foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Why Not to Trust That Early Wuhan Study

Why Not to Trust That Early Wuhan Study

Why Not to Trust That Early Wuhan Study Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : An unreviewed draft study about the timeline of the coronavirus could undermine more serious allegations against Beijing , the European Union pushes back on China over its aggressive diplomacy , and cities rebuke a call to make street vendors a part of economic recovery .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
An unreviewed early draft of a study—known as a preprint—from Harvard Medical School @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus may have been spreading in Wuhan , China , as early as August 2019 received widespread media coverage this week .
U.S. President Donald Trump and others keen to blame the pandemic on China have seized on the draft paper .
But as numerous analysts have pointed out , the preprint has serious problems—including cherry-picking data .
The Harvard study indicated that there had been a rise for certain search terms associated with COVID-19 in August .
But other researchers were unable to reproduce the results on the Baidu search engine using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ cough ” and “ diarrhea.
” And there was no rise in searches for “ pneumonia ” or “ flu ” in the same time frame .
The Harvard study also cites data on an increase in parked cars at Wuhan hospitals , but that appears in at least one instance to be a result of construction blocking visual access the year before .
Furthermore , given the reproduction rate of the virus and the lack of restrictions until late January , the number of victims in Wuhan would have been much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sketchy claims .
It is not unusual for the media to pick up on scientific preprints only for some claims to be rolled back after further review—without journalists following up on the retractions .
But the Harvard study follows a concerted effort by the Trump administration to promote the idea that China was aware of the pandemic well before January .
So far that effort has included a nonsensical paper by Pentagon contractors , a barely researched dossier promoted as an intelligence document , and selective leaks to the press .
That push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ consume the Trump administration ’ s attention .
After all , the chance of a 2020 reelection campaign focused entirely on China seems smaller than it did last month .
But serious charges against China ’ s coronavirus response—that the state wasted critical weeks in January concealing information about transmission , initially reacted with oppression , and has obfuscated any investigation—are lost amid the false claims .
EU pushes back on Beijing .
China ’ s aggressive diplomacy in Europe is now causing serious pushback .
The European Union , normally reluctant to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government of running “ targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU , its neighborhood , and globally , ” along with Russia .
The move may be a response to earlier criticism that the EU softened a report on the same topic .
Meanwhile , Britain ’ s swerve away from China has been fast , with Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposing a D-10 alliance of democracies—the existing G-7 , plus South Korea , India , and Australia—to build 5G networks free of Chinese influence .
The Hong Kong crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing warning that it may pull out a British nuclear power construction deal .
Since the original nuclear deal was widely seen as a disaster in the U.K. , this doesn ’ t give Beijing much leverage .
Skirmishes with India .
Despite diplomatic efforts , Chinese and Indian soldiers are still scuffling along the Himalayan border , and both countries ’ nationalist media outlets are having a field day .
It follows a predictable cycle : The Global Times and other papers in China produce stories targeted at insulting India , knowing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Indian media—thus allowing the editors in China to boast of their impact to their bosses .
The drawdown of forces may ease the conflict , but as Anik Joshi writes in Foreign Policy , it looks as though India is ready to choose sides against China in any future conflict—just as China and the United States rattle their sabers and strengthen their presence in the Pacific .
Kaohsiung ’ s mayoral recall .
In another blow to the pro-China Kuomintang ( KMT ) in Taiwan , voters in the city of Kaohsiung @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu as mayor .
After a meteoric rise that was compared to Trump ’ s , Han once seemed like a serious challenger to the incumbent president , Tsai Ing-wen .
But a series of scandals over his ties to China and the impact of repression in Hong Kong on Taiwanese voters led to a crushing defeat in January .
The KMT is trying to shake off its image as subservient to Beijing , while China has made aggressive moves toward Taiwan .
Street stall battle .
Chinese cities are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Premier Li Keqiang to make street vendors a critical part of the country ’ s economic recovery .
Li praised street vendors on June 1 , saying the government would give them support .
But municipalities are traditionally hostile to street vendors .
They are often targets of the chengguan—the urban security forces who bully , beat , and demand bribes from vendors .
In particular , metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai have long striven to reduce the number of rural migrants , who run most street stalls , in order to keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urban middle classes and to preserve an image as modern cities .
Days after Li ’ s comments , which were not accompanied by formal policies , Beijing vendors who believed they would now be protected were driven off the streets .
Suspicious apps .
Amid the rising border tensions , an Indian-made app that targeted and removed Chinese-made mobile apps went viral last week before being removed from the Google Play Store .
But Indian users have organized to suggest alternatives to Chinese-made apps out of rising nationalist sentiments and fears of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top smartphone brands in India are Chinese , and they normally come prepackaged with a suite of apps .
Oil recovery .
Some data indicates that the speed of economic recovery in China may be faster than feared , with oil use already back to 90 percent of pre-coronavirus levels .
Domestic demand for consumer goods is strong , but a lack of global demand is hamstringing Chinese manufacturers : Reopened factories are struggling to find customers .
Welfare for Autocrats : How Social Assistance in China Cares for Its Rulers , by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has made a big push to alleviate poverty while doubling down on repression and colonial atrocities .
But as Jennifer Pan shows in this important study , the two are connected : Dibao , a minimum-income program that is China ’ s main poverty relief tool , is another means for the government to surveil and control the population .
Pan demonstrates how the state obsession with control shifts funding priorities elsewhere , such as demanding that rural residents be fully integrated into security systems , creating models that reinforce and layer oppression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: An unreviewed draft study about the timeline of the coronavirus could undermine more serious allegations against Beijing, the European Union pushes back on China over its aggressive diplomacy, and cities rebuke a call to make street vendors a part of economic recovery.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: An unreviewed draft study about the timeline of the coronavirus could undermine more serious allegations against Beijing, the European Union pushes back on China over its aggressive diplomacy, and cities rebuke a call to make street vendors a part of economic recovery.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Draft Research Raises Murky Questions
An unreviewed early draft of a study—known as a preprint—from Harvard Medical School researchers with data that suggests that the coronavirus may have been spreading in Wuhan, China, as early as August 2019 received widespread media coverage this week. U.S. President Donald Trump and others keen to blame the pandemic on China have seized on the draft paper. But as numerous analysts have pointed out, the preprint has serious problems—including cherry-picking data.
The Harvard study indicated that there had been a rise for certain search terms associated with COVID-19 in August. But other researchers were unable to reproduce the results on the Baidu search engine using the most commonly used Chinese terms for “cough” and “diarrhea.” And there was no rise in searches for “pneumonia” or “flu” in the same time frame. The Harvard study also cites data on an increase in parked cars at Wuhan hospitals, but that appears in at least one instance to be a result of construction blocking visual access the year before.
Furthermore, given the reproduction rate of the virus and the lack of restrictions until late January, the number of victims in Wuhan would have been much higher had it emerged last August.
Sketchy claims. It is not unusual for the media to pick up on scientific preprints only for some claims to be rolled back after further review—without journalists following up on the retractions. But the Harvard study follows a concerted effort by the Trump administration to promote the idea that China was aware of the pandemic well before January. So far that effort has included a nonsensical paper by Pentagon contractors, a barely researched dossier promoted as an intelligence document, and selective leaks to the press.
That push has diminished as uprisings against police brutality consume the Trump administration’s attention. After all, the chance of a 2020 reelection campaign focused entirely on China seems smaller than it did last month. But serious charges against China’s coronavirus response—that the state wasted critical weeks in January concealing information about transmission, initially reacted with oppression, and has obfuscated any investigation—are lost amid the false claims.
What We’re Following
EU pushes back on Beijing. China’s aggressive diplomacy in Europe is now causing serious pushback. The European Union, normally reluctant to speak out against Beijing, has accused the government of running “targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, its neighborhood, and globally,” along with Russia. The move may be a response to earlier criticism that the EU softened a report on the same topic.
Meanwhile, Britain’s swerve away from China has been fast, with Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposing a D-10 alliance of democracies—the existing G-7, plus South Korea, India, and Australia—to build 5G networks free of Chinese influence. The Hong Kong crisis has further soured U.K.-Chinese relations, with Beijing warning that it may pull out a British nuclear power construction deal. Since the original nuclear deal was widely seen as a disaster in the U.K., this doesn’t give Beijing much leverage.
Skirmishes with India. Despite diplomatic efforts, Chinese and Indian soldiers are still scuffling along the Himalayan border, and both countries’ nationalist media outlets are having a field day. It follows a predictable cycle: The Global Times and other papers in China produce stories targeted at insulting India, knowing that they’ll be picked up by Indian media—thus allowing the editors in China to boast of their impact to their bosses.
The drawdown of forces may ease the conflict, but as Anik Joshi writes in Foreign Policy, it looks as though India is ready to choose sides against China in any future conflict—just as China and the United States rattle their sabers and strengthen their presence in the Pacific.
Kaohsiung’s mayoral recall. In another blow to the pro-China Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, voters in the city of Kaohsiung have ousted the party’s failed presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu as mayor. After a meteoric rise that was compared to Trump’s, Han once seemed like a serious challenger to the incumbent president, Tsai Ing-wen. But a series of scandals over his ties to China and the impact of repression in Hong Kong on Taiwanese voters led to a crushing defeat in January. The KMT is trying to shake off its image as subservient to Beijing, while China has made aggressive moves toward Taiwan.
Tech and Business
Street stall battle. Chinese cities are pushing back against an initiative led by Premier Li Keqiang to make street vendors a critical part of the country’s economic recovery. Li praised street vendors on June 1, saying the government would give them support. But municipalities are traditionally hostile to street vendors. They are often targets of the chengguan—the urban security forces who bully, beat, and demand bribes from vendors.
In particular, metropolises like Beijing and Shanghai have long striven to reduce the number of rural migrants, who run most street stalls, in order to keep superior urban public services exclusive to the urban middle classes and to preserve an image as modern cities. Days after Li’s comments, which were not accompanied by formal policies, Beijing vendors who believed they would now be protected were driven off the streets.
Suspicious apps. Amid the rising border tensions, an Indian-made app that targeted and removed Chinese-made mobile apps went viral last week before being removed from the Google Play Store. But Indian users have organized to suggest alternatives to Chinese-made apps out of rising nationalist sentiments and fears of Chinese surveillance. Four out the five top smartphone brands in India are Chinese, and they normally come prepackaged with a suite of apps.
Oil recovery. Some data indicates that the speed of economic recovery in China may be faster than feared, with oil use already back to 90 percent of pre-coronavirus levels. Domestic demand for consumer goods is strong, but a lack of global demand is hamstringing Chinese manufacturers: Reopened factories are struggling to find customers.
What We’re Reading Welfare for Autocrats: How Social Assistance in China Cares for its Rulers, Jennifer Pan, Oxford University Press, May 2020, 248 pp.
Welfare for Autocrats: How Social Assistance in China Cares for Its Rulers, by Jennifer Pan
Xi Jinping’s China has made a big push to alleviate poverty while doubling down on repression and colonial atrocities. But as Jennifer Pan shows in this important study, the two are connected: Dibao, a minimum-income program that is China’s main poverty relief tool, is another means for the government to surveil and control the population.
Pan demonstrates how the state obsession with control shifts funding priorities elsewhere, such as demanding that rural residents be fully integrated into security systems, creating models that reinforce and layer oppression.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


America the Unexceptional

Ever since its founding , the United States has presented itself as a shining city on a hill—a nation in which liberty and fundamental freedoms thrive and an example for the rest of the world .
It is a mythology refuted by American history .
And today , killings of African Americans that continue with impunity , systemic racism across institutions of U.S. life , and official violence against Black Lives Matter protesters once again demonstrate the hollowness at the center of American exceptionalism .
Still , many embrace the image of an exemplary , exceptional America .
Even those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a shining city may argue that the United States has historically played a positive global role for human rights .
After all , it helped build the postwar global human rights system , drawing in part on constitutional protections Americans enjoy .
It led the negotiation of the United Nations Charter , which makes the pursuit of human rights a fundamental purpose of the global organization .
Former U.S. first lady Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the U.N. committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 .
Human rights policy has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy since at least the administration of President Jimmy Carter , however inconsistently , if at all , some presidents have been committed to it .
Racism and white supremacy drove the American refusal to enforce human rights at home , and that legacy of hypocrisy shapes human rights policy today .
Yet even so , the phrase “ human rights ” in American policy has almost always referred to what others violate , and it rarely comes back to what the U.S. government is obligated to protect at home .
The United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights law to condemn official abuses against minorities worldwide , or violence against protesters in Venezuela , Hong Kong , Iran , and elsewhere , but it bristles when those same norms are deployed against it .
Despite its rhetoric and its occasional leadership , the United States has long had its foreign-policy foot inside the human rights system and its domestic one firmly outside .
Treaties and other international obligations that it calls upon others to keep are not even enforceable within the United States itself .
If human rights are so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an official feature of its diplomacy , why have Americans not applied it to their own government ?
The answer is simple and well documented .
Racism and white supremacy drove the American refusal to enforce human rights at home , and that legacy of hypocrisy shapes human rights policy today .
At the outset of the modern human rights movement , segregationist Southerners and their allies fought against U.S. engagement with the U.N. human rights system .
They saw human rights as a threat to segregation , to its oppressive system of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Jim Crow .
They worried , rightly , that the U.N. human rights bodies would , if they had the authority , put pressure on the United States to end its systemic racism .
As a result , when the United States ratified major human rights treaties on civil and political rights and racism , the Senate demanded that they not be applicable in U.S. courts absent further legislation , which senators knew would not be forthcoming .
It ’ s true that the United States comes under periodic evaluation at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ few treaties it has ratified , but such reviews hardly receive attention or have much impact domestically .
In the decades since , U.S. resistance to human rights has extended beyond its racist origins .
Some argue that international human rights law has always been too ambiguous and too politicized to be implemented consistently by governments .
The American right has taken to arguing that human rights treaties are an effort of global elites to undermine U.S. sovereignty .
Indeed , this was the argument against the Convention on the Rights of Persons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the administration of President George W. Bush that basically implemented U.S. law on a global scale .
The unwillingness of the United States to subject itself to the same obligations it demands of others extends beyond human rights law .
It underlies the reluctance to ratify the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and the resistance to state-to-state dispute settlement at the International Court of Justice , the U.N. ’ s principal judicial body .
But racism came first , limiting America ’ s human rights engagement and providing support to despots @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what they claim are essentially domestic matters .
The protests across the United States demand genuine accountability for police violence against African Americans and an end to racism in policing , education , and all the other structures of American society and governance .
These calls must lead to specific changes in law , policy , and practice .
Still , rhetorical commitments won ’ t be enough .
U.S. law and the tools of litigation have simply not protected black lives and promoted a fair and just society ; they often have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States has a system in which accountability for much abuse has been practically written out of the laws of the government .
Police kill but are covered by immunity .
Vigilantes “ stand their ground ” and get away with murder .
Presidents and their advisors and lawyers authorize torture , and Americans move forward .
Human rights law can play a meaningful role as Americans dismantle the infrastructure that supports racism and impunity .
Today ’ s protests should lead to a genuine and national commitment to human rights at home , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutional change and protect all the rights that people enjoy : rights to nondiscrimination , to remedies for abuse and lawlessness , to space for protest and expression , to privacy , to due process , to economic rights , and to much else that human rights law guarantees .
First , the United States should establish an independent and permanent Human Rights Commission that can evaluate any legislation to ensure that it meets the global standards articulated by human rights bodies for decades .
It could make recommendations about necessary change at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and propose and promote human rights policies and education across the United States .
An independent human rights institution can also monitor implementation of all the legal change that must follow the protests of recent weeks .
A national institution can initiate a network of similar institutions at local levels across the United States to ensure compliance of all public authorities with America ’ s human rights obligations .
Dozens of democratic countries , in all regions of the world , have well-established human rights institutions , with varying degrees of authority , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , France ’ s National Consultative Commission on Human Rights criticized recent hate speech legislation on grounds that it could lead to censorship , and yet the National Assembly still adopted it .
Many other such bodies , as in Mexico , may evaluate individual claims of human rights violations .
Second , Congress should begin the process of implementing the treaties the United States has ratified as a matter of U.S. law , especially the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ already done so for the Convention Against Torture . )
Above all , that means ensuring that courts can entertain claims that arise under these treaties , and that individuals can hold the government accountable to human rights standards and enjoy the right to seek remedies available to them under international law , such as remedies in the face of police abuse .
Third , the United States should ratify all the treaties that it has so far refused , particularly those related to discrimination against women , children ’ s rights , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of persons with disabilities .
Most are already consistent with U.S. law , so the failure to ratify is really only a failure to submit to international oversight as other countries , including other democracies , already do .
Fourth , Americans easily speak the language of civil and political rights , but they have failed to articulate a shared vision for fundamental rights to work and living wages , health care , and education at home and abroad .
The United States should also ratify the International Covenant on Economic , Social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of a human rights agenda , policies to protect against the unfairness , extreme poverty , and inhumane treatment caused by corruption , concentrations of unimaginable wealth , and capture of political processes at home and overseas .
Finally , only with a commitment to human rights at home can the United States truly be a global voice for human rights .
In a fit of Trumpian immaturity , then-U.S .
Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley pulled the United States out of the U.N. Human Rights Council , the central human @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As it builds its own infrastructure for human rights , the United States should also return to the council and move toward a constructive role in advocating for the human rights of people around the world , a voice against the authoritarianism that has taken root in so much of the world and the alternative , anti-rights vision promoted by China and others .
The Black Lives Matter protesters have demonstrated what the United States should be , the promise of becoming a shining city on a hill—a place in which government works @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which those who abuse law and lives are held accountable , a country that affirmatively dismantles and remedies racism and advocates equality .
Dismantling the racist origins of U.S. human rights policy should be a part of that agenda .
Law and policy must change to meet these demands .
Human rights can support and sustain it .

Ever since its founding, the United States has presented itself as a shining city on a hill—a nation in which liberty and fundamental freedoms thrive and an example for the rest of the world.
Ever since its founding, the United States has presented itself as a shining city on a hill—a nation in which liberty and fundamental freedoms thrive and an example for the rest of the world.
It is a mythology refuted by American history. And today, killings of African Americans that continue with impunity, systemic racism across institutions of U.S. life, and official violence against Black Lives Matter protesters once again demonstrate the hollowness at the center of American exceptionalism.
Still, many embrace the image of an exemplary, exceptional America. Even those who see the fault in the metaphor of a shining city may argue that the United States has historically played a positive global role for human rights. After all, it helped build the postwar global human rights system, drawing in part on constitutional protections Americans enjoy. It led the negotiation of the United Nations Charter, which makes the pursuit of human rights a fundamental purpose of the global organization. Former U.S. first lady Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the U.N. committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Human rights policy has been built into the structure of U.S. diplomacy since at least the administration of President Jimmy Carter, however inconsistently, if at all, some presidents have been committed to it.
Racism and white supremacy drove the American refusal to enforce human rights at home, and that legacy of hypocrisy shapes human rights policy today.
Yet even so, the phrase “human rights” in American policy has almost always referred to what others violate, and it rarely comes back to what the U.S. government is obligated to protect at home. The United States may use the language of human rights law to condemn official abuses against minorities worldwide, or violence against protesters in Venezuela, Hong Kong, Iran, and elsewhere, but it bristles when those same norms are deployed against it.
Despite its rhetoric and its occasional leadership, the United States has long had its foreign-policy foot inside the human rights system and its domestic one firmly outside. Treaties and other international obligations that it calls upon others to keep are not even enforceable within the United States itself.
If human rights are so important that the United States makes it an official feature of its diplomacy, why have Americans not applied it to their own government?
The answer is simple and well documented. Racism and white supremacy drove the American refusal to enforce human rights at home, and that legacy of hypocrisy shapes human rights policy today.
At the outset of the modern human rights movement, segregationist Southerners and their allies fought against U.S. engagement with the U.N. human rights system. They saw human rights as a threat to segregation, to its oppressive system of official racist violence, to the inequalities of Jim Crow. They worried, rightly, that the U.N. human rights bodies would, if they had the authority, put pressure on the United States to end its systemic racism.
As a result, when the United States ratified major human rights treaties on civil and political rights and racism, the Senate demanded that they not be applicable in U.S. courts absent further legislation, which senators knew would not be forthcoming. It’s true that the United States comes under periodic evaluation at the U.N. Human Rights Council and in the few treaties it has ratified, but such reviews hardly receive attention or have much impact domestically.
In the decades since, U.S. resistance to human rights has extended beyond its racist origins. Some argue that international human rights law has always been too ambiguous and too politicized to be implemented consistently by governments. The American right has taken to arguing that human rights treaties are an effort of global elites to undermine U.S. sovereignty. Indeed, this was the argument against the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a treaty negotiated by the administration of President George W. Bush that basically implemented U.S. law on a global scale.
The unwillingness of the United States to subject itself to the same obligations it demands of others extends beyond human rights law. It underlies the reluctance to ratify the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and the resistance to state-to-state dispute settlement at the International Court of Justice, the U.N.’s principal judicial body.
But racism came first, limiting America’s human rights engagement and providing support to despots around the world who resist evaluation of what they claim are essentially domestic matters.
The protests across the United States demand genuine accountability for police violence against African Americans and an end to racism in policing, education, and all the other structures of American society and governance. These calls must lead to specific changes in law, policy, and practice.
Still, rhetorical commitments won’t be enough. U.S. law and the tools of litigation have simply not protected black lives and promoted a fair and just society; they often have had the opposite effect. The United States has a system in which accountability for much abuse has been practically written out of the laws of the government. Police kill but are covered by immunity. Vigilantes “stand their ground” and get away with murder. Presidents and their advisors and lawyers authorize torture, and Americans move forward.
Human rights law can play a meaningful role as Americans dismantle the infrastructure that supports racism and impunity. Today’s protests should lead to a genuine and national commitment to human rights at home, a long-term effort to monitor and reinforce institutional change and protect all the rights that people enjoy: rights to nondiscrimination, to remedies for abuse and lawlessness, to space for protest and expression, to privacy, to due process, to economic rights, and to much else that human rights law guarantees.
First, the United States should establish an independent and permanent Human Rights Commission that can evaluate any legislation to ensure that it meets the global standards articulated by human rights bodies for decades. It could make recommendations about necessary change at local, state, and federal levels and propose and promote human rights policies and education across the United States. An independent human rights institution can also monitor implementation of all the legal change that must follow the protests of recent weeks. A national institution can initiate a network of similar institutions at local levels across the United States to ensure compliance of all public authorities with America’s human rights obligations.
Dozens of democratic countries, in all regions of the world, have well-established human rights institutions, with varying degrees of authority, success, and independence. For instance, France’s National Consultative Commission on Human Rights criticized recent hate speech legislation on grounds that it could lead to censorship, and yet the National Assembly still adopted it. Many other such bodies, as in Mexico, may evaluate individual claims of human rights violations.
Second, Congress should begin the process of implementing the treaties the United States has ratified as a matter of U.S. law, especially the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (It has already done so for the Convention Against Torture.) Above all, that means ensuring that courts can entertain claims that arise under these treaties, and that individuals can hold the government accountable to human rights standards and enjoy the right to seek remedies available to them under international law, such as remedies in the face of police abuse.
Third, the United States should ratify all the treaties that it has so far refused, particularly those related to discrimination against women, children’s rights, migrants’ rights, and the rights of persons with disabilities. Most are already consistent with U.S. law, so the failure to ratify is really only a failure to submit to international oversight as other countries, including other democracies, already do.
Fourth, Americans easily speak the language of civil and political rights, but they have failed to articulate a shared vision for fundamental rights to work and living wages, health care, and education at home and abroad. The United States should also ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and adopt, as part of a human rights agenda, policies to protect against the unfairness, extreme poverty, and inhumane treatment caused by corruption, concentrations of unimaginable wealth, and capture of political processes at home and overseas.
Finally, only with a commitment to human rights at home can the United States truly be a global voice for human rights. In a fit of Trumpian immaturity, then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley pulled the United States out of the U.N. Human Rights Council, the central human rights body of the U.N. system. As it builds its own infrastructure for human rights, the United States should also return to the council and move toward a constructive role in advocating for the human rights of people around the world, a voice against the authoritarianism that has taken root in so much of the world and the alternative, anti-rights vision promoted by China and others.
The Black Lives Matter protesters have demonstrated what the United States should be, the promise of becoming a shining city on a hill—a place in which government works for the people, a nation in which those who abuse law and lives are held accountable, a country that affirmatively dismantles and remedies racism and advocates equality. Dismantling the racist origins of U.S. human rights policy should be a part of that agenda.
Law and policy must change to meet these demands. Human rights can support and sustain it.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Millions of Americans Believe Trump Is Fighting Literal Demons

Millions of Americans Believe Trump Is Fighting Literal Demons Donald Trump may not know how to hold a Bible , but that hasn ’ t stopped white evangelicals from being his most persistent supporters .
The U.S. president ’ s evangelical followers have portrayed him as America ’ s deliverance , a flawed man recently converted to the cause around the time of his presidential campaign .
In the decade prior , he ’ d bragged about sexual assault , cheated on his wife , and claimed he had no sins that needed forgiven .
But these could all be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new Christian trying his best .
Except the timeline is false .
Trump has had a personal minister since 2002 , a fringe televangelist controversial even within evangelical circles .
Paula White is one of the most famous members of the neo-charismatic movement , and her beliefs are terrifying .
In January , she came to public attention after a sermon where she invoked the name of Jesus and commanded “ all satanic pregnancies to miscarry right now.
” She later explained that the phrase was metaphorical , and I see no reason @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earlier , when she claimed that infamous demon lords and hidden sorcerers were arrayed against Trump , she was speaking quite literally .
White ’ s vision of “ spiritual warfare ” isn ’ t rhetorical .
Like thousands of other preachers both in America and worldwide , she subscribes to an apocalyptic supernatural vision that drives politics , money , and sometimes violence .
Charismatic Christianity itself is simply the mixing of certain Pentecostal beliefs with other denominations or nondenominational Christianity .
It has a strong focus on the Holy Spirit and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ miracles .
At its best , it ’ s a welcoming , positive tradition that boosts spirits , promotes introspection , and welcomes those who feel rejected by mainstream churches .
The services are lively , often mixing sermons , praise and worship music , and spiritual practices .
They can provide a sort of euphoria and a chance to relieve stress .
At its worst , though , charismatic Christianity is a domain of cynical hucksters , judgmental self-proclaimed prophets , and intense bigotry .
The faith healing traditions are harmless and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ normal medical treatments , but they can be deadly when they completely replace modern medicine .
But while faith healing and speaking in tongues are the most famous practices , the most psychologically dangerous is the discernment of evil spirits and the practice of spiritual warfare .
This practice is inspired in large part by Ephesians 6:12 , which the New International Version translates as , “ For our struggle is not against flesh and blood , but against the rulers , against the authorities , against the powers of this dark world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the heavenly realms.
” In charismatic Christianity , the enemy is very real , and his demonic and mortal agents have supernatural powers as well .
People who claim to have the gift of discernment frequently use it to air petty grievances or express their bigotry , claiming people they don ’ t like are being influenced by unclean spirits .
When a demon is supposedly revealed , followers rebuke it in the name of Jesus , claiming that their savior has given them authority over evil spirits .
Some charismatics see @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its overuse as being too fascinated with the works of the enemy .
But the fringe neo-charismatic movement has embraced the most literal and paranoid form , twisting even the most straightforward biblical passages into secret lore .
For example , in mainstream Christianity , Luke 11:21-22 ’ s reference to a “ strong man ” guarding a house from burglary is usually interpreted as a metaphor for Satan .
In neo-charismatic circles , preachers instead talk about a class of demon called “ strongmen ” that must be bound by certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refer to their own practices as “ occult.
” One of White ’ s favorite targets is Leviathan .
In her theology , Leviathan is not a mundane crocodile nor a type of dragon from Middle Eastern mythology .
Rather , it ’ s a demon prince in the form of a many-headed dragon that is responsible for people experiencing everyday fatigue .
Fortunately , she offers countermeasures—available to anyone who makes a $ 74 donation .
Other packages are available for donations of $ 40 and $ 65 , presumably offering protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Many neo-charismatics share similar beliefs .
They practice what they call “ strategic-level spiritual warfare , ” where they name and describe various powerful demons who rule over various geographic territories .
They try to discern the witches and other followers who act as lieutenants and recruiters , and they search out and destroy objects of occult significance that spread demonic influence .
In charismatic theology , this world is dominated by Satan , and they are the only ones who see the threat .
This belief might seem comical , but its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of their secret war .
Trump ’ s spiritual advisor is both a leading figure in the movement and a strong believer in the worldwide demonic conspiracy .
In 2016 , when she rebuked “ spirits of Jezebel ” who stood against Trump , she was simultaneously attacking women who spoke out against him and engaging in spiritual warfare against the demons she associates with them .
She believes opposition to the president is spearheaded by territorial demons , and she ’ s not alone .
While she may not have actually converted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ converted many Christians to Trumpism and spread the neo-charismatic influence into mainstream spaces .
Neo-charismatics often associate minorities with demon worship and witchcraft .
Misogyny is rampant , and even White has been challenged by other neo-charismatics for presuming to serve as a pastor to men .
Political opposition to LGBT rights is also a spiritual battle , and Lester Sumrall used to claim he could smell the demons in gay people and wrote that they should be banned from churches everywhere .
And though there are many black charismatic Christians , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ literature is full of exotic and wicked African and Asian sorcerers .
Neo-charismatic missionaries have often used this imagery to advocate for the persecution of LGBT people and other minorities .
In the past , they ’ ve also clashed with other Christians , including mainstream evangelicals , and they frequently condemned Catholics and Mormons as purveyors of dark magic .
But White and her allies have recently embraced a more pragmatic approach .
They ’ ve forged alliances with mainstream evangelicals and others with whom they previously feuded .
When I attended @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the mainstream conservative evangelical Jerry Falwell was a frequent target of derision .
The feeling was apparently mutual , as Falwell ’ s Thomas Road Baptist Church had at least one service portraying neo-charismatic faith healers as heretical charlatans preying on the desperate .
But Jerry Falwell Jr. joined their alliance and promoted White ’ s latest book , as did many others such as Franklin Graham .
Some Christian conservatives sounded the alarm , including the Southern Baptist Convention ’ s Russell Moore and the executive editor of Christianity Today ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Graham that later supported Trump ’ s removal from office ) .
Much like their secular equivalents , the dissenters have largely been ignored or even condemned for their stances .
Though I disagree with Moore on almost everything else and condemn many of his past statements on other subjects , I ’ m sympathetic to him on this issue .
As a teenager , I attended a welcoming charismatic Christian church that gradually became more cultlike and more hateful as the pastor fell under the influence of neo-charismatic doctrine .
My family @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loss of community and feelings of disillusionment were heart-rending .
It must be horrific for people like Moore to see a gang of snake oil-selling magicians gain so much influence among his peers .
But this a concern for all of us , not just the faithful .
Like their mostly secular equivalent QAnon , which sometimes crosses over with believers in spiritual warfare , neo-charismatic leaders are promoting Trump as a champion of the people struggling against hidden enemies who are conveniently drawn primarily from progressives and minorities .
But unlike QAnon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the occasional retweet , neo-charismatics have the direct ear of a sympathetic president and act as his spiritual advisor .
Their theories are almost certainly reinforcing his paranoia , and they may have convinced him that he ’ s some sort of messiah figure—or he may treat the whole thing as just another scam to be run on the rubes .
Even more concerning is the influence they ’ ve had over believers , both neo-charismatics and mainstream evangelicals introduced to them through allies like Falwell Jr. and Graham .
People who believe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transition into secular conspiracy theories , including QAnon , Pizzagate , and classic anti-Semitism .
If Trump is defeated , and prophecy once again fails , the danger they pose will be more than spiritual .

Donald Trump may not know how to hold a Bible, but that hasn’t stopped white evangelicals from being his most persistent supporters. The U.S. president’s evangelical followers have portrayed him as America’s deliverance, a flawed man recently converted to the cause around the time of his presidential campaign. In the decade prior, he’d bragged about sexual assault, cheated on his wife, and claimed he had no sins that needed forgiven. But these could all be overlooked because in 2016 he became a new Christian trying his best. Except the timeline is false. Trump has had a personal minister since 2002, a fringe televangelist controversial even within evangelical circles. Paula White is one of the most famous members of the neo-charismatic movement, and her beliefs are terrifying.
Donald Trump may not know how to hold a Bible, but that hasn’t stopped white evangelicals from being his most persistent supporters. The U.S. president’s evangelical followers have portrayed him as America’s deliverance, a flawed man recently converted to the cause around the time of his presidential campaign. In the decade prior, he’d bragged about sexual assault, cheated on his wife, and claimed he had no sins that needed forgiven. But these could all be overlooked because in 2016 he became a new Christian trying his best. Except the timeline is false. Trump has had a personal minister since 2002, a fringe televangelist controversial even within evangelical circles. Paula White is one of the most famous members of the neo-charismatic movement, and her beliefs are terrifying.
In January, she came to public attention after a sermon where she invoked the name of Jesus and commanded “all satanic pregnancies to miscarry right now.” She later explained that the phrase was metaphorical, and I see no reason to doubt her. But several years earlier, when she claimed that infamous demon lords and hidden sorcerers were arrayed against Trump, she was speaking quite literally. White’s vision of “spiritual warfare” isn’t rhetorical. Like thousands of other preachers both in America and worldwide, she subscribes to an apocalyptic supernatural vision that drives politics, money, and sometimes violence.
Charismatic Christianity itself is simply the mixing of certain Pentecostal beliefs with other denominations or nondenominational Christianity. It has a strong focus on the Holy Spirit and the concept of spiritual gifts and modern-day miracles. At its best, it’s a welcoming, positive tradition that boosts spirits, promotes introspection, and welcomes those who feel rejected by mainstream churches. The services are lively, often mixing sermons, praise and worship music, and spiritual practices. They can provide a sort of euphoria and a chance to relieve stress.
At its worst, though, charismatic Christianity is a domain of cynical hucksters, judgmental self-proclaimed prophets, and intense bigotry. The faith healing traditions are harmless and perhaps even emotionally beneficial when they supplement normal medical treatments, but they can be deadly when they completely replace modern medicine.
But while faith healing and speaking in tongues are the most famous practices, the most psychologically dangerous is the discernment of evil spirits and the practice of spiritual warfare. This practice is inspired in large part by Ephesians 6:12, which the New International Version translates as, “For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.”
In charismatic Christianity, the enemy is very real, and his demonic and mortal agents have supernatural powers as well. People who claim to have the gift of discernment frequently use it to air petty grievances or express their bigotry, claiming people they don’t like are being influenced by unclean spirits. When a demon is supposedly revealed, followers rebuke it in the name of Jesus, claiming that their savior has given them authority over evil spirits.
Some charismatics see the practice as somewhat metaphorical and frown on its overuse as being too fascinated with the works of the enemy. But the fringe neo-charismatic movement has embraced the most literal and paranoid form, twisting even the most straightforward biblical passages into secret lore. For example, in mainstream Christianity, Luke 11:21-22’s reference to a “strong man” guarding a house from burglary is usually interpreted as a metaphor for Satan. In neo-charismatic circles, preachers instead talk about a class of demon called “strongmen” that must be bound by certain occult rituals, though they would never refer to their own practices as “occult.”
One of White’s favorite targets is Leviathan. In her theology, Leviathan is not a mundane crocodile nor a type of dragon from Middle Eastern mythology. Rather, it’s a demon prince in the form of a many-headed dragon that is responsible for people experiencing everyday fatigue. Fortunately, she offers countermeasures—available to anyone who makes a $74 donation. Other packages are available for donations of $40 and $65, presumably offering protection against slightly fewer classes of demons.
Many neo-charismatics share similar beliefs. They practice what they call “strategic-level spiritual warfare,” where they name and describe various powerful demons who rule over various geographic territories. They try to discern the witches and other followers who act as lieutenants and recruiters, and they search out and destroy objects of occult significance that spread demonic influence. In charismatic theology, this world is dominated by Satan, and they are the only ones who see the threat.
This belief might seem comical, but its adherents seek out political influence as part of their secret war. Trump’s spiritual advisor is both a leading figure in the movement and a strong believer in the worldwide demonic conspiracy. In 2016, when she rebuked “spirits of Jezebel” who stood against Trump, she was simultaneously attacking women who spoke out against him and engaging in spiritual warfare against the demons she associates with them. She believes opposition to the president is spearheaded by territorial demons, and she’s not alone. While she may not have actually converted Trump to Christianity, she has certainly converted many Christians to Trumpism and spread the neo-charismatic influence into mainstream spaces.
Neo-charismatics often associate minorities with demon worship and witchcraft. Misogyny is rampant, and even White has been challenged by other neo-charismatics for presuming to serve as a pastor to men. Political opposition to LGBT rights is also a spiritual battle, and Lester Sumrall used to claim he could smell the demons in gay people and wrote that they should be banned from churches everywhere. And though there are many black charismatic Christians, including White’s own mentor, neo-charismatic literature is full of exotic and wicked African and Asian sorcerers. Neo-charismatic missionaries have often used this imagery to advocate for the persecution of LGBT people and other minorities.
In the past, they’ve also clashed with other Christians, including mainstream evangelicals, and they frequently condemned Catholics and Mormons as purveyors of dark magic. But White and her allies have recently embraced a more pragmatic approach. They’ve forged alliances with mainstream evangelicals and others with whom they previously feuded. When I attended a charismatic church in the late 1990s, the mainstream conservative evangelical Jerry Falwell was a frequent target of derision. The feeling was apparently mutual, as Falwell’s Thomas Road Baptist Church had at least one service portraying neo-charismatic faith healers as heretical charlatans preying on the desperate. But Jerry Falwell Jr. joined their alliance and promoted White’s latest book, as did many others such as Franklin Graham. Some Christian conservatives sounded the alarm, including the Southern Baptist Convention’s Russell Moore and the executive editor of Christianity Today (a leading evangelical magazine founded by Billy Graham that later supported Trump’s removal from office). Much like their secular equivalents, the dissenters have largely been ignored or even condemned for their stances.
Though I disagree with Moore on almost everything else and condemn many of his past statements on other subjects, I’m sympathetic to him on this issue. As a teenager, I attended a welcoming charismatic Christian church that gradually became more cultlike and more hateful as the pastor fell under the influence of neo-charismatic doctrine. My family left fairly soon afterward, but the loss of community and feelings of disillusionment were heart-rending. It must be horrific for people like Moore to see a gang of snake oil-selling magicians gain so much influence among his peers.
But this a concern for all of us, not just the faithful. Like their mostly secular equivalent QAnon, which sometimes crosses over with believers in spiritual warfare, neo-charismatic leaders are promoting Trump as a champion of the people struggling against hidden enemies who are conveniently drawn primarily from progressives and minorities. But unlike QAnon believers, who have to settle for the occasional retweet, neo-charismatics have the direct ear of a sympathetic president and act as his spiritual advisor. Their theories are almost certainly reinforcing his paranoia, and they may have convinced him that he’s some sort of messiah figure—or he may treat the whole thing as just another scam to be run on the rubes.
Even more concerning is the influence they’ve had over believers, both neo-charismatics and mainstream evangelicals introduced to them through allies like Falwell Jr. and Graham. People who believe in demonic conspiracies are well positioned to transition into secular conspiracy theories, including QAnon, Pizzagate, and classic anti-Semitism. If Trump is defeated, and prophecy once again fails, the danger they pose will be more than spiritual.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Is America’s Future South Africa’s Past?

As a South African immigrant to the United States and a longtime observer of South African politics , I am attuned to the ways in which appeals for racial justice and demands for change can unleash powerful social and political forces .
Granted : I am biased by my particular experience , and the United States is by no means an apartheid state ( at least not since 1964 ) .
But it is striking to see the United States in 2020 look so much like the failing state that was late-apartheid South Africa—albeit at American scale , and at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ events has triggered growing warnings of the death of U.S. democracy or even another civil war .
But the South African precedent suggests that the future , while certainly challenging , is not quite so dire .
First , it ’ s useful to identify the parallels so I can ’ t be accused of a false optimism .
The explosion of protest against racial injustice and police brutality across the United States that followed the killing of George Floyd , and the over-militarized police response to it , mimic the caught-on-tape , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Africa .
Like many social movements before and since , they have in common a complex fusion of a majority of nonviolent protesters with violent radicals , outside agitators , and opportunistic looters .
They also share the morally unambiguous objective of ending systemic racism , and they were both propelled by a cascade of political and economic events that pushed this objective from socially marginal to the center of debate .
In the United States , those events include Trump ’ s divisive presidency and the COVID-19 crisis , which disproportionately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa , they included the 1976 Soweto uprising , a global commodities slump that shook the South African economy , and the end of the Cold War .
All this speaks to another , broader historical alignment between the United States and South Africa : the collapse of white rule .
To be sure , the end of apartheid in South Africa was preceded by decades ( if not centuries ) of institutionalized white minority rule , while in the United States , white Christians have only recently become a minority .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of color is a striking common thread .
In the United States , the election of the first black president in 2008 and declining faith in an increasingly unequal and unstable American economy brought the country ’ s recent demographic shift into sharp relief .
As has been well catalogued , both issues were ripe fruit for Donald Trump ’ s ethnonationalist presidential campaign and the transformation of the Republican Party into a movement motivated by preserving the political , economic , and social status of white Christian America .
Although the institutional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ established , the Republicans under Trump have gone all-in on defending what is—to be blunt—white rule.The Republicans under Trump have gone all-in on defending what is—to be blunt—white rule .
Of course , exploiting ostensibly democratic institutions to preserve minority rule could have been a page taken from the South African National Party ’ s playbook .
The latter used a series of blunt legislative instruments to effectively disenfranchise black voters by law .
Trump and the Republicans have an Electoral College and U.S. Senate that overrepresent predominantly white rural states , gerrymandered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ votes , and a wide range of other measures to suppress minority voting .
Other similarities include rallying conservative church networks , promoting ethnonationalist narratives and iconography ( Manifest Destiny promising the land to white people here , the armed Afrikaaner frontiersman there ) , co-opting financial elites and the white middle class with artificially high returns on capital , and fomenting racial discord in highly visible institutions like sports .
This mountain of parallels is why the past four-odd years of Trumpist politics in the United States have felt like two decades @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the events of recent weeks look like the dying phase of apartheid , sped up at a dizzying pace .
Just as South Africa ’ s economic and political elites split over the government ’ s attempts to suppress the anti-apartheid movement , the past 10 days have seen fractures among the U.S. ruling class .
Prominent figures in the U.S. military have defied and condemned Trump ’ s efforts to crack down on protesters ; Republican leaders have taken postures of defection from his reelection campaign ; and a growing collection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for the protesters despite the looting and economic damage .
Strikingly , even the National Football League has reversed course in its opposition to players protesting anti-black police brutality , defying Trump and echoing the infighting in South Africa ’ s white-supremacist rugby culture around 30 years ago ( known in the United States primarily via the hit movie Invictus , in which Morgan Freeman memorably plays Nelson Mandela ) .
Like South Africans before them , Americans rightly are concerned about violence and instability as the 2020 election approaches .
Egged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between protesters and police risk being reframed as a confrontation between “ thugs ” and “ patriots , ” Democrats and Republicans , multicultural and “ real ” Americans , people who want to change an unjust system and those who want law and order .
That some protests have been violent and that right-wing militias had already mobilized against public health measures to contain the coronavirus certainly add fuel to the fire .
As do Trump ’ s farcical but dangerous threats to declare any adverse electoral outcomes in November as having @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the South African experience is instructive .
Notwithstanding a series of killings , bombings , and high-profile attacks instigated by white supremacist groups and militias , the feared race war did not materialize .
Even though white South Africans stood to lose their legal monopoly on political , military , and economic power , the end of apartheid proceeded in relative peace .
Indeed , South Africa became the first country to voluntary dismantle its nuclear weapons , while most political violence during regime change occurred within racial groups , not between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still suffers from massive economic inequality , high crime rates , and frequent bouts of social unrest .
But it did not descend into civil war and has maintained core political and economic stability , even in conditions far less auspicious than those in the United States .
The critical effort to root out systemic racism will be painful and hard—but it will not require a new constitution like in South Africa , nor a complete overhaul of the economy , not even in the case of reparations .
Even though democratic institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fact that the historic demise of white rule will occur in the world ’ s oldest democracy , with the world ’ s largest and most dynamic economy , is a significant boon for the future .
Sometimes there are weeks when decades happen .
Such weeks are upon Americans today .
The South African experience can help guide them through the turbulence .

As a South African immigrant to the United States and a longtime observer of South African politics, I am attuned to the ways in which appeals for racial justice and demands for change can unleash powerful social and political forces.
As a South African immigrant to the United States and a longtime observer of South African politics, I am attuned to the ways in which appeals for racial justice and demands for change can unleash powerful social and political forces.
Granted: I am biased by my particular experience, and the United States is by no means an apartheid state (at least not since 1964). But it is striking to see the United States in 2020 look so much like the failing state that was late-apartheid South Africa—albeit at American scale, and at American speed.
The sudden speed of events has triggered growing warnings of the death of U.S. democracy or even another civil war. But the South African precedent suggests that the future, while certainly challenging, is not quite so dire.
First, it’s useful to identify the parallels so I can’t be accused of a false optimism.
The explosion of protest against racial injustice and police brutality across the United States that followed the killing of George Floyd, and the over-militarized police response to it, mimic the caught-on-tape, globally inspiring demonstrations in 1970s and 1980s South Africa. Like many social movements before and since, they have in common a complex fusion of a majority of nonviolent protesters with violent radicals, outside agitators, and opportunistic looters.
They also share the morally unambiguous objective of ending systemic racism, and they were both propelled by a cascade of political and economic events that pushed this objective from socially marginal to the center of debate. In the United States, those events include Trump’s divisive presidency and the COVID-19 crisis, which disproportionately affected black American communities. In South Africa, they included the 1976 Soweto uprising, a global commodities slump that shook the South African economy, and the end of the Cold War.
All this speaks to another, broader historical alignment between the United States and South Africa: the collapse of white rule. To be sure, the end of apartheid in South Africa was preceded by decades (if not centuries) of institutionalized white minority rule, while in the United States, white Christians have only recently become a minority. But the threat of losing power to people of color is a striking common thread.
In the United States, the election of the first black president in 2008 and declining faith in an increasingly unequal and unstable American economy brought the country’s recent demographic shift into sharp relief. As has been well catalogued, both issues were ripe fruit for Donald Trump’s ethnonationalist presidential campaign and the transformation of the Republican Party into a movement motivated by preserving the political, economic, and social status of white Christian America. Although the institutional infrastructure for this effort was already well established, the Republicans under Trump have gone all-in on defending what is—to be blunt—white rule.The Republicans under Trump have gone all-in on defending what is—to be blunt—white rule.
Of course, exploiting ostensibly democratic institutions to preserve minority rule could have been a page taken from the South African National Party’s playbook. The latter used a series of blunt legislative instruments to effectively disenfranchise black voters by law. Trump and the Republicans have an Electoral College and U.S. Senate that overrepresent predominantly white rural states, gerrymandered election districts that dilute urban and minority votes, and a wide range of other measures to suppress minority voting. Other similarities include rallying conservative church networks, promoting ethnonationalist narratives and iconography (Manifest Destiny promising the land to white people here, the armed Afrikaaner frontiersman there), co-opting financial elites and the white middle class with artificially high returns on capital, and fomenting racial discord in highly visible institutions like sports.
This mountain of parallels is why the past four-odd years of Trumpist politics in the United States have felt like two decades of South African politics, and why the events of recent weeks look like the dying phase of apartheid, sped up at a dizzying pace.
Just as South Africa’s economic and political elites split over the government’s attempts to suppress the anti-apartheid movement, the past 10 days have seen fractures among the U.S. ruling class. Prominent figures in the U.S. military have defied and condemned Trump’s efforts to crack down on protesters; Republican leaders have taken postures of defection from his reelection campaign; and a growing collection of U.S. corporate and financial institutions have voiced support for the protesters despite the looting and economic damage. Strikingly, even the National Football League has reversed course in its opposition to players protesting anti-black police brutality, defying Trump and echoing the infighting in South Africa’s white-supremacist rugby culture around 30 years ago (known in the United States primarily via the hit movie Invictus, in which Morgan Freeman memorably plays Nelson Mandela).
Like South Africans before them, Americans rightly are concerned about violence and instability as the 2020 election approaches. Egged on by the White House, clashes between protesters and police risk being reframed as a confrontation between “thugs” and “patriots,” Democrats and Republicans, multicultural and “real” Americans, people who want to change an unjust system and those who want law and order. That some protests have been violent and that right-wing militias had already mobilized against public health measures to contain the coronavirus certainly add fuel to the fire. As do Trump’s farcical but dangerous threats to declare any adverse electoral outcomes in November as having been rigged against him.
Yet again, the South African experience is instructive. Notwithstanding a series of killings, bombings, and high-profile attacks instigated by white supremacist groups and militias, the feared race war did not materialize. Even though white South Africans stood to lose their legal monopoly on political, military, and economic power, the end of apartheid proceeded in relative peace. Indeed, South Africa became the first country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons, while most political violence during regime change occurred within racial groups, not between them.
Sadly, post-apartheid South Africa still suffers from massive economic inequality, high crime rates, and frequent bouts of social unrest. But it did not descend into civil war and has maintained core political and economic stability, even in conditions far less auspicious than those in the United States.
The critical effort to root out systemic racism will be painful and hard—but it will not require a new constitution like in South Africa, nor a complete overhaul of the economy, not even in the case of reparations. Even though democratic institutions have taken a beating under Trump, the fact that the historic demise of white rule will occur in the world’s oldest democracy, with the world’s largest and most dynamic economy, is a significant boon for the future.
Sometimes there are weeks when decades happen. Such weeks are upon Americans today. The South African experience can help guide them through the turbulence.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Fired State Watchdog Confirms Ongoing Investigation Into Pompeo and His Wife

Fired State Watchdog Confirms Ongoing Investigation Into Pompeo and His Wife The State Department inspector general fired by U.S. President Donald Trump last month has confirmed that at the time of his dismissal his office was investigating alleged misuse of department resources by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his wife , Susan Pompeo , according to a transcript released by Democratic lawmakers .
The newly released interview is certain to ramp up public pressure on Pompeo to explain his recommendation to Trump that he sack Steve Linick last month .
In the interview with lawmakers , Linick confirmed that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was one of five investigations into alleged wrongdoing that his office was conducting at the time of his firing .
On one of the investigations into the department ’ s $ 7 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia last year over congressional objections , Linick said a senior political appointee attempted to “ bully ” him into halting his work .
Linick also said he was concerned about giving senior department officials information on an investigation into political retaliation into career State Department employees , for fear that his investigators themselves could be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who were involved in the investigation of the political retaliation matter in the Office of the Secretary .
And I was concerned—or I could imagine the department using information in that report against them , ” he said .
The 253-page transcript released on Wednesday sheds new light on how the department ’ s independent watchdog sought to do its job under a president who has railed against the so-called “ deep state ” and derided career diplomats dragged into the center of his impeachment investigation .
Linick was the fourth federal inspector @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of two months by the president , prompting criticism from many lawmakers—including one of Trump ’ s Republican allies on Capitol Hill .
Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa announced on June 4 that he would block several senior Trump administration nominees from advancing through Senate confirmation “ until the White House provides adequate reasons for the termination of the Intelligence Community and State Department inspectors general.
” Current U.S. law states that a president may remove an inspector general at will , but such a decision requires notifying Congress about the reasons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ advance .
Trump said in a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that he no longer had confidence in Linick but did not elaborate .
Linick was removed from his post before the 30 days was up .
In his testimony , he said he was “ shocked ” by the announcement and “ had no indication whatsoever ” that the secretary was planning on recommending that Trump fire him .
Pompeo has been vague on the specific reasons for Linick ’ s firing but has denied that it was a retaliatory move @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaking to the press .
“ Steve Linick was a bad actor in the inspector general office here , ” Pompeo told reporters in a press conference on Wednesday .
“ He didn ’ t take on the mission of the State Department to make us better .
That ’ s what inspector generals are supposed to do .
They work for the agency head—that ’ s me—and they are supposed to deliver and help make that organization better .
It ’ s not what Mr. Linick did.
” He claimed Linick “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ asked to do ” when pressed to investigate the leak to reporters of “ a very politically sensitive document designed to destroy the career of a professional State Department official.
” Pompeo said the leak could have come from Linick ’ s office , but the department is still looking into the matter .
An investigation from the Defense Department inspector general in March found no evidence that his office leaked information to the press regarding a Daily Beast story in September 2019 on an inspector general report on the State Department ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Linick rebutted allegations that he leaked to the press in his interview with lawmakers , which took place last week .
Trump fired Linick on May 15 at the recommendation of Pompeo .
Linick sat down for closed-door testimony with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers after three committees launched a joint investigation into his firing—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , the House Foreign Affairs Committee , and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform .
Other investigations Linick said he had opened before he was fired included a review of the International Women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department ’ s chief of protocol office .
Foreign Policy reported in March 2019 that the State Department had revoked an International Women of Courage Award to a Finnish investigative journalist after department officials flagged social media posts she made about Trump .
The secretary of state and his wife also hosted private taxpayer-funded dinners at the department with political heavyweights , including deep-pocketed Republican campaign donors , according to an NBC News investigation in May .
Fourteen percent of those who attended some two dozen of such dinners were foreign diplomats @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obtained by NBC News .
Pompeo has criticized the Democratic-led investigation into the matter as a personal and politicized attack .
“ This is just part and parcel of the attacks on President Trump and now on myself related to us trying to make sure that this government was functioning in a way that was designed to assist the American people , ” he told Fox News on May 31 .
“ These attacks have become very personal to me , to now come after my wife.
” He has also said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s work in advance in rebutting accusations from Democratic lawmakers that he fired Linick in retaliation for opening an investigation into his and his wife ’ s alleged wrongdoing .
In his testimony , Linick said he gave other senior State Department officials close to Pompeo advance warning of the investigation , however .
“ I wanted to make sure everybody was aware so that they wouldn ’ t be surprised , ” he said .
“ I didn ’ t tell them not to tell anybody , including Secretary Pompeo , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of view , I just wanted to make sure that folks on the Seventh Floor knew what we were doing before they just got a document request.
” Linick ’ s temporary replacement , Stephen Akard , is a close ally of Vice President Mike Pence who is also the head of the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department .
As acting inspector general , Akard now oversees the separate office he runs , raising concerns among some department officials and lawmakers about the independence of the inspector general ’ s @ @

The State Department inspector general fired by U.S. President Donald Trump last month has confirmed that at the time of his dismissal his office was investigating alleged misuse of department resources by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his wife, Susan Pompeo, according to a transcript released by Democratic lawmakers.
The State Department inspector general fired by U.S. President Donald Trump last month has confirmed that at the time of his dismissal his office was investigating alleged misuse of department resources by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his wife, Susan Pompeo, according to a transcript released by Democratic lawmakers.
The newly released interview is certain to ramp up public pressure on Pompeo to explain his recommendation to Trump that he sack Steve Linick last month.
In the interview with lawmakers, Linick confirmed that the probe into Pompeo and his wife was one of five investigations into alleged wrongdoing that his office was conducting at the time of his firing. On one of the investigations into the department’s $7 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia last year over congressional objections, Linick said a senior political appointee attempted to “bully” him into halting his work.
Linick also said he was concerned about giving senior department officials information on an investigation into political retaliation into career State Department employees, for fear that his investigators themselves could be retaliated against. “These were individuals who were involved in the investigation of the political retaliation matter in the Office of the Secretary. And I was concerned—or I could imagine the department using information in that report against them,” he said.
The 253-page transcript released on Wednesday sheds new light on how the department’s independent watchdog sought to do its job under a president who has railed against the so-called “deep state” and derided career diplomats dragged into the center of his impeachment investigation. Linick was the fourth federal inspector general to be fired in the course of two months by the president, prompting criticism from many lawmakers—including one of Trump’s Republican allies on Capitol Hill.
Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa announced on June 4 that he would block several senior Trump administration nominees from advancing through Senate confirmation “until the White House provides adequate reasons for the termination of the Intelligence Community and State Department inspectors general.”
Current U.S. law states that a president may remove an inspector general at will, but such a decision requires notifying Congress about the reasons for such a removal 30 days in advance. Trump said in a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi that he no longer had confidence in Linick but did not elaborate. Linick was removed from his post before the 30 days was up. In his testimony, he said he was “shocked” by the announcement and “had no indication whatsoever” that the secretary was planning on recommending that Trump fire him.
Pompeo has been vague on the specific reasons for Linick’s firing but has denied that it was a retaliatory move and accused Linick’s office of leaking to the press. “Steve Linick was a bad actor in the inspector general office here,” Pompeo told reporters in a press conference on Wednesday. “He didn’t take on the mission of the State Department to make us better. That’s what inspector generals are supposed to do. They work for the agency head—that’s me—and they are supposed to deliver and help make that organization better. It’s not what Mr. Linick did.”
He claimed Linick “didn’t do what he was asked to do” when pressed to investigate the leak to reporters of “a very politically sensitive document designed to destroy the career of a professional State Department official.” Pompeo said the leak could have come from Linick’s office, but the department is still looking into the matter.
An investigation from the Defense Department inspector general in March found no evidence that his office leaked information to the press regarding a Daily Beast story in September 2019 on an inspector general report on the State Department’s Iran envoy, Brian Hook. Linick rebutted allegations that he leaked to the press in his interview with lawmakers, which took place last week.
Trump fired Linick on May 15 at the recommendation of Pompeo. Linick sat down for closed-door testimony with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers after three committees launched a joint investigation into his firing—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform.
Other investigations Linick said he had opened before he was fired included a review of the International Women of Courage Award and one into the State Department’s chief of protocol office. Foreign Policy reported in March 2019 that the State Department had revoked an International Women of Courage Award to a Finnish investigative journalist after department officials flagged social media posts she made about Trump.
The secretary of state and his wife also hosted private taxpayer-funded dinners at the department with political heavyweights, including deep-pocketed Republican campaign donors, according to an NBC News investigation in May. Fourteen percent of those who attended some two dozen of such dinners were foreign diplomats, according to documents on the dinners obtained by NBC News.
Pompeo has criticized the Democratic-led investigation into the matter as a personal and politicized attack. “This is just part and parcel of the attacks on President Trump and now on myself related to us trying to make sure that this government was functioning in a way that was designed to assist the American people,” he told Fox News on May 31. “These attacks have become very personal to me, to now come after my wife.”
He has also said he had no way of knowing about Linick’s work in advance in rebutting accusations from Democratic lawmakers that he fired Linick in retaliation for opening an investigation into his and his wife’s alleged wrongdoing.
In his testimony, Linick said he gave other senior State Department officials close to Pompeo advance warning of the investigation, however. “I wanted to make sure everybody was aware so that they wouldn’t be surprised,” he said. “I didn’t tell them not to tell anybody, including Secretary Pompeo, about them. … From my point of view, I just wanted to make sure that folks on the Seventh Floor knew what we were doing before they just got a document request.”
Linick’s temporary replacement, Stephen Akard, is a close ally of Vice President Mike Pence who is also the head of the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department. As acting inspector general, Akard now oversees the separate office he runs, raising concerns among some department officials and lawmakers about the independence of the inspector general’s office.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-10--Forget the G-7, Build the D-10

Forget the G-7, Build the D-10

The canceled G-7 summit this week , unfortunately , is no great misfortune .
Though it ’ s a shame that the group of seven major industrialized nations ’ leaders were not able to gather amid the raging global pandemic—and perhaps , even more likely , due to mounting tensions between the United States and its allies—the grouping was always unlikely to achieve much with U.S. President Donald Trump at the helm .
That ’ s why it proved so easy for world leaders to miss .
Trump seemed to recognize this dated 1970s format was insufficient when he proposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Russia to join a rescheduled summit in September .
However , including a hostile actor like Vladimir Putin ’ s Russia in this group of leading democracies was obviously a nonstarter—especially since the G-20 already exists as a separate , broader grouping that includes both Russia and China .
But creative thinking across the Atlantic at No .
10 Downing St. is heading in the right direction .
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been actively considering the right idea : consolidating a new D-10 group of 10 leading democracies ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea , India , and Australia ) for addressing both 5G mobile communications and vulnerable supply chains .
While the idea behind a D-10 is not a novel one—a group organized by the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington has been promoting it for years with regular working-level meetings between officials—it has a new impetus amid the coronavirus pandemic .
As Beijing attempts to deflect away from its own mishandling of the virus ’ s initial outbreak in Wuhan and its lack of transparency , it is also engaging in “ wolf warrior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaigns against the United States and its allies and partners .
Stories of faulty Chinese-made masks and other vital medical equipment have also circulated widely around the world .
That has drawn new attention to the risks associated with relying on Chinese-made 5G infrastructure and critical supply chains .
Countries from Canada to Britain to Germany are already rethinking whether to allow Huawei to build out their next-generation 5G networks .
Meanwhile , the United States , the European Union , and Japan are all currently considering options for reducing dependence on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equipment , and possibly other critical sectors as well .
The United Kingdom ’ s D-10 is the right size and shape : neither too big , which reduces coherence ; nor too small , covering only the Cold War West .
The D-10 is not an anti-China alliance .
Instead , by narrowly focusing on the two defensive issues all democratic powers broadly agree they have a problem and can not solve on their own—5G and critical supply chains—it is a platform that could relatively quickly get off the ground .
Moreover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign-policy “ restrainers ” as well as “ competitors ” alike , as actively reducing these two strategic vulnerabilities and heated public concerns can work to lessen future tensions with Beijing .
Britain is well suited to play a key role in such an effort .
After flip-flopping on its decision from January to allow Huawei a limited role in building out Britain ’ s next 5G wireless network , Downing Street is now signaling resolve to reverse prior over-reliance on China .
British foreign policy is regaining confidence over Hong Kong : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s offer to provide open-ended residency and thus pathway to citizenship to over 2.5 million Hong Kong citizens , should Beijing impose the regressive national security law it passed on the city .
The British government is also planning a tightening of its foreign investment screening legislation .
Britain is also regaining trust with its Five Eyes allies , which have been strained due to London ’ s previous unwillingness to question its dependence on China .
Britain ’ s convening power is returning too , as a recent joint letter signed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States addressing the situation in Hong Kong indicates .
D-10 is a golden opportunity for London to put some meat on the bones on the still unproven “ Global Britain ” concept pitched by Johnson and others in the wake of Brexit .
To further advance the D-10 , the U.K. should seek to convene its first summit in London by early next year .
In an effort to put differences over Brexit aside , London should reach out to Paris and Berlin to explore if there is interest in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ EU and other European powers attending including Italy , which is also a G-7 member , but also Spain , the Netherlands , Sweden , and Poland as occasional participants depending on the topic at hand .
This would be in the long-standing format of the G-7 summits : The leaders of nine non-member states , including India and Australia , attended the 2019 summit in Biarritz , France .
The focus of these discussions should be , firstly , on developing cost-effective and technologically sophisticated 5G alternatives to Huawei by enhancing government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like-minded countries .
But they can also tackle how to promote more diverse global supply chains in critical areas while also building new capacities for sourcing components and shifting certain production to outside of China in a coordinated fashion that avoids becoming a slippery slope toward protectionism or U.S.-style “ decoupling ” .
Britain ’ s new thinking might be the right move for the EU , too , when it comes to trans-Atlantic relations—regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election in November .
First of all , the D-10 is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in two areas where they can actually work fairly constructively with the Trump administration .
This was most recently demonstrated by the fact the United States joined the G-7 AI group to set shared ethical guidelines for the use of the emerging technology .
Last year , the Trump administration also expressed appreciation for the EU ’ s efforts to address 5G security risks .
Additionally the D-10 opens the door for Europeans to quickly add working groups on climate and multilateralism to the agenda should Trump ’ s challenger Joe Biden win @ @ @ @ @ @ @ D-10 also offers the United States the perfect platform to implement Biden ’ s foreign-policy agenda should he win—adding working groups on security , corruption , and human rights—and could grow into a grouping that either formally superseded or met in parallel with the G-7 .
The case for trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific democratic allies and partners to join hands in an age of growing great-power competition against China is clear .
Quickly building a limited action-oriented D-10 focusing on core issues and not just another talking shop would aid this work while also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unilateral approaches or zero-sum thinking toward China .
London is still needed .
Despite Brexit , Britain ’ s role as a bridge between the democracies is far from over : By engaging the other G-7 members on the D-10 idea , it should now work to update Hastings Ismay ’ s 1949 strategic maxim on NATO , to “ keep the Soviet Union out , the Americans in , and the Germans down , ” for a world of 5G and fragile supply chains—a grand strategy for the democracies that will work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close , and the United States steady in the turbulent years to come .

The canceled G-7 summit this week, unfortunately, is no great misfortune. Though it’s a shame that the group of seven major industrialized nations’ leaders were not able to gather amid the raging global pandemic—and perhaps, even more likely, due to mounting tensions between the United States and its allies—the grouping was always unlikely to achieve much with U.S. President Donald Trump at the helm. That’s why it proved so easy for world leaders to miss.
The canceled G-7 summit this week, unfortunately, is no great misfortune. Though it’s a shame that the group of seven major industrialized nations’ leaders were not able to gather amid the raging global pandemic—and perhaps, even more likely, due to mounting tensions between the United States and its allies—the grouping was always unlikely to achieve much with U.S. President Donald Trump at the helm. That’s why it proved so easy for world leaders to miss.
Trump seemed to recognize this dated 1970s format was insufficient when he proposed inviting India, South Korea, Australia, and Russia to join a rescheduled summit in September. However, including a hostile actor like Vladimir Putin’s Russia in this group of leading democracies was obviously a nonstarter—especially since the G-20 already exists as a separate, broader grouping that includes both Russia and China.
But creative thinking across the Atlantic at No. 10 Downing St. is heading in the right direction. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been actively considering the right idea: consolidating a new D-10 group of 10 leading democracies (the current G-7 members, plus South Korea, India, and Australia) for addressing both 5G mobile communications and vulnerable supply chains. While the idea behind a D-10 is not a novel one—a group organized by the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington has been promoting it for years with regular working-level meetings between officials—it has a new impetus amid the coronavirus pandemic.
As Beijing attempts to deflect away from its own mishandling of the virus’s initial outbreak in Wuhan and its lack of transparency, it is also engaging in “wolf warrior” diplomacy, propaganda and online disinformation campaigns against the United States and its allies and partners. Stories of faulty Chinese-made masks and other vital medical equipment have also circulated widely around the world. That has drawn new attention to the risks associated with relying on Chinese-made 5G infrastructure and critical supply chains. Countries from Canada to Britain to Germany are already rethinking whether to allow Huawei to build out their next-generation 5G networks. Meanwhile, the United States, the European Union, and Japan are all currently considering options for reducing dependence on China for the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, and possibly other critical sectors as well.
The United Kingdom’s D-10 is the right size and shape: neither too big, which reduces coherence; nor too small, covering only the Cold War West. The D-10 is not an anti-China alliance. Instead, by narrowly focusing on the two defensive issues all democratic powers broadly agree they have a problem and cannot solve on their own—5G and critical supply chains—it is a platform that could relatively quickly get off the ground. Moreover, the D-10 is attractive to both foreign-policy “restrainers” as well as “competitors” alike, as actively reducing these two strategic vulnerabilities and heated public concerns can work to lessen future tensions with Beijing.
Britain is well suited to play a key role in such an effort. After flip-flopping on its decision from January to allow Huawei a limited role in building out Britain’s next 5G wireless network, Downing Street is now signaling resolve to reverse prior over-reliance on China. British foreign policy is regaining confidence over Hong Kong: a case in point being London’s offer to provide open-ended residency and thus pathway to citizenship to over 2.5 million Hong Kong citizens, should Beijing impose the regressive national security law it passed on the city. The British government is also planning a tightening of its foreign investment screening legislation. Britain is also regaining trust with its Five Eyes allies, which have been strained due to London’s previous unwillingness to question its dependence on China. Britain’s convening power is returning too, as a recent joint letter signed by the U.K., Canada, Australia, and the United States addressing the situation in Hong Kong indicates.
D-10 is a golden opportunity for London to put some meat on the bones on the still unproven “Global Britain” concept pitched by Johnson and others in the wake of Brexit. To further advance the D-10, the U.K. should seek to convene its first summit in London by early next year. In an effort to put differences over Brexit aside, London should reach out to Paris and Berlin to explore if there is interest in jointly proposing the D-10, with the EU and other European powers attending including Italy, which is also a G-7 member, but also Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Poland as occasional participants depending on the topic at hand. This would be in the long-standing format of the G-7 summits: The leaders of nine non-member states, including India and Australia, attended the 2019 summit in Biarritz, France.
The focus of these discussions should be, firstly, on developing cost-effective and technologically sophisticated 5G alternatives to Huawei by enhancing government and industry collaboration within the group of like-minded countries. But they can also tackle how to promote more diverse global supply chains in critical areas while also building new capacities for sourcing components and shifting certain production to outside of China in a coordinated fashion that avoids becoming a slippery slope toward protectionism or U.S.-style “decoupling”.
Britain’s new thinking might be the right move for the EU, too, when it comes to trans-Atlantic relations—regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election in November. First of all, the D-10 is an insurance policy to bind democratic partners together in two areas where they can actually work fairly constructively with the Trump administration. This was most recently demonstrated by the fact the United States joined the G-7 AI group to set shared ethical guidelines for the use of the emerging technology. Last year, the Trump administration also expressed appreciation for the EU’s efforts to address 5G security risks. Additionally the D-10 opens the door for Europeans to quickly add working groups on climate and multilateralism to the agenda should Trump’s challenger Joe Biden win in November. Looking ahead, the D-10 also offers the United States the perfect platform to implement Biden’s foreign-policy agenda should he win—adding working groups on security, corruption, and human rights—and could grow into a grouping that either formally superseded or met in parallel with the G-7.
The case for trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific democratic allies and partners to join hands in an age of growing great-power competition against China is clear. Quickly building a limited action-oriented D-10 focusing on core issues and not just another talking shop would aid this work while also making it harder for Washington to pursue unilateral approaches or zero-sum thinking toward China.
London is still needed. Despite Brexit, Britain’s role as a bridge between the democracies is far from over: By engaging the other G-7 members on the D-10 idea, it should now work to update Hastings Ismay’s 1949 strategic maxim on NATO, to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” for a world of 5G and fragile supply chains—a grand strategy for the democracies that will work to keep China in check, India close, and the United States steady in the turbulent years to come.