foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Pandemic Crisis Drives Cubans to Rare, Risky Protest

On a sweltering August day during the bleak scarcity of the so-called Special Period , Cuba ’ s economic crisis in the mid-Nineties following the collapse of the Soviet Union , hundreds of ragged and desperate Cubans marched through the streets of central Havana shouting “ ¡Libertad !
” ( freedom ) .
That march , on August 5 , 1994 , which was captured on snippets of grainy film and has been airbrushed from official Cuban history ever since , came to be known as the Maleconazo , as it took place along the sea wall , the Malecon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was one of the only documented and large-scale protests Cuba ’ s dictatorship has faced in recent decades .
Yet on Friday , Nov. 27 , a crowd of around 300 artists , intellectuals , and activists stunned the Cuban leadership by gathering outside the Ministry of Culture to protest against the lack of free expression and demand the liberation of imprisoned rapper , Denis Solís González .
As in 1994 , Cuba is facing a severe economic crisis .
Liberalising economic reforms approved at the 6th Communist Party Congress in 2009 have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of intransigence from regime hardliners .
Meanwhile , during his four years in office , U.S. President Donald Trump tightened the U.S. economic embargo , banned American cruise ships from docking in Cuba and has severely disrupted remittances to the island .
Making matters worse , the pandemic has shuttered tourism , one of Cuba ’ s main sources of hard currency .
Alongside the pandemic and economic crisis , there has been a further upsurge in repression in Cuba in 2020 , precipitated by the deteriorating economic situation and the transition to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the independent Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos ( Cuban Observatory of Human Rights ) , there were 544 violations of fundamental freedoms in Cuba in October 2020 , including arbitrary detentions and the besieging of homes by secret police and regime loyalists .
Critics of the government are often chased down and harassed by so-called rapid-response brigades , belligerent mobs organised by the state .
Despite the deterioration , in October Cuba was reelected for a fifth term to the U.N. Human Rights Council .
Last week ’ s protests were precipitated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( SIM ) artist ’ s collective in Havana to break up a hunger strike that began in response to the arrest in early November of Solís González .
Police raided the house of the Cuban rapper without a warrant and , following an exchange of insults , charged Solís González , who was then sentenced to eight months in jail on charges of contempt of authority .
SIM activists subsequently began a daily pilgrimage to read poetry in a park near the police station in Havana where they believed Solís González was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dispersed by police on Nov. 9 , and the activists who took part placed under house arrest in a property in Dumas Street that had become the SIM headquarters .
Omara Ruiz of the SIM relayed the incident to me : “ Harassment from the State Security grew .
[ It became ] impossible to leave [ SIM headquarters ] without receiving the repressive onslaught , so our peaceful barracks began there.
” Amnesty International confirmed that it had “ verified ” images showing that “ at one point the [ Cuban ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the [ SIM ] headquarters with yellow tape , limiting the group ’ s freedom of movement.
” Six members of the SIM began a hunger and thirst strike at Dumas Street .
A further raid was carried out on Nov. 26 , which the Cuban government claimed was due to a breach of hygiene and coronavirus protocol—an excuse commonly used by authoritarian states this year .
The police and state security had previously tried to detain SIM member Carlos Manuel Álvarez at José Martí International Airport on his return from Mexico @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address he would be staying on his return to Cuba .
According to SIM , Cuban police broke in and removed those on hunger strike “ in a violent act.
” SIM also say the “ government cut off all internet services for almost an hour.
” SIM activists were returned to their homes after being detained by the police , except for artist and free expression activist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara , who was confined in a hospital against his will .
Alcántara has since been released by authorities .
Along with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with friends and is effectively under house arrest after the SIM headquarters were destroyed by police .
Alcántara has been on the receiving end of a sustained campaign of intimidation by the Cuban state since 2017 .
His so-called crimes include the use of the Cuban flag for performance art and attempting to attend a kiss-in protest convened by Cuba ’ s LGBT community against anti-gay censorship on state television .
Cuba has made progress on LGBT rights in recent years thanks largely to Mariela Castro Espín , the influential daughter of Raúl @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Center for Sexual Education ( CENESEX ) .
However , all activism must be channelled through official government institutions , which brook no criticism .
Events escalated significantly last month .
On Nov. 22 , an unidentified man burst into SIM headquarters wielding a hammer and attacked Alcántara .
Photos posted on social media show the artist with a bloodied left eye .
According to the SIM Twitter account , state security and uniformed police were present and did nothing to prevent the attack .
The SIM was founded in 2018 in response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cuba .
One of the first laws signed by President Miguel Díaz-Canel ( Raúl Castro ’ s successor ) was Decree 349 .
Becoming law in April 2018 , the decree stipulates that artists and performers must seek prior approval from the Ministry of Culture for every performance .
The law also prohibits expression on the vague grounds of being “ obscene , ” “ vulgar , ” or “ harmful to ethical and cultural values.
” As Amnesty International puts it : “ The lack of precision in the wording of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ application to further crackdown on dissent and critical voices in a country where artists have been harassed and detained for decades.
” Since promoting the SIN 349 campaign against Decree 349 and the # NoAlDecreto349 hashtag , members of the SIM collective have faced an onslaught of surveillance , harassment , arbitrary detention , and sometimes physical assault by the forces of the Cuban state .
While the Cuban government has historically sought to portray all opposition as part of a nefarious plot by right-wing U.S. interests , it has cracked down on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Havana-based and left-wing friend told me via email this week , “ It does not matter if [ opposition ] has been made from left , centre , or right , all have been harassed and forced to dissolve , to emigrate , to get out.
” The Cuban government initially responded to last week ’ s protests outside the Ministry of Culture with calls for dialogue .
However , it soon backtracked once the protests had dispersed , resorting to familiar bellicose rhetoric .
The SIM was deemed part of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imperialists.
” Meanwhile Timothy Zúñiga-Brown , the United States ’ top diplomat on the island , was called in and chastised by the Cuban government for “ grave interference in Cuba ’ s internal affairs.
” Cuban state television called the SIM a “ farce ” and depicted the artists ’ collective as mercenaries in the pay of the United States .
But the protests appear to have unnerved the dictatorship .
In the days since the crowd appeared outside the Ministry of Culture , so-called Black Berets—elite units of Cuba ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been seen patrolling Havana ’ s dilapidated streets .
Social media platforms have also been aggressively targeted by the government .
The internet observatory platform NetBlocks confirmed that social media and messaging forums on state-run internet provider Cubacel were disrupted for three days ( Nov. 27-30 ) following the protest .
The legend of José Martí , a hero of the Cuban struggle for independence from the Spanish Empire in the 19th century , is often marshalled by the communist government for the purposes of propaganda .
Busts of Martí can be found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alongside more contemporary icons such as Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos .
Late revolutionary leader Fidel Castro is said to have seen himself as the heir to Martí .
And yet after nearly 62 years of continuous dictatorship in which the Cuban people remain impoverished and watched by a paranoid and aggressive state , it is the courage and resilience of a younger generation of activists that better embodies one of Marti ’ s central dictums : “ Rights are to be taken , not requested ; seized , not begged for .
@

On a sweltering August day during the bleak scarcity of the so-called Special Period, Cuba’s economic crisis in the mid-Nineties following the collapse of the Soviet Union, hundreds of ragged and desperate Cubans marched through the streets of central Havana shouting “¡Libertad!” (freedom). That march, on August 5, 1994, which was captured on snippets of grainy film and has been airbrushed from official Cuban history ever since, came to be known as the Maleconazo, as it took place along the sea wall, the Malecon.
On a sweltering August day during the bleak scarcity of the so-called Special Period, Cuba’s economic crisis in the mid-Nineties following the collapse of the Soviet Union, hundreds of ragged and desperate Cubans marched through the streets of central Havana shouting “¡Libertad!” (freedom). That march, on August 5, 1994, which was captured on snippets of grainy film and has been airbrushed from official Cuban history ever since, came to be known as the Maleconazo, as it took place along the sea wall, the Malecon.
Until last week, the Maleconazo was one of the only documented and large-scale protests Cuba’s dictatorship has faced in recent decades. Yet on Friday, Nov. 27, a crowd of around 300 artists, intellectuals, and activists stunned the Cuban leadership by gathering outside the Ministry of Culture to protest against the lack of free expression and demand the liberation of imprisoned rapper, Denis Solís González.
As in 1994, Cuba is facing a severe economic crisis. Liberalising economic reforms approved at the 6th Communist Party Congress in 2009 have stalled in recent years in the face of intransigence from regime hardliners. Meanwhile, during his four years in office, U.S. President Donald Trump tightened the U.S. economic embargo, banned American cruise ships from docking in Cuba and has severely disrupted remittances to the island. Making matters worse, the pandemic has shuttered tourism, one of Cuba’s main sources of hard currency.
Alongside the pandemic and economic crisis, there has been a further upsurge in repression in Cuba in 2020, precipitated by the deteriorating economic situation and the transition to a new leadership. According to researchers at the independent Observatorio Cubano de Derechos Humanos (Cuban Observatory of Human Rights), there were 544 violations of fundamental freedoms in Cuba in October 2020, including arbitrary detentions and the besieging of homes by secret police and regime loyalists. Critics of the government are often chased down and harassed by so-called rapid-response brigades, belligerent mobs organised by the state. Despite the deterioration, in October Cuba was reelected for a fifth term to the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Last week’s protests were precipitated by police besieging the San Isidro Movement (SIM) artist’s collective in Havana to break up a hunger strike that began in response to the arrest in early November of Solís González. Police raided the house of the Cuban rapper without a warrant and, following an exchange of insults, charged Solís González, who was then sentenced to eight months in jail on charges of contempt of authority.
SIM activists subsequently began a daily pilgrimage to read poetry in a park near the police station in Havana where they believed Solís González was being held. This too was forcibly dispersed by police on Nov. 9, and the activists who took part placed under house arrest in a property in Dumas Street that had become the SIM headquarters.
Omara Ruiz of the SIM relayed the incident to me: “Harassment from the State Security grew. [It became] impossible to leave [SIM headquarters] without receiving the repressive onslaught, so our peaceful barracks began there.” Amnesty International confirmed that it had “verified” images showing that “at one point the [Cuban] authorities appeared to cordon off the block of the [SIM] headquarters with yellow tape, limiting the group’s freedom of movement.”
Six members of the SIM began a hunger and thirst strike at Dumas Street. A further raid was carried out on Nov. 26, which the Cuban government claimed was due to a breach of hygiene and coronavirus protocol—an excuse commonly used by authoritarian states this year. The police and state security had previously tried to detain SIM member Carlos Manuel Álvarez at José Martí International Airport on his return from Mexico and accused him of lying about the address he would be staying on his return to Cuba. According to SIM, Cuban police broke in and removed those on hunger strike “in a violent act.” SIM also say the “government cut off all internet services for almost an hour.”
SIM activists were returned to their homes after being detained by the police, except for artist and free expression activist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, who was confined in a hospital against his will. Alcántara has since been released by authorities. Along with other SIM activists, he is staying with friends and is effectively under house arrest after the SIM headquarters were destroyed by police.
Alcántara has been on the receiving end of a sustained campaign of intimidation by the Cuban state since 2017. His so-called crimes include the use of the Cuban flag for performance art and attempting to attend a kiss-in protest convened by Cuba’s LGBT community against anti-gay censorship on state television. Cuba has made progress on LGBT rights in recent years thanks largely to Mariela Castro Espín, the influential daughter of Raúl Castro who leads Cuba’s National Center for Sexual Education (CENESEX). However, all activism must be channelled through official government institutions, which brook no criticism.
Events escalated significantly last month. On Nov. 22, an unidentified man burst into SIM headquarters wielding a hammer and attacked Alcántara. Photos posted on social media show the artist with a bloodied left eye. According to the SIM Twitter account, state security and uniformed police were present and did nothing to prevent the attack.
The SIM was founded in 2018 in response to heightened restrictions on free expression in Cuba. One of the first laws signed by President Miguel Díaz-Canel (Raúl Castro’s successor) was Decree 349. Becoming law in April 2018, the decree stipulates that artists and performers must seek prior approval from the Ministry of Culture for every performance. The law also prohibits expression on the vague grounds of being “obscene,” “vulgar,” or “harmful to ethical and cultural values.” As Amnesty International puts it: “The lack of precision in the wording of the decree opens the door for its arbitrary application to further crackdown on dissent and critical voices in a country where artists have been harassed and detained for decades.”
Since promoting the SIN 349 campaign against Decree 349 and the #NoAlDecreto349 hashtag, members of the SIM collective have faced an onslaught of surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detention, and sometimes physical assault by the forces of the Cuban state. While the Cuban government has historically sought to portray all opposition as part of a nefarious plot by right-wing U.S. interests, it has cracked down on opposition of every political hue. As a Havana-based and left-wing friend told me via email this week, “It does not matter if [opposition] has been made from left, centre, or right, all have been harassed and forced to dissolve, to emigrate, to get out.”
The Cuban government initially responded to last week’s protests outside the Ministry of Culture with calls for dialogue. However, it soon backtracked once the protests had dispersed, resorting to familiar bellicose rhetoric. The SIM was deemed part of a CIA plot created by “U.S. imperialists.” Meanwhile Timothy Zúñiga-Brown, the United States’ top diplomat on the island, was called in and chastised by the Cuban government for “grave interference in Cuba’s internal affairs.” Cuban state television called the SIM a “farce” and depicted the artists’ collective as mercenaries in the pay of the United States.
But the protests appear to have unnerved the dictatorship. In the days since the crowd appeared outside the Ministry of Culture, so-called Black Berets—elite units of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)—have been seen patrolling Havana’s dilapidated streets. Social media platforms have also been aggressively targeted by the government. The internet observatory platform NetBlocks confirmed that social media and messaging forums on state-run internet provider Cubacel were disrupted for three days (Nov. 27-30) following the protest.
The legend of José Martí, a hero of the Cuban struggle for independence from the Spanish Empire in the 19th century, is often marshalled by the communist government for the purposes of propaganda. Busts of Martí can be found in nearly every town and city, alongside more contemporary icons such as Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. Late revolutionary leader Fidel Castro is said to have seen himself as the heir to Martí.
And yet after nearly 62 years of continuous dictatorship in which the Cuban people remain impoverished and watched by a paranoid and aggressive state, it is the courage and resilience of a younger generation of activists that better embodies one of Marti’s central dictums: “Rights are to be taken, not requested; seized, not begged for.”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--How to Judge Facebook’s New Judges

How to Judge Facebook’s New Judges

How to Judge Facebook ’ s New Judges “ We Must Save Democracy From Conspiracies , ” insisted British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen in a Time magazine article from Oct. 8 , 2020 .
More specifically Baron Cohen accused Facebook of being “ the greatest propaganda machine in history , ” due to the platform ’ s failure to remove disinformation .
Five days later , Baron Cohen complained on Twitter that Facebook had deleted a post sharing his Time article , as it was accompanied by a picture of a man wearing a face mask with the caption “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s double condemnation of Facebook for not removing enough and also removing too much content is emblematic of the controversy surrounding the burning question of how , who , and according to which principles free speech should be limited on social media .
In the words of Techdirt editor Mike Masnick , content moderation at scale is “ impossible to do well ” given clashing global attitudes on where to draw the line , the vagueness of platform standards , and the fallibility of humans and technology .
Still , Facebook has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ articulate any coherent free-speech philosophy , even when it attempts to do just that .
Long gone are the early days of utopian techno-optimism infused by American First Amendment ideals that turbocharged the spread of hate and hoaxes and clashed with the values of the rest of the world , including European democracies .
But what has come instead is an incoherent and messy patchwork .
In November 2018 , amid growing calls for transparency and accountability , Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced the creation of an independent Oversight Board ( OSB ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ granted the power to make binding rulings in cases where users appeal decisions made by Facebook to remove content from the social network .
On December 1 , the OSB announced the first six cases chosen from 20,000 user appeals .
Three of the cases OSB has agreed to hear involve “ hate speech ” , whereas the others concern “ nudity ” , “ dangerous individuals ” , and “ violence and incitement.
” They include a screenshot of tweets by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad saying Muslims had a right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the massacres of the past , ” Instagram photos showing female nipples supposedly aimed to raise awareness of breast cancer , and a post with a photo of a deceased child in which the user asks in Burmese why there was no retaliation of China ’ s treatment of Uighur Muslims .
Yet it ’ s not at all clear how the OSB will reconcile Facebook ’ s commitment to free expression with the competing values of safety , dignity , and authenticity .
Facebook has adopted constantly changing community standards as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the media , and users demand renewed focus on whatever issue creates controversy , whether COVID-19 misinformation , hate speech , or Holocaust denial .
The publicly available community standards are only the tip of the iceberg .
The confidential implementation standards developed to guide Facebook ’ s human content moderators is a constantly growing index of prohibited content of around 12,000 words , which few content moderators truly understand .
Facebook says it respects international human-rights standards on freedom of expression ( despite not being legally bound by international human-rights law ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less speech-protective than what follows from Article 19 and 20 of the U.N. ’ s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR ) .
Recent years have also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of purged content on Facebook .
In the third quarter of 2020 , Facebook deleted 22.1 million pieces of content for violating its ban against hate speech ; a steep increase from the 2.5 million pieces of content deleted in Q1 of 2018 .
Almost 95 percent of the purged hate speech in 2020 was proactively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ notified Facebook—up from 38 percent in 2018 .
Whether the millions of posts and comments deleted for hate speech and other prohibited categories each month live up the Facebook ’ s own standards—or indeed human-rights standards—is an open question , since purged content is not available to the public .
Regardless of whether one thinks that Facebook removes too much or too little content , the lack of transparency about the moderation and algorithmic distribution of content is deeply problematic given the impact that Facebook ’ s decisions have on what ideas and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among its 2.7 billion monthly active users .
Despite Zuckerberg ’ s aversion to Facebook acting as a gatekeeper , the platforms users are subjected to moderation without any representation .
The OSB is an attempt to address some of these systemic shortcomings and inconsistencies , though it does not correct the fundamental lack of transparency .
The OSB ’ s decisions are final and its Charter mandates Facebook to implement the decisions “ promptly.
” But it ’ s already clear that no matter how the OSB rules in these cases , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s not too late , however , for OSB to strengthen the legitimacy of Facebook ’ s content moderation by explicitly adopting a number of principles to guide its decision-making .
A frequent frustration of Facebook users whose accounts or content gets blocked is the lack of any meaningful or reasoned decision , apart from a generic reference to a specific category such as “ hate speech ” or “ nudity.
” Accordingly , the OSB should strive to issue clear , understandable , and reasoned decisions that allow users—and Facebook moderators—to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the way it did .
The user should enjoy the benefit of doubt Context is crucial for the proper understanding of speech .
This is even more so on a global platform with users from almost all countries in the world speaking hundreds of different languages and with very different cultural norms , humor , etc , that may be interpreted very differently by people across the world .
Moreover , the so-called memefication of social media often makes it difficult to discern whether content is sincere or sarcastic .
Given that free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ OSB should establish that users enjoy the benefit of doubt when Facebook determines whether content violates its standards .
In the words of the Norwegian Supreme Court : “ In the interest of freedom expression , no one should risk criminal liability through attributing to a statement , a viewpoint which has not been expressly made and which can not with a reasonably high degree of certainty be inferred from the context.
” The thorniest category of content to be navigated by the OSB is undoubtedly that of hate speech , which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a global platform where users—and their governments—have very different ideas on what types of speech is considered “ hateful.
” Article 20 of the ICCPR provides a good starting point , and several expert reports and soft-law documents give useful guidance on how to interpret Article 20 .
However , the lack of legally binding case law applying these principles in concrete cases leaves much uncertainty .
Moreover , Facebook ’ s definition of hate speech is much broader than Article 20 .
Given how hate-speech bans are frequently abused to protect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups and minorities , the OSB should provide as robust and objective definition as possible , limiting hate speech bans to the most egregious content .
The OSB should look to South Africa , which has grappled with how to protect both free speech and dignity in a country with a recent past of oppressive white supremacy that relied on both systematic discrimination and censorship to maintain apartheid .
In one case , the South African Supreme Court of Appeal held that : “ [ A ] court should not be hasty to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tone or conveys hostility , it is therefore to be characterized as hate speech .
Even if it has overtones of race and ethnicity.
” In another case , the Supreme Court of Appeal noted : “ The fact that a particular expression may be hurtful of people ’ s feelings , or wounding , distasteful , politically inflammatory or downright offensive , does not exclude it from protection.
” Crucially the South African courts ’ narrow interpretation of hate speech has been justified with reference to the apartheid past , when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of apartheid .
Shortly after Baron Cohen celebrated Facebook and Twitter ’ s decision to purge Holocaust denial in October 2020 , Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan wrote a letter to Zuckerberg demanding “ a similar ban on Islamophobia and against Islam for Facebook.
” This was a textbook example of “ censorship envy ” where banning speech seen as particularly odious by one group encourages other groups to demand similar restrictions on content they view as beyond the pale .
Unless the OSB establishes clear and convincing principles—such as an operational definition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ might degenerate into a race to the bottom as various groups , clamor to have “ problematic ” content banned .
These principles should not be seen as exhaustive , but would all contribute to ensuring that the OSB plays a positive role toward establishing new models of content moderation capable of providing transparency , legitimacy , and ensuring the survival of free speech as a fundamental value in the digital age .

“We Must Save Democracy From Conspiracies,” insisted British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen in a Time magazine article from Oct. 8, 2020. More specifically Baron Cohen accused Facebook of being “the greatest propaganda machine in history,” due to the platform’s failure to remove disinformation.
“We Must Save Democracy From Conspiracies,” insisted British comedian Sacha Baron Cohen in a Time magazine article from Oct. 8, 2020. More specifically Baron Cohen accused Facebook of being “the greatest propaganda machine in history,” due to the platform’s failure to remove disinformation.
Five days later, Baron Cohen complained on Twitter that Facebook had deleted a post sharing his Time article, as it was accompanied by a picture of a man wearing a face mask with the caption “COVID-19 is a hoax.” Baron Cohen’s double condemnation of Facebook for not removing enough and also removing too much content is emblematic of the controversy surrounding the burning question of how, who, and according to which principles free speech should be limited on social media. In the words of Techdirt editor Mike Masnick, content moderation at scale is “impossible to do well” given clashing global attitudes on where to draw the line, the vagueness of platform standards, and the fallibility of humans and technology.
Still, Facebook has contributed to the confusion by failing to articulate any coherent free-speech philosophy, even when it attempts to do just that. Long gone are the early days of utopian techno-optimism infused by American First Amendment ideals that turbocharged the spread of hate and hoaxes and clashed with the values of the rest of the world, including European democracies. But what has come instead is an incoherent and messy patchwork. In November 2018, amid growing calls for transparency and accountability, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced the creation of an independent Oversight Board (OSB). This group of independent experts was granted the power to make binding rulings in cases where users appeal decisions made by Facebook to remove content from the social network.
On December 1, the OSB announced the first six cases chosen from 20,000 user appeals. Three of the cases OSB has agreed to hear involve “hate speech”, whereas the others concern “nudity”, “dangerous individuals”, and “violence and incitement.” They include a screenshot of tweets by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad saying Muslims had a right to perpetrate violence against French people “for the massacres of the past,” Instagram photos showing female nipples supposedly aimed to raise awareness of breast cancer, and a post with a photo of a deceased child in which the user asks in Burmese why there was no retaliation of China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims.
Yet it’s not at all clear how the OSB will reconcile Facebook’s commitment to free expression with the competing values of safety, dignity, and authenticity. Facebook has adopted constantly changing community standards as states, interest groups, NGOs, the media, and users demand renewed focus on whatever issue creates controversy, whether COVID-19 misinformation, hate speech, or Holocaust denial. The publicly available community standards are only the tip of the iceberg. The confidential implementation standards developed to guide Facebook’s human content moderators is a constantly growing index of prohibited content of around 12,000 words, which few content moderators truly understand.
Facebook says it respects international human-rights standards on freedom of expression (despite not being legally bound by international human-rights law). But its community standards are significantly less speech-protective than what follows from Article 19 and 20 of the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Recent years have also seen a dramatic increase in the amount of purged content on Facebook. In the third quarter of 2020, Facebook deleted 22.1 million pieces of content for violating its ban against hate speech; a steep increase from the 2.5 million pieces of content deleted in Q1 of 2018. Almost 95 percent of the purged hate speech in 2020 was proactively identified by AI before any human user notified Facebook—up from 38 percent in 2018. Whether the millions of posts and comments deleted for hate speech and other prohibited categories each month live up the Facebook’s own standards—or indeed human-rights standards—is an open question, since purged content is not available to the public.
Regardless of whether one thinks that Facebook removes too much or too little content, the lack of transparency about the moderation and algorithmic distribution of content is deeply problematic given the impact that Facebook’s decisions have on what ideas and information can be shared and by who among its 2.7 billion monthly active users. Despite Zuckerberg’s aversion to Facebook acting as a gatekeeper, the platforms users are subjected to moderation without any representation.
The OSB is an attempt to address some of these systemic shortcomings and inconsistencies, though it does not correct the fundamental lack of transparency. The OSB’s decisions are final and its Charter mandates Facebook to implement the decisions “promptly.” But it’s already clear that no matter how the OSB rules in these cases, many people will disagree vocally.
It’s not too late, however, for OSB to strengthen the legitimacy of Facebook’s content moderation by explicitly adopting a number of principles to guide its decision-making.
Reasoned decisions
A frequent frustration of Facebook users whose accounts or content gets blocked is the lack of any meaningful or reasoned decision, apart from a generic reference to a specific category such as “hate speech” or “nudity.” Accordingly, the OSB should strive to issue clear, understandable, and reasoned decisions that allow users—and Facebook moderators—to understand why and how the OSB ruled the way it did.
The user should enjoy the benefit of doubt
Context is crucial for the proper understanding of speech. This is even more so on a global platform with users from almost all countries in the world speaking hundreds of different languages and with very different cultural norms, humor, etc, that may be interpreted very differently by people across the world. Moreover, the so-called memefication of social media often makes it difficult to discern whether content is sincere or sarcastic. Given that free speech is a fundamental value, the OSB should establish that users enjoy the benefit of doubt when Facebook determines whether content violates its standards. In the words of the Norwegian Supreme Court: “In the interest of freedom expression, no one should risk criminal liability through attributing to a statement, a viewpoint which has not been expressly made and which cannot with a reasonably high degree of certainty be inferred from the context.”
Beware of hate speech “scope creep”
The thorniest category of content to be navigated by the OSB is undoubtedly that of hate speech, which is notoriously difficult to define. Not least on a global platform where users—and their governments—have very different ideas on what types of speech is considered “hateful.” Article 20 of the ICCPR provides a good starting point, and several expert reports and soft-law documents give useful guidance on how to interpret Article 20. However, the lack of legally binding case law applying these principles in concrete cases leaves much uncertainty. Moreover, Facebook’s definition of hate speech is much broader than Article 20. Given how hate-speech bans are frequently abused to protect powerful institutions and leaders rather than vulnerable groups and minorities, the OSB should provide as robust and objective definition as possible, limiting hate speech bans to the most egregious content.
The OSB should look to South Africa, which has grappled with how to protect both free speech and dignity in a country with a recent past of oppressive white supremacy that relied on both systematic discrimination and censorship to maintain apartheid. In one case, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal held that:
“[A] court should not be hasty to conclude that because language is angry in tone or conveys hostility, it is therefore to be characterized as hate speech. Even if it has overtones of race and ethnicity.”
In another case, the Supreme Court of Appeal noted:
“The fact that a particular expression may be hurtful of people’s feelings, or wounding, distasteful, politically inflammatory or downright offensive, does not exclude it from protection.” Crucially the South African courts’ narrow interpretation of hate speech has been justified with reference to the apartheid past, when the government used hate-speech bans to prohibit criticism of apartheid.
Beware of censorship envy
Shortly after Baron Cohen celebrated Facebook and Twitter’s decision to purge Holocaust denial in October 2020, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan wrote a letter to Zuckerberg demanding “a similar ban on Islamophobia and against Islam for Facebook.” This was a textbook example of “censorship envy” where banning speech seen as particularly odious by one group encourages other groups to demand similar restrictions on content they view as beyond the pale. Unless the OSB establishes clear and convincing principles—such as an operational definition of harm—for content removal, censorship envy might degenerate into a race to the bottom as various groups, clamor to have “problematic” content banned.
These principles should not be seen as exhaustive, but would all contribute to ensuring that the OSB plays a positive role toward establishing new models of content moderation capable of providing transparency, legitimacy, and ensuring the survival of free speech as a fundamental value in the digital age.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-04--Europe Needed Borders. Coronavirus Built Them.

In 1996 , a group of European scientists , academics , civil servants , and artists met in the Portuguese town of Coimbra to discuss European identity : Does it exist , and if so , what does it mean ?
All the participants made personal , deeply intellectual contributions .
But many pointed out that as long as it remains unclear where the European Union ends , and who belongs to it and who doesn ’ t , European political objectives remain vague .
How can citizens identify with vague political objectives ?
Maryon McDonald , an anthropologist , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The clearest identity is in conceptual opposition .
You know most clearly who you are through what you are not .
It is relatively easy to feel ‘ European ’ when visiting Japan , for example.
” Now consider what Europe is doing during the coronavirus pandemic : It is starting to draw borders .
A marked difference between “ us ” and “ others ” is slowly emerging , leading to a stronger sense of belonging among Europeans .
This has already had political ramifications .
The exercise in Coimbra was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boundaries , common values , and political goals .
During the Cold War those boundaries had been there , drawn by external circumstances .
At that time , it was clear who Europeans were and what they stood for , because it was also clear who they were not and what their opponents stood for .
After 1989 , that distinction disappeared .
Borders were erased , enemies became friends .
And by welcoming countries that had been behind the Iron Curtain , the EU gave them perspective .
This , it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vacuum along Europe ’ s external borders .
But where were those borders exactly ?
Nobody knew this anymore .
Everything was blurred .
Would Ukraine join the EU ?
Would Turkey , a Muslim country ?
How would this change the cozy Christian club ?
Many Europeans posed such questions .
Politicians never answered them .
They didn ’ t know the answers themselves .
This fueled Euroskepticism .
Enlargement fatigue and a growing demand for migration stops and more security can partly be traced back to this .
Now , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The era of vagueness seems to be coming to an end .
Boundaries are getting erected between Europeans and the rest of the world—mental boundaries and physical ones .
There are many reasons why this is happening .
Brexit , for example , has forced Europe to put up a border with the United Kingdom .
Borders are also a response to terror attacks in recent years .
But the coronavirus pandemic is a more powerful catalyst .
Initially , the pandemic led to chaos in Europe .
Every EU member state issued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perhaps inevitable : Public health is not a European competence .
But with some countries hermetically closed and others confiscating shipments of their neighbors ’ face masks , the European internal market was seriously disrupted .
This shocked EU governments into action .
Whatever their differences , they all know that European postwar peace and prosperity depend on the internal market .
The market is Europe ’ s economic and political foundation .
No EU government wanted to give that up .
Immediately , they got organized .
They fast-tracked procedures for trucks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lanes ” system ) , sent one another medical equipment , and arranged financial assistance for affected regions .
During the euro crisis , it took them three , four years to set up a rescue fund .
This year , a 750 billion-euro recovery fund was set up in three or four months , involving a revolutionary joint debt issuance mechanism via the EU budget .
This gave “ solidarity ” some new meaning .
Suddenly , Germans sang “ Bella Ciao ” for Italians in lockdown .
French and Dutch COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Lawyers took time off to work in hospitals .
People bought groceries for each other .
A new mood emerged in European society , German sociologist Heinz Bude said : “ The idea of individuals being able to fend for themselves rings hollow now .
… The days when freedom was the greatest good are over .
Now shelter and protection become more important.
” Back in March , Italians were burning European flags as the country became Europe ’ s first to suffer a major outbreak .
They felt abandoned : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese and Russian planes , displaying their flags , had delivered the first face masks in Lombardy .
Suddenly , cynical outsiders were seen as the good guys .
But this image changed quickly .
Many Chinese masks were unusable .
And by the end of March Europe was jolted into action—medically , financially , and logistically .
This “ has given [ the EU ] a new image , ” EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell told El País .
In a roundabout way , what really helped was other countries trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey opened its border with Greece , encouraging refugees and migrants to go to Europe .
It also started drilling in Greek and Cypriot waters .
Russia spread online conspiracy theories about the pandemic .
It propped up the president of Belarus , who had committed voting fraud and turned on his own people .
While Europe was in lockdown , the United States , its old ally , slammed tariffs on European products , threatened companies building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with sanctions , and withdrew thousands of soldiers from Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s search for the origin of the virus and invaded Hong Kong , while trying to force contracts with Huawei down European governments ’ throats .
This opposition from strongmen trying to take advantage of European vulnerability alerted many Europeans .
What kind of mercantile world were they suddenly living in ?
U.S. sanctions against the International Criminal Court , the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny , the British government tearing up the exit agreement with the EU—all this probably did more for European unification than decades of subsidies from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ migration crisis , European countries fell into the national-sovereign reflex .
But COVID-19 brought Europeans closer together .
Because the pandemic has coincided with geopolitical developments leaving Europe in the cold , the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev said in a public debate last summer , “ this is about our place in the world .
It ’ s about European sovereignty and the need to reduce our vulnerability .
This is new.
” In March , the EU closed its external borders with third countries .
That had never happened before .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ traveled to Greece ’ s border with Turkey and said that Europe showed solidarity with Greece and would not be bullied .
With helicopters and armed border guards as a backdrop , the message was implicit but clear : This is where Europe stops .
Turkey , which has been a candidate country to join the EU since 1999 , was thus indirectly told that accession is off the table .
But Europeans heard it , too .
There is a historical parallel .
The Habsburg Empire , which the EU resembles in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ottoman Empire for a long time .
But in the 18th century , when infectious diseases came from Ottoman territory , the Habsburgs built their first border posts with watchtowers and quarantine buildings for travelers , luggage , and merchandise .
Thousands of border guards were appointed , from all corners of the empire .
It was a tremendous exercise .
Europe is doing something similar now—again triggered by a pandemic .
Greece , for example , which reluctantly gave shelter to migrants from Turkey , is now pushing them back over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violation of international law .
But Europe looks the other way .
Apparently , borders now take precedence over human rights .
In a speech in Berlin in 2013 , then-European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said that Europe had long been a space to roam around in and explore diversity .
Now it was becoming “ a place , where we can feel at home.
” Indeed , while most citizens want Europe ’ s internal borders to remain open , they insist that external borders be better policed and controlled .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , and democracy are high on their priority list , too .
This sounds like a contradiction .
Frontex , Europe ’ s border guard that has just been beefed up from a few hundred to 10,000 , already stands accused of human rights violations .
Some members of the European Parliament have recently called on its director to resign .
But others insist that once external borders are better guarded , it will be easier to set up a functioning EU asylum and migration policy and erase some of these shameful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seemed divided into cosmopolitans and nationalists .
Now many , including cosmopolitans , say that Europe can no longer count on others and needs to be “ strategically autonomous.
” Borders and demarcation are part of this autonomy— “ l ’ Europe qui protège , ” French President Emmanuel Macron calls it .
Europe , once a community of choice , is becoming a community of need .
Many Europeans , not just nationalists , fear losing control in a dangerous world .
They are beginning to see the EU as a means @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still not be happy with the EU , but they are certainly happier in it .
German Bundestag President Wolfgang Schäuble , a hard-liner during the euro crisis , recently called in an op-ed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for more European sovereignty .
Former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb , who directs the European University Institute in Florence , Italy , said Europe has “ bloody well beaten itself through this crisis.
” In Foreign Affairs , the researcher Max Bergmann wrote that Europe has been “ a geopolitical nonentity since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this crisis a stronger , more unified global player.
” This doesn ’ t mean that a European identity will suddenly emerge , or that European politics will suffer no more setbacks .
Anyone saying that would ignore the nature of European integration and be hopelessly naive—the bitter fight over the rule of law in Europe , with the multiyear EU budget and coronavirus recovery fund as hostages , is a case in point .
Still , it could mean that the EU and nonmembers such as Norway and Switzerland slowly get some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after years of aimlessly floating around .
In her 1919 essay Prometheus , the Dutch writer Carry van Bruggen wrote that people always want to belong .
But if they get too involved in a group they will lose their individuality : “ Being different from others is the condition for self-preservation.
” Perhaps today ’ s Europe is discovering just that .

In 1996, a group of European scientists, academics, civil servants, and artists met in the Portuguese town of Coimbra to discuss European identity: Does it exist, and if so, what does it mean? All the participants made personal, deeply intellectual contributions . But many pointed out that as long as it remains unclear where the European Union ends, and who belongs to it and who doesn’t, European political objectives remain vague. How can citizens identify with vague political objectives?
In 1996, a group of European scientists, academics, civil servants, and artists met in the Portuguese town of Coimbra to discuss European identity: Does it exist, and if so, what does it mean? All the participants made personal, deeply intellectual contributions. But many pointed out that as long as it remains unclear where the European Union ends, and who belongs to it and who doesn’t, European political objectives remain vague. How can citizens identify with vague political objectives?
Maryon McDonald, an anthropologist, said: “Identity is constructed relationally. The clearest identity is in conceptual opposition. You know most clearly who you are through what you are not. It is relatively easy to feel ‘European’ when visiting Japan, for example.”
Now consider what Europe is doing during the coronavirus pandemic: It is starting to draw borders. A marked difference between “us” and “others” is slowly emerging, leading to a stronger sense of belonging among Europeans. This has already had political ramifications.
The exercise in Coimbra was a call for a demarcation of geographical boundaries, common values, and political goals. During the Cold War those boundaries had been there, drawn by external circumstances. At that time, it was clear who Europeans were and what they stood for, because it was also clear who they were not and what their opponents stood for. After 1989, that distinction disappeared. Borders were erased, enemies became friends. And by welcoming countries that had been behind the Iron Curtain, the EU gave them perspective. This, it was argued, would help prevent a dangerous vacuum along Europe’s external borders.
But where were those borders exactly? Nobody knew this anymore. Everything was blurred. Would Ukraine join the EU? Would Turkey, a Muslim country? How would this change the cozy Christian club? Many Europeans posed such questions. Politicians never answered them. They didn’t know the answers themselves. This fueled Euroskepticism. Enlargement fatigue and a growing demand for migration stops and more security can partly be traced back to this.
Now, in 2020, something remarkable is happening: The era of vagueness seems to be coming to an end. Boundaries are getting erected between Europeans and the rest of the world—mental boundaries and physical ones. There are many reasons why this is happening. Brexit, for example, has forced Europe to put up a border with the United Kingdom. Borders are also a response to terror attacks in recent years. But the coronavirus pandemic is a more powerful catalyst.
Initially, the pandemic led to chaos in Europe. Every EU member state issued its own national measures. This was perhaps inevitable: Public health is not a European competence. But with some countries hermetically closed and others confiscating shipments of their neighbors’ face masks, the European internal market was seriously disrupted. This shocked EU governments into action. Whatever their differences, they all know that European postwar peace and prosperity depend on the internal market. The market is Europe’s economic and political foundation. No EU government wanted to give that up.
Immediately, they got organized. They fast-tracked procedures for trucks at internal borders (the “green lanes” system), sent one another medical equipment, and arranged financial assistance for affected regions. During the euro crisis, it took them three, four years to set up a rescue fund. This year, a 750 billion-euro recovery fund was set up in three or four months, involving a revolutionary joint debt issuance mechanism via the EU budget.
This gave “solidarity” some new meaning. Suddenly, Germans sang “Bella Ciao” for Italians in lockdown. French and Dutch COVID-19 patients were treated for free in Germany. Lawyers took time off to work in hospitals. People bought groceries for each other.
A new mood emerged in European society, German sociologist Heinz Bude said: “The idea of individuals being able to fend for themselves rings hollow now. … The days when freedom was the greatest good are over. Now shelter and protection become more important.”
Back in March, Italians were burning European flags as the country became Europe’s first to suffer a major outbreak. They felt abandoned: Why didn’t Europe help? Chinese and Russian planes, displaying their flags, had delivered the first face masks in Lombardy. Suddenly, cynical outsiders were seen as the good guys.
But this image changed quickly. Many Chinese masks were unusable. And by the end of March Europe was jolted into action—medically, financially, and logistically. This “has given [the EU] a new image,” EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell told El País.
In a roundabout way, what really helped was other countries trying to weaken the EU during the pandemic. Turkey opened its border with Greece, encouraging refugees and migrants to go to Europe. It also started drilling in Greek and Cypriot waters. Russia spread online conspiracy theories about the pandemic. It propped up the president of Belarus, who had committed voting fraud and turned on his own people. While Europe was in lockdown, the United States, its old ally, slammed tariffs on European products, threatened companies building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with sanctions, and withdrew thousands of soldiers from Germany. China complicated the World Health Organization’s search for the origin of the virus and invaded Hong Kong, while trying to force contracts with Huawei down European governments’ throats.
This opposition from strongmen trying to take advantage of European vulnerability alerted many Europeans. What kind of mercantile world were they suddenly living in? U.S. sanctions against the International Criminal Court, the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, the British government tearing up the exit agreement with the EU—all this probably did more for European unification than decades of subsidies from Brussels.
In the euro crisis and migration crisis, European countries fell into the national-sovereign reflex. But COVID-19 brought Europeans closer together. Because the pandemic has coincided with geopolitical developments leaving Europe in the cold, the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev said in a public debate last summer, “this is about our place in the world. It’s about European sovereignty and the need to reduce our vulnerability. This is new.”
In March, the EU closed its external borders with third countries. That had never happened before. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Greece’s border with Turkey and said that Europe showed solidarity with Greece and would not be bullied. With helicopters and armed border guards as a backdrop, the message was implicit but clear: This is where Europe stops. Turkey, which has been a candidate country to join the EU since 1999, was thus indirectly told that accession is off the table.
But Europeans heard it, too.
There is a historical parallel. The Habsburg Empire, which the EU resembles in many ways, had no borders with the Ottoman Empire for a long time. But in the 18th century, when infectious diseases came from Ottoman territory, the Habsburgs built their first border posts with watchtowers and quarantine buildings for travelers, luggage, and merchandise. Thousands of border guards were appointed, from all corners of the empire. It was a tremendous exercise. Europe is doing something similar now—again triggered by a pandemic.
Greece, for example, which reluctantly gave shelter to migrants from Turkey, is now pushing them back over the border. This is a clear violation of international law. But Europe looks the other way. Apparently, borders now take precedence over human rights.
In a speech in Berlin in 2013, then-European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said that Europe had long been a space to roam around in and explore diversity. Now it was becoming “a place, where we can feel at home.”
Indeed, while most citizens want Europe’s internal borders to remain open, they insist that external borders be better policed and controlled. But human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are high on their priority list, too. This sounds like a contradiction. Frontex, Europe’s border guard that has just been beefed up from a few hundred to 10,000, already stands accused of human rights violations. Some members of the European Parliament have recently called on its director to resign. But others insist that once external borders are better guarded, it will be easier to set up a functioning EU asylum and migration policy and erase some of these shameful practices.
Ten years ago, Europe seemed divided into cosmopolitans and nationalists. Now many, including cosmopolitans, say that Europe can no longer count on others and needs to be “strategically autonomous.” Borders and demarcation are part of this autonomy—“l’Europe qui protège,” French President Emmanuel Macron calls it. Europe, once a community of choice, is becoming a community of need.
Many Europeans, not just nationalists, fear losing control in a dangerous world. They are beginning to see the EU as a means to strengthen national sovereignty. They may still not be happy with the EU, but they are certainly happier in it.
German Bundestag President Wolfgang Schäuble, a hard-liner during the euro crisis, recently called in an op-ed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for more European sovereignty. Former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who directs the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, said Europe has “bloody well beaten itself through this crisis.” In Foreign Affairs, the researcher Max Bergmann wrote that Europe has been “a geopolitical nonentity since the 1990s” but “will emerge from this crisis a stronger, more unified global player.”
This doesn’t mean that a European identity will suddenly emerge, or that European politics will suffer no more setbacks. Anyone saying that would ignore the nature of European integration and be hopelessly naive—the bitter fight over the rule of law in Europe, with the multiyear EU budget and coronavirus recovery fund as hostages, is a case in point. Still, it could mean that the EU and nonmembers such as Norway and Switzerland slowly get some sense of direction and cohesion again, after years of aimlessly floating around.
In her 1919 essay Prometheus, the Dutch writer Carry van Bruggen wrote that people always want to belong. But if they get too involved in a group they will lose their individuality: “Being different from others is the condition for self-preservation.” Perhaps today’s Europe is discovering just that.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-05--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Previous instances of European anxiety—like the crises over the fate of the eurozone and refugees—didn ’ t bode well for the cohesion of the continent .
In both cases , European Union member states reverted to exclusive , nationalist impulses , and the bloc ’ s future looked more precarious than ever .
But the coronavirus pandemic is different : Miraculously , a public health catastrophe has managed to turn the EU from a mere “ space ” to a meaningful “ place.
” Meanwhile , Afghan leaders are livid that international aid to their country is conditioned on stamping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Kabul are themselves accused of embezzlement schemes .
And read a sneak peek of how President-elect Joe Biden ’ s plans on climate may impact the global economy .
After initially precipitating chaos—and an uptick in Euroskepticism—across the EU , the coronavirus pandemic has underscored the importance of the common market and revitalized a once waning solidarity-based European identity , Caroline de Gruyter writes .
2 .
Afghans , Under Fire for Corruption , Accuse Donors of Hypocrisy Andrew Rathmell , a top NATO official in Kabul , co-founded a now-defunct U.K. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Now , the West has the gall to demand Afghan leaders clean up their act , Lynne O ’ Donnell reports .
3 .
How Biden ’ s Climate Plans Will Shake Up Global Energy Markets Any doubts about the seriousness of Biden ’ s promises to act on climate change were quelled by his selection of former Secretary of State John Kerry to serve as the special international envoy for climate , FP ’ s Jason Bordoff writes .
November saw one of Cuba ’ s largest documented anti-government demonstrations since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it was the result of months of economic hardship and a marked uptick in repression—capped off by the warrantless arrest and imprisonment of rapper Denis Solís González , James Bloodworth writes .
The United States is seeing daily coronavirus caseloads hit over 200,000 , but that isn ’ t stopping Secretary of State Mike Pompeo from hosting lavish holiday events that expose catering and waitstaff—most of whom don ’ t have employer-sponsored health insurance—to potential infection , FP ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .

Previous instances of European anxiety—like the crises over the fate of the eurozone and refugees—didn’t bode well for the cohesion of the continent. In both cases, European Union member states reverted to exclusive, nationalist impulses, and the bloc’s future looked more precarious than ever. But the coronavirus pandemic is different: Miraculously, a public health catastrophe has managed to turn the EU from a mere “space” to a meaningful “place.”
Previous instances of European anxiety—like the crises over the fate of the eurozone and refugees—didn’t bode well for the cohesion of the continent. In both cases, European Union member states reverted to exclusive, nationalist impulses, and the bloc’s future looked more precarious than ever. But the coronavirus pandemic is different: Miraculously, a public health catastrophe has managed to turn the EU from a mere “space” to a meaningful “place.”
Meanwhile, Afghan leaders are livid that international aid to their country is conditioned on stamping out corruption while Western donors’ contractors in Kabul are themselves accused of embezzlement schemes.
And read a sneak peek of how President-elect Joe Biden’s plans on climate may impact the global economy.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A Swiss customs officer attaches a chain to a fence after opening the Swiss-French border on June 14, 2020 in Thonex near Ambilly, France.
After initially precipitating chaos—and an uptick in Euroskepticism—across the EU, the coronavirus pandemic has underscored the importance of the common market and revitalized a once waning solidarity-based European identity, Caroline de Gruyter writes.
Afghan Foreign Minister Hanif Atmar and Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto
Andrew Rathmell, a top NATO official in Kabul, co-founded a now-defunct U.K. development contractor that allegedly stiffed subcontractors. Now, the West has the gall to demand Afghan leaders clean up their act, Lynne O’Donnell reports.
An oil pumpjack operates near Los Angeles, California on April 21.
Any doubts about the seriousness of Biden’s promises to act on climate change were quelled by his selection of former Secretary of State John Kerry to serve as the special international envoy for climate, FP’s Jason Bordoff writes.
A group of young intellectuals and artists protest in Cuba
November saw one of Cuba’s largest documented anti-government demonstrations since the Maleconazo in 1994. Led by artists, it was the result of months of economic hardship and a marked uptick in repression—capped off by the warrantless arrest and imprisonment of rapper Denis Solís González, James Bloodworth writes.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
The United States is seeing daily coronavirus caseloads hit over 200,000, but that isn’t stopping Secretary of State Mike Pompeo from hosting lavish holiday events that expose catering and waitstaff—most of whom don’t have employer-sponsored health insurance—to potential infection, FP’s Robbie Gramer reports.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-05--Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable

Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Joe Biden will enter office as America ’ s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past .
Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change , as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded , will be G. John Ikenberry ’ s new book , A World Safe for Democracy .
It is in some ways the crowning achievement of the Princeton University ’ s scholar ’ s decadeslong work explaining and defending the liberal international order .
Ikenberry ’ s research traces the origins of the liberal internationalist project—the idea of building a community of nations based on democracy , cooperation , and the rule of law—going back 200 years .
He chronicles it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions to its near-dissolution in the post-Cold War period under the neonationalist banner of its worst nemesis , President Donald Trump .
Ikenberry , in an interview , said that his purpose was to “ reframe the debate between nationalism and internationalism ” and acknowledge that American policymakers are now dealing with a “ liberal internationalism for wintertime rather than a Francis Fukuyama-style liberal internationalism for springtime ” of two decades ago .
( After the collapse of the Soviet Union , Fukuyama , the Stanford political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of democratic liberal capitalism over communism was so complete it could constitute a kind of “ end of history.
” This did not turn out to be the case . )
Ikenberry says that it ’ s long past time for Biden and the Democrats to acknowledge that rampaging American hubris after the Cold War led to some of the worst mistakes ever made by liberal internationalists of the modern era : from a Pollyannaish Reaganite belief that neoliberalism ( or capitalist free markets ) would solve most problems to the equally self-deluding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially in the Arab world ( hence the disastrous Iraq War ) .
Along the way , he writes in his book , nations and especially Washington lost the “ shared narrative ” of being a diverse but connected international community and became more of a U.S.-manufactured “ public utility ” dominated by the interests of multinational corporations .
And the former concept is what it must return to , he says .
“ The book tries to provide the deeper theory of the liberal project that Biden is going to try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I think it ’ s the first book that attempts to look at a whole tradition and cull it for usable knowledge we can apply today .
And to make the point that the post-1989 years [ after the fall of the Berlin Wall ] were very much an anomaly .
Two centuries on , it ’ s much more of a world-weary , contested run of democracies struggling to build order.
” According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team , speaking on background , the new administration is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ikenberry ’ s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization .
He also said that reinventing liberal internationalism along the lines Ikenberry recommends will be at the forefront of their efforts .
The incoming Biden team has already conceded that both they and the Republicans , pre-Trump , lost their way .
They erred badly because they “ came to treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else , ” as Biden ’ s nominee to be national security advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atlantic in early 2019 .
Under both Democrats and Republicans , “ U.S .
internationalism became insufficiently attentive to the needs and aspirations of the American middle class.
” In a remarkable admission , Sullivan , who served as then-Vice President Biden ’ s national security advisor , confessed : “ During the Obama administration , when the national-security team sat around the Situation Room table , we rarely posed the question What will this mean for the middle class ?
Many other countries have made economic growth that expands the middle class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy.
” The United States suffered a dangerous , society-splitting populist backlash because it did not address that same question , instead recklessly embracing global neoliberalism , and engaging in a confident flinging-open of all borders .
The result was the loss of any sense that internationalism was also a way of protecting social and economic equity—the kind of compact that existed after World War II .
Another result was a series of policies and trade deals that opened the door to the decimation of the American middle class , particularly to Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , starting with President Bill Clinton ( but in which George W. Bush ’ s administration was particularly culpable in not punishing Chinese dumping and intellectual property theft under World Trade Organization rules ) allowed China to flagrantly violate the rules of the game .
The post-Cold War internationalists failed equally in thinking they could easily co-opt major illiberal states such as China and Russia fully into the global system , Ikenberry writes .
They did not .
The answer may be to make liberal internationalism less “ offensive ” and intrusive .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a grand vision of a global march toward an ideal society , and more as a pragmatic , reform-oriented approach to making liberal democracies safe.
” China , the major rival to the United States , in particular could at least abide such an approach , Ikenberry argues , because even in its rise to global dominance it is still seeking to work within institutions like the United Nations , the International Monetary Fund , and the WTO .
“ In effect this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the vision of a one-world liberal order , ” he writes .
“ The emphasis instead would be on coexistence , building on the ‘ defensive ’ liberal principles of self-determination , tolerance , and ideological pluralism .
Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.
” Or , some would say , more realist .
There is little doubt about the direction the Bidenites will go , because all of them know—as Ikenberry argues—that in the end there really is no alternative .
As Sullivan wrote last year : Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he has surfaced questions that need clear answers .
Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role , even if a different role than in the past , have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future .
… “ This requires domestic renewal above all , with energetic responses at home to the rise of tribalism and the hollowing-out of the middle class.
” Ultimately , the challenges of modernity will require a reinvented liberal internationalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no other system available for dealing with “ the problems of interdependence ” other than through international cooperation .
Climate change , pandemics like COVID-19 , nuclear proliferation—all can only be solved through the established global system .
“ The pandemic is the poster child of that problem , ” he said in the interview .
But even here the United States must adopt more realist approaches to liberal internationalism .
“ The problem of liberal internationalism is about managing interdependence , not globalizing the world , ” he said .
Ikenberry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a more restrained version of President Woodrow Wilson ’ s original vision of making the world “ safe for democracy.
” But this , again , is likely to be more a defensive than offensive approach .
And at home , Ikenberry says , it means finding a brand-new way of making internationalism work for average Americans , especially with labor and environmental protections .
The idea of “ protectionism ” can no longer simply be anathema .
Indeed , Trumpist populism will not disappear under Biden .
He has already advocated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” plan and conditioned his return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership he once advocated on greater worker protections .
His political platform sounds a not a little Trumpian as well , declaring he will “ ensure the future is ‘ made in all of America ’ by all of America ’ s workers.
” Biden will also continue a campaign begun by former President Barack Obama—but turned into a strident war by Trump—pressuring European allies to pay their fair share of the Atlantic alliance and NATO .
In the end , Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but more demanding of other nations , as was Trump ’ s .
Above all , his approach will focus first at home , on the pandemic and joblessness .
“ Looking over 200 years , ” Ikenberry said , “ one of the things I found and which the Biden administration intuitively understands is that in every period where a golden era of internationalism that lifted America to greater heights existed , it was tied to a progressive agenda.
” Restoring this vision means going back to the nationalist origins of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the wars of the 19th century , the industrial revolution , and , in hands of proto-internationalists such as the British politician Richard Cobden , how it became a means to global hegemony and economic prosperity for its first great practitioner , Britain .
Cobden spoke of free trade and peace as “ one and the same cause , ” and at the same time new forms of social internationalism also sprung up , pushing for equanimity for all social classes .
The new concept of Adam Smith-conceived free trade presaged “ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territorial annexation and the abandonment of aristocratic militarism , ” as the British historian Anthony Howe argues .
It presaged the modern world , in other words , culminating , ultimately , in the international community institutions proposed by Wilson and imposed and perfected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt .
But institutions that were always meant to benefit all Americans .
These changes in the international system are now so entrenched they can not simply be undone .
Yet they remain badly misdirected at present .
Somewhere along the line the idea of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to achieve the end of national prosperity and peace , instead an end in itself .
And this is where policymakers went wrong .
In Washington , especially , the domestic impact of liberalization was consistently played down by both Republican and Democratic administrations .
The post-Cold War globalization of free trade did indeed create , as the economists predicted , more global equality and prosperity overall .
But in the past few decades far more of that equality and prosperity has accrued to developing nations than to the working classes of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Europe , where growing inequality has engendered a long-term populist reaction , one that is unlikely to disappear any time soon .
As a result , Ikenberry said , “ I think we ’ re in for a kind of managed openness that allows us to protect environmental and labor standards , so as to shore up the democracies.
” Even Ikenberry admits there is a long way to go in restoring faith in liberal internationalism in Washington , especially now that the problems of modernity “ are like Dr. Jekyll and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with technologies and innovation but also greater perils.
” Cyber-misinformation , for one thing , that emerged out of the very technology that was supposed to bring us closer together : the internet .
“ Functioning liberal democracy requires some factual agreed-upon knowledge base , ” said Ikenberry , and yet Trump showed that he could exploit the fact that there was no longer such an agreed-upon base—no direction home to broadly established economic and social truths .
In the end , Ikenberry calls for a new “ Wilsonian moment ” but he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very different from what Wilson himself conceived a century ago .
In the interview Ikenberry conceded : “ Some will say what we are introducing is a kind of illiberal internationalism instead .
”

Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power.
Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power.
One of their chief manifestos for change, as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded, will be G. John Ikenberry’s new book, A World Safe for Democracy. It is in some ways the crowning achievement of the Princeton University’s scholar’s decadeslong work explaining and defending the liberal international order.
A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, G. John Ikenberry, Yale University Press, 432 pp., , September 2020
Ikenberry’s research traces the origins of the liberal internationalist project—the idea of building a community of nations based on democracy, cooperation, and the rule of law—going back 200 years. He chronicles it from its inception in the Age of Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions to its near-dissolution in the post-Cold War period under the neonationalist banner of its worst nemesis, President Donald Trump.
Ikenberry, in an interview, said that his purpose was to “reframe the debate between nationalism and internationalism” and acknowledge that American policymakers are now dealing with a “liberal internationalism for wintertime rather than a Francis Fukuyama-style liberal internationalism for springtime” of two decades ago. (After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama, the Stanford political philosopher, famously suggested that the triumph of democratic liberal capitalism over communism was so complete it could constitute a kind of “end of history.” This did not turn out to be the case.)
Ikenberry says that it’s long past time for Biden and the Democrats to acknowledge that rampaging American hubris after the Cold War led to some of the worst mistakes ever made by liberal internationalists of the modern era: from a Pollyannaish Reaganite belief that neoliberalism (or capitalist free markets) would solve most problems to the equally self-deluding notion that democracy would achieve the same, especially in the Arab world (hence the disastrous Iraq War). Along the way, he writes in his book, nations and especially Washington lost the “shared narrative” of being a diverse but connected international community and became more of a U.S.-manufactured “public utility” dominated by the interests of multinational corporations.
And the former concept is what it must return to, he says. “The book tries to provide the deeper theory of the liberal project that Biden is going to try to renew,” Ikenberry said. “I think it’s the first book that attempts to look at a whole tradition and cull it for usable knowledge we can apply today. And to make the point that the post-1989 years [after the fall of the Berlin Wall] were very much an anomaly. Two centuries on, it’s much more of a world-weary, contested run of democracies struggling to build order.”
According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team, speaking on background, the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization. He also said that reinventing liberal internationalism along the lines Ikenberry recommends will be at the forefront of their efforts.
The incoming Biden team has already conceded that both they and the Republicans, pre-Trump, lost their way. They erred badly because they “came to treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else,” as Biden’s nominee to be national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote in the Atlantic in early 2019. Under both Democrats and Republicans, “U.S. internationalism became insufficiently attentive to the needs and aspirations of the American middle class.”
In a remarkable admission, Sullivan, who served as then-Vice President Biden’s national security advisor, confessed: “During the Obama administration, when the national-security team sat around the Situation Room table, we rarely posed the question What will this mean for the middle class? Many other countries have made economic growth that expands the middle class a key organizing principle of their foreign policy.”
The United States suffered a dangerous, society-splitting populist backlash because it did not address that same question, instead recklessly embracing global neoliberalism, and engaging in a confident flinging-open of all borders. The result was the loss of any sense that internationalism was also a way of protecting social and economic equity—the kind of compact that existed after World War II. Another result was a series of policies and trade deals that opened the door to the decimation of the American middle class, particularly to Chinese competition. Beyond that, successive administrations, starting with President Bill Clinton (but in which George W. Bush’s administration was particularly culpable in not punishing Chinese dumping and intellectual property theft under World Trade Organization rules) allowed China to flagrantly violate the rules of the game.
The post-Cold War internationalists failed equally in thinking they could easily co-opt major illiberal states such as China and Russia fully into the global system, Ikenberry writes. They did not. The answer may be to make liberal internationalism less “offensive” and intrusive. Instead “it must define itself less as a grand vision of a global march toward an ideal society, and more as a pragmatic, reform-oriented approach to making liberal democracies safe.” China, the major rival to the United States, in particular could at least abide such an approach, Ikenberry argues, because even in its rise to global dominance it is still seeking to work within institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO.
“In effect this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order,” he writes. “The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the ‘defensive’ liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.” Or, some would say, more realist.
There is little doubt about the direction the Bidenites will go, because all of them know—as Ikenberry argues—that in the end there really is no alternative. As Sullivan wrote last year: Trump’s neoisolationist approach “is dangerous, but he has surfaced questions that need clear answers. Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role, even if a different role than in the past, have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future. …
“This requires domestic renewal above all, with energetic responses at home to the rise of tribalism and the hollowing-out of the middle class.”
Ultimately, the challenges of modernity will require a reinvented liberal internationalism because, Ikenberry argues, there really is no other system available for dealing with “the problems of interdependence” other than through international cooperation. Climate change, pandemics like COVID-19, nuclear proliferation—all can only be solved through the established global system. “The pandemic is the poster child of that problem,” he said in the interview.
But even here the United States must adopt more realist approaches to liberal internationalism. “The problem of liberal internationalism is about managing interdependence, not globalizing the world,” he said.
Ikenberry concludes that liberal internationalism must recreate itself as a more restrained version of President Woodrow Wilson’s original vision of making the world “safe for democracy.” But this, again, is likely to be more a defensive than offensive approach. And at home, Ikenberry says, it means finding a brand-new way of making internationalism work for average Americans, especially with labor and environmental protections. The idea of “protectionism” can no longer simply be anathema.
Indeed, Trumpist populism will not disappear under Biden. He has already advocated a $700 billion-plus “Buy American” plan and conditioned his return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership he once advocated on greater worker protections. His political platform sounds a not a little Trumpian as well, declaring he will “ensure the future is ‘made in all of America’ by all of America’s workers.” Biden will also continue a campaign begun by former President Barack Obama—but turned into a strident war by Trump—pressuring European allies to pay their fair share of the Atlantic alliance and NATO. In the end, Biden’s return to liberal internationalism will be real, but more demanding of other nations, as was Trump’s.
Above all, his approach will focus first at home, on the pandemic and joblessness. “Looking over 200 years,” Ikenberry said, “one of the things I found and which the Biden administration intuitively understands is that in every period where a golden era of internationalism that lifted America to greater heights existed, it was tied to a progressive agenda.”
Restoring this vision means going back to the nationalist origins of internationalism, how it arose out of the wars of the 19th century, the industrial revolution, and, in hands of proto-internationalists such as the British politician Richard Cobden, how it became a means to global hegemony and economic prosperity for its first great practitioner, Britain. Cobden spoke of free trade and peace as “one and the same cause,” and at the same time new forms of social internationalism also sprung up, pushing for equanimity for all social classes. The new concept of Adam Smith-conceived free trade presaged “the dissolution of empire, the ending of territorial annexation and the abandonment of aristocratic militarism,” as the British historian Anthony Howe argues. It presaged the modern world, in other words, culminating, ultimately, in the international community institutions proposed by Wilson and imposed and perfected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
But institutions that were always meant to benefit all Americans.
These changes in the international system are now so entrenched they cannot simply be undone. Yet they remain badly misdirected at present. Somewhere along the line the idea of internationalism became, rather than a means to achieve the end of national prosperity and peace, instead an end in itself. And this is where policymakers went wrong. In Washington, especially, the domestic impact of liberalization was consistently played down by both Republican and Democratic administrations. The post-Cold War globalization of free trade did indeed create, as the economists predicted, more global equality and prosperity overall. But in the past few decades far more of that equality and prosperity has accrued to developing nations than to the working classes of the champions of globalization like the United States and Europe, where growing inequality has engendered a long-term populist reaction, one that is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
As a result, Ikenberry said, “I think we’re in for a kind of managed openness that allows us to protect environmental and labor standards, so as to shore up the democracies.”
Even Ikenberry admits there is a long way to go in restoring faith in liberal internationalism in Washington, especially now that the problems of modernity “are like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. There are greater opportunities with technologies and innovation but also greater perils.” Cyber-misinformation, for one thing, that emerged out of the very technology that was supposed to bring us closer together: the internet.
“Functioning liberal democracy requires some factual agreed-upon knowledge base,” said Ikenberry, and yet Trump showed that he could exploit the fact that there was no longer such an agreed-upon base—no direction home to broadly established economic and social truths.
In the end, Ikenberry calls for a new “Wilsonian moment” but he appears to think it will be something very different from what Wilson himself conceived a century ago. In the interview Ikenberry conceded: “Some will say what we are introducing is a kind of illiberal internationalism instead.”