foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--The Genetic Engineering Genie Is Out of the Bottle

The Genetic Engineering Genie Is Out of the Bottle Usually good for a conspiracy theory or two , U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested that the virus causing COVID-19 was either intentionally engineered or resulted from a lab accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China .
Its release could conceivably have involved an accident , but the pathogen isn ’ t the mishmash of known viruses that one would expect from something designed in a lab , as a research report in Nature Medicine conclusively lays out .
“ If someone were seeking to engineer a new coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constructed it from the backbone of a virus known to cause illness , ” the researchers said .
But if genetic engineering wasn ’ t behind this pandemic , it could very well unleash the next one .
With COVID-19 bringing Western economies to their knees , all the world ’ s dictators now know that pathogens can be as destructive as nuclear missiles .
What ’ s even more worrying is that it no longer takes a sprawling government lab to engineer a virus .
Thanks to a technological revolution in genetic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create a virus have become so cheap , simple , and readily available that any rogue scientist or college-age biohacker can use them , creating an even greater threat .
Experiments that could once only have been carried out behind the protected walls of government and corporate labs can now practically be done on the kitchen table with equipment found on Amazon .
Genetic engineering—with all its potential for good and bad—has become democratized .
One technology in particular makes it almost as easy to engineer life forms as it is to edit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus , a bio researcher ’ s first step is to obtain the genetic information of an existing pathogen—such as one of the coronaviruses that cause the common cold—which could then be altered to create something more dangerous .
In the 1970s , the first genetic sequencing of a bacterium , Escherichia coli , took weeks of effort and cost millions of dollars just to determine its 5,836 base pairs , the building blocks of genetic information .
Today , sequencing the 3,000,000,000 base pairs that make up the human genome , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ human being , can be done in a few hours for about $ 1000 in the United States .
Xun Xu , the CEO of Chinese genomics research company BGI Group , told me by email that he expects to offer full human-genome sequencing in supermarkets and online for about $ 290 by the end of this year .
The next step in engineering a virus is to modify the genome of the existing pathogen to change its effects .
One technology in particular makes it almost as easy to engineer life forms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ documents .
CRISPR gene editing , developed only a few years ago , deploys the same natural mechanism that bacteria use to trim pieces of genetic information from one genome and insert it into another .
This mechanism , which bacteria developed over millennia to defend themselves from viruses , has been turned into a cheap , simple , and fast way to edit the DNA of any organism in the lab .
If experimenting with DNA once required years of experience , sophisticated labs , and millions of dollars , CRISPR has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a CRISPR editing capability , the experimenter need only order a fragment of RNA and purchase off-the-shelf chemicals and enzymes , costing only a few dollars , on the Internet .
Because it ’ s so cheap and easy to use , thousands of scientists all over the world are experimenting with CRISPR-based gene editing projects .
Very little of this research is limited by regulations , largely because regulators don ’ t yet understand what has suddenly become possible .
China , with its emphasis on technological progress ahead of safety and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ breakthroughs .
In 2014 , Chinese scientists announced they had successfully produced monkeys that had been genetically modified at the embryonic stage .
In April 2015 , another group of researchers in China detailed the first ever-effort to edit the genes of a human embryo .
While the attempt failed , it shocked the world : This wasn ’ t supposed to happen so soon .
In April 2016 , yet another group of Chinese researchers reported having succeeded in modifying the genome of a human embryo in an effort to make it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ embryo was not brought to term .
But then , in November 2018 , Chinese researcher He Jiankui announced that he had created the first “ CRISPR babies ” —healthy infants whose genomes were edited before they were born .
The People ’ s Daily gushed over the “ historical breakthrough , ” but after a global uproar , the Chinese authorities—who , He claims , had supported his efforts—arrested and later sentenced him to three years in prison for unethical conduct .
But the Rubicon of biomedical science had been crossed .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the University of Alberta to resurrect an extinct relative of the smallpox virus .
China ’ s legion of rogue scientists is certainly a worry .
But gene-editing technology has become so accessible that we could conceivably see teenagers experimenting with viruses .
In the United States , anyone who wants to start modifying the genome in their garage can order a do-it-yourself CRISPR kit online for $ 169 , for example .
This comes with “ everything you need to make precision genome edits in bacteria at home.
” For $ 349 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a human engineering kit , which comes with embryonic kidney cells from a tissue culture originally taken from an aborted female human fetus .
Shipment is advertised to take no longer than three days—no special couriers or ice packs needed .
Mail-order DNA fragments enabled a team at the University of Alberta , in 2017 , to resurrect an extinct relative of the smallpox virus , horsepox , from scratch by stitching together the fragments .
Horsepox is not known to harm humans , but experts warned that the same method could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recreate smallpox—a horrific virus finally eradicated in 1980—within six months at a cost of about $ 100,000 .
Had the Canadian scientists used CRISPR , their cost would have been reduced to a fraction .
In my book , The Driver in the Driverless Car , published before the Canadian horsepox resurrection and the Chinese gene-edited babies , I warned about the dangers of gene editing , predicting we would have to make difficult choices about whether to restrict synthetic biology technologies .
When used for good purposes , these technologies can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finding cures for diseases , for example .
When used for evil , they can wreak global havoc of exactly the kind we are now fighting .
That is why many people , myself included , have advocated for a moratorium on human gene editing .
But not just a moratorium : There should have been international treaties to prevent the use of CRISPR for gene editing on humans or animals .
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration should have kept companies from selling DIY gene-editing kits .
Governments should have placed restrictions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alberta ’ s .
But none of this happened , nor were there any other checks and balances .
It is now too late to stop the global spread of these technologies—the genie is out of the bottle .
Now , the only solution is to accelerate the good side of these technologies while building our defenses .
As we are seeing with the development of vaccines for COVID-19 , this is possible .
In the past , vaccines took decades to create .
Now , we are on track to have them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ genetic engineering .
The Moderna Therapeutics and Pfizer/BioNTech vaccines , which are now in third-stage clinical trials , took only weeks to develop .
It is conceivable that this could be reduced to hours once the technologies are perfected .
We must treat the coronavirus pandemic as a full dress rehearsal of what is to come , including viruses deliberately engineered by humans .
We can also accelerate the process of testing vaccines and treatments , which has become the slowest part of the development cycle .
To test greater numbers of potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , labs all over the world are creating three-dimensional cell cultures called “ patient-derived organoids ” from tumor biopsies .
The leading company in this field , SEngine Precision Medicine , is able to test more than 100 drugs on these organoids , removing the need to use human subjects as the guinea pigs .
Researchers at Harvard University ’ s Wyss Institute announced in January 2020 that they had developed the first human “ organ-on-a-chip ” model of the lung that accurately replicates a human organ ’ s physiology and pathophysiology .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been developing a microfluidic platform that connects engineered tissues from up to 10 organs , allowing the replication of human-organ interactions for weeks at a time in order to measure the effects of drugs on different parts of the body .
Many more such systems are being developed that could accelerate testing and treatment .
All these technologies will greatly strengthen our biodefense .
There really is no turning back to correct the mistakes of the past .
The genie can not be put back in the bottle .
We must treat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rehearsal of what is to come—unfortunately , that includes not only viruses that erupt from nature , but also those that will be deliberately engineered by humans .
We must learn very quickly to build the same types of types of defenses that our computers have against their invaders .
The good that might ultimately come from this is the cure for all disease .
The bad is just about too terrible to think about .

Usually good for a conspiracy theory or two, U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested that the virus causing COVID-19 was either intentionally engineered or resulted from a lab accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China. Its release could conceivably have involved an accident, but the pathogen isn’t the mishmash of known viruses that one would expect from something designed in a lab, as a research report in Nature Medicine conclusively lays out. “If someone were seeking to engineer a new coronavirus as a pathogen, they would have constructed it from the backbone of a virus known to cause illness,” the researchers said .
Usually good for a conspiracy theory or two, U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested that the virus causing COVID-19 was either intentionally engineered or resulted from a lab accident at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China. Its release could conceivably have involved an accident, but the pathogen isn’t the mishmash of known viruses that one would expect from something designed in a lab, as a research report in Nature Medicine conclusively lays out. “If someone were seeking to engineer a new coronavirus as a pathogen, they would have constructed it from the backbone of a virus known to cause illness,” the researchers said.
But if genetic engineering wasn’t behind this pandemic, it could very well unleash the next one. With COVID-19 bringing Western economies to their knees, all the world’s dictators now know that pathogens can be as destructive as nuclear missiles. What’s even more worrying is that it no longer takes a sprawling government lab to engineer a virus. Thanks to a technological revolution in genetic engineering, all the tools needed to create a virus have become so cheap, simple, and readily available that any rogue scientist or college-age biohacker can use them, creating an even greater threat. Experiments that could once only have been carried out behind the protected walls of government and corporate labs can now practically be done on the kitchen table with equipment found on Amazon. Genetic engineering—with all its potential for good and bad—has become democratized.
One technology in particular makes it almost as easy to engineer life forms as it is to edit Microsoft Word documents.
To design a virus, a bio researcher’s first step is to obtain the genetic information of an existing pathogen—such as one of the coronaviruses that cause the common cold—which could then be altered to create something more dangerous. In the 1970s, the first genetic sequencing of a bacteriophage took weeks of effort and cost millions of dollars just to determine its 5,386 nucleotides, the building blocks of genetic information. Today, sequencing the 3,000,000,000 base pairs that make up the human genome, which dictates the construction and maintenance of a human being, can be done in a few hours for about $1000 in the United States. Xun Xu, the CEO of Chinese genomics research company BGI Group, told me by email that he expects to offer full human-genome sequencing in supermarkets and online for about $290 by the end of this year.
The next step in engineering a virus is to modify the genome of the existing pathogen to change its effects. One technology in particular makes it almost as easy to engineer life forms as it is to edit Microsoft Word documents. CRISPR gene editing, developed only a few years ago, deploys the same natural mechanism that bacteria use to trim pieces of genetic information from one genome and insert it into another. This mechanism, which bacteria developed over millennia to defend themselves from viruses, has been turned into a cheap, simple, and fast way to edit the DNA of any organism in the lab.
If experimenting with DNA once required years of experience, sophisticated labs, and millions of dollars, CRISPR has changed all that. To set up a CRISPR editing capability, the experimenter need only order a fragment of RNA and purchase off-the-shelf chemicals and enzymes, costing only a few dollars, on the Internet. Because it’s so cheap and easy to use, thousands of scientists all over the world are experimenting with CRISPR-based gene editing projects. Very little of this research is limited by regulations, largely because regulators don’t yet understand what has suddenly become possible.
China, with its emphasis on technological progress ahead of safety and ethics, has made the most astonishing breakthroughs. In 2014, Chinese scientists announced they had successfully produced monkeys that had been genetically modified at the embryonic stage. In April 2015, another group of researchers in China detailed the first ever-effort to edit the genes of a human embryo. While the attempt failed, it shocked the world: This wasn’t supposed to happen so soon.
In April 2016, yet another group of Chinese researchers reported having succeeded in modifying the genome of a human embryo in an effort to make it resistant to HIV infection, though the embryo was not brought to term. But then, in November 2018, Chinese researcher He Jiankui announced that he had created the first “CRISPR babies”—healthy infants whose genomes were edited before they were born. The People’s Daily gushed over the “historical breakthrough,” but after a global uproar, the Chinese authorities—who, He claims, had supported his efforts—arrested and later sentenced him to three years in prison for unethical conduct. But the Rubicon of biomedical science had been crossed.
Mail-order DNA fragments enabled a team at the University of Alberta to resurrect an extinct relative of the smallpox virus.
China’s legion of rogue scientists is certainly a worry. But gene-editing technology has become so accessible that we could conceivably see teenagers experimenting with viruses. In the United States, anyone who wants to start modifying the genome in their garage can order a do-it-yourself CRISPR kit online for $169, for example. This comes with “everything you need to make precision genome edits in bacteria at home.” For $349, the same company is also offering a human engineering kit, which comes with embryonic kidney cells from a tissue culture originally taken from an aborted female human fetus. Shipment is advertised to take no longer than three days—no special couriers or ice packs needed.
Mail-order DNA fragments enabled a team at the University of Alberta, in 2017, to resurrect an extinct relative of the smallpox virus, horsepox, from scratch by stitching together the fragments. Horsepox is not known to harm humans, but experts warned that the same method could be used by scientists without much specialized knowledge to recreate smallpox—a horrific virus finally eradicated in 1980—within six months at a cost of about $100,000. Had the Canadian scientists used CRISPR, their cost would have been reduced to a fraction.
In my book, The Driver in the Driverless Car, published before the Canadian horsepox resurrection and the Chinese gene-edited babies, I warned about the dangers of gene editing, predicting we would have to make difficult choices about whether to restrict synthetic biology technologies. When used for good purposes, these technologies can help solve the problems of humanity—by quickly finding cures for diseases, for example. When used for evil, they can wreak global havoc of exactly the kind we are now fighting. That is why many people, myself included, have advocated for a moratorium on human gene editing.
But not just a moratorium: There should have been international treaties to prevent the use of CRISPR for gene editing on humans or animals. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration should have kept companies from selling DIY gene-editing kits. Governments should have placed restrictions on labs such as the University of Alberta’s. But none of this happened, nor were there any other checks and balances. It is now too late to stop the global spread of these technologies—the genie is out of the bottle.
Now, the only solution is to accelerate the good side of these technologies while building our defenses. As we are seeing with the development of vaccines for COVID-19, this is possible. In the past, vaccines took decades to create. Now, we are on track to have them within months, thanks to advances in genetic engineering. The Moderna Therapeutics and Pfizer/BioNTech vaccines, which are now in third-stage clinical trials, took only weeks to develop. It is conceivable that this could be reduced to hours once the technologies are perfected.
We must treat the coronavirus pandemic as a full dress rehearsal of what is to come, including viruses deliberately engineered by humans.
We can also accelerate the process of testing vaccines and treatments, which has become the slowest part of the development cycle. To test greater numbers of potential cancer drugs more quickly, for example, labs all over the world are creating three-dimensional cell cultures called “patient-derived organoids” from tumor biopsies. The leading company in this field, SEngine Precision Medicine, is able to test more than 100 drugs on these organoids, removing the need to use human subjects as the guinea pigs. Researchers at Harvard University’s Wyss Institute announced in January 2020 that they had developed the first human “organ-on-a-chip” model of the lung that accurately replicates a human organ’s physiology and pathophysiology. Engineers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have been developing a microfluidic platform that connects engineered tissues from up to 10 organs, allowing the replication of human-organ interactions for weeks at a time in order to measure the effects of drugs on different parts of the body. Many more such systems are being developed that could accelerate testing and treatment. All these technologies will greatly strengthen our biodefense.
There really is no turning back to correct the mistakes of the past. The genie cannot be put back in the bottle. We must treat the coronavirus pandemic as a full dress rehearsal of what is to come—unfortunately, that includes not only viruses that erupt from nature, but also those that will be deliberately engineered by humans. We must learn very quickly to build the same types of types of defenses that our computers have against their invaders. The good that might ultimately come from this is the cure for all disease. The bad is just about too terrible to think about.
Correction, Sept. 16, 2020: This article stated that the first genetic sequencing of a bacterium was Escherichia coli in the 1970s. In fact, Escherichia coli was first fully gene sequenced in 1997.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--The Road to Peace In Afghanistan no Longer Runs Through Pakistan

The Road to Peace In Afghanistan no Longer Runs Through Pakistan Toward the end of August , a delegation from the Afghan Taliban led by the group ’ s deputy , Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , travelled to Islamabad .
There , they met with Pakistan ’ s foreign minister and head of its Inter-Services Intelligence , the military ’ s intelligence wing .
The first gathering , held at Pakistan ’ s Foreign Office , was meant to give boost to an intra-Afghan negotiation process that has been racked by persistent delays , including over the release of Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s meetings seem to have been helpful .
A Taliban negotiating team is now in Doha , Qatar , and is set to hold its first direct peace talks with representatives of the Afghan government .
But in these talks , the Taliban will be led by Mullah Abdul Hakim , a hardline cleric and the Taliban ’ s de facto chief justice , and not Baradar , who was central to the Taliban signing a peace deal with the United States back in February .
The change is part of a broader @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict it was once seen to script .
For years , Islamabad has maintained an uneasy relationship with Baradar , who , now in his fifties , leads the Taliban office—essentially its political arm—from Doha .
Before 2018 , Baradar spent eight years in Pakistani custody .
His eventual release came at the behest of U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad , who had been tasked with finding a way to get talks between the Taliban and Washington going .
Deft maneuvering by both Islamabad and Washington subsequently paved the way for nine rounds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal this year .
That first Doha agreement provided for drawing down approximately 7,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan and the lifting of U.S. sanctions on the Taliban this August .
But talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government , which were to follow in the summer , have taken longer than expected .
The coronavirus—and the public airing of internal political disagreements between Afghanistan ’ s political powerbrokers—have led to worries that Kabul may not have what it takes to strike , let alone sustain , a provisional power-sharing deal with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ guarantor of peace in Afghanistan is a big problem for everyone involved .
For its part , the West has long believed that Pakistan could play that role but is not quite fully exercising its power .
In turn , the United States frequently tried to ramp up the pressure on its erstwhile partner .
A recent controversial attempt was through the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force , which placed Pakistan on a grey list in 2019 for potential money laundering and terrorist financing .
That designation threatens Islamabad ’ s ability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the United States ’ relationship with Pakistan has also improved .
Officials in both countries are more careful about accusing each other of sabotaging regional stability .
Pakistan ’ s commitment to regional stabilization and peace notionally underlines its pursuit of East-West connectivity , which could greatly increase Afghanistan ’ s trade and economic prospects .
And the United States , for its part , seems to have done a volte-face on its hard-line policy towards the Haqqani Network , a group it long accused Islamabad of harboring , but which Islamabad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ counterterror operations in 2014 .
Indeed , many Pakistani observers find it ironic that after initially demanding that Pakistan eliminate the Haqqanis , the United States is now taking the lead in encouraging the group ’ s public rehabilitation .
Critically , there is also a growing understanding that Pakistan ’ s leverage over the Taliban is waning , not least of all because of the Taliban ’ s internal dynamics and the group ’ s well-established reputation for political and financial independence .
The recent elevation of Mullah Yaqub , the son @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the role of Taliban military chief over several senior commanders , signals the rise of a new generation of leaders that did not experience the historical patronage of the Pakistani state .
The Taliban now looks to Doha more than Islamabad as a guarantor of its interests .
That generation , and the Taliban along with it , now looks to Doha more than Islamabad as a guarantor of its interests .
It has requested that Taliban inmates released by the Afghan government be sent to Qatar rather than Pakistan .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expected that they will cycle through multiple capitals , including Doha , Oslo , and Tashkent , but not Islamabad , despite—or perhaps because of—the Baradar connection .
Indeed , unlike in the past , factors that could upend attempts at negotiating peace have relatively little to do with the extent and limits of Pakistan ’ s influence .
The first of these comes from within Kabul itself , where there is still a lack of unified consensus on what peace with the Taliban would look like .
Inside Afghanistan , disgruntlement over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year—starting with February ’ s bilateral commitments between the United States and Taliban , which bypassed Kabul entirely—is quite public .
A series of high profile but unclaimed deadly attacks in and around Kabul in recent weeks have targeted leaders associated with the U.S.-brokered process .
These strikes have amplified concerns that the intra-Afghan talks could be derailed .
The impression that there are serious turf wars within President Ashraf Ghani ’ s administration doesn ’ t help .
Recently Ghani issued a decree appointing 46 members to the High Council for National @ @ @ @ @ @ @ twice the size of the negotiating team it is mandated to oversee , bringing into question its viability .
Former President Hamid Karzai , whose name was included in the list of appointments , has refused to be a part of the body .
A second problem comes from U.S. strategy , now wedded to President Donald Trump ’ s compulsion to secure an exit from Afghanistan for all but 5,000 U.S. troops in time for the presidential election in November .
For many in Afghanistan and indeed in the wider region , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is politically committed to guaranteeing a deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban—through troops or otherwise—remains unclear .
According to the Pentagon , the United States has already closed five bases in Afghanistan , and it has largely ended the use of air power , which had been a critical factor in keeping the Taliban at bay .
That , combined with Trump ’ s frequent threats to pull all remaining troops from the country and cut aid , could embolden the Taliban .
The inclusion of hardline commanders in the new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t going to be easy .
A third issue comes from the internal structure of the Taliban and the ambiguity of its post-peace settlement ambitions .
Although the new Taliban department responsible for holding intra-Afghan talks will have the authority to set agendas , decide strategy , and even sign agreements , its leadership too has oscillated , from Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai , erstwhile Taliban chief negotiator , to Hakim .
Its distance from the Doha-based Taliban political office led by Baradar , furthermore , raises questions about the extent of Baradar ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the possibility that different factions may have different goalposts .
At the very least , the inclusion of hardline commanders in the new negotiating team suggests that conciliation isn ’ t going to be easy , and that getting to the Taliban to agree to a gradual reduction in violence may be more practical than an outright ceasefire .
Fourth is the risk of regional spoilers .
Washington has long suspected and accused Pakistan of maintaining an unhealthy strategic interest in the Afghan endgame without appreciating Islamabad ’ s concerns of threats to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Islamabad , meanwhile , are worried about a different kind of spoiler that could potentially disrupt reconciliation in Afghanistan : New Delhi has historically maintained that the Taliban should not be allowed back into government .
Indian officials continue to view ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Taliban as a setback to Indian interests in the region .
While India ’ s humanitarian and financial aid to Afghanistan makes it one of the country ’ s biggest aid providers , its attempts to nurture a defense and strategic relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns that India may be sponsoring the maintenance of militant groups within Afghanistan ’ s eastern provinces as a regional hedge .
Finding a way to end the war in Afghanistan is easier said than done .
An eventual start to intra-Afghan talks will certainly be a reason for optimism but talks alone will be unable to guarantee peace , unless all parties recognize and address the structural impediments that continue to bedevil the endgame .
And given the above risk factors , it is anything but clear that they will .

Toward the end of August, a delegation from the Afghan Taliban led by the group’s deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, travelled to Islamabad. There, they met with Pakistan’s foreign minister and head of its Inter-Services Intelligence, the military’s intelligence wing. The first gathering, held at Pakistan’s Foreign Office, was meant to give boost to an intra-Afghan negotiation process that has been racked by persistent delays, including over the release of Taliban inmates by Afghan authorities.
Toward the end of August, a delegation from the Afghan Taliban led by the group’s deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, travelled to Islamabad. There, they met with Pakistan’s foreign minister and head of its Inter-Services Intelligence, the military’s intelligence wing. The first gathering, held at Pakistan’s Foreign Office, was meant to give boost to an intra-Afghan negotiation process that has been racked by persistent delays, including over the release of Taliban inmates by Afghan authorities.
Baradar’s meetings seem to have been helpful. A Taliban negotiating team is now in Doha, Qatar, and is set to hold its first direct peace talks with representatives of the Afghan government. But in these talks, the Taliban will be led by Mullah Abdul Hakim, a hardline cleric and the Taliban’s de facto chief justice, and not Baradar, who was central to the Taliban signing a peace deal with the United States back in February. The change is part of a broader trend of Pakistan losing influence over a conflict it was once seen to script.
For years, Islamabad has maintained an uneasy relationship with Baradar, who, now in his fifties, leads the Taliban office—essentially its political arm—from Doha. Before 2018, Baradar spent eight years in Pakistani custody. His eventual release came at the behest of U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who had been tasked with finding a way to get talks between the Taliban and Washington going. Deft maneuvering by both Islamabad and Washington subsequently paved the way for nine rounds of negotiations, culminating in the earlier February deal this year. That first Doha agreement provided for drawing down approximately 7,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan and the lifting of U.S. sanctions on the Taliban this August. But talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which were to follow in the summer, have taken longer than expected. The coronavirus—and the public airing of internal political disagreements between Afghanistan’s political powerbrokers—have led to worries that Kabul may not have what it takes to strike, let alone sustain, a provisional power-sharing deal with the Taliban.
The absence of a credible guarantor of peace in Afghanistan is a big problem for everyone involved. For its part, the West has long believed that Pakistan could play that role but is not quite fully exercising its power. In turn, the United States frequently tried to ramp up the pressure on its erstwhile partner. A recent controversial attempt was through the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, which placed Pakistan on a grey list in 2019 for potential money laundering and terrorist financing. That designation threatens Islamabad’s ability to borrow internationally.
But on some indicators, the United States’ relationship with Pakistan has also improved. Officials in both countries are more careful about accusing each other of sabotaging regional stability. Pakistan’s commitment to regional stabilization and peace notionally underlines its pursuit of East-West connectivity, which could greatly increase Afghanistan’s trade and economic prospects. And the United States, for its part, seems to have done a volte-face on its hard-line policy towards the Haqqani Network, a group it long accused Islamabad of harboring, but which Islamabad insisted was dislocated after it officially launched counterterror operations in 2014. Indeed, many Pakistani observers find it ironic that after initially demanding that Pakistan eliminate the Haqqanis, the United States is now taking the lead in encouraging the group’s public rehabilitation.
Critically, there is also a growing understanding that Pakistan’s leverage over the Taliban is waning, not least of all because of the Taliban’s internal dynamics and the group’s well-established reputation for political and financial independence. The recent elevation of Mullah Yaqub, the son of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar, to the role of Taliban military chief over several senior commanders, signals the rise of a new generation of leaders that did not experience the historical patronage of the Pakistani state.
The Taliban now looks to Doha more than Islamabad as a guarantor of its interests.
That generation, and the Taliban along with it, now looks to Doha more than Islamabad as a guarantor of its interests. It has requested that Taliban inmates released by the Afghan government be sent to Qatar rather than Pakistan. And when intra-Afghan negotiations begin, it is expected that they will cycle through multiple capitals, including Doha, Oslo, and Tashkent, but not Islamabad, despite—or perhaps because of—the Baradar connection.
Indeed, unlike in the past, factors that could upend attempts at negotiating peace have relatively little to do with the extent and limits of Pakistan’s influence.
The first of these comes from within Kabul itself, where there is still a lack of unified consensus on what peace with the Taliban would look like. Inside Afghanistan, disgruntlement over the sequencing of the peace process this year—starting with February’s bilateral commitments between the United States and Taliban, which bypassed Kabul entirely—is quite public. A series of high profile but unclaimed deadly attacks in and around Kabul in recent weeks have targeted leaders associated with the U.S.-brokered process. These strikes have amplified concerns that the intra-Afghan talks could be derailed. The impression that there are serious turf wars within President Ashraf Ghani’s administration doesn’t help. Recently Ghani issued a decree appointing 46 members to the High Council for National Reconciliation. That makes the council roughly twice the size of the negotiating team it is mandated to oversee, bringing into question its viability. Former President Hamid Karzai, whose name was included in the list of appointments, has refused to be a part of the body.
A second problem comes from U.S. strategy, now wedded to President Donald Trump’s compulsion to secure an exit from Afghanistan for all but 5,000 U.S. troops in time for the presidential election in November. For many in Afghanistan and indeed in the wider region, the extent to which the United States is politically committed to guaranteeing a deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban—through troops or otherwise—remains unclear. According to the Pentagon, the United States has already closed five bases in Afghanistan, and it has largely ended the use of air power, which had been a critical factor in keeping the Taliban at bay. That, combined with Trump’s frequent threats to pull all remaining troops from the country and cut aid, could embolden the Taliban.
The inclusion of hardline commanders in the new negotiating team suggests that conciliation isn’t going to be easy.
A third issue comes from the internal structure of the Taliban and the ambiguity of its post-peace settlement ambitions. Although the new Taliban department responsible for holding intra-Afghan talks will have the authority to set agendas, decide strategy, and even sign agreements, its leadership too has oscillated, from Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, erstwhile Taliban chief negotiator, to Hakim. Its distance from the Doha-based Taliban political office led by Baradar, furthermore, raises questions about the extent of Baradar’s influence over peace talks, and the possibility that different factions may have different goalposts. At the very least, the inclusion of hardline commanders in the new negotiating team suggests that conciliation isn’t going to be easy, and that getting to the Taliban to agree to a gradual reduction in violence may be more practical than an outright ceasefire.
Fourth is the risk of regional spoilers. Washington has long suspected and accused Pakistan of maintaining an unhealthy strategic interest in the Afghan endgame without appreciating Islamabad’s concerns of threats to Pakistan emanating from Afghan soil. Observers in Islamabad, meanwhile, are worried about a different kind of spoiler that could potentially disrupt reconciliation in Afghanistan: New Delhi has historically maintained that the Taliban should not be allowed back into government. Indian officials continue to view ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Taliban as a setback to Indian interests in the region. While India’s humanitarian and financial aid to Afghanistan makes it one of the country’s biggest aid providers, its attempts to nurture a defense and strategic relationship with Kabul make Pakistan uneasy, adding to concerns that India may be sponsoring the maintenance of militant groups within Afghanistan’s eastern provinces as a regional hedge.
Finding a way to end the war in Afghanistan is easier said than done. An eventual start to intra-Afghan talks will certainly be a reason for optimism but talks alone will be unable to guarantee peace, unless all parties recognize and address the structural impediments that continue to bedevil the endgame. And given the above risk factors, it is anything but clear that they will.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-12--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Though it is a member of the European Union , Finland has long avoided becoming entangled in the West ’ s military alliances , such as NATO—a choice informed both by history and by the porous 830-mile-long border the country shares with Russia .
This deliberate nonalignment has made the Finnish president someone pretty unique : a world leader who ’ s well received in both Moscow and Washington .
Meanwhile , as the coronavirus continues to wreak havoc around the globe , there ’ s good reason to fear that the next viral pandemic could be genetically engineered by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purchased on Amazon .
And a checklist of all the ways U.S. President Donald Trump is maneuvering his way into autocracy , so you can keep track of his abuses in real time .
1 .
Finland ’ s President Can Hold His Own With Both Putin and Trump Much of the world has been captivated by Finland ’ s young , female prime minister and her swift response to the coronavirus pandemic .
But Finland ’ s ceremonial president , Sauli Niinisto— “ a cool-headed realist ” —may prove the more effective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
2 .
The Genetic Engineering Genie Is Out of the Bottle Developed only a few years ago , CRISPR gene-editing technology is so user-friendly and accessible that scientific feats once plausible only in secretive government laboratories have quickly become kitchen table ubiquities .
But this sort of democratization could doom us all , Vivek Wadhwa writes .
When Donald Trump was elected U.S. president in 2016 , optimists suggested his authoritarian impulses would be reined in by the norms and seasoned Washingtonians around him .
Four years later , these prognoses have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ writes .
4 .
No Gas , No War in the Mediterranean The cool , blue Eastern Mediterranean has become heated with tension in recent months , as Greece , Turkey , and Cyprus vie for natural gas riches .
The only way to prevent a full-scale conflict ?
Introduce a moratorium on drilling , which could save the peace—and , conveniently , the climate , too—Paul Hockenos writes .
5 .
Biden Has a Serious Credibility Problem in Asia Many of China ’ s regional foes have grown comfortable with Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jinping .
Now , officials in capitals across Asia are privately voicing concern about the potential geostrategic consequences of a more Beijing-balanced Biden presidency , James Crabtree writes .

Though it is a member of the European Union, Finland has long avoided becoming entangled in the West’s military alliances, such as NATO—a choice informed both by history and by the porous 830-mile-long border the country shares with Russia. This deliberate nonalignment has made the Finnish president someone pretty unique: a world leader who’s well received in both Moscow and Washington.
Though it is a member of the European Union, Finland has long avoided becoming entangled in the West’s military alliances, such as NATO—a choice informed both by history and by the porous 830-mile-long border the country shares with Russia. This deliberate nonalignment has made the Finnish president someone pretty unique: a world leader who’s well received in both Moscow and Washington.
Meanwhile, as the coronavirus continues to wreak havoc around the globe, there’s good reason to fear that the next viral pandemic could be genetically engineered by humans, perhaps even using amateur tools purchased on Amazon.
And a checklist of all the ways U.S. President Donald Trump is maneuvering his way into autocracy, so you can keep track of his abuses in real time.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Finnish President Sauli Niinisto welcomes Russian President Vladimir Putin as he arrives at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki on Aug. 21, 2019.
Much of the world has been captivated by Finland’s young, female prime minister and her swift response to the coronavirus pandemic. But Finland’s ceremonial president, Sauli Niinisto—“a cool-headed realist”—may prove the more effective geopolitical asset, Gordon F. Sander writes.
An infrared microscope image shows mosquito larvae with red-glowing eyes, part of an experiment using CRISPR gene-editing technology.
Developed only a few years ago, CRISPR gene-editing technology is so user-friendly and accessible that scientific feats once plausible only in secretive government laboratories have quickly become kitchen table ubiquities. But this sort of democratization could doom us all, Vivek Wadhwa writes.
Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump votes at his local polling station in New York's primary on April 19, 2016 in New York City.
When Donald Trump was elected U.S. president in 2016, optimists suggested his authoritarian impulses would be reined in by the norms and seasoned Washingtonians around him. Four years later, these prognoses have proved pathetically naive, Stephen M. Walt writes.
This pictures shows the Yavuz drillship seen from the Karpaz coast of the northern part of Cyprus, the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) close to Apostolos Andreas monastery on July 21, 2019.
The cool, blue Eastern Mediterranean has become heated with tension in recent months, as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus vie for natural gas riches. The only way to prevent a full-scale conflict? Introduce a moratorium on drilling, which could save the peace—and, conveniently, the climate, too—Paul Hockenos writes.
President Xi Jinping pictured with Joe Biden on Aug. 18, 2011, when they were each vice president of China and the United States, respectively, in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Many of China’s regional foes have grown comfortable with Trump’s tough approach toward Chinese President Xi Jinping. Now, officials in capitals across Asia are privately voicing concern about the potential geostrategic consequences of a more Beijing-balanced Biden presidency, James Crabtree writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-12--France and the United States Are Making West Africa’s Security Situation Worse

France and the United States Are Making West Africa ’ s Security Situation Worse The Sahel , a semiarid region south of the Sahara Desert that stretches from Senegal to Eritrea , is experiencing a major security crisis .
Since 2016 , terrorist attacks have increased in Burkina Faso , Mali , and Niger .
In February , the United Nations refugee agency stated that 4,000 people in Burkina Faso were being displaced each day because of political violence .
This trajectory of escalating violence has continued in spite of the COVID-19 pandemic , and the Aug. 18 coup that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power threatens to further destabilize an already fragile region .
The U.S. Department of State routinely emphasizes the role of transnational terrorist groups , such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State , in triggering the Sahel ’ s security crisis .
Reports from development agencies and think tanks regularly highlight fragile state institutions , authoritarianism , and climate change as factors that cause instability .
Still , policymakers vacillate on whether to devote resources to counterterrorism efforts or to development initiatives .
A willingness to equate authoritarianism with stability has led great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and fragile state institutions—that contribute to political violence in the Sahel .
Due to their intense focus on geostrategic competition and willingness to equate authoritarianism with stability , great powers such as France , the United States , Russia , and China , have actually perpetuated conditions , such as corruption and fragile state institutions , that contribute to rising political violence in the Sahel .
Regional institutions such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) have exacerbated the governance crisis because of a lack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of military resources .
Despite these military successes , France ’ s approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has also exacerbated the region ’ s security crisis .
Although French military operations rely on U.S. intelligence and logistical support from some 800 U.S. personnel deployed in Niger , France ’ s preference for unilateralism in West Africa has restricted its ability to work with Washington on developing a regional security strategy .
In 2017 , France initiated a U.N. motion calling for a 5,000-man African security force to be deployed to the Sahel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consulting with them on its plans .
The wavering U.S. commitment to stabilizing the Sahel has exacerbated France ’ s overextension and reduced the international community ’ s ability to combat extremism .
The wavering commitment of the United States to stabilizing the Sahel has exacerbated France ’ s overextension and reduced the international community ’ s ability to combat extremism in West Africa .
In spite of bipartisan opposition and strenuous objections from French Defense Minister Florence Parly , U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper hinted strongly on Jan. 27 at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sahel region .
In April , the Pentagon reduced access to medical evacuation flights for U.S. troops fighting in West Africa .
U.S. officials also have a skeptical view of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali , even though it has served as a partial check on political violence in the country ’ s central regions .
This dismissive attitude has placed the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump on a collision course with France at a time when increased cooperation is essential .
Although France ’ s unilateralism and the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contributors to the crisis of security governance in the Sahel , Russia and China ’ s approaches to regional security have also worsened this problem .
Russia ’ s permissive approach to arms contracts in West Africa reinforces France ’ s efforts to make autocracy the antidote to extremism .
Russia ’ s military cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso , Chad , Niger and Mali pay no heed to the human rights situation there , and Moscow has supported Guinean President Alpha Condé in spite of crackdowns on peaceful protesters .
Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mali might have resulted in the training of Malian militants involved in the Aug. 18 coup , but there are also reports that the U.S. government trained the coup plotters in Mali .
As for Beijing , in spite of its desire to extend the Belt and Road Initiative into the Sahel , China has only offered ambiguous rhetorical solidarity with the G-5 bloc ’ s counterterrorism goals .
Even though the inability of great powers to develop a coordinated Sahel security strategy has inspired calls to “ solve African problems in African @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stepped up to the challenge .
On Feb. 27 , the African Union announced a pledge to deploy 3,000 troops to the Sahel , but South Africa ’ s Ambassador to the AU , Edward Xolisa Makaya , subsequently stated that no countries had offered to volunteer troops and it remained unclear how this African Union operation would be financed .
Because of its abdication of responsibility , ECOWAS ’ s pledge to spend $ 1 billion on Sahel security from 2020 to 2024 has been thinly spread and left individual counterterrorism initiatives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failure to mitigate Mali ’ s ongoing political crisis has further undercut its credibility as a security provider in the Sahel .
After ECOWAS leaders convened for negotiations in Bamako on July 23 , Mahmoud Dicko , the leader of Mali ’ s opposition June 5 Movement , declared that no progress had been made in the talks .
ECOWAS ’ s threat to impose sanctions on Malian political factions that disrupt a peace settlement also did not deter the coup .
Although a comprehensive resolution of the security governance crisis in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are constructive steps leaders can take immediately .
The United States and France should emphasize great-power cooperation ; Washington should cease its efforts to undermine the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali ; and the United States should materially aid France ’ s efforts to defeat Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin , an al Qaeda partner in Mali , instead of merely seeking to contain its growth .
The United States and France should emphasize great-power cooperation and Washington should cease its efforts to undermine the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Sahel and avoid the backlash that resulted from unilateral U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia , great-power consultations must be paired with regional engagement .
International financial assistance can bolster the efficacy of the G-5 bloc and other initiatives that have supplanted ECOWAS while permanent U.N. Security Council member states could support regional efforts to mediate regional crises .

The Sahel, a semiarid region south of the Sahara Desert that stretches from Senegal to Eritrea, is experiencing a major security crisis. Since 2016, terrorist attacks have increased fivefold in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In February, the United Nations refugee agency stated that 4,000 people in Burkina Faso were being displaced each day because of political violence. This trajectory of escalating violence has continued in spite of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Aug. 18 coup that removed Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita from power threatens to further destabilize an already fragile region.
The Sahel, a semiarid region south of the Sahara Desert that stretches from Senegal to Eritrea, is experiencing a major security crisis. Since 2016, terrorist attacks have increased fivefold in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. In February, the United Nations refugee agency stated that 4,000 people in Burkina Faso were being displaced each day because of political violence. This trajectory of escalating violence has continued in spite of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Aug. 18 coup that removed Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita from power threatens to further destabilize an already fragile region.
As the security situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate, the causes of escalating violence are discussed regularly, but no one is taking appropriate action to counter it.
The U.S. Department of State routinely emphasizes the role of transnational terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State, in triggering the Sahel’s security crisis. Reports from development agencies and think tanks regularly highlight fragile state institutions, authoritarianism, and climate change as factors that cause instability. Still, policymakers vacillate on whether to devote resources to counterterrorism efforts or to development initiatives. A willingness to equate authoritarianism with stability has led great powers to perpetuate the conditions—such as corruption and fragile state institutions—that contribute to political violence in the Sahel.
In spite of these intense debates, one vital contributor to insecurity in the Sahel is often ignored: the crisis of international governance. Instead of taking constructive steps to address the array of challenges facing the Sahel, great powers and regional institutions are exacerbating the region’s problems.
Due to their intense focus on geostrategic competition and willingness to equate authoritarianism with stability, great powers such as France, the United States, Russia, and China, have actually perpetuated conditions, such as corruption and fragile state institutions, that contribute to rising political violence in the Sahel. Regional institutions such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have exacerbated the governance crisis because of a lack of strategic coordination and their inefficient use of military resources.
Although great-power competition in the Sahel has intensified in recent years, France remains the region’s dominant security provider. In January 2013, France responded to an official Malian government request for assistance by launching Operation Serval—a counterterrorism intervention that halted the advance of Islamic extremist militants from northern to central Mali. In August 2014, France and the G-5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) embarked on a regionwide counterterrorism campaign called Operation Barkhane.
A French strike on June 3 this year killed Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. France has also cooperated militarily with the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali. This mission deploys up to 13,289 soldiers and 1,920 police officers to the Sahel and monitors human rights abuses perpetrated by armed groups in the region.
Despite these military successes, France’s approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has also exacerbated the region’s security crisis. Although French military operations rely on U.S. intelligence and logistical support from some 800 U.S. personnel deployed in Niger, France’s preference for unilateralism in West Africa has restricted its ability to work with Washington on developing a regional security strategy. In 2017, France initiated a U.N. motion calling for a 5,000-man African security force to be deployed to the Sahel but rankled U.S. officials by apparently not consulting with them on its plans.
The wavering U.S. commitment to stabilizing the Sahel has exacerbated France’s overextension and reduced the international community’s ability to combat extremism. The wavering commitment of the United States to stabilizing the Sahel has exacerbated France’s overextension and reduced the international community’s ability to combat extremism in West Africa. In spite of bipartisan opposition and strenuous objections from French Defense Minister Florence Parly, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper hinted strongly on Jan. 27 at a drawdown of U.S. counterterrorism forces in the Sahel region.
In April, the Pentagon reduced access to medical evacuation flights for U.S. troops fighting in West Africa. U.S. officials also have a skeptical view of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali, even though it has served as a partial check on political violence in the country’s central regions. This dismissive attitude has placed the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump on a collision course with France at a time when increased cooperation is essential.
Although France’s unilateralism and the United States’ disengagement have been the most significant contributors to the crisis of security governance in the Sahel, Russia and China’s approaches to regional security have also worsened this problem. Russia’s permissive approach to arms contracts in West Africa reinforces France’s efforts to make autocracy the antidote to extremism. Russia’s military cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Mali pay no heed to the human rights situation there, and Moscow has supported Guinean President Alpha Condé in spite of crackdowns on peaceful protesters.
Russia’s June 2019 military cooperation agreement with Mali might have resulted in the training of Malian militants involved in the Aug. 18 coup, but there are also reports that the U.S. government trained the coup plotters in Mali. As for Beijing, in spite of its desire to extend the Belt and Road Initiative into the Sahel, China has only offered ambiguous rhetorical solidarity with the G-5 bloc’s counterterrorism goals.
Even though the inability of great powers to develop a coordinated Sahel security strategy has inspired calls to “solve African problems in African ways,” regional institutions have not stepped up to the challenge. On Feb. 27, the African Union announced a pledge to deploy 3,000 troops to the Sahel, but South Africa’s Ambassador to the AU, Edward Xolisa Makaya, subsequently stated that no countries had offered to volunteer troops and it remained unclear how this African Union operation would be financed.
Many observers have criticized the African Union for not deploying the African Standby Force to the Sahel, as some of its member states prefer ad hoc rather than longer-term deployments. (The force, which specializes in peacekeeping operations, was declared operationally ready in 2016, and its presence could centralize the Sahel security initiatives advanced by the African Union in recent years.)
ECOWAS’s response to the Sahel’s security crisis has been similarly marred by strategic incoherence. Instead of devising a coherent vision to combat insurgencies in the Sahel, ECOWAS has outsourced its security responsibilities to initiatives such as the G-5 bloc and the Multinational Joint Task Force, which seeks to stabilize the Lake Chad region.
Because of its abdication of responsibility, ECOWAS’s pledge to spend $1 billion on Sahel security from 2020 to 2024 has been thinly spread and left individual counterterrorism initiatives short of funds. ECOWAS’s failure to mitigate Mali’s ongoing political crisis has further undercut its credibility as a security provider in the Sahel. After ECOWAS leaders convened for negotiations in Bamako on July 23, Mahmoud Dicko, the leader of Mali’s opposition June 5 Movement, declared that no progress had been made in the talks. ECOWAS’s threat to impose sanctions on Malian political factions that disrupt a peace settlement also did not deter the coup.
Although a comprehensive resolution of the security governance crisis in the Sahel is unlikely to occur soon, there are constructive steps leaders can take immediately. The United States and France should emphasize great-power cooperation; Washington should cease its efforts to undermine the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali; and the United States should materially aid France’s efforts to defeat Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, an al Qaeda partner in Mali, instead of merely seeking to contain its growth.
As the United States and China are both concerned about transnational terrorism originating from the Sahel, they can use the Mali crisis as a rare opportunity to find common ground. France should refrain from uncritically supporting authoritarian regimes in the Sahel, encourage its European partners to contribute counterterrorism forces to the region, and address West African security in its strategic dialogue with Russia.
The United States and France should emphasize great-power cooperation and Washington should cease its efforts to undermine the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali. In order to reduce fears of neocolonialism in the Sahel and avoid the backlash that resulted from unilateral U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia, great-power consultations must be paired with regional engagement. International financial assistance can bolster the efficacy of the G-5 bloc and other initiatives that have supplanted ECOWAS while permanent U.N. Security Council member states could support regional efforts to mediate regional crises.
Great powers should also support initiatives like Morocco’s mediation during the Mali crisis and Algeria’s periodic arbitration efforts in the Sahel. Finally, as weaponry used during the 2011 Libyan civil war exacerbated the crisis in Mali from 2012 to 2013 and Sahel security hinges on stability in North Africa, the United States should assume a more active diplomatic role in Libya.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Afghanistan Leaders Meet as Peace Talks Get Underway

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time , Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader , and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet today in their first face-to-face meeting as part of peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to their nearly two-decade-old conflict .
The talks began in Doha , Qatar , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
The start of the talks followed months of delays over the highly contentious issue of prisoner releases .
As part of the peace agreement signed with the United States in February , the Taliban agreed to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel in exchange for the government releasing 5,000 of its fighters .
After several false starts , President Ashraf Ghani agreed to authorize the release of the final 320 “ hardcore ” Taliban prisoners , setting the stage for the current meeting .
What ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are expected to cover the terms of a permanent ceasefire , the rights of women and minorities , and the disarmament of the country ’ s many militia groups .
More broadly , the two sides will also discuss long-term constitutional arrangements as well as a possible power-sharing arrangement between them .
As Ezzatullah Mehrdad wrote in Foreign Policy last week , many young Afghans who detest the Taliban feel their interests have been ignored and are taking to social media to vent their frustration .
Power sharing deal ?
Ghani recently told @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mean a power sharing political deal.
” A significant portion of the talks will likely center around whether a political settlement will be implemented before or after a ceasefire .
The Afghan government has already said it wants to see a political settlement first , but the Taliban is unlikely to end its military activity before it achieves at least some of its political objectives .
The two sides could agree to appoint a transitional government to lead the effort on these issues .
Violence continues .
But the negotiations are occurring against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country .
Last week , the United Nations ’ top official in Afghanistan warned that violence has reached near-record levels and threatened to derail the talks .
Just hours before the start of talks on Saturday , the Taliban carried out a wave of attacks on government installations across the country , and Afghan security forces responded with air and artillery strikes in some parts of the country on Saturday .
“ With the start of intra-Afghan talks we were expecting the Taliban to reduce the number of their attacks , but unfortunately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers , ” a spokesman for the Afghan defense ministry said .
September 14-18 .
Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union continue .
September 17 .
France ’ s General Federation of Labor ( CGT ) trade union begins a general strike over wages and employment conditions .
September 18 .
The state of emergency in the Lebanese capital of Beirut , called after last month ’ s deadly explosions , is set to expire .
September 20 .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s executive order banning the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effect .
Japan ’ s new leader .
Japan ’ s Liberal Democratic Party chose Yoshihide Suga as its new leader earlier today .
Suga , who served as a top spokesman for the government over the past eight years , was elected to lead the ruling LDP by a large margin following the resignation of Shinzo Abe and he is expected to become prime minister after the LDP-dominated parliament confirms him later this week .
LDP members from both houses of parliament and local party representatives gave Suga 377 out of 534 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign minister , came in second with just 89 votes .
But Suga could face voters at the polls soon .
Taro Aso , Japan ’ s finance minister , is one of several LDP leaders to suggest that a general election could be imminent .
Fallout of normalization in Bahrain .
Some prominent Bahrainis have voiced their opposition to the country ’ s recent deal normalizing relations with Israel .
The Iran-based scholar Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim said that the deal contravenes the will of the people , saying that “ there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the ruled in thought , mind , aims and interests.
” Several political and civil society groups in the country echoed that sentiment , rejecting the deal in a joint statement and warning that it would “ not enjoy popular backing.
” Efforts at normalization have received significant pushback since the United Arab Emirates signed its historic deal with Israel last month .
Protesters in the occupied Palestinian territories have taken to the streets to rally against the moves , and citizens of many other Arab countries have also voiced their opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 100,000 protesters flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in one of the largest demonstrations against the rule of longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko since his disputed victory in last month ’ s presidential elections .
Police said they detained 400 people during the protests .
The demonstrations came before a meeting between Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled for today , during which they will reportedly discuss deeper integration of their two countries .
Lukashenko ’ s relations with Moscow had deteriorated in the months leading up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since warmed to Moscow again as the threat to his reign has grown more acute .
Putin recently confirmed that he would send a reserve police force to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it .
Boris on the ropes .
U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson continues to face mounting criticism over his Conservative government ’ s ongoing effort to override key parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement , which many observers contend could threaten peace and stability in Northern Ireland .
On Saturday , former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , co-authoring an article in which they warned that the bill threatens “ the very integrity of our nation.
” At least 20 Conservative members of parliament are expected to rally behind an amendment to the bill , part of the opposition ’ s strategy to tone down the legislation .
But as Owen Matthews reported for Foreign Policy , Johnson and his team are moving on full-steam ahead .
They “ seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses from a no-deal Brexit will be enough to focus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he wrote .
Political strain in Mali .
The uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Mali continues despite a meeting last week between members of the ruling junta and political and civil society leaders aimed at finding a way out of the crisis .
At the conclusion of those talks on Saturday , the coup leaders proposed a plan to appoint a transitional government led by either a civilian or a military leader for a period of 18 months .
The possibility that a military leader could lead the government was seen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hang onto power .
On Sunday , the opposition June 5 Movement rejected the proposal , accusing the junta of having a “ desire to monopolize and confiscate power.
” Pushback over new Greek migrant camp .
Greek authorities said they will build a permanent refugee camp on the island of Lesbos after a major site burned down last week , sparking protests against the move by islanders and refugees .
The fire that destroyed Moria camp , which is notorious for its overcrowded and poor conditions , left some 12,000 migrants homeless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the camp has been met with fierce opposition from protesters .
Refugees hope to be relocated to other countries in the European Union , while locals have railed against the negative impact the camp has had on the local community .
A lock of former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln ’ s hair was sold at an auction in Boston , Massachusetts , along with a blood-stained telegram for more than $ 81,000 .
The lock was removed during Lincoln ’ s postmortem examination after his assassination in 1865 and was given to Dr. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lincoln ’ s widow .
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Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader, and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Intra-Afghan talks begin as the leaders of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet for the first time, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party anoints Yoshihide Suga as its new leader, and Putin meets with Lukashenko to discuss Belarus crisis.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Afghanistan’s Peace Process Hangs in the Balance
Representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban meet today in their first face-to-face meeting as part of peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to their nearly two-decade-old conflict. The talks began in Doha, Qatar, on Saturday in a formal ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
The start of the talks followed months of delays over the highly contentious issue of prisoner releases. As part of the peace agreement signed with the United States in February, the Taliban agreed to release 1,000 Afghan military personnel in exchange for the government releasing 5,000 of its fighters. After several false starts, President Ashraf Ghani agreed to authorize the release of the final 320 “hardcore” Taliban prisoners, setting the stage for the current meeting.
What’s on—and off—the agenda. The negotiations are expected to cover the terms of a permanent ceasefire, the rights of women and minorities, and the disarmament of the country’s many militia groups. More broadly, the two sides will also discuss long-term constitutional arrangements as well as a possible power-sharing arrangement between them. As Ezzatullah Mehrdad wrote in Foreign Policy last week, many young Afghans who detest the Taliban feel their interests have been ignored and are taking to social media to vent their frustration.
Power sharing deal? Ghani recently told local reporters that “peace does not mean a power sharing political deal.” A significant portion of the talks will likely center around whether a political settlement will be implemented before or after a ceasefire. The Afghan government has already said it wants to see a political settlement first, but the Taliban is unlikely to end its military activity before it achieves at least some of its political objectives. The two sides could agree to appoint a transitional government to lead the effort on these issues.
Violence continues. But the negotiations are occurring against the backdrop of continuing violence across the country. Last week, the United Nations’ top official in Afghanistan warned that violence has reached near-record levels and threatened to derail the talks. Just hours before the start of talks on Saturday, the Taliban carried out a wave of attacks on government installations across the country, and Afghan security forces responded with air and artillery strikes in some parts of the country on Saturday.
“With the start of intra-Afghan talks we were expecting the Taliban to reduce the number of their attacks, but unfortunately their attacks are still going in high numbers,” a spokesman for the Afghan defense ministry said.
The World This Week
September 14. Top EU and Chinese officials meet for a virtual summit.
September 14-18. Negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union continue.
September 15. Journalist Bob Woodward’s new book Rage is released.
September 17. France’s General Federation of Labor (CGT) trade union begins a general strike over wages and employment conditions.
September 18. The state of emergency in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, called after last month’s deadly explosions, is set to expire.
September 20. U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order banning the Chinese messaging app WeChat is due to take effect.
What We’re Following Today Japan’s new leader. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party chose Yoshihide Suga as its new leader earlier today. Suga, who served as a top spokesman for the government over the past eight years, was elected to lead the ruling LDP by a large margin following the resignation of Shinzo Abe and he is expected to become prime minister after the LDP-dominated parliament confirms him later this week. LDP members from both houses of parliament and local party representatives gave Suga 377 out of 534 votes. Fumio Kishida, a former foreign minister, came in second with just 89 votes. But Suga could face voters at the polls soon. Taro Aso, Japan’s finance minister, is one of several LDP leaders to suggest that a general election could be imminent.
Fallout of normalization in Bahrain. Some prominent Bahrainis have voiced their opposition to the country’s recent deal normalizing relations with Israel. The Iran-based scholar Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim said that the deal contravenes the will of the people, saying that “there is a great divergence between the rulers and the ruled in thought, mind, aims and interests.” Several political and civil society groups in the country echoed that sentiment, rejecting the deal in a joint statement and warning that it would “not enjoy popular backing.”
Efforts at normalization have received significant pushback since the United Arab Emirates signed its historic deal with Israel last month. Protesters in the occupied Palestinian territories have taken to the streets to rally against the moves, and citizens of many other Arab countries have also voiced their opposition.
Lukashenko meets with Putin. More than 100,000 protesters flooded the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday in one of the largest demonstrations against the rule of longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko since his disputed victory in last month’s presidential elections. Police said they detained 400 people during the protests.
The demonstrations came before a meeting between Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled for today, during which they will reportedly discuss deeper integration of their two countries. Lukashenko’s relations with Moscow had deteriorated in the months leading up to the election, but he has since warmed to Moscow again as the threat to his reign has grown more acute. Putin recently confirmed that he would send a reserve police force to Belarus if Lukashenko requested it.
Boris on the ropes. U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson continues to face mounting criticism over his Conservative government’s ongoing effort to override key parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement, which many observers contend could threaten peace and stability in Northern Ireland. On Saturday, former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major both weighed in on the move, co-authoring an article in which they warned that the bill threatens “the very integrity of our nation.”
At least 20 Conservative members of parliament are expected to rally behind an amendment to the bill, part of the opposition’s strategy to tone down the legislation. But as Owen Matthews reported for Foreign Policy, Johnson and his team are moving on full-steam ahead. They “seem to be betting that the threat of disruption to EU businesses from a no-deal Brexit will be enough to focus minds in Brussels and force concessions,” he wrote.
Keep an Eye On
Political strain in Mali. The uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Mali continues despite a meeting last week between members of the ruling junta and political and civil society leaders aimed at finding a way out of the crisis. At the conclusion of those talks on Saturday, the coup leaders proposed a plan to appoint a transitional government led by either a civilian or a military leader for a period of 18 months.
The possibility that a military leader could lead the government was seen as a way for the junta to hang onto power. On Sunday, the opposition June 5 Movement rejected the proposal, accusing the junta of having a “desire to monopolize and confiscate power.”
Pushback over new Greek migrant camp. Greek authorities said they will build a permanent refugee camp on the island of Lesbos after a major site burned down last week, sparking protests against the move by islanders and refugees. The fire that destroyed Moria camp, which is notorious for its overcrowded and poor conditions, left some 12,000 migrants homeless. Greece’s decision to rebuild the camp has been met with fierce opposition from protesters. Refugees hope to be relocated to other countries in the European Union, while locals have railed against the negative impact the camp has had on the local community.
Odds and Ends
A lock of former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln’s hair was sold at an auction in Boston, Massachusetts, along with a blood-stained telegram for more than $81,000. The lock was removed during Lincoln’s postmortem examination after his assassination in 1865 and was given to Dr. Lyman Beecher Todd, a cousin of Lincoln’s widow.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-09-14--Public Support Surges for Trump-backed Afghan Peace Plan

Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging , according to a report provided to Foreign Policy , as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend .
Though the talks remain mostly shrouded in secrecy from Congress and the American public , the Eurasia Group Foundation , a New York-based nonprofit , found strong public support across both parties for the planned withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops over the next fourteen months .
Meanwhile , those calling for U.S. forces to stay in Afghanistan to ensure the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has halved since last year , to just 15 percent of respondents .
The survey found that fatigue with the Afghan war is dovetailing with a broader public desire to see the Pentagon reduce its footprint overseas and for Congress to slash military spending while reasserting its authority over U.S. war-making authority .
Though the start of the talks has been delayed for months as the Taliban continued military offensives despite pledging to reduce violence , Defense Secretary Mark Esper touted the start of Afghan negotiations as a “ historic moment ” in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is crucial for both sides to take advantage of this opportunity to make a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process a success , ” he added .
Nearly two-thirds of supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump said they ‘ strongly ’ or ‘ somewhat ’ support the peace deal that commits all U.S. forces to leave the country within fourteen months , a number nearly matched by Biden supporters .
( Biden wants the Pentagon to leave a small troop presence in the country to contain any terror threat , as he advocated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) Earlier this week , U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told reporters that the Pentagon would cut the number of troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 by November .
“ Young people ’ s experience of American foreign policy has been long and inconclusive wars in the Middle East , ” said Mark Hannah , a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation and a co-author of the survey .
“ We ’ re going into the 20th year of this war where people who were not even born on September 11th @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan ] , ” said Hannah .
“ I think there ’ s a sense that some of its just the original motivation for going into Afghanistan in the first place has receded into the rearview mirror.
” But it ’ s not just Afghanistan , and it ’ s not just overseas deployments : Many voters are souring on the full range of overseas U.S. commitments , and younger voters want to slash defense spending .
Some 44 percent of those surveyed called for the United States to draw down troops in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ East and shift away from security guarantees in those regions–a constant refrain in Trump ’ s foreign policy since before taking office .
The finding shows voter skepticism of U.S. alliances remaining a consistent theme of the Trump years : In last year ’ s survey , more than 57 percent of respondents called for the U.S. to reduce its military presence in Asia , and only half said that the U.S. should respond militarily to a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries .
Meanwhile , a plurality of voters under 30 called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , after years of inconclusive wars and economic dislocation on the home front .
“ It ’ s not surprising to us that younger Americans are less bullish on military spending , ” Hannah said .
While most respondents support the Trump administration ’ s effort to scale back military commitments , that doesn ’ t mean they share the administration ’ s lurch toward unilateralism , highlighted by the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord , the Iran nuclear deal , and the World Health Organization , as well as the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on U.S. diplomacy .
Nearly 56 percent of those polled said that the U.S. should engage more in international negotiations , such as rejoining talks with adversaries and international organizations that the Trump administration has withdrawn from .

Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging, according to a report provided to Foreign Policy , as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend.
Public support for Trump administration-backed peace talks to end the 19-year U.S. war in Afghanistan is surging, according to a report provided to Foreign Policy, as Afghan and Taliban negotiators began talks in Qatar this weekend.
Though the talks remain mostly shrouded in secrecy from the U.S. Congress and the American public, the Eurasia Group Foundation, a New York-based nonprofit, found strong public support among both Republicans and Democrats for the planned withdrawal of all remaining U.S. troops over the next 14 months. Meanwhile, the portion of those calling for U.S. forces to stay in Afghanistan to ensure the defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda has halved since last year, to just 15 percent of respondents.
The survey found that fatigue with the Afghan war is dovetailing with a broader public desire to see the U.S. Defense Department reduce its footprint overseas and for Congress to slash military spending while reasserting its authority over U.S. war-making authority.
Though the start of the talks has been delayed for months as the Taliban continued military offensives despite pledging to reduce violence, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper touted the start of Afghan negotiations as a “historic moment” in a statement on Saturday. “It is crucial for both sides to take advantage of this opportunity to make a truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process a success,” he added.
Nearly two-thirds of supporters of U.S. President Donald Trump said they “strongly” or “somewhat” support the peace deal that commits all U.S. forces to leave the country within 14 months, a number nearly matched by supporters of Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden. (Biden wants the Pentagon to leave a small troop presence in the country to contain any terrorist threat, as he advocated during his time as vice president.) Last week, U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie told reporters that the Pentagon would cut the number of troops in Afghanistan to 4,500 by November.
“Young people’s experience of American foreign policy has been long and inconclusive wars in the Middle East,” said Mark Hannah, a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation and a co-author of the survey.
“We’re going into the 20th year of this war where people who were not even born on Sept. 11 are being called to serve [in Afghanistan],” Hannah said. “I think there’s a sense that … the original motivation for going into Afghanistan in the first place has receded into the rearview mirror.”
But it’s not just Afghanistan, and it’s not just overseas deployments: Many voters are souring on the full range of overseas U.S. commitments, and younger voters want to slash defense spending.
Some 44 percent of those surveyed called for the United States to draw down troops in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and shift away from security guarantees in those regions—a constant refrain in Trump’s foreign policy since before taking office. The finding shows voter skepticism of U.S. alliances remaining a consistent theme of the Trump years: In last year’s survey, more than 57 percent of respondents called for the United States to reduce its military presence in Asia, and only half said the United States should respond militarily to a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries.
Meanwhile, a plurality of voters under 30 called on the United States to decrease defense spending, after years of inconclusive wars and economic dislocation on the homefront. “It’s not surprising to us that younger Americans are less bullish on military spending,” Hannah said.
While most respondents support the Trump administration’s effort to scale back military commitments, that doesn’t mean they share the administration’s lurch toward unilateralism, highlighted by the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal, and the World Health Organization, as well as the administration’s persistent efforts to cut spending on U.S. diplomacy. Nearly 56 percent of those polled said the United States should engage more in international negotiations, such as rejoining talks with adversaries and international organizations that the Trump administration has withdrawn from.