foreignpolicy--2020-06-29--Coronavirus Cases Surpass 10 Million, With 500,000 Dead

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Global coronavirus deaths exceed half a million , the United States and Russia deny Russian bounty program in Afghanistan , and Poland ’ s presidential election heads to second round .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Europe has seen the most deaths of any continent , although its overall caseload is declining .
The situation in the Americas is more concerning : Two countries—the United States and Brazil—account for roughly 35 percent of all COVID-19 deaths worldwide and both countries are still seeing new cases in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death rate slowing ?
In the United States , the death rate has yet to hit the highs of April , when over 2,000 deaths were recorded nearly every day .
As Bloomberg reports that could be down to better treatments , a younger population being infected , or warmer weather .
Ultimately , since deaths may take up to three weeks later to register in official tolls , it will be some time until it ’ s clear whether recent caseload spikes have increased the death rate .
“ My biggest concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Jill Roberts , an associate professor at the University of South Florida College of Public Health , told Bloomberg .
Those testing postive now “ could infect other people .
And if they infect other people , we ’ re going to see hospitalizations and deaths follow.
” About that vaccine .
Anthony Fauci , in remarks aired on Sunday , gave a gloomy assessment of the chances for a vaccine to be taken up by enough of the U.S. population to be effective .
“ There is a general anti-science @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people in this country—an alarmingly large percentage of people , relatively speaking , ” Fauci said , adding that a massive public health education campaign would be necessary should a vaccine prove viable .
Russia and U.S. deny bounty program .
Both Russia and the United States have denied a report in the New York Times of a program run by Russian military intelligence offering bounties to Taliban-linked fighters to kill U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan .
A further report from the Times , published on Sunday , said that U.S. military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their superiors and that the information appeared in U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s daily brief .
Trump addressed the reporting on Twitter .
“ Intel just reported to me that they did not find this info credible , and therefore did not report it to me or [ the vice president ] , ” he wrote .
Polish presidential election going to second round .
Polish President Andrzej Duda failed to meet the threshold necessary to win a second term outright , and now moves to a second round against Warsaw Mayor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polls predicted , winning roughly 43 percent of first round votes , while Trzaskowski won 30 percent .
The now-eliminated candidates represent another 27 percent of votes potentially up for grabs in the second round election on July 12 .
In Foreign Policy on June 27 , Dariusz Kalan reported from Warsaw on the contrasting styles and support bases of the two remaining candidates : Duda has campaigned as a hardline nationalist , and Trzaskowski as the “ consummate European.
” New Malawi president sworn in .
Lazarus Chakwera has been officially sworn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ following his victory in the country ’ s election last Tuesday .
Malawi ’ s electoral commission announced on Saturday that Chakwera had received 59 percent of the vote .
His rival , former President Peter Mutharika received 39 percent of the vote .
Chakwera ’ s success marks the first time an African opposition candidate has won a court-ordered rerun election .
Ireland names new prime minister .
The leader of the centrist Fianna Fail party , Micheál Martin , has been named as Ireland ’ s new prime minister , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role of deputy prime minister in a coalition government .
Martin had served in a number of cabinet posts in previous governments , most recently as foreign affairs minister .
According to the terms of the coalition agreement the role of prime minister will rotate and Varadkar will resume the premiership in 2022 .
Iceland ’ s president wins second term .
Icelandic President Gundi Johannesson won a second term on Saturday in a landslide victory .
Johanneson won 92 percent of the vote , while his right wing challenger Gudmundur Franklin Jonsson @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Icelandic presidency is a largely symbolic post , although the president can exercise veto power over legislation .
Facebook ad boycott grows .
Global brands continue to join a growing advertiser boycott of social media giant Facebook , whose user base covers roughly a third of the world ’ s population .
The company has been under pressure in recent months over its treatment of U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s posts , as well as its hands-off stance on political advertising .
Unilever and Starbucks have recently joined the boycott @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off Facebook ’ s market value on Friday .
Such is the size of Facebook ’ s advertiser base—reported to be 8 million individual advertisers—it ’ s not clear whether the current boycott will lead to fundamental changes to the platform .
French local elections offer Macron rebuke .
The party of French President Emmanuel Macron fared poorly in the second round of France ’ s local elections as Green party candidates saw increased gains , according to exit polls .
Macron ’ s prime minister Édouard Philippe was elected mayor of Le @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future even though he is allowed nominate an acting mayor while he serves in national government .
Marine Le Pen ’ s far-right National Rally made history as her party ’ s candidate , Louis Aliot—who was until recently also her domestic partner—won the mayoral race in Perpignan .
It is the first time Le Pen ’ s party was won control of a town with over 100,000 people .
On Wednesday , July 1 , a changing of the acronyms takes place as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement ( USMCA ) —the successor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( NAFTA ) —officially takes effect .
July 1 is also the earliest date on which Israeli lawmakers can vote on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s West Bank annexation plans , according to his coalition agreement with Benny Gantz .
Since last week ’ s internal White House discussions ended without agreement on whether to approve of such a rapid annexation , it ’ s unclear whether Netanyahu will move forward .
Also on July 1 , voting concludes in Russia ’ s referendum on changes to its constitution , potentially setting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2036 .
On Thursday , July 2 , the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will release its monthly jobs report covering the month of June .
The European Union will also release unemployment statistics on this day , although those will cover the month of May .
With this summer ’ s Olympic Games already postponed until 2021 , a majority of Tokyo residents would like the schedule change to go further , AFP reports .
In a poll published today , 51.7 percent of respondents said they would like to see the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 46.3 percent said they would like the games to go ahead as planned on July 23 , 2021 , however , only 15.2 percent of those positive respondents want to see the games proceed as normal with no restrictions .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Global coronavirus deaths exceed half a million, the United States and Russia deny Russian bounty program in Afghanistan, and Poland’s presidential election heads to second round.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Global coronavirus deaths exceed half a million, the United States and Russia deny Russian bounty program in Afghanistan, and Poland’s presidential election heads to second round.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Coronavirus Global Death Toll Passes 500,000 The coronavirus pandemic, about to enter its fifth month this week reached two grim milestones over the weekend: More than 10 million people have been infected with the virus and over 500,000 have died of it. As these numbers are taken from officially recorded cases, the actual figure is likely to be much higher.
Europe has seen the most deaths of any continent, although its overall caseload is declining. The situation in the Americas is more concerning: Two countries—the United States and Brazil—account for roughly 35 percent of all COVID-19 deaths worldwide and both countries are still seeing new cases in the tens of thousands daily.
Is the death rate slowing? In the United States, the death rate has yet to hit the highs of April, when over 2,000 deaths were recorded nearly every day. As Bloomberg reports that could be down to better treatments, a younger population being infected, or warmer weather. Ultimately, since deaths may take up to three weeks later to register in official tolls, it will be some time until it’s clear whether recent caseload spikes have increased the death rate.
“My biggest concern is what happens two weeks from now,” Jill Roberts, an associate professor at the University of South Florida College of Public Health, told Bloomberg. Those testing postive now “could infect other people. And if they infect other people, we’re going to see hospitalizations and deaths follow.”
About that vaccine. Anthony Fauci, in remarks aired on Sunday, gave a gloomy assessment of the chances for a vaccine to be taken up by enough of the U.S. population to be effective. “There is a general anti-science, anti-authority, anti-vaccine feeling among some people in this country—an alarmingly large percentage of people, relatively speaking,” Fauci said, adding that a massive public health education campaign would be necessary should a vaccine prove viable.
What We’re Following Today
Russia and U.S. deny bounty program. Both Russia and the United States have denied a report in the New York Times of a program run by Russian military intelligence offering bounties to Taliban-linked fighters to kill U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. A further report from the Times, published on Sunday, said that U.S. military forces had highlighted the Russian program to their superiors and that the information appeared in U.S. President Donald Trump’s daily brief. Trump addressed the reporting on Twitter. “Intel just reported to me that they did not find this info credible, and therefore did not report it to me or [the vice president],” he wrote.
Polish presidential election going to second round. Polish President Andrzej Duda failed to meet the threshold necessary to win a second term outright, and now moves to a second round against Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski. Duda performed largely as polls predicted, winning roughly 43 percent of first round votes, while Trzaskowski won 30 percent. The now-eliminated candidates represent another 27 percent of votes potentially up for grabs in the second round election on July 12.
In Foreign Policy on June 27, Dariusz Kalan reported from Warsaw on the contrasting styles and support bases of the two remaining candidates: Duda has campaigned as a hardline nationalist, and Trzaskowski as the “consummate European.”
New Malawi president sworn in. Lazarus Chakwera has been officially sworn in as the new president of Malawi following his victory in the country’s election last Tuesday. Malawi’s electoral commission announced on Saturday that Chakwera had received 59 percent of the vote. His rival, former President Peter Mutharika received 39 percent of the vote. Chakwera’s success marks the first time an African opposition candidate has won a court-ordered rerun election.
Ireland names new prime minister. The leader of the centrist Fianna Fail party, Micheál Martin, has been named as Ireland’s new prime minister, as his predecessor Leo Varadkar takes on the role of deputy prime minister in a coalition government. Martin had served in a number of cabinet posts in previous governments, most recently as foreign affairs minister. According to the terms of the coalition agreement the role of prime minister will rotate and Varadkar will resume the premiership in 2022.
Iceland’s president wins second term. Icelandic President Gundi Johannesson won a second term on Saturday in a landslide victory. Johanneson won 92 percent of the vote, while his right wing challenger Gudmundur Franklin Jonsson received just 7 percent of the vote. The Icelandic presidency is a largely symbolic post, although the president can exercise veto power over legislation.
Keep an Eye On
Facebook ad boycott grows. Global brands continue to join a growing advertiser boycott of social media giant Facebook, whose user base covers roughly a third of the world’s population. The company has been under pressure in recent months over its treatment of U.S. President Donald Trump’s posts, as well as its hands-off stance on political advertising. Unilever and Starbucks have recently joined the boycott, which helped wipe $56 billion off Facebook’s market value on Friday. Such is the size of Facebook’s advertiser base—reported to be 8 million individual advertisers—it’s not clear whether the current boycott will lead to fundamental changes to the platform.
French local elections offer Macron rebuke. The party of French President Emmanuel Macron fared poorly in the second round of France’s local elections as Green party candidates saw increased gains, according to exit polls. Macron’s prime minister Édouard Philippe was elected mayor of Le Havre, raising questions over his political future even though he is allowed nominate an acting mayor while he serves in national government.
Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally made history as her party’s candidate, Louis Aliot—who was until recently also her domestic partner—won the mayoral race in Perpignan. It is the first time Le Pen’s party was won control of a town with over 100,000 people.
The World this Week
On Wednesday, July 1, a changing of the acronyms takes place as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA)—the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—officially takes effect.
July 1 is also the earliest date on which Israeli lawmakers can vote on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s West Bank annexation plans, according to his coalition agreement with Benny Gantz. Since last week’s internal White House discussions ended without agreement on whether to approve of such a rapid annexation, it’s unclear whether Netanyahu will move forward.
Also on July 1, voting concludes in Russia’s referendum on changes to its constitution, potentially setting up President Vladimir Putin to rule until 2036.
On Thursday, July 2, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will release its monthly jobs report covering the month of June. The European Union will also release unemployment statistics on this day, although those will cover the month of May.
Odds and Ends
With this summer’s Olympic Games already postponed until 2021, a majority of Tokyo residents would like the schedule change to go further, AFP reports. In a poll published today, 51.7 percent of respondents said they would like to see the games postponed again or canceled entirely, 46.3 percent said they would like the games to go ahead as planned on July 23, 2021, however, only 15.2 percent of those positive respondents want to see the games proceed as normal with no restrictions.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--China’s Own Documents Show Potentially Genocidal Sterilization Plans in Xinjiang

These are direct quotes from the 2019 family planning budget of Hotan , the capital city of a prefecture with a population of 2.53 million in in southern Xinjiang , China .
The neighboring county of Guma , population 322,000 , set a similarly precise “ performance target ” figure of 5,970 intrauterine contraception device ( IUD ) placements and 8,064 female sterilizations for that year .
These two counties , predominantly home to members of the Uighur ethnic minority , planned to sterilize approximately 14 and 34 percent of women between 18 and 49—in a single year .
Per @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China performed in the 20 years between 1998 and 2018 combined .
Documents from Xinjiang ’ s Health Commission indicate that this is part of a wider project targeting all of Xinjiang ’ s southern minority regions in 2019 and 2020 .
Since 2017 , up to 1.8 million Uighurs , Kazaks , and other Turkic minority groups in the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang have been swept up in what is probably the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust .
Exile Uighurs and China researchers have described this campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , new research I published this month with the Jamestown Foundation provides strong evidence that Beijing ’ s actions in Xinjiang also meet the physical genocide criterion cited in Section D of Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide : “ imposing measures intended to prevent births within the [ targeted ] group.
” Starting in 2018 , a growing number of female former internment camp detainees testified that they were given injections that coincided with changes in or cessation of their menstrual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forcibly fitted with IUDs prior to internment or subjected to sterilization surgeries .
That same year , published natural population growth rates ( calculated as birth minus deaths , and excluding migration ) in Xinjiang plummeted .
In Kashgar and Hotan , two of the prefectures that make up the Uighur heartland , combined natural population growth rates fell by 84 percent between 2015 and 2018 , from 1.6 percent to 0.26 percent .
In some Uighur counties , 2018 saw more deaths than births .
In 2019 , Xinjiang ’ s birth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with ethnic minority regions seeing stronger declines between 30 and 56 percent .
In contrast , birth rates across the whole country fell by only 4.2 percent between 2018 and 2019 .
Worryingly , most recent birth rate figures in Uighur regions are not being published .
In an unusual development , Hotan ’ s annual report , always published in March or April each year , was not yet out by the end of June , but one of its counties reported a negative population growth rate .
For the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s annual report did not disclose birth or death rates .
However , its total population decreased compared to the previous year .
Clearly , the government has something to hide .
One minority region , Kizilsu , recently disclosed its 2020 natural population growth target : Shockingly , it was cut down to nearly zero .
Given that Uighur birth rates remained stable even during the horrific years of the Cultural Revolution , the most recent declines signal a worrying new development .
The campaign of mass internment would certainly negatively impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it can not have depressed population growth to such low levels .
Instead , comprehensive new evidence from government documents reveals a systematic state campaign of suppressing minority births , while simultaneously encouraging a mass influx of new Han Chinese workers and settlers .
For years , Han Chinese officials and academics have lamented “ excessive minority population ” growth in Xinjiang .
Li Xiaoxia , the director of the Institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences , wrote in 2017 that high Uighur population growth rates exacerbated spatial ethnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one ethnic group owns a [ particular ] land area.
” Such sentiments are seen as dangerous , because they “ weaken national identity and identification with the Chinese Nation-Race , impacting long-term rule and stability.
” However , government efforts to enforce family planning targets were often met with failure .
A 2013 World Bank report on vocational training needs in Xinjiang , compiled by two Han Chinese authors , states that “ Xinjiang ’ s enforcement of family planning in rural and minority regions has been comparatively relaxed.
” Many of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this directly on the minorities ’ predominantly Muslim faith .
One of them wrote in 2016 : “ It is undeniable that a wave of extremist religious thinking has fueled a resurgence in birth rates in Xinjiang ’ s southern regions.
” The campaign of mass internment that started in 2017 under Xinjiang ’ s current Party Secretary Chen Quanguo provided the ideal context for an unprecedented crackdown on minority birth rates .
My research shows that the detentions have primarily targeted male heads of households .
In some regions , government lists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them had been sent to detention camps or prisons .
With community leaders , religious authority figures , and husbands removed , nothing prevented the state from seizing complete control over female minority reproductive systems .
In February , a leaked government document called the “ Karakax List ” ( after its origin from Karakax County ) showed the reasons given for hundreds of camp detainees being detained .
Surprisingly , the most common reason was having had too many children .
Frequently , the detainees had only had one more child than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violations were often the only stated reason for internment .
In contrast , in January 2016 China abolished its one-child policy , and it has since encouraged its citizens to have two children in order to maintain positive population growth .
Some provinces are doling out financial rewards such as tax breaks and wedding or childbirth subsidies in order to boost birth rates .
The Karakax List indicates a spike in the number of Uighurs detained for birth control violations during the spring of 2018 .
During precisely that time , Xinjiang ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for dealing with birth control policy violations , with three counties explicitly threatening violators with internment .
Karakax County ’ s 2018 government work report proudly stated that by “ severely curbing behaviors that violate birth control [ policies ] , birth and natural population growth rates declined dramatically.
” Between 2016 and 2018 , Karakax ’ s natural population growth rate plunged by 83 percent .
However , punishing birth control violations with internment has been just one of several strategies to suppress minority birth rates .
The second approach was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ used form of birth control around the world and the most commonly used form in China .
In 2018 , a stunning 80 percent of all newly placed IUDs in China were fitted in Xinjiang , even though the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the country ’ s population .
By 2019 , Xinjiang planned to subject over 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to “ birth control measures with long-term effectiveness.
” In Xinjiang ’ s minority regions , this term refers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minority prefecture issued a related statement that women for whom the procedure wouldn ’ t pose medical risks must have IUDs placed “ immediately , ” and that the risks , known as contraindications , must be proved through a diagnosis certified by a higher health authority .
Before long , requiring minority women to get IUDs was not enough .
The third and most draconian birth prevention strategy—sterilizations—soon followed .
Until recently , sterilization surgeries had been uncommon in Xinjiang in order to avoid offending the predominantly Muslim population ’ s religious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persecuting any form of religious behavior , this was no longer an issue .
In 2018 , the region performed over seven times more sterilizations per capita than the national average .
Then , in 2019 , when a growing number of male detainees were shifted from internment camps to either prisons or forced labor compounds , the state moved toward what appears to be a campaign of mass female sterilization .
This campaign is part of a project titled “ Free Technical Family Planning Services to Farmers and Pastoralists.
” It provides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Xinjiang ’ s southern Uighur regions .
The project ’ s explicit aim is to reduce these regions ’ 2020 birth and population growth rates by “ at least ” 0.4 percentage points below the 2016 level .
The free “ birth control surgeries ” include IUD placements , abortions , and sterilizations .
The project ’ s combined funding for 2019 and 2020 amounted to 260 million RMB , about $ 36 million , on the regional level alone .
The evidence suggests that this campaign aims to sterilize some women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many or all women with three or more children .
One Uighur county ’ s 2019 family planning policy explicitly stated that women with three or more children are to be sterilized .
According to the 2010 national census , about 20 percent of all Uighur women across China had three or more children ; in some predominantly Uighur prefectures , that share may be as high as 36.1 percent , which might explain Hotan City ’ s 34.3 percent sterilization target .
In addition , in 2019 and 2020 Xinjiang budgeted about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ million , at the regional level alone for financial rewards for women who supposedly voluntarily opt for IUDs or sterilizations even though they are legally permitted to have a third child .
Together with local co-funding , the regionwide “ free technical family planning ” project has enough money to sterilize potentially up to nearly 200,000 or about 12 percent of all married women aged 18 to 49 years in rural southern Xinjiang .
However , at least one minority prefecture received additional central government funding for this initiative , indicating that these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also nothing to say that this campaign will end in 2020 .
Its obvious intermediate goal would be to sterilize the 20 percent or more of these women who have had more than two children , plus a percentage of those with fewer children .
Along with the mass deployment of IUDs , this campaign enables the Chinese government to permanently maintain Uighur natural population growth rates at levels that are 85 to 95 percent below those of the past two decades .
Xinjiang ’ s goal in Uighur regions is to achieve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ —not one minority child is to be born outside the will of the state .
Such targets are no joke .
Hotan prefecture ’ s 2019 birth control performance indicators mandated that the entire region , which has over half a million women of childbearing age , could have no more than exactly 21 birth control policy violations that year .
Technically , the government can now dial minority birth rates up and down at will , like opening or closing a faucet .
Unfortunately , it is unclear where all this will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are easier to control .
Alarmingly , Xinjiang ’ s 2019 population growth rate was far below its original target .
Under the one child policy , China had previously implemented repressive birth control measures .
However , they were nothing close to now what is now seen in Xinjiang : punishing violators in extrajudicial internment camps , sterilizing up to a third of all women in a single year , sending women to family planning clinics with armed police forces , or setting near-zero population growth targets .
A women who fled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they would chant these lines during daily flag-raising events : “ If we have too many children , we ’ re religious extremists .
… That means we have to go to the training centers.
” Soon after , she and hundreds of other Uighur women were taken to a hospital by armed police guards and forcibly fitted with IUDs .
In 2019 , Xinjiang ’ s population growth rate was far below its original target .
Xinjiang ’ s birth prevention tactics are just one aspect of what appears to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Between 2015 and 2018 , 2 million new residents moved to Xinjiang—all of them to regions dominated by China ’ s Han majority .
The state promotes such in-migration through lucrative offers .
In 2019 , a Han Chinese-dominated region in Xinjiang sought to attract young families from eastern China ( ages 35 and under ) with promises of 5.8 acres of arable land , new apartments , government jobs with annual salaries of up to 102,500 RMB ( about $ 14,000 , above the national average ) , and additional monthly livelihood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actively encourage interethnic marriages between Han men and Uighur women in an apparent effort to dilute Uighur cultural identity and promote assimilation into the “ Chinese Nation-Race.
” The internment of vast numbers of ethnic minority men in camps and sites of coercive labor facilitate this process of what often appear to be coerced relationships .
These findings indicate that Beijing is complementing its pursuit of cultural genocide in Xinjiang with a campaign of ethno-racial supremacy—a campaign that meets at least one of the five criteria for physical genocide specified by the U.N @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international community takes decisive measures .
The situation warrants an investigation into crimes against humanity , including an assessment whether Beijing ’ s policies in Xinjiang are gradually progressing from cultural genocide to a form of demographic genocide .

“Performance targets:
Target 1: target population for intrauterine contraception device placement 524 people
Target 2: [target] population for sterilizations 14,872 people.”
These are direct quotes from the 2019 family planning budget of Hotan, the capital city of a prefecture with a population of 2.53 million in in southern Xinjiang, China. The neighboring county of Guma, population 322,000, set a similarly precise “performance target” figure of 5,970 intrauterine contraception device (IUD) placements and 8,064 female sterilizations for that year.
These two counties, predominantly home to members of the Uighur ethnic minority, planned to sterilize approximately 14 and 34 percent of women between 18 and 49—in a single year. Per capita, that represents more sterilizations than China performed in the 20 years between 1998 and 2018 combined. Documents from Xinjiang’s Health Commission indicate that this is part of a wider project targeting all of Xinjiang’s southern minority regions in 2019 and 2020.
Since 2017, up to 1.8 million Uighurs, Kazaks, and other Turkic minority groups in the northwestern Chinese region of Xinjiang have been swept up in what is probably the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust. Exile Uighurs and China researchers have described this campaign as a “cultural genocide.” Now, new research I published this month with the Jamestown Foundation provides strong evidence that Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang also meet the physical genocide criterion cited in Section D of Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the [targeted] group.”
Starting in 2018, a growing number of female former internment camp detainees testified that they were given injections that coincided with changes in or cessation of their menstrual cycles. Others reported that they were forcibly fitted with IUDs prior to internment or subjected to sterilization surgeries.
That same year, published natural population growth rates (calculated as birth minus deaths, and excluding migration) in Xinjiang plummeted. In Kashgar and Hotan, two of the prefectures that make up the Uighur heartland, combined natural population growth rates fell by 84 percent between 2015 and 2018, from 1.6 percent to 0.26 percent. In some Uighur counties, 2018 saw more deaths than births. In 2019, Xinjiang’s birth rates declined by a further 24 percent, with ethnic minority regions seeing stronger declines between 30 and 56 percent. In contrast, birth rates across the whole country fell by only 4.2 percent between 2018 and 2019.
Worryingly, most recent birth rate figures in Uighur regions are not being published. In an unusual development, Hotan’s annual report, always published in March or April each year, was not yet out by the end of June, but one of its counties reported a negative population growth rate. For the first time since its publication, Kashgar’s annual report did not disclose birth or death rates. However, its total population decreased compared to the previous year. Clearly, the government has something to hide.
Given that Uighur birth rates remained stable even during the horrific years of the Cultural Revolution, the most recent declines signal a worrying new development. The campaign of mass internment would certainly negatively impact birth rates. However, by itself it cannot have depressed population growth to such low levels.
Instead, comprehensive new evidence from government documents reveals a systematic state campaign of suppressing minority births, while simultaneously encouraging a mass influx of new Han Chinese workers and settlers.
For years, Han Chinese officials and academics have lamented “excessive minority population” growth in Xinjiang. Li Xiaoxia, the director of the Institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in 2017 that high Uighur population growth rates exacerbated spatial ethnic segregation, “strengthening the viewpoint that one ethnic group owns a [particular] land area.” Such sentiments are seen as dangerous, because they “weaken national identity and identification with the Chinese Nation-Race, impacting long-term rule and stability.”
However, government efforts to enforce family planning targets were often met with failure. A 2013 World Bank report on vocational training needs in Xinjiang, compiled by two Han Chinese authors, states that “Xinjiang’s enforcement of family planning in rural and minority regions has been comparatively relaxed.” Many of Xinjiang’s officials and researchers blame this directly on the minorities’ predominantly Muslim faith. One of them wrote in 2016: “It is undeniable that a wave of extremist religious thinking has fueled a resurgence in birth rates in Xinjiang’s southern regions.”
The campaign of mass internment that started in 2017 under Xinjiang’s current Party Secretary Chen Quanguo provided the ideal context for an unprecedented crackdown on minority birth rates. My research shows that the detentions have primarily targeted male heads of households. In some regions, government lists show that up to 50 percent of them had been sent to detention camps or prisons. With community leaders, religious authority figures, and husbands removed, nothing prevented the state from seizing complete control over female minority reproductive systems.
In February, a leaked government document called the “Karakax List” (after its origin from Karakax County) showed the reasons given for hundreds of camp detainees being detained. Surprisingly, the most common reason was having had too many children. Frequently, the detainees had only had one more child than permitted by the state. Birth control violations were often the only stated reason for internment.
In contrast, in January 2016 China abolished its one-child policy, and it has since encouraged its citizens to have two children in order to maintain positive population growth. Some provinces are doling out financial rewards such as tax breaks and wedding or childbirth subsidies in order to boost birth rates.
The Karakax List indicates a spike in the number of Uighurs detained for birth control violations during the spring of 2018. During precisely that time, Xinjiang’s minority regions issued draconian new regulations for dealing with birth control policy violations, with three counties explicitly threatening violators with internment. Karakax County’s 2018 government work report proudly stated that by “severely curbing behaviors that violate birth control [policies], birth and natural population growth rates declined dramatically.” Between 2016 and 2018, Karakax’s natural population growth rate plunged by 83 percent.
However, punishing birth control violations with internment has been just one of several strategies to suppress minority birth rates. The second approach was a mass deployment of IUDs, a widely used form of birth control around the world and the most commonly used form in China. In 2018, a stunning 80 percent of all newly placed IUDs in China were fitted in Xinjiang, even though the region only makes up 1.8 percent of the country’s population. By 2019, Xinjiang planned to subject over 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to “birth control measures with long-term effectiveness.” In Xinjiang’s minority regions, this term refers to either IUDs or sterilizations. One minority prefecture issued a related statement that women for whom the procedure wouldn’t pose medical risks must have IUDs placed “immediately,” and that the risks, known as contraindications, must be proved through a diagnosis certified by a higher health authority.
Before long, requiring minority women to get IUDs was not enough. The third and most draconian birth prevention strategy—sterilizations—soon followed. Until recently, sterilization surgeries had been uncommon in Xinjiang in order to avoid offending the predominantly Muslim population’s religious sensibilities. Once the state began openly persecuting any form of religious behavior, this was no longer an issue. In 2018, the region performed over seven times more sterilizations per capita than the national average. Then, in 2019, when a growing number of male detainees were shifted from internment camps to either prisons or forced labor compounds, the state moved toward what appears to be a campaign of mass female sterilization.
This campaign is part of a project titled “Free Technical Family Planning Services to Farmers and Pastoralists.” It provides free “birth control surgeries” specifically in Xinjiang’s southern Uighur regions. The project’s explicit aim is to reduce these regions’ 2020 birth and population growth rates by “at least” 0.4 percentage points below the 2016 level. The free “birth control surgeries” include IUD placements, abortions, and sterilizations. The project’s combined funding for 2019 and 2020 amounted to 260 million RMB, about $36 million, on the regional level alone.
The evidence suggests that this campaign aims to sterilize some women with one or two children, and many or all women with three or more children. One Uighur county’s 2019 family planning policy explicitly stated that women with three or more children are to be sterilized. According to the 2010 national census, about 20 percent of all Uighur women across China had three or more children; in some predominantly Uighur prefectures, that share may be as high as 36.1 percent, which might explain Hotan City’s 34.3 percent sterilization target. In addition, in 2019 and 2020 Xinjiang budgeted about 1.5 billion RMB, over $200 million, at the regional level alone for financial rewards for women who supposedly voluntarily opt for IUDs or sterilizations even though they are legally permitted to have a third child.
Together with local co-funding, the regionwide “free technical family planning” project has enough money to sterilize potentially up to nearly 200,000 or about 12 percent of all married women aged 18 to 49 years in rural southern Xinjiang. However, at least one minority prefecture received additional central government funding for this initiative, indicating that these estimates could be higher. There is also nothing to say that this campaign will end in 2020. Its obvious intermediate goal would be to sterilize the 20 percent or more of these women who have had more than two children, plus a percentage of those with fewer children.
Along with the mass deployment of IUDs, this campaign enables the Chinese government to permanently maintain Uighur natural population growth rates at levels that are 85 to 95 percent below those of the past two decades. Xinjiang’s goal in Uighur regions is to achieve “zero birth control violation incidents”—not one minority child is to be born outside the will of the state. Such targets are no joke. Hotan prefecture’s 2019 birth control performance indicators mandated that the entire region, which has over half a million women of childbearing age, could have no more than exactly 21 birth control policy violations that year. Technically, the government can now dial minority birth rates up and down at will, like opening or closing a faucet.
Unfortunately, it is unclear where all this will end. Numerically stagnant or declining populations are easier to control. Alarmingly, Xinjiang’s 2019 population growth rate was far below its original target.
Under the one child policy, China had previously implemented repressive birth control measures. However, they were nothing close to now what is now seen in Xinjiang: punishing violators in extrajudicial internment camps, sterilizing up to a third of all women in a single year, sending women to family planning clinics with armed police forces, or setting near-zero population growth targets.
A women who fled Xinjiang last year told the Associated Press that they would chant these lines during daily flag-raising events: “If we have too many children, we’re religious extremists. … That means we have to go to the training centers.” Soon after, she and hundreds of other Uighur women were taken to a hospital by armed police guards and forcibly fitted with IUDs. In 2019, Xinjiang’s population growth rate was far below its original target.
Xinjiang’s birth prevention tactics are just one aspect of what appears to be a multipronged strategy of ethno-racial domination. Between 2015 and 2018, 2 million new residents moved to Xinjiang—all of them to regions dominated by China’s Han majority. The state promotes such in-migration through lucrative offers. In 2019, a Han Chinese-dominated region in Xinjiang sought to attract young families from eastern China (ages 35 and under) with promises of 5.8 acres of arable land, new apartments, government jobs with annual salaries of up to 102,500 RMB (about $14,000, above the national average), and additional monthly livelihood subsidy payments.
Additionally, regional authorities actively encourage interethnic marriages between Han men and Uighur women in an apparent effort to dilute Uighur cultural identity and promote assimilation into the “Chinese Nation-Race.” The internment of vast numbers of ethnic minority men in camps and sites of coercive labor facilitate this process of what often appear to be coerced relationships.
These findings indicate that Beijing is complementing its pursuit of cultural genocide in Xinjiang with a campaign of ethno-racial supremacy—a campaign that meets at least one of the five criteria for physical genocide specified by the U.N. It is high time that the international community takes decisive measures. The situation warrants an investigation into crimes against humanity, including an assessment whether Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang are gradually progressing from cultural genocide to a form of demographic genocide.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Don’t Let Erdogan Erase Turkey’s Christian Past

Istanbul ’ s Hagia Sophia was , for nearly 1,000 years , the largest and most important house of Christian worship in the world until it was converted into mosque in the 15th century .
The building , now a museum , is still filled with priceless Christian mosaics and frescoes .
It is also one of the most contested religious buildings in the world .
On July 2 , the Turkish high court will rule on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s request to annul the 1934 decree that turned Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision will reverberate across the world .
Erdogan has consistently expressed his desire to return Hagia Sophia to its previous status as a mosque .
This stance plays well with his pious political base .
Now he seems to be in a hurry ; his hand-picked Presidential High Advisory Board discussed the matter on June 16 .
If the court decides to annul the 86-year-old law , some advisors are hoping that Islamic prayers could be held in the mosque on July 15 , the anniversary of the failed coup against Erdogan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the politics here are irresistible .
It is hard to imagine a more powerful image of Islamification than to see him leading prayers in a building converted from an Orthodox Christian church into a mosque in 1453 by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II after his conquest of Constantinople .
For Erdogan it would be a huge symbolic step toward bolstering his religious nationalism .
But for many others , including Turkey ’ s tiny Christian minority and millions of other Christians around the world , it will be a disturbing echo of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peaceful coexistence most people aspire to in the modern world .
Kemal Ataturk , the first president of Turkey , secularized the building and reopened it as a museum in 1935 precisely in order to help create a modern Turkey—and to curry favor internationally , including better relations with Greece .
Ataturk knew how important the Hagia Sophia was to Orthodox Christians .
As the historian Diarmaid MacCulloch has observed , “ Orthodoxy has to a remarkable extent been moulded round one single church building… .
the Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consecrated in 537 during the reign of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian , the cathedral was the seat of the ecumenical patriarch , leader of the Eastern Orthodox church , for a millennium .
The Russian Orthodox Chruch already announced its uneasiness , saying that any attempt to convert the bullding into a mosque will hurt “ fragile inter-confessional balances.
” And the Greek culture minister sounded alarm with UNESCO to help protect the “ universal character ” of the Hagia Sophia .
Ataturk also knew that religious people have long memories , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of contention between Christians and Muslims .
Following Turkey ’ s defeat and occupation after World War I , a Greek priest recklessly performed a communion service in the mosque .
He barely escaped with his life .
Now the fragile peace achieved by secularization may be shattered .
No one knows what the court will decide .
But recent precedent looks hopeful for Erdogan .
In November 2019 , the court considered an almost identical case regarding the Church of the Holy Saviour , also known as the Chora Church , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Istanbul .
Like the Hagia Sophia , the Chora church was converted into a mosque , in the 16th century , before being converted to a museum , in 1948 .
In its ruling the court found the redesignation into a museum unlawful because a mosque “ can not be used except for its essential function.
” Indeed , many people who visit the Chora church or the Hagia Sophia will agree something important is lost when ancient houses of worship , of whatever faith , are hollowed out into museums , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But Christians might argue that the “ essential function ” of these buildings predated 1453 .
A complication is that both the Chora church and the Hagia Sophia are on UNESCO ’ s world heritage list as “ architectural masterpieces.
” But it is not clear what a change in status means for heritage value .
Indeed , Hagia Sophia needs urgent repairs , which are more likely to be financed if it becomes a mosque again .
But it ’ s unclear whether such repairs would protect the building ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as unacceptable if the building turns into a mosque .
Ataturk ’ s French-inspired strident secularism had problems of its own .
Its excesses which included inexcusable bans on Islamic practice and dress—have been viewed by religious Turks ever since as a heinous attack on their faith .
That is partly why , for decades , reopening Hagia Sophia to worship—Muslim worship—has been a dream for Turkey ’ s religious conservatives .
It is seems that Erdogan is finally ready to take this historic step , to show that he really is making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not accidental .
The popularity of Erdogan ’ s ruling party is at a two-year low—because of a declining economy , as well as appalling levels of authoritarianism and corruption .
He faces new challenges by two new parties that may appeal to his own conservative base : the Future Party , led by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu , and the Democracy and Progress Party , led by former Economy Minister Ali Babacan .
Since these two parties may chip away some of his religious voters , Erdogan may be hoping to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Muslims—in Turkey and even beyond .
There is a better way .
Instead of this revanchist religious nationalism , there is an opportunity for a solution based on pluralism instead .
The Hagia Sophia could be opened for both Muslim and Christian worship .
Certainly , the building is big enough to consecrate separate areas .
Thoughtful scheduling could allow services to take place at different times .
The Armenian patriarch of Constantinople , Sahak II , has already suggested a sharing solution .
And Bartholomew I , the current Orthodox archbishop and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ June 30 that “ Hagia Sophia belongs not only to those who own the monument , but also to all of humanity .
And the Turkish people have a responsibility to highlight this universality of the monument.
” Sharing space in this way would not be entirely novel .
The Prophet Mohammed is known to have allowed a Christian delegation to pray in his own mosque in Medina .
Soon after , back in the early 7th century , the Great Mosque of Damascus was shared by Muslims and Christians for a while—Muslims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ structure and the Christians in the western side .
Today , many churches are open for Muslim prayers , including the Church of the Epiphany in Washington .
A church in Berlin recently opened its doors to a Muslim congregation that was too large for its mosque under the official rules on COVID-19 social distancing .
If Turkey could model such an inspiring religious pluralism , it would provide a precedent for other significant places of worship which also have suffered conquest—or “ reconquest.
” The obvious case is the great Mosque-Cathedral of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ built in the 8th century as a mosque , only to be converted five centuries later into a church .
More recently , Muslim requests to worship in this magnificent building were rejected by Catholic and Spanish authorities .
In 2010 , two Muslim tourists even got arrested for trying to offer their prayers in what used to be one of the world ’ s great mosques .
This kind of narrow , zero-sum intolerance is not the way forward .
Instead , political and religious leaders should champion pluralism everywhere—from Córdoba to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Christians and many Muslims would object to such a compromise in Istanbul , each believing that the Hagia Sophia is theirs and theirs alone .
But many more would be likely to prefer it to the secular status quo .
( As an Orthodox Christian and a Turkish Muslim , we certainly would. )
.
Sadly , Erdogan is unlikely to have a pluralist compromise in mind .
Humiliating the millions of Christians who see an ancient home in Hagia Sophia may , to him , be a small price to pay—or even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ religious voters and angering Orthodox believers across the world , on his next visit , Erdogan should instead visit Hagia Sophia ’ s southern gallery and look at the Deesis ( Entreaty ) mosaic , uncovered and restored during Ataturk ’ s conversion of the building .
Likely dating from the 13th century , the mosaic is one of the most important surviving Byzantine works of art .
It depicts John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary appealing to Christ , incidentally one of Islam ’ s most important prophets , to show @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of art might cause even Erdogan to pause and reflect .
Perhaps he will come to see the value of religious pluralism on equal grounds , one of humanity ’ s greatest achievements in the modern age .
We can but hope—and pray .

Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia was, for nearly 1,000 years, the largest and most important house of Christian worship in the world until it was converted into mosque in the 15th century. The building, now a museum, is still filled with priceless Christian mosaics and frescoes. It is also one of the most contested religious buildings in the world.
Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia was, for nearly 1,000 years, the largest and most important house of Christian worship in the world until it was converted into mosque in the 15th century. The building, now a museum, is still filled with priceless Christian mosaics and frescoes. It is also one of the most contested religious buildings in the world.
On July 2, the Turkish high court will rule on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s request to annul the 1934 decree that turned Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum. If the court says yes, the decision will reverberate across the world.
Erdogan has consistently expressed his desire to return Hagia Sophia to its previous status as a mosque. This stance plays well with his pious political base. Now he seems to be in a hurry; his hand-picked Presidential High Advisory Board discussed the matter on June 16. If the court decides to annul the 86-year-old law, some advisors are hoping that Islamic prayers could be held in the mosque on July 15, the anniversary of the failed coup against Erdogan’s government in 2016.
For Erdogan, the politics here are irresistible. It is hard to imagine a more powerful image of Islamification than to see him leading prayers in a building converted from an Orthodox Christian church into a mosque in 1453 by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II after his conquest of Constantinople. For Erdogan it would be a huge symbolic step toward bolstering his religious nationalism. But for many others, including Turkey’s tiny Christian minority and millions of other Christians around the world, it will be a disturbing echo of the bloody conquests of the Middle Ages—not the peaceful coexistence most people aspire to in the modern world.
Kemal Ataturk, the first president of Turkey, secularized the building and reopened it as a museum in 1935 precisely in order to help create a modern Turkey—and to curry favor internationally, including better relations with Greece. Ataturk knew how important the Hagia Sophia was to Orthodox Christians. As the historian Diarmaid MacCulloch has observed, “Orthodoxy has to a remarkable extent been moulded round one single church building…. the Cathedral of the Holy Wisdom (Hagia Sophia).”
After being consecrated in 537 during the reign of the Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian, the cathedral was the seat of the ecumenical patriarch, leader of the Eastern Orthodox church, for a millennium. The Russian Orthodox Chruch already announced its uneasiness, saying that any attempt to convert the bullding into a mosque will hurt “fragile inter-confessional balances.” And the Greek culture minister sounded alarm with UNESCO to help protect the “universal character” of the Hagia Sophia.
Ataturk also knew that religious people have long memories, and that Hagia Sophia remained a source of contention between Christians and Muslims. Following Turkey’s defeat and occupation after World War I, a Greek priest recklessly performed a communion service in the mosque. He barely escaped with his life.
Now the fragile peace achieved by secularization may be shattered. No one knows what the court will decide. But recent precedent looks hopeful for Erdogan. In November 2019, the court considered an almost identical case regarding the Church of the Holy Saviour, also known as the Chora Church, a few miles away from the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul.
Like the Hagia Sophia, the Chora church was converted into a mosque, in the 16th century, before being converted to a museum, in 1948. In its ruling the court found the redesignation into a museum unlawful because a mosque “cannot be used except for its essential function.”
Indeed, many people who visit the Chora church or the Hagia Sophia will agree something important is lost when ancient houses of worship, of whatever faith, are hollowed out into museums, full of tourists listening to audio guides. But Christians might argue that the “essential function” of these buildings predated 1453.
A complication is that both the Chora church and the Hagia Sophia are on UNESCO’s world heritage list as “architectural masterpieces.” But it is not clear what a change in status means for heritage value. Indeed, Hagia Sophia needs urgent repairs, which are more likely to be financed if it becomes a mosque again. But it’s unclear whether such repairs would protect the building’s Christian imagery, which Muslims may see as unacceptable if the building turns into a mosque.
Ataturk’s French-inspired strident secularism had problems of its own. Its excesses which included inexcusable bans on Islamic practice and dress—have been viewed by religious Turks ever since as a heinous attack on their faith. That is partly why, for decades, reopening Hagia Sophia to worship—Muslim worship—has been a dream for Turkey’s religious conservatives. It is seems that Erdogan is finally ready to take this historic step, to show that he really is making Turkey Muslim again.
The timing is not accidental. The popularity of Erdogan’s ruling party is at a two-year low—because of a declining economy, as well as appalling levels of authoritarianism and corruption. He faces new challenges by two new parties that may appeal to his own conservative base: the Future Party, led by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and the Democracy and Progress Party, led by former Economy Minister Ali Babacan. Since these two parties may chip away some of his religious voters, Erdogan may be hoping to position himself as the true savior of Muslims—in Turkey and even beyond.
There is a better way. Instead of this revanchist religious nationalism, there is an opportunity for a solution based on pluralism instead. The Hagia Sophia could be opened for both Muslim and Christian worship. Certainly, the building is big enough to consecrate separate areas. Thoughtful scheduling could allow services to take place at different times.
The Armenian patriarch of Constantinople, Sahak II, has already suggested a sharing solution. And Bartholomew I, the current Orthodox archbishop and ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, said on June 30 that “Hagia Sophia belongs not only to those who own the monument, but also to all of humanity. And the Turkish people have a responsibility to highlight this universality of the monument.”
Sharing space in this way would not be entirely novel. The Prophet Mohammed is known to have allowed a Christian delegation to pray in his own mosque in Medina. Soon after, back in the early 7th century, the Great Mosque of Damascus was shared by Muslims and Christians for a while—Muslims prayed in the eastern part of the structure and the Christians in the western side. Today, many churches are open for Muslim prayers, including the Church of the Epiphany in Washington. A church in Berlin recently opened its doors to a Muslim congregation that was too large for its mosque under the official rules on COVID-19 social distancing.
If Turkey could model such an inspiring religious pluralism, it would provide a precedent for other significant places of worship which also have suffered conquest—or “reconquest.”
The obvious case is the great Mosque-Cathedral of Córdoba in southern Spain, which was built in the 8th century as a mosque, only to be converted five centuries later into a church. More recently, Muslim requests to worship in this magnificent building were rejected by Catholic and Spanish authorities. In 2010, two Muslim tourists even got arrested for trying to offer their prayers in what used to be one of the world’s great mosques.
This kind of narrow, zero-sum intolerance is not the way forward. Instead, political and religious leaders should champion pluralism everywhere—from Córdoba to Istanbul and Jerusalem.
No doubt many Christians and many Muslims would object to such a compromise in Istanbul, each believing that the Hagia Sophia is theirs and theirs alone. But many more would be likely to prefer it to the secular status quo. (As an Orthodox Christian and a Turkish Muslim, we certainly would.).
Sadly, Erdogan is unlikely to have a pluralist compromise in mind. Humiliating the millions of Christians who see an ancient home in Hagia Sophia may, to him, be a small price to pay—or even a bonus.
Visitors look at a mosaic depicting Christ enthroned between the Virgin Mary and St. John at Hagia Sophia on November 16, 2006 in Istanbul, Turkey.
Instead of pandering to religious voters and angering Orthodox believers across the world, on his next visit, Erdogan should instead visit Hagia Sophia’s southern gallery and look at the Deesis (Entreaty) mosaic, uncovered and restored during Ataturk’s conversion of the building. Likely dating from the 13th century, the mosaic is one of the most important surviving Byzantine works of art. It depicts John the Baptist and the Virgin Mary appealing to Christ, incidentally one of Islam’s most important prophets, to show mercy and compassion.
Such a work of art might cause even Erdogan to pause and reflect. Perhaps he will come to see the value of religious pluralism on equal grounds, one of humanity’s greatest achievements in the modern age. We can but hope—and pray.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Trump’s Syria Policy Is Working

Trump’s Syria Policy Is Working

Two years after celebrating victory in the Syrian civil war , the regime of Bashar Assad is facing renewed unrest .
A mini-insurgency is under way in Daraa province , the birthplace of the 2011 revolt .
Stormy demonstrations are under way in adjacent Suwayda .
The economy is hurtling toward the abyss .
What has changed , in two short years ?
How has Assad ’ s triumph turned to disaster ?
The answer is the Trump administration ’ s Syria policy .
The application of quiet but unrelenting pressure is transforming the Syrian president ’ s victory into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do is persuade Russia to cease backing the Assad regime , which means the strategy remains at a stalemate .
When James Jeffrey , U.S. special envoy for Syria , said on May 12 that his job was to make Syria “ a quagmire for the Russians , ” the remark went largely unnoticed .
Jeffrey ’ s words were not merely , it turns out , intended to convey a general sense of opposition to Russian designs in Syria .
They headlined a series of measures intended to prevent the return of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ renewed crisis , and thus to turn Syria from an asset to a burden for both Moscow and Tehran .
The main method for achieving these goals has been the strangling of the Syrian economy .
Assad urgently needs money for reconstruction .
The United Nations estimates the cost of Syria ’ s rebuilding at roughly $ 250 billion , which is four times Syria ’ s prewar GDP .
Assad ’ s main allies , however , have no money to give .
Iran is currently reeling from U.S.-led maximum-pressure sanctions ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic ; the cost of imperial commitments in Yemen , Afghanistan , Iraq , Syria , Lebanon , and Gaza ; and the loss of the man who managed those commitments , Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani , who was killed in a U.S. drone strike early this year .
Russia is facing collapsing oil and gas prices , as well as sanctions .
The urgent need for reconstruction and the absence of funds have created a lever against the Assad regime that the United States has been diligently working .
First , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Union a united front on demanding that no reconstruction funds will be made available to Syria so long as the regime refuses a “ comprehensive , genuine and inclusive political transition , negotiated by the Syrian parties to the conflict on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 ” —a long way of saying that for as long as Assad refuses to negotiate his own departure , his regime won ’ t get any money .
Second , the United States intends to block any possible economic escape routes for the regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrian government took effect on July 17 .
They will severely penalize third parties doing business with Assad ’ s Syria .
China and the United Arab Emirates have both expressed a willingness to be involved in the reconstruction of Assad ’ s Syria .
The UAE is likely to reconsider in light of the Caesar Act .
( Predicting China ’ s response is more difficult . )
Third , the United States is working to prevent a final regime military victory .
Despite talk of the war “ winding down , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control around 60 percent of Syria .
Around 15 percent is in the hands of the Turks and their Sunni Islamist allies—recently , they started using the Turkish lira currency in those areas , in place of Syria ’ s devastated pound .
An additional 25 percent is controlled by the U.S.-aligned , Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces .
The United States backed Turkey in its confrontation with a regime- and Russian-led offensive in March this year .
And contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s tweet announcing withdrawal in October 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kurdish-dominated area .
The immediate goal of the Trump administration ’ s Syria policy—which emerged from and is being run by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s office—is to secure regime acceptance of a nationwide , unlimited cease-fire .
That would freeze the current battle lines in place and allow negotiations about the country ’ s political future to begin .
Free elections and the departure of Assad are what the United States hopes would follow , but Washington would retain the ability to dial economic pressure up or down , depending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Russia .
In the absence of such cooperation , the strained status quo in Syria will persist .
That includes the growing scarcity of basic goods for Syrian civilians and the collapse of the Syrian currency ( today , 3,000 to the dollar on the black market versus 50 to one before the war ) .
It also includes armed attacks of the sort seen in Daraa over the last year , and growing rifts at the top of the regime , where Assad has recently struggled to pry money from family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Makhlouf .
For poorer Syrians , the results of all this are dire .
Danny Makki , a journalist with close connections in Syrian government circles , tweeted on June 7 : “ The economic situation in # Syria is at breaking point , medicine is very scarce , hunger is becoming a normality , poverty is at the worst-point ever , people even selling their organs to survive.
” Regime spokespeople and apologists in the coming period are likely to highlight the difficult humanitarian situation in regime areas and call for a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s hard to credit any sincerity to the regime ’ s belated discovery of humanitarian concerns toward its own citizens .
In covering Syria from the early years of the civil war , I witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure , including hospitals , by the Assad regime ’ s air force in Aleppo in the summer of 2012 .
Such tactics , replicated throughout the country , were the main reason for the terrible loss of civilian life during the Syrian war , and they were never informed by the regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy has not yet succeeded at its ultimate aim of changing the Syrian regime ’ s calculations .
The main result instead is emergent strife between different elements of the pro-regime camp , including Russian public criticism of Assad , the falling-out between the president and Makhlouf , and growing tensions between Russian-aligned and Iranian-aligned elements of the Syrian security forces in strife-torn Daraa .
But a strategy of this kind doesn ’ t require immediate results .
The direct cost to the United States of an economic blockade of Assad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ low or nonexistent .
Those wondering about the future shape of U.S. power projection in the Middle East should be paying close attention to the current look of Syria policy .
The key element is the weaponization of Western economic strength .
The camp around Assad is practiced in political and proxy warfare , and ruthless in pursuit of its goals .
It has bested over the last decade the efforts of Western-aligned regional powers to oust the Assad dictatorship .
But the Achilles ’ heel of this camp is its scarcity of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ being exploited , at minimal cost to the United States and without the large military commitments that both the president and the public prefer to avoid .
The intention is to turn Syria into a quagmire for the dictator and his allies .
Although Syria ’ s active war may have largely concluded , the United States has ensured that its underlying issues remain unresolved .
The resulting stalemate—marked by frozen conflict , continued poverty , and a messy de facto division of the country—has prevented a triumph for Assad and his allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s only practical future until Assad and his allies are finally prepared to negotiate on terms that their opponents are willing to accept .

Two years after celebrating victory in the Syrian civil war, the regime of Bashar Assad is facing renewed unrest. A mini-insurgency is under way in Daraa province, the birthplace of the 2011 revolt. Stormy demonstrations are under way in adjacent Suwayda. The economy is hurtling toward the abyss.
Two years after celebrating victory in the Syrian civil war, the regime of Bashar Assad is facing renewed unrest. A mini-insurgency is under way in Daraa province, the birthplace of the 2011 revolt. Stormy demonstrations are under way in adjacent Suwayda. The economy is hurtling toward the abyss.
What has changed, in two short years? How has Assad’s triumph turned to disaster? The answer is the Trump administration’s Syria policy. The application of quiet but unrelenting pressure is transforming the Syrian president’s victory into ashes. What it has yet to do is persuade Russia to cease backing the Assad regime, which means the strategy remains at a stalemate.
When James Jeffrey, U.S. special envoy for Syria, said on May 12 that his job was to make Syria “a quagmire for the Russians,” the remark went largely unnoticed. Jeffrey’s words were not merely, it turns out, intended to convey a general sense of opposition to Russian designs in Syria. They headlined a series of measures intended to prevent the return of normality to regime-controlled Syria, to foment renewed crisis, and thus to turn Syria from an asset to a burden for both Moscow and Tehran.
The main method for achieving these goals has been the strangling of the Syrian economy. Assad urgently needs money for reconstruction. The United Nations estimates the cost of Syria’s rebuilding at roughly $250 billion, which is four times Syria’s prewar GDP. Assad’s main allies, however, have no money to give. Iran is currently reeling from U.S.-led maximum-pressure sanctions; Tehran’s disastrous response the coronavirus pandemic; the cost of imperial commitments in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza; and the loss of the man who managed those commitments, Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike early this year. Russia is facing collapsing oil and gas prices, as well as sanctions.
The urgent need for reconstruction and the absence of funds have created a lever against the Assad regime that the United States has been diligently working. First, the United States has maintained with the European Union a united front on demanding that no reconstruction funds will be made available to Syria so long as the regime refuses a “comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties to the conflict on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254”—a long way of saying that for as long as Assad refuses to negotiate his own departure, his regime won’t get any money.
Second, the United States intends to block any possible economic escape routes for the regime. The so-called Caesar sanctions against the Syrian government took effect on July 17. They will severely penalize third parties doing business with Assad’s Syria. China and the United Arab Emirates have both expressed a willingness to be involved in the reconstruction of Assad’s Syria. The UAE is likely to reconsider in light of the Caesar Act. (Predicting China’s response is more difficult.)
Third, the United States is working to prevent a final regime military victory. Despite talk of the war “winding down,” Assad and his allies still only control around 60 percent of Syria. Around 15 percent is in the hands of the Turks and their Sunni Islamist allies—recently, they started using the Turkish lira currency in those areas, in place of Syria’s devastated pound. An additional 25 percent is controlled by the U.S.-aligned, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The United States backed Turkey in its confrontation with a regime- and Russian-led offensive in March this year. And contrary to U.S. President Donald Trump’s tweet announcing withdrawal in October 2019, U.S. forces are still present in the Kurdish-dominated area.
The immediate goal of the Trump administration’s Syria policy—which emerged from and is being run by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s office—is to secure regime acceptance of a nationwide, unlimited cease-fire. That would freeze the current battle lines in place and allow negotiations about the country’s political future to begin. Free elections and the departure of Assad are what the United States hopes would follow, but Washington would retain the ability to dial economic pressure up or down, depending on the extent of cooperation from Assad and Russia.
In the absence of such cooperation, the strained status quo in Syria will persist. That includes the growing scarcity of basic goods for Syrian civilians and the collapse of the Syrian currency (today, 3,000 to the dollar on the black market versus 50 to one before the war). It also includes armed attacks of the sort seen in Daraa over the last year, and growing rifts at the top of the regime, where Assad has recently struggled to pry money from family members, including his billionaire cousin Rami Makhlouf.
For poorer Syrians, the results of all this are dire. Danny Makki, a journalist with close connections in Syrian government circles, tweeted on June 7: “The economic situation in #Syria is at breaking point, medicine is very scarce, hunger is becoming a normality, poverty is at the worst-point ever, people even selling their organs to survive.”
Regime spokespeople and apologists in the coming period are likely to highlight the difficult humanitarian situation in regime areas and call for a softening of restrictions. But it’s hard to credit any sincerity to the regime’s belated discovery of humanitarian concerns toward its own citizens. In covering Syria from the early years of the civil war, I witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, by the Assad regime’s air force in Aleppo in the summer of 2012. Such tactics, replicated throughout the country, were the main reason for the terrible loss of civilian life during the Syrian war, and they were never informed by the regime’s newfound humanitarianism.
The U.S. strategy has not yet succeeded at its ultimate aim of changing the Syrian regime’s calculations. The main result instead is emergent strife between different elements of the pro-regime camp, including Russian public criticism of Assad, the falling-out between the president and Makhlouf, and growing tensions between Russian-aligned and Iranian-aligned elements of the Syrian security forces in strife-torn Daraa. But a strategy of this kind doesn’t require immediate results. The direct cost to the United States of an economic blockade of Assad’s Syria—like the maximum pressure campaign against Iran—is low or nonexistent.
Those wondering about the future shape of U.S. power projection in the Middle East should be paying close attention to the current look of Syria policy. The key element is the weaponization of Western economic strength. The camp around Assad is practiced in political and proxy warfare, and ruthless in pursuit of its goals. It has bested over the last decade the efforts of Western-aligned regional powers to oust the Assad dictatorship. But the Achilles’ heel of this camp is its scarcity of economic resources. This vulnerability is now being exploited, at minimal cost to the United States and without the large military commitments that both the president and the public prefer to avoid. The intention is to turn Syria into a quagmire for the dictator and his allies.
Although Syria’s active war may have largely concluded, the United States has ensured that its underlying issues remain unresolved. The resulting stalemate—marked by frozen conflict, continued poverty, and a messy de facto division of the country—has prevented a triumph for Assad and his allies. This will remain the country’s only practical future until Assad and his allies are finally prepared to negotiate on terms that their opponents are willing to accept.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Hong Kong Wakes Up To a New Order Under Beijing

Hong Kong Wakes Up To a New Order Under Beijing Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : China ’ s new national security law goes into effect in Hong Kong , thousands protest the killing of the musician Hachalu Hundessa in Ethiopia , and the United States buys up nearly the entire global stock of a potential coronavirus treatment .
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Hong Kong ’ s controversial national security law is now in effect , after it was imposed one hour @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s handover of the territory to China .
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam said the new legislation would restore stability and ease social unrest , allowing Hong Kong to “ start anew.
” Thousands of protesters have defied a police lockdown in the city center today to march against the law , although many have removed banners calling for independence to avoid running afoul of the new law .
Police responded by firing rubber bullets and pepper balls and one officer was stabbed in the arm .
The law—now public after being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , subversion , terrorism and colluding with foreign powers .
Under the new law , the Chinese government will set up its own police force in Hong Kong—the “ Office for Safeguarding National Security.
” U.S. reaction .
In a statement , House Speaker Nancy Pelosi suggested sanctioning China over the move and said the United States must consider “ all tools available , including visa limitations and economic penalties.
” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was more forceful , and said the administration would “ not stand idly by while China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The devil in the details .
The legal changes appear to be even more sweeping than initially expected .
Under the law , any person arrested by the Office for Safeguarding National Security will be tried in courts on the Chinese mainland , a senior Chinese official said , effectively ending Hong Kong ’ s judicial independence .
Article 38 in the law also appears to criminalize activities of non-residents outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong , potentially chilling the actions of activists overseas as well as putting future travelers at risk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s enactment has reportedly spooked investors in the financial hub .
The Financial Times reports that research reports coming out of Hong Kong will now be deemed less credible , as analysts fear running afoul of Beijing in their reporting .
Just the beginning ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on June 24 , Sarah Cook named six areas to watch—from crackdowns on religious freedom to journalist jailings—now that the law has gone into effect .
U.S. buys up coronavirus drug stocks .
In a sign of the global competition that may arise should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States has effectively blocked other countries from purchasing a potential coronavirus treatment after it bought 500,000 doses—almost the entire global stock—of the drug remdesivir .
“ President Trump has struck an amazing deal to ensure Americans have access to the first authorized therapeutic for COVID-19 , ” U.S. Health Secretary Alex Azar said when announcing the agreement with manufacturer Gilead Sciences .
The United States has purchased so much of the drug that under current manufacturing conditions , most remdesivir supplies will not be available to the broader global market until October @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fail to make EU “ safe ” travel list .
The European Union will now allow residents from 14 countries outside the bloc to visit the area as it begins to relax coronavirus-related travel restrictions .
The United States , Brazil , Russia , and Turkey are not on the list , as their efforts to contain the coronavirus have been deemed insufficient by the EU .
Chinese travelers are tentatively allowed to visit the EU as long as China allows reciprocal entry to EU citizens .
U.S. travelers will still be able @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as they are outside the Schengen travel area .
Pompeo faces frosty U.N. reception .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo received a scolding from other members of the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday as he pushed for an extension of an arms embargo against Iran .
The combative tone from allies and adversaries of the United States “ underscored how little deference other countries pay the Trump administration as it faces a grim reelection contest , ” FP ’ s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report .
France ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was firm in restating his country ’ s position on keeping the Iran nuclear deal intact as much as possible in the face of U.S. attempts to dismantle it .
“ There is as yet no serious alternative to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons , and its disappearance would improve neither the regional situation nor the security of our population , ” he said .
Large protests after singer killed in Ethiopia .
Thousands of people have taken to the streets of Ethiopia following the killing of Hachalu Hundessa , a famous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Oromo ethnic group who was shot in the suburbs of Addis Ababa .
The police have arrested suspects but have not released names .
Meanwhile , protesters have clashed with police and at least nine people have been killed .
Additionally , Reuters reported multiple bomb blasts in the capital Addis Ababa with no known death toll .
Attempting to quell unrest and halt media reporting on the issue , the Ethopian government switched off the country ’ s internet services—a commonly used tactic of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ’ s government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has pledged to spend roughly $ 185 billion on defense over the next ten years as he unveiled the country ’ s new defense strategy .
Morrison said the increased importance of the Indo-Pacific and “ the strategic competition between China and the United States ” meant that Australia needed to increase its defensive capabilities .
Those upgrades include purchasing an anti-ship missile system from the United States worth $ 550 million as well as an underwater surveillance system costing at least $ 3.45 billion .
It has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Jair Bolsonaro .
The populist president is facing one of the worst coronavirus epidemics in the world , an ongoing corruption investigation , and a procession of ministers deserting his cabinet .
To top it all off , he ’ s now lost the presidential dog .
Augusto , a Maremma Sheepdog , had been adopted by the Bolsonaro family 12 days ago after it had been spotted wandering around the presidential palace .
Following the publicity heaped on the newest member of the Bolsonaro family—including an Instagram account that had amassed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s orginal owner , Nagib Lima Zeidan , stepped forward .
Zeidan had offered to share the dog with the Bolsonaros , but Brazil ’ s First Lady Michelle Bolsonaro said she was happy that “ our Coca-Cola bear ” was being returned home .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China's new national security law goes into effect in Hong Kong , thousands protest the killing of the musician Hachalu Hundessa in Ethiopia , and the United States buys up nearly the entire global stock of a potential coronavirus treatment.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: China’s new national security law goes into effect in Hong Kong, thousands protest the killing of the musician Hachalu Hundessa in Ethiopia, and the United States buys up nearly the entire global stock of a potential coronavirus treatment.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
New National Security Law Sweeps Into Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s controversial national security law is now in effect, after it was imposed one hour before the 23rd anniversary of Britain’s handover of the territory to China.
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam said the new legislation would restore stability and ease social unrest, allowing Hong Kong to “start anew.” Thousands of protesters have defied a police lockdown in the city center today to march against the law, although many have removed banners calling for independence to avoid running afoul of the new law. Police responded by firing rubber bullets and pepper balls and one officer was stabbed in the arm.
The law—now public after being drafted in secret by Beijing authorities—criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism and colluding with foreign powers. Under the new law, the Chinese government will set up its own police force in Hong Kong—the “Office for Safeguarding National Security.”
U.S. reaction. In a statement, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi suggested sanctioning China over the move and said the United States must consider “all tools available, including visa limitations and economic penalties.” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was more forceful, and said the administration would “not stand idly by while China swallows Hong Kong into its authoritarian maw.”
The devil in the details. The legal changes appear to be even more sweeping than initially expected. Under the law, any person arrested by the Office for Safeguarding National Security will be tried in courts on the Chinese mainland, a senior Chinese official said, effectively ending Hong Kong’s judicial independence.
Article 38 in the law also appears to criminalize activities of non-residents outside the jurisdiction of Hong Kong, potentially chilling the actions of activists overseas as well as putting future travelers at risk.
Investor worries. The law’s enactment has reportedly spooked investors in the financial hub. The Financial Times reports that research reports coming out of Hong Kong will now be deemed less credible, as analysts fear running afoul of Beijing in their reporting.
Just the beginning? Writing in Foreign Policy on June 24, Sarah Cook named six areas to watch—from crackdowns on religious freedom to journalist jailings—now that the law has gone into effect.
What We’re Following Today
U.S. buys up coronavirus drug stocks. In a sign of the global competition that may arise should a coronavirus vaccine become available, the United States has effectively blocked other countries from purchasing a potential coronavirus treatment after it bought 500,000 doses—almost the entire global stock—of the drug remdesivir. “President Trump has struck an amazing deal to ensure Americans have access to the first authorized therapeutic for COVID-19,” U.S. Health Secretary Alex Azar said when announcing the agreement with manufacturer Gilead Sciences. The United States has purchased so much of the drug that under current manufacturing conditions, most remdesivir supplies will not be available to the broader global market until October.
U.S., Brazil, Russia, fail to make EU “safe” travel list. The European Union will now allow residents from 14 countries outside the bloc to visit the area as it begins to relax coronavirus-related travel restrictions. The United States, Brazil, Russia, and Turkey are not on the list, as their efforts to contain the coronavirus have been deemed insufficient by the EU. Chinese travelers are tentatively allowed to visit the EU as long as China allows reciprocal entry to EU citizens. U.S. travelers will still be able to enter Ireland and the United Kingdom, as they are outside the Schengen travel area.
Pompeo faces frosty U.N. reception. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo received a scolding from other members of the United Nations Security Council on Tuesday as he pushed for an extension of an arms embargo against Iran. The combative tone from allies and adversaries of the United States “underscored how little deference other countries pay the Trump administration as it faces a grim reelection contest,” FP’s Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer report.
France’s UN ambassador, Nicolas de Rivière, was firm in restating his country’s position on keeping the Iran nuclear deal intact as much as possible in the face of U.S. attempts to dismantle it. “There is as yet no serious alternative to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and its disappearance would improve neither the regional situation nor the security of our population,” he said.
Large protests after singer killed in Ethiopia. Thousands of people have taken to the streets of Ethiopia following the killing of Hachalu Hundessa, a famous musician and activist from the country’s Oromo ethnic group who was shot in the suburbs of Addis Ababa. The police have arrested suspects but have not released names.
Meanwhile, protesters have clashed with police and at least nine people have been killed. Additionally, Reuters reported multiple bomb blasts in the capital Addis Ababa with no known death toll. Attempting to quell unrest and halt media reporting on the issue, the Ethopian government switched off the country’s internet services—a commonly used tactic of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.
Keep An Eye On Turkey’s F-35 status. The U.S. Department of Defense is allowing Turkish contractors to continue manufacturing parts for the F-35 fighter jet until at least 2022, almost a year since Turkey was banned from purchasing the aircraft. A Pentagon spokesperson said the decision was based on a desire to “avoid costly, disruptive, and wasteful contract terminations.” Turkey was slated to purchase 100 F-35s before its purchase of a Russian-made S-400 air defense system led U.S. officials to kick Turkey out of the program.
Australia to boost military spending. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has pledged to spend roughly $185 billion on defense over the next ten years as he unveiled the country’s new defense strategy. Morrison said the increased importance of the Indo-Pacific and “the strategic competition between China and the United States” meant that Australia needed to increase its defensive capabilities. Those upgrades include purchasing an anti-ship missile system from the United States worth $550 million as well as an underwater surveillance system costing at least $3.45 billion.
Odds and Ends
It has been a rough few months for Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. The populist president is facing one of the worst coronavirus epidemics in the world, an ongoing corruption investigation, and a procession of ministers deserting his cabinet. To top it all off, he’s now lost the presidential dog.
Augusto, a Maremma Sheepdog, had been adopted by the Bolsonaro family 12 days ago after it had been spotted wandering around the presidential palace. Following the publicity heaped on the newest member of the Bolsonaro family—including an Instagram account that had amassed thousands of followers within a week—the dog’s orginal owner, Nagib Lima Zeidan, stepped forward. Zeidan had offered to share the dog with the Bolsonaros, but Brazil’s First Lady Michelle Bolsonaro said she was happy that “our Coca-Cola bear” was being returned home.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.