foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Trump Signals He Wants Troops Home by November

Trump Signals He Wants Troops Home by November Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump renews his push to bring troops home from Afghanistan by election day , another blow is dealt to the ailing Iran nuclear deal , and what to make of skirmishes on the China-India border .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
“ We are acting as a police force , not the fighting force that we are , in Afghanistan , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 19 years , it is time for them to police their own Country .
Bring our soldiers back home but closely watch what is going on and strike with a thunder like never before , if necessary !
” Out of step .
The comments came after The New York Times reported on Tuesday that Trump ’ s top military advisors planned to present the president with the option to withdraw all U.S. troops from the country by the November election .
The stance again appears to put Trump at odds with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy issue : the arduously brokered peace deal with the Taliban .
Bringing the troops home by November would not follow the timeline laid out in that agreement .
Under the Feb. 29 deal , withdrawal below 8,600 U.S troops should proceed on a “ conditions-based ” approach , meaning that the Taliban would have to continue reducing violent attacks—something the Trump administration has said is not happening .
Death knell of the Iran deal ?
Maybe .
The Trump administration said it is willing to use its rights as a participant in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to trigger punishing sanctions on Iran if the U.N. Security Council fails to agree to extend an arms embargo this year .
At the same time , the United States is distancing itself from the Obama-era deal two years after formally withdrawing .
On Wednesday , The Washington Post reported that the Trump administration would end sanctions waivers to Russian , Chinese , and European companies working on sensitive Iranian nuclear sites , a move that nonproliferation specialists say could limit U.S. visibility into Iran ’ s programs and increase Tehran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Himalayas .
China ’ s military build-up and incursions across the border with India have led to the biggest uptick in tensions between the nuclear powers in decades .
Parts of the 2,000-mile border remain contested .
While border skirmishes between the countries are nothing new , the scale and frequency of the latest clashes could be .
Reports estimate there could be three Chinese brigades in the region—suggesting thousands of troops involved .
A return to nuclear testing ?
The Trump administration is mulling the United States ’ first nuclear test @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cold War , the Washington Post reports .
Officials say that Russia and China have already begun conducting low-yield nuclear tests , though this is not substantiated by public data .
On Wednesday , Drew Walter , the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters , clarified : There “ has been no policy change ” regarding live nuclear testing , but the president could order a quick test “ within months ” if he wanted .
More Taiwan-U.S. defense deals .
The Taiwanese defense ministry announced on Monday that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missiles from the United States , the latest effort by the Trump administration to bolster Taiwan ’ s defenses and curb Chinese power in the region .
The announcement follows reports that the administration recently informed Congress of a possible sale of torpedoes to Taiwan valued at around $ 180 million .
And more Saudi arms sales .
The Trump administration just can ’ t seem to stop selling weapons to Saudi Arabia .
Over loud objections from Congress , the White House is pursuing yet another arms deal with Riyadh , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
One previous arms sale was under investigation by the State Department ’ s watchdog before Trump abruptly sacked him earlier this month .
Trump donor gets cushy post .
A deep-pocketed Republican campaign donor , Lee Rizzuto , was tapped to be the top U.S. diplomat in Bermuda this week .
Trump initially nominated Rizzuto , the heir to the Conair beauty empire , to be the ambassador to Barbados but his nomination was held up in the Senate after it emerged he promoted fringe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic and Republican presidents have made a habit of gifting glitzy ambassador posts to campaign donors with no prior diplomatic experience , but Trump has taken it to a new level , as Foreign Policy has reported .
New Pentagon appointment .
Trump intends to nominate Lucas Polakowski to be an assistant secretary of defense for nuclear , chemical , and biological defense programs .
Polakowski retired as a Major General in the U.S. Army Reserve .
Guy Roberts , who previously held the post , stepped down in April 2019 amid a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is booming .
The global pandemic lockdown has brought the world ’ s economy to a halt , but one industry seems to be shrugging it off .
Cocaine .
In this deep dive , investigative reporters at the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project show how resilient supply chains and complex distribution networks are keeping the illegal drug business afloat .
The Pentagon ’ s director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center , Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan , is speaking on Friday about AI and national security at the Center for Strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Development deputy Bonnie Glick will give a talk on Friday at the Hudson Institute on U.S. foreign assistance and great power competition during the COVID-19 pandemic .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump renews his push to bring troops home from Afghanistan by election day, another blow is dealt to the ailing Iran nuclear deal , and what to make of skirmishes on the China-India border .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump renews his push to bring troops home from Afghanistan by election day, another blow is dealt to the ailing Iran nuclear deal, and what to make of skirmishes on the China-India border.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Home for Election Day? It’s long been a tug of war between U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior military advisors to keep the nearly 19-year-old war in Afghanistan going, but with the 2020 presidential election looming, the unorthodox commander-in-chief said again this week that he’s ready to bring U.S. troops back home.
“We are acting as a police force, not the fighting force that we are, in Afghanistan,” Trump tweeted on Wednesday. “After 19 years, it is time for them to police their own Country. Bring our soldiers back home but closely watch what is going on and strike with a thunder like never before, if necessary!”
Out of step. The comments came after The New York Times reported on Tuesday that Trump’s top military advisors planned to present the president with the option to withdraw all U.S. troops from the country by the November election. The stance again appears to put Trump at odds with the rest of his administration on a key foreign-policy issue: the arduously brokered peace deal with the Taliban.
Bringing the troops home by November would not follow the timeline laid out in that agreement. Under the Feb. 29 deal, withdrawal below 8,600 U.S troops should proceed on a “conditions-based” approach, meaning that the Taliban would have to continue reducing violent attacks—something the Trump administration has said is not happening.
What We’re Watching
Death knell of the Iran deal? Maybe. The Trump administration said it is willing to use its rights as a participant in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to trigger punishing sanctions on Iran if the U.N. Security Council fails to agree to extend an arms embargo this year. At the same time, the United States is distancing itself from the Obama-era deal two years after formally withdrawing.
On Wednesday, The Washington Post reported that the Trump administration would end sanctions waivers to Russian, Chinese, and European companies working on sensitive Iranian nuclear sites, a move that nonproliferation specialists say could limit U.S. visibility into Iran’s programs and increase Tehran’s desire to enrich uranium.
Showdown in the Himalayas. China’s military build-up and incursions across the border with India have led to the biggest uptick in tensions between the nuclear powers in decades. Parts of the 2,000-mile border remain contested. While border skirmishes between the countries are nothing new, the scale and frequency of the latest clashes could be. Reports estimate there could be three Chinese brigades in the region—suggesting thousands of troops involved.
A return to nuclear testing? The Trump administration is mulling the United States’ first nuclear test since just after the end of the Cold War, the Washington Post reports. Officials say that Russia and China have already begun conducting low-yield nuclear tests, though this is not substantiated by public data. On Wednesday, Drew Walter, the acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters, clarified: There “has been no policy change” regarding live nuclear testing, but the president could order a quick test “within months” if he wanted.
More Taiwan-U.S. defense deals. The Taiwanese defense ministry announced on Monday that it plans to purchase a series of anti-ship missiles from the United States, the latest effort by the Trump administration to bolster Taiwan’s defenses and curb Chinese power in the region. The announcement follows reports that the administration recently informed Congress of a possible sale of torpedoes to Taiwan valued at around $180 million.
And more Saudi arms sales. The Trump administration just can’t seem to stop selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. Over loud objections from Congress, the White House is pursuing yet another arms deal with Riyadh, according to Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One previous arms sale was under investigation by the State Department’s watchdog before Trump abruptly sacked him earlier this month.
Movers and Shakers
Trump donor gets cushy post. A deep-pocketed Republican campaign donor, Lee Rizzuto, was tapped to be the top U.S. diplomat in Bermuda this week. Trump initially nominated Rizzuto, the heir to the Conair beauty empire, to be the ambassador to Barbados but his nomination was held up in the Senate after it emerged he promoted fringe conspiracy theories on social media.
Both Democratic and Republican presidents have made a habit of gifting glitzy ambassador posts to campaign donors with no prior diplomatic experience, but Trump has taken it to a new level, as Foreign Policy has reported.
New Pentagon appointment. Trump intends to nominate Lucas Polakowski to be an assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. Polakowski retired as a Major General in the U.S. Army Reserve. Guy Roberts, who previously held the post, stepped down in April 2019 amid a Pentagon sexual harassment investigation.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Illicit business is booming. The global pandemic lockdown has brought the world’s economy to a halt, but one industry seems to be shrugging it off. Cocaine. In this deep dive, investigative reporters at the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project show how resilient supply chains and complex distribution networks are keeping the illegal drug business afloat.
The Week Ahead
The Pentagon’s director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, is speaking on Friday about AI and national security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
U.S. Agency for International Development deputy Bonnie Glick will give a talk on Friday at the Hudson Institute on U.S. foreign assistance and great power competition during the COVID-19 pandemic.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Brazil Is Suffering. Bolsonaro Isn’t.

Brazil Is Suffering. Bolsonaro Isn’t.

The conventional wisdom about the politics of the coronavirus pandemic appears to have consolidated around the idea that it has weakened , if not ended , right-wing populism by reviving a desire for the very things that right-wing populist leaders are prone to vilify or to question : scientific expertise , global collaboration , and bureaucratic institutions ( the much-maligned “ deep state ” ) .
This line of analysis has typically centered on U.S. President Donald Trump ; as Politico succinctly put it : “ The Pandemic Is the End of Trumpism.
” But the example of Brazilian President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ Trump of the Tropics , ” offers a more complicated picture .
It shows that populists have tools at their disposal to survive , and that the global pandemic offers political opportunities for populists to exploit .
Less apparent is how the domestic environment can also work to the populists ’ advantage .
In Bolsonaro ’ s case , he ’ s tapping local myths about military rule to make the case for why he is the right person to get Brazil through the pandemic and beyond .
Like Trump , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : It ’ s just “ a little cold , ” he said , adding that there ’ s no point in worrying since “ we ’ re all going to die one day.
” He also joked about how the physical strength of Brazilians would allow them to power through the pandemic : “ They can jump in raw sewage and nothing happens.
” On March 24 , in a speech to the nation , Bolsonaro blamed the media for the pandemic .
“ Most of the media has been countervailing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the media to spread hysteria , ” he said .
By April 1 , the New York Times reported that Bolsonaro was “ the last notable holdout among major world leaders in denying the severity of the coronavirus.
” Weeks later , Bolsonaro fired the country ’ s health minister , Luiz Henrique Mandetta .
Among Mandetta ’ s sins were being more popular than Bolsonaro , refusing to relax social distancing , and objecting to the use of hydroxychloroquine as standard treatment for COVID-19 , the disease caused by the coronavirus .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ disregard for the protocol that public health officials have put in as the best defense against the coronavirus in the absence of a vaccine and effective therapeutic treatments .
In March , he joined his supporters in Brasília for a rally against Brazil ’ s Congress and Supreme Court .
At that event , Bolsonaro posed for pictures with children plucked out of the crowd , demonstrating a blatant disregard of the advice of public health officials .
He has criticized the governors and mayors who have implemented lockdowns across Brazil , saying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a crime ; they are destroying Brazil.
” Today , Brazil is one of the top global hot spots in the spread of the coronavirus .
According to the Johns Hopkins University coronavirus map , as of May 27 , Brazil had nearly 400,000 confirmed coronavirus cases , by far the highest count in Latin America .
The number of recorded coronavirus-related deaths in Brazil is lower , at 25,000 , than the number in other countries with fewer confirmed cases , but there ’ s reason to suspect that this death toll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighboring Argentina ( admittedly , a much smaller country ) has registered 13,000 coronavirus cases and under 500 deaths .
Brazil ’ s number of coronavirus cases also exceeds those of Italy , Spain , France , and the United Kingdom , some of the world ’ s worst-hit nations , and stands behind only that of the United States and Russia .
The reaction of the Brazilian public to Bolsonaro ’ s handling of the pandemic has been harsh , which suggests potential political peril ahead .
“ Fora Bolsonaro ” ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chant by quarantined Brazilians , especially in major cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo .
The chant is usually heard at night , coming from high-rise apartment buildings , and is accompanied by the sound of clanging pots and pans .
This is what Brazilians call panelaços , a long-standing form of protest in Latin America .
They helped bring down President Dilma Rousseff , of the Workers ’ Party , who was impeached in 2016 .
Curiously , media reports suggest that the recent panelaços have spread to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where Bolsonaro received considerable electoral support in the 2018 election .
As with Trump , Bolsonaro ’ s travails precede his botched response to the pandemic .
Indeed , it did not take long for Bolsonaro to become wildly unpopular .
His time in office has been defined by his controversial statements on homosexuality , education , and abortion ; disarray within his cabinet ; and corruption scandals .
All of this , according to a poll by Datafolha , by April 2019 had given Bolsonaro the lowest popularity rating of any first-term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mid-1980s , with 30 percent of Brazilians deeming his presidency “ bad or terrible.
” Since the pandemic erupted , the polling for Bolsonaro has worsened .
A recent XP opinion poll showed a disapproval rating of 42 percent , with 49 percent saying that they expected the reminder of his administration to be “ bad or terrible.
” Bolsonaro ’ s non-coronavirus troubles have deepened since the resignation last month of Brazil ’ s Justice Minister Sérgio Moro , setting up a perilous political challenge for Bolsonaro when he can least afford @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Brazil and something of a mythical figure for many Brazilians .
He ’ s also known to harbor political ambitions .
Moro earned his fame as the lead prosecutor in Operation Car Wash , the massive anti-corruption dragnet that implicated numerous Brazilian politicians , from both the right and the left .
And he forever endeared himself to Brazilian conservatives by jailing former left-wing president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva right before the 2018 presidential election , one of the primary factors behind Bolsonaro ’ s rise to the presidency .
Prompting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s firing of Maurício Valeixo , the head of Brazil ’ s federal police , which had been looking into allegations of corruption by Bolsonaro ’ s sons .
Reacting to the firing , Moro stated that : “ I have to protect my biography and above all the commitment I took on … that we would stand firm against corruption , organized crime and violent crime.
” But it would be a mistake to write off Bolsonaro , or other right-wing populists whose weaknesses have been exposed by the pandemic .
Bolsonaro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ key political allies ( especially the military , the religious right , and economic oligarchs ) , who are impervious to his undemocratic behavior .
Bolsonaro ’ s connection to his supporters is not based on ideology or policy but rather on a common distaste for the so-called liberal political elite .
Bolsonaro has also made inroads into the Brazilian working class , traditionally the province of the Workers ’ Party , by depicting himself as an everyday man .
In the very splintered political environment of present-day Brazil—there are dozens of political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loyal political base can mean a lot .
Indeed , the 30 percent of the electorate that professes its allegiance to Bolsonaro is probably enough to get him into the second round of voting in the next elections .
At the very least , the base will protect Bolsonaro from getting impeached .
It has been reported that some 30 requests for his impeachment have already landed on the desk of House Speaker Rodrigo Maia .
Beyond a loyal base , there ’ s the capacity of populists for political reinvention .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of personality , a penchant for demagoguery , and a disregard for political norms and institutions—is the lack of adherence to any political or economic doctrine .
Quite the contrary , populists have always been very adroit at abandoning old ideas and embracing new ones to suit the political moment and ensure their political survival .
It is also the case that for all of the weaknesses that the coronavirus pandemic has exposed about right-wing populism , the crisis has not come without plenty of political opportunities for populist leaders .
Around the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic for their own political benefits .
Far-right , populist parties in Spain , Germany , Italy , and France have used the crisis to call for the closing of national borders and for curtailing immigration .
In Bolsonaro ’ s case , the pandemic is providing him with a golden opportunity to remind the public of one of the things that got him elected in the first place : his law-and-order background ( he was a parachutist in the Brazilian Army ) and affection for the military .
Since the crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militarization of the government by , among other things , expanding the powers of the generals in his administration beyond the confines of military affairs and by amplifying calls for a military takeover at rallies where he has been in attendance .
“ We Want the Armed Forces in Power , ” read a banner at a pro-Bolsonaro rally in Brasília last month .
Addressing the crowd in that same rally , Bolsonaro said : “ We are not going to tolerate interference—our patience has ended .
We have the people on our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces on the side of the people.
” No serious political observer thinks that Brazil is anywhere near becoming a military dictatorship , not the least because the military itself will stand in the way .
After the Brasília rally , the military was rattled enough by what it heard from the protesters and Bolsonaro that Defense Minister Fernando Azevedo e Silva was compelled to issue a statement that read : “ The armed forces will always be on the side of law , order , democracy , and liberty.
” But Bolsonaro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not based in reality .
Instead , it taps into the mythification by the right of the military dictatorship that the country abandoned in 1985 .
Central to that myth is the image of Brazil under military rule as orderly , economically prosperous , and free of political corruption—everything that the country is not since it embraced democracy in 1988 , by enacting a new democratic constitution .
Like all myths , there ’ s a kernel of truth in the romanticized image of pre-democratic Brazil .
The military was much less bloodthirsty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Uruguay .
Under military rule , Brazil also experienced the so-called Brazilian miracle , a dramatic expansion of the economy .
But Brazil has not been anywhere near as zealous as its South American neighbors in exposing the truth about its experience with military government .
It was only in 2014 that an official truth commission chronicled the human rights abuses during the period of 1946 to 1988 , and especially the military regime that ruled from April 1 , 1964 to March 15 , 1985 .
It found the military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 400 killings and disappearances .
These findings came some 30 years after Argentina convened its own truth commission and put the military on trial for the human rights abuses of the Dirty War .
Bolsonaro ’ s law-and-order background and invocation of Brazil ’ s history with military government also resonates with the public .
For many years now , Brazilians have deemed crime an urgent problem .
And for good reason—in 2017 , the number of murders in Rio de Janeiro state reached 40 per 100,000 .
This is 14 times the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seven-term former congressman from Rio de Janeiro , Bolsonaro reassures people that he is serious when he says that only he can bring peace and order to the country .
Whether any of this will keep Bolsonaro in office remains to be seen .
But for now he is more than happy to evoke the mythical version of Brazil under military rule—and plenty of Brazilians are more than willing to go along with him .
It is a useful distraction from the dark reality of the pandemic and a wounded economy—and proof that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think .

The conventional wisdom about the politics of the coronavirus pandemic appears to have consolidated around the idea that it has weakened, if not ended, right-wing populism by reviving a desire for the very things that right-wing populist leaders are prone to vilify or to question: scientific expertise, global collaboration, and bureaucratic institutions (the much-maligned “deep state”). This line of analysis has typically centered on U.S. President Donald Trump; as Politico succinctly put it: “The Pandemic Is the End of Trumpism.”
The conventional wisdom about the politics of the coronavirus pandemic appears to have consolidated around the idea that it has weakened, if not ended, right-wing populism by reviving a desire for the very things that right-wing populist leaders are prone to vilify or to question: scientific expertise, global collaboration, and bureaucratic institutions (the much-maligned “deep state”). This line of analysis has typically centered on U.S. President Donald Trump; as Politico succinctly put it: “The Pandemic Is the End of Trumpism.”
But the example of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, often referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics,” offers a more complicated picture. It shows that populists have tools at their disposal to survive, and that the global pandemic offers political opportunities for populists to exploit. Less apparent is how the domestic environment can also work to the populists’ advantage. In Bolsonaro’s case, he’s tapping local myths about military rule to make the case for why he is the right person to get Brazil through the pandemic and beyond.
Like Trump, Bolsonaro underplayed the seriousness of the coronavirus: It’s just “ a little cold,” he said, adding that there’s no point in worrying since “we’re all going to die one day.” He also joked about how the physical strength of Brazilians would allow them to power through the pandemic: “They can jump in raw sewage and nothing happens.” On March 24, in a speech to the nation, Bolsonaro blamed the media for the pandemic. “Most of the media has been countervailing. The perfect scenario to be used by the media to spread hysteria,” he said.
By April 1, the New York Times reported that Bolsonaro was “the last notable holdout among major world leaders in denying the severity of the coronavirus.” Weeks later, Bolsonaro fired the country’s health minister, Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Among Mandetta’s sins were being more popular than Bolsonaro, refusing to relax social distancing, and objecting to the use of hydroxychloroquine as standard treatment for COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus. More telling, Bolsonaro has flaunted his disregard for the protocol that public health officials have put in as the best defense against the coronavirus in the absence of a vaccine and effective therapeutic treatments. In March, he joined his supporters in Brasília for a rally against Brazil’s Congress and Supreme Court. At that event, Bolsonaro posed for pictures with children plucked out of the crowd, demonstrating a blatant disregard of the advice of public health officials. He has criticized the governors and mayors who have implemented lockdowns across Brazil, saying that what they are doing “is a crime; they are destroying Brazil.”
Today, Brazil is one of the top global hot spots in the spread of the coronavirus. According to the Johns Hopkins University coronavirus map, as of May 27, Brazil had nearly 400,000 confirmed coronavirus cases, by far the highest count in Latin America. The number of recorded coronavirus-related deaths in Brazil is lower, at 25,000, than the number in other countries with fewer confirmed cases, but there’s reason to suspect that this death toll is grossly underestimated. By contrast, neighboring Argentina (admittedly, a much smaller country) has registered 13,000 coronavirus cases and under 500 deaths. Brazil’s number of coronavirus cases also exceeds those of Italy, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, some of the world’s worst-hit nations, and stands behind only that of the United States and Russia.
The reaction of the Brazilian public to Bolsonaro’s handling of the pandemic has been harsh, which suggests potential political peril ahead. “Fora Bolsonaro” (Get out Bolsonaro) is a familiar chant by quarantined Brazilians, especially in major cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The chant is usually heard at night, coming from high-rise apartment buildings, and is accompanied by the sound of clanging pots and pans. This is what Brazilians call panelaços, a long-standing form of protest in Latin America. They helped bring down President Dilma Rousseff, of the Workers’ Party, who was impeached in 2016. Curiously, media reports suggest that the recent panelaços have spread to the wealthy enclaves of Rio de Janeiro, where Bolsonaro received considerable electoral support in the 2018 election.
As with Trump, Bolsonaro’s travails precede his botched response to the pandemic. Indeed, it did not take long for Bolsonaro to become wildly unpopular. His time in office has been defined by his controversial statements on homosexuality, education, and abortion; disarray within his cabinet; and corruption scandals. All of this, according to a poll by Datafolha, by April 2019 had given Bolsonaro the lowest popularity rating of any first-term president since democracy was restored in the mid-1980s, with 30 percent of Brazilians deeming his presidency “bad or terrible.” Since the pandemic erupted, the polling for Bolsonaro has worsened. A recent XP opinion poll showed a disapproval rating of 42 percent, with 49 percent saying that they expected the reminder of his administration to be “bad or terrible.”
Bolsonaro’s non-coronavirus troubles have deepened since the resignation last month of Brazil’s Justice Minister Sérgio Moro, setting up a perilous political challenge for Bolsonaro when he can least afford it. Moro is a household name in Brazil and something of a mythical figure for many Brazilians. He’s also known to harbor political ambitions. Moro earned his fame as the lead prosecutor in Operation Car Wash, the massive anti-corruption dragnet that implicated numerous Brazilian politicians, from both the right and the left. And he forever endeared himself to Brazilian conservatives by jailing former left-wing president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva right before the 2018 presidential election, one of the primary factors behind Bolsonaro’s rise to the presidency. Prompting Moro’s resignation was Bolsonaro’s firing of Maurício Valeixo, the head of Brazil’s federal police, which had been looking into allegations of corruption by Bolsonaro’s sons. Reacting to the firing, Moro stated that: “I have to protect my biography and above all the commitment I took on … that we would stand firm against corruption, organized crime and violent crime.”
But it would be a mistake to write off Bolsonaro, or other right-wing populists whose weaknesses have been exposed by the pandemic. Bolsonaro has a fierce base of supporters and key political allies (especially the military, the religious right, and economic oligarchs), who are impervious to his undemocratic behavior. Bolsonaro’s connection to his supporters is not based on ideology or policy but rather on a common distaste for the so-called liberal political elite. Bolsonaro has also made inroads into the Brazilian working class, traditionally the province of the Workers’ Party, by depicting himself as an everyday man. In the very splintered political environment of present-day Brazil—there are dozens of political parties represented in the National Congress—having a loyal political base can mean a lot. Indeed, the 30 percent of the electorate that professes its allegiance to Bolsonaro is probably enough to get him into the second round of voting in the next elections. At the very least, the base will protect Bolsonaro from getting impeached. It has been reported that some 30 requests for his impeachment have already landed on the desk of House Speaker Rodrigo Maia.
Beyond a loyal base, there’s the capacity of populists for political reinvention. One of the trademarks of populism—alongside the cult of personality, a penchant for demagoguery, and a disregard for political norms and institutions—is the lack of adherence to any political or economic doctrine. Quite the contrary, populists have always been very adroit at abandoning old ideas and embracing new ones to suit the political moment and ensure their political survival. It is also the case that for all of the weaknesses that the coronavirus pandemic has exposed about right-wing populism, the crisis has not come without plenty of political opportunities for populist leaders. Around the world, right-wing populist leaders are exploiting the pandemic for their own political benefits. Far-right, populist parties in Spain, Germany, Italy, and France have used the crisis to call for the closing of national borders and for curtailing immigration.
In Bolsonaro’s case, the pandemic is providing him with a golden opportunity to remind the public of one of the things that got him elected in the first place: his law-and-order background (he was a parachutist in the Brazilian Army) and affection for the military. Since the crisis erupted, Bolsonaro has brazenly encouraged the militarization of the government by, among other things, expanding the powers of the generals in his administration beyond the confines of military affairs and by amplifying calls for a military takeover at rallies where he has been in attendance. “We Want the Armed Forces in Power,” read a banner at a pro-Bolsonaro rally in Brasília last month. Addressing the crowd in that same rally, Bolsonaro said: “We are not going to tolerate interference—our patience has ended. We have the people on our side, and we have the armed forces on the side of the people.”
No serious political observer thinks that Brazil is anywhere near becoming a military dictatorship, not the least because the military itself will stand in the way. After the Brasília rally, the military was rattled enough by what it heard from the protesters and Bolsonaro that Defense Minister Fernando Azevedo e Silva was compelled to issue a statement that read: “The armed forces will always be on the side of law, order, democracy, and liberty.” But Bolsonaro’s flirting with military government is not based in reality. Instead, it taps into the mythification by the right of the military dictatorship that the country abandoned in 1985. Central to that myth is the image of Brazil under military rule as orderly, economically prosperous, and free of political corruption—everything that the country is not since it embraced democracy in 1988, by enacting a new democratic constitution.
Like all myths, there’s a kernel of truth in the romanticized image of pre-democratic Brazil. The military was much less bloodthirsty in Brazil than in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Under military rule, Brazil also experienced the so-called Brazilian miracle, a dramatic expansion of the economy. But Brazil has not been anywhere near as zealous as its South American neighbors in exposing the truth about its experience with military government. It was only in 2014 that an official truth commission chronicled the human rights abuses during the period of 1946 to 1988, and especially the military regime that ruled from April 1, 1964 to March 15, 1985. It found the military responsible for systemic torture and for some 400 killings and disappearances. These findings came some 30 years after Argentina convened its own truth commission and put the military on trial for the human rights abuses of the Dirty War.
Bolsonaro’s law-and-order background and invocation of Brazil’s history with military government also resonates with the public. For many years now, Brazilians have deemed crime an urgent problem. And for good reason—in 2017, the number of murders in Rio de Janeiro state reached 40 per 100,000. This is 14 times the rate in New York state. A seven-term former congressman from Rio de Janeiro, Bolsonaro reassures people that he is serious when he says that only he can bring peace and order to the country.
Whether any of this will keep Bolsonaro in office remains to be seen. But for now he is more than happy to evoke the mythical version of Brazil under military rule—and plenty of Brazilians are more than willing to go along with him. It is a useful distraction from the dark reality of the pandemic and a wounded economy—and proof that populism is more resilient than one might think.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-28--Will the U.S. Sanction China Over Hong Kong Law?

Will the U.S .
Sanction China Over Hong Kong Law ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The U.S. government prepares a response to China ’ s Hong Kong national security law , the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan , and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “ move on ” from Dominic Cummings scandal .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
China ’ s National People ’ s Congress approved a draft decision today to impose national security laws @ @ @ @ @ @ @ formal legal process that will likely result in the finalized laws coming into effect by September .
As Foreign Policy ’ s James Palmer wrote in China Brief on Wednesday , the new law “ will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges , a crackdown on free speech , and the unleashing of China ’ s security organs , such as the Ministry of State Security and the People ’ s Armed Police.
” U.S. President Donald Trump now has an opportunity to turn his anti-China rhetoric into action , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what form that will take .
On Tuesday , he hinted at a White House announcement by the end of this week , with sanctions the likely avenue .
His most senior diplomat , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , laid the groundwork on Wednesday by certifying to the U.S. Congress that Hong Kong ’ s fate as a fully Chinese entity was all but sealed .
“ No reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China , given facts on the ground , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia , told reporters on Wednesday that the U.S. response “ will be as targeted as possible to change behavior , ” while adding that he still hoped for China to reverse its decision .
Just how much is the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship worth ?
Any sanctions or tariffs the United States proposes will have to reckon with the close economic ties between the U.S. economy and the territory .
In 2018 , Hong Kong was the 21st largest U.S. trading partner .
Also in 2018 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade surplus with Hong Kong , at $ 31.1 billion , according to the Congressional Research Service .
It is also home to the regional headquarters of almost 300 U.S. companies , and a regional office for another 434 .
Regardless of U.S. actions , Palmer argues , its status as a safe financial hub is under threat .
“ For businesses , the main value of the city is that its financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland ’ s , making it an attractive option for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prove their credibility in the region .
The erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that .
And on the ground , increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates.
” Don ’ t go it alone .
Also writing in FP , Doug Bandow advises that the best course of action is a unified one , and recommends that the United States bring together its European and Asian allies to present a “ a quiet demarche to Beijing : Continue down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most important economic powers together will revoke the territory ’ s special economic status.
” EU proposes dramatic recovery plan .
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed an ambitious economic recovery program for the bloc—funded by raising approximately 750 billion euros ( $ 825 billion ) .
Raising that amount would be a marked departure from EU policy and the first time a common debt would be shared among member states .
The funds would be split , with roughly two-thirds going toward grants and another one-third in loans .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , leaving countries , regions and people behind and accepting a union of haves and have-nots , or we walk that road together , ” Von der Leyen said upon unveiling the plan , called “ Europe ’ s Moment : Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation.
” The program is not yet finalized and must be ratified by all 27 EU member states to go forward .
The so called Frugal Four of Austria , the Netherlands , Sweden , and Denmark have previously been opposed to a grant mechanism funded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of loans instead .
Cummings under Conservative Party pressure .
Although British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has attempted to draw a line under the scandal regarding his advisor Dominic Cummings , who violated lockdown measures , lawmakers in his own party are still calling for the advisor ’ s removal .
As Johnson urged the country to “ move on , ” at least 44 MPs , or 12 percent of the Conservative Party ’ s representation in Parliament , have either called for his resignation or removal according to the Guardian ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ form of criticism .
Meanwhile , lockdown-weary Brits have reportedly started using Cummings ’ s behavior as an excuse when being questioned by police for possible lockdown breaches .
In FP on Tuesday , Owen Matthews explained why public anger has turned so quickly on British government , and why Johnson ’ s refusal to fire Cummings could be his undoing .
U.S. planning to indict wife of Venezuelan leader .
The United States is planning to charge Cilia Flores , the wife of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro , with crimes that could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reuters .
The move would represent a further escalation in the U.S. pressure campaign on the Venezuelan government , after Maduro and over a dozen other officials were indicted by the Justice Ddepartment in April on charges of a drug trafficking and narco-terrorism .
Venezuela ’ s Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez called Reuters questioning about the story “ nauseating , slanderous , and offensive.
” Huawei executive trial to continue .
A Canadian judge has ruled that the extradition case against Meng Wanzhou , the Huawei chief financial officer can move forward , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditions necessary for extradition to the United States .
Meng is charged with allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran , in a case that is seen as part of the broader struggle between China and the United States for control of the global 5G telecommunications market .
Meng is currently held under house arrest in Vancouver while her case proceeds .
China has detained two Canadian nationals since late 2018 , Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig , on suspicion of espionage in what Canadians see as a way to pressure the Canadian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ client was being held by the Chinese government as a “ pawn.
” U.S. out of WTO ?
U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization has become a rare bipartisan point of agreement on Capitol Hill , FP ’ s Keith Johnson reports , as frustrations with globalization and China ’ s actions threaten to boil over .
A Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives , Rep. Peter DeFazio , and Republican Senator Josh Hawley have both introduced legislation to leave the WTO in the past month .
The legislation is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , Johnson writes , “ the rush for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved , highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.
” An academic sifting through the results of a Freedom of Information Act request has yielded a previously unknown nugget of recent history .
Tim Gill , a sociologist at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington , uncovered a 2011 plan by the U.S. government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ record and distribute songs as a way “ to promote greater reflection among Venezuelan youth about freedom of expression , their connection with democracy , and the state of democracy in the country , ” according to a grant application .
The roughly $ 22,000 grant was ultimately approved by the National Endowment for Democracy .
U.S. government-funded musical projects are becoming something of a genre : A USAID-funded plan to infiltrate the Cuban underground hip-hop scene was revealed in 2014 , and the question of whether the CIA funded a popular post-Cold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new podcast series .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares a response to China’s Hong Kong national security law, the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “move on” from Dominic Cummings scandal.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The U.S. government prepares a response to China’s Hong Kong national security law, the European Union proposes an ambitious recovery plan, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson urges country to “move on” from Dominic Cummings scandal.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Says Hong Kong Is No Longer Autonomous
China’s National People’s Congress approved a draft decision today to impose national security laws directly on Hong Kong, beginning the formal legal process that will likely result in the finalized laws coming into effect by September. As Foreign Policy’s James Palmer wrote in China Brief on Wednesday, the new law “will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges, a crackdown on free speech, and the unleashing of China’s security organs, such as the Ministry of State Security and the People’s Armed Police.”
U.S. President Donald Trump now has an opportunity to turn his anti-China rhetoric into action, although it’s still not clear what form that will take. On Tuesday, he hinted at a White House announcement by the end of this week, with sanctions the likely avenue. His most senior diplomat, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, laid the groundwork on Wednesday by certifying to the U.S. Congress that Hong Kong’s fate as a fully Chinese entity was all but sealed. “No reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China, given facts on the ground,” Pompeo said.
David Stilwell, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia, told reporters on Wednesday that the U.S. response “will be as targeted as possible to change behavior,” while adding that he still hoped for China to reverse its decision.
Just how much is the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship worth? Any sanctions or tariffs the United States proposes will have to reckon with the close economic ties between the U.S. economy and the territory. In 2018, Hong Kong was the 21st largest U.S. trading partner. Also in 2018, the United States enjoyed its largest trade surplus with Hong Kong, at $31.1 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service. It is also home to the regional headquarters of almost 300 U.S. companies, and a regional office for another 434.
Regardless of U.S. actions, Palmer argues, its status as a safe financial hub is under threat. “For businesses, the main value of the city is that its financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland’s, making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove their credibility in the region. The erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that. And on the ground, increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates.”
Don’t go it alone. Also writing in FP, Doug Bandow advises that the best course of action is a unified one, and recommends that the United States bring together its European and Asian allies to present a “a quiet demarche to Beijing: Continue down this path and the world’s most important economic powers together will revoke the territory’s special economic status.”
What We’re Following Today
EU proposes dramatic recovery plan. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed an ambitious economic recovery program for the bloc—funded by raising approximately 750 billion euros ($825 billion). Raising that amount would be a marked departure from EU policy and the first time a common debt would be shared among member states. The funds would be split, with roughly two-thirds going toward grants and another one-third in loans. “We either all go it alone, leaving countries, regions and people behind and accepting a union of haves and have-nots, or we walk that road together,” Von der Leyen said upon unveiling the plan, called “Europe’s Moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation.”
The program is not yet finalized and must be ratified by all 27 EU member states to go forward. The so called Frugal Four of Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark have previously been opposed to a grant mechanism funded by EU-wide bonds, favoring a system of loans instead.
Cummings under Conservative Party pressure. Although British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has attempted to draw a line under the scandal regarding his advisor Dominic Cummings, who violated lockdown measures, lawmakers in his own party are still calling for the advisor’s removal. As Johnson urged the country to “move on,” at least 44 MPs, or 12 percent of the Conservative Party’s representation in Parliament, have either called for his resignation or removal according to the Guardian; more than 60 Tories have expressed some form of criticism. Meanwhile, lockdown-weary Brits have reportedly started using Cummings’s behavior as an excuse when being questioned by police for possible lockdown breaches.
In FP on Tuesday, Owen Matthews explained why public anger has turned so quickly on British government, and why Johnson’s refusal to fire Cummings could be his undoing.
U.S. planning to indict wife of Venezuelan leader. The United States is planning to charge Cilia Flores, the wife of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, with crimes that could include drug trafficking and corruption according to Reuters. The move would represent a further escalation in the U.S. pressure campaign on the Venezuelan government, after Maduro and over a dozen other officials were indicted by the Justice Ddepartment in April on charges of a drug trafficking and narco-terrorism. Venezuela’s Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez called Reuters questioning about the story “nauseating, slanderous, and offensive.”
Keep an Eye On
Huawei executive trial to continue. A Canadian judge has ruled that the extradition case against Meng Wanzhou, the Huawei chief financial officer can move forward, saying the case against Meng met the conditions necessary for extradition to the United States. Meng is charged with allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran, in a case that is seen as part of the broader struggle between China and the United States for control of the global 5G telecommunications market.
Meng is currently held under house arrest in Vancouver while her case proceeds. China has detained two Canadian nationals since late 2018, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, on suspicion of espionage in what Canadians see as a way to pressure the Canadian government. A laywer for Kovrig said his client was being held by the Chinese government as a “pawn.”
U.S. out of WTO? U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization has become a rare bipartisan point of agreement on Capitol Hill, FP’s Keith Johnson reports, as frustrations with globalization and China’s actions threaten to boil over. A Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Peter DeFazio, and Republican Senator Josh Hawley have both introduced legislation to leave the WTO in the past month. The legislation is not expected to pass in either chamber, however, Johnson writes, “the rush for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved, highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Odds and Ends
An academic sifting through the results of a Freedom of Information Act request has yielded a previously unknown nugget of recent history. Tim Gill, a sociologist at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, uncovered a 2011 plan by the U.S. government to fund rock bands in Venezuela to record and distribute songs as a way “to promote greater reflection among Venezuelan youth about freedom of expression, their connection with democracy, and the state of democracy in the country,” according to a grant application. The roughly $22,000 grant was ultimately approved by the National Endowment for Democracy.
U.S. government-funded musical projects are becoming something of a genre: A USAID-funded plan to infiltrate the Cuban underground hip-hop scene was revealed in 2014, and the question of whether the CIA funded a popular post-Cold War power ballad is the subject of a new podcast series.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--Trump Cuts U.S. Ties With World Health Organization Amid Pandemic

On May 19 , U.S. President Donald Trump gave the World Health Organization an ultimatum : Start implementing reforms in 30 days or else the United States would halt funding for the international body .
But 11 days after the pronouncement , Trump pulled the trigger anyway , abruptly declaring on Friday the United States would be “ terminating ” its relationship with WHO and cutting off the institution from any U.S. cash .
The move culminates months of growing U.S. anger with the international organization against the backdrop of spiking tensions between Washington and Beijing .
It also throws @ @ @ @ @ @ @ millions of dollars of U.S. global health funding at the peak of a global pandemic .
“ We have detailed the reforms that it must make and engaged with them directly , but they have refused to act , ” Trump said in a press conference on Friday .
“ Because they have failed to make the requested and greatly needed reforms , we will be today terminating our relationship with the World Health Organization and redirecting those funds to other worldwide and deserving urgent global public health needs.
” Top Trump officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ WHO for being too friendly with China and providing cover for Beijing in the wake of its initial cover-up and mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak .
But the announcement also drew swift condemnation from public health experts , who said it would undercut WHO ’ s ability to address the pandemic just as its spread in the developing world picks up .
“ This is the most counterproductive move in the middle of a world health crisis , ” said Megan Doherty , a senior director of policy and advocacy at Mercy Corps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council director for North Africa during the Obama administration .
“ In places with poor health infrastructure that don ’ t have an existing strong presence , this is creating a gap that we can ’ t fill.
” Other experts fear the decision will threaten the fate of other public health and vaccination programs around the world , beyond the current pandemic .
“ What it will do is rupture global vaccine programs , polio eradication , Ebola response , and a thousand other global health tasks that the U.S. relies on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Konyndyk , a former senior U.S. aid official now with the Center for Global Development .
Democratic lawmakers slammed the move , asserting Trump was scapegoating the WHO to cover up his administration ’ s own failings in the domestic pandemic response .
This week , the U.S. coronavirus death toll reached a grim milestone , surpassing 100,000 .
“ Not wanting to take responsibility as the deaths continue to mount , he blames others , ” Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy said in a statement to Foreign Policy .
“ WHO could have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a global health emergency sooner , but it is performing an essential function and needs our strong support , especially now.
” Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , said the move would only hasten the rise of Chinese influence in international institutions .
“ The big winner today is the Chinese government , ” he said .
“ They will now leap into the void created by the United States withdrawal from the WHO , and seek to become the world ’ s go-to power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ write the global public health rules , not the United States .
What a nightmare.
” Trump ’ s speech on Friday was centered on hammering China as the war of words between the two rival powers heats up .
He rebuked China ’ s plan to impose a sweeping new security law on Hong Kong , declaring the territory no longer autonomous from Beijing and revoking Hong Kong ’ s special trade and economic status with the United States .
His announcement on the WHO also leaves more questions than answers—including questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ through internally yet , according to several officials familiar with the matter .
It was not immediately clear whether the United States “ terminating ” its relationship with the WHO meant it was legally withdrawing from the institution .
Trump also gave no additional details on how the United States would reallocate its nearly $ 450 million a year in annual funding to WHO to other public health programs .
The decision appeared to have taken the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and the world health agency by surprise , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I don ’ t think anybody knew .
Nobody ever knows what Trump is going to do , ” said Ilona Kickbusch , a global health scholar with Chatham House , a think tank .
“ You have a president who needs to deflect attention from other problems and WHO seems to be the right organization [ to target ] right now.
” If WHO is completely cut off from U.S. funding—making up 15 percent of the institution ’ s budget—it ’ s largest funder will become not another major global power , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foundation .
( China only contributes about 0.21 percent of the budget , around $ 40 million . )
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been a leading critic of WHO , using his agency ’ s podium and conservative talk shows as a bully pulpit to batter the world body as the pandemic continues to spread worldwide .
The former Kansas congressman accused WHO of protecting the Chinese government and failing to help provide samples of the virus from where it originated in Wuhan , China .
“ When I see whether @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democrats saying , ‘ Well gosh , if you all would just cooperate with the World Health Organization , ’ I am astounded , ” Pompeo said in an interview with the conservative commentator Ben Shapiro earlier this month .
“ They failed us .
It ’ s not the first time the WHO has failed the world in the time of a pandemic .
You can ’ t go back to business as usual ; we ’ ve got to fix it.
” Despite the criticisms coming from Washington , U.S. efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to have fallen flat .
Trump ’ s announcement on Friday follows weeks of efforts by his ambassador to the Geneva-based organization , Andrew Bremberg , to prod WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus into taking a tougher line with China .
This includes an unsuccessful U.S. push at an annual WHO meeting this month to get the institution to open an investigation into the origins of the virus in China and invite Taiwan back into the health agency as an observer .
China ardently opposes Taiwan ’ s participation in international organizations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s sovereignty from Beijing .

Robbie Gramer, Colum Lynch and Jack Detsch

On May 19, U.S. President Donald Trump gave the World Health Organization an ultimatum: Start implementing reforms in 30 days or else the United States would halt funding for the international body. But 11 days after the pronouncement, Trump pulled the trigger anyway, abruptly declaring on Friday the United States would be “terminating” its relationship with WHO and cutting off the institution from any U.S. cash.
On May 19, U.S. President Donald Trump gave the World Health Organization an ultimatum: Start implementing reforms in 30 days or else the United States would halt funding for the international body. But 11 days after the pronouncement, Trump pulled the trigger anyway, abruptly declaring on Friday the United States would be “terminating” its relationship with WHO and cutting off the institution from any U.S. cash.
The move culminates months of growing U.S. anger with the international organization against the backdrop of spiking tensions between Washington and Beijing. It also throws into question the fate of hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. global health funding at the peak of a global pandemic.
“We have detailed the reforms that it must make and engaged with them directly, but they have refused to act,” Trump said in a press conference on Friday. “Because they have failed to make the requested and greatly needed reforms, we will be today terminating our relationship with the World Health Organization and redirecting those funds to other worldwide and deserving urgent global public health needs.”
Top Trump officials and Republican allies in Congress have criticized WHO for being too friendly with China and providing cover for Beijing in the wake of its initial cover-up and mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak.
But the announcement also drew swift condemnation from public health experts, who said it would undercut WHO’s ability to address the pandemic just as its spread in the developing world picks up. “This is the most counterproductive move in the middle of a world health crisis,” said Megan Doherty, a senior director of policy and advocacy at Mercy Corps and a former White House National Security Council director for North Africa during the Obama administration. “In places with poor health infrastructure that don’t have an existing strong presence, this is creating a gap that we can’t fill.”
Other experts fear the decision will threaten the fate of other public health and vaccination programs around the world, beyond the current pandemic. “What it will do is rupture global vaccine programs, polio eradication, Ebola response, and a thousand other global health tasks that the U.S. relies on WHO to deliver,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, a former senior U.S. aid official now with the Center for Global Development.
Democratic lawmakers slammed the move, asserting Trump was scapegoating the WHO to cover up his administration’s own failings in the domestic pandemic response. This week, the U.S. coronavirus death toll reached a grim milestone, surpassing 100,000.
“Not wanting to take responsibility as the deaths continue to mount, he blames others,” Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy said in a statement to Foreign Policy. “WHO could have been more assertive with China and declared a global health emergency sooner, but it is performing an essential function and needs our strong support, especially now.”
Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said the move would only hasten the rise of Chinese influence in international institutions. “The big winner today is the Chinese government,” he said. “They will now leap into the void created by the United States withdrawal from the WHO, and seek to become the world’s go-to power for global health. China will now write the global public health rules, not the United States. What a nightmare.”
Trump’s speech on Friday was centered on hammering China as the war of words between the two rival powers heats up. He rebuked China’s plan to impose a sweeping new security law on Hong Kong, declaring the territory no longer autonomous from Beijing and revoking Hong Kong’s special trade and economic status with the United States.
His announcement on the WHO also leaves more questions than answers—including questions the administration hasn’t even sorted through internally yet, according to several officials familiar with the matter. It was not immediately clear whether the United States “terminating” its relationship with the WHO meant it was legally withdrawing from the institution. Trump also gave no additional details on how the United States would reallocate its nearly $450 million a year in annual funding to WHO to other public health programs.
The decision appeared to have taken the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and the world health agency by surprise, several diplomats told Foreign Policy. “I don’t think anybody knew. Nobody ever knows what Trump is going to do,” said Ilona Kickbusch, a global health scholar with Chatham House, a think tank. “You have a president who needs to deflect attention from other problems and WHO seems to be the right organization [to target] right now.”
If WHO is completely cut off from U.S. funding—making up 15 percent of the institution’s budget—it’s largest funder will become not another major global power, but rather the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. (China only contributes about 0.21 percent of the budget, around $40 million.)
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been a leading critic of WHO, using his agency’s podium and conservative talk shows as a bully pulpit to batter the world body as the pandemic continues to spread worldwide. The former Kansas congressman accused WHO of protecting the Chinese government and failing to help provide samples of the virus from where it originated in Wuhan, China.
“When I see whether it’s the left-wing media or Democrats saying, ‘Well gosh, if you all would just cooperate with the World Health Organization,’ I am astounded,” Pompeo said in an interview with the conservative commentator Ben Shapiro earlier this month. “They failed us. It’s not the first time the WHO has failed the world in the time of a pandemic. You can’t go back to business as usual; we’ve got to fix it.”
Despite the criticisms coming from Washington, U.S. efforts to influence the direction of WHO appear to have fallen flat. Trump’s announcement on Friday follows weeks of efforts by his ambassador to the Geneva-based organization, Andrew Bremberg, to prod WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus into taking a tougher line with China. This includes an unsuccessful U.S. push at an annual WHO meeting this month to get the institution to open an investigation into the origins of the virus in China and invite Taiwan back into the health agency as an observer. China ardently opposes Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, seeing it as a sign of Taiwan’s sovereignty from Beijing.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-29--China’s Crackdown in Hong Kong Won’t Spare Foreigners

The submission of a national security decision document on Hong Kong at China ’ s National People ’ s Congress last week will enable the central government in Beijing to deploy new tools to suppress public protest and dissent in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region , further undermining Hong Kong ’ s autonomy and raising new risks for foreign companies operating there .
Unable to enact policies to address the underlying grievances of Hong Kong citizens , particularly young people and the educated middle class , Beijing faces a sustained , motivated insurgency in Hong Kong .
Its latest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the relevant organs of the central government for the maintenance of national security , ” effectively means that is it sending counterinsurgency forces to operate openly in Hong Kong against protesters and political opposition .
China is no stranger to insurgencies ( the Communist Party itself started out as one ) , and it has effectively dealt with them in Tibet and Xinjiang .
Hong Kong is obviously next .
The “ Decision of the National People ’ s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanism for the Maintenance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Special Administrative Region ( Draft ) ” was submitted for consideration and a ( purely rubber-stamp ) vote , which will pave the way for the National People ’ s Congress standing committee to draft and pass a National Security Law for Hong Kong .
The short , 840-character “ decision ” contains seven articles , the most important of which is Article 4 , which permits Beijing to deploy what it calls “ the relevant organs of the central government for the maintenance of national security ” in Hong Kong , giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Security , and Ministry of Public Security bodies enforcement powers and the ability to operate openly and independently there for the first time .
This development further erodes Hong Kong ’ s autonomy , fundamentally changing the political dynamic and business operating environment in the region .
Effectively , once the decision takes effect , Hong Kong will be amalgamated into China ’ s police state—through a variety of tools already well-honed on the mainland , although with some adjustments for Hong Kong ’ s unique situation .
The central government ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Hong Kong Basic Law , which stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason , secession , sedition , or subversion against China , including the theft of state secrets and political activities of foreign organizations .
Hong Kong authorities attempted to pass a National Security Bill in 2003 under the Article 23 provision , but mass demonstrations and insufficient support within the Legislative Council caused it to be dropped .
Sixteen years later , current Hong Kong Chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a proposed mainland extradition bill in September 2019 in the face of mass demonstrations that were sustained until late March of this year , when social distancing measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus pandemic began to take effect .
Beijing is acting now because it believes that the Hong Kong government is incapable of passing a law that would enable it to prevent Hong Kong from becoming , as it sees it , a base for subverting the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , forcing it to turn to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrations began in March 2019 in response to the Hong Kong Security Bureau ’ s proposal to amend the extradition law to enable suspects to be extradited to mainland China for trial .
Mass unrest resulted in the closure of Hong Kong ’ s airport and critical transport infrastructure including tunnels and the metro system that August .
Lam ’ s attempts to assuage the public were failures , with protests continuing and even escalating after the proposed extradition bill was dropped , most notably the occupation and siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protest in front of China ’ s liaison office in the city and the defacement of the national emblem over the entrance was a particularly painful episode for the CCP—and a deep embarrassment for the officials at the liaison office itself , whose director was brusquely dismissed five months later .
The announcement of new national security law last week sparked new mass protests and clashes with police , after two months of calm during pandemic social distancing .
Government messaging has again failed to reassure Hong Kong ’ s citizens or keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s first chief executive , Tung Chee-hwa—speaking in Beijing at the Chinese People ’ s Political Consultative Conference , where he serves as vice chairman—insulted protesters by arguing that Hong Kong needs the national security law because of supposed foreign interference .
Echoing sentiments repeated by current leaders and Chinese official media , he attempted to convince Hong Kong citizens that the new law will not infringe on their freedoms , saying , “ If you do not plan to engage in acts of secession , subversion , terrorism or conspiring with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affairs , you will have no reason to fear.
” Such assurances are not likely to assuage the public any more than the government ’ s unsuccessful efforts in the past have .
Widespread discontent with the Hong Kong government and popular anger at heavy-handed police tactics compound public frustration with a bleak socioeconomic situation , particularly low social mobility fueled by considerable underemployment among college-educated youth , wage stagnation , and outrageously high housing costs .
Large-scale protests are sustained as much by the government ’ s legislative missteps as by its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ segments of the population .
Tung ’ s emphasis on foreign influence reflects an oft-repeated claim that foreign , anti-China forces are supporting and encouraging protesters to challenge Beijing from the security of Hong Kong , rationalizing that a national security law is needed to deal with it .
With little actual evidence of foreign interference , however , the “ hostile foreign forces ” line is essentially a fig leaf used by Beijing to deflect attention and responsibility for its failed approach to peacefully integrating Hong Kong into the mainland .
Rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ popular discontent or admitting to policy failures , Beijing reverts to blaming external forces seeking to weaken China .
Despite behind-the-scenes support from mainland intelligence , state security , and police forces , Hong Kong police have been unable to use force to stop demonstrations , some of which numbered in the millions of participants .
Importantly , the government has been unable to identify and detain organizers or leaders of the movement , who have used technology and surreptitious collective leadership structures to mobilize protesters and avoid arrest .
It is doubtful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of suppression in Hong Kong that it used in Western China .
Hong Kong ’ s conditions are different and will call for different means , but China ’ s national security organs have a well-used playbook for suppression and are likely to lean on it .
China ’ s state security organs will have a large suite of tools to crack down on undesirable citizens in Hong Kong , including unrestricted surveillance , high-tech databases and apps , broad latitude to define what is considered criminal ( using vague terms such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , and an unconstrained security force able to administratively detain people accused of national security offences .
Beijing has the ability to quickly scale up national security infrastructure to coerce , detain , and reeducate citizens that it considers to be a threat on a very large scale .
The Ministry of State Security , which was originally modelled on Russia ’ s KGB , will be a key organization directing the Hong Kong pacification effort .
It will be but one part of a coordinated , all-of-government effort , which could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ministry of Public Security , and other departments under the State Council , in addition to domestic security and intelligence units under the Central Military Commission , which commands the People ’ s Liberation Army and the People ’ s Armed Police .
With the advent of Chinese state security forces operating in Hong Kong , the environment for foreigners will change .
Foreign businesspeople are mistaken to think the new national security law will not apply to them or their activities , even if they avoid participating in public protests or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of national security includes finance and economic activities , as foreign hedge fund managers learned when financiers were detained for shorting stocks during the 2015 market crash in Shanghai .
Journalists , businesspeople , and other visitors will soon be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention in Hong Kong , just as they are on the mainland .
Even though Hong Kong maintains an independent judicial system , security bureaus under the authority of the central government answer to the CCP , making it doubtful that Beijing will subject its agents to oversight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , mainland security forces operating in Hong Kong will focus on identifying and neutralizing undesirable Hong Kong citizens who they perceive pose a threat to the CCP , which would include any foreign individuals and organizations that support them .
More ominous is what organizations such as the Ministry of State Security will do once protests have been tamped down .
Rather than return to the mainland , they will likely continue their mission of defending the CCP and perform the same functions in Hong Kong that they perform in China .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ops and collect intelligence on foreigners , including journalists and businesspeople .
They will also provide support to state-owned enterprises , which could include providing intelligence on foreign competitors operating in Hong Kong or stealing intellectual property and proprietary business information using cyber-intrusions or other tradecraft .
It is unclear at this point if Beijing will commit sufficient resources to effectively suppress and end Hong Kong ’ s large-scale domestic unrest .
That would take considerable effort , time , money , and ruthlessness , which Beijing possesses abundantly , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong ’ s society to the same degree as the rest of the country , which it has not yet demonstrated and the long-term costs of which are unknown .
Beijing has successfully crushed popular insurgencies in Tibet and Xinjiang , however , indicating that it has the strategy and means to do so in Hong Kong should it determine that the local risks to the CCP outweigh the economic benefits of Hong Kong ’ s free society .

The submission of a national security decision document on Hong Kong at China’s National People’s Congress last week will enable the central government in Beijing to deploy new tools to suppress public protest and dissent in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, further undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy and raising new risks for foreign companies operating there.
The submission of a national security decision document on Hong Kong at China’s National People’s Congress last week will enable the central government in Beijing to deploy new tools to suppress public protest and dissent in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, further undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy and raising new risks for foreign companies operating there.
Unable to enact policies to address the underlying grievances of Hong Kong citizens, particularly young people and the educated middle class, Beijing faces a sustained, motivated insurgency in Hong Kong. Its latest move, deploying what it calls “the relevant organs of the central government for the maintenance of national security,” effectively means that is it sending counterinsurgency forces to operate openly in Hong Kong against protesters and political opposition. China is no stranger to insurgencies (the Communist Party itself started out as one), and it has effectively dealt with them in Tibet and Xinjiang. Hong Kong is obviously next.
The “Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanism for the Maintenance of National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Draft)” was submitted for consideration and a (purely rubber-stamp) vote, which will pave the way for the National People’s Congress standing committee to draft and pass a National Security Law for Hong Kong.
The short, 840-character “decision” contains seven articles, the most important of which is Article 4, which permits Beijing to deploy what it calls “the relevant organs of the central government for the maintenance of national security” in Hong Kong, giving intelligence, military, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Public Security bodies enforcement powers and the ability to operate openly and independently there for the first time.
This development further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy, fundamentally changing the political dynamic and business operating environment in the region. Effectively, once the decision takes effect, Hong Kong will be amalgamated into China’s police state—through a variety of tools already well-honed on the mainland, although with some adjustments for Hong Kong’s unique situation.
The central government’s justification for the move is Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against China, including the theft of state secrets and political activities of foreign organizations. Hong Kong authorities attempted to pass a National Security Bill in 2003 under the Article 23 provision, but mass demonstrations and insufficient support within the Legislative Council caused it to be dropped. Sixteen years later, current Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam was forced to drop a proposed mainland extradition bill in September 2019 in the face of mass demonstrations that were sustained until late March of this year, when social distancing measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus pandemic began to take effect.
Beijing is acting now because it believes that the Hong Kong government is incapable of passing a law that would enable it to prevent Hong Kong from becoming, as it sees it, a base for subverting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), forcing it to turn to the National People’s Congress.
Large-scale demonstrations began in March 2019 in response to the Hong Kong Security Bureau’s proposal to amend the extradition law to enable suspects to be extradited to mainland China for trial. Mass unrest resulted in the closure of Hong Kong’s airport and critical transport infrastructure including tunnels and the metro system that August. Lam’s attempts to assuage the public were failures, with protests continuing and even escalating after the proposed extradition bill was dropped, most notably the occupation and siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University in November. The July 21 protest in front of China’s liaison office in the city and the defacement of the national emblem over the entrance was a particularly painful episode for the CCP—and a deep embarrassment for the officials at the liaison office itself, whose director was brusquely dismissed five months later.
The announcement of new national security law last week sparked new mass protests and clashes with police, after two months of calm during pandemic social distancing. Government messaging has again failed to reassure Hong Kong’s citizens or keep them off the street. Hong Kong’s first chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa—speaking in Beijing at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, where he serves as vice chairman—insulted protesters by arguing that Hong Kong needs the national security law because of supposed foreign interference. Echoing sentiments repeated by current leaders and Chinese official media, he attempted to convince Hong Kong citizens that the new law will not infringe on their freedoms, saying, “If you do not plan to engage in acts of secession, subversion, terrorism or conspiring with foreign influence in connection with Hong Kong affairs, you will have no reason to fear.”
Such assurances are not likely to assuage the public any more than the government’s unsuccessful efforts in the past have. Widespread discontent with the Hong Kong government and popular anger at heavy-handed police tactics compound public frustration with a bleak socioeconomic situation, particularly low social mobility fueled by considerable underemployment among college-educated youth, wage stagnation, and outrageously high housing costs. Large-scale protests are sustained as much by the government’s legislative missteps as by its inability to provide public goods to broad segments of the population.
Tung’s emphasis on foreign influence reflects an oft-repeated claim that foreign, anti-China forces are supporting and encouraging protesters to challenge Beijing from the security of Hong Kong, rationalizing that a national security law is needed to deal with it. With little actual evidence of foreign interference, however, the “hostile foreign forces” line is essentially a fig leaf used by Beijing to deflect attention and responsibility for its failed approach to peacefully integrating Hong Kong into the mainland. Rather than addressing the underlying issues causing widespread popular discontent or admitting to policy failures, Beijing reverts to blaming external forces seeking to weaken China.
Despite behind-the-scenes support from mainland intelligence, state security, and police forces, Hong Kong police have been unable to use force to stop demonstrations, some of which numbered in the millions of participants. Importantly, the government has been unable to identify and detain organizers or leaders of the movement, who have used technology and surreptitious collective leadership structures to mobilize protesters and avoid arrest.
It is doubtful that China will use the same tools of suppression in Hong Kong that it used in Western China. Hong Kong’s conditions are different and will call for different means, but China’s national security organs have a well-used playbook for suppression and are likely to lean on it.
China’s state security organs will have a large suite of tools to crack down on undesirable citizens in Hong Kong, including unrestricted surveillance, high-tech databases and apps, broad latitude to define what is considered criminal (using vague terms such as “terrorism” and “subversion”), and an unconstrained security force able to administratively detain people accused of national security offences. Beijing has the ability to quickly scale up national security infrastructure to coerce, detain, and reeducate citizens that it considers to be a threat on a very large scale.
The Ministry of State Security, which was originally modelled on Russia’s KGB, will be a key organization directing the Hong Kong pacification effort. It will be but one part of a coordinated, all-of-government effort, which could include the United Front Work Department, the Ministry of Public Security, and other departments under the State Council, in addition to domestic security and intelligence units under the Central Military Commission, which commands the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police.
With the advent of Chinese state security forces operating in Hong Kong, the environment for foreigners will change. Foreign businesspeople are mistaken to think the new national security law will not apply to them or their activities, even if they avoid participating in public protests or online commentary. Beijing’s definition of national security includes finance and economic activities, as foreign hedge fund managers learned when financiers were detained for shorting stocks during the 2015 market crash in Shanghai. Journalists, businesspeople, and other visitors will soon be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention in Hong Kong, just as they are on the mainland. Even though Hong Kong maintains an independent judicial system, security bureaus under the authority of the central government answer to the CCP, making it doubtful that Beijing will subject its agents to oversight by independent Hong Kong bodies.
Initially, mainland security forces operating in Hong Kong will focus on identifying and neutralizing undesirable Hong Kong citizens who they perceive pose a threat to the CCP, which would include any foreign individuals and organizations that support them.
More ominous is what organizations such as the Ministry of State Security will do once protests have been tamped down. Rather than return to the mainland, they will likely continue their mission of defending the CCP and perform the same functions in Hong Kong that they perform in China. In addition to counterintelligence, they will run ops and collect intelligence on foreigners, including journalists and businesspeople. They will also provide support to state-owned enterprises, which could include providing intelligence on foreign competitors operating in Hong Kong or stealing intellectual property and proprietary business information using cyber-intrusions or other tradecraft.
It is unclear at this point if Beijing will commit sufficient resources to effectively suppress and end Hong Kong’s large-scale domestic unrest. That would take considerable effort, time, money, and ruthlessness, which Beijing possesses abundantly, as well as the political will to exert control over Hong Kong’s society to the same degree as the rest of the country, which it has not yet demonstrated and the long-term costs of which are unknown. Beijing has successfully crushed popular insurgencies in Tibet and Xinjiang, however, indicating that it has the strategy and means to do so in Hong Kong should it determine that the local risks to the CCP outweigh the economic benefits of Hong Kong’s free society.