foreignpolicy--2020-04-23--The Pandemic Could Tighten China’s Grip on Eurasia

The Pandemic Could Tighten China ’ s Grip on Eurasia The first phase of the coronavirus outbreak delivered a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin ’ s vision of a China-Russia quasi-alliance .
Following a schism in the Kremlin ’ s relations with the United States , Putin has touted ties to Beijing as an antidote to Western sanctions .
In October 2019 , the Russian president admitted that Moscow was helping Beijing to create a missile attack early warning system and characterized Sino-Russian ties as “ an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the lingering mistrust at both the general public and senior official levels between Moscow and Beijing that has long coexisted with the made-for-TV camaraderie between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping .
The recent closure of the northern Chinese city of Harbin , in the wake of a fresh mini-outbreak imported from across the Russian border , has highlighted similar suspicions among Chinese leaders .
But the hopes of some U.S. and European officials to hasten a new Sino-Russian split are bound to be disappointed .
If anything , relations will deepen in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s inroads in Russia and across the vast landmass of post-Soviet Eurasia could have global ramifications as the global competition between the United States and China accelerates .
After the annexation of Crimea and the dramatic breakdown in the U.S.-China relationship under President Donald Trump , the Kremlin ’ s policy has been rooted in the rapid expansion of security , economic and energy ties with Beijing .
Since 2014 , Moscow and Beijing have regularly touted their joint military exercises , high-profile energy exploration and pipeline deals , and a good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on issues like the Syrian civil war , the North Korea nuclear crisis , and the future of internet governance .
Then along came the new coronavirus , which exposed the deep level of suspicion that still exists between the two giant neighbors .
On the Chinese side , Russia is not viewed as a real superpower that can compete with China or the United States for global leadership .
Although it ’ s rarely pronounced officially , the most frank Chinese Russia watchers privately characterize the country as being in long-term decline @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and a one-sided dependency on exports of oil and gas .
Historic grievances on issues like the so-called unfair treaties forced on China by imperial Russia back in the 19th century and earlier , a narrative that still gets tacit backing from the government despite official resolution of the border issues more than a decade ago , adds to the hostility that Chinese netizens frequently express toward Russia on the internet .
Over the last decade , the attitude of the Russian public toward China has dramatically improved since the early days @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worried about possible Chinese colonization of the Far East .
However , lingering suspicions pop up immediately as soon as there is news about China ’ s possible involvement in Russian agriculture , water resources , or forestry .
As the pandemic has shown , public health issues can be included in this list of sensitive issues that trigger anti-Chinese sentiments in Russia .
Russia was among the first countries that rushed to ban the entry of Chinese citizens back in February .
It swiftly shut down the 2,600-mile border between the two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were summarily deported .
Chinese nationals were harassed on the streets of Russian cities , prompting official protests by Beijing .
Russia has shown vocal support to Xi ’ s “ people ’ s war ” on the virus at a high official level and has praised Beijing ’ s handling of the pandemic , as exemplified in April 16 phone call between Putin and Xi .
This helps explain why Beijing ’ s reaction to the unfair treatment of Chinese in Russia was muted compared with its vocal defense of compatriots elsewhere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kremlin officials have been frustrated by the quality and amount of information about the pandemic provided by Chinese counterparts .
The reaction of the authorities and public in Central Asia was similar .
Yet just a few weeks later , things look very different .
As Russia and the Central Asian states struggle to contend with the challenges posed by the pandemic , China is becoming even more central to their calculations .
Russia may have nearly $ 600 billion in hard currency reserves , but with the number of infections and deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s badly underfunded national health system at risk of being overwhelmed , now is not the time for more chest-thumping and finger-pointing .
The stay-at-home orders imposed in most Russian cities risk stoking social unrest not least because the government is reluctant to use all of its financial ammunition right away and roll out generous aid packages .
The Kremlin ’ s problems have been compounded by the oil price shock .
The Central Asian nations , which lack Russia ’ s vast reserves and with weaker state capacity , are facing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ circumstances , China remains unquestionably the most important external partner for these embattled regimes .
Firstly , the possibility that China will mount an economic recovery more quickly than Europe or the United States is perhaps the only bright spot for commodity exporters in Russia and Central Asia .
While Russian oil shipments to Europe continue to fall , volumes pumped to China have remained stable so far , thanks to Beijing ’ s desire to fill its strategic reserve at favorable price levels .
The Kremlin and Russian elites pin their hopes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out massive measures to support its tumbling economy and prevent growing unemployment from causing social unrest and will continue government-driven spending on construction and infrastructure , including accelerating rollout of 5G networks , giant data centers , and more .
Following cuts envisaged by the OPEC deal , Russia will have to decrease shipments of oil to Europe while continuing to supply oil to China in order to meet the obligations of Rosneft , the largest state-owned oil company in the country , under its multiple long-term contracts with Chinese energy companies .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s current position as the dominant trade partner for Russia and Central Asia will be reinforced .
The first-quarter data published by Chinese Customs supports this trend .
As China ’ s trade volume with the outside world has plunged by 8.4 percent , trade with Russia has grown by 3.4 percent to $ 25.4 billion .
Trade with Kazakhstan , its other important source of oil , has jumped by 17.8 percent .
Secondly , there is huge appetite among insecure leaders across Eurasia to emulate China ’ s model @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies including Hikvision and Huawei have been aggressively pushing their products to authoritarian leaders in the region long before the pandemic .
Moscow ’ s city government was an early adopter of this technology , relying on Chinese vendors like Hikvision .
In Central Asia , Huawei and other Chinese companies have been building similar systems throughout the last decade .
For the Kremlin , the pandemic has been the best possible justification for the rapid embrace of Chinese-style monitoring systems , such as the surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition technology that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Now it is increasingly likely that other Russian cities will roll out similar systems , and the Kremlin will no doubt turn to China for technical assistance .
The growing importance of telework for the Russian economy means that the Kremlin will also accelerate its plans to upgrade Russia ’ s digital infrastructure , including the rollout of 5G .
Given the Russian security services ’ deep mistrust of Western tech companies , Huawei and ZTE will remain the overwhelming front-runners in the race to supply key hardware for the Russian 5G @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to hedge its bets via trial projects with Nokia and Ericsson are now more doubtful .
Thanks to pressure on the Russian state budget , Chinese vendors , which can provide cutting-edge technology at lower prices than European companies , will have clear advantage .
Before the pandemic , French President Emmanuel Macron had been trying to convince the Kremlin not to put all of its eggs in China ’ s basket and has publicly called for improvement of Europe ’ s relationship with Russia in order to prevent the emergence of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ According to Macron ’ s interview with the Economist , Putin should be provided with options by the West in order not to turn him into “ China ’ s vassal.
” Such arguments are now going to be a lot harder to make , especially as Europe finds itself mired in a painful recession .
If anything , Beijing is set to boost its role across Eurasia as the major driver of economic growth , the provider of critical technologies , and the enabler of establishing new forms of political control for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wobblier .
Ironically , the virus outbreak may bring China one step closer to the establishment of a Pax Sinica , a Beijing-centered regional order that covers large swaths of the Eurasian landmass .

The first phase of the coronavirus outbreak delivered a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a China-Russia quasi-alliance. Following a schism in the Kremlin’s relations with the United States, Putin has touted ties to Beijing as an antidote to Western sanctions. In October 2019, the Russian president admitted that Moscow was helping Beijing to create a missile attack early warning system and characterized Sino-Russian ties as “an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.”
The first phase of the coronavirus outbreak delivered a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a China-Russia quasi-alliance. Following a schism in the Kremlin’s relations with the United States, Putin has touted ties to Beijing as an antidote to Western sanctions. In October 2019, the Russian president admitted that Moscow was helping Beijing to create a missile attack early warning system and characterized Sino-Russian ties as “an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.”
The pandemic is putting a spotlight on the lingering mistrust at both the general public and senior official levels between Moscow and Beijing that has long coexisted with the made-for-TV camaraderie between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The recent closure of the northern Chinese city of Harbin, in the wake of a fresh mini-outbreak imported from across the Russian border, has highlighted similar suspicions among Chinese leaders. But the hopes of some U.S. and European officials to hasten a new Sino-Russian split are bound to be disappointed. If anything, relations will deepen in the wake of the pandemic. Beijing’s inroads in Russia and across the vast landmass of post-Soviet Eurasia could have global ramifications as the global competition between the United States and China accelerates.
After the annexation of Crimea and the dramatic breakdown in the U.S.-China relationship under President Donald Trump, the Kremlin’s policy has been rooted in the rapid expansion of security, economic and energy ties with Beijing. Since 2014, Moscow and Beijing have regularly touted their joint military exercises, high-profile energy exploration and pipeline deals, and a good cop-bad cop routine to constrain U.S. power on issues like the Syrian civil war, the North Korea nuclear crisis, and the future of internet governance.
Then along came the new coronavirus, which exposed the deep level of suspicion that still exists between the two giant neighbors. On the Chinese side, Russia is not viewed as a real superpower that can compete with China or the United States for global leadership. Although it’s rarely pronounced officially, the most frank Chinese Russia watchers privately characterize the country as being in long-term decline amid a shrinking population, mounting corruption, and a one-sided dependency on exports of oil and gas.
Historic grievances on issues like the so-called unfair treaties forced on China by imperial Russia back in the 19th century and earlier, a narrative that still gets tacit backing from the government despite official resolution of the border issues more than a decade ago, adds to the hostility that Chinese netizens frequently express toward Russia on the internet. Over the last decade, the attitude of the Russian public toward China has dramatically improved since the early days of the 1990s, when many were worried about possible Chinese colonization of the Far East. However, lingering suspicions pop up immediately as soon as there is news about China’s possible involvement in Russian agriculture, water resources, or forestry. As the pandemic has shown, public health issues can be included in this list of sensitive issues that trigger anti-Chinese sentiments in Russia.
Russia was among the first countries that rushed to ban the entry of Chinese citizens back in February. It swiftly shut down the 2,600-mile border between the two countries. Across Russia, Chinese students were summarily deported. Chinese nationals were harassed on the streets of Russian cities, prompting official protests by Beijing. Russia has shown vocal support to Xi’s “people’s war” on the virus at a high official level and has praised Beijing’s handling of the pandemic, as exemplified in April 16 phone call between Putin and Xi. This helps explain why Beijing’s reaction to the unfair treatment of Chinese in Russia was muted compared with its vocal defense of compatriots elsewhere. However, in private, senior Kremlin officials have been frustrated by the quality and amount of information about the pandemic provided by Chinese counterparts. The reaction of the authorities and public in Central Asia was similar.
Yet just a few weeks later, things look very different. As Russia and the Central Asian states struggle to contend with the challenges posed by the pandemic, China is becoming even more central to their calculations. Russia may have nearly $600 billion in hard currency reserves, but with the number of infections and deaths from the coronavirus quickly rising and Russia’s badly underfunded national health system at risk of being overwhelmed, now is not the time for more chest-thumping and finger-pointing. The stay-at-home orders imposed in most Russian cities risk stoking social unrest not least because the government is reluctant to use all of its financial ammunition right away and roll out generous aid packages. The Kremlin’s problems have been compounded by the oil price shock. The Central Asian nations, which lack Russia’s vast reserves and with weaker state capacity, are facing even grimmer problems.
Under these challenging circumstances, China remains unquestionably the most important external partner for these embattled regimes. Firstly, the possibility that China will mount an economic recovery more quickly than Europe or the United States is perhaps the only bright spot for commodity exporters in Russia and Central Asia. While Russian oil shipments to Europe continue to fall, volumes pumped to China have remained stable so far, thanks to Beijing’s desire to fill its strategic reserve at favorable price levels.
The Kremlin and Russian elites pin their hopes on the proposition that China will roll out massive measures to support its tumbling economy and prevent growing unemployment from causing social unrest and will continue government-driven spending on construction and infrastructure, including accelerating rollout of 5G networks, giant data centers, and more. Following cuts envisaged by the OPEC deal, Russia will have to decrease shipments of oil to Europe while continuing to supply oil to China in order to meet the obligations of Rosneft, the largest state-owned oil company in the country, under its multiple long-term contracts with Chinese energy companies. With these two developments in sight, China’s current position as the dominant trade partner for Russia and Central Asia will be reinforced. The first-quarter data published by Chinese Customs supports this trend. As China’s trade volume with the outside world has plunged by 8.4 percent, trade with Russia has grown by 3.4 percent to $25.4 billion. Trade with Kazakhstan, its other important source of oil, has jumped by 17.8 percent.
Secondly, there is huge appetite among insecure leaders across Eurasia to emulate China’s model of societal control and surveillance. Chinese companies including Hikvision and Huawei have been aggressively pushing their products to authoritarian leaders in the region long before the pandemic. Moscow’s city government was an early adopter of this technology, relying on Chinese vendors like Hikvision. In Central Asia, Huawei and other Chinese companies have been building similar systems throughout the last decade. For the Kremlin, the pandemic has been the best possible justification for the rapid embrace of Chinese-style monitoring systems, such as the surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition technology that are starting to appear on city streets. Now it is increasingly likely that other Russian cities will roll out similar systems, and the Kremlin will no doubt turn to China for technical assistance.
Read More A picture taken during a guided tour organized by the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah shows volunteers sorting food aid that will be distributed during the coronavirus pandemic in Beirut's southern suburbs on March 31. A poster on the wall shows the current leader of the movement, Hassan Nasrallah. A picture taken during a guided tour organized by the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah shows volunteers sorting food aid that will be distributed during the coronavirus pandemic in Beirut's southern suburbs on March 31. A poster on the wall shows the current leader of the movement, Hassan Nasrallah. After the Coronavirus, Terrorism Won’t Be the Same As big-government initiatives expand and leaders deflect blame, anti-establishment groups, angry Luddites, and China-haters could turn to violence. Argument | Raffaello Pantucci Two Uzbek soldiers, both wearing camouflage and helmets and holding rifles, stand on either side of a metal gate with a stop sign at its center. Behind the fence is a flat field, and farther in the distance are trees and a blue sky. Two Uzbek soldiers, both wearing camouflage and helmets and holding rifles, stand on either side of a metal gate with a stop sign at its center. Behind the fence is a flat field, and farther in the distance are trees and a blue sky. The Water Wars Are Coming to Central Asia Things have been bad for decades, but the Taliban threaten to make them worse. Analysis | Lynne O’Donnell A man walks past a campaign billboard of Uzbekistan's incumbent President and presidential candidate Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Krasnogorsk, some 60kms from Tashkent, on July 8, 2023. A man walks past a campaign billboard of Uzbekistan's incumbent President and presidential candidate Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Krasnogorsk, some 60kms from Tashkent, on July 8, 2023. Uzbekistan’s Reformist President Makes a U-Turn Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reforms, which were meant to usher in a new era for the key Central Asian country, appear to have stalled. Report | Brawley Benson
The growing importance of telework for the Russian economy means that the Kremlin will also accelerate its plans to upgrade Russia’s digital infrastructure, including the rollout of 5G. Given the Russian security services’ deep mistrust of Western tech companies, Huawei and ZTE will remain the overwhelming front-runners in the race to supply key hardware for the Russian 5G market. Russia’s willingness and ability to hedge its bets via trial projects with Nokia and Ericsson are now more doubtful. Thanks to pressure on the Russian state budget, Chinese vendors, which can provide cutting-edge technology at lower prices than European companies, will have clear advantage.
Before the pandemic, French President Emmanuel Macron had been trying to convince the Kremlin not to put all of its eggs in China’s basket and has publicly called for improvement of Europe’s relationship with Russia in order to prevent the emergence of a Sino-Russian axis dominated by Beijing. According to Macron’s interview with the Economist, Putin should be provided with options by the West in order not to turn him into “China’s vassal.”
Such arguments are now going to be a lot harder to make, especially as Europe finds itself mired in a painful recession. If anything, Beijing is set to boost its role across Eurasia as the major driver of economic growth, the provider of critical technologies, and the enabler of establishing new forms of political control for regimes that are feeling a whole lot wobblier. Ironically, the virus outbreak may bring China one step closer to the establishment of a Pax Sinica, a Beijing-centered regional order that covers large swaths of the Eurasian landmass.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-23--Syria’s Forgotten War Is a Pandemic Time Bomb

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : How the pandemic could change the war in Syria , updates on a key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms treaty , and what to make of the Pentagon ’ s new policy chief .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Idlib province , the last pocket of rebel-held territory in Syria , is already facing one of the world ’ s worst humanitarian crises .
There haven ’ t yet been any confirmed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other foreign officials fear that it ’ s only a matter of time .
Humanitarian groups are bracing for the coronavirus to sweep into the province , where they fear it would spread like wildfire among displaced populations without access to adequate health care .
“ Millions of people , whose lives have already been marked by suffering , live in camps , collective shelters and informal sites where social distancing and regular handwashing are luxuries , ” Imran Riza , the U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Syria , said in a statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cease-fire brokered by Turkey and Russia in Idlib province is shaky , with reports of clashes between Turkish forces and Syrian government forces backed by Moscow .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan this week accused Syrian President Bashar al-Assad of taking advantage of the world ’ s focus on coronavirus to ratchet up tensions in Idlib .
“ Should the regime , which has violated the cease-fire and other conditions of the agreement , continue in this way , it will pay a price with heavy losses , ” said Erdogan .
Flurry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with Assad on Monday .
And on Wednesday the Iranian , Russian , and Turkish foreign ministers held a video conference to hash out their differences over the conflict in Syria .
It ’ s not clear if these conversations will strengthen the fragile cease-fire .
Previous truces have collapsed quickly in Syria amid nine years of grueling war .
Worrying trend .
Meanwhile , U.S. officials are concerned that the chaos sown by the pandemic could give the remnants of the Islamic State an opportunity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have already been credited with several attacks in southern Syria this month , according to the Institute for the Study of War .
Russia still complying with New START .
Russia is still complying with the Obama-era New START nuclear arms reduction treaty , according to a State Department report obtained by Foreign Policy .
However , the Trump administration is increasingly concerned about both Russia and China developing nuclear capabilities not covered by the 2010 agreement , according to the report .
The news comes as the Trump administration weights whether to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year .
Trump let another arms control pact with Russia , the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty , expire last year amid concerns over Russian violations .
Trump ’ s ship order puts Pentagon in a bind .
Trump was quick to reverse an early Wednesday tweet instructing the U.S. Navy to sink and destroy any Iranian boats that harass American ships .
But the missive left top Pentagon officials at a loss to explain what the president meant after a slew of dangerous encounters with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) fast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A U.S. official told Foreign Policy that they were not aware of any new orders to the Navy or Central Command , the military branch in the Middle East .
U.S. ships still have the right of self-defense if they come under attack from Iran .
Iran looks to space .
Iran has successfully launched a self-described military satellite , as confirmed by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Experts say the move is a significant boost to Iran ’ s ambitions in space , especially given reports that the elite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is dispensing with the fiction that it ’ s space program is purely civilian , ” said Behnam Ben Taleblu , of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank .
“ This means the IRGC has had a secret space flight program that is now entering public light.
” South Africa ’ s military to enforce lockdown .
Governments around the world are increasingly relying on their militaries to help respond to the coronavirus pandemic .
In South Africa , where President Cyril Ramaphosa announced this week that his government would deploy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Africa has one of the strictest lockdowns in the world , marked by mass arrests and police brutality .
Although the strict measures are credited with drastically reducing the spread of the coronavirus , critics worry that the latest deployment will turn South Africa into a “ military state.
” Spycraft in the age of contagion .
Working from home isn ’ t easy for those handling classified materials .
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency ( NGA ) , the organization responsible for providing policymakers and the intelligence community with mapping data , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order to help facilitate remote work during the coronavirus pandemic , C4ISRNet reports .
The move is the latest example of how the U.S. intelligence community is trying to keep up its work under lockdown .
The number-one Pentagon policy slot .
U.S. President Donald Trump has tapped retired Army Brig .
Gen. Anthony Tata—a frequent White House defender on cable news —to be the Pentagon ’ s next policy chief , Bloomberg reports .
The pick to replace the fired Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood is likely to be controversial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Senate .
Tata has defended Trump ’ s intervention in the war crimes case of Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher and written op-eds calling for the United States to send armed contractors to Afghanistan and Syria instead of U.S. troops .
The news ends weeks of speculation over who would replace Rood , an unpopular figure ousted in February months after warning against withholding military aid to Ukraine .
Senior administration officials and military officers told Foreign Policy that Tata had a bad reputation on active duty .
They have concerns that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the job , other than supporting Trump .
“ The new rule at the Pentagon for senior positions is political loyalty to the president , ” one official said .
“ Qualifications don ’ t matter anymore as the White House seeks to remove all Mattis holdovers.
” New envoy to Belarus .
Trump this week nominated a veteran career diplomat , Julie Fisher , to be the first U.S. ambassador to Belarus in over a decade .
Under Trump , the United States has quietly warmed relations with Belarus , considered eastern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to undercut its close partnership with Russia .
Foreign Policy was first to report the move was coming in February .
Mattis the model ?
If former U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis gets tired of raking in cash by sitting on defense contractor executive boards , he can always go back into modeling .
As Task and Purpose reports , in 2015 Mattis modeled a leather jacket for clothing line Kill Kapture , started by an Australian special forces veteran .
The photos from the line ’ s marketing campaign are now making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can be yours , for the bargain basement price of $ 1,322 . )
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: How the pandemic could change the war in Syria , updates on a key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms treaty , and what to make of the Pentagon’s new policy chief .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: How the pandemic could change the war in Syria, updates on a key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms treaty, and what to make of the Pentagon’s new policy chief.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Syria’s Looming Pandemic Disaster
Idlib province, the last pocket of rebel-held territory in Syria, is already facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. There haven’t yet been any confirmed coronavirus cases in Idlib, but U.N. and other foreign officials fear that it’s only a matter of time. Humanitarian groups are bracing for the coronavirus to sweep into the province, where they fear it would spread like wildfire among displaced populations without access to adequate health care.
“Millions of people, whose lives have already been marked by suffering, live in camps, collective shelters and informal sites where social distancing and regular handwashing are luxuries,” Imran Riza, the U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Syria, said in a statement last week.
Fraying cease-fire. The cease-fire brokered by Turkey and Russia in Idlib province is shaky, with reports of clashes between Turkish forces and Syrian government forces backed by Moscow. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan this week accused Syrian President Bashar al-Assad of taking advantage of the world’s focus on coronavirus to ratchet up tensions in Idlib. “Should the regime, which has violated the cease-fire and other conditions of the agreement, continue in this way, it will pay a price with heavy losses,” said Erdogan.
Flurry of diplomacy. Donning protective face masks, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with Assad on Monday. And on Wednesday the Iranian, Russian, and Turkish foreign ministers held a video conference to hash out their differences over the conflict in Syria. It’s not clear if these conversations will strengthen the fragile cease-fire. Previous truces have collapsed quickly in Syria amid nine years of grueling war.
Worrying trend. Meanwhile, U.S. officials are concerned that the chaos sown by the pandemic could give the remnants of the Islamic State an opportunity to regroup in Syria. ISIS militants have already been credited with several attacks in southern Syria this month, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
What We’re Watching
Russia still complying with New START. Russia is still complying with the Obama-era New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, according to a State Department report obtained by Foreign Policy. However, the Trump administration is increasingly concerned about both Russia and China developing nuclear capabilities not covered by the 2010 agreement, according to the report. The news comes as the Trump administration weights whether to renew New START, which expires next year. Trump let another arms control pact with Russia, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, expire last year amid concerns over Russian violations.
Trump’s ship order puts Pentagon in a bind. Trump was quick to reverse an early Wednesday tweet instructing the U.S. Navy to sink and destroy any Iranian boats that harass American ships. But the missive left top Pentagon officials at a loss to explain what the president meant after a slew of dangerous encounters with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fast boats in the Persian Gulf last week. A U.S. official told Foreign Policy that they were not aware of any new orders to the Navy or Central Command, the military branch in the Middle East. U.S. ships still have the right of self-defense if they come under attack from Iran.
Iran looks to space. Iran has successfully launched a self-described military satellite, as confirmed by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Experts say the move is a significant boost to Iran’s ambitions in space, especially given reports that the elite IRGC oversaw the launch. “Tehran is dispensing with the fiction that it’s space program is purely civilian,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank. “This means the IRGC has had a secret space flight program that is now entering public light.”
South Africa’s military to enforce lockdown. Governments around the world are increasingly relying on their militaries to help respond to the coronavirus pandemic. In South Africa, where President Cyril Ramaphosa announced this week that his government would deploy 70,000 troops to enforce lockdown measures. South Africa has one of the strictest lockdowns in the world, marked by mass arrests and police brutality. Although the strict measures are credited with drastically reducing the spread of the coronavirus, critics worry that the latest deployment will turn South Africa into a “military state.”
Spycraft in the age of contagion. Working from home isn’t easy for those handling classified materials. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the organization responsible for providing policymakers and the intelligence community with mapping data, will de-classify more of its work in order to help facilitate remote work during the coronavirus pandemic, C4ISRNet reports. The move is the latest example of how the U.S. intelligence community is trying to keep up its work under lockdown.
Movers and Shakers
The number-one Pentagon policy slot. U.S. President Donald Trump has tapped retired Army Brig. Gen. Anthony Tata—a frequent White House defender on cable news —to be the Pentagon’s next policy chief, Bloomberg reports. The pick to replace the fired Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood is likely to be controversial, even with Republicans in control of the Senate. Tata has defended Trump’s intervention in the war crimes case of Navy SEAL Eddie Gallagher and written op-eds calling for the United States to send armed contractors to Afghanistan and Syria instead of U.S. troops.
The news ends weeks of speculation over who would replace Rood, an unpopular figure ousted in February months after warning against withholding military aid to Ukraine. Senior administration officials and military officers told Foreign Policy that Tata had a bad reputation on active duty. They have concerns that the retired general has no serious credentials for the job, other than supporting Trump.
“The new rule at the Pentagon for senior positions is political loyalty to the president,” one official said. “Qualifications don’t matter anymore as the White House seeks to remove all Mattis holdovers.”
New envoy to Belarus. Trump this week nominated a veteran career diplomat, Julie Fisher, to be the first U.S. ambassador to Belarus in over a decade. Under Trump, the United States has quietly warmed relations with Belarus, considered eastern Europe’s last autocratic state, to undercut its close partnership with Russia. Foreign Policy was first to report the move was coming in February.
Odds and Ends
Mattis the model? If former U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis gets tired of raking in cash by sitting on defense contractor executive boards, he can always go back into modeling. As Task and Purpose reports, in 2015 Mattis modeled a leather jacket for clothing line Kill Kapture, started by an Australian special forces veteran. The photos from the line’s marketing campaign are now making the rounds again. (The jacket can be yours, for the bargain basement price of $1,322.)
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-23--How the Bottom Fell Out of the U.S.-Saudi Alliance

In late November 1973 , just six weeks after Saudi Arabia and OPEC launched a devastating oil embargo on Europe and the United States , U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger railed against the Saudis at a secret meeting in the White House Map Room .
He ’ d already toyed with the “ not … so insane ” idea of landing U.S. troops that “ would have divided up ” oil fields in the region , and he decried what he repeatedly called Saudi “ blackmail.
” “ It is ridiculous that the civilized world is held up by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Three months later , Kissinger was inside the palace of Saudi King Faisal , paying obeisance and promising U.S. economic , technical , and military aid—before the oil embargo was even lifted .
“ Our objective is to work with Your Majesty and to strengthen our friendship on a long-term basis , ” he said .
The monthslong drama of the OPEC oil embargo highlighted as seldom before the often troubled , yet surprisingly resilient nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship .
Again and again , the unlikely partners would fall out—usually over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 9/11 attacks .
But the fundamental bargain struck by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then-King Ibn Saud in the waning days of World War II that consummated the U.S.-Saudi relationship 75 years ago would never break .
Until , perhaps , now .
This spring , as in the early 1970s , the Saudis unleashed their oil weapon , inflicting damage on the U.S. economy by deliberately crashing oil prices at a time of global economic collapse amid the coronavirus pandemic .
Lawmakers on Capitol Hill already had little love for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights abuses in the kingdom , a brutal Saudi-led war in Yemen , and , perhaps most shockingly , the Saudi state-ordered butchery of a Washington Post columnist .
By unsheathing the oil weapon , the Saudis have finally tested the patience of oil-patch Republicans , who have long been among their staunchest supporters in Congress .
Even though the United States , Saudi Arabia , Russia , and other big oil producers reached a deal this month meant to curtail oil output and undo some of the damage , it hasn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are at their lowest levels of the 21st century , threatening mass bankruptcies and layoffs in the United States .
On April 20 , U.S. oil prices utterly collapsed , falling into negative territory for the first time in history .
Now , lawmakers in oil states such as Texas , Louisiana , North Dakota , and Alaska accuse Saudi Arabia of waging “ economic warfare ” and have drafted legislation to immediately pull out U.S. troops and furl up a decades-old U.S. security umbrella that has protected the vulnerable Saudi state .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ behave toward other friends , ” Sen. Kevin Cramer , a North Dakota Republican leading the charge on the legislation , told Foreign Policy .
“ They grossly miscalculated the U.S. response to this.
” More broadly , many in Washington are coming to question the very fundamentals that have underpinned a very special bilateral relationship for 75 years—essentially , U.S. security to ensure the free flow of Saudi oil and Saudi support for U.S. designs in the Middle East .
“ This isn ’ t how friends behave toward other friends .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ this.
” Even U.S. President Donald Trump , who has largely defended the relationship until recently , is openly questioning whether the United States needs to protect Saudi oil at all .
Most of it is now sold to China and other Asian buyers , rather than to Europe and the United States as in decades past .
The U.S. energy revolution over the past decade has dramatically reduced U.S. reliance on Saudi Arabia and the Middle East for oil supplies , which has driven many foreign-policy observers to question why U.S. funding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be lost to protect a Middle Eastern theocratic monarchy that shares few U.S. values .
A shotgun marriage that survived the oil embargo , 9/11 , and the Iraq War is now being shaken by seismic geopolitical shifts , and by growing discontent among American lawmakers , the media , and the general public .
“ I just have a hard time explaining to my constituents why we ’ re spending money and risking life to defend a country that ’ s got a sketchy history with us to begin with , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Cramer said .
“ They ’ ve just become very difficult to defend.
” Matters could soon grow even worse .
“ The only thing holding the relationship together now is Trump—he has a peculiar affinity for Saudi Arabia , ” said Bruce Riedel , an expert on Saudi Arabia and 30-year CIA veteran who is the director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution .
That could change with this year ’ s election , if presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden prevails over Trump .
Biden , the former vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ pariah ” and said he ’ d cut off military sales .
How did it come to this ?
Today ’ s tensions stem , in many ways , from the original foundations of the odd-couple relationship : an oil-for security bargain that always sought , but never fully managed , to bridge the divide between a liberal democracy and a conservative religious monarchy .
Some experts believe U.S.-Saudi ties will ultimately weather the storm , as they always have , because of the need for a large , wealthy , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East .
“ It is really difficult , if not unthinkable , to think of a collapse in relations or divorce , ” said Bilal Saab , an analyst with the Middle East Institute and former advisor on Middle East issues for the U.S. Department of Defense .
Others are starting to see a potential breaking point on the horizon .
“ I think this is a very significant and potentially existential moment in the relationship , ” Riedel said .
“ There have been ups and downs , and no foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as they did in 1973 , but the relationship survived and recovered because there was still that basic bargain .
“ But we don ’ t need the Saudis anymore—this comes in a very different geopolitical environment than previous crises.
” From the very beginning , a fissure baked into the relationship threatened to crack it open .
Tensions over the Arab-Israeli conflict would repeatedly flare up again , especially after the 1967 Six-Day War , culminating in the 1973 oil embargo , and again in the months after the terrorist attacks of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ displeasure at the stalled Middle East peace process came close to derailing the relationship that the terrorist attacks , carried out mainly by Saudis , had already come close to destroying .
These tensions , especially after the 1967 war , which saw Israel ’ s territory grow at the expense of Arab neighbors , threatened to poison U.S.-Saudi relations at the outset of the Nixon administration .
A National Security Council paper prepared for Kissinger in 1969 warned of an “ erosion in our position in Saudi Arabia over the past two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestine question is the chief area of misunderstanding which could seriously damage U.S.-Saudi relations.
” Those tensions escalated over the next three years until the Saudis started raising the threat of an unprecedented oil embargo to force a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East .
At the time , the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan were growing increasingly reliant on cheap Saudi oil , giving the kingdom a unique chance to leverage its position as the world ’ s central banker of oil to browbeat the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The growing financial reserves of Middle East producers have made oil a weapon for coercion or blackmail that we can no longer dismiss , ” National Security Council officials warned Kissinger in the summer of 1972 .
By the end of the year , backdoor U.S. missions to Saudi Arabia brought warnings that the Saudis , for decades a more-or-less reliable partner , were getting ready to do the unthinkable .
“ It seems clear , ” Kissinger wrote to President Richard Nixon in late 1972 , “ … that King Faisal is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure to bear on the US to impose a peace settlement on Israel favorable to Arab interests.
” Those fears came true in October 1973 , during the war between Israel and Egypt , after the United States rushed arms to Israel to forestall a Soviet threat and prop up its regional ally .
Ibn Saud ’ s heir King Faisal , described in a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Jeddah as being “ as furious ” as he had ever been , personally ordered an oil embargo on the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remained dismissive of the oil threat , quickly became furious himself and vowed not to make U.S. policy a hostage to economic coercion .
“ I know what would have happened in the 19th century , ” Kissinger fumed during a staff meeting .
“ The idea that a Bedouin kingdom could hold up Western Europe and the United States would have been absolutely inconceivable.
” A month later , he was still bouncing around ideas for a military solution to the oil embargo and Arab pressure .
“ Can ’ t we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ show that we can do it ?
” he asked over lunch in the White House Map Room .
In the end , the United States and Saudi Arabia patched up the dispute , and the oil embargo ended by the spring of 1974 .
But the scars it left were deep and long-lasting , permanently damaging Saudi Arabia ’ s image in American popular opinion , and leaving deep-rooted fears that the Saudis could and would use their oil weapon to damage U.S. interests—a fear that has persisted even though the nature @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The image of oil sheiks rubbing their hands in glee as we waited to fill up with gas has never made them popular , ” Riedel , the Brookings expert , said .
Even before the U.S. energy revolution enabled the United States to wean itself off of foreign—and especially Saudi—oil , the embargo planted a seed in the public mind that the kingdom wasn ’ t a rock-solid partner .
“ The embargo had a long-lasting effect on the relationship that still lasts today , ” said Joseph Westphal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from 2014 to 2017 .
“ It made us aware of our dependence on foreign oil , and it created a whole new attitude ” toward the Saudis , he said .
But that wasn ’ t the biggest impact of the Iranian revolution .
Fearful of being toppled by religious radicals , Saudi leaders embraced a much more conservative line and empowered hard-line religious leaders in their own country , the first steps toward a decadeslong program to export the austere Wahhabi brand of Islam particular to the kingdom .
Soon , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Laden , started funding the Muslim mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that began the same year as the Iranian revolution .
Two decades later , that Saudi lurch toward a harsher official line on religion would end up creating the biggest crisis yet in the special relationship .
The Saudi government welcomed the release of those documents .
“ We hope the release of these pages will clear up , once and for all , any lingering questions or suspicions about Saudi Arabia ’ s actions , intentions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Abdullah Al Saud , then the Saudi ambassador to Washington , said at the time .
“ The relationship never really recovered from 9/11.
” Fifteen years after the attacks , Congress unanimously passed legislation—and overrode a veto from then-President Barack Obama—that opened the door to lawsuits for damages against Saudi Arabia for the families of 9/11 victims .
“ The relationship never really recovered from 9/11 , ” said Gerald Feierstein , a former longtime career U.S. diplomat who served multiple tours in the Middle East .
A grueling legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ day , with the families of 9/11 victims , backed by powerful members of Congress , pushing for civil suits against the Saudi government for damages .
The Justice Department has fended off repeated attempts to declassify more secret FBI files that assess whether Saudi officials had a hand in the attack—the latest in a series of filings sent to a federal judge this month .
His fellow former envoy Westphal agreed that the joint fight against Islamist terrorism helped heal some of the wounds of 9/11 and give the relationship fresh impetus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be king , “ Abdullah was more conservative , in a religious , cultural way , but he was an absolute enemy of terrorism , and made it extremely clear that it needed to be stamped out , ” Westphal said .
“ We couldn ’ t have had a stronger relationship on intelligence and counterterrorism and security , ” he said of his time in the kingdom .
The common fight against terrorism was a bond that would help preserve the relationship through all the strains about to come—and there were plenty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia ’ s perspective , the Obama administration couldn ’ t have dawned more brightly—before dimming disastrously .
Saudi elites greeted Obama ’ s famous 2009 speech in Cairo calling for a “ new beginning ” of U.S. relations with the Muslim world with unabashed enthusiasm , U.S. diplomats reported in confidential cables at the time .
Yet within two years , the outbreak of the Arab Spring would shake the foundations of countries all over the region , and the American response to the upheaval , to Saudi eyes , was to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strongman Hosni Mubarak .
Worse , for Saudi leadership , was the apparent U.S. embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood—which Riyadh views as akin to a terrorist group threatening its place in the Muslim world—in the person of Egypt ’ s new president , Mohamed Morsi .
“ There ’ s no question that the Arab Spring unsettled the U.S. relationship with the Saudis .
For them , the U.S. response [ to calls for reform in the Arab world ] was way too sympathetic , and the relationship cooled , ” said Riedel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration on foreign-policy issues .
But the apparent U.S. welcoming of politically threatening reform movements went hand in hand with what seemed to the Saudis a frustrating lack of action on other fronts close to their borders .
When the Syrian civil war erupted , the Obama administration called for an end to the violence and eventually talked of the need for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to step down—but it did little to intervene in a fight that the Saudis saw as a core security concern of theirs .
At the same time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ little problem with the very pro-Iranian government of Iraq , led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki , which deeply unsettled Saudi leadership fearful of growing Iranian influence in their northern neighbor .
“ King Abdullah was very respectful and liked Obama personally , but there were things they couldn ’ t understand , ” said Westphal , who was present for three of Obama ’ s record four trips to Saudi Arabia .
“ ‘ Why are you supporting Maliki , who is essentially handing over his country to the Iranians ?
How @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” The biggest threat to the bilateral relationship , however , came from the Obama administration ’ s efforts to normalize relations with Iran and to secure a diplomatic deal that would minimize the threat of Iran ’ s nuclear weapons program .
Since 1979 , Saudi leaders had seen Iran as the gravest threat to the region and their own security , and U.S. efforts to reach a nuclear deal while seemingly letting Iran continue its destabilizing behavior in the region unsettled the Saudis .
Saudi unease “ was not because of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ In my conversations with the king , the crown prince , and the deputy crown prince , they favored the effort to halt Iran ’ s nuclear weapons program .
But they wanted more : They wanted us to push on Iran ’ s actions in Iraq , Syria , and Yemen , and we didn ’ t do that.
” If Riyadh had difficulties with the Obama White House , they were set to face even bigger challenges from Congress , even before the passage of the Justice Against Sponsors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to terrorism-related lawsuits against Riyadh .
Much of it centered over doubts about the Saudi-led fight against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen .
“ We knew we might be getting into a car with a drunk driver , ” one former senior Obama official later said .
Still , wary of a Houthi takeover , and sensitive to the frail state of U.S.-Saudi ties after the Iran deal , the Obama administration ultimately lent military and diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia ’ s efforts in Yemen .
As the war in Yemen dragged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support for the Saudi campaign intensified , with growing scrutiny of proposed U.S. arms sales to Riyadh .
Massachusetts Sen. Ed Markey , a Democrat , even warned in 2015 that the U.S.-Saudi partnership could be at risk over the war in Yemen .
By the time of the 2016 U.S. election , Saudi Arabia was fighting a rearguard action to restore its privileged relationship with the United States .
With the election of Donald Trump , a Republican who shared Riyadh ’ s hawkish views toward Iran and never made a fuss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a lifeline—but also a potential liability .
“ Washington is like Rome in the Roman Empire , and we are like a satellite state—you pay homage to the emperor.
” Congressional anger at Saudi Arabia only intensified after the brutal murder by Saudi operatives of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Turkey in October 2018 .
The CIA subsequently concluded that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—the ambitious heir apparent to Saudi rule—ordered Khashoggi ’ s killing .
But again , Trump ran interference to protect the Saudis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two countries and fears of other U.S. rivals ’ growing influence in the Middle East .
“ I ’ m not like a fool that says , ‘ We don ’ t want to do business with them , ’ ” he told NBC News in a June 2019 interview .
Yet those presidential ties have come at a cost for Riyadh .
The playbook that has reliably worked since 1945 to ground the bilateral ties in personal relationships with the president now seems to be backfiring .
Mohammed bin Salman , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alleged role in the Khashoggi killing , as well as other continued human rights abuses inside Saudi Arabia and in Yemen , is seen as being exceptionally close to Kushner and Trump .
Riding the coattails of a historically unpopular , already-impeached president isn ’ t the best way to improve Saudi Arabia ’ s image .
The overtures to the White House “ established a connection , but on the flip side , it identified Saudi Arabia with Trump , ” Shihabi said , which in a time of hyperpartisanship in Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Capitol Hill and in the press .
“ The Trump embrace has cost Saudi Arabia more than it has given.
” Despite decades of close economic ties and military and counterterrorism cooperation , Saudi Arabia never seemed to plant deep roots in the United States that would institutionalize the relationship beyond kings , generals , and presidents .
This meant when tensions flared up between the two countries , Riyadh didn ’ t have many outside allies to come to its defense in Washington .
“ It ’ s been a relationship @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wide and an inch deep , ” said Feierstein , the former U.S. diplomat .
Then came Mohammed bin Salman ’ s foreign-policy excesses : the disastrous war in Yemen , the bizarre virtual kidnapping of Lebanon ’ s prime minister to pressure Iran and Hezbollah , and an embargo on Qatar , its small neighbor and a key U.S. military partner .
At home , there was the regular drumbeat of reports on human rights violations , plus a $ 100 billion shakedown on wealthy political rivals to consolidate power under the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ MBS recognizes that we give him some legitimacy , that the world would probably come down much harder on them if we hadn ’ t stuck by them.
” Those moves overshadowed Mohammed bin Salman ’ s ambitious drive to reform his country and diversify the oil-rich economy , leading congressional critics to conclude Riyadh was taking a one step forward and two steps back .
In 2018 , for example , Saudi Arabia finally granted women the right to drive .
But some of the most prominent activists who pressed for such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ More than ever , Saudi Arabia has come to rely on its alliance with Washington to shore up international legitimacy as European countries and the wider international community soured on its trajectory .
“ As long as they ’ ve been a country—they ’ re so young—they really don ’ t know what their place in the world would be like without the backing of the United States , ” said Kirsten Fontenrose , a former head of Persian Gulf issues in Trump ’ s National Security Council .
Mohammed bin Salman “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that the world would probably come down much harder on them if we hadn ’ t stuck by them , that they would wind up potentially being a pariah , like Iran is , ” added Fontenrose , now at the Atlantic Council .
The pitchforks were already out for Saudi Arabia in Congress when , in early March , Russia and Saudi Arabia failed to reach an agreement to curb their oil production , breaking a partnership that had been in place for almost three years and that had kept oil @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil price war , but Saudi Arabia finished it , massively ramping up production and slashing the sales price of its oil exports .
Coupled with the catastrophic economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic , which paralyzed economic activity around the world , the move sent oil prices on a historic plunge .
Unlike in 1973 , when Saudi Arabia used the oil weapon to jack up oil prices and hurt the United States , this time crashing oil prices did the trick .
U.S. shale producers need oil prices above $ 40 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian-Saudi price war sent the price of oil to $ 25 and then into the single digits , ensuring a wave of bankruptcies and economic hardship from Texas to North Dakota .
Now , it wasn ’ t just human rights-focused Democrats in Congress who were clamoring for blood : Republicans , too , were questioning the entire basis of the U.S.-Saudi relationship .
In late April , powerful Oklahoma Republican Sen. James Inhofe urged the Trump administration to “ punish [ Saudi Arabia and Russia ] for their destructive behavior.
” “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Democrats , and that ’ s been clear for a long time .
Now they have spoiled their relationship with Republicans , ” Riedel said .
“ The strategic alliance that we have with them … I think it is broken , ” Cramer , the North Dakota Republican senator , said .
“ The trust is going to take a long time to rebuild.
” “ It ’ s hard to come down tough on a partner that has been heralded in other cases as one of the few partners we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship “ may very well need to be reevaluated , ” Cook said .
“ What I think is a problem is that there is so much anger at the way in which Saudi Arabia has dealt with this situation , that it doesn ’ t bode well for a reconfiguration of the relationship .
It bodes well for building up mistrust and division.
” One thing that has changed over the last decade is less U.S. need for Saudi and other Middle Eastern oil .
That alone puts the U.S.-Saudi relationship on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the founding , or in the 1970s , or during the Gulf War .
“ The interests of the United States in the Middle East are different than they were in the past , ” Cook said .
Even if the U.S. energy boom has created a mythical so-called energy independence , where U.S. producers are still very much hostage to Saudi oil might and global market pressures , the vision of an America free after all these decades from Middle Eastern oil makes it easier to imagine a wholesale rewriting of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ People discount the political appeal of energy independence : It ’ s the political appeal of reconfiguring our relations in the Middle East , ” Cook said .
Other experts believe that much of the glue that has held the two countries together remains sticky .
“ Having survived 9/11 it ’ s virtually unthinkable to think of something worse that could happen that could obliterate the relationship , ” said Saab , the Middle East Institute analyst .
And as long as the United States continues to view Iran as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Saudi Arabia will have a strong appeal .
Upending U.S.-Saudi ties “ isn ’ t just the waving of a wand , given the historical and traditional nature of that relationship , ” said Kaleigh Thomas , a Middle East expert at the Center for a New American Security .
“ It ’ s hard to come down tough on a partner that has been heralded in other cases as one of the few partners we can rely on against Iran.
” But in this latest crisis , Saudi Arabia ’ s close @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that saved it from an even bigger blowback from Congress and kept the eight-decade-old relationship from collapsing altogether .
That could change in November .
“ I think this time is different , ” Riedel said .
“ If Biden wins , we will likely see a very fundamental reassessment of the relationship .
”

In late November 1973, just six weeks after Saudi Arabia and OPEC launched a devastating oil embargo on Europe and the United States, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger railed against the Saudis at a secret meeting in the White House Map Room. He’d already toyed with the “not … so insane” idea of landing U.S. troops that “would have divided up” oil fields in the region, and he decried what he repeatedly called Saudi “blackmail.”
In late November 1973, just six weeks after Saudi Arabia and OPEC launched a devastating oil embargo on Europe and the United States, U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger railed against the Saudis at a secret meeting in the White House Map Room. He’d already toyed with the “not … so insane” idea of landing U.S. troops that “would have divided up” oil fields in the region, and he decried what he repeatedly called Saudi “blackmail.”
“It is ridiculous that the civilized world is held up by 8 million savages,” Kissinger raged.
Three months later, Kissinger was inside the palace of Saudi King Faisal, paying obeisance and promising U.S. economic, technical, and military aid—before the oil embargo was even lifted. “Our objective is to work with Your Majesty and to strengthen our friendship on a long-term basis,” he said.
The monthslong drama of the OPEC oil embargo highlighted as seldom before the often troubled, yet surprisingly resilient nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Again and again, the unlikely partners would fall out—usually over the Arab-Israeli conflict, much later over the 9/11 attacks. But the fundamental bargain struck by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then-King Ibn Saud in the waning days of World War II that consummated the U.S.-Saudi relationship 75 years ago would never break.
Until, perhaps, now. This spring, as in the early 1970s, the Saudis unleashed their oil weapon, inflicting damage on the U.S. economy by deliberately crashing oil prices at a time of global economic collapse amid the coronavirus pandemic. Lawmakers on Capitol Hill already had little love for the Saudis, disillusioned by continued human rights abuses in the kingdom, a brutal Saudi-led war in Yemen, and, perhaps most shockingly, the Saudi state-ordered butchery of a Washington Post columnist.
By unsheathing the oil weapon, the Saudis have finally tested the patience of oil-patch Republicans, who have long been among their staunchest supporters in Congress. Even though the United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other big oil producers reached a deal this month meant to curtail oil output and undo some of the damage, it hasn’t worked: U.S. crude oil prices are at their lowest levels of the 21st century, threatening mass bankruptcies and layoffs in the United States. On April 20, U.S. oil prices utterly collapsed, falling into negative territory for the first time in history.
Now, lawmakers in oil states such as Texas, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Alaska accuse Saudi Arabia of waging “economic warfare” and have drafted legislation to immediately pull out U.S. troops and furl up a decades-old U.S. security umbrella that has protected the vulnerable Saudi state.
“This isn’t how friends behave toward other friends,” Sen. Kevin Cramer, a North Dakota Republican leading the charge on the legislation, told Foreign Policy. “They grossly miscalculated the U.S. response to this.”
More broadly, many in Washington are coming to question the very fundamentals that have underpinned a very special bilateral relationship for 75 years—essentially, U.S. security to ensure the free flow of Saudi oil and Saudi support for U.S. designs in the Middle East.
“This isn’t how friends behave toward other friends. They grossly miscalculated the U.S. response to this.”
Even U.S. President Donald Trump, who has largely defended the relationship until recently, is openly questioning whether the United States needs to protect Saudi oil at all. Most of it is now sold to China and other Asian buyers, rather than to Europe and the United States as in decades past. The U.S. energy revolution over the past decade has dramatically reduced U.S. reliance on Saudi Arabia and the Middle East for oil supplies, which has driven many foreign-policy observers to question why U.S. funding must be spent and American lives must be lost to protect a Middle Eastern theocratic monarchy that shares few U.S. values. A shotgun marriage that survived the oil embargo, 9/11, and the Iraq War is now being shaken by seismic geopolitical shifts, and by growing discontent among American lawmakers, the media, and the general public.
“I just have a hard time explaining to my constituents why we’re spending money and risking life to defend a country that’s got a sketchy history with us to begin with, and now demonstrated this type of behavior,” Cramer said. “They’ve just become very difficult to defend.”
Matters could soon grow even worse.
“The only thing holding the relationship together now is Trump—he has a peculiar affinity for Saudi Arabia,” said Bruce Riedel, an expert on Saudi Arabia and 30-year CIA veteran who is the director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution. That could change with this year’s election, if presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden prevails over Trump. Biden, the former vice president, has called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” and said he’d cut off military sales.
How did it come to this? Today’s tensions stem, in many ways, from the original foundations of the odd-couple relationship: an oil-for-security bargain that always sought, but never fully managed, to bridge the divide between a liberal democracy and a conservative religious monarchy.
Some experts believe U.S.-Saudi ties will ultimately weather the storm, as they always have, because of the need for a large, wealthy, and anti-Iran anchor for U.S. interests in the Middle East.
“It is really difficult, if not unthinkable, to think of a collapse in relations or divorce,” said Bilal Saab, an analyst with the Middle East Institute and former advisor on Middle East issues for the U.S. Department of Defense.
Others are starting to see a potential breaking point on the horizon. “I think this is a very significant and potentially existential moment in the relationship,” Riedel said. “There have been ups and downs, and no foreign country has inflicted as much economic pain as they did in 1973, but the relationship survived and recovered because there was still that basic bargain.
“But we don’t need the Saudis anymore—this comes in a very different geopolitical environment than previous crises.”
Saudi King Abdulaziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al Saud (center) and U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt meet aboard the USS Quincy on Feb. 14, 1945. A military translator is pictured to the king's left.
From the very beginning, a fissure baked into the relationship threatened to crack it open.
Tensions over the Arab-Israeli conflict would repeatedly flare up again, especially after the 1967 Six-Day War, culminating in the 1973 oil embargo, and again in the months after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, when Saudi displeasure at the stalled Middle East peace process came close to derailing the relationship that the terrorist attacks, carried out mainly by Saudis, had already come close to destroying.
These tensions, especially after the 1967 war, which saw Israel’s territory grow at the expense of Arab neighbors, threatened to poison U.S.-Saudi relations at the outset of the Nixon administration. A National Security Council paper prepared for Kissinger in 1969 warned of an “erosion in our position in Saudi Arabia over the past two years” and stressed that “the Palestine question is the chief area of misunderstanding which could seriously damage U.S.-Saudi relations.”
Those tensions escalated over the next three years until the Saudis started raising the threat of an unprecedented oil embargo to force a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East. At the time, the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan were growing increasingly reliant on cheap Saudi oil, giving the kingdom a unique chance to leverage its position as the world’s central banker of oil to browbeat the West into doing its bidding.
“The growing financial reserves of Middle East producers have made oil a weapon for coercion or blackmail that we can no longer dismiss,” National Security Council officials warned Kissinger in the summer of 1972. By the end of the year, backdoor U.S. missions to Saudi Arabia brought warnings that the Saudis, for decades a more-or-less reliable partner, were getting ready to do the unthinkable.
U.S. national security adviser Henry Kissinger meets with Saudi King Faisal in this undated photograph.
“It seems clear,” Kissinger wrote to President Richard Nixon in late 1972, “… that King Faisal is considering the idea of somehow bringing economic pressure to bear on the US to impose a peace settlement on Israel favorable to Arab interests.”
Those fears came true in October 1973, during the war between Israel and Egypt, after the United States rushed arms to Israel to forestall a Soviet threat and prop up its regional ally. Ibn Saud’s heir King Faisal, described in a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Jeddah as being “as furious” as he had ever been, personally ordered an oil embargo on the United States. Kissinger, who hours before had remained dismissive of the oil threat, quickly became furious himself and vowed not to make U.S. policy a hostage to economic coercion.
“I know what would have happened in the 19th century,” Kissinger fumed during a staff meeting. “The idea that a Bedouin kingdom could hold up Western Europe and the United States would have been absolutely inconceivable.”
A month later, he was still bouncing around ideas for a military solution to the oil embargo and Arab pressure. “Can’t we overthrow one of the sheikhs just to show that we can do it?” he asked over lunch in the White House Map Room.
U.S. President Richard Nixon and national security adviser Henry Kissinger visit with Saudi King Faisal in Saudi Arabia on June 14, 1974. Nixon spoke with Faisal about the global impact of the oil embargo.
In the end, the United States and Saudi Arabia patched up the dispute, and the oil embargo ended by the spring of 1974. But the scars it left were deep and long-lasting, permanently damaging Saudi Arabia’s image in American popular opinion, and leaving deep-rooted fears that the Saudis could and would use their oil weapon to damage U.S. interests—a fear that has persisted even though the nature of the Saudi oil threat has changed.
“The image of oil sheiks rubbing their hands in glee as we waited to fill up with gas has never made them popular,” Riedel, the Brookings expert, said.
Even before the U.S. energy revolution enabled the United States to wean itself off of foreign—and especially Saudi—oil, the embargo planted a seed in the public mind that the kingdom wasn’t a rock-solid partner.
“The embargo had a long-lasting effect on the relationship that still lasts today,” said Joseph Westphal, who was U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2017. “It made us aware of our dependence on foreign oil, and it created a whole new attitude” toward the Saudis, he said.
King Khalid of Saudi Arabia stands with U.S. President Jimmy Carter during a ceremony welcoming the American president to Riyadh in January 1978.
Yet just a few years after the embargo, another momentous event shook the Middle East and had three lasting effects on U.S.-Saudi relations that persist to this day. In 1979, the Iranian revolution toppled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a fellow monarch and staunch U.S. ally in the region. The Iranian revolution, as well as an assault that same year on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, terrified Saudi leadership, who saw how vulnerable their own position was. The revolution, by removing the shah and creating permanent enmity with the United States, left Saudi Arabia as America’s main linchpin in the Middle East, all the bad blood from the oil embargo notwithstanding. Within a year, U.S. President Jimmy Carter would declare his eponymous doctrine that made U.S. protection of Persian Gulf oil supplies—and most especially those of Saudi Arabia—the very centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the region. The disruption of Iran’s huge oil industry also made Saudi Arabia an even more important player in the global oil market. Coming just a decade before the end of communism, the eruption of a revolutionary regime in Iran would conveniently offer the United States and Saudi Arabia a new and much-needed common enemy, one that would provide a glue to cement the relationship that lasts to this day. But the disruption of Iran’s huge oil industry also made Saudi Arabia an even more important player in the global oil market, reinforcing the lessons Riyadh had learned five years before and emboldening Saudi leadership to press for even more concessions. The Saudi government is “beginning to regard the U.S.-Saudi special relationship, generally defined as oil for security, as being somewhat unbalanced in the U.S. favor and is beginning to expect more consideration and more concessions from the U.S. in return for oil,” wrote U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John C. West in a report for Carter in mid-1979.
But that wasn’t the biggest impact of the Iranian revolution. Fearful of being toppled by religious radicals, Saudi leaders embraced a much more conservative line and empowered hard-line religious leaders in their own country, the first steps toward a decadeslong program to export the austere Wahhabi brand of Islam particular to the kingdom. Soon, wealthy Saudis, including one Osama bin Laden, started funding the Muslim mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that began the same year as the Iranian revolution.
Two decades later, that Saudi lurch toward a harsher official line on religion would end up creating the biggest crisis yet in the special relationship.
9/11, the worst attack ever on U.S. soil, killed almost 3,000 people in orchestrated suicide bombings by hijacked commercial planes, knocking down the World Trade Center in New York and driving a stake through America’s long-held sense of invulnerability. The attack was carried out largely by Saudi nationals—15 of the 19 hijackers—some of whom had contacts with Saudi officials prior to the attacks. It created the most serious crisis to that point in a seemingly unbreakable relationship. U.S. popular opinion turned even more against the kingdom, while Saudi leadership resented the overwhelming U.S. backlash against what they saw as the work of rogue Saudi citizens, whose actions they officially disavowed. “That was a really negative time,” recalled Robert Jordan, dispatched as the U.S. envoy to Saudi Arabia just a month after the attacks. The Saudis, stung by the popular U.S. reaction, organized massive boycotts of U.S. consumer products that were normally a staple in grocery stores and new-car lots. “There was a seething unhappiness with the negativity coming from U.S. politicians, religious figures, and more that colored the relationship to a great degree,” Jordan said. The attacks led not only to two decades of the U.S. military crusading through the greater Middle East, still continuing today, but also to a simmering American resentment against what many believe was some degree of official Saudi government involvement in the attacks. For years, a classified portion of the 9/11 report fueled popular suspicions about Saudi involvement, though the eventual declassification of those missing pages in July 2016 attempted to lay the matter to rest. They hinted at possible, if unverified contacts between some of the hijackers and people connected to the Saudi government, but the inquiry was unable to document any official Saudi foreknowledge of or participation in the attacks.
Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal walks away after speaking with reporters at the White House on July 29, 2003, following his meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush. The president said he could not grant the Saudi request to declassify sections of a congressional report into the September 11 attacks.
The Saudi government welcomed the release of those documents. “We hope the release of these pages will clear up, once and for all, any lingering questions or suspicions about Saudi Arabia’s actions, intentions, or long-term friendship with the United States,” Abdullah Al Saud, then the Saudi ambassador to Washington, said at the time.
It didn’t.
“The relationship never really recovered from 9/11.”
Fifteen years after the attacks, Congress unanimously passed legislation—and overrode a veto from then-President Barack Obama—that opened the door to lawsuits for damages against Saudi Arabia for the families of 9/11 victims.
“The relationship never really recovered from 9/11,” said Gerald Feierstein, a former longtime career U.S. diplomat who served multiple tours in the Middle East.
A grueling legal battle over the matter continues to this day, with the families of 9/11 victims, backed by powerful members of Congress, pushing for civil suits against the Saudi government for damages. The Justice Department has fended off repeated attempts to declassify more secret FBI files that assess whether Saudi officials had a hand in the attack—the latest in a series of filings sent to a federal judge this month.
Days after the United States invaded Iraq, a tank from the U.S. Marine Task Force Tarawa sets up position in front of a painting of Saddam Hussein in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriyah on March 24, 2003.
If actions by Saudis poisoned the relationship in 2001, the United States returned the favor two years later, when the George W. Bush administration, despite vehement Saudi objections, decided to invade Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. Saudis feared that would open the door to greater Iranian influence on their doorstep, as in fact happened. If Saudi Arabia had been paranoid about growing Iranian influence since 1979, “that was certainly exacerbated by Iraq and its aftermath,” Jordan, who served as ambassador until late 2003, said. “The Saudi foreign minister told me: ‘You have now turned Iraq over to Iran on a silver platter.’” But over time, even the 9/11 attacks offered the United States and Saudi Arabia the chance to find a new common purpose, especially after terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, which carried out the 9/11 attacks, began targeting Saudi Arabia itself with a high-profile attack in 2003. Counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Riyadh went into high gear and continues to this day, acting as one of the biggest sources of ballast in an otherwise troubled relationship. Building a new counterterrorism relationship was “a turning point,” Jordan said. “The Saudis recognized that al Qaeda was after them as much as after us.”
U.S. President George W. Bush holds hands with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah as they walk at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, on April 25, 2005.
His fellow former envoy Westphal agreed that the joint fight against Islamist terrorism helped heal some of the wounds of 9/11 and give the relationship fresh impetus. The then-crown prince, soon to be king, “Abdullah was more conservative, in a religious, cultural way, but he was an absolute enemy of terrorism, and made it extremely clear that it needed to be stamped out,” Westphal said.
“We couldn’t have had a stronger relationship on intelligence and counterterrorism and security,” he said of his time in the kingdom.
The common fight against terrorism was a bond that would help preserve the relationship through all the strains about to come—and there were plenty during the Obama years.
Saudi King Abdullah escorts U.S. President Barack Obama past an honor guard during an arrival ceremony in Riyadh on June 3, 2009.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the Obama administration couldn’t have dawned more brightly—before dimming disastrously, with clashing views over the Arab Spring, human rights, the civil war in Syria, and especially Obama’s efforts to reach a diplomatic accord with Iran. “Saudi Arabia has a 60-year history of disappointment with its lover,” said Ali Shihabi, who until last year headed the Arabia Foundation, a think tank, and who is a vocal proponent in Washington of Saudi interests. “But Obama was the first since Jimmy Carter that gave Saudi leaders a heartache,” he said.
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the Obama administration couldn’t have dawned more brightly—before dimming disastrously.
Saudi elites greeted Obama’s famous 2009 speech in Cairo calling for a “new beginning” of U.S. relations with the Muslim world with unabashed enthusiasm, U.S. diplomats reported in confidential cables at the time. Yet within two years, the outbreak of the Arab Spring would shake the foundations of countries all over the region, and the American response to the upheaval, to Saudi eyes, was to jettison longtime U.S. partners such as Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak. Worse, for Saudi leadership, was the apparent U.S. embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood—which Riyadh views as akin to a terrorist group threatening its place in the Muslim world—in the person of Egypt’s new president, Mohamed Morsi.
“There’s no question that the Arab Spring unsettled the U.S. relationship with the Saudis. For them, the U.S. response [to calls for reform in the Arab world] was way too sympathetic, and the relationship cooled,” said Riedel of Brookings, who advised the Obama administration on foreign-policy issues.
But the apparent U.S. welcoming of politically threatening reform movements went hand in hand with what seemed to the Saudis a frustrating lack of action on other fronts close to their borders. When the Syrian civil war erupted, the Obama administration called for an end to the violence and eventually talked of the need for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to step down—but it did little to intervene in a fight that the Saudis saw as a core security concern of theirs. At the same time, the Obama administration seemed to have little problem with the very pro-Iranian government of Iraq, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which deeply unsettled Saudi leadership fearful of growing Iranian influence in their northern neighbor.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and U.S. President Barack Obama leave the Rose Garden after a press conference at the White House on July 22, 2009.
“King Abdullah was very respectful and liked Obama personally, but there were things they couldn’t understand,” said Westphal, who was present for three of Obama’s record four trips to Saudi Arabia. “‘Why are you supporting Maliki, who is essentially handing over his country to the Iranians? How can you not depose Assad?’”
The biggest threat to the bilateral relationship, however, came from the Obama administration’s efforts to normalize relations with Iran and to secure a diplomatic deal that would minimize the threat of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Since 1979, Saudi leaders had seen Iran as the gravest threat to the region and their own security, and U.S. efforts to reach a nuclear deal while seemingly letting Iran continue its destabilizing behavior in the region unsettled the Saudis.
Saudi unease “was not because of the nuclear piece,” Westphal said. “In my conversations with the king, the crown prince, and the deputy crown prince, they favored the effort to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program. But they wanted more: They wanted us to push on Iran’s actions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and we didn’t do that.”
If Riyadh had difficulties with the Obama White House, they were set to face even bigger challenges from Congress, even before the passage of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act that opened the door to terrorism-related lawsuits against Riyadh.
Much of it centered over doubts about the Saudi-led fight against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. “We knew we might be getting into a car with a drunk driver,” one former senior Obama official later said. Still, wary of a Houthi takeover, and sensitive to the frail state of U.S.-Saudi ties after the Iran deal, the Obama administration ultimately lent military and diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia’s efforts in Yemen.
Saudi-led coalition soldiers deploy to the outskirts of Aden, Yemen, on Aug. 3, 2015, during a military operation against Houthi rebels and their allies.
As the war in Yemen dragged on, congressional opposition to U.S. military support for the Saudi campaign intensified, with growing scrutiny of proposed U.S. arms sales to Riyadh. Massachusetts Sen. Ed Markey, a Democrat, even warned in 2015 that the U.S.-Saudi partnership could be at risk over the war in Yemen.
By the time of the 2016 U.S. election, Saudi Arabia was fighting a rearguard action to restore its privileged relationship with the United States. With the election of Donald Trump, a Republican who shared Riyadh’s hawkish views toward Iran and never made a fuss about human rights, Saudi Arabia secured a lifeline—but also a potential liability.
From left, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Saudi King Salman, U.S. first lady Melania Trump, and U.S. President Donald Trump put their hands on an illuminated globe during the inauguration ceremony of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 21, 2017.
Saudi leaders, like nearly everybody else, were caught off guard by Trump’s surprise victory in the 2016 election—and quickly set out to build bridges to the new administration, cementing a personal bond between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Trump, and especially bonding with the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Recent past presidents had always made their first foreign visit to either Canada or Mexico, the United States’ closest trade partners and neighbors. Trump, bucking tradition, chose Saudi Arabia. Saudi leaders famously rolled out the red carpet, and a glowing orb, for Trump’s first overseas trip as president. It seemed a surprising about-face after Trump’s attacks on Muslims, and repeated attacks on Saudi Arabia, on the campaign trail, when he accused the kingdom of carrying out 9/11, criticized it for sponging off American protection, and threatened an economic boycott. Saudi leaders were happy to overlook Trump’s comments, eager to forge ties with an untested and unorthodox president before other foreign leaders could. “Washington is like Rome in the Roman Empire, and we are like a satellite state—you pay homage to the emperor,” Shihabi said. “You could put a monkey in the White House, and we’d pay homage.” Those close ties with the White House helped keep U.S.-Saudi relations on track even as Congress intensified its scrutiny over the war in Yemen and ramped up legislative efforts to loosen U.S.-Saudi security links during Trump’s first years in office; Trump vetoed congressional efforts to curb military cooperation.
“Washington is like Rome in the Roman Empire, and we are like a satellite state—you pay homage to the emperor.”
Congressional anger at Saudi Arabia only intensified after the brutal murder by Saudi operatives of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Turkey in October 2018. The CIA subsequently concluded that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—the ambitious heir apparent to Saudi rule—ordered Khashoggi’s killing.
But again, Trump ran interference to protect the Saudis, citing in part the economic ties between the two countries and fears of other U.S. rivals’ growing influence in the Middle East. “I’m not like a fool that says, ‘We don’t want to do business with them,’” he told NBC News in a June 2019 interview.
Yet those presidential ties have come at a cost for Riyadh. The playbook that has reliably worked since 1945 to ground the bilateral ties in personal relationships with the president now seems to be backfiring. Mohammed bin Salman, reviled by many in Congress for his alleged role in the Khashoggi killing, as well as other continued human rights abuses inside Saudi Arabia and in Yemen, is seen as being exceptionally close to Kushner and Trump. Riding the coattails of a historically unpopular, already-impeached president isn’t the best way to improve Saudi Arabia’s image.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (right) arrive for a meeting at the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019.
The overtures to the White House “established a connection, but on the flip side, it identified Saudi Arabia with Trump,” Shihabi said, which in a time of hyperpartisanship in Washington has hurt Saudi Arabia’s cause on Capitol Hill and in the press. “The Trump embrace has cost Saudi Arabia more than it has given.”
Despite decades of close economic ties and military and counterterrorism cooperation, Saudi Arabia never seemed to plant deep roots in the United States that would institutionalize the relationship beyond kings, generals, and presidents. This meant when tensions flared up between the two countries, Riyadh didn’t have many outside allies to come to its defense in Washington.
“It’s been a relationship that’s kind of a mile wide and an inch deep,” said Feierstein, the former U.S. diplomat.
Then came Mohammed bin Salman’s foreign-policy excesses: the disastrous war in Yemen, the bizarre virtual kidnapping of Lebanon’s prime minister to pressure Iran and Hezbollah, and an embargo on Qatar, its small neighbor and a key U.S. military partner. At home, there was the regular drumbeat of reports on human rights violations, plus a $100 billion shakedown on wealthy political rivals to consolidate power under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign.
“MBS recognizes that we give him some legitimacy, that the world would probably come down much harder on them if we hadn’t stuck by them.”
Those moves overshadowed Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious drive to reform his country and diversify the oil-rich economy, leading congressional critics to conclude Riyadh was taking a one step forward and two steps back. In 2018, for example, Saudi Arabia finally granted women the right to drive. But some of the most prominent activists who pressed for such reforms were jailed and reportedly tortured.
More than ever, Saudi Arabia has come to rely on its alliance with Washington to shore up international legitimacy as European countries and the wider international community soured on its trajectory.
“As long as they’ve been a country—they’re so young—they really don’t know what their place in the world would be like without the backing of the United States,” said Kirsten Fontenrose, a former head of Persian Gulf issues in Trump’s National Security Council.
Mohammed bin Salman “recognizes that we give him some legitimacy, that the world would probably come down much harder on them if we hadn’t stuck by them, that they would wind up potentially being a pariah, like Iran is,” added Fontenrose, now at the Atlantic Council.
The pitchforks were already out for Saudi Arabia in Congress when, in early March, Russia and Saudi Arabia failed to reach an agreement to curb their oil production, breaking a partnership that had been in place for almost three years and that had kept oil prices relatively high. Russia started the oil price war, but Saudi Arabia finished it, massively ramping up production and slashing the sales price of its oil exports. Coupled with the catastrophic economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, which paralyzed economic activity around the world, the move sent oil prices on a historic plunge.
Unlike in 1973, when Saudi Arabia used the oil weapon to jack up oil prices and hurt the United States, this time crashing oil prices did the trick. U.S. shale producers need oil prices above $40 a barrel to break even; the Russian-Saudi price war sent the price of oil to $25 and then into the single digits, ensuring a wave of bankruptcies and economic hardship from Texas to North Dakota.
A line handler helps dock the oil tanker Texas Voyager as it pulls into its mooring at Port Everglades in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on April 21. The day before, the price of West Texas Intermediate oil futures for delivery in May fell into negative territory—minus .63 a barrel—for the first time in history.
Now, it wasn’t just human rights-focused Democrats in Congress who were clamoring for blood: Republicans, too, were questioning the entire basis of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In late April, powerful Oklahoma Republican Sen. James Inhofe urged the Trump administration to “punish [Saudi Arabia and Russia] for their destructive behavior.”
“The Saudis have a deep problem with the Democrats, and that’s been clear for a long time. Now they have spoiled their relationship with Republicans,” Riedel said.
“The strategic alliance that we have with them … I think it is broken,” Cramer, the North Dakota Republican senator, said. “The trust is going to take a long time to rebuild.”
A giant billboard bearing the portraits of U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi King Salman hangs over a main road in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 19, 2017, before Trump’s first foreign trip since taking office.
So is the marriage that began on the Suez Canal in 1945 about to end in divorce? In some ways, the fundamental tenets that have always underwritten the relationship, and especially since 1980, have already been quietly cast aside. For years, the United States vowed to defend Saudi Arabia and to ensure the free flow of oil for the good of the global economy. Declaring an era of great-power competition, the Trump administration is trying to pry away U.S. resources from the Middle East to confront its global rivals Russia and China. In the summer of 2019, when Iranian attacks on oil tankers near the Persian Gulf threatened the flow of oil, Trump’s response was to tell allies such as Japan and South Korea to protect their own ships, questioning why the United States should continue to carry out a mission it’s done for decades unless other countries coughed up cash. That fall, key Saudi oil facilities were attacked, allegedly by Iran, knocking out 5 percent of global oil production in a matter of minutes. The U.S. response, other than a Trump tweet, was to do nothing. “We had been told forever that an attack on Saudi Arabia would require a U.S. response, and then everybody just shrugged their shoulders,” said Steven A. Cook, a Middle East expert at the Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy columnist. “The Carter Doctrine didn’t have any exceptions, and yet…” The bitter recriminations during this spring’s oil price war, coming on the heels of the Khashoggi murder, the continued war in Yemen, and other Saudi missteps, give many observers reason to believe that the relationship is due for a fundamental rethink.
“It’s hard to come down tough on a partner that has been heralded in other cases as one of the few partners we can rely on against Iran.”
The relationship “may very well need to be reevaluated,” Cook said. “What I think is a problem is that there is so much anger at the way in which Saudi Arabia has dealt with this situation, that it doesn’t bode well for a reconfiguration of the relationship. It bodes well for building up mistrust and division.”
One thing that has changed over the last decade is less U.S. need for Saudi and other Middle Eastern oil. That alone puts the U.S.-Saudi relationship on a different footing than it had at the founding, or in the 1970s, or during the Gulf War.
“The interests of the United States in the Middle East are different than they were in the past,” Cook said. Even if the U.S. energy boom has created a mythical so-called energy independence, where U.S. producers are still very much hostage to Saudi oil might and global market pressures, the vision of an America free after all these decades from Middle Eastern oil makes it easier to imagine a wholesale rewriting of the messy bargain Roosevelt struck with Ibn Saud.
“People discount the political appeal of energy independence: It’s the political appeal of reconfiguring our relations in the Middle East,” Cook said.
Other experts believe that much of the glue that has held the two countries together remains sticky. “Having survived 9/11 it’s virtually unthinkable to think of something worse that could happen that could obliterate the relationship,” said Saab, the Middle East Institute analyst.
And as long as the United States continues to view Iran as a major threat, close relations with Saudi Arabia will have a strong appeal. Upending U.S.-Saudi ties “isn’t just the waving of a wand, given the historical and traditional nature of that relationship,” said Kaleigh Thomas, a Middle East expert at the Center for a New American Security. “It’s hard to come down tough on a partner that has been heralded in other cases as one of the few partners we can rely on against Iran.”
But in this latest crisis, Saudi Arabia’s close relationship with Trump was the one thing that saved it from an even bigger blowback from Congress and kept the eight-decade-old relationship from collapsing altogether. That could change in November.
“I think this time is different,” Riedel said. “If Biden wins, we will likely see a very fundamental reassessment of the relationship.”