foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Foreign Governments Are Aiding Nigeria’s Violence Against Protesters

Young protesters had been singing the national anthem and waving the Nigerian flag when the Nigerian Army began shooting at them in a wealthy part of Lagos on Oct. 20 .
At least 12 people were killed at the Lekki Toll Gate and Alausa , according to human rights group Amnesty International .
At least 69 people have died across the country since protests began against police brutality on Oct. 8 .
“ There is little doubt that this was a case of excessive use of force , resulting in unlawful killings , ” said the United Nations ’ high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In a statement shortly after the incident , Joe Biden , now the U.S. president-elect , declared that “ the United States must stand with Nigerians who are peacefully demonstrating for police reform.
” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres , and African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat issued similar statements along with celebrities such as Beyoncé , Rihanna , and John Boyega .
The U.S. Congressional Black Caucus even wrote to Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari urging an independent investigation .
Rather than respond to calls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ curfew on Lagos and other areas with increased military presence to crack down on dissent .
Lagos state officials launched a judicial panel of inquiry into the supposedly disbanded Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) —the unit that provoked the protests—and the shootings with a six-month mandate .
But Nigerians are acutely aware that there will likely be no sanctions against the officers who gunned down unarmed citizens .
There was no accountability for police after the shooting of at least 11 Muslim protesters in the Nigerian capital , Abuja , in 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of at least 21 people northeast of the capital in 2018 .
Buhari ’ s statement in the wake of the Lekki massacre did not help matters .
“ Sadly , the promptness with which we have acted seemed to have been misconstrued as a sign of weakness , ” he said in a televised address that made no reference to the shooting .
“ This government … will not allow anybody or groups to disrupt the peace of our nation , ” added the former military strongman .
Rather than respond to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a curfew on Lagos and other areas with increased military presence to crack down on dissent .
Nigeria ’ s central bank froze the accounts of activists upon court order .
This is why Nigerians are calling for world leaders to do more than dole out empathetic statements .
It is crucial that international governments ensure accountability for the deaths of anti-SARS protesters—especially because they have had some links to the training of these officers .
In total , just over $ 38 million worth of training was provided over the past five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ substantial amount partly funded by U.S. taxpayers .
Officers from the Prince William County Police Department in Virginia trained members of the Nigeria Police Force on human rights in 2017 .
Three years later , Prince William County police officers acknowledged using tear gas and rubber bullets against a peaceful protest held in response to the death of George Floyd .
So it was no surprise that on multiple occasions Nigerian police also fired tear gas at peaceful protests against police brutality in the Nigerian capital .
More than 7,000 people were killed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and officers seldom face any legal consequences .
Similarly , the Nigerian Army and Nigeria Police Force they helped train are notorious for killing civilians with impunity .
U.S. funding for foreign police training expanded from $ 4.3 million in 2001 ( the first year reliable data exists ) to $ 146 million in 2018 , according to Benjamin Kenzer , a researcher in the political science department at Ohio State University .
Kenzer found that Nigerian police were often trained alongside members of the Nigerian Army .
His research shows “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is a small but noticeable effect that it ’ s more likely that police will harm average , everyday citizens , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ Police develop mentalities and energies that resemble the military.
” The greatest increase in funding was between 2016 and 2018 during the Trump presidency , ” he added .
That may have been due to less stringent observation .
“ These programs tend to fly really under the radar , ” he said .
The Democratic Republic of the Congo , Niger , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Nigeria were the top African countries to receive police training from the United States , according to Kenzer ’ s research .
All are countries where state actors have been accused of serious human rights abuses .
In particular , Moroccan police repeatedly denied allegations of extrajudicial killings until a June 2019 video emerged showing policemen severely beating two unarmed activists .
But it ’ s not just the United States that has trained Nigerian police .
British officials trained and supplied equipment to the SARS unit between 2016 and 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British Labour Party member of Parliament Kate Osamor .
A Freedom of Information request revealed that the College of Policing—the professional body for police in England and Wales—had also trained Nigeria ’ s security officers during 2019 , the Independent reported .
It found that the College of Policing had made almost 20 million pounds ( $ 27 million ) from international training since 2013 .
Other governments it offered training to included Hong Kong and Rwanda , where there has been equal criticism of police brutality .
Tactics used by officers during @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Allegations of unlawful shootings have dogged Rwandan officers , including killing at least 12 refugees protesting a cut in food rations .
The ostensibly disbanded SARS was infamous for robbing citizens , torture , rape , unwarranted arrests , and unlawful killings .
It was formed in 1992 to tackle a rise in armed robbery , but operated entirely unchecked .
Previous protests had led to similar announcements that the unit would be reorganized in 2017 , restructured in 2018 , and disbanded in 2019 .
A video showing military-style combat training @ @ @ @ @ @ @ SWAT ) team—the new squad that will replace SARS—left Nigerians doubtful that police brutality of citizens would end .
Buhari has once again pledged police reforms , including psychological evaluation for officers and a pay raise so they would not resort to bribery and extortion .
In 2018 , police officers earned a yearly salary of $ 1,700 and most bought their own uniforms .
In comparison , Nigerian senators have a monthly expense allowance of more than $ 37,000 , in addition to a yearly constituency budget of $ 5.5 million meant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contract fraud , according to the Nigerian government ’ s own report .
Such is the level of corruption that permeates the country ’ s elite .
As another Foreign Policy report revealed recently , more than 40 percent of Nigerian police are not actually protecting the public , but deployed to protect VIPs from the public .
Hours before the Nigerian military fired on protesters , a U.S. delegation arrived in Abuja to finalize sales of military fighter jets to the country , the Wall Street Journal reported .
“ We need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States insists on being this involved in the world , how the U.S. can equally empower citizens , ” said Kenzer .
Helping to launch civilian review boards of police training similar to those implemented in the wake of Black Lives Matter protests could be one way , he said .
Biden ’ s win raised eyebrows among Nigerians .
Buhari congratulated the president-elect , urging “ greater engagement with Africa on the basis of reciprocal respect.
” The anti-SARS protests could be an early litmus test of whether U.S. foreign policy toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its citizens rather than its rulers .
Issuing U.S. visa bans and other measures against officials involved in the Lekki massacre is not impossible .
Biden could impose an arms freeze—a move he signaled to human rights violators during his election campaign .
“ We will make clear that America will never again check its principles at the door just to buy oil or sell weapons , ” Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations last year when asked about the Saudi government ’ s killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi .
The administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocked arms sales to Nigeria , including an Israeli sale of U.S.-built attack helicopters , because of human rights abuses by the Nigerian military .
Shortly after , public anxiety about terrorism benefited Buhari ’ s call for a policy shift , and under U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017 , Nigeria finalized a deal to pay $ 593 million for U.S. arms and jets to fight Boko Haram .
Another move , strongly advocated by Nigerians , would be targeted sanctions such as use of the Global Magnitsky Act , which imposes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alleged human-rights abusers and freezes their U.S. assets .
A Biden administration could choose not to heed those calls .
Yet it would be indefensible for the U.S. government to continue finalizing helicopter sales while Nigerians are dying in the fight against police brutality .

Young protesters had been singing the national anthem and waving the Nigerian flag when the Nigerian Army began shooting at them in a wealthy part of Lagos on Oct. 20. At least 12 people were killed at the Lekki Toll Gate and Alausa, according to human rights group Amnesty International. At least 69 people have died across the country since protests began against police brutality on Oct. 8.
Young protesters had been singing the national anthem and waving the Nigerian flag when the Nigerian Army began shooting at them in a wealthy part of Lagos on Oct. 20. At least 12 people were killed at the Lekki Toll Gate and Alausa, according to human rights group Amnesty International. At least 69 people have died across the country since protests began against police brutality on Oct. 8.
“There is little doubt that this was a case of excessive use of force, resulting in unlawful killings,” said the United Nations’ high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet. In a statement shortly after the incident, Joe Biden, now the U.S. president-elect, declared that “the United States must stand with Nigerians who are peacefully demonstrating for police reform.”
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, and African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat issued similar statements along with celebrities such as Beyoncé, Rihanna, and John Boyega. The U.S. Congressional Black Caucus even wrote to Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari urging an independent investigation.
Rather than respond to calls for an investigation, Buhari imposed a curfew on Lagos and other areas with increased military presence to crack down on dissent.
Lagos state officials launched a judicial panel of inquiry into the supposedly disbanded Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)—the unit that provoked the protests—and the shootings with a six-month mandate. But Nigerians are acutely aware that there will likely be no sanctions against the officers who gunned down unarmed citizens. There was no accountability for police after the shooting of at least 11 Muslim protesters in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, in 2019, or the Army’s killing of at least 21 people northeast of the capital in 2018.
Buhari’s statement in the wake of the Lekki massacre did not help matters. “Sadly, the promptness with which we have acted seemed to have been misconstrued as a sign of weakness,” he said in a televised address that made no reference to the shooting. “This government … will not allow anybody or groups to disrupt the peace of our nation,” added the former military strongman.
Rather than respond to calls for an investigation, Buhari imposed a curfew on Lagos and other areas with increased military presence to crack down on dissent. Nigeria’s central bank froze the accounts of activists upon court order.
This is why Nigerians are calling for world leaders to do more than dole out empathetic statements. It is crucial that international governments ensure accountability for the deaths of anti-SARS protesters—especially because they have had some links to the training of these officers.
The United States made nearly $19 million worth of military sales of defense education and technical training to the Nigerian Army and police between 2015 and 2019, according to unclassified reports made to U.S. Congress. These trainings ranged from military civilian control, adherence to human rights, and military professionalization.
In total, just over $38 million worth of training was provided over the past five years to Nigerian security officials, a substantial amount partly funded by U.S. taxpayers.
Officers from the Prince William County Police Department in Virginia trained members of the Nigeria Police Force on human rights in 2017. Three years later, Prince William County police officers acknowledged using tear gas and rubber bullets against a peaceful protest held in response to the death of George Floyd. So it was no surprise that on multiple occasions Nigerian police also fired tear gas at peaceful protests against police brutality in the Nigerian capital. More than 7,000 people were killed by U.S. police between 2013 and 2019, and officers seldom face any legal consequences. Similarly, the Nigerian Army and Nigeria Police Force they helped train are notorious for killing civilians with impunity.
U.S. funding for foreign police training expanded from $4.3 million in 2001 (the first year reliable data exists) to $146 million in 2018, according to Benjamin Kenzer, a researcher in the political science department at Ohio State University.
Kenzer found that Nigerian police were often trained alongside members of the Nigerian Army. His research shows “the more training [police] get, there is a small but noticeable effect that it’s more likely that police will harm average, everyday citizens,” he told Foreign Policy. “Police develop mentalities and energies that resemble the military.”
The greatest increase in funding was between 2016 and 2018 during the Trump presidency,” he added. That may have been due to less stringent observation. “These programs tend to fly really under the radar,” he said. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Mali, Morocco, and Nigeria were the top African countries to receive police training from the United States, according to Kenzer’s research. All are countries where state actors have been accused of serious human rights abuses. In particular, Moroccan police repeatedly denied allegations of extrajudicial killings until a June 2019 video emerged showing policemen severely beating two unarmed activists.
But it’s not just the United States that has trained Nigerian police. British officials trained and supplied equipment to the SARS unit between 2016 and 2020, according to a letter sent to British Labour Party member of Parliament Kate Osamor.
A Freedom of Information request revealed that the College of Policing—the professional body for police in England and Wales—had also trained Nigeria’s security officers during 2019, the Independent reported. It found that the College of Policing had made almost 20 million pounds ($27 million) from international training since 2013. Other governments it offered training to included Hong Kong and Rwanda, where there has been equal criticism of police brutality. Tactics used by officers during Hong Kong protests breached human rights laws. Allegations of unlawful shootings have dogged Rwandan officers, including killing at least 12 refugees protesting a cut in food rations.
The ostensibly disbanded SARS was infamous for robbing citizens, torture, rape, unwarranted arrests, and unlawful killings. It was formed in 1992 to tackle a rise in armed robbery, but operated entirely unchecked. Previous protests had led to similar announcements that the unit would be reorganized in 2017, restructured in 2018, and disbanded in 2019. A video showing military-style combat training of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team—the new squad that will replace SARS—left Nigerians doubtful that police brutality of citizens would end.
Buhari has once again pledged police reforms, including psychological evaluation for officers and a pay raise so they would not resort to bribery and extortion. In 2018, police officers earned a yearly salary of $1,700 and most bought their own uniforms. In comparison, Nigerian senators have a monthly expense allowance of more than $37,000, in addition to a yearly constituency budget of $5.5 million meant for grassroots projects but often plagued by contract fraud, according to the Nigerian government’s own report. Such is the level of corruption that permeates the country’s elite. As another Foreign Policy report revealed recently, more than 40 percent of Nigerian police are not actually protecting the public, but deployed to protect VIPs from the public.
As the #EndSARS hashtag stopped trending globally earlier this month, Amnesty International warned about escalating violence in the country. The next U.S. administration will need to change tack if Nigerian authorities are going to take human rights violations seriously—and it should start with military and training assistance to police. Recent events are not encouraging.
Hours before the Nigerian military fired on protesters, a U.S. delegation arrived in Abuja to finalize sales of military fighter jets to the country, the Wall Street Journal reported. “We need to think about, if the United States insists on being this involved in the world, how the U.S. can equally empower citizens,” said Kenzer. Helping to launch civilian review boards of police training similar to those implemented in the wake of Black Lives Matter protests could be one way, he said.
Biden’s win raised eyebrows among Nigerians. Buhari congratulated the president-elect, urging “greater engagement with Africa on the basis of reciprocal respect.” The anti-SARS protests could be an early litmus test of whether U.S. foreign policy toward Nigeria will listen to the demands of its citizens rather than its rulers. Issuing U.S. visa bans and other measures against officials involved in the Lekki massacre is not impossible.
Biden could impose an arms freeze—a move he signaled to human rights violators during his election campaign. “We will make clear that America will never again check its principles at the door just to buy oil or sell weapons,” Biden told the Council on Foreign Relations last year when asked about the Saudi government’s killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
The administration of former U.S. President Barack Obama repeatedly blocked arms sales to Nigeria, including an Israeli sale of U.S.-built attack helicopters, because of human rights abuses by the Nigerian military. Shortly after, public anxiety about terrorism benefited Buhari’s call for a policy shift, and under U.S. President Donald Trump in 2017, Nigeria finalized a deal to pay $593 million for U.S. arms and jets to fight Boko Haram.
Another move, strongly advocated by Nigerians, would be targeted sanctions such as use of the Global Magnitsky Act, which imposes visa restrictions to enter the U.S. on alleged human-rights abusers and freezes their U.S. assets.
A Biden administration could choose not to heed those calls. Yet it would be indefensible for the U.S. government to continue finalizing helicopter sales while Nigerians are dying in the fight against police brutality.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Afghanistan Needs Truth Before It Can Have Reconciliation

Afghanistan Needs Truth Before It Can Have Reconciliation KABUL—Mohammad Yaser Qubadian was two years old and playing with toys when his father was killed by a Taliban roadside bomb in 2004 .
As a child , Qubadian used to wake up in the middle of the night , visit his father ’ s grave , read the Quran , and weep until morning .
Fourteen years later , the family gravesite grew .
One evening in August , 2018 , an Islamic State suicide bomber walked into a local educational center .
Qubadian picked up the dead body of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ covered in blood .
“ I was too young for such tragedies .
The war has taken away everything from me , ” said Qubadian , now the vice president of War Victims Centered-Peace Community , a national group for civilian victims of the war .
“ I have no reason to live , expect demanding justice.
” As Qubadian seeks justice for his father and his sister , thousands of miles away in Doha , Qatar , the children of the same Afghan leaders who started the war are now seeking to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one Taliban negotiator , is the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani , who was one of the initial leaders in the war against the Soviets .
Batur Dostum , one government negotiator , is the son of Marshal Dostum , a recently promoted warlord who fought for the Soviets and then turned against the communists in Kabul . )
The Doha negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government will have to go beyond deal-making and include the civilian victims as a third and independent party at the negotiation table , Qubadian insists .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the country without a fact-finding commission that investigates , acknowledges , and apologizes for the suffering of civilians .
An estimated 157,000 people—including 43,000 civilians—were killed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2019 .
And as many as two million Afghan civilians were killed in the 1970s , 1980s , and 1990s , according to Afghanistan Center for Memory and Dialogue .
The victims suffered from a double catastrophe : first losing their lives and then fading from the country ’ s collective memory .
The pattern of impunity and rewarding violence has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , in particular the communist era .
After Afghan communists gained power in April 1978 , killing civilians en masse and throwing the country into chaos , the Soviet Union invaded to support the regime that faced nationwide resistance .
In the nine-year war , the Soviet troops and their Afghan allies deliberately targeted civilian sympathizers of the mujahedeen , some of whom violated humanitarian laws by executing regime forces and rival groups , according to a U.N. report released in 1990 .
The Soviets withdrew in April 1988 , leaving the civilian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power vacuum created by the Soviets ’ exit in 1998 and by the collapse of President Mohammad Najibullah ’ s government in 1992 , Afghan mujahedeen factions turned their guns against each other in Kabul , relying on a strategy of targeting civilians as they vied for power .
Instead of investigating such killings , the leaders of the factions amassed wealth and shared power following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 .
The warlords gained so much power that they were able to block transitional justice efforts over the years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ themselves in 2007 , and halted the release of a report on their killings by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in 2012 .
The power-sharing politicized justice as well as ethnicity .
The warlords portrayed themselves as saviors of certain ethnic groups and the government gave them power in exchange for their support , even though the warlords supported only their patronage networks , pushing ordinary people out .
The resentment over past atrocities lived on among the Afghan people as the warlords refused to acknowledge and apologize for civilian killings .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban , inclusion of the civilian victims of the war in the process plays a crucial role .
Activists say that the victims in particular help the peace process to move forward through offering testimony about their suffering .
The trouble is that neither side is willing to consider victims as a serious part of the negotiations .
If the Taliban , the Afghan government , and warlords admit to their killings of civilians , the victims ’ families are likely to forgive them .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be some formal body to hear and acknowledge their testimony .
“ A political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is just the first phase of the peace process , ” said Mohammad Hussain Saramad , the head of research and advocacy at the Afghanistan Commission of Human Rights and Democracy , an NGO .
The process lays out social foundation for peace by taking the transitional justice , which includes independent investigations into civilian killings by the parties , acknowledging the victims , seeking amnesty , and possibly paying compensation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ peace process , the parties to the conflict are yet to show sincere interest in inclusion of the civilian victims in the process .
One member of the government negotiating team in peace talks said that there was a loose topic for the victims in government ’ s agenda for talks with the Taliban .
The Taliban did not return requests for comment .
Discussing victims hurts both parties ’ legitimacy , as they see civilian victims as collateral damage of their holy war and fear losing allies .
At the heart of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victims rather than criminal investigations into the atrocities to put perpetrators behind bars .
A Joint Special Victims ’ Committee could be the part of the deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban in a bid to address immediate needs of the war victims ’ families—like food , given that many victims were breadwinners .
Such a committee would also rebuild the country ’ s justice system and shatter the culture of impunity in society .
“ The legacy of the 40-year war in Afghanistan is not solely destruction of buildings and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and displacement of millions of others , ” said Saramad .
“ What we are dealing with right now is the destruction of structure of the society .
The destruction is fueling violence in the country.
” Fakhria Bayat , who lost her brother in the civil war , said that the public did not understand the human toll of the war , yet .
“ Me and my family and other families who lost their family members understand the cost of the war , ” said Bayat .
“ The country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wounded and disabled people , drug addicts , murderers , and thieves.
” Later in the day , when these soldiers were about to leave the area , the Taliban opened fire on them .
The joint-force called for an airstrike , which wiped out all twelve members of the Mubarez family , including his wife , four sons , and three daughters , along with four other young children who were in his house on that day .
Initially , the U.S. forces denied any airstrikes , then they admitted the airstrike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ I want justice for defenseless people , particularly for my own family , ” said Mubarez , who has not rebuilt his house ruined by the airstrike .
“ There is a strong feeling inside me that I need to stand up for justice and for those who are unable to stand for justice.
” Mubarez is part of large victim community that is a product of decades of war .
As this community grows and mobilizes , it becomes the primary hope for justice in a country where politics tends @ @ @ @ @ @ @ class of stakeholders .
Politicians are reluctant to pursue such efforts because they often gain power through force , but victims have the potential to break Afghanistan ’ s long cycle of violence .

KABUL—Mohammad Yaser Qubadian was two years old and playing with toys when his father was killed by a Taliban roadside bomb in 2004. As a child, Qubadian used to wake up in the middle of the night, visit his father’s grave, read the Quran, and weep until morning. Fourteen years later, the family gravesite grew. One evening in August, 2018, an Islamic State suicide bomber walked into a local educational center. Qubadian picked up the dead body of his sister from the ashes and went home covered in blood.
KABUL—Mohammad Yaser Qubadian was two years old and playing with toys when his father was killed by a Taliban roadside bomb in 2004. As a child, Qubadian used to wake up in the middle of the night, visit his father’s grave, read the Quran, and weep until morning. Fourteen years later, the family gravesite grew. One evening in August, 2018, an Islamic State suicide bomber walked into a local educational center. Qubadian picked up the dead body of his sister from the ashes and went home covered in blood.
“I was too young for such tragedies. The war has taken away everything from me,” said Qubadian, now the vice president of War Victims Centered-Peace Community, a national group for civilian victims of the war. “I have no reason to live, expect demanding justice.”
As Qubadian seeks justice for his father and his sister, thousands of miles away in Doha, Qatar, the children of the same Afghan leaders who started the war are now seeking to end it. (Anas Haqqani, one Taliban negotiator, is the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was one of the initial leaders in the war against the Soviets. Batur Dostum, one government negotiator, is the son of Marshal Dostum, a recently promoted warlord who fought for the Soviets and then turned against the communists in Kabul.)
The Doha negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government will have to go beyond deal-making and include the civilian victims as a third and independent party at the negotiation table, Qubadian insists. There will not be justice or healing in the country without a fact-finding commission that investigates, acknowledges, and apologizes for the suffering of civilians.
Over the course of the 19-year war, The Taliban, the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and allied forces have killed countless civilians in urban and rural areas. The Taliban often conducted suicide bombings and set off car bombs in cities, disproportionately killing civilians as government officials sheltered safely behind the blast walls. Crossfire and improvised explosive devices are also blamed for high civilian casualties.
An estimated 157,000 people—including 43,000 civilians—were killed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2019. And as many as two million Afghan civilians were killed in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, according to Afghanistan Center for Memory and Dialogue. The victims suffered from a double catastrophe: first losing their lives and then fading from the country’s collective memory.
The pattern of impunity and rewarding violence has been a constant in recent Afghan history, in particular the communist era. After Afghan communists gained power in April 1978, killing civilians en masse and throwing the country into chaos, the Soviet Union invaded to support the regime that faced nationwide resistance. In the nine-year war, the Soviet troops and their Afghan allies deliberately targeted civilian sympathizers of the mujahedeen, some of whom violated humanitarian laws by executing regime forces and rival groups, according to a U.N. report released in 1990.
The Soviets withdrew in April 1988, leaving the civilian killings and atrocities uninvestigated. In the power vacuum created by the Soviets’ exit in 1998 and by the collapse of President Mohammad Najibullah’s government in 1992, Afghan mujahedeen factions turned their guns against each other in Kabul, relying on a strategy of targeting civilians as they vied for power.
Instead of investigating such killings, the leaders of the factions amassed wealth and shared power following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The warlords gained so much power that they were able to block transitional justice efforts over the years, approved a national law to forgive themselves in 2007, and halted the release of a report on their killings by Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in 2012.
The power-sharing politicized justice as well as ethnicity. The warlords portrayed themselves as saviors of certain ethnic groups and the government gave them power in exchange for their support, even though the warlords supported only their patronage networks, pushing ordinary people out. The resentment over past atrocities lived on among the Afghan people as the warlords refused to acknowledge and apologize for civilian killings.
Inclusion of the civilian victims in the negotiations would break the old pattern of short-lived deals and rewarding violence. The chronic war in Afghanistan has destroyed countless lives across three generations. In each episode of the conflict, the armed rivals killed civilians, made deals, forgave themselves, and then turned against each other later on. The cycle has dragged on for more than 40 years.
For a sustainable peace rather than a short-lived deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban, inclusion of the civilian victims of the war in the process plays a crucial role. Activists say that the victims in particular help the peace process to move forward through offering testimony about their suffering. The trouble is that neither side is willing to consider victims as a serious part of the negotiations. If the Taliban, the Afghan government, and warlords admit to their killings of civilians, the victims’ families are likely to forgive them. But to make that happen, there must be some formal body to hear and acknowledge their testimony.
“A political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is just the first phase of the peace process,” said Mohammad Hussain Saramad, the head of research and advocacy at the Afghanistan Commission of Human Rights and Democracy, an NGO. The process lays out social foundation for peace by taking the transitional justice, which includes independent investigations into civilian killings by the parties, acknowledging the victims, seeking amnesty, and possibly paying compensation, said Saramad.
With the slow-motion peace process, the parties to the conflict are yet to show sincere interest in inclusion of the civilian victims in the process. One member of the government negotiating team in peace talks said that there was a loose topic for the victims in government’s agenda for talks with the Taliban. The Taliban did not return requests for comment. Discussing victims hurts both parties’ legitimacy, as they see civilian victims as collateral damage of their holy war and fear losing allies.
At the heart of the demand for justice is recognition of victims rather than criminal investigations into the atrocities to put perpetrators behind bars. A Joint Special Victims’ Committee could be the part of the deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban in a bid to address immediate needs of the war victims’ families—like food, given that many victims were breadwinners. Such a committee would also rebuild the country’s justice system and shatter the culture of impunity in society.
“The legacy of the 40-year war in Afghanistan is not solely destruction of buildings and cities, killing of millions of people, and displacement of millions of others,” said Saramad. “What we are dealing with right now is the destruction of structure of the society. The destruction is fueling violence in the country.”
Fakhria Bayat, who lost her brother in the civil war, said that the public did not understand the human toll of the war, yet. “Me and my family and other families who lost their family members understand the cost of the war,” said Bayat. “The country is becoming a big graveyard packed with wounded and disabled people, drug addicts, murderers, and thieves.”
Masih Ur-Rahman Mubarez, 40, who lost his entire family in a U.S. airstrike in September 2018, has been fighting for justice for his family two years. In Sep. 2018, Mubarez was in his rented room in Iran when he received a phone call from his family. Amina, his wife, told him that there had been a night raid, and soldiers who spoke English, Farsi, and Pashto searched the house, saying they were there to rescue four to six Afghan Special forces from a Taliban prison 400 meters away.
Later in the day, when these soldiers were about to leave the area, the Taliban opened fire on them. The joint-force called for an airstrike, which wiped out all twelve members of the Mubarez family, including his wife, four sons, and three daughters, along with four other young children who were in his house on that day. Initially, the U.S. forces denied any airstrikes, then they admitted the airstrike but denied civilian casualties, said Mubarez.
“I want justice for defenseless people, particularly for my own family,” said Mubarez, who has not rebuilt his house ruined by the airstrike. “There is a strong feeling inside me that I need to stand up for justice and for those who are unable to stand for justice.”
Mubarez is part of large victim community that is a product of decades of war. As this community grows and mobilizes, it becomes the primary hope for justice in a country where politics tends to represent the interests of a tiny class of stakeholders. Politicians are reluctant to pursue such efforts because they often gain power through force, but victims have the potential to break Afghanistan’s long cycle of violence.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Biden Faces Troubled Eastern Mediterranean Waters

As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden may well be discovering as he prepares to take office , the Eastern Mediterranean is far from a tranquil place .
In the Aegean , Turkish and Greek warships eye each other nervously , while on Cyprus , a decadeslong peace process seeking to reunite Turkish and Greek Cypriots is in danger of collapse after Turkey advocated a formal division of the island into two states in October .
Adding fuel to that fire is a long and unresolved wrangle over maritime and hydrocarbon rights between Cyprus and Turkey , which has pulled in international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Total , and Cyprus ’ s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors Israel and Egypt .
As tensions have grown over the past year , the United States has largely taken a pass on its traditional regional role as referee , arbiter , and occasional carrier of a big stick .
Yet that may be about to change .
The election of “ Joe Bidenopoulos ” —as he once introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans—has come as music to the ears of Greeks and Greek Cypriots looking for stronger U.S. support in their disputes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s tough rhetoric on Turkey , it remains a key nation in this strategically vital region .
Come January , when he is set to take office , the president-elect will have to weigh a range of interests in navigating the Eastern Mediterranean ’ s sea of troubles—and reining in Ankara may not be his greatest priority .
The last time Turkey and Greece nearly came to blows , in a 1996 dispute over Imia , a pair of uninhabited islets in the North Aegean , U.S. President Bill Clinton sent American warships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outgoing President Donald Trump , though , the country “ has not been constructive in defusing the immediate crisis situation ” over maritime boundaries , said Ekavi Athanassopoulou , an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Athens .
Marc Pierini , a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe , echoed those sentiments , saying that “ the U.S. role has been low key.
” Biden has made no secret of his hostility toward the current Turkish government.Biden , on the other hand , knows the region and its leaders well from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ official visits to Ankara , Athens , and Nicosia .
And unlike Trump , he doesn ’ t share a close relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
Quite the opposite : In the past , Biden has made no secret of his hostility toward the current Turkish government—and , conversely , of his support for Greece and Cyprus .
While Trump played up his friendship with Erdogan , Biden has dubbed him an “ autocrat ” who , as he told the New York Times in an interview last December , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Biden isn ’ t alone in his sentiments .
Concern in Washington over Turkey has been growing in recent times across the political divide .
Even so , “ Biden the president may not be quite the same as Biden the candidate , ” Soner Cagaptay , the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy , said in November .
“ Turkey borders Syria , Iran , Iraq , and , across the Black Sea , Russia .
Whatever U.S. policy is in these places , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ less costly with Turkey onboard.
” This feeling is expressed most fully at sea , where Turkey has long complained of an unfair distribution of maritime territories , arguing that the status quo leaves it with a largely coastal territory , while its neighbors enjoy extensive sea zones .
Ankara thus refuses to recognize Greek sea-boundary claims in the Aegean , where dozens of Greek islands lie close to the Turkish coast .
It also doesn ’ t recognize Athens ’ s claim to seas south and east of the Greek island of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United Nations-recognized Libyan government in Tripoli count as Turkish , but which international maritime law still considers Greek .
“ Turkey feels it is being ‘ boxed in ’ in the Eastern Mediterranean.
” Tensions rose this fall when Turkey dispatched a hydrocarbon exploration vessel , the Oruc Reis , into these waters near Crete , sending Greek and Turkish warships to battle stations , while also prompting France to dispatch naval vessels in support of European Union ally Greece .
At the same time , since the Turkish invasion of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south , there has been no agreement between Ankara and Nicosia over where their respective maritime and airspace frontiers lie .
This became a far more divisive issue after 2012 , when natural gas was discovered in waters claimed by Cyprus , but which Turkey now also claims .
Disagreements over how to handle the region ’ s unexpected hydrocarbon bonanza have also plagued U.N.-sponsored talks aimed at reunifying Cyprus .
These talks collapsed in 2017 , after which Turkey began to send seismic research @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it contests with Cyprus .
Those vessels are still there today , and Cyprus , with the backing of Greece and France , has continued to protest their presence , calling for the EU to punish Turkey with economic sanctions—a call that has so far gone unheeded but will be reconsidered by EU leaders in December .
Turkey ’ s position runs contrary to the last five decades of U.N.-sponsored negotiations , which have always aimed—unsuccessfully—at a comprehensive settlement to reunify the island .
This aim is still supported by the Greek Cypriot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , and the wider international community .
But Turkey argues that after five decades of failed negotiations , reunification is a waste of time and the de facto division of the island should be made de jure .
While this position has few supporters beyond Turkey and Northern Cyprus , it raises the possibility of a permanent breakdown in the U.N. negotiations .
Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikos Christodoulides also voiced his fears in November that Ankara ’ s position could also lead to an eventual annexation of the Turkish Cypriot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ potential failure of any new reunification effort , then , “ Biden may have to decide if he should still try to get a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem , or if he should tackle the hydrocarbons issue separately and immediately , ” said Erol Kaymak , an international relations professor at Eastern Mediterranean University in Turkish Northern Cyprus .
“ Biden will want de-escalation , and I wouldn ’ t be surprised if one of his first calls wasn ’ t to Erdogan to ask him to help with that.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Greece and Turkey have yet more disputed territorial claims , “ Biden will want de-escalation , and I wouldn ’ t be surprised if one of his first calls wasn ’ t to Erdogan to ask him to help with that , ” Cagaptay said .
Unlike Trump , Biden will not be able to rely on any personal relationship with Erdogan in doing that .
Instead , he is more likely to work with multilateral organizations to leverage change .
“ Biden will give much greater weight than Trump to alliances and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vice president of the German Marshall Fund .
Specifically , we can expect him to look to the EU , given that Cyprus and Greece are both EU member states .
“ Starting under President [ Barack ] Obama , ” said Sinan Ulgen , a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels , “ the U.S. has been expecting Europe to take a bigger role , particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean , where the dispute is , after all , between Turkey and two EU member states.
” Meanwhile , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take account of the change in the White House , ” Ulgen said .
“ This will also mean there will need to be a difficult , but more open dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey about a range of grievances.
” Those run from the Syrian civil war to Turkey ’ s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles—and threats of U.S. sanctions in response to those missiles ’ recent testing , meaning that “ there could well be some turbulence ahead in Turkish-U.S. relations , ” Ulgen said .
That turbulence , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of solving the region ’ s problems , Biden may only contribute to the troubled waters to come in the Eastern Mediterranean .

As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden may well be discovering as he prepares to take office, the Eastern Mediterranean is far from a tranquil place. In the Aegean, Turkish and Greek warships eye each other nervously, while on Cyprus, a decadeslong peace process seeking to reunite Turkish and Greek Cypriots is in danger of collapse after Turkey advocated a formal division of the island into two states in October. Adding fuel to that fire is a long and unresolved wrangle over maritime and hydrocarbon rights between Cyprus and Turkey, which has pulled in international oil companies such as Exxon Mobil and Total, and Cyprus’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors Israel and Egypt.
As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden may well be discovering as he prepares to take office, the Eastern Mediterranean is far from a tranquil place. In the Aegean, Turkish and Greek warships eye each other nervously, while on Cyprus, a decadeslong peace process seeking to reunite Turkish and Greek Cypriots is in danger of collapse after Turkey advocated a formal division of the island into two states in October. Adding fuel to that fire is a long and unresolved wrangle over maritime and hydrocarbon rights between Cyprus and Turkey, which has pulled in international oil companies such as Exxon Mobil and Total, and Cyprus’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors Israel and Egypt.
As tensions have grown over the past year, the United States has largely taken a pass on its traditional regional role as referee, arbiter, and occasional carrier of a big stick. Yet that may be about to change. The election of “Joe Bidenopoulos”—as he once introduced himself to a group of Greek Americans—has come as music to the ears of Greeks and Greek Cypriots looking for stronger U.S. support in their disputes with Turkey. But despite Biden’s tough rhetoric on Turkey, it remains a key nation in this strategically vital region. Come January, when he is set to take office, the president-elect will have to weigh a range of interests in navigating the Eastern Mediterranean’s sea of troubles—and reining in Ankara may not be his greatest priority.
The last time Turkey and Greece nearly came to blows, in a 1996 dispute over Imia, a pair of uninhabited islets in the North Aegean, U.S. President Bill Clinton sent American warships to separate the warring neighbors. Under outgoing President Donald Trump, though, the country “has not been constructive in defusing the immediate crisis situation” over maritime boundaries, said Ekavi Athanassopoulou, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Athens. Marc Pierini, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, echoed those sentiments, saying that “the U.S. role has been low key.”
Biden has made no secret of his hostility toward the current Turkish government.Biden, on the other hand, knows the region and its leaders well from his time as vice president and his official visits to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia. And unlike Trump, he doesn’t share a close relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Quite the opposite: In the past, Biden has made no secret of his hostility toward the current Turkish government—and, conversely, of his support for Greece and Cyprus. While Trump played up his friendship with Erdogan, Biden has dubbed him an “autocrat” who, as he told the New York Times in an interview last December, has “to pay a price.”
Biden isn’t alone in his sentiments. Concern in Washington over Turkey has been growing in recent times across the political divide. Even so, “Biden the president may not be quite the same as Biden the candidate,” Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said in November. “Turkey borders Syria, Iran, Iraq, and, across the Black Sea, Russia. Whatever U.S. policy is in these places, it will be a lot easier and less costly with Turkey onboard.”
The region’s troubles consist of a number of interconnected disputes, all of which have Turkey as a common denominator, as Ankara seeks to challenge what it sees as an unfair regional status quo. “Turkey feels it is being ‘boxed in’ in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Cagaptay said.
This feeling is expressed most fully at sea, where Turkey has long complained of an unfair distribution of maritime territories, arguing that the status quo leaves it with a largely coastal territory, while its neighbors enjoy extensive sea zones. Ankara thus refuses to recognize Greek sea-boundary claims in the Aegean, where dozens of Greek islands lie close to the Turkish coast. It also doesn’t recognize Athens’s claim to seas south and east of the Greek island of Crete—regions that a 2019 deal between Turkey and the United Nations-recognized Libyan government in Tripoli count as Turkish, but which international maritime law still considers Greek.
“Turkey feels it is being ‘boxed in’ in the Eastern Mediterranean.”Tensions rose this fall when Turkey dispatched a hydrocarbon exploration vessel, the Oruc Reis, into these waters near Crete, sending Greek and Turkish warships to battle stations, while also prompting France to dispatch naval vessels in support of European Union ally Greece.
At the same time, since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 split the island into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, there has been no agreement between Ankara and Nicosia over where their respective maritime and airspace frontiers lie. This became a far more divisive issue after 2012, when natural gas was discovered in waters claimed by Cyprus, but which Turkey now also claims.
Disagreements over how to handle the region’s unexpected hydrocarbon bonanza have also plagued U.N.-sponsored talks aimed at reunifying Cyprus. These talks collapsed in 2017, after which Turkey began to send seismic research vessels and drill ships into the waters it contests with Cyprus. Those vessels are still there today, and Cyprus, with the backing of Greece and France, has continued to protest their presence, calling for the EU to punish Turkey with economic sanctions—a call that has so far gone unheeded but will be reconsidered by EU leaders in December.
Although there is a widespread expectation in the region that a Biden administration will bring new activism and engagement to the stalemate, tackling these interconnected issues will be no easy task. The October elections in Northern Cyprus, which are only recognized internationally by Turkey, only complicate the matter. The new prime minister, Ersin Tatar, an Erdogan ally, supports the new Turkish position of a two-state solution for Cyprus. This would split the island permanently between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, who have been separated by a U.N.-patrolled buffer zone since 1974.
Turkey’s position runs contrary to the last five decades of U.N.-sponsored negotiations, which have always aimed—unsuccessfully—at a comprehensive settlement to reunify the island. This aim is still supported by the Greek Cypriot leadership, Greece, the EU, the United States, and the wider international community. But Turkey argues that after five decades of failed negotiations, reunification is a waste of time and the de facto division of the island should be made de jure.
While this position has few supporters beyond Turkey and Northern Cyprus, it raises the possibility of a permanent breakdown in the U.N. negotiations. Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikos Christodoulides also voiced his fears in November that Ankara’s position could also lead to an eventual annexation of the Turkish Cypriot north by Turkey.
Faced with the potential failure of any new reunification effort, then, “Biden may have to decide if he should still try to get a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem, or if he should tackle the hydrocarbons issue separately and immediately,” said Erol Kaymak, an international relations professor at Eastern Mediterranean University in Turkish Northern Cyprus.
“Biden will want de-escalation, and I wouldn’t be surprised if one of his first calls wasn’t to Erdogan to ask him to help with that.”On the Aegean, meanwhile, where Greece and Turkey have yet more disputed territorial claims, “Biden will want de-escalation, and I wouldn’t be surprised if one of his first calls wasn’t to Erdogan to ask him to help with that,” Cagaptay said. Unlike Trump, Biden will not be able to rely on any personal relationship with Erdogan in doing that. Instead, he is more likely to work with multilateral organizations to leverage change. “Biden will give much greater weight than Trump to alliances and institutions,” said Ian Lesser, a vice president of the German Marshall Fund.
Specifically, we can expect him to look to the EU, given that Cyprus and Greece are both EU member states. “Starting under President [Barack] Obama,” said Sinan Ulgen, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, “the U.S. has been expecting Europe to take a bigger role, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the dispute is, after all, between Turkey and two EU member states.”
Meanwhile, “Turkey will also recalibrate its foreign policy to take account of the change in the White House,” Ulgen said. “This will also mean there will need to be a difficult, but more open dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey about a range of grievances.” Those run from the Syrian civil war to Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles—and threats of U.S. sanctions in response to those missiles’ recent testing, meaning that “there could well be some turbulence ahead in Turkish-U.S. relations,” Ulgen said.
That turbulence, in turn, may mean that instead of solving the region’s problems, Biden may only contribute to the troubled waters to come in the Eastern Mediterranean.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-02--Cutting Through the Hype on Asia’s New Trade Deal

Cutting Through the Hype on Asia ’ s New Trade Deal Last month , 15 countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP ) , a landmark Indo-Pacific trade deal designed to “ create new employment opportunities , raise living standards , and improve the general welfare of their peoples.
” The original impetus for negotiations came from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) , which contributes 10 of the partnership ’ s members .
But around 80 percent of the new bloc ’ s combined $ 25 trillion GDP comes from just two countries : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trillion comes from ASEAN , and the remainder from South Korea , Australia , and New Zealand .
Is the RCEP big ?
Yes .
Is it meaningful ?
No .
Liberal internationalists may take encouragement from the signing of a new trade deal—any trade deal—in the current global climate .
But the RCEP is a straight tariff-reduction agreement at a time when base tariffs are already low , and countries don ’ t hesitate to impose punitive tariffs whenever it suits their foreign-policy objectives .
The RCEP says virtually nothing about economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are unenforceable .
It avoids difficult issues like government subsidies , government procurement , theft of intellectual property , and investor-state dispute settlement .
Labor standards aren ’ t even mentioned .
Agricultural trade is largely exempt .
The RCEP truly is a China-style trade agreement : platitudinous and ineffective .
Nonetheless , the RCEP has been lauded as “ the world ’ s largest trade agreement , ” supposedly creating a European Union-style trade bloc that provides “ a European Union-style single set of trade rules ” to govern the Indo-Pacific economy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accelerate a shift in global trade toward East Asia and away from the West.
” By remaining aloof from the negotiations , the United States has clearly lost out ” in terms of international influence and economic prosperity .
The Peterson Institute for International Economics ( PIIE ) estimates that the RCEP will boost global GDP by $ 186 billion a year , with China , Japan , and Korea gaining $ 85 billion , $ 48 billion , and $ 23 billion , respectively .
The fact that the RCEP will do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad behavior is probably the reason why India pulled out of the deal .
That ’ s the hype .
Now the reality .
The world will have to wait 10 years to see those GDP gains : The PIIE ’ s estimates pertain to forecasts for 2030 .
Based on past long-term trend growth rates ( and ignoring coronavirus effects ) , the world ’ s economy would be expected to grow around 40 percent over that period .
The RCEP may add two-tenths of a percentage point to that figure , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rounding error .
As for European Union-style integration , forget about a common market , freedom of movement , or even binding arbitration for dispute settlement .
Despite 469 pages covering the liberalization of trade in services , China ’ s internet will remain closed .
Even the deal ’ s tariff reduction provisions should be taken with a large grain of salt .
Reducing tariffs to zero sounds dramatic when considered in the abstract .
Get down to details , and there ’ s much less to get excited about .
For @ @ @ @ @ @ @ category of exports to China is machinery , at over $ 10 billion a year .
China ’ s highest tariffs on Japanese goods in this category are currently just 10 percent , scheduled to reduce to zero by 2030 or 2035 .
But in the most important categories of machinery—industrial robots and machines used to print integrated circuit boards—the tariffs are already zero .
Similarly , Australia ’ s main export to China , iron ore , is already tariff-free .
The RCEP will , however , eliminate China ’ s 3 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That might help—if China allows any of Australia ’ s coal to unload .
Reflecting an undeclared Chinese embargo , Australia currently has 82 coal vessels carrying 8.8 million metric tons of coal and 1500 crew stranded outside Chinese ports , where they await clearances to dock and unload .
Under the RCEP , China ’ s 14 percent tariff on imported wine will also be lifted next year , but in the meantime China has slapped a 200 percent levy on Australian wine—ostensibly as an anti-dumping measure , but in reality as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to abandon its efforts to stem Chinese influence in the country .
The fact that the RCEP will do nothing to rein in China ’ s bad behavior is probably the reason why India pulled out of the deal .
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been alternatively criticized for protecting Indian agriculture and praised for protecting manufacturing .
The criticism is absurd : The RCEP doesn ’ t even cover agriculture .
The praise is more reasonable—participation in the RCEP would have left India highly exposed to imports of cheap Chinese and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inefficient manufacturing is only part of the story .
There seems no reason to doubt Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ’ s own account of the reasons for his country ’ s withdrawal : non-tariff barriers , state subsidies , and a lack of transparency .
What he didn ’ t say was : on the part of China .
China may score propaganda points by posing as the guardian of the international system , but the system itself is increasingly bypassing China .
Even before the 2016 U.S. elections were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements became talismanic symbols of internationalism , global cooperation , and the liberal order writ large .
Since then , liberal internationalists have embraced them even more strongly as bulwarks against Trump-style populist nationalism , and have celebrated the RCEP as marking the end of the anti-trade backlash .
Yet it wasn ’ t only Trump who rubbished globalization with his America-first slogan .
The populist-progressive Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders also made the Trans-Pacific Partnership ( TPP ) , negotiated by the Bush and Obama administrations , a target of his 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hillary Clinton , ultimately came out against the TPP .
Four years later , President-elect Joe Biden has pledged to rewrite global trade rules to allow him to prefer U.S. suppliers in government procurement , and to erect other new barriers such as a border tax on carbon .
The global leader most loudly proclaiming his support for internationalization , an open global economy , tariff cuts , the “ liberalization of trade and investment , ” and “ high-standard free-trade agreements ” is … Chinese President Xi Jinping .
And that puts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the January 2017 World Economic Forum , they cheered him as the anti-Trump , a globalist committed to maintaining and expanding an open international system .
Four years later , any illusions the world may have had about the potential liberalism of Xi and China have been laid to rest .
Thus they have sought to redirect their RCEP plaudits toward ASEAN or simply contented themselves with cheering the future of Asia in general , while attempting to ignore the giant panda in the room .
The truth is that there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Asia—or anywhere else in the world .
North America has the NAFTA-successor United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement , and Europe of course has the European Union .
Both are true economic governance arrangements , the EU far more so than the USMCA .
Since the failure of the TPP , there has been nothing comparable in Asia .
The 11 erstwhile U.S. partners in the TPP did sign their own rump agreement in 2018 , the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ( CPTPP ) , but it is neither comprehensive ( it stripped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and dispute settlement provisions of the original TPP ) nor progressive ( in the absence of U.S. political pressure on workers ’ rights , the remaining 11 countries settled for a bland statement reaffirming their “ obligations as members of the International Labour Organization ” ) .
The CPTPP , like the RCEP , is a straight tariff-reduction agreement focused on areas where tariffs were already low or trade volumes relatively insignificant .
Liberal internationalists may crow that “ the RCEP and the CPTPP are powerful counterexamples to the global decline in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wishful thinking—and unjustified pessimism at the same time .
Tariff reduction agreements like the RCEP and the CPTPP are largely harmless , but hardly transformative .
That said , the stress test posed by the coronavirus pandemic has proven the extraordinary robustness of global production networks .
International supply chains have rapidly shifted away from China toward more rules-abiding countries such as Vietnam , Bangladesh , and India .
With its participation in the CPTPP as with Xi ’ s ode to trade in Davos , China may score propaganda points by posing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , but the system itself is increasingly bypassing China .
That may be bad news for global trade negotiators , but it can only be good for global trade .

Last month, 15 countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a landmark Indo-Pacific trade deal designed to “create new employment opportunities, raise living standards, and improve the general welfare of their peoples.” The original impetus for negotiations came from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which contributes 10 of the partnership's members. But around 80 percent of the new bloc’s combined $25 trillion GDP comes from just two countries: China and Japan. Another $3 trillion comes from ASEAN, and the remainder from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
Last month, 15 countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a landmark Indo-Pacific trade deal designed to “create new employment opportunities, raise living standards, and improve the general welfare of their peoples.” The original impetus for negotiations came from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which contributes 10 of the partnership’s members. But around 80 percent of the new bloc’s combined $25 trillion GDP comes from just two countries: China and Japan. Another $3 trillion comes from ASEAN, and the remainder from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
Is the RCEP big? Yes. Is it meaningful? No. Liberal internationalists may take encouragement from the signing of a new trade deal—any trade deal—in the current global climate. But the RCEP is a straight tariff-reduction agreement at a time when base tariffs are already low, and countries don’t hesitate to impose punitive tariffs whenever it suits their foreign-policy objectives. The RCEP says virtually nothing about economic governance, and even its trade provisions are unenforceable. It avoids difficult issues like government subsidies, government procurement, theft of intellectual property, and investor-state dispute settlement. Labor standards aren’t even mentioned. Agricultural trade is largely exempt. The RCEP truly is a China-style trade agreement: platitudinous and ineffective.
Nonetheless, the RCEP has been lauded as “the world’s largest trade agreement,” supposedly creating a European Union-style trade bloc that provides “a European Union-style single set of trade rules” to govern the Indo-Pacific economy. The deal is “expected to accelerate a shift in global trade toward East Asia and away from the West.” By remaining aloof from the negotiations, the United States has clearly lost out” in terms of international influence and economic prosperity. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) estimates that the RCEP will boost global GDP by $186 billion a year, with China, Japan, and Korea gaining $85 billion, $48 billion, and $23 billion, respectively.
The fact that the RCEP will do nothing to rein in China’s bad behavior is probably the reason why India pulled out of the deal.
That’s the hype. Now the reality. The world will have to wait 10 years to see those GDP gains: The PIIE’s estimates pertain to forecasts for 2030. Based on past long-term trend growth rates (and ignoring coronavirus effects), the world’s economy would be expected to grow around 40 percent over that period. The RCEP may add two-tenths of a percentage point to that figure, if you can find it in the rounding error. As for European Union-style integration, forget about a common market, freedom of movement, or even binding arbitration for dispute settlement. Despite 469 pages covering the liberalization of trade in services, China’s internet will remain closed.
Even the deal’s tariff reduction provisions should be taken with a large grain of salt. Reducing tariffs to zero sounds dramatic when considered in the abstract. Get down to details, and there’s much less to get excited about. For example, Japan’s single largest category of exports to China is machinery, at over $10 billion a year. China’s highest tariffs on Japanese goods in this category are currently just 10 percent, scheduled to reduce to zero by 2030 or 2035. But in the most important categories of machinery—industrial robots and machines used to print integrated circuit boards—the tariffs are already zero.
Similarly, Australia’s main export to China, iron ore, is already tariff-free. The RCEP will, however, eliminate China’s 3 percent tariff on coal next year. That might help—if China allows any of Australia’s coal to unload. Reflecting an undeclared Chinese embargo, Australia currently has 82 coal vessels carrying 8.8 million metric tons of coal and 1500 crew stranded outside Chinese ports, where they await clearances to dock and unload. Under the RCEP, China’s 14 percent tariff on imported wine will also be lifted next year, but in the meantime China has slapped a 200 percent levy on Australian wine—ostensibly as an anti-dumping measure, but in reality as an attempt to exert pressure on Australia to abandon its efforts to stem Chinese influence in the country.
The fact that the RCEP will do nothing to rein in China’s bad behavior is probably the reason why India pulled out of the deal. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been alternatively criticized for protecting Indian agriculture and praised for protecting manufacturing. The criticism is absurd: The RCEP doesn’t even cover agriculture. The praise is more reasonable—participation in the RCEP would have left India highly exposed to imports of cheap Chinese and Southeast Asian small manufactures—but the protection of inefficient manufacturing is only part of the story. There seems no reason to doubt Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s own account of the reasons for his country’s withdrawal: non-tariff barriers, state subsidies, and a lack of transparency. What he didn’t say was: on the part of China.
China may score propaganda points by posing as the guardian of the international system, but the system itself is increasingly bypassing China.
Even before the 2016 U.S. elections were won by President Donald Trump, trade agreements became talismanic symbols of internationalism, global cooperation, and the liberal order writ large. Since then, liberal internationalists have embraced them even more strongly as bulwarks against Trump-style populist nationalism, and have celebrated the RCEP as marking the end of the anti-trade backlash. Yet it wasn’t only Trump who rubbished globalization with his America-first slogan. The populist-progressive Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders also made the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), negotiated by the Bush and Obama administrations, a target of his 2016 campaign. Even the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton, ultimately came out against the TPP. Four years later, President-elect Joe Biden has pledged to rewrite global trade rules to allow him to prefer U.S. suppliers in government procurement, and to erect other new barriers such as a border tax on carbon.
The global leader most loudly proclaiming his support for internationalization, an open global economy, tariff cuts, the “liberalization of trade and investment,” and “high-standard free-trade agreements” is … Chinese President Xi Jinping. And that puts liberal internationalists in a bind. At the January 2017 World Economic Forum, they cheered him as the anti-Trump, a globalist committed to maintaining and expanding an open international system. Four years later, any illusions the world may have had about the potential liberalism of Xi and China have been laid to rest. Thus they have sought to redirect their RCEP plaudits toward ASEAN or simply contented themselves with cheering the future of Asia in general, while attempting to ignore the giant panda in the room.
The truth is that there’s little appetite for deep global governance in Asia—or anywhere else in the world. North America has the NAFTA-successor United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and Europe of course has the European Union. Both are true economic governance arrangements, the EU far more so than the USMCA. Since the failure of the TPP, there has been nothing comparable in Asia. The 11 erstwhile U.S. partners in the TPP did sign their own rump agreement in 2018, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), but it is neither comprehensive (it stripped out most of the agriculture, investment, and dispute settlement provisions of the original TPP) nor progressive (in the absence of U.S. political pressure on workers’ rights, the remaining 11 countries settled for a bland statement reaffirming their “obligations as members of the International Labour Organization”). The CPTPP, like the RCEP, is a straight tariff-reduction agreement focused on areas where tariffs were already low or trade volumes relatively insignificant.
Liberal internationalists may crow that “the RCEP and the CPTPP are powerful counterexamples to the global decline in rules-based trade,” but that is wishful thinking—and unjustified pessimism at the same time. Tariff reduction agreements like the RCEP and the CPTPP are largely harmless, but hardly transformative. That said, the stress test posed by the coronavirus pandemic has proven the extraordinary robustness of global production networks. International supply chains have rapidly shifted away from China toward more rules-abiding countries such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India. With its participation in the CPTPP as with Xi’s ode to trade in Davos, China may score propaganda points by posing as the guardian of the rules-based international system, but the system itself is increasingly bypassing China. That may be bad news for global trade negotiators, but it can only be good for global trade.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-03--Ethiopia Needs the United States to Act as an Honest Broker in the Nile Dam Dispute

Ethiopia Needs the United States to Act as an Honest Broker in the Nile Dam Dispute In August , the United States decided to cut its foreign aid to Ethiopia during a period of unprecedented crisis for the region , affecting up to $ 130 million in funds .
Construction continues on Africa ’ s largest hydroelectric dam , the Grand Ethiopian Resonance Dam ( GERD ) on the Blue Nile River , with negotiations between Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan at a standstill .
Despite U.S. mediation since November 2019 , the countries haven ’ t reached an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to penalize Ethiopia .
East Africa is already facing a triple challenge this year : the coronavirus pandemic ; a plague of desert locusts ; and flooding that has affected more than 1.3 million people .
Ethiopia has recorded more than 110,554 cases of COVID-19 and 1,709 deaths as of Dec. 2 .
The locust swarms , which began in Yemen and have reached Ethiopia , Kenya , and Somalia , are likely to cause a regional food security crisis that compounds the effects of the pandemic .
The World Bank estimates that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in East Africa and Yemen this year .
In Ethiopia alone , the locusts have damaged 200,000 hectares of crops .
And in recent weeks , internal conflict has flared in Ethiopia , where a militia attack on military bases in the Tigray region on Nov. 4 pushed the federal government to respond with force .
Unless Ethiopia manages the conflict , it could create a regional crisis throughout the Horn of Africa .
Amid these challenges , the long-standing debate over the construction of the GERD remains unresolved .
The U.S. aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ current negotiations but will instead complicate the talks .
The United States didn ’ t take the same harsh approach toward Egypt , which will affect its perceived role as a neutral mediator .
The move could increase tensions and disrupt the ongoing negotiations with Egypt and Sudan over the filling and operation of the dam .
Experts and some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that suspending aid didn ’ t take into consideration current conditions in the region .
Since the GERD is an Ethiopian-financed project , aid cuts at a critical moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will significantly affect the people of Ethiopia .
Given more than three-quarters of the dam is already complete , Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan should return to the table to pursue a long-term water-sharing agreement .
A discussion that prepares for challenges down the road , including climate change-induced shocks , can put the ongoing talks back on track .
As a result , in 1999 the riparian countries established an inter-governmental partnership , the Nile Basin Initiative , and signed an agreement for sustainable and equitable use of the river .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the initiative , and Eritrea participated as an observer . )
Following up on the 1999 agreement , Ethiopia began construction on the massive , $ 4.6 billion GERD project in 2011 .
Progress in the GERD negotiations has been slow , but there is promise .
In 2015 , the leaders of Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan met in Khartoum and signed a Declaration of Principles agreement that supplanted the colonial-era water treaties that had given Egypt an upper hand over other riparian countries The dam is a national project and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ethiopians , and the Ethiopian government argues that it will not significantly reduce the flow of the Nile .
Expected to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity upon completion , the GERD aims to fulfill the demands of the 55 percent of Ethiopia ’ s population that currently lacks access to electricity .
It will also help reduce poverty and boost businesses : Enterprises across Ethiopia incur up to 15 percent of production costs due to power outages .
Instead of helping mediate the dispute , the U.S. decision to withhold aid to Ethiopia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February , Ethiopia walked away from the last round of U.S-mediated talks in Washington .
The African Union , which is currently involved in negotiations , has embraced principle of “ African solutions for African problems , ” which seeks to prevent external interference in disputes and conflicts .
Since delaying the completion of the dam would lead to huge additional costs , Ethiopia has kept up construction .
The first stage of filling the dam ’ s reservoir was conducted in July , and it will continue over the next five to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 74 billion cubic meters of water .
First , the three countries and other stakeholders must recognize that sharing Nile water resources is not a zero-sum game ; it can result in a win-win situation .
This basic principle undermines Egypt and Sudan ’ s colonial-era water treaties , which excluded upstream countries without their consent .
In both the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 United Kingdom and independent Egypt treaties , the upstream riparian countries did not participate .
Second , the United States must remain neutral in the mediation process @ @ @ @ @ @ @ broker .
In a phone conversation with Sudan and Israel ’ s leaders in October , U.S. President Donald Trump said that Egypt might “ blow up ” the dam if an agreement is not reached over its operation .
Former U.S .
Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn said that the Trump administration was “ putting its thumb on the scale in favor of Egypt.
” Ethiopia ’ s foreign minister has called the United States “ undiplomatic ” in its effort to resolve the GERD dispute .
Third , other countries ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the Colorado River Basin in the United States and Mexico , could help to resolve concerns about the management and operation of the GERD .
These experiences could complement the advice of experts ’ groups formed by Ethiopia , Egypt , and Sudan to analyze the prospects of a major drought and how to address it .
Following a scientific approach and promoting the development of groundwater resources in Egypt could assuage the fears of the occurrence of drought .
Fourth , science , diplomacy , and collaboration will be important to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiple and overlapping shocks , such as the coronavirus pandemic , desert locusts , and flooding .
The United States should provide additional support to facilitate a long-lasting solution , not cut off aid at a critical time .
Since July , more than 300,000 people have been displaced by flooding in Ethiopia , exposing them to malaria and waterborne diseases more likely to affect vulnerable groups such as women and children .
Finally , given the importance of U.S. aid to Ethiopia ’ s economy , cutting it off as the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It will negatively affect the U.S. government ’ s image in Ethiopia , increase tensions , and undermine the perception of U.S. neutrality in the GERD negotiations .
Above all , managing the GERD dispute will not only help Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan but also the entire East African region .
Ethiopia is too big to fail ; if it does , the entire region will be dragged down with it .
The African Union has begun a conflict resolution discussion with the Ethiopian government over the Tigray conflict , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the African Union-led talks on the GERD dispute should be scaled up to reach an agreement on the filling and operation of the dam .
There is no peaceful way to resolve an issue such as the GERD dispute other than diplomacy and collaboration .
Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan have a long history of diplomatic relations with the United States and look forward to working with the incoming Biden administration—which should serve as a truly neutral broker—when it takes office in January 2021 .
Governing the Nile River water with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the interest of both upstream and downstream countries on sharing the Nile River rather than relying on the controversial colonial-era treaties .
In this case , all three countries , as well as stakeholders in the negotiations , would be winners .

In August, the United States decided to cut its foreign aid to Ethiopia during a period of unprecedented crisis for the region, affecting up to $130 million in funds. Construction continues on Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, with negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan at a standstill. Despite U.S. mediation since November 2019, the countries haven’t reached an agreement over the dam—leading the United States to penalize Ethiopia.
In August, the United States decided to cut its foreign aid to Ethiopia during a period of unprecedented crisis for the region, affecting up to $130 million in funds. Construction continues on Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, with negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan at a standstill. Despite U.S. mediation since November 2019, the countries haven’t reached an agreement over the dam—leading the United States to penalize Ethiopia.
East Africa is already facing a triple challenge this year: the coronavirus pandemic; a plague of desert locusts; and flooding that has affected more than 1.3 million people. Ethiopia has recorded more than 110,554 cases of COVID-19 and 1,709 deaths as of Dec. 2. The locust swarms, which began in Yemen and have reached Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, are likely to cause a regional food security crisis that compounds the effects of the pandemic. The World Bank estimates that the swarms could cost $8.5 billion in East Africa and Yemen this year. In Ethiopia alone, the locusts have damaged 200,000 hectares of crops.
And in recent weeks, internal conflict has flared in Ethiopia, where a militia attack on military bases in the Tigray region on Nov. 4 pushed the federal government to respond with force. Unless Ethiopia manages the conflict, it could create a regional crisis throughout the Horn of Africa.
Amid these challenges, the long-standing debate over the construction of the GERD remains unresolved. The U.S. aid cuts to Ethiopia will not help the current negotiations but will instead complicate the talks. The United States didn’t take the same harsh approach toward Egypt, which will affect its perceived role as a neutral mediator. The move could increase tensions and disrupt the ongoing negotiations with Egypt and Sudan over the filling and operation of the dam.
Experts and some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that suspending aid didn’t take into consideration current conditions in the region. Since the GERD is an Ethiopian-financed project, aid cuts at a critical moment when the country already faces multiple challenges will significantly affect the people of Ethiopia. Given more than three-quarters of the dam is already complete, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan should return to the table to pursue a long-term water-sharing agreement. A discussion that prepares for challenges down the road, including climate change-induced shocks, can put the ongoing talks back on track.
The Blue Nile is a tributary that begins in Ethiopia but supplies 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River, which passes through 11 riparian countries. Despite Ethiopia’s plans to build a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile since the 1960s, colonial-era water treaties left long-standing debates with Egypt and Sudan, which lie downstream. Established in 1963, the Organization of African Unity—the African Union’s predecessor—rejected most colonial-era agreements, and Ethiopia and the other upstream countries refuse to recognize water-sharing treaties between Egypt and Sudan signed in 1929 and 1959.
As a result, in 1999 the riparian countries established an inter-governmental partnership, the Nile Basin Initiative, and signed an agreement for sustainable and equitable use of the river. (Egypt and Sudan were part of the initiative, and Eritrea participated as an observer.) Following up on the 1999 agreement, Ethiopia began construction on the massive, $4.6 billion GERD project in 2011.
Progress in the GERD negotiations has been slow, but there is promise. In 2015, the leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan met in Khartoum and signed a Declaration of Principles agreement that supplanted the colonial-era water treaties that had given Egypt an upper hand over other riparian countries
The dam is a national project and a source of pride for millions of Ethiopians, and the Ethiopian government argues that it will not significantly reduce the flow of the Nile. Expected to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity upon completion, the GERD aims to fulfill the demands of the 55 percent of Ethiopia’s population that currently lacks access to electricity. It will also help reduce poverty and boost businesses: Enterprises across Ethiopia incur up to 15 percent of production costs due to power outages.
Instead of helping mediate the dispute, the U.S. decision to withhold aid to Ethiopia could disrupt the ongoing discussions. In February, Ethiopia walked away from the last round of U.S-mediated talks in Washington. The African Union, which is currently involved in negotiations, has embraced principle of “African solutions for African problems,” which seeks to prevent external interference in disputes and conflicts.
Since delaying the completion of the dam would lead to huge additional costs, Ethiopia has kept up construction. The first stage of filling the dam’s reservoir was conducted in July, and it will continue over the next five to seven years until the dam reserve stores 74 billion cubic meters of water.
The GERD is expected to significantly improve the livelihood of millions throughout the region. Ethiopia plans to supply affordable electric power to the neighboring countries, including Djibouti and Sudan. Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, and the other parties involved in mediation, should take five key actions to facilitate a win-win outcome in the current negotiations.
First, the three countries and other stakeholders must recognize that sharing Nile water resources is not a zero-sum game; it can result in a win-win situation. This basic principle undermines Egypt and Sudan’s colonial-era water treaties, which excluded upstream countries without their consent. In both the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 United Kingdom and independent Egypt treaties, the upstream riparian countries did not participate.
Second, the United States must remain neutral in the mediation process or risk losing credibility as an honest broker. In a phone conversation with Sudan and Israel’s leaders in October, U.S. President Donald Trump said that Egypt might “blow up” the dam if an agreement is not reached over its operation. Former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn said that the Trump administration was “putting its thumb on the scale in favor of Egypt.” Ethiopia’s foreign minister has called the United States “undiplomatic” in its effort to resolve the GERD dispute.
Third, other countries’ experiences with a transboundary river, such as the Colorado River Basin in the United States and Mexico, could help to resolve concerns about the management and operation of the GERD. These experiences could complement the advice of experts’ groups formed by Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan to analyze the prospects of a major drought and how to address it. Following a scientific approach and promoting the development of groundwater resources in Egypt could assuage the fears of the occurrence of drought.
Fourth, science, diplomacy, and collaboration will be important to mitigate the risks and improve resilience to multiple and overlapping shocks, such as the coronavirus pandemic, desert locusts, and flooding. The United States should provide additional support to facilitate a long-lasting solution, not cut off aid at a critical time. Since July, more than 300,000 people have been displaced by flooding in Ethiopia, exposing them to malaria and waterborne diseases more likely to affect vulnerable groups such as women and children.
Finally, given the importance of U.S. aid to Ethiopia’s economy, cutting it off as the country faces multiple daunting challenges is unwise. It will negatively affect the U.S. government’s image in Ethiopia, increase tensions, and undermine the perception of U.S. neutrality in the GERD negotiations.
Above all, managing the GERD dispute will not only help Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan but also the entire East African region. Ethiopia is too big to fail; if it does, the entire region will be dragged down with it. The African Union has begun a conflict resolution discussion with the Ethiopian government over the Tigray conflict, in collaboration with the United Nations. Likewise, the African Union-led talks on the GERD dispute should be scaled up to reach an agreement on the filling and operation of the dam.
There is no peaceful way to resolve an issue such as the GERD dispute other than diplomacy and collaboration. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have a long history of diplomatic relations with the United States and look forward to working with the incoming Biden administration—which should serve as a truly neutral broker—when it takes office in January 2021.
Governing the Nile River water with a new transboundary cooperative framework can accommodate the interest of both upstream and downstream countries on sharing the Nile River rather than relying on the controversial colonial-era treaties. In this case, all three countries, as well as stakeholders in the negotiations, would be winners.