foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--Spain’s Post-Lockdown Culture War Has Only Just Begun

Spain ’ s Post-Lockdown Culture War Has Only Just Begun For two months , Madrid ’ s citizens gathered on their balconies every evening to applaud the health care workers who have weathered the worst of the coronavirus pandemic in Spain .
That changed last month in the capital ’ s richest districts , where well-heeled protesters brandished pots , pans , and Spanish flags and called for the government to resign—openly defying social distancing rules .
The demonstrations began with the richest 1 percent ’ s opposition to Madrid—the epicenter of Spain ’ s coronavirus outbreak—remaining on stricter lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There have been more than 27,000 confirmed deaths from COVID-19 nationwide , but some protesters declared that they weren ’ t sure if the coronavirus was killing anyone .
“ We are in our rights not to believe a word they say .
I haven ’ t seen a single coffin or autopsy , ” one protester said .
“ This is a hoax to throw Spain into crisis and ruin us all.
” The protests marked the first shots fired in a post-lockdown culture war , with the country still raw from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In Spain , the coronavirus has killed more people per capita than in any other country except Belgium and the United Kingdom , and the capital has registered 32 percent of the country ’ s COVID-19 deaths .
But the Madrid community ’ s right-wing leader , Isabel Díaz Ayuso , has described the people of Madrid as “ hostages.
” As these lawmakers prioritize leverage for future elections over labor reform to address precarity and unemployment , the politicization of the pandemic threatens its economic recovery .
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez faces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right rather than scrutiny of the slow response and lockdown that cost many lives .
Meanwhile , Spain ’ s autonomous communities accuse Sánchez of centralizing power .
Amid this discourse , the majority view among the Spanish public—that government and opposition should work together to fix the mess—gets lost .
The protests began on May 10 in Madrid ’ s Salamanca neighborhood and to a lesser extent in the suburb of Pozuelo de Alarcón—areas that once voted for Díaz Ayuso ’ s center-right Popular Party ( PP ) but are increasingly drawn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vox party .
“ The main concentration of Vox voters in Madrid coincides exactly [ with ] where we are seeing these protests : the Salamanca neighborhood and the Pozuelo area , ” said Carmen González Enríquez , a senior analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute .
“ Pozuelo is the richest municipality in Spain , and Salamanca is the richest area in Madrid.
” The protests are dominated by older women who share plans for caceroladas—the banging of pots and pans in protest—via WhatsApp .
Since the beginning of the pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argued that the Socialist-led coalition government is incompetent and dangerous—including charges that it allowed feminist rallies to go ahead on March 8 .
( That Vox held a meeting the same day is rarely mentioned . )
The PP and Vox have never regarded the coalition as legitimate : Since forging an agreement with the far-left Podemos party in December 2019 , Sánchez has relied on the backing of regional Basque , Catalan , and Galician parties , some of which want independence from Spain .
The PP and Vox see any pro-independence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the country .
In other European countries , opposition parties have broadly supported government measures to address the pandemic—even if they quibble over the details of the response .
But in Spain , the rhetoric in parliament remains polarized , said Sandra León , a political scientist at the Carlos III-Juan March Institute in Madrid .
“ The underlying understanding of the situation for the opposition parties is basically the same : that this is an illegitimate government , ” she said .
The pandemic has deepened the erosion of civility in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks against Sánchez have increased alongside the death toll .
Since the national government declared a state of emergency on March 13 , Vox ’ s leaders have accused the government of turning Spain into Venezuela or North Korea .
Meanwhile , the record so far for PP leader Pablo Casado stands at 37 insults in 15 minutes directed at the prime minister during a debate in May , including “ manipulator , liar , incapable , awful , acting like Julius Caesar , incompetent , opaque , arbitrary … and a quack.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vox isn ’ t just intended for Sánchez ’ s government—it ’ s laying the groundwork for future elections .
The far-right party has eaten into the PP ’ s vote share in the last two elections , and it oversees an effective online propaganda effort that has been successful among young voters .
So when the PP calls Sánchez a liar , Vox says he is a traitor .
When the PP calls on Sánchez to resign , Vox brings a court case against the government .
The government has taken note @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facing the COVID-19 crisis as a space for electoral battle , ” Idoia Villanueva , a foreign affairs spokesperson for Podemos , the coalition ’ s junior partner , wrote in an email .
“ The position of the right-wing parties and the far right is not only discredited , but [ it ] also seeks to discredit our democracy and the capacity of political parties to be useful for people ’ s needs.
” The right-wing battle for support is just one part of the culture war emerging from Spain ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discontent is the ongoing tussle between the central government and Spain ’ s powerful regional governments .
The state of emergency centralizes many of the powers that are usually devolved to Spain ’ s 17 autonomous communities .
The pushback was swift .
“ There is a lack of trust , especially with the Catalan president , Quim Torra , and PP president Díaz Ayuso in Madrid , ” said Joan Esculies , a history professor at the Open University of Catalonia .
“ Every weekend in the meeting with the presidents of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had to deal with ever greater criticism.
” In addition to fighting with right-wing politicians in Madrid and Catalonia , Sánchez has received criticism from fellow Socialists .
The leader of the Valencian autonomous community , Ximo Puig , ordered medical supplies for the region himself after delays and shortages from the central government .
“ It doesn ’ t matter that in Valencia the president is a Socialist and the head of the Spanish government is Socialist , too .
The Valencian president feels he has a responsibility to Valencian citizens and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answers from him , ” Esculies said .
Under normal circumstances , Spain doesn ’ t operate like a federal state such as Germany—but it is close .
Sánchez speaks often of a “ nation of nations , ” but the recourse to centralization is proof for his critics in Catalonia that the devolved powers can be given and taken away at will .
Any hopes from the pro-independence Catalans that the central government might cede more power have faded away .
Spain ’ s economy is facing disaster , and a unified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenges : an expected GDP contraction of 10 percent and an unemployment rate poised to hit 19 percent .
The country will welcome the announcement of $ 543 billion in European Union grants .
But the economic shock will be long lasting , increasing already high levels of poverty .
The most worrying aspect of the post-lockdown culture war is its loud volume , which isn ’ t representative of public opinion .
Spain ’ s parliamentary debates and media discourse are a cacophony of accusations and fake news .
Meanwhile , 73 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should have handled the country ’ s outbreak from the beginning .
A full 88 percent said they thought opposition parties should “ leave criticism for another moment.
” And 92 percent want new “ Moncloa Pacts ” —the deals struck by all of Spain ’ s main political parties in 1977 to agree on the political and economic reconstruction of the country after the fascist dictatorship .
The memory of previous bank bailouts and the failure to recoup nearly $ 30 billion in public funds means the government has a clear target @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill for the pandemic : the richest 1 percent .
“ We are proposing … not to cut public services , but also to create new taxes , at European and Spanish level , to ensure that the richest people are the ones who contribute more .
We call it cutting from the top , rather than the bottom , ” Podemos ’ s Villanueva said .
Expect a lot more pots and pans on the streets of Madrid .

For two months, Madrid’s citizens gathered on their balconies every evening to applaud the health care workers who have weathered the worst of the coronavirus pandemic in Spain. That changed last month in the capital’s richest districts, where well-heeled protesters brandished pots, pans, and Spanish flags and called for the government to resign—openly defying social distancing rules.
For two months, Madrid’s citizens gathered on their balconies every evening to applaud the health care workers who have weathered the worst of the coronavirus pandemic in Spain. That changed last month in the capital’s richest districts, where well-heeled protesters brandished pots, pans, and Spanish flags and called for the government to resign—openly defying social distancing rules.
The demonstrations began with the richest 1 percent’s opposition to Madrid—the epicenter of Spain’s coronavirus outbreak—remaining on stricter lockdown as the government relaxed restrictions elsewhere. There have been more than 27,000 confirmed deaths from COVID-19 nationwide, but some protesters declared that they weren’t sure if the coronavirus was killing anyone. “We are in our rights not to believe a word they say. I haven’t seen a single coffin or autopsy,” one protester said. “This is a hoax to throw Spain into crisis and ruin us all.”
The protests marked the first shots fired in a post-lockdown culture war, with the country still raw from its harrowing experience with the pandemic. In Spain, the coronavirus has killed more people per capita than in any other country except Belgium and the United Kingdom, and the capital has registered 32 percent of the country’s COVID-19 deaths. But the Madrid community’s right-wing leader, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, has described the people of Madrid as “hostages.”
As these lawmakers prioritize leverage for future elections over labor reform to address precarity and unemployment, the politicization of the pandemic threatens its economic recovery. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez faces ad hominem attacks in parliament from the right rather than scrutiny of the slow response and lockdown that cost many lives. Meanwhile, Spain’s autonomous communities accuse Sánchez of centralizing power. Amid this discourse, the majority view among the Spanish public—that government and opposition should work together to fix the mess—gets lost.
The protests began on May 10 in Madrid’s Salamanca neighborhood and to a lesser extent in the suburb of Pozuelo de Alarcón—areas that once voted for Díaz Ayuso’s center-right Popular Party (PP) but are increasingly drawn to the far-right messaging of the upstart Vox party. “The main concentration of Vox voters in Madrid coincides exactly [with] where we are seeing these protests: the Salamanca neighborhood and the Pozuelo area,” said Carmen González Enríquez, a senior analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute. “Pozuelo is the richest municipality in Spain, and Salamanca is the richest area in Madrid.” The protests are dominated by older women who share plans for caceroladas—the banging of pots and pans in protest—via WhatsApp.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, Spain’s right-wing opposition parties have argued that the Socialist-led coalition government is incompetent and dangerous—including charges that it allowed feminist rallies to go ahead on March 8. (That Vox held a meeting the same day is rarely mentioned.) The PP and Vox have never regarded the coalition as legitimate: Since forging an agreement with the far-left Podemos party in December 2019, Sánchez has relied on the backing of regional Basque, Catalan, and Galician parties, some of which want independence from Spain. The PP and Vox see any pro-independence grouping as illegally pushing for the breakup of the country.
In other European countries, opposition parties have broadly supported government measures to address the pandemic—even if they quibble over the details of the response. But in Spain, the rhetoric in parliament remains polarized, said Sandra León, a political scientist at the Carlos III-Juan March Institute in Madrid. “The underlying understanding of the situation for the opposition parties is basically the same: that this is an illegitimate government,” she said.
The pandemic has deepened the erosion of civility in Spanish politics. The right-wing parties’ attacks against Sánchez have increased alongside the death toll. Since the national government declared a state of emergency on March 13, Vox’s leaders have accused the government of turning Spain into Venezuela or North Korea. Meanwhile, the record so far for PP leader Pablo Casado stands at 37 insults in 15 minutes directed at the prime minister during a debate in May, including “manipulator, liar, incapable, awful, acting like Julius Caesar, incompetent, opaque, arbitrary … and a quack.”
The one-upmanship between the PP and Vox isn’t just intended for Sánchez’s government—it’s laying the groundwork for future elections. The far-right party has eaten into the PP’s vote share in the last two elections, and it oversees an effective online propaganda effort that has been successful among young voters. So when the PP calls Sánchez a liar, Vox says he is a traitor. When the PP calls on Sánchez to resign, Vox brings a court case against the government.
The government has taken note. “In Spain the opposition is facing the COVID-19 crisis as a space for electoral battle,” Idoia Villanueva, a foreign affairs spokesperson for Podemos, the coalition’s junior partner, wrote in an email. “The position of the right-wing parties and the far right is not only discredited, but [it] also seeks to discredit our democracy and the capacity of political parties to be useful for people’s needs.”
The right-wing battle for support is just one part of the culture war emerging from Spain’s long lockdown. The other axis of discontent is the ongoing tussle between the central government and Spain’s powerful regional governments.
The state of emergency centralizes many of the powers that are usually devolved to Spain’s 17 autonomous communities. The pushback was swift. “There is a lack of trust, especially with the Catalan president, Quim Torra, and PP president Díaz Ayuso in Madrid,” said Joan Esculies, a history professor at the Open University of Catalonia. “Every weekend in the meeting with the presidents of the communities, [Sánchez] has had to deal with ever greater criticism.”
In addition to fighting with right-wing politicians in Madrid and Catalonia, Sánchez has received criticism from fellow Socialists. The leader of the Valencian autonomous community, Ximo Puig, ordered medical supplies for the region himself after delays and shortages from the central government. “It doesn’t matter that in Valencia the president is a Socialist and the head of the Spanish government is Socialist, too. The Valencian president feels he has a responsibility to Valencian citizens and that they are going to ask for answers from him,” Esculies said.
Under normal circumstances, Spain doesn’t operate like a federal state such as Germany—but it is close. Sánchez speaks often of a “nation of nations,” but the recourse to centralization is proof for his critics in Catalonia that the devolved powers can be given and taken away at will. Any hopes from the pro-independence Catalans that the central government might cede more power have faded away.
Spain’s economy is facing disaster, and a unified response would help the government confront immense challenges: an expected GDP contraction of 10 percent and an unemployment rate poised to hit 19 percent. The country will welcome the announcement of $543 billion in European Union grants. But the economic shock will be long lasting, increasing already high levels of poverty.
The most worrying aspect of the post-lockdown culture war is its loud volume, which isn’t representative of public opinion. Spain’s parliamentary debates and media discourse are a cacophony of accusations and fake news. Meanwhile, 73 percent of Spaniards believe the central government should have handled the country’s outbreak from the beginning. A full 88 percent said they thought opposition parties should “leave criticism for another moment.” And 92 percent want new “Moncloa Pacts”—the deals struck by all of Spain’s main political parties in 1977 to agree on the political and economic reconstruction of the country after the fascist dictatorship.
The memory of previous bank bailouts and the failure to recoup nearly $30 billion in public funds means the government has a clear target for who will foot the public expenditure bill for the pandemic: the richest 1 percent. “We are proposing … not to cut public services, but also to create new taxes, at European and Spanish level, to ensure that the richest people are the ones who contribute more. We call it cutting from the top, rather than the bottom,” Podemos’s Villanueva said.
Expect a lot more pots and pans on the streets of Madrid.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--New Report Exposes Brutal Methods of Russia’s Wagner Group

Late last November , videos of a gruesome killing went viral on Russian social networks .
The shaky cell phone footage taken at al-Shaer gas plant near Palmyra , Syria , shows a Syrian man , who was known to friends and family as Hamdi Bouta , lying on the ground , surrounded by Russian-speaking men in military fatigues .
They beat his extremities with a sledgehammer before decapitating him , setting his body on fire and posing for photographs with his remains .
The perpetrators , who have not yet been charged , were identified by the Russian independent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security contractors for the so-called Wagner Group .
Yevgeny Prigozhin , a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin who was indicted in the United States for attempted interference in the 2016 presidential election , is widely regarded as the driving force behind the mercenary group .
Bouta ’ s slaying is symptomatic of the accountability vacuum in which the Wagner Group operates .
While mercenary groups are outlawed within Russia , they have served as the tip of the spear of the Kremlin ’ s proxy wars abroad .
Close to Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contractors give the Kremlin a degree of plausible deniability and have complicated efforts by Western policymakers to formulate a response .
They are the Swiss Army knives of modern Russian warfare and serve as “ force multipliers , arms merchants , trainers of local military and security personnel , and political consultants , ” according to a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
This style of hybrid warfare has become a cornerstone of Russia ’ s efforts to project its interests abroad .
A similar melding of public and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a bid to influence the outcome of the U.S. presidential election , with Russian military hackers stealing emails and documents from the Hillary Clinton campaign while the so-called troll factory , allegedly funded by Prigozhin , sought to fuel divisions between American voters .
Having first appeared in 2014 in eastern Ukraine , where Wagner fighters trained and fought alongside separatist rebels against the Ukrainian army , the group ’ s operatives have since cropped up everywhere from Venezuela to the Central African Republic , Syria , and Libya .
A new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initiative of Arizona State University and the New America think tank , published on Tuesday explores the circumstances of Bouta ’ s death using company records and social media analysis .
It sheds new light on the network ’ s operations and reveals how the killing became a rallying point for Russian ultranationalists online .
“ There is a dynamic evolution in the fusion of Russian ultranationalist groups and Russian paramilitaries going on that nobody is really paying attention to or seeing yet , ” said Candace Rondeaux , a professor of practice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Studies at Arizona State University and the author of the report .
The report ’ s revelations have chilling implications , as Russian mercenaries motivated by both money and far-right ideology are increasingly operating unchecked in some of the world ’ s most fragile countries .
“ You ’ d better believe it ’ s terrifying , ” Rondeaux said .
“ And neither the United States government understands how terrifying it is nor do its European allies.
” The Wagner Group has achieved near-mythical status in the Russian and international press in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s interference efforts abroad , but there is no evidence that a single registered entity called “ Wagner ” exists , said Jack Margolin , a senior analyst with the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies ( C4ADS ) , which provided analytical support for the report .
“ The Wagner Group is a very convenient fiction for a lot of people in Russia who both want to get rich and project power abroad , ” Rondeaux said .
Rather than being a single organization , Wagner is an opaque network of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simultaneously further the Kremlin ’ s interests abroad while lining the pockets of those involved by gaining access to lucrative energy and natural resources mining contracts in the countries in which they operate .
Elements of these networks have been identified by researchers and journalists through their overlapping ownership structures , personnel , and supply chains .
“ It ’ s a really adaptable network , which makes it hard to target , but also hard to talk about , ” said Margolin of C4ADS .
Mercenary activity that enables and secures these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ manifestation of these networks .
The men responsible for murdering Bouta are believed to have worked for EvroPolis , a company that exemplifies the way organizations within the network have blended business and warfare .
“ EvroPolis really , perhaps more than any other single entirety in the Prigozhin-associated network , captures the full suite of services that the Prigozhin networks have access to , ” said Margolin .
Russian corporate records and customs documents reviewed by C4ADS as well as EvroPolis company records provided by the London-based Dossier Center show that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the revenues of Syrian oil and gas fields it was able to seize from the Islamic State .
The documents reveal that the company earned $ 162 million from oil and gas fields in central Syria in 2017 alone .
EvroPolis was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2018 for being owned or controlled by Prigozhin .
The Kremlin has repeatedly denied any connections to Russian private military security contractors operating in Syria .
U.S. forces clashed with pro-Syrian government forces , the majority of which are believed to have been Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ezzor province in 2018 .
Between 200 to 300 fighters were killed in the battle , including scores of Russian mercenaries believed to be working in the region to seize control of a nearby gas plant on behalf of EvroPolis .
“ Two years after the United States clashed with some sort of Wagner Group contingent in Deir Ezzor , the United States government still doesn ’ t know anything about the organizational structure of these military contingents , ” Rondeaux said .
But researchers from groups such as Bellingcat and the Conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalists most notably from Novaya Gazeta and Fontanka , have been able to use fragments of publicly available information to build a clearer picture of who is fighting for Russia ’ s private military contractors abroad .
An analysis of Russian social media groups for followers of the Wagner Group as well as the friend networks of individuals who shared details of Bouta ’ s murder online revealed “ a burgeoning online movement of Russian ultranationalists with an abiding interest in mercenary culture who claimed to have served in Russian military units , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Forensics , which was published by New America .
The researchers ’ social network analysis also revealed substantial cross-affiliation with Rusich , a Russian neo-Nazi paramilitary group that has operated in eastern Ukraine .
As the videos of Bouta ’ s torture and beheading were circulated , they became a rallying point for the social networks that have coalesced around Russia ’ s mercenary activity abroad .
“ What we saw was an astounding number of people who would pass this video around , talk about it , or adopt poses from their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rondeaux said .
Bouta is believed to have been killed in the spring of 2017 , and a video of his death first emerged online in June 2017 .
It wasn ’ t until November 2019 , when further videos emerged , that journalists were able to identify the perpetrators as well as the victim .
The Paris-based Syrian investigative news site Jesr Press was able to piece together the most detailed account of Bouta ’ s life and how he came to be captured by Russian mercenaries .
A father of four @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Bouta travelled to Lebanon in 2016 in search of work in the construction industry as large swaths of the region came under Islamic State control .
On his way back to Syria in 2017 , he was arrested and drafted into the Syrian military .
At some point in late March or early April , he escaped on foot from the T4 air base in Homs .
Lost in the desert , he appears to have sought refuge in al-Shaer gas field , where he was later tortured and killed .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ended up online or why the perpetrators chose to document the killing .
A member of the group can be overheard discussing whether they should cover their faces before one says there ’ s no point , as the video is “ not going to go anywhere .
”

Late last November, videos of a gruesome killing went viral on Russian social networks. The shaky cell phone footage taken at al-Shaer gas plant near Palmyra, Syria, shows a Syrian man, who was known to friends and family as Hamdi Bouta, lying on the ground, surrounded by Russian-speaking men in military fatigues. They beat his extremities with a sledgehammer before decapitating him, setting his body on fire and posing for photographs with his remains.
Late last November, videos of a gruesome killing went viral on Russian social networks. The shaky cell phone footage taken at al-Shaer gas plant near Palmyra, Syria, shows a Syrian man, who was known to friends and family as Hamdi Bouta, lying on the ground, surrounded by Russian-speaking men in military fatigues. They beat his extremities with a sledgehammer before decapitating him, setting his body on fire and posing for photographs with his remains.
The perpetrators, who have not yet been charged, were identified by the Russian independent news outlet Novaya Gazeta as private military security contractors for the so-called Wagner Group. Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin who was indicted in the United States for attempted interference in the 2016 presidential election, is widely regarded as the driving force behind the mercenary group.
Bouta’s slaying is symptomatic of the accountability vacuum in which the Wagner Group operates. While mercenary groups are outlawed within Russia, they have served as the tip of the spear of the Kremlin’s proxy wars abroad.
Close to Russian government but nominally independent, private military contractors give the Kremlin a degree of plausible deniability and have complicated efforts by Western policymakers to formulate a response. They are the Swiss Army knives of modern Russian warfare and serve as “force multipliers, arms merchants, trainers of local military and security personnel, and political consultants,” according to a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
This style of hybrid warfare has become a cornerstone of Russia’s efforts to project its interests abroad. A similar melding of public and nominally private entities was used in 2016 in a bid to influence the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, with Russian military hackers stealing emails and documents from the Hillary Clinton campaign while the so-called troll factory, allegedly funded by Prigozhin, sought to fuel divisions between American voters.
Having first appeared in 2014 in eastern Ukraine, where Wagner fighters trained and fought alongside separatist rebels against the Ukrainian army, the group’s operatives have since cropped up everywhere from Venezuela to the Central African Republic, Syria, and Libya.
A new report by Frontline Forensics, a joint initiative of Arizona State University and the New America think tank, published on Tuesday explores the circumstances of Bouta’s death using company records and social media analysis. It sheds new light on the network’s operations and reveals how the killing became a rallying point for Russian ultranationalists online.
“There is a dynamic evolution in the fusion of Russian ultranationalist groups and Russian paramilitaries going on that nobody is really paying attention to or seeing yet,” said Candace Rondeaux, a professor of practice in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University and the author of the report.
The report’s revelations have chilling implications, as Russian mercenaries motivated by both money and far-right ideology are increasingly operating unchecked in some of the world’s most fragile countries.
“You’d better believe it’s terrifying,” Rondeaux said. “And neither the United States government understands how terrifying it is nor do its European allies.”
The Wagner Group has achieved near-mythical status in the Russian and international press in recent years for its role in Russia’s interference efforts abroad, but there is no evidence that a single registered entity called “Wagner” exists, said Jack Margolin, a senior analyst with the nonprofit Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), which provided analytical support for the report.
“The Wagner Group is a very convenient fiction for a lot of people in Russia who both want to get rich and project power abroad,” Rondeaux said.
Rather than being a single organization, Wagner is an opaque network of titular companies and private military contractors that simultaneously further the Kremlin’s interests abroad while lining the pockets of those involved by gaining access to lucrative energy and natural resources mining contracts in the countries in which they operate. Elements of these networks have been identified by researchers and journalists through their overlapping ownership structures, personnel, and supply chains. “It’s a really adaptable network, which makes it hard to target, but also hard to talk about,” said Margolin of C4ADS. Mercenary activity that enables and secures these business interests has become the most visible manifestation of these networks.
The men responsible for murdering Bouta are believed to have worked for EvroPolis, a company that exemplifies the way organizations within the network have blended business and warfare. “EvroPolis really, perhaps more than any other single entirety in the Prigozhin-associated network, captures the full suite of services that the Prigozhin networks have access to,” said Margolin.
Russian corporate records and customs documents reviewed by C4ADS as well as EvroPolis company records provided by the London-based Dossier Center show that the company was offered a 25 percent share of the revenues of Syrian oil and gas fields it was able to seize from the Islamic State. The documents reveal that the company earned $162 million from oil and gas fields in central Syria in 2017 alone.
EvroPolis was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2018 for being owned or controlled by Prigozhin. The Kremlin has repeatedly denied any connections to Russian private military security contractors operating in Syria.
U.S. forces clashed with pro-Syrian government forces, the majority of which are believed to have been Russian mercenaries, in Syria’s Deir Ezzor province in 2018. Between 200 to 300 fighters were killed in the battle, including scores of Russian mercenaries believed to be working in the region to seize control of a nearby gas plant on behalf of EvroPolis. “Two years after the United States clashed with some sort of Wagner Group contingent in Deir Ezzor, the United States government still doesn’t know anything about the organizational structure of these military contingents,” Rondeaux said. But researchers from groups such as Bellingcat and the Conflict Intelligence Team, as well as Russian journalists most notably from Novaya Gazeta and Fontanka, have been able to use fragments of publicly available information to build a clearer picture of who is fighting for Russia’s private military contractors abroad.
An analysis of Russian social media groups for followers of the Wagner Group as well as the friend networks of individuals who shared details of Bouta’s murder online revealed “a burgeoning online movement of Russian ultranationalists with an abiding interest in mercenary culture who claimed to have served in Russian military units,” according to the research by Frontline Forensics, which was published by New America. The researchers’ social network analysis also revealed substantial cross-affiliation with Rusich, a Russian neo-Nazi paramilitary group that has operated in eastern Ukraine.
As the videos of Bouta’s torture and beheading were circulated, they became a rallying point for the social networks that have coalesced around Russia’s mercenary activity abroad. “What we saw was an astounding number of people who would pass this video around, talk about it, or adopt poses from their video as their profile photo,” Rondeaux said.
Bouta is believed to have been killed in the spring of 2017, and a video of his death first emerged online in June 2017. It wasn’t until November 2019, when further videos emerged, that journalists were able to identify the perpetrators as well as the victim. The Paris-based Syrian investigative news site Jesr Press was able to piece together the most detailed account of Bouta’s life and how he came to be captured by Russian mercenaries.
A father of four from Syria’s Deir Ezzor governorate, Bouta travelled to Lebanon in 2016 in search of work in the construction industry as large swaths of the region came under Islamic State control. On his way back to Syria in 2017, he was arrested and drafted into the Syrian military. At some point in late March or early April, he escaped on foot from the T4 air base in Homs. Lost in the desert, he appears to have sought refuge in al-Shaer gas field, where he was later tortured and killed.
It’s not clear how the videos ended up online or why the perpetrators chose to document the killing. A member of the group can be overheard discussing whether they should cover their faces before one says there’s no point, as the video is “not going to go anywhere.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--Trump Bats Down Military Plans on Confederate-Named Bases

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump rejects a plan to rename military bases , a top U.S. general says he regrets attending the president ’ s politicized photo-up , and what to make of new developments in peace talks in Libya and Afghanistan .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
After a week of global protest against racial injustice saw statues of Confederate , segregationist , and slave-owning figureheads toppled from Belgium to Birmingham , Alabama @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mark Esper and U.S. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy were ready to scrub the names of Confederate generals from forts throughout the southern United States .
But President Donald Trump had other ideas .
“ These Monumental and very Powerful Bases have become part of a Great American Heritage , and a history of Winning , Victory , and Freedom , ” the commander-in-chief tweeted on Wednesday .
“ The United States of America trained and deployed our HEROES on these Hallowed Grounds , and won two World Wars .
Therefore , my Administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these Magnificent and Fabled Military Installations.
” Caught off-guard .
In what has become an age-old story in the Trump era , the Pentagon was blindsided by sudden policy change from the president ’ s Twitter account , Politico reports .
The tweets again highlighted the growing gap between Esper and the White House , after the Pentagon declared opposition to the president ’ s plan to use active-duty troops to quell U.S. protests against police brutality and racial injustice .
The timeline matters .
Most of the posts—including Fort Bragg in North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Fort Benning in Georgia—were established between World Wars I and II .
Ret .
Gen. David Petraeus wrote in The Atlantic this week that he supported renaming the bases .
“ The irony of training at bases named for those who took up arms against the United States , and for the right to enslave others , is inescapable to anyone paying attention , ” he wrote .
Some former Pentagon officials agreed .
“ I don ’ t know anyone in the military that wouldn ’ t support renaming our military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ marines , soldiers , sailors , and airmen recipients , many of which sacrificed their life , over a general that took up arms against their country to protect the vile institution of slavery , ” said Mick Mulroy , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Trump administration .
Milley regrets Trump photo op .
Meanwhile , the U.S. military ’ s top general , Mark Milley , said he regretted joining President Trump ’ s controversial photo-op at Lafayette Square near the White House last week after police used @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to clear out protesters .
Critics said the episode showed the risk of increased politicization of the armed forces amid a debate over using active-duty U.S. troops to quell nationwide protests .
“ I should not have been there , ” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the National Defense University in a pre-recorded speech .
“ My presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.
” A stalemate in Libya leads to talks .
A potential glimmer of good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent hotbed of proxy power competition between United Arab Emirates , Egypt , Russia , Saudi Arabia , and Turkey all backing various sides in the conflict .
The United Nations said that Libyan National Army Gen. Khalifa Haftar met with representatives of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord ( GNA ) earlier this week for “ productive talks ” after fighting reached a stalemate .
As the talks got underway , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , who backs the GNA , said that he had reached agreements with Trump that could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ era ” for Libya , though he didn ’ t elaborate on specifics .
Tenuous moment in Afghanistan negotiations .
Meanwhile , Taliban officials have said they are preparing their agenda for peace talks with the Afghan government .
No date is set for when the intra-Afghan negotiations will begin , but talks were held up over prisoner exchanges .
As part of the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February , the Afghan government was expected to release 5,000 Taliban fighters and the Taliban to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel .
After weeks of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and as of June 8 , the government has reportedly released some 2,710 fighters and the Taliban has reciprocated with over 500 prisoners .
But complicating the peace talks are growing tensions between factions of the Taliban and indications a senior leader is severely sick with COVID-19 .
Boko Haram attacks .
Boko Haram militants are believed to be responsible for the deaths of at least 81 people in a gruesome attack on a village in northeast Nigeria on Tuesday , underscoring the growing threat from extremists in West Africa .
Survivors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the village claiming to be Islamic teachers .
Once they convinced villagers to drop their arms , they opened fire .
Nigerian troops have since been sent to the area to bolster the military ’ s presence there .
Proposed plans from the Pentagon to draw down the U.S. military footprint in Africa have drawn anger from U.S. lawmakers , who want to bolster troop presence in support of counter-terrorism operations .
Pentagon policy chief .
Trump announced on Wednesday that he intends to nominate Anthony Tata , a retired brigadier general and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department ’ s next policy chief .
If confirmed , Tata would replace John Rood , who was fired by Trump in February : He opposed a freeze on U.S. aid to Ukraine that prompted that impeachment investigation .
Tata is already a familiar face in the halls of the Pentagon .
He currently serves in a senior advisory role awaiting the nomination process in a move that could raise questions in Congress .
Cybercom .
The Pentagon announced on June 9 that Maj. Gen. Charles Moore will take over as the deputy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Adm. Ross Myers .
Moore currently holds the position of director of operations , where he was instrumental in implementing the Defense Department ’ s “ defend forward ” policy , a cyber strategy aimed at monitoring foreign networks and preventing attacks before they happen .
Space Command .
Marine Corps Master Gunnery Sgt .
Scott Stalker was tapped to serve as the next senior enlisted leader of the command .
Space Command , launched in 2019 , is separate from the U.S. Space Force .
Former DIA Director on racism .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency , wrote a powerful op-ed for Task and Purpose on systemic racism in the United States : “ I am now part of the ‘ privileged ’ class , a black man who overcame obstacles to become a three-star general , told by white people that at least things are better than they were , while black people think I can ’ t possibly understand their anger , frustration , or despair .
Neither are right.
” NATO defense ministers will meet virtually on June @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to discuss the decision by Trump to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany .
The target date for a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front is June 20 .
Accidental invasion .
Polish soldiers reportedly crossed into the Czech Republic in late May and accidentally set up a checkpoint in Czech communities .
Both Czech and Polish officials confirmed that the incident was not a purposeful invasion but the result of a misunderstanding on the Polish side and was resolved .
Phew .
For more from FP , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump rejects a plan to rename military bases , a top U.S. general says he regrets attending the president’s politicized photo-up , and what to make of new developments in peace talks in Libya and Afghanistan .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump rejects a plan to rename military bases, a top U.S. general says he regrets attending the president’s politicized photo-up, and what to make of new developments in peace talks in Libya and Afghanistan.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump: Bases Will Keep Their Names
After a week of global protest against racial injustice saw statues of Confederate, segregationist, and slave-owning figureheads toppled from Belgium to Birmingham, Alabama, senior Pentagon leaders including Defense Secretary Mark Esper and U.S. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy were ready to scrub the names of Confederate generals from forts throughout the southern United States.
But President Donald Trump had other ideas. “These Monumental and very Powerful Bases have become part of a Great American Heritage, and a history of Winning, Victory, and Freedom,” the commander-in-chief tweeted on Wednesday. “The United States of America trained and deployed our HEROES on these Hallowed Grounds, and won two World Wars. Therefore, my Administration will not even consider the renaming of these Magnificent and Fabled Military Installations.”
Caught off-guard. In what has become an age-old story in the Trump era, the Pentagon was blindsided by sudden policy change from the president’s Twitter account, Politico reports. The tweets again highlighted the growing gap between Esper and the White House, after the Pentagon declared opposition to the president’s plan to use active-duty troops to quell U.S. protests against police brutality and racial injustice.
The timeline matters. Most of the posts—including Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Hood in Texas, and Fort Benning in Georgia—were established between World Wars I and II. Ret. Gen. David Petraeus wrote in The Atlantic this week that he supported renaming the bases. “The irony of training at bases named for those who took up arms against the United States, and for the right to enslave others, is inescapable to anyone paying attention,” he wrote.
Some former Pentagon officials agreed. “I don’t know anyone in the military that wouldn’t support renaming our military installations after the young Medal of Honor marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen recipients, many of which sacrificed their life, over a general that took up arms against their country to protect the vile institution of slavery,” said Mick Mulroy, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Trump administration.
What We’re Watching
Milley regrets Trump photo op. Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s top general, Mark Milley, said he regretted joining President Trump’s controversial photo-op at Lafayette Square near the White House last week after police used tear gas and other riot control measures to clear out protesters. Critics said the episode showed the risk of increased politicization of the armed forces amid a debate over using active-duty U.S. troops to quell nationwide protests.
“I should not have been there,” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the National Defense University in a pre-recorded speech. “My presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”
A stalemate in Libya leads to talks. A potential glimmer of good news is emerging in Libya, a recent hotbed of proxy power competition between United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all backing various sides in the conflict. The United Nations said that Libyan National Army Gen. Khalifa Haftar met with representatives of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) earlier this week for “productive talks” after fighting reached a stalemate.
As the talks got underway, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who backs the GNA, said that he had reached agreements with Trump that could mark the beginning of a “new era” for Libya, though he didn’t elaborate on specifics.
Tenuous moment in Afghanistan negotiations. Meanwhile, Taliban officials have said they are preparing their agenda for peace talks with the Afghan government. No date is set for when the intra-Afghan negotiations will begin, but talks were held up over prisoner exchanges. As part of the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February, the Afghan government was expected to release 5,000 Taliban fighters and the Taliban to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel.
After weeks of stalling, prisoner swaps began in April, and as of June 8, the government has reportedly released some 2,710 fighters and the Taliban has reciprocated with over 500 prisoners. But complicating the peace talks are growing tensions between factions of the Taliban and indications a senior leader is severely sick with COVID-19.
Boko Haram attacks. Boko Haram militants are believed to be responsible for the deaths of at least 81 people in a gruesome attack on a village in northeast Nigeria on Tuesday, underscoring the growing threat from extremists in West Africa. Survivors told reporters that the militants arrived at the village claiming to be Islamic teachers. Once they convinced villagers to drop their arms, they opened fire. Nigerian troops have since been sent to the area to bolster the military’s presence there.
Proposed plans from the Pentagon to draw down the U.S. military footprint in Africa have drawn anger from U.S. lawmakers, who want to bolster troop presence in support of counter-terrorism operations.
Movers and Shakers
Pentagon policy chief. Trump announced on Wednesday that he intends to nominate Anthony Tata, a retired brigadier general and Fox News contributor, as the Defense Department’s next policy chief. If confirmed, Tata would replace John Rood, who was fired by Trump in February: He opposed a freeze on U.S. aid to Ukraine that prompted that impeachment investigation.
Tata is already a familiar face in the halls of the Pentagon. He currently serves in a senior advisory role awaiting the nomination process in a move that could raise questions in Congress.
Cybercom. The Pentagon announced on June 9 that Maj. Gen. Charles Moore will take over as the deputy commander of Cyber Command, replacing Vice. Adm. Ross Myers. Moore currently holds the position of director of operations, where he was instrumental in implementing the Defense Department’s “defend forward” policy, a cyber strategy aimed at monitoring foreign networks and preventing attacks before they happen.
Space Command. Marine Corps Master Gunnery Sgt. Scott Stalker was tapped to serve as the next senior enlisted leader of the command. Space Command, launched in 2019, is separate from the U.S. Space Force.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Former DIA Director on racism. Vincent Stewart, a retired lieutenant general and former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote a powerful op-ed for Task and Purpose on systemic racism in the United States: “I am now part of the ‘privileged’ class, a black man who overcame obstacles to become a three-star general, told by white people that at least things are better than they were, while black people think I can’t possibly understand their anger, frustration, or despair. Neither are right.”
The Week Ahead
NATO defense ministers will meet virtually on June 17 and 18. They are likely to discuss the decision by Trump to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany.
The target date for a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front is June 20.
Odds and Ends
Accidental invasion. Polish soldiers reportedly crossed into the Czech Republic in late May and accidentally set up a checkpoint in Czech communities. Both Czech and Polish officials confirmed that the incident was not a purposeful invasion but the result of a misunderstanding on the Polish side and was resolved. Phew.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-11--Fighting for U.S. Values Abroad, Black Diplomats Struggle With Challenges at Home

On June 1 , an hour after police began tear-gassing protesters outside the White House to clear the way for a photo-op for U.S. President Donald Trump , a top-ranking diplomat sent an email to State Department employees alluding to the police violence and racism that prompted the protests .
“ This past week , we have seen the difficult images across our country triggered by the horrifying events in Minnesota .
As Americans , it is a difficult moment for all of us , ” said Stephen Biegun , the deputy secretary of state , in the note , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ To that end , I have encouraged Department leaders across our missions overseas and our bureaus to take some time to open dialogues with their teams and create opportunities to share experiences as we reflect on how these experiences impact our communities and as we strive to represent American values in our work.
” The email was meant to send a message to State Department employees that senior leaders acknowledged the challenges of racial injustice and police brutality in the United States after the killing of George Floyd , a black man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minnesota on May 25 that ignited worldwide protests .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added his own thoughts in an email to employees on June 10—16 days after Floyd ’ s killing—condemning his death as a “ tragedy ” and saying the country ’ s “ civic unrest gives us an extraordinary opportunity to tell our story abroad.
” But for some State Department officials , particularly black diplomats and other diplomats of color , these messages fell flat .
As a broader swath of Americans reckon with racism in a new way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bottom to America ’ s diplomatic corps seem to be more of the same : a belated handful of emails to employees from senior officials calling for fresh dialogue , rehashing stale pledges to diversify the U.S. diplomatic corps , and committing to root out prejudice and bias that have plagued the department for decades .
Floyd ’ s death has laid bare how injustices at home can disarm American diplomats trying to advocate for human rights and rule of law in foreign countries .
But it has also resurfaced the painful difficulties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their jobs advancing U.S. foreign policy .
The nationwide movement that started after Floyd ’ s death has also highlighted how few diplomats of color , particularly African Americans , reach senior positions within the department .
Out of 189 ambassadors serving overseas today , only three are African American career diplomats , and just four are Hispanic , according to the American Academy of Diplomacy , which in an open letter on Tuesday urged the department to do more to increase its diversity .
Foreign Policy interviewed nearly a dozen current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who described racism they faced in foreign countries , as well as the discrimination and prejudice they experienced within the department and the difficulties of promoting American values abroad at a time when they feel under assault at home .
Many said the fragmented and overdue messages coming from senior department leaders after Floyd ’ s death is emblematic of a larger , systemic problem within U.S. diplomacy , which long predates Trump .
But they are exacerbated by a president who has inflamed divides in the country and emboldened white supremacists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wake of the 2017 Charlottesville protests , in which an anti-racist protester was killed .
Some of the diplomats who spoke to Foreign Policy say they are so dejected by the administration ’ s response to the latest wave of protests that they are considering quitting the foreign service altogether .
Others feel an obligation to stay , out of a sense of patriotism and the urgent need to ensure that minority voices within the department are still part of diplomatic discussions .
“ I think that a lot of foreign service officers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are at a point where they ’ re just fed up , ” said one official .
“ We ’ re dissatisfied , we feel dehumanized , and I think enough is enough .
We ’ re not only trying to be acknowledged as black human beings who are grieving and traumatized and affected by this … but there is an issue of diversity , recruitment , and retention that they ’ ve not taken seriously.
” When she crossed the nearby border into the United States , U.S. Customs and Border Protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ smuggling drugs , asked how she learned to speak English so well , and frequently flagged her cars for secondary inspections—something that as a U.S. diplomat and government employee she should ’ ve been exempted from .
It got to the point where she had to carry a special letter from the U.S. consul general , complete with her car make , model , and license plate numbers , to prove to border agents that she was in fact a U.S. diplomat .
Even then , unlike her white colleagues , she was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic passport or papers .
“ The harassment I got from CBP was so severe , ” recalled Cormier Smith , who has since left the foreign service .
Tianna Spears , another former foreign service officer who is black , recounted in a recent blog post—which has since gone viral within the diplomatic community—her harsh treatment by CBP officers while posted at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juárez , Mexico , from 2018 to 2019 .
She was subsequently diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder , depression , and anxiety and ultimately left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who read the post said it is illustrative of the types of hurdles they face in their jobs that their white counterparts don ’ t understand or fully appreciate .
Sometimes , the most blatant forms of racism they experienced came from foreign government officials themselves .
When then-U.S .
Ambassador to Zimbabwe Harry Thomas Jr. spoke up about Zimbabwe ’ s prevalent human rights violations in 2017 , a Zimbabwean government spokesperson said he and other U.S. critics should go “ hang on a banana tree.
” Zimbabwean State propaganda outlets previously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a “ house n***** dressed in a fine suit.
” Black diplomats said they have also faced prejudice and bias from their own colleagues .
They relayed experiences that ranged from offensive passing comments to more overt forms of racism .
They recounted times they were disciplined for things their white colleagues were not , and being passed over for promotions in favor of less experienced white colleagues .
Some recounted that when they brought up these issues with supervisors , their supervisors put the responsibility back on them , tasking them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on racial insensitivities in the workplace .
“ They ’ re putting that burden on their black employees , instead of actually spending the resources necessary to deal with it in the proper manner , and that is so unfair , ” Cormier Smith said .
“ To have the added task of trying to educate people on racism and give them solutions on how they can be better is a really heavy and unfair burden.
” These challenges are layered on top of an already emotionally traumatizing year for Americans across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personal connections to the scenes of police violence and racial injustice at home .
The deaths of George Floyd , Breonna Taylor , and Ahmaud Arbery in recent months have coincided with the coronavirus pandemic , which has underscored deep-seated and systemic racial inequalities in the United States : The pandemic has pushed unemployment for black workers far above the national average , and the COVID-19 death rate for black Americans is 2.4 times greater than it is for whites .
“ It ’ s just been one emotional assault after another , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In an email response , a State Department spokeswoman said Pompeo “ is committed to building a more diverse and inclusive ” State Department .
“ The men and women of the Department of State , like all institutions and organizations across America , are engaged in hard conversations and discussions in the wake of the killing of George Floyd , ” she said .
She also referred to State Department policies that prohibit employees from engaging in discriminatory harassment .
“ Over the past week , Department bureaus , offices , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open and honest conversations that make clear that bias and discrimination must continue to be addressed and have no place in the Department of State .
Many actions have been underway to achieve this , ” the spokesperson added .
“ The Department ’ s leadership is listening to the experiences of African Americans in the Department with humility and introspection.
” Two often-cited examples are the Pickering and Rangel fellowships , funded each year to bring more minorities and Americans from diverse backgrounds into the department .
The department has also ramped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the workplace in recent years , and trendlines point to increasing diversity in the department ’ s new classes of foreign service officers .
Senior State officials insist the department is improving its record over time .
“ I am proud that the composition of our State Department workforce also reflects America ’ s devotion to the principle of equal opportunity .
Nearly one-third of our team members are minorities—an all-time high—and 44 % are women , ” Pompeo wrote in his email to staff on June 10 .
“ We ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America by providing opportunities for Americans of all backgrounds.
” A February report on State Department diversity from the Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) , an independent federal watchdog , found the percentage of African Americans in the foreign service increased only from 6 to 7 percent between 2002 and 2018 .
The percentage of African American women in the department ’ s overall workforce , including those in the civil service , decreased from 13 to 9 percent during that time period , and within the foreign service it rose from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ study also found that racial or ethnic minorities in the State Department ’ s civil service “ had statistically significantly lower odds of promotion ” than white men .
“ The Department of State can always do better .
We can all do better , ” said the State Department spokeswoman .
“ We will continue to address these longstanding issues not only through policies and programs , but also practices and institutional culture , to recruit , retain , and promote to senior positions a skilled , motivated , and diverse workforce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” As in the military , it takes decades for foreign service officers to climb through the ranks to senior posts , meaning that a lack of diversity in a class of foreign service officers 20 years ago will play out in its midlevel and senior ranks today .
Diversity in the senior ranks of the department remains low and has also regressed over time in some ways , State Department data shows .
In 2008 , black diplomats made up about 8.6 percent of the senior foreign service , the top ranks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equivalent to generals in the military .
The latest State Department data from March shows that 2.8 percent of the senior foreign service identifies as African American , and 1.3 percent as multiracial .
The political appointees Trump has brought in to run the department are also overwhelmingly white men .
Some strides made in past decades , particularly under Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice—the first and second African American secretaries of state—stopped short when midlevel and senior nonwhite diplomats left the department in recent years .
Some left voluntarily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an attempt to restructure the department under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson .
U.S. lawmakers have called for the State Department to undertake more meaningful reforms to address its recruitment and retention issues .
Two Democratic members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Reps. Eliot Engel and Joaquin Castro , wrote in a letter last month that the department “ failed to demonstrate any serious effort to address the lack of workforce diversity at the mid-career and senior levels.
” When they requested further meetings and information from the department , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( The State Department has declined multiple requests for comment on this issue . )
Former senior diplomats say the current divisive political climate fueled by Trump only makes it more difficult to retain a diverse diplomatic corps .
“ We made painfully slow progress over the three and a half decades I served , but still struggled to be as inclusive and representative as we should have been , ” former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns told Foreign Policy .
“ Now the challenge has become much harder , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and is so disdainful of career public service.
” “ I can only imagine how hard it is to serve under these circumstances , but I admire those who persist—especially younger officers who are the future of a more diverse and effective Foreign Service , ” he added .
Harry Thomas Jr. , the former senior African American foreign service officer who faced racist insults from the Zimbabwean government , said the State Department should expand its Pickering and Rangel fellowship programs .
He also said the department needed to create more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ranks , particularly in regions where they are underrepresented in the department : bureaus that cover the Middle East , Europe , and Asia .
For Thomas , new task forces and internal dialogues on diversity aren ’ t enough anymore : “ You can set up all the kumbaya panels you want .
But until you see people of color being given these opportunities … nothing is going to change except band-aids on surfaces.
” Thomas Pickering , a renowned former senior diplomat from whom the Pickering fellowship draws its name @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expands the program .
He acknowledged how difficult it could be for some State Department officials to stay in their jobs at the moment .
“ This is a tough time .
And I recognize it , and telling everybody , ‘ Just hang in and everything will be better , ’ is not the answer that these people need to hear , ” he said .
Still , he encouraged those employees thinking of leaving to stay in the job .
“ They are essential for the future of the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could they give every consideration to sticking it out … they will be needed.
” Lower-ranking officials , many of whom were diplomats of color who quickly understood the gravity of the protests and potential for political fallout abroad , began pushing up the chain for assistant secretaries of state in regional bureaus and more senior officials to proactively issue statements .
Those efforts fell short , two officials said , and at least one assistant secretary of state flatly rejected the idea of issuing a statement , believing it to be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guidance from Washington on what statements they could issue to address Floyd ’ s killing and the international backlash to police violence against black Americans , some embassies were given no direction , instead only referred back to Trump ’ s Twitter account .
While embassies have agency to issue their own statements without prior approval from Washington , they say they face heightened political risks of doing so under the Trump administration , lest such statements running afoul of sudden shifts in policy or message from an unpredictable president who already appears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and disdain .
U.S. diplomats have drawn Trump ’ s ire before , including diplomats drawn into testify in the impeachment scandal .
Those who testified received no public words of support from Pompeo .
The pressure for a response was particularly acute for U.S. embassies in Africa , several officials said .
Some embassies—including those in Eritrea , the Democratic Republic of the Congo , Zambia , Kenya , and Uganda—still issued social media posts or statements on their own volition in an effort to make up for the silence from Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Zimbabwe , issued a personalized statement tying tragedies in the United States to U.S. commitments on human rights in Zimbabwe that was widely lauded in the diplomatic community .
( The assistant secretary of state for African affairs , Tibor Nagy , has not issued any statement . )
Biegun , the deputy secretary of state , sent his email to staff seven days after Floyd ’ s death , after the wave of international condemnation and protests began coalescing outside the gates of U.S. embassies in foreign capitals .
The State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guidance with coordinated messages from Washington on the matter until two days later , on June 3 , several officials told Foreign Policy—in some cases over a week after embassies had first requested it .
“ When you ’ re working in a country full of black lives , you don ’ t have the luxury of turning a blind eye or hiding under a rock hoping no one comes to find you to point out all the hypocrisy , ” said one department official .
“ The press guidance was a day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on June 3 , the director-general of the foreign service , Carol Perez , sent an email to staff acknowledging the department ’ s shortcomings .
“ Over the past few days I have read powerful employee testimonies—stories of disrespect , exhaustion , and disappointment.
” “ These distressing accounts should strengthen our collective resolve ; we must do better by our people and by one another , ” she wrote .
She said that the department had a task force rolling out a strategic plan on diversity and inclusion from 2020 to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Wednesday , Pompeo implied he held off on addressing staff until after Floyd ’ s funeral .
“ Now , following his burial , it is appropriate to address a set of issues that are currently the topic of much debate in the United States , and , importantly for us , around the world , ” he wrote .
But he had already commented on the matter in a May 31 Fox News interview .
He also issued a public statement on Floyd ’ s killing only as it related to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secretary also reiterated that message in his Wednesday evening email : “ We must reject unequivocally the false charges—many of them vile propaganda emanating from China , Iran and other autocracies—questioning America ’ s credibility in promoting human rights and democracy abroad , ” he wrote .
“ Yes , the United States is imperfect .
We should always be both proud of what we ’ ve achieved and humble knowing there is more to do , ” he added .
“ Americans recognize deeply that we must always strive toward , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more perfect union.
’ ” Many of the officials who spoke to Foreign Policy reacted to these messages with a mixture of anger and disillusionment .
Some took issue with the fact that in his note , Biegun focused on his conversations with new classes of Pickering and Rangel fellows .
“ Senior officials at the State Department love to mention the Pickering and Rangel fellows , they love to drop that in there to indicate how progressive we are on these issues , ” said one current State Department official , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fellowships .
“ Everyone ’ s tired of that .
Every alum that I talk to , the fellows themselves , they say , ‘ Don ’ t just trot us out when you want to make a point work then put us back on the shelf.
’ ” Others derided Pompeo ’ s statement , saying it missed the mark and questioning why it took him over two weeks to address employees .
“ Too little , too late , ” said one official .
“ I thought that the overall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ touch from the reality that Americans and department employees are facing , ” said a second .
“ It felt like he was more interested in picking a fight with and shifting the blame [ to ] China than actually addressing the human rights issues here , ” the diplomat added .
“ I ’ m just beyond embarrassed and disappointed.
” “ He didn ’ t acknowledge that racism is at the center of this , which tells me all I need to know , ” said a third diplomat .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brutal regimes … elsewhere in the world , even if they say they ’ re ‘ striving.
’ Why is this an acceptable excuse for us ?
” In recent weeks , Washington has found itself at the receiving end of the type of diplomatic signals it usually doles out to authoritarian countries .
Australia , for example , opened an investigation into U.S. police violence after two Australian news reporters were bludgeoned live on air outside the White House during the protests on June 1 .
In the United Kingdom , over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stop exporting tear gas and rubber bullets to Washington on human rights grounds .
Many African leaders also weighed in on the violence .
“ It can not be right that , in the 21st century , the United States , this great bastion of democracy , continues to grapple with the problem of systemic racism , ” wrote Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo .
Behind closed doors , U.S. diplomats quietly concede the recent spate of police violence targeting the black community is sapping America ’ s already dwindling soft power reserves and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ call out foreign governments on human rights violations .
“ The crux of this issue doesn ’ t rest with any one administration , ” said an official .
“ Though not the poster child for diversity , this issue is also bigger than the State Department .
This is a deeply rooted issue of national security .
How are ethnic minorities in other countries supposed to believe that the U.S. stands with them when they ’ re watching George Floyd ’ s murder on Twitter ?
” Former senior diplomats agreed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for ambassadors to try to explain what is happening in the United States in the context of human rights and justice , where we had been the voice that people have looked to , ” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield , who was the seniormost-ranking African American woman in the foreign service when she retired from her post in 2017 .
“ If I were an ambassador now , what I would be saying to these countries is , ‘ This does not represent the America that we had been talking about .
This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the more positive side , ’ ” she added .
“ Of course they ’ re going to say , ‘ You ’ re still hypocrites.
’ And , I ’ d probably say in private , ‘ You ’ re right .
’ ”

On June 1, an hour after police began tear-gassing protesters outside the White House to clear the way for a photo-op for U.S. President Donald Trump, a top-ranking diplomat sent an email to State Department employees alluding to the police violence and racism that prompted the protests.
On June 1, an hour after police began tear-gassing protesters outside the White House to clear the way for a photo-op for U.S. President Donald Trump, a top-ranking diplomat sent an email to State Department employees alluding to the police violence and racism that prompted the protests.
“This past week, we have seen the difficult images across our country triggered by the horrifying events in Minnesota. As Americans, it is a difficult moment for all of us,” said Stephen Biegun, the deputy secretary of state, in the note, which was obtained by Foreign Policy. “To that end, I have encouraged Department leaders across our missions overseas and our bureaus to take some time to open dialogues with their teams and create opportunities to share experiences as we reflect on how these experiences impact our communities and as we strive to represent American values in our work.”
The email was meant to send a message to State Department employees that senior leaders acknowledged the challenges of racial injustice and police brutality in the United States after the killing of George Floyd, a black man who died in police custody, in Minnesota on May 25 that ignited worldwide protests. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added his own thoughts in an email to employees on June 10—16 days after Floyd’s killing—condemning his death as a “tragedy” and saying the country’s “civic unrest gives us an extraordinary opportunity to tell our story abroad.”
But for some State Department officials, particularly black diplomats and other diplomats of color, these messages fell flat. As a broader swath of Americans reckon with racism in a new way, the signals coming out of Foggy Bottom to America’s diplomatic corps seem to be more of the same: a belated handful of emails to employees from senior officials calling for fresh dialogue, rehashing stale pledges to diversify the U.S. diplomatic corps, and committing to root out prejudice and bias that have plagued the department for decades.
Floyd’s death has laid bare how injustices at home can disarm American diplomats trying to advocate for human rights and rule of law in foreign countries. But it has also resurfaced the painful difficulties African American diplomats face day to day in their jobs advancing U.S. foreign policy.
The nationwide movement that started after Floyd’s death has also highlighted how few diplomats of color, particularly African Americans, reach senior positions within the department.
Out of 189 ambassadors serving overseas today, only three are African American career diplomats, and just four are Hispanic, according to the American Academy of Diplomacy, which in an open letter on Tuesday urged the department to do more to increase its diversity.
Foreign Policy interviewed nearly a dozen current and former African American State Department officials, who described racism they faced in foreign countries, as well as the discrimination and prejudice they experienced within the department and the difficulties of promoting American values abroad at a time when they feel under assault at home.
Many said the fragmented and overdue messages coming from senior department leaders after Floyd’s death is emblematic of a larger, systemic problem within U.S. diplomacy, which long predates Trump. But they are exacerbated by a president who has inflamed divides in the country and emboldened white supremacists with caustic rhetoric, particularly in the wake of the 2017 Charlottesville protests, in which an anti-racist protester was killed.
Some of the diplomats who spoke to Foreign Policy say they are so dejected by the administration’s response to the latest wave of protests that they are considering quitting the foreign service altogether. Others feel an obligation to stay, out of a sense of patriotism and the urgent need to ensure that minority voices within the department are still part of diplomatic discussions.
“I think that a lot of foreign service officers of color, particularly black officers, are at a point where they’re just fed up,” said one official. “We’re dissatisfied, we feel dehumanized, and I think enough is enough. We’re not only trying to be acknowledged as black human beings who are grieving and traumatized and affected by this … but there is an issue of diversity, recruitment, and retention that they’ve not taken seriously.”
When Desiree Cormier Smith was posted to the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, Mexico, from 2010 to 2012, she faced challenges in the job her white colleagues didn’t experience. “I had plenty of applicants come up to my window and say, ‘No, I want to talk to a real American,’ or, ‘I want to talk to a real official,’” she recalled from her days issuing nonimmigrant visas at the consulate.
When she crossed the nearby border into the United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers grilled her on whether she was smuggling drugs, asked how she learned to speak English so well, and frequently flagged her cars for secondary inspections—something that as a U.S. diplomat and government employee she should’ve been exempted from. It got to the point where she had to carry a special letter from the U.S. consul general, complete with her car make, model, and license plate numbers, to prove to border agents that she was in fact a U.S. diplomat. Even then, unlike her white colleagues, she was accused by border agents of faking her diplomatic passport or papers.
“The harassment I got from CBP was so severe,” recalled Cormier Smith, who has since left the foreign service.
Tianna Spears, another former foreign service officer who is black, recounted in a recent blog post—which has since gone viral within the diplomatic community—her harsh treatment by CBP officers while posted at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, from 2018 to 2019. She was subsequently diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety and ultimately left the department. Black foreign service officers who read the post said it is illustrative of the types of hurdles they face in their jobs that their white counterparts don’t understand or fully appreciate.
Sometimes, the most blatant forms of racism they experienced came from foreign government officials themselves. When then-U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Harry Thomas Jr. spoke up about Zimbabwe’s prevalent human rights violations in 2017, a Zimbabwean government spokesperson said he and other U.S. critics should go “hang on a banana tree.” Zimbabwean State propaganda outlets previously labeled him an “Uncle Tom” and a “house n***** dressed in a fine suit.”
Black diplomats said they have also faced prejudice and bias from their own colleagues. They relayed experiences that ranged from offensive passing comments to more overt forms of racism. They recounted times they were disciplined for things their white colleagues were not, and being passed over for promotions in favor of less experienced white colleagues. Some recounted that when they brought up these issues with supervisors, their supervisors put the responsibility back on them, tasking them to organize discussions with colleagues or trainings on racial insensitivities in the workplace.
“They’re putting that burden on their black employees, instead of actually spending the resources necessary to deal with it in the proper manner, and that is so unfair,” Cormier Smith said. “To have the added task of trying to educate people on racism and give them solutions on how they can be better is a really heavy and unfair burden.”
These challenges are layered on top of an already emotionally traumatizing year for Americans across the country, including diplomats abroad who feel personal connections to the scenes of police violence and racial injustice at home. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery in recent months have coincided with the coronavirus pandemic, which has underscored deep-seated and systemic racial inequalities in the United States: The pandemic has pushed unemployment for black workers far above the national average, and the COVID-19 death rate for black Americans is 2.4 times greater than it is for whites.
“It’s just been one emotional assault after another,” said one black State Department official.
In an email response, a State Department spokeswoman said Pompeo “is committed to building a more diverse and inclusive” State Department. “The men and women of the Department of State, like all institutions and organizations across America, are engaged in hard conversations and discussions in the wake of the killing of George Floyd,” she said. She also referred to State Department policies that prohibit employees from engaging in discriminatory harassment.
“Over the past week, Department bureaus, offices, embassies, and consulates have been having open and honest conversations that make clear that bias and discrimination must continue to be addressed and have no place in the Department of State. Many actions have been underway to achieve this,” the spokesperson added. “The Department’s leadership is listening to the experiences of African Americans in the Department with humility and introspection.”
Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, the first African American secretaries of state, at the White House on March 12, 2002 when Rice was national security adviser and Powell was secretary of state.
Current and former diplomats say the State Department has made some strides to shed its historic reputation as an elitist old boy network—“pale, male, and Yale” was at one time a common refrain to describe the foreign service—through hiring initiatives, fellowship programs, diversity training, and more outreach at historically black and historically Hispanic colleges.
Two often-cited examples are the Pickering and Rangel fellowships, funded each year to bring more minorities and Americans from diverse backgrounds into the department. The department has also ramped up training to tackle bias and prejudice in the workplace in recent years, and trendlines point to increasing diversity in the department’s new classes of foreign service officers.
Senior State officials insist the department is improving its record over time. “I am proud that the composition of our State Department workforce also reflects America’s devotion to the principle of equal opportunity. Nearly one-third of our team members are minorities—an all-time high—and 44% are women,” Pompeo wrote in his email to staff on June 10. “We’ll continue to honor the promise of America by providing opportunities for Americans of all backgrounds.”
But additional data shows uneven results.
A February report on State Department diversity from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent federal watchdog, found the percentage of African Americans in the foreign service increased only from 6 to 7 percent between 2002 and 2018. The percentage of African American women in the department’s overall workforce, including those in the civil service, decreased from 13 to 9 percent during that time period, and within the foreign service it rose from 2 to 3 percent.
The GAO study also found that racial or ethnic minorities in the State Department’s civil service “had statistically significantly lower odds of promotion” than white men.
African Americans at the State Department, 2018
“The Department of State can always do better. We can all do better,” said the State Department spokeswoman. “We will continue to address these longstanding issues not only through policies and programs, but also practices and institutional culture, to recruit, retain, and promote to senior positions a skilled, motivated, and diverse workforce that reflects the values of our nation.”
As in the military, it takes decades for foreign service officers to climb through the ranks to senior posts, meaning that a lack of diversity in a class of foreign service officers 20 years ago will play out in its midlevel and senior ranks today.
Diversity in the senior ranks of the department remains low and has also regressed over time in some ways, State Department data shows. In 2008, black diplomats made up about 8.6 percent of the senior foreign service, the top ranks of the diplomatic corps with senior grades equivalent to generals in the military. The latest State Department data from March shows that 2.8 percent of the senior foreign service identifies as African American, and 1.3 percent as multiracial.
The political appointees Trump has brought in to run the department are also overwhelmingly white men.
Some strides made in past decades, particularly under Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice—the first and second African American secretaries of state—stopped short when midlevel and senior nonwhite diplomats left the department in recent years. Some left voluntarily, while others were forced out during an attempt to restructure the department under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
U.S. lawmakers have called for the State Department to undertake more meaningful reforms to address its recruitment and retention issues. Two Democratic members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Reps. Eliot Engel and Joaquin Castro, wrote in a letter last month that the department “failed to demonstrate any serious effort to address the lack of workforce diversity at the mid-career and senior levels.” When they requested further meetings and information from the department, they said the department refused to cooperate. (The State Department has declined multiple requests for comment on this issue.)
Former senior diplomats say the current divisive political climate fueled by Trump only makes it more difficult to retain a diverse diplomatic corps.
“We made painfully slow progress over the three and a half decades I served, but still struggled to be as inclusive and representative as we should have been,” former Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns told Foreign Policy. “Now the challenge has become much harder, with a President who divides rather than unites, and is so disdainful of career public service.”
“I can only imagine how hard it is to serve under these circumstances, but I admire those who persist—especially younger officers who are the future of a more diverse and effective Foreign Service,” he added.
Harry Thomas Jr., the former senior African American foreign service officer who faced racist insults from the Zimbabwean government, said the State Department should expand its Pickering and Rangel fellowship programs. He also said the department needed to create more opportunities for nonwhite diplomats to advance through the ranks, particularly in regions where they are underrepresented in the department: bureaus that cover the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. For Thomas, new task forces and internal dialogues on diversity aren’t enough anymore: “You can set up all the kumbaya panels you want. But until you see people of color being given these opportunities … nothing is going to change except band-aids on surfaces.”
Thomas Pickering, a renowned former senior diplomat from whom the Pickering fellowship draws its name, also urged Congress to appropriate funds to expands the program. He acknowledged how difficult it could be for some State Department officials to stay in their jobs at the moment. “This is a tough time. And I recognize it, and telling everybody, ‘Just hang in and everything will be better,’ is not the answer that these people need to hear,” he said.
Still, he encouraged those employees thinking of leaving to stay in the job. “They are essential for the future of the American foreign service, and [if] could they give every consideration to sticking it out … they will be needed.”
The department’s long-standing challenges with diversity were evident in its response to the Floyd protests. In the weeks since his death, as protests garnering tens of thousands of demonstrators gained momentum worldwide, senior leaders in the department did not fully understand the need to issue any public response, multiple officials told Foreign Policy.
Lower-ranking officials, many of whom were diplomats of color who quickly understood the gravity of the protests and potential for political fallout abroad, began pushing up the chain for assistant secretaries of state in regional bureaus and more senior officials to proactively issue statements. Those efforts fell short, two officials said, and at least one assistant secretary of state flatly rejected the idea of issuing a statement, believing it to be a domestic matter.
When embassies asked for guidance from Washington on what statements they could issue to address Floyd’s killing and the international backlash to police violence against black Americans, some embassies were given no direction, instead only referred back to Trump’s Twitter account.
While embassies have agency to issue their own statements without prior approval from Washington, they say they face heightened political risks of doing so under the Trump administration, lest such statements running afoul of sudden shifts in policy or message from an unpredictable president who already appears to view career civil servants with suspicion and disdain. U.S. diplomats have drawn Trump’s ire before, including diplomats drawn into testify in the impeachment scandal. Those who testified received no public words of support from Pompeo.
The pressure for a response was particularly acute for U.S. embassies in Africa, several officials said. Some embassies—including those in Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda—still issued social media posts or statements on their own volition in an effort to make up for the silence from Washington.
Brian Nichols, the U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe, issued a personalized statement tying tragedies in the United States to U.S. commitments on human rights in Zimbabwe that was widely lauded in the diplomatic community. (The assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Tibor Nagy, has not issued any statement.)
Biegun, the deputy secretary of state, sent his email to staff seven days after Floyd’s death, after the wave of international condemnation and protests began coalescing outside the gates of U.S. embassies in foreign capitals. The State Department didn’t send out press guidance with coordinated messages from Washington on the matter until two days later, on June 3, several officials told Foreign Policy—in some cases over a week after embassies had first requested it.
“When you’re working in a country full of black lives, you don’t have the luxury of turning a blind eye or hiding under a rock hoping no one comes to find you to point out all the hypocrisy,” said one department official. “The press guidance was a day late and a dollar short.”
Also on June 3, the director-general of the foreign service, Carol Perez, sent an email to staff acknowledging the department’s shortcomings. “Over the past few days I have read powerful employee testimonies—stories of disrespect, exhaustion, and disappointment.”
“These distressing accounts should strengthen our collective resolve; we must do better by our people and by one another,” she wrote. She said that the department had a task force rolling out a strategic plan on diversity and inclusion from 2020 to 2024.
In his email to employees on Wednesday, Pompeo implied he held off on addressing staff until after Floyd’s funeral. “Now, following his burial, it is appropriate to address a set of issues that are currently the topic of much debate in the United States, and, importantly for us, around the world,” he wrote. But he had already commented on the matter in a May 31 Fox News interview. He also issued a public statement on Floyd’s killing only as it related to Chinese propaganda on June 6.
The secretary also reiterated that message in his Wednesday evening email: “We must reject unequivocally the false charges—many of them vile propaganda emanating from China, Iran and other autocracies—questioning America’s credibility in promoting human rights and democracy abroad,” he wrote.
“Yes, the United States is imperfect. We should always be both proud of what we’ve achieved and humble knowing there is more to do,” he added. “Americans recognize deeply that we must always strive toward, in the words of the Constitution, ‘a more perfect union.’”
Many of the officials who spoke to Foreign Policy reacted to these messages with a mixture of anger and disillusionment. Some took issue with the fact that in his note, Biegun focused on his conversations with new classes of Pickering and Rangel fellows. “Senior officials at the State Department love to mention the Pickering and Rangel fellows, they love to drop that in there to indicate how progressive we are on these issues,” said one current State Department official, who is an alumni of one of the fellowships. “Everyone’s tired of that. Every alum that I talk to, the fellows themselves, they say, ‘Don’t just trot us out when you want to make a point work then put us back on the shelf.’”
Others derided Pompeo’s statement, saying it missed the mark and questioning why it took him over two weeks to address employees. “Too little, too late,” said one official.
“I thought that the overall tone and focus was completely out of touch from the reality that Americans and department employees are facing,” said a second.
“It felt like he was more interested in picking a fight with and shifting the blame [to] China than actually addressing the human rights issues here,” the diplomat added. “I’m just beyond embarrassed and disappointed.”
“He didn’t acknowledge that racism is at the center of this, which tells me all I need to know,” said a third diplomat. “We don’t give passes to brutal regimes … elsewhere in the world, even if they say they’re ‘striving.’ Why is this an acceptable excuse for us?”
Across the State Department, diplomats agree that racial injustices at home are a major liability for the United States’ global stature. Floyd’s death and instances of police crackdowns at the ensuing protests sparked an uproar of condemnation from U.N. human rights watchdogs, and close U.S. allies, as well as foreign adversaries that have some of the worst human rights records in the world.
In recent weeks, Washington has found itself at the receiving end of the type of diplomatic signals it usually doles out to authoritarian countries. Australia, for example, opened an investigation into U.S. police violence after two Australian news reporters were bludgeoned live on air outside the White House during the protests on June 1. In the United Kingdom, over 160 members of Parliament petitioned London to stop exporting tear gas and rubber bullets to Washington on human rights grounds.
Many African leaders also weighed in on the violence. “It cannot be right that, in the 21st century, the United States, this great bastion of democracy, continues to grapple with the problem of systemic racism,” wrote Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo.
Behind closed doors, U.S. diplomats quietly concede the recent spate of police violence targeting the black community is sapping America’s already dwindling soft power reserves and making it more difficult for them to call out foreign governments on human rights violations.
“The crux of this issue doesn’t rest with any one administration,” said an official. “Though not the poster child for diversity, this issue is also bigger than the State Department. This is a deeply rooted issue of national security. How are ethnic minorities in other countries supposed to believe that the U.S. stands with them when they’re watching George Floyd’s murder on Twitter?”
Former senior diplomats agreed. “It has to be extraordinarily hard for ambassadors to try to explain what is happening in the United States in the context of human rights and justice, where we had been the voice that people have looked to,” said Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who was the seniormost-ranking African American woman in the foreign service when she retired from her post in 2017.
“If I were an ambassador now, what I would be saying to these countries is, ‘This does not represent the America that we had been talking about. This is an aberration, and you should look at the more positive side,’” she added. “Of course they’re going to say, ‘You’re still hypocrites.’ And, I’d probably say in private, ‘You’re right.’”