foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Afghans Choose Between Sickness and Starvation

KABUL—The coronavirus lockdown is offering an agonizing dilemma to Asadullah Haidery and his family , as it does to so many Afghans : get sick or go hungry .
For the past month , the 33-year-old laborer , who previously picked up odd construction or delivery jobs , battled with fears and uncertainties , juggling his options of staying home as advised by the government and venturing out for work opportunities .
Most days , he ended up sitting by the roadside on the back of his wheelbarrow , hoping for work yet risking contracting the coronavirus .
“ Staying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t afford , ” he said , adding that he felt ashamed .
“ It was different before the pandemic .
I had work most days and was able to provide for my family .
This month , I ’ ve come home empty-handed every day.
” Haidery , his pregnant wife , and five children are mainly surviving on beans and have turned to begging .
With Afghanistan ’ s officially confirmed coronavirus cases at almost 2,000—though , lacking a large number of tests , actual numbers are estimated to be much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dilemma to Haidery ’ s .
More than half of the 37 million-strong population lives under the poverty line , with hundreds of thousands of daily laborers in the capital alone—including some 60,000 child workers—scrambling to survive .
“ If we don ’ t take the coronavirus seriously , it will take us seriously.
” “ If we don ’ t take the coronavirus seriously , it will take us seriously , ” Public Health Minister Ferozuddin Feroz declared ahead of the city ’ s lockdown , which came into effect in late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic , the United Nations already projected that 14 million Afghans could face emergency levels of food insecurity throughout the winter months .
Now , temporary border closures and interrupted food supply chains have seen prices soar .
For the past month , Kabul ’ s streets have been lined with beggars and daily laborers , desperate for an income to provide food for their families and at risk of getting sick or being fined for violating lockdown rules .
“ It ’ s a scenario not seen since before the start of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ghyasi , the operations manager at the Relief & Emergency Fund for Afghanistan , an aid initiative that organizes countrywide food distributions and is largely funded by the U.S.-based Afghan diaspora .
“ People may not die of the coronavirus , but they will certainly die of hunger due to the lockdown.
” “ People may not die of the coronavirus , but they will certainly die of hunger due to the lockdown , ” he added , though emphasizing that government regulations were of course important to combat the further spread of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with his family in a small rented basement room in the center of Kabul , explained that he hasn ’ t been able to pay rent—a sum of 2,000 afghani ( $ 26 ) per month that he previously earned easily with his usual daily income of 150 afghani ( $ 2 ) .
“ The children ask for food , but for weeks , we haven ’ t been able to provide anything but beans for them , ” said his wife , Suzan , who is seven months pregnant .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply means having no food.
” Politically unstable and devastated by more than 40 years of conflict , Afghanistan is now in the middle of an even greater crisis , especially with the country ’ s underdeveloped health care system .
In the first quarter of 2020 , 533 civilians—including more than 150 children—were killed due to fighting , the United Nations said , and fears are growing over increased coronavirus cases .
The World Food Program , analyzing eight major markets throughout the country , found that the average price of cooking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while rice and pulses went up by up to 4 percent .
A 50-kilogram bag of flour sells for 1,900 afghani ( $ 25 ) in the capital right now , up from an initial 1,600 afghani ( $ 21 ) .
The $ 4 difference is an amount that Haidery would previously earn in two days but now struggles to come up with entirely .
Faranaz Anwari , a 35-year-old widow with three children , used to work as a cleaner before Kabul was put under lockdown .
She now begs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was my only hope to bring my family through , ” she said , explaining that two of her children died of disease in the past year as she was unable to afford medicine .
“ I don ’ t know what I ’ ll do if the lockdown continues .
It doesn ’ t work for people like us .
Of course I ’ m afraid of the coronavirus , but I ’ m more afraid of my family going hungry or me being unable to buy medicine for them.
” In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ live in close , crammed quarters , social distancing is nearly impossible , and workers in informal sectors can not transition to working from home , according to a report by the International Rescue Committee .
“ Governments are unable to provide sufficient relief packages or social safety nets .
Sweeping mitigation measures like those undertaken in … the United States will not just be difficult to implement but could cause longer term and more widespread harm than the disease itself , ” the report said .
While Afghanistan has a strong culture @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people who have little will give what they can , millions are currently facing the daily choice between potential sickness and hunger .
“ We have been suffering from war and sociopolitical crisis before COVID-19 , but now the situation is getting worse , ” Kabul ’ s governor , Yaqub Haidari , said , explaining that the government has started providing services—including food distributions—to around 200,000 residents .
But in a capital of 6 million people , many are already going hungry .
Mohammed Rosadin , 76 , sits with his 3-year-old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of old tents held together by old blankets , ropes , and pieces of wood .
In the background , the modern , air-conditioned apartment blocks of one of Kabul ’ s new up-and-coming neighborhoods are rising .
In Rosadin ’ s backyard , the smell of trash is rising .
His family has long collected garbage throughout the city , sorting through whatever was useful enough to sell , recycling the rest .
It was easy to sell old plastic or metal scraps , he said , but with the lockdown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their homes .
“ We ’ re supposed to do the same—to stay home , ” said Rosadin , laughing sarcastically .
“ Of course we ’ re afraid , of course we ’ d like to stay home if we had the support to do so , but we would go hungry .
We might die before the virus even reaches us .
If the situation continues like this for another six months , we will be digging our own graves .
”

KABUL—The coronavirus lockdown is offering an agonizing dilemma to Asadullah Haidery and his family, as it does to so many Afghans: get sick or go hungry.
KABUL—The coronavirus lockdown is offering an agonizing dilemma to Asadullah Haidery and his family, as it does to so many Afghans: get sick or go hungry.
For the past month, the 33-year-old laborer, who previously picked up odd construction or delivery jobs, battled with fears and uncertainties, juggling his options of staying home as advised by the government and venturing out for work opportunities. Most days, he ended up sitting by the roadside on the back of his wheelbarrow, hoping for work yet risking contracting the coronavirus.
“Staying home is an option I can’t afford,” he said, adding that he felt ashamed. “It was different before the pandemic. I had work most days and was able to provide for my family. This month, I’ve come home empty-handed every day.” Haidery, his pregnant wife, and five children are mainly surviving on beans and have turned to begging.
Asadullah Haidery (far right) and his children, seen in the room they rent on April 22, have recently had only beans to eat. The family lives in a basement room of a rented house, but can't afford the 2,000 Afghani ( USD) rent anymore.
With Afghanistan’s officially confirmed coronavirus cases at almost 2,000—though, lacking a large number of tests, actual numbers are estimated to be much higher—millions of poverty-stricken families face a similar dilemma to Haidery’s. More than half of the 37 million-strong population lives under the poverty line, with hundreds of thousands of daily laborers in the capital alone—including some 60,000 child workers—scrambling to survive.
“If we don’t take the coronavirus seriously, it will take us seriously.”
“If we don’t take the coronavirus seriously, it will take us seriously,” Public Health Minister Ferozuddin Feroz declared ahead of the city’s lockdown, which came into effect in late March. But even prior to the pandemic, the United Nations already projected that 14 million Afghans could face emergency levels of food insecurity throughout the winter months. Now, temporary border closures and interrupted food supply chains have seen prices soar.
For the past month, Kabul’s streets have been lined with beggars and daily laborers, desperate for an income to provide food for their families and at risk of getting sick or being fined for violating lockdown rules.
A man rides past mud brick houses in a West Kabul neighborhood on April 1.
“It’s a scenario not seen since before the start of the U.S.-led invasion,” said Behzad Ghyasi, the operations manager at the Relief & Emergency Fund for Afghanistan, an aid initiative that organizes countrywide food distributions and is largely funded by the U.S.-based Afghan diaspora.
“People may not die of the coronavirus, but they will certainly die of hunger due to the lockdown.”
“People may not die of the coronavirus, but they will certainly die of hunger due to the lockdown,” he added, though emphasizing that government regulations were of course important to combat the further spread of the virus.
Haidery, who lives with his family in a small rented basement room in the center of Kabul, explained that he hasn’t been able to pay rent—a sum of 2,000 afghani ($26) per month that he previously earned easily with his usual daily income of 150 afghani ($2).
“The children ask for food, but for weeks, we haven’t been able to provide anything but beans for them,” said his wife, Suzan, who is seven months pregnant. “They cry, but having no money simply means having no food.”
Food is distributed by the Relief and Emergency Fund Afghanistan, an initiative that is mostly privately funded by the U.S.-based Afghan diaspora, in Kabul on April 23.
Politically unstable and devastated by more than 40 years of conflict, Afghanistan is now in the middle of an even greater crisis, especially with the country’s underdeveloped health care system. In the first quarter of 2020, 533 civilians—including more than 150 children—were killed due to fighting, the United Nations said, and fears are growing over increased coronavirus cases.
The World Food Program, analyzing eight major markets throughout the country, found that the average price of cooking oil increased last month by 9 percent, while rice and pulses went up by up to 4 percent. A 50-kilogram bag of flour sells for 1,900 afghani ($25) in the capital right now, up from an initial 1,600 afghani ($21). The $4 difference is an amount that Haidery would previously earn in two days but now struggles to come up with entirely.
Faranaz Anwari, a 35-year-old widow with three children, used to work as a cleaner before Kabul was put under lockdown. She now begs on the street. “My job was my only hope to bring my family through,” she said, explaining that two of her children died of disease in the past year as she was unable to afford medicine.
“I don’t know what I’ll do if the lockdown continues. It doesn’t work for people like us. Of course I’m afraid of the coronavirus, but I’m more afraid of my family going hungry or me being unable to buy medicine for them.”
In contexts like Afghanistan, where many people live in close, crammed quarters, social distancing is nearly impossible, and workers in informal sectors cannot transition to working from home, according to a report by the International Rescue Committee.
A sign warns of the symptoms of the coronavirus and explains measures that need to be taken to prevent an infection in central Kabul on April 2.
“Governments are unable to provide sufficient relief packages or social safety nets. Sweeping mitigation measures like those undertaken in … the United States will not just be difficult to implement but could cause longer term and more widespread harm than the disease itself,” the report said.
While Afghanistan has a strong culture of charity and donating, and even people who have little will give what they can, millions are currently facing the daily choice between potential sickness and hunger.
“We have been suffering from war and sociopolitical crisis before COVID-19, but now the situation is getting worse,” Kabul’s governor, Yaqub Haidari, said, explaining that the government has started providing services—including food distributions—to around 200,000 residents.
But in a capital of 6 million people, many are already going hungry.
Mohammed Rosadin, 76, sits with his grandson Salim, 3, outside their home in Kabul on April 22.
Mohammed Rosadin, 76, sits with his 3-year-old grandson outside their home, a cluster of old tents held together by old blankets, ropes, and pieces of wood. In the background, the modern, air-conditioned apartment blocks of one of Kabul’s new up-and-coming neighborhoods are rising. In Rosadin’s backyard, the smell of trash is rising.
His family has long collected garbage throughout the city, sorting through whatever was useful enough to sell, recycling the rest. It was easy to sell old plastic or metal scraps, he said, but with the lockdown, most of his clients had vanished into their homes.
“We’re supposed to do the same—to stay home,” said Rosadin, laughing sarcastically. “Of course we’re afraid, of course we’d like to stay home if we had the support to do so, but we would go hungry. We might die before the virus even reaches us. If the situation continues like this for another six months, we will be digging our own graves.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Generosity Is an Easy Win for China After the Coronavirus Pandemic

Generosity Is an Easy Win for China After the Coronavirus Pandemic As ground zero of the coronavirus pandemic , China owes the rest of the world more than a few planeloads of masks and ventilators to help address the ongoing global health crisis , especially given Beijing ’ s apparent lack of initial transparency .
It now has a golden opportunity to do so , one that plays to its existing strengths in the renewable energy sector : electrifying health facilities across Africa and Asia .
But before China can follow through , it will first need to embrace a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overseas engagement .
In an effort to secure natural resources and access to markets , China has become a major global player in financing infrastructure projects in emerging economies , with its investments dominated by energy projects .
Through its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , Beijing plans to spend $ 27 trillion on energy alone in the roughly 70 BRI countries , one-quarter of that on grid infrastructure and the remainder on large-scale projects , which so far have been split evenly between renewable energy sources and coal .
African @ @ @ @ @ @ @ welcome the money , but some resent the perceived resource colonialism—the use of economic or military leverage by one country to extract raw materials from another—that often comes with it.The coronavirus pandemic offers China a unique chance to rethink its overseas energy strategy .
The coronavirus pandemic offers China a unique chance to rethink its overseas energy strategy and in doing so resolve a silent human rights disaster that persists despite the availability of the technology and money to solve it : the fact that 500 million people across rural Africa and Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are off the grid and have no electricity .
These clinics serve the world ’ s poorest people , who are also the most vulnerable to climate change .
Yet their local medical facilities have no lights by which to give birth , no autoclaves for sterilization , and no neonatal warmers ( much less ventilators , oxygenizers , or refrigerators for vaccines ) .
For them , medical crises are an everyday occurrence and have been for far too long .
China could change that .
As the world ’ s largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the fastest-growing manufacturer of medical device equipment , Beijing has all of the necessary ingredients : renewable energy , health care technology , investment-ready and abundant capital , and deep diplomatic and business ties .
It also has a political incentive—the need to repair its reputational issues in BRI recipient countries—to electrify the tens of thousands of hospitals and clinics without power in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia .
In other words , instead of being viewed globally as the source of the coronavirus crisis , for a tiny fraction of its BRI @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be seen as the savior of rural health care in poor countries practically overnight .
Calculations from India , where 230 million people are still served by unelectrified health facilities , show that for as little as 37 cents per person served by a facility , rural subcenters ( which typically serve four villages ) could be electrified with rooftop solar and batteries that power the most basic health services , including lighting , neonatal warmers , and autoclaves .
Add to that a population of 255 million in sub-Saharan Africa facing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only about $ 200 million in initial capital .
Deploying such solutions takes days , if not hours , and could also be applied to managed refugee camps that house millions of displaced people with little , if any , energy access .
A well-funded and coordinated effort led by China that accounts for the upfront capital costs and creates a funding pool to ensure sustainable operations and maintenance over the 20-year lifetime of the systems , plus additional capital to supply energy-efficient medical equipment , could be a truly transformative contribution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating theaters , better maternal and neonatal care , reliable vaccine refrigeration , operational cost savings , and much more.A well-funded and coordinated effort led by China could be a truly transformative contribution to global health .
With fears that coronavirus-related disruptions to food supply could also increase the potential for famine in Africa and elsewhere , distributed solar power solutions ( either rooftop panels or minigrids ) can also help ensure healthier rural communities by powering local food supply chains through groundwater pumping , allowing agroprocessing for the increased yields that come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ storage to extend the life of crops and reduce food waste .
( It is estimated that in developing countries , 40 percent of food loss occurs after harvest and early in the supply chain , amounting to more than $ 310 billion of food waste and loss annually—mostly because of inadequate refrigeration and unreliable and expensive energy supplies . )
This would not be an expensive undertaking for China , and it would create long-lasting good will and tangible impacts rather than mere photo-ops in front of recent flights full of medical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would require China to shift its overseas aid strategy away from big-grid infrastructure like hydropower dams and coal-fired power plants to distributed solar power and storage .
Instead of continuing to export coal technology and dump poor-quality goods on Africa and Asia—and thereby locking those countries into outdated , dirty-energy technology and spoiling consumer markets—China can leverage its solar and battery expertise and innovate and invest in more efficient , quality-assured medical devices that use less power .
In 2018 , China committed to make medical devices more accessible to Africa .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than ever , China has a responsibility to ensure a more secure world in a post-coronavirus era .
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation created by Beijing would be the ideal place to take up the urgent opportunity of ending the rural health care crisis before the next global pandemic and hopefully in time for a COVID-19 vaccine .

As ground zero of the coronavirus pandemic, China owes the rest of the world more than a few planeloads of masks and ventilators to help address the ongoing global health crisis, especially given Beijing’s apparent lack of initial transparency. It now has a golden opportunity to do so, one that plays to its existing strengths in the renewable energy sector: electrifying health facilities across Africa and Asia. But before China can follow through, it will first need to embrace a less transactional and more humanitarian approach to overseas engagement.
As ground zero of the coronavirus pandemic, China owes the rest of the world more than a few planeloads of masks and ventilators to help address the ongoing global health crisis, especially given Beijing’s apparent lack of initial transparency. It now has a golden opportunity to do so, one that plays to its existing strengths in the renewable energy sector: electrifying health facilities across Africa and Asia. But before China can follow through, it will first need to embrace a less transactional and more humanitarian approach to overseas engagement.
In an effort to secure natural resources and access to markets, China has become a major global player in financing infrastructure projects in emerging economies, with its investments dominated by energy projects. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing plans to spend $27 trillion on energy alone in the roughly 70 BRI countries, one-quarter of that on grid infrastructure and the remainder on large-scale projects, which so far have been split evenly between renewable energy sources and coal. African and Asian governments and their citizens often welcome the money, but some resent the perceived resource colonialism—the use of economic or military leverage by one country to extract raw materials from another—that often comes with it.
The coronavirus pandemic offers China a unique chance to rethink its overseas energy strategy and in doing so resolve a silent human rights disaster that persists despite the availability of the technology and money to solve it: the fact that 500 million people across rural Africa and Asia are still served by health clinics that are off the grid and have no electricity. These clinics serve the world’s poorest people, who are also the most vulnerable to climate change. Yet their local medical facilities have no lights by which to give birth, no autoclaves for sterilization, and no neonatal warmers (much less ventilators, oxygenizers, or refrigerators for vaccines). For them, medical crises are an everyday occurrence and have been for far too long.
The coronavirus pandemic offers China a unique chance to rethink its overseas energy strategy.
China could change that. As the world’s largest producer of solar panels and batteries, and the fastest-growing manufacturer of medical device equipment, Beijing has all of the necessary ingredients: renewable energy, health care technology, investment-ready and abundant capital, and deep diplomatic and business ties. It also has a political incentive—the need to repair its reputational issues in BRI recipient countries—to electrify the tens of thousands of hospitals and clinics without power in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
In other words, instead of being viewed globally as the source of the coronavirus crisis, for a tiny fraction of its BRI energy budget, China could come to be seen as the savior of rural health care in poor countries practically overnight. Calculations from India, where 230 million people are still served by unelectrified health facilities, show that for as little as 37 cents per person served by a facility, rural subcenters (which typically serve four villages) could be electrified with rooftop solar and batteries that power the most basic health services, including lighting, neonatal warmers, and autoclaves.
Add to that a population of 255 million in sub-Saharan Africa facing the same situation, and that would require only about $200 million in initial capital. Deploying such solutions takes days, if not hours, and could also be applied to managed refugee camps that house millions of displaced people with little, if any, energy access.
A well-funded and coordinated effort led by China that accounts for the upfront capital costs and creates a funding pool to ensure sustainable operations and maintenance over the 20-year lifetime of the systems, plus additional capital to supply energy-efficient medical equipment, could be a truly transformative contribution to global health. It would provide safer operating theaters, better maternal and neonatal care, reliable vaccine refrigeration, operational cost savings, and much more.A well-funded and coordinated effort led by China could be a truly transformative contribution to global health.
With fears that coronavirus-related disruptions to food supply could also increase the potential for famine in Africa and elsewhere, distributed solar power solutions (either rooftop panels or minigrids) can also help ensure healthier rural communities by powering local food supply chains through groundwater pumping, allowing agroprocessing for the increased yields that come from irrigated crops, and providing cold storage to extend the life of crops and reduce food waste. (It is estimated that in developing countries, 40 percent of food loss occurs after harvest and early in the supply chain, amounting to more than $310 billion of food waste and loss annually—mostly because of inadequate refrigeration and unreliable and expensive energy supplies.)
This would not be an expensive undertaking for China, and it would create long-lasting good will and tangible impacts rather than mere photo-ops in front of recent flights full of medical supplies sent to Europe. But it would require China to shift its overseas aid strategy away from big-grid infrastructure like hydropower dams and coal-fired power plants to distributed solar power and storage. Instead of continuing to export coal technology and dump poor-quality goods on Africa and Asia—and thereby locking those countries into outdated, dirty-energy technology and spoiling consumer markets—China can leverage its solar and battery expertise and innovate and invest in more efficient, quality-assured medical devices that use less power.
In 2018, China committed to make medical devices more accessible to Africa. That’s a start. But now more than ever, China has a responsibility to ensure a more secure world in a post-coronavirus era. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation created by Beijing would be the ideal place to take up the urgent opportunity of ending the rural health care crisis before the next global pandemic and hopefully in time for a COVID-19 vaccine.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Forget Washington and Beijing. These Days Global Leadership Comes From Berlin.

Forget Washington and Beijing .
These Days Global Leadership Comes From Berlin .
At the beginning of April , the university hospital in the central German city of Jena dispatched two doctors , two medical assistants , and assorted medical supplies to Naples , Italy .
A couple of days before , the Bundeswehr , Germany ’ s military , had airlifted French and Italian patients to German hospitals .
That ’ s just a tiny part of Germany ’ s coronavirus assistance to allies .
Germany ’ s initial response to the coronavirus outbreak was not exactly covered in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , Italy , the first European country badly hit by the coronavirus , logged an appeal for medical supplies with the European Union ’ s emergency hub .
But the German government reacted the way every other EU government did : It sent nothing .
Then , in early March , the German government imposed an export ban on vital medical supplies including face masks , medical gloves , and protective gowns .
By March 14 , Italy had still not received any medical aid from its EU allies .
Two days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economic Affairs and Energy announced that the delivery of 400,000 face masks to Italy had been approved by the government .
With that , Germany changed the tenor of the Europeans ’ response to Italy : Soon medical supplies were arriving from around the continent .
When there ’ s a crisis , the world ’ s collective instinct is often to pick on the Germans .
This time , we owe them a thank you—and a request for more global leadership .
Even as Germany took initiative to help Italy , Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there , as it subsequently would to other countries such as Serbia .
Though most of the supplies had been purchased by Italy , Beijing—assisted by Italy ’ s foreign minister , Luigi Di Maio—made a big deal of the Chinese support .
Soon Russia sent 100 military medics and medical supplies to Italy.When there ’ s a crisis , the world ’ s collective instinct is often to pick on the Germans .
This time , we owe them a thank you .
Any government ’ s first responsibility is to look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government imposed a ban on medical supply exports just as Italy was succumbing to the coronavirus in early March , while other countries closed their borders with Italy .
But the damage to the EU—and stature gained by China and Russia—was immense .
A new survey by SWG , an Italian pollster , reveals a shocking shift in Italian attitudes toward other countries : 52 percent of Italians surveyed now consider China a friendly country , a massive 42 percentage point leap compared with last year .
Likewise , 32 percent consider Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent , while only 17 percent consider the United States a friendly country , down from 29 percent a year ago .
Even more shockingly , 45 percent of Italians surveyed now consider Germany a “ hostile country , ” 38 percent consider France an enemy , and 17 percent see the U.K. that way .
Had Germany immediately responded to Italy ’ s appeal for medical supplies , chances are it could have reversed some of the resentment with which many Italians view it .
That resentment has been simmering since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ felt Germany acted heartlessly ( though it finally agreed to a bailout of Italy and Spain ) .
Germany wouldn ’ t even have had to send enormous amounts of medical supplies : China and Russia didn ’ t .
But Berlin ’ s change of heart is better late than never .
Now Germany is not just sending supplies ; the much-maligned Bundeswehr has airlifted 22 Italian and two French intensive-care coronavirus patients to Germany , transporting them on the military ’ s flying intensive care unit—an Airbus A310 medevac plane—and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ space on NATO ’ s Strategic Airlift International Solution initiative—which features enormous cargo aircraft—to coronavirus deliveries .
And despite having a slightly higher COVID-19 caseload than Britain , it has donated and delivered 60 of its own ventilators to the U.K. And that ’ s just the beginning .
To date , according to the German foreign ministry , Germany has treated 229 foreign intensive-care coronavirus patients ( 44 from Italy , 55 from the Netherlands , and 130 from France ) and offered to foot the bill for all of them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of medical supplies ( including ventilators ) to Italy and 25 ventilators to France .
The government-run Robert Koch Institute , the country ’ s disease control and prevention agency , has sent coronavirus test kits to developing countries .
Doctors employed by the Fresenius Helios hospital chain in Germany have traveled to Spain for coronavirus duty , bringing 50 ventilators with them .
And when the coronavirus first hit China , the Germans sent Beijing more than 14 tons of medical equipment .
On top of that , the German Ministry for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion euros ( $ 1.25 billion ) to help developing countries fight the coronavirus , for example in strengthening their health care systems and securing otherwise perilous jobs in supply chains and tourism .
The German government is also working with other governments to ensure sufficient global production of medical supplies for coronavirus patients .
Berlin is also now permitting exports of medical supplies to EU countries .
In recent weeks , German firms have , for example , exported 8 million medical gloves to Austria , according to the German foreign ministry.Many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries ’ coronavirus victims is a good thing and indeed a geopolitical imperative .
“ Since a virus doesn ’ t stop at any border , the response to it has to be a signal of global solidarity , ” said Agnieszka Brugger , a deputy leader of the Green Party in the Bundestag , the German parliament .
“ Every government that has the capacity to do so should help those most in need , and there have been German acts of solidarity with our European neighbors that should be applauded .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ example , provided hospital beds for corona [ virus ] patients from neighboring Alsace [ in France ] , and the Bundeswehr is helping with transport capacity .
These signals are exactly what we need now.
” Germany is , of course , not the only helper .
Romania and Norway have , for example , sent doctors to Italy .
Albania , with only 2.8 million people , has sent the Italians a 30-strong medical team , and France and Austria have sent medical supplies .
U.S. soldiers based in Germany are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the U.S. government has put all U.S. military personnel in Italy ( some 30,000 service members ) at Italy ’ s disposal for coronavirus duty .
Indeed , European airspace today is dotted with coronavirus aid flights between friendly countries .
Many governments have clearly realized that helping other countries ’ coronavirus victims is a good thing and indeed a geopolitical imperative .
The most phenomenal coronavirus aid effort has been put in by Taiwan , which has donated millions of face masks to countries around the world , including 6.9 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s aid .
But , thanks to concerted Chinese pressure , Taiwan is an international outcast and is not even recognized by the World Health Organization .
But unlike the Chinese and Russians with their modest aid , the Germans haven ’ t been very good at publicizing their efforts .
( That might be why nearly 50 percent of Italians surveyed consider them enemies . )
That needs to change , argued Roderich Kiesewetter , a Christian Democratic Union member in the Bundestag .
“ Otherwise there will be a skewed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the aid from Russia and China , ” he said .
Kiesewetter also proposed that the EU develop self-sufficiency in advanced medical technology and protective equipment .
Considering that the German medical technology industry already employs some 200,000 people , far more than any other European country , that ’ s an area where Germany could likewise play a leading role .
When the next global health crisis appears , the Europeans could then make sure the world is not dependent on Chinese supplies .
The German government isn ’ t compassionate in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to agree to so-called coronabonds , where all eurozone countries would share debt accumulated by the countries worst hit by the coronavirus crisis .
“ Given the severe economic threats to the EU , the German government has to stop blocking effective solidarity measures such as common bonds to deal with this crisis , ” Brugger told Foreign Policy .
“ Preventing an economic collapse in European countries is not just the right thing to do but also in Germany ’ s own economic interest.
” On April 23 , EU leaders finally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 585 billion ) coronavirus rescue package.Germany is indisputably aiding other countries ’ coronavirus victims , and it ’ s mostly doing so at taxpayers ’ expense .
Still , Germany is indisputably aiding other countries ’ coronavirus victims , and it ’ s mostly doing so at taxpayers ’ expense .
The German effort is also taking place in a global leadership vacuum .
During a global crisis , the United States would typically take charge .
It did so during the 2014 Ebola pandemic , sending soldiers and medics to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a global response that curtailed the outbreak .
This time there is no such U.S. leadership .
The absence of such leadership during this pandemic has created a Darwinian situation where countries compete against one another for medical supplies , components for medical supplies , and components for coronavirus vaccine and drug research .
Researchers are even competing to purchase the genetically modified mice best suited for coronavirus vaccine development .
If the world is to manage the next crisis less chaotically than this one , there has to be more coordination of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country doing its part and nudging and encouraging others .
But Germany ’ s coronavirus aid offers a model for such leadership in the future .
That ’ s especially important because when the next disaster hits , countries certainly won ’ t turn to China for leadership—and given Washington ’ s bungling of this crisis , perhaps not even to the United States either .
The EU can be a formidable actor but requires consensus among its member states , which doesn ’ t come quickly or easily .
The next time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Assad decides to kill his own people , it would be unwise to count on Germany to lead a global military effort to stop him .
But if there ’ s another a pandemic or a climate-triggered disaster , there ’ s potential in Berlin .
For once , the world should thank the Germans—and ask them for more global leadership .

At the beginning of April, the university hospital in the central German city of Jena dispatched two doctors, two medical assistants, and assorted medical supplies to Naples, Italy. A couple of days before, the Bundeswehr, Germany’s military, had airlifted French and Italian patients to German hospitals. That’s just a tiny part of Germany’s coronavirus assistance to allies.
At the beginning of April, the university hospital in the central German city of Jena dispatched two doctors, two medical assistants, and assorted medical supplies to Naples, Italy. A couple of days before, the Bundeswehr, Germany’s military, had airlifted French and Italian patients to German hospitals. That’s just a tiny part of Germany’s coronavirus assistance to allies.
Germany’s initial response to the coronavirus outbreak was not exactly covered in glory. At the beginning of the year, Italy, the first European country badly hit by the coronavirus, logged an appeal for medical supplies with the European Union’s emergency hub. But the German government reacted the way every other EU government did: It sent nothing. Then, in early March, the German government imposed an export ban on vital medical supplies including face masks, medical gloves, and protective gowns. By March 14, Italy had still not received any medical aid from its EU allies.
Two days later, Germany’s Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy announced that the delivery of 400,000 face masks to Italy had been approved by the government. With that, Germany changed the tenor of the Europeans’ response to Italy: Soon medical supplies were arriving from around the continent. When there’s a crisis, the world’s collective instinct is often to pick on the Germans. This time, we owe them a thank you—and a request for more global leadership.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Even as Germany took initiative to help Italy, Beijing had dispatched supplies and a few medics there, as it subsequently would to other countries such as Serbia. Though most of the supplies had been purchased by Italy, Beijing—assisted by Italy’s foreign minister, Luigi Di Maio—made a big deal of the Chinese support. Soon Russia sent 100 military medics and medical supplies to Italy.
Any government’s first responsibility is to look after its own population. The German government imposed a ban on medical supply exports just as Italy was succumbing to the coronavirus in early March, while other countries closed their borders with Italy. But the damage to the EU—and stature gained by China and Russia—was immense.
When there’s a crisis, the world’s collective instinct is often to pick on the Germans. This time, we owe them a thank you.
A new survey by SWG, an Italian pollster, reveals a shocking shift in Italian attitudes toward other countries: 52 percent of Italians surveyed now consider China a friendly country, a massive 42 percentage point leap compared with last year. Likewise, 32 percent consider Russia a friendly country, up from 15 percent, while only 17 percent consider the United States a friendly country, down from 29 percent a year ago. Even more shockingly, 45 percent of Italians surveyed now consider Germany a “hostile country,” 38 percent consider France an enemy, and 17 percent see the U.K. that way.
Had Germany immediately responded to Italy’s appeal for medical supplies, chances are it could have reversed some of the resentment with which many Italians view it. That resentment has been simmering since the 2012 eurozone crisis, when many Italians felt Germany acted heartlessly (though it finally agreed to a bailout of Italy and Spain). Germany wouldn’t even have had to send enormous amounts of medical supplies: China and Russia didn’t.
But Berlin’s change of heart is better late than never. Now Germany is not just sending supplies; the much-maligned Bundeswehr has airlifted 22 Italian and two French intensive-care coronavirus patients to Germany, transporting them on the military’s flying intensive care unit—an Airbus A310 medevac plane—and other aircraft. It has also donated its space on NATO’s Strategic Airlift International Solution initiative—which features enormous cargo aircraft—to coronavirus deliveries. And despite having a slightly higher COVID-19 caseload than Britain, it has donated and delivered 60 of its own ventilators to the U.K.
And that’s just the beginning. To date, according to the German foreign ministry, Germany has treated 229 foreign intensive-care coronavirus patients (44 from Italy, 55 from the Netherlands, and 130 from France) and offered to foot the bill for all of them. Berlin has donated and delivered 7.5 tons of medical supplies (including ventilators) to Italy and 25 ventilators to France. The government-run Robert Koch Institute, the country’s disease control and prevention agency, has sent coronavirus test kits to developing countries. Doctors employed by the Fresenius Helios hospital chain in Germany have traveled to Spain for coronavirus duty, bringing 50 ventilators with them. And when the coronavirus first hit China, the Germans sent Beijing more than 14 tons of medical equipment.
On top of that, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has reallocated 1.15 billion euros ($1.25 billion) to help developing countries fight the coronavirus, for example in strengthening their health care systems and securing otherwise perilous jobs in supply chains and tourism. The German government is also working with other governments to ensure sufficient global production of medical supplies for coronavirus patients. Berlin is also now permitting exports of medical supplies to EU countries. In recent weeks, German firms have, for example, exported 8 million medical gloves to Austria, according to the German foreign ministry.Many governments have clearly realized that helping other countries’ coronavirus victims is a good thing and indeed a geopolitical imperative.
“Since a virus doesn’t stop at any border, the response to it has to be a signal of global solidarity,” said Agnieszka Brugger, a deputy leader of the Green Party in the Bundestag, the German parliament. “Every government that has the capacity to do so should help those most in need, and there have been German acts of solidarity with our European neighbors that should be applauded. My home state of Baden-Württemberg, for example, provided hospital beds for corona[virus] patients from neighboring Alsace [in France], and the Bundeswehr is helping with transport capacity. These signals are exactly what we need now.”
Germany is, of course, not the only helper. Romania and Norway have, for example, sent doctors to Italy. Albania, with only 2.8 million people, has sent the Italians a 30-strong medical team, and France and Austria have sent medical supplies. U.S. soldiers based in Germany are making face masks for German soldiers, and the U.S. government has put all U.S. military personnel in Italy (some 30,000 service members) at Italy’s disposal for coronavirus duty. Indeed, European airspace today is dotted with coronavirus aid flights between friendly countries.
Many governments have clearly realized that helping other countries’ coronavirus victims is a good thing and indeed a geopolitical imperative. The most phenomenal coronavirus aid effort has been put in by Taiwan, which has donated millions of face masks to countries around the world, including 6.9 million to EU member states, dwarfing China’s aid. But, thanks to concerted Chinese pressure, Taiwan is an international outcast and is not even recognized by the World Health Organization.
But unlike the Chinese and Russians with their modest aid, the Germans haven’t been very good at publicizing their efforts. (That might be why nearly 50 percent of Italians surveyed consider them enemies.) That needs to change, argued Roderich Kiesewetter, a Christian Democratic Union member in the Bundestag. “Otherwise there will be a skewed picture of the situation, particularly regarding the aid from Russia and China,” he said. Kiesewetter also proposed that the EU develop self-sufficiency in advanced medical technology and protective equipment. Considering that the German medical technology industry already employs some 200,000 people, far more than any other European country, that’s an area where Germany could likewise play a leading role. When the next global health crisis appears, the Europeans could then make sure the world is not dependent on Chinese supplies.
The German government isn’t compassionate in every way: It has been reluctant to agree to so-called coronabonds, where all eurozone countries would share debt accumulated by the countries worst hit by the coronavirus crisis. “Given the severe economic threats to the EU, the German government has to stop blocking effective solidarity measures such as common bonds to deal with this crisis,” Brugger told Foreign Policy. “Preventing an economic collapse in European countries is not just the right thing to do but also in Germany’s own economic interest.” On April 23, EU leaders finally agreed on a 540 billion euro ($585 billion) coronavirus rescue package.Germany is indisputably aiding other countries’ coronavirus victims, and it’s mostly doing so at taxpayers’ expense.
Still, Germany is indisputably aiding other countries’ coronavirus victims, and it’s mostly doing so at taxpayers’ expense. The German effort is also taking place in a global leadership vacuum. During a global crisis, the United States would typically take charge. It did so during the 2014 Ebola pandemic, sending soldiers and medics to the most affected countries in Africa and marshaling a global response that curtailed the outbreak. This time there is no such U.S. leadership.
The absence of such leadership during this pandemic has created a Darwinian situation where countries compete against one another for medical supplies, components for medical supplies, and components for coronavirus vaccine and drug research. Researchers are even competing to purchase the genetically modified mice best suited for coronavirus vaccine development.
If the world is to manage the next crisis less chaotically than this one, there has to be more coordination of resources, and that requires a leading country doing its part and nudging and encouraging others. But Germany’s coronavirus aid offers a model for such leadership in the future.
That’s especially important because when the next disaster hits, countries certainly won’t turn to China for leadership—and given Washington’s bungling of this crisis, perhaps not even to the United States either. The EU can be a formidable actor but requires consensus among its member states, which doesn’t come quickly or easily.
The next time a dictator like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad decides to kill his own people, it would be unwise to count on Germany to lead a global military effort to stop him. But if there’s another a pandemic or a climate-triggered disaster, there’s potential in Berlin.
For once, the world should thank the Germans—and ask them for more global leadership.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--With Kim Jong Un Mysteriously Gone, China Is Likely to Make a Power Move

With Kim Jong Un Mysteriously Gone , China Is Likely to Make a Power Move Reports of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un ’ s death or permanent incapacitation may be greatly exaggerated , but the mystery of his whereabouts and condition forces the world to consider what a North Korean succession crisis might look like .
From the outside , the Kim family regime appears unassailable , but whatever is happening to the leader raises the specter of an uncertain transfer of power with no clear heir in sight .
If factions face off , a vicious internal conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not unthinkable .
With North Korea ’ s nuclear and ballistic missile sites potentially falling into the hands of whoever acts most quickly , Asia could face an unprecedented nuclear crisis .
Of these known unknowns , one stands out above all : Could any weakness in the Kim regime induce China to try to assert control over Pyongyang ?
If crisis equals opportunity , then it is only prudent to consider how Chinese President Xi Jinping might view making a bold move to reshape the regional balance of power .
A successful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geopolitical map of East Asia , isolating Japan and reducing U.S. power in the region .
This is the most dangerous moment for the three-generation Kim regime in decades .
Some reports claim that Kim Jong Un either had emergency heart surgery or is in a vegetative state , and that Beijing has already sent a team of medical experts to help .
The dictator has not been seen in public for weeks and missed several high-profile events , including the country ’ s main national holiday , which celebrates the birth of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Kim Il Sung .
Kim is only 36 years old , but has hardly been the picture of good health .
Obese , often photographed smoking cigarettes , and likely to enjoy the same sybaritic lifestyle of his father , he has been a prime candidate for a health crisis .
And while the North Korean state media insists the country has no coronavirus cases , it can not be ruled out that the supreme leader is a victim of the pandemic .
Coming to power in late 2011 after the death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Kim ruthlessly consolidated his position .
Named heir only the year before the elder Kim died , the little-known successor executed his powerful pro-Beijing uncle , Jang Song Thaek , and later reportedly had a half-brother murdered in Malaysia .
His own children are still young , leaving a gap in who would take over as ruler or regent .
If he is indeed incapacitated , it may be taking weeks for the regime to acknowledge the fact precisely because of behind-the-scenes machinations .
A power struggle is thus an entirely possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weakened .
His sister , Kim Yo Jong , has been raised to near second-in-command status , but she is only 32 years old—and whether North Korea ’ s patriarchal system would accept a woman as supreme leader is unknown .
Top military officers might decide to install a puppet or fight among themselves for dominance .
Outsiders ’ lack of knowledge about the dynamics of power in North Korea makes assessing any of this difficult .
Kim ’ s apparent medical crisis offers Beijing the first real opportunity in decades to strengthen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kim reappears tomorrow , the questions over his health and the regime ’ s cohesion will certainly make the Chinese Communist Party consider if it might be an opportune time to move in .
Kim has had a fraught relationship with Xi , reportedly spurning multiple requests to meet until acceding in March 2018 , a few months before his pathbreaking summit with U.S. President Donald Trump .
Pyongyang ’ s independence is legendary ; its successful nuclear and ballistic missile programs make the rogue state even more resistant to external pressure .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ tightly to China and maintain it as a buffer state facing U.S. allies South Korea and Japan would be a geopolitical gift to Xi .
Regaining the influence Beijing lost in Pyongyang with the execution of Jang would be another reason to make a move .
Moreover , South Korea ’ s political left is ascendant after legislative victories this month , and President Moon Jae-in has deepened his country ’ s ties with Beijing .
In short , the trends have been more auspicious for a dramatic expansion of Chinese power on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through economic power is one route for Beijing .
Another , more difficult path would be an actual physical move into North Korea .
In a world distracted by the coronavirus pandemic , Beijing might well make a bold gamble to intervene in North Korea in the name of peace and order , supposedly to prevent a government collapse and humanitarian crisis .
Suborning North Korean military leaders based near the Chinese border would ease passage toward Pyongyang , along with making deals with regime insiders beforehand .
Securing nuclear and missile sites @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cement Beijing ’ s control over the Kim regime .
A pliant client state , perhaps even headed by Kim ’ s sister , would naturally follow .
The geopolitical implications of Beijing ’ s control over North Korea would be enormous .
Given the likelihood that Chinese naval and air force units could be present in North Korea , Chinese and American forces would face each other across the Demilitarized Zone .
That would make the U.S. alliance with South Korea much more difficult .
With both pressure and inducements from Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in its lot with China.With both pressure and inducements from Beijing , Seoul could even decide to throw in its lot with China ; given Moon ’ s leanings and an endemic anti-Americanism in South Korea , that should not be inconceivable .
Beijing could neutralize any Southern opposition to reduced or severed ties with Washington by promising to help Seoul enforce its control over the Liancourt Rocks , a group of small islets held by South Korea , which refers to them as Dokdo , and also claimed by Japan , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese navy would thereby gain access to the strategic Korea Strait , which connects the Sea of Japan , Yellow Sea , and East China Sea , helping Beijing dominate Asia ’ s vital inner waters .
That , in turn , would leave Japan isolated in Northeast Asia , facing a Chinese-dominated Korean Peninsula and with little choice but to dramatically increase its military budget , perhaps including the nuclear option .
Tokyo would also put enormous pressure on Washington to maintain a credible military capability in the region .
With U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closer to each other , the potential for an accident or a miscalculation leading to an armed encounter would increase exponentially .
Washington would either have to accept much greater risk or decide to reduce its presence .
Calls would grow at home to reduce tensions with Beijing , which would be accomplished most easily by adopting a so-called offshore balancing strategy , which would maintaining readiness but pull back U.S. forces in the region .
None of this may come to pass this time .
However , political life in Pyongyang will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If a succession crisis did occur , options for the United States would be limited , but Washington will nonetheless need a plan to counter any possible moves by China into North Korea .
Enhanced intelligence is required to give advance notice of China ’ s military activity or political machinations in Pyongyang ; working with South Korean intelligence will be vital .
Close political consultation with Seoul is also needed to keep Moon committed to the U.S.-South Korean alliance , as is a campaign aimed at public opinion in the South , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as it is about the United States ’ .
Not for nothing do the South Koreans often describe themselves as “ minnows among whales.
” Beyond the peninsula , deeper planning with Japan for defense and deterrence is just as important , in order to reassure Tokyo about the United States ’ continuing presence .
Ensuring there is no drawdown of combat-ready U.S. forces in the region , and that they are equipped with the most advanced U.S. weapons systems , is a prerequisite .
Above all , U.S. diplomats must make clear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ’ resolve to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific remains unaltered , even if Kim were to rule for another half-century .

Reports of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s death or permanent incapacitation may be greatly exaggerated, but the mystery of his whereabouts and condition forces the world to consider what a North Korean succession crisis might look like. From the outside, the Kim family regime appears unassailable, but whatever is happening to the leader raises the specter of an uncertain transfer of power with no clear heir in sight. If factions face off, a vicious internal conflict is certain, and a civil war not unthinkable. With North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile sites potentially falling into the hands of whoever acts most quickly, Asia could face an unprecedented nuclear crisis.
Reports of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s death or permanent incapacitation may be greatly exaggerated, but the mystery of his whereabouts and condition forces the world to consider what a North Korean succession crisis might look like. From the outside, the Kim family regime appears unassailable, but whatever is happening to the leader raises the specter of an uncertain transfer of power with no clear heir in sight. If factions face off, a vicious internal conflict is certain, and a civil war not unthinkable. With North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile sites potentially falling into the hands of whoever acts most quickly, Asia could face an unprecedented nuclear crisis.
Of these known unknowns, one stands out above all: Could any weakness in the Kim regime induce China to try to assert control over Pyongyang? If crisis equals opportunity, then it is only prudent to consider how Chinese President Xi Jinping might view making a bold move to reshape the regional balance of power. A successful intervention by Beijing would permanently alter the geopolitical map of East Asia, isolating Japan and reducing U.S. power in the region.
This is the most dangerous moment for the three-generation Kim regime in decades. Some reports claim that Kim Jong Un either had emergency heart surgery or is in a vegetative state, and that Beijing has already sent a team of medical experts to help. The dictator has not been seen in public for weeks and missed several high-profile events, including the country’s main national holiday, which celebrates the birth of his grandfather and founder of the regime, Kim Il Sung.
Kim is only 36 years old, but has hardly been the picture of good health. Obese, often photographed smoking cigarettes, and likely to enjoy the same sybaritic lifestyle of his father, he has been a prime candidate for a health crisis. And while the North Korean state media insists the country has no coronavirus cases, it cannot be ruled out that the supreme leader is a victim of the pandemic.
Coming to power in late 2011 after the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, Kim ruthlessly consolidated his position. Named heir only the year before the elder Kim died, the little-known successor executed his powerful pro-Beijing uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and later reportedly had a half-brother murdered in Malaysia. His own children are still young, leaving a gap in who would take over as ruler or regent. If he is indeed incapacitated, it may be taking weeks for the regime to acknowledge the fact precisely because of behind-the-scenes machinations.
A power struggle is thus an entirely possible scenario, whether Kim is dead or weakened. His sister, Kim Yo Jong, has been raised to near second-in-command status, but she is only 32 years old—and whether North Korea’s patriarchal system would accept a woman as supreme leader is unknown. Top military officers might decide to install a puppet or fight among themselves for dominance. Outsiders’ lack of knowledge about the dynamics of power in North Korea makes assessing any of this difficult.
Kim’s apparent medical crisis offers Beijing the first real opportunity in decades to strengthen its hand over Pyongyang. Even if Kim reappears tomorrow, the questions over his health and the regime’s cohesion will certainly make the Chinese Communist Party consider if it might be an opportune time to move in.
Kim has had a fraught relationship with Xi, reportedly spurning multiple requests to meet until acceding in March 2018, a few months before his pathbreaking summit with U.S. President Donald Trump. Pyongyang’s independence is legendary; its successful nuclear and ballistic missile programs make the rogue state even more resistant to external pressure.
The opportunity to bind North Korea more tightly to China and maintain it as a buffer state facing U.S. allies South Korea and Japan would be a geopolitical gift to Xi. Regaining the influence Beijing lost in Pyongyang with the execution of Jang would be another reason to make a move. Moreover, South Korea’s political left is ascendant after legislative victories this month, and President Moon Jae-in has deepened his country’s ties with Beijing. In short, the trends have been more auspicious for a dramatic expansion of Chinese power on the Korean Peninsula.
Exerting political control through economic power is one route for Beijing. Another, more difficult path would be an actual physical move into North Korea. In a world distracted by the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing might well make a bold gamble to intervene in North Korea in the name of peace and order, supposedly to prevent a government collapse and humanitarian crisis. Suborning North Korean military leaders based near the Chinese border would ease passage toward Pyongyang, along with making deals with regime insiders beforehand. Securing nuclear and missile sites, ostensibly to ensure stability, would cement Beijing’s control over the Kim regime. A pliant client state, perhaps even headed by Kim’s sister, would naturally follow.
The geopolitical implications of Beijing’s control over North Korea would be enormous. Given the likelihood that Chinese naval and air force units could be present in North Korea, Chinese and American forces would face each other across the Demilitarized Zone. That would make the U.S. alliance with South Korea much more difficult. With both pressure and inducements from Beijing, Seoul could even decide to throw in its lot with China.With both pressure and inducements from Beijing, Seoul could even decide to throw in its lot with China; given Moon’s leanings and an endemic anti-Americanism in South Korea, that should not be inconceivable. Beijing could neutralize any Southern opposition to reduced or severed ties with Washington by promising to help Seoul enforce its control over the Liancourt Rocks, a group of small islets held by South Korea, which refers to them as Dokdo, and also claimed by Japan, which refers to them as Takeshima. The Chinese navy would thereby gain access to the strategic Korea Strait, which connects the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea, helping Beijing dominate Asia’s vital inner waters.
That, in turn, would leave Japan isolated in Northeast Asia, facing a Chinese-dominated Korean Peninsula and with little choice but to dramatically increase its military budget, perhaps including the nuclear option. Tokyo would also put enormous pressure on Washington to maintain a credible military capability in the region.
With U.S. and Chinese naval and air forces vastly closer to each other, the potential for an accident or a miscalculation leading to an armed encounter would increase exponentially. Washington would either have to accept much greater risk or decide to reduce its presence. Calls would grow at home to reduce tensions with Beijing, which would be accomplished most easily by adopting a so-called offshore balancing strategy, which would maintaining readiness but pull back U.S. forces in the region.
None of this may come to pass this time. However, political life in Pyongyang will remain uncertain even if Kim reappears. If a succession crisis did occur, options for the United States would be limited, but Washington will nonetheless need a plan to counter any possible moves by China into North Korea.
Enhanced intelligence is required to give advance notice of China’s military activity or political machinations in Pyongyang; working with South Korean intelligence will be vital. Close political consultation with Seoul is also needed to keep Moon committed to the U.S.-South Korean alliance, as is a campaign aimed at public opinion in the South, which is as concerned about Chinese power as it is about the United States’. Not for nothing do the South Koreans often describe themselves as “minnows among whales.”
Beyond the peninsula, deeper planning with Japan for defense and deterrence is just as important, in order to reassure Tokyo about the United States’ continuing presence. Ensuring there is no drawdown of combat-ready U.S. forces in the region, and that they are equipped with the most advanced U.S. weapons systems, is a prerequisite. Above all, U.S. diplomats must make clear to their Chinese counterparts that the United States’ resolve to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific remains unaltered, even if Kim were to rule for another half-century.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-28--Europe Can Afford to Fight With China

Europe Can Afford to Fight With China

Europe Can Afford to Fight With China The book China Can Say No was a 1996 Chinese bestseller and a blunt expression of nationalism .
Written by a group of right-wing intellectuals , the book called on China to reject liberal values and push back against Western interests conspiring to halt its rise .
Over 20 years later , after dismissing calls to democratize and advancing its state-led economy to become the world ’ s second largest , China has become well practiced at saying no .
In its present-day “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy , China is now even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yes to its own demands .
Restricting access to the Chinese marketplace is often brandished to break the political will of offending parties .
Europe is a prime venue for China ’ s top diplomats to show this new assertiveness .
Just last week , fearful of repercussions to its trade relationship with China , the European Union softened critical language in an upcoming report on China ’ s disinformation campaign about the coronavirus pandemic .
But Europe need not bow down to China ’ s economic bullying—it , too , can afford @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe far less reliant on the Chinese market than many presume , but the strategic vulnerabilities and loss of competitiveness from trading and investing in China are also starting to outweigh economic opportunities .
The EU ’ s recent capitulation to Beijing sends the wrong signal to member states facing similar pressures .
Earlier this year , the Chinese Embassy in Prague threatened retaliation against Czech companies if a senior lawmaker visited Taiwan , which Beijing sees as a breakaway province .
Not long after , the Chinese ambassador to Germany suggested harm @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German automakers in China if Berlin acted on security concerns to exclude the Chinese company Huawei from its 5G telecommunications networks .
At first glance , it is clear to see why Europe might give in to China ’ s political demands .
The Chinese economy is slowing and is burdened by unprecedented debt levels , but China still represented over a quarter of global economic growth from 2013 to 2018 , and its evolving consumer market is impossible for global corporations to ignore .
But despite its standing in the global economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how much of China ’ s economic growth is accessible to European and other foreign investors .
After decades of promises from Beijing that its economy would open up , investment restrictiveness in China , such as limits on foreign equity , is still nearly four times as high as the average in advanced economies .
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan recently remarked that even before the coronavirus pandemic scuttled high-level meetings this year , negotiations with Beijing had resulted in “ little concrete progress on improving market access ” for European companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Beijing pursues its “ Made in China 2025 ” industrial policy to take the lead in high-tech manufacturing sectors , the future is not necessarily bright for many foreign investors .
At the same time , many European policymakers misread the importance of trade with China .
EU officials often boast that every day over 1.5 billion euros ( $ 1.6 billion ) worth in goods flow between the regional body and China .
But EU member states trade nearly 30 billion euros a day in total with internal and external partners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China is a myth .
China represented just 5.5 percent of the total trade of EU member states in 2018.As analysts at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin point out , if one goes strictly by the numbers , the most important trading partner for all EU member states is in fact the EU .
Close to two-thirds of total trade on average for each member state is with its EU partners .
Geographical proximity , business and cultural familiarity , and a single market and customs union drive forward this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European policymakers is that the top figures on trade do not tell the whole story .
China ’ s economic importance is explained by the intangibles of its vital role in global supply chains , where it makes up one-third of intermediate products in complex , cross-border production processes , as well as its future market potential for European corporations .
But here too , China ’ s significance is misunderstood .
Where there is trade between the EU and China , an asymmetrical relationship is developing .
Trade integration with China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s share in global manufacturing exports from 44 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2018 .
Within global supply chains , China is exporting higher-value products to the EU but importing fewer goods in return .
If Europe does not focus on building its own industrial competitiveness , it will continue to slip down the ladder in the global economy .
The coronavirus pandemic is also showing that depending on overseas production can be dangerous in times of crisis .
As the coronavirus spread in China earlier this year and lockdowns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign countries and multinational corporations were left vulnerable by an over-reliance on particular Chinese intermediate products in consumer electronics , automobiles , and pharmaceuticals , not to mention crucial medical supplies .
French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire , among other European officials , cautioned that Europe needed to decease such points of dependence on China .
Neither is China any longer a land of vaulting revenue growth for many European corporations .
Take Germany ’ s automobile giants , Volkswagen , Daimler , and BMW .
They are some of the largest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time their Chinese competitors , such as Changan and Geely , have taken on a growing market share .
Volkswagen ’ s executives maintain an upbeat outlook , but the company ’ s operating results in China have dropped by some 15 percent from 2015 to 2019 .
For Daimler , BMW , and the German industrial manufacturer Siemens , China ’ s share of total revenues compared to other countries and regions has stagnated over the same period .
In euros and cents , it is often Europe , not China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ revenue growth .
As a result , European corporations are less enamored with the Chinese economy than they used to be .
Rising to above $ 15 billion in both 2011 and 2012 , European investment levels in China fell to under $ 8 billion per year from 2016 to 2018 .
Until Beijing comprehensively rolls back trade and investment controls and restrictions , such as technology transfers for market access , growth levels for European and other foreign companies in China will remain limited and can even come back to bite competitiveness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ challenge of economic recovery from the coronavirus-induced recession , the pressure on Europe to submit to China ’ s political dictates on Huawei , Taiwan , and other national interests overseas may grow .
But European policymakers need to recognize they have far more room for maneuver with Beijing than they might believe .
Facing its own economic slowdown , China will also be searching for growth opportunities during the coming global recession and will not want to upset its trade and investment position in the European Union ’ s massive common market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China can also blind Europe to broader horizons in the global economy .
As emerging Asia overtakes China as the world ’ s main growth engine , Europe can build on its trade and investment portfolio across India and Southeast Asia .
A recent free trade deal with Vietnam marks a promising start to such an expansion .
Closer to home , Europe can also foster manufacturing centers in Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey to revitalize its role in global trade .
Rather than chasing every last dollar in China , Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industrial competitiveness .
Nurturing its own leading corporations as global champions and supporting fellow democracies around the world better serve Europe ’ s economic and political interests .
Without subscribing to the same nationalist sentiments currently brewing strong in China , European leaders can encourage principled multilateralism in the world .
But before such priorities can take hold , Europe must first learn to say no to China .

The book China Can Say No was a 1996 Chinese bestseller and a blunt expression of nationalism. Written by a group of right-wing intellectuals, the book called on China to reject liberal values and push back against Western interests conspiring to halt its rise.
The book China Can Say No was a 1996 Chinese bestseller and a blunt expression of nationalism. Written by a group of right-wing intellectuals, the book called on China to reject liberal values and push back against Western interests conspiring to halt its rise.
Over 20 years later, after dismissing calls to democratize and advancing its state-led economy to become the world’s second largest, China has become well practiced at saying no. In its present-day “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, China is now even learning to pressure the West to say yes to its own demands. Restricting access to the Chinese marketplace is often brandished to break the political will of offending parties.
Europe is a prime venue for China’s top diplomats to show this new assertiveness. Just last week, fearful of repercussions to its trade relationship with China, the European Union softened critical language in an upcoming report on China’s disinformation campaign about the coronavirus pandemic.
But Europe need not bow down to China’s economic bullying—it, too, can afford to say no. Not only is Europe far less reliant on the Chinese market than many presume, but the strategic vulnerabilities and loss of competitiveness from trading and investing in China are also starting to outweigh economic opportunities.
The EU’s recent capitulation to Beijing sends the wrong signal to member states facing similar pressures. Earlier this year, the Chinese Embassy in Prague threatened retaliation against Czech companies if a senior lawmaker visited Taiwan, which Beijing sees as a breakaway province. Not long after, the Chinese ambassador to Germany suggested harm might come to the market positions of German automakers in China if Berlin acted on security concerns to exclude the Chinese company Huawei from its 5G telecommunications networks.
At first glance, it is clear to see why Europe might give in to China’s political demands. The Chinese economy is slowing and is burdened by unprecedented debt levels, but China still represented over a quarter of global economic growth from 2013 to 2018, and its evolving consumer market is impossible for global corporations to ignore.
But despite its standing in the global economy, few questions are put to just how much of China’s economic growth is accessible to European and other foreign investors. After decades of promises from Beijing that its economy would open up, investment restrictiveness in China, such as limits on foreign equity, is still nearly four times as high as the average in advanced economies.
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan recently remarked that even before the coronavirus pandemic scuttled high-level meetings this year, negotiations with Beijing had resulted in “little concrete progress on improving market access” for European companies. As Chinese corporations rise in competitiveness and Beijing pursues its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy to take the lead in high-tech manufacturing sectors, the future is not necessarily bright for many foreign investors.
At the same time, many European policymakers misread the importance of trade with China. EU officials often boast that every day over 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth in goods flow between the regional body and China. But EU member states trade nearly 30 billion euros a day in total with internal and external partners. Europe’s economic dependency on China is a myth. China represented just 5.5 percent of the total trade of EU member states in 2018.As analysts at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin point out, if one goes strictly by the numbers, the most important trading partner for all EU member states is in fact the EU. Close to two-thirds of total trade on average for each member state is with its EU partners. Geographical proximity, business and cultural familiarity, and a single market and customs union drive forward this centrality.
Yet the common retort from European policymakers is that the top figures on trade do not tell the whole story. China’s economic importance is explained by the intangibles of its vital role in global supply chains, where it makes up one-third of intermediate products in complex, cross-border production processes, as well as its future market potential for European corporations.
But here too, China’s significance is misunderstood. Where there is trade between the EU and China, an asymmetrical relationship is developing. Trade integration with China has coincided with a fall in the EU’s share in global manufacturing exports from 44 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2018. Within global supply chains, China is exporting higher-value products to the EU but importing fewer goods in return. If Europe does not focus on building its own industrial competitiveness, it will continue to slip down the ladder in the global economy.
The coronavirus pandemic is also showing that depending on overseas production can be dangerous in times of crisis. As the coronavirus spread in China earlier this year and lockdowns brought many industries to a standstill, foreign countries and multinational corporations were left vulnerable by an over-reliance on particular Chinese intermediate products in consumer electronics, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals, not to mention crucial medical supplies. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire, among other European officials, cautioned that Europe needed to decease such points of dependence on China.
Neither is China any longer a land of vaulting revenue growth for many European corporations. Take Germany’s automobile giants, Volkswagen, Daimler, and BMW. They are some of the largest European investors in China, but over time their Chinese competitors, such as Changan and Geely, have taken on a growing market share.
Volkswagen’s executives maintain an upbeat outlook, but the company’s operating results in China have dropped by some 15 percent from 2015 to 2019. For Daimler, BMW, and the German industrial manufacturer Siemens, China’s share of total revenues compared to other countries and regions has stagnated over the same period. In euros and cents, it is often Europe, not China, that is generating higher levels of new revenue growth.
As a result, European corporations are less enamored with the Chinese economy than they used to be. Rising to above $15 billion in both 2011 and 2012, European investment levels in China fell to under $8 billion per year from 2016 to 2018. Until Beijing comprehensively rolls back trade and investment controls and restrictions, such as technology transfers for market access, growth levels for European and other foreign companies in China will remain limited and can even come back to bite competitiveness.
As the EU confronts the immense challenge of economic recovery from the coronavirus-induced recession, the pressure on Europe to submit to China’s political dictates on Huawei, Taiwan, and other national interests overseas may grow. But European policymakers need to recognize they have far more room for maneuver with Beijing than they might believe. Facing its own economic slowdown, China will also be searching for growth opportunities during the coming global recession and will not want to upset its trade and investment position in the European Union’s massive common market.
Fixating on negotiating market access with China can also blind Europe to broader horizons in the global economy. As emerging Asia overtakes China as the world’s main growth engine, Europe can build on its trade and investment portfolio across India and Southeast Asia. A recent free trade deal with Vietnam marks a promising start to such an expansion.
Closer to home, Europe can also foster manufacturing centers in Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey to revitalize its role in global trade. Rather than chasing every last dollar in China, Europe should invest in its regional innovation and industrial competitiveness. Nurturing its own leading corporations as global champions and supporting fellow democracies around the world better serve Europe’s economic and political interests.
Without subscribing to the same nationalist sentiments currently brewing strong in China, European leaders can encourage principled multilateralism in the world. But before such priorities can take hold, Europe must first learn to say no to China.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-29--Where Does the Fed Go From Here?

Where Does the Fed Go From Here?

Where Does the Fed Go From Here ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. Federal Reserve concludes its April meeting today , Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro names a new justice minister , and a bomb in the Syrian border town of Afrin kills dozens .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
A two-day meeting of the U.S. Federal Reserve ’ s Federal Open Market Committee ( FOMC ) culminates today , with all eyes on the bank ’ s afternoon press conference .
Fed Chairman Jerome Powell will discuss the central bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision on interest rates and how long it plans to continue its aggressive , trillion-dollar maneuvers to keep the U.S. economy from depression .
On Monday , the Fed extended its Municipal Liquidity Facility , a $ 500 billion lending initiative , to include smaller counties and cities than had initially been given access when the plan was announced on April 9 .
U.S. states and municipalities are facing a steep budget shortfall in the face of the coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing unemployment crisis .
Will the Fed go negative ?
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s still room to bring them down further—negative interest rates have already been explored by Japan and the European Central Bank .
However , it ’ s not something Jerome Powell is considering .
“ We do not see negative policy rates as likely to be an appropriate policy response here in the United States , ” Powell told reporters back in March .
U.S. President Donald Trump pushed for negative rates back in September with a view to refinancing U.S. debt .
“ The Federal Reserve should get our interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ … It is only the naïveté of Jay Powell and the Federal Reserve that doesn ’ t allow us to do what other countries are already doing .
A once in a lifetime opportunity that we are missing because of “ Boneheads , ” ” Trump wrote on Twitter .
In a Bloomberg op-ed on Friday , Narayana Kocherlakota , a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis , said the Fed should set interest rates a “ quarter percentage point below zero ” and worry more about unemployment than concerning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Put crudely , the Fed is giving up on unemployment reductions to help keep banks and their shareholders safer , ” he wrote .
Bolsonaro names new justice minister , police chief .
Last weekend ’ s drama left two big gaps open at the top of Brazil ’ s law enforcement system , after Sergio Moro resigned his position as justice minister and the head of Brazil ’ s federal police was fired .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro named successors on Tuesday : André Mendonça , a former solicitor general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Alexandre Ramagem , the former head of the Brazilian intelligence agency is the new federal police chief .
Ramagem has been accused of being too close to the Bolsonaro family , an allegation that gained new momentum after pictures emerged of him alongside one of Bolsonaro ’ s sons at a recent New Year ’ s Eve party .
On Monday , Brazil ’ s Supreme Court authorized a request from the country ’ s attorney general to open an investigation into Bolsonaro after his former justice minister alleged the president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigations .
Those particular investigations likely involve the president ’ s sons .
A poll released on Monday shows Brazilians are split on whether Bolsonaro should be impeached .
45 percent support impeachment , but 48 percent are against it .
Lebanon protests turn violent .
Protestors vandalized and set fire to banks in Tripoli on Tuesday as unrest over the country ’ s battered economy reignited .
The Lebanese army was deployed to quell the protestors , firing tear gas and rubber bullets .
One man in his 20s died in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ riot , this is expressing ( anger ) that the dollar has reached 4,000 Lebanese pounds … How are people going to eat ?
And this is the holy month of Ramadan , ” Abou Hussein , a Tripoli-based activist , told Reuters .
Lebanon was already in financial crisis before the coronavirus pandemic , with street protests in October leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri .
On April 16 , Prime Minister Hassan Diab said it had contacted the International Monetary Fund in hopes of receiving emergency financing Dozens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 40 people were killed in the Syrian city of Afrin on the country ’ s Turkish border after a bomb detonated near an oil tanker on a busy street .
On Twitter , Turkey ’ s defense ministry blamed the Kurdish People ’ s Protection Units ( YPG ) for the attack .
Writing from Afrin in 2018 , after Turkish forces had seized the city from the YPG , Borzou Daragahi warned that Turkey may have overstepped by occupying the city .
“ Turkey , without quite realizing it , also made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of Syria .
The responsibility seems more of a quagmire than the Turkish government originally expected , ” he wrote .
Kim Jong Un ’ s whereabouts .
South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yeon Chul suggested that Kim Jong Un ’ s absence from public life could be the same as everyone else ’ s : He may be laying low to avoid the coronavirus .
“ I don ’ t think that ’ s particularly unusual given the current situation , ” Kim said at a parliamentary hearing , adding that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cancelled due to coronavirus fears .
A U.S. official , speaking anonymously to Reuters , said that U.S. assessments were largely in line with the South Korean minister ’ s comments .
On Tuesday , North Korea announced it was extending its coronavirus state of emergency until the end of the year , although the country has still not officially recorded any cases of COVID-19 .
Oil at sea .
As oil refiners rush to find places to store their product in the midst of a supply glut , the price of offshore @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reports that the cost of hiring a Long Range 2 tanker , capable of holding 800,000 barrels , has doubled in the past week to a record $ 173,000 a day .
The U.S. Department of Defense has declassified three videos showing “ unexplained aerial phenomena ” captured by U.S. military aircraft .
Two videos had previously been leaked to the press and the third had been released by an organization co-founded by former Blink-182 guitarist Tom DeLonge .
The videos show objects moving at high speed , executing unusual maneuvers for even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Department of Defense gave their reasoning for the declassification , “ DOD is releasing the videos in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real , or whether or not there is more to the videos .
The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as ‘ unidentified , ' ” the statement read .
DeLonge , whose To the Stars Academy of Arts and Sciences helped bring the videos to light , welcomed the release and hinted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we plan on pursuing the technology , finding more answers and telling the stories , ” he wrote on Twitter .
Former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid , who helped steer funds to UFO research in his time as Senate majority leader , suggested the Pentagon has even more information than it has let on .
The release “ only scratches the surface of research and materials available , ” he said .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Federal Reserve concludes its April meeting today, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro names a new justice minister, and a bomb in the Syrian border town of Afrin kills dozens.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. Federal Reserve concludes its April meeting today, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro names a new justice minister, and a bomb in the Syrian border town of Afrin kills dozens.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Fed to Announce Latest Moves in Afternoon Statement
A two-day meeting of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) culminates today, with all eyes on the bank’s afternoon press conference. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell will discuss the central bank’s latest moves, including its decision on interest rates and how long it plans to continue its aggressive, trillion-dollar maneuvers to keep the U.S. economy from depression.
On Monday, the Fed extended its Municipal Liquidity Facility, a $500 billion lending initiative, to include smaller counties and cities than had initially been given access when the plan was announced on April 9. U.S. states and municipalities are facing a steep budget shortfall in the face of the coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing unemployment crisis.
Will the Fed go negative? With interest rates already at near zero, there’s still room to bring them down further—negative interest rates have already been explored by Japan and the European Central Bank. However, it’s not something Jerome Powell is considering. “We do not see negative policy rates as likely to be an appropriate policy response here in the United States,” Powell told reporters back in March.
U.S. President Donald Trump pushed for negative rates back in September with a view to refinancing U.S. debt. “The Federal Reserve should get our interest rates down to ZERO, or less … It is only the naïveté of Jay Powell and the Federal Reserve that doesn’t allow us to do what other countries are already doing. A once in a lifetime opportunity that we are missing because of “Boneheads,”” Trump wrote on Twitter.
In a Bloomberg op-ed on Friday, Narayana Kocherlakota, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, said the Fed should set interest rates a “quarter percentage point below zero” and worry more about unemployment than concerning itself with the financial stability of banks. “Put crudely, the Fed is giving up on unemployment reductions to help keep banks and their shareholders safer,” he wrote.
What We’re Following Today
Bolsonaro names new justice minister, police chief. Last weekend’s drama left two big gaps open at the top of Brazil’s law enforcement system, after Sergio Moro resigned his position as justice minister and the head of Brazil’s federal police was fired. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro named successors on Tuesday: André Mendonça, a former solicitor general, will take over as justice minister, and Alexandre Ramagem, the former head of the Brazilian intelligence agency is the new federal police chief. Ramagem has been accused of being too close to the Bolsonaro family, an allegation that gained new momentum after pictures emerged of him alongside one of Bolsonaro’s sons at a recent New Year’s Eve party.
On Monday, Brazil’s Supreme Court authorized a request from the country’s attorney general to open an investigation into Bolsonaro after his former justice minister alleged the president had attempted to interfere with federal police investigations. Those particular investigations likely involve the president’s sons.
A poll released on Monday shows Brazilians are split on whether Bolsonaro should be impeached. 45 percent support impeachment, but 48 percent are against it.
Lebanon protests turn violent. Protestors vandalized and set fire to banks in Tripoli on Tuesday as unrest over the country’s battered economy reignited. The Lebanese army was deployed to quell the protestors, firing tear gas and rubber bullets. One man in his 20s died in the melee. “This is not a riot, this is expressing (anger) that the dollar has reached 4,000 Lebanese pounds … How are people going to eat? And this is the holy month of Ramadan,” Abou Hussein, a Tripoli-based activist, told Reuters.
Lebanon was already in financial crisis before the coronavirus pandemic, with street protests in October leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. On April 16, Prime Minister Hassan Diab said it had contacted the International Monetary Fund in hopes of receiving emergency financing
Dozens dead in Afrin bombing. At least 40 people were killed in the Syrian city of Afrin on the country’s Turkish border after a bomb detonated near an oil tanker on a busy street. On Twitter, Turkey’s defense ministry blamed the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) for the attack.
Writing from Afrin in 2018, after Turkish forces had seized the city from the YPG, Borzou Daragahi warned that Turkey may have overstepped by occupying the city. “Turkey, without quite realizing it, also made itself the de facto ruler of this part of Syria. The responsibility seems more of a quagmire than the Turkish government originally expected,” he wrote.
Keep an Eye On
Kim Jong Un’s whereabouts. South Korean Unification Minister Kim Yeon Chul suggested that Kim Jong Un’s absence from public life could be the same as everyone else’s: He may be laying low to avoid the coronavirus. “I don’t think that’s particularly unusual given the current situation,” Kim said at a parliamentary hearing, adding that other North Korean state events had been cancelled due to coronavirus fears. A U.S. official, speaking anonymously to Reuters, said that U.S. assessments were largely in line with the South Korean minister’s comments.
On Tuesday, North Korea announced it was extending its coronavirus state of emergency until the end of the year, although the country has still not officially recorded any cases of COVID-19.
Oil at sea. As oil refiners rush to find places to store their product in the midst of a supply glut, the price of offshore options have soared. The Financial Times reports that the cost of hiring a Long Range 2 tanker, capable of holding 800,000 barrels, has doubled in the past week to a record $173,000 a day.
Odds and Ends
The U.S. Department of Defense has declassified three videos showing “unexplained aerial phenomena” captured by U.S. military aircraft. Two videos had previously been leaked to the press and the third had been released by an organization co-founded by former Blink-182 guitarist Tom DeLonge. The videos show objects moving at high speed, executing unusual maneuvers for even modern aircraft.
In a statement, the Department of Defense gave their reasoning for the declassification, “DOD is releasing the videos in order to clear up any misconceptions by the public on whether or not the footage that has been circulating was real, or whether or not there is more to the videos. The aerial phenomena observed in the videos remain characterized as ‘unidentified,'” the statement read.
DeLonge, whose To the Stars Academy of Arts and Sciences helped bring the videos to light, welcomed the release and hinted at more to come. “Next, we plan on pursuing the technology, finding more answers and telling the stories,” he wrote on Twitter.
Former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid, who helped steer funds to UFO research in his time as Senate majority leader, suggested the Pentagon has even more information than it has let on. The release “only scratches the surface of research and materials available,” he said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.