foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--Why Indian Americans Matter in U.S. Politics

Why Indian Americans Matter in U.S .
Politics In the last decade , Democrats and Republicans in the United States have come to see Indian Americans as a demographic of growing influence .
Although they make up just 1 percent of the electorate , Indian Americans comprise the second largest immigrant group in the United States ( after Mexican Americans ) .
And their numbers are expanding rapidly : According to the U.S. census , between 2000 and 2018 the Indian American population grew by nearly 150 percent .
The community is also the highest-earning ethnic group in the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 100,000 in 2015—nearly double the national average that year .
Accordingly , Indian Americans have been tapped as a donor-base for both parties , contributing nearly $ 10 million towards the Democratic ticket in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential elections .
In the 2020 presidential election , the Trump and Biden campaigns have made concerted efforts to air television advertisements targeting the Indian American voter .
Competing Trump and Biden ads , in Hindi and several regional dialects , are running amid Bollywood films and telenovela-style Indian shows on popular South Asian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TVAsia and Sony Entertainment TV .
By picking Kamala Devi Harris as his running mate—the California senator had an Indian mother and a Jamaican father—the Biden campaign has mobilized significant support from the Indian American community .
Harris is vocal about her biracial identity , embracing her Indian roots , the impact of which is most visible at fundraisers .
At a single fundraising event in September , the Biden Victory Fund raised a record-breaking $ 3.3 million from the Indian American community .
Of course , some have posited—either with worry or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to support President Donald Trump in significant numbers , citing his friendship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi , the two leaders ’ comparable political styles and populist appeal , and their tough positions against the Islamic State .
Such predictions are premature—at least for now .
There are significant numbers of Indian American voters in key swing states.A recent YouGov poll found that 72 percent of registered Indian American voters supported Vice President Biden .
By comparison , 77 percent voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and 84 percent for President Barack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ found that the number of Trump-supporting Indian Americans had grown to 22 percent , from the 16 percent who supported him in 2016 .
Thus , while a majority of Indian Americans continue to support the Democratic ticket , it seems that the Republican party is having some success in growing support among Indian American voters .
As the 2016 election demonstrated , even small shifts can have major repercussions .
Perhaps more important than the Indian American community ’ s relative affluence and generally high levels of education is the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters in key swing states .
Texas , Michigan , and Pennsylvania all have large South Asian communities , and given that the margins of victory are likely to be narrow , even small shifts in support could tip the balance .
While the majority of Indian Americans may still lean Democratic on domestic issues , there is also the so-called Modi factor .
Many in the community continue to support Modi , and in particular his stance on the issue of Kashmir .
Nearly a month after the Indian government revoked Kashmir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amid widespread protests against his government ’ s human rights violations , Modi visited Houston , and was cheered on by a crowd of 50,000 supporters , including Trump .
Modi is widely credited for making India more visible on the global stage .
Trump and the Republican Party have drawn a clear connection between their support of India and the Indian voter , where Democrats have sometimes struggled , especially when it comes to Modi ’ s human rights record .
Accordingly , both parties are making big bets when it comes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden campaign is banking on the star power of Indian American celebrities and earlier this month hosted a virtual South Asian block party that featured celebrities such as Mindy Kaling , Lilly Singh , and Kumail Nanjiani in an effort to reach and motivate younger South Asian voters .
Similarly , the Trump campaign recently launched Indian Voices for Trump , a coalition of Indian Americans in government and the private sector led by Donald Trump Jr. , whose mission it is to “ honor the comprehensive global strategic partnership with India ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Although Indian Americans tend to lean left , we have seen in the last four years that their party allegiances are not binding .
The Modi factor is not a myth .
While Indian Americans are seen as broadly liberal , the crowds rallying in Houston in 2019 told a different story : Like any other demographic group in the United States , the Indian American community is not a monolith .
Trump is attempting to overshadow his own harsh rhetoric on immigrants and wall-building by drawing a connection between his support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The influence of Indian American attitudes on Indian politics has led to an ascendence of foreign-born Indian American conservatives organizing under Trump and focusing on Indian domestic issues .
Trump has pushed some donors to the right , particularly among those who see in the U.S. president a mirror image of Modi : a populist strongman who seemingly stands against Muslims .
Recall that Trump ’ s support among Indian Americans has grown by 8 percentage points since 2016—a notable rise for a president who has garnered otherwise historically low approval numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Harris galvanizes her party ’ s Indian American supporters , both parties continue to court this voting demographic in battleground states .
Having grown politically active , donating more to candidates and running for office , the visibility of Indian Americans will be hard to ignore .
Republicans and Democrats alike are recognizing that the political dividends of targeting this community , for votes and campaign contributions , are significant .
Meanwhile , Indian Americans are enjoying the spotlight .

In the last decade, Democrats and Republicans in the United States have come to see Indian Americans as a demographic of growing influence. Although they make up just 1 percent of the electorate, Indian Americans comprise the second largest immigrant group in the United States (after Mexican Americans). And their numbers are expanding rapidly: According to the U.S. census, between 2000 and 2018 the Indian American population grew by nearly 150 percent. The community is also the highest-earning ethnic group in the country, with a median income of $100,000 in 2015—nearly double the national average that year. Accordingly, Indian Americans have been tapped as a donor-base for both parties, contributing nearly $10 million towards the Democratic ticket in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential elections.
In the last decade, Democrats and Republicans in the United States have come to see Indian Americans as a demographic of growing influence. Although they make up just 1 percent of the electorate, Indian Americans comprise the second largest immigrant group in the United States (after Mexican Americans). And their numbers are expanding rapidly: According to the U.S. census, between 2000 and 2018 the Indian American population grew by nearly 150 percent. The community is also the highest-earning ethnic group in the country, with a median income of $100,000 in 2015—nearly double the national average that year. Accordingly, Indian Americans have been tapped as a donor-base for both parties, contributing nearly $10 million towards the Democratic ticket in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential elections.
In the 2020 presidential election, the Trump and Biden campaigns have made concerted efforts to air television advertisements targeting the Indian American voter. Competing Trump and Biden ads, in Hindi and several regional dialects, are running amid Bollywood films and telenovela-style Indian shows on popular South Asian networks in the United States such as TVAsia and Sony Entertainment TV.
By picking Kamala Devi Harris as his running mate—the California senator had an Indian mother and a Jamaican father—the Biden campaign has mobilized significant support from the Indian American community. Harris is vocal about her biracial identity, embracing her Indian roots, the impact of which is most visible at fundraisers. At a single fundraising event in September, the Biden Victory Fund raised a record-breaking $3.3 million from the Indian American community.
Of course, some have posited—either with worry or excitement—that Indian Americans are beginning to shift to support President Donald Trump in significant numbers, citing his friendship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the two leaders’ comparable political styles and populist appeal, and their tough positions against the Islamic State. Such predictions are premature—at least for now.
There are significant numbers of Indian American voters in key swing states.A recent YouGov poll found that 72 percent of registered Indian American voters supported Vice President Biden. By comparison, 77 percent voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and 84 percent for President Barack Obama in 2012. The poll also found that the number of Trump-supporting Indian Americans had grown to 22 percent, from the 16 percent who supported him in 2016. Thus, while a majority of Indian Americans continue to support the Democratic ticket, it seems that the Republican party is having some success in growing support among Indian American voters.
As the 2016 election demonstrated, even small shifts can have major repercussions. Perhaps more important than the Indian American community’s relative affluence and generally high levels of education is the fact that there are significant numbers of Indian American voters in key swing states. Texas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania all have large South Asian communities, and given that the margins of victory are likely to be narrow, even small shifts in support could tip the balance.
While the majority of Indian Americans may still lean Democratic on domestic issues, there is also the so-called Modi factor. Many in the community continue to support Modi, and in particular his stance on the issue of Kashmir. Nearly a month after the Indian government revoked Kashmir’s special constitutional status, and amid widespread protests against his government’s human rights violations, Modi visited Houston, and was cheered on by a crowd of 50,000 supporters, including Trump. Modi is widely credited for making India more visible on the global stage. Trump and the Republican Party have drawn a clear connection between their support of India and the Indian voter, where Democrats have sometimes struggled, especially when it comes to Modi’s human rights record.
Accordingly, both parties are making big bets when it comes to the Indian American community. The Biden campaign is banking on the star power of Indian American celebrities and earlier this month hosted a virtual South Asian block party that featured celebrities such as Mindy Kaling, Lilly Singh, and Kumail Nanjiani in an effort to reach and motivate younger South Asian voters.
Similarly, the Trump campaign recently launched Indian Voices for Trump, a coalition of Indian Americans in government and the private sector led by Donald Trump Jr., whose mission it is to “honor the comprehensive global strategic partnership with India” and “build on our US-India partnership.”
Although Indian Americans tend to lean left, we have seen in the last four years that their party allegiances are not binding. The Modi factor is not a myth. While Indian Americans are seen as broadly liberal, the crowds rallying in Houston in 2019 told a different story: Like any other demographic group in the United States, the Indian American community is not a monolith.
Trump is attempting to overshadow his own harsh rhetoric on immigrants and wall-building by drawing a connection between his support for India and the Indian American vote. The influence of Indian American attitudes on Indian politics has led to an ascendence of foreign-born Indian American conservatives organizing under Trump and focusing on Indian domestic issues. Trump has pushed some donors to the right, particularly among those who see in the U.S. president a mirror image of Modi: a populist strongman who seemingly stands against Muslims. Recall that Trump’s support among Indian Americans has grown by 8 percentage points since 2016—a notable rise for a president who has garnered otherwise historically low approval numbers.
While the history-making vice presidential candidacy of Harris galvanizes her party’s Indian American supporters, both parties continue to court this voting demographic in battleground states. Having grown politically active, donating more to candidates and running for office, the visibility of Indian Americans will be hard to ignore. Republicans and Democrats alike are recognizing that the political dividends of targeting this community, for votes and campaign contributions, are significant. Meanwhile, Indian Americans are enjoying the spotlight.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--The U.N. Protest Gag Order Lives On

The U.N. Protest Gag Order Lives On

In the summer of 2020 , as anti-racism demonstrations spread around the globe in response to the murder of George Floyd , United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was facing protests of his own .
U.N. civil servants who wanted to show solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement were up in arms about instructions from the U.N. ethics office telling personnel to steer clear of public demonstrations , even in their free time .
The directive , which was initially endorsed by the U.N. chief , expressly banned participation in the protests .
Guterres then reversed course , assuring U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting in June that they could take part , as long as they didn ’ t wave the U.N. flag .
In a letter to staff on June 9 , Guterres insisted that “ there is no ban on personal expressions of solidarity or acts of peaceful civic engagement , provided they are carried out in an entirely private capacity.
” But his statement didn ’ t put the matter to rest—or give an explicit green light to U.N. staffers to participate in political demonstrations , U.N. officials contend .
Staffers at an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and freedoms now wonder if they can even advocate for those rights , or if they ’ re going to be gagged to avoid courting public controversy .
On June 22 , less than two weeks after Guterres sent the letter , the U.N. Development Program reissued its own gag order .
“ The international , impartial nature of your role limits your freedom to publicly express views on controversial matters , ” the UNDP ’ s Code of Ethics document , which was revised this year , states .
“ For example @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political demonstrations , or wear politically-themed clothing or buttons .
You may not publicly criticize governments , or run for or hold political office at any level while working for UNDP.
” The internal debate over the U.N. response to the Black Lives Matter movement raises difficult questions about the rights of international civil servants to express support for core U.N. values , including the promotion of equality and human rights , if they are viewed as controversial by member states .
It also places the U.N. leadership in the awkward position of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ free expression and assembly , while restraining their own staff from exercising those same rights .
The U.N. development agency—which relies on the cooperation of foreign governments to carry out its work—has been among the U.N. ’ s most risk-averse entities , seeking to avoid offending member states at almost any cost .
But the guidance did not sit well with some UNDP staffers , who argued that it didn ’ t comply with the policy laid out by Guterres .
Niall McCann , an Irish national who works in UNDP ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ UNDP ’ s administrator and ethics office with the development agency ’ s internal Office of Audit and Investigations , and he requested an investigation into the matter .
The ban on participation in demonstrations , McCann wrote , constituted an “ abuse of authority.
” “ This assertion directly contradicts the U.N. Secretary General , who specifically commented on this matter , in the context of the ongoing Black Lives Matter protest movement in the United States , ” he wrote in the complaint , which was reviewed by Foreign Policy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ basis for the protest prohibition , insisting that it is not expressly banned by the key directives governing staff conduct : the U.N. Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service or the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations .
He also accused UNDP ’ s ethics chief , Peter Liria , of seeking to “ muzzle UNDP staff standing up against racism.
” To no avail : In late August , the internal investigations office informed McCann that a “ formal investigation is not warranted and has closed the case.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights of staff to engage in peaceful protest .
For instance , the standards of conduct states that , “ While their personal views remain inviolate , international civil servants do not have the freedom of private persons to take sides or to express their convictions publicly on controversial matters , either individually or as members of a group.
” A UNDP spokesperson said that the purpose of the code of ethics is to “ protect the integrity of UNDP as an impartial U.N. agency that upholds the values of the U.N. Charter.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights or anti-racism and discrimination campaign like Black Lives Matter is not the same as aligning with a specific political entity or adopting a political position , ” it added .
“ UNDP does not forbid staff from participating in peaceful acts of civic engagement.
” But the statement does not say whether participating in a Black Lives Matter protest constitutes a peaceful act of civic engagement .
There is a history of civil protest by U.N. officials .
In September 2014 , then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon marched with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ People ’ s Climate March in New York .
Ralph Bunche , the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. peace mediator , participated with Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1963 March on Washington and joined the late civil rights leader during his historic march for racial equality from Selma to Montgomery , Alabama , in 1965 .
The U.N. General Assembly , meanwhile , condemned South Africa ’ s racist apartheid policies and urged all nations to end economic and military relations with the minority , white-led government .
Under UNDP rules , such actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members .
On July 14 , Kevin Waite , an advisor in UNDP ’ s ethics office , defended the ban on demonstrations , informing McCann by email that there is a difference between “ peaceful civic engagement ” —which Guterres encouraged—and “ political demonstrations.
” Waite ’ s conclusion was subsequently backed by UNDP ’ s ethics chief , Liria , who also reaffirmed earlier guidance that placed even further restrictions on staff .
“ Sometimes a specific public activity may not on its face appear to contradict your independence , impartiality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( and in some cases may even seem to further values embraced by the UN ) , ” reads a February memo from UNDP ’ s ethics office to staff .
“ You must ask yourself whether the specific activity involves a highly polarized political issue or even a social issue utilized by a political party , government or candidates in the context of election or policy campaigns , or whether an activity has a dual purpose ( e.g.
, one that may be acceptable and the other not ) .
If the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not appropriate.
” U.N. officials insist that the U.N. chief is trying to balance the need to shield the organization from charges of political meddling in sovereign matters of member states , while providing some political cover for staffers committed to showing support for the human rights and equality of ordinary people .
“ The Secretary General ’ s position is clear : there is no ban on personal expressions of solidarity or acts of peaceful civic engagement , provided they are carried out in an entirely private capacity , ” Stéphane Dujarric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s top spokesperson , told Foreign Policy Tuesday .
“ Staff will need to use best judgment in balancing such activities with their responsibilities as international civil servants.
” But the secretary-general ’ s office also forwarded a statement to Foreign Policy that the UNDP position was consistent with the rest of the U.N. David Kaye , who served recently as the U.N. special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression , said the U.N. has a legitimate interest in dissuading its civil service from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that the UNDP directive was so vague that it would likely have a chilling effect on U.N. employees ’ ability to exercise their right to free assembly and expression .
The U.N. , he said , “ should distinguish between engaging in the local politics of a country versus standing up for fundamental rights.
” The challenge for U.N. employees , meanwhile , is trying to determine what is unacceptable behavior .
“ Where is the line ?
What is a so-called controversial matter ?
” McCann told Foreign Policy .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ something that arose in light of the Black Lives Matter movement .
You can ’ t put a blanket muzzle on people that they can ’ t take a position on a controversial matter without telling us what is a controversial matter .
Is taking a knee a controversial matter ?
Is attending a silent , candle-lit vigil commemorating George Floyd a controversial matter ?
” Update , Oct. 21 , 2020 : This article was updated to clarify when the UNDP Code of Ethics language was issued .

In the summer of 2020, as anti-racism demonstrations spread around the globe in response to the murder of George Floyd, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was facing protests of his own.
In the summer of 2020, as anti-racism demonstrations spread around the globe in response to the murder of George Floyd, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was facing protests of his own.
U.N. civil servants who wanted to show solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement were up in arms about instructions from the U.N. ethics office telling personnel to steer clear of public demonstrations, even in their free time. The directive, which was initially endorsed by the U.N. chief, expressly banned participation in the protests.
Guterres then reversed course, assuring U.N. employees at a hastily arranged town hall meeting in June that they could take part, as long as they didn’t wave the U.N. flag. In a letter to staff on June 9, Guterres insisted that “there is no ban on personal expressions of solidarity or acts of peaceful civic engagement, provided they are carried out in an entirely private capacity.”
But his statement didn’t put the matter to rest—or give an explicit green light to U.N. staffers to participate in political demonstrations, U.N. officials contend. Staffers at an organization founded to advance fundamental human rights and freedoms now wonder if they can even advocate for those rights, or if they’re going to be gagged to avoid courting public controversy.
On June 22, less than two weeks after Guterres sent the letter, the U.N. Development Program reissued its own gag order. “The international, impartial nature of your role limits your freedom to publicly express views on controversial matters,” the UNDP’s Code of Ethics document, which was revised this year, states. “For example, you cannot take part in political demonstrations, or wear politically-themed clothing or buttons. You may not publicly criticize governments, or run for or hold political office at any level while working for UNDP.”
The internal debate over the U.N. response to the Black Lives Matter movement raises difficult questions about the rights of international civil servants to express support for core U.N. values, including the promotion of equality and human rights, if they are viewed as controversial by member states. It also places the U.N. leadership in the awkward position of urging countries around the world to promote free expression and assembly, while restraining their own staff from exercising those same rights.
The U.N. development agency—which relies on the cooperation of foreign governments to carry out its work—has been among the U.N.’s most risk-averse entities, seeking to avoid offending member states at almost any cost. But the guidance did not sit well with some UNDP staffers, who argued that it didn’t comply with the policy laid out by Guterres.
Niall McCann, an Irish national who works in UNDP’s Brussels office, filed a complaint against UNDP’s administrator and ethics office with the development agency’s internal Office of Audit and Investigations, and he requested an investigation into the matter. The ban on participation in demonstrations, McCann wrote, constituted an “abuse of authority.”
“This assertion directly contradicts the U.N. Secretary General, who specifically commented on this matter, in the context of the ongoing Black Lives Matter protest movement in the United States,” he wrote in the complaint, which was reviewed by Foreign Policy. McCann argued that there was no legal basis for the protest prohibition, insisting that it is not expressly banned by the key directives governing staff conduct: the U.N. Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service or the Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations.
He also accused UNDP’s ethics chief, Peter Liria, of seeking to “muzzle UNDP staff standing up against racism.”
To no avail: In late August, the internal investigations office informed McCann that a “formal investigation is not warranted and has closed the case.”
The directives are ambiguous about the rights of staff to engage in peaceful protest. For instance, the standards of conduct states that, “While their personal views remain inviolate, international civil servants do not have the freedom of private persons to take sides or to express their convictions publicly on controversial matters, either individually or as members of a group.”
A UNDP spokesperson said that the purpose of the code of ethics is to “protect the integrity of UNDP as an impartial U.N. agency that upholds the values of the U.N. Charter.”
“Showing support for a human rights or anti-racism and discrimination campaign like Black Lives Matter is not the same as aligning with a specific political entity or adopting a political position,” it added. “UNDP does not forbid staff from participating in peaceful acts of civic engagement.” But the statement does not say whether participating in a Black Lives Matter protest constitutes a peaceful act of civic engagement.
There is a history of civil protest by U.N. officials. In September 2014, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon marched with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators demanding curbs on carbon emissions at the People’s Climate March in New York. Ralph Bunche, the Nobel Prize-winning U.N. peace mediator, participated with Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1963 March on Washington and joined the late civil rights leader during his historic march for racial equality from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, in 1965. The U.N. General Assembly, meanwhile, condemned South Africa’s racist apartheid policies and urged all nations to end economic and military relations with the minority, white-led government.
Under UNDP rules, such actions would likely be off-limits to ordinary staff members.
On July 14, Kevin Waite, an advisor in UNDP’s ethics office, defended the ban on demonstrations, informing McCann by email that there is a difference between “peaceful civic engagement”—which Guterres encouraged—and “political demonstrations.” Waite’s conclusion was subsequently backed by UNDP’s ethics chief, Liria, who also reaffirmed earlier guidance that placed even further restrictions on staff.
“Sometimes a specific public activity may not on its face appear to contradict your independence, impartiality or the interests of the UN, (and in some cases may even seem to further values embraced by the UN),” reads a February memo from UNDP’s ethics office to staff. “You must ask yourself whether the specific activity involves a highly polarized political issue or even a social issue utilized by a political party, government or candidates in the context of election or policy campaigns, or whether an activity has a dual purpose (e.g., one that may be acceptable and the other not). If the answer is yes, participation is likely not appropriate.”
U.N. officials insist that the U.N. chief is trying to balance the need to shield the organization from charges of political meddling in sovereign matters of member states, while providing some political cover for staffers committed to showing support for the human rights and equality of ordinary people.
“The Secretary General’s position is clear: there is no ban on personal expressions of solidarity or acts of peaceful civic engagement, provided they are carried out in an entirely private capacity,” Stéphane Dujarric, the U.N.’s chief’s top spokesperson, told Foreign Policy Tuesday. “Staff will need to use best judgment in balancing such activities with their responsibilities as international civil servants.”
But the secretary-general’s office also forwarded a statement to Foreign Policy that the UNDP position was consistent with the rest of the U.N.
David Kaye, who served recently as the U.N. special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, said the U.N. has a legitimate interest in dissuading its civil service from engaging in partisan politics. But he said that the UNDP directive was so vague that it would likely have a chilling effect on U.N. employees’ ability to exercise their right to free assembly and expression.
The U.N., he said, “should distinguish between engaging in the local politics of a country versus standing up for fundamental rights.”
The challenge for U.N. employees, meanwhile, is trying to determine what is unacceptable behavior.
“Where is the line? What is a so-called controversial matter?” McCann told Foreign Policy. “In this instance we are talking about something that arose in light of the Black Lives Matter movement. You can’t put a blanket muzzle on people that they can’t take a position on a controversial matter without telling us what is a controversial matter. Is taking a knee a controversial matter? Is attending a silent, candle-lit vigil commemorating George Floyd a controversial matter?”
Update, Oct. 21, 2020: This article was updated to clarify when the UNDP Code of Ethics language was issued.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--Trump’s Assaults on Immigrants Drive Georgia’s Latino Voters

“ This election [ is ] very personal , ” said Carlos Garcia , the director of the Pro-Immigrant Alliance of Cobb County , which lies northwest of Atlanta .
Garcia immigrated to Georgia from Mexico City in 1999 and became a U.S. citizen this year .
“ I saw [ the ] need to do something , and as soon as I could , obviously , I registered to vote.
” Atlanta suburbs like Gwinnett and Cobb are among a handful of counties driving Georgia ’ s shift from a Republican stronghold to a battleground state : Polls show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vice President Joe Biden in the Nov. 3 presidential election , and Democrats are gaining in the state ’ s two U.S. Senate races .
And as part of that shift , the Latino community has emerged as a powerful electoral force .
Mostly white until the 1990s , Gwinnett County residents are now majority-minority , and more than a quarter are foreign-born .
Atlanta-area Latinos are a potentially game-changing bloc in a state that Trump won by just over 200,000 votes in 2016 .
Latino voters now number more than 250,000 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Latino Elected Officials , or GALEO .
And they vote .
During the 2018 midterm elections , 56 percent of eligible Latino voters turned out in Georgia , a higher rate than any other group in the state—and outperforming the Latino vote in both Arizona and Florida .
Already in 2016 , the counties with the largest Latino populations , Gwinnett and Cobb , both went for the Democratic nominee for the first time in decades .
“ That ’ s where I think we can see the Latino community [ in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difference in this election , ” said Jerry Gonzalez , GALEO ’ s executive director .
But if Latino voters turn out in record numbers again , it will be against the Trump administration ’ s ethos rather than for Biden ’ s immigration platform , which largely focuses on reversing current policies .
“ It ’ s not so much about Joe Biden as the person , quite frankly , as much as it is sort of what is different that is not Trump , ” state Rep. Brenda Lopez Romero told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration has allowed— [ for others ] to feel that it is okay to threaten individuals because of their perceived immigration status—really has affected the quality of life for us here in the state.
” Latinos in Georgia are mostly first- or second-generation immigrants , the result of a surge in immigration from Mexico and Central America that began in the 1990s .
That makes them acutely sensitive to the very programs that the Trump administration seeks to dismantle , such as temporary protected status for families from El Salvador and Nicaragua and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All of these issues greatly affect us because we are a very young immigrant community.
” “ All of these issues greatly affect us because we are a very young immigrant community , ” said Lopez Romero , a native of Cuernavaca , Mexico , who grew up along the Buford Highway corridor in Atlanta before becoming a U.S. citizen in 2008 and winning election to the Georgia General Assembly eight years later .
Even with the dramatic changes to Georgia ’ s electorate underway , Latino advocates still worry that a possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their issues .
“ I haven ’ t really seen Joe Biden putting anything on the agenda that will be attractive to new citizens , ” said Garcia , echoing concerns among others that “ it ’ s not really a clear message when it comes to immigrants and the kids in cages.
” ( Lawyers have been unable to locate the parents of 545 children separated by the Trump administration , according to a Tuesday filing . )
Latinos in Georgia may turn out to vote en masse because U.S. Immigration and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the ballot even in local races .
In both Gwinnett and Cobb counties , two candidates seeking to replace long-standing sheriffs have pledged to stop cooperating with ICE to identify undocumented residents through local arrests and push them into immigration detention .
And some of the most harrowing allegations against ICE since Trump took office hit especially close to home for Latinos in Georgia .
Last month , a legal complaint filed on behalf of a whistleblower nurse at an ICE detention center in Irwin County , Georgia , reported “ jarring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of hysterectomies among Spanish-speaking detainees—some allegedly conducted without their full consent .
ICE ’ s Atlanta regional office recorded a 5 percent increase in deportations in fiscal 2019 , mostly from the increase in people apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border and transported to Georgia ’ s detention centers .
As elsewhere , in Georgia the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have fallen disproportionately on Latinos .
Many are essential workers in the service industry or the state ’ s poultry plants , and concerns about Trump ’ s handling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the polls .
Some are already there : Georgia ’ s in-person early voting began on Oct. 12 , and Gwinnett County recorded more ballots in the first week than in the entire three-week period in 2016 .
Yet Georgia ’ s history of voter suppression still weighs heavily on Latino voters ’ minds .
Only Gwinnett County has Spanish-language ballots .
But in-person voting may be a way around the potentially confusing , multistep mail-in ballot instructions that could otherwise deter Latino voters .
Garcia , a first-time voter himself , isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ’ m planning to be there in person—me , myself , and I—to make sure my vote is counted , ” he said .

In the suburbs of Gwinnett County, northeast of Atlanta, the Trump administration has detained more immigrants than in any county not located along the U.S.-Mexico border. While President Donald Trump’s raids, family separations, and the deployment of U.S. troops to the southern border have largely faded from the headlines in the final stretch of the 2020 campaign, Latino voters who have long dealt with Georgia’s own harsh legislation targeting undocumented immigrants haven’t forgotten the rhetoric and actions of the White House.
In the suburbs of Gwinnett County, northeast of Atlanta, the Trump administration has detained more immigrants than in any county not located along the U.S.-Mexico border. While President Donald Trump’s raids, family separations, and the deployment of U.S. troops to the southern border have largely faded from the headlines in the final stretch of the 2020 campaign, Latino voters who have long dealt with Georgia’s own harsh legislation targeting undocumented immigrants haven’t forgotten the rhetoric and actions of the White House.
“This election [is] very personal,” said Carlos Garcia, the director of the Pro-Immigrant Alliance of Cobb County, which lies northwest of Atlanta. Garcia immigrated to Georgia from Mexico City in 1999 and became a U.S. citizen this year. “I saw [the] need to do something, and as soon as I could, obviously, I registered to vote.”
Gwinnett and Cobb are among a handful of suburban counties driving Georgia’s shift from a Republican stronghold to a battleground state: Polls show a dead heat between Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden in the Nov. 3 presidential election, and Democrats are gaining in the state’s two U.S. Senate races. And as part of that shift, the Latino community has emerged as a powerful electoral force. Mostly white until the 1990s, Gwinnett County residents are now majority-minority, and more than a quarter are foreign-born.
Atlanta-area Latinos are a potentially game-changing bloc in a state that Trump won by just over 200,000 votes in 2016. Latino voters now number more than 250,000, according to estimates from the Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, or GALEO. And they vote. During the 2018 midterm elections, 56 percent of eligible Latino voters turned out in Georgia, a higher rate than any other group in the state—and outperforming the Latino vote in both Arizona and Florida.
Already in 2016, the counties with the largest Latino populations, Gwinnett and Cobb, both went for the Democratic nominee for the first time in decades. “That’s where I think we can see the Latino community [in Georgia] clearly can make a significant difference in this election,” said Jerry Gonzalez, GALEO’s executive director.
But if Latino voters turn out in record numbers again, it will be against the Trump administration’s ethos rather than for Biden’s immigration platform, which largely focuses on reversing current policies.
“It’s not so much about Joe Biden as the person, quite frankly, as much as it is sort of what is different that is not Trump,” state Rep. Brenda Lopez Romero told me. “The environment that this administration has allowed—[for others] to feel that it is okay to threaten individuals because of their perceived immigration status—really has affected the quality of life for us here in the state.”
Latinos in Georgia are mostly first- or second-generation immigrants, the result of a surge in immigration from Mexico and Central America that began in the 1990s. That makes them acutely sensitive to the very programs that the Trump administration seeks to dismantle, such as temporary protected status for families from El Salvador and Nicaragua and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.
“All of these issues greatly affect us because we are a very young immigrant community.”
“All of these issues greatly affect us because we are a very young immigrant community,” said Lopez Romero, a native of Cuernavaca, Mexico, who grew up along the Buford Highway corridor in Atlanta before becoming a U.S. citizen in 2008 and winning election to the Georgia General Assembly eight years later.
Even with the dramatic changes to Georgia’s electorate underway, Latino advocates still worry that a possible Biden administration won’t focus on their issues. “I haven’t really seen Joe Biden putting anything on the agenda that will be attractive to new citizens,” said Garcia, echoing concerns among others that “it’s not really a clear message when it comes to immigrants and the kids in cages.” (Lawyers have been unable to locate the parents of 545 children separated by the Trump administration, according to a Tuesday filing.)
Latinos in Georgia may turn out to vote en masse because U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s intensifying operations are on the ballot even in local races. In both Gwinnett and Cobb counties, two candidates seeking to replace long-standing sheriffs have pledged to stop cooperating with ICE to identify undocumented residents through local arrests and push them into immigration detention.
And some of the most harrowing allegations against ICE since Trump took office hit especially close to home for Latinos in Georgia. Last month, a legal complaint filed on behalf of a whistleblower nurse at an ICE detention center in Irwin County, Georgia, reported “jarring medical neglect” and an unusual number of hysterectomies among Spanish-speaking detainees—some allegedly conducted without their full consent. ICE’s Atlanta regional office recorded a 5 percent increase in deportations in fiscal 2019, mostly from the increase in people apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border and transported to Georgia’s detention centers.
As elsewhere, in Georgia the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have fallen disproportionately on Latinos. Many are essential workers in the service industry or the state’s poultry plants, and concerns about Trump’s handling of the pandemic may also push voters to the polls. Some are already there: Georgia’s in-person early voting began on Oct. 12, and Gwinnett County recorded more ballots in the first week than in the entire three-week period in 2016.
Georgia’s history of voter suppression still weighs heavily on Latino voters’ minds. Only Gwinnett County has Spanish-language ballots. But in-person voting may be a way around the potentially confusing, multistep mail-in ballot instructions that could otherwise deter Latino voters.
Garcia, a first-time voter himself, isn’t taking any chances: “I’m planning to be there in person—me, myself, and I—to make sure my vote is counted,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--Abenomics Can Flourish Without Abe

Abenomics Can Flourish Without Abe

Japan ’ s new prime minister , Yoshihide Suga , could easily be dismissed as a retread of his predecessor Shinzo Abe , but with his focus on the woes of rural Japan and his backroom skills to get things done , he may be a more potent force in pushing through economic reforms .
His level of success will decide if Abenomics , the package of measures that Abe put together in early 2013 , becomes Suganomics .
When Abe took office in December 2012 , he made much fanfare of a three-prong approach to reviving the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ successful in prodding the central bank to inject huge amounts of money into the economy in order to break out of a deflationary spiral where lower asset prices and earnings sapped consumption .
While the Bank of Japan has failed to reach its much-vaunted target of a 2 percent annual inflation rate , it has managed to keep prices from falling .
Abe was also able to push up government spending levels to provide fiscal stimulus , although at the cost of further increasing Japan ’ s already record-high government debt , still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States .
But these were relatively easy measures for Abe , using tools already in the government ’ s hands .
Structural reform proved far harder .
Japan ’ s myriad restrictions have long been blamed by economists for slowing the economy , but the bureaucracy proved difficult to budge .
In some ways , this was not a surprise .
Government and industry in Japan have always worked together , resulting in interlocking ties that are hard to break .
Abe , like most senior Japanese politicians , is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including 16 of the country ’ s prime ministers , come from the elite University of Tokyo , though Abe studied at the similarly exclusive Seikei University .
Many , such as Abe , are from storied political families—Abe ’ s grandfather was prime minister and his father a foreign minister .
In addition , Abe seemed more emotionally committed to a conservative agenda of greater military strength and an end to the postwar apologies that have been a mainstay of Japan ’ s relations with other Asian nations than to economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hand , is an outsider .
He grew up in northern Japan , the son of strawberry farmers .
Not relishing an agricultural career , he moved to Tokyo after high school , enrolling in night classes at the somewhat less prestigious Hosei University ( he would later say it was the least-expensive choice ) while working in a cardboard box factory .
He then worked for a lawmaker , was elected to the local assembly in Yokohama , and then became a member of parliament for the Yokohama area , a seat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
2 in the government throughout Abe ’ s seven-plus years as prime minister , Suga was already a key player in government policy , including the Abenomics program .
One of his targets was the sprawling Japan Agricultural Cooperative , a network of co-ops that controlled virtually every part of Japan ’ s farming sector .
It arranged the loans ( it owns Japan ’ s fifth-largest bank ) , sold the seeds and fertilizer at high prices , and handled the national marketing of nearly all farm produce .
Most important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protect farmers and the sky-high tariffs that made Japan one of the most protectionist nations .
With 85 percent of Japanese farmers cultivating rice , Japan ’ s import tariff for rice from abroad was set at 778 percent .
As the farming population continued to dwindle , however , and with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party no longer dependent on rural votes to stay in power , Japan Agricultural Cooperative ’ s political clout started to decline .
Under Abe , its monopoly powers over local co-ops were reduced , and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power in 2015 .
Within a few months , Japan was able to reach a deal on the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership by offering sharply reduced tariffs for a range of imported food .
Even after the United States pulled out in a dramatic January 2017 move by President Donald Trump , Japan cobbled together the remaining nations into a revised trade grouping .
Japanese officials like to stress that the United States is always welcome to come back .
With Suga now at the top , the agriculture lobby is concerned that more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trepidation as Prime Minister Suga , a farmer ’ s son , stands all ready and committed to execute deregulation , ” the influential newsmagazine Diamond wrote in a report .
Suga has wasted no time in taking up the cudgel for reform more broadly .
He ’ s targeted some ingrained government habits , including the use of hanko personal seals on documents and the related use of fax machines , which are seen as necessary to send documents with the proper seals and are still used by 95 percent of companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to conduct regulatory reform by tearing down bureaucratic sectionalism , vested interests and notorious habit of following precedents , ” Suga said at his inaugural news conference .
He has appointed a cabinet minister in charge of administrative reform , moving the feisty Taro Kono from the defense ministry job .
The new role was at first seen as a demotion ( Kono had the same job previously ) , but given Suga ’ s drive for reform , Kono has taken a high profile .
“ Kono declares war on fax machines @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japanese newspaper .
Among his first steps was to announce an email hotline for ideas on how to cut red tape .
It received so much traffic he shut it down after 4,000 ideas poured in .
“ Silos within Japan ’ s government ministries have often hindered private businesses in the areas of new business and exports , ” said Hiroshi Ugai , J.P. Morgan ’ s chief economist in Japan .
“ Since Suga is quite familiar with guiding the bureaucracy and has demonstrated his full support for Kono ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in this area.
” In addition , Suga has created a minister for digitalization , an initiative made more urgent by the increase in teleworking amid the COVID-19 pandemic .
The goal is to update the notoriously backward and fragmented IT systems used by the government and to encourage corporations to take a leap forward in how they use—or don ’ t use—technology .
“ This is a key way that Suga hopes to steer the economy , ” said Arthur Mitchell , an attorney with long experience in Japan who specializes in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industrial revitalization , artificial intelligence , a regulatory framework that allows for innovation , privacy protection.
” Suga has already announced plans for a new Digital Agency to coordinate the efforts .
The problem , Mitchell said , is whether a single office under the prime minister can effectively handle such a big issue with other ministries and stakeholders .
“ Will Suga be able to bring some coherence to this ?
” he asked .
Even as he launches his reform program , Suga has a more immediate concern common to all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back to some semblance of normal as the pandemic continues .
With its top trading partners , China and the United States , hit hard , Japan saw its GDP fall at a record 28 percent on an annualized basis in the second quarter—even though the country avoided the severe lockdowns seen elsewhere and has managed to keep the mortality rate from COVID-19 at 10 percent of the global average .
The economy has recovered somewhat since then , helped by renewed growth in chief trading partner China .
September trade figures showed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent from the same time last year .
Domestically , the government ’ s survey of the economic mood showed a sharp rebound in August and September , with the mood among households now at its highest since December 2017 .
In addition , unemployment has remained subdued , rising slightly to 3 percent in August .
All of this assumes that Suga will be around long enough to implement his economic—or for that matter any other—policies .
He didn ’ t win the top job by popular vote but through being elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Liberal Democratic Party .
Even that selection was a less-than-democratic process .
The rank-and-file members of the party were not allowed to vote .
Instead the balloting was by the senior officials and 394 lawmakers within the party .
Even that was largely an illusion , as most votes were effectively controlled by the five major factions within the party in the best tradition of smoke-filled-room bargaining .
Suga was able to come out on top even though he is not himself a member of any of the factions , which may be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common support .
He could just as easily be shown the door if the party ’ s kingmakers come up with a new figure .
That could in turn bring Japan back to the revolving door of leaders .
From 2006 to 2012 , there were no fewer than six new prime ministers , including the first unremarkable stint by Abe .
The voters may actually get a say in all this fairly soon .
A new general election must be held by October 2021 , with the prime minister able to fix @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s new government polling remarkably well with an approval rating around 60 percent despite its relative lack of charisma , that could come sooner rather than later .
It will not be lost on Suga that for most Japanese prime ministers in recent years , the support rate has been a fairly straight downward trend from the time they took office , Abe being a notable exception .
Another structural issue for Suga may also loom large as he tries to get the economy moving : What level of growth can a shrinking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of COVID-19 ?
Deutsche Bank Group ’ s Tokyo chief economist Kentaro Koyama contends that the government will need to cut what is called the “ potential growth rate ” for Japan , the rate of growth that would be considered the likely maximum over the long term .
The potential growth is now pegged at just 0.9 percent .
“ It may be an inconvenient truth for the government that the decline in potential growth occurred under Abenomics , ” Koyama said in a recent report .
“ We believe a downward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That will give Suga even more to think about as he tries to juggle the electorate , the backroom powers in the party , and the numerous bureaucracies that will not want to see the fundamental structural changes that Japan needs .

Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, could easily be dismissed as a retread of his predecessor Shinzo Abe, but with his focus on the woes of rural Japan and his backroom skills to get things done, he may be a more potent force in pushing through economic reforms. His level of success will decide if Abenomics, the package of measures that Abe put together in early 2013, becomes Suganomics.
Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, could easily be dismissed as a retread of his predecessor Shinzo Abe, but with his focus on the woes of rural Japan and his backroom skills to get things done, he may be a more potent force in pushing through economic reforms. His level of success will decide if Abenomics, the package of measures that Abe put together in early 2013, becomes Suganomics.
When Abe took office in December 2012, he made much fanfare of a three-prong approach to reviving the country’s long-stagnant economy. He was quite successful in prodding the central bank to inject huge amounts of money into the economy in order to break out of a deflationary spiral where lower asset prices and earnings sapped consumption. While the Bank of Japan has failed to reach its much-vaunted target of a 2 percent annual inflation rate, it has managed to keep prices from falling. Abe was also able to push up government spending levels to provide fiscal stimulus, although at the cost of further increasing Japan’s already record-high government debt, still twice as much per GDP as in the United States.
But these were relatively easy measures for Abe, using tools already in the government’s hands. Structural reform proved far harder. Japan’s myriad restrictions have long been blamed by economists for slowing the economy, but the bureaucracy proved difficult to budge. In some ways, this was not a surprise. Government and industry in Japan have always worked together, resulting in interlocking ties that are hard to break.
Abe, like most senior Japanese politicians, is a product of the system. Most politicians, including 16 of the country’s prime ministers, come from the elite University of Tokyo, though Abe studied at the similarly exclusive Seikei University. Many, such as Abe, are from storied political families—Abe’s grandfather was prime minister and his father a foreign minister. In addition, Abe seemed more emotionally committed to a conservative agenda of greater military strength and an end to the postwar apologies that have been a mainstay of Japan’s relations with other Asian nations than to economic reform.
Suga, on the other hand, is an outsider. He grew up in northern Japan, the son of strawberry farmers. Not relishing an agricultural career, he moved to Tokyo after high school, enrolling in night classes at the somewhat less prestigious Hosei University (he would later say it was the least-expensive choice) while working in a cardboard box factory. He then worked for a lawmaker, was elected to the local assembly in Yokohama, and then became a member of parliament for the Yokohama area, a seat he holds today.
As the No. 2 in the government throughout Abe’s seven-plus years as prime minister, Suga was already a key player in government policy, including the Abenomics program. One of his targets was the sprawling Japan Agricultural Cooperative, a network of co-ops that controlled virtually every part of Japan’s farming sector. It arranged the loans (it owns Japan’s fifth-largest bank), sold the seeds and fertilizer at high prices, and handled the national marketing of nearly all farm produce.
Most important, it provided a powerful lobby to protect farmers and the sky-high tariffs that made Japan one of the most protectionist nations. With 85 percent of Japanese farmers cultivating rice, Japan’s import tariff for rice from abroad was set at 778 percent. As the farming population continued to dwindle, however, and with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party no longer dependent on rural votes to stay in power, Japan Agricultural Cooperative’s political clout started to decline. Under Abe, its monopoly powers over local co-ops were reduced, and a pro-reform head of the association came to power in 2015. Within a few months, Japan was able to reach a deal on the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership by offering sharply reduced tariffs for a range of imported food. Even after the United States pulled out in a dramatic January 2017 move by President Donald Trump, Japan cobbled together the remaining nations into a revised trade grouping. Japanese officials like to stress that the United States is always welcome to come back.
With Suga now at the top, the agriculture lobby is concerned that more is coming. “JA Group in trepidation as Prime Minister Suga, a farmer’s son, stands all ready and committed to execute deregulation,” the influential newsmagazine Diamond wrote in a report.
Suga has wasted no time in taking up the cudgel for reform more broadly. He’s targeted some ingrained government habits, including the use of hanko personal seals on documents and the related use of fax machines, which are seen as necessary to send documents with the proper seals and are still used by 95 percent of companies.
“I will make utmost efforts to conduct regulatory reform by tearing down bureaucratic sectionalism, vested interests and notorious habit of following precedents,” Suga said at his inaugural news conference.
He has appointed a cabinet minister in charge of administrative reform, moving the feisty Taro Kono from the defense ministry job. The new role was at first seen as a demotion (Kono had the same job previously), but given Suga’s drive for reform, Kono has taken a high profile. “Kono declares war on fax machines,” was the headline in one Japanese newspaper. Among his first steps was to announce an email hotline for ideas on how to cut red tape. It received so much traffic he shut it down after 4,000 ideas poured in.
“Silos within Japan’s government ministries have often hindered private businesses in the areas of new business and exports,” said Hiroshi Ugai, J.P. Morgan’s chief economist in Japan. “Since Suga is quite familiar with guiding the bureaucracy and has demonstrated his full support for Kono’s approach, we expect to see progress in this area.”
In addition, Suga has created a minister for digitalization, an initiative made more urgent by the increase in teleworking amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The goal is to update the notoriously backward and fragmented IT systems used by the government and to encourage corporations to take a leap forward in how they use—or don’t use—technology. “This is a key way that Suga hopes to steer the economy,” said Arthur Mitchell, an attorney with long experience in Japan who specializes in technology. “It affects everything: industrial revitalization, artificial intelligence, a regulatory framework that allows for innovation, privacy protection.” Suga has already announced plans for a new Digital Agency to coordinate the efforts. The problem, Mitchell said, is whether a single office under the prime minister can effectively handle such a big issue with other ministries and stakeholders. “Will Suga be able to bring some coherence to this?” he asked.
Even as he launches his reform program, Suga has a more immediate concern common to all leaders: how to get the economy back to some semblance of normal as the pandemic continues. With its top trading partners, China and the United States, hit hard, Japan saw its GDP fall at a record 28 percent on an annualized basis in the second quarter—even though the country avoided the severe lockdowns seen elsewhere and has managed to keep the mortality rate from COVID-19 at 10 percent of the global average. The economy has recovered somewhat since then, helped by renewed growth in chief trading partner China. September trade figures showed that exports to China were up 16 percent from the same time last year. Domestically, the government’s survey of the economic mood showed a sharp rebound in August and September, with the mood among households now at its highest since December 2017. In addition, unemployment has remained subdued, rising slightly to 3 percent in August.
All of this assumes that Suga will be around long enough to implement his economic—or for that matter any other—policies. He didn’t win the top job by popular vote but through being elected as head of Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Even that selection was a less-than-democratic process. The rank-and-file members of the party were not allowed to vote. Instead the balloting was by the senior officials and 394 lawmakers within the party. Even that was largely an illusion, as most votes were effectively controlled by the five major factions within the party in the best tradition of smoke-filled-room bargaining.
Suga was able to come out on top even though he is not himself a member of any of the factions, which may be the reason he was able to find common support. He could just as easily be shown the door if the party’s kingmakers come up with a new figure. That could in turn bring Japan back to the revolving door of leaders. From 2006 to 2012, there were no fewer than six new prime ministers, including the first unremarkable stint by Abe.
The voters may actually get a say in all this fairly soon. A new general election must be held by October 2021, with the prime minister able to fix the exact date. With Suga’s new government polling remarkably well with an approval rating around 60 percent despite its relative lack of charisma, that could come sooner rather than later. It will not be lost on Suga that for most Japanese prime ministers in recent years, the support rate has been a fairly straight downward trend from the time they took office, Abe being a notable exception.
Another structural issue for Suga may also loom large as he tries to get the economy moving: What level of growth can a shrinking country actually achieve with the added burdens of COVID-19? Deutsche Bank Group’s Tokyo chief economist Kentaro Koyama contends that the government will need to cut what is called the “potential growth rate” for Japan, the rate of growth that would be considered the likely maximum over the long term. The potential growth is now pegged at just 0.9 percent.
“It may be an inconvenient truth for the government that the decline in potential growth occurred under Abenomics,” Koyama said in a recent report. “We believe a downward revision at some point is inevitable.” That will give Suga even more to think about as he tries to juggle the electorate, the backroom powers in the party, and the numerous bureaucracies that will not want to see the fundamental structural changes that Japan needs.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-21--The Realist Case for the Non-Realist Biden

The Realist Case for the Non-Realist Biden Last week , I got an email from a colleague who teaches at another university .
He said he was surprised to see that I had signed a recent open letter that declared U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s foreign policy a failure and concluded that “ we need new leadership.
” He wanted to know how I could possibly support Trump ’ s opponent Joe Biden in next month ’ s election , given that a future Biden administration was likely to be staffed by many of the same people whose handling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had criticized roundly in my last book .
He reminded me that some of Biden ’ s closest advisors had been critical of that work , and not always in the fairest way .
How , he wondered , could I possibly welcome the return to those familiar nostrums about the “ indispensable ” nation and the need for U.S. “ leadership ” in every region and on every issue , even if expressed in more measured terms ?
The writer of that email is an accomplished scholar whose work I respect , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Of course , if you ’ ve been reading this space for the past three-plus years , my opposition to Trump has been clear from day one , and I ’ ve explained why on several occasions .
But my opposition might still seem surprising when you consider the following : 1 .
Trump openly opposed the forever wars , tried to curtail or end them , and hasn ’ t started any new ones .
I ’ m all for that .
2 .
Trump took the challenge of a rising China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than any of his predecessors .
I agree with that broad objective , too .
3 .
He thinks—correctly—that America ’ s NATO allies are not doing enough to provide for their own defense , and he ’ s not convinced remaining in NATO is really necessary at this point .
I seem to recall saying something similar myself .
4 .
I ’ m sure Trump is unaware of my colleague Dani Rodrik ’ s compelling critique of “ hyperglobalization , ” but he has pulled the United States back from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever-lower barriers to migration .
Those goals are OK by me as well .
5 .
Russia has done a lot of things I oppose , but the all-out demonization of Russian foreign policy ( and President Vladimir Putin personally ) isn ’ t very helpful .
I ’ m in favor of exploring ways to wean Russia away from its partial alignment with China , so Trump ’ s refusal to condemn Moscow daily doesn ’ t bother me as much as it does some other people .
6 .
Lastly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. foreign-policy establishment , one might think I ’ d be sympathetic to Trump ’ s complaints about the “ deep state ” and his various battles with the Blob .
Given all that , my colleague ’ s email raised a legitimate question : Why do I seem to be eager to let the same passionate proselytizers for America ’ s “ special responsibilities ” get another chance to screw things up ?
Why did I sign that letter , and why am I crossing all my fingers and toes in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first big reason is Trump ’ s serial incompetence .
Even when he had sensible foreign-policy instincts , he pursued them ineptly and failed to achieve his own stated objectives .
It made good sense to get tough with China on trade policy , for example , but it would have been much more effective to do it in partnership with other U.S. trading partners , instead of launching or threatening trade wars with them , too .
In this regard , leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership on his third day in office was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the trade deals he did manage to negotiate were at best minor improvements over existing arrangements , and it is worth noting that the trade deficit that he vowed to close has gotten bigger on his watch .
( His obsession with trade balances and fondness for tariffs also reveals his ignorance of basic economics , but never mind . )
Nor has his administration made any serious effort to reform the World Trade Organization or create new global arrangements to manage global digital infrastructure , despite the obvious need for one .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ promised to get the United States “ out of the nation-building business , ” but he has had three-plus years to accomplish the job and hasn ’ t ended a single one of the wars he inherited from his predecessors .
And that ’ s just the big conflicts : Almost two decades after 9/11 , U.S. military forces are still conducting counterterrorism operations in 40 percent ( ! )
of the world ’ s nations .
His on-again , off-again approach in Afghanistan , Syria , Iraq , and elsewhere has confused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States might have had over ongoing peace talks , and left U.S. forces in increasingly precarious positions .
What about Europe ?
For all of Trump ’ s bluster , America ’ s wealthy NATO allies remain incapable of defending themselves without U.S. help .
Trump likes to take credit for their pledges to increase defense spending , but most of these initiatives began under former President Barack Obama , and there are good reasons to doubt whether much will come of them .
Trump ’ s decision to withdraw a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ act of pique than a serious strategic realignment , and his bull-in-a-china-shop treatment has driven public trust in the United States to record lows .
Trump ’ s handling of North Korea displayed a similar inability to develop and implement a realistic strategy .
After his initial war of words with leader Kim Jong Un ( whom he dubbed “ Little Rocket Man ” ) raised legitimate fears of a military clash , Trump wisely turned to diplomacy .
But his reality-show summits with Kim were poorly planned and doomed to fail , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to give up the nuclear deterrent on which the survival of his regime depends .
Trump claimed his personal charm and supposed deal-making acumen would win Kim over ; instead , Kim pocketed the prestige he gained from being recognized and feted by a U.S. president and gave up nothing in return .
Since then , of course , North Korea ’ s nuclear capabilities have continued to grow .
Finally , Trump may have had legitimate complaints about a foreign-policy establishment that has opposed him from the start despite its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t built a “ better Blob ” ; he ’ s just demoralized , discredited , demeaned , or disregarded the one he inherited .
His own foreign-policy team has been in turmoil since his inauguration , belying his claim that he would pick “ only the best people.
” His first national security advisor , Michael Flynn , lasted less than a month in the job , and since then Trump has gone through three more .
He ’ s churned through two secretaries of state , two secretaries of defense , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House chiefs of staff , while leaving key posts vacant , filling others with acting officials and visibly unqualified hacks , and presiding over a precipitous decline in morale and a steady exodus of experienced public servants in the Department of State .
As the shabby treatment of Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman ( and his brother ) , Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch , and other dedicated civil servants revealed all too clearly , competence isn ’ t what Trump prizes .
What he wants is unshakable personal loyalty , someone to blame when things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for all his complaints about the supposed “ deep state , ” Trump didn ’ t really reach outside the establishment for new thinking on foreign policy .
With only a few exceptions ( such as former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ) , Trump ’ s main appointees were all familiar members of the existing Washington elite .
They were former generals such as James Mattis , John Kelly , and H.R .
McMaster , hardy Washington perennials such as John Bolton and Elliott Abrams , defense industry executives such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Dan Coats and Mike Pompeo .
He didn ’ t drain the swamp ; he just scoured it for alligators who would do his bidding .
Trump failed to deliver when his initial instincts were sound , but he ’ s personally responsible for several big foreign-policy blunders .
Leaving the Iran nuclear deal may have pleased President Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel , Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia , and Trump biggest donor , Sheldon Adelson , but his alternative—the policy of “ maximum pressure ” —has been a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward the nuclear weapons threshold , the other signatories to the nuclear deal have rejected America ’ s bizarre efforts to get them to enforce the same agreement Washington had previously abandoned , and the State Department ’ s most recent report on Iran loudly warns that its various regional activities have continued .
In terms of its own stated objectives , in short , the administration ’ s Iran policy is a failure .
Even worse , Trump ’ s position on what is probably the single most important global issue of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The evidence that human activities are altering our planet in dangerous and possibly irreversible ways is now overwhelming , and yet Trump has done everything he could to make the problem worse .
Instead of moving to reduce greenhouse gas emissions , Trump left the Paris climate accord and has encouraged the United States to produce and burn more oil , gas , and coal .
As temperatures rise , forests burn , and storms become more frequent and severe , this is head-in-the-sand stupidity of the highest order .
Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All nations should have the capacity to decide who can enter their territory , work there , and perhaps become citizens one day , but Trump ’ s broad-brush approach to this heated issue has been counterproductive .
In particular , restrictions on H-1B and J-1 visas discourage skilled workers in high-technology fields from coming to the United States ( which is why tech companies oppose these restrictions ) , and make it harder for top foreign students to attend U.S. universities .
Both mechanisms have been an important advantage for the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bluntly , the United States has attracted some of the best minds from around the world and used them to build cutting-edge industries and aid scientific advances .
That magnetic attraction had already declined before Trump took office ( leading to fears of a reverse brain drain ) as Asia developed , but Trump ’ s policies are likely to make it worse .
Unless the policies are undone , more bright young students and skilled workers will go to Canada , Europe , the United Kingdom , Taiwan , or elsewhere in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reducing America ’ s .
Last but by no means least , there ’ s Trump ’ s unconscionable mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic .
To be clear : The pandemic would have been a serious challenge for any administration , but Trump ’ s fingerprints are all over the catastrophic responses that have made the United States an outlier—and not in a good way—among the major industrial powers .
He ’ s denied the danger was serious , promised the virus would “ disappear ” like magic , denigrated minimal precautions like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and government agencies to spread false information or adopt dangerous policies in order to bolster his image .
Instead of calling for the nation to unite in the face of a common danger , he saw the pandemic as merely another opportunity to sow divisions .
And if that weren ’ t enough , he managed to preside over his own superspreader event and come down with COVID-19 himself .
More than 200,000 Americans have died—a tragedy in itself—and the damage done to the country ’ s reputation for competence may haunt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There ’ s one final reason why , as the open letter put it , “ we need new leadership.
” A country does not live by foreign policy alone ; indeed , for major powers , what they do at home is often more important than what they do on the world stage .
Even if one believed Trump ’ s foreign policy was one triumph after another—and it is a far cry from that—the danger he poses to America ’ s constitutional order simply can not be ignored .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Stalin and not sufficiently demoniacal to be a Hitler , but his relentless narcissism , nonstop assault on core republican institutions , lawlessness and corruption , overt racism and misogyny , barely disguised encouragement of extremist violence , etc .
all threaten to further corrode the system of government that has defined the United States since its founding .
American democracy has never been perfect , but no president has been more willing to damage it in order to keep himself in power .
The fear of creeping autocracy might be overblown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that chance ?
Needless to say , Joe Biden doesn ’ t worry me in the same way .
Yes , he is likely to be advised by a foreign-policy team that 1 ) hasn ’ t covered itself with glory in the past , 2 ) remains unrepentant about its past failures , and 3 ) hasn ’ t abandoned its reflexive impulse to tell the rest of the world how to live and what to do .
But my concerns are tempered by the constraints that Biden is going face if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , yawning deficits , and a sluggish recovery will put limits on defense spending and force Biden & Co. to focus on problems at home .
The progressive wing of the Democratic Party will not support a return to liberal hegemony and is likely to give the administration considerable heat over some elements of its foreign policy , especially in the Middle East .
Republican obstructionists will be a further obstacle to big foreign-policy initiatives , including , unfortunately , ones the United States badly needs .
My hunch , therefore , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy on the back burner until the pandemic is over and the economy is recovering .
He won ’ t pick pointless fights with foreign leaders to no good purpose , won ’ t object to useful forms of multilateral cooperation , and won ’ t pretend that climate change is a hoax .
Even if he ’ s accompanied by a familiar coterie of once-and-future liberal interventionists , he won ’ t try to turn the clock back to the unipolar era , or even to that weird moment where an American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply because he simply wasn ’ t George W. Bush .
With a pandemic to defeat and a lot of repair work to do inside the government itself , the mantra of Biden ’ s foreign policy is likely to be “ First , Do No Harm.
” If you ’ re looking for a catchphrase , you might even call it a foreign policy of “ restraint.
” And that , everyone , is why Donald Trump didn ’ t get my vote and Joe Biden did .

Last week, I got an email from a colleague who teaches at another university. He said he was surprised to see that I had signed a recent open letter that declared U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy a failure and concluded that “we need new leadership.” He wanted to know how I could possibly support Trump’s opponent Joe Biden in next month’s election, given that a future Biden administration was likely to be staffed by many of the same people whose handling of foreign policy during previous administrations I had criticized roundly in my last book . He reminded me that some of Biden’s closest advisors had been critical of that work , and not always in the fairest way. How, he wondered, could I possibly welcome the return to those familiar nostrums about the “indispensable” nation and the need for U.S. “leadership” in every region and on every issue, even if expressed in more measured terms?
Last week, I got an email from a colleague who teaches at another university. He said he was surprised to see that I had signed a recent open letter that declared U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy a failure and concluded that “we need new leadership.” He wanted to know how I could possibly support Trump’s opponent Joe Biden in next month’s election, given that a future Biden administration was likely to be staffed by many of the same people whose handling of foreign policy during previous administrations I had criticized roundly in my last book. He reminded me that some of Biden’s closest advisors had been critical of that work, and not always in the fairest way. How, he wondered, could I possibly welcome the return to those familiar nostrums about the “indispensable” nation and the need for U.S. “leadership” in every region and on every issue, even if expressed in more measured terms?
The writer of that email is an accomplished scholar whose work I respect, and I took his inquiry seriously. Of course, if you’ve been reading this space for the past three-plus years, my opposition to Trump has been clear from day one, and I’ve explained why on several occasions. But my opposition might still seem surprising when you consider the following:
1. Trump openly opposed the forever wars, tried to curtail or end them, and hasn’t started any new ones. I’m all for that.
2. Trump took the challenge of a rising China seriously and did more to confront Beijing than any of his predecessors. I agree with that broad objective, too.
3. He thinks—correctly—that America’s NATO allies are not doing enough to provide for their own defense, and he’s not convinced remaining in NATO is really necessary at this point. I seem to recall saying something similar myself.
4. I’m sure Trump is unaware of my colleague Dani Rodrik’s compelling critique of “hyperglobalization,” but he has pulled the United States back from the headlong pursuit of ever-more-integrated global markets and ever-lower barriers to migration. Those goals are OK by me as well.
5. Russia has done a lot of things I oppose, but the all-out demonization of Russian foreign policy (and President Vladimir Putin personally) isn’t very helpful. I’m in favor of exploring ways to wean Russia away from its partial alignment with China, so Trump’s refusal to condemn Moscow daily doesn’t bother me as much as it does some other people.
6. Lastly, in light of my own criticisms of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, one might think I’d be sympathetic to Trump’s complaints about the “deep state” and his various battles with the Blob.
Given all that, my colleague’s email raised a legitimate question: Why do I seem to be eager to let the same passionate proselytizers for America’s “special responsibilities” get another chance to screw things up? Why did I sign that letter, and why am I crossing all my fingers and toes in hopes of a Biden victory?
The first big reason is Trump’s serial incompetence. Even when he had sensible foreign-policy instincts, he pursued them ineptly and failed to achieve his own stated objectives. It made good sense to get tough with China on trade policy, for example, but it would have been much more effective to do it in partnership with other U.S. trading partners, instead of launching or threatening trade wars with them, too. In this regard, leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership on his third day in office was a particularly egregious error.
Similarly, the trade deals he did manage to negotiate were at best minor improvements over existing arrangements, and it is worth noting that the trade deficit that he vowed to close has gotten bigger on his watch. (His obsession with trade balances and fondness for tariffs also reveals his ignorance of basic economics, but never mind.) Nor has his administration made any serious effort to reform the World Trade Organization or create new global arrangements to manage global digital infrastructure, despite the obvious need for one.
It gets worse. Trump may have promised to get the United States “out of the nation-building business,” but he has had three-plus years to accomplish the job and hasn’t ended a single one of the wars he inherited from his predecessors. And that’s just the big conflicts: Almost two decades after 9/11, U.S. military forces are still conducting counterterrorism operations in 40 percent (!) of the world’s nations. His on-again, off-again approach in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere has confused local partners, squandered whatever leverage the United States might have had over ongoing peace talks, and left U.S. forces in increasingly precarious positions.
What about Europe? For all of Trump’s bluster, America’s wealthy NATO allies remain incapable of defending themselves without U.S. help. Trump likes to take credit for their pledges to increase defense spending, but most of these initiatives began under former President Barack Obama, and there are good reasons to doubt whether much will come of them. Trump’s decision to withdraw a few thousand troops from Germany was more an act of pique than a serious strategic realignment, and his bull-in-a-china-shop treatment has driven public trust in the United States to record lows.
Trump’s handling of North Korea displayed a similar inability to develop and implement a realistic strategy. After his initial war of words with leader Kim Jong Un (whom he dubbed “Little Rocket Man”) raised legitimate fears of a military clash, Trump wisely turned to diplomacy. But his reality-show summits with Kim were poorly planned and doomed to fail, because the North Korean leader was never going to give up the nuclear deterrent on which the survival of his regime depends. Trump claimed his personal charm and supposed deal-making acumen would win Kim over; instead, Kim pocketed the prestige he gained from being recognized and feted by a U.S. president and gave up nothing in return. Since then, of course, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have continued to grow.
Finally, Trump may have had legitimate complaints about a foreign-policy establishment that has opposed him from the start despite its own less-than-stellar record. But he hasn’t built a “better Blob”; he’s just demoralized, discredited, demeaned, or disregarded the one he inherited. His own foreign-policy team has been in turmoil since his inauguration, belying his claim that he would pick “only the best people.” His first national security advisor, Michael Flynn, lasted less than a month in the job, and since then Trump has gone through three more. He’s churned through two secretaries of state, two secretaries of defense, two U.N. ambassadors, and four White House chiefs of staff, while leaving key posts vacant, filling others with acting officials and visibly unqualified hacks, and presiding over a precipitous decline in morale and a steady exodus of experienced public servants in the Department of State. As the shabby treatment of Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman (and his brother), Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, and other dedicated civil servants revealed all too clearly, competence isn’t what Trump prizes. What he wants is unshakable personal loyalty, someone to blame when things go wrong, or both.
Moreover, for all his complaints about the supposed “deep state,” Trump didn’t really reach outside the establishment for new thinking on foreign policy. With only a few exceptions (such as former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson), Trump’s main appointees were all familiar members of the existing Washington elite. They were former generals such as James Mattis, John Kelly, and H.R. McMaster, hardy Washington perennials such as John Bolton and Elliott Abrams, defense industry executives such as Mark Esper, or elected officials such as Dan Coats and Mike Pompeo. He didn’t drain the swamp; he just scoured it for alligators who would do his bidding.
Trump failed to deliver when his initial instincts were sound, but he’s personally responsible for several big foreign-policy blunders. Leaving the Iran nuclear deal may have pleased President Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, and Trump biggest donor, Sheldon Adelson, but his alternative—the policy of “maximum pressure”—has been a near-total bust. Iran is inching back toward the nuclear weapons threshold, the other signatories to the nuclear deal have rejected America’s bizarre efforts to get them to enforce the same agreement Washington had previously abandoned, and the State Department’s most recent report on Iran loudly warns that its various regional activities have continued. In terms of its own stated objectives, in short, the administration’s Iran policy is a failure.
Even worse, Trump’s position on what is probably the single most important global issue of our time—climate change—has been a disaster. The evidence that human activities are altering our planet in dangerous and possibly irreversible ways is now overwhelming, and yet Trump has done everything he could to make the problem worse. Instead of moving to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Trump left the Paris climate accord and has encouraged the United States to produce and burn more oil, gas, and coal. As temperatures rise, forests burn, and storms become more frequent and severe, this is head-in-the-sand stupidity of the highest order.
Trump’s immigration policy has been equally shortsighted. All nations should have the capacity to decide who can enter their territory, work there, and perhaps become citizens one day, but Trump’s broad-brush approach to this heated issue has been counterproductive. In particular, restrictions on H-1B and J-1 visas discourage skilled workers in high-technology fields from coming to the United States (which is why tech companies oppose these restrictions), and make it harder for top foreign students to attend U.S. universities. Both mechanisms have been an important advantage for the United States for decades: To put it bluntly, the United States has attracted some of the best minds from around the world and used them to build cutting-edge industries and aid scientific advances. That magnetic attraction had already declined before Trump took office (leading to fears of a reverse brain drain) as Asia developed, but Trump’s policies are likely to make it worse. Unless the policies are undone, more bright young students and skilled workers will go to Canada, Europe, the United Kingdom, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia, aiding their long-term growth and reducing America’s.
Last but by no means least, there’s Trump’s unconscionable mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. To be clear: The pandemic would have been a serious challenge for any administration, but Trump’s fingerprints are all over the catastrophic responses that have made the United States an outlier—and not in a good way—among the major industrial powers. He’s denied the danger was serious, promised the virus would “disappear” like magic, denigrated minimal precautions like masks, and pressured advisors, politicians, and government agencies to spread false information or adopt dangerous policies in order to bolster his image. Instead of calling for the nation to unite in the face of a common danger, he saw the pandemic as merely another opportunity to sow divisions. And if that weren’t enough, he managed to preside over his own superspreader event and come down with COVID-19 himself. More than 200,000 Americans have died—a tragedy in itself—and the damage done to the country’s reputation for competence may haunt it for a long time to come.
There’s one final reason why, as the open letter put it, “we need new leadership.” A country does not live by foreign policy alone; indeed, for major powers, what they do at home is often more important than what they do on the world stage. Even if one believed Trump’s foreign policy was one triumph after another—and it is a far cry from that—the danger he poses to America’s constitutional order simply cannot be ignored. He’s too lazy to be a Stalin and not sufficiently demoniacal to be a Hitler, but his relentless narcissism, nonstop assault on core republican institutions, lawlessness and corruption, overt racism and misogyny, barely disguised encouragement of extremist violence, etc. all threaten to further corrode the system of government that has defined the United States since its founding. American democracy has never been perfect, but no president has been more willing to damage it in order to keep himself in power. The fear of creeping autocracy might be overblown, but can Americans really afford to take that chance?
Needless to say, Joe Biden doesn’t worry me in the same way. Yes, he is likely to be advised by a foreign-policy team that 1) hasn’t covered itself with glory in the past, 2) remains unrepentant about its past failures, and 3) hasn’t abandoned its reflexive impulse to tell the rest of the world how to live and what to do.
But my concerns are tempered by the constraints that Biden is going face if he wins. The combination of COVID-19, yawning deficits, and a sluggish recovery will put limits on defense spending and force Biden & Co. to focus on problems at home. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party will not support a return to liberal hegemony and is likely to give the administration considerable heat over some elements of its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Republican obstructionists will be a further obstacle to big foreign-policy initiatives, including, unfortunately, ones the United States badly needs.
My hunch, therefore, is that Biden will try to keep foreign policy on the back burner until the pandemic is over and the economy is recovering. He won’t pick pointless fights with foreign leaders to no good purpose, won’t object to useful forms of multilateral cooperation, and won’t pretend that climate change is a hoax. Even if he’s accompanied by a familiar coterie of once-and-future liberal interventionists, he won’t try to turn the clock back to the unipolar era, or even to that weird moment where an American president could win a Nobel Peace Prize simply because he simply wasn’t George W. Bush. With a pandemic to defeat and a lot of repair work to do inside the government itself, the mantra of Biden’s foreign policy is likely to be “First, Do No Harm.” If you’re looking for a catchphrase, you might even call it a foreign policy of “restraint.”
And that, everyone, is why Donald Trump didn’t get my vote and Joe Biden did.