foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--America Must Promote Democracy, Despite Trump’s Disdain for It

America Must Promote Democracy , Despite Trump ’ s Disdain for It On Sept. 23 , the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election .
That same day , the United States ’ own president , Donald Trump , refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election .
The timing was more than awkward , as was the seeming double standard .
In a world already riven @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and autocrats sense wind at their backs .
A dysfunctional U.S. democracy at home makes it less credible to support liberalism abroad—at a time when freedom continues a more than decade-long retreat around the world .
When the world needs the United States to lead in the support of democracy , the country is deeply divided about the strength of its own .
Absent a quick correction , this portends trouble for what has long been a core element of U.S. foreign policy .
And a core element it remains , in spite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Take a look at nearly any week of U.S. diplomatic activity , and you will see the thread of democracy promotion running through it .
On Oct. 6 , for example , State Department officials held a human rights dialogue with Vietnam , in which they emphasized the rule of law , freedom of expression and association , and religious freedom .
Two days later , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on upcoming elections in several African countries , observing that “ [ r ] epression and intimidation have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9 , the United States sanctioned Nicaragua ’ s chief prosecutor for fabricating cases against political prisoners , while the State Department committed to “ [ p ] reserve and build upon the gains in democratization and human rights ” in Afghanistan “ as a necessary condition for sustainable peace.
” Foreign observers might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another ’ s .
These diplomatic efforts—and many others like them—run parallel to similar efforts by democracy promotion organizations such as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the National Democratic Institute , and the National Endowment for Democracy .
With budgets well-financed by a supportive U.S. Congress , these organizations ’ on-the-ground efforts to monitor elections , conduct polling , help build political parties , and strengthen the process of democracy remain vital .
Even in a Trump administration , support for democracy abroad remains a distinguishing feature of U.S. foreign policy .
Not a few foreign observers , however , might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power but has repeatedly said the election itself will be fraudulent .
He has begun insisting that the attorney general indict Trump ’ s political opponents , tweeted that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden “ shouldn ’ t be allowed to run , ” and argued that former Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton “ should be in jail.
” This is not exactly a firm embrace of the democratic process .
It ’ s also not new and follows years of undemocratic statements and behavior .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ the enemy of the people , ” claimed that the U.S. Constitution gives him “ the right to do whatever I want as president , ” and made many other statements that show a disdain for democratic norms .
The chinks in the United States ’ democratic armor go well beyond presidential rhetoric : The government has shut down twice in the past three years ; politicians now disagree not only about Supreme Court nominees but even the proper number of justices on the court .
With the nation roiled by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expert is under protection against death threats .
A militia was caught plotting to kidnap the governor of Michigan , and this year ’ s Black Lives Matter protests demonstrate once again that the country has fallen far short of its founding ideals .
In light of all this , one might ask by what rights the United States demands democracy and freedom in other countries .
Yet a sense of perspective is in order .
For all its flaws , the U.S. system of government remains vastly different from that of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regimes .
The U.S. president may denounce the press , but the press gives back as good as it gets .
Millions of Americans are freely voting already .
Protests against police violence could not have taken place in China , Iran , or Venezuela .
With any luck , there will be a peaceful post-election transition of power .
There are always inconsistencies in American democracy—yet it always remains far better than nondemocratic alternatives .
The key is to fix the flaws , not to lose faith in the project .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project .
Freedom House recently observed that the global pandemic has fueled what it calls a “ crisis for democracy , ” noting that the conditions for democracy and human rights have grown worse in 80 countries .
COVID-19 has inspired abuses of power , given governments an excuse to silence critics , weakened institutions , and undermined systems of accountability .
After 14 years of consecutive decline in global freedom as measured by Freedom House , democracy today is in need of strengthening .
According to Freedom House , the global pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The Trump administration ’ s own national defense strategy rightly observes that China and Russia are working to shape the world in accordance with their authoritarian model .
By undermining democratic alliances and interfering in the domestic politics of key democracies , Beijing and Moscow not only aim to defend their political systems but seek to gain strategic advantage in their rivalry with the United States .
Resisting these efforts requires that the United States protect its own democracy and support it abroad—in places such as Belarus , Ethiopia , and Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they should seek to influence the domestic affairs of other countries .
As secretary of state 200 years ago , John Quincy Adams famously held that the United States should not offer active support for liberal causes but lead with “ the benignant sympathy of her example.
” At the other extreme , former President George W. Bush committed the United States to aid the growth of democratic movements “ in every nation and culture.
” For all their differences , both approaches—the United States as exemplar of democracy or as handmaiden to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which stands in the balance today .
Political dysfunction sows doubt over Washington ’ s ability to lead the free world , undermines U.S. credibility in supporting liberal institutions abroad , and diminishes the attractiveness of the democratic model .
It also lends ammunition to those who tout autocratic alternatives , such as Moscow and Beijing .
Today , U.S. policymakers and foreign-policy experts increasingly hear from their international counterparts that instead of trying to teach the world about democracy , the United States would do well to learn from others : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Russian disinformation ; from Taiwan about handling a public health crisis without resorting to totalitarian controls ; or from South Korea about holding elections during the pandemic .
It is good to absorb these lessons—but U.S. foreign policy is strongest when the nation ’ s democracy functions well enough to convey its own set of positive lessons .
U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will do so in the future , especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored .
Even if the United States experiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , and even if Trump gives way to the more democratically minded Biden , the country will still have a lot of work to do to firm up its political , economic , and social foundations .
Yet the world won ’ t wait for the United States to perfect itself .
It requires Washington to reembrace the cause of defending liberalism and freedom now .
Of course , as IRI President Daniel Twining puts it , activists striving for rights and freedoms in places like Hong Kong and Belarus do so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States ’ fortunes .
Nonetheless , U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will continue to make a difference in the future , especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored .
If 2020 has not marked the high point of U.S. democratic practice , that ’ s no reason to lose faith in democracy promotion as a core element of U.S. foreign policy .
On the contrary , recent experience should be a spur : For both its own sake and the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy abroad to shaking its foundations at home .

On Sept. 23, the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election. That same day, the United States’ own president, Donald Trump, refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election.
On Sept. 23, the U.S. State Department announced that the United States would no longer recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus after he refused to hand over power to his opponent following a fraudulent election. That same day, the United States’ own president, Donald Trump, refused to commit to a peaceful transition after the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election.
The timing was more than awkward, as was the seeming double standard. In a world already riven by competition among political models, dictators and autocrats sense wind at their backs. A dysfunctional U.S. democracy at home makes it less credible to support liberalism abroad—at a time when freedom continues a more than decade-long retreat around the world. When the world needs the United States to lead in the support of democracy, the country is deeply divided about the strength of its own. Absent a quick correction, this portends trouble for what has long been a core element of U.S. foreign policy.
And a core element it remains, in spite of Trump’s statements and behavior. Take a look at nearly any week of U.S. diplomatic activity, and you will see the thread of democracy promotion running through it. On Oct. 6, for example, State Department officials held a human rights dialogue with Vietnam, in which they emphasized the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, and religious freedom. Two days later, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on upcoming elections in several African countries, observing that “[r]epression and intimidation have no place in democracies.” On Oct. 9, the United States sanctioned Nicaragua’s chief prosecutor for fabricating cases against political prisoners, while the State Department committed to “[p]reserve and build upon the gains in democratization and human rights” in Afghanistan “as a necessary condition for sustainable peace.”
Foreign observers might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another’s.
These diplomatic efforts—and many others like them—run parallel to similar efforts by democracy promotion organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy. With budgets well-financed by a supportive U.S. Congress, these organizations’ on-the-ground efforts to monitor elections, conduct polling, help build political parties, and strengthen the process of democracy remain vital. Even in a Trump administration, support for democracy abroad remains a distinguishing feature of U.S. foreign policy.
Not a few foreign observers, however, might ask Americans to extract the plank in their own eye before seeking to remove the speck in another’s. Trump has not only refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power but has repeatedly said the election itself will be fraudulent. He has begun insisting that the attorney general indict Trump’s political opponents, tweeted that Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden “shouldn’t be allowed to run,” and argued that former Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton “should be in jail.” This is not exactly a firm embrace of the democratic process.
It’s also not new and follows years of undemocratic statements and behavior. Trump has denounced the free press as “the enemy of the people,” claimed that the U.S. Constitution gives him “the right to do whatever I want as president,” and made many other statements that show a disdain for democratic norms. The chinks in the United States’ democratic armor go well beyond presidential rhetoric: The government has shut down twice in the past three years; politicians now disagree not only about Supreme Court nominees but even the proper number of justices on the court. With the nation roiled by the coronavirus pandemic, its chief infectious disease expert is under protection against death threats. A militia was caught plotting to kidnap the governor of Michigan, and this year’s Black Lives Matter protests demonstrate once again that the country has fallen far short of its founding ideals. In light of all this, one might ask by what rights the United States demands democracy and freedom in other countries.
Yet a sense of perspective is in order. For all its flaws, the U.S. system of government remains vastly different from that of the world’s autocracies and other illiberal regimes. The U.S. president may denounce the press, but the press gives back as good as it gets. Millions of Americans are freely voting already. Protests against police violence could not have taken place in China, Iran, or Venezuela. With any luck, there will be a peaceful post-election transition of power. There are always inconsistencies in American democracy—yet it always remains far better than nondemocratic alternatives. The key is to fix the flaws, not to lose faith in the project.
Some are indeed losing faith in the democratic project. Freedom House recently observed that the global pandemic has fueled what it calls a “crisis for democracy,” noting that the conditions for democracy and human rights have grown worse in 80 countries. COVID-19 has inspired abuses of power, given governments an excuse to silence critics, weakened institutions, and undermined systems of accountability. After 14 years of consecutive decline in global freedom as measured by Freedom House, democracy today is in need of strengthening.
According to Freedom House, the global pandemic has fueled a “crisis for democracy.”
The Trump administration’s own national defense strategy rightly observes that China and Russia are working to shape the world in accordance with their authoritarian model. By undermining democratic alliances and interfering in the domestic politics of key democracies, Beijing and Moscow not only aim to defend their political systems but seek to gain strategic advantage in their rivalry with the United States. Resisting these efforts requires that the United States protect its own democracy and support it abroad—in places such as Belarus, Ethiopia, and Hong Kong.
Americans have long debated whether they should seek to influence the domestic affairs of other countries. As secretary of state 200 years ago, John Quincy Adams famously held that the United States should not offer active support for liberal causes but lead with “the benignant sympathy of her example.” At the other extreme, former President George W. Bush committed the United States to aid the growth of democratic movements “in every nation and culture.”
For all their differences, both approaches—the United States as exemplar of democracy or as handmaiden to it—rely on a healthy democracy at home, which stands in the balance today. Political dysfunction sows doubt over Washington’s ability to lead the free world, undermines U.S. credibility in supporting liberal institutions abroad, and diminishes the attractiveness of the democratic model. It also lends ammunition to those who tout autocratic alternatives, such as Moscow and Beijing.
Today, U.S. policymakers and foreign-policy experts increasingly hear from their international counterparts that instead of trying to teach the world about democracy, the United States would do well to learn from others: from Estonia about protecting its democracy; from Russian disinformation; from Taiwan about handling a public health crisis without resorting to totalitarian controls; or from South Korea about holding elections during the pandemic. It is good to absorb these lessons—but U.S. foreign policy is strongest when the nation’s democracy functions well enough to convey its own set of positive lessons.
U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will do so in the future, especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored.
Even if the United States experiences a drama-free election and smooth transition of power, and even if Trump gives way to the more democratically minded Biden, the country will still have a lot of work to do to firm up its political, economic, and social foundations. Yet the world won’t wait for the United States to perfect itself. It requires Washington to reembrace the cause of defending liberalism and freedom now.
Of course, as IRI President Daniel Twining puts it, activists striving for rights and freedoms in places like Hong Kong and Belarus do so for their own reasons—not everything revolves around the United States’ fortunes. Nonetheless, U.S. support has demonstrably made a difference in the past and will continue to make a difference in the future, especially once the credibility of U.S. democracy is restored.
If 2020 has not marked the high point of U.S. democratic practice, that’s no reason to lose faith in democracy promotion as a core element of U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, recent experience should be a spur: For both its own sake and the world’s, the United States should prefer supporting democracy abroad to shaking its foundations at home.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-14--Israel to Approve New Settlement Units in the West Bank

Israel to Approve New Settlement Units in the West Bank Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Israel is set to authorize more than 4,000 new housing units in the West Bank , protests against police brutality continue in Nigeria , and violence intensifies in Afghanistan .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Israel ’ s Higher Planning Council ( HPC ) of the Civil Administration that operates the West Bank is expected to approve plans to construct 4,430 new housing units in settlements in the West Bank during a two-day meeting starting today .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ group that monitors settlement expansion , it will make 2020 the biggest year since 2012 for the construction of new settlement units .
Under pressure .
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come under significant pressure from settlers , one of his Likud party ’ s key constituencies , since signing the normalization deal with the United Arab Emirates in August .
As part of the deal , Netanyahu agreed to suspend plans to annex parts of the West Bank , outraging settlers and causing the head of the Yesha settlers ’ council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , defrauded us , duped us.
” As Albert B. Wolf wrote in Foreign Policy in August , “ abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop , and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters.
” Earlier this month , Netanyahu buckled under the pressure and approved plans for the construction of 5,400 new housing units in the West Bank .
Palestinian opposition .
But the Israeli government ’ s continued effort to expand settlements in the West Bank have angered Palestinians and undermined Netanyahu ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This disproves the Israeli claim that it has frozen settlement to enable its normalization with Arab states , ” said the Palestinian Authority ’ s foreign ministry in response to Netanyahu ’ s announcement earlier this month , “ and reflects the systematic American and Israeli violations of international law and United Nations resolutions.
” Stronger with allies .
The move could be another victory for Netanyahu as he continues to battle domestic challenges to his authority .
Settlement expansion will likely mollify one of its most important constituencies , and they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has signed with the UAE and Bahrain .
No calm in Nigeria .
Protests against police brutality continued in Nigeria for the sixth straight day on Tuesday despite the government agreeing to disband a controversial police unit at the heart of the public ’ s grievances .
Protests erupted last week after a video showing a person being beaten by police went viral online , sparking an online campaign in which users shared their personal experiences with police brutality .
The Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) was formed to combat armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country , but has since been accused of extrajudicial killings , torture , kidnapping , and theft .
On Sunday , Muhammed Adamu , the Nigerian police ’ s inspector general , said in a public broadcast that SARS would be immediately disbanded and that police would investigate alleged human rights violations committed by the squad .
Belarusian crisis escalates .
Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has demanded that President Aleksandr Lukashenko resign by Oct. 25 or face nationwide strikes .
“ [ On ] Oct. 26 , all enterprises will begin a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement , “ all roads will be blocked , state-owned stores will no longer have any sales.
” Tikhanovskaya is hugely popular among protesters but fled to Lithuania in the aftermath of the controversial Aug. 9 election , which saw Lukashenko win by a landslide amid allegations of electoral fraud .
Tikhanovskaya ’ s ultimatum is part of a wider escalation of tensions between Lukashenko and anti-government protesters .
On Monday , the government authorized police to use lethal force against protesters after the ninth consecutive Sunday of massive protests in the capital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote in Foreign Policy , Lukashenko ’ s changing tactics present a serious challenge to protesters that could ultimately undermine their cohesion .
Political uncertainty grips Kyrgyzstan .
Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov said he will ask the country ’ s parliament to hold a second vote affirming opposition leader Sadyr Zhaparov as prime minister after the first vote last week was marred by irregularities .
Zhaparov was released from prison by supporters and elected to replace Kubatbek Boronov after the latter ’ s government was brought down during major anti-government protests in response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has already said he will resign once a new prime minister has been formally appointed .
Kyrgyzstan was thrown into political chaos after two pro-government parties won a large majority of seats in the country ’ s parliament after the most recent elections .
The country faced major unrest before Jeenbekov declared a state of emergency , forcing Russia to intervene in yet another crisis in its backyard .
Tuesday ’ s announcement followed a meeting between Jeenbekov , Zhaparov , and a senior Russian official aimed at defusing the crisis .
Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ council .
Although Russia and China succeeded in winning seats on the United Nations Human Rights Council despite objections from rights groups , Saudi Arabia failed in its bid .
China and Saudi Arabia were competing against Pakistan , Uzbekistan , and Nepal for four regional seats .
With just 90 votes , the kingdom failed to make the cut .
Earlier this month , the Saudi lawyer Taha al-Hajji argued in FP that “ A country that tortures and executes its citizens for exercising their right to free expression should not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan .
The Afghan security forces launched a major counteroffensive against Taliban targets in the southern province of Helmand on Tuesday as violence between the two sides continues to intensify .
The assault was a response to a series of Taliban attacks on several security checkpoints around the southern city of Lashkar Gah , which precipitated a U.S. airstrike in the region .
The violence has overshadowed the slow-moving peace talks currently taking place between the Taliban and the Afghan government in Doha , Qatar .
The fighting has forced an estimated 35,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , pushing the country closer to a humanitarian disaster .
Who will lead Malaysia ?
Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim met with King Al-Sultan Abdullah on Tuesday as part of his bid to become the country ’ s next prime minister .
Ibrahim claims he has enough support in parliament to oust Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin , though he has not disclosed the identities of those he claims support his bid .
“ We must … remember that Muhyiddin has lost his majority , ” Anwar told reporters , “ and it would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The king will now review the documents presented to him and make a decision .
Malaysia has been wracked by political instability since the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ’ s government in February , after which Yassin took power with a slim majority .
Anwar , who has previously served as deputy prime minister , spent almost 10 years in prison for alleged corruption and sodomy , charges widely seen as politically-motivated .
Pundits , oddsmakers , and ordinary observers are at pains trying to predict the outcome of the upcoming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is notoriously unreliable .
But they might find it worthwhile to look closely at the voting patterns of Vigo County in Indiana .
Vigo residents have voted for the winning presidential candidate in every election since 1956 , and all but two since 1888 .
True to form , Vigo residents are split over who to support this election cycle , and another win for Trump isn ’ t guaranteed .
“ Donald Trump has shown that putting America first leads to total discord , ” one reader wrote in the letters section @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Trump is taking the country in the right direction while Biden and the left have the wrong vision of what this country is and should be , ” another reader hit back .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Israel is set to authorize more than 4,000 new housing units in the West Bank , protests against police brutality continue in Nigeria , and violence intensifies in Afghanistan .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Israel is set to authorize more than 4,000 new housing units in the West Bank, protests against police brutality continue in Nigeria, and violence intensifies in Afghanistan.
If you would like receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Netanyahu Sets His Sights on Settlement Expansion
Israel’s Higher Planning Council (HPC) of the Civil Administration that operates the West Bank is expected to approve plans to construct 4,430 new housing units in settlements in the West Bank during a two-day meeting starting today. According to Peace Now, an Israeli group that monitors settlement expansion, it will make 2020 the biggest year since 2012 for the construction of new settlement units.
Under pressure. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come under significant pressure from settlers, one of his Likud party’s key constituencies, since signing the normalization deal with the United Arab Emirates in August. As part of the deal, Netanyahu agreed to suspend plans to annex parts of the West Bank, outraging settlers and causing the head of the Yesha settlers’ council to say that “he deceived us, defrauded us, duped us.”
As Albert B. Wolf wrote in Foreign Policy in August, “abandoning annexation altogether would be seen as the ultimate flip-flop, and Netanyahu does not have any available substitutes to satisfy these supporters.” Earlier this month, Netanyahu buckled under the pressure and approved plans for the construction of 5,400 new housing units in the West Bank.
Palestinian opposition. But the Israeli government’s continued effort to expand settlements in the West Bank have angered Palestinians and undermined Netanyahu’s pledge to shelve annexation. “This disproves the Israeli claim that it has frozen settlement to enable its normalization with Arab states,” said the Palestinian Authority’s foreign ministry in response to Netanyahu’s announcement earlier this month, “and reflects the systematic American and Israeli violations of international law and United Nations resolutions.”
Stronger with allies. The move could be another victory for Netanyahu as he continues to battle domestic challenges to his authority. Settlement expansion will likely mollify one of its most important constituencies, and they are unlikely to seriously impact the normalization deals he has signed with the UAE and Bahrain.
What We’re Following Today
No calm in Nigeria. Protests against police brutality continued in Nigeria for the sixth straight day on Tuesday despite the government agreeing to disband a controversial police unit at the heart of the public’s grievances. Protests erupted last week after a video showing a person being beaten by police went viral online, sparking an online campaign in which users shared their personal experiences with police brutality.
The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) was formed to combat armed robbery and other serious crimes in the country, but has since been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, kidnapping, and theft. On Sunday, Muhammed Adamu, the Nigerian police’s inspector general, said in a public broadcast that SARS would be immediately disbanded and that police would investigate alleged human rights violations committed by the squad.
Belarusian crisis escalates. Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has demanded that President Aleksandr Lukashenko resign by Oct. 25 or face nationwide strikes. “[On] Oct. 26, all enterprises will begin a strike,” she said in a statement, “all roads will be blocked, state-owned stores will no longer have any sales.” Tikhanovskaya is hugely popular among protesters but fled to Lithuania in the aftermath of the controversial Aug. 9 election, which saw Lukashenko win by a landslide amid allegations of electoral fraud.
Tikhanovskaya’s ultimatum is part of a wider escalation of tensions between Lukashenko and anti-government protesters. On Monday, the government authorized police to use lethal force against protesters after the ninth consecutive Sunday of massive protests in the capital of Minsk. But as Vladislav Davidzon wrote in Foreign Policy, Lukashenko’s changing tactics present a serious challenge to protesters that could ultimately undermine their cohesion.
Political uncertainty grips Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz President Sooronbay Jeenbekov said he will ask the country’s parliament to hold a second vote affirming opposition leader Sadyr Zhaparov as prime minister after the first vote last week was marred by irregularities. Zhaparov was released from prison by supporters and elected to replace Kubatbek Boronov after the latter’s government was brought down during major anti-government protests in response to parliamentary elections last week. Jeenbekov has already said he will resign once a new prime minister has been formally appointed.
Kyrgyzstan was thrown into political chaos after two pro-government parties won a large majority of seats in the country’s parliament after the most recent elections. The country faced major unrest before Jeenbekov declared a state of emergency, forcing Russia to intervene in yet another crisis in its backyard. Tuesday’s announcement followed a meeting between Jeenbekov, Zhaparov, and a senior Russian official aimed at defusing the crisis.
Saudi Arabia fails to win seat on U.N. council. Although Russia and China succeeded in winning seats on the United Nations Human Rights Council despite objections from rights groups, Saudi Arabia failed in its bid. China and Saudi Arabia were competing against Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Nepal for four regional seats. With just 90 votes, the kingdom failed to make the cut. Earlier this month, the Saudi lawyer Taha al-Hajji argued in FP that “A country that tortures and executes its citizens for exercising their right to free expression should not be on the council.”
Keep an Eye On
Violence continues in Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces launched a major counteroffensive against Taliban targets in the southern province of Helmand on Tuesday as violence between the two sides continues to intensify. The assault was a response to a series of Taliban attacks on several security checkpoints around the southern city of Lashkar Gah, which precipitated a U.S. airstrike in the region. The violence has overshadowed the slow-moving peace talks currently taking place between the Taliban and the Afghan government in Doha, Qatar.
The fighting has forced an estimated 35,000 people to flee their homes in Helmand, pushing the country closer to a humanitarian disaster.
Who will lead Malaysia? Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim met with King Al-Sultan Abdullah on Tuesday as part of his bid to become the country’s next prime minister. Ibrahim claims he has enough support in parliament to oust Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, though he has not disclosed the identities of those he claims support his bid. “We must … remember that Muhyiddin has lost his majority,” Anwar told reporters, “and it would be appropriate for him to resign.” The king will now review the documents presented to him and make a decision.
Malaysia has been wracked by political instability since the resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s government in February, after which Yassin took power with a slim majority. Anwar, who has previously served as deputy prime minister, spent almost 10 years in prison for alleged corruption and sodomy, charges widely seen as politically-motivated.
Odds and Ends
Pundits, oddsmakers, and ordinary observers are at pains trying to predict the outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential election, and polling data is notoriously unreliable. But they might find it worthwhile to look closely at the voting patterns of Vigo County in Indiana. Vigo residents have voted for the winning presidential candidate in every election since 1956, and all but two since 1888.
True to form, Vigo residents are split over who to support this election cycle, and another win for Trump isn’t guaranteed. “Donald Trump has shown that putting America first leads to total discord,” one reader wrote in the letters section of the local Tribune-Star newspaper in September. “Trump is taking the country in the right direction while Biden and the left have the wrong vision of what this country is and should be,” another reader hit back.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-14--China Learns the Hard Way That Money Can’t Buy You Love

China Learns the Hard Way That Money Can ’ t Buy You Love China has long had Australia in its sights , and money is its favored weapon .
China accounts for roughly a third of Australia ’ s export earnings .
Until recently , it was also a big investor in Australia .
Chinese international students occupy 10 percent of all university places in Australia , and Beijing has funded Confucius Institutes at 13 of Australia ’ s 37 public universities .
China-linked donors fund several Australian think tanks advancing China-friendly policies .
Nearly every major public institution in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s presence looms even larger in Australia ’ s much smaller neighbor , New Zealand .
If there ’ s one region of the ( notionally ) Western world where China has staked its claim to the future , it ’ s in the Antipodes .
Yet the proportion of Australians who hold a favorable view of China has plummeted from 64 percent to just 15 percent over the last three years , according to a Pew Global Attitudes poll released last week .
( New Zealand wasn ’ t surveyed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ view China unfavorably has risen to 81 percent , with only 3 percent undecided .
Australia ’ s changing mood on China is part of a global shift , but it ’ s the most extreme reversal among the 12 countries Pew regularly surveys and started before the coronavirus .
Despite a widespread and long-standing perception in Australia that its economic future depends on China , it turns out that—at least when it comes to public diplomacy—money can ’ t buy you love .
China has certainly spent the money .
Australian ethics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Silent Invasion traced the many paths through which Chinese and China-linked money has informed and potentially influenced Australia ’ s public debates , from massive donations to political parties to the takeover of local Chinese-language media to luxury junkets for journalists and politicians to visit China .
The controversial China-born and based businessman ( and Australian citizen ) Chau Chak Wing has given tens of millions of dollars to Australian universities—and has made a series of donations to patriotic Australian causes like veterans ’ charities and the Australian War Memorial .
A confidant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has fought—and won—repeated lawsuits against Australian media that accused him of bribery and spying for China .
The proportion of Australians who hold a favorable view of China has plummeted from 64 percent to just 15 percent over the last three years .
On an even larger scale , between 2016 and 2018 at least eight Chinese state-owned and state-linked firms poured investment into the Australian state of Victoria , which then officially signed onto China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative in defiance of the national government ’ s warnings against doing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Daniel Andrews , attended China ’ s flagship Belt and Road forums in Beijing in both 2017 and 2019 , one of the few leaders below central government level to be invited .
Australia ’ s national government did not participate .
Perhaps coincidentally—and perhaps not—when China slapped tariffs and restrictions on Australian agricultural exports earlier this year , products from Victoria were largely unaffected .
Whether or not they were influenced by Chinese inducements , by 2018 many leading members of Australia ’ s political class were heeding China ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ independent ” foreign policy , meaning free from its historical alliance with the United States .
Former Prime Ministers Paul Keating ( in office 1991-1996 ) and the late Malcolm Fraser ( 1975-1983 ) actually recommended that Australia withdraw from its U.S. alliance , while the late Bob Hawke ( 1983-1991 ) made a lucrative second career out of lobbying for Beijing .
A senior senator and former government minister even criticized a government-funded think tank , the Australian Strategic Policy Institute , for accepting a research grant from the U.S. State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ become eminently respectable in Australia .
Meanwhile , the Australian public continued to support the country ’ s alignment with the United States and express skepticism about its burgeoning links with China .
Between 2008 and 2020 , public support for the U.S. alliance never dipped below 70 percent , according to the Australian Lowy Institute Poll .
The majority of respondents consistently believed that the Australian government was allowing too much investment from China .
And despite the personal unpopularity of U.S. President Donald Trump , the majority of Australians continue to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responsibly in the world , ” compared to just 23 percent who say the same about China .
As Abraham Lincoln never said , “ You can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time , but you can ’ t fool all of the people all of the time.
” If Hamilton ’ s Silent Invasion got people talking about Chinese influence in Australia in 2018 , a real turning point came in 2019 when U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soul for a pile of soybeans , or you can protect your people.
” Of course , Australia doesn ’ t actually sell soybeans , but Pompeo ’ s point hit home , resonating with an Australian public that was already wary about Chinese influence undermining their country ’ s institutions .
Had China simply run its public diplomacy through a competent corporate communications firm , it might have avoided a breakdown in relations .
Then came the coronavirus .
As in many other countries , China ’ s early misinformation about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ credibility in Australia .
But we should not overestimate the effects of the pandemic on Australia ’ s attitudes toward China .
Relying on World Health Organization advice , the country ’ s chief medical officer even expressed confidence in China ’ s ability to prevent the international spread of the virus , while a leading Victorian state politician praised China ’ s lockdown response .
The coronavirus has been a disaster for the world , but it didn ’ t have to be a disaster for China ’ s international relations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in response to a call by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Foreign Secretary Marise Payne for an international inquiry into the world ’ s handling of the coronavirus .
Never mind that the inquiry would be conducted by the China-dominated World Health Organization , or that China itself ended up signing the resolution to authorize the inquiry .
China ’ s embassy in Australia complained that “ Australian politicians are keen to parrot what those Americans have asserted and simply follow them in staging political attacks on China.
” The Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying that Australia was “ highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation ” and advising Australia “ to put aside ideological bias and political games.
” And as China ’ s deputy head of mission in Canberra explained , Australia ’ s call for an investigation “ hurts the feelings of the Chinese people … all of a sudden , they heard this shocking news of a proposal coming from Australia , which is supposed to be a good friend of China.
” Taken aback by Australia ’ s apparent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese people , ” China ’ s own diplomats seemed strangely unconcerned about the effects their own comments might have on the feelings of the Australian people .
Despite China ’ s extraordinary access to Australian politicians and public life , its diplomats proved either unable to comprehend the dynamics of democratic decision-making or unwilling to bend to its demands .
Had China simply run its public diplomacy through a competent corporate communications firm , it might have avoided anything worse than a brief coronavirus pause in its march through Australia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself into an international pariah , the gravy train that has fattened so many Western wallets will grind to a halt .
Instead , Beijing faces the rapid unraveling of three decades of patient influence-building .
In recent months , Australia has announced a serious tightening of its Foreign Investment Review Board procedures to make it harder for China-linked firms to acquire strategic Australian assets , proposed a new Foreign Relations Bill to give the national government veto power over state and local agreements with foreign entities , and taken steps to open @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Intelligence and Security into foreign interference in Australia ’ s universities .
All these efforts have widespread support , and all are directed at China .
It is a brave politician who takes a pro-China stance in Australian politics today .
The pendulum has swung .
It ’ s the same story across nearly all of the world ’ s democracies : China ’ s global strategy of elite capture has failed .
China has characterized Australia ’ s efforts to limit foreign influence in its politics as “ blatant irrational behaviours.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ them as simple common sense .
Now that China has turned itself into an international pariah , politicians in democratic countries will be very reluctant to be photographed shaking hands in Beijing , and the Chinese gravy train that has fattened so many Western wallets will grind to a halt .
Australia ’ s about-face on China reaffirms its commitments to liberal values and the Western alliance system , and parallels similar shifts in other countries .
In New Zealand , which goes to the polls this week , incumbent Prime Minister ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has joined international criticism of China ’ s record on human rights in Hong King and Xinjiang .
This follows New Zealand ’ s earlier moves , clearly directed at China , to limit foreign election interference .
In Europe , too , there has been a strong popular reaction against Chinese influence operations .
Democracies may be slow to protect themselves from foreign threats , but they do succeed eventually .
That ’ s a lesson China would do well to learn .

China has long had Australia in its sights, and money is its favored weapon. China accounts for roughly a third of Australia’s export earnings. Until recently, it was also a big investor in Australia. Chinese international students occupy 10 percent of all university places in Australia, and Beijing has funded Confucius Institutes at 13 of Australia’s 37 public universities. China-linked donors fund several Australian think tanks advancing China-friendly policies. Nearly every major public institution in Australia has a “China strategy.” China’s presence looms even larger in Australia’s much smaller neighbor, New Zealand . If there’s one region of the (notionally) Western world where China has staked its claim to the future, it’s in the Antipodes.
China has long had Australia in its sights, and money is its favored weapon. China accounts for roughly a third of Australia’s export earnings. Until recently, it was also a big investor in Australia. Chinese international students occupy 10 percent of all university places in Australia, and Beijing has funded Confucius Institutes at 13 of Australia’s 37 public universities. China-linked donors fund several Australian think tanks advancing China-friendly policies. Nearly every major public institution in Australia has a “China strategy.” China’s presence looms even larger in Australia’s much smaller neighbor, New Zealand. If there’s one region of the (notionally) Western world where China has staked its claim to the future, it’s in the Antipodes.
Yet the proportion of Australians who hold a favorable view of China has plummeted from 64 percent to just 15 percent over the last three years, according to a Pew Global Attitudes poll released last week. (New Zealand wasn’t surveyed.) The proportion of Australians who view China unfavorably has risen to 81 percent, with only 3 percent undecided. Australia’s changing mood on China is part of a global shift, but it’s the most extreme reversal among the 12 countries Pew regularly surveys and started before the coronavirus. Despite a widespread and long-standing perception in Australia that its economic future depends on China, it turns out that—at least when it comes to public diplomacy—money can’t buy you love.
China has certainly spent the money. Australian ethics professor Clive Hamilton’s 2018 book Silent Invasion traced the many paths through which Chinese and China-linked money has informed and potentially influenced Australia’s public debates, from massive donations to political parties to the takeover of local Chinese-language media to luxury junkets for journalists and politicians to visit China. The controversial China-born and based businessman (and Australian citizen) Chau Chak Wing has given tens of millions of dollars to Australian universities—and has made a series of donations to patriotic Australian causes like veterans’ charities and the Australian War Memorial. A confidant of Chinese President Xi Jinping, he has fought—and won—repeated lawsuits against Australian media that accused him of bribery and spying for China.
The proportion of Australians who hold a favorable view of China has plummeted from 64 percent to just 15 percent over the last three years.
On an even larger scale, between 2016 and 2018 at least eight Chinese state-owned and state-linked firms poured investment into the Australian state of Victoria, which then officially signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative in defiance of the national government’s warnings against doing so. Victoria’s state premier, Daniel Andrews, attended China’s flagship Belt and Road forums in Beijing in both 2017 and 2019, one of the few leaders below central government level to be invited. Australia’s national government did not participate. Perhaps coincidentally—and perhaps not—when China slapped tariffs and restrictions on Australian agricultural exports earlier this year, products from Victoria were largely unaffected.
Whether or not they were influenced by Chinese inducements, by 2018 many leading members of Australia’s political class were heeding China’s call for the country to pursue an “independent” foreign policy, meaning free from its historical alliance with the United States. Former Prime Ministers Paul Keating (in office 1991-1996) and the late Malcolm Fraser (1975-1983) actually recommended that Australia withdraw from its U.S. alliance, while the late Bob Hawke (1983-1991) made a lucrative second career out of lobbying for Beijing. A senior senator and former government minister even criticized a government-funded think tank, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, for accepting a research grant from the U.S. State Department. Pro-China, anti-American viewpoints had become eminently respectable in Australia.
Meanwhile, the Australian public continued to support the country’s alignment with the United States and express skepticism about its burgeoning links with China. Between 2008 and 2020, public support for the U.S. alliance never dipped below 70 percent, according to the Australian Lowy Institute Poll. The majority of respondents consistently believed that the Australian government was allowing too much investment from China. And despite the personal unpopularity of U.S. President Donald Trump, the majority of Australians continue to trust the United States to “act responsibly in the world,” compared to just 23 percent who say the same about China.
As Abraham Lincoln never said, “You can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, but you can’t fool all of the people all of the time.” If Hamilton’s Silent Invasion got people talking about Chinese influence in Australia in 2018, a real turning point came in 2019 when U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Australians: “You can sell your soul for a pile of soybeans, or you can protect your people.” Of course, Australia doesn’t actually sell soybeans, but Pompeo’s point hit home, resonating with an Australian public that was already wary about Chinese influence undermining their country’s institutions.
Had China simply run its public diplomacy through a competent corporate communications firm, it might have avoided a breakdown in relations.
Then came the coronavirus. As in many other countries, China’s early misinformation about the pathogen dealt a serious blow to its credibility in Australia. But we should not overestimate the effects of the pandemic on Australia’s attitudes toward China. Relying on World Health Organization advice, the country’s chief medical officer even expressed confidence in China’s ability to prevent the international spread of the virus, while a leading Victorian state politician praised China’s lockdown response. The coronavirus has been a disaster for the world, but it didn’t have to be a disaster for China’s international relations.
But that was before China lashed out, in response to a call by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Foreign Secretary Marise Payne for an international inquiry into the world’s handling of the coronavirus. Never mind that the inquiry would be conducted by the China-dominated World Health Organization, or that China itself ended up signing the resolution to authorize the inquiry. China’s embassy in Australia complained that “Australian politicians are keen to parrot what those Americans have asserted and simply follow them in staging political attacks on China.” The Foreign Ministry in Beijing went much further, saying that Australia was “highly irresponsible to resort to politically motivated suspicion and accusation” and advising Australia “to put aside ideological bias and political games.” And as China’s deputy head of mission in Canberra explained, Australia’s call for an investigation “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people … all of a sudden, they heard this shocking news of a proposal coming from Australia, which is supposed to be a good friend of China.”
Taken aback by Australia’s apparent insensitivity to the “feelings of the Chinese people,” China’s own diplomats seemed strangely unconcerned about the effects their own comments might have on the feelings of the Australian people. Despite China’s extraordinary access to Australian politicians and public life, its diplomats proved either unable to comprehend the dynamics of democratic decision-making or unwilling to bend to its demands. Had China simply run its public diplomacy through a competent corporate communications firm, it might have avoided anything worse than a brief coronavirus pause in its march through Australia’s institutions.
Now that China has turned itself into an international pariah, the gravy train that has fattened so many Western wallets will grind to a halt.
Instead, Beijing faces the rapid unraveling of three decades of patient influence-building. In recent months, Australia has announced a serious tightening of its Foreign Investment Review Board procedures to make it harder for China-linked firms to acquire strategic Australian assets, proposed a new Foreign Relations Bill to give the national government veto power over state and local agreements with foreign entities, and taken steps to open an inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security into foreign interference in Australia’s universities. All these efforts have widespread support, and all are directed at China. It is a brave politician who takes a pro-China stance in Australian politics today. The pendulum has swung.
It’s the same story across nearly all of the world’s democracies: China’s global strategy of elite capture has failed. China has characterized Australia’s efforts to limit foreign influence in its politics as “blatant irrational behaviours.” Ordinary citizens are likely to see them as simple common sense. Now that China has turned itself into an international pariah, politicians in democratic countries will be very reluctant to be photographed shaking hands in Beijing, and the Chinese gravy train that has fattened so many Western wallets will grind to a halt.
Australia’s about-face on China reaffirms its commitments to liberal values and the Western alliance system, and parallels similar shifts in other countries. In New Zealand, which goes to the polls this week, incumbent Prime Minister (and strong poll favorite) Jacinda Ardern has joined international criticism of China’s record on human rights in Hong King and Xinjiang. This follows New Zealand’s earlier moves, clearly directed at China, to limit foreign election interference. In Europe, too, there has been a strong popular reaction against Chinese influence operations. Democracies may be slow to protect themselves from foreign threats, but they do succeed eventually. That’s a lesson China would do well to learn.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-14--A Partial Ban on Autonomous Weapons Would Make Everyone Safer

A Partial Ban on Autonomous Weapons Would Make Everyone Safer The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts met late last month to discuss lethal , autonomous weapons .
The semiannual meetings are the first serious effort by global governments to control autonomous weapons .
And the weapons pose serious risks to global security : Even the best artificial intelligence isn ’ t well suited to distinguishing farmers from soldiers and may be trained only on laboratory data that is a poor substitute for real battlefields .
As U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres wrote on Twitter , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discretion to select targets and take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable , morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.
” Organizations such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots , the International Committee for Robot Arms Control , and Human Rights Watch advocate for a comprehensive ban on all autonomous weapons , but such a ban is unlikely to succeed .
The military potential of autonomous weapons is too great .
Autonomous weapons guard ships against small boat attacks , search for terrorists , stand sentry , and destroy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weeks ago , an AI simulation defeated a living , breathing F-16 pilot five to zero in a simulated dogfight .
Such an AI system could conceivably command a future aerial drone .
No doubt the technology will grow and mature .
No serious military power would give up such potential—especially when concerns are theoretical and adversaries may not follow suit .
Russia didn ’ t even show up to the experts ’ meeting .
Instead of a broad ban on all autonomous weapons , the international community should identify and focus restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and autonomous chemical , biological , radiological , and nuclear weapons , known as CBRN weapons .
A narrower focus would increase the likelihood of global agreement , while providing a normative foundation for broader restrictions .
A thousand-drone swarm has a thousand points of potential error .
And because drones in a true swarm communicate with one another , errors may propagate throughout the swarm .
For example , one drone may misidentify a cruise ship as an aircraft carrier , then unleash the full might of the swarm on a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if the drone correctly identifies the cruise ship as not a target , but the word not is lost , due to simple accident or adversary jamming .
Swarm communication also leads to emergent behavior—collective behaviors of the swarm that do not depend on the individual parts—that further reduces both the predictability and understandability of the weapon .
As P.W .
Singer , a strategist and senior fellow at New America , wrote in his book Wired for War , “ a swarm takes the action on its own , which may not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commander wants it .
Nothing happens in a swarm directly , but rather through the complex relationships among the parts.
” Drone swarms pose a greater threat to powerful militaries , because cheap drones can be flung one after another against expensive platforms until they fall .
In 2018 , a group calling itself the Free Alawites Movement claimed responsibility for launching 13 drones made largely of plywood , duct tape , and lawnmower engines that attacked Russia ’ s Khmeimim Air Base in Syria .
The movement claimed the successful destruction of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system .
( The exact identity of the “ Free Alawites Movement ” is unclear .
The only attacks it has claimed are the Khmeimim attacks and another drone attack on a Russian naval base in Syria on the same day .
Sources have also attributed the attacks to the Islamic State , Hayat Tahrir al-Sham , and Ahrar al-Sham . )
Russian officials acknowledged the drones flew autonomously and were preprogrammed to drop bombs on the base but claim no damage was done .
( The Russian officials did not comment on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make a true drone swarm . )
However , in Libya , Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones disabled at least nine Russian air defense systems .
The Bayraktar drones are considerably more advanced than those used in Syria , but they illustrate the same principle : Drones pose major threats to air defenses and other expensive systems .
An adversary could fling tons of drones against a $ 1.8 billion USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in an attempt to disable or destroy it and still have a cost advantage .
Facing such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lead—rather than resist—the arms control charge for certain weapons .
Yes , great powers would give up the potential to unleash their own massive swarms , but swarms are likely to favor weaker powers .
If swarms are most effective when used en masse against big , expensive platforms , then major powers that possess such expensive equipment stand to lose the most .
Swarms might also be easier to control .
A key arms control challenge for autonomous weapons is knowing if a weapon is actually autonomous .
At root , autonomy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapon to fire under given conditions , however simple or complex .
A simple landmine explodes when enough weight is put upon it ; an autonomous turret fires based on analyzed information collected from sensors and any design constraints .
With autonomous weapons , an outside observer can not tell whether the weapon operates under predesigned rules or is being controlled remotely .
However , no human can reasonably control a swarm of thousands of drones .
The complexity is simply too much .
They must monitor hundreds of video , infrared , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swarm ’ s actions and deciding who to kill .
Such a massive swarm must be autonomous , may be a weapon of mass destruction in its own right , and could carry traditional weapons of mass destruction .
Autonomous vehicles are a great way to deliver chemical , radiological , and biological weapons .
An autonomous vehicle can not get sick with anthrax , nor choke on chlorine .
Drones can more directly target enemies , while adjusting trajectories based on local wind and humidity conditions .
Plus , small drones can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and work together to carry out attacks .
Operatives from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria were reportedly quite interested in using drones to carry out radiological and potentially chemical attacks .
North Korea also has an arsenal of chemical , biological , and nuclear weapons and a thousand-drone fleet .
When robots make decisions on nuclear weapons , the fate of humanity is at stake .
In 1983 , at the height of the Cold War , a Soviet early warning system concluded the United States had launched five nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ computer expressed the highest degree of confidence in the conclusion .
The likely response : immediate nuclear retaliation to level U.S. cities and kill millions of American civilians .
Fortunately , Stanislav Petrov , the Soviet officer in charge of the warning system , concluded the computer was wrong .
Petrov was correct .
Without him , millions of people would be dead .
New restrictions on autonomous CBRN weapons should be a relatively easy avenue for new restrictions .
A wide range of treaties already restrict production , export , and use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention .
At minimum , governments could collectively agree to incorporate autonomous weapons in all applicable CBRN weapons treaties .
This would signal a greater willingness to adopt restrictions on autonomous weapons without a requirement to resolve the question of autonomous weapons with conventional payloads .
Of course , a ban may require giving up capabilities like a nuclear “ dead hand ” —in the words of proponents , “ an automated strategic response system based on artificial intelligence ” —but nuclear weapons experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risks to great powers of increased CBRN weapons proliferation and accidental nuclear war are far greater than any deterrent advantage already gained with a robust conventional and nuclear force .
Placing autonomous weapons on the global agenda in the first place is a definite success—a global treaty can never be made if no one cares enough to even talk about it—but the question is what happens next .
Do government experts simply keep talking or do these meetings lead to actionable treaties ?
What combination of inducements , export controls , transparency measures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ events , the use of force are best suited to preventing the threat ?
Historically , comprehensive bans took decades—the global community took about 70 years to go from the Geneva Protocols against chemical weapons usage to states giving up the weapons—but autonomous weapons are growing and proliferating rapidly .
Countries might not be willing to ban the weapons outright , but banning the highest-risk autonomous weapons—drone swarms and autonomous weapons armed with CBRN agents—could provide a foundation for reducing autonomous weapons risks .
Great powers would give up little , while improving @ @ @ @

The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts met late last month to discuss lethal, autonomous weapons. The semiannual meetings are the first serious effort by global governments to control autonomous weapons. And the weapons pose serious risks to global security: Even the best artificial intelligence isn’t well suited to distinguishing farmers from soldiers and may be trained only on laboratory data that is a poor substitute for real battlefields.
The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts met late last month to discuss lethal, autonomous weapons. The semiannual meetings are the first serious effort by global governments to control autonomous weapons. And the weapons pose serious risks to global security: Even the best artificial intelligence isn’t well suited to distinguishing farmers from soldiers and may be trained only on laboratory data that is a poor substitute for real battlefields.
As U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres wrote on Twitter, “Autonomous machines with the power and discretion to select targets and take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law.”
Organizations such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, and Human Rights Watch advocate for a comprehensive ban on all autonomous weapons, but such a ban is unlikely to succeed. The military potential of autonomous weapons is too great. Autonomous weapons guard ships against small boat attacks, search for terrorists, stand sentry, and destroy adversary air defenses.
Just a few weeks ago, an AI simulation defeated a living, breathing F-16 pilot five to zero in a simulated dogfight. Such an AI system could conceivably command a future aerial drone. No doubt the technology will grow and mature. No serious military power would give up such potential—especially when concerns are theoretical and adversaries may not follow suit. Russia didn’t even show up to the experts’ meeting.
Instead of a broad ban on all autonomous weapons, the international community should identify and focus restrictions on the highest-risk weapons: drone swarms and autonomous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, known as CBRN weapons. A narrower focus would increase the likelihood of global agreement, while providing a normative foundation for broader restrictions.
In 2018, the tech company Intel flew 2,018 drones at once in a Guinness World Record-breaking light show in Folsom, California. Earlier this year, Russia and China flew light shows of more than 2,000 drones too. The drones carried flashy lights and were meant as modern fireworks, but similar drones could be designed for war with thousands of guns, bombs, and missiles.
A thousand-drone swarm has a thousand points of potential error. And because drones in a true swarm communicate with one another, errors may propagate throughout the swarm. For example, one drone may misidentify a cruise ship as an aircraft carrier, then unleash the full might of the swarm on a few thousand civilians.
The same may occur if the drone correctly identifies the cruise ship as not a target, but the word not is lost, due to simple accident or adversary jamming. Swarm communication also leads to emergent behavior—collective behaviors of the swarm that do not depend on the individual parts—that further reduces both the predictability and understandability of the weapon.
As P.W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, wrote in his book Wired for War, “a swarm takes the action on its own, which may not always be exactly where and when the commander wants it. Nothing happens in a swarm directly, but rather through the complex relationships among the parts.”
Drone swarms pose a greater threat to powerful militaries, because cheap drones can be flung one after another against expensive platforms until they fall. In 2018, a group calling itself the Free Alawites Movement claimed responsibility for launching 13 drones made largely of plywood, duct tape, and lawnmower engines that attacked Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base in Syria.
The movement claimed the successful destruction of a $300 million S-400 surface-to-air missile system. (The exact identity of the “Free Alawites Movement” is unclear. The only attacks it has claimed are the Khmeimim attacks and another drone attack on a Russian naval base in Syria on the same day. Sources have also attributed the attacks to the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham.)
Russian officials acknowledged the drones flew autonomously and were preprogrammed to drop bombs on the base but claim no damage was done. (The Russian officials did not comment on whether the drones communicated with one another to make a true drone swarm.) However, in Libya, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones disabled at least nine Russian air defense systems. The Bayraktar drones are considerably more advanced than those used in Syria, but they illustrate the same principle: Drones pose major threats to air defenses and other expensive systems.
An adversary could fling tons of drones against a $1.8 billion USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in an attempt to disable or destroy it and still have a cost advantage. Facing such a threat, great powers should choose to lead—rather than resist—the arms control charge for certain weapons. Yes, great powers would give up the potential to unleash their own massive swarms, but swarms are likely to favor weaker powers. If swarms are most effective when used en masse against big, expensive platforms, then major powers that possess such expensive equipment stand to lose the most. Swarms might also be easier to control.
A key arms control challenge for autonomous weapons is knowing if a weapon is actually autonomous. At root, autonomy is just a matter of programming the weapon to fire under given conditions, however simple or complex. A simple landmine explodes when enough weight is put upon it; an autonomous turret fires based on analyzed information collected from sensors and any design constraints. With autonomous weapons, an outside observer cannot tell whether the weapon operates under predesigned rules or is being controlled remotely. However, no human can reasonably control a swarm of thousands of drones.
The complexity is simply too much. They must monitor hundreds of video, infrared, or other feeds, while planning the swarm’s actions and deciding who to kill. Such a massive swarm must be autonomous, may be a weapon of mass destruction in its own right, and could carry traditional weapons of mass destruction.
Discussion of autonomous weapons takes place under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, assuming the weapon fires bullets, bombs, or missiles. But an autonomous weapon could just as readily be armed with CBRN agents.
Autonomous vehicles are a great way to deliver chemical, radiological, and biological weapons. An autonomous vehicle cannot get sick with anthrax, nor choke on chlorine. Drones can more directly target enemies, while adjusting trajectories based on local wind and humidity conditions. Plus, small drones can take to the air, fly indoors, and work together to carry out attacks. Operatives from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria were reportedly quite interested in using drones to carry out radiological and potentially chemical attacks. North Korea also has an arsenal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and a thousand-drone fleet.
When robots make decisions on nuclear weapons, the fate of humanity is at stake. In 1983, at the height of the Cold War, a Soviet early warning system concluded the United States had launched five nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union. The computer expressed the highest degree of confidence in the conclusion. The likely response: immediate nuclear retaliation to level U.S. cities and kill millions of American civilians. Fortunately, Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer in charge of the warning system, concluded the computer was wrong. Petrov was correct. Without him, millions of people would be dead.
New restrictions on autonomous CBRN weapons should be a relatively easy avenue for new restrictions. A wide range of treaties already restrict production, export, and use of CBRN weapons from the Geneva Convention to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. At minimum, governments could collectively agree to incorporate autonomous weapons in all applicable CBRN weapons treaties.
This would signal a greater willingness to adopt restrictions on autonomous weapons without a requirement to resolve the question of autonomous weapons with conventional payloads. Of course, a ban may require giving up capabilities like a nuclear “dead hand”—in the words of proponents, “an automated strategic response system based on artificial intelligence”—but nuclear weapons experts are overwhelmingly against the idea. The risks to great powers of increased CBRN weapons proliferation and accidental nuclear war are far greater than any deterrent advantage already gained with a robust conventional and nuclear force.
Placing autonomous weapons on the global agenda in the first place is a definite success—a global treaty can never be made if no one cares enough to even talk about it—but the question is what happens next. Do government experts simply keep talking or do these meetings lead to actionable treaties?
What combination of inducements, export controls, transparency measures, sanctions, and, in extreme events, the use of force are best suited to preventing the threat? Historically, comprehensive bans took decades—the global community took about 70 years to go from the Geneva Protocols against chemical weapons usage to states giving up the weapons—but autonomous weapons are growing and proliferating rapidly.
Countries might not be willing to ban the weapons outright, but banning the highest-risk autonomous weapons—drone swarms and autonomous weapons armed with CBRN agents—could provide a foundation for reducing autonomous weapons risks. Great powers would give up little, while improving their own security.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-15--Deal or No Deal Is No Longer the Point

Deal or No Deal Is No Longer the Point

Deal or No Deal Is No Longer the Point It has been four years since the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union .
But since then , Brexit has been all talk .
Yes , the U.K. legally withdrew from the EU on Jan. 31 , 2020 .
But in the ensuing so-called “ transition phase , ” the U.K. has remained an EU member in all but name .
British firms have still been free to do business on the continent , and Germans have been able to move to London for work .
But by Dec. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period is over , Brexit will be a reality .
The negotiations on post-Brexit economic relations between the EU and the U.K. are entering their final stages , and both sides are upping the ante .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has said crashing out of the EU without a trade deal would be a “ good outcome.
” The EU , for its part , has underlined that it wants an arrangement but not at all costs .
Meanwhile , the British press and financial markets react to every muttering from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15—the day Johnson is scheduled to meet EU leaders in Brussels—approaches .
There is no more time for preliminaries .
If there is to be a trade agreement signed and ratified by the end of the year , this is the moment when the major obstacles to a deal have to be overcome .
The suspense is high .
But the wrangling over “ deal ” or “ no deal ” obscures the larger picture : Regardless of the negotiations ’ outcome , the U.K. is already headed for a “ hard Brexit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations with the EU .
No matter what , the British and European economies are in for a painful decoupling .
The deal is key for the United Kingdom ’ s agricultural sector , particularly the fishing and food processing industry .
The EU ’ s average tariff on these products is high , rising up to 24.5 percent on confectionary , for example .
But on the whole , the deal is small fry .
The free trade agreement still leaves British firms ’ at a significant competitive disadvantage in the EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU rivals .
First , the deal does not foresee a customs agreement that would prevent the imposition of burdensome import/export procedures at the border between the U.K. and the EU .
This will be a challenge to the United Kingdom ’ s manufacturing sector , which often relies on the import and export of intermediate goods in supply chains spread all over Europe .
The British government expects that trucks might have to wait up to two days to cross the Channel to Europe—a major delay for just-in-time manufacturers .
Second , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with so-called technical barriers to trade .
The EU ’ s single market is not just a customs union .
Like the United States , the EU is a market with one set of rules , from product to safety standards , and a common framework to enforce them .
For instance , a good certified in Ireland can be exported to all EU members just as a product made in Michigan can be sold in California .
But from January onward , British firms wishing to sell across the Channel will have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtain new certifications proving their goods .
To do this , many of the firms , for instance in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industry , will need to open up a subsidiary in the EU .
Europeans compete fiercely to host these U.K. subsidiaries .
Big corporations can deal with the hassle .
But for many of the United Kingdom ’ s exporting small and medium-sized enterprises , of which 82 percent do business with the continent , access to the EU market will be out of reach .
Third , the deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ services sector with nothing .
For services , any deal would most likely not go much beyond what is found in other standard free trade agreements .
In turn , service companies , the crown jewel of the British economy , will face a significant deterioration in their EU market access compared with today .
British banks and financial institutions—such as Barclays , Lloyds , and Coutts—have already sent a letter to thousands of their clients on the continent that they will have to close their accounts due to Brexit .
They ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up branches in the EU to continue servicing them was just not worth it .
Elsewhere in financial services , Ernst & Young estimates that 7,500 jobs and $ 1.55 trillion in client assets have already been moved from London to the continent .
And many other British financial service providers , such as the entire industry surrounding investment funds , simply don ’ t know what market access rules the EU will apply to them from next year onward .
As of 2021 , their European business model depends on the goodwill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to decide on a whim if it wants to close market access to non-EU countries , including the U.K. And history shows that the EU is not shy in using its leverage to obtain political concessions .
Brussels has threatened to ban EU customers from doing business with the Swiss stock exchange in order to obtain political concessions .
These threats and the corresponding legal uncertainty explain why Switzerland ’ s banking industry has moved many of its services to Frankfurt and Madrid in past years .
So even with a deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anomaly : the purposeful economic disintegration of two liberal market economies in peace time .
The decoupling will be painful for both .
But for the U.K. , whose economy has contracted during the COVID-19 pandemic more than all the major European economies , including Italy and Spain , the coming year will be dire .

It has been four years since the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. But since then, Brexit has been all talk. Yes, the U.K. legally withdrew from the EU on Jan. 31, 2020. But in the ensuing so-called “transition phase,” the U.K. has remained an EU member in all but name. British firms have still been free to do business on the continent, and Germans have been able to move to London for work.
It has been four years since the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. But since then, Brexit has been all talk. Yes, the U.K. legally withdrew from the EU on Jan. 31, 2020. But in the ensuing so-called “transition phase,” the U.K. has remained an EU member in all but name. British firms have still been free to do business on the continent, and Germans have been able to move to London for work.
But by Dec. 31 this year, when the transition period is over, Brexit will be a reality. The negotiations on post-Brexit economic relations between the EU and the U.K. are entering their final stages, and both sides are upping the ante. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has said crashing out of the EU without a trade deal would be a “good outcome.” The EU, for its part, has underlined that it wants an arrangement but not at all costs.
Meanwhile, the British press and financial markets react to every muttering from the negotiation table with increasing frenzy as Oct. 15—the day EU leaders are scheduled to discuss a deal in Brussels—approaches. There is no more time for preliminaries. If there is to be a trade agreement signed and ratified by the end of the year, this is the moment when the major obstacles to a deal have to be overcome.
The suspense is high. But the wrangling over “deal” or “no deal” obscures the larger picture: Regardless of the negotiations’ outcome, the U.K. is already headed for a “hard Brexit,” meaning a sharp break in relations with the EU. No matter what, the British and European economies are in for a painful decoupling.
The agreement London and Brussels are currently negotiating boils down to a classic free trade agreement with some add-ons. It does away with tariffs and quotas for industrial and manufacturing goods as well as food products between the United Kingdom and the EU.
The deal is key for the United Kingdom’s agricultural sector, particularly the fishing and food processing industry. The EU’s average tariff on these products is high, rising up to 24.5 percent on confectionary, for example.
But on the whole, the deal is small fry. The free trade agreement still leaves British firms’ at a significant competitive disadvantage in the EU’s 448-million-person market compared with their EU rivals.
First, the deal does not foresee a customs agreement that would prevent the imposition of burdensome import/export procedures at the border between the U.K. and the EU. This will be a challenge to the United Kingdom’s manufacturing sector, which often relies on the import and export of intermediate goods in supply chains spread all over Europe. The British government expects that trucks might have to wait up to two days to cross the Channel to Europe—a major delay for just-in-time manufacturers.
Second, the agreement doesn’t do away with so-called technical barriers to trade. The EU’s single market is not just a customs union. Like the United States, the EU is a market with one set of rules, from product to safety standards, and a common framework to enforce them. For instance, a good certified in Ireland can be exported to all EU members just as a product made in Michigan can be sold in California.
But from January onward, British firms wishing to sell across the Channel will have to pass separate EU regulatory checks and obtain new certifications proving their goods. To do this, many of the firms, for instance in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industry, will need to open up a subsidiary in the EU. Europeans compete fiercely to host these U.K. subsidiaries.
Big corporations can deal with the hassle. But for many of the United Kingdom’s exporting small and medium-sized enterprises, of which 82 percent do business with the continent, access to the EU market will be out of reach.
Third, the deal leaves the United Kingdom’s all-important services sector with nothing. For services, any deal would most likely not go much beyond what is found in other standard free trade agreements. In turn, service companies, the crown jewel of the British economy, will face a significant deterioration in their EU market access compared with today.
British banks and financial institutions—such as Barclays, Lloyds, and Coutts—have already sent a letter to thousands of their clients on the continent that they will have to close their accounts due to Brexit. They’ve decided that the cost of opening up branches in the EU to continue servicing them was just not worth it. Elsewhere in financial services, Ernst & Young estimates that 7,500 jobs and $1.55 trillion in client assets have already been moved from London to the continent.
And many other British financial service providers, such as the entire industry surrounding investment funds, simply don’t know what market access rules the EU will apply to them from next year onward. As of 2021, their European business model depends on the goodwill of the Europeans. Brussels will be able to decide on a whim if it wants to close market access to non-EU countries, including the U.K.
And history shows that the EU is not shy in using its leverage to obtain political concessions. Brussels has threatened to ban EU customers from doing business with the Swiss stock exchange in order to obtain political concessions. These threats and the corresponding legal uncertainty explain why Switzerland’s banking industry has moved many of its services to Frankfurt and Madrid in past years.
Deal or no deal, on Jan. 1, 2021, the U.K. will become the European country with the weakest trade links to the 27 EU member states. The free trade agreement under negotiation does not even come close to the arrangements that Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and even Ukraine have with Brussels. British exporters will have no better access to the EU market than, say, Japanese or South Korean firms.
So even with a deal, the world will witness a historical anomaly: the purposeful economic disintegration of two liberal market economies in peace time. The decoupling will be painful for both. But for the U.K., whose economy has contracted during the COVID-19 pandemic more than all the major European economies, including Italy and Spain, the coming year will be dire.