foreignpolicy--2020-05-23--Why We Should Worry About China and India’s Border Skirmishes

Why We Should Worry About China and India ’ s Border Skirmishes Tensions between India and China are not new .
The two countries—which share the world ’ s longest unmarked border—fought a full-fledged war in 1962 and have since engaged in several small skirmishes .
Not since 1975 has a bullet been fired across their shared border .
As a result , the theory that Sino-Indian clashes are flashes in the pan and unlikely to lead to more extensive fighting has become a widely held consensus .
Recent events , however , suggest that escalations are highly possible .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mostly disputed border .
And for more than a decade , the People ’ s Liberation Army ( PLA ) has been testing India ’ s military readiness and political resolve along several strategic areas .
Peace can no longer be taken for granted .
The most recent clashes took place earlier this month .
On May 5 , Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed near the Pangong Tso lake in Ladakh .
It is believed that the skirmish took place because the PLA had objected to Indian military patrols in the area @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from differing assessments of the location of the so-called Line of Actual Control—the de facto international border .
And then on May 9 , at an altitude of 15,000 feet , in the Naku La region near Tibet , soldiers from both sides came to blows and threw stones at each other mostly in efforts to induce the Indian troops to move back from the areas they were patrolling .
No arms were used but several dozen soldiers were injured , including a senior Indian officer who was required to be airlifted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government , the Chinese military crossed into Indian territory 1,025 times between 2016 and 2018 .
Given that China and India ’ s borders remain unmarked , such transgressions are likely rooted in how Beijing and New Delhi have different perceptions about the extent of their territories .
After a long period of relative quiet along the Sino-Indian border , militarized incidents have come to the fore again .
In 2017 , when Indian and Chinese troops faced off for two months in Doklam , an area claimed by both Bhutan and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ distinct possibility .
While that particular crisis abated , it is perhaps instructive to see the standoff not as an aberration but as part of a new phase in relations between the two countries .
The old phase dates back to 1988 , a year after a military skirmish between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh , when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited his counterpart Deng Xiaoping in Beijing to mend ties .
The two leaders agreed to establish a forward-looking relationship even as important issues such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aside .
The reason for this pragmatism was rooted in economic and strategic factors : Both China and India needed a stable external environment to promote domestic economic development .
China was already a decade into the dramatic economic reforms that Deng had initiated , while Gandhi ’ s India had also embarked on a similar path , albeit hesitantly.After a long period of relative quiet along the Sino-Indian border , militarized incidents have come to the fore again The 1988 compromise between India and China , helped in part by New Delhi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tibet , was driven by the fact that the two countries were near equals on the world stage .
According to the World Bank , India ’ s gross domestic product was $ 297 billion compared with China ’ s $ 312 billion that year , while India ’ s defense spending , at $ 10.6 billion , was also close to the Chinese allocation of $ 11.4 billion .
The material balance of power between China and India has dramatically changed since then .
At $ 13.6 trillion in 2018 , China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ five times India ’ s $ 2.7 trillion .
Similarly , China spent $ 261.1 billion on defense expenditure in 2019 , almost four times India ’ s total of $ 71.1 billion .
While India has risen as an economy and a global power in the past three decades , its relative strength to China has in fact greatly declined .
A new economic dynamic means that the underlying bedrock of the Gandhi-Deng bargain—of similar means and goals—is fizzling out .
Although it remains unclear when exactly the understanding between New Delhi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 2008 global financial crisis—China has become far more assertive in its foreign affairs in recent years , from artificial-island-building activities in the South China Sea to its muscular diplomacy amid the coronavirus pandemic .
Indeed , some scholars have argued that an impending power transition is underway between China and the United States , the current global hegemon .
While New Delhi has also become a more assertive player in global politics its rise has not been of much concern to the United States .
China and India ’ s recent border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of these changing power dynamics .
The Gandhi-Deng bargain paved the way for a number of border management agreements ( including the 1993 and 1996 agreements related to confidence-building measures and the 2005 agreement on the political parameters guiding boundary negotiations ) .
More recently , high-profile summits between the two countries ’ top leaders—in Wuhan and in Mamallapuram—have played an important role in managing the overall relationship .
However , even as the 1988 deal allowed relative tranquility along their border and promoted commercial links between China and India , none of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolved .
China and India find themselves in an “ extraordinarily complex relationship , ” according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar , India ’ s foreign minister .
In addition to the border dispute , some of the core issues in the Sino-Indian rivalry include Tibet ( the presence of the Dalai Lama , the Tibetan government-in-exile , and tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles in India ) , the burgeoning China-Pakistan partnership , and the two countries ’ overlapping spheres of influence in Asia .
These issues have become more salient in the context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asymmetric rising power.While India has risen as an economy and a global power in the past three decades , its relative strength to China has in fact greatly declined China and India ’ s material capabilities remain in flux ; China continues to outstrip India along most axes of power even as New Delhi seeks to boost its own capabilities .
According to the World Bank , India recorded higher growth rates than China every year between 2014 and 2018 .
While the long-term economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic remains unclear , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faster growth rates mean that it has the potential to narrow its power gap with China—at least in the long term .
In other words , India is the only major power that is rising with respect to China—even as China grows faster than other major powers such as Japan and the United States .
In addition to accruing power domestically , India is also building strong strategic partnerships with China ’ s other rivals , especially the United States and Japan .
Meanwhile , a rising China has stabilized its northern borders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States ’ primacy in the East Asian maritime commons through the modernization of its military and its push to build islands .
This basically leaves only one border issue with a rival unresolved : namely , the Sino-Indian border .
It is hardly surprising that it is exerting periodic pressure on India along this front—a trend that is only likely to escalate .
As China and India continue with their ascent , China will increasingly see India as an impertinent rival unwilling to settle the border dispute on terms favorable to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ global trading system ( through tariffs and restrictions on investments ) , as well as a trend of rising nationalism around the world , will further test Sino-Indian relations because trade negotiations are likely to become more fraught and contentious .
Indeed , given that Beijing sees New Delhi as the principal impediment to the realization of its ambitions to dominate Asia , a more violent clash along the volatile , poorly demarcated Sino-Indian border is highly likely .
Unless China emerges as the dominant power in South Asia ( and the Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remain a regional power in East Asia .
Put another way , China ’ s quest for pan-Asian dominance will intensify the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry as India itself is seeking primacy—but not hegemony—in southern Asia .
To avert a conflict spiral India will need to pursue a multifaceted strategy which will need to include cooperative elements such as summit diplomacy and working together in international institutions such the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation , the New Development Bank , and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank .
But while these cooperative endeavors could forestall more border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outstanding issues in Sino-Indian relations .
Short of making significant territorial concessions , there is little that India can do to assuage the underlying sources of the rivalry .

Tensions between India and China are not new. The two countries—which share the world’s longest unmarked border—fought a full-fledged war in 1962 and have since engaged in several small skirmishes. Not since 1975 has a bullet been fired across their shared border. As a result, the theory that Sino-Indian clashes are flashes in the pan and unlikely to lead to more extensive fighting has become a widely held consensus. Recent events, however, suggest that escalations are highly possible. Both sides have substantial—and growing—military deployments along a mostly disputed border. And for more than a decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been testing India’s military readiness and political resolve along several strategic areas. Peace can no longer be taken for granted.
Tensions between India and China are not new. The two countries—which share the world’s longest unmarked border—fought a full-fledged war in 1962 and have since engaged in several small skirmishes. Not since 1975 has a bullet been fired across their shared border. As a result, the theory that Sino-Indian clashes are flashes in the pan and unlikely to lead to more extensive fighting has become a widely held consensus. Recent events, however, suggest that escalations are highly possible. Both sides have substantial—and growing—military deployments along a mostly disputed border. And for more than a decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been testing India’s military readiness and political resolve along several strategic areas. Peace can no longer be taken for granted.
The most recent clashes took place earlier this month. On May 5, Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed near the Pangong Tso lake in Ladakh. It is believed that the skirmish took place because the PLA had objected to Indian military patrols in the area. Most of these clashes apparently stem from differing assessments of the location of the so-called Line of Actual Control—the de facto international border. And then on May 9, at an altitude of 15,000 feet, in the Naku La region near Tibet, soldiers from both sides came to blows and threw stones at each other mostly in efforts to induce the Indian troops to move back from the areas they were patrolling. No arms were used but several dozen soldiers were injured, including a senior Indian officer who was required to be airlifted to a hospital.
After a long period of relative quiet along the Sino-Indian border, militarized incidents have come to the fore again. According to the Indian government, the Chinese military crossed into Indian territory 1,025 times between 2016 and 2018. Given that China and India’s borders remain unmarked, such transgressions are likely rooted in how Beijing and New Delhi have different perceptions about the extent of their territories.
In 2017, when Indian and Chinese troops faced off for two months in Doklam, an area claimed by both Bhutan and China, a serious military clash was a distinct possibility. While that particular crisis abated, it is perhaps instructive to see the standoff not as an aberration but as part of a new phase in relations between the two countries. The old phase dates back to 1988, a year after a military skirmish between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh, when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited his counterpart Deng Xiaoping in Beijing to mend ties. The two leaders agreed to establish a forward-looking relationship even as important issues such as the border dispute were temporarily set aside. The reason for this pragmatism was rooted in economic and strategic factors: Both China and India needed a stable external environment to promote domestic economic development. China was already a decade into the dramatic economic reforms that Deng had initiated, while Gandhi’s India had also embarked on a similar path, albeit hesitantly.After a long period of relative quiet along the Sino-Indian border, militarized incidents have come to the fore again
The 1988 compromise between India and China, helped in part by New Delhi’s studious silence on developments within Tibet, was driven by the fact that the two countries were near equals on the world stage. According to the World Bank, India’s gross domestic product was $297 billion compared with China’s $312 billion that year, while India’s defense spending, at $10.6 billion, was also close to the Chinese allocation of $11.4 billion.
The material balance of power between China and India has dramatically changed since then. At $13.6 trillion in 2018, China’s GDP is now more than five times India’s $2.7 trillion. Similarly, China spent $261.1 billion on defense expenditure in 2019, almost four times India’s total of $71.1 billion. While India has risen as an economy and a global power in the past three decades, its relative strength to China has in fact greatly declined.
A new economic dynamic means that the underlying bedrock of the Gandhi-Deng bargain—of similar means and goals—is fizzling out. Although it remains unclear when exactly the understanding between New Delhi and Beijing began to fade—most likely after the 2008 global financial crisis—China has become far more assertive in its foreign affairs in recent years, from artificial-island-building activities in the South China Sea to its muscular diplomacy amid the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, some scholars have argued that an impending power transition is underway between China and the United States, the current global hegemon. While New Delhi has also become a more assertive player in global politics its rise has not been of much concern to the United States.
China and India’s recent border clashes look increasingly worrying in the context of these changing power dynamics. The Gandhi-Deng bargain paved the way for a number of border management agreements (including the 1993 and 1996 agreements related to confidence-building measures and the 2005 agreement on the political parameters guiding boundary negotiations). More recently, high-profile summits between the two countries’ top leaders—in Wuhan and in Mamallapuram—have played an important role in managing the overall relationship. However, even as the 1988 deal allowed relative tranquility along their border and promoted commercial links between China and India, none of their outstanding issues—including the border dispute—were actually resolved.
China and India find themselves in an “extraordinarily complex relationship,” according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister. In addition to the border dispute, some of the core issues in the Sino-Indian rivalry include Tibet (the presence of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile, and tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles in India), the burgeoning China-Pakistan partnership, and the two countries’ overlapping spheres of influence in Asia. These issues have become more salient in the context of the two countries’ simultaneous but asymmetric rising power.While India has risen as an economy and a global power in the past three decades, its relative strength to China has in fact greatly declined
China and India’s material capabilities remain in flux; China continues to outstrip India along most axes of power even as New Delhi seeks to boost its own capabilities. According to the World Bank, India recorded higher growth rates than China every year between 2014 and 2018. While the long-term economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic remains unclear, India’s smaller economy and marginally faster growth rates mean that it has the potential to narrow its power gap with China—at least in the long term. In other words, India is the only major power that is rising with respect to China—even as China grows faster than other major powers such as Japan and the United States.
In addition to accruing power domestically, India is also building strong strategic partnerships with China’s other rivals, especially the United States and Japan. Meanwhile, a rising China has stabilized its northern borders with Russia and is working to undermine the United States’ primacy in the East Asian maritime commons through the modernization of its military and its push to build islands. This basically leaves only one border issue with a rival unresolved: namely, the Sino-Indian border. It is hardly surprising that it is exerting periodic pressure on India along this front—a trend that is only likely to escalate.
As China and India continue with their ascent, China will increasingly see India as an impertinent rival unwilling to settle the border dispute on terms favorable to China. The ongoing fragmentation of the global trading system (through tariffs and restrictions on investments), as well as a trend of rising nationalism around the world, will further test Sino-Indian relations because trade negotiations are likely to become more fraught and contentious. Indeed, given that Beijing sees New Delhi as the principal impediment to the realization of its ambitions to dominate Asia, a more violent clash along the volatile, poorly demarcated Sino-Indian border is highly likely. Unless China emerges as the dominant power in South Asia (and the Indian Ocean), China is likely to remain a regional power in East Asia. Put another way, China’s quest for pan-Asian dominance will intensify the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry as India itself is seeking primacy—but not hegemony—in southern Asia.
To avert a conflict spiral India will need to pursue a multifaceted strategy which will need to include cooperative elements such as summit diplomacy and working together in international institutions such the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. But while these cooperative endeavors could forestall more border violence, they will not address core outstanding issues in Sino-Indian relations. Short of making significant territorial concessions, there is little that India can do to assuage the underlying sources of the rivalry.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-23--Why the White House Should Propose More Economic Stimulus

Why the White House Should Propose More Economic Stimulus U.S. economic officials now face the fog , if not of war itself , then at least of something like it .
President Donald Trump has declared a “ big war ” on the coronavirus .
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has spoken of an “ unusual , new kind of uncertainty added on top of our regular uncertainty.
” Amid today ’ s fog , familiar winds of debate howl about the size and speed of economic stimulus legislation .
Some people , favoring action , argue that additional spending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recovery .
Others worry about raising budget deficits or inflation .
In normal times , in a normal downturn , familiar principles of economics would apply .
But these times are not normal .
Nor is this downturn .
Familiar principles of economic policy may now lead U.S. officials dangerously astray .
Economists have analyzed the implications of “ true uncertainty ” ever since the University of Chicago ’ s Frank Knight first distinguished it from what we know as calculable risk in 1921 .
A rich body of research about decision-making in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Economists—including those who , like myself , have served in the Trump administration—continue to make its acquaintance .
In normal times , in a normal downturn , familiar principles of economics would apply .
But these times are not normal.Principles for decision-making under uncertain circumstances rather than traditional macroeconomics should now guide the response of U.S. economic officials to the coronavirus contraction .
In the unprecedented circumstance of unemployment rising to the highest rates in living memory , businesses and entire sectors shutting down , and no real timeline for activity to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a perfect solution becomes futile—and should be abandoned .
To err , one way or another , is now inevitable .
And so officials should base decisions on the likely ramifications of one type of error versus another , steering the ship of state away from the graver dangers .
Amid the haze , this new calculus of navigation shines a light on the right course of action : erring towards more rather than less stimulus , and sooner rather than later .
To err in the direction of inaction now is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Focusing on action risks the limited downsides of higher budget deficits and inflation .
The White House can embrace this approach while disagreeing , strenuously , with the contents of the draft stimulus legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives .
There is even a political opportunity for Trump by offering a bailout of Main Street to contrast with the Wall Street bailouts during the last financial crisis in 2008 .
There are likely staggering human costs of a tepid , prolonged recovery that resembles the Nike “ swoosh ” logo—with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , quick , V-shaped recovery .
According to one set of estimates , a U.S. recovery that ends in 2029 rather than 2023 may come with as many as 110,000 more deaths from suicide , alcoholism , and drug abuse .
Based on these estimates , even a modest raising of the rate of recovery towards a V-ending in 2023 would avert tragedy for thousands .
While the mechanisms are poorly understood , unemployment appears also to raise rates of ailments such as cancer and heart attacks .
A deeper recession would also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last .
People who live through temporary bouts of high unemployment tend to spend less—forever—as beliefs that influence spending habits permanently change .
Coronavirus is already attacking the mind of the U.S. consumer : Even long-term economic expectations are in free fall .
And negative shifts in belief dampen spending regardless of future incomes .
Deeper downturns displace more workers , whose permanent income losses infect even their children ’ s future selves .
A lengthier recovery also hurts a generation of college graduates , reducing their incomes .
Worse , these reductions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that exacerbate existing inequalities .
The legacy of a longer recovery and deeper recession would be a U.S. economy with a tapestry of scars on its consumers .
The downside risks on the supply side of the economy are no less grim than on the demand side .
As Neil Irwin of the New York Times pointed out , every business embodies a complex web of relationships—between customers and brands , suppliers and purchasers , employers and employees—that can be rebuilt only with time , if at all .
The full extent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the legendary Manhattan bar where Hamilton writer Lin Manuel-Miranda once serenaded a stranger , for instance , is unlikely to ever be filled .
The novel coronavirus may even produce a novel economic pathology that eliminates a typical upside of downturns—that of eliminating inefficient businesses .
The unusual nature of the pandemic-induced shutdown could instead lead to the end of otherwise successful businesses and models .
The downsides of inaction , then , include thousands of lives lost alongside structural damage to both the demand and supply sides of the U.S. economy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ budget deficits that would accompany any new stimulus are likely lower than at any point since 1945 .
Budget deficits decrease the net wealth of the United States when foreign buyers purchase the U.S. Treasury debt that funds them .
But the Federal Reserve is poised to buy new U.S. Treasury debt on a scale unseen since World War II .
The profits on the Federal Reserve ’ s bond portfolio , including U.S. Treasury bonds , are remitted back to the U.S. Treasury .
If past wartime experience is any precedent , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ onto the bonds from birth until they mature and die.If past wartime experience is any precedent , the U.S. central bank will hold onto bonds from birth until they mature and die .
An expansion of the central bank ’ s balance sheet , in principle , risks accelerating inflation in the United States by printing money .
As the U.S. economy officially experiences a bout of deflation , however , bond markets imply average inflation of slightly more than 1 percent over the next 10 years —less than half of the 2 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ An acceleration of inflation beyond 2 percent may therefore not even be a problem .
Yes , a return to rates of inflation unseen since the 1980s would come with serious side effects that harm some Americans , such as retirees who rely on savings , more than others .
But a flip side of the United States ’ persistent trade deficits is that foreigners hold many of the claims on future U.S. income—the U.S. equity and debt investments—that would bear much of inflation ’ s burden .
The U.S. dollar ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even mitigate the losses of foreign investment that often accompany bouts of inflation .
To be sure , debt issuance is never cost-free .
The U.S. Treasury likely needs to raise future tax rates to fund additional debt payments , lowering household incomes in the future .
But future households would also benefit from the higher incomes that would accompany the avoidance of permanent scars to the U.S. economy .
As Powell recently underscored , deficits are never free—but they are now worth the cost .
White House officials , for their part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach .
But the approach is no escape from today ’ s “ unusual , new kind of uncertainty.
” And it comes with perils of its own .
By the time quarterly computation-based macroeconomic data such as gross domestic product indicate a downturn in economic activity , it will be too late to start preparing a new round of stimulus .
Monthly , survey-based data such as the U.S. jobs report come with ambiguities that complicate their real-time interpretation .
According to the latest data , 4 out of 5 laid-off U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maybe their perception was right .
A data-dependent approach is not wrong in principle .
Like any other approach , however , it should come with a bias toward action , along with an acute awareness of the limits of even the best possible economic data .
The White House would be wise to use the respite of a brief wait-and-see period to , if anything , develop its own vision for what new stimulus legislation should contain .
It need not be filled with what ’ s in the draft legislation from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes tax breaks that would largely benefit high-income individuals and mentions “ cannabis ” 68 times .
The time could be used , for instance , to develop mechanisms that address concerns about bailing out U.S. state governments with profligacy that predates the crisis .
More broadly , the coming debate over new stimulus legislation offers Trump an opportunity to put forth a vision of a bailout for Main Street .
His likely opponent in the upcoming 2020 presidential election cycle , former Vice President Joe Biden , negotiated bailouts for Wall Street @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Uncertainty may fog the view U.S. officials have into the future state of the economy .
But it does not necessarily block the view of the best course of action .
In one direction lies the potential for catastrophic human and economic scars .
In the other are downsides that have rarely ever been so muted , and a political opportunity the White House would be wise to seize .

U.S. economic officials now face the fog, if not of war itself, then at least of something like it. President Donald Trump has declared a “big war” on the coronavirus. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has spoken of an “unusual, new kind of uncertainty added on top of our regular uncertainty.”
U.S. economic officials now face the fog, if not of war itself, then at least of something like it. President Donald Trump has declared a “big war” on the coronavirus. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has spoken of an “unusual, new kind of uncertainty added on top of our regular uncertainty.”
Amid today’s fog, familiar winds of debate howl about the size and speed of economic stimulus legislation. Some people, favoring action, argue that additional spending would avert a deeper downturn and prolonged recovery. Others worry about raising budget deficits or inflation. In normal times, in a normal downturn, familiar principles of economics would apply. But these times are not normal. Nor is this downturn. Familiar principles of economic policy may now lead U.S. officials dangerously astray.
Economists have analyzed the implications of “true uncertainty” ever since the University of Chicago’s Frank Knight first distinguished it from what we know as calculable risk in 1921. A rich body of research about decision-making in the presence of uncertainty has since developed. Economists—including those who, like myself, have served in the Trump administration—continue to make its acquaintance.
In normal times, in a normal downturn, familiar principles of economics would apply. But these times are not normal.Principles for decision-making under uncertain circumstances rather than traditional macroeconomics should now guide the response of U.S. economic officials to the coronavirus contraction. In the unprecedented circumstance of unemployment rising to the highest rates in living memory, businesses and entire sectors shutting down, and no real timeline for activity to return to normal, the pursuit of a perfect solution becomes futile—and should be abandoned. To err, one way or another, is now inevitable. And so officials should base decisions on the likely ramifications of one type of error versus another, steering the ship of state away from the graver dangers.
Amid the haze, this new calculus of navigation shines a light on the right course of action: erring towards more rather than less stimulus, and sooner rather than later. To err in the direction of inaction now is to risk irreversible human and economic catastrophe. Focusing on action risks the limited downsides of higher budget deficits and inflation. The White House can embrace this approach while disagreeing, strenuously, with the contents of the draft stimulus legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives. There is even a political opportunity for Trump by offering a bailout of Main Street to contrast with the Wall Street bailouts during the last financial crisis in 2008.
There are likely staggering human costs of a tepid, prolonged recovery that resembles the Nike “swoosh” logo—with its long right-hand side—rather than a relatively robust, quick, V-shaped recovery. According to one set of estimates, a U.S. recovery that ends in 2029 rather than 2023 may come with as many as 110,000 more deaths from suicide, alcoholism, and drug abuse. Based on these estimates, even a modest raising of the rate of recovery towards a V-ending in 2023 would avert tragedy for thousands. While the mechanisms are poorly understood, unemployment appears also to raise rates of ailments such as cancer and heart attacks.
A deeper recession would also scar U.S. consumers. And those scars last. People who live through temporary bouts of high unemployment tend to spend less—forever—as beliefs that influence spending habits permanently change. Coronavirus is already attacking the mind of the U.S. consumer: Even long-term economic expectations are in free fall. And negative shifts in belief dampen spending regardless of future incomes. Deeper downturns displace more workers, whose permanent income losses infect even their children’s future selves. A lengthier recovery also hurts a generation of college graduates, reducing their incomes. Worse, these reductions in income tend to manifest in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities. The legacy of a longer recovery and deeper recession would be a U.S. economy with a tapestry of scars on its consumers.
The downside risks on the supply side of the economy are no less grim than on the demand side. As Neil Irwin of the New York Times pointed out, every business embodies a complex web of relationships—between customers and brands, suppliers and purchasers, employers and employees—that can be rebuilt only with time, if at all. The full extent of the void left by the closure of the legendary Manhattan bar where Hamilton writer Lin Manuel-Miranda once serenaded a stranger, for instance, is unlikely to ever be filled.
The novel coronavirus may even produce a novel economic pathology that eliminates a typical upside of downturns—that of eliminating inefficient businesses. The unusual nature of the pandemic-induced shutdown could instead lead to the end of otherwise successful businesses and models.
The downsides of inaction, then, include thousands of lives lost alongside structural damage to both the demand and supply sides of the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, the costs of higher federal budget deficits that would accompany any new stimulus are likely lower than at any point since 1945. Budget deficits decrease the net wealth of the United States when foreign buyers purchase the U.S. Treasury debt that funds them. But the Federal Reserve is poised to buy new U.S. Treasury debt on a scale unseen since World War II. The profits on the Federal Reserve’s bond portfolio, including U.S. Treasury bonds, are remitted back to the U.S. Treasury. If past wartime experience is any precedent, the U.S. central bank will then hold onto the bonds from birth until they mature and die.If past wartime experience is any precedent, the U.S. central bank will hold onto bonds from birth until they mature and die.
An expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet, in principle, risks accelerating inflation in the United States by printing money. As the U.S. economy officially experiences a bout of deflation, however, bond markets imply average inflation of slightly more than 1 percent over the next 10 years —less than half of the 2 percent target of the Federal Reserve. An acceleration of inflation beyond 2 percent may therefore not even be a problem. Yes, a return to rates of inflation unseen since the 1980s would come with serious side effects that harm some Americans, such as retirees who rely on savings, more than others. But a flip side of the United States’ persistent trade deficits is that foreigners hold many of the claims on future U.S. income—the U.S. equity and debt investments—that would bear much of inflation’s burden. The U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve currency may even mitigate the losses of foreign investment that often accompany bouts of inflation. To be sure, debt issuance is never cost-free. The U.S. Treasury likely needs to raise future tax rates to fund additional debt payments, lowering household incomes in the future. But future households would also benefit from the higher incomes that would accompany the avoidance of permanent scars to the U.S. economy. As Powell recently underscored, deficits are never free—but they are now worth the cost.
White House officials, for their part, have indicated a data-dependent, wait-and-see approach. But the approach is no escape from today’s “unusual, new kind of uncertainty.” And it comes with perils of its own. By the time quarterly computation-based macroeconomic data such as gross domestic product indicate a downturn in economic activity, it will be too late to start preparing a new round of stimulus. Monthly, survey-based data such as the U.S. jobs report come with ambiguities that complicate their real-time interpretation. According to the latest data, 4 out of 5 laid-off U.S. workers perceive their layoff as temporary. Maybe their perception was right. A data-dependent approach is not wrong in principle. Like any other approach, however, it should come with a bias toward action, along with an acute awareness of the limits of even the best possible economic data.
The White House would be wise to use the respite of a brief wait-and-see period to, if anything, develop its own vision for what new stimulus legislation should contain. It need not be filled with what’s in the draft legislation from the U.S. House of Representatives, which includes tax breaks that would largely benefit high-income individuals and mentions “cannabis” 68 times. The time could be used, for instance, to develop mechanisms that address concerns about bailing out U.S. state governments with profligacy that predates the crisis. More broadly, the coming debate over new stimulus legislation offers Trump an opportunity to put forth a vision of a bailout for Main Street. His likely opponent in the upcoming 2020 presidential election cycle, former Vice President Joe Biden, negotiated bailouts for Wall Street firms and the automobile industry in 2009.
Uncertainty may fog the view U.S. officials have into the future state of the economy. But it does not necessarily block the view of the best course of action. In one direction lies the potential for catastrophic human and economic scars. In the other are downsides that have rarely ever been so muted, and a political opportunity the White House would be wise to seize.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-25--U.S. Falters in Bid to Replace Chinese Rare Earths

U.S. Falters in Bid to Replace Chinese Rare Earths Rising tensions with China and the race to repatriate supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have given fresh impetus to U.S. efforts to launch a renaissance in rare earths , the critical minerals at the heart of high technology , clean energy , and especially high-end U.S. defense platforms .
But it ’ s not going well , despite a slew of new bills and government initiatives aimed at rebuilding a soup-to-nuts rare-earth supply chain in the United States that would , after decades of growing reliance on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. self-reliance in a vital sector .
“ I think the light bulb has gone on , but we are still in a muddle about exactly what to do about it , ” said David Hammond , an expert on rare earths at Hammond International Group , a consultancy .
The problem is that , despite years of steadily increasing efforts under the Trump administration , the United States—both the public and private sectors—has yet to figure out how to redress the fundamental vulnerabilities in its critical materials supply chain , and America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ full gamut of rare-earth mining , processing , and refining capabilities it needs if it seeks to wean itself off foreign suppliers .
This month , Texas Republican Sen. Ted Cruz became the latest lawmaker to introduce legislation meant to jump-start a domestic rare-earth industry by offering juicy tax breaks for new projects—and especially large tax incentives for end consumers who source finished products from American suppliers .
Other lawmakers , like Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska , have pushed legislation of their own meant to spur U.S. development of rare earths .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is trying to throw money at the problem , putting rare earths at the center of the annual defense acquisition bill three years in a row , with plans this year to massively increase existing Pentagon funding for rare-earth projects .
All that comes after a drumbeat of Trump administration moves , from a 2017 executive order seeking to ensure supplies of critical minerals to a 2019 Commerce Department report suggesting ways to do so .
“ It ’ s ripe for legislation , ” said an advisor to Cruz , who says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ products will percolate back up the supply chain and rejuvenate a U.S. industry that has basically evaporated since its world-leading days three decades ago .
The drive to decouple from China has been thrown into overdrive by the coronavirus pandemic and new calls from hawks in Washington to take a tougher approach to confronting Beijing ’ s rise as a global rival .
Sen. Josh Hawley , a Missouri Republican , took to the Senate floor this week to rail against China ’ s economic imperialism and called for the United States to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a brand-new global economic order .
Other lawmakers and Trump administration officials , starting with the president , are also increasingly leery of maintaining the kind of deep economic integration with China that has marked the last two decades .
“ There ’ s this confluence of factors that really provided added momentum to the discussions on the Hill concerning security of supply [ of rare earths ] , ” said Jane Nakano , a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
“ It went on before COVID , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of COVID.
” Gaining independence on rare earths has been the subject of on-again , off-again debates in U.S. defense circles since 2010 , when China , the world ’ s leading supplier , briefly halted rare-earth exports during a dispute with Japan .
If there ’ s so much urgency about building a U.S. supply chain , it ’ s not to make the materials needed for the next generation of smartphones , electric car batteries , or wind turbines—though all those things need high-end rare-earth products .
Rather , the Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reliant on precision-crafted rare-earth products and materials whose manufacture now is largely in the hands of China .
Each F-35 fighter , for instance , needs 920 pounds of rare earths ; each Virginia-class nuclear submarine requires 9,200 pounds .
Tomahawk missiles , guidance systems , and jet engines all need different combinations of alloys and specialized products using some of the 17 different rare-earth elements .
If lawmakers , the Pentagon , and the White House are all now taking the rare-earth challenge seriously , why do they seem to be making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Part of the problem is that a lot of the efforts so far , both in private sector and those with government funding , have focused simply on getting more rare-earth ores out of the ground in the United States .
There are new rare-earth mines in different stages of early development in Alaska , Wyoming , and Texas , in addition to expansion underway at the one existing mine at Mountain Pass , California .
Another potential factor is the growing realization that China can ’ t continue to dominate the rare-earth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because of any legislation coming out of Washington that outmaneuvers Beijing but simply because China is taking steps to limit its breakneck production of the minerals , the mining of which leads to massive environmental damage .
“ China has in its campaign to dominate the world splurged all its rare earths at bargain basement prices and has now ended up as a net importer of heavy rare earths , ” said Christopher Eccleston , a mining strategist at the London-based financial advisory firm Hallgarten & Company .
“ It ’ s really @ @ @ @ @ @ @ study , Hallgarten projected that China would mine less than 50 percent of the world ’ s rare earths , compared with about 75 percent today , by the mid-2020s as it tightens restrictions on extracting its diminishing supplies .
Still , the critical bottleneck for the United States , and especially the defense sector , isn ’ t access to rare-earth ores , which are available from many countries all over the world , including deposits in Vietnam , Brazil , India , Australia , Canada , and Greenland .
Rather , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the value chain—processing those ores , refining them into metals , and turning that metal into advanced products like permanent magnets—is dominated by China .
“ People get caught up on the resource end , and they don ’ t realize that China owns the metals and will continue to own that space , ” said James Kennedy , the founder of ThREE Consulting , a rare-earth consultancy focused on security implications .
Some of the latest initiatives do seek to address part of those vulnerabilities , though even those measures have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would provide funding to both the project at Mountain Pass and for Australian firm Lynas to build processing facilities .
But now both those programs appear to be on hold : Reuters reported that the Pentagon is halting the funding of those rare earth projects pending further investigation .
It ’ s not clear if the holdup is due to the realization that Mountain Pass has minority Chinese ownership ( and a Chinese monopoly on the mine ’ s output ) or if the retreat is due to the realization that neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind of heavy rare earths the military needs .
So far , all the steps taken fall short of rebuilding the full , mine-to-magnet kind of value chain that would be needed to ensure U.S. self-reliance of the critical materials .
“ In the end , it does not matter how many rare-earth mines the United States opens .
It does not matter if they are upgraded to produce mixed or separated oxides , ” Kennedy said .
“ Nothing matters until we figure out how to overcome China ’ s control over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plans—like Cruz ’ s new bill—do try to nudge the development of more domestic capacity at the high end of the value chain , by incentivizing manufacturers to use magnets and other advanced products made in the United States .
But using traditional tools like tax credits to fix a problem caused by China ’ s state-mandated dominance of an entire industry is likely doomed to fail , Kennedy said .
“ Tax incentives are only good if you see profitability , ” he said , a rare event in an industry plagued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and serial bankruptcies .
U.S. lawmakers ’ proposals , he said , have “ a market solution for a non-market problem.
” That ’ s a point that Kennedy , Hammond , and many other rare-earth experts repeatedly make : Given China ’ s state-mandated dominance of the niche rare-earth industry , it basically controls pricing and ensures that normal economic rules don ’ t apply .
That makes it hard to respond to China ’ s current dominance by turning to market-based solutions , like urging mining companies to pour hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could be rendered uneconomical with a single decision in Beijing .
“ Let ’ s see : uncertain demand , uncertain price , uncertain technology—yeah , let me get my checkbook out , ” Hammond said .
To make sure the United States can rebuild the full range of rare-earth capabilities—from mining to processing to making the advanced final products—Hammond and others think it ’ s time for the Trump administration to turn its penchant for state capitalism to one sector that could actually use it .
That would entail bypassing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ processing altogether and doing something like creating a government entity that could just underwrite the entire process in the name of national security .
“ This is a critical defense issue , like the shipyards in the Second World War , ” Hammond said .
“ Rare earths lends itself to a state capitalist solution more than just about anything .
”

Rising tensions with China and the race to repatriate supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have given fresh impetus to U.S. efforts to launch a renaissance in rare earths, the critical minerals at the heart of high technology, clean energy, and especially high-end U.S. defense platforms.
Rising tensions with China and the race to repatriate supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have given fresh impetus to U.S. efforts to launch a renaissance in rare earths, the critical minerals at the heart of high technology, clean energy, and especially high-end U.S. defense platforms.
But it’s not going well, despite a slew of new bills and government initiatives aimed at rebuilding a soup-to-nuts rare-earth supply chain in the United States that would, after decades of growing reliance on China and other foreign suppliers, restore U.S. self-reliance in a vital sector.
“I think the light bulb has gone on, but we are still in a muddle about exactly what to do about it,” said David Hammond, an expert on rare earths at Hammond International Group, a consultancy.
The problem is that, despite years of steadily increasing efforts under the Trump administration, the United States—both the public and private sectors—has yet to figure out how to redress the fundamental vulnerabilities in its critical materials supply chain, and America still seems years away from developing the full gamut of rare-earth mining, processing, and refining capabilities it needs if it seeks to wean itself off foreign suppliers.
This month, Texas Republican Sen. Ted Cruz became the latest lawmaker to introduce legislation meant to jump-start a domestic rare-earth industry by offering juicy tax breaks for new projects—and especially large tax incentives for end consumers who source finished products from American suppliers. Other lawmakers, like Sen. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, have pushed legislation of their own meant to spur U.S. development of rare earths.
The U.S. Defense Department, meanwhile, is trying to throw money at the problem, putting rare earths at the center of the annual defense acquisition bill three years in a row, with plans this year to massively increase existing Pentagon funding for rare-earth projects. All that comes after a drumbeat of Trump administration moves, from a 2017 executive order seeking to ensure supplies of critical minerals to a 2019 Commerce Department report suggesting ways to do so.
“It’s ripe for legislation,” said an advisor to Cruz, who says that kick-starting domestic demand for finished rare-earth products will percolate back up the supply chain and rejuvenate a U.S. industry that has basically evaporated since its world-leading days three decades ago.
The drive to decouple from China has been thrown into overdrive by the coronavirus pandemic and new calls from hawks in Washington to take a tougher approach to confronting Beijing’s rise as a global rival. Sen. Josh Hawley, a Missouri Republican, took to the Senate floor this week to rail against China’s economic imperialism and called for the United States to leave the World Trade Organization and create a brand-new global economic order.
Other lawmakers and Trump administration officials, starting with the president, are also increasingly leery of maintaining the kind of deep economic integration with China that has marked the last two decades.
“There’s this confluence of factors that really provided added momentum to the discussions on the Hill concerning security of supply [of rare earths],” said Jane Nakano, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It went on before COVID, but certainly there’s added momentum because of COVID.”
Gaining independence on rare earths has been the subject of on-again, off-again debates in U.S. defense circles since 2010, when China, the world’s leading supplier, briefly halted rare-earth exports during a dispute with Japan. If there’s so much urgency about building a U.S. supply chain, it’s not to make the materials needed for the next generation of smartphones, electric car batteries, or wind turbines—though all those things need high-end rare-earth products.
Rather, the Pentagon’s front-line weapons are all heavily reliant on precision-crafted rare-earth products and materials whose manufacture now is largely in the hands of China. Each F-35 fighter, for instance, needs 920 pounds of rare earths; each Virginia-class nuclear submarine requires 9,200 pounds. Tomahawk missiles, guidance systems, and jet engines all need different combinations of alloys and specialized products using some of the 17 different rare-earth elements.
If lawmakers, the Pentagon, and the White House are all now taking the rare-earth challenge seriously, why do they seem to be making little progress in tackling the issue?
Part of the problem is that a lot of the efforts so far, both in private sector and those with government funding, have focused simply on getting more rare-earth ores out of the ground in the United States. There are new rare-earth mines in different stages of early development in Alaska, Wyoming, and Texas, in addition to expansion underway at the one existing mine at Mountain Pass, California.
Another potential factor is the growing realization that China can’t continue to dominate the rare-earth market in perpetuity. This is not because of any legislation coming out of Washington that outmaneuvers Beijing but simply because China is taking steps to limit its breakneck production of the minerals, the mining of which leads to massive environmental damage.
“China has in its campaign to dominate the world splurged all its rare earths at bargain basement prices and has now ended up as a net importer of heavy rare earths,” said Christopher Eccleston, a mining strategist at the London-based financial advisory firm Hallgarten & Company. “It’s really quite a turnaround.”
In a 2019 study, Hallgarten projected that China would mine less than 50 percent of the world’s rare earths, compared with about 75 percent today, by the mid-2020s as it tightens restrictions on extracting its diminishing supplies.
Still, the critical bottleneck for the United States, and especially the defense sector, isn’t access to rare-earth ores, which are available from many countries all over the world, including deposits in Vietnam, Brazil, India, Australia, Canada, and Greenland. Rather, it’s that the rest of the value chain—processing those ores, refining them into metals, and turning that metal into advanced products like permanent magnets—is dominated by China.
“People get caught up on the resource end, and they don’t realize that China owns the metals and will continue to own that space,” said James Kennedy, the founder of ThREE Consulting, a rare-earth consultancy focused on security implications.
Some of the latest initiatives do seek to address part of those vulnerabilities, though even those measures have been ill-starred. The Pentagon said last month it would provide funding to both the project at Mountain Pass and for Australian firm Lynas to build processing facilities. But now both those programs appear to be on hold: Reuters reported that the Pentagon is halting the funding of those rare earth projects pending further investigation. It’s not clear if the holdup is due to the realization that Mountain Pass has minority Chinese ownership (and a Chinese monopoly on the mine’s output) or if the retreat is due to the realization that neither U.S. project is rich in the particular kind of heavy rare earths the military needs.
So far, all the steps taken fall short of rebuilding the full, mine-to-magnet kind of value chain that would be needed to ensure U.S. self-reliance of the critical materials.
“In the end, it does not matter how many rare-earth mines the United States opens. It does not matter if they are upgraded to produce mixed or separated oxides,” Kennedy said. “Nothing matters until we figure out how to overcome China’s control over metal production.”
Some of the latest plans—like Cruz’s new bill—do try to nudge the development of more domestic capacity at the high end of the value chain, by incentivizing manufacturers to use magnets and other advanced products made in the United States. But using traditional tools like tax credits to fix a problem caused by China’s state-mandated dominance of an entire industry is likely doomed to fail, Kennedy said.
“Tax incentives are only good if you see profitability,” he said, a rare event in an industry plagued by high costs, razor-thin margins, and serial bankruptcies. U.S. lawmakers’ proposals, he said, have “a market solution for a non-market problem.”
That’s a point that Kennedy, Hammond, and many other rare-earth experts repeatedly make: Given China’s state-mandated dominance of the niche rare-earth industry, it basically controls pricing and ensures that normal economic rules don’t apply. That makes it hard to respond to China’s current dominance by turning to market-based solutions, like urging mining companies to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into big upfront investments that could be rendered uneconomical with a single decision in Beijing.
“Let’s see: uncertain demand, uncertain price, uncertain technology—yeah, let me get my checkbook out,” Hammond said.
To make sure the United States can rebuild the full range of rare-earth capabilities—from mining to processing to making the advanced final products—Hammond and others think it’s time for the Trump administration to turn its penchant for state capitalism to one sector that could actually use it. That would entail bypassing the dicey market economics of rare-earth mining and processing altogether and doing something like creating a government entity that could just underwrite the entire process in the name of national security.
“This is a critical defense issue, like the shipyards in the Second World War,” Hammond said. “Rare earths lends itself to a state capitalist solution more than just about anything.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-26--Will Bolsonaro Pay the Price for a Botched Pandemic Response?

Will Bolsonaro Pay the Price for a Botched Pandemic Response ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Brazil ’ s now has highest daily coronavirus death toll globally , Dominic Cummings defies calls to resign , and the first of five Iranian fuel tankers arrives in Venezuela .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
“ After being stabbed , no little flu is going to take me down , ” Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro said on March 29 , referencing both the stabbing he suffered on the campaign trail almost two years ago and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the time of Bolsonaro ’ s comment , Brazil was neck and neck with Australia and Israel with approximately 3,900 coronavirus cases .
Today , only the United States can claim more coronavirus cases as Brazil now has the second highest worldwide with 376,669—almost a hundred times more than it had when Bolsonaro made his macho boast .
Whether the pandemic will take Bolsonaro down is unclear , but polling is not in his favor .
A recent poll found that 58 percent of Brazilians rated his response as “ bad ” or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it “ good ” or “ excellent.
” Two Brazilian health ministers have resigned over the course of the pandemic , and a disconnect in leadership between federal and state governments is reflected in the grim numbers .
On Monday—for the second successive day—Brazil had the highest daily death toll of any nation , with over 800 new deaths reported .
Like many countries , the official numbers may hide higher counts due to shortages in testing and stretched medical facilities .
Also on Monday , the United States announced it would move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brazil to midnight tonight .
Bolsonaro ’ s foreign policy advisor Filipe Martins played down the restrictions , comparing them to similar travel bans on Chinese and European visitors .
“ There isn ’ t anything specifically against Brazil .
Ignore the hysteria from the press , ” he said .
Bolsonaro ’ s more immediate problem .
While Bolsonaro can claim the coronavirus pandemic was a problem he never instigated , a pending federal corruption investigation is closer to home .
Brazilian newspaper O Globo reported on Monday that prosecutors in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough evidence to charge Bolsonaro with a crime .
The lawyers say that a video from a cabinet meeting on April 22—released to the public last Friday—shows the president committing the crime of “ administrative advocacy , ” or using his public position to advance a private agenda : In this case , it was Bolsonaro allegedly pressuring then-Justice Minister Sergio Moro to fire the chief of the federal police in order to shield his sons from investigation .
The punishment for such a crime is relatively light : Up to one year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he likely to go to trial ?
For that to happen , Bolsonaro would have to be impeached .
As Bloomberg reported on May 21 , the president has recently created an alliance with the centrist bloc , Centrao , obtaining their backing in return for political favors .
Centrao , who hold 40 percent of seats in the lower house of congress , could protect him from impeachment in the same way it did Michel Temer , Bolsonaro ’ s predecessor .
However , that same support could evaporate if it runs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A recent poll showed gave Bolsonaro a 39.2 percent approval , the lowest of his presidency .
Scandal-plagued U.K. government advisor staying put .
While the United Kingdom is still reporting over a thousand new coronavirus cases per day , the British government may have an unwelcome distraction .
Dominic Cummings , the alleged mastermind of the 2016 Brexit referendum and current adviser to Prime Minister Johnson , held an hourlong press conference yesterday to defend himself after it emerged he had broken lockdown rules to travel to Durham , 260 miles north @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He is also reported to have taken a day trip to a local castle , a trip he defended on the grounds that he was testing his eyesight for the longer journey back to London .
Amid public outcry and calls from politicians within his own party to step down , Boris Johnson has defended his adviser and not asked for Cummings ’ resignation .
But the Cummings affair has already led to one resignation : Douglas Ross , the junior minister for Scotland , stepped down Tuesday over the scandal .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.K. have led to other resignations ; a lead epidemiologist on the government ’ s coronavirus advisory group , Neil Ferguson , stepped down after he allowed a visitor to his home during the country ’ s strictest lockdown period .
Scotland ’ s Chief Medical Officer Catherine Calderwood resigned in April after reports surfaced of two trips she had taken to her second home .
Fortune comes to Venezuela .
The first of five Iranian fuel tankers has arrived in Venezuelan waters after setting out from Iran in mid-March .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ with approximately 270,000 barrels of gasoline destined for the Venezuelan market .
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro praised his country ’ s relationship with Iran , describing the two countries as “ two revolutionary peoples who will never kneel down before North American imperialism ” .
Iran has warned the United States not to interfere with the shipment , and so far the U.S. reaction has been merely rhetorical .
“ Venezuelans need free and fair presidential elections leading to democracy and economic recovery , not Maduro ’ s expensive deals with another pariah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Morgan Ortagus said .
Embassy defuses U.S.-Australia flare up .
U.S. diplomats entered damage control mode after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo raised the possibility that Australia might be cut off from U.S. intelligence sharing if its infrastructure relationship with China got any closer .
Pompeo made the comments as a guest of a conservative Australian Sunday morning television show , saying the United States would “ simply disconnect ” if future telecommunications deals would have an “ adverse impact ” on U.S. citizens or security networks .
The Australian state of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Belt and Road initiative but the Australian government has also previously blocked the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from the country ’ s 5G network .
The U.S. embassy in Australia clarified that the United States has the “ absolute confidence in the Australian government ’ s ability to protect the security of its telecommunications networks and those of its Five Eyes partners.
” Kim Jong Un back in the spotlight .
North Korean leader Kim Jong UN made his first televised public appearance in three weeks when he chaired a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capabilities on Sunday .
The meeting discussed “ increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation , ” adopting “ crucial measures for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the artillery pieces , ” according to state news agency KCNA .
Scandal in Spain .
A political scandal is brewing in Spain after the Interior Minister removed the head of Madrid ’ s Civil Guard , Colonel Diego Pérez de los Cobos .
His dismissal is reportedly linked to a critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Madrid court investigating the Spanish government ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic .
The government approved rallies on March 8 that brought hundreds of thousands to the streets , potentially leading to an explosion in coronavirus infections .
The country belatedly shut down a week later .
As Denmark eases border restrictions with its Nordic neighbors and Germany , couples who were separated by national borders can now visit the country—once they prove their love has passed the test of time .
Under new rules , only relationships that have last six @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorities , and travelers must provide proof .
“ They can bring along a photo or a love letter , ” deputy police chief Allan Dalager Clausen told Danish broadcaster DR. “ I realize these are very intimate things , but the decision to let in the partner ultimately rests on the judgment of the individual police officer.
” Under current restrictions , relationships that blossomed online during lockdown will not be allowed to reunite in person as evidence “ solely of written or telephone correspondence ” is not sufficient .
Danish lawmakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ citing privacy concerns , and want to reduce the burden of proof to a written declaration .
“ If you say , you are in a relationship and put it in writing , that is enough , ” Justice Minister Nick Haekkerup said .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brazil now has the world’s highest daily coronavirus death toll, British government advisor Dominic Cummings defies calls to resign, and the first of five Iranian fuel tankers arrives in Venezuela.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Brazil now has the world’s highest daily coronavirus death toll, British government advisor Dominic Cummings defies calls to resign, and the first of five Iranian fuel tankers arrives in Venezuela.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Brazil’s Death Toll Increases As Public Support For Bolsonaro Sours
“After being stabbed, no little flu is going to take me down,” Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro said on March 29, referencing both the stabbing he suffered on the campaign trail almost two years ago and his resistance to the coronavirus. At the time of Bolsonaro’s comment, Brazil was neck and neck with Australia and Israel with approximately 3,900 coronavirus cases. Today, only the United States claims more coronavirus cases, as Brazil now has the second highest worldwide with 376,669—almost a hundred times more than it had when Bolsonaro made his macho boast.
Whether the pandemic will take Bolsonaro down is unclear, but polling is not in his favor. A recent poll found that 58 percent of Brazilians rated his response as “bad” or “terrible.” Only 21 percent called it “good” or “excellent.”
Two Brazilian health ministers have resigned over the course of the pandemic, and a disconnect in leadership between federal and state governments is reflected in the grim numbers. On Monday—for the second successive day—Brazil had the highest daily death toll of any nation, with over 800 new deaths reported. Like many countries, the official numbers may hide higher counts due to shortages in testing and stretched medical facilities.
Also on Monday, the United States announced it would move up the implementation of travel restrictions from Brazil to midnight tonight. Bolsonaro’s foreign policy advisor Filipe Martins played down the restrictions, comparing them to similar travel bans on Chinese and European visitors. “There isn’t anything specifically against Brazil. Ignore the hysteria from the press,” he said.
Bolsonaro’s more immediate problem. While Bolsonaro can claim the coronavirus pandemic was a problem he never instigated, a pending federal corruption investigation is closer to home. Brazilian newspaper O Globo reported on Monday that prosecutors in the office of the attorney general have gathered enough evidence to charge Bolsonaro with a crime. The lawyers say that a video from a cabinet meeting on April 22—released to the public last Friday—shows the president committing the crime of “administrative advocacy,” or using his public position to advance a private agenda: In this case, it was Bolsonaro allegedly pressuring then-Justice Minister Sergio Moro to fire the chief of the federal police in order to shield his sons from investigation. The punishment for such a crime is relatively light: Up to one year in prison and a fine.
Is he likely to go to trial? For that to happen, Bolsonaro would have to be impeached. As Bloomberg reported on May 21, the president has recently created an alliance with the centrist bloc, Centrao, obtaining their backing in return for political favors. Centrao, who hold 40 percent of seats in the lower house of congress, could protect him from impeachment in the same way it did Michel Temer, Bolsonaro’s predecessor. However, that same support could evaporate if it runs too far afoul of public opinion. A recent poll showed gave Bolsonaro a 39.2 percent approval, the lowest of his presidency.
What We’re Following Today
Scandal-plagued U.K. government advisor staying put. While the United Kingdom is still reporting over a thousand new coronavirus cases per day, the British government may have an unwelcome distraction. Dominic Cummings, the alleged mastermind of the 2016 Brexit referendum and current adviser to Prime Minister Johnson, held an hourlong press conference yesterday to defend himself after it emerged he had broken lockdown rules to travel to Durham, 260 miles north of London, to visit his parents. He is also reported to have taken a day trip to a local castle, a trip he defended on the grounds that he was testing his eyesight for the longer journey back to London.
Amid public outcry and calls from politicians within his own party to step down, Boris Johnson has defended his advisor and not asked for Cummings’ resignation. But the Cummings affair has already led to one resignation: Douglas Ross, the junior minister for Scotland, stepped down Tuesday over the scandal. Previous breaches of lockdown from senior officials in the U.K. have led to other resignations; a lead epidemiologist on the government’s coronavirus advisory group, Neil Ferguson, stepped down after he allowed a visitor to his home during the country’s strictest lockdown period. Scotland’s Chief Medical Officer Catherine Calderwood resigned in April after reports surfaced of two trips she had taken to her second home.
Fortune comes to Venezuela. The first of five Iranian fuel tankers has arrived in Venezuelan waters after setting out from Iran in mid-March. The ship, Fortune, is loaded with approximately 270,000 barrels of gasoline destined for the Venezuelan market. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro praised his country’s relationship with Iran, describing the two countries as “two revolutionary peoples who will never kneel down before North American imperialism”.
Iran has warned the United States not to interfere with the shipment, and so far the U.S. reaction has been merely rhetorical. “Venezuelans need free and fair presidential elections leading to democracy and economic recovery, not Maduro’s expensive deals with another pariah state,” U.S. State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said.
Embassy defuses U.S.-Australia flare up. U.S. diplomats entered damage control mode after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo raised the possibility that Australia might be cut off from U.S. intelligence sharing if its infrastructure relationship with China got any closer. Pompeo made the comments as a guest of a conservative Australian Sunday morning television show, saying the United States would “simply disconnect” if future telecommunications deals would have an “adverse impact” on U.S. citizens or security networks.
The Australian state of Victoria has recently proposed cooperating with China’s Belt and Road initiative but the Australian government has also previously blocked the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from the country’s 5G network. The U.S. embassy in Australia clarified that the United States has the “absolute confidence in the Australian government’s ability to protect the security of its telecommunications networks and those of its Five Eyes partners.”
Keep an Eye On
Kim Jong Un back in the spotlight. North Korean leader Kim Jong UN made his first televised public appearance in three weeks when he chaired a meeting on the country’s nuclear capabilities on Sunday. The meeting discussed “increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation,” adopting “crucial measures for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the artillery pieces,” according to state news agency KCNA.
Scandal in Spain. A political scandal is brewing in Spain after the Interior Minister removed the head of Madrid’s Civil Guard, Colonel Diego Pérez de los Cobos. His dismissal is reportedly linked to a critical report the colonel had delivered to a Madrid court investigating the Spanish government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic. The government approved rallies on March 8 that brought hundreds of thousands to the streets, potentially leading to an explosion in coronavirus infections. The country belatedly shut down a week later.
Odds and Ends
As Denmark eases border restrictions with its Nordic neighbors and Germany, couples who were separated by national borders can now visit the country—once they prove their love has passed the test of time. Under new rules, only relationships that have last six months or longer will be recognized by authorities, and travelers must provide proof. “They can bring along a photo or a love letter,” deputy police chief Allan Dalager Clausen told Danish broadcaster DR. “I realize these are very intimate things, but the decision to let in the partner ultimately rests on the judgment of the individual police officer.”
Under current restrictions, relationships that blossomed online during lockdown will not be allowed to reunite in person as evidence “solely of written or telephone correspondence” is not sufficient. Danish lawmakers are rushing to revise the rules, citing privacy concerns, and want to reduce the burden of proof to a written declaration. “If you say, you are in a relationship and put it in writing, that is enough,” Justice Minister Nick Haekkerup said.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-05-26--Japan Doesn’t Want to Become Another Casualty of English

Japan Doesn ’ t Want to Become Another Casualty of English In a 2019 survey , Japan dropped to 53rd in global English proficiency , squarely in the “ low proficiency ” band .
Japan ranks near the bottom of Asian and developed countries alike despite constant reshuffling and refinement of the English educational curriculum in schools and the frequent assertions , acknowledged by Japan ’ s Ministry of Education , that English-language skills are needed to compete in the modern economy .
The failure to adopt English is particularly unexpected given that the English language—and the whiteness associated with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flaunt white foreigners on TV and use English aptitude as the basis for selling products .
Top companies such as Rakuten , an e-commerce website and the Japanese competitor to Amazon , place immense weight on English proficiency , whether or not English is needed for an employee ’ s role .
Eikaiwa ( English conversation ) programs run daily on TV , and accounts featuring videos of Japanese American children speaking English cultivate tens of thousands of Instagram followers .
At the same time , essays and books about the supposed uniqueness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity—a genre known as nihonjinron—are in every bookstore , next to shelves of English-learning books .
They overflow with complaints about young people ’ s poor Japanese and instructions on how to speak polite and beautiful Japanese .
Today , Japanese are caught between a belief in the importance of Japanese language and culture and the need to exist in a globalized world in which English carries economic privileges and status associations .
A plummeting population and an inevitable future influx of foreign workers collide with a proud national identity , structural and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough economic independence to resist what might otherwise seem an inevitable future : an English-speaking Japan .
For years , multinational companies have been mandating English as the common corporate language .
“ In East Asia , many parents , professionals , and students themselves see English as a prerequisite for attaining the best jobs on the market , ” said Minh Tran , the executive director of academic affairs at Education First , a Swiss language-education company that offers classes in Japan .
Yet the spread of English has left behind a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ languages , literatures , and identities .
As countries around the world scramble for widespread English , there ’ s a fear of losing their own traditions , cultures , and even names .
English became a tool of the Japanese elite throughout Meiji era Japan ’ s relentless race to catch up technologically with the West .
And while Japan was never a colony of a Western country , the U.S. occupation after World War II lasted for seven years—enough time for the U.S. military to implement widespread political and economic changes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War , Japan came under the U.S. nuclear umbrella of protection from the Soviet Union , further cementing America ’ s image as a symbolic protector .
This presence of American soldiers at this time exposed the general Japanese public to spoken English .
“ America [ was ] idealized in Japan at the time as a symbol of freedom and democracy , partly as a result of the success of the American occupation , ” writes Takako Yoshida , a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Lleida .
English accordingly became associated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Throughout the 20th century , more and more English loanwords were introduced into the Japanese language , and English signage , slogans , advertising , and speakers spread across the country .
Foreign loanwords , closely associated with the world ’ s strongest nations and Japan ’ s social elite , took on elements of prestige .
English developed an undeniably positive association in Japanese culture .
“ English for speaking proved attractive to the general public , particularly since the image attached to eikaiwa in the media was cheerful , fun @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( desire ) for America , ” Yoshida wrote .
Yet despite this growth , studies estimate that less than 30 percent of Japanese speak English at any level at all .
Less than 8 percent and possibly as little as 2 percent speak English fluently .
For comparison , in Germany , roughly 60 percent of the population speaks English , and 16 percent of speakers say they are proficient .
There are various possible explanations for this gap between enthusiasm and proficiency .
The sheer difference between two languages certainly plays @ @ @ @ @ @ @ related , Japanese and English have extremely distinct vocabulary , writing systems , and sentence structure .
Japanese tutors at the English Tutor Network with fluent English say they spent a ridiculous 4,000 to 5,000 hours studying to reach that level .
Compare that to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages used for foreign-language study within Europe , which is based on achieving total fluency in a foreign language in just 1,200 hours of classes .
Teachers in Japan have pointed to English classes ’ strict correspondence to university entrance examinations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ poor proficiency .
They argue that the focus on exams leads to an over-emphasis on grammar as well as boring , memorization-oriented classes .
“ I studied English in junior high school , high school , and university , and when I graduated college I didn ’ t speak English at all , ” said Norihiko Inoue , the regional sales and marketing director at Education First Japan .
“ The Japanese Ministry of Education has introduced initiatives to make classrooms more interactive , but the teachers don ’ t know yet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” he said .
“ Japanese students are actually very good at grammar and vocabulary , but they can ’ t communicate very well because they ’ re afraid of making mistakes.
” Numerous studies agree that Japanese culture ’ s aversion to risk-taking leads many students to be reluctant to push their limits , especially in speaking , which is essential for language learning .
Heather Rucker , an associate language teacher with the government ’ s Japan Exchange and Teaching Program in Nagoya , said that when she initially followed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ students tuned out and avoided participating .
“ There are definitely kids who want to learn English and do things abroad in the future .
But the others try to avoid taking part in class as much as possible , ” she said .
“ I try to make activities as fun as possible , so it won ’ t drag for them at least.
” The practical economic benefits of English for Japan might seem clear .
Japan ’ s population fell by a record rate in 2019 .
Foreign residents now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the population , nearly double the proportion 20 years ago .
In the last two years , Japan has created new visa programs to attract more foreign workers , highly skilled and service sector employees alike , although the new workforce , especially caregivers , mainly comes from its Asian neighbors .
“ If Japan is content with not being connected to the rest of the world , then it doesn ’ t need English , ” said Liang Morita , a professor of language and culture at Nagoya University .
“ However @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shiseido have found that the Japanese market alone is not able to sustain the growth in profits they desire .
So it follows that Japan needs English to do business with the rest of the world.
” On the flip side , Ryuko Kubota , a professor of language literacy and education at the University of British Columbia , conducted a 2011 study that showed English-language skills do not contribute to upward career mobility in Japan .
While those numbers may have shifted by 2020 , Japan still has one of the lowest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Japan is lightyears away from requiring nationwide English fluency to keep the economy going .
Studies show that positive portrayals of white people and the English language are highly overrepresented in the Japanese media .
Some of the national obsession with English proficiency is based on social capital accumulated by proximity to whiteness and the West .
“ Teaching and learning eikaiwa in Japan is a commercialized activity built on the commodification of English , whiteness , Western culture , and native speakers constructed as superior , cool , exotic , or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If you know how to speak English , people think you ’ re smart , ” said Maki Shirase , a Japanese undergraduate studying at the City University of New York .
“ That ’ s a pretty big benefit.
” The discourse around English as a challenging skill that doesn ’ t come naturally to many people may be an additional barrier for everyday learners .
“ After graduating college , when I visited my hometown , some of my friends started to treat me differently , ” Shirase said .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact that I had studied abroad and spoke English made me different.
” Even with the relatively low number of English speakers in Japan , others are concerned about Japanese language and literature becoming overshadowed by the behemoth of English .
In 2008 , Minae Mizumura made waves with her book The Fall of Language in the Age of English , in which she traces the development of the English and Japanese languages and argues for more of a focus on Japanese-language education .
At the time , many called her an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of World War II , any talk about the need to defend the Japanese language has been considered as a reactionary , nationalistic gesture , ” Mizumura said in an interview with the literary blog Bookslut .
“ Now , there seems to be more of an awakening among the general population that they should take a fresh look at their own language.
” Mizumura says that Japan should establish a national literary canon and better literature education , as fewer Japanese are able to read literary classics .
Surveys show that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ similarly—in a 2014 study , 70 percent of respondents said that they believed people in Japan read fewer books than they used to .
“ [ After 1946 ] , Japan began to produce generations for whom reading anything prewar in its original form is increasingly a struggle , ” Mizumura writes in her book .
“ Older , premodern texts have of course become even more remote.
” Ultimately , despite the hype , there is ample resistance to studying English in Japan .
Most people simply don ’ t need it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demographic trends , Japan will have little choice but to up its English game or fall behind in a competitive global economy .
Critics such as Mizumura want to ensure that Japanese doesn ’ t get lost in the shuffle .
These combating priorities have left experts with mixed projections for the future of English in Japan .
“ I think the English learning industry will grow gradually in Japan , ” Inoue said .
“ Parents are spending more money on education per child .
English language is in high demand from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has also shaken up the global balance of power , leading some to speculate that the United States ’ bungled pandemic response may change the Japanese perception of America .
“ The U.S. response to COVID-19 , which falls short of what is expected of the largest economy in the world , may change the perception of U.S. superiority permanently , ” Morita , the Nagoya University professor , said .
“ I ’ m not very optimistic about the future of English in Japan .
Nihonjinron thinking is still strong .
”

In a 2019 survey , Japan dropped to 53rd in global English proficiency, squarely in the “low proficiency” band. Japan ranks near the bottom of Asian and developed countries alike despite constant reshuffling and refinement of the English educational curriculum in schools and the frequent assertions, acknowledged by Japan’s Ministry of Education, that English-language skills are needed to compete in the modern economy.
In a 2019 survey, Japan dropped to 53rd in global English proficiency, squarely in the “low proficiency” band. Japan ranks near the bottom of Asian and developed countries alike despite constant reshuffling and refinement of the English educational curriculum in schools and the frequent assertions, acknowledged by Japan’s Ministry of Education, that English-language skills are needed to compete in the modern economy.
The failure to adopt English is particularly unexpected given that the English language—and the whiteness associated with it—signifies privilege in Japan. Countless advertisements flaunt white foreigners on TV and use English aptitude as the basis for selling products. Top companies such as Rakuten, an e-commerce website and the Japanese competitor to Amazon, place immense weight on English proficiency, whether or not English is needed for an employee’s role. Eikaiwa (English conversation) programs run daily on TV, and accounts featuring videos of Japanese American children speaking English cultivate tens of thousands of Instagram followers.
At the same time, essays and books about the supposed uniqueness of Japanese language, culture, and identity—a genre known as nihonjinron—are in every bookstore, next to shelves of English-learning books. They overflow with complaints about young people’s poor Japanese and instructions on how to speak polite and beautiful Japanese.
Today, Japanese are caught between a belief in the importance of Japanese language and culture and the need to exist in a globalized world in which English carries economic privileges and status associations. A plummeting population and an inevitable future influx of foreign workers collide with a proud national identity, structural and cultural obstacles to English learning, and enough economic independence to resist what might otherwise seem an inevitable future: an English-speaking Japan.
For years, multinational companies have been mandating English as the common corporate language. “In East Asia, many parents, professionals, and students themselves see English as a prerequisite for attaining the best jobs on the market,” said Minh Tran, the executive director of academic affairs at Education First, a Swiss language-education company that offers classes in Japan.
Yet the spread of English has left behind a “trail of dead”: mangled languages, literatures, and identities. As countries around the world scramble for widespread English, there’s a fear of losing their own traditions, cultures, and even names.
English became a tool of the Japanese elite throughout Meiji era Japan’s relentless race to catch up technologically with the West. And while Japan was never a colony of a Western country, the U.S. occupation after World War II lasted for seven years—enough time for the U.S. military to implement widespread political and economic changes throughout the country. In the Cold War, Japan came under the U.S. nuclear umbrella of protection from the Soviet Union, further cementing America’s image as a symbolic protector.
This presence of American soldiers at this time exposed the general Japanese public to spoken English. “America [was] idealized in Japan at the time as a symbol of freedom and democracy, partly as a result of the success of the American occupation,” writes Takako Yoshida, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Lleida. English accordingly became associated with freedom, power, and status.
Throughout the 20th century, more and more English loanwords were introduced into the Japanese language, and English signage, slogans, advertising, and speakers spread across the country. Foreign loanwords, closely associated with the world’s strongest nations and Japan’s social elite, took on elements of prestige. English developed an undeniably positive association in Japanese culture. “English for speaking proved attractive to the general public, particularly since the image attached to eikaiwa in the media was cheerful, fun, and accessible, accompanied by akogare (desire) for America,” Yoshida wrote.
Yet despite this growth, studies estimate that less than 30 percent of Japanese speak English at any level at all. Less than 8 percent and possibly as little as 2 percent speak English fluently. For comparison, in Germany, roughly 60 percent of the population speaks English, and 16 percent of speakers say they are proficient.
There are various possible explanations for this gap between enthusiasm and proficiency. The sheer difference between two languages certainly plays a role—whereas German and English are closely related, Japanese and English have extremely distinct vocabulary, writing systems, and sentence structure. Japanese tutors at the English Tutor Network with fluent English say they spent a ridiculous 4,000 to 5,000 hours studying to reach that level. Compare that to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages used for foreign-language study within Europe, which is based on achieving total fluency in a foreign language in just 1,200 hours of classes.
Teachers in Japan have pointed to English classes’ strict correspondence to university entrance examinations as a major culprit of their students’ poor proficiency. They argue that the focus on exams leads to an over-emphasis on grammar as well as boring, memorization-oriented classes.
“I studied English in junior high school, high school, and university, and when I graduated college I didn’t speak English at all,” said Norihiko Inoue, the regional sales and marketing director at Education First Japan.
“The Japanese Ministry of Education has introduced initiatives to make classrooms more interactive, but the teachers don’t know yet how to execute on these initiatives,” he said. “Japanese students are actually very good at grammar and vocabulary, but they can’t communicate very well because they’re afraid of making mistakes.”
Numerous studies agree that Japanese culture’s aversion to risk-taking leads many students to be reluctant to push their limits, especially in speaking, which is essential for language learning.
Heather Rucker, an associate language teacher with the government’s Japan Exchange and Teaching Program in Nagoya, said that when she initially followed the official lesson plans, many of her students tuned out and avoided participating.
“There are definitely kids who want to learn English and do things abroad in the future. But the others try to avoid taking part in class as much as possible,” she said. “I try to make activities as fun as possible, so it won’t drag for them at least.”
The practical economic benefits of English for Japan might seem clear. Japan’s population fell by a record rate in 2019. Foreign residents now make up more than 2 percent of the population, nearly double the proportion 20 years ago. In the last two years, Japan has created new visa programs to attract more foreign workers, highly skilled and service sector employees alike, although the new workforce, especially caregivers, mainly comes from its Asian neighbors.
“If Japan is content with not being connected to the rest of the world, then it doesn’t need English,” said Liang Morita, a professor of language and culture at Nagoya University. “However, big businesses such as Toyota and Shiseido have found that the Japanese market alone is not able to sustain the growth in profits they desire. So it follows that Japan needs English to do business with the rest of the world.”
On the flip side, Ryuko Kubota, a professor of language literacy and education at the University of British Columbia, conducted a 2011 study that showed English-language skills do not contribute to upward career mobility in Japan. While those numbers may have shifted by 2020, Japan still has one of the lowest dependencies on foreign trade in the world. Japan is lightyears away from requiring nationwide English fluency to keep the economy going.
Studies show that positive portrayals of white people and the English language are highly overrepresented in the Japanese media. Some of the national obsession with English proficiency is based on social capital accumulated by proximity to whiteness and the West. “Teaching and learning eikaiwa in Japan is a commercialized activity built on the commodification of English, whiteness, Western culture, and native speakers constructed as superior, cool, exotic, or desirable,” Kubota said.
“If you know how to speak English, people think you’re smart,” said Maki Shirase, a Japanese undergraduate studying at the City University of New York. “That’s a pretty big benefit.” The discourse around English as a challenging skill that doesn’t come naturally to many people may be an additional barrier for everyday learners.
“After graduating college, when I visited my hometown, some of my friends started to treat me differently,” Shirase said. “Not making fun of me, but the fact that I had studied abroad and spoke English made me different.”
Even with the relatively low number of English speakers in Japan, others are concerned about Japanese language and literature becoming overshadowed by the behemoth of English. In 2008, Minae Mizumura made waves with her book The Fall of Language in the Age of English, in which she traces the development of the English and Japanese languages and argues for more of a focus on Japanese-language education. At the time, many called her an old-fashioned Japanese imperialist.
“Since the end of World War II, any talk about the need to defend the Japanese language has been considered as a reactionary, nationalistic gesture,” Mizumura said in an interview with the literary blog Bookslut. “Now, there seems to be more of an awakening among the general population that they should take a fresh look at their own language.”
Mizumura says that Japan should establish a national literary canon and better literature education, as fewer Japanese are able to read literary classics. Surveys show that many Japanese evaluated their own reading habits similarly—in a 2014 study, 70 percent of respondents said that they believed people in Japan read fewer books than they used to.
“[After 1946], Japan began to produce generations for whom reading anything prewar in its original form is increasingly a struggle,” Mizumura writes in her book. “Older, premodern texts have of course become even more remote.”
Ultimately, despite the hype, there is ample resistance to studying English in Japan. Most people simply don’t need it in their daily lives. But given demographic trends, Japan will have little choice but to up its English game or fall behind in a competitive global economy. Critics such as Mizumura want to ensure that Japanese doesn’t get lost in the shuffle.
These combating priorities have left experts with mixed projections for the future of English in Japan. “I think the English learning industry will grow gradually in Japan,” Inoue said. “Parents are spending more money on education per child. English language is in high demand from parents.”
The emergence of the coronavirus has also shaken up the global balance of power, leading some to speculate that the United States’ bungled pandemic response may change the Japanese perception of America.
“The U.S. response to COVID-19, which falls short of what is expected of the largest economy in the world, may change the perception of U.S. superiority permanently,” Morita, the Nagoya University professor, said. “I’m not very optimistic about the future of English in Japan. Nihonjinron thinking is still strong.”