foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Resurgent Taliban Bode Ill for Afghan Peace

JALALABAD , Afghanistan—At a mud-walled front-line checkpoint just yards away from Taliban territory , Anar Gul keeps a wary watch .
Developments in the past three weeks deeply trouble the long-bearded , AK-47-wielding local police commander .
In just the past month , the Taliban set up three new camps for their fighters just outside Sham Sharpoor village in Afghanistan ’ s eastern Nangarhar province , Gul reported , with another four camps farther away , in Tatang village .
“ They have been expanding quickly since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement , and that ’ s partly because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Gul , 47 , explained .
“ Joining the Taliban has become a growing trend—and it ’ s not only civilians but also local police officers or soldiers whom I ’ ve seen switch sides.
” “ Joining the Taliban has become a growing trend—and it ’ s not only civilians but also local police officers or soldiers whom I ’ ve seen switch sides.
” As government funds run dry , Afghanistan ’ s local police are due to be dissolved in the coming months .
Gul ’ s not sure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ front-line outpost .
“ At that point I wouldn ’ t be surprised if more police officers join the militants , ” he said , explaining that it might be the safer option for some , though reiterating that he wouldn ’ t follow suit .
More than four months after the United States and the Taliban signed their historic deal to chart a path toward peace , or at least end one chapter of the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan , unfulfilled promises are piling up , dampening the prospects of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban are growing in number—and audacity .
Afghan National Security Council spokesperson Javid Faisal said the third week of June had been the deadliest since the start of the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 , with 422 Taliban attacks in 32 provinces that left 291 Afghan security forces dead and another 550 wounded .
Casualty figures might have been that high before , but the government rarely acknowledged them all , and actual casualties were often underreported .
If the Taliban once again appear to be on the rise , that ’ s because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a durable peace deal between militants and the government .
The lack of money to pay police is leaving many Afghans with little choice but to consider joining the Taliban ; the fact that the militants now seem to have the upper hand gives them even more appeal as Afghans jockey for their own security in the future .
“ What kind of choices are people making when the paychecks stop flowing ?
” said Laurel Miller , the Asia director at the International Crisis Group .
“ There have been long-standing concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems that the tide is turning in the Taliban ’ s favor , you could see people get on board.
” Qari Kama , a 42-year-old drug and weapons smuggler in the Durbaba district of Nangarhar province , right on the Pakistani border and an hour ’ s drive east of Jalalabad , has done just that .
“ It ’ s not that I particularly like the group , but what choice do I have ?
” he asked .
Kama sought permission to join from the Taliban ’ s shadow district @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no documents were signed , Kama had officially joined the group .
“ I am now a Talib.
” He shrugged , sitting on the carpeted floor of his uncle ’ s house in Jalalabad .
“ Support for the militants is growing because many people think they will gain power , ” Kama added , explaining that dozens of his acquaintances had followed his lead .
“ Many of us fear a violent future and don ’ t believe that intra-Afghan talks will bring peace .
If the Taliban becomes more powerful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safe side , that ’ s all.
” Another aspect of the U.S.-Taliban agreement also seems to be falling by the wayside .
When the United States and the Taliban signed a deal on Feb. 29 , the militants promised to cut all ties with al Qaeda , the transnational terrorist group that carried out the 9/11 attacks while under Taliban protection .
“ It ’ s not that I particularly like the group , but what choice do I have ?
I am now a Talib.
” But the United Nations concluded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two groups remain close and are rooted in “ friendship , a history of shared struggle , ideological sympathy and intermarriage.
” A U.S. Defense Department report last week similarly concluded that al Qaeda continues to work with “ low-level Taliban members.
” Hussain Barzani , a Kabul-based researcher , said the two groups cooperate on the local level , such as in Nangarhar .
“ There are some economic ties and collaboration on technical issues , such as fighter training , ” he explained .
Additionally , even if cutting ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , many local fighters simply don ’ t accept the order , he said .
Qari Ahmad , 34 , a former Taliban and al Qaeda fighter trainer , who agreed to speak to Foreign Policy under a pseudonym , said the two groups are like “ a brother and a sister , ” though he says ties are usually most evident at the local fighter level .
That has become more apparent as the Afghan government has begun releasing thousands of Taliban prisoners as part of the peace process .
“ Of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ahmad said .
“ I recently learned that al Qaeda even supported some of the released [ Taliban ] prisoners who previously had al Qaeda links with small financial incentives , ” he alleged , though this hasn ’ t been further confirmed .
The Taliban dismissed the U.N. report as an effort to derail the already troubled peace process , saying in a statement on their website that it is “ designed to undermine and destroy the agreement reached between the Islamic Emirate [ Taliban ] and the United States , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ending the war , lasting peace and security in Afghanistan.
” Even one apparent success in Afghanistan ’ s counterterrorism campaign now seems illusory .
Last November , Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared that the Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan had been defeated .
While many fighters did surrender , others have dispersed into cities like Kabul and Jalalabad , where they are said to be rebuilding .
Ahmad said the Islamic State , which previously had been strongest in rural areas , is now “ growing their urban network.
” All that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace talks even dimmer .
Even as violence intensifies , and the Taliban grow stronger in places like Nangarhar , negotiations between militants and the government , slated to begin in March , have yet to do so in earnest .
One hurdle has been securing agreement on the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners from government custody in exchange for 1,000 government soldiers held by the militants , a process that is still ongoing .
Taliban prisoners sign a declaration promising to not return to the battlefield but aren ’ t further tracked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the table is a long way from securing any kind of lasting peace or stability .
Zalmay Khalilzad , the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation , last month urged Afghanistan ’ s top two leaders—Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah , the head of the High Council for National Reconciliation—to begin talks without delay .
Deborah Lyons , the U.N. special representative for Afghanistan , now says talks will start this month in Qatar .
But just getting the two sides to the table is a long way from securing any kind of lasting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should not be deterred , and push forward to take the steps necessary to reach intra-Afghan negotiations , where a comprehensive ceasefire & a political settlement can be negotiated as quickly as possible , ” Khalilzad wrote on Twitter .
But there is a long road from the start of negotiations to peace in Afghanistan , the Crisis Group ’ s Miller said .
“ It ’ s the biggest opportunity in a generation to try to bring the conflict to a close , and at the same time , it will lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ground because the stakes have changed , ” she said .
Back in Sham Sharpoor village , Gul spends his afternoon sipping green tea in the shade of a few leafy trees with colleagues , worrying more about his country ’ s future than his own .
“ We ’ ve seen more than 40 years of war , and still we worry , ” Gul said .
“ I don ’ t know what the future holds , but one thing I know : Peace is still far .
I hope that @ @ @ @ @ @ @

JALALABAD, Afghanistan—At a mud-walled front-line checkpoint just yards away from Taliban territory, Anar Gul keeps a wary watch. Developments in the past three weeks deeply trouble the long-bearded, AK-47-wielding local police commander.
JALALABAD, Afghanistan—At a mud-walled front-line checkpoint just yards away from Taliban territory, Anar Gul keeps a wary watch. Developments in the past three weeks deeply trouble the long-bearded, AK-47-wielding local police commander.
In just the past month, the Taliban set up three new camps for their fighters just outside Sham Sharpoor village in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province, Gul reported, with another four camps farther away, in Tatang village.
“They have been expanding quickly since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and that’s partly because there are barely any airstrikes now,” Gul, 47, explained. “Joining the Taliban has become a growing trend—and it’s not only civilians but also local police officers or soldiers whom I’ve seen switch sides.”
“Joining the Taliban has become a growing trend—and it’s not only civilians but also local police officers or soldiers whom I’ve seen switch sides.”
As government funds run dry, Afghanistan’s local police are due to be dissolved in the coming months. Gul’s not sure who will be left to defend his front-line outpost. “At that point I wouldn’t be surprised if more police officers join the militants,” he said, explaining that it might be the safer option for some, though reiterating that he wouldn’t follow suit.
More than four months after the United States and the Taliban signed their historic deal to chart a path toward peace, or at least end one chapter of the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan, unfulfilled promises are piling up, dampening the prospects of a peaceful or stable Afghan future.
The Taliban are growing in number—and audacity. Afghan National Security Council spokesperson Javid Faisal said the third week of June had been the deadliest since the start of the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, with 422 Taliban attacks in 32 provinces that left 291 Afghan security forces dead and another 550 wounded. Casualty figures might have been that high before, but the government rarely acknowledged them all, and actual casualties were often underreported.
Anar Gul (far right) sits with other police officers at his front-line checkpoint in Nangarhar’s Surkhrod district in Afghanistan on June 24.
If the Taliban once again appear to be on the rise, that’s because in many ways they are—despite hopes of a durable peace deal between militants and the government. The lack of money to pay police is leaving many Afghans with little choice but to consider joining the Taliban; the fact that the militants now seem to have the upper hand gives them even more appeal as Afghans jockey for their own security in the future.
“What kind of choices are people making when the paychecks stop flowing?” said Laurel Miller, the Asia director at the International Crisis Group. “There have been long-standing concerns based on historical experience that once it seems that the tide is turning in the Taliban’s favor, you could see people get on board.”
Qari Kama, a 42-year-old drug and weapons smuggler in the Durbaba district of Nangarhar province, right on the Pakistani border and an hour’s drive east of Jalalabad, has done just that. “It’s not that I particularly like the group, but what choice do I have?” he asked. Kama sought permission to join from the Taliban’s shadow district governor; by early March, though no documents were signed, Kama had officially joined the group. “I am now a Talib.” He shrugged, sitting on the carpeted floor of his uncle’s house in Jalalabad.
“Support for the militants is growing because many people think they will gain power,” Kama added, explaining that dozens of his acquaintances had followed his lead. “Many of us fear a violent future and don’t believe that intra-Afghan talks will bring peace. If the Taliban becomes more powerful, we want to be on the safe side, that’s all.”
Another aspect of the U.S.-Taliban agreement also seems to be falling by the wayside. When the United States and the Taliban signed a deal on Feb. 29, the militants promised to cut all ties with al Qaeda, the transnational terrorist group that carried out the 9/11 attacks while under Taliban protection.
“It’s not that I particularly like the group, but what choice do I have? I am now a Talib.”
But the United Nations concluded in a recent report that relations between the two groups remain close and are rooted in “friendship, a history of shared struggle, ideological sympathy and intermarriage.” A U.S. Defense Department report last week similarly concluded that al Qaeda continues to work with “low-level Taliban members.”
Hussain Barzani, a Kabul-based researcher, said the two groups cooperate on the local level, such as in Nangarhar. “There are some economic ties and collaboration on technical issues, such as fighter training,” he explained. Additionally, even if cutting ties has strictly been decided by Taliban leadership, many local fighters simply don’t accept the order, he said.
Qari Ahmad, 34, a former Taliban and al Qaeda fighter trainer, who agreed to speak to Foreign Policy under a pseudonym, said the two groups are like “a brother and a sister,” though he says ties are usually most evident at the local fighter level. That has become more apparent as the Afghan government has begun releasing thousands of Taliban prisoners as part of the peace process.
“Of course they have good relations,” Ahmad said. “I recently learned that al Qaeda even supported some of the released [Taliban] prisoners who previously had al Qaeda links with small financial incentives,” he alleged, though this hasn’t been further confirmed.
Anar Gul stands at his outpost in Nangarhar’s Surkhrod district in Afghanistan on June 24.
The Taliban dismissed the U.N. report as an effort to derail the already troubled peace process, saying in a statement on their website that it is “designed to undermine and destroy the agreement reached between the Islamic Emirate [Taliban] and the United States, which is an important instrument and tool for ending the war, lasting peace and security in Afghanistan.”
Even one apparent success in Afghanistan’s counterterrorism campaign now seems illusory. Last November, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared that the Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan had been defeated. While many fighters did surrender, others have dispersed into cities like Kabul and Jalalabad, where they are said to be rebuilding. Ahmad said the Islamic State, which previously had been strongest in rural areas, is now “growing their urban network.”
All that makes the prospects for the still sputtering peace talks even dimmer. Even as violence intensifies, and the Taliban grow stronger in places like Nangarhar, negotiations between militants and the government, slated to begin in March, have yet to do so in earnest. One hurdle has been securing agreement on the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners from government custody in exchange for 1,000 government soldiers held by the militants, a process that is still ongoing. Taliban prisoners sign a declaration promising to not return to the battlefield but aren’t further tracked.
Just getting the two sides to the table is a long way from securing any kind of lasting peace or stability.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, last month urged Afghanistan’s top two leaders—Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the head of the High Council for National Reconciliation—to begin talks without delay. Deborah Lyons, the U.N. special representative for Afghanistan, now says talks will start this month in Qatar. But just getting the two sides to the table is a long way from securing any kind of lasting peace or stability.
“Both sides should not be deterred, and push forward to take the steps necessary to reach intra-Afghan negotiations, where a comprehensive ceasefire & a political settlement can be negotiated as quickly as possible,” Khalilzad wrote on Twitter.
But there is a long road from the start of negotiations to peace in Afghanistan, the Crisis Group’s Miller said.
“It’s the biggest opportunity in a generation to try to bring the conflict to a close, and at the same time, it will lead to an even messier situation on the ground because the stakes have changed,” she said.
Back in Sham Sharpoor village, Gul spends his afternoon sipping green tea in the shade of a few leafy trees with colleagues, worrying more about his country’s future than his own.
“We’ve seen more than 40 years of war, and still we worry,” Gul said. “I don’t know what the future holds, but one thing I know: Peace is still far. I hope that one day it will come.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Bolsonaro’s Failed Diplomacy Leaves Brazil Isolated as Pandemic Rages

The way Brazil ’ s leadership is dealing with the coronavirus pandemic is puzzling .
The president and his most loyal followers remain in denial , even as the president himself may have fallen victim to the virus , questioning the need for social distancing and stay-at-home policies in the face of what they call “ a little flu ” —even after more than 65,000 deaths and over 1.6 million infections in Brazil alone .
Two ministers of health have already been fired for going against the president .
Disastrous as President Jair Bolsonaro ’ s handling of the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas is no brighter .
One of the most important structural weaknesses of the Bolsonaro government undoubtedly lies in its foreign policy , where a once-respected diplomatic corps has been spoiled by the president ’ s ideological fixations .
The fundamental axes on which the decision-making strategy for foreign policy should be organized must always include three central pillars : pragmatism , realism , and the national interest—especially for a country like Brazil .
Brazil has a large network of intercontinental diplomatic relationships that have to be meticulously balanced .
Brazil of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , but its status as a member of the BRICS group alongside Russia , India , China , and South Africa means that it should also carefully navigate its connections with U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia rather than simply antagonizing them .
Instead of strengthening these pillars , Brazilian foreign policy is chasing ghosts in Bolsonaro ’ s fight against climate science and imagined threats of cultural Marxism and globalism .
This misrepresentation of reality explains the lack of direction and purpose behind the thick fog of old-fashioned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Bolsonaro ’ s foreign-policy stance holds that Chinese communism is an existential threat to Brazil , even though China is the country ’ s largest trade partner , buying nearly 30 percent of all Brazilian exports .
High-ranked members of his cabinet have insulted the governments of European powers such as France and Germany , claiming that the Europeans know nothing about climate change .
The lack of strategy and the declining image of Brazil around the world are undeniable .
Brazil has placed itself in a dangerous diplomatic isolation due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world realistically and to manage the country ’ s interests pragmatically .
Brazil has experienced multiple recent foreign-policy failures in Latin America , such as the unsuccessful attempts to get rid of the Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro and the sidelining of Brazil ’ s influence in Bolivia with the breakdown of Evo Morales ’ s government .
Bolsonaro ’ s administration adopted from the start a hostile diplomatic stance toward the new government of Alberto Fernández in Argentina , Brazil ’ s most important geopolitical partner in South America , for no apparent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to Fernández ’ s left-leaning tendencies .
It took two decades to eliminate mutual distrust in the relationship between Argentina and Brazil .
Bolsonaro is throwing it away in months .
Over the course of multiple administrations since Brazilian President José Sarney and Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín in the late 1980s , the two countries put an end to the frictions between them .
A particularly important turning point came when both countries agreed to put an end to their mutual military nuclear programs in order to deescalate the tension between them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important steps in Brazilian diplomacy since World War II .
As a direct result of this improving relationship , Mercosur , South America ’ s trade bloc , was born .
The relations between Brasília and Buenos Aires since then have followed a path of constant improvement in institutional cooperation as well as a number of other important areas .
Both countries were able to overcome past rivalry and build a true strategic partnership , turning the page of the pervasive historic mistrust and moving toward perennial cooperation .
Reducing divergence and overcoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders of both countries and has served to advance their mutual interests .
In the realm of regional cooperation , Brazil under Bolsonaro gave up leadership and has now been sidelined by others such as Chile and Colombia .
Even right-wing governments are now keeping a safe distance from Brazil ’ s diplomatic disruptions .
Most Latin American states perceive Bolsonaro ’ s government as an unreliable actor in the region .
Brazil has become toxic—and the pandemic failure isn ’ t helping .
Paraguay and Uruguay have both closed their borders with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the coronavirus into their territory .
Brazil ’ s playing field has become tiny .
In South America , Brazil is adrift .
Argentina has already detached itself from negotiations within Mercosur , which had grown to become the region ’ s preeminent customs union and trade bloc—completely ignoring Brasília .
Brazil burned bridges with European powers by antagonizing the governments of France and Germany with personal attacks and reckless quarrelling , limiting its ability to negotiate .
To irritate China , Brazil began a reckless partnership with Narendra Modi ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States on a vast array of issues , and embarked on anti-Chinese diatribes , even though the country ’ s commercial dependence on China is practically absolute .
Brazil has renounced its autonomy when it comes to foreign policy , narrowing the number of ways that it could interpret its national interest .
The strategic result is the inclusion of Brazil as an obedient follower in a new , empowered Western world led by U.S. President Donald Trump .
In order to ensure that Bolsonaro ’ s new foreign policy could gain approval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an automatic alignment with a sense of pro-Western cultural superiority and relentless praise of Trump became central tenets of the president ’ s strategy .
It is an alignment more serious than even the preferential relationship established under the governments of Eurico Gaspar Dutra ( 1946-1951 ) and Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco ( 1964-1967 ) .
The historical circumstances of the Cold War had an immense effect on the strategic choices of Dutra and Castelo Branco .
But the subservient role that Brazil now adopts in relation to Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same factors .
Concessions made to Washington in the past were strategically calculated and did not violate the national interest nor the constitution—unlike Bolsonaro ’ s threats that he could unilaterally endorse a war against Venezuela if he so desired or his unasked-for invitation for the United States to establish a military base on Brazilian territory .
Nor did the decision-making of the past privilege one country above all others .
The Brazilian Constitution is clear : Brazil must respect the sovereignty of other countries , avoid interference in the internal affairs of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of crises in all possible cases .
In ordinary times , extreme right-wing populism could become outlandish in its rhetoric , but its policies would be tolerated to a certain extent in the name of democratic legitimacy .
But these are no ordinary times .
Under a state of calamity and in the midst of a public health emergency , democratic institutions and the system of checks and balances have become even more important as a guarantee against populist irrationality .
If populism is allowed to go unchecked , the whole country will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , these checks and balances have worked relatively well to moderate economic and health policies , but there is still work to be done on the international front .
Congressional oversight and judicial control of constitutionality are also badly needed to avoid a completely ideologically driven Brazilian foreign policy that will cause even more damage to the country ’ s international standing .
Brazil has nothing to gain from being Trump ’ s lapdog , harassing the U.S. Democratic Party and its presidential nominee or antagonizing China just to show that it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
I ’ ll state a truism , but one highly appropriate in these circumstances : Brazil needs to pursue its own national interest abroad in keeping with certain long-standing traditions .
Among them are a commitment to international law , peaceful settlement of disputes , and multilateralism .
Anything other than that can only distance the country from its goals , including obtaining secure access to the strategic items needed to tackle the pandemic .

The way Brazil’s leadership is dealing with the coronavirus pandemic is puzzling. The president and his most loyal followers remain in denial, even as the president himself may have fallen victim to the virus, questioning the need for social distancing and stay-at-home policies in the face of what they call “a little flu”—even after more than 65,000 deaths and over 1.6 million infections in Brazil alone. Two ministers of health have already been fired for going against the president.
The way Brazil’s leadership is dealing with the coronavirus pandemic is puzzling. The president and his most loyal followers remain in denial, even as the president himself may have fallen victim to the virus, questioning the need for social distancing and stay-at-home policies in the face of what they call “a little flu”—even after more than 65,000 deaths and over 1.6 million infections in Brazil alone. Two ministers of health have already been fired for going against the president.
Disastrous as President Jair Bolsonaro’s handling of the coronavirus has been, his record in other areas is no brighter. One of the most important structural weaknesses of the Bolsonaro government undoubtedly lies in its foreign policy, where a once-respected diplomatic corps has been spoiled by the president’s ideological fixations.
The fundamental axes on which the decision-making strategy for foreign policy should be organized must always include three central pillars: pragmatism, realism, and the national interest—especially for a country like Brazil. Brazil has a large network of intercontinental diplomatic relationships that have to be meticulously balanced. Brazil of course wants to maintain a good standing with the United States, but its status as a member of the BRICS group alongside Russia, India, China, and South Africa means that it should also carefully navigate its connections with U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia rather than simply antagonizing them. Instead of strengthening these pillars, Brazilian foreign policy is chasing ghosts in Bolsonaro’s fight against climate science and imagined threats of cultural Marxism and globalism. This misrepresentation of reality explains the lack of direction and purpose behind the thick fog of old-fashioned and anachronistic anti-communist language. For example, Bolsonaro’s foreign-policy stance holds that Chinese communism is an existential threat to Brazil, even though China is the country’s largest trade partner, buying nearly 30 percent of all Brazilian exports. High-ranked members of his cabinet have insulted the governments of European powers such as France and Germany, claiming that the Europeans know nothing about climate change.
The lack of strategy and the declining image of Brazil around the world are undeniable. Brazil has placed itself in a dangerous diplomatic isolation due to Bolsonaro’s inability to understand the world realistically and to manage the country’s interests pragmatically. Brazil has experienced multiple recent foreign-policy failures in Latin America, such as the unsuccessful attempts to get rid of the Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro and the sidelining of Brazil’s influence in Bolivia with the breakdown of Evo Morales’s government. Bolsonaro’s administration adopted from the start a hostile diplomatic stance toward the new government of Alberto Fernández in Argentina, Brazil’s most important geopolitical partner in South America, for no apparent reason other than a capricious ideological antipathy due to Fernández’s left-leaning tendencies.
It took two decades to eliminate mutual distrust in the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. Bolsonaro is throwing it away in months. Over the course of multiple administrations since Brazilian President José Sarney and Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín in the late 1980s, the two countries put an end to the frictions between them. A particularly important turning point came when both countries agreed to put an end to their mutual military nuclear programs in order to deescalate the tension between them. It was one of the most important steps in Brazilian diplomacy since World War II.
As a direct result of this improving relationship, Mercosur, South America’s trade bloc, was born. The relations between Brasília and Buenos Aires since then have followed a path of constant improvement in institutional cooperation as well as a number of other important areas. Both countries were able to overcome past rivalry and build a true strategic partnership, turning the page of the pervasive historic mistrust and moving toward perennial cooperation. Reducing divergence and overcoming disagreements has been a winning strategy for leaders of both countries and has served to advance their mutual interests.
In the realm of regional cooperation, Brazil under Bolsonaro gave up leadership and has now been sidelined by others such as Chile and Colombia. Even right-wing governments are now keeping a safe distance from Brazil’s diplomatic disruptions. Most Latin American states perceive Bolsonaro’s government as an unreliable actor in the region. Brazil has become toxic—and the pandemic failure isn’t helping. Paraguay and Uruguay have both closed their borders with Brazil in order to restrain the spread of the coronavirus into their territory.
Brazil’s playing field has become tiny. In South America, Brazil is adrift. Argentina has already detached itself from negotiations within Mercosur, which had grown to become the region’s preeminent customs union and trade bloc—completely ignoring Brasília. Brazil burned bridges with European powers by antagonizing the governments of France and Germany with personal attacks and reckless quarrelling, limiting its ability to negotiate. To irritate China, Brazil began a reckless partnership with Narendra Modi’s India, aligned itself with the United States on a vast array of issues, and embarked on anti-Chinese diatribes, even though the country’s commercial dependence on China is practically absolute.
Brazil has renounced its autonomy when it comes to foreign policy, narrowing the number of ways that it could interpret its national interest. The strategic result is the inclusion of Brazil as an obedient follower in a new, empowered Western world led by U.S. President Donald Trump. In order to ensure that Bolsonaro’s new foreign policy could gain approval from countries such as the United States, an automatic alignment with a sense of pro-Western cultural superiority and relentless praise of Trump became central tenets of the president’s strategy. It is an alignment more serious than even the preferential relationship established under the governments of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951) and Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964-1967).
The historical circumstances of the Cold War had an immense effect on the strategic choices of Dutra and Castelo Branco. But the subservient role that Brazil now adopts in relation to Trump’s United States does not stem from these same factors. Concessions made to Washington in the past were strategically calculated and did not violate the national interest nor the constitution—unlike Bolsonaro’s threats that he could unilaterally endorse a war against Venezuela if he so desired or his unasked-for invitation for the United States to establish a military base on Brazilian territory. Nor did the decision-making of the past privilege one country above all others. The Brazilian Constitution is clear: Brazil must respect the sovereignty of other countries, avoid interference in the internal affairs of others, and pursue the peaceful resolution of crises in all possible cases.
In ordinary times, extreme right-wing populism could become outlandish in its rhetoric, but its policies would be tolerated to a certain extent in the name of democratic legitimacy. But these are no ordinary times. Under a state of calamity and in the midst of a public health emergency, democratic institutions and the system of checks and balances have become even more important as a guarantee against populist irrationality. If populism is allowed to go unchecked, the whole country will certainly suffer the consequences. So far, these checks and balances have worked relatively well to moderate economic and health policies, but there is still work to be done on the international front.
Congressional oversight and judicial control of constitutionality are also badly needed to avoid a completely ideologically driven Brazilian foreign policy that will cause even more damage to the country’s international standing. Brazil has nothing to gain from being Trump’s lapdog, harassing the U.S. Democratic Party and its presidential nominee or antagonizing China just to show that it is part of a free world led by the United States. I’ll state a truism, but one highly appropriate in these circumstances: Brazil needs to pursue its own national interest abroad in keeping with certain long-standing traditions. Among them are a commitment to international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, and multilateralism. Anything other than that can only distance the country from its goals, including obtaining secure access to the strategic items needed to tackle the pandemic.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Egypt’s Social Media Discovered Its Coronavirus Crisis

Egypt originally seemed to have evaded a severe coronavirus outbreak .
After recording its first case in February , Egypt did not report a surge in infection of the sort experienced across the West .
The picture has drastically changed since then .
Even the likely deflated official statistics indicate the country has the second-highest number of COVID-19 cases in Africa and a high death rate .
The Egyptian government would prefer to remain in denial .
But ordinary Egyptians , speaking out on social media , have now forced it to own up to the growing crisis .
Whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state to cease manipulating its data remains to be seen .
The earliest instance of such data manipulation can be traced to March .
Although tourists tested positive upon returning from vacations at the ancient city of Luxor , the Egyptian government downplayed the scale of the local outbreak .
In one confirmed case , 45 tourists and crew members were found to be infected with COVID-19 on a Nile cruise ship .
In the United States alone , cases linked to Nile cruises were reported in Maryland and Virginia .
Egypt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , nevertheless insisted the situation was under control and tourism would remain open .
The health minister , Hala Zayed , warned Egyptians not to exaggerate the problem .
But despite the low official number of cases inside the country , alarm was spreading among Egyptians .
The government , after all , could not censor data that was emerging abroad—and made accessible via social media—about infections related to Egypt .
But the government soon redoubled its efforts to control the narrative at home .
Officials suppressed data , manipulated death reports , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of anyone contradicting state COVID-19 news , arrested critical doctors , and muzzled journalists .
Sometimes the government ’ s media manipulation efforts were so exaggerated as to be comical .
One anchor conducted a one-on-one interview with “ the coronavirus ” itself , speaking to a person dressed up in a green pinhead costume depicting the virus , apparently to put Egyptians at ease .
The presenter asked the “ virus ” what message it wanted to send to the Egyptian people .
The virus responded that the panic was all social-media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April , Magdy Badran , a member of the Egyptian Society of Pediatric Allergy and Immunology , said in a TV interview that the Americans and Europeans had sought advice from Egypt about how to defeat the virus as Egypt did .
“ America called and asked what we should do about corona , ” he said .
“ I told them to eat fava beans.
” On another show , a journalist on a pro-government channel suggested that spices used in India prevented infection .
While Egypt joined other countries in imposing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the state continued to report low figures .
Based on an analysis of flight records and traveler data , a Canadian study in March estimated that about 19,310 people were infected in Egypt .
The Egyptian government ’ s official account for that period of early March was that three people were infected .
The research was reported by the Guardian ’ s Egypt correspondent , who was then summoned by state apparatus and questioned for hours over what they believed was misinformation .
Egypt later forced the journalist to leave the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the country ’ s COVID-19 censorship .
Those critical of the country ’ s efforts to combat the virus , and lack of personal protective equipment , were labeled as Muslim Brotherhood members or accused of treason .
Others were threatened with losing their jobs .
The government went as far as arresting eight health care workers , including a 26-year-old pregnant woman , Alaa Shaaban Hamida , who had been treating a patient with COVID-19 symptoms in March .
A nurse used her phone to call a government hotline to report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on charges of “ membership in a terrorist group , ” “ spreading false news , ” and “ misusing social media.
” Authorities have also predictably labeled the pandemic a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy .
Although the state managed to censor some of its critics , its collapsing health care system is an undeniable problem .
Egyptian doctors and nurses have been dying at a rapid pace .
As hospitals began to run out of beds , swarms of Egyptians took to social media to seek help .
Videos were uploaded of hospital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of doctors available to help them .
Dead bodies were documented piling outside of hospitals because there was no one available to take them to a morgue .
Doctors reported being obliged to triage , deciding which patients would live and which would die without any treatment .
In a widely shared post , Mahmoud Antar said his brother , a professor at a medical college , died from COVID-19 but was given a death certificate stating that pneumonia was his cause of death .
As such reports of a growing COVID-19 crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official data in Egypt began to change .
Over the course of the past six weeks , the country ’ s somewhat stable curve saw an upward trend with a peak in cases reported in June .
Even with the limited testing available , by July 6 the most populous country in the Arab world had reported cases exceeding 75,000 and deaths exceeding 3,300 , placing in the Egypt among the top 10 countries with the highest mortality rate .
While the country ’ s official curve is likely an accurate depiction of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of cases and deaths the state is unwilling to publicly report remains in question .
On July 1 , in an unusual admission , Egypt ’ s higher-education and science minister , Khaled Abdel Ghaffar , admitted that numbers could be 10 times higher than official figures .
As the country begins to remove its lax lockdown rules , it will remain crucial to read Egypt ’ s state COVID-19 figures with some scrutiny .
( Perhaps hardest to assess is the scale of the problem in Egyptian prisons .
Despite concerns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infection , and despite cases arising among inmates , the government has shown little interest in addressing the problem . )
The state is already reporting overall cases are in decline , and Badran now says the virus is getting weaker and is losing its contagious characteristics—a claim disputed by other medical experts .
Egyptian citizens have been told to learn to coexist with the disease .
But as international travel picks up , this could be a burden soon born by the rest of the world too .
Indeed , on July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egyptian government resumed international flights into and out of the country , China ’ s aviation authority announced six passengers who arrived from Egypt had tested positive for COVID-19 .
The news spread quickly on Egyptian social media .

Egypt originally seemed to have evaded a severe coronavirus outbreak. After recording its first case in February, Egypt did not report a surge in infection of the sort experienced across the West. The picture has drastically changed since then. Even the likely deflated official statistics indicate the country has the second-highest number of COVID-19 cases in Africa and a high death rate.
Egypt originally seemed to have evaded a severe coronavirus outbreak. After recording its first case in February, Egypt did not report a surge in infection of the sort experienced across the West. The picture has drastically changed since then. Even the likely deflated official statistics indicate the country has the second-highest number of COVID-19 cases in Africa and a high death rate.
The Egyptian government would prefer to remain in denial. But ordinary Egyptians, speaking out on social media, have now forced it to own up to the growing crisis. Whether agitation on social media can also force the state to cease manipulating its data remains to be seen.
The earliest instance of such data manipulation can be traced to March. Although tourists tested positive upon returning from vacations at the ancient city of Luxor, the Egyptian government downplayed the scale of the local outbreak. In one confirmed case, 45 tourists and crew members were found to be infected with COVID-19 on a Nile cruise ship. In the United States alone, cases linked to Nile cruises were reported in Maryland and Virginia. Egypt’s tourism minister, Khaled el-Enany, nevertheless insisted the situation was under control and tourism would remain open. The health minister, Hala Zayed, warned Egyptians not to exaggerate the problem.
But despite the low official number of cases inside the country, alarm was spreading among Egyptians. The government, after all, could not censor data that was emerging abroad—and made accessible via social media—about infections related to Egypt. But the government soon redoubled its efforts to control the narrative at home. Officials suppressed data, manipulated death reports, expanded an emergency law to allow arrests of anyone contradicting state COVID-19 news, arrested critical doctors, and muzzled journalists.
Sometimes the government’s media manipulation efforts were so exaggerated as to be comical. One anchor conducted a one-on-one interview with “the coronavirus” itself, speaking to a person dressed up in a green pinhead costume depicting the virus, apparently to put Egyptians at ease. The presenter asked the “virus” what message it wanted to send to the Egyptian people. The virus responded that the panic was all social-media nonsense. In another instance, in April, Magdy Badran, a member of the Egyptian Society of Pediatric Allergy and Immunology, said in a TV interview that the Americans and Europeans had sought advice from Egypt about how to defeat the virus as Egypt did. “America called and asked what we should do about corona,” he said. “I told them to eat fava beans.” On another show, a journalist on a pro-government channel suggested that spices used in India prevented infection.
While Egypt joined other countries in imposing social restrictions to help halt the spread, the state continued to report low figures. Based on an analysis of flight records and traveler data, a Canadian study in March estimated that about 19,310 people were infected in Egypt. The Egyptian government’s official account for that period of early March was that three people were infected. The research was reported by the Guardian’s Egypt correspondent, who was then summoned by state apparatus and questioned for hours over what they believed was misinformation. Egypt later forced the journalist to leave the country.
Doctors have also fallen afoul of the country’s COVID-19 censorship. Those critical of the country’s efforts to combat the virus, and lack of personal protective equipment, were labeled as Muslim Brotherhood members or accused of treason. Others were threatened with losing their jobs. The government went as far as arresting eight health care workers, including a 26-year-old pregnant woman, Alaa Shaaban Hamida, who had been treating a patient with COVID-19 symptoms in March. A nurse used her phone to call a government hotline to report the case. Hamida was later arrested on charges of “membership in a terrorist group,” “spreading false news,” and “misusing social media.” Authorities have also predictably labeled the pandemic a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy.
Although the state managed to censor some of its critics, its collapsing health care system is an undeniable problem. Egyptian doctors and nurses have been dying at a rapid pace. As hospitals began to run out of beds, swarms of Egyptians took to social media to seek help. Videos were uploaded of hospital patients screaming in despair over the lack of doctors available to help them. Dead bodies were documented piling outside of hospitals because there was no one available to take them to a morgue. Doctors reported being obliged to triage, deciding which patients would live and which would die without any treatment. In a widely shared post, Mahmoud Antar said his brother, a professor at a medical college, died from COVID-19 but was given a death certificate stating that pneumonia was his cause of death.
As such reports of a growing COVID-19 crisis gained traction on social media, the official data in Egypt began to change. Over the course of the past six weeks, the country’s somewhat stable curve saw an upward trend with a peak in cases reported in June. Even with the limited testing available, by July 6 the most populous country in the Arab world had reported cases exceeding 75,000 and deaths exceeding 3,300, placing in the Egypt among the top 10 countries with the highest mortality rate.
While the country’s official curve is likely an accurate depiction of general trends in the country, the number of cases and deaths the state is unwilling to publicly report remains in question. On July 1, in an unusual admission, Egypt’s higher-education and science minister, Khaled Abdel Ghaffar, admitted that numbers could be 10 times higher than official figures.
As the country begins to remove its lax lockdown rules, it will remain crucial to read Egypt’s state COVID-19 figures with some scrutiny. (Perhaps hardest to assess is the scale of the problem in Egyptian prisons. Despite concerns of overcrowded prisons becoming breeding grounds for infection, and despite cases arising among inmates, the government has shown little interest in addressing the problem.) The state is already reporting overall cases are in decline, and Badran now says the virus is getting weaker and is losing its contagious characteristics—a claim disputed by other medical experts.
Egyptian citizens have been told to learn to coexist with the disease. But as international travel picks up, this could be a burden soon born by the rest of the world too. Indeed, on July 1, on the same day the Egyptian government resumed international flights into and out of the country, China’s aviation authority announced six passengers who arrived from Egypt had tested positive for COVID-19. The news spread quickly on Egyptian social media.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--The Dictator-Run Bank That Tells the Story of America’s Foreign Corruption

The Dictator-Run Bank That Tells the Story of America ’ s Foreign Corruption One bank , above all others , highlights the modern realities of transnational corruption and how authoritarian governments abroad can sink their tendrils into Western governments .
Overseen by autocratic oligarchs abroad , this bank used everything including shell companies , fake foundations , and anonymous real estate purchases to launder billions and billions of dollars .
And when Western investigators got wind of its financial fraud , this bank immediately began bankrolling white-shoe law firms and shady PR operators—even going so far as to fund leading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voices in at least one American political party , and even grow close to the American president himself .
The story is , in many respects , the perfect blueprint for modern kleptocracy—and how autocratic regimes abroad use strategic corruption and financial secrecy tools to swindle billions of dollars while also shifting U.S. policies to their own corrupt ends .
But there ’ s one thing : This bank no longer exists .
Instead , the story of this bank—the Bank of Credit and Commerce International , or BCCI—takes place decades ago , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1990s .
It ’ s a saga that has been largely forgotten .
That ’ s a shame , because in many ways the unprecedented graft and collapse of BCCI foretold precisely the kinds of transnational kleptocratic practices that would take root around the globe over the past decade—and how wide-open the United States remains when it comes to the infiltration of foreign dirty money .
In hindsight , it ’ s almost impossible to believe just how overlooked the BCCI affair now is .
The bank , headquartered in the United Arab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia , initially pitched itself as the leading bank for the so-called Third World .
It tried to position itself as a non-Western alternative for small-scale depositors across the postcolonial space , from sub-Saharan Africa to South Asia to Latin America .
And for a while , that scheme succeeded .
BCCI ended up operating in over 70 countries—including the United States , Switzerland , France , and the United Kingdom—and at one point boasted over $ 20 billion in assets ( or nearly $ 50 billion in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the mid-1980s , BCCI appeared well on its way to meeting its goal of becoming the world ’ s largest bank by the year 2000 .
And it wasn ’ t just the size of BCCI ’ s till .
Those running BCCI spun the bank as an institution interested more in achieving moral gains , rather than increasing its total assets .
( “ The spirit of BCCI is permeated by a moral dimension and this eases the burden of management , ” its founder once claimed . )
To that end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which it said would help “ relieve poverty and sickness ” in developing nations , and even created an award to mirror the Nobel Peace Prize , which it awarded to everyone from Nelson Mandela to former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt .
Unbeknownst to those small-scale depositors taking advantage of BCCI ’ s services , though , the bank was in reality little more than a Ponzi scheme for the higher-ups involved , who were simply pocketing the deposits while trying to recruit new customers .
By the time BCCI collapsed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , never accounted for .
As investigators later found , BCCI was the perfect money laundering vehicle for everyone from Panamanian drug kingpins to Pakistan ’ s dictatorial first family to brutal regimes across the Middle East .
Utilizing the kinds of kleptocratic tools still with us—anonymous shell companies , anonymous real estate purchases , and plenty more—the bank helped everyone from Panama ’ s Manuel Noriega to Iraq ’ s Saddam Hussein to the Philippines ’ Ferdinand Marcos move and stash their money abroad .
Indeed , foreign dictators couldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; at one point , according to one analysis , BCCI grew so close to Pakistani despot Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq that “ it is almost surprising that the dictator himself didn ’ t get a job with the bank.
” ( Zia ’ s son ended up getting a job as vice president with Bank of America , which was one of BCCI ’ s American partners . )
BCCI , of course , couldn ’ t keep its Ponzi scheme going forever .
So when rumors about financial malfeasance first began percolating in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a playbook that corrupt foreign outfits would employ for decades to come .
The firm employed a number of sleazy PR operators and supposedly white-shoe law firms in the United States to threaten any critical voices .
( One of the firms linked to the BCCI scandal , Skadden , Arps , Slate , Meagher & Flom , would later play a key role in former Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort ’ s corrupt schemes out of Ukraine , using many of the same tactics BCCI employed . )
It filed heavy-handed lawsuits @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.K.—where one investigative journalist , Anthony Mascarenhas , was beaten and stabbed during his reporting and had his investigative findings into BCCI stolen .
BCCI ’ s Western auditors ( most especially PwC , also known as PricewaterhouseCoopers ) also completely whiffed on discovering the gargantuan fraud right under their noses—or , in some cases , simply ignored it wholesale .
Most remarkably , BCCI and its affiliates managed to hire some of the most prominent politicos in Washington on their behalf .
Among those voices on the dole of the BCCI @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one of the doyens of the Democratic Party , who had worked closely with presidents from Harry S. Truman to Jimmy Carter .
BCCI ’ s affiliates had also helped bankroll presidential campaigns , such as Gary Hart ’ s presidential run .
Higher-ups at BCCI affiliates even grew unnervingly close to Carter .
All of these deep political connections helped stonewall Washington ’ s investigations into BCCI ’ s massive corruption .
Even when the Department of Justice finally began probing BCCI ’ s financial schemes , it hardly pushed far ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to BCCI , the lead Senate investigator said it was indicative of “ the power of BCCI to fix anything , ” adding that Washington ’ s response was a “ fucking outrage.
” Eventually , BCCI collapsed under the weight of its own fraud .
When it did , it was clear that it had committed “ the largest bank fraud in world financial history , ” as one American official said—enough to land the bank on the cover of Time magazine .
The lessons of BCCI ’ s collapse should have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beefed up regulatory oversight in the banking sector in the decade following—shell banks can no longer operate in the United States , for instance—the kleptocratic tools BCCI utilized are all still firmly in place .
U.S. states still produce hundreds of thousands of anonymous shell companies every year .
The United States still allows anonymous real estate purchases across almost all of the country .
And the lawyers and PR specialists and auditors are still free to work on behalf of any clients they ’ d like , without any legal requirement that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their clients ’ incomes stems from transnational money laundering operations .
Much of that , unfortunately , rises from one reality underpinning modern kleptocracy , as much as it underpinned BCCI ’ s machinations : greed .
While U.S. legislation helped clean up the banking sector in the aftermath of the BCCI affair , and while some of the main American political actors involved suffered significant reputational and financial damage , efforts at bringing broader transparency have been effectively gutted by assorted industrial lobbyists and the new politicos in their pockets .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Patriot Act took added anti-money laundering regulations to numerous industries highlighted in the BCCI affair , the Treasury department issued “ temporary ” exemptions from these new regulations for everything from real estate to private equity to escrow agents to luxury goods .
Thanks to lobbying efforts of those respective industries , these “ temporary ” exemptions are now nearly two decades old—and have only continued to attract inflows of dirty money from every corner , every regime , and every crooked outfit that wants in .
If anything , the story @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s ever been in the 30 years since the bank ’ s collapse .
The BCCI affair set the example for everything that came since in the world of modern kleptocracy , and that still corrupts the United States today .
From setting up anonymous shell companies to purchase American real estate to targeting American auditors that are willing to look the other way , from bilking billions via banking Ponzi schemes to even hiring prestigious law firms that provide everything from legal counsel to media relations to lobbying and political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create is still alive and well , all in the service of laundering foreign dirty money .
With things like “ authoritarian influence , ” which sees everything from disinformation campaigns to bounty-hunting orders to foreign payments to American politicians hidden behind webs of opaque transactions , or the questionable links between Donald Trump and Deutsche Bank—which has itself been connected to pro-Kremlin forces out of Moscow—still in the news , we overlook the lessons from BCCI ’ s implosion to our own peril .

Casey Michel and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira

One bank, above all others, highlights the modern realities of transnational corruption and how authoritarian governments abroad can sink their tendrils into Western governments. Overseen by autocratic oligarchs abroad, this bank used everything including shell companies, fake foundations, and anonymous real estate purchases to launder billions and billions of dollars. And when Western investigators got wind of its financial fraud, this bank immediately began bankrolling white-shoe law firms and shady PR operators—even going so far as to fund leading U.S. presidential campaigns, corrupt the leading voices in at least one American political party, and even grow close to the American president himself.
One bank, above all others, highlights the modern realities of transnational corruption and how authoritarian governments abroad can sink their tendrils into Western governments. Overseen by autocratic oligarchs abroad, this bank used everything including shell companies, fake foundations, and anonymous real estate purchases to launder billions and billions of dollars. And when Western investigators got wind of its financial fraud, this bank immediately began bankrolling white-shoe law firms and shady PR operators—even going so far as to fund leading U.S. presidential campaigns, corrupt the leading voices in at least one American political party, and even grow close to the American president himself.
The story is, in many respects, the perfect blueprint for modern kleptocracy—and how autocratic regimes abroad use strategic corruption and financial secrecy tools to swindle billions of dollars while also shifting U.S. policies to their own corrupt ends.
But there’s one thing: This bank no longer exists. Instead, the story of this bank—the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or BCCI—takes place decades ago, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
It’s a saga that has been largely forgotten. That’s a shame, because in many ways the unprecedented graft and collapse of BCCI foretold precisely the kinds of transnational kleptocratic practices that would take root around the globe over the past decade—and how wide-open the United States remains when it comes to the infiltration of foreign dirty money.
In hindsight, it’s almost impossible to believe just how overlooked the BCCI affair now is. The bank, headquartered in the United Arab Emirates and closely connected to ruling regimes in both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, initially pitched itself as the leading bank for the so-called Third World. It tried to position itself as a non-Western alternative for small-scale depositors across the postcolonial space, from sub-Saharan Africa to South Asia to Latin America.
And for a while, that scheme succeeded. BCCI ended up operating in over 70 countries—including the United States, Switzerland, France, and the United Kingdom—and at one point boasted over $20 billion in assets (or nearly $50 billion in today’s money). By the mid-1980s, BCCI appeared well on its way to meeting its goal of becoming the world’s largest bank by the year 2000.
And it wasn’t just the size of BCCI’s till. Those running BCCI spun the bank as an institution interested more in achieving moral gains, rather than increasing its total assets. (“The spirit of BCCI is permeated by a moral dimension and this eases the burden of management,” its founder once claimed.) To that end, BCCI bankrolled the Third World Foundation, which it said would help “relieve poverty and sickness” in developing nations, and even created an award to mirror the Nobel Peace Prize, which it awarded to everyone from Nelson Mandela to former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
Unbeknownst to those small-scale depositors taking advantage of BCCI’s services, though, the bank was in reality little more than a Ponzi scheme for the higher-ups involved, who were simply pocketing the deposits while trying to recruit new customers. By the time BCCI collapsed, nearly $10 billion had disappeared, never accounted for.
As investigators later found, BCCI was the perfect money laundering vehicle for everyone from Panamanian drug kingpins to Pakistan’s dictatorial first family to brutal regimes across the Middle East. Utilizing the kinds of kleptocratic tools still with us—anonymous shell companies, anonymous real estate purchases, and plenty more—the bank helped everyone from Panama’s Manuel Noriega to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos move and stash their money abroad. Indeed, foreign dictators couldn’t get enough of BCCI’s services; at one point, according to one analysis, BCCI grew so close to Pakistani despot Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq that “it is almost surprising that the dictator himself didn’t get a job with the bank.” (Zia’s son ended up getting a job as vice president with Bank of America, which was one of BCCI’s American partners.)
BCCI, of course, couldn’t keep its Ponzi scheme going forever. So when rumors about financial malfeasance first began percolating in the mid-1980s, the bank sketched out a playbook that corrupt foreign outfits would employ for decades to come.
The firm employed a number of sleazy PR operators and supposedly white-shoe law firms in the United States to threaten any critical voices. (One of the firms linked to the BCCI scandal, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, would later play a key role in former Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort’s corrupt schemes out of Ukraine, using many of the same tactics BCCI employed.) It filed heavy-handed lawsuits against any critical journalists, especially in the U.K.—where one investigative journalist, Anthony Mascarenhas, was beaten and stabbed during his reporting and had his investigative findings into BCCI stolen. BCCI’s Western auditors (most especially PwC, also known as PricewaterhouseCoopers) also completely whiffed on discovering the gargantuan fraud right under their noses—or, in some cases, simply ignored it wholesale.
Most remarkably, BCCI and its affiliates managed to hire some of the most prominent politicos in Washington on their behalf. Among those voices on the dole of the BCCI network was Clark Clifford, then considered one of the doyens of the Democratic Party, who had worked closely with presidents from Harry S. Truman to Jimmy Carter. BCCI’s affiliates had also helped bankroll presidential campaigns, such as Gary Hart’s presidential run. Higher-ups at BCCI affiliates even grew unnervingly close to Carter.
All of these deep political connections helped stonewall Washington’s investigations into BCCI’s massive corruption. Even when the Department of Justice finally began probing BCCI’s financial schemes, it hardly pushed far; when the department offered a sweetheart deal to BCCI, the lead Senate investigator said it was indicative of “the power of BCCI to fix anything,” adding that Washington’s response was a “fucking outrage.”
Eventually, BCCI collapsed under the weight of its own fraud. When it did, it was clear that it had committed “the largest bank fraud in world financial history,” as one American official said—enough to land the bank on the cover of Time magazine.
The lessons of BCCI’s collapse should have been clear. While the United States beefed up regulatory oversight in the banking sector in the decade following—shell banks can no longer operate in the United States, for instance—the kleptocratic tools BCCI utilized are all still firmly in place. U.S. states still produce hundreds of thousands of anonymous shell companies every year. The United States still allows anonymous real estate purchases across almost all of the country. And the lawyers and PR specialists and auditors are still free to work on behalf of any clients they’d like, without any legal requirement that they check whether or not the source of their clients’ incomes stems from transnational money laundering operations.
Much of that, unfortunately, rises from one reality underpinning modern kleptocracy, as much as it underpinned BCCI’s machinations: greed. While U.S. legislation helped clean up the banking sector in the aftermath of the BCCI affair, and while some of the main American political actors involved suffered significant reputational and financial damage, efforts at bringing broader transparency have been effectively gutted by assorted industrial lobbyists and the new politicos in their pockets. For instance, after the U.S.’s Patriot Act took added anti-money laundering regulations to numerous industries highlighted in the BCCI affair, the Treasury department issued “temporary” exemptions from these new regulations for everything from real estate to private equity to escrow agents to luxury goods. Thanks to lobbying efforts of those respective industries, these “temporary” exemptions are now nearly two decades old—and have only continued to attract inflows of dirty money from every corner, every regime, and every crooked outfit that wants in.
If anything, the story of BCCI is now more relevant than it’s ever been in the 30 years since the bank’s collapse. The BCCI affair set the example for everything that came since in the world of modern kleptocracy, and that still corrupts the United States today. From setting up anonymous shell companies to purchase American real estate to targeting American auditors that are willing to look the other way, from bilking billions via banking Ponzi schemes to even hiring prestigious law firms that provide everything from legal counsel to media relations to lobbying and political connections, the playbook that BCCI helped create is still alive and well, all in the service of laundering foreign dirty money. With things like “authoritarian influence,” which sees everything from disinformation campaigns to bounty-hunting orders to foreign payments to American politicians hidden behind webs of opaque transactions, or the questionable links between Donald Trump and Deutsche Bank—which has itself been connected to pro-Kremlin forces out of Moscow—still in the news, we overlook the lessons from BCCI’s implosion to our own peril.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--The Pandemic Should Kill Regime Change Forever

A few weeks ago , I tweeted the following : “ A country that can not convince its own citizens to wear masks to halt a pandemic has no business toppling foreign governments and trying to remake whole societies that it barely understands.
” It received more retweets and “ likes ” than I usually get , along with the usual amendments , endorsements , and snarky replies .
The logic of my tweet should be fairly obvious , but since there are still prominent people and organizations who think regime change is a ready solution to vexing foreign-policy challenges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argument in a bit more detail .
Let ’ s begin with the nation-building side of the equation .
Despite what you may have thought as the “ forever wars ” dragged on , the past 25 years have taught us quite a bit about why foreign-imposed regime change rarely works .
For starters , toppling a foreign government inevitably damages or destroys whatever political institutions existed previously ( which is the whole point of the intervention ) , which means there is no effective local capacity to keep order after the old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operation that removes a tyrant and his immediate henchmen but leaves lower-level officials in place would unravel lines of authority and patronage and thrust the country into uncertain territory .
By definition , regime change also creates winners and losers , and the latter ( normally those who held privileged positions in the old order ) are likely to be unhappy about their diminished status .
They are bound to resist their loss of power and wealth and are likely to take up arms to try to regain their former positions .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sectarian , or other divisions , some combination of fame , greed , or ambition encourage separate groups to begin jockeying for position and power .
Foreign powers and transnational terrorist organizations are quick to interfere in various ways , aided by the breakdown of existing institutions and the chaos that is likely to result .
In response , the original intervening power may have to occupy the country and use its own armed forces to keep order while the new government is being formed .
Unfortunately , a large foreign military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more violent resistance , which in turn requires the occupying power to send more troops to try to suppress it .
And because this often takes place in a country that is some distance away from the intervening power and that may lack sophisticated transportation systems , it is expensive to keep the occupying forces supplied and fed .
Lacking knowledge of local customs and values ( let alone a substantial number of officials who can even speak the local language ) , the would-be nation-builder is unlikely to pick the right leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions that will be legitimate in the eyes of the local population .
Its efforts to build local institutions and infrastructure to boost the economy inevitably fuel corruption and produce enormous unintended consequences .
The bottom line : Even in the best of circumstances , regime change and nation-building is an extraordinarily complicated act of social engineering .
In essence , the intervening power is trying to get millions of people whose backgrounds are different to alter their core beliefs and norms about politics and society , in order to get them to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ To succeed , foreign-imposed regime change requires efforts that are simultaneously massive yet subtle , conducted by knowledgeable and well-trained people .
It is likely to be expensive and take a long time , so it will also require sustained political support back home .
Plus a fair bit of luck .
Needless to say , these features were all lacking in the United States ’ recent misadventures .
Despite all the attention paid to counterinsurgency theory and to “ winning hearts and minds , ” U.S. efforts still relied overwhelmingly on kinetic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home , a bevy of right-wing cheerleaders and supportive think tanks kept insisting the U.S. could succeed if it just stayed the course .
We now know that insiders were never confident of success , but they kept their doubts from the public and kicked the can down the road .
The United States ’ unhappy record on regime change or nation-building is not unique .
In the period since nationalism spread around the globe , no great power has ever been very good at running an empire ( formal or informal ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics in distant foreign lands .
To repeat : The problem is that this sort of thing is really , really hard , even for a wealthy superpower .
Now consider the challenge of COVID-19 , and especially the seemingly pedestrian issue of getting people to wear masks in public .
Bear in mind that the masks do not weigh 20 pounds , are not painful to wear , do not transmit your location or other personal information to the government , George Soros , or Google , and do not cost a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. government is not trying to change the behavior of a foreign people ; it is operating on its own territory , with the people that it knows best .
Though some elements of pandemic response are challenging , the basic goals are pretty straightforward and well understood .
To contain the epidemic , you need to slow the rate of transmission in the population .
To do that you have to get people to practice social distancing , wear masks , and avoid other risky behaviors .
It helps to institute a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hot spots and isolate those infected from those that are healthy , and to take special precautions in places such as nursing homes .
And as we have seen , this requires shutting down those portions of the economy or society where distancing is impossible and the risk of transmission is high .
Although some of these measures are far-reaching and have profound short- to medium-term effects , none of these procedures require rewriting the U.S. Constitution , redrawing borders between the states , removing thousands of government officials from every branch of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or the status of women in society , or abandoning the basic political or social values of U.S. society .
In fact , the more successful the response , the less long-term political or social impact the pandemic is likely to have .
How do we know this ?
Because unlike foreign-imposed regime change and nation-building—which rarely succeeds no matter who does it—lots of different countries have done an impressive job of responding to COVID-19 .
I ’ m not talking just about relatively small nations such as New Zealand ; I ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Vietnam , Germany , Greece , and any number of others .
Compared with these countries , to be sure , much of the blame belongs squarely to U.S. President Donald Trump , whose head-in-the-sand belief that the virus would just disappear— “ like a miracle ” —delayed the U.S. response by at least a month and allowed the virus to spread far more widely .
Since then , the administration ’ s chaotic and inconsistent response—and especially Trump ’ s own refusal to wear a mask himself or to use his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things infinitely worse .
Even with a different president , however , the U.S. response might have fallen well short of what was needed .
From the beginning , a chorus of right-wing pundits and politicians downplayed the danger , and not all of them—such as the New York Times ’ Bret Stephens—did so out of a sense of fealty to Trump .
The Republican Party ’ s hostility to science or other politically inconvenient bodies of expertise didn ’ t begin with Trump or with COVID-19 ; if anything , it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GOP brand .
They don ’ t want to listen to atmospheric physicists and other scientists tell them about climate change , and they didn ’ t think they needed to understand Iraq or Afghanistan before trying to remake them in the image of the United States .
Nor do they want to create and fund robust public health institutions that could handle a pandemic , or adopt an approach to foreign policy that makes diplomacy the country ’ s first impulse and the use of force its last resort .
Instead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberty as its defining theme ( unless you ’ re a woman and want an abortion , of course ) , and encouraged its followers to see most elements of government authority as inherently suspect .
Instead of reminding the public that individual conduct sometimes affects other people—which is why the United States has laws against speeding , for example—and emphasizing that we are all in this together , the party of former Rep. Newt Gingrich , former Fox News CEO Roger Ailes , Sen. Mitch McConnell , and many others has increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much distrust and division as possible , mostly by igniting culture wars and demonizing anyone who doesn ’ t share their views .
Surprise , surprise : These sentiments are now inspiring all those angry people to regard rules requiring them to wear a mask or practice socially distancing as an infringement of their constitutional right to put the rest of us at risk .
Bad as Trump has been—and let ’ s be clear , his handling of this emergency has been a catastrophe—even great communicators such as former Presidents Franklin D. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trouble , given the degree of polarization in the country and the polluted information environment that it both nourishes and reflects .
Dealing with COVID-19 would not have been easy under the best of circumstances , but the central task is still a damn sight easier than trying to create stable and effective democracies in Iraq , Afghanistan , Libya , or other countries in the wake of U.S.-led regime change .
And that ’ s why a country that can not persuade its own citizens to wear a mask should not begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in some foreign country to remake their whole society according to its dictates .
One more thing : If you read this column and conclude that if the United States can figure out how to get Americans to put on masks and beat COVID-19 , then it can confidently get back into the regime change business , you ’ ve missed the point .
The two tasks are not in fact the same , and becoming much better at the entirely feasible goal of improving public health at home would not make the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impossible task of nation-building abroad .
Even so , the United States ’ COVID-19 failure does contain a timely warning : If the U.S. government can not handle a large-scale but relatively straightforward act of public policy at home—such as getting enough people to wear masks when they should—it would be foolish to try to do something far more ambitious in societies that are very different from its own .

A few weeks ago, I tweeted the following: “A country that cannot convince its own citizens to wear masks to halt a pandemic has no business toppling foreign governments and trying to remake whole societies that it barely understands.” It received more retweets and “likes” than I usually get, along with the usual amendments, endorsements, and snarky replies. The logic of my tweet should be fairly obvious, but since there are still prominent people and organizations who think regime change is a ready solution to vexing foreign-policy challenges, it’s worth unpacking the argument in a bit more detail.
A few weeks ago, I tweeted the following: “A country that cannot convince its own citizens to wear masks to halt a pandemic has no business toppling foreign governments and trying to remake whole societies that it barely understands.” It received more retweets and “likes” than I usually get, along with the usual amendments, endorsements, and snarky replies. The logic of my tweet should be fairly obvious, but since there are still prominent people and organizations who think regime change is a ready solution to vexing foreign-policy challenges, it’s worth unpacking the argument in a bit more detail.
Let’s begin with the nation-building side of the equation. Despite what you may have thought as the “forever wars” dragged on, the past 25 years have taught us quite a bit about why foreign-imposed regime change rarely works. For starters, toppling a foreign government inevitably damages or destroys whatever political institutions existed previously (which is the whole point of the intervention), which means there is no effective local capacity to keep order after the old regime is gone. Even a limited operation that removes a tyrant and his immediate henchmen but leaves lower-level officials in place would unravel lines of authority and patronage and thrust the country into uncertain territory.
By definition, regime change also creates winners and losers, and the latter (normally those who held privileged positions in the old order) are likely to be unhappy about their diminished status. They are bound to resist their loss of power and wealth and are likely to take up arms to try to regain their former positions. In societies riven by significant ethnic, religious, sectarian, or other divisions, some combination of fame, greed, or ambition encourage separate groups to begin jockeying for position and power. Foreign powers and transnational terrorist organizations are quick to interfere in various ways, aided by the breakdown of existing institutions and the chaos that is likely to result.
In response, the original intervening power may have to occupy the country and use its own armed forces to keep order while the new government is being formed. Unfortunately, a large foreign military presence usually triggers local resentments and encourages more violent resistance, which in turn requires the occupying power to send more troops to try to suppress it. And because this often takes place in a country that is some distance away from the intervening power and that may lack sophisticated transportation systems, it is expensive to keep the occupying forces supplied and fed.
Lacking knowledge of local customs and values (let alone a substantial number of officials who can even speak the local language), the would-be nation-builder is unlikely to pick the right leaders for key positions or to design new institutions that will be legitimate in the eyes of the local population. Its efforts to build local institutions and infrastructure to boost the economy inevitably fuel corruption and produce enormous unintended consequences.
The bottom line: Even in the best of circumstances, regime change and nation-building is an extraordinarily complicated act of social engineering. In essence, the intervening power is trying to get millions of people whose backgrounds are different to alter their core beliefs and norms about politics and society, in order to get them to change their behavior in fundamental ways. To succeed, foreign-imposed regime change requires efforts that are simultaneously massive yet subtle, conducted by knowledgeable and well-trained people. It is likely to be expensive and take a long time, so it will also require sustained political support back home. Plus a fair bit of luck.
Needless to say, these features were all lacking in the United States’ recent misadventures. Despite all the attention paid to counterinsurgency theory and to “winning hearts and minds,” U.S. efforts still relied overwhelmingly on kinetic operations and “hard power.” Back home, a bevy of right-wing cheerleaders and supportive think tanks kept insisting the U.S. could succeed if it just stayed the course. We now know that insiders were never confident of success, but they kept their doubts from the public and kicked the can down the road.
The United States’ unhappy record on regime change or nation-building is not unique. In the period since nationalism spread around the globe, no great power has ever been very good at running an empire (formal or informal) or at dictating the course of local politics in distant foreign lands. To repeat: The problem is that this sort of thing is really, really hard, even for a wealthy superpower.
Now consider the challenge of COVID-19, and especially the seemingly pedestrian issue of getting people to wear masks in public. Bear in mind that the masks do not weigh 20 pounds, are not painful to wear, do not transmit your location or other personal information to the government, George Soros, or Google, and do not cost a fortune.
In this case, the U.S. government is not trying to change the behavior of a foreign people; it is operating on its own territory, with the people that it knows best. Though some elements of pandemic response are challenging, the basic goals are pretty straightforward and well understood. To contain the epidemic, you need to slow the rate of transmission in the population. To do that you have to get people to practice social distancing, wear masks, and avoid other risky behaviors. It helps to institute a testing and tracing process that can identify hot spots and isolate those infected from those that are healthy, and to take special precautions in places such as nursing homes. And as we have seen, this requires shutting down those portions of the economy or society where distancing is impossible and the risk of transmission is high.
Although some of these measures are far-reaching and have profound short- to medium-term effects, none of these procedures require rewriting the U.S. Constitution, redrawing borders between the states, removing thousands of government officials from every branch of government, recasting the role of religion or the status of women in society, or abandoning the basic political or social values of U.S. society. In fact, the more successful the response, the less long-term political or social impact the pandemic is likely to have.
How do we know this? Because unlike foreign-imposed regime change and nation-building—which rarely succeeds no matter who does it—lots of different countries have done an impressive job of responding to COVID-19. I’m not talking just about relatively small nations such as New Zealand; I’m thinking of South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Germany, Greece, and any number of others.
Compared with these countries, to be sure, much of the blame belongs squarely to U.S. President Donald Trump, whose head-in-the-sand belief that the virus would just disappear—“like a miracle”—delayed the U.S. response by at least a month and allowed the virus to spread far more widely. Since then, the administration’s chaotic and inconsistent response—and especially Trump’s own refusal to wear a mask himself or to use his bully pulpit to unite the country—has made things infinitely worse.
Even with a different president, however, the U.S. response might have fallen well short of what was needed. From the beginning, a chorus of right-wing pundits and politicians downplayed the danger, and not all of them—such as the New York Times’ Bret Stephens—did so out of a sense of fealty to Trump. The Republican Party’s hostility to science or other politically inconvenient bodies of expertise didn’t begin with Trump or with COVID-19; if anything, it’s become a defining part of the GOP brand. They don’t want to listen to atmospheric physicists and other scientists tell them about climate change, and they didn’t think they needed to understand Iraq or Afghanistan before trying to remake them in the image of the United States. Nor do they want to create and fund robust public health institutions that could handle a pandemic, or adopt an approach to foreign policy that makes diplomacy the country’s first impulse and the use of force its last resort.
Instead of knowledge, the U.S. right has fetishized liberty as its defining theme (unless you’re a woman and want an abortion, of course), and encouraged its followers to see most elements of government authority as inherently suspect. Instead of reminding the public that individual conduct sometimes affects other people—which is why the United States has laws against speeding, for example—and emphasizing that we are all in this together, the party of former Rep. Newt Gingrich, former Fox News CEO Roger Ailes, Sen. Mitch McConnell, and many others has increasingly based its political fortunes on sowing as much distrust and division as possible, mostly by igniting culture wars and demonizing anyone who doesn’t share their views.
Surprise, surprise: These sentiments are now inspiring all those angry people to regard rules requiring them to wear a mask or practice socially distancing as an infringement of their constitutional right to put the rest of us at risk. Bad as Trump has been—and let’s be clear, his handling of this emergency has been a catastrophe—even great communicators such as former Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan would have had trouble, given the degree of polarization in the country and the polluted information environment that it both nourishes and reflects.
Dealing with COVID-19 would not have been easy under the best of circumstances, but the central task is still a damn sight easier than trying to create stable and effective democracies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, or other countries in the wake of U.S.-led regime change. And that’s why a country that cannot persuade its own citizens to wear a mask should not begin to think that it can get people in some foreign country to remake their whole society according to its dictates.
One more thing: If you read this column and conclude that if the United States can figure out how to get Americans to put on masks and beat COVID-19, then it can confidently get back into the regime change business, you’ve missed the point. The two tasks are not in fact the same, and becoming much better at the entirely feasible goal of improving public health at home would not make the United States any better at the nearly impossible task of nation-building abroad. Even so, the United States’ COVID-19 failure does contain a timely warning: If the U.S. government cannot handle a large-scale but relatively straightforward act of public policy at home—such as getting enough people to wear masks when they should—it would be foolish to try to do something far more ambitious in societies that are very different from its own.