foreignpolicy--2020-02-20--Europe’s Harsh Border Policies Are Pushing Refugees All the Way to Rwanda

Europe ’ s Harsh Border Policies Are Pushing Refugees All the Way to Rwanda GASHORA , Rwanda—Until the day before he left Libya in October 2019 , Alex was enslaved by a militia aligned with the United Nations-backed , Tripoli-based Government of National Accord .
For months , the young Eritrean had been moving weapons and ammunition , cleaning , and even building a shelter for horses owned by Mohammed al-Khoja , the deputy head of the Government of National Accord ’ s Department for Combating Illegal Migration .
He worried about airstrikes and drones : The buzzing sound made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stressed about potentially brutal punishments from men commanded by Khoja , who was also known as a vicious militia leader , making Alex frightened to disobey them .
Alex , whose name has been changed for his safety , knew his proximity to fighters made him both a human shield and a target in Tripoli ’ s ongoing war .
Alex ’ s story is an illustration of the impacts of hardening European Union border policy , which forces refugees back to a dangerous country where they live at the mercy of Libyan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asylum-seeker can go through before getting the chance to make a legal claim for protection , and how even the small number of people eventually chosen for evacuation from Libya suffer from long-term consequences and ongoing instability .
Even the small number of people eventually chosen for evacuation from Libya suffer from long-term consequences and ongoing instability .
Like huge numbers of his countryfolk , Alex fled indefinite national service in Eritrea ’ s dictatorship and traveled to Libya in the hope of reaching Europe and finding “ freedom.
” A U.N. commission @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Eritrea of carrying out crimes against humanity , while describing the national service system as “ slavery-like.
” After paying $ 16,000 in smugglers ’ fees borrowed from family and friends , Alex tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe , but the rubber boat he was on was intercepted by the EU-backed Libyan coast guard .
For more than a year after that , Alex was held in Triq al-Sikka detention center , the de facto headquarters of the Department for Combating Illegal Migration , which ostensibly oversees many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( The department did not respond to a request for comment . )
After war broke out in April 2019 , militiamen brought Alex across the road to work in an area they were using as a base , located in the outer perimeter of a center set up by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR ) to house refugees before they were legally evacuated ( Alex ’ s story was collaborated by the accounts of other refugees .
Aid officials who visit Triq al-Sikka told Foreign Policy they have noticed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said it had heard allegations of detainees being used as forced labor in the Gathering and Departure Facility , but it could not verify them . )
In the months afterward , Alex returned to detention only for his meetings with UNHCR staff .
He was interviewed and fingerprinted , and finally given good news : He would be evacuated to Rwanda .
When questioned about the ramifications of their policy , EU spokespeople regularly say they are funding the U.N. to improve conditions for refugees and migrants .
UNHCR , in turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety for refugees in Libya , meaning their only real hope is evacuation .
Those numbers are low , though : 2,427 people last year got the option to go with UNHCR either directly to European countries or to a transit country where their cases can be considered for resettlement to Europe or North America .
In contrast , nearly 1,000 refugees and migrants were returned to Libya in the first two weeks of 2020 alone .
Both Niger and Romania have previously been used as transit countries , though the number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of problems processing cases .
This past September , Rwanda announced it will also begin to take evacuees , following negotiations and a deal signed with the African Union and UNHCR .
“ Africa itself is also a source of solutions , ” said Rwandan President Paul Kagame , speaking about the agreement at the U.N. General Assembly last year .
The Rwandan government did not respond to multiple requests for interviews and a list of emailed questions , while African Union spokespeople did not respond to an interview request .
UNHCR is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hopes to evacuate 1,500 people to Rwanda by the end of 2020 , with the program expected to cost nearly $ 27 million by then .
So far , according to numbers provided by UNHCR , the EU has pledged 10 million euros , Norway just over 5 million euros , and Malta 50,000 .
I wasn ’ t allowed inside .
Though a relatively secure country with much-lauded economic development , Rwanda is also a dictatorship and police state with a tightly controlled media .
After several ignored emails over two months @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waiting at the Ministry of Emergency Management when I visited in November 2019 , a communications official told me journalists can ’ t visit alone .
I would be invited back on a future group trip instead , he said , as I already had media accreditation .
“ They gave you accreditation , because we believe you will write good stories about us , ” the Rwandan official told me in a candid moment .
“ We deny some people accreditation , I think you know that.
” The invitation to join @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in a small , bare room in a bar outside the camp that same month , a group of refugees gathered to tell me their stories .
For more than a year , they had been sending me evidence of human rights abuses from a network of Libyan detention centers , using a series of phones they kept hidden throughout .
Now they say they are grateful to be in Rwanda , but they also resent the time they spent locked up .
They ’ re worried about their own futures and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Evacuees came from Libyan detention centers including Zintan , Ain Zara , Abu Salim , Triq al-Sikka , and Sabaa , where they experienced an array of horrors .
They witnessed deaths from medical negligence and suffered through deliberate food deprivation , torture , and forced recruitment .
Alex—who was present in Triq al-Sikka when a hopeless Somali detainee set himself on fire in 2018—showed me how his nail was still cracked from being forced to lift heavy weapons .
Some of the migrants had contracted tuberculosis , while others were battling trauma @ @ @ @ @ @ @ completely spoilt .
We ’ re afraid of motorbikes , of helicopters , ” one Eritrean told me .
The trauma could last a long time .
Speaking about the “ precarious living conditions ” and “ grave human rights violations ” refugees in Libya ’ s detention system have gone through , Sonal Marwah , a humanitarian affairs manager with Doctors Without Borders , said survivors suffer from emotional and psychological problems , such as anxiety and depression .
Now , the refugees in Rwanda are struggling with their new reality .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a diet and is only eating one meal a day so she can “ regain ” her “ figure , ” after spending so long in detention without being able to move around .
Some minors are battling addictions or have begun patronizing the influx of Rwandan prostitutes they say arrived in Gashora shortly after them .
Two refugees who stayed out late drinking were robbed .
“ It ’ s like a baby who walks when he ’ s not old enough .
It ’ s like a new planet for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They feel they can ’ t trust anyone anymore , convinced everyone around them has tried to profit from them : whether Libyan authorities , smugglers , the U.N. , or the Rwandan government .
While I was in Rwanda , there was tension in Gashora camp after refugees kicked over chairs at a meeting with authorities , protesting changes to food distribution they believed were designed to keep them there long-term .
Afterward , they said , the camp ’ s guards told them they were no longer allowed gather in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can teach us how to survive—we should be teaching them , ” Alex said about the dispute .
In November , evacuees got another shock when UNHCR ’ s special envoy for the Mediterranean , Vincent Cochetel , tweeted that refugees in Rwanda have “ wrong ” expectations .
“ We have no obligation to resettle all refugees in/from Libya , ” he wrote .
“ They can locally integrate in Rwanda if they want , [ while ] learning and mentally accepting that there is not just a ‘ Europe option.
’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they felt this was just another disregard for what they have been through , with some saying they would rather have paid smugglers to try to cross the Mediterranean Sea again rather than being moved somewhere they see no future , and are willing to go back to Libya and try again .
Others accused UNHCR of using their evacuations as a public relations coup to show the agency is doing something , while promoting the Rwandan government ’ s charity , instead of prioritizing evacuees ’ welfare .
Some evacuees accused UNHCR @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relations coup to show the agency is doing something , while promoting the Rwandan government ’ s charity , instead of prioritizing their welfare .
“ From the outside , the evacuations to Rwanda seem as a great solution to those detained in Libya , but if you dig deeper you ’ ll find many unanswered questions , like who gets to be evacuated out of the total 40,000+ registered asylum-seekers and refugees in Libya , ” Amera Markous , a Libyan migration researcher wrote in a text message .
“ What is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before they evacuate them , and how ‘ voluntary ’ are they , if they are explained inside detention centers , where refugees can ’ t even have a private place for such interviews that determine their future ?
” she asked .
“ If I went through tragic journeys and finally left a place like Libya , I ’ d be expecting UNHCR or any responsible entity to provide a durable solution which fits my aspirations , not just getting me out of Libya to repeat it all again.
” Matteo de @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International , said while any effort to bring refugees to safety should be welcomed , “ only a reduced number of people have been able to benefit from this opportunity , as most countries—including EU countries that have cooperated with Libya to contain refugees and migrants there—are offering very few places for resettlement.
” The evacuation program “ risks exacerbating a situation where the vast majority of refugees continue to be hosted in developing countries , while richer ones spend their resources on keeping people out at any cost , ” he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stay tied to ever-shifting donor funding , and they can struggle to find stability .
In January , Cochetel seemingly backtracked , telling an audience in Berlin the “ vast majority ” of evacuees will be resettled , but it will take about a year .
In response to questions from Foreign Policy , UNHCR spokeswoman Elise Villechalane said everyone evacuated to Rwanda was informed that resettlement is not guaranteed .
“ While for the first Rwanda flights the counselling was in some instances provided closer to the time of departure , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” she said .
“ Refugees are asked to sign a document … stating they understand the implications of the process.
” UNHCR said it has received 1,150 resettlement pledges from other countries for refugees in Rwanda , with Norway alone pledging to take in 600 refugees ( not all of them from Libya ) .
Some Libya evacuees have already been accepted to go to Sweden .
The number of available places is still “ far outstripped by the needs , ” Villechalane said .
“ Africa is Africa , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from both Libya and Rwanda , saying he ’ s worried about corruption , repression , exploitation , a lack of freedom , and a lack of opportunity in his birth continent .
In Europe , Alex believes , refugees “ can start a new life , it ’ s like we [ will be ] born again .
All the suffering and all the torture , this only makes us stronger.
” His experience over the past few years has convinced him he won ’ t feel secure until he has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same freedom to travel if something goes wrong , wherever he may end up .
“ Still no one really feels or understands what we ’ ve been through .
We resisted all the suffering and torture … only to get our goal ” of reaching safety , he said .
“ We trusted UNHCR , we trusted the European countries , and we came here .
They owe us .
”

GASHORA, Rwanda—Until the day before he left Libya in October 2019, Alex was enslaved by a militia aligned with the United Nations-backed, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord. For months, the young Eritrean had been moving weapons and ammunition, cleaning, and even building a shelter for horses owned by Mohammed al-Khoja, the deputy head of the Government of National Accord’s Department for Combating Illegal Migration.
GASHORA, Rwanda—Until the day before he left Libya in October 2019, Alex was enslaved by a militia aligned with the United Nations-backed, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord. For months, the young Eritrean had been moving weapons and ammunition, cleaning, and even building a shelter for horses owned by Mohammed al-Khoja, the deputy head of the Government of National Accord’s Department for Combating Illegal Migration.
He worried about airstrikes and drones: The buzzing sound made him run for cover. He also stressed about potentially brutal punishments from men commanded by Khoja, who was also known as a vicious militia leader, making Alex frightened to disobey them. Alex, whose name has been changed for his safety, knew his proximity to fighters made him both a human shield and a target in Tripoli’s ongoing war.
Alex’s story is an illustration of the impacts of hardening European Union border policy, which forces refugees back to a dangerous country where they live at the mercy of Libyan militias. It demonstrates the traumas an asylum-seeker can go through before getting the chance to make a legal claim for protection, and how even the small number of people eventually chosen for evacuation from Libya suffer from long-term consequences and ongoing instability.
Even the small number of people eventually chosen for evacuation from Libya suffer from long-term consequences and ongoing instability.
Like huge numbers of his countryfolk, Alex fled indefinite national service in Eritrea’s dictatorship and traveled to Libya in the hope of reaching Europe and finding “freedom.” A U.N. commission of inquiry has previously accused the leadership of Eritrea of carrying out crimes against humanity, while describing the national service system as “slavery-like.”
After paying $16,000 in smugglers’ fees borrowed from family and friends, Alex tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, but the rubber boat he was on was intercepted by the EU-backed Libyan coast guard.
For more than a year after that, Alex was held in Triq al-Sikka detention center, the de facto headquarters of the Department for Combating Illegal Migration, which ostensibly oversees many of Libya’s migrant detention centers. (The department did not respond to a request for comment.)
After war broke out in April 2019, militiamen brought Alex across the road to work in an area they were using as a base, located in the outer perimeter of a center set up by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to house refugees before they were legally evacuated (Alex’s story was corroborated by the accounts of other refugees. Aid officials who visit Triq al-Sikka told Foreign Policy they have noticed certain detainees are often missing. UNHCR said it had heard allegations of detainees being used as forced labor in the Gathering and Departure Facility, but it could not verify them.)
In the months afterward, Alex returned to detention only for his meetings with UNHCR staff. He was interviewed and fingerprinted, and finally given good news: He would be evacuated to Rwanda.
A boda boda driver drives down the main road in Gashora, Rwanda, where hundreds of refugees are now being sheltered after they were evacuated from Libya, on Nov. 28, 2019.
Over the past three years, the EU has allocated nearly 100 million euros, around $100 million, to spend on the Libyan coast guard, with the aim of intercepting and stopping boats of migrants and refugees who are trying to reach Europe. Tens of thousands of people who could have their asylum claims assessed if they managed to reach European soil have instead been returned to Libya to spend months or years in for-profit detention centers where sexual violence, labor exploitation, torture, and trafficking have been repeatedly documented. They wait, in the unlikely hope of being selected for a legal route to safety.
When questioned about the ramifications of their policy, EU spokespeople regularly say they are funding the U.N. to improve conditions for refugees and migrants. UNHCR, in turn, has said it cannot provide safety for refugees in Libya, meaning their only real hope is evacuation. Those numbers are low, though: 2,427 people last year got the option to go with UNHCR either directly to European countries or to a transit country where their cases can be considered for resettlement to Europe or North America. In contrast, nearly 1,000 refugees and migrants were returned to Libya in the first two weeks of 2020 alone.
Both Niger and Romania have previously been used as transit countries, though the number of people going to Niger have slowed because of problems processing cases. This past September, Rwanda announced it will also begin to take evacuees, following negotiations and a deal signed with the African Union and UNHCR. “Africa itself is also a source of solutions,” said Rwandan President Paul Kagame, speaking about the agreement at the U.N. General Assembly last year.
The Rwandan government did not respond to multiple requests for interviews and a list of emailed questions, while African Union spokespeople did not respond to an interview request.
UNHCR is still appealing for funding, saying it hopes to evacuate 1,500 people to Rwanda by the end of 2020, with the program expected to cost nearly $27 million by then. So far, according to numbers provided by UNHCR, the EU has pledged 10 million euros, Norway just over 5 million euros, and Malta 50,000.
From the Rwandan capital of Kigali, it takes two buses and a motorbike drive to reach Gashora, 40 miles southeast of the capital city, where hundreds of evacuees from Libya are now staying. There is no fence around the refugee camp, and it seems like it would be easy just to walk in, avoiding a gate where guards stand watch. “It’s an invisible wall,” one Eritrean said, laughing.
I wasn’t allowed inside. Though a relatively secure country with much-lauded economic development, Rwanda is also a dictatorship and police state with a tightly controlled media. After several ignored emails over two months, as well as five days of waiting at the Ministry of Emergency Management when I visited in November 2019, a communications official told me journalists can’t visit alone. I would be invited back on a future group trip instead, he said, as I already had media accreditation.
“They gave you accreditation, because we believe you will write good stories about us,” the Rwandan official told me in a candid moment. “We deny some people accreditation, I think you know that.” The invitation to join the group trip never came.
Instead, in a small, bare room in a bar outside the camp that same month, a group of refugees gathered to tell me their stories. For more than a year, they had been sending me evidence of human rights abuses from a network of Libyan detention centers, using a series of phones they kept hidden throughout.
Now they say they are grateful to be in Rwanda, but they also resent the time they spent locked up. They’re worried about their own futures and about everyone they have left behind.
Evacuees came from Libyan detention centers including Zintan, Ain Zara, Abu Salim, Triq al-Sikka, and Sabaa, where they experienced an array of horrors. They witnessed deaths from medical negligence and suffered through deliberate food deprivation, torture, and forced recruitment.
Alex—who was present in Triq al-Sikka when a hopeless Somali detainee set himself on fire in 2018—showed me how his nail was still cracked from being forced to lift heavy weapons. Some of the migrants had contracted tuberculosis, while others were battling trauma. “Most of our minds are completely spoilt. We’re afraid of motorbikes, of helicopters,” one Eritrean told me.
The trauma could last a long time. Speaking about the “precarious living conditions” and “grave human rights violations” refugees in Libya’s detention system have gone through, Sonal Marwah, a humanitarian affairs manager with Doctors Without Borders, said survivors suffer from emotional and psychological problems, such as anxiety and depression.
Now, the refugees in Rwanda are struggling with their new reality. A young woman said she has gone on a diet and is only eating one meal a day so she can “regain” her “figure,” after spending so long in detention without being able to move around. Some minors are battling addictions or have begun patronizing the influx of Rwandan prostitutes they say arrived in Gashora shortly after them. Two refugees who stayed out late drinking were robbed. “It’s like a baby who walks when he’s not old enough. It’s like a new planet for us,” said an Eritrean man.
They feel they can’t trust anyone anymore, convinced everyone around them has tried to profit from them: whether Libyan authorities, smugglers, the U.N., or the Rwandan government.
All 15 refugees I interviewed in Rwanda say they believed they would be resettled onward, to countries in Europe or North America. Some said that it was only when they signed documents on the night before they left Libya that UNHCR staff informed them they might have to stay in Rwanda for longer. There were consequences for backing out at that stage, too. UNHCR confirmed a “very small number” of refugees in Libya refused to go to Rwanda, meaning the agency will not consider them for resettlement or evacuation again.
While I was in Rwanda, there was tension in Gashora camp after refugees kicked over chairs at a meeting with authorities, protesting changes to food distribution they believed were designed to keep them there long-term. Afterward, they said, the camp’s guards told them they were no longer allowed gather in big groups. “They think they can teach us how to survive—we should be teaching them,” Alex said about the dispute.
In November, evacuees got another shock when UNHCR’s special envoy for the Mediterranean, Vincent Cochetel, tweeted that refugees in Rwanda have “wrong” expectations. “We have no obligation to resettle all refugees in/from Libya,” he wrote. “They can locally integrate in Rwanda if they want, [while] learning and mentally accepting that there is not just a ‘Europe option.’”
Those who spoke to me said they felt this was just another disregard for what they have been through, with some saying they would rather have paid smugglers to try to cross the Mediterranean Sea again rather than being moved somewhere they see no future, and are willing to go back to Libya and try again. Others accused UNHCR of using their evacuations as a public relations coup to show the agency is doing something, while promoting the Rwandan government’s charity, instead of prioritizing evacuees’ welfare.
Some evacuees accused UNHCR of using their evacuations as a public relations coup to show the agency is doing something, while promoting the Rwandan government’s charity, instead of prioritizing their welfare.
“From the outside, the evacuations to Rwanda seem as a great solution to those detained in Libya, but if you dig deeper you’ll find many unanswered questions, like who gets to be evacuated out of the total 40,000+ registered asylum-seekers and refugees in Libya,” Amera Markous, a Libyan migration researcher wrote in a text message.
“What is the level of understanding of these terms before they evacuate them, and how ‘voluntary’ are they, if they are explained inside detention centers, where refugees can’t even have a private place for such interviews that determine their future?” she asked. “If I went through tragic journeys and finally left a place like Libya, I’d be expecting UNHCR or any responsible entity to provide a durable solution which fits my aspirations, not just getting me out of Libya to repeat it all again.”
Matteo de Bellis, a migration researcher at Amnesty International, said while any effort to bring refugees to safety should be welcomed, “only a reduced number of people have been able to benefit from this opportunity, as most countries—including EU countries that have cooperated with Libya to contain refugees and migrants there—are offering very few places for resettlement.”
The evacuation program “risks exacerbating a situation where the vast majority of refugees continue to be hosted in developing countries, while richer ones spend their resources on keeping people out at any cost,” he said. This means refugees’ welfare can stay tied to ever-shifting donor funding, and they can struggle to find stability.
In January, Cochetel seemingly backtracked, telling an audience in Berlin the “vast majority” of evacuees will be resettled, but it will take about a year.
In response to questions from Foreign Policy, UNHCR spokeswoman Elise Villechalane said everyone evacuated to Rwanda was informed that resettlement is not guaranteed. “While for the first Rwanda flights the counselling was in some instances provided closer to the time of departure, it is usually provided about two weeks before,” she said. “Refugees are asked to sign a document … stating they understand the implications of the process.”
UNHCR said it has received 1,150 resettlement pledges from other countries for refugees in Rwanda, with Norway alone pledging to take in 600 refugees (not all of them from Libya). Some Libya evacuees have already been accepted to go to Sweden. The number of available places is still “far outstripped by the needs,” Villechalane said.
This all raises the question: At what point does the EU become responsible for refugees it has forced from its borders through externalization policies? How much suffering can they go through before European officials recognize some obligation? More than 2,500 miles south of Europe’s borders, Rwanda’s new arrivals are wondering just that, while waiting to find out their futures. At some moments, Alex said, he feels suicidal, while at others he feels a glimmer of hope. He’s haunted by the memories of others who died in Libya. “We are really tired,” he said in a message in January. “We are nothing to them, nothing at all, they could leave us here. There is nothing we could do.” At what point does the EU become responsible for refugees it has forced from its borders through externalization policies?
“Africa is Africa,” he has repeated throughout months of contact from both Libya and Rwanda, saying he’s worried about corruption, repression, exploitation, a lack of freedom, and a lack of opportunity in his birth continent. In Europe, Alex believes, refugees “can start a new life, it’s like we [will be] born again. All the suffering and all the torture, this only makes us stronger.”
His experience over the past few years has convinced him he won’t feel secure until he has the same rights as a European and the same freedom to travel if something goes wrong, wherever he may end up.
“Still no one really feels or understands what we’ve been through. We resisted all the suffering and torture … only to get our goal” of reaching safety, he said. “We trusted UNHCR, we trusted the European countries, and we came here. They owe us.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-20--Iraq Needs Regime Change Again

Iraq Needs Regime Change Again

The United States faces an increasingly urgent set of first-order policy questions in Iraq .
Spoiler alert : The answer is not Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi , Iraq ’ s newly designated prime minister .
A popular uprising might be .
Allawi ’ s recent nomination to be Iraq ’ s next leader is a dead end , for Iraq and the United States alike .
He has no chance of resolving the two fundamental crises now plaguing the country : first , the collapse of legitimacy of Iraq ’ s post-2003 political class , and second , Iraq ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shiite Islamist proxies .
The United States would be well advised to keep its distance from Allawi ’ s candidacy and instead focus its energies on supporting the extraordinary protest movement that has upended Iraq ’ s politics since late last year , and whose demands for sovereignty , independence , and clean government represent the last best hope for salvaging not just Iraq , but the future of U.S.-Iraqi relations as well .
It is hard to overstate the importance of the mass demonstrations that erupted in Baghdad on Oct. 1 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major city in southern Iraq .
Dominated by young people ( close to 60 percent of Iraq ’ s population is now under 25 ) , the protesters are overwhelmingly Shiites—Iraq ’ s largest religious sect .
But from the beginning , they have called for a complete overhaul of the Shiite-dominated regime that has ruled them since the fall of Saddam Hussein , charging it with being irredeemably corrupt , incompetent , and fatally infected by sectarianism , Islamism , and Iranian penetration .
Whether or not the protesters ’ anger could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sincere effort to engage their demands , we ’ ll never know .
Instead , the government almost immediately chose the path of brutal repression—killing , maiming , and terrorizing its own citizens with a vengeance and on a scale that made Hong Kong ’ s protests seem like child ’ s play .
In waves of violence over the past four months , hundreds of people have been killed , abducted , tortured or disappeared .
Around 20,000 have been injured .
In the process , an insular and out-of-touch political class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades had systematically looted the nation ’ s enormous patrimony to line its own pockets was exposed in all its venality , cruelty , and criminality .
Confronted in a moment of acute crisis with the stark choice of siding with its people or protecting its own power and privilege , the post-2003 governing establishment opted to go down the path of killing and brutalizing its youth , or at best standing by mutely and watching while others did the dirty work .
A few politicians ineffectually tut-tutted from the sidelines , expressed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one resigned in protest .
No one joined the demonstrators .
No one called out the assassins by name .
No one was held to account .
The protests laid bare for all to see the unholy alliance that now exists between the post-2003 Iraqi governing class and the regime in Iran .
Years in the making , it rapidly accelerated with the rise of the PMF during the war against the Islamic State and the wholesale integration of Shiite militias , de facto foreign legions of the IRGC , into Iraq ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highest echelons of the government .
The so-called Hezbollah-ization of Iraq was already well down the road to completion when the protests first broke out .
With the government ’ s decision to kill rather than reform , to succumb with varying degrees of enthusiasm to the plots of Iran and its loyalists to crush a popular movement grounded in Iraqi nationalism , the process now seems nearly irreversible .
A Rubicon of sorts has been crossed .
Too much innocent blood has been spilled for the Iraqi political class to go back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , intimidation , bribery , greed or other reasons too numerous to mention , its members have collectively made their bed with the Iranian regime .
What they appear to want instead is the creation of some kind of transitional authority , blessed by the protesters and composed of well-regarded people without ties to the existing governing elite , that will work on a rapid timeline to implement sweeping emergency measures that pave the way for truly free and fair elections ( perhaps with coordination and oversight from the United Nations ) , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of corrupt rulers , Islamist parties , and Iranian toadies to the political margins .
That is a very tall order .
What it means in practice or how it can be achieved in ways consistent with the rule of law is far from clear .
But what it almost certainly doesn ’ t mean is Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi ’ s designation as Iraq ’ s next prime minister .
Allawi is an Islamist-leaning Shiite and former member of parliament who served two stints as Iraq ’ s minister of communications .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was reputedly less corrupt and incompetent than most of his colleagues .
Like the man he would now replace , Adil Abdul-Mahdi , Allawi is reportedly more of a longtime bureaucrat than a political power broker , claiming no party affiliation and lacking any independent base of support .
But also like Abdul-Mahdi , he is inescapably a man of the post-2003 system , not outside it .
Which is why , from the moment Allawi ’ s potential nomination surfaced , the protesters have loudly and consistently rejected it out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cause was the fact that his candidacy so brazenly emerged out of a backroom deal cut—where else ?
—in Iran between Hadi al-Amiri and Muqtada al-Sadr , two pillars of Iraq ’ s dysfunctional system of Islamist spoils and militias run wild .
Amiri , who fought for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War , heads both a major faction in Iraq ’ s parliament as well as the IRGC-backed Badr militia , which has controlled Iraq ’ s Interior Ministry for years and has played a leading role in repressing the current protests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , while a more mercurial figure , has been no less a staple of Iraq ’ s increasingly toxic post-2003 order , milking government ministries and wielding a murderous militia to bolster the wealth and power of his own political movement and cult of personality .
The protesters fully comprehend that , with a provenance so clearly dependent on the likes of Amiri and Sadr , Allawi ’ s appointment was concocted in sin , not for the purpose of transforming Iraq ’ s broken system , but to save it .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sordid reality surrounding Allawi ’ s nomination on Feb. 1 to be exposed .
While Allawi issued a conciliatory statement praising the protesters and promising to hold their oppressors to account , Sadr at that very moment was dispatching his militia to attack the demonstrations , shut them down , and crack the heads of those speaking out against Allawi ’ s designation .
In Baghdad and protest centers across southern Iraq , Sadr ’ s thugs went on a weeklong rampage of beatings , arsons , and killings .
After a particular @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Allawi called on Abdul-Mahdi ’ s caretaker government to protect the protests until he could form a new cabinet that would fulfill the people ’ s demands .
But there was not a word against the Sadrists openly perpetrating the atrocities in the name of his appointment .
Not a word demanding that his political patron , Sadr , call off his assault and deliver those in his ranks responsible for the mayhem to the authorities for punishment .
Quite predictably , Sadr ’ s forces were back at it the following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and destruction in their wake .
Even more directly threatening to U.S. interests has been the government ’ s ever-deepening submission to its eastern neighbor .
The dominating role that Iran and its militia proxies have played in directing and executing the violence against the protests has been disturbing enough .
But it has been simultaneously coupled with the government ’ s abject acquiescence in an escalating Iranian campaign to attack the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Iraq .
In the final weeks of 2019 , Iran ’ s militia allies conducted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against facilities hosting U.S. forces that have been supporting the Iraqi Army ’ s fight against the Islamic State .
After each incident , U.S. officials implored Iraqi authorities to condemn the attacks and take action against them .
The government did nothing .
U.S. pleas went ignored .
But when an attack on Dec. 27 killed an American contractor ( crossing an unambiguous red line repeatedly articulated by the Trump administration ) and the United States retaliated against Kataib Hezbollah , one of Iran ’ s most powerful Shiite proxies under Muhandis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rushed to publicly condemn the United States for its dangerous and unacceptable violation of Iraqi sovereignty .
More shocking still was the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad days later .
On Dec. 31 , Iraqi security forces opened the gates of the Green Zone ( the heavily guarded area housing government offices and diplomatic compounds ) to allow a mob of thousands of pro-Iranian militia members to lay siege to the embassy ’ s perimeter , breaching external walls , laying waste to guardhouses , and setting fires .
Embassy personnel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but outnumbered U.S. Marines steeled themselves to repel a potential assault à la Tehran in 1979 or Benghazi in 2012 .
Rather than taking any action to prevent a potential catastrophe and uphold its international obligations to protect diplomatic facilities , the Iraqi government sat on its hands for hours while many of its most powerful officials , including Muhandis and Amiri , openly joined the mob to egg on the rioters .
While the militias eventually withdrew and the nightmare scenario was averted , it was a near-miss thing and no thanks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contrary .
Instead , what transpired was an astonishing real-time display of how deep the rot of Iranian penetration had set in among Iraq ’ s governing elite , as it appeared to cross a fateful line from pathetic passivity in the face of Iran ’ s incessant assaults on U.S. interests to something much more resembling active complicity .
Needless to say , that is an intolerable situation .
A policy premised on partnering with the Iraqi state is simply not sustainable when , at its highest political and security echelons , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ structures are increasingly dominated by U.S.-designated individuals and armed groups whose primary allegiances are to an Iranian regime that is systematically working to inflict great harm on the United States .
Nor is it sustainable when , necessary as it might have been , the United States is forced into the position of droning convoys on major Baghdad highways carrying senior Iraqi and Iranian military commanders openly conspiring to attack US interests .
What an alternative U.S. policy should be is , of course , a much harder question .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump ’ s national security team .
One hopes that ’ s being done .
The new situation triggered by the protests requires deep analysis , questioning old assumptions , and the development of new policy options .
As a general proposition , a good starting point would probably be to invest less in the Iraqi government and more in the protest movement .
Within the deeply flawed confines of the post-2003 order , the game of musical chairs in Baghdad to get this prime minister or that group of cabinet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ term to be a losing proposition for the United States .
That ’ s Iran ’ s favored turf , and its clear result has been both the slow-motion discrediting of Iraqi democracy and the accelerating Hezbollah-ization of the Iraqi state .
Allawi ’ s nomination and whatever cabinet Iran and its loyalists permit him to cobble together will likely do nothing to change that trajectory , and the United States should act accordingly .
The protest movement , in contrast , is an historic challenge to all that Iran has perpetrated in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the protesters have no love lost for an America that they blame for saddling them after 2003 with a botched occupation and a failed political system .
But watch videos of the demonstrations closely and it wasn ’ t posters of Donald Trump that they were trampling day in and day out .
It was pictures of Qassem Suleimani and Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei .
They weren ’ t burning down U.S. and British diplomatic facilities across the Shiite heartland but Iranian consulates and the headquarters of Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ especially after the targeted killings of Suleimani and Muhandis , the protesters did make a point of coupling their standard chant of “ No , no Iran ” with “ No , no America.
” But talk to them confidentially and they will admit that including the United States is largely a means of reducing the risk of being attacked by Iran ’ s unforgiving proxies .
The fact is that at their core , in addition to being an uprising against corrupt and inept governance , the protests are quite clearly a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ malign interference , not American .
How to engage and support the protest movement , leaderless and inchoate as it is , without inadvertently tainting and endangering it is a genuinely difficult policy challenge .
But that is increasingly where the energies and attention of U.S. policymakers should be focused .
There should be a concerted campaign to keep the eyes of the world on the protests and the Iranian-backed attacks against them .
Together with allied governments , Washington should sponsor statements and resolutions in the U.N. Security Council and other multilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqi people ; find ways to assist Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations that are working discreetly with the protesters to channel their movement and demands into a practical political program ; help the protesters gain access to secure communications technologies for defeating internet shutdowns by the government ; and accelerate the sanctioning of the protesters ’ oppressors—including not just militia leaders but also major politicians such as Amiri , Sadr , and their key lieutenants , whose destabilizing actions had heretofore gotten a U.S. pass—for transgressions that mirror the movement ’ s main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abuses , and facilitating Iranian malign influence .
Finally , discreetly and in cooperation with its most reliable Iraqi and international partners , the U.S. government should make necessary adjustments now to its troop deployments in Iraq to limit their exposure during the country ’ s present upheaval while maintaining maximum flexibility to fulfill essential counterterrorism missions and respond aggressively to Iranian provocations .
Acknowledging that a longtime policy may have passed its sell-by date is rarely easy .
Policy inertia is a powerful force , and large bureaucracies are almost always resistant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes to things like Iraq ’ s post-2003 political order that the United States did so much to create .
But major events are afoot now in Iraq that cry out for serious reevaluation .
Not only are important U.S. interests are at stake , but , as we ’ ve seen repeatedly in recent weeks , the lives of U.S. troops and diplomats are increasingly at risk as well .
Recognizing the need for a significant shift in approach is the critical first step toward building a more sustainable and effective long-term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the expense of acknowledging that Washington ’ s approach since 2003 has largely been a failure .
Portions of this article previously appeared on the website of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies .

The United States faces an increasingly urgent set of first-order policy questions in Iraq. Spoiler alert: The answer is not Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, Iraq’s newly designated prime minister. A popular uprising might be.
Allawi’s recent nomination to be Iraq’s next leader is a dead end, for Iraq and the United States alike. He has no chance of resolving the two fundamental crises now plaguing the country: first, the collapse of legitimacy of Iraq’s post-2003 political class, and second, Iraq’s ever-expanding subjugation by Iran and its local Shiite Islamist proxies. The United States would be well advised to keep its distance from Allawi’s candidacy and instead focus its energies on supporting the extraordinary protest movement that has upended Iraq’s politics since late last year, and whose demands for sovereignty, independence, and clean government represent the last best hope for salvaging not just Iraq, but the future of U.S.-Iraqi relations as well.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the mass demonstrations that erupted in Baghdad on Oct. 1, 2019, and rapidly spread to every major city in southern Iraq. Dominated by young people (close to 60 percent of Iraq’s population is now under 25), the protesters are overwhelmingly Shiites—Iraq’s largest religious sect. But from the beginning, they have called for a complete overhaul of the Shiite-dominated regime that has ruled them since the fall of Saddam Hussein, charging it with being irredeemably corrupt, incompetent, and fatally infected by sectarianism, Islamism, and Iranian penetration.
Whether or not the protesters’ anger could have been assuaged by a rapid and sincere effort to engage their demands, we’ll never know. Instead, the government almost immediately chose the path of brutal repression—killing, maiming, and terrorizing its own citizens with a vengeance and on a scale that made Hong Kong’s protests seem like child’s play. In waves of violence over the past four months, hundreds of people have been killed, abducted, tortured or disappeared. Around 20,000 have been injured.
In the process, an insular and out-of-touch political class that for the better part of two decades had systematically looted the nation’s enormous patrimony to line its own pockets was exposed in all its venality, cruelty, and criminality. Confronted in a moment of acute crisis with the stark choice of siding with its people or protecting its own power and privilege, the post-2003 governing establishment opted to go down the path of killing and brutalizing its youth, or at best standing by mutely and watching while others did the dirty work. A few politicians ineffectually tut-tutted from the sidelines, expressed concern, urged restraint. But no one resigned in protest. No one joined the demonstrators. No one called out the assassins by name. No one was held to account.
Making matters worse, the government’s decision to kill was so clearly orchestrated by a foreign power, Iran, and in large part executed by its Iraqi proxies, including a group of powerful Shiite militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF. Before he was killed by an American Hellfire missile last month, Qassem Suleimani—the Iranian general in charge of the Quds Force, the special operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—was widely known to be chairing meetings in Baghdad to map out the government’s battle plan for repressing the protests, imperially usurping the authority of Iraq’s elected leaders. And when Suleimani was not in town, his power was dutifully delegated to his most trusted Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the operational commander of the PMF who (before dying in the same missile strike that killed Suleimani) had for years unabashedly made clear that his primary loyalties ran not to Iraq but to Suleimani and the Iranian revolution.
The protests laid bare for all to see the unholy alliance that now exists between the post-2003 Iraqi governing class and the regime in Iran. Years in the making, it rapidly accelerated with the rise of the PMF during the war against the Islamic State and the wholesale integration of Shiite militias, de facto foreign legions of the IRGC, into Iraq’s security forces as well as the highest echelons of the government.
The so-called Hezbollah-ization of Iraq was already well down the road to completion when the protests first broke out. With the government’s decision to kill rather than reform, to succumb with varying degrees of enthusiasm to the plots of Iran and its loyalists to crush a popular movement grounded in Iraqi nationalism, the process now seems nearly irreversible. A Rubicon of sorts has been crossed. Too much innocent blood has been spilled for the Iraqi political class to go back now. Whether out of ideological fealty, intimidation, bribery, greed or other reasons too numerous to mention, its members have collectively made their bed with the Iranian regime.
For all its myriad failings, including not delivering minimally competent governance and not protecting Iraqi sovereignty from foreign predators, Iraq’s political class has been unambiguously rejected en masse by the protesters. Week after week, month after month, they have without deviation made clear that there can be no solution to the current crisis that leaves any of those from the post-2003 order in charge of the system’s overhaul.
What they appear to want instead is the creation of some kind of transitional authority, blessed by the protesters and composed of well-regarded people without ties to the existing governing elite, that will work on a rapid timeline to implement sweeping emergency measures that pave the way for truly free and fair elections (perhaps with coordination and oversight from the United Nations), while banishing Iraq’s current crop of corrupt rulers, Islamist parties, and Iranian toadies to the political margins.
That is a very tall order. What it means in practice or how it can be achieved in ways consistent with the rule of law is far from clear. But what it almost certainly doesn’t mean is Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi’s designation as Iraq’s next prime minister.
Allawi is an Islamist-leaning Shiite and former member of parliament who served two stints as Iraq’s minister of communications. In cabinets filled with thieves and hacks, he was reputedly less corrupt and incompetent than most of his colleagues. Like the man he would now replace, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Allawi is reportedly more of a longtime bureaucrat than a political power broker, claiming no party affiliation and lacking any independent base of support. But also like Abdul-Mahdi, he is inescapably a man of the post-2003 system, not outside it. Which is why, from the moment Allawi’s potential nomination surfaced, the protesters have loudly and consistently rejected it out of hand.
Not helping Allawi’s cause was the fact that his candidacy so brazenly emerged out of a backroom deal cut—where else?—in Iran between Hadi al-Amiri and Muqtada al-Sadr, two pillars of Iraq’s dysfunctional system of Islamist spoils and militias run wild. Amiri, who fought for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, heads both a major faction in Iraq’s parliament as well as the IRGC-backed Badr militia, which has controlled Iraq’s Interior Ministry for years and has played a leading role in repressing the current protests. Sadr, a populist anti-American cleric, while a more mercurial figure, has been no less a staple of Iraq’s increasingly toxic post-2003 order, milking government ministries and wielding a murderous militia to bolster the wealth and power of his own political movement and cult of personality. The protesters fully comprehend that, with a provenance so clearly dependent on the likes of Amiri and Sadr, Allawi’s appointment was concocted in sin, not for the purpose of transforming Iraq’s broken system, but to save it.
It didn’t take long for the sordid reality surrounding Allawi’s nomination on Feb. 1 to be exposed. While Allawi issued a conciliatory statement praising the protesters and promising to hold their oppressors to account, Sadr at that very moment was dispatching his militia to attack the demonstrations, shut them down, and crack the heads of those speaking out against Allawi’s designation. In Baghdad and protest centers across southern Iraq, Sadr’s thugs went on a weeklong rampage of beatings, arsons, and killings. After a particular bloody day in Najaf on Feb. 5, Allawi called on Abdul-Mahdi’s caretaker government to protect the protests until he could form a new cabinet that would fulfill the people’s demands. But there was not a word against the Sadrists openly perpetrating the atrocities in the name of his appointment. Not a word demanding that his political patron, Sadr, call off his assault and deliver those in his ranks responsible for the mayhem to the authorities for punishment. Quite predictably, Sadr’s forces were back at it the following day in Karbala, leaving more death and destruction in their wake.
Hard as it might be given the United States’ pivotal role in establishing Iraq’s post-2003 order, the Trump administration now needs to come to grips with the challenging reality that the Iraqi regime as currently constituted is increasingly not a viable partner for advancing U.S. interests. While the situation was deeply worrisome even before the onset of the protests, events since this past October have left little room for doubt. For the first time since 2003, the Iraqi government has systematically unleashed widespread violence against its own unarmed citizens whose demands for democratic change and Iraqi sovereignty largely align with U.S. interests and values. The government’s legitimacy, already a rapidly wasting asset, has now been shattered in the eyes of the Iraqi people, probably irreparably. Its efforts to preserve its prerogatives at all costs by waging a bloody war of attrition against its own citizenry is a prescription for chronic instability and conflict.
Even more directly threatening to U.S. interests has been the government’s ever-deepening submission to its eastern neighbor. The dominating role that Iran and its militia proxies have played in directing and executing the violence against the protests has been disturbing enough. But it has been simultaneously coupled with the government’s abject acquiescence in an escalating Iranian campaign to attack the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Iraq.
In the final weeks of 2019, Iran’s militia allies conducted at least 11 increasingly dangerous rocket attacks against facilities hosting U.S. forces that have been supporting the Iraqi Army’s fight against the Islamic State. After each incident, U.S. officials implored Iraqi authorities to condemn the attacks and take action against them. The government did nothing. U.S. pleas went ignored. But when an attack on Dec. 27 killed an American contractor (crossing an unambiguous red line repeatedly articulated by the Trump administration) and the United States retaliated against Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most powerful Shiite proxies under Muhandis’s command, senior Iraqi officials rushed to publicly condemn the United States for its dangerous and unacceptable violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
More shocking still was the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad days later. On Dec. 31, Iraqi security forces opened the gates of the Green Zone (the heavily guarded area housing government offices and diplomatic compounds) to allow a mob of thousands of pro-Iranian militia members to lay siege to the embassy’s perimeter, breaching external walls, laying waste to guardhouses, and setting fires. Embassy personnel retreated to safe rooms while heavily armed but outnumbered U.S. Marines steeled themselves to repel a potential assault à la Tehran in 1979 or Benghazi in 2012. Rather than taking any action to prevent a potential catastrophe and uphold its international obligations to protect diplomatic facilities, the Iraqi government sat on its hands for hours while many of its most powerful officials, including Muhandis and Amiri, openly joined the mob to egg on the rioters.
While the militias eventually withdrew and the nightmare scenario was averted, it was a near-miss thing and no thanks to the Iraqi government. Quite the contrary. Instead, what transpired was an astonishing real-time display of how deep the rot of Iranian penetration had set in among Iraq’s governing elite, as it appeared to cross a fateful line from pathetic passivity in the face of Iran’s incessant assaults on U.S. interests to something much more resembling active complicity.
Needless to say, that is an intolerable situation. A policy premised on partnering with the Iraqi state is simply not sustainable when, at its highest political and security echelons, that government’s payroll and power structures are increasingly dominated by U.S.-designated individuals and armed groups whose primary allegiances are to an Iranian regime that is systematically working to inflict great harm on the United States. Nor is it sustainable when, necessary as it might have been, the United States is forced into the position of droning convoys on major Baghdad highways carrying senior Iraqi and Iranian military commanders openly conspiring to attack US interests.
What an alternative U.S. policy should be is, of course, a much harder question. It’s certainly worthy of an urgent review by President Donald Trump’s national security team. One hopes that’s being done. The new situation triggered by the protests requires deep analysis, questioning old assumptions, and the development of new policy options.
As a general proposition, a good starting point would probably be to invest less in the Iraqi government and more in the protest movement. Within the deeply flawed confines of the post-2003 order, the game of musical chairs in Baghdad to get this prime minister or that group of cabinet officials appointed has proved over the long term to be a losing proposition for the United States. That’s Iran’s favored turf, and its clear result has been both the slow-motion discrediting of Iraqi democracy and the accelerating Hezbollah-ization of the Iraqi state. Allawi’s nomination and whatever cabinet Iran and its loyalists permit him to cobble together will likely do nothing to change that trajectory, and the United States should act accordingly.
The protest movement, in contrast, is an historic challenge to all that Iran has perpetrated in Iraq. It’s true that the protesters have no love lost for an America that they blame for saddling them after 2003 with a botched occupation and a failed political system. But watch videos of the demonstrations closely and it wasn’t posters of Donald Trump that they were trampling day in and day out. It was pictures of Qassem Suleimani and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. They weren’t burning down U.S. and British diplomatic facilities across the Shiite heartland but Iranian consulates and the headquarters of Iran’s most important Iraqi allies. Yes, especially after the targeted killings of Suleimani and Muhandis, the protesters did make a point of coupling their standard chant of “No, no Iran” with “No, no America.” But talk to them confidentially and they will admit that including the United States is largely a means of reducing the risk of being attacked by Iran’s unforgiving proxies.
The fact is that at their core, in addition to being an uprising against corrupt and inept governance, the protests are quite clearly a mass movement of Iraqi nationalism targeting Iranian malign interference, not American.
How to engage and support the protest movement, leaderless and inchoate as it is, without inadvertently tainting and endangering it is a genuinely difficult policy challenge. But that is increasingly where the energies and attention of U.S. policymakers should be focused. There should be a concerted campaign to keep the eyes of the world on the protests and the Iranian-backed attacks against them. Together with allied governments, Washington should sponsor statements and resolutions in the U.N. Security Council and other multilateral forums expressing solidarity and concern for the Iraqi people; find ways to assist Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations that are working discreetly with the protesters to channel their movement and demands into a practical political program; help the protesters gain access to secure communications technologies for defeating internet shutdowns by the government; and accelerate the sanctioning of the protesters’ oppressors—including not just militia leaders but also major politicians such as Amiri, Sadr, and their key lieutenants, whose destabilizing actions had heretofore gotten a U.S. pass—for transgressions that mirror the movement’s main complaints, particularly corruption, human rights abuses, and facilitating Iranian malign influence. Finally, discreetly and in cooperation with its most reliable Iraqi and international partners, the U.S. government should make necessary adjustments now to its troop deployments in Iraq to limit their exposure during the country’s present upheaval while maintaining maximum flexibility to fulfill essential counterterrorism missions and respond aggressively to Iranian provocations.
Acknowledging that a longtime policy may have passed its sell-by date is rarely easy. Policy inertia is a powerful force, and large bureaucracies are almost always resistant to major changes in direction—especially when it comes to things like Iraq’s post-2003 political order that the United States did so much to create. But major events are afoot now in Iraq that cry out for serious reevaluation. Not only are important U.S. interests are at stake, but, as we’ve seen repeatedly in recent weeks, the lives of U.S. troops and diplomats are increasingly at risk as well. Recognizing the need for a significant shift in approach is the critical first step toward building a more sustainable and effective long-term Iraq policy, even if comes at the expense of acknowledging that Washington’s approach since 2003 has largely been a failure.
Portions of this article previously appeared on the website of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-20--Trump Loyalist Appointed Acting Intel Chief

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump ’ s ambassador to Berlin is tapped as the acting head of national intelligence , Syria ’ s humanitarian crisis reaches unprecedented levels , and what to make of the movement on peace talks in Afghanistan .
As you may have noticed , Security Brief is now delivered on Thursdays .
We ’ ve added an expanded section on industry moves and upcoming events to enhance your newsletter experience .
Premium and FP Insider subscribers can also now get email alerts as soon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
You can sign up here .
( You must be logged into your ForeignPolicy.com account to activate your alerts ) .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Richard Grenell , Trump ’ s fiery ambassador to Germany and a former Fox News commentator , was named as the new acting director of national intelligence on Wednesday .
Unlike his predecessors , he has no prior experience in the intelligence community .
In another unprecedented move , Grenell will keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he transitions to be acting director of national intelligence .
That decision mixes his political job in Berlin with a senior intelligence post that is supposed to be apolitical—something that is vexing former State Department and intelligence officials .
Last year Trump also appointed Grenell as special envoy to the Serbia-Kosovo peace process .
The State Department didn ’ t respond to request for comment on whether he ’ ll keep his special envoy role , but it ’ s not clear how Grenell can carry out the day-to-day tasks of two , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
There are only so many hours in a day .
Politicizing intelligence .
Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia , the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee , said Trump was shirking his constitutional duties by appointing an acting intelligence chief instead of nominating a full-fledged chief , which requires senate confirmation .
“ [ A ] t a time when the integrity and independence of the Department of Justice has been called into grave question , now more than ever our country needs a Senate-confirmed intelligence director who will provide the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether or not it ’ s expedient for the President who has appointed him , ” Warner said in a statement .
White House response .
White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham said Grenell is “ committed to a non-political , non-partisan approach as head of the intelligence community.
” She added that Trump “ has every confidence that Ambassador Grenell will perform his new duties with distinction.
” Syria crisis by the numbers .
After nearly a decade of war , it might be easy to become inured to the humanitarian crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the country ’ s last rebel stronghold , has pushed the crisis to unprecedented levels .
Nearly 1 million civilians are caught between the Turkish border and advancing Russian and Syrian forces .
Here ’ s a glimpse into the crisis , from U.N. figures .
What the Taliban wants .
Sirajuddin Haqqani , the deputy leader of the Taliban , published a New York Times op-ed today , writing that the Taliban is ready to work with international partners on a long-term peace-building plan .
He repeated the demand of fully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the New York Times Afghanistan correspondent , offered his thoughts : “ The piece by Siraj Haqqani in @ nytopinion – which ’ s independent of our news operations & judgment – omits the most fundamental fact : that Siraj is no Taliban peace-maker as he paints himself , that he ’ s behind some of most ruthless attacks of this war with many civilian lives lost , ” Mashal tweeted .
Libya peace talks breakdown .
Talks between Libya ’ s internationally recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khalifa Haftar appear to be breaking down after the GNA announced it would no longer participate in U.N.-brokered peace talks in Geneva next Wednesday .
The GNA ’ s decision came in response to a rocket attack on Tripoli by forces loyal to Haftar .
Tripoli is one of the GNA ’ s few remaining strongholds , but it has been under siege for almost a year .
Oversight SNAFU .
The U.S. government failed to account for $ 715.8 million in weapons and equipment allocated to its Syrian partners in the fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a new report from the Pentagon ’ s watchdog .
Lax standards for monitoring equipment left thousands of weapons “ vulnerable to loss or theft , ” Task and Purpose reports .
NSC move amid anonymous rumors .
Deputy National Security Advisor Victoria Coates is leaving her post to become a senior advisor at the Department of Energy .
It comes after Coates and the White House batted away an unsubstantiated whisper campaign that she was the author of an anonymous New York Times op-ed and book outlining a secret resistance campaign in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disinformation in Africa .
Africa is increasingly becoming the target of Russian-linked disinformation campaigns , a new group of researchers has uncovered .
Read more here , from the African Center for Strategic Studies .
Parliamentary elections in Iran .
On Friday , Iran goes to the polls to vote for 290 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly , the country ’ s national legislature .
The parliamentary elections are the first since anti-government protests broke out late last year .
Low turnout could deliver sweeping gains for hardliners , who would restrict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
DoD Budget 2021 hearing .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley will speak before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee about the details of the Defense Department ’ s fiscal year 2021 budget request next Wednesday .
The budget request totals $ 705 billion , a drop in about $ 13 billion from last year , but includes significant commitments to space and cybersecurity .
Pompeo in Oman .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo completes a three-day trip to Saudi Arabia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his respects to the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said in Oman .
The trip will also feature a meeting with Qaboos ’ s successor , Sultan Haitham bin Tarik , to help maintain strong U.S.-Omani ties under the leadership of the new sultan .
Thinking outside the box .
One Indonesian government minister has proposed a novel solution to the country ’ s widening wealth gap : Culture Minister Muhadjir Effendy called on the rich to start marrying the poor to reduce the country ’ s poverty rate .
Doomsday prep .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ too ambitious in preparing for , in his words , “ a nuclear disaster or zombie apocalypse.
” He was sentenced to prison for stockpiling explosives in event of the end times , the Belfast Telegraph reports .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s ambassador to Berlin is tapped as the acting head of national intelligence, Syria’s humanitarian crisis reaches unprecedented levels, and what to make of the movement on peace talks in Afghanistan .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump’s ambassador to Berlin is tapped as the acting head of national intelligence, Syria’s humanitarian crisis reaches unprecedented levels, and what to make of the movement on peace talks in Afghanistan.
As you may have noticed, Security Brief is now delivered on Thursdays. We’ve added an expanded section on industry moves and upcoming events to enhance your newsletter experience.
Premium and FP Insider subscribers can also now get email alerts as soon as FP publishes defense and security news. You can sign up here. (You must be logged into your ForeignPolicy.com account to activate your alerts).
Dan Haverty contributed to this report.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Berlin Ambassador Will Be Acting Intel Chief
Richard Grenell, Trump’s fiery ambassador to Germany and a former Fox News commentator, was named as the new acting director of national intelligence on Wednesday. Unlike his predecessors, he has no prior experience in the intelligence community. In another unprecedented move, Grenell will keep his job as ambassador in Berlin while he transitions to be acting director of national intelligence.
That decision mixes his political job in Berlin with a senior intelligence post that is supposed to be apolitical—something that is vexing former State Department and intelligence officials. Last year Trump also appointed Grenell as special envoy to the Serbia-Kosovo peace process. The State Department didn’t respond to request for comment on whether he’ll keep his special envoy role, but it’s not clear how Grenell can carry out the day-to-day tasks of two, let alone three, jobs at once. There are only so many hours in a day.
Politicizing intelligence. Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Trump was shirking his constitutional duties by appointing an acting intelligence chief instead of nominating a full-fledged chief, which requires senate confirmation.
“[A]t a time when the integrity and independence of the Department of Justice has been called into grave question, now more than ever our country needs a Senate-confirmed intelligence director who will provide the best intelligence and analysis, regardless of whether or not it’s expedient for the President who has appointed him,” Warner said in a statement.
White House response. White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham said Grenell is “committed to a non-political, non-partisan approach as head of the intelligence community.” She added that Trump “has every confidence that Ambassador Grenell will perform his new duties with distinction.”
What We’re Watching
Syria crisis by the numbers. After nearly a decade of war, it might be easy to become inured to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. But fighting around Idlib, the country’s last rebel stronghold, has pushed the crisis to unprecedented levels. Nearly 1 million civilians are caught between the Turkish border and advancing Russian and Syrian forces. Here’s a glimpse into the crisis, from U.N. figures.
What the Taliban wants. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the deputy leader of the Taliban, published a New York Times op-ed today, writing that the Taliban is ready to work with international partners on a long-term peace-building plan. He repeated the demand of fully withdrawing foreign troops first. Mujib Mashal, the New York Times Afghanistan correspondent, offered his thoughts:
“The piece by Siraj Haqqani in @nytopinion – which’s independent of our news operations & judgment – omits the most fundamental fact: that Siraj is no Taliban peace-maker as he paints himself, that he’s behind some of most ruthless attacks of this war with many civilian lives lost,” Mashal tweeted.
Libya peace talks breakdown. Talks between Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar appear to be breaking down after the GNA announced it would no longer participate in U.N.-brokered peace talks in Geneva next Wednesday. The GNA’s decision came in response to a rocket attack on Tripoli by forces loyal to Haftar. Tripoli is one of the GNA’s few remaining strongholds, but it has been under siege for almost a year.
Oversight SNAFU. The U.S. government failed to account for $715.8 million in weapons and equipment allocated to its Syrian partners in the fight against the Islamic State, according to a new report from the Pentagon’s watchdog. Lax standards for monitoring equipment left thousands of weapons “vulnerable to loss or theft,” Task and Purpose reports.
Movers and Shakers Another Pentagon ouster. John Rood, the Pentagon’s top policy official, is being forced out of his job at the end of the month amid a loss in confidence from the White House, FP’s Lara Seligman reports. Rood approved U.S. military aid to Ukraine before the White House ordered it to be held up last year, a point at the center of Trump’s impeachment trial. He also faced accusations of creating a hostile work environment. Rood will be replaced in an acting capacity by acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Anderson.
NSC move amid anonymous rumors. Deputy National Security Advisor Victoria Coates is leaving her post to become a senior advisor at the Department of Energy. It comes after Coates and the White House batted away an unsubstantiated whisper campaign that she was the author of an anonymous New York Times op-ed and book outlining a secret resistance campaign in the Trump administration.
Foreign Policy Recommends
Russia ramps up disinformation in Africa. Africa is increasingly becoming the target of Russian-linked disinformation campaigns, a new group of researchers has uncovered. Read more here, from the African Center for Strategic Studies.
The Week Ahead
Parliamentary elections in Iran. On Friday, Iran goes to the polls to vote for 290 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the country’s national legislature. The parliamentary elections are the first since anti-government protests broke out late last year. Low turnout could deliver sweeping gains for hardliners, who would restrict the moderate program of President Hassan Rouhani.
DoD Budget 2021 hearing. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley will speak before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee about the details of the Defense Department’s fiscal year 2021 budget request next Wednesday. The budget request totals $705 billion, a drop in about $13 billion from last year, but includes significant commitments to space and cybersecurity.
Pompeo in Oman. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo completes a three-day trip to Saudi Arabia tomorrow and will then leave to pay his respects to the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said in Oman. The trip will also feature a meeting with Qaboos’s successor, Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, to help maintain strong U.S.-Omani ties under the leadership of the new sultan.
Odds and Ends
Thinking outside the box. One Indonesian government minister has proposed a novel solution to the country’s widening wealth gap: Culture Minister Muhadjir Effendy called on the rich to start marrying the poor to reduce the country’s poverty rate.
Doomsday prep. A man from Northern Ireland got a little too ambitious in preparing for, in his words, “a nuclear disaster or zombie apocalypse.” He was sentenced to prison for stockpiling explosives in event of the end times, the Belfast Telegraph reports.
That’s it for today.
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Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-02-20--The Debate That Democrats Didn’t Have in Las Vegas

On Wednesday , Democrats held perhaps their most eventful debate of the presidential primary season .
All the top Democratic candidates for U.S. president were represented on stage—including , for the first time , Michael Bloomberg .
One subject , however , was mostly conspicuous by its absence : foreign policy .
The Elephants in the Room team wasn ’ t deterred from offering their own expert analysis on what was said—and what wasn ’ t .
It Feels Like 2016 All Over Again Throughout the 2016 Republican primary , a crowded field of candidates attacked one another because they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was necessary to reduce the field to just Donald Trump and one other candidate ( they disagreed on who that should be ) .
They believed Trump to be beyond the pale—a fact that would be self-evident once the choice was narrowed to two .
The rest is history : As the others bickered , the beyond-the-pale nominee used that free pass to good advantage to win the nomination .
The debate in Las Vegas showed that the 2020 Democratic candidates have largely embraced the same playbook .
All six devoted their efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down to two people , Sen. Bernie Sanders and one other person .
The five people not named Sanders tried their best to eliminate one another , leaving Sanders mostly unscathed .
If they keep this up , 2020 may echo 2016 , and the supposedly beyond-the-pale candidate will be the party ’ s nominee .
Even more striking than the lack of foreign-policy discussion in last night ’ s debate was the fact that when foreign-policy issues did come up—such as climate change or U.S.-Mexican relations—it did so primarily as a domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ facile exchanges about U.S. relations with Mexico started with questions on immigration policy , and the climate change discussion began as a question about Americans ’ jobs in coal- , oil- , and gas-producing states .
China and India only came into the picture when Michael Bloomberg brought them up .
As a political matter , this is understandable .
At this juncture , international security issues are not a top priority for the Democratic base ( the same is true of the Republican base ) .
The candidates want to speak to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prospects in the coming weeks .
And they will respond to the questions the moderators ask .
As a matter of civics , this is regrettable .
Debates should also help reveal what kind of president—especially what kind of commander in chief and diplomat-in-chief—each candidate might be .
It is the job of the moderators to surface that with at least a couple of questions on foreign and defense policy .
They should do so before another national security crisis erupts and brings those issues back into the headlines and back to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pickings in this slugfest for foreign-policy wonks .
That may align reasonably well with the priorities of most Americans , but it shortchanges a set of issues that , like it or not , are central to the presidency .
Shame on the moderators for not having a dedicated national security segment .
Pete Buttigieg ’ s effort to play gotcha with Sen. Amy Klobuchar for forgetting the Mexican president ’ s name in a recent interview came off as lame .
Slightly more illuminating was both Buttigieg and Joe Biden hitting Bloomberg @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a pretty big stick , might persuade China to do more on climate change .
“ Support for free trade reaches new high in NBC/WSJ poll , ” read an NBC News headline last August .
“ In the poll , 64 percent of Americans—including majorities of Democrats and Republicans—agree with the statement that free trade is good for America , because it opens up new markets , and the country can ’ t avoid the fact of a global economy , ” the story read .
Given President Trump ’ s rampant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidates an excellent opportunity to seize the political and economic high ground .
They failed to use it .
A few candidates mentioned their opposition to Trump ’ s tariffs .
That ’ s good , but not sufficient ; candidates need to be talking about negotiating major new trade agreements .
The United States is standing still as the rest of the world moves on .
Last night ’ s debate was another missed opportunity .

On Wednesday, Democrats held perhaps their most eventful debate of the presidential primary season. All the top Democratic candidates for U.S. president were represented on stage—including, for the first time, Michael Bloomberg. One subject, however, was mostly conspicuous by its absence: foreign policy.
The Elephants in the Room team wasn’t deterred from offering their own expert analysis on what was said—and what wasn’t.
It Feels Like 2016 All Over Again
By Peter Feaver
Throughout the 2016 Republican primary, a crowded field of candidates attacked one another because they agreed on only one thing: It was necessary to reduce the field to just Donald Trump and one other candidate (they disagreed on who that should be). They believed Trump to be beyond the pale—a fact that would be self-evident once the choice was narrowed to two. The rest is history: As the others bickered, the beyond-the-pale nominee used that free pass to good advantage to win the nomination.
The debate in Las Vegas showed that the 2020 Democratic candidates have largely embraced the same playbook. All six devoted their efforts to ensuring that the nomination would come down to two people, Sen. Bernie Sanders and one other person. The five people not named Sanders tried their best to eliminate one another, leaving Sanders mostly unscathed. If they keep this up, 2020 may echo 2016, and the supposedly beyond-the-pale candidate will be the party’s nominee.
Is All Policy Domestic Policy?
by Will Inboden
Even more striking than the lack of foreign-policy discussion in last night’s debate was the fact that when foreign-policy issues did come up—such as climate change or U.S.-Mexican relations—it did so primarily as a domestic policy issue. So the brief and facile exchanges about U.S. relations with Mexico started with questions on immigration policy, and the climate change discussion began as a question about Americans’ jobs in coal-, oil-, and gas-producing states. China and India only came into the picture when Michael Bloomberg brought them up.
As a political matter, this is understandable. At this juncture, international security issues are not a top priority for the Democratic base (the same is true of the Republican base). The candidates want to speak to the issues that will help their electoral prospects in the coming weeks. And they will respond to the questions the moderators ask.
As a matter of civics, this is regrettable. Debates should also help reveal what kind of president—especially what kind of commander in chief and diplomat-in-chief—each candidate might be. It is the job of the moderators to surface that with at least a couple of questions on foreign and defense policy. They should do so before another national security crisis erupts and brings those issues back into the headlines and back to the top of voter concerns.
Slim Pickings for Wonks
by John Hannah
Pretty slim pickings in this slugfest for foreign-policy wonks. That may align reasonably well with the priorities of most Americans, but it shortchanges a set of issues that, like it or not, are central to the presidency. Shame on the moderators for not having a dedicated national security segment.
Pete Buttigieg’s effort to play gotcha with Sen. Amy Klobuchar for forgetting the Mexican president’s name in a recent interview came off as lame. Slightly more illuminating was both Buttigieg and Joe Biden hitting Bloomberg for suggesting that talk alone, absent a pretty big stick, might persuade China to do more on climate change.
A Wasted Opportunity on Trade
by Clark Packard
“Support for free trade reaches new high in NBC/WSJ poll,” read an NBC News headline last August. “In the poll, 64 percent of Americans—including majorities of Democrats and Republicans—agree with the statement that free trade is good for America, because it opens up new markets, and the country can’t avoid the fact of a global economy,” the story read.
Given President Trump’s rampant protectionism, this trend presented Democratic presidential candidates an excellent opportunity to seize the political and economic high ground. They failed to use it. A few candidates mentioned their opposition to Trump’s tariffs. That’s good, but not sufficient; candidates need to be talking about negotiating major new trade agreements. The United States is standing still as the rest of the world moves on. Last night’s debate was another missed opportunity.