foreignpolicy--2020-06-01--Kim Is Back, but North Korea Still Isn’t Stable

Kim Is Back , but North Korea Still Isn ’ t Stable After nearly three weeks of international speculation about his health , North Korean leader Kim Jong Un returned to public view at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new factory on May 1 .
Kim is apparently “ alive and well.
” But it would be a mistake to lose focus on North Korea , because potential instability still exists there , from domestic shocks to new military provocations .
Kim ’ s continued power does not equate to a static situation in North Korea .
The Kim regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or it may crack down on social trends and commerce that do not comport with the ruling party ’ s ideology and control of the economy .
The military might make a few external provocations while quietly improving its capabilities , or it might push the envelope with further escalation .
In terms of diplomacy , Pyongyang could continue to reject engagement , or it could pursue tactical cooperation for short-term gain .
North Korea ’ s choices will be driven primarily by domestic politics and adjusted when the regime perceives changing international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recommended in Foreign Policy during Kim ’ s absence , Washington and Seoul will be better off preparing for a coordinated response to Pyongyang ’ s next move .
Kim appears focused on domestic affairs in light of North Korea ’ s economic challenges .
To address these , he could do more to evade sanctions , strengthen his country ’ s self-reliance , or both .
The coronavirus pandemic further complicates matters because North Korea ’ s self-imposed national quarantine has nearly halted trade with China , upon which the country is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be doing more than international sanctions to arrest economic activity across North Korea ’ s borders .
Along with the regime ’ s persistent military ambitions , Kim ’ s need to show domestic strength in the face of a coronavirus outbreak may explain the series of missile tests in March and April .
Kim ’ s reasons for choosing the Sunchon fertilizer plant ’ s ribbon-cutting ceremony as his occasion to reappear are unknown .
But the visit suggests the importance he places on food production , particularly while the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and flow of foreign currency from China .
After all , in his speech at the Workers ’ Party of Korea ’ s plenary meeting ahead of the new year , Kim stressed that the country needs to band together in an “ offensive for frontal breakthrough ” to “ foil the enemies ’ sanctions and blockade ” and “ fully meet the demand needed for … economic development ” and the people ’ s livelihood , according to a summary of his speech published in state-run media .
In the current context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urgent priority than extracting uranium from the fertilizer ’ s phosphate to help make nuclear weapons , especially if North Korea ’ s uranium plants at Pyongsan and Pakchon and other uranium enrichment facilities are operating normally .
Kim has continuously emphasized economic development , which is a pillar of North Korea ’ s byungjin strategic line dating back to 1966 to achieve both military or nuclear might and economic prosperity in parallel .
Kim reinvigorated byungjin in his December 2019 plenary speech while preparing his people for a long confrontation with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Juche , the country ’ s official ideology of self-reliance , across all sectors ( economic , political , defense ) to protect national sovereignty .
While blaming the United States for North Korea ’ s economic woes , state propaganda promotes self-reliance to motivate hard work , fuel nationalism , and portray Kim as the national savior and defender .
Outsiders may not have been the only ones questioning the sustainability of Kim ’ s leadership while he was absent .
The regime might look to reinforce its institutional strength by further @ @ @ @ @ @ @ central authority , stabilizing relations with the military and state bureaucracy .
Kim may also intensify political purges and anticorruption campaigns .
The current scarcity of goods in North Korea could be an opportunity for the state to reassert control over markets and currency , redistributing benefits from the nouveau riche donju mercantile class to chosen loyalists .
But it is still an open question whether the regime will double down on repression or become more open to outside assistance .
Maintaining international tensions as a means of pursuing strategic objectives remains a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world learned of Kim ’ s reappearance in public , tensions rose along the inter-Korean border when North Korea fired multiple shots , four of which hit a South Korean guard post in the Demilitarized Zone .
The South Korean side reported no casualties but fired warning shots in response and announced it considered the incident to be an unintentional .
The United Nations Command investigation could not “ definitively ” determine whether the North Korean gunshots were intentional , but it found that both Koreas violated the 1953 Korean War armistice .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations Command investigation , but its gunfire nevertheless violated the two Koreas ’ Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018 in which they pledged to cease all hostile acts on land , air , and sea .
Instead of replying to Seoul ’ s query for an explanation , Pyongyang condemned South Korea for conducting joint air force and navy drills in the Yellow Sea , the site of several clashes , some deadly , between the two Koreas ’ militaries and fishing vessels .
Blaming Seoul for violating the Comprehensive Military Agreement with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to maintain or escalate tensions on the peninsula to gain leverage in future talks with Washington .
While a major diplomatic breakthrough with Washington is unlikely before the U.S. presidential election in November , North Korea will continue pursuing its strategic aim of perfecting a nuclear deterrent and gaining strategic advantage without triggering outright conflict .
Its approach is conducting gray-zone provocations—just below U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s red line of testing intercontinental ballistic missiles or nuclear devices—including firing short-range ballistic missiles , waging cyberattacks , and perhaps disguising a long-range missile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could also follow through with Kim ’ s pledge to unveil a “ new strategic weapon ” which could be a qualitatively new missile or ballistic missile submarine .
It could be rolled out in a test , display , or a purported deployment .
On May 24 , state media reported that Kim laid out policies to increase the country ’ s “ nuclear war deterrence ” in a meeting of the Workers ’ Party Central Military Commission but did not disclose specifics .
North Korea does not necessarily need to test @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear arsenal .
It can expand facilities and follow Kim ’ s 2018 orders to “ mass-produce ” and deploy nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles .
Recent satellite imagery shows the near completion of a new facility near Pyongyang International Airport that experts believe is used to support the country ’ s ballistic missile program .
North Korea may have a freer hand in these endeavors as it faces less coordinated international pressure today than before the recent deterioration of U.S.-China relations .
Inter-Korean relations are another source of possible instability .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 10 , President Moon Jae-in again expressed South Korea ’ s capability and willingness to engage North Korea , beginning with public health cooperation , the reconnection of railways and roads , excavating war remains , and , eventually , sending South Korean tourists to the North .
Nongovernmental organizations have also called for a joint event commemorating the 20th anniversary of the two Koreas ’ first-ever summit in June 2000 .
But it is unclear if and when Pyongyang will entertain Seoul ’ s proposals for reengagement .
In the event North @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paint the acceptance of South Korean assistance as reciprocity for Pyongyang ’ s “ success ” in anti-epidemic measures or even as a form of tribute .
Pyongyang will still criticize South Korea for conducting military exercises with the United States and for failing to persuade Washington to lift sanctions .
Even when the Kim regime ’ s calculations to cooperate are driven by urgent practical needs , it typically looks to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States .
Seoul and Washington should continue to probe opportunities for COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without any expectation that it would jump-start nuclear diplomacy .
Inter-Korean projects , excluding humanitarian ones , should also be pursued in exchange for some proportionate North Korean denuclearization measures .
Seoul ’ s efforts at rail and road cooperation will require U.S. and U.N. sanctions exemptions , which in turn means reaching agreement with Washington on issues relating to the projects ’ scope and pace .
This approach would be politically palatable for Washington , because it would help allay concerns that North Korea will pocket benefits without taking meaningful steps toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , are not especially attractive to Pyongyang because their cash revenue would not be on the scale of Chinese tours lost to the pandemic or the profits North Korea reportedly derives from cyberhacking and cryptocurrency laundering .
The Moon government has expressed interest in expanding joint ventures into larger economic projects , such as the resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex .
But these activities would also require U.S. and U.N. sanctions relief and will not be feasible without the resumption of diplomacy leading to agreement on a broader package of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ key partners at the United Nations are likely to insist on significant and credible denuclearization measures before , or in tandem with , relaxing sanctions to allow for a reopening of Kaesong , because of concerns that the industrial park will generate funding that could be used for nuclear weapons development .
Therefore , diplomacy with North Korea will be more effective if Seoul and Washington create an incentive for denuclearization by a combination of deterrence , sanctions enforcement , and a clear articulation of the requirements for sanctions relief .
Amid all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s health will continue to be a wild card for the country ’ s future .
The rumor mill of international conjecture will probably spin many times more in the next few years .
The world experienced this with his grandfather and father because of the nature of the Kim regime .
North Korea ’ s lack of transparency about succession is a matter of coup proofing , and any modification to the “ Mount Paektu ” Kim bloodline succession is difficult because the regime has , for decades , indoctrinated and institutionalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a state religion .
Kim ’ s disappearance raised global concern about how a potential leadership vacuum in a nuclear-armed state could affect regional stability .
To be in a position to effectively respond to various contingencies , the U.S. and South Korea should resolve defense cost-sharing issues , maintain political cooperation , conduct regular field and tabletop exercises , and seek substantive discussions with China .
The next time Kim disappears could be different , and the United States and South Korea need to be prepared .

After nearly three weeks of international speculation about his health, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un returned to public view at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new factory on May 1. Kim is apparently “ alive and well .” But it would be a mistake to lose focus on North Korea, because potential instability still exists there, from domestic shocks to new military provocations. Kim’s continued power does not equate to a static situation in North Korea.
After nearly three weeks of international speculation about his health, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un returned to public view at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new factory on May 1. Kim is apparently “alive and well.” But it would be a mistake to lose focus on North Korea, because potential instability still exists there, from domestic shocks to new military provocations. Kim’s continued power does not equate to a static situation in North Korea.
The Kim regime may focus on modernizing state institutions, or it may crack down on social trends and commerce that do not comport with the ruling party’s ideology and control of the economy. The military might make a few external provocations while quietly improving its capabilities, or it might push the envelope with further escalation. In terms of diplomacy, Pyongyang could continue to reject engagement, or it could pursue tactical cooperation for short-term gain.
North Korea’s choices will be driven primarily by domestic politics and adjusted when the regime perceives changing international threats and opportunities. But as we recommended in Foreign Policy during Kim’s absence, Washington and Seoul will be better off preparing for a coordinated response irrespective of Pyongyang’s next move.
Kim appears focused on domestic affairs in light of North Korea’s economic challenges. To address these, he could do more to evade sanctions, strengthen his country’s self-reliance, or both. The coronavirus pandemic further complicates matters because North Korea’s self-imposed national quarantine has nearly halted trade with China, upon which the country is extremely dependent. Indeed, the pandemic may be doing more than international sanctions to arrest economic activity across North Korea’s borders. Along with the regime’s persistent military ambitions, Kim’s need to show domestic strength in the face of a coronavirus outbreak may explain the series of missile tests in March and April.
Kim’s reasons for choosing the Sunchon fertilizer plant’s ribbon-cutting ceremony as his occasion to reappear are unknown. But the visit suggests the importance he places on food production, particularly while the pandemic disrupts the country’s supply chain and flow of foreign currency from China. After all, in his speech at the Workers’ Party of Korea’s plenary meeting ahead of the new year, Kim stressed that the country needs to band together in an “offensive for frontal breakthrough” to “foil the enemies’ sanctions and blockade” and “fully meet the demand needed for … economic development” and the people’s livelihood, according to a summary of his speech published in state-run media. In the current context, food production could be a more urgent priority than extracting uranium from the fertilizer’s phosphate to help make nuclear weapons, especially if North Korea’s uranium plants at Pyongsan and Pakchon and other uranium enrichment facilities are operating normally.
Kim has continuously emphasized economic development, which is a pillar of North Korea’s byungjin strategic line dating back to 1966 to achieve both military or nuclear might and economic prosperity in parallel. Kim reinvigorated byungjin in his December 2019 plenary speech while preparing his people for a long confrontation with the United States and focusing national attention on Juche, the country’s official ideology of self-reliance, across all sectors (economic, political, defense) to protect national sovereignty. While blaming the United States for North Korea’s economic woes, state propaganda promotes self-reliance to motivate hard work, fuel nationalism, and portray Kim as the national savior and defender.
Outsiders may not have been the only ones questioning the sustainability of Kim’s leadership while he was absent. The regime might look to reinforce its institutional strength by further empowering the Workers’ Party as the central authority, stabilizing relations with the military and state bureaucracy. Kim may also intensify political purges and anticorruption campaigns. The current scarcity of goods in North Korea could be an opportunity for the state to reassert control over markets and currency, redistributing benefits from the nouveau riche donju mercantile class to chosen loyalists. But it is still an open question whether the regime will double down on repression or become more open to outside assistance.
Maintaining international tensions as a means of pursuing strategic objectives remains a priority. Just one day after the world learned of Kim’s reappearance in public, tensions rose along the inter-Korean border when North Korea fired multiple shots, four of which hit a South Korean guard post in the Demilitarized Zone. The South Korean side reported no casualties but fired warning shots in response and announced it considered the incident to be an “accident.” The United Nations Command investigation could not “definitively” determine whether the North Korean gunshots were intentional, but it found that both Koreas violated the 1953 Korean War armistice.
North Korea did not cooperate with the United Nations Command investigation, but its gunfire nevertheless violated the two Koreas’ Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018 in which they pledged to cease all hostile acts on land, air, and sea. Instead of replying to Seoul’s query for an explanation, Pyongyang condemned South Korea for conducting joint air force and navy drills in the Yellow Sea, the site of several clashes, some deadly, between the two Koreas’ militaries and fishing vessels. Blaming Seoul for violating the Comprehensive Military Agreement with the drills provides a pretext for Pyongyang to maintain or escalate tensions on the peninsula to gain leverage in future talks with Washington.
While a major diplomatic breakthrough with Washington is unlikely before the U.S. presidential election in November, North Korea will continue pursuing its strategic aim of perfecting a nuclear deterrent and gaining strategic advantage without triggering outright conflict. Its approach is conducting gray-zone provocations—just below U.S. President Donald Trump’s red line of testing intercontinental ballistic missiles or nuclear devices—including firing short-range ballistic missiles, waging cyberattacks, and perhaps disguising a long-range missile test as a satellite launch. Pyongyang could also follow through with Kim’s pledge to unveil a “new strategic weapon” which could be a qualitatively new missile or ballistic missile submarine. It could be rolled out in a test, display, or a purported deployment.
On May 24, state media reported that Kim laid out policies to increase the country’s “nuclear war deterrence” in a meeting of the Workers’ Party Central Military Commission but did not disclose specifics. North Korea does not necessarily need to test weapons before November to further advance its nuclear arsenal. It can expand facilities and follow Kim’s 2018 orders to “mass-produce” and deploy nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Recent satellite imagery shows the near completion of a new facility near Pyongyang International Airport that experts believe is used to support the country’s ballistic missile program. North Korea may have a freer hand in these endeavors as it faces less coordinated international pressure today than before the recent deterioration of U.S.-China relations.
Another set of potential instability factors involves inter-Korean relations. On his third anniversary in office on May 10, President Moon Jae-in again expressed South Korea’s capability and willingness to engage North Korea, beginning with public health cooperation, the reconnection of railways and roads, excavating war remains, and, eventually, sending South Korean tourists to the North. Nongovernmental organizations have also called for a joint event commemorating the 20th anniversary of the two Koreas’ first-ever summit in June 2000.
But it is unclear if and when Pyongyang will entertain Seoul’s proposals for reengagement. In the event North Korea obliges, its propaganda will likely paint the acceptance of South Korean assistance as reciprocity for Pyongyang’s “success” in anti-epidemic measures or even as a form of tribute. Pyongyang will still criticize South Korea for conducting military exercises with the United States and for failing to persuade Washington to lift sanctions. Even when the Kim regime’s calculations to cooperate are driven by urgent practical needs, it typically looks to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States.
Seoul and Washington should continue to probe opportunities for COVID-19 cooperation with Pyongyang for humanitarian purposes, without any expectation that it would jump-start nuclear diplomacy. Inter-Korean projects, excluding humanitarian ones, should also be pursued in exchange for some proportionate North Korean denuclearization measures. Seoul’s efforts at rail and road cooperation will require U.S. and U.N. sanctions exemptions, which in turn means reaching agreement with Washington on issues relating to the projects’ scope and pace. This approach would be politically palatable for Washington, because it would help allay concerns that North Korea will pocket benefits without taking meaningful steps toward denuclearization.
These smaller projects, however, are not especially attractive to Pyongyang because their cash revenue would not be on the scale of Chinese tours lost to the pandemic or the profits North Korea reportedly derives from cyberhacking and cryptocurrency laundering. The Moon government has expressed interest in expanding joint ventures into larger economic projects, such as the resumption of operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. But these activities would also require U.S. and U.N. sanctions relief and will not be feasible without the resumption of diplomacy leading to agreement on a broader package of reciprocal denuclearization steps.
Washington and its key partners at the United Nations are likely to insist on significant and credible denuclearization measures before, or in tandem with, relaxing sanctions to allow for a reopening of Kaesong, because of concerns that the industrial park will generate funding that could be used for nuclear weapons development. Therefore, diplomacy with North Korea will be more effective if Seoul and Washington incentivize denuclearization by coordinating deterrence, sanctions enforcement, and a clear articulation of the requirements for sanctions relief.
Amid all this, the North Korean leader’s health will continue to be a wild card for the country’s future. The rumor mill of international conjecture will probably spin many times more in the next few years. The world experienced this with his grandfather and father because of the nature of the Kim regime. North Korea’s lack of transparency about succession is a matter of coup proofing, and any modification to the “Mount Paektu” Kim bloodline succession is difficult because the regime has, for decades, indoctrinated and institutionalized a leadership system and ideology akin to a state religion.
Kim’s disappearance raised global concern about how a potential leadership vacuum in a nuclear-armed state could affect regional stability. To be in a position to effectively respond to various contingencies, the U.S. and South Korea should resolve defense cost-sharing issues, maintain political cooperation, conduct regular field and tabletop exercises, and seek substantive discussions with China. The next time Kim disappears could be different, and the United States and South Korea need to be prepared.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-02--Will Trump Put U.S. Boots on the Ground—at Home?

Will Trump Put U.S. Boots on the Ground—at Home ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Trump ’ s protest response shifts toward militarization , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson headed for crunch trade talks with EU Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen , and Congo reports a new Ebola outbreak .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Protests over police violence and systemic racism continued across the United States on Monday as the U.S. government response threatens to become even more militarized .
“ If a city or state refuses to take the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life and property of their residents , then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them , ” U.S. President Donald Trump said during a speech on Monday .
Other members of the Trump administration also sound as if they ’ re on the warpath .
Defense Secretary Mark Esper was heard quoting military jargon on a call with state governors that was later leaked to the public .
“ I think the sooner that you mass and dominate the battlespace , the quicker this dissipates and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ normal , ” Esper said .
From the country ’ s border to the capital .
Officers from U.S. Customs and Border Protection ( CBP ) , usually on America ’ s periphery , have been deployed in the heart of the capital .
A CBP statement said the personnel were being deployed to assist and protect “ law enforcement partners from any lawless rioting , domestic acts of terrorism , and other criminal activities.
” Acting CBP chief Mark Morgan said the officers were currently in place guarding national monuments .
Boots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestically faces some legal hurdles , as Jack Detsch reports in Foreign Policy .
“ The White House is limited from using the military to conduct most law enforcement operations under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act , ” Detsch writes .
However , that doesn ’ t close the door on military action .
Instead , the Insurrection Act—an 1807 law that was last invoked in 1992 during the Los Angeles riots after the police beating of Rodney King—could be used .
The law “ allows active-duty units to be sent in to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stop riots , ” Detsch adds .
How the world sees it .
During his phone call with state governors , Trump warned that a strong government response at home was important to maintain U.S. prestige abroad .
“ You know , when other countries watch this , they ’ re watching this , the next day wow , they ’ re really a pushover .
And we can ’ t be a pushover .
And we have all the resources—it ’ s not like we don ’ t have the resources @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know what you ’ re doing , ” he said .
As FP ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report , the protests have “ laid bare to the world deeply rooted societal problems in the United States , undercutting America ’ s standing as a standard-bearer of modern liberal values , including the promotion of human rights , democracy , and free-market capitalism.
” The view from Washington .
On Monday at about 6:30 p.m. Washington time , lines of police in riot gear began pushing a crowd of peaceful protesters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Park , where hundreds had gathered .
Foreign Policy witnessed mounted police and National Guardsmen positioned behind the front lines , as Secret Service officers fired flash-bang grenades and tear gas at protesters .
The disproportionate show of force initially appeared to be aimed at clearing the area ahead of the 7 p.m. curfew that Washington ’ s mayor , Muriel Bowser , had imposed earlier that evening .
In fact , protesters were being cleared so the president could have a photo op .
In front of St. John ’ s Church @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been gathered ( including clergy ) , Trump held up a bible as cameras flashed .
COVID-19 as strong as ever , WHO reiterates .
The World Health Organization ( WHO ) has moved to correct the record after an Italian doctor ’ s claims that the potency of the coronavirus is diminishing over time .
The assertion was made by Alberto Zangrillo , the head of intensive care at Italy ’ s San Raffaele Hospital , citing a yet to be released study .
Zangrillo is well known in Italy as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personal physician .
“ In terms of transmissibility , that has not changed , in terms of severity , that has not changed , ” the WHO official Maria Van Kerkhove said .
U.S. envoy signals progress in Afghanistan .
The U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan , Zalmay Khalilzad , talked up the chances of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban in remarks to reporters on Monday .
“ We are in a good place , ” Khalilzad said , adding that violence levels had stayed low after a recent three-day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finally we ’ re moving forward to the start of the intra-Afghan negotiations , ” he added .
Over the weekend , prisoner releases continued : The Afghan government released 700 Taliban members and the Taliban released 73 government prisoners .
Taliban officials have another threat to worry about ; according to a report in FP , many of the group ’ s top leaders are infected with COVID-19 .
U.K. and EU plan crunch talks .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are headed for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade negotiations between the two sides , the Financial Times reports .
It comes as the deadline for the United Kingdom to request a two-year extension approaches at the end of June .
Johnson has remained adamant that the U.K. must conclude a deal before Dec. 31 , but trade negotiations have recently been bogged down—first because of coronavirus-related delays and now due to disagreements over fisheries and a common regulatory framework .
Congo reports second Ebola outbreak .
Authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo have declared a new Ebola outbreak in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second ongoing outbreak in the country .
Six cases have been recorded so far , with four deaths .
“ This outbreak is a reminder that COVID-19 is not the only health threat people face , ” World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said on twitter .
Unrest at social media giant .
Some employees at Facebook—whose 2.6 billion monthly active users would make it the world ’ s most populous country—staged a virtual walkout on Monday in protest of CEO Mark Zuckerberg ’ s hands-off approach to President Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protests .
Facebook spokesperson Liz Bourgeois said the company is open to feedback from employees and that “ we recognize the pain many of our people are feeling right now , especially our Black community.
” According to Facebook ’ s 2019 diversity report , just 3.8 percent of employees are black .
On Monday , the company also committed to donating $ 10 million ( or roughly 0.2 percent of its 2020 first quarter earnings ) to racial justice groups in the United States .
Poland presidential race tightens .
Andrzej Duda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Law and Justice party would lose in the second round of the country ’ s presidential election , according to a new poll .
The poll found Duda would win the first round , but be beaten by either of his rival candidates—Warsaw mayor Rafal Trzaskowski or Catholic journalist Szymon Holownia—in the second round .
The Polish government was criticized last month for trying to force through a postal vote for a May 10 election date .
Although that plan was ultimately defeated , a new date for the election has yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up Japan on Monday in a synchronized display across the country .
The project , called “ Cheer up !
Hanabi ” ( the Japanese word for fireworks ) , was a show of strength for an industry facing a sharp downturn with the Tokyo Olympics postponed and other fireworks festivals canceled over coronavirus fears .
As the displays were designed to raise spirits during the country ’ s coronavirus epidemic , social distancing still factored into the planning : locations of the fireworks were kept secret and displays were limited to five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s protest response shifts toward militarization, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson is headed for crunch trade talks with EU Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo reports a new Ebola outbreak.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Trump’s protest response shifts toward militarization, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson is headed for crunch trade talks with EU Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo reports a new Ebola outbreak.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Trump Threatens Military Response to Protests
Protests over police violence and systemic racism continued across the United States on Monday as the U.S. government response threatens to become even more militarized. “If a city or state refuses to take the actions that are necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them,” U.S. President Donald Trump said during a speech on Monday.
Other members of the Trump administration also sound as if they’re on the warpath. Defense Secretary Mark Esper was heard quoting military jargon on a call with state governors that was later leaked to the public. “I think the sooner that you mass and dominate the battle space, the quicker this dissipates and we can get back to the right normal,” Esper said.
From the country’s border to the capital. Officers from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), usually on America’s periphery, have been deployed in the heart of the capital. A CBP statement said the personnel were being deployed to assist and protect “law enforcement partners from any lawless rioting, domestic acts of terrorism, and other criminal activities.” Acting CBP chief Mark Morgan said the officers were currently in place guarding national monuments.
Boots on home ground? Deploying U.S. troops domestically faces some legal hurdles, as FP’s Jack Detsch reports. “The White House is limited from using the military to conduct most law enforcement operations under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act,” Detsch writes. However, that doesn’t close the door on military action. Instead, the Insurrection Act—an 1807 law that was last invoked in 1992 during the Los Angeles riots after the police beating of Rodney King—could be used. The law “allows active-duty units to be sent in to relieve the National Guard or local police to stop riots,” Detsch adds.
How the world sees it. During his phone call with state governors, Trump warned that a strong government response at home was important to maintain U.S. prestige abroad. “You know, when other countries watch this, they’re watching this, the next day wow, they’re really a pushover. And we can’t be a pushover. And we have all the resources—it’s not like we don’t have the resources. So, I don’t know what you’re doing,” he said.
As FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report, the protests have “laid bare to the world deeply rooted societal problems in the United States, undercutting America’s standing as a standard-bearer of modern liberal values, including the promotion of human rights, democracy, and free-market capitalism.”
The view from Washington. On Monday at about 6:30 p.m. Washington time, lines of police in riot gear began pushing a crowd of peaceful protesters back from the north end of Lafayette Park, where hundreds had gathered. Foreign Policy witnessed mounted police and National Guardsmen positioned behind the front lines, as Secret Service officers fired flash-bang grenades and tear gas at protesters.
The disproportionate show of force initially appeared to be aimed at clearing the area ahead of the 7 p.m. curfew that Washington’s mayor, Muriel Bowser, had imposed earlier that evening. In fact, protesters were being cleared so the president could have a photo op. In front of St. John’s Church, where moments before masses of people had been gathered (including clergy), Trump held up a bible as cameras flashed.
What We’re Following Today
COVID-19 as strong as ever, WHO reiterates. The World Health Organization (WHO) has moved to correct the record after an Italian doctor’s claims that the potency of the coronavirus is diminishing over time. The assertion was made by Alberto Zangrillo, the head of intensive care at Italy’s San Raffaele Hospital, citing a yet to be released study. Zangrillo is well known in Italy as former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s personal physician. “In terms of transmissibility, that has not changed, in terms of severity, that has not changed,” the WHO official Maria Van Kerkhove said.
U.S. envoy signals progress in Afghanistan. The U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, talked up the chances of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban in remarks to reporters on Monday. “We are in a good place,” Khalilzad said, adding that violence levels had stayed low after a recent three-day cease-fire. “We are optimistic that finally we’re moving forward to the start of the intra-Afghan negotiations,” he added.
Over the weekend, prisoner releases continued: The Afghan government released 700 Taliban members and the Taliban released 73 government prisoners. Taliban officials have another threat to worry about; according to a report in FP, many of the group’s top leaders are infected with COVID-19.
U.K. and EU plan crunch talks. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are headed for talks this month aimed at resolving post-Brexit trade negotiations between the two sides, the Financial Times reports. It comes as the deadline for the United Kingdom to request a two-year extension approaches at the end of June. Johnson has remained adamant that the U.K. must conclude a deal before Dec. 31, but trade negotiations have recently been bogged down—first because of coronavirus-related delays and now due to disagreements over fisheries and a common regulatory framework.
Congo reports second Ebola outbreak. Authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo have declared a new Ebola outbreak in the city of Mbandaka, now the second ongoing outbreak in the country. Six cases have been recorded so far, with four deaths. “This outbreak is a reminder that COVID-19 is not the only health threat people face,” World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said on twitter.
Keep an Eye On
Unrest at social media giant. Some employees at Facebook—whose 2.6 billion monthly active users would make it the world’s most populous country—staged a virtual walkout on Monday in protest of CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s hands-off approach to President Trump’s increasingly inflammatory posts around the George Floyd protests.
Facebook spokesperson Liz Bourgeois said the company is open to feedback from employees and that “we recognize the pain many of our people are feeling right now, especially our Black community.” According to Facebook’s 2019 diversity report, just 3.8 percent of employees are black. On Monday, the company also committed to donating $10 million (or roughly 0.2 percent of its 2020 first quarter earnings) to racial justice groups in the United States.
Poland presidential race tightens. Andrzej Duda, the favored candidate of Poland’s Law and Justice party would lose in the second round of the country’s presidential election, according to a new poll. The poll found Duda would win the first round, but be beaten by either of his rival candidates—Warsaw mayor Rafal Trzaskowski or Catholic journalist Szymon Holownia—in the second round. The Polish government was criticized last month for trying to force through a postal vote for a May 10 election date. Although that plan was ultimately defeated, a new date for the election has yet to be set.
Odds and Ends
Surprise fireworks lit up Japan on Monday in a synchronized display across the country. The project, called “Cheer up! Hanabi” (the Japanese word for fireworks), was a show of strength for an industry facing a sharp downturn with the Tokyo Olympics postponed and other fireworks festivals canceled over coronavirus fears. As the displays were designed to raise spirits during the country’s coronavirus epidemic, social distancing still factored into the planning: locations of the fireworks were kept secret and displays were limited to five minutes to prevent crowds forming.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
Correction, June 2, 2020: The photograph accompanying this article depicts members of U.S. Marshal Special Operations restraining a protester. A previous version of the photo caption mislabeled the federal agents.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-02--U.S. Unable to Monitor Military Aid to Egypt’s Anti-Terrorism Fight

U.S .
Unable to Monitor Military Aid to Egypt ’ s Anti-Terrorism Fight The United States lacks visibility on how Egypt is using U.S.-provided weapons in the Sinai Peninsula , according to a State Department review obtained by Foreign Policy , a blind spot that Congress worries could limit the Trump administration ’ s ability to investigate human rights abuses in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State .
The State Department said that Egypt has only given U.S. forces stationed in Sinai infrequent access to monitor allegations of human rights abuses , and that Cairo has recently started to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers , limiting American visibility .
“ As a result , it is very difficult to determine whether U.S.-origin defense articles were used in a particular operation or maneuver , ” the report said , adding that U.S. troops do not have consistent on-the-ground access to Sinai .
“ The U.S. government generally lacks sufficient information to directly link specific U.S.-origin equipment to alleged violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law by Egyptian security forces.
” U.S. President Donald Trump has lavished praise on his Egyptian counterpart , Abdel Fattah al-Sisi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favorite dictator ” and continuing American military aid apace at $ 1.3 billion , despite internal protests earlier in his administration and assessments that Cairo ’ s trajectory toward reforms has been slowed by the former general ’ s authoritarian tendencies .
But Egypt ’ s long-standing status as the second-largest recipient of U.S. security assistance has come under fire from Capitol Hill in recent years , which has urged the Obama and Trump administrations to hold Egypt ’ s feet to the fire for human rights abuses in Sinai , the detention @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that restricts nongovernmental organizations ’ activities .
A State Department assessment released last year found that the Egyptian government “ committed arbitrary or unlawful killings , ” sometimes with impunity , as Sisi sought to redouble counter-drug operations and crack down on weapons smuggling in areas of North Sinai that border the Gaza Strip .
In 2019 , Human Rights Watch said that it had documented 20 cases of extrajudicial killings of detainees in North Sinai in recent years .
An aide to Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy , who has held up $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Egypt since 2018 , said the findings from the report show that Cairo ’ s counterterrorism campaign is failing and that the administration has little ability to track whether State and Defense Department-provided arms are causing civilian deaths , a potential violation of U.S. law .
“ What ’ s happening there is an example of where our weapons are being used to carry out a strategy that isn ’ t working and where we don ’ t know if they are harming civilians , ” the aide told Foreign Policy .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t know with confidence how our military aid is being used .
The State Department says they investigate reports of human rights abuses .
How do they do that , and where ’ s the evidence that anything is done about it ?
” The State Department said in the report that Egypt remains “ generally ” in compliance with U.S. programs that track the use of American military equipment .
Though there is a multinational intelligence unit based in Sinai—the so-called Multinational Force and Observers—charged with enforcing the four-decade-old peace treaty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put in place by Egyptian troops , according to a military official who once served in the area .
For instance , a major U.S. air base that ’ s an arm of the Sharm el-Sheikh airport is stuck behind layers of Egyptian security that require American troops to sign off with their hosts to get inside .
“ Their stuff is so closed off , ” the official , who is not authorized to speak about the situation on the ground and requested anonymity , told Foreign Policy .
“ We have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Egyptians to show up.
” The Egyptian government has also imposed travel restrictions on civilians living in North Sinai and has not allowed media trips into the area since 2018 , the State Department reported in an annual human rights review released last year .
Some experts believe that the return of press and independent monitors would provide a bigger deterrent to violence than beefing up the Multinational Force and Observers .
“ The real issue is we can ’ t get any independent monitors in there , ” said Allison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Center for Global Policy , a Washington think tank focused on U.S. relations with the Muslim world .
“ There ’ s no press.
” But back in Washington , the debate is heading toward further U.S. disengagement .
While Egypt is limited in the number of troops it can keep in the Sinai region under a 1979 peace treaty with Israel signed toward the end of the Carter administration , the status quo appears to be shifting as the Pentagon hopes to refocus U.S. military muscle on dealing with China .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Secretary Mark Esper is looking to draw down the contingent of 400 U.S. troops from Sinai as part of a global review of the Pentagon ’ s presence , as Islamic State-led terrorist attacks in the region have declined , according to official statistics .
Over the course of the first 11 months of 2019 , the Islamic State affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula launched 282 attacks that killed 269 people , mostly Egyptian troops , which was down from 377 such deaths in 2018 and 742 the year before .
Some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curtail $ 1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid to Cairo , citing Sisi ’ s flagging human rights record .
Yet even after the jailed American citizen Mustafa Kassem died in January and as several other U.S. nationals languish in Egyptian custody , the Trump administration has been reluctant to punish Sisi , floating a $ 300 million military aid cut reported by Foreign Policy in March that has yet to be enacted .
“ You might call them tyrants ; you might call them authoritarians .
But , there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Mike Pompeo told Leahy , a leading Senate critic of Egypt , in April 2019 .
“ There ’ s no doubt the Egyptians have been an important security partner , helping us take down terror threats in the Sinai that have reduced risks to the United States of America.
” But advocacy groups that have pushed back against U.S. military aid to Egypt are worried that the admission may not mean much if the Trump administration doesn ’ t act to limit security assistance .
“ It makes sense because Egypt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the press from what ’ s going on in the Sinai , ” said William Hartung , the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy and a co-author of the recent report analyzing U.S. security assistance to Egypt .
“ The fact that they ’ re acknowledging it is worth something , but the question is , are they going to do something about it ?
”

The United States lacks visibility on how Egypt is using U.S.-provided weapons in the Sinai Peninsula, according to a State Department review obtained by Foreign Policy , a blind spot that Congress worries could limit the Trump administration’s ability to investigate human rights abuses in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State.
The United States lacks visibility on how Egypt is using U.S.-provided weapons in the Sinai Peninsula, according to a State Department review obtained by Foreign Policy, a blind spot that Congress worries could limit the Trump administration’s ability to investigate human rights abuses in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State.
The State Department said that Egypt has only given U.S. personnel infrequent access to monitor allegations of human rights abuses, and that Cairo has recently started to buy Russian and French weapons in greater numbers, limiting American visibility.
“As a result, it is very difficult to determine whether U.S.-origin defense articles were used in a particular operation or maneuver,” the report said, adding that U.S. personnel do not have consistent on-the-ground access to Sinai. “The U.S. government generally lacks sufficient information to directly link specific U.S.-origin equipment to alleged violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law by Egyptian security forces.”
U.S. President Donald Trump has lavished praise on his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, calling the Egyptian leader “my favorite dictator” and continuing American military aid apace at $1.3 billion, despite internal protests earlier in his administration and assessments that Cairo’s trajectory toward reforms has been slowed by the former general’s authoritarian tendencies.
But Egypt’s long-standing status as the second-largest recipient of U.S. security assistance has come under fire from Capitol Hill in recent years, which has urged the Obama and Trump administrations to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire for human rights abuses in Sinai, the detention of American citizens, and a law that restricts nongovernmental organizations’ activities.
A State Department assessment released last year found that the Egyptian government “committed arbitrary or unlawful killings,” sometimes with impunity, as Sisi sought to redouble counter-drug operations and crack down on weapons smuggling in areas of North Sinai that border the Gaza Strip. In 2019, Human Rights Watch said that it had documented 20 cases of extrajudicial killings of detainees in North Sinai in recent years.
An aide to Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy, who has held up $105 million in U.S. military aid to Egypt since 2018, said the findings from the report show that Cairo’s counterterrorism campaign is failing and that the administration has little ability to track whether State and Defense Department-provided arms are causing civilian deaths, a potential violation of U.S. law.
“What’s happening there is an example of where our weapons are being used to carry out a strategy that isn’t working and where we don’t know if they are harming civilians,” the aide told Foreign Policy. “They have consistently acknowledged that they don’t know with confidence how our military aid is being used. The State Department says they investigate reports of human rights abuses. How do they do that, and where’s the evidence that anything is done about it?”
The State Department said in the report that Egypt remains “generally” in compliance with U.S. programs that track the use of American military equipment.
The so-called Multinational Force and Observers—charged with enforcing the four-decade-old peace treaty—is limited by logistical bottlenecks put in place by Egyptian troops, according to a military official who once served in the area.
For instance, an MFO airfield that’s an arm of the Sharm el-Sheikh airport is stuck behind layers of Egyptian security that require American troops to sign off with their hosts to get inside. “Their stuff is so closed off,” the official, who is not authorized to speak about the situation on the ground and requested anonymity, told Foreign Policy. “We have to sit at the gate and wait for the Egyptians to show up.”
The Egyptian government has also imposed travel restrictions on civilians living in North Sinai and has not allowed media trips into the area since 2018, the State Department reported in an annual human rights review released last year. Some experts believe that the return of press and independent monitors would provide a bigger deterrent to violence than beefing up the Multinational Force and Observers.
“The real issue is we can’t get any independent monitors in there,” said Allison McManus, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, a Washington think tank focused on U.S. relations with the Muslim world. “There’s no press.”
But back in Washington, the debate is heading toward further U.S. disengagement. While Egypt is limited in the number of troops it can keep in the Sinai region under a 1979 peace treaty with Israel signed toward the end of the Carter administration, the status quo appears to be shifting as the Pentagon hopes to refocus U.S. military muscle on dealing with China.
The Wall Street Journal reported last month that Defense Secretary Mark Esper is looking to draw down the contingent of 400 U.S. troops from Sinai as part of a global review of the Pentagon’s presence, as Islamic State-led terrorist attacks in the region have declined, according to official statistics. Over the course of the first 11 months of 2019, the Islamic State affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula launched 282 attacks that killed 269 people, mostly Egyptian troops, which was down from 377 such deaths in 2018 and 742 the year before.
Some lawmakers have pressured the Trump administration to curtail $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid to Cairo, citing Sisi’s flagging human rights record.
Yet even after the jailed American citizen Mustafa Kassem died in January and as several other U.S. nationals languish in Egyptian custody, the Trump administration has been reluctant to punish Sisi, floating a $300 million military aid cut reported by Foreign Policy in March that has yet to be enacted.
“You might call them tyrants; you might call them authoritarians. But, there’s a fundamental difference,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told Leahy, a leading Senate critic of Egypt, in April 2019. “There’s no doubt the Egyptians have been an important security partner, helping us take down terror threats in the Sinai that have reduced risks to the United States of America.”
But advocacy groups that have pushed back against U.S. military aid to Egypt are worried that the admission may not mean much if the Trump administration doesn’t act to limit security assistance.
“It makes sense because Egypt has tried to block both U.S. officials and the press from what’s going on in the Sinai,” said William Hartung, the director of the arms and security project at the Center for International Policy and a co-author of the recent report analyzing U.S. security assistance to Egypt. “The fact that they’re acknowledging it is worth something, but the question is, are they going to do something about it?”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-02--As Economies Reopen, It’s the Law of the Jungle for Workers

As Economies Reopen , It ’ s the Law of the Jungle for Workers As communities and businesses around the world decide on the next tentative steps to loosen lockdowns and return to business , exposure to a possible second wave of coronavirus infections is the main worry .
Yet there is another form of exposure that is almost as worrisome : What kind of liability will governments and corporations assume for the health of citizens , employees , customers , and tenants as they make these decisions to reopen ?
Who is legally responsible , for example , if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was safe to go back to work or school ?
Who is legally responsible if someone gets infected after being told it was safe to go back to work or school ?
These questions have as many answers as there are jurisdictions in the world , and in all but a few cases the answer simply does not yet exist .
Regulators still have to get their footing , and private-sector firms fear this may be a race that first movers can not win .
Labor unions talk tough on behalf of worker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ teeth .
Legal precedent for how to reopen after a pandemic may not be established for years .
The result is a deep uncertainty that is preventing coherent planning .
It ’ s easy in authoritarian states such as Russia and Iran , where people will simply be ordered back to work with little concern about the liability incurred by the state or individual companies .
In countries where citizens can seek redress for wrongs inflicted upon them by government or business , on the other hand , the legal and regulatory limbo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reopening is already creating a multispeed world , with some countries more successful in controlling the disease while others see little choice but to remain in full lockdown .
This picture becomes even more complex when factoring in the differences in legal and labor protections afforded to citizens .
In democracies with strong labor rights and a healthy tradition of employer-employee relations ( including the European Union , Australia , New Zealand , Canada , and South Africa ) , there are relatively clear rules for employers and workers , established processes for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predictable risks in terms of fines or penalties should a company fall afoul of the rules .
In these countries , expect reopening to be smoother and lead to fewer conflicts .
After all , many workers are just as eager to get back to the coal face as their bosses—they just want a say about the conditions that will prevail.Many workers are just as eager to get back to the coal face as their bosses—they just want a say about the conditions that will prevail .
In Germany , where stores and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies never closed their offices , workers can not cite fear of infection as a reason to stay away from work .
Some German labor unions have chafed at this , but long-established channels of labor-management relations have helped mitigate most conflicts .
These channels include Berufsgenossenschaften—self-administered industry associations that regulate occupational safety , which quickly developed guidelines for workplaces in various sectors of the economy that were implemented at the start of the pandemic and continually adjusted .
At the company level , employee representatives on works councils have a legally mandated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in ways not typical of other economies .
France puts its own more labor-friendly spin on the issue .
Companies that fail to meet French Labor Ministry regulations to the letter are vulnerable to occupational hazard claims .
These could arise even if COVID-19 is not yet on the list of officially recognized occupational diseases provided by the French social security code .
Companies operating in France—and their officers individually—can also be held criminally liable for “ inexcusable faults , ” which a court would likely interpret to include exposing employees to undue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employers are legally required to take “ sensible steps to discharge their duty of care and to document their assessment and adopted policies , ” according to a brief from Reed Smith , a global law firm .
“ If someone becomes infected at work in the absence of evidence of such steps having been taken , the employer is vulnerable to being found in breach of duty and liable for losses arising.
” In authoritarian countries ( including China , Russia , Iran , and Vietnam ) , workers have little choice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran , for instance , central authorities notoriously concealed the seriousness of their initial coronavirus outbreaks , leaving workers and citizens in the dark about risk .
Not surprisingly , workers in such countries have little or no protection against job loss or even arrest should they choose to stay away from working in conditions they consider unsafe.Workers have little or no protection against job loss or even arrest should they choose to stay away from working in conditions they consider unsafe .
While the virus appears to be waning in China , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread once it became impossible to deny are now echoed in the draconian measures threatened against those who don ’ t go along with the new messaging—in effect , that it ’ s now safe to go back in the water .
Even if countries such as China and Russia have rules in place for when workers can isolate themselves which protect those workers from retaliation , enforcing these codes in the face of shifting political winds often proves impossible .
If anything , “ squeaky wheels ” in the labor force become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ an employee who is absent from work without a proper cause may be acting in violation of the management policy and , therefore , the terms of the labor contract , which may lead to termination of the employment , ” notes a brief from the global law firm K & L Gates .
Then there are the unfettered capitalist societies , where the state can not or won ’ t play much of a role—this includes much of the developing world , but also the United States .
Here , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may occur with little or no concern for worker safety , with only uncertain judicial redress in a patchwork of jurisdictions available to workers .
In Bangladesh , many of the country ’ s 2 million garment workers must turn up or be fired .
Little enforcement of recent government edicts on social distancing and the use of personal protective equipment in Bangladesh ’ s sweatshops can be expected .
Meanwhile , the cancellation of enormous orders by the global fashion giants has led to widespread layoffs since early March .
The Bangladeshi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ owners to pay March wages , but many thousands have gone unpaid for over two months , and beyond street protests , they have little redress .
In such an environment , it ’ s easy to see how workers might not dare to speak up .
In the United States , which once upon a time led the campaign for the 40-hour week and an end to child labor , labor ’ s voice is much diminished today.In the United States , which once upon a time led the campaign for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor , labor ’ s voice is of course much diminished today .
In the U.S. Senate , the Republican majority is working on legislation backed by corporate lobbyists in Washington that would shield employers from liability when they demand that employees return to work .
Democrats , who control the House of Representatives , appear unlikely to agree for now .
But with the details of a new $ 3 trillion relief bill being negotiated and the political pressure to get people back to work building , it is conceivable that at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passed .
In the meantime—and in the absence of strong leadership from Washington—state governors are making policy on the fly , sometimes with nothing more than a Twitter message .
For instance , in response to worker complaints that Iowa ’ s meatpacking plants remained zones with a high risk of infection , the state ’ s Republican governor , Kim Reynolds , announced that not only do employers have the right to fire workers who won ’ t return , but that she ’ ll make sure their decision is registered as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them ineligible for unemployment benefits .
U.S. federal law potentially provides some redress through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration .
But in the absence of strong legal precedent , and with the agency taking its cues from President Donald Trump ’ s administration ’ s calls to reopen now , few legal experts expect strong federal enforcement of work safety rules .
While some of this may sound Dickensian , it ’ s worth noting that even if companies get their liability shield at the federal level , the courts will have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already seen the first lawsuits on behalf of workers who say they contracted the virus because of inadequate workplace safety measures .
“ I ’ ve seen a couple lawsuits filed already by the families of COVID-19 victims who claim the employer knew of the risks in the workplace , but failed to take adequate protective measures , ” said Douglas Varga , an attorney in Southport , Connecticut .
He said he expects the state to grant employers immunity from coronavirus-related liabilities unless they act “ willfully , ” “ wantonly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has often been difficult for plaintiffs to prove in court .
This high standard for liability is already the standard in Connecticut for an employee to sue an employer outside the normal workers ’ compensation claim procedure , Varga told Foreign Policy .
“ That seems fair to me given the circumstances , ” he said .
“ We have to find a way to get back to work eventually.
” Even if there is some solace for U.S. workers with egregious cases , the pandemic has presented them with an additional hurdle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by and large stopped taking filings in March as offices closed .
New York ’ s state courts , for instance , only just began accepting digital nonessential filings again on May 25 after a two-month hiatus .
Given the backlog that ’ s likely to confront judges when some semblance of normality returns , justice is unlikely to be swift .

As communities and businesses around the world decide on the next tentative steps to loosen lockdowns and return to business, exposure to a possible second wave of coronavirus infections is the main worry. Yet there is another form of exposure that is almost as worrisome: What kind of liability will governments and corporations assume for the health of citizens, employees, customers, and tenants as they make these decisions to reopen? Who is legally responsible, for example, if someone gets infected after being told it was safe to go back to work or school?Who is legally responsible if someone gets infected after being told it was safe to go back to work or school?
As communities and businesses around the world decide on the next tentative steps to loosen lockdowns and return to business, exposure to a possible second wave of coronavirus infections is the main worry. Yet there is another form of exposure that is almost as worrisome: What kind of liability will governments and corporations assume for the health of citizens, employees, customers, and tenants as they make these decisions to reopen? Who is legally responsible, for example, if someone gets infected after being told it was safe to go back to work or school?Who is legally responsible if someone gets infected after being told it was safe to go back to work or school?
These questions have as many answers as there are jurisdictions in the world, and in all but a few cases the answer simply does not yet exist. Regulators still have to get their footing, and private-sector firms fear this may be a race that first movers cannot win. Labor unions talk tough on behalf of worker health and safety, but often lack teeth. Legal precedent for how to reopen after a pandemic may not be established for years.
The result is a deep uncertainty that is preventing coherent planning. It’s easy in authoritarian states such as Russia and Iran, where people will simply be ordered back to work with little concern about the liability incurred by the state or individual companies. In countries where citizens can seek redress for wrongs inflicted upon them by government or business, on the other hand, the legal and regulatory limbo that now prevails has paralyzed decision-makers.
Reopening is already creating a multispeed world, with some countries more successful in controlling the disease while others see little choice but to remain in full lockdown. This picture becomes even more complex when factoring in the differences in legal and labor protections afforded to citizens.
In democracies with strong labor rights and a healthy tradition of employer-employee relations (including the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa), there are relatively clear rules for employers and workers, established processes for making decisions and adjudicating them, and predictable risks in terms of fines or penalties should a company fall afoul of the rules. In these countries, expect reopening to be smoother and lead to fewer conflicts. After all, many workers are just as eager to get back to the coal face as their bosses—they just want a say about the conditions that will prevail.Many workers are just as eager to get back to the coal face as their bosses—they just want a say about the conditions that will prevail.
In Germany, where stores and restaurants opened again in May and many companies never closed their offices, workers cannot cite fear of infection as a reason to stay away from work. Some German labor unions have chafed at this, but long-established channels of labor-management relations have helped mitigate most conflicts.
These channels include Berufsgenossenschaften—self-administered industry associations that regulate occupational safety, which quickly developed guidelines for workplaces in various sectors of the economy that were implemented at the start of the pandemic and continually adjusted. At the company level, employee representatives on works councils have a legally mandated say in workplace conditions and other issues in ways not typical of other economies.
France puts its own more labor-friendly spin on the issue. Companies that fail to meet French Labor Ministry regulations to the letter are vulnerable to occupational hazard claims. These could arise even if COVID-19 is not yet on the list of officially recognized occupational diseases provided by the French social security code. Companies operating in France—and their officers individually—can also be held criminally liable for “inexcusable faults,” which a court would likely interpret to include exposing employees to undue risk of infection.
In Britain, employers are legally required to take “sensible steps to discharge their duty of care and to document their assessment and adopted policies,” according to a brief from Reed Smith, a global law firm. “If someone becomes infected at work in the absence of evidence of such steps having been taken, the employer is vulnerable to being found in breach of duty and liable for losses arising.”
In authoritarian countries (including China, Russia, Iran, and Vietnam), workers have little choice in the matter. In China and Iran, for instance, central authorities notoriously concealed the seriousness of their initial coronavirus outbreaks, leaving workers and citizens in the dark about risk. Not surprisingly, workers in such countries have little or no protection against job loss or even arrest should they choose to stay away from working in conditions they consider unsafe.Workers have little or no protection against job loss or even arrest should they choose to stay away from working in conditions they consider unsafe.
While the virus appears to be waning in China, the draconian measures taken to halt its spread once it became impossible to deny are now echoed in the draconian measures threatened against those who don’t go along with the new messaging—in effect, that it’s now safe to go back in the water. Even if countries such as China and Russia have rules in place for when workers can isolate themselves which protect those workers from retaliation, enforcing these codes in the face of shifting political winds often proves impossible. If anything, “squeaky wheels” in the labor force become targets of retaliation.
In China, “an employee who is absent from work without a proper cause may be acting in violation of the management policy and, therefore, the terms of the labor contract, which may lead to termination of the employment,” notes a brief from the global law firm K&L Gates.
Then there are the unfettered capitalist societies, where the state cannot or won’t play much of a role—this includes much of the developing world, but also the United States. Here, the reopening of large sectors of the economy may occur with little or no concern for worker safety, with only uncertain judicial redress in a patchwork of jurisdictions available to workers.
In Bangladesh, many of the country’s 2 million garment workers must turn up or be fired. Little enforcement of recent government edicts on social distancing and the use of personal protective equipment in Bangladesh’s sweatshops can be expected.
Meanwhile, the cancellation of enormous orders by the global fashion giants has led to widespread layoffs since early March. The Bangladeshi government has made provisions to force factory owners to pay March wages, but many thousands have gone unpaid for over two months, and beyond street protests, they have little redress. In such an environment, it’s easy to see how workers might not dare to speak up.
In the United States, which once upon a time led the campaign for the 40-hour week and an end to child labor, labor’s voice is much diminished today.In the United States, which once upon a time led the campaign for the 40-hour week and an end to child labor, labor’s voice is of course much diminished today. In the U.S. Senate, the Republican majority is working on legislation backed by corporate lobbyists in Washington that would shield employers from liability when they demand that employees return to work. Democrats, who control the House of Representatives, appear unlikely to agree for now. But with the details of a new $3 trillion relief bill being negotiated and the political pressure to get people back to work building, it is conceivable that at least part of the liability shield gets passed.
In the meantime—and in the absence of strong leadership from Washington—state governors are making policy on the fly, sometimes with nothing more than a Twitter message. For instance, in response to worker complaints that Iowa’s meatpacking plants remained zones with a high risk of infection, the state’s Republican governor, Kim Reynolds, announced that not only do employers have the right to fire workers who won’t return, but that she’ll make sure their decision is registered as a “voluntary quit,” making them ineligible for unemployment benefits.
U.S. federal law potentially provides some redress through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. But in the absence of strong legal precedent, and with the agency taking its cues from President Donald Trump’s administration’s calls to reopen now, few legal experts expect strong federal enforcement of work safety rules.
While some of this may sound Dickensian, it’s worth noting that even if companies get their liability shield at the federal level, the courts will have the last say. U.S. courts have already seen the first lawsuits on behalf of workers who say they contracted the virus because of inadequate workplace safety measures. “I’ve seen a couple lawsuits filed already by the families of COVID-19 victims who claim the employer knew of the risks in the workplace, but failed to take adequate protective measures,” said Douglas Varga, an attorney in Southport, Connecticut. He said he expects the state to grant employers immunity from coronavirus-related liabilities unless they act “willfully,” “wantonly,” or “recklessly”—something that has often been difficult for plaintiffs to prove in court.
This high standard for liability is already the standard in Connecticut for an employee to sue an employer outside the normal workers’ compensation claim procedure, Varga told Foreign Policy. “That seems fair to me given the circumstances,” he said. “We have to find a way to get back to work eventually.”
Even if there is some solace for U.S. workers with egregious cases, the pandemic has presented them with an additional hurdle: long delays. U.S. state courts by and large stopped taking filings in March as offices closed. New York’s state courts, for instance, only just began accepting digital nonessential filings again on May 25 after a two-month hiatus. Given the backlog that’s likely to confront judges when some semblance of normality returns, justice is unlikely to be swift.