foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--How to Stop the Export of Authoritarianism

How to Stop the Export of Authoritarianism Human rights are in trouble .
Since 1945 , the world ’ s nations have enshrined in major U.N. treaties a broad set of precepts that now serve as global norms .
Though implemented unevenly and imperfectly , individual liberty , constraints on government power , democracy , and the rule of law are widely accepted principles that enjoy high levels of popular approval .
Even where rights are flouted , governments have increasingly donned accoutrements such as elections , trials , and participation in human rights reviews , not wanting to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Now , though , the global rights regime itself is in jeopardy—threatened by rising authoritarian powers .
No government threatens the international human rights system like China ’ s ruling Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
Despite having signed onto certain international agreements , it has never been willing to guarantee rights to free expression , fair trials , religious liberty , or freedom from torture and forced labor .
Beijing also rejects the role of human rights watchdogs , including nongovernmental organizations ( NGOs ) and independent journalists .
U.S. policymakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ integration with the West would force it to open up .
Free enterprise , it was assumed , would also lead to a freer society .
That ’ s not what happened in practice .
In fact , China ’ s economic and military rise has only deepened the conviction of Beijing ’ s party leaders that authoritarianism is essential to economic prosperity and civic stability .
A quick glance at Beijing ’ s abuses—whether it ’ s brutally snuffing out discrete ethnic identities such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang ; overseeing mass @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the activities of foreign organizations , foundations , and media ; or effectively canceling democracy in Hong Kong—reflects just how little the government is now constrained by global human rights norms , external pressures , or popular sentiments .
Beijing ’ s imperviousness to human rights pressures within its borders is nothing new .
But as China becomes more globally integrated , Beijing is working to preempt developments across the world that may erode its internal controls or impair its global aspirations .
The CCP sees threats everywhere ; the Arab Spring , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tighten its grip over social media for fear that its own population might be inspired to take to the streets , too .
Even when enjoyed far beyond China ’ s borders , personal freedoms ranging from speech to religion are considered potential perils because of the sentiments they might spark at home .
Beijing ’ s strategy to snuff out these nascent threats amounts to an ambitious , richly financed campaign to reshape political and civic life globally .
The Chinese government is working its will through a widening network of governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that are willing to compromise on Western values to assure access to Chinese money and markets .
The imperatives of access to Chinese capital and film-going markets now dictate what stories can be told in Hollywood .
The imperatives of access to Chinese capital and film-going markets now dictate what stories can be told in Hollywood ; producers and directors are reluctant to speak about the sacrifices they are making to artistic freedom .
Similar pressures are bearing down on online gaming and book publishing ; these made-in-Beijing strictures apply not just to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those made for Western and global audiences .
Meanwhile , China is also deepening its control over academic institutions in the United States , Australia , and elsewhere through tuition dollars , philanthropic contributions , and partnerships that seem irresistible to cash-hungry university leaders .
Perhaps the most prominent example are the more than 480 Confucius Institutes devoted to teaching Chinese language and culture housed on university campuses around the world and financed by the CCP—which dictates what is taught and by whom .
Of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family ties to the Chinese government , raising complex questions about the potential for espionage and theft of intellectual property in the sciences and technology .
As Chinese technology platforms make global inroads , systems of surveillance , data capture , and censorship are taking hold globally .
China ’ s national security laws mandate that private firms provide any and all data to the government on demand ; many companies host CCP cells that operate on-site to ensure compliance with party demands .
Chinese companies have also exported surveillance tools , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign governments , subsidizing the purchases to participants in its Belt and Road initiative , an ambitious global infrastructure development effort aimed to bolster Chinese ties around the world .
Beijing is also gaining support for an effort to rewrite the rules of the internet by replacing a rights-based emphasis on digital freedom with the idea of “ cybersovereignty , ” a principle that provides boundless leeway for governments to police the digital realm as they see fit , without regard to free speech , privacy , or other civil rights .
Through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statist approach to undercut creative freedom , academic freedom , privacy , and other human rights norms well beyond its borders .
Frighteningly , Beijing ’ s assault is happening with limited scrutiny , transparency , or debate as individual companies and institutions quietly bargain with Beijing—with every incentive to downplay the trade-offs involved , or the larger implications for free societies .
Beijing ’ s assault is happening with limited scrutiny , transparency , or debate .
In mounting resistance to the CCP ’ s worldwide encroachments , human rights advocacy offers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stakes go well beyond a power struggle between Washington and Beijing .
The United States led the creation of the international human rights system which , in many key respects , mirrors the United States ’ own constitutional order .
Washington must now not only fortify its own values around the world , but also fend off a competing set of prescriptions that were made in Beijing but are increasingly being felt in Boston .
China is not just working to undercut human rights norms , but also to remake them .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blocked the protection of civilians in Syria , Rohingyas in Myanmar , and victims of abuses in Venezuela .
During U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s tenure in office , Beijing has taken advantage of the United States ’ withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council to expand its own influence .
On the council , Beijing has sought to instill norms that uphold its own sovereignty at the expense of basic human rights norms .
CCP catchphrases such as “ shared future ” and “ mutual respect ” —code words for silencing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the council ’ s texts .
As China ’ s network of bilateral relationships expands , its ability to marshal votes behind its agenda grows .
China is now also a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council ’ s Consultative Group , which selects candidates for key U.N. roles ; its presence ensures that these appointments do not defy Beijing .
While pressuring countries and companies to subscribe to its authoritarian alternative to the international human rights system , Chinese envoys are simultaneously working from within that system to hollow it out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assault on the international human rights system demands a response from the United States , Europe , and other rights-respecting countries .
A passive , defensive posture—that is , a continuation of the status quo—will allow Beijing to proceed apace , renovating the international human rights system to a point where it may be unrecognizable .
This work will be hard , even if former Vice President Joe Biden takes charge in Washington next year .
The first order of business will be undoing the ravages of the Trump years : rebuilding alliances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ immigrants ’ rights , press freedom , racial equality , and other norms at home ; reclaiming a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council ; and reversing other policy and bureaucratic missteps and abdications .
It will require restoring the weight of human rights considerations in policymaking through the appointment of empowered , expert officials and the elevation of human rights issues in speeches and policy directives .
But a revitalized human rights policy must involve more than simply turning back the clock .
It demands a series of internal and external @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is developed and executed .
To sustain credibility , it is essential that such an effort not play into jingoism or xenophobia , allow leeriness toward the Chinese government to translate into bias toward Chinese people , or resort to tactics that trample human rights in the name of trying to protect them .
A revitalized human rights policy must involve more than simply turning back the clock .
Traditionally , U.S. policy on human rights in China is pursued as a subplot on the bilateral diplomatic agenda , only targeting China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the CCP ’ s efforts to propagate its ideology and methods globally will demand integrating human rights policy through a White House coordination cell that fuses intelligence , trade , cybersecurity , technology , commerce , and diplomatic relations into a comprehensive rejoinder spanning both domestic and foreign policy .
Senate Democrats have taken a first step by introducing legislation aimed to address China ’ s operations , including by training journalists to track and expose Chinese influence efforts .
Within the coordination cell , officials would build dialogues with universities , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ executives to mount defenses alongside affected institutions .
When it comes to Beijing ’ s efforts to remake the U.N. human rights system from within , the best defense is a good offense .
While it will not be enough to fend off the CCP ’ s inroads in the multilateral realm , a “ norm offensive ” that rallies the world to further elaborate existing precepts that address suffering , corruption , and injustice would be a good start ; there is no shortage of issues that could galvanize both civil society @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights system in the face of a Chinese government that seeks to dismantle it .
New norms could protect scientists and doctors from political influence and reprisals as they carry out their work , for example , while fostering public health , sounding alarms about climate science , and promoting other essential public goods .
In cyberspace , concerns about data privacy and free speech on platforms such as TikTok and WeChat should be addressed not through tit-for-tat reprisals , but via new global protocols that shield users from digital intrusions .
By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lives , human rights proponents can put Chinese diplomats on the defensive , forcing it to expend political capital and choose its battles—making it harder for Beijing to water down and manipulate the human rights system .
Success will depend upon creating broad coalitions willing to stand up to Beijing ’ s intrusions .
Rights-respecting leaders in democracies such as Germany , Canada , and Japan , among others , can augment these efforts , with broad cross-regional coalitions lending legitimacy that prevents Beijing from casting the battle as great-power rivalry .
With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ record now so tarnished , countries with strong credibility as human rights standard-bearers should lead the charge against new Chinese multilateral initiatives or resolutions .
The United States , for its part , will need to forge intimate collaborations among its own human rights experts , diplomats , and regional bureaus and embassies .
Beijing ’ s aims and tactics should lead policymakers to make multilateral human rights advocacy a central concern , rather than the afterthought it has traditionally been .
As China ’ s strength and influence intensify , it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the future of human rights and democracy globally may hang in the balance .
Only a broad-scale effort can ensure that Beijing ’ s rise does not bring with it an upsurge in global repression .

Human rights are in trouble. Since 1945, the world’s nations have enshrined in major U.N. treaties a broad set of precepts that now serve as global norms. Though implemented unevenly and imperfectly, individual liberty, constraints on government power, democracy, and the rule of law are widely accepted principles that enjoy high levels of popular approval . Even where rights are flouted, governments have increasingly donned accoutrements such as elections, trials, and participation in human rights reviews, not wanting to be seen to defy the system entirely. Now, though, the global rights regime itself is in jeopardy—threatened by rising authoritarian powers.
Human rights are in trouble. Since 1945, the world’s nations have enshrined in major U.N. treaties a broad set of precepts that now serve as global norms. Though implemented unevenly and imperfectly, individual liberty, constraints on government power, democracy, and the rule of law are widely accepted principles that enjoy high levels of popular approval. Even where rights are flouted, governments have increasingly donned accoutrements such as elections, trials, and participation in human rights reviews, not wanting to be seen to defy the system entirely. Now, though, the global rights regime itself is in jeopardy—threatened by rising authoritarian powers.
No government threatens the international human rights system like China’s ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Despite having signed onto certain international agreements, it has never been willing to guarantee rights to free expression, fair trials, religious liberty, or freedom from torture and forced labor. Beijing also rejects the role of human rights watchdogs, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and independent journalists.
U.S. policymakers once predicted that China’s economic integration with the West would force it to open up. Free enterprise, it was assumed, would also lead to a freer society. That’s not what happened in practice. In fact, China’s economic and military rise has only deepened the conviction of Beijing’s party leaders that authoritarianism is essential to economic prosperity and civic stability. A quick glance at Beijing’s abuses—whether it’s brutally snuffing out discrete ethnic identities such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang; overseeing mass censorship and intrusive social controls; stifling the activities of foreign organizations, foundations, and media; or effectively canceling democracy in Hong Kong—reflects just how little the government is now constrained by global human rights norms, external pressures, or popular sentiments.
Beijing’s imperviousness to human rights pressures within its borders is nothing new. But as China becomes more globally integrated, Beijing is working to preempt developments across the world that may erode its internal controls or impair its global aspirations. The CCP sees threats everywhere; the Arab Spring, for example, prompted Beijing to sharply tighten its grip over social media for fear that its own population might be inspired to take to the streets, too. Even when enjoyed far beyond China’s borders, personal freedoms ranging from speech to religion are considered potential perils because of the sentiments they might spark at home.
Beijing’s strategy to snuff out these nascent threats amounts to an ambitious, richly financed campaign to reshape political and civic life globally. The Chinese government is working its will through a widening network of governments, technologies, universities, and corporations that are willing to compromise on Western values to assure access to Chinese money and markets.
The imperatives of access to Chinese capital and film-going markets now dictate what stories can be told in Hollywood.
The imperatives of access to Chinese capital and film-going markets now dictate what stories can be told in Hollywood; producers and directors are reluctant to speak about the sacrifices they are making to artistic freedom. Similar pressures are bearing down on online gaming and book publishing; these made-in-Beijing strictures apply not just to products released in China, but also those made for Western and global audiences.
Meanwhile, China is also deepening its control over academic institutions in the United States, Australia, and elsewhere through tuition dollars, philanthropic contributions, and partnerships that seem irresistible to cash-hungry university leaders. Perhaps the most prominent example are the more than 480 Confucius Institutes devoted to teaching Chinese language and culture housed on university campuses around the world and financed by the CCP—which dictates what is taught and by whom. Of the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who study abroad, many have professional or family ties to the Chinese government, raising complex questions about the potential for espionage and theft of intellectual property in the sciences and technology.
As Chinese technology platforms make global inroads, systems of surveillance, data capture, and censorship are taking hold globally. China’s national security laws mandate that private firms provide any and all data to the government on demand; many companies host CCP cells that operate on-site to ensure compliance with party demands. Chinese companies have also exported surveillance tools, including facial recognition, to more than 60 foreign governments, subsidizing the purchases to participants in its Belt and Road initiative, an ambitious global infrastructure development effort aimed to bolster Chinese ties around the world.
Beijing is also gaining support for an effort to rewrite the rules of the internet by replacing a rights-based emphasis on digital freedom with the idea of “cybersovereignty,” a principle that provides boundless leeway for governments to police the digital realm as they see fit, without regard to free speech, privacy, or other civil rights.
Through these efforts, China is ingraining its statist approach to undercut creative freedom, academic freedom, privacy, and other human rights norms well beyond its borders. Frighteningly, Beijing’s assault is happening with limited scrutiny, transparency, or debate as individual companies and institutions quietly bargain with Beijing—with every incentive to downplay the trade-offs involved, or the larger implications for free societies.
Beijing’s assault is happening with limited scrutiny, transparency, or debate.
In mounting resistance to the CCP’s worldwide encroachments, human rights advocacy offers a morally grounded frame demonstrating that the stakes go well beyond a power struggle between Washington and Beijing. The United States led the creation of the international human rights system which, in many key respects, mirrors the United States’ own constitutional order. Washington must now not only fortify its own values around the world, but also fend off a competing set of prescriptions that were made in Beijing but are increasingly being felt in Boston.
China is not just working to undercut human rights norms, but also to remake them. At the U.N. Security Council, Beijing has blocked the protection of civilians in Syria, Rohingyas in Myanmar, and victims of abuses in Venezuela. During U.S. President Donald Trump’s tenure in office, Beijing has taken advantage of the United States’ withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council to expand its own influence. On the council, Beijing has sought to instill norms that uphold its own sovereignty at the expense of basic human rights norms. CCP catchphrases such as “shared future” and “mutual respect”—code words for silencing criticism—have managed to worm their way into the council’s texts. As China’s network of bilateral relationships expands, its ability to marshal votes behind its agenda grows.
China is now also a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Consultative Group, which selects candidates for key U.N. roles; its presence ensures that these appointments do not defy Beijing. While pressuring countries and companies to subscribe to its authoritarian alternative to the international human rights system, Chinese envoys are simultaneously working from within that system to hollow it out.
The breadth of Beijing’s assault on the international human rights system demands a response from the United States, Europe, and other rights-respecting countries. A passive, defensive posture—that is, a continuation of the status quo—will allow Beijing to proceed apace, renovating the international human rights system to a point where it may be unrecognizable.
This work will be hard, even if former Vice President Joe Biden takes charge in Washington next year. The first order of business will be undoing the ravages of the Trump years: rebuilding alliances and partnerships; recommitting to respect for immigrants’ rights, press freedom, racial equality, and other norms at home; reclaiming a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council; and reversing other policy and bureaucratic missteps and abdications. It will require restoring the weight of human rights considerations in policymaking through the appointment of empowered, expert officials and the elevation of human rights issues in speeches and policy directives.
But a revitalized human rights policy must involve more than simply turning back the clock. It demands a series of internal and external measures that reshape how human rights policy is developed and executed. To sustain credibility, it is essential that such an effort not play into jingoism or xenophobia, allow leeriness toward the Chinese government to translate into bias toward Chinese people, or resort to tactics that trample human rights in the name of trying to protect them.
A revitalized human rights policy must involve more than simply turning back the clock.
Traditionally, U.S. policy on human rights in China is pursued as a subplot on the bilateral diplomatic agenda, only targeting China’s domestic human rights record. Taking on the CCP’s efforts to propagate its ideology and methods globally will demand integrating human rights policy through a White House coordination cell that fuses intelligence, trade, cybersecurity, technology, commerce, and diplomatic relations into a comprehensive rejoinder spanning both domestic and foreign policy. Senate Democrats have taken a first step by introducing legislation aimed to address China’s operations, including by training journalists to track and expose Chinese influence efforts.
Within the coordination cell, officials would build dialogues with universities, academic associations, corporations, and tech executives to mount defenses alongside affected institutions.
When it comes to Beijing’s efforts to remake the U.N. human rights system from within, the best defense is a good offense. While it will not be enough to fend off the CCP’s inroads in the multilateral realm, a “norm offensive” that rallies the world to further elaborate existing precepts that address suffering, corruption, and injustice would be a good start; there is no shortage of issues that could galvanize both civil society and rights-respecting governments to reinforce the human rights system in the face of a Chinese government that seeks to dismantle it. New norms could protect scientists and doctors from political influence and reprisals as they carry out their work, for example, while fostering public health, sounding alarms about climate science, and promoting other essential public goods.
In cyberspace, concerns about data privacy and free speech on platforms such as TikTok and WeChat should be addressed not through tit-for-tat reprisals, but via new global protocols that shield users from digital intrusions. By taking on timely issues that affect individual lives, human rights proponents can put Chinese diplomats on the defensive, forcing it to expend political capital and choose its battles—making it harder for Beijing to water down and manipulate the human rights system.
Success will depend upon creating broad coalitions willing to stand up to Beijing’s intrusions. Rights-respecting leaders in democracies such as Germany, Canada, and Japan, among others, can augment these efforts, with broad cross-regional coalitions lending legitimacy that prevents Beijing from casting the battle as great-power rivalry. With the United States’ own human rights record now so tarnished, countries with strong credibility as human rights standard-bearers should lead the charge against new Chinese multilateral initiatives or resolutions. The United States, for its part, will need to forge intimate collaborations among its own human rights experts, diplomats, and regional bureaus and embassies. Beijing’s aims and tactics should lead policymakers to make multilateral human rights advocacy a central concern, rather than the afterthought it has traditionally been.
As China’s strength and influence intensify, it’s not an exaggeration to suggest that the future of human rights and democracy globally may hang in the balance. Only a broad-scale effort can ensure that Beijing’s rise does not bring with it an upsurge in global repression.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--Everything You Think About the Geopolitics of Climate Change Is Wrong

Everything You Think About the Geopolitics of Climate Change Is Wrong Signs that the energy transition is picking up speed abound .
One of the world ’ s largest oil companies , BP , recently projected oil demand may be close to peaking .
The governor of California just signed an executive order to ban the sale of new gasoline-fueled cars by 2035 .
China , responsible for more than one-quarter of the world ’ s carbon emissions , pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 .
And public polling shows a rising sense of urgency about the climate threat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ severe U.S. Gulf Coast hurricanes .
Transforming an industry that has defined the modern era will have profound consequences on the global order .
China will rise and petrostates will fall—or so says conventional wisdom .
In reality , the geopolitical fallout of a clean energy transition will be far more subtle , complex , and counterintuitive .
Many of today ’ s predictions are likely to turn out wrong , or will take decades to unfold in unpredictable ways .
If policymakers don ’ t get a clear-eyed understanding of how global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future era of zero-carbon energy , but during the long and messy transition to get there—they won ’ t be able to manage the coming era of foreign-policy risks , and their efforts to combat climate change will be stymied .
First , take China .
The Economist predicts powerful “ electrostates ” to take the place of today ’ s petrostates , with China benefiting the most by dominating rapidly growing markets for clean energy products .
Yet even if China dominates the production of solar panels , electric car batteries , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ derive the same measure of geopolitical influence that Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have by dominating oil supply .
The geopolitical leverage of the two is very different : China might have power over a new market for clean energy equipment by producing it most cheaply , but if China curbed solar panel exports for geopolitical reasons , the lights would not go out .
Restricting battery shipments may lead to higher prices and delays for new electric cars , but would have no impact on people ’ s ability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That stands in sharp contrast to a sudden cutoff of oil or natural gas that can stymie mobility , trigger price spikes , or lead to people freezing in their homes , such as when Russia stopped gas deliveries to some southeastern European countries in the depth of winter in 2006 and 2009 .
Many of today ’ s predictions are likely to turn out wrong , or will take decades to unfold in unpredictable ways .
China also dominates the market for some of the commodities—such as lithium and cobalt—that are critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as batteries .
This naturally raises national security risks , particularly in military and communications applications , where these commodities are also crucial .
Yet , again , there is a critical difference between the leverage that comes from producing an important industrial input and supplying the energy without which daily activities screech to a halt .
Any disruption unleashed by a Chinese halt of deliveries wouldn ’ t significantly impact energy prices for years , giving markets and companies time to adjust and find alternatives .
Moreover , though many of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rare-earth elements , they are actually not that rare , geologically speaking .
Growing demand will spur production in new places .
Or take the Middle East , where the narrative of collapse and chaos in a post-oil world has taken over the pundits ’ imaginations .
States that became powerful with their vast production of fossil fuels will fail to diversify their economies in time , lose U.S. protection , and descend into conflict—or so the prediction goes .
More likely , however , is that during the many decades needed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Agreement , petrostates could enjoy a veritable feast before the famine .
That ’ s because as demand peaks and then gradually declines , it is the lowest-cost producers—such as Kuwait , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates—that will be able to keep selling their oil the longest .
What ’ s more , stronger climate policies should focus not just on the greenhouse gases emitted by burning a fuel , but the carbon intensity of the entire production cycle .
Most Gulf Arab states are very efficient producers : With @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and lower flaring rates , they have some of the lowest life cycle emissions associated with their oil .
Therefore , even as oil demand declines , OPEC ’ s share of global production could rise as a result of its members ’ lower costs and emissions , strengthening the cartel ’ s grip on a market that will remain sizable for some time .
Conventional wisdom also holds that shrinking demand for oil and gas will mean lower prices , implying that even if petrostates gain market share , they would still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the reality is more complicated .
Absent continued investment , production from existing fields declines at a rate of roughly 8 percent per year .
According to the International Energy Agency ( IEA ) , demand won ’ t fall that quickly even if the Paris climate goals are met , meaning that additional investment is needed .
But capital may well dry up once oil demand peaks and the sector continues to fall into disfavor among investors .
They may no longer be willing to provide billions of dollars over many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sector seen to be in terminal decline .
As a result , supply may very well decline faster than demand , leading to a shortage of oil .
The resulting higher prices would actually boost petrostate revenues for a time , which may explain why Saudi Aramco still plans to spend tens of billions of dollars to grow its oil production capacity .
To defy the conventional wisdom further , consider that some of today ’ s petrostates may be tomorrow ’ s electrostates .
There could even be a paradox at play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faster than demand would improve the economics of alternative energy technologies such as electric vehicles .
While many worry that petrostates will delay the energy transition and falter as a result of it , the opposite could happen : Petrostates could temporarily profit from the energy transition even as higher prices speed the switch to clean energy .
To defy the conventional wisdom further , consider that some of today ’ s petrostates may be tomorrow ’ s electrostates .
Electrostates will not only be manufacturing powerhouses like China , but also those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , either as electricity to neighboring countries or in the form of fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia , which can be used to power factories , buildings , and transportation .
Saudi Arabia , for example , has abundant , low-cost solar power , just announced a $ 5 billion project to turn renewable energy into hydrogen , and has also sent Japan the world ’ s first blue ammonia shipment .
Other nations rich in cheap renewable power , such as Chile , may also emerge as the superpowers of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , another powerful petrostate widely expected to be a loser of the energy transition .
In reality , its leverage as the leading supplier of natural gas to Europe , an increasingly important supplier of gas to China , and a rapidly rising global exporter of liquefied natural gas could rise during the transition period .
According to the IEA ’ s scenario consistent with climate goals , natural gas demand in the Asia-Pacific region will rise over the next two decades .
In Europe , it will fall—but since Russia is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ share of the European gas market would likely rise for the same reason that OPEC ’ s share of the oil market will likely rise .
In addition , advances in carbon-capture technology could create opportunities for natural gas to play a role in a low-carbon economy , either directly or converted to other fuels such as hydrogen .
As for Russia ’ s substantial oil revenues , higher prices from persistent global underinvestment would benefit Russia as well .
Russia could actually get a boost in geopolitical influence from climate action .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ player in zero-carbon nuclear power technology , which will be needed around the world as sectors such as transportation and buildings are electrified to curb their emissions .
For example , China alone projects it will achieve its new 2060 net-zero emission goal by quadrupling nuclear power generation , an even bigger rise than that of wind power .
The United States , Germany , and other erstwhile market and technology leaders have largely ceded the sector to Russia and China , with Russia the leading exporter of civilian nuclear reactors today .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerns , but Russia consistently uses its role as a nuclear exporter to boost its geopolitical influence and shape the rules in the sector ; the business model of Russia ’ s state-owned firm Rosatom is to control major parts of the recipient country ’ s electricity market by not just constructing , but also financing and operating the nuclear plants .
The way to net-zero emissions will create new foreign-policy risks even as old ones subside .
Beyond these counterintuitive power shifts , the transition to clean energy will also create many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ others .
A growing seaborne trade in hydrogen and ammonia would come with risks of disruption similar to those that have plagued oil transit in conflict-prone shipping lanes .
A low-carbon economy would also face greater cybersecurity risks : As more sectors shift from burning fuels to running on electricity , they will be more vulnerable to malicious attacks through an increasingly interconnected and digital grid .
Already in 2018 , the FBI and U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned of rising cybersecurity risks to the energy system and publicly called out Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Dramatic shifts in the world ’ s energy sources will have profound geopolitical consequences—but not the simple ones that many pundits have predicted .
The way to net-zero emissions will create new foreign-policy risks even as old ones subside .
None of these risks are a reason to put the brake on climate policies , for they still pale in comparison to the devastating impacts of climate change itself .
Rather , national security leaders must anticipate and prepare for the new geopolitics of clean energy—not only to mitigate new risks , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ succeed unless they do .

Signs that the energy transition is picking up speed abound. One of the world’s largest oil companies, BP, recently projected oil demand may be close to peaking. The governor of California just signed an executive order to ban the sale of new gasoline-fueled cars by 2035. China, responsible for more than one-quarter of the world’s carbon emissions, pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. And public polling shows a rising sense of urgency about the climate threat, galvanized by raging California wildfires and severe U.S. Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Signs that the energy transition is picking up speed abound. One of the world’s largest oil companies, BP, recently projected oil demand may be close to peaking. The governor of California just signed an executive order to ban the sale of new gasoline-fueled cars by 2035. China, responsible for more than one-quarter of the world’s carbon emissions, pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. And public polling shows a rising sense of urgency about the climate threat, galvanized by raging California wildfires and severe U.S. Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Transforming an industry that has defined the modern era will have profound consequences on the global order. China will rise and petrostates will fall—or so says conventional wisdom. In reality, the geopolitical fallout of a clean energy transition will be far more subtle, complex, and counterintuitive. Many of today’s predictions are likely to turn out wrong, or will take decades to unfold in unpredictable ways. If policymakers don’t get a clear-eyed understanding of how global power relations will change—not only in a future era of zero-carbon energy, but during the long and messy transition to get there—they won’t be able to manage the coming era of foreign-policy risks, and their efforts to combat climate change will be stymied.
First, take China. The Economist predicts powerful “electrostates” to take the place of today’s petrostates, with China benefiting the most by dominating rapidly growing markets for clean energy products. Yet even if China dominates the production of solar panels, electric car batteries, and other technologies, it will not derive the same measure of geopolitical influence that Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries have by dominating oil supply. The geopolitical leverage of the two is very different: China might have power over a new market for clean energy equipment by producing it most cheaply, but if China curbed solar panel exports for geopolitical reasons, the lights would not go out. Restricting battery shipments may lead to higher prices and delays for new electric cars, but would have no impact on people’s ability to get around in their vehicles today. That stands in sharp contrast to a sudden cutoff of oil or natural gas that can stymie mobility, trigger price spikes, or lead to people freezing in their homes, such as when Russia stopped gas deliveries to some southeastern European countries in the depth of winter in 2006 and 2009.
Many of today’s predictions are likely to turn out wrong, or will take decades to unfold in unpredictable ways.
China also dominates the market for some of the commodities—such as lithium and cobalt—that are critical inputs for many clean energy technologies such as batteries. This naturally raises national security risks, particularly in military and communications applications, where these commodities are also crucial. Yet, again, there is a critical difference between the leverage that comes from producing an important industrial input and supplying the energy without which daily activities screech to a halt. Any disruption unleashed by a Chinese halt of deliveries wouldn’t significantly impact energy prices for years, giving markets and companies time to adjust and find alternatives. Moreover, though many of the commodities now controlled by China are so-called rare-earth elements, they are actually not that rare, geologically speaking. Growing demand will spur production in new places.
Or take the Middle East, where the narrative of collapse and chaos in a post-oil world has taken over the pundits’ imaginations. States that became powerful with their vast production of fossil fuels will fail to diversify their economies in time, lose U.S. protection, and descend into conflict—or so the prediction goes. More likely, however, is that during the many decades needed to achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, petrostates could enjoy a veritable feast before the famine.
That’s because as demand peaks and then gradually declines, it is the lowest-cost producers—such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—that will be able to keep selling their oil the longest. What’s more, stronger climate policies should focus not just on the greenhouse gases emitted by burning a fuel, but the carbon intensity of the entire production cycle. Most Gulf Arab states are very efficient producers: With easy-to-extract barrels, less methane leakage, and lower flaring rates, they have some of the lowest life cycle emissions associated with their oil. Therefore, even as oil demand declines, OPEC’s share of global production could rise as a result of its members’ lower costs and emissions, strengthening the cartel’s grip on a market that will remain sizable for some time.
Conventional wisdom also holds that shrinking demand for oil and gas will mean lower prices, implying that even if petrostates gain market share, they would still see revenues collapse. Here, too, the reality is more complicated. Absent continued investment, production from existing fields declines at a rate of roughly 8 percent per year. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), demand won’t fall that quickly even if the Paris climate goals are met, meaning that additional investment is needed. But capital may well dry up once oil demand peaks and the sector continues to fall into disfavor among investors. They may no longer be willing to provide billions of dollars over many years to develop new resources in a sector seen to be in terminal decline. As a result, supply may very well decline faster than demand, leading to a shortage of oil. The resulting higher prices would actually boost petrostate revenues for a time, which may explain why Saudi Aramco still plans to spend tens of billions of dollars to grow its oil production capacity.
To defy the conventional wisdom further, consider that some of today’s petrostates may be tomorrow’s electrostates.
There could even be a paradox at play: Rising oil prices as supply shrinks faster than demand would improve the economics of alternative energy technologies such as electric vehicles. While many worry that petrostates will delay the energy transition and falter as a result of it, the opposite could happen: Petrostates could temporarily profit from the energy transition even as higher prices speed the switch to clean energy.
To defy the conventional wisdom further, consider that some of today’s petrostates may be tomorrow’s electrostates. Electrostates will not only be manufacturing powerhouses like China, but also those that produce cheap zero-carbon energy for export, either as electricity to neighboring countries or in the form of fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia, which can be used to power factories, buildings, and transportation. Saudi Arabia, for example, has abundant, low-cost solar power, just announced a $5 billion project to turn renewable energy into hydrogen, and has also sent Japan the world’s first blue ammonia shipment. Other nations rich in cheap renewable power, such as Chile, may also emerge as the superpowers of a new hydrogen-based economy.
Finally, take Russia, another powerful petrostate widely expected to be a loser of the energy transition. In reality, its leverage as the leading supplier of natural gas to Europe, an increasingly important supplier of gas to China, and a rapidly rising global exporter of liquefied natural gas could rise during the transition period. According to the IEA’s scenario consistent with climate goals, natural gas demand in the Asia-Pacific region will rise over the next two decades. In Europe, it will fall—but since Russia is the lowest-cost supplier to Europe, its share of the European gas market would likely rise for the same reason that OPEC’s share of the oil market will likely rise. In addition, advances in carbon-capture technology could create opportunities for natural gas to play a role in a low-carbon economy, either directly or converted to other fuels such as hydrogen. As for Russia’s substantial oil revenues, higher prices from persistent global underinvestment would benefit Russia as well.
Russia could actually get a boost in geopolitical influence from climate action. Like China, it is a dominant player in zero-carbon nuclear power technology, which will be needed around the world as sectors such as transportation and buildings are electrified to curb their emissions. For example, China alone projects it will achieve its new 2060 net-zero emission goal by quadrupling nuclear power generation, an even bigger rise than that of wind power. The United States, Germany, and other erstwhile market and technology leaders have largely ceded the sector to Russia and China, with Russia the leading exporter of civilian nuclear reactors today. Not only does this raise significant proliferation concerns, but Russia consistently uses its role as a nuclear exporter to boost its geopolitical influence and shape the rules in the sector; the business model of Russia’s state-owned firm Rosatom is to control major parts of the recipient country’s electricity market by not just constructing, but also financing and operating the nuclear plants.
The way to net-zero emissions will create new foreign-policy risks even as old ones subside.
Beyond these counterintuitive power shifts, the transition to clean energy will also create many new geopolitical risks even as it mitigates others. A growing seaborne trade in hydrogen and ammonia would come with risks of disruption similar to those that have plagued oil transit in conflict-prone shipping lanes. A low-carbon economy would also face greater cybersecurity risks: As more sectors shift from burning fuels to running on electricity, they will be more vulnerable to malicious attacks through an increasingly interconnected and digital grid. Already in 2018, the FBI and U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned of rising cybersecurity risks to the energy system and publicly called out Russia for hacking the U.S. power grid.
Dramatic shifts in the world’s energy sources will have profound geopolitical consequences—but not the simple ones that many pundits have predicted. The way to net-zero emissions will create new foreign-policy risks even as old ones subside. None of these risks are a reason to put the brake on climate policies, for they still pale in comparison to the devastating impacts of climate change itself. Rather, national security leaders must anticipate and prepare for the new geopolitics of clean energy—not only to mitigate new risks, but because a robust climate agenda will not succeed unless they do.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--The Dangerous Foreign-Policy Fallout of Trump’s COVID-19 Diagnosis

First , and most consequentially , Trump could change his mind about the seriousness of the virus—as other infected political leaders have—and work closely with Democrats to mitigate COVID-19 ’ s multiple harms .
With the virus representing the most acute and lethal threat facing Americans , reducing its cumulative impacts should be the top national security concern for the commander in chief .
Moreover , the interventions required to reduce those immediate and long-term harms have been well known and could be adapted quickly if the president expended the requisite political capital .
In a video tweeted from Walter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even revealed he “ learned a lot about COVID.
” He added : “ I get it .
And I understand it .
And it ’ s a very interesting thing.
” Unfortunately , as noted in a previous column , Trump is wholly incapable of updating any opinion once it has been expressed publicly .
In the days leading up to his COVID-19 announcement , he again minimized the virus ’ s death rate based on his “ hunch , ” compared it to the regular flu , and mocked Joe Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s inability to update his thinking , his immovable poor judgments anchor the collective beliefs of his party and loyalist followers .
Thus , the president will never take COVID-19 seriously , and the federal government ’ s lack of urgency and overall incompetency will persist .
Second , if the president exhibits mild symptoms , but especially if he experiences a downturn comparable to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson , Trump ’ s illness could hinder his foreign-policy decision-making .
Pharmaceutical treatments , fatigue , and elevated stress impair people @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make and communicate decisions .
Trump ’ s most immediate and observable foreign-policy tool is kinetic military force .
He has authorized ( and often escalated ) airstrikes in every country his predecessor Barack Obama bombed and was most enthusiastic about the filmed and well-publicized missile strikes against Syrian government assets in April 2017 and 2018 .
Hence , Trump could approve some vivid but also escalatory military action , assuming that it would distract attention from his illness or demonstrate his pseudo-toughness .
And given his practice of tweeting classified spy satellite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one would assume that near-term strikes would be accompanied by graphic imagery of death and destruction .
Until now , despite his approval for more overall airstrikes than his predecessor in the ongoing wars in Iraq , Syria , Pakistan , and Somalia , Trump has yet to authorize any massive new military attacks .
Even though , since taking office , he has made eliminationist threats against North Korea , Afghanistan , Turkey , and Iran and repeatedly claimed ( falsely ) that U.S. forces were executing the war crime of “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq .
But a medically impaired president could change course and suddenly authorize any number of extreme and unwise wars .
Third , there is some possibility that adversaries could perceive Trump ’ s illness as a window of opportunity , during which time they could advance their agendas without fear of imminent retribution .
This scenario is improbable for the simple reason that U.S. foreign policy has already been tremendously distracted and diminished throughout Trump ’ s presidency .
The administration has failed to execute any truly meaningful bilateral economic or diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( to China ) within international organizations , and largely disengaged from its allies—which has made the pursuit of shared global objectives impossible .
In short , America has quickly become a lazy superpower .
Adversaries of the United States have learned that they can pursue their international goals incrementally without much pushback from Washington .
There is no reason for those adversaries to cross any perceived red lines with a triggering incident—for example , China imposing a blockade on Taiwan—that would wake up America ’ s somnolent foreign-policy apparatus .
Fourth , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reputation for honesty has fallen further , with its buffet of lies and contradictions concerning COVID-19 .
Lying to successfully deceive is a skill that requires practice and refinement .
The Trump White House has lied so long and so unsuccessfully without any penalty that its deception skills have atrophied beyond recovery .
Understandably , and to an extent greater than any previous president , nobody could trust any statements produced by the White House .
If the Trump administration can not tell a true , plausible story about the health of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during an acute national security crisis ?
For example , imagine a crisis characterized by deep uncertainty and requiring a presidential response in a compressed timeframe : mass hostage-taking by unknown assailants at a diplomatic facility or a devastating cyberattack against critical infrastructure that results in American deaths and can only be attributed with moderate confidence .
During such events , multiple audiences look to the White House—diplomats and military forces for broad guidance and specific orders , Congress for factual oversight briefings , allies for appeals for support , and the American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the remaining weeks of the presidential campaign , and certainly after Nov. 3 if Biden wins the election , few would believe anything uttered by Trump or anyone who works for him .
Of course , it did not have to be this way .
The president could have protected his health and the health of those working for him , he could have led the country competently when the virus first emerged , and his administration could have participated in world affairs beyond just extending existing bombing campaigns .
But Trump and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they are—self-interested , above all .
Nobody should expect them to change , no matter how severe the president ’ s COVID-19 infection turns out to be .

Nobody can pretend to know how President Donald Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis will unfold, but some fallout for U.S. national security will be impossible to avoid. What sort of distortions will the illness introduce to foreign policy? That’s harder to say. The Trump administration, after all, has had no baseline of normalcy from which to estimate such deviations. Nevertheless, four potential issues stand out.
Nobody can pretend to know how President Donald Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis will unfold, but some fallout for U.S. national security will be impossible to avoid. What sort of distortions will the illness introduce to foreign policy? That’s harder to say. The Trump administration, after all, has had no baseline of normalcy from which to estimate such deviations. Nevertheless, four potential issues stand out.
First, and most consequentially, Trump could change his mind about the seriousness of the virus—as other infected political leaders have—and work closely with Democrats to mitigate COVID-19’s multiple harms. With the virus representing the most acute and lethal threat facing Americans, reducing its cumulative impacts should be the top national security concern for the commander in chief. Moreover, the interventions required to reduce those immediate and long-term harms have been well known and could be adapted quickly if the president expended the requisite political capital. In a video tweeted from Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Trump even revealed he “learned a lot about COVID.” He added: “I get it. And I understand it. And it’s a very interesting thing.”
Unfortunately, as noted in a previous column, Trump is wholly incapable of updating any opinion once it has been expressed publicly. In the days leading up to his COVID-19 announcement, he again minimized the virus’s death rate based on his “hunch,” compared it to the regular flu, and mocked Joe Biden for wearing a mask. Worse than Trump’s inability to update his thinking, his immovable poor judgments anchor the collective beliefs of his party and loyalist followers. Thus, the president will never take COVID-19 seriously, and the federal government’s lack of urgency and overall incompetency will persist.
Second, if the president exhibits mild symptoms, but especially if he experiences a downturn comparable to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Trump’s illness could hinder his foreign-policy decision-making. Pharmaceutical treatments, fatigue, and elevated stress impair people’s cognition and alters how they make and communicate decisions. Trump’s most immediate and observable foreign-policy tool is kinetic military force. He has authorized (and often escalated) airstrikes in every country his predecessor Barack Obama bombed and was most enthusiastic about the filmed and well-publicized missile strikes against Syrian government assets in April 2017 and 2018.
Hence, Trump could approve some vivid but also escalatory military action, assuming that it would distract attention from his illness or demonstrate his pseudo-toughness. And given his practice of tweeting classified spy satellite photos without any opposition from Republicans, one would assume that near-term strikes would be accompanied by graphic imagery of death and destruction. Until now, despite his approval for more overall airstrikes than his predecessor in the ongoing wars in Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Somalia, Trump has yet to authorize any massive new military attacks. Even though, since taking office, he has made eliminationist threats against North Korea, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran and repeatedly claimed (falsely) that U.S. forces were executing the war crime of “taking the oil” from Syria and Iraq. But a medically impaired president could change course and suddenly authorize any number of extreme and unwise wars.
Third, there is some possibility that adversaries could perceive Trump’s illness as a window of opportunity, during which time they could advance their agendas without fear of imminent retribution. This scenario is improbable for the simple reason that U.S. foreign policy has already been tremendously distracted and diminished throughout Trump’s presidency. The administration has failed to execute any truly meaningful bilateral economic or diplomatic agreements, abandoned its traditional leadership role (to China) within international organizations, and largely disengaged from its allies—which has made the pursuit of shared global objectives impossible. In short, America has quickly become a lazy superpower.
Adversaries of the United States have learned that they can pursue their international goals incrementally without much pushback from Washington. There is no reason for those adversaries to cross any perceived red lines with a triggering incident—for example, China imposing a blockade on Taiwan—that would wake up America’s somnolent foreign-policy apparatus.
Fourth, the Trump administration’s already microscopic reputation for honesty has fallen further, with its buffet of lies and contradictions concerning COVID-19. Lying to successfully deceive is a skill that requires practice and refinement. The Trump White House has lied so long and so unsuccessfully without any penalty that its deception skills have atrophied beyond recovery. Understandably, and to an extent greater than any previous president, nobody could trust any statements produced by the White House. If the Trump administration cannot tell a true, plausible story about the health of its own workforce, who would believe it during an acute national security crisis?
For example, imagine a crisis characterized by deep uncertainty and requiring a presidential response in a compressed timeframe: mass hostage-taking by unknown assailants at a diplomatic facility or a devastating cyberattack against critical infrastructure that results in American deaths and can only be attributed with moderate confidence. During such events, multiple audiences look to the White House—diplomats and military forces for broad guidance and specific orders, Congress for factual oversight briefings, allies for appeals for support, and the American people for clarity and leadership. During the remaining weeks of the presidential campaign, and certainly after Nov. 3 if Biden wins the election, few would believe anything uttered by Trump or anyone who works for him.
Of course, it did not have to be this way. The president could have protected his health and the health of those working for him, he could have led the country competently when the virus first emerged, and his administration could have participated in world affairs beyond just extending existing bombing campaigns. But Trump and everyone who works for him are who they are—self-interested, above all. Nobody should expect them to change, no matter how severe the president’s COVID-19 infection turns out to be.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--Sweden and the World-Historical Power of Conformity

Sweden and the World-Historical Power of Conformity “ It ’ s a serious matter , ” the human-resources chief for the Swedish Armed Forces told the paper .
“ It is dreadful .
It ’ s difficult for the defense forces to protect themselves against liars.
” But what makes the story really extraordinary is that it is the second such case to emerge this year .
Last winter Dagens Nyheter revealed that a rather more senior staff officer had simply faked his résumé , claiming qualifications he did not have and which were never checked .
“ It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protect themselves against liars.
” That seems a quite extraordinary response from a soldier whose task is to prepare his country to defend itself against enemies who use weapons even deadlier than lies .
But it reveals something profound about the strengths and weaknesses of Swedish society—and about the tremendous fascination that it exerts on foreigners .
The country may not be quite as fascinating as Swedes themselves believe , but it ’ s still difficult to think of any other small- or medium-sized country which is so often held up to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a dreadful warning .
When it was the model of a welfare state , both left and right assumed that there could be nowhere else in the West that was so close to working socialism .
When it was the most welcoming country in Western Europe to immigrants and refugees , this gave it a corresponding importance among both supporters and opponents of mass immigration .
Even its policies on prostitution—where the working girls are legal , but their pimps and customers are criminalized—have been held up on both sides of that debate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been cited both as the country that got everything right , by refusing to impose a lockdown , and as the place that got everything wrong , by allowing the virus to rage freely in old people ’ s homes , leading to an early death toll far higher than in neighboring nations .
This prominence in the world ’ s imagination depends on one of the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the country : Sweden is a very high-trust society .
Swedes know how they should behave , and they expect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way .
They say what they believe to be true and they expect everyone else to share that belief .
That ’ s why large parts of the country work so well ; it ’ s also why it is defenseless against shameless fantasists like the analyst in the military .
High-trust societies are always vulnerable to such betrayals .
What keeps them safe in normal times is their conformism .
People feel an obligation to stick to the rules .
Swedes , like other Nordic peoples , have a very strong sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ done.
” Ironically , it is this conformism and deference toward the unwritten rules of society that led Sweden by a tortuous route to becoming an idol for libertarians in the global pandemic .
The first steps on this path were taken almost by accident .
In the 1930s Sweden was the most industrially advanced of the Nordic countries , and though it was intellectually and culturally part of the German sphere of interest , neutrality in World War I had spared it the devastating social consequences of defeat .
Swedish social democracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crushed between Nazism and communism , as the German Social Democrats were .
For Anglo-Saxon thinkers on the left , Sweden then seemed to offer a golden path into the future , a “ middle way ” between communism and unfettered capitalism .
Swedish politicians were happy to play along with this .
They trusted their own propaganda .
In the decades of social democracy , it was axiomatic all across the West—not least in Sweden itself—that Sweden was the summit of human progress , the brightest beacon of enlightened Europe : rich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to outsiders .
At the same time , Sweden became a dreadful warning to conservatives everywhere—including , quietly , among conservatives in Sweden itself .
It was a right-wing lawyer in Stockholm who first use the phrase “ cultural Marxism ” to me in the early 1980s , to describe his own government .
But ideas such as his were entirely marginalized in those days .
They weren ’ t even denounced .
They simply leaped through the Overton window to their deaths .
But as the example of my lawyer friend showed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conformity .
What really mattered was that everyone should agree on an ideology and feel they must believe in it .
Which ideology this was , or what it said , was very much less important .
When social democracy appeared to stop working in the 1980s , everyone , even the social democrats , switched to believing in market solutions .
It took decades for the outside world to notice this .
The foreigners who see in Sweden a chart to a better future have never been much interested in the reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ describes .
But the pandemic has greatly accelerated the process .
This was signalized by the news that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had consulted a Swedish epidemiologist , Anders Tegnell , on the correct response to the coronavirus .
It ’ s a transformation of the country ’ s image .
Now Sweden enthuses libertarians with its refusal to require its citizens to wear masks or to lock down the country out of fear .
You would not know from much of the foreign coverage that these decisions have been fiercely criticized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April 26 this year , 200 scientists of various sorts , some of them both prestigious and working in the relevant fields , signed an open letter that was scathingly critical of the strategy .
Of course , this libertarian enthusiasm , at home and abroad , overlooks the country ’ s remarkably high death toll in the early stages of the pandemic , along with the huge damage done to its export-dependent economy .
And if you actually read Tegnell ’ s long and surprisingly open discussions of his strategy , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the abstract than by the long-term health effects of a prolonged economic downturn .
This uniformed enthusiasm is not entirely the fault of the admiring foreigners or slapdash media reports .
Swedish politicians encourage the idea that Sweden works just the way the plans say it should .
They too trust the maps far more than the country .
This was very clear during the decades when Sweden had an extremely liberal immigration policy , supported by all the respectable parties , and opposed only by the Sweden Democrats , a right-wing nationalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to shake off the stigma of its fascist roots in the 1980s .
By 2010 it was obvious that provincial Sweden , outside the delightful and rich city centers , was not a welcoming place for immigrants .
When I talked to voters in the unfashionable parts of the country it was obvious that for many of them , there was something wrong with immigrants—something that the prevailing political consensus wouldn ’ t acknowledge .
The immigrants , they felt , weren ’ t attuned to the Swedish consensus about a proper way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust them to understand how a Swede ought to behave .
But when I asked the then minister of integration , Nyamko Sabuni , herself originally from Burundi , what the plan was when the Sweden Democrats broke into parliament at the 2010 elections , as the polls suggested they must , she replied simply that it was unthinkable that they should do so .
There was no plan for that contingency , so it couldn ’ t possibly happen .
That year , SD got 5.7 percent of the vote , nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to get into the parliament for the first time .
Four years later , their share of the vote had more than doubled , to 12.9 percent , after all the other parties agreed to ignore them entirely and to vote as if they had no influence in parliament .
After that election , at another embassy lunch , I asked Fredrik Reinfeldt , who had been Moderate Party prime minister during those years and resigned after his defeat , whether he regretted the loss of votes to his right .
He replied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ always believed in freedom of movement and he was not going to abandon that belief now .
The map projected by Swedish social conformity , after all , suggested that Swedes were enlightened anti-racists who welcomed the benefits of globalization .
If the country was different , so much the worse for the country .
Meanwhile , the Sweden Democrats , with equal untruth , were talking down the country as a hellhole full of no-go zones where sharia law was maintained by force .
They , too , believe their own propaganda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the right to share their beliefs .
Perhaps the pendulum will swing again , and in 10 years ’ time the left will once more talk up Sweden as a place where everything is simple and works as it should .
One thing is certain not to happen : The country won ’ t quietly be remembered as the quirky , frequently delightful , and dreadfully self-important backwater that I love .
It ’ s too well established as a map—rather than a real living place—for that .
The only question is who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there .

The Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter recently reported that a senior officer in the Swedish Armed Forces worked there for years on the strength of a completely false résumé. The man, who has not been named, claimed to have been a British helicopter pilot who’d survived being shot down in the Gulf War and to have been a commodore in the Royal Navy, but in fact he’d never been anything more than a civilian engineer working on electrical systems.
The Stockholm daily Dagens Nyheter recently reported that a senior officer in the Swedish Armed Forces worked there for years on the strength of a completely false résumé. The man, who has not been named, claimed to have been a British helicopter pilot who’d survived being shot down in the Gulf War and to have been a commodore in the Royal Navy, but in fact he’d never been anything more than a civilian engineer working on electrical systems.
“It’s a serious matter,” the human-resources chief for the Swedish Armed Forces told the paper. “It is dreadful. It’s difficult for the defense forces to protect themselves against liars.” But what makes the story really extraordinary is that it is the second such case to emerge this year. Last winter Dagens Nyheter revealed that a rather more senior staff officer had simply faked his résumé, claiming qualifications he did not have and which were never checked.
“It’s difficult for the defense forces to protect themselves against liars.” That seems a quite extraordinary response from a soldier whose task is to prepare his country to defend itself against enemies who use weapons even deadlier than lies. But it reveals something profound about the strengths and weaknesses of Swedish society—and about the tremendous fascination that it exerts on foreigners.
The country may not be quite as fascinating as Swedes themselves believe, but it’s still difficult to think of any other small- or medium-sized country which is so often held up to the outside world as a model or as a dreadful warning. When it was the model of a welfare state, both left and right assumed that there could be nowhere else in the West that was so close to working socialism. When it was the most welcoming country in Western Europe to immigrants and refugees, this gave it a corresponding importance among both supporters and opponents of mass immigration. Even its policies on prostitution—where the working girls are legal, but their pimps and customers are criminalized—have been held up on both sides of that debate.
In the coronavirus pandemic, it has been cited both as the country that got everything right, by refusing to impose a lockdown, and as the place that got everything wrong, by allowing the virus to rage freely in old people’s homes, leading to an early death toll far higher than in neighboring nations.
This prominence in the world’s imagination depends on one of the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the country: Sweden is a very high-trust society. Swedes know how they should behave, and they expect everyone else to behave in the same way. They say what they believe to be true and they expect everyone else to share that belief. That’s why large parts of the country work so well; it’s also why it is defenseless against shameless fantasists like the analyst in the military.
High-trust societies are always vulnerable to such betrayals. What keeps them safe in normal times is their conformism. People feel an obligation to stick to the rules. Swedes, like other Nordic peoples, have a very strong sense of what is and is not “done.” Ironically, it is this conformism and deference toward the unwritten rules of society that led Sweden by a tortuous route to becoming an idol for libertarians in the global pandemic.
The first steps on this path were taken almost by accident. In the 1930s Sweden was the most industrially advanced of the Nordic countries, and though it was intellectually and culturally part of the German sphere of interest, neutrality in World War I had spared it the devastating social consequences of defeat. Swedish social democracy was therefore able to develop without being crushed between Nazism and communism, as the German Social Democrats were. For Anglo-Saxon thinkers on the left, Sweden then seemed to offer a golden path into the future, a “middle way” between communism and unfettered capitalism.
Swedish politicians were happy to play along with this. They trusted their own propaganda. In the decades of social democracy, it was axiomatic all across the West—not least in Sweden itself—that Sweden was the summit of human progress, the brightest beacon of enlightened Europe: rich, peaceful, democratic, and generous to outsiders. At the same time, Sweden became a dreadful warning to conservatives everywhere—including, quietly, among conservatives in Sweden itself. It was a right-wing lawyer in Stockholm who first use the phrase “cultural Marxism” to me in the early 1980s, to describe his own government. But ideas such as his were entirely marginalized in those days. They weren’t even denounced. They simply leaped through the Overton window to their deaths.
But as the example of my lawyer friend showed, what looked like consensus was actually conformity. What really mattered was that everyone should agree on an ideology and feel they must believe in it. Which ideology this was, or what it said, was very much less important. When social democracy appeared to stop working in the 1980s, everyone, even the social democrats, switched to believing in market solutions.
It took decades for the outside world to notice this. The foreigners who see in Sweden a chart to a better future have never been much interested in the reality of the country that the map supposedly describes. But the pandemic has greatly accelerated the process.
This was signalized by the news that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had consulted a Swedish epidemiologist, Anders Tegnell, on the correct response to the coronavirus. It’s a transformation of the country’s image. Now Sweden enthuses libertarians with its refusal to require its citizens to wear masks or to lock down the country out of fear.
You would not know from much of the foreign coverage that these decisions have been fiercely criticized within Sweden itself. As early as April 26 this year, 200 scientists of various sorts, some of them both prestigious and working in the relevant fields, signed an open letter that was scathingly critical of the strategy. Of course, this libertarian enthusiasm, at home and abroad, overlooks the country’s remarkably high death toll in the early stages of the pandemic, along with the huge damage done to its export-dependent economy. And if you actually read Tegnell’s long and surprisingly open discussions of his strategy, he is much less worried about freedom in the abstract than by the long-term health effects of a prolonged economic downturn.
This uniformed enthusiasm is not entirely the fault of the admiring foreigners or slapdash media reports. Swedish politicians encourage the idea that Sweden works just the way the plans say it should. They too trust the maps far more than the country. This was very clear during the decades when Sweden had an extremely liberal immigration policy, supported by all the respectable parties, and opposed only by the Sweden Democrats, a right-wing nationalist party that took a very long time to shake off the stigma of its fascist roots in the 1980s.
By 2010 it was obvious that provincial Sweden, outside the delightful and rich city centers, was not a welcoming place for immigrants. When I talked to voters in the unfashionable parts of the country it was obvious that for many of them, there was something wrong with immigrants—something that the prevailing political consensus wouldn’t acknowledge. The immigrants, they felt, weren’t attuned to the Swedish consensus about a proper way of life—and thus you couldn’t trust them to understand how a Swede ought to behave.
But when I asked the then minister of integration, Nyamko Sabuni, herself originally from Burundi, what the plan was when the Sweden Democrats broke into parliament at the 2010 elections, as the polls suggested they must, she replied simply that it was unthinkable that they should do so. There was no plan for that contingency, so it couldn’t possibly happen.
That year, SD got 5.7 percent of the vote, nearly 50 percent more than they had needed to get into the parliament for the first time. Four years later, their share of the vote had more than doubled, to 12.9 percent, after all the other parties agreed to ignore them entirely and to vote as if they had no influence in parliament. After that election, at another embassy lunch, I asked Fredrik Reinfeldt, who had been Moderate Party prime minister during those years and resigned after his defeat, whether he regretted the loss of votes to his right. He replied that as a liberal, he had always believed in freedom of movement and he was not going to abandon that belief now.
The map projected by Swedish social conformity, after all, suggested that Swedes were enlightened anti-racists who welcomed the benefits of globalization. If the country was different, so much the worse for the country. Meanwhile, the Sweden Democrats, with equal untruth, were talking down the country as a hellhole full of no-go zones where sharia law was maintained by force. They, too, believe their own propaganda, and found plenty of foreigners on the right to share their beliefs.
Perhaps the pendulum will swing again, and in 10 years’ time the left will once more talk up Sweden as a place where everything is simple and works as it should. One thing is certain not to happen: The country won’t quietly be remembered as the quirky, frequently delightful, and dreadfully self-important backwater that I love. It’s too well established as a map—rather than a real living place—for that. The only question is who will plot which voyages to their future there.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--India Doesn’t Need the Quad to Counter China—and Neither Do Its Partners

India Doesn ’ t Need the Quad to Counter China—and Neither Do Its Partners The U.S. pivot to Asia is back and in full swing .
Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton may own the trademark for the term , but her successor Mike Pompeo made it a reality .
Since taking office in April 2018 , Pompeo has seized on President Donald Trump ’ s pledge to work toward a “ free and open Indo-Pacific ” and put it at the center of the administration ’ s foreign policy .
To promote it , he has revitalized the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now rebranded as the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations .
As a sign of the Quad ’ s priority , Pompeo will be attending a first-ever dedicated meeting of Quad foreign ministers in Tokyo this week , even after canceling the other legs of his Asia trip due to Trump ’ s sudden hospitalization for the coronavirus .
Many proponents of the Quad consider it a fledgling alliance with the potential to form the nucleus of an “ Asian NATO ” to contain China .
Detractors dismiss the Quad as a false dawn for Indo-Pacific multilateral @ @ @ @ @ @ @ views it as an “ anti-China front line , ” and it ’ s probably right .
Although the United States ’ partners in the Quad have been careful not to say so , Pompeo admitted as much last year when he said the grouping would play a key role in “ ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world.
” Yet it is not at all clear that Australia , India , and Japan actually want or need the Quad to put a check on China .
Even more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ better off without the Quad , too .
Each of the four members of the Quad is , in its own way , already pushing back on China .
The United States , of course , has its trade war with China , which has morphed into a tech war and now encompasses a wide spectrum of U.S. economic sanctions .
Japan has begun converting two existing ships into aircraft carriers in a bid to counter China ’ s naval expansion , and its Defense Ministry has requested another record budget .
Australia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of legislation to curb foreign influence that is clearly ( though unofficially ) targeted at China .
And India is actively engaged in a high-altitude , high-stakes game of chicken with China in the Himalayas—a hot-and-cold conflict in which India is increasingly seizing the initiative instead of passively countering China ’ s advances .
The deadly standoff between India and China is possibly the most consequential confrontation in the world right now .
China , with an economy more than four times the size of India ’ s , can afford to gamble @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India must need all the help it can get .
Washington is certainly willing to give it .
Pompeo has sought to tie the conflict to a broader pattern of Chinese expansionism and use it as leverage for nudging India toward greater cooperation with the developed democracies of the Indo-Pacific region .
India , for its part , has cautiously inched forward toward closer security ties with the United States .
India , once the cornerstone of the nonaligned movement , is hedging its bets .
But India , once the cornerstone of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bets .
Although it has ramped up purchases of U.S. military hardware , it has staked the modernization of its air force on French Rafale jets .
It is paying Russia to upgrade and expand its existing fleet of MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft .
And it has asked Russia to expedite delivery of the S-400 air defense system it bought in 2018 in defiance of the threat of U.S. sanctions .
India is also developing increasingly close defense ties with another nonaligned regional giant , Indonesia .
The Quad ’ s viability @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however .
Australia and Japan already operate mainly U.S. military hardware to ensure broad interoperability among their armed forces .
Both also have longtime alliance treaties with the United States and are fully integrated into regional and global security systems centered on the United States .
For the United States , Australia , and Japan , the Quad is superfluous .
It only adds value if it has India .
The main rationale usually offered for including India in the Quad is that it will create a league of democracies straddling the Indo-Pacific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , then at least three of the region ’ s democracies are glaringly absent : South Korea , Taiwan , and New Zealand .
South Korea famously refuses to engage openly in defense cooperation with Japan , citing unresolved issues from the pre-1945 colonial and wartime past .
Taiwan , of course , lacks official diplomatic relations with any of the Quad democracies .
And New Zealand , feeling securely remote in the South Pacific , has effectively divorced itself from the U.S. alliance system while retaining a tenuous membership in the “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Quad is thus in essence a rump group of three Indo-Pacific democracies already working together , plus India .
If they are unable to bind like-minded countries such as South Korea , Taiwan , or even New Zealand to their alignment , how can the trilateral partners possibly hope to form a quasi-alliance with India ?
The only thing Quad diplomacy really has going for it is China ’ s decidedly undiplomatic pressure on India in the Himalayas , in the Indian Ocean , and among nearly all of India ’ s neighbors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Initiative projects in Bangladesh , Myanmar , the Maldives , Nepal , Pakistan , and Sri Lanka .
That ’ s every one of India ’ s neighboring countries except Afghanistan and tiny Bhutan—and Afghanistan only has a border with India via the legal fiction that India still owns all of Kashmir .
The idea of collective security has a fuzzy and familiar feel to it .
If the Quad is all about India , India ’ s participation in it is all about China .
But if that ’ s the case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t need the Quad .
India has every incentive to counter Chinese expansionism in South Asia , with or without a tenuous membership in an ill-defined intergovernmental grouping .
It might do so more effectively with U.S. military hardware , but it can more easily afford Russian equipment .
Of course , the United States would like to develop India as a market for its defense exports .
But if U.S. defense sales to India are the main motivation for pushing the Quad , then Australia and Japan hardly need to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has a fuzzy and familiar feel to it , and NATO stands as the exemplar of an alliance that kept the peace .
But who now remembers the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or puts much stock in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance , aka the Rio Pact ?
Even NATO itself has arguably degenerated into more of a standards-setting organization than a functioning defense pact .
The United States ’ hub-and-spoke security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific , by contrast , have demonstrated the flexibility to shift quickly from facing North Korea to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from multilateral institutional baggage , the United States and its ad hoc allies in the region are able to keep the peace without getting bogged down in unanimity-requiring diplomacy .
The best future for the Quad would be for it to fail peacefully and quietly , unlike the original 2007-2008 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue , which failed spectacularly .
Its main promoter , former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe , resigned in September 2007 ; three months later , Kevin Rudd took office as prime minister in Australia with an agenda to improve ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s unspoken goals .
Rudd promptly took a trip to China , suspended uranium sales to India , condemned Japanese whaling , and disparaged the Quad as “ not something that we are pursuing.
” Lacking a strong commitment from Washington and New Delhi , the first Quad fell apart .
With so little to add to the four countries ’ existing stands against Chinese aggression , the second Quad should learn the lesson of history , issue a noble declaration , declare victory , and disband .

The U.S. pivot to Asia is back and in full swing. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton may own the trademark for the term, but her successor Mike Pompeo made it a reality. Since taking office in April 2018, Pompeo has seized on President Donald Trump’s pledge to work toward a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and put it at the center of the administration’s foreign policy. To promote it, he has revitalized the Quad—originally the 2007-2008 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue but now rebranded as the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations. As a sign of the Quad’s priority, Pompeo will be attending a first-ever dedicated meeting of Quad foreign ministers in Tokyo this week, even after canceling the other legs of his Asia trip due to Trump’s sudden hospitalization for the coronavirus.
The U.S. pivot to Asia is back and in full swing. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton may own the trademark for the term, but her successor Mike Pompeo made it a reality. Since taking office in April 2018, Pompeo has seized on President Donald Trump’s pledge to work toward a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and put it at the center of the administration’s foreign policy. To promote it, he has revitalized the Quad—originally the 2007-2008 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue but now rebranded as the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations. As a sign of the Quad’s priority, Pompeo will be attending a first-ever dedicated meeting of Quad foreign ministers in Tokyo this week, even after canceling the other legs of his Asia trip due to Trump’s sudden hospitalization for the coronavirus.
Many proponents of the Quad consider it a fledgling alliance with the potential to form the nucleus of an “Asian NATO” to contain China. Detractors dismiss the Quad as a false dawn for Indo-Pacific multilateral cooperation. China’s Foreign Ministry views it as an “anti-China front line,” and it’s probably right. Although the United States’ partners in the Quad have been careful not to say so, Pompeo admitted as much last year when he said the grouping would play a key role in “ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world.” Yet it is not at all clear that Australia, India, and Japan actually want or need the Quad to put a check on China. Even more importantly, the United States might be better off without the Quad, too.
Each of the four members of the Quad is, in its own way, already pushing back on China. The United States, of course, has its trade war with China, which has morphed into a tech war and now encompasses a wide spectrum of U.S. economic sanctions. Japan has begun converting two existing ships into aircraft carriers in a bid to counter China’s naval expansion, and its Defense Ministry has requested another record budget. Australia’s government has announced a raft of legislation to curb foreign influence that is clearly (though unofficially) targeted at China. And India is actively engaged in a high-altitude, high-stakes game of chicken with China in the Himalayas—a hot-and-cold conflict in which India is increasingly seizing the initiative instead of passively countering China’s advances.
The deadly standoff between India and China is possibly the most consequential confrontation in the world right now. China, with an economy more than four times the size of India’s, can afford to gamble, and it would seem as if India must need all the help it can get. Washington is certainly willing to give it. Pompeo has sought to tie the conflict to a broader pattern of Chinese expansionism and use it as leverage for nudging India toward greater cooperation with the developed democracies of the Indo-Pacific region. India, for its part, has cautiously inched forward toward closer security ties with the United States.
India, once the cornerstone of the nonaligned movement, is hedging its bets.
But India, once the cornerstone of the nonaligned movement, is hedging its bets. Although it has ramped up purchases of U.S. military hardware, it has staked the modernization of its air force on French Rafale jets. It is paying Russia to upgrade and expand its existing fleet of MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft. And it has asked Russia to expedite delivery of the S-400 air defense system it bought in 2018 in defiance of the threat of U.S. sanctions. India is also developing increasingly close defense ties with another nonaligned regional giant, Indonesia.
The Quad’s viability hinges on India’s participation, however. Australia and Japan already operate mainly U.S. military hardware to ensure broad interoperability among their armed forces. Both also have longtime alliance treaties with the United States and are fully integrated into regional and global security systems centered on the United States. For the United States, Australia, and Japan, the Quad is superfluous. It only adds value if it has India.
The main rationale usually offered for including India in the Quad is that it will create a league of democracies straddling the Indo-Pacific region. If that is the goal, then at least three of the region’s democracies are glaringly absent: South Korea, Taiwan, and New Zealand. South Korea famously refuses to engage openly in defense cooperation with Japan, citing unresolved issues from the pre-1945 colonial and wartime past. Taiwan, of course, lacks official diplomatic relations with any of the Quad democracies. And New Zealand, feeling securely remote in the South Pacific, has effectively divorced itself from the U.S. alliance system while retaining a tenuous membership in the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network.
The Quad is thus in essence a rump group of three Indo-Pacific democracies already working together, plus India. If they are unable to bind like-minded countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, or even New Zealand to their alignment, how can the trilateral partners possibly hope to form a quasi-alliance with India? The only thing Quad diplomacy really has going for it is China’s decidedly undiplomatic pressure on India in the Himalayas, in the Indian Ocean, and among nearly all of India’s neighbors. China has undertaken Belt and Road Initiative projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. That’s every one of India’s neighboring countries except Afghanistan and tiny Bhutan—and Afghanistan only has a border with India via the legal fiction that India still owns all of Kashmir.
The idea of collective security has a fuzzy and familiar feel to it.
If the Quad is all about India, India’s participation in it is all about China. But if that’s the case, a free and open Indo-Pacific doesn’t need the Quad. India has every incentive to counter Chinese expansionism in South Asia, with or without a tenuous membership in an ill-defined intergovernmental grouping. It might do so more effectively with U.S. military hardware, but it can more easily afford Russian equipment. Of course, the United States would like to develop India as a market for its defense exports. But if U.S. defense sales to India are the main motivation for pushing the Quad, then Australia and Japan hardly need to be involved.
The idea of collective security has a fuzzy and familiar feel to it, and NATO stands as the exemplar of an alliance that kept the peace. But who now remembers the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or puts much stock in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, aka the Rio Pact? Even NATO itself has arguably degenerated into more of a standards-setting organization than a functioning defense pact. The United States’ hub-and-spoke security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific, by contrast, have demonstrated the flexibility to shift quickly from facing North Korea to the Soviet Union to China. Free from multilateral institutional baggage, the United States and its ad hoc allies in the region are able to keep the peace without getting bogged down in unanimity-requiring diplomacy.
The best future for the Quad would be for it to fail peacefully and quietly, unlike the original 2007-2008 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which failed spectacularly. Its main promoter, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, resigned in September 2007; three months later, Kevin Rudd took office as prime minister in Australia with an agenda to improve ties with China, undermining the Quad’s unspoken goals. Rudd promptly took a trip to China, suspended uranium sales to India, condemned Japanese whaling, and disparaged the Quad as “not something that we are pursuing.” Lacking a strong commitment from Washington and New Delhi, the first Quad fell apart. With so little to add to the four countries’ existing stands against Chinese aggression, the second Quad should learn the lesson of history, issue a noble declaration, declare victory, and disband.