to present themselves as representatives of Islamic authenticity and purity .
There will be few buyers .
One of the characteristics of ideologies in their senile phase , when they become part of the language that regimes use to justify themselves , is that no one is really convinced by them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and certainly no one else .
The game to come is great-power competition , directed by ruling elites from above .
Among the emergent generation , meanwhile , there appears to be a very great cynicism , a perhaps healthy indifference toward all such narratives , and a search mainly for self-advancement .
Israel , like the other areas targeted for destruction by insurgent political Islam over the past 20 years , has come through this period .
Meanwhile , the idea that first erupted into real consequence for the Arab world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment seemed about to bestride the world , has gone down to defeat .
In 2020 , 20 years since the outbreak of the Second Intifada , the age of Islamist insurgency in the Middle East has passed .

This week marks 20 years since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The years that followed witnessed bus and café bombings perpetrated by organizations wrapped in the banners of insurgent political Islam, most importantly Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Their tactics—including suicide bombings and the deliberate targeting of civilians—were borrowed from an earlier generation of Islamists, the Shiite jihadis of the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
This week marks 20 years since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The years that followed witnessed bus and café bombings perpetrated by organizations wrapped in the banners of insurgent political Islam, most importantly Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Their tactics—including suicide bombings and the deliberate targeting of civilians—were borrowed from an earlier generation of Islamists, the Shiite jihadis of the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
The history of the past 20 years marks the rise of the revolutionary political idea of insurgent political Islam—but also its sudden decline. For a distinct period, bottom-up Islamism was the most vital political ideology in the Middle East, capturing the energy that was once invested in pan-Arab nationalism in an earlier era. Islamism’s ongoing eclipse is no less stark than the similar decline of its predecessor ideology.
The Second Intifada was the first eruption of political Islam in its insurgent form against a Western democracy (Sunni Islamism had already risen against and been defeated by the Syrian and Algerian regimes in the 1980s and ‘90s, respectively.) It felt unfamiliar at first, but would quickly become a harbinger. One year later, as Israel was still in the middle of its assault of suicide bombings, al Qaeda destroyed the twin towers in New York. That attack—together with subsequent ones in Madrid, London, and Paris—ushered in a global focus on the issue of insurgent political Islam.
From 2010 to 2014, Islamist popular mobilization and insurgency arrived in mass form in the heartland of the Arab Islamic world itself. This was evident in the rapid takeover of the Syrian rebellion by Sunni Islamist militias, in the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief triumph in Egypt, and reaching its purest, most unalloyed expression in the shape of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate. This marked the high point of the Arab world’s insurgent Islamism—and also the start of its downfall. The Muslim Brotherhood’s long-awaited period of rule proved a brief interlude. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s powerful allies, Iran and Russia, held back the Islamist-dominated revolt in Syria. The Islamic State provoked a massive reaction against itself and initiated the decline of its underlying ideology.
Look around the Arabic-speaking world today. Where does one find an insurgency led from below—a jihad, a popular revolt—of the kind premiered by Hamas and PIJ during the Second Intifada and then witnessed on a vastly larger scale by the Syrian Sunni Arab rebellion and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Islamist-dominated insurgency against former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the mass civil revolts in Egypt and Tunisia? Nowhere.
There is certainly disorder. The end result of the past 10 years of political chaos triggered by Islamist insurgencies is that large swaths of the Arabic-speaking world are smoking ruins. Today, across that ruin, with its semi- or nonfunctioning governments in Libya, Yemen, and across the single space still officially referred to as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, what one finds is not popular insurgency, but rather the machinations of states and their obedient clients.
The main legacy of Islamist insurgency’s tearing asunder of the Arab world, paradoxically, is the terminal weakening of a number of Arab states, and their penetration by a variety of regional and global non-Arab powers. These powers—Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States—make use of the remnant organizations of the insurgents as contractors and cannon fodder for their own designs.
Political Islam, meanwhile, has itself entered a new phase. No longer an insurgent banner, it is now a decoration used by powerful states as part of their justification of themselves. Today, it is borne along by Turkey and Iran, and this is its main remaining relevance.
But in both these cases, political Islam is mixed up with a kind of imperial revanchism as the main justifying idea of the regimes. This is largely a top-down affair, with insurgents remustered as military contractors. The former Sunni Islamist rebels of northern Syria, for example, are now trucked and flown to Libya and Azerbaijan by the Turkish state and Adnan Tanriverdi’s SADAT company. The various militias that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps raises—such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Zeinabiyoun Brigade—labor in return for tiny salaries and residency rights to the Shiite refugees who make up the ranks.
If this reminds you of anything, it should. It is a phase that both Arab nationalism and Soviet-style communism also passed through before they finally dissolved. Long after its existence as a revolutionary idea, Arab nationalism became the empty excuse offered by a series of Arab police states for their existence and their repression. And long after the days when it inspired millions, Soviet-style communism remained as the justifying ideology of a number of harsh and airless dictatorships in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Political Islam has now entered this phase of its existence. Which means that as an idea, it hardly matters anymore. The states have returned. The Middle East is entering a phase of great-power competition. The recent deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates was an important event in this process of alliance crystallization.
Three power blocs are now set to compete in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and across the semi-governed spaces of the Arabic-speaking world. Two of these—those led by Iran and Turkey—present political Islam in its post-insurgent phase. The third, that of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, constitutes the camp of the reaction against insurgent political Islam, which defeated it.
So we are, it appears, at the end or in the closing stages of a trajectory. The trajectory is that of an idea, which came, rose, and was conquered, and the legacy of which is a broken region and two decades of insurgency and civil war. We didn’t know what was coming then, in the summer of 2000, in Jerusalem, in the curious interim months between the end of the bright hopes of the 1990s and the thing that was going to replace them. We know now.
As to what will follow, there will be winners and losers. Iran and Turkey will continue to present themselves as representatives of Islamic authenticity and purity. There will be few buyers. One of the characteristics of ideologies in their senile phase, when they become part of the language that regimes use to justify themselves, is that no one is really convinced by them. Not even the people who serve them, and certainly no one else. The game to come is great-power competition, directed by ruling elites from above. Among the emergent generation, meanwhile, there appears to be a very great cynicism, a perhaps healthy indifference toward all such narratives, and a search mainly for self-advancement.
Israel, like the other areas targeted for destruction by insurgent political Islam over the past 20 years, has come through this period. Meanwhile, the idea that first erupted into real consequence for the Arab world in Jerusalem, and which for a moment seemed about to bestride the world, has gone down to defeat. In 2020, 20 years since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the age of Islamist insurgency in the Middle East has passed.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--The Death of Human Rights in India?

The Death of Human Rights in India?

The Death of Human Rights in India ?
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) government appear intent on squelching any independent scrutiny of India ’ s human rights problems .
Last week , the government froze the assets of the human rights organization Amnesty International , claiming that the organization was in violation of Indian law .
Its stated reasons aside , there is more than ample evidence that the government was irritated by Amnesty ’ s unfavorable reports on recent riots in New Delhi , India ’ s human rights record in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of recent legislation that could adversely affect Muslims .
Images of Amnesty International closing its Indian offices may be shocking , but this is hardly the first time an Indian administration , faced with similar criticisms , reacted with hostility .
For example , at the height of the Kashmir insurgency in 1990 , Narasimha Rao , then prime minister , was surely irritated by criticism of the Indian security forces ’ harsh counterinsurgency tactics .
Still , his actual efforts to limit the work of foreign human rights organizations in India was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with repeated allegations of rampant human rights violations in Kashmir , his government created the National Human Rights Commission ( NHRC ) to examine the charges .
Initially dismissed as a public relations move , over time , the NHRC became more autonomous and powerful .
As he is faced with criticisms of his own , it is hard to imagine Modi setting up such a watchdog .
Instead , he ’ s decided to bully Amnesty International .
After New Delhi froze all its bank assets , the organization chose to suspend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fifth time it felt compelled to discontinue its operations in the country .
The last time , before now , was in 2009 , when its applications to be allowed to accept funds from abroad were repeatedly denied and it faced budget shortfalls .
The global human rights organization has again come under pressure from the current government .
In October 2018 , one of India ’ s national anti-corruption organizations , the Enforcement Directorate , accused Amnesty of violating the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act and seized some of its bank accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed its offices in Bengaluru and laid off some staff .
Later , in 2019 , India ’ s Income Tax Department sent a letter to the organization accusing it of tax irregularities .
Amnesty called all this a “ pattern of harassment ” related to its role highlighting widespread human rights abuses in the country .
Amnesty International has not been the government ’ s only target .
Rather , New Delhi appears to be in the midst of an orchestrated campaign to undermine any independent scrutiny of the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2015 , the government named the Ford Foundation , a major American philanthropic organization , on its national security watch list and placed it under the jurisdiction of India ’ s Ministry of Home Affairs .
The foundation , which had operated in India since 1952 , has a storied history , including catalyzing India ’ s agricultural Green Revolution in the 1970s .
New Delhi ’ s message was clear : The Ford Foundation ’ s work in certain areas was unwelcome .
It is widely believed that the government was particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fund a well-known human rights lawyer and activist , Teesta Setalvad , and her work representing the victims of a pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat when Modi was chief minister of the state .
Following the government ’ s actions , the Ford Foundation , which had disbursed more than $ 500 million in the country since the early 1950s , decided to freeze its spending .
The harassment and intimidation of critical nonprofits have two critical implications for India ’ s democracy .
First , such behavior obviously threatens the exercise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This , in itself , is deeply disturbing .
Second , it can also undermine the legitimacy of government institutions charged with law enforcement and anti-corruption , because they are being asked to act in completely partisan and dubious ways to hound nongovernmental organizations .
For now , the Modi government ’ s intolerance of foreign institutions that question it is growing .
Given the significant asymmetry of power between the NGOs and the government in almost every instance , the latter has prevailed .
Unless a groundswell of opposition emerges from India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s little hope that Modi ’ s human rights record will improve .
That ’ s especially true given that the Indian judiciary , long known for its independence , is increasingly submissive to Modi , too .
If there is one small sign of hope , it is that the NHRC has issued a formal note to the home ministry asking it to clarify its grounds for freezing the financial assets of Amnesty International .
Whether its elicits a meaningful response is doubtful .
At best , if it persists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government on notice that even a quasi-governmental body finds its actions questionable .
And so , the Modi government may still continue to use its expansive and largely unfettered executive powers to shoot any messenger who dares bring it unwelcome news .

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government appear intent on squelching any independent scrutiny of India’s human rights problems. Last week, the government froze the assets of the human rights organization Amnesty International, claiming that the organization was in violation of Indian law. Its stated reasons aside, there is more than ample evidence that the government was irritated by Amnesty’s unfavorable reports on recent riots in New Delhi, India’s human rights record in Jammu and Kashmir, and the passage of recent legislation that could adversely affect Muslims.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government appear intent on squelching any independent scrutiny of India’s human rights problems. Last week, the government froze the assets of the human rights organization Amnesty International, claiming that the organization was in violation of Indian law. Its stated reasons aside, there is more than ample evidence that the government was irritated by Amnesty’s unfavorable reports on recent riots in New Delhi, India’s human rights record in Jammu and Kashmir, and the passage of recent legislation that could adversely affect Muslims.
Images of Amnesty International closing its Indian offices may be shocking, but this is hardly the first time an Indian administration, faced with similar criticisms, reacted with hostility. For example, at the height of the Kashmir insurgency in 1990, Narasimha Rao, then prime minister, was surely irritated by criticism of the Indian security forces’ harsh counterinsurgency tactics. Still, his actual efforts to limit the work of foreign human rights organizations in India was minimal. On the contrary, stung with repeated allegations of rampant human rights violations in Kashmir, his government created the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to examine the charges. Initially dismissed as a public relations move, over time, the NHRC became more autonomous and powerful.
As he is faced with criticisms of his own, it is hard to imagine Modi setting up such a watchdog. Instead, he’s decided to bully Amnesty International. After New Delhi froze all its bank assets, the organization chose to suspend its activities in India. This was the fifth time it felt compelled to discontinue its operations in the country. The last time, before now, was in 2009, when its applications to be allowed to accept funds from abroad were repeatedly denied and it faced budget shortfalls.
The global human rights organization has again come under pressure from the current government. In October 2018, one of India’s national anti-corruption organizations, the Enforcement Directorate, accused Amnesty of violating the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act and seized some of its bank accounts. Faced with this action, Amnesty closed its offices in Bengaluru and laid off some staff. Later, in 2019, India’s Income Tax Department sent a letter to the organization accusing it of tax irregularities. Amnesty called all this a “pattern of harassment” related to its role highlighting widespread human rights abuses in the country.
Amnesty International has not been the government’s only target. Rather, New Delhi appears to be in the midst of an orchestrated campaign to undermine any independent scrutiny of the country’s human rights record. Earlier, in 2015, the government named the Ford Foundation, a major American philanthropic organization, on its national security watch list and placed it under the jurisdiction of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs. The foundation, which had operated in India since 1952, has a storied history, including catalyzing India’s agricultural Green Revolution in the 1970s. New Delhi’s message was clear: The Ford Foundation’s work in certain areas was unwelcome. It is widely believed that the government was particularly incensed with the foundation’s decision to fund a well-known human rights lawyer and activist, Teesta Setalvad, and her work representing the victims of a pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat when Modi was chief minister of the state. Following the government’s actions, the Ford Foundation, which had disbursed more than $500 million in the country since the early 1950s, decided to freeze its spending.
The harassment and intimidation of critical nonprofits have two critical implications for India’s democracy. First, such behavior obviously threatens the exercise of civil liberties and personal rights. This, in itself, is deeply disturbing. Second, it can also undermine the legitimacy of government institutions charged with law enforcement and anti-corruption, because they are being asked to act in completely partisan and dubious ways to hound nongovernmental organizations.
For now, the Modi government’s intolerance of foreign institutions that question it is growing.
Given the significant asymmetry of power between the NGOs and the government in almost every instance, the latter has prevailed. Unless a groundswell of opposition emerges from India’s increasingly beleaguered civil society, there’s little hope that Modi’s human rights record will improve. That’s especially true given that the Indian judiciary, long known for its independence, is increasingly submissive to Modi, too.
If there is one small sign of hope, it is that the NHRC has issued a formal note to the home ministry asking it to clarify its grounds for freezing the financial assets of Amnesty International. Whether its elicits a meaningful response is doubtful. At best, if it persists with its inquiries it could put the government on notice that even a quasi-governmental body finds its actions questionable. And so, the Modi government may still continue to use its expansive and largely unfettered executive powers to shoot any messenger who dares bring it unwelcome news.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Beijing Is Winning the Clean Energy Race

At the end of September , Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his country ’ s intention to peak its emissions by 2030 and be carbon neutral before 2060 .
To meet this goal , China will have to expand its domestic market for clean energy technologies , many of which it produces .
China is also hoping to spur other countries to be more aggressive in lowering emissions—calling for a “ Green Revolution ” —and these countries could also be a market for Chinese technologies .
Thanks to initiatives like these , China is for now winning the global race @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will allow a new low-carbon world .
Europe , which has made its own commitment to become climate neutral by 2050 , is not far behind .
Given its robust high-tech sector and wealth of private investment , the United States is well positioned to compete , but it risks falling behind .
For now , it is still resting on the energy boom that came with the shale oil revolution and relying on its traditional approach to energy innovation .
This shortsightedness will hurt the country economically and geopolitically .
To avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a clear strategy for leading in new energy markets and technologies .
China has emerged as the lead supplier of this transition .
In 2018 , Chinese companies made up over a third of the world ’ s manufacturers of wind turbines .
In 2019 , the country built over 70 percent of the world ’ s solar photovoltaics .
In electric vehicles , China ’ s command is even greater : It holds almost three-fourths of the world ’ s manufacturing capacity for lithium ion battery cells , and it controls even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final assembly .
Of the three big green energy technologies taking off around the world , then , two are largely made in China with a good portion of the third made there as well .
Europe is also eyeing this growing market .
European countries rely more on solar and wind than most other countries in the world , and European manufacturers are prominent in wind energy .
The European Union has already unveiled a battery strategy to create a competitive manufacturing value chain in Europe for sustainable battery technologies , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as not just an environmental strategy but as an industrial strategy as well .
Beyond decarbonizing the continent ’ s energy system , the Green Deal looks toward developing the industries necessary to do so , with a special focus on hydrogen , which is one of Europe ’ s big bets and an area where it hopes to lead .
The implications of this picture should be obvious , at least when it comes to China .
China will get good jobs and become the partner of choice for any country that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is unlikely to care as much as about how materials are sourced or whether their extraction enriches local politicians in shady deals .
The country will also exert control over supply chains , possibly tampering with them when politically convenient .
In turn , it will be harder for the United States to lead if it does not build any of the nuts and bolts that the new world needs .
In energy , U.S. R & D spending is still above average versus other advanced economies but only barely : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Energy Agency ( IEA ) reports spending relative to GDP , the United States ranked 10th in 2018 .
( The IEA figures include deployment , so this ranking constitutes research , development , and deployment . )
China already spends more , in absolute dollars , than the United States .
In areas where the United States leads technologically—namely health care and defense—such spending is much greater : Federal R & D for health care is roughly 1 percent of total health expenditures , four times greater than the equivalent number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requires more money .
There ’ s also a problem with the targeting of U.S. spending .
The country has a deep aversion toward “ picking winners , ” at least in theory ( and usually when the winners are in someone else ’ s district ) .
Avoiding heavy-handed government direction can be wise , but it can also lead to paralysis .
We can already visualize what a low-carbon future looks like : It is more efficient and electrified , it relies on certain technologies that will provide storage and energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , freight , shipping , aviation—and it involves removing carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere .
Promoting the development of the technology needed to meet this future does not mean going all in on a few particular companies ; a large country can afford to place multiple big bets even if they do not pay off ( just as it is doing in the race to create a vaccine for COVID-19 ) .
The United States ’ current innovation system is often geared to avoiding failure rather than supercharging success .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Innovation alone , though , will not be enough—it needs to be paired with deployment and manufacturing .
In 2009 , the United States had twice as much wind capacity as China and five times as much solar capacity .
By 2019 , China had taken the lead and deployed twice as much wind and three times as much solar as the Unites States .
In electric vehicles , the reversal has been faster : The United States had five times as many electric vehicles as China in 2013 , but now China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , courtesy of generous state support .
These trends reverberate into manufacturing : In the late 1990s , for instance , the United States had a 30 percent market share in solar photovoltaics manufacturing .
Now it has just 1 percent .
The toolkit for encouraging deployment is relatively straightforward—it is just a matter of choosing the level of ambition required .
At one extreme are nudges : getting consumers to shift from one appliance to another , prompting them to cut individual energy use , and so on .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : support for purchases of electric vehicles or to retrofit a house , incentives to procure a certain amount of renewable energy or to build cars that meet a certain mileage standard , and so on .
And on the other extreme are policies where the state takes a central role in creating a market—electrifying the region like the Tennessee Valley Authority did after the Great Depression or building highways that boost automobile use .
This is largely a political challenge , not a policy or a technical one .
Deployment , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
From a climate perspective , a solar panel is a solar panel no matter where it was produced .
But from an economic and national security perspective , manufacturing matters .
This is not about fighting China .
Rather , it means caring about where things are built and asking tough questions about why companies tend to go overseas to do manufacturing .
It means building supply chains across the world and ensuring that the United States is embedded in them .
And it means a commitment to making things again , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For an administration supposedly committed to not picking winners , this is not an approach that favors all energy sources equally .
Looser regulations undermine the fuels and technologies that the administration seeks to support .
Oil , natural gas , and coal will compete in a world with tighter environmental restrictions on their production and use .
To not prepare traditional energy companies for that future puts them at a disadvantage worldwide .
In some ways , the situation the United States has put itself in is understandable .
For decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ big hydrocarbon producer would yield lasting economic and geopolitical advantage .
Now that U.S. oil and gas production has risen to record levels , it is hard to look beyond the short term and into a future where the commanding heights of the energy system may lay elsewhere .
But that future is coming soon , and other major countries are vying to become leaders in the technologies that will define that future .
The United States need not abandon fossil fuels , of course , nor assume that they will disappear anytime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look into the future , not just the past , and articulate a strategy to invent , manufacture , and deploy what the world will need over the next two decades .
China and Europe certainly are .

At the end of September, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his country’s intention to peak its emissions by 2030 and be carbon neutral before 2060. To meet this goal, China will have to expand its domestic market for clean energy technologies, many of which it produces. China is also hoping to spur other countries to be more aggressive in lowering emissions—calling for a “Green Revolution”—and these countries could also be a market for Chinese technologies.
At the end of September, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his country’s intention to peak its emissions by 2030 and be carbon neutral before 2060. To meet this goal, China will have to expand its domestic market for clean energy technologies, many of which it produces. China is also hoping to spur other countries to be more aggressive in lowering emissions—calling for a “Green Revolution”—and these countries could also be a market for Chinese technologies.
Thanks to initiatives like these, China is for now winning the global race to invent and manufacture the technologies that will allow a new low-carbon world. Europe, which has made its own commitment to become climate neutral by 2050, is not far behind.
Given its robust high-tech sector and wealth of private investment, the United States is well positioned to compete, but it risks falling behind. For now, it is still resting on the energy boom that came with the shale oil revolution and relying on its traditional approach to energy innovation. This shortsightedness will hurt the country economically and geopolitically. To avoid the pain, the United States needs a clear strategy for leading in new energy markets and technologies.
The world’s energy system is changing rapidly. The last decade has seen exponential growth in the use of wind and solar for electricity generation and in the deployment of electric vehicles. Some of the milestones of this transition are well known: in 2019, consumption from renewable energy sources surpassed coal use in the United States for the first time in more than 130 years. In the United Kingdom and Spain, coal-fired power generation is almost phased out, while renewable energy sources have surpassed nonrenewable ones in Germany’s power consumption. This transition is not yet universal, but it is happening quickly and in an ever increasing number of places. Only when compared with the immense challenge of dealing with climate change does this transition look slow.
China has emerged as the lead supplier of this transition. In 2018, Chinese companies made up over a third of the world’s manufacturers of wind turbines. In 2019, the country built over 70 percent of the world’s solar photovoltaics. In electric vehicles, China’s command is even greater: It holds almost three-fourths of the world’s manufacturing capacity for lithium ion battery cells, and it controls even more of the supply chain before the final assembly. Of the three big green energy technologies taking off around the world, then, two are largely made in China with a good portion of the third made there as well.
Europe is also eyeing this growing market. European countries rely more on solar and wind than most other countries in the world, and European manufacturers are prominent in wind energy. The European Union has already unveiled a battery strategy to create a competitive manufacturing value chain in Europe for sustainable battery technologies, and its European Green Deal is explicitly seen as not just an environmental strategy but as an industrial strategy as well. Beyond decarbonizing the continent’s energy system, the Green Deal looks toward developing the industries necessary to do so, with a special focus on hydrogen, which is one of Europe’s big bets and an area where it hopes to lead.
The implications of this picture should be obvious, at least when it comes to China. China will get good jobs and become the partner of choice for any country that wants to lower its greenhouse gas emissions. It is unlikely to care as much as about how materials are sourced or whether their extraction enriches local politicians in shady deals. The country will also exert control over supply chains, possibly tampering with them when politically convenient. In turn, it will be harder for the United States to lead if it does not build any of the nuts and bolts that the new world needs.
For the United States, the green tech challenge is often framed as a need for more innovation—and it certainly is that. As a share of GDP, the United States spends less on research and development than competitors like Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The private sector, of course, has stepped in. But the shift of R&D money from government to individual companies also means a change in focus (narrower) and ambition (shorter term).
In energy, U.S. R&D spending is still above average versus other advanced economies but only barely: Among the 27 countries for which the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports spending relative to GDP, the United States ranked 10th in 2018. (The IEA figures include deployment, so this ranking constitutes research, development, and deployment.) China already spends more, in absolute dollars, than the United States. In areas where the United States leads technologically—namely health care and defense—such spending is much greater: Federal R&D for health care is roughly 1 percent of total health expenditures, four times greater than the equivalent number in energy. A commitment to excellence requires more money.
There’s also a problem with the targeting of U.S. spending. The country has a deep aversion toward “picking winners,” at least in theory (and usually when the winners are in someone else’s district). Avoiding heavy-handed government direction can be wise, but it can also lead to paralysis. We can already visualize what a low-carbon future looks like: It is more efficient and electrified, it relies on certain technologies that will provide storage and energy for sectors that are hard to electrify—industry, freight, shipping, aviation—and it involves removing carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere. Promoting the development of the technology needed to meet this future does not mean going all in on a few particular companies; a large country can afford to place multiple big bets even if they do not pay off (just as it is doing in the race to create a vaccine for COVID-19). The United States’ current innovation system is often geared to avoiding failure rather than supercharging success. It needs to flip that focus.
Innovation alone, though, will not be enough—it needs to be paired with deployment and manufacturing. In 2009, the United States had twice as much wind capacity as China and five times as much solar capacity. By 2019, China had taken the lead and deployed twice as much wind and three times as much solar as the Unites States. In electric vehicles, the reversal has been faster: The United States had five times as many electric vehicles as China in 2013, but now China has twice as many as the United States, courtesy of generous state support. These trends reverberate into manufacturing: In the late 1990s, for instance, the United States had a 30 percent market share in solar photovoltaics manufacturing. Now it has just 1 percent.
The toolkit for encouraging deployment is relatively straightforward—it is just a matter of choosing the level of ambition required. At one extreme are nudges: getting consumers to shift from one appliance to another, prompting them to cut individual energy use, and so on. In the middle are tax credits and firm mandates: support for purchases of electric vehicles or to retrofit a house, incentives to procure a certain amount of renewable energy or to build cars that meet a certain mileage standard, and so on. And on the other extreme are policies where the state takes a central role in creating a market—electrifying the region like the Tennessee Valley Authority did after the Great Depression or building highways that boost automobile use. This is largely a political challenge, not a policy or a technical one.
Deployment, however, cannot be divorced from manufacturing. From a climate perspective, a solar panel is a solar panel no matter where it was produced. But from an economic and national security perspective, manufacturing matters. This is not about fighting China. Rather, it means caring about where things are built and asking tough questions about why companies tend to go overseas to do manufacturing. It means building supply chains across the world and ensuring that the United States is embedded in them. And it means a commitment to making things again, rather than merely consuming or financing them.
Doubling down on R&D and encouraging deployment of green tech will mark a reversal from the United States’ policies of the past few years. The country has always struggled to operationalize a green energy strategy. But the Trump administration has gone further in doubling down on fossil fuels and prioritizing hydrocarbon exports, infrastructure, and consumption. When an oil or gas pipeline falters, the administration has plenty to say—but it lets permitting for an offshore wind project languish. It is trying to relax auto standards rather than working with Detroit to make the car of the future, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has made it harder to deploy renewable energy by casting doubt on a state’s right to support new industries.
For an administration supposedly committed to not picking winners, this is not an approach that favors all energy sources equally. Looser regulations undermine the fuels and technologies that the administration seeks to support. Oil, natural gas, and coal will compete in a world with tighter environmental restrictions on their production and use. To not prepare traditional energy companies for that future puts them at a disadvantage worldwide.
In some ways, the situation the United States has put itself in is understandable. For decades, Washington has assumed that being a big hydrocarbon producer would yield lasting economic and geopolitical advantage. Now that U.S. oil and gas production has risen to record levels, it is hard to look beyond the short term and into a future where the commanding heights of the energy system may lay elsewhere. But that future is coming soon, and other major countries are vying to become leaders in the technologies that will define that future. The United States need not abandon fossil fuels, of course, nor assume that they will disappear anytime soon.
But it does need to look into the future, not just the past, and articulate a strategy to invent, manufacture, and deploy what the world will need over the next two decades. China and Europe certainly are.