foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--Will Afghanistan’s Cease-Fire Open The Door For Peace?

Will Afghanistan ’ s Cease-Fire Open The Door For Peace ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : A short cease-fire in Afghanistan raises hopes for peace talks , the White House considers sanctions against China over Hong Kong national security law , and Russia begins work on its first stealth bomber .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
A three-day cease-fire between the Afghan army and the Taliban expired at midnight local time on Tuesday .
The truce was only the second cease-fire observed in almost 20 years of fighting—and it ’ s on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is hoping to build a path to peace .
The Afghan government took the opportunity to make good on one of the stipulations of the U.S.-Taliban peace deal signed in February by renewing the release of Taliban prisoners ; approximately 1,000 prisoners have been released over two days , and the Taliban have promised to release a “ remarkable number ” in a reciprocal gesture .
By releasing the Taliban prisoners , the Afghan government is also signaling its optimism : Under the terms of their release , the former detainees must sign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the battlefield .
The incentive to return to Taliban service isn ’ t difficult to understand ; the newly released men were only provided with enough cash for bus fare home .
On Tuesday in Foreign Policy , Stefanie Glinksi reported from Afghanistan as the prisoners were released .
She found one prisoner hopeful .
“ The Taliban and the government need to come together .
It ’ s what our people deserve , ” said Abdul Basir , a 32-year-old political prisoner .
Another was more blunt .
“ There won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long as the U.S. is still here , ” 27-year-old Abdul Hak said .
“ They must leave for things to improve.
” Next step , peace talks ?
The relative comity is a contrast to the violence the Afghan government accuses the Taliban of perpetrating during the holy month of Ramadan .
( The government says 146 civilians were killed and a further 430 were wounded over the 30-day period . )
Afghan National Security Council spokesperson Javid Faisal has said the government wants to extend the cease-fire .
“ If the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we are ready to continue the cease-fire too , ” Faisal said .
“ We hope they release our prisoners so that intra-Afghan peace talks begin as soon as possible … The future depends on the Taliban ’ s next move.
” The Taliban has not yet responded publicly to the overture , but AFP reports that the group could extend the cease-fire a further seven days if prisoner releases continue .
An early U.S. exit ?
With an eye on November ’ s presidential election , U.S. President Donald Trump is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ roughly 12,000 U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan according to the New York Times .
The Pentagon is reportedly trying to calm the president ’ s urgency , and bring the withdrawal schedule more in line with the May 2021 date agreed in the U.S.-Taliban peace deal .
Any training and capacity building that U.S. troops have been conducting with Afghan forces has had to be put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic , potentially delaying withdrawal even longer .
U.S. officials estimate that up to 50 percent of Afghan security forces have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong in the works .
President Trump hinted at future White House against China in retaliation for its plan to impose national security laws on Hong Kong .
Trump refused to be drawn on what those actions may be , but said “ It ’ s something you ’ re going to be hearing about … before the end of the week.
” Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday that measures could include sanctions on Chinese officials and entities doing business in Hong Kong .
The move comes as media reports suggest Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the new laws , an expansion beyond a previous draft that only targeted individuals .
WHO declares the Americas new virus epicenter .
The World Health Organization has declared the western hemisphere the new pandemic epicenter as cases continue to rise in Latin American countries .
As well as a rising number of deaths and cases in Brazil , officials are tracking growing outbreaks in Peru , Chile , El Salvador , Guatemala , and Nicaragua .
While countries in Europe and some European states begin to relax lockdown measures , WHO director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such moves in Latin America .
“ Now is not the time for countries to ease restrictions , ” she said .
Russian warplanes in Libya .
The United States has accused Russia of sending its warplanes to Libya in support of Khalifa Haftar , the head of the Libyan National Army currently fighting with the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord for control of the country .
In a statement , U.S. Africa Command said that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets had come to Libya from Syria and had their markings repainted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Jack Detsch reports , the release of such information by the United States is rare as Washington has largely ignored the conflict recently .
By adding its firepower to Haftar ’ s efforts , U.S. Africa Command chief Gen. Stephen Townsend said Russia was “ clearly trying to tip the scales in its favor in Libya.
” Hungary could end rule by decree .
Hungary could soon end Prime Minister Viktor Orban ’ s ability to rule by decree if a bill to end the country ’ s coronavirus emergency passes the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ she would introduce the required legislation to end the “ state of danger ” on June 20 .
“ We expect those who have attacked us with unjust political accusations to apologize for leading a slander campaign , ” Varga wrote on Facebook .
Grenell to join Trump campaign .
U.S .
Ambassador Richard Grenell is expected to step down from his diplomatic post and join the Trump presidential campaign , according to Politico .
Grenell had also held the role of acting director of national intelligence until John Ratcliffe was sworn into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responded to the Politico story , which came after other news outlets had reported his impending departure , by calling it “ fake news.
” A new Russian stealth bomber ?
Russia has begun constructing a prototype for its first stealth bomber , according to a Russian state news agency .
The aircraft is called the PAK DA and will be designed to match the capabilities of the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber .
China is also at work on its own stealth bomber , the Xian H-20 .
The £300 million ( $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Premier League team Newcastle United by Saudi Arabia ’ s Public Investment Fund is in jeopardy after an investigation by The Guardian revealed the kingdom ’ s ties to a pirate satellite TV service that gives illegal access to sporting events .
The team ’ s acquisition by the fund , which is chaired by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , had already come under fire from human rights groups and the fiancée of murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi .
Saudi Arabia denies being behind the TV service , named beoutQ , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Organization from ruling that the government is involved in the service and as such is in breach of international law .
Like most sports , the Premier League is mostly bankrolled by TV revenue—its latest three-year rights package was worth £5 billion ( $ 6.15 billion ) —and prospective owners must prove they have not broken any laws before any purchase is finalized , putting the Saudi takeover in trouble .
If the Saudi fund ’ s acquisition of the soccer team goes through , it would be one of several purchases it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 500 million stake in entertainment giant Live Nation and building a 7.3 percent stake in cruise operator Carnival .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A short cease-fire in Afghanistan raises hopes for peace talks, the White House considers sanctions against China over the new Hong Kong national security law, and Russia begins work on its first stealth bomber.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: A short cease-fire in Afghanistan raises hopes for peace talks, the White House considers sanctions against China over the new Hong Kong national security law, and Russia begins work on its first stealth bomber.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
‘The Future Depends on the Taliban’s Next Move’
A three-day cease-fire between the Afghan army and the Taliban expired at midnight local time on Tuesday. The truce was only the second cease-fire observed in almost 20 years of fighting—and it’s on this shaky ground that the Afghan government is hoping to build a path to peace.
The Afghan government took the opportunity to make good on one of the stipulations of the U.S.-Taliban peace deal signed in February by renewing the release of Taliban prisoners; approximately 1,000 prisoners have been released over two days, and the Taliban have promised to release a “remarkable number” in a reciprocal gesture.
By releasing the Taliban prisoners, the Afghan government is also signaling its optimism: Under the terms of their release, the former detainees must sign a waiver confirming they will not return to the battlefield. The incentive to return to Taliban service isn’t difficult to understand; the newly released men were only provided with enough cash for bus fare home.
On Tuesday in Foreign Policy, Stefanie Glinksi reported from Afghanistan as the prisoners were released. She found one prisoner hopeful. “The Taliban and the government need to come together. It’s what our people deserve,” said Abdul Basir, a 32-year-old political prisoner. Another was more blunt. “There won’t be peace in Afghanistan as long as the U.S. is still here,” 27-year-old Abdul Hak said. “They must leave for things to improve.”
Next step, peace talks? The relative comity is a contrast to the violence the Afghan government accuses the Taliban of perpetrating during the holy month of Ramadan. (The government says 146 civilians were killed and a further 430 were wounded over the 30-day period.) Afghan National Security Council spokesperson Javid Faisal has said the government wants to extend the cease-fire. “If the Taliban are ready to extend the cease-fire, we are ready to continue the cease-fire too,” Faisal said. “We hope they release our prisoners so that intra-Afghan peace talks begin as soon as possible … The future depends on the Taliban’s next move.”
The Taliban has not yet responded publicly to the overture, but AFP reports that the group could extend the cease-fire a further seven days if prisoner releases continue.
An early U.S. exit? With an eye on November’s presidential election, U.S. President Donald Trump is pushing for a quicker withdrawal of the roughly 12,000 U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan according to the New York Times. The Pentagon is reportedly trying to calm the president’s urgency, and bring the withdrawal schedule more in line with the May 2021 date agreed in the U.S.-Taliban peace deal.
Any training and capacity building that U.S. troops have been conducting with Afghan forces has had to be put on hold due to the coronavirus pandemic, potentially delaying withdrawal even longer. U.S. officials estimate that up to 50 percent of Afghan security forces have the virus.
What We’re Following Today
White House action on Hong Kong in the works. President Trump hinted at future White House against China in retaliation for its plan to impose national security laws on Hong Kong. Trump refused to be drawn on what those actions may be, but said “It’s something you’re going to be hearing about … before the end of the week.” Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday that measures could include sanctions on Chinese officials and entities doing business in Hong Kong.
The move comes as media reports suggest Hong Kong based-organizations could come under scrutiny under the new laws, an expansion beyond a previous draft that only targeted individuals.
WHO declares the Americas new virus epicenter. The World Health Organization has declared the western hemisphere the new pandemic epicenter as cases continue to rise in Latin American countries. As well as a rising number of deaths and cases in Brazil, officials are tracking growing outbreaks in Peru, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. While countries in Europe and some European states begin to relax lockdown measures, WHO director for the Americas Carissa Etienne warned against such moves in Latin America. “Now is not the time for countries to ease restrictions,” she said.
Russian warplanes in Libya. The United States has accused Russia of sending its warplanes to Libya in support of Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army currently fighting with the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord for control of the country. In a statement, U.S. Africa Command said that Russian MiG-29 fighter jets had come to Libya from Syria and had their markings repainted to disguise their origin.
As FP’s Jack Detsch reports, the release of such information by the United States is rare as Washington has largely ignored the conflict recently. By adding its firepower to Haftar’s efforts, U.S. Africa Command chief Gen. Stephen Townsend said Russia was “clearly trying to tip the scales in its favor in Libya.”
Keep an Eye On
Hungary could end rule by decree. Hungary could soon end Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s ability to rule by decree if a bill to end the country’s coronavirus emergency passes the legislature. Justice Minister Judit Varga said she would introduce the required legislation to end the “state of danger” on June 20. “We expect those who have attacked us with unjust political accusations to apologize for leading a slander campaign,” Varga wrote on Facebook.
Grenell to join Trump campaign. U.S. Ambassador Richard Grenell is expected to step down from his diplomatic post and join the Trump presidential campaign, according to Politico. Grenell had also held the role of acting director of national intelligence until John Ratcliffe was sworn into the permanent role on Tuesday. Grenell responded to the Politico story, which came after other news outlets had reported his impending departure, by calling it “fake news.”
A new Russian stealth bomber? Russia has begun constructing a prototype for its first stealth bomber, according to a Russian state news agency. The aircraft is called the PAK DA and will be designed to match the capabilities of the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber. China is also at work on its own stealth bomber, the Xian H-20.
Odds and Ends
The £300 million ($369 million) takeover of the English Premier League team Newcastle United by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund is in jeopardy after an investigation by The Guardian revealed the kingdom’s ties to a pirate satellite TV service that gives illegal access to sporting events. The team’s acquisition by the fund, which is chaired by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, had already come under fire from human rights groups and the fiancée of murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Saudi Arabia denies being behind the TV service, named beoutQ, but that has not stopped the World Trade Organization from ruling that the government is involved in the service and as such is in breach of international law. Like most sports, the Premier League is mostly bankrolled by TV revenue—its latest three-year rights package was worth £5 billion ($6.15 billion)—and prospective owners must prove they have not broken any laws before any purchase is finalized, putting the Saudi takeover in trouble.
If the Saudi fund’s acquisition of the soccer team goes through, it would be one of several purchases it has made this year, including a $500 million stake in entertainment giant Live Nation and building a 7.3 percent stake in cruise operator Carnival.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--Hong Kong Is in Danger

Hong Kong Is in Danger

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : Beijing ’ s rubber-stamp legislature is expected to pass Hong Kong ’ s new national security law , a Canadian judge makes a big ruling in the case of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou , and British authorities fine the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
Beijing ’ s announcement of a new national security law in Hong Kong stunned the city ’ s more than 7 million @ @ @ @ @ @ @ death blow to the “ one country , two systems ” model—the rights and laws that have protected the territory from Beijing ’ s despotism since 1997 .
China ’ s own rubber-stamp parliament , the National People ’ s Congress , is expected to pass the law on Thursday—not the Hong Kong legislature .
While the details remain unclear , the law will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges , a crackdown on free speech , and the unleashing of China ’ s security organs , such as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Armed Police .
At the same time , the Hong Kong legislature is moving to push through a hugely unpopular law that criminalizes the mockery of China ’ s national anthem , which is routinely booed by crowds in the territory .
What is to come .
Coronavirus restrictions and an unprecedented police presence have limited protests in critical areas around government buildings .
Even so , the Hong Kong police made over 300 arrests in 24 hours this week .
The mood among young Hong Kongers , who largely do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The slogan laam caau—loosely translated as “ If we burn , you burn with us ” —has become popular .
So too have calls for outright independence , which were rare before the authorities ’ brutal response to last year ’ s protests .
The new law means that Hong Kong could be a simmering center of revolt for years .
This summer could see violence—mostly at the hands of the police , but some by protesters—on a scale that dwarfs last year ’ s protests .
The U.S. response .
Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announcement was swift .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced today that Hong Kong could no longer be considered a meaningfully autonomous territory .
A wide range of measures could result , including the end of Hong Kong ’ s special trading status , despite pushback from U.S. businesses there .
The first step may be sanctions against individual Chinese officials .
As ever , China has threatened countermeasures .
Beyond the U.S. measures , Hong Kong ’ s status as a financial hub is in danger .
For businesses , the main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland ’ s , making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove their credibility in the region .
The erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that .
And on the ground , increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates .
Meng Wanzhou could face extradition .
Meng Wanzhou , Huawei ’ s chief financial officer and the daughter of the company ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Canada since she was detained on U.S. fraud charges there last year .
Today , a Canadian judge ruled that Meng ’ s actions could be considered a crime in Canada , removing an important barrier to her deportation to the United States to stand trial .
Since the United States still has to make its case for extradition , the legal battle continues .
Meng will reside in her multimillion-dollar mansion while awaiting the final results .
Meng ’ s case touches not only on Chinese power—Huawei has ties to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese firms—but also on the belief among China ’ s super-rich that they should be able to move freely and enjoy the benefits of their wealth in other countries .
That ’ s one reason why Meng ’ s initial arrest prompted such anger from China , including the ongoing false imprisonment of two Canadian nationals , Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor .
The response this time is likely to be fierce , including boycotts and sanctions on Canadian trade .
State TV fined .
The Chinese state broadcaster CGTN , which has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last decade , is facing sanctions and fines from U.K. authorities over its failure to present a balanced picture of Hong Kong on its British network .
The U.K. ’ s broadcasting standards call for particular balance on television news , even for channels like CGTN with a small audience .
With Chinese propaganda under the microscope , CGTN—which is also facing visa challenges in the United States—is likely to be a particularly easy target .
Indian border standoff .
The coronavirus pandemic and its political fallout are driving a new wave of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The latest clash is ongoing along the contentious Indian border , where China has sent thousands of troops into territory that India considers its own .
Previous standoffs have been resolved peacefully .
A diplomatic solution is also the most likely answer this time , but scuffles between soldiers could still accidentally escalate .
Correct your maps .
This nationalist push is also evident in a new Chinese initiative to force companies , both Chinese and foreign , to use “ correct ” maps—i.e.
, showing Taiwan and disputed territory in the South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firms are likely to face challenges similar to those posed to airlines over the naming of Taiwan .
Even websites and publicity materials published in other countries will face demands to conform to Chinese standards or be charged with national security offenses that could lead to fines .
Maps have long been an obsession for China ’ s government , which uses them to justify spurious territorial claims .
Growth target ditched .
For the first time since it started publicizing the numbers in 1990 , China has officially ditched any GDP growth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a big move , signaling just how bad the economic future is—any talk of a V-shaped recovery is gone .
Not announcing a target disincentivizes local officials from artificially boosting GDP figures , it signals the seriousness of the crisis to the public and to outsiders , and it avoids the political embarrassment of missing a target .
But Beijing ’ s de-prioritization of economic growth may mean something else : a system that empowers officials to make radical moves they previously held back on because of economic costs .
Hong Kong ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often been held up as a limit on what Beijing could do in the city , but in an environment where nationalist credentials and security concerns matter more than economic growth , those considerations can be pushed aside .
Avoiding unemployment ?
Chinese officials have also focused on the unemployment crisis , especially with a crop of new graduates about to enter the market this summer .
China ’ s official unemployment figure is just 5.9 percent , up two points from before the pandemic .
But that number is widely acknowledged to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regions , for example , are excluded because the system still counts all residents as employed on their farmland .
While migrant workers are worst-hit by the crisis , the picture for college graduates in the private sector has been getting bleaker in recent years as the number of graduates exceeds the number of available jobs .
As a result , the attraction of government jobs has grown .
Expect record numbers for the civil service exams this year .
Coronavirus checks , forever .
The app-based monitoring systems put in place during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of some Chinese cities , with the unhealthy excluded from public spaces or subject to extra monitoring—a category that could include those deemed politically contagious .
Disease discrimination has long been a part of Chinese work life , although the government has previously tried to crack down on trends such as the widespread prejudice against hepatitis B carriers .
Systems gamed .
YouTube reported it will no longer automatically delete comments that use the term wumao , a derogatory reference to Chinese internet propagandists who were once reported to be paid five mao @ @ @ @ @ @ @ post .
The deletions may have resulted from mass reporting of the term , which triggered an automatic response from the YouTube commentary system—a sign of how easily mass numbers can be mobilized to game such systems .
“ The Gap Between the PLA and HKPF is An Order to Shoot , ” by Trey Menefee , Comparativist As Hong Kong waits for the jackboots , this short piece by resident and commentator Trey Menefee from last year is well worth reading .
It dives into the history of colonial policing in Hong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing’s rubber-stamp legislature is expected to pass Hong Kong’s new national security law , a Canadian judge makes a big ruling in the case of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, and British authorities fine the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing’s rubber-stamp legislature is expected to pass Hong Kong’s new national security law, a Canadian judge makes a big ruling in the case of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, and British authorities fine the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Protesters Say Hong Kong Will Burn
Beijing’s announcement of a new national security law in Hong Kong stunned the city’s more than 7 million residents, who see it as a death blow to the “one country, two systems” model—the rights and laws that have protected the territory from Beijing’s despotism since 1997. China’s own rubber-stamp parliament, the National People’s Congress, is expected to pass the law on Thursday—not the Hong Kong legislature.
While the details remain unclear, the law will likely lead to widespread arrests on spurious political charges, a crackdown on free speech, and the unleashing of China’s security organs, such as the Ministry of State Security and the People’s Armed Police. At the same time, the Hong Kong legislature is moving to push through a hugely unpopular law that criminalizes the mockery of China’s national anthem, which is routinely booed by crowds in the territory.
What is to come. Coronavirus restrictions and an unprecedented police presence have limited protests in critical areas around government buildings. Even so, the Hong Kong police made over 300 arrests in 24 hours this week. The mood among young Hong Kongers, who largely do not identify as Chinese, is grim: The slogan laam caau—loosely translated as “If we burn, you burn with us”—has become popular. So too have calls for outright independence, which were rare before the authorities’ brutal response to last year’s protests.
The new law means that Hong Kong could be a simmering center of revolt for years. This summer could see violence—mostly at the hands of the police, but some by protesters—on a scale that dwarfs last year’s protests.
The U.S. response. Washington’s reaction to Beijing’s announcement was swift. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced today that Hong Kong could no longer be considered a meaningfully autonomous territory. A wide range of measures could result, including the end of Hong Kong’s special trading status, despite pushback from U.S. businesses there. The first step may be sanctions against individual Chinese officials. As ever, China has threatened countermeasures.
Beyond the U.S. measures, Hong Kong’s status as a financial hub is in danger. For businesses, the main value of the city is that its financial and legal systems are more transparent and fair than the mainland’s, making it an attractive option for both foreign and Chinese firms looking to prove their credibility in the region. The erosion of the rule of law and freedom of speech endangers that. And on the ground, increased security measures and chaotic protests may make the city less attractive for rich expatriates.
What We’re Following
Meng Wanzhou could face extradition. Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and the daughter of the company’s founder, has been under house arrest in Canada since she was detained on U.S. fraud charges there last year. Today, a Canadian judge ruled that Meng’s actions could be considered a crime in Canada, removing an important barrier to her deportation to the United States to stand trial. Since the United States still has to make its case for extradition, the legal battle continues. Meng will reside in her multimillion-dollar mansion while awaiting the final results.
Meng’s case touches not only on Chinese power—Huawei has ties to the state, like all nominally private big Chinese firms—but also on the belief among China’s super-rich that they should be able to move freely and enjoy the benefits of their wealth in other countries. That’s one reason why Meng’s initial arrest prompted such anger from China, including the ongoing false imprisonment of two Canadian nationals, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. The response this time is likely to be fierce, including boycotts and sanctions on Canadian trade.
State TV fined. The Chinese state broadcaster CGTN, which has made a large international push in the last decade, is facing sanctions and fines from U.K. authorities over its failure to present a balanced picture of Hong Kong on its British network. The U.K.’s broadcasting standards call for particular balance on television news, even for channels like CGTN with a small audience. With Chinese propaganda under the microscope, CGTN—which is also facing visa challenges in the United States—is likely to be a particularly easy target.
Indian border standoff. The coronavirus pandemic and its political fallout are driving a new wave of aggressive policies and actions from Beijing. The latest clash is ongoing along the contentious Indian border, where China has sent thousands of troops into territory that India considers its own. Previous standoffs have been resolved peacefully. A diplomatic solution is also the most likely answer this time, but scuffles between soldiers could still accidentally escalate.
Correct your maps. This nationalist push is also evident in a new Chinese initiative to force companies, both Chinese and foreign, to use “correct” maps—i.e., showing Taiwan and disputed territory in the South China Sea as Chinese territory. Foreign firms are likely to face challenges similar to those posed to airlines over the naming of Taiwan. Even websites and publicity materials published in other countries will face demands to conform to Chinese standards or be charged with national security offenses that could lead to fines. Maps have long been an obsession for China’s government, which uses them to justify spurious territorial claims.
Tech and Business
Growth target ditched. For the first time since it started publicizing the numbers in 1990, China has officially ditched any GDP growth target for this year. That is a big move, signaling just how bad the economic future is—any talk of a V-shaped recovery is gone. Not announcing a target disincentivizes local officials from artificially boosting GDP figures, it signals the seriousness of the crisis to the public and to outsiders, and it avoids the political embarrassment of missing a target.
But Beijing’s de-prioritization of economic growth may mean something else: a system that empowers officials to make radical moves they previously held back on because of economic costs. Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub has often been held up as a limit on what Beijing could do in the city, but in an environment where nationalist credentials and security concerns matter more than economic growth, those considerations can be pushed aside.
Avoiding unemployment? Chinese officials have also focused on the unemployment crisis, especially with a crop of new graduates about to enter the market this summer. China’s official unemployment figure is just 5.9 percent, up two points from before the pandemic. But that number is widely acknowledged to have little relationship to reality: Rural regions, for example, are excluded because the system still counts all residents as employed on their farmland.
While migrant workers are worst-hit by the crisis, the picture for college graduates in the private sector has been getting bleaker in recent years as the number of graduates exceeds the number of available jobs. As a result, the attraction of government jobs has grown. Expect record numbers for the civil service exams this year.
Coronavirus checks, forever. The app-based monitoring systems put in place during the pandemic may become a permanent part of some Chinese cities, with the unhealthy excluded from public spaces or subject to extra monitoring—a category that could include those deemed politically contagious. Disease discrimination has long been a part of Chinese work life, although the government has previously tried to crack down on trends such as the widespread prejudice against hepatitis B carriers.
Systems gamed. YouTube reported it will no longer automatically delete comments that use the term wumao, a derogatory reference to Chinese internet propagandists who were once reported to be paid five mao (approximately seven U.S. cents) per post. The deletions may have resulted from mass reporting of the term, which triggered an automatic response from the YouTube commentary system—a sign of how easily mass numbers can be mobilized to game such systems.
What We’re Reading
“The Gap Between the PLA and HKPF is An Order to Shoot,” by Trey Menefee, Comparativist
As Hong Kong waits for the jackboots, this short piece by resident and commentator Trey Menefee from last year is well worth reading. It dives into the history of colonial policing in Hong Kong and the tools available to the authorities.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--In Hong Kong, Xi Plays a Dangerous Game of Chicken

China ’ s government continues to back away from its formulation of “ one country , two systems ” for Hong Kong .
With Beijing ’ s decision to impose its national security law directly by fiat , the special administrative region is being subsumed by the mainland ’ s brutally authoritarian system .
Hong Kong ’ s chief executive has always been sensitive to China ’ s dictates , but Beijing initially ruled with a light hand after the 1997 transfer from the United Kingdom .
Some city residents who had feared for the future were reassured at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end up looking more like Hong Kong itself .
Those days are long gone .
China has kidnapped Hong Kong residents , reset election qualifications for Hong Kong ’ s Legislative Council , and ordered the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates .
In January , Chinese President Xi Jinping replaced the head of the Hong Kong Liaison Office with a security expert .
In February , he replaced the director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office with a hard-liner , reducing the local government to puppet status .
Now it plans to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The South China Morning Post reported that the legislation would cover “ secessionist and subversive activity as well as foreign interference and terrorism , ” which could and likely would be interpreted to cover most any pro-democracy activity .
Indeed , China ’ s Foreign Ministry explained the country ’ s position in a letter to foreign diplomats : “ The opposition in Hong Kong have long colluded with external forces to carry out acts of secession , subversion , infiltration and destruction against the Chinese mainland.
” Among the so-called security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disrespect to the Chinese national anthem—which will be punishable by a prison sentence .
Equally menacing , the regime indicated that it would set up “ national security organs ” in Hong Kong “ to fulfill relevant duties to safeguard national security.
” Almost certainly Beijing plans to destroy opposition in Hong Kong as ruthlessly as it has done throughout China .
The Xi government has yet to unveil the specific language of the planned measure and conceivably could limit its reach .
Officials might hope the threat alone quells unrest and opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a lighter touch .
However , nothing in Xi ’ s brutal crackdown in China itself suggests such an outcome .
Almost certainly Beijing plans to destroy opposition in Hong Kong as ruthlessly as it has done throughout China .
The use of the term “ terrorists ” to describe the Hong Kong opposition is particularly worrying , given the way the term was weaponized in Xinjiang in a campaign of state atrocity against the Uighur people .
Such seizure of power was not unexpected .
The United Kingdom lost all leverage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong to China .
While London won a pledge to maintain the territory ’ s autonomy for 50 years—until 2047—there was no means of enforcement .
The only limit was Beijing ’ s forbearance .
China ’ s determination was tested early .
On China ’ s behalf , Hong Kong pushed a similarly repressive national security law in 2003—backing down after widespread protests .
That was a very different China , however , with a very different man at the top .
Since then , prudence and compromise have disappeared from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Xi took power in 2012 , China has been sliding back toward Maoism .
Xi has expanded party authority and state power .
He has centralized control , enhanced by public promotion and adulation , including emphasis on “ Xi Jinping thought.
” The central government has mounted a sustained attack on criticism in any form or forum .
While only a courageous fool would challenge the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) after Mao Zedong ’ s death , over time controls loosened sufficiently to allow some discussion of ideas and intellectual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of today is dramatically less free than the China of a decade ago .
And repression continues to worsen .
Beijing appears to believe that it has lost effective control of the territory , which plunged into unrelenting mass protests last year after the Hong Kong government proposed a China-friendly extradition law .
Wang Yang , the head of the Chinese People ’ s Political Consultative Conference , spoke of supporting “ the improvement of the implementation of the systems and mechanisms of the constitution and Basic Law.
” Stanley Ng , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National People ’ s Congress , was blunter : “ The social unrest last year showed that the Hong Kong government was unable to handle passing ” the requested legislation .
Even Regina Ip , who heads the Legislative Council ’ s pro-Beijing party , acknowledged that the territory “ simply does not have the capacity or political will to ” approve the security law .
So China decided to dispense with legal niceties .
The Xi government likely feared it would become impossible to rely on Hong Kong ’ s legislature for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That body always has been under reliable control of the establishment , which long genuflected before Beijing .
However , last year ’ s district council election wipeout was a dramatic warning to China : Come September , it might lose its once guaranteed majority in the Legislative Council too , even with the electoral fix innate to the system—in which half the seats are not directly elected .
Then the only way to enact unpopular legislation would be by diktat .
The threat of criminal convictions under the security legislation could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy , protesting against the Hong Kong and Beijing governments , and running for office .
Convictions also could be used to disqualify pro-democracy candidates .
Applying the law retroactively could maintain Beijing ’ s legislative control , in the same way as Thailand ’ s military used its control of the electoral and judicial processes to steal a parliamentary majority .
The potential for intimidation has encouraged Hong Kong activists to begin using virtual private networks ( VPNs ) to disguise their activities .
The CCP also may have come to understand @ @ @ @ @ @ @ admit , that it has lost the hearts and minds of Hong Kongers .
In a poll released last June , just 1 in 10 said they viewed themselves as Chinese .
A majority saw themselves as solely Hong Kongers—particularly those under 30 .
Beijing blames outsiders for stirring up trouble .
( Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam recently targeted the educational system for not making Hong Kong residents into loyal Chinese citizens . )
But COVID-19 has hampered the protest movement and given Beijing a chance to act .
In late @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 15 democracy leaders , including the 81-year-old lawyer Martin Lee—the so-called “ Father of Hong Kong ’ s Democracy ” —and Jimmy Lai , the publisher of the influential , pro-democracy Apple Daily .
The group was charged with organizing allegedly illegal gatherings months ago , and China ’ s Foreign Ministry labeled them “ anti-China troublemakers in Hong Kong.
” The government appears to be seeking lengthy prison terms .
While thousands of people have rallied , braving a violent police response , such a crackdown in the past would have sparked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may be counting on the continued weakness of activism amid a pandemic .
Xi also may believe that he needs to enhance his hard-line image in light of the damage done by the coronavirus debacle .
Even as the government has spent years attempting to cow independent thinking in China , social media erupted over the CCP ’ s blunders in February—before control was brutally reasserted online .
And Xi can not easily escape responsibility since he has presented himself as both omniscient and omnipotent .
Clamping down in Hong Kong will gratify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he brooks no resistance .
Western governments have reproached China for violating its pledge , but the Xi government has long dismissed such critiques .
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian responded to the latest criticism , according to Xinhua , by insisting that the territory is “ purely a matter of China ’ s internal affairs ” and that “ no foreign country has the right to interfere.
” U.S. President Donald Trump originally appeared reluctant to intervene .
When asked about the Hong Kong legislation , the president responded : “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ address that issue very strongly.
” Under normal circumstances , that likely would have meant nothing meaningful , as in the past .
However , times are not normal .
Even tougher criticism would not be of much help since the Trump administration lacks credibility , having already demonstrated that it views human rights as a tactic for use against adversaries , nothing more .
After all , the U.S. president stands with Russia ’ s Vladimir Putin , Saudi Arabia ’ s Mohammed bin Salman , Turkey ’ s Recep Tayyip Erdogan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Sisi , among others .
Until now Trump even called Xi his friend .
Moreover , the administration has begun its shameless attempt to use China as a weapon against Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden , meaning everything the president and his highly partisan secretary of state say about China will be evaluated through a political prism .
Their global counterparts realize the administration ’ s actions are all about domestic partisanship .
Congress might act—but ineffectively .
Sen. Josh Hawley announced that the United States “ can not let this stand.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this attempted crackdown ” and urging “ all free nations to stand with ” Hong Kong .
Sens .
Pat Toomey and Chris Van Hollen proposed penalizing Chinese officials and firms involved in enforcing the new laws .
However , no one believes that China will run out of willing apparatchiks to impose Beijing ’ s dictates .
Such a measure also would raise the question why the senators do not propose the same for anyone involved in repression elsewhere in China .
Economic retaliation is unlikely to be any more productive .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but even that would not deter Beijing from taking political steps that it considers vital for its control .
Trump ’ s steadily increasing sanctions against Cuba and Russia , and “ maximum pressure ” campaigns against Venezuela , Iran , and North Korea , meanwhile , all have flopped .
Moreover , serious economic sanctions would have significant impacts on the United States as it tries to recover from COVID-19 lockdowns across the nation .
Trump still appears committed to his trade deal , which he sees as an important political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ injured by his trade war .
Neither the administration nor Congress was willing to break ties with China after a million Uighurs were locked up in so-called reeducation camps ; it ’ s hard to imagine policymakers will do much to at most defer an inevitable Chinese takeover of a Chinese possession .
Washington ’ s main lever is the Hong Kong Policy Act , which ties Hong Kong trade preferences to its separate governance .
If that separation disappears , Hong Kong would lose its unique status and be subject to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That would mean tougher investment and export restrictions as well as higher tariffs .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wielded this hammer Wednesday , issuing a statement that “ [ n ] o reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China , given facts on the ground.
” One problem with this approach is that doing so will hurt Hong Kongers far more than China .
Washington normally acts without the slightest interest in such collateral damage .
But this time U.S. officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the most at stake thought .
Will Beijing care about such economic threats ?
China ’ s dramatic economic growth has reduced Hong Kong ’ s economic significance .
In 1997 , the territory accounted for almost one-fifth of China ’ s GDP .
Today , that number is about 3 percent .
While Beijing would not like to lose any economic growth , especially when recovering from its COVID-19 shutdown , the regime will not hesitate to make such a sacrifice to achieve its political ends .
China ’ s ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drawing barely a shrug from Beijing .
Money and personnel started flowing out of the territory last year .
More will follow , since Hong Kong ’ s economic credibility is at risk thanks to the new measures .
Businesses and analysts publishing research on China ’ s economy and state enterprises—and especially those criticizing government claims—could be held liable and tried in China , as has previously happened to foreign corporate investigators in mainland China .
Announcement of the security law saw Hong Kong ’ s Hang Seng Index drop 5.6 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the investment firm Pacific Group , warned that “ increasingly these concerns are seeping into business decisions ” and “ what is just a trickle could become a flood of capital out of Hong Kong.
” But Hong Kong ’ s economic success remains critical for Beijing .
A new report from Hong Kong Watch notes that the territory “ still plays a key role both for the mainland and the world as the Asia Pacific region ’ s pre-eminent financial and professional services centre.
” Companies that relocated would not likely move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also would be significant .
The territory accounts for nearly three-quarters of initial public offerings of Chinese firms , according to Hong Kong Watch , and is “ increasingly the preferred route for Western investors seeking to access the Mainland Chinese market.
” The potential loss of these benefits might cause China to hit the pause button .
Thus , Pompeo acted prematurely , since the legislation will not be drafted , passed , and implemented until late in the summer .
Which gives Washington and Beijing time .
The Hong Kong Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Once the United States eliminates Hong Kong ’ s trade preferences , the Xi government has no reason not to erase any distinctions between it and the mainland .
To have the greatest impact , then , the Trump administration should suspend its certification decision ( pending China ’ s final action ) , drop its bluster , and bring together European and Asian allies to discuss taking a common position on Hong Kong .
They should collectively set a legislative red line and make a quiet demarche to Beijing : Continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s most important economic powers together will revoke the territory ’ s special economic status .
The resulting exodus of Chinese-oriented business and capital would be accentuated by rising hostility toward Beijing across much of the world .
This threat might cause China to reconsider , maintaining face by formally approving the law while draining it of its most threatening provisions and failing to enforce whatever survives in a threatening manner .
If Beijing subsequently oversteps the coalition red line , the countries should follow through on their threat .
“ This is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warned Dennis Kwok , a pro-democracy Legislative Council member .
If China proceeds , its course should worry people everywhere .
Hong Kong is the proverbial canary in the geopolitical mine .
If Beijing is willing to both violate its international promises and risk serious economic consequences to impose its political will on the territory , China ’ s agenda is likely to grow even more hostile to the United States and democratic states in Asia and Europe .
It still is vital to avoid a cold war or , worse , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and China .
But the West is not the only decision-maker here , and Xi seems to have little desire to avoid conflict .
While cooperation remains critical , looking to a better future with the Chinese people , the necessity of constraining Beijing will only grow as long as Xi rules .

China’s government continues to back away from its formulation of “one country, two systems” for Hong Kong. With Beijing’s decision to impose its national security law directly by fiat, the special administrative region is being subsumed by the mainland’s brutally authoritarian system.
China’s government continues to back away from its formulation of “one country, two systems” for Hong Kong. With Beijing’s decision to impose its national security law directly by fiat, the special administrative region is being subsumed by the mainland’s brutally authoritarian system.
Hong Kong’s chief executive has always been sensitive to China’s dictates, but Beijing initially ruled with a light hand after the 1997 transfer from the United Kingdom. Some city residents who had feared for the future were reassured at the time, seeing a China that might end up looking more like Hong Kong itself. Those days are long gone. China has kidnapped Hong Kong residents, reset election qualifications for Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, and ordered the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping replaced the head of the Hong Kong Liaison Office with a security expert. In February, he replaced the director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office with a hard-liner, reducing the local government to puppet status. Now it plans to impose criminal legislation on Hong Kong residents.
The South China Morning Post reported that the legislation would cover “secessionist and subversive activity as well as foreign interference and terrorism,” which could and likely would be interpreted to cover most any pro-democracy activity. Indeed, China’s Foreign Ministry explained the country’s position in a letter to foreign diplomats: “The opposition in Hong Kong have long colluded with external forces to carry out acts of secession, subversion, infiltration and destruction against the Chinese mainland.” Among the so-called security threats likely to be addressed is showing disrespect to the Chinese national anthem—which will be punishable by a prison sentence. Equally menacing, the regime indicated that it would set up “national security organs” in Hong Kong “to fulfill relevant duties to safeguard national security.”
Almost certainly Beijing plans to destroy opposition in Hong Kong as ruthlessly as it has done throughout China. The Xi government has yet to unveil the specific language of the planned measure and conceivably could limit its reach. Officials might hope the threat alone quells unrest and opposition, allowing the central government to rule with a lighter touch. However, nothing in Xi’s brutal crackdown in China itself suggests such an outcome. Almost certainly Beijing plans to destroy opposition in Hong Kong as ruthlessly as it has done throughout China. The use of the term “terrorists” to describe the Hong Kong opposition is particularly worrying, given the way the term was weaponized in Xinjiang in a campaign of state atrocity against the Uighur people.
Such seizure of power was not unexpected. The United Kingdom lost all leverage the moment it agreed to return Hong Kong to China. While London won a pledge to maintain the territory’s autonomy for 50 years—until 2047—there was no means of enforcement. The only limit was Beijing’s forbearance. China’s determination was tested early. On China’s behalf, Hong Kong pushed a similarly repressive national security law in 2003—backing down after widespread protests. That was a very different China, however, with a very different man at the top. Since then, prudence and compromise have disappeared from the regime’s lexicon.
Ever since Xi took power in 2012, China has been sliding back toward Maoism. Xi has expanded party authority and state power. He has centralized control, enhanced by public promotion and adulation, including emphasis on “Xi Jinping thought.” The central government has mounted a sustained attack on criticism in any form or forum. While only a courageous fool would challenge the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after Mao Zedong’s death, over time controls loosened sufficiently to allow some discussion of ideas and intellectual cooperation with Westerners. But the China of today is dramatically less free than the China of a decade ago. And repression continues to worsen.
Protesters Causeway Bay Hong Kong
Beijing appears to believe that it has lost effective control of the territory, which plunged into unrelenting mass protests last year after the Hong Kong government proposed a China-friendly extradition law. Wang Yang, the head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, spoke of supporting “the improvement of the implementation of the systems and mechanisms of the constitution and Basic Law.” Stanley Ng, a Hong Kong member of China’s National People’s Congress, was blunter: “The social unrest last year showed that the Hong Kong government was unable to handle passing” the requested legislation. Even Regina Ip, who heads the Legislative Council’s pro-Beijing party, acknowledged that the territory “simply does not have the capacity or political will to” approve the security law. So China decided to dispense with legal niceties.
The Xi government likely feared it would become impossible to rely on Hong Kong’s legislature for anything after elections later this year. That body always has been under reliable control of the establishment, which long genuflected before Beijing. However, last year’s district council election wipeout was a dramatic warning to China: Come September, it might lose its once guaranteed majority in the Legislative Council too, even with the electoral fix innate to the system—in which half the seats are not directly elected. Then the only way to enact unpopular legislation would be by diktat.
The threat of criminal convictions under the security legislation could be used to discourage opponents from criticizing Chinese policy, protesting against the Hong Kong and Beijing governments, and running for office. Convictions also could be used to disqualify pro-democracy candidates. Applying the law retroactively could maintain Beijing’s legislative control, in the same way as Thailand’s military used its control of the electoral and judicial processes to steal a parliamentary majority. The potential for intimidation has encouraged Hong Kong activists to begin using virtual private networks (VPNs) to disguise their activities.
The CCP also may have come to understand, though not so far as to admit, that it has lost the hearts and minds of Hong Kongers. In a poll released last June, just 1 in 10 said they viewed themselves as Chinese. A majority saw themselves as solely Hong Kongers—particularly those under 30. Beijing blames outsiders for stirring up trouble. (Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam recently targeted the educational system for not making Hong Kong residents into loyal Chinese citizens.)
But COVID-19 has hampered the protest movement and given Beijing a chance to act. In late April, the Hong Kong government arrested 15 democracy leaders, including the 81-year-old lawyer Martin Lee—the so-called “Father of Hong Kong’s Democracy”—and Jimmy Lai, the publisher of the influential, pro-democracy Apple Daily. The group was charged with organizing allegedly illegal gatherings months ago, and China’s Foreign Ministry labeled them “anti-China troublemakers in Hong Kong.” The government appears to be seeking lengthy prison terms. While thousands of people have rallied, braving a violent police response, such a crackdown in the past would have sparked far larger protests. The Xi government may be counting on the continued weakness of activism amid a pandemic.
Xi also may believe that he needs to enhance his hard-line image in light of the damage done by the coronavirus debacle. Even as the government has spent years attempting to cow independent thinking in China, social media erupted over the CCP’s blunders in February—before control was brutally reasserted online. And Xi cannot easily escape responsibility since he has presented himself as both omniscient and omnipotent. Clamping down in Hong Kong will gratify domestic nationalists while reminding putative critics that he brooks no resistance.
Western governments have reproached China for violating its pledge, but the Xi government has long dismissed such critiques. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian responded to the latest criticism, according to Xinhua, by insisting that the territory is “purely a matter of China’s internal affairs” and that “no foreign country has the right to interfere.”
In Hong Kong, people are calling for an international response—particularly from the United States and Britain. But what can be done? Legally nothing, since authority over Hong Kong passed to China 23 years ago. Militarily nothing, since the United States is not going to war to liberate a Chinese possession.
U.S. President Donald Trump originally appeared reluctant to intervene. When asked about the Hong Kong legislation, the president responded: “If it happens, we’ll address that issue very strongly.” Under normal circumstances, that likely would have meant nothing meaningful, as in the past.
However, times are not normal. Even tougher criticism would not be of much help since the Trump administration lacks credibility, having already demonstrated that it views human rights as a tactic for use against adversaries, nothing more. After all, the U.S. president stands with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, among others. Until now Trump even called Xi his friend.
Police Brutality Hong Kong
Moreover, the administration has begun its shameless attempt to use China as a weapon against Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, meaning everything the president and his highly partisan secretary of state say about China will be evaluated through a political prism. Their global counterparts realize the administration’s actions are all about domestic partisanship.
Congress might act—but ineffectively. Sen. Josh Hawley announced that the United States “cannot let this stand.” His answer: a resolution “condemning this attempted crackdown” and urging “all free nations to stand with” Hong Kong. Sens. Pat Toomey and Chris Van Hollen proposed penalizing Chinese officials and firms involved in enforcing the new laws. However, no one believes that China will run out of willing apparatchiks to impose Beijing’s dictates. Such a measure also would raise the question why the senators do not propose the same for anyone involved in repression elsewhere in China.
Economic retaliation is unlikely to be any more productive. Washington could declare economic war on China, but even that would not deter Beijing from taking political steps that it considers vital for its control. Trump’s steadily increasing sanctions against Cuba and Russia, and “maximum pressure” campaigns against Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea, meanwhile, all have flopped.
Moreover, serious economic sanctions would have significant impacts on the United States as it tries to recover from COVID-19 lockdowns across the nation. Trump still appears committed to his trade deal, which he sees as an important political selling point, especially to domestic constituencies injured by his trade war. Neither the administration nor Congress was willing to break ties with China after a million Uighurs were locked up in so-called reeducation camps; it’s hard to imagine policymakers will do much to at most defer an inevitable Chinese takeover of a Chinese possession.
Washington’s main lever is the Hong Kong Policy Act, which ties Hong Kong trade preferences to its separate governance. If that separation disappears, Hong Kong would lose its unique status and be subject to the more onerous trade rules applied to China. That would mean tougher investment and export restrictions as well as higher tariffs. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wielded this hammer Wednesday, issuing a statement that “[n]o reasonable person can assert today that Hong Kong maintains a high degree of autonomy from China, given facts on the ground.”
One problem with this approach is that doing so will hurt Hong Kongers far more than China. Washington normally acts without the slightest interest in such collateral damage. But this time U.S. officials should have found out first what those with the most at stake thought.
Will Beijing care about such economic threats? China’s dramatic economic growth has reduced Hong Kong’s economic significance. In 1997, the territory accounted for almost one-fifth of China’s GDP. Today, that number is about 3 percent. While Beijing would not like to lose any economic growth, especially when recovering from its COVID-19 shutdown, the regime will not hesitate to make such a sacrifice to achieve its political ends.
China’s ongoing encroachments have already reduced business confidence, drawing barely a shrug from Beijing. Money and personnel started flowing out of the territory last year. More will follow, since Hong Kong’s economic credibility is at risk thanks to the new measures. Businesses and analysts publishing research on China’s economy and state enterprises—and especially those criticizing government claims—could be held liable and tried in China, as has previously happened to foreign corporate investigators in mainland China. Announcement of the security law saw Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index drop 5.6 percent. William Kaye, the founder of the investment firm Pacific Group, warned that “increasingly these concerns are seeping into business decisions” and “what is just a trickle could become a flood of capital out of Hong Kong.”
But Hong Kong’s economic success remains critical for Beijing. A new report from Hong Kong Watch notes that the territory “still plays a key role both for the mainland and the world as the Asia Pacific region’s pre-eminent financial and professional services centre.” Companies that relocated would not likely move to the mainland. The capital loss also would be significant. The territory accounts for nearly three-quarters of initial public offerings of Chinese firms, according to Hong Kong Watch, and is “increasingly the preferred route for Western investors seeking to access the Mainland Chinese market.” The potential loss of these benefits might cause China to hit the pause button.
Thus, Pompeo acted prematurely, since the legislation will not be drafted, passed, and implemented until late in the summer. Which gives Washington and Beijing time. The Hong Kong Policy Act is most powerful as a threat. Once the United States eliminates Hong Kong’s trade preferences, the Xi government has no reason not to erase any distinctions between it and the mainland.
To have the greatest impact, then, the Trump administration should suspend its certification decision (pending China’s final action), drop its bluster, and bring together European and Asian allies to discuss taking a common position on Hong Kong. They should collectively set a legislative red line and make a quiet demarche to Beijing: Continue down this path and the world’s most important economic powers together will revoke the territory’s special economic status. The resulting exodus of Chinese-oriented business and capital would be accentuated by rising hostility toward Beijing across much of the world. This threat might cause China to reconsider, maintaining face by formally approving the law while draining it of its most threatening provisions and failing to enforce whatever survives in a threatening manner. If Beijing subsequently oversteps the coalition red line, the countries should follow through on their threat.
“This is the end of Hong Kong,” warned Dennis Kwok, a pro-democracy Legislative Council member. If China proceeds, its course should worry people everywhere. Hong Kong is the proverbial canary in the geopolitical mine. If Beijing is willing to both violate its international promises and risk serious economic consequences to impose its political will on the territory, China’s agenda is likely to grow even more hostile to the United States and democratic states in Asia and Europe.
It still is vital to avoid a cold war or, worse, a direct military confrontation between the United States and China. But the West is not the only decision-maker here, and Xi seems to have little desire to avoid conflict. While cooperation remains critical, looking to a better future with the Chinese people, the necessity of constraining Beijing will only grow as long as Xi rules.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-27--U.S. Effort to Depart WTO Gathers Momentum

Frustration with hyperglobalization , China ’ s “ economic imperialism , ” and a seemingly broken world trading system is boiling over into serious calls for the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) —which would have potentially disastrous implications for the country if carried out .
For the first time since 2005 , lawmakers from both parties and both houses of Congress are pushing to pull the United States out of the trading body it helped create and which was the culmination of decades of postwar efforts to boost free trade and economic integration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a chance to vote every five years on staying inside the WTO , but staying on board was such a no-brainer in recent years that no such resolution was even presented .
But this year—powered by a rise in economic nationalism , growing concern about China , and frustration with two decades of paralysis at the WTO—the knives on Capitol Hill are out , to the delight of some of the trade hard-liners in the White House .
“ The WTO has been a disaster for the United States , ” said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who introduced House legislation to withdraw this month .
“ No trade regime can last when it no longer serves the people of the countries who are part of it , ” said Sen. Josh Hawley , a Missouri Republican , in a recent Senate floor speech after introducing his own resolution to leave .
“ Our interests and those of the WTO diverged long ago.
” It ’ s doubtful that the measures could secure enough votes for passage in either chamber , and a tight legislative calendar makes the push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the rush for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved , highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic .
If the United States were to pull out of the system it helped build , the implications would be dire .
Other countries would be able to discriminate against U.S. goods and services with no limits .
Tariffs would almost certainly rise and export markets shrink .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ European Union would increasingly be in a position to write the rules of the future economy , from data protection and privacy to intellectual property and state subsidies .
“ We ’ d have no rights , and we ’ d lose a seat at the table , ” said Wendy Cutler , a former U.S. trade negotiator now at the Asia Society .
Why the big push now ?
For years , different aspects of the global trading system have stirred concern and at times anger in the United States and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stuck in place since the collapse of its last big negotiating round in 2008 .
For years , economists have debated the impact of the so-called “ China shock ” on U.S. jobs and manufacturing , and some evidence has shown that the competition from low-wage Chinese labor and the rapid movement of U.S. companies offshore hit the U.S. middle class harder than many economists expected .
For years , Republicans have railed against international organizations—from the WTO to the International Criminal Court—that they see as encroaching on U.S. sovereignty .
Now , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a kind of imperfect storm .
“ I think the confluence of factors—the WTO ’ s credibility , China ’ s accession and all the outsourcing , and then the general animosity toward international organizations—they ’ re all in play , ” Cutler said .
For proponents of withdrawal , like Hawley , it ’ s mostly about China taking advantage of an open global trading system to get a leg up on countries like the United States that mostly try to play by the rules .
“ I think [ China ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ push to leave the WTO , Hawley told Foreign Policy in a recent interview .
Beijing ’ s ability to claim special privileges inside the WTO as a so-called “ developing ” country , despite boasting the world ’ s second-largest economy , has powered its rise at the expense of countries like the United States , he said .
“ This has really enabled the economic imperialism that we see China practicing , and that has become a direct threat to our economic security and to our national security , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from [ the WTO ] , and we ought to work with like-minded nations and allied nations in order to create something better.
” Even defenders of the WTO and the current global trading system acknowledge that some of Hawley ’ s critiques are valid .
When China finally joined the WTO in 2001 after years of knocking on the door , it made huge concessions and changed thousands of domestic laws to conform to global trade standards .
But the high hopes that the United States and other countries had about the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s economic trajectory were bound to be disappointed .
In addition , some have argued that the U.S. government , fearful of alienating Beijing , failed to use some of the WTO implements it could have in recent decades , such as anti-surge provisions to blunt Chinese dumping .
“ The perception was , for the first few years , that things were going quite well , and then China did a total U-turn , ” said Jennifer Hillman , an expert on trade at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of tepid reform , the Chinese state took a bigger role in the economy , especially through state-owned enterprises , and the Chinese Communist Party took a more active role in driving corporate behavior .
The notion that WTO membership would turn China into a more market-driven economy has foundered , she said .
“ Clearly , the things that everybody thought were going to happen , and which were happening , that has gone in the opposite direction , ” Hillman said .
Perhaps the biggest failing , she said , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rein in China ’ s use and abuse of state subsidies to give its firms a competitive advantage in all kinds of sectors , from steel and aluminum to telecommunications to clean energy .
Those failings have been coupled , in the eyes of U.S. critics , with other specific problems that mean the WTO has outlived its usefulness .
The WTO started its last big negotiating round to draft updated rules for global commerce almost two decades ago—a round that ended with a whimper , and virtual paralysis , as unanimous agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even as the global economy and trade have undergone seismic shifts since the beginning of the century , the WTO ’ s playbook has remained stuck in the past .
“ The expectation was that there would be continued negotiations to open all markets , and that would lead to more tariff cuts and new rules , and that didn ’ t happen , and the agenda froze because many countries wouldn ’ t take on responsibilities , ” Cutler said .
“ No one thought these would be the rules prevailing 20 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a particularly American anger at the WTO ’ s dispute settlement system , which critics like Hawley ( and the Trump administration ) see as stacked against the United States .
For years , U.S. administrations of both parties have taken issue with the way the WTO interprets global trading rules in its judicial rulings—leading many U.S. trade experts to argue that bureaucrats are unfairly snatching away U.S. trade prerogatives .
That frustration came to a head late last year , when the Trump administration essentially killed the WTO ’ s Appellate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jewel , paralyzing the trade organization ’ s ability to adjudicate trade disputes between countries .
But the WTO , for its critics , has also become a proxy for all the ills of runaway globalization , which those critics blame for the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs and huge changes to the manufacturing sector , in particular .
U.S. President Donald Trump , who savaged the WTO on the campaign trail and has repeatedly criticized the organization , has sought since taking office to bring jobs back to the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with little success so far .
Hawley , in his Senate speech , called the 164-nation organization a “ symbol of an economic order whose Wilsonian ambitions have cost this country dearly.
” The U.S. broadsides against the WTO come at a challenging time .
The WTO ’ s director-general , Roberto Azevêdo , just announced that he is quitting a year early , setting off the search for a new head of the WTO who could salvage the organization ’ s central role at governing global trade at a time of rising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But if the groundswell of opposition to the WTO is understandable , the implications of a U.S. withdrawal would be grim , not only for the world but for U.S. prestige and power .
Proponents like Hawley say leaving the organization would free the United States to pursue its own unfettered trade policies , free from the oversight of an “ activist ” WTO judiciary , and to create a new global trade architecture explicitly meant to push back against Chinese abuses .
In his view , the United States could simultaneously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ America First ” policies to boost U.S. trading prospects , and convince other countries to join that effort .
Many experts think that ’ s a difficult circle to square .
“ It ’ s not realistic to think if we blew up the WTO that we could put it back together ” in some form , said Thomas Duesterberg , a former George H.W .
Bush administration official now at the Hudson Institute .
“ There is too much tension right now , especially with the COVID economic crisis , too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is the rediscovered interest in a partnership of like-minded countries to create a new trade grouping that could push back against China .
Trump administration officials talk of creating just such an economic partnership , and Hawley specifically mentioned joining forces with countries like Japan , Vietnam , and Australia to counter Chinese trade abuses .
But that was the whole point of the Barack Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) , an 11-country grouping meant to write the rules of trade for a huge chunk of the global economy—but not including China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his first week in office and decided to confront China one-on-one in a lingering trade war that has left him largely isolated and gotten him almost nowhere .
“ This presumption that the U.S. leads and everyone else follows … U.S. leadership is premised on putting forward rules that other countries can buy into and requires consistency and predictability , ” said Joshua Meltzer , a trade expert at the Brookings Institution and a former Australian trade negotiator .
“ That ’ s one of the harms of pulling out of the TPP—a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a limb , and it really raises a huge question mark , because they ’ d be extremely cautious about going down a similar path with the United States again.
” And U.S. abdication from the WTO would , instead of isolating China and making it easier to fight back against its trade abuses , end up ceding ground to Beijing—much as the Trump administration ’ s withdrawal from other areas of international engagement , from the Paris climate accord to the World Health Organization , has created an opening for China to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States pulls out , then the WTO becomes China-dominated , ” Meltzer said .
“ This is still the key multilateral trading institution—you don ’ t want to leave that to China.
” And that ’ s without even counting the immediate and short-term cost of leaving the umbrella organization that regulates about 95 percent of all global trade—trade that amounts to an annual $ 2 trillion boon for the U.S. economy .
Outside of the WTO ’ s rules that regulate tariffs and trade behavior , the United States would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries could levy tariffs on U.S. goods for any reason or ban trade altogether—with no real recourse other than tit-for-tat retaliation .
“ If we are not a member , then the rest of the world can unequivocally discriminate against U.S. goods and services just because they ’ re American , ” Hillman said .
She recalled the Trump administration ’ s assurances that no countries would dare retaliate when it slapped tariffs on friends and allies on questionable grounds of national security—and then every country immediately retaliated with tariffs of their own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wish of some Trump trade officials to move from a rules-based system to one grounded in pure economic power , but that ’ s a risky move—especially when China has made clear it can and will use trade as a geopolitical weapon .
“ In a globalized economy , the notion that you are better off with a power-based system is empirically wrong , ” Hillman said .

Frustration with hyperglobalization, China’s “economic imperialism,” and a seemingly broken world trading system is boiling over into serious calls for the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO)—which would have potentially disastrous implications for the country if carried out.
Frustration with hyperglobalization, China’s “economic imperialism,” and a seemingly broken world trading system is boiling over into serious calls for the United States to withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO)—which would have potentially disastrous implications for the country if carried out.
For the first time since 2005, lawmakers from both parties and both houses of Congress are pushing to pull the United States out of the trading body it helped create and which was the culmination of decades of postwar efforts to boost free trade and economic integration. By law, the United States has a chance to vote every five years on staying inside the WTO, but staying on board was such a no-brainer in recent years that no such resolution was even presented. But this year—powered by a rise in economic nationalism, growing concern about China, and frustration with two decades of paralysis at the WTO—the knives on Capitol Hill are out, to the delight of some of the trade hard-liners in the White House.
“The WTO has been a disaster for the United States,” said Rep. Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat, who introduced House legislation to withdraw this month.
“No trade regime can last when it no longer serves the people of the countries who are part of it,” said Sen. Josh Hawley, a Missouri Republican, in a recent Senate floor speech after introducing his own resolution to leave. “Our interests and those of the WTO diverged long ago.”
It’s doubtful that the measures could secure enough votes for passage in either chamber, and a tight legislative calendar makes the push for withdrawal doubly hard to pull off. But the rush for the exit is still a serious indication of deep and growing dissatisfaction with how global trade has evolved, highlighted by the vulnerability of cross-border supply chains that have begun to come apart under the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic.
If the United States were to pull out of the system it helped build, the implications would be dire. Other countries would be able to discriminate against U.S. goods and services with no limits. Tariffs would almost certainly rise and export markets shrink. Meanwhile, others like China and the European Union would increasingly be in a position to write the rules of the future economy, from data protection and privacy to intellectual property and state subsidies.
“We’d have no rights, and we’d lose a seat at the table,” said Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade negotiator now at the Asia Society.
Why the big push now? For years, different aspects of the global trading system have stirred concern and at times anger in the United States and other countries; the WTO has essentially been stuck in place since the collapse of its last big negotiating round in 2008. For years, economists have debated the impact of the so-called “China shock” on U.S. jobs and manufacturing, and some evidence has shown that the competition from low-wage Chinese labor and the rapid movement of U.S. companies offshore hit the U.S. middle class harder than many economists expected. For years, Republicans have railed against international organizations—from the WTO to the International Criminal Court—that they see as encroaching on U.S. sovereignty.
Now, all those forces have come together in a kind of imperfect storm.
“I think the confluence of factors—the WTO’s credibility, China’s accession and all the outsourcing, and then the general animosity toward international organizations—they’re all in play,” Cutler said.
For proponents of withdrawal, like Hawley, it’s mostly about China taking advantage of an open global trading system to get a leg up on countries like the United States that mostly try to play by the rules.
“I think [China] is a principal factor” in the push to leave the WTO, Hawley told Foreign Policy in a recent interview. Beijing’s ability to claim special privileges inside the WTO as a so-called “developing” country, despite boasting the world’s second-largest economy, has powered its rise at the expense of countries like the United States, he said.
“This has really enabled the economic imperialism that we see China practicing, and that has become a direct threat to our economic security and to our national security,” he said. “We ought to withdraw from [the WTO], and we ought to work with like-minded nations and allied nations in order to create something better.”
Even defenders of the WTO and the current global trading system acknowledge that some of Hawley’s critiques are valid. When China finally joined the WTO in 2001 after years of knocking on the door, it made huge concessions and changed thousands of domestic laws to conform to global trade standards. But the high hopes that the United States and other countries had about the impact of WTO accession on China’s economic trajectory were bound to be disappointed. In addition, some have argued that the U.S. government, fearful of alienating Beijing, failed to use some of the WTO implements it could have in recent decades, such as anti-surge provisions to blunt Chinese dumping.
“The perception was, for the first few years, that things were going quite well, and then China did a total U-turn,” said Jennifer Hillman, an expert on trade at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former WTO Appellate Body judge. After years of tepid reform, the Chinese state took a bigger role in the economy, especially through state-owned enterprises, and the Chinese Communist Party took a more active role in driving corporate behavior. The notion that WTO membership would turn China into a more market-driven economy has foundered, she said.
“Clearly, the things that everybody thought were going to happen, and which were happening, that has gone in the opposite direction,” Hillman said.
Perhaps the biggest failing, she said, has been the WTO’s inability to rein in China’s use and abuse of state subsidies to give its firms a competitive advantage in all kinds of sectors, from steel and aluminum to telecommunications to clean energy.
Those failings have been coupled, in the eyes of U.S. critics, with other specific problems that mean the WTO has outlived its usefulness. The WTO started its last big negotiating round to draft updated rules for global commerce almost two decades ago—a round that ended with a whimper, and virtual paralysis, as unanimous agreement among the sprawling membership proved impossible. Even as the global economy and trade have undergone seismic shifts since the beginning of the century, the WTO’s playbook has remained stuck in the past.
“The expectation was that there would be continued negotiations to open all markets, and that would lead to more tariff cuts and new rules, and that didn’t happen, and the agenda froze because many countries wouldn’t take on responsibilities,” Cutler said. “No one thought these would be the rules prevailing 20 years later.”
That frustration is coupled with a particularly American anger at the WTO’s dispute settlement system, which critics like Hawley (and the Trump administration) see as stacked against the United States. For years, U.S. administrations of both parties have taken issue with the way the WTO interprets global trading rules in its judicial rulings—leading many U.S. trade experts to argue that bureaucrats are unfairly snatching away U.S. trade prerogatives. That frustration came to a head late last year, when the Trump administration essentially killed the WTO’s Appellate Body, the organization’s crown jewel, paralyzing the trade organization’s ability to adjudicate trade disputes between countries.
But the WTO, for its critics, has also become a proxy for all the ills of runaway globalization, which those critics blame for the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs and huge changes to the manufacturing sector, in particular. U.S. President Donald Trump, who savaged the WTO on the campaign trail and has repeatedly criticized the organization, has sought since taking office to bring jobs back to the United States through a mixture of sticks and carrots—though with little success so far. Hawley, in his Senate speech, called the 164-nation organization a “symbol of an economic order whose Wilsonian ambitions have cost this country dearly.”
The U.S. broadsides against the WTO come at a challenging time. The WTO’s director-general, Roberto Azevêdo, just announced that he is quitting a year early, setting off the search for a new head of the WTO who could salvage the organization’s central role at governing global trade at a time of rising protectionism and trade barriers around the world.
But if the groundswell of opposition to the WTO is understandable, the implications of a U.S. withdrawal would be grim, not only for the world but for U.S. prestige and power. Proponents like Hawley say leaving the organization would free the United States to pursue its own unfettered trade policies, free from the oversight of an “activist” WTO judiciary, and to create a new global trade architecture explicitly meant to push back against Chinese abuses. In his view, the United States could simultaneously undermine the global trading order, pursue “America First” policies to boost U.S. trading prospects, and convince other countries to join that effort.
Many experts think that’s a difficult circle to square. “It’s not realistic to think if we blew up the WTO that we could put it back together” in some form, said Thomas Duesterberg, a former George H.W. Bush administration official now at the Hudson Institute. “There is too much tension right now, especially with the COVID economic crisis, too much unwillingness to cooperate.”
Especially telling is the rediscovered interest in a partnership of like-minded countries to create a new trade grouping that could push back against China. Trump administration officials talk of creating just such an economic partnership, and Hawley specifically mentioned joining forces with countries like Japan, Vietnam, and Australia to counter Chinese trade abuses. But that was the whole point of the Barack Obama-era Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an 11-country grouping meant to write the rules of trade for a huge chunk of the global economy—but not including China. Trump pulled out of the TPP his first week in office and decided to confront China one-on-one in a lingering trade war that has left him largely isolated and gotten him almost nowhere.
“This presumption that the U.S. leads and everyone else follows … U.S. leadership is premised on putting forward rules that other countries can buy into and requires consistency and predictability,” said Joshua Meltzer, a trade expert at the Brookings Institution and a former Australian trade negotiator. “That’s one of the harms of pulling out of the TPP—a lot of countries really went out on a limb, and it really raises a huge question mark, because they’d be extremely cautious about going down a similar path with the United States again.”
And U.S. abdication from the WTO would, instead of isolating China and making it easier to fight back against its trade abuses, end up ceding ground to Beijing—much as the Trump administration’s withdrawal from other areas of international engagement, from the Paris climate accord to the World Health Organization, has created an opening for China to increase its global influence.
“If the United States pulls out, then the WTO becomes China-dominated,” Meltzer said. “This is still the key multilateral trading institution—you don’t want to leave that to China.”
And that’s without even counting the immediate and short-term cost of leaving the umbrella organization that regulates about 95 percent of all global trade—trade that amounts to an annual $2 trillion boon for the U.S. economy. Outside of the WTO’s rules that regulate tariffs and trade behavior, the United States would essentially be in the jungle. Other countries could levy tariffs on U.S. goods for any reason or ban trade altogether—with no real recourse other than tit-for-tat retaliation.
“If we are not a member, then the rest of the world can unequivocally discriminate against U.S. goods and services just because they’re American,” Hillman said.
She recalled the Trump administration’s assurances that no countries would dare retaliate when it slapped tariffs on friends and allies on questionable grounds of national security—and then every country immediately retaliated with tariffs of their own. Leaving the WTO might fulfill the wish of some Trump trade officials to move from a rules-based system to one grounded in pure economic power, but that’s a risky move—especially when China has made clear it can and will use trade as a geopolitical weapon.
“In a globalized economy, the notion that you are better off with a power-based system is empirically wrong,” Hillman said.
Robbie Gramer contributed to this article.