foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Putin’s Security Forces Are Increasingly Unsure About Putin

Suppose you ordered a crackdown and nobody came ?
The continuing protests in the Russian city of Khabarovsk , triggered by the arrest of the elected local governor , do not simply demonstrate pent-up dissatisfaction toward Vladimir Putin ’ s regime—they also demonstrate some of the potential limitations of its control over the security forces .
As the Kremlin seems to be pivoting toward a renewed campaign of repression , the question of the morale and loyalty of its enforcers becomes crucial .
Thousands of protesters have turned out every weekend since July 9 , when the Khabarovsk region ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arrested on 15-year-old murder-conspiracy charges .
This is less about Furgal himself so much as a widespread local discontent about a government they feel only notices the territories outside Moscow ’ s MKAD beltway when it is time to tax them .
What has been particularly striking , though , has been that although none of the protests have been authorized , the local police have not tried to control them .
This weekend , six protesters out of maybe 10,000 were detained : Two protesters were sentenced to a week behind bars @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 134 ) each , and two more were held overnight then cut loose .
Compared with how protests elsewhere in Russia have been handled , this was positively benign .
It is not as if Khabarovsk lacks for security forces .
Along with its regular police , it has an OMON riot police unit , a SOBR SWAT team , an Independent National Guard Motorized Battalion and Interior Troop Brigade , and the 21st “ Typhoon ” Special Designation Commando Detachment .
As if that were not enough , as a key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ army ’ s Eastern Military District is headquartered there , and there is also a regional headquarters of the Federal Security Service ( FSB ) .
Yet the police have not just done little to prevent the protests ; they have also escorted the marches and fraternized with demonstrators who chanted “ thank you , police ” after officers handed out face masks .
Even the fearsome National Guard have left them be , demonstrating what one observer said was obvious sympathy for them .
The latest demonstration also coincided with the annual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s paratroopers .
Veterans of wars in Chechnya , Georgia , and Syria , waving flags and sporting their distinctive blue-and-white striped shirts , joined the march .
Meanwhile , the investigators of the Prosecutor General ’ s Office , the Investigative Committee , and the FSB may be compiling reports for the day they are unleashed , but so far they have been noticeably quiet .
Indeed , when claims surfaced in Moscow that the protests were instigated by professional malcontents from outside the city , maybe even prompted by the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ denying them .
In part , it is simply that no one has any appetite for a showdown so long as the protests are—largely—confined to a single city and still have local opinion on their side .
The Kremlin can afford to wait and simply suppress any mention of Khabarovsk in the mass media .
However , this hesitation also seems to reflect the unease Moscow is feeling about how far it could rely on its security forces in a crisis that would pit them against the local population .
Since 2011 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ drop the Soviet-era name “ militia , ” the police have been engaged in a serious effort to reconnect with the Russian public .
Although they are still viewed with suspicion , they are nonetheless much better regarded now than a decade ago .
This works both ways , though .
Their disinclination to play the role of Kremlin stormtrooper led to the creation of the National Guard in 2016 under Viktor Zolotov , a former head of Putin ’ s personal security team and a man with a reputation for heavy-handed loyalty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and even FSB officers will spend their careers in the same city or region .
They will marry , make friends , and generally be part of the local community—they often feel the same pressures and injustices as their neighbors .
Just as importantly , most of their commanders will also stay put .
In Soviet times , the MVD ( Ministry of Internal Affairs ) and the KGB—predecessor of the FSB—liked to move them around to prevent them developing local loyalties .
Since then , this practice has fallen into disuse .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ they know their chances of making it to the more prestigious—and lucrative—jobs in Moscow are minimal .
Instead , the local business and political elite are their peers , their friends , and the people on whose corrupt schemes they will rely for their enrichment .
For example , Maj. Gen. Sergei Kraev , the commander of the National Guard ’ s Khabarovsk region forces , has served there since he left the army in 1994 .
It is telling that rumors circulated that OMON riot police from Rostov or Novosibirsk were being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ know if it could trust local forces .
After all , their commanders profess their loyalty to the center , but until these are put to the test , even the Kremlin can not know how they will react .
In the hard-line August Coup against the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev , for example , even though the heads of the KGB and MVD were behind it , the police and even many security officers were not .
Nor , for that matter , was the army .
The military remains the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu appears to be a strong Putin loyalist , number-crunching of the votes for recent constitutional changes from military towns suggests the soldiers were evenly split for and against the Kremlin ’ s revisions—even though the official overall figure was 78 percent in favor .
At the very least , they show no evidence of especially fervent commitment to the regime .
None of this means that the services are likely to turn on Putin or that any serious crisis is imminent .
Nor does it mean that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Rather , as protests subside to a more manageable level , the government will likely then decide to be more assertive .
However , the very sense that it is having to more carefully calibrate its use of repression suggests that the Kremlin , while clearly seeking to reestablish its authority , is conscious that it would be wise not to test the loyalties of its enforcers too far .
It also opens up an interesting new flank for the opposition .
Members of the security forces are increasingly willing to express @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditions .
In May , Vladimir Vorontsov , the ex-cop behind the unofficial Police Ombudsman website campaigning on officers ’ issues , was arrested in a clear sign of the authorities ’ sensitivities about this .
In an equally clear sign of how the police felt , many even went public in criticizing the arrest .
Meanwhile , the activist leader Alexei Navalny has reached out to police and National Guard alike , even after Zolotov surreally challenged him to a duel , while Abbas Gallyamov , a former Kremlin speechwriter-turned-critic , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the security forces .
The Khabarovsk protests are not going to bring down Putin—but they have highlighted that one of the key fronts in any future efforts to do so will be in the hearts and minds of his praetorians .

Suppose you ordered a crackdown and nobody came? The continuing protests in the Russian city of Khabarovsk, triggered by the arrest of the elected local governor, do not simply demonstrate pent-up dissatisfaction toward Vladimir Putin’s regime —they also demonstrate some of the potential limitations of its control over the security forces . As the Kremlin seems to be pivoting toward a renewed campaign of repression , the question of the morale and loyalty of its enforcers becomes crucial.
Suppose you ordered a crackdown and nobody came? The continuing protests in the Russian city of Khabarovsk, triggered by the arrest of the elected local governor, do not simply demonstrate pent-up dissatisfaction toward Vladimir Putin’s regime—they also demonstrate some of the potential limitations of its control over the security forces. As the Kremlin seems to be pivoting toward a renewed campaign of repression, the question of the morale and loyalty of its enforcers becomes crucial.
Thousands of protesters have turned out every weekend since July 9, when the Khabarovsk region’s governor, Sergei Furgal, was arrested on 15-year-old murder-conspiracy charges. This is less about Furgal himself so much as a widespread local discontent about a government they feel only notices the territories outside Moscow’s MKAD beltway when it is time to tax them.
What has been particularly striking, though, has been that although none of the protests have been authorized, the local police have not tried to control them. This weekend, six protesters out of maybe 10,000 were detained: Two protesters were sentenced to a week behind bars, two were fined 10,000 rubles ($134) each, and two more were held overnight then cut loose. Compared with how protests elsewhere in Russia have been handled, this was positively benign.
It is not as if Khabarovsk lacks for security forces. Along with its regular police, it has an OMON riot police unit, a SOBR SWAT team, an Independent National Guard Motorized Battalion and Interior Troop Brigade, and the 21st “Typhoon” Special Designation Commando Detachment. As if that were not enough, as a key city along the Chinese border, the army’s Eastern Military District is headquartered there, and there is also a regional headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB).
Yet the police have not just done little to prevent the protests; they have also escorted the marches and fraternized with demonstrators who chanted “thank you, police” after officers handed out face masks. Even the fearsome National Guard have left them be, demonstrating what one observer said was obvious sympathy for them.
The latest demonstration also coincided with the annual holiday of the VDV, Russia’s paratroopers. Veterans of wars in Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria, waving flags and sporting their distinctive blue-and-white striped shirts, joined the march.
Meanwhile, the investigators of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee, and the FSB may be compiling reports for the day they are unleashed, but so far they have been noticeably quiet. Indeed, when claims surfaced in Moscow that the protests were instigated by professional malcontents from outside the city, maybe even prompted by the United States, local prosecutors gave off-the-record briefings denying them.
In part, it is simply that no one has any appetite for a showdown so long as the protests are—largely—confined to a single city and still have local opinion on their side. The Kremlin can afford to wait and simply suppress any mention of Khabarovsk in the mass media.
However, this hesitation also seems to reflect the unease Moscow is feeling about how far it could rely on its security forces in a crisis that would pit them against the local population.
Since 2011, when major reforms even saw them finally drop the Soviet-era name “militia,” the police have been engaged in a serious effort to reconnect with the Russian public. Although they are still viewed with suspicion, they are nonetheless much better regarded now than a decade ago.
This works both ways, though. Their disinclination to play the role of Kremlin stormtrooper led to the creation of the National Guard in 2016 under Viktor Zolotov, a former head of Putin’s personal security team and a man with a reputation for heavy-handed loyalty.
Most police, National Guard, and even FSB officers will spend their careers in the same city or region. They will marry, make friends, and generally be part of the local community—they often feel the same pressures and injustices as their neighbors.
Just as importantly, most of their commanders will also stay put. In Soviet times, the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the KGB—predecessor of the FSB—liked to move them around to prevent them developing local loyalties. Since then, this practice has fallen into disuse. Except for a handful of high-fliers, they know their chances of making it to the more prestigious—and lucrative—jobs in Moscow are minimal. Instead, the local business and political elite are their peers, their friends, and the people on whose corrupt schemes they will rely for their enrichment.
For example, Maj. Gen. Sergei Kraev, the commander of the National Guard’s Khabarovsk region forces, has served there since he left the army in 1994.
It is telling that rumors circulated that OMON riot police from Rostov or Novosibirsk were being drafted into Khabarovsk because Moscow did not know if it could trust local forces. After all, their commanders profess their loyalty to the center, but until these are put to the test, even the Kremlin cannot know how they will react. In the hard-line August Coup against the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, even though the heads of the KGB and MVD were behind it, the police and even many security officers were not.
Nor, for that matter, was the army. The military remains the largest armed force in Russia, and while Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu appears to be a strong Putin loyalist, number-crunching of the votes for recent constitutional changes from military towns suggests the soldiers were evenly split for and against the Kremlin’s revisions—even though the official overall figure was 78 percent in favor. At the very least, they show no evidence of especially fervent commitment to the regime.
None of this means that the services are likely to turn on Putin or that any serious crisis is imminent. Nor does it mean that we can expect a kinder, gentler Kremlin. Rather, as protests subside to a more manageable level, the government will likely then decide to be more assertive. However, the very sense that it is having to more carefully calibrate its use of repression suggests that the Kremlin, while clearly seeking to reestablish its authority, is conscious that it would be wise not to test the loyalties of its enforcers too far.
It also opens up an interesting new flank for the opposition. Members of the security forces are increasingly willing to express criticisms of the government and their own conditions. In May, Vladimir Vorontsov, the ex-cop behind the unofficial Police Ombudsman website campaigning on officers’ issues, was arrested in a clear sign of the authorities’ sensitivities about this. In an equally clear sign of how the police felt, many even went public in criticizing the arrest.
Meanwhile, the activist leader Alexei Navalny has reached out to police and National Guard alike, even after Zolotov surreally challenged him to a duel, while Abbas Gallyamov, a former Kremlin speechwriter-turned-critic, has openly called for efforts to win over the security forces. The Khabarovsk protests are not going to bring down Putin—but they have highlighted that one of the key fronts in any future efforts to do so will be in the hearts and minds of his praetorians.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--The COVID-19 Economic Crash Could Set Indian Women Back Decades

A year ago , Punita Dhawan , 32 , opened a tailoring shop in New Delhi ’ s middle-class colony of Lajpat Nagar in a rented garage .
The neighborhood aunties soon began to take notice of the entrepreneur ’ s creativity , and she became their unofficial stylist .
Word spread , and Dhawan ’ s roster of clients gradually grew to include ladies from the adjoining residential areas as well .
The successful businesswoman started to make plans to launch her own boutique soon .
Her plans came crashing down on March 24 , when India announced a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to their homes .
The restrictions on travel and business meant Dhawan couldn ’ t operate her existing shop , let alone expand .
Her clients disappeared , as have her meager savings .
Babita Sharma , 35 , has a similar story .
In 2018 , she started working for a salon in Mumbai after relocating there from northern Uttar Pradesh with her parents in the same year .
The closure of Sharma ’ s thriving salon due to COVID-19 drove her family to return to their native village , where they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Life is tough for a woman , ” Sharma told me in July .
“ I went to a big city to fulfill my dreams .
I even put my marriage on hold to take care of my aging parents .
But now I ’ m jobless , and we have to survive selling vegetables , which grow on our tiny patch of land .
The future is so uncertain.
” Millions of Indian women like Dhawan and Sharma are finding their lives upended due to the pandemic .
Added together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make clear that the raging virus has further entrenched gender inequities in a country where women already face a wide gap in employment , wages , and education .
In the World Economic Forum ’ s 2020 Global Gender Gap Index , which uses pre-pandemic data , India ranks 112th of 153 countries in offering equal opportunities to women and men .
In particular , women often don ’ t have the same access to health care and education as their male counterparts .
Even before the pandemic , less than a quarter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ labor force , putting India among the bottom 10 countries in the world in terms of women ’ s workforce participation .
They also earn 35 percent less on average than men .
( The global average is 16 percent . )
Meanwhile , women are slightly under half of India ’ s population but they contribute only 18 percent to its economic output .
The pandemic will make these metrics far worse .
Small and growing businesses ( SGBs ) have been one of the hardest-hit segments during the pandemic .
According @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Innovation Review , the COVID-19 crisis is especially threatening SGBs in low-income nations .
In fact , the report adds , nearly 40 percent of SGBs in emerging markets are staring at potential failure in the next half of the year .
These developments will have a disproportionate impact on women .
According to India ’ s sixth economic census , published in 2016 , 13.8 percent of business establishments in India are owned by women , a majority of which are microenterprises and self-financed .
Many of these women-led businesses are found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and beauty , which have been ravaged by the COVID-19 lockdowns .
Already , at least 4 in 10 women in India have lost their jobs during the pandemic , according to the latest data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy ’ s Consumer Pyramids Household Survey .
In other words , between March and April , an estimated 17 million women were rendered jobless , in both the formal and informal sectors .
“ Women have been grievously impacted by the slashing of informal sector jobs , ” Kavita Krishnan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Women ’ s Association , a pan-India women ’ s advocacy group , told me in July .
And the effects will last a long time .
“ Most of them are employed in the informal sector , where revival has been tardy , ” Krishnan continued , so the pandemic “ will have long-term and irreversible ramifications on their lives and livelihoods .
The pandemic is already putting extra burden on women in terms of added domestic responsibilities , child care demands , and a looming recession .
The threat of them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is very real.
” According to Ranjana Kumari , the director of the Centre for Social Research , a New Delhi-based women ’ s rights group , the problem is all the worse because “ the gender lens is completely missing from policymaking , economic initiatives , or infrastructure development .
None of these crucial areas have women at their core.
” Around the world , policies and public health efforts have not taken the gendered implications of the illness and the changing social organization into account .
A gendered approach , Kumari @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workforce with better representation of women , higher salaries , better jobs , and maternity leave , to name a few .
Even now that India ’ s lockdown is being lifted , Kumari noted , not all women will be getting their jobs back—many of those jobs are simply gone , and many others will go to out-of-work men first .
Those who do get back in the workforce may have to compromise with inferior work or lesser salaries .
Already under the 2005 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s flagship scheme for distributing work to the poor , women aren ’ t getting good jobs .
They ’ re only getting the work men won ’ t take , she added .
The decline in women in the workforce will be a huge loss for India .
According to some estimates , if workforce participation of women rose , India could potentially increase its 2025 GDP by $ 700 billion .
There would be social gains , too .
Women who are employed may enjoy greater respect and bargaining power within @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own and their household ’ s well-being .
More money is available for higher education of children , health care , elder care , and retirement .
Thus by neglecting women , India is missing an opportunity to help its economy both recover from this pandemic and improve in the future .
In April , U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called for pandemic responses around the world to focus on women .
“ With women ’ s interests and rights front and centre , ” he wrote , “ we can get through this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and resilient communities and societies that benefit everyone.
” If not , millions of women like Dhawan and Sharma will continue to teeter on the edge .

A year ago, Punita Dhawan, 32, opened a tailoring shop in New Delhi’s middle-class colony of Lajpat Nagar in a rented garage. The neighborhood aunties soon began to take notice of the entrepreneur’s creativity, and she became their unofficial stylist. Word spread, and Dhawan’s roster of clients gradually grew to include ladies from the adjoining residential areas as well. The successful businesswoman started to make plans to launch her own boutique soon.
A year ago, Punita Dhawan, 32, opened a tailoring shop in New Delhi’s middle-class colony of Lajpat Nagar in a rented garage. The neighborhood aunties soon began to take notice of the entrepreneur’s creativity, and she became their unofficial stylist. Word spread, and Dhawan’s roster of clients gradually grew to include ladies from the adjoining residential areas as well. The successful businesswoman started to make plans to launch her own boutique soon.
Her plans came crashing down on March 24, when India announced a strict COVID-19 lockdown confining 1.4 billion people to their homes. The restrictions on travel and business meant Dhawan couldn’t operate her existing shop, let alone expand. Her clients disappeared, as have her meager savings.
Babita Sharma, 35, has a similar story. In 2018, she started working for a salon in Mumbai after relocating there from northern Uttar Pradesh with her parents in the same year. The closure of Sharma’s thriving salon due to COVID-19 drove her family to return to their native village, where they now eke out a living through farming.
“Life is tough for a woman,” Sharma told me in July. “I went to a big city to fulfill my dreams. I even put my marriage on hold to take care of my aging parents. But now I’m jobless, and we have to survive selling vegetables, which grow on our tiny patch of land. The future is so uncertain.”
Millions of Indian women like Dhawan and Sharma are finding their lives upended due to the pandemic. Added together, their poignant stories of individual loss make clear that the raging virus has further entrenched gender inequities in a country where women already face a wide gap in employment, wages, and education.
In the World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global Gender Gap Index, which uses pre-pandemic data, India ranks 112th of 153 countries in offering equal opportunities to women and men. In particular, women often don’t have the same access to health care and education as their male counterparts. Even before the pandemic, less than a quarter of women in India were in the labor force, putting India among the bottom 10 countries in the world in terms of women’s workforce participation. They also earn 35 percent less on average than men. (The global average is 16 percent.) Meanwhile, women are slightly under half of India’s population but they contribute only 18 percent to its economic output.
The pandemic will make these metrics far worse. Small and growing businesses (SGBs) have been one of the hardest-hit segments during the pandemic. According to a report in the Stanford Social Innovation Review, the COVID-19 crisis is especially threatening SGBs in low-income nations. In fact, the report adds, nearly 40 percent of SGBs in emerging markets are staring at potential failure in the next half of the year.
These developments will have a disproportionate impact on women. According to India’s sixth economic census, published in 2016, 13.8 percent of business establishments in India are owned by women, a majority of which are microenterprises and self-financed. Many of these women-led businesses are found in sectors like tourism, education, and beauty, which have been ravaged by the COVID-19 lockdowns.
Already, at least 4 in 10 women in India have lost their jobs during the pandemic, according to the latest data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy’s Consumer Pyramids Household Survey. In other words, between March and April, an estimated 17 million women were rendered jobless, in both the formal and informal sectors.
“Women have been grievously impacted by the slashing of informal sector jobs,” Kavita Krishnan, the secretary of the All India Progressive Women’s Association, a pan-India women’s advocacy group, told me in July. And the effects will last a long time. “Most of them are employed in the informal sector, where revival has been tardy,” Krishnan continued, so the pandemic “will have long-term and irreversible ramifications on their lives and livelihoods. The pandemic is already putting extra burden on women in terms of added domestic responsibilities, child care demands, and a looming recession. The threat of them getting squeezed out of the productive economy is very real.”
According to Ranjana Kumari, the director of the Centre for Social Research, a New Delhi-based women’s rights group, the problem is all the worse because “the gender lens is completely missing from policymaking, economic initiatives, or infrastructure development. None of these crucial areas have women at their core.” Around the world, policies and public health efforts have not taken the gendered implications of the illness and the changing social organization into account. A gendered approach, Kumari added, would facilitate a more inclusive workforce with better representation of women, higher salaries, better jobs, and maternity leave, to name a few.
Even now that India’s lockdown is being lifted, Kumari noted, not all women will be getting their jobs back—many of those jobs are simply gone, and many others will go to out-of-work men first. Those who do get back in the workforce may have to compromise with inferior work or lesser salaries. Already under the 2005 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which has served as the government’s flagship scheme for distributing work to the poor, women aren’t getting good jobs. They’re only getting the work men won’t take, she added.
The decline in women in the workforce will be a huge loss for India. According to some estimates, if workforce participation of women rose, India could potentially increase its 2025 GDP by $700 billion. There would be social gains, too. Women who are employed may enjoy greater respect and bargaining power within their families, which positively affects their own and their household’s well-being. More money is available for higher education of children, health care, elder care, and retirement.
Thus by neglecting women, India is missing an opportunity to help its economy both recover from this pandemic and improve in the future. In April, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called for pandemic responses around the world to focus on women. “With women’s interests and rights front and centre,” he wrote, “we can get through this pandemic faster, and build more equal and resilient communities and societies that benefit everyone.”
If not, millions of women like Dhawan and Sharma will continue to teeter on the edge.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Beijing’s Retaliation on TikTok Could Hurt U.S. Firms

Beijing ’ s Retaliation on TikTok Could Hurt U.S. Firms On July 31 , President Donald Trump told reporters that he planned to ban TikTok in the United States , sending shockwaves through the technology sector .
After a false start over the weekend , Microsoft began negotiations with TikTok ’ s parent company , ByteDance , to purchase the app .
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has reportedly given TikTok 45 days to find a buyer or face a ban of questionable effectiveness from the U.S. market .
The Trump administration has forced Chinese companies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past—most recently the gay dating app Grindr—but this would mark the first time the U.S. government forced a Chinese-developed product with significant market share out of the U.S. market .
The Chinese government might retaliate to either a U.S. government outright ban or a forced sale of TikTok , but the long-term implications of a forced sale are potentially more worrying .
Although ByteDance is not a state-owned enterprise or even a favored nominally private champion like Huawei , it is a major Chinese technology company with vast domestic and global markets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 50 billion , about one-half of the valuation that ByteDance received in May .
On July 30 and Aug. 3 , China ’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MFA ) registered its objections to the U.S. government ’ s action against TikTok , noting the United States “ is threatening a Chinese company based on presumption of guilt … in violation of the [ World Trade Organization ] principles of openness , transparency , and nondiscrimination.
” China has a fairly consistent policy of measured but reciprocal retaliation to U.S. actions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in retaliation for the abrupt closure of its consulate in Houston , and it has maintained this proportionality following U.S. actions such as cutting media visas and sanctioning officials .
Beijing has been less likely to retaliate against U.S. companies in response to U.S. government actions targeting Chinese businesses for several reasons .
The first is that clear equivalents are often lacking , since China severely restricts foreign businesses and investment already .
There is no U.S. equivalent to TikTok in China because almost all U.S. technology and information companies have already been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ equivalency forces the Chinese government to consider asymmetrical responses .
The Chinese government also continues to enthusiastically solicit foreign investment to stabilize its economic growth , hit hard by COVID-19 , and to continue its drive toward becoming a more advanced , diversified economy .
And finally , maintaining positive relations with the U.S. business community is politically astute in the current climate , too , since U.S. businesses have traditionally sought to dial back a tougher approach to China from U.S. policymakers , and continue to try to do so today .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S.-China sphere .
Notably , the Chinese government has not retaliated against Indian companies after the Indian government banned TikTok and 58 other Chinese apps in June .
On June 30 , a Chinese MFA spokesperson objected to the ban and noted China ’ s strong concern .
But on July 2 , a Chinese Ministry of Commerce spokesperson confirmed : “ I want to clarify that China does not impose any restrictive or discriminatory measures on goods and services from India.
” This nonresponse by the Chinese government could indicate that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ TikTok , or it could simply reflect that China ’ s delicate detente with India over the Galwan Valley skirmish is more important , for now , than economic retaliation .
Additionally , as one Indian newspaper noted , “ China can not do a tit-for-tat ban on Indian innovators .
Why ?
Because India … has no presence in the top technology innovations of the world.
” But if the Chinese government does choose to retaliate against U.S. government action on TikTok with measures targeting U.S. companies , it has several potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determine the most likely among them , Cisco could be one option since it has been considered out of favor in China for years due to its intellectual property disputes with Huawei .
In fact , in February the U.S. Justice Department announced an investigation of Huawei theft of U.S. intellectual property , and , while unnamed , Cisco is widely understood to be one of the victims cited in this case .
Other U.S. companies that might make a retaliatory short list include Amazon Web Services , which has a cloud services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which has huge markets and supply chains in China ; and Microsoft , which has major markets , research and development , and supply chains in China .
Given the Chinese government ’ s interest in balancing the business community ’ s favor with a principled policy of reciprocal retaliation to U.S. government actions , Beijing could also choose more discrete forms of retaliation , such as continued discrimination against U.S. technology companies ’ expansion in China .
If the U.S. government forces TikTok to sell its U.S. holdings , rather than simply @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , this unfortunately ratchets up the likelihood for the Chinese government to pursue some form of retaliation against American companies , including the potential to force sales of assets in China .
The Chinese government could easily target U.S. companies designated as “ critical information infrastructure ” under the vague Cybersecurity Law for forced fire sales , and this could be a potent weapon in China ’ s toolbox to consolidate domestic control of strategic emerging industries .
To be clear , the Chinese government has myriad ways to squeeze foreign company market @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. government does force a sale of TikTok , it could be erecting another hurdle in the already hazard-strewn path of U.S. companies doing business in China .

On July 31, President Donald Trump told reporters that he planned to ban TikTok in the United States, sending shockwaves through the technology sector. After a false start over the weekend, Microsoft began negotiations with TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, to purchase the app. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has reportedly given TikTok 45 days to find a buyer or face a ban of questionable effectiveness from the U.S. market. The Trump administration has forced Chinese companies to reverse purchases of U.S. companies in the past—most recently the gay dating app Grindr —but this would mark the first time the U.S. government forced a Chinese-developed product with significant market share out of the U.S. market.
On July 31, President Donald Trump told reporters that he planned to ban TikTok in the United States, sending shockwaves through the technology sector. After a false start over the weekend, Microsoft began negotiations with TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, to purchase the app. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has reportedly given TikTok 45 days to find a buyer or face a ban of questionable effectiveness from the U.S. market. The Trump administration has forced Chinese companies to reverse purchases of U.S. companies in the past—most recently the gay dating app Grindr—but this would mark the first time the U.S. government forced a Chinese-developed product with significant market share out of the U.S. market.
The Chinese government might retaliate to either a U.S. government outright ban or a forced sale of TikTok, but the long-term implications of a forced sale are potentially more worrying. Although ByteDance is not a state-owned enterprise or even a favored nominally private champion like Huawei, it is a major Chinese technology company with vast domestic and global markets. Some investors are valuing TikTok at $50 billion, about one-half of the valuation that ByteDance received in May. On July 30 and Aug. 3, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) registered its objections to the U.S. government’s action against TikTok, noting the United States “is threatening a Chinese company based on presumption of guilt … in violation of the [World Trade Organization] principles of openness, transparency, and nondiscrimination.” China has a fairly consistent policy of measured but reciprocal retaliation to U.S. actions, such as shuttering the Chengdu consulate in retaliation for the abrupt closure of its consulate in Houston, and it has maintained this proportionality following U.S. actions such as cutting media visas and sanctioning officials.
Beijing has been less likely to retaliate against U.S. companies in response to U.S. government actions targeting Chinese businesses for several reasons. The first is that clear equivalents are often lacking, since China severely restricts foreign businesses and investment already. There is no U.S. equivalent to TikTok in China because almost all U.S. technology and information companies have already been blocked in China. This lack of equivalency forces the Chinese government to consider asymmetrical responses.
The Chinese government also continues to enthusiastically solicit foreign investment to stabilize its economic growth, hit hard by COVID-19, and to continue its drive toward becoming a more advanced, diversified economy. And finally, maintaining positive relations with the U.S. business community is politically astute in the current climate, too, since U.S. businesses have traditionally sought to dial back a tougher approach to China from U.S. policymakers, and continue to try to do so today.
This measured Beijing action extends beyond the U.S.-China sphere. Notably, the Chinese government has not retaliated against Indian companies after the Indian government banned TikTok and 58 other Chinese apps in June. On June 30, a Chinese MFA spokesperson objected to the ban and noted China’s strong concern. But on July 2, a Chinese Ministry of Commerce spokesperson confirmed: “I want to clarify that China does not impose any restrictive or discriminatory measures on goods and services from India.” This nonresponse by the Chinese government could indicate that it will generally not retaliate over actions blocking TikTok, or it could simply reflect that China’s delicate detente with India over the Galwan Valley skirmish is more important, for now, than economic retaliation. Additionally, as one Indian newspaper noted, “China cannot do a tit-for-tat ban on Indian innovators. Why? Because India … has no presence in the top technology innovations of the world.”
But if the Chinese government does choose to retaliate against U.S. government action on TikTok with measures targeting U.S. companies, it has several potential candidates. While it is hard to determine the most likely among them, Cisco could be one option since it has been considered out of favor in China for years due to its intellectual property disputes with Huawei. In fact, in February the U.S. Justice Department announced an investigation of Huawei theft of U.S. intellectual property, and, while unnamed, Cisco is widely understood to be one of the victims cited in this case. Other U.S. companies that might make a retaliatory short list include Amazon Web Services, which has a cloud services joint venture in China; Apple, which has huge markets and supply chains in China; and Microsoft, which has major markets, research and development, and supply chains in China.
Given the Chinese government’s interest in balancing the business community’s favor with a principled policy of reciprocal retaliation to U.S. government actions, Beijing could also choose more discrete forms of retaliation, such as continued discrimination against U.S. technology companies’ expansion in China.
If the U.S. government forces TikTok to sell its U.S. holdings, rather than simply banning the app in the United States, this unfortunately ratchets up the likelihood for the Chinese government to pursue some form of retaliation against American companies, including the potential to force sales of assets in China. The Chinese government could easily target U.S. companies designated as “critical information infrastructure” under the vague Cybersecurity Law for forced fire sales, and this could be a potent weapon in China’s toolbox to consolidate domestic control of strategic emerging industries.
To be clear, the Chinese government has myriad ways to squeeze foreign company market share in China. But if the U.S. government does force a sale of TikTok, it could be erecting another hurdle in the already hazard-strewn path of U.S. companies doing business in China.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Arm Taiwan—but Skip the Nukes

Arm Taiwan—but Skip the Nukes

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned in late July that mainland China ’ s military threat to Taiwan is “ on the rise.
” His warning was echoed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper , who assessed that Beijing has “ become more aggressive ” toward Taiwan and taken the threat “ to a new level.
” In response to Beijing ’ s increasing bellicosity , there is a growing debate in Washington about various forms of military aid to Taiwan .
Some have even suggested that the United States equip Taiwan with nuclear weapons .
That would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Cuban missile crisis might predict .
Instead , the United States should urgently provide additional conventional military aid to address the dangerous shift in the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait , which if left unchecked could invite aggression by mainland China .
Since 1979 , the Taiwan Relations Act has served as the foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan .
The law unequivocally states that “ any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ” would represent “ a threat to the peace and security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be “ of grave concern to the United States.
” Peaceful means , however , are not what the Chinese Communist Party seems to have in mind .
Not only has Beijing undertaken the most ambitious military modernization effort in the history of the People ’ s Republic of China , but it has also been using its growing military might to intimidate and coerce Taiwan .
Last year , for the first time in years , Beijing sent fighter aircraft across the median line in the Taiwan Strait .
According to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bipartisan group established by the U.S. Congress , China also conducted “ joint firepower assault ” and “ beach raid ” exercises near Taiwan last year , involving “ bomber aircraft , naval surface combatants , amphibious ships , and helicopters.
” It is tempting to suggest Taipei acquire a nuclear deterrent , but that could invite the very aggression that such a step is designed to prevent .
And it has only gotten worse since then .
In June , according to the Taiwanese defense ministry , Beijing sent military aircraft @ @ @ @ @ @ @ zone eight times .
Beijing used Su-30 fighters , as well as J-10 and J-11 fighters , Y-8 surveillance aircraft , and H-6 bombers , to probe Taiwan ’ s defenses .
Last month , Esper rightly called Beijing ’ s actions “ destabilizing , ” saying they “ significantly increase the risk of miscalculation.
” So , what is to be done ?
The Chinese threat against Taiwan has grown so acute that Michael Rubin , a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and former Pentagon official , has even suggested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ medium-range nuclear weapons as a means to deter attack .
It is tempting to suggest Taipei acquire the ultimate deterrent , but that could invite the very aggression that such a step is designed to prevent—by giving Beijing a de facto deadline for a lower-risk attack .
Rubin responds by suggesting the United States could sneak nuclear weapons into Taiwan before Beijing knew what happened .
That would be a dangerous gamble .
Giving nuclear weapons to Taiwan would also deliver another blow to nuclear nonproliferation—a regime that is already under severe strain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ condemnation , reinforcing Beijing ’ s successes in diplomatically isolating Taiwan .
The United States worked to stop Taipei from acquiring nuclear weapons in 1977 and 1988 .
Washington ’ s rationale was sound then , and it remains so today .
But that does not mean Washington should simply accept the status quo .
Beijing ’ s willingness to disregard its treaty obligations in Hong Kong and pursue an authoritarian power grab , together with intensified military exercises and provocations , suggest Taiwan could be next .
With the Taiwan Relations Act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid Taipei enshrined in law .
The act provides that the United States will provide “ defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
” Even if U.S. administrations have too often hesitated to provide arms to Taiwan for fear of angering Beijing , there is ample precedent for U.S. help .
In August 1982 , for example , then-President Ronald Reagan sent a now-declassified internal memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reiterating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Reagan emphasized that the “ quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat ” from Beijing .
He underscored that calibrating the level of arms sales to the intensity of the threat from Beijing represents “ a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.
” Recent years have , in fact , seen an uptick in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan .
Some might argue that it was these deliveries that invited a more aggressive posture from Beijing .
That , however , would be a misreading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Party ’ s foreign and defense policy became more hostile when Xi Jinping became general secretary of the party in 2012 .
And if Beijing ’ s more aggressive posture were merely a response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan , then what explains Beijing ’ s parallel escalations in the South China Sea , toward Hong Kong , or on the border with India ?
Taiwan needs , for example , anti-ship missiles—and lots of them .
To its credit , Washington has taken several positive initial steps in the last few @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible attack , including decisions to provide Stinger missiles , F-16C/D fighters , MK 48 torpedoes , upgraded PAC-3 missiles , and M1A2T tanks .
While these arms deliveries are welcome , they are insufficient .
In order to convince Beijing that it can not use military force to achieve reunification with Taiwan at an acceptable cost , Washington should also help Taipei field an array of asymmetric defensive capabilities .
Taiwan needs , for example , anti-ship missiles—and lots of them .
That includes cruise missiles for coastal defense .
Naval defensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a priority .
But arms sales alone are not enough .
To underscore Washington ’ s commitment to deterring Beijing ’ s aggression , the U.S. military should continue to fly and sail where international law permits—including in the Taiwan Strait .
Washington should also jettison excessive inhibitions related to training the Taiwanese military .
The United States should help Taiwan develop tough and realistic training with the new systems , focusing on joint warfighting effectiveness .
Taiwan also needs help building the capability and capacity of its reserve forces .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incremental and modulated manner that signals U.S. commitment and achieves real gains in military readiness without sparking a conflagration with Beijing .
For example , U.S. National Guard military advisors could conduct a regular and progressive program of training in Taiwan .
Over time , if Beijing ’ s provocations continue , this could be expanded to small-unit National Guard training .
Japanese and Australian partners could be invited to monitor or participate in the training .
Beijing fears Taiwan because it is a prosperous , vibrant democracy—a constant reminder of a Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , U.S. Coast Guard vessels could also conduct combined exercises , perhaps stopping for a brief port call in Taiwan after the exercise concludes .
By using the National Guard instead of active-duty soldiers and the Coast Guard instead of the U.S. Navy , the signal to Beijing is clear and the help for Taiwan is real , while seeking to avoid an overreaction from China .
Additional and more robust deterrence steps would remain an option in case of further escalation by Beijing .
Washington has often tried to ignore or accommodate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while the threat to Taiwan and U.S. interests in the region has only grown .
Beijing fears Taiwan because it is a prosperous , vibrant democracy—a constant reminder of a Chinese alternative to Communist Party rule .
As the military balance of power with Taiwan has shifted to Beijing ’ s advantage , the Chinese Communist Party may be increasingly tempted to act against Taiwan .
Helping to deter any such aggression doesn ’ t require nukes , but it should nonetheless be an urgent national security priority for Washington .

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned in late July that mainland China’s military threat to Taiwan is “on the rise.” His warning was echoed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who assessed that Beijing has “become more aggressive” toward Taiwan and taken the threat “to a new level.”
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned in late July that mainland China’s military threat to Taiwan is “on the rise.” His warning was echoed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who assessed that Beijing has “become more aggressive” toward Taiwan and taken the threat “to a new level.”
In response to Beijing’s increasing bellicosity, there is a growing debate in Washington about various forms of military aid to Taiwan. Some have even suggested that the United States equip Taiwan with nuclear weapons. That would be a provocative mistake, as students of the Cuban missile crisis might predict. Instead, the United States should urgently provide additional conventional military aid to address the dangerous shift in the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, which if left unchecked could invite aggression by mainland China.
Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act has served as the foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The law unequivocally states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” would represent “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area” and be “of grave concern to the United States.”
Peaceful means, however, are not what the Chinese Communist Party seems to have in mind. Not only has Beijing undertaken the most ambitious military modernization effort in the history of the People’s Republic of China, but it has also been using its growing military might to intimidate and coerce Taiwan.
Last year, for the first time in years, Beijing sent fighter aircraft across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a bipartisan group established by the U.S. Congress, China also conducted “joint firepower assault” and “beach raid” exercises near Taiwan last year, involving “bomber aircraft, naval surface combatants, amphibious ships, and helicopters.”
It is tempting to suggest Taipei acquire a nuclear deterrent, but that could invite the very aggression that such a step is designed to prevent.
And it has only gotten worse since then. In June, according to the Taiwanese defense ministry, Beijing sent military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone eight times. Beijing used Su-30 fighters, as well as J-10 and J-11 fighters, Y-8 surveillance aircraft, and H-6 bombers, to probe Taiwan’s defenses. Last month, Esper rightly called Beijing’s actions “destabilizing,” saying they “significantly increase the risk of miscalculation.”
So, what is to be done? The Chinese threat against Taiwan has grown so acute that Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and former Pentagon official, has even suggested the United States should equip Taiwan with medium-range nuclear weapons as a means to deter attack.
It is tempting to suggest Taipei acquire the ultimate deterrent, but that could invite the very aggression that such a step is designed to prevent—by giving Beijing a de facto deadline for a lower-risk attack. Rubin responds by suggesting the United States could sneak nuclear weapons into Taiwan before Beijing knew what happened. That would be a dangerous gamble.
Giving nuclear weapons to Taiwan would also deliver another blow to nuclear nonproliferation—a regime that is already under severe strain. And it would surely invite international condemnation, reinforcing Beijing’s successes in diplomatically isolating Taiwan.
The United States worked to stop Taipei from acquiring nuclear weapons in 1977 and 1988. Washington’s rationale was sound then, and it remains so today. But that does not mean Washington should simply accept the status quo. Beijing’s willingness to disregard its treaty obligations in Hong Kong and pursue an authoritarian power grab, together with intensified military exercises and provocations, suggest Taiwan could be next.
With the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington already has a policy to aid Taipei enshrined in law. The act provides that the United States will provide “defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
Even if U.S. administrations have too often hesitated to provide arms to Taiwan for fear of angering Beijing, there is ample precedent for U.S. help. In August 1982, for example, then-President Ronald Reagan sent a now-declassified internal memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reiterating U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan. Reagan emphasized that the “quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat” from Beijing. He underscored that calibrating the level of arms sales to the intensity of the threat from Beijing represents “a permanent imperative of U.S. foreign policy.”
Recent years have, in fact, seen an uptick in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Some might argue that it was these deliveries that invited a more aggressive posture from Beijing. That, however, would be a misreading of the facts.
The Chinese Communist Party’s foreign and defense policy became more hostile when Xi Jinping became general secretary of the party in 2012. And if Beijing’s more aggressive posture were merely a response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, then what explains Beijing’s parallel escalations in the South China Sea, toward Hong Kong, or on the border with India?
Taiwan needs, for example, anti-ship missiles—and lots of them.
To its credit, Washington has taken several positive initial steps in the last few years to help Taiwan prepare for a possible attack, including decisions to provide Stinger missiles, F-16C/D fighters, MK 48 torpedoes, upgraded PAC-3 missiles, and M1A2T tanks.
While these arms deliveries are welcome, they are insufficient. In order to convince Beijing that it cannot use military force to achieve reunification with Taiwan at an acceptable cost, Washington should also help Taipei field an array of asymmetric defensive capabilities. Taiwan needs, for example, anti-ship missiles—and lots of them. That includes cruise missiles for coastal defense. Naval defensive mines and short-range air defense should also be a priority.
But arms sales alone are not enough. To underscore Washington’s commitment to deterring Beijing’s aggression, the U.S. military should continue to fly and sail where international law permits—including in the Taiwan Strait.
Washington should also jettison excessive inhibitions related to training the Taiwanese military. The United States should help Taiwan develop tough and realistic training with the new systems, focusing on joint warfighting effectiveness. Taiwan also needs help building the capability and capacity of its reserve forces.
The United States could accomplish this in an incremental and modulated manner that signals U.S. commitment and achieves real gains in military readiness without sparking a conflagration with Beijing. For example, U.S. National Guard military advisors could conduct a regular and progressive program of training in Taiwan. Over time, if Beijing’s provocations continue, this could be expanded to small-unit National Guard training. Japanese and Australian partners could be invited to monitor or participate in the training.
Beijing fears Taiwan because it is a prosperous, vibrant democracy—a constant reminder of a Chinese alternative to Communist Party rule.
Similarly, U.S. Coast Guard vessels could also conduct combined exercises, perhaps stopping for a brief port call in Taiwan after the exercise concludes. By using the National Guard instead of active-duty soldiers and the Coast Guard instead of the U.S. Navy, the signal to Beijing is clear and the help for Taiwan is real, while seeking to avoid an overreaction from China. Additional and more robust deterrence steps would remain an option in case of further escalation by Beijing.
Washington has often tried to ignore or accommodate Beijing. That has not worked, while the threat to Taiwan and U.S. interests in the region has only grown.
Beijing fears Taiwan because it is a prosperous, vibrant democracy—a constant reminder of a Chinese alternative to Communist Party rule. As the military balance of power with Taiwan has shifted to Beijing’s advantage, the Chinese Communist Party may be increasingly tempted to act against Taiwan. Helping to deter any such aggression doesn’t require nukes, but it should nonetheless be an urgent national security priority for Washington.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Ask What You Can Do for Your Country

Ask What You Can Do for Your Country

Ask What You Can Do for Your Country Spend a year serving your country .
Twenty years ago the idea sounded old-fashioned—so old-fashioned that most of the countries that had national service did away with it .
But threats to democracies are growing , and , what ’ s more , Western societies are fragmenting .
The concept of serving one ’ s country—whether in the armed forces or a care home—is making a return .
Last month , Germany ’ s defense minister , Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , presented her new “ Your Year for Germany ” program , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members of the U.S. Congress are pursuing a “ CORPS Act ” ( short for “ Cultivating Opportunity and Response to the Pandemic through Service ” ) to aid the country ’ s coronavirus recovery through civic engagement .
National service is exactly the answer Western countries need to some of their most serious problems .
“ What keeps our society together ?
What ’ s the mortar in our society ?
” asked Kramp-Karrenbauer on July 23 , when she introduced the program .
At the moment , the answer is : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clearly suffers from particularly strong polarization , but other liberal democracies are struggling as well .
“ What keeps our society together ?
What ’ s the mortar in our society ?
” asked German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer on July 23 .
At the moment , the answer is : not very much .
Verbal attacks cast an ugly shadow over Poland ’ s recent presidential election campaign ; British police officers have been attacked with bricks in the United Kingdom ; extremists on both sides , piggybacking on peaceful Black Lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other and assorted bystanders , buildings , and monuments .
And in the United States , uninvited federal troops have been dispatched to quell protests but instead appear to have made things worse .
If there is any mortar left between society ’ s bricks , it is barely holding things together .
At the same time , threats to European and North American national security are increasing .
Russia ’ s annexation of Crimea six years ago famously made the West realize that history hadn ’ t ended , and since then @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spending .
Some countries have returned to national service , too : Lithuania ( whose previous national service system was a continuation of the Soviet Union ’ s mandatory military service ) introduced selective national service in 2015 in response to the Russian threat , and two years later Sweden reinstated national service ( suspended in 2009 ) as a highly selective program in which only up to 5,000 of Sweden ’ s around 90,000 19-year-olds are chosen .
Sweden also made military service gender-neutral , as Norway had done the year before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one-month national service for 16-year-olds in 2018 , though it focuses on civic culture .
During the Cold War , lots of Western countries mandated military service for men .
The purpose was training for the defense of the country , but conscription also functioned as citizen service , with young men learning that being a citizen of a liberal democracy includes responsibilities as well as rights .
Military service also helped with social cohesion ; it brought together young men from all walks of life in a way that few if any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressing need for military service , countries did away with it : France in 1997 , Sweden in 2010 , Germany the following year .
But even if there is a revival of national service , virtually no country today needs tens of thousands of new conscripts in its armed forces every year .
( That ’ s why Norway , Sweden , and Lithuania , as well as Denmark , operate Ivy League-style competitive selection processes . )
Israel , with its near-universal mandatory military service for all Israelis , is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Germany , ” Kramp-Karrenbauer is trying to improve on Cold War national service .
The defense minister ’ s program offers voluntary national service to young Germans .
Participants will spend a year in the armed forces , but , unlike in the past , they won ’ t simply serve in a random regiment .
After six months ’ training , they will practice “ homeland protection ” in their home regions and participate in crisis operations there .
Though lightly trained homeland protectors are hardly the same thing as the 12,000 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Germany , they ’ ll strengthen Germany ’ s resilience in the face of crises , whether ones caused by Mother Nature or a hostile state—and such crises , not the prospect of a Russian invasion , are Western countries ’ most immediate national security concern .
Kramp-Karrenbauer calls such resilience “ Helping Hands.
” At the press conference where she introduced “ Your Year for Germany , ” she noted that if the coronavirus had been accompanied by another contingency or hostile-state attack , the armed forces would not have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a point I ’ ve previously made in Foreign Policy .
In Germany ’ s civilian service track ( the so-called Voluntary Social Year ) , young citizens can volunteer for training and work in social institutions , including care homes and hospitals—another face of resilience .
Under Germany ’ s previous national service system , young men who didn ’ t want to carry weapons could opt for similar civilian service .
But as with the military track , this time participation is voluntary—and open to women .
“ Your Year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ selective , with initially only 1,000 volunteers chosen each year .
Within a week of the defense minister ’ s announcement , 500 young Germans had already expressed an interest in joining .
With Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s program , Germany is thus following in the footsteps of Sweden , Norway , and Denmark , where the selective nature of the program has made military service a highly attractive proposition .
The teenagers selected get a desirable entry on their resumes ; the government gets the best and the brightest .
More countries are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , leaders such as retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal have long been pushing for it—not for military purposes but as societal glue .
“ At this scale of one full quarter of an age cohort , serving together to solve public problems will build attachment to community and country , understanding among people who might otherwise be skeptical of one another and a new generation of leaders who can get things done .
I saw these effects for 34 years in the U.S. Army .
We need them in civilian life @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That ’ s even more true today—so true , in fact , that in June a rare encouraging event took place in the deeply divided U.S. Senate .
A group of senators ranging from the pro-Trump Republican Lindsey Graham to former Democratic presidential candidate Cory Booker introduced the aforementioned CORPS Act , which if passed will see the U.S. government fund and administer a national community service initiative with space for up to 250,000 participants annually .
If adopted by Congress the national service plan will help the United States recover from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Crucially , if adopted by Congress the national service plan—which will build on the existing AmeriCorps , 21st Century Conservation Service Corps , and Senior Corps programs—will help the United States recover from the devastation brought by the coronavirus .
“ This legislation will help elevate national service to uplift people and communities , strengthen our democracy , and help us address health , economic , and social challenges , ” Democratic Sen. Jack Reed said in a press statement .
Scotland looks likely to pursue a similar path .
While national defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the devolved Scottish government ( led by the Scottish National Party ) oversees resilience .
Earlier this year , the party ’ s defense spokesperson , Stewart McDonald , presented a new plan called Resilience Scotland .
The plan , building on ideas I ’ ve put forward elsewhere , foresees voluntary resilience training offered to Scots from all walks of life ; McDonald sees particular potential among teenagers , people between jobs , and recent retirees .
Thus equipped , Scots would be much better prepared to tackle the next crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Russia and China engage in needle-prick aggression aimed to cause discomfort , distrust , and discord in Western societies .
Assorted extremist groups are likewise out to cause harm .
And as a result of climate change , Mother Nature will spout more frequent extreme-weather events .
The police , emergency medics , and the armed forces alone can ’ t tackle such contingencies .
Indeed , it would be an unforgivable waste not to utilize the population ’ s potential to make society more resilient .
Germany is showing the way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western country needs more mortar to hold itself together .

Spend a year serving your country. Twenty years ago the idea sounded old-fashioned—so old-fashioned that most of the countries that had national service did away with it. But threats to democracies are growing, and, what’s more, Western societies are fragmenting. The concept of serving one’s country—whether in the armed forces or a care home—is making a return.
Spend a year serving your country. Twenty years ago the idea sounded old-fashioned—so old-fashioned that most of the countries that had national service did away with it. But threats to democracies are growing, and, what’s more, Western societies are fragmenting. The concept of serving one’s country—whether in the armed forces or a care home—is making a return.
Last month, Germany’s defense minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, presented her new “Your Year for Germany” program, which will be launched next spring, while members of the U.S. Congress are pursuing a “CORPS Act” (short for “Cultivating Opportunity and Response to the Pandemic through Service”) to aid the country’s coronavirus recovery through civic engagement. National service is exactly the answer Western countries need to some of their most serious problems.
“What keeps our society together? What’s the mortar in our society?” asked Kramp-Karrenbauer on July 23, when she introduced the program. At the moment, the answer is: not very much. The United States clearly suffers from particularly strong polarization, but other liberal democracies are struggling as well.
“What keeps our society together? What’s the mortar in our society?” asked German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer on July 23. At the moment, the answer is: not very much.
Verbal attacks cast an ugly shadow over Poland’s recent presidential election campaign; British police officers have been attacked with bricks in the United Kingdom; extremists on both sides, piggybacking on peaceful Black Lives Matter marches, have attacked both each other and assorted bystanders, buildings, and monuments. And in the United States, uninvited federal troops have been dispatched to quell protests but instead appear to have made things worse. If there is any mortar left between society’s bricks, it is barely holding things together.
At the same time, threats to European and North American national security are increasing. Russia’s annexation of Crimea six years ago famously made the West realize that history hadn’t ended, and since then most European countries have increased their defense spending.
Some countries have returned to national service, too: Lithuania (whose previous national service system was a continuation of the Soviet Union’s mandatory military service) introduced selective national service in 2015 in response to the Russian threat, and two years later Sweden reinstated national service (suspended in 2009) as a highly selective program in which only up to 5,000 of Sweden’s around 90,000 19-year-olds are chosen. Sweden also made military service gender-neutral, as Norway had done the year before. And French President Emmanuel Macron introduced one-month national service for 16-year-olds in 2018, though it focuses on civic culture.
During the Cold War, lots of Western countries mandated military service for men. The purpose was training for the defense of the country, but conscription also functioned as citizen service, with young men learning that being a citizen of a liberal democracy includes responsibilities as well as rights. Military service also helped with social cohesion; it brought together young men from all walks of life in a way that few if any other venues can. But with no pressing need for military service, countries did away with it: France in 1997, Sweden in 2010, Germany the following year.
But even if there is a revival of national service, virtually no country today needs tens of thousands of new conscripts in its armed forces every year. (That’s why Norway, Sweden, and Lithuania, as well as Denmark, operate Ivy League-style competitive selection processes.) Israel, with its near-universal mandatory military service for all Israelis, is an exception.
With “Your Year for Germany,” Kramp-Karrenbauer is trying to improve on Cold War national service. The defense minister’s program offers voluntary national service to young Germans. Participants will spend a year in the armed forces, but, unlike in the past, they won’t simply serve in a random regiment. After six months’ training, they will practice “homeland protection” in their home regions and participate in crisis operations there.
Though lightly trained homeland protectors are hardly the same thing as the 12,000 professional troops the United States is withdrawing from Germany, they’ll strengthen Germany’s resilience in the face of crises, whether ones caused by Mother Nature or a hostile state—and such crises, not the prospect of a Russian invasion, are Western countries’ most immediate national security concern.
Kramp-Karrenbauer calls such resilience “Helping Hands.” At the press conference where she introduced “Your Year for Germany,” she noted that if the coronavirus had been accompanied by another contingency or hostile-state attack, the armed forces would not have been able to spare troops for coronavirus duty, a point I’ve previously made in Foreign Policy.
In Germany’s civilian service track (the so-called Voluntary Social Year), young citizens can volunteer for training and work in social institutions, including care homes and hospitals—another face of resilience. Under Germany’s previous national service system, young men who didn’t want to carry weapons could opt for similar civilian service. But as with the military track, this time participation is voluntary—and open to women.
“Your Year for Germany” will also be highly selective, with initially only 1,000 volunteers chosen each year. Within a week of the defense minister’s announcement, 500 young Germans had already expressed an interest in joining. With Kramp-Karrenbauer’s program, Germany is thus following in the footsteps of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, where the selective nature of the program has made military service a highly attractive proposition. The teenagers selected get a desirable entry on their resumes; the government gets the best and the brightest.
More countries are joining the national service trend. In the United States, leaders such as retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal have long been pushing for it—not for military purposes but as societal glue. “At this scale of one full quarter of an age cohort, serving together to solve public problems will build attachment to community and country, understanding among people who might otherwise be skeptical of one another and a new generation of leaders who can get things done. I saw these effects for 34 years in the U.S. Army. We need them in civilian life,” McCrystal wrote three years ago.
That’s even more true today—so true, in fact, that in June a rare encouraging event took place in the deeply divided U.S. Senate. A group of senators ranging from the pro-Trump Republican Lindsey Graham to former Democratic presidential candidate Cory Booker introduced the aforementioned CORPS Act, which if passed will see the U.S. government fund and administer a national community service initiative with space for up to 250,000 participants annually.
If adopted by Congress the national service plan will help the United States recover from the devastation brought by the coronavirus.
Crucially, if adopted by Congress the national service plan—which will build on the existing AmeriCorps, 21st Century Conservation Service Corps, and Senior Corps programs—will help the United States recover from the devastation brought by the coronavirus. “This legislation will help elevate national service to uplift people and communities, strengthen our democracy, and help us address health, economic, and social challenges,” Democratic Sen. Jack Reed said in a press statement.
Scotland looks likely to pursue a similar path. While national defense is the responsibility of the U.K. government, the devolved Scottish government (led by the Scottish National Party) oversees resilience. Earlier this year, the party’s defense spokesperson, Stewart McDonald, presented a new plan called Resilience Scotland. The plan, building on ideas I’ve put forward elsewhere, foresees voluntary resilience training offered to Scots from all walks of life; McDonald sees particular potential among teenagers, people between jobs, and recent retirees. Thus equipped, Scots would be much better prepared to tackle the next crisis.
And the next crisis will happen. Russia and China engage in needle-prick aggression aimed to cause discomfort, distrust, and discord in Western societies. Assorted extremist groups are likewise out to cause harm. And as a result of climate change, Mother Nature will spout more frequent extreme-weather events. The police, emergency medics, and the armed forces alone can’t tackle such contingencies. Indeed, it would be an unforgivable waste not to utilize the population’s potential to make society more resilient. Germany is showing the way. To use Kramp-Karrenbauer terminology, every Western country needs more mortar to hold itself together.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--A New Comic Exposes Racism Amid the Pandemic in Brazil

RIO DE JANEIRO—The first recorded victim of the coronavirus in Rio de Janeiro was a Black domestic worker whose employer brought the coronavirus back to Brazil after a vacation in Italy .
The wealthy woman had recovered quickly .
Her maid , 63-year-old Cleonice Gonçalves , died after she , too , fell ill in March .
It was the stories of vulnerable domestic workers like Gonçalves that drove Triscila Oliveira and Leandro Assis to create a new comic series that sharply critiques the disproportionate toll that the pandemic is taking on poor and Black Brazilians .
“ There is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the first person to die of COVID-19 to be a Black domestic worker , ” said Oliveira , a Black feminist writer and cyberactivist .
“ Sadly , we needed a pandemic to show just how sick our society is.
” The series—called Confinada meaning “ Confined ” —aims to reflect the starkly divergent realities that Brazil ’ s rich and poor have faced during the pandemic .
It tells the story of Ju , a fictionalized Black domestic worker from a favela who is forced to quarantine with her wealthy employer , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penthouse in Rio ’ s beachfront São Conrado neighborhood .
The series , which launched in April , is published on social media networks such as Instagram , where it generates hundreds of thousands of likes .
“ We knew we had to talk about this subject , ” Assis said in July .
He is a screenwriter-turned-illustrator who first joined forces with Oliveira earlier this year .
Together , they produced another series that tackles broader economic and racial inequality in Brazil .
The reason for the new project ?
“ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic was making even more clear the social inequality that we have in Brazil , ” Assis said .
In one recent comic strip , a domestic worker employed by the influencer ’ s aunt contracts the coronavirus from guests the family invited for a birthday gathering .
The uncle survives the virus thanks to top-notch private medical care , and his wife blames the maid for infecting him .
“ You know how it is in the favela , everyone crammed in , ” she says in the comic .
“ She @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worker dies in a run-down public hospital and is promptly replaced by a new one .
“ I have to teach her everything , ” the aunt laments .
“ How annoying.
” Brazil currently has the world ’ s second-worst outbreak of the novel coronavirus , which has infected over 2.7 million people and killed more than 94,000 there .
But the pandemic has also exposed the deep racial and economic inequalities plaguing the country .
The virus has hit poor , informal settlements—including favelas—particularly hard , where the spread is sped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ running water , and poor sanitation .
Public hospitals were overwhelmed in April and May , with residents in poorer communities struggling to access care .
The government response , meanwhile , has been slow and chaotic .
President Jair Bolsonaro has downplayed the threat of the virus , railing against quarantine measures and urging people to go back to work .
Although the federal government approved an emergency aid package for informal workers in April , the meager sum has done little to ease the financial hit on the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many domestic workers—often employed informally , without any contract—have been forced to keep showing up to work .
In the northern city of Belém , local authorities even went as far as declaring maids to be essential workers who could continue working through the quarantine .
“ People have to expose themselves to this virus , which is killing every day , because they need to eat , because they need to pay their bills , ” Oliveira said .
“ You either die of COVID or you die of hunger .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The struggles faced by Black domestic workers in Confinada are deeply familiar to Oliveira .
She was born and raised by a single mother in Niterói , a city that overlooks Rio de Janeiro ’ s famous beaches .
Her mother toiled as a domestic worker for 50 years , building their home , little by little , on a hill that was once a sugar cane plantation .
Her seven aunts spent years working as maids , some of them as virtual slaves receiving no payment .
Oliveira , too , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 12 years old .
Oliveira and Assis ’ s Confinada comes as Brazil ’ s own Black Lives Matter movement is gaining momentum , partly fueled by the coronavirus ’ s devastating toll on Afro-Brazilians .
The collapse of public hospitals in April and May disproportionately affected them .
They make up 67 percent of those who rely on the overburdened public health system .
Even though Black and multiracial Brazilians make up 54 percent of the population , recent figures suggest that they represent 61 percent of those dying from COVID-19 .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Black favelas during the pandemic has also claimed lives and fueled anger .
In Rio , police killed nearly six people per day during the first five months of the year , a number not seen for over two decades .
Public outrage over racial and social inequality swelled further in June , when a 5-year-old boy in the north of Brazil fell from a nine-story luxury building after his mother—a Black domestic worker—entrusted him to her wealthy boss while she walked the family ’ s dog .
“ The violence and erasure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unfortunately , ended up getting worse during this pandemic , ” said Marcelo D ’ Salete , a comic book writer and illustrator .
Brazil was the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery , in 1888 .
Afro-Brazilians make up more than half of the country ’ s population but still face significantly worse health , employment , and education outcomes .
White Brazilians earn 74 percent more than their Black and multiracial counterparts , figures from the country ’ s statistics agency show .
Afro-Brazilians are also victims of homicide @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whites , and they are vastly over-represented in prisons .
Black and multiracial Brazilians accounted for just over half of students attending universities in 2018 , in large part thanks to a quota system put in place less than a decade ago .
But illiteracy rates among Afro-Brazilians are still twice as high as those among the white population .
Confinada mounts a poignant critique of some of these long-standing structural inequalities , which Oliveira and Assis say paved the way for the pandemic ’ s devastating toll on the most vulnerable .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s friend complains that her two children are struggling to stay focused on their online classes , despite having vast resources and the latest technology .
To reward their efforts , the mother gives them lavish gifts .
“ Anything is worthwhile if it makes a child study , right ?
” Ju ’ s daughter , meanwhile , is shown back in the favela they call home , helping with chores and then struggling to access her online class on a cellphone with a patchy Wi-Fi connection borrowed from a neighbor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn how to read and write , ” she says as she bursts into tears while she tells her mother on the phone that she missed the lesson .
“ I ’ m going to stay dumb.
” In another installment , the series parodies a viral video in which a wealthy fitness blogger celebrated the return of her Black domestic worker with a coordinated dance .
The video—posted just as Brazilian cities were reopening despite surging coronavirus cases—shows the uniformed employee waving a dust rag alongside her boss .
In the comic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ her own maid to make a similar video , saying , “ The idea is to do the same thing .
To show that we are friends .
That you like being in quarantine with me .
What do you say ?
” “ To celebrate—in the middle of a pandemic—that your maid came back to work for you , ” Assis said .
“ The video ended up being very symbolic of this … slavery mentality.
” Oliveira and Assis say that their aim was not to attack the particular blogger but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ within Brazilian society , which places less value on Black lives .
It was also intended as a critique of a common attitude among Brazil ’ s wealthy , who often “ like to say the maid is ‘ almost ’ part of the family , ” which erases the formality of the relationship and paves the way for the exploitation of workers , Assis said .
Creating art that highlights the toll of the coronavirus on the most vulnerable is critical , Gabriela Borges said in July .
She is the founder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that publishes comics created by female and nonbinary artists that often tackle such themes as inequality and discrimination .
“ It ’ s fundamental that we have more people speaking about these subjects within pop culture , ” said Borges , noting that publishing the comic strips on social media makes Confinada particularly accessible and broadens its reach .
But , while the series is part of a rich tradition of Brazilian graphic art critiquing race and class inequality , D ’ Salete said that mainstream culture still lacks stories reflecting the experiences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can not continue with this erasure , this silencing , ” D ’ Salete said .
“ It ’ s urgent for us to get to know these stories so we can try to build another society that is not as unequal as the one in which we are living today .
”

“Mom told me what happened, what a scare!” Fran, the digital influencer, says to her aunt over a video call. Her uncle and their family’s maid contracted COVID-19 from guests, who came over for a birthday celebration. The family “spared no expense” on medical care for the uncle, who survived after 12 days in an intensive care unit. The aunt is categorical: It wasn’t the guests who infected him; she blames the maid. “You know how it is in the favela, everyone crammed in,” she says. “She brought COVID to us.” The maid dies in a run-down public hospital and is replaced by another one right after. “New maid—I have to teach her everything. How annoying,” the aunt laments. “Hahaha, I know how it is. But thank God the worst is over now,” Fran says. “Life carries on.” Courtesy of Leandro Assis and Triscila Oliveira
RIO DE JANEIRO—The first recorded victim of the coronavirus in Rio de Janeiro was a Black domestic worker whose employer brought the coronavirus back to Brazil after a vacation in Italy. The wealthy woman had recovered quickly. Her maid, 63-year-old Cleonice Gonçalves, died after she, too, fell ill in March.
It was the stories of vulnerable domestic workers like Gonçalves that drove Triscila Oliveira and Leandro Assis to create a new comic series that sharply critiques the disproportionate toll that the pandemic is taking on poor and Black Brazilians. “There is nothing more symbolic of Brazil than this—for the first person to die of COVID-19 to be a Black domestic worker,” said Oliveira, a Black feminist writer and cyberactivist. “Sadly, we needed a pandemic to show just how sick our society is.”
The series—called Confinada , meaning “Confined”—aims to reflect the starkly divergent realities that Brazil’s rich and poor have faced during the pandemic. It tells the story of Ju, a fictionalized Black domestic worker from a favela who is forced to quarantine with her wealthy employer, a digital influencer living in a luxurious penthouse in Rio’s beachfront São Conrado neighborhood. The series, which launched in April, is published on social media networks such as Instagram, where it generates hundreds of thousands of likes.
“We knew we had to talk about this subject,” Assis said in July. He is a screenwriter-turned-illustrator who first joined forces with Oliveira earlier this year. Together, they produced another series that tackles broader economic and racial inequality in Brazil. The reason for the new project? “We were seeing that, really, the pandemic was making even more clear the social inequality that we have in Brazil,” Assis said.
In one recent comic strip, a domestic worker employed by the influencer’s aunt contracts the coronavirus from guests the family invited for a birthday gathering. The uncle survives the virus thanks to top-notch private medical care, and his wife blames the maid for infecting him. “You know how it is in the favela, everyone crammed in,” she says in the comic. “She brought COVID to us.” The domestic worker dies in a run-down public hospital and is promptly replaced by a new one. “I have to teach her everything,” the aunt laments. “How annoying.”
Brazil currently has the world’s second-worst outbreak of the novel coronavirus, which has infected over 2.7 million people and killed more than 94,000 there. But the pandemic has also exposed the deep racial and economic inequalities plaguing the country. The virus has hit poor, informal settlements—including favelas—particularly hard, where the spread is sped up by crowded housing, lack of running water, and poor sanitation. Public hospitals were overwhelmed in April and May, with residents in poorer communities struggling to access care.
The government response, meanwhile, has been slow and chaotic. President Jair Bolsonaro has downplayed the threat of the virus, railing against quarantine measures and urging people to go back to work. Although the federal government approved an emergency aid package for informal workers in April, the meager sum has done little to ease the financial hit on the country’s poorest.
Faced with economic necessity, many domestic workers—often employed informally, without any contract—have been forced to keep showing up to work. In the northern city of Belém, local authorities even went as far as declaring maids to be essential workers who could continue working through the quarantine. “People have to expose themselves to this virus, which is killing every day, because they need to eat, because they need to pay their bills,” Oliveira said. “You either die of COVID or you die of hunger. The poor don’t have a choice.”
The struggles faced by Black domestic workers in Confinada are deeply familiar to Oliveira. She was born and raised by a single mother in Niterói, a city that overlooks Rio de Janeiro’s famous beaches. Her mother toiled as a domestic worker for 50 years, building their home, little by little, on a hill that was once a sugar cane plantation. Her seven aunts spent years working as maids, some of them as virtual slaves receiving no payment. Oliveira, too, began cleaning homes when she was just 12 years old.
Oliveira and Assis’s Confinada comes as Brazil’s own Black Lives Matter movement is gaining momentum, partly fueled by the coronavirus’s devastating toll on Afro-Brazilians. The collapse of public hospitals in April and May disproportionately affected them. They make up 67 percent of those who rely on the overburdened public health system. Even though Black and multiracial Brazilians make up 54 percent of the population, recent figures suggest that they represent 61 percent of those dying from COVID-19.
Surging police violence in poor, predominantly Black favelas during the pandemic has also claimed lives and fueled anger. In Rio, police killed nearly six people per day during the first five months of the year, a number not seen for over two decades. Public outrage over racial and social inequality swelled further in June, when a 5-year-old boy in the north of Brazil fell from a nine-story luxury building after his mother—a Black domestic worker—entrusted him to her wealthy boss while she walked the family’s dog.
“The violence and erasure that is part of our history, unfortunately, ended up getting worse during this pandemic,” said Marcelo D’Salete, a comic book writer and illustrator.
Brazil was the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery, in 1888. Afro-Brazilians make up more than half of the country’s population but still face significantly worse health, employment, and education outcomes. White Brazilians earn 74 percent more than their Black and multiracial counterparts, figures from the country’s statistics agency show. Afro-Brazilians are also victims of homicide at nearly three times the rate of whites, and they are vastly over-represented in prisons. Black and multiracial Brazilians accounted for just over half of students attending universities in 2018, in large part thanks to a quota system put in place less than a decade ago. But illiteracy rates among Afro-Brazilians are still twice as high as those among the white population.
Confinada mounts a poignant critique of some of these long-standing structural inequalities, which Oliveira and Assis say paved the way for the pandemic’s devastating toll on the most vulnerable. In one comic strip, the influencer’s friend complains that her two children are struggling to stay focused on their online classes, despite having vast resources and the latest technology. To reward their efforts, the mother gives them lavish gifts. “Anything is worthwhile if it makes a child study, right?” Ju’s daughter, meanwhile, is shown back in the favela they call home, helping with chores and then struggling to access her online class on a cellphone with a patchy Wi-Fi connection borrowed from a neighbor.
“My friends are going to learn how to read and write,” she says as she bursts into tears while she tells her mother on the phone that she missed the lesson. “I’m going to stay dumb.”
In another installment, the series parodies a viral video in which a wealthy fitness blogger celebrated the return of her Black domestic worker with a coordinated dance. The video—posted just as Brazilian cities were reopening despite surging coronavirus cases—shows the uniformed employee waving a dust rag alongside her boss. In the comic strip, the influencer tries to convince her own maid to make a similar video, saying, “The idea is to do the same thing. To show that we are friends. That you like being in quarantine with me. What do you say?”
“To celebrate—in the middle of a pandemic—that your maid came back to work for you,” Assis said. “The video ended up being very symbolic of this … slavery mentality.” Oliveira and Assis say that their aim was not to attack the particular blogger but to capture the ingrained racism that exists within Brazilian society, which places less value on Black lives. It was also intended as a critique of a common attitude among Brazil’s wealthy, who often “like to say the maid is ‘almost’ part of the family,” which erases the formality of the relationship and paves the way for the exploitation of workers, Assis said.
Creating art that highlights the toll of the coronavirus on the most vulnerable is critical, Gabriela Borges said in July. She is the founder of Mina de HQ, a platform that publishes comics created by female and nonbinary artists that often tackle such themes as inequality and discrimination. “It’s fundamental that we have more people speaking about these subjects within pop culture,” said Borges, noting that publishing the comic strips on social media makes Confinada particularly accessible and broadens its reach.
But, while the series is part of a rich tradition of Brazilian graphic art critiquing race and class inequality, D’Salete said that mainstream culture still lacks stories reflecting the experiences and history of Afro-Brazilians. “We cannot continue with this erasure, this silencing,” D’Salete said. “It’s urgent for us to get to know these stories so we can try to build another society that is not as unequal as the one in which we are living today.”