foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--Is an Undecided U.S. Presidential Election a National Security Threat?

Is an Undecided U.S. Presidential Election a National Security Threat ?
Emma Ashford : Hey , Matt !
How long do you think it ’ s possible for humans to go without sleep ?
It ’ s been a couple of days of doom-scrolling and waiting for an election result at this point .
Matthew Kroenig : You are stronger than me .
I was determined to stay up Tuesday night , but I ended up crashing at 11 p.m .
The race was much closer than almost anyone predicted .
Foreign Policy should start a series on the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their own country .
EA : I suspect some in D.C. would benefit from some time studying abroad in the Midwest , but I think almost everyone was surprised at how close this election has become .
Actually , that ’ s not entirely accurate .
The election isn ’ t close at all ; Joe Biden is currently ahead by almost 4 million votes .
But the strange structure of the U.S .
Electoral College means that we ’ re waiting to see if a handful of votes in a tiny percentage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same direction as the popular vote or not .
It ’ s a reminder of how unrepresentative American democracy can be sometimes .
MK : Thank goodness for the U.S. Constitution .
The founders didn ’ t trust a democratic mob to choose the president and delegated the power to states to send representatives to vote in an electoral college .
My loved ones in Missouri and Ohio are grateful that they are less vulnerable to the tyranny of coastal majorities in New York and Los Angeles who don ’ t understand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this is a column on international affairs .
How is the rest of the world viewing the U.S. election results ?
EA : Well , they ’ re watching closely .
The election has been the top story on the BBC website for days now—a reminder of how important U.S. elections are for foreign policy .
We ’ ve got ambassadors hedging their bets and governments refusing to say anything that might offend either potential victor in the vote .
What I found particularly sad were the comments from European allies like the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.S. electoral system .
It sounded exactly like the sort of statement that the State Department would make about disputed elections in some far-off , semi-democratic country .
U.S. elections have never been the paragon of virtue that some suggest—Jim Crow , anyone ?
—but these statements from other countries are a reminder of how much the United States ’ image has suffered in the last few years .
MK : But , so far , the election has been mostly a good news story for American democracy .
It has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are patiently waiting for the process to play out .
To be sure , the president has made unfortunate and unfounded claims about the integrity of the process , and adversaries , like Iran ’ s supreme leader , are poking fun at the U.S. system .
( I guess he prefers bloody repression to the messiness of democracy . )
But the worst fears have not materialized .
There has been none of the feared violence .
The stores around my house in Georgetown have been boarded up for nothing .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of misinterpreting the results .
I have heard many in the Beltway bubble and abroad say that the large vote share for Donald Trump shows that America is more racist , sexist , and isolationist than many understood .
But that ’ s not the right way to view it .
Believe it or not , most people in red states don ’ t spend most of their time thinking about race , gender , and foreign policy .
They simply liked Trump more than Joe Biden .
EA : So does it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s more unorthodox foreign-policy ideas ?
After all , in the campaign , he returned to his 2016 promises to end the war in Afghanistan .
Even if Biden ends up winning , it seems as if Trump thought that this was a popular foreign-policy view—and that some of the electorate agreed with him .
MK : Maybe for some .
But most Americans don ’ t vote on foreign policy .
My friends and family who voted for Trump did so because they think of themselves as Republicans and they are supporting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t love the coach .
Others thought Trump would be good for the economy and worry about a Biden tax hike .
They fear the far-left more than the far-right .
Most do not closely follow what is going on in Afghanistan or know Trump ’ s or Biden ’ s position on the matter .
EA : Really ?
I agree with you that voters rarely vote on foreign policy , but polling shows that two-thirds of Trump supporters think he was right to negotiate with the Taliban .
Trump himself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign to try to cover up the fact that he failed to follow through on that promise during his first term .
MK : If pollsters ask for an opinion , they will get one , even if it is not what is driving the respondents ’ political behavior .
And this poll says that Trump ’ s supporters back something the pollster tells them Trump is trying to do ?
That is not surprising .
I suspect two-thirds of Trump supporters would tell a pollster they back Trump ’ s efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atlantis .
EA : OK , that ’ s probably true .
I ’ m reminded of the time pollsters managed to get 30 percent of Republicans to agree that the United States should bomb Agrabah , the fictional country from Disney ’ s Aladdin .
But my broader point is that even if voters don ’ t vote on specific foreign-policy issues , the substantive level of support for Trump indicates that they certainly don ’ t repudiate his foreign-policy approach .
Trumpism in foreign policy—a kind of belligerent unilateral nationalism—may well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That sounds terrible .
Belligerent unilateral internationalism would be a much better fit for a globalized world .
I just don ’ t think Trumpism exists apart from Trump .
He is sui generis .
We saw at the vice presidential debate that Mike Pence ’ s articulation of America ’ s role in the world was a return to standard Republican rhetoric .
EA : Yes , but is “ standard Republican ” going to look different after Trump ?
After all , he pretty strongly repudiated nation-building and all the rest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
MK : We will see for sure in just about two years when we will have non-Trump Republicans campaigning for the 2024 election .
I suspect the likely candidates ( Nikki Haley , Mike Pompeo , Mike Pence , Marco Rubio , Ted Cruz , Tom Cotton , Josh Hawley , and others ) will have foreign policies that look more like Ronald Reagan ’ s than Trump ’ s .
An adversary might try to take advantage of the United States ’ internal fixation on the election and the possible uncertainties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
This would be a good time for China to move on Taiwan , for example .
There is another international dimension to the elections that worries me .
Maybe it is my background in the Pentagon , but I do fear that an adversary might try to take advantage of the United States ’ internal fixation on the election and the possible uncertainties of a transition to a new administration .
This would be a good time for China to move on Taiwan , for example .
The probability is low , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is significant enough that I would be watching this closely if I were still in government .
EA : I think the fear of a fait accompli on Taiwan—or elsewhere—during the election aftermath or a transition period is seriously overblown .
As Michael Kofman described in an excellent essay the other day , faits accomplis are harder to , well , accomplish and rarer than commonly assumed .
Yes , it ’ s possible that China could use this period of uncertainty to move on Taiwan , but it would still be incredibly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s defenses .
As Kofman points out , seizing Taiwan isn ’ t a simple land grab ; it would be the invasion and seizure of a whole country , something that hasn ’ t happened in 70 years .
Or to put it another way , the United States isn ’ t the only deterrent to Chinese actions against Taiwan .
So despite the growing talk about it , I ’ m seriously skeptical that China or other states will try to use the electoral uncertainty for large-scale nefarious purposes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure .
The Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) has made no secret about its desire to incorporate Taiwan eventually and through force if necessary .
Chinese warplanes have been increasing incursions into Taiwan ’ s airspace this fall .
And it wouldn ’ t have to be a D-Day-style assault .
The People ’ s Liberation Army could use 21st-century tactics , including cyberattacks , precision conventional strikes , and other gray-zone tactics in a bid to coerce Taipei into submission .
At a minimum , I think there is value for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Taiwan to help the CCP avoid miscalculation .
And it would be great if it could be joined in that pledge by treaty allies around the world .
World War III in the Taiwan Strait would be a problem for everyone , including allies in Europe .
Germany , for example , might not send troops , but it could make a political declaration backed up with the threat of sanctions .
The free world standing united on this issue would give the CCP pause .
EA : Not to be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only become World War III if the United States gets involved .
That ’ s exactly why so many people argue against making a concrete security commitment to Taiwan ; the risk of conflict between China and the United States is not worth it .
MK : So we should stand by as a rising revisionist great power uses force to gobble up its neighbors that happen to be U.S. allies ?
I would think that is something a cynical realist would want to deter .
EA : It depends .
Taiwan is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties and proximity to China .
It ’ s certainly not the same as deterring Chinese aggression toward Japan , South Korea , or other U.S. allies in the region .
And let ’ s be honest , Taiwan could relatively easily defend itself if it invested in the right military capabilities .
Taiwan has chosen to rely on the United States instead , even though Washington has never made a concrete security guarantee .
That comes with a substantive escalation risk for the United States .
But we ’ re off topic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is more relevant to the news of the day .
The United States can ’ t make decisions about how it wants to engage with the world until it has a confirmed new leader .
I don ’ t think it ’ s dangerous that it ’ s taking this long to figure out the next president , but it doesn ’ t reflect well on the United States that the electoral system is this disorganized and that the current president is making profoundly undemocratic statements .
I mean , just a few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ received after Election Day shouldn ’ t be counted , which violates the law in a number of states .
And he ’ s calling for all vote counts to be stopped—except where he trails and still has a shot of winning .
MK : I hope we can address the question of how the U.S. government will engage with the world over the next four years in our next column in mid-November .
What would a Biden or second-term Trump administration mean for America ’ s role in the world ?
Who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But we should probably turn to the civil war brewing in East Africa .
Have you been following events in Ethiopia ?
EA : Do they have an electoral college , too ?
MK : That would certainly be less messy than the current situation .
EA : So it looks as if the Ethiopian government , having finally ended its external conflicts , could be heading into a civil war , launching military action in the Tigray region—after an alleged raid on federal troops—and in response to the region ’ s ruling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the federal government until Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018 ) seeking more political independence .
What ’ s your take ?
MK : It is disappointing to see the country fragmenting .
Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for signing a peace deal with neighboring Eritrea , and he was putting in place some much-needed economic and political reforms .
I hate to be a broken record , but this action may have been timed to take place when the United States—an important partner for Ethiopia—was distracted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there ’ s probably more to that .
I still think it ’ s unlikely that China will attack Taiwan , but there ’ s definitely an element of “ when the cat ’ s away ” to what ’ s happening in Ethiopia .
Tensions have been building for months , but timing the government ’ s assault to coincide with the U.S. election was almost certainly intended to avoid as much notice and criticism .
And it ’ s a serious step backward for Ethiopia .
It ’ s not out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into civil war or even into partition ; after all , one of Ethiopia ’ s other neighbors , Sudan , just fought a lengthy civil war over independence for South Sudan .
That said , I ’ m not sure I see a U.S. role here other than mediation .
MK : Africa is not a priority region for U.S. foreign policy .
But Ethiopia has been an important partner for advancing U.S. interests in the region , including on counterterrorism and development .
This will certainly complicate the relationship .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ I hope this doesn ’ t become a new Yugoslav-style war that leads to the breakup of a multiethnic country .
We will have to watch this closely .
But , for now , we better rest up in preparation for our second debate of the day .
Apparently , our scribblings here have a growing audience .
We have been invited to debate U.S. foreign policy ( virtually ) on a college campus tonight .
I hope you are up to the challenge .
EA : Matt , the sooner you accept @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy , the sooner I can stop following you around to remind you !

Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! How long do you think it’s possible for humans to go without sleep? It’s been a couple of days of doom-scrolling and waiting for an election result at this point.
Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! How long do you think it’s possible for humans to go without sleep? It’s been a couple of days of doom-scrolling and waiting for an election result at this point.
Matthew Kroenig: You are stronger than me. I was determined to stay up Tuesday night, but I ended up crashing at 11 p.m.
The race was much closer than almost anyone predicted. Foreign Policy should start a series on the American Midwest so Washington-based wonks can better understand their own country.
Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
EA: I suspect some in D.C. would benefit from some time studying abroad in the Midwest, but I think almost everyone was surprised at how close this election has become. Actually, that’s not entirely accurate. The election isn’t close at all; Joe Biden is currently ahead by almost 4 million votes. But the strange structure of the U.S. Electoral College means that we’re waiting to see if a handful of votes in a tiny percentage of counties in five states go in the same direction as the popular vote or not. It’s a reminder of how unrepresentative American democracy can be sometimes.
MK: Thank goodness for the U.S. Constitution. The founders didn’t trust a democratic mob to choose the president and delegated the power to states to send representatives to vote in an electoral college. My loved ones in Missouri and Ohio are grateful that they are less vulnerable to the tyranny of coastal majorities in New York and Los Angeles who don’t understand or share their political preferences.
But this is a column on international affairs. How is the rest of the world viewing the U.S. election results?
EA: Well, they’re watching closely. The election has been the top story on the BBC website for days now—a reminder of how important U.S. elections are for foreign policy. We’ve got ambassadors hedging their bets and governments refusing to say anything that might offend either potential victor in the vote.
What I found particularly sad were the comments from European allies like the German foreign minister, calling for trust in the U.S. electoral system. It sounded exactly like the sort of statement that the State Department would make about disputed elections in some far-off, semi-democratic country. U.S. elections have never been the paragon of virtue that some suggest—Jim Crow, anyone?—but these statements from other countries are a reminder of how much the United States’ image has suffered in the last few years.
MK: But, so far, the election has been mostly a good news story for American democracy. It has been free and fair, and we are patiently waiting for the process to play out. To be sure, the president has made unfortunate and unfounded claims about the integrity of the process, and adversaries, like Iran’s supreme leader, are poking fun at the U.S. system. (I guess he prefers bloody repression to the messiness of democracy.) But the worst fears have not materialized. There has been none of the feared violence. The stores around my house in Georgetown have been boarded up for nothing.
But I do think people are at risk of misinterpreting the results. I have heard many in the Beltway bubble and abroad say that the large vote share for Donald Trump shows that America is more racist, sexist, and isolationist than many understood. But that’s not the right way to view it. Believe it or not, most people in red states don’t spend most of their time thinking about race, gender, and foreign policy. They simply liked Trump more than Joe Biden.
EA: So does it show support for some of Trump’s more unorthodox foreign-policy ideas? After all, in the campaign, he returned to his 2016 promises to end the war in Afghanistan. Even if Biden ends up winning, it seems as if Trump thought that this was a popular foreign-policy view—and that some of the electorate agreed with him.
MK: Maybe for some. But most Americans don’t vote on foreign policy. My friends and family who voted for Trump did so because they think of themselves as Republicans and they are supporting the team, even if they don’t love the coach. Others thought Trump would be good for the economy and worry about a Biden tax hike. They fear the far-left more than the far-right. Most do not closely follow what is going on in Afghanistan or know Trump’s or Biden’s position on the matter.
EA: Really? I agree with you that voters rarely vote on foreign policy, but polling shows that two-thirds of Trump supporters think he was right to negotiate with the Taliban. Trump himself clearly thought it important enough in the campaign to try to cover up the fact that he failed to follow through on that promise during his first term.
MK: If pollsters ask for an opinion, they will get one, even if it is not what is driving the respondents’ political behavior. And this poll says that Trump’s supporters back something the pollster tells them Trump is trying to do? That is not surprising. I suspect two-thirds of Trump supporters would tell a pollster they back Trump’s efforts to negotiate peace with the lost city of Atlantis.
EA: OK, that’s probably true. I’m reminded of the time pollsters managed to get 30 percent of Republicans to agree that the United States should bomb Agrabah, the fictional country from Disney’s Aladdin.
But my broader point is that even if voters don’t vote on specific foreign-policy issues, the substantive level of support for Trump indicates that they certainly don’t repudiate his foreign-policy approach. Trumpism in foreign policy—a kind of belligerent unilateral nationalism—may well be here to stay.
MK: That sounds terrible. Belligerent unilateral internationalism would be a much better fit for a globalized world.
I just don’t think Trumpism exists apart from Trump. He is sui generis. We saw at the vice presidential debate that Mike Pence’s articulation of America’s role in the world was a return to standard Republican rhetoric.
EA: Yes, but is “standard Republican” going to look different after Trump? After all, he pretty strongly repudiated nation-building and all the rest of the George W. Bush-era freedom agenda.
MK: We will see for sure in just about two years when we will have non-Trump Republicans campaigning for the 2024 election. I suspect the likely candidates (Nikki Haley, Mike Pompeo, Mike Pence, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Tom Cotton, Josh Hawley, and others) will have foreign policies that look more like Ronald Reagan’s than Trump’s.
An adversary might try to take advantage of the United States’ internal fixation on the election and the possible uncertainties of a transition to a new administration. This would be a good time for China to move on Taiwan, for example.
There is another international dimension to the elections that worries me. Maybe it is my background in the Pentagon, but I do fear that an adversary might try to take advantage of the United States’ internal fixation on the election and the possible uncertainties of a transition to a new administration. This would be a good time for China to move on Taiwan, for example. The probability is low, but the cost of World War III is significant enough that I would be watching this closely if I were still in government.
EA: I think the fear of a fait accompli on Taiwan—or elsewhere—during the election aftermath or a transition period is seriously overblown. As Michael Kofman described in an excellent essay the other day, faits accomplis are harder to, well, accomplish and rarer than commonly assumed. Yes, it’s possible that China could use this period of uncertainty to move on Taiwan, but it would still be incredibly difficult and costly to overcome the island’s defenses.
As Kofman points out, seizing Taiwan isn’t a simple land grab; it would be the invasion and seizure of a whole country, something that hasn’t happened in 70 years. Or to put it another way, the United States isn’t the only deterrent to Chinese actions against Taiwan. So despite the growing talk about it, I’m seriously skeptical that China or other states will try to use the electoral uncertainty for large-scale nefarious purposes.
MK: I’m not so sure. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made no secret about its desire to incorporate Taiwan eventually and through force if necessary. Chinese warplanes have been increasing incursions into Taiwan’s airspace this fall. And it wouldn’t have to be a D-Day-style assault. The People’s Liberation Army could use 21st-century tactics, including cyberattacks, precision conventional strikes, and other gray-zone tactics in a bid to coerce Taipei into submission.
At a minimum, I think there is value for the United States to clarify its commitment to Taiwan to help the CCP avoid miscalculation. And it would be great if it could be joined in that pledge by treaty allies around the world. World War III in the Taiwan Strait would be a problem for everyone, including allies in Europe. Germany, for example, might not send troops, but it could make a political declaration backed up with the threat of sanctions. The free world standing united on this issue would give the CCP pause.
EA: Not to be the cynical realist here, but it would only become World War III if the United States gets involved. That’s exactly why so many people argue against making a concrete security commitment to Taiwan; the risk of conflict between China and the United States is not worth it.
MK: So we should stand by as a rising revisionist great power uses force to gobble up its neighbors that happen to be U.S. allies? I would think that is something a cynical realist would want to deter.
EA: It depends. Taiwan is a fairly unique case in its historical ties and proximity to China. It’s certainly not the same as deterring Chinese aggression toward Japan, South Korea, or other U.S. allies in the region. And let’s be honest, Taiwan could relatively easily defend itself if it invested in the right military capabilities. Taiwan has chosen to rely on the United States instead, even though Washington has never made a concrete security guarantee. That comes with a substantive escalation risk for the United States.
But we’re off topic here. I think your second point is more relevant to the news of the day. The United States can’t make decisions about how it wants to engage with the world until it has a confirmed new leader. I don’t think it’s dangerous that it’s taking this long to figure out the next president, but it doesn’t reflect well on the United States that the electoral system is this disorganized and that the current president is making profoundly undemocratic statements. I mean, just a few hours ago Trump tweeted that any vote received after Election Day shouldn’t be counted, which violates the law in a number of states. And he’s calling for all vote counts to be stopped—except where he trails and still has a shot of winning.
MK: I hope we can address the question of how the U.S. government will engage with the world over the next four years in our next column in mid-November. What would a Biden or second-term Trump administration mean for America’s role in the world? Who are the winners and losers internationally?
But we should probably turn to the civil war brewing in East Africa. Have you been following events in Ethiopia?
EA: Do they have an electoral college, too?
MK: That would certainly be less messy than the current situation.
EA: So it looks as if the Ethiopian government, having finally ended its external conflicts, could be heading into a civil war, launching military action in the Tigray region—after an alleged raid on federal troops—and in response to the region’s ruling TPLF party (which used to dominate the federal government until Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018) seeking more political independence. What’s your take?
MK: It is disappointing to see the country fragmenting. Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for signing a peace deal with neighboring Eritrea, and he was putting in place some much-needed economic and political reforms. I hate to be a broken record, but this action may have been timed to take place when the United States—an important partner for Ethiopia—was distracted by domestic issues.
EA: Yeah, there’s probably more to that. I still think it’s unlikely that China will attack Taiwan, but there’s definitely an element of “when the cat’s away” to what’s happening in Ethiopia. Tensions have been building for months, but timing the government’s assault to coincide with the U.S. election was almost certainly intended to avoid as much notice and criticism.
And it’s a serious step backward for Ethiopia. It’s not out of the question for this to spiral into civil war or even into partition; after all, one of Ethiopia’s other neighbors, Sudan, just fought a lengthy civil war over independence for South Sudan. That said, I’m not sure I see a U.S. role here other than mediation.
MK: Africa is not a priority region for U.S. foreign policy. But Ethiopia has been an important partner for advancing U.S. interests in the region, including on counterterrorism and development. This will certainly complicate the relationship. The conflict runs along ethnic lines, and I hope this doesn’t become a new Yugoslav-style war that leads to the breakup of a multiethnic country. We will have to watch this closely.
But, for now, we better rest up in preparation for our second debate of the day. Apparently, our scribblings here have a growing audience. We have been invited to debate U.S. foreign policy (virtually) on a college campus tonight. I hope you are up to the challenge.
EA: Matt, the sooner you accept that you’re wrong about foreign policy, the sooner I can stop following you around to remind you!


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--Free Trade Is Over

Free Trade Is Over

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
The United States is emerging from this presidential election as divided as ever : geographically , ideologically , and economically .
Democratic nominee Joe Biden , who for now seems to have the edge to secure the White House , would have needed a solid congressional majority to implement the ambitious fiscal and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ran on .
Controlling the House of Representatives will not be enough .
Thus curbed in his ability to pursue his broader agenda , Biden will likely at least try to shield the American middle class from global economic turbulence through trade policy .
In short , whether Biden or President Donald Trump eventually triumphs , protectionism is here to stay .
Four years in power have allowed Trump to engineer the most abrupt shift in U.S. trade policy since World War II , marking its departure from the rules-based trading system that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decades .
A Biden presidency would lead to a partial normalization in trade relations , marking a return to a more multilateral and less transactional approach .
But even before messy electoral outcomes became likely , it was foolish to expect him to repudiate Trump ’ s protectionist legacy .
From the very beginning , Biden made clear that “ economic security is national security.
” In that framework , domestic issues , primarily the regeneration of the American middle class and small businesses , would always top his agenda , especially amid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sense then that protectionism has crept into his platform .
The candidate ’ s “ Made in America ” agenda hides veiled forms of protectionism aimed at promoting goods and services that are produced domestically .
Under the “ Buy American ” slogan , for example , he envisages $ 400 billion in government procurement investment that would target goods and services provided exclusively by U.S. businesses .
And consider his proposed carbon adjustment fee against countries that fail to meet their climate and environmental obligations .
That is nothing more than a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which would actually reinforce protectionism , there is the simple political fact that , on entering the White House , Biden would have a hard time unrolling Trump ’ s protectionist measures or launching new free trade agreements .
Although Biden blamed Trump ’ s tariffs for hurting the U.S. economy , he would have to perform a complicated balancing act to lift them .
This is especially true when it comes to China because he is backed by labor unions , which want jobs protected from Chinese competition , but also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ access to the lucrative Chinese market .
In an attempt to build a common front against China , Biden might lift tariffs on aluminum and steel produced by European companies .
That might look like a win for free trade , but such a concession would likely be made conditional on NATO spending commitments , a shared reform of the World Trade Organization , and reassurances concerning 5G deals with Beijing .
Finally , even if the political will were there to forge new trade agreements , it would take years to do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has had a habit of just declaring them .
According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics , it takes on average one and a half years to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States and then more than three and a half years to reach the implementation stage .
More complex , multiparty agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( from which Trump withdrew ) can take almost a decade .
In short , if Biden wins , Trump ’ s confrontational protectionism may give way to a more selective form—focused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aimed at the protection of U.S. manufacturing , and targeted at real geopolitical rivals .
But the days of free trade are over .

The United States is emerging from this presidential election as divided as ever: geographically, ideologically, and economically. Democratic nominee Joe Biden, who for now seems to have the edge to secure the White House, would have needed a solid congressional majority to implement the ambitious fiscal and environmental agenda to rebuild America that he ran on.
The United States is emerging from this presidential election as divided as ever: geographically, ideologically, and economically. Democratic nominee Joe Biden, who for now seems to have the edge to secure the White House, would have needed a solid congressional majority to implement the ambitious fiscal and environmental agenda to rebuild America that he ran on.
Controlling the House of Representatives will not be enough. Thus curbed in his ability to pursue his broader agenda, Biden will likely at least try to shield the American middle class from global economic turbulence through trade policy. In short, whether Biden or President Donald Trump eventually triumphs, protectionism is here to stay.
Four years in power have allowed Trump to engineer the most abrupt shift in U.S. trade policy since World War II, marking its departure from the rules-based trading system that Washington had established over the previous seven decades. A Biden presidency would lead to a partial normalization in trade relations, marking a return to a more multilateral and less transactional approach. But even before messy electoral outcomes became likely, it was foolish to expect him to repudiate Trump’s protectionist legacy.
From the very beginning, Biden made clear that “economic security is national security.” In that framework, domestic issues, primarily the regeneration of the American middle class and small businesses, would always top his agenda, especially amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It makes sense then that protectionism has crept into his platform. The candidate’s “Made in America” agenda hides veiled forms of protectionism aimed at promoting goods and services that are produced domestically. Under the “Buy American” slogan, for example, he envisages $400 billion in government procurement investment that would target goods and services provided exclusively by U.S. businesses. And consider his proposed carbon adjustment fee against countries that fail to meet their climate and environmental obligations. That is nothing more than a tariff.
Even beyond efforts like these, which would actually reinforce protectionism, there is the simple political fact that, on entering the White House, Biden would have a hard time unrolling Trump’s protectionist measures or launching new free trade agreements.
Although Biden blamed Trump’s tariffs for hurting the U.S. economy, he would have to perform a complicated balancing act to lift them. This is especially true when it comes to China because he is backed by labor unions, which want jobs protected from Chinese competition, but also by farmers, who want to regain access to the lucrative Chinese market. In an attempt to build a common front against China, Biden might lift tariffs on aluminum and steel produced by European companies. That might look like a win for free trade, but such a concession would likely be made conditional on NATO spending commitments, a shared reform of the World Trade Organization, and reassurances concerning 5G deals with Beijing.
Finally, even if the political will were there to forge new trade agreements, it would take years to do so through the normal processes—even though Trump has had a habit of just declaring them. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, it takes on average one and a half years to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States and then more than three and a half years to reach the implementation stage. More complex, multiparty agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (from which Trump withdrew) can take almost a decade.
In short, if Biden wins, Trump’s confrontational protectionism may give way to a more selective form—focused on specific issues like the environment, aimed at the protection of U.S. manufacturing, and targeted at real geopolitical rivals. But the days of free trade are over.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--This Time, the Meddling Is Coming From Inside the House

This Time , the Meddling Is Coming From Inside the House This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Preparing for the worst ahead of the United States ’ presidential election , U.S. Cyber Command upped its game .
To deter interference with the campaign and the vote , the command set up operations in Europe , the Middle East , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Americans worried that foreign governments would be able to meddle on Election Day .
But Nov. 3 came with a big surprise : no significant foreign interference to note .
The United States ’ adversaries are clever strategists .
“ We have no indications that a foreign actor has succeeded in compromising or affecting the actual votes cast in this election , ” announced Acting Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf on Nov. 3 .
His message stood in stark contrast to preelection warnings from the White House , the FBI @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Center , which had all raised the specter of a combination of disinformation and hacking attempts by Russia , China , and Iran .
Many analysts , too , predicted 2016-style disinformation chaos .
Sure , there have been hacking attempts , and the FBI documented Russian disinformation .
But two things have changed since America ’ s rude election-interference awakening in 2016 .
U.S. authorities , election machine manufacturers , and social media companies are now acutely aware of the interference risk and try to limit it .
U.S. Cyber Command , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its Defending Forward strategy , where cyberoperatives signal to would-be attackers that they ’ ve been identified ( and might be punished ) .
In 2018 , the cyber-warriors managed to keep the midterm elections clean .
This time their added firepower—with units operating around the world to counter would-be perpetrators—paid dividends .
But it is too soon for self-congratulations .
As Sun Tzu said , in more elegant words : Don ’ t try the same trick twice .
The United States ’ adversaries didn ’ t bet on a mega version @ @ @ @ @ @ @ makes no sense to attack in a manner the adversary is already familiar with .
Instead , for the most part , they sat back and watched America harm itself .
Indeed , scores of Americans have shown themselves capable of discrediting their elections all on their own .
If the leader of a country announces to his 68 million or so supporters that an election has been “ a major fraud on our nation , ” as President Donald Trump did , America ’ s rivals ’ initial work is done .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ phase two .

Preparing for the worst ahead of the United States’ presidential election, U.S. Cyber Command upped its game. To deter interference with the campaign and the vote, the command set up operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Even so, three-quarters of Americans worried that foreign governments would be able to meddle on Election Day. But Nov. 3 came with a big surprise: no significant foreign interference to note. The United States’ adversaries are clever strategists.
Preparing for the worst ahead of the United States’ presidential election, U.S. Cyber Command upped its game. To deter interference with the campaign and the vote, the command set up operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Even so, three-quarters of Americans worried that foreign governments would be able to meddle on Election Day. But Nov. 3 came with a big surprise: no significant foreign interference to note. The United States’ adversaries are clever strategists.
“We have no indications that a foreign actor has succeeded in compromising or affecting the actual votes cast in this election,” announced Acting Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf on Nov. 3. His message stood in stark contrast to preelection warnings from the White House, the FBI, and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, which had all raised the specter of a combination of disinformation and hacking attempts by Russia, China, and Iran. Many analysts, too, predicted 2016-style disinformation chaos.
Sure, there have been hacking attempts, and the FBI documented Russian disinformation. But two things have changed since America’s rude election-interference awakening in 2016. U.S. authorities, election machine manufacturers, and social media companies are now acutely aware of the interference risk and try to limit it. U.S. Cyber Command, meanwhile, went on offense early with its Defending Forward strategy, where cyberoperatives signal to would-be attackers that they’ve been identified (and might be punished). In 2018, the cyber-warriors managed to keep the midterm elections clean. This time their added firepower—with units operating around the world to counter would-be perpetrators—paid dividends.
But it is too soon for self-congratulations. As Sun Tzu said, in more elegant words: Don’t try the same trick twice. The United States’ adversaries didn’t bet on a mega version of the 2016 playbook, because it makes no sense to attack in a manner the adversary is already familiar with. Instead, for the most part, they sat back and watched America harm itself.
Indeed, scores of Americans have shown themselves capable of discrediting their elections all on their own. If the leader of a country announces to his 68 million or so supporters that an election has been “a major fraud on our nation,” as President Donald Trump did, America’s rivals’ initial work is done. And they may have other plans for phase two.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--Trump Legal Challenges More Bluster Than Substance

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s campaign has filed a flurry of lawsuits in battleground states , raising fears that the protracted battle for the White House could be drawn out even further through the courts .
But legal experts say that the cases filed in Georgia , Michigan , Wisconsin , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact on the race .
Rather , the cases appear to be an effort by the Trump campaign to muddy the waters about the integrity of the election .
“ These do not appear to be very serious challenges , there ’ s not a ton of evidence being submitted with these complaints , ” said Jonathan Diaz , legal counsel with the Campaign Legal Center , a nonpartisan voter advocacy organization .
On Thursday , a judge in Georgia dismissed a case filed against the Chatham County Board of Elections less than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In his decision , Judge James Bass said that there was “ no evidence ” that 53 absentee ballots had been mishandled , as the Trump campaign ’ s lawsuit alleged .
In Michigan , a judge dismissed a request by the Trump campaign team to halt the counting of ballots , with the campaign alleging that Republicans hadn ’ t been granted full access to observe the vote tabulation process .
“ These lawsuits are tinkering on the edges claiming potentially minor infractions ; nothing which would reverse any electoral college win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scholar Rick Hasen on his Election Law Blog .
The one case that could potentially have some legs is a Republican challenge to a decision made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that allows mail-in ballots received by 5 p.m. on Friday to be counted , so long as the postmark indicates they were sent by Election Day on Tuesday .
The Supreme Court refused to fast-track a request by Republicans to review the Pennsylvania court ’ s decision , but three justices indicated that they would be willing to revisit the issue in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the decision coming out of it would really only become a factor if Pennsylvania ends up so close that those ballots … end up being decisive , ” Diaz said .
A lot of what-if scenarios would have to align for the case to come into play : Pennsylvania would have to become the decisive state in pushing one of the candidates across the finish line ( it isn ’ t right now ) , and the margin in the state would have to be so tight that the tiny fraction of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
While none of these lawsuits is expected to meaningfully impact the electoral map , they are likely to foment further strife as they give more ammunition to Trump supporters on the ground to challenge the legitimacy of a Biden win .
“ I think that there ’ s maybe two separate things going on , one is a PR strategy using litigation trying to undermine confidence in the integrity of the result in order to stoke public distrust , ” said Wendy Weiser , the director of the Democracy Program at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they ’ re just throwing a lot of spaghetti at the wall , coming up with whatever claims they can make up , ” she said .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign has filed a flurry of lawsuits in battleground states, raising fears that the protracted battle for the White House could be drawn out even further through the courts. But legal experts say that the cases filed in Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania are unlikely to have any material impact on the race. Rather, the cases appear to be an effort by the Trump campaign to muddy the waters about the integrity of the election.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign has filed a flurry of lawsuits in battleground states, raising fears that the protracted battle for the White House could be drawn out even further through the courts. But legal experts say that the cases filed in Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania are unlikely to have any material impact on the race. Rather, the cases appear to be an effort by the Trump campaign to muddy the waters about the integrity of the election.
“These do not appear to be very serious challenges, there’s not a ton of evidence being submitted with these complaints,” said Jonathan Diaz, legal counsel with the Campaign Legal Center, a nonpartisan voter advocacy organization.
On Thursday, a judge in Georgia dismissed a case filed against the Chatham County Board of Elections less than 24 hours after it was filed. In his decision, Judge James Bass said that there was “no evidence” that 53 absentee ballots had been mishandled, as the Trump campaign’s lawsuit alleged.
In Michigan, a judge dismissed a request by the Trump campaign team to halt the counting of ballots, with the campaign alleging that Republicans hadn’t been granted full access to observe the vote tabulation process.
“These lawsuits are tinkering on the edges claiming potentially minor infractions; nothing which would reverse any electoral college win for Biden,” wrote the legal scholar Rick Hasen on his Election Law Blog.
The one case that could potentially have some legs is a Republican challenge to a decision made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that allows mail-in ballots received by 5 p.m. on Friday to be counted, so long as the postmark indicates they were sent by Election Day on Tuesday. The Supreme Court refused to fast-track a request by Republicans to review the Pennsylvania court’s decision, but three justices indicated that they would be willing to revisit the issue in the future.
“But that lawsuit and the decision coming out of it would really only become a factor if Pennsylvania ends up so close that those ballots … end up being decisive,” Diaz said.
A lot of what-if scenarios would have to align for the case to come into play: Pennsylvania would have to become the decisive state in pushing one of the candidates across the finish line (it isn’t right now), and the margin in the state would have to be so tight that the tiny fraction of ballots received after Election Day becomes decisive.
While none of these lawsuits is expected to meaningfully impact the electoral map, they are likely to foment further strife as they give more ammunition to Trump supporters on the ground to challenge the legitimacy of a Biden win.
“I think that there’s maybe two separate things going on, one is a PR strategy using litigation trying to undermine confidence in the integrity of the result in order to stoke public distrust,” said Wendy Weiser, the director of the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center for Justice.
“Then they’re just throwing a lot of spaghetti at the wall, coming up with whatever claims they can make up,” she said.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--Trump’s Language of Hate Has Deep Roots in American Religious Bigotry

Trump ’ s Language of Hate Has Deep Roots in American Religious Bigotry U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s influence on U.S. politics and society will last far longer than his tenure as president .
Trumpism is not a coherent doctrine ; there ’ s no grand strategy holding it together .
Instead it is a combination of ideologies : judicial appointments to renew the culture wars and preserve Trump ’ s power ; deep-seated corruption to benefit the Trump family and their allies monetarily ; standard Republican ideas about taxes ; and , most crucially , systems of violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration defines as the Other .
That ’ s an idea that goes back a long way in the United States , and which hasn ’ t entirely escaped its religious roots .
Trump has repeatedly leaned on fear of and opposition to imaginary enemies to avoid responsibility for his own failures and to suggest who belongs and who doesn ’ t in U.S. society .
The most recent example is his executive order establishing the 1776 Commission .
Pitched as an counterpunch to the New York Times ’ 1619 Project , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , it was in fact a declaration that the Other does not and has never existed in U.S. society , and that anyone who suggests otherwise has a nonfactual , un-American agenda .
This is absurd .
U.S. politics has a long history of weaponizing the fear and hate of the Other , one of the earliest of which was anti-Catholicism and the genre of symbolic language associated with it , “ anti-popery.
” Sectarian fights between dissenting religious groups and the state establishment of Massachusetts frequently devolved into mutual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was a designation of immediate dread and scorn among the Protestant Christian exile society that dominated colonial politics .
When the ruling conservative Quakers in colonial Pennsylvania tried to block the political ascendancy of other groups and maintain their rule in the face of an accelerating minority status , those being disenfranchised labeled their enemies “ papists.
” For their part , Quakers accused the newly mobilized voters of having rigged the election and pretending toward greater freedom while secretly intending a radical agenda of egalitarianism and wealth redistribution .
Sound familiar ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ state or its governing elite could be readily denigrated as “ popish.
” Yet , so , too , could elements of society seen as subversive , dissatisfied , or antagonistic to the godly society of the empowered .
The beauty of this symbolism to those who relied upon it was that it could increasingly be detached from a specific meaning or grievance without losing any of its potency to mobilize the fearful and resentful within society .
Think “ socialist ” among the right wing today .
The politics of the colonial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dog whistle of the period remained .
In the early republican and antebellum period , the language of anti-Catholicism morphed once more to target new immigrants to the country .
As waves of European migration set in , nativists within U.S. society used anti-Catholic tropes to bemoan the jobs taken , the voting influence wielded , and the rights demanded by newly arrived Americans .
These signals also increasingly overlapped with 19th-century race theory , which added an entirely new level of “ othering ” amid a rapidly diversifying society .
Jews were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , at the time a disliked demographic , were threatened with a U.S. governor ’ s extermination order .
Anyone seen as a threat to a progressively more mythologized image of a lost Anglo-Saxon , Protestant orthodoxy was smeared with the language of anti-popery and threatened with violence .
Nativists , evangelicals , and some economic elites demanded restrictions on immigration .
They demanded the franchise be denied to Americans born on foreign soil .
An alliance of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and Christian fundamentalists carried this mantle well @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , into the 21st .
Time and again a class of political leaders answered them in kind , motivating their voters and would-be supporters with calls , subtle and unsubtle , to exclude and suspect the unwanted Other amongst them .
Trump ’ s reliance on this same kind of religious symbolism have not been subtle .
Trump overtly claims that Christians are under attack in the United States and that he is fighting back against their supposed oppression .
Plenty has been written on the multiple branches of Christianity that support him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , neocharismatic Pentecostals , and evangelicals in general .
His travel ban on several majority-Muslim countries , his violent rhetoric about Muslims in this country and abroad , and the several performative laws banning “ sharia law ” by GOP state legislatures across the nation have been very clear .
Trump ’ s embrace of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such as QAnon , of explicitly white-nationalist groups , and repeated promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda about “ cosmopolitan elites , ” “ globalists , ” and protests “ paid for by [ George ] Soros @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Life synagogue shooting and other incidents of anti-Semitic violence .
While these are the most explicit examples of Trump ’ s emphasis on violence toward any religious group other than white Protestants who support Trump and his policies , there are numerous other examples .
Hate crimes against Sikhs , for example , have surged during the Trump administration .
A number of Trump ’ s executive orders and statements , and those of his supporters , have been full-throated apologias for colonialism and have led to real violence against Native Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ border .
And Trump ’ s historic and ongoing hatred of Latino immigrants , channeled into his rhetoric ( leading to the El Paso shooting ) , border policies , wall , and detention camps , merges into traditional Nativist rhetoric , which is inherently anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant .
To be sure , Trump did not invent this political language .
It is exceedingly unlikely he is aware of its long presence in U.S. history and the language that informs it .
But he stands in a long tradition of conservative political leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. society , a calculated language that strikes a careful balance between unspoken or understated inference and a current of anger and resentment toward anyone who might be to blame for the misfortune of the so-called silent majority .
For Trump and his followers , however , subtext is often straightforward text .
Even 19th-century nativist supporters didn ’ t resort to grave desecration .
Trump ’ s presidency will end , and there will be a rush to pretend we are back to normal .
The horrifying truth , however , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States ’ normal .
And when he goes , it won ’ t disappear with him .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s influence on U.S. politics and society will last far longer than his tenure as president. Trumpism is not a coherent doctrine; there’s no grand strategy holding it together. Instead it is a combination of ideologies: judicial appointments to renew the culture wars and preserve Trump’s power; deep-seated corruption to benefit the Trump family and their allies monetarily; standard Republican ideas about taxes; and, most crucially, systems of violence, ideological and physical, against groups the administration defines as the Other. That’s an idea that goes back a long way in the United States, and which hasn’t entirely escaped its religious roots.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s influence on U.S. politics and society will last far longer than his tenure as president. Trumpism is not a coherent doctrine; there’s no grand strategy holding it together. Instead it is a combination of ideologies: judicial appointments to renew the culture wars and preserve Trump’s power; deep-seated corruption to benefit the Trump family and their allies monetarily; standard Republican ideas about taxes; and, most crucially, systems of violence, ideological and physical, against groups the administration defines as the Other. That’s an idea that goes back a long way in the United States, and which hasn’t entirely escaped its religious roots.
Trump has repeatedly leaned on fear of and opposition to imaginary enemies to avoid responsibility for his own failures and to suggest who belongs and who doesn’t in U.S. society. The most recent example is his executive order establishing the 1776 Commission. Pitched as an counterpunch to the New York Times’ 1619 Project, which examines the consequences of slavery in the United States, it was in fact a declaration that the Other does not and has never existed in U.S. society, and that anyone who suggests otherwise has a nonfactual, un-American agenda.
This is absurd. U.S. politics has a long history of weaponizing the fear and hate of the Other, one of the earliest of which was anti-Catholicism and the genre of symbolic language associated with it, “anti-popery.” Sectarian fights between dissenting religious groups and the state establishment of Massachusetts frequently devolved into mutual accusations of “popery,” which was a designation of immediate dread and scorn among the Protestant Christian exile society that dominated colonial politics. When the ruling conservative Quakers in colonial Pennsylvania tried to block the political ascendancy of other groups and maintain their rule in the face of an accelerating minority status, those being disenfranchised labeled their enemies “papists.”
For their part, Quakers accused the newly mobilized voters of having rigged the election and pretending toward greater freedom while secretly intending a radical agenda of egalitarianism and wealth redistribution. Sound familiar? Any abusive or corrupt actions by the state or its governing elite could be readily denigrated as “popish.” Yet, so, too, could elements of society seen as subversive, dissatisfied, or antagonistic to the godly society of the empowered. The beauty of this symbolism to those who relied upon it was that it could increasingly be detached from a specific meaning or grievance without losing any of its potency to mobilize the fearful and resentful within society. Think “socialist” among the right wing today.
The politics of the colonial era shifted, but the most successful dog whistle of the period remained. In the early republican and antebellum period, the language of anti-Catholicism morphed once more to target new immigrants to the country. As waves of European migration set in, nativists within U.S. society used anti-Catholic tropes to bemoan the jobs taken, the voting influence wielded, and the rights demanded by newly arrived Americans. These signals also increasingly overlapped with 19th-century race theory, which added an entirely new level of “othering” amid a rapidly diversifying society. Jews were targeted as inferior and nefarious. Mormons, at the time a disliked demographic, were threatened with a U.S. governor’s extermination order.
Anyone seen as a threat to a progressively more mythologized image of a lost Anglo-Saxon, Protestant orthodoxy was smeared with the language of anti-popery and threatened with violence. Nativists, evangelicals, and some economic elites demanded restrictions on immigration. They demanded the franchise be denied to Americans born on foreign soil. An alliance of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and Christian fundamentalists carried this mantle well into the 20th century and, seemingly, into the 21st. Time and again a class of political leaders answered them in kind, motivating their voters and would-be supporters with calls, subtle and unsubtle, to exclude and suspect the unwanted Other amongst them.
Trump’s reliance on this same kind of religious symbolism have not been subtle. Trump overtly claims that Christians are under attack in the United States and that he is fighting back against their supposed oppression. Plenty has been written on the multiple branches of Christianity that support him in this endeavor—Christian dominionists, Christian Zionists, neocharismatic Pentecostals, and evangelicals in general. His travel ban on several majority-Muslim countries, his violent rhetoric about Muslims in this country and abroad, and the several performative laws banning “sharia law” by GOP state legislatures across the nation have been very clear. Trump’s embrace of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such as QAnon, of explicitly white-nationalist groups, and repeated promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda about “cosmopolitan elites,” “globalists,” and protests “paid for by [George] Soros,” helped lead to the Tree of Life synagogue shooting and other incidents of anti-Semitic violence.
While these are the most explicit examples of Trump’s emphasis on violence toward any religious group other than white Protestants who support Trump and his policies, there are numerous other examples. Hate crimes against Sikhs, for example, have surged during the Trump administration. A number of Trump’s executive orders and statements, and those of his supporters, have been full-throated apologias for colonialism and have led to real violence against Native Americans and even religious sites on the southern border. And Trump’s historic and ongoing hatred of Latino immigrants, channeled into his rhetoric (leading to the El Paso shooting), border policies, wall, and detention camps, merges into traditional Nativist rhetoric, which is inherently anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant.
To be sure, Trump did not invent this political language. It is exceedingly unlikely he is aware of its long presence in U.S. history and the language that informs it. But he stands in a long tradition of conservative political leaders that have embraced the conspiratorial style within U.S. society, a calculated language that strikes a careful balance between unspoken or understated inference and a current of anger and resentment toward anyone who might be to blame for the misfortune of the so-called silent majority. For Trump and his followers, however, subtext is often straightforward text. Even 19th-century nativist supporters didn’t resort to grave desecration.
Trump’s presidency will end, and there will be a rush to pretend we are back to normal. The horrifying truth, however, is that religious violence is historically the United States’ normal. And when he goes, it won’t disappear with him.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--What Economic Stimulus Could Look Like Under a Divided Government

What Economic Stimulus Could Look Like Under a Divided Government This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
Whom the next president will be is still unknown .
But we do have some clarity on one thing : A much-discussed $ 3 trillion economic stimulus is not in the offing this fall .
With Republicans increasingly likely to hold the Senate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the table for not only the next six months but probably the next two years .
In the months and days leading up to the election , Republicans and Democrats had come to a deadlock on stimulus spending over a $ 300 million to $ 400 million disagreement .
The Democrats wouldn ’ t budge on their $ 2.2 trillion plan , and the Republicans wouldn ’ t go above $ 1.8 trillion or $ 1.9 trillion .
The most contentious discussions came over Democrats ’ desire for an extra $ 600 monthly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Republicans ’ insistence that businesses be granted liability protections in case their employees fell ill with COVID-19 .
Although President Donald Trump ’ s economic advisor , Stephen Moore , has said Trump would not pass any stimulus during a lame-duck period , likely Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has insisted that passing a bill before the end of the year will be a top priority .
Trump has never appeared to share Moore ’ s distaste for debt , so odds are he ’ ll sign legislation for a stimulus if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The question of what will come after Inauguration Day is trickier .
Democratic nominee Joe Biden has laid out what a potential stimulus under his watch would include , and it sounds a lot like the Democrats ’ original plan—with an extended unemployment benefit and lots of aid for states—and also ensures free COVID-19 tests and vaccines .
But given a likely Republican Senate , an uncertain course for the pandemic throughout the winter , and a lack of clarity on what the economy might look like in January , it is hard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and what compromises he could make with the Senate .
If Trump wins , meanwhile , he ’ ll still need to contend with a Democrat-held House , which means that passing a stimulus will necessitate comprise on his end , too .
Odds are that he ’ ll want to follow through on his promise of more stimulus , but it would need to be more restrained to please people in his party .
In the center of the Venn diagram of possible 2021 stimulus plans under Trump or Biden is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was being debated at the end of October .
For Democrats : some unemployment enhancement and relief for states .
For Republicans : some liability protections .
For both : a check for most taxpayers .
The Democrats and Republicans were not too far apart—given the size of other spending , $ 300 million to $ 400 million isn ’ t all that much—and both have political reasons to stimulate an economy still ravaged by COVID-19 .
Longer term , as the virus recedes and the economy recovers , the bigger differences between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long term , Biden seeks a muscular Keynesian approach , bringing the government into the economy on a scale not seen since the Depression .
He plans on infrastructure spending , universal broadband , clean energy , and addressing what he calls “ environmental injustice.
” Biden also promises much higher minimum wages ( doubling it in some states ) and , presumably to offset the burden that will place on small businesses , more help for them—though what help exactly is not entirely clear .
He also plans to cancel the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accrues and enlarge the amount of government-sponsored health care .
A Trump administration would take more cues from the private sector with lower corporate and income taxes but would still be more interventionist than a typical Republican one .
Trump also favors large infrastructure spending and at one point suggested $ 2 trillion infrastructure spending , compared with Biden ’ s more modest $ 1.3 trillion .
Both candidates plan to revitalize manufacturing and become less reliant on trade .
A Republican Senate would scale back both men ’ s spending .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ large expansions of the government , so even with a Senate that is skeptical of larger government , odds are good that changes will come no matter who is president .
Such changes often make sense following a crisis , but they tend to grow and persist far after the initial shock fades into distant memory .

Whom the next president will be is still unknown. But we do have some clarity on one thing: A much-discussed $3 trillion economic stimulus is not in the offing this fall. With Republicans increasingly likely to hold the Senate, such massive government spending is off the table for not only the next six months but probably the next two years.
Whom the next president will be is still unknown. But we do have some clarity on one thing: A much-discussed $3 trillion economic stimulus is not in the offing this fall. With Republicans increasingly likely to hold the Senate, such massive government spending is off the table for not only the next six months but probably the next two years.
In the months and days leading up to the election, Republicans and Democrats had come to a deadlock on stimulus spending over a $300 million to $400 million disagreement. The Democrats wouldn’t budge on their $2.2 trillion plan, and the Republicans wouldn’t go above $1.8 trillion or $1.9 trillion. The most contentious discussions came over Democrats’ desire for an extra $600 monthly unemployment benefit and bailouts for states and the Republicans’ insistence that businesses be granted liability protections in case their employees fell ill with COVID-19.
Although President Donald Trump’s economic advisor, Stephen Moore, has said Trump would not pass any stimulus during a lame-duck period, likely Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has insisted that passing a bill before the end of the year will be a top priority. Trump has never appeared to share Moore’s distaste for debt, so odds are he’ll sign legislation for a stimulus if it gets to him this fall.
The question of what will come after Inauguration Day is trickier.
Democratic nominee Joe Biden has laid out what a potential stimulus under his watch would include, and it sounds a lot like the Democrats’ original plan—with an extended unemployment benefit and lots of aid for states—and also ensures free COVID-19 tests and vaccines. But given a likely Republican Senate, an uncertain course for the pandemic throughout the winter, and a lack of clarity on what the economy might look like in January, it is hard to say what the country will need and what compromises he could make with the Senate.
If Trump wins, meanwhile, he’ll still need to contend with a Democrat-held House, which means that passing a stimulus will necessitate comprise on his end, too. Odds are that he’ll want to follow through on his promise of more stimulus, but it would need to be more restrained to please people in his party.
In the center of the Venn diagram of possible 2021 stimulus plans under Trump or Biden is a pared-down version of something close to what was being debated at the end of October. For Democrats: some unemployment enhancement and relief for states. For Republicans: some liability protections. For both: a check for most taxpayers. The Democrats and Republicans were not too far apart—given the size of other spending, $300 million to $400 million isn’t all that much—and both have political reasons to stimulate an economy still ravaged by COVID-19.
Longer term, as the virus recedes and the economy recovers, the bigger differences between the two candidates emerge. Over the long term, Biden seeks a muscular Keynesian approach, bringing the government into the economy on a scale not seen since the Depression. He plans on infrastructure spending, universal broadband, clean energy, and addressing what he calls “environmental injustice.” Biden also promises much higher minimum wages (doubling it in some states) and, presumably to offset the burden that will place on small businesses, more help for them—though what help exactly is not entirely clear. He also plans to cancel the first $10,000 of student debt a student accrues and enlarge the amount of government-sponsored health care.
A Trump administration would take more cues from the private sector with lower corporate and income taxes but would still be more interventionist than a typical Republican one. Trump also favors large infrastructure spending and at one point suggested $2 trillion infrastructure spending, compared with Biden’s more modest $1.3 trillion. Both candidates plan to revitalize manufacturing and become less reliant on trade.
A Republican Senate would scale back both men’s spending. But big economic shocks are normally followed by large expansions of the government, so even with a Senate that is skeptical of larger government, odds are good that changes will come no matter who is president. Such changes often make sense following a crisis, but they tend to grow and persist far after the initial shock fades into distant memory.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--America’s Unique Kind of Disenfranchisement

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
As the world watches the United States stagger into the third day of vote counting , this year ’ s election is a reminder of another way the country stands out : criminal disenfranchisement .
Take Florida , a state some polls suggested Joe Biden could win , even though President Donald Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ boost in Latino support .
But due to a loophole in a 2018 amendment to the Florida constitution , Floridians with felony convictions must pay all their fines and restitution before they can vote .
That measure , which most affects Latino and Black voters , kept an estimated 900,000 felons who have served their time disenfranchised—more than Trump ’ s expected margin of victory .
A report estimates that 2.23 million Americans remain disenfranchised after their release due to their felony convictions , and Florida has more than any other state .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights to people convicted of felonies , states that maintain some restrictions tend to be solidly Republican .
In the 2018 elections , where Georgia faced national criticism for widespread mismanagement and voter suppression , felony disenfranchisement prevented 211,511 ex-prisoners from voting .
This year the state was again denounced for a mishandled primary election that included long polling lines and broken voting machines .
In comparison , only three other democratic countries—Armenia , Belgium , and Chile— have post-release restrictions on felony voting , though Germany , Norway , and Portugal also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases that target the “ integrity of the state ” or the “ constitutionally protected democratic order.
” Italian and Polish courts are also empowered to ban certain people from voting after release .
Similarly , although only two U.S. states—Maine and Vermont—allow people in prison to vote , at least 21 democratic countries allow incarcerated felons to vote , including Canada , South Africa .
and Ukraine .
In 2005 , the European Court of Human Rights found that a complete ban on voting from prison violated the European Convention on Human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sanders has called for the United States to extend voting rights to those currently incarcerated , but he has been met with widespread opposition .
Accounting for the disenfranchisement of felons in prison , 5.2 million Americans have been prevented from voting in this election due to a felony conviction .
The U.S. practice has drawn international criticism .
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has charged that U.S. policies violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , and that the country “ should adopt appropriate measures to ensure that states @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fully served their sentences and those who have been released on parole .
”

As the world watches the United States stagger into the third day of vote counting, this year’s election is a reminder of another way the country stands out: criminal disenfranchisement.
As the world watches the United States stagger into the third day of vote counting, this year’s election is a reminder of another way the country stands out: criminal disenfranchisement.
Take Florida, a state some polls suggested Joe Biden could win, even though President Donald Trump carried the state handily thanks to a boost in Latino support. But due to a loophole in a 2018 amendment to the Florida constitution, Floridians with felony convictions must pay all their fines and restitution before they can vote. That measure, which most affects Latino and Black voters, kept an estimated 900,000 felons who have served their time disenfranchised—more than Trump’s expected margin of victory.
A report estimates that 2.23 million Americans remain disenfranchised after their release due to their felony convictions, and Florida has more than any other state. While many states have begun restoring voting rights to people convicted of felonies, states that maintain some restrictions tend to be solidly Republican. In the 2018 elections, where Georgia faced national criticism for widespread mismanagement and voter suppression, felony disenfranchisement prevented 211,511 ex-prisoners from voting. This year the state was again denounced for a mishandled primary election that included long polling lines and broken voting machines.
In comparison, only three other democratic countries—Armenia, Belgium, and Chile— have post-release restrictions on felony voting, though Germany, Norway, and Portugal also ban felons from voting based in rare cases that target the “integrity of the state” or the “constitutionally protected democratic order.” Italian and Polish courts are also empowered to ban certain people from voting after release.
Similarly, although only two U.S. states—Maine and Vermont—allow people in prison to vote, at least 21 democratic countries allow incarcerated felons to vote, including Canada, South Africa. and Ukraine. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights found that a complete ban on voting from prison violated the European Convention on Human Rights. Two-time Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has called for the United States to extend voting rights to those currently incarcerated, but he has been met with widespread opposition. Accounting for the disenfranchisement of felons in prison, 5.2 million Americans have been prevented from voting in this election due to a felony conviction.
The U.S. practice has drawn international criticism. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has charged that U.S. policies violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that the country “should adopt appropriate measures to ensure that states restore voting rights to citizens who have fully served their sentences and those who have been released on parole.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--For Afghans, the U.S. Election Feels Very Familiar

For Afghans , the U.S. Election Feels Very Familiar This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
KABUL—The ongoing U.S. election is starting to look awfully familiar to people here .
Going into Tuesday ’ s vote , officials in Kabul were already worried about the potential violence and disorder that could come from a disputed election , but at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump ’ s responses seem to be straight out of Afghanistan ’ s much-contested 2014 and 2019 elections .
To millions of people here , it ’ s as if both men were cribbing off current President Ashraf Ghani and his longtime rival , Abdullah Abdullah .
Though Biden still insists he will win , it ’ s really Trump who seems to have borrowed the most from the playbook of a country he was determined to leave behind until he was shown pictures of women in the 1970s walking the streets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ began early .
On Wednesday morning , with millions of ballots left to be counted and a half-dozen states in doubt , Trump prematurely declared victory in an election that is still too close to call 48 hours later .
Both Ghani and Abdullah also insisted they won two elections in a row .
Not only that , but last year they held dueling inauguration ceremonies on the same day , only a few miles apart .
Then came Sharpiegate , the claim that the use of marker pens had invalidated an undisclosed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remains ( for most news organizations ) too close to call as of Thursday .
Afghans have been there .
During the U.N.-supervised audit of ballots in the June 2014 runoff here , I saw representatives from the election teams of Ghani and Abdullah argue that the use of a pen of any color other than blue or black should be invalidated .
But it got even weirder as one election team argued that green is close enough to blue so votes cast in green ink should be accepted .
Even worse , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same representatives argue that the use of red in votes cast for the rival team should be trashed .
There are other similarities .
Trump has called for a recount in Wisconsin and additional counting in Arizona and Nevada but demanded that vote counting be stopped in states like Pennsylvania that are tipping toward Biden as mail-in ballots are tallied .
During the 2014 U.N.-monitored audit , Abdullah backed out not once but twice during the nearly two-month process .
While Afghans wait to see who will be commander in chief of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joke that we may need to send the foreign minister to broker a deal between Biden and Trump—as then-Secretary of State John Kerry did in 2014—may yet come true .
Ironic for a country that was a constitutional monarchy from 1963 to 1973 and then a republic thereafter—long before George W. Bush vowed to bring democracy to Afghanistan with the 2001 invasion .

KABUL—The ongoing U.S. election is starting to look awfully familiar to people here.
Going into Tuesday’s vote, officials in Kabul were already worried about the potential violence and disorder that could come from a disputed election, but at the moment, Joe Biden’s and Donald Trump’s responses seem to be straight out of Afghanistan’s much-contested 2014 and 2019 elections. To millions of people here, it’s as if both men were cribbing off current President Ashraf Ghani and his longtime rival, Abdullah Abdullah.
Though Biden still insists he will win, it’s really Trump who seems to have borrowed the most from the playbook of a country he was determined to leave behind until he was shown pictures of women in the 1970s walking the streets of Kabul in miniskirts.
The echoes began early. On Wednesday morning, with millions of ballots left to be counted and a half-dozen states in doubt, Trump prematurely declared victory in an election that is still too close to call 48 hours later. Both Ghani and Abdullah also insisted they won two elections in a row. Not only that, but last year they held dueling inauguration ceremonies on the same day, only a few miles apart.
Then came Sharpiegate, the claim that the use of marker pens had invalidated an undisclosed number of ballots in Arizona—a race that remains (for most news organizations) too close to call as of Thursday. Afghans have been there. During the U.N.-supervised audit of ballots in the June 2014 runoff here, I saw representatives from the election teams of Ghani and Abdullah argue that the use of a pen of any color other than blue or black should be invalidated. But it got even weirder as one election team argued that green is close enough to blue so votes cast in green ink should be accepted. Even worse, a few minutes later I witnessed those same representatives argue that the use of red in votes cast for the rival team should be trashed.
There are other similarities. Trump has called for a recount in Wisconsin and additional counting in Arizona and Nevada but demanded that vote counting be stopped in states like Pennsylvania that are tipping toward Biden as mail-in ballots are tallied. During the 2014 U.N.-monitored audit, Abdullah backed out not once but twice during the nearly two-month process.
While Afghans wait to see who will be commander in chief of the U.S. mission in their country, the joke that we may need to send the foreign minister to broker a deal between Biden and Trump—as then-Secretary of State John Kerry did in 2014—may yet come true. Ironic for a country that was a constitutional monarchy from 1963 to 1973 and then a republic thereafter—long before George W. Bush vowed to bring democracy to Afghanistan with the 2001 invasion.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-05--What Trump’s Near-Victory Means for Republican Foreign Policy

This article is part of Election 2020 : America Votes , FP ’ s round-the-clock coverage of the U.S. election results as they come in , with short dispatches from correspondents and analysts around the world .
The America Votes page is free for all readers .
If trends hold and U.S. President Donald Trump loses his chance at a second term by a margin roughly as narrow as that by which he won his first , what are the implications for Republican foreign and national security policy , and those Republicans who favor a return to the approach that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past ?
In the short run , very bleak .
In the medium term , mixed .
In the long term , hopeful .
In the short run—measured from now until Inauguration Day in January—Trump will have all the power to cause mischief and few fetters to restrain him .
If he and his allies in the party had lost decisively , perhaps the rebuke might have had a chastening effect .
But in the current scenario , he will be angry and likely keen to wield the considerable powers of his office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home and abroad and doing nothing to advance genuine U.S. interests .
Should his efforts to challenge the election ’ s outcome succeed in securing him a second term , this bleak picture could last another four years .
In the medium run—from the inauguration until about the 2022 midterm elections—the effects will probably be mixed .
A more decisive defeat would have created more political space for Republicans who see their future in a party no longer dominated by Trump .
A clear repudiation of Trump and his allies would have hastened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freedom to jettison what was bad about Trumpism while seeking to keep what positive things the Trump administration was able to accomplish .
With victory having been so close , the Trumpist faction in the party will be empowered and in no mood to compromise or reform .
But in the long run—after 2022 , with the 2024 presidential campaign in sight—there are reasons to be hopeful .
A President Joe Biden will not be able to claim a strong mandate for pushing the most radical parts of the Democrats ’ agenda at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will have the excuse to follow his more moderate foreign-policy instincts .
Debates about foreign policy could well return to more reasonable terrain , and Trump ’ s bogus strawman—you either have to embrace his hyper-transactionalist “ America first ” agenda or you are an effete globalist selling out the United States—will lose its traction .
That kind of terrain favors the sensible strategies that successful Republican administrations—those that succeeded in serving a second term—pursued to the United States ’ benefit in the past .
With any hope , they will do so @ @

If trends hold and U.S. President Donald Trump loses his chance at a second term by a margin roughly as narrow as that by which he won his first, what are the implications for Republican foreign and national security policy, and those Republicans who favor a return to the approach that successful Republican administrations have followed in the past? In the short run, very bleak. In the medium term, mixed. In the long term, hopeful.
If trends hold and U.S. President Donald Trump loses his chance at a second term by a margin roughly as narrow as that by which he won his first, what are the implications for Republican foreign and national security policy, and those Republicans who favor a return to the approach that successful Republican administrations have followed in the past? In the short run, very bleak. In the medium term, mixed. In the long term, hopeful.
In the short run—measured from now until Inauguration Day in January—Trump will have all the power to cause mischief and few fetters to restrain him. If he and his allies in the party had lost decisively, perhaps the rebuke might have had a chastening effect. But in the current scenario, he will be angry and likely keen to wield the considerable powers of his office to the max, settling scores at home and abroad and doing nothing to advance genuine U.S. interests. Should his efforts to challenge the election’s outcome succeed in securing him a second term, this bleak picture could last another four years.
In the medium run—from the inauguration until about the 2022 midterm elections—the effects will probably be mixed. A more decisive defeat would have created more political space for Republicans who see their future in a party no longer dominated by Trump. A clear repudiation of Trump and his allies would have hastened the healing process, allowing for more freedom to jettison what was bad about Trumpism while seeking to keep what positive things the Trump administration was able to accomplish. With victory having been so close, the Trumpist faction in the party will be empowered and in no mood to compromise or reform.
But in the long run—after 2022, with the 2024 presidential campaign in sight—there are reasons to be hopeful. A President Joe Biden will not be able to claim a strong mandate for pushing the most radical parts of the Democrats’ agenda at home or abroad. Instead, he will have the excuse to follow his more moderate foreign-policy instincts. Debates about foreign policy could well return to more reasonable terrain, and Trump’s bogus strawman—you either have to embrace his hyper-transactionalist “America first” agenda or you are an effete globalist selling out the United States—will lose its traction.
That kind of terrain favors the sensible strategies that successful Republican administrations—those that succeeded in serving a second term—pursued to the United States’ benefit in the past. With any hope, they will do so again.