foreignpolicy--2020-01-18--What U.S. Foreign Policy Will Look Like Under Socialism

The political configurations now emerging in the West have dramatically reversed the recent status quo .
The old consensus-oriented social democratic parties in France and Germany today lie in ruins , having paid dearly for the privilege of selling themselves out .
In stark contrast , the United Kingdom , the heartland of market capitalism and monetary discipline , is now home to one of the most significant mass leftist political movements in the world , however grim its electoral future .
Portugal , once a political backwater in the European Union , shows that alternatives to austerity are as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the Atlantic , the idea of a democratic socialist president winning the White House is no longer the stuff of fantasy .
Such is the leftist momentum in the United States that it is once again necessary to distinguish between social democracy and democratic socialism .
The first is fundamentally reformist and aims to blunt the harder edges of capitalism and make it sustainable .
The second is transformative and aims to replace the capitalist system with a socialist order .
Now that both these agendas have shot to prominence in U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( Elizabeth Warren for social democracy , Bernie Sanders for democratic socialism ) , it ’ s imperative to think through how the power of the United States could be used—and changed—by these ideological formations .
For the sake of convenience , the whole spectrum running from social democracy to democratic socialism will be referred to below as “ left , ” though it is important to avoid collapsing all of the differences between the two visions .
Considering the forces arrayed against it—a diplomatic corps still rooted in Cold War visions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determined to resist any leftward drift in Washington , and the left ’ s own talent for schism—any left U.S. foreign policy would likely unfold in a piecemeal fashion .
But any program worthy of the name would have to be explicit about its goals .
It would have to fundamentally revise the position of U.S. power in the world , from one of presumed and desired primacy to one of concerted cooperation with allies on behalf of working people across the planet .
Today ’ s left foreign-policy thinkers argue that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serve a different purpose : At a bare minimum , it should protect the world from the excesses of capitalism .
Since the early 1940s , U.S. foreign policy has been largely premised on saving the world for capitalism—whether that has meant setting up international monetary institutions , enforcing a property-protecting legal order , keeping capital-threatening insurgencies at bay , or protecting the economies of allies to allow them to develop .
Today ’ s left foreign-policy thinkers argue that the time has come for U.S. power to serve a different purpose : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protect the world from the excesses of capitalism and counteract the violent implosions that U.S. policies and interventions around the world have all too often oxygenated , if not ignited .
The first steps of any left foreign-policy program would be to democratize U.S. foreign policy , reduce the size of the U.S. military footprint , discipline and nationalize the defense industry , and use U.S. economic power to achieve egalitarian and environmental ends .
The tradition of social democracy in particular is haunted by its own ideals .
Its triumphs have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the defeat of official racial discrimination , the provision of basic welfare and other rights .
The movement got its start in the 19th century , together with the emergence of nation-states , when owners of corporations and factories were forced into making at least some compromises with workers .
The question of how to extend social democratic principles beyond the nation has long been a vexed one .
The snapshots under the heading of “ foreign policy ” are not the prettiest pages in the movement ’ s album : German Social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I ; French Socialists insisting on holding the course in Algeria ; Brazil ’ s Workers ’ Party government sending armed forces to lead a peacekeeping mission in support of an authoritarian Haitian government in 2004 in a vain attempt to win a Brazilian seat on the United Nations Security Council .
Nevertheless , social democracy ’ s basic principles—the idea of a large organization of working people , not a vanguard , aspiring to better social and economic conditions—retain their force .
It is often forgotten , even by social democrats themselves @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attached to the idea of social equality but rather to the idea that genuine freedom requires certain social and economic preconditions .
Social democracy starts with people using the instruments of a democratically controlled state to loosen the grip of liberal capitalist dogma .
The question for a left foreign policy is how to harness anti-elite sentiment around the world for the cause of environmental renewal , economic and social equality , and mutual political liberation .
This restoration of public accountability would have the additional advantage of furthering substantive democratic goals .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ wars and interventions , unmoved by the appeals to credibility that foreign-policy elites have used to guide the United States into one quagmire after another .
Donald Trump won the presidency in part by acknowledging this fact .
No one doubts that the United States ’ current global posture is the contingent result of its extremely free hand in world affairs in the 1940s and 1950s .
The maintenance of U.S. troops in Germany , Japan , and South Korea today baffles a generation that did not live through the Cold War .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germans want U.S. forces to leave the country and 37 percent want them to stay , while in Japan protests and referendums have repeatedly confirmed the public ’ s desire for a reduction of the U.S. presence .
The U.S. foreign-policy elite has barely questioned its commitment to free trade pacts and permanent military missions abroad .
The problem with the existing foreign-policy culture ’ s prioritizing of military solutions is that it cuts off more effective policy options and stunts the diplomatic corps ’ ability to pursue them .
Long-term consequences on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent calls—from liberals and conservatives alike—to intervene in Syria , Iraq , Iran , and Venezuela .
No matter that Washington ’ s postwar use of force has an extremely poor record on this score .
In the case of Syria , the constant airing of a military solution precluded political bargaining that could have reduced violence at a much earlier stage .
A left foreign policy would mean ending the way the foreign-policy establishment and the media routinely conflate “ the United States doing something ” with “ military intervention.
” There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left foreign policy must reduce the size of the U.S. military footprint .
One could imagine a scenario in which U.S. forces went to war to protect the global environment from climate chauvinists , slave states , or other enemies of a social democratic global order .
But a genuinely left foreign policy would be a failure if it did not focus on the vast extent of U.S. economic power , which is constantly at work in the background of international politics .
Social democrats would properly seek to place economic power at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s why a priority of a left foreign policy would be to revolutionize military industrial policy .
Comprising well over half of the $ 420 billion global arms industry , the U.S. armament sector considerably outstrips more visible industries such as car manufacturing and is four times the national education budget .
The problem is not simply that this industry looks for customers around the world like any other .
Nor is it the revolving doors between the military and weapons and security companies .
The issue is that the arms industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to siphon taxpayer dollars under the cover of the national interest .
Its leading firms donate directly to avowedly pro-war candidates , especially those who sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee , with the aim of not only blocking attempts to stop U.S.-backed wars , such as support of the Saudi war on Yemen , but to create the illusion that without U.S. armed forces global capitalism itself would collapse .
The problem with the existing foreign-policy culture ’ s prioritizing of military solutions is that it cuts off more effective policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to pursue them .
There is no reason why a left administration should not demand the best possible military technology in the world , but it should impose stringent requirements on the industrial sector to integrate American defense into American society .
The government should more closely regulate the management of the arms companies to which it awards public contracts , including the extent to which workers have a financial and managerial stake in their companies .
The government should stop military materiel from being used in domestic policing .
( It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to end up on the streets of places like Ferguson , Missouri . )
Trying to completely nationalize a company like Lockheed Martin would be a very costly engagement for a social democratic administration in the short term .
In the longer term , however , it would be worth pursuing demands for partial worker ownership of such corporations .
But a left international economic agenda wouldn ’ t end at industrial policy .
It would recognize that , at least since the Dawes Plan of 1924 , which managed the debt payments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in America ’ s arsenal has been the U.S. Treasury .
The United States most commonly expresses its power by allowing and barring access to the U.S. economy .
This is an area where a left administration could make a major difference .
Loans ( and the denial of loans ) , debt forgiveness , offshore tax havens , currency inflation—these affect the lives of far more people than America ’ s missiles and bombs .
Instead of tying aid to indicators such as the protection of property rights and other rubrics designed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a left administration could instead make aid more contingent on the pursuit of a redistributive domestic agenda or the environmental record of the government in question .
Carbon taxes on imports alone could encourage foreign trading partners to put in place more environmentally sustainable domestic policies .
Any U.S. left agenda worth the name would need to consider the social welfare of foreign populations in conjunction with taking care of its own .
Earlier generations of socialists and social democrats generally did not understand the effect they were having on the climate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship to economic growth must be rethought if its citizens are to flourish in the next century .
Left foreign-policy practitioners should still prioritize the equitable distribution of resources across society , but they may need to accept that such resources won ’ t be an ever-increasing bounty .
This shift in popular values , away from the ideology of growth to the necessity of sustainability , may prove to be the left ’ s most defining challenge .
The second dilemma for any left foreign policy is what to do with fellow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but under threat from an internal or external power .
Should the United States intervene on behalf of the single social democratic entity in the Middle East , the Kurdish statelet of Rojava ?
What should a social democratic administration do about reactionary coups against social democratic regimes , such as in Brazil , or freedom movements such as Hong Kong ’ s ?
Would the United States not have the responsibility to help its friends ?
The age-old question of whether socialism means pacificism or noninterference is unlikely to ever be resolved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most cases , any form of explicitly militarist intervention would spell disaster .
The age-old question of whether socialism means pacificism or noninterference is unlikely to ever be resolved .
But domestic clarity can provide orientation : By working toward a social transformation at home , building up the legitimacy of the American state and the moral legitimacy of its economy , the United States increases its ability to marshal diplomatic pressure on behalf of allies around the world .
There is also the inverse dilemma : What should a left administration do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Venezuela repress their own people ?
There will always be pressure in Washington to do something in such cases , which at the bare minimum tends to mean backing the opposition , with the possibility of military intervention dangling in the background .
Yet left foreign-policy practitioners must have the forbearance to recognize that such solutions generally have little practical promise .
Often the opposition groups hailed in Washington have impressive storage space for liberal values but small local followings .
Meanwhile , the track record of U.S. military interference in South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A new foreign policy should instead focus on diplomatic openings , including the possibility that a figure like Venezuela ’ s Nicolás Maduro might have opponents with large public followings to his left .
Which brings us to China .
One worrying aspect of the 2020 presidential race is that every serious contender across the spectrum—from Sanders and Warren to Trump himself—have staked out a hostile stance on China .
( Michael Bloomberg and Deval Patrick , the candidates most directly involved in international capitalism , may turn out to be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ merely about intellectual property or American wages or the hollowing out of the U.S. industrial core or cyberwarfare .
There is also a growing sense among many left-of-center Americans that China ’ s repressions on its borderlands must be met head on .
Among human rights advocates , a clear agenda is coming into view , which involves activating Uighurs and Hong Kongers and the people of Guangdong to fight Beijing and to help them balance the scales of dignity .
But pursuing such a course would be counterproductive .
Chinese President Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an industrial-agrarian economy into a massive consumer economy—much as U.S. economists have long advised Beijing to do .
The overheating of the Chinese economy has not only resulted in the Belt and Road Initiative as a way of sending excess capital out of the country but also the directed spillover of Mandarin- speaking populations into Hong Kong ( where their presence only aggravates competition over higher education and housing ) and the ongoing colonization of Xinjiang .
With such an economic transformation underway , it makes good sense for Xi to deflect from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China of foreign ideologies and undergoing a new round of ideological hygiene .
The idea that this world-historical development can be decently improved by any military swagger or hard-line approach seems deluded at best .
No left U.S. foreign policy can expect full implementation or success in the short term .
More valuable would be to recognize the United States ’ own role in this unfolding China of the present .
The American and Chinese economies are locked in an embrace that can only be dealt with as a totality , rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would , for instance , any attempt at forging a serious environmental pact be achievable .
No human rights cause in China can be furthered by the United States if it does not use the real economic power at its disposal : fining U.S. companies for doing business in Xin- jiang , forcing Apple to comply with U.S. labor regulations abroad , shifting the emphasis of World Bank loans from Chinese corporations to individual Chinese migrants leaving the countryside en masse .
Meanwhile , the demonization of China will likely continue to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engage in .
Whether predominantly social democratic or democratic socialist in character , no left U.S. foreign policy can expect full implementation or success in the short term .
It would be naive to believe otherwise .
It is not only that the diplomatic corps itself remains embroiled in the Cold War consensus but that foreign policy is merely one domain among others that Americans would need to change and co-opt in concert , such as the judiciary , the intelligence services , and the Federal Reserve .
It would be a decent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration succeeded simply in making left diplomats an inhabitable identity at the State Department , where they are currently an extinct species .
It may be that some of the most effective arms of a left U.S. foreign policy are the most mundane .
Imagine if the IRS were empowered to pursue wealth taxes globally , giving the 1 percent nowhere to hide .
That desk-bound agency may contain more revolutionary tinder than the U.S. Marine Corps .
This article appears in the Winter 2020 print issue .

Just a few years ago, the idea of a social democratic foreign policy—much less a democratic socialist one—in the United States would have seemed a quixotic proposition. No U.S. administration has even pretended to have one. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy had no coherent ideological agenda. Jimmy Carter’s brief administration broke with postwar U.S. foreign policy, but it did so under the banner of human rights, not social democracy.
Just a few years ago, the idea of a social democratic foreign policy—much less a democratic socialist one—in the United States would have seemed a quixotic proposition. No U.S. administration has even pretended to have one. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy had no coherent ideological agenda. Jimmy Carter’s brief administration broke with postwar U.S. foreign policy, but it did so under the banner of human rights, not social democracy.
The political configurations now emerging in the West have dramatically reversed the recent status quo. The old consensus-oriented social democratic parties in France and Germany today lie in ruins, having paid dearly for the privilege of selling themselves out. In stark contrast, the United Kingdom, the heartland of market capitalism and monetary discipline, is now home to one of the most significant mass leftist political movements in the world, however grim its electoral future. Portugal, once a political backwater in the European Union, shows that alternatives to austerity are as practicable as they are popular. And across the Atlantic, the idea of a democratic socialist president winning the White House is no longer the stuff of fantasy.
Such is the leftist momentum in the United States that it is once again necessary to distinguish between social democracy and democratic socialism. The first is fundamentally reformist and aims to blunt the harder edges of capitalism and make it sustainable. The second is transformative and aims to replace the capitalist system with a socialist order. Now that both these agendas have shot to prominence in U.S. politics, each with their own protagonist (Elizabeth Warren for social democracy, Bernie Sanders for democratic socialism), it’s imperative to think through how the power of the United States could be used—and changed—by these ideological formations. For the sake of convenience, the whole spectrum running from social democracy to democratic socialism will be referred to below as “left,” though it is important to avoid collapsing all of the differences between the two visions.
Considering the forces arrayed against it—a diplomatic corps still rooted in Cold War visions of order, corporate interests that are largely determined to resist any leftward drift in Washington, and the left’s own talent for schism—any left U.S. foreign policy would likely unfold in a piecemeal fashion. But any program worthy of the name would have to be explicit about its goals. It would have to fundamentally revise the position of U.S. power in the world, from one of presumed and desired primacy to one of concerted cooperation with allies on behalf of working people across the planet.
Today’s left foreign-policy thinkers argue that the time has come for U.S. power to serve a different purpose: At a bare minimum, it should protect the world from the excesses of capitalism.
Since the early 1940s, U.S. foreign policy has been largely premised on saving the world for capitalism—whether that has meant setting up international monetary institutions, enforcing a property-protecting legal order, keeping capital-threatening insurgencies at bay, or protecting the economies of allies to allow them to develop. Today’s left foreign-policy thinkers argue that the time has come for U.S. power to serve a different purpose: At a bare minimum, it should protect the world from the excesses of capitalism and counteract the violent implosions that U.S. policies and interventions around the world have all too often oxygenated, if not ignited. The first steps of any left foreign-policy program would be to democratize U.S. foreign policy, reduce the size of the U.S. military footprint, discipline and nationalize the defense industry, and use U.S. economic power to achieve egalitarian and environmental ends.
The tradition of social democracy in particular is haunted by its own ideals. Its triumphs have been mostly domestic: mass voter enfranchisement, the defeat of official racial discrimination, the provision of basic welfare and other rights. The movement got its start in the 19th century, together with the emergence of nation-states, when owners of corporations and factories were forced into making at least some compromises with workers. The question of how to extend social democratic principles beyond the nation has long been a vexed one. The snapshots under the heading of “foreign policy” are not the prettiest pages in the movement’s album: German Social Democrats backing the Kaiser in World War I; French Socialists insisting on holding the course in Algeria; Brazil’s Workers’ Party government sending armed forces to lead a peacekeeping mission in support of an authoritarian Haitian government in 2004 in a vain attempt to win a Brazilian seat on the United Nations Security Council.
Nevertheless, social democracy’s basic principles—the idea of a large organization of working people, not a vanguard, aspiring to better social and economic conditions—retain their force. It is often forgotten, even by social democrats themselves, that the fight is not fanatically attached to the idea of social equality but rather to the idea that genuine freedom requires certain social and economic preconditions. Social democracy starts with people using the instruments of a democratically controlled state to loosen the grip of liberal capitalist dogma. The question for a left foreign policy is how to harness anti-elite sentiment around the world for the cause of environmental renewal, economic and social equality, and mutual political liberation.
The first goal of a left foreign policy would focus on changing how foreign policy is forged in the first place. The priority would be to give democratic control over the basic direction of foreign policy back to the electorate. It is imperative that state power not be delegated to a cloistered elite, whether a Leninist vanguard or, as in the U.S. case, a liberal technocratic elite that has long conflated the interests of the nation with those of global capital. The U.S. foreign-policy elite has barely questioned its commitment to free trade pacts and permanent military missions abroad. That’s why a left foreign policy would need to begin by returning war-making powers to Congress (even if that involves cajoling Congress to reassume them) and rescinding the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which, since 2001, has functioned as the legal writ for wars across three administrations.
This restoration of public accountability would have the additional advantage of furthering substantive democratic goals. The U.S. electorate overwhelmingly opposes aggressive foreign wars and interventions, unmoved by the appeals to credibility that foreign-policy elites have used to guide the United States into one quagmire after another. Donald Trump won the presidency in part by acknowledging this fact. No one doubts that the United States’ current global posture is the contingent result of its extremely free hand in world affairs in the 1940s and 1950s. The maintenance of U.S. troops in Germany, Japan, and South Korea today baffles a generation that did not live through the Cold War. Recent polls suggest that 42 percent of Germans want U.S. forces to leave the country and 37 percent want them to stay, while in Japan protests and referendums have repeatedly confirmed the public’s desire for a reduction of the U.S. presence.
The U.S. foreign-policy elite has barely questioned its commitment to free trade pacts and permanent military missions abroad.
The problem with the existing foreign-policy culture’s prioritizing of military solutions is that it cuts off more effective policy options and stunts the diplomatic corps’ ability to pursue them. Long-term consequences on the ground have been all afterthought in recent calls—from liberals and conservatives alike—to intervene in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela. No matter that Washington’s postwar use of force has an extremely poor record on this score. In the case of Syria, the constant airing of a military solution precluded political bargaining that could have reduced violence at a much earlier stage. A left foreign policy would mean ending the way the foreign-policy establishment and the media routinely conflate “the United States doing something” with “military intervention.”
There is no ironclad rule that says a left foreign policy must reduce the size of the U.S. military footprint. One could imagine a scenario in which U.S. forces went to war to protect the global environment from climate chauvinists, slave states, or other enemies of a social democratic global order. But a genuinely left foreign policy would be a failure if it did not focus on the vast extent of U.S. economic power, which is constantly at work in the background of international politics. Social democrats would properly seek to place economic power at the center of foreign policy.
That’s why a priority of a left foreign policy would be to revolutionize military industrial policy. Comprising well over half of the $420 billion global arms industry, the U.S. armament sector considerably outstrips more visible industries such as car manufacturing and is four times the national education budget. The problem is not simply that this industry looks for customers around the world like any other. Nor is it the revolving doors between the military and weapons and security companies. The issue is that the arms industry has become a way for the ultrawealthy to siphon taxpayer dollars under the cover of the national interest. Its leading firms donate directly to avowedly pro-war candidates, especially those who sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee, with the aim of not only blocking attempts to stop U.S.-backed wars, such as support of the Saudi war on Yemen, but to create the illusion that without U.S. armed forces global capitalism itself would collapse.
The problem with the existing foreign-policy culture’s prioritizing of military solutions is that it cuts off more effective policy options and stunts the diplomatic corps’ ability to pursue them.
There is no reason why a left administration should not demand the best possible military technology in the world, but it should impose stringent requirements on the industrial sector to integrate American defense into American society. The government should more closely regulate the management of the arms companies to which it awards public contracts, including the extent to which workers have a financial and managerial stake in their companies. The government should stop military materiel from being used in domestic policing. (It’s not uncommon for surplus tanks to end up on the streets of places like Ferguson, Missouri.) Trying to completely nationalize a company like Lockheed Martin would be a very costly engagement for a social democratic administration in the short term. In the longer term, however, it would be worth pursuing demands for partial worker ownership of such corporations.
But a left international economic agenda wouldn’t end at industrial policy. It would recognize that, at least since the Dawes Plan of 1924, which managed the debt payments of Weimar Germany, the main weapon in America’s arsenal has been the U.S. Treasury. The United States most commonly expresses its power by allowing and barring access to the U.S. economy. This is an area where a left administration could make a major difference. Loans (and the denial of loans), debt forgiveness, offshore tax havens, currency inflation—these affect the lives of far more people than America’s missiles and bombs.
Instead of tying aid to indicators such as the protection of property rights and other rubrics designed by conservative and liberal think tanks, a left administration could instead make aid more contingent on the pursuit of a redistributive domestic agenda or the environmental record of the government in question. Carbon taxes on imports alone could encourage foreign trading partners to put in place more environmentally sustainable domestic policies. Any U.S. left agenda worth the name would need to consider the social welfare of foreign populations in conjunction with taking care of its own.
There are uncomfortable political areas that no left administration should shy away from. The history of social democracy’s relationship with the environment has been a rocky one. Much of the movement’s success in the past has been linked to enormous amounts of resource extraction, from the Ruhr in Germany, where the coal furnaces formed one of the backbones of early social democracy, to the great success of Workers’ Party social programs in Brazil, which were in part insulated from right-wing attack because they relied on a vast energy boom that did not require redistributing their wealth.
Earlier generations of socialists and social democrats generally did not understand the effect they were having on the climate, but the American working class’s relationship to economic growth must be rethought if its citizens are to flourish in the next century. Left foreign-policy practitioners should still prioritize the equitable distribution of resources across society, but they may need to accept that such resources won’t be an ever-increasing bounty. This shift in popular values, away from the ideology of growth to the necessity of sustainability, may prove to be the left’s most defining challenge.
The second dilemma for any left foreign policy is what to do with fellow movements that are affirmatively socialist in character but under threat from an internal or external power. Should the United States intervene on behalf of the single social democratic entity in the Middle East, the Kurdish statelet of Rojava? What should a social democratic administration do about reactionary coups against social democratic regimes, such as in Brazil, or freedom movements such as Hong Kong’s? Would the United States not have the responsibility to help its friends?
The age-old question of whether socialism means pacificism or noninterference is unlikely to ever be resolved.
The problem is that, in most cases, any form of explicitly militarist intervention would spell disaster. The age-old question of whether socialism means pacificism or noninterference is unlikely to ever be resolved. But domestic clarity can provide orientation: By working toward a social transformation at home, building up the legitimacy of the American state and the moral legitimacy of its economy, the United States increases its ability to marshal diplomatic pressure on behalf of allies around the world.
There is also the inverse dilemma: What should a left administration do when nominally socialist governments such as Cuba or Venezuela repress their own people? There will always be pressure in Washington to do something in such cases, which at the bare minimum tends to mean backing the opposition, with the possibility of military intervention dangling in the background. Yet left foreign-policy practitioners must have the forbearance to recognize that such solutions generally have little practical promise. Often the opposition groups hailed in Washington have impressive storage space for liberal values but small local followings. Meanwhile, the track record of U.S. military interference in South America has mostly given rise to autocracies. A new foreign policy should instead focus on diplomatic openings, including the possibility that a figure like Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro might have opponents with large public followings to his left.
Which brings us to China. One worrying aspect of the 2020 presidential race is that every serious contender across the spectrum—from Sanders and Warren to Trump himself—have staked out a hostile stance on China. (Michael Bloomberg and Deval Patrick, the candidates most directly involved in international capitalism, may turn out to be the exceptions.) This hostility is not merely about intellectual property or American wages or the hollowing out of the U.S. industrial core or cyberwarfare. There is also a growing sense among many left-of-center Americans that China’s repressions on its borderlands must be met head on. Among human rights advocates, a clear agenda is coming into view, which involves activating Uighurs and Hong Kongers and the people of Guangdong to fight Beijing and to help them balance the scales of dignity.
But pursuing such a course would be counterproductive. Chinese President Xi Jinping is in the middle of transforming an industrial-agrarian economy into a massive consumer economy—much as U.S. economists have long advised Beijing to do. The overheating of the Chinese economy has not only resulted in the Belt and Road Initiative as a way of sending excess capital out of the country but also the directed spillover of Mandarin-
speaking populations into Hong Kong (where their presence only aggravates competition over higher education and housing) and the ongoing colonization of Xinjiang. With such an economic transformation underway, it makes good sense for Xi to deflect from this hard reality with speeches about cleansing China of foreign ideologies and undergoing a new round of ideological hygiene. The idea that this world-historical development can be decently improved by any military swagger or hard-line approach seems deluded at best.
No left U.S. foreign policy can expect full implementation or success in the short term.
More valuable would be to recognize the United States’ own role in this unfolding China of the present. The American and Chinese economies are locked in an embrace that can only be dealt with as a totality, rather than piecemeal. Only through diplomacy with China would, for instance, any attempt at forging a serious environmental pact be achievable. No human rights cause in China can be furthered by the United States if it does not use the real economic power at its disposal: fining U.S. companies for doing business in Xin-
jiang, forcing Apple to comply with U.S. labor regulations abroad, shifting the emphasis of World Bank loans from Chinese corporations to individual Chinese migrants leaving the countryside en masse. Meanwhile, the demonization of China will likely continue to be a profitable hypocrisy for American politicians to engage in.
Whether predominantly social democratic or democratic socialist in character, no left U.S. foreign policy can expect full implementation or success in the short term. It would be naive to believe otherwise. It is not only that the diplomatic corps itself remains embroiled in the Cold War consensus but that foreign policy is merely one domain among others that Americans would need to change and co-opt in concert, such as the judiciary, the intelligence services, and the Federal Reserve. It would be a decent enough start if a Sanders or Warren administration succeeded simply in making left diplomats an inhabitable identity at the State Department, where they are currently an extinct species. It may be that some of the most effective arms of a left U.S. foreign policy are the most mundane. Imagine if the IRS were empowered to pursue wealth taxes globally, giving the 1 percent nowhere to hide. That desk-bound agency may contain more revolutionary tinder than the U.S. Marine Corps.
This article appears in the Winter 2020 print issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-18--Socialism: Why It’s Back and What It Means

For FP Insiders : Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman hosts a conference call with special guest Sheri Berman @ @ @ @ @ science at Barnard College , for a deep dive into the conditions and causes of @ @ @ @ @

FP-Ask-the-editor-Ravi-FPLive-Site-3-2-2 Viewers of FP Live regularly see host Ravi Agrawal quiz world leaders and policymakers about issues such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, the state of the global economy, and competition betwee...Show moren the United States and China. Now it’s your turn to interrogate the host. In a special Ask-Me-Anything episode on FP Live, Agrawal will field your questions in conversation with executive editor Amelia Lester. Anything the magazine regularly covers is fair game, in addition to questions about how FP makes its decisions. The Ask-Me-Anything edition is open to anyone. Please write in and submit your questions below.
A crowd of women wearing scarves on their heads and colorful garb hold torches during a demonstration demanding the restoration of peace in India's northeastern Manipur state in Imphal on July 10. Is the world standing by as ethnic cleansing takes place in the Indian state of Manipur? Since May, violence between the Meitei ethnic majority and the Kuki minority has torn through the sma...Show morell state bordering Myanmar in India’s northeast. Mobs have burned hundreds of homes and churches, and tens of thousands of people have fled. The conflict has largely been ignored by Western media, despite global attention focused on India, which is the rotating host of the G-20 this year. What is actually going on in Manipur? What should New Delhi do? What are the ramifications for India, Myanmar, and the world? Indian journalist Barkha Dutt has reported extensively from Manipur this year. Join her and defense expert Sushant Singh, who has chronicled the conflict in Foreign Policy, for a FP Live conversation with host Ravi Agrawal.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-17--Qassem Suleimani Wanted U.S. Troops Out of Iraq. If They Go, ISIS Will Be Back.

Qassem Suleimani Wanted U.S .
Troops Out of Iraq .
If They Go , ISIS Will Be Back .
Before his death last October , informants reported that Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would hold strategy sessions in minivans packed with vegetables .
Now , as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month , it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq .
Indeed , the militant group ’ s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , kidnapping soldiers , burning crops , laying roadside ambushes , and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs .
Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival , but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result : removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether .
Iran has reached a dangerous juncture , in which hard-line factions are feeling considerable pressure .
In misidentifying Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 as a cruise missile , and then going on to misrepresent what happened as a tragic air disaster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IRGC ) has empowered its critics , in an unprecedented way , both inside and outside Iran .
For many , the downing of the civilian jet captured the dysfunctional essence of the leadership in Tehran : at once deadly , incompetent , and dishonest .
With the global spotlight on this “ unforgivable mistake , ” demands for accountability , and widespread anti-government protests inside Iran , the strain on the right wing of the regime will only intensify in the near term .
At this vulnerable moment for hawks in Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prosecute its shadow war—whose architect was the slain commander Suleimani—with renewed vigor .
The capstone in that covert project would be the departure , once and for all , of U.S. troops from Iraq.At this vulnerable moment for hawks in Iran , the embattled IRGC may well seek to prosecute its shadow war .
The official Iranian response to the U.S. killing of Suleimani was to attack air bases housing U.S. and allied troops in Iraq .
Iranian officials indicated that this therapeutic salvo of missiles drew a line under the matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies clearly had other ideas : In a fiery speech , the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon announced that “ the response to the blood of Qassem Suleimani and Abu Mahdi will be to oust the American troops from our entire region.
” Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , the founder of the powerful Kataib Hezbollah and deputy head of Iraq ’ s Popular Mobilization Forces , was killed alongside Suleimani in the Jan. 3 drone strike .
Muhandis was an Iraqi national and , effectively , a government official targeted in his own country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we can assume Muhandis had many militia friends , who are now ready to inflict pain on U.S. troops to avenge his death .
This includes the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq , who , on Jan. 9 , promised that operations to avenge Muhandis ’ s death had not yet begun .
The Katyusha rocket attacks against the Balad air base on Jan. 12 and the Taji camp on Jan. 14 suggest that the crisis inside Iran could embolden , rather than inhibit , its militia allies in Iraq .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the already fragile campaign against the Islamic State .
On Jan. 5 , the global coalition against the Islamic State paused its activities to focus on “ protecting the Iraqi bases that host Coalition personnel.
” This announcement was made as the Iraqi parliament passed a nonbinding resolution , supported by the caretaker prime minister , calling for the expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq .
The mission apparently restarted Wednesday , according to anonymous U.S. military officials , with no official comment from the Iraqi government .
In 2014 , U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lightning advance of the Islamic State , where , in places like Mosul , whole Iraqi Army divisions tore off their uniforms and fled .
Since then , the coalition and its partners—which sometimes included Suleimani ’ s Iranian forces and Shiite proxies , for whom the fanatical Sunni ideology of the Islamic State represented an existential threat—retook 42,000 square miles of territory , drawing the curtains on the Islamic State ’ s proto-state.Islamic State remnants in Iraq masterfully slip between the cracks of social and political divisions .
In that fight , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of coalition troops on the front lines was to communicate with aircraft so that strikes were carefully targeted .
U.S. air power remain key to keeping the pressure on the Islamic State militarily , but , as one former coalition commander told me , “ If you have a U.S. plane with a U.S. bomb and an Iraqi national is calling in for you to drop that bomb , you ’ re confronted with a series of practical and legal challenges.
” The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with battlespace management .
The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise , but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle .
However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are , for the time being , the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary ( though of course not sufficient ) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum .
“ The sad truth is that , if left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security forces might rot while they stand , like they did in 2014 , ” the former commander said .
“ Maybe not next week , but eventually it would happen.
” Islamic State remnants in Iraq masterfully slip between the cracks of social and political divisions .
A major safe haven is located in the valleys and caves of the Qara Chokh mountains in the north , which are controlled by the Iraqi security forces on one side and the Kurdish peshmerga on the other .
In the no man ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neither side patrols , the Islamic State has freedom of movement .
Deep in the Hamrin mountain range , which has long been a sanctuary for Sunni militant groups both established ( al Qaeda in Iraq ) and emerging ( Jaysh Ahrar al-Sunna ) , the Islamic State is able to “ preserve combat power.
” It has built a tunnel network , ensconced weapons caches , erected solar panels , and exploited the higher ground .
In nearby settlements , converted or coerced villagers leave out food and livestock for the fighters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Iraqi Army sometimes combs ungoverned spaces in the Sunni heartlands , but its forces can not hold them .
In an almost cartoonish fashion , the Islamic State actively inflames Sunni fears and frustrations related to the Shiite-dominated government—for example , damaging power lines during heat waves.Lurching from one crisis to the next , the Iraqi government has no alternative but to deliver reforms that finally reject sectarian politics .
Beginning in early October 2019 , thousands of young Iraqi demonstrators marched in Baghdad , Basra , and other cities , decrying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and connecting its failures to the coercive control of Iran in Iraq .
Live fire from Iran-linked militia members has killed an estimated 400 protesters and injured 19,000 more .
Away from the demonstrations themselves , there have been targeted killings of coordinators , medics , and fundraisers , as well as reporters who have covered the protests .
Iraqi Shiite grandees like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr appear to have sided with the demonstrators , with Sistani reminding Iraq ’ s leaders that “ the people are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the war drums between the United States and Iran , the demonstrations resumed last Friday .
An escalation inside Iraq , between the United States and Iran , would certainly strengthen the hand of Iran-linked Shiite militias , such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah .
The further encouragement of these groups would only perpetuate the toxic sectarian environment that served as the political cradle for the Islamic State in Iraq .
These ideological militias would continue the fight against the Islamic State , no doubt , but with a divisive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic State ’ s self-declared role as the protector of Iraq ’ s Sunnis .
The bolstering of Shiite militias would also harden yet another fault line in Baghdad , this time between supporters of the grassroots protest movement and the Iran-linked snipers and thugs leading the violent crackdown against them .
The demands of the youth on the streets of Shiite-dominated Iraqi cities overlap significantly with the grievances prevailing in Iraq ’ s Sunni areas , which were expressed through a large protest movement in 2013 .
The government ’ s militarization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which the Islamic State gained its most consequential foothold in Iraq : As Sunni groups took up arms to defend themselves against government forces , the militant group began moving into the towns of Anbar province .
Within weeks , the black flag was flying over parts of Fallujah and Ramadi .
Lurching from one crisis to the next , the Iraqi government has no alternative but to deliver reforms that finally reject sectarian politics .
However , with its back to the wall in Iran , the IRGC may double down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the political and military costs of a U.S. presence there .
Amid the fallout , the Islamic State would likely surge forward , taking Iraq and the wider region backward to an even darker place .

Before his death last October, informants reported that Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would hold strategy sessions in minivans packed with vegetables.
Now, as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month, it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq. Indeed, the militant group’s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots, assassinating tribal elders, taxing local populations, kidnapping soldiers, burning crops, laying roadside ambushes, and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs. Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival, but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result: removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether.
Iran has reached a dangerous juncture, in which hard-line factions are feeling considerable pressure. In misidentifying Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 as a cruise missile, and then going on to misrepresent what happened as a tragic air disaster, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has empowered its critics, in an unprecedented way, both inside and outside Iran. For many, the downing of the civilian jet captured the dysfunctional essence of the leadership in Tehran: at once deadly, incompetent, and dishonest. With the global spotlight on this “unforgivable mistake,” demands for accountability, and widespread anti-government protests inside Iran, the strain on the right wing of the regime will only intensify in the near term.
At this vulnerable moment for hawks in Iran, the embattled IRGC may well seek to prosecute its shadow war—whose architect was the slain commander Suleimani—with renewed vigor. The capstone in that covert project would be the departure, once and for all, of U.S. troops from Iraq.At this vulnerable moment for hawks in Iran, the embattled IRGC may well seek to prosecute its shadow war.
The official Iranian response to the U.S. killing of Suleimani was to attack air bases housing U.S. and allied troops in Iraq. Iranian officials indicated that this therapeutic salvo of missiles drew a line under the matter. However, Iran’s regional allies clearly had other ideas: In a fiery speech, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon announced that “the response to the blood of Qassem Suleimani and Abu Mahdi will be to oust the American troops from our entire region.” Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the founder of the powerful Kataib Hezbollah and deputy head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, was killed alongside Suleimani in the Jan. 3 drone strike.
Muhandis was an Iraqi national and, effectively, a government official targeted in his own country. Given his role in high command, we can assume Muhandis had many militia friends, who are now ready to inflict pain on U.S. troops to avenge his death. This includes the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who, on Jan. 9, promised that operations to avenge Muhandis’s death had not yet begun.
The Katyusha rocket attacks against the Balad air base on Jan. 12 and the Taji camp on Jan. 14 suggest that the crisis inside Iran could embolden, rather than inhibit, its militia allies in Iraq. But an escalation in Iraq could prove disastrous for the already fragile campaign against the Islamic State.
On Jan. 5, the global coalition against the Islamic State paused its activities to focus on “protecting the Iraqi bases that host Coalition personnel.” This announcement was made as the Iraqi parliament passed a nonbinding resolution, supported by the caretaker prime minister, calling for the expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq. The mission apparently restarted Wednesday, according to anonymous U.S. military officials, with no official comment from the Iraqi government.
In 2014, U.S. forces scrambled back to Iraq after the lightning advance of the Islamic State, where, in places like Mosul, whole Iraqi Army divisions tore off their uniforms and fled. Since then, the coalition and its partners—which sometimes included Suleimani’s Iranian forces and Shiite proxies, for whom the fanatical Sunni ideology of the Islamic State represented an existential threat—retook 42,000 square miles of territory, drawing the curtains on the Islamic State’s proto-state.Islamic State remnants in Iraq masterfully slip between the cracks of social and political divisions.
In that fight, the main function of the small numbers of coalition troops on the front lines was to communicate with aircraft so that strikes were carefully targeted. U.S. air power remain key to keeping the pressure on the Islamic State militarily, but, as one former coalition commander told me, “If you have a U.S. plane with a U.S. bomb and an Iraqi national is calling in for you to drop that bomb, you’re confronted with a series of practical and legal challenges.”
The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi forces, as well as critical help with battlespace management. The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise, but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle. However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are, for the time being, the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary (though of course not sufficient) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum. “The sad truth is that, if left to their own devices, the Iraqi security forces might rot while they stand, like they did in 2014,” the former commander said. “Maybe not next week, but eventually it would happen.”
Islamic State remnants in Iraq masterfully slip between the cracks of social and political divisions. A major safe haven is located in the valleys and caves of the Qara Chokh mountains in the north, which are controlled by the Iraqi security forces on one side and the Kurdish peshmerga on the other. In the no man’s land along the dividing line, where neither side patrols, the Islamic State has freedom of movement.
Deep in the Hamrin mountain range, which has long been a sanctuary for Sunni militant groups both established (al Qaeda in Iraq) and emerging (Jaysh Ahrar al-Sunna), the Islamic State is able to “preserve combat power.” It has built a tunnel network, ensconced weapons caches, erected solar panels, and exploited the higher ground. In nearby settlements, converted or coerced villagers leave out food and livestock for the fighters, who move freely at night. The Iraqi Army sometimes combs ungoverned spaces in the Sunni heartlands, but its forces cannot hold them. In an almost cartoonish fashion, the Islamic State actively inflames Sunni fears and frustrations related to the Shiite-dominated government—for example, damaging power lines during heat waves.Lurching from one crisis to the next, the Iraqi government has no alternative but to deliver reforms that finally reject sectarian politics.
Beginning in early October 2019, thousands of young Iraqi demonstrators marched in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities, decrying the corruption and ineptitude of their government and connecting its failures to the coercive control of Iran in Iraq. Live fire from Iran-linked militia members has killed an estimated 400 protesters and injured 19,000 more. Away from the demonstrations themselves, there have been targeted killings of coordinators, medics, and fundraisers, as well as reporters who have covered the protests.
Iraqi Shiite grandees like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr appear to have sided with the demonstrators, with Sistani reminding Iraq’s leaders that “the people are the source of power.” Temporarily quietened by the war drums between the United States and Iran, the demonstrations resumed last Friday.
An escalation inside Iraq, between the United States and Iran, would certainly strengthen the hand of Iran-linked Shiite militias, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah. The further encouragement of these groups would only perpetuate the toxic sectarian environment that served as the political cradle for the Islamic State in Iraq.
These ideological militias would continue the fight against the Islamic State, no doubt, but with a divisive sectarian bent that would only validate the Islamic State’s self-declared role as the protector of Iraq’s Sunnis. The bolstering of Shiite militias would also harden yet another fault line in Baghdad, this time between supporters of the grassroots protest movement and the Iran-linked snipers and thugs leading the violent crackdown against them.
The demands of the youth on the streets of Shiite-dominated Iraqi cities overlap significantly with the grievances prevailing in Iraq’s Sunni areas, which were expressed through a large protest movement in 2013. The government’s militarization of that political crisis created the space in which the Islamic State gained its most consequential foothold in Iraq: As Sunni groups took up arms to defend themselves against government forces, the militant group began moving into the towns of Anbar province. Within weeks, the black flag was flying over parts of Fallujah and Ramadi.
Lurching from one crisis to the next, the Iraqi government has no alternative but to deliver reforms that finally reject sectarian politics. However, with its back to the wall in Iran, the IRGC may double down in Iraq and seek to ramp up the political and military costs of a U.S. presence there. Amid the fallout, the Islamic State would likely surge forward, taking Iraq and the wider region backward to an even darker place.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-18--Russia’s Role in the Libyan Civil War Gives It Leverage Over Europe

Russia ’ s Role in the Libyan Civil War Gives It Leverage Over Europe A recent joint Russian-Turkish summit in Moscow aimed at forging a cease-fire in Libya broke down after the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar left without signing the proposed truce agreement .
One of Haftar ’ s main backers is Russia , and his unwillingness to sign on to the deal raises important questions about not only the degree of influence Russia actually has in Libya , but also how serious it is about bringing an end to the conflict .
Russia first rose to prominence in Libya @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the front lines of Tripoli to back Haftar , sparking concern in the United States and Europe that the Kremlin had finally thrown its hat into Libya ’ s civil war .
Its presence in Libya was strikingly reminiscent of the decisive role it played in Syria , where it backed the regime of President Bashar al-Assad to brutal effect and essentially saved the regime from collapse .
Russia ’ s inability to push Haftar into a cease-fire could be a sign that it does not have as much leverage over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that it isn ’ t trying that hard , and a look at its activity elsewhere in Libya might offer some insight into the reason why .
Moscow has spread itself across the different factions of the conflict , supporting Haftar and engaging his main rival , the Government of National Accord ( GNA ) , as well as former members of Muammar al-Qaddafi ’ s regime .
It is exploiting the conflict by playing each side off of the other in an apparent attempt to put pressure on the European Union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set of economic sanctions the EU imposed on Russia after it began its intervention in Ukraine in 2014 .
Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to attend a conference in Berlin on Jan. 19 where he will meet EU member states seeking to negotiate a cease-fire in Libya.Russia ’ s inability to push Haftar into a cease-fire could be a sign that it does not have as much leverage over the warlord as it seems .
To this end , Russia has allegedly deployed up to 200 Wagner Group mercenaries to buttress Haftar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ providing funding worth $ 3 billion .
( That money was counterfeit and is primarily in circulation in eastern Libya , a scenario that has turned the country into two financial territories and sowed deeper division . )
But that support was never enough to give Haftar the edge .
Two hundred mercenaries could break the current military stalemate , but they can ’ t seize and control territory on their own—never mind take a city like Tripoli .
And Russia ’ s financial assistance might provide a safety net for Haftar , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his $ 25 billion debt , a total that threatens to derail his entire campaign .
From this view , it appears that Moscow ’ s financial and military assistance was never meant to be decisive ; it was enough to keep Haftar afloat but not enough to ensure his victory .
Russia ’ s willingness to play both sides was put on international display when Putin received Haftar ’ s chief political rival , GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj , at a summit in Sochi in October 2019 .
In contrast , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after he was denied the chance to finally meet Putin at the Kremlin , revealing a somewhat testy relationship between the two .
Since the Sochi summit with Sarraj , Russia is believed to be close to securing a billion-dollar deal to supply the GNA with 1 million tons of wheat , a move designed in part to boost the country ’ s economic productivity , but also to break into a market dominated by France and Italy and curtail the EU ’ s influence in Libya .
Moscow has also moved to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Libyan leader Qaddafi ’ s family .
In early July 2019 , two Russians linked to the Wagner Group and formerly accused of operating internet trolling operations in Africa were arrested in Tripoli after allegedly making contact with representatives of Qaddafi ’ s so , Saif al-Islam Qaddafi .
They were accused of attempting to manipulate and influence future elections in favor of the younger Qaddafi .
A Qaddafi revival could severely undermine Haftar ’ s authority .
He has , in large part , built his armed forces on top of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime , and if Saif al-Islam reemerges as a political force , it could divide the loyalties of key players in that network .
Within the last month , the Russian state broadcasting company RT also aired an exclusive interview with Moussa Ibrahim Qaddafi , the regime ’ s former wartime spokesman , who had not been interviewed by the media in almost a decade .
Moussa Ibrahim used the interview to reframe the current conflict dynamic as a fight between the Western-backed products of NATO ’ s 2011 intervention ( embodied by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Islam , the former regime , and the Libyan people more broadly .
That Moscow was willing to let its broadcaster run an interview that so blatantly criticized one of its regional partners illustrates its effort to play each side off against the other.Russia ’ s willingness to play both sides was put on international display when Putin received Haftar ’ s chief political rival , GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj .
The attempt to resuscitate fragments of the Qaddafi regime—despite the near impossibility that the former regime could regain control of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which will only sow further discord in Libya .
The prospect of a prolonged conflict is concerning for European policymakers , as memories of the 2015 refugee crisis are still fresh .
Over a million people reached Europe from parts of the Middle East and North Africa that year—many of them fleeing unrest through Libya .
Their arrival fueled racial , ethnic , and religious tension in Europe and sparked the birth of a particularly virulent brand of Islamophobic populism .
Far-right nationalists rode the wave of populist agitation to power , taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary , and Italy .
They also spearheaded the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom and solidified a substantial electoral presence in France and Germany .
Migration levels have since dropped , but immigration is still a top concern for many voters , meaning another refugee crisis emanating from Libya could respark tensions , further embolden a deeply Euroskeptic far-right , and destabilize an already fragile European Union .
Russian efforts do appear , to an extent , to be succeeding .
The number of migrants fleeing to Europe is rising again , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a key player in the conflict , earning it a seat at the negotiating table in Berlin .
Although Moscow has clearly clawed itself into a position of strength , it doesn ’ t want to invest resources indefinitely in Libya .
It will only do so long enough to maximize the potential geopolitical gains it can reap from Europe .
Now that European leaders are willing to talk to Moscow , and it appears that sanctions might be on the table , Russian policymakers may consider initiating a conversation with Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict in Libya and ending sanctions .
Russia ’ s role is still limited , so European powers don ’ t necessarily need to feel pressure to give in to Russian demands .
The risk , of course , is that Russia might then decide to increase its involvement and amplify the pressure on Europe .
It is unclear how that could turn out for either Russia or Europe , but what is clear is that Moscow is trying hard to exploit the world ’ s most chaotic conflicts as a way of @ @ @ @ @

A recent joint Russian-Turkish summit in Moscow aimed at forging a cease-fire in Libya broke down after the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar left without signing the proposed truce agreement. One of Haftar’s main backers is Russia, and his unwillingness to sign on to the deal raises important questions about not only the degree of influence Russia actually has in Libya, but also how serious it is about bringing an end to the conflict.
A recent joint Russian-Turkish summit in Moscow aimed at forging a cease-fire in Libya broke down after the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar left without signing the proposed truce agreement. One of Haftar’s main backers is Russia, and his unwillingness to sign on to the deal raises important questions about not only the degree of influence Russia actually has in Libya, but also how serious it is about bringing an end to the conflict.
Russia first rose to prominence in Libya in September 2019 after it deployed mercenaries to the front lines of Tripoli to back Haftar, sparking concern in the United States and Europe that the Kremlin had finally thrown its hat into Libya’s civil war. Its presence in Libya was strikingly reminiscent of the decisive role it played in Syria, where it backed the regime of President Bashar al-Assad to brutal effect and essentially saved the regime from collapse.
Russia’s inability to push Haftar into a cease-fire could be a sign that it does not have as much leverage over the warlord as it seems or, frankly, that it isn’t trying that hard, and a look at its activity elsewhere in Libya might offer some insight into the reason why.
Moscow has spread itself across the different factions of the conflict, supporting Haftar and engaging his main rival, the Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as former members of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime. It is exploiting the conflict by playing each side off of the other in an apparent attempt to put pressure on the European Union to negotiate an end to the comprehensive set of economic sanctions the EU imposed on Russia after it began its intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to attend a conference in Berlin on Jan. 19 where he will meet EU member states seeking to negotiate a cease-fire in Libya.Russia’s inability to push Haftar into a cease-fire could be a sign that it does not have as much leverage over the warlord as it seems.
To this end, Russia has allegedly deployed up to 200 Wagner Group mercenaries to buttress Haftar’s forces, in addition to providing funding worth $3 billion. (That money was counterfeit and is primarily in circulation in eastern Libya, a scenario that has turned the country into two financial territories and sowed deeper division.) But that support was never enough to give Haftar the edge. Two hundred mercenaries could break the current military stalemate, but they can’t seize and control territory on their own—never mind take a city like Tripoli.
And Russia’s financial assistance might provide a safety net for Haftar, but it will do little to offset his $25 billion debt, a total that threatens to derail his entire campaign. From this view, it appears that Moscow’s financial and military assistance was never meant to be decisive; it was enough to keep Haftar afloat but not enough to ensure his victory.
Russia’s willingness to play both sides was put on international display when Putin received Haftar’s chief political rival, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, at a summit in Sochi in October 2019. In contrast, Haftar stormed out of Moscow last week after he was denied the chance to finally meet Putin at the Kremlin, revealing a somewhat testy relationship between the two. Since the Sochi summit with Sarraj, Russia is believed to be close to securing a billion-dollar deal to supply the GNA with 1 million tons of wheat, a move designed in part to boost the country’s economic productivity, but also to break into a market dominated by France and Italy and curtail the EU’s influence in Libya.
Moscow has also moved to cultivate relations with members of the late Libyan leader Qaddafi’s family. In early July 2019, two Russians linked to the Wagner Group and formerly accused of operating internet trolling operations in Africa were arrested in Tripoli after allegedly making contact with representatives of Qaddafi’s so, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. They were accused of attempting to manipulate and influence future elections in favor of the younger Qaddafi.
A Qaddafi revival could severely undermine Haftar’s authority. He has, in large part, built his armed forces on top of the tribal patronage network left by the Qaddafi regime, and if Saif al-Islam reemerges as a political force, it could divide the loyalties of key players in that network.
Within the last month, the Russian state broadcasting company RT also aired an exclusive interview with Moussa Ibrahim Qaddafi, the regime’s former wartime spokesman, who had not been interviewed by the media in almost a decade. Moussa Ibrahim used the interview to reframe the current conflict dynamic as a fight between the Western-backed products of NATO’s 2011 intervention (embodied by both Haftar and Sarraj) against Saif al-Islam, the former regime, and the Libyan people more broadly. That Moscow was willing to let its broadcaster run an interview that so blatantly criticized one of its regional partners illustrates its effort to play each side off against the other.Russia’s willingness to play both sides was put on international display when Putin received Haftar’s chief political rival, GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.
The attempt to resuscitate fragments of the Qaddafi regime—despite the near impossibility that the former regime could regain control of the country—adds another player to the mix, which will only sow further discord in Libya.
The prospect of a prolonged conflict is concerning for European policymakers, as memories of the 2015 refugee crisis are still fresh. Over a million people reached Europe from parts of the Middle East and North Africa that year—many of them fleeing unrest through Libya. Their arrival fueled racial, ethnic, and religious tension in Europe and sparked the birth of a particularly virulent brand of Islamophobic populism.
Far-right nationalists rode the wave of populist agitation to power, taking over governments in Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Italy. They also spearheaded the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom and solidified a substantial electoral presence in France and Germany.
Migration levels have since dropped, but immigration is still a top concern for many voters, meaning another refugee crisis emanating from Libya could respark tensions, further embolden a deeply Euroskeptic far-right, and destabilize an already fragile European Union.
Russian efforts do appear, to an extent, to be succeeding. The number of migrants fleeing to Europe is rising again, and Russia has convinced Germany that it is a key player in the conflict, earning it a seat at the negotiating table in Berlin. Although Moscow has clearly clawed itself into a position of strength, it doesn’t want to invest resources indefinitely in Libya. It will only do so long enough to maximize the potential geopolitical gains it can reap from Europe. Now that European leaders are willing to talk to Moscow, and it appears that sanctions might be on the table, Russian policymakers may consider initiating a conversation with Europe over both finding a resolution to the conflict in Libya and ending sanctions.
Russia’s role is still limited, so European powers don’t necessarily need to feel pressure to give in to Russian demands. The risk, of course, is that Russia might then decide to increase its involvement and amplify the pressure on Europe. It is unclear how that could turn out for either Russia or Europe, but what is clear is that Moscow is trying hard to exploit the world’s most chaotic conflicts as a way of reaping geopolitical rewards elsewhere.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-19--Could a Spy Save Liberal Democracy?

Could a Spy Save Liberal Democracy?

Speaking to an audience of trainee spies in John Le Carré ’ s The Secret Pilgrim , the inscrutable Cold Warrior George Smiley—Le Carré ’ s most iconic character—instructs them to place a quest for understanding at the center of their work .
“ I only ever cared about the man , ” Smiley says .
“ I never gave a fig for the ideologies , unless they were mad or evil , I never saw institutions as being worthy of their parts , or policies as much other than excuses for not feeling.
” Le Carré ’ s books @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of European liberals to defend democratic principles .
After the Cold War ended , and with it his morally ambiguous chronicles of the men charged with a good-and-evil struggle against the other side , the British author ’ s own vision of good and evil—especially evil—became unambiguous .
His books turned to characters grappling with unaccountable corporate power , banks laundering money for international criminals , fearsome terrorists , and privatized security services .
In his novelistic universe , individuals confront private power , terrorism , and American imperialism , sometimes making the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clear are the villains and moral questions in some of Le Carré ’ s later novels that some critics , like the Guardian ’ s Steven Poole in a 2003 review of Absolute Friends , accuse the now 88-year-old of becoming a strident editorialist in old age .
Le Carré does not appear to have taken this criticism too seriously .
His latest novel , Agent Running in the Field , contends with the question of loyalty : How does one ’ s integrity remain intact as the establishment to which one has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ work in the public interest ?
Le Carré remains one of the most interesting political novelists of his time , asking readers how much they ’ re willing to risk in order to protect European democracy—with its pledges to uphold the rule of law and human rights—from becoming nothing more than a historical anomaly .
His novels take place in large part within the minds of his characters , prompting the reader to consider an adjacent question : How much is your conscience worth to you ?
Espionage is a fitting form for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agents break laws—and social norms—in order to protect them .
They lie , cheat , and steal in order to preserve truth , honesty , and individual rights .
Astute intelligence agents learn how the world works , starting within the minds of their enemies .
They determine where people fit into bureaucracies , the truths that animate the intricate webs of human societies , and how these truths govern critical events .
Armed with this knowledge , they must make choices profoundly unsettling to their loyalties and moral sensibilities .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for example , Smiley persuades his KGB nemesis to defect by threatening to expose his use of ill-gotten funds to pay for his daughter ’ s care in a Swiss psychiatric facility .
Smiley finds no solace in this victory .
“ He did not want these spoils , won by these methods , ” Le Carré writes .
In Le Carré ’ s post-Cold War novels , these costs tend to be more direct than the damage to conscience Smiley and others suffer .
Most of Le Carré ’ s do-gooder characters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2001 ’ s The Constant Gardener , a diplomat-turned-big pharma muckraker seeking to uncover the perpetrators of his wife ’ s murder and the sinister actors responsible for fraudulent drug tests in the developing world is rewarded with a shallow grave .
An interpreter attempts to stop a coup meant to help wealthy Westerners get their hands on Eastern Congo ’ s coltan reserves and is imprisoned and stripped of his U.K. citizenship in 2006 ’ s The Mission Song .
Agent Running in the Field bridges Le Carré ’ s old @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a veteran MI6 agent runner , returning to a Brexit-rattled Britain after a career cultivating Russian assets on the European continent .
Though he is no longer behind enemy lines , Nat has not exactly returned home .
He does his best to keep his political sensibilities tucked away , but Nat finds himself at odds with the ideas reshaping his country .
Born in Paris to a Scots Guards officer and a mother of White Russian stock , Nat grows up between a boarding school education in the Scottish Highlands and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Though Nat is outwardly conservative , his globetrotting career and marriage to a human rights lawyer named Prue prove burdens in the twilight of his career .
Newly returned to London , Nat is reassigned to the Haven , an espionage backwater , where his superior will be a former financier with few spy qualifications .
Nat ’ s situation , that of the worldly expert subordinated to the bumbling authority of an entitled putz , is a blistering satirical , if unsubtle , take on the United Kingdom ’ s ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profession to his leftist adolescent daughter for the first time , the ordinarily quiet Nat can ’ t help but reveal his fury toward Britain ’ s ruling class .
Electrified by the possibility of strengthening his connection with his daughter—who doesn ’ t quite respect him—Nat lets his guard down , decrying “ a minority Tory cabinet of tenth-raters ” and the “ sheer bloody lunacy of Brexit.
” She easily gets the better of Nat : “ So if I ’ ve got this right … for the sake of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even very serious , you persuade other nationals to betray their own countries , ” she says .
Without a satisfying rejoinder , Nat spends much of the rest of the book keeping his moral reservations close to his chest , lest they force him to act on the dangerous truths he and many of his fellow citizens are all too aware of : that in a fragmenting society governed by self-dealing fools hellbent on shepherding every last democratic institution into an abyss of corruption and demagoguery , moral clarity depends only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bewilderment in the face of a U.K. governed by Brexiteers is familiar to readers with liberal sensibilities .
Nat ’ s bewilderment in the face of a U.K. governed by Brexiteers is familiar to readers with liberal sensibilities , as is his general passivity in the face of a world changing so quickly .
Like so many of his contemporaries , Nat is called upon to act in a manner that accommodates the designs of those unmaking the institutions once believed to be the substance of their country .
Nat ’ s weekly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at keeping his offended sense of personal ethics to himself .
A twenty-something researcher for a nondescript media company , Ed is a largely friendless Germanophile who spends much of his postgame drinking sessions with Nat raging impotently at the Tories , U.S. President Donald Trump , Euroskeptics , and anyone else he sees as a threat to European unity and democratic principles .
In the face of Ed ’ s anger , Nat does his best to preserve a “ decent silence ” about his own views , gently reminding his companion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. Constitution , will survive the incompetents and ideologues who seek to undermine them .
But Nat and his colleagues at MI6 learn that Ed has his own share of secrets .
An intelligence officer himself—though at a junior level—he ’ s uncovered a covert plot by the United States and a pre-Brexit U.K. to bribe and blackmail European politicians and other powerful figures to dismantle the EU ’ s trading tariffs .
Ed bungles his attempt to reveal the conspiracy to a European ally capable of doing something about it and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence agents .
As his only close confidant , Nat is hauled in for interrogation , his sympathies scrutinized for signs of treason .
In the eyes of his colleagues , he becomes a liability at best and a potential traitor at worst .
To prove himself one last time , Nat is charged with recruiting Ed as a double agent , turning him into another instrument of government power , far from courts , cameras , and any notion of due process .
Instead , with his wife ’ s help , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may save Ed and his own conscience .
Le Carré is famous for literally shaping the vocabulary of tradecraft : Terms he invented or popularized , including “ mole , ” were rapidly adopted by actual spies .
But his great contribution is not the details of dead drops and Moscow rules but his protagonists ’ attempts to make sense of their bit parts in the backrooms of history : to explore the moral dilemmas facing those who wish to live morally in open societies threatened both externally and from within .
Le @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the details of dead drops and Moscow rules but his protagonists ’ attempts to make sense of their bit parts in the backrooms of history .
How Nat or any individual reacts in the face of such forces , Le Carré suggests , has less to do with their circumstances and more to do with how deeply ingrained their moral strengths and weaknesses are .
One of Nat ’ s supervisors refers to one ’ s “ other head , ” the place where secret plots and betrayals take shape .
It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a soul in Le Carré ’ s work , a place in one ’ s mind where cunning and conviction unite behind actions that seem inevitable in retrospect .
This , in Le Carré ’ s eyes , is what unites the traitor and the liberal patriot : the choices that will define them lie dormant like sleeper agents , waiting for activation .
“ The seeds of sedition , ” he writes , “ … are sown a great deal earlier than the outward act that results from them .
”

Speaking to an audience of trainee spies in John Le Carré’s The Secret Pilgrim, the inscrutable Cold Warrior George Smiley—Le Carré’s most iconic character—instructs them to place a quest for understanding at the center of their work. “I only ever cared about the man,” Smiley says. “I never gave a fig for the ideologies, unless they were mad or evil, I never saw institutions as being worthy of their parts, or policies as much other than excuses for not feeling.”
Speaking to an audience of trainee spies in John Le Carré’s The Secret Pilgrim, the inscrutable Cold Warrior George Smiley—Le Carré’s most iconic character—instructs them to place a quest for understanding at the center of their work. “I only ever cared about the man,” Smiley says. “I never gave a fig for the ideologies, unless they were mad or evil, I never saw institutions as being worthy of their parts, or policies as much other than excuses for not feeling.”
Le Carré’s books lend heroic proportions to the dull-sounding injunctions of European liberals to defend democratic principles. After the Cold War ended, and with it his morally ambiguous chronicles of the men charged with a good-and-evil struggle against the other side, the British author’s own vision of good and evil—especially evil—became unambiguous. His books turned to characters grappling with unaccountable corporate power, banks laundering money for international criminals, fearsome terrorists, and privatized security services. In his novelistic universe, individuals confront private power, terrorism, and American imperialism, sometimes making the ultimate sacrifice in the process.
Agent Running in the Field, John Le Carré, Viking, 288 pp., , Oct. 22, 2019
So clear are the villains and moral questions in some of Le Carré’s later novels that some critics, like the Guardian’s Steven Poole in a 2003 review of Absolute Friends, accuse the now 88-year-old of becoming a strident editorialist in old age.
Le Carré does not appear to have taken this criticism too seriously. His latest novel, Agent Running in the Field, contends with the question of loyalty: How does one’s integrity remain intact as the establishment to which one has committed one’s life ceases to work in the public interest?
Le Carré remains one of the most interesting political novelists of his time, asking readers how much they’re willing to risk in order to protect European democracy—with its pledges to uphold the rule of law and human rights—from becoming nothing more than a historical anomaly. His novels take place in large part within the minds of his characters, prompting the reader to consider an adjacent question: How much is your conscience worth to you?
Espionage is a fitting form for that task. In theory, intelligence agents break laws—and social norms—in order to protect them. They lie, cheat, and steal in order to preserve truth, honesty, and individual rights. Astute intelligence agents learn how the world works, starting within the minds of their enemies. They determine where people fit into bureaucracies, the truths that animate the intricate webs of human societies, and how these truths govern critical events. Armed with this knowledge, they must make choices profoundly unsettling to their loyalties and moral sensibilities. In the 1979 novel Smiley’s People, for example, Smiley persuades his KGB nemesis to defect by threatening to expose his use of ill-gotten funds to pay for his daughter’s care in a Swiss psychiatric facility. Smiley finds no solace in this victory. “He did not want these spoils, won by these methods,” Le Carré writes.
In Le Carré’s post-Cold War novels, these costs tend to be more direct than the damage to conscience Smiley and others suffer. Most of Le Carré’s do-gooder characters don’t meet happy endings. In 2001’s The Constant Gardener, a diplomat-turned-big pharma muckraker seeking to uncover the perpetrators of his wife’s murder and the sinister actors responsible for fraudulent drug tests in the developing world is rewarded with a shallow grave. An interpreter attempts to stop a coup meant to help wealthy Westerners get their hands on Eastern Congo’s coltan reserves and is imprisoned and stripped of his U.K. citizenship in 2006’s The Mission Song.
Agent Running in the Field bridges Le Carré’s old and new heroes. It follows Nat, a veteran MI6 agent runner, returning to a Brexit-rattled Britain after a career cultivating Russian assets on the European continent. Though he is no longer behind enemy lines, Nat has not exactly returned home.
He does his best to keep his political sensibilities tucked away, but Nat finds himself at odds with the ideas reshaping his country. Born in Paris to a Scots Guards officer and a mother of White Russian stock, Nat grows up between a boarding school education in the Scottish Highlands and a polyglot household in a Parisian suburb. Though Nat is outwardly conservative, his globetrotting career and marriage to a human rights lawyer named Prue prove burdens in the twilight of his career.
Newly returned to London, Nat is reassigned to the Haven, an espionage backwater, where his superior will be a former financier with few spy qualifications. Nat’s situation, that of the worldly expert subordinated to the bumbling authority of an entitled putz, is a blistering satirical, if unsubtle, take on the United Kingdom’s ongoing self-immolation.
Revealing the nature of his profession to his leftist adolescent daughter for the first time, the ordinarily quiet Nat can’t help but reveal his fury toward Britain’s ruling class. Electrified by the possibility of strengthening his connection with his daughter—who doesn’t quite respect him—Nat lets his guard down, decrying “a minority Tory cabinet of tenth-raters” and the “sheer bloody lunacy of Brexit.”
She easily gets the better of Nat: “So if I’ve got this right … for the sake of a country that you have serious reservations about, even very serious, you persuade other nationals to betray their own countries,” she says.
Without a satisfying rejoinder, Nat spends much of the rest of the book keeping his moral reservations close to his chest, lest they force him to act on the dangerous truths he and many of his fellow citizens are all too aware of: that in a fragmenting society governed by self-dealing fools hellbent on shepherding every last democratic institution into an abyss of corruption and demagoguery, moral clarity depends only on the self.
Nat’s bewilderment in the face of a U.K. governed by Brexiteers is familiar to readers with liberal sensibilities.
Nat’s bewilderment in the face of a U.K. governed by Brexiteers is familiar to readers with liberal sensibilities, as is his general passivity in the face of a world changing so quickly. Like so many of his contemporaries, Nat is called upon to act in a manner that accommodates the designs of those unmaking the institutions once believed to be the substance of their country.
Nat’s weekly badminton partner threatens to upend his attempts at keeping his offended sense of personal ethics to himself. A twenty-something researcher for a nondescript media company, Ed is a largely friendless Germanophile who spends much of his postgame drinking sessions with Nat raging impotently at the Tories, U.S. President Donald Trump, Euroskeptics, and anyone else he sees as a threat to European unity and democratic principles.
In the face of Ed’s anger, Nat does his best to preserve a “decent silence” about his own views, gently reminding his companion that Britain’s institutions, like the U.S. Constitution, will survive the incompetents and ideologues who seek to undermine them.
But Nat and his colleagues at MI6 learn that Ed has his own share of secrets. An intelligence officer himself—though at a junior level—he’s uncovered a covert plot by the United States and a pre-Brexit U.K. to bribe and blackmail European politicians and other powerful figures to dismantle the EU’s trading tariffs.
Ed bungles his attempt to reveal the conspiracy to a European ally capable of doing something about it and makes himself the unwitting puppet of Russian intelligence agents. As his only close confidant, Nat is hauled in for interrogation, his sympathies scrutinized for signs of treason. In the eyes of his colleagues, he becomes a liability at best and a potential traitor at worst.
To prove himself one last time, Nat is charged with recruiting Ed as a double agent, turning him into another instrument of government power, far from courts, cameras, and any notion of due process. Instead, with his wife’s help, he sets a plan in motion that may save Ed and his own conscience.
Le Carré is famous for literally shaping the vocabulary of tradecraft: Terms he invented or popularized, including “mole,” were rapidly adopted by actual spies. But his great contribution is not the details of dead drops and Moscow rules but his protagonists’ attempts to make sense of their bit parts in the backrooms of history: to explore the moral dilemmas facing those who wish to live morally in open societies threatened both externally and from within.
Le Carré’s great contribution is not the details of dead drops and Moscow rules but his protagonists’ attempts to make sense of their bit parts in the backrooms of history.
How Nat or any individual reacts in the face of such forces, Le Carré suggests, has less to do with their circumstances and more to do with how deeply ingrained their moral strengths and weaknesses are. One of Nat’s supervisors refers to one’s “other head,” the place where secret plots and betrayals take shape. It’s the closest thing one might find to a soul in Le Carré’s work, a place in one’s mind where cunning and conviction unite behind actions that seem inevitable in retrospect.
This, in Le Carré’s eyes, is what unites the traitor and the liberal patriot: the choices that will define them lie dormant like sleeper agents, waiting for activation. “The seeds of sedition,” he writes, “… are sown a great deal earlier than the outward act that results from them.”