foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here

The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here

The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here Foreign-policy experts have spilled much ink in the debate over whether the United States is , or is not , in a new cold war—whether with China , or Russia , or perhaps both .
Whatever observers call it , it should be abundantly clear that Russia and China have more severely harmed the core national security interests of the United States and its allies than either ever did on a battlefield or during the entirety of the classic Cold War .
In fact , “ cold war ” may not be enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Rather , what China and Russia have pulled off might be more usefully thought of as “ full-spectrum warfare , ” which comprises full-bore geopolitical challenges by traditional military and nonmilitary means .
Experts and laypeople alike can get their heads around military competition , not to mention major economic clashes , and even intelligence agency spycraft .
But the cyberwar aspect—including tampering with voter rolls and machines , malware , social media interference , troll farms , and much more—is proving more difficult to get a handle on ( even among senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Atlantic ) .
In round one of the era of full-spectrum warfare , China won .
For the past decade and a half , Chinese government hackers stole unimaginable amounts of intellectual property from the United States—to the tune of $ 300 billion to $ 600 billion worth per year—and others .
Starting in former President Barack Obama ’ s administration , numerous aides and cabinet officials encouraged him to do more to hold China accountable .
It was a catastrophic failure that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump continued that failure , and now 1 in 5 North America-based companies report that Chinese hackers have stolen intellectual property , including information with direct military applications—as observed by senior American military officials in staff-to-staff visits with their Chinese counterparts in China .
China ’ s long-term plans for extending its full-spectrum warfare may be even more threatening .
The Trump administration has been clumsy , but it is correct to be deeply concerned about TikTok , WeChat , Huawei , and other Chinese technology platforms and companies , which are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States and its allies .
In short , it is clear that China won round one of full-spectrum warfare .
It is Russia , however , that has taken round two .
As retired Lt. Gen. James Clapper , a former director of national intelligence , states in his book , Facts and Fears , if not for Russian meddling , Hillary Clinton would be president .
In Europe , Russia meddled in elections across the continent on behalf of populists .
And British officials have been even more feckless than American counterparts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s massive interference in the United Kingdom ’ s Brexit vote , which saw millions of instances of misinformation spread in the four weeks leading up to the vote .
And further afield , Russia allegedly paid the Taliban bounties for killing U.S. and British soldiers , has largely displaced the United States in Syria after Trump ’ s ill-advised abandonment of the Kurds , has intervened in Libya , and has sold Turkey , a NATO ally , its S-400 anti-aircraft missile system .
More recently , Russia has gained momentum in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-Western governments getting the boot from office in Kosovo and Montenegro .
And in the last few weeks , Russia has been helping Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh .
And that brings us to round three .
Back in the United States , senior former officials such as Sam Nunn , Ernest Moniz , Matthew Rojansky , and Thomas Graham , as well as think tanks around the world including the Nuclear Threat Initiative , the European Leadership Network , and the International Affairs Institute in Italy , suggest everything @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accommodating it by doing the unthinkable and trading Crimea for the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine .
Were the United States to do any of this , it would hand round three to Russia as well , a thorough boiling of the American frog .
Instead , the next administration should hold Russia ’ s feet to the fire by targeting the personal assets of top Russian officials , augmenting allied forces in Europe with multiple new battalions of troops and a range of permanently placed offensive weapons systems , forging a full-court @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the fold of the Western alliance , fortifying air- and sea-based weapons systems in the Indo-Pacific aimed at China , and joining with all allies in reinvigorating NATO and the European Union .
Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for a truce with the United States concerning election interference and has begun to hedge Russia ’ s bets by praising Democratic candidate Joe Biden .
China is likely to follow suit .
But the next U.S. administration can not forget the severe damage both countries have done to the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure that the United States and the West win round three of the new era of full-spectrum warfare .

Foreign-policy experts have spilled much ink in the debate over whether the United States is, or is not, in a new cold war—whether with China, or Russia, or perhaps both. Whatever observers call it, it should be abundantly clear that Russia and China have more severely harmed the core national security interests of the United States and its allies than either ever did on a battlefield or during the entirety of the classic Cold War.
Foreign-policy experts have spilled much ink in the debate over whether the United States is, or is not, in a new cold war—whether with China, or Russia, or perhaps both. Whatever observers call it, it should be abundantly clear that Russia and China have more severely harmed the core national security interests of the United States and its allies than either ever did on a battlefield or during the entirety of the classic Cold War.
In fact, “cold war” may not be enough to capture what has actually happened. Rather, what China and Russia have pulled off might be more usefully thought of as “full-spectrum warfare,” which comprises full-bore geopolitical challenges by traditional military and nonmilitary means.
Experts and laypeople alike can get their heads around military competition, not to mention major economic clashes, and even intelligence agency spycraft. But the cyberwar aspect—including tampering with voter rolls and machines, malware, social media interference, troll farms, and much more—is proving more difficult to get a handle on (even among senior officials, past and present, on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Atlantic).
In round one of the era of full-spectrum warfare, China won. For the past decade and a half, Chinese government hackers stole unimaginable amounts of intellectual property from the United States—to the tune of $300 billion to $600 billion worth per year—and others. Starting in former President Barack Obama’s administration, numerous aides and cabinet officials encouraged him to do more to hold China accountable. It was a catastrophic failure that he didn’t.
U.S. President Donald Trump continued that failure, and now 1 in 5 North America-based companies report that Chinese hackers have stolen intellectual property, including information with direct military applications—as observed by senior American military officials in staff-to-staff visits with their Chinese counterparts in China. China’s long-term plans for extending its full-spectrum warfare may be even more threatening. The Trump administration has been clumsy, but it is correct to be deeply concerned about TikTok, WeChat, Huawei, and other Chinese technology platforms and companies, which are all potent intrusive threats to the United States and its allies.
In short, it is clear that China won round one of full-spectrum warfare. It is Russia, however, that has taken round two. As retired Lt. Gen. James Clapper, a former director of national intelligence, states in his book, Facts and Fears, if not for Russian meddling, Hillary Clinton would be president.
In Europe, Russia meddled in elections across the continent on behalf of populists. And British officials have been even more feckless than American counterparts in doing something serious about Russia’s massive interference in the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, which saw millions of instances of misinformation spread in the four weeks leading up to the vote.
And further afield, Russia allegedly paid the Taliban bounties for killing U.S. and British soldiers, has largely displaced the United States in Syria after Trump’s ill-advised abandonment of the Kurds, has intervened in Libya, and has sold Turkey, a NATO ally, its S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. More recently, Russia has gained momentum in the Balkans and Central Europe, with pro-Western governments getting the boot from office in Kosovo and Montenegro. And in the last few weeks, Russia has been helping Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
And that brings us to round three. Back in the United States, senior former officials such as Sam Nunn, Ernest Moniz, Matthew Rojansky, and Thomas Graham, as well as think tanks around the world including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the European Leadership Network, and the International Affairs Institute in Italy, suggest everything from working more forthrightly with Russia to accommodating it by doing the unthinkable and trading Crimea for the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.
Were the United States to do any of this, it would hand round three to Russia as well, a thorough boiling of the American frog. Instead, the next administration should hold Russia’s feet to the fire by targeting the personal assets of top Russian officials, augmenting allied forces in Europe with multiple new battalions of troops and a range of permanently placed offensive weapons systems, forging a full-court press to bring populist Russian-leaning regimes back into the fold of the Western alliance, fortifying air- and sea-based weapons systems in the Indo-Pacific aimed at China, and joining with all allies in reinvigorating NATO and the European Union.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has called for a truce with the United States concerning election interference and has begun to hedge Russia’s bets by praising Democratic candidate Joe Biden. China is likely to follow suit. But the next U.S. administration cannot forget the severe damage both countries have done to the United States and its friends. The next president must ensure that the United States and the West win round three of the new era of full-spectrum warfare.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Trump, Not Biden, Wrecked American Power in the Pacific

Trump , Not Biden , Wrecked American Power in the Pacific A string of recent pieces have suggested that America ’ s friends in Asia have grown used to President Donald Trump ’ s tough-love approach and that , perhaps counterintuitively , Vice President Joe Biden has a credibility problem in the region .
Biden , they intimate , is too closely associated with the policies of the Obama era , which no longer fit today ’ s security environment .
As such , regional nations expect that Biden would mount inadequate resistance to Chinese expansionism and instead introduce an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is wrong .
It ’ s Trump , not Biden , who ’ s destroyed American standing in Asia , needlessly increased the risks of war in the region , and put the United States in a weaker position to defend American interests as a Pacific power .
The idea that Asian countries think more highly of Trump than Biden , or that they would be somehow more anxious about a Biden presidency than Trump ’ s , does not reflect our experience .
As analysts who live and work in the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and think tankers from Northeast Asia , Southeast Asia , and the Antipodes .
There are Biden detractors here to be sure—Washington does not have a monopoly on Trump-supporting foreign policy militarists .
But they ’ re a minority .
Our anecdotal encounters are supported by an abundance of opinion polling revealing that confidence in the United States has dropped precipitously since Obama left office .
According to a 2020 survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore , 77 percent say that U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia has declined under the Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share of respondents in Southeast Asia that had little or no confidence in the U.S. as a strategic partner rose from 34 percent in 2019 to 47 in 2020 .
The United States ranks behind Japan and the European Union , but notably above China , which has also seen a serious drop in confidence under President Xi Jinping , as the most trusted major power .
Crucially , more than 60 percent of respondents to the ISEAS survey said their confidence in the United States would increase if a new president was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similarly found that confidence in Trump among allies and partners has fallen significantly compared to Obama .
In Australia , confidence in Obama in 2016 was 84 percent .
By contrast , under Trump that figure was just 35 percent in 2019 .
In Japan , 78 percent said they were confident in Obama to do the right thing in 2016 , while just 36 percent said the same of Trump in 2019 .
South Koreans ’ confidence in Trump fell to 46 percent in 2019 from Obama ’ s 2016 level of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there was less of a gap between Obama and Trump ( 94 percent in 2016 versus 77 percent in 2019 ) , but it was still significant .
And after nearly three years , the Trump administration ’ s Free and Open Indo-Pacific ( FOIP ) initiative is also far less popular in the region than many in Washington presume .
While regional support for multilateral institutions and free trade remains high , a recent survey of Southeast Asian elites by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that most respondents overwhelmingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the most important for regional order , while less than 10 percent of those surveyed point to FOIP .
There ’ s simply no way to parse the above data in a manner that favors Trump over Biden .
By any measurable indicator , America ’ s standing has been lower in Asia during Trump ’ s presidency than before it .
Asia hands who look favorably on Trump believe his decisions have shored up American strength and resolve in the region .
As one pundit fawned , “ We will look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the policies most closely associated with U.S. toughness have been counterproductive , not only generating costly reactions but also needlessly increasing risks of conflict .
Trump ’ s campaign of maximum pressure against North Korea—aimed at the unrealizable goal of denuclearization—caused the most acute nuclear confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis .
Worse , his summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un while maintaining maximum pressure did nothing to check the very outcome Trump risked nuclear war to stop in 2017 : the expansion and improvement of Pyongyang ’ s nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 30 missile tests since the first Trump-Kim summit in 2018 alone , North Korea ’ s ability to threaten the territory of the U.S. and its allies with a nuclear strike is substantially greater now than before Trump came to office .
Trump ’ s shambolic approach to North Korea carried over to his China policy as well .
Taiwan may enjoy the newly opened spigot on U.S. arms sales and the attention lavished on it by U.S. officials these days , but it has been rendered a pawn in a game @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) dangerous on Trump ’ s watch .
Because China views Taiwan ’ s status as that of an unresolved civil war , its ultimate goal of what Beijing might term reunification , peacefully or otherwise , remains unchanged .
But the inhibitions on using force for this end have steadily eroded in recent years .
Since 2017 , the United States has thrown racist rhetoric at China while declaring itself in a civilizational clash , expanded a trade war , initiated a process of economic decoupling , and changed the status quo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largest military buildup since the Cold War .
Beijing is now less convinced than ever that Washington will come to Taiwan ’ s defense if it chooses to attack .
One can be an ardent supporter of Taiwan and still recognize that U.S. policies under Trump have only undermined the stability of the Taiwan Strait .
Trump has also done longer-term damage to the U.S. position in Asia , which may take decades to repair .
Once considered the region ’ s great stabilizer , the prevailing image of the United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s greatest source of uncertainty .
New Zealand , in the estimation of Kiwi strategist Robert Ayson among others , increasingly sees the United States not as a leader but rather one of the so-called great irresponsibles of the world , along with China and Russia .
Facing a track record of U.S. unreliability , Australia has begun planning for a future when it may have to deal with China on its own .
Trump has also taken a wrecking ball to long-standing alliances with Japan and Korea , demanding both countries increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bases by as much as 400 percent .
Tokyo and Seoul have in recent years strengthened ties with Beijing as a hedge against the prospect of U.S. abandonment , and have therefore so far resisted Washington ’ s demands to ban Chinese telecommunications corporation Huawei from developing their countries ’ 5G infrastructure .
As Washington ’ s influence has ebbed , moreover , relations between Japan and South Korea have reached their worst level since normalization in 1965 , driven by identity clashes over historical memory and Japan ’ s imperial legacy in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ played a crucial role in buffering friction between its two Northeast Asian allies .
But because of the Trump administration ’ s mishandling of alliance management , a former Japanese defense official now claims Trump has “ deepened the overall crisis of antagonism between the two neighbors , ” while South Korea says : “ The United States is no longer a factor in our issues with Japan.
” And in Southeast Asia , Trump has undermined already controversial efforts to repair tenuous alliances with the Philippines and Thailand .
Since the 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Philippines and the 2014 military coup in Thailand , bilateral ties with each country have been fraught .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted last year that the Mutual Defense Treaty extended to disputed waters in the South China Sea , where Beijing has waged a concerted pressure campaign against its smaller neighbor .
Whether this and other attempts at alliance management were rewarding Duterte for cozying up to China , or providing a ballast for the Duterte government to stand up to it , did not matter .
Trump soon contradicted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s decision to terminate the U.S .
Visiting Forces Agreement , which allows for the rotational deployment of U.S. troops , by saying it would “ save a lot of money.
” Finally , Trump has channeled U.S. influence into disrupting Asia ’ s economic order , upending the economic interdependence underpinning the absence of interstate war in the region since 1979 .
His decision to walk away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership that U.S. diplomats spent years crafting at the start of his presidency crimps America ’ s ability to promote or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump officials have been campaigning to persuade Asian governments to abandon business with Chinese state-owned enterprises without offering any plausible U.S. alternative , particularly in specialized sectors like 5G technology where China has positioned itself to meet global demand .
Trump ’ s obsession with mercantilism has created blowback for U.S. friends in the region , too .
Japanese manufacturers reported significantly lower profits in 2019 , with the technology sector particularly hard-hit as a result of fewer purchases by Chinese factories affected by U.S. tariffs .
The trade war has also reduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , especially in its semiconductor industry , which comprises almost half of Korean exports to its largest trading partner .
And Trump has bemoaned Vietnam , his most recent target , as “ the single worst abuser ” on trade .
Just this month the administration announced it was investigating Vietnam over timber and currency practices .
This undermines efforts to cultivate a partnership with Hanoi that could give it a chance at a geopolitical future independent of China .
Worse , it throws a wrench in Vietnam ’ s bid to become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because its export-led growth strategy is contingent on a weaker currency and access to the U.S. consumer market .
America today is more estranged from the realities of Asian international relations than most in Trump ’ s Washington would care to admit .
It ’ s a more dangerous and fragmented region than when Trump took office .
Assuming Biden wins the presidency , he ( and in all likelihood his successors ) will have to expend precious political capital recovering from the risky , costly , and incoherent wagers of the past @ @ @

A string of recent pieces have suggested that America’s friends in Asia have grown used to President Donald Trump’s tough-love approach and that, perhaps counterintuitively, Vice President Joe Biden has a credibility problem in the region. Biden, they intimate, is too closely associated with the policies of the Obama era, which no longer fit today’s security environment. As such, regional nations expect that Biden would mount inadequate resistance to Chinese expansionism and instead introduce an Obama 2.0 Asia policy.
A string of recent pieces have suggested that America’s friends in Asia have grown used to President Donald Trump’s tough-love approach and that, perhaps counterintuitively, Vice President Joe Biden has a credibility problem in the region. Biden, they intimate, is too closely associated with the policies of the Obama era, which no longer fit today’s security environment. As such, regional nations expect that Biden would mount inadequate resistance to Chinese expansionism and instead introduce an Obama 2.0 Asia policy.
This argument is wrong. It’s Trump, not Biden, who’s destroyed American standing in Asia, needlessly increased the risks of war in the region, and put the United States in a weaker position to defend American interests as a Pacific power.
The idea that Asian countries think more highly of Trump than Biden, or that they would be somehow more anxious about a Biden presidency than Trump’s, does not reflect our experience. As analysts who live and work in the region, we engage regularly with policy elites and think tankers from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Antipodes. There are Biden detractors here to be sure—Washington does not have a monopoly on Trump-supporting foreign policy militarists. But they’re a minority.
Our anecdotal encounters are supported by an abundance of opinion polling revealing that confidence in the United States has dropped precipitously since Obama left office. According to a 2020 survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, 77 percent say that U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia has declined under the Trump administration compared to Obama, while the share of respondents in Southeast Asia that had little or no confidence in the U.S. as a strategic partner rose from 34 percent in 2019 to 47 in 2020.
The United States ranks behind Japan and the European Union, but notably above China, which has also seen a serious drop in confidence under President Xi Jinping, as the most trusted major power. Crucially, more than 60 percent of respondents to the ISEAS survey said their confidence in the United States would increase if a new president was elected.
A Pew Research Center poll similarly found that confidence in Trump among allies and partners has fallen significantly compared to Obama. In Australia, confidence in Obama in 2016 was 84 percent. By contrast, under Trump that figure was just 35 percent in 2019. In Japan, 78 percent said they were confident in Obama to do the right thing in 2016, while just 36 percent said the same of Trump in 2019. South Koreans’ confidence in Trump fell to 46 percent in 2019 from Obama’s 2016 level of 88 percent. In the Philippines, there was less of a gap between Obama and Trump (94 percent in 2016 versus 77 percent in 2019), but it was still significant.
And after nearly three years, the Trump administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative is also far less popular in the region than many in Washington presume. While regional support for multilateral institutions and free trade remains high, a recent survey of Southeast Asian elites by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that most respondents overwhelmingly identify the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as the most important for regional order, while less than 10 percent of those surveyed point to FOIP.
There’s simply no way to parse the above data in a manner that favors Trump over Biden. By any measurable indicator, America’s standing has been lower in Asia during Trump’s presidency than before it.
Asia hands who look favorably on Trump believe his decisions have shored up American strength and resolve in the region. As one pundit fawned, “We will look back on Trump with nostalgia.” But the policies most closely associated with U.S. toughness have been counterproductive, not only generating costly reactions but also needlessly increasing risks of conflict.
Trump’s campaign of maximum pressure against North Korea—aimed at the unrealizable goal of denuclearization—caused the most acute nuclear confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Worse, his summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un while maintaining maximum pressure did nothing to check the very outcome Trump risked nuclear war to stop in 2017: the expansion and improvement of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile arsenal. After conducting more than 30 missile tests since the first Trump-Kim summit in 2018 alone, North Korea’s ability to threaten the territory of the U.S. and its allies with a nuclear strike is substantially greater now than before Trump came to office.
Trump’s shambolic approach to North Korea carried over to his China policy as well. Taiwan may enjoy the newly opened spigot on U.S. arms sales and the attention lavished on it by U.S. officials these days, but it has been rendered a pawn in a game that has grown more (and needlessly) dangerous on Trump’s watch. Because China views Taiwan’s status as that of an unresolved civil war, its ultimate goal of what Beijing might term reunification, peacefully or otherwise, remains unchanged. But the inhibitions on using force for this end have steadily eroded in recent years. Since 2017, the United States has thrown racist rhetoric at China while declaring itself in a civilizational clash, expanded a trade war, initiated a process of economic decoupling, and changed the status quo toward Taiwan—all while continuing to pursue the largest military buildup since the Cold War. Beijing is now less convinced than ever that Washington will come to Taiwan’s defense if it chooses to attack. One can be an ardent supporter of Taiwan and still recognize that U.S. policies under Trump have only undermined the stability of the Taiwan Strait.
Trump has also done longer-term damage to the U.S. position in Asia, which may take decades to repair. Once considered the region’s great stabilizer, the prevailing image of the United States is that it has become the region’s greatest source of uncertainty. New Zealand, in the estimation of Kiwi strategist Robert Ayson among others, increasingly sees the United States not as a leader but rather one of the so-called great irresponsibles of the world, along with China and Russia. Facing a track record of U.S. unreliability, Australia has begun planning for a future when it may have to deal with China on its own.
Trump has also taken a wrecking ball to long-standing alliances with Japan and Korea, demanding both countries increase their share of financial support for American bases by as much as 400 percent. Tokyo and Seoul have in recent years strengthened ties with Beijing as a hedge against the prospect of U.S. abandonment, and have therefore so far resisted Washington’s demands to ban Chinese telecommunications corporation Huawei from developing their countries’ 5G infrastructure.
As Washington’s influence has ebbed, moreover, relations between Japan and South Korea have reached their worst level since normalization in 1965, driven by identity clashes over historical memory and Japan’s imperial legacy in Korea. The United States has always played a crucial role in buffering friction between its two Northeast Asian allies. But because of the Trump administration’s mishandling of alliance management, a former Japanese defense official now claims Trump has “deepened the overall crisis of antagonism between the two neighbors,” while South Korea says: “The United States is no longer a factor in our issues with Japan.”
And in Southeast Asia, Trump has undermined already controversial efforts to repair tenuous alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. Since the 2016 election of populist President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and the 2014 military coup in Thailand, bilateral ties with each country have been fraught. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted last year that the Mutual Defense Treaty extended to disputed waters in the South China Sea, where Beijing has waged a concerted pressure campaign against its smaller neighbor. Whether this and other attempts at alliance management were rewarding Duterte for cozying up to China, or providing a ballast for the Duterte government to stand up to it, did not matter. Trump soon contradicted his administration when asked about Duterte’s decision to terminate the U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, which allows for the rotational deployment of U.S. troops, by saying it would “save a lot of money.”
Finally, Trump has channeled U.S. influence into disrupting Asia’s economic order, upending the economic interdependence underpinning the absence of interstate war in the region since 1979. His decision to walk away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership that U.S. diplomats spent years crafting at the start of his presidency crimps America’s ability to promote or even benefit from regional trade and investment. Trump officials have been campaigning to persuade Asian governments to abandon business with Chinese state-owned enterprises without offering any plausible U.S. alternative, particularly in specialized sectors like 5G technology where China has positioned itself to meet global demand.
Trump’s obsession with mercantilism has created blowback for U.S. friends in the region, too. Japanese manufacturers reported significantly lower profits in 2019, with the technology sector particularly hard-hit as a result of fewer purchases by Chinese factories affected by U.S. tariffs. The trade war has also reduced South Korea’s exports to China, especially in its semiconductor industry, which comprises almost half of Korean exports to its largest trading partner. And Trump has bemoaned Vietnam, his most recent target, as “the single worst abuser” on trade. Just this month the administration announced it was investigating Vietnam over timber and currency practices. This undermines efforts to cultivate a partnership with Hanoi that could give it a chance at a geopolitical future independent of China. Worse, it throws a wrench in Vietnam’s bid to become the next Asian so-called miracle economy, because its export-led growth strategy is contingent on a weaker currency and access to the U.S. consumer market.
America today is more estranged from the realities of Asian international relations than most in Trump’s Washington would care to admit. It’s a more dangerous and fragmented region than when Trump took office. Assuming Biden wins the presidency, he (and in all likelihood his successors) will have to expend precious political capital recovering from the risky, costly, and incoherent wagers of the past four years.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-23--Pompeo Hosts Foreign Ministers From Both Sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Pompeo Hosts Foreign Ministers From Both Sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan , Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister , and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate .
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The United States is trying its hand at mediating between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington today .
Both ministers are scheduled to meet with Pompeo separately , and no plans for a trilateral meeting have been announced .
Speaking at a State Department briefing on Wednesday , Pompeo demurred when asked whether he would be brokering a cease-fire today , but he did give some indication of the words he would have for the two men , saying that “ the right path forward is to cease the conflict , tell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should stay out , provide no fuel for this conflict , no weapons systems , no support.
” A rising death toll .
On Thursday , Russian President Vladimir Putin reported a significantly higher death toll in the conflict than either Armenia or Azerbaijan have reported .
Speaking at a televised meeting , Putin said the number of dead was “ nearing 5,000 , ” five times more than official estimates have suggested .
Nagorno-Karabakh ’ s ethnic Armenian authorities have said at least 874 military personnel have died since the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijan has reported 61 civilian deaths , but has not disclosed the number of military dead .
Military gains .
As diplomats make their way to Washington , Azerbaijan ’ s military is making gains on the ground .
On Thursday , Azerbaijan ’ s President Ilham Aliyev claimed that his military had regained control of all territory on Azerbaijan ’ s border with Iran previously under Armenian control .
Armenia denies the claim , yet Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted this week that his military faced “ a difficult situation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far better equipped forces .
Diaspora diplomacy .
Although seemingly outgunned , Armenia does have one significant card to play in the information wars : its diaspora .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Rebecca Collard highlights how Armenians around the world are rallying support for their homeland as the conflict worsens .
“ Whether it ’ s Kardashian West and her fellow Armenian Americans in California or Lebanese Armenians lobbying their government and calling for cyberattacks on Azerbaijan , the usually well-off and well-educated diaspora is a strategic asset , ” Collard writes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PM .
Saad Hariri was named Lebanon ’ s new prime minister on Thursday , the fourth time he has held the position and a year after he resigned from the same post as the country was gripped by protests .
Hariri has promised to name a technocratic cabinet , with a pressing task of reforming Lebanon ’ s ailing economy .
FP explains the reasons for Hariri ’ s return , namely “ there ’ s not really anybody else whom Lebanon ’ s political parties would agree on.
” About last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his Democratic challenger , former Vice President Joe Biden , squared off in their final debate before the presidential election on November 3 .
Debate moderator Kristin Welker came away with her reputation enhanced and , although there were few memorable moments , the debate was more orderly and substantive than last month ’ s clash .
FP ’ s Michael Hirsh provided snap analysis of a debate where “ foreign-policy played only a small part ” and where Trump “ failed to deliver the knockout blow most of his advisors believed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ results published on Thursday suggest that Guinean President Alpha Condé scored a decisive victory in the country ’ s presidential election last Sunday , winning almost twice as many votes as his rival , Cellou Dalein Diallo .
Opposition supporters are likely to contest the results .
Diallo already claimed victory earlier in the week , citing his own internal calculations , sparking clashes between security forces and protesters in which 13 people have died so far .
Israel warms to Sudan .
An Israeli government delegation visited Sudan on Thursday , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two countries .
Israeli officials reportedly met with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan , Sudan ’ s head of state during its transitional government .
Reuters reported on Thursday that Sudan ’ s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is ready to normalize relations with Israel as long as the country ’ s parliament approves the move .
That approval may be some time in coming , as Sudan has yet to form a transitional parliament .
Chile goes to the polls .
Chileans vote on Sunday in a referendum on whether to replace their Pinochet-era @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change , a further vote will take place in October to choose to confirm those who will draft the document , followed by another vote on whether to approve the new constitution .
U.S. pondering anti-Semitic label for human rights groups .
The U.S. State Department is considering labelling a number of prominent human rights groups as anti-Semitic , and encouraging national governments to avoid supporting them .
The groups in question include household names such as Amnesty International , Human Rights Watch , and Oxfam .
According to reporting in Politico , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the groups ’ alleged support for the Boycott , Divestment , and Sanctions movement as evidence of anti-Semitic leanings .
A Dutch “ white hat ” —or ethical hacker—claims to have logged in to the Twitter account of U.S. President Donald Trump … simply by guessing his password .
Victor Gevers , a security researcher , discovered the vulnerability last Friday before alerting U.S. security authorities .
Gevers allegedly gained access using the password “ maga2020 !
” but did not succumb to the temptation of tweeting to the president ’ s 87 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of account security to Trump ’ s age .
“ ‘ Trump is over 70—elderly people often switch off two-step verification because they find it too complicated .
My own mother , for instance.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister, and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon names the former prime minister Saad Hariri as its new prime minister, and U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden traded barbs in a surprisingly substantive final U.S. presidential debate.
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Pompeo Hosts His Armenian and Azerbaijani Counterparts As Hopes For Peace Fade
The United States is trying its hand at mediating between the two warring sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosts the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington today.
Both ministers are scheduled to meet with Pompeo separately, and no plans for a trilateral meeting have been announced.
Speaking at a State Department briefing on Wednesday, Pompeo demurred when asked whether he would be brokering a cease-fire today, but he did give some indication of the words he would have for the two men, saying that “the right path forward is to cease the conflict, tell them to de-escalate, that every country should stay out, provide no fuel for this conflict, no weapons systems, no support.”
A rising death toll. On Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin reported a significantly higher death toll in the conflict than either Armenia or Azerbaijan have reported. Speaking at a televised meeting, Putin said the number of dead was “nearing 5,000,” five times more than official estimates have suggested. Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian authorities have said at least 874 military personnel have died since the end of September, along with 37 civilians. Azerbaijan has reported 61 civilian deaths, but has not disclosed the number of military dead.
Military gains. As diplomats make their way to Washington, Azerbaijan’s military is making gains on the ground. On Thursday, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev claimed that his military had regained control of all territory on Azerbaijan’s border with Iran previously under Armenian control. Armenia denies the claim, yet Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted this week that his military faced “a difficult situation,” going up against Azerbaijan’s far better equipped forces.
Diaspora diplomacy. Although seemingly outgunned, Armenia does have one significant card to play in the information wars: its diaspora. Writing in Foreign Policy, Rebecca Collard highlights how Armenians around the world are rallying support for their homeland as the conflict worsens. “Whether it’s Kardashian West and her fellow Armenian Americans in California or Lebanese Armenians lobbying their government and calling for cyberattacks on Azerbaijan, the usually well-off and well-educated diaspora is a strategic asset,” Collard writes.
What We’re Following Today
Lebanon’s “new” PM. Saad Hariri was named Lebanon’s new prime minister on Thursday, the fourth time he has held the position and a year after he resigned from the same post as the country was gripped by protests. Hariri has promised to name a technocratic cabinet, with a pressing task of reforming Lebanon’s ailing economy. FP explains the reasons for Hariri’s return, namely “there’s not really anybody else whom Lebanon’s political parties would agree on.”
About last night. U.S. President Donald Trump and his Democratic challenger, former Vice President Joe Biden, squared off in their final debate before the presidential election on November 3. Debate moderator Kristin Welker came away with her reputation enhanced and, although there were few memorable moments, the debate was more orderly and substantive than last month’s clash. FP’s Michael Hirsh provided snap analysis of a debate where “foreign-policy played only a small part” and where Trump “failed to deliver the knockout blow most of his advisors believed that he needed.”
Condé landslide. Preliminary results published on Thursday suggest that Guinean President Alpha Condé scored a decisive victory in the country’s presidential election last Sunday, winning almost twice as many votes as his rival, Cellou Dalein Diallo. Opposition supporters are likely to contest the results. Diallo already claimed victory earlier in the week, citing his own internal calculations, sparking clashes between security forces and protesters in which 13 people have died so far.
Keep an Eye On
Israel warms to Sudan. An Israeli government delegation visited Sudan on Thursday, in the latest sign of warming ties between the two countries. Israeli officials reportedly met with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s head of state during its transitional government. Reuters reported on Thursday that Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is ready to normalize relations with Israel as long as the country’s parliament approves the move. That approval may be some time in coming, as Sudan has yet to form a transitional parliament.
Chile goes to the polls. Chileans vote on Sunday in a referendum on whether to replace their Pinochet-era constitution. If voters agree to a change, a further vote will take place in October to choose to confirm those who will draft the document, followed by another vote on whether to approve the new constitution.
U.S. pondering anti-Semitic label for human rights groups. The U.S. State Department is considering labelling a number of prominent human rights groups as anti-Semitic, and encouraging national governments to avoid supporting them. The groups in question include household names such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Oxfam. According to reporting in Politico, the United States is planning to use the groups’ alleged support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement as evidence of anti-Semitic leanings.
Odds and Ends
A Dutch “white hat”—or ethical hacker—claims to have logged in to the Twitter account of U.S. President Donald Trump … simply by guessing his password. Victor Gevers, a security researcher, discovered the vulnerability last Friday before alerting U.S. security authorities. Gevers allegedly gained access using the password “maga2020!” but did not succumb to the temptation of tweeting to the president’s 87 million followers.
Gevers attributes the lack of account security to Trump’s age. “‘Trump is over 70—elderly people often switch off two-step verification because they find it too complicated. My own mother, for instance.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-22--Why Is Saad Hariri Back in Charge of Lebanon?

Why Is Saad Hariri Back in Charge of Lebanon ?
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand , pledging to do better this time ( his fourth as premier ) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis , its worst financial crisis in decades , the coronavirus pandemic , and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut .
On Thursday , a slim majority of the Lebanon ’ s members of parliament agreed to have Hariri return as prime minister-designate and form a new cabinet—which will be his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not be welcomed by the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who have been in the streets in protest since last October , when they secured their biggest victory by forcing Hariri ’ s resignation .
But after a year of dashed hopes , protesters are greeting his return with more despair than anger .
Wait , Hariri resigned a year ago in answer to the popular protests .
How is his return supposed to be the solution to Lebanon ’ s problems , which have only gotten worse since then ?
Hariri is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because there ’ s not really anybody else whom Lebanon ’ s political parties would agree on .
Hassan Diab , who succeeded Hariri last fall , resigned himself after the August explosion , which killed almost 200 people and was widely seen as the result of government incompetence and corruption .
After him came Mustapha Adib , then ( and now again ) Lebanon ’ s ambassador to Germany .
But he couldn ’ t form a new cabinet and stepped down as prime minister late last month .
The biggest cabinet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a powerful position , as financial signoff can influence the work of other ministries .
Lebanon ’ s Shiite parties , Hezbollah and Amal , wanted the post , but there was resistance from other groups .
Hariri is believed to be more likely to accommodate that demand—and indeed , while Hezbollah declined to nominate anyone for prime minister , it has said it won ’ t stand in the way of forming a new government .
At the same time , though , Hariri has promised to assemble a cabinet of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mission to implement the economic , financial and administrative reforms ” the country desperately needs .
Of course , that ’ s the same promise Adib and Diab made before him .
Hariri is an old hand in Lebanon ’ s political game and more likely to accommodate the demands of the traditional political parties than Adib was , but success in forming a cabinet is not guaranteed .
It will be a balancing act of political interests .
The process could go on for months .
If it ’ s unsuccessful , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in less than a year and more delays on its road to recovery .
But there must be other options , right ?
Other names were floated to head the next government , but the pool is limited .
Under Lebanon ’ s sectarian political system , the prime minister has to be a Sunni Muslim , just as the president has to be a Christian and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim .
Then , he has to be seen as acceptable to most of the sect-based political parties .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Shiite Amal Movement , the Druze Progressive Socialist Party , and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party all voted in favor of Hariri ’ s return , but the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun and the Christian Lebanese Forces did not .
In the end , Hariri passed with a slim majority—just 65 of the 128 seats .
That sectarian political system breeds the very sort of dynastic approach to politics that brought the protesters in the streets in the first place .
This week , a two-year-old clip of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viral , in which he says that he didn ’ t want to be in politics , but it ’ s a “ family business.
” And that ’ s true across sectarian lines .
Hariri ’ s father , Rafik , was previously prime minister , too , for 10 years , but he was killed by Hezbollah in 2005 .
Saad Hariri ’ s brother Bahaa has also been floated as a future prime minister .
The son-in-law of current President Aoun was foreign minister until last year , and so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s civil war of 1975 to 1990 still casts the biggest shadow over the political landscape .
Lebanon ’ s political system—the very thing the protesters were up in arms about—has been dominated by the same sect-based political parties and often the same rulers , many of them former wartime militia leaders and their relatives .
If protesters brought down Hariri once before , how are they reacting now ?
Hariri ’ s resignation—just weeks after the protests started last October—was the most substantial victory for the protest movement and gave it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time names associated with Lebanon ’ s old guard were floated for government posts , protesters headed back out to the streets .
But as of late Thursday , demonstrations were small , and there is a sense of defeat among many who saw their calls to end corruption , mismanagement , and the sectarian political system doused with tear gas .
Hariri ’ s return almost exactly one year later suggests to many protesters that it was all for naught .
Hassan Safsouf , who took part in the protests starting last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ English exam , as part of the process of emigrating to Canada .
He says he doesn ’ t see the point in going to the streets anymore and just wants to leave the country .
“ The political decisions are not taken by the Lebanese people .
The decisions are taken by the corrupt leaders , ” said Safsouf , walking in Beirut ’ s Gemmayze neighborhood with two friends—both of whom are also trying to emigrate .
But if so many poured into the streets demanding change , how is Lebanon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the slogan “ killon yani killon , ” or “ everyone means everyone , ” a shot at the entire political class—of which Hariri is very much an exemplar .
The key demand of the protests has been the fall of the system , not just individual leaders , but that hasn ’ t happened , and it ’ s not clear what would replace it .
Even if new elections were held tomorrow , results would probably vary little from the current parliament , experts say .
Independents outside of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a handful of seats in the 128-seat Lebanese parliament , but not enough to fundamentally change things .
And that stasis is itself a reflection of the end of the civil war .
The Taif Agreement , which ended the fighting , only further entrenched the country ’ s sectarian system as warlords divvied up power to secure their own interests .
It ’ s a system that is now deeply entrenched in almost every aspect of social , political , and economic life .
Many Lebanese still feel dependent on warlords-turned-politicians for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries , as well as economic sustenance .
Basic foodstuffs , government jobs , education , and health care—all even more important now due to the country ’ s economic collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic—are doled out as political patronage rather than as state services .
That keeps people deeply reliant on their parties and ends up entrenching the leaders in power .
Will the fourth time be the charm for Hariri as prime minister ?
Unlikely .
The first task for Hariri will be to form a cabinet , no easy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are made through political wrangling and horse-trading to appease the country ’ s political elites .
All of Lebanon ’ s sect-based political parties will need to be accommodated , in what is more like a balancing act than a democratic process .
Protesters say the country ’ s leaders negotiate for their own interests , not what ’ s good for the country or even their own constituents .
The key task of the new government—if and when it is formed—will be to implement economic and financial reforms to meet the conditions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , needed to unlock billions of dollars in badly needed aid .
That could avert complete collapse in the short term but would not solve Lebanon ’ s structural problems .
It ’ s got one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and is highly reliant on imports , including food , that it can no longer afford as the currency has lost 80 percent of its value since last fall .
Half of Lebanese are now below the poverty line , and reforms will likely mean removing the subsidies on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of State David Schenker told reporters Thursday : “ Whatever government comes next must commit to and have the ability to implement reforms that can lead to economic opportunity , better governance , and an end to endemic corruption.
” Jan Kubis , the United Nations special coordinator for Lebanon , warned the country ’ s leaders not to “ count on miracles , foreign elections , or external donors—the rescue must start in Lebanon , by Lebanon .
”

Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand, pledging to do better this time (his fourth as premier) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis, its worst financial crisis in decades, the coronavirus pandemic, and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut.
Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri is back by unpopular demand, pledging to do better this time (his fourth as premier) as Lebanon reels from its months of political paralysis, its worst financial crisis in decades, the coronavirus pandemic, and the aftermath of the deadly Aug. 4 explosion at the port of Beirut.
On Thursday, a slim majority of the Lebanon’s members of parliament agreed to have Hariri return as prime minister-designate and form a new cabinet—which will be his first tough test. His return will not be welcomed by the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who have been in the streets in protest since last October, when they secured their biggest victory by forcing Hariri’s resignation. But after a year of dashed hopes, protesters are greeting his return with more despair than anger.
Wait, Hariri resigned a year ago in answer to the popular protests. How is his return supposed to be the solution to Lebanon’s problems, which have only gotten worse since then?
Hariri is back as prime minister in large part because there’s not really anybody else whom Lebanon’s political parties would agree on. Hassan Diab, who succeeded Hariri last fall, resigned himself after the August explosion, which killed almost 200 people and was widely seen as the result of government incompetence and corruption. After him came Mustapha Adib, then (and now again) Lebanon’s ambassador to Germany. But he couldn’t form a new cabinet and stepped down as prime minister late last month.
The biggest cabinet hurdle was the post of finance minister, a powerful position, as financial signoff can influence the work of other ministries. Lebanon’s Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, wanted the post, but there was resistance from other groups. Hariri is believed to be more likely to accommodate that demand—and indeed, while Hezbollah declined to nominate anyone for prime minister, it has said it won’t stand in the way of forming a new government.
At the same time, though, Hariri has promised to assemble a cabinet of “nonpartisan specialists” with a “mission to implement the economic, financial and administrative reforms” the country desperately needs. Of course, that’s the same promise Adib and Diab made before him.
Hariri is an old hand in Lebanon’s political game and more likely to accommodate the demands of the traditional political parties than Adib was, but success in forming a cabinet is not guaranteed. It will be a balancing act of political interests. The process could go on for months. If it’s unsuccessful, Lebanon could see its fourth prime minister in less than a year and more delays on its road to recovery.
But there must be other options, right?
Other names were floated to head the next government, but the pool is limited. Under Lebanon’s sectarian political system, the prime minister has to be a Sunni Muslim, just as the president has to be a Christian and the speaker of the house a Shiite Muslim. Then, he has to be seen as acceptable to most of the sect-based political parties. Hariri’s own Future Movement, the Shiite Amal Movement, the Druze Progressive Socialist Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party all voted in favor of Hariri’s return, but the Free Patriotic Movement of President Michel Aoun and the Christian Lebanese Forces did not. In the end, Hariri passed with a slim majority—just 65 of the 128 seats.
That sectarian political system breeds the very sort of dynastic approach to politics that brought the protesters in the streets in the first place. This week, a two-year-old clip of the son of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt went viral, in which he says that he didn’t want to be in politics, but it’s a “family business.” And that’s true across sectarian lines.
Hariri’s father, Rafik, was previously prime minister, too, for 10 years, but he was killed by Hezbollah in 2005. Saad Hariri’s brother Bahaa has also been floated as a future prime minister. The son-in-law of current President Aoun was foreign minister until last year, and so on.
In a way, Lebanon’s civil war of 1975 to 1990 still casts the biggest shadow over the political landscape. Lebanon’s political system—the very thing the protesters were up in arms about—has been dominated by the same sect-based political parties and often the same rulers, many of them former wartime militia leaders and their relatives.
If protesters brought down Hariri once before, how are they reacting now?
Hariri’s resignation—just weeks after the protests started last October—was the most substantial victory for the protest movement and gave it momentum. For months afterward, every time names associated with Lebanon’s old guard were floated for government posts, protesters headed back out to the streets.
But as of late Thursday, demonstrations were small, and there is a sense of defeat among many who saw their calls to end corruption, mismanagement, and the sectarian political system doused with tear gas. Hariri’s return almost exactly one year later suggests to many protesters that it was all for naught. Hassan Safsouf, who took part in the protests starting last fall, instead spent Thursday completing an English exam, as part of the process of emigrating to Canada. He says he doesn’t see the point in going to the streets anymore and just wants to leave the country.
“The political decisions are not taken by the Lebanese people. The decisions are taken by the corrupt leaders,” said Safsouf, walking in Beirut’s Gemmayze neighborhood with two friends—both of whom are also trying to emigrate.
But if so many poured into the streets demanding change, how is Lebanon back where it started?
Protesters marched under the slogan “killon yani killon,” or “everyone means everyone,” a shot at the entire political class—of which Hariri is very much an exemplar. The key demand of the protests has been the fall of the system, not just individual leaders, but that hasn’t happened, and it’s not clear what would replace it.
Even if new elections were held tomorrow, results would probably vary little from the current parliament, experts say. Independents outside of the established political class would probably pick up a handful of seats in the 128-seat Lebanese parliament, but not enough to fundamentally change things.
And that stasis is itself a reflection of the end of the civil war. The Taif Agreement, which ended the fighting, only further entrenched the country’s sectarian system as warlords divvied up power to secure their own interests. It’s a system that is now deeply entrenched in almost every aspect of social, political, and economic life.
Many Lebanese still feel dependent on warlords-turned-politicians for safety, whether from other sects or other countries, as well as economic sustenance. Basic foodstuffs, government jobs, education, and health care—all even more important now due to the country’s economic collapse and the COVID-19 pandemic—are doled out as political patronage rather than as state services. That keeps people deeply reliant on their parties and ends up entrenching the leaders in power.
Will the fourth time be the charm for Hariri as prime minister?
Unlikely. The first task for Hariri will be to form a cabinet, no easy task in Lebanese politics, where decisions are made through political wrangling and horse-trading to appease the country’s political elites. All of Lebanon’s sect-based political parties will need to be accommodated, in what is more like a balancing act than a democratic process. Protesters say the country’s leaders negotiate for their own interests, not what’s good for the country or even their own constituents.
The key task of the new government—if and when it is formed—will be to implement economic and financial reforms to meet the conditions of France and the International Monetary Fund, needed to unlock billions of dollars in badly needed aid. That could avert complete collapse in the short term but would not solve Lebanon’s structural problems. It’s got one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and is highly reliant on imports, including food, that it can no longer afford as the currency has lost 80 percent of its value since last fall. Half of Lebanese are now below the poverty line, and reforms will likely mean removing the subsidies on fuel and bread.
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker told reporters Thursday: “Whatever government comes next must commit to and have the ability to implement reforms that can lead to economic opportunity, better governance, and an end to endemic corruption.” Jan Kubis, the United Nations special coordinator for Lebanon, warned the country’s leaders not to “count on miracles, foreign elections, or external donors—the rescue must start in Lebanon, by Lebanon.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-24--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

As former Yankees baseball great Yogi Berra once said , it ’ s déjà vu all over again .
Nearly a year ago , on Oct. 29 , 2019 , Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri—an emblem of the country ’ s corrupt and ineffectual political class—gave into protesters ’ demands for his resignation .
But just two days ago , on Oct. 22 , Hariri assumed the premiership once again .
He ’ s unpopular , sure , but , after months of unprecedented turmoil for Lebanon , it appears there ’ s nobody else willing or able to run @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political reality has come full circle .
Meanwhile , international relations scholars—including many avowed Republicans—are backing Joe Biden in next month ’ s presidential race and give incumbent Donald Trump low marks on his foreign-policy record .
To the president ’ s probable chagrin , 71 percent of experts say there are no international policy areas in which Trump has performed better than his predecessor , Barack Obama .
Plus , an addictive quarantine hobby that , if played right ( or very wrong ) , could land you in the upper echelons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saad Hariri Back in Charge of Lebanon ?
Lebanon ’ s sectarian political system—which dictates the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim—limits the candidate pool significantly .
Now , after Lebanon ’ s interim premier-designate failed to form a cabinet , it appears the only man left for the job is disgraced former Prime Minister Saad Hariri , who ’ s making a reluctant return to the post he resigned from last year , Rebecca Collard explains .
2 .
Poll : How Biden and Trump Differ on Foreign Policy The U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but there ’ s one voter demographic that ’ s nearly unanimously in favor of Democratic nominee Joe Biden : international relations scholars , Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes , Alexandra Murphy , Susan Peterson , Ryan Powers , and Michael J. Tierney write .
3 .
The Game That Ruins Friendships and Shapes Careers Henry Kissinger ’ s board game of choice—Diplomacy—has made a comeback during the coronavirus pandemic , with nerdy and power-hungry players converging to craft ( virtual ) spheres of influence .
But it ’ s not all fun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ others , functions as a legitimate training ground for Washington ’ s dirty politicking , David Klion writes .
The United States wants to include China in nuclear weapons negotiations with Russia .
The demand unearths a complicated history of the Soviet Union ’ s initial involvement in—and subsequent trepidation about—Beijing ’ s nuclear program , which it regarded with the same level of caution as did Washington , Joseph Torigian writes .
5 .
Trump , Not Biden , Wrecked American Power in the Pacific There is a widespread assumption in Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region than former President Barack Obama—or former Vice President Biden .
Public opinion polling tells a very different story , Van Jackson and Hunter Marston write .

As former Yankees baseball great Yogi Berra once said, it’s déjà vu all over again. Nearly a year ago, on Oct. 29, 2019, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri—an emblem of the country’s corrupt and ineffectual political class—gave into protesters’ demands for his resignation. But just two days ago, on Oct. 22, Hariri assumed the premiership once again. He’s unpopular, sure, but, after months of unprecedented turmoil for Lebanon, it appears there’s nobody else willing or able to run the splintered country. Lebanon’s political reality has come full circle.
As former Yankees baseball great Yogi Berra once said, it’s déjà vu all over again. Nearly a year ago, on Oct. 29, 2019, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri—an emblem of the country’s corrupt and ineffectual political class—gave into protesters’ demands for his resignation. But just two days ago, on Oct. 22, Hariri assumed the premiership once again. He’s unpopular, sure, but, after months of unprecedented turmoil for Lebanon, it appears there’s nobody else willing or able to run the splintered country. Lebanon’s political reality has come full circle.
Meanwhile, international relations scholars—including many avowed Republicans—are backing Joe Biden in next month’s presidential race and give incumbent Donald Trump low marks on his foreign-policy record. To the president’s probable chagrin, 71 percent of experts say there are no international policy areas in which Trump has performed better than his predecessor, Barack Obama.
Plus, an addictive quarantine hobby that, if played right (or very wrong), could land you in the upper echelons of politics.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A Lebanese protester
Lebanon’s sectarian political system—which dictates the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim—limits the candidate pool significantly. Now, after Lebanon’s interim premier-designate failed to form a cabinet, it appears the only man left for the job is disgraced former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who’s making a reluctant return to the post he resigned from last year, Rebecca Collard explains.
U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden debate at the Health Education Campus of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland on Sept. 29.
The U.S. presidential election may end up being tight, but there’s one voter demographic that’s nearly unanimously in favor of Democratic nominee Joe Biden: international relations scholars, Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Alexandra Murphy, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney write.
Henry Kissinger’s board game of choice—Diplomacy—has made a comeback during the coronavirus pandemic, with nerdy and power-hungry players converging to craft (virtual) spheres of influence. But it’s not all fun: The game, which requires manipulating others, functions as a legitimate training ground for Washington’s dirty politicking, David Klion writes.
A military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing
The United States wants to include China in nuclear weapons negotiations with Russia. The demand unearths a complicated history of the Soviet Union’s initial involvement in—and subsequent trepidation about—Beijing’s nuclear program, which it regarded with the same level of caution as did Washington, Joseph Torigian writes.
The South Korean Navy Aegis destroyer King Sejong the Great sails during a drill on the Dokdo/Takeshima islets on Aug. 25, 2019.
There is a widespread assumption in Washington that Trump is better-liked in the Asia-Pacific region than former President Barack Obama—or former Vice President Biden. Public opinion polling tells a very different story, Van Jackson and Hunter Marston write.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-24--Here’s How the 2020 U.S. Elections Resemble Those of Fragile Democracies

Here ’ s How the 2020 U.S .
Elections Resemble Those of Fragile Democracies With an incumbent president attacking the electoral process as rigged and refusing to commit to accepting the results , the Nov. 3 U.S. elections increasingly resemble those in struggling democracies and autocratic countries .
I speak from experience , having led or managed some 40 election observation efforts in 22 countries over more than 30 years .
As the co-founder and president of Democracy International , I now see the United States exhibiting many of the same kinds of problems with elections that we in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in countries where democracy is less established .
In genuine , established democracies , political competitors generally do not attack the rules or the fairness of the process , accuse the opposing candidate or the election authorities of cheating , intimidate voters , or threaten them with violence .
In less than fully democratic countries , on the other hand , complaints about fraud and fairness are routine , and violence—or the threat of it—is often involved .
This tends to undermine public confidence in the elections and in democracy itself .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have observed elections , much of the argument is about the integrity of the rules and process .
Losing candidates routinely attack the fairness of the electoral process , whether or not they have a basis for their attacks .
In fact , you can tell that a country is not ( or not yet ) a successful democracy when the losers of its elections blame fraud for their loss and attack the legitimacy of the process .
You can tell that a country is not a successful democracy when the losers of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimacy of the process .
The United States can now be compared with Bangladesh : The latter has many of the hallmarks of a democracy , such as multiparty elections and a functioning parliament , but in each of the six national elections since the country ’ s transition away from authoritarianism in 1991 , the losing party has accused the winning party of rigging the vote .
Another example is Egypt , which has missed the opportunity to move toward genuine democracy since its revolution in 2011 , as the integrity of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been challenged .
In presidential elections in Afghanistan in both 2014 and 2019 , candidate Abdullah Abdullah refused to concede to the declared winner , President Ashraf Ghani , plunging the country into political crisis .
In the worst case , allegations of stolen elections can lead to a paroxysm of violence , as in Kenya in 2007 , where about 1400 people were killed .
Although Kenya ’ s more recent elections have seen less violence , the losing parties again complained that the elections had been stolen .
Much like political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump has aggressively questioned the credibility of the election process .
During the Sept. 29 presidential debate , for example , he claimed , without evidence , that there is “ going to be fraud like you ’ ve never seen.
” Even though voting by mail is well established throughout the country , Trump has repeatedly disparaged absentee balloting , calling it “ horrible ” and “ corrupt.
” He tweeted : “ Mail-in ballots are very dangerous .
There ’ s tremendous fraud involved and tremendous illegality.
” In a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jr. asserted : “ The radical left are laying the groundwork to steal this election … Their plan is to add millions of fraudulent ballots that can cancel your vote and overturn the election.
” Trump has also attacked election administrators .
He called Jocelyn Benson , who oversees elections in Michigan , a “ rogue Secretary of State ” and accused her of acting “ illegally and without authorization ” for implementing the state ’ s legally valid policy on absentee ballots .
He also threatened “ to hold up funding to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this Voter Fraud path !
” If Trump loses the election and blames fraud , he will join a long tradition of autocrats who have lost their elections .
Voter intimidation at polling places by unofficial security forces—or by poll watchers affiliated with political parties—is another practice often seen in less democratic countries and criticized by international election observers .
We do strongly advocate for legitimate observers from nonpartisan citizen groups and political parties to gain access to polling stations , but international standards require generally that poll watchers be accredited and trained—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harass voters .
During elections in Egypt in 2014 and 2015 , we criticized the presence of unidentified plain-clothed armed personnel at polling stations .
In Myanmar in 2015 , observers expressed concern about the recruitment of civilians for an auxiliary police force to be deployed at the polls .
In Venezuela in 2018 , ruling-party activists set up red tents outside voting centers in an apparent effort to pressure voters .
The presence of these kinds of groups seems to go hand-in-hand with an increased risk of violence : In Bangladesh and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affiliated with political parties often show up at polling places to discourage their opponents ’ supporters from voting , and clashes between supporters of opposing parties are not uncommon .
In elections in Afghanistan over the past 15 years , groups opposed to the government or to democracy in general have aggressively threatened voters with violence .
As with elections in fragile countries around the world , there is every reason to worry about violence on Election Day .
Compare these practices with what is now happening in the United States : Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in to the polls and watch very carefully.
” Donald Trump , Jr. has declared : “ We need every able-bodied man and woman to join Army For Trump ’ s election security operation … We need you to help us watch them.
” The idea is that the so-called army of supporters will show up at polling places to defend their vote against supposed fraud by supporters of Democratic candidate Joe Biden .
This rhetoric seems to encourage vigilante-type confrontation during the elections and thus to increase the risk of violence .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Black Lives Matter demonstrations around the country and his seeming encouragement to white supremacists and right-wing militias , as in the Sept. 29 presidential debate when he called on the extremist Proud Boys group to “ stand back and stand by , ” and when he defended the armed young Trump supporter charged in the killing of two people at a protest in Wisconsin .
Speaking in August , Trump senior advisor Kellyanne Conway seemed to welcome violence before the election : “ The more chaos and anarchy and vandalism and violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the better it is for the very clear choice on who ’ s best on public safety and law and order.
” It is striking for a U.S. president and those close to him to be calling for actions or using language that might incite violence or imply its endorsement .
Such language is inherently intimidating , not to mention dangerous .
As with elections in fragile or undemocratic countries around the world , there is every reason to worry about an escalating confrontation on Election Day and that whichever side loses the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its supporters take to the streets .
Other problems common to controversial elections in developing countries are also now prevalent in the United States .
International observers , for example , have criticized authorities in many countries for obstacles to voter registration and balloting , which may lead to the suppression of specific voter groups .
In Myanmar , members of the Rohingya minority are generally not allowed to vote ; in Afghanistan , participating in elections has been especially difficult for women .
Likewise , in Florida , the Republican establishment has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requiring the restoration of voting rights to citizens with previous felony convictions by passing legislation and using the courts to limit those rights .
In Georgia , in the lead-up to the 2018 midterm elections , Secretary of State Brian Kemp and the state legislature adopted a so-called exact match system for voter lists that reportedly held up 53,000 voter registrations , of which 70 percent involved minority voters .
In Texas this year , state authorities have declined to expand the use of absentee balloting despite the ongoing pandemic , and Republican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ county—even the most populous ones—can have only one drop box for early ballots , thereby making voting much less accessible and disproportionately affecting urban areas more likely to vote Democratic .
And many critics contend that recent service cuts by the U.S .
Postal Service at the behest of new Postmaster General ( and Trump donor ) Louis DeJoy seem calculated to slow delivery of mail-in ballots .
Because of Trump ’ s attacks on the process , elections in the United States look more like those we have observed in less-than-democratic countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the establishment of independent election authorities to oversee the interpretation and implementation of election laws , and the administration of the election itself , as official election management bodies often favor ruling parties .
In many respects , this problem is actually worse in the United States , where there is no national election authority like in most democracies , and where partisan state and local political officials generally run elections .
They sometimes even run elections in which they themselves are candidates , as happened in Georgia in 2018 , when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was narrowly elected governor .
During the election itself , international observers almost always urge candidates , parties , and voters to wait patiently for votes to be tallied and to avoid prematurely claiming victory or questioning the count , as has happened in dozens of places , including Afghanistan in 2014 , Honduras and Kenya in 2017 , and Guyana and Malawi this year .
In the United States this year , AP News has reported that “ some Trump allies say their best bet is to hope that the results look @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the mail-in ballots are counted , allowing Trump to declare victory and have the results thrown to the courts.
” Trump apparently wants the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene on his behalf in any post-election dispute over ballot counting ; during the first presidential debate , he admitted that he wants the Supreme Court “ to look at the ballots , ” calling for the confirmation of Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett in time for her to participate in such a case .
“ I think [ the election ] will end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he said .
“ And I think it ’ s very important that we have nine justices.
” From experience monitoring elections around the world , we know that what distinguishes a genuine democracy from a troubled or fake one is that all major candidates and parties accept the rules and those that lose accept and respect the results .
Legitimacy derives not only from the laws and rules that govern the system but also from broad acceptance of the rules of the game and the legitimacy of the process .
In large @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the process , elections in the United States look more and more like those we have observed in less-than-democratic countries .
These are the kinds of problems that trigger substantial international concern .
They hurt public confidence in the U.S. election process and threaten to undermine the very legitimacy of the United States ’ democracy .

With an incumbent president attacking the electoral process as rigged and refusing to commit to accepting the results, the Nov. 3 U.S. elections increasingly resemble those in struggling democracies and autocratic countries. I speak from experience, having led or managed some 40 election observation efforts in 22 countries over more than 30 years.
With an incumbent president attacking the electoral process as rigged and refusing to commit to accepting the results, the Nov. 3 U.S. elections increasingly resemble those in struggling democracies and autocratic countries. I speak from experience, having led or managed some 40 election observation efforts in 22 countries over more than 30 years.
As the co-founder and president of Democracy International, I now see the United States exhibiting many of the same kinds of problems with elections that we in the international election monitoring community have long criticized in countries where democracy is less established. In genuine, established democracies, political competitors generally do not attack the rules or the fairness of the process, accuse the opposing candidate or the election authorities of cheating, intimidate voters, or threaten them with violence. In less than fully democratic countries, on the other hand, complaints about fraud and fairness are routine, and violence—or the threat of it—is often involved. This tends to undermine public confidence in the elections and in democracy itself.
In the struggling democracies and autocracies where I have observed elections, much of the argument is about the integrity of the rules and process. Losing candidates routinely attack the fairness of the electoral process, whether or not they have a basis for their attacks. In fact, you can tell that a country is not (or not yet) a successful democracy when the losers of its elections blame fraud for their loss and attack the legitimacy of the process.
You can tell that a country is not a successful democracy when the losers of its elections blame fraud and attack the legitimacy of the process.
The United States can now be compared with Bangladesh: The latter has many of the hallmarks of a democracy, such as multiparty elections and a functioning parliament, but in each of the six national elections since the country’s transition away from authoritarianism in 1991, the losing party has accused the winning party of rigging the vote. Another example is Egypt, which has missed the opportunity to move toward genuine democracy since its revolution in 2011, as the integrity of each of a series of elections has been challenged. In presidential elections in Afghanistan in both 2014 and 2019, candidate Abdullah Abdullah refused to concede to the declared winner, President Ashraf Ghani, plunging the country into political crisis. In the worst case, allegations of stolen elections can lead to a paroxysm of violence, as in Kenya in 2007, where about 1400 people were killed. Although Kenya’s more recent elections have seen less violence, the losing parties again complained that the elections had been stolen.
Much like political competitors in undemocratic countries, U.S. President Donald Trump has aggressively questioned the credibility of the election process. During the Sept. 29 presidential debate, for example, he claimed, without evidence, that there is “going to be fraud like you’ve never seen.” Even though voting by mail is well established throughout the country, Trump has repeatedly disparaged absentee balloting, calling it “horrible” and “corrupt.” He tweeted: “Mail-in ballots are very dangerous. There’s tremendous fraud involved and tremendous illegality.” In a recent online video, Donald Trump, Jr. asserted: “The radical left are laying the groundwork to steal this election … Their plan is to add millions of fraudulent ballots that can cancel your vote and overturn the election.” Trump has also attacked election administrators. He called Jocelyn Benson, who oversees elections in Michigan, a “rogue Secretary of State” and accused her of acting “illegally and without authorization” for implementing the state’s legally valid policy on absentee ballots. He also threatened “to hold up funding to Michigan if they want to go down this Voter Fraud path!” If Trump loses the election and blames fraud, he will join a long tradition of autocrats who have lost their elections.
Voter intimidation at polling places by unofficial security forces—or by poll watchers affiliated with political parties—is another practice often seen in less democratic countries and criticized by international election observers. We do strongly advocate for legitimate observers from nonpartisan citizen groups and political parties to gain access to polling stations, but international standards require generally that poll watchers be accredited and trained—and never allowed to disrupt polling places or harass voters. During elections in Egypt in 2014 and 2015, we criticized the presence of unidentified plain-clothed armed personnel at polling stations. In Myanmar in 2015, observers expressed concern about the recruitment of civilians for an auxiliary police force to be deployed at the polls. In Venezuela in 2018, ruling-party activists set up red tents outside voting centers in an apparent effort to pressure voters. The presence of these kinds of groups seems to go hand-in-hand with an increased risk of violence: In Bangladesh and Pakistan, for example, armed gangs affiliated with political parties often show up at polling places to discourage their opponents’ supporters from voting, and clashes between supporters of opposing parties are not uncommon. In elections in Afghanistan over the past 15 years, groups opposed to the government or to democracy in general have aggressively threatened voters with violence.
As with elections in fragile countries around the world, there is every reason to worry about violence on Election Day.
Compare these practices with what is now happening in the United States: Trump has urged his supporters “to go in to the polls and watch very carefully.” Donald Trump, Jr. has declared: “We need every able-bodied man and woman to join Army For Trump’s election security operation … We need you to help us watch them.” The idea is that the so-called army of supporters will show up at polling places to defend their vote against supposed fraud by supporters of Democratic candidate Joe Biden. This rhetoric seems to encourage vigilante-type confrontation during the elections and thus to increase the risk of violence. It echoes the president’s attacks on Black Lives Matter demonstrations around the country and his seeming encouragement to white supremacists and right-wing militias, as in the Sept. 29 presidential debate when he called on the extremist Proud Boys group to “stand back and stand by,” and when he defended the armed young Trump supporter charged in the killing of two people at a protest in Wisconsin. Speaking in August, Trump senior advisor Kellyanne Conway seemed to welcome violence before the election: “The more chaos and anarchy and vandalism and violence reigns,” she said, “the better it is for the very clear choice on who’s best on public safety and law and order.” It is striking for a U.S. president and those close to him to be calling for actions or using language that might incite violence or imply its endorsement. Such language is inherently intimidating, not to mention dangerous. As with elections in fragile or undemocratic countries around the world, there is every reason to worry about an escalating confrontation on Election Day and that whichever side loses the 2020 elections in the U.S. will see its supporters take to the streets.
Other problems common to controversial elections in developing countries are also now prevalent in the United States. International observers, for example, have criticized authorities in many countries for obstacles to voter registration and balloting, which may lead to the suppression of specific voter groups. In Myanmar, members of the Rohingya minority are generally not allowed to vote; in Afghanistan, participating in elections has been especially difficult for women. Likewise, in Florida, the Republican establishment has fought to undermine a state constitutional amendment requiring the restoration of voting rights to citizens with previous felony convictions by passing legislation and using the courts to limit those rights. In Georgia, in the lead-up to the 2018 midterm elections, Secretary of State Brian Kemp and the state legislature adopted a so-called exact match system for voter lists that reportedly held up 53,000 voter registrations, of which 70 percent involved minority voters. In Texas this year, state authorities have declined to expand the use of absentee balloting despite the ongoing pandemic, and Republican Governor Greg Abbott has decreed that each county—even the most populous ones—can have only one drop box for early ballots, thereby making voting much less accessible and disproportionately affecting urban areas more likely to vote Democratic. And many critics contend that recent service cuts by the U.S. Postal Service at the behest of new Postmaster General (and Trump donor) Louis DeJoy seem calculated to slow delivery of mail-in ballots.
Because of Trump’s attacks on the process, elections in the United States look more like those we have observed in less-than-democratic countries.
Similarly, international observers routinely call for the establishment of independent election authorities to oversee the interpretation and implementation of election laws, and the administration of the election itself, as official election management bodies often favor ruling parties. In many respects, this problem is actually worse in the United States, where there is no national election authority like in most democracies, and where partisan state and local political officials generally run elections. They sometimes even run elections in which they themselves are candidates, as happened in Georgia in 2018, when Kemp oversaw the election in which he was narrowly elected governor.
During the election itself, international observers almost always urge candidates, parties, and voters to wait patiently for votes to be tallied and to avoid prematurely claiming victory or questioning the count, as has happened in dozens of places, including Afghanistan in 2014, Honduras and Kenya in 2017, and Guyana and Malawi this year. In the United States this year, AP News has reported that “some Trump allies say their best bet is to hope that the results look close election night, before some of the mail-in ballots are counted, allowing Trump to declare victory and have the results thrown to the courts.” Trump apparently wants the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene on his behalf in any post-election dispute over ballot counting; during the first presidential debate, he admitted that he wants the Supreme Court “to look at the ballots,” calling for the confirmation of Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett in time for her to participate in such a case. “I think [the election] will end up in the Supreme Court,” he said. “And I think it’s very important that we have nine justices.”
From experience monitoring elections around the world, we know that what distinguishes a genuine democracy from a troubled or fake one is that all major candidates and parties accept the rules and those that lose accept and respect the results. Legitimacy derives not only from the laws and rules that govern the system but also from broad acceptance of the rules of the game and the legitimacy of the process.
In large part because of Trump’s attacks on the process, elections in the United States look more and more like those we have observed in less-than-democratic countries. These are the kinds of problems that trigger substantial international concern. They hurt public confidence in the U.S. election process and threaten to undermine the very legitimacy of the United States’ democracy.