foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--The East Fails Iran

The East Fails Iran

Officials in Tehran have a lot to worry about .
But they are particularly irked at the speed by which Asian states have dropped Iran as a trading partner .
Iran had hoped that the East would save the country ’ s economy from the barrage of sanctions enacted by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump .
In early 2018 , at a time when Trump and his team were about to unveil the most punishing sanctions regime ever imposed on a country , Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly urged Tehran to look east for trading partners .
Khamenei @ @ @ @ @ @ @ West is lengthy , with the ayatollah regularly scorning any official in Tehran who disagreed as a simpleton or “ unreasonable.
” But his alternative has so far proved to be nothing but a pipe dream .
Even so , Khamenei maintains the charade of a promised bailout .
Tehran is also livid that Seoul is still blocking payments of some $ 7 billion for oil that was exported to South Korea before U.S. sanctions were implemented in late 2018 .
Iranian media are full of headlines demanding not only that Koreans pay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maintenance fees for having kept the money in two South Korean banks .
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has asked his government take legal action against Seoul to deter other countries from behaving the same way .
Iran ’ s protestations have had few results .
When in 2019 the South Korean companies Samsung and LG announced that they would stop operating in Iran , officials in Tehran warned them that coming back to the Iranian market might not be so easy .
“ Commercial logic dictates that keeping a market is easier than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said one .
Still , the South Koreans left .
Although Iran does represent a big market , of course , the United States represents a bigger one .
South Korea is not alone .
Take India .
New Delhi has in recent years rebuffed Tehran at every critical turn .
When the Trump administration first reimposed sanctions on Iran in 2018 , the Indians first sought to push for a hard bargain with Tehran .
India has historically had a large trade deficit with the country .
In 2018 , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 13 billion from Iran , but its exports were worth merely $ 3 billion .
New Delhi was looking to address that imbalance .
The Indians offered a barter of oil for goods .
It was a major setback for Tehran , since such an arrangement would have deprived it of much-needed foreign currency exchange .
In the end , U.S. pressure was impossible for the Indian government to resist , and it basically cut Iran loose altogether .
The United States had even given New Delhi a waiver so it could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the development of Iran ’ s deep-sea port at Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman , but the Indians still dragged their feet on that project .
Chabahar has long been touted as India ’ s strategic conduit to markets in Afghanistan and in Central Asia and as a regional counter to the Chinese-sponsored port of Gwadar in Pakistan .
But India had second thoughts , and Tehran ’ s anger was palpable .
In retaliation , Khamenei himself has begun to issue criticism of Indian policies in Kashmir , a conflict he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Among Iran ’ s other top trading partners in the East , Japan and China stand out for different reasons .
In the case of Japan , Tokyo swiftly ended trade with Iran in compliance with U.S. sanctions .
Still , the government , as former National Security Advisor John Bolton ’ s new book underscores , was at the same time happy to play a possible mediator role between Tehran and Washington .
Since Japan is a top U.S. ally , Tehran never held out much hope for maintaining trade with Tokyo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japanese efforts aimed at a diplomatic resolution .
This was evident in Rouhani ’ s decision to pay a state visit to Tokyo in December 2019 , the first by an Iranian president since 2000 .
Even as Japanese mediation failed to result in a breakthrough , Tokyo ’ s handling of the U.S.-Iranian standoff stood out as rather skillful diplomatic navigation .
Meanwhile , in Tehran ’ s eyes , China has ranged from being a potential silver bullet to the mother of all disappointments .
In May 2019 , Foreign Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two-pronged mission .
Zarif asked Beijing to help save the Iran nuclear deal of 2015 , which the Trump administration left in May 2018 .
He also pushed the Chinese to continue to buy Iran ’ s oil and ignore U.S. sanctions .
At first it looked like Zarif ’ s message had been well received .
As he was in Beijing , it was reported that a tanker with Iranian oil had delivered its cargo to a Chinese port .
This was the first time Iranian oil arrived in China since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all Iranian oil exports starting in late 2018 .
Just a few weeks before , at the January 2019 Munich Security Conference , Zarif had admonished the Europeans for abandoning trade with Iran under U.S. pressure .
The Europeans had that month launched Instex , a mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran , but it was already clear that European investors and firms were rushing out of Iran .
Only China could be Iran ’ s economic savior—or so the thinking went in Tehran .
In fact , for the year 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ total of around $ 23 billion .
Both Iran and China are exporting less to each other .
The alarming data was revealed at a time when the Iranian public was already increasingly anti-Chinese due to the coronavirus , which had arrived in Iran from China sometime in late 2019 .
The state of affairs became so tense that China ’ s ambassador to Tehran , Chang Hua , had to write an open letter .
He explained that the downturn in trade was due to the COVID-19 crisis in China and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Chinese ambassador has periodically reminded the Iranian public that China has long-term strategic plans for Iran and said that it is bound to be a country that will eventually dominate the global economy .
Still , while China has a strong protector in Tehran in Khamenei , there are official voices within the ranks of the ruling class that question the logic behind Iran putting all its eggs in the Chinese basket .
Iran ’ s dependence on Beijing is creating tough questions about Tehran ’ s inability to risk offending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two institutions most dedicated to China in Iran are the Office of the Supreme Leader and his armed foot soldiers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps , the two most significant centers of power in the country .
This is why China feels comfortable in its position as Tehran ’ s matchless foreign partner .
There is no doubt that Iran ’ s relationship with China is bigger than mere trade .
As was evident in China ’ s vote against censuring Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 19 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Most notably , each see the other as a card to be played in their respective tugs of war with the United States .
But even in the unlikely event that Beijing comes through for Iran in saving its economy from U.S. sanctions , this would not be tantamount to a successful Iranian anchor in the so-called East as Khamenei has for years advocated .
It is more a case of subjugation to China and its interests .
There is otherwise no sign of a working Iranian policy toward the East .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Tehran who recognize this hard reality , but very few are willing to stick their necks out and say so publicly and loudly .
After all , self-censorship is a way of life for Iranian officials , and very few of them dare to question the purported wisdom of Ayatollah Khamenei ’ s much-coveted pivot to the East .

Officials in Tehran have a lot to worry about. But they are particularly irked at the speed by which Asian states have dropped Iran as a trading partner. Iran had hoped that the East would save the country’s economy from the barrage of sanctions enacted by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. In early 2018, at a time when Trump and his team were about to unveil the most punishing sanctions regime ever imposed on a country, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly urged Tehran to look east for trading partners. Khamenei’s track record in vilifying the West is lengthy, with the ayatollah regularly scorning any official in Tehran who disagreed as a simpleton or “unreasonable.” But his alternative has so far proved to be nothing but a pipe dream. Even so, Khamenei maintains the charade of a promised bailout.
Officials in Tehran have a lot to worry about. But they are particularly irked at the speed by which Asian states have dropped Iran as a trading partner. Iran had hoped that the East would save the country’s economy from the barrage of sanctions enacted by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. In early 2018, at a time when Trump and his team were about to unveil the most punishing sanctions regime ever imposed on a country, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly urged Tehran to look east for trading partners. Khamenei’s track record in vilifying the West is lengthy, with the ayatollah regularly scorning any official in Tehran who disagreed as a simpleton or “unreasonable.” But his alternative has so far proved to be nothing but a pipe dream. Even so, Khamenei maintains the charade of a promised bailout.
Over the course of the Trump presidency, Iran’s relations with Asian countries have varied, but there is no sign of a clear success anywhere. Among the country’s big former trading partners, South Korea and India stand out as the most eager to respect U.S. sanctions on Iran. They stopped buying Iran’s oil, halted any long-term investments they had in Iran, and more or less refuse to sell anything to the country. In June, after two years of negotiations, South Korea finally sent to Iran a cargo of humanitarian goods worth $500,000. Another shipment worth $2 million is said to be under way, but only if Seoul first secures the approval of Washington.
Tehran is also livid that Seoul is still blocking payments of some $7 billion for oil that was exported to South Korea before U.S. sanctions were implemented in late 2018. Iranian media are full of headlines demanding not only that Koreans pay up but also that they hand over maintenance fees for having kept the money in two South Korean banks. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has asked his government take legal action against Seoul to deter other countries from behaving the same way.
Iran’s protestations have had few results. When in 2019 the South Korean companies Samsung and LG announced that they would stop operating in Iran, officials in Tehran warned them that coming back to the Iranian market might not be so easy. “Commercial logic dictates that keeping a market is easier than reentering a market once you leave,” said one. Still, the South Koreans left. Although Iran does represent a big market, of course, the United States represents a bigger one.
South Korea is not alone. Take India. New Delhi has in recent years rebuffed Tehran at every critical turn. When the Trump administration first reimposed sanctions on Iran in 2018, the Indians first sought to push for a hard bargain with Tehran. India has historically had a large trade deficit with the country. In 2018, for example, its imports amounted to around $13 billion from Iran, but its exports were worth merely $3 billion. New Delhi was looking to address that imbalance. The Indians offered a barter of oil for goods. It was a major setback for Tehran, since such an arrangement would have deprived it of much-needed foreign currency exchange. In the end, U.S. pressure was impossible for the Indian government to resist, and it basically cut Iran loose altogether.
The United States had even given New Delhi a waiver so it could continue as an investor and operator in the development of Iran’s deep-sea port at Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, but the Indians still dragged their feet on that project. Chabahar has long been touted as India’s strategic conduit to markets in Afghanistan and in Central Asia and as a regional counter to the Chinese-sponsored port of Gwadar in Pakistan. But India had second thoughts, and Tehran’s anger was palpable. In retaliation, Khamenei himself has begun to issue criticism of Indian policies in Kashmir, a conflict he had in the past largely ignored.
Among Iran’s other top trading partners in the East, Japan and China stand out for different reasons. In the case of Japan, Tokyo swiftly ended trade with Iran in compliance with U.S. sanctions. Still, the government, as former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s new book underscores, was at the same time happy to play a possible mediator role between Tehran and Washington. Since Japan is a top U.S. ally, Tehran never held out much hope for maintaining trade with Tokyo, but it seemed to genuinely appreciate Japanese efforts aimed at a diplomatic resolution. This was evident in Rouhani’s decision to pay a state visit to Tokyo in December 2019, the first by an Iranian president since 2000. Even as Japanese mediation failed to result in a breakthrough, Tokyo’s handling of the U.S.-Iranian standoff stood out as rather skillful diplomatic navigation.
Meanwhile, in Tehran’s eyes, China has ranged from being a potential silver bullet to the mother of all disappointments. In May 2019, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited China on a two-pronged mission. Zarif asked Beijing to help save the Iran nuclear deal of 2015, which the Trump administration left in May 2018. He also pushed the Chinese to continue to buy Iran’s oil and ignore U.S. sanctions. At first it looked like Zarif’s message had been well received. As he was in Beijing, it was reported that a tanker with Iranian oil had delivered its cargo to a Chinese port. This was the first time Iranian oil arrived in China since the Trump administration put a total ban on all Iranian oil exports starting in late 2018.
Just a few weeks before, at the January 2019 Munich Security Conference, Zarif had admonished the Europeans for abandoning trade with Iran under U.S. pressure. The Europeans had that month launched Instex, a mechanism to facilitate trade with Iran, but it was already clear that European investors and firms were rushing out of Iran. Only China could be Iran’s economic savior—or so the thinking went in Tehran. In fact, for the year 2019, Iran-China trade dropped by one-third to a total of around $23 billion. Both Iran and China are exporting less to each other.
The alarming data was revealed at a time when the Iranian public was already increasingly anti-Chinese due to the coronavirus, which had arrived in Iran from China sometime in late 2019. The state of affairs became so tense that China’s ambassador to Tehran, Chang Hua, had to write an open letter. He explained that the downturn in trade was due to the COVID-19 crisis in China and that it would be temporary. Since then, the Chinese ambassador has periodically reminded the Iranian public that China has long-term strategic plans for Iran and said that it is bound to be a country that will eventually dominate the global economy.
Still, while China has a strong protector in Tehran in Khamenei, there are official voices within the ranks of the ruling class that question the logic behind Iran putting all its eggs in the Chinese basket. Iran’s dependence on Beijing is creating tough questions about Tehran’s inability to risk offending its partner. And yet, the two institutions most dedicated to China in Iran are the Office of the Supreme Leader and his armed foot soldiers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the two most significant centers of power in the country. This is why China feels comfortable in its position as Tehran’s matchless foreign partner.
There is no doubt that Iran’s relationship with China is bigger than mere trade. As was evident in China’s vote against censuring Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 19, Iran and China have a multitiered engagement. Most notably, each see the other as a card to be played in their respective tugs of war with the United States. But even in the unlikely event that Beijing comes through for Iran in saving its economy from U.S. sanctions, this would not be tantamount to a successful Iranian anchor in the so-called East as Khamenei has for years advocated. It is more a case of subjugation to China and its interests. There is otherwise no sign of a working Iranian policy toward the East. There are plenty of analysts and commentators in Tehran who recognize this hard reality, but very few are willing to stick their necks out and say so publicly and loudly. After all, self-censorship is a way of life for Iranian officials, and very few of them dare to question the purported wisdom of Ayatollah Khamenei’s much-coveted pivot to the East.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--How to Watch for Freedom Disappearing in Hong Kong

How to Watch for Freedom Disappearing in Hong Kong Last month the Chinese government unexpectedly unveiled plans to authorize the the National People ’ s Congress Standing Committee to draft national security legislation that would be imposed on Hong Kong , short-circuiting the city ’ s own lawmaking process .
The forthcoming legislation is expected to criminalize “ separatism , ” “ subversion of state power , ” “ terrorist activities , ” and foreign interference—the very restraints that Hong Kongers have been protesting against for a year .
It would also allow mainland China ’ s domestic security services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first time .
This could facilitate increased surveillance , intimidation , and possibly even rendition of Beijing ’ s critics in a city that has long enjoyed significantly greater freedom of expression and civil liberties than the rest of China .
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and Beijing officials have tried to reassure Hong Kongers that the law will target “ an extremely small minority of illegal and criminal acts ” and that the “ basic rights and freedoms of the overwhelming majority of citizens will be protected.
” However , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as Jerome Cohen of New York University have predicted an increase in mass arrests .
The territory ’ s residents appear to agree : Inquiries on emigration options for Hong Kongers have spiked , and greater self-censorship has already begun to take hold .
The following are six possible effects to watch for after the law ’ s implementation , which will probably come before the end of the summer .
If some or all of these scenarios actually unfold , then Hong Kongers ’ fears will have been justified .
• @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a proposed extradition bill broke out last summer , violence against journalists has increased in Hong Kong , occasional arrests have occurred , and Jimmy Lai , a media owner who is critical of Beijing , has been prosecuted for participating in demonstrations .
Still , so far no journalists have been convicted for their work or appeared on the Committee to Protect Journalists ’ global tally of jailed reporters , which China leads with 48 journalists behind bars .
Watch for any signs that mainland-style imprisonment of journalists—and the egregiously unfair trials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong .
• Penalties for critical news outlets : The public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong ( RTHK ) , founded in 1928 , is editorially independent according to its charter and is a widely respected source of news and diverse viewpoints in the territory .
But its autonomy is already being threatened .
In late May , days before the security legislation was announced , RTHK canceled the popular satirical and current-events show Headliner under suspected direct or indirect pressure from the government .
The station is currently undergoing an unprecedented @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 , a government-appointed advisor urged the network to report on the national security legislation “ positively ” to enable citizens to form a “ correct understanding ” of it .
Watch for whether RTHK is either slowly or abruptly transformed into a government mouthpiece , and whether the new legislation enables fines or suspensions of privately owned media outlets for their coverage of sensitive topics such as Hong Kong ’ s autonomy , calls for universal suffrage , the ongoing protests , or the national security law itself .
• Retroactive charges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broke , many Hong Kongers moved to purchase virtual private networks in order to circumvent any future website blocking and protect the privacy of their digital communications .
Others began closing social media accounts on services such as Telegram , which has been used to organize protests , because they feared their posts could be used to charge them with separatism or subversion under the new law .
Watch for whether anyone is charged for speech or actions that predated the legislation ’ s enactment .
Such retroactive application would signal a dangerous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong .
• Declining digital freedom : In addition to the prospect of criminal prosecutions for legitimate and peaceful online speech , there are a number of ways in which the national security law could be used to curtail internet freedom .
Charles Mok , a member of Hong Kong ’ s Legislative Council who represents the technology sector , told Freedom House that under the new national security law , “ internet service providers , telecommunication operators , those who manage social networks and online platforms , and potentially those operating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” could face greater liability for user content , meaning they would be obliged to censor their platforms .
They may also be required to hand over user data to authorities.Indeed , Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg has expressed concern about the law ’ s effects on his company ’ s ability to provide services in Hong Kong , including through its WhatsApp encrypted messaging application .
Mok noted that after the nearby semiautonomous territory of Macao introduced its own national security law in 2009 , a separate cybersecurity law followed , imposing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainland-style controls .
Watch for any internet-related laws or implementing regulations addressing topics like data localization , intermediary liability , real-name registration , or designation of “ fake news ” that may follow in the wake of the new national security law .
• Restrictions on artistic and academic expression : Hong Kong is home to a thriving and politically outspoken arts community .
Statues depicting heroic protesters and murals mocking Carrie Lam and Chinese President Xi Jinping regularly pop up on buildings , in cafes , and at other venues .
Such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainland , and Hong Kong artists are now wondering whether their work will be prosecuted as “ separatism ” or “ subversion.
” More than 1,500 members of the city ’ s arts scene signed a petition to one of Hong Kong ’ s representatives in the National People ’ s Congress that eloquently voiced these fears .
Even prior to the law , some cultural venues have been reluctant to display anti-government art for fear of negative economic repercussions from China .
Academic freedom in Hong Kong has already deteriorated somewhat in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have also raised concerns that Beijing will use the new law to further rein in the city ’ s universities and undermine their strong international reputation .
Mainland academics such as Ilham Tohti have received heavy prison sentences and other penalties for work that is deemed contrary to Beijing ’ s political priorities .
• Crackdowns on religious communities : Various religious groups that face persecution in China enjoy comparative freedom in Hong Kong .
Many residents—including protesters—are practicing Protestant Christians or Roman Catholics .
The territory is also home to a modest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the spiritual discipline that is banned in China but legally registered in Hong Kong and practiced openly .
All have engaged in activities that could fall afoul of the national security legislation : Some churches offered refuge to protesters fleeing police and tear gas , several Catholic churches held mass and candlelight vigils commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre , and Falun Gong activists regularly set up booths and marches to raise awareness of Chinese government rights abuses and convince visiting Chinese to symbolically renounce their association with the Communist Party and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fears that the new law will bring restrictions on worship or even the kind of arbitrary detention and torture their co-religionists endure in China .
In one telling case , pastor Wang Yi of Sichuan province was sentenced in late 2019 to nine years in prison on charges of inciting subversion after he publicly condemned forced abortions and the 1989 massacre .
Watch for any indications that the national security law is being deployed to restrict not only upon the rights of Hong Kong ’ s religious believers to practice their faith , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to free expression , assembly , association , and political participation .
It is a troubling sign of Beijing ’ s intentions that the central government ’ s own allies in Hong Kong were apparently not told about the legislative plan until 48 hours before it was announced .
News reports have described remarks from pro-establishment politicians saying they were “ caught off guard , ” including those who were attending the National People ’ s Congress session as the territory ’ s representatives .
If the Communist Party leadership does not trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it seems highly unlikely that it would defer to local practices and institutions on the enforcement of its security law .
Legislation in mainland China is often vaguely worded to give authorities maximum discretion .
What is tolerated or even officially sanctioned today may be banned as “ sedition ” or “ subversion ” tomorrow , without any change in the law .
This is why it is so crucial to carefully monitor the new national security measure ’ s implementation , and to know how far down the slippery slope of vague @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong ‘ s political system will fall .
This piece was originally published in Freedom House ’ s China Media Bulletin .

Last month the Chinese government unexpectedly unveiled plans to authorize the the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to draft national security legislation that would be imposed on Hong Kong, short-circuiting the city’s own lawmaking process.
Last month the Chinese government unexpectedly unveiled plans to authorize the the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to draft national security legislation that would be imposed on Hong Kong, short-circuiting the city’s own lawmaking process.
The forthcoming legislation is expected to criminalize “separatism,” “subversion of state power,” “terrorist activities,” and foreign interference—the very restraints that Hong Kongers have been protesting against for a year. It would also allow mainland China’s domestic security services to operate openly in Hong Kong for the first time. This could facilitate increased surveillance, intimidation, and possibly even rendition of Beijing’s critics in a city that has long enjoyed significantly greater freedom of expression and civil liberties than the rest of China.
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and Beijing officials have tried to reassure Hong Kongers that the law will target “an extremely small minority of illegal and criminal acts” and that the “basic rights and freedoms of the overwhelming majority of citizens will be protected.” However, experts on China’s legal system such as Jerome Cohen of New York University have predicted an increase in mass arrests. The territory’s residents appear to agree: Inquiries on emigration options for Hong Kongers have spiked, and greater self-censorship has already begun to take hold.
The following are six possible effects to watch for after the law’s implementation, which will probably come before the end of the summer. If some or all of these scenarios actually unfold, then Hong Kongers’ fears will have been justified.
It is a troubling sign of Beijing’s intentions that the central government’s own allies in Hong Kong were apparently not told about the legislative plan until 48 hours before it was announced. News reports have described remarks from pro-establishment politicians saying they were “caught off guard,” including those who were attending the National People’s Congress session as the territory’s representatives. If the Communist Party leadership does not trust Hong Kong officials even this much, it seems highly unlikely that it would defer to local practices and institutions on the enforcement of its security law.
Legislation in mainland China is often vaguely worded to give authorities maximum discretion. What is tolerated or even officially sanctioned today may be banned as “sedition” or “subversion” tomorrow, without any change in the law. This is why it is so crucial to carefully monitor the new national security measure’s implementation, and to know how far down the slippery slope of vague criminal offenses and arbitrary law enforcement Hong Kong‘s political system will fall.
This piece was originally published in Freedom House’s China Media Bulletin.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-24--The Pandemic and the Limits of Realism

The Pandemic and the Limits of Realism

The Pandemic and the Limits of Realism Stephen Walt ’ s “ The Realist ’ s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak , ” together with some of his other recent articles , are compelling examples of how realist scholars of international relations see the coronavirus as helping to validate this school of thought .
Realists have good reason for confidence .
Responses to the pandemic have demonstrated the primacy of sovereign states , rationale for great-power competition , and obstacles to international cooperation—all key tenets of the realist tradition .
But the pandemic also exposes realism ’ s shortcomings as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at explaining risks and dangers than offering solutions , realism ’ s strengths lie in diagnosis rather than treatment or prevention .
To fight the pandemic most effectively , policymakers will have to turn to the other theoretical tradition that has , however reluctantly , informed responses to the other great crises of the past three-quarters of a century .
Realism gets a lot right , which is one reason it remains international relations ’ foundational school of thought , at least in the United States .
One insight the pandemic underscores is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ primary actors in world politics .
As the coronavirus struck , states moved swiftly to close or tighten international borders , restricted movement within their borders , and marshaled security and public health resources .
That the World Health Organization ( WHO ) initially recommended against such border controls , businesses dreaded declining economic activity , and individuals chafed against restrictions on their freedom of movement underscores the authority of states to maintain order and shape events .
But however much independent national action is understandable or even predictable from realism , so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel restrictions did not spare states from the pandemic .
Even if perfect controls were possible , their desirability is doubtful .
Consider New Zealand , the island nation enjoying relative success and the advantage of physical geography ( and decisive state action ) in maintaining its international borders against the coronavirus .
A national triumph for New Zealand , however commendable , remains incomplete so long as the pandemic rages outside its borders .
The country risks reinfection and continuing economic damage to industries that depend on greater international openness .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to best the disease within a state ’ s borders , the national interest remains unrealized so long as other states have not done the same .
Unlike economic or security competition that more easily fits realist considerations of “ relative gains ” or zero-sum competitive logic , transnational catastrophes such as disease unmask the limitations of individual states in an “ anarchical ” global system .
The disconnect between transnational risks and national interests relates to another problem : states ’ scramble for resources .
Again , realism does a good job @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries compete for scarce items such as medical masks , ventilators , and intellectual property for treatment and vaccines .
Such contests do have a zero-sum logic quality .
But the uncoordinated action results in an inefficient allocation , potentially wasted time and effort and increased costs—all of which undercuts the overarching ( and shared ) interest in quashing the outbreak .
A domestic comparison exists in the chaotic struggle among U.S. states and localities for these same resources .
Realism offers few constructive alternatives .
Realists caution against placing faith in international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the WHO can defeat the coronavirus , for example .
And that is true ; if international institutions are autonomous global actors at all , they ’ re weak ones .
But this critique misses the point ; international institutions are neither alternatives to state action nor challengers to states ’ prime position in international relations .
Instead , they are a tool of foreign policy and statecraft .
States establish and participate in international institutions because they benefit from predictability , information , reduced costs , and other services institutions can provide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledges that international institutions “ are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow , because they believe that obeying those rules is in their interest.
” As institutionalists Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin famously observed in a great debate with Mearsheimer decades ago , states are indeed self-interested , but cooperation is often in their interest and institutions help to facilitate that cooperation .
( Mearsheimer may ultimately have come to agree , as he recently argued for the creation of more international institutions to help serve U.S. interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledge realism ’ s warnings against the naivete of expecting easy cooperation . )
In our daily lives , cooperation with our neighbors is neither easy nor certain , but it ’ s worth striving to obtain because it ’ s preferable to the alternative—as many Americans have taken to the streets to demand in spite of the pandemic .
The main distinction is that institutionalism better emphasizes the practical potential for self-interested cooperation .
This differing emphasis can obscure substantial common ground between realism and institutionalism .
Both recognize the desirability of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is how to achieve it .
Here , realist insights have much to contribute .
One classic idea is that a hegemonic power may impose international institutions , which may in turn prove durable even after hegemony .
Power is also central to Joseph Nye ’ s arguments for leadership and the “ smart ” application of power ’ s hard and soft variants to lower costs and improve outcomes .
Still other scholars have pointed to the ways institutional design can blunt the risks of cheating , fear , and uncertainty through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ features .
While these resources are not perfect , the good news is that all of them—power , leadership , and influence over institutional design—are available to the United States .
In our daily lives , cooperation with our neighbors is neither easy nor certain , but it ’ s worth striving to obtain because it ’ s preferable to the alternative—as many Americans have taken to the streets to demand in spite of the pandemic .
The national interest , combined with available resources and vision , explains why the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and acted through international institutions during past crises .
The “ United Nations ” was the term the United States coined for the Allies during World War II , and it was institutionalized at the end of the war .
The global coalition to defeat the Islamic State brought dozens of countries together to further their shared interest in combating international terrorism , and was itself devised on the sidelines of a NATO meeting in 2014 .
During the financial crisis of 2008 , states reinvented the G-20 in order to coordinate economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy .
The United States was a leader in the creation of these institutions , and it benefited enormously from them .
International cooperation was not always the United States ’ first impulse , as when it declined participation in the post-World War I League of Nations or during its initially somewhat unilateral approach to counterterrorism after 9/11 .
But the United States ultimately concluded its interests were better served by coordinated international action and leadership .
Although realism does much to explain states ’ initial reactions to the coronavirus pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constructive policy ideas about how to do it better .
As in previous global crises , the United States can , and should , strive to see the national interest in international institutions .

Stephen Walt’s “ The Realist’s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak ,” together with some of his other recent articles , are compelling examples of how realist scholars of international relations see the coronavirus as helping to validate this school of thought. Realists have good reason for confidence. Responses to the pandemic have demonstrated the primacy of sovereign states, rationale for great-power competition, and obstacles to international cooperation—all key tenets of the realist tradition.
Stephen Walt’s “The Realist’s Guide to the Coronavirus Outbreak,” together with some of his other recent articles, are compelling examples of how realist scholars of international relations see the coronavirus as helping to validate this school of thought. Realists have good reason for confidence. Responses to the pandemic have demonstrated the primacy of sovereign states, rationale for great-power competition, and obstacles to international cooperation—all key tenets of the realist tradition.
But the pandemic also exposes realism’s shortcomings as a source for successful policy. Better at explaining risks and dangers than offering solutions, realism’s strengths lie in diagnosis rather than treatment or prevention. To fight the pandemic most effectively, policymakers will have to turn to the other theoretical tradition that has, however reluctantly, informed responses to the other great crises of the past three-quarters of a century.
Realism gets a lot right, which is one reason it remains international relations’ foundational school of thought, at least in the United States. One insight the pandemic underscores is the realist view of states as the primary actors in world politics. As the coronavirus struck, states moved swiftly to close or tighten international borders, restricted movement within their borders, and marshaled security and public health resources. That the World Health Organization (WHO) initially recommended against such border controls, businesses dreaded declining economic activity, and individuals chafed against restrictions on their freedom of movement underscores the authority of states to maintain order and shape events.
But however much independent national action is understandable or even predictable from realism, so is its inadequacy. Border controls and travel restrictions did not spare states from the pandemic. Even if perfect controls were possible, their desirability is doubtful. Consider New Zealand, the island nation enjoying relative success and the advantage of physical geography (and decisive state action) in maintaining its international borders against the coronavirus. A national triumph for New Zealand, however commendable, remains incomplete so long as the pandemic rages outside its borders. The country risks reinfection and continuing economic damage to industries that depend on greater international openness. So while it clearly serves the national interest to best the disease within a state’s borders, the national interest remains unrealized so long as other states have not done the same. Unlike economic or security competition that more easily fits realist considerations of “relative gains” or zero-sum competitive logic, transnational catastrophes such as disease unmask the limitations of individual states in an “anarchical” global system.
The disconnect between transnational risks and national interests relates to another problem: states’scramble for resources. Again, realism does a good job of diagnosing the problem, explaining why countries compete for scarce items such as medical masks, ventilators, and intellectual property for treatment and vaccines. Such contests do have a zero-sum logic quality. But the uncoordinated action results in an inefficient allocation, potentially wasted time and effort and increased costs—all of which undercuts the overarching (and shared) interest in quashing the outbreak. A domestic comparison exists in the chaotic struggle among U.S. states and localities for these same resources. Realism offers few constructive alternatives.
Realists caution against placing faith in international institutions. Neither the United Nations nor the WHO can defeat the coronavirus, for example. And that is true; if international institutions are autonomous global actors at all, they’re weak ones. But this critique misses the point; international institutions are neither alternatives to state action nor challengers to states’ prime position in international relations. Instead, they are a tool of foreign policy and statecraft. States establish and participate in international institutions because they benefit from predictability, information, reduced costs, and other services institutions can provide. Even noted realist scholar John Mearsheimer acknowledges that international institutions “are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow, because they believe that obeying those rules is in their interest.” As institutionalists Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin famously observed in a great debate with Mearsheimer decades ago, states are indeed self-interested, but cooperation is often in their interest and institutions help to facilitate that cooperation. (Mearsheimer may ultimately have come to agree, as he recently argued for the creation of more international institutions to help serve U.S. interests in other areas. And institutionalists too acknowledge realism’s warnings against the naivete of expecting easy cooperation.) In our daily lives, cooperation with our neighbors is neither easy nor certain, but it’s worth striving to obtain because it’s preferable to the alternative—as many Americans have taken to the streets to demand in spite of the pandemic.
The main distinction is that institutionalism better emphasizes the practical potential for self-interested cooperation. This differing emphasis can obscure substantial common ground between realism and institutionalism. Both recognize the desirability of international cooperation; the more difficult question is how to achieve it. Here, realist insights have much to contribute. One classic idea is that a hegemonic power may impose international institutions, which may in turn prove durable even after hegemony. Power is also central to Joseph Nye’s arguments for leadership and the “smart” application of power’s hard and soft variants to lower costs and improve outcomes. Still other scholars have pointed to the ways institutional design can blunt the risks of cheating, fear, and uncertainty through enforcement, information-sharing, and other design features. While these resources are not perfect, the good news is that all of them—power, leadership, and influence over institutional design—are available to the United States.
The national interest, combined with available resources and vision, explains why the United States and other countries have so often created and acted through international institutions during past crises. The “United Nations” was the term the United States coined for the Allies during World War II, and it was institutionalized at the end of the war. The global coalition to defeat the Islamic State brought dozens of countries together to further their shared interest in combating international terrorism, and was itself devised on the sidelines of a NATO meeting in 2014. During the financial crisis of 2008, states reinvented the G-20 in order to coordinate economic policies, share costs, and save the economy.
The United States was a leader in the creation of these institutions, and it benefited enormously from them. International cooperation was not always the United States’ first impulse, as when it declined participation in the post-World War I League of Nations or during its initially somewhat unilateral approach to counterterrorism after 9/11. But the United States ultimately concluded its interests were better served by coordinated international action and leadership.
Although realism does much to explain states’ initial reactions to the coronavirus pandemic, one should look to other theories for constructive policy ideas about how to do it better. As in previous global crises, the United States can, and should, strive to see the national interest in international institutions.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--CIA Recruitment Has Joined the Social Media Age

The first time I saw , it stopped me in my tracks .
It was over a decade ago , and I had just landed at Washington ’ s Reagan National Airport after a short trip home to Texas .
The quick walk from the arrival gates to the baggage claim—the reverse commute whose only scenery was a smattering of fast food outlets and newsstands—was one I had made countless times , but the poster caught my eye as I made the sharp hairpin out of the terminal ’ s secure area .
It was a recruitment ad for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ motto : “ The work of a nation .
The center of intelligence.
” The ad was sleek and , at least for me , jarring .
I stopped to admire it for just as long as it took me to register that I had done so—in the middle of a heavily trafficked area , no less .
I was a CIA analyst at the time , and I was hypersensitive about allowing my gawking to potentially suggest to those around me that I was at all connected to the institution the poster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ walking , the poster and its tagline rattled in mind because it captured why I , along with so many of my contemporaries , applied to and joined the agency in the first place .
We were the post-9/11 generation of CIA officers , and it was precisely that sense of mission—the work of the nation—that compelled us to Langley and left us motivated to do the job .
Just this week , the CIA released a new recruitment ad campaign , its first ever designed for streaming services like YouTube and Hulu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s sleeker and more dramatic than the agency ’ s previous recruitment videos with a narrative arc that ’ s about as developed as 60 seconds will allow .
What it may lack in verisimilitude , it conveys the same sense of mission that struck me about that poster all those years ago .
First , a bit about the new ad .
It begins—as most CIA careers do—in an orientation classroom in an undisclosed location .
The instructor narrates the ad , which includes scenes from the classroom , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a generic “ overseas ” urban setting .
In addition to the orientation leader , the ad features at least eight CIA officers with varied roles—analysts , operations officers , even a translator .
The minute-long video reaches a crescendo as officers collect and make sense of a piece of intelligence apparently important enough to merit alerting the White House .
We , the viewers , remain none the wiser as to the details of that revelation .
Also , a note about the medium itself .
There ’ s still a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recruitment process is more targeted , more discrete , than the shotgun approach that streaming services provide .
That may have been the case decades ago when the Hollywood depiction of a grizzled recruiter approaching a promising student on a college campus or in a dark bar was more accurate , if not always commonplace even then .
The agency still undertakes targeted recruitments of especially qualified would-be officers , but today ’ s CIA receives more unsolicited résumés—reportedly to the tune of 10,000 per month—than it can plausibly review in any detail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the early 2000s , the message I heard from recruiters and CIA hands even then was consistent : applying through the website provided the best shot at a fair shake .
Is the ad all that realistic ?
Not particularly .
Even the premise of the ad—an intimate orientation session with a dozen or so officers in a dimly light room—is more cinematic than accurate .
Unless those sessions have changed markedly since I left the agency in 2017 , new officers are likely to be herded into a larger lecture hall-style @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for weeks about issues both sublime and mundane .
In my case , orientation was where I learned my first official U.S. government secrets and listened to CIA graybeards—at least a few of whom also looked the part—tell war stories about the operations that defined their careers .
But it ’ s also the place where you learn about federal health insurance options and retirement plans , elements that I , as a healthy 22-year-old at the time , found much less fascinating .
The ad portrays orientation as universally enthralling , rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coaster whose steep—and often long—climbs through bureaucratese are occasionally rewarded with thrilling revelations .
The operation at the heart of the ad also takes a hefty measure of cinematic license .
The key scene takes place in the “ overseas location.
” It ’ s there that a CIA officer—presumably playing the role of a case officer , whose ranks spend their careers recruiting and running foreign agents or spies—conducts a “ brush pass ” with an official of the local foreign ministry .
The two officials , the case officer and her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a deserted stairwell , where the latter discreetly places a USB drive in her palm without either breaking stride .
That ’ s not to say that brush passes are solely the stuff of fiction .
They ’ re not .
But color me skeptical that a case officer , whose ranks are targets of intense surveillance the world over , would take such a risky approach to acquire the drive .
A dead drop—the act of leaving behind information often disguised to fit in with the surroundings—would be safer .
Alternatively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ means of electronic transmission .
For example , after the FBI in 2010 arrested a ring of Russian sleeper agents , who in many cases had no overt connections to the Russian government , the FBI and court documents spoke of their use of secure and hidden Wi-Fi networks to communicate with their handlers .
Presumably such a tactic would ’ ve subjected the CIA officer and her asset to less risk of exposure and arrest—even if its depiction would ’ ve been less cinematic .
The ad also showcases a version of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than accurate .
While the agency has made strides in recent years on diversity and inclusion , it still has a way to go to ensure that its workforce—previous generations of which were in large part “ white , male , and Yale ” —looks like today ’ s America , especially at the more senior ranks .
The ad , on the other hand , presents a level of diversity , especially in terms of race , that today ’ s CIA could only dream of .
Just with the orientation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thrills as well as bureaucracy during the course of a career , and the spot understandably elides the latter in favor of spotlighting the former .
An analyst will encounter the challenge of coordination—the process of ensuring that the CIA and , on occasion , the entire intelligence community speak to policymakers with as close to one voice as possible—just as operations officers in the field will fight second-guessing and red tape from headquarters on their proposals .
While the ad features none of that , the creators could be forgiven for omitting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What does the ad get right , then ?
Its treatment of the intelligence cycle—the process of identifying intelligence requirements and gaps , collecting that intelligence , analyzing it , and packing it for policymakers—is about as thorough as 60 seconds will allow .
The spot features a presumably headquarters-based analyst identifying the missing piece of information , her colleagues in what is most likely a CIA station overseas devising an operation to collect it , a case officer undertaking the mission , and—as the dramatic denouement—a senior official alerting the policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sensationalized instance , of the blockbuster analysis and conclusions .
Of course , the ad doesn ’ t capture the nuance or details of a cycle that routinely lasts months or years , but it accurately depicts the essence of officers across the CIA ’ s career paths working together to accomplish the mission .
There ’ s a broader essence also there , and that ’ s what ’ s most important .
At the heart of the new ad is the same message that stopped me in my tracks all those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the agency affords its officers unparalleled responsibility , opportunity , and mission .
It ’ s what continues to make a career with the CIA rewarding .
The plot implicitly captures that agency ethos , but it becomes explicit when , in the final seconds , one of the officers breaks the fourth wall , telling viewers : “ Start a career at the CIA and do more for your country than you ever dreamed possible.
” The message may not be all that novel , and it may even strike some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of cynicism and scandal—and amid the demonization of the so-called “ deep state ” by those at the apex of power—there ’ s something comforting in knowing that mission and purpose are just as compelling to the next generation of CIA officers as they were to the last .
If this ad is to be effective , and I hope it will , it will send a signal that Americans broadly recognize that the work of a nation has never been more important .

The first time I saw, it stopped me in my tracks.
It was over a decade ago, and I had just landed at Washington’s Reagan National Airport after a short trip home to Texas. The quick walk from the arrival gates to the baggage claim—the reverse commute whose only scenery was a smattering of fast food outlets and newsstands—was one I had made countless times, but the poster caught my eye as I made the sharp hairpin out of the terminal’s secure area. It was a recruitment ad for the CIA bearing the agency’s unofficial motto: “The work of a nation. The center of intelligence.”
The ad was sleek and, at least for me, jarring. I stopped to admire it for just as long as it took me to register that I had done so—in the middle of a heavily trafficked area, no less. I was a CIA analyst at the time, and I was hypersensitive about allowing my gawking to potentially suggest to those around me that I was at all connected to the institution the poster was hawking. Even as I kept walking, the poster and its tagline rattled in mind because it captured why I, along with so many of my contemporaries, applied to and joined the agency in the first place. We were the post-9/11 generation of CIA officers, and it was precisely that sense of mission—the work of the nation—that compelled us to Langley and left us motivated to do the job.
Just this week, the CIA released a new recruitment ad campaign, its first ever designed for streaming services like YouTube and Hulu, targeting the next generation of officers. It’s sleeker and more dramatic than the agency’s previous recruitment videos with a narrative arc that’s about as developed as 60 seconds will allow.
What it may lack in verisimilitude, it conveys the same sense of mission that struck me about that poster all those years ago.
First, a bit about the new ad. It begins—as most CIA careers do—in an orientation classroom in an undisclosed location. The instructor narrates the ad, which includes scenes from the classroom, the CIA’s Langley headquarters, and a generic “overseas” urban setting. In addition to the orientation leader, the ad features at least eight CIA officers with varied roles—analysts, operations officers, even a translator. The minute-long video reaches a crescendo as officers collect and make sense of a piece of intelligence apparently important enough to merit alerting the White House. We, the viewers, remain none the wiser as to the details of that revelation.
Also, a note about the medium itself. There’s still a lingering impression that the CIA’s recruitment process is more targeted, more discrete, than the shotgun approach that streaming services provide. That may have been the case decades ago when the Hollywood depiction of a grizzled recruiter approaching a promising student on a college campus or in a dark bar was more accurate, if not always commonplace even then. The agency still undertakes targeted recruitments of especially qualified would-be officers, but today’s CIA receives more unsolicited résumés—reportedly to the tune of 10,000 per month—than it can plausibly review in any detail. When I went through the process in the early 2000s, the message I heard from recruiters and CIA hands even then was consistent: applying through the website provided the best shot at a fair shake.
Is the ad all that realistic? Not particularly. Even the premise of the ad—an intimate orientation session with a dozen or so officers in a dimly light room—is more cinematic than accurate. Unless those sessions have changed markedly since I left the agency in 2017, new officers are likely to be herded into a larger lecture hall-style setting, where they are talked at for weeks about issues both sublime and mundane. In my case, orientation was where I learned my first official U.S. government secrets and listened to CIA graybeards—at least a few of whom also looked the part—tell war stories about the operations that defined their careers. But it’s also the place where you learn about federal health insurance options and retirement plans, elements that I, as a healthy 22-year-old at the time, found much less fascinating. The ad portrays orientation as universally enthralling, rather than what it is: a roller coaster whose steep—and often long—climbs through bureaucratese are occasionally rewarded with thrilling revelations.
The operation at the heart of the ad also takes a hefty measure of cinematic license. The key scene takes place in the “overseas location.” It’s there that a CIA officer—presumably playing the role of a case officer, whose ranks spend their careers recruiting and running foreign agents or spies—conducts a “brush pass” with an official of the local foreign ministry. The two officials, the case officer and her foreign ministry asset, pass each other in a deserted stairwell, where the latter discreetly places a USB drive in her palm without either breaking stride.
That’s not to say that brush passes are solely the stuff of fiction. They’re not. But color me skeptical that a case officer, whose ranks are targets of intense surveillance the world over, would take such a risky approach to acquire the drive. A dead drop—the act of leaving behind information often disguised to fit in with the surroundings—would be safer. Alternatively, one could imagine any number of means of electronic transmission. For example, after the FBI in 2010 arrested a ring of Russian sleeper agents, who in many cases had no overt connections to the Russian government, the FBI and court documents spoke of their use of secure and hidden Wi-Fi networks to communicate with their handlers. Presumably such a tactic would’ve subjected the CIA officer and her asset to less risk of exposure and arrest—even if its depiction would’ve been less cinematic.
The ad also showcases a version of the CIA that’s more aspirational than accurate. While the agency has made strides in recent years on diversity and inclusion, it still has a way to go to ensure that its workforce—previous generations of which were in large part “white, male, and Yale”—looks like today’s America, especially at the more senior ranks. The ad, on the other hand, presents a level of diversity, especially in terms of race, that today’s CIA could only dream of. Just with the orientation, moreover, a CIA officer will encounter thrills as well as bureaucracy during the course of a career, and the spot understandably elides the latter in favor of spotlighting the former. An analyst will encounter the challenge of coordination—the process of ensuring that the CIA and, on occasion, the entire intelligence community speak to policymakers with as close to one voice as possible—just as operations officers in the field will fight second-guessing and red tape from headquarters on their proposals. While the ad features none of that, the creators could be forgiven for omitting the more mundane from a minute-long spot.
What does the ad get right, then? Its treatment of the intelligence cycle—the process of identifying intelligence requirements and gaps, collecting that intelligence, analyzing it, and packing it for policymakers—is about as thorough as 60 seconds will allow. The spot features a presumably headquarters-based analyst identifying the missing piece of information, her colleagues in what is most likely a CIA station overseas devising an operation to collect it, a case officer undertaking the mission, and—as the dramatic denouement—a senior official alerting the policy community, the White House in this sensationalized instance, of the blockbuster analysis and conclusions. Of course, the ad doesn’t capture the nuance or details of a cycle that routinely lasts months or years, but it accurately depicts the essence of officers across the CIA’s career paths working together to accomplish the mission.
There’s a broader essence also there, and that’s what’s most important. At the heart of the new ad is the same message that stopped me in my tracks all those years ago. It portrays the idea that the agency affords its officers unparalleled responsibility, opportunity, and mission. It’s what continues to make a career with the CIA rewarding. The plot implicitly captures that agency ethos, but it becomes explicit when, in the final seconds, one of the officers breaks the fourth wall, telling viewers: “Start a career at the CIA and do more for your country than you ever dreamed possible.”
The message may not be all that novel, and it may even strike some as trite. But in an era of cynicism and scandal—and amid the demonization of the so-called “deep state” by those at the apex of power—there’s something comforting in knowing that mission and purpose are just as compelling to the next generation of CIA officers as they were to the last. If this ad is to be effective, and I hope it will, it will send a signal that Americans broadly recognize that the work of a nation has never been more important.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--John Bolton Can Stomach Kim Jong Un’s North Korea, but Not Iran

John Bolton Can Stomach Kim Jong Un ’ s North Korea , but Not Iran Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton ’ s revenge book hasn ’ t revealed much that is new .
It mostly adds details to already-known episodes of President Donald Trump ’ s mismanagement of world affairs .
But there is one exception : the story of Bolton , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s efforts to sabotage Trump ’ s would-be diplomacy with Tehran .
This episode reveals something crucial and until now not fully appreciated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iran nuclear deal had little to do with the deal itself and everything to do with the very idea of the United States striking any deal with Iran .
The same is true for Saudi Arabia .
Whomever occupies the White House next year must address head-on the Israeli prime minister and the Saudi crown prince ’ s commitment to keeping the United States bogged down in conflict with Iran .
Bolton boasts about his extensive coordination with Pompeo and Netanyahu to scuttle mediation efforts by French President Emmanuel Macron and to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meeting between Trump and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the G-7 summit in Biarritz , France , in 2019 .
The idea of the Americans and Iranians talking to each other so offended Bolton that he prepared a two-sentence letter of resignation if the meeting were to go ahead .
Desperate to block any opening between the United States and Iran , Bolton instructed his staff to prepare a flight for him to return to Washington in protest .
The idea of the Americans and Iranians talking to each other so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter of resignation if the meeting were to go ahead .
He had no such letter in hand before Trump ’ s summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un .
In fact , Bolton himself participated in that meeting and shook Kim ’ s hand—demonstrating that as hawkish as he is on North Korea , he views Iran as a separate sort of pariah altogether .
He had already succeeded in scuttling an effort by Republican Sen. Rand Paul to get Zarif to visit the White House .
Pompeo assured Bolton that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Trump met with Zarif , though , publicly , Pompeo continues to insist that his goal is to get the Iranians to “ come to the table.
” Bolton appears to have had no qualms about working with a foreign leader to undermine the expressed desire of the U.S. president he was supposedly serving .
When Netanyahu tried to dissuade Trump from meeting with Zarif , Trump ’ s son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner blocked the Israeli prime minister ’ s attempts to reach Trump , as he believed it was inappropriate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictate to the U.S. president whom he should and shouldn ’ t speak to .
Bolton had no such trepidation and instead accused Kushner of being a “ Democrat.
” But behind the banal palace intrigue that Bolton details lurks a geopolitical reality that the United States must come to terms with .
The Netanyahu government and the Israeli security apparatus—albeit not all parts of it—were not opposed to former President Barack Obama ’ s nuclear deal because of its alleged flaws .
They were then and now remain opposed to any deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Bolton ’ s account indicates that there simply wasn ’ t anything the Obama administration could have done to placate Netanyahu and the Saudi regime .
It wasn ’ t that Obama was insufficiently sympathetic to Israeli and Saudi security concerns or that his bad rapport with Netanyahu and the Saudi royals fueled their misgivings about the nuclear talks .
Bolton Is the Villain of His Own Memoir The former national security advisor wrote a book about an ignorant president—but refuses to learn anything himself .
The Trump-Netanyahu Alliance Is Endangering Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s prime minister and the U.S. president might help them win elections , but it doesn ’ t keep their citizens safe .
After all , in Trump , Netanyahu found a very different U.S. president .
In Trump , he had a president willing to break with all his predecessors in acquiescing to almost all key Israeli demands : moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem , recognizing Israeli control of the Golan Heights , accepting Israeli annexation of Palestinian land , and even promising Netanyahu that the United States will support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war with Iran .
Both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama had pressed Israel not to take military action and only offered U.S. backing if the Iranians initiated the fighting .
It is then no surprise that the Israeli prime minister has hailed the former reality TV star as the “ the greatest friend that Israel has ever had in the White House.
” It is hard to imagine a bigger pushover in the White House from Netanyahu ’ s standpoint .
Yet , he repeatedly worked with Bolton and Pompeo to prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iranians , fearing that it would lead to an agreement between Tehran and Washington that would dial back their animosity .
Netanyahu ’ s calculation is not terribly difficult to understand .
Israel ’ s longest-serving prime minister and many within the Israeli security establishment have feared that U.S.-Iranian diplomacy ultimately would lead to an agreement that would reduce U.S.-Iranian tensions without necessarily decreasing the Israeli-Iranian animus proportionally .
With Iran largely moving off of the United States ’ radar , the U.S. government would be freed to shift its focus and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaving Israel “ abandoned ” to deal with Iran without the automatic backing of the United States .
This would reduce Israeli maneuverability in the Middle East and affect the configuration of the regional balance of power in a way that negatively impacts Israeli interests .
Supremely confident that he could bend Washington ’ s will to his own , Netanyahu opted to prevent U.S.-Iranian diplomacy .
Supremely confident that he could bend Washington ’ s will to his own , Netanyahu opted to prevent U.S.-Iranian diplomacy and sabotage any potential negotiations—even at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama or Israel ’ s relations with the Democratic Party .
The calculation of the House of Saud was very similar .
Saudi Arabia ’ s partnership with the United States has allowed it to enjoy a position in the region that its own power never could justify .
But for that benefit to be enduring , the United States must remain committed to keeping a large military presence in the region to check Riyadh ’ s rivals .
A U.S.-Iranian accommodation would not only jeopardize Saudi Arabia ’ s beneficial position , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confront Tehran alone—something it lacks the military and political competence to do , unlike Israel .
In that sense , Saudi Arabia ’ s anxiety about losing U.S. backing is more understandable .
Israel is a powerful nuclear-equipped nation with one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world .
It has deterred and pushed back Iran ’ s position in Syria without any help from the United States .
Saudi Arabia can ’ t point to any such achievement .
For the United States—whether led by Trump or by his rival candidate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ square the circle of diplomatically resolving the dispute with Iran while satisfying Saudi Arabia ’ s and Israel ’ s geostrategic needs simply may not be possible .
Bolton ’ s inside account has inadvertently clarified that Washington must choose between either satisfying its own interest in bringing U.S. troops home from the Middle East and avoiding an unnecessary war with Iran or satisfying Netanyahu and the Saudi royal family ’ s interest in keeping the United States trapped in a cycle of enmity with Iran that keeps the region ’ s balance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that none of the United States ’ core interests warrants a major U.S. military presence in the Middle East , let alone U.S. military domination of the region .
Retaining such a force structure in order to sustain a partnership with Israel and Saudi Arabia gets the very purpose of alliances backward .
However problematic or erroneous their approach may be , Israel and Saudi Arabia have defined their interests vis-à-vis America and are pursuing them unapologetically .
The U.S. government should do the same .

Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s revenge book hasn’t revealed much that is new. It mostly adds details to already-known episodes of President Donald Trump’s mismanagement of world affairs. But there is one exception: the story of Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to sabotage Trump’s would-be diplomacy with Tehran. This episode reveals something crucial and until now not fully appreciated: Netanyahu’s ferocious opposition to the Iran nuclear deal had little to do with the deal itself and everything to do with the very idea of the United States striking any deal with Iran. The same is true for Saudi Arabia. Whomever occupies the White House next year must address head-on the Israeli prime minister and the Saudi crown prince’s commitment to keeping the United States bogged down in conflict with Iran.
Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s revenge book hasn’t revealed much that is new. It mostly adds details to already-known episodes of President Donald Trump’s mismanagement of world affairs. But there is one exception: the story of Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to sabotage Trump’s would-be diplomacy with Tehran. This episode reveals something crucial and until now not fully appreciated: Netanyahu’s ferocious opposition to the Iran nuclear deal had little to do with the deal itself and everything to do with the very idea of the United States striking any deal with Iran. The same is true for Saudi Arabia. Whomever occupies the White House next year must address head-on the Israeli prime minister and the Saudi crown prince’s commitment to keeping the United States bogged down in conflict with Iran.
Bolton boasts about his extensive coordination with Pompeo and Netanyahu to scuttle mediation efforts by French President Emmanuel Macron and to, at all costs, prevent a meeting between Trump and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the G-7 summit in Biarritz, France, in 2019.
The idea of the Americans and Iranians talking to each other so offended Bolton that he prepared a two-sentence letter of resignation if the meeting were to go ahead.
Desperate to block any opening between the United States and Iran, Bolton instructed his staff to prepare a flight for him to return to Washington in protest. The idea of the Americans and Iranians talking to each other so offended Bolton that he prepared a two-sentence letter of resignation if the meeting were to go ahead. He had no such letter in hand before Trump’s summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. In fact, Bolton himself participated in that meeting and shook Kim’s hand—demonstrating that as hawkish as he is on North Korea, he views Iran as a separate sort of pariah altogether. He had already succeeded in scuttling an effort by Republican Sen. Rand Paul to get Zarif to visit the White House. Pompeo assured Bolton that he would follow his lead in resigning if Trump met with Zarif, though, publicly, Pompeo continues to insist that his goal is to get the Iranians to “come to the table.”
Bolton appears to have had no qualms about working with a foreign leader to undermine the expressed desire of the U.S. president he was supposedly serving. When Netanyahu tried to dissuade Trump from meeting with Zarif, Trump’s son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner blocked the Israeli prime minister’s attempts to reach Trump, as he believed it was inappropriate for a foreign leader to try to dictate to the U.S. president whom he should and shouldn’t speak to. Bolton had no such trepidation and instead accused Kushner of being a “Democrat.”
But behind the banal palace intrigue that Bolton details lurks a geopolitical reality that the United States must come to terms with. The Netanyahu government and the Israeli security apparatus—albeit not all parts of it—were not opposed to former President Barack Obama’s nuclear deal because of its alleged flaws. They were then and now remain opposed to any deal with Iran due to its geopolitical implications.
Bolton’s account indicates that there simply wasn’t anything the Obama administration could have done to placate Netanyahu and the Saudi regime. It wasn’t that Obama was insufficiently sympathetic to Israeli and Saudi security concerns or that his bad rapport with Netanyahu and the Saudi royals fueled their misgivings about the nuclear talks.
Read More Former National Security Advisor John Bolton discusses the "current threats to national security" during a forum moderated by Peter Feaver, the director of Duke's American Grand Strategy, at the Page Auditorium on the campus of Duke University on Feb. 17, 2020 in Durham, North Carolina. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton discusses the "current threats to national security" during a forum moderated by Peter Feaver, the director of Duke's American Grand Strategy, at the Page Auditorium on the campus of Duke University on Feb. 17, 2020 in Durham, North Carolina. Bolton Is the Villain of His Own Memoir The former national security advisor wrote a book about an ignorant president—but refuses to learn anything himself. Review | Jeremi Suri Palestinian demonstrators burn portraits of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the slogan in Arabic "Down with the Deal of the Century" during a protest in Gaza's Jabalia refugee camp on Jan. 31. Palestinian demonstrators burn portraits of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the slogan in Arabic "Down with the Deal of the Century" during a protest in Gaza's Jabalia refugee camp on Jan. 31. The Trump-Netanyahu Alliance Is Endangering Americans and Israelis The corrupt bond between Israel’s prime minister and the U.S. president might help them win elections, but it doesn’t keep their citizens safe. Argument | Avner Cohen, Jason Blazakis Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi waves as he walks through the 77th United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York City. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi waves as he walks through the 77th United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York City. Iran’s Grand Strategy Has Fundamentally Shifted Tehran has shifted to using carrots in the region—and reserving sticks for the United States and Israel. Analysis | Kenneth M. Pollack
After all, in Trump, Netanyahu found a very different U.S. president. In Trump, he had a president willing to break with all his predecessors in acquiescing to almost all key Israeli demands: moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing Israeli control of the Golan Heights, accepting Israeli annexation of Palestinian land, and even promising Netanyahu that the United States will support Israel if it chooses to start a war with Iran.
Both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama had pressed Israel not to take military action and only offered U.S. backing if the Iranians initiated the fighting. It is then no surprise that the Israeli prime minister has hailed the former reality TV star as the “the greatest friend that Israel has ever had in the White House.”
It is hard to imagine a bigger pushover in the White House from Netanyahu’s standpoint. Yet, he repeatedly worked with Bolton and Pompeo to prevent even a single meeting between Trump and the Iranians, fearing that it would lead to an agreement between Tehran and Washington that would dial back their animosity.
Netanyahu’s calculation is not terribly difficult to understand. Israel’s longest-serving prime minister and many within the Israeli security establishment have feared that U.S.-Iranian diplomacy ultimately would lead to an agreement that would reduce U.S.-Iranian tensions without necessarily decreasing the Israeli-Iranian animus proportionally. With Iran largely moving off of the United States’ radar, the U.S. government would be freed to shift its focus and resources away from the Middle East, leaving Israel “abandoned” to deal with Iran without the automatic backing of the United States. This would reduce Israeli maneuverability in the Middle East and affect the configuration of the regional balance of power in a way that negatively impacts Israeli interests.
Supremely confident that he could bend Washington’s will to his own, Netanyahu opted to prevent U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.
Supremely confident that he could bend Washington’s will to his own, Netanyahu opted to prevent U.S.-Iranian diplomacy and sabotage any potential negotiations—even at the expense of damaging his relations with Obama or Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party.
The calculation of the House of Saud was very similar. Saudi Arabia’s partnership with the United States has allowed it to enjoy a position in the region that its own power never could justify. But for that benefit to be enduring, the United States must remain committed to keeping a large military presence in the region to check Riyadh’s rivals. A U.S.-Iranian accommodation would not only jeopardize Saudi Arabia’s beneficial position, but it would also force Riyadh to confront Tehran alone—something it lacks the military and political competence to do, unlike Israel.
In that sense, Saudi Arabia’s anxiety about losing U.S. backing is more understandable. Israel is a powerful nuclear-equipped nation with one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world. It has deterred and pushed back Iran’s position in Syria without any help from the United States. Saudi Arabia can’t point to any such achievement.
For the United States—whether led by Trump or by his rival candidate Joe Biden—this implies that any effort to square the circle of diplomatically resolving the dispute with Iran while satisfying Saudi Arabia’s and Israel’s geostrategic needs simply may not be possible.
Bolton’s inside account has inadvertently clarified that Washington must choose between either satisfying its own interest in bringing U.S. troops home from the Middle East and avoiding an unnecessary war with Iran or satisfying Netanyahu and the Saudi royal family’s interest in keeping the United States trapped in a cycle of enmity with Iran that keeps the region’s balance in their favor.
The reality is that none of the United States’ core interests warrants a major U.S. military presence in the Middle East, let alone U.S. military domination of the region. Retaining such a force structure in order to sustain a partnership with Israel and Saudi Arabia gets the very purpose of alliances backward. However problematic or erroneous their approach may be, Israel and Saudi Arabia have defined their interests vis-à-vis America and are pursuing them unapologetically. The U.S. government should do the same.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-25--The Pandemic Is Reversing Decades of Progress

The Pandemic Is Reversing Decades of Progress Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
This week , a closer look at how the coronavirus pandemic threatens to reverse progress on poverty in the region .
Plus , the latest on the India-China skirmish , a troubling arrest in Bangladesh , the impact of Trump ’ s visa freeze , and why a Turkish TV show is topping the charts in Pakistan .
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Coronavirus cases continue to rise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of new daily cases across the region .
South Asia ’ s three most populous countries—India , Pakistan , and Bangladesh—are leading the way , as shown below .
The biggest hotspots seem to be in New Delhi and Mumbai , but that could be the result of increased testing in those cities .
Poverty warning .
Health experts point to South Asia ’ s young demographics as a potential reason why the total number of deaths—if they are being accurately recorded—is not as high as it could be .
But there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population : Children may never quite recover from the damage that the pandemic is inflicting on health care , education , and the economy .
According to a new UNICEF report , the coronavirus could push 120 million children in South Asia into poverty—joining 240 million other children in the region .
It makes for dismal but important reading .
A growing number of children are succumbing to pneumonia and measles .
Pregnant women are resorting to unsafe deliveries at home .
Around 430 million children can ’ t go to school and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to study remotely .
Domestic abuse against children is on the rise .
And as remittances and tourism dry up , households are spending less on good nutrition .
Put together , each of these developments could have lasting impacts on the region ’ s 600 million children .
“ The side effects of the pandemic , including the lockdown and other measures , have been damaging for children in numerous ways , ” said Jean Gough , UNICEF Regional Director for South Asia .
“ But the longer-term impact of the economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different scale entirely .
Without urgent action now , COVID-19 could destroy the hopes and futures of an entire generation.
” The report doesn ’ t just detail problems .
It recommends quick universal income transfers to vulnerable families , suggesting those packages could cost countries around 2 percent of their GDPs .
Profiteering ?
As always in a crisis , there is no shortage of people and companies trying to make a quick buck .
The Indian state of Maharashtra has banned what it called a “ spurious ” cure for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Baba Ramdev , the founder of the ayurvedic products juggernaut Patanjali , launched a drug called Coronil on Tuesday .
He said the medicine , made up of ancient ingredients , had a 100 percent cure rate .
Testing rates .
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the coronavirus outbreaks in South Asia is that there is still limited data because not enough people are being tested .
As shown below , every South Asian country barring Bhutan and the Maldives has testing rates that are a tiny fraction that of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exemplar .
Afghanistan , for example , has tested an average of 1.6 among every 1,000 people .
The lack of data , and the fact that most economies are opening up , has led observers to think that the real number of cases in the region must be higher—with a peak several months away .
As Kunal Purohit writes in Foreign Policy , extrapolations from local surveys show India could have as many as 9 million infections so far .
India and China disengage .
We ’ ve been here before , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing have agreed to calm tensions a week after the deadliest clash between the two in decades .
As Reuters reports , a senior Indian government source said “ there was a mutual consensus to disengage.
” China ’ s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian made similar comments but dismissed India ’ s claim that 40 Chinese soldiers were killed as “ fake news.
” While China can shape its message effectively at home , I worry about India ’ s jingoistic media , which continues to make rash and irresponsible calls for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spoke about this on India ’ s CNN-News18 this week . )
One effect of such discourse is the growing Indian sentiment to boycott Chinese imports .
But India ’ s turning inward would damage its own growth prospects and serve to benefit China .
And abrupt shifts in Indian policy will bruise confidence among global investors .
Part of India ’ s predicament can be blamed on its poor relations with countries such as Bangladesh , Nepal , and Sri Lanka .
As our FP columnist Sumit Ganguly writes , Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promising a “ neighborhood first ” policy—but many of those neighbors now seem to be pursuing China-first strategies .
Bangladesh social media arrest .
In another sign of how free speech is endangered in South Asia , Bangladeshi police arrested a 15-year-old boy for criticizing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on Facebook this week .
The arrest puts the focus on Bangladesh ’ s Digital Security Act , which has been increasingly deployed against citizens and which Amnesty International calls “ a weapon to punish legitimate dissent.
” Incidentally , the arrest mirrors the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Burning by Megha Majumdar .
India-Pakistan expulsions .
India expelled half the staff in Pakistan ’ s embassy in New Delhi on Tuesday after alleging those members had “ engaged in acts of espionage and maintained dealings with terrorist organizations.
” Pakistan denied the allegations and said it would similarly expel Indian embassy staffers in Islamabad .
Indians are scrutinizing the amount of Chinese money that has flooded their market as tensions between the countries remain high .
That brings us to our question this week .
Of the top 30 Indian unicorns—startups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many have received investments from China ?
Scroll down for the answer .
Trump ’ s visa freeze .
On Tuesday , U.S. President Donald Trump extended a suspension of new visas for certain categories of foreign workers until the end of 2020 .
The move will affect India most of all .
The freeze includes the H-1B visa , through which 85,000 highly skilled workers enter the United States .
And according to the BBC , three-quarters of all H-1B visas go to India-born workers .
H-1B holders account for some 25 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unfair Air India ?
The U.S. Department of Transportation ( DOT ) has accused Air India of “ discriminatory practices ” because it was selling tickets—potentially sidestepping flight restrictions—on charter flights designated for repatriations .
The DOT will now scrutinize Air India ’ s flights on a case-by-case basis “ to restore a level playing field for U.S. airlines.
” Turkey ’ s soft power .
As statues around the world come down , residents of Lahore , Pakistan , have erected two new monuments of the 13th century Turkish leader Ertugrul @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sudden interest in the Ottoman sultanate to the Turkish TV show Ertugrul Gazi , which airs on Pakistani state TV dubbed in Urdu .
It has become the most watched program ever on PTV , which compares it to HBO ’ s Game of Thrones .
Perhaps realizing the show ’ s impact—and the soft power gains for Ankara—Turkish state TV waived its royalties for the dubbed show .
According to the BBC , which cites research by the think tank Gateway House , 60 percent of India ’ s top startups have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China accounts for 12 percent of India ’ s total imports .
Most of the top smartphone brands in India—Huawei , Xiaomi , Oppo , OnePlus , and Vivo—are Chinese .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week, a closer look at how the coronavirus pandemic threatens to reverse progress on poverty in the region. Plus, the latest on the India-China skirmish , a troubling arrest in Bangladesh , the impact of Trump’s visa freeze , and why a Turkish TV show is topping the charts in Pakistan.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. This week, a closer look at how the coronavirus pandemic threatens to reverse progress on poverty in the region. Plus, the latest on the India-China skirmish, a troubling arrest in Bangladesh, the impact of Trump’s visa freeze, and why a Turkish TV show is topping the charts in Pakistan.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Poverty and the Pandemic
Coronavirus cases continue to rise rapidly, with records for the number of new daily cases across the region. South Asia’s three most populous countries—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—are leading the way, as shown below. The biggest hotspots seem to be in New Delhi and Mumbai, but that could be the result of increased testing in those cities.
Poverty warning. Health experts point to South Asia’s young demographics as a potential reason why the total number of deaths—if they are being accurately recorded—is not as high as it could be. But there is a flip side to having a young population: Children may never quite recover from the damage that the pandemic is inflicting on health care, education, and the economy.
According to a new UNICEF report, the coronavirus could push 120 million children in South Asia into poverty—joining 240 million other children in the region. It makes for dismal but important reading. A growing number of children are succumbing to pneumonia and measles. Pregnant women are resorting to unsafe deliveries at home. Around 430 million children can’t go to school and most don’t have adequate connectivity to study remotely. Domestic abuse against children is on the rise. And as remittances and tourism dry up, households are spending less on good nutrition.
Put together, each of these developments could have lasting impacts on the region’s 600 million children. “The side effects of the pandemic, including the lockdown and other measures, have been damaging for children in numerous ways,” said Jean Gough, UNICEF Regional Director for South Asia. “But the longer-term impact of the economic crisis on children will be on a different scale entirely. Without urgent action now, COVID-19 could destroy the hopes and futures of an entire generation.”
The report doesn’t just detail problems. It recommends quick universal income transfers to vulnerable families, suggesting those packages could cost countries around 2 percent of their GDPs.
Profiteering? As always in a crisis, there is no shortage of people and companies trying to make a quick buck. The Indian state of Maharashtra has banned what it called a “spurious” cure for the coronavirus manufactured by a popular yoga guru. Baba Ramdev, the founder of the ayurvedic products juggernaut Patanjali, launched a drug called Coronil on Tuesday. He said the medicine, made up of ancient ingredients, had a 100 percent cure rate.
Testing rates. Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the coronavirus outbreaks in South Asia is that there is still limited data because not enough people are being tested. As shown below, every South Asian country barring Bhutan and the Maldives has testing rates that are a tiny fraction that of the United States—which itself has not been an exemplar. Afghanistan, for example, has tested an average of 1.6 among every 1,000 people.
The lack of data, and the fact that most economies are opening up, has led observers to think that the real number of cases in the region must be higher—with a peak several months away. As Kunal Purohit writes in Foreign Policy, extrapolations from local surveys show India could have as many as 9 million infections so far.
What We’re Following
India and China disengage. We’ve been here before, but it appears that New Delhi and Beijing have agreed to calm tensions a week after the deadliest clash between the two in decades. As Reuters reports, a senior Indian government source said “there was a mutual consensus to disengage.” China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian made similar comments but dismissed India’s claim that 40 Chinese soldiers were killed as “fake news.”
While China can shape its message effectively at home, I worry about India’s jingoistic media, which continues to make rash and irresponsible calls for teaching China a lesson. (I spoke about this on India’s CNN-News18 this week.) One effect of such discourse is the growing Indian sentiment to boycott Chinese imports. But India’s turning inward would damage its own growth prospects and serve to benefit China. And abrupt shifts in Indian policy will bruise confidence among global investors.
Part of India’s predicament can be blamed on its poor relations with countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. As our FP columnist Sumit Ganguly writes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 promising a “neighborhood first” policy—but many of those neighbors now seem to be pursuing China-first strategies.
Bangladesh social media arrest. In another sign of how free speech is endangered in South Asia, Bangladeshi police arrested a 15-year-old boy for criticizing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on Facebook this week. The arrest puts the focus on Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act, which has been increasingly deployed against citizens and which Amnesty International calls “a weapon to punish legitimate dissent.” Incidentally, the arrest mirrors the premise of the new bestselling novel A Burning by Megha Majumdar.
India-Pakistan expulsions. India expelled half the staff in Pakistan’s embassy in New Delhi on Tuesday after alleging those members had “engaged in acts of espionage and maintained dealings with terrorist organizations.” Pakistan denied the allegations and said it would similarly expel Indian embassy staffers in Islamabad.
Question of the Week
Indians are scrutinizing the amount of Chinese money that has flooded their market as tensions between the countries remain high. That brings us to our question this week.
Of the top 30 Indian unicorns—startups valued at more than $1 billion—how many have received investments from China?
A) 5
B) 10
C) 18
D) 25
Scroll down for the answer.
South Asia Inc.
Trump’s visa freeze. On Tuesday, U.S. President Donald Trump extended a suspension of new visas for certain categories of foreign workers until the end of 2020. The move will affect India most of all. The freeze includes the H-1B visa, through which 85,000 highly skilled workers enter the United States. And according to the BBC, three-quarters of all H-1B visas go to India-born workers. H-1B holders account for some 25 percent of the 3 million-strong Indian-American population.
Unfair Air India? The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has accused Air India of “discriminatory practices” because it was selling tickets—potentially sidestepping flight restrictions—on charter flights designated for repatriations. The DOT will now scrutinize Air India’s flights on a case-by-case basis “to restore a level playing field for U.S. airlines.”
Odds and Ends
Turkey’s soft power. As statues around the world come down, residents of Lahore, Pakistan, have erected two new monuments of the 13th century Turkish leader Ertugrul Gazi. Reuters connects Pakistan’s sudden interest in the Ottoman sultanate to the Turkish TV show Ertugrul Gazi, which airs on Pakistani state TV dubbed in Urdu. It has become the most watched program ever on PTV, which compares it to HBO’s Game of Thrones.
Perhaps realizing the show’s impact—and the soft power gains for Ankara—Turkish state TV waived its royalties for the dubbed show.
And the Answer Is…
C) 18
According to the BBC, which cites research by the think tank Gateway House, 60 percent of India’s top startups have received Chinese funding. More broadly, China accounts for 12 percent of India’s total imports. Most of the top smartphone brands in India—Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, OnePlus, and Vivo—are Chinese.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.