foreignpolicy--2020-10-06--Syria Is Still Trying to Use Chemical Weapons

Syria Is Still Trying to Use Chemical Weapons Syria continues to obtain components for its chemical weapons and missile programs , the Trump administration said in a report to Congress this year , as Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime seeks to restore capabilities eroded by a near-decade-long civil war and successive U.S. airstrikes .
The finding—confirmed to Foreign Policy by current and former U.S. officials , as well as diplomatic sources who spoke on condition of anonymity—comes as current and former Trump administration officials worry that a potential buildup of missile production facilities inside Syria could threaten Israel .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s declared [ chemical weapons ] production facilities and stockpile of [ chemical weapons ] agent , the Assad regime continues to pursue chemical weapons and has used both chlorine and sarin on a number of occasions over the course of the conflict , ” the State Department reported to Congress this year in a document obtained by Foreign Policy .
“ We believe the Assad regime is seeking to reestablish strategic weapons production capabilities it lost in the course of the conflict and we continue to see Syrian procurement activity in support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In a U.N. Security Council meeting on Monday , Kelly Craft , the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations , accused Syria of breaching its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention and U.N. resolutions to dismantle its chemical weapons program .
The United States attributes more than 50 instances of chemical weapons use to the Assad regime , mostly launched from aircraft and targeting civilians in residential neighborhoods , markets , and hospitals .
Many of the chemical weapons stockpiled by the regime in the face of international arms control treaties are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s ballistic missiles .
It ’ s not clear to U.S. officials that Iran would consider transferring ballistic missiles directly to Assad , a move that would significantly extend the range of Damascus ’ s deadly sarin and chlorine stockpiles .
But the Syrian regime ’ s continued efforts to secure chemical weapons have raised concerns in Washington and Jerusalem .
Collaboration between Iranian proxies and Damascus in weapons production is not unheard of .
In the past , the Syrian regime developed an improvised rocket munition to fire chemical weapons based on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Weekly has reported on Iran previously aiding in the growth of Syria ’ s surface-to-surface missile program .
In the report to Congress obtained by Foreign Policy , the State Department warned that Iran was also exploiting the Syrian war to build up a coterie of multinational militia forces along border crossing routes and to fly armed drones into nearby Israel .
One former Trump administration official said the United States has greenlit Israeli airstrikes inside Syria targeting Iranian efforts to house missile facilities near its border , considered a red line for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have only grown , officials and diplomatic sources said , as Iran has stepped up efforts to produce precision guidance kits on Syrian soil that can increase the accuracy of short-range missiles fired at Israel .
In the meantime , Assad ’ s continued effort to rebuild Syria ’ s chemical weapons production appears significant not only for the human rights implications but also for the threats it would pose to U.S. allies and partners .
“ The reemergence of Assad ’ s offensive chemical weapons program , that would be significant , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ director of the Arms Control Association .
“ It ’ s one thing to have barrel bombs dropped from helicopters .
It ’ s another thing entirely to have sarin available for deploying on ballistic missiles that can hit other countries in the region .
Those are two very different threats.
” Kimball said it would be difficult for nongovernmental organizations to independently confirm whether Assad was taking steps to rebuild his chemical weapons program .
Still , “ it would not be surprising if the U.S. intelligence community assessed that the Assad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its previous programs , ” he said .
“ If it does have evidence , it has a responsibility to bring this evidence to the [ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons , or OPCW ] so it can bring the full weight of the organization and international community to bear on Syria.
” The resilience of Assad ’ s chemical weapons program appears to fly in the face of optimism from U.S. civilian and military officials after successive U.S.-led missile strikes against air bases and facilities in 2017 and 2018 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kenneth McKenzie did not rule out the possibility of future chemical weapons attacks by the regime in 2018 , though he said the multinational attack that included Britain and France had dealt a “ very serious blow ” to the heart of Assad ’ s program .
But former officials said the Trump administration had to balance its desire to strike a blow against the Syrian regime with concerns about collateral damage on a crowded battlefield .
“ We definitely wanted to do something actual to their capability that wasn ’ t just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t want to kill a bunch of Russians , ” said a former senior Trump administration official .
“ It would have depleted their general ability , but we didn ’ t want to hit a bunch of places that had Iranian and Russian advisors there.
” But even before the strikes , Western intelligence agencies and international weapons inspectors long suspected that Assad hid some stores of chemical weapons after declaring he had eliminated the entire program as part of a pact brokered by the United States and Russia in 2013 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ persistent reports that Syrian forces continue to fire munitions filled with sarin and chlorine at civilian towns in rebel-controlled territory .
As far back as 2016 , international chemical weapons experts at the Hague-based OPCW described a troubling pattern of incomplete and inaccurate disclosures about the scale of Syria ’ s ongoing chemical weapons program , according to a confidential 2016 report that was reviewed by Foreign Policy .
“ We , therefore , remain very concerned that [ chemical weapons ] agent and associated munitions , subject to declaration and destruction , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Washington ’ s then-envoy to the OPCW , Kenneth Ward , at the time .
There have been indications that Syria has sought to reconstitute its chemical weapons program .
“ The United States has been sanctioning front companies working for the Syrian chemical weapons program since 2013 and 2014—that would indicate ongoing attempts at procurement , ” said Gregory Koblentz , a professor at George Mason University .
For instance , France issued a statement in April 2017 claiming that Syrians were trying to acquire stores of isopropanol , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sarin .
The OPCW also said it had found “ major inconsistencies ” in Syrian regime explanations for the discovery of traces of sarin in sites that hadn ’ t been declared to inspectors as weapons facilities .
This year , a U.N. panel of experts monitoring North Korea ’ s compliance with U.N. sanctions found that Pyongyang had been routinely shipping potentially critical supplies to a Syrian entity—the Scientific Studies and Research Center—that oversaw Syria ’ s chemical weapons program .
Koblentz said the administration ’ s reference to a strategic program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expand its chemical weapons threat to deter attacks by regional rivals , particularly Israel .
While some U.S. officials believe that the Trump administration ’ s steady diet of sanctions against Assad has dampened his wherewithal to cause trouble in the region , experts insist that the regime will still look to double down on its chemical weapons arsenal .
“ The first thing you always have to say is that the disarmament was incomplete and not just in terms of volumes of agents but what production capacities may have survived , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin who has conducted several studies of the Assad regime ’ s chemical weapons program .
“ It was the consensus that the program had survived and it was being consolidated on a smaller scale but that it quietly continued , ” he said .

Jack Detsch, Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer

Syria continues to obtain components for its chemical weapons and missile programs, the Trump administration said in a report to Congress this year, as Bashar al-Assad’s regime seeks to restore capabilities eroded by a near-decade-long civil war and successive U.S. airstrikes.
Syria continues to obtain components for its chemical weapons and missile programs, the Trump administration said in a report to Congress this year, as Bashar al-Assad’s regime seeks to restore capabilities eroded by a near-decade-long civil war and successive U.S. airstrikes.
The finding—confirmed to Foreign Policy by current and former U.S. officials, as well as diplomatic sources who spoke on condition of anonymity—comes as current and former Trump administration officials worry that a potential buildup of missile production facilities inside Syria could threaten Israel.
“Despite having completed destruction of Syria’s declared [chemical weapons] production facilities and stockpile of [chemical weapons] agent, the Assad regime continues to pursue chemical weapons and has used both chlorine and sarin on a number of occasions over the course of the conflict,” the State Department reported to Congress this year in a document obtained by Foreign Policy. “We believe the Assad regime is seeking to reestablish strategic weapons production capabilities it lost in the course of the conflict and we continue to see Syrian procurement activity in support of its chemical weapons and missile programs.”
In a U.N. Security Council meeting on Monday, Kelly Craft, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, accused Syria of breaching its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention and U.N. resolutions to dismantle its chemical weapons program. The United States attributes more than 50 instances of chemical weapons use to the Assad regime, mostly launched from aircraft and targeting civilians in residential neighborhoods, markets, and hospitals. Many of the chemical weapons stockpiled by the regime in the face of international arms control treaties are capable of being launched by Syria’s ballistic missiles.
It’s not clear to U.S. officials that Iran would consider transferring ballistic missiles directly to Assad, a move that would significantly extend the range of Damascus’s deadly sarin and chlorine stockpiles. But the Syrian regime’s continued efforts to secure chemical weapons have raised concerns in Washington and Jerusalem.
Collaboration between Iranian proxies and Damascus in weapons production is not unheard of. In the past, the Syrian regime developed an improvised rocket munition to fire chemical weapons based on designs from Hezbollah, and Janes Defence Weekly has reported on Iran previously aiding in the growth of Syria’s surface-to-surface missile program.
In the report to Congress obtained by Foreign Policy, the State Department warned that Iran was also exploiting the Syrian war to build up a coterie of multinational militia forces along border crossing routes and to fly armed drones into nearby Israel. One former Trump administration official said the United States has greenlit Israeli airstrikes inside Syria targeting Iranian efforts to house missile facilities near its border, considered a red line for Israel. Concerns about Iranian missile sites have only grown, officials and diplomatic sources said, as Iran has stepped up efforts to produce precision guidance kits on Syrian soil that can increase the accuracy of short-range missiles fired at Israel.
In the meantime, Assad’s continued effort to rebuild Syria’s chemical weapons production appears significant not only for the human rights implications but also for the threats it would pose to U.S. allies and partners.
“The reemergence of Assad’s offensive chemical weapons program, that would be significant,” said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “It’s one thing to have barrel bombs dropped from helicopters. It’s another thing entirely to have sarin available for deploying on ballistic missiles that can hit other countries in the region. Those are two very different threats.”
Kimball said it would be difficult for nongovernmental organizations to independently confirm whether Assad was taking steps to rebuild his chemical weapons program. Still, “it would not be surprising if the U.S. intelligence community assessed that the Assad regime was trying to reconstitute some of its previous programs,” he said. “If it does have evidence, it has a responsibility to bring this evidence to the [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW] so it can bring the full weight of the organization and international community to bear on Syria.”
The resilience of Assad’s chemical weapons program appears to fly in the face of optimism from U.S. civilian and military officials after successive U.S.-led missile strikes against air bases and facilities in 2017 and 2018. Then-Joint Chiefs of Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie did not rule out the possibility of future chemical weapons attacks by the regime in 2018, though he said the multinational attack that included Britain and France had dealt a “very serious blow” to the heart of Assad’s program. But former officials said the Trump administration had to balance its desire to strike a blow against the Syrian regime with concerns about collateral damage on a crowded battlefield.
“We definitely wanted to do something actual to their capability that wasn’t just symbolic, but we also didn’t want to kill a bunch of Russians,” said a former senior Trump administration official. “It would have depleted their general ability, but we didn’t want to hit a bunch of places that had Iranian and Russian advisors there.”
But even before the strikes, Western intelligence agencies and international weapons inspectors long suspected that Assad hid some stores of chemical weapons after declaring he had eliminated the entire program as part of a pact brokered by the United States and Russia in 2013. Those concerns have been repeatedly reinforced by persistent reports that Syrian forces continue to fire munitions filled with sarin and chlorine at civilian towns in rebel-controlled territory.
As far back as 2016, international chemical weapons experts at the Hague-based OPCW described a troubling pattern of incomplete and inaccurate disclosures about the scale of Syria’s ongoing chemical weapons program, according to a confidential 2016 report that was reviewed by Foreign Policy.
“We, therefore, remain very concerned that [chemical weapons] agent and associated munitions, subject to declaration and destruction, have been illicitly retained by Syria,” said Washington’s then-envoy to the OPCW, Kenneth Ward, at the time.
There have been indications that Syria has sought to reconstitute its chemical weapons program. “The United States has been sanctioning front companies working for the Syrian chemical weapons program since 2013 and 2014—that would indicate ongoing attempts at procurement,” said Gregory Koblentz, a professor at George Mason University.
For instance, France issued a statement in April 2017 claiming that Syrians were trying to acquire stores of isopropanol, a chemical precursor used in the production of sarin. The OPCW also said it had found “major inconsistencies” in Syrian regime explanations for the discovery of traces of sarin in sites that hadn’t been declared to inspectors as weapons facilities.
This year, a U.N. panel of experts monitoring North Korea’s compliance with U.N. sanctions found that Pyongyang had been routinely shipping potentially critical supplies to a Syrian entity—the Scientific Studies and Research Center—that oversaw Syria’s chemical weapons program.
Koblentz said the administration’s reference to a strategic program suggested that Syria may be seeking to expand its chemical weapons threat to deter attacks by regional rivals, particularly Israel. While some U.S. officials believe that the Trump administration’s steady diet of sanctions against Assad has dampened his wherewithal to cause trouble in the region, experts insist that the regime will still look to double down on its chemical weapons arsenal.
“The first thing you always have to say is that the disarmament was incomplete and not just in terms of volumes of agents but what production capacities may have survived,” said Tobias Schneider, a research fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin who has conducted several studies of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program.
“It was the consensus that the program had survived and it was being consolidated on a smaller scale but that it quietly continued,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-06--Why Fishing Could Sink Britain’s Brexit Deal With Europe

Why Fishing Could Sink Britain ’ s Brexit Deal With Europe WEYMOUTH , UK—Twenty or so small boats , slung with orange floats and lobster pots and bearing banners reading “ SAVE BRITAIN ’ S FISH ” and “ COASTAL COMMUNITIES COUNT , ” chugged out of the harbor into the bay .
The flotilla set off rockets and flares , and orange and white smoke billowed out over the English Channel .
The unusual episode—part protest , part distress call—was replicated in port towns across Britain in April 2018 .
“ You get pushed that far , you ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dave Pitman , 65 , a third-generation trawlerman who took part in the demonstration , said in an interview this August .
At issue was the Common Fisheries Policy ( CFP ) , a European Union agreement that gives European boats access to British waters and which , critics claim , has decimated the U.K. ’ s fishing industry .
The country remains in the CFP while it negotiates its exit from the EU , which Fishing for Leave spokesman Arron Banks said in a statement at the time gives Europe the opportunity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the UK fleet.
” He added , “ Brexit creates a golden opportunity to regain 70 per cent of the UK ’ s fisheries resources and rejuvenate a multi-billion pound industry for the nation.
” Two years on—and four years since the country voted to leave the EU—such demands threaten to derail the painstaking negotiations to determine what relationship Britain , currently in a transition period , will have with the EU once it becomes fully independent on Dec. 31 .
Both sides have indicated a need to finalize a comprehensive trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stalled for months , with competition rules and the status of Northern Ireland proving particularly controversial .
But experts suggest that the U.K. ’ s efforts to carve out a better deal for its fishing fleet—and the EU ’ s steely defense of the status quo—could be the issue that sees talks stumble at the last hurdle .
This would lead to a painful no-deal scenario , in which the country loses tariff-free access to the destination of 43 percent of its exports and practical , diplomatic , and security cooperation is thrown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European Parliament threatened the United Kingdom with economic sanctions should it try to block European fishermen from Britain ’ s waters , which extend up to 200 nautical miles into the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea .
In an Oct. 2 phone call with Ursula von der Leyen , the European Commission president , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson emphasized the importance of fisheries to the U.K .
Both sides agreed to intensify talks on remaining issues , especially fishing , ahead of a pivotal EU summit on Oct. 15-16 , with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a no-deal Brexit but could “ more than live with it.
” “ This stand-off has the potential to derail the entire talks , ” concluded a report published this June by The UK in a Changing Europe , a British think tank .
“ Absurd though it may seem , as the formal Brexit process reaches its endgame , fisheries might yet be the issue that determines whether the negotiations succeed or fail.
” The CFP was set up in the 1970s to help sustainably manage stocks of the dozens of species @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nations .
Overall catch limits are set every year by EU ministers .
But each country ’ s share of individual species was fixed four decades ago based on historical fishing patterns .
This rigid allowance has increasingly disadvantaged the United Kingdom : European trawlers land around 700,000 metric tons of fish from British waters annually , compared with under 100,000 metric tons in the other direction .
Meanwhile , the British fishing fleet of nearly 6,000 vessels has had trouble adapting to changing fish stocks and competing with large fishing companies that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , compared to what it was like 20 years ago , is quite a small fishing port now , ” said Pitman , who has fished out of this small town in southwestern England for five decades .
“ A lot of the reason why it declined here is because of the quota system.
” By the time migrating shoals—of Dover soles , for example—come within reach of Weymouth ’ s smaller craft , bigger boats belonging to both the U.K. and Europe have already taken the lion ’ s share , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limits catches to a handful of species makes turning a profit difficult , agreed Bob Summerhayes , 57 , who nets bass , mullet , and pollock off Weymouth .
“ We don ’ t have the range to go up and down the Channel into other areas chasing fish , ” he explained .
“ Pigeonholing vessels into selective fishing doesn ’ t really suit inshore , small-scale fishermen .
We need that ability to diversify.
” Supertrawlers hurt artisanal fishermen on both sides of the Channel , he added , by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ food chain and inadvertently scooping up larger fish such as bass , which often have to be thrown away due to catch limits .
Four out of every 5 British fishing vessels are 10 meters long or under .
But the U.K. currently gives this low-range , inshore fleet less than 2 percent of the country ’ s available quota , according to a recent report from the New Economics Foundation .
This could have been remedied even within the EU .
But many hope that in the process of bringing fishing policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the chance to give its smaller fishermen a break—perhaps through awarding access to fish stocks based on days at sea .
A post-Brexit Fisheries Bill currently working its way through Parliament places some restrictions on larger vessels , but the opposition Labour Party argues it could do much more to help smaller fishermen .
The difficulties facing Britain ’ s fishermen are clear .
But less immediately obvious is why their government is prepared to potentially risk the most important negotiation in modern British history on getting them a better deal .
Catching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the British economy and employs barely 12,000 people , or 0.04 % of the British workforce .
Even combined with the fish-processing sector , roughly twice as big , the industry remains minnow-sized compared to the U.K. ’ s creative arts or financial services sectors .
Part of the answer is that Britain ’ s fishing fleet is concentrated in small coastal towns , often already economically deprived , and their fishermen often find it hard to retire or retrain .
Once a beach resort frequented by King George III , Weymouth and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 533 English districts in terms of social mobility in a 2018 report by the U.K. Parliament .
Like Weymouth , many fishing communities voted for Brexit in 2016 and are represented by Conservative members of Parliament “ who don ’ t want to see any giving in on the fishing issue , ” said Christopher Huggins , a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Suffolk and lead author of the report on Brexit and fishing .
“ The government can ’ t ignore it all that easily.
” Similarly , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and France want the EU to fight tooth and nail to protect their access to U.K. waters , he added .
“ There ’ s politics on both sides of the channel.
” But perhaps the biggest spur to Prime Minister Boris Johnson ’ s unlikely fishing offensive is Britain ’ s stubborn pride in having once “ ruled the waves.
” “ Fishing is seen as the litmus test of Brexit , ” Huggins explains .
“ It is a complicated issue but to most people it seems relatively simple .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s going on in your waters or you don ’ t. ” “ You either have control of what ’ s going on in your waters or you don ’ t. ” If no deal is reached by the end of the transition , the UK in a Changing Europe report concluded , the risk grows of British and EU fishermen clashing over access to fish .
Even if trade talks fall apart for unrelated reasons —such as shared rules around state subsidies for industry—animosities could play out at sea .
Some experts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high as 50-50 .
Disputes over fishing have heated up before : the “ Cod Wars ” from 1958 to 1976 saw Icelandic fishermen shoot at British trawlers and cut their nets , and Royal Navy escort ships ram Icelandic Coast Guard vessels .
In August 2018 , French fishermen threw petrol bombs and rocks at British boats off Normandy in an ongoing quarrel over scallops .
The United Kingdom is reportedly tripling the size of its Fishery Protection Squadron , a Royal Navy detachment which guards the country ’ s fish stocks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either .
In 2013 , the EU closed its ports to fishing vessels from the Faroe Islands—a tiny North Atlantic archipelago—for overfishing .
To avoid souring relations with an important trading and security partner , the EU may relent on the fishing issue .
Some sort of reworked quota system boosting Britain ’ s share of the fish in its own waters , but offering EU fishermen a transitional period , seems likely .
Even without an immediate deal , under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea , Britain will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to manage fish stocks sustainably .
“ I don ’ t think we ’ re going to see any big bang , ” said Huggins .
When it comes to fish , too , the EU has strong leverage .
Britons barely eat any fish other than salmon , cod , shrimp , tuna , and haddock , so 80 percent of British fish landings are exported—mostly to the EU , which will probably make tariff-free access to its markets conditional on its fishermen still being allowed into British waters .
Among Weymouth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , lobster , and whelks , and “ the bigger shellfish markets tend to be Europe : France , Spain , and Portugal , ” Summerhayes admitted .
“ If there isn ’ t a deal it ’ s going to be difficult.
” Even if the United Kingdom can claw back some concessions , fishing will probably remain the work of a tough few .
Many fancy their chances in the industry after a few sunny days at sea , said Pitman .
“ It ’ s a total different effect when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six southwesterly , it ’ s pissing it down , and you ’ re waking up in the dark on a cold winter ’ s morning .
You ’ ve got to be half-mad.
” “ But going to work in an office ?
Nah .
As long as I can pass the medical , I ’ ll keep going .
”

WEYMOUTH, UK—Twenty or so small boats, slung with orange floats and lobster pots and bearing banners reading “SAVE BRITAIN’S FISH” and “COASTAL COMMUNITIES COUNT,” chugged out of the harbor into the bay. The flotilla set off rockets and flares, and orange and white smoke billowed out over the English Channel. The unusual episode—part protest, part distress call—was replicated in port towns across Britain in April 2018. “You get pushed that far, you’ve got to do something,” Dave Pitman, 65, a third-generation trawlerman who took part in the demonstration, said in an interview this August.
WEYMOUTH, UK—Twenty or so small boats, slung with orange floats and lobster pots and bearing banners reading “SAVE BRITAIN’S FISH” and “COASTAL COMMUNITIES COUNT,” chugged out of the harbor into the bay. The flotilla set off rockets and flares, and orange and white smoke billowed out over the English Channel. The unusual episode—part protest, part distress call—was replicated in port towns across Britain in April 2018. “You get pushed that far, you’ve got to do something,” Dave Pitman, 65, a third-generation trawlerman who took part in the demonstration, said in an interview this August.
At issue was the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), a European Union agreement that gives European boats access to British waters and which, critics claim, has decimated the U.K.’s fishing industry. The country remains in the CFP while it negotiates its exit from the EU, which Fishing for Leave spokesman Arron Banks said in a statement at the time gives Europe the opportunity “to cull what’s left of the UK fleet.” He added, “Brexit creates a golden opportunity to regain 70 per cent of the UK’s fisheries resources and rejuvenate a multi-billion pound industry for the nation.”
Two years on—and four years since the country voted to leave the EU—such demands threaten to derail the painstaking negotiations to determine what relationship Britain, currently in a transition period, will have with the EU once it becomes fully independent on Dec. 31. Both sides have indicated a need to finalize a comprehensive trade deal in October, although discussions have stalled for months, with competition rules and the status of Northern Ireland proving particularly controversial.
But experts suggest that the U.K.’s efforts to carve out a better deal for its fishing fleet—and the EU’s steely defense of the status quo—could be the issue that sees talks stumble at the last hurdle. This would lead to a painful no-deal scenario, in which the country loses tariff-free access to the destination of 43 percent of its exports and practical, diplomatic, and security cooperation is thrown into uncertainty. This August, the European Parliament threatened the United Kingdom with economic sanctions should it try to block European fishermen from Britain’s waters, which extend up to 200 nautical miles into the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. In an Oct. 2 phone call with Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson emphasized the importance of fisheries to the U.K. Both sides agreed to intensify talks on remaining issues, especially fishing, ahead of a pivotal EU summit on Oct. 15-16, with Johnson saying the U.K. did not want a no-deal Brexit but could “more than live with it.”
“This stand-off has the potential to derail the entire talks,” concluded a report published this June by The UK in a Changing Europe, a British think tank. “Absurd though it may seem, as the formal Brexit process reaches its endgame, fisheries might yet be the issue that determines whether the negotiations succeed or fail.”
The CFP was set up in the 1970s to help sustainably manage stocks of the dozens of species that move between the waters of European nations. Overall catch limits are set every year by EU ministers. But each country’s share of individual species was fixed four decades ago based on historical fishing patterns.
This rigid allowance has increasingly disadvantaged the United Kingdom: European trawlers land around 700,000 metric tons of fish from British waters annually, compared with under 100,000 metric tons in the other direction. Meanwhile, the British fishing fleet of nearly 6,000 vessels has had trouble adapting to changing fish stocks and competing with large fishing companies that monopolize lucrative fishing grounds.
“Weymouth, compared to what it was like 20 years ago, is quite a small fishing port now,” said Pitman, who has fished out of this small town in southwestern England for five decades. “A lot of the reason why it declined here is because of the quota system.” By the time migrating shoals—of Dover soles, for example—come within reach of Weymouth’s smaller craft, bigger boats belonging to both the U.K. and Europe have already taken the lion’s share, he argues.
The strict licensing system that limits catches to a handful of species makes turning a profit difficult, agreed Bob Summerhayes, 57, who nets bass, mullet, and pollock off Weymouth. “We don’t have the range to go up and down the Channel into other areas chasing fish,” he explained. “Pigeonholing vessels into selective fishing doesn’t really suit inshore, small-scale fishermen. We need that ability to diversify.” Supertrawlers hurt artisanal fishermen on both sides of the Channel, he added, by depleting stocks of fish further down the food chain and inadvertently scooping up larger fish such as bass, which often have to be thrown away due to catch limits.
Four out of every 5 British fishing vessels are 10 meters long or under. But the U.K. currently gives this low-range, inshore fleet less than 2 percent of the country’s available quota, according to a recent report from the New Economics Foundation. This could have been remedied even within the EU. But many hope that in the process of bringing fishing policy back in-house, the U.K. will seize the chance to give its smaller fishermen a break—perhaps through awarding access to fish stocks based on days at sea. A post-Brexit Fisheries Bill currently working its way through Parliament places some restrictions on larger vessels, but the opposition Labour Party argues it could do much more to help smaller fishermen.
The difficulties facing Britain’s fishermen are clear. But less immediately obvious is why their government is prepared to potentially risk the most important negotiation in modern British history on getting them a better deal. Catching fish makes up just 0.1 percent of the British economy and employs barely 12,000 people, or 0.04% of the British workforce. Even combined with the fish-processing sector, roughly twice as big, the industry remains minnow-sized compared to the U.K.’s creative arts or financial services sectors.
Part of the answer is that Britain’s fishing fleet is concentrated in small coastal towns, often already economically deprived, and their fishermen often find it hard to retire or retrain. Once a beach resort frequented by King George III, Weymouth and the surrounding area came last out of 533 English districts in terms of social mobility in a 2018 report by the U.K. Parliament.
Like Weymouth, many fishing communities voted for Brexit in 2016 and are represented by Conservative members of Parliament “who don’t want to see any giving in on the fishing issue,” said Christopher Huggins, a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Suffolk and lead author of the report on Brexit and fishing. “The government can’t ignore it all that easily.” Similarly, the fishing industries of Denmark, the Netherlands, and France want the EU to fight tooth and nail to protect their access to U.K. waters, he added. “There’s politics on both sides of the channel.”
But perhaps the biggest spur to Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s unlikely fishing offensive is Britain’s stubborn pride in having once “ruled the waves.” “Fishing is seen as the litmus test of Brexit,” Huggins explains. “It is a complicated issue but to most people it seems relatively simple. You either have control of what’s going on in your waters or you don’t.”
“You either have control of what’s going on in your waters or you don’t.”
If no deal is reached by the end of the transition, the UK in a Changing Europe report concluded, the risk grows of British and EU fishermen clashing over access to fish. Even if trade talks fall apart for unrelated reasons —such as shared rules around state subsidies for industry—animosities could play out at sea. Some experts put the chances of no deal as high as 50-50.
Disputes over fishing have heated up before: the “Cod Wars” from 1958 to 1976 saw Icelandic fishermen shoot at British trawlers and cut their nets, and Royal Navy escort ships ram Icelandic Coast Guard vessels. In August 2018, French fishermen threw petrol bombs and rocks at British boats off Normandy in an ongoing quarrel over scallops. The United Kingdom is reportedly tripling the size of its Fishery Protection Squadron, a Royal Navy detachment which guards the country’s fish stocks. Sanctions would not be without precedent either. In 2013, the EU closed its ports to fishing vessels from the Faroe Islands—a tiny North Atlantic archipelago—for overfishing.
To avoid souring relations with an important trading and security partner, the EU may relent on the fishing issue. Some sort of reworked quota system boosting Britain’s share of the fish in its own waters, but offering EU fishermen a transitional period, seems likely. Even without an immediate deal, under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Britain will still have to cooperate with its neighbors to manage fish stocks sustainably. “I don’t think we’re going to see any big bang,” said Huggins.
When it comes to fish, too, the EU has strong leverage. Britons barely eat any fish other than salmon, cod, shrimp, tuna, and haddock, so 80 percent of British fish landings are exported—mostly to the EU, which will probably make tariff-free access to its markets conditional on its fishermen still being allowed into British waters. Among Weymouth’s most lucrative catches are crab, lobster, and whelks, and “the bigger shellfish markets tend to be Europe: France, Spain, and Portugal,” Summerhayes admitted. “If there isn’t a deal it’s going to be difficult.”
Even if the United Kingdom can claw back some concessions, fishing will probably remain the work of a tough few. Many fancy their chances in the industry after a few sunny days at sea, said Pitman. “It’s a total different effect when you’re blown a five or six southwesterly, it’s pissing it down, and you’re waking up in the dark on a cold winter’s morning. You’ve got to be half-mad.”
“But going to work in an office? Nah. As long as I can pass the medical, I’ll keep going.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-06--A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy

Since the resumption of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh last week between Azerbaijan and Armenia , Ankara ’ s rhetoric has differed dramatically from that of the rest of the international community .
The United Nations , the European Union , and even Russia and Iran have called for a cease-fire .
Turkey , on the other hand , expressed unequivocal support for Azerbaijan , and said that without a sustainable solution , a cease-fire is meaningless .
The government ’ s statement underlined that Turkey would fully support Azerbaijan with unwavering solidarity and “ stand by Azerbaijan whichever way it prefers.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ broader change in Turkish foreign policy that is driven by lost trust in international diplomacy , a greater willingness to get directly involved in regional conflicts with a view to acquiring relevance and influence , and an urge to capitalize on the domestic popularity of these moves .
Turkey ’ s position on Nagorno-Karabakh can firstly be explained by the close emotional and identity ties linking Turkey and Azerbaijan .
Turks and Azerbaijanis speak closely related languages and consider themselves part of a greater Turkic family extending all the way to Central Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firm in its criticism of the international community ’ s stance .
Since the end of the Cold War , the U.N. and Western powers have repeatedly reacted harshly to attempts by nation-states to acquire territory by force .
Turkey contends that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh , the international reaction is tantamount to a clear double standard .
Since the end of the Cold War , the U.N. and Western powers have repeatedly reacted harshly to attempts by nation-states—such as Iraq under President Saddam Hussein or Russia under President Vladimir Putin—to acquire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh , the international reaction has been much more muted and is tantamount to a clear double standard .
The conflict in the Azerbaijani territory degenerated into armed struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991 .
It ended with the occupation of the region and even additional neighboring zones by Armenian units , leading to the internal displacement of close to 1 million people .
The occupied territories correspond to some 20 percent of Azerbaijan ’ s total land area , compelling Turkey to close its border with Armenia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that despite this tragic outcome , too much trust was placed in the dysfunctional mechanism of the Minsk Group led by France , Russia , and the United States to steer the parties toward a settlement for too long .
Turkey ’ s political support for Azerbaijan also comes in the wake of an era of deepened economic and especially military cooperation .
Turkey has been instrumental in the reform of the Azerbaijani military with advisors and regular training programs , as well as the transfer of strategic assets such as armed drones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by acquiring similar airborne platforms from Israel .
The impact has become visible since the beginning of the most recent military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh , with the Azerbaijani units ’ vastly improved performance compared with previous confrontations .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated the only solution to the conflict can come about by the full withdrawal of the Armenian forces from Karabakh and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan .
But this claimed objective risks opening yet another theater of confrontation between Turkey and Russia .
So far Moscow has been conspicuously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a more delicate balancing act to uphold .
Despite a historical and religious penchant for ties with Armenia , Moscow needs to sustain its political ties with Azerbaijan .
Russia is known to sell arms to both countries .
It may also be that Moscow is looking to weaken the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan , which it finds to be too friendly to the West .
But ultimately , it is clear that Moscow will seek to draw a line in Nagorno-Karabakh .
It can hardly countenance Azerbaijan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force .
Depending on where and when the line is drawn , Turkey-Russia relations could again deteriorate .
If they do , Nagorno-Karabakh could become yet another theater of militarized dispute involving Turkey , in addition to ongoing and unsettled conflicts in Syria , Libya , and the Eastern Mediterranean .
There are at least three different explanations .
The first relates to the global order .
The diplomatic divestment of the United States from Europe in Turkey ’ s immediate neighborhood has created a power vacuum that could have potentially made the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actor in its near abroad .
And yet the EU has so far failed to overcome its internal divisions .
Turkey has taken advantage of this strategic shortcoming .
The second driver is the political ideology of Turkey ’ s ruling Justice and Development Party ( AKP ) and its leader , Erdogan .
The AKP leadership has severely criticized Turkey ’ s former rulers and blamed them for pursuing a foreign policy of the status quo too closely aligned with U.S. interests .
In return , Erdogan has promised Turkey to return @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the very least by becoming an influential regional actor .
Sometimes referred as “ neo-Ottomanism , ” this policy has nonetheless captured the imagination of the Turkish electorate .
The electorate responded enthusiastically to making Turkey “ great again ” against the backdrop of accumulated frustrations with the country ’ s relationship with the West .
The never-ending ambivalence of European countries on Turkey ’ s accession to the EU , combined with the palpable rise in anti-Americanism within Turkey—especially after the botched coup attempt of 2016 , coupled with the U.S. decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Protection Units , or YPG , as its ally in the fight against the Islamic State—had already created a domestic public opinion deeply skeptical about Turkey ’ s relations with the West .
The alliance that has emerged since 2015 between the AKP and the hypernationalist Nationalist Movement Party further facilitated this shift .
Finally , Erdogan ’ s illiberal turn at home has tarnished mutual trust and the prospects of a mature dialogue with Turkey ’ s established Western partners .
Erdogan has promised Turkey to return to its former imperial glory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an influential regional actor .
Voters responded enthusiastically to making Turkey “ great again ” against the backdrop of accumulated frustrations .
Foreign policy has thus become an essential part of the story of Turkey ’ s rise .
It has also been used to justify the more combative rhetoric that has come to dominate the foreign-policy discourse of the Turkish leadership in recent years .
According to this logic , it was because Turkey was rising that the country was being challenged on all fronts by foreign actors .
Whenever the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters were told it was because of foreign governments or shadowy international cabals resentful of Turkey ’ s economic growth .
Likewise , Turkey ’ s isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is explained as an inevitable outcome of Turkey ’ s rise to regional prominence .
The final explanation relates to day-to-day politics .
There is a legitimate question about whether Turkey can afford the ever-increasing number of theaters where it has military exposure .
Especially at a time when the country ’ s economy remains under duress because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lack of reforms to address long-running structural imbalances .
Since reaching a peak of $ 951 billion in 2013 , Turkey ’ s gross domestic product has reversed its growth trend , falling to $ 754 billion in 2019 in nominal terms—a drop of $ 200 billion , nearly the size of the GDP of Greece , in six years .
The lackluster performance of the economy has had a political impact on the AKP ’ s popularity at home .
According to the pollster Metropoll , support for the AKP had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant drop from the 43 percent of votes the party received in the 2018 parliamentary elections .
But those who wonder whether a weak economy will eventually curb Erdogan ’ s activist foreign policy may be asking the wrong question .
As Turkey ’ s involvement in Syria , Libya , and now Nagorno-Karabakh have shown , the economy may not be a constraint on the conduct of Turkey ’ s hard-power foreign policy , but rather its source .
The conflicts perpetuate the perception that Turkey is a country under siege , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They nurture the need for strong leadership .
But more importantly , they create a false dichotomy and compel the electorate to choose between economic well-being and national security .
That is the dilemma facing Turkey ’ s policymakers today .
A foreign policy that gives priority to combative rhetoric , hard power , and maligning the West can be politically useful in the short term , but remains incompatible with the long-term requirement of stabilizing the economy .
And yet it is the country ’ s economic performance that will ultimately determine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contest when the time comes .

Since the resumption of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh last week between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ankara’s rhetoric has differed dramatically from that of the rest of the international community. The United Nations, the European Union, and even Russia and Iran have called for a cease-fire. Turkey, on the other hand, expressed unequivocal support for Azerbaijan, and said that without a sustainable solution, a cease-fire is meaningless.
Since the resumption of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh last week between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ankara’s rhetoric has differed dramatically from that of the rest of the international community. The United Nations, the European Union, and even Russia and Iran have called for a cease-fire. Turkey, on the other hand, expressed unequivocal support for Azerbaijan, and said that without a sustainable solution, a cease-fire is meaningless.
The government’s statement underlined that Turkey would fully support Azerbaijan with unwavering solidarity and “stand by Azerbaijan whichever way it prefers.” Turkey’s stance illustrates a broader change in Turkish foreign policy that is driven by lost trust in international diplomacy, a greater willingness to get directly involved in regional conflicts with a view to acquiring relevance and influence, and an urge to capitalize on the domestic popularity of these moves.
Turkey’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh can firstly be explained by the close emotional and identity ties linking Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turks and Azerbaijanis speak closely related languages and consider themselves part of a greater Turkic family extending all the way to Central Asia. In addition, Turkey has been firm in its criticism of the international community’s stance.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. and Western powers have repeatedly reacted harshly to attempts by nation-states to acquire territory by force. Turkey contends that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the international reaction is tantamount to a clear double standard.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. and Western powers have repeatedly reacted harshly to attempts by nation-states—such as Iraq under President Saddam Hussein or Russia under President Vladimir Putin—to acquire territory by force. Turkey contends that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the international reaction has been much more muted and is tantamount to a clear double standard.
The conflict in the Azerbaijani territory degenerated into armed struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1991. It ended with the occupation of the region and even additional neighboring zones by Armenian units, leading to the internal displacement of close to 1 million people. The occupied territories correspond to some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s total land area, compelling Turkey to close its border with Armenia in 1993. Yet Ankara has argued that despite this tragic outcome, too much trust was placed in the dysfunctional mechanism of the Minsk Group led by France, Russia, and the United States to steer the parties toward a settlement for too long.
Turkey’s political support for Azerbaijan also comes in the wake of an era of deepened economic and especially military cooperation. Turkey has been instrumental in the reform of the Azerbaijani military with advisors and regular training programs, as well as the transfer of strategic assets such as armed drones. Azerbaijan has further enriched its arsenal by acquiring similar airborne platforms from Israel. The impact has become visible since the beginning of the most recent military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh, with the Azerbaijani units’ vastly improved performance compared with previous confrontations.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated the only solution to the conflict can come about by the full withdrawal of the Armenian forces from Karabakh and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. But this claimed objective risks opening yet another theater of confrontation between Turkey and Russia. So far Moscow has been conspicuously unfazed. Compared with Turkey, Russia has a more delicate balancing act to uphold. Despite a historical and religious penchant for ties with Armenia, Moscow needs to sustain its political ties with Azerbaijan.
Russia is known to sell arms to both countries. It may also be that Moscow is looking to weaken the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan, which it finds to be too friendly to the West. But ultimately, it is clear that Moscow will seek to draw a line in Nagorno-Karabakh. It can hardly countenance Azerbaijan’s recovery of the territory by force. Depending on where and when the line is drawn, Turkey-Russia relations could again deteriorate. If they do, Nagorno-Karabakh could become yet another theater of militarized dispute involving Turkey, in addition to ongoing and unsettled conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The world is currently witnessing a transformation in Turkish foreign and security policy. Ankara has become a more assertive foreign-policy actor. It is now more inclined to rely on its hard power and to get directly involved in regional conflicts. There is therefore a need to understand the drivers of this change—and to question whether Ankara’s growing exposure to regional conflicts is really sustainable.
There are at least three different explanations. The first relates to the global order. The diplomatic divestment of the United States from Europe in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood has created a power vacuum that could have potentially made the EU a more influential foreign and security actor in its near abroad. And yet the EU has so far failed to overcome its internal divisions. Turkey has taken advantage of this strategic shortcoming.
The second driver is the political ideology of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Erdogan. The AKP leadership has severely criticized Turkey’s former rulers and blamed them for pursuing a foreign policy of the status quo too closely aligned with U.S. interests. In return, Erdogan has promised Turkey to return to its former imperial glory, at the very least by becoming an influential regional actor. Sometimes referred as “neo-Ottomanism,” this policy has nonetheless captured the imagination of the Turkish electorate. The electorate responded enthusiastically to making Turkey “great again” against the backdrop of accumulated frustrations with the country’s relationship with the West.
The never-ending ambivalence of European countries on Turkey’s accession to the EU, combined with the palpable rise in anti-Americanism within Turkey—especially after the botched coup attempt of 2016, coupled with the U.S. decision to weaponize the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, as its ally in the fight against the Islamic State—had already created a domestic public opinion deeply skeptical about Turkey’s relations with the West. The alliance that has emerged since 2015 between the AKP and the hypernationalist Nationalist Movement Party further facilitated this shift. Finally, Erdogan’s illiberal turn at home has tarnished mutual trust and the prospects of a mature dialogue with Turkey’s established Western partners.
Erdogan has promised Turkey to return to its former imperial glory, at the very least by becoming an influential regional actor. Voters responded enthusiastically to making Turkey “great again” against the backdrop of accumulated frustrations.
Foreign policy has thus become an essential part of the story of Turkey’s rise. It has also been used to justify the more combative rhetoric that has come to dominate the foreign-policy discourse of the Turkish leadership in recent years. According to this logic, it was because Turkey was rising that the country was being challenged on all fronts by foreign actors. Whenever the country’s currency came under pressure, voters were told it was because of foreign governments or shadowy international cabals resentful of Turkey’s economic growth. Likewise, Turkey’s isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is explained as an inevitable outcome of Turkey’s rise to regional prominence.
The final explanation relates to day-to-day politics. There is a legitimate question about whether Turkey can afford the ever-increasing number of theaters where it has military exposure. Especially at a time when the country’s economy remains under duress because of the shock of the coronavirus and the lack of reforms to address long-running structural imbalances.
Since reaching a peak of $951 billion in 2013, Turkey’s gross domestic product has reversed its growth trend, falling to $754 billion in 2019 in nominal terms—a drop of $200 billion, nearly the size of the GDP of Greece, in six years. The lackluster performance of the economy has had a political impact on the AKP’s popularity at home. According to the pollster Metropoll, support for the AKP had fallen to 31 percent in August 2020—a significant drop from the 43 percent of votes the party received in the 2018 parliamentary elections.
But those who wonder whether a weak economy will eventually curb Erdogan’s activist foreign policy may be asking the wrong question. As Turkey’s involvement in Syria, Libya, and now Nagorno-Karabakh have shown, the economy may not be a constraint on the conduct of Turkey’s hard-power foreign policy, but rather its source.
The conflicts perpetuate the perception that Turkey is a country under siege, being continually attacked by malign actors. They nurture the need for strong leadership. But more importantly, they create a false dichotomy and compel the electorate to choose between economic well-being and national security. That is the dilemma facing Turkey’s policymakers today.
A foreign policy that gives priority to combative rhetoric, hard power, and maligning the West can be politically useful in the short term, but remains incompatible with the long-term requirement of stabilizing the economy. And yet it is the country’s economic performance that will ultimately determine the fate of the next national political contest when the time comes.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-06--China’s Global Image Plummets After Coronavirus

Public attitudes toward China have turned sharply sour over the past year , according to a new report published on Tuesday by the Pew Research Center , amid widespread criticism of China ’ s handling of the coronavirus outbreak .
Despite China ’ s shift to an aggressive posture through its new “ Wolf Warrior ” , style of diplomacy , over two-thirds of people in 14 major countries said they had no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing with regards to world affairs .
More than three out of five on average said China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the coronavirus outbreak .
The most negative views of China ’ s coronavirus performance came from the three nations in close proximity that were surveyed , Japan , South Korea , and Australia .
China ’ s new approach may not be winning friends abroad , but it may not be meant to .
“ The Wolf Warrior diplomacy doesn ’ t work well in the Western context , but it ’ s often oriented toward domestic audiences within China because it makes China seem stronger and withstanding Western pressures , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia State University who focuses on China .
While those surveyed took a dim view of China ’ s handling of the pandemic , the United States fared even worse .
Some 84 percent of respondents said America had mishandled the pandemic .
And however much those surveyed may not trust Xi , they have even less faith in the U.S. President Donald Trump .
A Pew survey released last month found that across 13 wealthy countries , Trump was less trusted than Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin , with 83 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confidence ” in the U.S. president ’ s handling of global affairs .
When it comes to the economy , China is on track to see an estimated 1 percent growth this year , while the rest of the world grapples with a spiraling economic crisis .
That economic heft and resilience is reflected in the survey : In most of the European countries surveyed , at least half the respondents saw China as the world ’ s leading economic power , while only a third held this view about the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after the House Intelligence Committee warned last week that the United States was at risk of being outpaced by China on the global stage and left unable to protect the nation ’ s health and security unless the intelligence community is overhauled to meet the multifaceted global threat posed by Beijing .
Public opinion in a number of countries seemed to reflect a growing hawkishness among national governments .
Australia , which saw the biggest increase in negative views toward China , has traditionally seen China as a valuable market for its natural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sought to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and increase defense spending in the Indo-Pacific region—indicative of Australia ’ s growing perception that China is a threat to the country ’ s democracy and sovereignty .
In Europe , China was flying high just a few years ago .
Today , it is battling a growing perception that it is a destabilizing actor .
The United Kingdom , which once defined itself as “ China ’ s best partner in the West ” saw a jump in unfavorable opinion of China from 55 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , once very open to business with China , has recently taken a more defensive posture to protect its technology industry .
In the latest sign of international diplomatic pushback , Britain and Germany secured support Tuesday from 37 other countries for a statement before the U.N. General Assembly human rights committee denouncing China ’ s treatment of Hong Kongers , Tibetans , and Uighurs .
A similar resolution last year secured only 23 votes .
The shift reflected growing resentment against China , which has previously threatened to punish countries that backed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last year , China threatened to block an effort by Austria to secure property in Beijing for its embassy .
Beijing also warned Lebanon that it would veto a resolution extending the mandate of a critical U.N. peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon , according to diplomatic sources .
Austria supported this year ’ s resolution , but Lebanon did not .
The sponsors of the resolution also persuaded key European countries , including Italy , Spain , and Switzerland , to back the resolution for the first time .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We are gravely concerned about the human rights situation in Xinjiang and the recent developments in Hong Kong , ” Germany ’ s U.N .
Ambassador Christoph Heusgen said in the statement on behalf of the 39 countries .
“ We call on China to respect human rights , particularly the rights of persons belonging to religious and ethnic minorities , especially in Xinjiang and Tibet.
” China portrayed the vote as an effort by the Trump administration to distract from its own failings at home to address racial discrimination , police brutality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus , which has resulted in the death of more than 210,000 Americans , while infecting the president and leading lawmakers , and sending top generals into protective quarantine .
“ Blaming others won ’ t solve your problems , nor hide your failures .
I would like to say to the U.S. that blaming China can not cover up your poor human rights records , ” China ’ s U.N. ambassador , Zhang Jun , told the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday .
“ Before accusing others , you ’ d better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at yourself .
In fact : It is the U.S. that should protect the basic rights of its people.
” For its part , China secured support from 45 other countries for a statement defending its own policies in Xinjiang , ostensibly meant to root out terrorism , which have been criticized by rights groups .
The joint statement was read out by Cuba .
“ We note with appreciation that China has undertaken a series of measures in response to threats of terrorism and extremism , ” the statement read .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happy lives in a peaceful and stable environment.
” China ’ s global image is bad and getting worse among rich countries , like those in the survey .
But less-developed countries , such as Kenya , Nigeria , Ukraine , and Tunisia , tend to have more positive views of China , as a Pew survey last year showed .
One explanation : the more perceived corruption there is in any given country , according to Transparency Internationals ’ Corruption Perceptions Index , the more positive attitudes are toward China .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Last year ’ s Pew report found little correlation between Chinese investment in a country and the country ’ s overall views of China .
The study found while some countries that receive high levels of investment , such as Nigeria , have highly favorable views , other countries like Indonesia remain evenly split in their views of China despite receiving , in Indonesia ’ s case , nearly $ 50 billion in capital investment .
That has China rethinking how to boost its global image , since its huge economy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have failed to pay political dividends .
“ The Chinese government has invested heavily in promoting its image beyond its economic expansion , ” Repnikova said .
In China , “ there ’ s a narrative that we don ’ t just want to be an economic powerhouse , we also want to be liked , accepted , and recognized .
”

Amy Mackinnon, Darcy Palder and Colum Lynch

Public attitudes toward China have turned sharply sour over the past year, according to a new report published on Tuesday by the Pew Research Center, amid widespread criticism of China’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak.
Public attitudes toward China have turned sharply sour over the past year, according to a new report published on Tuesday by the Pew Research Center, amid widespread criticism of China’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak.
Despite China’s shift to an aggressive posture through its new “Wolf Warrior”, style of diplomacy, over two-thirds of people in 14 major countries said they had no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing with regards to world affairs. More than three out of five on average said China had done a bad job in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak. The most negative views of China’s coronavirus performance came from the three nations in close proximity that were surveyed, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
China’s new approach may not be winning friends abroad, but it may not be meant to.
“The Wolf Warrior diplomacy doesn’t work well in the Western context, but it’s often oriented toward domestic audiences within China because it makes China seem stronger and withstanding Western pressures,” said Maria Repnikova, a professor at Georgia State University who focuses on China.
While those surveyed took a dim view of China’s handling of the pandemic, the United States fared even worse. Some 84 percent of respondents said America had mishandled the pandemic. And however much those surveyed may not trust Xi, they have even less faith in the U.S. President Donald Trump. A Pew survey released last month found that across 13 wealthy countries, Trump was less trusted than Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, with 83 percent of respondents saying they had “no confidence” in the U.S. president’s handling of global affairs.
When it comes to the economy, China is on track to see an estimated 1 percent growth this year, while the rest of the world grapples with a spiraling economic crisis. That economic heft and resilience is reflected in the survey: In most of the European countries surveyed, at least half the respondents saw China as the world’s leading economic power, while only a third held this view about the United States.
Pew’s findings come just after the House Intelligence Committee warned last week that the United States was at risk of being outpaced by China on the global stage and left unable to protect the nation’s health and security unless the intelligence community is overhauled to meet the multifaceted global threat posed by Beijing.
Public opinion in a number of countries seemed to reflect a growing hawkishness among national governments. Australia, which saw the biggest increase in negative views toward China, has traditionally seen China as a valuable market for its natural resources. However, Australia has recently sought to investigate the origins of the coronavirus and increase defense spending in the Indo-Pacific region—indicative of Australia’s growing perception that China is a threat to the country’s democracy and sovereignty.
In Europe, China was flying high just a few years ago. Today, it is battling a growing perception that it is a destabilizing actor. The United Kingdom, which once defined itself as “China’s best partner in the West” saw a jump in unfavorable opinion of China from 55 percent to 74 percent. The Netherlands, once very open to business with China, has recently taken a more defensive posture to protect its technology industry.
In the latest sign of international diplomatic pushback, Britain and Germany secured support Tuesday from 37 other countries for a statement before the U.N. General Assembly human rights committee denouncing China’s treatment of Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and Uighurs. A similar resolution last year secured only 23 votes.
The shift reflected growing resentment against China, which has previously threatened to punish countries that backed the statement with a cutoff of trade. Last year, China threatened to block an effort by Austria to secure property in Beijing for its embassy.
Beijing also warned Lebanon that it would veto a resolution extending the mandate of a critical U.N. peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, according to diplomatic sources. Austria supported this year’s resolution, but Lebanon did not.
The sponsors of the resolution also persuaded key European countries, including Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, to back the resolution for the first time. The United States supported the resolution both years.
“We are gravely concerned about the human rights situation in Xinjiang and the recent developments in Hong Kong,” Germany’s U.N. Ambassador Christoph Heusgen said in the statement on behalf of the 39 countries. “We call on China to respect human rights, particularly the rights of persons belonging to religious and ethnic minorities, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet.”
China portrayed the vote as an effort by the Trump administration to distract from its own failings at home to address racial discrimination, police brutality, and a failed response to the coronavirus, which has resulted in the death of more than 210,000 Americans, while infecting the president and leading lawmakers, and sending top generals into protective quarantine.
“Blaming others won’t solve your problems, nor hide your failures. I would like to say to the U.S. that blaming China cannot cover up your poor human rights records,” China’s U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, told the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday. “Before accusing others, you’d better take a good look in the mirror at yourself. In fact: It is the U.S. that should protect the basic rights of its people.”
For its part, China secured support from 45 other countries for a statement defending its own policies in Xinjiang, ostensibly meant to root out terrorism, which have been criticized by rights groups. The joint statement was read out by Cuba. “We note with appreciation that China has undertaken a series of measures in response to threats of terrorism and extremism,” the statement read. “People of all ethnic groups enjoy their happy lives in a peaceful and stable environment.”
China’s global image is bad and getting worse among rich countries, like those in the survey. But less-developed countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Tunisia, tend to have more positive views of China, as a Pew survey last year showed. One explanation: the more perceived corruption there is in any given country, according to Transparency Internationals’ Corruption Perceptions Index, the more positive attitudes are toward China.
And China can’t necessarily buy love. Last year’s Pew report found little correlation between Chinese investment in a country and the country’s overall views of China. The study found while some countries that receive high levels of investment, such as Nigeria, have highly favorable views, other countries like Indonesia remain evenly split in their views of China despite receiving, in Indonesia’s case, nearly $50 billion in capital investment.
That has China rethinking how to boost its global image, since its huge economy, trade might, and massive investments overseas have failed to pay political dividends.
“The Chinese government has invested heavily in promoting its image beyond its economic expansion,” Repnikova said. In China, “there’s a narrative that we don’t just want to be an economic powerhouse, we also want to be liked, accepted, and recognized.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-06--Can Harris Push Biden Across the Finish Line?

Can Harris Push Biden Across the Finish Line ?
Since her anointment as Joe Biden ’ s vice presidential choice in August , Sen. Kamala Harris has barely made headlines .
Perhaps that ’ s no surprise : In an election that has really been mostly about Donald Trump ’ s fitness for office , the president ’ s own No .
2 , Mike Pence , has been all but invisible as well .
But even as Trump triumphantly left Walter Reed National Military Medical Center on Monday , tweeting that despite his COVID-19 diagnosis he felt “ better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thanks to his administration ’ s development of “ really great drugs & knowledge , ” the health of the 74-year-old president will also be on the ballot Nov. 3 , as will Pence ’ s readiness to take over .
And that means Harris is back in the spotlight too as the person who is a heartbeat away from the 77-year-old Biden , though he has tested negative for the virus so far .
Early indications are that COVID-19 will be center stage during Wednesday ’ s vice presidential debate as it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump announced Tuesday he won ’ t negotiate further on another economic relief plan until the election is over .
Harris will focus much of her attention on Pence ’ s alleged failures as head of the White House ’ s coronavirus task force , according to a source close to the campaign .
Indeed , the debate already appeared to get underway on Tuesday , as the two camps traded barbs about Harris ’ s demand for a plexiglass divider between them .
After Pence spokesperson Katie Miller told Politico , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fortress around herself , have at it , ” Harris spokesperson Sabrina Singh tweeted back : “ Interesting that @ VPComDir Katie Miller mocks our wanting a plexiglass barrier on the debate stage , when her own boss is supposedly in charge of the COVID-19 task force and should be advocating for this too.
” “ It could be the first VP debate ever to matter , ” said Matt Bennett of the Third Way , a Washington-based think tank .
“ The scrutiny on Pence in particular will be intense .
Not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he [ Pence ] is the ostensible chair of the coronavirus task force and that is the only issue that matters at the moment .
Harris is a skilled advocate , and she will be relentless in prosecuting that case.
” “ That ’ s where the election is , ” said Elaine Kamarck , the director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institution and a former senior aide to Vice President Al Gore .
“ That ’ s their biggest vulnerability .
That ’ s what is going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while I think Pence is a much more decent human being than Trump , he ’ s in a classic bind .
You have to be completely loyal to the president .
He ’ s going to have to defend the president on COVID , a pretty difficult thing to do.
” Pence ’ s influence on Trump administration policy had always been unclear .
But that ended in February , when the president put him in charge of the U.S. pandemic response and on camera almost every day .
Since then he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including by Pence ’ s own former homeland security advisor , Olivia Troye , who accused the White House of missing months to slow the spread of the virus even as she said she organized every meeting of the coronavirus task force between February and July .
Troye , who now says she ’ s voting for Biden , focused most of her criticism on Trump himself—but that won ’ t help Pence much when he ’ s forced to defend the president ’ s policies in the debate .
( Troye @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Pence “ was in an impossible situation with the president.
” ) According to FP Analytics ’ s COVID-19 Global Response Index , the United States continues to rank among the worst countries ( 32nd of 36 ) in terms of per capita deaths and cases , among other factors indicating a laggard response .
Vice presidential debates typically mean next to nothing in presidential elections .
Even when some candidates have scored well against their opponents , as Mike Dukakis ’ s pick , Lloyd Bentsen , did against George H.W @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Quayle , in 1988—when Bentsen famously humiliated the Republican candidate by saying he was “ no Jack Kennedy ” —their ticket lost in the end .
But Wednesday night ’ s contest between Harris and Pence will highlight in much greater relief the two candidates ’ suitability for the top office as the coronavirus pandemic rages on .
And that has a great deal to do with the ages of both Biden and Trump , some analysts said .
“ The VPs never play big roles in campaigns .
They do what they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Except that these two guys are old and the president is sick .
Forget COVID—you just have to look at the guy to know he ’ s a walking heart attack .
That will change the status of the VP candidates somewhat.
” Something similar happened in 2008 , she noted , when Republican John McCain ’ s selection of Alaska Gov .
Sarah Palin backfired in large part because of doubts about his age and health .
“ In 1988 , Quayle was really not thought to be up to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very healthy 63-year-old , so it didn ’ t matter that much .
Palin also showed herself to be not up to the job , but McCain was 72 and had a history of cancer , so when Palin fell apart , it became a big story .
This time there ’ s a lot riding on Pence.
” Even so , the Trump campaign and the president himself sought to portray his infection as a kind of triumph , suggesting that Trump was now in a better position to handle the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had not .
The president appeared to be using his swift return as evidence that the nation , like him , could quickly overcome the pandemic that has put his presidency in extreme jeopardy , with Biden leading in all major polls .
Though the virus has now infected some 7.7 million people in the United States , killed more than 215,000 , and few people have enjoyed the immediate and intensive care he received at Walter Reed , Trump said : “ Don ’ t be afraid of Covid .
Don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On Monday , Trump also tweeted a video in which he said , “ I knew there ’ s danger to it .
But I had to do it .
I stood out front .
I led .
Nobody that ’ s a leader would not do what I did .
And I know there ’ s a risk .
… But that ’ s OK. And now I ’ m better .
And maybe I ’ m immune , I don ’ t know.
” Biden , who until then had reined @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president was in the hospital , responded : “ I hope no one walks away with the message thinking that it is not a problem .
It ’ s a serious problem .
It ’ s an international pandemic , and we have … 20 percent of the deaths ” in the world .
Harris ’ s history-making debut in August as the first Black and South Asian American woman to be selected as a vice presidential running mate was swiftly eclipsed by the broad realization that in fact she didn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially since her record as a tough prosecutor in California ( a firm blue state ) appeared to flatten her appeal at a time of racial unrest and widespread anger at police tactics .
But now , for the first time since Trump was diagnosed last week , his handling of the pandemic will be front and center .
And Harris will have to make the case that the president ’ s own infection is evidence that his response to the epidemic has been irresponsible .
Though Trump returned to the White @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warned that he may not be “ out of the woods yet.
“ Trump hasn ’ t yet cleared the 10-day-or-so window when some COVID-19 patients have worsened in their symptoms .

Since her anointment as Joe Biden’s vice presidential choice in August, Sen. Kamala Harris has barely made headlines. Perhaps that’s no surprise: In an election that has really been mostly about Donald Trump’s fitness for office, the president’s own No. 2, Mike Pence, has been all but invisible as well.
Since her anointment as Joe Biden’s vice presidential choice in August, Sen. Kamala Harris has barely made headlines. Perhaps that’s no surprise: In an election that has really been mostly about Donald Trump’s fitness for office, the president’s own No. 2, Mike Pence, has been all but invisible as well.
But even as Trump triumphantly left Walter Reed National Military Medical Center on Monday, tweeting that despite his COVID-19 diagnosis he felt “better than I did 20 years ago” thanks to his administration’s development of “really great drugs & knowledge,” the health of the 74-year-old president will also be on the ballot Nov. 3, as will Pence’s readiness to take over. And that means Harris is back in the spotlight too as the person who is a heartbeat away from the 77-year-old Biden, though he has tested negative for the virus so far.
Early indications are that COVID-19 will be center stage during Wednesday’s vice presidential debate as it has been all week, especially after Trump announced Tuesday he won’t negotiate further on another economic relief plan until the election is over. Harris will focus much of her attention on Pence’s alleged failures as head of the White House’s coronavirus task force, according to a source close to the campaign. Indeed, the debate already appeared to get underway on Tuesday, as the two camps traded barbs about Harris’s demand for a plexiglass divider between them. After Pence spokesperson Katie Miller told Politico, “If Sen. Harris wants to use a fortress around herself, have at it,” Harris spokesperson Sabrina Singh tweeted back: “Interesting that @VPComDir Katie Miller mocks our wanting a plexiglass barrier on the debate stage, when her own boss is supposedly in charge of the COVID-19 task force and should be advocating for this too.”
“It could be the first VP debate ever to matter,” said Matt Bennett of the Third Way, a Washington-based think tank. “The scrutiny on Pence in particular will be intense. Not just because Trump is sick but because he [Pence] is the ostensible chair of the coronavirus task force and that is the only issue that matters at the moment. Harris is a skilled advocate, and she will be relentless in prosecuting that case.”
“That’s where the election is,” said Elaine Kamarck, the director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institution and a former senior aide to Vice President Al Gore. “That’s their biggest vulnerability. That’s what is going to cause Trump to lose. And while I think Pence is a much more decent human being than Trump, he’s in a classic bind. You have to be completely loyal to the president. He’s going to have to defend the president on COVID, a pretty difficult thing to do.”
Pence’s influence on Trump administration policy had always been unclear. But that ended in February, when the president put him in charge of the U.S. pandemic response and on camera almost every day. Since then he and the administration have been often criticized, including by Pence’s own former homeland security advisor, Olivia Troye, who accused the White House of missing months to slow the spread of the virus even as she said she organized every meeting of the coronavirus task force between February and July. Troye, who now says she’s voting for Biden, focused most of her criticism on Trump himself—but that won’t help Pence much when he’s forced to defend the president’s policies in the debate. (Troye herself told the Washington Post in September that Pence “was in an impossible situation with the president.”)
According to FP Analytics’s COVID-19 Global Response Index, the United States continues to rank among the worst countries (32nd of 36) in terms of per capita deaths and cases, among other factors indicating a laggard response.
Vice presidential debates typically mean next to nothing in presidential elections. Even when some candidates have scored well against their opponents, as Mike Dukakis’s pick, Lloyd Bentsen, did against George H.W. Bush’s choice, Dan Quayle, in 1988—when Bentsen famously humiliated the Republican candidate by saying he was “no Jack Kennedy”—their ticket lost in the end. But Wednesday night’s contest between Harris and Pence will highlight in much greater relief the two candidates’ suitability for the top office as the coronavirus pandemic rages on.
And that has a great deal to do with the ages of both Biden and Trump, some analysts said. “The VPs never play big roles in campaigns. They do what they’re told,” Kamarck said. “Except that these two guys are old and the president is sick. Forget COVID—you just have to look at the guy to know he’s a walking heart attack. That will change the status of the VP candidates somewhat.”
Something similar happened in 2008, she noted, when Republican John McCain’s selection of Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin backfired in large part because of doubts about his age and health. “In 1988, Quayle was really not thought to be up to the job, but Bush was a very healthy 63-year-old, so it didn’t matter that much. Palin also showed herself to be not up to the job, but McCain was 72 and had a history of cancer, so when Palin fell apart, it became a big story. This time there’s a lot riding on Pence.”
Even so, the Trump campaign and the president himself sought to portray his infection as a kind of triumph, suggesting that Trump was now in a better position to handle the pandemic because he had suffered COVID-19 and Biden had not. The president appeared to be using his swift return as evidence that the nation, like him, could quickly overcome the pandemic that has put his presidency in extreme jeopardy, with Biden leading in all major polls. Though the virus has now infected some 7.7 million people in the United States, killed more than 215,000, and few people have enjoyed the immediate and intensive care he received at Walter Reed, Trump said: “Don’t be afraid of Covid. Don’t let it dominate your life.”
On Monday, Trump also tweeted a video in which he said, “I knew there’s danger to it. But I had to do it. I stood out front. I led. Nobody that’s a leader would not do what I did. And I know there’s a risk. … But that’s OK. And now I’m better. And maybe I’m immune, I don’t know.”
Biden, who until then had reined in his criticisms of Trump while the president was in the hospital, responded: “I hope no one walks away with the message thinking that it is not a problem. It’s a serious problem. It’s an international pandemic, and we have … 20 percent of the deaths” in the world.
Harris’s history-making debut in August as the first Black and South Asian American woman to be selected as a vice presidential running mate was swiftly eclipsed by the broad realization that in fact she didn’t appear to add much to the ticket, especially since her record as a tough prosecutor in California (a firm blue state) appeared to flatten her appeal at a time of racial unrest and widespread anger at police tactics.
But now, for the first time since Trump was diagnosed last week, his handling of the pandemic will be front and center. And Harris will have to make the case that the president’s own infection is evidence that his response to the epidemic has been irresponsible.
Though Trump returned to the White House on Monday, his own doctor warned that he may not be “out of the woods yet.“ Trump hasn’t yet cleared the 10-day-or-so window when some COVID-19 patients have worsened in their symptoms.