foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Under Cover of Coronavirus, Maduro Is Consolidating Control

Under Cover of Coronavirus , Maduro Is Consolidating Control Few countries are as ill-equipped to deal with a pandemic as Venezuela .
Despite boasting the largest proven oil reserves on the planet , the South American nation is mired in economic , political , and social turmoil .
Some 4.5 million Venezuelans have left altogether , mostly for other Latin American countries , with doctors and nurses among them .
Those that stay have to work with dwindling resources .
Roughly eighty percent of Venezuela ’ s hospitals lack basic supplies , including soap , masks and gowns , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ carried out by the local nongovernmental organization Médicos Unidos in March this year found that 32 percent of respondents did not have reliable running water in their health centers .
Meanwhile , the pandemic has taken hold in the country .
Venezuela had confirmed 23,280 cases of coronavirus and 202 deaths as of Aug. 7 , with two senior figures in the government—United Socialist Party of Venezuela politician Diosdado Cabello and the country ’ s oil minister , Tareck El Aissami—testing positive for the coronavirus , although observers see little reason to trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ’ s outlook is also contradicted by the worsening outbreak in hot spots across Venezuela , including in the country ’ s northwestern Zulia state .
A study carried out by the Venezuelan Academy of Physical , Mathematical , and Natural Sciences and published on May 11 projected the possibility of up to 4,000 daily cases between June and September .
As hospitals get overrun and confidence in government collapses , Venezuela is bracing for chaos .
But President Nicolás Maduro has been treating this crisis as an opportunity , steadily strengthening @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year ’ s parliamentary elections .
An investigation carried out by Alianza Rebelde Investiga—a coalition of three independent Venezuelan media outlets—found that when cases jumped 93 percent in the last week of May , hospitals across the country were without X-ray machines and reliable water .
The last time the government provided reliable and comprehensive data on disease outbreaks was in 2016 .
“ The health system here is severely weakened and hospitals are in ruin , ” said José Félix Oletta , who served as Venezuela ’ s health minister from 1997 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of everything from masks and ventilators to hospital beds , we have an impoverished population without basic food security , and there are huge faults in the epidemiological information offered and in the transparency of the response.
” The government has attempted to show strength by using the military to enforce a nationwide curfew and social distancing measures .
But most Venezuelans make less than $ 10 a month , and many could not afford to stay home .
Videos circulating on social media showed bustling markets , one of the few spots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hot spots for virus transmissions .
Despite the urgency of the crisis , Maduro and his chavista allies have been using it to strengthen their hand against the opposition .
“ To a government that is determined to cling on no matter what , a crisis is an opportunity to cement itself in power , ” said Raúl Gallegos , the director of Control Risks , a consultancy firm .
Maduro currently remains in power , though a U.S.-led coalition of more than 50 countries does not recognize his legitimacy , instead backing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declared himself as the constitutionally mandated president in January 2019 .
Despite mounting pressure abroad for regime change and a botched attempt to oust Maduro militarily in April 2019 , Guaidó has made few practical gains .
The young opposition leader ’ s stake was further weakened following a calamitous attempt claimed by an American mercenary , Jordan Goudreau , to force Maduro from office .
The plot was quickly foiled , arrests were made , and Maduro came out looking in control .
Indeed , in recent weeks , Maduro has managed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s institutions and political parties .
In mid-June , Venezuela ’ s top court—which remains loyal to Maduro—ousted the leaders of two major opposition parties , replacing them with chavista loyalists .
In early July a similar move suspended the leadership of Voluntad Popular , the former party of Guaidó .
These authoritarian moves , which occurred despite an early June agreement to work with Guaidó and health officials to tackle the coronavirus outbreak roundly drew criticism from observers .
“ When a judiciary that answers to Maduro decapitates opposition political parties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rights of all Venezuelans , dispensing with even the pretense of a democratic process , ” said José Miguel Vivanco , Americas director at Human Rights Watch , in a statement at the time .
“ Venezuelans ’ right to vote for their preferred candidates requires a free and fair election in which all parties and candidates have a reasonable opportunity to present their ideas to the electorate.
” Despite the criticism , Maduro has emerged firmly in command of the levers of power in Caracas .
“ It ’ s an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some power outside the country , but inside the country all the power is concentrated in the government , ” said Margarita López , who recently retired as a professor of political science at the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas .
Chief among Maduro ’ s ability to stay afloat is his largely unwavering support from the military .
That support is difficult to break , as Maduro willingly turns a blind eye to the military ’ s excesses , including involvement in the illegal trafficking of drugs and minerals such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bolstered by civilian militias , known as colectivos , which have been accused by human rights watchdogs of carrying out extrajudicial executions of opposition supporters .
Maduro , as is common practice for dictators in times of crisis , has been furthering repression .
Journalists have reported harassment by authorities and Maduro ’ s supporters while covering the pandemic .
The Committee to Protect Journalists slammed Maduro ’ s administration after Darvinson Rojas , a freelancer , was violently detained in late March , ahead of other crackdowns .
Adding oil to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump has sent mixed messages to Maduro at breakneck speed .
At the end of March , the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Maduro and 14 of his suspected cronies for drug trafficking , offering a $ 15 million dollar reward for information .
That was followed days later by calls from Elliott Abrams , the U.S. special representative for Venezuela , for Guaidó and Maduro to step aside and allow for free and fair elections to resolve the impasse .
Then the administration announced that it was dispatching a naval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an unmistakably provocative display of force .
The browbeating did not stop there .
In late June , the White House sanctioned Iranian ships for delivering oil to Venezuela , and a U.S. Navy ship navigated near Venezuela ’ s coast .
Trump also signaled a willingness to meet with Maduro before walking it back shortly afterward .
“ Ultimately what I see is a White House with no clear plan , ” said Geoff Ramsey , a Venezuela expert at the Washington Office on Latin America , a think tank .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , another it ’ s negotiations , and then the next it ’ s back to saber rattling .
They ’ re throwing everything at the wall and hoping that something sticks.
” But pugnacious words and actions out of Washington tend to favor Maduro , who is comfortable both leveling blame on the United States for his country ’ s woes and mocking it for its own challenges .
“ You ’ d have to be a degenerate to wish any country in the world an evil as great as becoming the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in a combative televised address on March 26 , the same day that the United States announced its indictments and became the country with the largest number of confirmed cases of the coronavirus .
Adopting a siege mentality rallies Maduro ’ s supporters behind the flag and allows him to lambaste U.S. sanctions .
But observers say those sanctions , while adding to the hurt of Venezuelans , are not responsible for the health system ’ s disarray .
“ The health service had collapsed long before sanctions were imposed , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Crisis Group in Caracas , said .
“ The health service had collapsed long before sanctions were imposed.
” Venezuela ’ s ongoing response to the pandemic has raised eyebrows around the world .
Despite its broken health system , local authorities are still reporting some of the lowest rates of infection and mortality in the region .
But local health workers say that does not chime with the reality on the ground .
“ There is no way to assess if these numbers are right , and [ the government ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Feliciano Reyna , who runs Acción Solidaria , a Caracas-based NGO that imports and distributes medicines to those who otherwise can not get them .
Reyna added that national lockdowns are hard to enforce , allowing the disease to spread unchecked .
“ It ’ s impossible to enforce quarantines , when people can not afford to buy food for more than two or three days .
This is happening all over.
” Maduro ’ s government has relied on rapid-result blood tests donated by China , which give a quick diagnosis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the molecular version of the test recommended by the World Health Organisation .
Reuters found that the National Institute of Hygiene , responsible for administering the 15-minute tests , “ can ’ t keep pace with the retesting workload , creating a backlog that has kept Venezuela ’ s coronavirus case count artificially low.
” The news agency reported that 100 tests a day was a more realistic figure .
In July , Reyna said that “ there ’ s simply no way of knowing how many tests are being carried out.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , heath experts who once hoped that some common ground between Maduro and Guaidó would appear in response to the crisis are now disappointed .
“ The situation really is very difficult and getting worse , ” Reyna said .
“ Moving against the opposition , arbitrarily arresting health professionals and journalists , overstitching a dire health system : The government is simply trying to divert responsibility for its failings in the pandemic .
”

Few countries are as ill-equipped to deal with a pandemic as Venezuela. Despite boasting the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, the South American nation is mired in economic, political, and social turmoil. Some 4.5 million Venezuelans have left altogether, mostly for other Latin American countries, with doctors and nurses among them. Those that stay have to work with dwindling resources. Roughly eighty percent of Venezuela’s hospitals lack basic supplies, including soap, masks and gowns, while a survey of doctors across the country carried out by the local nongovernmental organization Médicos Unidos in March this year found that 32 percent of respondents did not have reliable running water in their health centers.
Few countries are as ill-equipped to deal with a pandemic as Venezuela. Despite boasting the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, the South American nation is mired in economic, political, and social turmoil. Some 4.5 million Venezuelans have left altogether, mostly for other Latin American countries, with doctors and nurses among them. Those that stay have to work with dwindling resources. Roughly eighty percent of Venezuela’s hospitals lack basic supplies, including soap, masks and gowns, while a survey of doctors across the country carried out by the local nongovernmental organization Médicos Unidos in March this year found that 32 percent of respondents did not have reliable running water in their health centers.
Meanwhile, the pandemic has taken hold in the country. Venezuela had confirmed 23,280 cases of coronavirus and 202 deaths as of Aug. 7, with two senior figures in the government—United Socialist Party of Venezuela politician Diosdado Cabello and the country’s oil minister, Tareck El Aissami—testing positive for the coronavirus, although observers see little reason to trust the government’s data. The government’s outlook is also contradicted by the worsening outbreak in hot spots across Venezuela, including in the country’s northwestern Zulia state. A study carried out by the Venezuelan Academy of Physical, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences and published on May 11 projected the possibility of up to 4,000 daily cases between June and September.
As hospitals get overrun and confidence in government collapses, Venezuela is bracing for chaos. But President Nicolás Maduro has been treating this crisis as an opportunity, steadily strengthening his grip on power ahead of this year’s parliamentary elections.
An investigation carried out by Alianza Rebelde Investiga—a coalition of three independent Venezuelan media outlets—found that when cases jumped 93 percent in the last week of May, hospitals across the country were without X-ray machines and reliable water. The last time the government provided reliable and comprehensive data on disease outbreaks was in 2016. “The health system here is severely weakened and hospitals are in ruin,” said José Félix Oletta, who served as Venezuela’s health minister from 1997 to 1999. “We have shortages of everything from masks and ventilators to hospital beds, we have an impoverished population without basic food security, and there are huge faults in the epidemiological information offered and in the transparency of the response.”
The government has attempted to show strength by using the military to enforce a nationwide curfew and social distancing measures. But most Venezuelans make less than $10 a month, and many could not afford to stay home. Videos circulating on social media showed bustling markets, one of the few spots where goods are available, but possible hot spots for virus transmissions. Despite the urgency of the crisis, Maduro and his chavista allies have been using it to strengthen their hand against the opposition. “To a government that is determined to cling on no matter what, a crisis is an opportunity to cement itself in power,” said Raúl Gallegos, the director of Control Risks, a consultancy firm.
Maduro currently remains in power, though a U.S.-led coalition of more than 50 countries does not recognize his legitimacy, instead backing 37-year-old opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who declared himself as the constitutionally mandated president in January 2019. Despite mounting pressure abroad for regime change and a botched attempt to oust Maduro militarily in April 2019, Guaidó has made few practical gains. The young opposition leader’s stake was further weakened following a calamitous attempt claimed by an American mercenary, Jordan Goudreau, to force Maduro from office. The plot was quickly foiled, arrests were made, and Maduro came out looking in control.
Indeed, in recent weeks, Maduro has managed to strengthen his grip on the country’s institutions and political parties. In mid-June, Venezuela’s top court—which remains loyal to Maduro—ousted the leaders of two major opposition parties, replacing them with chavista loyalists. In early July a similar move suspended the leadership of Voluntad Popular, the former party of Guaidó.
These authoritarian moves, which occurred despite an early June agreement to work with Guaidó and health officials to tackle the coronavirus outbreak roundly drew criticism from observers. “When a judiciary that answers to Maduro decapitates opposition political parties that represent dissenting voices, it undermines the rights of all Venezuelans, dispensing with even the pretense of a democratic process,” said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch, in a statement at the time. “Venezuelans’ right to vote for their preferred candidates requires a free and fair election in which all parties and candidates have a reasonable opportunity to present their ideas to the electorate.”
Despite the criticism, Maduro has emerged firmly in command of the levers of power in Caracas. “It’s an asymmetrical situation: Guaidó has support and some power outside the country, but inside the country all the power is concentrated in the government,” said Margarita López, who recently retired as a professor of political science at the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas. Chief among Maduro’s ability to stay afloat is his largely unwavering support from the military. That support is difficult to break, as Maduro willingly turns a blind eye to the military’s excesses, including involvement in the illegal trafficking of drugs and minerals such as gold and coltan. He is also bolstered by civilian militias, known as colectivos, which have been accused by human rights watchdogs of carrying out extrajudicial executions of opposition supporters.
Maduro, as is common practice for dictators in times of crisis, has been furthering repression. Journalists have reported harassment by authorities and Maduro’s supporters while covering the pandemic. The Committee to Protect Journalists slammed Maduro’s administration after Darvinson Rojas, a freelancer, was violently detained in late March, ahead of other crackdowns.
Adding oil to a raging fire, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has sent mixed messages to Maduro at breakneck speed. At the end of March, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Maduro and 14 of his suspected cronies for drug trafficking, offering a $15 million dollar reward for information. That was followed days later by calls from Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special representative for Venezuela, for Guaidó and Maduro to step aside and allow for free and fair elections to resolve the impasse. Then the administration announced that it was dispatching a naval flotilla to the Caribbean to combat narcotrafficking, an unmistakably provocative display of force.
The browbeating did not stop there. In late June, the White House sanctioned Iranian ships for delivering oil to Venezuela, and a U.S. Navy ship navigated near Venezuela’s coast. Trump also signaled a willingness to meet with Maduro before walking it back shortly afterward.
“Ultimately what I see is a White House with no clear plan,” said Geoff Ramsey, a Venezuela expert at the Washington Office on Latin America, a think tank. “One day it’s indictments, another it’s negotiations, and then the next it’s back to saber rattling. They’re throwing everything at the wall and hoping that something sticks.”
But pugnacious words and actions out of Washington tend to favor Maduro, who is comfortable both leveling blame on the United States for his country’s woes and mocking it for its own challenges. “You’d have to be a degenerate to wish any country in the world an evil as great as becoming the epicenter of a pandemic,” he said in a combative televised address on March 26, the same day that the United States announced its indictments and became the country with the largest number of confirmed cases of the coronavirus.
Adopting a siege mentality rallies Maduro’s supporters behind the flag and allows him to lambaste U.S. sanctions. But observers say those sanctions, while adding to the hurt of Venezuelans, are not responsible for the health system’s disarray. “The health service had collapsed long before sanctions were imposed,” Phil Gunson, a consultant for the International Crisis Group in Caracas, said.
“The health service had collapsed long before sanctions were imposed.”
Venezuela’s ongoing response to the pandemic has raised eyebrows around the world. Despite its broken health system, local authorities are still reporting some of the lowest rates of infection and mortality in the region. But local health workers say that does not chime with the reality on the ground. “There is no way to assess if these numbers are right, and [the government] is not informing about results,” said Feliciano Reyna, who runs Acción Solidaria, a Caracas-based NGO that imports and distributes medicines to those who otherwise cannot get them. Reyna added that national lockdowns are hard to enforce, allowing the disease to spread unchecked. “It’s impossible to enforce quarantines, when people cannot afford to buy food for more than two or three days. This is happening all over.”
Maduro’s government has relied on rapid-result blood tests donated by China, which give a quick diagnosis, but are considerably less reliable than the molecular version of the test recommended by the World Health Organisation. Reuters found that the National Institute of Hygiene, responsible for administering the 15-minute tests, “can’t keep pace with the retesting workload, creating a backlog that has kept Venezuela’s coronavirus case count artificially low.” The news agency reported that 100 tests a day was a more realistic figure. In July, Reyna said that “there’s simply no way of knowing how many tests are being carried out.”
As the political stalemate in Caracas continues, heath experts who once hoped that some common ground between Maduro and Guaidó would appear in response to the crisis are now disappointed. “The situation really is very difficult and getting worse,” Reyna said. “Moving against the opposition, arbitrarily arresting health professionals and journalists, overstitching a dire health system: The government is simply trying to divert responsibility for its failings in the pandemic.”


Meltdown in Minsk

Security forces arrested some 3,000 people overnight in Belarus after protests broke out in response to Sunday ’ s dubious election results , the results of which have been questioned by opposition activists as well as European governments .
Dozens of people were injured as riot police used rubber bullets , water cannons , and flash grenades to suppress the protests .
NetBlocks , a service that tracks internet freedom , reported severe disruptions in internet access in Belarus on Sunday , while security forces blocked off access to main roads into the capital , Minsk .
Early on Monday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and opposition activists have called for a general strike to begin on Tuesday .
As political unrest threatens to engulf another country on the borderlands between Russia and the European Union , we ’ ve gathered our top reads to help make sense of what ’ s going on in Belarus .
After 26 years in power , Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko faces the most significant challenge yet to his rule .
Frustrations are mounting over economic stagnation and his laissez-faire handling of the coronavirus pandemic , driving support for opposition leader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of the largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union .
On Monday , the Belarusian Central Election Commission declared that Lukashenko had won with 80.23 percent of the vote to Tikhanovskaya ’ s 9.9 percent , with the remaining votes split between three other candidates .
Tikhanovskaya rejected the election results and said her team would do everything they could to challenge them .
Exit polls conducted outside of Belarusian Embassies in 19 countries with large diasporas suggested that Tikhanovskaya received almost 80 percent of the vote while results from some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stations also put the opposition candidate in the lead .
In a statement on Monday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said : “ The United States is deeply concerned about the conduct of the August 9 presidential election in Belarus , which was not free and fair.
” “ The authorities should start to think about how to manage a peaceful transfer of power because at the moment they only have one method : violence against peaceful Belarusians , ” Tikhanovskaya said on Monday .
In the spring , it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pass quietly , as the opposition video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky announced on May 6 that he was going to run for president with the campaign slogan “ Stop the Cockroach , ” a reference to Lukashenko ’ s indefatigable rule .
Voters turned out in droves to sign petitions in support of his candidacy .
When Tikhanovsksy was arrested two days later , they collected signatures to put his wife on the ballot instead .
“ At root , it ’ s about the coronavirus pandemic .
Lukashenko ’ s approach to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president cares for their safety and well-being , ” Vitali Shkliarov wrote for Foreign Policy in June .
( Shkliarov , a Belarus-born political analyst who worked on Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders ’ s presidential campaigns , was arrested in Belarus in July and charged with organizing an illegal political rally .
If convicted , Shkliarov , who is based in Washington and married to a U.S. diplomat , could face up to three years in prison . )
Another leading opposition candidate , the former banker Viktor Barbaryko , was also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the country ’ s former ambassador to the United States , was prevented from registering his candidacy .
After Tikhanovskaya was unexpectedly allowed to register her candidacy—possibly having been underestimated by Lukashenko , who has previously said a women could not handle the stress of the job—Tsepaklo ’ s wife , Veronika Tsepkalo , and Babariko ’ s campaign manager , Maria Kolesnikova , rallied around Tikhanovskaya to form the new , all-female face of the Belarusian opposition .
On Monday , Robert Biedron , the Polish MEP who chairs the European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the European Union to reimpose sanctions on Minsk , while the Polish government called for an emergency EU summit to discuss the situation .
The escalating crackdown on dissent could throw into question a delicate thaw in relations underway between Western countries and Belarus .
In January 2019 , Foreign Policy reported that Belarus lifted a long-standing cap on the number of U.S. diplomats allowed to serve in the country , a major diplomatic breakthrough after the last U.S. ambassador was expelled in 2008 , when Washington imposed sanctions on the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ September 2019 , then-U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton became the most senior U.S. official to visit the country this century , a record soon broken when Pompeo traveled to Minsk this year during a tour of the region .
In February , we reported that the Trump administration was to appoint Julie Fisher , a career foreign service officer , as the U.S. ambassador to Belarus .
Fisher ’ s Senate confirmation hearing took place last week .
Belarus has long been regarded to be one of Moscow ’ s closest allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil for kisses , ” and Russia ’ s invasion of eastern Ukraine prompted Lukashenko to rethink his dependence on the Kremlin and to pursue closer ties with both the West and China .
In 2015 , he freed the country ’ s remaining political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill to the West , prompting the United States and the EU to ease their sanctions on Belarus , paving the way for a diplomatic thaw .
In late 2018 , as Moscow ’ s chattering classes were consumed with the question of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reached his constitutionally imposed term limit in 2024 , Russian officials dusted off a 1999 treaty of union between Belarus and Russia , which , if fully realized , could create a kind of confederacy .
Statements from former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev about deepening ties between the two countries prompted speculation that Belarus could become part of Putin ’ s plan to stay in power—and fears about Belarus ’ s independence .
“ We ’ re not going to cut off our ties with Russia , they are our neighbor and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sovereignty and independence is out of the discussion , ” Vladimir Makei , Belarus ’ s foreign minister , told Foreign Policy ’ s Reid Standish in an interview late last year .
“ There are already three or four generations of people born in the new , independent state of Belarus , and they will never agree with giving up any independence.
” While a constitutional referendum ultimately solved Putin ’ s term-limit problem , relations between the two countries—strained by a lengthy dispute over energy prices—took a nosedive last month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the quasi-private Russian military contractor the Wagner Group .
Russia claims that the men were using Minsk as a transit hub to travel elsewhere .
Lukashenko said it was evidence of a plot against him , part of a Russian destabilization campaign , and in a fiery state-of-the-nation speech last week claimed , without evidence , that a second group of fighters had been deployed in southern Belarus .
Russia has never been shy about meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring countries , but for now at least Moscow appears to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But that doesn ’ t mean that the Kremlin isn ’ t watching closely .
Lukashenko ’ s present predicament could be a preview of what the future may have in store for Putin .

Security forces arrested some 3,000 people overnight in Belarus after protests broke out in response to Sunday’s dubious election results, the results of which have been questioned by opposition activists as well as European governments.
Security forces arrested some 3,000 people overnight in Belarus after protests broke out in response to Sunday’s dubious election results, the results of which have been questioned by opposition activists as well as European governments.
Dozens of people were injured as riot police used rubber bullets, water cannons, and flash grenades to suppress the protests. NetBlocks, a service that tracks internet freedom, reported severe disruptions in internet access in Belarus on Sunday, while security forces blocked off access to main roads into the capital, Minsk. Early on Monday evening, further protests were violently dispersed, and opposition activists have called for a general strike to begin on Tuesday.
As political unrest threatens to engulf another country on the borderlands between Russia and the European Union, we’ve gathered our top reads to help make sense of what’s going on in Belarus. After 26 years in power, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko faces the most significant challenge yet to his rule. Frustrations are mounting over economic stagnation and his laissez-faire handling of the coronavirus pandemic, driving support for opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, whose preelection rallies were some of the largest since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
On Monday, the Belarusian Central Election Commission declared that Lukashenko had won with 80.23 percent of the vote to Tikhanovskaya’s 9.9 percent, with the remaining votes split between three other candidates. Tikhanovskaya rejected the election results and said her team would do everything they could to challenge them. Exit polls conducted outside of Belarusian Embassies in 19 countries with large diasporas suggested that Tikhanovskaya received almost 80 percent of the vote while results from some of Minsk’s more reliable polling stations also put the opposition candidate in the lead. In a statement on Monday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said: “The United States is deeply concerned about the conduct of the August 9 presidential election in Belarus, which was not free and fair.”
“The authorities should start to think about how to manage a peaceful transfer of power because at the moment they only have one method: violence against peaceful Belarusians,” Tikhanovskaya said on Monday.
In the spring, it was already clear that the election would not pass quietly, as the opposition video blogger Sergei Tikhanovsky announced on May 6 that he was going to run for president with the campaign slogan “Stop the Cockroach,” a reference to Lukashenko’s indefatigable rule. Voters turned out in droves to sign petitions in support of his candidacy. When Tikhanovsksy was arrested two days later, they collected signatures to put his wife on the ballot instead.
“At root, it’s about the coronavirus pandemic. Lukashenko’s approach to the coronavirus has shown Belarusians how little their president cares for their safety and well-being,” Vitali Shkliarov wrote for Foreign Policy in June. (Shkliarov, a Belarus-born political analyst who worked on Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaigns, was arrested in Belarus in July and charged with organizing an illegal political rally. If convicted, Shkliarov, who is based in Washington and married to a U.S. diplomat, could face up to three years in prison.)
Another leading opposition candidate, the former banker Viktor Barbaryko, was also arrested. Yet another, Valery Tsepkalo, the country’s former ambassador to the United States, was prevented from registering his candidacy. After Tikhanovskaya was unexpectedly allowed to register her candidacy—possibly having been underestimated by Lukashenko, who has previously said a women could not handle the stress of the job—Tsepaklo’s wife, Veronika Tsepkalo, and Babariko’s campaign manager, Maria Kolesnikova, rallied around Tikhanovskaya to form the new, all-female face of the Belarusian opposition.
On Monday, Robert Biedron, the Polish MEP who chairs the European Parliament’s Belarus delegation, called for the European Union to reimpose sanctions on Minsk, while the Polish government called for an emergency EU summit to discuss the situation. The escalating crackdown on dissent could throw into question a delicate thaw in relations underway between Western countries and Belarus. In January 2019, Foreign Policy reported that Belarus lifted a long-standing cap on the number of U.S. diplomats allowed to serve in the country, a major diplomatic breakthrough after the last U.S. ambassador was expelled in 2008, when Washington imposed sanctions on the country over growing human rights concerns.
In September 2019, then-U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton became the most senior U.S. official to visit the country this century, a record soon broken when Pompeo traveled to Minsk this year during a tour of the region. In February, we reported that the Trump administration was to appoint Julie Fisher, a career foreign service officer, as the U.S. ambassador to Belarus. Fisher’s Senate confirmation hearing took place last week.
Belarus has long been regarded to be one of Moscow’s closest allies in a relationship often described as “oil for kisses,” and Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine prompted Lukashenko to rethink his dependence on the Kremlin and to pursue closer ties with both the West and China. In 2015, he freed the country’s remaining political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill to the West, prompting the United States and the EU to ease their sanctions on Belarus, paving the way for a diplomatic thaw.
In late 2018, as Moscow’s chattering classes were consumed with the question of what would happen when President Vladimir Putin reached his constitutionally imposed term limit in 2024, Russian officials dusted off a 1999 treaty of union between Belarus and Russia, which, if fully realized, could create a kind of confederacy. Statements from former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev about deepening ties between the two countries prompted speculation that Belarus could become part of Putin’s plan to stay in power—and fears about Belarus’s independence.
“We’re not going to cut off our ties with Russia, they are our neighbor and largest economic partner, but surrendering our sovereignty and independence is out of the discussion,” Vladimir Makei, Belarus’s foreign minister, told Foreign Policy’s Reid Standish in an interview late last year. “There are already three or four generations of people born in the new, independent state of Belarus, and they will never agree with giving up any independence.”
While a constitutional referendum ultimately solved Putin’s term-limit problem, relations between the two countries—strained by a lengthy dispute over energy prices—took a nosedive last month, when Belarus arrested 33 suspected mercenaries from the quasi-private Russian military contractor the Wagner Group. Russia claims that the men were using Minsk as a transit hub to travel elsewhere. Lukashenko said it was evidence of a plot against him, part of a Russian destabilization campaign, and in a fiery state-of-the-nation speech last week claimed, without evidence, that a second group of fighters had been deployed in southern Belarus.
Russia has never been shy about meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, but for now at least Moscow appears to be letting events in Belarus run their course. But that doesn’t mean that the Kremlin isn’t watching closely. Lukashenko’s present predicament could be a preview of what the future may have in store for Putin.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--The Dutch Are Uncomfortable With Being History’s Villains, Not Victims

The Dutch Are Uncomfortable With Being History ’ s Villains , Not Victims Anti-racist protestors in both the United States and Europe have scored significant symbolic victories this year , as the statues of slave traders , Confederates , and colonialists have been removed from public spaces .
One of the most intriguing historical battles has been taking place in the Netherlands , a country often seen as a liberal bulwark , but whose political establishment largely continues to defend its colonial record .
In the 1600s , the Dutch East India Company ( VOC ) began colonizing parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ VOC in 1796 , the Dutch government gained controlled over Indonesia , which was then referred to as the Netherlands East Indies .
The colonization of Indonesia , which was motivated by Dutch economic interests , was portrayed as a “ civilizing mission , ” that is , the notion that Indonesians were primitive and backwards and that the Dutch , as Europeans , would civilize and modernise them .
Rulers who had promised to bring so-called civilization actually brought cruelty on a vast scale .
During colonial rule , Dutch forces regularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , raped , and executed .
Even in the last years of colonialism , thousands of supporters of independence were jailed .
The men who led these atrocities have often been lionized in the Netherlands .
For instance , in 1621 during the Dutch conquest of the Banda Islands in Indonesia , led by VOC officer Jan Pieterszoon Coen , almost the entire population was killed by Dutch forces .
Some Indonesians were also deported to the then-capital , Batavia , to serve as slaves .
Throughout the 1800s , Coen was viewed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to his expansion of Dutch empire .
As a result , a statue of him was erected in his hometown , Hoorn , in 1893 and unveiled in the presence of the Dutch minister of the colonies , Baron van Dedem .
In June 2020 , more than 200 people protested in Hoorn calling for Coen ’ s statue to be taken down .
A small group of hypernationalist individuals carrying Dutch flags also protested in defence of Coen at the statue .
This is not the first time that demands have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be toppled .
In 2011 , residents of Hoorn signed a petition calling for Coen ’ s statue to be removed on the grounds that actions committed under Coen ’ s direction in the Banda Islands were genocidal—an assertion supported by some historians .
In response , in 2012 , the local city council placed a plaque at the bottom of the statue which stated that Coen “ led a punitive expedition against one of the Banda Islands ” and “ thousands of Bandanese lost their lives during the assault.
” But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that “ Coen was praised as a vigorous and visionary administrator ” —thus partly glorifying him .
Another flashpoint has been in Amsterdam , where graffiti was sprayed onto a monument erected in 1935 to memorialize J.B. van Heutsz , the Dutch former governor of the Indonesian province of Aceh and governor of the Netherlands East Indies .
From 1899 until 1909 , during Van Heutsz ’ s governorships , approximately 22,000 Indonesians were killed .
Opposition to the Van Heutsz monument is also not new .
In 1962 , in a reference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over Indonesia , the Indonesian word merdeka ( meaning freedom or independence ) was painted on the monument .
In addition , following protests against the monument , in 2007 , the name and image of Van Heutsz were removed from it and the monument was renamed Monument Indië-Nederland ( Dutch East Indies-Netherlands Monument ) .
Despite such protests , many politicians still continue to glorify or excuse the colonial era .
In 2018 , Dutch prime minister and head of the right-wing People ’ s Party for Freedom and Democracy , Mark @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be careful to judge … Coen with our current day conceptions ” , and argued that Coen needed to be seen “ in that time and in that context.
” In response to recent protests against Coen ’ s statue , Rutte publicly recognized Coen ’ s involvement in actions in the Banda Islands which led to the death of “ thousands of people , ” but , lamentably , also referred to him as “ a visionary.
” Such attitudes reflect widely held views in the Netherlands .
For example , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Dutch citizens viewed Dutch colonialism as a source of pride .
By contrast , only 6 percent of individuals polled viewed Dutch colonialism as shameful , compared to 23 percent of Belgian citizens polled about Belgium ’ s colonial rule .
Furthermore , alarmingly , over half of the individuals surveyed viewed Dutch colonisation as beneficial or benign for those in Dutch colonies .
Many Dutch have long preferred to see themselves as simply victims , rather than perpetrators , of historical violence .
The education system focuses on Germany ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not the Dutch occupation of Indonesia and other colonial possessions for centuries .
There have been a few apologies .
Dutch King Willem-Alexander apologized for “ excessive violence ” perpetrated by Dutch forces during the 1945-49 Indonesian war of independence .
This war , which was an unsuccessful attempt by the Dutch to regain control of Indonesia following its proclamation of independence in 1945 , resulted in 5,000 Dutch deaths , 150,000 Indonesian deaths and involved Dutch forces raping , torturing , and executing thousands of Indonesian civilians .
In 2011 and 2013 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ massacres of Indonesian civilians perpetrated by Dutch troops in 1946 and 1947 known as the Rawagede tragedy and Westerling massacres and , only following court orders , provided compensation to victims ’ families .
Despite these apologies , no Dutch government has ever apologized for violence perpetrated by Coen , Heutsz , and their forces , or any cases of colonial violence committed in Indonesia prior to 1945 .
Similarly , no Dutch government has apologized for the colonization of Indonesia .
By contrast , in Belgium , protestors have succeeded in toppling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protestors is arguably unsurprising as according to a 2019 survey , fewer than one in four Belgians view the country ’ s colonial era as a source of pride—a sharp change from the past Recently , protestors set a statue of Belgian King Leopold II on fire in Antwerp .
Belgium colonized the Democratic Republic of Congo , then referred to as the Congo Free State , and Belgian King , Leopold II , ran it as his private colony .
During his rule , Congolese served as forced labourers on rubber plantations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assigned rubber quotas were mutilated or killed .
At least 6 million Congolese were killed during Leopold ’ s rule .
In response to Leopold ’ s statue being set on fire , local authorities removed it .
Similarly , authorities in the Belgian city of Ghent recently removed a bust of Leopold in response to it being sprayed with graffiti multiple times .
According to a recent survey , more than 80 percent of Dutch citizens are opposed to the removal of colonial-era statues .
Rutte ’ s recent statement , that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ answer , ” is very much the mainstream .
Van Heutsz , Coen , and other past imperialists are unlikely to meet Leopold ’ s fate any time soon .

Anti-racist protestors in both the United States and Europe have scored significant symbolic victories this year, as the statues of slave traders, Confederates, and colonialists have been removed from public spaces. One of the most intriguing historical battles has been taking place in the Netherlands, a country often seen as a liberal bulwark, but whose political establishment largely continues to defend its colonial record.
Anti-racist protestors in both the United States and Europe have scored significant symbolic victories this year, as the statues of slave traders, Confederates, and colonialists have been removed from public spaces. One of the most intriguing historical battles has been taking place in the Netherlands, a country often seen as a liberal bulwark, but whose political establishment largely continues to defend its colonial record.
In the 1600s, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) began colonizing parts of Indonesia. After the abolition of the VOC in 1796, the Dutch government gained control over Indonesia, which was then referred to as the Netherlands East Indies. The colonization of Indonesia, which was motivated by Dutch economic interests, was portrayed as a “civilizing mission,” that is, the notion that Indonesians were primitive and backwards and that the Dutch, as Europeans, would civilize and modernise them.
Rulers who had promised to bring so-called civilization actually brought cruelty on a vast scale. During colonial rule, Dutch forces regularly committed atrocities and Indonesian civilians were tortured, raped, and executed. Even in the last years of colonialism, thousands of supporters of independence were jailed.
The men who led these atrocities have often been lionized in the Netherlands. For instance, in 1621 during the Dutch conquest of the Banda Islands in Indonesia, led by VOC officer Jan Pieterszoon Coen, almost the entire population was killed by Dutch forces. Some Indonesians were also deported to the then-capital, Batavia, to serve as slaves. Throughout the 1800s, Coen was viewed as a national hero in the Netherlands due to his expansion of Dutch empire. As a result, a statue of him was erected in his hometown, Hoorn, in 1893 and unveiled in the presence of the Dutch minister of the colonies, Baron van Dedem.
In June 2020, more than 200 people protested in Hoorn calling for Coen’s statue to be taken down. A small group of hypernationalist individuals carrying Dutch flags also protested in defence of Coen at the statue.
This is not the first time that demands have been made for Coen’s statue to be toppled. In 2011, residents of Hoorn signed a petition calling for Coen’s statue to be removed on the grounds that actions committed under Coen’s direction in the Banda Islands were genocidal—an assertion supported by some historians. In response, in 2012, the local city council placed a plaque at the bottom of the statue which stated that Coen “led a punitive expedition against one of the Banda Islands” and “thousands of Bandanese lost their lives during the assault.” But the plaque also included the problematic assertion that “Coen was praised as a vigorous and visionary administrator”—thus partly glorifying him.
Another flashpoint has been in Amsterdam, where graffiti was sprayed onto a monument erected in 1935 to memorialize J.B. van Heutsz, the Dutch former governor of the Indonesian province of Aceh and governor of the Netherlands East Indies. From 1899 until 1909, during Van Heutsz’s governorships, approximately 22,000 Indonesians were killed.
Opposition to the Van Heutsz monument is also not new. In 1962, in a reference to Van Heutsz’s colonial rule over Indonesia, the Indonesian word merdeka (meaning freedom or independence) was painted on the monument. In addition, following protests against the monument, in 2007, the name and image of Van Heutsz were removed from it and the monument was renamed Monument Indië-Nederland (Dutch East Indies-Netherlands Monument).
Despite such protests, many politicians still continue to glorify or excuse the colonial era. In 2018, Dutch prime minister and head of the right-wing People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, Mark Rutte, stated that people should “be careful to judge … Coen with our current day conceptions”, and argued that Coen needed to be seen “in that time and in that context.” In response to recent protests against Coen’s statue, Rutte publicly recognized Coen’s involvement in actions in the Banda Islands which led to the death of “thousands of people,” but, lamentably, also referred to him as “a visionary.”
Such attitudes reflect widely held views in the Netherlands. For example, according to a 2019 survey, 50 percent of Dutch citizens viewed Dutch colonialism as a source of pride. By contrast, only 6 percent of individuals polled viewed Dutch colonialism as shameful, compared to 23 percent of Belgian citizens polled about Belgium’s colonial rule. Furthermore, alarmingly, over half of the individuals surveyed viewed Dutch colonisation as beneficial or benign for those in Dutch colonies.
Many Dutch have long preferred to see themselves as simply victims, rather than perpetrators, of historical violence. The education system focuses on Germany’s occupation of the Netherlands during WWII, not the Dutch occupation of Indonesia and other colonial possessions for centuries.
There have been a few apologies. Dutch King Willem-Alexander apologized for “excessive violence” perpetrated by Dutch forces during the 1945-49 Indonesian war of independence. This war, which was an unsuccessful attempt by the Dutch to regain control of Indonesia following its proclamation of independence in 1945, resulted in 5,000 Dutch deaths, 150,000 Indonesian deaths and involved Dutch forces raping, torturing, and executing thousands of Indonesian civilians. In 2011 and 2013, the Dutch government apologised for two massacres of Indonesian civilians perpetrated by Dutch troops in 1946 and 1947 known as the Rawagede tragedy and Westerling massacres and, only following court orders, provided compensation to victims’ families.
Despite these apologies, no Dutch government has ever apologized for violence perpetrated by Coen, Heutsz, and their forces, or any cases of colonial violence committed in Indonesia prior to 1945. Similarly, no Dutch government has apologized for the colonization of Indonesia.
By contrast, in Belgium, protestors have succeeded in toppling colonial-era statues.
The efficacy of Belgian protestors is arguably unsurprising as according to a 2019 survey, fewer than one in four Belgians view the country’s colonial era as a source of pride—a sharp change from the past
Recently, protestors set a statue of Belgian King Leopold II on fire in Antwerp. Belgium colonized the Democratic Republic of Congo, then referred to as the Congo Free State, and Belgian King, Leopold II, ran it as his private colony. During his rule, Congolese served as forced labourers on rubber plantations and locals who failed to meet the assigned rubber quotas were mutilated or killed. At least 6 million Congolese were killed during Leopold’s rule. In response to Leopold’s statue being set on fire, local authorities removed it. Similarly, authorities in the Belgian city of Ghent recently removed a bust of Leopold in response to it being sprayed with graffiti multiple times.
According to a recent survey, more than 80 percent of Dutch citizens are opposed to the removal of colonial-era statues. Rutte’s recent statement, that “pulling down statues is not the answer,” is very much the mainstream. Van Heutsz, Coen, and other past imperialists are unlikely to meet Leopold’s fate any time soon.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--The Islamic State Isn’t Behind Syria’s Amphetamine Trade

On July 1 , Italian police in the port of Salerno announced that they had intercepted 84 million counterfeit Captagon tablets worth 1 billion euros ( $ 1.1 billion ) , deemed “ the biggest seizure of amphetamines in the world.
” Scientists first produced Captagon , the brand name of the drug fenethylline , in the 1960s to treat depression and children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder .
Two decades later , the World Health Organization banned the substance due its high potential for addiction , abuse , and other adverse health effects .
But counterfeit Captagon—which is sometimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fenethylline—remains in demand on the black market in the Middle East .
The pills intercepted in Salerno arrived on three ships from Latakia , a Syrian port , and Italian police quickly announced that the Islamic State was responsible for their production and shipment—allegedly to fund its global terrorism operations .
The incident shows how the connections between drug trafficking and war are often poorly understood .
Global media outlets disseminated the information provided by the Italian police without questioning it , replicating misinformation without considering how a scattered group of Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the truth is , they probably didn ’ t .
Indeed , it is more likely that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has a hand in producing Captagon , reaping a profit that it can invest into its armed campaigns against civilians and damaging the health of many Syrians who are now addicted to amphetamines after years of war .
The Syrian government has played a role in drug trafficking since as early as the as early as the 1990s .
The Syrian government has played a role in drug trafficking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the 1990s .
“ When Syria invaded Lebanon in the ’ 90s there were many reports showing the Syrian military were aiding and abetting hashish and opium production in the Bekaa Valley , ” said Laurent Laniel , an analyst at the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction .
Captagon production flourished in Syria after 2013 , when a crackdown in neighboring Lebanon likely forced Hezbollah to relocate its drug production operations next door .
The shift came at an opportune time for the Syrian regime , as it needed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebel groups .
Nearly a decade into Syria ’ s civil war , Captagon production is still increasing at the expense of civilians .
Counterfeit Captagon is relatively easy to produce .
A factory space isn ’ t necessary , only a room big enough to fit a pill press and a few ingredients , which are easy to obtain .
The informal economy of the drug trade is a “ lifeline for the Assad regime , ” said Caroline Rose , the co-author of a report on Captagon produced by the London @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The majority of Syria ’ s Captagon production sites are in regime-held areas , according to Abu Ja ’ far , a former truck driver who worked between Homs , Rif-Dimashq , and Aleppo .
“ You only need some deserted homes and a few workers supervised by someone with strong connections , ” Abu Ja ’ far , who requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns , told Foreign Policy .
The locations are spread throughout the suburbs of Aleppo , Damascus , and Latakia , as well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tal Kalakh , he said .
International organizations are unable to conduct research on the ground , meaning there is no concrete evidence linking the Assad regime to the Captagon trade .
But sources say that strong protection would be required to produce , sell , and export the drugs from regime-held areas .
“ It was always possible in a country at war that those best placed to safely manufacture a drug in large quantities would be people in the regime … or in areas the regime were guaranteeing security , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would likely not be possible without the technical knowledge of Hezbollah , which has links to Captagon production in Homs , Tal Kalakh , and Qusayr , near the Lebanese border .
Elsewhere in Syria , Bedouins have played a leading role in the sale and transport of Captagon , according to Abu Ja ’ far .
They were among the first to buy amphetamine shipments coming from Bulgaria via Turkey to sell in Syria , Jordan , and the Gulf states , and they now have a foot in manufacturing , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ports such as Latakia , it ’ s likely that connections are needed—tracing the trade back to the Syrian regime .
Last year , more than 33 million Captagon pills were seized in Greece after being shipped from regime-held Latakia .
And in April this year , Saudi customs seized more than 44 million pills hidden in tea packaging from a company close to the Assad family .
“ You can say anything that comes out of the port of Latakia can be linked to the regime or someone who has paid to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Despite these possible links , many beyond the Middle East have incorrectly linked Captagon with the Islamic State .
Reports published after the 2015 Paris attacks indicated that the perpetrators had been using Captagon and described it as a jihadi drug .
Toxicology reports later showed the attackers weren ’ t using any drugs .
There is little evidence that the Islamic State ever produced Captagon—even if individual fighters used the drug on the battlefield .
At the height of its territorial control , the Islamic State was involved in the black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and oil .
But there is little evidence that the group ever produced Captagon—even if individual fighters used the drug on the battlefield .
It would not have been sanctioned at the institutional level because of the group ’ s Salafism : Islamic State leaders punished people caught smoking or selling tobacco , making it unlikely they condoned the manufacturing of amphetamines .
Furthermore , the Italian police misunderstood Europe as the final destination of the Captagon shipment seized in July , resulting in missed opportunities to hold other countries accountable for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long been the No .
1 consumer of Captagon , which is popular among young and affluent partygoers .
As conflict drags on in Libya , it is also possible the large shipment was destined for the port of Benghazi , with Europe as a transit point .
The pills could have been intended for Gen. Khalifa Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army ( LNA ) , which Russia backs in its campaign against the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli .
Russia is one of the Assad regime ’ s main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make geopolitical sense : to act as a boost for the LNA fighters .
While much of the Captagon produced in Syria is destined for overseas markets , Syrians themselves suffer some of the worst damage from the trade .
The worst-quality Captagon tablets are sold within Syria for as cheap as $ 1 per pill , according to Rose .
Producers often mix substances to dilute the compounds , and some pills contain toxic levels of zinc and nickel .
“ They ’ re going to sell the worst formulas they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the cheapest and people are desperate , ” Rose said .
Captagon is known to inhibit tiredness , hunger , and fear .
But its use is now common among all demographics in Syria , not just fighters .
The most common side effects include extreme depression , insomnia , malnutrition , and heart and blood toxicity .
Those who are addicted find little support from a health care system wrecked by years of war .
The seizure in Italy has marked the opportunity for governments to act to halt Captagon production .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ data on Captagon seizures , including testing the drug ’ s composition and tracking smuggling networks and shipment frequency .
The data could be shared openly between governments and law enforcement agencies .
Countries could then hold those high up in the chain of Captagon production and export accountable through sanctions or other measures , making it harder for the business to be so lucrative .
“ The Captagon trade is not going anywhere , but the level of the shipment in Italy , they wouldn ’ t be able to carry that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Rose said .
Taking action requires the cooperation of the international community and increased public awareness of the harsh effects the Captagon trade has , particularly on Syrian civilians .
The myths around the drug and its production and use by terrorist groups must be exposed and discredited .

On July 1, Italian police in the port of Salerno announced that they had intercepted 84 million counterfeit Captagon tablets worth 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion), deemed “ the bigge st seizure of amphetamines in the world .”
On July 1, Italian police in the port of Salerno announced that they had intercepted 84 million counterfeit Captagon tablets worth 1 billion euros ($1.1 billion), deemed “the biggest seizure of amphetamines in the world.”
Scientists first produced Captagon, the brand name of the drug fenethylline, in the 1960s to treat depression and children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Two decades later, the World Health Organization banned the substance due its high potential for addiction, abuse, and other adverse health effects. But counterfeit Captagon—which is sometimes just a cocktail of amphetamines with no fenethylline—remains in demand on the black market in the Middle East.
The pills intercepted in Salerno arrived on three ships from Latakia, a Syrian port, and Italian police quickly announced that the Islamic State was responsible for their production and shipment—allegedly to fund its global terrorism operations.
The incident shows how the connections between drug trafficking and war are often poorly understood. Global media outlets disseminated the information provided by the Italian police without questioning it, replicating misinformation without considering how a scattered group of Islamic State members could pull off such an operation—but the truth is, they probably didn’t.
Indeed, it is more likely that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has a hand in producing Captagon, reaping a profit that it can invest into its armed campaigns against civilians and damaging the health of many Syrians who are now addicted to amphetamines after years of war.
The Syrian government has played a role in drug trafficking since as early as the 1990s.
The Syrian government has played a role in drug trafficking since as early as the as early as the 1990s. “When Syria invaded Lebanon in the ’90s there were many reports showing the Syrian military were aiding and abetting hashish and opium production in the Bekaa Valley,” said Laurent Laniel, an analyst at the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.
Captagon production flourished in Syria after 2013, when a crackdown in neighboring Lebanon likely forced Hezbollah to relocate its drug production operations next door. The shift came at an opportune time for the Syrian regime, as it needed money to fund its military campaign against rebel groups.
Nearly a decade into Syria’s civil war, Captagon production is still increasing at the expense of civilians. Counterfeit Captagon is relatively easy to produce. A factory space isn’t necessary, only a room big enough to fit a pill press and a few ingredients, which are easy to obtain. The informal economy of the drug trade is a “lifeline for the Assad regime,” said Caroline Rose, the co-author of a report on Captagon produced by the London School of Economics International Drug Policy Unit.
The majority of Syria’s Captagon production sites are in regime-held areas, according to Abu Ja’far, a former truck driver who worked between Homs, Rif-Dimashq, and Aleppo. “You only need some deserted homes and a few workers supervised by someone with strong connections,” Abu Ja’far, who requested the use of a pseudonym out of safety concerns, told Foreign Policy. The locations are spread throughout the suburbs of Aleppo, Damascus, and Latakia, as well as in Homs, Qusayr, and Tal Kalakh, he said.
International organizations are unable to conduct research on the ground, meaning there is no concrete evidence linking the Assad regime to the Captagon trade. But sources say that strong protection would be required to produce, sell, and export the drugs from regime-held areas. “It was always possible in a country at war that those best placed to safely manufacture a drug in large quantities would be people in the regime … or in areas the regime were guaranteeing security,” Laniel said.
The Syrian drug operations would likely not be possible without the technical knowledge of Hezbollah, which has links to Captagon production in Homs, Tal Kalakh, and Qusayr, near the Lebanese border. Elsewhere in Syria, Bedouins have played a leading role in the sale and transport of Captagon, according to Abu Ja’far. They were among the first to buy amphetamine shipments coming from Bulgaria via Turkey to sell in Syria, Jordan, and the Gulf states, and they now have a foot in manufacturing, he said.
To pass through checkpoints and ports such as Latakia, it’s likely that connections are needed—tracing the trade back to the Syrian regime. Last year, more than 33 million Captagon pills were seized in Greece after being shipped from regime-held Latakia. And in April this year, Saudi customs seized more than 44 million pills hidden in tea packaging from a company close to the Assad family. “You can say anything that comes out of the port of Latakia can be linked to the regime or someone who has paid to use the port,” Laniel said.
Despite these possible links, many beyond the Middle East have incorrectly linked Captagon with the Islamic State. Reports published after the 2015 Paris attacks indicated that the perpetrators had been using Captagon and described it as a jihadi drug. Toxicology reports later showed the attackers weren’t using any drugs.
There is little evidence that the Islamic State ever produced Captagon—even if individual fighters used the drug on the battlefield.
At the height of its territorial control, the Islamic State was involved in the black market, trading looted antiquities, arms, and oil. But there is little evidence that the group ever produced Captagon—even if individual fighters used the drug on the battlefield. It would not have been sanctioned at the institutional level because of the group’s Salafism: Islamic State leaders punished people caught smoking or selling tobacco, making it unlikely they condoned the manufacturing of amphetamines.
Furthermore, the Italian police misunderstood Europe as the final destination of the Captagon shipment seized in July, resulting in missed opportunities to hold other countries accountable for the illicit trade. Saudi Arabia has long been the No. 1 consumer of Captagon, which is popular among young and affluent partygoers. As conflict drags on in Libya, it is also possible the large shipment was destined for the port of Benghazi, with Europe as a transit point.
The pills could have been intended for Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), which Russia backs in its campaign against the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Russia is one of the Assad regime’s main guarantors, and this illicit trade would make geopolitical sense: to act as a boost for the LNA fighters.
While much of the Captagon produced in Syria is destined for overseas markets, Syrians themselves suffer some of the worst damage from the trade. The worst-quality Captagon tablets are sold within Syria for as cheap as $1 per pill, according to Rose. Producers often mix substances to dilute the compounds, and some pills contain toxic levels of zinc and nickel. “They’re going to sell the worst formulas they have in Syria, because it’s the cheapest and people are desperate,” Rose said.
Captagon is known to inhibit tiredness, hunger, and fear. But its use is now common among all demographics in Syria, not just fighters. The most common side effects include extreme depression, insomnia, malnutrition, and heart and blood toxicity. Those who are addicted find little support from a health care system wrecked by years of war.
The seizure in Italy has marked the opportunity for governments to act to halt Captagon production. Further research should be implemented to collect data on Captagon seizures, including testing the drug’s composition and tracking smuggling networks and shipment frequency. The data could be shared openly between governments and law enforcement agencies.
Countries could then hold those high up in the chain of Captagon production and export accountable through sanctions or other measures, making it harder for the business to be so lucrative. “The Captagon trade is not going anywhere, but the level of the shipment in Italy, they wouldn’t be able to carry that off if further sanctions were placed,” Rose said.
Taking action requires the cooperation of the international community and increased public awareness of the harsh effects the Captagon trade has, particularly on Syrian civilians. The myths around the drug and its production and use by terrorist groups must be exposed and discredited.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--12 Years After Russian Invasion, Georgia Sees No End in Sight

12 Years After Russian Invasion , Georgia Sees No End in Sight This week marks 12 years since Russia ’ s five-day invasion of Georgia allowed two provinces to break away , splintering the Caucasian nation .
Now , its ambassador to the United States only sees further bad behavior from Moscow , which has used the coronavirus pandemic to harden borders and spread misinformation about the response to the virus .
“ Unfortunately , after six months of the aggression against Georgia , business with Russia went back to normal , ” David Bakradze , Georgia ’ s ambassador @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy in an interview .
But he says the international community has become increasingly wary of Russian involvement in the conflict .
To mark the anniversary , the United States and seven European nations urged Russia to withdraw their troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia , as Georgian officials warn of an increasingly grave human rights situation .
Russian-backed authorities have denied medical evacuations from the breakaway provinces , while Moscow has poured more than 10,000 troops into the area .
“ I think that at some point Russia will realize that far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once again the desire [ to join ] and very much accelerated the tempo of Georgians marching [ into ] NATO and the European Union , ” Bakradze said .
This interview has been edited for length and clarity .
Foreign Policy : There ’ s a new push from the United States and Europe to help evict Russian forces .
Where do Georgian officials see the U.N.-backed talks with the Russians in Geneva to end the conflict ?
David Bakradze : Unfortunately , there is no progress .
We see after 50-plus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t want to abide by its own obligations .
And today after 12 years of the invasion and occupation of 20 percent of Georgia ’ s territory , it still continues the process of creeping annexation , which includes the incorporation of local , so-called institutions into the Russian federal structures and also attempting to eradicate any Georgian heritage in the occupied region .
And today hybrid warfare has become Russia ’ s weapon , something that we have seen in other countries .
It is not new for Georgia .
We have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the years .
It was the energy and economic tools used in 2006 , it was cyberattacks in 2008 .
In 2019 , as well , cyberattacks took place against Georgia .
There is misinformation and propaganda that now even attacks Georgia during COVID when everyone is united , the entire world to fight against the spread of COVID-19 pandemic .
Russia has seized the opportunity , even in these times , to intensify its provocations .
FP : The State Department has reported that Russian-backed authorities have put up more barriers to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights violations .
Is the situation getting worse ?
DB : Since the occupation there are tens of thousands of new internally displaced persons in Georgia from the occupied regions of Tskhinvali [ the capital of South Ossetia ] , South Ossetia , and Abkhazia .
We see human rights violations on a daily basis .
What needs to be underlined is a very grave humanitarian situation on the ground in those two occupied regions which [ are being ] depopulated .
You can see that the population has decreased four or five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around 30,000 in Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia , and from up to 350 to 400,000 to no more than 100,000 in Abkhazia .
This took place mostly on ethnic grounds , and even today we see that this occupation line serves as a new kind of a tool for Russia to continue the kidnappings of Georgian citizens .
Around 100 kidnappings took place last year and a year ago at the occupation line .
There are closures of the so-called crossing points and continuous restriction of freedom of movement have also been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instrument and extremely aggravated the humanitarian situation in the conflict-affected regions and occupied regions .
The occupation regime in Tskhinvali specifically has denied medical evacuation from the occupied district .
That has led to multiple fatal cases .
Fifty people have died since the closure of the occupation line in September 2019 , due to the very irresponsible decision to deny patients to get emergency treatment .
Now , on the other side the Georgian government is trying to extend the benefits that every Georgian citizen has to our citizens living in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care .
But they are denied this opportunity .
FP : Are the United States and Europe doing enough to stop Russia from further consolidating its foothold in Georgia ’ s breakaway regions ?
Has it made you rethink plans to enter NATO and the EU ?
DB : Unfortunately , after six months of the aggression against Georgia , business with Russia went back to normal .
But we see a very strong stance now , that is expressed in numerous documents and actions .
Only in 2017 for the first time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s breakaway ] regions are occupied by Russia and put a restriction of any funding for any country which recognizes [ their ] independence .
We have seen a very strong message of support that came from Congress last year when the House of Representatives unanimously adopted the Georgia Support Act , which includes the strong support to Georgia ’ s territorial integrity , but also put sanctions on those individuals who have clearly violated human rights in the occupied regions .
We are strongly hopeful that the Senate will push forward this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of this year .
With the European Union , and from the U.S. side , we see a strong support to Georgia ’ s NATO integration , [ they ’ ve ] very much increased the number of exercises that take place .
Around 76 percent of Georgians support Georgia ’ s [ bid for ] EU membership , and almost 70 percent [ support ] NATO membership , which is a strong demonstration of Georgia ’ s belonging to the European family of nations .
So I think that at some point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Georgia they have also united once again the desire [ to join ] and very much accelerated the tempo of Georgians marching [ into ] NATO and the European Union .
FP : How much direct support are the Russians providing to the separatist provinces ?
DB : From the beginning , Russia has increased its presence in the occupied regions through a process that we call creeping annexation , which is incorporating local institutions into Russian federal structures .
We see that illegal activities take place in both [ separatist ] regions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and predict that these activities are led by Russia in not only in Georgia ’ s two occupied regions , but also in the occupied or annexed territories of Ukraine .
This is something that the U.S. pays very close attention to .
We see that all the social or military or other structures are becoming gradually something that Russia continues its effective control .
We see that more than 10,000 Russian troops are today located in the military bases in the Tskhinvali region of South Ossetia .
We see that the financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , almost 100 percent of the local budget that is effectively used by Russia to continue and strengthen its policies .
We see military equipment that is present in those two regions , the range of which goes far beyond Georgia and creates an important threat to the wider region including to the Black Sea security .
FP : The Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research , Georgia ’ s equivalent of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , has also been targeted by a misinformation campaign… DB : Right after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saw misinformation that attacked the public health care system in Georgia , but specifically the Lugar Center , which has played a critical life-saving rule in Georgia , [ which has had ] great success in containing COVID-19 .
While the Lugar Center has received strong support from the World Health [ Organization ] and political leaders , Russian misinformation has portrayed it as a testing ground for toxins and viruses .
This was a very orchestrated attack that was extended on hundreds of different statements from the highest officials , or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ telling , the Lugar Center is responsible for wild conspiracies including the Ebola virus production or outbreaks .

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foreignpolicy--2020-08-10--Toppling Statues Isn’t Enough in Latin America

Statues have fallen across the United States in recent months , turning the issue into a political flash point .
All of Chicago ’ s three monuments to Christopher Columbus have been taken down—at least temporarily .
In Virginia , an array of Confederate statues have fallen so far .
In response to that , U.S. President Donald Trump has promised new laws and deployed federal troops to defend America ’ s racist legacies .
For Latin America , the turmoil in its northern neighbor is nothing more than an anxious flashback .
The region has already gone through the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of stone symbols alone isn ’ t enough .
In late 2019 , the regional movement that began with anti-austerity demonstrations by the Indigenous people of Ecuador suddenly gained momentum throughout Latin America .
From Colombians striking over economic and political reforms to Bolivians marching as a result of the contested fall of Evo Morales , last year ’ s Latin American protests helped put some of the region ’ s historically overlooked demands in the spotlight—helping spark much-needed conversations on colonial legacies .
While settlers in North America worked to rapidly exterminate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of integration that happened early on in Spanish colonies made efforts to whiten the population more complicated .
Genocidal campaigns were certainly not uncommon , such as Argentina ’ s “ Conquest of the Desert , ” a late-1800s incursion to colonize Patagonia that resulted in the deaths of at least 1,000 Mapuche people and the displacement of 15,000 more , serves as a prime example of that .
And as late as the 1990s , Peru was carrying out an ethnic cleansing campaign that sterilized at least 200,000 Indigenous women .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a larger part of the population , their voices were often silenced in favor of the colonial elite or their descendants .
Across the Andes beginning last September , though , they spoke loudly .
In Chile , as over a million people took the streets of Santiago in October to protest rampant inequality , different Indigenous communities—including the Mapuche , Aymara , Quechua , and Rapa Nui—came together around the statue of Spanish conquistador Pedro de Valdivia , the city ’ s founder , to object the country ’ s dominance of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bring attention to Indigenous demands , the group dressed the monument in traditional clothing while performing native chants and dances .
In other parts of the country , Indigenous protesters took a more direct approach .
South of Santiago , in cities such as Concepción , Temuco , and Collipulli , demonstrators tore down and decapitated monuments both to Valdivia and to some of his fellow conquistadors .
The Chilean government estimated that property damage reached $ 1.4 billion as a result of the protests .
Elisa Loncón , a Mapuche activist and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Chile , said this form of resistance has been used by Indigenous groups to address the country ’ s “ parallel histories.
” “ Colonial symbols are a key part of Chilean identity , but of the one that is associated with and carries the power , ” Loncón told Foreign Policy in Spanish .
“ These are symbols that have been transmitted through the teaching of history—the curriculum that was left by the colonizers and later adopted by the Chilean oligarchy .
This contrasts with the parallel history and memory that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ones who know that these are not our fathers , especially the ones who carried out genocides.
” Statues have been a point of contention in Latin America for nearly three decades .
Jeremy Adelman , the director of the Global History Lab at Princeton University , says targeting monuments has been a protest tactic since the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus ’ arrival in the Americas .
“ In 1992 , they were connected to the rise of political Indigenous movements in Mexico and Peru , as well as those of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Adelman told Foreign Policy .
“ But the challenge was that these were movements in the name of an oppressed minority .
It was not easy to make them part of the pantheon , to make these Indigenous leaders part of the pantheon of national leaders .
To some extent what they were doing was criticizing even the concept of the nation.
” But more potent than isolated statues may be the geographical and urban markers that are still named for invaders .
“ All streets remember them , but they are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the streets are full of their names , ” Loncón said .
“ This is very tough for our Mapuche history and memory , because we know who the ones who have committed genocide in Chile are.
” Beyond that , the structures of imperial colonialism are still the norm in a distinct way .
Adelman noted that the colonial period for most of Latin America came much earlier and ran deeper than in the United States and Canada , as “ the English penetration in North America only skimmed the edges @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was very shallow in that sense and was cut short much sooner.
” “ In Latin America , colonial institutions sank very deep roots , ” said Adelman , who edited the collection Colonial Legacies : The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History .
“ Colonial peoples and structures persist .
So there is an irony , because you had very well-organized , highly populated political structures , including empires .
And the descendants of those empires are still there , and , in some cases , they are the majority @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alive.
” As of 2010 , to take two examples from the region , Indigenous people made up 61 percent of the population in Bolivia and 24 percent in Peru .
In the United States , where instead of integrating these groups governments opted for genocide , only 1.3 percent of the population identifies as Native American .
And while in Latin America ’ s approximately 42 million Indigenous people comprise less than one-tenth of the region ’ s total population , they represent 14 percent of the poor and 17 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care and education is also especially limited among Indigenous groups .
Yet , despite the colonial legacy that still haunts the Indigenous people of Latin America , Adelman noted that , in some countries , “ reckoning with dictatorships is a more proximate memory.
” “ For the Mapuche , there might be an anti-colonial discourse , but where it gets the most traction is in the ways the Mapuche were treated during the Pinochet dictatorship , ” Adelman said .
“ If we are going to see a public fight over memory @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that .
But there are no statues to be taken down on the streets , so it will take a different form.
” For Loncón , Chile ’ s return to democracy in the early 1990s after nearly two decades of a bloody military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet “ has not meant democracy for the Mapuche.
” She said Indigenous groups continue to tear down statues because they “ do not represent the popular sectors or the Indigenous peoples , only the oligarchy that has taken advantage of the resources and the political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their agenda goes beyond the removal of such symbols .
“ Our demands have two main pillars : Self-determination , which means the right to manage our own politics , as well as cultural change , ” Loncón , who is the coordinator of the Network for the Educational and Linguistic Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Chile , said .
“ Chile is a colonial state , and colonialism is not gone yet , it is instead part of the institutions.
” Adelman agrees that the change needed in the region goes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Latin Americans can revisit their own past in the way Americans have to examine some of the assumptions they have about the nation .
“ Not only its inclusions but also exclusions , ” he noted .
“ For Latin America , the uncomfortable thing is that the excluded people have historically been so many , and the dispossession so vast , ” Adelman said .
“ In the United States , the exclusion was genocidal , practically .
Indigenous people were not included at all within the nation .
They were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Brazil , Bolivia , Mexico , and even the whitest of the white like Argentina , although they had genocidal policies , a much higher percentage of the Indigenous population became part of the nation.
” While mass protests have lost momentum throughout South America , Indigenous groups in Chile continue physically resisting the country ’ s colonial legacy .
Last week , a group of a hundred Mapuche people took over the city hall of a small town south of Santiago .
Since then , demonstrators have occupied government buildings in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , resulting in confrontations with the Chilean police .
The tensions started one day after Interior Minister Víctor Pérez , a right-wing politician who served in Pinochet ’ s dictatorship , visited the area .
He referred to protesters as “ funded groups , with an operative and logistic capacity , who have decided that peace and tranquility should not exist.
” The Indigenous people of Latin America have been used to fighting since day one .
They know that when statues fall , colonial legacies are not suddenly dismantled .
But they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region that pretends to be colorblind , these groups have long been aware that breaking away from whiteness is the first step to actually achieve the diversity Latin America has always prided itself on .

Statues have fallen across the United States in recent months, turning the issue into a political flash point. All of Chicago’s three monuments to Christopher Columbus have been taken down —at least temporarily. In Virginia, an array of Confederate statues have fallen so far. In response to that, U.S. President Donald Trump has promised new laws and deployed federal troops to defend America’s racist legacies.
Statues have fallen across the United States in recent months, turning the issue into a political flash point. All of Chicago’s three monuments to Christopher Columbus have been taken down—at least temporarily. In Virginia, an array of Confederate statues have fallen so far. In response to that, U.S. President Donald Trump has promised new laws and deployed federal troops to defend America’s racist legacies.
For Latin America, the turmoil in its northern neighbor is nothing more than an anxious flashback. The region has already gone through the great statue wars—and discovered that the removal of stone symbols alone isn’t enough.
In late 2019, the regional movement that began with anti-austerity demonstrations by the Indigenous people of Ecuador suddenly gained momentum throughout Latin America. From Colombians striking over economic and political reforms to Bolivians marching as a result of the contested fall of Evo Morales, last year’s Latin American protests helped put some of the region’s historically overlooked demands in the spotlight—helping spark much-needed conversations on colonial legacies.
While settlers in North America worked to rapidly exterminate or drive out the locals, the level of integration that happened early on in Spanish colonies made efforts to whiten the population more complicated. Genocidal campaigns were certainly not uncommon, such as Argentina’s “Conquest of the Desert,” a late-1800s incursion to colonize Patagonia that resulted in the deaths of at least 1,000 Mapuche people and the displacement of 15,000 more, serves as a prime example of that. And as late as the 1990s, Peru was carrying out an ethnic cleansing campaign that sterilized at least 200,000 Indigenous women.
But while people of Indigenous descent remained a larger part of the population, their voices were often silenced in favor of the colonial elite or their descendants. Across the Andes beginning last September, though, they spoke loudly.
In Chile, as over a million people took the streets of Santiago in October to protest rampant inequality, different Indigenous communities—including the Mapuche, Aymara, Quechua, and Rapa Nui—came together around the statue of Spanish conquistador Pedro de Valdivia, the city’s founder, to object the country’s dominance of colonial history. In an effort to bring attention to Indigenous demands, the group dressed the monument in traditional clothing while performing native chants and dances.
In other parts of the country, Indigenous protesters took a more direct approach. South of Santiago, in cities such as Concepción, Temuco, and Collipulli, demonstrators tore down and decapitated monuments both to Valdivia and to some of his fellow conquistadors. The Chilean government estimated that property damage reached $1.4 billion as a result of the protests.
Elisa Loncón, a Mapuche activist and education professor at the University of Santiago, Chile, said this form of resistance has been used by Indigenous groups to address the country’s “parallel histories.”
“Colonial symbols are a key part of Chilean identity, but of the one that is associated with and carries the power,” Loncón told Foreign Policy in Spanish. “These are symbols that have been transmitted through the teaching of history—the curriculum that was left by the colonizers and later adopted by the Chilean oligarchy. This contrasts with the parallel history and memory that the Indigenous people are familiar with, the ones who know that these are not our fathers, especially the ones who carried out genocides.”
Statues have been a point of contention in Latin America for nearly three decades. Jeremy Adelman, the director of the Global History Lab at Princeton University, says targeting monuments has been a protest tactic since the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ arrival in the Americas.
“In 1992, they were connected to the rise of political Indigenous movements in Mexico and Peru, as well as those of the Mapuche in Southern Chile,” Adelman told Foreign Policy. “But the challenge was that these were movements in the name of an oppressed minority. It was not easy to make them part of the pantheon, to make these Indigenous leaders part of the pantheon of national leaders. To some extent what they were doing was criticizing even the concept of the nation.”
But more potent than isolated statues may be the geographical and urban markers that are still named for invaders.
“All streets remember them, but they are the ones who destroyed and killed communities, and the streets are full of their names,” Loncón said. “This is very tough for our Mapuche history and memory, because we know who the ones who have committed genocide in Chile are.”
Beyond that, the structures of imperial colonialism are still the norm in a distinct way. Adelman noted that the colonial period for most of Latin America came much earlier and ran deeper than in the United States and Canada, as “the English penetration in North America only skimmed the edges of one part of North America, it was very shallow in that sense and was cut short much sooner.”
“In Latin America, colonial institutions sank very deep roots,” said Adelman, who edited the collection Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History. “Colonial peoples and structures persist. So there is an irony, because you had very well-organized, highly populated political structures, including empires. And the descendants of those empires are still there, and, in some cases, they are the majority of the population. The colony is alive.”
As of 2010, to take two examples from the region, Indigenous people made up 61 percent of the population in Bolivia and 24 percent in Peru. In the United States, where instead of integrating these groups governments opted for genocide, only 1.3 percent of the population identifies as Native American. And while in Latin America’s approximately 42 million Indigenous people comprise less than one-tenth of the region’s total population, they represent 14 percent of the poor and 17 percent of the extremely poor. Access to health care and education is also especially limited among Indigenous groups.
Yet, despite the colonial legacy that still haunts the Indigenous people of Latin America, Adelman noted that, in some countries, “reckoning with dictatorships is a more proximate memory.”
“For the Mapuche, there might be an anti-colonial discourse, but where it gets the most traction is in the ways the Mapuche were treated during the Pinochet dictatorship,” Adelman said. “If we are going to see a public fight over memory, it is going to be around that. But there are no statues to be taken down on the streets, so it will take a different form.”
For Loncón, Chile’s return to democracy in the early 1990s after nearly two decades of a bloody military dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet “has not meant democracy for the Mapuche.” She said Indigenous groups continue to tear down statues because they “do not represent the popular sectors or the Indigenous peoples, only the oligarchy that has taken advantage of the resources and the political power,” but she emphasized that their agenda goes beyond the removal of such symbols.
“Our demands have two main pillars: Self-determination, which means the right to manage our own politics, as well as cultural change,” Loncón, who is the coordinator of the Network for the Educational and Linguistic Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Chile, said. “Chile is a colonial state, and colonialism is not gone yet, it is instead part of the institutions.”
Adelman agrees that the change needed in the region goes beyond removing symbols, and he argues that Latin Americans can revisit their own past in the way Americans have to examine some of the assumptions they have about the nation. “Not only its inclusions but also exclusions,” he noted.
“For Latin America, the uncomfortable thing is that the excluded people have historically been so many, and the dispossession so vast,” Adelman said. “In the United States, the exclusion was genocidal, practically. Indigenous people were not included at all within the nation. They were exterminated. Whereas in Latin America, in Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, and even the whitest of the white like Argentina, although they had genocidal policies, a much higher percentage of the Indigenous population became part of the nation.”
While mass protests have lost momentum throughout South America, Indigenous groups in Chile continue physically resisting the country’s colonial legacy. Last week, a group of a hundred Mapuche people took over the city hall of a small town south of Santiago. Since then, demonstrators have occupied government buildings in at least five cities in the region, resulting in confrontations with the Chilean police. The tensions started one day after Interior Minister Víctor Pérez, a right-wing politician who served in Pinochet’s dictatorship, visited the area. He referred to protesters as “funded groups, with an operative and logistic capacity, who have decided that peace and tranquility should not exist.”
The Indigenous people of Latin America have been used to fighting since day one. They know that when statues fall, colonial legacies are not suddenly dismantled. But they recognize that symbolism matters. In a region that pretends to be colorblind, these groups have long been aware that breaking away from whiteness is the first step to actually achieve the diversity Latin America has always prided itself on.