foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Don’t Expect a Biden Win to Boost U.S. Favorability

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
When Barack Obama won a landslide victory over John McCain in 2008 to become U.S. president , it was a boon for America ’ s global image .
According to the Pew Research Center ’ s Global Attitudes poll , after years of falling under President George W. Bush , U.S. favorability ratings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ much of the world , especially Western Europe and Latin America .
In Germany , for instance , the favorability figure was 31 percent in 2008 and 64 percent in 2009 ; in Mexico , it was 47 percent in 2008 and 69 percent in 2009 .
( In some countries , such as Turkey and Russia , U.S. favorability remained flat or slightly fell . )
Trust in the U.S. president himself to “ do the right thing ” in global affairs also leapt massively , often by 60 or 70 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seen U.S. favorability ratings—and trust in the president—plummet globally to levels even lower than Bush ’ s .
Between the end of Obama ’ s presidency and Trump ’ s inauguration , U.S. favorability ratings dropped by an average of 15 percentage points , and trust in the U.S. president by 42 percentage points .
Just 22 percent of the world had confidence in Trump to do the right thing .
The sole exceptions were Israel and Russia—and , over time , India , where Trump ’ s favorability grew .
The figures @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result of America ’ s catastrophic mishandling of the coronavirus under Trump .
Trust in Joe Biden himself if he takes office will doubtless be higher in most of the world .
But U.S. favorability ratings are unlikely to see a boost on par with that seen after Obama ’ s election for several reasons .
For one , this is the second time around .
Bush might have been seen as an aberration , but Trump can ’ t be .
The narrowness ( in the Electoral College ) of his defeat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that either Trump himself or a possibly even worse successor will return in 2024 or 2028 will remain .
And while Biden might project normality and reassurance , his story doesn ’ t have the resonance that that of the first African American president did—a symbolic role so powerful that it won Obama the Nobel Peace Prize essentially just for his presidential victory .
With the U.S.-China cold war taking shape , too , attitudes toward both superpowers are likely to sharpen—although a hugely unpopular Chinese President Xi Jinping still managed to poll @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

When Barack Obama won a landslide victory over John McCain in 2008 to become U.S. president, it was a boon for America’s global image. According to the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes poll, after years of falling under President George W. Bush, U.S. favorability ratings leaped back up to pre-Bush levels in much of the world, especially Western Europe and Latin America. In Germany, for instance, the favorability figure was 31 percent in 2008 and 64 percent in 2009; in Mexico, it was 47 percent in 2008 and 69 percent in 2009. (In some countries, such as Turkey and Russia, U.S. favorability remained flat or slightly fell.) Trust in the U.S. president himself to “do the right thing” in global affairs also leapt massively, often by 60 or 70 points.
When Barack Obama won a landslide victory over John McCain in 2008 to become U.S. president, it was a boon for America’s global image. According to the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes poll, after years of falling under President George W. Bush, U.S. favorability ratings leaped back up to pre-Bush levels in much of the world, especially Western Europe and Latin America. In Germany, for instance, the favorability figure was 31 percent in 2008 and 64 percent in 2009; in Mexico, it was 47 percent in 2008 and 69 percent in 2009. (In some countries, such as Turkey and Russia, U.S. favorability remained flat or slightly fell.) Trust in the U.S. president himself to “do the right thing” in global affairs also leapt massively, often by 60 or 70 points.
Donald Trump’s presidency has seen U.S. favorability ratings—and trust in the president—plummet globally to levels even lower than Bush’s. Between the end of Obama’s presidency and Trump’s inauguration, U.S. favorability ratings dropped by an average of 15 percentage points, and trust in the U.S. president by 42 percentage points. Just 22 percent of the world had confidence in Trump to do the right thing. The sole exceptions were Israel and Russia—and, over time, India, where Trump’s favorability grew. The figures plummeted even further in 2020 as a result of America’s catastrophic mishandling of the coronavirus under Trump.
Trust in Joe Biden himself if he takes office will doubtless be higher in most of the world. But U.S. favorability ratings are unlikely to see a boost on par with that seen after Obama’s election for several reasons. For one, this is the second time around. Bush might have been seen as an aberration, but Trump can’t be. The narrowness (in the Electoral College) of his defeat will only reinforce that image; fears that either Trump himself or a possibly even worse successor will return in 2024 or 2028 will remain. And while Biden might project normality and reassurance, his story doesn’t have the resonance that that of the first African American president did—a symbolic role so powerful that it won Obama the Nobel Peace Prize essentially just for his presidential victory. With the U.S.-China cold war taking shape, too, attitudes toward both superpowers are likely to sharpen—although a hugely unpopular Chinese President Xi Jinping still managed to poll above Trump in the global popularity contest.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Why Trump Will Blame Beijing for a Biden Victory

Why Trump Will Blame Beijing for a Biden Victory This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
President Donald Trump ’ s false claims of voter fraud and conspiracies against him are dominating right-wing media as his supporters attempt to come to terms with an almost certain election defeat .
But while the president and his fans are struggling to find @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has already settled on a clear culprit : the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
The fiction of CCP support for Joe Biden has been percolating through right-wing media for some time .
In Chinese , it has been heavily pushed by Guo Wengui , the exiled Chinese billionaire who formed a media group with the far-right activist Steve Bannon .
An attempt to promote a report that falsely claimed Biden had profited from his son ’ s ties to China dramatically fell apart when key claims about its provenance turned out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , figures like Gordon G. Chang , the author of the 2001 book The Coming Collapse of China , and Robert Spalding , a former U.S. Air Force brigadier general who makes extreme claims about Chinese influence , have promoted the idea of CCP interference in the election , without citing any evidence or method .
In reality , there was little sign of foreign interference in the 2020 election , and most attempts to interfere could be sourced to Russia or Iran—not China .
But hard-line opposition to the CCP in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican Party , which is seen as more hawkish on Beijing .
Conspiracy theories about Democrats have become more prominent after some CCP opponents latched onto Trump as a savior figure .
That may be a strategic error : Anti-China policy is one of the few areas likely to see significant bipartisan legislative movement under Biden .
Chinese media took a carefully neutral position on the electoral victor while jeering at democracy itself , but as Biden ’ s victory became clearer , some flattery toward Biden emerged .
That will probably disappear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power ; anti-Americanism is extremely dominant in Chinese politics under Xi Jinping , regardless of the identity of the occupant of the White House .
While the conspiracy theory is confined to a relatively narrow group right now , it ’ s quite possible that it will spread into the mainstream , especially if Trump himself adopts it .
The United States faces genuine problems of CCP coercion and influence—but the idea that Beijing tried to help Biden win doesn ’ t hold water .
To be sure , there were also claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great deal more evidence .
But with Asian Americans already facing a surge in racist attacks this year , Trump blaming Beijing for a Biden victory could quickly turn toxic .

President Donald Trump’s false claims of voter fraud and conspiracies against him are dominating right-wing media as his supporters attempt to come to terms with an almost certain election defeat. But while the president and his fans are struggling to find a clear narrative, right-wing Chinese-language media has already settled on a clear culprit: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
President Donald Trump’s false claims of voter fraud and conspiracies against him are dominating right-wing media as his supporters attempt to come to terms with an almost certain election defeat. But while the president and his fans are struggling to find a clear narrative, right-wing Chinese-language media has already settled on a clear culprit: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The fiction of CCP support for Joe Biden has been percolating through right-wing media for some time. In Chinese, it has been heavily pushed by Guo Wengui, the exiled Chinese billionaire who formed a media group with the far-right activist Steve Bannon. An attempt to promote a report that falsely claimed Biden had profited from his son’s ties to China dramatically fell apart when key claims about its provenance turned out to be a lie. In English, figures like Gordon G. Chang, the author of the 2001 book The Coming Collapse of China, and Robert Spalding, a former U.S. Air Force brigadier general who makes extreme claims about Chinese influence, have promoted the idea of CCP interference in the election, without citing any evidence or method.
In reality, there was little sign of foreign interference in the 2020 election, and most attempts to interfere could be sourced to Russia or Iran—not China. But hard-line opposition to the CCP in the Chinese diaspora has often aligned with the Republican Party, which is seen as more hawkish on Beijing. Conspiracy theories about Democrats have become more prominent after some CCP opponents latched onto Trump as a savior figure. That may be a strategic error: Anti-China policy is one of the few areas likely to see significant bipartisan legislative movement under Biden. Chinese media took a carefully neutral position on the electoral victor while jeering at democracy itself, but as Biden’s victory became clearer, some flattery toward Biden emerged. That will probably disappear quickly in the likely event he takes power; anti-Americanism is extremely dominant in Chinese politics under Xi Jinping, regardless of the identity of the occupant of the White House.
While the conspiracy theory is confined to a relatively narrow group right now, it’s quite possible that it will spread into the mainstream, especially if Trump himself adopts it. The United States faces genuine problems of CCP coercion and influence—but the idea that Beijing tried to help Biden win doesn’t hold water. To be sure, there were also claims of Russian interference in 2016—albeit with a great deal more evidence. But with Asian Americans already facing a surge in racist attacks this year, Trump blaming Beijing for a Biden victory could quickly turn toxic.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--After This U.S. Election, the Case for Online Voting Is Stronger Than Ever

After This U.S. Election , the Case for Online Voting Is Stronger Than Ever This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
The gridlock over the U.S. election results is frustrating for voters , embarrassing for Americans , and , perhaps most important , damaging to the spread of democracy around the world .
As the world ’ s oldest democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country with a continuous constitutional democracy more than 200 years old ) the country has a unique obligation to show the world that democracy works .
Whether it has worked this week is debatable .
Whatever the eventual result , the questions raised about the electoral process will long outlast current events .
The United States needs to revive its democracy through technology .
Online voting can provide transparent , fast , and reliable results .
It can also increase voter turnout : Less than half of eligible voters under 30 ( an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ screen than a polling booth ) voted in the 2016 election .
This time around , that turnout may be higher , but it ’ s still not especially strong for a Western democracy .
A democracy that doesn ’ t capture the preferences of broad swaths of its constituents isn ’ t a functioning democracy .
To be sure , some commenters might fear that online voting would lead to worse accusations of ( or actual ) fraud , and fear of Russian hackers or Chinese cybercriminals fatally disrupting an election could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ online .
But the technology already exists to keep the process secure .
We bank online and do not routinely go to bed expecting that we will wake up to find that bank has disappeared and our accounts have been emptied .
The United States has nuclear submarines that are networked , and it has found ways to prevent them from being hacked and used against the country .
The same military-grade technology that makes those things safe can do the same for voting .
Online voting is not even experimental : Estonia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ electorate since 2005 .
Although the country has been targeted by Russian hackers , thorough testing and end-to-end verifiability have eased concerns about the integrity of the system .
In the United States , West Virginia and Delaware have already provided online voting for primaries , with no plausible suggestions of fraud or hacks .
By embracing online voting , the United States can give voters confidence in the system ; after all , voters would be able to see the counts in hours , not days ( or weeks ) .
Such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to connect with those who would not normally vote , and would put the United States in a position to again lead the world with an example of a political system that does what it ’ s supposed to do .
Online voting has one further benefit : It would allow Big Tech to find its true purpose in society .
Increasingly , tech firms are quickly taking on editorial functions by suppressing or promoting stories .
Their efforts—and their unique capacities—would be better spent providing the infrastructure to keep America ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open to real-time audits by both parties as well as neutral observers .
Perhaps the server logs could even be posted online , creating a truly open , 21st-century democratic system .
After this month ’ s election , it is clear that American democracy needs a reboot .
At a time when many organizations are going through a digital transformation , it ’ s time for the United States itself to join in .

The gridlock over the U.S. election results is frustrating for voters, embarrassing for Americans, and, perhaps most important, damaging to the spread of democracy around the world. As the world’s oldest democracy (the United States is the only country with a continuous constitutional democracy more than 200 years old) the country has a unique obligation to show the world that democracy works. Whether it has worked this week is debatable. Whatever the eventual result, the questions raised about the electoral process will long outlast current events.
The gridlock over the U.S. election results is frustrating for voters, embarrassing for Americans, and, perhaps most important, damaging to the spread of democracy around the world. As the world’s oldest democracy (the United States is the only country with a continuous constitutional democracy more than 200 years old) the country has a unique obligation to show the world that democracy works. Whether it has worked this week is debatable. Whatever the eventual result, the questions raised about the electoral process will long outlast current events.
The United States needs to revive its democracy through technology. Online voting can provide transparent, fast, and reliable results. It can also increase voter turnout: Less than half of eligible voters under 30 (an age group more comfortable looking at a screen than a polling booth) voted in the 2016 election. This time around, that turnout may be higher, but it’s still not especially strong for a Western democracy. A democracy that doesn’t capture the preferences of broad swaths of its constituents isn’t a functioning democracy.
To be sure, some commenters might fear that online voting would lead to worse accusations of (or actual) fraud, and fear of Russian hackers or Chinese cybercriminals fatally disrupting an election could be increased if the whole process went online. But the technology already exists to keep the process secure. We bank online and do not routinely go to bed expecting that we will wake up to find that bank has disappeared and our accounts have been emptied. The United States has nuclear submarines that are networked, and it has found ways to prevent them from being hacked and used against the country.
The same military-grade technology that makes those things safe can do the same for voting. Online voting is not even experimental: Estonia has implemented online voting for its entire electorate since 2005. Although the country has been targeted by Russian hackers, thorough testing and end-to-end verifiability have eased concerns about the integrity of the system. In the United States, West Virginia and Delaware have already provided online voting for primaries, with no plausible suggestions of fraud or hacks.
By embracing online voting, the United States can give voters confidence in the system; after all, voters would be able to see the counts in hours, not days (or weeks). Such a system would also allow both parties to connect with those who would not normally vote, and would put the United States in a position to again lead the world with an example of a political system that does what it’s supposed to do.
Online voting has one further benefit: It would allow Big Tech to find its true purpose in society. Increasingly, tech firms are quickly taking on editorial functions by suppressing or promoting stories. Their efforts—and their unique capacities—would be better spent providing the infrastructure to keep America’s democracy functioning. That infrastructure can be open to real-time audits by both parties as well as neutral observers. Perhaps the server logs could even be posted online, creating a truly open, 21st-century democratic system.
After this month’s election, it is clear that American democracy needs a reboot. At a time when many organizations are going through a digital transformation, it’s time for the United States itself to join in.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--As QAnon Copes With Trump’s Likely Loss, They Wonder Where Q Is

As QAnon Copes With Trump ’ s Likely Loss , They Wonder Where Q Is This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
As the first projections emerged declaring the U.S. presidential election for former Vice President Joe Biden , QAnon is wondering where their Q is .
On far-right and conspiracy channels , the legion of loyalists to President Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can find that widespread fraud delivered the election to Biden .
Rallies are being planned in the states that are still too close to call .
There is an emerging strategy to pressure Republican lawmakers in Georgia , Arizona , and elsewhere to ignore the results of the vote and send Republicans to the Electoral College anyway , in effect demanding that Trump be installed despite the official election results .
Other followers are confident that the election results are all part of a plan devised by Q and Trump to smoke out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , however , QAnon hasn ’ t violently mobilized as many feared .
Protests outside of state houses and county offices have been , in some cases , unruly but generally small .
The only news of an extremist plot appears to have come via a pair of arrests in Philadelphia on weapons charges—researcher J.J. MacNab identified one suspected as an avowed QAnon believer .
While promises that the coming weeks could “ go hot ” may yet be fulfilled , things have been relatively quiet .
QAnon ’ s unexpected malaise seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The movement ’ s pseudonymous leader has not posted since the early-morning hours of Election Day , when they uploaded a picture of a massive American flag , a quote from Abraham Lincoln , and a promise that “ together we win .
”

As the first projections emerged declaring the U.S. presidential election for former Vice President Joe Biden, QAnon is wondering where their Q is.
As the first projections emerged declaring the U.S. presidential election for former Vice President Joe Biden, QAnon is wondering where their Q is.
On far-right and conspiracy channels, the legion of loyalists to President Donald Trump are ginning up any evidence they can find that widespread fraud delivered the election to Biden. Rallies are being planned in the states that are still too close to call. There is an emerging strategy to pressure Republican lawmakers in Georgia, Arizona, and elsewhere to ignore the results of the vote and send Republicans to the Electoral College anyway, in effect demanding that Trump be installed despite the official election results. Other followers are confident that the election results are all part of a plan devised by Q and Trump to smoke out the so-called deep state.
Generally speaking, however, QAnon hasn’t violently mobilized as many feared. Protests outside of state houses and county offices have been, in some cases, unruly but generally small. The only news of an extremist plot appears to have come via a pair of arrests in Philadelphia on weapons charges—researcher J.J. MacNab identified one suspected as an avowed QAnon believer. While promises that the coming weeks could “go hot” may yet be fulfilled, things have been relatively quiet.
QAnon’s unexpected malaise seems to correspond to silence from Q themself. The movement’s pseudonymous leader has not posted since the early-morning hours of Election Day, when they uploaded a picture of a massive American flag, a quote from Abraham Lincoln, and a promise that “together we win.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Saudi Arabia’s Worst Nightmare

Saudi Arabia’s Worst Nightmare

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Over the last couple days , few capitals have awaited the results of the U.S. presidential election with as much anxiety as Riyadh , particularly its young and ruthless would-be king , Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman .
Even though he ’ s well aware that the U.S.-Saudi relationship may still be regarded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an impending victory for Joe Biden means the end of the zone of immunity the Trump administration crafted around Saudi Arabia .
The country ’ s human rights record , its dealings in Yemen , and its reckless efforts to amass influence in its region are likely to emerge as sources of rhetorical tension , particularly with a Biden administration that isn ’ t looking to invest heavily in the Middle East .
The crown prince has every reason to be worried .
He played U.S. President Donald Trump and Jared Kushner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East advisor , well , convincing them that Saudi willingness to buy billions of dollars in U.S. weapons , oppose Iran , and reach out to Israel mandated allowing the Saudis to do just about anything else in the region they wanted .
But a President Joe Biden would be less likely to go along with Saudi Arabia : He has described the country as a pariah , called for ending the “ disastrous war ” in Yemen , and urged a reassessment of the U.S. relationship with Riyadh .
“ America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should be set in Washington , not Riyadh , ” Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations last year .
Under Biden , those priorities , it seems , would be soothing tensions with Iran through reentering the nuclear accord while avoiding a blowup with Israel .
In those efforts , there will also be a new rival for Washington ’ s affections—the United Arab Emirates ’ Mohammed bin Zayed , who has already normalized ties with Israel , is less reckless than Mohammed bin Salman , and may thus seem to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assuming Tehran is interested in rapprochement and is looking for an agreement on the nuclear issue , especially if it ’ s accompanied by a Barack Obama-like pledge to inject more balance into U.S. policy and stay out of Saudi Arabia and Iran ’ s regional games , U.S. regional efforts are likely to roil Riyadh .
And with Biden mostly interested in not getting sucked back into the Middle East , the administration may not be prepared to invest all that much time or attention to Saudi Arabia .
What impact this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It might push Saudi Arabia to expand ties with China , especially on the nuclear issue , or perhaps the country could borrow a page from the UAE and accelerate normalization with Israel in an effort to curry favor with Washington .
Whatever it does , though , it ’ s fair to say that under a Biden administration , with its priorities elsewhere , Saudi Arabia won ’ t be Washington ’ s darling any longer .

Over the last couple days, few capitals have awaited the results of the U.S. presidential election with as much anxiety as Riyadh, particularly its young and ruthless would-be king, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Even though he’s well aware that the U.S.-Saudi relationship may still be regarded as too big and important to fail, an impending victory for Joe Biden means the end of the zone of immunity the Trump administration crafted around Saudi Arabia. The country’s human rights record, its dealings in Yemen, and its reckless efforts to amass influence in its region are likely to emerge as sources of rhetorical tension, particularly with a Biden administration that isn’t looking to invest heavily in the Middle East.
Over the last couple days, few capitals have awaited the results of the U.S. presidential election with as much anxiety as Riyadh, particularly its young and ruthless would-be king, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Even though he’s well aware that the U.S.-Saudi relationship may still be regarded as too big and important to fail, an impending victory for Joe Biden means the end of the zone of immunity the Trump administration crafted around Saudi Arabia. The country’s human rights record, its dealings in Yemen, and its reckless efforts to amass influence in its region are likely to emerge as sources of rhetorical tension, particularly with a Biden administration that isn’t looking to invest heavily in the Middle East.
The crown prince has every reason to be worried. He played U.S. President Donald Trump and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and pro-Saudi Middle East advisor, well, convincing them that Saudi willingness to buy billions of dollars in U.S. weapons, oppose Iran, and reach out to Israel mandated allowing the Saudis to do just about anything else in the region they wanted. But a President Joe Biden would be less likely to go along with Saudi Arabia: He has described the country as a pariah, called for ending the “disastrous war” in Yemen, and urged a reassessment of the U.S. relationship with Riyadh. “America’s priorities in the Middle East should be set in Washington, not Riyadh,” Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations last year.
Under Biden, those priorities, it seems, would be soothing tensions with Iran through reentering the nuclear accord while avoiding a blowup with Israel. In those efforts, there will also be a new rival for Washington’s affections—the United Arab Emirates’ Mohammed bin Zayed, who has already normalized ties with Israel, is less reckless than Mohammed bin Salman, and may thus seem to a Biden administration a more reliable partner.
Assuming Tehran is interested in rapprochement and is looking for an agreement on the nuclear issue, especially if it’s accompanied by a Barack Obama-like pledge to inject more balance into U.S. policy and stay out of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s regional games, U.S. regional efforts are likely to roil Riyadh. And with Biden mostly interested in not getting sucked back into the Middle East, the administration may not be prepared to invest all that much time or attention to Saudi Arabia. What impact this distancing might have on Riyadh is unclear.
It might push Saudi Arabia to expand ties with China, especially on the nuclear issue, or perhaps the country could borrow a page from the UAE and accelerate normalization with Israel in an effort to curry favor with Washington. Whatever it does, though, it’s fair to say that under a Biden administration, with its priorities elsewhere, Saudi Arabia won’t be Washington’s darling any longer.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Europe Doesn’t Want Lockdowns. It Wants Government.

Europe Doesn ’ t Want Lockdowns .
It Wants Government .
Matteo Salvini is back .
During a demonstration by restaurant owners against new , strict measures to contain the coronavirus last week , the former interior minister from the far-right League party came to pay a visit and “ bring solidarity.
” With beautifully set but empty dinner tables on the sunlit Pantheon Square as a backdrop , some told him off for not respecting social distancing rules .
But others thanked him .
It was a portrait of how the mood in Italy is shifting .
Many Italians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to question the ability of the government to manage a pandemic crisis that has cost over 40,000 lives in the country since February .
During the first lockdown in Italy , which started in March , there were no demonstrations at all .
Initially , Salvini also sharply criticized Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte ’ s pandemic response , but Italians severely punished him for it .
They clearly didn ’ t want a spoiler in their midst during a national emergency , and they put their weight behind the government .
It was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weak to last long , who shot up in the polls—not Salvini .
But since Conte announced a “ mini-lockdown ” including a nighttime curfew and shop closures last week to combat the second wave of the coronavirus—there were 30,000 new infections in a single day by the end of October—things are suddenly starting to look a little different .
Demonstrations have popped up in several cities .
Shop owners , workers , and others vented their frustration at the new measures with slogans like “ You close us , you pay us.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ mafiosi , football hooligans , and both anarchist and neo-fascist thugs , all trying to capitalize on the frustration .
The streets of Naples even briefly became a battlefield between demonstrators and the police .
Salvini and other politicians who largely kept quiet during the first wave took this as a sign that the political hunting season was open again .
And they resumed their habitual political bickering .
Will Italy and other European countries be able to maintain political and economic stability , while meeting the public health challenge , in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many , this is the key question this fall .
Worrying signs , in the form of angry protests and new political movements , have emerged across the continent .
( Last week , for instance , the British politician Nigel Farage announced that he would change the name of his Brexit Party to “ Reform UK , ” a new party with the sole aim of fighting the new lockdowns . )
But , examined more closely , and against the sweep of European history , there ’ s reason to think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what they seem—to the state ’ s growing , not diminishing , legitimacy in the eyes of the public .
“ Sociohistorically speaking , epidemics and wars have been key moments of state-building , ” Samuel Hayat , a French political scientist , recently told Le Monde .
He is right .
In the face of disaster , citizens usually rally around the flag .
They want to trust their leaders .
They lose interest in slogans and political panoramas , and simply want the competent authorities to solve the problems instead .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ and assumes the role of protector , the more citizens respect it .
It is in severe crises like these that the state assumes—or reassumes—its authority .
Health care providers all over Europe were quickly stretched to the limit in March , due in part to the fact that governments had trimmed public services for many years .
During the spring , many hospitals were desperately overcrowded , and there were shortages of protective gear and equipment .
This led to panic , misery , and sometimes cruelty ; the elderly were often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ situation , one would expect citizens to turn against the state .
But that didn ’ t happen .
Instead , support for the government went up—and citizens turned to the state for protection .
In several countries , including Belgium , Austria , and the Netherlands , the army stepped in to assist care homes , for example .
This also happened in Italy .
The country has seen deep cutbacks in health care during the last decades , after the European debt crisis in particular .
The regions are responsible for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Rome .
Many regions had no reserves and were devastated by shortages of beds , oxygen machines , and personnel .
Still , most citizens and political parties supported Conte .
He became more confident , developing a role as the “ father of the nation ” as he regularly addressed citizens directly on television .
Over the summer he was cheered for bringing home a large European recovery package from Brussels .
Other European countries have seen similar patterns .
Center-right governing parties , especially , saw their popularity rise throughout @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s governing Christian Democratic Union soared in the polls this spring to over 39 percent , with Merkel scoring a popularity rate of 82 percent .
Meanwhile , her coalition partner , the Social Democratic Party , trailed behind the Greens with 16 percent approval .
Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte ’ s center-right People ’ s Party for Freedom and Democracy climbed to 26 percent recently—twice as much as the second party , Geert Wilders ’ s far-right Party for Freedom .
The Conservative Austrian People @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sebastian Kurz , is also riding high : After a peak of 44 percent support in April , it is currently at 41 percent .
Governments in Slovenia , Denmark , and other countries have done well , too .
Far-right protest parties , meanwhile , have lost support since the arrival of the pandemic .
The Alternative for Germany party went from nearly 15 percent backing before the crisis to below 10 percent .
During local elections in Vienna in early October , the Freedom Party of Austria—polling at just 12 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vote to 7 percent .
The Italian League , the French National Rally , and the Swiss People ’ s Party also lost support .
All accused the authorities of mismanaging the crisis .
But this didn ’ t work .
People feel insecure and are looking for protection , the Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev recently said during a debate in Vienna : “ But populists don ’ t give protection .
They ’ re just giving expression.
” But in recent weeks , national governments have lost some of their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Dutch Party for Freedom—are recovering somewhat , and they have started supporting street rallies against government coronavirus prevention measures that are emerging in many places .
They do this cautiously : Polls show that most citizens still firmly support government restrictions and want a forceful pandemic response .
Between June and August , 71 percent of citizens in 9 European countries said their country had done a good job .
Just 29 percent believed the government had handled the pandemic poorly .
In fact , many of the demonstrators critical of government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support .
This has nothing to do with the pandemic ; it started before that .
For example , the yellow vest movement , which emerged as a disruptive force in France last year , was one loud cry for state protection and attention .
Demonstrators demanded more provincial hospitals , lower diesel taxes , higher minimum wages and pensions , more low-rent housing , and a prohibition of industrial relocations abroad , among many other things .
The yellow vests have now tried to make a comeback by organizing protests against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ever , they are a collection of individuals with widely different interests .
There are small entrepreneurs , nurses , truck drivers , and retirees in their midst , and their rallies have attracted far-right and far-left militants .
Other groups protesting coronavirus measures across Europe are remarkably similar in their heterogeneity .
Among the activists who regularly gather in Berlin ; The Hague , Netherlands ; and Bern , Switzerland , are anti-vaccine advocates , restaurant owners , anti-globalists , soccer fans , neo-Nazis and everything in between .
What unites them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state attend to it .
The French philosopher Jacques Rancière observed in 2003 that the relationship between individuals and the state “ is increasingly determined by a sense of fear.
” He wrote this after a long , hot summer , when the French government took special measures to protect the elderly .
Many people found this ironic , because at the same time the government was trying to decrease pensions—the idea being that citizens shouldn ’ t rely too much on the welfare state .
Rancière argued that there was nothing contradictory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one hand , while giving it with the other .
On the contrary : The more the state withdraws from public life , the more citizens will be forced to beg for protection if disaster strikes .
This enables the state to step back in , surfing a wave of fear of the consequences of a scarcity that it has itself created .
Today , the French government ’ s public health measures come after decades in which it transformed the welfare state to make it more efficient and market-oriented .
When the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were increasingly alone .
Traditional structures that gave them shelter—trade unions , church communities—had melted away , leaving citizens to fend for themselves .
And so , when danger loomed , they only had the state to turn to .
French President Emmanuel Macron has told citizens that he is waging a “ war ” against the virus .
Then-Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar also rallied citizens of his “ great nation ” in the fight against a “ common enemy.
” The link with warfare is not accidental .
At the start @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two states of emergency : one military ( for obvious reasons ) , the other public health ( in response to any potential dangers from infectious diseases ) .
Leaders have often used war metaphors to consolidate power in the past .
The Habsburg Empire established its first official borders with the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century to stop pandemics from coming in .
This was a tremendous state-building operation , involving almost a quarter of the imperial army .
To be sure , contagion was a genuine concern for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into a general centralization of power that was already under way The more public health measures a state imposes on citizens , the more citizens wish to be protected , the French demographer and historian Patrice Bourdelais once wrote .
But the reverse is also true .
Public authorities behave more responsibly when the population becomes more demanding on public health .
The fact that demonstrations are now erupting all over Europe and that protest parties are reemerging clearly shows that the patience of the public isn ’ t endless .
Dissatisfaction is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the state to perform better in this second wave .
But as long as citizens are afraid of contagion , citizens will want their governments to do more , not less .

Matteo Salvini is back. During a demonstration by restaurant owners against new, strict measures to contain the coronavirus last week, the former interior minister from the far-right League party came to pay a visit and “bring solidarity.” With beautifully set but empty dinner tables on the sunlit Pantheon Square as a backdrop, some told him off for not respecting social distancing rules. But others thanked him.
Matteo Salvini is back. During a demonstration by restaurant owners against new, strict measures to contain the coronavirus last week, the former interior minister from the far-right League party came to pay a visit and “bring solidarity.” With beautifully set but empty dinner tables on the sunlit Pantheon Square as a backdrop, some told him off for not respecting social distancing rules. But others thanked him.
It was a portrait of how the mood in Italy is shifting. Many Italians are getting desperate. Some are starting to question the ability of the government to manage a pandemic crisis that has cost over 40,000 lives in the country since February.
During the first lockdown in Italy, which started in March, there were no demonstrations at all. Initially, Salvini also sharply criticized Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s pandemic response, but Italians severely punished him for it. They clearly didn’t want a spoiler in their midst during a national emergency, and they put their weight behind the government. It was Conte, an outsider once considered too weak to last long, who shot up in the polls—not Salvini.
But since Conte announced a “mini-lockdown” including a nighttime curfew and shop closures last week to combat the second wave of the coronavirus—there were 30,000 new infections in a single day by the end of October—things are suddenly starting to look a little different. Demonstrations have popped up in several cities. Shop owners, workers, and others vented their frustration at the new measures with slogans like “You close us, you pay us.” Some protests were quickly joined by mafiosi, football hooligans, and both anarchist and neo-fascist thugs, all trying to capitalize on the frustration. The streets of Naples even briefly became a battlefield between demonstrators and the police. Salvini and other politicians who largely kept quiet during the first wave took this as a sign that the political hunting season was open again. And they resumed their habitual political bickering.
Will Italy and other European countries be able to maintain political and economic stability, while meeting the public health challenge, in the second phase of the pandemic? For many, this is the key question this fall. Worrying signs, in the form of angry protests and new political movements, have emerged across the continent. (Last week, for instance, the British politician Nigel Farage announced that he would change the name of his Brexit Party to “Reform UK,” a new party with the sole aim of fighting the new lockdowns.) But, examined more closely, and against the sweep of European history, there’s reason to think the protests testify to the opposite of what they seem—to the state’s growing, not diminishing, legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
“Sociohistorically speaking, epidemics and wars have been key moments of state-building,” Samuel Hayat, a French political scientist, recently told Le Monde. He is right. In the face of disaster, citizens usually rally around the flag. They want to trust their leaders. They lose interest in slogans and political panoramas, and simply want the competent authorities to solve the problems instead. The more the government takes the lead and assumes the role of protector, the more citizens respect it. It is in severe crises like these that the state assumes—or reassumes—its authority.
Health care providers all over Europe were quickly stretched to the limit in March, due in part to the fact that governments had trimmed public services for many years. During the spring, many hospitals were desperately overcrowded, and there were shortages of protective gear and equipment. This led to panic, misery, and sometimes cruelty; the elderly were often left to die. In such a situation, one would expect citizens to turn against the state. But that didn’t happen. Instead, support for the government went up—and citizens turned to the state for protection. In several countries, including Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands, the army stepped in to assist care homes, for example.
This also happened in Italy. The country has seen deep cutbacks in health care during the last decades, after the European debt crisis in particular. The regions are responsible for health care, but the financing comes from Rome. Many regions had no reserves and were devastated by shortages of beds, oxygen machines, and personnel. Still, most citizens and political parties supported Conte. He became more confident, developing a role as the “father of the nation” as he regularly addressed citizens directly on television. Over the summer he was cheered for bringing home a large European recovery package from Brussels.
Other European countries have seen similar patterns. Center-right governing parties, especially, saw their popularity rise throughout the crisis before the second wave struck. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing Christian Democratic Union soared in the polls this spring to over 39 percent, with Merkel scoring a popularity rate of 82 percent. Meanwhile, her coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, trailed behind the Greens with 16 percent approval. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy climbed to 26 percent recently—twice as much as the second party, Geert Wilders’s far-right Party for Freedom. The Conservative Austrian People’s Party, led by Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, is also riding high: After a peak of 44 percent support in April, it is currently at 41 percent. Governments in Slovenia, Denmark, and other countries have done well, too.
Far-right protest parties, meanwhile, have lost support since the arrival of the pandemic. The Alternative for Germany party went from nearly 15 percent backing before the crisis to below 10 percent. During local elections in Vienna in early October, the Freedom Party of Austria—polling at just 12 percent support nationwide—went down from 30 percent of the vote to 7 percent. The Italian League, the French National Rally, and the Swiss People’s Party also lost support. All accused the authorities of mismanaging the crisis. But this didn’t work.
People feel insecure and are looking for protection, the Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev recently said during a debate in Vienna: “But populists don’t give protection. They’re just giving expression.”
But in recent weeks, national governments have lost some of their earlier gains again. Populist parties—such as the Dutch Party for Freedom—are recovering somewhat, and they have started supporting street rallies against government coronavirus prevention measures that are emerging in many places. They do this cautiously: Polls show that most citizens still firmly support government restrictions and want a forceful pandemic response. Between June and August, 71 percent of citizens in 9 European countries said their country had done a good job. Just 29 percent believed the government had handled the pandemic poorly.
In fact, many of the demonstrators critical of government measures are themselves asking the government for support. This has nothing to do with the pandemic; it started before that. For example, the yellow vest movement, which emerged as a disruptive force in France last year, was one loud cry for state protection and attention. Demonstrators demanded more provincial hospitals, lower diesel taxes, higher minimum wages and pensions, more low-rent housing, and a prohibition of industrial relocations abroad, among many other things.
The yellow vests have now tried to make a comeback by organizing protests against the government’s coronavirus measures. As ever, they are a collection of individuals with widely different interests. There are small entrepreneurs, nurses, truck drivers, and retirees in their midst, and their rallies have attracted far-right and far-left militants. Other groups protesting coronavirus measures across Europe are remarkably similar in their heterogeneity. Among the activists who regularly gather in Berlin; The Hague, Netherlands; and Bern, Switzerland, are anti-vaccine advocates, restaurant owners, anti-globalists, soccer fans, neo-Nazis and everything in between.
What unites them is their anxiety—and their demand that the state attend to it. The French philosopher Jacques Rancière observed in 2003 that the relationship between individuals and the state “is increasingly determined by a sense of fear.” He wrote this after a long, hot summer, when the French government took special measures to protect the elderly. Many people found this ironic, because at the same time the government was trying to decrease pensions—the idea being that citizens shouldn’t rely too much on the welfare state.
Rancière argued that there was nothing contradictory about the state taking away protection with one hand, while giving it with the other. On the contrary: The more the state withdraws from public life, the more citizens will be forced to beg for protection if disaster strikes. This enables the state to step back in, surfing a wave of fear of the consequences of a scarcity that it has itself created.
Today, the French government’s public health measures come after decades in which it transformed the welfare state to make it more efficient and market-oriented. When the virus arrived, it found individuals who were increasingly alone. Traditional structures that gave them shelter—trade unions, church communities—had melted away, leaving citizens to fend for themselves. And so, when danger loomed, they only had the state to turn to.
French President Emmanuel Macron has told citizens that he is waging a “war” against the virus. Then-Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar also rallied citizens of his “great nation” in the fight against a “common enemy.” The link with warfare is not accidental. At the start of World War I, France declared two states of emergency: one military (for obvious reasons), the other public health (in response to any potential dangers from infectious diseases). Leaders have often used war metaphors to consolidate power in the past. The Habsburg Empire established its first official borders with the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century to stop pandemics from coming in. This was a tremendous state-building operation, involving almost a quarter of the imperial army. To be sure, contagion was a genuine concern for the Habsburgs. But the measures also fit into a general centralization of power that was already under way
The more public health measures a state imposes on citizens, the more citizens wish to be protected, the French demographer and historian Patrice Bourdelais once wrote. But the reverse is also true. Public authorities behave more responsibly when the population becomes more demanding on public health.
The fact that demonstrations are now erupting all over Europe and that protest parties are reemerging clearly shows that the patience of the public isn’t endless. Dissatisfaction is growing, and so is the pressure on the state to perform better in this second wave. But as long as citizens are afraid of contagion, citizens will want their governments to do more, not less.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--America Under Biden Won’t Go Soft on China

America Under Biden Won ’ t Go Soft on China This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
A Biden White House is likely to oversee a steadier and more coherent China policy than the Trump administration , whose erratic approach careened from President Donald Trump ’ s fawning praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping—including reportedly condoning concentration camps in Xinjiang—to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A consistent approach will bring more stability to a delicate and difficult relationship .
But a more stable approach does not mean a soft one , since there is now a bipartisan recognition in the United States that China is a strategic competitor .
Indeed , while Beijing may appreciate soon having a more predictable set of interlocutors , it should not expect them to be more pliable .
Helping Biden is the fact that much of U.S. foreign policy is the prerogative of the president and therefore less constrained than domestic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell remains in control of the U.S. Senate , one of the first tests for the Republicans in the Senate will be whether they will cut off America ’ s nose in order to spite the new president ’ s face .
The United States needs a robust economic stimulus , including significant investment in infrastructure , in order to make it to the other side of the pandemic and jump-start the economy .
Republicans who want to be tougher on China must recognize that a strong U.S. economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have suggested that the Trump presidency , and its undignified end , has emboldened Chinese government leaders and raised their confidence in the superiority of their own system .
On Election Day , the editor of the Chinese government propaganda newspaper Global Times , Hu Xijin , gleefully posted on Twitter about storefronts being boarded up in U.S. cities , writing that unrest is usually a “ complication of elections in poor countries , but people are worried it may appear in the US .
The US is in degradation.
” It should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Chinese Communist Party boards up its windows from the inside , metaphorically speaking , to keep citizens from seeing how the leaders of its authoritarian regime are selected .
We can not deny or dismiss the damage done to the global reputation of U.S. democracy by Trump ’ s antics .
But neither should we overstate that damage .
In the end , the United States—a giant , multiethnic , multiconfessional , industrialized democracy—had an election where the result was unknown ahead of time .
It generated record voter participation and was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ midst of a global pandemic .
It delivered a defeat for the incumbent and a new president .
Biden will most likely lead the United States with a divided government .
His administration will have to work with senators and representatives from diverse constituencies and make compromises in order to strike deals that equip the county to confront the challenges of the 21st century , including its strategic rivalry with China .
It will be messy and challenging , and progress will not be linear .
But this is not a new story—it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders pride themselves on taking a long view .
The United States faces plenty of foreign and domestic challenges today , including in its democratic institutions .
But in the long view , its democracy is not a source of weakness ; it is a source of strength .

A Biden White House is likely to oversee a steadier and more coherent China policy than the Trump administration, whose erratic approach careened from President Donald Trump’s fawning praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping—including reportedly condoning concentration camps in Xinjiang—to name-calling and fighting a failed tariff war. A consistent approach will bring more stability to a delicate and difficult relationship. But a more stable approach does not mean a soft one, since there is now a bipartisan recognition in the United States that China is a strategic competitor. Indeed, while Beijing may appreciate soon having a more predictable set of interlocutors, it should not expect them to be more pliable.
A Biden White House is likely to oversee a steadier and more coherent China policy than the Trump administration, whose erratic approach careened from President Donald Trump’s fawning praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping—including reportedly condoning concentration camps in Xinjiang—to name-calling and fighting a failed tariff war. A consistent approach will bring more stability to a delicate and difficult relationship. But a more stable approach does not mean a soft one, since there is now a bipartisan recognition in the United States that China is a strategic competitor. Indeed, while Beijing may appreciate soon having a more predictable set of interlocutors, it should not expect them to be more pliable.
Helping Biden is the fact that much of U.S. foreign policy is the prerogative of the president and therefore less constrained than domestic policy by the legislative branch. But if Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell remains in control of the U.S. Senate, one of the first tests for the Republicans in the Senate will be whether they will cut off America’s nose in order to spite the new president’s face. The United States needs a robust economic stimulus, including significant investment in infrastructure, in order to make it to the other side of the pandemic and jump-start the economy. Republicans who want to be tougher on China must recognize that a strong U.S. economy is a strategic imperative.
Some commentators have suggested that the Trump presidency, and its undignified end, has emboldened Chinese government leaders and raised their confidence in the superiority of their own system. On Election Day, the editor of the Chinese government propaganda newspaper Global Times, Hu Xijin, gleefully posted on Twitter about storefronts being boarded up in U.S. cities, writing that unrest is usually a “complication of elections in poor countries, but people are worried it may appear in the US. The US is in degradation.” It should be noted, of course, that the Chinese Communist Party boards up its windows from the inside, metaphorically speaking, to keep citizens from seeing how the leaders of its authoritarian regime are selected.
We cannot deny or dismiss the damage done to the global reputation of U.S. democracy by Trump’s antics. But neither should we overstate that damage. In the end, the United States—a giant, multiethnic, multiconfessional, industrialized democracy—had an election where the result was unknown ahead of time. It generated record voter participation and was held with relatively few problems in the midst of a global pandemic. It delivered a defeat for the incumbent and a new president.
Biden will most likely lead the United States with a divided government. His administration will have to work with senators and representatives from diverse constituencies and make compromises in order to strike deals that equip the county to confront the challenges of the 21st century, including its strategic rivalry with China. It will be messy and challenging, and progress will not be linear. But this is not a new story—it is a very old one. Chinese leaders pride themselves on taking a long view. The United States faces plenty of foreign and domestic challenges today, including in its democratic institutions. But in the long view, its democracy is not a source of weakness; it is a source of strength.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--What Are Biden’s Climate Options if the Senate Stays Republican?

What Are Biden ’ s Climate Options if the Senate Stays Republican ?
This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
With a President Joe Biden and a Republican-controlled U.S. Senate—the current scenario pending final vote counts and two runoff elections in Georgia—ambitious legislative action on energy and climate change will be significantly more challenging .
Nonetheless , there will still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under a Biden administration .
First , there are several existing laws a president can work with without congressional approval .
The most significant is the Clean Air Act , which gives the executive branch the authority to regulate emissions from sources such as power plants , cars , and trucks , as well as methane emissions from the oil and gas sector .
A judiciary dominated by Republican appointees , however , raises risks that regulatory action under this authority may not withstand legal challenge .
A Biden administration can also use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to expand leasing for renewable energy projects such as offshore wind farms ; use the procurement power of the federal government and military to drive deployment of clean technologies ; curb agricultural and forestry emissions by rewarding carbon sequestration by farmers , ranchers , and landowners ; and appoint a majority of commissioners at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission , which sets market rules for the electricity sector and can use them to favor low-carbon energy sources .
As president , Biden could also support policies by U.S. states , for example by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration that allowed California to set its own vehicle emission standards .
Second , the executive branch has significant authority over foreign policy .
Since 85 percent of global emissions are produced by other countries , putting climate change at the center of foreign policy is crucial .
Rejoining the Paris agreement is necessary but far from sufficient .
There is much else that a Biden administration could pursue , such as promoting collaboration on clean energy trade and innovation ; spearheading a multilateral agreement to curb methane emissions and finalizing another to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carbon-intensive industries such as steel and cement ; and working with allies to redouble efforts to phase out emissions from existing coal plants .
Of course , Washington ’ s international leverage would be enhanced by stronger climate action at home .
A proposed global phasedown of coal use would thus have more credibility if domestic regulations limiting power sector emissions drive down coal use in the United States—enabled by cheap renewable energy and natural gas .
Finally , it may be wrong to assume no congressional action is possible with a Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republicans—not to mention business groups that often support congressional candidates—have expressed interest in climate proposals such as a carbon tax , which could sharply reduce emissions in the power sector .
Many Republicans also support subsidies for low-carbon energy sources such as solar , wind , and nuclear power , carbon capture , and investments in energy technology innovation , which could yield enormous economic dividends .
A President Biden could aim to launch a National Energy Innovation Mission in concert with a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers .
Policies commensurate with the staggering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legislative action , which will no doubt be more difficult with Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader .
Yet using existing regulatory authority , pressing ahead in foreign policy , and seeking bipartisan agreement in narrower areas , a Biden administration can still make meaningful climate progress .

With a President Joe Biden and a Republican-controlled U.S. Senate—the current scenario pending final vote counts and two runoff elections in Georgia—ambitious legislative action on energy and climate change will be significantly more challenging. Nonetheless, there will still be many options for meaningful climate action under a Biden administration.
With a President Joe Biden and a Republican-controlled U.S. Senate—the current scenario pending final vote counts and two runoff elections in Georgia—ambitious legislative action on energy and climate change will be significantly more challenging. Nonetheless, there will still be many options for meaningful climate action under a Biden administration.
First, there are several existing laws a president can work with without congressional approval. The most significant is the Clean Air Act, which gives the executive branch the authority to regulate emissions from sources such as power plants, cars, and trucks, as well as methane emissions from the oil and gas sector. A judiciary dominated by Republican appointees, however, raises risks that regulatory action under this authority may not withstand legal challenge. A Biden administration can also use its authority over public lands and waters to expand leasing for renewable energy projects such as offshore wind farms; use the procurement power of the federal government and military to drive deployment of clean technologies; curb agricultural and forestry emissions by rewarding carbon sequestration by farmers, ranchers, and landowners; and appoint a majority of commissioners at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which sets market rules for the electricity sector and can use them to favor low-carbon energy sources. As president, Biden could also support policies by U.S. states, for example by reinstating a waiver revoked by the Trump administration that allowed California to set its own vehicle emission standards.
Second, the executive branch has significant authority over foreign policy. Since 85 percent of global emissions are produced by other countries, putting climate change at the center of foreign policy is crucial. Rejoining the Paris agreement is necessary but far from sufficient. There is much else that a Biden administration could pursue, such as promoting collaboration on clean energy trade and innovation; spearheading a multilateral agreement to curb methane emissions and finalizing another to phase down hydrofluorocarbons; pursuing agreements covering carbon-intensive industries such as steel and cement; and working with allies to redouble efforts to phase out emissions from existing coal plants.
Of course, Washington’s international leverage would be enhanced by stronger climate action at home. A proposed global phasedown of coal use would thus have more credibility if domestic regulations limiting power sector emissions drive down coal use in the United States—enabled by cheap renewable energy and natural gas.
Finally, it may be wrong to assume no congressional action is possible with a Republican Senate. An increasing number of moderate Republicans—not to mention business groups that often support congressional candidates—have expressed interest in climate proposals such as a carbon tax, which could sharply reduce emissions in the power sector. Many Republicans also support subsidies for low-carbon energy sources such as solar, wind, and nuclear power, carbon capture, and investments in energy technology innovation, which could yield enormous economic dividends. A President Biden could aim to launch a National Energy Innovation Mission in concert with a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers.
Policies commensurate with the staggering scale of the climate challenge require ambitious legislative action, which will no doubt be more difficult with Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader. Yet using existing regulatory authority, pressing ahead in foreign policy, and seeking bipartisan agreement in narrower areas, a Biden administration can still make meaningful climate progress.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Trump’s Anti-Communist Foreign Policy Won Florida Hispanics

While many scratched their heads over the large number of votes cast by Hispanics in South Florida in favor of reelecting U.S. President Donald Trump , poll-takers who ’ ve been monitoring those communities were more blasé .
“ Democrats should have seen this coming , ” said Michael Bustamante , an assistant professor of Latin American history at Florida International University ( FIU ) .
“ It ’ s not a surprise for anyone who has been paying close attention to what has been happening in the last two to four years.
” Florida ’ s vote for Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the best result a Republican presidential candidate has garnered in 16 years , with nearly twice as many votes from Hispanics in Miami-Dade County than he received in the race against Hillary Clinton in 2016 .
Emigres from Latin American countries , including Nicaragua , Venezuela , and Colombia , provided a boost for the Republican Party , but Cuban Americans , who represent 37 percent of the county ’ s population , provided the biggest lift—nearly 200,000 more votes than four years ago , according to precinct data .
Cuban American ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going back to bitterness against Democratic President John F. Kennedy for the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and gratitude to Republican presidents who stood against Cuban leader Fidel Castro .
Experts point to a number of issues to explain why the vote went as it did in Miami-Dade , particularly among Cuban Americans : campaign rhetoric that stoked fears of socialism , emerging Cuban American influencers who hold sway among newer immigrants , a perception that mainstream media is part of the left wing , and a schism over the Black Lives Matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Republican vote was simple : U.S. policy toward Latin America .
“ This area gives all candidates the opportunity to give their foreign-policy pitch , ” said Guillermo Grenier , a sociologist at FIU who has overseen university surveys of Cuban American opinion for the past three decades .
Trump never missed an opportunity to make his pitch on Latin America—particularly tied to Cuba and Venezuela—during visits to Miami that resonated with Cuban Americans , who also sided with Trump on domestic issues .
The most recent FIU Cuba Poll shows Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his handling of the economy and the COVID-19 pandemic .
He also scored high on race relations .
Black Lives Matter turned out to be “ another one of the polarizing factors , ” Grenier said .
During protests in Miami , images emerged of activists spray-painting hammer-and-sickle images onto walls and statues or celebrating the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara .
Much media coverage early on also focused on the spurts of violence in the otherwise largely peaceful protests .
Those images were used to link socialism to the movement and helped elevate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Black Lives Matter movement .
“ The interesting and frustrating thing is how the socialist attack line has been used and abused , ” Bustamante said .
“ While the attack was cynical and misleading , I think it worked.
” “ It struck a chord in a really unfortunate and very sad way , ” he said .
Another key part of the Cuban American political discourse was the rise of social media influencers such as the popular YouTube celebrity Alexander Otaola , who left Cuba in 2003 and uses humor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and demand human rights and democratic change .
Otaola scored an interview with Trump prior to the 2020 elections with the help of Miami Republican Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart , who served as his interpreter .
The interview went viral as Otaola urged his large audience to beware the “ socialist ” tendencies exhibited by Democrats .
“ That ’ s the perfect example of how the Republican Party narrative and rhetoric resonates everywhere , ” Grenier said .
“ Cubans are pretty mainstream Republicans .
The narrative of the Republican Party is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Los 3 de la Habana band based in Miami also quickly rose as an anthem among Trump supporters at campaign rallies , who danced and sang to the lyrics “ Yo voy a votar por Donald Trump !
” ( “ I ’ m going to vote for Donald Trump !
” ) “ Ronald Reagan recruited Cubans to help him with his foreign policy in the fight against the ‘ evil empire , ’ ” Grenier said .
“ Republicans have established a very strong base in the community .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve never built a base.
” By the time President Barack Obama took office in 2009 , there was a slight shift among some Cuban American voters who wanted closer ties with the island following a tightening of the U.S. embargo on Cuba under President George W. Bush .
Obama restored diplomatic relations with Cuba—making the announcement simultaneously with then-Cuban leader Raúl Castro .
The so-called interests sections in Washington and Havana were upgraded to embassies , travel restrictions and business transactions were eased , and in 2016 Obama became the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Calvin Coolidge in 1928 .
However , as warmer relations with Havana blossomed , another exodus was brewing .
Cubans in third countries made their way to Central America and journeyed north to the U.S.-Mexico border , where they used the “ wet-foot , dry-foot ” policy to claim asylum upon reaching U.S. soil then win residency after a year and a day , as mandated by the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 .
Just before leaving the Oval Office in January 2017 , Obama put an end to that policy , leaving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America .
Many ultimately made it to the United States with help from Cuban American members of Congress , settled in Miami-Dade , and aligned themselves with the Republican Party .
Trump , meanwhile , has consistently adopted a firmer approach to foreign policy .
Soon after assuming office , he pulled U.S. diplomatic personnel out of Cuba after American and Canadian diplomats suffered mysterious health problems .
He also drastically reduced staff at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and has since tightened travel restrictions , clamped down on investments from American companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the United States , and placed restrictions on how remittances can be sent to the island .
Even as many Cuban Americans oppose some of those measures , two-thirds broadly support Trump ’ s tactics aimed at the Communist government , according to the FIU survey .
Win or lose , the Democratic Party has work to do to regain the Florida Hispanic vote , especially among Cuban Americans .
“ Democrats really need to think like organizers , ” Grenier said , “ not politicians.
” Mainstream media also has a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority of Cuban Americans likely know that Biden is not a socialist , the attention mainstream media gives that kind of rhetoric amplifies the message , Grenier said .
“ Mainstream media has to go back to doing the news , ” he said , “ not the obsession with the newsmaker .
”

While many scratched their heads over the large number of votes cast by Hispanics in South Florida in favor of reelecting U.S. President Donald Trump, poll-takers who’ve been monitoring those communities were more blasé.
While many scratched their heads over the large number of votes cast by Hispanics in South Florida in favor of reelecting U.S. President Donald Trump, poll-takers who’ve been monitoring those communities were more blasé.
“Democrats should have seen this coming,” said Michael Bustamante, an assistant professor of Latin American history at Florida International University (FIU). “It’s not a surprise for anyone who has been paying close attention to what has been happening in the last two to four years.”
Florida’s vote for Trump among Latinos on Tuesday night resulted in the best result a Republican presidential candidate has garnered in 16 years, with nearly twice as many votes from Hispanics in Miami-Dade County than he received in the race against Hillary Clinton in 2016. Emigres from Latin American countries, including Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Colombia, provided a boost for the Republican Party, but Cuban Americans, who represent 37 percent of the county’s population, provided the biggest lift—nearly 200,000 more votes than four years ago, according to precinct data.
Cuban American ties to the Republican Party run deep, going back to bitterness against Democratic President John F. Kennedy for the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and gratitude to Republican presidents who stood against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Experts point to a number of issues to explain why the vote went as it did in Miami-Dade, particularly among Cuban Americans: campaign rhetoric that stoked fears of socialism, emerging Cuban American influencers who hold sway among newer immigrants, a perception that mainstream media is part of the left wing, and a schism over the Black Lives Matter movement.
But the overriding reason for the Republican vote was simple: U.S. policy toward Latin America.
“This area gives all candidates the opportunity to give their foreign-policy pitch,” said Guillermo Grenier, a sociologist at FIU who has overseen university surveys of Cuban American opinion for the past three decades.
Trump never missed an opportunity to make his pitch on Latin America—particularly tied to Cuba and Venezuela—during visits to Miami that resonated with Cuban Americans, who also sided with Trump on domestic issues.
The most recent FIU Cuba Poll shows Trump did well among respondents in terms of his handling of the economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. He also scored high on race relations.
Black Lives Matter turned out to be “another one of the polarizing factors,” Grenier said. During protests in Miami, images emerged of activists spray-painting hammer-and-sickle images onto walls and statues or celebrating the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara. Much media coverage early on also focused on the spurts of violence in the otherwise largely peaceful protests.
Those images were used to link socialism to the movement and helped elevate the outcry against Democrats who publicly supported the Black Lives Matter movement.
“The interesting and frustrating thing is how the socialist attack line has been used and abused,” Bustamante said. “While the attack was cynical and misleading, I think it worked.”
“It struck a chord in a really unfortunate and very sad way,” he said.
Another key part of the Cuban American political discourse was the rise of social media influencers such as the popular YouTube celebrity Alexander Otaola, who left Cuba in 2003 and uses humor to take swipes at the Cuban government and demand human rights and democratic change. Otaola scored an interview with Trump prior to the 2020 elections with the help of Miami Republican Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, who served as his interpreter. The interview went viral as Otaola urged his large audience to beware the “socialist” tendencies exhibited by Democrats.
“That’s the perfect example of how the Republican Party narrative and rhetoric resonates everywhere,” Grenier said. “Cubans are pretty mainstream Republicans. The narrative of the Republican Party is a national narrative.”
A Cuban salsa tune by the Los 3 de la Habana band based in Miami also quickly rose as an anthem among Trump supporters at campaign rallies, who danced and sang to the lyrics “Yo voy a votar por Donald Trump!” (“I’m going to vote for Donald Trump!”)
“Ronald Reagan recruited Cubans to help him with his foreign policy in the fight against the ‘evil empire,’” Grenier said. “Republicans have established a very strong base in the community. Democrats have never done that. They’ve never built a base.”
By the time President Barack Obama took office in 2009, there was a slight shift among some Cuban American voters who wanted closer ties with the island following a tightening of the U.S. embargo on Cuba under President George W. Bush.
Obama restored diplomatic relations with Cuba—making the announcement simultaneously with then-Cuban leader Raúl Castro. The so-called interests sections in Washington and Havana were upgraded to embassies, travel restrictions and business transactions were eased, and in 2016 Obama became the first U.S. president to visit the island since Calvin Coolidge in 1928.
However, as warmer relations with Havana blossomed, another exodus was brewing. Cubans in third countries made their way to Central America and journeyed north to the U.S.-Mexico border, where they used the “wet-foot, dry-foot” policy to claim asylum upon reaching U.S. soil then win residency after a year and a day, as mandated by the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
Just before leaving the Oval Office in January 2017, Obama put an end to that policy, leaving thousands of Cuban migrants stranded in Central America. Many ultimately made it to the United States with help from Cuban American members of Congress, settled in Miami-Dade, and aligned themselves with the Republican Party.
Trump, meanwhile, has consistently adopted a firmer approach to foreign policy.
Soon after assuming office, he pulled U.S. diplomatic personnel out of Cuba after American and Canadian diplomats suffered mysterious health problems. He also drastically reduced staff at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and has since tightened travel restrictions, clamped down on investments from American companies, limited visas for Cubans to travel to the United States, and placed restrictions on how remittances can be sent to the island.
Even as many Cuban Americans oppose some of those measures, two-thirds broadly support Trump’s tactics aimed at the Communist government, according to the FIU survey.
Win or lose, the Democratic Party has work to do to regain the Florida Hispanic vote, especially among Cuban Americans. “Democrats really need to think like organizers,” Grenier said, “not politicians.”
Mainstream media also has a role to play.
Even though the majority of Cuban Americans likely know that Biden is not a socialist, the attention mainstream media gives that kind of rhetoric amplifies the message, Grenier said.
“Mainstream media has to go back to doing the news,” he said, “not the obsession with the newsmaker.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--China and Europe Won’t Get Any Relief on Trade From Biden

China and Europe Won ’ t Get Any Relief on Trade From Biden This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Under U.S. President Donald Trump , Republicans forgot everything they once believed about trade policy .
The party of big business and free trade became the party of “ America first ” and high tariffs .
If Joe Biden becomes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean cooperating with a Republican Party that now looks a lot more like the party of Sen. Robert A. Taft , the post-World-War-II isolationist , than Ronald Reagan .
In some ways , this will make life easier for the new president , whose own Democrats are split on trade .
Biden has pledged to avoid any new trade agreements “ until we ’ ve made major investments here at home , in our workers and our communities.
” With Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell likely to remain in control of the U.S. Senate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could still change that ) , the chances of even minor such investments are close to zero .
Were Biden to push ahead on trade deals regardless , he would risk a revolt from progressive lawmakers such as Sen. Bernie Sanders , who are still smarting over what they see as a sellout to corporate interests under the last two Democratic presidents .
That political hornet ’ s nest suggests a President Biden would do as little as possible on trade .
But the world will not stand still .
He would inherit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any moves to ease U.S. tariffs would face significant congressional opposition .
A hard line on Beijing is one of the few places where the two parties now agree .
Europe would be almost as challenging : Biden is predisposed toward closer trans-Atlantic cooperation , but Republicans are likely to criticize any efforts to remove Trump ’ s tariffs on the European Union ’ s exports or revive the World Trade Organization .
The lone Republican trade negotiating priority—a deal with a post-Brexit United Kingdom—would find little love on the Democratic side .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ they would no longer need to genuflect to Trump ’ s odd obsessions—from the dangers of bilateral trade deficits to his bizarre belief that China was enriching the United States by paying the tariffs charged to U.S. importers .
Under Biden , Washington would not return as the champion of the rules-based trading system .
But at least it might cease to be its biggest adversary .

Under U.S. President Donald Trump, Republicans forgot everything they once believed about trade policy. The party of big business and free trade became the party of “America first” and high tariffs. If Joe Biden becomes president, moving forward on trade will mean cooperating with a Republican Party that now looks a lot more like the party of Sen. Robert A. Taft, the post-World-War-II isolationist, than Ronald Reagan.
Under U.S. President Donald Trump, Republicans forgot everything they once believed about trade policy. The party of big business and free trade became the party of “America first” and high tariffs. If Joe Biden becomes president, moving forward on trade will mean cooperating with a Republican Party that now looks a lot more like the party of Sen. Robert A. Taft, the post-World-War-II isolationist, than Ronald Reagan.
In some ways, this will make life easier for the new president, whose own Democrats are split on trade. Biden has pledged to avoid any new trade agreements “until we’ve made major investments here at home, in our workers and our communities.” With Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell likely to remain in control of the U.S. Senate (though two runoff elections in Georgia could still change that), the chances of even minor such investments are close to zero. Were Biden to push ahead on trade deals regardless, he would risk a revolt from progressive lawmakers such as Sen. Bernie Sanders, who are still smarting over what they see as a sellout to corporate interests under the last two Democratic presidents.
That political hornet’s nest suggests a President Biden would do as little as possible on trade. But the world will not stand still. He would inherit a trade war with China, and any moves to ease U.S. tariffs would face significant congressional opposition. A hard line on Beijing is one of the few places where the two parties now agree. Europe would be almost as challenging: Biden is predisposed toward closer trans-Atlantic cooperation, but Republicans are likely to criticize any efforts to remove Trump’s tariffs on the European Union’s exports or revive the World Trade Organization. The lone Republican trade negotiating priority—a deal with a post-Brexit United Kingdom—would find little love on the Democratic side.
The good news for trading partners is they would no longer need to genuflect to Trump’s odd obsessions—from the dangers of bilateral trade deficits to his bizarre belief that China was enriching the United States by paying the tariffs charged to U.S. importers. Under Biden, Washington would not return as the champion of the rules-based trading system. But at least it might cease to be its biggest adversary.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-06--Biden and Harris Could Be Bad News for India’s Modi

Biden and Harris Could Be Bad News for India ’ s Modi This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Indian Americans love Kamala Harris .
The daughter of an Indian biologist who moved to the United States and became one of the country ’ s most respected cancer researchers , Harris embodies the values of hard work , intellectual accomplishment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. senator , she pushed for immigration policies favored by the Indian American community , including a lifting of country caps on H1-B temporary employment visas and the retention of employment rights for spouses of H1-B visa holders .
And Indian Americans are understandably proud to see one of their own rising to the top of the U.S. political system .
But good for Indian Americans does not necessarily mean good for the current government of India .
On the contrary : The Biden team ’ s priorities ( from what we know @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a wedge between the United States and continental Asia ’ s oldest democracy at a time when Washington is looking for new allies in its strategic rivalry with China .
Harris may be a part of that wedge herself .
As senator , Harris has been diplomatically circumspect in her few public comments about India ’ s government but has shown no love for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) .
Last year , she even publicly criticized Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar while he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
Jaishankar had refused to share a platform with U.S. Rep. Pramila Jayapal , the Indian American sponsor of a House of Representatives resolution calling out the Indian government for its policies in Kashmir .
Harris ’ s own family connection to India may color her attitude .
Her mother hailed from Tamil Nadu in southern India , a state in which Modi ’ s BJP did not win a single seat in last year ’ s national parliamentary elections .
The BJP is often described as a Hindu nationalist party , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a regional movement centered on the Hindi heartland of northern India .
That regional base has expanded in recent years , but Tamil Nadu—which is almost 90 percent Hindu but not Hindi-speaking—remains a bastion of opposition .
Harris herself has been critical of the Indian government ’ s policies in Kashmir and strongly suggested ( without explicitly saying ) that she would put human rights at the center of her approach to India—and the rest of the world .
That sounds like political boilerplate until you realize that in India , “ human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Unable to beat Modi at the polls , his domestic critics have focused on what they say are policies and incitement directed against minorities , such as India ’ s 172 million Muslims .
With Harris in the West Wing , Modi ’ s opponents in India may suddenly have much more leverage at their disposal .

Indian Americans love Kamala Harris. The daughter of an Indian biologist who moved to the United States and became one of the country’s most respected cancer researchers, Harris embodies the values of hard work, intellectual accomplishment, and political engagement. As a U.S. senator, she pushed for immigration policies favored by the Indian American community, including a lifting of country caps on H1-B temporary employment visas and the retention of employment rights for spouses of H1-B visa holders. And Indian Americans are understandably proud to see one of their own rising to the top of the U.S. political system.
Indian Americans love Kamala Harris. The daughter of an Indian biologist who moved to the United States and became one of the country’s most respected cancer researchers, Harris embodies the values of hard work, intellectual accomplishment, and political engagement. As a U.S. senator, she pushed for immigration policies favored by the Indian American community, including a lifting of country caps on H1-B temporary employment visas and the retention of employment rights for spouses of H1-B visa holders. And Indian Americans are understandably proud to see one of their own rising to the top of the U.S. political system.
But good for Indian Americans does not necessarily mean good for the current government of India. On the contrary: The Biden team’s priorities (from what we know so far) are likely to drive a wedge between the United States and continental Asia’s oldest democracy at a time when Washington is looking for new allies in its strategic rivalry with China.
Harris may be a part of that wedge herself. As senator, Harris has been diplomatically circumspect in her few public comments about India’s government but has shown no love for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Last year, she even publicly criticized Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar while he was on an official visit to the United States. Jaishankar had refused to share a platform with U.S. Rep. Pramila Jayapal, the Indian American sponsor of a House of Representatives resolution calling out the Indian government for its policies in Kashmir.
Harris’s own family connection to India may color her attitude. Her mother hailed from Tamil Nadu in southern India, a state in which Modi’s BJP did not win a single seat in last year’s national parliamentary elections. The BJP is often described as a Hindu nationalist party, but it can also be seen as a regional movement centered on the Hindi heartland of northern India. That regional base has expanded in recent years, but Tamil Nadu—which is almost 90 percent Hindu but not Hindi-speaking—remains a bastion of opposition.
Harris herself has been critical of the Indian government’s policies in Kashmir and strongly suggested (without explicitly saying) that she would put human rights at the center of her approach to India—and the rest of the world. That sounds like political boilerplate until you realize that in India, “human rights” often translates as “anti-BJP.” Unable to beat Modi at the polls, his domestic critics have focused on what they say are policies and incitement directed against minorities, such as India’s 172 million Muslims. With Harris in the West Wing, Modi’s opponents in India may suddenly have much more leverage at their disposal.