foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--How Russia Tried to Weaponize Charlie Sheen

How Russia Tried to Weaponize Charlie Sheen “ Do not give up , freedom will come , ” said one-time sitcom actor Charlie Sheen , standing in what appeared to be his kitchen , jabbing his finger at the camera .
“ Freedom is , is , is , is in your future , on your horizon , ” he stammered .
His audience ?
Maxim Shugaley , a Russian political consultant and operative who has been imprisoned in Libya for over a year , accused of meddling in the country ’ s chaotic internal conflict—a fight that Russia is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sheen , alongside actors Vinnie Jones and Dolph Lundgren , seems to have been unwittingly recruited to record messages of support for Shugaley through the pay-for-videos website Cameo .
The videos are just the latest twist in an increasingly bizarre international campaign to raise the profile of Shugaley ’ s detention .
So far , that has included his election to a local council in Russia , two feature films , an advertorial in the Washington Post , a mixed martial arts tournament , and a one-woman picket in front of the Libyan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the gun-loving Russian who spent 15 months in prison in the United States after being convicted for conspiring to act as a foreign agent .
It ’ s not clear what is motivating the determined campaign to free Shugaley .
A “ veteran political operative ” who has been involved in at least one other Russian political influence operation in Africa , Shugaley may simply be too valuable to lose .
Playing up the arrest has also proved to be a useful stick with which to beat the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until this summer was locked in a bitter fight with the forces of renegade general Khalifa Haftar , who has been backed militarily by Russia , especially by its mercenaries .
But the effort offers a glimpse into Russian overseas interference activities , in which celebrity pleas exist on the same plane as MiGs and mercenary activity from the Wagner group in Libya , where the U.S. military has warned that Russia is looking to establish a foothold .
“ For Russia , there is no direct break between war and peace between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West .
It ’ s a continuum , ” said Anna Borshchevskaya , a senior fellow at the Washington Institute .
The campaign to release Shugaley and his interpreter has been spearheaded by Alexander Malkevich , a Russian government media policy advisor and head of the Moscow-based Foundation for National Values Protection , which works to “ protect the national interests of the Russian Federation ” .
Shugaley and his translator were arrested in Libya last spring while ostensibly conducting sociological research for the foundation .
While Malkevich and Russian state media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Shugaley has been named in an investigation by the BBC as part of a team of Russians that travelled to Madagascar ahead of the 2018 presidential elections claiming to be tourists and election observers , while offering money to at least six candidates .
He is alleged to have led a team which offered one of the candidates $ 2 million .
In June , Libyan prosecutors formally charged Shugaley and his translator , accusing them of espionage and of working for Yevgeny Prigozhin as part of a wider plot to help @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Prigozhin is the catering magnate believed to be behind Russia ’ s troll factory , the Internet Research Agency , and the linchpin of a shadowy group of Russian mercenaries known as the Wagner group .
According to documents obtained by the London-based Dossier center and reported by various media outlets , Shugaley was part of an operation to bring Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi , the fugitive son of deposed dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi , to power in Libya .
If so , it would fit Russia ’ s pattern of betting on all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they are well-positioned no matter who wins .
“ I think that what this shows is that the Russians have a diversified portfolio approach , ” said Frederic Wehrey , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment .
“ It ’ s sort of opportunism : They ’ re pushing on a creaking door , there ’ s no counter force , the United States isn ’ t present.
” If Malkevich is the public face of the campaign , Prigozhin , a close associate of Putin , appears to be bankrolling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been central to Russia ’ s efforts to increase its influence in Africa , where his operatives mix business interests , often in natural resources , with election interference efforts and mercenary activity .
Political strategists , mercenaries , and geologists associated with Prigozhin have been deployed to at least 20 African countries , including Libya , according to the Russian investigative news site Proekt .
On Wednesday , the U.S. Treasury announced new sanctions on a number of individuals believed to be working on behalf of Prigozhin to advance Russia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A U.N. report published in May said that hundreds , if not thousands , of mercenaries from the nominally private Russian military contractor , the Wagner group—widely believed to be managed and financed by Prigozhin—have been dispatched to the country to fight alongside forces loyal to Haftar , who controls the east of the country .
The Kremlin denies any involvement in the Libyan conflict , which over the past decade has evolved into an international proxy war .
U.S. Africa Command has accused the Wagner group of laying mines and improvised explosives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dozen Russian aircraft are thought to have been deployed to Libya where they are being flown by Wagner fighters .
This month , in an apparent bid to give the imprisoned Shugaley a higher political profile , he was elected to the regional parliament in the Komi republic in northwestern Russia .
According to the independent Russian news outlet Meduza , Prigozhin personally funded the campaign in the hopes that his election to office would help secure his release from prison .
“ I think that by converting him into a ‘ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spy caught in Libya , ’ Prigozhin could leverage his links to Putin to have the Kremlin directly engage with Turkey and the GNA to negotiate his release as part of broader ongoing political and military talks , ” said Emadeddin Badi , a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council .
Shugaley ’ s election was hardly the first or last effort to raise his profile .
It followed a big-budget feature film about his arrest which aired on the pro-Kremlin channel NTV this spring , depicting Shugaley as an intrepid social scientist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could undermine the GNA , for which he is imprisoned and tortured .
The film ’ s copyright belongs to Aurum LLC—a company founded by Prigozhin , according to Russian company records .
Malkevich , who contributed money towards the production of the film and supervised the writing of the script , declined to comment on Prigozhin ’ s involvement .
A second feature-length film about Shugaley ’ s detention was released on Sept. 10 , around the same time the video messages from Sheen , Lundgren , and Jones were posted online @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a link to a YouTube compilation of the celebrity videos , but made no mention that they were a paid service .
“ [ Lundgren ] and his colleagues… who no one could accuse of having a special love for Russia , joined our indefinite , already long-standing international campaign in support of those captured by Libyan terrorists Maxim Shugaley and [ his translator ] Samer Seifan , ” he wrote .
Malkevich denied paying for the videos , which quickly made headlines on Russian news sites associated with Prigozhin .
Malkevich has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and break things ” nature of Russia ’ s overseas influence operations .
His efforts to bring the information war to Washington in the summer of 2018 fizzled , as he was ejected from his White House-adjacent WeWork office space two hours after he entered the building , the social media accounts of his website USA Really were quickly blocked , and his efforts to hold a rally in front of the White House in support of Trump were dashed when he sent his permit request to the wrong office .
On a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2018 midterm elections , Malkevich was detained for questioning at Washington ’ s Dulles airport ; a month later he was subject to sanctions over his site ’ s ties to Prigozhin .
His U.S. ambitions scuppered , Malkevich last year launched the Foundation for National Values Protection , turning his focus to Africa .
On the organization ’ s site , Malkevich publishes research he claims was carried out by Shugaley and other purported sociologists , including Mikhail Potepkin , who was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in July in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operations .
Potepkin previously co-owned an IT company with Anna Bogacheva , one of 13 Russians indicted by former Special Counsel Robert Mueller as part of his probe into Russia ’ s interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election .
Elsewhere on the foundation ’ s site , Malkevich has chronicled his attempts to free Shugaley , which this year have included placing a since-deleted advertorial on the Washington Post website , a potential violation of U.S. sanctions , and recruiting convicted Russian operative Maria Butina to the cause .
In March , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Libyan Embassy in Moscow calling for Shugaley ’ s immediate release .
“ Originally this situation was brought to my attention by Alexander Malkevich , who helped me a lot while I was detained in the U.S , ” said Butina in response to questions .
“ I am doing everything I can to help him [ Shugaley ] as my Motherland helped me when I was in prison in the U.S. Russians don ’ t surrender and we must help each other.
” The videos of Sheen , Lundgren , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thursday after Foreign Policy contacted the three actors for comment .
They are still available on the Russian social networking site VKontakte .
Jones ’ s agent Alex Cole confirmed that Jones received $ 300 to record his video through Cameo , but said he didn ’ t know the identity of the mystery client behind the request .
“ Vinnie gets many per day and doesn ’ t do the due diligence as to who these people are and we presume , harmless in tone .
Apart from this , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea who this person he was paid to mention is .
A non-story , really , ” Cole said .
Cameo ’ s CEO Steven Galanis said his site was looking into whether the videos were paid for by a Russian individual or entity .
He did not respond to multiple follow-up questions .
Lundgren and Sheen could not be reached for comment .
Asked why he had mounted such an extensive campaign in support of Shugaley , Malkevich said , “ It is clear to any normal person that we will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But there might be a wider game afoot .
Moscow has sought to keep channels of communication open with all the key players in Libya , including the internationally-recognized government in Tripoli–which the Kremlin has yet to blame directly for Shugaley ’ s arrest .
Kirill Semonov , a Libya expert with the Russian International Affairs Council , said that Shugaley ’ s arrest was being used by the mercenaries ’ financial backers as a wedge issue to prevent any strengthening of ties between Moscow and the GNA .
“ The Shugaley case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposed to a normalization of relations between Moscow and Tripoli , those magnates who oversee the activities of mercenaries in Libya and provide support to Haftar , ” he said .

“Do not give up, freedom will come,” said one-time sitcom actor Charlie Sheen, standing in what appeared to be his kitchen, jabbing his finger at the camera. “Freedom is, is, is, is in your future, on your horizon,” he stammered.
“Do not give up, freedom will come,” said one-time sitcom actor Charlie Sheen, standing in what appeared to be his kitchen, jabbing his finger at the camera. “Freedom is, is, is, is in your future, on your horizon,” he stammered.
His audience? Maxim Shugaley, a Russian political consultant and operative who has been imprisoned in Libya for over a year, accused of meddling in the country’s chaotic internal conflict—a fight that Russia is very much in the thick of. Sheen, alongside actors Vinnie Jones and Dolph Lundgren, seems to have been unwittingly recruited to record messages of support for Shugaley through the pay-for-videos website Cameo.
The videos are just the latest twist in an increasingly bizarre international campaign to raise the profile of Shugaley’s detention. So far, that has included his election to a local council in Russia, two feature films, an advertorial in the Washington Post, a mixed martial arts tournament, and a one-woman picket in front of the Libyan Embassy in Moscow by Maria Butina, the gun-loving Russian who spent 15 months in prison in the United States after being convicted for conspiring to act as a foreign agent.
It’s not clear what is motivating the determined campaign to free Shugaley. A “veteran political operative” who has been involved in at least one other Russian political influence operation in Africa, Shugaley may simply be too valuable to lose. Playing up the arrest has also proved to be a useful stick with which to beat the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, which until this summer was locked in a bitter fight with the forces of renegade general Khalifa Haftar, who has been backed militarily by Russia, especially by its mercenaries.
But the effort offers a glimpse into Russian overseas interference activities, in which celebrity pleas exist on the same plane as MiGs and mercenary activity from the Wagner group in Libya, where the U.S. military has warned that Russia is looking to establish a foothold.
“For Russia, there is no direct break between war and peace between the way we think about it in the West. It’s a continuum,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute.
The campaign to release Shugaley and his interpreter has been spearheaded by Alexander Malkevich, a Russian government media policy advisor and head of the Moscow-based Foundation for National Values Protection, which works to “protect the national interests of the Russian Federation”. Shugaley and his translator were arrested in Libya last spring while ostensibly conducting sociological research for the foundation.
While Malkevich and Russian state media have portrayed Shugaley as a humble academic, Shugaley has been named in an investigation by the BBC as part of a team of Russians that travelled to Madagascar ahead of the 2018 presidential elections claiming to be tourists and election observers, while offering money to at least six candidates. He is alleged to have led a team which offered one of the candidates $2 million.
In June, Libyan prosecutors formally charged Shugaley and his translator, accusing them of espionage and of working for Yevgeny Prigozhin as part of a wider plot to help Russia secure a military base in Libya. Prigozhin is the catering magnate believed to be behind Russia’s troll factory, the Internet Research Agency, and the linchpin of a shadowy group of Russian mercenaries known as the Wagner group. According to documents obtained by the London-based Dossier center and reported by various media outlets, Shugaley was part of an operation to bring Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, the fugitive son of deposed dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi, to power in Libya.
If so, it would fit Russia’s pattern of betting on all horses in the Libyan quagmire to ensure that they are well-positioned no matter who wins. “I think that what this shows is that the Russians have a diversified portfolio approach,” said Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. “It’s sort of opportunism: They’re pushing on a creaking door, there’s no counter force, the United States isn’t present.”
If Malkevich is the public face of the campaign, Prigozhin, a close associate of Putin, appears to be bankrolling much of the effort. Prigozhin has been central to Russia’s efforts to increase its influence in Africa, where his operatives mix business interests, often in natural resources, with election interference efforts and mercenary activity.
Political strategists, mercenaries, and geologists associated with Prigozhin have been deployed to at least 20 African countries, including Libya, according to the Russian investigative news site Proekt. On Wednesday, the U.S. Treasury announced new sanctions on a number of individuals believed to be working on behalf of Prigozhin to advance Russia’s interest in the Central African Republic.
A U.N. report published in May said that hundreds, if not thousands, of mercenaries from the nominally private Russian military contractor, the Wagner group—widely believed to be managed and financed by Prigozhin—have been dispatched to the country to fight alongside forces loyal to Haftar, who controls the east of the country.
The Kremlin denies any involvement in the Libyan conflict, which over the past decade has evolved into an international proxy war. U.S. Africa Command has accused the Wagner group of laying mines and improvised explosives, complicating ceasefire efforts; at least a dozen Russian aircraft are thought to have been deployed to Libya where they are being flown by Wagner fighters.
This month, in an apparent bid to give the imprisoned Shugaley a higher political profile, he was elected to the regional parliament in the Komi republic in northwestern Russia. According to the independent Russian news outlet Meduza, Prigozhin personally funded the campaign in the hopes that his election to office would help secure his release from prison.
“I think that by converting him into a ‘politician’ rather than just a ‘spy caught in Libya,’ Prigozhin could leverage his links to Putin to have the Kremlin directly engage with Turkey and the GNA to negotiate his release as part of broader ongoing political and military talks,” said Emadeddin Badi, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Shugaley’s election was hardly the first or last effort to raise his profile. It followed a big-budget feature film about his arrest which aired on the pro-Kremlin channel NTV this spring, depicting Shugaley as an intrepid social scientist who uncovered “explosive evidence” that could undermine the GNA, for which he is imprisoned and tortured. The film’s copyright belongs to Aurum LLC—a company founded by Prigozhin, according to Russian company records. Malkevich, who contributed money towards the production of the film and supervised the writing of the script, declined to comment on Prigozhin’s involvement.
A second feature-length film about Shugaley’s detention was released on Sept. 10, around the same time the video messages from Sheen, Lundgren, and Jones were posted online.
Four days later, Malkevich posted a link to a YouTube compilation of the celebrity videos, but made no mention that they were a paid service. “[Lundgren] and his colleagues… who no one could accuse of having a special love for Russia, joined our indefinite, already long-standing international campaign in support of those captured by Libyan terrorists Maxim Shugaley and [his translator] Samer Seifan,” he wrote. Malkevich denied paying for the videos, which quickly made headlines on Russian news sites associated with Prigozhin.
Malkevich has come to embody the “move fast and break things” nature of Russia’s overseas influence operations. His efforts to bring the information war to Washington in the summer of 2018 fizzled, as he was ejected from his White House-adjacent WeWork office space two hours after he entered the building, the social media accounts of his website USA Really were quickly blocked, and his efforts to hold a rally in front of the White House in support of Trump were dashed when he sent his permit request to the wrong office. On a subsequent trip to the United States during the 2018 midterm elections, Malkevich was detained for questioning at Washington’s Dulles airport; a month later he was subject to sanctions over his site’s ties to Prigozhin.
His U.S. ambitions scuppered, Malkevich last year launched the Foundation for National Values Protection, turning his focus to Africa. On the organization’s site, Malkevich publishes research he claims was carried out by Shugaley and other purported sociologists, including Mikhail Potepkin, who was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in July in connection with Prigozhin’s African mining operations. Potepkin previously co-owned an IT company with Anna Bogacheva, one of 13 Russians indicted by former Special Counsel Robert Mueller as part of his probe into Russia’s interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Elsewhere on the foundation’s site, Malkevich has chronicled his attempts to free Shugaley, which this year have included placing a since-deleted advertorial on the Washington Post website, a potential violation of U.S. sanctions, and recruiting convicted Russian operative Maria Butina to the cause. In March, she held a one-person protest in front of the Libyan Embassy in Moscow calling for Shugaley’s immediate release.
“Originally this situation was brought to my attention by Alexander Malkevich, who helped me a lot while I was detained in the U.S,” said Butina in response to questions. “I am doing everything I can to help him [Shugaley] as my Motherland helped me when I was in prison in the U.S. Russians don’t surrender and we must help each other.”
The videos of Sheen, Lundgren, and Jones was removed from YouTube on Thursday after Foreign Policy contacted the three actors for comment. They are still available on the Russian social networking site VKontakte.
Jones’s agent Alex Cole confirmed that Jones received $300 to record his video through Cameo, but said he didn’t know the identity of the mystery client behind the request. “Vinnie gets many per day and doesn’t do the due diligence as to who these people are and we presume, harmless in tone. Apart from this, there is nothing to say and Vinnie has no idea who this person he was paid to mention is. A non-story, really,” Cole said.
Cameo’s CEO Steven Galanis said his site was looking into whether the videos were paid for by a Russian individual or entity. He did not respond to multiple follow-up questions. Lundgren and Sheen could not be reached for comment.
Asked why he had mounted such an extensive campaign in support of Shugaley, Malkevich said, “It is clear to any normal person that we will not rest until our citizens return home.”
But there might be a wider game afoot. Moscow has sought to keep channels of communication open with all the key players in Libya, including the internationally-recognized government in Tripoli–which the Kremlin has yet to blame directly for Shugaley’s arrest.
Kirill Semonov, a Libya expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, said that Shugaley’s arrest was being used by the mercenaries’ financial backers as a wedge issue to prevent any strengthening of ties between Moscow and the GNA.
“The Shugaley case is being used by forces who are opposed to a normalization of relations between Moscow and Tripoli, those magnates who oversee the activities of mercenaries in Libya and provide support to Haftar,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--Turkish Aggression Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What?

Turkish Aggression Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean .
Now What ?
On Sept. 25 , the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey .
At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara ’ s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus , both EU members .
Specifically , Turkey has sent , and continues to send , ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries ’ sovereign waters .
The vote has now been pushed back a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ council ’ s president , but for Ankara , the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable : a potential divorce from Europe .
The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018 , when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean .
At that time , the council voted to freeze Turkey ’ s EU accession negotiations , and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc ’ s customs union with its eastern neighbor .
A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent .
The outcome of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s longtime ambivalence .
In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics , it is Italy ’ s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome ’ s choice .
The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya ’ s Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy , France , and Turkey , suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italy the European Union ’ s swing state ?
To sanction Turkey , the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states , and the votes are far from assured .
Stepping into the breach to rally the EU ’ s support for Greece and Cyprus , in early September , French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s Turkey was “ no longer a partner ” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “ a more united and clear voice.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exhortation was Italy , which is France ’ s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations .
With Greece , Cyprus , and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy , Malta , and Spain demur , the Mediterranean is evenly split .
But if Italy shifts toward France , resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU ’ s two largest Mediterranean states , then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey .
To this end , Macron has called for a “ Pax Mediterranea , ” managed by a partnership of the EU ’ s Mediterranean nations .
Behind his high-flown Latin , Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean ’ s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region .
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean ’ s great game ?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt , Turkey , France , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population and define the rules of the Mediterranean ’ s great game .
Despite the interventions of outside actors , from Russia to the United Arab Emirates , it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean ’ s big four to dominate the region ’ s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics .
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean ’ s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war , which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA , which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports .
Italy ’ s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin .
That rebalancing has seen Italy ’ s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China .
Yet despite Italy ’ s trade advances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southern shores , the country ’ s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France ’ s supersized influence .
Until Macron ’ s reprioritization of French foreign policy , leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea , Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity .
But Turkey ’ s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris ’ s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italy ’ s Mediterranean energy conundrum ?
At the center of Italy ’ s policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East is the energy company Eni , Italy ’ s largest company by revenue .
Eni itself is under the de facto control of the Italian government , which holds the company ’ s largest share ( 30.33 percent ) .
Oftentimes , that investment makes Italy ’ s interest in Eni ’ s operations barely distinguishable from Italian foreign policy overall .
Eni ’ s holdings have been the source of contradictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The country is aligned against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean , where Eni is the leading partner in Cyprus ’ s and Egypt ’ s natural gas development , but works in alignment with Turkey to support the GNA , in whose territory almost all of Eni ’ s oil and natural gas assets are concentrated .
In 2015 , two events brought Italy ’ s Mediterranean energy paradox into a sharper contradiction .
Eni ’ s August 2015 game-changing discovery of Egypt ’ s massive Zohr natural gas field , the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eastern Mediterranean now collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas .
Eni , also the lead operator in Cyprus ’ s natural gas development and the lead stakeholder in one of Egypt ’ s two liquefaction plants , began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot , Egyptian , and Israeli gas and use Egypt ’ s liquefaction facilities to cost-effectively market the region ’ s gas to Europe as liquefied natural gas .
Eni ’ s marketing scheme left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe .
Dashing Ankara ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional energy hub , Eni ’ s energy development in Egypt and Cyprus set Italy and Turkey on a geopolitical collision course .
At the same time , Eni controls about 45 percent of Libya ’ s oil and gas production .
In 2015 , the year of Eni ’ s Zohr discovery , the GNA formed in Libya under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj , who enabled Eni to maintain stable energy production in the areas under the protection of the GNA-aligned militias supported by Turkey .
In 2019 , exports from GNA-held @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s total natural gas demand .
With Eni holding its Eastern Mediterranean interests in one hand while holding its Libyan energy interests in the other , Italy maintained an uneasy balancing act .
But Turkey ’ s 2020 military intervention in Libya reshuffled Eni ’ s geopolitical deck .
How did Turkey reshuffle the deck for Italy ’ s energy geopolitics ?
My previous explainer recounts why Turkey opted for a breakout strategy in Libya to redress its grievances with Greece and Cyprus over maritime boundaries .
By helping the GNA-aligned forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eastern Libya , Turkey reversed the course of Libya ’ s civil war .
Turkey ’ s considerable air force presence at the recaptured al-Watiya air base , located 17 miles from Tunisia ’ s border , and its developing naval presence in the GNA coastal stronghold of Misrata have increased Ankara ’ s clout in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria .
But Turkey ’ s new outsized military presence in Libya and its growing regional influence have caused alarm in Italy .
Although Turkey rescued Sarraj ’ s GNA , Rome can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey as a security provider to the extent it will render Eni ’ s energy interests subject to Ankara ’ s dictates .
And it is not just in Libya that Italy ’ s Eni feels vulnerable .
In Algeria , Africa ’ s top natural gas producer , Eni is one of the leading foreign partners of Algeria ’ s state oil company Sonatrach .
Eni and Sonatrach jointly own the 1,500-mile Trans-Mediterranean pipeline that transports Algerian natural gas via Tunisia to Italy .
Natural gas from Algeria and Libya combined account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gas imports .
In 2018 , when Turkey started its gunboat diplomacy off the shores of Cyprus , Italy began turning to France to mitigate the risks in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the central Maghreb .
In February 2018 , the Turkish navy blocked an Eni ship from reaching its intended drill site in Cypriot waters , forcing the company to withdraw the vessel .
In response , Eni brought on the French energy giant Total as a partner in all of its Cyprus operations .
Also in 2018 , Eni and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two companies formed a consortium with Sonatrach for the exclusive rights to explore for energy off Algeria ’ s coast .
Within the same time frame , Total acquired significant new oil holdings in Libya without objection from Eni .
With Franco-Italian energy cooperation already established , Rome and Paris would not have much further to go to implement Macron ’ s Pax Mediterranea .
And at least in Libya , the Franco-Italian reset may have already happened .
On Sept. 13 , the head of Turkey ’ s Foreign Economic Relations Board @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was on the verge of signing an agreement to give Turkish energy firms a share of Libya ’ s oil and natural gas production .
Two days later , Sarraj made the stunning announcement that he would resign in October , apparently catching Turkey off guard .
Sarraj ’ s move paves the way for the dissolution of the GNA and the formation of a unity government composed of officials from Libya ’ s rival halves that will be less beholden to Ankara .
A strategic boon for Italy and France , Sarraj @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Paris and Rome .
Could Turkey ’ s estrangement from Europe be permanent ?
Even with newfound solidarity among the EU ’ s Mediterranean states , it will still be difficult to obtain the required unanimous vote of the 27 EU members to sanction Turkey .
In turn , Europe will probably opt for only mild sanctions at most .
Eastern EU states whose foremost concern is Russia are reluctant to antagonize Ankara , which fields NATO ’ S largest military after the United States and plays an important role in restraining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eastern borders .
Vividly illustrating the EU ’ s south-versus-east divide , Greece and Cyprus threatened to hold up pending EU sanctions on Belarus unless the council imposes “ severe ” sanctions on Turkey .
On Sept. 21 , Cyprus made good on that threat .
No matter the outcome of the council ’ s vote , Europe and Turkey may be on the path to a permanent estrangement .
In the post-Brexit EU , the Germany-France-Italy triad is likely to replace the Germany-France-United Kingdom trio as the principal driver of European politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up in the Mediterranean , Europe ’ s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen .

On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
The outcome of the sanctions vote could hinge on Italy’s longtime ambivalence. In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics, it is Italy’s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome’s choice. The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy, France, and Turkey, suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy’s Mediterranean policy is underway.
Why is Italy the European Union’s swing state?
To sanction Turkey, the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states, and the votes are far from assured. Stepping into the breach to rally the EU’s support for Greece and Cyprus, in early September, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey was “no longer a partner” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “a more united and clear voice.” The main target of Macron’s exhortation was Italy, which is France’s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations.
With Greece, Cyprus, and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain demur, the Mediterranean is evenly split. But if Italy shifts toward France, resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU’s two largest Mediterranean states, then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of some form of sanctions. The momentum in the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey. To this end, Macron has called for a “Pax Mediterranea,” managed by a partnership of the EU’s Mediterranean nations. Behind his high-flown Latin, Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean’s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region.
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt, Turkey, France, and Italy—comprise over half the region’s population and define the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game. Despite the interventions of outside actors, from Russia to the United Arab Emirates, it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean’s big four to dominate the region’s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics.
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean’s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war, which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against Turkey. France is one of Egypt’s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA, which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports.
Italy’s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin. That rebalancing has seen Italy’s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China. Yet despite Italy’s trade advances and proximity to the Mediterranean’s southern shores, the country’s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France’s supersized influence.
Until Macron’s reprioritization of French foreign policy, leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea, Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity. But Turkey’s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris’s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement.
Why is Turkey at the heart of Italy’s Mediterranean energy conundrum?
At the center of Italy’s policies in the Mediterranean and Middle East is the energy company Eni, Italy’s largest company by revenue. Eni itself is under the de facto control of the Italian government, which holds the company’s largest share (30.33 percent). Oftentimes, that investment makes Italy’s interest in Eni’s operations barely distinguishable from Italian foreign policy overall. Eni’s holdings have been the source of contradictions in Italy’s foreign policy. The country is aligned against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Eni is the leading partner in Cyprus’s and Egypt’s natural gas development, but works in alignment with Turkey to support the GNA, in whose territory almost all of Eni’s oil and natural gas assets are concentrated.
In 2015, two events brought Italy’s Mediterranean energy paradox into a sharper contradiction. Eni’s August 2015 game-changing discovery of Egypt’s massive Zohr natural gas field, the region’s largest, meant that the Eastern Mediterranean now collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas. Eni, also the lead operator in Cyprus’s natural gas development and the lead stakeholder in one of Egypt’s two liquefaction plants, began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot, Egyptian, and Israeli gas and use Egypt’s liquefaction facilities to cost-effectively market the region’s gas to Europe as liquefied natural gas. Eni’s marketing scheme left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe. Dashing Ankara’s previously developed plans to become a regional energy hub, Eni’s energy development in Egypt and Cyprus set Italy and Turkey on a geopolitical collision course.
At the same time, Eni controls about 45 percent of Libya’s oil and gas production. In 2015, the year of Eni’s Zohr discovery, the GNA formed in Libya under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, who enabled Eni to maintain stable energy production in the areas under the protection of the GNA-aligned militias supported by Turkey. In 2019, exports from GNA-held territories accounted for 8 percent of Italy’s total natural gas demand.
With Eni holding its Eastern Mediterranean interests in one hand while holding its Libyan energy interests in the other, Italy maintained an uneasy balancing act. But Turkey’s 2020 military intervention in Libya reshuffled Eni’s geopolitical deck.
How did Turkey reshuffle the deck for Italy’s energy geopolitics?
My previous explainer recounts why Turkey opted for a breakout strategy in Libya to redress its grievances with Greece and Cyprus over maritime boundaries. By helping the GNA-aligned forces drive back their opponents 280 miles to eastern Libya, Turkey reversed the course of Libya’s civil war. Turkey’s considerable air force presence at the recaptured al-Watiya air base, located 17 miles from Tunisia’s border, and its developing naval presence in the GNA coastal stronghold of Misrata have increased Ankara’s clout in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria.
But Turkey’s new outsized military presence in Libya and its growing regional influence have caused alarm in Italy. Although Turkey rescued Sarraj’s GNA, Rome cannot tolerate the GNA’s dependence on Turkey as a security provider to the extent it will render Eni’s energy interests subject to Ankara’s dictates.
And it is not just in Libya that Italy’s Eni feels vulnerable. In Algeria, Africa’s top natural gas producer, Eni is one of the leading foreign partners of Algeria’s state oil company Sonatrach. Eni and Sonatrach jointly own the 1,500-mile Trans-Mediterranean pipeline that transports Algerian natural gas via Tunisia to Italy. Natural gas from Algeria and Libya combined account for 28 percent of Italy’s gas imports.
In 2018, when Turkey started its gunboat diplomacy off the shores of Cyprus, Italy began turning to France to mitigate the risks in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the central Maghreb. In February 2018, the Turkish navy blocked an Eni ship from reaching its intended drill site in Cypriot waters, forcing the company to withdraw the vessel. In response, Eni brought on the French energy giant Total as a partner in all of its Cyprus operations. Also in 2018, Eni and Total joined forces in Algeria when the two companies formed a consortium with Sonatrach for the exclusive rights to explore for energy off Algeria’s coast. Within the same time frame, Total acquired significant new oil holdings in Libya without objection from Eni.
With Franco-Italian energy cooperation already established, Rome and Paris would not have much further to go to implement Macron’s Pax Mediterranea. And at least in Libya, the Franco-Italian reset may have already happened. On Sept. 13, the head of Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board responsible for Libya announced that the GNA was on the verge of signing an agreement to give Turkish energy firms a share of Libya’s oil and natural gas production. Two days later, Sarraj made the stunning announcement that he would resign in October, apparently catching Turkey off guard.
Sarraj’s move paves the way for the dissolution of the GNA and the formation of a unity government composed of officials from Libya’s rival halves that will be less beholden to Ankara. A strategic boon for Italy and France, Sarraj’s resignation likely involved coordinated action between Paris and Rome.
Could Turkey’s estrangement from Europe be permanent?
Even with newfound solidarity among the EU’s Mediterranean states, it will still be difficult to obtain the required unanimous vote of the 27 EU members to sanction Turkey. In turn, Europe will probably opt for only mild sanctions at most. Eastern EU states whose foremost concern is Russia are reluctant to antagonize Ankara, which fields NATO’S largest military after the United States and plays an important role in restraining Russian military adventurism on Europe’s eastern borders. Vividly illustrating the EU’s south-versus-east divide, Greece and Cyprus threatened to hold up pending EU sanctions on Belarus unless the council imposes “severe” sanctions on Turkey. On Sept. 21, Cyprus made good on that threat.
No matter the outcome of the council’s vote, Europe and Turkey may be on the path to a permanent estrangement. In the post-Brexit EU, the Germany-France-Italy triad is likely to replace the Germany-France-United Kingdom trio as the principal driver of European politics. And with France and Italy partnering up in the Mediterranean, Europe’s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--As Decoupling Grows, the West Risks Losing Insight Into China

As Decoupling Grows , the West Risks Losing Insight Into China As a college student studying Mandarin in the 1960s , former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk once described China as “ remote as the moon ” and “ more mysterious and isolated … than North Korea.
” In 1971 , Shirk had the chance to visit China for the first time , as part of a delegation of several American Ph.D. students based in Hong Kong , in advance of President Richard Nixon ’ s meeting with Mao Zedong .
When Shirk entered the State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely gave her a better grasp of the decision-making paradigms embraced by key Chinese political and military leaders .
The world has changed significantly since 1971 , and relations between the United States and China are at their lowest point in decades .
In a July speech to American executives , U.S. Attorney General William Barr accused companies like Apple and Disney of “ kowtowing ” to China .
Barr also implied that decoupling may be the only solution to protecting U.S. interests in light of an increasingly aggressive China .
But while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the damaging effects of academic decoupling haven ’ t .
Indeed , in an August article in Foreign Policy , Salvatore Babones advocated for Western universities to cut their ties in China and labeled universities as “ apologists for an illiberal China.
” Advocating for broader academic decoupling between China and the West may be dangerous and self-defeating .
As Babones rightfully points out , Confucius Institutes have been credibly accused of hindering academic freedom in liberal democracies , likely promote the spread of disinformation and help legitimize the Chinese Communist Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be designated as Chinese foreign missions .
But advocating for broader academic decoupling between China and the West may be dangerous and self-defeating .
China tends to commit to a policy of proportional retaliation in response to economic sanctions and media activity restrictions—even if it began the cycle in the first place .
If a significant number of Western universities suspend their research partnerships with China and place further restrictions on Chinese students , the CCP will likely retaliate , terminating many Western academic exchange and study abroad programs .
In the worst-case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lost generation of Western policymakers and analysts who can not fully become China hands due to a lack of language and cultural expertise .
We risk going “ back to the future ” —a 1960s-style future where tomorrow ’ s Susan Shirks are confined to Taiwan and Singapore , unable to study in mainland China ( and perhaps even Hong Kong ) except in the rarest of circumstances , and unable to reach their full potential as China specialists .
U.S. academic and cultural exchange programs with China are already becoming endangered in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jinping .
After the U.S. Peace Corps pulled out of China in early 2020 , a conservative Chinese commentator published an article titled “ Farewell , Peace Corps in China , We Won ’ t See You Off.
” The headline references Mao ’ s famous essay “ Farewell to Leighton Stuart , ” which celebrated the United States ’ recall of the last ambassador to the Republic of China before the CCP took over .
Additionally , in a July executive order discontinuing U.S. preferential treatment for Hong Kong after the passage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also included a provision that suspended the Fulbright exchange program in mainland China and Hong Kong .
Babones advocates for additional academic decoupling by further reducing Chinese student flows to the West and terminating joint research partnerships .
The Trump administration has debated doing just that .
I am not critiquing Babones ’ s argument on the grounds that enhanced academic exchange programs can promote public diplomacy , expose Chinese students to Western democratic systems , and help liberalize China .
Those are hotly contended arguments .
But if the administration expands Presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese students , like undergraduates , or enacts visa restrictions on all CCP members , China may also reciprocate by ending U.S. study abroad programs and scholarships .
These actions may threaten the security of the United States and its allies for two main reasons .
First , the Chinese language is the CCP ’ s primary line of defense .
For example , as Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil highlight in their book Chinese Communist Espionage , many “ published works on Chinese espionage in English failed to pierce that veil [ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to give it a fair go , using few if any Chinese-language sources .
It is as if someone in Beijing wrote a book about the U.S. intelligence community without examining English-language sources.
” The State Department considers Mandarin to be a “ super-hard language ” that is “ exceptionally difficult for native English speakers.
” It often takes years of focused study to be able to read and fully understand a Chinese newspaper article , let alone a Chinese academic journal or dissertation .
Most importantly , in the next few years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and intelligence analysts more than ever to “ pierce that veil ” of Chinese denial and deception efforts , particularly as great-power competition continues to intensify .
To address these challenges , for the last 30 years , the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies has offered a M.A .
program at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center , located in Nanjing , China .
The center is arguably the world ’ s top program for students to “ bring their Chinese language skills to an advanced professional level , ” offering courses taught in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a master ’ s thesis written in Chinese .
Students often graduate from the program with high levels of Chinese proficiency , if not full professional fluency , positioning them to become leading experts who could readily contribute to critical missions in the U.S. and allied governments .
Additionally , Boren Scholarships and Fellowships are sponsored by the National Security Education Program ( NSEP ) and provide $ 20,000 to $ 24,000 awards from the U.S. Defense Department to students desiring to pursue “ long-term , overseas immersive language study.
” Since NSEP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ develop a pipeline of foreign language and culture expertise for the U.S. federal government workforce , ” Boren awardees also take on a service requirement to work in the State Department , Department of Homeland Security , Defense Department , or any element of the intelligence community at the conclusion of their program .
In 2019 , China was the second-most popular destination for Boren awardees , and the program has produced scores of policymakers and intelligence officers who later serve in the U.S. government .
According to former Secretary of State Madeleine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ups and downs in the relationship between China and the United States , the Hopkins-Nanjing Center has overcome its own challenges and thrived.
” However , these high-profile academic exchange programs are not immune from political trends .
For example , in 2014 , two Boren fellows sent job search emails to .gov and .mil domains from within Russia , which attracted the attention of Russian intelligence officers , who interrogated one of the students for two hours .
After this incident , the Boren program prohibited students from studying in Russia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighboring countries like Kazakhstan .
It is not difficult to imagine a similar situation occurring in China in the near future .
Indeed , a former Boren scholar in China , who wishes to remain anonymous , described to us his peers , who included U.S. military-affiliated students , rebelling against class censorship in high-profile ways .
These disruptive actions attracted significant attention from the Chinese university ’ s administration .
Programs like Boren and Hopkins-Nanjing will likely be targeted first if the CCP decides to reciprocate in the event of increased academic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allow students to gain vital , long-term , on-the-ground experience in China—and in a fashion that , thanks to their high-profile nature , protects students from some of the scrutiny experienced during the security clearance process for Americans who spend less structured time in China .
Of course , they should be adjusted to promote improved operational security for students .
But if the Hopkins-Nanjing Center , the Boren program , and other long-term exchange programs are suspended , aspiring China hands would have to rely on alternative options for language study , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , close as its language and some aspects of its culture are to China , is an imperfect solution , due largely to Taiwan ’ s usage of traditional Chinese and an absence of mainland Chinese vernacular .
Second , living in China also provides valuable insight into attitudes , culture , and the state .
According to Adam Grimm , a former Boren fellow in Chengdu and a Ph.D. candidate in higher education at Michigan State University , “ If you ’ re living in China , you need to engage with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s registering with the Public Security Bureau or dealing with other elements of the Chinese bureaucracy , you can not fully understand how the Chinese government functions unless you experience it firsthand.
” Leigh Lawrence , a Boren scholar ( ’ 13 ) and Fulbright scholar ( ’ 19 ) to mainland China , is working on a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Cambridge that analyzes reforms to “ moral education ” within the Chinese compulsory education system under Xi .
She notes that her research into the lived experiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ study in China .
Although Babones is right that Chinese partnerships with Western universities often facilitate the CCP ’ s foreign influence , disinformation , and intelligence operations , broader academic decoupling is not the answer .
The United States and allied governments can still implement counterintelligence screening programs to mitigate the threat of Chinese nontraditional intelligence collectors , who may include Chinese students studying at Western institutions .
Additionally , staff at Western colleges and universities can employ countermeasures , including protecting student identities using code names during sensitive discussions pertaining to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Western university partnerships with China allow tomorrow ’ s national security leaders and China hands to gain vital Chinese language and cultural expertise .
Babones ’ s recommendations run the risk of further “ otherizing ” Chinese international students as pawns of the state .
While it is true that some Chinese students are under immense pressure from the CCP , and others are perhaps nontraditional intelligence collectors , they still enjoy the civil liberties of any other visitor to , or resident in , the United States—and those rights should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ naturalized Chinese citizens serve in the United States and allied governments—more than you might think , based on information provided to Foreign Policy .
Bona fide Chinese students must still be able to study in open academic environments , perhaps become naturalized citizens , and even use their native linguistic and cultural knowledge to contribute to their new country ’ s own national security efforts in the long term .
Western university partnerships with China allow tomorrow ’ s national security leaders and China hands to gain vital Chinese language and cultural expertise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in an era of increased great-power competition .
If the price of this expertise is maintaining current Chinese student flows and sustaining joint university research partnerships in certain low-risk fields , then so be it .
Our eagerness to mitigate threats in the short term can not be allowed to impede our ability to detect threats in the long term .
All statements of fact , analysis , or opinion are the author ’ s and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Justice Department , Department of Homeland Security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ components , or the U.S. government .

As a college student studying Mandarin in the 1960s, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk once described China as “remote as the moon” and “more mysterious and isolated … than North Korea.” In 1971, Shirk had the chance to visit China for the first time , as part of a delegation of several American Ph.D. students based in Hong Kong, in advance of President Richard Nixon’s meeting with Mao Zedong.
As a college student studying Mandarin in the 1960s, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk once described China as “remote as the moon” and “more mysterious and isolated … than North Korea.” In 1971, Shirk had the chance to visit China for the first time, as part of a delegation of several American Ph.D. students based in Hong Kong, in advance of President Richard Nixon’s meeting with Mao Zedong.
When Shirk entered the State Department, her personal exposure to Chinese society likely gave her a better grasp of the decision-making paradigms embraced by key Chinese political and military leaders.
The world has changed significantly since 1971, and relations between the United States and China are at their lowest point in decades. In a July speech to American executives, U.S. Attorney General William Barr accused companies like Apple and Disney of “kowtowing” to China. Barr also implied that decoupling may be the only solution to protecting U.S. interests in light of an increasingly aggressive China. But while economic decoupling has gotten plenty of attention, the damaging effects of academic decoupling haven’t. Indeed, in an August article in Foreign Policy, Salvatore Babones advocated for Western universities to cut their ties in China and labeled universities as “apologists for an illiberal China.”
Advocating for broader academic decoupling between China and the West may be dangerous and self-defeating.
As Babones rightfully points out, Confucius Institutes have been credibly accused of hindering academic freedom in liberal democracies, likely promote the spread of disinformation and help legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and should justly be designated as Chinese foreign missions. But advocating for broader academic decoupling between China and the West may be dangerous and self-defeating. China tends to commit to a policy of proportional retaliation in response to economic sanctions and media activity restrictions—even if it began the cycle in the first place. If a significant number of Western universities suspend their research partnerships with China and place further restrictions on Chinese students, the CCP will likely retaliate, terminating many Western academic exchange and study abroad programs.
In the worst-case scenario, academic decoupling risks creating a lost generation of Western policymakers and analysts who cannot fully become China hands due to a lack of language and cultural expertise. We risk going “back to the future”—a 1960s-style future where tomorrow’s Susan Shirks are confined to Taiwan and Singapore, unable to study in mainland China (and perhaps even Hong Kong) except in the rarest of circumstances, and unable to reach their full potential as China specialists.
U.S. academic and cultural exchange programs with China are already becoming endangered in the era of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. After the U.S. Peace Corps pulled out of China in early 2020, a conservative Chinese commentator published an article titled “Farewell, Peace Corps in China, We Won’t See You Off.” The headline references Mao’s famous essay “Farewell to Leighton Stuart,” which celebrated the United States’ recall of the last ambassador to the Republic of China before the CCP took over. Additionally, in a July executive order discontinuing U.S. preferential treatment for Hong Kong after the passage of its national security law, Trump also included a provision that suspended the Fulbright exchange program in mainland China and Hong Kong.
Babones advocates for additional academic decoupling by further reducing Chinese student flows to the West and terminating joint research partnerships. The Trump administration has debated doing just that. I am not critiquing Babones’s argument on the grounds that enhanced academic exchange programs can promote public diplomacy, expose Chinese students to Western democratic systems, and help liberalize China. Those are hotly contended arguments. But if the administration expands Presidential Proclamation 10043 to include additional classes of Chinese students, like undergraduates, or enacts visa restrictions on all CCP members, China may also reciprocate by ending U.S. study abroad programs and scholarships.
These actions may threaten the security of the United States and its allies for two main reasons.
First, the Chinese language is the CCP’s primary line of defense. For example, as Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil highlight in their book Chinese Communist Espionage, many “published works on Chinese espionage in English failed to pierce that veil [of the Chinese language] or even to give it a fair go, using few if any Chinese-language sources. It is as if someone in Beijing wrote a book about the U.S. intelligence community without examining English-language sources.” The State Department considers Mandarin to be a “super-hard language” that is “exceptionally difficult for native English speakers.” It often takes years of focused study to be able to read and fully understand a Chinese newspaper article, let alone a Chinese academic journal or dissertation. Most importantly, in the next few years, Western governments will need language-enabled policymakers and intelligence analysts more than ever to “pierce that veil” of Chinese denial and deception efforts, particularly as great-power competition continues to intensify.
To address these challenges, for the last 30 years, the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies has offered a M.A. program at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, located in Nanjing, China. The center is arguably the world’s top program for students to “bring their Chinese language skills to an advanced professional level,” offering courses taught in Mandarin and even requiring students to complete a master’s thesis written in Chinese. Students often graduate from the program with high levels of Chinese proficiency, if not full professional fluency, positioning them to become leading experts who could readily contribute to critical missions in the U.S. and allied governments.
Additionally, Boren Scholarships and Fellowships are sponsored by the National Security Education Program (NSEP) and provide $20,000 to $24,000 awards from the U.S. Defense Department to students desiring to pursue “long-term, overseas immersive language study.” Since NSEP’s primary mission is to “develop a pipeline of foreign language and culture expertise for the U.S. federal government workforce,” Boren awardees also take on a service requirement to work in the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Defense Department, or any element of the intelligence community at the conclusion of their program. In 2019, China was the second-most popular destination for Boren awardees, and the program has produced scores of policymakers and intelligence officers who later serve in the U.S. government.
According to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, “Through 30 years of ups and downs in the relationship between China and the United States, the Hopkins-Nanjing Center has overcome its own challenges and thrived.” However, these high-profile academic exchange programs are not immune from political trends. For example, in 2014, two Boren fellows sent job search emails to .gov and .mil domains from within Russia, which attracted the attention of Russian intelligence officers, who interrogated one of the students for two hours. After this incident, the Boren program prohibited students from studying in Russia, and awardees must now study Russian in neighboring countries like Kazakhstan.
It is not difficult to imagine a similar situation occurring in China in the near future. Indeed, a former Boren scholar in China, who wishes to remain anonymous, described to us his peers, who included U.S. military-affiliated students, rebelling against class censorship in high-profile ways. These disruptive actions attracted significant attention from the Chinese university’s administration. Programs like Boren and Hopkins-Nanjing will likely be targeted first if the CCP decides to reciprocate in the event of increased academic decoupling.
However imperfect, these programs allow students to gain vital, long-term, on-the-ground experience in China—and in a fashion that, thanks to their high-profile nature, protects students from some of the scrutiny experienced during the security clearance process for Americans who spend less structured time in China. Of course, they should be adjusted to promote improved operational security for students. But if the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, the Boren program, and other long-term exchange programs are suspended, aspiring China hands would have to rely on alternative options for language study, none of them ideal. Even Taiwan, close as its language and some aspects of its culture are to China, is an imperfect solution, due largely to Taiwan’s usage of traditional Chinese and an absence of mainland Chinese vernacular.
Second, living in China also provides valuable insight into attitudes, culture, and the state.
According to Adam Grimm, a former Boren fellow in Chengdu and a Ph.D. candidate in higher education at Michigan State University, “If you’re living in China, you need to engage with the state to some degree. Whether it’s registering with the Public Security Bureau or dealing with other elements of the Chinese bureaucracy, you cannot fully understand how the Chinese government functions unless you experience it firsthand.”
Leigh Lawrence, a Boren scholar (’13) and Fulbright scholar (’19) to mainland China, is working on a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Cambridge that analyzes reforms to “moral education” within the Chinese compulsory education system under Xi. She notes that her research into the lived experiences of students would be impossible without focused study in China.
Although Babones is right that Chinese partnerships with Western universities often facilitate the CCP’s foreign influence, disinformation, and intelligence operations, broader academic decoupling is not the answer. The United States and allied governments can still implement counterintelligence screening programs to mitigate the threat of Chinese nontraditional intelligence collectors, who may include Chinese students studying at Western institutions. Additionally, staff at Western colleges and universities can employ countermeasures, including protecting student identities using code names during sensitive discussions pertaining to Chinese politics, to preserve academic freedom.
Western university partnerships with China allow tomorrow’s national security leaders and China hands to gain vital Chinese language and cultural expertise.
Babones’s recommendations run the risk of further “otherizing” Chinese international students as pawns of the state. While it is true that some Chinese students are under immense pressure from the CCP, and others are perhaps nontraditional intelligence collectors, they still enjoy the civil liberties of any other visitor to, or resident in, the United States—and those rights should be protected. Many first-generation Chinese immigrants and naturalized Chinese citizens serve in the United States and allied governments—more than you might think, based on information provided to Foreign Policy. Bona fide Chinese students must still be able to study in open academic environments, perhaps become naturalized citizens, and even use their native linguistic and cultural knowledge to contribute to their new country’s own national security efforts in the long term.
Western university partnerships with China allow tomorrow’s national security leaders and China hands to gain vital Chinese language and cultural expertise, which will become even more important in an era of increased great-power competition. If the price of this expertise is maintaining current Chinese student flows and sustaining joint university research partnerships in certain low-risk fields, then so be it. Our eagerness to mitigate threats in the short term cannot be allowed to impede our ability to detect threats in the long term.
All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author’s and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Justice Department, Department of Homeland Security, Defense Department, any of their components, or the U.S. government. The Department of Homeland Security cannot attest to the substantive or technical accuracy of the information contained in this article.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-23--Germany’s Lateral Thinkers, Unite

Germany’s Lateral Thinkers, Unite

Walking the streets of Berlin during one of the recent protests against government-mandated measures to contain COVID-19 , which brought out an estimated 38,000 people on Aug. 29 , felt like attending a postmodernist costume party .
A middle-aged man dressed up as the Grundgesetz , Germany ’ s constitution , screamed “ Article 8 , ” which guarantees the right to free assembly , while a young student with a ponytail and flashy Birkenstocks sported the “ lateral thinker ” pin that is the distinctive mark of many protesters .
Nearby , so-called Reichsbürger—far-right activists who claim that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to storm the Bundestag , Germany ’ s parliament , while bearded hipster dads pushed their kids in bike trailers festooned with anti-nuclear energy stickers .
Alongside middle-of-the road types demanding that the government start allowing them to visit their parents in care homes or just registering their sense that the government is overdoing the anti-coronavirus measures were folks shouting against vaccines or meditating for world peace .
An entire repertoire of conspiracy theorists warned of everything from 5G to chemtrails .
And there were flags and signs , too—lots of them .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace , and the rainbow flag waved high .
Historical flags , in particular the Wilhelmine Imperial War flag used today by the far-right Reichsbürger , were there as well .
As was the U.S. Confederate flag and many “ Q ” signs referring to the QAnon conspiracy movement that has made its way to Germany from the United States .
Across the crowd , there was some anger , some tears , but also people enjoying themselves , dancing to drum music , and savoring the good weather .
And despite the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there was a common denominator : the claim that the government is deliberately using the pandemic to curtail political liberties guaranteed by Germany ’ s constitution , kill free speech , and denounce its critics .
This is the key message of the self-labeled lateral thinkers , or Querdenker , the German term for a person who thinks in nonconventional terms and thereby runs the risk of offending society .
Their loose movement was the main driving force behind the protests late last month , and they have organized demonstrations in other cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of course , right that there is tension between the goals of stamping out a pandemic and ensuring political freedom .
The Berlin police at first wanted to ban the protests , citing health reasons .
A court quickly overturned the decision , allowing the protests to go ahead .
Walking the streets of Berlin , one could sense the enthusiasm of these lateral thinkers of all sorts , who could see that they were not as alone as they had thought .
Not alone , but still a minority .
After all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approval rating is still 71 percent .
By contrast , according to a recent poll , just 7 percent think that her government ’ s coronavirus containment measures are being led by “ powerful groups trying to push their own agenda.
” And 16 percent think that protective measures are needed , but that current ones are too strict .
Historically , it is no surprise that conspiracy movements would pop up during a pandemic .
During the cholera outbreaks in Paris in 1832 , Parisians thought it much more plausible that death @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government poisoning wells than some other force , like bacteria , which science had not yet identified as the true cause .
The sense that the government was behind the outbreak was partly responsible for sparking the failed June Rebellion portrayed in Victor Hugo ’ s masterpiece Les Misérables .
The French government then ; Merkel and her globalist friends now .
As one Berlin demonstrator revealingly screamed , “ Show me the virus !
” The tendency to point to a cover-up during situations like this , which most people can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feeling insecure , gives the Querdenker a role to play .
In such times , revealing the truth to the people becomes its heroic task .
One coronavirus skeptic said : “ When the Nazis took over , the Germans didn ’ t say anything .
I don ’ t want to tell my nephews I didn ’ t speak up.
” There ’ s also the issue the political scientist Francis Fukuyama raised in his book The End of History and the Last Man .
In wealthy societies , opposition to liberal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the side of man that deliberately seeks out struggle and sacrifice , that tries to prove that the self is something better and higher.
” Indeed , the belief that the world is governed by a small , secretive group of conspiracists corresponds to the view of conspiracy theorists who see themselves as a special club—in this case , the Querdenker—that is in the know and sees through the supposed lies .
These Querdenker consider themselves freedom fighters or sorts .
Many of them are wrong , and sometimes scarily so .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Berlin ’ s streets should send a shiver down anyone ’ s spine .
But , ironically , if the demonstrations have revealed one thing , it is that the protesters ’ concern for political liberties and free speech is unfounded .
They were allowed to march .
And they still live in a free world where their voices can be heard .
Today , more than at any time before , one doesn ’ t necessarily need to be part of the elite to have a platform .
For example , Attila @ @ @ @ @ @ @ self-declared German nationalist , has emerged as one of the leaders of the right-wing faction of the German protests .
He has over 80,000 followers on Telegram , where he falsely claims that Merkel is Jewish and is planning a global genocide .
Meanwhile , the YouTube channel of the Querdenker organizers of the marches has over 75,000 followers .
There are no such protests in China or Russia .
Only truly open societies can produce the mishmash of ideas and personalities that converged last month in Berlin .

Walking the streets of Berlin during one of the recent protests against government-mandated measures to contain COVID-19, which brought out an estimated 38,000 people on Aug. 29, felt like attending a postmodernist costume party.
Walking the streets of Berlin during one of the recent protests against government-mandated measures to contain COVID-19, which brought out an estimated 38,000 people on Aug. 29, felt like attending a postmodernist costume party.
A middle-aged man dressed up as the Grundgesetz, Germany’s constitution, screamed “Article 8,” which guarantees the right to free assembly, while a young student with a ponytail and flashy Birkenstocks sported the “lateral thinker” pin that is the distinctive mark of many protesters. Nearby, so-called Reichsbürger—far-right activists who claim that the pre-World War II German Reich still exists—attempted to storm the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, while bearded hipster dads pushed their kids in bike trailers festooned with anti-nuclear energy stickers. Alongside middle-of-the road types demanding that the government start allowing them to visit their parents in care homes or just registering their sense that the government is overdoing the anti-coronavirus measures were folks shouting against vaccines or meditating for world peace. An entire repertoire of conspiracy theorists warned of everything from 5G to chemtrails.
And there were flags and signs, too—lots of them. The peace sign, the dove of peace, and the rainbow flag waved high. Historical flags, in particular the Wilhelmine Imperial War flag used today by the far-right Reichsbürger, were there as well. As was the U.S. Confederate flag and many “Q” signs referring to the QAnon conspiracy movement that has made its way to Germany from the United States.
Across the crowd, there was some anger, some tears, but also people enjoying themselves, dancing to drum music, and savoring the good weather. And despite the vastly different causes the protesters supported, there was a common denominator: the claim that the government is deliberately using the pandemic to curtail political liberties guaranteed by Germany’s constitution, kill free speech, and denounce its critics.
This is the key message of the self-labeled lateral thinkers, or Querdenker, the German term for a person who thinks in nonconventional terms and thereby runs the risk of offending society. Their loose movement was the main driving force behind the protests late last month, and they have organized demonstrations in other cities since.
Those out protesting are, of course, right that there is tension between the goals of stamping out a pandemic and ensuring political freedom. The Berlin police at first wanted to ban the protests, citing health reasons. A court quickly overturned the decision, allowing the protests to go ahead. Walking the streets of Berlin, one could sense the enthusiasm of these lateral thinkers of all sorts, who could see that they were not as alone as they had thought.
Not alone, but still a minority. After all, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s approval rating is still 71 percent. By contrast, according to a recent poll, just 7 percent think that her government’s coronavirus containment measures are being led by “powerful groups trying to push their own agenda.” And 16 percent think that protective measures are needed, but that current ones are too strict.
Historically, it is no surprise that conspiracy movements would pop up during a pandemic. During the cholera outbreaks in Paris in 1832, Parisians thought it much more plausible that death and misery were the result of the government poisoning wells than some other force, like bacteria, which science had not yet identified as the true cause. The sense that the government was behind the outbreak was partly responsible for sparking the failed June Rebellion portrayed in Victor Hugo’s masterpiece Les Misérables.
The French government then; Merkel and her globalist friends now. As one Berlin demonstrator revealingly screamed, “Show me the virus!” The tendency to point to a cover-up during situations like this, which most people can’t fully grasp and which leave society feeling insecure, gives the Querdenker a role to play. In such times, revealing the truth to the people becomes its heroic task. One coronavirus skeptic said: “When the Nazis took over, the Germans didn’t say anything. I don’t want to tell my nephews I didn’t speak up.”
There’s also the issue the political scientist Francis Fukuyama raised in his book The End of History and the Last Man. In wealthy societies, opposition to liberal democracy often comes from “Thymos … the side of man that deliberately seeks out struggle and sacrifice, that tries to prove that the self is something better and higher.” Indeed, the belief that the world is governed by a small, secretive group of conspiracists corresponds to the view of conspiracy theorists who see themselves as a special club—in this case, the Querdenker—that is in the know and sees through the supposed lies.
These Querdenker consider themselves freedom fighters or sorts. Many of them are wrong, and sometimes scarily so. And the sight of the Reichsbürger marching in Berlin’s streets should send a shiver down anyone’s spine.
But, ironically, if the demonstrations have revealed one thing, it is that the protesters’ concern for political liberties and free speech is unfounded. They were allowed to march. And they still live in a free world where their voices can be heard. Today, more than at any time before, one doesn’t necessarily need to be part of the elite to have a platform.
For example, Attila Hildmann, a vegan TV chef turned self-declared German nationalist, has emerged as one of the leaders of the right-wing faction of the German protests. He has over 80,000 followers on Telegram, where he falsely claims that Merkel is Jewish and is planning a global genocide. Meanwhile, the YouTube channel of the Querdenker organizers of the marches has over 75,000 followers.
There are no such protests in China or Russia. Only truly open societies can produce the mishmash of ideas and personalities that converged last month in Berlin.