foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Why the World Should Root for the EU in Brexit Talks

Why the World Should Root for the EU in Brexit Talks In words now coming back to haunt him , British Prime Minister Boris Johnson once said that negotiations with the European Union on the terms of Britain ’ s departure from the bloc would let Britain have its cake and eat it too .
The United Kingdom , he insisted , would walk away with a trade deal that preserved unfettered access to the continent ’ s market of 450 million consumers , while freeing the U.K. from pesky European rules , regulations , and standards .
The only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t seem to want to give away their half of the cake .
As talks remain deadlocked and a hard deadline of Jan. 1 , 2021 , is fast approaching for Britain to crash out of the EU , the rest of the world should be rooting for Europe to hold on to its share .
It is easy to dismiss the too long-running Brexit show as an internal European affair—of deep interest to companies doing business there , of slightly less interest to European citizens , and of little consequence to anyone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For one , there will be short-term economic costs—and if Britain has a hard exit with no new trade rules in place , it could send shock waves around the globe .
The British economy is expected to shrink by 4 percent over the next decade , and there will likely be massive short-term disruptions in trucking and air freight , possibly leading to widespread shortages .
But there is also a larger stake for the world .
If Brussels folds in the negotiations , it will mark of the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the race to the bottom in global trade .
At the heart of the unresolved Brexit issues is a hoary metaphor known as “ the level playing field.
” For decades , the phrase was uttered as justification every time a trade minister slapped tariffs or other protectionist restraints on imports .
Who could possibly compete on tilted playing field , after all ?
But the metaphor captured the belief shared in many of the West ’ s market-based democracies that capitalist competition is expected to be more or less fair .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market share to a nimbler , more innovative competitor .
But what if that competitor is enjoying huge , tax-free loans or other subsidies from the government ?
Or given preferential treatment by regulators ?
Or allowed to cut costs by dumping waste into a nearby river ?
Most of us would consider these practices unfair and wish to constrain them .
Many of the issues dividing the United States and China over trade , for example , are level playing field issues .
The EU , though not without its own sins @ @ @ @ @ @ @ high-standards capitalism .
In the Brexit negotiations , these issues have proved by far the hardest to resolve .
The EU , though not without its own sins , has been the global champion of high-standards capitalism .
It has gone much further than the United States , for example , in restraining government subsidies for companies , resisting tax competition that drains government coffers , and insisting on high levels of social protections for its citizens .
In the Brexit talks , the European fear is that an unshackled Britain will siphon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Britain full access to the EU market without any of these costly protections .
The European Council in 2018 went so far as to enshrine the metaphor in its guidelines for the Brexit negotiations , insisting that “ the future relationship will only deliver in a mutually satisfactory way if it includes robust guarantees which ensure a level playing field.
” The aim , the guidelines say , is to “ prevent unfair competitive advantage ” by ensuring that a post-Brexit U.K. does not undercut European rules that restrict state subsidies to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set certain benchmarks for labor standards and environmental protection .
The European Parliament took this a step further , insisting that Britain must adhere to EU standards for consumer protection , climate change , public health , and animal welfare if it wants to keep the same access to the EU market that a member state enjoys .
To the British , such demands undermine the entire reason for the exercise , which is to reassert national control over economic regulation .
Whatever the British people may have wanted when they voted in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appears to have been a top issue—for those parts of the U.K. elite that supported Brexit , the real prize was greater economic autonomy .
Freed from the shackles of supposedly stifling EU regulations , or so the argument went , Britain would become a “ Singapore-on-the-Thames ” —a deregulated , free-trading , business-friendly magnet for investment .
The EU ’ s insistence that the U.K. adhere to EU standards if it wants to remain in the common market is therefore nonnegotiable .
“ To think that we might accept EU supervision on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to see the point of what we are doing , ” Britain ’ s chief negotiator David Frost said in a lecture in Brussels earlier this year .
“ It isn ’ t a simple negotiating position which might move under pressure—it is the point of the whole project.
” The U.K. argues that Brussels should be prepared to accept a trade deal similar to the ones it has negotiated with Canada , Japan , and others , in which the EU is eliminating tariffs without requiring full alignment on standards .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those countries trade far less with Europe and therefore have far less capacity to disrupt EU markets .
Britain , on the other hand , is far more economically integrated with the EU , and laxer standards post-Brexit could pressure the EU to lower its own if it wants to remain competitive .
The Biden team should go further and say publicly that it would prefer a final Brexit deal that respects high European standards .
The Brexiteers certainly have a legitimate point : A more lightly regulated Britain may well enjoy greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coincidence that few of the world ’ s top tech companies are located in Europe .
For a young entrepreneur with a good idea who wants to become fabulously wealthy with minimal interference from the government , the United States is a much better place to set up shop than Europe .
It may also be a touch paranoid for the EU to fear that Britain will suddenly launch a frenzied dismantling of regulations on the environment , labor , and worker safety in the style of U.S. President Donald Trump and his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commitments to uphold existing standards , though he has not agreed to align with future EU rules .
Nor has the EU always practiced what it preaches .
Ireland and the Netherlands are critical hubs for many of the infamous tax avoidance schemes by giant tech companies such as Apple and Google , even as Brussels has tried now and then to crack down on these practices .
The EU state aid regime does far more than most to prevent governments from throwing taxpayer money at companies .
But massive French and German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the company ’ s commercial success , triggering a decadeslong trade confrontation with the United States .
But nonetheless , the EU remains the most serious effort in the world today to smoothen global capitalism ’ s rough edges .
For example , income inequality in EU member states is , on average , far lower than in Britain or the United States .
It is hard , of course , to predict the outcome in deadlocked negotiations .
Both sides have reasons to back away from the cliff before the end of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is by far the weaker of the two .
One of Johnson ’ s big bargaining chips was the prospect for a new trade agreement with the United States , which the anti-EU Trump administration enthusiastically supported .
The United States is by far the largest export market for Britain outside the EU , and progress on a U.S.-U.K. deal would have strengthened Johnson ’ s hand .
But the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden has shown much less enthusiasm for the deal .
The Biden team should go further and say @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal that respects high European standards .
The U.S. trade consensus is already moving more strongly in the direction that freer trade must come with stronger social obligations .
At the insistence of the Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives , for example , the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement—now called United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement—requires Mexico to do far more to uphold labor standards and allow union organizing in its factories ; failure to do so could trigger quick U.S. retaliation .
The European Commission has also handed an olive branch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Washington to seize what it described as a “ once-in-a-generation ” opportunity to embrace a new trans-Atlantic agenda built on shared values , interests , and global influence .
The proposal calls for the two economic giants to deepen cooperation on controlling the pandemic , fighting climate change , regulating the digital economy , screening risky investments , and revitalizing global trade rules through the World Trade Organization .
The agenda fits well with the Biden platform : His agenda to “ build back better ” calls for the United States to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investing in workers , communities , and the tattered social safety net .
A clear Brexit outcome that maintains the commitment to high European standards would be a strong signal that a new direction is possible for global trade and capitalism—where governments work cooperatively to make their economies better serve their people .
As the Brexit negotiations head to a final deal or a final breakdown , the EU should continue to insist that it will only share the cake on equitable terms .
The world is watching .

In words now coming back to haunt him, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson once said that negotiations with the European Union on the terms of Britain’s departure from the bloc would let Britain have its cake and eat it too. The United Kingdom, he insisted, would walk away with a trade deal that preserved unfettered access to the continent’s market of 450 million consumers, while freeing the U.K. from pesky European rules, regulations, and standards. The only problem is that EU negotiators don’t seem to want to give away their half of the cake. As talks remain deadlocked and a hard deadline of Jan. 1, 2021, is fast approaching for Britain to crash out of the EU, the rest of the world should be rooting for Europe to hold on to its share.
In words now coming back to haunt him, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson once said that negotiations with the European Union on the terms of Britain’s departure from the bloc would let Britain have its cake and eat it too. The United Kingdom, he insisted, would walk away with a trade deal that preserved unfettered access to the continent’s market of 450 million consumers, while freeing the U.K. from pesky European rules, regulations, and standards. The only problem is that EU negotiators don’t seem to want to give away their half of the cake. As talks remain deadlocked and a hard deadline of Jan. 1, 2021, is fast approaching for Britain to crash out of the EU, the rest of the world should be rooting for Europe to hold on to its share.
It is easy to dismiss the too long-running Brexit show as an internal European affair—of deep interest to companies doing business there, of slightly less interest to European citizens, and of little consequence to anyone else. That would be a mistake. For one, there will be short-term economic costs—and if Britain has a hard exit with no new trade rules in place, it could send shock waves around the globe. The British economy is expected to shrink by 4 percent over the next decade, and there will likely be massive short-term disruptions in trucking and air freight, possibly leading to widespread shortages.
But there is also a larger stake for the world. If Brussels folds in the negotiations, it will mark of the end of the last, best hope for restraining the race to the bottom in global trade.
At the heart of the unresolved Brexit issues is a hoary metaphor known as “the level playing field.” For decades, the phrase was uttered as justification every time a trade minister slapped tariffs or other protectionist restraints on imports. Who could possibly compete on tilted playing field, after all? But the metaphor captured the belief shared in many of the West’s market-based democracies that capitalist competition is expected to be more or less fair. There is no shame in a company losing market share to a nimbler, more innovative competitor. But what if that competitor is enjoying huge, tax-free loans or other subsidies from the government? Or given preferential treatment by regulators? Or allowed to cut costs by dumping waste into a nearby river? Most of us would consider these practices unfair and wish to constrain them. Many of the issues dividing the United States and China over trade, for example, are level playing field issues.
The EU, though not without its own sins, has been the global champion of high-standards capitalism.
In the Brexit negotiations, these issues have proved by far the hardest to resolve. The EU, though not without its own sins, has been the global champion of high-standards capitalism. It has gone much further than the United States, for example, in restraining government subsidies for companies, resisting tax competition that drains government coffers, and insisting on high levels of social protections for its citizens. In the Brexit talks, the European fear is that an unshackled Britain will siphon off investment by promising companies that invest in Britain full access to the EU market without any of these costly protections.
The European Council in 2018 went so far as to enshrine the metaphor in its guidelines for the Brexit negotiations, insisting that “the future relationship will only deliver in a mutually satisfactory way if it includes robust guarantees which ensure a level playing field.” The aim, the guidelines say, is to “prevent unfair competitive advantage” by ensuring that a post-Brexit U.K. does not undercut European rules that restrict state subsidies to companies, limit tax competition, and set certain benchmarks for labor standards and environmental protection. The European Parliament took this a step further, insisting that Britain must adhere to EU standards for consumer protection, climate change, public health, and animal welfare if it wants to keep the same access to the EU market that a member state enjoys.
To the British, such demands undermine the entire reason for the exercise, which is to reassert national control over economic regulation. Whatever the British people may have wanted when they voted in 2016 to leave the EU—control over immigration appears to have been a top issue—for those parts of the U.K. elite that supported Brexit, the real prize was greater economic autonomy. Freed from the shackles of supposedly stifling EU regulations, or so the argument went, Britain would become a “Singapore-on-the-Thames”—a deregulated, free-trading, business-friendly magnet for investment.
The EU’s insistence that the U.K. adhere to EU standards if it wants to remain in the common market is therefore nonnegotiable. “To think that we might accept EU supervision on so-called level playing field issues simply fails to see the point of what we are doing,” Britain’s chief negotiator David Frost said in a lecture in Brussels earlier this year. “It isn’t a simple negotiating position which might move under pressure—it is the point of the whole project.” The U.K. argues that Brussels should be prepared to accept a trade deal similar to the ones it has negotiated with Canada, Japan, and others, in which the EU is eliminating tariffs without requiring full alignment on standards. But France, in particular, argues that those countries trade far less with Europe and therefore have far less capacity to disrupt EU markets. Britain, on the other hand, is far more economically integrated with the EU, and laxer standards post-Brexit could pressure the EU to lower its own if it wants to remain competitive.
The Biden team should go further and say publicly that it would prefer a final Brexit deal that respects high European standards.
The Brexiteers certainly have a legitimate point: A more lightly regulated Britain may well enjoy greater competitive success. It is likely no coincidence that few of the world’s top tech companies are located in Europe. For a young entrepreneur with a good idea who wants to become fabulously wealthy with minimal interference from the government, the United States is a much better place to set up shop than Europe. It may also be a touch paranoid for the EU to fear that Britain will suddenly launch a frenzied dismantling of regulations on the environment, labor, and worker safety in the style of U.S. President Donald Trump and his Republican allies. Johnson has already made commitments to uphold existing standards, though he has not agreed to align with future EU rules.
Nor has the EU always practiced what it preaches. Ireland and the Netherlands are critical hubs for many of the infamous tax avoidance schemes by giant tech companies such as Apple and Google, even as Brussels has tried now and then to crack down on these practices. The EU state aid regime does far more than most to prevent governments from throwing taxpayer money at companies. But massive French and German subsidies to aircraft maker Airbus helped ensure the company’s commercial success, triggering a decadeslong trade confrontation with the United States. But nonetheless, the EU remains the most serious effort in the world today to smoothen global capitalism’s rough edges. For example, income inequality in EU member states is, on average, far lower than in Britain or the United States.
It is hard, of course, to predict the outcome in deadlocked negotiations. Both sides have reasons to back away from the cliff before the end of the year. But the U.K. position is by far the weaker of the two. One of Johnson’s big bargaining chips was the prospect for a new trade agreement with the United States, which the anti-EU Trump administration enthusiastically supported. The United States is by far the largest export market for Britain outside the EU, and progress on a U.S.-U.K. deal would have strengthened Johnson’s hand. But the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden has shown much less enthusiasm for the deal.
The Biden team should go further and say publicly that it would prefer a final deal that respects high European standards. The U.S. trade consensus is already moving more strongly in the direction that freer trade must come with stronger social obligations. At the insistence of the Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement—now called United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement—requires Mexico to do far more to uphold labor standards and allow union organizing in its factories; failure to do so could trigger quick U.S. retaliation.
The European Commission has also handed an olive branch to the incoming Biden administration, calling on Washington to seize what it described as a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity to embrace a new trans-Atlantic agenda built on shared values, interests, and global influence. The proposal calls for the two economic giants to deepen cooperation on controlling the pandemic, fighting climate change, regulating the digital economy, screening risky investments, and revitalizing global trade rules through the World Trade Organization. The agenda fits well with the Biden platform: His agenda to “build back better” calls for the United States to take a far more European-style approach to investing in workers, communities, and the tattered social safety net.
A clear Brexit outcome that maintains the commitment to high European standards would be a strong signal that a new direction is possible for global trade and capitalism—where governments work cooperatively to make their economies better serve their people. As the Brexit negotiations head to a final deal or a final breakdown, the EU should continue to insist that it will only share the cake on equitable terms. The world is watching.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Numbers Aren’t Reality, but You Can’t Govern Without Them

Numbers Aren ’ t Reality , but You Can ’ t Govern Without Them From COVID-19 to the U.S. election , 2020 has been a year of numbers .
Numbers matter .
Picking which ones to highlight is a powerful tool for democratic and authoritarian governments—even if the choices don ’ t always sync up with the reality they ’ re supposed to depict .
While rejecting quantification altogether may appeal to some populists and intellectuals , governments need some form of it to govern massive societies .
Yet quantification organizes and simplifies a complex reality into something digestible and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ objective truth , transparency , and scientific authority to descriptions of reality or to decisions .
For the dictator or aspiring autocrat , it can make them appear fair , transparent , and accountable .
Even in a democratic state , it can empower one agenda over the other .
Choose to evaluate a policy ’ s impact on the terms of a balance book , and austerity looks appealing .
Choose to evaluate it in years of life saved , and things may appear more generous .
And in the middle of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ involuntary statisticians , anxiously arguing over caseloads and spread , picking the right numbers is more important than ever .
What objects are counted and made politically salient influences public expectations and evaluations .
Once a number is at the center of the debate , it can be difficult to dislodge .
The hypercompetitive market for attention relegates demands to adjust GDP calculation methods or cost-of-living formulas to the back pages .
That ’ s especially the case in systems , such as China ’ s , that pride themselves on being “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lack outside controls or evaluation on officials .
Once officials became used to GDP growth targets being the core part of their evaluations , as had long been the practice under China ’ s “ GDP supremacy , ” moving away from it proved difficult .
Limiting the regime ’ s vision to a single growth measure produced tremendous progress , but pollution , debt , and corruption accumulated in its blind spots .
Numbers have also defined the COVID-19 pandemic .
While the crisis has produced arresting images of empty cities and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scale of the devastation and its spread has been communicated principally in numerical terms .
The New York Times , for instance , put infographics onto its front page in 2020 at three times the rate that it did in 2019 .
U.S. President Donald Trump clearly believed that if the media paid less attention to the virus , it would stop hurting his electoral chances .
Since he knew the coverage was centered on rising case counts , he tossed out a gambit to undermine those numbers .
On Aug. 1 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We have more cases because we have tested far more than any other country , 60,000,000 .
If we tested less , there would be less cases.
” But the trillions of viruses did not care what numbers Fox News showed or the New York Times reported .
The reality is distinct from the number trying to measure that reality .
On the pandemic-induced economic crisis , Trump again attempted to shift to more favorable terrain .
By focusing on stock market indices rather than on the millions of jobs lost or the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Trump could sidestep conversations about the recession by pointing to a bright spot .
But while stock markets typically track the real economy ’ s progress , unlisted small businesses were routed while larger publicly traded firms stabilized .
At the individual level , this split led to what ’ s known as a K-shaped recovery , as just under half of Americans own no stocks , while the top 10 percent hold around 85 percent of shares .
Meanwhile , China focused on the virus rather than the stock market or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s continued development objectives , the Chinese government ’ s response to COVID-19 was deeply trained on the virus itself .
While there were rumblings about trade-offs between opening back up the economy and halting the virus ’ s spread , the country ’ s extensive lockdowns and closures continued through February until a March 22 statement that Wuhan , the original viral epicenter , had seen zero new local cases for four days in a row .
An obsessive focus on particular numbers—both caseloads and the reproduction number of the virus—paid off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made possible a swift economic rebound .
China , with a population of 1.4 billion , has not reported 500 cases in a single day since the end of February , whereas North Dakota , with a population of 750,000 , has averaged over 500 cases each day since Oct. 11 .
After quashing the virus , China , almost alone among the world ’ s major economies , has posted positive year-on-year growth .
And in part as a result , China has finally inched away from its long period of GDP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goal in favor of a targeted range of growth and then dropping that target altogether this year .
While surely some part of that decision is attributable to China ’ s own economic headwinds due to the virus , Beijing in large part blamed the instability of foreign markets , which have been ravaged by the pandemic .
Quantification ’ s weaknesses should not lead us to throw the baby out with the bathwater .
It encourages precise thinking , fair comparisons , informed plans , and subsequent evaluations .
What we need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ different priorities are deeply embedded in the measures governments choose .
Those differences should be treated seriously and honestly , neither ignored as arcana nor tossed aside as irrelevant in an uncertain world .
The pandemic required a focus on the right numbers , not on massaging them to make things appear better or making the false choice of the economy over lives .
The same applies to the final battle against the coronavirus .
The focus on slight differences in vaccine efficiency is a distraction compared to the numbers that matter most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vaccine , and of picking the right groups to vaccinate first .
In the long term , the pandemic might create a public that ’ s more informed—and more active—in choosing what statistics it values .

From COVID-19 to the U.S. election, 2020 has been a year of numbers. Numbers matter. Picking which ones to highlight is a powerful tool for democratic and authoritarian governments—even if the choices don’t always sync up with the reality they’re supposed to depict.
From COVID-19 to the U.S. election, 2020 has been a year of numbers. Numbers matter. Picking which ones to highlight is a powerful tool for democratic and authoritarian governments—even if the choices don’t always sync up with the reality they’re supposed to depict.
While rejecting quantification altogether may appeal to some populists and intellectuals, governments need some form of it to govern massive societies. Yet quantification organizes and simplifies a complex reality into something digestible and concrete. It conveys an aura of objective truth, transparency, and scientific authority to descriptions of reality or to decisions. For the dictator or aspiring autocrat, it can make them appear fair, transparent, and accountable. Even in a democratic state, it can empower one agenda over the other. Choose to evaluate a policy’s impact on the terms of a balance book, and austerity looks appealing. Choose to evaluate it in years of life saved, and things may appear more generous. And in the middle of a pandemic that has made us all involuntary statisticians, anxiously arguing over caseloads and spread, picking the right numbers is more important than ever.
What objects are counted and made politically salient influences public expectations and evaluations. Once a number is at the center of the debate, it can be difficult to dislodge. The hypercompetitive market for attention relegates demands to adjust GDP calculation methods or cost-of-living formulas to the back pages. That’s especially the case in systems, such as China’s, that pride themselves on being “scientific and objective,” and that lack outside controls or evaluation on officials. Once officials became used to GDP growth targets being the core part of their evaluations, as had long been the practice under China’s “GDP supremacy,” moving away from it proved difficult. Limiting the regime’s vision to a single growth measure produced tremendous progress, but pollution, debt, and corruption accumulated in its blind spots.
Numbers have also defined the COVID-19 pandemic. While the crisis has produced arresting images of empty cities and body bags loaded into refrigerated trucks, the scale of the devastation and its spread has been communicated principally in numerical terms. The New York Times, for instance, put infographics onto its front page in 2020 at three times the rate that it did in 2019.
U.S. President Donald Trump clearly believed that if the media paid less attention to the virus, it would stop hurting his electoral chances. Since he knew the coverage was centered on rising case counts, he tossed out a gambit to undermine those numbers. On Aug. 1, he tweeted: “Wrong! We have more cases because we have tested far more than any other country, 60,000,000. If we tested less, there would be less cases.” But the trillions of viruses did not care what numbers Fox News showed or the New York Times reported. The reality is distinct from the number trying to measure that reality.
On the pandemic-induced economic crisis, Trump again attempted to shift to more favorable terrain. By focusing on stock market indices rather than on the millions of jobs lost or the collapse of state and local government revenue, Trump could sidestep conversations about the recession by pointing to a bright spot. But while stock markets typically track the real economy’s progress, unlisted small businesses were routed while larger publicly traded firms stabilized. At the individual level, this split led to what’s known as a K-shaped recovery, as just under half of Americans own no stocks, while the top 10 percent hold around 85 percent of shares.
Meanwhile, China focused on the virus rather than the stock market or the economy. Despite the regime’s continued development objectives, the Chinese government’s response to COVID-19 was deeply trained on the virus itself. While there were rumblings about trade-offs between opening back up the economy and halting the virus’s spread, the country’s extensive lockdowns and closures continued through February until a March 22 statement that Wuhan, the original viral epicenter, had seen zero new local cases for four days in a row. An obsessive focus on particular numbers—both caseloads and the reproduction number of the virus—paid off.
Success at combating the virus also made possible a swift economic rebound. China, with a population of 1.4 billion, has not reported 500 cases in a single day since the end of February, whereas North Dakota, with a population of 750,000, has averaged over 500 cases each day since Oct. 11. After quashing the virus, China, almost alone among the world’s major economies, has posted positive year-on-year growth.
And in part as a result, China has finally inched away from its long period of GDP supremacy, dropping first a specific numerical goal in favor of a targeted range of growth and then dropping that target altogether this year. While surely some part of that decision is attributable to China’s own economic headwinds due to the virus, Beijing in large part blamed the instability of foreign markets, which have been ravaged by the pandemic.
Quantification’s weaknesses should not lead us to throw the baby out with the bathwater. It encourages precise thinking, fair comparisons, informed plans, and subsequent evaluations. What we need is an understanding that different values and different priorities are deeply embedded in the measures governments choose. Those differences should be treated seriously and honestly, neither ignored as arcana nor tossed aside as irrelevant in an uncertain world.
The pandemic required a focus on the right numbers, not on massaging them to make things appear better or making the false choice of the economy over lives. The same applies to the final battle against the coronavirus. The focus on slight differences in vaccine efficiency is a distraction compared to the numbers that matter most: the speed and efficiency of distributing the vaccine, and of picking the right groups to vaccinate first. In the long term, the pandemic might create a public that’s more informed—and more active—in choosing what statistics it values.


Lebanon’s Concrete Cartel

BEIRUT—Even after decades , the international community still has not quite figured out what makes Lebanese politicians tick .
Potential donors focus on economic mismanagement and political will , but gloss over the shady commercial interests that keep sectarian leaders popular .
When Saad Hariri , one of Lebanon ’ s most controversial politician-businessmen , returned to the position of prime minister in October—one year after protests forced his government to resign—it signaled a depressing return to business as usual .
Like outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump , Hariri inherited a business empire from his real-estate tycoon father and is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Also like Trump , Hariri and Lebanon ’ s other sectarian leaders enjoy supporter bases of Trumpian fervor .
He ’ s not alone .
Since the Lebanese civil war , the country ’ s leaders have fused politics and commerce , abusing their positions to buy their supporters ’ loyalty .
Business cartels with political connections leech off government subsidies , filch lucrative state assets , and wildly overcharge for basic products and services .
Rank-and-file loyalists also benefit from corrupt patronage networks , financially tying even more constituents to their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its worst recession in decades , and recovering from a devastating explosion , new economic pressures are forcing Lebanon ’ s cartels to do anything to survive—except change their spots .
The Lebanese public and the government are increasingly broke , leaving corrupt elites with fewer pockets to pillage .
Business cartels are accepting short-term concessions to avoid lasting reform , in the hopes of reactivating stagnant patronage networks in the future .
The institutionalized racket extends deep into the private sector , where oligopolies preside over cartels in everything from bottled water @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s rapacious politico-business elites can not ignore the current economic meltdown , which has decimated consumer spending power .
This year—for the first time in a generation—the Lebanese started paying reasonable prices for one of the cartels ’ darling money-spinners : cement .
Politicians and their associates control Lebanon ’ s only three cement production companies , Cimenterie Nationale S.A.L.
, LafargeHolcim Ltd , and Ciment De Sibline S.A.L .
And since the 1990s , prohibitive tariffs have effectively excluded foreign competition , forcing consumers to buy wildly overpriced Lebanese cement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ cement providers agreed to drop their prices to around $ 30 per tonne .
That was a marked drop from the previous $ 100 per tonne , about three times the global market rate , and in line with the rates the businesses charged abroad .
The country ’ s caretaker government had successfully threatened to lift tariffs on cement imports to secure the cartel ’ s compliance with a cement price ceiling , according to Alain Bifani , the Ministry of Finance ’ s former director-general , said in November .
Bifani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ small successes ” of Hassan Diab ’ s short-lived administration .
Unfortunately , not everyone is so optimistic about the new cement-price ceiling .
The agreement continues on a month-to-month basis only—and resistance in one of Lebanon ’ s most anti-competitive industries is strong .
“ When push came to shove , [ the cartel ] lowered their prices .
But they made it very difficult for the government and resisted as much as they could , ” explained Nafez Zouk , lead economist and emerging markets strategist at Oxford Economics , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the price ceiling , moreover , the cement industry also managed to preserve the tariff regime which , had it been removed , might provide actual competition .
In other words , the cartel may be accepting lower prices for now , but market conditions remain in place for the cartel to exploit the Lebanese people once more .
But now , the bountiful tap of public funds has almost run dry .
As the state faces the world ’ s third highest debt-to-GDP ratio , again Lebanon ’ s cartels will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep the lights on—is one example of a lucrative racket under threat .
With fuel subsidies set to end imminently , fuel importers will have to retreat into survival mode .
Much like cement , three companies allegedly connected to sectarian leaders control fuel imports to Lebanon .
They ’ ve historically been allowed to act as exclusive middlemen between the government and fuel exporting countries .
The sector ’ s tight oligopoly is very lucrative for those involved , explains Jessica Obeid , an independent energy policy consultant .
“ How @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a big question mark , but they definitely make a high cut [ from the Lebanese market ] , ” said Obeid in November .
But now , with foreign currency reserves dangerously low , these importers are about to lose this golden goose .
In the short term , Obeid predicts that the fuel importing cartel will bear losses in the hope that they can remake the profits like usual in the future .
“ I hope that the government will allow more competition to exist [ in the fuel market ] @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many uncertain factors—the main one being when the foreign reserves run out , ” she said .
In short , Lebanon ’ s political figures appear uninterested in fixing the economy , which would mean giving up their own enrichment .
Yet new economic realities are destabilizing some cartels on their own .
A crumbling local currency could address Lebanon ’ s unhealthy addiction to imports , which are already down about 50 percent compared to last year .
In rural Lebanon , a lack of foreign currency is shaking the foundations of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ long exploited small-scale farmers .
Sectarian leaders are evidently at their lowest political popularity in decades , even facing mock public executions after August ’ s catastrophic explosion in Beirut .
But their financial troubles could prove much more damaging .
Leveraged correctly , donors could finally wean politicians off their unethical revenue streams and force-feed them genuine reform , starting with a proper competition law and authority that ensures a level playing field for all businesses .
Successive governments have failed to deliver this basic legislation , because it would allow competitors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bifani believes anything short of a full-scale economic overhaul would squander a unique bargaining position .
“ [ Hariri ] will be tempted to do a deal with the IMF , probably for the lowest amount accompanied by the lowest reforms , ” he said .
“ This would be a disaster because it is a lost opportunity for change.
” Reeling from heavy political and economic hits , Lebanon ’ s sectarian leaders are on the ropes .
But as long as their business fiefdoms remain intact , they won ’ t @ @ @ @ @

BEIRUT—Even after decades, the international community still has not quite figured out what makes Lebanese politicians tick. Potential donors focus on economic mismanagement and political will, but gloss over the shady commercial interests that keep sectarian leaders popular.
BEIRUT—Even after decades, the international community still has not quite figured out what makes Lebanese politicians tick. Potential donors focus on economic mismanagement and political will, but gloss over the shady commercial interests that keep sectarian leaders popular.
When Saad Hariri, one of Lebanon’s most controversial politician-businessmen, returned to the position of prime minister in October—one year after protests forced his government to resign—it signaled a depressing return to business as usual.
Like outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump, Hariri inherited a business empire from his real-estate tycoon father and is not afraid of mixing business and politics. Also like Trump, Hariri and Lebanon’s other sectarian leaders enjoy supporter bases of Trumpian fervor. He’s not alone. Since the Lebanese civil war, the country’s leaders have fused politics and commerce, abusing their positions to buy their supporters’ loyalty. Business cartels with political connections leech off government subsidies, filch lucrative state assets, and wildly overcharge for basic products and services. Rank-and-file loyalists also benefit from corrupt patronage networks, financially tying even more constituents to their leaders.
Now that Lebanon is enduring its worst recession in decades, and recovering from a devastating explosion, new economic pressures are forcing Lebanon’s cartels to do anything to survive—except change their spots. The Lebanese public and the government are increasingly broke, leaving corrupt elites with fewer pockets to pillage. Business cartels are accepting short-term concessions to avoid lasting reform, in the hopes of reactivating stagnant patronage networks in the future.
After three decades of exploitation, Lebanese consumers rarely expect value for money. Most shrug their shoulders at daily power outages, water shortages, and some of the region’s most expensive phone bills.
The institutionalized racket extends deep into the private sector, where oligopolies preside over cartels in everything from bottled water to potato farming. But even Lebanon’s rapacious politico-business elites cannot ignore the current economic meltdown, which has decimated consumer spending power.
This year—for the first time in a generation—the Lebanese started paying reasonable prices for one of the cartels’ darling money-spinners: cement. Politicians and their associates control Lebanon’s only three cement production companies, Cimenterie Nationale S.A.L., LafargeHolcim Ltd, and Ciment De Sibline S.A.L. And since the 1990s, prohibitive tariffs have effectively excluded foreign competition, forcing consumers to buy wildly overpriced Lebanese cement. But in August, Lebanon’s cement providers agreed to drop their prices to around $30 per tonne. That was a marked drop from the previous $100 per tonne, about three times the global market rate, and in line with the rates the businesses charged abroad. The country’s caretaker government had successfully threatened to lift tariffs on cement imports to secure the cartel’s compliance with a cement price ceiling, according to Alain Bifani, the Ministry of Finance’s former director-general, said in November. Bifani regards this policy as one of the “small successes” of Hassan Diab’s short-lived administration.
Unfortunately, not everyone is so optimistic about the new cement-price ceiling. The agreement continues on a month-to-month basis only—and resistance in one of Lebanon’s most anti-competitive industries is strong. “When push came to shove, [the cartel] lowered their prices. But they made it very difficult for the government and resisted as much as they could,” explained Nafez Zouk, lead economist and emerging markets strategist at Oxford Economics, in a November interview.
In return for the price ceiling, moreover, the cement industry also managed to preserve the tariff regime which, had it been removed, might provide actual competition. In other words, the cartel may be accepting lower prices for now, but market conditions remain in place for the cartel to exploit the Lebanese people once more.
Public coffers are another trusty source of revenue for Lebanese cartels, helping to grease the machinery of sectarian political patronage. In particular, opaque bidding processes have long awarded massively overpriced contracts for public services, such as waste management, to favored companies. “We have seen in many sectors that [politicians] always introduce middle men for [state] contracts,” Bifani added. In other cases, politicians approved meaningless “ghost jobs” that let their supporters draw a wage for doing virtually no work.
But now, the bountiful tap of public funds has almost run dry. As the state faces the world’s third highest debt-to-GDP ratio, again Lebanon’s cartels will need to adapt. Fuel—an import needed to keep the lights on—is one example of a lucrative racket under threat. With fuel subsidies set to end imminently, fuel importers will have to retreat into survival mode.
Much like cement, three companies allegedly connected to sectarian leaders control fuel imports to Lebanon. They’ve historically been allowed to act as exclusive middlemen between the government and fuel exporting countries. The sector’s tight oligopoly is very lucrative for those involved, explains Jessica Obeid, an independent energy policy consultant. “How the contract is made, that is a big question mark, but they definitely make a high cut [from the Lebanese market],” said Obeid in November.
But now, with foreign currency reserves dangerously low, these importers are about to lose this golden goose. In the short term, Obeid predicts that the fuel importing cartel will bear losses in the hope that they can remake the profits like usual in the future. “I hope that the government will allow more competition to exist [in the fuel market]. But it is dependent on so many uncertain factors—the main one being when the foreign reserves run out,” she said.
Attempts to untangle the Lebanese economic knot are stalled. In late November, the central bank’s continued obstruction of a forensic audit led Alvarez & Marsal, an international restructuring consultancy, to quit its contract in desperation. Completion of the audit is a central demand of international donors looking to bail Lebanon out. Without it, and a raft of other reforms, Lebanon risks losing its tens of billions of dollars in aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor nations.
In short, Lebanon’s political figures appear uninterested in fixing the economy, which would mean giving up their own enrichment. Yet new economic realities are destabilizing some cartels on their own. A crumbling local currency could address Lebanon’s unhealthy addiction to imports, which are already down about 50 percent compared to last year. In rural Lebanon, a lack of foreign currency is shaking the foundations of a well-established potato cartel, which has long exploited small-scale farmers.
Sectarian leaders are evidently at their lowest political popularity in decades, even facing mock public executions after August’s catastrophic explosion in Beirut. But their financial troubles could prove much more damaging. Leveraged correctly, donors could finally wean politicians off their unethical revenue streams and force-feed them genuine reform, starting with a proper competition law and authority that ensures a level playing field for all businesses. Successive governments have failed to deliver this basic legislation, because it would allow competitors to compromise their cherished cash cows.
Bifani believes anything short of a full-scale economic overhaul would squander a unique bargaining position. “[Hariri] will be tempted to do a deal with the IMF, probably for the lowest amount accompanied by the lowest reforms,” he said. “This would be a disaster because it is a lost opportunity for change.”
Reeling from heavy political and economic hits, Lebanon’s sectarian leaders are on the ropes. But as long as their business fiefdoms remain intact, they won’t throw in the towel.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--Trump Ally Nunes Seeks to Derail Key Bill Funding Intelligence Community

U.S. lawmakers are running out of time to pass the annual intelligence bill authorizing billions of dollars for the country ’ s spy agencies thanks to objections by Rep. Devin Nunes , one of the president ’ s most loyal allies in Congress .
The Intelligence Authorization Act outlines how the country ’ s 17 intelligence agencies can spend federal funds , helps shape the priorities for the coming year , and gives lawmakers the opportunity to make certain oversight requests of the country ’ s spy chiefs .
This bill also would provide additional protections for inspectors general and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment investigation .
Intelligence agencies will still receive funding through the appropriations process even if the bill doesn ’ t pass .
But without an authorization bill , the intelligence community is limited in its ability to stand up new programs and make significant changes in direction .
“ It prohibits the agency from being nimble , from being adaptable , because they can ’ t start doing something new and they can ’ t stop doing something pointless , ” said Kel McClanahan , the executive director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the bill isn ’ t passed , it also deprives lawmakers of the opportunity to tweak oversight of the intelligence community .
“ It ’ s the best vehicle Congress has to amend the laws dealing with intelligence community or intelligence community oversight , ” said Irvin McCullough , a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project .
Public portions of the bill—some bits are classified—include requirements for the intelligence community to report annually on the national security threats posed by emerging infectious diseases , and it calls for lawmakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the intelligence community are deployed to support responses to civil unrest within the United States .
If passed , the legislation would also withhold funding for the U.S. intelligence agencies to engage with their Saudi counterparts until the community produces an unclassified report into the 2018 murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the hand of Saudi operatives .
The bill was passed along partisan lines by the House Intelligence Committee in July and was approved by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by a resounding 14-1 bipartisan vote .
As in previous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legislation to the annual defense spending bill .
But to include an already chunky bill like the Intelligence Authorization Act in the blockbuster 4,500-page defense budget , congressional leaders look for unanimous support from top Democrats and Republicans on both committees .
As the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee , Nunes has been able to single-handedly stall the bill .
Nunes ’ s office did not respond to a request for comment for this story .
The National Defense Authorization Act was passed by the House on Tuesday .
Trump has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over unrelated issues such as a provision calling for military bases honoring Confederate generals to be renamed .
In the minority views section of the report that accompanied the House Intelligence Committee bill , Nunes offered a caustic rebuke of parts of the bill , describing the legislation as “ geared toward achieving purely political outcomes , ” and suggested certain provisions were “ only included in this bill as a continuation of the Majority ’ s hyper-partisan impeachment of President Trump.
” Among the provisions of the bill that Nunes objected to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mechanisms that have been strained during the Trump administration by ensuring that the president is only able to fire the inspector general of the intelligence community for cause , and by adding further protections for whistleblowers .
“ They were very good reforms that would have corrected a lot of the problems shown in the Ukraine whistleblower case , ” said McCullough , referring to the whistleblower complaint filed by a CIA analyst that triggered Trump ’ s impeachment .
Congressional aides said they were hopeful that the bill could be passed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there was broad , bipartisan agreement .
“ We shouldn ’ t punt this to next year when an agreement is within reach and potential vehicles are available , ” said a Democratic aide speaking on background .
Asked about the status of the bill on Tuesday , Sen. Marco Rubio , the Republican acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee , said it was “ unfortunate ” the bill was not attached to the National Defense Authorization Act .
“ We ’ re still trying to see if we get it as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the end of year … there ’ s nothing I can do to mediate those disputes on the other side.
” Nunes ’ s current obstruction could have consequences .
If the bill is not passed by the end of this Congress on Jan. 3 , 2021 , it may well fall by the wayside as a new Congress tries to grapple with unaddressed emergencies .
“ They ’ re going to have more pressing things , they ’ re going to want to do things like confirmations , hearings about COVID @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do everything under the sun except go and reargue something that they already argued about before , ” McClanahan said .
If the bill fails , it wouldn ’ t be the first time lawmakers have been unable to pass an intelligence authorization act .
Years went by in the 2000s without one , and authorization for the past three years were passed in a bundle as part of the 2020 defense spending bill .
Now , though , the delay comes as the intelligence community faces a rapidly changing security landscape @ @ @ @ @ @ @ light a fire under [ lawmakers ] or blow up , sometimes literally , in order to break that cycle , ” McClanahan said .

U.S. lawmakers are running out of time to pass the annual intelligence bill authorizing billions of dollars for the country’s spy agencies thanks to objections by Rep. Devin Nunes, one of the president’s most loyal allies in Congress.
U.S. lawmakers are running out of time to pass the annual intelligence bill authorizing billions of dollars for the country’s spy agencies thanks to objections by Rep. Devin Nunes, one of the president’s most loyal allies in Congress.
The Intelligence Authorization Act outlines how the country’s 17 intelligence agencies can spend federal funds, helps shape the priorities for the coming year, and gives lawmakers the opportunity to make certain oversight requests of the country’s spy chiefs. This bill also would provide additional protections for inspectors general and whistleblowers—the source, ultimately, of outgoing President Donald Trump’s impeachment investigation.
Intelligence agencies will still receive funding through the appropriations process even if the bill doesn’t pass. But without an authorization bill, the intelligence community is limited in its ability to stand up new programs and make significant changes in direction.
“It prohibits the agency from being nimble, from being adaptable, because they can’t start doing something new and they can’t stop doing something pointless,” said Kel McClanahan, the executive director of the law firm National Security Counselors.
If the bill isn’t passed, it also deprives lawmakers of the opportunity to tweak oversight of the intelligence community. “It’s the best vehicle Congress has to amend the laws dealing with intelligence community or intelligence community oversight,” said Irvin McCullough, a national security analyst with the Government Accountability Project.
Public portions of the bill—some bits are classified—include requirements for the intelligence community to report annually on the national security threats posed by emerging infectious diseases, and it calls for lawmakers to be notified before any parts of the intelligence community are deployed to support responses to civil unrest within the United States.
If passed, the legislation would also withhold funding for the U.S. intelligence agencies to engage with their Saudi counterparts until the community produces an unclassified report into the 2018 murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the hand of Saudi operatives.
The bill was passed along partisan lines by the House Intelligence Committee in July and was approved by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by a resounding 14-1 bipartisan vote. As in previous years, lawmakers hoped to attach the legislation to the annual defense spending bill.
But to include an already chunky bill like the Intelligence Authorization Act in the blockbuster 4,500-page defense budget, congressional leaders look for unanimous support from top Democrats and Republicans on both committees. As the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, Nunes has been able to single-handedly stall the bill.
Nunes’s office did not respond to a request for comment for this story.
The National Defense Authorization Act was passed by the House on Tuesday. Trump has threatened to veto the 2021 spending bill over unrelated issues such as a provision calling for military bases honoring Confederate generals to be renamed.
In the minority views section of the report that accompanied the House Intelligence Committee bill, Nunes offered a caustic rebuke of parts of the bill, describing the legislation as “geared toward achieving purely political outcomes,” and suggested certain provisions were “only included in this bill as a continuation of the Majority’s hyper-partisan impeachment of President Trump.”
Among the provisions of the bill that Nunes objected to were ones that sought to strengthen oversight mechanisms that have been strained during the Trump administration by ensuring that the president is only able to fire the inspector general of the intelligence community for cause, and by adding further protections for whistleblowers.
“They were very good reforms that would have corrected a lot of the problems shown in the Ukraine whistleblower case,” said McCullough, referring to the whistleblower complaint filed by a CIA analyst that triggered Trump’s impeachment.
Congressional aides said they were hopeful that the bill could be passed by the end of the session, saying there was broad, bipartisan agreement.
“We shouldn’t punt this to next year when an agreement is within reach and potential vehicles are available,” said a Democratic aide speaking on background.
Asked about the status of the bill on Tuesday, Sen. Marco Rubio, the Republican acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said it was “unfortunate” the bill was not attached to the National Defense Authorization Act. “We’re still trying to see if we get it as part of the omni[bus] at the end of year … there’s nothing I can do to mediate those disputes on the other side.”
Nunes’s current obstruction could have consequences. If the bill is not passed by the end of this Congress on Jan. 3, 2021, it may well fall by the wayside as a new Congress tries to grapple with unaddressed emergencies.
“They’re going to have more pressing things, they’re going to want to do things like confirmations, hearings about COVID, they’re going to want to do everything under the sun except go and reargue something that they already argued about before,” McClanahan said.
If the bill fails, it wouldn’t be the first time lawmakers have been unable to pass an intelligence authorization act. Years went by in the 2000s without one, and authorization for the past three years were passed in a bundle as part of the 2020 defense spending bill. Now, though, the delay comes as the intelligence community faces a rapidly changing security landscape.
“So something has to either light a fire under [lawmakers] or blow up, sometimes literally, in order to break that cycle,” McClanahan said.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-11--The Peril of Persuasion in the Big Tech Age

The Peril of Persuasion in the Big Tech Age Persuasion is as old our species .
Both democracy and the market economy depend on it .
Politicians persuade citizens to vote for them , or to support different policy positions .
Businesses persuade consumers to buy their products or services .
We all persuade our friends to accept our choice of restaurant , movie , and so on .
It ’ s essential to society ; we couldn ’ t get large groups of people to work together without it .
But as with many things , technology is fundamentally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society needs to adapt its rules of persuasion or suffer the consequences .
Democratic societies , in particular , are in dire need of a frank conversation about the role persuasion plays in them and how technologies are enabling powerful interests to target audiences .
In a society where public opinion is a ruling force , there is always a risk of it being mobilized for ill purposes—such as provoking fear to encourage one group to hate another in a bid to win office , or targeting personal vulnerabilities to push products that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this regard , the United States , already extremely polarized , sits on a precipice .
Persuasion also involves psychology , and that has been far harder to regulate .
Using psychology to persuade people is not new .
Edward Bernays , a pioneer of public relations and nephew to Sigmund Freud , made a marketing practice of appealing to the ego .
His approach was to tie consumption to a person ’ s sense of self .
In his 1928 book Propaganda , Bernays advocated engineering events to persuade target audiences as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he hired women to smoke cigarettes while taking part in the 1929 New York City Easter Sunday parade , causing a scandal while linking smoking with the emancipation of women .
The tobacco industry would continue to market lifestyle in selling cigarettes into the 1960s .
Our senses of self , meanwhile , are increasingly shaped by our interaction with technology .
Emotional appeals have likewise long been a facet of political campaigns .
In the 1860 U.S. presidential election , Southern politicians and newspaper editors spread fears of what a “ Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ horrific pictures of what the emancipation of slaves would do to the country .
In the 2020 U.S. presidential election , modern-day Republicans used Cuban Americans ’ fears of socialism in ads on Spanish-language radio and messaging on social media .
Because of the emotions involved , many voters believed the campaigns enough to let them influence their decisions .
The Internet has enabled new technologies of persuasion to go even further .
Those seeking to influence others can collect and use data about targeted audiences to create personalized messaging .
Tracking the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they make online , and what they engage with on social media , persuasion technologies enable those who have access to such tools to better understand audiences and deliver more tailored messaging where audiences are likely to see it most .
This information can be combined with data about other activities , such as offline shopping habits , the places a person visits , and the insurance they buy , to create a profile of them that can be used to develop persuasive messaging that is aimed at provoking a specific response .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ are increasingly shaped by our interaction with technology .
The same digital environment where we read , search , and converse with our intimates enables marketers to take that data and turn it back on us .
A modern day Bernays no longer needs to ferret out the social causes that might inspire you or entice you—you ’ ve likely already shared that by your online behavior .
Some marketers posit that women feel less attractive on Mondays , particularly first thing in the morning—and therefore that ’ s the best time to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Times once experimented by predicting the moods of readers based on article content to better target ads , enabling marketers to find audiences when they were sad or fearful .
Some music streaming platforms encourage users to disclose their current moods , which helps advertisers target subscribers based on their emotional states .
The phones in our pockets provide marketers with our location in real time , helping deliver geographically relevant ads , such as propaganda to those attending a political rally .
This always-on digital experience enables marketers to know what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and how we might be feeling at that moment .
Right now , there are few legal or even moral limits on persuasion—and few answers regarding the effectiveness of such technologies .
Before it is too late , the world needs to consider what is acceptable and what is over the line .
For example , it ’ s been long known that people are more receptive to advertisements made with people who look like them : in race , ethnicity , age , gender .
Ads have long been modified to suit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or magazine they appear in .
But we can take this further .
The technology exists to take your likeness and morph it with a face that is demographically similar to you .
The result is a face that looks like you , but that you don ’ t recognize .
If that turns out to be more persuasive than coarse demographic targeting , is that okay ?
Another example : Instead of just advertising to you when they detect that you are vulnerable , what if advertisers craft advertisements that deliberately manipulate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ show you ads designed to lower your self-esteem before showing you ads for their products .
In some ways , being able to place ads alongside content that is likely to provoke a certain emotional response enables advertisers to do this already .
The only difference is that the media outlet claims it isn ’ t crafting the content to deliberately achieve this .
But is it acceptable to actively prime a target audience and then to deliver persuasive messaging that fits the mood ?
Further , emotion-based decision-making is not the rational @ @ @ @ @ @ @ inform important civic choices such as voting .
In fact , emotional thinking threatens to undermine the very legitimacy of the system , as voters are essentially provoked to move in whatever direction someone with power and money wants .
Given the pervasiveness of digital technologies , and the often instant , reactive responses people have to them , how much emotion ought to be allowed in persuasive technologies ?
Is there a line that shouldn ’ t be crossed ?
Finally , for most people today , exposure to information and technology @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spends more than 11 hours a day interacting with media .
Such levels of engagement lead to huge amounts of personal data generated and aggregated about you—your preferences , interests , and state of mind .
The more those who control persuasive technologies know about us , what we are doing , how we are feeling , when we feel it , and where we are , the better they can tailor messaging that provokes us into action .
The unsuspecting target is grossly disadvantaged .
Is it acceptable for the same services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to target us ?
Is there ever such thing as too much targeting ?
The power dynamics of persuasive technologies are changing .
Access to tools and technologies of persuasion is not egalitarian .
Many require large amounts of both personal data and computation power , turning modern persuasion into an arms race where the better resourced will be better placed to influence audiences .
At the same time , the average person has very little information about how these persuasion technologies work , and is thus unlikely to understand how their beliefs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What ’ s more , there are few rules in place to protect people from abuse of persuasion technologies , much less even a clear articulation of what constitutes a level of manipulation so great it effectively takes agency away from those targeted .
This creates a positive feedback loop that is dangerous for society .
In the 1970s , there was widespread fear about so-called subliminal messaging , which claimed that images of sex and death were hidden in the details of print advertisements , as in the curls of smoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of liquor ads .
It was pretty much all a hoax , but that didn ’ t stop the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission from declaring it an illegal persuasive technology .
That ’ s how worried people were about being manipulated without their knowledge and consent .
It is time to have a serious conversation about limiting the technologies of persuasion .
This must begin by articulating what is permitted and what is not .
If we don ’ t , the powerful persuaders will become even more powerful @

Persuasion is as old as our species. Both democracy and the market economy depend on it. Politicians persuade citizens to vote for them, or to support different policy positions. Businesses persuade consumers to buy their products or services. We all persuade our friends to accept our choice of restaurant, movie, and so on. It’s essential to society; we couldn’t get large groups of people to work together without it. But as with many things, technology is fundamentally changing the nature of persuasion. And society needs to adapt its rules of persuasion or suffer the consequences.
Persuasion is as old as our species. Both democracy and the market economy depend on it. Politicians persuade citizens to vote for them, or to support different policy positions. Businesses persuade consumers to buy their products or services. We all persuade our friends to accept our choice of restaurant, movie, and so on. It’s essential to society; we couldn’t get large groups of people to work together without it. But as with many things, technology is fundamentally changing the nature of persuasion. And society needs to adapt its rules of persuasion or suffer the consequences.
Democratic societies, in particular, are in dire need of a frank conversation about the role persuasion plays in them and how technologies are enabling powerful interests to target audiences. In a society where public opinion is a ruling force, there is always a risk of it being mobilized for ill purposes—such as provoking fear to encourage one group to hate another in a bid to win office, or targeting personal vulnerabilities to push products that might not benefit the consumer.
In this regard, the United States, already extremely polarized, sits on a precipice.
There have long been rules around persuasion. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces laws that claims about products “must be truthful, not misleading, and, when appropriate, backed by scientific evidence.” Political advertisers must identify themselves in television ads. If someone abuses a position of power to force another person into a contract, undue influence can be argued to nullify that agreement. Yet there is more to persuasion than the truth, transparency, or simply applying pressure.
Persuasion also involves psychology, and that has been far harder to regulate. Using psychology to persuade people is not new. Edward Bernays, a pioneer of public relations and nephew to Sigmund Freud, made a marketing practice of appealing to the ego. His approach was to tie consumption to a person’s sense of self. In his 1928 book Propaganda, Bernays advocated engineering events to persuade target audiences as desired. In one famous stunt, he hired women to smoke cigarettes while taking part in the 1929 New York City Easter Sunday parade, causing a scandal while linking smoking with the emancipation of women. The tobacco industry would continue to market lifestyle in selling cigarettes into the 1960s.
Our senses of self, meanwhile, are increasingly shaped by our interaction with technology.
Emotional appeals have likewise long been a facet of political campaigns. In the 1860 U.S. presidential election, Southern politicians and newspaper editors spread fears of what a “Black Republican” win would mean, painting horrific pictures of what the emancipation of slaves would do to the country. In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, modern-day Republicans used Cuban Americans’ fears of socialism in ads on Spanish-language radio and messaging on social media. Because of the emotions involved, many voters believed the campaigns enough to let them influence their decisions.
The Internet has enabled new technologies of persuasion to go even further. Those seeking to influence others can collect and use data about targeted audiences to create personalized messaging. Tracking the websites a person visits, the searches they make online, and what they engage with on social media, persuasion technologies enable those who have access to such tools to better understand audiences and deliver more tailored messaging where audiences are likely to see it most. This information can be combined with data about other activities, such as offline shopping habits, the places a person visits, and the insurance they buy, to create a profile of them that can be used to develop persuasive messaging that is aimed at provoking a specific response.
Our senses of self, meanwhile, are increasingly shaped by our interaction with technology. The same digital environment where we read, search, and converse with our intimates enables marketers to take that data and turn it back on us. A modern day Bernays no longer needs to ferret out the social causes that might inspire you or entice you—you’ve likely already shared that by your online behavior.
Some marketers posit that women feel less attractive on Mondays, particularly first thing in the morning—and therefore that’s the best time to advertise cosmetics to them. The New York Times once experimented by predicting the moods of readers based on article content to better target ads, enabling marketers to find audiences when they were sad or fearful. Some music streaming platforms encourage users to disclose their current moods, which helps advertisers target subscribers based on their emotional states.
The phones in our pockets provide marketers with our location in real time, helping deliver geographically relevant ads, such as propaganda to those attending a political rally. This always-on digital experience enables marketers to know what we are doing—and when, where, and how we might be feeling at that moment.
All of this is not intended to be alarmist. It is important not to overstate the effectiveness of persuasive technologies. But while many of them are more smoke and mirrors than reality, it is likely that they will only improve over time. The technology already exists to help predict moods of some target audiences, pinpoint their location at any given time, and deliver fairly tailored and timely messaging. How far does that ability need to go before it erodes the autonomy of those targeted to make decisions of their own free will?
Right now, there are few legal or even moral limits on persuasion—and few answers regarding the effectiveness of such technologies. Before it is too late, the world needs to consider what is acceptable and what is over the line.
For example, it’s been long known that people are more receptive to advertisements made with people who look like them: in race, ethnicity, age, gender. Ads have long been modified to suit the general demographic of the television show or magazine they appear in. But we can take this further. The technology exists to take your likeness and morph it with a face that is demographically similar to you. The result is a face that looks like you, but that you don’t recognize. If that turns out to be more persuasive than coarse demographic targeting, is that okay?
Another example: Instead of just advertising to you when they detect that you are vulnerable, what if advertisers craft advertisements that deliberately manipulate your mood? A cosmetics company might show you ads designed to lower your self-esteem before showing you ads for their products. In some ways, being able to place ads alongside content that is likely to provoke a certain emotional response enables advertisers to do this already. The only difference is that the media outlet claims it isn’t crafting the content to deliberately achieve this. But is it acceptable to actively prime a target audience and then to deliver persuasive messaging that fits the mood?
Further, emotion-based decision-making is not the rational type of slow thinking that ought to inform important civic choices such as voting. In fact, emotional thinking threatens to undermine the very legitimacy of the system, as voters are essentially provoked to move in whatever direction someone with power and money wants. Given the pervasiveness of digital technologies, and the often instant, reactive responses people have to them, how much emotion ought to be allowed in persuasive technologies? Is there a line that shouldn’t be crossed?
Finally, for most people today, exposure to information and technology is pervasive. The average U.S. adult spends more than 11 hours a day interacting with media. Such levels of engagement lead to huge amounts of personal data generated and aggregated about you—your preferences, interests, and state of mind. The more those who control persuasive technologies know about us, what we are doing, how we are feeling, when we feel it, and where we are, the better they can tailor messaging that provokes us into action. The unsuspecting target is grossly disadvantaged. Is it acceptable for the same services to both mediate our digital experience and to target us? Is there ever such thing as too much targeting?
The power dynamics of persuasive technologies are changing. Access to tools and technologies of persuasion is not egalitarian. Many require large amounts of both personal data and computation power, turning modern persuasion into an arms race where the better resourced will be better placed to influence audiences.
At the same time, the average person has very little information about how these persuasion technologies work, and is thus unlikely to understand how their beliefs and opinions might be manipulated by them. What’s more, there are few rules in place to protect people from abuse of persuasion technologies, much less even a clear articulation of what constitutes a level of manipulation so great it effectively takes agency away from those targeted. This creates a positive feedback loop that is dangerous for society.
In the 1970s, there was widespread fear about so-called subliminal messaging, which claimed that images of sex and death were hidden in the details of print advertisements, as in the curls of smoke in cigarette ads and the ice cubes of liquor ads. It was pretty much all a hoax, but that didn’t stop the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission from declaring it an illegal persuasive technology. That’s how worried people were about being manipulated without their knowledge and consent.
It is time to have a serious conversation about limiting the technologies of persuasion. This must begin by articulating what is permitted and what is not. If we don’t, the powerful persuaders will become even more powerful.