foreignpolicy--2020-09-01--The Next Front in the India-China Conflict Could Be a Thai Canal

The Next Front in the India-China Conflict Could Be a Thai Canal Forget the new Cold War in the Pacific between the United States and China .
There ’ s a much warmer war already going on between India and China that has killed at least 20 on a disputed border in the high Himalayas .
At sea , China is attempting to encircle India with a series of alliances and naval bases evocatively known as the string of pearls .
China ’ s greatest vulnerability in its strategy to dominate the Indian Ocean—and thereby India—is the Malacca Strait , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sumatra , through which so much marine traffic must pass that it ’ s both a lifeline for China ’ s seaborne trade and the main path for its navy toward South Asia , and points further west .
With regards to China ’ s rivalry with India—and its strategic ambitions in Africa , the Middle East , the Mediterranean , and beyond—anything that reduces the dependency on one narrow chokepoint between potentially hostile powers is vital .
That ’ s where the most ambitious of all of Beijing ’ s regional infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : a long-mooted canal across southern Thailand ’ s Kra Isthmus , the narrowest point of the Malay peninsula , which would open a second sea route from China to the Indian Ocean .
This could allow the Chinese navy to quickly move ships between its newly constructed bases in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean without diverting more than 700 miles south to round the tip of Malaysia .
That would make the Thai canal a crucial strategic asset for China—and a potential noose around Thailand ’ s narrow southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invest up to $ 30 billion in digging the canal , it may find that the associated strings are attached forever .
Long controversial , the canal now seems to have gained widespread support among Thailand ’ s political elite , with a parliamentary committee due to make recommendations on the project this month .
Even the historically critical Bangkok Post has editorialized in favor of the canal .
Chinese influence operations in Thailand have probably helped shape public opinion .
And despite its nominal alliance with the United States , Thailand has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States refused to recognize a military takeover of the Thai government in 2014 .
A Thai canal would fit neatly into Beijing ’ s plans to encircle India .
The Chinese Navy is actively pushing west into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean , opening an East African logistics base in Djibouti and conducting joint exercises in the region with the navies of Myanmar , Bangladesh , Pakistan , Iran , and even Russia .
The plethora of China-sponsored port infrastructure projects throughout the region only add to the impression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gearing up for potential future confrontations with China at sea .
In August , the Hindustan Times reported that India was planning significant upgrades of its air and naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands , specifically to counter China .
An Indian union territory with a population of fewer than half a million , the strategic archipelago intersects the sea lanes leading from the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean .
They also have the potential to quarantine the proposed Thai canal .
The canal would allow the Chinese navy to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without diverting more than 700 miles south to round the tip of Malaysia .
The Malacca Strait has been a key corridor of global commerce for centuries , if not millennia .
The Italian adventurer Marco Polo sailed through the strait in 1292 on his way home from the court of Kublai Khan .
In the early 1400s , China ’ s Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He passed through on his voyages to India , Africa , and the Middle East .
Today , more than 80,000 ships a year transit the strait @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil to East Asia and manufactured goods back out .
Modern Singapore ’ s prosperity has been built on its strategic location at the narrow southeastern end of the strait .
The Thai Canal Association , which is closely linked to the politically powerful Thai army , argues that Thailand could divert some of that prosperity to itself , building industrial parks and logistics hubs at both ends of what could become one of Asia ’ s major transit arteries .
There is some logic to that argument .
Although industry experts estimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today ’ s shipping rates and fuel costs , the current route through the Malacca Strait has almost reached its safe limit in terms of the shipping volume it can handle .
Current alternatives to Malacca , like Indonesia ’ s Sunda Strait , would require east-west cargos to detour even further out of their way .
The current Thai canal proposal , known as the 9A route , would involve two parallel channels—each 30 meters deep , 180 meters wide , and running 75 miles at sea level from Songkhla on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Andaman Sea .
By embracing the proposed project , however , Thailand risks splitting itself in two .
Thailand faces an active insurgency in its three southernmost provinces , which are majority Muslim in religion and majority Malay in ethnicity .
The canal could become a symbolic border between “ mainland ” Thailand in the north and a separatist movement in the south .
It wouldn ’ t hamper the Thai military ’ s aggressive counterinsurgency campaign , but it would create a divide that could last for centuries .
Once the channels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be impossible to fill in , and if Thailand were ever to break in two , the Thai canal could be the fault along which it cracks .
Thais may recall that Colombia once had a northwestern isthmus called Panama .
When Panamanian secessionists revolted in 1903 , the U.S. Navy stepped in to ensure the new country ’ s independence .
The United States ’ Isthmian Canal Commission moved in one year later , and the Panama Canal finally opened for business in 1914 .
Panama has been a virtual U.S. protectorate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which opened in 1869 , was the focus of British and French military intervention as late as 1956 .
It remained a geopolitical football until 1975 , and even today Egypt faces an Islamist insurgency in the Sinai peninsula on the other side of the canal .
It is not inconceivable that China would support an independence movement in Thailand ’ s south and seize control of the canal , justified by the need to protect its interests .
Today , Thailand ’ s territorial integrity is relatively secure .
But a successful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geography of Southeast Asia .
It would bring in China as a permanent security partner that could not easily be kicked out—just ask Panama .
Coupled with planned investments in ports at Sihanoukville in Cambodia and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar , China will see the Thai canal as a strategic waterway connecting its string of pearls .
Were a hostile government in Bangkok ever to threaten to cut that string , it is not inconceivable that China would support an independence movement in the south and seize control of the canal in an intervention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own interests—again , the creation of Panama is instructive .
Perhaps getting wise to the canal ’ s inherent dangers , the Thai Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob recently said he preferred building rail and highway links across the isthmus instead of a canal .
Chidchob said the government has budgeted funds to study the construction of two new seaports—one on each side of the isthmus—as well as a “ land bridge ” to shuttle goods between them .
A Thai canal would pose little threat to the United States , its allies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( if expensively ) counter Chinese expansionism by upgrading its domestic forward bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands .
The real concern is that it would further undermine the independence of poor southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Cambodia , which have comparatively weak civil societies that are highly vulnerable to Chinese interference .
And it absolutely imperils Thailand .
The Malacca Strait has been a boon to Singapore only because Singapore has an open economy that is relatively free from foreign influence .
Thailand should ponder that lesson before it sticks @ @ @ @ @ @

Forget the new Cold War in the Pacific between the United States and China. There’s a much warmer war already going on between India and China that has killed at least 20 on a disputed border in the high Himalayas. At sea, China is attempting to encircle India with a series of alliances and naval bases evocatively known as the string of pearls . China’s greatest vulnerability in its strategy to dominate the Indian Ocean—and thereby India—is the Malacca Strait, a narrow sea lane separating Singapore and Sumatra, through which so much marine traffic must pass that it’s both a lifeline for China’s seaborne trade and the main path for its navy toward South Asia, and points further west. With regards to China’s rivalry with India—and its strategic ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and beyond—anything that reduces the dependency on one narrow chokepoint between potentially hostile powers is vital.
Forget the new Cold War in the Pacific between the United States and China. There’s a much warmer war already going on between India and China that has killed at least 20 on a disputed border in the high Himalayas. At sea, China is attempting to encircle India with a series of alliances and naval bases evocatively known as the string of pearls. China’s greatest vulnerability in its strategy to dominate the Indian Ocean—and thereby India—is the Malacca Strait, a narrow sea lane separating Singapore and Sumatra, through which so much marine traffic must pass that it’s both a lifeline for China’s seaborne trade and the main path for its navy toward South Asia, and points further west. With regards to China’s rivalry with India—and its strategic ambitions in Africa, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and beyond—anything that reduces the dependency on one narrow chokepoint between potentially hostile powers is vital.
That’s where the most ambitious of all of Beijing’s regional infrastructure projects—the controversial Belt and Road Initiative—comes in: a long-mooted canal across southern Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, the narrowest point of the Malay peninsula, which would open a second sea route from China to the Indian Ocean. This could allow the Chinese navy to quickly move ships between its newly constructed bases in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean without diverting more than 700 miles south to round the tip of Malaysia. That would make the Thai canal a crucial strategic asset for China—and a potential noose around Thailand’s narrow southern neck. If Thailand allows China to invest up to $30 billion in digging the canal, it may find that the associated strings are attached forever.
Long controversial, the canal now seems to have gained widespread support among Thailand’s political elite, with a parliamentary committee due to make recommendations on the project this month. Even the historically critical Bangkok Post has editorialized in favor of the canal. Chinese influence operations in Thailand have probably helped shape public opinion. And despite its nominal alliance with the United States, Thailand has tilted strongly toward China ever since the United States refused to recognize a military takeover of the Thai government in 2014.
A Thai canal would fit neatly into Beijing’s plans to encircle India. The Chinese Navy is actively pushing west into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, opening an East African logistics base in Djibouti and conducting joint exercises in the region with the navies of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia. The plethora of China-sponsored port infrastructure projects throughout the region only add to the impression of encirclement. India has responded by gearing up for potential future confrontations with China at sea. In August, the Hindustan Times reported that India was planning significant upgrades of its air and naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, specifically to counter China. An Indian union territory with a population of fewer than half a million, the strategic archipelago intersects the sea lanes leading from the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. They also have the potential to quarantine the proposed Thai canal.
The canal would allow the Chinese navy to quickly move ships to the Indian Ocean without diverting more than 700 miles south to round the tip of Malaysia.
The Malacca Strait has been a key corridor of global commerce for centuries, if not millennia. The Italian adventurer Marco Polo sailed through the strait in 1292 on his way home from the court of Kublai Khan. In the early 1400s, China’s Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng He passed through on his voyages to India, Africa, and the Middle East. Today, more than 80,000 ships a year transit the strait, which is a key corridor bringing oil to East Asia and manufactured goods back out. Modern Singapore’s prosperity has been built on its strategic location at the narrow southeastern end of the strait.
The Thai Canal Association, which is closely linked to the politically powerful Thai army, argues that Thailand could divert some of that prosperity to itself, building industrial parks and logistics hubs at both ends of what could become one of Asia’s major transit arteries. There is some logic to that argument. Although industry experts estimate that the canal would be uneconomical at today’s shipping rates and fuel costs, the current route through the Malacca Strait has almost reached its safe limit in terms of the shipping volume it can handle. Current alternatives to Malacca, like Indonesia’s Sunda Strait, would require east-west cargos to detour even further out of their way.
The current Thai canal proposal, known as the 9A route, would involve two parallel channels—each 30 meters deep, 180 meters wide, and running 75 miles at sea level from Songkhla on the Gulf of Thailand to Krabi in the Andaman Sea.
By embracing the proposed project, however, Thailand risks splitting itself in two. Thailand faces an active insurgency in its three southernmost provinces, which are majority Muslim in religion and majority Malay in ethnicity. The canal could become a symbolic border between “mainland” Thailand in the north and a separatist movement in the south. It wouldn’t hamper the Thai military’s aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, but it would create a divide that could last for centuries. Once the channels have been dug out, they would be impossible to fill in, and if Thailand were ever to break in two, the Thai canal could be the fault along which it cracks.
Thais may recall that Colombia once had a northwestern isthmus called Panama. When Panamanian secessionists revolted in 1903, the U.S. Navy stepped in to ensure the new country’s independence. The United States’ Isthmian Canal Commission moved in one year later, and the Panama Canal finally opened for business in 1914. Panama has been a virtual U.S. protectorate ever since. The Suez Canal, which opened in 1869, was the focus of British and French military intervention as late as 1956. It remained a geopolitical football until 1975, and even today Egypt faces an Islamist insurgency in the Sinai peninsula on the other side of the canal.
It is not inconceivable that China would support an independence movement in Thailand’s south and seize control of the canal, justified by the need to protect its interests.
Today, Thailand’s territorial integrity is relatively secure. But a successful Thai canal project would reconfigure the political geography of Southeast Asia. It would bring in China as a permanent security partner that could not easily be kicked out—just ask Panama. Coupled with planned investments in ports at Sihanoukville in Cambodia and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, China will see the Thai canal as a strategic waterway connecting its string of pearls. Were a hostile government in Bangkok ever to threaten to cut that string, it is not inconceivable that China would support an independence movement in the south and seize control of the canal in an intervention justified by the need to protect its own interests—again, the creation of Panama is instructive.
Perhaps getting wise to the canal’s inherent dangers, the Thai Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob recently said he preferred building rail and highway links across the isthmus instead of a canal. Chidchob said the government has budgeted funds to study the construction of two new seaports—one on each side of the isthmus—as well as a “land bridge” to shuttle goods between them.
A Thai canal would pose little threat to the United States, its allies, or even India, which can effectively (if expensively) counter Chinese expansionism by upgrading its domestic forward bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The real concern is that it would further undermine the independence of poor southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Cambodia, which have comparatively weak civil societies that are highly vulnerable to Chinese interference. And it absolutely imperils Thailand. The Malacca Strait has been a boon to Singapore only because Singapore has an open economy that is relatively free from foreign influence. Thailand should ponder that lesson before it sticks its neck out for China.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Germany Is Losing the Fight Against QAnon

Germany Is Losing the Fight Against QAnon On Aug. 29 , 38,000 people amassed in Berlin for Europe ’ s largest protest against COVID-19 safety measures and lockdowns .
The eclectic mix of right-wing extremists , conspiracy theorists , anti-vaccine activists , club kids , and New Age esoterics blurred political messages .
Signs with “ We are the Second Wave ” and “ Fight the Corona Dictatorship ” filled the streets , coupled with a motley potpourri of “ Free Assange ” banners , QAnon signs , and American , rainbow , Russian , German , and Wilhelmine Imperial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far-right revisionists who reject the legitimacy of Germany ’ s post-World War II federal republic—enacted a symbolic storming of the Bundestag and trotted out a “ Peace Treaty ” to the Russian and U.S. embassies .
Robert Kennedy Jr. railed against vaccines and Bill Gates just miles from where his uncle John F. Kennedy gave his famous 1963 “ Ich bin ein Berliner ” speech .
The Berlin government tried , but failed , to ban the protests on public safety grounds .
But the demonstrations may have a positive , if unintended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany and Europe awake to a new wave of political disinformation aimed right at the heart of European democracy .
Berlin ’ s coronavirus pandemic management has been the source of global admiration and pride at home , and it has driven government approval to new heights .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel enjoys a 71 percent approval rating .
Her health minister , Jens Spahn , has 60 percent support .
And her Social Democratic Finance Minister Olaf Scholz , the architect of Germany ’ s coronavirus rescue package , is at 57 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a broad , vocal segment of the population unsatisfied with the government ’ s response .
Berlin ’ s August demonstrations in opposition to the COVID-19 lockdown are the latest in a groundswell of disinformation-infused civil disobedience across Germany .
From Stuttgart to Ulm , Gera , Düsseldorf , Munich , and Hanover , so-called hygiene demos against the lockdown have blurred lines between legitimate political expression , disorderly conduct , and conspiracy theories .
An earlier such protest in Berlin—under the motto “ Day of Freedom ” —drew 20,000 attendees before it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not obeying public health measures .
Organizers and their supporters—including some in the right-wing Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) party—claimed that over 1.3 million people took part .
The leading organizer of Germany ’ s coronavirus rebellion is the group Querdenken 711 , a diffuse and growing grassroots movement with origins in Stuttgart .
Querdenken 711 has become the epicenter of Germany ’ s so-called Corona-Pegida movement—a reference to the Dresden-based anti-Islam , ethnonationalist Pegida movement that caught fire in Germany ’ s east .
In fact , Pegida leader Lutz Bachmann @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamization and toward Merkel ’ s COVID-19 policies .
The AfD has leveraged these sentiments by submitting parliamentary motions titled “ Restoring fundamental rights despite corona , ” implicitly claiming these rights have been taken from German citizens .
Together with other movements such as the nationalist Zukunft Heimat in Brandenburg , some wings of the AfD and left-wing activists such as the Berliner playwright Anselm Lenz , they have blamed shadowy elites , particularly the billionaire tech founder and philanthropist Bill Gates , for puppeteering the COVID-19 crisis .
This loose alliance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces is eerily reminiscent of the Querfront cross-ideological affinities of extremists in the Weimar era .
As in other democracies , Germany ’ s early coronavirus disinformation mixed rumors , truth-adjacent content , home remedies , out-of-context imagery , and a minimization of the crisis .
Germany saw a crop of debunked but credentialed so-called experts minting conspiracy theories and undermining fact-based information .
One prominent example is Sucharit Bhakdi , German Thai epidemiologist , who has started a YouTube channel claiming that COVID-19 deaths are exaggerated , linking deaths in China and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lockdowns unconstitutional .
His coronavirus-related YouTube channel has gained over 100,000 followers in less than six months , and his videos have over 8 million views total .
Another example is Wolfgang Wodarg , a former member of parliament for the Social Democrats and a virologist by training , who has linked COVID-19 to attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to sell vaccines .
One of the most savvy and influential figures in the sphere of coronavirus disinformation has been the celebrity vegan chef turned right-wing firebrand Attila Hildmann .
Hildmann , whose background @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German adoptive parents , rails against COVID-19 measures , Gates , the Rothschild family , and the federal republic ’ s legitimacy .
The chef-turned-influencer , who has announced his intention to launch a political party , has accumulated a following of over 80,000 on the messaging platform Telegram .
At the Aug. 29 Berlin protest , Hildmann rallied the crowd in front of the Russian Embassy until his arrest .
He is quickly becoming the face of Germany ’ s anti-lockdown , anti-Merkel nationalism .
In Germany , as in other countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conspiracy theories , radicalization , and organizing of so-called hygiene demos .
For his part , Hildmann drives his potential followers from Twitter and YouTube to his Telegram group as the central location for his activism .
The messaging app is currently the world ’ s fifth most popular , behind WhatsApp , Facebook Messenger , WeChat , and QQ .
It is adding 1.5 million new users daily .
The number of German Telegram users has exploded during the pandemic .
According to one study , two-thirds of the 100,000 German conspiracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not been on Telegram prior to March .
Germany ’ s disinformation landscape is evolving—and metastasizing—rapidly .
In recent months , Querdenken 711 has developed connective tissue with the Reichsbürger , Hildmann , and the growing German following of the QAnon cult of conspiracy .
In fact , Germany has the second-highest number of QAnon believers after the United States .
NewsGuard has identified more than 448,000 QAnon followers in Europe .
On YouTube , Facebook , and Telegram , accounts dealing with the QAnon conspiracy have over 200,000 followers in Germany alone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Frag uns doch !
WWG1WGA and Qlobal-Change ) have gone from 10,000 to nearly 200,000 followers combined in the past five months .
The German-language QAnon YouTube channel Qlobal-Change has over 17 million views .
Public figures such as the former national news anchor Eva Herman , the rapper Sido , and Hildmann have all expressed sympathy with the conspiracy theory .
The German pop star Xavier Naidoo , a former judge on the German version of American Idol—Deutschland Sucht den Superstar—regularly shares QAnon content and tearfully lamented the supposed shadowy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany , most QAnon followers are people under 50 .
This tracks a pattern in Germany ’ s anti-establishment right .
In the 2019 elections in the East German states of Brandenburg and Saxony , voters under 50 supported the AfD more than any other party .
Establishment parties were only able to cling to power because of overwhelming backing from voters over 60 .
Many of these conspiracist groups risk violating Germany ’ s constitution , which has limitations on anti-Democratic and pro-Nazi speech owing to the country ’ s dark past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Herrmann pointed at QAnon ’ s use of anti-Semitic tropes .
( Imagines of supposed conspirators drinking the blood of children draws directly on medieval anti-Semitic conspiracies that led to pogroms in Germany . )
Vocabulary associated with QAnon-adjacent conspiracies has also been drawn on by the right-wing terrorists responsible for the June 2019 assassination of Walter Lübcke in Kassel , the October 2019 synagogue attack in Halle , and the Hanau shisha bar attack that left 11 people dead and 5 injured this February .
In June , Germany ’ s federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a strategy to combat coronavirus-based disinformation and conspiracy theories , including raising questions around the constitutionality of some of them .
A strategy should be adopted at their next meeting in the fall .
The depth and intensity of Germany ’ s conspiracy theory-addled unrest has surprised many both at home and abroad .
Germany has a well-established and highly regarded gatekeeper media .
Outlets such as ZDF , ARD , Der Spiegel , and Süddeutsche Zeitung continue to play important roles in shaping political discourse , providing uncontested facts , drawing public @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But they continue to lack channels to niche communities already hostile to mainstream media and their perceived cozy relationships with established elites like Merkel ’ s Christian Democrats .
Twenty percent of Germans believe the term “ Lügenpresse ” ( “ lying press ” ) as a description of the German media has some truth to it .
Lack of access in these communities opens up vulnerabilities and blind spots in news coverage .
In contrast to the highly regulated radio , TV , and print media space , Germany is only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rules for online political speech .
Currently , speech on social media platforms , mass private messaging systems , and influencer speech remain a Wild West of political information on everything from COVID-19 to climate change to incitement to overthrow the government .
Germany—and Europe—have begun to take weaponized disinformation and radicalization amid the COVID-19 crisis seriously .
The European Union is currently working on a Democracy Action Plan to support transparent , vibrant , fact-based information ecosystems and develop on legal , civic , and economic instruments to fight disinformation and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2017 Network Enforcement Act or the Maas Law—named after the former justice minister and current foreign minister , Heiko Maas—requires social media platforms to remove illegal hate speech within 24 hours of its reporting .
The law prompted platforms like Facebook , YouTube , and Twitter to staff up with hundreds of German-language content monitors to take down incendiary speech and get tougher on disinformation .
But despite rigorous notice-and-takedown efforts , German-language disinformation on COVID-19 is removed from platforms less often than English or French-language equivalents , partly due to staff @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increased training programs and technological solutions like artificial intelligence to fill current platform shortfalls .
Germany must also consider how to tackle the issue of hate speech enforcement in messaging systems , particularly those with mass groups that should be reclassified as platforms .
The Maas Law does not apply to messenger apps such as Telegram , and , thus far , the messenger has been uncooperative in assisting German law enforcement with unmasking users who incite hate and violence .
Telegram allows users to form groups of up to 200,000 members , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This makes it a potential space for radicalization and organizing action .
Finally , Germany—and Europe more broadly—needs to consider the intermediary role that social media influencers play both in spreading disinformation and offering it entry into mainstream discourse .
Germany already has experience with the social media influencer power in shaping political action .
In 2019 , a viral video from the Generation Z influencer Rezo , titled “ The Destruction of the CDU , ” struck a nerve among young German voters about the establishment Christian Democratic Union party ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tech , and Germany ’ s role in NATO .
The video—viewed more than 17 million times—engulfed Germany ’ s European election campaign and sparked a deep crisis in the party .
But influencers can also be information launderers—vectors by which disinformation is legitimated , spreads quickly and finds adherents .
As Hildmann , Bhakdi , and others have shown , adjacency and in-group credibility are important variables in how disinformation travels .
Influencers can accelerate disinformation-spreading , because of their adjacency , trust , and in-group credibility built up with niche audiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shown that influencers can play an important role in the fight to stave off the spread of disinformation .
Engaging white hat influencers in what some call the coronavirus infodemic fight would help fortify Germany ’ s fact-based COVID-19 information ecosystem—particularly in advance of growing disinformation campaigns on exit strategies and vaccines .
They can also help squash omnivorous conspiracy theories like QAnon before they take root .

On Aug. 29, 38,000 people amassed in Berlin for Europe’s largest protest against COVID-19 safety measures and lockdowns. The eclectic mix of right-wing extremists, conspiracy theorists, anti-vaccine activists, club kids, and New Age esoterics blurred political messages. Signs with “We are the Second Wave” and “Fight the Corona Dictatorship” filled the streets, coupled with a motley potpourri of “Free Assange” banners, QAnon signs, and American, rainbow, Russian, German, and Wilhelmine Imperial War flags. The Reichsbürger—a group of far-right revisionists who reject the legitimacy of Germany’s post-World War II federal republic—enacted a symbolic storming of the Bundestag and trotted out a “Peace Treaty” to the Russian and U.S. embassies. Robert Kennedy Jr. railed against vaccines and Bill Gates just miles from where his uncle John F. Kennedy gave his famous 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech.
On Aug. 29, 38,000 people amassed in Berlin for Europe’s largest protest against COVID-19 safety measures and lockdowns. The eclectic mix of right-wing extremists, conspiracy theorists, anti-vaccine activists, club kids, and New Age esoterics blurred political messages. Signs with “We are the Second Wave” and “Fight the Corona Dictatorship” filled the streets, coupled with a motley potpourri of “Free Assange” banners, QAnon signs, and American, rainbow, Russian, German, and Wilhelmine Imperial War flags. The Reichsbürger—a group of far-right revisionists who reject the legitimacy of Germany’s post-World War II federal republic—enacted a symbolic storming of the Bundestag and trotted out a “Peace Treaty” to the Russian and U.S. embassies. Robert Kennedy Jr. railed against vaccines and Bill Gates just miles from where his uncle John F. Kennedy gave his famous 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech.
The Berlin government tried, but failed, to ban the protests on public safety grounds. But the demonstrations may have a positive, if unintended, effect: they are already jolting Germany and Europe awake to a new wave of political disinformation aimed right at the heart of European democracy.
Berlin’s coronavirus pandemic management has been the source of global admiration and pride at home, and it has driven government approval to new heights. German Chancellor Angela Merkel enjoys a 71 percent approval rating. Her health minister, Jens Spahn, has 60 percent support. And her Social Democratic Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, the architect of Germany’s coronavirus rescue package, is at 57 percent approval. But there is still a broad, vocal segment of the population unsatisfied with the government’s response. Berlin’s August demonstrations in opposition to the COVID-19 lockdown are the latest in a groundswell of disinformation-infused civil disobedience across Germany. From Stuttgart to Ulm, Gera, Düsseldorf, Munich, and Hanover, so-called hygiene demos against the lockdown have blurred lines between legitimate political expression, disorderly conduct, and conspiracy theories. An earlier such protest in Berlin—under the motto “Day of Freedom”—drew 20,000 attendees before it was preemptively broken up by police for not obeying public health measures. Organizers and their supporters—including some in the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party—claimed that over 1.3 million people took part.
The leading organizer of Germany’s coronavirus rebellion is the group Querdenken 711, a diffuse and growing grassroots movement with origins in Stuttgart. Querdenken 711 has become the epicenter of Germany’s so-called Corona-Pegida movement—a reference to the Dresden-based anti-Islam, ethnonationalist Pegida movement that caught fire in Germany’s east. In fact, Pegida leader Lutz Bachmann has redirected his conspiratorial organizing away from Islamization and toward Merkel’s COVID-19 policies. The AfD has leveraged these sentiments by submitting parliamentary motions titled “Restoring fundamental rights despite corona,” implicitly claiming these rights have been taken from German citizens. Together with other movements such as the nationalist Zukunft Heimat in Brandenburg, some wings of the AfD and left-wing activists such as the Berliner playwright Anselm Lenz, they have blamed shadowy elites, particularly the billionaire tech founder and philanthropist Bill Gates, for puppeteering the COVID-19 crisis. This loose alliance of right and left, conspiracy-fueled illiberal forces is eerily reminiscent of the Querfront cross-ideological affinities of extremists in the Weimar era.
As in other democracies, Germany’s early coronavirus disinformation mixed rumors, truth-adjacent content, home remedies, out-of-context imagery, and a minimization of the crisis. Germany saw a crop of debunked but credentialed so-called experts minting conspiracy theories and undermining fact-based information. One prominent example is Sucharit Bhakdi, German Thai epidemiologist, who has started a YouTube channel claiming that COVID-19 deaths are exaggerated, linking deaths in China and Italy to air pollution, and calling lockdowns unconstitutional. His coronavirus-related YouTube channel has gained over 100,000 followers in less than six months, and his videos have over 8 million views total. Another example is Wolfgang Wodarg, a former member of parliament for the Social Democrats and a virologist by training, who has linked COVID-19 to attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to sell vaccines.
One of the most savvy and influential figures in the sphere of coronavirus disinformation has been the celebrity vegan chef turned right-wing firebrand Attila Hildmann. Hildmann, whose background is Turkish but who was raised by German adoptive parents, rails against COVID-19 measures, Gates, the Rothschild family, and the federal republic’s legitimacy. The chef-turned-influencer, who has announced his intention to launch a political party, has accumulated a following of over 80,000 on the messaging platform Telegram. At the Aug. 29 Berlin protest, Hildmann rallied the crowd in front of the Russian Embassy until his arrest. He is quickly becoming the face of Germany’s anti-lockdown, anti-Merkel nationalism.
In Germany, as in other countries, Telegram has become a nest for conspiracy theories, radicalization, and organizing of so-called hygiene demos. For his part, Hildmann drives his potential followers from Twitter and YouTube to his Telegram group as the central location for his activism. The messaging app is currently the world’s fifth most popular, behind WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, and QQ. It is adding 1.5 million new users daily. The number of German Telegram users has exploded during the pandemic. According to one study, two-thirds of the 100,000 German conspiracy theory adherents sampled for the report had not been on Telegram prior to March.
Germany’s disinformation landscape is evolving—and metastasizing—rapidly. In recent months, Querdenken 711 has developed connective tissue with the Reichsbürger, Hildmann, and the growing German following of the QAnon cult of conspiracy. In fact, Germany has the second-highest number of QAnon believers after the United States. NewsGuard has identified more than 448,000 QAnon followers in Europe. On YouTube, Facebook, and Telegram, accounts dealing with the QAnon conspiracy have over 200,000 followers in Germany alone. Telegram Channels related to QAnon (such as Frag uns doch! WWG1WGA and Qlobal-Change) have gone from 10,000 to nearly 200,000 followers combined in the past five months. The German-language QAnon YouTube channel Qlobal-Change has over 17 million views. Public figures such as the former national news anchor Eva Herman, the rapper Sido, and Hildmann have all expressed sympathy with the conspiracy theory. The German pop star Xavier Naidoo, a former judge on the German version of American Idol—Deutschland Sucht den Superstar—regularly shares QAnon content and tearfully lamented the supposed shadowy globalist sex-trafficking ring on YouTube.
In Germany, most QAnon followers are people under 50. This tracks a pattern in Germany’s anti-establishment right. In the 2019 elections in the East German states of Brandenburg and Saxony, voters under 50 supported the AfD more than any other party. Establishment parties were only able to cling to power because of overwhelming backing from voters over 60.
Many of these conspiracist groups risk violating Germany’s constitution, which has limitations on anti-Democratic and pro-Nazi speech owing to the country’s dark past. Bavaria’s Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann pointed at QAnon’s use of anti-Semitic tropes. (Imagines of supposed conspirators drinking the blood of children draws directly on medieval anti-Semitic conspiracies that led to pogroms in Germany.) Vocabulary associated with QAnon-adjacent conspiracies has also been drawn on by the right-wing terrorists responsible for the June 2019 assassination of Walter Lübcke in Kassel, the October 2019 synagogue attack in Halle, and the Hanau shisha bar attack that left 11 people dead and 5 injured this February. In June, Germany’s federal and state interior ministers began thinking about a strategy to combat coronavirus-based disinformation and conspiracy theories, including raising questions around the constitutionality of some of them. A strategy should be adopted at their next meeting in the fall.
The depth and intensity of Germany’s conspiracy theory-addled unrest has surprised many both at home and abroad. Germany has a well-established and highly regarded gatekeeper media. Outlets such as ZDF, ARD, Der Spiegel, and Süddeutsche Zeitung continue to play important roles in shaping political discourse, providing uncontested facts, drawing public attention to important issues, and myth-busting. But they continue to lack channels to niche communities already hostile to mainstream media and their perceived cozy relationships with established elites like Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Twenty percent of Germans believe the term “Lügenpresse” (“lying press”) as a description of the German media has some truth to it. Lack of access in these communities opens up vulnerabilities and blind spots in news coverage.
In contrast to the highly regulated radio, TV, and print media space, Germany is only beginning to consider the regulatory frameworks addressing the rules for online political speech. Currently, speech on social media platforms, mass private messaging systems, and influencer speech remain a Wild West of political information on everything from COVID-19 to climate change to incitement to overthrow the government. Germany—and Europe—have begun to take weaponized disinformation and radicalization amid the COVID-19 crisis seriously. The European Union is currently working on a Democracy Action Plan to support transparent, vibrant, fact-based information ecosystems and develop on legal, civic, and economic instruments to fight disinformation and conspiracy theories.
On content monitoring, the 2017 Network Enforcement Act or the Maas Law—named after the former justice minister and current foreign minister, Heiko Maas—requires social media platforms to remove illegal hate speech within 24 hours of its reporting. The law prompted platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to staff up with hundreds of German-language content monitors to take down incendiary speech and get tougher on disinformation. But despite rigorous notice-and-takedown efforts, German-language disinformation on COVID-19 is removed from platforms less often than English or French-language equivalents, partly due to staff shortages. The government must look to increased training programs and technological solutions like artificial intelligence to fill current platform shortfalls.
Germany must also consider how to tackle the issue of hate speech enforcement in messaging systems, particularly those with mass groups that should be reclassified as platforms. The Maas Law does not apply to messenger apps such as Telegram, and, thus far, the messenger has been uncooperative in assisting German law enforcement with unmasking users who incite hate and violence. Telegram allows users to form groups of up to 200,000 members, well beyond WhatApp’s 256-member limit. This makes it a potential space for radicalization and organizing action.
Finally, Germany—and Europe more broadly—needs to consider the intermediary role that social media influencers play both in spreading disinformation and offering it entry into mainstream discourse. Germany already has experience with the social media influencer power in shaping political action. In 2019, a viral video from the Generation Z influencer Rezo, titled “The Destruction of the CDU,” struck a nerve among young German voters about the establishment Christian Democratic Union party’s unfulfilled promises on climate change, tech, and Germany’s role in NATO. The video—viewed more than 17 million times—engulfed Germany’s European election campaign and sparked a deep crisis in the party.
But influencers can also be information launderers—vectors by which disinformation is legitimated, spreads quickly and finds adherents. As Hildmann, Bhakdi, and others have shown, adjacency and in-group credibility are important variables in how disinformation travels. Influencers can accelerate disinformation-spreading, because of their adjacency, trust, and in-group credibility built up with niche audiences. Initiatives in Finland and Quebec have shown that influencers can play an important role in the fight to stave off the spread of disinformation. Engaging white hat influencers in what some call the coronavirus infodemic fight would help fortify Germany’s fact-based COVID-19 information ecosystem—particularly in advance of growing disinformation campaigns on exit strategies and vaccines. They can also help squash omnivorous conspiracy theories like QAnon before they take root.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Lebanon Is Nearing the Brink of Civil War Again

Lebanon Is Nearing the Brink of Civil War Again During the 30 years since Lebanon ’ s civil war , the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines , mirroring the country ’ s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system .
But this political edifice has been under challenge for months .
In October , Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders , whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite .
Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blew the lid off the country ’ s sectarian fault lines .
Lebanon ’ s various communities are more suspicious of each other than at any time in recent memory .
At the center of tensions , holding the key to both chaos and peace , is Hezbollah .
It ’ s not clear how these vitriolic sectarian tensions will be resolved .
No one wants the situation to escalate into another civil war .
At a coffee shop in Ouzai , a Shiite-dominated southern suburb of Beirut barely 3 kilometers from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests , a group of Hezbollah supporters accused the protestors of being foreign agents .
Abu Ali , the owner of the cafe in his mid-50s , claimed the protestors were a front for Israeli—and by extension , American—interests , and that they had crossed a red line when they hung a noose around the effigy of Hezbollah ’ s leader , Hassan Nasrallah , demanding the group give up its weapons .
Hezbollah ’ s weapons , he said , were necessary protection for the Shiites , traditionally Lebanon ’ s poorest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a nation riven with sectarian divisions .
The Shiites ’ subordinate social position dates back centuries , and reflects the support traditionally given to Christians by Western powers , and the greater wealth and influence of Sunni Muslims , particularly under their coreligionist Ottoman overlords .
The rise of Hezbollah , feared by both of those other communities , is a matter of pride for many Shiites .
Abu Ali identified himself as a supporter , rather than member , of the group—Hezbollah ’ s fighters rarely speak to journalists and present themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ direct orders from leadership .
However , two hours into a contentious interview with Foreign Policy , he revealed his identity on the condition of anonymity , admitting that not only was he a fighter with the group who had fought in the 2006 war against Israel , but that his elder son also fought in the Syrian war alongside Hezbollah , whilst the younger was in training .
As evidence , he produced half a dozen photographs : of himself at the border in army fatigues with a Hezbollah flag fluttering near @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian battlefield posing with an AK-47 and an M16 ; and of his younger , 13-year-old boy , lying on the ground with his finger on the trigger of a gun and taking aim from their home in southern Lebanon at invisible Israelis .
“ Of course he knows how to shoot .
He needs to be able to guard the house if my elder son and I are not at home , ” he said of his teenage son .
“ My sons and I fight against Israelis , and we can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of these protestors are backed by Israel ’ s friends in Lebanon and are on the payroll of Western embassies.
” Abu Ali tried to back up his theory by pointing to the visible economic disparity between the largely middle-class protesters and relatively poorer Shiites who could neither afford the cosmopolitan lives of their neighbors nor buy laptops , some of which Hezbollah ’ s supporters stole—or as Abu Ali liked to put it , “ confiscated ” —from protestors .
“ They chant slogans against our Sheikh Nasrallah and then drink @ @ @ @ @ @ @ poor then how come they have laptops ?
” Lifestyle apart , he added , all is fair game if the protestors crossed Hezbollah ’ s red lines , “ There will be a price .
Red lines are red lines.
” Hezbollah has already clashed on several occasions with the protest movement .
Most analysts assume that protest leaders and opposition factions will not want to provoke it much further , unclear as to what price Hezbollah could extract .
Many Lebanese outside the Shiite community , and some within , want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but know from bitter experience that loud opposition to the group ’ s independent control of its weaponry comes with high personal risk .
Professor Nasser Yassin of the American University of Beirut said the group would not shy away from taking over the streets , as it did in 2008 , if attacked physically .
“ If , and that is a big if , some groups ( Sunni , Christian , or Druze ) carry arms against Hezbollah , and should the Lebanese Army be reluctant to crush them , then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to control the country , 2008-style.
” In 2008 , a Saudi-supported Sunni prime minister in the country dared to shut down Hezbollah ’ s communications , giving the group the provocation it needed to demonstrate its power on the streets .
Within days , Hezbollah ’ s supporters had flooded Beirut .
The Sunnis have since been on the back foot .
Ziad Allouki , a Sunni militia commander from the northern city of Tripoli , has fought in sectarian clashes in the past but said that now his political overlords were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw action when Syria ’ s civil war briefly spilled over into Tripoli between 2011-2014 , and his Sunni fighters took on members of the city ’ s small Alawite community , coreligionists with President Assad .
Alawites are generally regarded as an offshoot of Shiism .
After those clashes , he was arrested , along with hundreds of others , and only released on condition of a promise to keep the peace .
As his fighting force was enfeebled , the same happened to the leading Sunni Muslim party , the Tayyar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) .
Even when a UN international tribunal last month found a senior Hezbollah member guilty of the 2005 assassination of the FM ’ s former prime minister , Rafik Hariri , men like Allouki could do nothing , even if they wanted .
“ Al Mustaqbal decided not to go down to the streets , to avoid clashes with Hezbollah , to avoid the possibility of a civil war , ” Mr Allouki said .
The general perception among Sunnis in Lebanon is that their leadership both in Lebanon and in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have abandoned them to the whims of Hezbollah and its patron , Iran .
“ The absence of armed activity is due to the concessions made by our leaders , ” Mr Allouki told Foreign Policy .
Bahaa Hariri , Rafik ’ s son and older brother of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri , said the party was not ready for confrontation .
“ We called for restraint because we said we don ’ t want any issues , ” said Hariri on the phone from the United Kingdom .
When asked how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both his father and brother failed to do , he answered : “ We need to get our act together.
” There are those in Lebanese society who would prefer the Western powers to somehow take responsibility for disarming the group .
“ What can we do against their arms ?
America has the power , not us , ” said a middle-aged lady in Gemmayze , one of the neighborhoods heavily damaged in the port blast .
She refused to give her name but identified herself as a supporter of the right-wing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This group , disempowered since the civil war , strongly aligns itself with America and is accused of wanting to make peace with Israel .
Over the last two months , the protest movement has both dwindled and , particularly since the explosion , become more sectarian in tone .
“ It would be best if the Christians got a separate country and Hezbollah got their own , ” the woman said , reflecting an increasingly common sentiment in Christian areas , even if one rarely spoken on a public stage .
Dozens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their movement to seek structural change and economic reform had been infiltrated by sectarian forces , including both Hezbollah and the Lebanese military .
Many protesters say the question of Hezbollah ’ s weapons has divided the public and that they preferred it be addressed nationally only when a new governing system was in place .
Gilbert Doumit , a civil society activist who stood in the last election and lost , blamed not just Hezbollah but all sectarian leaders for bringing Lebanon back to the edge of a cliff .
“ Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have imposed on citizens the same tradeoff : We protect you and in return , we steal from you , ” he said .
“ Any time you threaten our interests we provoke a civil war under the pretext of protecting the sect.
” Analysts say that while sectarian mistrust is increasing , there is no threat of a civil war just yet —unless Hezbollah decides it wants one .
Hezbollah and its main Shiite ally , the Amal Movement , have recently staged a number of their signature motorbike parades , waving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Imam Hussain .
Shiites are currently commemorating the holy day of Ashura , during which they mourn Hussain ’ s killing .
This might normally be seen as a harmless expression of religiosity , but most Beirutis nowadays see it as an assertion of Hezbollah ’ s power : a veiled message that its boys can , if they want , take over the streets again .
Back at the coffee shop , Abu Ali says that Hezbollah does not want a civil war and that its supporters are merely trying to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sectarian tensions do not break out .
“ If there were civil warlike conditions , then Hezbollah would attack Israel .
It is the head of all those who want violence in the country , ” said Abu Ali .
Internal peace , however , comes at the cost of accepting the hegemony of Hezbollah and its allies .
That would trap Lebanon in the crippling status quo : a failed economy and ineffective sectarian politics .

During the 30 years since Lebanon’s civil war, the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines, mirroring the country’s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system. But this political edifice has been under challenge for months. In October, Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders, whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite. Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the dominantly Christian neighborhoods in ruins, it blew the lid off the country’s sectarian fault lines.
During the 30 years since Lebanon’s civil war, the neighborhoods of the capital Beirut have been split on sectarian lines, mirroring the country’s sect-based power-sharing constitutional system. But this political edifice has been under challenge for months. In October, Lebanese people from across the religious spectrum came out on the streets and demonstrated against their political leaders, whom they described as a corrupt and self-serving elite. Last month when an explosion ripped through the city and left some of the dominantly Christian neighborhoods in ruins, it blew the lid off the country’s sectarian fault lines.
Lebanon’s various communities are more suspicious of each other than at any time in recent memory. At the center of tensions, holding the key to both chaos and peace, is Hezbollah. It’s not clear how these vitriolic sectarian tensions will be resolved. No one wants the situation to escalate into another civil war.
At a coffee shop in Ouzai, a Shiite-dominated southern suburb of Beirut barely 3 kilometers from the downtown neighborhood at the epicenter of the protests, a group of Hezbollah supporters accused the protestors of being foreign agents. Abu Ali, the owner of the cafe in his mid-50s, claimed the protestors were a front for Israeli—and by extension, American—interests, and that they had crossed a red line when they hung a noose around the effigy of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, demanding the group give up its weapons.
Hezbollah’s weapons, he said, were necessary protection for the Shiites, traditionally Lebanon’s poorest community, both against Israel and in a nation riven with sectarian divisions. The Shiites’ subordinate social position dates back centuries, and reflects the support traditionally given to Christians by Western powers, and the greater wealth and influence of Sunni Muslims, particularly under their coreligionist Ottoman overlords. The rise of Hezbollah, feared by both of those other communities, is a matter of pride for many Shiites.
Abu Ali identified himself as a supporter, rather than member, of the group—Hezbollah’s fighters rarely speak to journalists and present themselves as civilian supporters rather than as taking direct orders from leadership. However, two hours into a contentious interview with Foreign Policy, he revealed his identity on the condition of anonymity, admitting that not only was he a fighter with the group who had fought in the 2006 war against Israel, but that his elder son also fought in the Syrian war alongside Hezbollah, whilst the younger was in training. As evidence, he produced half a dozen photographs: of himself at the border in army fatigues with a Hezbollah flag fluttering near him; of his 23-year-old in the Syrian battlefield posing with an AK-47 and an M16; and of his younger, 13-year-old boy, lying on the ground with his finger on the trigger of a gun and taking aim from their home in southern Lebanon at invisible Israelis.
“Of course he knows how to shoot. He needs to be able to guard the house if my elder son and I are not at home,” he said of his teenage son. “My sons and I fight against Israelis, and we can never make peace with them. But most of these protestors are backed by Israel’s friends in Lebanon and are on the payroll of Western embassies.”
Abu Ali tried to back up his theory by pointing to the visible economic disparity between the largely middle-class protesters and relatively poorer Shiites who could neither afford the cosmopolitan lives of their neighbors nor buy laptops, some of which Hezbollah’s supporters stole—or as Abu Ali liked to put it, “confiscated”—from protestors. “They chant slogans against our Sheikh Nasrallah and then drink whiskey and party. If they are poor then how come they have laptops?” Lifestyle apart, he added, all is fair game if the protestors crossed Hezbollah’s red lines, “There will be a price. Red lines are red lines.”
Hezbollah has already clashed on several occasions with the protest movement. Most analysts assume that protest leaders and opposition factions will not want to provoke it much further, unclear as to what price Hezbollah could extract. Many Lebanese outside the Shiite community, and some within, want Hezbollah to merge with the army, but know from bitter experience that loud opposition to the group’s independent control of its weaponry comes with high personal risk. Professor Nasser Yassin of the American University of Beirut said the group would not shy away from taking over the streets, as it did in 2008, if attacked physically. “If, and that is a big if, some groups (Sunni, Christian, or Druze) carry arms against Hezbollah, and should the Lebanese Army be reluctant to crush them, then the group will take a swift action to control the country, 2008-style.”
In 2008, a Saudi-supported Sunni prime minister in the country dared to shut down Hezbollah’s communications, giving the group the provocation it needed to demonstrate its power on the streets. Within days, Hezbollah’s supporters had flooded Beirut. The Sunnis have since been on the back foot. Ziad Allouki, a Sunni militia commander from the northern city of Tripoli, has fought in sectarian clashes in the past but said that now his political overlords were keen to avoid escalation. Allouki last saw action when Syria’s civil war briefly spilled over into Tripoli between 2011-2014, and his Sunni fighters took on members of the city’s small Alawite community, coreligionists with President Assad. Alawites are generally regarded as an offshoot of Shiism.
After those clashes, he was arrested, along with hundreds of others, and only released on condition of a promise to keep the peace. As his fighting force was enfeebled, the same happened to the leading Sunni Muslim party, the Tayyar Al Mustaqbal or Future Movement (FM). Even when a UN international tribunal last month found a senior Hezbollah member guilty of the 2005 assassination of the FM’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, men like Allouki could do nothing, even if they wanted.
“Al Mustaqbal decided not to go down to the streets, to avoid clashes with Hezbollah, to avoid the possibility of a civil war,” Mr Allouki said. The general perception among Sunnis in Lebanon is that their leadership both in Lebanon and in the region, led by the Saudis, have abandoned them to the whims of Hezbollah and its patron, Iran. “The absence of armed activity is due to the concessions made by our leaders,” Mr Allouki told Foreign Policy. Bahaa Hariri, Rafik’s son and older brother of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, said the party was not ready for confrontation. “We called for restraint because we said we don’t want any issues,” said Hariri on the phone from the United Kingdom. When asked how it intended to disarm Hezbollah, something both his father and brother failed to do, he answered: “We need to get our act together.”
There are those in Lebanese society who would prefer the Western powers to somehow take responsibility for disarming the group. “What can we do against their arms? America has the power, not us,” said a middle-aged lady in Gemmayze, one of the neighborhoods heavily damaged in the port blast. She refused to give her name but identified herself as a supporter of the right-wing Christian faction, the Lebanese Forces. This group, disempowered since the civil war, strongly aligns itself with America and is accused of wanting to make peace with Israel.
Over the last two months, the protest movement has both dwindled and, particularly since the explosion, become more sectarian in tone. “It would be best if the Christians got a separate country and Hezbollah got their own,” the woman said, reflecting an increasingly common sentiment in Christian areas, even if one rarely spoken on a public stage. Dozens of Lebanese protestors told Foreign Policy that their movement to seek structural change and economic reform had been infiltrated by sectarian forces, including both Hezbollah and the Lebanese military.
Many protesters say the question of Hezbollah’s weapons has divided the public and that they preferred it be addressed nationally only when a new governing system was in place. Gilbert Doumit, a civil society activist who stood in the last election and lost, blamed not just Hezbollah but all sectarian leaders for bringing Lebanon back to the edge of a cliff. “Since 1990, there have been warlords who have imposed on citizens the same tradeoff: We protect you and in return, we steal from you,” he said. “Any time you threaten our interests we provoke a civil war under the pretext of protecting the sect.”
Analysts say that while sectarian mistrust is increasing, there is no threat of a civil war just yet —unless Hezbollah decides it wants one. Hezbollah and its main Shiite ally, the Amal Movement, have recently staged a number of their signature motorbike parades, waving flags of Shiism’s founding father, Imam Hussain. Shiites are currently commemorating the holy day of Ashura, during which they mourn Hussain’s killing. This might normally be seen as a harmless expression of religiosity, but most Beirutis nowadays see it as an assertion of Hezbollah’s power: a veiled message that its boys can, if they want, take over the streets again.
Back at the coffee shop, Abu Ali says that Hezbollah does not want a civil war and that its supporters are merely trying to maintain law and order, and ensure sectarian tensions do not break out. “If there were civil warlike conditions, then Hezbollah would attack Israel. It is the head of all those who want violence in the country,” said Abu Ali.
Internal peace, however, comes at the cost of accepting the hegemony of Hezbollah and its allies. That would trap Lebanon in the crippling status quo: a failed economy and ineffective sectarian politics.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-02--Trump Appointee Takes ‘Slash and Burn’ Approach to Key USAID Bureau

Peter Marocco , a Trump political appointee hired in early July by the U.S. Agency for International Development to run its conflict prevention bureau , is seeking to ramp up funding for programs to defend Christian minorities while shortchanging initiatives designed to help countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine survive transitions to democracy .
The effort—if successful—would mark a dramatic shift in priorities for USAID ’ s new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization , launched last year to promote peace building and conflict prevention in countries undergoing political transition .
Marocco ’ s effort to rewrite the bureau ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not only threatens to hamstring the new bureau ’ s operations , former officials say , but it could put USAID on a collision course with leading Democrats and Republicans in Congress who helped drive the creation of the conflict prevention bureau to nurture delicate political transitions .
This article is based on interviews with more than 20 former and current U.S. officials , congressional staffers , and outside experts , most of whom only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of internal administration deliberations .
Since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administrator , Marocco has held up funding for scores of transitional initiatives , including a program in Ukraine aimed at countering Russian efforts to destabilize the country ’ s democratic government .
At the same time , he has maintained support for programs favored by the White House , including an initiative to promote peace in Colombia and a plan backed by Vice President Mike Pence to protect religious minorities , particularly Christians and Yazidis , in Iraq .
Marocco has also expressed an interest in scaling back funding for the bureau @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is under pressure from the White House Office of Management and Budget to impose wide-ranging spending cuts .
In his first two months on the job , Marocco has sought to centralize control over the bureau ’ s activities , insisting that he personally approve all hires and sign off on thousands of contracts over $ 20,000—contracts previously authorized by USAID officials in the field .
He has also asked his staff to compile reviews of staff members to ensure their work is consistent with his visions for the bureau .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , ” said Dave Harden , a former USAID assistant administrator and now managing director of the Georgetown Strategy Group .
“ These cuts put us at greater risk.
” Marocco has tried to wield his budgetary knife with abandon .
In late June , John Barsa , the acting director of USAID , announced a $ 356 million contribution to Sudan ’ s democratic transition , which included funds to support the country ’ s pandemic response and food-security initiatives .
The office has played a vital role over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is leading a transition to a democratic government after decades of military rule .
Pence turned to the bureau to invest in programs aimed at protecting religious minorities , a move that fueled controversy after the vice president ’ s office meddled in aid funding and grant applications to reroute money to favored organizations working to protect Christian groups in the Middle East .
Shortly after Barsa ’ s announcement , Marocco proposed cutting funds for the Sudan program—an initiative that Barsa quickly shot down .
But Marocco @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greater action to protect religious minorities .
He has proposed revising the mandate of a USAID program aiming at strengthening democratic institutions , promoting good governance and security in Nigeria .
The new mandate would make the protection of religious minorities in Nigeria—which has struggled to contain Islamist extremists from such groups as Boko Haram and the Islamic State—a key priority .
Marocco also placed holds on the Global Reconciliation Fund , which supports international conflict mediation , and on $ 5 million for programs in Myanmar and Somalia from the Women , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seeks to comply with a United Nations Security Council resolution that promotes a larger role for women in peacemaking .
He proposed that money , including Women , Peace , and Security funding for Somalia and Myanmar , be returned to the Treasury Department , according to one official .
But a second official said the money for the women ’ s fund is ultimately expected to be allocated .
Since taking office , Marocco has ordered a major review of tens of millions of dollars in funding for the Office of Transition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that seeks to help fledgling democracies take root and that accounts for more than half the bureau ’ s approximately $ 200 million annual budget .
Every Office of Transition Initiatives program , Marocco recently told a congressional delegation , would have to be “ scrutinized ” to ensure it supported U.S. national security interests .
“ He will say it ’ s about getting results and getting value for the taxpayers but he definitely has a slash and burn approach to foreign assistance , ” said a U.S. official who worked with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ everything he can to make himself look good to the White House looking like a money-saving hard charger.
” Marocco ’ s assignment to USAID caps a tumultuous career in President Donald Trump ’ s administration , where he rose through the ranks despite courting controversy in other federal agencies , as Politico has previously reported .
Marocco faced criticism of mismanagement and creating toxic work environments during previous senior postings at the Commerce , Defense , and State department , according to six current and former U.S. officials who spoke to Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ served as the deputy assistant secretary of state in the State Department ’ s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations until August 2019 , and he then moved to the Pentagon , where he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs .
A spokesperson for USAID did not respond to a lengthy list of questions , but she defended Marocco ’ s leadership .
“ Pete Marocco brings a decade of experience serving in conflict zones to USAID .
USAID is pleased to have him serve as Assistant to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ launching the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization , ” USAID ’ s acting spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala told Foreign Policy by email .
“ His experience as the Senior Bureau Official for Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the Department of State , and most recent service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs , adds to his leadership capabilities , as well as his experience in leading large scale rescue and resettlement operations for persecuted religious minorities , ” she added .
Ahead of a report on conflict stabilization and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Capitol Hill later this month , Marocco has expressed skepticism about many of the bureau ’ s core programs , which are aimed at improving governance , peace building , and economic development .
Instead , he favors hard security programs aimed at training and equipping U.S. allies in conflict zones .
He has frequently cited the White House “ America first ” 2017 National Security Strategy—which highlights the need to align U.S. financial assistance to fragile states with U.S. economic and security interests , and closely ties diplomacy and aid to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S .
development assistance must support America ’ s national interests , ” the 2017 strategy paper says .
He has called on staff to hire more U.S. veterans , expressing concern that the bureau has been biased against veterans—even though the department already has a preferential hiring program for veterans .
But critics say that he has interpreted the strategy too narrowly , noting that the same strategy underscores the importance of promoting good governance and sustainable development while countering violent extremism .
“ Stable , prosperous , and friendly states enhance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” the strategy paper reads .
“ Some of the greatest triumphs of American statecraft resulted from helping fragile and developing countries become successful societies.
” Marocco ’ s conduct has captured the attention of Congress , where leading lawmakers in both chambers and on both sides of the aisle—including Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Michael McCaul as well as Democratic Sens .
Bob Menendez and Chris Coons and Rep. Eliot Engel—have championed the bureau ’ s role supporting governments at a critical juncture .
Marocco , according to one source @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bureau contacts with lawmakers , requesting access to his staff ’ s calendars to determine whether they have penciled in any telephone calls to congressional staffers .
Last week , Marocco provided a pair of briefings to staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committees to address mounting concerns about the direction of the bureau .
During the Senate briefing , Marocco expressed frustration with the transitions office and said he intended to remake its mission statement .
He singled out the Ukraine program , telling staffers that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security goals .
Following a heated exchange , Marocco cut short the call and hung up , telling staffers that he had only allotted 45 minutes for the conversation , according to two people familiar with the matter .
Marocco ’ s arrival has further dampened sagging morale at USAID , officials say , after a spate of controversial Trump loyalists came to the agency after the departure of former Administrator Mark Green in April .
Green ’ s acting successor , Barsa , has publicly defended three of the new appointees who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions , including Deputy Chief of Staff Bethany Kozma , Deputy White House Liaison Merritt Corrigan , and religious freedom advisor Mark Lloyd .
( Corrigan , who tweeted in 2019 that “ female empowerment was a civilizational calamity , ” was ousted from her job in early August . )
Marocco ’ s handling of the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization has echoes of his previous controversial tours at the Pentagon .
Two U.S. officials told Foreign Policy that Marocco centralized the office around himself , eliminated office directors , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t approved through the Pentagon ’ s chain of command .
In multiple incidents , Marocco also earned the ire of U.S. Africa Command chief Gen. Stephen Townsend , current and former officials told Foreign Policy , in one case attempting to stop the publication of an unclassified report that had already been approved by the combatant command and the Defense Intelligence Agency .
“ He continues to demonstrate that he ’ s not a fit for these senior positions , and he keeps failing into higher-profile [ roles ] , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Marocco .

Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch

Peter Marocco, a Trump political appointee hired in early July by the U.S. Agency for International Development to run its conflict prevention bureau, is seeking to ramp up funding for programs to defend Christian minorities while shortchanging initiatives designed to help countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine survive transitions to democracy.
Peter Marocco, a Trump political appointee hired in early July by the U.S. Agency for International Development to run its conflict prevention bureau, is seeking to ramp up funding for programs to defend Christian minorities while shortchanging initiatives designed to help countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine survive transitions to democracy.
The effort—if successful—would mark a dramatic shift in priorities for USAID’s new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, launched last year to promote peace building and conflict prevention in countries undergoing political transition. Marocco’s effort to rewrite the bureau’s mandate and slash its overall funding not only threatens to hamstring the new bureau’s operations, former officials say, but it could put USAID on a collision course with leading Democrats and Republicans in Congress who helped drive the creation of the conflict prevention bureau to nurture delicate political transitions.
This article is based on interviews with more than 20 former and current U.S. officials, congressional staffers, and outside experts, most of whom only agreed to speak on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of internal administration deliberations.
Since taking up his post as assistant to the administrator, Marocco has held up funding for scores of transitional initiatives, including a program in Ukraine aimed at countering Russian efforts to destabilize the country’s democratic government. At the same time, he has maintained support for programs favored by the White House, including an initiative to promote peace in Colombia and a plan backed by Vice President Mike Pence to protect religious minorities, particularly Christians and Yazidis, in Iraq.
Marocco has also expressed an interest in scaling back funding for the bureau. He has confided to colleagues that he is under pressure from the White House Office of Management and Budget to impose wide-ranging spending cuts.
In his first two months on the job, Marocco has sought to centralize control over the bureau’s activities, insisting that he personally approve all hires and sign off on thousands of contracts over $20,000—contracts previously authorized by USAID officials in the field. He has also asked his staff to compile reviews of staff members to ensure their work is consistent with his visions for the bureau.
“Stabilization and governance mean better security for the United States,” said Dave Harden, a former USAID assistant administrator and now managing director of the Georgetown Strategy Group. “These cuts put us at greater risk.”
Marocco has tried to wield his budgetary knife with abandon. In late June, John Barsa, the acting director of USAID, announced a $356 million contribution to Sudan’s democratic transition, which included funds to support the country’s pandemic response and food-security initiatives.
The office has played a vital role over the past year in Sudan, where civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is leading a transition to a democratic government after decades of military rule. Pence turned to the bureau to invest in programs aimed at protecting religious minorities, a move that fueled controversy after the vice president’s office meddled in aid funding and grant applications to reroute money to favored organizations working to protect Christian groups in the Middle East.
Shortly after Barsa’s announcement, Marocco proposed cutting funds for the Sudan program—an initiative that Barsa quickly shot down.
But Marocco has reinforced Pence’s call for greater action to protect religious minorities. He has proposed revising the mandate of a USAID program aiming at strengthening democratic institutions, promoting good governance and security in Nigeria. The new mandate would make the protection of religious minorities in Nigeria—which has struggled to contain Islamist extremists from such groups as Boko Haram and the Islamic State—a key priority.
Marocco also placed holds on the Global Reconciliation Fund, which supports international conflict mediation, and on $5 million for programs in Myanmar and Somalia from the Women, Peace, and Security fund, which seeks to comply with a United Nations Security Council resolution that promotes a larger role for women in peacemaking. He proposed that money, including Women, Peace, and Security funding for Somalia and Myanmar, be returned to the Treasury Department, according to one official. But a second official said the money for the women’s fund is ultimately expected to be allocated.
Since taking office, Marocco has ordered a major review of tens of millions of dollars in funding for the Office of Transition Initiatives, a critical congressionally mandated unit that seeks to help fledgling democracies take root and that accounts for more than half the bureau’s approximately $200 million annual budget. Every Office of Transition Initiatives program, Marocco recently told a congressional delegation, would have to be “scrutinized” to ensure it supported U.S. national security interests.
“He will say it’s about getting results and getting value for the taxpayers but he definitely has a slash and burn approach to foreign assistance,” said a U.S. official who worked with Marocco. “He’s doing everything he can to make himself look good to the White House looking like a money-saving hard charger.”
Marocco’s assignment to USAID caps a tumultuous career in President Donald Trump’s administration, where he rose through the ranks despite courting controversy in other federal agencies, as Politico has previously reported. Marocco faced criticism of mismanagement and creating toxic work environments during previous senior postings at the Commerce, Defense, and State department, according to six current and former U.S. officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity.
He served as the deputy assistant secretary of state in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations until August 2019, and he then moved to the Pentagon, where he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs.
A spokesperson for USAID did not respond to a lengthy list of questions, but she defended Marocco’s leadership.
“Pete Marocco brings a decade of experience serving in conflict zones to USAID. USAID is pleased to have him serve as Assistant to the Administrator and appreciates his role in launching the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization,” USAID’s acting spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala told Foreign Policy by email.
“His experience as the Senior Bureau Official for Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the Department of State, and most recent service as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, adds to his leadership capabilities, as well as his experience in leading large scale rescue and resettlement operations for persecuted religious minorities,” she added.
Ahead of a report on conflict stabilization and prevention programs due to be sent to Capitol Hill later this month, Marocco has expressed skepticism about many of the bureau’s core programs, which are aimed at improving governance, peace building, and economic development. Instead, he favors hard security programs aimed at training and equipping U.S. allies in conflict zones.
He has frequently cited the White House “America first” 2017 National Security Strategy—which highlights the need to align U.S. financial assistance to fragile states with U.S. economic and security interests, and closely ties diplomacy and aid to work with the military—as a guide. “U.S. development assistance must support America’s national interests,” the 2017 strategy paper says.
He has called on staff to hire more U.S. veterans, expressing concern that the bureau has been biased against veterans—even though the department already has a preferential hiring program for veterans.
But critics say that he has interpreted the strategy too narrowly, noting that the same strategy underscores the importance of promoting good governance and sustainable development while countering violent extremism.
“Stable, prosperous, and friendly states enhance American security and boost U.S. economic opportunities,” the strategy paper reads. “Some of the greatest triumphs of American statecraft resulted from helping fragile and developing countries become successful societies.”
Marocco’s conduct has captured the attention of Congress, where leading lawmakers in both chambers and on both sides of the aisle—including Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Michael McCaul as well as Democratic Sens. Bob Menendez and Chris Coons and Rep. Eliot Engel—have championed the bureau’s role supporting governments at a critical juncture.
Marocco, according to one source, has sought to clamp down on bureau contacts with lawmakers, requesting access to his staff’s calendars to determine whether they have penciled in any telephone calls to congressional staffers.
Last week, Marocco provided a pair of briefings to staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committees to address mounting concerns about the direction of the bureau. During the Senate briefing, Marocco expressed frustration with the transitions office and said he intended to remake its mission statement. He singled out the Ukraine program, telling staffers that it did not align with U.S. national security goals.
Following a heated exchange, Marocco cut short the call and hung up, telling staffers that he had only allotted 45 minutes for the conversation, according to two people familiar with the matter.
Marocco’s arrival has further dampened sagging morale at USAID, officials say, after a spate of controversial Trump loyalists came to the agency after the departure of former Administrator Mark Green in April. Green’s acting successor, Barsa, has publicly defended three of the new appointees who faced criticism over controversial remarks and policy positions, including Deputy Chief of Staff Bethany Kozma, Deputy White House Liaison Merritt Corrigan, and religious freedom advisor Mark Lloyd. (Corrigan, who tweeted in 2019 that “female empowerment was a civilizational calamity,” was ousted from her job in early August.)
Marocco’s handling of the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization has echoes of his previous controversial tours at the Pentagon. Two U.S. officials told Foreign Policy that Marocco centralized the office around himself, eliminated office directors, and arranged trips to Africa that weren’t approved through the Pentagon’s chain of command. In multiple incidents, Marocco also earned the ire of U.S. Africa Command chief Gen. Stephen Townsend, current and former officials told Foreign Policy, in one case attempting to stop the publication of an unclassified report that had already been approved by the combatant command and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
“He continues to demonstrate that he’s not a fit for these senior positions, and he keeps failing into higher-profile [roles],” said a U.S. official who was a colleague of Marocco.