foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Trump’s New Realism in China

Trump’s New Realism in China

Critics of the president describe his White House as vacillating wildly or barreling toward an outright break in ties with China .
In his new book , for example , former National Security Advisor John Bolton , at the moment the most visible of the critics , claims that President Donald Trump ’ s China policy is “ chaotic , ” reflects “ incoherence , ” and is “ not grounded in philosophy , grand strategy or policy ” but rather in domestic political calculations .
Yet the example of the airline ban , among others , offers a different @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon to judge the ultimate effectiveness of a reciprocity strategy , it represents a potentially fundamental shift in Washington ’ s approach to Beijing , overturning four decades of diplomatic practice .
By the turn of the millennium , both Washington ’ s and Beijing ’ s bets had paid off .
China had fully entered the international community , notably joining the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) , while the Soviet Union had long since disappeared .
China ’ s economic modernization was rapidly changing global trade and production patterns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world ’ s economy and bringing it unimagined wealth .
One of many optimists about China , then-President Bill Clinton asserted in 2000 that getting China accepted into the WTO was the best opportunity since the 1970s to create “ positive change ” that would reshape the country ’ s politics and society , as well as its economy .
Signs of growing civil society were celebrated in the West as evidence of neoliberal development .
Yet a darker side of Chinese modernization soon began to appear .
At home , the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Leninist model proved far more enduring than Western observers assumed .
Instead of a wealthier country naturally becoming more liberal , as modernization theory presumes , the CCP revitalized its authoritarian rule starting around 2009 .
Over the past decade , it has eroded civil society inside China and attempted to limit foreign , especially Western , influences .
Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s infamous Document No .
9 in 2013 made clear the party ’ s determination to resist any type of liberalization and that it saw itself in a long-term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign affairs , too , Beijing moved to assert its dominance in Asia by the 2010s and was beginning to challenge Washington for global preeminence .
Using mercantilist trade practices , widespread espionage , cyberattacks , a relentless military expansion , and a global influence campaign , Beijing increasingly pressured nations throughout Asia and took advantage of open societies for unfair advantage .
Even prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election , then , China had become one of the United States ’ primary foreign-policy concerns .
A rebalancing in U.S.-Chinese ties began @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama ’ s much lauded “ pivot ” to the Indo-Pacific led , by the end of his term , to a significant deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations without much success in changing Xi ’ s policies .
The Trump administration picked up the nascent shift in U.S. policy and accelerated it during its first three years , even as it pursued high-level diplomacy with Beijing .
From trade to cyberattacks and the South China Sea , the Trump approach fused both liberal and conservative dissatisfaction over the direction of China ’ s growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to long-held assumptions about China at home .
Distinct from critics like Bolton , whose main charge against Trump ’ s China policy was an apparent haphazardness , others who favored continued engagement with China claimed that he was bent on a radical decoupling of economic and even political ties with Beijing .
A review of his administration ’ s actions leads to a different conclusion : that it has adopted instead a fairly measured realist policy .
The policy ’ s short-term implementation may appear uneven , as in cases like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ telecommunications company ZTE , but its overarching goals are consistent and , in the main , acted on .
This approach was laid out explicitly in the 2017 National Security Strategy , helmed by then-National Security Advisor H.R .
McMaster , which called for a “ principled realism ” in responding to China ’ s competitive policies .
Beijing ’ s actions make it increasingly difficult to talk about cooperation after years of predatory Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses and individuals or in the face of rampant theft of intellectual property , much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American businesses up to $ 600 billion a year , despite promises by Beijing to halt such practices .
Broken promises not to militarize territory in the South China Sea have shifted the balance of power in one of the world ’ s most strategic waterways , and Beijing ’ s intimidation of Japan , Taiwan , Vietnam , and other countries in the region has increased with its military power .
Similarly , Beijing ’ s recent so-called “ Wolf Warrior diplomacy , ” personified by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and threatening browbeating .
That Beijing considers itself to be in a strategic competition with the United States is made clear in major speeches by Xi , in which competition with the Western capitalist system forms the core of the CCP ’ s worldview .
Despite Trump ’ s inclinations , his China team—including such disparate personalities as McMaster and Bolton , Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell , Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger , and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer—faced powerful headwinds that aimed to put relations back on the path @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previous administrations .
By the dawn of 2020 , signs of an emerging modus vivendi , such as the winter agreement on a “ phase one ” trade deal , seemed to presage a return to the pre-Trump status quo , prioritizing stability in the bilateral relationship over radical reform .
But any return to the old policy was swept away by the coronavirus pandemic .
As the pandemic swept from China across the globe , shuttering economies and locking down societies , charges and countercharges traded between Washington and Beijing over responsibility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ precipitous downward spiral in relations , revealing the dearth of trust and cooperative relations between the two nations .
More significantly , the chilling of relations seems to have spurred the administration to fully embrace a policy of reciprocity as a more viable means to shape Beijing ’ s actions .
If it is indeed guided by this concept of reciprocal treatment , as openly proclaimed by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , U.S. policy would adopt a measured balance toward Beijing ’ s actions , far from the shoot-from-the-hip belligerence portrayed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goal is not conflict but rather to create a level playing field .
To that end , there are two kinds of reciprocity that the administration is pursuing : structural and issue-specific .
The Trump administration ’ s first attempts at reciprocal policies were focused on correcting structural inequalities in the Sino-American relationship .
The primary target was unbalanced economic ties .
Despite decades of claims by U.S. policymakers that a China economically integrated into the global economy would gradually liberalize its trade approach , Beijing ’ s mercantilist policy was instead strengthened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given a free pass .
At the same time , the so-called “ China shock ” of the country ’ s admission into the WTO led to a dramatic decline for manufacturing and other economic activity in the American heartland .
Pursuing what previous presidents have called “ fair trade , ” the Trump administration challenged long-standing tenets of the free trade school .
As in the 1980s negotiations with Japan , the primary approach was to levy various tariffs , phased in over a period of months on more than $ 500 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , as a means to get expanded market access inside China and increased purchases of American goods .
The “ phase one ” trade deal agreed to before the pandemic is just the first step in what may be a constant recalibration of trade relations .
Further market-limiting policies may be adopted to ensure either full Chinese compliance with WTO standards or subsequent trade deals , as well as in response to future Chinese actions that discriminate against U.S. businesses operating in China .
Even staunchly pro-engagement business groups , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China , are now advocating government actions to ensure what AmCham China calls “ competitive neutrality.
” The administration has also taken actions taken to limit Chinese companies ’ access to American markets or technology .
Most notably , it has blocked Huawei from being able to purchase U.S. semiconductor chips and banned it from the American 5G market while preventing both Huawei and ZTE from selling equipment to U.S. government purchasers .
These policies have been defended primarily on national security grounds , to prevent the future theft of digital data , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Huawei in particular from becoming the world ’ s dominant telecommunications provider .
However , in light of Beijing ’ s unwillingness to allow major American technology companies such as Amazon , Facebook , and Google from operating freely in China , as well as its long-running attempts to steal U.S. technology , the Trump administration ’ s actions can also be seen as attempting to impose costs on China for unfair treatment of U.S. companies .
Although there has been little explicit claim from Washington that it seeks to level the technological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been frustrated by Chinese restrictions placed on U.S. companies and onerous requirements , such as those mandating that such firms work with Chinese partners ( often with government ties ) .
The second set of reciprocal actions is related to specific issues that Washington seeks to resolve , as the 5G confrontation reveals .
Evidence for the administration ’ s issue-specific reciprocal approach has been building this year , in addition to the administration ’ s threat to block Chinese airline flights into the United States .
Driven by Pottinger and Stilwell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Chinese journalists allowed to operate in the United States for state-run media outlets to 100 , in response to expulsions of U.S. reporters and increasing restrictions in China .
The government also shortened work visas for Chinese journalists , reflecting visa restrictions on foreign journalists imposed by Beijing .
In May , the administration announced plans to cancel educational visas for Chinese graduate students linked to People ’ s Liberation Army schools and institutes , after years of widespread concerns , reports , and arrests for theft of intellectual property and material @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a prudent attempt to make policy fit real conditions , and its built-in drive toward balance prevents it from swinging too far in the direction of either accommodation or antagonism .
The goal is to encourage further engagement—but only if both sides clearly benefit equally from the interaction .
In its way , reciprocity lets Beijing determine the atmosphere of the relationship through its actions , with Washington responding so as to ensure that American interests are not harmed .
Reciprocity is also a brake on unrealistic U.S. expectations , and it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further undermine relations when Chinese promises are not kept or American hopes fall short .
A reciprocity policy does not come without significant challenges , however .
It will call into question liberal values deeper than just free trade , such as the open society that Westerners take for granted .
Americans have long believed that allowing foreigners full access to this society would produce four main outcomes : helping to reduce political tensions , improving mutual understanding , promoting scientific and other types of knowledge , and encouraging liberal development abroad .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that China would follow suit , if only engagement were steadily pursued .
Since the opening of relations with China in 1979 , Chinese visitors , temporary residents , and students have had no restrictions placed on them in the United States and have had as much freedom here as American citizens , while the U.S. government developed a robust array of official exchanges with Beijing .
In contrast , Americans have been denied free access throughout China or restricted in the types of business , educational , and cultural exchanges they can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there were at one point over 600 Beijing-funded Confucius Institutes and “ Confucius classrooms ” in the United States , most on university campuses and secondary schools , only 20 counterpart American centers at Chinese universities existed in the 2010s , and these closed after Chinese officials refused American diplomats access to them or pressured universities to cease their operations .
Similarly , NGOs and other forms of Western-inspired civil society have been restricted , if not suppressed , under Xi ’ s rule .
Similarly , whether Washington ’ s China policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working-level diplomatic and economic opportunities , thereby making America safer and wealthier , it long ago stopped benefiting the country ’ s economic or political security .
Such a diagnosis does not mandate shutting off all relations but rather a rethink of how to ensure a more realistic approach .
Whether Trump or someone else , some type of recalibration in U.S.-Chinese relations seemed inevitable by the middle of Obama ’ s term .
After nearly a half-century of engagement , there is a widespread recognition that the best of Washington ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship or the China for which generations of U.S. leaders hoped .
The CCP chose a path that it believed best fit its interests , one in congruence with much of China ’ s authoritarian , bureaucratic history and not the brief moment of democracy glimpsed during the 1919 May 4 Movement .
Washington ’ s new realism heralds a different approach toward Beijing .
In the light of decades of experience , the Trump administration is betting that a policy of reciprocity may turn out to be the most realistic means for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world ’ s two most powerful nations .

This summer, as the international travel industry began its struggle to rebuild after collapsing during the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing maintained a near-blanket ban on U.S. airlines flying into China while allowing Chinese carriers to fly freely from American airports back home. By the beginning of June, with Chinese flights increasing on American soil, Washington announced that it would block Chinese passenger air flights into the United States in retaliation for the prohibition. Within one day of the announcement, Beijing indicated that it would relax its restriction. The episode was the latest evidence that the Trump administration does have a coherent China policy—and it is based on reciprocity.
Critics of the president describe his White House as vacillating wildly or barreling toward an outright break in ties with China. In his new book, for example, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, at the moment the most visible of the critics, claims that President Donald Trump’s China policy is “chaotic,” reflects “incoherence,” and is “not grounded in philosophy, grand strategy or policy” but rather in domestic political calculations. Yet the example of the airline ban, among others, offers a different interpretation. And although it is too soon to judge the ultimate effectiveness of a reciprocity strategy, it represents a potentially fundamental shift in Washington’s approach to Beijing, overturning four decades of diplomatic practice.
U.S. President Jimmy Carter (left), former President Richard Nixon (second left), and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (right) speak at a state dinner in honor of Deng’s visit to the United States in January 1979.
Since the opening of relations with China in 1979, the U.S. government, as well as businesses, universities, cultural organizations, and the like, has pursued open-ended engagement. In the first 20 years of formal diplomatic ties, Washington was eager to explore how far relations with Beijing could develop, and China appeared to present little threat and vast opportunity. Focused on the global struggle with Moscow, Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, along with their advisors Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, welcomed China as a counter to the Soviet Union. For his part, China’s then-paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, saw economic ties and normalized political relations with Washington as key elements in his strategy to repair the destruction wrought by Mao Zedong’s rule. Even the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre did not significantly destabilize U.S.-Chinese relations, despite being ordered by Deng, who is still celebrated in the West as China’s most important reformer.
By the turn of the millennium, both Washington’s and Beijing’s bets had paid off. China had fully entered the international community, notably joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), while the Soviet Union had long since disappeared. China’s economic modernization was rapidly changing global trade and production patterns, placing it at the center of the world’s economy and bringing it unimagined wealth. One of many optimists about China, then-President Bill Clinton asserted in 2000 that getting China accepted into the WTO was the best opportunity since the 1970s to create “positive change” that would reshape the country’s politics and society, as well as its economy. Signs of growing civil society were celebrated in the West as evidence of neoliberal development. Yet a darker side of Chinese modernization soon began to appear.
At home, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its Leninist model proved far more enduring than Western observers assumed. Instead of a wealthier country naturally becoming more liberal, as modernization theory presumes, the CCP revitalized its authoritarian rule starting around 2009. Over the past decade, it has eroded civil society inside China and attempted to limit foreign, especially Western, influences. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s infamous Document No. 9 in 2013 made clear the party’s determination to resist any type of liberalization and that it saw itself in a long-term ideological struggle with the West. In foreign affairs, too, Beijing moved to assert its dominance in Asia by the 2010s and was beginning to challenge Washington for global preeminence. Using mercantilist trade practices, widespread espionage, cyberattacks, a relentless military expansion, and a global influence campaign, Beijing increasingly pressured nations throughout Asia and took advantage of open societies for unfair advantage.
Even prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, then, China had become one of the United States’ primary foreign-policy concerns. A rebalancing in U.S.-Chinese ties began before Trump took office. President Barack Obama’s much lauded “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific led, by the end of his term, to a significant deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations without much success in changing Xi’s policies. The Trump administration picked up the nascent shift in U.S. policy and accelerated it during its first three years, even as it pursued high-level diplomacy with Beijing. From trade to cyberattacks and the South China Sea, the Trump approach fused both liberal and conservative dissatisfaction over the direction of China’s growth into a broad-based challenge both to Beijing and to long-held assumptions about China at home.
Distinct from critics like Bolton, whose main charge against Trump’s China policy was an apparent haphazardness, others who favored continued engagement with China claimed that he was bent on a radical decoupling of economic and even political ties with Beijing. A review of his administration’s actions leads to a different conclusion: that it has adopted instead a fairly measured realist policy. The policy’s short-term implementation may appear uneven, as in cases like the on-again, off-again sanctions against the telecommunications company ZTE, but its overarching goals are consistent and, in the main, acted on. This approach was laid out explicitly in the 2017 National Security Strategy, helmed by then-National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, which called for a “principled realism” in responding to China’s competitive policies.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian takes a question at a media briefing in Beijing on April 8.
At its core, the new approach reflects the gap between the reality of Xi’s China and the China that Western policymakers and business leaders assumed would develop through global integration. The National Security Strategy thus attempted to fit U.S. policy to the facts on the ground or, in Confucian terms, strove for a “rectification of names” (zhengming), a concept popularized by Xunzi, one of the three leading figures of the early Confucian school, after Mencius and Confucius himself. As an American policy approach, rectifying names is an attempt to accurately represent the state of affairs inside China and the relationship between China and the United States.
Beijing’s actions make it increasingly difficult to talk about cooperation after years of predatory Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. businesses and individuals or in the face of rampant theft of intellectual property, much of which comes from China and costs American businesses up to $600 billion a year, despite promises by Beijing to halt such practices. Broken promises not to militarize territory in the South China Sea have shifted the balance of power in one of the world’s most strategic waterways, and Beijing’s intimidation of Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other countries in the region has increased with its military power. Similarly, Beijing’s recent so-called “Wolf Warrior diplomacy,” personified by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian, abandons diplomatic niceties for rhetorically aggressive and threatening browbeating. That Beijing considers itself to be in a strategic competition with the United States is made clear in major speeches by Xi, in which competition with the Western capitalist system forms the core of the CCP’s worldview.
Despite Trump’s inclinations, his China team—including such disparate personalities as McMaster and Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell, Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer—faced powerful headwinds that aimed to put relations back on the path of the kind of engagement pursued by previous administrations. By the dawn of 2020, signs of an emerging modus vivendi, such as the winter agreement on a “phase one” trade deal, seemed to presage a return to the pre-Trump status quo, prioritizing stability in the bilateral relationship over radical reform.
But any return to the old policy was swept away by the coronavirus pandemic. As the pandemic swept from China across the globe, shuttering economies and locking down societies, charges and countercharges traded between Washington and Beijing over responsibility for the COVID-19 catastrophe led to a precipitous downward spiral in relations, revealing the dearth of trust and cooperative relations between the two nations. More significantly, the chilling of relations seems to have spurred the administration to fully embrace a policy of reciprocity as a more viable means to shape Beijing’s actions.
A pedestrian walks under an advertisement for the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei’s latest phone in Tokyo on June 26. The Trump administration has taken actions to limit Chinese companies’ access to American markets or technology, most notably by banning Huawei from the American 5G market.
The reciprocity strategy was articulated in a May White House report, “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.” Following the concept of principled realism in the National Security Strategy, the new approach states that “the United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge and respond in kind to Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible threats thereof.”
If it is indeed guided by this concept of reciprocal treatment, as openly proclaimed by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. policy would adopt a measured balance toward Beijing’s actions, far from the shoot-from-the-hip belligerence portrayed by some of its critics. The goal is not conflict but rather to create a level playing field. To that end, there are two kinds of reciprocity that the administration is pursuing: structural and issue-specific.
The Trump administration’s first attempts at reciprocal policies were focused on correcting structural inequalities in the Sino-American relationship. The primary target was unbalanced economic ties. Despite decades of claims by U.S. policymakers that a China economically integrated into the global economy would gradually liberalize its trade approach, Beijing’s mercantilist policy was instead strengthened and its theft of intellectual property largely given a free pass. At the same time, the so-called “China shock” of the country’s admission into the WTO led to a dramatic decline for manufacturing and other economic activity in the American heartland.
Pursuing what previous presidents have called “fair trade,” the Trump administration challenged long-standing tenets of the free trade school. As in the 1980s negotiations with Japan, the primary approach was to levy various tariffs, phased in over a period of months on more than $500 billion worth of Chinese exports to the United States, as a means to get expanded market access inside China and increased purchases of American goods. The “phase one” trade deal agreed to before the pandemic is just the first step in what may be a constant recalibration of trade relations. Further market-limiting policies may be adopted to ensure either full Chinese compliance with WTO standards or subsequent trade deals, as well as in response to future Chinese actions that discriminate against U.S. businesses operating in China. Even staunchly pro-engagement business groups, such as the American Chamber of Commerce in China, are now advocating government actions to ensure what AmCham China calls “competitive neutrality.”
The administration has also taken actions taken to limit Chinese companies’ access to American markets or technology. Most notably, it has blocked Huawei from being able to purchase U.S. semiconductor chips and banned it from the American 5G market while preventing both Huawei and ZTE from selling equipment to U.S. government purchasers. These policies have been defended primarily on national security grounds, to prevent the future theft of digital data, or adopted as a means of preventing Huawei in particular from becoming the world’s dominant telecommunications provider.
However, in light of Beijing’s unwillingness to allow major American technology companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google from operating freely in China, as well as its long-running attempts to steal U.S. technology, the Trump administration’s actions can also be seen as attempting to impose costs on China for unfair treatment of U.S. companies. Although there has been little explicit claim from Washington that it seeks to level the technological playing field inside China, American policymakers have been frustrated by Chinese restrictions placed on U.S. companies and onerous requirements, such as those mandating that such firms work with Chinese partners (often with government ties).
The second set of reciprocal actions is related to specific issues that Washington seeks to resolve, as the 5G confrontation reveals. Evidence for the administration’s issue-specific reciprocal approach has been building this year, in addition to the administration’s threat to block Chinese airline flights into the United States. Driven by Pottinger and Stilwell, in March Washington limited the number of Chinese journalists allowed to operate in the United States for state-run media outlets to 100, in response to expulsions of U.S. reporters and increasing restrictions in China. The government also shortened work visas for Chinese journalists, reflecting visa restrictions on foreign journalists imposed by Beijing. In May, the administration announced plans to cancel educational visas for Chinese graduate students linked to People’s Liberation Army schools and institutes, after years of widespread concerns, reports, and arrests for theft of intellectual property and material from U.S. university research labs.
U.S. President Donald Trump takes part in a welcoming ceremony with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9.
The reciprocal approach is new enough that its effectiveness cannot yet be fully assessed. It is enough of a departure from the past four decades of U.S. policy toward China, however, that many voices see it as needlessly provocative. Yet, as seen in the airlines case, a policy of reciprocity does not ensure a cycle of worsening relations. It may instead offer a more effective means of correcting inequities in a relationship.
Reciprocity is a prudent attempt to make policy fit real conditions, and its built-in drive toward balance prevents it from swinging too far in the direction of either accommodation or antagonism. The goal is to encourage further engagement—but only if both sides clearly benefit equally from the interaction. In its way, reciprocity lets Beijing determine the atmosphere of the relationship through its actions, with Washington responding so as to ensure that American interests are not harmed. Reciprocity is also a brake on unrealistic U.S. expectations, and it can protect against the disappointment that can further undermine relations when Chinese promises are not kept or American hopes fall short.
A reciprocity policy does not come without significant challenges, however. It will call into question liberal values deeper than just free trade, such as the open society that Westerners take for granted. Americans have long believed that allowing foreigners full access to this society would produce four main outcomes: helping to reduce political tensions, improving mutual understanding, promoting scientific and other types of knowledge, and encouraging liberal development abroad. American policymakers from both parties long claimed that China would follow suit, if only engagement were steadily pursued. Since the opening of relations with China in 1979, Chinese visitors, temporary residents, and students have had no restrictions placed on them in the United States and have had as much freedom here as American citizens, while the U.S. government developed a robust array of official exchanges with Beijing.
In contrast, Americans have been denied free access throughout China or restricted in the types of business, educational, and cultural exchanges they can have. As one example, while there were at one point over 600 Beijing-funded Confucius Institutes and “Confucius classrooms” in the United States, most on university campuses and secondary schools, only 20 counterpart American centers at Chinese universities existed in the 2010s, and these closed after Chinese officials refused American diplomats access to them or pressured universities to cease their operations. Similarly, NGOs and other forms of Western-inspired civil society have been restricted, if not suppressed, under Xi’s rule.
After four decades of trying, it is time to admit that access to the United States for the millions of Chinese who have lived, studied, and worked there—while surely beneficial for them—has completely failed to help liberalize the CCP, nor has it done much to moderate the Chinese policies that have led to increased tensions. If anything, it has forced Chinese leaders to further dissolve the civil society that was emerging in the 1980s and 1990s, and it has led Beijing to adopt a confrontational attitude toward the United States and other liberal nations.
Similarly, whether Washington’s China policy from the 1970s through the 1990s created working-level diplomatic and economic opportunities, thereby making America safer and wealthier, it long ago stopped benefiting the country’s economic or political security. Such a diagnosis does not mandate shutting off all relations but rather a rethink of how to ensure a more realistic approach. Whether Trump or someone else, some type of recalibration in U.S.-Chinese relations seemed inevitable by the middle of Obama’s term.
After nearly a half-century of engagement, there is a widespread recognition that the best of Washington’s intentions did not produce either the bilateral relationship or the China for which generations of U.S. leaders hoped. The CCP chose a path that it believed best fit its interests, one in congruence with much of China’s authoritarian, bureaucratic history and not the brief moment of democracy glimpsed during the 1919 May 4 Movement. Washington’s new realism heralds a different approach toward Beijing. In the light of decades of experience, the Trump administration is betting that a policy of reciprocity may turn out to be the most realistic means for rebalancing ties and maintaining stable relations between the world’s two most powerful nations.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Brazil Must Address Its Own Racist Police Violence

Brazil Must Address Its Own Racist Police Violence RIO DE JANEIRO—Sitting in front of a house dotted with bullet holes , Joel Luiz Costa , a criminal lawyer from Rio de Janeiro , told me about one of his former clients , when we met in June last year .
During a police operation in 2018 , heavily armed officers patrolling the alleyways of Manguinhos , a favela north of the city , found a walkie-talkie on the ground , just outside one of the houses .
Police entered the property , where a young Black man named Wellington was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yanking him out of bed , officers took the 25-year-old into custody on the grounds that he worked for the drug dealers who ruled the community , and that the walkie-talkie was evidence of how he kept in touch with his employers .
Wellington—who prefers not to use his full name for security reasons—had prior convictions , so he spent eight months behind bars , awaiting trial .
Costa sought pretrial release for his client , but his habeas corpus request was denied .
On the day of the hearing , Costa was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police witnesses .
He was familiar with the area where his client was arrested , so he posed very specific questions .
“ I asked the officers to describe the street , how was it , was it straight , was it curved ; was he at the end or at the beginning of the street ?
” he recalled .
“ What were you doing there , what were you looking for ; did you actually hear someone saying ‘ Wellington , do you copy ?
’ ” “ It didn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ start contradicting themselves , ” Costa said proudly .
The judge found the defendant not guilty .
After eight months behind bars for a walkie-talkie found on the floor outside his house , Wellington was free to go .
Brazil ’ s constitution states that every citizen has the right to a lawyer , but most of those who pass through the system are unaware of this .
If it wasn ’ t for Costa taking Wellington ’ s case pro bono , the young man would most likely still be in jail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ front of a judge .
In countries at war , the presence of an enemy within—real or imagined—tends to increase the public ’ s capacity to tolerate the excesses of the state .
There are 725,000 people behind bars in Brazil .
In the whole world , only two countries incarcerate a larger number of their own populations : China has 1.7 million people in prison , and the United States has 2.1 million .
Over 40 percent of Brazilian inmates are still awaiting trial , while only 14 percent are imprisoned for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and prisons , overcrowded and left at the mercy of powerful drug cartels , are known in the criminal world as “ universities.
” “ We produce our own suicide bombers , ” said the journalist and author Bruno Paes Manso , who has written extensively about Brazil ’ s main criminal organizations .
“ The only difference is that our jihadis prefer to die or go to jail before they get to 25 years of age , rather than bowing their heads to a system that will humiliate and oppress them.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s deadliest , and Rio ’ s are the country ’ s most lethal .
Costa ’ s own father spent most of his life on the run , supervising the drug trade in Jacarezinho , a favela in the north of Rio , using the proceeds to pay for his son ’ s education .
Now , at 31 , Costa is deeply invested in the movement to decriminalize drugs and bring an end to a war that has mostly claimed the lives of poor Black Brazilians .
“ People ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes from , ” Costa , who , like over half of Brazil ’ s population , is Black , told me when I met him in Rio last year .
“ Their problem is with the person committing the crime , because when the wife of a corrupt politician buys a designer bag or pays for tennis lessons in Switzerland , nobody questions the money ’ s origins.
” Brazilian police are among the world ’ s deadliest , and Rio ’ s are the country ’ s most lethal .
Last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alone , 1,814 people were shot dead by police officers , with more than 75 percent of the victims Black people , according to the city ’ s Institute of Public Safety .
Brazil ’ s police force also leads the world in the number of officers lost in the line of duty : In 2018 , 343 officers were killed on the job .
Not even the arrival of a global pandemic has been enough to halt the violence .
So far in Alemão , there have been 108 cases of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recoveries .
But Vasconcelos said that the actions of the police make it harder to fight the virus ; as Foreign Policy has reported , accessing hospitals or getting a bed has been nearly impossible for the community ’ s residents .
“ How are we supposed to self-isolate if we don ’ t feel safe in our own homes ?
How are we supposed to avoid crowds if when police do this kind of thing and we are forced to get together to collect the bodies left behind ?
” Three days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pedro Mattos Pinto , 14 , was killed at home by police forces in São Gonçalo , a working-class city that faces Rio de Janeiro from the other side of Guanabara Bay .
João Pedro had dreams of becoming a soccer star .
“ He always used to say : ‘ Dad , one day I ’ ll make you proud , ’ ” his father told The Guardian .
João Pedro ’ s house took in more than 70 high-caliber bullets , after heavily armed police officers entered the wrong property in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wake of the teenager ’ s killing , Brazilian news outlets and online platforms held a brief discussion on race , police brutality , and the fight against drug trafficking—but for the most part it was business as usual .
Then the images of George Floyd ’ s killing in the United States hit the news .
Brazilians of all races took to the streets to march against racism like many others around the world .
It didn ’ t go unnoticed that it took the killing of an African American man more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and mainstream media outlets to pay attention to their own homegrown race problem .
“ In Brazil , when Black people die , white Brazilians stay silent , ” said Manoel Soares , one of the few Black journalists working for Globo , the country ’ s largest TV network .
“ That silence allows the media , the government , and even Black people to normalize those deaths.
” Historically , Brazil has always tried to align itself with the United States .
Brazilians even have an expression for this : complexo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to “ mongrel complex.
” The term was coined in the 1950s by the sports writer Nelson Rodrigues , after Brazil lost the 1950 World Cup .
It was said the national team was afraid to play its own brand of soccer—especially in later years against Argentina .
The mongrel complex alludes to a Brazilian nation low in self-esteem , with very little confidence in the power of its own culture , economy , and scientific expertise .
On the other hand , the country often deems everything coming from abroad , especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to anything found within Brazil .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro sees in his U.S. counterpart someone to be emulated ; like President Donald Trump , Bolsonaro has played a major role in further polarizing his country along racial lines .
Earlier this year , indigenous activists vowed to sue the far-right president for racism after his latest bigoted outburst .
In one of his weekly Facebook broadcasts , Bolsonaro declared : “ Indians are undoubtedly changing .
… They are increasingly becoming human beings just like us.
” Almost 20 years after Cidade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the west of Rio , burst into the world ’ s consciousness with the film by the neighborhood ’ s English name—City of God—very little has changed for those living there .
Directed by Fernando Meirelles and Kátia Lund , the 2002 film featuring a mostly Black cast tells the story of two young men who choose different paths while growing up in Rio during the ’ 70s .
Rocket , played by Alexandre Rodrigues , is a budding photographer who documents everyday life in his neighborhood .
José “ Zé ” Pequeno @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is an ambitious drug dealer who uses Rocket and his photos as a way to increase his fame , as a turf war erupts with his rival , “ Knockout Ned , ” played by the singer Seu Jorge .
Like many favelas all over Rio , the one depicted in the film also has a long history of violent police incursions .
One of those took place three days before George Floyd ’ s killing in late May .
BOPE soldiers went in without warning , guns blazing , stopping volunteers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local residents .
In the favelas I ’ ve visited over the years , residents have been almost unanimous in their view that the police do more harm than good .
This time , an 18-year-old boy was shot dead .
There are conflicting reports about the victim ’ s affiliations .
Some say he was shot while on his way to the shop to buy a kite ; others claim he was part of the local gang that rules the area .
Rodrigo Felha , a filmmaker born and raised in Cidade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off guard when police opened fire : “ As if the government ’ s absence wasn ’ t enough , not contributing in any way with [ coronavirus ] relief efforts , they don ’ t let us do the work either , they don ’ t let us help our own people.
” There have been a few brave individuals in Brazil , who have dedicated their lives to denouncing the abuses committed by the state ’ s security apparatus .
One of those people was Marielle Franco , a popular Rio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fifth-highest vote count among council members .
A fierce feminist and human rights campaigner , she was known for speaking truth to power , especially when it came to police brutality against favela residents .
In March 2018 , Franco was gunned down in the streets of Rio , along with her driver , on her way home from an event .
The investigation into her murder is still ongoing , but among her supporters there is little hope that those who ordered her killing will ever be found .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years , residents have been almost unanimous in their view that the police do more harm than good , and that they would be better off policing themselves , left alone to look after their own communities .
“ The ones bringing chaos into the favelas are the police .
In the same way you walk around Ipanema without a problem , ” Felha said , referring to one of Rio ’ s wealthiest neighborhoods , “ it would be my pleasure to show you around Cidade de Deus.
” He then paused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Without the police there , of course , because at any moment they might invade .
”

RIO DE JANEIRO—Sitting in front of a house dotted with bullet holes, Joel Luiz Costa, a criminal lawyer from Rio de Janeiro, told me about one of his former clients, when we met in June last year.
RIO DE JANEIRO—Sitting in front of a house dotted with bullet holes, Joel Luiz Costa, a criminal lawyer from Rio de Janeiro, told me about one of his former clients, when we met in June last year.
During a police operation in 2018, heavily armed officers patrolling the alleyways of Manguinhos, a favela north of the city, found a walkie-talkie on the ground, just outside one of the houses. Police entered the property, where a young Black man named Wellington was sleeping next to his girlfriend. After yanking him out of bed, officers took the 25-year-old into custody on the grounds that he worked for the drug dealers who ruled the community, and that the walkie-talkie was evidence of how he kept in touch with his employers. Wellington—who prefers not to use his full name for security reasons—had prior convictions, so he spent eight months behind bars, awaiting trial.
[Leia este artigo em português]
Costa sought pretrial release for his client, but his habeas corpus request was denied. On the day of the hearing, Costa was prepared and launched a tough cross-examination of police witnesses. He was familiar with the area where his client was arrested, so he posed very specific questions. “I asked the officers to describe the street, how was it, was it straight, was it curved; was he at the end or at the beginning of the street?” he recalled. “What were you doing there, what were you looking for; did you actually hear someone saying ‘Wellington, do you copy?’”
“It didn’t take long for the officers to start contradicting themselves,” Costa said proudly. The judge found the defendant not guilty. After eight months behind bars for a walkie-talkie found on the floor outside his house, Wellington was free to go. Brazil’s constitution states that every citizen has the right to a lawyer, but most of those who pass through the system are unaware of this. If it wasn’t for Costa taking Wellington’s case pro bono, the young man would most likely still be in jail, awaiting his turn to get in front of a judge.
Protesters take to the streets of São Paulo on June 6.
In countries at war, the presence of an enemy within—real or imagined—tends to increase the public’s capacity to tolerate the excesses of the state. There are 725,000 people behind bars in Brazil. In the whole world, only two countries incarcerate a larger number of their own populations: China has 1.7 million people in prison, and the United States has 2.1 million. Over 40 percent of Brazilian inmates are still awaiting trial, while only 14 percent are imprisoned for violent crimes and homicide.
Brazilian jails and prisons, overcrowded and left at the mercy of powerful drug cartels, are known in the criminal world as “universities.”
“We produce our own suicide bombers,” said the journalist and author Bruno Paes Manso, who has written extensively about Brazil’s main criminal organizations. “The only difference is that our jihadis prefer to die or go to jail before they get to 25 years of age, rather than bowing their heads to a system that will humiliate and oppress them.”
Brazilian police are among the world’s deadliest, and Rio’s are the country’s most lethal.
Costa’s own father spent most of his life on the run, supervising the drug trade in Jacarezinho, a favela in the north of Rio, using the proceeds to pay for his son’s education. Now, at 31, Costa is deeply invested in the movement to decriminalize drugs and bring an end to a war that has mostly claimed the lives of poor Black Brazilians.
“People’s problem is not with where the money comes from,” Costa, who, like over half of Brazil’s population, is Black, told me when I met him in Rio last year. “Their problem is with the person committing the crime, because when the wife of a corrupt politician buys a designer bag or pays for tennis lessons in Switzerland, nobody questions the money’s origins.”
Brazilian police are among the world’s deadliest, and Rio’s are the country’s most lethal. Last year, in Rio de Janeiro state alone, 1,814 people were shot dead by police officers, with more than 75 percent of the victims Black people, according to the city’s Institute of Public Safety. Brazil’s police force also leads the world in the number of officers lost in the line of duty: In 2018, 343 officers were killed on the job. Not even the arrival of a global pandemic has been enough to halt the violence.
Brazilians demonstrate with a Black Lives Matter sign in São Paulo on June 14.
At 6 a.m. on May 15, Tiê Vasconcelos woke up to the sound of heavy artillery. “My first reaction, as always, was to lie down on the floor,” said the 25-year-old community organizer and YouTuber, who lives in the Complexo do Alemão favela, a sprawling, impoverished community in northern Rio. “It lasted until around 10:30 a.m. There was an intense exchange of fire, heavy noises, sounds of war, grenade explosions, armored vehicles roaming the streets.” The firefight was the result of a police incursion led by Rio’s elite Special Police Operations Battalion, known by the Portuguese acronym BOPE, aimed at capturing local drug dealers. By the time the operation came to an end, officials had seized a total of eight machine guns. In the process, 13 people lost their lives. Their bodies, left exposed in the middle of the street, had to be carried away by local residents.
So far in Alemão, there have been 108 cases of the coronavirus, 37 deaths, and 10 recoveries. But Vasconcelos said that the actions of the police make it harder to fight the virus; as Foreign Policy has reported, accessing hospitals or getting a bed has been nearly impossible for the community’s residents. “How are we supposed to self-isolate if we don’t feel safe in our own homes? How are we supposed to avoid crowds if when police do this kind of thing and we are forced to get together to collect the bodies left behind?”
Three days after the bloodbath in Alemão, João Pedro Mattos Pinto, 14, was killed at home by police forces in São Gonçalo, a working-class city that faces Rio de Janeiro from the other side of Guanabara Bay. João Pedro had dreams of becoming a soccer star. “He always used to say: ‘Dad, one day I’ll make you proud,’” his father told The Guardian. João Pedro’s house took in more than 70 high-caliber bullets, after heavily armed police officers entered the wrong property in search of drug traffickers. In the wake of the teenager’s killing, Brazilian news outlets and online platforms held a brief discussion on race, police brutality, and the fight against drug trafficking—but for the most part it was business as usual.
Then the images of George Floyd’s killing in the United States hit the news. Brazilians of all races took to the streets to march against racism like many others around the world. It didn’t go unnoticed that it took the killing of an African American man more than 5,000 miles away for white Brazilians and mainstream media outlets to pay attention to their own homegrown race problem. “In Brazil, when Black people die, white Brazilians stay silent,” said Manoel Soares, one of the few Black journalists working for Globo, the country’s largest TV network. “That silence allows the media, the government, and even Black people to normalize those deaths.”
Historically, Brazil has always tried to align itself with the United States. Brazilians even have an expression for this: complexo de vira-lata, which in English translates to “mongrel complex.” The term was coined in the 1950s by the sports writer Nelson Rodrigues, after Brazil lost the 1950 World Cup. It was said the national team was afraid to play its own brand of soccer—especially in later years against Argentina. The mongrel complex alludes to a Brazilian nation low in self-esteem, with very little confidence in the power of its own culture, economy, and scientific expertise. On the other hand, the country often deems everything coming from abroad, especially from the United States, as superior to anything found within Brazil.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro sees in his U.S. counterpart someone to be emulated; like President Donald Trump, Bolsonaro has played a major role in further polarizing his country along racial lines. Earlier this year, indigenous activists vowed to sue the far-right president for racism after his latest bigoted outburst. In one of his weekly Facebook broadcasts, Bolsonaro declared: “Indians are undoubtedly changing. … They are increasingly becoming human beings just like us.”
A protester holds a sign that reads “Black skin is not a crime. Racism is!” while demonstrating in the streets of São Gonçalo, Brazil, on June 5. About 300 people shouted slogans against the government of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and protested against the deaths of the American George Floyd and Brazilian teen João Pedro Mattos Pinto at the hands of police.
Almost 20 years after Cidade de Deus, an impoverished community in the west of Rio, burst into the world’s consciousness with the film by the neighborhood’s English name—City of God—very little has changed for those living there. Directed by Fernando Meirelles and Kátia Lund, the 2002 film featuring a mostly Black cast tells the story of two young men who choose different paths while growing up in Rio during the’70s. Rocket, played by Alexandre Rodrigues, is a budding photographer who documents everyday life in his neighborhood. José “Zé” Pequeno, played by Leandro Firmino da Hora, is an ambitious drug dealer who uses Rocket and his photos as a way to increase his fame, as a turf war erupts with his rival, “Knockout Ned,” played by the singer Seu Jorge. Like many favelas all over Rio, the one depicted in the film also has a long history of violent police incursions. One of those took place three days before George Floyd’s killing in late May. BOPE soldiers went in without warning, guns blazing, stopping volunteers from distributing food and hand sanitizer to local residents. In the favelas I’ve visited over the years, residents have been almost unanimous in their view that the police do more harm than good.
This time, an 18-year-old boy was shot dead. There are conflicting reports about the victim’s affiliations. Some say he was shot while on his way to the shop to buy a kite; others claim he was part of the local gang that rules the area. Rodrigo Felha, a filmmaker born and raised in Cidade de Deus, said he was caught off guard when police opened fire: “As if the government’s absence wasn’t enough, not contributing in any way with [coronavirus] relief efforts, they don’t let us do the work either, they don’t let us help our own people.”
There have been a few brave individuals in Brazil, who have dedicated their lives to denouncing the abuses committed by the state’s security apparatus. One of those people was Marielle Franco, a popular Rio city councillor, elected in 2016 with the fifth-highest vote count among council members. A fierce feminist and human rights campaigner, she was known for speaking truth to power, especially when it came to police brutality against favela residents. In March 2018, Franco was gunned down in the streets of Rio, along with her driver, on her way home from an event. The investigation into her murder is still ongoing, but among her supporters there is little hope that those who ordered her killing will ever be found.
In the favelas I’ve visited over the years, residents have been almost unanimous in their view that the police do more harm than good, and that they would be better off policing themselves, left alone to look after their own communities. “The ones bringing chaos into the favelas are the police. In the same way you walk around Ipanema without a problem,” Felha said, referring to one of Rio’s wealthiest neighborhoods, “it would be my pleasure to show you around Cidade de Deus.”
He then paused for a second, before adding, “Without the police there, of course, because at any moment they might invade.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--In Syria, a Grim Trade-Off Between Tackling Pandemic and Famine

In Syria , a Grim Trade-Off Between Tackling Pandemic and Famine Measures to control the spread of the coronavirus pandemic in Syria are exacerbating the country ’ s mounting food shortages , U.N. officials and Syria-based aid workers told Foreign Policy , a trend that could plunge the country ’ s humanitarian crisis to new depths after almost a decade of conflict .
The compounding crises offer a grim model for how the long-term effects of the pandemic could worsen the humanitarian situation in other conflict-riven regions , such as South Sudan , Yemen , and the Sahel , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a trade-off of enacting lockdown measures that worsen food shortages or tackling food shortages while increasing the risk of more infections .
To make matters worse , the global economic downturn from the coronavirus has already exacerbated food shortages worldwide .
Already , international aid groups were predicting that 2020 would be one of the worst years on record for global food insecurity , thanks to a combination of climate change and conflict .
After the outbreak of the pandemic , the World Food Program ( WFP ) nearly doubled the number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hunger worldwide , from 135 million to 265 million .
Syria is bearing the brunt of these interlinked crises .
Over half the country ’ s total population of some 17 million is now classified as food insecure—with an increase of 1.4 million just since the start of the year , according to WFP .
Another 2.2 million could potentially face food shortages , U.N. humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock told Foreign Policy .
“ The numbers in need are growing , ” he said .
The problems for Syria are several .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and distribution of food , with farming and agriculture—a pillar of Syria ’ s prewar economy—supply flows and imports all derailed by the conflict .
Even when food lands on the shelves , Syrians have less and less money to spend on it .
Both are hampered by coronavirus lockdowns .
And Syria has also been hammered by years of climate change-induced droughts , including a massive one that may have helped kick off the uprising in the first place a decade ago .
Then there ’ s the economic cataclysm in neighboring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and dollars for Syria ’ s war-ravaged economy .
“ There was already a perfect storm of climate change impacts and conflict that were making Syria one of the most food-insecure countries in the world , ” said Caitlin Welsh , the director of the global food security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , a think tank .
“ COVID is making bad situations even worse.
” Rebel-held northwestern Syria is in most dire need of humanitarian assistance , where attacks from Russian-backed Syrian government forces displaced over half @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation is also worsening in government-held areas , where people are now increasingly talking about the risks they face of going hungry , said Matt Hemsley , a Damascus-based policy and communications advisor at Oxfam , who says the lack of jobs and money is driving people to the brink .
“ We have anecdotal reports that people are taking quite desperate measures .
People talking to us , telling us they ’ re gathering , boiling , and eating weeds , ” Lowcock said .
“ This is not what people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The fundamental issue that the short-term fixes that could help Syria ’ s most vulnerable—more international food shipments , more visits to food distribution centers or markets , more interactions with aid workers—all require the sorts of travel and in-person interactions that health experts warn against to prevent the spread of the coronavirus .
That leaves humanitarian aid workers grappling with a grim trade-off : fight hunger or fight COVID-19 .
For now , at least according to official data , the number of reported coronavirus cases and deaths in Syria remains low @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) has tracked 372 confirmed cases and 14 deaths in the country as of July 7 .
But a devastated health infrastructure , living conditions that make social distancing difficult , and a low rate of testing mean that number is likely far higher .
The country ’ s weakened and overburdened health care infrastructure likely won ’ t be able to handle a wider outbreak : WHO estimates that more than half of Syria ’ s hospitals and health centers were taken out of action during the war .
Syria has only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intensive care unit beds , according to data from the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations , a nonprofit group tracking the crisis in Syria .
Last month , an international donor conference raised $ 5.5 billion from the United States , European Union , Germany , and other countries in humanitarian assistance for Syria in 2020 and $ 2.2 billion for crisis response in 2021 .
The United States pledged $ 696 million in new humanitarian assistance and is providing over $ 31 million to Syrians specifically to combat the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acting spokesperson for the U.S. Agency for International Development .
The new surge in funds offers a lifeline to Syrians caught between the conflict , pandemic , and food shortages .
But Lowcock said that even with the increased fundraising for Syria , it may not be enough , given the looming COVID-19 crisis—even if aid could actually be delivered .
“ Although we have our cross-border operation bringing food and medicines and other supplies in , the scale of the need is such that we can ’ t meet everybody ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moment , ” he said .
Other countries that have been much harder hit by the virus have thrown hundreds of billions of dollars at the problem in terms of ramped-up health care and massive economic stimulus .
Syria , like other poor and conflict-riven countries , can ’ t afford any economic shots in the arm .
That means there is likely a lot worse in store .
“ There ’ s an alarming prospect of a really , really bad situation in many countries in six months ’ time , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk of multiple famines [ and ] big spikes in loss of life as health services deteriorate .
”

Measures to control the spread of the coronavirus pandemic in Syria are exacerbating the country’s mounting food shortages, U.N. officials and Syria-based aid workers told Foreign Policy , a trend that could plunge the country’s humanitarian crisis to new depths after almost a decade of conflict.
Measures to control the spread of the coronavirus pandemic in Syria are exacerbating the country’s mounting food shortages, U.N. officials and Syria-based aid workers told Foreign Policy, a trend that could plunge the country’s humanitarian crisis to new depths after almost a decade of conflict.
The compounding crises offer a grim model for how the long-term effects of the pandemic could worsen the humanitarian situation in other conflict-riven regions, such as South Sudan, Yemen, and the Sahel, where governments and aid organizations may be faced with a trade-off of enacting lockdown measures that worsen food shortages or tackling food shortages while increasing the risk of more infections.
To make matters worse, the global economic downturn from the coronavirus has already exacerbated food shortages worldwide. Already, international aid groups were predicting that 2020 would be one of the worst years on record for global food insecurity, thanks to a combination of climate change and conflict. After the outbreak of the pandemic, the World Food Program (WFP) nearly doubled the number of people it predicted would face acute hunger worldwide, from 135 million to 265 million.
Syria is bearing the brunt of these interlinked crises. Over half the country’s total population of some 17 million is now classified as food insecure—with an increase of 1.4 million just since the start of the year, according to WFP. Another 2.2 million could potentially face food shortages, U.N. humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock told Foreign Policy. “The numbers in need are growing,” he said.
The problems for Syria are several. There are ongoing difficulties with the simple production and distribution of food, with farming and agriculture—a pillar of Syria’s prewar economy—supply flows and imports all derailed by the conflict. Even when food lands on the shelves, Syrians have less and less money to spend on it. Both are hampered by coronavirus lockdowns. And Syria has also been hammered by years of climate change-induced droughts, including a massive one that may have helped kick off the uprising in the first place a decade ago. Then there’s the economic cataclysm in neighboring Lebanon, the main conduit for banking and dollars for Syria’s war-ravaged economy.
“There was already a perfect storm of climate change impacts and conflict that were making Syria one of the most food-insecure countries in the world,” said Caitlin Welsh, the director of the global food security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank. “COVID is making bad situations even worse.”
Rebel-held northwestern Syria is in most dire need of humanitarian assistance, where attacks from Russian-backed Syrian government forces displaced over half a million people this year. But the situation is also worsening in government-held areas, where people are now increasingly talking about the risks they face of going hungry, said Matt Hemsley, a Damascus-based policy and communications advisor at Oxfam, who says the lack of jobs and money is driving people to the brink.
“We have anecdotal reports that people are taking quite desperate measures. People talking to us, telling us they’re gathering, boiling, and eating weeds,” Lowcock said. “This is not what people do unless they’re desperate.”
The fundamental issue that the short-term fixes that could help Syria’s most vulnerable—more international food shipments, more visits to food distribution centers or markets, more interactions with aid workers—all require the sorts of travel and in-person interactions that health experts warn against to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. That leaves humanitarian aid workers grappling with a grim trade-off: fight hunger or fight COVID-19.
For now, at least according to official data, the number of reported coronavirus cases and deaths in Syria remains low. The World Health Organization (WHO) has tracked 372 confirmed cases and 14 deaths in the country as of July 7. But a devastated health infrastructure, living conditions that make social distancing difficult, and a low rate of testing mean that number is likely far higher. The country’s weakened and overburdened health care infrastructure likely won’t be able to handle a wider outbreak: WHO estimates that more than half of Syria’s hospitals and health centers were taken out of action during the war. Syria has only about 1,400 adult hospital beds and 250 intensive care unit beds, according to data from the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations, a nonprofit group tracking the crisis in Syria.
Last month, an international donor conference raised $5.5 billion from the United States, European Union, Germany, and other countries in humanitarian assistance for Syria in 2020 and $2.2 billion for crisis response in 2021. The United States pledged $696 million in new humanitarian assistance and is providing over $31 million to Syrians specifically to combat the coronavirus, according to Pooja Jhunjhunwala, the acting spokesperson for the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The new surge in funds offers a lifeline to Syrians caught between the conflict, pandemic, and food shortages. But Lowcock said that even with the increased fundraising for Syria, it may not be enough, given the looming COVID-19 crisis—even if aid could actually be delivered.
“Although we have our cross-border operation bringing food and medicines and other supplies in, the scale of the need is such that we can’t meet everybody’s basic needs through that program at the moment,” he said.
Other countries that have been much harder hit by the virus have thrown hundreds of billions of dollars at the problem in terms of ramped-up health care and massive economic stimulus. Syria, like other poor and conflict-riven countries, can’t afford any economic shots in the arm. That means there is likely a lot worse in store.
“There’s an alarming prospect of a really, really bad situation in many countries in six months’ time,” Lowcock said. “There is a risk of multiple famines [and] big spikes in loss of life as health services deteriorate.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-07--Leaving the WHO Will Hurt Americans’ Health

Leaving the WHO Will Hurt Americans ’ Health Even as the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies in the United States , on July 7 , 2020 , U.S. President Donald Trump notified Congress that he had sent formal notification to the United Nations of the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
Not only is the United States a critical player in global health , but the WHO is deeply integrated into U.S. public health efforts at home .
Under U.S. law , the president can not immediately and unilaterally withdraw from the organization .
The U.S. Congress @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work to prevent this damaging move .
But even if they do , the president ’ s actions will have immediate effects .
Trump is moving rapidly to freeze relations , disrupting ongoing operations of U.S. health agencies .
Further extracting the United States over the next year would be difficult and harmful .
U.S. experts work daily with WHO , sharing information and expertise to protect Americans ’ health and save lives around the world .
Those who suggest that the United States can go it alone , substitute another institution , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manner on certain issues misunderstand global public health and international relations .
Simply put , the United States needs the WHO , even with its imperfections .
WHO plays an indispensable role on disease outbreaks .
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) has invested heavily in innovative global disease surveillance to identify foreign outbreaks—crawling the Internet and social media , for example , for key words that might indicate an epidemic .
But more detailed , actionable data—and cooperation from other governments—is necessary to p lan effective responses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sharing public health information can be ; many governments are reluctant to share information , particularly if they don ’ t see eye-to-eye with the United States .
Thus , the CDC depends on the WHO to broker global information sharing—from the epidemiological data needed to prepare health systems to the viral genomic sequences needed to create tests .
It was only as part of a WHO mission that U.S. scientists even got access to the epidemic in Wuhan , China , to begin with .
Working only from what U.S. public health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts to combat disease .
Meanwhile , helping to stop disease outbreaks before they spread is a key U.S. global health security strategy and the WHO is an essential partner .
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo , for example , health workers could halt an Ebola outbreak in the middle of active war in part because WHO staff and its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network members were deployed to areas deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel .
Disease response is one of many areas where the WHO and U.S. public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is home to 83 different WHO collaborating centers—research institutes , universities , and U.S. government agencies that work at the intersection of U.S. and global public health .
Of these , more than 20 are at CDC and the National Institutes of Health , where they focus on areas Congress has identified as priorities , ranging from biosecurity to travelers ’ health , cancer , and smallpox .
This collaborative work will presumably cease immediately under the president ’ s moves unless Congress acts .
Such centers also participate in the process of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. government could be cut out of for the first time .
That could interrupt efforts to prevent a dangerous flu epidemic this winter , a double emergency for U.S. hospitals dealing with COVID-19 .
The WHO ’ s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System aggregates information from 112 countries around the world to track and study flu .
Twice a year , the organization convenes its collaborating centers , including at the CDC , to share data and virus samples and design that year ’ s vaccine—critical since new flu strains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not in the United States .
Severing ties with the WHO would end CDC ’ s status as a collaborating center and hub for this work .
The flu vaccine is not the only one the U.S. should be worried about .
The WHO is coordinating access to a COVID-19 vaccine to safely reopen societies and economies .
If the most effective vaccine is developed outside the United States , and the United States is not part of the frameworks negotiated through the WHO , the U.S. public could be at the back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO also threatens enduring bipartisan U.S. global health priorities .
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative , which is housed at the WHO , is the center of a global effort tantalizingly close to ending polio , which remains endemic only in Nigeria , Afghanistan , and Pakistan .
CDC experts are inextricably embedded in the initiative , to which the United States has been the second-biggest donor .
Were the country to withdraw from the effort , a historic opportunity to eradicate a terrible disease and save millions of children from paralysis could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pivotal support to the U.S. President ’ s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief , helping countries to adopt new testing , treatment , and prevention technologies to end the AIDS crisis .
At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to double the death toll from HIV and AIDS , tuberculosis , and malaria , any disruption would be devastating .
The WHO ’ s processes are deeply imperfect , and reform is warranted .
In part , the WHO has limited power to compel countries to take action or share information .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to succeed .
Some U.S. allies would work closely with it on health efforts , but many other governments around the world would be reluctant .
Governments cooperate and share information through the WHO because it is an international organization where they have power in decision-making , building trust , and predictability .
And in a multipolar world , powerful countries will not cooperate without gaining influence at WHO—that is the trade-off among sovereign nations .
It will be necessary to improve the WHO ’ s powers and agreements between countries .
Revision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , a legally binding treaty adopted at the World Health Assembly , is the venue to accomplish the Trump administration ’ s stated goal to speed information sharing and pressure recalcitrant governments .
Giving the WHO greater powers to gather and share outbreak information without the permission of member states , creating new capacity for external review of “ official ” data , improving WHO ’ s ability to work with non-state actors , agreeing to consequences for states who do not rapidly share information , and other ideas will be on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have little influence in revising the IHR if it vacates its seat at table within the WHO .
The WHO is woven deep into the fabric of U.S. public health .
Extracting it will be difficult , disruptive , and damaging .
It is naive to think that the essential functions of the WHO could be recreated through bilateral accords—indeed , the long history of failure in state relations on health is proof positive .
Trying to do so , and failing , is the last thing the world needs in the middle @ @ @ @ @

Even as the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies in the United States, on July 7, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump notified Congress that he had sent formal notification to the United Nations of the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO).
Even as the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies in the United States, on July 7, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump notified Congress that he had sent formal notification to the United Nations of the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO).
Not only is the United States a critical player in global health, but the WHO is deeply integrated into U.S. public health efforts at home. Under U.S. law, the president cannot immediately and unilaterally withdraw from the organization. The U.S. Congress, courts, and public can all work to prevent this damaging move. But even if they do, the president’s actions will have immediate effects. Trump is moving rapidly to freeze relations, disrupting ongoing operations of U.S. health agencies. Further extracting the United States over the next year would be difficult and harmful. U.S. experts work daily with WHO, sharing information and expertise to protect Americans’ health and save lives around the world. Those who suggest that the United States can go it alone, substitute another institution, or work with WHO in a transactional manner on certain issues misunderstand global public health and international relations. Simply put, the United States needs the WHO, even with its imperfections.
WHO plays an indispensable role on disease outbreaks. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has invested heavily in innovative global disease surveillance to identify foreign outbreaks—crawling the Internet and social media, for example, for key words that might indicate an epidemic. But more detailed, actionable data—and cooperation from other governments—is necessary to p lan effective responses. And COVID-19 has shown how political sharing public health information can be; many governments are reluctant to share information, particularly if they don’t see eye-to-eye with the United States. Thus, the CDC depends on the WHO to broker global information sharing—from the epidemiological data needed to prepare health systems to the viral genomic sequences needed to create tests. It was only as part of a WHO mission that U.S. scientists even got access to the epidemic in Wuhan, China, to begin with. Working only from what U.S. public health officials can gather themselves would hobble U.S. efforts to combat disease. Meanwhile, helping to stop disease outbreaks before they spread is a key U.S. global health security strategy and the WHO is an essential partner. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, health workers could halt an Ebola outbreak in the middle of active war in part because WHO staff and its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network members were deployed to areas deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel.
Disease response is one of many areas where the WHO and U.S. public health are intertwined. The United States is home to 83 different WHO collaborating centers—research institutes, universities, and U.S. government agencies that work at the intersection of U.S. and global public health. Of these, more than 20 are at CDC and the National Institutes of Health, where they focus on areas Congress has identified as priorities, ranging from biosecurity to travelers’ health, cancer, and smallpox. This collaborative work will presumably cease immediately under the president’s moves unless Congress acts.
Such centers also participate in the process of developing an influenza vaccine, a process the U.S. government could be cut out of for the first time. That could interrupt efforts to prevent a dangerous flu epidemic this winter, a double emergency for U.S. hospitals dealing with COVID-19. The WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System aggregates information from 112 countries around the world to track and study flu. Twice a year, the organization convenes its collaborating centers, including at the CDC, to share data and virus samples and design that year’s vaccine—critical since new flu strains are usually first spotted in Asia, not in the United States. Severing ties with the WHO would end CDC’s status as a collaborating center and hub for this work.
The flu vaccine is not the only one the U.S. should be worried about. The WHO is coordinating access to a COVID-19 vaccine to safely reopen societies and economies. If the most effective vaccine is developed outside the United States, and the United States is not part of the frameworks negotiated through the WHO, the U.S. public could be at the back of the line.
Withdrawing from the WHO also threatens enduring bipartisan U.S. global health priorities. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, which is housed at the WHO, is the center of a global effort tantalizingly close to ending polio, which remains endemic only in Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. CDC experts are inextricably embedded in the initiative, to which the United States has been the second-biggest donor. Were the country to withdraw from the effort, a historic opportunity to eradicate a terrible disease and save millions of children from paralysis could be lost. The WHO also provides pivotal support to the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, helping countries to adopt new testing, treatment, and prevention technologies to end the AIDS crisis. At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to double the death toll from HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, any disruption would be devastating.
The WHO’s processes are deeply imperfect, and reform is warranted. In part, the WHO has limited power to compel countries to take action or share information. But substituting U.S. bilateral efforts is unlikely to succeed. Some U.S. allies would work closely with it on health efforts, but many other governments around the world would be reluctant. Governments cooperate and share information through the WHO because it is an international organization where they have power in decision-making, building trust, and predictability. And in a multipolar world, powerful countries will not cooperate without gaining influence at WHO—that is the trade-off among sovereign nations.
It will be necessary to improve the WHO’s powers and agreements between countries. Revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR), a legally binding treaty adopted at the World Health Assembly, is the venue to accomplish the Trump administration’s stated goal to speed information sharing and pressure recalcitrant governments. Giving the WHO greater powers to gather and share outbreak information without the permission of member states, creating new capacity for external review of “official” data, improving WHO’s ability to work with non-state actors, agreeing to consequences for states who do not rapidly share information, and other ideas will be on the table. The United States will have little influence in revising the IHR if it vacates its seat at table within the WHO.
The WHO is woven deep into the fabric of U.S. public health. Extracting it will be difficult, disruptive, and damaging. It is naive to think that the essential functions of the WHO could be recreated through bilateral accords—indeed, the long history of failure in state relations on health is proof positive. Trying to do so, and failing, is the last thing the world needs in the middle of a global pandemic.