foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--France Is Still on Strike

France Is Still on Strike

France Is Still on Strike Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : France ’ s unions have yet to reach a deal with the government over pension reform , the United States and Iran appear to stand down , and Putin and Erdogan push for a cease-fire in Libya .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Some of France ’ s unions have called another nationwide protest today against state pension reform , over a month since public sector walkouts began .
Rail workers walked off on Dec. 5 , making it the longest continuous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s national rail service .
Protesters are returning to the streets while a compromise between the unions and the government over the reform—a reelection promise of President Emmanuel Macron—still seems out of reach .
On Tuesday , the government and the unions resumed negotiations to try to end the deadlock .
Prime Minister Édouard Philippe has said he is “ open to any discussions of the terms , ” including the proposal to incentivize a later retirement age .
On the eve of the protest , the talks hadn ’ t gone far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a deal this evening , ” the head of the moderate CFDT union said .
Escalating tactics .
An increase in public transit disruption is expected today , particularly in Paris , and schools could be shut .
The two left-wing unions that called today ’ s strike have promised to continue and pushed to shut down refineries , which would cause further disruption .
Another mass protest is expected on Saturday .
India on strike .
A 24-hour strike also disrupted India on Wednesday , with workers walking out in major cities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The strike came after unofficial statistics projected India ’ s growth to slow to 5 percent in 2020 .
Public transport was affected in major cities , though New Delhi and Mumbai avoided major disruption .
For more news and analysis on stories like this , sign up for South Asia Brief , delivered on Tuesdays .
Trump seems to step back from war .
After Iranian strikes on U.S. and coalition military targets in Iraq , U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday seemed to open the door to de-escalation with Iran—even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions.
” Trump stepped back from threatening a response to the attack—retaliation for the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Friday .
Earlier on Wednesday , Iran ’ s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said Iran did “ not seek escalation or war.
” Still , Iran could still find new ways to strike asymmetrically , as an energy expert tells FP ’ s Keith Johnson .
Meanwhile , the U.S. decision to assassinate Suleimani has given Russia a chance to cement its reputation as a regional power broker .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to be a friend to all major players , FP ’ s Reid Standish and Amy Mackinnon report .
Tensions over plane crash in Tehran .
Meanwhile , there has been little clarity on what happened to the Ukraine International flight that went down in Tehran , killing at least 176 people on board .
The crash came hours after Iran launched its strikes , with Iranian troops on alert for a counterattack .
The incident is strained by U.S.-Iran distrust .
Ukraine and Iran issued conflicting statements on Wednesday , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have been attacked .
Iran will lead an investigation , though it said it would not send the plane ’ s black box to U.S. manufacturer Boeing .
Canada , which lost 63 citizens , is seeking to play a role .
Turkey and Russia push for Libya cease-fire .
Meeting in Istanbul , the leaders of Turkey and Russia jointly called for the factions in Libya ’ s civil war to declare a cease-fire on Sunday as the conflict spirals .
Ankara supports the internationally recognized government in Tripoli , where it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s mercenaries have fought with the rival grouping of Gen. Khalifa Haftar ’ s Libyan National Army , which took the strategic city of Sirte this week .
A recent escalation in fighting has raised concerns within the region and the United Nations , which welcomed the call for a cease-fire .
Ireland ’ s next election .
Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar meets today with an opposition leader in his minority government to discuss the date of the next parliamentary election .
With Britain leaving the European Union on Jan. 31 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by May—though it could come as early as next month if they can ’ t agree on a legislative agenda .
Global opinion of Trump .
People around the world express little confidence ( 29 percent ) in U.S. President Donald Trump , according to an annual survey by the Pew Research Center published Wednesday .
His worst ratings come from Western Europe and Mexico , and the least confidence was expressed in his handling of foreign policy .
Norway ’ s refugee policy .
Norway announced Wednesday that it would give refuge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s dangerous detention centers to Rwanda .
In what it says is an effort to disincentivize human trafficking in the Mediterranean , Norway ’ s coalition government agreed to take in 3,000 refugees from U.N. camps this year .
Car manufacturer Toyota announced plans for a “ city of the future ” near Japan ’ s Mount Fuji as a testing ground for autonomous vehicles , robotics , and other technology , the Guardian reports .
The community , planned by the Danish architect Bjarke Ingels , would house 2,000 employees and other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustainable , ” powered by hydrogen fuel cells and solar panels .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: France’s unions have yet to reach a deal with the government over pension reform, the United States and Iran appear to stand down, and Putin and Erdogan push for a cease-fire in Libya.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: France’s unions have yet to reach a deal with the government over pension reform, the United States and Iran appear to stand down, and Putin and Erdogan push for a cease-fire in Libya.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
No Compromise Yet in France
Some of France’s unions have called another nationwide protest today against state pension reform, over a month since public sector walkouts began. Rail workers walked off on Dec. 5, making it the longest continuous strike in the history of France’s national rail service. Protesters are returning to the streets while a compromise between the unions and the government over the reform—a reelection promise of President Emmanuel Macron—still seems out of reach.
On Tuesday, the government and the unions resumed negotiations to try to end the deadlock. Prime Minister Édouard Philippe has said he is “open to any discussions of the terms,” including the proposal to incentivize a later retirement age. On the eve of the protest, the talks hadn’t gone far. “We’re far from a deal this evening,” the head of the moderate CFDT union said.
Escalating tactics. An increase in public transit disruption is expected today, particularly in Paris, and schools could be shut. The two left-wing unions that called today’s strike have promised to continue and pushed to shut down refineries, which would cause further disruption. Another mass protest is expected on Saturday.
India on strike. A 24-hour strike also disrupted India on Wednesday, with workers walking out in major cities against the government’s economic policies. The strike came after unofficial statistics projected India’s growth to slow to 5 percent in 2020. Public transport was affected in major cities, though New Delhi and Mumbai avoided major disruption.
For more news and analysis on stories like this, sign up for South Asia Brief, delivered on Tuesdays.
What We’re Following Today
Trump seems to step back from war. After Iranian strikes on U.S. and coalition military targets in Iraq, U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday seemed to open the door to de-escalation with Iran—even as he announced more “punishing economic sanctions.” Trump stepped back from threatening a response to the attack—retaliation for the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani on Friday. Earlier on Wednesday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said Iran did “not seek escalation or war.” Still, Iran could still find new ways to strike asymmetrically, as an energy expert tells FP’s Keith Johnson.
Meanwhile, the U.S. decision to assassinate Suleimani has given Russia a chance to cement its reputation as a regional power broker. It’s also likely to test its ability to be a friend to all major players, FP’s Reid Standish and Amy Mackinnon report.
Tensions over plane crash in Tehran. Meanwhile, there has been little clarity on what happened to the Ukraine International flight that went down in Tehran, killing at least 176 people on board. The crash came hours after Iran launched its strikes, with Iranian troops on alert for a counterattack. The incident is strained by U.S.-Iran distrust. Ukraine and Iran issued conflicting statements on Wednesday, and some experts have speculated the plane could have been attacked. Iran will lead an investigation, though it said it would not send the plane’s black box to U.S. manufacturer Boeing. Canada, which lost 63 citizens, is seeking to play a role.
Turkey and Russia push for Libya cease-fire. Meeting in Istanbul, the leaders of Turkey and Russia jointly called for the factions in Libya’s civil war to declare a cease-fire on Sunday as the conflict spirals. Ankara supports the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, where it could soon send troops. Moscow’s mercenaries have fought with the rival grouping of Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, which took the strategic city of Sirte this week. A recent escalation in fighting has raised concerns within the region and the United Nations, which welcomed the call for a cease-fire.
Keep an Eye On
Ireland’s next election. Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar meets today with an opposition leader in his minority government to discuss the date of the next parliamentary election. With Britain leaving the European Union on Jan. 31, both agree an election should be held by May—though it could come as early as next month if they can’t agree on a legislative agenda.
Global opinion of Trump. People around the world express little confidence (29 percent) in U.S. President Donald Trump, according to an annual survey by the Pew Research Center published Wednesday. His worst ratings come from Western Europe and Mexico, and the least confidence was expressed in his handling of foreign policy.
Norway’s refugee policy. Norway announced Wednesday that it would give refuge to 600 people evacuated from Libya’s dangerous detention centers to Rwanda. In what it says is an effort to disincentivize human trafficking in the Mediterranean, Norway’s coalition government agreed to take in 3,000 refugees from U.N. camps this year.
Odds and Ends
Car manufacturer Toyota announced plans for a “city of the future” near Japan’s Mount Fuji as a testing ground for autonomous vehicles, robotics, and other technology, the Guardian reports. The community, planned by the Danish architect Bjarke Ingels, would house 2,000 employees and other researchers. It would be “fully sustainable,” powered by hydrogen fuel cells and solar panels.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--Harry and Meghan Are Leaving the Job but Keeping the Salary

Harry and Meghan Are Leaving the Job but Keeping the Salary An announcement on Wednesday by Prince Harry , currently sixth in line to the British throne , and Meghan , the Duchess of Sussex—formerly Meghan Markle—that they would be stepping back from their role as senior royals , moving at least part-time to North America , and seeking “ financial independence ” has shocked the British public as much as it has the royal family itself .
Buckingham Palace almost immediately issued its own statement , saying discussions were at an “ early stage ” —adding weight to reports @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not told the announcement was coming .
The surprising development has created an ambiguous future for the couple—and possibly for the British royal family .
Why do people care about this ?
Even if you ’ re not a royal gossip aficionado , the story is an obsession for the British press .
That says something about the toxicity of Britain ’ s print media , and the interests of a country that ’ s been politically sundered in recent years over the issue of race and a desperate nostalgia that drove @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Meghan has always been poisonous , to the degree that Prince Harry issued an unprecedented statement condemning what he described as “ bullying ” last October .
The endless flood of stories about Meghan recalls the days of Princess Diana and Prince Charles ’ s marriage—except that Diana was far more complicit in her own coverage , maintaining private lines of communication with journalists to leak stories while also complaining about the intensity of press interest .
Unsurprisingly , the media ’ s reaction to Wednesday ’ s news was to throw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mail , one of Britain ’ s most popular tabloids , to produce no less than 17 pages of coverage .
Some of the targeting of the couple came from racism directed against Meghan , whose mother is African American .
But there was also a kind of displacement taking place , where Meghan has been targeted instead of other royals .
The tabloids have been relatively restricted in royal reporting since the death of Diana , who died in a car crash as she was chased by paparazzi in Paris in 1997 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aggressive in issuing legal threats over coverage .
That ’ s led to stories about other royals that would have been major scandals if they had concerned Prince Charles and Princess Diana , or Prince Andrew and Sarah , Duchess of York , going almost completely unreported in Britain .
Meghan , on the other hand , was seen as an acceptable target for even the most trivial stories—leading her to actually sue the Daily Mail in an ongoing case .
Yes , but so are a lot of things the modern monarchy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ royal family depends on a series of improvisations , adaptations , and compromises theoretically underpinned by the continuance of a ritual core .
Attempts to form a new relationship with the press , in particular , have oscillated between the smoothly stage-managed , such as the filming of Queen Elizabeth II ’ s coronation , and the outright disastrous , such as Prince Andrew ’ s recent BBC interview on his close friendship with the late child abuser Jeffrey Epstein .
Plenty of royals have backed away from the institution for the sake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Edward VIII ’ s abdication in order to marry Wallis Simpson , who like Meghan was an American divorcee .
( Unlike Meghan , she was also a Nazi sympathizer . )
Historically , relationships seen as unsuitable were usually kept secret and unrecognized , especially after the Royal Marriages Act of 1772—an effort by Parliament to regulate royal alliances and keep the Catholics out .
That produced King George IV ’ s secret marriage to a Catholic , Maria Fitzherbert .
( British royals couldn ’ t marry a Catholic and stay @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The anti-Catholic streak in British politics continued for a surprisingly long time , with former Prime Minister Tony Blair , who attended Catholic services for many years but only converted after he left office in 2007 . )
But the in-betweenness of Prince Harry and Meghan ’ s statement is something new .
The intent appears to be to maintain the roles they enjoy and believe in—chiefly as charitable ambassadors—while steering away from more formal royal duties and cutting some ties with the family .
There are clearly personal issues at stake @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with her in-laws , but with the royal family , the personal always ends up at least somewhat a matter of state .
What about the money ?
The statement said that they were aspiring to be “ financially independent.
” From the plans released so far , that ’ s akin to somebody who started with a million-dollar loan and a free house from their parents declaring themselves self-made .
Prince Harry and Meghan are eschewing only a small part of their income , and giving up—at least under current plans—almost none @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is messy , since the wealth of the Crown and that of the nation have always been tangled up .
While the queen herself is moderately frugal , extravagant spending tends to go with royalty—the late queen mother , an immensely wealthy woman , left massive debts behind .
Prince Harry has inherited huge amounts as a semi-private citizen .
( Meghan earned her wealth herself as a successful actress . )
The costs of royal service are paid through the Sovereign Grant , which comes from the Crown Estate—lands that originally belonged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1760 to be managed and used entirely for the purpose of the state .
About 25 percent of that income—82.2 million pounds last year , over $ 100 million—now goes to fund repair of palaces , royal banquets and travel , household staff , and so on .
That ’ s justified—according to its supporters—by the state duties performed by royals .
( Other funds come directly from the government for some large additional costs such as security . )
Most other European royals have a similar mix of state income and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ British royal family is by far the most expensive .
But the queen and Prince Charles , Prince Harry ’ s father , also have their own private duchies—land holdings that provide a considerable income in their own right , but that they have limited control over , as they ’ re held in trust for future sovereigns .
They , and the rest of the family , also have considerable inherited wealth not directly connected to their royal status .
According to the couple ’ s own website ( produced by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their funding previously came through the Sovereign Grant .
That ’ s the only portion they ’ re giving up so far .
The rest comes through Charles ’ s own duchy , and they ’ re not giving that up—nor are they leaving the extremely large house provided for them , which was recently renovated at a cost of $ 2.8 million .
The couple ’ s long-term vision seems for them to be charitable ambassadors supported by a combination of family wealth and personal deals—and quite possibly a return to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like his father and grandfather , has been a steadfast patron of various charities , using the royal glamor to attract fundraising far beyond even what he could manage himself .
Giving up the house and the duchy income , though , would be far more genuine and impressive sacrifices .
So does this spell trouble for the monarchy ?
It certainly doesn ’ t make the royal family look good , and if Meghan begins the kind of targeted leaks that Diana employed to badmouth the Windsors , it could be very @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prince Andrew , now forcibly retired from royal duties , not just for his relationship with Epstein but also his ties to Gulf states and arms dealers .
( Andrew is the only senior royal with negative—very negative—popularity numbers . )
But the monarchy has survived plenty worse .
Prince Charles simply outlasted his scandals , and the age and revered status of the queen makes any change unlikely in the near future .
So too does the recent reelection of the Conservative government , since British republicanism has generally been the province @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leader Jeremy Corbyn , thrashed in the last vote , is a committed republican . )
The desperation to find national symbols in a post-Brexit world also works strongly to the monarchy ’ s advantage .
Ultimately , the political powerlessness of the monarchy means that family quarrels extend only to passive-aggressive public statements and press leaks .
When there ’ s actual power at stake , royal sons have had far worse fights with their families .

An announcement on Wednesday by Prince Harry, currently sixth in line to the British throne, and Meghan, the Duchess of Sussex—formerly Meghan Markle—that they would be stepping back from their role as senior royals, moving at least part-time to North America, and seeking “financial independence” has shocked the British public as much as it has the royal family itself. Buckingham Palace almost immediately issued its own statement, saying discussions were at an “ early stage ”—adding weight to reports that the rest of the royal family was not told the announcement was coming. The surprising development has created an ambiguous future for the couple—and possibly for the British royal family.
An announcement on Wednesday by Prince Harry, currently sixth in line to the British throne, and Meghan, the Duchess of Sussex—formerly Meghan Markle—that they would be stepping back from their role as senior royals, moving at least part-time to North America, and seeking “financial independence” has shocked the British public as much as it has the royal family itself. Buckingham Palace almost immediately issued its own statement, saying discussions were at an “early stage”—adding weight to reports that the rest of the royal family was not told the announcement was coming. The surprising development has created an ambiguous future for the couple—and possibly for the British royal family.
Why do people care about this?
Even if you’re not a royal gossip aficionado, the story is an obsession for the British press. That says something about the toxicity of Britain’s print media, and the interests of a country that’s been politically sundered in recent years over the issue of race and a desperate nostalgia that drove Brexit.
The British press’ relationship with Meghan has always been poisonous, to the degree that Prince Harry issued an unprecedented statement condemning what he described as “bullying” last October. The endless flood of stories about Meghan recalls the days of Princess Diana and Prince Charles’s marriage—except that Diana was far more complicit in her own coverage, maintaining private lines of communication with journalists to leak stories while also complaining about the intensity of press interest. Unsurprisingly, the media’s reaction to Wednesday’s news was to throw a fit—in the case of the Daily Mail, one of Britain’s most popular tabloids, to produce no less than 17 pages of coverage.
Some of the targeting of the couple came from racism directed against Meghan, whose mother is African American. But there was also a kind of displacement taking place, where Meghan has been targeted instead of other royals. The tabloids have been relatively restricted in royal reporting since the death of Diana, who died in a car crash as she was chased by paparazzi in Paris in 1997. Buckingham Palace has also become more aggressive in issuing legal threats over coverage. That’s led to stories about other royals that would have been major scandals if they had concerned Prince Charles and Princess Diana, or Prince Andrew and Sarah, Duchess of York, going almost completely unreported in Britain. Meghan, on the other hand, was seen as an acceptable target for even the most trivial stories—leading her to actually sue the Daily Mail in an ongoing case.
Is this unprecedented?
Yes, but so are a lot of things the modern monarchy does. The continuance of the British royal family depends on a series of improvisations, adaptations, and compromises theoretically underpinned by the continuance of a ritual core. Attempts to form a new relationship with the press, in particular, have oscillated between the smoothly stage-managed, such as the filming of Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation, and the outright disastrous, such as Prince Andrew’s recent BBC interview on his close friendship with the late child abuser Jeffrey Epstein.
Plenty of royals have backed away from the institution for the sake of their relationships, most famously King Edward VIII’s abdication in order to marry Wallis Simpson, who like Meghan was an American divorcee. (Unlike Meghan, she was also a Nazi sympathizer.) Historically, relationships seen as unsuitable were usually kept secret and unrecognized, especially after the Royal Marriages Act of 1772—an effort by Parliament to regulate royal alliances and keep the Catholics out. That produced King George IV’s secret marriage to a Catholic, Maria Fitzherbert. (British royals couldn’t marry a Catholic and stay in the line of inheritance until 2013: The anti-Catholic streak in British politics continued for a surprisingly long time, with former Prime Minister Tony Blair, who attended Catholic services for many years but only converted after he left office in 2007.)
But the in-betweenness of Prince Harry and Meghan’s statement is something new. The intent appears to be to maintain the roles they enjoy and believe in—chiefly as charitable ambassadors—while steering away from more formal royal duties and cutting some ties with the family. There are clearly personal issues at stake in terms of Meghan’s relationship with her in-laws, but with the royal family, the personal always ends up at least somewhat a matter of state.
What about the money? The statement said that they were aspiring to be “financially independent.”
From the plans released so far, that’s akin to somebody who started with a million-dollar loan and a free house from their parents declaring themselves self-made. Prince Harry and Meghan are eschewing only a small part of their income, and giving up—at least under current plans—almost none of their wealth.
British royal money is messy, since the wealth of the Crown and that of the nation have always been tangled up. While the queen herself is moderately frugal, extravagant spending tends to go with royalty—the late queen mother, an immensely wealthy woman, left massive debts behind. Prince Harry has inherited huge amounts as a semi-private citizen. (Meghan earned her wealth herself as a successful actress.)
The costs of royal service are paid through the Sovereign Grant, which comes from the Crown Estate—lands that originally belonged to the monarch but that were agreed in 1760 to be managed and used entirely for the purpose of the state. About 25 percent of that income—82.2 million pounds last year, over $100 million—now goes to fund repair of palaces, royal banquets and travel, household staff, and so on. That’s justified—according to its supporters—by the state duties performed by royals. (Other funds come directly from the government for some large additional costs such as security.) Most other European royals have a similar mix of state income and properties held in trust, though the British royal family is by far the most expensive.
But the queen and Prince Charles, Prince Harry’s father, also have their own private duchies—land holdings that provide a considerable income in their own right, but that they have limited control over, as they’re held in trust for future sovereigns. They, and the rest of the family, also have considerable inherited wealth not directly connected to their royal status.
According to the couple’s own website (produced by a PR firm), roughly 5 percent of their funding previously came through the Sovereign Grant. That’s the only portion they’re giving up so far. The rest comes through Charles’s own duchy, and they’re not giving that up—nor are they leaving the extremely large house provided for them, which was recently renovated at a cost of $2.8 million.
The couple’s long-term vision seems for them to be charitable ambassadors supported by a combination of family wealth and personal deals—and quite possibly a return to acting for Meghan. Prince Harry, like his father and grandfather, has been a steadfast patron of various charities, using the royal glamor to attract fundraising far beyond even what he could manage himself. Giving up the house and the duchy income, though, would be far more genuine and impressive sacrifices.
So does this spell trouble for the monarchy?
It certainly doesn’t make the royal family look good, and if Meghan begins the kind of targeted leaks that Diana employed to badmouth the Windsors, it could be very bad indeed. Several questions remain around Prince Andrew, now forcibly retired from royal duties, not just for his relationship with Epstein but also his ties to Gulf states and arms dealers. (Andrew is the only senior royal with negative—very negative—popularity numbers.)
But the monarchy has survived plenty worse. Prince Charles simply outlasted his scandals, and the age and revered status of the queen makes any change unlikely in the near future. So too does the recent reelection of the Conservative government, since British republicanism has generally been the province of the Labour Party. (Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, thrashed in the last vote, is a committed republican.) The desperation to find national symbols in a post-Brexit world also works strongly to the monarchy’s advantage.
Ultimately, the political powerlessness of the monarchy means that family quarrels extend only to passive-aggressive public statements and press leaks. When there’s actual power at stake, royal sons have had far worse fights with their families.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--U.S. Media Prefers Foreign Pundits to Middle Eastern Voices

As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in , the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear .
As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted , the voices of Syrians , Iraqis , and Lebanese—the “ main victims ” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television .
That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani ’ s role and the impact his death is having .
I ’ ve been keenly listening to both the Western and Arab discourse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. and British policy institutions , of English and Arab origins , who has spent the better part of the past decade working in the Arab world .
In the aftermath of Suleimani ’ s death , it ’ s high time to center on voices from within the region , rather than exclude them .
They , after all , are the ones who will pay the cost in blood of this action and Iran ’ s retaliation .
Indeed , they ’ ve been paying that cost all along , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discussion .
Suleimani ’ s main impact , by far , was how he was perceived by the peoples of the region—not Americans or Westerners .
And that perception , by and large , was negative .
Suleimani was the leader of the Quds Force—a division within Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps primarily dedicated to overseas operations and covert action of this deeply ideological outfit .
It was for that reason that Arab journalists like Kareem Shaheen , who spent years as a Guardian reporter throughout the Middle East , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how Syrians , Iraqis , and other victims of Suleimani ’ s Quds Force were going to interpret the news .
That ’ s why the initial flurry of responses to his death from Arab media and from Arab figures was largely positive .
Suleimani ’ s activities in Syria , Iraq , and Lebanon had targeted scores of Arabs who were either fighting against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad or protesting against their leaders in Beirut or Baghdad .
The Palestinian activist Iyad el-Baghdadi spoke out strongly , centering on the struggles of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region , rather than supporting or centering on the designs of Washington , Riyadh , Tehran , or really anyone else : Suleimani “ was a war criminal and nobody in the communities that were subjected to his brutality will shed a tear for him .
But we also *know* for fact Trump has no plan other than one-upmanship .
Iraqis and Iranians will be left to pay the price.
” There were , of course , many who mourned his death in the region , primarily in Iran , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that among officials of the Iranian regime , as well as allies and their proxies elsewhere .
And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that he also had a genuine base of support , primarily in Iran , even while many Iranians also felt differently .
Mistaken support for a terrible political leader is hardly unique to the Middle East .
If nothing else , history teaches us—including rather recent history—that normally reasonable people can support truly outrageous political figures .
But the reactions also make it clear that this was not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s appalling instrumentalization of sectarianism to further the fortunes of the Iranian regime .
Many within Assad ’ s regime are Sunni , and they wanted Suleimani ’ s assistance .
Many protesters in Iraq are Shiite , and they were targeted by Suleimani ’ s allies , as were protesters in Iran .
Arab activists like Joey Ayoub put it succinctly : “ The ‘ problem ’ is that us anti-sectarians refuse to use that ‘ card ’ as opposed to actual sectarians who do it all the time while pretending to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ follow discussions in Washington and Western media outlets , the focus was rather different .
There was very little discussion about the peoples of the region , only the fortunes of the West .
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies , for example , led with : The killing of Suleimani “ has removed a huge threat to U.S. national security , ” continuing to warn against threats to “ U.S .
interests.
” Bild , Germany ’ s most popular newspaper , went with : “ [ Trump ] has freed the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ life was an atomic cloud over Tel Aviv .
Trump has acted in self-defense.
” Hypothetical Israeli and American victims weighed much heavier in the scale than the Arabs and others who died because of Suleimani ’ s actions .
For those who supported Trump ’ s ordering of the strike , it was about Suleimani ’ s impact on Americans or about supporting the U.S. president .
For those who opposed Trump ’ s move , it was about the stability of the region for American interests—or opposing Trump for domestic purposes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reporting around Iraqi protests following the killing , the Western media focused on grassroots opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq—ignoring that the protests also called for Iranian forces to leave .
Nowhere was that more visible than in the initial media focus , after Iran ’ s retaliation in Iraq , only on the possibility of American casualties .
( In the end , thankfully , nobody was killed at all . )
On one level , perhaps that ’ s understandable .
After all , the audience that the Beltway @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t necessarily of the region or from the region .
Their audience is domestic—so , naturally , they ’ ll talk about issues that are most relevant domestically .
And surely , that ’ s what every country will do—focus on their own interests .
But that shouldn ’ t be accepted as the norm , especially for the West and particularly the United States—because the impact the West has on the wider Arab world far outstrips anything in reverse .
For far too long , the wider region has been viewed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ without due consideration for how that same region looks at itself and understands itself .
It gives us such analysis as that suggested by the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman : “ One day they may name a street after President Trump in Tehran .
Why ?
Because Trump just ordered the assassination of possibly the dumbest man in Iran and the most overrated strategist in the Middle East.
” The consequences of that kind of narrow thinking are far starker than in reverse—because like it or not , the West in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular , has far more power in the Arab world than vice versa .
But listening to informed voices in the region who highlight victims will also help the West avoid catastrophes—for itself , as well as the Arab world , and arguably far beyond .
The Islamic State , for example , was not really considered a major problem for Western policymakers when it was rampaging against the peoples of the region—it became one when it began to target Westerners .
It ’ s not just a moral and ethical failure of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in this region with minimal or little care for how those of the region look at events therein .
It ’ s a strategic disaster of untold proportions .
At every step of the way , the record of catastrophic Western involvement in the region could have been averted by better local understanding .
There is no better way of doing that than by engaging with voices of the region more widely and with more seriousness .
Yet we ’ re still at a point where a major news network such as CNN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani ’ s death with a wide-ranging panel—none of whom are from the region .
There are better ways of going about this .
Commentators on France , say , are expected to be French , know French , or at least to have spent long amounts of time there .
That ’ s not the case for the Middle East .
It ’ s true that finding people who actually know the region is the harder option .
Those engaged in forming the nature of the debate in analytical circles and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal of stress , particularly against the backdrop of fast-moving stories .
It ’ s easy to go to the regular talking head that we know on the basis of previous work—usually a white man of a particular professional class—even if that work is only tangentially related to the subject of hand .
It will make for satisfying television , or a certain number of retweets on Twitter , and so forth .
But it is far more rewarding for listeners to benefit from years of experience and in-depth cultural understanding , rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ utterly ignorant about the countries they are talking about .
There are scores of such figures who do know the region ; who have spent years within it ; who engaged in a lot of effort to understand it ; who know the languages of it ; and who , ultimately , see the peoples of it as complicated and complex as any Western population .
And as noted : It ’ s a grave responsibility .
Informed policymakers are less likely to make reckless decisions that will engage their countries in turmoil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It ’ s not a guarantee , of course—but it ’ s certainly better than the alternative of relying on a cast of interpreters who are fumbling in their own outdated phrasebooks .

As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear. As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted , the voices of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese—the “main victims” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television. That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani’s role and the impact his death is having.
As the news of the killing of Qassem Suleimani sunk in, the differences between how it was covered in the West and the reaction in the wider Arab world became clear. As one Syrian writer based in the United States noted, the voices of Syrians, Iraqis, and Lebanese—the “main victims” of Suleimani—have been largely absent from U.S. television. That has led to an often misleading impression of Suleimani’s role and the impact his death is having.
I’ve been keenly listening to both the Western and Arab discourse, as a British think tanker in U.S. and British policy institutions, of English and Arab origins, who has spent the better part of the past decade working in the Arab world. In the aftermath of Suleimani’s death, it’s high time to center on voices from within the region, rather than exclude them. They, after all, are the ones who will pay the cost in blood of this action and Iran’s retaliation. Indeed, they’ve been paying that cost all along, while being kept on the margins of Western discussion.
Suleimani’s main impact should be judged by how he was perceived by the peoples of the region—not Americans or Westerners. And that perception, by and large, was negative. Suleimani was the leader of the Quds Force—a division within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps primarily dedicated to overseas operations and covert action of this deeply ideological outfit. It was for that reason that Arab journalists like Kareem Shaheen, who spent years as a Guardian reporter throughout the Middle East, and Kim Ghattas focused, likewise, on how Syrians, Iraqis, and other victims of Suleimani’s Quds Force were going to interpret the news.
That’s why the initial flurry of responses to his death from Arab media and from Arab figures was largely positive. Suleimani’s activities in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon had targeted scores of Arabs who were either fighting against Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad or protesting against their leaders in Beirut or Baghdad. The Palestinian activist Iyad el-Baghdadi spoke out strongly, centering on the struggles of movements dedicated to good governance and accountability in the region, rather than supporting or centering on the designs of Washington, Riyadh, Tehran, or really anyone else: Suleimani “was a war criminal and nobody in the communities that were subjected to his brutality will shed a tear for him. But we also *know* for fact Trump has no plan other than one-upmanship. Iraqis and Iranians will be left to pay the price.”
There were, of course, many who mourned his death in the region, primarily in Iran, as well as acolytes elsewhere. You saw that among officials of the Iranian regime, as well as allies and their proxies elsewhere. And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that he also had a genuine base of support, primarily in Iran, even while many Iranians also felt differently. Mistaken support for a terrible political leader is hardly unique to the Middle East. If nothing else, history teaches us—including rather recent history—that normally reasonable people can support truly outrageous political figures.
But the reactions also make it clear that this was not a Sunni-Shiite divide, despite Suleimani’s appalling use of sectarianism to further the fortunes of the Iranian regime. Many within Assad’s regime are Sunni, and they wanted Suleimani’s assistance. Many protesters in Iraq are Shiite, and they were targeted by Suleimani’s allies, as were protesters in Iran. Arab activists like Joey Ayoub put it succinctly: “The ‘problem’ is that us anti-sectarians refuse to use that ‘card’ as opposed to actual sectarians who do it all the time while pretending to be anti-sectarian.”
When I tried to follow discussions in Washington and Western media outlets, the focus was rather different. There was very little discussion about the peoples of the region, only the fortunes of the West. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, for example, led with: The killing of Suleimani “has removed a huge threat to U.S. national security,” continuing to warn against threats to “U.S. interests.” Bild, Germany’s most popular newspaper, went with: “[Trump] has freed the world of a monster whose aim in life was an atomic cloud over Tel Aviv. Trump has acted in self-defense.”
Hypothetical Israeli and American victims weighed much heavier in the scale than the Arabs and others who died because of Suleimani’s actions. For those who supported Trump’s ordering of the strike, it was about Suleimani’s impact on Americans or about supporting the U.S. president. For those who opposed Trump’s move, it was about the stability of the region for American interests—or opposing Trump for domestic purposes. Indeed, even in the immediate reporting around Iraqi protests following the killing, the Western media focused on grassroots opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq—ignoring that the protests also called for Iranian forces to leave. Nowhere was that more visible than in the initial media focus, after Iran’s retaliation in Iraq, only on the possibility of American casualties. (In the end, thankfully, nobody was killed at all.)
On one level, perhaps that’s understandable. After all, the audience that the Beltway and the Western media writ large isn’t necessarily of the region or from the region. Their audience is domestic—so, naturally, they’ll talk about issues that are most relevant domestically. And surely, that’s what every country will do—focus on their own interests.
But that shouldn’t be accepted as the norm, especially for the West and particularly the United States—because the impact the West has on the wider Arab world far outstrips anything in reverse. For far too long, the wider region has been viewed without due consideration for how that same region looks at itself and understands itself. That gives us an analysis that can often be dangerously distant and sometimes even callous, such as the notion that “One day they may name a street after President Trump in Tehran,” as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman recently claimed. To be sure, Middle Eastern depictions of the West can also be distorted. But the consequences of narrow Western thinking are far starker than in reverse—because like it or not, the West in general, and the United States in particular, has far more power in the Arab world than vice versa.
But listening to informed voices in the region who highlight victims will also help the West avoid catastrophes—for itself, as well as the Arab world, and arguably far beyond. The Islamic State, for example, was not really considered a major problem for Western policymakers when it was rampaging against the peoples of the region—it became one when it began to target Westerners. It’s not just a moral and ethical failure of the highest proportions that the West engages in this region with minimal or little care for the perspectives of the people there. It’s a strategic disaster of untold proportions.
At every step of the way, the record of catastrophic Western involvement in the region could have been averted by better local understanding. There is no better way of doing that than by engaging with voices of the region more widely and with more seriousness. Some Western media has sought out local voices and commentators, and broadened its coverage. Yet we’re still at a point where a major news network such as CNN can hold programs on the impacts of Suleimani’s death with a wide-ranging panel—none of whom are from the region.
There are better ways of going about this. Commentators on France, say, are expected to be French, know French, or at least to have spent long amounts of time there. That’s not the case for the Middle East.
It’s true that finding people who actually know the region is the harder option. Those engaged in forming the nature of the debate in analytical circles and the media arena are often under a great deal of stress, particularly against the backdrop of fast-moving stories. It’s easy to go to the regular talking head that we know on the basis of previous work, even if that work is only tangentially related to the subject at hand. It will make for satisfying television, or a certain number of retweets on Twitter, and so forth.
But it is far more rewarding for listeners to benefit from years of experience and in-depth cultural understanding, even if the vision presented might be more complex than an easy soundbite. There are scores of such figures who do know the region; who have spent years within it; who engaged in a lot of effort to understand it; who know the languages of it; and who, ultimately, see the people there as complicated and complex as any Western population.
And as noted: It’s a grave responsibility. Informed policymakers are less likely to make reckless decisions that will engage their countries in turmoil abroad—or worse, take them to war. It’s not a guarantee, of course—but it’s certainly better than the alternative of relying on a cast of interpreters who are fumbling in their own outdated phrasebooks.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--‘We Will Have to Wait and See if Iran Is Done’

‘ We Will Have to Wait and See if Iran Is Done ’ As a young general officer , one of retired Gen. Joseph Votel ’ s first jobs in the U.S. Defense Department was as the director of a task force established to defeat a lethal new threat that killed and maimed thousands of American and coalition troops in the early 2000s—improvised explosive devices .
The man who engineered Iran ’ s campaign to plant these deadly devices on battlefields across Iraq and Afghanistan : Qassem Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s elite Quds Force , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last week .
More than a decade later , Votel saw the impact of Iran ’ s malign activities firsthand as the head of U.S. Central Command from March 2016 to March 2019 .
In an interview with Foreign Policy , Votel weighed in on the thinking behind Tehran ’ s retaliatory strike on U.S. and coalition targets in Iraq on Tuesday and the need for the United States to rebuild its relationship with Iraq .
Foreign Policy : What message was Iran trying to send with the retaliatory strikes on Tuesday ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ was clearly designed to address both an internal and an external audience .
Tehran definitely chose a method that was unambiguous and very clearly linked back to them .
The signal there was that they wanted to show that it was coming from them and not hide behind their proxies .
The fact that they notified the Iraqis and then struck in areas that would not have casualties was indicative of their desire , hopefully , to seek some kind of offramp after this .
FP : Iran notably used its ballistic missile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cruise missiles or armed drones , as was the case in the attack on Saudi oil infrastructure last year .
What do you make of this ?
JV : I think they are trying to demonstrate a capability .
There is no big surprise that for a number of years now they have made investments in this particular area .
They have not only increased quantitatively .
They ’ ve increased qualitatively .
I don ’ t necessarily think a drone would ’ ve been the system that would ’ ve been chosen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they were trying to be unambiguous , to make sure it was clear it was them .
They know we track missiles—we know where they are coming from .
I don ’ t think they were trying to hide that .
FP : President Donald Trump in his response announced additional sanctions but no military action .
Do you think he was trying to de-escalate ?
JV : It was very clear from his remarks that the maximum pressure campaign continues , and he wants to stay focused on that .
I thought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some of the NATO partners to become part of the solution here and bring them on board .
He also mentioned that we share a common enemy with Iran in the Islamic State , and I took that to be perhaps an initial opportunity that there can be things that we can agree on and there are things that we can work on .
FP : Trump gave his address standing in front of the entire top U.S. military brass .
What message do you think he intended to convey ?
JV : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was to show unity .
There is no doubt it was designed to show strength and some resolve , and I think it did that .
I would note that the secretary of state , the vice president , and the secretary of defense were right there so that our civilians were up front as they should be .
FP : Iran ’ s foreign minister said after the strikes that Tehran had concluded its attacks and did not seek escalation .
Is the threat over ?
JV : I think we will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is done .
They have lots of capabilities and options .
I do assess some of their initial public communication is designed to take advantage of the current information environment and cast themselves in the best light possible with both internal and external audiences .
That said , my view is we ought to be paying attention .
We ’ ve got to be vigilant for other attacks , whether it is proxies or something happening in the maritime environment .
We shouldn ’ t just assume that because they say that that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
FP : Do you think Iran wants war with the United States ?
JV : I think we left them with no option but to respond .
They had to respond .
I don ’ t think that Iran wants head-to-head war with the United States—that said , I think one of their objectives is to get the United States out of the Middle East , to deconstruct these coalitions that we have led in that area .
So I think that remains very much part of their objective , and they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is through low-level attacks or otherwise .
FP : Did the strike on Suleimani damage the U.S. relationship with the Iraqi government ?
JV : We ’ ve put Iraq in a very difficult position here with our operation .
I ’ m not saying we shouldn ’ t have done it—I don ’ t know all the details , I haven ’ t been briefed on it and never will be .
But if we don ’ t incorporate our partners into this , if we don ’ t have a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ think we make it very , very difficult for them .
I hope it ’ s not irreversible , but it ’ s something we will have to work through .
FP : The Iraqi government voted after the Suleimani strike on a nonbinding resolution to expel U.S. troops .
Do you think the United States will leave Iraq , and what impact would that have on the Middle East ?
JV : I don ’ t know if it will happen or not .
I hope that it doesn ’ t happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a linchpin country in the region—it sits at an important point here .
It is a great place for us to exercise our influence , to be a good partner , and by doing that , I think it gives us a strategic advantage .
So I ’ m hopeful that we can work through this issue with the Iraqis .
In order to do that , in the coming days and weeks , we need to be very consistently and clearly communicating what we are doing—we need to reemphasize our interests in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our strategy in terms of what we are doing , and we need to really double down on our partnership here .
FP : Do you think the vote reflects the wishes of the majority of Iraqis ?
JV : The vote was largely the Shiite members of parliament—most of the Sunnis and close to all of the Kurds were not present—so I can ’ t say that that represents the view of the majority of Iraqis .
We ’ ve seen this before where there have been these nonbinding resolutions in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ indicate what they really want to have happen .
So I don ’ t believe that all the Iraqis want us to go , but I do believe we need to shore up this aspect of the relationship by being good , reliable , open partners .
My experience as commander of U.S. Central Command for the last several years was largely to the defeat-ISIS campaign .
By being very open and by being transparent in things we were doing , and by incorporating the Iraqis into the decision-making process for the campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partners for them .
We have to be trusted partners , and when we do that , then they will recognize that .
But it isn ’ t something you turn off and turn on .
Where trust is lost , you have to rebuild it .
FP : What advice would you give your successors in the aftermath of the attack ?
JV : If I were still in the Central Command seat , I ’ d be in the assessment phase here : What just happened ?
What is our assessment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expose in them , and what does it expose in us ?
I would want to make sure I understood the situation as best as I could .
Secondly , I think we want to make sure we stay vigilant .
We ’ ve seen a response , but of course Iran is multifaceted in their threat .
Third , we have to have clear , consistent communication—it would be important for me to be talking to our partners and making sure they understood what happened to the best of our ability and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next .

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foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--Trump’s Real Trade War Is Being Waged on the WTO

Trump ’ s Real Trade War Is Being Waged on the WTO Since the beginning of 2018 , the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has waged an aggressive war on the global trading system .
Although much of the media coverage has focused on the ongoing U.S.-Chinese trade conflict and the administration ’ s efforts to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement , a subtler development could prove more consequential : the United States ’ reckless decision to disempower the World Trade Organization ’ s Appellate Body .
This move could mark a real turning point in U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , go back to the early 1930s .
As the world slipped into recession , Republicans in Congress passed and President Herbert Hoover signed the Tariff Act of 1930 , colloquially known as Smoot-Hawley , which raised tariffs on about 900 products .
Because Smoot-Hawley coincided with the severe deflation brought on by the early stages of the Great Depression , the average U.S. tariff on goods imported from other countries increased by about 45 percent between 1929 and 1932 .
Smoot-Hawley burdened America ’ s domestic consumers with higher prices and triggered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the act did not cause the Depression , it certainly deepened and prolonged it while adding fuel to the fire of nationalism raging around the globe .
By 1934 , it became apparent that the Smoot-Hawley tariffs were an economic and foreign-policy disaster , and policymakers began working to atone for America ’ s protectionist sins .
In many ways , their efforts marked the beginning of the 80-plus-year U.S.-led international economic order .
Starting with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 , the trajectory of U.S. trade policy was radically overhauled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s first secretary of state , Cordell Hull .
As a firm believer in the economic and foreign-policy benefits of trade liberalization , Hull was a fierce critic of Smoot-Hawley .
Throughout the latter part of the 1930s , he pushed the Roosevelt administration to use the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to enter into freer trade agreements with several countries and eventually brought the average tariff rate down to about its pre-Smoot-Hawley level—with the added bonus of having other countries reduce their tariffs on U.S. exports in turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the late 1930s , the United States ’ trade liberalization efforts were on put on hold .
As the war raged on , however , the State Department began working on ambitious plans to help rebuild Europe following the war .
A vital component of the plan involved rebuilding and expanding the global trading system .
When the war did end in 1945 , the United States was the dominant global military and economic power .
American policymakers leveraged their newfound position to create a postwar order that reflected the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American exporters , rebuilding war-torn Europe , and promoting trade as a bulwark for future peace .
Through a tumultuous round of negotiations in 1947 , 23 mostly Allied countries formed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) , a vital component of the U.S.-led postwar order , which went into effect Jan. 1 , 1948 .
The GATT reduced tariffs and created basic trade rules to guide international commercial policy .
Global trade volumes exploded , and the related economic boom helped rebuild Europe and Japan .
The United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reduce tariffs and nontariff barriers .
Although the GATT worked relatively well for the first few decades , by the mid-1970s it was apparent the system had a number of flaws , most notably the lack of a binding dispute settlement mechanism to hold countries accountable for violating the agreement .
As things stood , GATT members could block the formation of arbitration panels and the adoption of such panels ’ decisions , allowing violators to skirt punishment .
The United States took advantage of that flaw and began a policy of what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dubbed “ aggressive unilateralism.
” Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s , the United States would impose unilateral tariffs , ostensibly in order to claw open foreign markets .
This approach had a limited record of success , but it angered a number of trading partners , including the Europeans .
As tensions deepened , GATT members began negotiating the Uruguay Round in 1986 at the behest of the United States .
Talks were slow , but there was eventually a breakthrough with the so-called grand bargain .
This deal converted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The United States agreed to stop its aggressive unilateral approach , and the Europeans agreed to a binding dispute settlement .
All alleged violations of rules would be settled within the WTO ’ s new system .
Although not perfect , the dispute settlement system—which includes the Appellate Body , the highest court of international trade—has worked well for nearly 25 years .
Trade conflicts rarely spread like wildfire the way they did before the advent of the rules-based trading system .
And despite the sitting U.S. president ’ s claims to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about 85 percent of the cases it brings to the WTO .
It also wins a greater percentage of the cases brought against it than do most other member nations .
The system is a vital tool the United States has successfully used to target foreign protectionism and to ensure that WTO members abide by their commitments .
So while China ’ s mercantilist trade policies may pose problems for the long-term viability of the rules-based system , and the failure to significantly revise trade rules since the completion of the Uruguay Round @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the value of the WTO as a forum for economic liberalization , the more immediate threat to the global system is the Trump administration ’ s war of attrition on the WTO ’ s Appellate Body .
Citing a litany of disagreements with the Appellate Body—some legitimate , and some not—the Trump administration has continued to block nominees to the Geneva-based tribunal .
With just one member as of mid-December 2019 , the forum is now unable to form the quorum necessary to hear disputes .
Without a functioning Appellate Body , countries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ level of the dispute mechanism can effectively block the decision by filing an appeal , and the case will languish .
In other words , the world could be heading back to the days of the broken GATT enforcement system .
To be clear , the WTO will remain intact as a system of rules that will largely be adhered to , as well as a forum to negotiate new rules .
But the dispute settlement system , the “ crown jewel ” of the WTO , has been damaged—perhaps irrevocably so .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the late 1940s and again in the early 1990s was indispensable to the success of building the multilateral system .
The United States created the status quo , and the imperative to fix it reflects the United States ’ accumulated responsibility .
All in all , the United States is walking a lonely path into worse economic circumstances .
If Washington decides to go it alone , it will tarnish its reputation on the global stage , hurt its ability to shape the productive rules-based system to its own specifications , abandon a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , above all , abdicate its responsibility to lead an institution that it took enormous effort and foresight to create .
Others will weigh in on the economic and legal ramifications of the Trump administration ’ s policy choices , but this development is an ugly stain on U.S. international economic leadership .

Since the beginning of 2018, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has waged an aggressive war on the global trading system. Although much of the media coverage has focused on the ongoing U.S.-Chinese trade conflict and the administration’s efforts to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement, a subtler development could prove more consequential: the United States’ reckless decision to disempower the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body. This move could mark a real turning point in U.S. global economic leadership.
Since the beginning of 2018, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has waged an aggressive war on the global trading system. Although much of the media coverage has focused on the ongoing U.S.-Chinese trade conflict and the administration’s efforts to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement, a subtler development could prove more consequential: the United States’ reckless decision to disempower the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body. This move could mark a real turning point in U.S. global economic leadership.
To understand why, go back to the early 1930s. As the world slipped into recession, Republicans in Congress passed and President Herbert Hoover signed the Tariff Act of 1930, colloquially known as Smoot-Hawley, which raised tariffs on about 900 products. Because Smoot-Hawley coincided with the severe deflation brought on by the early stages of the Great Depression, the average U.S. tariff on goods imported from other countries increased by about 45 percent between 1929 and 1932.
Smoot-Hawley burdened America’s domestic consumers with higher prices and triggered predictable retaliation from trading partners. Although the act did not cause the Depression, it certainly deepened and prolonged it while adding fuel to the fire of nationalism raging around the globe.
By 1934, it became apparent that the Smoot-Hawley tariffs were an economic and foreign-policy disaster, and policymakers began working to atone for America’s protectionist sins. In many ways, their efforts marked the beginning of the 80-plus-year U.S.-led international economic order.
Starting with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the trajectory of U.S. trade policy was radically overhauled. These efforts were largely driven by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first secretary of state, Cordell Hull. As a firm believer in the economic and foreign-policy benefits of trade liberalization, Hull was a fierce critic of Smoot-Hawley. Throughout the latter part of the 1930s, he pushed the Roosevelt administration to use the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to enter into freer trade agreements with several countries and eventually brought the average tariff rate down to about its pre-Smoot-Hawley level—with the added bonus of having other countries reduce their tariffs on U.S. exports in turn.
As World War II engulfed Europe in the late 1930s, the United States’ trade liberalization efforts were on put on hold. As the war raged on, however, the State Department began working on ambitious plans to help rebuild Europe following the war. A vital component of the plan involved rebuilding and expanding the global trading system.
When the war did end in 1945, the United States was the dominant global military and economic power. American policymakers leveraged their newfound position to create a postwar order that reflected the United States’ priorities: expanding market access for American exporters, rebuilding war-torn Europe, and promoting trade as a bulwark for future peace. Through a tumultuous round of negotiations in 1947, 23 mostly Allied countries formed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a vital component of the U.S.-led postwar order, which went into effect Jan. 1, 1948.
The GATT reduced tariffs and created basic trade rules to guide international commercial policy. Global trade volumes exploded, and the related economic boom helped rebuild Europe and Japan. The United States led subsequent negotiating rounds to further reduce tariffs and nontariff barriers.
Although the GATT worked relatively well for the first few decades, by the mid-1970s it was apparent the system had a number of flaws, most notably the lack of a binding dispute settlement mechanism to hold countries accountable for violating the agreement. As things stood, GATT members could block the formation of arbitration panels and the adoption of such panels’ decisions, allowing violators to skirt punishment.
The United States took advantage of that flaw and began a policy of what the Columbia University trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati dubbed “aggressive unilateralism.” Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the United States would impose unilateral tariffs, ostensibly in order to claw open foreign markets. This approach had a limited record of success, but it angered a number of trading partners, including the Europeans.
As tensions deepened, GATT members began negotiating the Uruguay Round in 1986 at the behest of the United States. Talks were slow, but there was eventually a breakthrough with the so-called grand bargain. This deal converted the GATT into the World Trade Organization. The United States agreed to stop its aggressive unilateral approach, and the Europeans agreed to a binding dispute settlement. All alleged violations of rules would be settled within the WTO’s new system.
Although not perfect, the dispute settlement system—which includes the Appellate Body, the highest court of international trade—has worked well for nearly 25 years. Trade conflicts rarely spread like wildfire the way they did before the advent of the rules-based trading system. And despite the sitting U.S. president’s claims to the contrary, the United States wins about 85 percent of the cases it brings to the WTO. It also wins a greater percentage of the cases brought against it than do most other member nations. The system is a vital tool the United States has successfully used to target foreign protectionism and to ensure that WTO members abide by their commitments.
So while China’s mercantilist trade policies may pose problems for the long-term viability of the rules-based system, and the failure to significantly revise trade rules since the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1993 has led observers to question the value of the WTO as a forum for economic liberalization, the more immediate threat to the global system is the Trump administration’s war of attrition on the WTO’s Appellate Body. Citing a litany of disagreements with the Appellate Body—some legitimate, and some not—the Trump administration has continued to block nominees to the Geneva-based tribunal.
With just one member as of mid-December 2019, the forum is now unable to form the quorum necessary to hear disputes. Without a functioning Appellate Body, countries that lose their cases at the panel level of the dispute mechanism can effectively block the decision by filing an appeal, and the case will languish. In other words, the world could be heading back to the days of the broken GATT enforcement system.
To be clear, the WTO will remain intact as a system of rules that will largely be adhered to, as well as a forum to negotiate new rules. But the dispute settlement system, the “crown jewel” of the WTO, has been damaged—perhaps irrevocably so.
The United States’ outsized influence in the late 1940s and again in the early 1990s was indispensable to the success of building the multilateral system. The United States created the status quo, and the imperative to fix it reflects the United States’ accumulated responsibility.
All in all, the United States is walking a lonely path into worse economic circumstances. If Washington decides to go it alone, it will tarnish its reputation on the global stage, hurt its ability to shape the productive rules-based system to its own specifications, abandon a system from which Americans benefit, and, above all, abdicate its responsibility to lead an institution that it took enormous effort and foresight to create.
Others will weigh in on the economic and legal ramifications of the Trump administration’s policy choices, but this development is an ugly stain on U.S. international economic leadership.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--Western Officials Believe Iran Shot Down Ukrainian Airliner

Officials in the U.S. and Canadian governments believe Iranian missiles shot down a Ukrainian commercial airliner taking off from Tehran on Wednesday , adding a new layer of complication to the dramatic escalation in tensions between Iran and the United States .
“ We have intelligence from multiple sources , including our allies and our own intelligence .
The evidence indicates that the plane was shot down by an Iranian surface-to-air missile , ” Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said in a press conference on Thursday afternoon .
“ This may well have been unintentional.
” A U.S. official who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plane could have been mistakenly shot down by Iranian missile systems .
The downing of the plane came immediately after Iran launched more than a dozen missiles at military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops .
Iranian air defenses would have been on high alert at that time .
The new revelation implicates the Iranian regime in the deaths of 176 passengers and crew members of the Ukraine International Airlines flight that was traveling from Tehran to Kyiv before it crashed , just hours after Tehran launched a series of missiles at U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani .
Iranian , Canadian , Ukrainian , and other European nationals were on board the flight .
A majority of passengers on board were bound for Canada , and at least 63 of those killed were Canadian citizens .
Trudeau said he would not get into the specifics of the intelligence , but he was confident enough to share the news publicly .
He urged the Iranian government to cooperate with Canada and other countries for a “ full and credible investigation ” into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That means closure , transparency , accountability , and justice .
And this government will not rest until we get that , ” he said .
Asked whether the United States shouldered any of the blame for the events that led to the downing of the plane , Trudeau said , “ I think it is too soon to be drawing conclusions or assigning blame or responsibility in whatever proportions.
” U.S. defense officials reportedly believe the surface-to-air missiles Iran used to shoot down the plane were Russian-made , according to CNN @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not respond to requests for comment .
Iranian officials initially told state media that the plane crashed due to a technical fault and that it appeared to turn around shortly after taking off from Tehran before disappearing off radar .
Iran has so far refused to share the plane ’ s black box , which collects flight data , with Ukrainian authorities , though it has pledged to do so at a later date .
Iranian authorities have dismissed notions that the plane was shot down and said the cause of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is now up to the experts to investigate and to find answers to the questions of what caused the crash , ” Ukraine ’ s deputy foreign minister , Sergiy Kyslytsya , said in a statement on behalf of Canada , Germany , Sweden , and Ukraine at the United Nations on Thursday .
“ To do so , our experts must receive unconditional support for their investigations into the incident.
” When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday about the circumstances surrounding the crash , Trump said , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mistake on the other side .
… It has nothing to do with us.
” He added that the plane was flying in a “ rough neighborhood.
” This is not the first time civilians on board a commercial airliner have paid the price for tension between Tehran and Washington .
In 1988 , Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile fired from a U.S.-guided missile destroyer while flying over the Persian Gulf , killing all 290 on board .
According to the U.S. government , the ship ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an attacking fighter jet .

Robbie Gramer, Lara Seligman and Colum Lynch

Officials in the U.S. and Canadian governments believe Iranian missiles shot down a Ukrainian commercial airliner taking off from Tehran on Wednesday, adding a new layer of complication to the dramatic escalation in tensions between Iran and the United States.
Officials in the U.S. and Canadian governments believe Iranian missiles shot down a Ukrainian commercial airliner taking off from Tehran on Wednesday, adding a new layer of complication to the dramatic escalation in tensions between Iran and the United States.
“We have intelligence from multiple sources, including our allies and our own intelligence. The evidence indicates that the plane was shot down by an Iranian surface-to-air missile,” Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said in a press conference on Thursday afternoon. “This may well have been unintentional.”
A U.S. official who spoke to Foreign Policy also suggested the plane could have been mistakenly shot down by Iranian missile systems. The downing of the plane came immediately after Iran launched more than a dozen missiles at military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops. Iranian air defenses would have been on high alert at that time.
The new revelation implicates the Iranian regime in the deaths of 176 passengers and crew members of the Ukraine International Airlines flight that was traveling from Tehran to Kyiv before it crashed, just hours after Tehran launched a series of missiles at U.S. military installations in Iraq in retaliation for the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani. Iranian, Canadian, Ukrainian, and other European nationals were on board the flight. A majority of passengers on board were bound for Canada, and at least 63 of those killed were Canadian citizens.
Trudeau said he would not get into the specifics of the intelligence, but he was confident enough to share the news publicly. He urged the Iranian government to cooperate with Canada and other countries for a “full and credible investigation” into the crash. “I want answers. That means closure, transparency, accountability, and justice. And this government will not rest until we get that,” he said.
Asked whether the United States shouldered any of the blame for the events that led to the downing of the plane, Trudeau said, “I think it is too soon to be drawing conclusions or assigning blame or responsibility in whatever proportions.”
U.S. defense officials reportedly believe the surface-to-air missiles Iran used to shoot down the plane were Russian-made, according to CNN. The U.S. Defense and State departments did not respond to requests for comment.
Iranian officials initially told state media that the plane crashed due to a technical fault and that it appeared to turn around shortly after taking off from Tehran before disappearing off radar. Iran has so far refused to share the plane’s black box, which collects flight data, with Ukrainian authorities, though it has pledged to do so at a later date.
Iranian authorities have dismissed notions that the plane was shot down and said the cause of the crash is still under investigation.
“It is now up to the experts to investigate and to find answers to the questions of what caused the crash,” Ukraine’s deputy foreign minister, Sergiy Kyslytsya, said in a statement on behalf of Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Ukraine at the United Nations on Thursday. “To do so, our experts must receive unconditional support for their investigations into the incident.”
When asked by reporters at the White House on Thursday about the circumstances surrounding the crash, Trump said, “Somebody could’ve made a mistake on the other side. … It has nothing to do with us.”
He added that the plane was flying in a “rough neighborhood.”
This is not the first time civilians on board a commercial airliner have paid the price for tension between Tehran and Washington. In 1988, Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down by a surface-to-air missile fired from a U.S.-guided missile destroyer while flying over the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 on board. According to the U.S. government, the ship’s crew incorrectly identified the airliner as an attacking fighter jet.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-09--For Now, U.S. Troops Are Likely in Iraq to Stay

For Now , U.S .
Troops Are Likely in Iraq to Stay On Jan. 5 , shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump authorized the targeted killing of the Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil , Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi asked the parliament to take “ urgent measures ” to evict U.S. troops from his country .
The next day , the parliament complied , passing a resolution to expel them , although it is nonbinding to the government .
Shortly after , Iran launched 20 missiles at two military bases in Iraq that house U.S. troops .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ makes the issue of the U.S. military presence in Iraq even more contentious in Baghdad .
As tensions intensified earlier in the week , Abdul-Mahdi felt that he had no choice but to call for urgent action .
But privately , the prime minister likely wants the United States to stay , at least until a modicum of normalcy and stability in Iraq is achieved .
He understands full well that , without U.S. involvement , the Islamic State has a good chance of coming back and Iran will be all the freer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Based on discussions with Iraqis both in Washington and inside the country , most Iraqis desire neither outcome .
Despite their concerns about a continued U.S. military presence , many Iraqis we ’ ve spoken to see the United States as a benign balancing force against Iran ’ s nefarious influence .
For that reason , it ’ s not unreasonable to assume that while the conversation among Iraqis about the U.S. troops will surely continue , the Iraqi government will take no definitive action anytime soon .
But assume for a moment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong enough momentum in Baghdad that the expulsion of U.S. troops proceeds .
As unlikely as such a scenario might be , it is worth planning for this contingency .
If Baghdad does push out U.S. forces , it will be throwing away a legacy of heavy sacrifice and historic achievements by both Americans and Iraqis .
Most recently , the two militaries fought side by side to destroy the Islamic State ’ s caliphate in Iraq .
Together , they liberated numerous cities and rescued hundreds of thousands of people living under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Those are accomplishments worth being proud of and must not be forgotten .
Alone , the Iraqi military is not ready to stop the Islamic State from reemerging .
And as the New York Times reported last August , the insurgent group is already “ gathering new strength , conducting guerrilla attacks across Iraq and Syria , retooling its financial networks and targeting new recruits.
” Without U.S. support , moreover , Iraqi politicians will not be able to prevent Iran from dominating Baghdad and subjugating Iraq ’ s Sunni and Kurdish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least some Iraqi legislators were strong-armed into voting to push the U.S. soldiers out of the country by pro-Iran members of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces , which were under Suleimani ’ s control .
If the United States withdraws , it would lose as well—and big .
Its influence in the Middle East would wane , and its leadership and credibility as a partner of choice around the world would be weakened .
The problems that are left behind would only grow and , at some point , would require the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight the fight that the current generation should have finished .
The United States has no interest in having a large military presence in Iraq forever .
But it does have every interest in a more stable and secure country .
And for the time being , that isn ’ t something the Iraqi military can provide on its own , although it is getting closer : The U.S. troop presence in the country has gone from 150,000 in 2008 to just over 5,000 today , which shows significant progress .
Certainly , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ able to help the Iraqis build a strong military remotely , as efforts would necessarily be limited to transferring yet more trucks and weapons to the country .
Instead , for Iraq to have an effective military , it needs help building defense institutional capacity .
As recent defense modernization plans suggest , the Iraqi military wants to become self-sufficient and capable of both defending its country and participating in coalition operations .
But without the institutional infrastructure that glues the basic elements of defense together , such goals will be difficult to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among Iraq ’ s national security institutions , Baghdad is largely unable to develop true national defense strategies and policies , build joint capabilities and doctrine , and address human resource management issues .
In turn , it is unable to effectively staff and operate the vast amount of defense systems the United States sells it .
Defense institution-building won ’ t be easy—especially because defense reform depends on political reform—but it is still worth pursuing .
Defense institution-building won ’ t be easy—especially because defense reform depends on political reform—but it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both U.S. and Iraqi national security interests .
To the extent that the U.S. military is allowed to stay in Iraq , there are a couple of things it can do to push this agenda forward .
First , American officials should elevate the issue of defense institution-building in high-level meetings with Iraqi leaders and others in the region .
By showing that the United States takes the issue seriously , it sends a message to the Iraqis about its importance .
Second , the United States must make sure that its programs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Defense Advisors and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies—have enough resources to truly help partners with that mission .
They ’ re currently massively under-resourced and could use at least a 60 percent upgrade in funding .
Third , the United States needs to focus more on joint planning with regional partners by integrating institution-building into this process .
This means that the next time U.S. officials run a joint military commission meeting with those partners , don ’ t treat the issue of institutional capacity as an afterthought .
Fourth , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military personnel in its partners ’ defense ministries to advise on all matters of national security .
Such programs exist—for example , the Ministry of Defense Advisors .
But neither the United States nor its partners have taken full advantage of them .
They may be politically problematic in Iraq at the moment , but they could be used in the future .
Lastly , the United States should put more emphasis on educating partner militaries about the value of defense institution-building .
This is something former Central Command Commander Joseph Votel recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ amount of money the United States spends on International Military Education and Training programs , which provide training and education grants to students from partner nations .
But the United States can ’ t effectively pursue any of its comprehensive defense institution-building programs without being physically in the country , where it can actively mentor , advise , and train .
After the Iranian strikes on the U.S. troops in Iraq , and as Tehran contemplates further options for retaliation , Washington should be mindful of Tehran ’ s ultimate goal : to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S. mission in Iraq is not finished , and both countries risk losing everything if the United States goes .
They owe it to those who have died in the fight to secure Iraq and build a more sustainable security partnership .

On Jan. 5, shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump authorized the targeted killing of the Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi asked the parliament to take “urgent measures” to evict U.S. troops from his country. The next day, the parliament complied, passing a resolution to expel them, although it is nonbinding to the government. Shortly after, Iran launched 20 missiles at two military bases in Iraq that house U.S. troops. The move, meant to avenge Suleimani, makes the issue of the U.S. military presence in Iraq even more contentious in Baghdad.
On Jan. 5, shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump authorized the targeted killing of the Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi soil, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi asked the parliament to take “urgent measures” to evict U.S. troops from his country. The next day, the parliament complied, passing a resolution to expel them, although it is nonbinding to the government. Shortly after, Iran launched 20 missiles at two military bases in Iraq that house U.S. troops. The move, meant to avenge Suleimani, makes the issue of the U.S. military presence in Iraq even more contentious in Baghdad.
As tensions intensified earlier in the week, Abdul-Mahdi felt that he had no choice but to call for urgent action. But privately, the prime minister likely wants the United States to stay, at least until a modicum of normalcy and stability in Iraq is achieved. He understands full well that, without U.S. involvement, the Islamic State has a good chance of coming back and Iran will be all the freer to exert control over his country.
Based on discussions with Iraqis both in Washington and inside the country, most Iraqis desire neither outcome. Despite their concerns about a continued U.S. military presence, many Iraqis we’ve spoken to see the United States as a benign balancing force against Iran’s nefarious influence. For that reason, it’s not unreasonable to assume that while the conversation among Iraqis about the U.S. troops will surely continue, the Iraqi government will take no definitive action anytime soon.
But assume for a moment that Iranian-allied forces are able to generate strong enough momentum in Baghdad that the expulsion of U.S. troops proceeds. As unlikely as such a scenario might be, it is worth planning for this contingency.
If Baghdad does push out U.S. forces, it will be throwing away a legacy of heavy sacrifice and historic achievements by both Americans and Iraqis. Most recently, the two militaries fought side by side to destroy the Islamic State’s caliphate in Iraq. Together, they liberated numerous cities and rescued hundreds of thousands of people living under the militant group’s barbaric reign. Those are accomplishments worth being proud of and must not be forgotten.
Alone, the Iraqi military is not ready to stop the Islamic State from reemerging. And as the New York Times reported last August, the insurgent group is already “gathering new strength, conducting guerrilla attacks across Iraq and Syria, retooling its financial networks and targeting new recruits.”
Without U.S. support, moreover, Iraqi politicians will not be able to prevent Iran from dominating Baghdad and subjugating Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish populations. It is likely that at least some Iraqi legislators were strong-armed into voting to push the U.S. soldiers out of the country by pro-Iran members of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, which were under Suleimani’s control.
If the United States withdraws, it would lose as well—and big. Its influence in the Middle East would wane, and its leadership and credibility as a partner of choice around the world would be weakened. The problems that are left behind would only grow and, at some point, would require the next generation of Americans to go back and fight the fight that the current generation should have finished.
The United States has no interest in having a large military presence in Iraq forever. But it does have every interest in a more stable and secure country. And for the time being, that isn’t something the Iraqi military can provide on its own, although it is getting closer: The U.S. troop presence in the country has gone from 150,000 in 2008 to just over 5,000 today, which shows significant progress.
Certainly, the United States won’t be able to help the Iraqis build a strong military remotely, as efforts would necessarily be limited to transferring yet more trucks and weapons to the country. Instead, for Iraq to have an effective military, it needs help building defense institutional capacity.
As recent defense modernization plans suggest, the Iraqi military wants to become self-sufficient and capable of both defending its country and participating in coalition operations. But without the institutional infrastructure that glues the basic elements of defense together, such goals will be difficult to attain. After all, without coherence among Iraq’s national security institutions, Baghdad is largely unable to develop true national defense strategies and policies, build joint capabilities and doctrine, and address human resource management issues. In turn, it is unable to effectively staff and operate the vast amount of defense systems the United States sells it.
Defense institution-building won’t be easy—especially because defense reform depends on political reform—but it is still worth pursuing.
Defense institution-building won’t be easy—especially because defense reform depends on political reform—but it is still worth pursuing, because it serves both U.S. and Iraqi national security interests. To the extent that the U.S. military is allowed to stay in Iraq, there are a couple of things it can do to push this agenda forward.
First, American officials should elevate the issue of defense institution-building in high-level meetings with Iraqi leaders and others in the region. By showing that the United States takes the issue seriously, it sends a message to the Iraqis about its importance.
Second, the United States must make sure that its programs focused on defense institution-building—including the Ministry of Defense Advisors and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies—have enough resources to truly help partners with that mission. They’re currently massively under-resourced and could use at least a 60 percent upgrade in funding.
Third, the United States needs to focus more on joint planning with regional partners by integrating institution-building into this process. This means that the next time U.S. officials run a joint military commission meeting with those partners, don’t treat the issue of institutional capacity as an afterthought.
Fourth, the United States can embed more of its military personnel in its partners’ defense ministries to advise on all matters of national security. Such programs exist—for example, the Ministry of Defense Advisors. But neither the United States nor its partners have taken full advantage of them. They may be politically problematic in Iraq at the moment, but they could be used in the future.
Lastly, the United States should put more emphasis on educating partner militaries about the value of defense institution-building. This is something former Central Command Commander Joseph Votel recently highlighted when he argued for tripling the amount of money the United States spends on International Military Education and Training programs, which provide training and education grants to students from partner nations.
But the United States can’t effectively pursue any of its comprehensive defense institution-building programs without being physically in the country, where it can actively mentor, advise, and train.
After the Iranian strikes on the U.S. troops in Iraq, and as Tehran contemplates further options for retaliation, Washington should be mindful of Tehran’s ultimate goal: to drive the United States out of Iraq. The U.S. mission in Iraq is not finished, and both countries risk losing everything if the United States goes. They owe it to those who have died in the fight to secure Iraq and build a more sustainable security partnership.