foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--WHO Warns of Pandemic’s ‘Catastrophic Impact’ on Syria

WHO Warns of Pandemic ’ s ‘ Catastrophic Impact ’ on Syria The World Health Organization ( WHO ) warned the U.N. Security Council this week that the coronavirus pandemic could have a “ catastrophic impact ” on Syria , citing shortages of medicines and supplies for up to 2.1 million people in the northeastern part of the country .
But the U.N. health agency apparently backed down from an appeal to the 15-nation council to reopen the critical crossing point along the Syria-Iraq border at Yaroubia in order to help stem the spread of the virus .
The WHO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that WHO officials prepared for the Security Council ’ s Wednesday debate on Syria .
At Russia ’ s insistence , it was scrubbed from the final paper—titled “ Criticality of All-Modalities Response to COVID-19 Response in Northeast Syria ” —that was presented to the council .
Foreign Policy is posting the original draft as its Document of the Week .
The U.N. Security Council established four border crossing points , including Yaroubia , in July 2014 to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of needy civilians living in opposition-controlled territory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the so-called cross-border arrangement , saying it violates national sovereignty .
But the council approved the arrangement on the grounds that the Syrian government , which had sought to starve hundreds of thousands of civilians in rebel-controlled cities and towns , was unwilling , or in some cases unable , to provide vital supplies to civilians in enemy territory .
Syria ’ s powerful ally Russia has argued Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s case before the council , insisting that Damascus could be counted on to deliver any needed assistance to Syrian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 , Russia , which threatened to block the entire cross-border aid arrangement , forced the council to shutter Yaroubia and a second crossing point on the Jordanian border .
It agreed to allow two remaining crossing points along the Turkish border to remain open .
The closure of Yaroubia—which was primarily used to deliver medical supplies—has rendered the medical supply chain “ less effective and reliable , ” according to the paper .
The Syrian government , meanwhile , has not been able to meet the medical needs of northeastern Syria since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three months , only 31 percent of clinics and hospitals run by relief groups have received medical supplies from Damascus , including hospitals in Tabqa , Raqqa , and Hasakah , as well as camps for displaced Syrians .
“ UN partners do not believe that cross-line support [ from Damascus ] can be adequately expanded into all areas of need in the short- to medium-term , ” according to the draft .
“ Up to 2.1 million people in Northeast Syria ( NES ) rely significantly on cross-border support from northern Iraq @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” the draft paper noted .
“ Re-establishing a reliable cross-border operation … is the most feasible means of ensuring a regular supply chain into areas of NES that can not be reached from Damascus or through cross-line activities , ” according to the draft .
“ United Nations partners therefore propose the re-opening of Yaroubia crossing as a matter of urgency .
This would have significant impact on the COVID-19 response in NES.
” That recommendation was stripped from the final paper presented to the council .
Instead , the final version @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agree that the cross-line option alone can not be adequately expanded to meet the needs in NES and will not be sufficient to support an effective response to COVID-19 .
… New options are needed to fill the significant gaps and to continue the humanitarian assistance previously delivered through Yaroubia , through more cross-border and cross-line access.
” Reuters previously reported on the revision .
The diplomatic standoff over humanitarian aid comes at a time when Syria has registered its first 43 cases of COVID-19 , the disease caused by the new coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disease , but public health experts believe the low count is largely the result of scant testing .
The draft paper cited a single case in northeastern Syria , a 53-year-old man with no travel history and no known contact with an infected person .
A close relative is hospitalized in Qamishli with symptoms consistent with the disease , providing a clear indication that the virus is spreading through community transmission .
“ Recent explosive disease outbreaks in several countries with sophisticated health systems demonstrate the devastating effect that the COVID-19 pandemic can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ draft paper noted .
“ In Syria—where the health system has been severely weakened by years of conflict—the impact could be truly catastrophic.
” Northeastern Syria has endured some of the worst violence during the country ’ s more than nine years of conflict , leaving its health system with severe shortages of hospital beds , health care workers , testing kits , and protective gear like masks and gowns .
The hardships have been exacerbated by Syrian and Russian bombing campaigns that have reportedly targeted medical facilities .
None of the districts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of 18 hospital beds per 10,000 people .
International relief agencies currently operate 58 primary health centers , 37 mobile clinics , and 13 hospitals in northeastern Syria and rely primarily on supplies delivered across land borders into Syria .
Those supplies have been impeded since the closure of Yaroubia .
Kelly Craft , the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations , told the Security Council on Wednesday that the closure of the Yaroubia crossing point undercut the capacity of U.N. relief agencies and private charities “ to serve those in dire need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a disastrous COVID-19 outbreak that will ravage Syria—if we don ’ t immediately facilitate the delivery of additional aid.
” Russia fired back , accusing the United States of hampering the Syrian government ’ s ability to respond to the virus with the imposition of sanctions , and urged the U.N. and governments to step up cooperation with Syria to battle it .
“ The government of Syria is doing its utmost to fight the spread of COVID-19 despite cruel unilateral sanctions , ” Russia ’ s U.N. ambassador , Vassily Nebenzia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urge our colleagues not to waste their time on looking for a way to advocate , explicitly or implicitly , for getting Yaroubia back and saying that this be the ‘ only solution.
’ ” “ Don ’ t lose time , but rather focus on engaging humanitarian agencies in a constructive dialogue with Syrian authorities , ” he added .
“ You don ’ t have to knock on the door .
The door is open .
”

The World Health Organization (WHO) warned the U.N. Security Council this week that the coronavirus pandemic could have a “catastrophic impact” on Syria, citing shortages of medicines and supplies for up to 2.1 million people in the northeastern part of the country.
The World Health Organization (WHO) warned the U.N. Security Council this week that the coronavirus pandemic could have a “catastrophic impact” on Syria, citing shortages of medicines and supplies for up to 2.1 million people in the northeastern part of the country.
But the U.N. health agency apparently backed down from an appeal to the 15-nation council to reopen the critical crossing point along the Syria-Iraq border at Yaroubia in order to help stem the spread of the virus. The WHO appeal was included in a draft paper that WHO officials prepared for the Security Council’s Wednesday debate on Syria. At Russia’s insistence, it was scrubbed from the final paper—titled “Criticality of All-Modalities Response to COVID-19 Response in Northeast Syria”—that was presented to the council. Foreign Policy is posting the original draft as its Document of the Week.
The U.N. Security Council established four border crossing points, including Yaroubia, in July 2014 to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of needy civilians living in opposition-controlled territory. The Syrian government has sharply criticized the so-called cross-border arrangement, saying it violates national sovereignty. But the council approved the arrangement on the grounds that the Syrian government, which had sought to starve hundreds of thousands of civilians in rebel-controlled cities and towns, was unwilling, or in some cases unable, to provide vital supplies to civilians in enemy territory.
Syria’s powerful ally Russia has argued Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s case before the council, insisting that Damascus could be counted on to deliver any needed assistance to Syrian communities across enemy lines. On Jan. 10, Russia, which threatened to block the entire cross-border aid arrangement, forced the council to shutter Yaroubia and a second crossing point on the Jordanian border. It agreed to allow two remaining crossing points along the Turkish border to remain open.
The closure of Yaroubia—which was primarily used to deliver medical supplies—has rendered the medical supply chain “less effective and reliable,” according to the paper.
The Syrian government, meanwhile, has not been able to meet the medical needs of northeastern Syria since Yaroubia was shuttered. Over the past three months, only 31 percent of clinics and hospitals run by relief groups have received medical supplies from Damascus, including hospitals in Tabqa, Raqqa, and Hasakah, as well as camps for displaced Syrians. “UN partners do not believe that cross-line support [from Damascus] can be adequately expanded into all areas of need in the short- to medium-term,” according to the draft.
“Up to 2.1 million people in Northeast Syria (NES) rely significantly on cross-border support from northern Iraq for their medical services and supplies,” the draft paper noted.
“Re-establishing a reliable cross-border operation … is the most feasible means of ensuring a regular supply chain into areas of NES that cannot be reached from Damascus or through cross-line activities,” according to the draft. “United Nations partners therefore propose the re-opening of Yaroubia crossing as a matter of urgency. This would have significant impact on the COVID-19 response in NES.”
That recommendation was stripped from the final paper presented to the council. Instead, the final version noted that “UN and NGO partners agree that the cross-line option alone cannot be adequately expanded to meet the needs in NES and will not be sufficient to support an effective response to COVID-19. … New options are needed to fill the significant gaps and to continue the humanitarian assistance previously delivered through Yaroubia, through more cross-border and cross-line access.” Reuters previously reported on the revision.
The diplomatic standoff over humanitarian aid comes at a time when Syria has registered its first 43 cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the new coronavirus. Three Syrians have died of the disease, but public health experts believe the low count is largely the result of scant testing.
The draft paper cited a single case in northeastern Syria, a 53-year-old man with no travel history and no known contact with an infected person. A close relative is hospitalized in Qamishli with symptoms consistent with the disease, providing a clear indication that the virus is spreading through community transmission.
“Recent explosive disease outbreaks in several countries with sophisticated health systems demonstrate the devastating effect that the COVID-19 pandemic can have on public health,” the draft paper noted. “In Syria—where the health system has been severely weakened by years of conflict—the impact could be truly catastrophic.”
Northeastern Syria has endured some of the worst violence during the country’s more than nine years of conflict, leaving its health system with severe shortages of hospital beds, health care workers, testing kits, and protective gear like masks and gowns. The hardships have been exacerbated by Syrian and Russian bombing campaigns that have reportedly targeted medical facilities. None of the districts in northeastern Syria meet the minimum standard of 18 hospital beds per 10,000 people. International relief agencies currently operate 58 primary health centers, 37 mobile clinics, and 13 hospitals in northeastern Syria and rely primarily on supplies delivered across land borders into Syria. Those supplies have been impeded since the closure of Yaroubia.
Kelly Craft, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told the Security Council on Wednesday that the closure of the Yaroubia crossing point undercut the capacity of U.N. relief agencies and private charities “to serve those in dire need. It also set the stage for a disastrous COVID-19 outbreak that will ravage Syria—if we don’t immediately facilitate the delivery of additional aid.”
Russia fired back, accusing the United States of hampering the Syrian government’s ability to respond to the virus with the imposition of sanctions, and urged the U.N. and governments to step up cooperation with Syria to battle it. “The government of Syria is doing its utmost to fight the spread of COVID-19 despite cruel unilateral sanctions,” Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, told the council. “We strongly urge our colleagues not to waste their time on looking for a way to advocate, explicitly or implicitly, for getting Yaroubia back and saying that this be the ‘only solution.’”
“Don’t lose time, but rather focus on engaging humanitarian agencies in a constructive dialogue with Syrian authorities,” he added. “You don’t have to knock on the door. The door is open.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--There’s Still Life in the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement

There ’ s Still Life in the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement On Feb. 11 , Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced that Manila would be terminating the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement ( VFA ) —an agreement authorizing , among other things , the U.S. military to have freedom of movement into and within the Philippines .
Duterte ’ s decision was met in Washington with deep concerns about the potential fallout for the Indo-Pacific strategy , largely aimed at countering China ’ s growing assertiveness .
They were right to be worried .
After all , bases across the Philippines—namely Subic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Fort Magsaysay , Antonio Bautista Air Base , Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base , and Lumbia Air Base—are ideally located for U.S. purposes .
They ’ re near or on the South China Sea , significantly enhancing the U.S. military ’ s ability to challenge Beijing there .
Without them , Washington would have to rely more heavily on other , more distant bases in Guam ; Okinawa ; mainland Japan ; Darwin , Australia ; Hawaii ; and elsewhere .
Doing so would likely reduce the ability of the U.S. military to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Philippines itself , effectively hollowing out the two countries ’ Mutual Defense Treaty ( MDT ) and severely complicating the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement , under which the U.S. military is authorized to preposition weapons and equipment at bases in the Philippines .
Losing the VFA would probably also weaken other allies and partners ’ perceptions of Washington ’ s security commitments in the region .
But there is a glimmer of hope in Duterte ’ s announcement : Per the agreement , official VFA cancellation does not take effect for 180 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until Aug. 9 to save it or negotiate a new VFA to avert any further alliance crisis .
The challenge is that Duterte is an extremely anti-U.S. president who may seek to eliminate the MDT in its entirety in favor of greater self-reliance and better relations with China and Russia .
Yet success would speak volumes about the durability of the alliance in spite of the whims of an autocratic president .
While Duterte ’ s stance is likely to come out on top given his position as chief executive of the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ VFA ’ s demise is not a predetermined outcome .
For example , shortly after Duterte ’ s termination announcement , the Philippine ambassador to the United States , Jose Manuel Romualdez , noted at a forum in Manila that both countries were exploring “ ways and means to see how we can come up with something similar.
” Meanwhile , in a very cryptic tweet from Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin Jr. the same day as the announcement , Locsin said : “ As a diplomatic courtesy there will be no further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After Joshua Melvin of Agence France-Presse retweeted Locsin ’ s remarks with the comment “ Now the furious negotiations begin .
180 day countdown # VFA , ” Locsin retweeted him with “ You ’ re the only one who got that , ” suggesting that negotiations were about to begin or already underway .
If the two sides are indeed negotiating , it is unknown what each country seeks for the future .
Aside from this reading of the tea leaves , Duterte may not fundamentally possess sole discretion in deciding the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders in the Philippine Senate , notably led the Senate president , a Duterte ally , filed a petition requesting the Supreme Court review whether Duterte has the unilateral power to terminate the agreement .
The petition calls for the executive and legislative branches to reach concurrence on such a decision .
Regardless of the court ruling , presidential spokesman Salvador Panelo said , “ We will follow the Supreme Court .
Whatever the law says , we will follow.
” The Supreme Court , however , tends to favor Duterte .
Members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appear to have serious misgivings about his VFA decision .
They have tried to delicately discuss their concerns with him but understand they are unlikely to change his mind .
To make their views more palatable to Duterte , they likely sought to highlight the importance of the VFA in maintaining U.S. special forces support to counterterrorism operations in the southern Philippines against jihadis .
Although Duterte in 2016 threatened to kick U.S. forces out , he also clearly benefits from U.S. military assistance in these operations as well—and Manila may need more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just killed battling the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in Sulu .
The VFA was also essential in allowing the U.S. military to enter the Philippines in 2013 to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following Typhoon Haiyan .
U.S. security assistance over the past two decades of VFA existence has been substantial , tallying approximately $ 1.3 billion , and annual exercises like Balikatan—though canceled this year due to the coronavirus pandemic—significantly enhance the readiness of the Philippine military to conduct a range of missions .
Indeed , decades of close interaction between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in highly favorable views of the United States among the Philippine defense establishment , whereas China is assessed as the top threat .
China ’ s behavior in the coming months could also push Duterte to reconsider .
Beijing recently declared the establishment of new administrative districts on disputed features in the Paracel and Spratly islands .
Manila in mid-March quietly reaffirmed its favorable Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling to the United Nations , and voices are growing only louder to stay the course .
It is more likely , however , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , he recently thanked Beijing for coronavirus assistance—and willfully ignore challenges in the bilateral relationship .
Duterte ’ s strategy may reach a breaking point as polls consistently show strong support among Filipinos for alignment with the United States over China .
Paradoxically , the death knell for the VFA might come from Washington itself instead of Manila .
When asked his thoughts on Duterte ’ s notice of termination of the agreement , Trump replied , “ I don ’ t really mind if they would like to do that .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
… My views are different than others.
” Trump ’ s statement highlights his general lack of appreciation for international agreements and alliances in favor of his “ America First ” policy .
The two leaders did , however , speak on April 19 , and it was unclear if the VFA came up .
Regardless of what happens , the fate of the VFA will set the tone of the alliance at least for the remainder of Duterte ’ s tenure out to 2022 , if not beyond .

On Feb. 11, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced that Manila would be terminating the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)—an agreement authorizing, among other things, the U.S. military to have freedom of movement into and within the Philippines. Duterte’s decision was met in Washington with deep concerns about the potential fallout for the Indo-Pacific strategy , largely aimed at countering China’s growing assertiveness.
On Feb. 11, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced that Manila would be terminating the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)—an agreement authorizing, among other things, the U.S. military to have freedom of movement into and within the Philippines. Duterte’s decision was met in Washington with deep concerns about the potential fallout for the Indo-Pacific strategy, largely aimed at countering China’s growing assertiveness.
They were right to be worried. After all, bases across the Philippines—namely Subic Bay Naval Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Antonio Bautista Air Base, Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base, and Lumbia Air Base—are ideally located for U.S. purposes. They’re near or on the South China Sea, significantly enhancing the U.S. military’s ability to challenge Beijing there. Without them, Washington would have to rely more heavily on other, more distant bases in Guam; Okinawa; mainland Japan; Darwin, Australia; Hawaii; and elsewhere. Doing so would likely reduce the ability of the U.S. military to react to challenges, including threats to the Philippines itself, effectively hollowing out the two countries’ Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and severely complicating the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, under which the U.S. military is authorized to preposition weapons and equipment at bases in the Philippines. Losing the VFA would probably also weaken other allies and partners’ perceptions of Washington’s security commitments in the region.
But there is a glimmer of hope in Duterte’s announcement: Per the agreement, official VFA cancellation does not take effect for 180 days, meaning Washington and Manila have until Aug. 9 to save it or negotiate a new VFA to avert any further alliance crisis. The challenge is that Duterte is an extremely anti-U.S. president who may seek to eliminate the MDT in its entirety in favor of greater self-reliance and better relations with China and Russia. Yet success would speak volumes about the durability of the alliance in spite of the whims of an autocratic president.
While Duterte’s stance is likely to come out on top given his position as chief executive of the country, there are subtle signs that the VFA’s demise is not a predetermined outcome. For example, shortly after Duterte’s termination announcement, the Philippine ambassador to the United States, Jose Manuel Romualdez, noted at a forum in Manila that both countries were exploring “ways and means to see how we can come up with something similar.”
Meanwhile, in a very cryptic tweet from Philippine Foreign Secretary Teddy Locsin Jr. the same day as the announcement, Locsin said: “As a diplomatic courtesy there will be no further factual announcements following this self-explanatory development.” After Joshua Melvin of Agence France-Presse retweeted Locsin’s remarks with the comment “Now the furious negotiations begin. 180 day countdown #VFA,” Locsin retweeted him with “You’re the only one who got that,” suggesting that negotiations were about to begin or already underway. If the two sides are indeed negotiating, it is unknown what each country seeks for the future.
Aside from this reading of the tea leaves, Duterte may not fundamentally possess sole discretion in deciding the VFA’s fate. Bipartisan senior leaders in the Philippine Senate, notably led the Senate president, a Duterte ally, filed a petition requesting the Supreme Court review whether Duterte has the unilateral power to terminate the agreement. The petition calls for the executive and legislative branches to reach concurrence on such a decision. Regardless of the court ruling, presidential spokesman Salvador Panelo said, “We will follow the Supreme Court. Whatever the law says, we will follow.” The Supreme Court, however, tends to favor Duterte.
Members of Duterte’s own cabinet also appear to have serious misgivings about his VFA decision. They have tried to delicately discuss their concerns with him but understand they are unlikely to change his mind. To make their views more palatable to Duterte, they likely sought to highlight the importance of the VFA in maintaining U.S. special forces support to counterterrorism operations in the southern Philippines against jihadis.
Although Duterte in 2016 threatened to kick U.S. forces out, he also clearly benefits from U.S. military assistance in these operations as well—and Manila may need more assistance as 11 of its soldiers were just killed battling the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in Sulu. The VFA was also essential in allowing the U.S. military to enter the Philippines in 2013 to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following Typhoon Haiyan. U.S. security assistance over the past two decades of VFA existence has been substantial, tallying approximately $1.3 billion, and annual exercises like Balikatan—though canceled this year due to the coronavirus pandemic—significantly enhance the readiness of the Philippine military to conduct a range of missions. Indeed, decades of close interaction between the U.S. and Philippine militaries have resulted in highly favorable views of the United States among the Philippine defense establishment, whereas China is assessed as the top threat.
China’s behavior in the coming months could also push Duterte to reconsider. Beijing recently declared the establishment of new administrative districts on disputed features in the Paracel and Spratly islands. Manila in mid-March quietly reaffirmed its favorable Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling to the United Nations, and voices are growing only louder to stay the course. It is more likely, however, that Duterte will continue to value Chinese support—for example, he recently thanked Beijing for coronavirus assistance—and willfully ignore challenges in the bilateral relationship. Duterte’s strategy may reach a breaking point as polls consistently show strong support among Filipinos for alignment with the United States over China.
Paradoxically, the death knell for the VFA might come from Washington itself instead of Manila. When asked his thoughts on Duterte’s notice of termination of the agreement, Trump replied, “I don’t really mind if they would like to do that. It will save a lot of money. … My views are different than others.” Trump’s statement highlights his general lack of appreciation for international agreements and alliances in favor of his “America First” policy. The two leaders did, however, speak on April 19, and it was unclear if the VFA came up. Regardless of what happens, the fate of the VFA will set the tone of the alliance at least for the remainder of Duterte’s tenure out to 2022, if not beyond.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--Autocrats Are Finding Democratic Facades Hard to Keep Up

Autocrats Are Finding Democratic Facades Hard to Keep Up For many dictatorships , COVID-19 is a moment of opportunity .
The pandemic represents an auspicious invitation for autocrats , or aspiring autocrats , to gain , consolidate , or extend political power .
In fact , it is difficult to find a dictator who has not taken advantage of this window of opportunity in some way .
And yet , the pandemic threatens the very facade autocratic regimes have built to provide themselves a veneer of legitimacy .
The list of dictatorships that have taken advantage of this crisis is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Aliyev has used the coronavirus as a pretext to further target dissident groups .
Last month , the office of the D18 Movement was closed by police because a gathering of four of its members was deemed a violation of coronavirus prevention measures .
In Hungary , Viktor Orban was granted indefinite emergency powers by parliament .
Among them are the rights to rule by decree , suspend existing laws , and punish the spread of “ distorted truths ” with imprisonment .
In Cambodia , Hun Sen used his control over parliament @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right to surveil all means of communication , prohibit the distribution of information , and utilize “ other measures that are deemed appropriate for and necessary to responding to the state of emergency.
” In Thailand , Prayuth Chan-ocha has invoked emergency powers that allow the civilian front government to censor or shut down any media outlets it deems necessary .
In Togo , Faure Gnassingbé announced a state of emergency and brought a curfew into immediate effect .
The government deployed 5,000 soldiers who proceeded to beat and assault civilians .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of information deemed false by the government .
The new law carries a sentence of up to 20 years imprisonment for offenders .
In Egypt , Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has revoked press credentials and warned of harsh penalties for anyone who promotes “ bad faith ” information about the coronavirus that could be interpreted as harming Egyptian interests .
In Iran , the government launched a phone app that claimed to diagnose the coronavirus but instead collected the names , addresses , dates of birth , and locations of citizens in real time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an early release for thousands of prisoners as part of its piecemeal strategy of dealing with the coronavirus , but he deliberately excluded those who were imprisoned for opposing his government .
In Venezuela , Nicolás Maduro has arrested opposition members and health care workers who publicly questioned the government ’ s preparedness for dealing with COVID-19 .
This incomplete catalogue underscores that no region of the world has been immune to dictators using the coronavirus pandemic as a window of opportunity to fulfil their naked political ambitions .
The narrative so far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invaluable pretext for the entrenchment of autocratic rule .
But this is only half the story .
The pandemic also strips away the window dressing that has sheltered dictatorships in recent decades .
In fact , it has returned many of them to their base instincts .
Orban ’ s irrefutable power grab is indifferent to the incremental and disguised consolidation processes observable elsewhere ; Paul Kagame ’ s heavy-handed repression in Rwanda forsakes the subtler techniques to be found in the toolkit of contemporary dictators ; Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov ’ s blanket censorship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkmenistan actually fails to shape the beliefs citizens have about it ; Xi Jinping ’ s outlandish propaganda in China merely serves to worsen broader opinion of his government ; and Alexander Lukashenko ’ s obtuse denial of the pandemic in Belarus underscores the existence of retrograde dictatorships .
The pandemic hurts dictatorships in another specific area : the global industry of zombie election monitoring .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Christopher Walker and Alexander Cooley previously identified the emergence of what they termed “ zombie monitors ” among a small cohort of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ color revolutions that swept across Eurasia between 2000 and 2005 , they noted how regional organizations with no experience in election observation , including the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization , began to send monitors to polls in Azerbaijan , Belarus , Kazakhstan , and Russia .
In the intervening years , this savvy strategy evidently caught on and evolved .
Zombie monitors have since been sighted in Burundi , Cambodia , Cameroon , Ecuador , Egypt , Ethiopia , Gabon , Honduras , Kyrgyzstan , Malaysia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Uganda , Uzbekistan , Venezuela , and Zimbabwe , among many other countries .
The goal of these zombie monitors is to subvert the critical assessments of any genuine election observation organizations in attendance , while also lending a veneer of legitimacy to the flawed elections taking place .
The key feature is having supposed outside experts pretend to impartially judge the integrity of elections .
The need for self-isolation , social distancing , and international travel restrictions established to slow the spread of the coronavirus now make this strategy unviable , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Venezuelan National Assembly elections scheduled for this year , for example , Nicolás Maduro will be unable to rely on individuals from the Union of South American Nations and the Latin American Council of Electoral Experts .
Both zombie monitors gave ringing endorsements of Venezuela ’ s 2017 gubernatorial elections and 2018 presidential election .
In Belarus , Lukashenko will be deprived of a horde of zombie monitors for the forthcoming presidential election .
In 2015 , he utilized 409 individuals from zombie monitors such as the Alliance of Election Observation Missions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Shanghai Cooperation Organization to validate his highly dubious victory .
The same dearth of zombie monitors will impact Egypt ’ s parliamentary elections scheduled for later this year .
The last time they occurred , Sisi turned to the services of the Global Network for Rights and Development , the International Institute for Peace , Justice and Human Rights , and the Ecumenical Alliance for Human Rights and Development .
Together , these zombie monitors lent credibility to the flawed poll .
The constitutional referendum that would allow Vladimir Putin to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at stake .
Putin has proved adept at employing zombie monitors in the past .
In Ukraine , he used the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy and Elections to recruit scores of politicians from far-right parties to validate the 2014 Crimea referendum , which was regarded as illegitimate by the European Union and the United States .
Given how the need for self-isolation , social distancing , and international travel restrictions makes the employment of zombie monitors to legitimize elections nearly impossible , what might dictatorships do in response ?
There are five options @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The first option is to have no election monitors of any kind ( or quality ) .
This would essentially return dictatorships to the pre-1980s era , when external election monitoring was not an international norm .
The problem with this approach is that it forsakes the known benefits of norm compliance , including increased foreign direct investment , new memberships in international organizations , and greater regime legitimacy .
Another option is to give zombie monitors an exemption from the existing travel restrictions .
By opening the borders just to accredited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictatorships could reap the benefit of their alleged expertise and participation .
The danger of this approach is that it creates an immense public relations problem for the incumbent government and ignores the need for zombie monitors to quarantine upon arrival .
The third option is to have zombie monitors indirectly report on the integrity of the election .
Under such an arrangement , trusted individuals and groups could use government information and media reports to make a remote judgement .
The downside of this approach is that it completely gives up on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these alleged experts follow international election observation best practice , especially the need to directly monitor all stages of the electoral process .
A fourth option is for dictatorships to use the endorsements of zombie monitors from previous elections as a blanket endorsement of a current election .
By claiming the exact same conditions persist across two different elections , dictators could take a rhetorical leap of faith .
The trouble with this approach , of course , is that it requires engaged citizens , civil society groups , and opposition parties to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which is never advisable .
The final option is to cancel or postpone Notwithstanding the tangible benefits to public health , the risk with this approach is that changing the electoral calendar has been shown to undermine the stability of dictatorships .
In addition , canceling or postponing elections raises tangible questions among citizens about the authority of governments acting beyond their statutory time in office .
Since dictatorships empowered zombie monitors to act as judges of electoral integrity , nothing has slowed the spread of them .
What is innovative about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role of genuine election observation groups , while also displacing the standard of elections they have traditionally applied .
The scourge of zombie monitors , however , has not been met by a consistent , coordinated response from the liberal democracies that have long defended and promoted the international norm of external election observation .
The coronavirus pandemic provides all supporters of free and fair elections a momentary period of catch-up .
The crucial task is to better account for the vague history , operational features , and precise impact of zombie monitors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opportunity will not last .

For many dictatorships, COVID-19 is a moment of opportunity. The pandemic represents an auspicious invitation for autocrats, or aspiring autocrats, to gain, consolidate, or extend political power. In fact, it is difficult to find a dictator who has not taken advantage of this window of opportunity in some way. And yet, the pandemic threatens the very facade autocratic regimes have built to provide themselves a veneer of legitimacy.
For many dictatorships, COVID-19 is a moment of opportunity. The pandemic represents an auspicious invitation for autocrats, or aspiring autocrats, to gain, consolidate, or extend political power. In fact, it is difficult to find a dictator who has not taken advantage of this window of opportunity in some way. And yet, the pandemic threatens the very facade autocratic regimes have built to provide themselves a veneer of legitimacy.
The list of dictatorships that have taken advantage of this crisis is worryingly long. In Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev has used the coronavirus as a pretext to further target dissident groups. Last month, the office of the D18 Movement was closed by police because a gathering of four of its members was deemed a violation of coronavirus prevention measures. In Hungary, Viktor Orban was granted indefinite emergency powers by parliament. Among them are the rights to rule by decree, suspend existing laws, and punish the spread of “distorted truths” with imprisonment.
In Cambodia, Hun Sen used his control over parliament to push through open-ended laws granting the right to surveil all means of communication, prohibit the distribution of information, and utilize “other measures that are deemed appropriate for and necessary to responding to the state of emergency.” In Thailand, Prayuth Chan-ocha has invoked emergency powers that allow the civilian front government to censor or shut down any media outlets it deems necessary.
In Togo, Faure Gnassingbé announced a state of emergency and brought a curfew into immediate effect. The government deployed 5,000 soldiers who proceeded to beat and assault civilians. In Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa criminalized the circulation of information deemed false by the government. The new law carries a sentence of up to 20 years imprisonment for offenders.
In Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has revoked press credentials and warned of harsh penalties for anyone who promotes “bad faith” information about the coronavirus that could be interpreted as harming Egyptian interests. In Iran, the government launched a phone app that claimed to diagnose the coronavirus but instead collected the names, addresses, dates of birth, and locations of citizens in real time.
In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega issued an early release for thousands of prisoners as part of its piecemeal strategy of dealing with the coronavirus, but he deliberately excluded those who were imprisoned for opposing his government. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro has arrested opposition members and health care workers who publicly questioned the government’s preparedness for dealing with COVID-19.
This incomplete catalogue underscores that no region of the world has been immune to dictators using the coronavirus pandemic as a window of opportunity to fulfil their naked political ambitions. The narrative so far is of a global pandemic providing an invaluable pretext for the entrenchment of autocratic rule. But this is only half the story.
The pandemic also strips away the window dressing that has sheltered dictatorships in recent decades. In fact, it has returned many of them to their base instincts. Orban’s irrefutable power grab is indifferent to the incremental and disguised consolidation processes observable elsewhere; Paul Kagame’s heavy-handed repression in Rwanda forsakes the subtler techniques to be found in the toolkit of contemporary dictators; Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s blanket censorship of the word “coronavirus” in Turkmenistan actually fails to shape the beliefs citizens have about it; Xi Jinping’s outlandish propaganda in China merely serves to worsen broader opinion of his government; and Alexander Lukashenko’s obtuse denial of the pandemic in Belarus underscores the existence of retrograde dictatorships.
The pandemic hurts dictatorships in another specific area: the global industry of zombie election monitoring. Writing in Foreign Policy, Christopher Walker and Alexander Cooley previously identified the emergence of what they termed “zombie monitors” among a small cohort of dictatorships. In the wake of the color revolutions that swept across Eurasia between 2000 and 2005, they noted how regional organizations with no experience in election observation, including the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States and Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, began to send monitors to polls in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
In the intervening years, this savvy strategy evidently caught on and evolved. Zombie monitors have since been sighted in Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, among many other countries.
The goal of these zombie monitors is to subvert the critical assessments of any genuine election observation organizations in attendance, while also lending a veneer of legitimacy to the flawed elections taking place. The key feature is having supposed outside experts pretend to impartially judge the integrity of elections. The need for self-isolation, social distancing, and international travel restrictions established to slow the spread of the coronavirus now make this strategy unviable, especially the longer they persist.
With Venezuelan National Assembly elections scheduled for this year, for example, Nicolás Maduro will be unable to rely on individuals from the Union of South American Nations and the Latin American Council of Electoral Experts. Both zombie monitors gave ringing endorsements of Venezuela’s 2017 gubernatorial elections and 2018 presidential election.
In Belarus, Lukashenko will be deprived of a horde of zombie monitors for the forthcoming presidential election. In 2015, he utilized 409 individuals from zombie monitors such as the Alliance of Election Observation Missions, Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasia Barometer, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization to validate his highly dubious victory.
The same dearth of zombie monitors will impact Egypt’s parliamentary elections scheduled for later this year. The last time they occurred, Sisi turned to the services of the Global Network for Rights and Development, the International Institute for Peace, Justice and Human Rights, and the Ecumenical Alliance for Human Rights and Development. Together, these zombie monitors lent credibility to the flawed poll.
The constitutional referendum that would allow Vladimir Putin to extend his rule in Russia is also at stake. Putin has proved adept at employing zombie monitors in the past. In Ukraine, he used the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy and Elections to recruit scores of politicians from far-right parties to validate the 2014 Crimea referendum, which was regarded as illegitimate by the European Union and the United States.
Given how the need for self-isolation, social distancing, and international travel restrictions makes the employment of zombie monitors to legitimize elections nearly impossible, what might dictatorships do in response? There are five options, but none of them is ideal.
The first option is to have no election monitors of any kind (or quality). This would essentially return dictatorships to the pre-1980s era, when external election monitoring was not an international norm. The problem with this approach is that it forsakes the known benefits of norm compliance, including increased foreign direct investment, new memberships in international organizations, and greater regime legitimacy.
Another option is to give zombie monitors an exemption from the existing travel restrictions. By opening the borders just to accredited international observers, the logic runs, dictatorships could reap the benefit of their alleged expertise and participation. The danger of this approach is that it creates an immense public relations problem for the incumbent government and ignores the need for zombie monitors to quarantine upon arrival.
The third option is to have zombie monitors indirectly report on the integrity of the election. Under such an arrangement, trusted individuals and groups could use government information and media reports to make a remote judgement. The downside of this approach is that it completely gives up on trying to trick anyone into believing that these alleged experts follow international election observation best practice, especially the need to directly monitor all stages of the electoral process.
A fourth option is for dictatorships to use the endorsements of zombie monitors from previous elections as a blanket endorsement of a current election. By claiming the exact same conditions persist across two different elections, dictators could take a rhetorical leap of faith. The trouble with this approach, of course, is that it requires engaged citizens, civil society groups, and opposition parties to give dictators the benefit of the doubt, which is never advisable. The final option is to cancel or postpone Notwithstanding the tangible benefits to public health, the risk with this approach is that changing the electoral calendar has been shown to undermine the stability of dictatorships. In addition, canceling or postponing elections raises tangible questions among citizens about the authority of governments acting beyond their statutory time in office.
Since dictatorships empowered zombie monitors to act as judges of electoral integrity, nothing has slowed the spread of them. What is innovative about this strategy is that it supplants the role of genuine election observation groups, while also displacing the standard of elections they have traditionally applied. The scourge of zombie monitors, however, has not been met by a consistent, coordinated response from the liberal democracies that have long defended and promoted the international norm of external election observation.
The coronavirus pandemic provides all supporters of free and fair elections a momentary period of catch-up. The crucial task is to better account for the vague history, operational features, and precise impact of zombie monitors around the world. This window of opportunity will not last.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--Why Lebanon’s Protesters Are Back

Why Lebanon’s Protesters Are Back

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Beyond the pandemic , here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Renewed economic protests rock Lebanon , Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces his biggest political challenge yet , and Czech officials are placed under police protection amid reports of a Russian poison plot .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox , please sign up here .
As Lebanon begins to ease its coronavirus lockdown , the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the streets .
While last fall ’ s demonstrations were characterized by music and dancing , protests turned violent this week as Lebanon plunges deeper into an economic catastrophe that has been years in the making .
Angered by the collapse of the Lebanese pound and rising poverty , protesters across the country set fire to banks , shut down highways , and clashed with soldiers on Monday .
Dozens were injured after the military used live ammunition , rubber bullets , and tear gas to disperse the crowds .
At least one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soldiers have also been wounded .
Revolution of hunger .
In October 2019 , people across Lebanon took to the streets to protest rampant corruption and an ailing economy , prompting Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his cabinet to resign .
A new technocratic government was formed in January by Prime Minister Hassan Diab , but observers noted it still had ties to the country ’ s elite that oversaw years of economic mismanagement—now compounded by coronavirus shutdowns .
Lebanon is facing its biggest economic crisis since the end of the civil war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1997 , but dollars are now in short supply .
Many have been forced to turn to parallel exchange markets , where the currency has lost 50 percent of its value since last summer , slashing wages and savings in half .
Food prices have soared by as much as 67 percent , and the Lebanese government estimates that three-quarters of the population are now in need of aid , the Guardian reports .
Long road ahead .
Lebanon has one of the highest debt ratios @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it defaulted on its loans for the first time .
On Thursday , the Lebanese government approved a rescue plan to overhaul the economy and lay the groundwork for negotiating a bailout package with the International Monetary Fund .
“ If we get [ IMF support ] , and God willing we will , it will help us to pass through this difficult economic phase , which could be three , four , or five years , ” Diab said .
An IMF loan is widely seen as Lebanon ’ s only way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ free fall.
” The country is expected to ask for $ 10 billion , but the final amount will be subject to negotiation with the IMF , Diab said on Thursday .
IMF loans usually come with strings attached , however , and those could necessitate unpopular fiscal reforms—leading to further political uncertainty .
Bolsonaro ’ s woes .
On Monday , Brazil ’ s supreme court authorized an investigation into alleged corruption and obstruction of justice by right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro after the respected Justice Minister Sérgio Moro stepped down .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of firing the head of the federal police to hamper ongoing investigations into members of his family .
The investigation authorized by the supreme court is the biggest political challenge yet for Bolsonaro , who was elected in 2018 on an anti-corruption platform .
Rodrigo Maia , the speaker of the lower house of Brazil ’ s National Congress , has so far held off calls for impeachment—but he has called for a full investigation .
Brazilians are divided on the question of impeachment , but that could change as Brazil heads toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s worst coronavirus outbreak , spurred in part by Bolsonaro ’ s own denialism over the virus .
El Salvador ’ s crackdown .
El Salvador ’ s government has launched a brutal crackdown against imprisoned gang members after President Nayib Bukele said that a recent spike in homicides had been orchestrated by those already behind bars .
Gang leaders have been placed in solitary confinement , while rival gang members have been placed in the same cells in a bid to prevent gangs from communicating , a move that Human Rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Photos show near-naked inmates forced to sit pressed up against one another on the floor while their cells are searched .
José Miguel Vivanco , the Americas director for Human Rights Watch , described the conditions as “ cruel and inhumane.
” El Salvador has one of the world ’ s highest homicide rates , but murders dropped significantly in March amid lockdown measures .
That period of relative calm was shattered last weekend , with 29 people murdered on Sunday alone—the deadliest day since Bukele took office last June .
Russian poison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capital of Prague , including the city ’ s mayor , have confirmed that they are under police protection following reports that a Russian man with a diplomatic passport entered the country earlier this month carrying the deadly poison ricin .
I reported for FP this week on how a decision by Prague officials to remove a statue of a Soviet World War II hero from a city park has pushed relations between the Czech Republic and Russia to their lowest point since the fall of the Berlin Wall , with suspicions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Yemen .
Separatists in the south of Yemen on Sunday declared self-rule in the port city of Aden and other provinces .
The move could spark renewed conflict with the U.N.-backed government .
Since 2017 , the separatist Southern Transitional Council has periodically sought independence , culminating in a “ civil war within a civil war ” in 2019 , which ended with a Saudi-brokered deal .
This latest bid for self-rule is likely to complicate Yemen ’ s multifaceted civil war .
Ramadan TV drama .
Two Saudi-produced soap operas have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel , raising speculation that they could be a prelude to a shift in relations .
One of the series explores the Jewish history of the Gulf , while in the other a character says that “ Israel is there , whether you like it or not.
” Ramadan soap opera specials have long been used by regional leaders to shape public attitudes .
Experts told Bloomberg that the idea of Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Israel was a long shot , but the shows could be the first step in introducing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent years Israel has found common ground with the Gulf states over shared concerns about Iran .
U.S. Marine marooned in Moscow .
This week , Russian prosecutors concluded the presentation of their case against former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan , who has been imprisoned in Moscow since December 2018 , when he traveled to Russia for a friend ’ s wedding .
Prosecutors say he possessed classified information and have charged him with espionage .
If found guilty , Whelan faces up to 20 years in prison .
He has denied the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtained last year by FP , Whelan said that he believed his arrest was retaliation for U.S. sanctions on Russian companies .
The trial is set to resume on May 13 .
Kim Jong Un ’ s absence .
There is no sign of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , and conflicting reports about his well-being prevail .
Last seen on April 11 , Kim has missed two of the country ’ s most important political events , fueling speculation that he might be gravely ill—or hiding out from the coronavirus in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for FP , Jessica Lee explains where North Korean analysts turn for the most credible information about life in the closed-off country .
Kim has no clear successor .
If he ’ s dead or incapacitated , North Korea could be plunged into crisis , Doug Bandow writes for FP .
Guess who ’ s back .
Authorities in the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia will temporarily rename their capital Stalinir , a tribute to the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin , ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of World War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in tandem with the city ’ s current name , Tskhinvali , during events to mark the war ’ s end on May 9 .
Authorities in another breakaway republic , Ukraine ’ s Donetsk region , also announced ( link in Russian ) that they would reintroduce the name Stalino for the city of Donetsk for the anniversaries .
Despite his responsibility for mass atrocities , Stalin is still revered in parts of the former Soviet Union for his role in defeating Nazi Germany .
…And who ’ s not quite back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Advisor John Bolton ’ s much anticipated memoir , The Room Where It Happened , has been pushed back to June 23 , more than three months after its original release date .
No reason for the delay was given , but publication has already been delayed by the White House ’ s review process .
Bolton never testified during President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment process , but leaks to the New York Times suggest he may have further details about Trump ’ s knowledge of efforts to pressure Ukraine to investigate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ son .
That ’ s it for this week .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Beyond the pandemic, here’s what we’re watching this week: Renewed economic protests rock Lebanon, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces his biggest political challenge yet, and Czech officials are placed under police protection amid reports of a Russian poison plot.
If you would like to receive While You Weren’t Looking in your inbox, please sign up here.
Lebanon on the Brink
As Lebanon begins to ease its coronavirus lockdown, the country’s anti-government protesters are returning to the streets. While last fall’s demonstrations were characterized by music and dancing, protests turned violent this week as Lebanon plunges deeper into an economic catastrophe that has been years in the making.
Angered by the collapse of the Lebanese pound and rising poverty, protesters across the country set fire to banks, shut down highways, and clashed with soldiers on Monday. Dozens were injured after the military used live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas to disperse the crowds. At least one person is reported dead, and 54 soldiers have also been wounded.
Revolution of hunger. In October 2019, people across Lebanon took to the streets to protest rampant corruption and an ailing economy, prompting Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his cabinet to resign. A new technocratic government was formed in January by Prime Minister Hassan Diab, but observers noted it still had ties to the country’s elite that oversaw years of economic mismanagement—now compounded by coronavirus shutdowns. Lebanon is facing its biggest economic crisis since the end of the civil war in 1990.
The Lebanese pound has been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1997, but dollars are now in short supply. Many have been forced to turn to parallel exchange markets, where the currency has lost 50 percent of its value since last summer, slashing wages and savings in half. Food prices have soared by as much as 67 percent, and the Lebanese government estimates that three-quarters of the population are now in need of aid, the Guardian reports.
Long road ahead. Lebanon has one of the highest debt ratios in the world, and in March it defaulted on its loans for the first time. On Thursday, the Lebanese government approved a rescue plan to overhaul the economy and lay the groundwork for negotiating a bailout package with the International Monetary Fund. “If we get [IMF support], and God willing we will, it will help us to pass through this difficult economic phase, which could be three, four, or five years,” Diab said.
An IMF loan is widely seen as Lebanon’s only way out of what Diab has called economic “free fall.” The country is expected to ask for $10 billion, but the final amount will be subject to negotiation with the IMF, Diab said on Thursday. IMF loans usually come with strings attached, however, and those could necessitate unpopular fiscal reforms—leading to further political uncertainty.
What We’re Following
Bolsonaro’s woes. On Monday, Brazil’s supreme court authorized an investigation into alleged corruption and obstruction of justice by right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro after the respected Justice Minister Sérgio Moro stepped down. In his resignation speech Moro accused Bolsonaro of firing the head of the federal police to hamper ongoing investigations into members of his family. The investigation authorized by the supreme court is the biggest political challenge yet for Bolsonaro, who was elected in 2018 on an anti-corruption platform.
Rodrigo Maia, the speaker of the lower house of Brazil’s National Congress, has so far held off calls for impeachment—but he has called for a full investigation. Brazilians are divided on the question of impeachment, but that could change as Brazil heads toward a recession and grapples with Latin America’s worst coronavirus outbreak, spurred in part by Bolsonaro’s own denialism over the virus.
El Salvador’s crackdown. El Salvador’s government has launched a brutal crackdown against imprisoned gang members after President Nayib Bukele said that a recent spike in homicides had been orchestrated by those already behind bars. Gang leaders have been placed in solitary confinement, while rival gang members have been placed in the same cells in a bid to prevent gangs from communicating, a move that Human Rights Watch warns could spark prison riots.
Photos show near-naked inmates forced to sit pressed up against one another on the floor while their cells are searched. José Miguel Vivanco, the Americas director for Human Rights Watch, described the conditions as “cruel and inhumane.” El Salvador has one of the world’s highest homicide rates, but murders dropped significantly in March amid lockdown measures. That period of relative calm was shattered last weekend, with 29 people murdered on Sunday alone—the deadliest day since Bukele took office last June.
Russian poison plots? Three officials in the Czech capital of Prague, including the city’s mayor, have confirmed that they are under police protection following reports that a Russian man with a diplomatic passport entered the country earlier this month carrying the deadly poison ricin. I reported for FP this week on how a decision by Prague officials to remove a statue of a Soviet World War II hero from a city park has pushed relations between the Czech Republic and Russia to their lowest point since the fall of the Berlin Wall, with suspicions of cyberattacks and assassination plots mounting.
Separatists in Yemen. Separatists in the south of Yemen on Sunday declared self-rule in the port city of Aden and other provinces. The move could spark renewed conflict with the U.N.-backed government. Since 2017, the separatist Southern Transitional Council has periodically sought independence, culminating in a “civil war within a civil war” in 2019, which ended with a Saudi-brokered deal. This latest bid for self-rule is likely to complicate Yemen’s multifaceted civil war.
Keep an Eye On
Ramadan TV drama. Two Saudi-produced soap operas have broached the topic of normalizing ties with Israel, raising speculation that they could be a prelude to a shift in relations. One of the series explores the Jewish history of the Gulf, while in the other a character says that “Israel is there, whether you like it or not.” Ramadan soap opera specials have long been used by regional leaders to shape public attitudes. Experts told Bloomberg that the idea of Saudi Arabia normalizing ties with Israel was a long shot, but the shows could be the first step in introducing the idea to the Saudi public. In recent years Israel has found common ground with the Gulf states over shared concerns about Iran.
U.S. Marine marooned in Moscow. This week, Russian prosecutors concluded the presentation of their case against former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan, who has been imprisoned in Moscow since December 2018, when he traveled to Russia for a friend’s wedding. Prosecutors say he possessed classified information and have charged him with espionage. If found guilty, Whelan faces up to 20 years in prison. He has denied the charges. In letters to family members obtained last year by FP, Whelan said that he believed his arrest was retaliation for U.S. sanctions on Russian companies. The trial is set to resume on May 13.
Kim Jong Un’s absence. There is no sign of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and conflicting reports about his well-being prevail. Last seen on April 11, Kim has missed two of the country’s most important political events, fueling speculation that he might be gravely ill—or hiding out from the coronavirus in the sea resort of Wonsan. Writing for FP, Jessica Lee explains where North Korean analysts turn for the most credible information about life in the closed-off country.
Kim has no clear successor. If he’s dead or incapacitated, North Korea could be plunged into crisis, Doug Bandow writes for FP.
Odds and Ends
Guess who’s back. Authorities in the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia will temporarily rename their capital Stalinir, a tribute to the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II. The moniker will be used in tandem with the city’s current name, Tskhinvali, during events to mark the war’s end on May 9.
Authorities in another breakaway republic, Ukraine’s Donetsk region, also announced (link in Russian) that they would reintroduce the name Stalino for the city of Donetsk for the anniversaries. Despite his responsibility for mass atrocities, Stalin is still revered in parts of the former Soviet Union for his role in defeating Nazi Germany.
…And who’s not quite back. The publication of former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s much anticipated memoir, The Room Where It Happened, has been pushed back to June 23, more than three months after its original release date. No reason for the delay was given, but publication has already been delayed by the White House’s review process. Bolton never testified during President Donald Trump’s impeachment process, but leaks to the New York Times suggest he may have further details about Trump’s knowledge of efforts to pressure Ukraine to investigate his Democratic rival Joe Biden and his son.
That’s it for this week.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to newsletters@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-01--In Myanmar, the Coronavirus Gives Nationalists an Opening

In Myanmar , the Coronavirus Gives Nationalists an Opening In Myanmar ’ s northern Kachin state , a short-lived street mural this month showed health care workers fighting to save the planet from a virus cast by death personified .
It featured a Myanmar flag and a call for unity amid the coronavirus pandemic : “ Stay at home , save lives , ” it said .
“ We fight together.
” Before it was painted over , the mural was intended to raise awareness about COVID-19 .
Instead , its creators were charged in a case that is emblematic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic .
The three artists who painted the mural were accused of blasphemy after Buddhist nationalists complained that Death ’ s robe resembled that of a monk .
The arbitrary censorship mirrored larger trends .
Slow to acknowledge the coronavirus crisis , Myanmar authorities and leaders are instead stoking nationalism , a trend that both undermines public health efforts and puts vulnerable ethnic groups at risk .
Largely due to lack of testing , it wasn ’ t until March 23 that Myanmar confirmed its first case of the coronavirus : a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who had recently returned for a wedding .
The announcement brought an end to weeks of government bragging about Myanmar ’ s supposed lack of cases .
Nearly two weeks later , the doctor who examined the first patient revealed that no one who had come into contact with him was tested .
Health officials then scrambled to administer tests and found that the patient ’ s mother and a few other contacts were also infected .
When testing was moderately expanded in April , there was a correlating surge in confirmed coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of confirmed cases jumped from 27 to 85 .
As of May 1 , Myanmar has still only administered around 8,300 tests .
It has confirmed 150 cases and six deaths .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
That Myanmar would be hit by the coronavirus was inevitable—but the government did not take action quickly .
The country shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with China , with an estimated 10,000 migrant workers crossing on a daily basis until late January .
Direct flights traveled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Wuhan , China , to Myanmar ’ s three international airports on a weekly basis before they were suspended that month .
Over 320,000 Chinese tourists visited Myanmar in 2019 .
Despite the transport links and high risk , the government didn ’ t acknowledge that Myanmar ’ s lack of confirmed cases was likely due to a lack of testing .
Officials instead came up with explanations that would make epidemiologists shudder .
On March 14 , government spokesperson Zaw Htay said that “ lifestyle and diet ” protected Myanmar citizens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nationalist perception of the country as rooted in tradition .
He also claimed that limited credit card usage in the country stopped the virus from spreading .
Myanmar has two national-level COVID-19 response committees , one led by the civilian government and one with significant military representation .
Community quarantines were established in areas with returning migrant workers , but they are often run by locals with little government support .
Yangon , Myanmar ’ s largest city , imposed a lockdown during the Thingyan holiday from April 10 to April 19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers to celebrate .
During that time , the number of cases roughly quadrupled , with the majority in Yangon .
Restrictions remain in 10 neighborhoods , but they are poorly enforced at the community level .
Meanwhile , Buddhist monks have rained down prayers from an airplane , and Investment Minister Thaung Tun has touted Myanmar ’ s “ whole of nation ” approach—as if social distancing and quarantines were a strategy unique to Myanmar .
As is often the case in Myanmar , the “ nation ” doesn ’ t seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority .
Diagnostic testing for the virus is only available in Yangon , a relatively wealthy , Bamar-majority city , with swab samples transported from other parts of the country .
And as the government distributes food aid in Yangon to cope with the economic effects of lockdown , the military continues to wage war in ethnic minority states , devastating communities trying to prepare for a potential outbreak .
Fighting continues in Karen , Shan , Rakhine , and Chin states despite domestic and international calls for a cease-fire , which Myanmar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of people have been displaced by the conflicts .
Human Rights Watch warned in March that overcrowded displaced persons camps are “ tinderboxes ” for disease .
Fighting is most severe in Rakhine and Chin states , where internet blackouts and media shutdowns have cut civilians off from vital information about the coronavirus .
On April 20 , a World Health Organization staffer was shot and killed while transporting test swabs from Rakhine state to Yangon .
Both the Myanmar military and the rebel Arakan Army blamed each other for the attack .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ protecting Myanmar ’ s people , ethnic minorities face the familiar experience of being ignored or having their own preparations undermined .
“ All these actions by the government and military show a glaring double standard , ” the Karen Peace Support Network said in a statement earlier this month .
Community-led preparations in Karen state are supported by a local armed group , the Karen National Union , and are opposed by the military because of the group ’ s involvement , according to the Karen activist Wahkushee Tenner .
Tenner told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occur in Karen state , there would be a humanitarian crisis due to the lack of testing and shortages of personal protective equipment .
“ Death rates would be very high , ” she said .
People in Shan state also report that civilians there were threatened with arrest if they accepted equipment from the local armed group .
Myanmar ’ s health care system has been delusionally irresponsible .
Even in developed areas , such as Yangon , health care is poor .
Hospitals were almost at capacity before the coronavirus outbreak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Myanmar only has 249 ventilators , though more are being donated .
But on March 14 , the Ministry of Health and Sports announced its goal was “ to prevent a single citizen from contracting COVID-19 and for a zero-mortality rate.
” A doctor told the New York Times that Myanmar was lucky to be Buddhist and was protected by monks ’ prayers .
The health ministry appeared unprepared to accept that coronavirus could already have been in the country , as some epidemiologists theorized .
In late March , the government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be tested—not just those with recent travel history—but it had already lost valuable time .
Responding to a crisis with a mixture of denial and fervent nationalism is not a new strategy in Myanmar .
It resembles the Rohingya crisis in 2017 , when Myanmar carried out a campaign of mass atrocities against the country ’ s Muslim minority .
During and after the crackdown , the government refused to acknowledge direct evidence of military killings , and those who questioned the official version of events faced public criticism .
Social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread dangerous hate speech and conspiracy theories around the Rohingya .
It has shown flashes of the same during the coronavirus crisis .
For example , when the British Embassy urged citizens to leave Myanmar because the health care system wasn ’ t able to handle a large outbreak , the Facebook post went viral among an army of nationalist zealots .
One user suggested that people in Myanmar have particularly strong immune systems , and another urged Myanmar citizens to avoid British citizens .
Even Myanmar ’ s ambassador to the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should “ smear ” Myanmar when it did not have any confirmed coronavirus cases .
John Quinley , a senior human rights specialist with the organization Fortify Rights , said that Myanmar ’ s government must not “ use nationalist rhetoric as a pretext for exclusion ” and called the charges against the artists in Kachin state “ outrageous.
” “ Any national action plan for COVID-19 must include everyone without discrimination , ” he said in an email .
But the government has shown no indication of inclusivity .
A state that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not be trusted to protect ethnic minorities from a pandemic .
Even more grimly , the coronavirus crisis could represent an opportunity for Myanmar ’ s ruthless military .
If the coronavirus were to weaken ethnic-minority regions , it would aid the military ’ s quest to wrest control from local armed groups—which still seems to be its main priority even amid the pandemic .

In Myanmar’s northern Kachin state, a short-lived street mural this month showed health care workers fighting to save the planet from a virus cast by death personified. It featured a Myanmar flag and a call for unity amid the coronavirus pandemic: “Stay at home, save lives,” it said. “We fight together.”
In Myanmar’s northern Kachin state, a short-lived street mural this month showed health care workers fighting to save the planet from a virus cast by death personified. It featured a Myanmar flag and a call for unity amid the coronavirus pandemic: “Stay at home, save lives,” it said. “We fight together.”
Before it was painted over, the mural was intended to raise awareness about COVID-19. Instead, its creators were charged in a case that is emblematic of Myanmar’s inadequate response to the pandemic. The three artists who painted the mural were accused of blasphemy after Buddhist nationalists complained that Death’s robe resembled that of a monk. The arbitrary censorship mirrored larger trends. Slow to acknowledge the coronavirus crisis, Myanmar authorities and leaders are instead stoking nationalism, a trend that both undermines public health efforts and puts vulnerable ethnic groups at risk.
Largely due to lack of testing, it wasn’t until March 23 that Myanmar confirmed its first case of the coronavirus: a Myanmar citizen living in the United States who had recently returned for a wedding. The announcement brought an end to weeks of government bragging about Myanmar’s supposed lack of cases. Nearly two weeks later, the doctor who examined the first patient revealed that no one who had come into contact with him was tested. Health officials then scrambled to administer tests and found that the patient’s mother and a few other contacts were also infected.
When testing was moderately expanded in April, there was a correlating surge in confirmed coronavirus cases. In five days, the number of confirmed cases jumped from 27 to 85. As of May 1, Myanmar has still only administered around 8,300 tests. It has confirmed 150 cases and six deaths.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
That Myanmar would be hit by the coronavirus was inevitable—but the government did not take action quickly. The country shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with China, with an estimated 10,000 migrant workers crossing on a daily basis until late January. Direct flights traveled from the coronavirus’s initial epicenter in Wuhan, China, to Myanmar’s three international airports on a weekly basis before they were suspended that month. Over 320,000 Chinese tourists visited Myanmar in 2019.
Despite the transport links and high risk, the government didn’t acknowledge that Myanmar’s lack of confirmed cases was likely due to a lack of testing. Officials instead came up with explanations that would make epidemiologists shudder. On March 14, government spokesperson Zaw Htay said that “lifestyle and diet” protected Myanmar citizens from the infection, alluding to the nationalist perception of the country as rooted in tradition. He also claimed that limited credit card usage in the country stopped the virus from spreading.
Myanmar has two national-level COVID-19 response committees, one led by the civilian government and one with significant military representation. Community quarantines were established in areas with returning migrant workers, but they are often run by locals with little government support. Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, imposed a lockdown during the Thingyan holiday from April 10 to April 19, which prevented people from gathering in large numbers to celebrate. During that time, the number of cases roughly quadrupled, with the majority in Yangon. Restrictions remain in 10 neighborhoods, but they are poorly enforced at the community level.
Meanwhile, Buddhist monks have rained down prayers from an airplane, and Investment Minister Thaung Tun has touted Myanmar’s “whole of nation” approach—as if social distancing and quarantines were a strategy unique to Myanmar. As is often the case in Myanmar, the “nation” doesn’t seem to extend beyond the ethnic Bamar Buddhist majority. Diagnostic testing for the virus is only available in Yangon, a relatively wealthy, Bamar-majority city, with swab samples transported from other parts of the country. And as the government distributes food aid in Yangon to cope with the economic effects of lockdown, the military continues to wage war in ethnic minority states, devastating communities trying to prepare for a potential outbreak.
Fighting continues in Karen, Shan, Rakhine, and Chin states despite domestic and international calls for a cease-fire, which Myanmar’s military has rejected. Thousands of people have been displaced by the conflicts. Human Rights Watch warned in March that overcrowded displaced persons camps are “tinderboxes” for disease. Fighting is most severe in Rakhine and Chin states, where internet blackouts and media shutdowns have cut civilians off from vital information about the coronavirus. On April 20, a World Health Organization staffer was shot and killed while transporting test swabs from Rakhine state to Yangon. Both the Myanmar military and the rebel Arakan Army blamed each other for the attack.
While government officials speak of unity and protecting Myanmar’s people, ethnic minorities face the familiar experience of being ignored or having their own preparations undermined.
“All these actions by the government and military show a glaring double standard,” the Karen Peace Support Network said in a statement earlier this month. Community-led preparations in Karen state are supported by a local armed group, the Karen National Union, and are opposed by the military because of the group’s involvement, according to the Karen activist Wahkushee Tenner. Tenner told Foreign Policy that should a widespread outbreak occur in Karen state, there would be a humanitarian crisis due to the lack of testing and shortages of personal protective equipment. “Death rates would be very high,” she said. People in Shan state also report that civilians there were threatened with arrest if they accepted equipment from the local armed group.
Myanmar’s health care system has been delusionally irresponsible. Even in developed areas, such as Yangon, health care is poor. Hospitals were almost at capacity before the coronavirus outbreak. The World Bank estimated in March that Myanmar only has 249 ventilators, though more are being donated. But on March 14, the Ministry of Health and Sports announced its goal was “to prevent a single citizen from contracting COVID-19 and for a zero-mortality rate.” A doctor told the New York Times that Myanmar was lucky to be Buddhist and was protected by monks’ prayers. The health ministry appeared unprepared to accept that coronavirus could already have been in the country, as some epidemiologists theorized. In late March, the government at last said that any symptomatic patients should be tested—not just those with recent travel history—but it had already lost valuable time.
Responding to a crisis with a mixture of denial and fervent nationalism is not a new strategy in Myanmar. It resembles the Rohingya crisis in 2017, when Myanmar carried out a campaign of mass atrocities against the country’s Muslim minority. During and after the crackdown, the government refused to acknowledge direct evidence of military killings, and those who questioned the official version of events faced public criticism.
Social media became a fertile ground for ultranationalists to spread dangerous hate speech and conspiracy theories around the Rohingya. It has shown flashes of the same during the coronavirus crisis. For example, when the British Embassy urged citizens to leave Myanmar because the health care system wasn’t able to handle a large outbreak, the Facebook post went viral among an army of nationalist zealots. One user suggested that people in Myanmar have particularly strong immune systems, and another urged Myanmar citizens to avoid British citizens. Even Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations got involved, tweeting that nobody should “smear” Myanmar when it did not have any confirmed coronavirus cases.
John Quinley, a senior human rights specialist with the organization Fortify Rights, said that Myanmar’s government must not “use nationalist rhetoric as a pretext for exclusion” and called the charges against the artists in Kachin state “outrageous.” “Any national action plan for COVID-19 must include everyone without discrimination,” he said in an email.
But the government has shown no indication of inclusivity. A state that engages in ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation cannot be trusted to protect ethnic minorities from a pandemic. Even more grimly, the coronavirus crisis could represent an opportunity for Myanmar’s ruthless military. If the coronavirus were to weaken ethnic-minority regions, it would aid the military’s quest to wrest control from local armed groups—which still seems to be its main priority even amid the pandemic.