foreignpolicy--2020-12-01--What Iran’s Leaders Really Think About Biden

What Iran ’ s Leaders Really Think About Biden The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh , an atomic physics specialist widely regarded as the chief architect of Iran ’ s nuclear program since the 1979 revolution , has predictably sullied the mood of policymakers in Tehran .
The hardliner-dominated parliament is already pushing through a “ Strategic Action ” proposal that , if passed into law , could force the pro-diplomacy administration of President Hassan Rouhani to significantly reduce Iran ’ s commitments under the 2015 nuclear accord—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—and essentially kill it .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 251-majority vote of endorsement on Tuesday before possible final passage in the future , requires , among other things , that the administration halt Iran ’ s voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol , produce at least 120 kilograms of 20-percent enriched uranium per year , and build a new heavy water reactor .
The foreign ministry was quick to slam it as a “ neither necessary , nor useful ” move that “ will not help with the removal of sanctions.
” Other hardline groups have urged the government to expel International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of espionage and complicity in the killing .
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has also demanded “ definitive punishment ” for those behind the Nov. 27 assassination .
But while the chorus of calls for retaliation is growing among the elite and public alike , the Iranian leadership seems inclined toward exercising restraint and sticking to the same policy of “ strategic patience ” it has deliberately pursued over the last year , at least until U.S. President-elect Joe Biden assumes office on Jan. 20 , 2021 .
Rather than a retaliatory terrorist attack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , public statements by government officials suggest their sights are set on negotiations with the United States .
The killing of Fakhrizadeh , widely attributed to Israel and believed to have the Trump administration ’ s blessing , was clearly meant to wreck the prospects of Iranian-American diplomacy on the eve of Biden ’ s inauguration by provoking Iran into jettisoning the nuclear agreement once and for all or taking radical retaliatory action that could trigger war and drag the United States in .
“ We can not deal with the issue in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never forget , ” Gen. Esmail Kowsari , top advisor to the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps , said in an interview two days after the assassination , adding that the “ time , location , and type ” of Iran ’ s revenge has yet to be determined .
Interestingly , his note of caution echoed earlier comments by Rouhani vowing retaliation “ at an appropriate time.
” But if Tehran ’ s decision is to resist the bait and persist with strategic patience until cooler heads prevail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may still be able to take steps toward salvaging the nuclear agreement and resuming negotiations .
A number of senior Iranian officials have already started making overtures to the incoming Biden administration to revive the beleaguered nuclear deal , which U.S. President Donald Trump abrogated in May 2018 before unleashing what was termed a “ maximum pressure ” campaign of economic sanctions against Iran in an ambitious bid to compel it into changing its behavior and negotiating a better deal .
There are sound arguments for Biden ’ s intention to return swiftly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continuous shrinking of Iran ’ s so-called breakout time needed to make a single nuclear bomb from one year under the 2015 deal to as short as three months at the moment .
But there are also substantial political costs to such a decision for a freshly minted unity-seeking administration in Washington .
For one , if the Senate remains in Republican hands , a Biden administration may be compelled to spend considerable political capital on ensuring the passage of a COVID-19 stimulus package , and that as well as other domestic priorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear deal .
Additionally , U.S. allies—especially Israel but also Saudi Arabia—have made it clear they are willing to go to great lengths to torpedo the accord once and for all .
Combined with intensifying domestic rivalries in Tehran as the state leadership succession looms on the horizon , these complications make a clean return to the 2015 deal unlikely before Iran ’ s presidential elections in June 2021 , however desirable it is from a conflict prevention point of view .
In a televised public address on Nov. 3 , Khamenei discounted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American leadership , reaffirming the sensibility of Tehran ’ s “ maximum resistance ” policy , which has significantly featured a disdainful rejection of negotiations with the United States .
“ As for the United States , our policy is calculated and clear , and does change with the arrival and departure of persons , ” he said .
“ It has no effect on our [ U.S. ] policy.
” In another speech later this month , Khamenei reiterated a similar position that strongly suggested his absence of urgency about sanctions relief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iran-U.S. talks ajar , preferably within a multilateral framework , provided that Washington secures Tehran ’ s trust first .
Meanwhile , the Rouhani administration and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have adopted quite different stances , producing a characteristic set of mixed signals by Iran ’ s ruling elite .
In an interview on Nov. 18 , Zarif made a pragmatic proposal that puts the ball in the U.S. court without a need for fresh negotiations .
If the United States as a United Nations member “ meets its obligations as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fulfill ours under the # JCPOA , ” he tweeted , referring to the resolution passed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council in July 2015 to anchor the nuclear accord in international law .
“ If the US then seeks to re-join the JCPOA , we ’ re ready to negotiate terms for it to regain its ‘ JCPOA Participant ’ status , ” Zarif continued .
As the embattled Rouhani administration seeks to grasp a short window of opportunity from Jan. 20 to June 18 , the date designated for Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s proposal is primarily aimed at sparing both sides the trouble of another round of complicated negotiations , implying that these would face stiff opposition in Iran by powerful hard-liners .
In an unusually straightforward interview after the assassination of Fakhrizadeh , the foreign minister excoriated his hard-line rivals ’ overtures and messages to the next U.S. administration that “ moderates won ’ t remain in power ” and that Washington “ can work with them better.
” In other words , Khamenei seems to have allowed Rouhani and Zarif to extract any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relief from the Biden administration while assuming , as he has repeatedly made clear , that American “ hostility ” to Iran “ will persist ” regardless , and that “ we should frustrate them.
” Khamenei is clearly not counting on the possibility of the Biden administration making major concessions as it urgently needs to tackle a spiraling domestic COVID-19 crisis , potentially faces a hawkish Senate , and may require time to meaningfully unravel the complex sanctions mechanisms and structures the Trump administration has put in place .
Against this backdrop @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iran deal by the Biden administration would likely surprise Khamenei and frustrate his hard-line allies who are counting on Rouhani ’ s continued failure to repair the economy so as to boost their own political prospects before Iran ’ s presidential elections in June .
Having seized control of the judiciary and the legislature already , they appear determined to win the presidency as well , an ambition that may require playing the spoiler ’ s game to hamper diplomatic efforts for resumption of multilateral negotiations until Iran ’ s next president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the thinking goes .
Notably , Swedish media sources reported on Nov. 24 that Ahmadreza Djalali , an Iranian Swedish disaster medicine expert accused dubiously of nuclear espionage for Israel and sentenced to death , has been abruptly moved to an isolation cell to await execution .
This measure came only days before state prosecutors in Belgium commenced the trial of Assadollah Assadi , an Austria-stationed Iranian diplomat charged with plotting a bomb attack against an opposition group in France .
It is in facilitating a smooth return to the nuclear deal that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , France , and Germany , can team up with the incoming Biden administration to try to force Khamenei ’ s hand .
Those three countries could simply revive a key element of the 2019 plan from French President Emmanuel Macron by setting up an immediate credit line of $ 10 billion to $ 20 billion for the purchase of Iranian oil based on a U.S. presidential waiver effective Jan. 21 , 2021—in exchange for Iran freezing its ongoing nuclear activities that are in breach of the nuclear deal , including a halt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In a single move , these European powers can restore some of their lost credibility and leverage in Tehran , build a trans-Atlantic bridge , stabilize the situation , and save the incoming U.S. president the trouble of having to spend political capital domestically .
The longer-term merits of such a move—if it is backed up by effective removal of sanctions in lockstep with the United States rejoining the nuclear deal—could include reinvigorating the political relevance of moderates in the upcoming presidential Iranian elections .
In turn , this might contribute to fostering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eventual succession of the country ’ s next leader , or even the formation of a leadership council instead of one-man rule .
It bears reminding that Khamenei himself has grown ever more skeptical of diplomacy with Washington after he enabled the nuclear talks in 2013 with his pragmatic rhetoric of “ heroic flexibility , ” only to suffer an unprecedented economic pressure campaign against his country less than three years later .
Despite their fiery rhetoric , however , Iranian hard-liners do not categorically oppose diplomacy with Washington but in fact prefer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequential domestic authority and international prestige .
Unsurprisingly , an influential outlet of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps recently demanded that Iran ’ s nuclear file be moved from the moderate-dominated foreign ministry back to the Supreme National Security Council , which directly handled it from 2003 to 2013 before Rouhani took office .
Formidable challenges notwithstanding , it serves strategic American and European interests better to capitalize on the brief window of opportunity that starts on Jan. 20 by providing meaningful sanctions relief as a confidence-building step and harness Iranian moderates ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible follow-on negotiations that Biden and his team are hoping for .
If the United States and European powers team up behind the nuclear deal , Tehran can not help coming back in from the cold .

The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an atomic physics specialist widely regarded as the chief architect of Iran’s nuclear program since the 1979 revolution, has predictably sullied the mood of policymakers in Tehran. The hardliner-dominated parliament is already pushing through a “ Strategic Action ” proposal that, if passed into law, could force the pro-diplomacy administration of President Hassan Rouhani to significantly reduce Iran’s commitments under the 2015 nuclear accord—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—and essentially kill it.
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an atomic physics specialist widely regarded as the chief architect of Iran’s nuclear program since the 1979 revolution, has predictably sullied the mood of policymakers in Tehran. The hardliner-dominated parliament is already pushing through a “Strategic Action” proposal that, if passed into law, could force the pro-diplomacy administration of President Hassan Rouhani to significantly reduce Iran’s commitments under the 2015 nuclear accord—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—and essentially kill it.
The bill, whose general provisions received a 251-majority vote of endorsement on Tuesday before possible final passage in the future, requires, among other things, that the administration halt Iran’s voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, produce at least 120 kilograms of 20-percent enriched uranium per year, and build a new heavy water reactor. The foreign ministry was quick to slam it as a “neither necessary, nor useful” move that “will not help with the removal of sanctions.” Other hardline groups have urged the government to expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, accusing them of espionage and complicity in the killing. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has also demanded “definitive punishment” for those behind the Nov. 27 assassination.
But while the chorus of calls for retaliation is growing among the elite and public alike, the Iranian leadership seems inclined toward exercising restraint and sticking to the same policy of “strategic patience” it has deliberately pursued over the last year, at least until U.S. President-elect Joe Biden assumes office on Jan. 20, 2021. Rather than a retaliatory terrorist attack or radical escalation of its nuclear noncompliance, public statements by government officials suggest their sights are set on negotiations with the United States.
The killing of Fakhrizadeh, widely attributed to Israel and believed to have the Trump administration’s blessing, was clearly meant to wreck the prospects of Iranian-American diplomacy on the eve of Biden’s inauguration by provoking Iran into jettisoning the nuclear agreement once and for all or taking radical retaliatory action that could trigger war and drag the United States in. “We cannot deal with the issue in an impulsive way, but we will never forget,” Gen. Esmail Kowsari, top advisor to the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said in an interview two days after the assassination, adding that the “time, location, and type” of Iran’s revenge has yet to be determined. Interestingly, his note of caution echoed earlier comments by Rouhani vowing retaliation “at an appropriate time.”
But if Tehran’s decision is to resist the bait and persist with strategic patience until cooler heads prevail in the White House, both sides may still be able to take steps toward salvaging the nuclear agreement and resuming negotiations. A number of senior Iranian officials have already started making overtures to the incoming Biden administration to revive the beleaguered nuclear deal, which U.S. President Donald Trump abrogated in May 2018 before unleashing what was termed a “maximum pressure” campaign of economic sanctions against Iran in an ambitious bid to compel it into changing its behavior and negotiating a better deal.
There are sound arguments for Biden’s intention to return swiftly and unconditionally to the nuclear agreement—including the continuous shrinking of Iran’s so-called breakout time needed to make a single nuclear bomb from one year under the 2015 deal to as short as three months at the moment. But there are also substantial political costs to such a decision for a freshly minted unity-seeking administration in Washington. For one, if the Senate remains in Republican hands, a Biden administration may be compelled to spend considerable political capital on ensuring the passage of a COVID-19 stimulus package, and that as well as other domestic priorities might keep it from focusing on the nuclear deal. Additionally, U.S. allies—especially Israel but also Saudi Arabia—have made it clear they are willing to go to great lengths to torpedo the accord once and for all. Combined with intensifying domestic rivalries in Tehran as the state leadership succession looms on the horizon, these complications make a clean return to the 2015 deal unlikely before Iran’s presidential elections in June 2021, however desirable it is from a conflict prevention point of view.
In a televised public address on Nov. 3, Khamenei discounted the significance of the possible change in American leadership, reaffirming the sensibility of Tehran’s “maximum resistance” policy, which has significantly featured a disdainful rejection of negotiations with the United States. “As for the United States, our policy is calculated and clear, and does change with the arrival and departure of persons,” he said. “It has no effect on our [U.S.] policy.” In another speech later this month, Khamenei reiterated a similar position that strongly suggested his absence of urgency about sanctions relief, even though he left the door to Iran-U.S. talks ajar, preferably within a multilateral framework, provided that Washington secures Tehran’s trust first.
Meanwhile, the Rouhani administration and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have adopted quite different stances, producing a characteristic set of mixed signals by Iran’s ruling elite. In an interview on Nov. 18, Zarif made a pragmatic proposal that puts the ball in the U.S. court without a need for fresh negotiations. If the United States as a United Nations member “meets its obligations as such under UNSCR 2231, we will fulfill ours under the #JCPOA,” he tweeted, referring to the resolution passed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council in July 2015 to anchor the nuclear accord in international law. “If the US then seeks to re-join the JCPOA, we’re ready to negotiate terms for it to regain its ‘JCPOA Participant’ status,” Zarif continued.
As the embattled Rouhani administration seeks to grasp a short window of opportunity from Jan. 20 to June 18, the date designated for Iran’s presidential election, Zarif’s proposal is primarily aimed at sparing both sides the trouble of another round of complicated negotiations, implying that these would face stiff opposition in Iran by powerful hard-liners. In an unusually straightforward interview after the assassination of Fakhrizadeh, the foreign minister excoriated his hard-line rivals’ overtures and messages to the next U.S. administration that “moderates won’t remain in power” and that Washington “can work with them better.” In other words, Khamenei seems to have allowed Rouhani and Zarif to extract any concessions they can in terms of sanctions relief from the Biden administration while assuming, as he has repeatedly made clear, that American “hostility” to Iran “will persist” regardless, and that “we should frustrate them.”
Khamenei is clearly not counting on the possibility of the Biden administration making major concessions as it urgently needs to tackle a spiraling domestic COVID-19 crisis, potentially faces a hawkish Senate, and may require time to meaningfully unravel the complex sanctions mechanisms and structures the Trump administration has put in place. Against this backdrop, a straightforward and unconditional reentry into the Iran deal by the Biden administration would likely surprise Khamenei and frustrate his hard-line allies who are counting on Rouhani’s continued failure to repair the economy so as to boost their own political prospects before Iran’s presidential elections in June. Having seized control of the judiciary and the legislature already, they appear determined to win the presidency as well, an ambition that may require playing the spoiler’s game to hamper diplomatic efforts for resumption of multilateral negotiations until Iran’s next president assumes office in summer, or so the thinking goes. Notably, Swedish media sources reported on Nov. 24 that Ahmadreza Djalali, an Iranian Swedish disaster medicine expert accused dubiously of nuclear espionage for Israel and sentenced to death, has been abruptly moved to an isolation cell to await execution. This measure came only days before state prosecutors in Belgium commenced the trial of Assadollah Assadi, an Austria-stationed Iranian diplomat charged with plotting a bomb attack against an opposition group in France.
It is in facilitating a smooth return to the nuclear deal that Europe, more specifically the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, can team up with the incoming Biden administration to try to force Khamenei’s hand. Those three countries could simply revive a key element of the 2019 plan from French President Emmanuel Macron by setting up an immediate credit line of $10 billion to $20 billion for the purchase of Iranian oil based on a U.S. presidential waiver effective Jan. 21, 2021—in exchange for Iran freezing its ongoing nuclear activities that are in breach of the nuclear deal, including a halt to uranium enrichment with advanced centrifuges. In a single move, these European powers can restore some of their lost credibility and leverage in Tehran, build a trans-Atlantic bridge, stabilize the situation, and save the incoming U.S. president the trouble of having to spend political capital domestically.
The longer-term merits of such a move—if it is backed up by effective removal of sanctions in lockstep with the United States rejoining the nuclear deal—could include reinvigorating the political relevance of moderates in the upcoming presidential Iranian elections. In turn, this might contribute to fostering a more balanced political climate for the eventual succession of the country’s next leader, or even the formation of a leadership council instead of one-man rule.
It bears reminding that Khamenei himself has grown ever more skeptical of diplomacy with Washington after he enabled the nuclear talks in 2013 with his pragmatic rhetoric of “heroic flexibility,” only to suffer an unprecedented economic pressure campaign against his country less than three years later.
Despite their fiery rhetoric, however, Iranian hard-liners do not categorically oppose diplomacy with Washington but in fact prefer to manage it themselves and enjoy the consequential domestic authority and international prestige. Unsurprisingly, an influential outlet of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps recently demanded that Iran’s nuclear file be moved from the moderate-dominated foreign ministry back to the Supreme National Security Council, which directly handled it from 2003 to 2013 before Rouhani took office.
Formidable challenges notwithstanding, it serves strategic American and European interests better to capitalize on the brief window of opportunity that starts on Jan. 20 by providing meaningful sanctions relief as a confidence-building step and harness Iranian moderates’ greater flexibility to set the stage for possible follow-on negotiations that Biden and his team are hoping for. If the United States and European powers team up behind the nuclear deal, Tehran cannot help coming back in from the cold.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-01--Peru Needs a New Constitution

Peru Needs a New Constitution

Peru cycled through three different presidents in a week last month—a record even in a country notorious for shifting political winds .
Popular demonstrations have spilled onto the streets , led by young people who are advocating for major institutional changes in the country .
Some are pushing for a referendum on a new constitution in the same way that demonstrators in Chile successfully did this past year .
Peru should follow in Chile ’ s footsteps and write a new constitution .
Peru ’ s political system is facing a serious crisis of legitimacy .
The country has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and inefficiencies in its health care system .
All of its former elected presidents are either jailed or facing corruption charges .
Congress is deeply unpopular and inexperienced .
Over half of its members are under investigation for corruption , some of whom are linked to the political party of the daughter of the country ’ s last dictator , Alberto Fujimori .
And in spite of the country ’ s enviable record of economic growth over the last two decades , inequality remains sky-high , and many Peruvians remain mired in poverty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this backdrop , Peru ’ s constitution is facing renewed scrutiny .
The current constitution was written under the authoritarian rule of Fujimori in 1993 , which echoes the authoritarian roots of Chile ’ s current constitution that was forged under the iron fist of Augusto Pinochet .
Indeed , my research indicates that many young democracies operate under constitutions written in their authoritarian past .
Like Chile ’ s Pinochet-era constitution , Peru ’ s constitution embeds a host of elements that make it unresponsive to popular demands .
Too much power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indigenous groups are underrepresented in politics .
Peripheral regions of the country are often ignored when it comes to policymaking .
The judiciary is unduly subject to political pressure .
And some of the social and economic rights that the constitution enshrines are no longer in keeping with shifting social norms .
A new constitution could address these issues head on and , in doing so , forge a new , more inclusive and democratic social contract that would put an end to Peru ’ s chronic political instability and underpin shared prosperity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can help to level the playing field so that more of its citizens can flourish .
The country needs fairer taxation and social spending oriented toward creating opportunity for the middle and lower classes .
Greater protections for local populations against the negative consequences of an extractivist economy that is heavily weighted toward mining are long overdue .
Massive investment in basic infrastructure that can both reduce transaction costs in everyday business and link the country ’ s peripheries more tightly to its economic hubs to encourage shared prosperity is sorely needed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ policies for the country ’ s sizable Indigenous population , which is disproportionately poor .
But a stronger government alone can end up backfiring without accompanying reforms .
The judicial system , for instance , requires an overhaul to ensure much greater independence from political pressure and to insulate against corruption .
And there should be greater revenue-sharing with regional governments to promote more even growth across the country .
A central government that is too powerful and subject to corruption could cause more problems than it solves .
Diagnosing Peru ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rectifying them.A new constitution for Peru can help to encourage accountability .
Disgusted with the corruption and naked exercise of power in the service of self-interest , Peruvians recently voted to eliminate the possibility of reelection for members of Congress .
But this gets rid of incentives for representatives to build issue expertise and reputations for competency .
Responsibility can be restored with longer term limits—but again , this should be paired with judicial reform so that corruption can be more effectively investigated and prosecuted .
The country also needs to correct current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It should rid the constitution of a clause that enables Congress to remove a president for “ moral incapacity.
” The clause is too ambiguous and has been used to oust presidents who are simply at odds with Congress .
This was the case with Martín Vizcarra , whose impeachment on Nov. 9 set in motion the current crisis and the parade of new presidents .
Diagnosing Peru ’ s political ills has always been easier than rectifying them .
The process of a constitutional overhaul faces more obstacles than Chile did due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s political parties and the fact that many are headed by outsized , and often dubious , personalities .
The largest party in Congress , Popular Action , does not even hold 20 percent of legislative seats .
Furthermore , most parties are internally ideologically divided , and political factionalization and poverty will complicate Peru ’ s path to reform .
There are also other critical differences between Chile and Peru that could make Peru ’ s path to reform more difficult .
Chile is a development success story .
Despite the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country has blossomed into one of the most developed countries in the region .
Peru , by contrast , is far poorer in spite of the economic stability and growth it has enjoyed in the last two decades .
Nonetheless , there has been a marked shift in the political debate in recent months from whether to reform the constitution to how to reform it .
Politicians from across the spectrum along with constitutional scholars are rapidly converging on reform .
There is a snowballing call for a referendum on the nature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the next elections scheduled for 2021 .
The current president , Francisco Sagasti , says that a referendum for a new constitution is not the current priority and should be shelved for a later date .
A growing number of Peruvians think otherwise .
Even if Sagasti ’ s reputation as an even-keeled statesman can keep him in office as a caretaker until the next election , the country is barreling toward another political reckoning .
If he does not heed citizens ’ calls for constitutional reform , Peru might have yet @ @ @ @ @ @

Peru cycled through three different presidents in a week last month—a record even in a country notorious for shifting political winds. Popular demonstrations have spilled onto the streets, led by young people who are advocating for major institutional changes in the country. Some are pushing for a referendum on a new constitution in the same way that demonstrators in Chile successfully did this past year. Peru should follow in Chile’s footsteps and write a new constitution.
Peru cycled through three different presidents in a week last month—a record even in a country notorious for shifting political winds. Popular demonstrations have spilled onto the streets, led by young people who are advocating for major institutional changes in the country. Some are pushing for a referendum on a new constitution in the same way that demonstrators in Chile successfully did this past year. Peru should follow in Chile’s footsteps and write a new constitution.
Peru’s political system is facing a serious crisis of legitimacy. The country has been ravaged by COVID-19, exposing major gaps and inefficiencies in its health care system. All of its former elected presidents are either jailed or facing corruption charges. Congress is deeply unpopular and inexperienced. Over half of its members are under investigation for corruption, some of whom are linked to the political party of the daughter of the country’s last dictator, Alberto Fujimori. And in spite of the country’s enviable record of economic growth over the last two decades, inequality remains sky-high, and many Peruvians remain mired in poverty.
It is no surprise that against this backdrop, Peru’s constitution is facing renewed scrutiny. The current constitution was written under the authoritarian rule of Fujimori in 1993, which echoes the authoritarian roots of Chile’s current constitution that was forged under the iron fist of Augusto Pinochet. Indeed, my research indicates that many young democracies operate under constitutions written in their authoritarian past.
Like Chile’s Pinochet-era constitution, Peru’s constitution embeds a host of elements that make it unresponsive to popular demands. Too much power is concentrated in an unaccountable Congress. Indigenous groups are underrepresented in politics. Peripheral regions of the country are often ignored when it comes to policymaking. The judiciary is unduly subject to political pressure. And some of the social and economic rights that the constitution enshrines are no longer in keeping with shifting social norms.
A new constitution could address these issues head on and, in doing so, forge a new, more inclusive and democratic social contract that would put an end to Peru’s chronic political instability and underpin shared prosperity.
Peru needs a stronger government that can help to level the playing field so that more of its citizens can flourish. The country needs fairer taxation and social spending oriented toward creating opportunity for the middle and lower classes. Greater protections for local populations against the negative consequences of an extractivist economy that is heavily weighted toward mining are long overdue. Massive investment in basic infrastructure that can both reduce transaction costs in everyday business and link the country’s peripheries more tightly to its economic hubs to encourage shared prosperity is sorely needed. And there should be stronger affirmative action policies for the country’s sizable Indigenous population, which is disproportionately poor.
But a stronger government alone can end up backfiring without accompanying reforms. The judicial system, for instance, requires an overhaul to ensure much greater independence from political pressure and to insulate against corruption. And there should be greater revenue-sharing with regional governments to promote more even growth across the country. A central government that is too powerful and subject to corruption could cause more problems than it solves.
Diagnosing Peru’s political ills has always been easier than rectifying them.A new constitution for Peru can help to encourage accountability. Disgusted with the corruption and naked exercise of power in the service of self-interest, Peruvians recently voted to eliminate the possibility of reelection for members of Congress. But this gets rid of incentives for representatives to build issue expertise and reputations for competency. Responsibility can be restored with longer term limits—but again, this should be paired with judicial reform so that corruption can be more effectively investigated and prosecuted.
The country also needs to correct current imbalances in power across government branches. It should rid the constitution of a clause that enables Congress to remove a president for “moral incapacity.” The clause is too ambiguous and has been used to oust presidents who are simply at odds with Congress. This was the case with Martín Vizcarra, whose impeachment on Nov. 9 set in motion the current crisis and the parade of new presidents.
Diagnosing Peru’s political ills has always been easier than rectifying them. The process of a constitutional overhaul faces more obstacles than Chile did due to the fractionalization and weakness of Peru’s political parties and the fact that many are headed by outsized, and often dubious, personalities. The largest party in Congress, Popular Action, does not even hold 20 percent of legislative seats. Furthermore, most parties are internally ideologically divided, and political factionalization and poverty will complicate Peru’s path to reform.
There are also other critical differences between Chile and Peru that could make Peru’s path to reform more difficult. Chile is a development success story. Despite the brutality of its dictatorship under Pinochet, the country has blossomed into one of the most developed countries in the region. Peru, by contrast, is far poorer in spite of the economic stability and growth it has enjoyed in the last two decades.
Nonetheless, there has been a marked shift in the political debate in recent months from whether to reform the constitution to how to reform it. Politicians from across the spectrum along with constitutional scholars are rapidly converging on reform. There is a snowballing call for a referendum on the nature of constitutional change to occur in tandem with the next elections scheduled for 2021.
The current president, Francisco Sagasti, says that a referendum for a new constitution is not the current priority and should be shelved for a later date. A growing number of Peruvians think otherwise. Even if Sagasti’s reputation as an even-keeled statesman can keep him in office as a caretaker until the next election, the country is barreling toward another political reckoning. If he does not heed citizens’ calls for constitutional reform, Peru might have yet another president in short order.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-01--Controversial Trump USAID Appointee Returns from Absence

A controversial political appointee of outgoing President Donald Trump who has sought to remake important programs at the U.S. Agency for International Development is set to return to the agency following a two-month absence , after he had been accused of mismanagement and hostility toward employees , according to U.S. and NGO officials .
The return of Pete Marocco , who took leave after USAID officials documented complaints with the Trump loyalist in a 13-page memo first obtained by Politico , comes after concerns about his slash-and-burn tactics toward aid programs raised alarm throughout Washington .
Morocco had sought to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conflict Prevention and Stabilization , known as CPS , which he leads .
Marocco , who has been running the new Office of Transition Initiatives ( OTI ) , sought to slash money to help build democratic institutions in countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine while boosting funding to protect Christian minorities , particularly in Iraq , raising questions from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress who had pushed for those democracy programs .
It was not immediately clear whether Marocco had begun taking meetings at USAID again , but sources described his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as imminent .
A spokesperson for USAID did not immediately respond to a request for comment .
But Marocco ’ s arrival could cause more problems at the agency , which has been plagued by personnel churn and overreaching policy influence from the White House .
In recent months , USAID has been riddled with tumult , with several appointees loyal to Trump coming on board despite publicly espousing anti-LGBT and Islamophibic views .
Last month , the White House abruptly fired USAID ’ s number-two official , Bonnie Glick , to allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , John Barsa , to stay in place despite running up against the 210-day time limit for temporary officials under federal vacancy laws .
A Trump loyalist who received major promotions despite being previously dismissed from positions at the State and Defense Departments over similar concerns , Marocco ’ s return comes just as executive branch agencies are under deadline to decide whether to strip workplace protections from career federal civil service workers .
( The Office of Management and Budget has already reportedly sought to reclassify 88 percent of its workforce under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ F , according to an internal memo reported by Federal News Network . )
A former U.S. official familiar with the move feared that Marocco could influence USAID ’ s decision .
Yet Marocco ’ s ability to shake up USAID ’ s programs may run into stiffer internal resistance .
The appointment of Jenny McGee as USAID ’ s assistant administrator for relief , response , and resilience—a role overseeing Marocco—brought significant complaints about the embattled OPS chief , including claims that he was micromanaging agency operations in the field to an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consistent with concerns about Marocco ’ s handling of the Pentagon ’ s Africa Office and the State Department ’ s bureau for conflict and stabilization operations , where current and former officials said he frequently disregarded the chain of command and would try to ditch handlers on regional trips and arrange meetings without the knowledge of ambassadors or other higher-ranking officials .
Before being dismissed from the State Department , he was sent to a migration conference in Hungary , which has championed hardline anti-migration policies .
At the State Department , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racked up more than half a dozen complaints with the agency ’ s inspector general over workplace concerns and held unexplained personal grievances against top contractors .
In one incident , officials said that Marocco became convinced that Creative Associates International , which contracts for the State Department and USAID , was improperly winning grants and urged officials to take money back that had already been programmed , despite regulations preventing that .
In some cases , Marocco has also allegedly sought to bend the bureaus under his purview to fit the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seemingly tenuous legal footing .
At the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations at State , former colleagues also said that Marocco championed the idea of conducting data mining on violence patterns in El Salvador , Honduras , Guatemala , and other Northern Triangle countries .
His idea was seemingly to hone in on the most dangerous areas and inform immigration judges to prevent them from granting asylum to migrants from specific hotspots .
The effort stalled when subordinates told him the project fell outside of the State Department ’ s purview .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ has begun ousting dozens of top officials throughout the government to reward loyalists faithful to the White House and speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq .
On Monday , Christopher Maier , the top Pentagon civilian official overseeing the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State , was abruptly dismissed , just days after Trump fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper via a tweet and removed acting Pentagon policy chief , James Anderson .

A controversial political appointee of outgoing President Donald Trump who has sought to remake important programs at the U.S. Agency for International Development is set to return to the agency following a two-month absence, after he had been accused of mismanagement and hostility toward employees, according to U.S. and NGO officials.
A controversial political appointee of outgoing President Donald Trump who has sought to remake important programs at the U.S. Agency for International Development is set to return to the agency following a two-month absence, after he had been accused of mismanagement and hostility toward employees, according to U.S. and NGO officials.
The return of Pete Marocco, who took leave after USAID officials documented complaints with the Trump loyalist in a 13-page memo first obtained by Politico, comes after concerns about his slash-and-burn tactics toward aid programs raised alarm throughout Washington. Morocco had sought to scale back funding for the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, known as CPS, which he leads.
Marocco, who has been running the new Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), sought to slash money to help build democratic institutions in countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine while boosting funding to protect Christian minorities, particularly in Iraq, raising questions from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress who had pushed for those democracy programs.
It was not immediately clear whether Marocco had begun taking meetings at USAID again, but sources described his return to his previous role leading CPS as imminent. A spokesperson for USAID did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
But Marocco’s arrival could cause more problems at the agency, which has been plagued by personnel churn and overreaching policy influence from the White House. In recent months, USAID has been riddled with tumult, with several appointees loyal to Trump coming on board despite publicly espousing anti-LGBT and Islamophibic views. Last month, the White House abruptly fired USAID’s number-two official, Bonnie Glick, to allow for Trump’s hand-picked acting chief, John Barsa, to stay in place despite running up against the 210-day time limit for temporary officials under federal vacancy laws.
A Trump loyalist who received major promotions despite being previously dismissed from positions at the State and Defense Departments over similar concerns, Marocco’s return comes just as executive branch agencies are under deadline to decide whether to strip workplace protections from career federal civil service workers. (The Office of Management and Budget has already reportedly sought to reclassify 88 percent of its workforce under the new category, known as Schedule F, according to an internal memo reported by Federal News Network.) A former U.S. official familiar with the move feared that Marocco could influence USAID’s decision.
Yet Marocco’s ability to shake up USAID’s programs may run into stiffer internal resistance. The appointment of Jenny McGee as USAID’s assistant administrator for relief, response, and resilience—a role overseeing Marocco—brought significant complaints about the embattled OPS chief, including claims that he was micromanaging agency operations in the field to an unprecedented degree.
Those complaints were also consistent with concerns about Marocco’s handling of the Pentagon’s Africa Office and the State Department’s bureau for conflict and stabilization operations, where current and former officials said he frequently disregarded the chain of command and would try to ditch handlers on regional trips and arrange meetings without the knowledge of ambassadors or other higher-ranking officials. Before being dismissed from the State Department, he was sent to a migration conference in Hungary, which has championed hardline anti-migration policies.
At the State Department, former colleagues told Foreign Policy that Marocco racked up more than half a dozen complaints with the agency’s inspector general over workplace concerns and held unexplained personal grievances against top contractors. In one incident, officials said that Marocco became convinced that Creative Associates International, which contracts for the State Department and USAID, was improperly winning grants and urged officials to take money back that had already been programmed, despite regulations preventing that.
In some cases, Marocco has also allegedly sought to bend the bureaus under his purview to fit the Trump administration’s policy goals, despite seemingly tenuous legal footing. At the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations at State, former colleagues also said that Marocco championed the idea of conducting data mining on violence patterns in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and other Northern Triangle countries. His idea was seemingly to hone in on the most dangerous areas and inform immigration judges to prevent them from granting asylum to migrants from specific hotspots. The effort stalled when subordinates told him the project fell outside of the State Department’s purview.
Marocco’s return comes as Trump has begun ousting dozens of top officials throughout the government to reward loyalists faithful to the White House and speed up the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. On Monday, Christopher Maier, the top Pentagon civilian official overseeing the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State, was abruptly dismissed, just days after Trump fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper via a tweet and removed acting Pentagon policy chief, James Anderson.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Pentagon Says UAE Possibly Funding Russia’s Shadowy Mercenaries in Libya

The United Arab Emirates is apparently helping to finance the Russian mercenary group Wagner in Libya , according to a report issued last week by the Pentagon ’ s Inspector General for counterterrorism operations in Africa , a finding which is likely to complicate the United States ’ close relationship with the Gulf state .
Experts have long suspected that the UAE may be using Russian private military contractors to help obfuscate its role in the conflict , but the report is the first public , official assessment of the arrangement .
Military officials have been increasingly candid in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ destabilizing role in Libya , amid concerns that the Kremlin may use the conflict to establish a military foothold off of Europe ’ s southern shores .
In July , the Pentagon ’ s Africa Command accused the group of indiscriminately laying landmines around Tripoli and putting the lives of civilians in jeopardy .
But the revelation that those Russian mercenaries may have been bankrolled by one of America ’ s closest military allies in the Middle East further complicates the calculus for Washington , and comes as Democrats in Congress have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s proposed $ 23 billion sale of F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi .
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is set to hold a closed hearing on the arms sale early Monday evening .
“ Now there appears to be a permanent Russian presence on the flank of NATO , and it was enabled by a U.S ally , ” said Frederic Wehrey , a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
Nine countries have provided military support to the opposing factions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as 10,000 mercenaries and foreign fighters have battled in support of the warring parties .
Most notably , Turkey has supported the Tripoli-based United Nations-backed Government of National Accord , while Russia has thrown its weight behind the renegade Libyan General Khalifa Haftar , who controls large swathes of territory in the country ’ s east .
While private military contractors are outlawed within Russia , a network of companies collectively known as the Wagner group has been at the forefront of Russian interference efforts abroad from Ukraine to Libya and Sudan .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the group has lent its overseas operations a veneer of plausible deniability , but Wagner is deeply entwined with Russian military and intelligence structures and the Department of State has characterized it as a “ surrogate for the Russian ministry of defense.
” The group was initially thought to be bankrolled by Putin-ally Yevgeny Prigozhin , although it has increasingly secured a number of contracts with foreign actors in Syria , Sudan and the Central African Republic , further blurring the lines between Russian foreign policy and for-profit motives .
“ The overall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very long time is that Wagner is being completely funded by foreign contracts , ” said Kimberly Marten , a professor of political science at Barnard College .
While the UAE has been the biggest military backer of Haftar as part of its broader effort to quash political Islam in the region , the Gulf state ’ s role in the conflict has received significantly less scrutiny than Russia ’ s intervention .
Experts attribute this to the UAE ’ s formidable lobbying efforts in Washington , and the country ’ s role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , such as the maximum pressure campaign on Iran and the UAE ’ s peace deal with Israel , which has been hailed as a rare foreign policy success for the Trump administration .
“ It doesn ’ t gather a lot of traction because when you mention it to U.S officials , they say well , we have other equities with the UAE , ” said Emadeddin Badi , a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Program of the Atlantic Council .
The UAE is Russia ’ s closest ally in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harbored suspicions that the two countries were closely cooperating in Libya , the emirates ’ reliance on Russian mercenaries on the ground has also enabled them to obfuscate their involvement .
“ It ’ s deniability , it ’ s better than direct involvement , ” said Anna Borshchevskaya , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute .
The cautious wording in the Inspector General report that “ The DIA [ Defense Intelligence Agency ] assessed that the United Arab Emirates may provide some financing for the group ’ s operations ” is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involved .
The Trump administration has long been reluctant to call out U.S. partners in the Gulf , including the UAE , despite allegations of human rights abuses in the conflict in Yemen , and Trump has gone as far as to say that the U.S. has no interests in Libya .
“ I would imagine DIA has some good information on the UAE ’ s support to Wagner , ” said Douglas Wise , who served as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2014 to 2016 .
“ Having DIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less formal and embarrassing way to chide the UAE on their behavior than a diplomatic note or a press release from DoD or the White House .
It lets the UAE know that we know , ” he said .
Throughout 2020 , experts tracking the conflict in Libya have noted patterns that would indicate closer ties between the UAE and Russia .
In January , after Turkey ’ s parliament approved a measure to allow active-duty troops to fight on the ground in Libya alongside Turkish-backed mercenaries , there was a drastic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laden with weapons and ammunition–flying to eastern Libya and western Egypt .
Like Russia , the UAE supports Haftar , the eastern Libyan strongman who was once a CIA asset and for years lived in the Washington , D.C. , suburbs .
The increased Russian presence in Libya has also coincided with Emirati drawdowns , further sparking suspicions .
As cargo shipments began to tick up and more Turkish troops entered the country , the UAE withdrew its equipment from the al-Khadim airbase near Benghazi and allowed Russian forces to take over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the U.S. military that led to flagging the UAE was the deployment of a dozen Russian fourth-generation fighter jets operated by Wagner in May , which was part of Haftar ’ s push to stop Turkish-backed forces from advancing further into the country , said Jalel Harchaoui , a senior fellow at the Paris-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime .
“ That moment incensed many within the Department of Defense , but the only facet that was made public back then was AFRICOM naming and shaming the Russians publicly , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of course was that the Americans knew full well that part of the Wagner mission in Libya was likely paid for by Abu Dhabi.
” But while the U.S. election was still up for grabs when the Pentagon first spotted Russian fighters in Libya , the Trump administration ’ s departure makes it easier for the Pentagon to speak up now .
“ Alluding to it in May was a much tougher proposition than now , ” Harchoaui said .
The United Nations Panel of Experts , which reports on possible sanctionable activities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the UAE repeatedly violated the world body ’ s embargo on arms transfers into Libya .
“ We ’ ve known that there has been battlefield coordination between the Emirates and Wagner , ” said Wehrey of Carnegie .
“ But the funding is just one more indictment of the Emirates ’ collaboration .
”

The United Arab Emirates is apparently helping to finance the Russian mercenary Wagner Group in Libya, according to a report issued last week by the U.S. Defense Department’s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa—a finding that is likely to complicate the United States’ close relationship with the Gulf state.
The United Arab Emirates is apparently helping to finance the Russian mercenary Wagner Group in Libya, according to a report issued last week by the U.S. Defense Department’s inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa—a finding that is likely to complicate the United States’ close relationship with the Gulf state.
Experts have long suspected that the UAE may be using Russian private military contractors to help obfuscate its role in the conflict—a charge that Abu Dhabi denies—but the report is the first public, official assessment of the arrangement.
“The UAE is not financing and has never financed the Wagner Group as suggested by a recent Foreign Policy story,” Emirati Ambassador to the United States Yousef Al Otaiba said in a statement, insisting that the finding presented in the inspector general report is a “vague and unsubstantiated claim.” Otaiba said the UAE has asked the Pentagon to share how it reached the finding “so we can all know how suggestion and ambiguity can become ‘news.’”
Yet military officials have been increasingly candid in their assessments of the Wagner Group’s destabilizing role in Libya, amid concerns that the Kremlin may use the conflict to establish a military foothold off Europe’s southern shores. In July, U.S. Africa Command accused the group of indiscriminately laying land mines around Tripoli and putting the lives of civilians in jeopardy.
But the revelation that those Russian mercenaries may have been bankrolled by one of the United States’ closest military allies in the Middle East further complicates the calculus for Washington and comes as Democrats in Congress have been mounting a campaign to oppose the Trump administration’s proposed $23 billion sale of F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is set to hold a closed hearing on the arms sale on Monday.
“Now there appears to be a permanent Russian presence on the flank of NATO, and it was enabled by a U.S. ally,” said Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Nine countries have provided military support to the opposing factions in the Libyan conflict, and as many as 10,000 mercenaries and foreign fighters have battled in support of the warring parties. Most notably, Turkey has supported the Tripoli-based, United Nations-backed Government of National Accord, while Russia has thrown its weight behind renegade Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who controls large swaths of territory in the country’s east.
While private military contractors are outlawed within Russia, a network of companies collectively known as the Wagner Group has been at the forefront of Russian interference efforts abroad from Ukraine to Libya and Sudan. The Kremlin’s increasing reliance on the group has lent its overseas operations a veneer of plausible deniability, but Wagner is deeply entwined with Russian military and intelligence structures and the U.S. State Department has characterized it as a “surrogate for the Russian ministry of defense.”
The group was initially thought to be bankrolled by Putin-ally Yevgeny Prigozhin, although it has increasingly secured a number of contracts with foreign actors in Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, further blurring the lines between Russian foreign policy and for-profit motives.
“The overall impression that I have had for a very long time is that Wagner is being completely funded by foreign contracts,” said Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science at Barnard College.
While the UAE has been the biggest military backer of Haftar as part of its broader effort to quash political Islam in the region, the Gulf state’s role in the conflict has received significantly less scrutiny than Russia’s intervention. Experts attribute this to the UAE’s formidable lobbying efforts in Washington and the country’s role in other key U.S. foreign-policy objectives, such as the maximum pressure campaign on Iran and the UAE’s peace deal with Israel, which has been hailed as a rare foreign-policy success for the Trump administration.
“It doesn’t gather a lot of traction because when you mention it to U.S. officials, they say, ‘Well, we have other equities with the UAE,’” said Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Atlantic Council.
The UAE is Russia’s closest ally in the Gulf, and while experts have long harbored suspicions that the two countries were closely cooperating in Libya, the country’s reliance on Russian mercenaries on the ground has also enabled it to obfuscate its involvement. “It’s deniability. It’s better than direct involvement,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute.
The cautious wording in the inspector general report that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) “assessed that the United Arab Emirates may provide some financing for the group’s operations” is likely a reflection of the political sensitivities involved. The Trump administration has long been reluctant to call out U.S. partners in the Gulf, including the UAE, despite allegations of human rights abuses in the conflict in Yemen, and President Donald Trump has gone as far as to say the United States has no interests in Libya.
“I would imagine DIA has some good information on the UAE’s support to Wagner,” said Douglas Wise, who served as DIA deputy director from 2014 to 2016. “Having DIA issue this would be an easy and less formal and embarrassing way to chide the UAE on their behavior than a diplomatic note or a press release from [the Defense Department] or the White House. It lets the UAE know that we know.”
Throughout 2020, experts tracking the conflict in Libya have noted patterns that would indicate closer ties between the UAE and Russia.
In January, after Turkey’s parliament approved a measure to allow active-duty troops to fight on the ground in Libya alongside Turkish-backed mercenaries, there was a drastic increase in Russian and Emirati cargo planes—likely laden with weapons and ammunition—flying to eastern Libya and western Egypt. Like Russia, the UAE supports Haftar, the eastern Libyan strongman who was once a CIA asset and for years lived in the Washington, D.C., area.
The increased Russian presence in Libya has also coincided with Emirati drawdowns, further sparking suspicions. As cargo shipments began to tick up and more Turkish troops entered the country, the UAE withdrew its equipment from al-Khadim air base near Benghazi and allowed Russian forces to take over the facility.
But the likely turning point for the U.S. military that led to flagging the UAE was the deployment of a dozen Russian fourth-generation fighter jets operated by Wagner in May, which was part of Haftar’s push to stop Turkish-backed forces from advancing further into the country, said Jalel Harchaoui, a senior fellow at the Paris-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
“That moment incensed many within the Department of Defense, but the only facet that was made public back then was Africom naming and shaming the Russians publicly,” he said. “The other facet of course was that the Americans knew full well that part of the Wagner mission in Libya was likely paid for by Abu Dhabi.”
But while the U.S. election was still up for grabs when the Pentagon first spotted Russian fighters in Libya, the Trump administration’s departure makes it easier for defense officials to speak up now.
“Alluding to it in May was a much tougher proposition than now,” Harchoaui said. The U.N. Panel of Experts monitoring possible sanctionable activities in Libya has reported that the UAE repeatedly violated the world body’s embargo on arms transfers into Libya.
“We’ve known that there has been battlefield coordination between the Emirates and Wagner,” said Wehrey of Carnegie. “But the funding is just one more indictment of the Emirates’ collaboration.”
Update, Dec. 4, 2020: This article was updated to add a statement from the Emirati ambassador to the United States.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Israeli Lawmakers Set to Vote on Dissolving Knesset

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Israeli lawmakers set to vote on dissolving parliament , U.N. demands access to Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia , and China-Australia tensions simmer .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Israel ’ s unlikely coalition government is on even shakier foundations today as Israeli lawmakers vote to dissolve the Knesset .
Benny Gantz , the leader of the Blue and White party and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s coalition partner , has said he would support the measure , setting up a showdown that could lead to another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
Gantz ’ s decision comes out of frustration over the government ’ s failure to pass a budget for 2021 , which , if passed , would essentially lock in Gantz ’ s ability to assume the office of prime minister next November as per the terms of the coalition deal struck between Likud and Blue and White in April .
“ Netanyahu has decided to dissolve the government and drag Israel into an election , ” Gantz said in a statement to the media .
Hitting Bibi while he ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viewed as an attempt by Gantz to strike at Netanyahu while he is relatively weak .
Although the Likud leader proved resilient in the eyes of Israeli voters in March elections , public discontent over the coronavirus pandemic , months of protests over his rule , and an impending corruption trial could add up to an opportune time for Gantz to prevail in a new election .
Today ’ s vote is only one step toward that future .
Further readings of the legislation are required before the dissolution can be confirmed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that harmony can be restored , as long as Netanyahu agrees on a budget by Dec. 23 .
A leader snubbed .
Although budget issues are the proximate cause of the Knesset vote , recent developments have likely made Gantz wary that Netanyahu will hand over the premiership in November .
Gantz was reportedly left in the dark about Netanyahu ’ s secret ( and almost immediately leaked ) visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman .
New leader , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should not expect an easier ride on Iran policy if Gantz does take power , an Israeli government source told Foreign Policy .
There is “ no daylight ” between Netanyahu and Gantz on the question of the U.S.-led “ maximum pressure ” campaign on Iran .
Neri Zilber looks at why Israel will remain a thorn in the side of any U.S.-Iran rapprochement .
Fakhrizadeh fallout .
The shockwaves from the killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh by suspected Israeli agents continue to be felt across the Middle East .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to suspend international nuclear inspections in the country until sanctions are lifted was passed by Iran ’ s hardliner-dominated parliament on Tuesday , although its unlikely to have an effect as the country ’ s nuclear policy is set by the Supreme National Security Council .
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia ’ s foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir has rubbished claims made by his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif of the kingdom ’ s involvement in the killing following a secret meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif is desperate to blame the Kingdom for anything negative that happens in Iran .
Will he blame us for the next earthquake or flood ?
” Jubeir wrote on Twitter .
Antonov speaks .
Russia ’ s ambassador to the United States will give rare public remarks today in an event hosted by the Brookings Institution .
Ambassador Anatoly Antonov ’ s job is made more difficult due to the fact that his boss , Russian President Vladimir Putin , has yet to congratulate President-elect Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week , Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the lack of a call should not be interpreted as a non-recognition of Biden ’ s win but that Putin would congratulate Biden “ in due course ” and had merely waited until “ election results are summed up.
” Refugee crisis in Ethiopia .
Nearly 100,000 Eritrean refugees camped in Northern Ethiopia “ have now run out of food supplies—making hunger and malnutrition a real danger , ” according to UNHCR spokesperson Babar Baloch .
The refugees , who have lived in camps near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years , were cut off from United Nations aid as a result of the Etiopian government ’ s assault on the Tigray region , which began last month .
The U.N. has called for immediate access to the refugees , on top of the estimated 2 million people in Tigray that now need assistance .
China-Australia tensions .
The U.S. State Department called a tweet by Chinese government spokesman Zhao Lijian a “ new low ” as tensions between China and Australia escalated after Zhao posted an image mock-up of an Australian soldier @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an Afghan child .
China ’ s foreign ministry has shrugged off the international outcry over the use of the image—a reference to a damning report outlining war crimes perpetrated by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan—as overblown .
The twitter spat is the latest sign of rising tensions between the two countries after China began blocking Australian imports of barley , coal , corn , cotton , and wine over an Australian demand to investigate China ’ s role in the initial spread of the coronavirus .
Rules for thee , not me .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sunday of a Hungarian member of European parliament came to light on Tuesday , when Belgian media reported that Jozsef Szajer , an MEP with Viktor Orban ’ s right-wing Fidesz party had been arrested fleeing a mostly-male sex party in the center of Brussels .
Police had broken up the party as it had violated coronavirus restrictions and said at least two of the participants claimed diplomatic immunity .
Szajer ’ s presence at the party will come as a shock to some , as he is considered one of the architects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , beginning with his co-authorship of an amendment to the constitution calling for a marriage definition as between one man and one woman .
EU discord .
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called on Hungary and Poland to take their dispute over the bloc ’ s rule of law punishment mechanism to the European Court of Justice rather than continue to uphold their veto over the EU ’ s coronavirus recovery package .
Von der Leyen criticized the countries for digging in “ at the expense of millions of Europeans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , because we are in the middle of a deep , deep crisis.
” A spokesperson for the Polish government warned on Monday that “ arbitrary criteria for judging the rule of law in certain countries can in the future lead to the collapse of the EU.
” Boyband rule .
South Korea ’ s parliament has passed a bill that would allow its K-pop stars to defer their mandatory military service .
Under South Korean law , all able-bodied men between 18 and 28 must serve in the country ’ s armed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a problem for bands like global phenomenon BTS , whose oldest member is 27 .
An amendment to the country ’ s Military Service Act means that the culture minister can now recommend entertainers ’ deferment until the age of 30 .
Sportsmen and classical musicians have received deferments before , but never K-pop acts .
Intangible soup .
If yesterday ’ s kimchi news wasn ’ t enough to whet your appetite , prepare for the borscht course .
A Ukrainian chef has convinced his government to apply to cultural body UNESCO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as an intangible part of the country ’ s heritage , alongside French champagne and Neapolitan pizza .
The Ukrainian government decision has irked Russia , whose government Twitter accounts were quick to point out that many Eastern European countries have their own versions of borscht and is “ one of Russia ’ s most famous and beloved dishes.
” Ukrainian historians dispute the popular image of the soup ’ s Russian origins , insisting it was brought to Russia by Ukrainian migrants .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Israeli lawmakers set to vote on dissolving parliament, the United Nations demands access to Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, and China-Australia tensions simmer.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Gantz Backs Vote to Dissolve Knesset
Israel’s unlikely coalition government is on even shakier foundations today as Israeli lawmakers vote to dissolve the Knesset. Benny Gantz, the leader of the Blue and White party and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition partner, has said he would support the measure, setting up a showdown that could lead to another election—the country’s fourth in two years.
Gantz’s decision comes out of frustration over the government’s failure to pass a budget for 2021, which, if passed, would essentially lock in Gantz’s ability to assume the office of prime minister next November as per the terms of the coalition deal struck between Likud and Blue and White in April. “Netanyahu has decided to dissolve the government and drag Israel into an election,” Gantz said in a statement to the media.
Hitting Bibi while he’s down? It also could be viewed as an attempt by Gantz to strike at Netanyahu while he is relatively weak. Although the Likud leader proved resilient in the eyes of Israeli voters in March elections, public discontent over the coronavirus pandemic, months of protests over his rule, and an impending corruption trial could add up to an opportune time for Gantz to prevail in a new election.
Today’s vote is only one step toward that future. Further readings of the legislation are required before the dissolution can be confirmed. Gantz has also held out the possibility that harmony can be restored, as long as Netanyahu agrees on a budget by Dec. 23.
A leader snubbed. Although budget issues are the proximate cause of the Knesset vote, recent developments have likely made Gantz wary that Netanyahu will hand over the premiership in November. Gantz was reportedly left in the dark about Netanyahu’s secret (and almost immediately leaked) visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
New leader, new policy? U.S. President-elect Joe Biden should not expect an easier ride on Iran policy if Gantz does take power, an Israeli government source told Foreign Policy. There is “no daylight” between Netanyahu and Gantz on the question of the U.S.-led “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. Neri Zilber looks at why Israel will remain a thorn in the side of any U.S.-Iran rapprochement.
What We’re Following Today
Fakhrizadeh fallout. The shockwaves from the killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh by suspected Israeli agents continue to be felt across the Middle East. In response to the killing, a bill to suspend international nuclear inspections in the country until sanctions are lifted was passed by Iran’s hardliner-dominated parliament on Tuesday, although its unlikely to have an effect as the country’s nuclear policy is set by the Supreme National Security Council.
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir has rubbished claims made by his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif of the kingdom’s involvement in the killing following a secret meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif is desperate to blame the Kingdom for anything negative that happens in Iran. Will he blame us for the next earthquake or flood?” Jubeir wrote on Twitter.
Antonov speaks. Russia’s ambassador to the United States will give rare public remarks today in an event hosted by the Brookings Institution. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov’s job is made more difficult due to the fact that his boss, Russian President Vladimir Putin, has yet to congratulate President-elect Joe Biden on his electoral victory. Speaking last week, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that the lack of a call should not be interpreted as a non-recognition of Biden’s win but that Putin would congratulate Biden “in due course” and had merely waited until “election results are summed up.”
Refugee crisis in Ethiopia. Nearly 100,000 Eritrean refugees camped in Northern Ethiopia “have now run out of food supplies—making hunger and malnutrition a real danger,” according to UNHCR spokesperson Babar Baloch. The refugees, who have lived in camps near the Eritrean border for more than ten years, were cut off from United Nations aid as a result of the Etiopian government’s assault on the Tigray region, which began last month. The U.N. has called for immediate access to the refugees, on top of the estimated 2 million people in Tigray that now need assistance.
Keep an Eye On Russia’s island build-up. Russia announced on Tuesday it had deployed the S-300 missile system on the disputed island of Iturup, north of the Japanese Hokkaido prefecture. Both Russia and Japan claim the chain of islands that includes Iturup, known as the Kuril Islands, although there is no international consensus on ownership. The combat deployment marks a reversal of a previous Russian statement made in October claiming that the S-300 would only be used for military drills, not in a combat posture.
China-Australia tensions. The U.S. State Department called a tweet by Chinese government spokesman Zhao Lijian a “new low” as tensions between China and Australia escalated after Zhao posted an image mock-up of an Australian soldier holding a knife to the throat of an Afghan child. China’s foreign ministry has shrugged off the international outcry over the use of the image—a reference to a damning report outlining war crimes perpetrated by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan—as overblown. The twitter spat is the latest sign of rising tensions between the two countries after China began blocking Australian imports of barley, coal, corn, cotton, and wine over an Australian demand to investigate China’s role in the initial spread of the coronavirus.
Rules for thee, not me. The reasoning behind a surprise resignation on Sunday of a Hungarian member of European parliament came to light on Tuesday, when Belgian media reported that Jozsef Szajer, an MEP with Viktor Orban’s right-wing Fidesz party had been arrested fleeing a mostly-male sex party in the center of Brussels. Police had broken up the party as it had violated coronavirus restrictions and said at least two of the participants claimed diplomatic immunity. Szajer’s presence at the party will come as a shock to some, as he is considered one of the architects of Hungary’s increasingly anti-LGBT policies, beginning with his co-authorship of an amendment to the constitution calling for a marriage definition as between one man and one woman.
EU discord. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called on Hungary and Poland to take their dispute over the bloc’s rule of law punishment mechanism to the European Court of Justice rather than continue to uphold their veto over the EU’s coronavirus recovery package. Von der Leyen criticized the countries for digging in “at the expense of millions of Europeans who are desperately waiting for our help, because we are in the middle of a deep, deep crisis.” A spokesperson for the Polish government warned on Monday that “arbitrary criteria for judging the rule of law in certain countries can in the future lead to the collapse of the EU.”
Odds and Ends
Boyband rule. South Korea’s parliament has passed a bill that would allow its K-pop stars to defer their mandatory military service. Under South Korean law, all able-bodied men between 18 and 28 must serve in the country’s armed forces for roughly two years, creating a problem for bands like global phenomenon BTS, whose oldest member is 27. An amendment to the country’s Military Service Act means that the culture minister can now recommend entertainers’ deferment until the age of 30. Sportsmen and classical musicians have received deferments before, but never K-pop acts.
Intangible soup. If yesterday’s kimchi news wasn’t enough to whet your appetite, prepare for the borscht course. A Ukrainian chef has convinced his government to apply to cultural body UNESCO to enshrine the beetroot and cabbage soup as an intangible part of the country’s heritage, alongside French champagne and Neapolitan pizza. The Ukrainian government decision has irked Russia, whose government Twitter accounts were quick to point out that many Eastern European countries have their own versions of borscht and is “one of Russia’s most famous and beloved dishes.” Ukrainian historians dispute the popular image of the soup’s Russian origins, insisting it was brought to Russia by Ukrainian migrants.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Why China Just Doubled Down on Australia

Why China Just Doubled Down on Australia Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : China turns up its aggressive diplomacy against Australia , a Beijing court hears a landmark sexual harassment case , and where China stacks up in the race for a coronavirus vaccine .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
China ’ s relationship with Australia keeps hitting new lows .
After threatening Canberra with a list of 14 demands , Beijing imposed heavy tariffs on Australian wine—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of unofficial trade restrictions in recent weeks .
Afterward , foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian , who is well known for trolling other countries on social media , tweeted an image of an Australian soldier cutting a child ’ s throat—a reference to allegations of war crimes against several Australian soldiers .
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has demanded the tweet ’ s removal .
This behavior is not new for Zhao , but it ’ s now clear that the Chinese state backs his trolling .
In previous times , the tweet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But under the current environment of ultranationalism , the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the quote .
Some Chinese advisors attempted to rein in the so-called wolf warrior diplomacy earlier this year , but the wind is clearly against them .
Other Chinese media , including the People ’ s Daily , came out swinging for Zhao , and thousands of Chinese bots expressed their support on Twitter .
Jake Sullivan , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s pick for national security advisor , has already offered a strong statement of support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watch Australia ’ s experience , as they see the country as being on the front lines of attempted Chinese influence efforts .
Biden has also stated that he doesn ’ t plan on giving up outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s trade war tariffs until a “ coherent strategy ” is in place .
Australia is particularly vulnerable to Chinese pressure because its decadeslong economic boom has been driven in large part by exports to the Chinese market , especially minerals .
One-third of all Australian exports go to China , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kevin Rudd once saw the country ’ s future as inextricably linked to China .
But the combination of the coronavirus pandemic and Beijing ’ s increased aggression has turned Canberra against it .
Stronger defense ties with the United States—prompting further Chinese retaliation—are more likely than concessions .
Landmark sexual harassment case .
A Beijing court heard a critical sexual harassment case today brought by Zhou Xiaoxuan , known online as Xianzi , a screenwriter who alleges she was assaulted by the famous television host Zhu Jun when she was an intern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Initially turned away by police , Zhou brought a civil case under recently introduced laws .
Zhu denies her claims and has launched multiple countersuits .
Zhou is a pivotal figure in moving China ’ s # MeToo movement forward , organizing and inspiring others online .
Hundreds of backers , mostly women , demonstrated outside the courthouse in support , despite the freezing Beijing winter .
But victory in the case is unlikely given Zhu ’ s power , a heavily politicized court system , and the novelty of the laws .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ online .
Global Times debacle .
Hu Xijin , the editor in chief of the Global Times and a prominent propagandist , faces potential political trouble after an accusation by his deputy editor that he has fathered two children with employees .
Children born outside of marriage in China often face legal discrimination , including the inability to access public education or health care .
Hu has called the accusations concocted—an alleged plot by his deputy to try to create a disciplinary case against him within the Chinese Communist Party .
Hu is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which owns the Global Times , but his business success and political intelligence have so far protected him .
This case might not push him over the line , but it can ’ t help him .
Shifting conspiracy theories .
As I predicted during the U.S. election , Trumpian conspiracy theories about voter fraud are moving toward the obvious villain : China .
Trump himself hasn ’ t explicitly made Beijing the culprit for his loss on Nov. 3 , but the conspiracist lawyer Sidney Powell has alleged a tripartite conspiracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Epoch Times , the Falun Gong-run newspaper , remains a key source of far-right election disinformation , pushing the idea of sinister Chinese conspiracies into the U.S. conservative media sphere .
Vaccine race .
China is slightly behind Europe and the United States in COVID-19 vaccine development , but it may have a critical advantage in production and distribution due to the size of its manufacturing industry and the ability of the state to command resources .
That is important because it ’ s not just the efficacy of the vaccine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ produce it on a large scale—especially when it comes to reaching the developing world , where vaccination looks likely to become a key soft power tool .
Moon landing .
The Chang ’ e 5 , China ’ s first lunar sample return mission , has successfully landed on the moon , following the precedents set by the United States and Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s .
China ’ s space program continues to make steady , well-funded progress .
Space advocates in the United States hope it will spur a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off something unprecedented or dramatic , such as a new manned moon landing , the battle seems unlikely to capture the public imagination .
Another one for the list .
The China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation , a midsize state-owned enterprise specializing in civil and defense engineering , has been added to the U.S. entity list , freezing its assets in the United States and banning U.S. firms from doing business with it .
It ’ s a little surprising it wasn ’ t on the list already , given its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Liberation Army , but this time the nominal excuse is its work in Venezuela .
This evocative and tragic essay by Xujun Eberlein , a well-known translator , about her older sister ’ s death by drowning during the Cultural Revolution focuses on the immediate and the intimate rather than the political .
It also captures just how much of a battlefield Chinese cities such as Chongqing were in those chaotic days—and the gap between the revolutionary romanticism of death and its reality .
That ’ s it for this week .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: China turns up its aggressive diplomacy against Australia, a Beijing court hears a landmark sexual harassment case , and where China stacks up in the race for a coronavirus vaccine .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief. The highlights this week: China turns up its aggressive diplomacy against Australia, a Beijing court hears a landmark sexual harassment case, and where China stacks up in the race for a coronavirus vaccine.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Wine Tariffs Follow Aggressive Pattern
China’s relationship with Australia keeps hitting new lows.
After threatening Canberra with a list of 14 demands, Beijing imposed heavy tariffs on Australian wine—a key export—last Friday, following a range of unofficial trade restrictions in recent weeks. Afterward, foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, who is well known for trolling other countries on social media, tweeted an image of an Australian soldier cutting a child’s throat—a reference to allegations of war crimes against several Australian soldiers. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has demanded the tweet’s removal.
This behavior is not new for Zhao, but it’s now clear that the Chinese state backs his trolling. In previous times, the tweet probably would have been quietly deleted. But under the current environment of ultranationalism, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the quote. Some Chinese advisors attempted to rein in the so-called wolf warrior diplomacy earlier this year, but the wind is clearly against them. Other Chinese media, including the People’s Daily, came out swinging for Zhao, and thousands of Chinese bots expressed their support on Twitter.
Jake Sullivan, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s pick for national security advisor, has already offered a strong statement of support for Australia. China hawks in Washington closely watch Australia’s experience, as they see the country as being on the front lines of attempted Chinese influence efforts. Biden has also stated that he doesn’t plan on giving up outgoing President Donald Trump’s trade war tariffs until a “coherent strategy” is in place.
Australia is particularly vulnerable to Chinese pressure because its decadeslong economic boom has been driven in large part by exports to the Chinese market, especially minerals. One-third of all Australian exports go to China, and politicians such as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd once saw the country’s future as inextricably linked to China.
But the combination of the coronavirus pandemic and Beijing’s increased aggression has turned Canberra against it. Stronger defense ties with the United States—prompting further Chinese retaliation—are more likely than concessions.
What We’re Following
Landmark sexual harassment case. A Beijing court heard a critical sexual harassment case today brought by Zhou Xiaoxuan, known online as Xianzi, a screenwriter who alleges she was assaulted by the famous television host Zhu Jun when she was an intern at CCTV (now CGTN). Initially turned away by police, Zhou brought a civil case under recently introduced laws. Zhu denies her claims and has launched multiple countersuits.
Zhou is a pivotal figure in moving China’s #MeToo movement forward, organizing and inspiring others online. Hundreds of backers, mostly women, demonstrated outside the courthouse in support, despite the freezing Beijing winter. But victory in the case is unlikely given Zhu’s power, a heavily politicized court system, and the novelty of the laws. Discussion of the case has been censored online.
Global Times debacle. Hu Xijin, the editor in chief of the Global Times and a prominent propagandist, faces potential political trouble after an accusation by his deputy editor that he has fathered two children with employees. Children born outside of marriage in China often face legal discrimination, including the inability to access public education or health care.
Hu has called the accusations concocted—an alleged plot by his deputy to try to create a disciplinary case against him within the Chinese Communist Party. Hu is unpopular within the People’s Daily, which owns the Global Times, but his business success and political intelligence have so far protected him. This case might not push him over the line, but it can’t help him.
Shifting conspiracy theories. As I predicted during the U.S. election, Trumpian conspiracy theories about voter fraud are moving toward the obvious villain: China. Trump himself hasn’t explicitly made Beijing the culprit for his loss on Nov. 3, but the conspiracist lawyer Sidney Powell has alleged a tripartite conspiracy involving Venezuela, China, and Iran.
The Epoch Times, the Falun Gong-run newspaper, remains a key source of far-right election disinformation, pushing the idea of sinister Chinese conspiracies into the U.S. conservative media sphere.
Tech and Business
Vaccine race. China is slightly behind Europe and the United States in COVID-19 vaccine development, but it may have a critical advantage in production and distribution due to the size of its manufacturing industry and the ability of the state to command resources. That is important because it’s not just the efficacy of the vaccine that matters but also the ability to produce it on a large scale—especially when it comes to reaching the developing world, where vaccination looks likely to become a key soft power tool.
Moon landing. The Chang’e 5, China’s first lunar sample return mission, has successfully landed on the moon, following the precedents set by the United States and Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. China’s space program continues to make steady, well-funded progress. Space advocates in the United States hope it will spur a second space race.
Until China pulls off something unprecedented or dramatic, such as a new manned moon landing, the battle seems unlikely to capture the public imagination.
Another one for the list. The China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation, a midsize state-owned enterprise specializing in civil and defense engineering, has been added to the U.S. entity list, freezing its assets in the United States and banning U.S. firms from doing business with it. It’s a little surprising it wasn’t on the list already, given its close ties with the People’s Liberation Army, but this time the nominal excuse is its work in Venezuela.
What We’re Reading
“The Summer before Thirteen,” by Xujun Eberlein
This evocative and tragic essay by Xujun Eberlein, a well-known translator, about her older sister’s death by drowning during the Cultural Revolution focuses on the immediate and the intimate rather than the political. It also captures just how much of a battlefield Chinese cities such as Chongqing were in those chaotic days—and the gap between the revolutionary romanticism of death and its reality.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.