foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--Feeling Like an Outcast

Feeling Like an Outcast

As delegates from around the world lobbied in Durban , Dalits had reportedly won the backing of the spokesperson of the European Union , as well as that of representatives from Guatemala and Switzerland .
A handful of other European countries had also promised their support .
But months of strategizing and advocacy failed to materialize when the Dalits were let down by a crucial constituency : their own government .
For decades , New Delhi had championed boycotts against apartheid-era South Africa .
But at an international platform designed to hold nations accountable for the continued mistreatment of marginalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world that the issue of caste—and the institutionalized suppression of those who fall at the bottom of its hierarchies—was an internal matter .
In the new bestseller Caste : The Origins of Our Discontents , a work Oprah Winfrey has said “ might be the most important book I ’ ve ever chosen for my book club , ” the Pulitzer Prize-winning Isabel Wilkerson ensures that the topic of caste gets a major platform .
Wilkerson introduces caste as a framework to analyze the United States ’ graded racial hierarchy that holds African @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conventional concepts of racism alone are no longer sufficient to explain how it has endured , nearly intact , for four centuries .
In order to understand how an unconscious ranking of human characteristics has been “ used to justify brutalities against entire groups within our species , ” she looks to the concentrated evil of Nazi Germany , which lasted 12 years , and the Hinduism-rooted caste system of varnas in India , which has lasted , in various forms , for millenniums .
Wilkerson patiently peels each carefully matted layer of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of oppression that people such as myself , a Dalit , have inherited from our ancestors .
And in some 400 pages , she obliterates decades of New Delhi ’ s diplomatic attempts to prevent caste from getting the global notoriety it has always deserved .
The parallels between caste and race are not new , and Wilkerson leans heavily on the work of several early 20th-century researchers , notably the pathbreaking African American anthropologist Allison Davis , to trace how racial inequalities in the United States mirrored those in India and how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reflected those of Dalits .
Yet Wilkerson , like many before her , unequivocally centers her work on the United States , with caste as a larger framework—a structure of gradation to explain how race represents the skin atop the bones of the fixed , immovable ranking that is known as caste .
In doing so , Wilkerson gives us a language uniquely tailored for our times .
As the Black Lives Matter movement forces the United States to contend with its history of racism , many of its white residents now recognize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ privilege ( along with many others who resent this interrogation and cling tighter to their assumed superiority ) .
Wilkerson gives us a language uniquely tailored for our times .
While the United States ’ liberal ideology of multiculturalism was once content with overlooking the factions and frictions within the various communities labeled as nonwhite , the world is now openly examining the striations within racial hierarchies—and within races themselves .
The supposed solidarity of Latinx people , Middle Eastern Americans , and East Asian and South Asian Americans , all of whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often violent struggles of African Americans during the civil rights movement and beyond , is rightfully under scrutiny at a time when Black folk fight to bring attention to their modern-day lynchings at the hands of the police system .
An estimated 90 percent of Indian Americans are upper caste—they also comprise the highest-earning ethnic group in the United States—so it is understandable then that discussions about the horrors of the Indian caste system are only just entering mainstream American discourse .
This makes Wilkerson ’ s definitions of dominant caste ( white @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asian ) , subordinate caste ( African American ) , and indigenous people ( Native American ) in the United States a radical intervention .
It not only makes visible the plainly manifest yet stubbornly obscured reality of racial suppression of African Americans but also supplies other people of color with a vocabulary to understand their place in the lattice of racial and social order in the United States .
As a Dalit woman and immigrant from a formerly untouchable manual scavenging caste in India , my place in the Indian social order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a brown resident in the United States , I fall somewhere in the middle of the racial caste pyramid .
The brilliance of Wilkerson ’ s book lies in her painstaking research , her clear understanding of the different executions of caste , and her ability to draw a single direct thread that goes from the enslavement of African natives , captured and brought to Virginia in 1619 , to nearly every form of inequity inflicted on Black folk—public lynchings , segregation , legal slavery under Jim Crow , redlining , mass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suppression , killings by police , medical mistreatment , and constant microaggressions .
She deftly and neatly reveals how systemic coding and learned cultural assumptions of white superiority—along with the unconscious biases—are often responsible for upholding the racial hierarchy of caste .
There is perhaps no aspect of Black life , including the knee-jerk social distancing of newer African immigrants from African Americans , that , in Wilkerson ’ s telling , is unrelated to the well-worn , comforting grooves of caste .
In a later chapter , she describes how a Nigerian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being Black , something that had no meaning for him back home and which led him to believe that if they were being passed on for jobs and promotions , then “ [ m ] aybe the African-Americans were not working hard enough.
” But after spending a few years in the United States , he knew better than to dismiss the reality of his race as a perceived determining factor in his worth .
As she unbraids each knot of the United States ’ complex racial caste system , however , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces that define the American social order is glaring .
While Wilkerson connects both the mass incarceration of African Americans and an absence of universal health care to slavery , there is no mention of the prison industrial complex or the crooked lobbying by insurance and pharmaceutical firms to keep the health care system as broken as it is .
Ibram X. Kendi , the National Book Award-winning author of How to Be an Antiracist , whom Wilkerson also prominently acknowledges in her book , has noted that the origins of racism can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capitalism in the slave trade that provided the economic fuel of a new world order .
While racism is commonly understood as a form of personal hatred , Wilkerson frames it as a consolidation of power .
She explains that for members of the dominant caste to loathe the progress of African Americans , or for them to feel discomfort at seeing Black people in positions of influence , the disgust at an assertion of equality isn ’ t an individual response but a result of the collective conditioning of white populations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ every cultural , social , economic , legal , and judicial aspect of American life .
Seen through Wilkerson ’ s framework , when a supposed majority of white women vote for a presidential candidate who has conclusively proved to be harmful to their interests—over a seemingly more competent white woman—they are choosing the cultural aspect of their identity that brings them closest to power .
Or when a white working-class voter is willing to suffer from an inflamed liver rather than vote for the Affordable Care Act , he is acting in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his dominant white male caste that rebukes any shared solidarity with those lower than him on the caste order .
In a culture that defines us often exclusively with our identities ( as opposed to , as Wilkerson argues , who we are on the inside ) , it is staggering to imagine the power of a Black female journalist unpacking how caste structures can hurt even white men when most of the inequality she seems to have faced comes at the behest of that same dominant caste .
Making a case for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a mild case of moral grandstanding—that our prejudices are systemic yet our awakening can only be individual .
But if that is so , then it ’ s difficult to imagine how structural power and privilege might spontaneously topple in the wake of the personal recognition of inequality .
But this seemingly naive and even simplistic belief in our humanity might possibly be the single most subversive statement in Wilkerson ’ s laborious undertaking .
Wilkerson ’ s definition of caste makes one expect that her book would underline the ongoing horrors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within Indian communities in the United States and elsewhere .
Reading Caste , however , it would be hard to know that .
Serving a uniquely American argument , Wilkerson expediently relies on B.R .
Ambedkar , the Dalit architect of the Indian Constitution and the foremost leader of anti-caste ideology , whom she calls the “ Martin Luther King of India.
” Readers of Ambedkar ’ s work will recognize his words and phrases generously sprinkled throughout Wilkerson ’ s book .
For Dalits , who have almost single-handedly kept Ambedkar ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Indian institutions and have struggled to see him recognized as the preeminent leader of Dalit rights on a global stage , it is a moment of pride .
Wilkerson recalls forming her initial theory of the eight pillars of caste , which serve as the foundation of her argument , through a lecture she was invited to deliver at a meeting of Dalit Ambedkarites in Massachusetts .
Later , she recounts her visits to India , a caste conference in the United Kingdom , and outlines conversations she had with Dalit academics , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of Wilkerson ’ s attention , however , is the treatment of Dalits as it aligned with the enslavement of African Americans and in the Jim Crow era that followed .
Wilkerson gives little space to the inequities that affect Dalits today , some of which are more brutal and dehumanizing than even before India ’ s independence .
Describing her first trip to India a few years ago , she mentions the roadside religious shrines lined on the streets of New Delhi and admits to finding them slightly exotic , only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ memorials that appear at the site of a police shooting or at gun violence in U.S. schools .
Wilkerson fails to mention how Dalits in India are routinely abused and subjected to violence .
Yet she fails to mention how Dalits in India are routinely abused and subjected to violence and even murder for supposedly desecrating a religious shrine or a temple with their so-called polluting touch—a concept to which Wilkerson devotes an entire chapter when she explains the different pillars of caste .
One such pillar is titled “ Endogamy and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an idea Ambedkar explored extensively as a graduate student at Columbia University in 1916 .
Endogamy , or the practice of marrying within one ’ s caste to maintain caste superiority and purity , is the basis of arranged marriages , one of India ’ s more recognizable cultural exports to the United States .
Neither that nor the heartless so-called honor killings ( of Dalit and dominant caste couples by their family members ) to preserve the superiority of their caste find mention in her pages .
In support of her larger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inflicted by the Third Reich and draws attention to how the miscegenation regulations of the Southern United States were extreme even for the drafters of the Nuremberg laws .
But even as the most sensitive analyst , Wilkerson appears to give in to the idea of American exceptionalism and centers Western narratives while failing to dig into the continued brutalization of Dalits who largely reside in India—in the global south .
Despite her humanist and internationalist approach to bring all three systems of caste on par with each other , the original Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suffers the most in the service of the greater rationalization and possibly in favor of a largely American audience .
Wilkerson ’ s radical framing of racial injustice as a system of caste , aligning the struggles of Black Americans with those of Dalits , elevates thousands of years of Dalit trauma and struggle into the global spotlight in a single swoop .
Her construct unquestionably cements the solidarity between Black and Dalit movements after decades of foiled attempts , from the brief correspondence between Ambedkar and W.E.B .
Du Bois to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black Panthers .
But overlooking the ongoing horrors and implications of the Indian caste system on Dalit lives ultimately serves the dominant caste ’ s straw man argument that casteism is a fading reality in the Indian subcontinent .
Wilkerson plays an assessor shining a spotlight on the decaying foundations of the house that is America , festered with the rot of the racial caste system .
She powerfully reveals the American story , unearthing the chapters that have been deliberately buried by a white supremacist version of history .
Wilkerson forces readers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racial hierarchy .
Yet for me , a Dalit reader often marginalized and restricted to the bottom of an even more lopsided global order , it often feels like being left out of my own history .

In early September 2001, at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, Indian Dalit activists were desperately rallying support to get caste recognized as a manifestation of racism. The term Dalit, derived from the Sanskrit word for oppressed, is used to describe people placed by India’s caste system at the very bottom of the social hierarchy and once called “untouchables.”
In early September 2001, at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa, Indian Dalit activists were desperately rallying support to get caste recognized as a manifestation of racism. The term Dalit, derived from the Sanskrit word for oppressed, is used to describe people placed by India’s caste system at the very bottom of the social hierarchy and once called “untouchables.”
As delegates from around the world lobbied in Durban, Dalits had reportedly won the backing of the spokesperson of the European Union, as well as that of representatives from Guatemala and Switzerland. A handful of other European countries had also promised their support. But months of strategizing and advocacy failed to materialize when the Dalits were let down by a crucial constituency: their own government.
For decades, New Delhi had championed boycotts against apartheid-era South Africa. But at an international platform designed to hold nations accountable for the continued mistreatment of marginalized populations, the Indian government informed the world that the issue of caste—and the institutionalized suppression of those who fall at the bottom of its hierarchies—was an internal matter.
In the new bestseller Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, a work Oprah Winfrey has said “might be the most important book I’ve ever chosen for my book club,” the Pulitzer Prize-winning Isabel Wilkerson ensures that the topic of caste gets a major platform. Wilkerson introduces caste as a framework to analyze the United States’ graded racial hierarchy that holds African Americans near the bottom and explains why conventional concepts of racism alone are no longer sufficient to explain how it has endured, nearly intact, for four centuries. In order to understand how an unconscious ranking of human characteristics has been “used to justify brutalities against entire groups within our species,” she looks to the concentrated evil of Nazi Germany, which lasted 12 years, and the Hinduism-rooted caste system of varnas in India, which has lasted, in various forms, for millenniums. Wilkerson patiently peels each carefully matted layer of racial hierarchy to lay bare the history of oppression that people such as myself, a Dalit, have inherited from our ancestors. And in some 400 pages, she obliterates decades of New Delhi’s diplomatic attempts to prevent caste from getting the global notoriety it has always deserved.
The parallels between caste and race are not new, and Wilkerson leans heavily on the work of several early 20th-century researchers, notably the pathbreaking African American anthropologist Allison Davis, to trace how racial inequalities in the United States mirrored those in India and how the inhuman life conditions of African Americans reflected those of Dalits. Yet Wilkerson, like many before her, unequivocally centers her work on the United States, with caste as a larger framework—a structure of gradation to explain how race represents the skin atop the bones of the fixed, immovable ranking that is known as caste. In doing so, Wilkerson gives us a language uniquely tailored for our times. As the Black Lives Matter movement forces the United States to contend with its history of racism, many of its white residents now recognize themselves as beneficiaries of centuries of caste privilege (along with many others who resent this interrogation and cling tighter to their assumed superiority). Wilkerson gives us a language uniquely tailored for our times.
While the United States’ liberal ideology of multiculturalism was once content with overlooking the factions and frictions within the various communities labeled as nonwhite, the world is now openly examining the striations within racial hierarchies—and within races themselves. The supposed solidarity of Latinx people, Middle Eastern Americans, and East Asian and South Asian Americans, all of whom gained from the advances made by the often violent struggles of African Americans during the civil rights movement and beyond, is rightfully under scrutiny at a time when Black folk fight to bring attention to their modern-day lynchings at the hands of the police system. An estimated 90 percent of Indian Americans are upper caste—they also comprise the highest-earning ethnic group in the United States—so it is understandable then that discussions about the horrors of the Indian caste system are only just entering mainstream American discourse. This makes Wilkerson’s definitions of dominant caste (white), middle castes (Latinx and Asian), subordinate caste (African American), and indigenous people (Native American) in the United States a radical intervention. It not only makes visible the plainly manifest yet stubbornly obscured reality of racial suppression of African Americans but also supplies other people of color with a vocabulary to understand their place in the lattice of racial and social order in the United States. As a Dalit woman and immigrant from a formerly untouchable manual scavenging caste in India, my place in the Indian social order lies at the very bottom. But as a brown resident in the United States, I fall somewhere in the middle of the racial caste pyramid.
The brilliance of Wilkerson’s book lies in her painstaking research, her clear understanding of the different executions of caste, and her ability to draw a single direct thread that goes from the enslavement of African natives, captured and brought to Virginia in 1619, to nearly every form of inequity inflicted on Black folk—public lynchings, segregation, legal slavery under Jim Crow, redlining, mass incarceration, underrepresentation, voter disenfranchisement, suppression, killings by police, medical mistreatment, and constant microaggressions. She deftly and neatly reveals how systemic coding and learned cultural assumptions of white superiority—along with the unconscious biases—are often responsible for upholding the racial hierarchy of caste.
There is perhaps no aspect of Black life, including the knee-jerk social distancing of newer African immigrants from African Americans, that, in Wilkerson’s telling, is unrelated to the well-worn, comforting grooves of caste. In a later chapter, she describes how a Nigerian student at first did not identify with being Black, something that had no meaning for him back home and which led him to believe that if they were being passed on for jobs and promotions, then “[m]aybe the African-Americans were not working hard enough.” But after spending a few years in the United States, he knew better than to dismiss the reality of his race as a perceived determining factor in his worth.
As she unbraids each knot of the United States’ complex racial caste system, however, the absence of a critique of the capitalist forces that define the American social order is glaring. While Wilkerson connects both the mass incarceration of African Americans and an absence of universal health care to slavery, there is no mention of the prison industrial complex or the crooked lobbying by insurance and pharmaceutical firms to keep the health care system as broken as it is. Ibram X. Kendi, the National Book Award-winning author of How to Be an Antiracist, whom Wilkerson also prominently acknowledges in her book, has noted that the origins of racism cannot be separated from the origins of capitalism in the slave trade that provided the economic fuel of a new world order.
While racism is commonly understood as a form of personal hatred, Wilkerson frames it as a consolidation of power. She explains that for members of the dominant caste to loathe the progress of African Americans, or for them to feel discomfort at seeing Black people in positions of influence, the disgust at an assertion of equality isn’t an individual response but a result of the collective conditioning of white populations. It is a superiority reinforced through nearly every cultural, social, economic, legal, and judicial aspect of American life. Seen through Wilkerson’s framework, when a supposed majority of white women vote for a presidential candidate who has conclusively proved to be harmful to their interests—over a seemingly more competent white woman—they are choosing the cultural aspect of their identity that brings them closest to power. Or when a white working-class voter is willing to suffer from an inflamed liver rather than vote for the Affordable Care Act, he is acting in the interests of the collective superiority of his dominant white male caste that rebukes any shared solidarity with those lower than him on the caste order.
In a culture that defines us often exclusively with our identities (as opposed to, as Wilkerson argues, who we are on the inside), it is staggering to imagine the power of a Black female journalist unpacking how caste structures can hurt even white men when most of the inequality she seems to have faced comes at the behest of that same dominant caste. Making a case for radical empathy, Wilkerson asserts—somewhat tidily and with a mild case of moral grandstanding—that our prejudices are systemic yet our awakening can only be individual. But if that is so, then it’s difficult to imagine how structural power and privilege might spontaneously topple in the wake of the personal recognition of inequality. But this seemingly naive and even simplistic belief in our humanity might possibly be the single most subversive statement in Wilkerson’s laborious undertaking.
Wilkerson’s definition of caste makes one expect that her book would underline the ongoing horrors of the caste system in India and within Indian communities in the United States and elsewhere. Reading Caste, however, it would be hard to know that. Serving a uniquely American argument, Wilkerson expediently relies on B.R. Ambedkar, the Dalit architect of the Indian Constitution and the foremost leader of anti-caste ideology, whom she calls the “Martin Luther King of India.” Readers of Ambedkar’s work will recognize his words and phrases generously sprinkled throughout Wilkerson’s book. For Dalits, who have almost single-handedly kept Ambedkar’s legacy alive despite abject neglect from Indian institutions and have struggled to see him recognized as the preeminent leader of Dalit rights on a global stage, it is a moment of pride. Wilkerson recalls forming her initial theory of the eight pillars of caste, which serve as the foundation of her argument, through a lecture she was invited to deliver at a meeting of Dalit Ambedkarites in Massachusetts. Later, she recounts her visits to India, a caste conference in the United Kingdom, and outlines conversations she had with Dalit academics, researchers, and theorists.
What captures most of Wilkerson’s attention, however, is the treatment of Dalits as it aligned with the enslavement of African Americans and in the Jim Crow era that followed. Wilkerson gives little space to the inequities that affect Dalits today, some of which are more brutal and dehumanizing than even before India’s independence. Describing her first trip to India a few years ago, she mentions the roadside religious shrines lined on the streets of New Delhi and admits to finding them slightly exotic, only to later compare them to the spontaneous memorials that appear at the site of a police shooting or at gun violence in U.S. schools.
Wilkerson fails to mention how Dalits in India are routinely abused and subjected to violence.
Yet she fails to mention how Dalits in India are routinely abused and subjected to violence and even murder for supposedly desecrating a religious shrine or a temple with their so-called polluting touch—a concept to which Wilkerson devotes an entire chapter when she explains the different pillars of caste. One such pillar is titled “Endogamy and the Control of Marriage and Mating,” an idea Ambedkar explored extensively as a graduate student at Columbia University in 1916. Endogamy, or the practice of marrying within one’s caste to maintain caste superiority and purity, is the basis of arranged marriages, one of India’s more recognizable cultural exports to the United States. Neither that nor the heartless so-called honor killings (of Dalit and dominant caste couples by their family members) to preserve the superiority of their caste find mention in her pages.
In support of her larger argument, Wilkerson investigates the blood-curdling horrors inflicted by the Third Reich and draws attention to how the miscegenation regulations of the Southern United States were extreme even for the drafters of the Nuremberg laws. But even as the most sensitive analyst, Wilkerson appears to give in to the idea of American exceptionalism and centers Western narratives while failing to dig into the continued brutalization of Dalits who largely reside in India—in the global south. Despite her humanist and internationalist approach to bring all three systems of caste on par with each other, the original Indian version, as Wilkerson calls it, suffers the most in the service of the greater rationalization and possibly in favor of a largely American audience.
Wilkerson’s radical framing of racial injustice as a system of caste, aligning the struggles of Black Americans with those of Dalits, elevates thousands of years of Dalit trauma and struggle into the global spotlight in a single swoop. Her construct unquestionably cements the solidarity between Black and Dalit movements after decades of foiled attempts, from the brief correspondence between Ambedkar and W.E.B. Du Bois to the revolutionary Dalit Panther Party modeled after the Black Panthers. But overlooking the ongoing horrors and implications of the Indian caste system on Dalit lives ultimately serves the dominant caste’s straw man argument that casteism is a fading reality in the Indian subcontinent. Wilkerson plays an assessor shining a spotlight on the decaying foundations of the house that is America, festered with the rot of the racial caste system. She powerfully reveals the American story, unearthing the chapters that have been deliberately buried by a white supremacist version of history. Wilkerson forces readers to confront the implications of a skewed racial hierarchy. Yet for me, a Dalit reader often marginalized and restricted to the bottom of an even more lopsided global order, it often feels like being left out of my own history.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--Why Israel Should Worry About the Saudi and Emirati Nuclear Programs

Why Israel Should Worry About the Saudi and Emirati Nuclear Programs The embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently found an escape route from his escalating domestic crisis , with the announcement in August of Israel ’ s peace deal with the United Arab Emirates and in recent days with Bahrain .
For decades , the United States has pledged to uphold Israel ’ s qualitative military edge over neighboring Arab states , and in recent years it has refused the sale of cutting-edge weapons to the UAE , fearing this could compromise Israel ’ s military advantage .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the UAE and Bahrain , however , it will become harder for Israel to oppose the sale of military hardware to its Arab neighbors .
Israel has historically expressed fierce opposition to strengthening the offensive capacity of any Arab state .
The United States is pushing to sell Abu Dhabi a package of sophisticated weapons including F-35 fighter jets , widely believed to be the most capable strike aircraft in the world , as well as Reaper drones and electronic warfare planes which jam enemy defenses .
Once the UAE receives these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same treatment .
Neither the Trump administration nor the Netanyahu government are willing to acknowledge the dangers of transferring sophisticated arms to countries that are allies today but could be enemies tomorrow .
The United States does not deny that the arms package has been facilitated by the normalization deal between Israel and the UAE , but neither the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump nor the Netanyahu government are willing to acknowledge the dangers of transferring sophisticated arms to countries that are allies today but could be enemies tomorrow .
After @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Iran , reflected by strong military and intelligence cooperation and flourishing economic ties , until the Iranians became an implacable foe almost overnight following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 .
Israel had also enjoyed a strategic alliance with Turkey for decades , on and off , until 2010 .
After news of the arms sales became public in late August , Netanyahu repeatedly denied that he had given assurances to the Trump administration that Israel would not oppose them .
Understandably , he did not wish to be portrayed by his rivals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s security .
A former defense minister and chief of staff , Moshe Ya ’ alon , who is now a fierce critic of Netanyahu , has expressed concerns over the lack of transparency regarding the agreement with the UAE .
While the peace agreements with the UAE and Bahrain are a hugely positive development for Israel , there will be rising strategic costs as it seeks to widen the circle of normalization with the Persian Gulf states .
This can be seen most clearly in the case of Saudi Arabia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and informal contacts between senior Israelis and Saudis have intensified , amid shared concerns over the threat posed by Iran .
Netanyahu ’ s determination to preserve close ties with Riyadh has been reflected in his readiness to defend the Saudi regime following the murder of the dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi .
More significantly , Israel ’ s government has thus far chosen silence amid new revelations of Saudi Arabia ’ s construction of a new nuclear facility in cooperation with China , suggesting that the kingdom ’ s embryonic nuclear program @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undermines one of Israel ’ s most effective arguments in bringing international pressure to bear against Iran ’ s nuclear program : the idea that a failure to prevent a nuclear Iran would result in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East .
Yet it appears that the nuclear arms race is already up and running .
Israel ’ s long-standing policy has been to prevent its regional adversaries from acquiring any nuclear capability .
This policy has become known as the “ Begin Doctrine , ” named after the then Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorized the bombing of Iraq ’ s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 .
On being asked whether Israel would also take action against other countries with nuclear ambitions , Begin replied that Israel was dealing with Iraq first .
“ The others we ’ ll deal with another time.
” The doctrine has largely been upheld both before and after the Osirak raid .
As early as 1979 , Begin wrote to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to express his concern over nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Libya .
And in 2007 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a raid that destroyed the Syrian al-Kibar nuclear facility .
Netanyahu reportedly gave orders in 2010 for the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) to begin preparations for a strike against Iran ’ s nuclear facilities , but backed down in the face of strong opposition from the Israeli military as well as the intelligence and security agencies .
Nevertheless , some Middle Eastern intelligence officials have claimed that Israel was behind the explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility in July this year .
From this perspective , an upgrade to the Begin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ yet , in a break with its long-standing policy , Israel expressed no opposition to a deal for peaceful nuclear cooperation between Washington and Abu Dhabi in 2009 , which facilitated the transfer of nuclear technology to the UAE for the building of an ostensibly civilian nuclear reactor .
In the case of the UAE , the administration of then President Barack Obama insisted on strict conditions , whereby Abu Dhabi would forgo enrichment and reprocessing .
This hasn ’ t prevented Emirati officials from suggesting that the deal could be reassessed after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ uranium under the 2015 nuclear deal it signed with the world powers .
The case of Saudi Arabia , however , is more troubling .
Unlike the UAE , it has yet to agree to the so-called gold standard of nuclear oversight .
Saudi Arabia has a very limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA ) .
Moreover , in contrast to the UAE , the Saudis have not signed up to the IAEA Additional Protocol , which enhances the ability of the agency to verify the peaceful uses @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not ruled out enriching uranium , which raises suspicions that it is pursuing a military nuclear program .
Saudi Arabia has not ruled out enriching uranium , which raises suspicions that it is pursuing a military nuclear program .
On the one hand , there are significant differences between the situation of Iran and Saudi Arabia .
Iran remains committed to Israel ’ s destruction and is drawing closer to having enough enriched uranium to produce a single nuclear weapon .
The fact that Iran is moving closer towards a nuclear breakout is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s strategy toward Tehran ’ s nuclear program .
He lobbied intensively for the Trump administration to pull out of the 2015 nuclear deal but even critics of the deal have conceded that Iran was largely in compliance prior to the U.S. pullout from the agreement .
As the deal unravels , the Saudis are now more likely to pursue a military nuclear program because there are no longer constraints on Iran ’ s program .
Nevertheless , the Saudis are a long way from developing nuclear weapons .
While Saudi Arabia was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ symbolic military reinforcement to its Arab enemies during the wars of 1948 , 1967 , and 1973 , the ties between the two countries have clearly evolved , with mutual cooperation driven by the shared fear and loathing of Iran .
Yet , Israel can not count on Saudi Arabia remaining on good terms with the Jewish state forever .
If raising concerns over Saudi Arabia appear far-fetched today , then consider this : Iran ’ s nuclear program was first developed during the 1970s not by the ayatollahs but by the shah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the nuclear activities conducted under the shah had clear military purposes .
Although Israel and Iran did not enjoy full ambassadorial relations prior to the Islamic Revolution , the two countries established close intelligence and military cooperation .
Iran was a key supplier of oil to Israel until 1979 .
Several thousand Israeli businessmen and their families were living comfortably in Iran .
Israeli Soltam mortars that were sold to the Shah of Iran were used a few years later against the IDF in Lebanon .
The two countries even struck up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1.2 billion shortly before the fall of the shah .
Israel established cooperation in the intelligence field with Iran and Turkey as far back as the 1950s , but Israel ’ s strategic cooperation with Turkey arguably reached its peak in the 1990s with the sale of advanced weapons systems to Ankara .
The strategic cooperation fell away with the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party under current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002 .
The strategic alliance with Iran and Turkey was driven by a shared fear of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Israel ’ s new cooperation with the Gulf states is propelled by anxiety over Iran .
The deterioration in ties between the two countries was reflected in the Mavi Marmara episode of May 2010 , in which 10 Turks were killed by Israeli naval commandos when they intercepted a Turkish aid ship in international waters en route to Gaza .
As the former U.S. government officials and nuclear nonproliferation experts Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski pointed out in Foreign Policy in 2018 , “ Saudi Arabia ’ s resistance to restrictions on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a public declaration that the kingdom wants to keep the nuclear weapons option open.
” The Trump administration has explored the possibility of providing the Saudis with nuclear power technology , but Riyadh has resisted the nonproliferation restrictions that would prevent it from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel—precisely the restrictions that Israel is so adamant to maintain vis-à-vis Iran .
The advantage for the Saudis of nuclear cooperation with China is that Beijing asks fewer questions when it comes to nuclear safeguards .
That should raise alarms in Washington .
China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ construction of a facility for extracting uranium yellowcake from uranium ore , potentially laying the foundations for a uranium enrichment program .
And according to a recent report in the Guardian , the Saudis may now have enough uranium ore to produce nuclear fuel .
China ’ s long-standing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan suggests that global nonproliferation norms are the least of its concerns when assisting allies with their nuclear programs .
China ’ s support was vital in Pakistan ’ s development of its nuclear program , with the notorious engineer Abdul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of an agreement with Beijing in the early 1980s .
For now , both the Israelis and the Saudis remain committed to the adage , “ The enemy of my enemy is my friend.
” After all , Saudi Arabia has never hidden its determination to acquire a nuclear capability if Iran also goes nuclear .
But it exposes Netanyahu ’ s double standard—and his dangerous indifference to the way threats can shift and evolve over time .
The same Netanyahu who has fought tooth and nail to prevent Iran from going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudis move ahead with their own nuclear program—a program that could one day threaten Israelis under different leaders and in different geopolitical conditions .
According to the Israel news website Walla , Israeli security and intelligence officials have contacted their U.S. counterparts to express concerns over Saudi Arabia ’ s nuclear program .
At the same time , however , the prime minister ’ s office has instructed officials not to comment publicly on the matter because of concerns about harming Israel ’ s ties with the kingdom .
Netanyahu is an expert @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet eventually a choice will have to be made between acquiescing to the erosion of Israel ’ s qualitative military edge and limiting how deep its ties with newfound friends in the Gulf will be allowed to go .

The embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently found an escape route from his escalating domestic crisis, with the announcement in August of Israel’s peace deal with the United Arab Emirates and in recent days with Bahrain. For decades, the United States has pledged to uphold Israel’s qualitative military edge over neighboring Arab states, and in recent years it has refused the sale of cutting-edge weapons to the UAE, fearing this could compromise Israel’s military advantage. Now that Israel has signed a peace deal with the UAE and Bahrain, however, it will become harder for Israel to oppose the sale of military hardware to its Arab neighbors.
The embattled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently found an escape route from his escalating domestic crisis, with the announcement in August of Israel’s peace deal with the United Arab Emirates and in recent days with Bahrain. For decades, the United States has pledged to uphold Israel’s qualitative military edge over neighboring Arab states, and in recent years it has refused the sale of cutting-edge weapons to the UAE, fearing this could compromise Israel’s military advantage. Now that Israel has signed a peace deal with the UAE and Bahrain, however, it will become harder for Israel to oppose the sale of military hardware to its Arab neighbors.
Israel has historically expressed fierce opposition to strengthening the offensive capacity of any Arab state. The United States is pushing to sell Abu Dhabi a package of sophisticated weapons including F-35 fighter jets, widely believed to be the most capable strike aircraft in the world, as well as Reaper drones and electronic warfare planes which jam enemy defenses. Once the UAE receives these arms, other Arab states will expect the same treatment.
Neither the Trump administration nor the Netanyahu government are willing to acknowledge the dangers of transferring sophisticated arms to countries that are allies today but could be enemies tomorrow.
The United States does not deny that the arms package has been facilitated by the normalization deal between Israel and the UAE, but neither the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump nor the Netanyahu government are willing to acknowledge the dangers of transferring sophisticated arms to countries that are allies today but could be enemies tomorrow. After all, Israel enjoyed a strategic alliance with Iran, reflected by strong military and intelligence cooperation and flourishing economic ties, until the Iranians became an implacable foe almost overnight following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Israel had also enjoyed a strategic alliance with Turkey for decades, on and off, until 2010.
After news of the arms sales became public in late August, Netanyahu repeatedly denied that he had given assurances to the Trump administration that Israel would not oppose them. Understandably, he did not wish to be portrayed by his rivals as a leader who had compromised Israel’s security. A former defense minister and chief of staff, Moshe Ya’alon, who is now a fierce critic of Netanyahu, has expressed concerns over the lack of transparency regarding the agreement with the UAE.
While the peace agreements with the UAE and Bahrain are a hugely positive development for Israel, there will be rising strategic costs as it seeks to widen the circle of normalization with the Persian Gulf states. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Saudi Arabia. Over the past five years, formal and informal contacts between senior Israelis and Saudis have intensified, amid shared concerns over the threat posed by Iran. Netanyahu’s determination to preserve close ties with Riyadh has been reflected in his readiness to defend the Saudi regime following the murder of the dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. More significantly, Israel’s government has thus far chosen silence amid new revelations of Saudi Arabia’s construction of a new nuclear facility in cooperation with China, suggesting that the kingdom’s embryonic nuclear program is moving forward.
This hands-off approach undermines one of Israel’s most effective arguments in bringing international pressure to bear against Iran’s nuclear program: the idea that a failure to prevent a nuclear Iran would result in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Yet it appears that the nuclear arms race is already up and running.
Israel’s long-standing policy has been to prevent its regional adversaries from acquiring any nuclear capability. This policy has become known as the “Begin Doctrine,” named after the then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who famously authorized the bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981.
On being asked whether Israel would also take action against other countries with nuclear ambitions, Begin replied that Israel was dealing with Iraq first. “The others we’ll deal with another time.”
The doctrine has largely been upheld both before and after the Osirak raid. As early as 1979, Begin wrote to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to express his concern over nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Libya. And in 2007, then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert authorized a raid that destroyed the Syrian al-Kibar nuclear facility.
Netanyahu reportedly gave orders in 2010 for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to begin preparations for a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but backed down in the face of strong opposition from the Israeli military as well as the intelligence and security agencies. Nevertheless, some Middle Eastern intelligence officials have claimed that Israel was behind the explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility in July this year. From this perspective, an upgrade to the Begin Doctrine may be taking shape.
And yet, in a break with its long-standing policy, Israel expressed no opposition to a deal for peaceful nuclear cooperation between Washington and Abu Dhabi in 2009, which facilitated the transfer of nuclear technology to the UAE for the building of an ostensibly civilian nuclear reactor. In the case of the UAE, the administration of then President Barack Obama insisted on strict conditions, whereby Abu Dhabi would forgo enrichment and reprocessing. This hasn’t prevented Emirati officials from suggesting that the deal could be reassessed after Iran was granted the right to enrich uranium under the 2015 nuclear deal it signed with the world powers.
The case of Saudi Arabia, however, is more troubling. Unlike the UAE, it has yet to agree to the so-called gold standard of nuclear oversight. Saudi Arabia has a very limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, in contrast to the UAE, the Saudis have not signed up to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which enhances the ability of the agency to verify the peaceful uses of all nuclear material. It has not ruled out enriching uranium, which raises suspicions that it is pursuing a military nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia has not ruled out enriching uranium, which raises suspicions that it is pursuing a military nuclear program.
On the one hand, there are significant differences between the situation of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran remains committed to Israel’s destruction and is drawing closer to having enough enriched uranium to produce a single nuclear weapon.
The fact that Iran is moving closer towards a nuclear breakout is itself a damning indictment of Netanyahu’s strategy toward Tehran’s nuclear program. He lobbied intensively for the Trump administration to pull out of the 2015 nuclear deal but even critics of the deal have conceded that Iran was largely in compliance prior to the U.S. pullout from the agreement. As the deal unravels, the Saudis are now more likely to pursue a military nuclear program because there are no longer constraints on Iran’s program.
Nevertheless, the Saudis are a long way from developing nuclear weapons. While Saudi Arabia was an adversary of Israel and had provided symbolic military reinforcement to its Arab enemies during the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, the ties between the two countries have clearly evolved, with mutual cooperation driven by the shared fear and loathing of Iran. Yet, Israel cannot count on Saudi Arabia remaining on good terms with the Jewish state forever.
If raising concerns over Saudi Arabia appear far-fetched today, then consider this: Iran’s nuclear program was first developed during the 1970s not by the ayatollahs but by the shah. Indeed, Western intelligence agencies believed that the nuclear activities conducted under the shah had clear military purposes.
Although Israel and Iran did not enjoy full ambassadorial relations prior to the Islamic Revolution, the two countries established close intelligence and military cooperation. Iran was a key supplier of oil to Israel until 1979. Several thousand Israeli businessmen and their families were living comfortably in Iran. Israeli Soltam mortars that were sold to the Shah of Iran were used a few years later against the IDF in Lebanon. The two countries even struck up six oil-for-arms deals worth an estimated $1.2 billion shortly before the fall of the shah.
Israel established cooperation in the intelligence field with Iran and Turkey as far back as the 1950s, but Israel’s strategic cooperation with Turkey arguably reached its peak in the 1990s with the sale of advanced weapons systems to Ankara. The strategic cooperation fell away with the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party under current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002.
The strategic alliance with Iran and Turkey was driven by a shared fear of the Soviet Union in much the same way that Israel’s new cooperation with the Gulf states is propelled by anxiety over Iran. The deterioration in ties between the two countries was reflected in the Mavi Marmara episode of May 2010, in which 10 Turks were killed by Israeli naval commandos when they intercepted a Turkish aid ship in international waters en route to Gaza.
As the former U.S. government officials and nuclear nonproliferation experts Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski pointed out in Foreign Policy in 2018, “Saudi Arabia’s resistance to restrictions on uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction amounts to a public declaration that the kingdom wants to keep the nuclear weapons option open.”
The Trump administration has explored the possibility of providing the Saudis with nuclear power technology, but Riyadh has resisted the nonproliferation restrictions that would prevent it from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel—precisely the restrictions that Israel is so adamant to maintain vis-à-vis Iran. The advantage for the Saudis of nuclear cooperation with China is that Beijing asks fewer questions when it comes to nuclear safeguards.
That should raise alarms in Washington. China has provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the construction of a facility for extracting uranium yellowcake from uranium ore, potentially laying the foundations for a uranium enrichment program. And according to a recent report in the Guardian, the Saudis may now have enough uranium ore to produce nuclear fuel. China’s long-standing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan suggests that global nonproliferation norms are the least of its concerns when assisting allies with their nuclear programs. China’s support was vital in Pakistan’s development of its nuclear program, with the notorious engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan obtaining nuclear warhead designs as part of an agreement with Beijing in the early 1980s.
For now, both the Israelis and the Saudis remain committed to the adage, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” After all, Saudi Arabia has never hidden its determination to acquire a nuclear capability if Iran also goes nuclear. But it exposes Netanyahu’s double standard—and his dangerous indifference to the way threats can shift and evolve over time.
The same Netanyahu who has fought tooth and nail to prevent Iran from going nuclear has chosen public silence as the Saudis move ahead with their own nuclear program—a program that could one day threaten Israelis under different leaders and in different geopolitical conditions.
According to the Israel news website Walla, Israeli security and intelligence officials have contacted their U.S. counterparts to express concerns over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. At the same time, however, the prime minister’s office has instructed officials not to comment publicly on the matter because of concerns about harming Israel’s ties with the kingdom.
Netanyahu is an expert when it comes to deferring difficult choices. Yet eventually a choice will have to be made between acquiescing to the erosion of Israel’s qualitative military edge and limiting how deep its ties with newfound friends in the Gulf will be allowed to go.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--Decolonizing the United Nations Means Abolishing the Permanent Five

Decolonizing the United Nations Means Abolishing the Permanent Five This year , as the effects of COVID-19 continue to be felt around the world , leaders are preparing to meet virtually to mark 75 years of the United Nations : its “ diamond ” anniversary .
But 2020 has brought into focus some sharp issues around the U.N. ’ s effectiveness , including its largest donor , the United States , pulling funds from the World Health Organization ( WHO ) .
There were mounting problems in the U.N. prior to this .
The U.N. and its agencies are constantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ costs of various missions such as on health , education , and peacekeeping , despite global improvements in poverty .
In terms of maintaining peace and security—the U.N. ’ s record has been dismal—from dithering over apartheid in South Africa , to Iraq , Rwanda , Yemen , the 2008 financial crisis , and now , COVID-19 .
The typical responses to the U.N. ’ s failure have been to enlarge the P5 , the five permanent members of the Security Council who represent the chief victors of World War II .
Bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Turkey .
Move around the representational seats and create new categories .
Create more seats for Africa .
Dilute the veto power exercised by the P5 .
But all of these measures are tinkering .
None are adequate .
The only way forward is to acknowledge the key difference between 1945 and 2020 , decolonization , and abolish the permanent members of the Security Council altogether .
Here ’ s why and how .
The roots of the U.N. are deeply colonial .
Back in 1945 four out of the five members @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Over the 75 years of the U.N. ’ s existence , 80 former colonies have gained independence , from India to Kenya , to Nigeria and Kazakhstan .
This has meant a significant shift in population terms .
In 1945 the P5—China , the United States , the United Kingdom , France , and Russia—accounted for 10 percent of member states and over 50 percent of the world ’ s population , within their empires .
Now , the P5 account for 26 percent of the world ’ s population , and just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Even with the 10 additional nonpermanent members of the Security Council—who have to compete to be elected to sit on the council for two years , which costs millions of dollars in lobbying—Security Council seats are distinctly Eurocentric .
As our research shows , the Western European and Others Group and the Eastern European Group combined represent just 17.1 percent of the global population , but they have held 47 percent of Security Council seats .
And within these groups , the big countries almost always win .
Japan has spent 22 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 20 years .
Within African countries , only Nigeria , with 10 years , comes close .
This poorly distributed allocation is reflected in other parts of the U.N.—in particular the secretary-general position itself .
Since 1945 , four out of the nine secretaries-general have been white European men .
There has never been a Muslim secretary-general .
U.N. leaders have sought to address this by diversifying heads of agencies or undersecretaries-general , but individuals are not the answer .
Take COVID-19 .
Despite an Ethiopian head of the WHO , who might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries in the world , the only resolution the P5-led Security Council has unanimously adopted referring to COVID-19 this year is resolution 2532—supporting a call made by the secretary-general in March for a global cease-fire to focus on efforts to fight COVID-19 .
This is important but hardly influential , and it ’ s largely irrelevant to the thousands of people who have since died prematurely due to lax COVID-19 responses and lack of international finance to manage the impacts of required lockdowns in the poorest countries .
Instead , African leaders have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention for COVID-19 advice , and to the unrepresentative yet powerful G-20 and IMF for financial support , not the U.N. Why does this distribution matter ?
The shift in postcolonial ( and post-Cold War ) membership is essentially the U.N. ’ s only major shift in composition in 75 years .
Contrary to what many observers—especially economists like ourselves—might have us believe , there has not been a great economic rebalancing .
Our calculations suggest—again including former colonies—that the P5 ’ s share of global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Today , the P5 accounts for just 2 percentage points more of GDP—49 percent of the global total .
Yes , China ’ s economic rise within the P5 has been notable—in fact , doubling in economic importance from accounting for 14 percent to 33 percent of the P5 ’ s total wealth .
But for the rest of the world , their economic relationship with the P5 has hardly changed over the U.N. ’ s 75 years .
Global economics and the U.N. structure remain rooted in the power structures of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Has the P5 ’ s U.N. status helped to maintain economic imperialism , or has their economic might helped them to maintain their powerful U.N. positions ?
In some ways it is only the correlation that matters .
The U.N. ’ s structural inability to compel the P5 countries themselves to act decisively for the greater good is often acknowledged as a key justification for change , but this is often countered with economic arguments that we are all better off now .
This counter does not hold water .
The P5 ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of the world despite decolonization is also a structural problem that justifies change .
The answer lies in the geopolitical ideals leaders set out back in 1945 .
The Security Council was conceived on a basis of responsibility and capacity of working collaboratively , rather than on the principle of representation .
At that time , after emerging from World War II and meeting in San Francisco , the leaders of the P5 felt themselves to be responsible and capable , despite their colonial pursuits .
While the economics might be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that might be deemed responsible or capable in 2020 are very different to those in 1945 .
And they will likely be different in 2030 , 2045 , or another 75 years ahead .
With climate change , it ’ s likely that our global crises will only become more complex over the next 75 years .
There is no country in the world that deserves a permanent seat .
Veto-based decision-making on behalf of others , as the Security Council does , should be earned , and criteria for responsibility and capability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ structure for a Security Council would see all 15 seats being made temporary , for periods of five years to provide more continuity , with wide , nonregional open competition for each seat , alongside clear , monitored restrictions on lobbying expenses and two-term limits within a cycle of 30 years to reward excellence while avoiding domination .
Such a structure would not be a toothless democratic body like the U.N. General Assembly , where every country has one vote , regardless of its record , wealth , population , or military might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Nor would it be an easy and potentially diverse yet unaccountable “ coalition of the willing , ” nor a supposedly elite and powerful grouping of countries such as the G-7 , BRICS , or G-20 , subject to groupthink and hiding behind each other .
These 15 countries , just as nonpermanent members have established precedent for doing now , would need to be elected by others—they would need to prove their worth to others .
They would need to build allies within the U.N. , for instance within their groupings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indeed responsible and capable to be trusted to help the world tackle issues from poverty and climate change to pandemics and financial crises .
P5 members could thus arguably remain on the council , but they would need to compete and pitch to do so .
While a 15-seat Security Council might initially seem large , a council that aimed to be effective in decision-making while embedding the principle of collaboration would also implement a rule that veto power can only be exercised by two members together—i.e.
, any country would need to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Preserving the veto would also maintain its distinction from the General Assembly and from the pre-World War II League of Nations , the U.N. ’ s failed predecessor .
Detractors will immediately contend that the P5 will not accept this .
Nor would they submit to decisions made by others .
Indeed , some P5 members have remained out of certain U.N.-based mechanisms for this reason .
Three out of the five permanent members do not recognize the U.N. General Assembly-endorsed International Criminal Court ( ICC ) decisions .
Yet the ICC @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thousands , if not millions of people .
The U.N. can and does still play a guardian role , even if P5 members remain outside .
The world can not take another 75 years of unaccountability and inequality .
A reimagined , stronger structure has a chance of creating a more fit-for-purpose and adaptive U.N. , ready to face the challenges of the future .

Hannah Ryder, Ovigwe Eguege and Anna Baisch

This year, as the effects of COVID-19 continue to be felt around the world, leaders are preparing to meet virtually to mark 75 years of the United Nations: its “diamond” anniversary. But 2020 has brought into focus some sharp issues around the U.N.’s effectiveness, including its largest donor, the United States, pulling funds from the World Health Organization (WHO). There were mounting problems in the U.N. prior to this. The U.N. and its agencies are constantly fighting for new money to cover escalating costs of various missions such as on health, education, and peacekeeping, despite global improvements in poverty. In terms of maintaining peace and security—the U.N.’s record has been dismal—from dithering over apartheid in South Africa, to Iraq, Rwanda, Yemen, the 2008 financial crisis, and now, COVID-19.
This year, as the effects of COVID-19 continue to be felt around the world, leaders are preparing to meet virtually to mark 75 years of the United Nations: its “diamond” anniversary. But 2020 has brought into focus some sharp issues around the U.N.’s effectiveness, including its largest donor, the United States, pulling funds from the World Health Organization (WHO). There were mounting problems in the U.N. prior to this. The U.N. and its agencies are constantly fighting for new money to cover escalating costs of various missions such as on health, education, and peacekeeping, despite global improvements in poverty. In terms of maintaining peace and security—the U.N.’s record has been dismal—from dithering over apartheid in South Africa, to Iraq, Rwanda, Yemen, the 2008 financial crisis, and now, COVID-19.
The typical responses to the U.N.’s failure have been to enlarge the P5, the five permanent members of the Security Council who represent the chief victors of World War II. Bring in other global powers such as India or Turkey. Move around the representational seats and create new categories. Create more seats for Africa. Dilute the veto power exercised by the P5.
But all of these measures are tinkering. None are adequate. The only way forward is to acknowledge the key difference between 1945 and 2020, decolonization, and abolish the permanent members of the Security Council altogether. Here’s why and how.
The roots of the U.N. are deeply colonial. Back in 1945 four out of the five members of the P5 were colonial states. Over the 75 years of the U.N.’s existence, 80 former colonies have gained independence, from India to Kenya, to Nigeria and Kazakhstan.
This has meant a significant shift in population terms. In 1945 the P5—China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—accounted for 10 percent of member states and over 50 percent of the world’s population, within their empires. Now, the P5 account for 26 percent of the world’s population, and just 3 percent of the U.N. member states.
Even with the 10 additional nonpermanent members of the Security Council—who have to compete to be elected to sit on the council for two years, which costs millions of dollars in lobbying—Security Council seats are distinctly Eurocentric. As our research shows, the Western European and Others Group and the Eastern European Group combined represent just 17.1 percent of the global population, but they have held 47 percent of Security Council seats.
And within these groups, the big countries almost always win. Japan has spent 22 years on the Security Council. Brazil 20 years. Within African countries, only Nigeria, with 10 years, comes close.
This poorly distributed allocation is reflected in other parts of the U.N.—in particular the secretary-general position itself. Since 1945, four out of the nine secretaries-general have been white European men. There has never been a Muslim secretary-general.
U.N. leaders have sought to address this by diversifying heads of agencies or undersecretaries-general, but individuals are not the answer. Take COVID-19. Despite an Ethiopian head of the WHO, who might be expected to advocate for the poorest countries in the world, the only resolution the P5-led Security Council has unanimously adopted referring to COVID-19 this year is resolution 2532—supporting a call made by the secretary-general in March for a global cease-fire to focus on efforts to fight COVID-19. This is important but hardly influential, and it’s largely irrelevant to the thousands of people who have since died prematurely due to lax COVID-19 responses and lack of international finance to manage the impacts of required lockdowns in the poorest countries. Instead, African leaders have turned closer to the African Union’s Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention for COVID-19 advice, and to the unrepresentative yet powerful G-20 and IMF for financial support, not the U.N.
Why does this distribution matter? The shift in postcolonial (and post-Cold War) membership is essentially the U.N.’s only major shift in composition in 75 years.
Contrary to what many observers—especially economists like ourselves—might have us believe, there has not been a great economic rebalancing. Our calculations suggest—again including former colonies—that the P5’s share of global GDP in 1940 was around 47 percent. Today, the P5 accounts for just 2 percentage points more of GDP—49 percent of the global total.
Yes, China’s economic rise within the P5 has been notable—in fact, doubling in economic importance from accounting for 14 percent to 33 percent of the P5’s total wealth. But for the rest of the world, their economic relationship with the P5 has hardly changed over the U.N.’s 75 years. Global economics and the U.N. structure remain rooted in the power structures of 1945, despite the political independence.
Has the P5’s U.N. status helped to maintain economic imperialism, or has their economic might helped them to maintain their powerful U.N. positions? In some ways it is only the correlation that matters. The U.N.’s structural inability to compel the P5 countries themselves to act decisively for the greater good is often acknowledged as a key justification for change, but this is often countered with economic arguments that we are all better off now. This counter does not hold water. The P5’s failure to distribute economic benefits to the rest of the world despite decolonization is also a structural problem that justifies change.
The answer lies in the geopolitical ideals leaders set out back in 1945. The Security Council was conceived on a basis of responsibility and capacity of working collaboratively, rather than on the principle of representation. At that time, after emerging from World War II and meeting in San Francisco, the leaders of the P5 felt themselves to be responsible and capable, despite their colonial pursuits.
While the economics might be the same, the potential member states that might be deemed responsible or capable in 2020 are very different to those in 1945. And they will likely be different in 2030, 2045, or another 75 years ahead. With climate change, it’s likely that our global crises will only become more complex over the next 75 years.
There is no country in the world that deserves a permanent seat. Veto-based decision-making on behalf of others, as the Security Council does, should be earned, and criteria for responsibility and capability transparently demonstrated and rewarded.
A reimagined structure for a Security Council would see all 15 seats being made temporary, for periods of five years to provide more continuity, with wide, nonregional open competition for each seat, alongside clear, monitored restrictions on lobbying expenses and two-term limits within a cycle of 30 years to reward excellence while avoiding domination.
Such a structure would not be a toothless democratic body like the U.N. General Assembly, where every country has one vote, regardless of its record, wealth, population, or military might, and no country has a veto. Nor would it be an easy and potentially diverse yet unaccountable “coalition of the willing,” nor a supposedly elite and powerful grouping of countries such as the G-7, BRICS, or G-20, subject to groupthink and hiding behind each other.
These 15 countries, just as nonpermanent members have established precedent for doing now, would need to be elected by others—they would need to prove their worth to others. They would need to build allies within the U.N., for instance within their groupings, and campaign to show they are indeed responsible and capable to be trusted to help the world tackle issues from poverty and climate change to pandemics and financial crises. P5 members could thus arguably remain on the council, but they would need to compete and pitch to do so.
While a 15-seat Security Council might initially seem large, a council that aimed to be effective in decision-making while embedding the principle of collaboration would also implement a rule that veto power can only be exercised by two members together—i.e., any country would need to find another supporter to oppose a decision. Preserving the veto would also maintain its distinction from the General Assembly and from the pre-World War II League of Nations, the U.N.’s failed predecessor.
Detractors will immediately contend that the P5 will not accept this. Nor would they submit to decisions made by others. Indeed, some P5 members have remained out of certain U.N.-based mechanisms for this reason. Three out of the five permanent members do not recognize the U.N. General Assembly-endorsed International Criminal Court (ICC) decisions. Yet the ICC has made important contributions to justice for thousands, if not millions of people. The U.N. can and does still play a guardian role, even if P5 members remain outside.
The world cannot take another 75 years of unaccountability and inequality. A reimagined, stronger structure has a chance of creating a more fit-for-purpose and adaptive U.N., ready to face the challenges of the future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--U.S. Democrats Unveil Hawkish Strategy to Counter China

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : U.S. Senate Democrats get tough on China , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo battles Congress , and U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper looks to fund more shipbuilding to expand the U.S. Navy .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Not to be outmatched by U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s harsh rhetoric against China since the start of the coronavirus pandemic , Senate Democrats have their own plan to stick @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s allies have called former Vice President Joe Biden weak on China , the Democrats now plan to fire back with legislation that would put in place harsher trade enforcement measures and build up U.S. industrial capacity to challenge the rising power .
If the bill is passed—which is no guarantee in a Republican-controlled Senate—it would also force the Trump administration to crack down further on Beijing and recast U.S. diplomatic efforts and human rights priorities on China .
While Democrats and Republicans clash on virtually all aspects of Trump ’ s foreign-policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with lawmakers on both sides urging the administration to do more to counter Beijing ’ s global influence .
“ Many on this committee have concerns that the administration ’ s strategies and policies to deal with this new China still fall well short of answering the enormity of the challenge , ” said Sen. Bob Menendez , the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , during a committee hearing on Thursday .
During the hearing , senior administration diplomats outlined its view of how Beijing poses a growing threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Europe warned that Beijing was sowing division between the United States and its European allies .
“ China does not necessarily seek new allies in Europe—they prefer vassals not partners—but it does want to drive a wedge between the United States and our allies , ” said Philip Reeker , the acting assistant secretary of state in the bureau of European and Eurasian affairs .
Pompeo ’ s wars with Capitol Hill continue .
The pitched battle between U.S. House Democrats and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reached a head on Wednesday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo ’ s closest aides attempted to fend off accusations of wrongdoing and misleading Congress over Trump and Pompeo ’ s decision to sack the State Department watchdog , who had launched investigations into fast-tracked arms sales to Saudi Arabia .
An inspector general ’ s report found the arms sales were legal but that the State Department failed to take into account risks of increased civilian casualties .
“ You pat yourselves on the back when it ’ s determined that you technically followed the process laid out in law .
More @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scheme to make an end run around Congress wasn ’ t illegal , strictly speaking .
Congratulations , ” Rep. Eliot Engel , chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , said .
Naval gazing .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper called for more funding to expand the size of the U.S. Navy in a policy speech at the Rand Corporation on Wednesday , after getting briefed on the Pentagon ’ s closely guarded plan to increase the size of the fleet to 355 ships .
To get to that number , Esper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to conduct surveillance , logistics , and combat power against a near-peer challenger such as China .
Defense News reported that a remaining question is whether the Navy will foot the bill or if it would come from the broader Defense Department budget .
Navalny poisoning likely occurred at hotel .
Backers of the Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny said on Thursday that a nerve agent that left their boss in a coma was found on an empty water bottle in a hotel room in Siberia .
Previously , Navalny was believed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Siberian city of Tomsk , as he became sick on the flight out .
European officials say that Navalny , a longtime government critic , was poisoned with the Soviet-era nerve agent Novichok— a charge the Kremlin denies .
Suga ’ s cabinet .
Freshly minted Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga announced his cabinet on Wednesday .
It features many familiar faces in Japanese politics .
Taro Aso , a one-time prime minister , will stay in place as finance minister , while the seasoned diplomat Toshimitsu Motegi remains foreign minister .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kono will move to the ministry of administrative reform .
Taking his old job is departing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ’ s brother , Nobuo Kishi .
“ This war is out of our hands.
” New America ’ s Frederic Wehrey has issued a new in-depth report on the state of the conflict in Libya , mired in messy geopolitics and competing proxy powers .
Far from the regular jargon-filled think tank report , Wehrey ’ s report is full of fascinating anecdotes and insights based on interviews with Libyan and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the conflict .
Reps. Joaquin Castro and Will Hurd speak at a Center for Strategic and International Studies virtual event today at 1 p.m. EST on information warfare and U.S. competition with China .
European Union leaders will hold a special meeting over the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean on Sept. 24 and 25 .
“ We believe that Venus is a Russian planet.
” —Dmitry Rogozin , the head of Russia ’ s space agency , after announcing a new Russian initiative to independently explore the planet .
MiGs on the campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump campaign issued a digital ad centered on supporting U.S. troops , which ran from Sept. 8 through Sept. 12 .
The only problem ?
It used photos of Russian fighter jets , Politico reports .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. Senate Democrats get tough on China , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo battles Congress , and U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper looks to fund more shipbuilding to expand the U.S. Navy .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: U.S. Senate Democrats get tough on China, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo battles Congress, and U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper looks to fund more shipbuilding to expand the U.S. Navy.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Great Power Competition With China Heats Up
Not to be outmatched by U.S. President Donald Trump’s harsh rhetoric against China since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Senate Democrats have their own plan to stick it to Beijing. As Trump’s allies have called former Vice President Joe Biden weak on China, the Democrats now plan to fire back with legislation that would put in place harsher trade enforcement measures and build up U.S. industrial capacity to challenge the rising power.
If the bill is passed—which is no guarantee in a Republican-controlled Senate—it would also force the Trump administration to crack down further on Beijing and recast U.S. diplomatic efforts and human rights priorities on China.
While Democrats and Republicans clash on virtually all aspects of Trump’s foreign-policy agenda, China is a rare exception, with lawmakers on both sides urging the administration to do more to counter Beijing’s global influence.
“Many on this committee have concerns that the administration’s strategies and policies to deal with this new China still fall well short of answering the enormity of the challenge,” said Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during a committee hearing on Thursday.
During the hearing, senior administration diplomats outlined its view of how Beijing poses a growing threat. Trump’s top acting envoy for Europe warned that Beijing was sowing division between the United States and its European allies.
“China does not necessarily seek new allies in Europe—they prefer vassals not partners—but it does want to drive a wedge between the United States and our allies,” said Philip Reeker, the acting assistant secretary of state in the bureau of European and Eurasian affairs.
What We’re Watching
Pompeo’s wars with Capitol Hill continue. The pitched battle between U.S. House Democrats and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reached a head on Wednesday with a fiery hearing. Some of Pompeo’s closest aides attempted to fend off accusations of wrongdoing and misleading Congress over Trump and Pompeo’s decision to sack the State Department watchdog, who had launched investigations into fast-tracked arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
An inspector general’s report found the arms sales were legal but that the State Department failed to take into account risks of increased civilian casualties. “You pat yourselves on the back when it’s determined that you technically followed the process laid out in law. More Yemeni children may die, but your scheme to make an end run around Congress wasn’t illegal, strictly speaking. Congratulations,” Rep. Eliot Engel, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said.
Naval gazing. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper called for more funding to expand the size of the U.S. Navy in a policy speech at the Rand Corporation on Wednesday, after getting briefed on the Pentagon’s closely guarded plan to increase the size of the fleet to 355 ships.
To get to that number, Esper is proposing major investments in unmanned vessels able to conduct surveillance, logistics, and combat power against a near-peer challenger such as China. Defense News reported that a remaining question is whether the Navy will foot the bill or if it would come from the broader Defense Department budget.
Navalny poisoning likely occurred at hotel. Backers of the Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny said on Thursday that a nerve agent that left their boss in a coma was found on an empty water bottle in a hotel room in Siberia. Previously, Navalny was believed to be poisoned at the airport in the Siberian city of Tomsk, as he became sick on the flight out. European officials say that Navalny, a longtime government critic, was poisoned with the Soviet-era nerve agent Novichok— a charge the Kremlin denies.
Movers and Shakers
Suga’s cabinet. Freshly minted Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga announced his cabinet on Wednesday. It features many familiar faces in Japanese politics. Taro Aso, a one-time prime minister, will stay in place as finance minister, while the seasoned diplomat Toshimitsu Motegi remains foreign minister.
One big shakeup: Defense Minister Taro Kono will move to the ministry of administrative reform. Taking his old job is departing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s brother, Nobuo Kishi.
Foreign Policy Recommends
“This war is out of our hands.” New America’s Frederic Wehrey has issued a new in-depth report on the state of the conflict in Libya, mired in messy geopolitics and competing proxy powers. Far from the regular jargon-filled think tank report, Wehrey’s report is full of fascinating anecdotes and insights based on interviews with Libyan and other foreign officials on the front lines of the conflict.
The Week Ahead
Reps. Joaquin Castro and Will Hurd speak at a Center for Strategic and International Studies virtual event today at 1 p.m. EST on information warfare and U.S. competition with China.
European Union leaders will hold a special meeting over the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean on Sept. 24 and 25.
Quote of the Week
“We believe that Venus is a Russian planet.”
—Dmitry Rogozin, the head of Russia’s space agency, after announcing a new Russian initiative to independently explore the planet.
Odds and Ends
MiGs on the campaign trail. The fundraising arm of the Trump campaign issued a digital ad centered on supporting U.S. troops, which ran from Sept. 8 through Sept. 12. The only problem? It used photos of Russian fighter jets, Politico reports.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-17--The Real Foreign Policy of ‘Alice in Wonderland’

The Real Foreign Policy of ‘ Alice in Wonderland ’ One of the strangest revelations in Bob Woodward ’ s latest book on Donald Trump ’ s presidency , Rage , is that Jared Kushner suggested to Woodward that the way to understand his father-in-law was to meditate on Lewis Carroll ’ s Alice ’ s Adventures in Wonderland .
This was , apparently , intended as praise .
But groveling flattery is hardly new among Trump ’ s courtiers .
What makes the remark stand out is that it ’ s also almost entirely true , especially as applied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the way that Kushner intended .
Some of the parallels lie on the surface of Carroll ’ s narrative : Alice ’ s progress throughout the story , after all , consists largely of negotiations with irascible megalomaniacs ( even if the Queen of Hearts has neither Novichok nor chainsaws for the dismemberment of corpses at her disposal ) .
But there is a much deeper connection between this children ’ s fantasy and foreign policy in the age of Trump .
References to Alice in Wonderland are generally used as a shorthand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kushner intended it , with the implication that Trump was uniquely positioned to navigate those conditions .
But when you reread the book and its sequel , Through the Looking-Glass , it ’ s obvious that this is not what ’ s going on at all .
There is a tight internal logic that regulates the actions of the characters .
It is just completely detached from the logic of the world beyond the rabbit hole .
It pays attention only to words , and not to the things in the world that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Looking-Glass , Humpty Dumpty , for example , says that words mean only whatever he wants them to mean—but this is not exactly true .
Lewis Carroll thinks like a man setting clues in a British cryptic crossword .
The obvious meaning is never the one that is useful .
Inside the looking-glass world , meanings are chosen precisely for their incongruity with the outside world , rather than “ contrariwise ” ( to quote Tweedledum ) .
The application to the self-described business titan Trump—or even Britain ’ s own “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obvious to belabor .
Kushner seems to have meant his reference to the Cheshire Cat— “ whose strategy was endurance and persistence , not direction , ” in the presidential advisor ’ s words—as an endorsement of the apparent lack of planning or direction in Trump ’ s actions .
Whatever obstacles she encounters , Alice always makes it through to the end .
Or perhaps , in his reference to Alice and the Cheshire Cat , he was describing his own cautious approaches to another threatening orange enigma .
The Cat only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ looked good-natured , she thought : still it had very long claws and a great many teeth , so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect .
“ Cheshire Puss , ” she began , rather timidly , as she did not at all know whether it would like the name : however , it only grinned a little wider .
“ Come , it ’ s pleased so far , ” thought Alice , and she went on .
“ Would you tell me , please , which way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” “ That depends a good deal on where you want to get to , ” said the Cat .
“ Then it doesn ’ t matter which way you go , ” said the Cat .
“ —— so long as I get somewhere , ” Alice added as an explanation .
“ Oh , you ’ re sure to do that , ” said the Cat , “ if you only walk long enough.
” This exchange from Alice in Wonderland surely captures much of Trump ’ s attitude toward , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where his previously stated positions ( with his emphasis on withdrawing from the region ) only haphazardly intersect with his policies .
He doesn ’ t much care where he goes so long as he gets somewhere—and in a work of fiction there is no distinction between word and deed : Whatever destination you announce you ’ ve reached , you have gotten to .
Outside the rabbit hole there are Kurds , Syrians , Iraqis , Palestinians , and so forth to whom this isn ’ t fictional at all .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t exist at all .
They are only words to be twisted into any shape that ’ s useful for the moment .
In a similar way , there are vast quantities of bloviation that can be boiled down to a single remark made right at the beginning of the first book as Alice is falling down an apparently endless rabbit hole and trying to find her feet .
Like anyone else pitched from New York real estate into geopolitics , “ Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude was , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were nice grand words to say.
” If the foundational principle of the looking-glass world of Carroll ’ s sequel is that reality obeys words , rather than the other way around , almost everything about Trump ’ s foreign policy becomes clear : not least that it is almost as bewildering from the inside as it is from the outside .
In Alice in Wonderland , Alice is sometimes huge , sometimes entirely insignificant ; only very occasionally is she the same size as the other characters .
Surely this is how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As the British writer Anatol Lieven pointed out in a recent issue of Prospect magazine : “ For all America ’ s overwhelming superiority on paper , it has turned out that many countries have greater strength than the U.S. in particular places : Russia in Georgia and Ukraine , Russia and Iran in Syria , China in the South China Sea , and even Pakistan in southern Afghanistan.
” Alice would sympathize .
When the White Rabbit asks her to go into the house to fetch a pair of gloves and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ eagerly as an American government bringing democracy to Afghanistan—and once inside , she drinks , of course , from the bottle she finds on the table .
“ ‘ I know something interesting is sure to happen , ’ she said to herself , ‘ whenever I eat or drink anything ; so I ’ ll just see what this bottle does .
I do hope it ’ ll make me grow large again , for really I ’ m quite tired of being such a tiny little thing !
’ ” In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is so large that she is entirely trapped within the house .
She is able to kick out anyone else who tries to enter , but she ’ s entirely unable to get her leg out of the chimney or her arm out of the window .
Only when the pebbles that the actual owners of the house throw at her are miraculously transformed to cake that shrinks her can she escape—and then she is chased into the woods by a furious mob and threatened by a gigantic puppy before talking on equal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ three inches long .
This inability to maintain a size at which the world makes sense is coupled with an astonishing tactlessness .
Alice dearly loves her cat Dinah , so she tells a mouse all about it .
When the mouse is offended , she talks about a terrier instead , which is a wonderful rat-killer ; at this the mouse flees again , only returning after she promises not to speak of cats or dogs again .
But she has learned nothing from this , and as soon as she has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tell them in turn what a wonderful animal her cat is .
Truly to understand what links the world of Alice in Wonderland with the Trump presidency you have to perform one final imaginative inversion and picture not just what Wonderland looked like to Alice , but how Alice seemed to the inhabitants of Wonderland—and how happy they must have been to see her go .

One of the strangest revelations in Bob Woodward’s latest book on Donald Trump’s presidency, Rage, is that Jared Kushner suggested to Woodward that the way to understand his father-in-law was to meditate on Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. This was, apparently, intended as praise. But groveling flattery is hardly new among Trump’s courtiers. What makes the remark stand out is that it’s also almost entirely true, especially as applied to U.S. foreign policy—though perhaps not in the way that Kushner intended.
One of the strangest revelations in Bob Woodward’s latest book on Donald Trump’s presidency, Rage, is that Jared Kushner suggested to Woodward that the way to understand his father-in-law was to meditate on Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. This was, apparently, intended as praise. But groveling flattery is hardly new among Trump’s courtiers. What makes the remark stand out is that it’s also almost entirely true, especially as applied to U.S. foreign policy—though perhaps not in the way that Kushner intended.
Some of the parallels lie on the surface of Carroll’s narrative: Alice’s progress throughout the story, after all, consists largely of negotiations with irascible megalomaniacs (even if the Queen of Hearts has neither Novichok nor chainsaws for the dismemberment of corpses at her disposal). But there is a much deeper connection between this children’s fantasy and foreign policy in the age of Trump.
References to Alice in Wonderland are generally used as a shorthand for anarchy, which is apparently how Kushner intended it, with the implication that Trump was uniquely positioned to navigate those conditions. But when you reread the book and its sequel, Through the Looking-Glass, it’s obvious that this is not what’s going on at all. There is a tight internal logic that regulates the actions of the characters. It is just completely detached from the logic of the world beyond the rabbit hole. It pays attention only to words, and not to the things in the world that they usually point to.
In Through the Looking-Glass, Humpty Dumpty, for example, says that words mean only whatever he wants them to mean—but this is not exactly true. Lewis Carroll thinks like a man setting clues in a British cryptic crossword. The obvious meaning is never the one that is useful. Inside the looking-glass world, meanings are chosen precisely for their incongruity with the outside world, rather than “contrariwise” (to quote Tweedledum). The application to the self-described business titan Trump—or even Britain’s own “world-beating” Prime Minister Boris Johnson—is too obvious to belabor.
Kushner seems to have meant his reference to the Cheshire Cat—“whose strategy was endurance and persistence, not direction,” in the presidential advisor’s words—as an endorsement of the apparent lack of planning or direction in Trump’s actions. Whatever obstacles she encounters, Alice always makes it through to the end. Or perhaps, in his reference to Alice and the Cheshire Cat, he was describing his own cautious approaches to another threatening orange enigma.
The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice. It looked good-natured, she thought: still it had very long claws and a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect.
“Cheshire Puss,” she began, rather timidly, as she did not at all know whether it would like the name: however, it only grinned a little wider. “Come, it’s pleased so far,” thought Alice, and she went on. “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where——” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.
“—— so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation.
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
This exchange from Alice in Wonderland surely captures much of Trump’s attitude toward, for instance, the Middle East, where his previously stated positions (with his emphasis on withdrawing from the region) only haphazardly intersect with his policies. He doesn’t much care where he goes so long as he gets somewhere—and in a work of fiction there is no distinction between word and deed: Whatever destination you announce you’ve reached, you have gotten to. Outside the rabbit hole there are Kurds, Syrians, Iraqis, Palestinians, and so forth to whom this isn’t fictional at all. But down the rabbit hole they don’t exist at all. They are only words to be twisted into any shape that’s useful for the moment.
In a similar way, there are vast quantities of bloviation that can be boiled down to a single remark made right at the beginning of the first book as Alice is falling down an apparently endless rabbit hole and trying to find her feet. Like anyone else pitched from New York real estate into geopolitics, “Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude was, or Longitude either, but she thought they were nice grand words to say.”
If the foundational principle of the looking-glass world of Carroll’s sequel is that reality obeys words, rather than the other way around, almost everything about Trump’s foreign policy becomes clear: not least that it is almost as bewildering from the inside as it is from the outside.
In Alice in Wonderland, Alice is sometimes huge, sometimes entirely insignificant; only very occasionally is she the same size as the other characters. Surely this is how American power must feel to Jared Kushner. As the British writer Anatol Lieven pointed out in a recent issue of Prospect magazine: “For all America’s overwhelming superiority on paper, it has turned out that many countries have greater strength than the U.S. in particular places: Russia in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia and Iran in Syria, China in the South China Sea, and even Pakistan in southern Afghanistan.”
Alice would sympathize. When the White Rabbit asks her to go into the house to fetch a pair of gloves and a fan, she rushes in as eagerly as an American government bringing democracy to Afghanistan—and once inside, she drinks, of course, from the bottle she finds on the table. “‘I know something interesting is sure to happen,’ she said to herself, ‘whenever I eat or drink anything; so I’ll just see what this bottle does. I do hope it’ll make me grow large again, for really I’m quite tired of being such a tiny little thing!’”
In no time at all she finds she is so large that she is entirely trapped within the house. She is able to kick out anyone else who tries to enter, but she’s entirely unable to get her leg out of the chimney or her arm out of the window. Only when the pebbles that the actual owners of the house throw at her are miraculously transformed to cake that shrinks her can she escape—and then she is chased into the woods by a furious mob and threatened by a gigantic puppy before talking on equal terms with a hookah-smoking caterpillar all of three inches long.
This inability to maintain a size at which the world makes sense is coupled with an astonishing tactlessness. Alice dearly loves her cat Dinah, so she tells a mouse all about it. When the mouse is offended, she talks about a terrier instead, which is a wonderful rat-killer; at this the mouse flees again, only returning after she promises not to speak of cats or dogs again. But she has learned nothing from this, and as soon as she has an audience of birds she starts to tell them in turn what a wonderful animal her cat is.
Truly to understand what links the world of Alice in Wonderland with the Trump presidency you have to perform one final imaginative inversion and picture not just what Wonderland looked like to Alice, but how Alice seemed to the inhabitants of Wonderland—and how happy they must have been to see her go.