foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Taiwan’s Military Has Flashy American Weapons but No Ammo

Huang Zhi-jie was a 30-year-old lieutenant in the Taiwanese army .
Initially serving in the airborne troops as an enlisted soldier , Huang was so committed that he requested officer training—normally considered more work for little reward—and was later commissioned as a lieutenant in charge of a maintenance depot of the 269th Mechanized Infantry Brigade .
Huang was supposed to be the model soldier of which Taiwan desperately wanted more : a young , college-educated volunteer who chose to serve the country out of his own volition , at a time when the military was still facing difficult transition from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the night of April 16 , Huang hung himself on a dark staircase by his base ’ s mess hall .
Initially his death was not even reported in the Taiwanese media , until Huang ’ s mother took to Facebook in a long open letter appealing to President Tsai Ing-wen for an investigation .
In an emotional press conference , Huang ’ s mother alleged that her son was subjected to hazing by his superior officers , and that he was pressured to procure tools and spare repair parts out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ messages , receipts , and photos of items purchased by Huang were shown to the public as proof .
For some time before Huang ’ s death , the novice lieutenant was desperately trying to make up for the shortages in his depot by buying a variety of items like repair hammers and fire buckets from the civilian market .
Huang ’ s brother even used a U.S. website in Arizona to purchase a pair of spark plug gap gauges for him that used imperial measurements instead of metric ones .
“ It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to buy parts with soldiers ’ own money , ” said Taiwan ’ s defense minister , Yen Teh-fa , when questioned by Taiwanese legislators .
“ If something is broken or missing , a soldier can request a replacement part by filling the necessary paper works.
” But to serving officers and soldiers , that response was a grim joke .
In fact , during the same parliament hearing the inspector general of the military directly contradicted Yen and admitted that “ there were indeed occurrences ” of soldiers being pressured to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least 31 items still missing from Huang ’ s depot after his death .
Taiwan ’ s Ministry of National Defense ( MND ) does not officially disclose how many “ major combat platforms ” are in a mission-capable state .
During computer-simulated exercises such as the annual Han Kuang war game , however , the military simply assumed its units would have 90 percent fighting strength in terms of personnel and at least 85 percent equipment as mission-capable .
“ Those numbers are worthless .
They have no basis in reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ army lieutenant colonel who has become a prolific military writer and a vocal critic of Taiwan ’ s defense ministry , told Foreign Policy .
“ The army likely has no clue how many tanks or guns are actually mission-capable even if they wanted to tell the truth .
Because it is common for soldiers even from the lowest ranks to make up numbers so officers can present a rosy picture to please the top brass and politicians.
” “ The army likely has no clue how many tanks or guns are actually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the truth.
” Yu Pei-chen , a retired major general who was a commander of the 542th Armor Brigade , speculates that Huang may have been caught in a Catch-22 situation in which he could not request replacements “ by the book ” because too many things in his depot were already broken or missing when he was assigned there .
If he gave a truthful report , the system might demand that he replace the parts personally at inflated “ army prices ” which can reach astronomical sums .
The process for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , according to Yu , would be absurdly bureaucratic , require begging forgiveness from superiors , and would probably be unknown to an inexperienced officer .
His superior officers in the brigade might also frown on him for triggering an investigation from the top .
Instead of faking paperwork to cover up the shortfalls , as the officers before him may have done , he probably tried to cover the missing items himself , Yu explained .
On Taiwan ’ s internet forums , there is no shortage of netizens claiming to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of having served in logistics and armory jobs .
They write horror stories detailing not just buying parts with own money , but also how they were forced to engage in practices like writing fake paperwork and maintenance logs , hiding “ surplus ” parts from inspectors , conducting hasty and substandard repair tasks , even stealing parts from other units in preparation for equipment inspection or exercise .
A Taiwanese army master sergeant , who remains in active service and has long experience in logistics units , confirmed many of these accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ you define mission capable , ” said Master Sergeant Chen , who asked to be referred to only by last name because he is still in active service .
“ Our wheeled vehicles like the Humvees and Clouded Leopards ( Taiwan ’ s indigenous-produced infantry fighting vehicles ) have decent working numbers , maybe 90 percent or so .
But poorly maintained parts like the axle shaft on the Humvees means they tend to break down after running for as little as 50 kilometers on paved roads .
“ Tracked vehicles are the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the tanks and self-propelled artillery guns I ’ ve seen are in running conditions .
But a tank that has engine and tracks running is no guarantee that it also has a functional gun.
” Chen added : “ If we are talking about something that resembles U.S. standards , I would say 30 percent of the tanks are in running conditions and have functional weapons.
” The problem doesn ’ t stop there , the master sergeant explained , because ammunition , fuel , and field repair resources are also almost always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about to participate in some major exercise .
“ What if China attacks now ?
” Chen asked .
“ In that case , we better hope they give us a few more days or weeks to at least get some of our tanks running and loaded with live rounds.
” Chang Han-ching , a retired navy captain and a researcher for the Taiwan Center for International Strategic Studies , believes it was the Taiwanese military ’ s hasty yet critically flawed downsizing that hollowed out its logistics .
During the late 1990s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to cutting the force size from half a million strong to fewer than 200,000 .
Much of the changes were planned by the Office of the General Staff for Operations and Planning of Taiwan ’ s Defense Ministry , where Chang was a staffer .
“ Politicians wanted to shrink the size of the military to shorten and eventually get rid of conscription , the top generals obliged .
Given rising threats from China , cutting combat units is out of the question .
Guess where they cut instead ?
Yes , logistics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaving combat units unsupported will do any good.
” The drastically trimmed down logistics units , which have undergone round after round of cuts , soon became overwhelmed with major repair tasks .
Meanwhile , rank-and-file officers and soldiers in the field troops were delegated to undertake complex maintenance tasks and management of repair parts inventory that they had little idea how to do properly .
This led to a vicious cycle of more poorly maintained equipment , more failures and breakdowns , more misallocation of repair parts and resources .
The addition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such as the recently ordered M1A2 Abram tanks , may further overwhelm the existing system , as they are almost always bigger , heavier , and more complex to maintain .
The addition of more newly procured U.S. weapons may further overwhelm the existing system , as they are almost always bigger , heavier , and more complex to maintain .
“ Can you imagine a tank driver , a private with a few weeks ’ worth of driver ’ s training in the armor school , being tasked to conduct a 200-items @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ?
” Yu said .
“ He would have no idea what to do except to write up fake paperwork.
” One possible solution is to use civilian help to substitute for logistical forces , as much of the equipment like trucks and Humvees could be cheaper and more effectively maintained with civilian mechanics .
The U.S. military , for example , has 760,000 civilians and 560,000 contractors to support its mighty 2.2 million active duty and reserve personnel .
In contrast , Taiwan ’ s military has 153,000 soldiers and only 8,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , whose civilian employees and contractors are competitively selected from across a wide range of specialized fields , civilians in Taiwan ’ s military mostly hold trivial clerical positions , according to Huang .
There is “ no science whatsoever ” to the military ’ s designing of force structure to begin with , let along the army ’ s process of selecting civilian employees or contractors , Huang said .
The root cause of problems , therefore , appears to go far deeper than just broken tanks and not enough mechanics .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the military ’ s dysfunctional organizational culture , lack of civilian audit and oversight , and an ineffectual leadership ( both military and political ) that seems to give little thought to preparing troops for actual war .
Active and retired officers interviewed by this report , including Lt. Col. Huang , Maj. Gen. Yu , and navy Capt .
Chang were also unanimous in pointing to Defense Minister Yen as a prime example of the type of failed leadership that plagued Taiwan ’ s military for years .
They described Yen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and photo-ops , while at the same time stymieing any call for reform or even minor fixes that could remedy at least part of the military ’ s dire lack of combat readiness .
Historically , Taiwan ’ s Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) , now the ruling party under Tsai , was known for being more critical of the military ’ s leadership and for a time proposed overarching reform to improve its management and effectiveness .
In recent years , this has severely waned as Tsai ’ s administration has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense ministry .
A clear example is Yen , who was himself a senior general before being promoted by Tsai to head the ministry .
“ You want to fix Taiwan ’ s military ?
Find a defense minister that actually cares about our soldiers and how they might fare on the battlefield , instead of a guy whose apparent priority is feeding the president and politicians some feel-good publicity stuff to make them look tough on Facebook , ” said Yu , who since his retirement from the army a few years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a veteran affairs association affiliated with the opposition Kuomintang party .
Chang said that despite the Tsai administration ’ s vocal public rhetoric about defending Taiwan and resisting Beijing ’ s advances , he sees the administration as taking a defeatist attitude that treats the China-Taiwan stand-off as ultimately a political , rather than a military , question .
“ Their underlying thinking , based on my observation of the policies , is that China ’ s People ’ s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has grown to be too strong for us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan should just focus on putting up a good show of being tough , buy enough U.S. weapons for display , and pray that Americans come to our rescue when the Chinese call our bluff , which hopefully wouldn ’ t happen , ” Chang said .
But as long as Chinese intelligence services can read from newspapers that Taiwanese soldiers are busy shopping for Humvee parts from Amazon , Beijing can draw accurate conclusions about the state of the Taiwanese military .
But they could also come to mistaken conclusions about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their own country .
“ Speaking strictly from my heart as a retired officer I would never doubt—not even for one second , that the mass majority of our soldiers and officer corps are dedicated to defending the country , and Taiwan can expect every one of them to do their duty on the battlefield—however much equipment is working , ” Yu said .

A U.S.-made F-16V releases flares during the annual Han Kuang military drills in Taichung, Taiwan, on July 16. The five-day drills aimed to test how the armed forces would repel an invasion from China, which has vowed to bring Taiwan back into the fold—by force if necessary. SAM YEH/AFP via Getty Images
As China builds up military forces across the Taiwan strait and vows to take back the island through “any means” necessary, the United States and others hope for a Taiwan that can stand on its own feet against Chinese aggression. But in reality, not only is the Taiwanese military facing a serious shortage of soldiers and an entirely dysfunctional reserve system, as my previous reporting for Foreign Policy revealed, half of its tanks may not be able to run—and even fewer have functional weapons. These failures are costing lives even before China fires a single shot. As Taiwanese politicians showcase flashy U.S. weapons bought with taxpayers’ money, the logistics inside the military remain so abysmal that a young army officer killed himself after being pressured to buy repair parts out of his own pocket.
Huang Zhi-jie was a 30-year-old lieutenant in the Taiwanese army. Initially serving in the airborne troops as an enlisted soldier, Huang was so committed that he requested officer training—normally considered more work for little reward—and was later commissioned as a lieutenant in charge of a maintenance depot of the 269th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Huang was supposed to be the model soldier of which Taiwan desperately wanted more: a young, college-educated volunteer who chose to serve the country out of his own volition, at a time when the military was still facing difficult transition from conscription to an all-volunteer military.
But on the night of April 16, Huang hung himself on a dark staircase by his base’s mess hall. Initially his death was not even reported in the Taiwanese media, until Huang’s mother took to Facebook in a long open letter appealing to President Tsai Ing-wen for an investigation.
Huang Zhi-Jie
In an emotional press conference, Huang’s mother alleged that her son was subjected to hazing by his superior officers, and that he was pressured to procure tools and spare repair parts out of his own pocket. Screenshots of private messages, receipts, and photos of items purchased by Huang were shown to the public as proof. For some time before Huang’s death, the novice lieutenant was desperately trying to make up for the shortages in his depot by buying a variety of items like repair hammers and fire buckets from the civilian market. Huang’s brother even used a U.S. website in Arizona to purchase a pair of spark plug gap gauges for him that used imperial measurements instead of metric ones.
“It is against the rules of the army to buy parts with soldiers’ own money,” said Taiwan’s defense minister, Yen Teh-fa, when questioned by Taiwanese legislators. “If something is broken or missing, a soldier can request a replacement part by filling the necessary paper works.”
But to serving officers and soldiers, that response was a grim joke. In fact, during the same parliament hearing the inspector general of the military directly contradicted Yen and admitted that “there were indeed occurrences” of soldiers being pressured to purchase parts. Army inspectors also found at least 31 items still missing from Huang’s depot after his death.
A projectile is launched from a Taiwanese-made Thunderbolt-2000 multiple rocket system during the annual Han Kuang military drills in Taichung, Taiwan, on July 16.
Even worse, the 269th Mechanized Infantry Brigade isn’t some rear-echelon unit but a major combat formation strategically stationed around the outskirt of Taoyuan City, northern Taiwan. It is expected to bear the brunt of ground fighting to stop any invading Chinese troops from reaching the basin of Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. If the 269th is in such bad material shape, how about the rest of the Taiwanese military?
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) does not officially disclose how many “major combat platforms” are in a mission-capable state. During computer-simulated exercises such as the annual Han Kuang war game, however, the military simply assumed its units would have 90 percent fighting strength in terms of personnel and at least 85 percent equipment as mission-capable.
“Those numbers are worthless. They have no basis in reality,” James Huang, a retired army lieutenant colonel who has become a prolific military writer and a vocal critic of Taiwan’s defense ministry, told Foreign Policy. “The army likely has no clue how many tanks or guns are actually mission-capable even if they wanted to tell the truth. Because it is common for soldiers even from the lowest ranks to make up numbers so officers can present a rosy picture to please the top brass and politicians.”
“The army likely has no clue how many tanks or guns are actually mission-capable even if they wanted to tell the truth.”
Yu Pei-chen, a retired major general who was a commander of the 542th Armor Brigade, speculates that Huang may have been caught in a Catch-22 situation in which he could not request replacements “by the book” because too many things in his depot were already broken or missing when he was assigned there. If he gave a truthful report, the system might demand that he replace the parts personally at inflated “army prices” which can reach astronomical sums. The process for getting the items replaced without paying himself, according to Yu, would be absurdly bureaucratic, require begging forgiveness from superiors, and would probably be unknown to an inexperienced officer. His superior officers in the brigade might also frown on him for triggering an investigation from the top. Instead of faking paperwork to cover up the shortfalls, as the officers before him may have done, he probably tried to cover the missing items himself, Yu explained.
On Taiwan’s internet forums, there is no shortage of netizens claiming to be veterans, who complain about the misfortune of having served in logistics and armory jobs. They write horror stories detailing not just buying parts with own money, but also how they were forced to engage in practices like writing fake paperwork and maintenance logs, hiding “surplus” parts from inspectors, conducting hasty and substandard repair tasks, even stealing parts from other units in preparation for equipment inspection or exercise.
A Taiwanese army master sergeant, who remains in active service and has long experience in logistics units, confirmed many of these accounts.
“It all depends on how you define mission capable,” said Master Sergeant Chen, who asked to be referred to only by last name because he is still in active service. “Our wheeled vehicles like the Humvees and Clouded Leopards (Taiwan’s indigenous-produced infantry fighting vehicles) have decent working numbers, maybe 90 percent or so. But poorly maintained parts like the axle shaft on the Humvees means they tend to break down after running for as little as 50 kilometers on paved roads.
“Tracked vehicles are the real nightmares. About 50 percent of the tanks and self-propelled artillery guns I’ve seen are in running conditions. But a tank that has engine and tracks running is no guarantee that it also has a functional gun.”
Chen added: “If we are talking about something that resembles U.S. standards, I would say 30 percent of the tanks are in running conditions and have functional weapons.”
The problem doesn’t stop there, the master sergeant explained, because ammunition, fuel, and field repair resources are also almost always in chronic shortage unless a unit is about to participate in some major exercise.
“What if China attacks now?” Chen asked. “In that case, we better hope they give us a few more days or weeks to at least get some of our tanks running and loaded with live rounds.”
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen
The dilapidated state of the military has many roots, but veteran staff officers have proposed one likely theory to explain it.
Chang Han-ching, a retired navy captain and a researcher for the Taiwan Center for International Strategic Studies, believes it was the Taiwanese military’s hasty yet critically flawed downsizing that hollowed out its logistics. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Taiwan committed itself to cutting the force size from half a million strong to fewer than 200,000. Much of the changes were planned by the Office of the General Staff for Operations and Planning of Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, where Chang was a staffer.
“Politicians wanted to shrink the size of the military to shorten and eventually get rid of conscription, the top generals obliged. Given rising threats from China, cutting combat units is out of the question. Guess where they cut instead? Yes, logistics, of all things. As if leaving combat units unsupported will do any good.”
The drastically trimmed down logistics units, which have undergone round after round of cuts, soon became overwhelmed with major repair tasks. Meanwhile, rank-and-file officers and soldiers in the field troops were delegated to undertake complex maintenance tasks and management of repair parts inventory that they had little idea how to do properly. This led to a vicious cycle of more poorly maintained equipment, more failures and breakdowns, more misallocation of repair parts and resources. The addition of more newly procured U.S. weapons, such as the recently ordered M1A2 Abram tanks, may further overwhelm the existing system, as they are almost always bigger, heavier, and more complex to maintain.
The addition of more newly procured U.S. weapons may further overwhelm the existing system, as they are almost always bigger, heavier, and more complex to maintain.
“Can you imagine a tank driver, a private with a few weeks’ worth of driver’s training in the armor school, being tasked to conduct a 200-items maintenance routine around an entire M60 tank?” Yu said. “He would have no idea what to do except to write up fake paperwork.”
One possible solution is to use civilian help to substitute for logistical forces, as much of the equipment like trucks and Humvees could be cheaper and more effectively maintained with civilian mechanics. The U.S. military, for example, has 760,000 civilians and 560,000 contractors to support its mighty 2.2 million active duty and reserve personnel. In contrast, Taiwan’s military has 153,000 soldiers and only 8,000 civilian employees.
Unlike the U.S. military, whose civilian employees and contractors are competitively selected from across a wide range of specialized fields, civilians in Taiwan’s military mostly hold trivial clerical positions, according to Huang. There is “no science whatsoever” to the military’s designing of force structure to begin with, let along the army’s process of selecting civilian employees or contractors, Huang said.
The root cause of problems, therefore, appears to go far deeper than just broken tanks and not enough mechanics. Interviewees suggested the answer must lies somewhere between the military’s dysfunctional organizational culture, lack of civilian audit and oversight, and an ineffectual leadership (both military and political) that seems to give little thought to preparing troops for actual war.
Civilian contractor mechanics conduct checks and repairs on the Taiwanese army’s Clouded Leopard infantry fighting vehicles during the Han Kuang military exercise.
After many requests for comment, including an extensive preview of the findings of this article, the MND spokesperson’s office replied with a one paragraph statement reading: “Our ministry cannot reply to independent inquiries, as our ministry only communicate with media that are familiar to us.”
Active and retired officers interviewed by this report, including Lt. Col. Huang, Maj. Gen. Yu, and navy Capt. Chang were also unanimous in pointing to Defense Minister Yen as a prime example of the type of failed leadership that plagued Taiwan’s military for years. They described Yen as a habitual yes-man who prioritizes pomp-and-show and photo-ops, while at the same time stymieing any call for reform or even minor fixes that could remedy at least part of the military’s dire lack of combat readiness.
Historically, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the ruling party under Tsai, was known for being more critical of the military’s leadership and for a time proposed overarching reform to improve its management and effectiveness. In recent years, this has severely waned as Tsai’s administration has grown closer to the generals running the defense ministry. A clear example is Yen, who was himself a senior general before being promoted by Tsai to head the ministry.
“You want to fix Taiwan’s military? Find a defense minister that actually cares about our soldiers and how they might fare on the battlefield, instead of a guy whose apparent priority is feeding the president and politicians some feel-good publicity stuff to make them look tough on Facebook,” said Yu, who since his retirement from the army a few years ago has taken up a position leading a veteran affairs association affiliated with the opposition Kuomintang party.
Chang said that despite the Tsai administration’s vocal public rhetoric about defending Taiwan and resisting Beijing’s advances, he sees the administration as taking a defeatist attitude that treats the China-Taiwan stand-off as ultimately a political, rather than a military, question.
“Their underlying thinking, based on my observation of the policies, is that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown to be too strong for us to fight militarily anyway. They think Taiwan should just focus on putting up a good show of being tough, buy enough U.S. weapons for display, and pray that Americans come to our rescue when the Chinese call our bluff, which hopefully wouldn’t happen,” Chang said.
But as long as Chinese intelligence services can read from newspapers that Taiwanese soldiers are busy shopping for Humvee parts from Amazon, Beijing can draw accurate conclusions about the state of the Taiwanese military. But they could also come to mistaken conclusions about the resolve of the Taiwanese soldiers in defending their own country.
“Speaking strictly from my heart as a retired officer I would never doubt—not even for one second, that the mass majority of our soldiers and officer corps are dedicated to defending the country, and Taiwan can expect every one of them to do their duty on the battlefield—however much equipment is working,” Yu said.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview.

The Biden Doctrine Exists Already .
Here ’ s an Inside Preview .
In an essay published earlier this year in Foreign Affairs , Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wrote , “ the triumph of democracy and liberalism over fascism and autocracy created the free world .
But this contest does not just define our past .
It will define our future , as well.
” That is a sentiment worth pausing over .
Biden , who was born in 1942 , is a child of that heroic era : He grew up in the 1950s , when the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union .
The Soviet collapse in 1989 appeared to put an end to the great ideological contest of the 20th century .
In his own tenure as vice president , Biden worked with President Barack Obama to buffer conflict with the authoritarian states of our own time—China , Russia , Iran .
Only four years have passed since that time , and yet in his essay Biden was , in effect , conceding that this project had failed .
The contest with authoritarianism will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states , each in their own way , have chosen a path of confrontation with the West , and because—what is far more shocking—in 2016 the United States elected a president who has trampled democratic norms at home , insulted democratic allies abroad , and showered dictators with praise .
Should Biden become president , he will inherit a crisis that bears a resemblance to the early days of the Cold War—far better in some ways but worse in others .
Indeed , several of Biden ’ s foreign-policy advisors to whom I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the analogy to President Harry S. Truman .
Certain words keep cropping up in Biden ’ s campaign documents and the works of his confidantes : “ free world , ” “ democracy , ” “ Europe , ” “ lead.
” Progressives would regard these as retrograde words that bear the mark of a candidate shaped by a vanished world .
Certainly they are words that come naturally to Biden , an old-school sentimental patriot .
Yet to his former national security aides and current advisors , some of them almost two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the necessary response to radical changes both abroad and at home .
I began every conversation with members of the foreign-policy team by asking how they thought the world had changed .
Colin Kahl , Biden ’ s national security advisor from 2014 to the end of the administration and now a professor at Stanford University , said , “ The three things that are most obvious are one , the world has become so interconnected that the biggest existential challenges we face are the transnational threats ” —an awareness acutely amplified by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democracy is on its back foot around the world ; and three , the changing distribution of global power—great-power competition is back.
” These threats are interconnected .
As Kahl points out , Obama had muted the language of democracy promotion not only because he recoiled from American braggadocio but because the whole debate , from the time of President Bill Clinton ’ s strategy of “ democratic enlargement , ” had revolved around the question of how , and how far , the United States could project its domestic values abroad .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ was : much less than we think , and at a vastly greater cost .
Nevertheless , the debate itself presupposed American primacy—and American democracy .
Those pillars have crumbled away .
“ This is not about a liberal effort to expand democracy , ” Kahl said .
“ This is about defending the existing frontiers of the free world.
” Those frontiers are threatened by illiberal populism inside democratic states and abroad by the proxy wars and weaponized corruption of Russia as well as China ’ s growing effort to leverage its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the global order .
“ We have to rally the democratic nations to preserve what we have , ” Kahl said .
Here lies the analogy to 1947 , the year when Truman declared that the United States would come to the aid of nations fighting tyranny because Soviet opportunism threatened U.S. national security .
Of course today ’ s Russia is a middling power , and China , though more formidable than any past American rival , poses a that which is primarily economic and diplomatic .
What ’ s more , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ threat , the United States offered succor to right-wing dictators and overthrew democratically elected leaders .
That is not the record Biden plans to emulate .
But Washington also fostered networks of alliances and rule-based institutions that governed the world without a heavy American hand—thus the conceit of the “ benevolent hegemon ” —and offered a model that the autocrats could not duplicate .
What would it mean to rally democracies without fighting a new cold war , and without pretending to the status of undisputed leadership the United States had 70 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as Biden notes in his Foreign Affairs essay , is “ renewing democracy at home ” —ending the assault on immigrants , minorities , public servants , and all the other targets of President Donald Trump ’ s nationalist abuse .
This is one problem that Truman did not face , yet the Cold War liberals of his day , such as Hubert Humphrey , also recognized that the United States could not serve as a credible defender of democratic values unless it conspicuously practiced them at home , in their case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a generous welcome to displaced persons .
Domestic reform thus enables reform abroad .
Then what ?
Biden has vowed to convene a “ Summit for Democracy ” in his first year .
This is an idea that in recent years has been chiefly associated with neoconservatives , who are inclined to see the divisions of the world in ideological rather than strictly geopolitical terms .
Yet that premise has been migrating toward the center .
Last year , in what now seems a straw in the wind , Tony Blinken , Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the head of the campaign ’ s vast network of foreign-policy advisors , joined up with the neocon Robert Kagan to call for a “ league ” —not just a summit—of democracies .
A cautious , fine-grained thinker , Blinken says that he was pleasantly surprised to discover how much common ground he shared with the far more doctrinal Kagan .
Nevertheless , he stipulated that what he and Biden have in mind is not a “ crusade ” but a medium for collective action .
“ Your base in the world are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it .
But not , perhaps , all democracies : On many issues , emerging-world democracies like India and Brazil feel much more like part of the problem than part of the solution .
Biden ’ s vision is far more Atlanticist .
The core members of his envisioned body would be Europe plus South Korea , Japan , Australia , and New Zealand—America ’ s traditional allies .
What Biden and his advisors have in mind is not a formal institution like NATO but a forum , a kind of expanded G-7 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out common solutions to the transnational problems Kahl was thinking of—pandemics or cybersecurity or , of course , climate change—as well as the specific issues presented by the rise of authoritarian states , including election interference , surveillance technology , and China ’ s role in 5G technology .
To put it in the most grandiose terms , Biden would refound “ the West ” for a new age of problems without borders .
This new orientation also implies a new geopolitical tilt—a pivot to Europe .
It has been left to Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to stand up to Russia , and increasingly to China , and to speak out against illiberalism inside Europe .
In a recent article in the Washington Monthly , Julie Smith , another former Biden official and member of the inner circle of advisors , suggested that the next president travel to Germany within 100 days of taking office and deliver a major speech to “ redefine the transatlantic agenda around the concept of defending democratic values.
” The equivalent for Obama of this ingathering-of-the-West address was , of course , the June @ @ @ @ @ @ @ called for “ a new beginning ” between the United States and Islam .
Obama ’ s Middle Eastern adventure brought him nothing but tears .
Much though he wanted to pivot to Asia , a region of stable nation-states , Obama never pulled more than one leg out of the Middle Eastern quagmire .
Biden may have better luck showing the Arab world his back ( for reasons to be explored in a future column ) .
“ Lead ” is of course a word as loaded as “ free world.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ behind , ” which they believed summed up Obama ’ s philosophy .
Progressives and realists of the left , in contrast , flinch at invocations of the burdens of leadership , which they associate with regime change , drone warfare , and imperial hubris .
As Andrew Bacevich of the Quincy Institute recently wrote , “ for too long , ruling elites allowed the purported obligations of global leadership to take precedence over tending to the collective wellbeing of the American people.
” Bacevich argues that “ the era of US dominion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe that .
He really does regard the United States as the “ indispensable nation , ” in Madeleine Albright ’ s much-mocked formulation , and he tends to attract aides who do too .
In an article in the Atlantic last year , Jake Sullivan , another former national security official who now occupies a unique position as an advisor on both foreign and domestic policy , argued that , thanks to its capacity for self-renewal , its pragmatism , and its commitment to a doctrine of enlightened self-interest , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , albeit in the more modest role of first among equals .
In words guaranteed to vex the left , Sullivan called for “ a new American exceptionalism ” to restore the nation ’ s place atop the global order .
That does sound more like a daydream than a plan of action .
After all , Obama issued much the same promise of renewal , and Americans chose to replace him with Trump .
Both world leaders and ordinary citizens have concluded that the United States is not the country they thought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no Franklin D. Roosevelt .
Of course , that ’ s what they said about Truman .
This is the first of a weekly series reporting on Joe Biden ’ s foreign-policy vision .

In an essay published earlier this year in Foreign Affairs, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wrote , “the triumph of democracy and liberalism over fascism and autocracy created the free world. But this contest does not just define our past. It will define our future, as well.” That is a sentiment worth pausing over. Biden, who was born in 1942, is a child of that heroic era: He grew up in the 1950s, when the United States assumed its role of benevolent hegemon of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union. The Soviet collapse in 1989 appeared to put an end to the great ideological contest of the 20th century. In his own tenure as vice president, Biden worked with President Barack Obama to buffer conflict with the authoritarian states of our own time—China, Russia, Iran.
In an essay published earlier this year in Foreign Affairs, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden wrote, “the triumph of democracy and liberalism over fascism and autocracy created the free world. But this contest does not just define our past. It will define our future, as well.” That is a sentiment worth pausing over. Biden, who was born in 1942, is a child of that heroic era: He grew up in the 1950s, when the United States assumed its role of benevolent hegemon of the West in the struggle with the Soviet Union. The Soviet collapse in 1989 appeared to put an end to the great ideological contest of the 20th century. In his own tenure as vice president, Biden worked with President Barack Obama to buffer conflict with the authoritarian states of our own time—China, Russia, Iran.
Only four years have passed since that time, and yet in his essay Biden was, in effect, conceding that this project had failed. The contest with authoritarianism will define the American future both because those states, each in their own way, have chosen a path of confrontation with the West, and because—what is far more shocking—in 2016 the United States elected a president who has trampled democratic norms at home, insulted democratic allies abroad, and showered dictators with praise. Should Biden become president, he will inherit a crisis that bears a resemblance to the early days of the Cold War—far better in some ways but worse in others. Indeed, several of Biden’s foreign-policy advisors to whom I have been speaking in recent weeks made the analogy to President Harry S. Truman.
Certain words keep cropping up in Biden’s campaign documents and the works of his confidantes: “free world,” “democracy,” “Europe,” “lead.” Progressives would regard these as retrograde words that bear the mark of a candidate shaped by a vanished world. Certainly they are words that come naturally to Biden, an old-school sentimental patriot. Yet to his former national security aides and current advisors, some of them almost two generations younger than Biden, they constitute the necessary response to radical changes both abroad and at home.
I began every conversation with members of the foreign-policy team by asking how they thought the world had changed. Colin Kahl, Biden’s national security advisor from 2014 to the end of the administration and now a professor at Stanford University, said, “The three things that are most obvious are one, the world has become so interconnected that the biggest existential challenges we face are the transnational threats”—an awareness acutely amplified by the coronavirus pandemic; “two, democracy is on its back foot around the world; and three, the changing distribution of global power—great-power competition is back.”
These threats are interconnected. As Kahl points out, Obama had muted the language of democracy promotion not only because he recoiled from American braggadocio but because the whole debate, from the time of President Bill Clinton’s strategy of “democratic enlargement,” had revolved around the question of how, and how far, the United States could project its domestic values abroad. The implicit message of the Iraq War was: much less than we think, and at a vastly greater cost. Nevertheless, the debate itself presupposed American primacy—and American democracy.
Those pillars have crumbled away. “This is not about a liberal effort to expand democracy,” Kahl said. “This is about defending the existing frontiers of the free world.” Those frontiers are threatened by illiberal populism inside democratic states and abroad by the proxy wars and weaponized corruption of Russia as well as China’s growing effort to leverage its economic power to rewrite the rules of the global order. “We have to rally the democratic nations to preserve what we have,” Kahl said.
Here lies the analogy to 1947, the year when Truman declared that the United States would come to the aid of nations fighting tyranny because Soviet opportunism threatened U.S. national security. Of course today’s Russia is a middling power, and China, though more formidable than any past American rival, poses a that which is primarily economic and diplomatic. What’s more, in the name of fighting an existential threat, the United States offered succor to right-wing dictators and overthrew democratically elected leaders. That is not the record Biden plans to emulate. But Washington also fostered networks of alliances and rule-based institutions that governed the world without a heavy American hand—thus the conceit of the “benevolent hegemon”—and offered a model that the autocrats could not duplicate.
What would it mean to rally democracies without fighting a new cold war, and without pretending to the status of undisputed leadership the United States had 70 years ago? The first order of business, as Biden notes in his Foreign Affairs essay, is “renewing democracy at home”—ending the assault on immigrants, minorities, public servants, and all the other targets of President Donald Trump’s nationalist abuse. This is one problem that Truman did not face, yet the Cold War liberals of his day, such as Hubert Humphrey, also recognized that the United States could not serve as a credible defender of democratic values unless it conspicuously practiced them at home, in their case by passing civil rights legislation and offering a generous welcome to displaced persons. Domestic reform thus enables reform abroad.
Then what? Biden has vowed to convene a “Summit for Democracy” in his first year. This is an idea that in recent years has been chiefly associated with neoconservatives, who are inclined to see the divisions of the world in ideological rather than strictly geopolitical terms. Yet that premise has been migrating toward the center. Last year, in what now seems a straw in the wind, Tony Blinken, Biden’s longtime national security aide and the head of the campaign’s vast network of foreign-policy advisors, joined up with the neocon Robert Kagan to call for a “league”—not just a summit—of democracies.
A cautious, fine-grained thinker, Blinken says that he was pleasantly surprised to discover how much common ground he shared with the far more doctrinal Kagan. Nevertheless, he stipulated that what he and Biden have in mind is not a “crusade” but a medium for collective action. “Your base in the world are other democracies,” as Blinken put it. But not, perhaps, all democracies: On many issues, emerging-world democracies like India and Brazil feel much more like part of the problem than part of the solution. Biden’s vision is far more Atlanticist. The core members of his envisioned body would be Europe plus South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—America’s traditional allies.
What Biden and his advisors have in mind is not a formal institution like NATO but a forum, a kind of expanded G-7, in which democratic allies can work out common solutions to the transnational problems Kahl was thinking of—pandemics or cybersecurity or, of course, climate change—as well as the specific issues presented by the rise of authoritarian states, including election interference, surveillance technology, and China’s role in 5G technology. To put it in the most grandiose terms, Biden would refound “the West” for a new age of problems without borders.
This new orientation also implies a new geopolitical tilt—a pivot to Europe. It has been left to Germany, France, and a few others to stand up to Russia, and increasingly to China, and to speak out against illiberalism inside Europe. In a recent article in the Washington Monthly, Julie Smith, another former Biden official and member of the inner circle of advisors, suggested that the next president travel to Germany within 100 days of taking office and deliver a major speech to “redefine the transatlantic agenda around the concept of defending democratic values.”
The equivalent for Obama of this ingathering-of-the-West address was, of course, the June 2009 speech in Cairo in which he called for “a new beginning” between the United States and Islam. Obama’s Middle Eastern adventure brought him nothing but tears.
Much though he wanted to pivot to Asia, a region of stable nation-states, Obama never pulled more than one leg out of the Middle Eastern quagmire. Biden may have better luck showing the Arab world his back (for reasons to be explored in a future column).
“Lead” is of course a word as loaded as “free world.” Conservatives mocked the expression “lead from behind,” which they believed summed up Obama’s philosophy. Progressives and realists of the left, in contrast, flinch at invocations of the burdens of leadership, which they associate with regime change, drone warfare, and imperial hubris. As Andrew Bacevich of the Quincy Institute recently wrote, “for too long, ruling elites allowed the purported obligations of global leadership to take precedence over tending to the collective wellbeing of the American people.”
Bacevich argues that “the era of US dominion has now passed.” Biden does not believe that. He really does regard the United States as the “indispensable nation,” in Madeleine Albright’s much-mocked formulation, and he tends to attract aides who do too. In an article in the Atlantic last year, Jake Sullivan, another former national security official who now occupies a unique position as an advisor on both foreign and domestic policy, argued that, thanks to its capacity for self-renewal, its pragmatism, and its commitment to a doctrine of enlightened self-interest, the United States remains uniquely capable of world leadership, albeit in the more modest role of first among equals. In words guaranteed to vex the left, Sullivan called for “a new American exceptionalism” to restore the nation’s place atop the global order.
That does sound more like a daydream than a plan of action. After all, Obama issued much the same promise of renewal, and Americans chose to replace him with Trump. Both world leaders and ordinary citizens have concluded that the United States is not the country they thought it was. And Joe Biden is no Franklin D. Roosevelt. Of course, that’s what they said about Truman.
This is the first of a weekly series reporting on Joe Biden’s foreign-policy vision.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Why Putin Might be Hoping Navalny Survives His Poisoning

Why Putin Might be Hoping Navalny Survives His Poisoning Did Vladimir Putin just try to kill one of his harshest domestic critics ?
Though it wouldn ’ t be the first time the Russian president has gone after enemies—his own or his country ’ s—with lethal precision , analysts say the apparent poisoning of the opposition politician and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny doesn ’ t quite seem like a Putin hit job .
Navalny was flying from the city of Tomsk , where he had been campaigning with local opposition politicians , to Moscow when he suddenly fell ill on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Instagram by another passenger , Navalny could be heard crying out in pain before the flight made an emergency landing in Omsk .
His press secretary , Kira Yarmysh , who was traveling with Navalny , said he became sick drinking a cup of tea at the Tomsk airport : “ We assume that Aleksei was poisoned with something mixed with his tea , ” she wrote on Twitter .
Navalny , whom the Wall Street Journal once called “ the man Vladimir Putin fears most , ” was rushed unconscious to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ placed on a ventilator .
Doctors at the hospital in Omsk said that the Kremlin critic was in a serious but stable condition .
There is a long history of Russian dissidents and defectors being poisoned or meeting untimely deaths .
In 2006 , former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko died in London after his tea was poisoned with the radioactive isotope polonium-210 .
A British inquiry concluded that agents of the Russian security agency FSB carried out the murder , likely acting under orders from Putin .
“ One of poison ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is their capacity to combine easy deniability and vicious theatricality , ” Mark Galeotti , an expert on the Russian security services , told Foreign Policy last year .
“ Even while the murderer denies any role , perhaps with a sly wink , the victim dies a horrific and often lengthy death .
A message in a poison bottle.
” While Navalny has long been an irritant for the Kremlin , organizing large street protests and exposing high-level corruption by Russian officials , including former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev , experts were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s interests to kill him .
“ I don ’ t believe this for a second , ” the analyst Tatiana Stanovaya wrote on her public Telegram channel .
“ Some years ago I was told that Navalny ’ s murder was seen in the Kremlin as a kind of nightmare scenario—one that would be seen only as a dangerous kind of provocation that would spark protests.
” The timing of the incident makes the Putin theory seem especially unlikely—as the Kremlin juggles a large coronavirus outbreak , an escalating political crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the far-east region of Khabarovsk .
In the week before he fell ill , Navalny was in the Siberian cities of Tomsk and Novosibirsk to show support for local opposition candidates ahead of city council elections next month .
The local news outlet Tayga.info reported that he also may have been collecting material for an investigation into the activities of politicians from Putin ’ s United Russia party , raising the possibility that his poisoning was orchestrated by politicos outside the Kremlin .
“ He ’ s garnered hundreds of enemies in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ individuals , ” Stanovaya wrote .
Seva Gunitsky , an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto , said the incident could also point to a burgeoning chaos in Putin ’ s system of control .
“ [ I ] t ’ s natural to assume Putin had Navalny poisoned , but the scarier and equally plausible option is he can ’ t really control when and how people with a lot of enemies get poisoned , ” Gunitsky wrote on Twitter .
While political power in Russia is highly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not without its rogue elements looking to settle personal scores , protect their own economic interests , or curry favor with the president .
The best example would be the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov , who stands accused of helping orchestrate the murder of the Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015 and the journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 .
Still , it would be premature to absolve Putin , who for 20 years has presided over a system where political opponents , journalists , and human rights activists are assaulted and assassinated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bottom line is that Putin is a self-appointed ruler of a country where opposition figures regularly get murdered and poisoned , and where there is no rule of law .
Therefore , Putin bears full responsibility , ” Sergey Radchenko , a Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University wrote on Twitter .
Navalny ’ s personal doctor Yaroslav Ashikhmin told the independent Russian news outlet Meduza that his team was trying to arrange a medical transfer to Europe .
According to one of Navalny ’ s aides , the hospital is so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moved , claiming his condition is too fragile .
Another of Navalny ’ s physicians , Anastasia Vasileva , said that his team had asked the Kremlin for assistance in transporting him to Europe for treatment .
Last year Navalny was hospitalized after developing a severe allergic reaction to an unknown chemical substance while in prison , where he was serving a 30-day sentence for organizing an illegal protest in Moscow .
Doctors feared at the time that Navalny had been poisoned , though his condition this time seems far more serious .

Did Vladimir Putin just try to kill one of his harshest domestic critics?
Did Vladimir Putin just try to kill one of his harshest domestic critics?
Though it wouldn’t be the first time the Russian president has gone after enemies—his own or his country’s—with lethal precision, analysts say the apparent poisoning of the opposition politician and anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny doesn’t quite seem like a Putin hit job.
Navalny was flying from the city of Tomsk, where he had been campaigning with local opposition politicians, to Moscow when he suddenly fell ill on Thursday. In a video posted on Instagram by another passenger, Navalny could be heard crying out in pain before the flight made an emergency landing in Omsk. His press secretary, Kira Yarmysh, who was traveling with Navalny, said he became sick drinking a cup of tea at the Tomsk airport: “We assume that Aleksei was poisoned with something mixed with his tea,” she wrote on Twitter.
Navalny, whom the Wall Street Journal once called “the man Vladimir Putin fears most,” was rushed unconscious to a hospital in Siberia, where he was placed on a ventilator. Doctors at the hospital in Omsk said that the Kremlin critic was in a serious but stable condition.
There is a long history of Russian dissidents and defectors being poisoned or meeting untimely deaths. In 2006, former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko died in London after his tea was poisoned with the radioactive isotope polonium-210. A British inquiry concluded that agents of the Russian security agency FSB carried out the murder, likely acting under orders from Putin.
“One of poison’s great virtues for the politically minded murderer is their capacity to combine easy deniability and vicious theatricality,” Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian security services, told Foreign Policy last year. “Even while the murderer denies any role, perhaps with a sly wink, the victim dies a horrific and often lengthy death. A message in a poison bottle.”
While Navalny has long been an irritant for the Kremlin, organizing large street protests and exposing high-level corruption by Russian officials, including former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, experts were skeptical that it would be in Putin’s interests to kill him.
“I don’t believe this for a second,” the analyst Tatiana Stanovaya wrote on her public Telegram channel. “Some years ago I was told that Navalny’s murder was seen in the Kremlin as a kind of nightmare scenario—one that would be seen only as a dangerous kind of provocation that would spark protests.”
The timing of the incident makes the Putin theory seem especially unlikely—as the Kremlin juggles a large coronavirus outbreak, an escalating political crisis in neighboring Belarus, and unrest in the far-east region of Khabarovsk.
In the week before he fell ill, Navalny was in the Siberian cities of Tomsk and Novosibirsk to show support for local opposition candidates ahead of city council elections next month. The local news outlet Tayga.info reported that he also may have been collecting material for an investigation into the activities of politicians from Putin’s United Russia party, raising the possibility that his poisoning was orchestrated by politicos outside the Kremlin.
“He’s garnered hundreds of enemies in the past few years, including some hardened individuals,” Stanovaya wrote.
Seva Gunitsky, an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto, said the incident could also point to a burgeoning chaos in Putin’s system of control.
“[I]t’s natural to assume Putin had Navalny poisoned, but the scarier and equally plausible option is he can’t really control when and how people with a lot of enemies get poisoned,” Gunitsky wrote on Twitter.
While political power in Russia is highly centralized under Putin, the system is not without its rogue elements looking to settle personal scores, protect their own economic interests, or curry favor with the president.
The best example would be the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who stands accused of helping orchestrate the murder of the Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in 2015 and the journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006.
Still, it would be premature to absolve Putin, who for 20 years has presided over a system where political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists are assaulted and assassinated, often with impunity.
“The bottom line is that Putin is a self-appointed ruler of a country where opposition figures regularly get murdered and poisoned, and where there is no rule of law. Therefore, Putin bears full responsibility,” Sergey Radchenko, a Professor of International Relations at Cardiff University wrote on Twitter.
Navalny’s personal doctor Yaroslav Ashikhmin told the independent Russian news outlet Meduza that his team was trying to arrange a medical transfer to Europe. According to one of Navalny’s aides, the hospital is so far refusing to allow him to be moved, claiming his condition is too fragile. Another of Navalny’s physicians, Anastasia Vasileva, said that his team had asked the Kremlin for assistance in transporting him to Europe for treatment.
Last year Navalny was hospitalized after developing a severe allergic reaction to an unknown chemical substance while in prison, where he was serving a 30-day sentence for organizing an illegal protest in Moscow. Doctors feared at the time that Navalny had been poisoned, though his condition this time seems far more serious.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Fascists Know How to Turn Mockery Into Power

Fascists Know How to Turn Mockery Into Power Karl Marx wrote that history repeats itself , “ the first time as tragedy , the second time as farce.
” If he ’ d lived in our day , he might have said the same thing about Adolf Hitler .
Once the Nazi leader was the solemn embodiment of evil , cruelty , and hatred ; he was a warning and a moral lesson .
Now , he ’ s a joke .
Thanks to internet meme-makers , Hitler is famous for disco dancing and looking like cats .
Hitler : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s excitable .
He ’ s funny .
Making Hitler funny can be a way to diminish , mock , or insult him ; humor and irreverence can challenge evil .
But they don ’ t necessarily challenge fascism .
Ironic , aestheticized , anti-establishment Hitler is in many respects congruent with the original irreverent , anti-establishment aesthetic of the Nazi Party .
That ’ s an aesthetic that the alt-right has consciously tried to recapture today .
As a result , funny Hitler and his modern acolytes often have the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 book , Hi Hitler !
: How the Nazi Past Is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture , provides a thorough outline of how Hitler became fun .
Early representations of the Führer in pop culture were often satirical and goofy .
Charlie Chaplin ’ s 1940 The Great Dictator portrayed the fictitious dictator Adenoid Hynkel engaged in vicious food fights with his Italian counterparts .
The would-be ruler of a thousand-year Reich couldn ’ t even tear spaghetti in half .
Following the war , though , Chaplin admitted that he couldn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ d “ known of the actual horrors of the German concentration camps.
” That moralistic reticence defined representations of Hitler for decades .
Films from 1955 ’ s The Last Ten Days to 1981 ’ s The Bunker portrayed Hitler in serious , documentary style , often in the days before his ignominious defeat .
That tradition persists , as 2004 ’ s Downfall makes clear .
But since the turn of the century , Hitler has increasingly been portrayed in less sober ways .
Movies like Inglourious Basterds ( 2009 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2016-2019 ) have picked up where Chaplin left off some 80 years ago , using slapstick and exaggeration to portray Hitler as preposterously contemptible .
In 2019 ’ s Jojo Rabbit , the titular Jojo , a young boy in Nazi Germany , dreams up Hitler as his imaginary friend , who provides gushing encouragement .
“ Sure , you ’ re a little bit scrawny and a bit unpopular and you can ’ t tie your shoelaces even though you ’ re 10 years old , but you ’ re still the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve ever met !
” Fascists are infants who need a Hitler teddy bear .
Most of the funny Hitlers are intended to mock and insult Nazis .
When Jojo tells Hitler to “ fuck off ” and kicks him through a window , it ’ s pretty clear where the filmmaker stands .
But even here , where the joke is on Hitler , it ’ s also at least partially a dig at the moralistic tradition of Hitler representation .
This is clearest in the proliferation of memes from Downfall @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are decked out in new subtitles so the Führer ends up throwing a tantrum about his broken PlayStation 4 or about the Red Wedding scene in Game of Thrones .
The triviality makes Hitler look preposterous .
But it also makes the serious portrayals of Hitler look fusty and tired .
A whole movie of Hitler being evil and boring ?
Lighten up , dude .
Hip denigration of a tedious status quo can be entertaining and energizing—but it ’ s not necessarily anti-fascist .
On the contrary , kicking the squares is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Robert O. Paxton ’ s classic The Anatomy of Fascism explains that fascist movements explicitly framed themselves in opposition to a safe moralistic consensus .
“ Fascist contempt for the soft , complacent , compromising center was absolute , ” he writes .
The German philosopher Walter Benjamin argued : “ The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life.
” What this means is that part of the allure of fascism is the way it makes politics more fun , replacing dreary reasoned policy discussions with spectacle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neo-Nazis are very aware of the tradition of fascist anti-establishment aesthetics .
They ’ ve rebranded themselves as “ alt-right ” to make themselves sound like a hip contrast to the traditional right , and online they use silly frog memes to make themselves seem loopy , irreverent , and entertaining .
Leading figures like Milo Yiannopoulos linked white nationalist communities and video gamers , positioning fascism as a defense of exhilarating violent , sexist culture against boring establishment scolds .
Making Hitler funny may be a break with the reverence Hitler demanded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up being a way to give Hitler back his aesthetics and part of his glamor .
When Downfall Hitler launches into an attack on road construction , it ’ s incongruous and absurd .
But it ’ s also Hitler getting you to cheer along as he attacks the incompetence and inconvenience of a sclerotic democratic bureaucracy—and attacking sclerotic democratic bureaucracy is a thing that the real Hitler actually did .
A dollop of humor makes the anti-establishment rage go down easy , not least because it distracts you from the fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just anyone the fascists decide to target .
As the political scientist Jonathan Bernstein explains , “ drain the swamp ” is a successful slogan precisely because it ’ s a catchier way to say “ liquidate our enemies.
” The fascist appeal of funny Hitler is perhaps most queasily evident in the 2015 German film Look Who ’ s Back , based on a hugely successful 2012 novel .
Hitler ( portrayed by Oliver Masucci ) wakes up one day to find himself in contemporary Germany and has to adjust to modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ battling a small dog and trying to get his underwear cleaned .
But the movie also includes reality television-style sections in which Masucci , in character as Hitler , wanders around and interacts with German people .
Everyone obviously knows that this is not the real Hitler—and that frees them up to behave jokingly like Nazis .
Some give the Nazi salute .
Some tell “ Hitler ” they agree with him about immigrants or even about setting up camps .
The filmmakers turn Hitler into a symbol of himself .
But that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it effectively calls Germans to their own hatred .
Humor and parody relax the moralistic bonds of convention , creating a space in which people feel comfortable embracing Hitler as their own .
Look Who ’ s Back intends to parody and mock the Führer , and it does that .
But it also ends up suggesting that parody and mockery are as likely to spur fascism as to combat it .
As the comedian Peter Cook dryly observed , the satirical political cabarets of Weimar did not prevent the rise of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humor isn ’ t necessarily fascist .
It ’ s just not necessarily anti-fascist either .
If you search “ Hitler memes ” on the internet , you ’ ll see some anti-fascist humor , but you ’ ll also come up with a lot of alt-right anti-Semitic “ jokes.
” Fascism likes to portray itself as irreverent even as it represses dissent .
It claims that it ’ s an alternative to the status quo even as it sets about murdering marginalized people .
Nazi claims to humor , like all Nazi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spat on , and mocked .
But for precisely that reason , if you ’ re going to use Hitler as a joke , you need to be very careful that the joke isn ’ t on you .

Karl Marx wrote that history repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” If he’d lived in our day, he might have said the same thing about Adolf Hitler. Once the Nazi leader was the solemn embodiment of evil, cruelty, and hatred; he was a warning and a moral lesson. Now, he’s a joke. Thanks to internet meme-makers , Hitler is famous for disco dancing and looking like cats . Hitler: He has a dumb mustache. He’s excitable. He’s funny.
Karl Marx wrote that history repeats itself, “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” If he’d lived in our day, he might have said the same thing about Adolf Hitler. Once the Nazi leader was the solemn embodiment of evil, cruelty, and hatred; he was a warning and a moral lesson. Now, he’s a joke. Thanks to internet meme-makers, Hitler is famous for disco dancing and looking like cats. Hitler: He has a dumb mustache. He’s excitable. He’s funny.
Making Hitler funny can be a way to diminish, mock, or insult him; humor and irreverence can challenge evil. But they don’t necessarily challenge fascism. Ironic, aestheticized, anti-establishment Hitler is in many respects congruent with the original irreverent, anti-establishment aesthetic of the Nazi Party. That’s an aesthetic that the alt-right has consciously tried to recapture today. As a result, funny Hitler and his modern acolytes often have the last laugh.
Gavriel D. Rosenfeld’s 2014 book, Hi Hitler!: How the Nazi Past Is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture, provides a thorough outline of how Hitler became fun. Early representations of the Führer in pop culture were often satirical and goofy. Charlie Chaplin’s 1940 The Great Dictator portrayed the fictitious dictator Adenoid Hynkel engaged in vicious food fights with his Italian counterparts. The would-be ruler of a thousand-year Reich couldn’t even tear spaghetti in half.
Following the war, though, Chaplin admitted that he couldn’t have made the film if he’d “known of the actual horrors of the German concentration camps.” That moralistic reticence defined representations of Hitler for decades. Films from 1955’s The Last Ten Days to 1981’s The Bunker portrayed Hitler in serious, documentary style, often in the days before his ignominious defeat.
That tradition persists, as 2004’s Downfall makes clear. But since the turn of the century, Hitler has increasingly been portrayed in less sober ways. Movies like Inglourious Basterds (2009) and television shows like Preacher (2016-2019) have picked up where Chaplin left off some 80 years ago, using slapstick and exaggeration to portray Hitler as preposterously contemptible. In 2019’s Jojo Rabbit, the titular Jojo, a young boy in Nazi Germany, dreams up Hitler as his imaginary friend, who provides gushing encouragement. “Sure, you’re a little bit scrawny and a bit unpopular and you can’t tie your shoelaces even though you’re 10 years old, but you’re still the bestest, most loyal little Nazi I’ve ever met!” Fascists are infants who need a Hitler teddy bear.
Most of the funny Hitlers are intended to mock and insult Nazis. When Jojo tells Hitler to “fuck off” and kicks him through a window, it’s pretty clear where the filmmaker stands. But even here, where the joke is on Hitler, it’s also at least partially a dig at the moralistic tradition of Hitler representation.
This is clearest in the proliferation of memes from Downfall, in which clips of the film are decked out in new subtitles so the Führer ends up throwing a tantrum about his broken PlayStation 4 or about the Red Wedding scene in Game of Thrones. The triviality makes Hitler look preposterous. But it also makes the serious portrayals of Hitler look fusty and tired. A whole movie of Hitler being evil and boring? Lighten up, dude.
Hip denigration of a tedious status quo can be entertaining and energizing—but it’s not necessarily anti-fascist. On the contrary, kicking the squares is perfectly congruent with fascist attitudes and style. Robert O. Paxton’s classic The Anatomy of Fascism explains that fascist movements explicitly framed themselves in opposition to a safe moralistic consensus. “Fascist contempt for the soft, complacent, compromising center was absolute,” he writes.
The German philosopher Walter Benjamin argued: “The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life.” What this means is that part of the allure of fascism is the way it makes politics more fun, replacing dreary reasoned policy discussions with spectacle, symbol, and emotion.
Current neo-Nazis are very aware of the tradition of fascist anti-establishment aesthetics. They’ve rebranded themselves as “alt-right” to make themselves sound like a hip contrast to the traditional right, and online they use silly frog memes to make themselves seem loopy, irreverent, and entertaining. Leading figures like Milo Yiannopoulos linked white nationalist communities and video gamers, positioning fascism as a defense of exhilarating violent, sexist culture against boring establishment scolds.
Making Hitler funny may be a break with the reverence Hitler demanded at gunpoint. But it also ends up being a way to give Hitler back his aesthetics and part of his glamor. When Downfall Hitler launches into an attack on road construction, it’s incongruous and absurd. But it’s also Hitler getting you to cheer along as he attacks the incompetence and inconvenience of a sclerotic democratic bureaucracy—and attacking sclerotic democratic bureaucracy is a thing that the real Hitler actually did. A dollop of humor makes the anti-establishment rage go down easy, not least because it distracts you from the fact that the “establishment” in question is just anyone the fascists decide to target. As the political scientist Jonathan Bernstein explains, “drain the swamp” is a successful slogan precisely because it’s a catchier way to say “liquidate our enemies.”
The fascist appeal of funny Hitler is perhaps most queasily evident in the 2015 German film Look Who’s Back, based on a hugely successful 2012 novel. Hitler (portrayed by Oliver Masucci) wakes up one day to find himself in contemporary Germany and has to adjust to modern life. Fish-out-of-water set pieces show him battling a small dog and trying to get his underwear cleaned.
But the movie also includes reality television-style sections in which Masucci, in character as Hitler, wanders around and interacts with German people. Everyone obviously knows that this is not the real Hitler—and that frees them up to behave jokingly like Nazis. Some give the Nazi salute. Some tell “Hitler” they agree with him about immigrants or even about setting up camps.
The filmmakers turn Hitler into a symbol of himself. But that doesn’t diminish him. Instead, it effectively calls Germans to their own hatred. Humor and parody relax the moralistic bonds of convention, creating a space in which people feel comfortable embracing Hitler as their own. Look Who’s Back intends to parody and mock the Führer, and it does that. But it also ends up suggesting that parody and mockery are as likely to spur fascism as to combat it. As the comedian Peter Cook dryly observed, the satirical political cabarets of Weimar did not prevent the rise of the Nazis.
Of course, Hitler humor isn’t necessarily fascist. It’s just not necessarily anti-fascist either. If you search “Hitler memes” on the internet, you’ll see some anti-fascist humor, but you’ll also come up with a lot of alt-right anti-Semitic “jokes.” Fascism likes to portray itself as irreverent even as it represses dissent. It claims that it’s an alternative to the status quo even as it sets about murdering marginalized people. Nazi claims to humor, like all Nazi claims, should be ruthlessly refuted, spat on, and mocked. But for precisely that reason, if you’re going to use Hitler as a joke, you need to be very careful that the joke isn’t on you.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-20--Why We Joined Over 70 Former Republican National Security Officials to Support Biden

Why We Joined Over 70 Former Republican National Security Officials to Support Biden On Friday , Aug. 21 , we will join with more than 70 former national security officials from Republican administrations stretching from former President Ronald Reagan to current President Donald Trump as well as former Republican members of the U.S. Congress to warn that Trump lacks the character and competence to lead the country and arguing that Joe Biden should be elected the next president of the United States .
In a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal , we and our colleagues list 10 points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. national security if Trump were allowed four more years to continue soliciting foreign interference , aligning with dictators , threatening allies , fueling divisions at home , and disparaging military service personnel , intelligence officers , and diplomats .
For those of us who have spent our careers advancing U.S. partnerships and prosperity in Asia , the prospect of another four years under Trump is particularly alarming .
Asia policy has been one of the most bipartisan issues in Washington .
To some extent , that continues for those in the current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to ensure freedom of navigation and trade , promote economic prosperity , and foster peace and stability in the region .
The problem is that Trump believes in none of it .
And there is ample evidence that , empowered with a second term , he will move from degrading the value of U.S. partnerships in Asia to actively destroying them .
The internationalist Republicans in Congress and senior national security officials within this administration who have actively worked behind the scenes to contain the damage caused by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficult to do in a second term .
Empowered with a second term , Trump will move from degrading the value of U.S. partnerships to actively destroying them .
In his press conference after the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018 , Trump announced his intent to eventually withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and the cancellation of U.S.-South Korea military exercises—mimicking North Korean propaganda by calling them “ war games ” —without any prior consultation with allies .
He is now demanding an impossible exponential increase in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bases and has threatened to draw down U.S. troops , just as he did in a fit of pique with Germany .
Congress included amendments in the last two National Defense Authorization Acts to make this more difficult , but members and staff we have talked to have less confidence that they can stop Trump ’ s elusive and narcissistic pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize by dealing away U.S. troops and bases for a fake peace deal with Kim .
The Korean Peninsula is the lynchpin of Asian stability , and a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China and create an almost existential danger for allies like Japan .
Trump has confronted China by starting trade wars with everyone else .
Major democratic powers including Japan , France , and Canada are desperate to work with the United States to blunt China ’ s predatory technology policies .
There is an opportunity to forge an international coalition on 5G telecommunications , for example , that would set the rules for economic competition and technology dominance in the 21st century , but Trump would clearly rather play the theater of tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and bluster .
The United States will not block—let alone reverse—Chinese predatory economic policies by itself , and the window to build an effective international coalition will close over the next four years if Washington stays on the same counterproductive course .
Many of us are concerned that China is positioning itself to increase military coercion and pressure on Taiwan , which in turn threatens key alliance relationships with Japan and Australia .
In contrast to every previous president , Trump has rarely , if ever , reiterated the United States ’ security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the contrary , in his mind every crisis is a transactional opportunity to extract a bit more cash and a few more favors from allies .
If he sells Taiwan out in the next cross-straits crisis simply by demanding a better trade deal from China , U.S. credibility and the international order in Asia might never recover .
Biden has far more in common with the other Republican presidents we worked for than Trump does .
Strategic competition with China will not be won with podium-pounding speeches by Trump officials in Washington .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ where Chinese diplomats , spies , and businesspeople are offering cash and making threats to pressure countries to move away from the United States .
Washington needs its diplomats and intelligence officers to be in the trenches winning that fight from Sri Lanka to the Solomon Islands .
But the president has denuded the State Department and placed political hacks in charge of intelligence policy .
That would only get worse over the next four years .
China is now actively campaigning globally against democratic norms by pointing to the United States ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but a recent poll by the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that there is overwhelmingly more support across Asia for democratic norms than China ’ s authoritarian model .
The United States has a winning hand to play in this battle over values , but Trump is squandering it by embracing dictators abroad and fueling the kind of divisive nativism at home that represents the greatest threat to democracy in Asia .
When we look at the challenges we face in Asia and the pattern of Trump ’ s leadership up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us and many of our former colleagues that Biden has far more in common with the other Republican presidents we worked for than Trump does .
This is why so many who worked for Republican presidents over the past four decades are supporting Biden in this election .

On Friday, Aug. 21, we will join with more than 70 former national security officials from Republican administrations stretching from former President Ronald Reagan to current President Donald Trump as well as former Republican members of the U.S. Congress to warn that Trump lacks the character and competence to lead the country and arguing that Joe Biden should be elected the next president of the United States. In a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal, we and our colleagues list 10 points explaining how dangerous it would be for U.S. national security if Trump were allowed four more years to continue soliciting foreign interference, aligning with dictators, threatening allies, fueling divisions at home, and disparaging military service personnel, intelligence officers, and diplomats.
On Friday, Aug. 21, we will join with more than 70 former national security officials from Republican administrations stretching from former President Ronald Reagan to current President Donald Trump as well as former Republican members of the U.S. Congress to warn that Trump lacks the character and competence to lead the country and arguing that Joe Biden should be elected the next president of the United States. In a full-page ad in the Wall Street Journal, we and our colleagues list 10 points explaining how dangerous it would be for U.S. national security if Trump were allowed four more years to continue soliciting foreign interference, aligning with dictators, threatening allies, fueling divisions at home, and disparaging military service personnel, intelligence officers, and diplomats.
For those of us who have spent our careers advancing U.S. partnerships and prosperity in Asia, the prospect of another four years under Trump is particularly alarming. Asia policy has been one of the most bipartisan issues in Washington. To some extent, that continues for those in the current administration who are trying to advance the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy to ensure freedom of navigation and trade, promote economic prosperity, and foster peace and stability in the region.
The problem is that Trump believes in none of it. And there is ample evidence that, empowered with a second term, he will move from degrading the value of U.S. partnerships in Asia to actively destroying them. The internationalist Republicans in Congress and senior national security officials within this administration who have actively worked behind the scenes to contain the damage caused by the president will find that much more difficult to do in a second term.
Empowered with a second term, Trump will move from degrading the value of U.S. partnerships to actively destroying them.
In his press conference after the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2018, Trump announced his intent to eventually withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and the cancellation of U.S.-South Korea military exercises—mimicking North Korean propaganda by calling them “war games”—without any prior consultation with allies. He is now demanding an impossible exponential increase in the amount South Korea pays for U.S. bases and has threatened to draw down U.S. troops, just as he did in a fit of pique with Germany. Congress included amendments in the last two National Defense Authorization Acts to make this more difficult, but members and staff we have talked to have less confidence that they can stop Trump’s elusive and narcissistic pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize by dealing away U.S. troops and bases for a fake peace deal with Kim. The Korean Peninsula is the lynchpin of Asian stability, and a U.S. retreat would be a jackpot for China and create an almost existential danger for allies like Japan.
Trump has confronted China by starting trade wars with everyone else. Major democratic powers including Japan, France, and Canada are desperate to work with the United States to blunt China’s predatory technology policies. There is an opportunity to forge an international coalition on 5G telecommunications, for example, that would set the rules for economic competition and technology dominance in the 21st century, but Trump would clearly rather play the theater of tariffs, unilateral threats, fake deals, and bluster. The United States will not block—let alone reverse—Chinese predatory economic policies by itself, and the window to build an effective international coalition will close over the next four years if Washington stays on the same counterproductive course.
Many of us are concerned that China is positioning itself to increase military coercion and pressure on Taiwan, which in turn threatens key alliance relationships with Japan and Australia. In contrast to every previous president, Trump has rarely, if ever, reiterated the United States’ security commitments to allies and partners. On the contrary, in his mind every crisis is a transactional opportunity to extract a bit more cash and a few more favors from allies. If he sells Taiwan out in the next cross-straits crisis simply by demanding a better trade deal from China, U.S. credibility and the international order in Asia might never recover.
Biden has far more in common with the other Republican presidents we worked for than Trump does.
Strategic competition with China will not be won with podium-pounding speeches by Trump officials in Washington. The real battle is in Asia, where Chinese diplomats, spies, and businesspeople are offering cash and making threats to pressure countries to move away from the United States. Washington needs its diplomats and intelligence officers to be in the trenches winning that fight from Sri Lanka to the Solomon Islands. But the president has denuded the State Department and placed political hacks in charge of intelligence policy. That would only get worse over the next four years.
China is now actively campaigning globally against democratic norms by pointing to the United States’ disastrous response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but a recent poll by the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that there is overwhelmingly more support across Asia for democratic norms than China’s authoritarian model. The United States has a winning hand to play in this battle over values, but Trump is squandering it by embracing dictators abroad and fueling the kind of divisive nativism at home that represents the greatest threat to democracy in Asia.
When we look at the challenges we face in Asia and the pattern of Trump’s leadership up to now, it is clear to us and many of our former colleagues that Biden has far more in common with the other Republican presidents we worked for than Trump does. This is why so many who worked for Republican presidents over the past four decades are supporting Biden in this election.