foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Xi Jinping Is a ‘Good Emperor’

Xi Jinping Is a ‘Good Emperor’

Life and work are gradually returning to normal in Shanghai .
My colleagues and I are back in the office .
Restaurants and bars have reopened—with a temperature check at the door .
Hellobike , China ’ s largest bike-sharing company ( of which I am an investor ) , is reporting that ridership is back to 70 percent of the pre-pandemic level .
The same is happening by varying degrees in the rest of China .
The nightmare that felt as if it would last forever may be behind us—knock on wood .
Let me use this teachable moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s society and government.China is fortunate to have the right leader at the right time .
The Chinese people trust their political institutions .
Our understanding of China has been dominated by the narrative that an authoritarian one-party state is by definition incapable of retaining genuine public trust .
This narrative has overwhelmed our perceptions , but it ’ s time to put it aside .
Now that Mother Nature has delivered something with such impact , reality can no longer be ignored .
On Jan. 23 , the Chinese government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wuhan and then the entire province of Hubei , with a total population of 56 million , making it the largest quarantine in human history .
Two days later , all provinces except Tibet declared the highest level of health emergency , and more than 760 million urban dwellers were confined to their homes , being allowed to go out only for essential needs with face masks mandatory in all public places .
Most rural villages were also closed off .
At the time , total reported infections and deaths nationwide were 571 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transpired afterward around the world .
The entire nation was surprised by the magnitude of the measure .
Overnight in Shanghai , a city of 24 million people , streets that were clogged with traffic only days before became empty of both people and automobiles .
At first I thought this would last a week , maybe two .
But it went on—and on .
People stayed home , and streets remained empty .
This immediate and nearly total compliance by hundreds of millions of people came as a genuine surprise to me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , you would know how unruly people can seem .
Regular Chinese police are unarmed .
On the streets of Shanghai , it is not uncommon to see someone arguing , often aggressively , with police officers over a traffic ticket .
There is no way to explain the complete submission to a massive lockdown like this for so long by so many other than voluntary .
Yes , self-interest can explain it in part because no one wants to get sick .
But if we compare this with other countries where large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ beaches and in clubs in open defiance of their governments ’ orders and warnings ( at least in the initial phase ) and where harsh police enforcement is still going on , it is clear that self-interest isn ’ t enough as an explanation .
Only a very high degree of trust by the people in their political institutions ’ expertise and ability to protect them can result in such compliance .
Some may argue that such submission was due to China ’ s strict security apparatus .
This is off the mark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces are only effective against small groups of activists , not a vast population of hundreds of millions of people if they chose to disobey en masse .
Second , throughout the epidemic , there were few reports and little evidence of mass coercive actions to enforce lockdowns .
The government also went to extraordinary lengths in its communication with the public .
Every day , new data was released—by city , by province , and nationwide .
Every hour , government experts were on TV talking in detail about the new coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Every newspaper was writing about the importance of social distancing .
In other words , the trust was not blind.Opportunism and shirking responsibility are not within Xi Jinping ’ s character .
Chinese civil society is alive and well .
If you were immersed in Chinese social media in early February , you might have drawn the opposite conclusion .
Public anger was raging in the midst of the biggest national trauma since the end of the Cultural Revolution .
The alert mechanism for local authorities to provide early warnings to Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SARS epidemic 15 years ago , apparently failed in the initial stage of the coronavirus outbreak .
Many speculated that the bureaucratic fear of delivering bad news up the official chain caused the delay , exposing a significant fault in China ’ s political system .
The uproar reached a boiling point when Li Wenliang , the Wuhan doctor who first warned of the danger of the coronavirus in December and was muzzled by the local police , succumbed to the virus himself .
If that ’ s all you saw , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this as China ’ s Chernobyl moment or the beginning of a version of the Arab Spring , as some indeed claimed .
But that ’ s not how it turned out .
When the central government acted to mobilize for the most sweeping counter-epidemic operation in human history , the country coalesced .
Half a million volunteers went to the front lines in Hubei province , risking their health and lives as medics , quarantine workers , and logistics personnel .
Nationwide , more than 2 million citizens have registered and served @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be flooded with their inspiring stories and images .
Cafes and restaurants were providing free food and drinks to volunteers , even though their businesses were suffering catastrophic losses .
One picture that went viral showed a Wuhan community worker covered shoulder to toe with medicine packages he was carrying for home delivery .
Virtually every neighborhood in the country organized 24-hour checkpoints with volunteers and security personnel controlling access and checking people ’ s temperatures .
Many communities also organized volunteers to check on the livelihoods of vulnerable residents like the elderly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people , on every street , in every neighborhood , in every village !
There has been virtually no crime .
On the internet , the government and various social institutions put out an enormous volume of information about the characteristics of the coronavirus and the progress of the pandemic .
There was massive public engagement on social media for the dissemination of information .
Now I watch Western experts and authorities talking on CNN and BBC about such things as the length of time the virus can survive on hard surfaces or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ things tens of millions of Chinese netizens were already talking about , every day and every hour , back in February .
From the top down , the government called for a “ people ’ s war ” against the pandemic .
And this is exactly what happened , from the bottom up .
I had more or less bought into the common assumption among many political thinkers that civil society was weak in China because the authoritarian party-state would not allow it to flourish .
But now it occurred to me that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ definition of civil society as something apart from or even in opposition the state .
If we look at Chinese civil society in the classical definition of the term , what Aristotle called koinonia politike—political community that is not distinct from the state—it appeared throughout this pandemic to be perhaps the most vibrant in the world .
In China , state capacity counts even more than the market .
One of the most endlessly debated topics , not just in China , is the relationship between the market and the state .
Well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ won big .
It is abundantly clear to everyone except the most die-hard neoliberals that the preservation of state capacity ( alongside the growth of the market ) has saved China from an unimaginable catastrophe with potentially hundreds of thousands , if not millions , of deaths.Our understanding of China has been dominated by the idea that an authoritarian one-party-state is incapable of retaining genuine public trust .
At the onset of the counter-epidemic operation in late January , the Chinese state swung into action .
The central government coordinated national medical resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In total , 217 medical teams with more than 42,000 medical personnel were dispatched to Hubei from around the country , along with equipment and supplies .
The central government coordinated the shipment of around 17,000 ventilators to Hubei .
The result was that the epicenter of the outbreak never experienced any major shortage of ventilators .
An enormous new hospital with 1,000 beds was built in Wuhan in 10 days .
Following that , 16 additional makeshift hospitals with a total of 13,000 beds were built across the city in existing structures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mild-symptom patients in a quarantined environment .
Sinopec , the state-owned energy giant that produces raw materials for industrial masks , took 35 days to redesign and repurpose its production lines to support medical mask production .
Automakers also used their assembly lines to pump out masks and other medical supplies .
Mask production went from 20 million per day in January to 116 million in late February .
So who did these things ?
The doctors and nurses who were sent to Hubei from around the country were mostly state employees working @ @ @ @ @ @ @ built the hospitals and produced most of the masks were state-owned enterprises .
The entire operation was incredibly well coordinated for such a large country .
From Beijing , the central government rolled out measures in the provinces on a weekly and sometimes daily basis .
The provincial governments were given orders with the leeway to adapt them to local conditions .
Then the provincial governments did the same downward to cities and counties .
It also worked the other way around : Local governments sent their findings and suggestions to Beijing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , came from an academic team studying the situation in Wuhan and found that existing hospitals were not enough to deal with a large number of mild-symptom patients who posed a contagion threat .
They sent the findings and proposal to Beijing , and it was approved and ordered to be implemented within 24 hours .
The state also moved quickly to soften the economic impact of the crisis .
In addition to direct subsidies to companies , the government adjusted the enforcement practices of the labor law so companies could be relieved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ salaries when there was no business .
In exchange , companies were asked not to lay off employees and to keep them on the payroll with minimum wage and health benefits .
Businesses were entitled to have their rents reduced or even waived if their landlords were state-owned enterprises .
The party has played the central role .
Through this crisis , three individuals emerged from relative obscurity to national fame .
Li , the initial whistleblower whose warnings were not heeded , died of COVID-19 .
Zhong Nanshan , the national public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been the public face of the counter-epidemic operation , similar to Anthony Fauci in the United States .
Zhang Wenhong is the Huashan Hospital doctor who has been leading the counter-epidemic operation in Shanghai .
They are from very different personal backgrounds and geographical regions and of different generations but share two things in common .
First , they are all doctors .
Second , they are all veteran members of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .The uproar reached a boiling point when the Wuhan doctor who first warned about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ succumbed to the virus .
The party has been the most conspicuous presence throughout this ordeal .
Zhang works in the hospital two blocks from my house .
He was recorded in a video speaking about the organization of the medical team for the defense of Shanghai .
In his booming voice , he said , “ Party members go first , no questions asked !
” The video went viral .
Day in and day out , the Chinese internet was flooded with images of party-member volunteers swearing their oaths before the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , pledging to place the lives of others before their own .
Of the 496 health workers and volunteers who died on the front lines as of April 29 , 328 were party members .
Chinese President Xi Jinping is a “ good emperor.
” Some years ago , the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama coined the term “ bad emperor problem.
” It was meant to theorize that in an authoritarian political system , even if there can be good rulers , there is little to prevent a bad ruler from gaining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is not the time or the place to debate this theory .
But one thing I do know now is that Xi is a “ good emperor.
” On Jan. 28 , Xi used a meeting with the head of the World Health Organization to tell the nation that he was directly in charge of the counter-epidemic operation .
At that time , the future had never seemed bleaker and more uncertain , but opportunism and shirking responsibility are not within this leader ’ s character .
The decision to lock down Wuhan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was likely to have been his and his alone .
And it turned out to be the decision that saved the nation from a devastating catastrophe .
In an unprecedented practice , he chaired the Politburo Standing Committee meetings to issue policy directives and made them public .
He wore a mask in his public appearances .
He held a videoconference with 170,000 front-line government officials and volunteers .
Indeed , the “ people ’ s war ” was led by him personally in front of the entire nation .
As a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his share of detractors , especially internationally but also domestically , and will no doubt continue to have them .
Western media and governments have attacked his government for the tightening of restrictions on media and political dissent and for its controversial policies toward Muslims in Xinjiang .
Some domestic opponents disagree with the recent moves to centralize political power in Beijing .
But among my circle of business acquaintances and political commentators in China , even some of his harshest critics have acknowledged his stewardship during this once-in-a-generation crisis .
I believe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soar after this .
Xi ’ s leadership has raised the public credibility of the entire government .
It is clear that mistakes were made at the early stages that resulted in a delay in responding to the outbreak .
And there was justified anger , especially at the apparent silencing of the whistleblower Li .
But it is also true that China was caught by surprise by a virus about which little was known .
Now , as Chinese watch in horror as many countries ’ governments struggle to contain the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world what was coming for months on end , their own government ’ s initial mistakes—though worthy of examination and reflection—no longer feel so unforgivable .
China is fortunate to have the right leader at the right time.The Chinese internet was flooded with images of volunteers swearing their oaths before the Chinese Communist Party flag on their way to Wuhan .
For me , as for so many around the world , COVID-19 is certainly the most extraordinary event of my lifetime .
It has certainly impacted me as a businessman and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most emotional effect on me as a parent .
My children attend public schools in Shanghai .
On Jan. 27 , Shanghai announced the delay of the start of the spring semester that had been scheduled for February .
Being kids , they celebrated .
But their euphoria did not last long .
About two weeks later , the Shanghai Education Bureau ordered the reopening of schools only 10 days behind the regular schedule—but online .
They had adapted , in record time , the entire curriculum for online learning .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ email to be printed out .
My home inkjet printer died on the second day .
I bought an industrial-strength laser printer and printed more than a thousand pages of middle school textbook materials .
Every school day now starts at 8 a.m. and ends at 4 p.m. Chinese , math , physics , English—one session after another in front of the computer screen as on regular school days .
Homework has to be turned in every evening by taking pictures of the workbook and uploading it onto the school system .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corrections demanded .
Having the kids at home is nice .
But the workload on us parents is brutal .
I have never screamed at the kids so much .
On the morning of March 19 , I woke up and reached for my phone to check the coronavirus numbers from the day before , as I had every morning for almost two months .
That morning , I saw a total of 80,928 confirmed cases in China and 3,245 cumulative deaths .
The total number of new confirmed cases : zero !
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the good news .
As I walked into the dining room , which served as their makeshift classroom , I was stopped by the prelude to the national anthem .
My children were standing before their computer screens in their full school uniforms , observing the daily flag-raising ceremony .
I had not cried in a very long time .

Life and work are gradually returning to normal in Shanghai. My colleagues and I are back in the office. Restaurants and bars have reopened—with a temperature check at the door. Hellobike, China’s largest bike-sharing company (of which I am an investor), is reporting that ridership is back to 70 percent of the pre-pandemic level. The same is happening by varying degrees in the rest of China. The nightmare that felt as if it would last forever may be behind us—knock on wood. Let me use this teachable moment to share five things I learned about China’s society and government.China is fortunate to have the right leader at the right time.
Life and work are gradually returning to normal in Shanghai. My colleagues and I are back in the office. Restaurants and bars have reopened—with a temperature check at the door. Hellobike, China’s largest bike-sharing company (of which I am an investor), is reporting that ridership is back to 70 percent of the pre-pandemic level. The same is happening by varying degrees in the rest of China. The nightmare that felt as if it would last forever may be behind us—knock on wood. Let me use this teachable moment to share five things I learned about China’s society and government.China is fortunate to have the right leader at the right time.
The Chinese people trust their political institutions. Our understanding of China has been dominated by the narrative that an authoritarian one-party state is by definition incapable of retaining genuine public trust. This narrative has overwhelmed our perceptions, but it’s time to put it aside. Now that Mother Nature has delivered something with such impact, reality can no longer be ignored.
On Jan. 23, the Chinese government ordered the lockdown of the city of Wuhan and then the entire province of Hubei, with a total population of 56 million, making it the largest quarantine in human history. Two days later, all provinces except Tibet declared the highest level of health emergency, and more than 760 million urban dwellers were confined to their homes, being allowed to go out only for essential needs with face masks mandatory in all public places. Most rural villages were also closed off. At the time, total reported infections and deaths nationwide were 571 and 17, respectively—rather low considering what transpired afterward around the world.
The entire nation was surprised by the magnitude of the measure. Overnight in Shanghai, a city of 24 million people, streets that were clogged with traffic only days before became empty of both people and automobiles. At first I thought this would last a week, maybe two. But it went on—and on. People stayed home, and streets remained empty.
This immediate and nearly total compliance by hundreds of millions of people came as a genuine surprise to me. If you have been to China, you would know how unruly people can seem. Regular Chinese police are unarmed. On the streets of Shanghai, it is not uncommon to see someone arguing, often aggressively, with police officers over a traffic ticket. There is no way to explain the complete submission to a massive lockdown like this for so long by so many other than voluntary. Yes, self-interest can explain it in part because no one wants to get sick. But if we compare this with other countries where large crowds of educated young people congregated on beaches and in clubs in open defiance of their governments’ orders and warnings (at least in the initial phase) and where harsh police enforcement is still going on, it is clear that self-interest isn’t enough as an explanation. Only a very high degree of trust by the people in their political institutions’ expertise and ability to protect them can result in such compliance.
Some may argue that such submission was due to China’s strict security apparatus. This is off the mark for two reasons. First, security forces are only effective against small groups of activists, not a vast population of hundreds of millions of people if they chose to disobey en masse. Second, throughout the epidemic, there were few reports and little evidence of mass coercive actions to enforce lockdowns.
The government also went to extraordinary lengths in its communication with the public. Every day, new data was released—by city, by province, and nationwide. Every hour, government experts were on TV talking in detail about the new coronavirus and the nation’s evolving response. Every newspaper was writing about the importance of social distancing. In other words, the trust was not blind.Opportunism and shirking responsibility are not within Xi Jinping’s character.
Chinese civil society is alive and well. If you were immersed in Chinese social media in early February, you might have drawn the opposite conclusion. Public anger was raging in the midst of the biggest national trauma since the end of the Cultural Revolution. The alert mechanism for local authorities to provide early warnings to Beijing, which the government established after the SARS epidemic 15 years ago, apparently failed in the initial stage of the coronavirus outbreak. Many speculated that the bureaucratic fear of delivering bad news up the official chain caused the delay, exposing a significant fault in China’s political system. The uproar reached a boiling point when Li Wenliang, the Wuhan doctor who first warned of the danger of the coronavirus in December and was muzzled by the local police, succumbed to the virus himself. If that’s all you saw, it might be understandable for you to see this as China’s Chernobyl moment or the beginning of a version of the Arab Spring, as some indeed claimed. But that’s not how it turned out.
When the central government acted to mobilize for the most sweeping counter-epidemic operation in human history, the country coalesced. Half a million volunteers went to the front lines in Hubei province, risking their health and lives as medics, quarantine workers, and logistics personnel. Nationwide, more than 2 million citizens have registered and served as volunteers. Social media began to be flooded with their inspiring stories and images. Cafes and restaurants were providing free food and drinks to volunteers, even though their businesses were suffering catastrophic losses. One picture that went viral showed a Wuhan community worker covered shoulder to toe with medicine packages he was carrying for home delivery. Virtually every neighborhood in the country organized 24-hour checkpoints with volunteers and security personnel controlling access and checking people’s temperatures. Many communities also organized volunteers to check on the livelihoods of vulnerable residents like the elderly. Imagine this happening with 1.4 billion people, on every street, in every neighborhood, in every village! There has been virtually no crime.
Read More Chinese paramilitary police wear protective masks as they guard the entrance to the Forbidden City as it reopened to limited visitors for the May holiday in Beijing on May 2. Chinese paramilitary police wear protective masks as they guard the entrance to the Forbidden City as it reopened to limited visitors for the May holiday in Beijing on May 2. China’s Coronavirus Success Is Made Possible by Xi’s Brutality Beijing’s advocates whitewash an increasingly oppressive regime. Argument | James Palmer A man wearing a face mask holds a welcome sign at the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, on April 8, as a team of Chinese medics sponsored by China Railway Construction Corp. arrived in Nigeria to help fight the coronavirus pandemic. A man wearing a face mask holds a welcome sign at the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, on April 8, as a team of Chinese medics sponsored by China Railway Construction Corp. arrived in Nigeria to help fight the coronavirus pandemic. Beijing’s Propaganda Is Finding Few Takers As the Chinese Communist Party embarks on a presumptive goodwill campaign, few in the developing world are falling for it. Argument | Charles Dunst Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia Beijing’s attempts to encircle New Delhi are being systematically reversed. Analysis | Derek Grossman
On the internet, the government and various social institutions put out an enormous volume of information about the characteristics of the coronavirus and the progress of the pandemic. There was massive public engagement on social media for the dissemination of information. Now I watch Western experts and authorities talking on CNN and BBC about such things as the length of time the virus can survive on hard surfaces or in aerosol form. But these are things tens of millions of Chinese netizens were already talking about, every day and every hour, back in February.
From the top down, the government called for a “people’s war” against the pandemic. And this is exactly what happened, from the bottom up. I had more or less bought into the common assumption among many political thinkers that civil society was weak in China because the authoritarian party-state would not allow it to flourish. But now it occurred to me that this was based on the common liberal definition of civil society as something apart from or even in opposition the state. If we look at Chinese civil society in the classical definition of the term, what Aristotle called koinonia politike—political community that is not distinct from the state—it appeared throughout this pandemic to be perhaps the most vibrant in the world.
In China, state capacity counts even more than the market. One of the most endlessly debated topics, not just in China, is the relationship between the market and the state. Well, this time the state has won—and won big. It is abundantly clear to everyone except the most die-hard neoliberals that the preservation of state capacity (alongside the growth of the market) has saved China from an unimaginable catastrophe with potentially hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of deaths.Our understanding of China has been dominated by the idea that an authoritarian one-party-state is incapable of retaining genuine public trust.
At the onset of the counter-epidemic operation in late January, the Chinese state swung into action. The central government coordinated national medical resources to quickly concentrate on Hubei province. In total, 217 medical teams with more than 42,000 medical personnel were dispatched to Hubei from around the country, along with equipment and supplies. The central government coordinated the shipment of around 17,000 ventilators to Hubei. The result was that the epicenter of the outbreak never experienced any major shortage of ventilators.
An enormous new hospital with 1,000 beds was built in Wuhan in 10 days. Following that, 16 additional makeshift hospitals with a total of 13,000 beds were built across the city in existing structures such as convention centers to care for mild-symptom patients in a quarantined environment. Sinopec, the state-owned energy giant that produces raw materials for industrial masks, took 35 days to redesign and repurpose its production lines to support medical mask production. Automakers also used their assembly lines to pump out masks and other medical supplies. Mask production went from 20 million per day in January to 116 million in late February.
So who did these things? The doctors and nurses who were sent to Hubei from around the country were mostly state employees working in state-operated hospitals. The companies that built the hospitals and produced most of the masks were state-owned enterprises.
The entire operation was incredibly well coordinated for such a large country. From Beijing, the central government rolled out measures in the provinces on a weekly and sometimes daily basis. The provincial governments were given orders with the leeway to adapt them to local conditions. Then the provincial governments did the same downward to cities and counties. It also worked the other way around: Local governments sent their findings and suggestions to Beijing. The makeshift hospital idea, for example, came from an academic team studying the situation in Wuhan and found that existing hospitals were not enough to deal with a large number of mild-symptom patients who posed a contagion threat. They sent the findings and proposal to Beijing, and it was approved and ordered to be implemented within 24 hours.
The state also moved quickly to soften the economic impact of the crisis. In addition to direct subsidies to companies, the government adjusted the enforcement practices of the labor law so companies could be relieved of their obligations to pay employees full salaries when there was no business. In exchange, companies were asked not to lay off employees and to keep them on the payroll with minimum wage and health benefits. Businesses were entitled to have their rents reduced or even waived if their landlords were state-owned enterprises.
The party has played the central role. Through this crisis, three individuals emerged from relative obscurity to national fame. Li, the initial whistleblower whose warnings were not heeded, died of COVID-19. Zhong Nanshan, the national public health czar for the pandemic, has been the public face of the counter-epidemic operation, similar to Anthony Fauci in the United States. Zhang Wenhong is the Huashan Hospital doctor who has been leading the counter-epidemic operation in Shanghai. They are from very different personal backgrounds and geographical regions and of different generations but share two things in common. First, they are all doctors. Second, they are all veteran members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).The uproar reached a boiling point when the Wuhan doctor who first warned about the coronavirus and was muzzled by the police succumbed to the virus.
The party has been the most conspicuous presence throughout this ordeal. Zhang works in the hospital two blocks from my house. He was recorded in a video speaking about the organization of the medical team for the defense of Shanghai. In his booming voice, he said, “Party members go first, no questions asked!” The video went viral.
Day in and day out, the Chinese internet was flooded with images of party-member volunteers swearing their oaths before the CCP flag on their way to Wuhan, pledging to place the lives of others before their own. Of the 496 health workers and volunteers who died on the front lines as of April 29, 328 were party members.
Chinese President Xi Jinping is a “good emperor.” Some years ago, the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama coined the term “bad emperor problem.” It was meant to theorize that in an authoritarian political system, even if there can be good rulers, there is little to prevent a bad ruler from gaining power and ruining the country. This is not the time or the place to debate this theory. But one thing I do know now is that Xi is a “good emperor.”
On Jan. 28, Xi used a meeting with the head of the World Health Organization to tell the nation that he was directly in charge of the counter-epidemic operation. At that time, the future had never seemed bleaker and more uncertain, but opportunism and shirking responsibility are not within this leader’s character. The decision to lock down Wuhan and Hubei carried such enormous consequences that it was likely to have been his and his alone. And it turned out to be the decision that saved the nation from a devastating catastrophe. In an unprecedented practice, he chaired the Politburo Standing Committee meetings to issue policy directives and made them public. He wore a mask in his public appearances. He held a videoconference with 170,000 front-line government officials and volunteers. Indeed, the “people’s war” was led by him personally in front of the entire nation.
As a strong leader, Xi certainly has had his share of detractors, especially internationally but also domestically, and will no doubt continue to have them. Western media and governments have attacked his government for the tightening of restrictions on media and political dissent and for its controversial policies toward Muslims in Xinjiang. Some domestic opponents disagree with the recent moves to centralize political power in Beijing. But among my circle of business acquaintances and political commentators in China, even some of his harshest critics have acknowledged his stewardship during this once-in-a-generation crisis. I believe his popularity among the general public will soar after this.
Xi’s leadership has raised the public credibility of the entire government. It is clear that mistakes were made at the early stages that resulted in a delay in responding to the outbreak. And there was justified anger, especially at the apparent silencing of the whistleblower Li. But it is also true that China was caught by surprise by a virus about which little was known. Now, as Chinese watch in horror as many countries’ governments struggle to contain the pandemic even after 1.4 billion people showed the world what was coming for months on end, their own government’s initial mistakes—though worthy of examination and reflection—no longer feel so unforgivable. China is fortunate to have the right leader at the right time.The Chinese internet was flooded with images of volunteers swearing their oaths before the Chinese Communist Party flag on their way to Wuhan.
For me, as for so many around the world, COVID-19 is certainly the most extraordinary event of my lifetime. It has certainly impacted me as a businessman and a student of politics. But it had the most emotional effect on me as a parent. My children attend public schools in Shanghai. On Jan. 27, Shanghai announced the delay of the start of the spring semester that had been scheduled for February. Being kids, they celebrated. But their euphoria did not last long. About two weeks later, the Shanghai Education Bureau ordered the reopening of schools only 10 days behind the regular schedule—but online. They had adapted, in record time, the entire curriculum for online learning. The new materials were sent to us by email to be printed out. My home inkjet printer died on the second day. I bought an industrial-strength laser printer and printed more than a thousand pages of middle school textbook materials.
Every school day now starts at 8 a.m. and ends at 4 p.m. Chinese, math, physics, English—one session after another in front of the computer screen as on regular school days. Homework has to be turned in every evening by taking pictures of the workbook and uploading it onto the school system. The next morning, they are graded and corrections demanded. Having the kids at home is nice. But the workload on us parents is brutal. I have never screamed at the kids so much.
On the morning of March 19, I woke up and reached for my phone to check the coronavirus numbers from the day before, as I had every morning for almost two months. That morning, I saw a total of 80,928 confirmed cases in China and 3,245 cumulative deaths. The total number of new confirmed cases: zero!
I rushed downstairs to tell the kids the good news. As I walked into the dining room, which served as their makeshift classroom, I was stopped by the prelude to the national anthem. My children were standing before their computer screens in their full school uniforms, observing the daily flag-raising ceremony. I had not cried in a very long time.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Is the Afghan Peace Deal Dead on Arrival?

Is the Afghan Peace Deal Dead on Arrival ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : A fresh wave of violence endangers the already shaky Afghan peace deal , the acting U.S. intelligence chief approves sweeping changes without consulting Congress , and geopolitical tensions are on the rise in the Arctic .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
If nearly two months of Taliban attacks hadn ’ t made it clear that the U.S. peace deal with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks targeting a Kabul hospital and a funeral in Afghanistan on Tuesday showed that that the uptick in violence poses a significant threat to the shaky bargain to end nearly 19 years of war .
The Taliban has denied any role in the attacks .
While the Taliban has stuck to March pledges not to attack foreign troops in Afghanistan , Pentagon officials had already said the level of violence was “ unacceptably high.
” That was before gunmen stormed a maternity hospital on Tuesday , killing two dozen people including newborns .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ State-linked group said it carried out the suicide bombing in nearby Nangarhar province that killed 25 people .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned the attacks as an “ act of sheer evil ” in a statement .
The Afghan government has already blamed the hospital attacks on the Taliban , announcing that it would resume offensive operations against the group—potentially derailing years of careful U.S.-led diplomacy .
With the peace talks still snagged on the Taliban ’ s demands for the release of as many as 5,000 prisoners—a deal-breaker for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its signature foreign-policy accomplishments is in jeopardy .
“ As long as there is no sustained reduction in violence and insufficient progress towards a negotiated political settlement , Afghanistan will remain vulnerable to terrorism , ” Pompeo said .
Acting intel chief moves ahead with overhaul .
Acting U.S. Director of National Intelligence ( DNI ) Richard Grenell approved sweeping changes to the 17-agency U.S. intelligence community last Friday without consulting Congress .
Grenell—a Trump loyalist who also serves as the U.S. ambassador to Germany—had rebuffed Capitol Hill ’ s requests for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moves will eliminate the DNI ’ s directorate for partnerships , which coordinates between civilian and military intelligence agencies , and makes the directorate ’ s chief a new advisor to the DNI .
Grenell also stirred controversy this week when he requested the identities of Obama administration officials who might have allowed the “ unmasking ” of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn .
U.S. Navy returns to the Arctic .
The Arctic is becoming a geopolitical hotspot as climate change melts sea ice to historic lows , and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region with growing suspicion .
Defense News has a must-read series of stories on the national security impacts of a less-than-frozen North , including a look at how the U.S. Navy is stepping up patrols in the Barents Sea , in Russia ’ s backyard , signaling the return of a substantial U.S. defense interest in the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War .
Arms sales boom in the Middle East .
Arms sales in the Middle East have—for lack of a better word—exploded in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States .
The Project on Middle East Democracy ’ s Seth Binder crunched the numbers : “ Six of the top 10 importers of major arms were Arab countries , totaling nearly one-third of all global imports ( $ 146 billion ) between 2015 and 2019 , ” he .
In 2017 , the last year with publicly available data , “ four of the top 10 purchasers of U.S. arms were Arab countries , and nearly one-third of all U.S. weapons sales ( $ 36.6 billion ) , along @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security aid , went to Arab regimes.
” The end of Open Skies ?
European leaders are increasingly rattled by the Trump administration ’ s plan to withdraw from a decades-old treaty aimed at boosting military transparency with Russia .
A group of 16 former senior European officials have signed an open letter to the administration urging it to reconsider withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty .
The treaty allows signatories , including the United States , NATO allies , and Russia , to conduct unarmed aerial surveillance to gauge military capabilities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is violating the treaty and announced plans to withdraw—over the concerns of its NATO allies .
More from Grenell .
The acting DNI made another splash on Wednesday , appointing Neil Wiley , a career intelligence officer , to be his top deputy .
Sue Gordon , a longtime CIA officer , was ousted from a Senate-confirmed version of the role after reports that Trump sought to place a political loyalist in that position .
Lebanon in freefall .
Lebanon has been in political and economic turmoil for more than six months , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forced out Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his cabinet last fall .
The New York Times ’ Ben Hubbard breaks down the tremors shaking the value of the Lebanese pound , which only appear to be getting worse as the coronavirus pandemic has left the nation in lockdown .
A Holocaust survivor remembers .
Haaretz has a must-read interview with Michael Goldmann-Gilead , a Holocaust survivor who would later go on to interrogate Adolf Eichmann—one of the Nazi architects of the “ Final Solution ” —after his capture by Israeli agents .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apparently harassing U.S. Marine recruits on the West Coast , disrupting their training .
So the Marines have hired a falconry service to use the birds of prey to scare off the seagulls from the Marine Corps training depot in San Diego .
UFO watch .
For Vox , the renowned international relations scholar Alexander Wendt offers up some seriously deep thinking on why we need to take UFOs seriously .
You know , just in case .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: A fresh wave of violence endangers the already shaky Afghan peace deal , the acting U.S. intelligence chief approves sweeping changes without consulting Congress, and geopolitical tensions are on the rise in the Arctic .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: A fresh wave of violence endangers the already shaky Afghan peace deal, the acting U.S. intelligence chief approves sweeping changes without consulting Congress, and geopolitical tensions are on the rise in the Arctic.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Renewed Violence in Afghanistan Endangers Peace Deal
If nearly two months of Taliban attacks hadn’t made it clear that the U.S. peace deal with the militant group was running behind schedule, attacks targeting a Kabul hospital and a funeral in Afghanistan on Tuesday showed that that the uptick in violence poses a significant threat to the shaky bargain to end nearly 19 years of war. The Taliban has denied any role in the attacks.
While the Taliban has stuck to March pledges not to attack foreign troops in Afghanistan, Pentagon officials had already said the level of violence was “unacceptably high.” That was before gunmen stormed a maternity hospital on Tuesday, killing two dozen people including newborns. On the same day, an Islamic State-linked group said it carried out the suicide bombing in nearby Nangarhar province that killed 25 people.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned the attacks as an “act of sheer evil” in a statement. The Afghan government has already blamed the hospital attacks on the Taliban, announcing that it would resume offensive operations against the group—potentially derailing years of careful U.S.-led diplomacy.
With the peace talks still snagged on the Taliban’s demands for the release of as many as 5,000 prisoners—a deal-breaker for the Afghan government—the Trump administration concedes that one of its signature foreign-policy accomplishments is in jeopardy. “As long as there is no sustained reduction in violence and insufficient progress towards a negotiated political settlement, Afghanistan will remain vulnerable to terrorism,” Pompeo said.
What We’re Watching
Acting intel chief moves ahead with overhaul. Acting U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Richard Grenell approved sweeping changes to the 17-agency U.S. intelligence community last Friday without consulting Congress. Grenell—a Trump loyalist who also serves as the U.S. ambassador to Germany—had rebuffed Capitol Hill’s requests for details about the new plans. The moves will eliminate the DNI’s directorate for partnerships, which coordinates between civilian and military intelligence agencies, and makes the directorate’s chief a new advisor to the DNI.
Grenell also stirred controversy this week when he requested the identities of Obama administration officials who might have allowed the “unmasking” of former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn.
U.S. Navy returns to the Arctic. The Arctic is becoming a geopolitical hotspot as climate change melts sea ice to historic lows, and the United States views Russia and China’s aims in the region with growing suspicion. Defense News has a must-read series of stories on the national security impacts of a less-than-frozen North, including a look at how the U.S. Navy is stepping up patrols in the Barents Sea, in Russia’s backyard, signaling the return of a substantial U.S. defense interest in the region for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
Arms sales boom in the Middle East. Arms sales in the Middle East have—for lack of a better word—exploded in recent years, thanks in large part to the United States. The Project on Middle East Democracy’s Seth Binder crunched the numbers: “Six of the top 10 importers of major arms were Arab countries, totaling nearly one-third of all global imports ($146 billion) between 2015 and 2019,” he writes . In 2017, the last year with publicly available data, “four of the top 10 purchasers of U.S. arms were Arab countries, and nearly one-third of all U.S. weapons sales ($36.6 billion), along with roughly $5 billion in U.S. security aid, went to Arab regimes.”
The end of Open Skies? European leaders are increasingly rattled by the Trump administration’s plan to withdraw from a decades-old treaty aimed at boosting military transparency with Russia. A group of 16 former senior European officials have signed an open letter to the administration urging it to reconsider withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty. The treaty allows signatories, including the United States, NATO allies, and Russia, to conduct unarmed aerial surveillance to gauge military capabilities. Trump officials have expressed concerns that Russia is violating the treaty and announced plans to withdraw—over the concerns of its NATO allies.
Movers and Shakers
More from Grenell. The acting DNI made another splash on Wednesday, appointing Neil Wiley, a career intelligence officer, to be his top deputy. Sue Gordon, a longtime CIA officer, was ousted from a Senate-confirmed version of the role after reports that Trump sought to place a political loyalist in that position.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Lebanon in freefall. Lebanon has been in political and economic turmoil for more than six months, amid non-stop street protests against elites that forced out Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his cabinet last fall. The New York Times’ Ben Hubbard breaks down the tremors shaking the value of the Lebanese pound, which only appear to be getting worse as the coronavirus pandemic has left the nation in lockdown.
A Holocaust survivor remembers. Haaretz has a must-read interview with Michael Goldmann-Gilead, a Holocaust survivor who would later go on to interrogate Adolf Eichmann—one of the Nazi architects of the “Final Solution”—after his capture by Israeli agents.
Odds and Ends
More cost-efficient than Ospreys. Nesting seagulls are apparently harassing U.S. Marine recruits on the West Coast, disrupting their training. So the Marines have hired a falconry service to use the birds of prey to scare off the seagulls from the Marine Corps training depot in San Diego.
UFO watch. For Vox, the renowned international relations scholar Alexander Wendt offers up some seriously deep thinking on why we need to take UFOs seriously. You know, just in case.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Horrific Attack on Maternity Ward Threatens to Upend Afghan Truce

KABUL—In the early morning hours on Wednesday , Mohammed Zahir buried his wife ’ s lifeless body , marks of a gunshot wound still visible on her head .
In the afternoon , he roamed the city ’ s children ’ s hospitals , trying to find his newborn child , which he ’ d been told was a boy ; but in the evening he came home empty-handed , and he broke down .
“ I don ’ t even know what he looks like or if he is even alive , ” the 30-year-old laborer said , barely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ filled with trauma and tears .
It took Zahir several more determined hospital visits , but finally , early Thursday after a long chase , he was able to find his baby—he was surprised to discover it was actually a girl—and take her home .
On Tuesday , gunmen dressed in police uniforms stormed a 100-bed hospital in Afghanistan ’ s capital of Kabul , where the aid group Médecins Sans Frontières ( MSF ) runs a maternity clinic , killing 24 people—most of them delivering mothers—and injuring dozens more .
Afghan President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offensive to fight militant groups , including the Taliban , sparking speculations about what the switch might mean for peace negotiations .
— But the complex array of militant groups now fighting in Afghanistan suggested that the latest violence could as easily have emanated from the Islamist State , which seeks to disrupt the U.S.-orchestrated peace process between the Afghan national government and the Taliban .
Tuesday ’ s attack , which hasn ’ t been claimed by any group , came on the same day that a suicide bomber targeted the funeral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s Nangarhar province , killing 32 people and injuring 133 and which was later claimed by the Islamic State .
The Taliban were quick to deny both incidents—but the Afghan government has blamed the militants for the hospital attack regardless .
MSF officials said they were “ devastated after [ the ] sickening attack on pregnant women , mothers and their babies while seeking healthcare at our maternity ward in Dasht-e-Barchi hospital , ” a west Kabul neighborhood home to about 1.5 million people—most of them ethnic Hazara , a minority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Since the beginning of the year , more than 5,000 children have been delivered at the clinic .
Thomas Ruttig , an expert on Afghanistan , believes that the hospital attack “ fits the sectarian approach of the Islamic State … which primarily acts against ethnic and religious minorities , ” and he likened it to an attack on a Sikh temple in Kabul in March that was claimed by the group .
The Taliban , he said , showed anti-Shiite tendencies during their rule between 1996 and 2001 and carried out some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turned away from such positions ” since a tentative truce with Washington was announced at the end of February , he added .
The hospital attack has since turned into a political blame game , with the different sides accusing each other of fomenting violence even as the nation struggles with a wave of coronavirus infections .
Tuesday should have been a happy day for Zahir , who already has three children .
At 5 in the morning , just as the sun was rising , he took his wife , Tahira—then in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a.m. , he received a call telling him about the birth of a baby boy .
It is not common for fathers to attend their children ’ s births in conservative Afghanistan , and maternity wards usually don ’ t allow men to enter .
Zahir was told to pick up his wife and son around 11 a.m. , but the attackers struck before he reached the hospital .
Immediately after the attack , which lasted several hours and saw the assailants killed , Ghani addressed the nation , publicly stating his mistrust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to defend the country , the security , and safety of the people and public facilities and to repel and defeat the attacks and threats of the Taliban and all terrorist groups , I instruct the country ’ s security and defense forces to return to offensive mode , instead of defensive mode , ” he said .
His office , however , later added that it “ will be ready to take any step towards peace.
” With this , the government officially launched its spring offensive—something the Taliban have usually done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refrained from this year .
“ Taliban attacks in the past weeks , the latest on Afghan National [ Defense and ] Security Forces [ ANDSF ] in Laghman , the suicide attack in a funeral in Nangarhar , and some other attacks around the country took a toll on the ANSDF and civilians , ” a spokesperson for the presidential palace told Foreign Policy .
The Taliban , which called Ghani ’ s announcement a declaration of war , claimed that Islamic State militias carried out the attack , adding that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the Islamic Emirate and the United States and endorsed by national and international parties , the Ashraf Ghani administration has been trying to create hurdles for the peace process.
” U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad called for the Taliban and the Afghan government to cooperate in spite of the latest violence .
“ Failure to do so leaves Afghanistan vulnerable to terrorism , perpetual instability & economic hardship , ” he said in a tweet .
But Ghani ’ s national security advisor , Hamdullah Mohib , accused the Taliban of not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying that “ their sponsors have now subcontracted their terror to other entities , which was one of our primary concerns from the beginning.
” Overall , a reduction of violence had been observed by all parties of the conflict prior to the U.S.-Taliban deal , signed on Feb. 29 , which was supposed to bring an end to the almost two-decade-long war .
But violence has increased over recent months as the Taliban have stepped up fighting , avoiding U.S. forces while killing hundreds of Afghan soldiers and casting doubts on whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would happen .
The insurgent group announced that 5,000 of its fighters had to be released before it would take up direct negotiations .
And following the brutal attack on the maternity clinic , many Afghans took to social media , blaming the Taliban ; while security officials tried to push the narrative that the assault had been a joint operation between the Islamic State , the Haqqani network , and Lashkar-e-Taiba , a prominent extremist group mainly active in South Asia .
On Monday , Afghanistan ’ s spy agency , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior Islamic State members—including Abu Omar Khorasani , the group ’ s head of South Asia .
Yet while it might be easy to assume that both Ghani ’ s condemnation and his announcement that forces would resume an offensive operation would augur the death of efforts to initiate a peace process , Andrew Watkins , the International Crisis Group ’ s senior analyst for Afghanistan , said the tragic reality of the peace process was that “ days like Tuesday were always a possibility.
” “ The process was designed to initiate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ If you distill the Afghan government ’ s response beyond its catalog of Taliban transgressions , they effectively demand a cease-fire before moving forward with the talks .
It is key to note that the Afghan government has adopted this posture at more than one point in the past.
” But even as the international community called for a cessation of violence during the coronavirus pandemic , attacks have peaked throughout Afghanistan .
According to the United Nations , 1,293 civilians were wounded or killed in Kabul alone during the first quarter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lowest figure since 2012 , violence grew considerably during March , and civilian deaths caused by militant groups increased by 22 percent compared with the first quarter of 2019 .
At Ataturk Children ’ s Hospital , eight newborn babies—brought here by ambulances after being evacuated from the maternity clinic under attack—have remained in the care of doctors and nurses since Tuesday .
Eleven babies had already been identified and picked up by relatives .
“ Several families came by , in search for their lost babies , ” said Javed Ahmad , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wrapped in fresh blankets , the eight remaining children lay on beds quietly , their mothers ’ lives likely lost .
Ahmad admitted that the hospital had no capacity for DNA testing but instead relied on the small wristbands , wrapped around the newborns ’ arms , carrying their mothers ’ name—their only way of identification .
Outside the hospital , a mob of women had gathered , demanding the babies be given to them and offering to care for them .
Back in Dasht-e-Barchi , Humayon Wafa , a 20-year-old police officer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the center of Tuesday ’ s attack .
Life outside the clinic continues as usual , with a busy fruit and vegetable market just steps away from the entrance , and families shopping in preparation for the night ’ s iftar , the breaking of the fast during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan .
Wafa , who witnessed the attack , hasn ’ t taken a break in several days .
“ In Afghanistan , we are always on edge , ” he explained .
“ We hope for peace , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second .
Here in Kabul , life is fragile , even for newborn babies .
”

KABUL—In the early morning hours on Wednesday, Mohammed Zahir buried his wife’s lifeless body, marks of a gunshot wound still visible on her head. In the afternoon, he roamed the city’s children’s hospitals, trying to find his newborn child, which he'd been told was a boy; but in the evening he came home empty-handed, and he broke down.
KABUL—In the early morning hours on Wednesday, Mohammed Zahir buried his wife’s lifeless body, marks of a gunshot wound still visible on her head. In the afternoon, he roamed the city’s children’s hospitals, trying to find his newborn child, which he’d been told was a boy; but in the evening he came home empty-handed, and he broke down.
“I don’t even know what he looks like or if he is even alive,” the 30-year-old laborer said, barely able to speak, his swollen eyes filled with trauma and tears. It took Zahir several more determined hospital visits, but finally, early Thursday after a long chase, he was able to find his baby—he was surprised to discover it was actually a girl—and take her home.
On Tuesday, gunmen dressed in police uniforms stormed a 100-bed hospital in Afghanistan’s capital of Kabul, where the aid group Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) runs a maternity clinic, killing 24 people—most of them delivering mothers—and injuring dozens more. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has since announced an active offensive to fight militant groups, including the Taliban, sparking speculations about what the switch might mean for peace negotiations. —
But the complex array of militant groups now fighting in Afghanistan suggested that the latest violence could as easily have emanated from the Islamist State, which seeks to disrupt the U.S.-orchestrated peace process between the Afghan national government and the Taliban. Tuesday’s attack, which hasn’t been claimed by any group, came on the same day that a suicide bomber targeted the funeral of a local police commander in the country’s Nangarhar province, killing 32 people and injuring 133 and which was later claimed by the Islamic State. The Taliban were quick to deny both incidents—but the Afghan government has blamed the militants for the hospital attack regardless.
MSF officials said they were “devastated after [the] sickening attack on pregnant women, mothers and their babies while seeking healthcare at our maternity ward in Dasht-e-Barchi hospital,” a west Kabul neighborhood home to about 1.5 million people—most of them ethnic Hazara, a minority group that continues to face discrimination. Since the beginning of the year, more than 5,000 children have been delivered at the clinic.
Thomas Ruttig, an expert on Afghanistan, believes that the hospital attack “fits the sectarian approach of the Islamic State … which primarily acts against ethnic and religious minorities,” and he likened it to an attack on a Sikh temple in Kabul in March that was claimed by the group. The Taliban, he said, showed anti-Shiite tendencies during their rule between 1996 and 2001 and carried out some Shiite massacres but have meanwhile “officially turned away from such positions” since then, a position reinforced by a tentative truce with Washington was announced at the end of February.
The hospital attack has since turned into a political blame game, with the different sides accusing each other of fomenting violence even as the nation struggles with a wave of coronavirus infections.
Mohammed Zahir, 30, who lost his wife in the attack after she had given birth to a baby boy, roams Kabul's hospitals on May 13 hoping to find his son who he had not yet met.
Tuesday should have been a happy day for Zahir, who already has three children. At 5 in the morning, just as the sun was rising, he took his wife, Tahira—then in labor—to the hospital. Shortly after 6:30 a.m., he received a call telling him about the birth of a baby boy. It is not common for fathers to attend their children’s births in conservative Afghanistan, and maternity wards usually don’t allow men to enter. Zahir was told to pick up his wife and son around 11 a.m., but the attackers struck before he reached the hospital.
Immediately after the attack, which lasted several hours and saw the assailants killed, Ghani addressed the nation, publicly stating his mistrust toward the Taliban.
“In order to defend the country, the security, and safety of the people and public facilities and to repel and defeat the attacks and threats of the Taliban and all terrorist groups, I instruct the country’s security and defense forces to return to offensive mode, instead of defensive mode,” he said. His office, however, later added that it “will be ready to take any step towards peace.”
With this, the government officially launched its spring offensive—something the Taliban have usually done in previous years but have so far refrained from this year. “Taliban attacks in the past weeks, the latest on Afghan National [Defense and] Security Forces [ANDSF] in Laghman, the suicide attack in a funeral in Nangarhar, and some other attacks around the country took a toll on the ANSDF and civilians,” a spokesperson for the presidential palace told Foreign Policy.
The Taliban, which called Ghani’s announcement a declaration of war, claimed that Islamic State militias carried out the attack, adding that “from the day the agreement was signed between the Islamic Emirate and the United States and endorsed by national and international parties, the Ashraf Ghani administration has been trying to create hurdles for the peace process.”
U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad called for the Taliban and the Afghan government to cooperate in spite of the latest violence. “Failure to do so leaves Afghanistan vulnerable to terrorism, perpetual instability & economic hardship,” he said in a tweet.
But Ghani’s national security advisor, Hamdullah Mohib, accused the Taliban of not being able to control the violence, saying that “their sponsors have now subcontracted their terror to other entities, which was one of our primary concerns from the beginning.” Overall, a reduction of violence had been observed by all parties of the conflict prior to the U.S.-Taliban deal, signed on Feb. 29, which was supposed to bring an end to the almost two-decade-long war.
But violence has increased over recent months as the Taliban have stepped up fighting, avoiding U.S. forces while killing hundreds of Afghan soldiers and casting doubts on whether direct talks between the government and Taliban would happen. The insurgent group announced that 5,000 of its fighters had to be released before it would take up direct negotiations.
And following the brutal attack on the maternity clinic, many Afghans took to social media, blaming the Taliban; while security officials tried to push the narrative that the assault had been a joint operation between the Islamic State, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a prominent extremist group mainly active in South Asia.
Newborn babies—whose mothers have not been found yet—lie at Ataturk Hospital in Kabul on May 13 after the maternity ward attack.
On Monday, Afghanistan’s spy agency, the National Directorate of Security, arrested three senior Islamic State members—including Abu Omar Khorasani, the group’s head of South Asia.
Yet while it might be easy to assume that both Ghani’s condemnation and his announcement that forces would resume an offensive operation would augur the death of efforts to initiate a peace process, Andrew Watkins, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Afghanistan, said the tragic reality of the peace process was that “days like Tuesday were always a possibility.”
“The process was designed to initiate talks regardless,” he said. “If you distill the Afghan government’s response beyond its catalog of Taliban transgressions, they effectively demand a cease-fire before moving forward with the talks. It is key to note that the Afghan government has adopted this posture at more than one point in the past.”
But even as the international community called for a cessation of violence during the coronavirus pandemic, attacks have peaked throughout Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, 1,293 civilians were wounded or killed in Kabul alone during the first quarter of 2020. Despite this being the lowest figure since 2012, violence grew considerably during March, and civilian deaths caused by militant groups increased by 22 percent compared with the first quarter of 2019.
At Ataturk Children’s Hospital, eight newborn babies—brought here by ambulances after being evacuated from the maternity clinic under attack—have remained in the care of doctors and nurses since Tuesday. Eleven babies had already been identified and picked up by relatives. “Several families came by, in search for their lost babies,” said Javed Ahmad, the maternity ward’s manager. Wrapped in fresh blankets, the eight remaining children lay on beds quietly, their mothers’ lives likely lost.
Ahmad admitted that the hospital had no capacity for DNA testing but instead relied on the small wristbands, wrapped around the newborns’ arms, carrying their mothers’ name—their only way of identification. Outside the hospital, a mob of women had gathered, demanding the babies be given to them and offering to care for them.
Back in Dasht-e-Barchi, Humayon Wafa, a 20-year-old police officer, sat outside the hospital that was the center of Tuesday’s attack. Life outside the clinic continues as usual, with a busy fruit and vegetable market just steps away from the entrance, and families shopping in preparation for the night’s iftar, the breaking of the fast during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
Wafa, who witnessed the attack, hasn’t taken a break in several days. “In Afghanistan, we are always on edge,” he explained. “We hope for peace, but we know that violence could erupt any second. Here in Kabul, life is fragile, even for newborn babies.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--Under Cover of Pandemic, China Steps Up Brinkmanship in South China Sea

Under Cover of Pandemic , China Steps Up Brinkmanship in South China Sea While the world is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic , China has been quietly taking paramilitary and political-legal actions in the South China Sea that could be game-changing for the region .
Betting that the United States is focused elsewhere and exhausted from years of Chinese encroachments , Beijing ’ s efforts are approaching an irretrievable tipping point .
China aims to coerce its maritime neighbors to abandon their claims and territorial rights under international law and irrevocably alter the status quo .
Beijing seeks to impose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boundary it has drawn around 85 percent of the South China Sea , almost all of it in international waters , and through which $ 3.4 trillion in shipped goods pass each year—freely , at least for now .
A bit like Russia in Crimea , Beijing is creating facts on the ground .
China ’ s claims to the disputed islets and reefs encompassing the Paracel and Spratly islands—which it calls Xisha and Nansha , respectively—have a questionable basis in international law and are based instead on an oval-shaped series of dashes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sea .
These islets , some of which Beijing has artificially reclaimed and fortified with military bases , overlap with claims by Malaysia , the Philippines , Vietnam , and Brunei .
China ’ s line was originally drawn by the pre-Communist government of Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 and modified in 1952 by Mao Zedong .
In 2009 , in a diplomatic note to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf , China attached the dashed-line map and claimed that it had “ indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.
” Beijing has pressed that claim with growing assertiveness ever since , all the while exploiting the ambiguity of terms such as “ adjacent ” and “ relevant.
” Never mind that Beijing ’ s claims are fundamentally incompatible with established international law on maritime boundaries , the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , which China has ratified and by which it professes to abide .
Never mind , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fraudulent by an international tribunal in The Hague .
This is part of a broader Chinese strategy to create its own version of the Monroe Doctrine , the 19th-century policy by which the United States claimed all of North and South America as its rightful area of control at the exclusion of the European powers .
Beijing seeks a sphere of decisive influence with military defense capabilities to raise the cost of any potential U.S. intervention .
In short , while the world fights COVID-19 , China is moving closer to establishing regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response by the United States and the countries in the region , will determine whether the region ’ s future will be one of openness and shared prosperity or coercion and conflict .
Trying to create a fait accompli is the only way to interpret Beijing ’ s behavior in recent weeks .
On April 18 , China declared the establishment of two new administrative districts , one headquartered on Fiery Cross Reef , an artificial island in the Spratlys , and the other on Woody Island in the Paracels .
It has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not only artificial ones but also 55 entities that are permanently underwater .
These actions are meant to create new facts to buttress claims to control the 1.4 million square miles of the South China Sea .
To enforce these claims over the past year , China has ramped up the pressure by using its three navies—the fleets of the People ’ s Liberation Army , China Coast Guard , and maritime militia—in waters off Indonesia , Malaysia , Vietnam , and the Philippines .
Its illegal fishing has led Indonesia to step @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than a dozen Chinese fishing boats around the Natuna Islands , internationally recognized to lie in Indonesian waters .
Rather than back off , China resumed illegal fishing around the Natuna Islands at the end of March .
While China does not dispute Indonesia ’ s sovereignty over the area , Beijing makes the absurd claim that these have been “ traditional Chinese fishing grounds since ancient times , ” as if Indonesian , Malaysian , or Vietnamese fishermen ( whom Chinese vessels systematically harass ) did not exist in the past .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the stakes over the past year by threatening major offshore oil and gas projects inside Malaysia ’ s and Vietnam ’ s internationally recognized exclusive economic zones ( EEZs ) .
( A country ’ s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles off its shores . )
In late April , a Chinese survey ship escorted by the China Coast Guard harassed an exploration vessel operated by the Malaysian energy giant Petronas inside Malaysia ’ s EEZ .
The intimidation of the drillship followed similar standoffs last year .
Before reaching Malaysia , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EEZ near the site of a previous incident .
In 2019 , Chinese and Vietnamese ships tried to block each other ’ s exploration of five offshore oil blocs inside Vietnam ’ s EEZ .
This has raised worries in the region that China is trying to disrupt and gradually strangle Malaysian and Vietnamese oil and gas operations in the area and erase their territorial claims .
The cost to Malaysia will be severe if Petronas has to pull the plug on important projects .
Similarly , Hanoi fears that ExxonMobil and Rosneft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese harassment continues .
China ’ s gambit is an existential test of the United States ’ position and credibility in Asia .
Equally , China is challenging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) , which brings together countries opposed to Chinese expansion but with little record of standing up to Beijing with anything other than rhetoric and diplomacy .
The United States has no territorial claims but an enduring vital interest in freedom of navigation .
To date , the U.S. response to China ’ s bellicosity has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of so-called freedom of navigation operations by the U.S. Navy in international waters claimed by China .
These operations are necessary but not sufficient , as they have had no visible impact on Chinese behavior so far .
Similarly , while ASEAN wags its finger at Beijing , the organization has spent nearly 20 fruitless years trying to negotiate a code of conduct for the South China Sea with Beijing.The central role in standing up to China will fall on ASEAN , a potentially powerful alliance of 10 nations with 625 million people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GDP .
The central role in standing up to China will fall on ASEAN , a potentially powerful alliance of 10 nations with 625 million people and nearly $ 3 trillion in combined GDP .
But because ASEAN ’ s decisions require unanimous consent , forceful action has been blocked by two of its members , Cambodia and Laos , that are beholden to Beijing—giving China a de facto veto in the bloc .
ASEAN needs to reinvent its decision-making process or risk irrelevance .
If ASEAN can not find the will to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ASEAN members that do want to act should form a maritime bloc as a coalition of the willing .
Bolder Asian action also requires reliable U.S. leadership .
Regional players fear that provoking China will result in economic coercion .
But Beijing ’ s recent actions have spurred an unusually strong reaction from maritime ASEAN states fearing permanent Chinese pressure .
Sea-bordering Southeast Asian countries are acutely aware that inaction risks giving Beijing permanent control over economic and military activities in the South China Sea—which would be a mortal blow to their strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a U.S.-led coalition .
The United States , Japan , and Australia would be wise to take the lead in crafting a code of conduct for the Western Pacific based on recognized international law and established maritime legal institutions .
If ASEAN can take collective action , China ’ s power over its member countries will dissipate .
Conversely , Beijing ’ s bullying tactics are most effective when it successfully divides and isolates its neighbors .
After the China Coast Guard sank a Vietnamese ship and injured eight fishermen on April @ @ @ @ @ @ @ took the rare step of expressing support for Vietnam .
Beijing took note .
Similarly , it made a difference when Vietnam rescued Filipino fishermen who were stranded last year after a suspected Chinese maritime militia vessel sank their boat .
Preventing the Western Pacific from turning into a China-owned lake requires working together to defend partners and international law .
Maritime states like the Philippines , Vietnam , Indonesia , Malaysia , and Brunei should enhance cooperation by coordinating their coast guard operations , increasing their sharing of intelligence , and reaching @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Sea maritime boundaries should be demarcated .
Meanwhile , the United States should act as a catalyst for the region ’ s defense by funding the bipartisan congressional Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative , which would provide military funding and build on earlier efforts .
If Beijing ’ s South China Sea gambit succeeds , it would be a ruinous blow to U.S. credibility , rippling across U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region .
China understands the stakes and so must ASEAN and the United States .

While the world is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic, China has been quietly taking paramilitary and political-legal actions in the South China Sea that could be game-changing for the region. Betting that the United States is focused elsewhere and exhausted from years of Chinese encroachments, Beijing’s efforts are approaching an irretrievable tipping point. China aims to coerce its maritime neighbors to abandon their claims and territorial rights under international law and irrevocably alter the status quo. Beijing seeks to impose its so-called nine-dash line , an unrecognized boundary it has drawn around 85 percent of the South China Sea, almost all of it in international waters, and through which $3.4 trillion in shipped goods pass each year—freely, at least for now.
While the world is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic, China has been quietly taking paramilitary and political-legal actions in the South China Sea that could be game-changing for the region. Betting that the United States is focused elsewhere and exhausted from years of Chinese encroachments, Beijing’s efforts are approaching an irretrievable tipping point. China aims to coerce its maritime neighbors to abandon their claims and territorial rights under international law and irrevocably alter the status quo. Beijing seeks to impose its so-called nine-dash line, an unrecognized boundary it has drawn around 85 percent of the South China Sea, almost all of it in international waters, and through which $3.4 trillion in shipped goods pass each year—freely, at least for now.
A bit like Russia in Crimea, Beijing is creating facts on the ground. China’s claims to the disputed islets and reefs encompassing the Paracel and Spratly islands—which it calls Xisha and Nansha, respectively—have a questionable basis in international law and are based instead on an oval-shaped series of dashes drawn on map of the South China Sea. These islets, some of which Beijing has artificially reclaimed and fortified with military bases, overlap with claims by Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei. China’s line was originally drawn by the pre-Communist government of Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 and modified in 1952 by Mao Zedong. In 2009, in a diplomatic note to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, China attached the dashed-line map and claimed that it had “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” Beijing has pressed that claim with growing assertiveness ever since, all the while exploiting the ambiguity of terms such as “adjacent” and “relevant.”
Disputed Claims in the South China Sea
Never mind that Beijing’s claims are fundamentally incompatible with established international law on maritime boundaries, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which China has ratified and by which it professes to abide. Never mind, as well, that the claims have been ruled fraudulent by an international tribunal in The Hague. This is part of a broader Chinese strategy to create its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, the 19th-century policy by which the United States claimed all of North and South America as its rightful area of control at the exclusion of the European powers. Beijing seeks a sphere of decisive influence with military defense capabilities to raise the cost of any potential U.S. intervention. In short, while the world fights COVID-19, China is moving closer to establishing regional dominion.
These actions, and the response by the United States and the countries in the region, will determine whether the region’s future will be one of openness and shared prosperity or coercion and conflict.
Trying to create a fait accompli is the only way to interpret Beijing’s behavior in recent weeks. On April 18, China declared the establishment of two new administrative districts, one headquartered on Fiery Cross Reef, an artificial island in the Spratlys, and the other on Woody Island in the Paracels. It has named 80 islets and reefs, including not only artificial ones but also 55 entities that are permanently underwater. These actions are meant to create new facts to buttress claims to control the 1.4 million square miles of the South China Sea.
To enforce these claims over the past year, China has ramped up the pressure by using its three navies—the fleets of the People’s Liberation Army, China Coast Guard, and maritime militia—in waters off Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Its illegal fishing has led Indonesia to step up naval actions, including sinking more than a dozen Chinese fishing boats around the Natuna Islands, internationally recognized to lie in Indonesian waters. Rather than back off, China resumed illegal fishing around the Natuna Islands at the end of March. While China does not dispute Indonesia’s sovereignty over the area, Beijing makes the absurd claim that these have been “traditional Chinese fishing grounds since ancient times,” as if Indonesian, Malaysian, or Vietnamese fishermen (whom Chinese vessels systematically harass) did not exist in the past.
More ominously, Beijing has been raising the stakes over the past year by threatening major offshore oil and gas projects inside Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s internationally recognized exclusive economic zones (EEZs). (A country’s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles off its shores.) In late April, a Chinese survey ship escorted by the China Coast Guard harassed an exploration vessel operated by the Malaysian energy giant Petronas inside Malaysia’s EEZ. The intimidation of the drillship followed similar standoffs last year. Before reaching Malaysia, the survey ship sailed through Vietnam’s EEZ near the site of a previous incident. In 2019, Chinese and Vietnamese ships tried to block each other’s exploration of five offshore oil blocs inside Vietnam’s EEZ. This has raised worries in the region that China is trying to disrupt and gradually strangle Malaysian and Vietnamese oil and gas operations in the area and erase their territorial claims. The cost to Malaysia will be severe if Petronas has to pull the plug on important projects. Similarly, Hanoi fears that ExxonMobil and Rosneft might abandon projects in Vietnamese waters if Chinese harassment continues.
China’s gambit is an existential test of the United States’ position and credibility in Asia. Equally, China is challenging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which brings together countries opposed to Chinese expansion but with little record of standing up to Beijing with anything other than rhetoric and diplomacy. The United States has no territorial claims but an enduring vital interest in freedom of navigation. To date, the U.S. response to China’s bellicosity has been mainly diplomatic condemnation and a ramping up of so-called freedom of navigation operations by the U.S. Navy in international waters claimed by China. These operations are necessary but not sufficient, as they have had no visible impact on Chinese behavior so far. Similarly, while ASEAN wags its finger at Beijing, the organization has spent nearly 20 fruitless years trying to negotiate a code of conduct for the South China Sea with Beijing.The central role in standing up to China will fall on ASEAN, a potentially powerful alliance of 10 nations with 625 million people and nearly $3 trillion in combined GDP.
The central role in standing up to China will fall on ASEAN, a potentially powerful alliance of 10 nations with 625 million people and nearly $3 trillion in combined GDP. But because ASEAN’s decisions require unanimous consent, forceful action has been blocked by two of its members, Cambodia and Laos, that are beholden to Beijing—giving China a de facto veto in the bloc. ASEAN needs to reinvent its decision-making process or risk irrelevance. If ASEAN cannot find the will to act as a bloc, then those ASEAN members that do want to act should form a maritime bloc as a coalition of the willing.
Bolder Asian action also requires reliable U.S. leadership. Regional players fear that provoking China will result in economic coercion. But Beijing’s recent actions have spurred an unusually strong reaction from maritime ASEAN states fearing permanent Chinese pressure. Sea-bordering Southeast Asian countries are acutely aware that inaction risks giving Beijing permanent control over economic and military activities in the South China Sea—which would be a mortal blow to their strategic autonomy. The time is therefore ripe for a U.S.-led coalition. The United States, Japan, and Australia would be wise to take the lead in crafting a code of conduct for the Western Pacific based on recognized international law and established maritime legal institutions.
If ASEAN can take collective action, China’s power over its member countries will dissipate. Conversely, Beijing’s bullying tactics are most effective when it successfully divides and isolates its neighbors. After the China Coast Guard sank a Vietnamese ship and injured eight fishermen on April 3, the Philippine Foreign Affairs Department took the rare step of expressing support for Vietnam. Beijing took note. Similarly, it made a difference when Vietnam rescued Filipino fishermen who were stranded last year after a suspected Chinese maritime militia vessel sank their boat.
Preventing the Western Pacific from turning into a China-owned lake requires working together to defend partners and international law. Maritime states like the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei should enhance cooperation by coordinating their coast guard operations, increasing their sharing of intelligence, and reaching an accord on how their overlapping South China Sea maritime boundaries should be demarcated.
Meanwhile, the United States should act as a catalyst for the region’s defense by funding the bipartisan congressional Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which would provide military funding and build on earlier efforts. If Beijing’s South China Sea gambit succeeds, it would be a ruinous blow to U.S. credibility, rippling across U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. China understands the stakes and so must ASEAN and the United States.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-14--As Rohingya Boats Keep Sailing, Southeast Asia Turns a Blind Eye

The ink was barely dry on a statement by Southeast Asian governments pledging to leave “ no one behind ” in the coronavirus pandemic when reports of hundreds of Rohingya refugees adrift in the Andaman Sea emerged in early April .
But instead of showing solidarity , the countries demurred on sending out search and rescue missions or granting access .
When one of the boats approached Malaysia hoping to land , the navy pushed it back—giving the desperate passengers food but refusing to tow them to land .
The boats lingered at sea for two months before nearly 400 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April 15 .
Another boat with almost 300 Rohingyas languished in Bangladeshi waters for weeks before its navy reluctantly rescued them on May 7 .
Calls by Dhaka for more support from Southeast Asia have fallen on deaf ears .
In the meantime , pushed out by the ongoing persecution and violence in Myanmar and hardship in the Bangladeshi camps , the Muslim minority continues to flee by boat .
The Malaysian government points to the coronavirus threat as justification for turning the refugees away .
Bangladesh is asking why it should again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rohingyas ’ rescue , calling for Western countries to act instead of chastising others .
But while people are starving , there is no time for whataboutism .
Human rights organizations have called the refusal to help a “ death sentence ” that might turn the Andaman Sea into a “ graveyard.
” Such repudiations are not new for the Rohingya or for other victims of human rights violations in Southeast Asia .
Among states where human rights abuses are rife , resources often scarce , and the principle of noninterference reigns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ look the other way when needed .
Branded as illegal immigrants by the Myanmar government despite being born in Myanmar , the Muslim minority has faced brutal violence and discrimination for years .
Rohingyas have fled Myanmar by the hundreds of thousands after being stripped of their rights , confined to camps , and worse .
Nearly a million now live in refugee camps in Bangladesh ’ s Cox ’ s Bazar , the vast majority of whom arrived after a brutal August 2017 military campaign by Myanmar ’ s army , described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Each year before monsoon season , hundreds or thousands escape by sea , paying vast sums of money to smugglers to leave Myanmar .
The journey has always carried deep risks , from the tumultuous waters to the traffickers themselves , who have held refugees hostage while extorting more money from their families .
In the summer of 2015 , when a Thai army general was arrested for running trafficking camps on the Thailand-Malaysia border , traffickers rapidly abandoned their human cargo , and hundreds died at sea .
But the trafficking never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were lined up by the shore in Bangladesh after a trawler carrying more than 100 Rohingyas capsized .
More boats may meet the same fate as Southeast Asian nations turn further inward , citing coronavirus pressure .
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet warned of a “ human tragedy of terrible proportions.
” The U.N. estimates there are still hundreds of Rohingya men , women , and children left in potentially deadly limbo in the Andaman Sea .
An idea of the conditions on these boats was given in mid-April as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than skin and bone , staggered onto the shore after being rescued from a trafficking boat .
Several dozen on the same boat died at sea .
On May 7 , a boat with 280 Rohingyas originally bound for Malaysia was finally let ashore in Bangladesh after a weekslong standoff .
The asylum-seekers were brought straight to an island hours from the refugee camps at Cox ’ s Bazar , opposed by aid groups for its unlivable conditions .
The world has relied on Bangladesh to host Rohingya refugees for years .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit a wall , with the government refusing to meet the minimum guarantees for their safe return .
In turn , Dhaka has put pressure on the refugees themselves .
The government has restricted the ability for Rohingyas to work , buy SIM cards , learn the local language , or move freely and has started to build barbed wire fences around the camps .
After years of persecution , a small civil society emerged in the camps , only to be cracked down on .
Internet access has been restricted since June @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , have long been silent about holding Myanmar—the root cause of all the Rohingyas ’ suffering—accountable for its crimes .
It was Gambia , a small Muslim-majority country , that made the important step last year of taking Myanmar to the International Court of Justice in The Hague .
If the moral compass of the Southeast Asian nations fails to compel them to save Rohingya lives , international law should .
Under the principle of non-refoulement , states are prohibited from pushing back anyone at risk of persecution , obligating them to let @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rights Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) , meanwhile , includes the right to seek and receive asylum .
As long as ASEAN shirks these responsibilities , needless suffering will continue .
“ We only survive here ” is something Rohingyas have repeatedly told me while reporting from the refugee camps over the years .
The world doesn ’ t even seem to grant them this right , let alone the chance to strive for something better .

The ink was barely dry on a statement by Southeast Asian governments pledging to leave “no one behind” in the coronavirus pandemic when reports of hundreds of Rohingya refugees adrift in the Andaman Sea emerged in early April.
The ink was barely dry on a statement by Southeast Asian governments pledging to leave “no one behind” in the coronavirus pandemic when reports of hundreds of Rohingya refugees adrift in the Andaman Sea emerged in early April.
But instead of showing solidarity, the countries demurred on sending out search and rescue missions or granting access. When one of the boats approached Malaysia hoping to land, the navy pushed it back—giving the desperate passengers food but refusing to tow them to land. The boats lingered at sea for two months before nearly 400 emaciated refugees were rescued by Bangladesh on April 15. Another boat with almost 300 Rohingyas languished in Bangladeshi waters for weeks before its navy reluctantly rescued them on May 7. Calls by Dhaka for more support from Southeast Asia have fallen on deaf ears. In the meantime, pushed out by the ongoing persecution and violence in Myanmar and hardship in the Bangladeshi camps, the Muslim minority continues to flee by boat.
The Malaysian government points to the coronavirus threat as justification for turning the refugees away. Bangladesh is asking why it should again be its job to come to the Rohingyas’ rescue, calling for Western countries to act instead of chastising others. But while people are starving, there is no time for whataboutism. Human rights organizations have called the refusal to help a “death sentence” that might turn the Andaman Sea into a “graveyard.”
Such repudiations are not new for the Rohingya or for other victims of human rights violations in Southeast Asia. Among states where human rights abuses are rife, resources often scarce, and the principle of noninterference reigns, governments can count on one another to look the other way when needed.
Branded as illegal immigrants by the Myanmar government despite being born in Myanmar, the Muslim minority has faced brutal violence and discrimination for years. Rohingyas have fled Myanmar by the hundreds of thousands after being stripped of their rights, confined to camps, and worse. Nearly a million now live in refugee camps in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar, the vast majority of whom arrived after a brutal August 2017 military campaign by Myanmar’s army, described as genocide by the United Nations.
Each year before monsoon season, hundreds or thousands escape by sea, paying vast sums of money to smugglers to leave Myanmar. The journey has always carried deep risks, from the tumultuous waters to the traffickers themselves, who have held refugees hostage while extorting more money from their families. In the summer of 2015, when a Thai army general was arrested for running trafficking camps on the Thailand-Malaysia border, traffickers rapidly abandoned their human cargo, and hundreds died at sea. But the trafficking never stopped. This February, shrouded corpses were lined up by the shore in Bangladesh after a trawler carrying more than 100 Rohingyas capsized. More boats may meet the same fate as Southeast Asian nations turn further inward, citing coronavirus pressure.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet warned of a “human tragedy of terrible proportions.” The U.N. estimates there are still hundreds of Rohingya men, women, and children left in potentially deadly limbo in the Andaman Sea.
An idea of the conditions on these boats was given in mid-April as some 400 emaciated Rohingyas, many not more than skin and bone, staggered onto the shore after being rescued from a trafficking boat. Several dozen on the same boat died at sea. On May 7, a boat with 280 Rohingyas originally bound for Malaysia was finally let ashore in Bangladesh after a weekslong standoff. The asylum-seekers were brought straight to an island hours from the refugee camps at Cox’s Bazar, opposed by aid groups for its unlivable conditions.
The world has relied on Bangladesh to host Rohingya refugees for years. Efforts to repatriate them to Myanmar have hit a wall, with the government refusing to meet the minimum guarantees for their safe return. In turn, Dhaka has put pressure on the refugees themselves. The government has restricted the ability for Rohingyas to work, buy SIM cards, learn the local language, or move freely and has started to build barbed wire fences around the camps. After years of persecution, a small civil society emerged in the camps, only to be cracked down on. Internet access has been restricted since June 2019.
Southeast Asian governments, meanwhile, have long been silent about holding Myanmar—the root cause of all the Rohingyas’ suffering—accountable for its crimes. It was Gambia, a small Muslim-majority country, that made the important step last year of taking Myanmar to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
If the moral compass of the Southeast Asian nations fails to compel them to save Rohingya lives, international law should. Under the principle of non-refoulement, states are prohibited from pushing back anyone at risk of persecution, obligating them to let the refugees ashore instead. The Human Rights Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), meanwhile, includes the right to seek and receive asylum. As long as ASEAN shirks these responsibilities, needless suffering will continue.
“We only survive here” is something Rohingyas have repeatedly told me while reporting from the refugee camps over the years. The world doesn’t even seem to grant them this right, let alone the chance to strive for something better.