foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Seeing Race In a Pandemic

Seeing Race In a Pandemic

The material environment we move through , I wrote in my first book , The Black Skyscraper : Architecture and the Perception of Race , shapes how we perceive race .
Focusing on the skyscraper ’ s emergence on the American scene in the late 19th and early 20th centuries , I showed how the new densities , vantage points , and urban scales shaped by this architecture affected people ’ s capacities to see and read bodies as racially marked .
Skyscrapers first rose to prominence at a time when understandings of what race was , where it resided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategies for recognizing and reading its alleged characteristics were all in flux .
As Reconstruction ended , Jim Crow rose , and millions made their way to growing urban centers , many Americans turned to law , science , and culture to stabilize racial definitions and categorizations .
Skyscraper architecture , however , unsettled the very ground upon which Americans perceived and threw a wrench in efforts to shore up certainties around race .
Given that everyone appears as a dark speck when viewed from high enough , the skyscraper raised questions in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would remain legible in an urbanizing nation where tall buildings were challenging what it meant to see in the first place .
Black Skyscraper focuses on the specific social and historical conditions of the late 19th century that led writers and architects in this period to understand the early skyscraper in racial terms .
But this early test case underscores how pervasive a role the material environment plays in shaping how we perceive and understand race across historical periods and locations .
Our habits and patterns for seeing and knowing race are not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developed within the specific environments we navigate .
Indeed , recent events , especially the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing police violence against Black Americans and communities emblematized by the murder of George Floyd , point to enduring entanglements of racial perception , racial hierarchies , and the material environment .
These yoked catastrophes of health and policing , which have disproportionately devastated minority communities , shape and have been shaped by the physical contexts in which these crises unfold .
Density ’ s role in the pandemic is one place where the relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into focus .
Some of the initial concerns about skyscrapers and density in growing urban centers had to do with anxieties that these structures might weaken the ability to make out racial distinctions and , by extension , control interracial contact deemed by many as unhealthy and degenerative .
Concerns about being able to discern and manage racial populations helped drive the growing institutionalization of redlining—the systematic exclusion of Black Americans from certain neighborhoods and services—which concentrated Black people into overcrowded urban neighborhoods while mass state subsidies supported white flight out of cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the 20th century .
It is easy to see the long afterlife of density ’ s racialization when observing neighborhoods disproportionately affected by COVID-19—many of which are the same areas marked by bankers , urban planners , and government officials in the first half of the 20th century as unfit for investment due to their minority populations .
But even as the racial consequences of these early redlining maps persist , the environmental mechanisms for their endurance have shifted with the emergence of new forms of racial inequity .
As ProPublica reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rates in predominately African American and Hispanic neighborhoods do not seem to correlate with population density .
For example , Chicago ’ s Englewood neighborhood , which had one of the highest infection rates in the city also has fewer households per mile than many other neighborhoods .
ProPublica ’ s preliminary findings suggest that the number of people who share a household rather than housing density itself may be larger driver of infections in minority neighborhoods .
The housing crisis following the 2008 economic crisis devastated neighborhoods such as Englewood targeted by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of wealth from these communities that resulted from the economic collapse has led to larger extended families living under one roof , a factor likely contributing to the differential spread of COVID-19 .
Although the city of Chicago declared in a recent advertising campaign that “ COVID-19 Doesn ’ t See Race , ” the city ’ s infection rates point to the tethered history of racial sight and differential investment .
Masks are another place where the history of how we see and experience race both shapes responses to the current pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racial perception in our changing material world .
While the act of wearing a mask in public to prevent the spread COVID-19 was first framed as a matter of public health , it quickly transformed into a symbol of sovereignty when largely white and largely maskless crowds began descending on capitals and statehouses in early spring to protest stay-at-home orders for infringing on their freedoms .
After several new incidents of police-sanctioned murder , those early protests about individual rights gave way to much larger protests against systemic racism .
But the remnants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and , at times belligerent , acts of dissent staged by those unwilling to wear masks in stores and venues requiring them .
It ’ s rare for a week to go by without new video of a white patron becoming incensed when required to wear masks to receive services .
The outrage provoked by perceived infractions threatening one ’ s sovereignty reverberates with a much older racial ideology that understood power over oneself to be a categorically Anglo-American trait .
Social theorists at the turn of the 20th century , including then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of specific European origins—conditioned by both their racial makeup and centuries of frontier living—had acquired a heightened capacity for self-control .
That quality made them inherently fit to rule themselves as well as conquered “ savage ” races .
Such theories construed whiteness as the right to own and occupy space .
Faith in racial dominion underpins scenes of white patrons in grocery stores , ride-sharing cars , and parks who believe in their inalienable right to take up space at the expense of others .
African Americans , however , offer a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public mandate to wear masks .
Their concerns stem not from a sense of spatial supremacy but from the victimization that stemmed from it and was used to justify racially biased forms of surveillance and policing .
By obscuring access to people ’ s faces as well as potentially impeding one ’ s own sight , masks disrupt habits for seeing and reading race from the bodies of others .
In the United States , a nation physically and socially designed to scrutinize and contain minority bodies , changes to racial perception pose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their concerns that wearing masks would heighten racist assumptions about black criminality , making them even more susceptible to surveillance and harassment .
The disproportionate punishing of minorities for violating public health ordinances instituted in the wake of COVID-19 , coupled with reports of masked Black men being questioned by police for appearing suspicious , reflects the Catch-22 of mask-wearing for many Black Americans .
Disruptions to norms of racial identification have historically been followed by systemic efforts to produce and enforce structures capable of doing the work instead .
Race-based methods of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and facial recognition technology in the 21st are examples of systems designed to produce and enforce alleged racial truths more effectively than subjective individuals can , generally with discriminatory results .
The intensified policing of Black communities in the immediate wake of the pandemic may be linked to not only to the civic and economic anxieties unleashed by the crisis , but the spatial and perceptual crises it has also fostered .
But with alterations to racial perception also arise new abolitionist and emancipatory visions To return to a lesson gleaned from Black @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Henry James and William Dean Howells expressed great anxiety about the effect of tall buildings on our ability to see and know race , Black writers such as W.E.B .
Du Bois and Nella Larsen imagined the skyscraper ’ s capacity to scramble the senses as an opportunity for dismantling racial hierarchies by exposing their arbitrariness .
The pandemic and the uprisings in response to police violence seem to also be seeding experiments in racial perception and liberation—the oversized calligraphy declaring “ Black Lives Matter ” and “ Defund the Police ” being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the United States , at a scale reflective of the urgency of the demand ; the virtual DJ sets emerging in the early days of the pandemic , reframing the relationship between sound and sociality ; and the new habits of attention being cultivated in the wake of shelter-in-place orders , forcing many to rethink their orientation to the natural , material , and social worlds around them .
Protocols for perceiving race are difficult to disrupt , especially since habits for racial assessment and meaning are generally learned informally rather than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emphasis on apprehending structures of systemic racism—as opposed to thinking we can teach ourselves to ignore race or override our own biases—may be the beginning of a larger shift in how and where we think and see race .

The material environment we move through, I wrote in my first book, The Black Skyscraper: Architecture and the Perception of Race , shapes how we perceive race. Focusing on the skyscraper’s emergence on the American scene in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, I showed how the new densities, vantage points, and urban scales shaped by this architecture affected people’s capacities to see and read bodies as racially marked.
The material environment we move through, I wrote in my first book, The Black Skyscraper: Architecture and the Perception of Race, shapes how we perceive race. Focusing on the skyscraper’s emergence on the American scene in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, I showed how the new densities, vantage points, and urban scales shaped by this architecture affected people’s capacities to see and read bodies as racially marked.
Skyscrapers first rose to prominence at a time when understandings of what race was, where it resided in or on the body, and strategies for recognizing and reading its alleged characteristics were all in flux. As Reconstruction ended, Jim Crow rose, and millions made their way to growing urban centers, many Americans turned to law, science, and culture to stabilize racial definitions and categorizations. Skyscraper architecture, however, unsettled the very ground upon which Americans perceived and threw a wrench in efforts to shore up certainties around race. Given that everyone appears as a dark speck when viewed from high enough, the skyscraper raised questions in this period about how and whether race would remain legible in an urbanizing nation where tall buildings were challenging what it meant to see in the first place.
Black Skyscraper focuses on the specific social and historical conditions of the late 19th century that led writers and architects in this period to understand the early skyscraper in racial terms. But this early test case underscores how pervasive a role the material environment plays in shaping how we perceive and understand race across historical periods and locations. Our habits and patterns for seeing and knowing race are not timeless but taught; not transcendental but developed within the specific environments we navigate.
Indeed, recent events, especially the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing police violence against Black Americans and communities emblematized by the murder of George Floyd, point to enduring entanglements of racial perception, racial hierarchies, and the material environment. These yoked catastrophes of health and policing, which have disproportionately devastated minority communities, shape and have been shaped by the physical contexts in which these crises unfold.
Density’s role in the pandemic is one place where the relationship between race and the material environment comes into focus. Some of the initial concerns about skyscrapers and density in growing urban centers had to do with anxieties that these structures might weaken the ability to make out racial distinctions and, by extension, control interracial contact deemed by many as unhealthy and degenerative. Concerns about being able to discern and manage racial populations helped drive the growing institutionalization of redlining—the systematic exclusion of Black Americans from certain neighborhoods and services—which concentrated Black people into overcrowded urban neighborhoods while mass state subsidies supported white flight out of cities to low-density suburbs in the first half of the 20th century.
It is easy to see the long afterlife of density’s racialization when observing neighborhoods disproportionately affected by COVID-19—many of which are the same areas marked by bankers, urban planners, and government officials in the first half of the 20th century as unfit for investment due to their minority populations. But even as the racial consequences of these early redlining maps persist, the environmental mechanisms for their endurance have shifted with the emergence of new forms of racial inequity.
As ProPublica reported in April, the higher COVID-19 infection rates in predominately African American and Hispanic neighborhoods do not seem to correlate with population density. For example, Chicago’s Englewood neighborhood, which had one of the highest infection rates in the city also has fewer households per mile than many other neighborhoods. ProPublica’s preliminary findings suggest that the number of people who share a household rather than housing density itself may be larger driver of infections in minority neighborhoods. The housing crisis following the 2008 economic crisis devastated neighborhoods such as Englewood targeted by subprime lending practices. The massive expropriation of wealth from these communities that resulted from the economic collapse has led to larger extended families living under one roof, a factor likely contributing to the differential spread of COVID-19. Although the city of Chicago declared in a recent advertising campaign that “COVID-19 Doesn’t See Race,” the city’s infection rates point to the tethered history of racial sight and differential investment.
Masks are another place where the history of how we see and experience race both shapes responses to the current pandemic and raises questions about the future of racial perception in our changing material world. While the act of wearing a mask in public to prevent the spread COVID-19 was first framed as a matter of public health, it quickly transformed into a symbol of sovereignty when largely white and largely maskless crowds began descending on capitals and statehouses in early spring to protest stay-at-home orders for infringing on their freedoms.
After several new incidents of police-sanctioned murder, those early protests about individual rights gave way to much larger protests against systemic racism. But the remnants of these earlier protests endure in isolated and, at times belligerent, acts of dissent staged by those unwilling to wear masks in stores and venues requiring them. It’s rare for a week to go by without new video of a white patron becoming incensed when required to wear masks to receive services. The outrage provoked by perceived infractions threatening one’s sovereignty reverberates with a much older racial ideology that understood power over oneself to be a categorically Anglo-American trait. Social theorists at the turn of the 20th century, including then historian Theodore Roosevelt, alleged that Americans of specific European origins—conditioned by both their racial makeup and centuries of frontier living—had acquired a heightened capacity for self-control. That quality made them inherently fit to rule themselves as well as conquered “savage” races. Such theories construed whiteness as the right to own and occupy space. Faith in racial dominion underpins scenes of white patrons in grocery stores, ride-sharing cars, and parks who believe in their inalienable right to take up space at the expense of others.
African Americans, however, offer a different rationale for their discomfort with the public mandate to wear masks. Their concerns stem not from a sense of spatial supremacy but from the victimization that stemmed from it and was used to justify racially biased forms of surveillance and policing. By obscuring access to people’s faces as well as potentially impeding one’s own sight, masks disrupt habits for seeing and reading race from the bodies of others. In the United States, a nation physically and socially designed to scrutinize and contain minority bodies, changes to racial perception pose real threats. African Americans have described their concerns that wearing masks would heighten racist assumptions about black criminality, making them even more susceptible to surveillance and harassment. The disproportionate punishing of minorities for violating public health ordinances instituted in the wake of COVID-19, coupled with reports of masked Black men being questioned by police for appearing suspicious, reflects the Catch-22 of mask-wearing for many Black Americans.
Disruptions to norms of racial identification have historically been followed by systemic efforts to produce and enforce structures capable of doing the work instead. Race-based methods of property appraisal in the early 20th century and facial recognition technology in the 21st are examples of systems designed to produce and enforce alleged racial truths more effectively than subjective individuals can, generally with discriminatory results. The intensified policing of Black communities in the immediate wake of the pandemic may be linked to not only to the civic and economic anxieties unleashed by the crisis, but the spatial and perceptual crises it has also fostered.
But with alterations to racial perception also arise new abolitionist and emancipatory visions To return to a lesson gleaned from Black Skyscraper, whereas white writers such as Henry James and William Dean Howells expressed great anxiety about the effect of tall buildings on our ability to see and know race, Black writers such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Nella Larsen imagined the skyscraper’s capacity to scramble the senses as an opportunity for dismantling racial hierarchies by exposing their arbitrariness.
The pandemic and the uprisings in response to police violence seem to also be seeding experiments in racial perception and liberation—the oversized calligraphy declaring “Black Lives Matter” and “Defund the Police” being drawn on a growing number of streets in the United States, at a scale reflective of the urgency of the demand; the virtual DJ sets emerging in the early days of the pandemic, reframing the relationship between sound and sociality; and the new habits of attention being cultivated in the wake of shelter-in-place orders, forcing many to rethink their orientation to the natural, material, and social worlds around them.
Protocols for perceiving race are difficult to disrupt, especially since habits for racial assessment and meaning are generally learned informally rather than through explicit pedagogy. But the growing emphasis on apprehending structures of systemic racism—as opposed to thinking we can teach ourselves to ignore race or override our own biases—may be the beginning of a larger shift in how and where we think and see race.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--What’s This Unit of Russian Spies That Keeps Getting Outed?

What ’ s This Unit of Russian Spies That Keeps Getting Outed ?
On Friday , the New York Times broke the explosive story that a unit of Russia ’ s military intelligence—Unit 29155 of the GRU—had allegedly offered bounties to militants in Afghanistan to kill U.S. troops .
The GRU , Russia ’ s military intelligence agency , has emerged as a key player in Moscow ’ s efforts to sow chaos around the world , including the operation to hack and release emails from Hillary Clinton ’ s 2016 presidential campaign .
Unit 29155 , accused of offering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of Russia ’ s most brazen overseas operations in recent years—or at least the ones we know about , from the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016 to the botched effort to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England .
It ’ s not clear how the U.S. intelligence community was able to tie the operation back to Unit 29155 .
Information about the bounty plot , which was included in the president ’ s daily intelligence briefing early last year , is filtering into the press in bits and pieces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the assessment was backed up by evidence of bank transfers between bank accounts linked to the GRU and the Taliban .
While Unit 29155 is often described as secretive , its tradecraft has at times been sloppy , including implausible cover stories and repeated use of the same aliases .
Using leaked passport records , flight passenger data , and databases of border crossings , journalists and open-source investigators from groups such as Bellingcat and the Russian outlet the Insider have been able to use this trail of breadcrumbs to build a remarkably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members .
Bellingcat ’ s findings have been “ consistently accurate , ” said Marc Polymeropoulos , who formerly oversaw the CIA ’ s operations in Europe and Eurasia before retiring from the agency last year .
“ Since it was open source , it enabled us to discuss the GRU activities more openly , particularly with foreign liaison services.
” What exactly is the GRU ?
Russia has three main intelligence agencies : the Foreign Intelligence Service ( SVR ) , the Main Intelligence Directorate ( GRU ) , and the Federal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most powerful of the three .
All three are involved in foreign operations , but it ’ s the GRU that has the necessary audacity to attempt complicated , high-stakes operations .
“ The GRU was always seen as a little more thuggish .
They are tasked to do all of these things but their tradecraft is not great , ” Polymeropoulos said .
How did a unit in an intelligence agency get to be so visible ?
Unit 29155 is thought to have operated for at least a decade , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 2018 that intelligence agencies and investigative reporters were able to gradually map out the group ’ s membership and their involvement in other Russian operations in Europe .
In early 2018 , two Russian men operating under the aliases Alexander Petrov ( later revealed to be Alexander Mishkin ) and Ruslan Boshirov ( whose real name is Anatoliy Chepiga ) sprayed the deadly nerve agent Novichok on the door handle of Skripal ’ s home in Salisbury , England .
Six months later , British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ men as agents of the GRU and to charge them with attempted murder .
The pair ’ s movements had been picked up by the U.K. ’ s plentiful closed-circuit TV cameras from the moment they stepped off an Aeroflot flight from Moscow .
A little over a week later , Petrov and Boshirov appeared on the Russian state-controlled TV channel RT to claim that they were but humble fitness instructors who flew to the U.K. for a weekend to travel to Salisbury not once , but twice , to see the city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the pair were released , digital sleuths at the open-source investigative group Bellingcat were able to piece together their identities .
Knowing that they were GRU , they scoured the website and yearbooks of a GRU training academy in Siberia that , given their age , the men likely attended .
There , they found a photo of Chepiga in Chechnya in an article posted on the academy ’ s website in 2018 , which noted that graduates of the academy had gone on to receive the “ Hero of Russia ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ honor .
It was this detail that led them to Chepiga ’ s true identity .
Passports of GRU aliases will often use the same first name , patronymic—a name derived from the name of a person ’ s father—and date of birth as the agent ’ s true identity .
Working on this assumption , Bellingcat researchers were able to find Mishkin ’ s real name and identity in leaked databases of Russian passport records .
The sloppiness of the operation , especially the use of a Soviet-developed nerve agent , led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was meant to be traced back to Russia .
“ They wanted to send a signal that this is what happens to defectors , ” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor , a former deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council .
It was the discovery of a third accomplice , who traveled under the alias Sergei Fedotov , that led to the discovery of Unit 29155 .
His involvement was first reported by the St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka .
The travel history of Fedotov , whose real @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he had been part of a team dispatched to the capital of Bulgaria in 2015 to poison local arms dealer Emilian Gebrev .
The case had been closed by investigators in Bulgaria .
But details of the assassination attempt served as a “ Rosetta stone ” for Western intelligence agencies , reported the New York Times , which enabled them to decipher the unit ’ s activities .
In 2016 the unit attempted to orchestrate a coup in Montenegro , which at the time was on the brink of becoming a NATO member @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Spain , the Audiencia Nacional , opened an investigation into the unit ’ s alleged connection with a 2017 independence bid by the Spanish region of Catalonia .
Using flight records , passenger data , and a database of Russian border crossings , researchers at Bellingcat were able to reveal that Sergeyev traveled frequently to Europe , Central Asia , Ukraine , and the Middle East between 2012 to 2018 under his persona of Sergei Fedotov .
The purpose of the majority of these trips is still unknown .
“ We only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lot .
They may be doing a lot of other things that we don ’ t know about , ” said Aric Toler , who heads up Bellingcat ’ s investigations in Eastern Europe .
Much of the unraveling of the GRU unit ’ s activities was made possible by the fact that there is a booming trade in hacked and leaked data in Russia .
“ The Russians have an issue with the fact that you can basically buy any information .
It ’ s kind of a perverse fact that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” said Mark Galeotti , a senior associate fellow at the British-based Royal United Services Institute .
Databases of flight records , customs data , passport information , and car registrations have been instrumental in the work of journalists and researchers piecing together the activities of Russian intelligence operatives abroad .
Why are the Afghan bounties such a big escalation ?
U.S. President Donald Trump insists that the story is basically a fabrication—doubling down on charges of “ fake news ” on Wednesday despite multiple independent confirmations of the Times report—but former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the assessment made its way into the president ’ s daily briefing reflects a high degree of confidence .
“ If an assessment was made and it made it to the PDB there would have to be pretty significant confidence and cohesion in the intelligence community views on this , ” said Kendall-Taylor , now a senior fellow with the Center for New American Security .
It ’ s not clear why the Taliban would need a financial incentive from Russian intelligence services to kill U.S. troops , whom they ’ ve fought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ represent a significant escalation in Russia ’ s efforts to directly target American interests .
It ’ s not yet clear yet whether the Kremlin intended the payments to the Taliban to be discovered , knowing that it would sow further discord in the United States .
Kendall-Taylor said that while not all operations carried out by the unit are intended to be traced back to them as the Skripal case was , that GRU was also unlikely to put secrecy ahead of its objectives .
While the Russian security services have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , defectors , and former Chechen fighters abroad , this is a big shift .
“ They ’ ve always been very careful about Americans because they know there ’ s a massive price tag on dead Americans , ” Galeotti said .
U.S. forces have similarly made “ painstaking efforts ” to avoid hitting Russian troops in Syria , Kendall-Taylor noted .
Trump ’ s failure to respond to the intelligence has prompted a firestorm of criticism in Washington from both parties .
On Wednesday , Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley described the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ serious escalation ” that “ demands a strong response.
” In contrast , when Iran downed an unmanned U.S. drone last year , Trump nearly responded with an attack , but didn ’ t .
When Iran killed a U.S. contractor late last year , he ordered the killing of a top Iranian general , Qassem Suleimani .

On Friday, the New York Times broke the explosive story that a unit of Russia’s military intelligence—Unit 29155 of the GRU—had allegedly offered bounties to militants in Afghanistan to kill U.S. troops. The GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, has emerged as a key player in Moscow’s efforts to sow chaos around the world, including the operation to hack and release emails from Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.
On Friday, the New York Times broke the explosive story that a unit of Russia’s military intelligence—Unit 29155 of the GRU—had allegedly offered bounties to militants in Afghanistan to kill U.S. troops. The GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, has emerged as a key player in Moscow’s efforts to sow chaos around the world, including the operation to hack and release emails from Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.
Unit 29155, accused of offering bounties to Taliban-linked militants, has spearheaded some of Russia’s most brazen overseas operations in recent years—or at least the ones we know about, from the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016 to the botched effort to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England.
It’s not clear how the U.S. intelligence community was able to tie the operation back to Unit 29155. Information about the bounty plot, which was included in the president’s daily intelligence briefing early last year, is filtering into the press in bits and pieces. On Tuesday the Times reported that the assessment was backed up by evidence of bank transfers between bank accounts linked to the GRU and the Taliban.
While Unit 29155 is often described as secretive, its tradecraft has at times been sloppy, including implausible cover stories and repeated use of the same aliases. Using leaked passport records, flight passenger data, and databases of border crossings, journalists and open-source investigators from groups such as Bellingcat and the Russian outlet the Insider have been able to use this trail of breadcrumbs to build a remarkably detailed picture of the unit and its members.
Bellingcat’s findings have been “consistently accurate,” said Marc Polymeropoulos, who formerly oversaw the CIA’s operations in Europe and Eurasia before retiring from the agency last year. “Since it was open source, it enabled us to discuss the GRU activities more openly, particularly with foreign liaison services.”
What exactly is the GRU?
Russia has three main intelligence agencies: the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB), the most powerful of the three. All three are involved in foreign operations, but it’s the GRU that has the necessary audacity to attempt complicated, high-stakes operations. “The GRU was always seen as a little more thuggish. They are tasked to do all of these things but their tradecraft is not great,” Polymeropoulos said.
How did a unit in an intelligence agency get to be so visible?
Unit 29155 is thought to have operated for at least a decade, but it wasn’t until its agents attempted to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 2018 that intelligence agencies and investigative reporters were able to gradually map out the group’s membership and their involvement in other Russian operations in Europe.
In early 2018, two Russian men operating under the aliases Alexander Petrov (later revealed to be Alexander Mishkin) and Ruslan Boshirov (whose real name is Anatoliy Chepiga) sprayed the deadly nerve agent Novichok on the door handle of Skripal’s home in Salisbury, England. Six months later, British prosecutors had enough evidence to identify the men as agents of the GRU and to charge them with attempted murder. The pair’s movements had been picked up by the U.K.’s plentiful closed-circuit TV cameras from the moment they stepped off an Aeroflot flight from Moscow.
A little over a week later, Petrov and Boshirov appeared on the Russian state-controlled TV channel RT to claim that they were but humble fitness instructors who flew to the U.K. for a weekend to travel to Salisbury not once, but twice, to see the city’s cathedral.
Once the photos of the pair were released, digital sleuths at the open-source investigative group Bellingcat were able to piece together their identities. Knowing that they were GRU, they scoured the website and yearbooks of a GRU training academy in Siberia that, given their age, the men likely attended. There, they found a photo of Chepiga in Chechnya in an article posted on the academy’s website in 2018, which noted that graduates of the academy had gone on to receive the “Hero of Russia” award, Russia’s highest military honor. It was this detail that led them to Chepiga’s true identity. Passports of GRU aliases will often use the same first name, patronymic—a name derived from the name of a person’s father—and date of birth as the agent’s true identity. Working on this assumption, Bellingcat researchers were able to find Mishkin’s real name and identity in leaked databases of Russian passport records.
The sloppiness of the operation, especially the use of a Soviet-developed nerve agent, led a number of experts to conclude that it was meant to be traced back to Russia. “They wanted to send a signal that this is what happens to defectors,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. It was the discovery of a third accomplice, who traveled under the alias Sergei Fedotov, that led to the discovery of Unit 29155. His involvement was first reported by the St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka.
The travel history of Fedotov, whose real name is Denis Sergeyev, revealed that he had been part of a team dispatched to the capital of Bulgaria in 2015 to poison local arms dealer Emilian Gebrev. The case had been closed by investigators in Bulgaria. But details of the assassination attempt served as a “Rosetta stone” for Western intelligence agencies, reported the New York Times, which enabled them to decipher the unit’s activities. In 2016 the unit attempted to orchestrate a coup in Montenegro, which at the time was on the brink of becoming a NATO member state. Last year the high court in Spain, the Audiencia Nacional, opened an investigation into the unit’s alleged connection with a 2017 independence bid by the Spanish region of Catalonia.
Using flight records, passenger data, and a database of Russian border crossings, researchers at Bellingcat were able to reveal that Sergeyev traveled frequently to Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and the Middle East between 2012 to 2018 under his persona of Sergei Fedotov. The purpose of the majority of these trips is still unknown.
“We only know the failures, because they fail a lot. They may be doing a lot of other things that we don’t know about,” said Aric Toler, who heads up Bellingcat’s investigations in Eastern Europe.
Much of the unraveling of the GRU unit’s activities was made possible by the fact that there is a booming trade in hacked and leaked data in Russia. “The Russians have an issue with the fact that you can basically buy any information. It’s kind of a perverse fact that Russia is very transparent in this way,” said Mark Galeotti, a senior associate fellow at the British-based Royal United Services Institute. Databases of flight records, customs data, passport information, and car registrations have been instrumental in the work of journalists and researchers piecing together the activities of Russian intelligence operatives abroad.
Why are the Afghan bounties such a big escalation?
U.S. President Donald Trump insists that the story is basically a fabrication—doubling down on charges of “fake news” on Wednesday despite multiple independent confirmations of the Times report—but former intelligence officials agreed that the fact that the assessment made its way into the president’s daily briefing reflects a high degree of confidence.
“If an assessment was made and it made it to the PDB there would have to be pretty significant confidence and cohesion in the intelligence community views on this,” said Kendall-Taylor, now a senior fellow with the Center for New American Security.
It’s not clear why the Taliban would need a financial incentive from Russian intelligence services to kill U.S. troops, whom they’ve fought for decades. But the alleged bounties represent a significant escalation in Russia’s efforts to directly target American interests. It’s not yet clear yet whether the Kremlin intended the payments to the Taliban to be discovered, knowing that it would sow further discord in the United States. Kendall-Taylor said that while not all operations carried out by the unit are intended to be traced back to them as the Skripal case was, that GRU was also unlikely to put secrecy ahead of its objectives.
While the Russian security services have been brazen in their efforts to kill critics, defectors, and former Chechen fighters abroad, this is a big shift. “They’ve always been very careful about Americans because they know there’s a massive price tag on dead Americans,” Galeotti said. U.S. forces have similarly made “painstaking efforts” to avoid hitting Russian troops in Syria, Kendall-Taylor noted.
Trump’s failure to respond to the intelligence has prompted a firestorm of criticism in Washington from both parties. On Wednesday, Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley described the revelations of Russia’s actions as a “serious escalation” that “demands a strong response.” In contrast, when Iran downed an unmanned U.S. drone last year, Trump nearly responded with an attack, but didn’t. When Iran killed a U.S. contractor late last year, he ordered the killing of a top Iranian general, Qassem Suleimani.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--In Afghanistan, the Dead Cast a Long Shadow

On the second day of Eid al-Fitr , the Islamic festival commemorating the end of Ramadan , Hamdullah Mohib , Afghanistan ’ s national security advisor and would-be president , visited an inconspicuous burial site in the southeastern province of Paktia and dug up quite a stir .
The grave belonged to Mohammed Najibullah , Afghanistan ’ s last communist president , brutally murdered when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996 .
Mohib is the first post-Taliban senior government official to ever pay his respects there .
The controversial visit had several objectives for Mohib : to court Afghans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recall Najibullah as a charismatic Afghan patriot who launched a national reconciliation process , and also as a reminder of the enduring brutality of the Taliban , who again today stand poised to share power , if not take it outright , as Kabul , Washington , and the Taliban grope their way toward the conclusion of an agonizing peace process .
But many Afghans , especially those who fought on the side of the mujahideen rebels in the 1980s , found Mohib ’ s actions provocative , even offensive .
Mahmoud Saikal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United Nations , criticized Mohib for visiting the grave of “ a murderer of the people.
” Others recoiled at Najibullah ’ s bloody record as head of the Soviet-backed secret police .
“ It ’ s a shame that he visited the grave of this murderer .
Najibullah killed and tortured thousands of innocent people , ” said Modaser Islami , a Kabul-based activist focusing on Islamic issues.Many Afghans , especially those who fought on the side of the mujahideen rebels in the 1980s , found Mohib ’ s actions provocative , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doubt one of modern Afghanistan ’ s most controversial figures , is at the center of a battle for Afghanistan ’ s historical memory .
The young Najibullah , then a medical student in Kabul , joined the communist People ’ s Democratic Party of Afghanistan , a faction of which launched the bloody coup in April 1978 against the nascent Republic of Afghanistan ’ s first president , Mohammed Daoud Khan .
Daoud Khan was killed alongside his children , grandchildren , and wife in a manner grimly similar to how the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bolsheviks , disposed of the Russian royal family six decades earlier .
The coup propelled Afghanistan into a spiral of war and conflict from which it still suffers .
According to many of Najibullah ’ s contemporaries , historians , and analysts , including the Soviet Union ’ s own ex-archivist Vasili Mitrokhin , “ Comrade Najib ” was a brutal man wholly dedicated to supporting his party ’ s ideological goals .
That ranged from the mundane—dropping the “ -ullah ” ( God ) suffix of his name in a deeply conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ torturing and killing prisoners while head of the secret police at the height of the Soviet-Afghan War .
Abdul Latif , a former mujahid and victim of the secret police , recently detailed in a book how Najibullah ’ s subordinates tortured him with electrocutions , red hot skewers , and mock executions .
According to the United Nations , Najibullah ’ s secret police also used sexual violence against both men and women , raping victims with bottles or bullets or , as Latif described , by sexually assaulting female prisoners in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the man that the Soviets installed in 1986 as president with the hopes of reinvigorating what seemed a doomed communist project in Kabul .
But with the inevitable Soviet withdrawal already on the horizon , Najibullah ’ s tone shifted .
Sharp , savvy , and charismatic , a gifted orator in both Pashto and Dari , he started to shed his Soviet skin and portray himself as a nationalist .
He talked of unity , and launched a program of national reconciliation with the mujahideen rebels he ’ d spent years battling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the army and his newly formed militias continued to attack Afghan villages , engendering distrust among the mujahideen who still remembered disappeared relatives and suffering in Najibullah ’ s dungeons .
But by bringing a measure of stability to war-wracked Afghanistan , Najibullah burnished part of his legacy .
Even today , many in the current Afghan government look back fondly on elements of Najibullah ’ s rule , and see an example to follow .
Meanwhile , for all the ink that ’ s spilled over the atrocities committed by mujahideen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after Najibullah ’ s fall from power in 1992 , the crimes of the Afghan communist regimes in Kabul are often whitewashed or downplayed by regime supporters or by younger generations who recall only Najibullah ’ s heartfelt , charismatic speeches still available on YouTube .
“ Afghans who look back on the days of Najibullah as a time of peace have conveniently forgotten the thousands who were tortured and killed by secret police under his command .
Was he willing to make peace at the end ?
Possibly .
But if he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lives of those who suffered because of his part in the war , ” Patricia Gossman , associate Asia director for Human Rights Watch , told Foreign Policy .
Najibullah ’ s complicated legacy explains the controversy over Mohib ’ s graveside visit , which many observers understood as a deliberate political message .
A quarter-century after his death , Najibullah still has a strong base in the country ’ s southeast , a Pashtun heartland ; in Afghanistan , the dead cast a long shadow .
Afghanistan ’ s bloody past @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with a solution to decades of conflict .
“ Mohib wants to be politically successful , so he believes he needs Najibullah ’ s Pashtun nationalist supporters , who have become very loud during the last years , ” said Sayed Jalal Shajjan , a Kabul-based anthropologist and writer .
The visit was a reminder of Taliban brutality and a poke in the eye to Pakistan , a country whose intelligence services have long supported Taliban insurgents and a frequent target of Mohib ’ s verbal barbs .
But Mohib apparently sought to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , paying homage as well to the grave of Ahmad Shah Massoud , a legendary commander of the mujahideen known as the “ Lion of the Panjshir , ” who fought first the Soviets ( and Najibullah ) then the Taliban , before he was killed by assassins linked to al Qaeda two days before the 9/11 attacks .
“ Mohib did not do this without calculation , ” said Shajjan .
“ He is preparing himself to become the next president , the leader of a new generation of Afghans .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visited the graves of both Massoud and Najibullah , two very contrary figures.
” Afghanistan ’ s bloody past—and especially the role played by the Taliban after a period of civil war—is again present as the country grapples with a solution to decades of conflict .
When the Taliban , after years of fighting , finally entered Kabul in 1996 , they broke into the compound where Najibullah had spent four years in hiding , brutally tortured and murdered him , then hung his mutilated corpse out on public display .
Today , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Kabul and taking a part in the new government , many have déjà vu .
Like Najibullah , current President Ashraf Ghani comes from the Pashtun Ahmadzai tribe , prominent in the southeast .
And like Najibullah , Ghani , who finds himself in an isolated situation between Washington and the Taliban , hopes to arouse nationalist and patriotic feelings among his Pashtun supporters to protect himself from Taliban reprisals .
Although it appears very unlikely at the moment , some Afghans even fear that Ghani will eventually share a similar violent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban reconquer Kabul .
In a recent interview on the Afghan peace process , Ghani nodded back at the dissolution of the republic and the bloody fate of Najibullah—perhaps as a cautionary tale for Afghanistan ’ s road ahead .
“ Najibullah made the mistake of his life by announcing that he was going to resign , ” Ghani said .
“ Please don ’ t ask us to replay a film that we know well .
”

On the second day of Eid al-Fitr, the Islamic festival commemorating the end of Ramadan, Hamdullah Mohib, Afghanistan’s national security advisor and would-be president, visited an inconspicuous burial site in the southeastern province of Paktia and dug up quite a stir.
On the second day of Eid al-Fitr, the Islamic festival commemorating the end of Ramadan, Hamdullah Mohib, Afghanistan’s national security advisor and would-be president, visited an inconspicuous burial site in the southeastern province of Paktia and dug up quite a stir.
The grave belonged to Mohammed Najibullah, Afghanistan’s last communist president, brutally murdered when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996. Mohib is the first post-Taliban senior government official to ever pay his respects there. The controversial visit had several objectives for Mohib: to court Afghans, especially many nationalist Pashtuns, who recall Najibullah as a charismatic Afghan patriot who launched a national reconciliation process, and also as a reminder of the enduring brutality of the Taliban, who again today stand poised to share power, if not take it outright, as Kabul, Washington, and the Taliban grope their way toward the conclusion of an agonizing peace process.
But many Afghans, especially those who fought on the side of the mujahideen rebels in the 1980s, found Mohib’s actions provocative, even offensive. Mahmoud Saikal, a former Afghan envoy to the United Nations, criticized Mohib for visiting the grave of “a murderer of the people.” Others recoiled at Najibullah’s bloody record as head of the Soviet-backed secret police. “It’s a shame that he visited the grave of this murderer. Najibullah killed and tortured thousands of innocent people,” said Modaser Islami, a Kabul-based activist focusing on Islamic issues.Many Afghans, especially those who fought on the side of the mujahideen rebels in the 1980s, found Mohib’s actions provocative, even offensive.
Najibullah, without a doubt one of modern Afghanistan’s most controversial figures, is at the center of a battle for Afghanistan’s historical memory.
The young Najibullah, then a medical student in Kabul, joined the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a faction of which launched the bloody coup in April 1978 against the nascent Republic of Afghanistan’s first president, Mohammed Daoud Khan. Daoud Khan was killed alongside his children, grandchildren, and wife in a manner grimly similar to how the Afghan communists’ ideological forebears, the Bolsheviks, disposed of the Russian royal family six decades earlier.
The coup propelled Afghanistan into a spiral of war and conflict from which it still suffers. According to many of Najibullah’s contemporaries, historians, and analysts, including the Soviet Union’s own ex-archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, “Comrade Najib” was a brutal man wholly dedicated to supporting his party’s ideological goals. That ranged from the mundane—dropping the “-ullah” (God) suffix of his name in a deeply conservative, Islamic country—to taking personal relish in torturing and killing prisoners while head of the secret police at the height of the Soviet-Afghan War.
Abdul Latif, a former mujahid and victim of the secret police, recently detailed in a book how Najibullah’s subordinates tortured him with electrocutions, red hot skewers, and mock executions. According to the United Nations, Najibullah’s secret police also used sexual violence against both men and women, raping victims with bottles or bullets or, as Latif described, by sexually assaulting female prisoners in front of men.
That’s the man that the Soviets installed in 1986 as president with the hopes of reinvigorating what seemed a doomed communist project in Kabul. But with the inevitable Soviet withdrawal already on the horizon, Najibullah’s tone shifted. Sharp, savvy, and charismatic, a gifted orator in both Pashto and Dari, he started to shed his Soviet skin and portray himself as a nationalist. He talked of unity, and launched a program of national reconciliation with the mujahideen rebels he’d spent years battling and brutalizing.
At the same time, the army and his newly formed militias continued to attack Afghan villages, engendering distrust among the mujahideen who still remembered disappeared relatives and suffering in Najibullah’s dungeons.
But by bringing a measure of stability to war-wracked Afghanistan, Najibullah burnished part of his legacy. Even today, many in the current Afghan government look back fondly on elements of Najibullah’s rule, and see an example to follow. Meanwhile, for all the ink that’s spilled over the atrocities committed by mujahideen and other warlords during the civil war after Najibullah’s fall from power in 1992, the crimes of the Afghan communist regimes in Kabul are often whitewashed or downplayed by regime supporters or by younger generations who recall only Najibullah’s heartfelt, charismatic speeches still available on YouTube.
“Afghans who look back on the days of Najibullah as a time of peace have conveniently forgotten the thousands who were tortured and killed by secret police under his command. Was he willing to make peace at the end? Possibly. But if he was, we gain nothing by erasing the lives of those who suffered because of his part in the war,” Patricia Gossman, associate Asia director for Human Rights Watch, told Foreign Policy.
Najibullah’s complicated legacy explains the controversy over Mohib’s graveside visit, which many observers understood as a deliberate political message. A quarter-century after his death, Najibullah still has a strong base in the country’s southeast, a Pashtun heartland; in Afghanistan, the dead cast a long shadow. Afghanistan’s bloody past is again present as the country grapples with a solution to decades of conflict.
“Mohib wants to be politically successful, so he believes he needs Najibullah’s Pashtun nationalist supporters, who have become very loud during the last years,” said Sayed Jalal Shajjan, a Kabul-based anthropologist and writer. The visit was a reminder of Taliban brutality and a poke in the eye to Pakistan, a country whose intelligence services have long supported Taliban insurgents and a frequent target of Mohib’s verbal barbs.
But Mohib apparently sought to hedge his bets with his Eid visits, paying homage as well to the grave of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a legendary commander of the mujahideen known as the “Lion of the Panjshir,” who fought first the Soviets (and Najibullah) then the Taliban, before he was killed by assassins linked to al Qaeda two days before the 9/11 attacks.
“Mohib did not do this without calculation,” said Shajjan. “He is preparing himself to become the next president, the leader of a new generation of Afghans. And to be successful with that, he visited the graves of both Massoud and Najibullah, two very contrary figures.”
Afghanistan’s bloody past—and especially the role played by the Taliban after a period of civil war—is again present as the country grapples with a solution to decades of conflict. When the Taliban, after years of fighting, finally entered Kabul in 1996, they broke into the compound where Najibullah had spent four years in hiding, brutally tortured and murdered him, then hung his mutilated corpse out on public display.
Today, with the prospect of the Taliban returning to Kabul and taking a part in the new government, many have déjà vu. Like Najibullah, current President Ashraf Ghani comes from the Pashtun Ahmadzai tribe, prominent in the southeast. And like Najibullah, Ghani, who finds himself in an isolated situation between Washington and the Taliban, hopes to arouse nationalist and patriotic feelings among his Pashtun supporters to protect himself from Taliban reprisals. Although it appears very unlikely at the moment, some Afghans even fear that Ghani will eventually share a similar violent fate after the Americans withdraw and the Taliban reconquer Kabul.
In a recent interview on the Afghan peace process, Ghani nodded back at the dissolution of the republic and the bloody fate of Najibullah—perhaps as a cautionary tale for Afghanistan’s road ahead.
“Najibullah made the mistake of his life by announcing that he was going to resign,” Ghani said. “Please don’t ask us to replay a film that we know well.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-01--Mozambique’s Insurgency Is a Regional Problem

Armed attacks by extremist militant groups in Mozambique ’ s oil-rich Cabo Delgado province have increased this year , sending a wave of panic through neighboring countries .
The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks , but extremists from Kenya and Tanzania and a homegrown group called Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama are also behind the rise in violence .
It is unclear if the extremist groups are connected and therefore difficult to determine who is behind which attacks .
Since 2017 , militants have killed 700 civilians and also targeted security forces , destroying government infrastructure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In April , an extremist group killed 52 people in the village of Xitaxi—the deadliest attack yet .
No group has claimed responsibility .
The violence in Cabo Delgado began in October 2017 , several years after massive oil and gas deposits were discovered in the region .
Multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil and Total invested in the area , but the rising insurgency presents a major risk : Their projects could stall if the violence continues to escalate .
Mozambique shares borders with Malawi , South Africa , Eswatini , Zambia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Southern African Development Community ( SADC ) , a 16-country economic bloc collectively worth $ 721 billion .
If the insurgency is not checked soon , it could spread throughout the region—threatening the peace and stability of the other member states .
But SADC isn ’ t mounting a coordinated response to the looming danger .
In the first four months of 2020 , violent incidents in Cabo Delgado rose by 300 percent compared with the same period in 2019 , according to estimates by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same period , 285 people were killed in extremist attacks—bringing the total number of all reported fatalities to more than 1,000 since the insurgency began .
More than 200,000 people have fled their homes as the violence spreads toward the southern part of the province .
In addition to Cabo Delgado ’ s rich mineral resources , the marginalization of its majority Muslim population has played a key role in stoking the fires of insurgency .
Years of central government neglect , joblessness , and poverty have pushed the province ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ For me , it does not make sense to speak of ‘ jihadism , ’ ” Yussuf Adam , a professor at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo , told a local media outlet .
“ These are people who find themselves marginalized , who do not receive the benefits they should receive.
” The Mozambican army has moved to quell the attacks with the help of private military contractors , including Russia ’ s Wagner Group and the South Africa-based security company Dyck Advisory Group .
The government says it has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ months , but it is hardly on top of the situation .
Instead , it has dithered for years , allowing the militants to transform from a small movement into a much larger menace .
The government has long been secretive about the insurgency , viewing the attacks as the result of local criminal activity rather than an external force .
The government has long been secretive about the insurgency in Cabo Delgado , viewing the attacks as the result of local criminal activity rather than an external force .
At first , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jihadists .
Meanwhile , opposition voices , such as the Democratic Movement of Mozambique party , have appealed to the government to declare a state of war in the region to elicit international support in fighting the shadowy insurgency .
Northern Mozambique now risks becoming a regional center of Islamist extremism , and the security threat requires a coordinated response before it spills into the other SADC states .
But there is a growing feeling among some observers that the SADC has been slow to provide support to Mozambique .
Some say that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nigeria and into neighboring states is evidence enough that the SADC should assist Mozambique now before the broader region faces a similar threat .
During a May telephone briefing , Tibor Nagy , the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs , compared the rise of the insurgency in Mozambique to the emergence of Boko Haram .
“ Boko Haram was just a small movement , and because of the way the Nigerian government initially responded to it , it grew into a very serious threat , not just to northeast Nigeria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
Another example is Mali , where Islamist military attacks began in the country ’ s north in 2012 , spread to Burkina Faso , and now threaten other neighbors .
The SADC could learn from West Africa : Mali , Burkina Faso , Chad , Niger , and Mauritania established a coordinated force to fight terrorism and organized crime .
But earlier regional coordination would have helped curtail the violence , which continues to rise despite the presence of French and U.S. troops .
Mozambique badly needs the regional assistance : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civil war , which ended in 1992 .
Its poorly resourced military has struggled to contain and combat attacks by the extremists .
In February , the escalation of violence prompted Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi to call for assistance from the SADC .
After ignoring the insurgency in Mozambique for years , the SADC convened a special meeting May 19—but it produced nothing more than empty promises .
Tanzania is the only country that reacted swiftly by dispatching its troops to the border .
Tanzania , which borders Cabo Delgado to the north @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swiftly by dispatching its troops to the border .
The move is a precautionary measure that could prove vital in curtailing extremists ’ operations and the spread of their activities into Tanzania , where it is suspected that some insurgents have links .
The rising extremist threat in Mozambique also poses a major risk to Zimbabwe , which relies on Mozambique for imported electricity and food .
Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa met Nyusi on April 30 in Chimoio , Mozambique , to discuss the security situation .
Despite denying rumors that it has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the insurgency , Zimbabwe is believed to have sent about 30 elite troops to train the Mozambican army while awaiting a possible SADC troop deployment .
South Africa would also be seriously affected by Mozambique ’ s conflict .
The two countries share a critical economic corridor—one that also harbors illegal activities such as drug trafficking that financially sustain terrorist groups .
But South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has been conspicuously silent on the escalating conflict .
In May , Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor revealed that South Africa and Mozambique were engaged in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but she did not offer specifics .
The comment followed media reports that Ramaphosa was sitting on Mozambique ’ s official request for support .
The coronavirus makes a coordinated response more urgent : The pandemic could undercut counterterrorism operations in Mozambique .
Many African states are shifting military spending to respond to the health crisis , and insurgents have used the pandemic to increase their attacks and propaganda while gaining civilian support through the distribution of food , medicine , and fuel to loyal residents .
But government measures to tighten @ @ @ @ @ @ @ destabilize extremists ’ operations .
If Mozambique ’ s fellow SADC states have a solid plan , they haven ’ t revealed it to the public .
They have not moved quickly , even though the insurgency could potentially affect them .
As the conflict rages , it is clear that it can ’ t be left unattended for much longer .
If it gains any more ground , it will have drastic consequences for peace and economic activity in the region .

Armed attacks by extremist militant groups in Mozambique’s oil-rich Cabo Delgado province have increased this year, sending a wave of panic through neighboring countries. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, but extremists from Kenya and Tanzania and a homegrown group called Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama are also behind the rise in violence.
Armed attacks by extremist militant groups in Mozambique’s oil-rich Cabo Delgado province have increased this year, sending a wave of panic through neighboring countries. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, but extremists from Kenya and Tanzania and a homegrown group called Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama are also behind the rise in violence.
It is unclear if the extremist groups are connected and therefore difficult to determine who is behind which attacks. Since 2017, militants have killed 700 civilians and also targeted security forces, destroying government infrastructure and seizing weapons from Mozambican troops. In April, an extremist group killed 52 people in the village of Xitaxi—the deadliest attack yet. No group has claimed responsibility.
The violence in Cabo Delgado began in October 2017, several years after massive oil and gas deposits were discovered in the region. Multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil and Total invested in the area, but the rising insurgency presents a major risk: Their projects could stall if the violence continues to escalate.
Mozambique shares borders with Malawi, South Africa, Eswatini, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania—all members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a 16-country economic bloc collectively worth $721 billion. If the insurgency is not checked soon, it could spread throughout the region—threatening the peace and stability of the other member states. But SADC isn’t mounting a coordinated response to the looming danger.
In the first four months of 2020, violent incidents in Cabo Delgado rose by 300 percent compared with the same period in 2019, according to estimates by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a U.S.-based crisis-mapping project. During the same period, 285 people were killed in extremist attacks—bringing the total number of all reported fatalities to more than 1,000 since the insurgency began. More than 200,000 people have fled their homes as the violence spreads toward the southern part of the province.
In addition to Cabo Delgado’s rich mineral resources, the marginalization of its majority Muslim population has played a key role in stoking the fires of insurgency. Years of central government neglect, joblessness, and poverty have pushed the province’s disenchanted young people into the armed militias. “For me, it does not make sense to speak of ‘jihadism,’” Yussuf Adam, a professor at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, told a local media outlet. “These are people who find themselves marginalized, who do not receive the benefits they should receive.”
The Mozambican army has moved to quell the attacks with the help of private military contractors, including Russia’s Wagner Group and the South Africa-based security company Dyck Advisory Group. The government says it has killed more than 100 insurgents in recent months, but it is hardly on top of the situation. Instead, it has dithered for years, allowing the militants to transform from a small movement into a much larger menace.
The government has long been secretive about the insurgency, viewing the attacks as the result of local criminal activity rather than an external force.
The government has long been secretive about the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, viewing the attacks as the result of local criminal activity rather than an external force. At first, some government officials denied the presence of jihadists. Meanwhile, opposition voices, such as the Democratic Movement of Mozambique party, have appealed to the government to declare a state of war in the region to elicit international support in fighting the shadowy insurgency.
Northern Mozambique now risks becoming a regional center of Islamist extremism, and the security threat requires a coordinated response before it spills into the other SADC states. But there is a growing feeling among some observers that the SADC has been slow to provide support to Mozambique. Some say that Boko Haram’s expansion in northern Nigeria and into neighboring states is evidence enough that the SADC should assist Mozambique now before the broader region faces a similar threat.
During a May telephone briefing, Tibor Nagy, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, compared the rise of the insurgency in Mozambique to the emergence of Boko Haram. “Boko Haram was just a small movement, and because of the way the Nigerian government initially responded to it, it grew into a very serious threat, not just to northeast Nigeria but to surrounding countries,” he said.
Another example is Mali, where Islamist military attacks began in the country’s north in 2012, spread to Burkina Faso, and now threaten other neighbors. The SADC could learn from West Africa: Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania established a coordinated force to fight terrorism and organized crime. But earlier regional coordination would have helped curtail the violence, which continues to rise despite the presence of French and U.S. troops.
Mozambique badly needs the regional assistance: It is still recovering from decades of civil war, which ended in 1992. Its poorly resourced military has struggled to contain and combat attacks by the extremists. In February, the escalation of violence prompted Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi to call for assistance from the SADC. After ignoring the insurgency in Mozambique for years, the SADC convened a special meeting May 19—but it produced nothing more than empty promises.
Tanzania is the only country that reacted swiftly by dispatching its troops to the border.
Tanzania, which borders Cabo Delgado to the north, is the only country that reacted swiftly by dispatching its troops to the border. The move is a precautionary measure that could prove vital in curtailing extremists’ operations and the spread of their activities into Tanzania, where it is suspected that some insurgents have links.
The rising extremist threat in Mozambique also poses a major risk to Zimbabwe, which relies on Mozambique for imported electricity and food. Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa met Nyusi on April 30 in Chimoio, Mozambique, to discuss the security situation. Despite denying rumors that it has deployed its army to help Mozambique fight the insurgency, Zimbabwe is believed to have sent about 30 elite troops to train the Mozambican army while awaiting a possible SADC troop deployment.
South Africa would also be seriously affected by Mozambique’s conflict. The two countries share a critical economic corridor—one that also harbors illegal activities such as drug trafficking that financially sustain terrorist groups. But South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has been conspicuously silent on the escalating conflict. In May, Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor revealed that South Africa and Mozambique were engaged in talks over how South Africa could assist, but she did not offer specifics. The comment followed media reports that Ramaphosa was sitting on Mozambique’s official request for support.
The coronavirus makes a coordinated response more urgent: The pandemic could undercut counterterrorism operations in Mozambique. Many African states are shifting military spending to respond to the health crisis, and insurgents have used the pandemic to increase their attacks and propaganda while gaining civilian support through the distribution of food, medicine, and fuel to loyal residents. But government measures to tighten borders and internal transportation routes could also destabilize extremists’ operations.
If Mozambique’s fellow SADC states have a solid plan, they haven’t revealed it to the public. They have not moved quickly, even though the insurgency could potentially affect them. As the conflict rages, it is clear that it can’t be left unattended for much longer. If it gains any more ground, it will have drastic consequences for peace and economic activity in the region.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--New Details Emerge of Afghan Middleman In Russian Bounty Case

New Details Emerge of Afghan Middleman In Russian Bounty Case Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Fresh details shed light on alleged Russian bounty program , the United States records over 50,000 new coronavirus cases in one day , and Russians approve new constitutional changes .
Please note : There will be no Morning Brief on Friday , July 3 , in observance of the Independence Day holiday in the United States .
We will return to your inbox on Monday , July 6 .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
A new report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian-backed bounty program to further incentivize Taliban-linked forces to kill U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan .
On Wednesday , the New York Times named Rahmatullah Azizi as a central player in attempts to launder money from Russia into Afghanistan in order to make payments to militant groups .
Efforts to detain Azizi were made at least six months ago , although authorities assume he had already fled to Russia .
Security forces instead found roughly $ 500,000 in cash in one of his Kabul properties .
In an echo of America ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doomed relationship with the mujahideen , Azizi was also once a beneficiary of U.S. largess only to later turn elsewhere .
Azizi was a former recipient of U.S. contractor cash for road building in the early days of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan , until he allegedly found more lucrative options .
Much is still unknown about some aspects of the program , including how exactly the bounty money changed hands , and at what levels of the Taliban attacks were coordinated .
There ’ s also a question of motivation , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as to “ why the Taliban would need a financial incentive from Russian intelligence services to kill U.S. troops , whom they ’ ve fought for decades.
” What the White House is saying .
The White House continues to dismiss the story as a case of thinly-sourced intelligence .
National Security Adviser Robert O ’ Brien said on Thursday that the CIA official in charge of verbally presenting the daily intelligence brief to President Donald Trump had refrained from bringing up the Russian bounty story as she was not confident in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coalition forces took protective measures at the time of receiving the intelligence .
What is this Russian intel unit ?
FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon breaks down who exactly Unit 29155 of the Main Intelligence Directorate ( GRU ) —the group allegedly responsibly for orchestrating the bounty program—are .
She also explores why , from an attempted coup in Montenegro to a botched effort to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England , the no-longer-secret group continues to make headlines .
What ’ s in it for Russia ?
Writing in Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bailey chart Russia ’ s interests in Afghanistan—from failure in Soviet times to the present day .
“ Putin ’ s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests , ” they write .
“ As Syria demonstrates , the Kremlin is rewriting history to retrospectively justify intervention abroad as it seeks to regain its status as a global power.
” U.S. leads world with record number of new COVID-19 cases .
The United States recorded its highest number of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Wednesday , with over 51,000 new cases reported .
Brazil is not far behind , as it recorded roughly 44,000 new cases .
Together the two countries accounted for almost half of all new coronavirus cases reported worldwide yesterday .
When President Trump was asked by Fox Business whether he still believed the virus would eventually go away on its own , the president replied “ I do.
” Russians approve new constitutional amendments .
Changes to Russia ’ constitution—including an amendment to allow President Vladimir Putin to remain in office until 2036—appear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with near landslide approval , according to the country ’ s Central Election Commission .
The commission reported 77 percent support for changing the constitution after roughly 87 percent of ballots were counted .
The amendments also included increases to state pensions and an effective ban on same-sex marriage .
Israeli annexation in “ weeks.
” Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank will happen “ in the coming weeks or months , ” Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said yesterday , before adding that he is not “ versed in the details @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a vote on annexation came and went without any government action .
As international pressure builds against the move , the Vatican made the rare decision to summon the ambassadors of both Israel and the United States to express “ the concern of the Holy See regarding possible unilateral actions that may further jeopardize the search for peace between Israelis and Palestinians , as well as the delicate situation in the Middle East.
” Khashoggi trial begins on Friday .
On Friday , a Turkish court will begin the trial of 20 Saudi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul .
All of the defendants are expected to be tried in absentia .
Khashoggi ’ s fiancee Hatice Cengiz said she hopes the trial shed light on new evidence in the murder as well as possible the whereabouts of Khashoggi ’ s remains .
Saudi Arabia conducted its own trial in December , sentencing five people to death and three to prison .
Those sentenced to death were eventually granted a reprieve after a declaration of forgiveness from the Khashoggi family .
Cengiz has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bemoan slow progress on Brexit trade deal .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said progress on post-Brexit trade talks with the United Kingdom had been “ very limited ” and that the European Union should prepare “ for the possibility that a deal doesn ’ t materialize.
” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also said talks between the two sides were moving “ very sluggishly and slowly , ” and criticized the Westminster government , saying the delay was “ partly because we don ’ t know if the British want an agreement or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of talks between the EU and U.K. continues this week , before full negotiations are scheduled to resume the week of July 20 .
Taiwan cements ties with Somaliland .
Taiwan has set up a diplomatic office in Somaliland , a self-declared but internationally-unrecognized state within the borders of Somalia that is located on the strategically significant Horn of Africa .
The move gives Taiwan another ally as it begins to lose others under Chinese pressure .
It also gives Taiwan an opening in an area where the United States and China are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established military bases in neighboring Djibouti .
Seventy years after the Nazis were defeated in World War II , one European military branch has quietly decided to ditch the swastika from its emblem .
Finland ’ s Air Force Command had used a swastika with a pair of wings since 1918 , long before its popularization in the West following Hitler ’ s rise , after the unit was gifted a plane by Swedish Count Eric von Rosen with the Sanskrit symbol emblazoned on the side .
Teivo Teivainen , the Finnish academic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2017 without an announcement , welcomed the move .
Teivainen told the BBC that the Finnish military ’ s job “ is to defend the nation—not to defend an old symbol given by a Swedish count in 1918.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Fresh details shed light on alleged Russian bounty program , the United States records over 50,000 new coronavirus cases in one day, and Russians approve new constitutional changes.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Fresh details shed light on alleged Russian bounty program, the United States records over 50,000 new coronavirus cases in one day, and Russians approve new constitutional changes.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
White House Downplays Russia Bounty Story As Afghan Middleman Named
A new report pinpoints a key figure in the alleged Russian-backed bounty program to further incentivize Taliban-linked forces to kill U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. On Wednesday, the New York Times named Rahmatullah Azizi as a central player in attempts to launder money from Russia into Afghanistan in order to make payments to militant groups.
Efforts to detain Azizi were made at least six months ago, although authorities assume he had already fled to Russia. Security forces instead found roughly $500,000 in cash in one of his Kabul properties.
In an echo of America’s historical missteps in Afghanistan and its doomed relationship with the mujahideen, Azizi was also once a beneficiary of U.S. largess only to later turn elsewhere. Azizi was a former recipient of U.S. contractor cash for road building in the early days of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, until he allegedly found more lucrative options.
Much is still unknown about some aspects of the program, including how exactly the bounty money changed hands, and at what levels of the Taliban attacks were coordinated. There’s also a question of motivation, as Foreign Policy’s Amy Mackinnon writes, as to “why the Taliban would need a financial incentive from Russian intelligence services to kill U.S. troops, whom they’ve fought for decades.”
What the White House is saying. The White House continues to dismiss the story as a case of thinly-sourced intelligence. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien said on Thursday that the CIA official in charge of verbally presenting the daily intelligence brief to President Donald Trump had refrained from bringing up the Russian bounty story as she was not confident in it. He also said U.S. and coalition forces took protective measures at the time of receiving the intelligence.
What is this Russian intel unit? FP’s Amy Mackinnon breaks down who exactly Unit 29155 of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)—the group allegedly responsibly for orchestrating the bounty program—are. She also explores why, from an attempted coup in Montenegro to a botched effort to assassinate former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in England, the no-longer-secret group continues to make headlines.
What’s in it for Russia? Writing in Foreign Policy, Sajjan M. Gohel and Allison Bailey chart Russia’s interests in Afghanistan—from failure in Soviet times to the present day. “Putin’s focus on Afghanistan is an essential aspect of how Russia seeks to reevaluate its past while furthering its future strategic interests,” they write. “As Syria demonstrates, the Kremlin is rewriting history to retrospectively justify intervention abroad as it seeks to regain its status as a global power.”
What We’re Following Today
U.S. leads world with record number of new COVID-19 cases. The United States recorded its highest number of new coronavirus cases in one day on Wednesday, with over 51,000 new cases reported. Brazil is not far behind, as it recorded roughly 44,000 new cases. Together the two countries accounted for almost half of all new coronavirus cases reported worldwide yesterday. When President Trump was asked by Fox Business whether he still believed the virus would eventually go away on its own, the president replied “I do.”
Russians approve new constitutional amendments. Changes to Russia’ constitution—including an amendment to allow President Vladimir Putin to remain in office until 2036—appear to have been accepted by a referendum with near landslide approval, according to the country’s Central Election Commission. The commission reported 77 percent support for changing the constitution after roughly 87 percent of ballots were counted. The amendments also included increases to state pensions and an effective ban on same-sex marriage.
Israeli annexation in “weeks.” Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank will happen “in the coming weeks or months,” Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said yesterday, before adding that he is not “versed in the details” as a July 1 date for a vote on annexation came and went without any government action. As international pressure builds against the move, the Vatican made the rare decision to summon the ambassadors of both Israel and the United States to express “the concern of the Holy See regarding possible unilateral actions that may further jeopardize the search for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the delicate situation in the Middle East.”
Keep an Eye On
Khashoggi trial begins on Friday. On Friday, a Turkish court will begin the trial of 20 Saudi nationals charged in connection with the killing of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. All of the defendants are expected to be tried in absentia. Khashoggi’s fiancee Hatice Cengiz said she hopes the trial shed light on new evidence in the murder as well as possible the whereabouts of Khashoggi’s remains. Saudi Arabia conducted its own trial in December, sentencing five people to death and three to prison. Those sentenced to death were eventually granted a reprieve after a declaration of forgiveness from the Khashoggi family. Cengiz has called the Saudi trial illegitimate.
Germans bemoan slow progress on Brexit trade deal. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said progress on post-Brexit trade talks with the United Kingdom had been “very limited” and that the European Union should prepare “for the possibility that a deal doesn’t materialize.” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also said talks between the two sides were moving “very sluggishly and slowly,” and criticized the Westminster government, saying the delay was “partly because we don’t know if the British want an agreement or not.” A “restricted” round of talks between the EU and U.K. continues this week, before full negotiations are scheduled to resume the week of July 20.
Taiwan cements ties with Somaliland. Taiwan has set up a diplomatic office in Somaliland, a self-declared but internationally-unrecognized state within the borders of Somalia that is located on the strategically significant Horn of Africa. The move gives Taiwan another ally as it begins to lose others under Chinese pressure. It also gives Taiwan an opening in an area where the United States and China are jockeying for influence: both countries have established military bases in neighboring Djibouti.
Odds and Ends
Seventy years after the Nazis were defeated in World War II, one European military branch has quietly decided to ditch the swastika from its emblem. Finland’s Air Force Command had used a swastika with a pair of wings since 1918, long before its popularization in the West following Hitler’s rise, after the unit was gifted a plane by Swedish Count Eric von Rosen with the Sanskrit symbol emblazoned on the side. Teivo Teivainen, the Finnish academic who noticed the change, which began in 2017 without an announcement, welcomed the move. Teivainen told the BBC that the Finnish military’s job “is to defend the nation—not to defend an old symbol given by a Swedish count in 1918.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.