foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Puerto Rico’s Colonial Model Doesn’t Serve Its People

Last summer , the drums of freedom sounded in the streets of San Juan .
Puerto Ricans rose up to drive Gov .
Ricardo Rosselló from office after the publication of a series of profane chats between the leader and his top aides deriding other politicians and ordinary Puerto Ricans , including survivors of the devastating Hurricane Maria in 2017 .
For weeks , protesters filled the streets of the capital ’ s colonial zone , marching , dancing , and chanting .
The uprising against Rosselló , once a leading light in the ruling New Progressive Party ( PNP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from a population that has faced great hardship in recent decades and for whom Puerto Rico ’ s tangled relationship with the United States appears to have reached a crossroads .
The colonial model , which for decades provided U.S. companies with low-wage workers and a captive export market for goods , appears to have given all it has to give .
Beyond rhetoric , there is little appetite in the U.S. Congress to make the island a full state , and its independence movement remains on the electoral margins .
Puerto Rico @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States sees those born in Puerto Rico afforded U.S. citizenship and the ability to vote in presidential primaries , but island residents can not vote in U.S. presidential elections .
Despite having a population of over 3 million , surpassing nearly half of all U.S. states , Puerto Rico has only a single nonvoting member in Congress .
So while the island has a bicameral legislature , its citizens are ultimately governed by entities—the U.S. president and Congress—that they have no say in electing .
The backroom deals of Puerto Rico ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. President Donald Trump have brought into stark relief what has always been a lopsided , unequal relationship .
A series of natural disasters now have Puerto Ricans questioning what it will take to wrench the island out of the hybrid system that has poorly served its people for at least the last two decades .
However , for five decades after the U.S. invasion Puerto Rico was ruled by unelected and often racist functionaries appointed through political patronage .
Under direct orders from U.S. colonial governors , Puerto Rican police crushed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ponce Massacre on Palm Sunday 1937 , when a march of several hundred nationalists resulted in a police riot that left 19 civilians dead and some 200 hundred injured .
In July 1952 , some 15 years after the Ponce Massacre , Puerto Rico ’ s constitution came into effect , declaring the island the “ Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico , ” the “ Free Associated State of Puerto Rico ” —and setting up its hybrid relationship with the United States .
Puerto Rico ’ s current status is due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s first elected governor , Luis Muñoz Marín .
Muñoz Marín was the scion of a notable political family who spent much of his younger years living a bohemian life in New York before returning to become Puerto Rico ’ s dominant political figure in the middle of the 20th century , governing from 1948 to 1965 as the head of the Popular Democratic Party ( PPD ) .
Muñoz Marín and the PPD oversaw a series of measures known as Operation Bootstrap , an aggressive program of industrialization that moved the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward an urban , export-oriented model .
By the mid-1950s , the income generated by manufacturing outstripped that generated by agriculture for the first time , and between 1953 and 1963 manufacturing salaries more than doubled .
Easy migration to the United States provided an escape for those frustrated by this model , and tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans left for better-paying jobs on the mainland , preventing the widespread social unrest that occurred elsewhere in Latin America during the second half of the 20th century .
By the 1970s , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the PPD and the pro-statehood PNP—a colonial reflection of the U.S. two-party system on the mainland .
Much of the political oxygen was consumed by the question of the island ’ s status vis-à-vis the United States .
U.S.-backed security forces had crushed violent pro-independence uprisings in the early 1950s , diminishing the nationalist movement as an electoral force .
Activists were targeted by the FBI as part of the Counterintelligence Program and by the Puerto Rican police—sometimes with lethal consequences .
In July 1978 , two would-be revolutionaries , Carlos Enrique @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , were slain by police in what many viewed as a state-sanctioned assassination .
Puerto Rico ’ s dependence on the United States proved a Faustian bargain .
In 1996 , seeking new revenue to reduce the federal deficit , the Clinton administration abolished Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code with bipartisan support , which gave companies from the mainland United States an exemption from federal taxes on income earned in Puerto Rico .
The island was sacrificed to pay for the minimum wage hike on the mainland , and companies quickly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Section 936 took place during the tenure of Rosselló ’ s father , Gov .
Pedro Rosselló—lambasted during last summer ’ s protests in a popular reggaeton song as “ the most corrupt son of a bitch in history.
” By the time the elder Rosselló left office in 2001 , Puerto Rico ’ s public debt had ballooned to $ 25.7 billion .
The value of the island ’ s bonds sank , and capitalist adventurers specializing in distressed assets arrived from the mainland to take advantage .
Hedge funds dominated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paulson & Co. of leading Republican donor John Paulson , lent Puerto Rico more than $ 3 billion—envisioning a 20 percent return based on a constitutional clause requiring that bonds be paid back .
The territory had no legal ability to declare bankruptcy .
Successive governments effectively created a pyramid scheme : The state was borrowing money from some lenders to pay others .
Appearing to grow tired of the status quo , in 2012 Puerto Ricans voted by a slim margin in a nonbinding referendum to jettison their commonwealth status to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A 2017 referendum boycotted by the PPD—in part due to the party ’ s rejection of its characterization of Puerto Rico as a “ colony ” —led to a more emphatic result .
Another nonbinding status vote is planned for this fall .
In a letter this week to Puerto Rico ’ s elections commission , the U.S. Department of Justice said that it would neither officially approve nor fund the vote in part because the framing of the ballot approached the question of Puerto Rico ’ s status “ from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of view.
” By 2016 , Puerto Rico ’ s financial situation had grown so dire that the U.S. Congress passed a law giving the territory the ability to seek bankruptcy and created an unelected federal oversight board with the ability to manage the island ’ s finances over the objections of the elected government .
Many saw the move as deepening Puerto Rico ’ s colonial relationship with the United States .
The devastation of Hurricane Maria soon followed .
The storm killed around 3,000 people on the island and laid waste @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s response—mocking Puerto Rican citizens as people who “ want everything done for them ” and delaying aid—added insult to injury .
( The president spent much of the crisis golfing . )
The ruling PNP holds commanding majorities in both houses of Puerto Rico ’ s legislature .
But it is a viper ’ s nest of competing interests : Pierluisi and Vázquez , for example , are engaged in a bitter primary to see who will become the party ’ s gubernatorial candidate in the November elections .
The PNP ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is among the island ’ s most divisive political figures , viewed by many protesters as a symbol of an old and corrupt political order .
On Jan. 7 , Guánica , where the U.S. military landed all those years ago , was the epicenter of another momentous event : Puerto Rico was rocked by a 6.4 magnitude earthquake , which caused extensive damage in several southern towns and knocked out power across the island for days .
As thousands of ordinary Puerto Ricans flooded south to help their neighbors , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials to direct aid so that ruling-party politicians could benefit .
Vázquez and several others in her party are now the subjects of an investigation by a special prosecutor into those actions and the resignation of two consecutive justice secretaries earlier this summer .
While protests against Vázquez have been smaller and less frequent due to the pandemic , anti-government graffiti still appears on colonial walls of San Juan near the governor ’ s mansion .
Shortly before last summer ’ s protests , a new political party , the Citizens ’ Victory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It attracted independents and dissidents from the main political parties and , among other proposals , seeks to abolish the fiscal oversight board .
This November ’ s election will be the MVC ’ s first big test .
Along with the governorship—which is being contested by Alexandra Lúgaro , an attorney and businesswoman who came in third in the 2016 gubernatorial elections—Manuel Natal Albelo , a representative in the commonwealth ’ s House of Representatives , who under the PPD banner got more votes than any other party candidate , is running @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mayor of San Juan .
Puerto Rico is in the middle of a struggle to define itself beyond its status as the colony of the nation to the north .
A few days ago , walking through my neighborhood of Viejo San Juan , I happened upon one of the sporadic protests against Vázquez ’ s government that happen from time to time .
On its fringes I encountered an elderly man with a sign .
“ The homeland can not be defended from a sofa , ” it read .
“ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like in the summer of 2019 .
”

Last summer, the drums of freedom sounded in the streets of San Juan. Puerto Ricans rose up to drive Gov. Ricardo Rosselló from office after the publication of a series of profane chats between the leader and his top aides deriding other politicians and ordinary Puerto Ricans, including survivors of the devastating Hurricane Maria in 2017. For weeks, protesters filled the streets of the capital’s colonial zone, marching, dancing, and chanting.
Last summer, the drums of freedom sounded in the streets of San Juan. Puerto Ricans rose up to drive Gov. Ricardo Rosselló from office after the publication of a series of profane chats between the leader and his top aides deriding other politicians and ordinary Puerto Ricans, including survivors of the devastating Hurricane Maria in 2017. For weeks, protesters filled the streets of the capital’s colonial zone, marching, dancing, and chanting.
The uprising against Rosselló, once a leading light in the ruling New Progressive Party (PNP), was a cri de coeur from a population that has faced great hardship in recent decades and for whom Puerto Rico’s tangled relationship with the United States appears to have reached a crossroads. The colonial model, which for decades provided U.S. companies with low-wage workers and a captive export market for goods, appears to have given all it has to give. Beyond rhetoric, there is little appetite in the U.S. Congress to make the island a full state, and its independence movement remains on the electoral margins.
Puerto Rico’s hybrid relationship with the continental United States sees those born in Puerto Rico afforded U.S. citizenship and the ability to vote in presidential primaries, but island residents cannot vote in U.S. presidential elections. Despite having a population of over 3 million, surpassing nearly half of all U.S. states, Puerto Rico has only a single nonvoting member in Congress. So while the island has a bicameral legislature, its citizens are ultimately governed by entities—the U.S. president and Congress—that they have no say in electing.
The backroom deals of Puerto Rico’s political elites and the caustic racism of U.S. President Donald Trump have brought into stark relief what has always been a lopsided, unequal relationship. A series of natural disasters now have Puerto Ricans questioning what it will take to wrench the island out of the hybrid system that has poorly served its people for at least the last two decades.
On July 25, 1898, 1,300 American troops landed at Guánica, Puerto Rico, at the behest of U.S. President William McKinley, and within a month U.S. forces had seized the island from the Spanish. This military capture began Puerto Rico’s long and complex association with the U.S. federal government in Washington. Three days after landing, U.S. commanding officer Gen. Nelson A. Miles issued a proclamation to the island’s residents assuring them that he was acting “in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity.”
However, for five decades after the U.S. invasion Puerto Rico was ruled by unelected and often racist functionaries appointed through political patronage. Under direct orders from U.S. colonial governors, Puerto Rican police crushed moves toward independence, such as during the Ponce Massacre on Palm Sunday 1937, when a march of several hundred nationalists resulted in a police riot that left 19 civilians dead and some 200 hundred injured.
In July 1952, some 15 years after the Ponce Massacre, Puerto Rico’s constitution came into effect, declaring the island the “Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico,” the “Free Associated State of Puerto Rico”—and setting up its hybrid relationship with the United States.
Puerto Rico’s current status is due in no small part to the island’s first elected governor, Luis Muñoz Marín. Muñoz Marín was the scion of a notable political family who spent much of his younger years living a bohemian life in New York before returning to become Puerto Rico’s dominant political figure in the middle of the 20th century, governing from 1948 to 1965 as the head of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD).
Muñoz Marín and the PPD oversaw a series of measures known as Operation Bootstrap, an aggressive program of industrialization that moved the island’s economic engine from agriculture toward an urban, export-oriented model. By the mid-1950s, the income generated by manufacturing outstripped that generated by agriculture for the first time, and between 1953 and 1963 manufacturing salaries more than doubled. Easy migration to the United States provided an escape for those frustrated by this model, and tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans left for better-paying jobs on the mainland, preventing the widespread social unrest that occurred elsewhere in Latin America during the second half of the 20th century.
By the 1970s, the island seemed to settle into an equilibrium between the PPD and the pro-statehood PNP—a colonial reflection of the U.S. two-party system on the mainland. Much of the political oxygen was consumed by the question of the island’s status vis-à-vis the United States.
U.S.-backed security forces had crushed violent pro-independence uprisings in the early 1950s, diminishing the nationalist movement as an electoral force. Activists were targeted by the FBI as part of the Counterintelligence Program and by the Puerto Rican police—sometimes with lethal consequences. In July 1978, two would-be revolutionaries, Carlos Enrique Soto Arriví and Arnaldo Darío Rosado Torres, were slain by police in what many viewed as a state-sanctioned assassination.
Puerto Rico’s dependence on the United States proved a Faustian bargain. In 1996, seeking new revenue to reduce the federal deficit, the Clinton administration abolished Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code with bipartisan support, which gave companies from the mainland United States an exemption from federal taxes on income earned in Puerto Rico. The island was sacrificed to pay for the minimum wage hike on the mainland, and companies quickly began to move elsewhere.
The abolition of Section 936 took place during the tenure of Rosselló’s father, Gov. Pedro Rosselló—lambasted during last summer’s protests in a popular reggaeton song as “the most corrupt son of a bitch in history.” By the time the elder Rosselló left office in 2001, Puerto Rico’s public debt had ballooned to $25.7 billion. The value of the island’s bonds sank, and capitalist adventurers specializing in distressed assets arrived from the mainland to take advantage. Hedge funds dominated by the politically well-connected, such as Paulson & Co. of leading Republican donor John Paulson, lent Puerto Rico more than $3 billion—envisioning a 20 percent return based on a constitutional clause requiring that bonds be paid back. The territory had no legal ability to declare bankruptcy. Successive governments effectively created a pyramid scheme: The state was borrowing money from some lenders to pay others.
Appearing to grow tired of the status quo, in 2012 Puerto Ricans voted by a slim margin in a nonbinding referendum to jettison their commonwealth status to become the 51st state in the United States. A 2017 referendum boycotted by the PPD—in part due to the party’s rejection of its characterization of Puerto Rico as a “colony”—led to a more emphatic result. Another nonbinding status vote is planned for this fall. In a letter this week to Puerto Rico’s elections commission, the U.S. Department of Justice said that it would neither officially approve nor fund the vote in part because the framing of the ballot approached the question of Puerto Rico’s status “from a decidedly pro-Statehood, and anti-territorial, point of view.”
By 2016, Puerto Rico’s financial situation had grown so dire that the U.S. Congress passed a law giving the territory the ability to seek bankruptcy and created an unelected federal oversight board with the ability to manage the island’s finances over the objections of the elected government. Many saw the move as deepening Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship with the United States. The devastation of Hurricane Maria soon followed. The storm killed around 3,000 people on the island and laid waste to its electrical grid. Trump’s response—mocking Puerto Rican citizens as people who “want everything done for them” and delaying aid—added insult to injury. (The president spent much of the crisis golfing.)
The year since Rosselló announced his resignation in July 2019 has been tumultuous. After five days, Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court ruled the ascent to the governorship by Rosselló’s chosen successor, Pedro Pierluisi, unconstitutional. Pierluisi had previously served as Puerto Rico’s nonvoting congressional representative and was instrumental in the creation of the fiscal oversight board. He was replaced by Secretary of Justice Wanda Vázquez Garced, whose administration has since been engulfed in scandal.
The ruling PNP holds commanding majorities in both houses of Puerto Rico’s legislature. But it is a viper’s nest of competing interests: Pierluisi and Vázquez, for example, are engaged in a bitter primary to see who will become the party’s gubernatorial candidate in the November elections. The PNP’s Senate leader, Thomas Rivera Schatz, is among the island’s most divisive political figures, viewed by many protesters as a symbol of an old and corrupt political order.
On Jan. 7, Guánica, where the U.S. military landed all those years ago, was the epicenter of another momentous event: Puerto Rico was rocked by a 6.4 magnitude earthquake, which caused extensive damage in several southern towns and knocked out power across the island for days. As thousands of ordinary Puerto Ricans flooded south to help their neighbors, it is alleged that Vázquez colluded with other officials to direct aid so that ruling-party politicians could benefit. Vázquez and several others in her party are now the subjects of an investigation by a special prosecutor into those actions and the resignation of two consecutive justice secretaries earlier this summer.
While protests against Vázquez have been smaller and less frequent due to the pandemic, anti-government graffiti still appears on colonial walls of San Juan near the governor’s mansion. Shortly before last summer’s protests, a new political party, the Citizens’ Victory Movement (MVC) was formed. It attracted independents and dissidents from the main political parties and, among other proposals, seeks to abolish the fiscal oversight board.
This November’s election will be the MVC’s first big test. Along with the governorship—which is being contested by Alexandra Lúgaro, an attorney and businesswoman who came in third in the 2016 gubernatorial elections—Manuel Natal Albelo, a representative in the commonwealth’s House of Representatives, who under the PPD banner got more votes than any other party candidate, is running as the MVC’s candidate for mayor of San Juan.
Puerto Rico is in the middle of a struggle to define itself beyond its status as the colony of the nation to the north. A few days ago, walking through my neighborhood of Viejo San Juan, I happened upon one of the sporadic protests against Vázquez’s government that happen from time to time. On its fringes I encountered an elderly man with a sign. “The homeland cannot be defended from a sofa,” it read. “It must be defended in the street, like in the summer of 2019.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Zimbabwe Cracks Down on Protests as Economy Crumbles

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : tensions rise in Zimbabwe amid rampant inflation and a widening crackdown on dissent , QAnon conspiracy theories are taking root in Europe , and Ecuador has put the Galapagos Islands on alert after hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels were spotted off its shores .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up here .
The streets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were empty on Friday save for hundreds of soldiers and police dispatched to squash planned anti-government protests amid rising public anger over corruption , food shortages , and rampant inflation .
Security forces cracked down on public spaces across the country earlier this week , while in Harare , checkpoints originally erected during the COVID-19 lockdown were used to control movement into the city center .
Dozens of people were arrested on Friday for participating in small protests including the prominent author Tsitsi Dangarembga and Fadzayi Mahere , the spokeswoman of the main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The government has cautioned that protests will be regarded as an insurrection and that anyone who attends them will “ only have themselves to blame.
” Security forces were implicated in the deaths of six protestors in post-election violence in the country in 2018 .
On Wednesday , President Emmerson Mnangagwa sought to blame foreign interference for fueling the protests , while a spokesman for the ruling party described U.S .
Ambassador Brian A. Nichols as a “ thug ” and threatened him with expulsion .
Similar accusations were levied by Mnangagwa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was ousted in 2017 .
Mahere , the opposition spokeswoman , told the Guardian that the “ state is at war with its citizens.
” Brewing humanitarian catastrophe .
Tensions have risen dramatically in recent months as the pandemic has tipped the country ’ s fragile economy into crisis .
The local currency , which was reintroduced last year after being shelved for a decade due to a hyperinflation crisis in the late 2000s , has imploded with inflation over 700 percent , obliterating people ’ s savings and salaries .
The World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the end of the year 60 percent of the country ’ s population would lack food security , and it appealed to the international community to step up to prevent “ a potential humanitarian catastrophe.
” The pandemic has also underscored the devastating impact of corruption , which Transparency International Zimbabwe estimates costs the country almost $ 2 billion each year .
Earlier this month Health Minister Obadiah Moyo was fired after being charged with criminal abuse of office for awarding a $ 60 million contract to a company blamed for inflating the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government .
In April , doctors in Zimbabwe took the country to court and nurses went on a nationwide strike over the lack of personal protective equipment .
On Monday , seven babies were stillborn at Harare Central Hospital as staff shortages lead critical treatment to be delayed .
“ We have been robbed of our future , including our unborn babies .
Please Stop the LOOTING , ” tweeted Peter Magombeyi , a doctor who first reported the deaths .
Widening crackdown .
Last week the investigative journalist Hopewell Chin ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corruption in the government procurement of coronavirus supplies , was arrested and charged with “ incitement to participate in public violence.
” The opposition politician Jacob Ngarivhume was also arrested on the same charges ; if convicted they could face up to 10 years in prison .
On Monday evening , police in Zimbabwe published a wanted list of 14 political activists , without giving any details of alleged crimes .
On Thursday , unidentified armed men believed to be from the police raided the home of ZimLive editor Mduduzi Mathuthu .
Mathuthu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raid , said that his sister had been detained in a bid to force him to turn himself in .
Since Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 , the country has never seen a popular uprising .
“ They know they will be killed , people will disappear , ” said Harry K. Thomas Jr , a former U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe .
“ In Africa , you go out the way you came in , ” he said in reference to President Mnangagwa , who was swept to power following a military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Galapagos .
The Ecuadorian Navy has been placed on alert after a fleet of some 260 mostly Chinese flagged fishing vessels was spotted 200 miles off the coast of the Galapagos Islands .
“ We are on alert , [ conducting ] surveillance , patrolling to avoid an incident such as what happened in 2017 , ” Ecuadorian Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrín told reporters , referring to an incident three years ago in which a Chinese vessel was found to be carrying 300 tons of marine wildlife , mostly sharks .
On Saturday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Galapagos Marine Reserve was one of the “ richest fishing areas and a hotbed of life for the entire planet.
” Chinese fishing vessels head to the region every year , as fishing stocks nearer their home ports are increasingly exhausted , but this is the largest fleet seen in recent years , according to the Guardian .
Salvini stripped of immunity .
On Thursday , the Italian Senate voted to strip the country ’ s former Interior Minister Matteo Salvini of his immunity from prosecution , paving the way for him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after he refused docking rights to a ship carrying refugees and migrants last August .
Over 150 people were trapped on the ship off the Italian coast for 19 days .
The far-right politician , known for his vehement opposition to immigration , could face up to 15 years in prison if found guilty .
He faces two other cases on similar charges .
Contagious conspiracy theories .
Baseless QAnon conspiracy theories that allege there is a “ deep state ” conspiracy to overthrow U.S. President Donald Trump have gained traction in Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week by NewsGuard , an organization that rates the reliability of news sites .
Over the past year , QAnon sites amassed a large number of followers , adapting the U.S conspiracy theory to local and regional contexts in France , Italy , Germany , and the United Kingdom , according to the group .
Similar movements have taken root in Canada and Iran , as Justin Ling and Ariane Tabatabai explain in Foreign Policy .
In an interview last month , the British singer Robbie Williams said that “ the right questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the Pizzagate conspiracy theory , which claims—without evidence—that leading members of the Democratic Party were running a human trafficking ring out of the basement of a Washington , D.C. , pizza restaurant .
As people have been confined to their homes , the coronavirus has fueled conspiracy theories that 5G cell networks have been used to spread the virus and that global elites orchestrated the pandemic in a bid to vaccinate much of the world ’ s population .
Environmental defenders .
Last year was the deadliest on record for activists seeking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illegal exploitation of natural resources through activities such as logging , mining , and large-scale agriculture , according to a report released this week by the watchdog group Global Witness .
Two hundred and twelve activists were killed worldwide last year , with the Philippines and Colombia accounting for half of the deaths .
Indigenous communities are most at risk , accounting for 40 percent of those killed last year .
“ These are the people on the frontline of the climate crisis , trying to protect climate-critical areas and reverse these devastating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India ’ s education reform .
On Wednesday , India ’ s Union Cabinet , the supreme decision-making body , approved a package of reforms to the education system , the most significant overhaul in decades .
The New Education Policy includes an increase in education spending to 6 percent of the country ’ s GDP and measures to reduce pressure on students ahead of board exams taken at age 16 and 18 .
It would also allow the world ’ s leading universities to open campuses in India .
Vice President M. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truly global and essentially Indian.
” The opposition Indian National Congress party voiced concerns about new advice for schools to make vernacular or regional languages the language of instruction until the fifth class over concerns that it could undermine the teaching of English , one of the country ’ s official languages , which has given India a significant head start in the global economy .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: tensions rise in Zimbabwe amid rampant inflation and a widening crackdown on dissent, QAnon conspiracy theories are taking root in Europe, and Ecuador has put the Galapagos Islands on alert after hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels were spotted off its shores.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox on Fridays, please sign up here.
Zimbabwe on the Brink
The streets of the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, were empty on Friday save for hundreds of soldiers and police dispatched to squash planned anti-government protests amid rising public anger over corruption, food shortages, and rampant inflation. Security forces cracked down on public spaces across the country earlier this week, while in Harare, checkpoints originally erected during the COVID-19 lockdown were used to control movement into the city center. Dozens of people were arrested on Friday for participating in small protests including the prominent author Tsitsi Dangarembga and Fadzayi Mahere, the spokeswoman of the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance bloc.
The government has cautioned that protests will be regarded as an insurrection and that anyone who attends them will “only have themselves to blame.” Security forces were implicated in the deaths of six protestors in post-election violence in the country in 2018. On Wednesday, President Emmerson Mnangagwa sought to blame foreign interference for fueling the protests, while a spokesman for the ruling party described U.S. Ambassador Brian A. Nichols as a “thug” and threatened him with expulsion. Similar accusations were levied by Mnangagwa’s predecessor Robert Mugabe, who was ousted in 2017. Mahere, the opposition spokeswoman, told the Guardian that the “state is at war with its citizens.”
Brewing humanitarian catastrophe. Tensions have risen dramatically in recent months as the pandemic has tipped the country’s fragile economy into crisis. The local currency, which was reintroduced last year after being shelved for a decade due to a hyperinflation crisis in the late 2000s, has imploded with inflation over 700 percent, obliterating people’s savings and salaries. The World Food Program warned this week that by the end of the year 60 percent of the country’s population would lack food security, and it appealed to the international community to step up to prevent “a potential humanitarian catastrophe.”
The pandemic has also underscored the devastating impact of corruption, which Transparency International Zimbabwe estimates costs the country almost $2 billion each year. Earlier this month Health Minister Obadiah Moyo was fired after being charged with criminal abuse of office for awarding a $60 million contract to a company blamed for inflating the cost of COVID-19 medical supplies sold to the government. In April, doctors in Zimbabwe took the country to court and nurses went on a nationwide strike over the lack of personal protective equipment. On Monday, seven babies were stillborn at Harare Central Hospital as staff shortages lead critical treatment to be delayed. “We have been robbed of our future, including our unborn babies. Please Stop the LOOTING,” tweeted Peter Magombeyi, a doctor who first reported the deaths.
Widening crackdown. Last week the investigative journalist Hopewell Chin’ono, who exposed the allegations of corruption in the government procurement of coronavirus supplies, was arrested and charged with “incitement to participate in public violence.” The opposition politician Jacob Ngarivhume was also arrested on the same charges; if convicted they could face up to 10 years in prison. On Monday evening, police in Zimbabwe published a wanted list of 14 political activists, without giving any details of alleged crimes. On Thursday, unidentified armed men believed to be from the police raided the home of ZimLive editor Mduduzi Mathuthu. Mathuthu, who was not home during the raid, said that his sister had been detained in a bid to force him to turn himself in.
Since Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, the country has never seen a popular uprising. “They know they will be killed, people will disappear,” said Harry K. Thomas Jr, a former U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe. “In Africa, you go out the way you came in,” he said in reference to President Mnangagwa, who was swept to power following a military coup in 2017.
What We’re Following
Alarm in the Galapagos. The Ecuadorian Navy has been placed on alert after a fleet of some 260 mostly Chinese flagged fishing vessels was spotted 200 miles off the coast of the Galapagos Islands. “We are on alert, [conducting] surveillance, patrolling to avoid an incident such as what happened in 2017,” Ecuadorian Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrín told reporters, referring to an incident three years ago in which a Chinese vessel was found to be carrying 300 tons of marine wildlife, mostly sharks. On Saturday, Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno tweeted that the Galapagos Marine Reserve was one of the “richest fishing areas and a hotbed of life for the entire planet.” Chinese fishing vessels head to the region every year, as fishing stocks nearer their home ports are increasingly exhausted, but this is the largest fleet seen in recent years, according to the Guardian.
Salvini stripped of immunity. On Thursday, the Italian Senate voted to strip the country’s former Interior Minister Matteo Salvini of his immunity from prosecution, paving the way for him to be prosecuted for illegal detention, after he refused docking rights to a ship carrying refugees and migrants last August. Over 150 people were trapped on the ship off the Italian coast for 19 days. The far-right politician, known for his vehement opposition to immigration, could face up to 15 years in prison if found guilty. He faces two other cases on similar charges.
Contagious conspiracy theories. Baseless QAnon conspiracy theories that allege there is a “deep state” conspiracy to overthrow U.S. President Donald Trump have gained traction in Europe, according to a report published this week by NewsGuard, an organization that rates the reliability of news sites. Over the past year, QAnon sites amassed a large number of followers, adapting the U.S conspiracy theory to local and regional contexts in France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, according to the group. Similar movements have taken root in Canada and Iran, as Justin Ling and Ariane Tabatabai explain in Foreign Policy.
In an interview last month, the British singer Robbie Williams said that “the right questions haven’t been asked,” about the Pizzagate conspiracy theory, which claims—without evidence—that leading members of the Democratic Party were running a human trafficking ring out of the basement of a Washington, D.C., pizza restaurant. As people have been confined to their homes, the coronavirus has fueled conspiracy theories that 5G cell networks have been used to spread the virus and that global elites orchestrated the pandemic in a bid to vaccinate much of the world’s population.
Keep an Eye On
Environmental defenders. Last year was the deadliest on record for activists seeking to protect the environment from damaging or illegal exploitation of natural resources through activities such as logging, mining, and large-scale agriculture, according to a report released this week by the watchdog group Global Witness. Two hundred and twelve activists were killed worldwide last year, with the Philippines and Colombia accounting for half of the deaths. Indigenous communities are most at risk, accounting for 40 percent of those killed last year. “These are the people on the frontline of the climate crisis, trying to protect climate-critical areas and reverse these devastating practices,” said the report.
India’s education reform. On Wednesday, India’s Union Cabinet, the supreme decision-making body, approved a package of reforms to the education system, the most significant overhaul in decades. The New Education Policy includes an increase in education spending to 6 percent of the country’s GDP and measures to reduce pressure on students ahead of board exams taken at age 16 and 18. It would also allow the world’s leading universities to open campuses in India. Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu described the policy as “truly global and essentially Indian.” The opposition Indian National Congress party voiced concerns about new advice for schools to make vernacular or regional languages the language of instruction until the fifth class over concerns that it could undermine the teaching of English, one of the country’s official languages, which has given India a significant head start in the global economy.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Document of The Week: Global Plan for Sharing Vaccines

Document of The Week : Global Plan for Sharing Vaccines With the Trump administration seeking to gobble up much of the world ’ s COVID-19 vaccine supplies for Americans , the World Health Organization and a coalition of governments and international health organizations have been straining to secure future stores of vaccines for the world ’ s neediest .
The effort is led by Gavi , which is dedicated to making vaccines available to children around the world , and involves the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations , which helps finance vaccine development and production , and the U.N. health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( COVAX ) Facility alliance aims to persuade governments to invest in the development and distribution of multiple vaccines to priority , vulnerable populations—including health workers , the elderly , and the ill—before distributing them universally .
The effort is running into headwinds from bigger and sometimes richer countries , including China , the United States , and many in Europe , which are locking in their own agreements with major suppliers of vaccines .
On Friday , the French drugmaker Sanofi announced that the U.S. government would spend $ 2.1 billion to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , GlaxoSmithKline , produce 100 million doses of an experimental coronavirus vaccine , bringing the total U.S. investment in experimental vaccines to more than $ 8 billion .
Only a fraction of vaccine candidates are ever brought to market , and the United States , like many other countries , is betting on several companies to increase the odds that one or more will succeed .
As part of our Document of the Week series , Foreign Policy is publishing a copy of a June 11 internal draft technical design plan , outlining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around the world .
“ The world urgently needs safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccines to protect the most vulnerable , stop transmission and prevent resurgence of COVID-19 , ” according to the plan , which Foreign Policy cited in a previous report .
“ Individual countries and groups of countries are already trying to address this challenge and secure vaccine [ s ] for their domestic or regional needs by entering into bilateral agreements with manufacturers .
However , going down this pathway with a siloed and disaggregated approach will not be effective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidate would lead to a global bidding frenzy , driving up pricing as countries ‘ panic buy.
’ ” Officials familiar with the effort to secure government investments in the COVAX Facility say the goal is to conclude negotiations by the end of August .
But a number of sticking points remain , including who will decide who gets the vaccines—or , as one official put it , “ who calls the shots on the shots .
”

With the Trump administration seeking to gobble up much of the world’s COVID-19 vaccine supplies for Americans, the World Health Organization and a coalition of governments and international health organizations have been straining to secure future stores of vaccines for the world’s neediest. The effort is led by Gavi, which is dedicated to making vaccines available to children around the world, and involves the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, which helps finance vaccine development and production, and the U.N. health agency.
With the Trump administration seeking to gobble up much of the world’s COVID-19 vaccine supplies for Americans, the World Health Organization and a coalition of governments and international health organizations have been straining to secure future stores of vaccines for the world’s neediest. The effort is led by Gavi, which is dedicated to making vaccines available to children around the world, and involves the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, which helps finance vaccine development and production, and the U.N. health agency.
The COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility alliance aims to persuade governments to invest in the development and distribution of multiple vaccines to priority, vulnerable populations—including health workers, the elderly, and the ill—before distributing them universally. The effort is running into headwinds from bigger and sometimes richer countries, including China, the United States, and many in Europe, which are locking in their own agreements with major suppliers of vaccines.
On Friday, the French drugmaker Sanofi announced that the U.S. government would spend $2.1 billion to help the company and its British partner, GlaxoSmithKline, produce 100 million doses of an experimental coronavirus vaccine, bringing the total U.S. investment in experimental vaccines to more than $8 billion. Only a fraction of vaccine candidates are ever brought to market, and the United States, like many other countries, is betting on several companies to increase the odds that one or more will succeed.
As part of our Document of the Week series, Foreign Policy is publishing a copy of a June 11 internal draft technical design plan, outlining the COVAX Facility strategy for distributing vaccines around the world.
“The world urgently needs safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccines to protect the most vulnerable, stop transmission and prevent resurgence of COVID-19,” according to the plan, which Foreign Policy cited in a previous report.
“Individual countries and groups of countries are already trying to address this challenge and secure vaccine[s] for their domestic or regional needs by entering into bilateral agreements with manufacturers. However, going down this pathway with a siloed and disaggregated approach will not be effective or efficient. The competition for vaccine candidate would lead to a global bidding frenzy, driving up pricing as countries ‘panic buy.’”
Officials familiar with the effort to secure government investments in the COVAX Facility say the goal is to conclude negotiations by the end of August. But a number of sticking points remain, including who will decide who gets the vaccines—or, as one official put it, “who calls the shots on the shots.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--Vietnam Steps Up to Take ASEAN Leadership Role

Vietnam Steps Up to Take ASEAN Leadership Role Vietnam assumed the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) last November for 2020—perhaps the most challenging year ever to take on the role .
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the nature of diplomacy , particularly the somewhat old-fashioned style that ASEAN most favored : frequent consultations , informal negotiations , and confidence building through meetings and retreats—none of which are possible given the restrictions .
But an even greater challenge to ASEAN ’ s usual diplomatic style has been posed by the critical tensions between the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jeopardizes regional trade and economic cooperation and contributes to the sense of confrontation and unpredictability of international conduct .
As both Washington and Beijing escalate the conflict and bilateral channels shrink , multilateral forums are become proxies for their disputes .
Vietnam has been preparing for the challenges and had been gearing for this important year , where it not only chairs ASEAN but is also a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council .
It has already proved on multiple occasions its ability to host important regional forums and even high-level meetings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highly challenging U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi last year—a remarkable makeover , given its relatively recent diplomatic isolation from which it only broke out with normalization of relations with the United States and joining ASEAN in the mid-1990s .
But beyond Vietnam merely holding the chair , many already harbor hopes that it can take a stronger leadership role within ASEAN .
ASEAN has lacked leadership for some time , which has led to hard questions about the group ’ s effectiveness .
The lack of a formal leader was a deliberate part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equality among a diverse group , but it became an inherent weakness .
Indonesia is traditionally closest to such a position as de facto leader but by virtue of size rather than by authority or legitimacy .
But Jakarta ’ s notable withdrawal from that role since Joko Widodo became president leaves a leadership vacuum , even if informal .
Many in ASEAN think that there could be no better country standing up to the mounting challenges than Vietnam .
In fact , Vietnam ’ s thus far impressive response to COVID-19 has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighbors , including much wealthier and more developed ones , like Singapore , Thailand , and Malaysia .
Its effective and early recovery puts it in a better position to think beyond the crisis management and have more strategic bandwidth for regional matters .
Economists from the World Bank , International Monetary Fund , and Asian Development Bank predict that Vietnam has the highest chances in the region to come out of the post-coronavirus economic crisis in a relatively better shape .
This is a significant shift in Vietnam ’ s position in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the market economy , used to be labeled among the “ second-tier ” economies .
Diplomatically , Hanoi has also been taking up a more pivotal role .
It is a de facto front-liner in South China Sea matters , where it has strong disputes with Beijing , but it ’ s also increasingly among the few that truly advocate for a powerful ASEAN role in regional matters .
Hanoi ’ s leadership attaches strong importance to ASEAN norms and maintains a consistent foreign policy and has stepped up to socialize these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The stability of Vietnam ’ s government makes it unusual in a region that has recently seen many dramatic changes in domestic leadership .
Given the crisis enveloping the world , the main objective of Vietnam ’ s 2020 chairmanship is to preserve ASEAN ’ s unity and solidarity and prevent further erosion .
The high expectations from the other ASEAN members and dialogue partners reflect a level of confidence in Vietnam ’ s diplomatic capability .
Hanoi is strategically astute and aware of both the value and limitations of the regional body @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s security , and its unchanging posture on the South China Sea , shows that Hanoi is keen to preserve ASEAN ’ s role in security and international affairs and to invest more diplomatic capital in the regional body .
Vietnam has been holding the line in the maritime disputes , at times rather diplomatically isolated in its determination from its Southeast Asian peers .
But this year , it looks as if that has paid off .
Hanoi shepherded a strong joint statement following the 36th ASEAN Summit , which openly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ departure from ASEAN ’ s usual evasive statements on this matter .
In his speech opening the summit , Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc called for the “ full and strict compliance ” of the rules in the South China Sea and said ASEAN was “ making every effort to establish an effective ” code of conduct with China .
The joint statement expressed concerns regarding recent developments in the waters , “ which have eroded trust and confidence , increased tensions and may undermine peace , security and stability in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) is “ the basis for determining maritime entitlements , sovereign rights , jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones.
” Vietnam is also insistent that UNCLOS remains the basis for the negotiated code of conduct .
All of that addresses China ’ s current intensified military presence in the South China Sea and its repeated unilateral blockage of oil and gas exploration in the waters , as well as reports about Beijing ’ s intentions to announce an air defense identification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Sea policy may have cost it some diplomatic points with China , as well as incurring serious monetary losses from disrupted exploration projects in partnerships with international companies .
But China ’ s overreach may have turned the tides , as the recent wave of formal complaints to the United Nations rejecting China ’ s excessive claims in the South China Sea indicates .
In recent months , Malaysia , the Philippines , Indonesia , Australia , and even the United States have issued complaints that explicitly reject Beijing ’ s own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the “ Four Sha ” island groups—which is inconsistent with UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague .
This will be considered in Hanoi as a sign of success in its policy of uncompromising internationalization of the disputes and keeping the South China Sea a regional security issue , rather than a bilateral issue between China and individual Southeast Asian claimant states .
By taking up this role when few ASEAN members wanted to , or even supported that , Vietnam has taken on a security leadership @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ASEAN .
Not bad for a latecomer and certainly not an irrelevant contribution over 25 years of membership .

Vietnam assumed the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last November for 2020—perhaps the most challenging year ever to take on the role. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the nature of diplomacy, particularly the somewhat old-fashioned style that ASEAN most favored: frequent consultations, informal negotiations, and confidence building through meetings and retreats—none of which are possible given the restrictions.
Vietnam assumed the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last November for 2020—perhaps the most challenging year ever to take on the role. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the nature of diplomacy, particularly the somewhat old-fashioned style that ASEAN most favored: frequent consultations, informal negotiations, and confidence building through meetings and retreats—none of which are possible given the restrictions.
But an even greater challenge to ASEAN’s usual diplomatic style has been posed by the critical tensions between the United States and China. The growing competition jeopardizes regional trade and economic cooperation and contributes to the sense of confrontation and unpredictability of international conduct. As both Washington and Beijing escalate the conflict and bilateral channels shrink, multilateral forums are become proxies for their disputes.
Vietnam has been preparing for the challenges and had been gearing for this important year, where it not only chairs ASEAN but is also a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It has already proved on multiple occasions its ability to host important regional forums and even high-level meetings of global importance, such as the highly challenging U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi last year—a remarkable makeover, given its relatively recent diplomatic isolation from which it only broke out with normalization of relations with the United States and joining ASEAN in the mid-1990s. But beyond Vietnam merely holding the chair, many already harbor hopes that it can take a stronger leadership role within ASEAN.
ASEAN has lacked leadership for some time, which has led to hard questions about the group’s effectiveness. The lack of a formal leader was a deliberate part of ASEAN’s design to ensure equality among a diverse group, but it became an inherent weakness. Indonesia is traditionally closest to such a position as de facto leader but by virtue of size rather than by authority or legitimacy. But Jakarta’s notable withdrawal from that role since Joko Widodo became president leaves a leadership vacuum, even if informal. Many in ASEAN think that there could be no better country standing up to the mounting challenges than Vietnam.
In fact, Vietnam’s thus far impressive response to COVID-19 has earned further respect and recognition from its neighbors, including much wealthier and more developed ones, like Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. Its effective and early recovery puts it in a better position to think beyond the crisis management and have more strategic bandwidth for regional matters. Economists from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank predict that Vietnam has the highest chances in the region to come out of the post-coronavirus economic crisis in a relatively better shape. This is a significant shift in Vietnam’s position in ASEAN, which, as a latecomer to the market economy, used to be labeled among the “second-tier” economies.
Diplomatically, Hanoi has also been taking up a more pivotal role. It is a de facto front-liner in South China Sea matters, where it has strong disputes with Beijing, but it’s also increasingly among the few that truly advocate for a powerful ASEAN role in regional matters. Hanoi’s leadership attaches strong importance to ASEAN norms and maintains a consistent foreign policy and has stepped up to socialize these norms to the other newer members. The stability of Vietnam’s government makes it unusual in a region that has recently seen many dramatic changes in domestic leadership.
Given the crisis enveloping the world, the main objective of Vietnam’s 2020 chairmanship is to preserve ASEAN’s unity and solidarity and prevent further erosion. The high expectations from the other ASEAN members and dialogue partners reflect a level of confidence in Vietnam’s diplomatic capability. Hanoi is strategically astute and aware of both the value and limitations of the regional body. But its commitment to the region’s security, and its unchanging posture on the South China Sea, shows that Hanoi is keen to preserve ASEAN’s role in security and international affairs and to invest more diplomatic capital in the regional body.
Vietnam has been holding the line in the maritime disputes, at times rather diplomatically isolated in its determination from its Southeast Asian peers. But this year, it looks as if that has paid off. Hanoi shepherded a strong joint statement following the 36th ASEAN Summit, which openly reflected the tense situation in the region—a departure from ASEAN’s usual evasive statements on this matter. In his speech opening the summit, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc called for the “full and strict compliance” of the rules in the South China Sea and said ASEAN was “making every effort to establish an effective” code of conduct with China.
The joint statement expressed concerns regarding recent developments in the waters, “which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.” It reiterated that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is “the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones.” Vietnam is also insistent that UNCLOS remains the basis for the negotiated code of conduct. All of that addresses China’s current intensified military presence in the South China Sea and its repeated unilateral blockage of oil and gas exploration in the waters, as well as reports about Beijing’s intentions to announce an air defense identification zone.
Vietnam’s consistent South China Sea policy may have cost it some diplomatic points with China, as well as incurring serious monetary losses from disrupted exploration projects in partnerships with international companies. But China’s overreach may have turned the tides, as the recent wave of formal complaints to the United Nations rejecting China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea indicates. In recent months, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and even the United States have issued complaints that explicitly reject Beijing’s own formal claim to offshore rights and sovereignty of the “Four Sha” island groups—which is inconsistent with UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague.
This will be considered in Hanoi as a sign of success in its policy of uncompromising internationalization of the disputes and keeping the South China Sea a regional security issue, rather than a bilateral issue between China and individual Southeast Asian claimant states. By taking up this role when few ASEAN members wanted to, or even supported that, Vietnam has taken on a security leadership role, at least partially, in ASEAN. Not bad for a latecomer and certainly not an irrelevant contribution over 25 years of membership.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--U.S. Slaps Sanctions on Xinjiang’s Vast Paramilitary Settler Corps

The Trump administration slapped sanctions on a vast paramilitary Chinese colonial enterprise in Xinjiang and two Chinese officials on Friday , in a move likely to drive the U.S.-China relationship to new lows .
The action may be an opening salvo of further sanctions against state-owned enterprises and other government bodies in China .
The move , announced Friday by the Treasury Department , blacklists the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps ( XPCC ) ; Sun Jinlong , a former political commissar of the XPCC ; and Peng Jiarui , the deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sweeping crackdown on Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in China ’ s Xinjiang region .
The announcement is a significant escalation for the Trump administration , which has relied heavily on sanctions as a blunt instrument of foreign policy to punish adversaries in Iran , North Korea , and Venezuela .
It also sheds light on a powerful and secretive organization that controls much of the regional economy in the western region of Xinjiang , where over a million Uighurs have been swept into so-called reeducation camps under the guise of counterterrorism operations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The XPCC , more commonly known as the Bingtuan ( “ the Corps ” ) , is the sharp edge of Chinese colonialism in Xinjiang .
It was established as a way of transforming the many former soldiers—both Nationalist and Communist—left adrift at the end of the country ’ s decadeslong civil war into a force that would colonize and stabilize the border region , akin to the grants of land given to Roman soldiers in newly conquered territories .
These soldier-farmers would both settle the land and defend it—against outside aggression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The XPCC ’ s members are overwhelmingly from China ’ s Han ethnic majority ; only about 7 percent of its 2.7 million members today are Uighur .
Many of them are the children and grandchildren of the original settlers .
The military presence has been diminished , although it still maintains a militia .
Instead , it ’ s turned into a state within a state—running its own cities , health care , and even TV stations .
That ’ s not that unusual in China , where the sheer scale of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fiefdoms .
Before it was dissolved in an extensive anti-corruption purge in 2013 , for instance , the Ministry of Railways had its own police force , universities , and judges .
Because of its massive agricultural presence and extensive factory ownership , the XPCC is a major player in the Xinjiang economy , controlling at least 20 percent of the region ’ s GDP .
Friday ’ s designations mark one of the first times that the United States has sanctioned top Chinese government officials or a large Chinese state entity with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions have targeted lower-ranking officials or intelligence staff , as well much smaller entities over sanctions violations on North Korea and Iran .
The sanctions were carried out under the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act , which grants the U.S. government authorities to sanction foreign entities and personnel complicit in human rights violations .
“ It ’ s notable because it ’ s one of the first times they ’ ve gone after a company in China with Global Magnitsky sanctions , ” said Brian O ’ Toole , a former Treasury and CIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atlantic Council .
“ It suggests that maybe more companies might be in the crosshairs down the line .
That would be the idea , if you ’ re doing this intelligently you start with one entity then progress to the next , essentially trying to discourage others from doing the same things , ” he said .
The sanctions represent another sign of worsening relations between Washington and Beijing , following diplomatic battles over trade , the coronavirus pandemic , and U.S. accusations of Chinese industrial espionage .
The United States this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s consulate in Houston , and China responded by shuttering the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu , all while senior Chinese and Trump administration officials have ramped up a war of words that emulates the tensest days of the Cold War .
“ We see the Chinese Communist Party for what it is : the central threat of our times , ” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said during a Senate hearing on Thursday .
“ A number of new fronts have opened up in the competition between Washington and Beijing , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a New American Security , a think tank .
“ But the growing focus on Xinjiang reflects growing bipartisan consensus around the need to take action against reprehensible human rights abuses that the CCP has perpetuated in with impunity—and it is also consistent with the Trump administration ’ s framing of the competition in ideological terms.
” It ’ s as yet unclear how China will respond to the sanctions , but Chinese officials have taken an increasingly aggressive stance toward the United States and its allies since Xi Jinping took power .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ its own sanctions on some U.S. lawmakers in recent months , accusing Washington of “ interfering in China ’ s international affairs.
” However , the Chinese elite is far more tied into the United States—where many of the rich , including high-level officials , have financial interests or send their children for education—than vice versa .
There are also signs that China is looking to establish financial networks that wouldn ’ t be beholden to U.S. sanctions—though some experts question how feasible such measures would be .
A new report from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ itself off of the SWIFT financial messaging system that underpins virtually all transactions in the global financial markets today in anticipation of further U.S. sanctions .
The sanctions are likely to make it difficult for any U.S. business to operate with Xinjiang partners , because the XPCC is so influential in the region .
As repression has intensified in Xinjiang over the last few years , the Corps has started to play an even more powerful role , taking over the responsibilities previously held by municipal governments .
Lauren Hansen Restrepo , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this as a “ totalitarian politics of land , ” in which previously more flexible policies are being replaced with a vision of powerful , Han-dominated central institutions .
The XPCC runs its own courts and prison systems , which have played an important role in the crackdown on Uighur culture , religion , and family life .
Enforcing the measures on smaller businesses may be hard , but larger corporations with their own compliance departments are likely to break off business connections .
Some groups , such as the Better Cotton Initiative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ producers .
Former U.S. government officials describe the sanctions against the XPCC and other Chinese officials as an important signal that Washington won ’ t allow the sweeping crackdowns in Xinjiang to continue without retaliation .
It may also signal a willingness to target other large organizations , such as state-owned enterprises involved in China ’ s construction of bases in disputed waters in the South China Sea , which the United States deems illegal under international law .
However , they concede that sanctions alone likely won ’ t prompt Beijing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important part of a broader policy to tackle China ’ s human rights abuses , ” said David Mortlock , a sanctions expert and former director of international economic affairs at the White House during the Obama administration .
“ The sanctions by themselves are certainly a positive step , but they ’ re not going to be enough by themselves to get China to change its behavior , and the administration needs to realize this is not the end of that effort .
”

The Trump administration slapped sanctions on a vast paramilitary Chinese colonial enterprise in Xinjiang and two Chinese officials on Friday, in a move likely to drive the U.S.-China relationship to new lows. The action may be an opening salvo of further sanctions against state-owned enterprises and other government bodies in China.
The Trump administration slapped sanctions on a vast paramilitary Chinese colonial enterprise in Xinjiang and two Chinese officials on Friday, in a move likely to drive the U.S.-China relationship to new lows. The action may be an opening salvo of further sanctions against state-owned enterprises and other government bodies in China.
The move, announced Friday by the Treasury Department, blacklists the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC); Sun Jinlong, a former political commissar of the XPCC; and Peng Jiarui, the deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC, over human rights violations linked to the sweeping crackdown on Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang region.
The announcement is a significant escalation for the Trump administration, which has relied heavily on sanctions as a blunt instrument of foreign policy to punish adversaries in Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. It also sheds light on a powerful and secretive organization that controls much of the regional economy in the western region of Xinjiang, where over a million Uighurs have been swept into so-called reeducation camps under the guise of counterterrorism operations or forced to labor for Chinese corporations.
The XPCC, more commonly known as the Bingtuan (“the Corps”), is the sharp edge of Chinese colonialism in Xinjiang. It was established as a way of transforming the many former soldiers—both Nationalist and Communist—left adrift at the end of the country’s decadeslong civil war into a force that would colonize and stabilize the border region, akin to the grants of land given to Roman soldiers in newly conquered territories. These soldier-farmers would both settle the land and defend it—against outside aggression and against an unruly local population.
The XPCC’s members are overwhelmingly from China’s Han ethnic majority; only about 7 percent of its 2.7 million members today are Uighur. Many of them are the children and grandchildren of the original settlers. The military presence has been diminished, although it still maintains a militia. Instead, it’s turned into a state within a state—running its own cities, health care, and even TV stations.
That’s not that unusual in China, where the sheer scale of state enterprises often transforms them into separate fiefdoms. Before it was dissolved in an extensive anti-corruption purge in 2013, for instance, the Ministry of Railways had its own police force, universities, and judges. Because of its massive agricultural presence and extensive factory ownership, the XPCC is a major player in the Xinjiang economy, controlling at least 20 percent of the region’s GDP.
Friday’s designations mark one of the first times that the United States has sanctioned top Chinese government officials or a large Chinese state entity with sanctions over human rights violations in China—past sanctions have targeted lower-ranking officials or intelligence staff, as well much smaller entities over sanctions violations on North Korea and Iran. The sanctions were carried out under the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act, which grants the U.S. government authorities to sanction foreign entities and personnel complicit in human rights violations.
“It’s notable because it’s one of the first times they’ve gone after a company in China with Global Magnitsky sanctions,” said Brian O’Toole, a former Treasury and CIA official and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. “It suggests that maybe more companies might be in the crosshairs down the line. That would be the idea, if you’re doing this intelligently you start with one entity then progress to the next, essentially trying to discourage others from doing the same things,” he said.
The sanctions represent another sign of worsening relations between Washington and Beijing, following diplomatic battles over trade, the coronavirus pandemic, and U.S. accusations of Chinese industrial espionage. The United States this month ordered the closure of China’s consulate in Houston, and China responded by shuttering the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, all while senior Chinese and Trump administration officials have ramped up a war of words that emulates the tensest days of the Cold War.
“We see the Chinese Communist Party for what it is: the central threat of our times,” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said during a Senate hearing on Thursday.
“A number of new fronts have opened up in the competition between Washington and Beijing,” said Kristine Lee of the Center for a New American Security, a think tank. “But the growing focus on Xinjiang reflects growing bipartisan consensus around the need to take action against reprehensible human rights abuses that the CCP has perpetuated in with impunity—and it is also consistent with the Trump administration’s framing of the competition in ideological terms.”
It’s as yet unclear how China will respond to the sanctions, but Chinese officials have taken an increasingly aggressive stance toward the United States and its allies since Xi Jinping took power. Beijing has retaliated against U.S. sanctions with its own sanctions on some U.S. lawmakers in recent months, accusing Washington of “interfering in China’s international affairs.” However, the Chinese elite is far more tied into the United States—where many of the rich, including high-level officials, have financial interests or send their children for education—than vice versa.
There are also signs that China is looking to establish financial networks that wouldn’t be beholden to U.S. sanctions—though some experts question how feasible such measures would be. A new report from the Bank of China recommends the country wean itself off of the SWIFT financial messaging system that underpins virtually all transactions in the global financial markets today in anticipation of further U.S. sanctions.
The sanctions are likely to make it difficult for any U.S. business to operate with Xinjiang partners, because the XPCC is so influential in the region. As repression has intensified in Xinjiang over the last few years, the Corps has started to play an even more powerful role, taking over the responsibilities previously held by municipal governments. Lauren Hansen Restrepo, a professor specializing in Xinjiang governance, describes this as a “totalitarian politics of land,” in which previously more flexible policies are being replaced with a vision of powerful, Han-dominated central institutions. The XPCC runs its own courts and prison systems, which have played an important role in the crackdown on Uighur culture, religion, and family life. Enforcing the measures on smaller businesses may be hard, but larger corporations with their own compliance departments are likely to break off business connections. Some groups, such as the Better Cotton Initiative, have already severed ties with Corps producers.
Former U.S. government officials describe the sanctions against the XPCC and other Chinese officials as an important signal that Washington won’t allow the sweeping crackdowns in Xinjiang to continue without retaliation. It may also signal a willingness to target other large organizations, such as state-owned enterprises involved in China’s construction of bases in disputed waters in the South China Sea, which the United States deems illegal under international law. However, they concede that sanctions alone likely won’t prompt Beijing to alter course.
“They are an important part of a broader policy to tackle China’s human rights abuses,” said David Mortlock, a sanctions expert and former director of international economic affairs at the White House during the Obama administration. “The sanctions by themselves are certainly a positive step, but they’re not going to be enough by themselves to get China to change its behavior, and the administration needs to realize this is not the end of that effort.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--‘The Tea Leaves Suggest That if He Doesn’t Cheat, He’s Going to Lose’

‘ The Tea Leaves Suggest That if He Doesn ’ t Cheat , He ’ s Going to Lose ’ On Thursday morning , minutes after news broke of the worst quarterly economic collapse in U.S. history , U.S. President Donald Trump suggested delaying this year ’ s election .
“ With Universal Mail-In Voting ( not Absentee Voting , which is good ) , 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in history .
It will be a great embarrassment to the USA .
Delay the Election until people can properly , securely and safely vote ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ has repeatedly railed against mail-in ballots—which is how he casts his votes—as an illegitimate form of voting , even though five states vote exclusively by mail and another 29 plus the District of Columbia allow no-excuse absentee ballots .
( Which are , of course , sent by mail . )
In the last presidential election , one-quarter of all votes cast were by mail .
There is zero evidence that mail-in voting leads to increased voter fraud .
Trump doesn ’ t have the authority to delay the election—only Congress could do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the House and the Senate were quick to shoot down Trump ’ s suggestion on Thursday .
But after almost four years of Trump , the idea that something can ’ t happen just because it has never been tried or might be illegal doesn ’ t reassure everyone .
To put Trump ’ s suggestion in context , Foreign Policy spoke with Timothy Naftali , a presidential scholar at New York University .
The interview has been edited for length and clarity .
FP : Is there any precedent for Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
Timothy Naftali : No .
I think the way to frame this is to look at how the United States managed elections in the Civil War and in World War II : In 1864 and 1944 , the United States had elections .
In both cases , especially the Civil War , the country was convulsed .
In World War II , that country was in the middle of a national emergency .
And even so , the election happened as it was supposed to on the day it was supposed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Remember , no one but a man who lacks any historical knowledge or any commitment to the Constitution is calling for this .
We have to keep in mind what ’ s going on here .
There ’ s no national call to delay the election .
There are no local or state leaders of any number who are suggesting that the presidential election can not be held as required in November .
There is only one man with a Twitter finger .
This is a distraction by a man who is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s no grounding or history for what he ’ s suggesting .
And that ’ s why serious people in the last couple of hours responded by saying that this can ’ t happen .
FP : If we look at not just Trump but the whole of the Republican Party , would you put this suggestion within the wider trends of the Republican Party or solely as a Trump phenomenon ?
TN : Oh , that ’ s an interesting question .
I think there ’ s a radical element on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermine democratic norms to hold on to power as a minority position in this country .
And Donald Trump reflects that , but he didn ’ t create that ; he has benefited from it .
The election of Donald Trump is a perfect storm of all of these various phenomena that we ’ ve seen in the last 20 years but especially since the Tea Party movement gained traction .
The irony of this moment is that the argument of Trumpists was that we needed a strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ save us from a presidential delay of a presidential election because the Constitution makes clear it ’ s up to the Congress to decide when we vote for the president .
It ’ s not up to the president to decide .
So if you follow this strict constructionist approach , Trump is done on this issue , but I don ’ t think there ’ s any consistency in the Trump worldview , other than presenting power for Trump himself and access to power for his family .
And so there ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Republican Party .
I mean , will it be renamed the party of Trump ?
Should it be carrying [ Abraham ] Lincoln ’ s banner anymore ?
It ’ s up to Republicans to determine that , but what we have seen on the right is systematic .
We see on the right , as demographics have shifted in this country , and as public opinion has shifted on cultural and social issues , there have been those on the right who tried to use and find every institution and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from being expressed in this country .
FP : I suppose the question is whether this is the Republican Party that tried and failed to repeal Obamacare or the party that managed to deprive Merrick Garland of a Supreme Court seat .
TN : Well , I think that we ’ re not talking about an organization .
I don ’ t think there ’ s a central strategic core to this organization because there ’ s no logical consistency to the ideas that Republicans have professed as an institution in the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-free trade and pro-balanced budgets to protectionists and not seeming to care about the budget .
They ’ ve been all over the map on immigration .
They ’ ve been strict constructionists , but then many of them supported the use of the national emergency power to fund the wall [ along the border with Mexico ] .
I don ’ t see any logical consistency among professed Republican ideas in the last decade .
The consistency is the desire for power and the desire to use whatever instruments are available to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and to stay in office .
And Trump is what seemed to be the perfect instrument .
And Trump , of course , was very happy to have these ideas and tactics floating about because he likes to win .
I ’ m not sure he ever really understood what it meant to be president .
I ’ m not sure he still understands it , because he doesn ’ t seek a national mandate , but he loves winning .
And he also doesn ’ t mind cheating .
And he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party who don ’ t mind cheating either .
And so [ Thursday ’ s ] tweet is hoping to find a way to cheat , but the Constitution gives the power to Congress and Congress is divided , and there ’ s no way the House would approve this .
And , listening to some of the GOP reactions , I ’ m not sure that the Senate would approve shifting the date .
So he ’ s desperately looking for a way to cheat to avoid defeat in November .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to happen , but the tea leaves suggest that if he doesn ’ t cheat , he ’ s going to lose .

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