foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--All Bets Are Off in Belarus

All Bets Are Off in Belarus

All Bets Are Off in Belarus Elections are a predictable affair in the country often called Europe ’ s last dictatorship : There will be few surprises when Aleksandr Lukashenko is reelected to his sixth consecutive term as president of Belarus on Sunday .
But the real political upset has taken place on the campaign trail , as the president has faced an unprecedented challenge from the teacher-turned-opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , who has drawn big crowds in smaller towns and cities across the country that were once thought to be Lukashenko ’ s base .
Increasingly defiant political opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contract that guaranteed moderate prosperity in exchange for authoritarian rule , has apparently undermined what popular support Lukashenko still had .
“ The level of dissatisfaction among the population has been growing all the time , ” said Tadeusz Giczan , a Belarusian-born Ph.D. researcher at University College London who studies the country ’ s political economy .
“ It ’ s clear for everyone that Lukashenko ’ s time is over.
” The closely watched election comes after several weeks of cascading incidents .
Tensions with Russia have spiked after Belarus arrested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military contractor the Wagner Group in Minsk , claiming they were part of a Russian operation to destabilize the country .
Dmitry Medvedev , the deputy head of Russia ’ s Security Council , described the arrests as “ offensive ” this week and warned that they could have “ sad consequences.
” On Monday , Moscow said 3,000 men would take part in war games near the border with Belarus .
The next day , Minsk announced that it was going to conduct military training for reservists near the border with Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intimidation have also marked the final stretch of the campaign .
Last week , some 63,000 people attended a rally in Minsk—thought to be the largest since the 1990s—in support of Tikhanovskaya , whose two campaign promises are to free political prisoners and hold new elections .
Another scheduled rally in the capital on Thursday was canceled after Tikhanovskaya ’ s campaign chief , Maryya Maroz , was briefly detained and warned about the potential consequences of holding “ unsanctioned ” rallies .
Other members of the campaign team were detained across the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 , some 1,140 people were detained for taking part in protests , rallies , and other election-related activities , while almost 200 people have been sentenced to 15 days ’ imprisonment , with some receiving multiple sentences , according to human rights groups in the country .
The crackdown widened this week and at times took a turn for the absurd .
After Tikhanovskaya ’ s rally in the capital was canceled , the candidate and her team announced that they would instead attend a pro-government rally as “ ordinary Belarusian citizens.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition leader actually attended the rally , but as her supporters arrived , two DJs at the event began to play the song “ I Want Changes !
” by the Soviet rock group Kino , a well-known protest anthem in the former Soviet Union .
They were later detained and charged with minor hooliganism and disobedience , according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty .
Several popular Russian singers and the American rappers Tyga and Saint Jhn , who were invited to perform in Minsk and other cities on the eve of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to overshadow opposition protests , canceled their concerts .
Tyga canceled his participation in the event after receiving a letter from the Human Rights Foundation imploring him to pull out .
Meanwhile the Belarusian Football Federation has postponed all soccer matches in the capital this weekend after fans began chanting “ Long live Belarus ” at a match Thursday , perceived as an anti-Lukashenko chant .
As if that weren ’ t enough , in late July Belarus got into a diplomatic tiff with the United States , detaining Vitali Shkliarov , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigns of Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders , in his hometown of Gomel .
Shkliarov told BuzzFeed News that he was in town to visit his mother , who has cancer .
On Friday , he was charged with organizing an unsanctioned political rally for the opposition and could face up to three years ’ imprisonment .
Shkliarov is married to a U.S. diplomat and travels on a diplomatic passport .
A spokesperson for the State Department told Foreign Policy that the department was aware that a U.S. citizen had been detained in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his right to consular notification honored .
State declined to provide further comment due to privacy considerations .
Tikanovskaya launched her presidential campaign when her husband , the popular video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky , was arrested after trying to mount his own bid for the presidency .
He remains in prison on charges of violating public order and election laws , and the couple have sent their two children to live abroad after receiving threats .
Female activists in Belarus are often threatened with having their children removed from their care and placed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent Amnesty International report .
The very fact that Tikhanovskaya is a woman may explain why she was unexpectedly allowed to register her candidacy last month after two previous candidates were jailed—Tikhanovsky and the former banker Viktor Babariko—and a third , former Belarusian Ambassador to the United States Valery Tsepkalo , was prevented from registering .
Lukashenko has previously said the country was not ready for a female president and that the stresses of the job would cause her to “ collapse , poor thing.
” What seems to be collapsing—though it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ true support .
In the early 2000s , Belarus enjoyed strong economic growth , with GDP growth topping 11 percent a year at one point , tamping down any embers of unrest at the country ’ s authoritarian bent .
But the economy never recovered after the global financial crash just over a decade ago .
The World Bank has predicted that the Belarusian economy will contract by 4 percent this year , the largest decline in 25 years .
Lukashenko ’ s response to the pandemic , like that of other authoritarian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ point for many Belarusians .
“ The virus attacks the weak , ” Lukashenko said amid the outbreak , refusing to implement lockdown measures and instead recommending that people drink vodka and visit the sauna to ward off the virus .
He revealed last month that he had contracted and recovered from the virus .
The country ’ s last remaining independent pollster shuttered in 2016 , facing increased pressure from the authorities , so it ’ s hard to know just how far his support may have fallen .
A wily political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West against each other , Lukashenko increasingly looks to have painted himself into a corner as his popularity plunges at home and tensions flare with his longtime backer Russia .
In a fiery state-of-the-nation address on Tuesday , Lukashenko accused Russia of lying about the arrested Wagner mercenaries , which Moscow had claimed were using Minsk as a transit point before traveling to a third country .
“ So far there is no open warfare , no shooting , the trigger has not yet been pulled , but an attempt to organize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is already obvious , ” Lukashenko said .
He also claimed , without evidence , that a second group of fighters had been deployed to the south of the country .
In a phone call on Wednesday , Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked for the extradition of a number of the Wagner mercenaries to Ukraine , where several of them are reported to have fought alongside separatists in the Donbass .
Moscow , which has long sought to obfuscate its role in stoking the conflict in eastern Ukraine and in the shooting down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely be nervous about what the men could reveal if they are handed over to Kyiv .
“ I am not confident anymore that it [ extradition ] was just an empty threat , though I believe it is still quite unlikely , ” said Andrei Yeliseyeu , the research director of the Warsaw-based Eurasian States in Transition Research Center .
“ In case they are extradited , one can not rule out that the Kremlin will seriously think of betting against Lukashenko and creating a controlled chaos in Belarus to bring another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
”

Elections are a predictable affair in the country often called Europe’s last dictatorship: There will be few surprises when Aleksandr Lukashenko is reelected to his sixth consecutive term as president of Belarus on Sunday.
Elections are a predictable affair in the country often called Europe’s last dictatorship: There will be few surprises when Aleksandr Lukashenko is reelected to his sixth consecutive term as president of Belarus on Sunday.
But the real political upset has taken place on the campaign trail, as the president has faced an unprecedented challenge from the teacher-turned-opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who has drawn big crowds in smaller towns and cities across the country that were once thought to be Lukashenko’s base.
Increasingly defiant political opposition, and the crumbling of the social contract that guaranteed moderate prosperity in exchange for authoritarian rule, has apparently undermined what popular support Lukashenko still had.
“The level of dissatisfaction among the population has been growing all the time,” said Tadeusz Giczan, a Belarusian-born Ph.D. researcher at University College London who studies the country’s political economy. “It’s clear for everyone that Lukashenko’s time is over.”
The closely watched election comes after several weeks of cascading incidents. Tensions with Russia have spiked after Belarus arrested 33 operatives from Russia’s quasi-private military contractor the Wagner Group in Minsk, claiming they were part of a Russian operation to destabilize the country. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of Russia’s Security Council, described the arrests as “offensive” this week and warned that they could have “sad consequences.”
On Monday, Moscow said 3,000 men would take part in war games near the border with Belarus. The next day, Minsk announced that it was going to conduct military training for reservists near the border with Russia.
But tensions, defiance, and intimidation have also marked the final stretch of the campaign. Last week, some 63,000 people attended a rally in Minsk—thought to be the largest since the 1990s—in support of Tikhanovskaya, whose two campaign promises are to free political prisoners and hold new elections. Another scheduled rally in the capital on Thursday was canceled after Tikhanovskaya’s campaign chief, Maryya Maroz, was briefly detained and warned about the potential consequences of holding “unsanctioned” rallies. Other members of the campaign team were detained across the country.
Between May 6 and July 20, some 1,140 people were detained for taking part in protests, rallies, and other election-related activities, while almost 200 people have been sentenced to 15 days’ imprisonment, with some receiving multiple sentences, according to human rights groups in the country. The crackdown widened this week and at times took a turn for the absurd.
After Tikhanovskaya’s rally in the capital was canceled, the candidate and her team announced that they would instead attend a pro-government rally as “ordinary Belarusian citizens.” It’s unclear if the opposition leader actually attended the rally, but as her supporters arrived, two DJs at the event began to play the song “I Want Changes!” by the Soviet rock group Kino, a well-known protest anthem in the former Soviet Union. They were later detained and charged with minor hooliganism and disobedience, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Several popular Russian singers and the American rappers Tyga and Saint Jhn, who were invited to perform in Minsk and other cities on the eve of the election, thought to be a bid to overshadow opposition protests, canceled their concerts. Tyga canceled his participation in the event after receiving a letter from the Human Rights Foundation imploring him to pull out.
Meanwhile the Belarusian Football Federation has postponed all soccer matches in the capital this weekend after fans began chanting “Long live Belarus” at a match Thursday, perceived as an anti-Lukashenko chant.
As if that weren’t enough, in late July Belarus got into a diplomatic tiff with the United States, detaining Vitali Shkliarov, a Belarusian-born U.S. citizen who worked on the campaigns of Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders, in his hometown of Gomel. Shkliarov told BuzzFeed News that he was in town to visit his mother, who has cancer. On Friday, he was charged with organizing an unsanctioned political rally for the opposition and could face up to three years’ imprisonment.
Shkliarov is married to a U.S. diplomat and travels on a diplomatic passport. A spokesperson for the State Department told Foreign Policy that the department was aware that a U.S. citizen had been detained in Belarus and called for Shkliarov to have his right to consular notification honored. State declined to provide further comment due to privacy considerations.
Tikanovskaya launched her presidential campaign when her husband, the popular video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky, was arrested after trying to mount his own bid for the presidency. He remains in prison on charges of violating public order and election laws, and the couple have sent their two children to live abroad after receiving threats. Female activists in Belarus are often threatened with having their children removed from their care and placed in state custody, according to a recent Amnesty International report.
The very fact that Tikhanovskaya is a woman may explain why she was unexpectedly allowed to register her candidacy last month after two previous candidates were jailed—Tikhanovsky and the former banker Viktor Babariko—and a third, former Belarusian Ambassador to the United States Valery Tsepkalo, was prevented from registering.
Lukashenko has previously said the country was not ready for a female president and that the stresses of the job would cause her to “collapse, poor thing.”
What seems to be collapsing—though it’s hard to measure—is Lukashenko’s true support.
In the early 2000s, Belarus enjoyed strong economic growth, with GDP growth topping 11 percent a year at one point, tamping down any embers of unrest at the country’s authoritarian bent. But the economy never recovered after the global financial crash just over a decade ago. The World Bank has predicted that the Belarusian economy will contract by 4 percent this year, the largest decline in 25 years.
Lukashenko’s response to the pandemic, like that of other authoritarian leaders, proved to be a turning point for many Belarusians. “The virus attacks the weak,” Lukashenko said amid the outbreak, refusing to implement lockdown measures and instead recommending that people drink vodka and visit the sauna to ward off the virus. He revealed last month that he had contracted and recovered from the virus.
The country’s last remaining independent pollster shuttered in 2016, facing increased pressure from the authorities, so it’s hard to know just how far his support may have fallen.
A wily political operative who has successfully played Russia and the West against each other, Lukashenko increasingly looks to have painted himself into a corner as his popularity plunges at home and tensions flare with his longtime backer Russia.
In a fiery state-of-the-nation address on Tuesday, Lukashenko accused Russia of lying about the arrested Wagner mercenaries, which Moscow had claimed were using Minsk as a transit point before traveling to a third country.
“So far there is no open warfare, no shooting, the trigger has not yet been pulled, but an attempt to organize a massacre in the center of Minsk is already obvious,” Lukashenko said. He also claimed, without evidence, that a second group of fighters had been deployed to the south of the country.
In a phone call on Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky asked for the extradition of a number of the Wagner mercenaries to Ukraine, where several of them are reported to have fought alongside separatists in the Donbass. Moscow, which has long sought to obfuscate its role in stoking the conflict in eastern Ukraine and in the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, will likely be nervous about what the men could reveal if they are handed over to Kyiv.
“I am not confident anymore that it [extradition] was just an empty threat, though I believe it is still quite unlikely,” said Andrei Yeliseyeu, the research director of the Warsaw-based Eurasian States in Transition Research Center. “In case they are extradited, one cannot rule out that the Kremlin will seriously think of betting against Lukashenko and creating a controlled chaos in Belarus to bring another person to power favorable to the Kremlin.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Iran Policy in Holding Pattern Before Elections

Brian Hook ’ s abrupt departure as the Trump administration ’ s top Iran envoy leaves an uncertain future for the White House ’ s biggest Middle East policy , two years after President Donald Trump abandoned the Iran nuclear pact and proclaimed he could secure a “ new and lasting deal.
” Hook ’ s replacement , Elliott Abrams , will simultaneously continue as the administration ’ s envoy for Venezuela , making him responsible for two defining Trump foreign-policy initiatives—neither of which has yielded the kind of high-profile victory the White House once hoped for .
The big @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s U.S. presidential election .
Iran has been rocked by mysterious explosions for weeks and may privately suspect U.S. involvement , but it is wary about rocking the boat before seeing if Trump wins reelection .
But there ’ s also little chance for any last-minute outreach to Iran to secure a new and improved deal before the vote .
“ The administration is sunk in a deep rut of its own devising , with no pathway to negotiations , ” said Barbara Leaf , a former U.S. ambassador to the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrations .
“ And needless to say , Tehran will not pick up the phone if Washington rings before November 3rd.
” Abrams , the longtime foreign-policy hawk taking over from Hook , would also bring potential baggage to the new role .
He is perhaps best known for pleading guilty for lying to Congress over the Iran-Contra scandal during the Ronald Reagan administration .
Some former officials think Abrams might use the remaining months before the election to tighten the screws on Iran , whether through an increase in the mysterious attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deepening U.S. relations with Israel .
“ I think Abrams is much smarter than Hook .
He may be more effective , ” one former U.S. official said .
“ They don ’ t have time to get things done , but they do have time to make trouble.
” Iran ’ s challenge will be to lie low until it knows whom it will be dealing with next year .
“ I think the Iranians are concerned about Trump because of how unpredictable he ’ s been , and I think they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explosions , ” said Ariane Tabatabai , a Middle East fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States who specializes in Iran .
“ But they ’ re careful not to talk too much about it because of the fact that then they ’ d have to do something and they don ’ t want to rock the boat.
” If Trump does win , some administration officials expect that Iran might finally come to the table to discuss a new nuclear accord , due to the unsustainable pressure from loads @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran ’ s economy to the brink .
“ When it comes to Iran , the election is a big part of their calculation , ” one U.S. official said .
“ If Trump ends up winning the election , I think you ’ re going to end up seeing some movement on these things.
” “ We still believe the only way the current Iranian government has ever come to the table is pressure , ” the official added .
Hook shepherded the so-called “ maximum pressure ” campaign on Iran for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.S. sanctions that put the administration squarely at odds with European allies who have tried to keep afloat the Iran nuclear deal , formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
Hook , considered a moderate Republican , became an influential behind-the-scenes fixture first under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and later as point man on Iran .
He long argued , including in a Q & A with Foreign Policy , that the onus was on Tehran to come to the table for new talks after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal in 2018 .
Instead of agreeing to talk , Iran shook off the deal ’ s constraints on uranium enrichment and nuclear development , potentially shortening its breakout time to acquire nuclear capability .
Former administration officials pointed to Iran ’ s stepped-up activity , a series of attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf , and the downing of an American drone as evidence that Hook was increasingly the spokesperson for a failed strategy .
“ I don ’ t think the [ White House ] will admit the strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy .
“ But Iran is breaking the JCPOA limits on enrichment and storage , so it will be super difficult to say it is working.
” News of Hook ’ s departure comes as the Trump administration faces likely defeat on his major diplomatic initiative at the U.N. Security Council next week : a U.N. resolution to extend a conventional arms embargo on Tehran .
China and Russia , veto-wielding members of the Security Council , are unlikely to back the resolution , several diplomatic sources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role to see through the U.N. fight , a State Department official told Foreign Policy .
Some former officials see Trump ’ s Iran policy as a way to try to fence in Joe Biden should he win .
The former vice president has expressed a willingness for the United States to return to compliance with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal .
By extending the arms embargo and triggering snapback sanctions , the United States could potentially shatter the legal framework underpinning the deal , experts suggested .
“ At this stage , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is all about preparing for Trump ’ s loss and trying to pin down a future President Biden in his options with Iran , ” said Jarrett Blanc , the former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation during the Obama administration and now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
“ I think they ’ re likely to fail at that effort .
”

Brian Hook’s abrupt departure as the Trump administration’s top Iran envoy leaves an uncertain future for the White House’s biggest Middle East policy, two years after President Donald Trump abandoned the Iran nuclear pact and proclaimed he could secure a “new and lasting deal.”
Brian Hook’s abrupt departure as the Trump administration’s top Iran envoy leaves an uncertain future for the White House’s biggest Middle East policy, two years after President Donald Trump abandoned the Iran nuclear pact and proclaimed he could secure a “new and lasting deal.”
Hook’s replacement, Elliott Abrams, will simultaneously continue as the administration’s envoy for Venezuela, making him responsible for two defining Trump foreign-policy initiatives—neither of which has yielded the kind of high-profile victory the White House once hoped for.
The big question now is who wins this November’s U.S. presidential election. Iran has been rocked by mysterious explosions for weeks and may privately suspect U.S. involvement, but it is wary about rocking the boat before seeing if Trump wins reelection. But there’s also little chance for any last-minute outreach to Iran to secure a new and improved deal before the vote.
“The administration is sunk in a deep rut of its own devising, with no pathway to negotiations,” said Barbara Leaf, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates during the Obama and Trump administrations. “And needless to say, Tehran will not pick up the phone if Washington rings before November 3rd.”
Abrams, the longtime foreign-policy hawk taking over from Hook, would also bring potential baggage to the new role. He is perhaps best known for pleading guilty for lying to Congress over the Iran-Contra scandal during the Ronald Reagan administration. Some former officials think Abrams might use the remaining months before the election to tighten the screws on Iran, whether through an increase in the mysterious attacks inside the coronavirus-racked country or by further deepening U.S. relations with Israel.
“I think Abrams is much smarter than Hook. He may be more effective,” one former U.S. official said. “They don’t have time to get things done, but they do have time to make trouble.”
Iran’s challenge will be to lie low until it knows whom it will be dealing with next year.
“I think the Iranians are concerned about Trump because of how unpredictable he’s been, and I think they see the U.S. as implicated in the explosions,” said Ariane Tabatabai, a Middle East fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States who specializes in Iran. “But they’re careful not to talk too much about it because of the fact that then they’d have to do something and they don’t want to rock the boat.”
If Trump does win, some administration officials expect that Iran might finally come to the table to discuss a new nuclear accord, due to the unsustainable pressure from loads of U.S. economic sanctions that have pushed Iran’s economy to the brink.
“When it comes to Iran, the election is a big part of their calculation,” one U.S. official said. “If Trump ends up winning the election, I think you’re going to end up seeing some movement on these things.”
“We still believe the only way the current Iranian government has ever come to the table is pressure,” the official added.
Hook shepherded the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran for two years, overseeing a substantial expansion of U.S. sanctions that put the administration squarely at odds with European allies who have tried to keep afloat the Iran nuclear deal, formally called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Hook, considered a moderate Republican, became an influential behind-the-scenes fixture first under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and later as point man on Iran. He long argued, including in a Q&A with Foreign Policy, that the onus was on Tehran to come to the table for new talks after the Trump administration pulled out of the deal in 2018.
Instead of agreeing to talk, Iran shook off the deal’s constraints on uranium enrichment and nuclear development, potentially shortening its breakout time to acquire nuclear capability. Former administration officials pointed to Iran’s stepped-up activity, a series of attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and the downing of an American drone as evidence that Hook was increasingly the spokesperson for a failed strategy.
“I don’t think the [White House] will admit the strategy was a failure,” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy. “But Iran is breaking the JCPOA limits on enrichment and storage, so it will be super difficult to say it is working.”
News of Hook’s departure comes as the Trump administration faces likely defeat on his major diplomatic initiative at the U.N. Security Council next week: a U.N. resolution to extend a conventional arms embargo on Tehran. China and Russia, veto-wielding members of the Security Council, are unlikely to back the resolution, several diplomatic sources said. Hook will stay in his role to see through the U.N. fight, a State Department official told Foreign Policy.
Some former officials see Trump’s Iran policy as a way to try to fence in Joe Biden should he win. The former vice president has expressed a willingness for the United States to return to compliance with the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. By extending the arms embargo and triggering snapback sanctions, the United States could potentially shatter the legal framework underpinning the deal, experts suggested.
“At this stage, the Trump administration’s Iran policy is all about preparing for Trump’s loss and trying to pin down a future President Biden in his options with Iran,” said Jarrett Blanc, the former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation during the Obama administration and now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I think they’re likely to fail at that effort.”


Scowcroft Trusted America

Last June , I was asked to categorically prove something that everyone in Washington believes is true .
It was during fact-checking for an article on the legacy of Brent Scowcroft , who had served as national security advisor to two U.S. presidents .
In my draft , I offhandedly wrote that every national security advisor since him had pointed to him as a model .
When the line was flagged by the editor , I was able to prove that 9 of 10 national security advisors since 1993 had said as much , but I couldn ’ t find @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only a few weeks in the job .
That was good enough for me and thankfully for the fact-checker as well .
But imitation is not a good enough way to flatter the monumental service and legacy of Scowcroft , who died Thursday at the age of 95 .
By shaping how Washington and even the world made national security decisions and , more importantly , thought decisions should be made , Scowcroft became more influential than Gerald Ford and George H.W .
Bush , the very presidents he served .
Even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ process he established destroyed by Donald Trump , the former national security advisor redefined what was once normal for Washington and , one suspects , will be again .
Last year , I published a history of the White House National Security Council ( NSC ) , a body Scowcroft single-handedly saved and empowered after the Cold War .
Yet , when the book jacket was being developed , the designer cropped an iconic photo from the 1970s to focus on its most famous faces in national security—those of Henry Kissinger , Dick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the one person cropped out—Scowcroft—was arguably more influential than all of them .
It was not the designer ’ s fault : Few in Washington could pick Scowcroft out of a crowd on the street or , in my experience , a crowded book cover .
Yet Scowcroft , most especially as Bush ’ s national security advisor from 1989 to 1993 , ensured that the NSC became not only the engine of Washington ’ s foreign-policy machinery but also the envy of the world .
Yet Scowcroft , most especially as Bush @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 1993 , ensured that the NSC became not only the engine of Washington ’ s foreign-policy machinery but also the envy of the world : Countries including India , Japan , and the United Kingdom have created NSCs in the United States ’ image .
Along the way , each U.S. president since Bush has made many of their hardest decisions within the meetings and system Scowcroft helped design .
As such , Scowcroft ’ s NSC served as the rhythm to three decades of unrivaled U.S. leadership in the world and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lived the history of the NSC .
Of the 100 people I interviewed for my book , nearly everyone had worked with or for Scowcroft or worked within a system he designed .
Here are a few things I learned about him along the way .
Americans don ’ t understand what good staffing means .
This weekend , you can binge-watch every episode of The West Wing , Veep , and House of Cards and still not grasp what made Scowcroft special .
He was so averse to attention that people may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him to be a good follower .
Yet Scowcroft was a leader through and through : With his manner , methods , and mind , he led people , including presidents , to do things the right way and often do the right thing—and what he wanted—with few fingerprints .
Good staff are usually good leaders .
Even in the background , Scowcroft proved the wisest of wise men could still make mistakes .
After the Iran-Contra affair—in which NSC staffers traded arms to Iran for hostages and then illegally funneled the money @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reagan ’ s presidency , Scowcroft blocked reforms to the NSC staff , missing an opportunity to put the national security state on more democratic footing .
The worst mistakes , however , were Scowcroft ’ s clumsy trips to Beijing to reassure Chinese leaders after the Tiananmen Square massacre .
Scowcroft ’ s reserve masked righteous views on policy .
He never played realpolitik chess like Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger or cerebrally weighed the geopolitical balance of power like another predecessor , Zbigniew Brzezinski—though Scowcroft could hang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ I don ’ t know if I ever became a defense intellectual.
” .
Instead , Scowcroft ’ s views were more visceral .
Prior to just about anyone else , including the president , Scowcroft was so viscerally offended by Saddam Hussein ’ s invasion of Kuwait 30 years ago this week that the national security advisor basically refused to let it stand or set a precedent that tarred the post-Cold War world ’ s promise .
History proved him right , but plenty disagreed in August 1990 .
Scowcroft stood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposed the war in Iraq 12 years later .
Such strong views might surprise everyone who misunderstands Scowcroft ’ s genius .
When Bush named Scowcroft national security advisor , the president-elect went out of his way underscore he ’ d be an “ honest broker.
” As a result , if you ask 9 out of 10 people who have ever attended an interagency meeting in Washington about Scowcroft , they ’ d reflexively say he was an “ honest broker.
” But most would be wrong about what it meant , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the middle of a policy debate , such a person would ensure everyone ’ s views were considered .
But Scowcroft knew that no one in government is really neutral : Opinions are like assholes , and there are too many in Washington .
Because even the biggest jerk in town might have a good idea , Scowcroft wanted to get everyone at the table to give their best proposals so the president ( and thus the country ) got the best to choose from .
More than just an insight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ best if everyone at the table trusted the national security advisor to give their views a fair hearing and then given them to the president .
People shared more when they knew where Scowcroft stood .
With those two insights into the nature of the peculiar humans who work in Washington , Scowcroft established the NSC ’ s interagency process .
It sounds like some sort of machinery , but it is just a series of meetings and memorandums with people at different levels—namely the principals and deputies committees—trying to whittle down options @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used by presidents of different parties in wartime and peacetime , blessed by Congress , and emulated by the world .
Of course , despite the promises and desires of Scowcroft ’ s successors , none was as capable of running that system .
That ’ s especially true today .
Robert O ’ Brien , Trump ’ s fourth national security advisor and the latest to claim Scowcroft as a model , has helped dismantle that system .
Today , there are fewer meetings , with fewer participants , and fewer consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choice keeps with Scowcroft ’ s views : The president gets what he needs , and an irregular president like Trump was never going to think he needed Washington ’ s regular order .
Even if the system is down for now , Scowcroft ’ s legacy remains .
Although normal feels a long way off , one way we ’ ll know something like it has returned to Washington is when operative principals and deputies committees again fill the calendar .
Still , it ’ s telling that Scowcroft ’ s greatest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same place : He trusted those who came—or were sent—to Washington to protect their country .
Such trust led Scowcroft to build a system that placed a lot of power in the hands of a few , despite the chance that those hands might belong to someone like Trump .
No one can judge Scowcroft ’ s full legacy without remembering that risk or it went so wrong .
But at a moment when it feels as if no one in the United States seems to trust anyone or anything , let @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model still .
Today ’ s Washington proves Scowcroft was right : Trust is central to effective government .
To get back to normal , or something like it , Americans are going to need to find a way to trust again .

Last June, I was asked to categorically prove something that everyone in Washington believes is true. It was during fact-checking for an article on the legacy of Brent Scowcroft, who had served as national security advisor to two U.S. presidents. In my draft, I offhandedly wrote that every national security advisor since him had pointed to him as a model. When the line was flagged by the editor, I was able to prove that 9 of 10 national security advisors since 1993 had said as much, but I couldn’t find anything from Michael Flynn, who lasted only a few weeks in the job. That was good enough for me and thankfully for the fact-checker as well.
Last June, I was asked to categorically prove something that everyone in Washington believes is true. It was during fact-checking for an article on the legacy of Brent Scowcroft, who had served as national security advisor to two U.S. presidents. In my draft, I offhandedly wrote that every national security advisor since him had pointed to him as a model. When the line was flagged by the editor, I was able to prove that 9 of 10 national security advisors since 1993 had said as much, but I couldn’t find anything from Michael Flynn, who lasted only a few weeks in the job. That was good enough for me and thankfully for the fact-checker as well.
But imitation is not a good enough way to flatter the monumental service and legacy of Scowcroft, who died Thursday at the age of 95. By shaping how Washington and even the world made national security decisions and, more importantly, thought decisions should be made, Scowcroft became more influential than Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, the very presidents he served. Even if Scowcroft lived long enough to see the process he established destroyed by Donald Trump, the former national security advisor redefined what was once normal for Washington and, one suspects, will be again.
Last year, I published a history of the White House National Security Council (NSC), a body Scowcroft single-handedly saved and empowered after the Cold War. Yet, when the book jacket was being developed, the designer cropped an iconic photo from the 1970s to focus on its most famous faces in national security—those of Henry Kissinger, Dick Cheney, and Bush. Unfortunately, the one person cropped out—Scowcroft—was arguably more influential than all of them. It was not the designer’s fault: Few in Washington could pick Scowcroft out of a crowd on the street or, in my experience, a crowded book cover.
Yet Scowcroft, most especially as Bush’s national security advisor from 1989 to 1993, ensured that the NSC became not only the engine of Washington’s foreign-policy machinery but also the envy of the world.
Yet Scowcroft, most especially as Bush’s national security advisor from 1989 to 1993, ensured that the NSC became not only the engine of Washington’s foreign-policy machinery but also the envy of the world: Countries including India, Japan, and the United Kingdom have created NSCs in the United States’ image. Along the way, each U.S. president since Bush has made many of their hardest decisions within the meetings and system Scowcroft helped design. As such, Scowcroft’s NSC served as the rhythm to three decades of unrivaled U.S. leadership in the world and thus the global order itself.
Scowcroft lived the history of the NSC. Of the 100 people I interviewed for my book, nearly everyone had worked with or for Scowcroft or worked within a system he designed. Here are a few things I learned about him along the way.
Americans don’t understand what good staffing means. This weekend, you can binge-watch every episode of The West Wing, Veep, and House of Cards and still not grasp what made Scowcroft special. He was so averse to attention that people may think that being a good staffer required him to be a good follower. Yet Scowcroft was a leader through and through: With his manner, methods, and mind, he led people, including presidents, to do things the right way and often do the right thing—and what he wanted—with few fingerprints. Good staff are usually good leaders.
Even in the background, Scowcroft proved the wisest of wise men could still make mistakes. After the Iran-Contra affair—in which NSC staffers traded arms to Iran for hostages and then illegally funneled the money to U.S.-backed forces in Nicaragua—nearly ended Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Scowcroft blocked reforms to the NSC staff, missing an opportunity to put the national security state on more democratic footing. The worst mistakes, however, were Scowcroft’s clumsy trips to Beijing to reassure Chinese leaders after the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Scowcroft’s reserve masked righteous views on policy. He never played realpolitik chess like Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger or cerebrally weighed the geopolitical balance of power like another predecessor, Zbigniew Brzezinski—though Scowcroft could hang with both even if he joked, “I don’t know if I ever became a defense intellectual.”. Instead, Scowcroft’s views were more visceral. Prior to just about anyone else, including the president, Scowcroft was so viscerally offended by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 30 years ago this week that the national security advisor basically refused to let it stand or set a precedent that tarred the post-Cold War world’s promise. History proved him right, but plenty disagreed in August 1990. Scowcroft stood out from the crowd again when he opposed the war in Iraq 12 years later.
Such strong views might surprise everyone who misunderstands Scowcroft’s genius. When Bush named Scowcroft national security advisor, the president-elect went out of his way underscore he’d be an “honest broker.” As a result, if you ask 9 out of 10 people who have ever attended an interagency meeting in Washington about Scowcroft, they’d reflexively say he was an “honest broker.” But most would be wrong about what it meant, pointing to the academic idea that, in the middle of a policy debate, such a person would ensure everyone’s views were considered.
But Scowcroft knew that no one in government is really neutral: Opinions are like assholes, and there are too many in Washington. Because even the biggest jerk in town might have a good idea, Scowcroft wanted to get everyone at the table to give their best proposals so the president (and thus the country) got the best to choose from. More than just an insight, Scowcroft found that people only gave their best if everyone at the table trusted the national security advisor to give their views a fair hearing and then given them to the president. People shared more when they knew where Scowcroft stood.
With those two insights into the nature of the peculiar humans who work in Washington, Scowcroft established the NSC’s interagency process. It sounds like some sort of machinery, but it is just a series of meetings and memorandums with people at different levels—namely the principals and deputies committees—trying to whittle down options and decisions. That system has been used by presidents of different parties in wartime and peacetime, blessed by Congress, and emulated by the world.
Of course, despite the promises and desires of Scowcroft’s successors, none was as capable of running that system. That’s especially true today. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s fourth national security advisor and the latest to claim Scowcroft as a model, has helped dismantle that system. Today, there are fewer meetings, with fewer participants, and fewer consequences. In some ways, such a choice keeps with Scowcroft’s views: The president gets what he needs, and an irregular president like Trump was never going to think he needed Washington’s regular order.
Even if the system is down for now, Scowcroft’s legacy remains. Although normal feels a long way off, one way we’ll know something like it has returned to Washington is when operative principals and deputies committees again fill the calendar. Still, it’s telling that Scowcroft’s greatest genius and biggest blind spot arose from the same place: He trusted those who came—or were sent—to Washington to protect their country. Such trust led Scowcroft to build a system that placed a lot of power in the hands of a few, despite the chance that those hands might belong to someone like Trump.
No one can judge Scowcroft’s full legacy without remembering that risk or it went so wrong. But at a moment when it feels as if no one in the United States seems to trust anyone or anything, let alone Washington, Scowcroft might be a model still. Today’s Washington proves Scowcroft was right: Trust is central to effective government. To get back to normal, or something like it, Americans are going to need to find a way to trust again.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Why Is the United States Effectively Banning WeChat and TikTok?

Why Is the United States Effectively Banning WeChat and TikTok ?
Following days of speculation , the Trump White House dropped two new executive orders on Thursday night , effectively barring any U.S. transactions with the Chinese social media apps TikTok and WeChat .
The decision was made under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that underlies U.S. sanctions programs .
Amid a flurry of actions directed against China by the administration in recent weeks , including the rollout of a wide-ranging but unclear Clean Network program , this is perhaps the most significant .
Is this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyway ?
The new restrictions on the popular video-sharing app TikTok increase the likelihood of a quick sale to Microsoft , the U.S. software giant that has expressed interest in a purchase .
It would likely be easy to slice off TikTok from its original Chinese ownership since it was set up as a separate system in the first place .
WeChat , by contrast , is the same app in the United States as it is in China .
And in China , WeChat is everything .
It started as a mere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ecosystem : Imagine Instagram , Facebook , Venmo , WhatsApp , Twitter , and Uber Eats all rolled into a single megaplatform .
The app is extremely convenient , well designed , and easy to use .
It ’ s far more common to pay with WeChat Pay than with cash in Chinese cities , where even the destitute display QR codes .
Some 83 percent of recorded Chinese transactions go through mobile payment systems , either WeChat Pay or its competitor Alipay .
( That probably understates the continued usage of cash—more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but cash transactions are much more difficult to track . )
Even ID systems , a critical part of life in China , especially since the coronavirus pandemic , are being incorporated into WeChat .
WeChat hasn ’ t had anywhere near as much success outside China as TikTok .
It ’ s difficult to access most of its features without reading Chinese or , in many cases , having a recognized Chinese ID .
The vast bulk of its 1.2 billion users is in China—basically , every single person online in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diaspora makes up a lot of the remainder .
It made a serious effort in India but lost out to WhatsApp .
It ’ s important to remember that WeChat ’ s dominance lies in part because China already shut out competition .
Virtually all foreign social media is banned in China and has been for a decade or so in most cases .
WeChat is an excellent platform , but it has also thrived in a protected environment—and largely failed outside it .
What do the new restrictions actually accomplish ?
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ White House , the real impact is not entirely clear .
The wording of the executive orders leaves much scope to interpret exactly what “ transactions ” are covered .
The order covering WeChat was drafted so badly that it appeared to cover all transactions with Tencent , WeChat ’ s owner .
That would have disrupted huge sections of the tech economy .
Tencent has a large presence in online gaming , where , for instance , it owns 40 percent of Epic Games , which makes the popular game Fortnite , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Spotify , among other companies .
But White House officials clarified—for now—that the order is only supposed to cover transactions regarding WeChat itself .
The most likely enforcement route is to force Apple and Google to remove the apps from their stores .
That will effectively kill them for many users : While it ’ s possible to keep running an unsupported app , or to use a virtual private network ( VPN ) to get access to another country ’ s stores , the process can be complicated and annoying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it ’ s likely that the ban will effectively apply internationally as well .
Apple also removes unsupported apps during regularly scheduled iOS upgrades .
Penalties on U.S. firms advertising with either service are also highly probable .
That ’ s going to make life hard for U.S. firms trying to reach the Chinese market , where WeChat is a huge advertising platform .
But isn ’ t Apple huge in China as well ?
Apple sells over 3 million iPhones in China every month , making it the company ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If Apple is forced to remove WeChat from the Chinese version of the App Store , it could represent a potential deathblow for the California-based tech giant ; the Chinese public likes iPhones , but they need WeChat .
Apple is also highly compliant with the Chinese authorities , even going out of its way to remove protest apps in Hong Kong .
Apple will likely to do everything in its power to avoid a scenario where consumers have to choose between iPhones and WeChat .
Are these apps really a threat to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Both WeChat and TikTok effectively function as spyware , collecting huge amounts of data on users .
But so do U.S. apps like Facebook .
On a purely personal level , China may technically have stronger data protection laws than the United States .
The problem is that none of that applies once the government comes into play ; China ’ s national security law—and the overwhelming reality of life in a dictatorial party-state—means that companies have no choice but to turn that data over to the state .
( Contrast that with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , for instance , unlock an iPhone for the FBI . )
WeChat , like all Chinese social media , is subject to massive surveillance and censorship , especially for foreign accounts .
Because it ’ s so common in the diaspora , it ’ s a major part of the Chinese Communist Party ’ s concerted efforts to control , threaten , and manipulate people of Chinese descent worldwide .
Uighurs , Tibetans , and dissidents abroad avoid using WeChat entirely or use it only in the knowledge that everything they write @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Then there ’ s the question of influence operations .
Chinese American communities are heavily dependent on WeChat ’ s internal news network , which is controlled by censors in Beijing .
TikTok has faced credible allegations , which it denies , of tweaking its algorithms in the United States at China ’ s direction .
Of course , any ban on those grounds would face First Amendment challenges : Americans are free to immerse themselves in foreign propaganda networks just as they are domestic ones .
Whom does this hurt most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as their primary way to talk to friends and family in China who are shut off by Chinese policies from any other social media tools .
Sure , email exists—but the convenience and ease of being tucked into the vast WeChat ecosystem is real .
From texting grandparents to keeping in touch with college buddies , WeChat plays an important emotional and practical role in the life of the diaspora .
It may be possible to maintain access to WeChat—either through its somewhat halfhearted web app or through fiddling with VPNs—but a lot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ older people unfamiliar with such technology .
With predictable fury and brazen hypocrisy .
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned the United States for “ using national security as an excuse and using state power to oppress non-American businesses.
” That ’ s a bit rich coming from a country that effectively splintered itself off from the global internet in the early 2010s under the excuse of national security .
Google , Facebook , Twitter , and YouTube have all been banned in China for a long time .
The non-Chinese internet is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Fears of a “ splinternet ” are a decade too late ; the walls already went up on the Chinese side .
Because China already banned such a wide sweep of foreign products , it doesn ’ t have a lot of options to retaliate directly , as Nina Palmer wrote in Foreign Policy this week .
One possibility , though , is going after foreign operating systems .
The dominance of Windows in official systems has long been a source of worry for Beijing , and there have been repeated , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alternative .
This could be the push that actually gets those efforts moving .
But it ’ s also possible that the retaliation will come in some other form entirely , such as the detention of U.S. tech executives in China or further harassment of U.S. consulates .
As I ’ ve argued before , Thursday ’ s orders may actually be a key part of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s broader China strategy .
Provoking a Chinese reaction forces U.S. companies to start considering the risk of their positions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just about walling off Chinese tech from global markets—it ’ s an attempt to force a much wider economic decoupling .
The moves by China hawks inside the administration definitely won ’ t end here ; many more forms of Chinese power and economic reach are likely to be targeted in the next few months .
In particular , given the contentions over vaccines , action against Chinese biotech firms and their ties to the United States—already sharply reduced since 2018—is very likely .

Following days of speculation, the Trump White House dropped two new executive orders on Thursday night, effectively barring any U.S. transactions with the Chinese social media apps TikTok and WeChat. The decision was made under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that underlies U.S. sanctions programs. Amid a flurry of actions directed against China by the administration in recent weeks, including the rollout of a wide-ranging but unclear Clean Network program, this is perhaps the most significant.
Following days of speculation, the Trump White House dropped two new executive orders on Thursday night, effectively barring any U.S. transactions with the Chinese social media apps TikTok and WeChat. The decision was made under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that underlies U.S. sanctions programs. Amid a flurry of actions directed against China by the administration in recent weeks, including the rollout of a wide-ranging but unclear Clean Network program, this is perhaps the most significant.
Is this a big deal? What is WeChat anyway?
The new restrictions on the popular video-sharing app TikTok increase the likelihood of a quick sale to Microsoft, the U.S. software giant that has expressed interest in a purchase. It would likely be easy to slice off TikTok from its original Chinese ownership since it was set up as a separate system in the first place. WeChat, by contrast, is the same app in the United States as it is in China.
And in China, WeChat is everything. It started as a mere chat program but expanded into its own ecosystem: Imagine Instagram, Facebook, Venmo, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Uber Eats all rolled into a single megaplatform. The app is extremely convenient, well designed, and easy to use. It’s far more common to pay with WeChat Pay than with cash in Chinese cities, where even the destitute display QR codes. Some 83 percent of recorded Chinese transactions go through mobile payment systems, either WeChat Pay or its competitor Alipay. (That probably understates the continued usage of cash—more than 400 million Chinese are still offline, but cash transactions are much more difficult to track.) Even ID systems, a critical part of life in China, especially since the coronavirus pandemic, are being incorporated into WeChat.
WeChat hasn’t had anywhere near as much success outside China as TikTok. It’s difficult to access most of its features without reading Chinese or, in many cases, having a recognized Chinese ID. The vast bulk of its 1.2 billion users is in China—basically, every single person online in China is likely on WeChat—and the Chinese diaspora makes up a lot of the remainder. It made a serious effort in India but lost out to WhatsApp.
It’s important to remember that WeChat’s dominance lies in part because China already shut out competition. Virtually all foreign social media is banned in China and has been for a decade or so in most cases. WeChat is an excellent platform, but it has also thrived in a protected environment—and largely failed outside it.
What do the new restrictions actually accomplish?
As with many decisions coming from the Trump White House, the real impact is not entirely clear. The wording of the executive orders leaves much scope to interpret exactly what “transactions” are covered. The order covering WeChat was drafted so badly that it appeared to cover all transactions with Tencent, WeChat’s owner. That would have disrupted huge sections of the tech economy. Tencent has a large presence in online gaming, where, for instance, it owns 40 percent of Epic Games, which makes the popular game Fortnite, and has stakes in Reddit, Tesla, and Spotify, among other companies. But White House officials clarified—for now—that the order is only supposed to cover transactions regarding WeChat itself.
The most likely enforcement route is to force Apple and Google to remove the apps from their stores. That will effectively kill them for many users: While it’s possible to keep running an unsupported app, or to use a virtual private network (VPN) to get access to another country’s stores, the process can be complicated and annoying. Given that both companies are U.S.-based, it’s likely that the ban will effectively apply internationally as well. Apple also removes unsupported apps during regularly scheduled iOS upgrades. Penalties on U.S. firms advertising with either service are also highly probable. That’s going to make life hard for U.S. firms trying to reach the Chinese market, where WeChat is a huge advertising platform.
But isn’t Apple huge in China as well?
Apple sells over 3 million iPhones in China every month, making it the company’s second-largest market after the United States. If Apple is forced to remove WeChat from the Chinese version of the App Store, it could represent a potential deathblow for the California-based tech giant; the Chinese public likes iPhones, but they need WeChat. Apple is also highly compliant with the Chinese authorities, even going out of its way to remove protest apps in Hong Kong. Apple will likely to do everything in its power to avoid a scenario where consumers have to choose between iPhones and WeChat.
Are these apps really a threat to U.S. national security, as claimed?
Both WeChat and TikTok effectively function as spyware, collecting huge amounts of data on users. But so do U.S. apps like Facebook. On a purely personal level, China may technically have stronger data protection laws than the United States. The problem is that none of that applies once the government comes into play; China’s national security law—and the overwhelming reality of life in a dictatorial party-state—means that companies have no choice but to turn that data over to the state. (Contrast that with Apple’s ability to refuse to, for instance, unlock an iPhone for the FBI.)
WeChat, like all Chinese social media, is subject to massive surveillance and censorship, especially for foreign accounts. Because it’s so common in the diaspora, it’s a major part of the Chinese Communist Party’s concerted efforts to control, threaten, and manipulate people of Chinese descent worldwide. Uighurs, Tibetans, and dissidents abroad avoid using WeChat entirely or use it only in the knowledge that everything they write is being read by the Chinese police.
Then there’s the question of influence operations. Chinese American communities are heavily dependent on WeChat’s internal news network, which is controlled by censors in Beijing. TikTok has faced credible allegations, which it denies, of tweaking its algorithms in the United States at China’s direction. Of course, any ban on those grounds would face First Amendment challenges: Americans are free to immerse themselves in foreign propaganda networks just as they are domestic ones.
Whom does this hurt most?
Millions of people overseas use WeChat as their primary way to talk to friends and family in China who are shut off by Chinese policies from any other social media tools. Sure, email exists—but the convenience and ease of being tucked into the vast WeChat ecosystem is real. From texting grandparents to keeping in touch with college buddies, WeChat plays an important emotional and practical role in the life of the diaspora. It may be possible to maintain access to WeChat—either through its somewhat halfhearted web app or through fiddling with VPNs—but a lot of users in the United States are older people unfamiliar with such technology.
How is China reacting?
With predictable fury and brazen hypocrisy. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemned the United States for “using national security as an excuse and using state power to oppress non-American businesses.” That’s a bit rich coming from a country that effectively splintered itself off from the global internet in the early 2010s under the excuse of national security. Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have all been banned in China for a long time. The non-Chinese internet is effectively unreachable without a VPN in China. Fears of a “splinternet” are a decade too late; the walls already went up on the Chinese side.
Because China already banned such a wide sweep of foreign products, it doesn’t have a lot of options to retaliate directly, as Nina Palmer wrote in Foreign Policy this week. One possibility, though, is going after foreign operating systems. The dominance of Windows in official systems has long been a source of worry for Beijing, and there have been repeated, failed attempts to develop a strong domestic alternative. This could be the push that actually gets those efforts moving. But it’s also possible that the retaliation will come in some other form entirely, such as the detention of U.S. tech executives in China or further harassment of U.S. consulates.
As I’ve argued before, Thursday’s orders may actually be a key part of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s broader China strategy. Provoking a Chinese reaction forces U.S. companies to start considering the risk of their positions in China. This isn’t just about walling off Chinese tech from global markets—it’s an attempt to force a much wider economic decoupling. The moves by China hawks inside the administration definitely won’t end here; many more forms of Chinese power and economic reach are likely to be targeted in the next few months. In particular, given the contentions over vaccines, action against Chinese biotech firms and their ties to the United States—already sharply reduced since 2018—is very likely.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-07--Give Up on Proxy Wars in the Middle East

Give Up on Proxy Wars in the Middle East Despite their policy differences , the successive administrations of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush , Barack Obama , and Donald Trump have all struggled to balance the United States ’ expansive security objectives in the Middle East with the limited resources available to pursue them .
Their maximalist policy goals aimed not just to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil , but to eradicate al Qaeda and the Islamic State wherever local branches took root ; not just to push back against Iran ’ s influence in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so much pressure on the Iranian regime that it would crumble , or at the very least dramatically alter its regional foreign policy .
But at the same time , successive U.S. administrations knew it was politically untenable to use maximal resources in pursuit of these objectives .
After the disastrous intervention in Iraq , putting American boots on the ground—and thereby risking casualties and a quagmire—became politically untenable .
As a result , U.S. policymakers have sought to split the difference .
While it has worn various titles over the years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and through , ” the approach is more or less the same : Empower local actors—via support from U.S. special operations forces , training , arms transfers , intelligence sharing , and so forth—to fight the wars that Americans can not or don ’ t want to fight themselves .
In the Middle East , it has meant arming proxy actors in some places , such as Syria , and empowering security partners to do so or intervene directly in others , such as Yemen and Libya .
But these proxy wars have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they have even done the opposite .
Advocates who criticize U.S. policy in the broader Middle East region have tended to focus on “ ending endless wars.
” This is a critical step , but U.S. policy must go beyond ending these wars .
The proxy approach to Middle East conflicts has failed .
It ’ s time to focus on a new strategy centered on major investments in development and diplomacy .
This will help ensure that wars do not simply start up again in a revised form and pull the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has found that U.S. security partners in the region , particularly the Persian Gulf monarchies , already understand the shortcomings of their own proxy-war approaches .
As the Arab Spring toppled governments across the region in 2011 , Qatar , the United Arab Emirates , and Saudi Arabia saw the instability as an opportunity to gain regional influence by replacing opponents with friendlier regimes .
However , rather than achieving quick victories in Libya and Syria as they had hoped , these states found themselves sucked into complex quagmires without hope for outright @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have transformed localized conflicts into destabilizing regional wars that spill across borders .
They have contributed to massive levels of human displacement , with significant impacts on the domestic politics of countries where refugees arrive .
Libya , where former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi ’ s regime has been replaced by years of fighting , is a case in point .
In 2014 , Khalifa Haftar , an autocratic warlord supported by Russia , the UAE , Egypt , and others , launched an offensive against the Tripoli-based U.N.-recognized government , which in turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and , theoretically , the United States ) .
Haftar has refused to engage in negotiations in good faith—at least until his forces suffered significant setbacks in recent months .
While intervening countries have periodically called for a cease-fire , Turkey , the UAE , and Egypt are all poised to deepen their involvement in Libya and intensify their regional rivalries .
In Libya and elsewhere , proxy warfare has been destructive to U.S. strategic goals of limiting the influence of Iran and defeating terrorist groups .
Instead , it has had complex @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which will make these conflicts last longer , while drawing U.S. security partners into conflicts that make them less secure .
This approach has not even allowed successive U.S. administrations to pull back from the region .
Instead , the United States has been drawn into several conflicts , from returning to Iraq in 2014 after the rise of the Islamic State to providing military logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition intervening in Yemen .
In Yemen , the Houthis have gone from an insurgent group receiving minimal military support from Iran to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ based on Iran ’ s Qiam missile ) at Riyadh .
At the same time , the conflict has provided a potent breeding ground for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula .
Indeed , the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has reportedly cut secret deals with al Qaeda fighters , while U.S. arms sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ended up in the hands of these fighters .
And this does not begin to account for the humanitarian fallout from these conflicts , which will have long-lasting and unpredictable consequences .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the resulting problems of instability , terrorism , and a level of societal polarization that may be past the point of no return ; nor can it hope to simply contain these conflicts within failed states without spillover effects .
Faced with this legacy of failure , the United States should abandon its split-the-difference approach and begin a completely different kind of engagement , centered on diplomatic leadership .
My research shows that when the United States has used its leverage in the past , it has been able to restrain regional countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their preferences for ending the war .
During Egypt ’ s intervention in Yemen in the 1960s , for instance , the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were able to restrain Saudi Arabia from intervening more directly through a combination of military assurances and threats to cut U.S. assistance .
The U.S. government should use the resources at its disposal to pressure local actors and third party interveners to come to the table and engage in good-faith negotiations to end proxy wars .
During the current war in Yemen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi-led coalition ’ s behavior at key moments .
The Obama administration was reportedly able to deter the UAE from initiating a ground operation to capture Hodeida , while phone calls from Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi helped seal the 2018 Stockholm Agreement—a partial peace accord for Yemen .
However , U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administration officials did not place the kind of sustained pressure on the Saudi-led coalition that could have led to a negotiated settlement , largely in order to avoid damaging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi Arabia and the UAE .
At the same time , policymakers will need to abandon the idea that the United States can exert leverage in contexts where it has very little .
In Syria , the idea of retaining “ leverage ” over the outcome has been trotted out repeatedly by strategists and analysts to justify keeping a small number of U.S. forces in northeast Syria , yet it is unclear what such leverage has achieved .
After investing five years in supporting Kurdish-led forces in Syria as a hedge against Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mercurial policy reversals in late 2019 led Kurdish forces to seek an alliance with the Assad regime due to a Turkish incursion in northeast Syrian territory long held by opposition forces—with calamitous results for civilians .
Where the United States has relatively little military leverage , it can still use economic tools to achieve more limited policy objectives .
In Syria , the Trump administration has zeroed out reconstruction aid , claiming that it would only provide support for the Assad regime .
But as Steven Heydemann has pointed out , donor states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ insulating [ reconstruction aid ] programs from the Assad regime—developing channels to fund and implement reconstruction that are not subject to the authority of the regime and prevent its participation in such activities , ” by working directly with Syrian local councils and nongovernmental organizations that are independently vetted .
And while U.S. sanctions are intended to force the Assad regime to make concessions or even to topple the regime itself , they are far more likely to further entrench the regime while punishing the Syrian people by devastating the economy and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the regime for their economic survival .
With respect to foreign aid , the United States has long taken a military-first approach to the region .
A recent Project on Middle East Democracy ( POMED ) report shows that the trend in securitizing U.S. foreign assistance in the Middle East over past decades continues in the 2021 budget request : More than 80 percent of the total is security-related , while democracy assistance represents just under 3 percent .
The proposal would slash U.S. assistance to countries in conflict , including Syria and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the proposal contains no bilateral aid to Syria .
Instead of focusing on narrowly defined strategic aims , economic aid to the region should be oriented toward meeting immediate humanitarian needs , as well as long-term economic development that creates opportunities and opens paths to prosperity for the people of the region .
To take one example , the U.S. aid that Egypt receives for foreign military financing—which facilitates the purchase of U.S. arms , training , and services—far outweighs the amount of economic aid it receives .
Both Democratic and Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this funding , even as Egypt has descended deeper into repressive autocracy under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ’ s rule .
As the POMED report demonstrates , 2021 bilateral assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is completely oriented around coercing Palestinian leadership to agree to the Trump peace plan , instead of addressing dire humanitarian needs .
The next administration should condition economic aid to repressive regimes like Sisi ’ s , while decreasing overall levels of military aid in favor of aid that promotes economic opportunity and supports local peace and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy that is built around promoting human well-being rather than more narrowly defined security aims will be critical to ensuring that proxy wars end for good .
Research shows that civil conflict is more likely in states that have recently experienced poverty , poor governance , political instability , and institutional weakness , factors that are themselves very often the effects of wars .
In other words , conflict begets conflict .
If the international community fails to implement measures to prevent the recurrence of conflict , civil wars will continue to provide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States should also reassess and fundamentally reform its relationships with regional security partners , such as Saudi Arabia , which consider U.S. security assistance a given .
Instead , the United States should condition its continued support for these partners on ending proxy interventions , engaging in constructive diplomacy , and addressing human rights issues at home , as Daniel Benaim has suggested .
This does not mean that these autocracies will become liberal democracies overnight .
But U.S. leverage—including arms sales , security assistance , and training—can play an important role in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own citizens and in the broader region .
Finally , the United States can continue to maintain its current counterterrorism policies with vastly increased oversight .
Transparency and careful use of standardized metrics to measure the efficacy of this approach can prevent the limitless expansion of this set of tactics and promote pivoting to alternative approaches if one is not working , instead of investing in more of the same .
A Congress that exerts its oversight authority over U.S. security assistance programs can play a critical role .
And these partnerships should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defeat terrorist organizations around the world .
Rather , policymakers and the public must identify the trade-offs we are willing to make when it comes to our counterterrorism policies .
Even with large increases in investments in aid and diplomacy , this approach will be cheaper than Washington ’ s current Middle East strategy—and more effective .

Despite their policy differences, the successive administrations of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have all struggled to balance the United States’ expansive security objectives in the Middle East with the limited resources available to pursue them. Their maximalist policy goals aimed not just to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, but to eradicate al Qaeda and the Islamic State wherever local branches took root; not just to push back against Iran’s influence in key strategic locations, but to place so much pressure on the Iranian regime that it would crumble, or at the very least dramatically alter its regional foreign policy.
Despite their policy differences, the successive administrations of U.S. Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have all struggled to balance the United States’ expansive security objectives in the Middle East with the limited resources available to pursue them. Their maximalist policy goals aimed not just to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, but to eradicate al Qaeda and the Islamic State wherever local branches took root; not just to push back against Iran’s influence in key strategic locations, but to place so much pressure on the Iranian regime that it would crumble, or at the very least dramatically alter its regional foreign policy.
But at the same time, successive U.S. administrations knew it was politically untenable to use maximal resources in pursuit of these objectives. After the disastrous intervention in Iraq, putting American boots on the ground—and thereby risking casualties and a quagmire—became politically untenable. As a result, U.S. policymakers have sought to split the difference.
While it has worn various titles over the years, such as “by, with, and through,” the approach is more or less the same: Empower local actors—via support from U.S. special operations forces, training, arms transfers, intelligence sharing, and so forth—to fight the wars that Americans cannot or don’t want to fight themselves. In the Middle East, it has meant arming proxy actors in some places, such as Syria, and empowering security partners to do so or intervene directly in others, such as Yemen and Libya.
But these proxy wars have not accomplished U.S. strategic goals—in some cases, they have even done the opposite. Advocates who criticize U.S. policy in the broader Middle East region have tended to focus on “ending endless wars.” This is a critical step, but U.S. policy must go beyond ending these wars. The proxy approach to Middle East conflicts has failed. It’s time to focus on a new strategy centered on major investments in development and diplomacy. This will help ensure that wars do not simply start up again in a revised form and pull the United States back in.
My research has found that U.S. security partners in the region, particularly the Persian Gulf monarchies, already understand the shortcomings of their own proxy-war approaches. As the Arab Spring toppled governments across the region in 2011, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia saw the instability as an opportunity to gain regional influence by replacing opponents with friendlier regimes. However, rather than achieving quick victories in Libya and Syria as they had hoped, these states found themselves sucked into complex quagmires without hope for outright victory. Instead, regional proxy sponsors have transformed localized conflicts into destabilizing regional wars that spill across borders. They have contributed to massive levels of human displacement, with significant impacts on the domestic politics of countries where refugees arrive.
Libya, where former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime has been replaced by years of fighting, is a case in point. In 2014, Khalifa Haftar, an autocratic warlord supported by Russia, the UAE, Egypt, and others, launched an offensive against the Tripoli-based U.N.-recognized government, which in turn is supported by Turkey and Qatar (and, theoretically, the United States). Haftar has refused to engage in negotiations in good faith—at least until his forces suffered significant setbacks in recent months. While intervening countries have periodically called for a cease-fire, Turkey, the UAE, and Egypt are all poised to deepen their involvement in Libya and intensify their regional rivalries.
In Libya and elsewhere, proxy warfare has been destructive to U.S. strategic goals of limiting the influence of Iran and defeating terrorist groups. Instead, it has had complex political, economic, and social effects which will make these conflicts last longer, while drawing U.S. security partners into conflicts that make them less secure. This approach has not even allowed successive U.S. administrations to pull back from the region. Instead, the United States has been drawn into several conflicts, from returning to Iraq in 2014 after the rise of the Islamic State to providing military logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition intervening in Yemen.
In Yemen, the Houthis have gone from an insurgent group receiving minimal military support from Iran to lobbing ballistic missiles (with a design based on Iran’s Qiam missile) at Riyadh. At the same time, the conflict has provided a potent breeding ground for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has reportedly cut secret deals with al Qaeda fighters, while U.S. arms sold to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ended up in the hands of these fighters.
And this does not begin to account for the humanitarian fallout from these conflicts, which will have long-lasting and unpredictable consequences. The U.S. government cannot inoculate itself from the resulting problems of instability, terrorism, and a level of societal polarization that may be past the point of no return; nor can it hope to simply contain these conflicts within failed states without spillover effects.
Faced with this legacy of failure, the United States should abandon its split-the-difference approach and begin a completely different kind of engagement, centered on diplomatic leadership. My research shows that when the United States has used its leverage in the past, it has been able to restrain regional countries’ interventions in civil wars and shape their preferences for ending the war. During Egypt’s intervention in Yemen in the 1960s, for instance, the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were able to restrain Saudi Arabia from intervening more directly through a combination of military assurances and threats to cut U.S. assistance. The U.S. government should use the resources at its disposal to pressure local actors and third party interveners to come to the table and engage in good-faith negotiations to end proxy wars.
During the current war in Yemen, U.S. pressure has successfully shaped the Saudi-led coalition’s behavior at key moments. The Obama administration was reportedly able to deter the UAE from initiating a ground operation to capture Hodeida, while phone calls from Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi helped seal the 2018 Stockholm Agreement—a partial peace accord for Yemen. However, U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administration officials did not place the kind of sustained pressure on the Saudi-led coalition that could have led to a negotiated settlement, largely in order to avoid damaging the United States’ bilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
At the same time, policymakers will need to abandon the idea that the United States can exert leverage in contexts where it has very little. In Syria, the idea of retaining “leverage” over the outcome has been trotted out repeatedly by strategists and analysts to justify keeping a small number of U.S. forces in northeast Syria, yet it is unclear what such leverage has achieved. After investing five years in supporting Kurdish-led forces in Syria as a hedge against Russian and Iranian influence, Trump’s mercurial policy reversals in late 2019 led Kurdish forces to seek an alliance with the Assad regime due to a Turkish incursion in northeast Syrian territory long held by opposition forces—with calamitous results for civilians.
Where the United States has relatively little military leverage, it can still use economic tools to achieve more limited policy objectives. In Syria, the Trump administration has zeroed out reconstruction aid, claiming that it would only provide support for the Assad regime. But as Steven Heydemann has pointed out, donor states and institutions can manage reconstruction funds by “insulating [reconstruction aid] programs from the Assad regime—developing channels to fund and implement reconstruction that are not subject to the authority of the regime and prevent its participation in such activities,” by working directly with Syrian local councils and nongovernmental organizations that are independently vetted. And while U.S. sanctions are intended to force the Assad regime to make concessions or even to topple the regime itself, they are far more likely to further entrench the regime while punishing the Syrian people by devastating the economy and forcing Syrians to become increasingly reliant on the regime for their economic survival.
With respect to foreign aid, the United States has long taken a military-first approach to the region. A recent Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) report shows that the trend in securitizing U.S. foreign assistance in the Middle East over past decades continues in the 2021 budget request: More than 80 percent of the total is security-related, while democracy assistance represents just under 3 percent. The proposal would slash U.S. assistance to countries in conflict, including Syria and Iraq—for the second year in a row, the proposal contains no bilateral aid to Syria.
Instead of focusing on narrowly defined strategic aims, economic aid to the region should be oriented toward meeting immediate humanitarian needs, as well as long-term economic development that creates opportunities and opens paths to prosperity for the people of the region. To take one example, the U.S. aid that Egypt receives for foreign military financing—which facilitates the purchase of U.S. arms, training, and services—far outweighs the amount of economic aid it receives. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have waived human rights conditions on this funding, even as Egypt has descended deeper into repressive autocracy under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule.
As the POMED report demonstrates, 2021 bilateral assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is completely oriented around coercing Palestinian leadership to agree to the Trump peace plan, instead of addressing dire humanitarian needs. The next administration should condition economic aid to repressive regimes like Sisi’s, while decreasing overall levels of military aid in favor of aid that promotes economic opportunity and supports local peace and conflict prevention efforts.
A Middle East policy that is built around promoting human well-being rather than more narrowly defined security aims will be critical to ensuring that proxy wars end for good. Research shows that civil conflict is more likely in states that have recently experienced poverty, poor governance, political instability, and institutional weakness, factors that are themselves very often the effects of wars. In other words, conflict begets conflict. If the international community fails to implement measures to prevent the recurrence of conflict, civil wars will continue to provide opportunities for proxy interventions.
The United States should also reassess and fundamentally reform its relationships with regional security partners, such as Saudi Arabia, which consider U.S. security assistance a given. Instead, the United States should condition its continued support for these partners on ending proxy interventions, engaging in constructive diplomacy, and addressing human rights issues at home, as Daniel Benaim has suggested. This does not mean that these autocracies will become liberal democracies overnight. But U.S. leverage—including arms sales, security assistance, and training—can play an important role in changing these autocracies’ behavior towards their own citizens and in the broader region.
Finally, the United States can continue to maintain its current counterterrorism policies with vastly increased oversight. Transparency and careful use of standardized metrics to measure the efficacy of this approach can prevent the limitless expansion of this set of tactics and promote pivoting to alternative approaches if one is not working, instead of investing in more of the same. A Congress that exerts its oversight authority over U.S. security assistance programs can play a critical role. And these partnerships should not be seen as a panacea to defeat terrorist organizations around the world. Rather, policymakers and the public must identify the trade-offs we are willing to make when it comes to our counterterrorism policies.
Even with large increases in investments in aid and diplomacy, this approach will be cheaper than Washington’s current Middle East strategy—and more effective.