foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--Yoshihide Suga Takes Over as Japan’s New Prime Minister

Yoshihide Suga Takes Over as Japan ’ s New Prime Minister Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Japan ’ s parliament officially names Yoshihide Suga as prime minister ; Israel , the UAE , and Bahrain formalize their recent agreements at the White House ; and Russia announces military exercises in Belarus .
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The Japanese parliament has confirmed Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga as the country ’ s new prime minister , replacing the outgoing premier Shinzo Abe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him as party leader in a landslide on Monday .
The longest-serving prime minister since the end of World War II , Abe ’ s decision to resign was widely considered the end of an era in Japan .
But Suga ’ s premiership is expected to be characterized by a substantial degree of policy continuity .
He is a longtime ally of Abe , and Japanese media have already reported that many key ministers will likely keep their jobs after Suga steps in .
The homefront .
Taking over in the midst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s main priority will be dealing with Japan ’ s slumping economy , which has taken a hit since the beginning of the pandemic despite the country ’ s success in avoiding the high numbers of cases and deaths seen elsewhere .
Abe popularized his brand of economic policy known as “ Abenomics , ” which Suga helped develop and from which he is unlikely to depart in any significant way .
Still , as Chris Miller wrote in Foreign Policy , Japan is overdue for a change to its monetary policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tough set of choices if the yen continues to strengthen against the dollar in a country where exporters hold outsized political influence .
Challenges abroad .
The salience of domestic issues will probably prevent Suga from continuing Japan ’ s renewed defense posturing .
Under Abe , Japan adopted a more aggressive foreign policy unseen since the end of World War II , as the threat posed by China grew and the United States became less reliable as a security partner .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch reported , “ Unlike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely to hew to the low-profile approach honed by seven years of scandal and intra-party rebellion as Abe ’ s right-hand man.
” Regardless of what stance he takes , policymakers in both Washington and Beijing will be watching closely .
Sooner or later , geopolitical realities could force Suga to turn his focus to foreign policy again .
Formalizing normalization .
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu , Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed , and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani met in Washington on Tuesday to sign their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by U.S. President Donald Trump .
The deals represent a significant shift in the priorities of many Arab states away from Palestinian statehood and toward countering Iran ’ s growing military strength in the region .
As Maysam Behravesh and Hamidreza Azizi wrote in Foreign Policy , that shift has threatened decades of strategic planning in Tehran .
The Trump administration hopes to entice more Gulf states to sign similar deals with Israel , and there are signs that steps are being taken in that direction .
Key Saudi leaders have softened their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Saudi government ’ s silence on the issue is considered a sign of tacit support .
Militarization of U.S. police .
A new report produced by Brown University ’ s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs details how the militarization of U.S. police forces has ballooned since the September 11 attacks , arguing that it should be counted as one of the long-term costs of the United States ’ post-9/11 War on Terror .
The attacks , the report says , provided a new justification to funnel massive amounts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to local and state law enforcement , all in the name of counterterrorism and national security .
The study also argues that the intensive militarization of the police could have helped produce the current political crisis in the United States .
“ Visibly militaristic tactics and imagery breed fear and mistrust , particularly among poor and hyperpoliced communities of color .
This can erode police legitimacy.
” U.S. and Iran tit-for-tat .
Iran and the United States engaged in a war of words over reports that Tehran planned a reprisal killing in retaliation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January .
Some U.S. media outlets reported that Iran was planning to assassinate the U.S. ambassador to South Africa ahead of the presidential election in November .
Trump tweeted his response , warning that an attack on the United States “ will be met with an attack on Iran that will be 1,000 times greater in magnitude !
” During a news conference on Tuesday , an Iranian government spokesman responded in kind : “ We hope that they do not make a new strategic mistake and certainly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they will witness Iran ’ s decisive response.
” Russian military to drill in Belarus .
The Russian defense ministry said on Tuesday that six members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation ( CSTO ) will conduct joint military exercises in Belarus in October as the political crisis in the country continues to worsen .
The announcement came as Russian and Belarusian troops began joint military drills near Belarus ’ s border with Poland , due to last until Sep. 25 , which Russia ’ s defense ministry has insisted focuses on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries .
After initially dragging its feet , the Kremlin has deepened its involvement in Belarus considerably over the previous few weeks .
Last month , Russian President Vladimir Putin said he had formed a reserve police force that could be deployed to Belarus , and he recently committed a $ 1.5 billion loan to Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko .
Crisis in the Ivory Coast .
Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara has reportedly made an offer to his predecessor , Laurent Gbagbo , to stay neutral through the end of the presidential election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pardon of the 20-year prison sentence he received in a corruption case .
Ouattara has attracted controversy over his bid for a third term as president despite the constitution barring him from doing so .
Protests against Ouattara broke out across much of the country earlier this week , especially in districts considered loyal to Gbagbo .
Ouattara ’ s victory over Gbagbo in 2010 sparked a brutal civil war that killed around 3,000 people , and the current political crisis has raised concerns that the upcoming election could lead to another round @ @ @ @ @ @ @ declined the offer .
Four hundred years after the original Mayflower brought the first colonial settlers from England to what is now New England , a new , high-tech version of the ship is set to make the same voyage across the Atlantic .
This time , however , the ship will have no crew , no captain , and no passengers—it will be captained solely by artificial intelligence technology as part of a research mission that will help to determine if high-tech vessels can be used to explore parts of the ocean @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Autonomous Ship ( MAS ) will travel along the original Mayflower ’ s route—from Plymouth , England , to Plymouth , Massachusetts .
Originally scheduled to set sail today—the 400th anniversary of its namesake ’ s journey—MAS ’ s launch has been postponed until next spring due to delays caused by the coronavirus pandemic .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Japan's parliament officially names Yoshihide Suga as prime minister; Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain formalize their recent agreements at the White House; and Russia announces military exercises in Belarus .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Japan’s parliament officially names Yoshihide Suga as prime minister; Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain formalize their recent agreements at the White House; and Russia announces military exercises in Belarus.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Suga Represents Continuity as Japan Faces New Challenges
The Japanese parliament has confirmed Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga as the country’s new prime minister, replacing the outgoing premier Shinzo Abe after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party elected him as party leader in a landslide on Monday. The longest-serving prime minister since the end of World War II, Abe’s decision to resign was widely considered the end of an era in Japan.
But Suga’s premiership is expected to be characterized by a substantial degree of policy continuity. He is a longtime ally of Abe, and Japanese media have already reported that many key ministers will likely keep their jobs after Suga steps in.
The homefront. Taking over in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, Suga’s main priority will be dealing with Japan’s slumping economy, which has taken a hit since the beginning of the pandemic despite the country’s success in avoiding the high numbers of cases and deaths seen elsewhere.
Abe popularized his brand of economic policy known as “Abenomics,” which Suga helped develop and from which he is unlikely to depart in any significant way. Still, as Chris Miller wrote in Foreign Policy, Japan is overdue for a change to its monetary policy, and Suga could be faced with a tough set of choices if the yen continues to strengthen against the dollar in a country where exporters hold outsized political influence.
Challenges abroad. The salience of domestic issues will probably prevent Suga from continuing Japan’s renewed defense posturing. Under Abe, Japan adopted a more aggressive foreign policy unseen since the end of World War II, as the threat posed by China grew and the United States became less reliable as a security partner.
As Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch reported, “Unlike the globe-trotting, glad-handing Abe … Suga is likely to hew to the low-profile approach honed by seven years of scandal and intra-party rebellion as Abe’s right-hand man.” Regardless of what stance he takes, policymakers in both Washington and Beijing will be watching closely. Sooner or later, geopolitical realities could force Suga to turn his focus to foreign policy again.
What We’re Following Today
Formalizing normalization. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani met in Washington on Tuesday to sign their historic normalization agreements at a ceremony hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump. The deals represent a significant shift in the priorities of many Arab states away from Palestinian statehood and toward countering Iran’s growing military strength in the region. As Maysam Behravesh and Hamidreza Azizi wrote in Foreign Policy, that shift has threatened decades of strategic planning in Tehran.
The Trump administration hopes to entice more Gulf states to sign similar deals with Israel, and there are signs that steps are being taken in that direction. Key Saudi leaders have softened their stance on normalization in recent days, and the Saudi government’s silence on the issue is considered a sign of tacit support.
Militarization of U.S. police. A new report produced by Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs details how the militarization of U.S. police forces has ballooned since the September 11 attacks, arguing that it should be counted as one of the long-term costs of the United States’ post-9/11 War on Terror. The attacks, the report says, provided a new justification to funnel massive amounts of military equipment, funding, and personnel to local and state law enforcement, all in the name of counterterrorism and national security.
The study also argues that the intensive militarization of the police could have helped produce the current political crisis in the United States. “Visibly militaristic tactics and imagery breed fear and mistrust, particularly among poor and hyperpoliced communities of color. This can erode police legitimacy.”
U.S. and Iran tit-for-tat. Iran and the United States engaged in a war of words over reports that Tehran planned a reprisal killing in retaliation for the United States’ assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January. Some U.S. media outlets reported that Iran was planning to assassinate the U.S. ambassador to South Africa ahead of the presidential election in November. Trump tweeted his response, warning that an attack on the United States “will be met with an attack on Iran that will be 1,000 times greater in magnitude!”
During a news conference on Tuesday, an Iranian government spokesman responded in kind: “We hope that they do not make a new strategic mistake and certainly in the case of any strategic mistake, they will witness Iran’s decisive response.”
Keep an Eye On
Russian military to drill in Belarus. The Russian defense ministry said on Tuesday that six members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) will conduct joint military exercises in Belarus in October as the political crisis in the country continues to worsen. The announcement came as Russian and Belarusian troops began joint military drills near Belarus’s border with Poland, due to last until Sep. 25, which Russia’s defense ministry has insisted focuses on counterterrorism and are not directed against other countries.
After initially dragging its feet, the Kremlin has deepened its involvement in Belarus considerably over the previous few weeks. Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he had formed a reserve police force that could be deployed to Belarus, and he recently committed a $1.5 billion loan to Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko.
Crisis in the Ivory Coast. Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara has reportedly made an offer to his predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo, to stay neutral through the end of the presidential election on Oct. 31 in exchange for a pardon of the 20-year prison sentence he received in a corruption case. Ouattara has attracted controversy over his bid for a third term as president despite the constitution barring him from doing so. Protests against Ouattara broke out across much of the country earlier this week, especially in districts considered loyal to Gbagbo.
Ouattara’s victory over Gbagbo in 2010 sparked a brutal civil war that killed around 3,000 people, and the current political crisis has raised concerns that the upcoming election could lead to another round of violence. Gbagbo has so far declined the offer.
Odds and Ends
Four hundred years after the original Mayflower brought the first colonial settlers from England to what is now New England, a new, high-tech version of the ship is set to make the same voyage across the Atlantic. This time, however, the ship will have no crew, no captain, and no passengers—it will be captained solely by artificial intelligence technology as part of a research mission that will help to determine if high-tech vessels can be used to explore parts of the ocean too dangerous for humans.
The Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS) will travel along the original Mayflower’s route—from Plymouth, England, to Plymouth, Massachusetts. Originally scheduled to set sail today—the 400th anniversary of its namesake’s journey—MAS’s launch has been postponed until next spring due to delays caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-16--Congress Pressures Trump Administration to Restore Aid to Yemen

U.S. Congress is urging the State Department to reconsider U.S. assistance to Yemen suspended by President Donald Trump ’ s administration earlier this year after a plea from humanitarian groups last month appeared to fall on deaf ears , redoubling attention on years of U.S. policy missteps in the war-torn country .
In a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo provided to us , a group of more than 50 Democratic lawmakers led by Rep. Ted Deutch of Florida , who chairs the Middle East subcommittee of the House ’ s powerful foreign-affairs panel , called on the agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ halted in March over U.S. fears that Iran-backed Houthi rebels were seizing control of the aid and stopping distribution .
Lawmakers said that the move has only worsened the humanitarian disaster in Yemen , where the majority of citizens face deepening food insecurity and which is struggling to stop the spread of the coronavirus .
In a plea to U.S. Agency for International Development acting head John Barsa last month , aid organizations said that as fighting intensified over the summer , they were unable to provide lifesaving aid—in part because of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is controlled by Iran-backed Houthi rebels .
Lawmakers cited worries that airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis have destroyed many of Yemen ’ s medical facilities and that escalating fighting in the Marib region has caused additional displacement of civilians , problems that threaten to get worse as United Nations-led peace talks have stalled .
“ The challenges of Yemen are multifaceted and complex .
However , progress is impossible without sustained and vigorous U.S. diplomatic engagement , ” the lawmakers wrote to Pompeo .
“ We urge you to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reduce the spread of COVID-19 , mitigate the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe , and advance a political solution to the Yemeni conflict.
” Democratic Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York is working on a companion letter to Pompeo in the upper chamber , a former U.S. official familiar with the effort said .
But Republicans have refused to sign onto either effort , seeing the push to restore U.S. aid in Houthi-controlled areas as a red line , according to a House aide , though Democrats remain hopeful that Pompeo will consider restoring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ progress .
The United Nations has cited a $ 2.7 billion funding gap to help ease the humanitarian crisis in Yemen as contributions from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries have fallen off .
Congress has also been frustrated with a lack of high-level Trump administration engagement to end the conflict in Yemen , the House aide said , which comes as U.N. human rights investigators allege widespread war crimes by all parties in the conflict , including U.S.-facilitated Saudi airstrikes that have indiscriminately targeted civilians .
The U.N. investigators , citing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , cruel or inhuman treatment , rape and other forms of sexual violence , ” called for the alleged war crimes to be referred to the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) .
The U.S. role in the Yemen conflict over the past two administrations has become a political lightning rod—and a potential liability .
Some legal experts and State Department officials fear that the United States ’ backing of the Saudi coalition could put U.S. officials in legal jeopardy and implicate them in potential war crimes , according to an investigation from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the International Criminal Court would be likely to run into jurisdictional challenges , legal experts said , as neither the United States , Saudi Arabia , nor Yemen are a party to The Hague-based tribunal ’ s charter .
But other countries , especially in Europe , claim universal jurisdiction over potential war crimes .
Two cases that might establish legal precedent for officials liable in war crimes cases are the 1998 arrest on a Spanish judge ’ s request of former Chilean dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet for human rights violations , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two years in London .
A group of Palestinians also tried to bring war crimes charges against then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Belgium in 2003 , but the nation ’ s highest court ruled he could only be tried after he left office .
The risk , experts say , is likely greater for higher-level policymakers .
“ The risk seems more real for people who have the knowledge and intent to say we are knowingly supporting this Saudi policy and here ’ s how this U.S. action supports it , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department official now with the Brookings Institution .
“ That ’ s the essence of this aiding and abetting liability .
Lower-level people might say they don ’ t know what they ’ re involved in , but that gets harder as you get higher up the chain.
” Beyond the ICC , laws in Germany and the Netherlands allow for universal jurisdiction , which has recently allowed prosecutors in the German city of Koblenz to bring cases against alleged torturers in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s regime .
French authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Emirati crown prince of Abu Dhabi , Mohammed bin Zayed , has been complicit in acts of torture in Yemen .
For the Trump administration , staunch support for Saudi Arabia ’ s war in Yemen has drawn criticism from a unique coalition of progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans , including some of Trump ’ s staunchest supporters on Capitol Hill .
For years , lawmakers have pushed—and failed—to halt U.S. military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen by trying to revive a Vietnam War-era resolution that would pare back a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without prior congressional approval .
Some experts say the United States has backed itself into an impossible corner .
“ [ The United States ] ended up in this dilemma where if they don ’ t help the coalition , the attacks will be worse in terms of the humanitarian impact .
But if you do help , you may be accused of culpability in indiscriminate attacks , ” said Elana DeLozier , a research fellow and expert on Yemen at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy .
“ Here we are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is there ’ s no good way out except to prevent this dilemma in the future.
” The Trump administration ’ s drive to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over congressional objections became the subject of an internal State Department watchdog investigation .
Trump in May fired the State Department inspector general looking into the matter at Pompeo ’ s request .
Democrats have accused top aides to Pompeo of trying to slow down the investigation , while Pompeo has denied any wrongdoing .
The Trump administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lists and joint intelligence cells , and trained Saudi airmen to avoid bombing civilian targets .
But the State Department inspector general ’ s recent investigation said those steps didn ’ t go far enough to mitigate the risk of innocent loss of life .
The State Department ’ s decision to move portions of the report on civilian casualties to a classified annex also has raised concerns that the agency could be keeping more damning information out of the public eye , congressional aides and former officials said .
“ I think @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paid in Yemeni lives in arms sales is beyond the moral and ethical failings of this administration , ” said a former U.S. official familiar with the issue who spoke on condition of anonymity .
The Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the sacking of Steven Linick , the former State Department inspector general .
Linick was abruptly fired in May while probing the expedited Saudi arms sales and other allegations of wrongdoing by Pompeo .

U.S. Congress is urging the State Department to reconsider U.S. assistance to Yemen suspended by President Donald Trump’s administration earlier this year after a plea from humanitarian groups last month appeared to fall on deaf ears, redoubling attention on years of U.S. policy missteps in the war-torn country.
U.S. Congress is urging the State Department to reconsider U.S. assistance to Yemen suspended by President Donald Trump’s administration earlier this year after a plea from humanitarian groups last month appeared to fall on deaf ears, redoubling attention on years of U.S. policy missteps in the war-torn country.
In a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo provided to us, a group of more than 50 Democratic lawmakers led by Rep. Ted Deutch of Florida, who chairs the Middle East subcommittee of the House’s powerful foreign-affairs panel, called on the agency to restore $73 million in aid halted in March over U.S. fears that Iran-backed Houthi rebels were seizing control of the aid and stopping distribution.
Lawmakers said that the move has only worsened the humanitarian disaster in Yemen, where the majority of citizens face deepening food insecurity and which is struggling to stop the spread of the coronavirus. In a plea to U.S. Agency for International Development acting head John Barsa last month, aid organizations said that as fighting intensified over the summer, they were unable to provide lifesaving aid—in part because of a U.S.-imposed aid suspension to northern Yemen, which is controlled by Iran-backed Houthi rebels.
Lawmakers cited worries that airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis have destroyed many of Yemen’s medical facilities and that escalating fighting in the Marib region has caused additional displacement of civilians, problems that threaten to get worse as United Nations-led peace talks have stalled.
“The challenges of Yemen are multifaceted and complex. However, progress is impossible without sustained and vigorous U.S. diplomatic engagement,” the lawmakers wrote to Pompeo. “We urge you to reverse U.S. assistance cuts, redouble efforts to reduce the spread of COVID-19, mitigate the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, and advance a political solution to the Yemeni conflict.”
Democratic Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York is working on a companion letter to Pompeo in the upper chamber, a former U.S. official familiar with the effort said. But Republicans have refused to sign onto either effort, seeing the push to restore U.S. aid in Houthi-controlled areas as a red line, according to a House aide, though Democrats remain hopeful that Pompeo will consider restoring assistance if it is tied to diplomatic progress. The United Nations has cited a $2.7 billion funding gap to help ease the humanitarian crisis in Yemen as contributions from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries have fallen off.
Congress has also been frustrated with a lack of high-level Trump administration engagement to end the conflict in Yemen, the House aide said, which comes as U.N. human rights investigators allege widespread war crimes by all parties in the conflict, including U.S.-facilitated Saudi airstrikes that have indiscriminately targeted civilians. The U.N. investigators, citing the “murder of civilians, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence,” called for the alleged war crimes to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The U.S. role in the Yemen conflict over the past two administrations has become a political lightning rod—and a potential liability. Some legal experts and State Department officials fear that the United States’ backing of the Saudi coalition could put U.S. officials in legal jeopardy and implicate them in potential war crimes, according to an investigation from the New York Times.
A probe from the International Criminal Court would be likely to run into jurisdictional challenges, legal experts said, as neither the United States, Saudi Arabia, nor Yemen are a party to The Hague-based tribunal’s charter. But other countries, especially in Europe, claim universal jurisdiction over potential war crimes.
Two cases that might establish legal precedent for officials liable in war crimes cases are the 1998 arrest on a Spanish judge’s request of former Chilean dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet for human rights violations, which forced him into house arrest for two years in London. A group of Palestinians also tried to bring war crimes charges against then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Belgium in 2003, but the nation’s highest court ruled he could only be tried after he left office. The risk, experts say, is likely greater for higher-level policymakers.
“The risk seems more real for people who have the knowledge and intent to say we are knowingly supporting this Saudi policy and here’s how this U.S. action supports it,” said Scott Anderson, a former State Department official now with the Brookings Institution. “That’s the essence of this aiding and abetting liability. Lower-level people might say they don’t know what they’re involved in, but that gets harder as you get higher up the chain.”
Beyond the ICC, laws in Germany and the Netherlands allow for universal jurisdiction, which has recently allowed prosecutors in the German city of Koblenz to bring cases against alleged torturers in Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. French authorities have also opened an investigation into whether the Emirati crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, has been complicit in acts of torture in Yemen.
For the Trump administration, staunch support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has drawn criticism from a unique coalition of progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans, including some of Trump’s staunchest supporters on Capitol Hill. For years, lawmakers have pushed—and failed—to halt U.S. military support for the Saudi coalition in Yemen by trying to revive a Vietnam War-era resolution that would pare back a president’s ability to wage war without prior congressional approval.
Some experts say the United States has backed itself into an impossible corner. “[The United States] ended up in this dilemma where if they don’t help the coalition, the attacks will be worse in terms of the humanitarian impact. But if you do help, you may be accused of culpability in indiscriminate attacks,” said Elana DeLozier, a research fellow and expert on Yemen at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Here we are in this dilemma, and the answer is there’s no good way out except to prevent this dilemma in the future.”
The Trump administration’s drive to expedite arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over congressional objections became the subject of an internal State Department watchdog investigation. Trump in May fired the State Department inspector general looking into the matter at Pompeo’s request. Democrats have accused top aides to Pompeo of trying to slow down the investigation, while Pompeo has denied any wrongdoing.
The Trump administration has consistently argued that it crafted no-strike lists and joint intelligence cells, and trained Saudi airmen to avoid bombing civilian targets. But the State Department inspector general’s recent investigation said those steps didn’t go far enough to mitigate the risk of innocent loss of life.
The State Department’s decision to move portions of the report on civilian casualties to a classified annex also has raised concerns that the agency could be keeping more damning information out of the public eye, congressional aides and former officials said.
“I think being willing and affirmatively hiding the price paid in Yemeni lives in arms sales is beyond the moral and ethical failings of this administration,” said a former U.S. official familiar with the issue who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The Democratic-led House Foreign Affairs Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the sacking of Steven Linick, the former State Department inspector general. Linick was abruptly fired in May while probing the expedited Saudi arms sales and other allegations of wrongdoing by Pompeo.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-15--For Iran, Negotiations Aren’t Optional

For Iran, Negotiations Aren’t Optional

No matter who wins the U.S. presidential election , Joe Biden or President Donald Trump , the next administration will have to confront a dangerous situation with Iran .
Although Trump ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign has wrecked the Iranian economy , it has failed to produce Iran ’ s capitulation or collapse .
Instead , as international inspectors affirmed this month , Tehran is closer to having a nuclear weapon today than when Trump took office .
The regime ’ s regional aggression is undiminished .
And just this week , it was accused of plotting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa in retaliation for the United States ’ killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January .
To address these threats , it will be crucial for the next U.S. president to make a credible effort at diplomacy ; indeed , both Biden and Trump have stated a willingness to pursue negotiations .
In a Sunday op-ed , Biden reiterated his pledge to reverse the current administration ’ s policy and re-enter the 2015 nuclear deal , which Trump left in 2018 .
The former vice president ’ s proposal can be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal , the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.
” For his part , Trump has claimed on several occasions that if he were elected for a second term , he ’ d be able to strike a deal with Iran within weeks of his inauguration .
A key question facing the next administration is how and when it would take the first step toward reengaging Tehran .
In the United States and Europe , observers increasingly argue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to secure a deal with Iran between the U.S. inauguration in January and the Iranian presidential elections in June .
President Hassan Rouhani isn ’ t eligible to run again and will likely be replaced by a more conservative politician .
Thus , the argument goes , Biden ( or a reelected Trump ) should move quickly to strike a deal with Iran while Rouhani is still in power .
That would be a mistake .
To be sure , there are compelling reasons for a new administration to reengage Iran early on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the United States shouldn ’ t rush to secure a deal in the hopes of shaping Iran ’ s domestic politics , or for fear that the window of opportunity will close .
And the new administration shouldn ’ t assume that without Rouhani , diplomacy wouldn ’ t stand a chance .
Rouhani ’ s 2013 election was key to diplomacy ’ s success .
Under the hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , American diplomats faced counterparts much less inclined or equipped to negotiate in good faith .
Rouhani ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chief negotiator Ambassador Wendy Sherman recounts in her memoir .
Yet , U.S. policy-makers should not overstate Rouhani ’ s personal role or assume that he can play a similar role again .
In 2013 , Rouhani could run on a diplomacy-first campaign message because the political system , led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei , had already decided to tack toward diplomacy , facing a significant escalation in U.S. sanctions and domestic pressure .
Secret U.S.-Iranian talks throughout 2012 and 2013 demonstrated Tehran ’ s different attitude .
Rouhani ’ s election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to negotiate ; the system ’ s strategic decision enabled Rouhani ’ s election .
Rouhani ’ s political position could not be more different today .
In 2013 , Rouhani had considerable political capital and was a contender to succeed Khamenei .
Today , his standing has collapsed along with that of the nuclear agreement he championed and the economy he promised to revive .
He is probably keen to open up talks with Washington in his final months to rehabilitate his political legacy and show that the accord was not in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with succession looming large , powerful forces have a vested interest in seeing Rouhani fail during the remainder of his tenure .
Washington should therefore not assume that Rouhani has the leash to get a deal done , even if it is in his best political interest .
Meanwhile , proponents of diplomacy rightly assess that Rouhani ’ s successor will almost certainly be more conservative .
But that ’ s not necessarily a death knell for diplomacy .
Ahmadinejad will likely not be allowed to run again , and his ilk are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s leadership .
Even from the perspective of key hardliners—including Khamenei—the Ahmadinejad experiment in hard-line populism was a failure .
His mismanagement of affairs at home and his belligerence abroad led to internal turmoil and accelerated the country ’ s isolation internationally .
Iranian elites are probably more interested in stability than gambling with a volatile candidate , with succession on the agenda and given increasing discontent at home ( as demonstrated by the November 2019 protests and the regime ’ s violent response ) .
It is far too soon to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a spectrum of well-known conservative figures appear to have a viable shot , including Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi , Ezzatollah Zarghami , Hossein Dehghan , and Parviz Fattah .
All have Revolutionary Guards or intelligence credentials , although this says more about the mounting political power of the security apparatus than it does about each man ’ s likelihood of negotiating with Washington .
Ultimately , it will not be up to the new president to decide whether to negotiate with Washington .
When it comes to national security strategy , Iran acts as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to say that the country ’ s domestic politics don ’ t matter , but it ’ d be a mistake to think of the regime ’ s strategic-level decisions shifting fundamentally with the change in government .
Major decisions are made with buy-in from the whole system .
Although there will be differences between Rouhani and his successor , if and when Iran decides to return to the negotiating table , it ’ ll do so regardless of who ’ s holding the reins of the executive branch .
In the end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but to negotiate with the U.S. president .
Despite extraordinary steps to stabilize the stock market and cover the budget deficit , Iran ’ s economic situation is not sustainable .
The regime can almost certainly not risk the return of widespread protests as it falters further .
But Iranian leaders will nevertheless approach negotiations cautiously .
Khamenei and others have been quick to point out that Trump ’ s withdrawal from the last nuclear deal showed that the United States can not be trusted , and they will approach Washington accordingly .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ will likely be determined once the results of the U.S. elections are known and Iran has a better sense of the new administration ’ s composition , goals , and policies .
Above all , Iran will assiduously avoid appearing to be in a state of desperation .
There are good reasons for a new U.S. administration to move quickly to talk to Tehran to try to de-escalate tensions .
But that ’ s quite different from chasing the Iranians in the hopes of striking a deal based on the artificial deadline of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ track record of trying to influence Iranian domestic politics leaves a lot to be desired .
Not only will such attempts fail to secure American interests , Iran will also leverage this desire to its advantage .
Ultimately , timelines guiding the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic process should serve the United States ’ objectives , not vice versa .

No matter who wins the U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden or President Donald Trump, the next administration will have to confront a dangerous situation with Iran. Although Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has wrecked the Iranian economy, it has failed to produce Iran’s capitulation or collapse. Instead, as international inspectors affirmed this month, Tehran is closer to having a nuclear weapon today than when Trump took office. The regime’s regional aggression is undiminished. And just this week, it was accused of plotting the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to South Africa in retaliation for the United States’ killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January.
No matter who wins the U.S. presidential election, Joe Biden or President Donald Trump, the next administration will have to confront a dangerous situation with Iran. Although Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has wrecked the Iranian economy, it has failed to produce Iran’s capitulation or collapse. Instead, as international inspectors affirmed this month, Tehran is closer to having a nuclear weapon today than when Trump took office. The regime’s regional aggression is undiminished. And just this week, it was accused of plotting the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to South Africa in retaliation for the United States’ killing of Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani in January.
To address these threats, it will be crucial for the next U.S. president to make a credible effort at diplomacy; indeed, both Biden and Trump have stated a willingness to pursue negotiations. In a Sunday op-ed, Biden reiterated his pledge to reverse the current administration’s policy and re-enter the 2015 nuclear deal, which Trump left in 2018. The former vice president’s proposal can be boiled down to this: “If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” For his part, Trump has claimed on several occasions that if he were elected for a second term, he’d be able to strike a deal with Iran within weeks of his inauguration. A key question facing the next administration is how and when it would take the first step toward reengaging Tehran.
In the United States and Europe, observers increasingly argue that there is a window of opportunity to secure a deal with Iran between the U.S. inauguration in January and the Iranian presidential elections in June. President Hassan Rouhani isn’t eligible to run again and will likely be replaced by a more conservative politician. Thus, the argument goes, Biden (or a reelected Trump) should move quickly to strike a deal with Iran while Rouhani is still in power.
That would be a mistake. To be sure, there are compelling reasons for a new administration to reengage Iran early on to reduce the nuclear and regional risks. But the United States shouldn’t rush to secure a deal in the hopes of shaping Iran’s domestic politics, or for fear that the window of opportunity will close. And the new administration shouldn’t assume that without Rouhani, diplomacy wouldn’t stand a chance.
Rouhani’s 2013 election was key to diplomacy’s success. Under the hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, American diplomats faced counterparts much less inclined or equipped to negotiate in good faith. Rouhani’s election broke the logjam, as U.S. chief negotiator Ambassador Wendy Sherman recounts in her memoir. Yet, U.S. policy-makers should not overstate Rouhani’s personal role or assume that he can play a similar role again. In 2013, Rouhani could run on a diplomacy-first campaign message because the political system, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, had already decided to tack toward diplomacy, facing a significant escalation in U.S. sanctions and domestic pressure. Secret U.S.-Iranian talks throughout 2012 and 2013 demonstrated Tehran’s different attitude. Rouhani’s election didn’t enable a strategic decision to negotiate; the system’s strategic decision enabled Rouhani’s election.
Rouhani’s political position could not be more different today. In 2013, Rouhani had considerable political capital and was a contender to succeed Khamenei. Today, his standing has collapsed along with that of the nuclear agreement he championed and the economy he promised to revive. He is probably keen to open up talks with Washington in his final months to rehabilitate his political legacy and show that the accord was not in vain. By the same token, with succession looming large, powerful forces have a vested interest in seeing Rouhani fail during the remainder of his tenure. Washington should therefore not assume that Rouhani has the leash to get a deal done, even if it is in his best political interest.
Meanwhile, proponents of diplomacy rightly assess that Rouhani’s successor will almost certainly be more conservative. But that’s not necessarily a death knell for diplomacy. Ahmadinejad will likely not be allowed to run again, and his ilk are not in good standing among the country’s leadership. Even from the perspective of key hardliners—including Khamenei—the Ahmadinejad experiment in hard-line populism was a failure. His mismanagement of affairs at home and his belligerence abroad led to internal turmoil and accelerated the country’s isolation internationally.
Iranian elites are probably more interested in stability than gambling with a volatile candidate, with succession on the agenda and given increasing discontent at home (as demonstrated by the November 2019 protests and the regime’s violent response). It is far too soon to pick a frontrunner for president, although a spectrum of well-known conservative figures appear to have a viable shot, including Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi, Ezzatollah Zarghami, Hossein Dehghan, and Parviz Fattah. All have Revolutionary Guards or intelligence credentials, although this says more about the mounting political power of the security apparatus than it does about each man’s likelihood of negotiating with Washington.
Ultimately, it will not be up to the new president to decide whether to negotiate with Washington. When it comes to national security strategy, Iran acts as a unitary actor. This is not to say that the country’s domestic politics don’t matter, but it’d be a mistake to think of the regime’s strategic-level decisions shifting fundamentally with the change in government. Major decisions are made with buy-in from the whole system. Although there will be differences between Rouhani and his successor, if and when Iran decides to return to the negotiating table, it’ll do so regardless of who’s holding the reins of the executive branch.
In the end, Iran will probably have no choice but to negotiate with the U.S. president. Despite extraordinary steps to stabilize the stock market and cover the budget deficit, Iran’s economic situation is not sustainable. The regime can almost certainly not risk the return of widespread protests as it falters further. But Iranian leaders will nevertheless approach negotiations cautiously. Khamenei and others have been quick to point out that Trump’s withdrawal from the last nuclear deal showed that the United States cannot be trusted, and they will approach Washington accordingly. The timing and scope of the negotiations will likely be determined once the results of the U.S. elections are known and Iran has a better sense of the new administration’s composition, goals, and policies. Above all, Iran will assiduously avoid appearing to be in a state of desperation.
There are good reasons for a new U.S. administration to move quickly to talk to Tehran to try to de-escalate tensions. But that’s quite different from chasing the Iranians in the hopes of striking a deal based on the artificial deadline of the Iranian elections. The United States’ track record of trying to influence Iranian domestic politics leaves a lot to be desired. Not only will such attempts fail to secure American interests, Iran will also leverage this desire to its advantage. Ultimately, timelines guiding the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic process should serve the United States’ objectives, not vice versa.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-15--China Is Merkel’s Biggest Failure in Office

Angela Merkel has made it clear that she will step down after Germany ’ s next general election in the fall of 2021 .
By then she will draw level with Chancellor Helmut Kohl ’ s 16-year reign , who entered the history books for paving the way to German reunification .
Merkel wants to leave behind an equally impressive achievement in Germany ’ s relationship with China , which she has visited an unprecedented 12 times during her chancellorship—but the odds , and the actions of the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , are against her .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to leave the political scene with a landmark European Union-China summit in Leipzig , where she had studied physics at the then-named Karl Marx University in the mid-1970s .
Merkel had pinned her hopes on signing a historic investment treaty that would level the field for European business in China .
It wasn ’ t meant to be .
As a result of COVID-19 , the gathering was reduced to a one-day virtual summit .
The televised press conference following the two-hour virtual summit provided remarkable insights into Merkel ’ s approach to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Merkel talked about Hong Kong , minorities , and human rights for a mere 10 seconds .
The characteristically stoic chancellor was far more animated when talking about the improved chances to sell German wine and beer following the EU-China agreement on geographical indications , which took up half a minute of her statement .
There is a sense of déjà vu .
In the fall of 1997 , Kohl had been in power for 15 years .
Pundits across the German political spectrum complained about a suffocating intellectual inertia that had beset @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after Kohl ’ s uninterrupted reign as German chancellor .
Fast-forward to this fall and history is repeating itself .
Merkel , also in her 15th year , appears to be suffering permanent adjournment of political change .
Not a day goes by without reports about the CCP ’ s genocide against the Uighurs .
That should matter in a country where “ never again ” is a mainstream value .
Hong Kong ’ s courageous democracy movement has been suppressed with the help of a draconian so-called national security law .
Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan with military annexation .
And despite clear evidence of the CCP ’ s authoritarian brutalities , Merkel is unwilling to make even cosmetic changes to Germany ’ s mercantilist approach to China .
The problem goes well beyond Merkel .
In an interview with Politico in mid-July , German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier doubled down on Germany ’ s failed “ change through trade ” policy by saying , “ I have always been convinced and I still believe that change can be achieved through trade.
” To substantiate his claim , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ previous engagement approach toward Eastern Europe .
The fact that an economically faltering Soviet Union can hardly be compared with China ’ s turbocharged state-led crony capitalism didn ’ t seem to matter much to him .
But since Altmaier was previously Merkel ’ s chief of staff , his view matters a lot .
In the same interview , he also shrugged off criticism of German trade with an increasingly authoritarian China by stating , “ We have trade relations with many regions across the globe , including in many cases countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights than we have in Germany.
” Why it is taking so long for the German government to abandon Merkel ’ s failed China policy of change through trade ?
When it comes to China , the German government has largely engaged in foreign trade promotion .
Academic scholarship on the subject matter suggests that in foreign trade promotion the German government has let the private sector take the lead , which explains the highly corporatist approach .
This makes foreign-policy change through legislative means much harder , as the German government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ private sector .
Outsourcing foreign policy to the private sector has also meant that corporate propaganda has always loomed large in the German public discourse about China .
To justify trade and investments with an authoritarian China , corporate lobbyists have for decades hyped the significance of the Chinese market for Germany ’ s traditionally export-oriented economy .
During their regular visits to China , senior German politicians including Kohl , former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder , and Merkel have provided the TV images for such one-sided narratives .
By signing trade and investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have created the impression that Germany heavily relies on the Chinese market .
It is rather ironic that government statistics reveal that in 2018 China only ranked third ( 7.1 percent ) , after the United States ( 8.7 percent ) and Europe ( 68.5 percent ) in Germany ’ s overall exports .
As is so often , the promise of a largely illusory Chinese market has outweighed the reality .
German media has often uncritically amplified such corporate propaganda .
I recently discussed this problem with a German media professional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear to me that groupthink contributed to this rather unfortunate practice among journalists .
Instead of challenging dominant narratives , all too often journalists have uncritically added formulations such as “ Germany ’ s biggest export market ” to their China-related reports .
As the previously mentioned government statistics show , Europe is by far Germany ’ s most significant export market .
Germany ’ s outdated China policy will only change if politicians and parliamentarians reassert the central role of the state and strengthen both democratic security and industrial policy .
Didi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Relations recently pointed out that “ Europe can protect its interests by countering disinformation , auditing and diversifying supply chains , building trusted alliances , screening foreign investments , clearly labeling propaganda sources , cracking down on United Front activity , prohibiting Chinese tech and taking cybersecurity seriously.
” Following such sound advice will require political will , which in today ’ s Berlin unfortunately is in short supply .
There is also a need to better regulate corporate lobbying .
It is an open secret in Germany ’ s corporatist political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intertwined .
This makes it all the more important to create greater transparency and accountability , e.g.
, in the form of a lobby register at the German parliament .
If conglomerates dictate German foreign policy toward China , the public has a right to know its authors .
Academics and journalists should play their part by breaking down both government and corporate propaganda that hypes the significance of China ’ s market for Germany ’ s export-oriented economy .
And finally , German citizens should take note of the totalitarian turn in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end to Germany ’ s failed China policy of change through trade .

Angela Merkel has made it clear that she will step down after Germany’s next general election in the fall of 2021. By then she will draw level with Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 16-year reign , who entered the history books for paving the way to German reunification. Merkel wants to leave behind an equally impressive achievement in Germany’s relationship with China, which she has visited an unprecedented 12 times during her chancellorship—but the odds, and the actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are against her.
Angela Merkel has made it clear that she will step down after Germany’s next general election in the fall of 2021. By then she will draw level with Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 16-year reign, who entered the history books for paving the way to German reunification. Merkel wants to leave behind an equally impressive achievement in Germany’s relationship with China, which she has visited an unprecedented 12 times during her chancellorship—but the odds, and the actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are against her.
It has been widely reported that Merkel wanted to leave the political scene with a landmark European Union-China summit in Leipzig, where she had studied physics at the then-named Karl Marx University in the mid-1970s. Merkel had pinned her hopes on signing a historic investment treaty that would level the field for European business in China. It wasn’t meant to be. As a result of COVID-19, the gathering was reduced to a one-day virtual summit.
The televised press conference following the two-hour virtual summit provided remarkable insights into Merkel’s approach to China. In her six-minute statement, Merkel talked about Hong Kong, minorities, and human rights for a mere 10 seconds. The characteristically stoic chancellor was far more animated when talking about the improved chances to sell German wine and beer following the EU-China agreement on geographical indications, which took up half a minute of her statement.
There is a sense of déjà vu. In the fall of 1997, Kohl had been in power for 15 years. Pundits across the German political spectrum complained about a suffocating intellectual inertia that had beset the country’s politics and society after Kohl’s uninterrupted reign as German chancellor. Fast-forward to this fall and history is repeating itself. Merkel, also in her 15th year, appears to be suffering permanent adjournment of political change.
Not a day goes by without reports about the CCP’s genocide against the Uighurs. That should matter in a country where “never again” is a mainstream value. Hong Kong’s courageous democracy movement has been suppressed with the help of a draconian so-called national security law. Chinese President Xi Jinping has threatened liberal democratic Taiwan with military annexation. And despite clear evidence of the CCP’s authoritarian brutalities, Merkel is unwilling to make even cosmetic changes to Germany’s mercantilist approach to China.
The problem goes well beyond Merkel. In an interview with Politico in mid-July, German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier doubled down on Germany’s failed “change through trade” policy by saying, “I have always been convinced and I still believe that change can be achieved through trade.” To substantiate his claim, he referred to West Germany’s previous engagement approach toward Eastern Europe.
The fact that an economically faltering Soviet Union can hardly be compared with China’s turbocharged state-led crony capitalism didn’t seem to matter much to him. But since Altmaier was previously Merkel’s chief of staff, his view matters a lot. In the same interview, he also shrugged off criticism of German trade with an increasingly authoritarian China by stating, “We have trade relations with many regions across the globe, including in many cases countries that have a different understanding of civil rights than we have in Germany.”
Why it is taking so long for the German government to abandon Merkel’s failed China policy of change through trade? When it comes to China, the German government has largely engaged in foreign trade promotion. Academic scholarship on the subject matter suggests that in foreign trade promotion the German government has let the private sector take the lead, which explains the highly corporatist approach.
This makes foreign-policy change through legislative means much harder, as the German government has essentially outsourced its foreign policy to the private sector. Outsourcing foreign policy to the private sector has also meant that corporate propaganda has always loomed large in the German public discourse about China. To justify trade and investments with an authoritarian China, corporate lobbyists have for decades hyped the significance of the Chinese market for Germany’s traditionally export-oriented economy.
During their regular visits to China, senior German politicians including Kohl, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and Merkel have provided the TV images for such one-sided narratives. By signing trade and investment deals during their visits to Beijing, they have created the impression that Germany heavily relies on the Chinese market. It is rather ironic that government statistics reveal that in 2018 China only ranked third (7.1 percent), after the United States (8.7 percent) and Europe (68.5 percent) in Germany’s overall exports. As is so often, the promise of a largely illusory Chinese market has outweighed the reality.
German media has often uncritically amplified such corporate propaganda. I recently discussed this problem with a German media professional. In this conversation, it became clear to me that groupthink contributed to this rather unfortunate practice among journalists. Instead of challenging dominant narratives, all too often journalists have uncritically added formulations such as “Germany’s biggest export market” to their China-related reports. As the previously mentioned government statistics show, Europe is by far Germany’s most significant export market.
Germany’s outdated China policy will only change if politicians and parliamentarians reassert the central role of the state and strengthen both democratic security and industrial policy. Didi Kirsten Tatlow of the German Council on Foreign Relations recently pointed out that “Europe can protect its interests by countering disinformation, auditing and diversifying supply chains, building trusted alliances, screening foreign investments, clearly labeling propaganda sources, cracking down on United Front activity, prohibiting Chinese tech and taking cybersecurity seriously.” Following such sound advice will require political will, which in today’s Berlin unfortunately is in short supply.
There is also a need to better regulate corporate lobbying. It is an open secret in Germany’s corporatist political economy that politics and industry are deeply intertwined. This makes it all the more important to create greater transparency and accountability, e.g., in the form of a lobby register at the German parliament. If conglomerates dictate German foreign policy toward China, the public has a right to know its authors.
Academics and journalists should play their part by breaking down both government and corporate propaganda that hypes the significance of China’s market for Germany’s export-oriented economy.
And finally, German citizens should take note of the totalitarian turn in Xi’s China and demand an end to Germany’s failed China policy of change through trade.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-18--Will Trump Approve Oracle’s Bid to Purchase TikTok?

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S.-China tech war over TikTok comes to a head , Russia is building up its troop presence near the Chinese border as anti-government protests continue , and militia attacks kill dozens across Ethiopia .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Oracle and the Chinese company ByteDance have tentatively agreed to terms with the U.S. Treasury Department in the former ’ s bid to purchase the U.S. operations of the popular video-sharing app TikTok , which is owned by ByteDance .
Earlier this week , Oracle and ByteDance agreed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would keep ByteDance as the majority owner of TikTok , but would give Oracle a minority stake as well as control over user data and the power to review TikTok ’ s code for security .
Under the U.S. Treasury ’ s revised terms , TikTok ’ s board of directors would have to consist solely of U.S. citizens and would also include a national security committee that would work with the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment to deal with any security concerns .
Walmart , which had previously expressed interest in purchasing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , said it was still interested in investing in the company .
Security concerns .
In August , U.S. President Donald Trump signed a series of executive orders banning the Chinese apps TikTok and WeChat over national security concerns .
The U.S. government and some U.S. politicians have warned about the danger posed by TikTok , and several cybersecurity experts said it could pose a risk if ByteDance chose to share the data it collects with the Chinese government .
The ban on TikTok is due to go into effect on Sept. 20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senior Adviser Jared Kushner , who has some influence over Trump ’ s decision making , has not commented on the new terms , although he previously expressed strong approval for Oracle ’ s bid to buy TikTok .
The deal ultimately needs to be approved by Trump .
On Wednesday , the U.S. president said that he wasn ’ t happy about the reports he was hearing regarding the proposed partnership and that he would prefer to see a deal that did not leave ByteDance as a majority owner , which the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talks .
Lebanon ’ s Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib said he will hold more talks with political leaders over forming a new government , after failing to meet a Sept. 15 deadline .
The inability so far to form a government is rooted in demands by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement to appoint Shiite leaders to key ministerial posts , including the finance minister .
Facing mass anti-government protests in the wake of last month ’ s explosions in Beirut , the Lebanese government collapsed after it was revealed that official negligence was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blast .
Russia boosts its military presence near Chinese border .
Russia is bolstering its troop presence in the country ’ s east in response to growing geopolitical threats in the region , though the Kremlin did not say what those threats are .
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 500 units of new , advanced equipment were being sent to the region , but he did not specify the destination .
The moves are likely a response to China ’ s growing assertiveness , though some parts of the region have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks .
In July , people took to the streets in the city of Khabarovsk , which lies along the border with China , after the arrest of the region ’ s hugely popular governor , Sergei Furgal , who beat out Putin ’ s favored candidate in an election in September 2018 .
Belarus sanctions in doubt .
Twin crises in Europe are colliding as Cyprus has threatened to veto an attempt by the European Union to slap sanctions on Belarusian individuals involved in last month ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s refusal to implement similar measures against Turkey over its involvement in the ongoing eastern Mediterranean crisis .
EU officials have come under heavy pressure to impose sanctions on Belarus .
Last month , Lithuania , Latvia , and Estonia preempted the European Union by slapping sanctions of their own on Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko .
EU foreign ministers are due to meet on Monday , but efforts to pressure Lukashenko and his allies will likely be delayed .
Violence in Ethiopia .
More than 30 people were killed in militia attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said on Thursday , underscoring the country ’ s worsening security situation and creating new problems for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed .
The attackers are “ groups aimed at overturning the reforms journey , ” Abiy said in a tweet .
Abiy entered government promising sweeping reforms of the country ’ s political system , but his efforts have since faced criticism from opponents and former allies .
Last week , the country ’ s Tigray region held parliamentary elections despite the national government ’ s decision to postpone the vote over coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front , the country ’ s dominant political force before Abiy ’ s takeover in 2019 .
Crowd control in Washington .
U.S. federal officials reportedly sought a “ heat ray ” device to deal with protesters around the White House in June before using tear gas to forcibly remove them from the area to allow Trump to take pictures for a campaign ad outside a local church .
The device , which was developed by the U.S. military almost two decades ago , emits a burst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sensation in its victims .
It is designed for use as a form of crowd control .
The protests were part of a nationwide outburst of anger over the police killing of George Floyd in May .
As sports leagues around the world take precautionary measures to protect players from the spread of the coronavirus , some teams have no choice but to play—sometimes with disastrous outcomes on the field .
On Sunday , a lower-division German soccer team , SG Ripdorf/Molzen II , lost to a rival by a whopping score of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take the field due to the other team having come into contact with a player who tested positive for coronavirus in a previous game .
“ When the game kicked off , one of our players passed the ball to the opponent and our team walked to the sidelines , ” a Ripdorf team representative said .
The game had already been scheduled , so Ripdorf would have been fined 200 euros if it cancelled , forcing it to “ play ” anyway .
Although its opponent , Holdenstedt , opted not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still felt the game was worth playing .
“ Holdenstedt showed no mercy and scored a goal nearly every two minutes , while their opponents watched on from a safe distance , ” the Guardian reported .
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Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S.-China tech war over TikTok comes to a head, Russia is building up its troop presence near the Chinese border as anti-government protests continue, and militia attacks kill dozens across Ethiopia .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S.-China tech war over TikTok comes to a head, Russia is building up its troop presence near the Chinese border as anti-government protests continue, and militia attacks kill dozens across Ethiopia.
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White House Considering Oracle ByteDance Deal
Oracle and the Chinese company ByteDance have tentatively agreed to terms with the U.S. Treasury Department in the former’s bid to purchase the U.S. operations of the popular video-sharing app TikTok, which is owned by ByteDance. Earlier this week, Oracle and ByteDance agreed to a “technical partnership” which would keep ByteDance as the majority owner of TikTok, but would give Oracle a minority stake as well as control over user data and the power to review TikTok’s code for security.
Under the U.S. Treasury’s revised terms, TikTok’s board of directors would have to consist solely of U.S. citizens and would also include a national security committee that would work with the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment to deal with any security concerns. Walmart, which had previously expressed interest in purchasing the app through its partnership with Microsoft, said it was still interested in investing in the company.
Security concerns. In August, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a series of executive orders banning the Chinese apps TikTok and WeChat over national security concerns. The U.S. government and some U.S. politicians have warned about the danger posed by TikTok, and several cybersecurity experts said it could pose a risk if ByteDance chose to share the data it collects with the Chinese government. The ban on TikTok is due to go into effect on Sept. 20.
Will Trump approve? White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner, who has some influence over Trump’s decision making, has not commented on the new terms, although he previously expressed strong approval for Oracle’s bid to buy TikTok. The deal ultimately needs to be approved by Trump. On Wednesday, the U.S. president said that he wasn’t happy about the reports he was hearing regarding the proposed partnership and that he would prefer to see a deal that did not leave ByteDance as a majority owner, which the current terms allow.
What We’re Following Today
Lebanon delays government talks. Lebanon’s Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib said he will hold more talks with political leaders over forming a new government, after failing to meet a Sept. 15 deadline. The inability so far to form a government is rooted in demands by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement to appoint Shiite leaders to key ministerial posts, including the finance minister.
Facing mass anti-government protests in the wake of last month’s explosions in Beirut, the Lebanese government collapsed after it was revealed that official negligence was partly responsible for the intensity of the blast.
Russia boosts its military presence near Chinese border. Russia is bolstering its troop presence in the country’s east in response to growing geopolitical threats in the region, though the Kremlin did not say what those threats are. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that 500 units of new, advanced equipment were being sent to the region, but he did not specify the destination.
The moves are likely a response to China’s growing assertiveness, though some parts of the region have been gripped by protests against the government of President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks. In July, people took to the streets in the city of Khabarovsk, which lies along the border with China, after the arrest of the region’s hugely popular governor, Sergei Furgal, who beat out Putin’s favored candidate in an election in September 2018.
Belarus sanctions in doubt. Twin crises in Europe are colliding as Cyprus has threatened to veto an attempt by the European Union to slap sanctions on Belarusian individuals involved in last month’s election fraud due to the bloc’s refusal to implement similar measures against Turkey over its involvement in the ongoing eastern Mediterranean crisis.
EU officials have come under heavy pressure to impose sanctions on Belarus. Last month, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia preempted the European Union by slapping sanctions of their own on Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko. EU foreign ministers are due to meet on Monday, but efforts to pressure Lukashenko and his allies will likely be delayed.
Keep an Eye On
Violence in Ethiopia. More than 30 people were killed in militia attacks in western Ethiopia last week, officials said on Thursday, underscoring the country’s worsening security situation and creating new problems for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The attackers are “groups aimed at overturning the reforms journey,” Abiy said in a tweet.
Abiy entered government promising sweeping reforms of the country’s political system, but his efforts have since faced criticism from opponents and former allies. Last week, the country’s Tigray region held parliamentary elections despite the national government’s decision to postpone the vote over coronavirus concerns. The region is home to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the country’s dominant political force before Abiy’s takeover in 2019.
Crowd control in Washington. U.S. federal officials reportedly sought a “heat ray” device to deal with protesters around the White House in June before using tear gas to forcibly remove them from the area to allow Trump to take pictures for a campaign ad outside a local church. The device, which was developed by the U.S. military almost two decades ago, emits a burst of energy that causes an intense heating sensation in its victims. It is designed for use as a form of crowd control.
The protests were part of a nationwide outburst of anger over the police killing of George Floyd in May.
Odds and Ends
As sports leagues around the world take precautionary measures to protect players from the spread of the coronavirus, some teams have no choice but to play—sometimes with disastrous outcomes on the field.
On Sunday, a lower-division German soccer team, SG Ripdorf/Molzen II, lost to a rival by a whopping score of 37-0, after only seven players agreed to take the field due to the other team having come into contact with a player who tested positive for coronavirus in a previous game. “When the game kicked off, one of our players passed the ball to the opponent and our team walked to the sidelines,” a Ripdorf team representative said.
The game had already been scheduled, so Ripdorf would have been fined 200 euros if it cancelled, forcing it to “play” anyway. Although its opponent, Holdenstedt, opted not to field its first team, it still felt the game was worth playing. “Holdenstedt showed no mercy and scored a goal nearly every two minutes, while their opponents watched on from a safe distance,” the Guardian reported.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-09-18--India’s Democracy Is Under Threat

India’s Democracy Is Under Threat

A fair and transparent judicial system represents the bedrock of any democracy , especially one as large and diverse as India ’ s .
But there ’ s a growing body of evidence that the Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is using state powers to intimidate its political opposition as well as critics .
And amid a coronavirus pandemic and other concerns for the international media , there is a danger that New Delhi ’ s erosion of democratic values may go unnoticed before it is too late .
One of the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 when New Delhi deployed one of the principal national investigative bodies , the Central Bureau of Investigation , to arrest and incarcerate Palaniappan Chidambaram , a former finance minister from the opposition Indian National Congress party , on charges of bribery and corruption .
It was a made-for-TV moment , with agents scaling the walls of his New Delhi home to issue their arrest warrant .
Chidambaram , a lawyer of some repute , was able to obtain appropriate legal counsel and was eventually released on bail .
But given the delays @ @ @ @ @ @ @ judiciary , it may be months , if not years , before a court delivers a verdict .
Without taking a stance on the veracity of the charges , the move in effect muzzles a prominent opposition politician who has long been vocal in his criticism of the Modi government .
Of course , corruption is rife in India , but the BJP has yet to explain why Chidambaram in particular was singled out .
The Modi government has also sought to quash political dissent through the use of anti-terrorist laws , most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) Act ( UAPA ) , which allows the state to designate individuals as terrorists on extremely flimsy grounds .
One of the most prominent such cases stemmed from a riot that took place in January 2018 at an annual gathering of Dalits—members of India ’ s so-called lowest caste—in the village of Bhima Koregaon to commemorate a military victory against high-caste rulers more than 200 years ago .
Several left-wing intellectuals and activists were detained under the UAPA last February on the grounds that they were guilty of “ promoting enmity between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They included , among others , Varavara Rao , a 79-year-old left-wing poet and writer ; Arun Ferreira , a criminal lawyer ; Sudha Bharadwaj , a trade union leader ; and Gautam Navlakha , a human rights activist and a long-standing critic of state coercion in India .
It was hardly a group of people likely to be involved in terrorism .
Worse still , local police claimed that they had unearthed a plot to assassinate Modi.A premier investigative body has been rendered into a plaything of the government in office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ known is that the accused had , in fact , participated in a meeting in late December 2017 that had foreshadowed the Bhima Koregaon celebration .
Some of them had given speeches in which they had roundly condemned the curse of caste hierarchies in India .
All of them , at various points of their careers , have been known to be associated with left-wing causes including the rights of the socially marginalized or oppressed .
The police , seizing on their left-wing credentials , dubbed them “ urban Naxals ” —a misplaced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began in West Bengal in the 1960s .
Despite concerted attempts on the part of the National Investigation Agency ( NIA ) , which had brought the legal proceedings against the activists in the first place , the authorities were unable to gather evidence linking them to any of the professed charges .
Even so , the Bombay High Court refused to grant bail to several of the key detainees—highlighting the court ’ s unwillingness to stand up to the present government .
Worse still , the NIA ’ s persistence in legally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigative body has been rendered into a plaything of the government in office .
As their legal fate remains in limbo , the government has now chosen to go after another group of politicians , university professors , and activists whom it claims were responsible for instigating riots in New Delhi last February .
Among them are Jayati Ghosh , a noted economics professor from Jawaharlal Nehru University ; Sitaram Yechury , the general secretary of the Communist Party of India ( Marxist ) ; Yogendra Yadav , a well-known pollster and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Rahul Roy , a prominent documentary filmmaker .
Each of them has been accused of participating in a wide-ranging conspiracy to provoke the inter-religious riots that swept through the capital .
In reality , the riots largely stemmed from protests against Modi ’ s controversial Citizen Amendment Act , which allows many Hindus , Buddhists , Christians , Jains , and Sikhs from Afghanistan , Bangladesh , and Pakistan to obtain accelerated citizenship in India on the grounds that they constitute oppressed minorities in those countries .
However , the legislation does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rightly highlighted as discriminatory and going against the secular values of India ’ s constitution.This blatant , partisan use of police powers threatens to further undermine the already troubled rule of law in India .
The bulk of the protesters were university students and civil society activists—and most demonstrations were peaceful .
But there is ample evidence that Hindu mobs , many of them affiliated with the BJP , set upon the protesters and attacked them .
They also used the cover of the disturbances to attack vulnerable Muslim communities in New Delhi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi police , which is directly under the control of the federal Ministry of Home Affairs—and not the local state government—either supported the rioters or stood by as the riots proceeded apace .
Far from prosecuting those who were actually involved in organized mob violence against hapless communities , the central government is now using its powers to intimidate those whom it deems to be critics of the government ’ s policies .
This blatant , partisan use of police powers threatens to further undermine the already troubled rule of law in India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The most egregious historical examples are the anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi in 1984 following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi , for which blame lies at the door of Gandhi ’ s Congress party , and anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 during Modi ’ s term as the state ’ s chief minister .
Both sets of incidents are a stain on the country ’ s judicial record—but they are largely seen as lapses in the wider history of democratic India .
The systematic abuse of police and judicial powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Modi government—amounts to a new and major challenge to India ’ s commitment to impartial justice .
It is a dangerous trend that could , if unchecked , upend Indian democracy .

A fair and transparent judicial system represents the bedrock of any democracy, especially one as large and diverse as India’s. But there’s a growing body of evidence that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is using state powers to intimidate its political opposition as well as critics. And amid a coronavirus pandemic and other concerns for the international media, there is a danger that New Delhi’s erosion of democratic values may go unnoticed before it is too late.
A fair and transparent judicial system represents the bedrock of any democracy, especially one as large and diverse as India’s. But there’s a growing body of evidence that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is using state powers to intimidate its political opposition as well as critics. And amid a coronavirus pandemic and other concerns for the international media, there is a danger that New Delhi’s erosion of democratic values may go unnoticed before it is too late.
One of the first signs of this trend came in August 2019 when New Delhi deployed one of the principal national investigative bodies, the Central Bureau of Investigation, to arrest and incarcerate Palaniappan Chidambaram, a former finance minister from the opposition Indian National Congress party, on charges of bribery and corruption. It was a made-for-TV moment, with agents scaling the walls of his New Delhi home to issue their arrest warrant. Chidambaram, a lawyer of some repute, was able to obtain appropriate legal counsel and was eventually released on bail. But given the delays that have long defined India’s judiciary, it may be months, if not years, before a court delivers a verdict. Without taking a stance on the veracity of the charges, the move in effect muzzles a prominent opposition politician who has long been vocal in his criticism of the Modi government. Of course, corruption is rife in India, but the BJP has yet to explain why Chidambaram in particular was singled out.
The Modi government has also sought to quash political dissent through the use of anti-terrorist laws, most notably the draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), which allows the state to designate individuals as terrorists on extremely flimsy grounds. One of the most prominent such cases stemmed from a riot that took place in January 2018 at an annual gathering of Dalits—members of India’s so-called lowest caste—in the village of Bhima Koregaon to commemorate a military victory against high-caste rulers more than 200 years ago. Several left-wing intellectuals and activists were detained under the UAPA last February on the grounds that they were guilty of “promoting enmity between groups” and involved in abetting terrorism. They included, among others, Varavara Rao, a 79-year-old left-wing poet and writer; Arun Ferreira, a criminal lawyer; Sudha Bharadwaj, a trade union leader; and Gautam Navlakha, a human rights activist and a long-standing critic of state coercion in India. It was hardly a group of people likely to be involved in terrorism. Worse still, local police claimed that they had unearthed a plot to assassinate Modi.A premier investigative body has been rendered into a plaything of the government in office.
These charges aside, what is known is that the accused had, in fact, participated in a meeting in late December 2017 that had foreshadowed the Bhima Koregaon celebration. Some of them had given speeches in which they had roundly condemned the curse of caste hierarchies in India. All of them, at various points of their careers, have been known to be associated with left-wing causes including the rights of the socially marginalized or oppressed. The police, seizing on their left-wing credentials, dubbed them “urban Naxals”—a misplaced reference to a violent left-wing movement that began in West Bengal in the 1960s.
Despite concerted attempts on the part of the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which had brought the legal proceedings against the activists in the first place, the authorities were unable to gather evidence linking them to any of the professed charges. Even so, the Bombay High Court refused to grant bail to several of the key detainees—highlighting the court’s unwillingness to stand up to the present government. Worse still, the NIA’s persistence in legally harassing these activists highlights how a premier investigative body has been rendered into a plaything of the government in office.
As their legal fate remains in limbo, the government has now chosen to go after another group of politicians, university professors, and activists whom it claims were responsible for instigating riots in New Delhi last February. Among them are Jayati Ghosh, a noted economics professor from Jawaharlal Nehru University; Sitaram Yechury, the general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist); Yogendra Yadav, a well-known pollster and the co-founder of a civil society organization; and Rahul Roy, a prominent documentary filmmaker. Each of them has been accused of participating in a wide-ranging conspiracy to provoke the inter-religious riots that swept through the capital.
In reality, the riots largely stemmed from protests against Modi’s controversial Citizen Amendment Act, which allows many Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Jains, and Sikhs from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to obtain accelerated citizenship in India on the grounds that they constitute oppressed minorities in those countries. However, the legislation does not apply to Muslims—a fact that protesters rightly highlighted as discriminatory and going against the secular values of India’s constitution.This blatant, partisan use of police powers threatens to further undermine the already troubled rule of law in India.
The bulk of the protesters were university students and civil society activists—and most demonstrations were peaceful. But there is ample evidence that Hindu mobs, many of them affiliated with the BJP, set upon the protesters and attacked them. They also used the cover of the disturbances to attack vulnerable Muslim communities in New Delhi. Perhaps most disturbingly, the New Delhi police, which is directly under the control of the federal Ministry of Home Affairs—and not the local state government—either supported the rioters or stood by as the riots proceeded apace. Far from prosecuting those who were actually involved in organized mob violence against hapless communities, the central government is now using its powers to intimidate those whom it deems to be critics of the government’s policies. This blatant, partisan use of police powers threatens to further undermine the already troubled rule of law in India.
Police partisanship is not new. The most egregious historical examples are the anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi in 1984 following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for which blame lies at the door of Gandhi’s Congress party, and anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 during Modi’s term as the state’s chief minister. Both sets of incidents are a stain on the country’s judicial record—but they are largely seen as lapses in the wider history of democratic India. The systematic abuse of police and judicial powers that is now underway—with the apparent blessing of the Modi government—amounts to a new and major challenge to India’s commitment to impartial justice. It is a dangerous trend that could, if unchecked, upend Indian democracy.