foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--One Year After Mass Protests, India’s Muslims Still Live in Fear

One Year After Mass Protests , India ’ s Muslims Still Live in Fear Last December , hundreds of thousands of people in cities across India joined in protest against the recently passed Citizenship Amendment Act ( CAA ) .
The law creates a pathway to citizenship for some undocumented residents who have fled religious persecution , but it discriminates against refugees and immigrants who happen to be Muslim—members of India ’ s largest minority .
The anti-CAA movement , as it became known , was India ’ s most sustained people ’ s movement since the Bharatiya Janata Party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2014 .
The size of the protests caught Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s government by surprise .
Like the ongoing protests led by Sikh farmers against new agricultural laws , the anti-CAA movement was characterized by the ruling party as “ anti-national.
” But while the Modi government is now negotiating with the farmers to end their blockade of Delhi ’ s borders , the anti-CAA movement was never accorded any political legitimacy .
One year on , the anti-CAA movement has receded into the background , its anniversary barely remembered : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by students on Dec. 15 .
In March , the mass protests were cut short by the coronavirus pandemic , but it is hard to say how long they would have survived anyway , given the movement ’ s vilification by BJP leaders , hostilities from Delhi residents over blocked roads , and the lack of support from India ’ s so-called secular parties .
The movement has suffered from its own limitations .
It failed to engage a larger cross-section of society , building bridges with other distressed communities such as farmers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ BJP ’ s messaging that it was stirred by Pakistan .
The arrests of the anti-CAA movement ’ s leaders , as well as others who have decried the BJP ’ s virulent Hindu nationalism , mark the decline of India ’ s inclusive and consensus-building democratic ethos .
Indian Muslims remain in the same precarious situation they found themselves in 2019 : living in fear of becoming second-class citizens .
But it ’ s clear that the anti-CAA protests did not resonate much beyond an urban , liberal segment of Indian society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hindu middle class—the country ’ s largest demographic—remain solidly behind the prime minister and his politics .
Even so , the large numbers of people who joined the movement served as a rude awakening for a leadership confident that it had stamped out dissent .
The protests , coupled with a shift in international perceptions , seemed to push Modi ’ s government to take a step back and soften its tone .
The mothership of the anti-CAA movement was in Shaheen Bagh , a Muslim-majority neighborhood in Delhi .
Muslim women led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ joined by Muslims and non-Muslims alike .
“ I sat for 101 days , but no one [ from the government ] came to meet or speak with us , ” said Bilkis Bano , 82 , one of the most famous faces of the sit-in .
“ What could we do when no one came to speak with us ?
” Even before the full onset of the pandemic , the anti-CAA movement came to a halt after religious violence ravaged parts of Delhi in February , killing 53 people , mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led the anti-CAA protests—mostly young women and men—were blamed .
A Delhi Police investigation , which critics have called biased , concluded that the protests were part of a conspiracy to overthrow the Modi government .
In two separate bail hearings for jailed activists , the judges said the terrorism charges were seemingly “ targeted ” and “ vindictive.
” Despite a few political setbacks , the BJP ’ s brand of Hindu nationalism is gaining strength in the Modi government ’ s second term .
The arrests of anti-CAA activists and students @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the riots on the protesters , and by extension the Muslim community .
Delhi police have called activist Umar Khalid , 33—one of the most vocal critics of the Modi government—the “ mastermind ” behind the Delhi riots .
“ He has been targeted because he refused to be silenced , ” Banojyotsna Lahiri , his partner , said .
Despite a few political setbacks in state elections , the BJP ’ s brand of Hindu nationalism is gaining strength in the Modi government ’ s second term .
In addition to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stripped Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir of its constitutional autonomy and prompted fears of demographic change in the region .
And in November 2019 , after decades of litigation , the Supreme Court ruled in favor of building a Hindu temple on the site of a 16th-century mosque destroyed by Hindu extremists in 1992 .
In Modi ’ s India , people increasingly reveal a once-hidden anti-Muslim bigotry .
Just last month , a major jewelry brand pulled an advertisement that showed a Hindu woman married into a Muslim family after public backlash .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ India ’ s most populous state , recently passed a law against forced “ unlawful conversions ” and marriages intended solely to change a woman ’ s religion .
Critics say the law amplifies the Hindu nationalist conspiracy that Muslim men seek to convert Hindu women by marrying them—so-called love jihad .
( Modi ’ s government has officially distanced itself from the term . )
One year after the Indian parliament passed the CAA , the Modi government says it is still drafting the rules to enforce it , and the Supreme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 140 petitions challenging its constitutional validity .
Home Minister Amit Shah , who has described undocumented immigrants as “ termites , ” backtracked on the plan for a nationwide citizens ’ register last year , after 11 states not governed by the BJP refused to implement it .
But while the government may have put the NRC on hold , it has not ruled out implementing data collection , which some argue is a surreptitious way of reintroducing the NRC .
The stripping of Kashmir ’ s protected status , the passage of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on anti-CAA students at two predominantly Muslim universities have offended Islamic countries that are friendly to India .
Iran , Turkey , and Malaysia condemned the Delhi riots in February .
The Organization of Islamic Cooperation has called on Modi to ensure protection for Muslims and Islamic holy places in India .
And after a year of lobbying , Pakistan managed to get the organization to pass a strong statement on Kashmir .
India ’ s CAA push has even put off friendly Bangladesh , which has refused to accept the return of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NRC .
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has called the CAA unnecessary , and three of her ministers canceled trips to India amid the protests .
The Modi government will likely tread forward carefully , given that Islamophobia in India has become somewhat of a liability—and could be a thorny issue with U.S. President-elect Joe Biden .
With state elections due next year in both Assam and Bengal , the BJP is now letting the CAA issue simmer .
The issue is already playing out in Assam state , home to many Bengali-speaking Hindus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over many years .
The state government prepared a list of citizens in August 2019 .
But the BJP suffered a setback : Of the 1.9 million people found to be living in Assam without documents , over 500,000 were Hindus who would effectively have to claim they fled religious persecution in a neighboring country to gain their citizenship .
BJP leaders have said that Hindus left out of the NRC would be covered under the CAA , and Shah said last year that the NRC would be repeated in Assam .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the list it had declared final in 2019 was not final after all .
With state elections due next year in both Assam and Bengal , the BJP is now letting the CAA issue simmer .
In Assam , the BJP ’ s attempt to make the NRC a Hindu-Muslim issue—rather than one tied to local differences in language and ethnicity—hasn ’ t quite worked .
Winning Bengal , which also has a sizable population of immigrants from Bangladesh , would be a milestone for the Hindu right wing .
There , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among upper-caste communities and worked hard to polarize the base of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee , who took power after three decades of Communist Party rule in 2011 .
“ The BJP is in a legal bind when it comes to Assam .
But wherever there is some space in the communal game , they are playing it , ” said Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty , the author of Assam : The Accord , The Discord .
In the anti-CAA movement , progressive forces couched their pleas to uphold the rights and freedoms of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the constitution .
They now recognize the BJP government ’ s unwillingness to even pay lip service to India ’ s constitutional values—and the not-so-silent majority ’ s antagonism toward these calls .

Last December, hundreds of thousands of people in cities across India joined in protest against the recently passed Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The law creates a pathway to citizenship for some undocumented residents who have fled religious persecution, but it discriminates against refugees and immigrants who happen to be Muslim—members of India’s largest minority. The anti-CAA movement, as it became known, was India’s most sustained people’s movement since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014.
Last December, hundreds of thousands of people in cities across India joined in protest against the recently passed Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The law creates a pathway to citizenship for some undocumented residents who have fled religious persecution, but it discriminates against refugees and immigrants who happen to be Muslim—members of India’s largest minority. The anti-CAA movement, as it became known, was India’s most sustained people’s movement since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014.
The size of the protests caught Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government by surprise. Like the ongoing protests led by Sikh farmers against new agricultural laws, the anti-CAA movement was characterized by the ruling party as “anti-national.” But while the Modi government is now negotiating with the farmers to end their blockade of Delhi’s borders, the anti-CAA movement was never accorded any political legitimacy.
One year on, the anti-CAA movement has receded into the background, its anniversary barely remembered: Delhi police stopped a candlelight march led by students on Dec. 15. In March, the mass protests were cut short by the coronavirus pandemic, but it is hard to say how long they would have survived anyway, given the movement’s vilification by BJP leaders, hostilities from Delhi residents over blocked roads, and the lack of support from India’s so-called secular parties.
The movement has suffered from its own limitations. It failed to engage a larger cross-section of society, building bridges with other distressed communities such as farmers and Dalits, and to counter the BJP’s messaging that it was stirred by Pakistan. The arrests of the anti-CAA movement’s leaders, as well as others who have decried the BJP’s virulent Hindu nationalism, mark the decline of India’s inclusive and consensus-building democratic ethos. Indian Muslims remain in the same precarious situation they found themselves in 2019: living in fear of becoming second-class citizens.
The anti-CAA movement challenged not only the BJP’s Hindu majoritarianism but also the Modi government’s authoritarianism, apparent in its moves to ram through laws such as the CAA or its sudden announcement in 2016 that it would replace certain Indian rupee notes with new ones, causing chaos and lasting economic damage. Using the language of the 1949 constitution, the movement was a tribute to the idea of an India built on secularism and pluralism, an appeal for practicing tolerance.
But it’s clear that the anti-CAA protests did not resonate much beyond an urban, liberal segment of Indian society. Much of the media and the Hindu middle class—the country’s largest demographic—remain solidly behind the prime minister and his politics. Even so, the large numbers of people who joined the movement served as a rude awakening for a leadership confident that it had stamped out dissent. The protests, coupled with a shift in international perceptions, seemed to push Modi’s government to take a step back and soften its tone.
The mothership of the anti-CAA movement was in Shaheen Bagh, a Muslim-majority neighborhood in Delhi. Muslim women led a sit-in there for three months, joined by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. “I sat for 101 days, but no one [from the government] came to meet or speak with us,” said Bilkis Bano, 82, one of the most famous faces of the sit-in. “What could we do when no one came to speak with us?”
Even before the full onset of the pandemic, the anti-CAA movement came to a halt after religious violence ravaged parts of Delhi in February, killing 53 people, mostly Muslims. The students and activists who led the anti-CAA protests—mostly young women and men—were blamed. A Delhi Police investigation, which critics have called biased, concluded that the protests were part of a conspiracy to overthrow the Modi government. In two separate bail hearings for jailed activists, the judges said the terrorism charges were seemingly “targeted” and “vindictive.”
Despite a few political setbacks, the BJP’s brand of Hindu nationalism is gaining strength in the Modi government’s second term.
The arrests of anti-CAA activists and students reflect a narrative that pins blame for the riots on the protesters, and by extension the Muslim community. Delhi police have called activist Umar Khalid, 33—one of the most vocal critics of the Modi government—the “mastermind” behind the Delhi riots. “He has been targeted because he refused to be silenced,” Banojyotsna Lahiri, his partner, said.
Despite a few political setbacks in state elections, the BJP’s brand of Hindu nationalism is gaining strength in the Modi government’s second term. In addition to the passage of the CAA, it has stripped Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir of its constitutional autonomy and prompted fears of demographic change in the region. And in November 2019, after decades of litigation, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of building a Hindu temple on the site of a 16th-century mosque destroyed by Hindu extremists in 1992.
In Modi’s India, people increasingly reveal a once-hidden anti-Muslim bigotry. Just last month, a major jewelry brand pulled an advertisement that showed a Hindu woman married into a Muslim family after public backlash. The BJP government in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, recently passed a law against forced “unlawful conversions” and marriages intended solely to change a woman’s religion. Critics say the law amplifies the Hindu nationalist conspiracy that Muslim men seek to convert Hindu women by marrying them—so-called love jihad. (Modi’s government has officially distanced itself from the term.)
The CAA grants citizenship to non-Muslim minority groups from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The Modi government maintains that the law won’t affect Indian Muslims. But some fear that coupled with the National Population Register, a data collection exercise, and a proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC) aimed at identifying those living in the country without the proper documents, the CAA will be used to target Muslims who can’t produce documents and strip them of the right to call India home.
One year after the Indian parliament passed the CAA, the Modi government says it is still drafting the rules to enforce it, and the Supreme Court has yet to hear more than 140 petitions challenging its constitutional validity. Home Minister Amit Shah, who has described undocumented immigrants as “termites,” backtracked on the plan for a nationwide citizens’ register last year, after 11 states not governed by the BJP refused to implement it. But while the government may have put the NRC on hold, it has not ruled out implementing data collection, which some argue is a surreptitious way of reintroducing the NRC.
The stripping of Kashmir’s protected status, the passage of the CAA, and the subsequent crackdown on anti-CAA students at two predominantly Muslim universities have offended Islamic countries that are friendly to India. Iran, Turkey, and Malaysia condemned the Delhi riots in February. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation has called on Modi to ensure protection for Muslims and Islamic holy places in India. And after a year of lobbying, Pakistan managed to get the organization to pass a strong statement on Kashmir.
India’s CAA push has even put off friendly Bangladesh, which has refused to accept the return of any Indian residents left out of the NRC. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has called the CAA unnecessary, and three of her ministers canceled trips to India amid the protests. The Modi government will likely tread forward carefully, given that Islamophobia in India has become somewhat of a liability—and could be a thorny issue with U.S. President-elect Joe Biden.
With state elections due next year in both Assam and Bengal, the BJP is now letting the CAA issue simmer.
The issue is already playing out in Assam state, home to many Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims who have immigrated from Bangladesh over many years. The state government prepared a list of citizens in August 2019. But the BJP suffered a setback: Of the 1.9 million people found to be living in Assam without documents, over 500,000 were Hindus who would effectively have to claim they fled religious persecution in a neighboring country to gain their citizenship. BJP leaders have said that Hindus left out of the NRC would be covered under the CAA, and Shah said last year that the NRC would be repeated in Assam. This month, the Assam government said that the list it had declared final in 2019 was not final after all.
With state elections due next year in both Assam and Bengal, the BJP is now letting the CAA issue simmer. In Assam, the BJP’s attempt to make the NRC a Hindu-Muslim issue—rather than one tied to local differences in language and ethnicity—hasn’t quite worked. Winning Bengal, which also has a sizable population of immigrants from Bangladesh, would be a milestone for the Hindu right wing. There, the BJP has tapped into Hindu conservatism dormant among upper-caste communities and worked hard to polarize the base of Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, who took power after three decades of Communist Party rule in 2011.
“The BJP is in a legal bind when it comes to Assam. But wherever there is some space in the communal game, they are playing it,” said Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, the author of Assam: The Accord, The Discord.
In the anti-CAA movement, progressive forces couched their pleas to uphold the rights and freedoms of minority groups as a call to defend the constitution. They now recognize the BJP government’s unwillingness to even pay lip service to India’s constitutional values—and the not-so-silent majority’s antagonism toward these calls.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Washington Needs a Cybersecurity Overhaul

As made clear by the revelations this week about suspected Russian hacks into various federal agencies , U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris face a daunting task when it comes to cybersecurity .
Nine years ago , as vice president , Biden delivered remarks advocating for a free , open , and secure Internet while highlighting the need to protect against the cyberthreats targeting Americans daily .
Years later , the dangers are ballooning in scope and size , authoritarian governments are gaining ground in their efforts to control the Internet for their citizens , and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ downgraded the country ’ s cyberdiplomacy efforts .
But as a new report from the think tank Third Way , where one of us is deputy director , makes clear , there are things Biden and Harris can do to strengthen and protect the United States .
Biden and Harris understand all this .
As a senator , Biden pushed for more resources to fight cybercrime .
And as vice president , he took a forceful stand against intellectual property theft , pushed for more global cybersecurity cooperation , and supported efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ cybersecurity workforce .
Harris has also been a strong champion of cybersecurity and technology policy issues in the Senate and , as California attorney general , launched the state ’ s cybercrime center .
Now , at the top of the U.S. government , they ’ ll have to make up for lost ground .
Under the Trump administration , the U.S. government did pursue a comprehensive approach that yielded some success in imposing consequences for cybercrime and building new partnerships with foreign governments to combat state cyberterrorism .
The Department of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a leading role in these efforts , and the hardworking women and men left at the department should be commended .
But this work was , in some cases , undermined by Trump and his allies .
Where former U.S. President Barack Obama often raised cybersecurity issues in his discussions with other leaders , leading to increased cooperation and dialogues , Trump preferred to ignore the issue .
The Trump administration also downgraded the United States ’ architecture for handling international engagement on cyberthreats , which are typically global in scope and require @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Trump administration downgraded the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues at the State Department , which was established by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and led by one of the authors .
The United States was the first country to establish such a senior-level position to spearhead its global cybersecurity engagement .
Downgrading the post eliminated its direct connection to the secretary of state and sent a signal to the United States ’ allies , partners , and adversaries alike that cyberdiplomacy is not a top priority for the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proposed cuts to critical programs at the State Department aimed at boosting the cybersecurity capacity of other countries .
First , the new secretary of state should establish an office of international cyberspace policy led by an experienced official with the rank and status of ambassador to restore the United States ’ global leadership on cyberdiplomacy .
The office will need the authority to coordinate all aspects of international diplomacy related to cybersecurity policy issues—instead of each bureau pursuing its own goals in this area .
Congress has introduced legislation to establish such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amid fights between the Trump administration and Capitol Hill .
The Biden administration should revive the effort in its first 100 days .
Second , the Biden-Harris administration should build an explicit strategy for repairing the global alliances that have been weakened under the Trump administration and for advancing diplomacy related to cybersecurity priorities .
The administration should build on successful aspects of prior cybersecurity engagement strategies by formally assessing what is working and what is not .
Because cybercrime has largely not received attention in previous strategies , it must be one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy should also lay the groundwork for the U.S. government to play a more strategic and productive role in its engagement with international organizations , including the United Nations , on these issues .
This will be particularly critical as the U.S. government decides how to engage in negotiations on a new cybercrime treaty pushed by Russia and in continued debates on cybersecurity norms .
Third , Biden and Harris should be prepared to put cybersecurity issues on the agenda in meetings with other heads of states and ministers .
They ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ technical experts , but they are , in fact , core issues of national security , economic prosperity , human rights , and , ultimately , foreign policy .
There is no better way to mainstream cybersecurity than having it on the agenda when the president and vice president meet with their peers .
At the heart of this engagement , the U.S. government must also commit to living by the cybersecurity norms it is promoting and work to enforce those norms when they are violated .
Fourth , the new administration must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more strategically and consistently .
Since Obama first instituted a cybersecurity-related sanctions regime five years ago , sanctions have become an often-used tool to punish hard-to-reach malicious actors .
But they are not always applied in a way that would change a bad actor ’ s calculus , and—even worse—are undermined by contrary messaging .
The time is ripe to reassess those sanctions and determine whether they might be more effectively employed .
Fifth , the incoming administration should prioritize global cybersecurity capacity building in its budget and make sure adequate resources are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries lack the ability to conduct investigations into cybercrime and other cyberactivity .
While the U.S. government has provided foreign aid to help address these capacity gaps , the State Department has not seen a big boost in these resources by Congress despite the proliferation of the threats .
Additionally , as the outgoing chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee , Eliot Engel , and ranking member Michael McCaul highlighted last year , the department has little ability to assess , monitor , or evaluate whether the funding is making a difference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ framework to allow it to better monitor its efforts .
Lastly , the Biden administration should prioritize reforms to the mechanisms the U.S. government uses to share and request cross-border data .
Washington needs healthy partnerships with other countries and the private sector to help investigate , arrest , prosecute , and , when warranted , extradite criminals operating outside U.S. jurisdiction .
But processes for foreign governments to request the data held in the United States that is needed for such cooperation remain too slow and cumbersome .
Attempts in recent years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact but are expected to be limited in scope .
It will be critical for the attorney general to prioritize negotiations and further reforms aimed at making cross-border data-sharing more efficient .
Biden and Harris will be faced with an endless array of national security threats and a U.S. foreign-policy machine in dire need of repair .
They will have to make tough decisions about what to prioritize , but will have no choice but to take on the cybersecurity threats that continue to endanger U.S. national , economic , and human security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are ( seemingly ) intractable , but Biden and Harris ’ s records demonstrate that , with their strong leadership , progress is possible .

As made clear by the revelations this week about suspected Russian hacks into various federal agencies, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris face a daunting task when it comes to cybersecurity. Nine years ago, as vice president, Biden delivered remarks advocating for a free, open, and secure Internet while highlighting the need to protect against the cyberthreats targeting Americans daily.
As made clear by the revelations this week about suspected Russian hacks into various federal agencies, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris face a daunting task when it comes to cybersecurity. Nine years ago, as vice president, Biden delivered remarks advocating for a free, open, and secure Internet while highlighting the need to protect against the cyberthreats targeting Americans daily.
Years later, the dangers are ballooning in scope and size, authoritarian governments are gaining ground in their efforts to control the Internet for their citizens, and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has downgraded the country’s cyberdiplomacy efforts. But as a new report from the think tank Third Way, where one of us is deputy director, makes clear, there are things Biden and Harris can do to strengthen and protect the United States.
There is no shortage of research that highlights the different cyberthreats faced by the United States. Much of the discourse has focused on threats posed by nation-states, such as Iran and Russia, to the United States’ critical infrastructure, including its election systems. All this is, of course, important. But there is perhaps no threat that has a greater impact on all aspects of American society on a daily basis than cybercrime. According to polling, 1 in 4 American households has been impacted by some form of cybercrime, and, according to Third Way, only 3 in 1,000 of these cybercrime incidents ever see an arrest of the perpetrator.
Biden and Harris understand all this. As a senator, Biden pushed for more resources to fight cybercrime. And as vice president, he took a forceful stand against intellectual property theft, pushed for more global cybersecurity cooperation, and supported efforts to bolster the ranks of the United States’ cybersecurity workforce. Harris has also been a strong champion of cybersecurity and technology policy issues in the Senate and, as California attorney general, launched the state’s cybercrime center.
Now, at the top of the U.S. government, they’ll have to make up for lost ground. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. government did pursue a comprehensive approach that yielded some success in imposing consequences for cybercrime and building new partnerships with foreign governments to combat state cyberterrorism. The Department of State, in particular, has taken a leading role in these efforts, and the hardworking women and men left at the department should be commended. But this work was, in some cases, undermined by Trump and his allies. Where former U.S. President Barack Obama often raised cybersecurity issues in his discussions with other leaders, leading to increased cooperation and dialogues, Trump preferred to ignore the issue.
The Trump administration also downgraded the United States’ architecture for handling international engagement on cyberthreats, which are typically global in scope and require an unprecedented level of cross-border cooperation. The Trump administration downgraded the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues at the State Department, which was established by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and led by one of the authors. The United States was the first country to establish such a senior-level position to spearhead its global cybersecurity engagement. Downgrading the post eliminated its direct connection to the secretary of state and sent a signal to the United States’ allies, partners, and adversaries alike that cyberdiplomacy is not a top priority for the U.S. government. The Trump administration has also proposed cuts to critical programs at the State Department aimed at boosting the cybersecurity capacity of other countries.
There are plenty of things the Biden-Harris administration can do immediately to reverse course and deal with evolving cybersecurity challenges.
First, the new secretary of state should establish an office of international cyberspace policy led by an experienced official with the rank and status of ambassador to restore the United States’ global leadership on cyberdiplomacy. The office will need the authority to coordinate all aspects of international diplomacy related to cybersecurity policy issues—instead of each bureau pursuing its own goals in this area. Congress has introduced legislation to establish such an office, but it has languished amid fights between the Trump administration and Capitol Hill. The Biden administration should revive the effort in its first 100 days.
Second, the Biden-Harris administration should build an explicit strategy for repairing the global alliances that have been weakened under the Trump administration and for advancing diplomacy related to cybersecurity priorities. The administration should build on successful aspects of prior cybersecurity engagement strategies by formally assessing what is working and what is not. Because cybercrime has largely not received attention in previous strategies, it must be one area of central focus. The new strategy should also lay the groundwork for the U.S. government to play a more strategic and productive role in its engagement with international organizations, including the United Nations, on these issues. This will be particularly critical as the U.S. government decides how to engage in negotiations on a new cybercrime treaty pushed by Russia and in continued debates on cybersecurity norms.
Third, Biden and Harris should be prepared to put cybersecurity issues on the agenda in meetings with other heads of states and ministers. They’re too often dismissed as the province of technical experts, but they are, in fact, core issues of national security, economic prosperity, human rights, and, ultimately, foreign policy. There is no better way to mainstream cybersecurity than having it on the agenda when the president and vice president meet with their peers. At the heart of this engagement, the U.S. government must also commit to living by the cybersecurity norms it is promoting and work to enforce those norms when they are violated.
Fourth, the new administration must evaluate how cybersecurity sanctions can be employed more strategically and consistently. Since Obama first instituted a cybersecurity-related sanctions regime five years ago, sanctions have become an often-used tool to punish hard-to-reach malicious actors. But they are not always applied in a way that would change a bad actor’s calculus, and—even worse—are undermined by contrary messaging. The time is ripe to reassess those sanctions and determine whether they might be more effectively employed.
Fifth, the incoming administration should prioritize global cybersecurity capacity building in its budget and make sure adequate resources are provided to determine the impact. Some countries lack the ability to conduct investigations into cybercrime and other cyberactivity. While the U.S. government has provided foreign aid to help address these capacity gaps, the State Department has not seen a big boost in these resources by Congress despite the proliferation of the threats. Additionally, as the outgoing chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Eliot Engel, and ranking member Michael McCaul highlighted last year, the department has little ability to assess, monitor, or evaluate whether the funding is making a difference. The State Department needs a comprehensive framework to allow it to better monitor its efforts.
Lastly, the Biden administration should prioritize reforms to the mechanisms the U.S. government uses to share and request cross-border data. Washington needs healthy partnerships with other countries and the private sector to help investigate, arrest, prosecute, and, when warranted, extradite criminals operating outside U.S. jurisdiction. But processes for foreign governments to request the data held in the United States that is needed for such cooperation remain too slow and cumbersome. Attempts in recent years to overcome these challenges might have some impact but are expected to be limited in scope. It will be critical for the attorney general to prioritize negotiations and further reforms aimed at making cross-border data-sharing more efficient.
Biden and Harris will be faced with an endless array of national security threats and a U.S. foreign-policy machine in dire need of repair. They will have to make tough decisions about what to prioritize, but will have no choice but to take on the cybersecurity threats that continue to endanger U.S. national, economic, and human security. The challenges in addressing these threats are (seemingly) intractable, but Biden and Harris’s records demonstrate that, with their strong leadership, progress is possible.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--China Is Gnawing at Democracy’s Roots Worldwide

The 20th century may have been the world ’ s bloodiest , but in the end democracy was triumphant .
A political system that was an aberration among monarchies in 1900 cut a swath through empires , fascism , and communism to emerge as the dominant political system by the end of the century .
But while the world celebrated the fall of authoritarianism in Russia and Eastern Europe in 1989 , China was carefully studying how to avoid the same fate .
The Chinese Communist Party concluded that its Soviet counterpart had collapsed not only because it failed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , more importantly , because it had turned its back on its own historical and ideological experiences .
Even as China firmly went down the path of economic reform and the spectacular growth that came with it , it doubled down on its core ideology : socialism with Chinese characteristics under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party .
Thirty years on , the world , according to the Chinese Communist Party , is undergoing a once-in-a-century change that will turn the tide of global power from the West to the East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War II international order .
China ’ s experience of the coronavirus pandemic has reaffirmed this assessment of faltering American global leadership , the failing capacities of the West to address the challenges of the new century , and the resilience of China ’ s socialist economy in comparison to capitalism ; most importantly , they think it has also validated the superiority of their political system .
In a nutshell , the Chinese leadership seems convinced that China ’ s national experience and the international situation have proved a fundamental premise of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ namely that democracy is superior to other forms of governance and most conducive for national development and prosperity .
Since assuming the office of general secretary , Xi Jinping has called upon the Communist Party to prepare for the upcoming ideological battle .
In a speech he delivered in January 2013 , Xi described socialism with Chinese characteristics as “ our party ’ s most fundamental , unifying program ” which had “ allowed China to stand tall and stride far , ” and which would eventually prove to be superior to all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the time as an exhortation to party cadres and of the younger generation in China not to forget what China had achieved because of the Communist Party , because outside forces wanted to confuse the people and incite them into overthrowing the regime in China .
As often with such exhortations , it was a mix of insecurity , amid what the party saw as the dangerous growth of Western culture and media in China , and confidence , born out of China ’ s economic growth and its relative success at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But of late , the foreign-policy implications of Xi ’ s address are more apparent Although China ’ s successful economic model has won admirers and friends around the world , its ability to move to the center of the world stage depends upon whether its political or ideological model becomes a world standard .
The United States is referred to as the “ leader of the free world ” due as much to the attractiveness of its political model as its economic power ; it owes as much to Hollywood as to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s problem is that its model of “ socialism with Chinese characteristics ” is , by its very definition , exclusive to China .
Or as Xi put it himself in his address in 2013 , the idea is “ imbued with characteristically Chinese features bestowed by the conditions of the time.
” Its adoption as a global standard becomes difficult since it is virtually impossible to replicate Chinese conditions in other societies , and thus it is difficult for other polities to emulate .
Since the failed Soviet experiment has dampened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go down the path of exporting communist ideology as a means of building its own political brand , discrediting democracy as a political system appears to be the option of choice for the Chinese Communist Party .
It appears to be moving from a defensive strategy of preventing the subversion of the communist state in China through so-called peaceful evolution by democratic means to an offensive strategy of undermining democracy abroad as the better political model .
It is a turning of the tables .
The Chinese famously claim that they never interfere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That is a good principle , but it ’ s one that should no longer be taken at face value .
The Chinese Communist Party appears to be influencing the politics of democracies in many different ways .
The more obvious ones include the manipulation of the principles of freedom of speech and assembly while denying the same tools to others .
China denies the American and European ambassadors in China the right to publish their unedited views in the Chinese mainstream media , even as their own diplomats have unfettered access to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happy to use Western social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook—where party newspaper People ’ s Daily maintains one of the most followed accounts on the site—while banning the platforms from China itself .
The lack of access for foreigners to Chinese decision-makers in government as well as opinion-makers in the strategic community stands in sharp contrast to the readiness with which democracies allow access in the name of openness .
Chinese state media abroad are using the same openness to collate and present information that portrays the host democracy in negative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratic governments in handling COVID-19 , whereas it denies access to foreign media even to report on the facts about how China handled the same crisis domestically or its social and economic consequences .
Even the small pockets of openness that once existed have been closed off , with numerous journalists kicked out of China and the country ’ s own social media , such as WeChat , more heavily censored than ever .
But these are only the more obvious ways .
Less obvious are the activities of the International Liaison Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parallel foreign office , which not only systematically cultivates foreign personalities and their families in traditional ways but also plants its people as diplomats inside Chinese embassies so they can influence politics and policies in democracies under legal cover .
Originally designed to work with fellow communist parties , it ’ s become a much broader group targeting any organization it thinks might prove a useful tool .
While the International Liaison Department targets foreigners , the United Front Work Department—a long-standing body whose power has swollen with new responsibilities under Xi—targets the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and personal pressure on communities for the party ’ s ends .
As with all efforts at propaganda nowadays , China ’ s efforts are digitalized , including the use of big data and artificial intelligence .
For many years , the world ’ s democracies believed that their triumph made them secure .
They are still hoping that China implodes , as it well might .
The Chinese are keenly aware of the fragility of their own political system .
There is no ideology left beyond the idea of prolonging the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China .
Painful economic slowdown loomed even before the impact of COVID-19 ; even as China can point to an early recovery thanks to its successful control of the coronavirus , it still faces an unprecedented year of recession .
While democracies dither , China is silently undermining the roots of democracy throughout the world like a river systematically erodes the bank—until even the mightiest tree must fall .
The Chinese authorities are fond of saying that they do not play zero-sum games , but Xi Jinping ’ s self-declared historical mission for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leading power by 2049 will remain incomplete unless its model supplants democracy as the leading idea in this century .
Democracies can no longer afford to rest on their laurels .

The 20th century may have been the world’s bloodiest, but in the end democracy was triumphant. A political system that was an aberration among monarchies in 1900 cut a swath through empires, fascism, and communism to emerge as the dominant political system by the end of the century.
The 20th century may have been the world’s bloodiest, but in the end democracy was triumphant. A political system that was an aberration among monarchies in 1900 cut a swath through empires, fascism, and communism to emerge as the dominant political system by the end of the century.
But while the world celebrated the fall of authoritarianism in Russia and Eastern Europe in 1989, China was carefully studying how to avoid the same fate. The Chinese Communist Party concluded that its Soviet counterpart had collapsed not only because it failed to adapt to the changing world but also, more importantly, because it had turned its back on its own historical and ideological experiences. Even as China firmly went down the path of economic reform and the spectacular growth that came with it, it doubled down on its core ideology: socialism with Chinese characteristics under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Thirty years on, the world, according to the Chinese Communist Party, is undergoing a once-in-a-century change that will turn the tide of global power from the West to the East, thus transforming the nature of post-World War II international order. China’s experience of the coronavirus pandemic has reaffirmed this assessment of faltering American global leadership, the failing capacities of the West to address the challenges of the new century, and the resilience of China’s socialist economy in comparison to capitalism; most importantly, they think it has also validated the superiority of their political system. In a nutshell, the Chinese leadership seems convinced that China’s national experience and the international situation have proved a fundamental premise of the 20th century to be wrong, namely that democracy is superior to other forms of governance and most conducive for national development and prosperity.
Since assuming the office of general secretary, Xi Jinping has called upon the Communist Party to prepare for the upcoming ideological battle. In a speech he delivered in January 2013, Xi described socialism with Chinese characteristics as “our party’s most fundamental, unifying program” which had “allowed China to stand tall and stride far,” and which would eventually prove to be superior to all other models. His speech was seen at the time as an exhortation to party cadres and of the younger generation in China not to forget what China had achieved because of the Communist Party, because outside forces wanted to confuse the people and incite them into overthrowing the regime in China. As often with such exhortations, it was a mix of insecurity, amid what the party saw as the dangerous growth of Western culture and media in China, and confidence, born out of China’s economic growth and its relative success at tackling the financial crisis of 2008. But of late, the foreign-policy implications of Xi’s address are more apparent
Although China’s successful economic model has won admirers and friends around the world, its ability to move to the center of the world stage depends upon whether its political or ideological model becomes a world standard. The United States is referred to as the “leader of the free world” due as much to the attractiveness of its political model as its economic power; it owes as much to Hollywood as to the dollar. The Chinese Communist Party’s problem is that its model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is, by its very definition, exclusive to China. Or as Xi put it himself in his address in 2013, the idea is “imbued with characteristically Chinese features bestowed by the conditions of the time.” Its adoption as a global standard becomes difficult since it is virtually impossible to replicate Chinese conditions in other societies, and thus it is difficult for other polities to emulate.
Since the failed Soviet experiment has dampened any desire in the Chinese leadership to go down the path of exporting communist ideology as a means of building its own political brand, discrediting democracy as a political system appears to be the option of choice for the Chinese Communist Party. It appears to be moving from a defensive strategy of preventing the subversion of the communist state in China through so-called peaceful evolution by democratic means to an offensive strategy of undermining democracy abroad as the better political model. It is a turning of the tables.
The Chinese famously claim that they never interfere in the internal affairs of others. That is a good principle, but it’s one that should no longer be taken at face value. The Chinese Communist Party appears to be influencing the politics of democracies in many different ways. The more obvious ones include the manipulation of the principles of freedom of speech and assembly while denying the same tools to others. China denies the American and European ambassadors in China the right to publish their unedited views in the Chinese mainstream media, even as their own diplomats have unfettered access to the media in democracies. China is happy to use Western social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook—where party newspaper People’s Daily maintains one of the most followed accounts on the site—while banning the platforms from China itself.
The lack of access for foreigners to Chinese decision-makers in government as well as opinion-makers in the strategic community stands in sharp contrast to the readiness with which democracies allow access in the name of openness. Chinese state media abroad are using the same openness to collate and present information that portrays the host democracy in negative light, such as the performance of democratic governments in handling COVID-19, whereas it denies access to foreign media even to report on the facts about how China handled the same crisis domestically or its social and economic consequences. Even the small pockets of openness that once existed have been closed off, with numerous journalists kicked out of China and the country’s own social media, such as WeChat, more heavily censored than ever.
But these are only the more obvious ways. Less obvious are the activities of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party, virtually a parallel foreign office, which not only systematically cultivates foreign personalities and their families in traditional ways but also plants its people as diplomats inside Chinese embassies so they can influence politics and policies in democracies under legal cover. Originally designed to work with fellow communist parties, it’s become a much broader group targeting any organization it thinks might prove a useful tool.
While the International Liaison Department targets foreigners, the United Front Work Department—a long-standing body whose power has swollen with new responsibilities under Xi—targets the Chinese diaspora, putting social, financial, and personal pressure on communities for the party’s ends. As with all efforts at propaganda nowadays, China’s efforts are digitalized, including the use of big data and artificial intelligence.
For many years, the world’s democracies believed that their triumph made them secure. They are still hoping that China implodes, as it well might. The Chinese are keenly aware of the fragility of their own political system. There is no ideology left beyond the idea of prolonging the Communist Party’s absolute dictatorship over China. Painful economic slowdown loomed even before the impact of COVID-19; even as China can point to an early recovery thanks to its successful control of the coronavirus, it still faces an unprecedented year of recession.
While democracies dither, China is silently undermining the roots of democracy throughout the world like a river systematically erodes the bank—until even the mightiest tree must fall. The Chinese authorities are fond of saying that they do not play zero-sum games, but Xi Jinping’s self-declared historical mission for China to become the world’s leading power by 2049 will remain incomplete unless its model supplants democracy as the leading idea in this century. Democracies can no longer afford to rest on their laurels.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Progressives Try to Sway Biden on Top Foreign-Policy Jobs

Progressives Try to Sway Biden on Top Foreign-Policy Jobs This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
More than a dozen progressive groups are calling on incoming President-elect Joe Biden to staff top foreign-policy jobs in his incoming administration with candidates seen as anti-war and not tied to Washington lobbying , after some of his picks raised eyebrows due to perceived establishment ties .
While progressives , some lacking foreign-policy experience @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party for top administration jobs , aren ’ t being considered for many leading cabinet roles , left-leaning groups are hoping to put down roots at lower levels .
In a request sent to the Biden transition team today , progressives identified more than 100 candidates to fill jobs in the State Department , the Department of Defense , and the National Security Council—the majority of whom are women and people of color .
Progressive groups have largely cooperated with the Biden transition so far , only staunchly opposing former CIA Deputy Director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top job at the agency , and raising concerns about Michèle Flournoy—a one-time candidate for defense secretary—and her ties to the defense industry .
But the continued push to place their own candidates in top jobs could cause tension with the president-elect , who has mostly opted to place longtime allies like Lloyd Austin , Antony Blinken , and Jake Sullivan into top national security positions .
The cadre of progressive contenders is led by Matt Duss , a longtime foreign-policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders , a key behind-the-scenes operator who helped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Donald Trump ’ s war powers related to the Saudi-led fighting in Yemen .
Duss is being considered for a role as deputy national security advisor or as a special advisor to the secretary of state .
Trump vetoed the war powers bill that passed both houses of Congress earlier this year , but the issue became a calling card for progressives over the past four years , a time in which Duss also made a name for himself as an outspoken critic of U.S. policy toward Israel .
Biden reportedly plans to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so-called Abraham accords between Israel and Arab nations , an issue that could be a point of contention with progressives such as Duss .
Another leading candidate is Trita Parsi , the Iranian-born co-founder of the anti-war Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft think tank in Washington .
Progressives want Biden to consider him for senior director for Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council .
Parsi had called for the United States to engage diplomatically with Iran before negotiations began on the 2015 nuclear deal that the Trump administration later abandoned .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the United States to shrink its military commitments around the world .
Dozens of organizations , including the Quincy Institute and the MoveOn advocacy group added names to the list .
The effort was coordinated by Yasmine Taeb , a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy , and Common Defense , a veteran-led grassroots organization opposing Trump , and the Progressive Change Institute .
In particular , the CIP has pushed for senators not to confirm cabinet picks with corporate ties , a move that is now backed by Rep. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort to land subcabinet-level picks is an outgrowth of a call earlier this month led by many of the same groups to find suitable candidates .
A similar cluster of progressive groups also called for Biden to move his foreign-policy agenda to the left after he emerged as the Democratic nominee this summer , including requests to slash the defense budget and re-engage diplomatically with Iran , Russia , China , and North Korea .
Among the other names floated by the groups include Alison Friedman , who fought human trafficking during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department ’ s Senate-confirmed undersecretary for civilian security , democracy , and human rights .
That ’ s a broad portfolio that could allow progressives to scrutinize U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel , as well as relationships with foreign autocrats such as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that have grown closer under Trump .
The groups have also flagged Noah Gottschalk , Oxfam America ’ s top policy official , to be a deputy assistant secretary in the State Department ’ s Bureau of Population , Refugees , and Migration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Congressional Progressive Caucus , as a senior White House policy advisor .
Also being recommended is Elisa Massimino , a chair in human rights at Georgetown University Law Center , as assistant secretary of state for democracy , human rights , and labor , and Kate Gould , a senior staffer for Rep. Ro Khanna , another architect of war-powers legislation in Congress , to serve as a senior policy advisor at the United States Mission to the United Nations , which Biden has tapped Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield , a Black woman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also hoping to to bring foreign-policy voices cast out during the Trump administration into the Biden team , including Susan Thornton , a career diplomat who led the State Department ’ s Asia bureau on an acting basis until mid-2018 , but faced pushback against her nomination for the full-time role from inside the White House and on Capitol Hill over concerns she wasn ’ t hawkish enough on China .
Sahar Nowrouzzadeh , a career civil servant removed by then-director of Policy Planning Brian Hook in 2017 after asking top Trump officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conservative media , is also being flagged for a role by progressives .
Progressives are hoping the Biden administration will bring back Obama-era veterans to high-level roles , such as Robert Malley , a former top National Security Council official for the Middle East and advisor to Sanders who is reportedly in the mix for a top Iran-focused job ; Jarrett Blanc , a deputy lead coordinator to implement the Iran nuclear deal under Obama ; and Patrick Gaspard , a former ambassador to South Africa .
Sasha Baker , a top advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bhatt , the current communications director for Sanders , are also being touted for top jobs .
The progressives ’ campaign has intensified in part due to perceived corporate ties among many Biden picks , such as Blinken , the secretary of state-designate .
A longtime Biden acolyte , he co-founded WestExec Advisors with Flournoy , which has not publicly revealed its client lists inside the government , something that progressives have worried could raise conflicts of interest .
Austin , a retired Army general , who would become the first Black defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ board of Raytheon Technologies , which designs many of the smart bombs used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen , and is also tied to Nucor , an American steel corporation .
Update , Dec. 18 , 2020 : This article was updated to provide more information about candidates to serve in the upcoming administration .

More than a dozen progressive groups are calling on incoming President-elect Joe Biden to staff top foreign-policy jobs in his incoming administration with candidates seen as anti-war and not tied to Washington lobbying, after some of his picks raised eyebrows due to perceived establishment ties.
More than a dozen progressive groups are calling on incoming President-elect Joe Biden to staff top foreign-policy jobs in his incoming administration with candidates seen as anti-war and not tied to Washington lobbying, after some of his picks raised eyebrows due to perceived establishment ties.
While progressives, some lacking foreign-policy experience to compete with centrists in the Democratic Party for top administration jobs, aren’t being considered for many leading cabinet roles, left-leaning groups are hoping to put down roots at lower levels. In a request sent to the Biden transition team today, progressives identified more than 100 candidates to fill jobs in the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council—the majority of whom are women and people of color.
Progressive groups have largely cooperated with the Biden transition so far, only staunchly opposing former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell in his bid for the top job at the agency, and raising concerns about Michèle Flournoy—a one-time candidate for defense secretary—and her ties to the defense industry. But the continued push to place their own candidates in top jobs could cause tension with the president-elect, who has mostly opted to place longtime allies like Lloyd Austin, Antony Blinken, and Jake Sullivan into top national security positions.
The cadre of progressive contenders is led by Matt Duss, a longtime foreign-policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders, a key behind-the-scenes operator who helped mount a congressional challenge to outgoing President Donald Trump’s war powers related to the Saudi-led fighting in Yemen. Duss is being considered for a role as deputy national security advisor or as a special advisor to the secretary of state. Trump vetoed the war powers bill that passed both houses of Congress earlier this year, but the issue became a calling card for progressives over the past four years, a time in which Duss also made a name for himself as an outspoken critic of U.S. policy toward Israel. Biden reportedly plans to continue with Trump’s push for so-called Abraham accords between Israel and Arab nations, an issue that could be a point of contention with progressives such as Duss.
Another leading candidate is Trita Parsi, the Iranian-born co-founder of the anti-war Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft think tank in Washington. Progressives want Biden to consider him for senior director for Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council. Parsi had called for the United States to engage diplomatically with Iran before negotiations began on the 2015 nuclear deal that the Trump administration later abandoned. Parsi’s Quincy Institute has called for the United States to shrink its military commitments around the world.
Dozens of organizations, including the Quincy Institute and the MoveOn advocacy group added names to the list. The effort was coordinated by Yasmine Taeb, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and Common Defense, a veteran-led grassroots organization opposing Trump, and the Progressive Change Institute. In particular, the CIP has pushed for senators not to confirm cabinet picks with corporate ties, a move that is now backed by Rep. Raul Grijalva on Capitol Hill. The effort to land subcabinet-level picks is an outgrowth of a call earlier this month led by many of the same groups to find suitable candidates. A similar cluster of progressive groups also called for Biden to move his foreign-policy agenda to the left after he emerged as the Democratic nominee this summer, including requests to slash the defense budget and re-engage diplomatically with Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea.
Among the other names floated by the groups include Alison Friedman, who fought human trafficking during the Obama administration, to be the State Department’s Senate-confirmed undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. That’s a broad portfolio that could allow progressives to scrutinize U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as relationships with foreign autocrats such as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi that have grown closer under Trump. The groups have also flagged Noah Gottschalk, Oxfam America’s top policy official, to be a deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, and Mike Darner, who heads the Congressional Progressive Caucus, as a senior White House policy advisor. Also being recommended is Elisa Massimino, a chair in human rights at Georgetown University Law Center, as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, and Kate Gould, a senior staffer for Rep. Ro Khanna, another architect of war-powers legislation in Congress, to serve as a senior policy advisor at the United States Mission to the United Nations, which Biden has tapped Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, a Black woman, to lead.
The groups are also hoping to to bring foreign-policy voices cast out during the Trump administration into the Biden team, including Susan Thornton, a career diplomat who led the State Department’s Asia bureau on an acting basis until mid-2018, but faced pushback against her nomination for the full-time role from inside the White House and on Capitol Hill over concerns she wasn’t hawkish enough on China. Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, a career civil servant removed by then-director of Policy Planning Brian Hook in 2017 after asking top Trump officials to help defend her from attacks in conservative media, is also being flagged for a role by progressives.
Progressives are hoping the Biden administration will bring back Obama-era veterans to high-level roles, such as Robert Malley, a former top National Security Council official for the Middle East and advisor to Sanders who is reportedly in the mix for a top Iran-focused job; Jarrett Blanc, a deputy lead coordinator to implement the Iran nuclear deal under Obama; and Patrick Gaspard, a former ambassador to South Africa. Sasha Baker, a top advisor to Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and Keane Bhatt, the current communications director for Sanders, are also being touted for top jobs.
The progressives’ campaign has intensified in part due to perceived corporate ties among many Biden picks, such as Blinken, the secretary of state-designate. A longtime Biden acolyte, he co-founded WestExec Advisors with Flournoy, which has not publicly revealed its client lists inside the government, something that progressives have worried could raise conflicts of interest. Austin, a retired Army general, who would become the first Black defense secretary if confirmed, sits on the board of Raytheon Technologies, which designs many of the smart bombs used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and is also tied to Nucor, an American steel corporation.
Update, Dec. 18, 2020: This article was updated to provide more information about candidates to serve in the upcoming administration.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-18--Biden Shouldn’t Rush to Restore the Iran Nuclear Deal

It ’ s now clear that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is determined to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) —as soon as possible after his Jan. 20 inauguration .
Both Biden and his designated national security advisor , Jake Sullivan , have given recent interviews in which they underscore their intent to make Tehran a straightforward offer : If Iran comes back into compliance with the deal , the United States will do likewise .
Iran would bring its nuclear activities back within the JCPOA ’ s limits , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 .
Rushing to restore the Iran deal virtually guarantees that Biden will start his presidency with a hugely divisive controversy .
Such a step flies in the face of advice from JCPOA skeptics , who have urged Biden not to rush back into the deal .
Rather than squander the leverage built up by Trump ’ s maximum-pressure campaign for no higher purpose than restoring a flawed arms-control agreement , Biden should exploit that leverage ( and Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better deal .
Such a revised deal would delay or even remove the JCPOA ’ s sunset clauses—which provide for restrictions on nuclear activities to eventually be lifted .
Or better yet , ban entirely Iran ’ s uranium enrichment efforts .
Or better still , include constraints on Iran ’ s most threatening non-nuclear activities , especially its missile programs and regional aggression .
Biden and his team have yet to be convinced .
While agreeing on the importance of a JCPOA 2.0—a follow-on agreement in which the constraints on Iran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stronger— they don ’ t see pursing it as a viable short-term strategy .
On the contrary , they clearly fear that a failure to restore the original JCPOA is the surest route not to a better deal , but to a dangerous expansion of the Iranian nuclear program , an escalation of regional tensions , and perhaps even war .
Whatever benefits Biden might see in buckling to Iran ’ s extortion , the risks and potential costs should also be apparent .
Needless to say , an all-consuming crisis over Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Biden ’ s agenda , which he has promised will be intently focused on tackling the daunting array of challenges now confronting the American people—from the devastation wrought by COVID-19 to racial inequality , climate change , and competition with China .
That explains the allure of a rapid return to the JCPOA that promises some measure of de-escalation by reversing Iran ’ s recent nuclear expansion and , in Sullivan ’ s words , “ put its program back in a box ” and “ time back on the clock.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Times that his overwhelming priority with Iran—and “ the best way to achieve getting some stability in the region ” —was to bring its nuclear program back under control .
Once that was done , Biden said , “ in consultation with our allies and partners , we ’ re going to engage in negotiations and follow-on agreements to tighten and lengthen Iran ’ s nuclear constraints , as well as address the missile program.
” Concerns about the current trajectory of Iran ’ s nuclear progress are well founded .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Sullivan told the Wall Street Journal .
“ Since the United States left [ the JCPOA ] , Iran has moved closer to a nuclear weapon.
” That includes expanding its uranium stockpile , enriching to higher levels of purity , and testing more powerful centrifuges .
And just two weeks ago , Iran ’ s parliament dramatically raised the stakes , passing a law that would require the government—within Biden ’ s first weeks in office should sanctions relief not be forthcoming—to embark upon its most far-reaching violations of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advanced centrifuges , building a stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent , and placing major constraints on inspectors .
All in all , it ’ s an exquisite act of nuclear blackmail designed to send an unmistakable message to Biden : Either lift sanctions or face a nuclear crisis that could derail your presidency almost before it starts .
Whatever benefits Biden might see in buckling to Iran ’ s extortion , the risks and potential costs should also be apparent .
The U.S. domestic backlash is certain to be fierce—from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and perhaps even a few prominent Democrats .
It ’ s worth recalling that the top two Democrats on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations , Bob Menendez and Ben Cardin , not to mention Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer , all opposed the JCPOA in 2015 .
That fight was one of the most bitter of President Barack Obama ’ s tenure and there ’ s no reason to believe that a second round would be any easier .
Biden has suggested that his presidency ’ s north star will be rebuilding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s most urgent problems .
Opting for a bruising battle over granting an economic lifeline to Iran ’ s terror-sponsoring regime has all the markings of a poison pill that could derail that agenda .
Biden ’ s difficulties will be further exacerbated by the international reaction .
Whatever chits he earns with pro-JCPOA Europeans will be offset by the opposition triggered among Washington ’ s most consequential allies in the Middle East .
If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood alone railing against the deal five years ago , he ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ around , particularly from U.S. partners in the Gulf .
Things could get ugly quickly , with charges of betrayal flying fast and furious .
Biden ’ s bid to restore U.S. credibility internationally could take a substantial beating .
It could be that the Iranians are only bluffing and that their escalation options are in fact heavily constrained .
Then there are the substantive risks associated with rejoining the JCPOA .
Far and away the most important is the preemptive surrender of pressure on Iran before any of the original agreement ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is free to sell its oil and gain access to billions of dollars , what leverage will Biden have to force Tehran into the follow-on diplomacy that he claims is essential ?
Liberated from the threat of economic collapse , what incentive would Iran have to make further painful concessions on issues such as its missile programs , which it views as central to its security ?
Biden and his advisors suggest that if Iran resists negotiations , they ’ d be prepared to reimpose sanctions using the JCPOA ’ s so-called snapback @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s terms , snapback is limited to instances where Iran is in significant non-performance of its nuclear commitments .
It says nothing about any subsequent Iranian obligation to negotiate an extension of the JCPOA ’ s sunsets , much less agree to limits on its non-nuclear activities .
Assuming that Iran returns to and stays in JCPOA compliance , what exactly would Biden ’ s grounds be for triggering snapback ?
He and other critics lambasted Trump for leaving the JCPOA at a time when Iran was , according to inspectors , abiding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it that Biden would now choose to blow up the agreement for reasons totally outside its terms ?
Biden would be smart to task the intelligence community with providing , by Jan. 20 , a National Intelligence Estimate that rigorously tests the key assumption underlying any decision to rejoin the JCPOA : that otherwise Iran will dramatically escalate its nuclear program and war will become more likely .
Or could Elliott Abrams , Trump ’ s special envoy for Iran , be right instead when he argues that maximum pressure has made the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon have no choice but to sue for economic relief on U.S. terms ?
Others , such as the New York Times columnist Bret Stephens , have suggested that the Biden team ’ s worries about Iranian nuclear blackmail are overblown .
It could be that the Iranians are only bluffing and that their escalation options are in fact heavily constrained—not only by their desperation to see sanctions lifted , but more importantly by their understanding that if they push too far , they will face the implacable determination of an Israel that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whatever it takes to stop Iran ’ s progress toward a bomb .
Biden ’ s hand would be stronger if the U.S. assessment incorporated the views of Washington ’ s most capable intelligence allies .
A National Intelligence Estimate could shed important light on these competing claims and scenarios and help inform what is likely to be one of the most fateful choices of Biden ’ s presidency .
Should the assessment end up supporting his instinct to rejoin the JCPOA , it could also serve as important ammunition in his efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Middle East .
Biden ’ s hand would be stronger still if the U.S. assessment incorporated the views of Washington ’ s most capable intelligence allies , especially Israel and Britain .
In addition to an intelligence assessment that buttresses his position , Biden would be wise to couple any return to the JCPOA with something approaching a guarantee that would commit to triggering the snapback of sanctions automatically if , within a proscribed time period such as one year , Iran is not engaged in serious follow-on negotiations on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be better still if Biden ’ s new snapback guarantee has the upfront backing of Washington ’ s key European partners .
It would also be smart to include a bipartisan delegation from Congress in any follow-on diplomacy that could monitor progress and act as a check on any administration tendency to prevaricate or avoid hard decisions .
None of these measures will prevent the firestorm that surely awaits any attempt to restore the deeply flawed JCPOA .
But they might help mitigate at least some of the costs that such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden needs to have subjected his own policy biases to rigorous challenge and competing arguments that leave him convinced that , despite all the downsides , the game is truly worth the candle in terms of U.S. vital interests .
Otherwise , he may be—to paraphrase scripture—be left to wonder : “ What does it profit a man if he gains the JCPOA but loses his presidency ?
”

It’s now clear that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is determined to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as soon as possible after his Jan. 20 inauguration. Both Biden and his designated national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, have given recent interviews in which they underscore their intent to make Tehran a straightforward offer: If Iran comes back into compliance with the deal, the United States will do likewise. Iran would bring its nuclear activities back within the JCPOA’s limits, while the United States would ease sanctions imposed since outgoing President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018.
It’s now clear that U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is determined to resurrect the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as soon as possible after his Jan. 20 inauguration. Both Biden and his designated national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, have given recent interviews in which they underscore their intent to make Tehran a straightforward offer: If Iran comes back into compliance with the deal, the United States will do likewise. Iran would bring its nuclear activities back within the JCPOA’s limits, while the United States would ease sanctions imposed since outgoing President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018.
Rushing to restore the Iran deal virtually guarantees that Biden will start his presidency with a hugely divisive controversy. Such a step flies in the face of advice from JCPOA skeptics, who have urged Biden not to rush back into the deal. Rather than squander the leverage built up by Trump’s maximum-pressure campaign for no higher purpose than restoring a flawed arms-control agreement, Biden should exploit that leverage (and Iran’s desperate economic straits) to negotiate a better deal. Such a revised deal would delay or even remove the JCPOA’s sunset clauses—which provide for restrictions on nuclear activities to eventually be lifted. Or better yet, ban entirely Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts. Or better still, include constraints on Iran’s most threatening non-nuclear activities, especially its missile programs and regional aggression.
Biden and his team have yet to be convinced. While agreeing on the importance of a JCPOA 2.0—a follow-on agreement in which the constraints on Iran’s malign behaviors are both longer and stronger— they don’t see pursing it as a viable short-term strategy. On the contrary, they clearly fear that a failure to restore the original JCPOA is the surest route not to a better deal, but to a dangerous expansion of the Iranian nuclear program, an escalation of regional tensions, and perhaps even war.
Whatever benefits Biden might see in buckling to Iran’s extortion, the risks and potential costs should also be apparent.
Needless to say, an all-consuming crisis over Iran’s nuclear program has no place in Biden’s agenda, which he has promised will be intently focused on tackling the daunting array of challenges now confronting the American people—from the devastation wrought by COVID-19 to racial inequality, climate change, and competition with China.
That explains the allure of a rapid return to the JCPOA that promises some measure of de-escalation by reversing Iran’s recent nuclear expansion and, in Sullivan’s words, “put its program back in a box” and “time back on the clock.” Biden, similarly, told the New York Times that his overwhelming priority with Iran—and “the best way to achieve getting some stability in the region”—was to bring its nuclear program back under control. Once that was done, Biden said, “in consultation with our allies and partners, we’re going to engage in negotiations and follow-on agreements to tighten and lengthen Iran’s nuclear constraints, as well as address the missile program.”
Concerns about the current trajectory of Iran’s nuclear progress are well founded. “We’re in a dangerous situation,” Sullivan told the Wall Street Journal. “Since the United States left [the JCPOA], Iran has moved closer to a nuclear weapon.” That includes expanding its uranium stockpile, enriching to higher levels of purity, and testing more powerful centrifuges. And just two weeks ago, Iran’s parliament dramatically raised the stakes, passing a law that would require the government—within Biden’s first weeks in office should sanctions relief not be forthcoming—to embark upon its most far-reaching violations of the JCPOA yet, including deploying thousands of advanced centrifuges, building a stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent, and placing major constraints on inspectors. All in all, it’s an exquisite act of nuclear blackmail designed to send an unmistakable message to Biden: Either lift sanctions or face a nuclear crisis that could derail your presidency almost before it starts.
Whatever benefits Biden might see in buckling to Iran’s extortion, the risks and potential costs should also be apparent. The U.S. domestic backlash is certain to be fierce—from the majority of Republicans, for sure, and perhaps even a few prominent Democrats. It’s worth recalling that the top two Democrats on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Bob Menendez and Ben Cardin, not to mention Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, all opposed the JCPOA in 2015. That fight was one of the most bitter of President Barack Obama’s tenure and there’s no reason to believe that a second round would be any easier. Biden has suggested that his presidency’s north star will be rebuilding bipartisan consensus to address the country’s most urgent problems. Opting for a bruising battle over granting an economic lifeline to Iran’s terror-sponsoring regime has all the markings of a poison pill that could derail that agenda.
Biden’s difficulties will be further exacerbated by the international reaction. Whatever chits he earns with pro-JCPOA Europeans will be offset by the opposition triggered among Washington’s most consequential allies in the Middle East. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood alone railing against the deal five years ago, he’s likely to have significant company this time around, particularly from U.S. partners in the Gulf. Things could get ugly quickly, with charges of betrayal flying fast and furious. Biden’s bid to restore U.S. credibility internationally could take a substantial beating.
It could be that the Iranians are only bluffing and that their escalation options are in fact heavily constrained.
Then there are the substantive risks associated with rejoining the JCPOA. Far and away the most important is the preemptive surrender of pressure on Iran before any of the original agreement’s flaws are addressed. Once Iran is free to sell its oil and gain access to billions of dollars, what leverage will Biden have to force Tehran into the follow-on diplomacy that he claims is essential? Liberated from the threat of economic collapse, what incentive would Iran have to make further painful concessions on issues such as its missile programs, which it views as central to its security?
Biden and his advisors suggest that if Iran resists negotiations, they’d be prepared to reimpose sanctions using the JCPOA’s so-called snapback mechanism. But under the deal’s terms, snapback is limited to instances where Iran is in significant non-performance of its nuclear commitments. It says nothing about any subsequent Iranian obligation to negotiate an extension of the JCPOA’s sunsets, much less agree to limits on its non-nuclear activities. Assuming that Iran returns to and stays in JCPOA compliance, what exactly would Biden’s grounds be for triggering snapback? He and other critics lambasted Trump for leaving the JCPOA at a time when Iran was, according to inspectors, abiding by its terms. How credible is it that Biden would now choose to blow up the agreement for reasons totally outside its terms?
Biden would be smart to task the intelligence community with providing, by Jan. 20, a National Intelligence Estimate that rigorously tests the key assumption underlying any decision to rejoin the JCPOA: that otherwise Iran will dramatically escalate its nuclear program and war will become more likely. Or could Elliott Abrams, Trump’s special envoy for Iran, be right instead when he argues that maximum pressure has made the Iranian regime so vulnerable that it will soon have no choice but to sue for economic relief on U.S. terms?
Others, such as the New York Times columnist Bret Stephens, have suggested that the Biden team’s worries about Iranian nuclear blackmail are overblown. It could be that the Iranians are only bluffing and that their escalation options are in fact heavily constrained—not only by their desperation to see sanctions lifted, but more importantly by their understanding that if they push too far, they will face the implacable determination of an Israel that has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to do whatever it takes to stop Iran’s progress toward a bomb.
Biden’s hand would be stronger if the U.S. assessment incorporated the views of Washington’s most capable intelligence allies.
A National Intelligence Estimate could shed important light on these competing claims and scenarios and help inform what is likely to be one of the most fateful choices of Biden’s presidency. Should the assessment end up supporting his instinct to rejoin the JCPOA, it could also serve as important ammunition in his efforts to manage domestic opposition and fretful friends in the Middle East. Biden’s hand would be stronger still if the U.S. assessment incorporated the views of Washington’s most capable intelligence allies, especially Israel and Britain.
In addition to an intelligence assessment that buttresses his position, Biden would be wise to couple any return to the JCPOA with something approaching a guarantee that would commit to triggering the snapback of sanctions automatically if, within a proscribed time period such as one year, Iran is not engaged in serious follow-on negotiations on the full range of U.S. concerns. It would be better still if Biden’s new snapback guarantee has the upfront backing of Washington’s key European partners. It would also be smart to include a bipartisan delegation from Congress in any follow-on diplomacy that could monitor progress and act as a check on any administration tendency to prevaricate or avoid hard decisions.
None of these measures will prevent the firestorm that surely awaits any attempt to restore the deeply flawed JCPOA. But they might help mitigate at least some of the costs that such a course will inevitably incur. Most importantly, Biden needs to have subjected his own policy biases to rigorous challenge and competing arguments that leave him convinced that, despite all the downsides, the game is truly worth the candle in terms of U.S. vital interests. Otherwise, he may be—to paraphrase scripture—left to wonder: “What does it profit a man if he gains the JCPOA but loses his presidency?”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-19--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Sweden has long enjoyed a sort of wholesome global image : home of Ikea , Pippi Longstocking , and meatballs in cream sauce .
But that reputation has taken a beating during the coronavirus pandemic , as the country became a lone proponent of herd immunity and floundered accordingly .
Now , the government has instituted some restrictions , but confusion remains as to how Swedes should behave toward the coronavirus .
Meanwhile , progressive groups have developed a robust strategy for laying down roots in U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s foreign-policy ranks .
And , a decade after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the permanence of an enduring , but never consummated , revolution .
1 .
Sweden ’ s Second Wave Is a Failure of Government—and Guidance Rattled by a staggering second wave of coronavirus infections , Swedes are less opposed to mask recommendations and social-distancing guidelines than they are puzzled by their government ’ s chronic mixed messaging—a result of infighting between the prime minister and public health officials , Carl-Johan Karlsson writes .
2 .
Progressives Try to Sway Biden on Top Foreign-Policy Jobs Though progressives have recently won some key posts in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team is still fairly establishment .
But the left isn ’ t fretting—yet : Cabinet posts are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to political appointments , and they ’ ve got a plan for putting down roots at a lower level , FP ’ s Jack Detsch reports .
3 .
Betrayed by Their Leaders , Failed by the West , Arabs Still Want Democracy The Arab Spring was less a coordinated , democratic movement than a series of localized struggles against decades of failed governance .
Ten years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ instead provoked further repression is not just an indictment of brutal Arab dictatorships , but also of the Western countries that embrace them , Oz Katerji writes .
4 .
The War in Tigray Is a Fight Over Ethiopia ’ s Past—and Future There are fears that the burgeoning civil war in Ethiopia could lead to one of the largest state collapses in modern history .
That ’ s ironic given what the conflict is all about : not whether Ethiopia should exist , but how it should be governed , Teferi Mergo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
But observers shouldn ’ t be too worried about the prospect of a robust Beijing-Tehran alliance .
China cares far more about courting the West than wooing Iran , and it won ’ t risk further U.S. sanctions by saving Iran from its own financial peril , Wang Xiyue writes .

Sweden has long enjoyed a sort of wholesome global image: home of Ikea, Pippi Longstocking, and meatballs in cream sauce. But that reputation has taken a beating during the coronavirus pandemic, as the country became a lone proponent of herd immunity and floundered accordingly. Now, the government has instituted some restrictions, but confusion remains as to how Swedes should behave toward the coronavirus.
Sweden has long enjoyed a sort of wholesome global image: home of Ikea, Pippi Longstocking, and meatballs in cream sauce. But that reputation has taken a beating during the coronavirus pandemic, as the country became a lone proponent of herd immunity and floundered accordingly. Now, the government has instituted some restrictions, but confusion remains as to how Swedes should behave toward the coronavirus.
Meanwhile, progressive groups have developed a robust strategy for laying down roots in U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s foreign-policy ranks.
And, a decade after the Arab Spring, a look at the permanence of an enduring, but never consummated, revolution.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
A nurse wearing personal protective equipment in a tent at the Sophiahemmet private hospital performs tests on a patient to look for symptoms of COVID-19 in Stockholm on April 22.
Rattled by a staggering second wave of coronavirus infections, Swedes are less opposed to mask recommendations and social-distancing guidelines than they are puzzled by their government’s chronic mixed messaging—a result of infighting between the prime minister and public health officials, Carl-Johan Karlsson writes.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden gives a thumbs-up as he leaves Pennsylvania Hospital after a follow up appointment at the radiology department December 12 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Though progressives have recently won some key posts in Biden’s cabinet, his foreign-policy team is still fairly establishment. But the left isn’t fretting—yet: Cabinet posts are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to political appointments, and they’ve got a plan for putting down roots at a lower level, FP’s Jack Detsch reports.
A man mourns the death of seven members of a family in Syria
3. Betrayed by Their Leaders, Failed by the West, Arabs Still Want Democracy
The Arab Spring was less a coordinated, democratic movement than a series of localized struggles against decades of failed governance. Ten years on, the fact that those struggles instead provoked further repression is not just an indictment of brutal Arab dictatorships, but also of the Western countries that embrace them, Oz Katerji writes.
A young man pushes a cart in front of Tigrayan flags at Martyrs Square in the city of Mekelle, on Sept. 9, 2020.
There are fears that the burgeoning civil war in Ethiopia could lead to one of the largest state collapses in modern history. That’s ironic given what the conflict is all about: not whether Ethiopia should exist, but how it should be governed, Teferi Mergo writes.
Iran's President Hassan Rouhani and Chinese President Xi Jinping at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on June 14, 2019.
China is making inroads in Iran. But observers shouldn’t be too worried about the prospect of a robust Beijing-Tehran alliance. China cares far more about courting the West than wooing Iran, and it won’t risk further U.S. sanctions by saving Iran from its own financial peril, Wang Xiyue writes.