foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--America First? The Coronavirus Couldn’t Care Less

America First ?
The Coronavirus Couldn ’ t Care Less In recent years , the White House has raised the drawbridge against trade , immigration , long-standing alliances , and international institutions .
The limits of this approach have been laid bare by the coronavirus pandemic : “ America first ” means nothing to germs that know no borders .
A key facet of Washington ’ s strategy in fighting the coronavirus hinges on the Trump administration ’ s ability to convene and lead other nations .
Even if the United States momentarily subdues the virus , an outbreak in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quickly restart a new spiral of American infections—long before a vaccine is approved .
Now more than ever , the United States ’ health and therefore security depends on the world ’ s most fragile health systems and governments .
That interdependence—and the imperative it creates for cooperation—should have prompted an immediate rethink of a blustering , unilateralist diplomacy .
But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continues advancing , mostly unchanged , a policy agenda that predated the virus .
Before COVID-19 ’ s onslaught , U.S. foreign policy focused primarily on major-power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secondarily , maximum pressure campaigns to force Iran , North Korea , and Venezuela to change course .
( With North Korea , of course , the administration has supplemented sanctions with direct talks . )
These inveterate challenges require vigilance and constant management .
But now , an invisible , lethal enemy also demands that U.S. diplomacy adapt to contain an omnipresent danger .
As the coronavirus spreads at an exponential rate in the United States and elsewhere , President Donald Trump ’ s State Department isn ’ t adjusting fast enough @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stoking the president ’ s ego rather than rallying the international community .
Public health coordination with China , a rising world power with abundant resources and scientific expertise , needs to be at the center of any international effort .
Organizations such as the G-7 , the United Nations Security Council , and the World Health Organization can ’ t respond effectively amid U.S.-China confrontation .
So far , Trump and Pompeo have engaged Beijing in a pointless blame game .
China initially hid important information about the extent of the problem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the WHO .
But more recently it has been assisting developing countries and U.S. allies in Europe ravaged by the virus—and facilitating donations of ventilators to New York City .
Skeptics point out these moves may come with strings attached .
But right now , countries in dire need appreciate help where they can find it .
Despite their intensifying competition , Washington and Beijing need to find ways to come together against the virus .
Pompeo similarly squabbled with Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei , whom he accused of dishonesty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreak .
While leading U.S. and European voices have urged him to remove roadblocks complicating the timely delivery of aid to the Iranian people , he has refused .
In Afghanistan , after Pompeo was unable to broker a power-sharing agreement between factions , he announced the withdrawal of $ 1 billion in U.S. aid .
Reports subsequently emerged of deep cuts in U.S. assistance to war-torn Yemen in response to Iran-backed Houthi rebels ’ restrictions on aid distribution .
Instead of helping shore up brittle societies , these actions threaten to leave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable to the coronavirus—an outcome that could eventually lead to secondary waves of infections around the world .
U.S. military allies aren ’ t faring much better .
More than 4,000 local workers at U.S. bases in South Korea were placed on unpaid leave this month over a disagreement on defense cost-sharing .
The European Union evidently learned of Trump ’ s plans to shut down travel from the region at the same time as everyone else did , stirring up consternation and confusion .
Put together , these are zero-sum steps that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic .
For generations , top U.S. diplomats have displayed generous leadership in times of crisis and united countries against global threats .
They coordinated the First Gulf War coalition against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and led responses to arrest the AIDS epidemic in Africa starting in 2003 , deal with the financial meltdown of 2008 , and fight back against the Ebola outbreak in 2014 .
U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama often did not agree on foreign policy , but they both understood the United States must take the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent missteps , the world is still hungry for U.S. leadership .
No other country is better positioned to provide it .
In these unprecedented times , every country is fighting a common enemy .
The immediate focus must be on saving lives by ensuring the world ’ s health systems will not be overwhelmed by the virus ’ s rapid spread .
That means supporting and building the research and development programs to provide faster , more accurate , wide-scale testing , efficacious therapies , and vaccines .
The State Department must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It should revisit foreign aid cuts , provide support to refugees and other at-risk populations , and reconsider the impact of sanctions on humanitarian aid .
With budgets tight , existing funds can be repurposed to address the most urgent pandemic challenges .
But leaders in Washington should also invest more overseas precisely because it advances the health and economic well-being of Americans—and can preempt the need for future , far more costly U.S. interventions .
According to one recent estimate , the record $ 2.2 trillion stimulus passed last month devoted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Under U.S. leadership , the G-20 can assist countries in understanding what national strategies are working and shed light on private sector and academic efforts to test more people for the coronavirus and discover therapies and a vaccine .
No other country has the resources , the international experience , or the will to lead .
The group can foster more international scientific collaboration among likeminded nations , help coordinate travel and border restrictions , and share national experiences on how to ease lockdowns after flattening the curve .
So far largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.N. should declare the coronavirus a threat to world peace and security , as it did during the 2014 Ebola response , and build on France ’ s recent Security Council efforts to promote cease-fires and peace-building in war-torn countries such as Syria and Yemen .
Words alone won ’ t tame the epidemic or bring an end to international violence , but they can inspire global action .
As the first 100-plus days of the virus have amply demonstrated ( not to mention the worsening of global crises from climate change @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States has turned inward ) , a coordinated response is unlikely without U.S. leadership .
And when the crisis has abated , the United States ought to organize a meeting of global leaders to understand its lessons and prepare future joint strategies .
The pandemic is also exacting a heavy economic toll .
While finance ministers and central bankers work to coordinate stimulus and extend loans to struggling economies , the State Department should be encouraging countries to curtail trade barriers on food and medical supplies .
As essential domestic supplies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positive example and lead interagency support for the distribution of testing equipment , ventilators , and medical items to the world ’ s poorest and hardest-hit regions .
Restrictions only invite retaliation against essential imports , putting more American lives in danger .
They produce national shortages , promote hoarding , and bid up prices to disproportionately harm the developing world .
One thing is for certain : Using the pandemic to double down on major-power rivalry or apply maximum pressure on bad actors won ’ t address a global public health crisis—not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Faso , could impact Washington .
U.S. leadership overseas isn ’ t a substitute for a well-managed domestic response , but it is an essential complement to effective action at home and can safeguard against subsequent viral waves .
In past world crises , the United States has habitually rebounded after stumbling out of the gate .
That was the case in both World Wars .
After focusing inward , the United States regrouped to lead the community of nations to victory .
History must repeat itself in the global war against COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ major diplomatic reset .

In recent years, the White House has raised the drawbridge against trade, immigration, long-standing alliances, and international institutions. The limits of this approach have been laid bare by the coronavirus pandemic: “America first” means nothing to germs that know no borders.
In recent years, the White House has raised the drawbridge against trade, immigration, long-standing alliances, and international institutions. The limits of this approach have been laid bare by the coronavirus pandemic: “America first” means nothing to germs that know no borders.
A key facet of Washington’s strategy in fighting the coronavirus hinges on the Trump administration’s ability to convene and lead other nations. Even if the United States momentarily subdues the virus, an outbreak in some far-flung corner of the world could quickly restart a new spiral of American infections—long before a vaccine is approved. Now more than ever, the United States’ health and therefore security depends on the world’s most fragile health systems and governments. That interdependence—and the imperative it creates for cooperation—should have prompted an immediate rethink of a blustering, unilateralist diplomacy. But Secretary of State Mike Pompeo continues advancing, mostly unchanged, a policy agenda that predated the virus.
Before COVID-19’s onslaught, U.S. foreign policy focused primarily on major-power rivalry with China and Russia and, secondarily, maximum pressure campaigns to force Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela to change course. (With North Korea, of course, the administration has supplemented sanctions with direct talks.) These inveterate challenges require vigilance and constant management. But now, an invisible, lethal enemy also demands that U.S. diplomacy adapt to contain an omnipresent danger.
As the coronavirus spreads at an exponential rate in the United States and elsewhere, President Donald Trump’s State Department isn’t adjusting fast enough. Instead, Pompeo seems focused on stoking the president’s ego rather than rallying the international community. Public health coordination with China, a rising world power with abundant resources and scientific expertise, needs to be at the center of any international effort. Organizations such as the G-7, the United Nations Security Council, and the World Health Organization can’t respond effectively amid U.S.-China confrontation.
So far, Trump and Pompeo have engaged Beijing in a pointless blame game. China initially hid important information about the extent of the problem from U.S. epidemiologists, scientists, and the WHO. But more recently it has been assisting developing countries and U.S. allies in Europe ravaged by the virus—and facilitating donations of ventilators to New York City. Skeptics point out these moves may come with strings attached. But right now, countries in dire need appreciate help where they can find it. Despite their intensifying competition, Washington and Beijing need to find ways to come together against the virus.
Pompeo similarly squabbled with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whom he accused of dishonesty over the country’s devastating coronavirus outbreak. While leading U.S. and European voices have urged him to remove roadblocks complicating the timely delivery of aid to the Iranian people, he has refused. In Afghanistan, after Pompeo was unable to broker a power-sharing agreement between factions, he announced the withdrawal of $1 billion in U.S. aid. Reports subsequently emerged of deep cuts in U.S. assistance to war-torn Yemen in response to Iran-backed Houthi rebels’ restrictions on aid distribution. Instead of helping shore up brittle societies, these actions threaten to leave the people of Afghanistan and Yemen more vulnerable to the coronavirus—an outcome that could eventually lead to secondary waves of infections around the world.
U.S. military allies aren’t faring much better. More than 4,000 local workers at U.S. bases in South Korea were placed on unpaid leave this month over a disagreement on defense cost-sharing. The European Union evidently learned of Trump’s plans to shut down travel from the region at the same time as everyone else did, stirring up consternation and confusion.
Put together, these are zero-sum steps that do nothing to stem a spreading global pandemic.
For generations, top U.S. diplomats have displayed generous leadership in times of crisis and united countries against global threats. They coordinated the First Gulf War coalition against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and led responses to arrest the AIDS epidemic in Africa starting in 2003, deal with the financial meltdown of 2008, and fight back against the Ebola outbreak in 2014. U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama often did not agree on foreign policy, but they both understood the United States must take the lead in fighting global threats.
Despite recent missteps, the world is still hungry for U.S. leadership. No other country is better positioned to provide it. In these unprecedented times, every country is fighting a common enemy.
The immediate focus must be on saving lives by ensuring the world’s health systems will not be overwhelmed by the virus’s rapid spread. That means supporting and building the research and development programs to provide faster, more accurate, wide-scale testing, efficacious therapies, and vaccines.
The State Department must step forward to unite the international community. It should revisit foreign aid cuts, provide support to refugees and other at-risk populations, and reconsider the impact of sanctions on humanitarian aid. With budgets tight, existing funds can be repurposed to address the most urgent pandemic challenges. But leaders in Washington should also invest more overseas precisely because it advances the health and economic well-being of Americans—and can preempt the need for future, far more costly U.S. interventions. According to one recent estimate, the record $2.2 trillion stimulus passed last month devoted a scant 0.05 percent to foreign aid.
Under U.S. leadership, the G-20 can assist countries in understanding what national strategies are working and shed light on private sector and academic efforts to test more people for the coronavirus and discover therapies and a vaccine. No other country has the resources, the international experience, or the will to lead. The group can foster more international scientific collaboration among likeminded nations, help coordinate travel and border restrictions, and share national experiences on how to ease lockdowns after flattening the curve.
So far largely disregarded by its most powerful members, the U.N. should declare the coronavirus a threat to world peace and security, as it did during the 2014 Ebola response, and build on France’s recent Security Council efforts to promote cease-fires and peace-building in war-torn countries such as Syria and Yemen. Words alone won’t tame the epidemic or bring an end to international violence, but they can inspire global action. As the first 100-plus days of the virus have amply demonstrated (not to mention the worsening of global crises from climate change to Iran’s nuclear threat as the United States has turned inward), a coordinated response is unlikely without U.S. leadership. And when the crisis has abated, the United States ought to organize a meeting of global leaders to understand its lessons and prepare future joint strategies.
The pandemic is also exacting a heavy economic toll. While finance ministers and central bankers work to coordinate stimulus and extend loans to struggling economies, the State Department should be encouraging countries to curtail trade barriers on food and medical supplies. As essential domestic supplies are secured, Washington can set a positive example and lead interagency support for the distribution of testing equipment, ventilators, and medical items to the world’s poorest and hardest-hit regions. Restrictions only invite retaliation against essential imports, putting more American lives in danger. They produce national shortages, promote hoarding, and bid up prices to disproportionately harm the developing world.
One thing is for certain: Using the pandemic to double down on major-power rivalry or apply maximum pressure on bad actors won’t address a global public health crisis—not when what happens in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, could impact Washington. U.S. leadership overseas isn’t a substitute for a well-managed domestic response, but it is an essential complement to effective action at home and can safeguard against subsequent viral waves.
In past world crises, the United States has habitually rebounded after stumbling out of the gate. That was the case in both World Wars. After focusing inward, the United States regrouped to lead the community of nations to victory. History must repeat itself in the global war against COVID-19. It’s time for a major diplomatic reset.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--China’s Racism Is Wrecking Its Success in Africa

China ’ s Racism Is Wrecking Its Success in Africa Over the past week , hundreds of African migrant workers , traders , and students in the southern city of Guangzhou , home to Asia ’ s largest African diaspora , were tossed out onto the street—some by their landlords , some by hotel managers , and some by local officials .
Those evicted , mostly Igbo Nigerians , insisted that they had paid their rent , had valid visas and the right paperwork , and had no contact with anybody infected with COVID-19 .
Meanwhile , many others were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ testing without getting their test results .
Tony Mathias , an Ugandan exchange student , told Agence France-Presse : “ I ’ ve been sleeping under the bridge for four days with no food to eat .
… I can not buy food anywhere .
No shops or restaurants will serve me.
” Over the past two decades , China and Africa have become inextricably entwined .
China has built roads and railways across Africa and is the biggest trading partner for the entire continent .
Eighty percent of Nigeria ’ s bilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 60 percent of foreign direct investments to Ethiopia came from China in 2019 .
China has repeatedly stressed the importance of China-Africa alliances based on “ mutual prosperity.
” Yet these partnerships face irrevocable disruption if the Chinese government continues to downplay deeply rooted racial prejudices and dismisses the international outrage concerning the treatment of African migrant workers and students in China .
The events of April 10 are part of the response to growing Chinese fear of a reemergence of coronavirus infection but also build on long-standing hostility toward Africans in southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back decades , including riots aimed at Africans in 1988-1989 in Nanjing .
In Chinese media , Africans are often characterized as backward or primitive and blackness as unattractive .
Virulent racism common on social media is largely unchecked by censors , including claims that Africans are rapists , drug dealers , or AIDS carriers .
Those prejudices have led to a string of incidents amid coronavirus-induced paranoia .
On April 4 , reports of an infected Nigerian man attacking a Chinese nurse went viral , unleashing a slew of online trolls demanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was “ littered with blacks.
” Three days later , four Nigerians tested positive for the virus after having been seen eating together at a local restaurant .
These reports sparked widespread fear that Africans were the primary cause of recent upticks in coronavirus cases .
African expats were left at the mercy of xenophobic attitudes and heavy-handed enforcement .
“ They are accusing us of having the virus , ” Tobenna Victor , an evicted Nigerian student , told the BBC .
A viral post shows McDonald ’ s staff in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ says : “ We ’ ve been informed that from now on black people are not allowed to enter the restaurant.
” Rumors quickly circulated that “ 300,000 black people in Guangzhou were setting off a second epidemic , ” and even though public officials later debunked that myth , the damage to domestic perceptions in China had been done .
Video evidence of these mistreatments has sparked international outrage .
A dozen African countries have summoned their Chinese ambassadors to explain the “ inhumane treatment being meted out.
” A coalition of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to China ’ s foreign minister demanding an immediate end to all discrimination .
Moussa Faki Mahamat , the chairman of the African Union Commission , also expressed his “ extreme concern.
” Moses Kuria , a vocal member of the Kenyan Parliament , took a more aggressive stance , calling for the immediate removal of all Chinese nationals in Kenya .
Rhetoric in the African press was just as intense .
The front page of the Daily Nation , Kenya ’ s biggest newspaper , led with the headline “ Kenyans in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Similar news stories were found in the Nigerian , Ghanaian , and Ugandan press .
The hashtag # ChinaMustExplain quickly trended on Twitter , as users expressed their anger and frustration .
However , many people on Chinese social media praised the forcible expulsions and mistreatments as responsible steps to “ stemming the spread of virus by Africans.
” China ’ s response has been to deny that any problem exists .
Last Thursday , Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian responded by stressing that China treats “ all foreign nationals equally.
” On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urged critics not to “ sensationalize isolated incidents.
” The Global Times , a state-controlled English-language newspaper , dismissed the situation in Guangzhou as a “ Western trap to stir enmity , ” all the while reaffirming China ’ s impartiality .
Yet as more and more videos of African mistreatment emerge , China ’ s stance of innocence is harder to maintain .
Some measures have been taken .
McDonald ’ s has apologized for the Guangzhou store ’ s refusal to serve black people , ordering the halt of any discrimination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ money , connecting African migrants with hotels that accept foreign guests and even offering counseling services .
Zhao , the spokesman , also stressed that Chinese citizens should end all racist remarks and that the government will indiscriminately provide accommodations for all foreigners .
Yet Zhao did not specifically address allegations of forced evictions , lack of testing results , and other discriminatory actions .
As of now , no formal apology has been offered .
Some have argued that the recent mistreatment of Africans is the unfortunate consequence of the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in China whose murky identity poses risks to the public health during the virus .
This technical hurdle factors into local officials ’ heavy-handed approach to prevent a second wave of the infection .
The fact that many Africans lack legal status is partially a result of China ’ s very own stringent immigration policies and the frequent racism .
Yet the fact that many Africans lack legal status is partially a result of China ’ s very own stringent immigration policies and the frequent racism .
Erratic laws and racial profiling make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police are incentivized to stigmatize Africans as sanfei ( “ the three illegals ” —illegal entry , illegal stay , and illegal work ) regardless of their immigration status .
During crackdowns on immigration , Africans are seen as easier targets than Europeans or other Asians .
Demonization of Africans in news reports and social media serves to increase incidents of racial prejudice .
In March , an invitation by the Chinese Justice Ministry for the public to comment on a proposal that would ease immigration restrictions led to an inundation of racist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sexual predators , and many Chinese men vowed to defend the honor of Chinese women .
The crisis in Guangzhou only reaffirmed the underlying racism of Chinese society .
And while it poses very real challenges to Sino-African relations , no full breaks between China and African nations are on the horizon .
Africa is an increasingly important market for China ’ s private investors , especially in the technology sector .
China is also Africa ’ s top creditor , having lent an estimated $ 152 billion to nearly 50 African states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , compounded with the destabilization caused by COVID-19 , demand that Chinese officials assuage African concerns .
“ Officials on all sides will have to scramble to put this episode behind them in order to focus on more pressing issues , such as containing the virus and Chinese debt relief , ” said Eric Olander , the managing editor of the China Africa Project initiative and podcast .
Yet economic and political relationships between governments alone will not help China address this crisis , not when the insults remain so fresh and when @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to acknowledge the deep-rooted prejudices underlying the crisis .
China ’ s image as a trustworthy and equal partner to Africa is in danger of being seriously tarnished , as the mistreatment and abuse of nationals from Africa risk confirming preconceptions that China is a racist country .
If China is intent on being a major player on the world stage , it must not only confront racist tendencies at home but show that the respect it promises to smaller nations can be extended to their citizens .

Over the past week, hundreds of African migrant workers, traders, and students in the southern city of Guangzhou, home to Asia’s largest African diaspora, were tossed out onto the street—some by their landlords, some by hotel managers, and some by local officials. Those evicted, mostly Igbo Nigerians, insisted that they had paid their rent, had valid visas and the right paperwork, and had no contact with anybody infected with COVID-19. Meanwhile, many others were forced into a 14-day quarantine and random testing without getting their test results. Tony Mathias, an Ugandan exchange student, told Agence France-Presse: “I’ve been sleeping under the bridge for four days with no food to eat. … I cannot buy food anywhere. No shops or restaurants will serve me.”
Over the past week, hundreds of African migrant workers, traders, and students in the southern city of Guangzhou, home to Asia’s largest African diaspora, were tossed out onto the street—some by their landlords, some by hotel managers, and some by local officials. Those evicted, mostly Igbo Nigerians, insisted that they had paid their rent, had valid visas and the right paperwork, and had no contact with anybody infected with COVID-19. Meanwhile, many others were forced into a 14-day quarantine and random testing without getting their test results. Tony Mathias, an Ugandan exchange student, told Agence France-Presse: “I’ve been sleeping under the bridge for four days with no food to eat. … I cannot buy food anywhere. No shops or restaurants will serve me.”
Over the past two decades, China and Africa have become inextricably entwined. China has built roads and railways across Africa and is the biggest trading partner for the entire continent. Eighty percent of Nigeria’s bilateral debt is owed to China. About 60 percent of foreign direct investments to Ethiopia came from China in 2019. China has repeatedly stressed the importance of China-Africa alliances based on “mutual prosperity.” Yet these partnerships face irrevocable disruption if the Chinese government continues to downplay deeply rooted racial prejudices and dismisses the international outrage concerning the treatment of African migrant workers and students in China.
The events of April 10 are part of the response to growing Chinese fear of a reemergence of coronavirus infection but also build on long-standing hostility toward Africans in southern China. Anti-African feelings in China go back decades, including riots aimed at Africans in 1988-1989 in Nanjing. In Chinese media, Africans are often characterized as backward or primitive and blackness as unattractive. Virulent racism common on social media is largely unchecked by censors, including claims that Africans are rapists, drug dealers, or AIDS carriers.
Those prejudices have led to a string of incidents amid coronavirus-induced paranoia. On April 4, reports of an infected Nigerian man attacking a Chinese nurse went viral, unleashing a slew of online trolls demanding the cleansing of a city they claimed was “littered with blacks.” Three days later, four Nigerians tested positive for the virus after having been seen eating together at a local restaurant. These reports sparked widespread fear that Africans were the primary cause of recent upticks in coronavirus cases.
African expats were left at the mercy of xenophobic attitudes and heavy-handed enforcement. “They are accusing us of having the virus,” Tobenna Victor, an evicted Nigerian student, told the BBC. A viral post shows McDonald’s staff in a restaurant in Guangzhou holding a sign that says: “We’ve been informed that from now on black people are not allowed to enter the restaurant.” Rumors quickly circulated that “300,000 black people in Guangzhou were setting off a second epidemic,” and even though public officials later debunked that myth, the damage to domestic perceptions in China had been done.
Video evidence of these mistreatments has sparked international outrage. A dozen African countries have summoned their Chinese ambassadors to explain the “inhumane treatment being meted out.” A coalition of African ambassadors in Beijing delivered a letter to China’s foreign minister demanding an immediate end to all discrimination. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairman of the African Union Commission, also expressed his “extreme concern.” Moses Kuria, a vocal member of the Kenyan Parliament, took a more aggressive stance, calling for the immediate removal of all Chinese nationals in Kenya.
Rhetoric in the African press was just as intense. The front page of the Daily Nation, Kenya’s biggest newspaper, led with the headline “Kenyans in China: Rescue Us From Hell.” Similar news stories were found in the Nigerian, Ghanaian, and Ugandan press. The hashtag #ChinaMustExplain quickly trended on Twitter, as users expressed their anger and frustration. However, many people on Chinese social media praised the forcible expulsions and mistreatments as responsible steps to “stemming the spread of virus by Africans.”
China’s response has been to deny that any problem exists. Last Thursday, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian responded by stressing that China treats “all foreign nationals equally.” On Saturday, the Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe urged critics not to “sensationalize isolated incidents.” The Global Times, a state-controlled English-language newspaper, dismissed the situation in Guangzhou as a “Western trap to stir enmity,” all the while reaffirming China’s impartiality. Yet as more and more videos of African mistreatment emerge, China’s stance of innocence is harder to maintain.
Some measures have been taken. McDonald’s has apologized for the Guangzhou store’s refusal to serve black people, ordering the halt of any discrimination. Chinese volunteers banded together to raise money, connecting African migrants with hotels that accept foreign guests and even offering counseling services. Zhao, the spokesman, also stressed that Chinese citizens should end all racist remarks and that the government will indiscriminately provide accommodations for all foreigners. Yet Zhao did not specifically address allegations of forced evictions, lack of testing results, and other discriminatory actions. As of now, no formal apology has been offered.
Some have argued that the recent mistreatment of Africans is the unfortunate consequence of the fact that many of them are migrants living illegally in China whose murky identity poses risks to the public health during the virus. This technical hurdle factors into local officials’ heavy-handed approach to prevent a second wave of the infection.
The fact that many Africans lack legal status is partially a result of China’s very own stringent immigration policies and the frequent racism.
Yet the fact that many Africans lack legal status is partially a result of China’s very own stringent immigration policies and the frequent racism. Erratic laws and racial profiling make navigating byzantine immigration channels challenging. Local police are incentivized to stigmatize Africans as sanfei (“the three illegals”—illegal entry, illegal stay, and illegal work) regardless of their immigration status. During crackdowns on immigration, Africans are seen as easier targets than Europeans or other Asians. Demonization of Africans in news reports and social media serves to increase incidents of racial prejudice. In March, an invitation by the Chinese Justice Ministry for the public to comment on a proposal that would ease immigration restrictions led to an inundation of racist comments. African migrants were painted as sexual predators, and many Chinese men vowed to defend the honor of Chinese women.
The crisis in Guangzhou only reaffirmed the underlying racism of Chinese society. And while it poses very real challenges to Sino-African relations, no full breaks between China and African nations are on the horizon. Africa is an increasingly important market for China’s private investors, especially in the technology sector. China is also Africa’s top creditor, having lent an estimated $152 billion to nearly 50 African states between 2000 and 2018. Economic realities, compounded with the destabilization caused by COVID-19, demand that Chinese officials assuage African concerns. “Officials on all sides will have to scramble to put this episode behind them in order to focus on more pressing issues, such as containing the virus and Chinese debt relief,” said Eric Olander, the managing editor of the China Africa Project initiative and podcast.
Yet economic and political relationships between governments alone will not help China address this crisis, not when the insults remain so fresh and when many on the Chinese side still refuse to acknowledge the deep-rooted prejudices underlying the crisis. China’s image as a trustworthy and equal partner to Africa is in danger of being seriously tarnished, as the mistreatment and abuse of nationals from Africa risk confirming preconceptions that China is a racist country. If China is intent on being a major player on the world stage, it must not only confront racist tendencies at home but show that the respect it promises to smaller nations can be extended to their citizens.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--The Coronavirus Loosens Lips in Hanoi

The Coronavirus Loosens Lips in Hanoi

When Vietnam ’ s Communist government attempted to cover up a major toxic spill in 2016—a disaster that decimated farming and fishing sectors across several provinces—it looked to some as Vietnam ’ s Chernobyl moment .
The ruling Communist Party had become so secretive , and the public so distrusting of what officials said , that rare large-scale public protests erupted across central Vietnam .
Two years later , large demonstrations broke out again over special economic zones .
The protests were against Chinese incursion but directed at a government viewed as corrupt and secretive .
That view has spread @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-democracy bloggers have gained widespread prominence—and drawn harsh punishment—for exploring the failings of Hanoi .
So , few might have predicted that the Communist Party could mount such a successful fight against the coronavirus—let alone one marked by openness .
Hanoi ’ s uncharacteristically transparent and proactive response to the coronavirus pandemic has earned it international and domestic praise .
It ’ s not much of an exaggeration to say that the Communist Party hasn ’ t been this popular since the Vietnam War .
But will Hanoi ’ s newfound awareness of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the crisis is over ?
Though it has not received the international attention paid to Canada , South Korea , or Taiwan , Vietnam has emerged as one of the major success stories in battling the coronavirus pandemic .
As of April 15 , the country has recorded just 267 cases—even as it has tested far more people than most other Southeast Asian nations .
( For instance , Vietnam has tested some 122,000 people , while the more populous Philippines has conducted 45,000 tests and has more than 5,400 confirmed cases .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighboring China in January , the Vietnamese government responded quickly and efficiently—becoming the first country in the region to shut down travel to and from China .
When the epicenter shifted to Europe in March , the government ordered a nationwide shutdown and began one of the world ’ s largest quarantine programs for those returning from abroad .
Hanoi has also been swift in closing schools and nonessential business activity , and the impact shows .
Vietnam is a middle-income country with a fraction of the health care budget of the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ don ’ t appear stretched , and Hanoi has even donated medical supplies to Europe .
Even more surprising for a one-party state and one of the most repressive countries in Asia , Vietnam ’ s Communist government has been deeply transparent with the public during the crisis .
Ministers give daily press briefings , often broadcast on state television ; telecommunications providers send regular text message updates to users ; and the government ’ s health warnings are even translated for expatriates .
“ Clear communication and government-citizen cooperation that leveraged technology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has had relatively few cases , ” wrote Hong Kong Nguyen , a researcher at the A.I .
for Social Data Lab in Hanoi , last week .
Vietnamese are usually skeptical of the government ’ s intentions , but official actions have won public applause this time round .
Military personnel are once again being hailed as “ uncle soldiers , ” as it was during the Vietnam War .
Patriotic poems are spreading virally on social media .
The Communist Party is busy ramping up the warlike rhetoric , which is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s “ all in it together ” sprit .
As Mai Truong , a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Arizona , wrote recently in the Diplomat , the coronavirus crisis has provided the Communist Party with a “ unique opportunity to regain its people ’ s trust and strengthen its legitimacy in the midst of criticism toward how the party handled several issues in late 2019 and early 2020.
” This is now more important than ever .
For years , the party has been losing its sources of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades of war and separation , the sole prolocutor of nationalism , and the representative of the common man .
By the 2010s , it no longer had a monopoly on nationalist sentiment .
At nationwide protests in 2016 and 2018 , demonstrators rebuked the Communist Party as a lackey of China , the bête noire of Vietnamese jingoism .
The rise of the private sector , especially private health care and education , has also weakened the party ’ s monopoly on public services .
The vast majority of Vietnamese are now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the state .
The only real source of legitimacy the Communist Party has left is as the guarantor of a fast-growing economy .
Indeed , growth rates have been kept at around 7 percent , ensuring ordinary people grew a little richer each year .
Now that is in doubt .
Because of the global recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic , Vietnam is set to experience its worst economy in decades .
The World Bank ’ s latest forecasts suggest 4.9 percent growth at best , and 1.5 percent at worst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ double for households linked to the vital manufacturing sectors , the World Bank warns .
In the coming months , the Communist Party ’ s legitimacy is going to be tested in ways not known in decades .
If it is to survive this crisis , it needs to win back public trust , just as it has done during the past three months .
But is change possible with the current leadership ?
Since 2016 , domestic politics have moved away from the reform-minded leadership of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who was in office between 2006 and 2016 .
Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong , an aging ideologue from the old Hanoi elite , has orchestrated purges of nonideological officials through an extensive anti-corruption campaign and plans to remake the party in his own image through a new generation of morally pure and ideologically committed “ strategic cadre.
” In late 2018 , he became state president at the same time as serving as party chief , ending an informal separation of powers pact that had lasted since the 1980s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sweeping crackdown on free speech in decades .
Next January at the 13th National Congress—a quinquennial event when the party reshuffles its leaders and officials—Trong must step down as party chief after serving his two-term limit , though he could remain as president for another five years .
If he politicks well this year , he will get his protégés into positions of power next year , securing his traditionalist faction dominance over moderates and reformers .
But that ’ s not certain .
Rival factions remain .
Not all senior officials agree @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideological politics , let alone his anti-corruption campaign , which has left officials fearful and out of pocket .
And many moderates , like Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc , a current front-runner to fill the party chief post , will come out of this coronavirus crisis in high esteem .
Indeed , it has been technocrats ( such as Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam , who heads the government ’ s steering committee managing the pandemic ) , not ideologues , who have won the most praise from the public during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has been relatively quiet throughout .
Vietnam needs technocrats and experienced administrators who can steer the economy through the coming global recession and guide the country through the increasingly fraught geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China .
( In fact , a Vietnamese fishing vessel was sunk this month in the South China Sea by a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel , a reminder that Beijing is taking advantage of the world ’ s engrossment in the pandemic . )
At the moment , the public remains unified and supportive of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last for much longer .
Once today ’ s “ rally around the flag ” sentiment wanes and the public starts to feel the real implications of a faltering economy , the government can either return to its secretive leadership and ramp up repression or realize that more transparency might be the only thing that can keep the public onside during the coming lean years .

When Vietnam’s Communist government attempted to cover up a major toxic spill in 2016—a disaster that decimated farming and fishing sectors across several provinces—it looked to some as Vietnam’s Chernobyl moment. The ruling Communist Party had become so secretive, and the public so distrusting of what officials said, that rare large-scale public protests erupted across central Vietnam. Two years later, large demonstrations broke out again over special economic zones. The protests were against Chinese incursion but directed at a government viewed as corrupt and secretive. That view has spread more quietly across the internet, where pro-democracy bloggers have gained widespread prominence—and drawn harsh punishment—for exploring the failings of Hanoi.
When Vietnam’s Communist government attempted to cover up a major toxic spill in 2016—a disaster that decimated farming and fishing sectors across several provinces—it looked to some as Vietnam’s Chernobyl moment. The ruling Communist Party had become so secretive, and the public so distrusting of what officials said, that rare large-scale public protests erupted across central Vietnam. Two years later, large demonstrations broke out again over special economic zones. The protests were against Chinese incursion but directed at a government viewed as corrupt and secretive. That view has spread more quietly across the internet, where pro-democracy bloggers have gained widespread prominence—and drawn harsh punishment—for exploring the failings of Hanoi.
So, few might have predicted that the Communist Party could mount such a successful fight against the coronavirus—let alone one marked by openness. Hanoi’s uncharacteristically transparent and proactive response to the coronavirus pandemic has earned it international and domestic praise. It’s not much of an exaggeration to say that the Communist Party hasn’t been this popular since the Vietnam War. But will Hanoi’s newfound awareness of the benefits of transparent government endure once the crisis is over?
Though it has not received the international attention paid to Canada, South Korea, or Taiwan, Vietnam has emerged as one of the major success stories in battling the coronavirus pandemic. As of April 15, the country has recorded just 267 cases—even as it has tested far more people than most other Southeast Asian nations. (For instance, Vietnam has tested some 122,000 people, while the more populous Philippines has conducted 45,000 tests and has more than 5,400 confirmed cases.) When the outbreak first occurred in neighboring China in January, the Vietnamese government responded quickly and efficiently—becoming the first country in the region to shut down travel to and from China. When the epicenter shifted to Europe in March, the government ordered a nationwide shutdown and began one of the world’s largest quarantine programs for those returning from abroad. Hanoi has also been swift in closing schools and nonessential business activity, and the impact shows. Vietnam is a middle-income country with a fraction of the health care budget of the other successful countries, yet its health services don’t appear stretched, and Hanoi has even donated medical supplies to Europe.
Even more surprising for a one-party state and one of the most repressive countries in Asia, Vietnam’s Communist government has been deeply transparent with the public during the crisis. Ministers give daily press briefings, often broadcast on state television; telecommunications providers send regular text message updates to users; and the government’s health warnings are even translated for expatriates. “Clear communication and government-citizen cooperation that leveraged technology are the main reasons why the country has had relatively few cases,” wrote Hong Kong Nguyen, a researcher at the A.I. for Social Data Lab in Hanoi, last week.
Vietnamese are usually skeptical of the government’s intentions, but official actions have won public applause this time round. Military personnel are once again being hailed as “uncle soldiers,” as it was during the Vietnam War. Patriotic poems are spreading virally on social media. The Communist Party is busy ramping up the warlike rhetoric, which is clearly in tune with the public’s “all in it together” sprit.
As Mai Truong, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Arizona, wrote recently in the Diplomat, the coronavirus crisis has provided the Communist Party with a “unique opportunity to regain its people’s trust and strengthen its legitimacy in the midst of criticism toward how the party handled several issues in late 2019 and early 2020.”
This is now more important than ever.
For years, the party has been losing its sources of legitimacy as the unifier of Vietnam after decades of war and separation, the sole prolocutor of nationalism, and the representative of the common man. By the 2010s, it no longer had a monopoly on nationalist sentiment. At nationwide protests in 2016 and 2018, demonstrators rebuked the Communist Party as a lackey of China, the bête noire of Vietnamese jingoism. The rise of the private sector, especially private health care and education, has also weakened the party’s monopoly on public services. The vast majority of Vietnamese are now employed in the private sector, not by the state.
The only real source of legitimacy the Communist Party has left is as the guarantor of a fast-growing economy. Indeed, growth rates have been kept at around 7 percent, ensuring ordinary people grew a little richer each year. Now that is in doubt. Because of the global recession caused by the coronavirus pandemic, Vietnam is set to experience its worst economy in decades. The World Bank’s latest forecasts suggest 4.9 percent growth at best, and 1.5 percent at worst, this year. Poverty rates could double for households linked to the vital manufacturing sectors, the World Bank warns.
In the coming months, the Communist Party’s legitimacy is going to be tested in ways not known in decades. If it is to survive this crisis, it needs to win back public trust, just as it has done during the past three months. But is change possible with the current leadership? Since 2016, domestic politics have moved away from the reform-minded leadership of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a powerful leader of the civilian government, who was in office between 2006 and 2016. Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, an aging ideologue from the old Hanoi elite, has orchestrated purges of nonideological officials through an extensive anti-corruption campaign and plans to remake the party in his own image through a new generation of morally pure and ideologically committed “strategic cadre.” In late 2018, he became state president at the same time as serving as party chief, ending an informal separation of powers pact that had lasted since the 1980s. He has also overseen the most sweeping crackdown on free speech in decades.
Next January at the 13th National Congress—a quinquennial event when the party reshuffles its leaders and officials—Trong must step down as party chief after serving his two-term limit, though he could remain as president for another five years. If he politicks well this year, he will get his protégés into positions of power next year, securing his traditionalist faction dominance over moderates and reformers.
But that’s not certain. Rival factions remain. Not all senior officials agree with Trong’s revanchist style of ideological politics, let alone his anti-corruption campaign, which has left officials fearful and out of pocket. And many moderates, like Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, a current front-runner to fill the party chief post, will come out of this coronavirus crisis in high esteem. Indeed, it has been technocrats (such as Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam, who heads the government’s steering committee managing the pandemic), not ideologues, who have won the most praise from the public during the coronavirus crisis. Trong, meanwhile, has been relatively quiet throughout.
Vietnam needs technocrats and experienced administrators who can steer the economy through the coming global recession and guide the country through the increasingly fraught geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. (In fact, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was sunk this month in the South China Sea by a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel, a reminder that Beijing is taking advantage of the world’s engrossment in the pandemic.)
At the moment, the public remains unified and supportive of the government. But that may not last for much longer. Once today’s “rally around the flag” sentiment wanes and the public starts to feel the real implications of a faltering economy, the government can either return to its secretive leadership and ramp up repression or realize that more transparency might be the only thing that can keep the public onside during the coming lean years.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--The Secret to Coronavirus Success Is Trust

The Secret to Coronavirus Success Is Trust Americans are suddenly taking a greater interest in the world around them .
Folks who couldn ’ t spot Wuhan , Qom , or Lombardy on a map two months ago now discuss the coronavirus responses there .
Meanwhile , they anxiously check for updated statistics on the number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths .
Looking at different countries , comparing their public health systems and responses , and measuring their outcomes against the United States ’ is an exercise in comparative public policy that ’ s become a daily norm in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drive-through coronavirus testing .
That seemed like an effective idea , so now drive-through clinics are everywhere .
Those Asian and European countries where mask-wearing is obligatory seemed to have lower rates of spread , so now Centers for Disease Control and Prevention policy encourages widespread mask-wearing , too .
And , of course , the pandemic is exposing many of the flaws and vulnerabilities of the American for-profit health care system , as compared to universal health care systems across the developed world .
Tests , clinics , masks , and respirators @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observe and measure .
But like the invisible coronavirus itself , perhaps the most important determinant of the success of a country ’ s response is something that isn ’ t so easily seen : trust .
High levels of trust seem to be a common feature of countries with the most effective coronavirus responses , measured by slow spread and low mortality .
Singapore ’ s successes have been chalked up to “ an effective government-led response , trust in authorities and regular communication.
” They ’ re not alone .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sleeve , ” writes Nick Aspinwall here in Foreign Policy : “ trust.
” Government transparency , competence , and experience with the SARS epidemic have bolstered trust in government .
In South Korea , the government “ says the public is more likely to trust it if it releases transparent and accurate information , ” Nature reports .
More succinctly : Government competence breeds trust .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus numbers coming out of China , we ignore the more important role of Chinese trust in their own government ’ s response .
While China ’ s high trust in government has been hotly contested , the early prognostications that the coronavirus would “ topple ” or “ derail ” the Chinese Communist Party seem to have come to naught .
If anything , China ’ s competent—if heavy-handed—response seems to have both benefited from and bolstered Chinese trust in government .
More than 80 percent of respondents in China and almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust their government to care for their health .
In the United States , it ’ s only 44 percent .
But it is not just trust in government that ’ s at issue : It ’ s trust in each other .
We watch with nervous wonder : How can countries such as South Korea , Iceland , and Sweden institute voluntary ( rather than mandatory ) restrictions , and still keep most businesses and schools open ?
The common denominator in each is not simply a developed , well-functioning , competent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sense of societal trust that others will act responsibly , too : that they ’ ll self-isolate and look out for one another as much as they look out for themselves .
Is it any wonder , then , that the countries doing the best in terms of coronavirus mitigation are the ones that constantly rank highest in terms of political and social trust , even well before the current crisis ?
From the United States—where individuals , communities , and states have largely been left to forage for themselves—such trust in government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ While jokes about shortages of toilet paper abound , there ’ s no better symbol of American insecurity , fear , and mistrust than Americans stockpiling guns and ammunition .
Both physically and psychologically , you only need an arsenal of weaponry to defend against your fellow man if you deeply distrust him .
The United States is experiencing a deficit of trust , and it is quite literally killing people .
That the Trump administration is beset by a crisis of confidence—in which very little that is said in the daily briefings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and alarmingly few Americans trust President Donald Trump to handle the outbreak—is nothing new .
It is just the tragic outcome of a situation in which the narrative is more important than reality , and politically inconvenient truths can be brushed away with “ fake news ” accusations and untrue “ alternative facts.
” It ’ s worth noting surveys that show the most trusted leaders in the current crisis are not Donald Trump or Vice President Mike Pence , but New York Gov .
Andrew Cuomo , seen as a teller of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s infectious-disease experts , Anthony Fauci and Deborah Birx , though Fauci already appears to be on his way out of Trump ’ s White House .
In this time of crisis , transparency , responsibility , and facts—however unpleasant—breed greater trust than obfuscation , denial , deflection , and soothing half-truths .
But my point isn ’ t narrowly partisan , nor is it about dunking on the incumbent regime , however great its failings .
To be American today is to be skeptical of anything that does not comport with our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say that my strongly held opinion is just as valid as your professional expertise , because I don ’ t trust you .
Democrats distrust Republicans .
Republicans distrust Democrats , science , and that amorphous boogeyman known collectively as “ the media.
” It ’ s well known that neither Republicans nor Democrats trust politicians or the government , but it ’ s striking that , somehow , Americans trust one another even less .
Such mistrust has been an endemic part of conservative politics for ages , but it has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the epitome of the Republican ideal that government can do no good and must be blown up .
The problem is that when you blow up the government , we all have to live with the consequences of a government that ’ s been blown up .
Mistrust will continue to be a major problem for America ’ s coronavirus response .
First , there ’ s the short-term health crisis , in which states can ’ t trust the federal government for help , hospitals can ’ t trust that their supply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ newly unemployed can ’ t trust a ramshackle infrastructure never designed to meet those needs .
But in the long term , Americans have to confront a new , post-quarantine reality that will likely retain some elements of social distancing , bolstered by widespread testing and health surveillance—something akin to Taiwan , South Korea , Singapore , or Iceland—only on a heretofore unimaginable scale .
The problem is that all the major scenarios for reopening the U.S. economy are premised on trust .
These scenarios envision the power of big data to forestall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ coronavirus tests and their location so as to be alerted if they ’ ve been to a potential hot spot .
Will Americans really trust an entity—whether government , business , or nonprofit organization—that compiles and tracks such personal data ?
They will need to , like it or not .
Every scenario moving forward necessarily entails an expansion of the role of government .
But as political-science research concludes , people first need to trust government in order to support more of it .
While the coronavirus has exposed the deficit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simple fix .
A rote prescription for more trust in government is unwarranted if the government has proved itself undeserving .
Trust must be earned .
But perhaps instead of increasing trust , Americans can work to minimize its opposite : cynicism .
Americans are given to cocoons of self-righteous cynicism—claiming to see through the “ left-wing media ” or “ right-wing spin ” —confident that what they see in the world is a true reflection of reality—their perceived reality—regardless of facts or science .
But , ironically , their own cynicism has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demagogues telling them what they want to hear , regardless of its truth .
Unlikely though it might seem , the current administration could actually take steps to reduce cynicism and increase trust , and the best place to start would be by telling the hard truths .
Practically , this would look like empowering people who actually know what they ’ re doing .
Instead of appointing a “ Council to Reopen America ” that consists of your kids and business cronies , how about including an actual expert on health policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Or a professional epidemiologist ?
Or actual doctors who understand the front-line health care challenges ?
Or anyone who understands the intersection of health and economics ?
Empowering experts is what competent countries do .
It ’ s what the United States used to do .
The lessons of other successful countries are clear : Now more than ever , it is vital to empower professionals , be transparent with facts , and , most of all , build a reputation for effectiveness in delivering the goods .
The Trump administration already has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Fauci .
The only difference between building trust by empowering him with a pat on the back—rather than sticking a knife in it—is the impact it ’ d have on Trump ’ s ego .
And there lies all the difference .
This is how you reduce cynicism and build trust in government .
And the greater the extent to which Americans all become involved in their great , collective response to these challenges , the likelier it is they ’ ll put away their tribal , partisan divisions , recognize that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and start to build those bonds of trust among one another , too .

Americans are suddenly taking a greater interest in the world around them. Folks who couldn’t spot Wuhan, Qom, or Lombardy on a map two months ago now discuss the coronavirus responses there. Meanwhile, they anxiously check for updated statistics on the number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths.
Americans are suddenly taking a greater interest in the world around them. Folks who couldn’t spot Wuhan, Qom, or Lombardy on a map two months ago now discuss the coronavirus responses there. Meanwhile, they anxiously check for updated statistics on the number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths.
Looking at different countries, comparing their public health systems and responses, and measuring their outcomes against the United States’ is an exercise in comparative public policy that’s become a daily norm in the coronavirus era. South Korea pioneered drive-through coronavirus testing. That seemed like an effective idea, so now drive-through clinics are everywhere. Those Asian and European countries where mask-wearing is obligatory seemed to have lower rates of spread, so now Centers for Disease Control and Prevention policy encourages widespread mask-wearing, too. And, of course, the pandemic is exposing many of the flaws and vulnerabilities of the American for-profit health care system, as compared to universal health care systems across the developed world.
Tests, clinics, masks, and respirators are all tangible things that we can observe and measure. But like the invisible coronavirus itself, perhaps the most important determinant of the success of a country’s response is something that isn’t so easily seen: trust.
High levels of trust seem to be a common feature of countries with the most effective coronavirus responses, measured by slow spread and low mortality. Singapore’s successes have been chalked up to “an effective government-led response, trust in authorities and regular communication.” They’re not alone. “Taiwan does have one ace up its sleeve,” writes Nick Aspinwall here in Foreign Policy: “trust.” Government transparency, competence, and experience with the SARS epidemic have bolstered trust in government. In South Korea, the government “says the public is more likely to trust it if it releases transparent and accurate information,” Nature reports. More succinctly: Government competence breeds trust.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
While the world wonders whether to trust the coronavirus numbers coming out of China, we ignore the more important role of Chinese trust in their own government’s response. While China’s high trust in government has been hotly contested, the early prognostications that the coronavirus would “topple” or “derail” the Chinese Communist Party seem to have come to naught. If anything, China’s competent—if heavy-handed—response seems to have both benefited from and bolstered Chinese trust in government. More than 80 percent of respondents in China and almost 65 percent in South Korea say they trust their government to care for their health. In the United States, it’s only 44 percent.
But it is not just trust in government that’s at issue: It’s trust in each other. We watch with nervous wonder: How can countries such as South Korea, Iceland, and Sweden institute voluntary (rather than mandatory) restrictions, and still keep most businesses and schools open? The common denominator in each is not simply a developed, well-functioning, competent welfare state, but also a broad sense of societal trust that others will act responsibly, too: that they’ll self-isolate and look out for one another as much as they look out for themselves. Is it any wonder, then, that the countries doing the best in terms of coronavirus mitigation are the ones that constantly rank highest in terms of political and social trust, even well before the current crisis?
From the United States—where individuals, communities, and states have largely been left to forage for themselves—such trust in government and each other seems downright otherworldly. While jokes about shortages of toilet paper abound, there’s no better symbol of American insecurity, fear, and mistrust than Americans stockpiling guns and ammunition. Both physically and psychologically, you only need an arsenal of weaponry to defend against your fellow man if you deeply distrust him.
The United States is experiencing a deficit of trust, and it is quite literally killing people.
That the Trump administration is beset by a crisis of confidence—in which very little that is said in the daily briefings can be trusted as factually accurate, and alarmingly few Americans trust President Donald Trump to handle the outbreak—is nothing new. It is just the tragic outcome of a situation in which the narrative is more important than reality, and politically inconvenient truths can be brushed away with “fake news” accusations and untrue “alternative facts.” It’s worth noting surveys that show the most trusted leaders in the current crisis are not Donald Trump or Vice President Mike Pence, but New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo, seen as a teller of unvarnished truths, and the administration’s infectious-disease experts, Anthony Fauci and Deborah Birx, though Fauci already appears to be on his way out of Trump’s White House. In this time of crisis, transparency, responsibility, and facts—however unpleasant—breed greater trust than obfuscation, denial, deflection, and soothing half-truths.
But my point isn’t narrowly partisan, nor is it about dunking on the incumbent regime, however great its failings. To be American today is to be skeptical of anything that does not comport with our preexisting beliefs. To be American is to say that my strongly held opinion is just as valid as your professional expertise, because I don’t trust you.
Democrats distrust Republicans. Republicans distrust Democrats, science, and that amorphous boogeyman known collectively as “the media.” It’s well known that neither Republicans nor Democrats trust politicians or the government, but it’s striking that, somehow, Americans trust one another even less. Such mistrust has been an endemic part of conservative politics for ages, but it has been supercharged in the Trump administration: the epitome of the Republican ideal that government can do no good and must be blown up. The problem is that when you blow up the government, we all have to live with the consequences of a government that’s been blown up.
Mistrust will continue to be a major problem for America’s coronavirus response. First, there’s the short-term health crisis, in which states can’t trust the federal government for help, hospitals can’t trust that their supply needs will be met, and the newly unemployed can’t trust a ramshackle infrastructure never designed to meet those needs.
But in the long term, Americans have to confront a new, post-quarantine reality that will likely retain some elements of social distancing, bolstered by widespread testing and health surveillance—something akin to Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, or Iceland—only on a heretofore unimaginable scale. The problem is that all the major scenarios for reopening the U.S. economy are premised on trust. These scenarios envision the power of big data to forestall regional outbreaks and flare-ups by tracking individuals’ coronavirus tests and their location so as to be alerted if they’ve been to a potential hot spot. Will Americans really trust an entity—whether government, business, or nonprofit organization—that compiles and tracks such personal data?
They will need to, like it or not. Every scenario moving forward necessarily entails an expansion of the role of government. But as political-science research concludes, people first need to trust government in order to support more of it.
While the coronavirus has exposed the deficit of trust, there’s no simple fix. A rote prescription for more trust in government is unwarranted if the government has proved itself undeserving. Trust must be earned.
But perhaps instead of increasing trust, Americans can work to minimize its opposite: cynicism. Americans are given to cocoons of self-righteous cynicism—claiming to see through the “left-wing media” or “right-wing spin”—confident that what they see in the world is a true reflection of reality—their perceived reality—regardless of facts or science. But, ironically, their own cynicism has made Americans gullible: easy prey to demagogues telling them what they want to hear, regardless of its truth.
Unlikely though it might seem, the current administration could actually take steps to reduce cynicism and increase trust, and the best place to start would be by telling the hard truths. Practically, this would look like empowering people who actually know what they’re doing. Instead of appointing a “Council to Reopen America” that consists of your kids and business cronies, how about including an actual expert on health policy? Or experts in supply-chain management? Or a professional epidemiologist? Or actual doctors who understand the front-line health care challenges? Or anyone who understands the intersection of health and economics? Empowering experts is what competent countries do. It’s what the United States used to do.
The lessons of other successful countries are clear: Now more than ever, it is vital to empower professionals, be transparent with facts, and, most of all, build a reputation for effectiveness in delivering the goods. The Trump administration already has such professionals it could empower, such as Fauci. The only difference between building trust by empowering him with a pat on the back—rather than sticking a knife in it—is the impact it’d have on Trump’s ego. And there lies all the difference.
This is how you reduce cynicism and build trust in government. And the greater the extent to which Americans all become involved in their great, collective response to these challenges, the likelier it is they’ll put away their tribal, partisan divisions, recognize that they’re all in this together, and start to build those bonds of trust among one another, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-15--After the Coronavirus, the Era of Small Government Will Be Over

After the Coronavirus , the Era of Small Government Will Be Over Will everything change ?
Will anything ?
In the wild heart of tumult , we overestimate how easily settled patterns of behavior can be overthrown .
“ We ’ ll never laugh again , ” we glumly predicted after the 9/11 attacks .
And then , of course , we did .
And now , with global deaths from the coronavirus topping 121,000 and much of the world under lockdown ?
Perhaps , as the veteran diplomat Richard Haass suggests in an essay in Foreign Affairs , things @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sooner .
But what things ?
In what sphere ?
Those of us who think and write about foreign policy naturally ask how the pandemic will reshape relations among states .
But perhaps that ’ s the wrong question .
Crises are a blunt tool for change , but they do have a shape ; and that shape determines the nature of the changes they force .
Of the cataclysmic events of the last century , the two world wars radically changed the state system by replacing the European balance of power with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and law .
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a quarter-century of U.S. hegemony , now drawing to a close .
World orders , as former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes in his book of the same name , last until their foundations are shattered by events .
The pandemic is not that kind of event .
What we see , in fact , is the apex institutions of today ’ s global order—the U.N. Security Council , the G-20 , the European Union—making hapless gestures as the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no reason to believe that their inability to mount an effective global response to what is plainly a global problem threatens their survival .
The crisis is far more likely , as Haass predicts , to hasten the relative decline of the United States and the nationalist reaction against global cooperation .
It may also further deepen the breach between the United States and China , each of which has blamed the other for the outbreak of the pandemic .
This crisis will affect , above all , our personal lives .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the experience is sure to change us at an intimate level .
It ’ s as if the lights have been switched off and we have all had to learn to find our way in darkness .
I don ’ t know whether it will make people kinder , more self-protective , or , as I suggested in an essay just before the pandemic struck , less individualistic .
Already we have a kind of social pandemic of loneliness .
How much deeper will it become if social distancing must remain in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as increasingly seems to be the case ?
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
The catastrophe to which the pandemic bears the closest comparison is the Great Depression , a worldwide event in which national economies collapsed with terrifying speed .
That is , the change-forcing event will not be the scale of death but the economic and political consequences .
Fifty million people died during the 1918 flu pandemic without redirecting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case , the projected death toll from the coronavirus has been diminishing in recent days as preventive measures have taken hold .
The virus may also turn out to be somewhat less lethal than we feared .
But the economic suffering has been profound and threatens the legitimacy of national governments .
It is in this sense that the pandemic resembles the Depression .
As World War I made the 19th-century alliance system look like a suicide pact , so the Depression put an end to the giddy faith in an unregulated marketplace @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market failed , and it never fully stepped out again .
The Nordic model that U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders so admires first took shape in 1938 , when , after years of mass unemployment and labor strife , workers and employers groups came together to agree on a system of national-level negotiations .
The pandemic certainly will not threaten capitalism itself , both because the economic pain will not be so long-lasting and because states , no longer chained to a laissez-faire orthodoxy , have responded with massive spending .
The Economist recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percentage of GDP in the world ’ s richest countries is likely to cross 40 percent this year , perhaps to the highest rate ever .
The Normal Economy Is Never Coming Back The latest U.S. data proves the world is in its steepest freefall ever—and the old economic and political playbooks don ’ t apply .
That very response has already gone a long way toward undermining the anti-statism that serves as the orienting ideology of the Republican Party in the United States .
As happened during the Depression , measures justified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ category of the unthinkable to join the policy toolkit .
The Senate is unlikely to adopt the recent proposal by Republican Sen. Josh Hawley , an ardent supporter of President Donald Trump , to reimburse businesses for 80 percent of their payroll , a policy apparently lifted from the United Kingdom or Denmark .
But the Hawley proposal has nevertheless removed the mark of the devil from the Nordic model .
Nor is the effect limited to the United States .
In the face of catastrophe , as the editorialist Alain Frachon recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no longer ‘ the problem , ’ as one said in the Thatcher-Reagan era , but ‘ the solution.
’ ” The solution will be seen to mean not only active government but good government .
Those are scarcely the same things .
Despite its comprehensive welfare and public health system , the U.K. has already suffered more than 13,000 deaths , and the outbreak there has not yet reached a peak—because Prime Minister Boris Johnson , like Trump , at first dismissed the virus as a kind of foreign fad .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ like France , have still suffered very high death tolls because they did not react early enough .
The countries that have fared best—South Korea , Germany , New Zealand , perhaps Sweden—have an effective and nonpartisan civil service and a culture of pragmatic governance .
In the United States , a litany of missed opportunities reflect a demonization of government , and a consequent enfeeblement of the state , that stretches back to the era of President Ronald Reagan .
Four decades of Republican hostility to government culminated in Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; that dog may no longer hunt .
Though major tech companies are bound to absorb traditional public functions , whether contract-tracing for epidemics or the execution of the census , the prospect of big tech as a kind of parallel and autonomous government seems like a dangerous fantasy .
The return of the state may be a disaster in some places .
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has used the pandemic as a pretext to award himself the power to rule by decree for as long as he wishes .
Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s clangorous free press to heel .
The coronavirus is spring time for populists .
But the state ’ s resurgence will make for intriguing drama in the United States , where Trump , unable to run for reelection on the economy and deprived of the foil of a socialist Sanders , will have to extol the vast government forces he has deployed to overcome the health and economic threat of the coronavirus .
Left to his own devices , Trump might have been the Herbert Hoover of the pandemic ; instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ D. Roosevelt .
On the Democratic side , the imperative of state intervention may well push the presumptive nominee Joe Biden closer to Sanders on issues like health care and Social Security .
If the return of the state includes the idea of heightened nationalism , as seems to be the case , then the implications of the pandemic for statecraft may be almost wholly negative .
Nationalism has already hamstrung the efforts of the EU to coordinate regional responses to problems like refugees and immigration .
The coronavirus similarly shows us that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less—but it doesn ’ t shake the system violently enough to force change .
The cataclysm that is likely to accomplish that goal is climate change .
Let ’ s hope the realization dawns before it ’ s too late to do us much good .

Will everything change? Will anything? In the wild heart of tumult, we overestimate how easily settled patterns of behavior can be overthrown. “We’ll never laugh again,” we glumly predicted after the 9/11 attacks. And then, of course, we did. And now, with global deaths from the coronavirus topping 121,000 and much of the world under lockdown? Perhaps, as the veteran diplomat Richard Haass suggests in an essay in Foreign Affairs, things that were already happening will simply happen sooner.
Will everything change? Will anything? In the wild heart of tumult, we overestimate how easily settled patterns of behavior can be overthrown. “We’ll never laugh again,” we glumly predicted after the 9/11 attacks. And then, of course, we did. And now, with global deaths from the coronavirus topping 121,000 and much of the world under lockdown? Perhaps, as the veteran diplomat Richard Haass suggests in an essay in Foreign Affairs, things that were already happening will simply happen sooner.
But what things? In what sphere? Those of us who think and write about foreign policy naturally ask how the pandemic will reshape relations among states. But perhaps that’s the wrong question. Crises are a blunt tool for change, but they do have a shape; and that shape determines the nature of the changes they force. Of the cataclysmic events of the last century, the two world wars radically changed the state system by replacing the European balance of power with an American-led world order based on institutions and law. The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a quarter-century of U.S. hegemony, now drawing to a close.
World orders, as former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes in his book of the same name, last until their foundations are shattered by events. The pandemic is not that kind of event. What we see, in fact, is the apex institutions of today’s global order—the U.N. Security Council, the G-20, the European Union—making hapless gestures as the virus races around the world. There is no reason to believe that their inability to mount an effective global response to what is plainly a global problem threatens their survival. The crisis is far more likely, as Haass predicts, to hasten the relative decline of the United States and the nationalist reaction against global cooperation. It may also further deepen the breach between the United States and China, each of which has blamed the other for the outbreak of the pandemic.
This crisis will affect, above all, our personal lives. The national lockdown is an intimate experience, and the experience is sure to change us at an intimate level. It’s as if the lights have been switched off and we have all had to learn to find our way in darkness. I don’t know whether it will make people kinder, more self-protective, or, as I suggested in an essay just before the pandemic struck, less individualistic. Already we have a kind of social pandemic of loneliness. How much deeper will it become if social distancing must remain in place until a vaccine has been developed, as increasingly seems to be the case?
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
The catastrophe to which the pandemic bears the closest comparison is the Great Depression, a worldwide event in which national economies collapsed with terrifying speed. That is, the change-forcing event will not be the scale of death but the economic and political consequences. Fifty million people died during the 1918 flu pandemic without redirecting the course of global politics. In any case, the projected death toll from the coronavirus has been diminishing in recent days as preventive measures have taken hold. The virus may also turn out to be somewhat less lethal than we feared.
But the economic suffering has been profound and threatens the legitimacy of national governments. It is in this sense that the pandemic resembles the Depression. As World War I made the 19th-century alliance system look like a suicide pact, so the Depression put an end to the giddy faith in an unregulated marketplace. The state stepped in where the market failed, and it never fully stepped out again. The Nordic model that U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders so admires first took shape in 1938, when, after years of mass unemployment and labor strife, workers and employers groups came together to agree on a system of national-level negotiations.
The pandemic certainly will not threaten capitalism itself, both because the economic pain will not be so long-lasting and because states, no longer chained to a laissez-faire orthodoxy, have responded with massive spending. The Economist recently noted that overall state spending as a percentage of GDP in the world’s richest countries is likely to cross 40 percent this year, perhaps to the highest rate ever.
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That very response has already gone a long way toward undermining the anti-statism that serves as the orienting ideology of the Republican Party in the United States. As happened during the Depression, measures justified as emergency responses quickly exit from the category of the unthinkable to join the policy toolkit. The Senate is unlikely to adopt the recent proposal by Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, an ardent supporter of President Donald Trump, to reimburse businesses for 80 percent of their payroll, a policy apparently lifted from the United Kingdom or Denmark. But the Hawley proposal has nevertheless removed the mark of the devil from the Nordic model. Nor is the effect limited to the United States. In the face of catastrophe, as the editorialist Alain Frachon recently wrote in Le Monde, “government is no longer ‘the problem,’ as one said in the Thatcher-Reagan era, but ‘the solution.’”
The solution will be seen to mean not only active government but good government. Those are scarcely the same things. Despite its comprehensive welfare and public health system, the U.K. has already suffered more than 13,000 deaths, and the outbreak there has not yet reached a peak—because Prime Minister Boris Johnson, like Trump, at first dismissed the virus as a kind of foreign fad. European countries with less captious leaders, like France, have still suffered very high death tolls because they did not react early enough. The countries that have fared best—South Korea, Germany, New Zealand, perhaps Sweden—have an effective and nonpartisan civil service and a culture of pragmatic governance.
In the United States, a litany of missed opportunities reflect a demonization of government, and a consequent enfeeblement of the state, that stretches back to the era of President Ronald Reagan. Four decades of Republican hostility to government culminated in Trump’s McCarthyite crusade against the so-called deep state; that dog may no longer hunt. Though major tech companies are bound to absorb traditional public functions, whether contract-tracing for epidemics or the execution of the census, the prospect of big tech as a kind of parallel and autonomous government seems like a dangerous fantasy.
The return of the state may be a disaster in some places. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has used the pandemic as a pretext to award himself the power to rule by decree for as long as he wishes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought to bring India’s clangorous free press to heel. The coronavirus is spring time for populists. But the state’s resurgence will make for intriguing drama in the United States, where Trump, unable to run for reelection on the economy and deprived of the foil of a socialist Sanders, will have to extol the vast government forces he has deployed to overcome the health and economic threat of the coronavirus. Left to his own devices, Trump might have been the Herbert Hoover of the pandemic; instead, he has become an unwilling Franklin D. Roosevelt. On the Democratic side, the imperative of state intervention may well push the presumptive nominee Joe Biden closer to Sanders on issues like health care and Social Security.
If the return of the state includes the idea of heightened nationalism, as seems to be the case, then the implications of the pandemic for statecraft may be almost wholly negative. Nationalism has already hamstrung the efforts of the EU to coordinate regional responses to problems like refugees and immigration. The coronavirus similarly shows us that we need more global governance, not less—but it doesn’t shake the system violently enough to force change. The cataclysm that is likely to accomplish that goal is climate change. Let’s hope the realization dawns before it’s too late to do us much good.