foreignpolicy--2020-06-17--As the World Marches for American Victims, Police Brutality in Africa Goes Unnoticed

As the World Marches for American Victims , Police Brutality in Africa Goes Unnoticed In Nkpor , a bustling commercial town in Anambra , in southeast Nigeria , the body of Chukwuebuka lay on the street under the scorching sun .
Chukwuebuka , 20 , was playing football in the street with his friends on April 15 when he was shot dead by the police who were enforcing lockdown rules .
A police truck had pulled over to disperse them , but a trigger-happy officer shot the young man when he made his way to run .
Justifying the killing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acted in self-defense after being provoked and attacked by the young men when they tried to disperse them .
But Chukwuebuka ’ s friends who witnessed the shooting say there was no provocation .
The last few weeks has seen protests across Africa , including in Nigeria , in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests taking place in the United States that later snowballed across major cities around the world—London , Paris , Sydney , Berlin , Toronto .
The African protests have been matched with powerful government statements .
The killing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a white Minneapolis police officer , Derek Chauvin , knelt on his neck for eight minutes and 46 seconds , has stirred rightful outrage and cries for justice .
But no one in other countries is seeking justice for Chukwuebuka and others killed through police brutality during the lockdown in Nigeria .
Friends of Chukwuebuka and a group of youth in the area defied the lockdown restrictions to protest his killing .
But it lasted just for a day and produced only a brief flicker .
Life returned to normal , just as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ man was killed by the police enforcing lockdown rules .
But for Chukwuebuka , there was no national outrage or calls for independent inquiry and reforms , no mass protests or global solidarity worldwide .
As a Nigerian , it shocked me that the death of Floyd seems to mean more the world than Chukwuebuka ’ s meant in his own country .
This is how much a black life matters in Nigeria .
Chukwuebuka is hardly alone .
During the first two weeks after lockdown began on March 30 , 18 people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ according to the National Human Rights Commission .
The latest victim , not counted in that number , was Tina Ezekwe , 17 , who was killed in May .
Amnesty International has reacted by calling on the government to uphold human rights during the efforts to curb COVID-19 .
This is not a new phenomenon .
Nigerian police has a notorious record of human-rights abuses , brutality , and even extrajudicial killings for the slightest of offenses , such as refusing to give bribes , holding an expensive phone , or driving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brutality are so common across Africa that they ’ re not meaningfully tracked .
Whenever anyone is killed by the police in Nigeria , fancy hashtag activism for justice trends for some days .
A moment later , everything returns to normal and life continues .
There are no street protests demanding justice or the prosecution of the killers .
The police and other security actors such as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad unit carry on as before .
Hashtag activism is no answer .
In the wake of the killing of Floyd , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that provides engagement and protects the welfare of Nigerians abroad , officially held a solidarity rally and memorial service to protest the killing and called for justice .
“ This gathering is against violence , brutality and racial discrimination , ” Abike Dabiri-Erewa , the head of the commission , said during the solidarity rally .
“ We call for respect and dignity for all races .
Never again should we be made to witness what we saw on the streets of Minneapolis , the slow murder of an individual by a uniformed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no memorial service for the hundreds of Nigerians killed through police brutality over the last few years .
South Africa ’ s international relations minister , Naledi Pandor , said the killing of Floyd presents an “ opportunity to address fundamental issues of human rights , such as freedom dignity and equality.
” The ruling African National Congress launched an anti-racism campaign which it said was created to support the Black Lives Matter movement .
But this move was immediately criticized , following the death of Collins Khosa , a 40-year-old resident of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by soldiers after an altercation when he was caught drinking at a time when the lockdown banned alcohol sales .
An inquiry constituted by the South African Defence Force recently absolved the soldiers of any wrongdoing .
At least 10 people have been killed by security personnel enforcing the lockdown in the country , a situation even President Cyril Ramaphosa , also the chairman of the African Union , described as regrettable during the launch of the anti-racism campaign .
South Africa has a harsh record of police brutality—and sometimes public brutality , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against fellow Africans from countries such as Nigeria , Zimbabwe , and Lesotho have swept across the country , leaving deaths and ruin in their wake .
Some have tried to call attention to the issue .
The Economic Freedom Fighters , an opposition political party , held a protest in front of the United States embassy in Pretoria and said Africans must learn to respect the lives of their neighbors first .
Black Lives Matter solidarity protests have also held in other African cities such as Nairobi , Kampala , and Dakar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brutality both in the United States and in African countries such as Kenya , where at least 15 people have been killed by police since the lockdown began .
“ We must start caring about the lives of black people here in Africa first , ” said Julius Malema , the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters .
“ When you kill Zimbabweans , Nigerians , and Mozambicans here in South Africa , you ’ re teaching the world that it is OK to kill black people.
” At the memorial service and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a one-minute silence was observed for Floyd amid chats of “ Justice for Floyd ” and “ Black Lives Matter.
” But Chukwuebuka and others killed by the Nigerian police got not even a split second of silence from the government .
How can we express outrage over the death of Floyd but keep silent on the killing of our own people ?
In the United States , their lives would have mattered to the world—but not in Nigeria .

In Nkpor, a bustling commercial town in Anambra, in southeast Nigeria, the body of Chukwuebuka lay on the street under the scorching sun. Chukwuebuka, 20, was playing football in the street with his friends on April 15 when he was shot dead by the police who were enforcing lockdown rules. A police truck had pulled over to disperse them, but a trigger-happy officer shot the young man when he made his way to run.
In Nkpor, a bustling commercial town in Anambra, in southeast Nigeria, the body of Chukwuebuka lay on the street under the scorching sun. Chukwuebuka, 20, was playing football in the street with his friends on April 15 when he was shot dead by the police who were enforcing lockdown rules. A police truck had pulled over to disperse them, but a trigger-happy officer shot the young man when he made his way to run.
Justifying the killing, the police said the patrol team acted in self-defense after being provoked and attacked by the young men when they tried to disperse them. But Chukwuebuka’s friends who witnessed the shooting say there was no provocation.
The last few weeks has seen protests across Africa, including in Nigeria, in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests taking place in the United States that later snowballed across major cities around the world—London, Paris, Sydney, Berlin, Toronto. The African protests have been matched with powerful government statements. The killing of George Floyd, who died when a white Minneapolis police officer, Derek Chauvin, knelt on his neck for eight minutes and 46 seconds, has stirred rightful outrage and cries for justice. But no one in other countries is seeking justice for Chukwuebuka and others killed through police brutality during the lockdown in Nigeria.
Friends of Chukwuebuka and a group of youth in the area defied the lockdown restrictions to protest his killing. But it lasted just for a day and produced only a brief flicker. Life returned to normal, just as it had two weeks earlier when another man was killed by the police enforcing lockdown rules.
But for Chukwuebuka, there was no national outrage or calls for independent inquiry and reforms, no mass protests or global solidarity worldwide. As a Nigerian, it shocked me that the death of Floyd seems to mean more the world than Chukwuebuka’s meant in his own country. This is how much a black life matters in Nigeria.
Chukwuebuka is hardly alone. During the first two weeks after lockdown began on March 30, 18 people were killed extrajudicially by the police, according to the National Human Rights Commission. The latest victim, not counted in that number, was Tina Ezekwe, 17, who was killed in May. Amnesty International has reacted by calling on the government to uphold human rights during the efforts to curb COVID-19.
This is not a new phenomenon. Nigerian police have a notorious record of human rights abuses, brutality, and even extrajudicial killings for the slightest of offenses, such as refusing to give bribes, holding an expensive phone, or driving a fancy car. Reports of police brutality are so common across Africa that they’re not meaningfully tracked.
Whenever anyone is killed by the police in Nigeria, fancy hashtag activism for justice trends for some days. A moment later, everything returns to normal, and life continues. There are no street protests demanding justice or the prosecution of the killers. The police and other security actors such as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad unit carry on as before. Hashtag activism is no answer.
In the wake of the killing of Floyd, the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission—a government agency that provides engagement and protects the welfare of Nigerians abroad, officially held a solidarity rally and memorial service to protest the killing and called for justice.
“This gathering is against violence, brutality and racial discrimination,” Abike Dabiri-Erewa, the head of the commission, said during the solidarity rally. “We call for respect and dignity for all races. Never again should we be made to witness what we saw on the streets of Minneapolis, the slow murder of an individual by a uniformed police officer.”
But there has been no memorial service for the hundreds of Nigerians killed through police brutality over the last few years.
The discrepancy isn’t limited to Nigeria.
South Africa’s international relations minister, Naledi Pandor, said the killing of Floyd presents an “opportunity to address fundamental issues of human rights, such as freedom dignity and equality.” The ruling African National Congress launched an anti-racism campaign which it said was created to support the Black Lives Matter movement.
But this move was immediately criticized, following the death of Collins Khosa, a 40-year-old resident of Alexandra township who was killed in April by soldiers after an altercation when he was caught drinking at a time when the lockdown banned alcohol sales. An inquiry constituted by the South African Defence Force recently absolved the soldiers of any wrongdoing.
At least 10 people have been killed by security personnel enforcing the lockdown in the country, a situation even President Cyril Ramaphosa, also the chairman of the African Union, described as regrettable during the launch of the anti-racism campaign.
South Africa has a harsh record of police brutality—and sometimes public brutality, too. Past waves of xenophobic attacks against fellow Africans from countries such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho have swept across the country, leaving deaths and ruin in their wake.
Some have tried to call attention to the issue. The Economic Freedom Fighters, an opposition political party, held a protest in front of the United States embassy in Pretoria and said Africans must learn to respect the lives of their neighbors first. Black Lives Matter solidarity protests have also held in other African cities such as Nairobi, Kampala, and Dakar. Some have tried to highlight police brutality both in the United States and in African countries such as Kenya, where at least 15 people have been killed by police since the lockdown began.
“We must start caring about the lives of black people here in Africa first,” said Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters. “When you kill Zimbabweans, Nigerians, and Mozambicans here in South Africa, you’re teaching the world that it is OK to kill black people.”
At the memorial service and solidarity protest by the Nigerian government, a one-minute silence was observed for Floyd amid chats of “Justice for Floyd” and “Black Lives Matter.” But Chukwuebuka and others killed by the Nigerian police got not even a split second of silence from the government.
How can we express outrage over the death of Floyd but keep silent on the killing of our own people? In the United States, their lives would have mattered to the world—but not in Nigeria.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-17--It’s Not Techno-Angst That’s Driving East Asia to Abandon Nuclear Power

Western discussions about nuclear energy in East Asia usually start with the Fukushima disaster and end with efforts to address climate change .
But anti-nuclear sentiment in Asia looks nothing like that in the West , where it was birthed during the Jane Fonda era and is still based on long-debunked claims about the intrinsic dangers of accidents and nuclear waste .
The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism are largely foreign to Asian discussions of nuclear energy , climate change , and similar environmental concerns.The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear energy and climate change .
After all , following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that led to a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant , it was Germany—not Japan—that immediately decided to permanently phase out nuclear power , even if it meant that its carbon emissions would rise .
Japan , South Korea , and Taiwan may nonetheless take a decisive turn against nuclear power .
The reasons have little to do with public fears of nuclear energy but are tied to long-standing demands for political and economic reform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ industry in each of these three countries is tied to a highly contested political and economic model that the reformers are pressing to change .
In April , the anti-nuclear Democratic Party of Korea swept to the most dominating electoral victory in South Korean history .
In January , Taiwan ’ s reform-minded Democratic Progressive Party , which has proposed phasing out the country ’ s nuclear power stations , also won by a landslide .
Meanwhile , both Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party ( LDP ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-nuclear party , face worsening poll numbers as a major election approaches in 2021 .
The proximate causes of these political shifts have little to do with nuclear or environmental policies .
South Korean President Moon Jae-in ’ s smashing victory followed his exemplary management of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic .
In Taiwan , it was China ’ s brutal crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong that heavily tipped the scales in favor of the Democratic Progressive Party , which has taken a far more defiant position on relations with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kuomintang .
Japan ’ s LDP is languishing in the polls because of its failure to revitalize the country ’ s long-stagnant economy , a task made all the more challenging by the pandemic .
Dig a little deeper , however , and the same underlying political dynamics have undermined support for nuclear energy .
In all three nations , the nuclear power sector has become closely identified with long-entrenched political parties and the power of state bureaucracies and industry groups over economic life .
Fukushima undoubtedly amplified anti-nuclear sentiment in the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been a proxy for political and economic reform for decades .
The nuclear industries of Taiwan , South Korea , and Japan are the product of authoritarian or de facto one-party states.In all three nations , state-led nuclear energy development took place during prolonged periods of political dominance by conservative parties with strong ties to industry and business interests .
In the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s and the Korean War in the 1950s , respectively , South Korea and Taiwan were led by authoritarian governments that focused on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
South Korea only held its first free elections in 1988 ; Taiwan followed in 1992 .
While Japan has conducted democratic elections since the 1950s , the LPD has maintained nearly continuous control .
The nuclear industries of Taiwan , South Korea , and Japan are thus the product of authoritarian or de facto one-party states , where the ruling party passed control over the energy sector ( and many other parts of the economy ) to state-owned corporations , government-issued monopolies , or quasi-cartels of favored companies .
State-owned Taiwan Power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until the electricity market became more liberalized after 1995 .
In South Korea , the government-operated Korea Electric Power Corporation still holds a monopoly on power generation and grid infrastructure ; one of its subsidiaries , Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power , operates all nuclear reactors .
In Japan , the power sector consists of 10 regional monopolies that operate in close coordination with the powerful Ministry of Economy , Trade , and Industry .
And just as the nuclear establishment was part and parcel of postwar economic planning by what were effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has become a cause for those who demand political and economic reform .
Evolving nuclear policies in East Asia reflect a changing balance of power that is likely to persist .
In Taiwan , the conservative Kuomintang ’ s aging demographic base and support for closer ties with mainland China now appears out of touch with a younger electorate increasingly distrustful of China and hostile to reunification .
In South Korea , demographic shifts and evolving public opinion have favored reforms on issues ranging from diplomacy with North Korea to checks on powerful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan , successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have boosted the credibility of reformist leaders .
Even as the nuclear issue is taken up by reform parties , public support for nuclear energy remains strong in South Korea and Taiwan , and has been growing again in Japan.The political situation in Japan , by contrast , is more uncertain .
With the pandemic set to erase the LDP ’ s recent successes in controlling the national debt and boost the economy , the party also faces a leadership transition when Abe steps down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as he must according to LDP rules .
But anti-nuclear opposition parties remain weak and have almost no record of winning national elections , let alone governing—an enormous disadvantage at a moment when the economy is struggling , China has reemerged as the region ’ s dominant power , and the public health crisis is far from over .
Even as the nuclear issue is taken up by reform parties , public support for nuclear energy remains strong in South Korea and Taiwan , and has been growing again in Japan .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ supported a 2018 referendum to retain the nation ’ s nuclear power stations .
In South Korea , support for nuclear energy dipped in the wake of Fukushima but has since rebounded to around 70 percent .
Opinion in Japan remains divided , but support has slowly rebounded since the Fukushima accident .
Given the historical status of nuclear power as the dominant source of domestic clean energy in all three countries and their heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels , retiring nuclear power plants will likely result in substantially higher carbon emissions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scale up renewable energy have struggled .
In Japan , renewable energy has run into various obstacles , from geography to bureaucratic barriers and an outdated electrical grid .
Japanese emissions increased sharply as fossil fuels replaced nuclear energy after the latter was shut down following Fukushima , and they have remained elevated since then .
In 2016 , Taiwan set a bold goal of 20 percent renewable electricity by 2025 , but it has reached less than half of the intermediate target for 2020 , far less than would be required just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently generated by the nation ’ s nuclear plants , let alone decarbonize the power sector any further .
As for South Korea , nuclear plants provide a quarter of domestic power , while wind and solar generate just 1.9 percent .
While the government has set lofty goals for power generated from renewable sources , there are as of yet no indications that the targets will be reached .
Nuclear power will therefore determine the region ’ s climate footprint for the foreseeable future , regardless of targets and pledges on renewable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The combined carbon dioxide emissions of Japan , South Korea , and Taiwan lie between those of India and Russia , the world ’ s third- and fourth-largest carbon emitters respectively .
And it ’ s not just East Asia that will be affected if these countries turn against nuclear power .
Taiwan , South Korea , and Japan are dominant global players in advanced manufacturing , with South Korea in particular having a long history of exporting its nuclear reactor designs abroad .
The loss of these critical supply chains would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far beyond the region .
Nuclear power will determine the region ’ s climate footprint for the foreseeable future , regardless of targets and pledges on renewable energy .
The fact that political opposition to nuclear energy in East Asia has to do with the history and power of the industry—and not any great popular opposition to nuclear power—opens up an opportunity for the sector to develop and evolve using different technologies , business models , and market structures .
Advanced modular reactor designs , for example , have inherent safety features that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while their smaller scale and more flexible deployment would be a good fit for deregulated electricity markets as the region transitions away from state-run models and powerful monopolies .
As always , real transparency and dialogue , robust oversight frameworks , and an emphasis on energy security and economic benefits will also prove key to wider acceptance of nuclear power .
The COVID-19 pandemic has created dramatic new instability in an energy sector that was already in a process of rapid and acute change .
Even before the crisis , South Korea , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ verge of transforming their energy markets , with the future status of nuclear power a central question .
As the legacy of one-party rule and the planned economy of the postwar era gives way to social , political , and economic liberalization , the future of nuclear energy and climate mitigation in East Asia hangs very much in the balance .

Western discussions about nuclear energy in East Asia usually start with the Fukushima disaster and end with efforts to address climate change. But anti-nuclear sentiment in Asia looks nothing like that in the West, where it was birthed during the Jane Fonda era and is still based on long-debunked claims about the intrinsic dangers of accidents and nuclear waste. The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism are largely foreign to Asian discussions of nuclear energy, climate change, and similar environmental concerns.The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism are largely foreign to Asian discussions of nuclear energy and climate change. After all, following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that led to a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, it was Germany—not Japan—that immediately decided to permanently phase out nuclear power, even if it meant that its carbon emissions would rise.
Western discussions about nuclear energy in East Asia usually start with the Fukushima disaster and end with efforts to address climate change. But anti-nuclear sentiment in Asia looks nothing like that in the West, where it was birthed during the Jane Fonda era and is still based on long-debunked claims about the intrinsic dangers of accidents and nuclear waste. The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism are largely foreign to Asian discussions of nuclear energy, climate change, and similar environmental concerns.The techno-angst and apocalyptic fears that have always animated Western environmentalism are largely foreign to Asian discussions of nuclear energy and climate change. After all, following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that led to a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, it was Germany—not Japan—that immediately decided to permanently phase out nuclear power, even if it meant that its carbon emissions would rise.
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan may nonetheless take a decisive turn against nuclear power. The reasons have little to do with public fears of nuclear energy but are tied to long-standing demands for political and economic reform. That’s because the nuclear industry in each of these three countries is tied to a highly contested political and economic model that the reformers are pressing to change.
In April, the anti-nuclear Democratic Party of Korea swept to the most dominating electoral victory in South Korean history. In January, Taiwan’s reform-minded Democratic Progressive Party, which has proposed phasing out the country’s nuclear power stations, also won by a landslide. Meanwhile, both Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the country’s last major pro-nuclear party, face worsening poll numbers as a major election approaches in 2021.
The proximate causes of these political shifts have little to do with nuclear or environmental policies. South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s smashing victory followed his exemplary management of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Taiwan, it was China’s brutal crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong that heavily tipped the scales in favor of the Democratic Progressive Party, which has taken a far more defiant position on relations with China than its main rival, the Kuomintang. Japan’s LDP is languishing in the polls because of its failure to revitalize the country’s long-stagnant economy, a task made all the more challenging by the pandemic.
Dig a little deeper, however, and the same underlying political dynamics have undermined support for nuclear energy. In all three nations, the nuclear power sector has become closely identified with long-entrenched political parties and the power of state bureaucracies and industry groups over economic life. Fukushima undoubtedly amplified anti-nuclear sentiment in the region, but opposition to nuclear power has been a proxy for political and economic reform for decades.
The nuclear industries of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are the product of authoritarian or de facto one-party states.In all three nations, state-led nuclear energy development took place during prolonged periods of political dominance by conservative parties with strong ties to industry and business interests. In the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s and the Korean War in the 1950s, respectively, South Korea and Taiwan were led by authoritarian governments that focused on economic development while severely restricting political freedoms. South Korea only held its first free elections in 1988; Taiwan followed in 1992. While Japan has conducted democratic elections since the 1950s, the LPD has maintained nearly continuous control.
The nuclear industries of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are thus the product of authoritarian or de facto one-party states, where the ruling party passed control over the energy sector (and many other parts of the economy) to state-owned corporations, government-issued monopolies, or quasi-cartels of favored companies. State-owned Taiwan Power Company controlled Taiwan’s power sector until the electricity market became more liberalized after 1995. In South Korea, the government-operated Korea Electric Power Corporation still holds a monopoly on power generation and grid infrastructure; one of its subsidiaries, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power, operates all nuclear reactors. In Japan, the power sector consists of 10 regional monopolies that operate in close coordination with the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.
And just as the nuclear establishment was part and parcel of postwar economic planning by what were effectively one-party states, opposition to that establishment has become a cause for those who demand political and economic reform.
Evolving nuclear policies in East Asia reflect a changing balance of power that is likely to persist. In Taiwan, the conservative Kuomintang’s aging demographic base and support for closer ties with mainland China now appears out of touch with a younger electorate increasingly distrustful of China and hostile to reunification. In South Korea, demographic shifts and evolving public opinion have favored reforms on issues ranging from diplomacy with North Korea to checks on powerful corporations. In both South Korea and Taiwan, successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have boosted the credibility of reformist leaders.
Even as the nuclear issue is taken up by reform parties, public support for nuclear energy remains strong in South Korea and Taiwan, and has been growing again in Japan.The political situation in Japan, by contrast, is more uncertain. With the pandemic set to erase the LDP’s recent successes in controlling the national debt and boost the economy, the party also faces a leadership transition when Abe steps down after his current term as prime minster, as he must according to LDP rules. But anti-nuclear opposition parties remain weak and have almost no record of winning national elections, let alone governing—an enormous disadvantage at a moment when the economy is struggling, China has reemerged as the region’s dominant power, and the public health crisis is far from over.
Even as the nuclear issue is taken up by reform parties, public support for nuclear energy remains strong in South Korea and Taiwan, and has been growing again in Japan. In Taiwan, 59 percent of voters supported a 2018 referendum to retain the nation’s nuclear power stations. In South Korea, support for nuclear energy dipped in the wake of Fukushima but has since rebounded to around 70 percent. Opinion in Japan remains divided, but support has slowly rebounded since the Fukushima accident.
Given the historical status of nuclear power as the dominant source of domestic clean energy in all three countries and their heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, retiring nuclear power plants will likely result in substantially higher carbon emissions, especially as regional efforts to meaningfully scale up renewable energy have struggled. In Japan, renewable energy has run into various obstacles, from geography to bureaucratic barriers and an outdated electrical grid. Japanese emissions increased sharply as fossil fuels replaced nuclear energy after the latter was shut down following Fukushima, and they have remained elevated since then. In 2016, Taiwan set a bold goal of 20 percent renewable electricity by 2025, but it has reached less than half of the intermediate target for 2020, far less than would be required just to replace the 16 percent of electricity currently generated by the nation’s nuclear plants, let alone decarbonize the power sector any further.
As for South Korea, nuclear plants provide a quarter of domestic power, while wind and solar generate just 1.9 percent. While the government has set lofty goals for power generated from renewable sources, there are as of yet no indications that the targets will be reached.
Nuclear power will therefore determine the region’s climate footprint for the foreseeable future, regardless of targets and pledges on renewable energy. That footprint is significant: The combined carbon dioxide emissions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan lie between those of India and Russia, the world’s third- and fourth-largest carbon emitters respectively.
And it’s not just East Asia that will be affected if these countries turn against nuclear power. Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are dominant global players in advanced manufacturing, with South Korea in particular having a long history of exporting its nuclear reactor designs abroad. The loss of these critical supply chains would be a setback for nuclear energy and decarbonization far beyond the region.
Nuclear power will determine the region’s climate footprint for the foreseeable future, regardless of targets and pledges on renewable energy.
The fact that political opposition to nuclear energy in East Asia has to do with the history and power of the industry—and not any great popular opposition to nuclear power—opens up an opportunity for the sector to develop and evolve using different technologies, business models, and market structures. Advanced modular reactor designs, for example, have inherent safety features that could address concerns over possible accidents, while their smaller scale and more flexible deployment would be a good fit for deregulated electricity markets as the region transitions away from state-run models and powerful monopolies. As always, real transparency and dialogue, robust oversight frameworks, and an emphasis on energy security and economic benefits will also prove key to wider acceptance of nuclear power.
The COVID-19 pandemic has created dramatic new instability in an energy sector that was already in a process of rapid and acute change. Even before the crisis, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan were on the verge of transforming their energy markets, with the future status of nuclear power a central question. As the legacy of one-party rule and the planned economy of the postwar era gives way to social, political, and economic liberalization, the future of nuclear energy and climate mitigation in East Asia hangs very much in the balance.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--New Bolton Book Suggests U.S.-China Feud Is Trumped Up

New Bolton Book Suggests U.S.-China Feud Is Trumped Up Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : John Bolton ’ s book shines new light on U.S.-China relations , the United Nations elects new security council members , and the Saudi-led coalition denies killing civilians in Yemen .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The authenticity of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s ongoing rhetorical feud with China has been thrown into question by revelations in a forthcoming book by former national security advisor John Bolton , which alleges that Trump explicitly asked Chinese premier Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For months the Trump administration has been pinning the blame on China for the coronavirus pandemic .
The campaign has included referring to the coronavirus as the “ Wuhan virus ” and a “ Chinese virus ” as well as alleging that China fabricated the virus in a research lab , despite statements to the contrary by the U.S. intelligence community .
That combative tone is in sharp contrast to the picture Bolton paints of a Trump eager to seek Xi ’ s assistance with his 2020 reelection campaign by persuading China to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to Bolton , Trump “ stressed the importance of farmers and increased Chinese purchases of soybeans and wheat in the electoral outcome.
” Bolton also says Trump reversed penalties imposed on the Chinese ZTE corporation in 2018 in order to ingratiate himself with Xi .
At the time , Trump tweeted that the U-turn was due to “ too many jobs in China ” being lost .
Trump ’ s two-faced Uighur policy .
Bolton further alleges that Trump said Xi should “ go ahead ” with concentration camps for over one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Xinjiang .
That didn ’ t stop Trump signing legislation on Wednesday that calls for sanctions on those involved in the disappearance and detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang .
However , the president later issued a statement saying one part of the bill—asking the president to notify Congress before lifting sanctions on individuals—would be considered advisory rather than mandatory as it may hamper his efforts at diplomacy .
Will it change anything ?
As Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report , the book—like the president ’ s impeachment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump .
However , “ the revelations could instead give a fresh batch of political ammunition to Trump ’ s 2020 Democratic rival , whose surrogates have castigated the president as reckless and dangerous for American democracy , ” they write .
Fauci says America not in coronavirus “ second wave.
” Anthony Fauci , the senior infectious disease expert on the White House coronavirus task force poured cold water on talk of a second wave of infections in the United States , as cases rise nationwide .
“ We ’ re still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in an interview in the Wall Street Journal .
The statistics are on Fauci ’ s side , whereas other wealthy countries have managed to bend their coronavirus curves , the U.S. curve now resembles more of a plateau : the three-day moving average of daily new cases on June 1 stood at 22,887 ; that same measure on Tuesday was 22,009 .
U.N. says yes to Bono , no to Celine Dion .
India , Ireland , Mexico and Norway were elected to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ One seat is still unfilled after U.N. members voted and will go to either Kenya or Djibouti .
The two-year term for the new members will begin on January 1 , 2021 .
Canada missed out on a seat on the council despite wooing U.N. ambassadors with a Celine Dion concert .
The Irish delegation was more successful—having curried favor by treating ambassadors to a U2 concert early in campaigning .
Coalition denies killing civilians in Yemen .
The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has denied killing civilians in an airstrike in the Houthi-controlled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said the Monday strike killed 13 civilians , including four children .
Lise Grande , the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Yemen , seemed to corroborate the Houthi account , citing initial reports from the field .
Burundi fast-tracks inauguration .
Following a ruling by Burundi ’ s constitutional court , the winner of May ’ s presidential election , Evariste Ndayishimiye , will be sworn in today—two months ahead of schedule .
The ruling was made after the previous president , Pierre Nkurunziza , died suddenly on June 8 .
In normal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have assumed the office , but the court ’ s ruling is intended to smooth the transfer of power .
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 15 , Désiré Nimubona outlined the challenges ahead for Ndayishimiye as he takes office .
Your LinkedIn messages .
Hackers posing as recruiters for U.S. defense contractors used bogus job offers on LinkedIn to access the networks of at least two defense and aerospace firms in Central Europe according to the cybersecurity firm ESET .
Jean-Ian Boutin , ESET ’ s head of threat research said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ e-mail to engineer a breach , but not the social networking site .
“ This is the first case I am aware of where LinkedIn was used to deliver the malware itself , ” he said .
Venezuela “ restructuring ” opposition .
The Venezuelan Supreme Court has appointed new leaders to two of Venezuela ’ s opposition political parties in a process it called a “ necessary restructuring , ” ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections .
Juan Guaidó ’ s party was unaffected by the changes .
The appointees have ties to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European Union to warn that the move reduces “ the democratic space in the country.
” The Supreme Court made further changes to Venezuela ’ s electoral processes last week , when they appointed a new electoral commission—a process usually undertaken by the opposition-led National Assembly .
Manipulating mosquitoes .
The Florida department of agriculture has approved a plan to release millions of genetically-modified mosquitoes into the wild in an attempt to stem the proliferation of the insect in the famously warm and humid state .
Only male non-biting mosquitoes will be released @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is hoped that a special protein the insects carry will lessen the chances of survival for any female ( and biting ) offspring .
Jaydee Hanson , policy director for the International Center for Technology Assessment and Center for Food Safety called the operation a “ Jurassic Park experiment ” and criticized the lack of an assessment into potential environmental damage .
“ What could possibly go wrong ?
We don ’ t know , because they unlawfully refused to seriously analyze environmental risks.
” Big Brother comes to Russia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facial recognition program called “ Orwell ” are to be installed in hundreds of Russian schools , according to a report in the Russian newspaper Vedomosti .
The company installing the systems is a subsidiary of state defense company Rostec and will track students entering and exiting schoolgrounds , as well as detect strangers .
A company representative admitted that a trial surveillance system was being used in Russian schools , but denied the use of facial recognition programs .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: John Bolton's book shines new light on U.S.-China relations, the United Nation s elects new security council members, and the Saudi-led coalition denies killing civilians in Yemen .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: John Bolton’s book shines new light on U.S.-China relations, the United Nations elects new security council members, and the Saudi-led coalition denies killing civilians in Yemen.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Former Trump Advisor Provides New Look At Trump-Xi Relationship
The authenticity of U.S. President Donald Trump’s ongoing rhetorical feud with China has been thrown into question by revelations in a forthcoming book by former national security advisor John Bolton, which alleges that Trump explicitly asked Chinese premier Xi Jinping to help ensure his reelection.
For months the Trump administration has been pinning the blame on China for the coronavirus pandemic. The campaign has included referring to the coronavirus as the “Wuhan virus” and a “Chinese virus” as well as alleging that China fabricated the virus in a research lab, despite statements to the contrary by the U.S. intelligence community.
That combative tone is in sharp contrast to the picture Bolton paints of a Trump eager to seek Xi’s assistance with his 2020 reelection campaign by persuading China to spend more on U.S. agricultural products. According to Bolton, Trump “stressed the importance of farmers and increased Chinese purchases of soybeans and wheat in the electoral outcome.”
Bolton also says Trump reversed penalties imposed on the Chinese ZTE corporation in 2018 in order to ingratiate himself with Xi. At the time, Trump tweeted that the U-turn was due to “too many jobs in China” being lost.
Trump’s two-faced Uighur policy. Bolton further alleges that Trump said Xi should “go ahead” with concentration camps for over one million ethnic Uighurs in the eastern province of Xinjiang. That didn’t stop Trump signing legislation on Wednesday that calls for sanctions on those involved in the disappearance and detention of Uighurs in Xinjiang. However, the president later issued a statement saying one part of the bill—asking the president to notify Congress before lifting sanctions on individuals—would be considered advisory rather than mandatory as it may hamper his efforts at diplomacy.
Will it change anything? As Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report, the book—like the president’s impeachment and special counsel inquiry—are unlikely to derail Trump. However, “the revelations could instead give a fresh batch of political ammunition to Trump’s 2020 Democratic rival, whose surrogates have castigated the president as reckless and dangerous for American democracy,” they write.
What We’re Following Today
Fauci says America not in coronavirus “second wave.” Anthony Fauci, the senior infectious disease expert on the White House coronavirus task force poured cold water on talk of a second wave of infections in the United States, as cases rise nationwide. “We’re still in a first wave,” Fauci said in an interview in the Wall Street Journal. The statistics are on Fauci’s side, whereas other wealthy countries have managed to bend their coronavirus curves, the U.S. curve now resembles more of a plateau: the three-day moving average of daily new cases on June 1 stood at 22,887; that same measure on Tuesday was 22,009.
U.N. says yes to Bono, no to Celine Dion. India, Ireland, Mexico and Norway were elected to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday after stiff campaigning at the international body. One seat is still unfilled after U.N. members voted and will go to either Kenya or Djibouti. The two-year term for the new members will begin on January 1, 2021. Canada missed out on a seat on the council despite wooing U.N. ambassadors with a Celine Dion concert. The Irish delegation was more successful—having curried favor by treating ambassadors to a U2 concert early in campaigning.
Coalition denies killing civilians in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has denied killing civilians in an airstrike in the Houthi-controlled Saada province. The Houthi health minister said the Monday strike killed 13 civilians, including four children. Lise Grande, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, seemed to corroborate the Houthi account, citing initial reports from the field.
Burundi fast-tracks inauguration. Following a ruling by Burundi’s constitutional court, the winner of May’s presidential election, Evariste Ndayishimiye, will be sworn in today—two months ahead of schedule. The ruling was made after the previous president, Pierre Nkurunziza, died suddenly on June 8. In normal circumstances the president of the national assembly would have assumed the office, but the court’s ruling is intended to smooth the transfer of power.
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 15, Désiré Nimubona outlined the challenges ahead for Ndayishimiye as he takes office.
Keep an Eye On
Your LinkedIn messages. Hackers posing as recruiters for U.S. defense contractors used bogus job offers on LinkedIn to access the networks of at least two defense and aerospace firms in Central Europe according to the cybersecurity firm ESET. Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET’s head of threat research said it was common for hackers to use e-mail to engineer a breach, but not the social networking site. “This is the first case I am aware of where LinkedIn was used to deliver the malware itself,” he said.
Venezuela “restructuring” opposition. The Venezuelan Supreme Court has appointed new leaders to two of Venezuela’s opposition political parties in a process it called a “necessary restructuring,” ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections. Juan Guaidó’s party was unaffected by the changes. The appointees have ties to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, prompting the European Union to warn that the move reduces “the democratic space in the country.” The Supreme Court made further changes to Venezuela’s electoral processes last week, when they appointed a new electoral commission—a process usually undertaken by the opposition-led National Assembly.
Odds and Ends
Manipulating mosquitoes. The Florida department of agriculture has approved a plan to release millions of genetically-modified mosquitoes into the wild in an attempt to stem the proliferation of the insect in the famously warm and humid state. Only male non-biting mosquitoes will be released as part of the scheme, and it is hoped that a special protein the insects carry will lessen the chances of survival for any female (and biting) offspring. Jaydee Hanson, policy director for the International Center for Technology Assessment and Center for Food Safety called the operation a “Jurassic Park experiment” and criticized the lack of an assessment into potential environmental damage. “What could possibly go wrong? We don’t know, because they unlawfully refused to seriously analyze environmental risks.”
Big Brother comes to Russia’s schools. Surveillance cameras linked to a facial recognition program called “Orwell” are to be installed in hundreds of Russian schools, according to a report in the Russian newspaper Vedomosti. The company installing the systems is a subsidiary of state defense company Rostec and will track students entering and exiting schoolgrounds, as well as detect strangers. A company representative admitted that a trial surveillance system was being used in Russian schools, but denied the use of facial recognition programs.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--The Bloody China-India Border Fight Is a Lot Like the Last One

The Bloody China-India Border Fight Is a Lot Like the Last One Chinese and Indian troops killing each other in the thin air of the Himalayas .
America torn by violent confrontations between police and protesters .
Rumors of leadership turmoil in Beijing .
It ’ s not 2020 .
It ’ s 1967 .
The last time there was an incident as deadly as Monday ’ s along the China-India border , Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi were both teenagers .
In 1967 , in the Himalayas far to the southeast of the location @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encounters between the world ’ s two most populous countries left dozens of Indians and Chinese dead .
Coming only five years after their 1962 war , and with China ’ s Cultural Revolution at its most chaotic point , many feared the conflict could escalate regionally .
After its loss to China in 1962 , India initiated an extensive military expansion .
The total size of the Indian military doubled .
Intelligence agencies took note .
The CIA argued in August 1967 that the Indian military could be expected to repulse a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ At the time , the area in which the skirmishes took place , Sikkim , was a semi-independent kingdom and protectorate of India .
The Chinese Communist Party government encouraged Sikkim ’ s population to break from India decisively and declare independence .
( Eventually , in 1975 , it did the opposite and voted in a referendum to join India as a state . )
As is the case this year , the conflict in 1967 began with a gradual increase in nonmilitary activities .
This year , an Indian road project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crews .
In 1967 , a series of minor building projects near the mountain pass at Nathu La ( also known as Naku La ) , such as new loudspeakers , a trench , and a small wire fence , led to minor incidents of pushing , shoving , and punching between soldiers on either side of the line that serves as the functional border , known as the Line of Actual Control .
On Sept. 9 , 1967 , Beijing ’ s People ’ s Daily ran a story claiming that Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese soldiers , who fought them until they retreated .
No other source I have seen lists fighting around that time .
Whether the story was a pretext for aggression or not , it was on Sept. 11 , 1967 , that the major flash point occurred .
By most accounts , as Indian soldiers were replacing older fencing with a barbed wire fence , Chinese soldiers argued with them and then opened fire from bunkers and nearby fortified positions .
Artillery hit the positions , and many Indian soldiers fled—some of whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very same day that Chinese forces attacked , the People ’ s Daily decried a supposed invasion of Chinese territory , a propaganda technique that China would repeat in subsequent conflicts , such as its 1979 invasion of Vietnam .
For three straight days , Indian and Chinese positions exchanged artillery , mortar , and machine-gun fire .
Although the death tolls offered by each side are totally inconsistent—China later claimed 36 of its soldiers were killed or wounded , while one Indian estimate approximated the number around 400—at least dozens were killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were destroyed , however , because the Indian artillery was better located tactically on the high ground of the pass—which , if Indian figures are correct , may explain why the Chinese came off worse .
So too could the logistical and leadership tumult inside a Chinese military already roiled by the political attacks of the Cultural Revolution .
As the fighting continued and headlines blared , then-Deputy Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai was in the United States on a scheduled visit .
While he was there , he was interviewed on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict .
He also conversed with American officials about their issues with China .
Finally , as Desai was heading home , a cease-fire was reached via high-level diplomacy .
Two weeks later , however , another incident broke the fragile calm .
Indian and Chinese soldiers again began fighting over Chinese troops ’ advance into a neighboring patch of borderland known as Chola .
Wielding bayonets and knives , several soldiers on both sides were gored and even beheaded in the brawl .
A firefight ensued that lasted into the next day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last deadly fight between China and India until this week ’ s occurred in 1975 when Chinese troops fought an Indian patrol near the border of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in another incident whose details are disputed by both sides .
That similar incidents are still occurring more than half a century later speaks to the broader interests of national prestige and the strategic position of the Himalayas , which are the world ’ s geographical apex , the source of nearly all of the region ’ s major rivers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Despite the violence , however , both governments continue to leave themselves options for de-escalation .
Chinese media have downplayed the recent incidents .
Similarly , in 1967 , only one story on the topic made the front page of the People ’ s Daily .
Another similarity to the 1967 conflict is that due to the remote locations of the conflict zones , there are no reporters , or even civilian observers , present .
A review of press from 1967 reveals how dependent the reporting was on government statements .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well .
War reporters and foreign-policy analysts are once again left parsing government statements , nationalistic press reports of dubious origin , and outright propaganda to try to understand what exactly happened .
This leaves considerable room for the governments to manipulate impressions domestically and internationally .
While India ’ s greater press freedom may lend the country ’ s press accounts greater weight , the physical absence of anyone not directly affiliated with the governments means all accounts should be treated with a degree of skepticism , especially given the jingoistic turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years .
Governments often try to manipulate perceptions of conflicts , but the degree to which it is possible is greater under these circumstances .
Even in recent conflicts , such as the Syrian civil war , when the Assad regime sought to cover up atrocities , the mere presence of civilians with cameras meant that much of the truth eventually reached the world .
China did not offer casualty figures for the 1967 border conflict until the 1990s .
Some details about the 1967 incidents remain unclear .
It is possible that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today .
Anyone asserting with confidence that they know the exact course of events or attitude of the leadership in each country should be treated skeptically .
The most major difference between the 1967 fighting and today is that , by all accounts , no firearms or artillery were used in Tuesday ’ s killings , a norm that developed over the intervening years .
Today , border patrols go unarmed precisely to avoid such escalation .
The fact that such a norm arose was viewed by many observers as an important stabilizing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , if that norm is viewed by either side as an opportunity to advance its interests without risking all-out war , and then de-escalate after achieving its goals , it encourages risk-taking .
Reasonable people may justly hope that the fighting goes no further .
However , even if the incidents do not escalate into a broader conflict , the Ussuri River clashes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 were of similarly minor scope .
And yet , they had vast implications for the structure of the international system , locking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviets for decades .
In 1967 , India was a member of the nonaligned movement .
In recent years , it has deftly maintained cordial relations with both the United States and China during their growing rivalry .
Whether it will maintain such a position indefinitely after its soldiers ’ blood has been spilled is less certain .

Chinese and Indian troops killing each other in the thin air of the Himalayas. America torn by violent confrontations between police and protesters. Rumors of leadership turmoil in Beijing. It’s not 2020. It’s 1967.
Chinese and Indian troops killing each other in the thin air of the Himalayas. America torn by violent confrontations between police and protesters. Rumors of leadership turmoil in Beijing. It’s not 2020. It’s 1967.
The last time there was an incident as deadly as Monday’s along the China-India border, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi were both teenagers. In 1967, in the Himalayas far to the southeast of the location of the present violence, several deadly encounters between the world’s two most populous countries left dozens of Indians and Chinese dead. Coming only five years after their 1962 war, and with China’s Cultural Revolution at its most chaotic point, many feared the conflict could escalate regionally.
After its loss to China in 1962, India initiated an extensive military expansion. The total size of the Indian military doubled. Intelligence agencies took note. The CIA argued in August 1967 that the Indian military could be expected to repulse a Chinese attack without relinquishing substantial territory.
At the time, the area in which the skirmishes took place, Sikkim, was a semi-independent kingdom and protectorate of India. The Chinese Communist Party government encouraged Sikkim’s population to break from India decisively and declare independence. (Eventually, in 1975, it did the opposite and voted in a referendum to join India as a state.)
As is the case this year, the conflict in 1967 began with a gradual increase in nonmilitary activities. This year, an Indian road project led to Chinese attempts to harry work crews. In 1967, a series of minor building projects near the mountain pass at Nathu La (also known as Naku La), such as new loudspeakers, a trench, and a small wire fence, led to minor incidents of pushing, shoving, and punching between soldiers on either side of the line that serves as the functional border, known as the Line of Actual Control.
On Sept. 9, 1967, Beijing’s People’s Daily ran a story claiming that Indian soldiers had crossed the border and attacked Chinese soldiers, who fought them until they retreated. No other source I have seen lists fighting around that time. Whether the story was a pretext for aggression or not, it was on Sept. 11, 1967, that the major flash point occurred. By most accounts, as Indian soldiers were replacing older fencing with a barbed wire fence, Chinese soldiers argued with them and then opened fire from bunkers and nearby fortified positions. Artillery hit the positions, and many Indian soldiers fled—some of whom were later convicted of desertion.
That very same day that Chinese forces attacked, the People’s Daily decried a supposed invasion of Chinese territory, a propaganda technique that China would repeat in subsequent conflicts, such as its 1979 invasion of Vietnam. For three straight days, Indian and Chinese positions exchanged artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. Although the death tolls offered by each side are totally inconsistent—China later claimed 36 of its soldiers were killed or wounded, while one Indian estimate approximated the number around 400—at least dozens were killed on both sides. More Chinese fortifications were destroyed, however, because the Indian artillery was better located tactically on the high ground of the pass—which, if Indian figures are correct, may explain why the Chinese came off worse. So too could the logistical and leadership tumult inside a Chinese military already roiled by the political attacks of the Cultural Revolution.
As the fighting continued and headlines blared, then-Deputy Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai was in the United States on a scheduled visit. While he was there, he was interviewed on the Today show and asked repeatedly about the conflict. He also conversed with American officials about their issues with China. Finally, as Desai was heading home, a cease-fire was reached via high-level diplomacy.
Two weeks later, however, another incident broke the fragile calm. Indian and Chinese soldiers again began fighting over Chinese troops’ advance into a neighboring patch of borderland known as Chola. Wielding bayonets and knives, several soldiers on both sides were gored and even beheaded in the brawl. A firefight ensued that lasted into the next day, when Chinese troops retreated. The last deadly fight between China and India until this week’s occurred in 1975 when Chinese troops fought an Indian patrol near the border of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in another incident whose details are disputed by both sides.
That similar incidents are still occurring more than half a century later speaks to the broader interests of national prestige and the strategic position of the Himalayas, which are the world’s geographical apex, the source of nearly all of the region’s major rivers, and a place of cultural confluence. Despite the violence, however, both governments continue to leave themselves options for de-escalation. Chinese media have downplayed the recent incidents. Similarly, in 1967, only one story on the topic made the front page of the People’s Daily.
Another similarity to the 1967 conflict is that due to the remote locations of the conflict zones, there are no reporters, or even civilian observers, present. A review of press from 1967 reveals how dependent the reporting was on government statements. That is true so far this year as well. War reporters and foreign-policy analysts are once again left parsing government statements, nationalistic press reports of dubious origin, and outright propaganda to try to understand what exactly happened. This leaves considerable room for the governments to manipulate impressions domestically and internationally.
While India’s greater press freedom may lend the country’s press accounts greater weight, the physical absence of anyone not directly affiliated with the governments means all accounts should be treated with a degree of skepticism, especially given the jingoistic turn of much of Indian media in recent years. Governments often try to manipulate perceptions of conflicts, but the degree to which it is possible is greater under these circumstances. Even in recent conflicts, such as the Syrian civil war, when the Assad regime sought to cover up atrocities, the mere presence of civilians with cameras meant that much of the truth eventually reached the world. China did not offer casualty figures for the 1967 border conflict until the 1990s. Some details about the 1967 incidents remain unclear. It is possible that will be another similarity between 1967 and today. Anyone asserting with confidence that they know the exact course of events or attitude of the leadership in each country should be treated skeptically.
The most major difference between the 1967 fighting and today is that, by all accounts, no firearms or artillery were used in Tuesday’s killings, a norm that developed over the intervening years. Today, border patrols go unarmed precisely to avoid such escalation. The fact that such a norm arose was viewed by many observers as an important stabilizing influence to prevent future escalation. However, if that norm is viewed by either side as an opportunity to advance its interests without risking all-out war, and then de-escalate after achieving its goals, it encourages risk-taking.
Reasonable people may justly hope that the fighting goes no further. However, even if the incidents do not escalate into a broader conflict, the Ussuri River clashes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 were of similarly minor scope. And yet, they had vast implications for the structure of the international system, locking in China’s split from the Soviets for decades. In 1967, India was a member of the nonaligned movement. In recent years, it has deftly maintained cordial relations with both the United States and China during their growing rivalry. Whether it will maintain such a position indefinitely after its soldiers’ blood has been spilled is less certain.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--Leading Pentagon Official Exits After White House Axes Nomination

A leading U.S. Defense Department policy official resigned Thursday after the Trump administration passed over her nomination for another top defense job , as the White House continued its efforts to fill the Pentagon with loyalists to President Donald Trump .
Kathryn Wheelbarger—who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs , a top Pentagon policy job that oversees Defense Department strategy in Europe , Africa , and the Middle East—is resigning with an effective date of July 4 , a person familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy .
The decision comes as the Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sending out more professional candidates in favor of new officials loyal to Trump .
Wheelbarger ’ s planned departure occurred just two days after Elaine McCusker resigned as the Pentagon ’ s acting comptroller after questioning Trump ’ s decision to freeze military aid to Ukraine last summer .
The White House recently rescinded McCusker ’ s nomination to be the Pentagon ’ s permanent comptroller after she questioned the aid freeze on Ukraine that had prompted Trump ’ s impeachment in the House .
Wheelbarger also saw herself replaced as the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence last week amid questions about her loyalty to Trump .
A senior administration official told Foreign Policy last month that Wheelbarger ’ s ties to the late Sen. John McCain and former Defense Secretary James Mattis—who recently rebuked Trump ’ s response to nationwide racial injustice protests—were preventing the White House from nominating her for any role .
Wheelbarger served as policy director and counsel on the Senate Armed Services Committee when McCain led the panel .
Her departure , first reported by Reuters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials that there is little room left in the Pentagon to disagree with the White House across the river .
Even Defense Secretary Mark Esper was said to be on shaky ground after he publicly disputed Trump ’ s assertion two weeks ago that he might have to invoke the Insurrection Act and send in U.S. troops to quell violence in cities amid protests against the killing of a black man in Minneapolis police custody .
“ The ideological divergences and policy disagreements were too wide and deep for her and others who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a former senior advisor on security cooperation in the office of the secretary of defense for policy and now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute .
Another former colleague described Wheelbarger as “ a professional policy person ” and “ not really partisan.
” Wheelbarger ’ s departure comes as the White House has moved quickly to add more appointees loyal to Trump at the Pentagon .
In May , Foreign Policy reported that Michael Cutrone , who served as Vice President Mike Pence ’ s top security aide for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s permanent role as principal deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs last month , a post officials fear he will use to vet Pentagon officials for loyalty to Trump .
The vice president ’ s office has disputed this characterization of Cutrone ’ s role at the Pentagon .
Soon after that , Ezra Cohen , a former senior National Security Council official under Michael Flynn , was tapped to become the Pentagon ’ s deputy assistant secretary for counter-narcotics .
In place of Wheelbarger , the White House tapped Bradley Hansell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council director for transnational threats until last year , to the Pentagon intelligence post .
While Cutrone ’ s and Cohen ’ s roles do not require confirmation in the Senate , the Trump administration is facing pushback on Anthony Tata , a Fox News regular and a retired Army brigadier general whom Trump has tapped as his intended nominee to lead the Pentagon ’ s policy shop .
Two Democrats on the Senate Armed Services panel—ranking member Jack Reed and Elizabeth Warren—have already confirmed they will not vote for Tata after Islamophobic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Three prominent retired generals pulled their support for Tata on Thursday .
But the tenure of Wheelbarger , who played a major role in handling NATO allies and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS that grew to more than 90 nations at its height , also demonstrated a major challenge the Pentagon has faced since Trump ’ s election : a lack of Senate-confirmed civilian appointees in the building .
“ Let ’ s not pretend we didn ’ t know this was coming .
This has been in the making for some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former Pentagon official .
“ The only reason why it took a bit longer is because Katie , the consummate professional she is , probably wanted to make sure some important files were effectively addressed and some kind of a transition plan was put in place before her departure.
” Taking over from Robert Karem in 2018 , Wheelbarger served as acting assistant secretary for international security for 210 days—the legal limit that officials can act in Senate-confirmed roles without a vote under the Vacancies Act—until June 2019 , at which point the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ duties of ” assistant secretary , a role with fewer authorities in creating policy but without a timeline of service .
Of 755 Trump administration roles that require Senate confirmation , 138 still have no nominees , according to data from the Washington Post .
The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the move .
But former colleagues defended Wheelbarger amid her departure .
“ Katie Wheelbarger is one of the hardest working , smartest , and talented people I have worked with in government , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secretary of defense for the Middle East until last year .
“ She should have been confirmed for the job she so ably did for over a year and a half .
She is a consummate professional who undoubtedly will be missed by the whole Pentagon policy team who I know will miss her leadership .
”

A leading U.S. Defense Department policy official resigned Thursday after the Trump administration passed over her nomination for another top defense job, as the White House continued its efforts to fill the Pentagon with loyalists to President Donald Trump.
A leading U.S. Defense Department policy official resigned Thursday after the Trump administration passed over her nomination for another top defense job, as the White House continued its efforts to fill the Pentagon with loyalists to President Donald Trump.
Kathryn Wheelbarger—who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, a top Pentagon policy job that oversees Defense Department strategy in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East—is resigning with an effective date of July 4, a person familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.
The decision comes as the Pentagon’s revolving door appears to be sending out more professional candidates in favor of new officials loyal to Trump. Wheelbarger’s planned departure occurred just two days after Elaine McCusker resigned as the Pentagon’s acting comptroller after questioning Trump’s decision to freeze military aid to Ukraine last summer. The White House recently rescinded McCusker’s nomination to be the Pentagon’s permanent comptroller after she questioned the aid freeze on Ukraine that had prompted Trump’s impeachment in the House.
Wheelbarger also saw herself replaced as the administration’s nominee to be the Pentagon’s deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence last week amid questions about her loyalty to Trump. A senior administration official told Foreign Policy last month that Wheelbarger’s ties to the late Sen. John McCain and former Defense Secretary James Mattis—who recently rebuked Trump’s response to nationwide racial injustice protests—were preventing the White House from nominating her for any role. Wheelbarger served as policy director and counsel on the Senate Armed Services Committee when McCain led the panel.
In a short three-paragraph resignation letter obtained by Foreign Policy, Wheelbarger said she had faith that her remaining colleagues at the Defense Department “will continue to be guided by the U.S. Constitution and the principles of our founding, which will ensure both our security and freedom.”
Drawing upon the Constitution, her resignation letter came just a week after lawmakers raised legal questions about Trump’s response to the racial injustice protests in the wake of George Floyd’s death, including about the use of U.S. Park Police to break up a peaceful demonstration in Lafayette Square and a D.C. National Guard helicopter that performed a low-flying maneuver amid a gathering of protesters.
The incidents also raised questions about the use of the military for political purposes, as Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley joined Trump for a walk to St. John’s Episcopal Church on June 1, where the commander in chief staged a photo-op. Milley, who was wearing his Army battle dress uniform at the time, later apologized for having participated.
Wheelbarger’s departure, first reported by Reuters, is raising fears with current and former officials that there is little room left in the Pentagon to disagree with the White House across the river. Even Esper was said to be on shaky ground after he publicly disputed Trump’s assertion two weeks ago that he might have to invoke the Insurrection Act and send in U.S. troops to quell violence in cities amid protests against the killing of a black man in Minneapolis police custody.
“The ideological divergences and policy disagreements were too wide and deep for her and others who left before,” said Bilal Saab, a former senior advisor on security cooperation in the office of the secretary of defense for policy and now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Another former colleague described Wheelbarger as “a professional policy person” and “not really partisan.”
On Thursday afternoon, Esper praised Wheelbarger on her time at the Pentagon. “In her role as Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Katie brought a wealth of experience and the utmost professionalism to the Department throughout her service,” Esper said in a statement. “Her leadership in support of the National Defense Strategy is evident in the proud accomplishments of her team.”
Wheelbarger’s departure comes as the White House has moved quickly to add more appointees loyal to Trump at the Pentagon. In May, Foreign Policy reported that Michael Cutrone, who served as Vice President Mike Pence’s top security aide for South Asia, slid into Wheelbarger’s permanent role as principal deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs last month, a post officials fear he will use to vet Pentagon officials for loyalty to Trump. The vice president’s office has disputed this characterization of Cutrone’s role at the Pentagon.
Soon after that, Ezra Cohen, a former senior National Security Council official under Michael Flynn, was tapped to become the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary for counter-narcotics. In place of Wheelbarger, the White House tapped Bradley Hansell, who served as a National Security Council director for transnational threats until last year, to the Pentagon intelligence post.
While Cutrone’s and Cohen’s roles do not require confirmation in the Senate, the Trump administration is facing pushback on Anthony Tata, a Fox News regular and a retired Army brigadier general whom Trump has tapped as his intended nominee to lead the Pentagon’s policy shop. Two Democrats on the Senate Armed Services panel—ranking member Jack Reed and Elizabeth Warren—have already confirmed they will not vote for Tata after Islamophobic comments he made on Twitter surfaced. Three prominent retired generals pulled their support for Tata on Thursday.
But the tenure of Wheelbarger, who played a major role in handling NATO allies and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS that grew to more than 90 nations at its height, also demonstrated a major challenge the Pentagon has faced since Trump’s election: a lack of Senate-confirmed civilian appointees in the building.
“Let’s not pretend we didn’t know this was coming. This has been in the making for some time,” said Saab, the former Pentagon official. “The only reason why it took a bit longer is because Katie, the consummate professional she is, probably wanted to make sure some important files were effectively addressed and some kind of a transition plan was put in place before her departure.”
Taking over from Robert Karem in 2018, Wheelbarger served as acting assistant secretary for international security for 210 days—the legal limit that officials can act in Senate-confirmed roles without a vote under the Vacancies Act—until June 2019, at which point the role was downgraded to “performing the duties of” assistant secretary, a role with fewer authorities in creating policy but without a timeline of service. Of 755 Trump administration roles that require Senate confirmation, 138 still have no nominees, according to data from the Washington Post.
The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the move. But former colleagues defended Wheelbarger amid her departure.
“Katie Wheelbarger is one of the hardest working, smartest, and talented people I have worked with in government,” said Mick Mulroy, who was deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East until last year. “She should have been confirmed for the job she so ably did for over a year and a half. She is a consummate professional who undoubtedly will be missed by the whole Pentagon policy team who I know will miss her leadership.”
Update, June 19, 2020: This article was updated to include details of Wheelbarger’s resignation letter.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-18--It’s Not Just Trump. The World Worries America Is Broken.

It ’ s Not Just Trump .
The World Worries America Is Broken .
For more than three years , many of America ’ s closest allies have comforted themselves with the thought that Donald Trump ’ s populist presidency was a historical aberration , and that the United States would ultimately return to its democratic and internationalist roots .
But a season of pandemic and protest has shaken that faith , pulling back the curtain on a country plagued by deeper social , economic , and political ills .
Today , the United States is the locus of international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but also at its precedent , with scenes of unchecked police brutality , lynchings , and the unexorcised demons of slavery and the Civil War horrifying onlookers from Geneva to Gabon .
In Geneva , a key bloc of African governments is pressing for a United Nations inquiry into abuses against descendants of Africans in the United States and elsewhere .
A group of 20 senior U.N. officials from Africa , including Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , the Ethiopian director-general of the World Health Organization , recently issued a joint statement condemning the police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ As senior African leaders in the United Nations , the last few weeks of protests at the killing of George Floyd in the hands of police , have left us all outraged at the injustice of racism that continued to be pervasive in our host country [ the United States ] and across the world , ” the group said .
Tendayi Achiume , a University of California , Los Angeles law professor who serves as the U.N. special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism , racial discrimination , xenophobia and related @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council on Wednesday that the United States needs watching .
“ The situation in the United States requires an international response that can help ensure that people of African descent in that country are no longer subject to routine but egregious violations , ” she said .
Achiume urged the council to establish a commission of inquiry “ with the necessary authority to investigate systemic racism in law enforcement in the United States.
” The failure to do so , she said , “ would signal that black lives do not matter.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rights council in June 2018 , had apparently succeeded in persuading friendly countries , including Britain , France , and Mexico , to pressure the Africans to drop their call for such a commission , and to delete any specific references to America ’ s role in repressing its black citizens .
Instead , the council appears likely to adopt a resolution Friday asking the high commissioner for human rights , Michelle Bachelet , to conduct a review of abuses against descendants of Africa anywhere in the world .
Foreign leaders and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they view as gross incompetence in his response to the coronavirus , as well as to several weeks of political upheaval .
But what has disheartened observers abroad is that even liberal states and cities , including New York , have proved woefully unprepared for a long-predicted pandemic , before eagerly taking up the truncheons to pummel peaceful protesters .
Some of the most violent crackdowns on demonstrators protesting the killing of George Floyd have played out in blue states and cities , including Los Angeles , Minneapolis , and New York , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the latest demonstration of American carnage appears to be yet another sign of a great power spiraling at high speed into a period of national and international decline .
“ There has been a dramatic decline in American political and soft power under Trump , ” said Andrew Gilmour , a British national who served as U.N. assistant secretary-general for human rights .
“ I come from a country that experienced decline , but it took decades .
This is happening much faster .
A Democratic victory may stanch it , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has inflicted on American prestige.
” Not everyone has given up on the United States , which has lived through this before .
The civil rights movement of the 1960s left images of Southern cops unleashing dogs and firehoses on peaceful black protesters ; by the end of the decade , the world was lamenting the My Lai massacre in Vietnam .
The new century brought photos of tortured detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad , followed in the Trump years by internment camps for immigrant minors .
Jan Eliasson , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , was a high school exchange student in Indiana in 1957 , heady on visions of America as a beacon of democracy .
And then he witnessed Little Rock , when local racists used police and troops to prevent black children from attending school , and began filling his scrapbook with a different American chronicle .
“ I was in shock .
I had come as a young student with a view of America as a champion of democracy , ” he said .
But he said that his faith @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched paratroopers to enforce a landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling desegregating American public schools .
“ I must admit when I saw President Trump aiming to get the military in to fight demonstrators on the street I swallowed twice , ” he said .
“ But I was deeply impressed that the top echelons of the military stood up for the constitution .
I thought that was the best of America.
” America ’ s reputation has certainly taken a beating under Trump ’ s presidency , according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia ’ s Lowy Institute .
And that ’ s only been accentuated by America ’ s world-worst handling of the coronavirus pandemic .
Almost all other developed countries have sharply reduced cases and hospitalizations ; only in the United States ( and to a certain extent , Britain ) are both still spiking .
“ America ’ s mediocre performance in response to COVID-19 has shaken a lot of observers , ” Fullilove said .
“ We are accustomed to seeing America as the epicenter of global power , not the epicenter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has bounced back before .
Michel Duclos , a former French ambassador to Syria and special advisor to the Paris-based think tank Institut Montaigne , recalled conversations with U.S. diplomats after revelations of American torture at Abu Ghraib .
“ Colleagues in the American diplomatic services told us that it was the worst day in our diplomatic history , ” he recalled .
But he said the United States has been able to rebuild its diplomatic standing .
“ So in a way American already went through this kind of situation and was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this idea that if Trump is not reelected there should be a rebound.
” The difference this time around , he said , is that U.S. allies are questioning the extent to which there may be “ something broken in the fabric of American society itself .
You have at the same time a broken society and a broken political system.
” Fullilove has not lost hope that a Democratic victory in the November elections could begin to restore America ’ s standing .
“ The world will always remember America elected Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can make up a lot of the ground you lost , ” he said .
The United States , he added , has a long history of “ sinning , falling , and picking yourself up and redeeming yourselves.
” But for overseas observers , that means making sure that Trump ’ s election really was an aberration .
“ I would be much less confident about the United States recovering its global position if Americans were to reelect President Trump , ” Fullilove added .
“ What does it tell the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ four years and say : ‘ More , please ’ ?
”

For more than three years, many of America’s closest allies have comforted themselves with the thought that Donald Trump’s populist presidency was a historical aberration, and that the United States would ultimately return to its democratic and internationalist roots. But a season of pandemic and protest has shaken that faith, pulling back the curtain on a country plagued by deeper social, economic, and political ills.
For more than three years, many of America’s closest allies have comforted themselves with the thought that Donald Trump’s populist presidency was a historical aberration, and that the United States would ultimately return to its democratic and internationalist roots. But a season of pandemic and protest has shaken that faith, pulling back the curtain on a country plagued by deeper social, economic, and political ills.
Today, the United States is the locus of international condemnation—targeted not just at its president, but also at its precedent, with scenes of unchecked police brutality, lynchings, and the unexorcised demons of slavery and the Civil War horrifying onlookers from Geneva to Gabon.
In Geneva, a key bloc of African governments is pressing for a United Nations inquiry into abuses against descendants of Africans in the United States and elsewhere. A group of 20 senior U.N. officials from Africa, including Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Ethiopian director-general of the World Health Organization, recently issued a joint statement condemning the police brutality in America’s cities.
“As senior African leaders in the United Nations, the last few weeks of protests at the killing of George Floyd in the hands of police, have left us all outraged at the injustice of racism that continued to be pervasive in our host country [the United States] and across the world,” the group said.
Tendayi Achiume, a University of California, Los Angeles law professor who serves as the U.N. special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, told the U.N. Human Rights Council on Wednesday that the United States needs watching.
“The situation in the United States requires an international response that can help ensure that people of African descent in that country are no longer subject to routine but egregious violations,” she said. Achiume urged the council to establish a commission of inquiry “with the necessary authority to investigate systemic racism in law enforcement in the United States.” The failure to do so, she said, “would signal that black lives do not matter.”
The United States, which withdrew from the rights council in June 2018, had apparently succeeded in persuading friendly countries, including Britain, France, and Mexico, to pressure the Africans to drop their call for such a commission, and to delete any specific references to America’s role in repressing its black citizens. Instead, the council appears likely to adopt a resolution Friday asking the high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, to conduct a review of abuses against descendants of Africa anywhere in the world.
Foreign leaders and diplomats broadly agree that Trump displayed what they view as gross incompetence in his response to the coronavirus, as well as to several weeks of political upheaval. But what has disheartened observers abroad is that even liberal states and cities, including New York, have proved woefully unprepared for a long-predicted pandemic, before eagerly taking up the truncheons to pummel peaceful protesters. Some of the most violent crackdowns on demonstrators protesting the killing of George Floyd have played out in blue states and cities, including Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and New York, under liberal political leaders.
From afar, the latest demonstration of American carnage appears to be yet another sign of a great power spiraling at high speed into a period of national and international decline.
“There has been a dramatic decline in American political and soft power under Trump,” said Andrew Gilmour, a British national who served as U.N. assistant secretary-general for human rights. “I come from a country that experienced decline, but it took decades. This is happening much faster. A Democratic victory may stanch it, but it cannot reverse the damage Trump has inflicted on American prestige.”
Not everyone has given up on the United States, which has lived through this before. The civil rights movement of the 1960s left images of Southern cops unleashing dogs and firehoses on peaceful black protesters; by the end of the decade, the world was lamenting the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. The new century brought photos of tortured detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, followed in the Trump years by internment camps for immigrant minors.
Jan Eliasson, a former Swedish foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was a high school exchange student in Indiana in 1957, heady on visions of America as a beacon of democracy. And then he witnessed Little Rock, when local racists used police and troops to prevent black children from attending school, and began filling his scrapbook with a different American chronicle.
“I was in shock. I had come as a young student with a view of America as a champion of democracy,” he said.
But he said that his faith in American institutions and values was restored after President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched paratroopers to enforce a landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling desegregating American public schools.
“I must admit when I saw President Trump aiming to get the military in to fight demonstrators on the street I swallowed twice,” he said. “But I was deeply impressed that the top echelons of the military stood up for the constitution. I thought that was the best of America.”
America’s reputation has certainly taken a beating under Trump’s presidency, according to Michael Fullilove, the executive director of Australia’s Lowy Institute. And that’s only been accentuated by America’s world-worst handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Almost all other developed countries have sharply reduced cases and hospitalizations; only in the United States (and to a certain extent, Britain) are both still spiking.
“America’s mediocre performance in response to COVID-19 has shaken a lot of observers,” Fullilove said. “We are accustomed to seeing America as the epicenter of global power, not the epicenter of global disease.”
The United States has bounced back before. Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador to Syria and special advisor to the Paris-based think tank Institut Montaigne, recalled conversations with U.S. diplomats after revelations of American torture at Abu Ghraib.
“Colleagues in the American diplomatic services told us that it was the worst day in our diplomatic history,” he recalled. But he said the United States has been able to rebuild its diplomatic standing. “So in a way American already went through this kind of situation and was always able to rebound. There is this idea that if Trump is not reelected there should be a rebound.”
The difference this time around, he said, is that U.S. allies are questioning the extent to which there may be “something broken in the fabric of American society itself. You have at the same time a broken society and a broken political system.”
Fullilove has not lost hope that a Democratic victory in the November elections could begin to restore America’s standing.
“The world will always remember America elected Donald Trump president, but I think you can make up a lot of the ground you lost,” he said. The United States, he added, has a long history of “sinning, falling, and picking yourself up and redeeming yourselves.”
But for overseas observers, that means making sure that Trump’s election really was an aberration.
“I would be much less confident about the United States recovering its global position if Americans were to reelect President Trump,” Fullilove added. “What does it tell the world if Americans look back at the past four years and say: ‘More, please’?”