foreignpolicy--2020-07-24--Trump Is Escalating the Trade Fight With Europe—and There’s No Easy Way Out

Trump Is Escalating the Trade Fight With Europe—and There ’ s No Easy Way Out When the United States and the European Union fight over trade , it might lack the intensity and geopolitical impact of the U.S.-Chinese trade war .
But what trans-Atlantic trade disputes have so far lacked in drama , they make up for with a history of irreconcilable differences and sheer tenacity—which does not bode well for the relationship going forward , no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election .
Take the dispute of more than 15 years over the various government subsidies enjoyed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friday , Airbus and the European Commission announced they would change the terms of state support in an effort to persuade the United States to lift $ 7.5 billion in tariffs .
The move came after Washington escalated the dispute last month by serving notice that it would strike the EU with a particularly punitive form of tariffs .
Under the so-called carousel retaliation , the United States said it would rotate its current tariffs of 10 to 25 percent on European products to a different set of items every six months , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , olives , and gin .
Washington has not yet said whether it is prepared to lift the tariffs in response to the EU ’ s new move .
The two sides have a history of rejecting each other ’ s overtures .
An assertive China needs a strong , coordinated response from the United States and Europe—instead , the two are mired in their own increasingly caustic trade battles.The ongoing Airbus-Boeing dispute was one of several that derailed the grandly named Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership , which was supposed to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ superpowers of trade at a time when the growing challenge from China was becoming apparent .
But in 2016 , after three years and 15 rounds of negotiations , the planned agreement died without a single chapter being concluded .
Growing popular opposition on both sides of the Atlantic to trade deals that were seen as infringements on sovereignty , and the inability of Brussels and Washington to agree on the proper role for government regulation and subsidies , doomed the effort .
Few mourned its passing when the deal was quietly abandoned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ office and began his systematic pushback against trade .
Today , with the once rule-bound world of global trade nearly unrecognizable , the failure of that U.S.-EU deal looms much larger .
An increasingly assertive China , which has refused to bow to U.S. trade demands—while cracking down on domestic dissent and imposing a new security law on Hong Kong—needs a strong , coordinated response from the United States and Europe , which share similar interests and together dominate global trade .
Instead , the two are mired in their own increasingly caustic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reiterated his threat to impose a hefty tariff on European cars , mainly aimed at German companies such as Volkswagen and Daimler .
In front of reporters last week , Trump claimed that the EU was “ formed in order to take advantage of the United States , ” and he has frequently said that Europe “ treats us worse than China.
” The United States has also launched an investigation under Section 301 , the same law used to impose tariffs on China , into new digital taxes levied or under consideration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ member states .
The EU , in turn , has promised to retaliate in kind against any new U.S. tariffs .
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan warned that he expected an especially turbulent relationship with the United States in the months leading up to the November presidential election .
The feud is particularly corrosive given the otherwise shared values of the world ’ s two largest trading powers , which should be a model to the rest of the world .
The building of the modern global trade system was a project led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several decades following World War II .
If the two can not find ways to cooperate—on trade and economic relations , on defense , and on shared global challenges such as pandemics and climate change—then the prospects for the future world order are dim .
Instead , the two are now setting an example of how not to resolve differences .
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan is expecting an especially turbulent relationship with the United States leading up to the November presidential election.How did the relationship deteriorate so badly—and can it be healed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both to understand the underlying U.S.-EU tensions and to learn lessons for resolving them , is the futile struggle between Boeing and Airbus over dominance of the world ’ s civilian aircraft market .
Since Airbus ’ s government-backed creation in 1970 , initially as an alliance of several smaller European aircraft manufacturers , it has been Europe ’ s champion and a global leader in aviation .
Boeing has lost much of its luster since the two deadly crashes of its new 737-MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019 , and the subsequent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company is still the largest U.S. exporter and the closest thing to a national manufacturing champion .
The two companies have been locked in mortal combat since the mid-1980s , when Airbus snatched large orders from U.S. airlines such as Pan Am , Northwest , and American .
The United States argues that Airbus succeeded largely because of generous financing from European governments that violated global trade rules ; Airbus argues that Boeing has enjoyed similar benefits through its lucrative Pentagon and NASA contracts and various state-level tax breaks .
Part of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is playing out again with the rise of China : To what extent should countries be permitted to bend the rules in order for their companies to catch up with dominant market leaders ?
There is no legal answer to this question ; it requires a negotiated settlement , however difficult those negotiations might be .
Europe is not going to abandon its ambitions to be a leading aerospace power , nor is the United States going to permit Boeing to be crippled by competition from Airbus .
But instead of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the U.S. government filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) in 2004 , and Europe responded with a counter-complaint .
Fought out by the world ’ s most expensive trade lawyers , the dispute has dragged on 16 years without resolution .
Last year , the WTO ruled that the United States was entitled to $ 7.5 billion in “ damages ” ( WTO-speak for the right to impose tariffs ) , and is widely expected to make a similar ruling in favor of Airbus this fall , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , perhaps as much as $ 10 billion .
In other words , 16 years of fighting have achieved nothing but new tariffs that hurt exporters of unrelated products , and that have not helped either company .
And it ’ s anything but clear whether the latest move by Airbus will finally bring the fight to a long-overdue resolution .
That self-destructive failure has set a template for U.S.-EU trade relations .
Instead of finding mutually acceptable resolutions to trade problems , each side has dug in deeper , often inflaming public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. chickens safely disinfected with chlorine and corn grown from genetically modified seeds ?
Do U.S. companies such as Amazon and Apple unfairly benefit from differences in corporate tax rules ?
Each has become the stuff of epic trade fights , with neither side willing to reach a compromise or calmly live with their differences .
Like rival siblings , the two sides have fought the same battles over and over , each time feeling more righteous and aggrieved than the previous time around .
During the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectors such as automobiles , where product regulations differ on the details but are nearly indistinguishable in their commitment to consumer safety .
The fights would be amusing if the stakes were not so high.The fights would be amusing if the stakes were not so high .
The inability to resolve such issues has widened the trans-Atlantic rift and left an open door for Beijing .
For example , China continues to use massive government subsidies to capture global markets in one industry after another , from steel to solar panels to automobiles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as those to Airbus and Boeing , the United States and Europe have never presented a united front to China .
On product regulations , China frequently uses nonobjective claims , as Europe does , to block imports on alleged health or safety grounds .
U.S.-European disagreements have entrenched the idea that product regulations are purely a national matter , even if they are often intentionally used to block trade .
Corporate taxation is another battleground .
With governments across the world starved for resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic , they need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies such as Apple that are increasingly effective at avoiding taxes .
The United States and Europe are threatening tariffs against each other instead of finding common ground .
Trump ’ s “ America-first ” trade policy has been especially self-destructive ; he sees every trade issue as a zero-sum battle that the United States must win at all costs , precluding any cooperation that serves both sides ’ interests .
But it should be just as clear that a victory by Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden in November would not heal all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on both sides of the Atlantic must relearn the lesson that long-term cooperation matters more than short-term gain—however popular the latter might be among politicians , voters , and opinion leaders focusing on the two sides ’ differences .
The United States and Europe need to recognize that the values and interests that unite them—not least the preservation of prosperity and global stability in the face of a rising China—are far larger than the small squabbles that divide them .

When the United States and the European Union fight over trade, it might lack the intensity and geopolitical impact of the U.S.-Chinese trade war. But what trans-Atlantic trade disputes have so far lacked in drama, they make up for with a history of irreconcilable differences and sheer tenacity—which does not bode well for the relationship going forward, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election.
When the United States and the European Union fight over trade, it might lack the intensity and geopolitical impact of the U.S.-Chinese trade war. But what trans-Atlantic trade disputes have so far lacked in drama, they make up for with a history of irreconcilable differences and sheer tenacity—which does not bode well for the relationship going forward, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election.
Take the dispute of more than 15 years over the various government subsidies enjoyed by rival aircraft-makers Airbus and Boeing. On Friday, Airbus and the European Commission announced they would change the terms of state support in an effort to persuade the United States to lift $7.5 billion in tariffs. The move came after Washington escalated the dispute last month by serving notice that it would strike the EU with a particularly punitive form of tariffs. Under the so-called carousel retaliation, the United States said it would rotate its current tariffs of 10 to 25 percent on European products to a different set of items every six months, affecting goods such as trucks, beer, olives, and gin. Washington has not yet said whether it is prepared to lift the tariffs in response to the EU’s new move. The two sides have a history of rejecting each other’s overtures.
An assertive China needs a strong, coordinated response from the United States and Europe—instead, the two are mired in their own increasingly caustic trade battles.The ongoing Airbus-Boeing dispute was one of several that derailed the grandly named Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which was supposed to be a comprehensive deal to align the two superpowers of trade at a time when the growing challenge from China was becoming apparent. But in 2016, after three years and 15 rounds of negotiations, the planned agreement died without a single chapter being concluded. Growing popular opposition on both sides of the Atlantic to trade deals that were seen as infringements on sovereignty, and the inability of Brussels and Washington to agree on the proper role for government regulation and subsidies, doomed the effort. Few mourned its passing when the deal was quietly abandoned, even before President Donald Trump assumed office and began his systematic pushback against trade.
Today, with the once rule-bound world of global trade nearly unrecognizable, the failure of that U.S.-EU deal looms much larger. An increasingly assertive China, which has refused to bow to U.S. trade demands—while cracking down on domestic dissent and imposing a new security law on Hong Kong—needs a strong, coordinated response from the United States and Europe, which share similar interests and together dominate global trade. Instead, the two are mired in their own increasingly caustic trade battles.
Last month, Trump reiterated his threat to impose a hefty tariff on European cars, mainly aimed at German companies such as Volkswagen and Daimler. In front of reporters last week, Trump claimed that the EU was “formed in order to take advantage of the United States,” and he has frequently said that Europe “treats us worse than China.” The United States has also launched an investigation under Section 301, the same law used to impose tariffs on China, into new digital taxes levied or under consideration in the EU and several of its member states. The EU, in turn, has promised to retaliate in kind against any new U.S. tariffs. EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan warned that he expected an especially turbulent relationship with the United States in the months leading up to the November presidential election.
The feud is particularly corrosive given the otherwise shared values of the world’s two largest trading powers, which should be a model to the rest of the world. The building of the modern global trade system was a project led by the United States and Europe over several decades following World War II. If the two cannot find ways to cooperate—on trade and economic relations, on defense, and on shared global challenges such as pandemics and climate change—then the prospects for the future world order are dim. Instead, the two are now setting an example of how not to resolve differences.
EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan is expecting an especially turbulent relationship with the United States leading up to the November presidential election.How did the relationship deteriorate so badly—and can it be healed? A good place to start, both to understand the underlying U.S.-EU tensions and to learn lessons for resolving them, is the futile struggle between Boeing and Airbus over dominance of the world’s civilian aircraft market. Since Airbus’s government-backed creation in 1970, initially as an alliance of several smaller European aircraft manufacturers, it has been Europe’s champion and a global leader in aviation. Boeing has lost much of its luster since the two deadly crashes of its new 737-MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, and the subsequent allegations of safety oversights, but the company is still the largest U.S. exporter and the closest thing to a national manufacturing champion. The two companies have been locked in mortal combat since the mid-1980s, when Airbus snatched large orders from U.S. airlines such as Pan Am, Northwest, and American. The United States argues that Airbus succeeded largely because of generous financing from European governments that violated global trade rules; Airbus argues that Boeing has enjoyed similar benefits through its lucrative Pentagon and NASA contracts and various state-level tax breaks.
Part of the aircraft dispute hinges on a fundamental question that is playing out again with the rise of China: To what extent should countries be permitted to bend the rules in order for their companies to catch up with dominant market leaders? There is no legal answer to this question; it requires a negotiated settlement, however difficult those negotiations might be. Europe is not going to abandon its ambitions to be a leading aerospace power, nor is the United States going to permit Boeing to be crippled by competition from Airbus. But instead of the obvious solution of reaching an amicable agreement, the U.S. government filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004, and Europe responded with a counter-complaint. Fought out by the world’s most expensive trade lawyers, the dispute has dragged on 16 years without resolution. Last year, the WTO ruled that the United States was entitled to $7.5 billion in “damages” (WTO-speak for the right to impose tariffs), and is widely expected to make a similar ruling in favor of Airbus this fall, awarding the EU its own compensatory tariffs, perhaps as much as $10 billion. In other words, 16 years of fighting have achieved nothing but new tariffs that hurt exporters of unrelated products, and that have not helped either company. And it’s anything but clear whether the latest move by Airbus will finally bring the fight to a long-overdue resolution.
That self-destructive failure has set a template for U.S.-EU trade relations. Instead of finding mutually acceptable resolutions to trade problems, each side has dug in deeper, often inflaming public opinion. Should Europe permit imports of U.S. chickens safely disinfected with chlorine and corn grown from genetically modified seeds? Do U.S. companies such as Amazon and Apple unfairly benefit from differences in corporate tax rules? Each has become the stuff of epic trade fights, with neither side willing to reach a compromise or calmly live with their differences. Like rival siblings, the two sides have fought the same battles over and over, each time feeling more righteous and aggrieved than the previous time around. During the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations, they even made scant progress in sectors such as automobiles, where product regulations differ on the details but are nearly indistinguishable in their commitment to consumer safety.
The fights would be amusing if the stakes were not so high.The fights would be amusing if the stakes were not so high. The inability to resolve such issues has widened the trans-Atlantic rift and left an open door for Beijing. For example, China continues to use massive government subsidies to capture global markets in one industry after another, from steel to solar panels to automobiles. Given their disagreements on subsidies such as those to Airbus and Boeing, the United States and Europe have never presented a united front to China. On product regulations, China frequently uses nonobjective claims, as Europe does, to block imports on alleged health or safety grounds. U.S.-European disagreements have entrenched the idea that product regulations are purely a national matter, even if they are often intentionally used to block trade. Corporate taxation is another battleground. With governments across the world starved for resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, they need to find better ways to tax global companies such as Apple that are increasingly effective at avoiding taxes. The United States and Europe are threatening tariffs against each other instead of finding common ground.
Trump’s “America-first” trade policy has been especially self-destructive; he sees every trade issue as a zero-sum battle that the United States must win at all costs, precluding any cooperation that serves both sides’ interests. But it should be just as clear that a victory by Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden in November would not heal all wounds in the U.S.-EU relationship. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must relearn the lesson that long-term cooperation matters more than short-term gain—however popular the latter might be among politicians, voters, and opinion leaders focusing on the two sides’ differences. The United States and Europe need to recognize that the values and interests that unite them—not least the preservation of prosperity and global stability in the face of a rising China—are far larger than the small squabbles that divide them.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-24--Taiwan Shows How to Carefully Snip Chinese Economic Ties

After keeping its society and economy running throughout the coronavirus pandemic , squashing the outbreak , and donating millions of face masks to many countries , Taiwan has earned a lot of positive press internationally .
But there is another vital area in which the world could also learn from Taiwan ’ s experience .
The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the enormous danger of being over-reliant on China .
The logistical vulnerabilities of concentrating manufacturing supply chains in a single country like China plus its antagonistic and unreliable behavior are pushing countries including Japan , the United States , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on China .
Japan is providing $ 2.2 billion in stimulus funds to help Japanese companies move their manufacturing plants out of China .
U.S. lawmakers are weighing proposals , including a $ 25 billion fund , to help American firms move their operations and suppliers from China .
Australia is facing a debate over whether it ’ s too dependent on China in light of recent economic threats and tariffs due to Australia ’ s global demand for an inquiry into the coronavirus pandemic .
But Taiwan ’ s situation goes far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the top destination for its exports and outbound investment—and also its main strategic opponent .
China claims Taiwan as its own territory and frequently threatens invasion , even as it works to subvert Taiwan ’ s democracy , push Taiwan out of international forums and bodies , and delegitimize the state .
Adding to this paradoxical relationship is the fact that since the 1980s , over 100,000 Taiwanese firms have moved to China to set up manufacturing facilities , attracted by cheap labor and the massive domestic Chinese market .
This significantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot of Taiwanese investment and expertise in China .
In 2019 , the U.S.-China trade war , the renewed hostility from Beijing toward the leadership of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen , and Taiwanese analysts ’ correct predictions that the situation would worsen caused Taiwan to initiate a reshoring initiative to lure its companies to move their manufacturing back home from China .
Before that , the island nation had initiated an ambitious plan called the New Southbound Policy ( NSP ) in 2016 to diversify its economy and reduce reliance on China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so , Taiwan has been well ahead of the global curve .
After the U.S. imposition of tariffs on Chinese-made products starting in 2018 , Taiwanese firms started mulling moving production to other countries , such as Vietnam .
In response , the Tsai government launched a three-year reshoring plan to attract Taiwanese companies to move back to Taiwan .
The plan offers incentives covering land supply , labor , and power , as well as tax breaks and bank loan subsidies .
It is especially targeted at innovative industrial sectors such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and green energy .
As a result , while makers of lower-margin items are going to Southeast Asia , more high-end manufacturing is moving back to Taiwan , where there is an abundance of engineering and computer talent .
In about a year and a half , the reshoring initiative has already seen Taiwanese companies pledge 1 trillion New Taiwan dollars ( about $ 33 billion ) in reinvesting in Taiwan .
Of that amount , NT $ 200 billion had already been invested in 2019 , with another NT $ 325.3 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This domestic investment by returning firms contributed to Taiwan ’ s GDP increasing by 2.73 percent in 2019 , the most in a rough year among the Four Asian Tigers ( Taiwan , Hong Kong , Singapore , and South Korea ) .
Just as importantly , the initiative will also create tens of thousands of new skilled jobs—a useful bulwark against the pandemic ’ s unexpected employment impact .
Even before the reshoring plan , Tsai launched the NSP in 2016 to reduce Taiwan ’ s economic reliance on China , boosting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia , as well as Australia and New Zealand .
Taiwan had launched previous attempts in the late 1990s and mid-2000s to increase trade and investment with regional neighbors , but the NSP is significantly broader in both the scope of countries and goals .
After four years , the NSP has seen notable gains in trade , investment , and tourism .
Taiwan ’ s trade with NSP countries grew from $ 95.8 billion in 2016 to over $ 111 billion in 2019 .
Outbound investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year on year in 2019 to $ 2.79 billion .
Meanwhile , outbound investment in China fell dramatically year on year in 2019 by 51 percent to $ 4.17 billion , which also marked the fourth consecutive annual decline in investment to China .
China , including Hong Kong , still accounted for roughly 40 percent of Taiwan ’ s exports in 2019 , twice that of the NSP countries , which collectively made up almost 20 percent .
Mainland China was Taiwan ’ s top export destination , with Hong Kong in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second with 14 percent ) , though NSP countries accounted for seven of Taiwan ’ s top 15 export destinations in 2019 .
This suggests that there is a lot of room for Taiwan to increase its trade and investment with the NSP countries .
Despite China ’ s increased belligerence toward Taiwan during Tsai ’ s presidency , trade between the two has remained strong over the past four years .
However , the coronavirus pandemic has impacted the NSP , especially in reducing trade with Southeast Asia , where several countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to be made , though the NSP will still be important during Tsai ’ s second presidential term , which runs until 2024 after she won reelection in January .
In particular , NSP public health and pharmaceutical collaborative efforts with Southeast Asian countries will be even more vital .
“ Successful flagship projects such as medical supply chain cooperation will be strengthened , while critical ones such as educational exchange will obviously continue , ” said Jeremy Huai-Che Chiang , a research associate at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation , a Taiwanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where Taiwan has broken its dependency on China , whose tourists were once a major factor due to their sheer numbers .
This was particularly necessary , as Beijing often wields tourism as a weapon , banning group tours—the main way Chinese tourists travel—to countries outside of its favor , like Taiwan .
Taiwan saw only 2.7 million Chinese tourists in 2019 , down from a high of over 4 million in 2015 , but its overall visitor numbers still rose annually from 2015 to 2019 .
In fact , 2019 saw a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a 7 percent increase from 2018 .
Taiwan more than made up for the fall in Chinese tourists by attracting more visitors from Japan , South Korea , and NSP countries , especially from Southeast Asia .
In 2019 , almost 2.2 million Japanese travelers visited Taiwan , up from 1.6 million in 2015 .
Here again , the NSP has provided a boost , as visitors from NSP countries rose by 2.7 million in 2019 , an increase of 6.6 percent from 2018 .
But this tourism decoupling was actually driven by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bid to punish Tsai for not agreeing that Taiwan is part of China , it started restricting the number of Chinese tour groups that could visit Taiwan .
Then in 2019 , in a further fit of pique , Beijing decided to ban most Chinese from visiting Taiwan as individual tourists .
Of course , it ’ s difficult to pull yourself away from the gravitational field of a nation of China ’ s size .
Due to China ’ s significant trade and influence with Southeast Asian countries , there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cooperation Taiwan can foster in that region .
“ This is the main challenge for Taiwan ’ s ambitions , which creates political obstacles for government endeavors and business operations alike .
This does not mean things are impossible , but it does mean innovative policy approaches are often needed , ” Chiang said .
This includes U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in such programs as the Global Cooperation and Training Framework ( GCTF ) , which helps Taiwanese experts share their expertise with other countries in areas including public health , disaster relief , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a focal point for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation , but of course it is only one part of bilateral cooperation .
It would be more of the U.S. and Taiwan working on new and existent programs like the GCTF program to increase Taiwan ’ s engagement with the wider region , including most of the NSP-targeted countries , ” Chiang said .
Meanwhile , not all Taiwanese companies are on board .
Some Taiwanese tycoons with operations in China have recently cited problems such as labor shortages , low domestic demand , and administrative issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relocating , according to local media .
There are political costs , too .
In 2018 , the populist candidate Han Kuo-yu of the opposition Kuomintang caused a huge shock when he won the mayoralty of Kaohsiung , a major port city in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party ’ s southern heartland .
( A U.S. equivalent would be a Republican winning the San Francisco mayoralty . )
He ran on a very China-friendly platform , which included a pledge to attract Chinese tourists in large numbers .
Disgruntled Kaohsiung business owners who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Han , who would later run and lose against Tsai in January for the presidency .
Han stepped down as Kaohsiung mayor after losing a recall referendum on June 6 .
Taiwan ’ s efforts can act as a useful model for countries such as Australia looking to reduce their own dependence on China .
There is a growing debate on this issue in Canberra , especially in light of boycott threats from the Chinese ambassador , a recent ban on some Australian beef , and tariffs imposed on Australian barley imports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mood among business leaders ( now much augmented by COVID-19 ) that over-exposure to the China market is not prudent from a risk management perspective , and so individual business leaders are taking action on their own initiative to diversify their product markets , ” said James Giesecke , the director of the Centre of Policy Studies at Victoria University .
“ It is unlikely that Australia will implement explicit tariffs or taxes to tilt trade away from China .
However , this will not rule out a significant tilt of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from marketing efforts in China and towards efforts in other countries , ” added Giesecke , referring to the “ India Economic Strategy to 2035 , ” which proposed a long-term strategy for expanding trade with India , put out by Australia ’ s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade .
Decoupling from China will not be easy , but it is becoming an increasingly important issue for many countries .
Taiwan is showing that strong political leadership that understands the urgent need to diversify from China and has the will to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as cooperation from the business community—is essential .
Taiwan ’ s foresight in this area , just as with the coronavirus pandemic , may prove a useful example .

After keeping its society and economy running throughout the coronavirus pandemic, squashing the outbreak, and donating millions of face masks to many countries, Taiwan has earned a lot of positive press internationally. But there is another vital area in which the world could also learn from Taiwan’s experience.
After keeping its society and economy running throughout the coronavirus pandemic, squashing the outbreak, and donating millions of face masks to many countries, Taiwan has earned a lot of positive press internationally. But there is another vital area in which the world could also learn from Taiwan’s experience.
The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the enormous danger of being over-reliant on China. The logistical vulnerabilities of concentrating manufacturing supply chains in a single country like China plus its antagonistic and unreliable behavior are pushing countries including Japan, the United States, and Australia to reduce or debate their dependence on China.
Japan is providing $2.2 billion in stimulus funds to help Japanese companies move their manufacturing plants out of China. U.S. lawmakers are weighing proposals, including a $25 billion fund, to help American firms move their operations and suppliers from China. Australia is facing a debate over whether it’s too dependent on China in light of recent economic threats and tariffs due to Australia’s global demand for an inquiry into the coronavirus pandemic.
But Taiwan’s situation goes far beyond either of these three. China is the top destination for its exports and outbound investment—and also its main strategic opponent. China claims Taiwan as its own territory and frequently threatens invasion, even as it works to subvert Taiwan’s democracy, push Taiwan out of international forums and bodies, and delegitimize the state.
Adding to this paradoxical relationship is the fact that since the 1980s, over 100,000 Taiwanese firms have moved to China to set up manufacturing facilities, attracted by cheap labor and the massive domestic Chinese market. This significantly reduced local manufacturing while tying up a lot of Taiwanese investment and expertise in China.
In 2019, the U.S.-China trade war, the renewed hostility from Beijing toward the leadership of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, and Taiwanese analysts’ correct predictions that the situation would worsen caused Taiwan to initiate a reshoring initiative to lure its companies to move their manufacturing back home from China. Before that, the island nation had initiated an ambitious plan called the New Southbound Policy (NSP) in 2016 to diversify its economy and reduce reliance on China, its main trading partner. In doing so, Taiwan has been well ahead of the global curve.
After the U.S. imposition of tariffs on Chinese-made products starting in 2018, Taiwanese firms started mulling moving production to other countries, such as Vietnam. In response, the Tsai government launched a three-year reshoring plan to attract Taiwanese companies to move back to Taiwan. The plan offers incentives covering land supply, labor, and power, as well as tax breaks and bank loan subsidies. It is especially targeted at innovative industrial sectors such as tech, smart machinery, biomedicine, and green energy. As a result, while makers of lower-margin items are going to Southeast Asia, more high-end manufacturing is moving back to Taiwan, where there is an abundance of engineering and computer talent.
In about a year and a half, the reshoring initiative has already seen Taiwanese companies pledge 1 trillion New Taiwan dollars (about $33 billion) in reinvesting in Taiwan. Of that amount, NT$200 billion had already been invested in 2019, with another NT$325.3 billion set to be invested this year. This domestic investment by returning firms contributed to Taiwan’s GDP increasing by 2.73 percent in 2019, the most in a rough year among the Four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea). Just as importantly, the initiative will also create tens of thousands of new skilled jobs—a useful bulwark against the pandemic’s unexpected employment impact.
Even before the reshoring plan, Tsai launched the NSP in 2016 to reduce Taiwan’s economic reliance on China, boosting trade and investment between Taiwan and 18 countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
Taiwan had launched previous attempts in the late 1990s and mid-2000s to increase trade and investment with regional neighbors, but the NSP is significantly broader in both the scope of countries and goals. After four years, the NSP has seen notable gains in trade, investment, and tourism.
Taiwan’s trade with NSP countries grew from $95.8 billion in 2016 to over $111 billion in 2019. Outbound investment to NSP countries grew by 16 percent year on year in 2019 to $2.79 billion. Meanwhile, outbound investment in China fell dramatically year on year in 2019 by 51 percent to $4.17 billion, which also marked the fourth consecutive annual decline in investment to China.
China, including Hong Kong, still accounted for roughly 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports in 2019, twice that of the NSP countries, which collectively made up almost 20 percent. Mainland China was Taiwan’s top export destination, with Hong Kong in third place (the United States was second with 14 percent), though NSP countries accounted for seven of Taiwan’s top 15 export destinations in 2019. This suggests that there is a lot of room for Taiwan to increase its trade and investment with the NSP countries.
Despite China’s increased belligerence toward Taiwan during Tsai’s presidency, trade between the two has remained strong over the past four years. However, the coronavirus pandemic has impacted the NSP, especially in reducing trade with Southeast Asia, where several countries have undergone long lockdowns. Adjustments may need to be made, though the NSP will still be important during Tsai’s second presidential term, which runs until 2024 after she won reelection in January.
In particular, NSP public health and pharmaceutical collaborative efforts with Southeast Asian countries will be even more vital. “Successful flagship projects such as medical supply chain cooperation will be strengthened, while critical ones such as educational exchange will obviously continue,” said Jeremy Huai-Che Chiang, a research associate at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, a Taiwanese think tank.
Tourism is another area where Taiwan has broken its dependency on China, whose tourists were once a major factor due to their sheer numbers. This was particularly necessary, as Beijing often wields tourism as a weapon, banning group tours—the main way Chinese tourists travel—to countries outside of its favor, like Taiwan.
Taiwan saw only 2.7 million Chinese tourists in 2019, down from a high of over 4 million in 2015, but its overall visitor numbers still rose annually from 2015 to 2019. In fact, 2019 saw a record high of 11.84 million visitors, a 7 percent increase from 2018.
Taiwan more than made up for the fall in Chinese tourists by attracting more visitors from Japan, South Korea, and NSP countries, especially from Southeast Asia. In 2019, almost 2.2 million Japanese travelers visited Taiwan, up from 1.6 million in 2015. Here again, the NSP has provided a boost, as visitors from NSP countries rose by 2.7 million in 2019, an increase of 6.6 percent from 2018.
But this tourism decoupling was actually driven by China in 2016, when, in a bid to punish Tsai for not agreeing that Taiwan is part of China, it started restricting the number of Chinese tour groups that could visit Taiwan. Then in 2019, in a further fit of pique, Beijing decided to ban most Chinese from visiting Taiwan as individual tourists.
Of course, it’s difficult to pull yourself away from the gravitational field of a nation of China’s size. Due to China’s significant trade and influence with Southeast Asian countries, there is a limit to the depth of relationships and cooperation Taiwan can foster in that region.
“This is the main challenge for Taiwan’s ambitions, which creates political obstacles for government endeavors and business operations alike. This does not mean things are impossible, but it does mean innovative policy approaches are often needed,” Chiang said.
This includes U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in such programs as the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), which helps Taiwanese experts share their expertise with other countries in areas including public health, disaster relief, and good governance.“The NSP is a focal point for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation, but of course it is only one part of bilateral cooperation. It would be more of the U.S. and Taiwan working on new and existent programs like the GCTF program to increase Taiwan’s engagement with the wider region, including most of the NSP-targeted countries,” Chiang said.
Meanwhile, not all Taiwanese companies are on board. Some Taiwanese tycoons with operations in China have recently cited problems such as labor shortages, low domestic demand, and administrative issues in the region that prevent them from relocating, according to local media.
There are political costs, too. In 2018, the populist candidate Han Kuo-yu of the opposition Kuomintang caused a huge shock when he won the mayoralty of Kaohsiung, a major port city in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s southern heartland. (A U.S. equivalent would be a Republican winning the San Francisco mayoralty.) He ran on a very China-friendly platform, which included a pledge to attract Chinese tourists in large numbers. Disgruntled Kaohsiung business owners who were dependent on Chinese tourists helped vote in Han, who would later run and lose against Tsai in January for the presidency. Han stepped down as Kaohsiung mayor after losing a recall referendum on June 6.
Taiwan’s efforts can act as a useful model for countries such as Australia looking to reduce their own dependence on China. There is a growing debate on this issue in Canberra, especially in light of boycott threats from the Chinese ambassador, a recent ban on some Australian beef, and tariffs imposed on Australian barley imports. “I think there was already a mood among business leaders (now much augmented by COVID-19) that over-exposure to the China market is not prudent from a risk management perspective, and so individual business leaders are taking action on their own initiative to diversify their product markets,” said James Giesecke, the director of the Centre of Policy Studies at Victoria University.
“It is unlikely that Australia will implement explicit tariffs or taxes to tilt trade away from China. However, this will not rule out a significant tilt of the energies of politicians and business leaders away from marketing efforts in China and towards efforts in other countries,” added Giesecke, referring to the “India Economic Strategy to 2035,” which proposed a long-term strategy for expanding trade with India, put out by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Decoupling from China will not be easy, but it is becoming an increasingly important issue for many countries. Taiwan is showing that strong political leadership that understands the urgent need to diversify from China and has the will to do so—backed up by planning and programs, as well as cooperation from the business community—is essential. Taiwan’s foresight in this area, just as with the coronavirus pandemic, may prove a useful example.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-27--It’s Time to Put Climate Action at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy

It ’ s Time to Put Climate Action at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy In the U.S. Democratic Party , perhaps no issue has risen more in prominence during this election year compared with prior ones than climate change .
The number of self-identified Democrats who consider it a “ major threat ” is up from 6 in 10 in 2013 to almost 9 in 10 today .
A slew of proposals—from the Green New Deal embraced by many progressive environmental groups to a new 538-page climate plan released by Democratic members of a special committee on the climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out various policies .
Yet while these plans offer much to celebrate , all of them fall short by focusing on domestic actions while paying scant attention to the global nature of the crisis .
Every ton of carbon dioxide contributes to climate change no matter where it is emitted , so an ambitious climate strategy can not only be domestic—it must put the issue squarely at the center of U.S. foreign policy .
Past U.S. efforts to advance global action , such as Washington ’ s leadership to help secure the 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to progress .
Yet given both the urgency and global nature of climate change , the issue can not be siloed into U.S. State Department or Energy Department offices and spheres of diplomacy .
Many aspects of U.S. foreign policy will impact , and be impacted by , climate change .
An effective foreign policy requires taking climate change directly into consideration—not just as a problem to resolve , but as an issue that can affect the success and failure of strategies in areas as varied as counterterrorism , migration , international economics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ offers some important lessons .
In the wake of the Vietnam War and the United States ’ secret bombings of Cambodia , public concern for human rights was on the rise .
Upon taking office in 1977 , President Jimmy Carter declared human rights to be a “ central concern ” of U.S. foreign policy .
In contrast to the realpolitik promoted by outgoing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger , Carter argued that protecting human rights would advance U.S. interests and was too important to be divorced from other aspects of U.S. foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be “ woven into the fabric of our foreign policy , ” as then Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before a Senate subcommittee .
Many aspects of U.S. foreign policy will impact , and be impacted by , climate change .
Despite Carter ’ s mixed foreign-policy success , climate change demands a similar centrality .
As the defining challenge of our time , climate change must be elevated to a foreign-policy priority and can not be addressed with a compartmentalized approach .
It is necessary , of course , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international finance efforts such as the Green Climate Fund , curb multilateral coal financing , and collaborate with other countries on clean-energy innovation .
Yet all these efforts add up to an international climate strategy , not a climate-centered foreign policy .
Truly making climate change a pillar of a foreign-policy strategy would have five key elements .
First , the biggest shift from the current U.S. approach would be to take climate change considerations into the mainstream of all national-security and foreign-policy decision-making .
If a meeting in the White House Situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ climate-related concern , it is unlikely any official in the room will bring that perspective to how the issue is discussed .
Prioritizing climate change requires integrating its consideration into foreign-policy strategies broadly , just as issues ranging from counterterrorism to nonproliferation are treated today .
For example , stability and security are central aims of U.S. foreign policy : They influence how the United States addresses conflict in the Middle East , counters Boko Haram , confronts China , and much more .
Yet a strategy for stability in Iraq will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of water scarcity and heat waves on the Iraqi people or the loss of Iraq ’ s oil revenue as climate policy gradually erodes oil demand .
Similarly , the United States ’ efforts to counter terrorism in North Africa may prove fruitless unless officials also consider climate impacts on desertification that make local populations vulnerable to terrorists ’ promises .
A climate-centered foreign policy would also require that foreign-policy actors consider the consequences of their actions for climate change and determine whether less harmful approaches exist .
For example , U.S. foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebuild Iraq ’ s struggling economy by helping the country to boost its oil output , and to address its chronic and politically destabilizing electricity shortages by increasing gas production as well .
A climate-centered foreign policy would not only provide assistance to reduce flaring and use that gas within Iraq , but also explore opportunities to attract investment in renewable energy .
Iraq ’ s neighbor Saudi Arabia just announced a $ 5 billion project to generate solar and wind energy to produce hydrogen .
It is easy to say that climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but much harder to actually do so .
As important as climate change is , there are many other urgent foreign-policy priorities , and in many cases there may not be a climate-friendly alternative approach .
But foreign-policy makers won ’ t know whether the alternatives exist or not unless they ask the question .
It is easy to say that climate change should be considered when making policy , but much harder to actually do so.Domestic policymaking shows how it can be done : The National Environmental Policy Act requires that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the relevant agency analyzes the effects on the environment and identifies reasonable alternatives that may mitigate those effects .
A similar internal step in the foreign-policy making process—time permitting—would ensure that officials have full information about environmental consequences before they act .
Several international financial institutions such as the World Bank have processes , albeit imperfect , to review the environmental impacts of their actions .
To be clear , climate change considerations should not outweigh all other national security imperatives , such as nonproliferation , arms control , and counterterrorism .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because the easing of sanctions brought an additional 2 million barrels per day of Iranian oil onto the market , that was a price well worth paying to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon .
Similarly , more zero-carbon nuclear energy would help nations avoid coal power and lower their emissions .
Yet nuclear nonproliferation concerns still mean U.S. foreign policy should seek to limit the proliferation of technology that could help produce weapons while ostensibly supporting civil energy , such as uranium enrichment .
Second , climate change obviously needs to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy .
For example , dialogue with OPEC nations or cooperation on strategic oil stocks to address global supply shocks should include discussion of how to prepare for an uncertain and potentially volatile period of transition away from oil .
Plans to increase energy security for Eastern European countries dependent on Russian natural gas must consider the carbon intensity of alternatives , including U.S. liquid-natural-gas exports , and whether infrastructure investments to bolster security today may stymie efforts to reach lower emissions tomorrow .
Expanding energy access for the 840 million people who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa , is critical for global health and development , yet support for efforts to achieve this goal must avoid following the carbon-intensive paths of other emerging economies such as India .
At present , Africa ’ s growth in oil demand over the next two decades is projected to be larger than China ’ s and second only to India ’ s .
Prioritizing climate change in energy diplomacy also means attaching an even greater weight to issues such as securing electricity grids around the world against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depend even more on electrical power as many additional sectors—such as buildings , cars , and trucks—are electrified .
In most countries today , the power grid is at greater risk of cyberattack than the fossil fuel supply .
Similarly , access to rare earths and other critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt will be even more important as raw materials for batteries , solar panels , and other renewable energy technologies.At present , Africa ’ s growth in oil demand over the next two decades is projected to be larger than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India ’ s .
Third , international climate diplomacy remains essential .
That means not only rejoining the Paris agreement , but also taking numerous additional bilateral and multilateral steps , such as reengaging with China and India to deliver ambitious climate action ; developing bold initiatives in such areas as clean-energy technology and sectoral emissions in the G-20 , G-7 , and other forums of the largest-emitting nations ; expanding climate-related financing in development assistance ; and setting tougher targets for methane and black carbon in the Arctic Council .
Fourth , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in other governments and within international institutions , such in the United Nations Security Council and NATO , to integrate climate change into their security agendas .
Defense planning must increasingly consider the impacts of climate change , such as the threats of extreme weather to military installations , the stresses increased disaster assistance may pose to military readiness , and the risks food or water scarcity may pose to security in fragile states .
Finally , as with human rights , international leadership has little credibility if it is not matched with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home .
That means implementing much stronger policies that will justify a more ambitious U.S. voluntary emissions reduction target in the Paris process and put the nation on a pathway to net-zero emissions by 2050 .
From the standpoint of foreign policy , stronger domestic action can also lay the groundwork for cooperation instead of conflict with the European Union , which is planning to impose carbon border tariffs on imports from countries taking inadequate climate actions .
The U.S. foreign-policy landscape is already complicated enough without adding yet more decision criteria .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ too high for it to be delegated to a marginal role , where it is considered only by climate officials in climate-specific policy contexts .
To truly prioritize climate change , foreign policy must go beyond climate and energy diplomacy to make mainstream the consideration of climate change in all foreign-policy decisions .
It may not always prevail when weighed against all other national security goals , but it is too important to be ignored .

In the U.S. Democratic Party, perhaps no issue has risen more in prominence during this election year compared with prior ones than climate change. The number of self-identified Democrats who consider it a “major threat” is up from 6 in 10 in 2013 to almost 9 in 10 today. A slew of proposals—from the Green New Deal embraced by many progressive environmental groups to a new 538-page climate plan released by Democratic members of a special committee on the climate crisis in the U.S. House of Representatives—lay out various policies. Yet while these plans offer much to celebrate, all of them fall short by focusing on domestic actions while paying scant attention to the global nature of the crisis. Every ton of carbon dioxide contributes to climate change no matter where it is emitted, so an ambitious climate strategy cannot only be domestic—it must put the issue squarely at the center of U.S. foreign policy.
In the U.S. Democratic Party, perhaps no issue has risen more in prominence during this election year compared with prior ones than climate change. The number of self-identified Democrats who consider it a “major threat” is up from 6 in 10 in 2013 to almost 9 in 10 today. A slew of proposals—from the Green New Deal embraced by many progressive environmental groups to a new 538-page climate plan released by Democratic members of a special committee on the climate crisis in the U.S. House of Representatives—lay out various policies. Yet while these plans offer much to celebrate, all of them fall short by focusing on domestic actions while paying scant attention to the global nature of the crisis. Every ton of carbon dioxide contributes to climate change no matter where it is emitted, so an ambitious climate strategy cannot only be domestic—it must put the issue squarely at the center of U.S. foreign policy.
Past U.S. efforts to advance global action, such as Washington’s leadership to help secure the 2015 Paris climate agreement, have been key to progress. Yet given both the urgency and global nature of climate change, the issue cannot be siloed into U.S. State Department or Energy Department offices and spheres of diplomacy. Many aspects of U.S. foreign policy will impact, and be impacted by, climate change. An effective foreign policy requires taking climate change directly into consideration—not just as a problem to resolve, but as an issue that can affect the success and failure of strategies in areas as varied as counterterrorism, migration, international economics, and maritime security.
Human rights offers some important lessons. In the wake of the Vietnam War and the United States’ secret bombings of Cambodia, public concern for human rights was on the rise. Upon taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter declared human rights to be a “central concern” of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast to the realpolitik promoted by outgoing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Carter argued that protecting human rights would advance U.S. interests and was too important to be divorced from other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, human rights must be “woven into the fabric of our foreign policy,” as then Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before a Senate subcommittee.
Many aspects of U.S. foreign policy will impact, and be impacted by, climate change.
Despite Carter’s mixed foreign-policy success, climate change demands a similar centrality. As the defining challenge of our time, climate change must be elevated to a foreign-policy priority and cannot be addressed with a compartmentalized approach. It is necessary, of course, to rejoin the Paris agreement, contribute to international finance efforts such as the Green Climate Fund, curb multilateral coal financing, and collaborate with other countries on clean-energy innovation. Yet all these efforts add up to an international climate strategy, not a climate-centered foreign policy. Truly making climate change a pillar of a foreign-policy strategy would have five key elements.
First, the biggest shift from the current U.S. approach would be to take climate change considerations into the mainstream of all national-security and foreign-policy decision-making. If a meeting in the White House Situation Room is not squarely focused on a climate-related concern, it is unlikely any official in the room will bring that perspective to how the issue is discussed. Prioritizing climate change requires integrating its consideration into foreign-policy strategies broadly, just as issues ranging from counterterrorism to nonproliferation are treated today.
For example, stability and security are central aims of U.S. foreign policy: They influence how the United States addresses conflict in the Middle East, counters Boko Haram, confronts China, and much more. Yet a strategy for stability in Iraq will not be effective unless it considers the impacts of water scarcity and heat waves on the Iraqi people or the loss of Iraq’s oil revenue as climate policy gradually erodes oil demand. Similarly, the United States’ efforts to counter terrorism in North Africa may prove fruitless unless officials also consider climate impacts on desertification that make local populations vulnerable to terrorists’ promises.
A climate-centered foreign policy would also require that foreign-policy actors consider the consequences of their actions for climate change and determine whether less harmful approaches exist. For example, U.S. foreign policy has aimed for many years to rebuild Iraq’s struggling economy by helping the country to boost its oil output, and to address its chronic and politically destabilizing electricity shortages by increasing gas production as well. A climate-centered foreign policy would not only provide assistance to reduce flaring and use that gas within Iraq, but also explore opportunities to attract investment in renewable energy. Iraq’s neighbor Saudi Arabia just announced a $5 billion project to generate solar and wind energy to produce hydrogen.
It is easy to say that climate change should be considered when making policy, but much harder to actually do so. As important as climate change is, there are many other urgent foreign-policy priorities, and in many cases there may not be a climate-friendly alternative approach. But foreign-policy makers won’t know whether the alternatives exist or not unless they ask the question.
It is easy to say that climate change should be considered when making policy, but much harder to actually do so.Domestic policymaking shows how it can be done: The National Environmental Policy Act requires that before major federal actions are taken, the relevant agency analyzes the effects on the environment and identifies reasonable alternatives that may mitigate those effects. A similar internal step in the foreign-policy making process—time permitting—would ensure that officials have full information about environmental consequences before they act. Several international financial institutions such as the World Bank have processes, albeit imperfect, to review the environmental impacts of their actions.
To be clear, climate change considerations should not outweigh all other national security imperatives, such as nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism. If the Iran nuclear deal boosted carbon emissions because the easing of sanctions brought an additional 2 million barrels per day of Iranian oil onto the market, that was a price well worth paying to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Similarly, more zero-carbon nuclear energy would help nations avoid coal power and lower their emissions. Yet nuclear nonproliferation concerns still mean U.S. foreign policy should seek to limit the proliferation of technology that could help produce weapons while ostensibly supporting civil energy, such as uranium enrichment.
Second, climate change obviously needs to be at the center of U.S. energy diplomacy. For example, dialogue with OPEC nations or cooperation on strategic oil stocks to address global supply shocks should include discussion of how to prepare for an uncertain and potentially volatile period of transition away from oil. Plans to increase energy security for Eastern European countries dependent on Russian natural gas must consider the carbon intensity of alternatives, including U.S. exports of liquified natural gas, and whether infrastructure investments to bolster security today may stymie efforts to reach lower emissions tomorrow. Expanding energy access for the 840 million people who lack access to electricity, the majority of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa, is critical for global health and development, yet support for efforts to achieve this goal must avoid following the carbon-intensive paths of other emerging economies such as India. At present, Africa’s growth in oil demand over the next two decades is projected to be larger than China’s and second only to India’s.
Prioritizing climate change in energy diplomacy also means attaching an even greater weight to issues such as securing electricity grids around the world against cyberattacks, since a decarbonized world will depend even more on electrical power as many additional sectors—such as buildings, cars, and trucks—are electrified. In most countries today, the power grid is at greater risk of cyberattack than the fossil fuel supply. Similarly, access to rare earths and other critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt will be even more important as raw materials for batteries, solar panels, and other renewable energy technologies.At present, Africa’s growth in oil demand over the next two decades is projected to be larger than China’s and second only to India’s.
Third, international climate diplomacy remains essential. That means not only rejoining the Paris agreement, but also taking numerous additional bilateral and multilateral steps, such as reengaging with China and India to deliver ambitious climate action; developing bold initiatives in such areas as clean-energy technology and sectoral emissions in the G-20, G-7, and other forums of the largest-emitting nations; expanding climate-related financing in development assistance; and setting tougher targets for methane and black carbon in the Arctic Council.
Fourth, defense leaders should work with their counterparts in other governments and within international institutions, such in the United Nations Security Council and NATO, to integrate climate change into their security agendas. Defense planning must increasingly consider the impacts of climate change, such as the threats of extreme weather to military installations, the stresses increased disaster assistance may pose to military readiness, and the risks food or water scarcity may pose to security in fragile states.
Finally, as with human rights, international leadership has little credibility if it is not matched with robust actions to prioritize the issue at home. That means implementing much stronger policies that will justify a more ambitious U.S. voluntary emissions reduction target in the Paris process and put the nation on a pathway to net-zero emissions by 2050. From the standpoint of foreign policy, stronger domestic action can also lay the groundwork for cooperation instead of conflict with the European Union, which is planning to impose carbon border tariffs on imports from countries taking inadequate climate actions.
The U.S. foreign-policy landscape is already complicated enough without adding yet more decision criteria. But the stakes for climate change are too high for it to be delegated to a marginal role, where it is considered only by climate officials in climate-specific policy contexts. To truly prioritize climate change, foreign policy must go beyond climate and energy diplomacy to make mainstream the consideration of climate change in all foreign-policy decisions. It may not always prevail when weighed against all other national security goals, but it is too important to be ignored.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-27--Afghanistan’s Gen Z Is Fighting Back

Afghanistan’s Gen Z Is Fighting Back

KABUL , Afghanistan—There were few things that scared Fatima Khalil , a 24-year-old human rights activist who torpedoed her way across an increasingly volatile and patriarchal landscape of Afghanistan .
One of them , Lima Ahmad , her older sister , told me in July , was “ that Afghanistan will take away her happiness ; it was something she always talked about.
” Ahmad is now picking up the remnants of a life after Khalil was killed in an attack on her vehicle in Kabul on June 27 .
Through the digital crumbs left behind by a member of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Facebook posts , photos , video clips , tweets , Instagram stories , and more , Ahmad draws a vivid picture of her baby sister .
Khalil , known to her family as Natasha , was a rising star among young Afghans , whose future is increasingly under threat by ever worsening conflict .
In one video clip , Khalil and her friends are parasailing in the Kyrgyz capital , Bishkek , where she was studying .
In the background , her friend says , “ Natasha , we might die.
” She @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dying in an explosion in Afghanistan.
” In the end , Ahmad says , “ she faced her biggest fear.
” She could have stayed away from Afghanistan—in Kyrgyzstan , where she had studied , or in the United States , where she had opportunities to go—but even grave physical risks were not enough to keep her away from Afghanistan , a country she loved and one that frustrated her in equal parts .
Khalil was born as a refugee in Pakistan , sixth of seven siblings , to parents who were forced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to civil war .
“ We did not come from a rich economic background , but when we moved to Pakistan , life became more difficult .
My parents were both teachers and also did not speak the local languages and so could not find enough work to support the family .
We had many ups and downs , and Natasha was born in this time , ” Ahmad said , recalling how the midwife had walked out during her sister ’ s delivery because they could not afford to pay her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an early age , seemed wise beyond her years .
“ She already spoke three languages by the age of five .
Her excellence in school ensured that she was awarded a scholarship to study at the Afghan Turk school when we moved back to Kabul .
After she graduated , she secured another full scholarship to study anthropology at the American University of Central Asia and later pursued another degree in international human rights , ” Ahmad said .
“ She loved to dance and was annoyingly good at it .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open in case she wanted to choose to work in a field other than human rights .
We discussed the possibility of her opening the first dance school in Afghanistan.
” Still she was most passionate about human rights , particularly about women ’ s freedoms .
At one point , Ahmad recalled , Khalil got into an argument with a government official who refused to take her photo for the electronic ID cards until she agreed to cover her head with a chador .
“ She raised a furor and demanded the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Constitution it says that a woman needs wear a chador for taking ID photographs .
She always had her own way of doing things .
And eventually she got an ID card with a photo of her without a chador because that is who she was.
” A childhood friend , Zuhal Ahad , an Afghan journalist with the BBC , concurred that Khalil would advocate for women ’ s education even in school , urging married classmates to continue or pursue higher education .
“ I was sure she was going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” she added .
In September 2019 , Khalil joined the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ( AIHRC ) , and immediately delved into field work .
It was while on her way to work that she was killed by a roadside bomb believed to have been targeting the AIHRC vehicle .
The blast killed not just Khalil but also the driver , Ahmad Jawed Folad .
Although no group has claimed responsibility , Afghans have attributed a recent of spate of attacks in Kabul to the Taliban , who have been known @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In just the first quarter of this year , the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 1,293 civilian victims—533 killed and 760 injured .
Khalil ’ s death has accentuated the multigenerational nature of the Afghan conflict , now threatening young people who have never known peace .
The latest generation , though , appears ready to fight back in new ways .
“ She was never happy with the status quo .
If it did not satisfy her , she demanded change with a sense of entitlement .
She didn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the system that was made by others for her .
I have noticed this characteristics among other Afghans of her generation , too , ” said Ahmad , whose Ph.D. thesis explores the potential of Afghanistan ’ s Gen Z , a topic that was inspired by Khalil herself .
“ Even though we were raised by the same parents in the same family , with the same economy , her approach to life was uncomplicated .
She was outspoken and did not care to wear layers of social and emotional norms.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some advantages that shaped its worldview differently than its predecessors ’ .
“ For one , they are so connected to the rest of the world .
Growing up in my generation , Afghanistan was so isolated from the world .
But for Natasha it was normal to socialize with friends from other countries or cultures , ” Ahmad explained .
In turn , the increasing sophistication and accessibility of technology have played an important role in allowing the current generation of Afghans to aspire for a better life .
“ In my @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of world , where people of their generation lived peacefully , make them entitled to the same comforts and [ they ] adopted the same values , ” Ahmad added .
The sense of entitlement to peace has also meant that the current generation is willing to take bigger risks .
“ We were both raised in war , but she was not scared of breaking social taboos like I was .
Natasha ’ s generation is bold in their opinions , thoughts , and actions , irrespective of the criticism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
Like many of the educated elite of this generation , “ Natasha had the opportunity to live in other countries if she wanted to , she was very intelligent , but she chose to come back here to work here for our future , ” Ahad added .
From Ahmad ’ s ongoing research , she has found less shame around the choice to live freely .
She added that if the Taliban do return , they will have to take into account this generation , which will not submit to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Khalil ’ s rage about the increasing violence in Afghanistan makes Ahmad think that she would have hated being called a shaheed—martyr—as many are currently eulogizing her .
“ She was murdered .
As someone who loved life like no one else , I know she would have been very angry .
I can feel this immense energy within myself that she is mad , she is really mad … and I can feel it.
” Terms like shaheed glorify death , Ahmad concluded .
“ It normalizes a horrible thing … @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have the agency .
This glorification of death is making our children feel like if you die in the way that Natasha and so many other young people died , then you will be a hero , ” she said .
“ I don ’ t want Natasha to be a symbol of death .
I want her to be the symbol of life.
” Afghan and international organizations are closely following the investigation into Khalil ’ s death .
Amnesty International has launched a petition asking for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ justice to human rights defenders like Khalil .
Ahmad hopes that by keeping the issue alive , the way Afghans view life and death in the country will change .

KABUL, Afghanistan—There were few things that scared Fatima Khalil, a 24-year-old human rights activist who torpedoed her way across an increasingly volatile and patriarchal landscape of Afghanistan. One of them, Lima Ahmad, her older sister, told me in July, was “that Afghanistan will take away her happiness; it was something she always talked about.” Ahmad is now picking up the remnants of a life after Khalil was killed in an attack on her vehicle in Kabul on June 27.
KABUL, Afghanistan—There were few things that scared Fatima Khalil, a 24-year-old human rights activist who torpedoed her way across an increasingly volatile and patriarchal landscape of Afghanistan. One of them, Lima Ahmad, her older sister, told me in July, was “that Afghanistan will take away her happiness; it was something she always talked about.” Ahmad is now picking up the remnants of a life after Khalil was killed in an attack on her vehicle in Kabul on June 27.
Through the digital crumbs left behind by a member of Generation Z, who documented everything through Facebook posts, photos, video clips, tweets, Instagram stories, and more, Ahmad draws a vivid picture of her baby sister. Khalil, known to her family as Natasha, was a rising star among young Afghans, whose future is increasingly under threat by ever worsening conflict.
In one video clip, Khalil and her friends are parasailing in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, where she was studying. In the background, her friend says, “Natasha, we might die.” She responds, “It is better than dying in an explosion in Afghanistan.” In the end, Ahmad says, “she faced her biggest fear.” She could have stayed away from Afghanistan—in Kyrgyzstan, where she had studied, or in the United States, where she had opportunities to go—but even grave physical risks were not enough to keep her away from Afghanistan, a country she loved and one that frustrated her in equal parts.
Khalil was born as a refugee in Pakistan, sixth of seven siblings, to parents who were forced to flee their homeland in the 1990s due to civil war. “We did not come from a rich economic background, but when we moved to Pakistan, life became more difficult. My parents were both teachers and also did not speak the local languages and so could not find enough work to support the family. We had many ups and downs, and Natasha was born in this time,” Ahmad said, recalling how the midwife had walked out during her sister’s delivery because they could not afford to pay her fees.
Khalil survived and, from an early age, seemed wise beyond her years. “She already spoke three languages by the age of five. Her excellence in school ensured that she was awarded a scholarship to study at the Afghan Turk school when we moved back to Kabul. After she graduated, she secured another full scholarship to study anthropology at the American University of Central Asia and later pursued another degree in international human rights,” Ahmad said. “She loved to dance and was annoyingly good at it. I often told her to keep her options open in case she wanted to choose to work in a field other than human rights. We discussed the possibility of her opening the first dance school in Afghanistan.”
Still she was most passionate about human rights, particularly about women’s freedoms. At one point, Ahmad recalled, Khalil got into an argument with a government official who refused to take her photo for the electronic ID cards until she agreed to cover her head with a chador. “She raised a furor and demanded the officials show her where in the Afghan Constitution it says that a woman needs wear a chador for taking ID photographs. She always had her own way of doing things. And eventually she got an ID card with a photo of her without a chador because that is who she was.” A childhood friend, Zuhal Ahad, an Afghan journalist with the BBC, concurred that Khalil would advocate for women’s education even in school, urging married classmates to continue or pursue higher education. “I was sure she was going to be a future leader of Afghanistan,” she added.
In September 2019, Khalil joined the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and immediately delved into field work. It was while on her way to work that she was killed by a roadside bomb believed to have been targeting the AIHRC vehicle. The blast killed not just Khalil but also the driver, Ahmad Jawed Folad. Although no group has claimed responsibility, Afghans have attributed a recent of spate of attacks in Kabul to the Taliban, who have been known to disregard civilian lives in their attacks. In just the first quarter of this year, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 1,293 civilian victims—533 killed and 760 injured.
Khalil’s death has accentuated the multigenerational nature of the Afghan conflict, now threatening young people who have never known peace. The latest generation, though, appears ready to fight back in new ways. “She was never happy with the status quo. If it did not satisfy her, she demanded change with a sense of entitlement. She didn’t feel the need to be in the system that was made by others for her. I have noticed this characteristics among other Afghans of her generation, too,” said Ahmad, whose Ph.D. thesis explores the potential of Afghanistan’s Gen Z, a topic that was inspired by Khalil herself. “Even though we were raised by the same parents in the same family, with the same economy, her approach to life was uncomplicated. She was outspoken and did not care to wear layers of social and emotional norms.”
Afghanistan’s Gen Z has had some advantages that shaped its worldview differently than its predecessors’. “For one, they are so connected to the rest of the world. Growing up in my generation, Afghanistan was so isolated from the world. But for Natasha it was normal to socialize with friends from other countries or cultures,” Ahmad explained. In turn, the increasing sophistication and accessibility of technology have played an important role in allowing the current generation of Afghans to aspire for a better life. “In my opinion, their exposure and interaction with the rest of world, where people of their generation lived peacefully, make them entitled to the same comforts and [they] adopted the same values,” Ahmad added.
The sense of entitlement to peace has also meant that the current generation is willing to take bigger risks. “We were both raised in war, but she was not scared of breaking social taboos like I was. Natasha’s generation is bold in their opinions, thoughts, and actions, irrespective of the criticism that comes their way,” Ahmad said. Like many of the educated elite of this generation, “Natasha had the opportunity to live in other countries if she wanted to, she was very intelligent, but she chose to come back here to work here for our future,” Ahad added.
From Ahmad’s ongoing research, she has found less shame around the choice to live freely. She added that if the Taliban do return, they will have to take into account this generation, which will not submit to their will as the previous ones did.
Khalil’s rage about the increasing violence in Afghanistan makes Ahmad think that she would have hated being called a shaheed—martyr—as many are currently eulogizing her. “She was murdered. As someone who loved life like no one else, I know she would have been very angry. I can feel this immense energy within myself that she is mad, she is really mad … and I can feel it.” Terms like shaheed glorify death, Ahmad concluded. “It normalizes a horrible thing … one where you don’t even have the agency. This glorification of death is making our children feel like if you die in the way that Natasha and so many other young people died, then you will be a hero,” she said. “I don’t want Natasha to be a symbol of death. I want her to be the symbol of life.”
Afghan and international organizations are closely following the investigation into Khalil’s death. Amnesty International has launched a petition asking for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to take proactive measure to provide protection and justice to human rights defenders like Khalil. Ahmad hopes that by keeping the issue alive, the way Afghans view life and death in the country will change.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-27--Brazil Halts Police Raids in Favelas

Brazil Halts Police Raids in Favelas

It hardly ever makes news when poor , usually Black people living in the sprawling favelas of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo are killed .
But that changed on May 18 , when 14-year-old João Pedro Mattos Pinto was shot by police in Rio while at his cousin ’ s house .
Over 70 bullets marked the inner walls of the small room where the children had been playing .
The police had entered the wrong property while in search of drug traffickers .
After João Pedro was shot , officers whisked his body away without informing his family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family , with the help of a social media campaign , finally tracked him down to a police forensic institute the next day .
If the world ’ s attention had not already been tuned to police brutality in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis , then João Pedro ’ s death would have been just another strike in the tally of thousands gunned down by police every year in the outskirts of Brazil ’ s cities .
But this time , when people from the favelas took @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have done countless times before—it caught the world ’ s attention .
Soon , newspapers and protesters around the world were taking note .
In the face of unwanted international attention last month , for the first time in the history of modern Brazil , Brazil ’ s Supreme Court banned police raids in the favelas during the coronavirus pandemic , “ except in absolutely exceptional cases , ” which must be preapproved by the state prosecutor ’ s office .
The decision was certainly a step in the right direction .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ retracted at any moment .
Even more worrying , bloodshed at the hands of police has continued despite the June 5 order .
In fact , the day after it was issued , officers fired guns in the Complexo do Alemão favela , the same neighborhood where police shot dead 13 people in the space of a few hours during a single operation in May .
Brazilian police are among the world ’ s deadliest .
Last year , they killed at least 5,804 people in the whole country , 1,810 in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For comparison , U.S. police forces , which are also criticized for an outsized number of shootings , are estimated to have killed around 1,000 people in the past year .
This year , the numbers of deaths in Brazil look set to rise even higher .
April alone saw a 43 percent increase in Rio de Janeiro compared to the same month in 2019 , according to official statistics .
( Analysis from outside groups estimate that the rise was even greater—almost 60 percent—for the same period . )
The military and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meanwhile , had already killed 606 people in the first four months of 2020 .
Studies show that the victims of police killings are predominantly young Black men , who account for up to 80 percent of those deaths .
Beyond the terrible physical trauma—across all favelas , the life expectancy is well over a decade lower than the national average—police raids are a constant interruption to life .
In 2019 , police raids in the favela of Maré , where I grew up , made students miss up to 12 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of about 15,000 health care appointments according to internal calculations .
A minuscule percentage of young people from Maré manage to go to university .
The large numbers of police actions are the result of Brazil ’ s historical disregard for poor Black residents of the favelas .
Without equal treatment , opportunity , or security in those areas , civilian armed groups stepped into the vacuum .
Soon , organized crime , including drug trafficking and gun trafficking , was taking off .
And so , the stage was set for turf @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , though , do little to stop or prevent organized crimes .
And police aggression is a constant fear , causing major damage to the country ’ s civil society .
For nongovernmental organization workers like myself , who spend long days delivering food and hygiene supplies or trying to set up university preparation courses for people in favelas , the constant police violence makes work nearly impossible .
And the utter lack of public security , financial security , and opportunities keep generations of Brazilians in poverty .
Brazil needs a real @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the favelas .
The groundwork for that will be a reexamination of the relationship between the state and peripheral communities .
These communities must be guaranteed the same basic rights as other civilians .
Today , the state sees all favela residents as criminals .
It doesn ’ t distinguish between residents and criminal groups .
That could be changed with a universal declaration that acknowledges that the security is a public service for everyone , including those in favelas .
Meanwhile , the police should be restructured so that there is less @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protecting lives .
The struggle now is to maintain this season ’ s momentum for reform in a country where more than half the population is Black or biracial and where state violence is an everyday reality for peripheral communities .
Last September , hundreds of protesters took to the streets when 8-year-old Ágatha Sales , who was travelling with her mother in a public transport van , was shot in the back by the police .
Police shrugged the death off as collateral damage in their fight against drug gangs .
No @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force .
That can not happen again .
This time , the campaigns and protests must stay steady in their push for reforms .
In Brazil , violence and police brutality are so common that citizens believe they are normal .
It is also important for the justice system to commit to addressing police abuse in a serious way .
The halt on police raids issued during the pandemic should be extended and enforced .
Favela-based residents are doing their part to raise awareness of the abyss that separates their communities from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But it will take interest and courage from every citizen to demand effective public policies that guarantee the same rights to every Brazilian , regardless of where they live .
Historical inequality and invisibility have normalized living lives on borrowed time .
Brazil can ’ t let that continue .

It hardly ever makes news when poor, usually Black people living in the sprawling favelas of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo are killed. But that changed on May 18, when 14-year-old João Pedro Mattos Pinto was shot by police in Rio while at his cousin’s house.
It hardly ever makes news when poor, usually Black people living in the sprawling favelas of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo are killed. But that changed on May 18, when 14-year-old João Pedro Mattos Pinto was shot by police in Rio while at his cousin’s house.
Over 70 bullets marked the inner walls of the small room where the children had been playing. The police had entered the wrong property while in search of drug traffickers. After João Pedro was shot, officers whisked his body away without informing his family where they were taking him. His family, with the help of a social media campaign, finally tracked him down to a police forensic institute the next day.
If the world’s attention had not already been tuned to police brutality in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, then João Pedro’s death would have been just another strike in the tally of thousands gunned down by police every year in the outskirts of Brazil’s cities. But this time, when people from the favelas took to the streets to condemn police brutality—as they have done countless times before—it caught the world’s attention. Soon, newspapers and protesters around the world were taking note.
In the face of unwanted international attention last month, for the first time in the history of modern Brazil, Brazil’s Supreme Court banned police raids in the favelas during the coronavirus pandemic, “except in absolutely exceptional cases,” which must be preapproved by the state prosecutor’s office.
The decision was certainly a step in the right direction. But it is provisional and can be retracted at any moment. Even more worrying, bloodshed at the hands of police has continued despite the June 5 order. In fact, the day after it was issued, officers fired guns in the Complexo do Alemão favela, the same neighborhood where police shot dead 13 people in the space of a few hours during a single operation in May.
Brazilian police are among the world’s deadliest. Last year, they killed at least 5,804 people in the whole country, 1,810 in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone. For comparison, U.S. police forces, which are also criticized for an outsized number of shootings, are estimated to have killed around 1,000 people in the past year. This year, the numbers of deaths in Brazil look set to rise even higher. April alone saw a 43 percent increase in Rio de Janeiro compared to the same month in 2019, according to official statistics. (Analysis from outside groups estimate that the rise was even greater—almost 60 percent—for the same period.) The military and civil police forces of the city, meanwhile, had already killed 606 people in the first four months of 2020. Studies show that the victims of police killings are predominantly young Black men, who account for up to 80 percent of those deaths.
Beyond the terrible physical trauma—across all favelas, the life expectancy is well over a decade lower than the national average—police raids are a constant interruption to life. In 2019, police raids in the favela of Maré, where I grew up, made students miss up to 12 percent of school days and led to the cancellation of about 15,000 health care appointments according to internal calculations. A minuscule percentage of young people from Maré manage to go to university.
The large numbers of police actions are the result of Brazil’s historical disregard for poor Black residents of the favelas. Without equal treatment, opportunity, or security in those areas, civilian armed groups stepped into the vacuum. Soon, organized crime, including drug trafficking and gun trafficking, was taking off. And so, the stage was set for turf wars and police raids. The raids, though, do little to stop or prevent organized crimes. And police aggression is a constant fear, causing major damage to the country’s civil society.
For nongovernmental organization workers like myself, who spend long days delivering food and hygiene supplies or trying to set up university preparation courses for people in favelas, the constant police violence makes work nearly impossible. And the utter lack of public security, financial security, and opportunities keep generations of Brazilians in poverty.
Brazil needs a real shift in how the police operate in the favelas. The groundwork for that will be a reexamination of the relationship between the state and peripheral communities. These communities must be guaranteed the same basic rights as other civilians. Today, the state sees all favela residents as criminals. It doesn’t distinguish between residents and criminal groups. That could be changed with a universal declaration that acknowledges that the security is a public service for everyone, including those in favelas. Meanwhile, the police should be restructured so that there is less reliance on guns and more emphasis on protecting lives.
The struggle now is to maintain this season’s momentum for reform in a country where more than half the population is Black or biracial and where state violence is an everyday reality for peripheral communities. Last September, hundreds of protesters took to the streets when 8-year-old Ágatha Sales, who was travelling with her mother in a public transport van, was shot in the back by the police. Police shrugged the death off as collateral damage in their fight against drug gangs. No one was prosecuted or suspended from the force. That cannot happen again.
This time, the campaigns and protests must stay steady in their push for reforms. In Brazil, violence and police brutality are so common that citizens believe they are normal. It is also important for the justice system to commit to addressing police abuse in a serious way. The halt on police raids issued during the pandemic should be extended and enforced.
Favela-based residents are doing their part to raise awareness of the abyss that separates their communities from the middle- and upper-class areas in Rio. But it will take interest and courage from every citizen to demand effective public policies that guarantee the same rights to every Brazilian, regardless of where they live. Historical inequality and invisibility have normalized living lives on borrowed time. Brazil can’t let that continue.