foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Tigray’s War Against Ethiopia Isn’t About Autonomy. It’s About Economic Power.

Tigray ’ s War Against Ethiopia Isn ’ t About Autonomy .
It ’ s About Economic Power .
It has been two weeks since a military conflict in Ethiopia ’ s Tigray region between regional forces and the Ethiopian federal army began .
Some analysts fear that it could escalate further , leading to the disintegration of the country , which would have significant economic and political repercussions for all countries in the Horn of Africa .
But the fundamental causes of the conflict are misunderstood .
Outside observers and analysts tend to see the proximate cause as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the federal government—which is led by Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—regarding the constitutionality of the parliament ’ s decision to postpone the national and regional elections due to COVID-19 .
Tigray ’ s regional leaders held an election in defiance of that decision , in which the governing the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) won all seats , and the result was subsequently declared null and void by the country ’ s parliament .
Others identify the prevailing ideological differences between Abiy and the TPLF as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , do not explain why such differences would give rise to a military confrontation .
That ’ s because they are not the underlying causes of the conflict at all .
This war is ultimately a battle for control of Ethiopia ’ s economy , its natural resources , and the billions of dollars the country receives annually from international donors and lenders .
Access to those riches is a function of who heads the federal government—which the TPLF controlled for nearly three decades before Abiy came to power in April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TPLF-led government .
In other words , this is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray , a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia ’ s more than 110 million people .
It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country ’ s economy , a prize that Tigray ’ s regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost .
The current director-general of the World Health Organization ( WHO ) , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TPLF leadership and served as Ethiopia ’ s health minister for many years under Meles .
Before Abiy ’ s rise to power , all the country ’ s heads of intelligence and the military chiefs came from the TPLF or were members of the military wing of the party during the armed struggle against Mengitsu .
After coming to power , the TPLF-led government converted its forces into an ostensibly Ethiopian army , after completely disbanding the old Ethiopian army .
This ensured that most of the top generals and other military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the TPLF ’ s ranks as well .
The TPLF ’ s political and military power eventually gave rise to economic dominance as it enabled its leaders to exercise complete control of the country ’ s economy and natural resources—mainly its land—as well as aid flows and loans .
In recent years , Ethiopia received , on average , about $ 3.5 billion per year in foreign aid alone , which accounted for about half of the country ’ s national budget during the late Meles years .
The TPLF-led government also took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and governments , mainly from China , which had reached 60 percent of the country ’ s GDP when Abiy came to power .
In fact , Abiy ’ s new administration , which inherited meager foreign exchange reserves , has been struggling to service this debt and was forced to request deferral and renegotiation of terms of these loans from creditors .
Furthermore , the constitution that the TPLF-led government introduced in 1994 , which allowed only public ownership of land , gave government officials unfettered access to abundant land resources in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela regions , which they leased to foreign and domestic investors in a long-term lease , amassing billions of dollars in the process .
According to Human Rights Watch , by January 2011 the Ethiopian government had leased out 3.6 million hectares of land , an area equivalent to the size of the Netherlands , to foreign investors .
Moreover , the TPLF was also able to dominate virtually all sectors of the Ethiopian economy through the companies under its massive conglomerate , the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far the largest conglomerate in the country .
Until recently , EFFORT was administered by Meles ’ s widow , Azeb Mesfin , and TPLF officials are still board members of the major companies under this conglomerate , which enjoyed access to loans from a financial sector that is dominated by the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and Development Bank of Ethiopia .
The TPLF ’ s dominance was not confined to the economy ; it also directly intervened in the selection of the leaders of the major religions , which it regarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the TPLF ’ s rule , both patriarchs of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church , with over 40 million followers in the country , came from Tigray .
Its leaders also intervened in selecting Ethiopia ’ s Islamic Affairs Supreme Council , which was eventually met with resistance from some Muslim activists and leaders , whom the government jailed , leading to widespread protests by Muslims throughout the country in 2012 .
Human rights group such as Amnesty International as well as the U.S. State Department frequently accused government security forces of severe human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the opposition parties and individuals suspected of working with groups that were waging armed struggle against the government , such as the Oromo Liberation Front , Ogaden National Liberation Front , and Ginbot 7—one of the major multiethnic parties in the country opposed to the system of ethnic federalism .
Although the United States and the EU knew of the government ’ s poor human rights record , the economic progress they saw and Ethiopia ’ s key role in fighting al-Shabab meant that they were reluctant to exert pressure on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European Union knew of the government ’ s poor human rights record , the economic progress they saw and Ethiopia ’ s key role in fighting al-Shabab militants in neighboring Somalia meant that they were reluctant to exert sufficient pressure on the TPLF-led government to undertake democratic reforms , even when government security forces shot and killed hundreds of demonstrators in Addis Ababa in 2005 , who were protesting the election results the government claimed to have won .
They looked the other way again when the government claimed to have won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last general election in 2015 , which opposition parties claimed was rigged .
It was clear for many years that the TPLF ’ s political dominance could not go on indefinitely .
Widespread protests broke out in 2018 in the Oromia and Amhara regions , homes of the two largest ethnic groups in the country , forcing the TPLF-led coalition , the Ethiopian People ’ s Revolutionary Democratic Front , to replace then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn , who succeeded Meles following his sudden death in 2012 .
( Although Hailemariam was from a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he did not pose a serious threat to the TPLF ’ s dominance .
Abiy does pose such a threat , because he is an ethnic Oromo—the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia . )
This is when the leaders of two parties in the TPLF-led coalition , the Amhara National Democratic Movement and Oromo People ’ s Democratic Organization , which were hitherto playing second fiddle to the TPLF , secretly decided to join forces and break the TPLF ’ s hegemony by voting for Abiy as the leader of the coalition , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t see coming and never forgave .
Abiy has unveiled or carried out important economic measures that threaten the economic dominance of the leaders of the TPLF .
These include his administration ’ s plan to privatize the state-owned Ethio Telecom , the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation , and companies in the energy sector with assets of over $ 7 billion .
More recently , the government introduced new currency notes , which , according to the prime minister , are designed to fight corruption and smuggling ; some observers noted that this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside the financial system that is held by former government officials and their economic entities that authorities suspect are engaged in illegal trade and illicit activities .
Indeed , on Nov. 17 , the federal attorney general announced that the government had frozen the bank accounts of 34 of these companies for funding “ ethnic-based attacks and terrorist activities , having links with and providing financial assistance to TPLF , tax avoidance and corruption.
” Abiy ’ s reforms have also reduced TPLF influence in the security sector .
Immediately after taking power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and journalists the government had imprisoned , unbanned groups that were waging armed struggles against the Ethiopian government , and signed a peace treaty with Eritrea , with which the TPLF-led government fought a border war that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers from both sides .
Then he sacked the fearsome and reclusive security chief , Getachew Assefa , and replaced the military chief .
He soon began undertaking reforms in the military and security sectors aimed at bringing about more balanced representation of the ethnic groups .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abiy posed a serious threat to their long-standing dominance in the Ethiopian armed forces and economy .
And they acted to regain control .
On June 23 , 2018 , nearly three months after Abiy came to power , there was an assassination attempt against him during a rally in Addis Ababa .
The government shortly after identified the former TPLF security chief , Getachew , as the mastermind , but he had already fled to the Tigray region .
A federal court issued an arrest warrant for him for the attempt and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Tigrayan regional government refused to hand him over .
His former deputy , however , was arrested while fleeing security forces .
Since the TPLF lost control of the federal government , the frequency of ethnic-based conflicts in all regional states , except in Tigray , has spiked significantly .
While there is deep ethnic rivalry in the country , it does not explain how millions have been displaced ; how hundreds of Orthodox Christians and ethnic Amharas living in the South were massacred and their homes , churches , and businesses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were kidnapped ; or how important Oromo figures such as the musician Hachalu Hundessa were killed , sparking protests that led to the deaths of over 150 civilians .
Many of these attacks appear to have been orchestrated and financed by those who lost out from Abiy ’ s rise to power and the reforms he has been undertaking ; they are determined to make the country utterly ungovernable unless they are the ones ruling it .
And there is overwhelming consensus that the TPLF ’ s leaders were the main losers from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the capacity to plan and carry out such attacks—by employing the financial muscle and security network they built over three decades of political dominance .
Rather , what ’ s at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy ’ s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled—moves that TPLF leaders perceive as unacceptably threatening to the economic and political dominance they have long enjoyed and the considerable influence they still wield across Ethiopia .
That dominance is something the TPLF is willing to fight to preserve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carry out what a top TPLF official described as a “ preemptive strike ” against the federal army ’ s Northern Command , triggering the current conflict .
The risk now is that the TPLF ’ s persistent and increasingly audacious actions could make Abiy ’ s peaceful reforms impossible and thereby make a violent transition inevitable .

It has been two weeks since a military conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between regional forces and the Ethiopian federal army began. Some analysts fear that it could escalate further, leading to the disintegration of the country, which would have significant economic and political repercussions for all countries in the Horn of Africa. But the fundamental causes of the conflict are misunderstood.
It has been two weeks since a military conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region between regional forces and the Ethiopian federal army began. Some analysts fear that it could escalate further, leading to the disintegration of the country, which would have significant economic and political repercussions for all countries in the Horn of Africa. But the fundamental causes of the conflict are misunderstood.
Outside observers and analysts tend to see the proximate cause as a recent disagreement between the regional leaders and the federal government—which is led by Nobel Peace Prize-winning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—regarding the constitutionality of the parliament’s decision to postpone the national and regional elections due to COVID-19. Tigray’s regional leaders held an election in defiance of that decision, in which the governing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) won all seats, and the result was subsequently declared null and void by the country’s parliament.
Others identify the prevailing ideological differences between Abiy and the TPLF as the key source of friction. These arguments, however, do not explain why such differences would give rise to a military confrontation. That’s because they are not the underlying causes of the conflict at all.
This war is ultimately a battle for control of Ethiopia’s economy, its natural resources, and the billions of dollars the country receives annually from international donors and lenders. Access to those riches is a function of who heads the federal government—which the TPLF controlled for nearly three decades before Abiy came to power in April 2018, following widespread protests against the TPLF-led government.
In other words, this is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray, a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia’s more than 110 million people. It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country’s economy, a prize that Tigray’s regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost.
The TPLF was the dominant force in Ethiopian politics for nearly 30 years, after it ousted the military government of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991 in a protracted armed struggle alongside the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, which was led by the current president of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki. After the fall of the military government, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, and the TPLF’s former leader, the late Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, ruled the country with an iron fist until his death in 2012.
The current director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, was also a member of the TPLF leadership and served as Ethiopia’s health minister for many years under Meles. Before Abiy’s rise to power, all the country’s heads of intelligence and the military chiefs came from the TPLF or were members of the military wing of the party during the armed struggle against Mengitsu. After coming to power, the TPLF-led government converted its forces into an ostensibly Ethiopian army, after completely disbanding the old Ethiopian army. This ensured that most of the top generals and other military leaders in the new army came from the TPLF’s ranks as well.
The TPLF’s political and military power eventually gave rise to economic dominance as it enabled its leaders to exercise complete control of the country’s economy and natural resources.
The TPLF’s political and military power eventually gave rise to economic dominance as it enabled its leaders to exercise complete control of the country’s economy and natural resources—mainly its land—as well as aid flows and loans. In recent years, Ethiopia received, on average, about $3.5 billion per year in foreign aid alone, which accounted for about half of the country’s national budget during the late Meles years. The TPLF-led government also took significant amounts of loans from private creditors and governments, mainly from China, which had reached 60 percent of the country’s GDP when Abiy came to power. In fact, Abiy’s new administration, which inherited meager foreign exchange reserves, has been struggling to service this debt and was forced to request deferral and renegotiation of terms of these loans from creditors.
Furthermore, the constitution that the TPLF-led government introduced in 1994, which allowed only public ownership of land, gave government officials unfettered access to abundant land resources in the southern parts of the country, particularly in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela regions, which they leased to foreign and domestic investors in a long-term lease, amassing billions of dollars in the process. According to Human Rights Watch, by January 2011 the Ethiopian government had leased out 3.6 million hectares of land, an area equivalent to the size of the Netherlands, to foreign investors.
Moreover, the TPLF was also able to dominate virtually all sectors of the Ethiopian economy through the companies under its massive conglomerate, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), by far the largest conglomerate in the country. Until recently, EFFORT was administered by Meles’s widow, Azeb Mesfin, and TPLF officials are still board members of the major companies under this conglomerate, which enjoyed access to loans from a financial sector that is dominated by the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and Development Bank of Ethiopia.
The TPLF’s dominance was not confined to the economy; it also directly intervened in the selection of the leaders of the major religions, which it regarded as instruments of social control. During the TPLF’s rule, both patriarchs of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, with over 40 million followers in the country, came from Tigray. Its leaders also intervened in selecting Ethiopia’s Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, which was eventually met with resistance from some Muslim activists and leaders, whom the government jailed, leading to widespread protests by Muslims throughout the country in 2012.
Driven by massive investment in infrastructure and the education and health sectors, mainly financed with foreign aid and loans, the TPLF-led government, with Meles at the helm, oversaw significant economic progress in the country over the nearly three decades it held power. The regime was also authoritarian, frequently jailing opposition politicians and journalists and liberally using its defense and security forces to quell anti-government protests.
Human rights group such as Amnesty International as well as the U.S. State Department frequently accused government security forces of severe human violations, including torture, against members of the opposition parties and individuals suspected of working with groups that were waging armed struggle against the government, such as the Oromo Liberation Front, Ogaden National Liberation Front, and Ginbot 7—one of the major multiethnic parties in the country opposed to the system of ethnic federalism.
Although the United States and the European Union knew of the government’s poor human rights record, the economic progress they saw and Ethiopia’s key role in fighting al-Shabab militants in neighboring Somalia meant that they were reluctant to exert sufficient pressure on the TPLF-led government to undertake democratic reforms, even when government security forces shot and killed hundreds of demonstrators in Addis Ababa in 2005, who were protesting the election results the government claimed to have won. They looked the other way again when the government claimed to have won all seats in the parliament during the last general election in 2015, which opposition parties claimed was rigged.
It was clear for many years that the TPLF’s political dominance could not go on indefinitely. Widespread protests broke out in 2018 in the Oromia and Amhara regions, homes of the two largest ethnic groups in the country, forcing the TPLF-led coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, to replace then-Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who succeeded Meles following his sudden death in 2012. (Although Hailemariam was from a minority ethnic group in the South, he did not pose a serious threat to the TPLF’s dominance. Abiy does pose such a threat, because he is an ethnic Oromo—the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.)
This is when the leaders of two parties in the TPLF-led coalition, the Amhara National Democratic Movement and Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, which were hitherto playing second fiddle to the TPLF, secretly decided to join forces and break the TPLF’s hegemony by voting for Abiy as the leader of the coalition, a move that the TPLF leadership didn’t see coming and never forgave.
Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy’s new federal administration has directly threatened the TPLF’s long-standing economic dominance in Ethiopia as a whole by seeking to limit its sphere of influence to the small Tigray region.
Abiy has unveiled or carried out important economic measures that threaten the economic dominance of the leaders of the TPLF. These include his administration’s plan to privatize the state-owned Ethio Telecom, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, and companies in the energy sector with assets of over $7 billion.
More recently, the government introduced new currency notes, which, according to the prime minister, are designed to fight corruption and smuggling; some observers noted that this was principally aimed at controlling the money outside the financial system that is held by former government officials and their economic entities that authorities suspect are engaged in illegal trade and illicit activities.
Indeed, on Nov. 17, the federal attorney general announced that the government had frozen the bank accounts of 34 of these companies for funding “ethnic-based attacks and terrorist activities, having links with and providing financial assistance to TPLF, tax avoidance and corruption.”
Abiy’s reforms have also reduced TPLF influence in the security sector. Immediately after taking power, Abiy released thousands of political prisoners and journalists the government had imprisoned, unbanned groups that were waging armed struggles against the Ethiopian government, and signed a peace treaty with Eritrea, with which the TPLF-led government fought a border war that claimed the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers from both sides.
Then he sacked the fearsome and reclusive security chief, Getachew Assefa, and replaced the military chief. He soon began undertaking reforms in the military and security sectors aimed at bringing about more balanced representation of the ethnic groups. This made it clear to TPLF leaders that Abiy posed a serious threat to their long-standing dominance in the Ethiopian armed forces and economy. And they acted to regain control.
On June 23, 2018, nearly three months after Abiy came to power, there was an assassination attempt against him during a rally in Addis Ababa. The government shortly after identified the former TPLF security chief, Getachew, as the mastermind, but he had already fled to the Tigray region. A federal court issued an arrest warrant for him for the attempt and other human right rights violations, but the Tigrayan regional government refused to hand him over. His former deputy, however, was arrested while fleeing security forces.
Since the TPLF lost control of the federal government, the frequency of ethnic-based conflicts in all regional states, except in Tigray, has spiked significantly. While there is deep ethnic rivalry in the country, it does not explain how millions have been displaced; how hundreds of Orthodox Christians and ethnic Amharas living in the South were massacred and their homes, churches, and businesses burned down; how ethnic Amhara students were kidnapped; or how important Oromo figures such as the musician Hachalu Hundessa were killed, sparking protests that led to the deaths of over 150 civilians.
Many of these attacks appear to have been orchestrated and financed by those who lost out from Abiy’s rise to power and the reforms he has been undertaking; they are determined to make the country utterly ungovernable unless they are the ones ruling it. And there is overwhelming consensus that the TPLF’s leaders were the main losers from Abiy’s reforms while also possessing the capacity to plan and carry out such attacks—by employing the financial muscle and security network they built over three decades of political dominance.
It is clear that the current conflict is not over who gets to govern Tigray because the postponement of national and regional elections extended the tenure of the legislative and executive branches of all regional governments in the country, including in Tigray, which is still ruled by the TPLF. Nor is it a clash between federalists and unitarists; Ethiopia’s federal system remains intact, as evidenced by a 10th regional state that was recently created.
Rather, what’s at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy’s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled—moves that TPLF leaders perceive as unacceptably threatening to the economic and political dominance they have long enjoyed and the considerable influence they still wield across Ethiopia.
That dominance is something the TPLF is willing to fight to preserve, as evidenced by the decision to carry out what a top TPLF official described as a “preemptive strike” against the federal army’s Northern Command, triggering the current conflict. The risk now is that the TPLF’s persistent and increasingly audacious actions could make Abiy’s peaceful reforms impossible and thereby make a violent transition inevitable.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Winter and Air Pollution Raise Coronavirus Fears in South Asia

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
Today : Worsening air quality raises fears about COVID-19 , Imran Khan visits Kabul , the Quad countries hold military exercises , and the world ’ s biggest trade partnership goes ahead—without India .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Governments across South Asia seem to be giving up on coronavirus lockdowns .
Amid the Hindu holiday season—more than 1 billion Indians marked Diwali last weekend—people are increasingly going about their lives as if the worst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shown below , South Asia ’ s countries seem to have slowed their rates of COVID-19 transmission .
But the data doesn ’ t tell the full story or show the extent to which South Asia may be in trouble in the months ahead .
Testing rates remain worryingly low .
Among the 30 countries with the world ’ s most coronavirus cases , Bangladesh has the lowest rate of testing , with only 15,769 tests conducted per million citizens .
Pakistan performs only slightly better .
The reality is that far greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 than data can capture .
In India , for example , estimates suggest that as many as 200 million people have had undetected infections , a figure nearly 10 times higher than the official data .
Deadly combination ?
The onset of winter—and the accompanying rise in pollution—makes for a worrying next few months .
Cities such as New Delhi and Lahore , Pakistan , were enveloped in smog this week .
That often happens around this time of year , when farmers burn stubble to prepare for a new planting season @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humidity , and wind leads to the suspension of particulate matter across the region .
With increased levels of smog , the air in New Delhi , already the city with the world ’ s worst pollution , often becomes unbreathable , causing asthma , eye and nose infections , and lung diseases .
Now the question is how these conditions will affect the ongoing pandemic .
Worsening air quality makes indoor gatherings more likely , which could lead to more rapid spread of the coronavirus .
And people with throat infections due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their symptoms with COVID-19 , clogging up testing or hospital capacity .
Some studies show that pollution can also increase the chances of catching the coronavirus—or dying from it .
A study by scientists in Europe found that particulate air pollution , the kind found across South Asia , resulted in a 15 percent increase in the worldwide deaths from COVID-19 .
Don ’ t ease up restrictions .
The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington projected how mask-wearing could affect India ’ s coronavirus cases , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wears a mask , an estimated 251,000 Indians will be infected daily by Dec. 31 .
If not , that number could rise to 611,000 infections daily—the vast majority undetected .
Malabar naval exercises .
Australia , India , Japan , and the United States held joint naval drills in the northern Arabian Sea on Tuesday , just two weeks after the first phase of the group ’ s military exercises in the Bay of Bengal .
The drills mark the first time Australia has participated since 2007 .
While the exercises are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the four countries , the growing ties speak to a new form of multilateralism .
As the Economist put it this week , “ the Quad embodies the grammar of modern diplomacy .
It is a compact bloc , rather than a sprawling multilateral organisation ; it has a broad agenda , from investment to cybersecurity ; and it is suitably elastic , opportunistically embracing New Zealand , South Korea and Vietnam during the early weeks of the pandemic to discuss economic recovery.
” Khan visits Afghanistan .
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kabul on Thursday , in what Afghan President Ashraf Ghani called a “ historic ” visit .
Islamabad has played an important role in bringing the Taliban to the table in talks between Kabul and Washington .
But neither Khan nor Ghani addressed the Trump administration ’ s plans to speed up a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan , announced this week .
For more , read Foreign Policy ’ s reporting on the issue : FP ’ s Jack Detsch points out that acting U.S. Defense Secretary Chris Miller ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the head of NATO .
In Kabul , Lynne O ’ Donnell describes how a crime wave is further undermining the government ’ s legitimacy .
And FP ’ s Colum Lynch , Robbie Gramer , and Jack Detsch report how policy experts are urging the Biden transition team to keep Washington ’ s Afghan peace envoy , Zalmay Khalilzad , in his job .
Pakistan ’ s India allegation .
On Saturday , Pakistan ’ s foreign minister and military spokesperson held an unusual press conference alleging that New Delhi was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shah Mahmood Qureshi said Islamabad would send evidence to the United Nations for adjudication .
Among the proof displayed was an audio clip of a conversation between an alleged Indian intelligence official and the leader of a separatist insurgency in Pakistan .
New Delhi has not formally responded .
The world ’ s largest trading bloc .
Fifteen countries in Asia have signed a pact to form the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership , covering one-third of the global economy .
The partnership is expected to eliminate many tariffs among members , increasing trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India , Asia ’ s third-largest economy , opted to stay out of the partnership .
Harley-Davidson ’ s exit .
Indian dealers for Harley-Davidson are exploring legal action against the iconic American motorbike company after it announced it was exiting the Indian market .
As the New York Times reports , Harley-Davidson only sold 2,470 bikes in India in the 12 months preceding March .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Worsening air quality raises fears about COVID-19, Imran Khan visits Kabul , the Quad countries hold military exercises , and the world’s biggest trade partnership goes ahead—without India .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Worsening air quality raises fears about COVID-19, Imran Khan visits Kabul, the Quad countries hold military exercises, and the world’s biggest trade partnership goes ahead—without India.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
A Deadly Combination: Winter, Air Pollution, and COVID-19
Governments across South Asia seem to be giving up on coronavirus lockdowns. Amid the Hindu holiday season—more than 1 billion Indians marked Diwali last weekend—people are increasingly going about their lives as if the worst of the pandemic is over. As shown below, South Asia’s countries seem to have slowed their rates of COVID-19 transmission.
But the data doesn’t tell the full story or show the extent to which South Asia may be in trouble in the months ahead. Testing rates remain worryingly low. Among the 30 countries with the world’s most coronavirus cases, Bangladesh has the lowest rate of testing, with only 15,769 tests conducted per million citizens. Pakistan performs only slightly better.
The reality is that far greater numbers of people have been infected with COVID-19 than data can capture. In India, for example, estimates suggest that as many as 200 million people have had undetected infections, a figure nearly 10 times higher than the official data.
Deadly combination? The onset of winter—and the accompanying rise in pollution—makes for a worrying next few months. Cities such as New Delhi and Lahore, Pakistan, were enveloped in smog this week. That often happens around this time of year, when farmers burn stubble to prepare for a new planting season and a combination of colder temperatures, humidity, and wind leads to the suspension of particulate matter across the region.
With increased levels of smog, the air in New Delhi, already the city with the world’s worst pollution, often becomes unbreathable, causing asthma, eye and nose infections, and lung diseases. Now the question is how these conditions will affect the ongoing pandemic. Worsening air quality makes indoor gatherings more likely, which could lead to more rapid spread of the coronavirus. And people with throat infections due to the air quality may easily confuse their symptoms with COVID-19, clogging up testing or hospital capacity.
Some studies show that pollution can also increase the chances of catching the coronavirus—or dying from it. A study by scientists in Europe found that particulate air pollution, the kind found across South Asia, resulted in a 15 percent increase in the worldwide deaths from COVID-19.
Don’t ease up restrictions. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington projected how mask-wearing could affect India’s coronavirus cases, and the results are stunning. If everyone wears a mask, an estimated 251,000 Indians will be infected daily by Dec. 31. If not, that number could rise to 611,000 infections daily—the vast majority undetected.
What We’re Following
Malabar naval exercises. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States held joint naval drills in the northern Arabian Sea on Tuesday, just two weeks after the first phase of the group’s military exercises in the Bay of Bengal. The drills mark the first time Australia has participated since 2007. While the exercises are not formally part of the so-called Quad between the four countries, the growing ties speak to a new form of multilateralism.
As the Economist put it this week, “the Quad embodies the grammar of modern diplomacy. It is a compact bloc, rather than a sprawling multilateral organisation; it has a broad agenda, from investment to cybersecurity; and it is suitably elastic, opportunistically embracing New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam during the early weeks of the pandemic to discuss economic recovery.”
Khan visits Afghanistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan made his first official trip to Kabul on Thursday, in what Afghan President Ashraf Ghani called a “historic” visit. Islamabad has played an important role in bringing the Taliban to the table in talks between Kabul and Washington. But neither Khan nor Ghani addressed the Trump administration’s plans to speed up a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, announced this week.
For more, read Foreign Policy’s reporting on the issue:
FP’s Jack Detsch points out that acting U.S. Defense Secretary Chris Miller’s announcement on Tuesday drew criticism from Republicans and the head of NATO. In Kabul, Lynne O’Donnell describes how a crime wave is further undermining the government’s legitimacy. And FP’s Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch report how policy experts are urging the Biden transition team to keep Washington’s Afghan peace envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, in his job.
Pakistan’s India allegation. On Saturday, Pakistan’s foreign minister and military spokesperson held an unusual press conference alleging that New Delhi was sponsoring terrorism against Pakistan. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said Islamabad would send evidence to the United Nations for adjudication. Among the proof displayed was an audio clip of a conversation between an alleged Indian intelligence official and the leader of a separatist insurgency in Pakistan. New Delhi has not formally responded.
South Asia Inc.
The world’s largest trading bloc. Fifteen countries in Asia have signed a pact to form the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, covering one-third of the global economy. The partnership is expected to eliminate many tariffs among members, increasing trade ties and changing global supply chains. India, Asia’s third-largest economy, opted to stay out of the partnership.
Harley-Davidson’s exit. Indian dealers for Harley-Davidson are exploring legal action against the iconic American motorbike company after it announced it was exiting the Indian market. As the New York Times reports, Harley-Davidson only sold 2,470 bikes in India in the 12 months preceding March.
And Finally… Last weekend was Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights. For families separated by the coronavirus pandemic, the festival was bittersweet. The period is usually one when families congregate, share feasts, and celebrate together. But many Indians thronged crowded markets, malls, and temples anyway, potentially increasing the chances of greater spread of the coronavirus.
A shopkeeper arranges lanterns at a roadside market ahead of the Hindu festival Diwali, the festival of lights, in Kolkata on Nov. 7.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--South Korea’s Corporate Hierarchies Are Breaking Down

There ’ s a change underway in South Korean corporate culture .
It ’ s subtler than the country ’ s massive cultural hits like BTS , Blackpink , K-dramas , and the Oscar-winning Parasite—but in the long run it may be more important .
Young professionals are rattling the rigid , hierarchy-bound corporate systems that have become a core part of Korean working life .
Unlike in the past , they are finding a sympathetic ear in C-suites across South Korea , which are increasingly filled with Generation X and even millennial executives .
This confluence is already causing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country does business .
South Korea ’ s economic rise was built by the chaebols , or family-owned conglomerates , that were selected as national champions by the government and that received preferential treatment .
Today , many are international household names—Samsung , Hyundai , Kia , LG , Lotte , and others .
Working at one of the top chaebols meant a prestigious job for life , a prized possession in a country that experienced bitter privation in the wake of the Korean War .
Competition to get hired young was tough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success for those who could afford it : Years of study at private after-school academies in hopes of scoring highly enough on the national college entrance exam to gain admission to one of the country ’ s top three universities .
A degree from any of the three was usually a ticket to employment at one of the top chaebols .
But South Korea was too successful at prioritizing education—it created too many four-year college graduates for the number of available jobs at the top chaebols .
Youth unemployment rose along with dissatisfaction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people griped , and now you say there are no jobs ?
They gathered online in the 2010s and coined the term “ Hell Chosun , ” or “ Hell Korea , ” to describe their woes .
Privately , middle-aged professional South Koreans groused about “ gentlemen scholar ” college graduates who felt they were above taking jobs at middle-tier chaebols , which were less prestigious but also reasonably secure work .
There was another factor on the side of the young Korean professionals , and they knew it : Despite being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ per week , South Korea ’ s productivity is inversely proportional to its effort .
Millions of hours were wasted as junior employees sat at their desks , doing nothing , waiting for their bosses to leave work—because you didn ’ t leave before them .
Koreans have long theorized how much could be unleashed if all this culturally enforced wasted time and effort could be eliminated .
A new generation of corporate leaders began rising to power and reading the weather .
Today , there are an estimated 130 adult children of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in leadership positions in the country ’ s largest companies , including three at the chairman level .
This doesn ’ t mean , however , that chaebols have overnight become squishy collectives .
Family owners have not instantly diluted their power by breaking up the interconnectedness of the individual chaebol business units .
The conglomerates are not suddenly less opaque to foreign investors .
Chaebol bosses still wield a level of influence over Koreans ’ daily lives on a scale comparable to America ’ s Gilded Age grandees .
Still , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I walked out of the lobby of Hyundai Motor ’ s headquarters in Seoul in December 2013 , leaving my job as the automaker ’ s vice president of global corporate communications , every man in the lobby was wearing a dark suit , a white or light blue shirt , and a tie .
Five years later , I walked back into the same lobby .
My first question to my Hyundai friends : “ Where are all the ties ?
” Almost every man was dressed in business-casual attire , most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer was twofold : the changing attitudes of young Korean professionals and the leadership of then-Vice Chairman Chung Eui-sun .
Chung , 50 , is the grandson of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung and the son of the second company chairman , Chung Mong-koo .
The younger Chung is the exemplar of change underway in corporate South Korea .
Chung Eui-sun was educated and worked in the United States , unlike his father and grandfather .
Also unlike them , he speaks fluent English .
As Chung Mong-koo ’ s only son , Chung @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : hereditary succession .
He took management jobs at Hyundai and its affiliate Kia , staying in the shadow of his father the chairman , but making noteworthy changes along the way as he rose through the ranks .
He hired a legendary German designer to revitalize the Kia look .
He launched Hyundai ’ s premium Genesis brand .
He tweaked the dominant company culture in small but telling acts of rebellion : Instead of picking standard-issue black for his company luxury car , he chose dark blue .
For all practical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company for the past few years as his elderly father receded from view .
In October , he was appointed as Hyundai Motor Group ’ s third chairman , the head of South Korea ’ s second-largest chaebol and the world ’ s fourth-largest automaker .
When I left Hyundai in 2013 , teams were arranged in rows of cubicles with the most junior employee sitting farthest from the team leader .
When promoted , an employee literally moved one cubicle closer to the team leader .
One of the most promising young @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korean university graduate , trilingual—checked out of chaebol life because , he said , “ I know what my salary is going to be in 20 years.
” For a previous generation , that was immeasurable security .
For his , it meant suffocation .
Today , the once-dour Hyundai cubicle farm has been renovated to include rest spots and desks of different sizes and shapes ; employees can work wherever they like .
There are flexible working hours ; employees no longer have to arrive by 8 a.m. ( or risk being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Instead of staff members dutifully walking a paper document to a superior to receive their signature , wasting time while waiting until they are free , team leaders and executives are encouraged to sign online .
When I was unlucky enough to be in the lobby whenever Chairman Chung Mong-koo decided to enter or leave the building , security guards ushered us mere mortals out of the lobby until he passed , such was the deference for his station .
Now , young Hyundai employees crowd around Chairman Chung Eui-sun and take selfies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a remarkable revolution , especially at what has been known as the most conservative of chaebols .
Chung ’ s trusted top executives come largely from the company ’ s global operations—Koreans who have lived and worked in the United States , the United Kingdom , Brazil , Russia , Europe , and everywhere the company operates , unlike previous generations of South Korea-bound leaders .
Chung has hired more non-Korean executives to work at the headquarters in Seoul .
Corporate South Korea has tried to Westernize in fits and starts before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headquarters hired a raft of Western C-suite executives to internationalize the company , which made fine fodder for glowing business magazine coverage .
Soon enough—but less discussed in the media—they were gone , because , my Korean Hyundai colleagues told ( warned ? )
me , they were “ poor communicators.
” The key is not for Korean companies to become more Western .
The key is for them to become more global while embracing their unique Koreanness as a brand attribute .
Chung Eui-sun grew up during the time when Hyundai and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ followers : those that could mimic what the innovators did , and usually cheaper .
Now , that ’ s all changed .
Chung is taking over Hyundai at a time when South Korea is the innovator .
It was the first country to roll out commercial 5G service .
Bloomberg named it the world ’ s most innovative country five years running .
And the world has watched South Korean innovations—drive-through testing , mobile apps , choreographed drone shows—bend the COVID-19 curve twice this year .
Recent years have seen periodic media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work culture , but this was usually little more than policy PR that rarely filtered down to the beleaguered employees .
This moment feels different—a confluence of young professionals and youthful leadership , both of whom have global perspectives and can choose from the world ’ s best business ideas while keeping the best of the Korean ways and discarding the worst .
The new Chairman Chung said he wants to change Hyundai culture to be “ more open ” to good ideas .
If this is true , and if other Korean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ herald a combination of South Korea ’ s already demonstrated creativity and innovation with a corporate culture that finally matches it .

There’s a change underway in South Korean corporate culture. It’s subtler than the country’s massive cultural hits like BTS, Blackpink, K-dramas, and the Oscar-winning Parasite—but in the long run it may be more important.
There’s a change underway in South Korean corporate culture. It’s subtler than the country’s massive cultural hits like BTS, Blackpink, K-dramas, and the Oscar-winning Parasite—but in the long run it may be more important.
Young professionals are rattling the rigid, hierarchy-bound corporate systems that have become a core part of Korean working life. Unlike in the past, they are finding a sympathetic ear in C-suites across South Korea, which are increasingly filled with Generation X and even millennial executives. This confluence is already causing a massive shift in the way the country does business.
South Korea’s economic rise was built by the chaebols, or family-owned conglomerates, that were selected as national champions by the government and that received preferential treatment. Today, many are international household names—Samsung, Hyundai, Kia, LG, Lotte, and others.
Working at one of the top chaebols meant a prestigious job for life, a prized possession in a country that experienced bitter privation in the wake of the Korean War. Competition to get hired young was tough, but there was a path to success for those who could afford it: Years of study at private after-school academies in hopes of scoring highly enough on the national college entrance exam to gain admission to one of the country’s top three universities. A degree from any of the three was usually a ticket to employment at one of the top chaebols.
But South Korea was too successful at prioritizing education—it created too many four-year college graduates for the number of available jobs at the top chaebols. Youth unemployment rose along with dissatisfaction. We followed the formula, young people griped, and now you say there are no jobs? They gathered online in the 2010s and coined the term “Hell Chosun,” or “Hell Korea,” to describe their woes. Privately, middle-aged professional South Koreans groused about “gentlemen scholar” college graduates who felt they were above taking jobs at middle-tier chaebols, which were less prestigious but also reasonably secure work.
There was another factor on the side of the young Korean professionals, and they knew it: Despite being among the global leaders in hours worked per week, South Korea’s productivity is inversely proportional to its effort. Millions of hours were wasted as junior employees sat at their desks, doing nothing, waiting for their bosses to leave work—because you didn’t leave before them. Koreans have long theorized how much could be unleashed if all this culturally enforced wasted time and effort could be eliminated.
A new generation of corporate leaders began rising to power and reading the weather. Today, there are an estimated 130 adult children of chaebol families 50 years old or younger in leadership positions in the country’s largest companies, including three at the chairman level.
This doesn’t mean, however, that chaebols have overnight become squishy collectives. Family owners have not instantly diluted their power by breaking up the interconnectedness of the individual chaebol business units. The conglomerates are not suddenly less opaque to foreign investors. Chaebol bosses still wield a level of influence over Koreans’ daily lives on a scale comparable to America’s Gilded Age grandees.
Still, the beginning of change is visible. When I walked out of the lobby of Hyundai Motor’s headquarters in Seoul in December 2013, leaving my job as the automaker’s vice president of global corporate communications, every man in the lobby was wearing a dark suit, a white or light blue shirt, and a tie.
Five years later, I walked back into the same lobby. My first question to my Hyundai friends: “Where are all the ties?” Almost every man was dressed in business-casual attire, most without jackets. I was told the answer was twofold: the changing attitudes of young Korean professionals and the leadership of then-Vice Chairman Chung Eui-sun.
Chung, 50, is the grandson of Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung and the son of the second company chairman, Chung Mong-koo. The younger Chung is the exemplar of change underway in corporate South Korea.
Chung Eui-sun was educated and worked in the United States, unlike his father and grandfather. Also unlike them, he speaks fluent English. As Chung Mong-koo’s only son, Chung Eui-sun had his fate sealed from birth: hereditary succession. He took management jobs at Hyundai and its affiliate Kia, staying in the shadow of his father the chairman, but making noteworthy changes along the way as he rose through the ranks. He hired a legendary German designer to revitalize the Kia look. He launched Hyundai’s premium Genesis brand. He tweaked the dominant company culture in small but telling acts of rebellion: Instead of picking standard-issue black for his company luxury car, he chose dark blue.
For all practical purposes, Chung has been running the company for the past few years as his elderly father receded from view. In October, he was appointed as Hyundai Motor Group’s third chairman, the head of South Korea’s second-largest chaebol and the world’s fourth-largest automaker.
When I left Hyundai in 2013, teams were arranged in rows of cubicles with the most junior employee sitting farthest from the team leader. When promoted, an employee literally moved one cubicle closer to the team leader. One of the most promising young members of my team at Hyundai—top-three South Korean university graduate, trilingual—checked out of chaebol life because, he said, “I know what my salary is going to be in 20 years.” For a previous generation, that was immeasurable security. For his, it meant suffocation.
Today, the once-dour Hyundai cubicle farm has been renovated to include rest spots and desks of different sizes and shapes; employees can work wherever they like. There are flexible working hours; employees no longer have to arrive by 8 a.m. (or risk being shamed if they are late). Instead of staff members dutifully walking a paper document to a superior to receive their signature, wasting time while waiting until they are free, team leaders and executives are encouraged to sign online.
When I was unlucky enough to be in the lobby whenever Chairman Chung Mong-koo decided to enter or leave the building, security guards ushered us mere mortals out of the lobby until he passed, such was the deference for his station.
Now, young Hyundai employees crowd around Chairman Chung Eui-sun and take selfies with him. This is nothing short of a remarkable revolution, especially at what has been known as the most conservative of chaebols. Chung’s trusted top executives come largely from the company’s global operations—Koreans who have lived and worked in the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Russia, Europe, and everywhere the company operates, unlike previous generations of South Korea-bound leaders. Chung has hired more non-Korean executives to work at the headquarters in Seoul.
Corporate South Korea has tried to Westernize in fits and starts before. In the late 2000s, LG headquarters hired a raft of Western C-suite executives to internationalize the company, which made fine fodder for glowing business magazine coverage. Soon enough—but less discussed in the media—they were gone, because, my Korean Hyundai colleagues told (warned?) me, they were “poor communicators.”
The key is not for Korean companies to become more Western. The key is for them to become more global while embracing their unique Koreanness as a brand attribute. Chung Eui-sun grew up during the time when Hyundai and South Korea as a whole were fast followers: those that could mimic what the innovators did, and usually cheaper.
Now, that’s all changed. Chung is taking over Hyundai at a time when South Korea is the innovator. It was the first country to roll out commercial 5G service. Bloomberg named it the world’s most innovative country five years running. And the world has watched South Korean innovations—drive-through testing, mobile apps, choreographed drone shows—bend the COVID-19 curve twice this year.
Recent years have seen periodic media coverage of an alleged loosening of Korean work culture, but this was usually little more than policy PR that rarely filtered down to the beleaguered employees.
This moment feels different—a confluence of young professionals and youthful leadership, both of whom have global perspectives and can choose from the world’s best business ideas while keeping the best of the Korean ways and discarding the worst. The new Chairman Chung said he wants to change Hyundai culture to be “more open” to good ideas. If this is true, and if other Korean chaebols follow suit, this moment could herald a combination of South Korea’s already demonstrated creativity and innovation with a corporate culture that finally matches it.
—


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Can Biden End America’s Forever Wars?

Can Biden End America’s Forever Wars?

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Earlier this week , the Trump administration announced plans to bring home half of the 5,000 U.S. troops still stationed in Afghanistan , as well as 500 of the 3,000 servicemembers now based in Iraq .
The promise , on which the administration pledged to make good by Jan. 15 , was unpopular among military brass and defense experts , but it handed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The reason ?
Throughout this year ’ s campaign , Biden vowed repeatedly to end America ’ s “ forever wars ” ; now President Donald Trump has suddenly moved the country 3,000 bodies closer to that goal .
But Biden will soon face a much larger , and tougher , problem : How will he deliver on the rest of his pledge when he finally takes office ?
At this point , his odds of succeeding don ’ t look very good .
To see why , you first have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or “ endless ” war actually means .
The answer turns out to be surprisingly hard to pin down .
That slipperiness explains why virtually every Democratic presidential candidate in this year ’ s race , and Republican candidate Trump before them , were able to embrace the idea .
You know that if Elizabeth Warren and Trump can agree on a policy , it ’ s got to be pretty vague .
To his credit , Biden has at least tried to articulate what exactly he means .
His biggest , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ combat operations such as in Afghanistan , Iraq , or Libya .
That should be eminently doable : After all , no major wars loom on the horizon .
The one possible exception is Iran—but even Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , the cabinet ’ s uber-hawk on the issue , reportedly argued against Trump ’ s idea of launching strikes on Iran ’ s main nuclear complex last week .
Ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen , as Biden has also promised , should also prove pretty easy ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one .
Progressives define ending forever wars much more expansively than Biden does .
But beyond that , things get much trickier .
Progressives define ending forever wars much more expansively than Biden does .
For example , Matt Duss , foreign policy advisor to Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders , includes formally confronting all the negative aspects of the war on terror , including the use of torture , targeted killings , and cooperation with authoritarian governments : a process that could do wonders for U.S. policy in the long term but would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short that it ’ s hard to imagine Biden having the stomach for it .
Meanwhile , the president-elect ’ s determination to maintain a robust counterterrorism presence around the world will also spark anger among some of his allies on the left , who include counterterrorism operations in their definition of endless wars .
And even if he wanted to , there are several powerful reasons why Biden would find it hard to end these low-scale combat missions—which as recently as 2018 involved fighting in 15 different countries—and to bring most U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last 20 years have shown , groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State are very good at shifting form , moving into new countries with weak governments and very angry citizens , and then coopting that anger into their ultimate goal of global jihad .
As they do so , they create dangerous new international threats in the process .
Second , every U.S. president who takes office promising a more peaceful approach to foreign policy inevitably gets mugged by reality when unexpected threats arise , or his generals start pointing out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoiding existing conflicts .
As Kori Schake , head of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute , put it to me , “ It ’ s much easier to criticize the practice of dealing with threats where they ’ re emerging when you ’ re not responsible for assuming the risk of getting it wrong.
” Every U.S. president who takes office promising a more peaceful approach to foreign policy inevitably gets mugged by reality when unexpected threats arise .
A large majority of Americans may favor bringing U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But do you really want to be the president who abandons the long-suffering Afghan people to the brutal depredations and strictures of the Taliban ?
Or the one who accepts the risk that pulling back America ’ s global military presence could spark new conflicts or even terror attacks on the West ( a remote but not impossible outcome ) ?
Meanwhile , let ’ s say you ’ ve pledged to support human rights—as Biden , like every Democratic candidate , has—and another round of ethnic cleansing breaks out somewhere .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ your hands and just watch ?
The answer to all these questions is probably not—which is why President Barack Obama , for example , entered office making similar promises but ended up sending more troops to Iraq and Afghanistan , getting involved in Syria ’ s civil war , and helping to topple Libya ’ s Muammar al-Qaddafi .
So what should Biden do to make good on his commitment ?
As president , he ’ ll have three main options .
The first could be called the Jim Jeffries approach : just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ career diplomat who just stepped down as Trump ’ s special envoy for Syria and the fight against the Islamic State , said in an exit interview last week , his team consistently deceived the White House about the real number of U.S. troops in Syria—a number that remained much larger than the 200 servicemembers Trump thought he was leaving there after his loudly touted withdrawal last year .
Another , less duplicitous approach to ending forever wars would be to do what political scientist Charli Carpenter and many other scholars and advocates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : treat global terrorism as a legal problem , and use international law-enforcement tools to attack it .
But this option carries so many risks and potential problems—both political and technical—and would be such a radical shift from long-standing U.S. policy that it ’ s hard to imagine a moderate consensus-oriented leader like Biden embracing it .
Biden ’ s best option might be to follow the advice of Sanders and Pete Buttigieg , former mayor of South Bend , and to focus on process : improving the procedures that govern when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the transparency of the system .
Both Sanders and Buttigieg have stressed that a critical first step would be getting Congress to resume its constitutional duty to decide when the United States goes to war .
This approach would have obvious merits : Virtually all U.S. military operations of the last 19 years have been conducted under legislation , called the Authorization for Use of Military Force ( AUMF ) , passed in 2001 to give the George W. Bush administration broad latitude in its response to the terror attacks of 9/11 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ should never have been allowed to justify almost two decades of warfare around the globe , in countries as different as Niger and the Philippines .
But even the Sanders/Buttigieg strategy would face problems .
Start with the fact that Congress has shown close to zero interest in taking more responsibility for America ’ s wars .
Attempts by Virginia Democratic Senator Tim Kaine and a few others to introduce legislation to repeal the 2001 AUMF ( and another similar law passed in 2002 to enable the war in Iraq ) have fallen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ preferred to leave the hard decisions to the White House and then criticize it when things go wrong .
It ’ s hard to imagine why a majority of legislators would abandon that approach , cynical as it is , anytime soon .
What all this means for Biden is that he ’ s unlikely to make much progress on what was one of the key foreign policy positions he took during the campaign—one that became very popular with his supporters .
In my next column , I ’ ll get into what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ability to hold onto the progressives who are a key part of his coalition .
For now , it ’ s enough to say that the longer the United States ’ forever wars continue—and Americans keep coming home in body bags—the higher the price Biden may end up paying .
The national-security risks of retrenchment may be grave—but so could be the political risks of not doing so .

Earlier this week, the Trump administration announced plans to bring home half of the 5,000 U.S. troops still stationed in Afghanistan, as well as 500 of the 3,000 servicemembers now based in Iraq. The promise, on which the administration pledged to make good by Jan. 15, was unpopular among military brass and defense experts, but it handed an unexpected gift to President-elect Joe Biden.
Earlier this week, the Trump administration announced plans to bring home half of the 5,000 U.S. troops still stationed in Afghanistan, as well as 500 of the 3,000 servicemembers now based in Iraq. The promise, on which the administration pledged to make good by Jan. 15, was unpopular among military brass and defense experts, but it handed an unexpected gift to President-elect Joe Biden.
The reason? Throughout this year’s campaign, Biden vowed repeatedly to end America’s “forever wars”; now President Donald Trump has suddenly moved the country 3,000 bodies closer to that goal. But Biden will soon face a much larger, and tougher, problem: How will he deliver on the rest of his pledge when he finally takes office? At this point, his odds of succeeding don’t look very good.
To see why, you first have to define what the term “forever” or “endless” war actually means. The answer turns out to be surprisingly hard to pin down. That slipperiness explains why virtually every Democratic presidential candidate in this year’s race, and Republican candidate Trump before them, were able to embrace the idea. You know that if Elizabeth Warren and Trump can agree on a policy, it’s got to be pretty vague.
To his credit, Biden has at least tried to articulate what exactly he means. His biggest, and easiest, priority is avoiding more large-scale combat operations such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. That should be eminently doable: After all, no major wars loom on the horizon. The one possible exception is Iran—but even Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the cabinet’s uber-hawk on the issue, reportedly argued against Trump’s idea of launching strikes on Iran’s main nuclear complex last week.
Ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, as Biden has also promised, should also prove pretty easy; even numerous Republican senators agree on that one.
Progressives define ending forever wars much more expansively than Biden does.
But beyond that, things get much trickier. Progressives define ending forever wars much more expansively than Biden does. For example, Matt Duss, foreign policy advisor to Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, includes formally confronting all the negative aspects of the war on terror, including the use of torture, targeted killings, and cooperation with authoritarian governments: a process that could do wonders for U.S. policy in the long term but would prove so divisive and controversial in the short that it’s hard to imagine Biden having the stomach for it.
Meanwhile, the president-elect’s determination to maintain a robust counterterrorism presence around the world will also spark anger among some of his allies on the left, who include counterterrorism operations in their definition of endless wars. And even if he wanted to, there are several powerful reasons why Biden would find it hard to end these low-scale combat missions—which as recently as 2018 involved fighting in 15 different countries—and to bring most U.S. troops home.
First, as the last 20 years have shown, groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State are very good at shifting form, moving into new countries with weak governments and very angry citizens, and then coopting that anger into their ultimate goal of global jihad. As they do so, they create dangerous new international threats in the process.
Second, every U.S. president who takes office promising a more peaceful approach to foreign policy inevitably gets mugged by reality when unexpected threats arise, or his generals start pointing out the potentially disastrous consequences of abandoning or avoiding existing conflicts. As Kori Schake, head of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, put it to me, “It’s much easier to criticize the practice of dealing with threats where they’re emerging when you’re not responsible for assuming the risk of getting it wrong.”
Every U.S. president who takes office promising a more peaceful approach to foreign policy inevitably gets mugged by reality when unexpected threats arise.
A large majority of Americans may favor bringing U.S. troops home, and keeping them there. But do you really want to be the president who abandons the long-suffering Afghan people to the brutal depredations and strictures of the Taliban? Or the one who accepts the risk that pulling back America’s global military presence could spark new conflicts or even terror attacks on the West (a remote but not impossible outcome)? Meanwhile, let’s say you’ve pledged to support human rights—as Biden, like every Democratic candidate, has—and another round of ethnic cleansing breaks out somewhere. Are you really going to sit on your hands and just watch?
The answer to all these questions is probably not—which is why President Barack Obama, for example, entered office making similar promises but ended up sending more troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, getting involved in Syria’s civil war, and helping to topple Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi.
So what should Biden do to make good on his commitment? As president, he’ll have three main options. The first could be called the Jim Jeffrey approach: just lie. As Jeffrey, a well-respected career diplomat who just stepped down as Trump’s special envoy for Syria and the fight against the Islamic State, said in an exit interview last week, his team consistently deceived the White House about the real number of U.S. troops in Syria—a number that remained much larger than the 200 servicemembers Trump thought he was leaving there after his loudly touted withdrawal last year.
Another, less duplicitous approach to ending forever wars would be to do what political scientist Charli Carpenter and many other scholars and advocates have suggested over the last 20 years: treat global terrorism as a legal problem, and use international law-enforcement tools to attack it. But this option carries so many risks and potential problems—both political and technical—and would be such a radical shift from long-standing U.S. policy that it’s hard to imagine a moderate consensus-oriented leader like Biden embracing it.
Biden’s best option might be to follow the advice of Sanders and Pete Buttigieg, former mayor of South Bend, and to focus on process: improving the procedures that govern when the United States uses force, and enhancing the transparency of the system. Both Sanders and Buttigieg have stressed that a critical first step would be getting Congress to resume its constitutional duty to decide when the United States goes to war.
This approach would have obvious merits: Virtually all U.S. military operations of the last 19 years have been conducted under legislation, called the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed in 2001 to give the George W. Bush administration broad latitude in its response to the terror attacks of 9/11. That’s absurd; the law should never have been allowed to justify almost two decades of warfare around the globe, in countries as different as Niger and the Philippines.
But even the Sanders/Buttigieg strategy would face problems. Start with the fact that Congress has shown close to zero interest in taking more responsibility for America’s wars. Attempts by Virginia Democratic Senator Tim Kaine and a few others to introduce legislation to repeal the 2001 AUMF (and another similar law passed in 2002 to enable the war in Iraq) have fallen flat again and again. Congress has preferred to leave the hard decisions to the White House and then criticize it when things go wrong. It’s hard to imagine why a majority of legislators would abandon that approach, cynical as it is, anytime soon.
What all this means for Biden is that he’s unlikely to make much progress on what was one of the key foreign policy positions he took during the campaign—one that became very popular with his supporters. In my next column, I’ll get into what this failure could mean for Biden’s ability to hold onto the progressives who are a key part of his coalition. For now, it’s enough to say that the longer the United States’ forever wars continue—and Americans keep coming home in body bags—the higher the price Biden may end up paying. The national-security risks of retrenchment may be grave—but so could be the political risks of not doing so.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Biden’s Irish Roots Promise a New Kind of Special Relationship

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
It ’ s been 170 years since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s great-great grandfather Patrick Blewitt fled the Irish potato famine and settled in Scranton , Pennsylvania .
But Biden ’ s Irish roots and Catholic faith are a cornerstone of his self-identity , an embrace that the Emerald Isle has enthusiastically reciprocated—setting nerves on edge in London that Brexit Britain could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States a little less special .
Nigel Farage , former leader of the UK Independence Party , tweeted that Biden “ hates the UK ” after a video clip surfaced of Biden rebuffing a question from a BBC journalist by saying , “ I ’ m Irish.
” U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s advisors were , according to the New York Times , concerned that the British leader ’ s warm relationship with outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump could put him on the back foot with Biden .
Widening the gap @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a member of House of Lords , the unelected upper chamber of the British Parliament , described U.S. Vice President-elect Kamala Harris as simply “ the Indian ” in a tweet earlier this month .
While outgoing Trump was vocal in his support of Britain ’ s withdrawal from the European Union , Biden has long made known his distaste for the move—and for Johnson .
Speaking at a fundraiser last year Biden described the prime minister as a “ physical and emotional clone ” of Trump .
Biden has made clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it runs through the island of Ireland .
On the campaign trail , he said that any future trade deal between the U.K. and the United States would be contingent on London ’ s respect for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement , which ended decades of conflict in Northern Ireland .
The U.S.-brokered deal did away with the hard border between Northern Ireland , part of the U.K. , and the Republic of Ireland , which is a member of the European Union .
But the Irish border has become a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson ’ s government recently reneged on an agreement with Brussels to respect the agreement and the open border , raising fears of a return to a hard border and a renewed conflict .
Biden raised the issue with Johnson in his first chat with an overseas leader as president-elect .
And Biden ’ s emphasis on that agreement is one area where his Irish roots definitely seem to come into play .
“ I think President Biden ’ s understanding and instincts will stem specifically from his identification as Irish and Irish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Anne Anderson , who served as Irish ambassador to the United States during the Obama administration , when Biden served as vice president .
“ He ’ s visited Ireland , he knows these issues backward , and we don ’ t need to educate him in any way about the Good Friday Agreement and its importance to the north-south relationship on the island , ” she said .
But even though Biden and Democrats in Congress are expected to toe a hard line on Brexit and the Irish border , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ say that any concerns of favoritism are overblown .
While Biden ’ s priorities may align closely with Dublin ’ s , it mostly has to do with a shared worldview , rather than heritage .
“ We believe in the same kind of things that President- [ elect ] Biden believes in , ” Anderson said .
Even as Britain lurches ever closer to a no-deal exit from the European Union at the end of next month , Biden ’ s known opposition to Brexit doesn ’ t necessarily have to derail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even as Johnson ’ s big election win last year has turbocharged die-hard Brexiteers who were more comfortable with Trump in office .
“ I don ’ t think the president-elect will hold it against the United Kingdom .
They had an election , they voted , that ’ s what they decided , and we ’ ll deal with it , ” said Kevin O ’ Malley , who served as U.S. ambassador to Ireland during the Obama administration .
Many experts expect Biden ’ s Irish roots will actually help cement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe .
“ I think it ’ s totally compatible for someone to be Irish American and that be an important part of who they are and to also have a close relationship with the U.K. , because Ireland also wants a close relationship between the European Union and the U.K. , ” said Thomas Wright , the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution think tank .
Ireland , which has been actively trying to mediate between the U.K. and the rest of Europe as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatically punching well above the weight its 5 million population would suggest .
Earlier this year , the Economist wrote that Ireland has “ a good claim to be the world ’ s most diplomatically powerful country ” on a per capita basis .
Ireland has an embassy in every EU country , and the Irish government is one of the biggest spenders in Washington when it comes to foreign lobbying .
In June , Ireland beat Canada to secure a seat on the U.N. Security Council , having thrown in performances by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In July , Ireland ’ s Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe clinched the leadership of the Eurogroup , a club of eurozone finance ministers .
Ireland ’ s extensive diaspora , making up some 10 percent of the U.S. population , as well as its cultural soft power have long proved potent diplomatic tools .
Ireland ’ s taoiseach , the country ’ s prime minister , is the only world leader with an automatic invite every year to the Oval Office , for St. Patrick ’ s Day—and not just for green @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former U.S. ambassador , noted that the meetings are “ full-on substantive ” and are followed by a lunch at the Capitol with the speaker of the house , and then a big reception with Irish Americans and Irish government and commercial interests .
“ It ’ s a big deal , ” he said .
Those commercial ties have turned a relationship once anchored in kith and kin into something else .
Ireland has become a magnet for U.S. tech and pharmaceutical giants attracted by low taxes and a well-educated , English-speaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Johnson & Johnson , Facebook , Google , Apple , and Twitter all have a significant presence in Ireland .
Still , Irish eyes might not be smiling forever .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard Neal , a Massachusetts Democrat , have been vocal in their support of Ireland ’ s border stance , but neither is getting any younger .
“ Biden , Pelosi , and Richie Neal are that generation ’ s last gasp .
They ’ re not going to be around forever , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy adviser to Sen. Ted Kennedy , founder of the US-Ireland Alliance , and author of Shenanigans : The US-Ireland Relationship in Uncertain Times .
Another type of generational turf-cutting is also apparent .
Rep. Joe Crowley , a big Ireland booster , was ousted from his New York seat in 2018 by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez .
More recently , Rep. Jamaal Bowman , another rising Democratic star from New York , unseated Rep. Eliot Engel , the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a former co-chair of the Congressional Ad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with backers still in power , Ireland ’ s diplomatic clout in Washington has its limits .
For decades , immigration reform has been a top priority for successive Irish governments , as over 10,000 Irish citizens are estimated to be living in the United States without legal status .
But these efforts have yielded little .
The latest attempt to secure more work visas for Irish citizens was approved by the House in March , but it now languishes in the Senate .
Republican Sen. Tom Cotton squashed the same bill two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embassy in Washington , Ambassador Daniel Mulhall—who , unlike his British counterpart , weathered the Trump presidency without incident—is cautiously optimistic about Ireland ’ s prospects now .
“ It ’ s a good thing that we will have a president who has this kind of depth of understanding of Irish affairs , which is bound to be beneficial to us , ” Mulhall said .
“ Not that I ’ m expecting any great bonanza .
I ’ m clear about that .
”

It’s been 170 years since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s great-great grandfather Patrick Blewitt fled the Irish potato famine and settled in Scranton, Pennsylvania. But Biden’s Irish roots and Catholic faith are a cornerstone of his self-identity, an embrace that the Emerald Isle has enthusiastically reciprocated—setting nerves on edge in London that Brexit Britain could find the special relationship with the United States a little less special.
It’s been 170 years since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s great-great grandfather Patrick Blewitt fled the Irish potato famine and settled in Scranton, Pennsylvania. But Biden’s Irish roots and Catholic faith are a cornerstone of his self-identity, an embrace that the Emerald Isle has enthusiastically reciprocated—setting nerves on edge in London that Brexit Britain could find the special relationship with the United States a little less special.
Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence Party, tweeted that Biden “hates the UK” after a video clip surfaced of Biden rebuffing a question from a BBC journalist by saying, “I’m Irish.” U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s advisors were, according to the New York Times, concerned that the British leader’s warm relationship with outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump could put him on the back foot with Biden. Widening the gap between the two governments, John Taylor, a member of House of Lords, the unelected upper chamber of the British Parliament, described U.S. Vice President-elect Kamala Harris as simply “the Indian” in a tweet earlier this month.
While outgoing Trump was vocal in his support of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, Biden has long made known his distaste for the move—and for Johnson. Speaking at a fundraiser last year Biden described the prime minister as a “physical and emotional clone” of Trump.
Biden has made clear where his red line is with London, and it runs through the island of Ireland. On the campaign trail, he said that any future trade deal between the U.K. and the United States would be contingent on London’s respect for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which ended decades of conflict in Northern Ireland. The U.S.-brokered deal did away with the hard border between Northern Ireland, part of the U.K., and the Republic of Ireland, which is a member of the European Union.
But the Irish border has become a major sticking point in Brexit negotiations. Johnson’s government recently reneged on an agreement with Brussels to respect the agreement and the open border, raising fears of a return to a hard border and a renewed conflict. Biden raised the issue with Johnson in his first chat with an overseas leader as president-elect.
And Biden’s emphasis on that agreement is one area where his Irish roots definitely seem to come into play.
“I think President Biden’s understanding and instincts will stem specifically from his identification as Irish and Irish American and understanding of this issue,” said Anne Anderson, who served as Irish ambassador to the United States during the Obama administration, when Biden served as vice president.
“He’s visited Ireland, he knows these issues backward, and we don’t need to educate him in any way about the Good Friday Agreement and its importance to the north-south relationship on the island,” she said.
But even though Biden and Democrats in Congress are expected to toe a hard line on Brexit and the Irish border, experts and former Irish and American diplomats say that any concerns of favoritism are overblown. While Biden’s priorities may align closely with Dublin’s, it mostly has to do with a shared worldview, rather than heritage.
“We believe in the same kind of things that President-[elect] Biden believes in,” Anderson said.
Even as Britain lurches ever closer to a no-deal exit from the European Union at the end of next month, Biden’s known opposition to Brexit doesn’t necessarily have to derail the decades-old close relationship with London, even as Johnson’s big election win last year has turbocharged die-hard Brexiteers who were more comfortable with Trump in office.
“I don’t think the president-elect will hold it against the United Kingdom. They had an election, they voted, that’s what they decided, and we’ll deal with it,” said Kevin O’Malley, who served as U.S. ambassador to Ireland during the Obama administration.
Many experts expect Biden’s Irish roots will actually help cement better relations among the three countries and Europe.
“I think it’s totally compatible for someone to be Irish American and that be an important part of who they are and to also have a close relationship with the U.K., because Ireland also wants a close relationship between the European Union and the U.K.,” said Thomas Wright, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution think tank.
Ireland, which has been actively trying to mediate between the U.K. and the rest of Europe as Brexit reaches its end game, is diplomatically punching well above the weight its 5 million population would suggest. Earlier this year, the Economist wrote that Ireland has “a good claim to be the world’s most diplomatically powerful country” on a per capita basis. Ireland has an embassy in every EU country, and the Irish government is one of the biggest spenders in Washington when it comes to foreign lobbying.
In June, Ireland beat Canada to secure a seat on the U.N. Security Council, having thrown in performances by Riverdance and U2 to boost their chances. In July, Ireland’s Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe clinched the leadership of the Eurogroup, a club of eurozone finance ministers.
Ireland’s extensive diaspora, making up some 10 percent of the U.S. population, as well as its cultural soft power have long proved potent diplomatic tools. Ireland’s taoiseach, the country’s prime minister, is the only world leader with an automatic invite every year to the Oval Office, for St. Patrick’s Day—and not just for green beer. O’Malley, the former U.S. ambassador, noted that the meetings are “full-on substantive” and are followed by a lunch at the Capitol with the speaker of the house, and then a big reception with Irish Americans and Irish government and commercial interests. “It’s a big deal,” he said.
Those commercial ties have turned a relationship once anchored in kith and kin into something else. Ireland has become a magnet for U.S. tech and pharmaceutical giants attracted by low taxes and a well-educated, English-speaking workforce. Pfizer, Boston Scientific, Johnson & Johnson, Facebook, Google, Apple, and Twitter all have a significant presence in Ireland.
Still, Irish eyes might not be smiling forever. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard Neal, a Massachusetts Democrat, have been vocal in their support of Ireland’s border stance, but neither is getting any younger.
“Biden, Pelosi, and Richie Neal are that generation’s last gasp. They’re not going to be around forever,” said Trina Vargo, a former foreign-policy adviser to Sen. Ted Kennedy, founder of the US-Ireland Alliance, and author of Shenanigans: The US-Ireland Relationship in Uncertain Times.
Another type of generational turf-cutting is also apparent. Rep. Joe Crowley, a big Ireland booster, was ousted from his New York seat in 2018 by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. More recently, Rep. Jamaal Bowman, another rising Democratic star from New York, unseated Rep. Eliot Engel, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a former co-chair of the Congressional Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs.
Even with backers still in power, Ireland’s diplomatic clout in Washington has its limits. For decades, immigration reform has been a top priority for successive Irish governments, as over 10,000 Irish citizens are estimated to be living in the United States without legal status. But these efforts have yielded little. The latest attempt to secure more work visas for Irish citizens was approved by the House in March, but it now languishes in the Senate. Republican Sen. Tom Cotton squashed the same bill two years ago.
At Ireland’s embassy in Washington, Ambassador Daniel Mulhall—who, unlike his British counterpart, weathered the Trump presidency without incident—is cautiously optimistic about Ireland’s prospects now.
“It’s a good thing that we will have a president who has this kind of depth of understanding of Irish affairs, which is bound to be beneficial to us,” Mulhall said. “Not that I’m expecting any great bonanza. I’m clear about that.”