foreignpolicy--2020-09-21--What the U.N. Is Good For… or Could Be

What the U.N. Is Good For… or Could Be

What the U.N. Is Good For… or Could Be In an ordinary year , mid-September in New York would feature traffic jams grotesque even by Manhattan standards , compounded by complaints about diplomats shirking parking fines and allegations of espionage .
These would be followed up by lengthy speeches , fiery denunciations of the United States , and outraged editorials lamenting the hypocrisy of offending states on the United Nations Human Rights Council .
All part of the annual New York ritual known as the convocation of the U.N. General Assembly ( UNGA ) .
This year ’ s largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using to celebrate the U.N. ’ s 75th anniversary , seems laughably mistimed , given that the Trump administration has withdrawn from participation in the Human Rights Council , refused funding for Palestinian refugees , and is $ 3.6 billion behind on its financial contributions to the organization .
The United States has chafed for decades at its U.N. dues—one-fifth of the body ’ s total budget—but under the Trump administration , U.S. animosity toward the U.N. has hit new highs .
President Donald Trump has been broadcasting his hostility since at least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speech he refused to acknowledge any past successes of the body and derided its operations .
While the president ’ s views may be extreme , however , they ’ re hardly uncommon among American leaders .
Richard Haass , the president of the Council on Foreign Relations , argued this month that the U.N. has become pointless , and he said that the United States should pursue multilateral cooperation in other coalitions like the G-7 instead .
It ’ s certainly true that the world has made less progress than desired on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ maintain international peace and security , ” “ develop friendly relations among nations , ” and “ achieve international cooperation in solving international problems.
” Disagreements among the five permanent , veto-wielding members of the Security Council deadlock the group ; others object to the structural inequality of this “ permanent five.
” The Security Council ’ s lack of action against modern horrors like the Chinese incarceration of Uighur Muslims then makes it both easy and fashionable to lament all the U.N. has failed to do .
Haass also criticized the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representation , characterizing it as “ ineffectual ” because “ every country has one vote , regardless of its size , population , wealth , or military might.
” Such criticisms are misplaced .
Insofar as they are accurate , denouncing the U.N. ’ s structure is the international equivalent of bemoaning the United States ’ electoral college or the distribution of seats in the U.S. Senate : These features—which today may seem suboptimal—were essential to securing countries ’ agreement for participation at the time of the U.N. ’ s founding .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.N. of 50 member states , not the current 193 .
Nevertheless , today ’ s U.N. members can ’ t agree on how to change things , and the United States isn ’ t willing to take a position on reform or expend the effort to make changes .
So , for the time being , the U.N. as it stands is the organ for broad international cooperation we ’ ve got .
For the time being , the U.N. as it stands is the organ for broad international cooperation we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.N. ’ s structure as an explanation for the United States ’ failure to achieve its goals ignores the reality that any conceivable reform of the U.N. would reduce rather than expand the structural power of the United States .
Fleeing to more exclusive bodies like the G-7 makes policy coordination easier , but it narrows these policies ’ global reach .
The United States ’ failure to get its policies adopted at the U.N. is not rooted in the body ’ s structure ; rather , U.S. initiatives have floundered because @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persuading others of its agenda .
At the end of the day , there ’ s no such thing as a substitute for winning the argument—and evasive abandonment certainly isn ’ t it .
When U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed office in 1953 , the U.N. looked similar to how it does now—albeit with fewer members .
Eisenhower also faced problems similar to those that plague both U.S. and global action today : a deadlocked Security Council , for one , and broad suspicion of U.S. motives due to the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eisenhower , too , was daunted by the tall task of building coalitions for U.S. initiatives .
His administration ’ s review of U.S. participation in the U.N. arrived at all-too-similar conclusions to those of the current administration .
The Eisenhower administration called the Security Council “ unworkable , ” and criticized fellow permanent-five members Britain and France for stymieing “ rapid progress in this field.
” Rather than write the U.N. off completely , however , Eisenhower worked within its structures to accomplish U.S. objectives .
For instance , his administration capitalized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one vote feature , which it considered “ an important means of pressure as well as public justification of [ its ] case.
” Eisenhower sought to bring Cold War-relevant matters before the UNGA , where he hoped to achieve “ large majorities.
” This orientation to more participation became a new way to circumvent what Washington called the “ paralysis ” of the Security Council .
This approach proved successful , and the Eisenhower administration was able to use the U.N. to advance U.S. interests .
Eisenhower brought forward a substantive agenda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of U.N. activity and helped develop institutional capacities the United States and the world now rely on : The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Food Program , for example , both grew out of proposals made in Eisenhower ’ s U.N. General Assembly speeches .
This approach—and these accomplishments—contrast starkly with the Trump administration ’ s relentless disparagement of the U.N. , which it has followed up with refusals to fund or participate fully in the organization .
There are real costs to this sort of behavior .
The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.
” Within the U.N. , the United States now seems too arrogant and impatient to attend to these very opinions .
The United States ’ founders understood the importance of “ a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.
” Writing off the rest of the world impedes support for U.S. policies by those Americans need—or want—to help them .
It ’ s true that shepherding policies through the U.N. is less efficient than taking action unilaterally , but the United States also does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only do the United States ’ tantrums when things don ’ t go its way aggravate those nations that get what they want much less often , but they also leave room for countries with antagonistic interests to dominate proceedings .
In recent years , China has capitalized on U.S. petulance at the U.N. to move into leadership positions .
The United States should return to expending its diplomatic efforts at the United Nations .
Washington currently contents itself with braying its demands loudly , rather than trying to understand what others want—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to attain U.S. aims .
To become effective again at the U.N. , the United States must remember three important points .
First , the United States has always considered the U.N. an “ avenue of last resort ” —an approach The United States dumps into the U.N. the problems it doesn ’ t care enough about to solve itself .
While U.N. peacekeeping operations , for example , tend to be unsuccessful ( unless political circumstances have created an actual peace to keep ) , they do stabilize situations of little interest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. , the United States would likely not pay heed to these situations , but funding peacekeeping operations can buy smaller countries ’ support on larger matters of actual U.S. interest .
Second , international security is not the U.N. ’ s main focus ; economic development , global health , refugee assistance , and information-sharing are , and they are attended to through agencies such as the World Food Program , the International Civil Aviation Organization , and the International Monetary Fund .
The U.N. does an enormous amount of good in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but isn ’ t keen on taking full responsibility , paying the full costs , or doing the diplomatic bidding .
The U.N. does an enormous amount of good in areas where the United States wants action .
Third , the U.N. Charter is an enormous ideological achievement for American values .
As the Eisenhower administration understood , “ we have in the U.N. Charter a statement of our own values and objectives , and we have tried to persuade other members to identify their self-interest in terms of that same standard of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advances those values internationally .
Today , however , the United States at the U.N. has become what the Soviet Union once was , adopting policies of “ non-cooperation and wrecking activities.
” The U.N. is not a perfect body—nor has it ever been .
But it is a necessary one .
If the United States wants to regain broad international support for its policies , the country would do well to remember that the U.N. does ample important work around the globe—and only through active participation in that work can the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @

In an ordinary year, mid-September in New York would feature traffic jams grotesque even by Manhattan standards, compounded by complaints about diplomats shirking parking fines and allegations of espionage. These would be followed up by lengthy speeches , fiery denunciations of the United States, and outraged editorials lamenting the hypocrisy of offending states on the United Nations Human Rights Council. All part of the annual New York ritual known as the convocation of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA).
In an ordinary year, mid-September in New York would feature traffic jams grotesque even by Manhattan standards, compounded by complaints about diplomats shirking parking fines and allegations of espionage. These would be followed up by lengthy speeches, fiery denunciations of the United States, and outraged editorials lamenting the hypocrisy of offending states on the United Nations Human Rights Council. All part of the annual New York ritual known as the convocation of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA).
This year’s largely virtual assembly, which the organization is using to celebrate the U.N.’s 75th anniversary, seems laughably mistimed, given that the Trump administration has withdrawn from participation in the Human Rights Council, refused funding for Palestinian refugees, and is $3.6 billion behind on its financial contributions to the organization. The United States has chafed for decades at its U.N. dues—one-fifth of the body’s total budget—but under the Trump administration, U.S. animosity toward the U.N. has hit new highs.
President Donald Trump has been broadcasting his hostility since at least 2017, when in his debut UNGA speech he refused to acknowledge any past successes of the body and derided its operations. While the president’s views may be extreme, however, they’re hardly uncommon among American leaders. Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued this month that the U.N. has become pointless, and he said that the United States should pursue multilateral cooperation in other coalitions like the G-7 instead.
It’s certainly true that the world has made less progress than desired on the U.N. Charter’s commitments to “maintain international peace and security,” “develop friendly relations among nations,” and “achieve international cooperation in solving international problems.” Disagreements among the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council deadlock the group; others object to the structural inequality of this “permanent five.” The Security Council’s lack of action against modern horrors like the Chinese incarceration of Uighur Muslims then makes it both easy and fashionable to lament all the U.N. has failed to do. Haass also criticized the General Assembly’s system of universal representation, characterizing it as “ineffectual” because “every country has one vote, regardless of its size, population, wealth, or military might.”
Such criticisms are misplaced. Insofar as they are accurate, denouncing the U.N.’s structure is the international equivalent of bemoaning the United States’ electoral college or the distribution of seats in the U.S. Senate: These features—which today may seem suboptimal—were essential to securing countries’ agreement for participation at the time of the U.N.’s founding. The Security Council and UNGA were developed for a U.N. of 50 member states, not the current 193. Nevertheless, today’s U.N. members can’t agree on how to change things, and the United States isn’t willing to take a position on reform or expend the effort to make changes. So, for the time being, the U.N. as it stands is the organ for broad international cooperation we’ve got.
For the time being, the U.N. as it stands is the organ for broad international cooperation we’ve got.
Moreover, using the U.N.’s structure as an explanation for the United States’ failure to achieve its goals ignores the reality that any conceivable reform of the U.N. would reduce rather than expand the structural power of the United States. Fleeing to more exclusive bodies like the G-7 makes policy coordination easier, but it narrows these policies’ global reach. The United States’ failure to get its policies adopted at the U.N. is not rooted in the body’s structure; rather, U.S. initiatives have floundered because the United States has been unsuccessful at persuading others of its agenda. At the end of the day, there’s no such thing as a substitute for winning the argument—and evasive abandonment certainly isn’t it.
When U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, the U.N. looked similar to how it does now—albeit with fewer members. Eisenhower also faced problems similar to those that plague both U.S. and global action today: a deadlocked Security Council, for one, and broad suspicion of U.S. motives due to the United States’ alliances with many colonial oppressors. Eisenhower, too, was daunted by the tall task of building coalitions for U.S. initiatives. His administration’s review of U.S. participation in the U.N. arrived at all-too-similar conclusions to those of the current administration. The Eisenhower administration called the Security Council “unworkable,” and criticized fellow permanent-five members Britain and France for stymieing “rapid progress in this field.”
Rather than write the U.N. off completely, however, Eisenhower worked within its structures to accomplish U.S. objectives. For instance, his administration capitalized on UNGA’s one country, one vote feature, which it considered “an important means of pressure as well as public justification of [its] case.” Eisenhower sought to bring Cold War-relevant matters before the UNGA, where he hoped to achieve “large majorities.” This orientation to more participation became a new way to circumvent what Washington called the “paralysis” of the Security Council.
This approach proved successful, and the Eisenhower administration was able to use the U.N. to advance U.S. interests. Eisenhower brought forward a substantive agenda of U.S. policies that formed the basis of U.N. activity and helped develop institutional capacities the United States and the world now rely on: The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Food Program, for example, both grew out of proposals made in Eisenhower’s U.N. General Assembly speeches.
This approach—and these accomplishments—contrast starkly with the Trump administration’s relentless disparagement of the U.N., which it has followed up with refusals to fund or participate fully in the organization. There are real costs to this sort of behavior. The United States’ founders understood the importance of “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” Within the U.N., the United States now seems too arrogant and impatient to attend to these very opinions.
The United States’ founders understood the importance of “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”
Writing off the rest of the world impedes support for U.S. policies by those Americans need—or want—to help them. It’s true that shepherding policies through the U.N. is less efficient than taking action unilaterally, but the United States also does not want to do everything alone. Not only do the United States’ tantrums when things don’t go its way aggravate those nations that get what they want much less often, but they also leave room for countries with antagonistic interests to dominate proceedings. In recent years, China has capitalized on U.S. petulance at the U.N. to move into leadership positions.
The United States should return to expending its diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. Washington currently contents itself with braying its demands loudly, rather than trying to understand what others want—and when it can align with those desires to attain U.S. aims. To become effective again at the U.N., the United States must remember three important points.
First, the United States has always considered the U.N. an “avenue of last resort”—an approach The United States dumps into the U.N. the problems it doesn’t care enough about to solve itself. While U.N. peacekeeping operations, for example, tend to be unsuccessful (unless political circumstances have created an actual peace to keep), they do stabilize situations of little interest to the United States. Without the U.N., the United States would likely not pay heed to these situations, but funding peacekeeping operations can buy smaller countries’ support on larger matters of actual U.S. interest.
Second, international security is not the U.N.’s main focus; economic development, global health, refugee assistance, and information-sharing are, and they are attended to through agencies such as the World Food Program, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Monetary Fund. The U.N. does an enormous amount of good in areas where the United States wants action but isn’t keen on taking full responsibility, paying the full costs, or doing the diplomatic bidding.
The U.N. does an enormous amount of good in areas where the United States wants action.
Third, the U.N. Charter is an enormous ideological achievement for American values. As the Eisenhower administration understood, “we have in the U.N. Charter a statement of our own values and objectives, and we have tried to persuade other members to identify their self-interest in terms of that same standard of measurement.” Engaging constructively at the U.N. advances those values internationally. Today, however, the United States at the U.N. has become what the Soviet Union once was, adopting policies of “non-cooperation and wrecking activities.”
The U.N. is not a perfect body—nor has it ever been. But it is a necessary one. If the United States wants to regain broad international support for its policies, the country would do well to remember that the U.N. does ample important work around the globe—and only through active participation in that work can the United States ensure it advances U.S. interests.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-21--Much Maligned But Still Necessary: the U.N. at 75

Much Maligned But Still Necessary : the U.N. at 75 The annual gathering of the United Nations General Assembly will be especially strange this year , with speeches from world leaders piped in from around the globe as they mark the U.N. ’ s 75th birthday from afar .
But the truth is , many nations were socially distancing themselves from the U.N. well before the coronavirus came along .
Indeed , the scattered assembly and empty chamber looming over the East River are emblematic of a longer-term problem than COVID-19 : the widening gulf of policy and practice among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a pervasive sense of the world body ’ s growing irrelevance .
Leading the way , of course , has been an unremittingly hostile Trump administration .
This year ’ s UNGA theme is “ confronting COVID-19 through effective multilateral action.
” Yet this is precisely what the world has not done against the worst pandemic in decades .
Instead it ’ s mostly every country and vaccine manufacturer for himself , despite the COVAX initiative recently co-orchestrated by the World Health Organization , which aims to speed vaccine development to nations most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than 170 countries are in talks to join , many of them submitting non-binding expressions of interest , so that a vaccine would go to vulnerable groups around the world first .
But the effort came months after the pandemic hit , held up in part by U.S. obstructionism and European divisions .
And the U.N. agency that ’ s supposed to be the front-line responder , the WHO , finds itself under attack from every side , especially the U.N. ’ s most powerful member , the United States .
Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ creation , the United Nations , has a long history extending to Democratic as well as Republican administrations .
But Donald Trump has gone further than any other president—even George W. Bush—in pushing the United Nations to the sidelines .
Arguing that the WHO has fallen under Chinese influence , it is defunding the world ’ s premier health agency even as the global death toll from COVID-19 is reaching 1 million ( and U.S. deaths now top 200,000 ) .
Trump also withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council and the compact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rebuffed by the Security Council and U.N. leadership in seeking to reimpose sanctions on Iran over the 2015 nuclear agreement , which Trump but no other nation has rejected .
And Trump , perhaps in a fit of pique , decided to skip his planned videotaped anniversary remarks on Monday .
His administration relegated the speech to the No .
2 at the U.S. mission—not even U.N .
Ambassador Kelly Craft .
Craft herself—a political donor appointee with scant diplomatic experience—has also been a marginalized player , outmaneuvered by China and Russia and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prominent U.S. ambassadors as Adlai Stevenson , Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Richard Holbrooke .
( Trump will deliver his major speech to the assembly on Tuesday . )
In other respects , 75 years on , the United Nations has turned into a very different institution than it was supposed to be when it was inaugurated on Oct. 24 , 1945 ( the leadership decided to commemorate the 75th anniversary at a high-level session on Monday ) .
The General Assembly has been little more than a talking shop for most of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington to be a great-power-dominated enforcer of world peace—is all but paralyzed by worsening hostility between the U.S. , China and Russia , each of which veto resolution after resolution against each other .
And as Trump walks away from the U.N. , Beijing has been swift to move in , taking major swipes at Washington in the process as it seeks a leadership role throughout the organization .
“ No country has the right to dominate global affairs , control the destiny of others , or keep advantages in development all to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in his speech Monday as the 75th celebration got underway .
“ Even less should one be allowed to do whatever it likes and be the hegemon , bully or boss of the world.
” Most experts and diplomats believe Trump is being foolish in snubbing the United Nations—and leaving it open to Chinese influence—because it still critically serves U.S. interests .
Indeed , when viewed over its entire long history , the United Nations has mostly realized its larger purpose : preventing a third world war , argues Stephen Schlesinger , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. ’ s founding , Act of Creation .
“ The U.N. played a direct role in resolving the biggest and most dangerous confrontation we ’ ve had in the last 75 years , the Cuban Missile Crisis.
” This is true : Then-U.N .
Ambassador Stevenson had a critical part in averting nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union when he famously confronted the Soviet ambassador in the Security Council , telling him , “ You are in the court of world opinion right now.
” Schlesinger counts about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations played a peacemaking role in preventing a regional or local conflict that could have threatened a wider war—some that easily might have drawn in Washington .
These include crises in Cambodia , Mozambique , Guatemala , Angola , Serbia , South Africa , Namibia and Croatia .
Yet few of these events garnered major headlines .
“ The problem is the U.N. failures tend to be dramatic and the successes tend to be mundane , ” said Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group , referring to past blue helmet disasters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1995 slaughter at Srebrenica in Bosnia .
The United Nations has adapted in other ways and proved critical in trouble spots across the world , from Afghanistan to Syria to Iraq .
And it continues to perform essential stabilizing functions–not least as a legitimizing authority whether the issue is nuclear non-proliferation , sanctions against rogue nations like North Korea and Iran , or armed invasion .
The United Nations played an essential role in the Paris climate pact and the Iran nuclear deal—both of which Trump has rejected but which Democrat Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elected .
And the Security Council has been necessary to organizing broad alliance support in U.S.-led missions such as the Gulf War .
It even became important in supporting George W. Bush ’ s early enforcement actions against Saddam Hussein in 2002 , before he went beyond his U.N. remit and invaded .
The U.N. has created critical institutions from the International Atomic Energy Agency—which monitors the largely successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by 191 states—to the World Food Program .
True , the United Nations has partly failed to fulfill the role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wilson ’ s dream of global governance through a League of Nations ( which failed , only to be reinvented in a more practical way by Franklin Roosevelt ) .
Global collective security under FDR ’ s “ four policemen ” concept , giving the major powers ( the victors of World War II ) a veto , never worked well enough to form anything like a supra-national combat force .
Nor was there ever serious consideration of an independent “ peace enforcement ” capability , as former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington ended .
It ’ s impossible to imagine that the United States and other major powers will ever allow the United Nations to develop one either .
U.N. peacekeeping missions , the so-called blue helmets , are composed of combined national forces .
Though the United Nations was conceived at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington D.C. and inaugurated in San Francisco—then plunked down in the middle of New York City—it has long been regarded as an alien entity by many Americans who see it as a threat to U.S. sovereignty .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nonsense about U.N. black helicopters traversing the American heartland , plotting to install a new world order run by international bureaucrats .
Yet for most of its existence , when it comes to the really big issues , the United Nations has acted more as an adjunct to U.S. power than an obstructionist force .
“ It ’ s sort of tragic that so many Americans see it that way , ” said Gowan .
“ If you talk to most diplomats around the U.N. , what they will tell you is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. Secretary-General António ] Guterres has had to devote a considerable part of his term to massaging the Trump administration.
” And far from threatening world government , the United Nations has never gone to war in the name of collective security unless the United States has orchestrated such military action .
And this has happened just twice in its history—Korea in the early ‘ 50s , and the Gulf War in 1990-91 .
For all its flaws and failures , the U.N. Security Council is also necessary if the United States is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ superpower without too much in-your-face unilateralism , and minimizing any commitment of U.S. forces .
U.N. legitimation gives foreign leaders the face they need to sign onto U.S. initiatives .
As former U.S. general and NATO commander Wesley Clark—who led the multilateral effort in the Balkans in the 1990s—once said , The role of the U.N. Security Council “ is huge because it enables your friends to do what you want them to do in their own domestic politics , ” and they don ’ t have to admit to bowing to U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a clearinghouse for an endless slew of aid projects that Washington has no interest in orchestrating .
In war-torn Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002 , for example , it was the World Food Program that managed to get food—much of it supplied by U.S. aid—to hard-to-reach regions as the war was still going on .
Earning almost no headlines , the WFP averted a famine .
And in the end , most presidents come to see the U.N. ’ s broader role—the vast substructure of stability it provides to the global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the U.N. to orchestrate sanctions against North Korea and Iran .
“ Most American presidents have kind of a skeptical view at first but they come around to realizing it ’ s a useful extension of our foreign policy , ” said Schlesinger .

The annual gathering of the United Nations General Assembly is especially strange this year, with speeches from world leaders piped in from around the globe as they mark the U.N.’s 75th birthday from afar. But the truth is, many nations were socially distancing themselves from the U.N. well before the coronavirus came along.
The annual gathering of the United Nations General Assembly is especially strange this year, with speeches from world leaders piped in from around the globe as they mark the U.N.’s 75th birthday from afar. But the truth is, many nations were socially distancing themselves from the U.N. well before the coronavirus came along.
Indeed, the scattered assembly and empty chamber looming over the East River are emblematic of a longer-term problem than COVID-19: the widening gulf of policy and practice among dozens of key U.N. members, and a pervasive sense of the world body’s growing irrelevance. Leading the way, of course, has been an unremittingly hostile Trump administration.
This year’s UNGA theme is “confronting COVID-19 through effective multilateral action.” Yet this is precisely what the world has not done against the worst pandemic in decades. Instead it’s mostly every country and vaccine manufacturer for himself, despite the COVAX initiative recently co-orchestrated by the World Health Organization, which aims to speed vaccine development to nations most in need. The United Nations says more than 170 countries are in talks to join, many of them submitting non-binding expressions of interest, so that a vaccine would go to vulnerable groups around the world first. But the effort came months after the pandemic hit, held up in part by U.S. obstructionism and European divisions. And the U.N. agency that’s supposed to be the front-line responder, the WHO, finds itself under attack from every side, especially the U.N.’s most powerful member, the United States.
Washington’s animosity toward its own postwar creation, the United Nations, has a long history extending to Democratic as well as Republican administrations. But Donald Trump has gone further than any other president—even George W. Bush—in pushing the United Nations to the sidelines. Arguing that the WHO has fallen under Chinese influence, it is defunding the world’s premier health agency even as the global death toll from COVID-19 is reaching 1 million (and U.S. deaths now top 200,000). Trump also withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council and the compact on migration.
The U.S. was recently rebuffed by the Security Council and U.N. leadership in seeking to reimpose sanctions on Iran over the 2015 nuclear agreement, which Trump but no other nation has rejected. And Trump, perhaps in a fit of pique, decided to skip his planned videotaped anniversary remarks on Monday. His administration relegated the speech to the No. 2 at the U.S. mission—not even U.N. Ambassador Kelly Craft. Craft herself—a political donor appointee with scant diplomatic experience—has also been a marginalized player, outmaneuvered by China and Russia and a far cry in stature from such prominent U.S. ambassadors as Adlai Stevenson, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Richard Holbrooke. (Trump delivered his major speech to the assembly on Tuesday.)
In other respects, 75 years on, the United Nations has turned into a very different institution than it was supposed to be when it was inaugurated on Oct. 24, 1945 (the leadership decided to commemorate the 75th anniversary at a high-level session on Monday). The General Assembly has been little more than a talking shop for most of its history. The U.N. Security Council—designed by Washington to be a great-power-dominated enforcer of world peace—is all but paralyzed by worsening hostility between the U.S., China and Russia, each of which veto resolution after resolution against each other.
And as Trump walks away from the U.N., Beijing has been swift to move into the vacuum, taking major swipes at Washington as it seeks a leadership role throughout the organization. “No country has the right to dominate global affairs, control the destiny of others, or keep advantages in development all to itself,” Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his speech Monday as the 75th celebration got underway. “Even less should one be allowed to do whatever it likes and be the hegemon, bully or boss of the world.” In his speech Tuesday, Trump hit back at Beijing over its role in spreading the coronavirus, saying, “The United Nations must hold China accountable for their actions.”
Most experts and diplomats believe Trump is being foolish in snubbing the United Nations—and leaving it open to Chinese influence—because for all its flaws it still critically serves U.S. interests. Indeed, when viewed over its entire long history, the United Nations has mostly realized its larger purpose: preventing a third world war, argues Stephen Schlesinger, author of a 2004 book about the U.N.’s founding, Act of Creation. “The U.N. played a direct role in resolving the biggest and most dangerous confrontation we’ve had in the last 75 years, the Cuban Missile Crisis.” This is true: Then-U.N. Ambassador Stevenson had a critical part in averting nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union when he famously confronted the Soviet ambassador in the Security Council, telling him, “You are in the court of world opinion right now.”
Schlesinger counts about 30 cases in its history where the United Nations played a peacemaking role in preventing a regional or local conflict that could have threatened a wider war—some that easily might have drawn in Washington. These include crises in Cambodia, Mozambique, Guatemala, Angola, Serbia, South Africa, Namibia and Croatia.
Yet few of these events garnered major headlines. “The problem is the U.N. failures tend to be dramatic and the successes tend to be mundane,” said Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group, referring to past blue helmet disasters such as the Rwandan genocide and the 1995 slaughter at Srebrenica in Bosnia.
The United Nations has adapted in other ways and proved critical in trouble spots across the world, from Afghanistan to Syria to Iraq. And it continues to perform essential stabilizing functions–not least as a legitimizing authority whether the issue is nuclear non-proliferation, sanctions against rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, or armed invasion. The United Nations played an essential role in the Paris climate pact and the Iran nuclear deal—both of which Trump has rejected but which Democrat Joe Biden has pledged to rejoin if he is elected. And the Security Council has been necessary to organizing broad alliance support in U.S.-led missions such as the Gulf War. It even became important in supporting George W. Bush’s early enforcement actions against Saddam Hussein in 2002, before he went beyond his U.N. remit and invaded. The U.N. has created critical institutions from the International Atomic Energy Agency—which monitors the largely successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by 191 states—to the World Food Program.
True, the United Nations has partly failed to fulfill the role that began a century ago with Woodrow Wilson’s dream of global governance through a League of Nations (which failed, only to be reinvented in a more practical way by Franklin Roosevelt). Global collective security under FDR’s “four policemen” concept, giving the major powers (the victors of World War II) a veto, never worked well enough to form anything like a supra-national combat force. Nor was there ever serious consideration of an independent “peace enforcement” capability, as former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed after the Cold War stalemate between Moscow and Washington ended. It’s impossible to imagine that the United States and other major powers will ever allow the United Nations to develop one either. U.N. peacekeeping missions, the so-called blue helmets, are composed of combined national forces.
Though the United Nations was conceived at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington D.C. and inaugurated in San Francisco—then plunked down in the middle of New York City—it has long been regarded as an alien entity by many Americans who see it as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. On the right, conspiracy theorists spread nonsense about U.N. black helicopters traversing the American heartland, plotting to install a new world order run by international bureaucrats.
Yet for most of its existence, when it comes to the really big issues, the United Nations has acted more as an adjunct to U.S. power than an obstructionist force. “It’s sort of tragic that so many Americans see it that way,” said Gowan. “If you talk to most diplomats around the U.N., what they will tell you is the U.S. really dominates the institution. [U.N. Secretary-General António] Guterres has had to devote a considerable part of his term to massaging the Trump administration.”
And far from threatening world government, the United Nations has never gone to war in the name of collective security unless the United States has orchestrated such military action. And this has happened just twice in its history—Korea in the early ‘50s, and the Gulf War in 1990-91.
For all its flaws and failures, the U.N. Security Council is also necessary if the United States is to impose its influence as the lone superpower without too much in-your-face unilateralism, and minimizing any commitment of U.S. forces. U.N. legitimation gives foreign leaders the face they need to sign onto U.S. initiatives. As former U.S. general and NATO commander Wesley Clark—who led the multilateral effort in the Balkans in the 1990s—once said, The role of the U.N. Security Council “is huge because it enables your friends to do what you want them to do in their own domestic politics,” and they don’t have to admit to bowing to U.S. pressure. The United Nations also acts as a clearinghouse for an endless slew of aid projects that Washington has no interest in orchestrating. In war-torn Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002, for example, it was the World Food Program that managed to get food—much of it supplied by U.S. aid—to hard-to-reach regions as the war was still going on. Earning almost no headlines, the WFP averted a famine.
And in the end, most presidents come to see the U.N.’s broader role—the vast substructure of stability it provides to the global system. Even Trump initially made use of the U.N. to orchestrate sanctions against North Korea and Iran. “Most American presidents have kind of a skeptical view at first but they come around to realizing it’s a useful extension of our foreign policy,” said Schlesinger.
Senior Diplomatic Correspondent Colum Lynch contributed to this report.
Sept. 22: This story was updated with Trump’s speech.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-21--Repairing Humanity’s Relationship With the Planet Will Be Cheaper Than Continuing to Let It Slide

Repairing Humanity ’ s Relationship With the Planet Will Be Cheaper Than Continuing to Let It Slide All around , on the land and in the ocean , nature ’ s alarm bells are ringing .
Wildfires rage in California as hotter , drier conditions make such events more frequent and more severe .
One of the worst Atlantic hurricane seasons on record threatens coastal communities .
And a coronavirus that jumped from animals to people late last year continues to drive a global pandemic that is responsible for nearly 1 million deaths so far and a global recession .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in what scientists refer to as the Anthropocene , the current geologic period dominated by human influence on the planet .
Now we can add another data point to the growing chronicle of humanity ’ s broken relationship with nature .
According to the newly released 2020 Living Planet Report , produced by the WWF , where one of us is CEO , population sizes of mammals , fish , birds , reptiles , and amphibians declined globally by an average of 68 percent between 1970 and 2016 .
Such loss of nature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and energy production and consumption—the same factors that have fanned climate change and provoked public health crises , such as COVID-19 .
But there is reason for measured optimism : These problems are linked , but so are their solutions .
And if 2020 was the year when our broken relationship with nature revealed itself with immense global consequences , so too can 2020 be the year when humanity began to repair it .
The Living Planet Report provides a detailed look at the drivers behind biodiversity loss , and an examination of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for restoring planetary health .
Land use change looms largest in this equation , particularly the conversion of pristine native habitats , like forests and grasslands , into agricultural systems .
In the Amazon , for example , cattle ranching accounts for 80 percent of the region ’ s deforestation .
Deforestation in turn releases carbon into the atmosphere , robs species of their natural habitat , and pushes humans into closer proximity with animals that harbor diseases .
Ending this cycle needs to start with ending deforestation in tropical areas , where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since 1990 has occurred .
One of the most effective interventions is establishing protected areas , such as national parks , wildlife refuges , Indigenous reserves , and other conservation areas .
Once such designations are made , governments still need to secure the long-term funding necessary to make those parks effective .
After all , a park in and of itself can not keep out illegal loggers or safeguard sensitive biodiversity .
That requires clear borders , engaged communities living in or adjacent to protected areas , rangers , scientists , maps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In some cases , it may also involve applying modern technology to the protection of Indigenous lands .
All of this costs money .
For that , partnerships among governments , donors , foundations , and financial institutions—similar to the model that has secured long-term funding for 42 million acres of protected rainforest in Peru through Patrimonio Natural del Perú—will be vital .
Such efforts to channel investment toward forests is a remedy both for environmental pressures and a source of jobs , revenue , and well-being .
Other strategies will also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s broken relationship with nature .
As the Living Planet Report makes clear , food production and consumption are also key drivers behind the loss of forests and other vital ecosystems around the globe .
Governments could address this phenomenon by enacting policies to reward sustainable agriculture—as has been done in Costa Rica where locals are paid to follow regenerative practices—and to greatly reduce food loss and waste .
The world would also benefit from strategies that reduce the impact of livestock on land use , such as working with ranchers to sustainably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global trade of high-risk wildlife for exotic pets and meat can limit our risk to future zoonotic disease outbreaks while also ending a major threat to species populations .
These are big challenges .
But we ignore nature ’ s warning signs at our peril .
The pandemic has made that clear .
Governments crafting plans for their post-coronavirus recovery have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to address the root causes of zoonotic disease spillover and turn the tide on climate change and biodiversity loss .
Effectively , the world has a choice .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accept increasingly frequent wildfires , extreme weather , species loss , and disease outbreaks that require trillions of dollars to address each year .
Or we can take the steps required to secure a viable future on Earth at a fraction of the cost .
For example , the United States alone has authorized some $ 3 trillion in COVID-19 response spending so far ; a study published in the journal Science recently estimated the cost of preventing another pandemic at between $ 22 billion and $ 31 billion per year .
Difficult @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the current moment will be the one in which governments , companies , and people everywhere take action .

Carter Roberts and Carlos Manuel Rodriguez

All around, on the land and in the ocean, nature’s alarm bells are ringing. Wildfires rage in California as hotter, drier conditions make such events more frequent and more severe. One of the worst Atlantic hurricane seasons on record threatens coastal communities. And a coronavirus that jumped from animals to people late last year continues to drive a global pandemic that is responsible for nearly 1 million deaths so far and a global recession. All this seems like a new normal in what scientists refer to as the Anthropocene, the current geologic period dominated by human influence on the planet.
All around, on the land and in the ocean, nature’s alarm bells are ringing. Wildfires rage in California as hotter, drier conditions make such events more frequent and more severe. One of the worst Atlantic hurricane seasons on record threatens coastal communities. And a coronavirus that jumped from animals to people late last year continues to drive a global pandemic that is responsible for nearly 1 million deaths so far and a global recession. All this seems like a new normal in what scientists refer to as the Anthropocene, the current geologic period dominated by human influence on the planet.
Now we can add another data point to the growing chronicle of humanity’s broken relationship with nature. According to the newly released 2020 Living Planet Report, produced by the WWF, where one of us is CEO, population sizes of mammals, fish, birds, reptiles, and amphibians declined globally by an average of 68 percent between 1970 and 2016. Such loss of nature is driven by unsustainable forms of food and energy production and consumption—the same factors that have fanned climate change and provoked public health crises, such as COVID-19.
But there is reason for measured optimism: These problems are linked, but so are their solutions. And if 2020 was the year when our broken relationship with nature revealed itself with immense global consequences, so too can 2020 be the year when humanity began to repair it.
The Living Planet Report provides a detailed look at the drivers behind biodiversity loss, and an examination of those also serves as a road map for restoring planetary health. Land use change looms largest in this equation, particularly the conversion of pristine native habitats, like forests and grasslands, into agricultural systems. In the Amazon, for example, cattle ranching accounts for 80 percent of the region’s deforestation. Deforestation in turn releases carbon into the atmosphere, robs species of their natural habitat, and pushes humans into closer proximity with animals that harbor diseases.
Ending this cycle needs to start with ending deforestation in tropical areas, where nearly 90 percent of intact forest loss since 1990 has occurred. One of the most effective interventions is establishing protected areas, such as national parks, wildlife refuges, Indigenous reserves, and other conservation areas. Once such designations are made, governments still need to secure the long-term funding necessary to make those parks effective. After all, a park in and of itself cannot keep out illegal loggers or safeguard sensitive biodiversity. That requires clear borders, engaged communities living in or adjacent to protected areas, rangers, scientists, maps of fragile resources, and educational signage. In some cases, it may also involve applying modern technology to the protection of Indigenous lands. All of this costs money.
For that, partnerships among governments, donors, foundations, and financial institutions—similar to the model that has secured long-term funding for 42 million acres of protected rainforest in Peru through Patrimonio Natural del Perú—will be vital. Such efforts to channel investment toward forests is a remedy both for environmental pressures and a source of jobs, revenue, and well-being.
Other strategies will also be needed to fully repair humanity’s broken relationship with nature. As the Living Planet Report makes clear, food production and consumption are also key drivers behind the loss of forests and other vital ecosystems around the globe. Governments could address this phenomenon by enacting policies to reward sustainable agriculture—as has been done in Costa Rica , where locals are paid to follow regenerative practices—and to greatly reduce food loss and waste. The world would also benefit from strategies that reduce the impact of livestock on land use, such as working with ranchers to sustainably manage grasslands. Last, ending the global trade of high-risk wildlife for exotic pets and meat can limit our risk to future zoonotic disease outbreaks while also ending a major threat to species populations.
These are big challenges. But we ignore nature’s warning signs at our peril. The pandemic has made that clear. Governments crafting plans for their post-coronavirus recovery have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to address the root causes of zoonotic disease spillover and turn the tide on climate change and biodiversity loss.
Effectively, the world has a choice. We can continue with the status quo and accept increasingly frequent wildfires, extreme weather, species loss, and disease outbreaks that require trillions of dollars to address each year. Or we can take the steps required to secure a viable future on Earth at a fraction of the cost. For example, the United States alone has authorized some $3 trillion in COVID-19 response spending so far; a study published in the journal Science recently estimated the cost of preventing another pandemic at between $22 billion and $31 billion per year. Difficult circumstances often breed invention, and perhaps the current moment will be the one in which governments, companies, and people everywhere take action.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-21--U.S. Isolated at U.N. as Push to Ramp Up Pressure on Iran Fails

U.S. Isolated at U.N. as Push to Ramp Up Pressure on Iran Fails The Trump administration celebrated the 75th birthday of the United Nations by ramping up its campaign to kill off one of the most important multilateral agreements of the century : the 2015 Iran nuclear deal .
But the unilateral U.S. effort to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran appeared to be in tatters , as key U.N. powers redoubled their support for the pact , and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres rebuffed an appeal from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to reimpose multilateral sanctions .
Most of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Defense Secretary Mark Esper , and National Security Advisor Robert O ’ Brien—in a press conference urged other countries to adhere to its announcement Monday that it had “ snapped back ” U.N. sanctions on Iran that were in place prior to the 2015 deal negotiated during the Obama administration .
The United States also announced further unilateral sanctions on Iranian officials and entities involved in weapons production .
Almost no one followed Washington ’ s lead , highlighting the latest failure in the Trump administration ’ s effort to rally the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
None of the other signatories of the 2015 pact—including Britain , France , Germany , the European Union , China , and Russia—took heed of the U.S. plea , though the United States did secure expressions of support from Israel and the bloc representing Persian Gulf states backed a renewed arms embargo .
Trump ’ s ambassador to the U.N. , Kelly Craft , brushed off the historic rebuff .
“ We don ’ t need a cheering section to validate our moral compass .
We do not find comfort based @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority has found themselves in an uncomfortable position of underwriting terrorism , chaos , and conflict , ” Craft said .
“ We refuse to be members of that club.
” “ The country that ’ s isolated today is not the United States but rather Iran , ” Pompeo added .
“ By these actions , we have made it very clear that every member state in the United Nations has a responsibility to enforce these sanctions .
That certainly includes the United Kingdom , France , and Germany .
We will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these sanctions.
” European officials have said they have no plans to honor a snapback .
The Trump administration insists that it has the authority to trigger the snapback of sanctions because it was an original party to the 2015 deal , before pulling out in 2018 .
The foreign ministers of the United Kingdom , Germany , and France issued a statement saying the U.S. proclamation is “ incapable of having legal effect ” because only current parties to the deal could trigger such a move .
The standoff gives rise to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political questions about how Washington could unilaterally enforce multilateral sanctions without the cooperation of other U.N. powers .
It also underscores how some of the United States ’ closest allies are fed up with the Trump administration ’ s unilateralism .
“ Frankly , there ’ s a degree of exhaustion with this administration in the Security Council , ” said Richard Gowan , the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group .
“ On top of three and a half years of Trump unraveling multilateral arrangements , there ’ s just very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right now.
” The standoff with European powers has only deepened as the United States has sought to prevent the expiration of the existing U.N. arms embargo against Iran ; one of the conditions of the 2015 nuclear deal was that Iran would see arms sanctions relief this year .
On Aug. 20 , Pompeo tried to trigger the snapback of sanctions in a letter to then-U.N. Security Council president , Dian Triansyah Djani of Indonesia , arguing that Tehran was in “ significant non-performance ” of the accord .
But Britain , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia—all Security Council members—countered that the United States can not legally trigger the snapback of sanctions in a deal to which it is no longer a party .
Over the weekend , Guterres informed Pompeo that his office would not be able to support efforts to reimpose sanctions unless the divided council reached agreement on the matter .
It didn ’ t : The Trump administration ’ s U.N. resolution to reimpose the embargo failed in August by a wide margin , with all of Washington ’ s closest European allies abstaining from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republic—supporting it .
The Trump administration warns that without reimposing the sanctions , Iran could strengthen its military and nuclear program , even though the country is still under strict sanctions regimes from the United States and European Union .
The Defense Intelligence Agency , the Pentagon ’ s in-house intelligence arm , said in a report last year that Iran ’ s air force is likely to buy fourth-generation fighter jets from Russia when the U.N. arms embargo expires in October .
Some former officials see the Trump administration ’ s efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to deal a final death blow to the nuclear deal , which could force a future Joe Biden administration to renegotiate the 2015 deal from scratch .
“ When the Trump administration started going down this road , it was very clear what they wanted to do , ” said Jarrett Blanc , the former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation during the Obama administration and now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .
“ They wanted to smash the remnants of the [ Iran nuclear deal ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for doing that.
” The administration ’ s legal wrangling to trigger snapback sanctions has even drawn criticism from Iran hawks .
The “ Trump Administration ’ s failed ‘ snapback sanctions ’ effort will ironically—and unfortunately—undercut U.S. efforts to eliminate Iran ’ s nuclear weapons program , ” former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton tweeted Monday .
Bolton—a stalwart Iran hawk and sharp critic of the nuclear deal—has expressed concern that Biden , should he win in November , could use the Trump administration ’ s insistence that the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to more easily reenter the agreement .
The former U.S. vice president reiterated last week that he would return to the deal in exchange for Iranian compliance on the limits of its nuclear program .
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif , speaking at an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations on Monday , said Tehran had enough low-enriched uranium “ for three bombs ” and refused to commit to fresh talks if Biden is elected president .
Still , the Trump administration is leaving the door open .
“ If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and proxy wars and is willing to end its pursuit of a nuclear bomb , Iran could be a tremendously prosperous state , ” O ’ Brien said during Monday ’ s press briefing .
“ Unfortunately , the regime hasn ’ t chosen that route .
We ’ re hoping that with these renewed sanctions that will be some inducement for Iran to change its behavior.
” Zarif said Monday that Iran had “ never been hesitant to negotiate ” but would not renegotiate anything new beyond the 2015 deal .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Colum Lynch

The Trump administration celebrated the 75th birthday of the United Nations by ramping up its campaign to kill off one of the most significant multilateral agreements of the century: the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
The Trump administration celebrated the 75th birthday of the United Nations by ramping up its campaign to kill off one of the most significant multilateral agreements of the century: the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
But the unilateral U.S. effort to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran appeared to be in tatters, as key U.N. powers redoubled their support for the pact, and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres rebuffed an appeal from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to reimpose multilateral sanctions.
Most of the Trump administration’s top officials—including Pompeo, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien—in a press conference urged other countries to adhere to its announcement Monday that it had “snapped back” U.N. sanctions on Iran that were in place prior to the 2015 deal negotiated during the Obama administration. The United States also announced further unilateral sanctions on Iranian officials and entities involved in weapons production.
Almost no one followed Washington’s lead, highlighting the latest failure in the Trump administration’s effort to rally the world behind its maximum pressure campaign against Iran. None of the other signatories of the 2015 pact—including Britain, France, Germany, the European Union, China, and Russia—took heed of the U.S. plea, though the United States did secure expressions of support from Israel and the bloc representing Persian Gulf states for a renewed arms embargo.
Trump’s ambassador to the U.N., Kelly Craft, brushed off the historic rebuff.
“We don’t need a cheering section to validate our moral compass. We do not find comfort based solely on numbers, particularly when the majority has found themselves in an uncomfortable position of underwriting terrorism, chaos, and conflict,” Craft said. “We refuse to be members of that club.”
“The country that’s isolated today is not the United States but rather Iran,” Pompeo added. “By these actions, we have made it very clear that every member state in the United Nations has a responsibility to enforce these sanctions. That certainly includes the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. We will have every expectation that those nations enforce these sanctions.” European officials have said they have no plans to honor a snapback.
The Trump administration insists that it has the authority to trigger the snapback of sanctions because it was an original party to the 2015 deal, before pulling out in 2018. The foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France issued a statement saying the U.S. proclamation is “incapable of having legal effect” because only current parties to the deal could trigger such a move.
The standoff gives rise to a new maze of unanswered legal and political questions about how Washington could unilaterally enforce multilateral sanctions without the cooperation of other U.N. powers. It also underscores how some of the United States’ closest allies are fed up with the Trump administration’s unilateralism.
“Frankly, there’s a degree of exhaustion with this administration in the Security Council,” said Richard Gowan, the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group. “On top of three and a half years of Trump unraveling multilateral arrangements, there’s just very little good will left for the U.S. right now.”
But even if the U.S. isn’t able to convince European states to support snapback sanctions, some experts believe that the Trump administration can still deter would-be investors from placing bets on Iran. Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said the United States doesn’t need multilateral support to make a sanctions snapback work, given the global dominance of the U.S. dollar and power of the United States in international financial markets. “U.S. secondary sanctions help enforce U.N. sanctions—indeed it’s the only thing that ever has,” said Dubowitz. “It’s the same line that we heard in 2015 that U.S. sanctions wouldn’t work without multilateral support. Well it was wrong then and it’s wrong now. Sanctions efficacy is about markets not politics, CEOs not diplomats.”
The standoff with European powers has only deepened as the United States has sought to prevent the expiration of the existing U.N. arms embargo against Iran; one of the conditions of the 2015 nuclear deal was that Iran would see arms sanctions relief this year. On Aug. 20, Pompeo tried to trigger the snapback of sanctions in a letter to then-U.N. Security Council president, Dian Triansyah Djani of Indonesia, arguing that Tehran was in “significant non-performance” of the accord. But Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia—all Security Council members—countered that the United States cannot legally trigger the snapback of sanctions in a deal to which it is no longer a party.
Over the weekend, Guterres informed Pompeo that his office would not be able to support efforts to reimpose sanctions unless the divided council reached agreement on the matter. It didn’t: The Trump administration’s U.N. resolution to reimpose the embargo failed in August by a wide margin, with all of Washington’s closest European allies abstaining from the vote and only one country—the Dominican Republic—supporting it.
The Trump administration warns that without reimposing the sanctions, Iran could strengthen its military and nuclear program. The country remains under strict sanctions regimes from the United States and European Union. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s in-house intelligence arm, said in a report last year that Iran’s air force is likely to buy fourth-generation fighter jets from Russia when the U.N. arms embargo expires in October.
Some former officials see the Trump administration’s efforts to trigger snapback sanctions as a way to deal a final death blow to the nuclear deal, which could force a future Joe Biden administration to renegotiate the 2015 deal from scratch.
“When the Trump administration started going down this road, it was very clear what they wanted to do,” said Jarrett Blanc, the former State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation during the Obama administration and now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They wanted to smash the remnants of the [Iran nuclear deal]. They saw snapback as a vehicle for doing that.”
The administration’s legal wrangling to trigger snapback sanctions has even drawn criticism from some Iran hawks.
The “Trump Administration’s failed ‘snapback sanctions’ effort will ironically—and unfortunately—undercut U.S. efforts to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” former White House National Security Advisor John Bolton tweeted Monday. Bolton—a stalwart Iran hawk and sharp critic of the nuclear deal—has expressed concern that Biden, should he win in November, could use the Trump administration’s insistence that the United States remains a party to the deal to more easily reenter the agreement.
The former U.S. vice president reiterated last week that he would return to the deal in exchange for Iranian compliance on the limits of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, speaking at an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations on Monday, said Tehran had enough low-enriched uranium “for three bombs” and refused to commit to fresh talks if Biden is elected president.
Still, the Trump administration is leaving the door open. “If Iran is willing to forswear regional terrorism and proxy wars and is willing to end its pursuit of a nuclear bomb, Iran could be a tremendously prosperous state,” O’Brien said during Monday’s press briefing. “Unfortunately, the regime hasn’t chosen that route. We’re hoping that with these renewed sanctions that will be some inducement for Iran to change its behavior.”
Zarif said Monday that Iran had “never been hesitant to negotiate” but would not renegotiate anything new beyond the 2015 deal.
Update, Sept. 22, 2020: This article was updated to include comments from additional experts.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-21--Counting Presidential Dead Is a Distraction

Former U.S. President George W. Bush comes up in the news with some frequency .
He was trending on social media earlier this summer when he eulogized Rep. John Lewis .
Then earlier this month , on the anniversary of 9/11 , the liberal commenter Paul Krugman posted an ill-considered tweet in which he credited Bush with preventing a “ mass outbreak of anti-Muslim sentiment and violence ” following the terrorist attacks .
Every time Bush ’ s name surfaces like this , U.S. commentators in the press and social media have the same conversation .
Centrists point out how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump .
Those on the left then claim that Bush ’ s administration in general , and his Iraq War record in particular , is being whitewashed .
One common talking point is that Bush ’ s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in more deaths than Trump ’ s coronavirus pandemic response .
But arguing about who is worse , Bush or Trump , obscures their similarities .
It ’ s not an accident that the last two Republican presidencies have ended in failure , mass death , and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up the dead can be a distraction from preventing more harm in the future .
The main problem with comparing the number of dead under Bush and Trump is that those numbers are very difficult to nail down .
Estimates of deaths in Iraq from the war , for example , range from around 50,000 to more than 750,000 .
A good guess is somewhere around half a million deaths , but it could easily be much lower or much higher than that—depending in part on how you reckon them , whether by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by social and civil collapse .
There are similar problems with estimating COVID-19 deaths under Trump .
Currently , official estimates put the death toll at over 200,000 people in the United States .
But some researchers believe that may be undercounting deaths by 28 percent , which would put the real number at more than 250,000 .
And , of course , we are still in the middle of the pandemic .
Experts believe there could be hundreds of thousands more deaths if the United States doesn ’ t reassess its virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the virus could continue to kill people for years .
There are even more uncertainties when you start to factor in the massive possible ripple effects from presidential decisions .
Bush reportedly disregarded intelligence about potential terrorist attacks in the United States .
When a CIA briefer warned him of an impending terrorist attack by Osama bin Laden , he responded , “ All right .
You ’ ve covered your ass , now , ” and then went fishing .
If Bush had taken the threat seriously , he might have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have saved close to 3,000 victims .
It would have also prevented U.S. involvement in the Afghanistan War .
There are no good estimates of the numbers killed in that nearly 20-year conflict , but the number is probably in the tens of thousands .
For his part , Trump had significantly more direct and explicit knowledge than Bush of impending disaster .
He was warned about the coronavirus spread in early January but downplayed it for months , as he unwittingly confessed to the journalist Bob Woodward at the time .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
But it may also have hampered the global response .
If the United States had responded immediately and aggressively , could global institutions have helped contain the virus in China ?
If the Trump administration had actually focused on the problem , could the United States , with its vast resources , have come up with better tests for the whole world ?
Taiwan , with less than a 10th of the population of the United States , was exporting masks by March , thanks to turning over factory production early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributed not just to the U.S. death toll , but also to the nearly 1 million deaths and counting worldwide .
Pinning down which president is responsible for how many deaths is difficult .
But it ’ s easy to see that Bush and Trump had a similar formula for their policy failures .
It ’ s easy to see that Bush and Trump had a similar formula for their policy failures .
That formula , broadly , involved lack of knowledge and incuriosity .
Trump ’ s refusal to read daily intelligence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is his monumental policy illiteracy .
This is the man who wondered aloud whether people could inject disinfectant to kill the virus .
( Obligatory disclaimer : Do not inject cleaning products under any circumstances . )
Bush ’ s ignorance was generally less flamboyant , but it was just as damaging .
“ Unprepared for the complexities of governing , with little executive experience and a glaring deficit in his attention span , untutored , untraveled , and unversed in the ways of the world , Bush thrived on making a show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Smith wrote in his 2016 biography Bush .
Condoleezza Rice once commented that Bush hated hearing that a foreign-policy problem was complicated .
He saw combating terrorism as a “ crusade ” and blithely disregarded or lied about intelligence that contradicted his push for war .
As with Trump , for Bush , intellectual laziness , motivated reasoning , and malevolence were indistinguishable .
Trump was determined to ignore the virus ; Bush was determined to invade Iraq .
Facts , logic , and consequences didn ’ t matter .
Republicans have elected @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interest in facts , logic , or consequences because the party itself is not interested in those things .
As the political scientist Jonathan Bernstein has explained , Republicans at least since Newt Gingrich have actively denigrated expertise and policy knowledge .
Spurred on by a right-wing media bubble that prioritizes conspiracy theories and vapid resentment , the Republican Party has deliberately gutted legislative policy capacity .
This is why , more than a decade after Republicans set themselves against Obamacare , they still have no coherent counter health care proposal .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican dismissal of accountability .
Bush dedicated his presidency to eliminating checks on his own power .
He gave intelligence agencies broad leeway to wiretap people in the United States without warrants and tossed aside international and domestic restrictions on torture .
He appointed Supreme Court justices such as John Roberts who gutted the Voting Rights Act , allowing Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp to steal the governor ’ s election for candidate Brian Kemp during Trump ’ s tenure .
Bush also repeatedly invoked executive privilege to block congressional oversight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comply with congressional subpoenas .
Executive ignorance and authoritarianism impulses reinforce each other .
A president who can operate without oversight is a president who doesn ’ t need to respond to opposing viewpoints .
At worst , authoritarian leaders can ignore the well-being of the populace altogether , shielded alike from dissenting opinions and electoral consequences .
Existing Republican efforts to disenfranchise and gerrymander their way to victory is of a piece with Trump ’ s reported indifference to virus deaths in states controlled by Democrats .
A political party indifferent alike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well-being is a political party that is going to leave large numbers of dead in its wake .
You can argue about whether Bush or Trump is better or worse .
But based on their example , it seems likely that the next Republican president , whether Trump or Josh Hawley or Ted Cruz or Marco Rubio , can also be expected to do incalculable harm .

Former U.S. President George W. Bush comes up in the news with some frequency. He was trending on social media earlier this summer when he eulogized Rep. John Lewis. Then earlier this month, on the anniversary of 9/11, the liberal commenter Paul Krugman posted an ill-considered tweet in which he credited Bush with preventing a “mass outbreak of anti-Muslim sentiment and violence” following the terrorist attacks.
Former U.S. President George W. Bush comes up in the news with some frequency. He was trending on social media earlier this summer when he eulogized Rep. John Lewis. Then earlier this month, on the anniversary of 9/11, the liberal commenter Paul Krugman posted an ill-considered tweet in which he credited Bush with preventing a “mass outbreak of anti-Muslim sentiment and violence” following the terrorist attacks.
Every time Bush’s name surfaces like this, U.S. commentators in the press and social media have the same conversation. Centrists point out how presidential and responsible he is compared to President Donald Trump. Those on the left then claim that Bush’s administration in general, and his Iraq War record in particular, is being whitewashed. One common talking point is that Bush’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in more deaths than Trump’s coronavirus pandemic response.
But arguing about who is worse, Bush or Trump, obscures their similarities. It’s not an accident that the last two Republican presidencies have ended in failure, mass death, and economic crisis. In some cases, tallying up the dead can be a distraction from preventing more harm in the future.
The main problem with comparing the number of dead under Bush and Trump is that those numbers are very difficult to nail down. Estimates of deaths in Iraq from the war, for example, range from around 50,000 to more than 750,000. A good guess is somewhere around half a million deaths, but it could easily be much lower or much higher than that—depending in part on how you reckon them, whether by direct violence or the indirect destruction caused by social and civil collapse.
There are similar problems with estimating COVID-19 deaths under Trump. Currently, official estimates put the death toll at over 200,000 people in the United States. But some researchers believe that may be undercounting deaths by 28 percent, which would put the real number at more than 250,000. And, of course, we are still in the middle of the pandemic. Experts believe there could be hundreds of thousands more deaths if the United States doesn’t reassess its virus response. Absent a vaccine or treatment, the virus could continue to kill people for years.
There are even more uncertainties when you start to factor in the massive possible ripple effects from presidential decisions. Bush reportedly disregarded intelligence about potential terrorist attacks in the United States. When a CIA briefer warned him of an impending terrorist attack by Osama bin Laden, he responded, “All right. You’ve covered your ass, now,” and then went fishing. If Bush had taken the threat seriously, he might have been able to prevent 9/11. That would have saved close to 3,000 victims. It would have also prevented U.S. involvement in the Afghanistan War. There are no good estimates of the numbers killed in that nearly 20-year conflict, but the number is probably in the tens of thousands.
For his part, Trump had significantly more direct and explicit knowledge than Bush of impending disaster. He was warned about the coronavirus spread in early January but downplayed it for months, as he unwittingly confessed to the journalist Bob Woodward at the time. This had catastrophic effects for the United States. But it may also have hampered the global response. If the United States had responded immediately and aggressively, could global institutions have helped contain the virus in China? If the Trump administration had actually focused on the problem, could the United States, with its vast resources, have come up with better tests for the whole world? Taiwan, with less than a 10th of the population of the United States, was exporting masks by March, thanks to turning over factory production early. Trump’s failures may have contributed not just to the U.S. death toll, but also to the nearly 1 million deaths and counting worldwide.
Pinning down which president is responsible for how many deaths is difficult. But it’s easy to see that Bush and Trump had a similar formula for their policy failures.
It’s easy to see that Bush and Trump had a similar formula for their policy failures.
That formula, broadly, involved lack of knowledge and incuriosity. Trump’s refusal to read daily intelligence briefings is well known, and so is his monumental policy illiteracy. This is the man who wondered aloud whether people could inject disinfectant to kill the virus. (Obligatory disclaimer: Do not inject cleaning products under any circumstances.)
Bush’s ignorance was generally less flamboyant, but it was just as damaging. “Unprepared for the complexities of governing, with little executive experience and a glaring deficit in his attention span, untutored, untraveled, and unversed in the ways of the world, Bush thrived on making a show of his decisiveness,” Jean Edward Smith wrote in his 2016 biography Bush.
Condoleezza Rice once commented that Bush hated hearing that a foreign-policy problem was complicated. He saw combating terrorism as a “crusade” and blithely disregarded or lied about intelligence that contradicted his push for war. As with Trump, for Bush, intellectual laziness, motivated reasoning, and malevolence were indistinguishable. Trump was determined to ignore the virus; Bush was determined to invade Iraq. Facts, logic, and consequences didn’t matter.
Republicans have elected two presidents in a row with little interest in facts, logic, or consequences because the party itself is not interested in those things. As the political scientist Jonathan Bernstein has explained, Republicans at least since Newt Gingrich have actively denigrated expertise and policy knowledge. Spurred on by a right-wing media bubble that prioritizes conspiracy theories and vapid resentment, the Republican Party has deliberately gutted legislative policy capacity. This is why, more than a decade after Republicans set themselves against Obamacare, they still have no coherent counter health care proposal.
The Republican contempt for policy goes along with Republican dismissal of accountability. Bush dedicated his presidency to eliminating checks on his own power. He gave intelligence agencies broad leeway to wiretap people in the United States without warrants and tossed aside international and domestic restrictions on torture. He appointed Supreme Court justices such as John Roberts who gutted the Voting Rights Act, allowing Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp to steal the governor’s election for candidate Brian Kemp during Trump’s tenure. Bush also repeatedly invoked executive privilege to block congressional oversight, foreshadowing Trump’s sweeping refusal to comply with congressional subpoenas.
Executive ignorance and authoritarianism impulses reinforce each other. A president who can operate without oversight is a president who doesn’t need to respond to opposing viewpoints. At worst, authoritarian leaders can ignore the well-being of the populace altogether, shielded alike from dissenting opinions and electoral consequences. Existing Republican efforts to disenfranchise and gerrymander their way to victory is of a piece with Trump’s reported indifference to virus deaths in states controlled by Democrats.
A political party indifferent alike to facts and to its constituents’ well-being is a political party that is going to leave large numbers of dead in its wake. You can argue about whether Bush or Trump is better or worse. But based on their example, it seems likely that the next Republican president, whether Trump or Josh Hawley or Ted Cruz or Marco Rubio, can also be expected to do incalculable harm.