foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--The Death of Lebanon’s Middle Class

The Death of Lebanon’s Middle Class

TRIPOLI , Lebanon—In the second-biggest city in Lebanon , activists are on a mission .
They are scouting Tripoli ’ s middle-class neighborhoods , lined with well-kept apartment buildings and designer boutiques , for families who desperately need help but are too embarrassed to ask for it .
The activists ’ charity efforts had originally been concentrating on outreach to Syrian refugees .
But over the last few months , as the Lebanese lira devalued by 60 percent , precisely as the pandemic lockdown shuttered businesses and produced mass layoffs , charity workers have learned that poverty has become a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exteriors of Tripoli ’ s buildings are increasingly a facade masking despair .
It is a new experience for residents of the city and the country .
Grocery store owners and pharmacists in most parts of the city have tens or hundreds of open tabs by households unable to pay their bills .
These essential service providers have been recruited by activists as providers of local intelligence .
They share sensitive information , including names and addresses of indebted families , with activists on the condition that the identities of the borrowers must @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matter of shame to incur debt among the Arab middle classes , and any form of public acknowledgment of dwindling fortunes can lead to catastrophic collapses of social standing .
The humanitarians , also locals , understand the predicament .
They are quietly handing out little white envelopes with $ 350 to $ 550 in cash , donated by Tripolitans abroad , to some of those in need .
The interaction is brief and furtively carried out , usually between a female activist and the woman who manages the household , on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never find out .
Hala Kabara , an activist with the Tripoli-based Sanobel Aid organization , recounted many such experiences .
“ Lebanon ’ s middle classes were not rich but managed to pay house rent and send their children to decent schools .
It is much harder now , ” she said .
“ We have given money to about a hundred such women , but they were ashamed of it .
One of them just cried and said thank you.
” Fida Jundi Hajjeh , Kabara ’ s colleague and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s economic crisis is crushing the extremely poor but it is also biting the middle classes .
The impact is hard to see but heard loud and clear in the roar of protesters who engulfed city squares even amid the coronavirus lockdown .
“ There is no middle class left .
There are only low-income socioeconomic groups struggling to make ends meet , ” Hajjeh said .
“ You can see unemployed men loitering around everywhere you go.
” Lebanon , historically a land of seafarers and traders on the Mediterranean , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in modern times .
But a country that hitherto sought international aid for almost 2 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees now finds that 75 percent of its own population is in need of assistance , most of whom previously hailed from the middle class .
They have enough to buy bread , unlike income groups below them , but are running short of cash to pay phone bills and purchase fuel , detergent soap , and other such daily necessities .
Roy Badaro , a Lebanese economist , said that until recently 65 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the middle classes .
But the class structure in Lebanon was collapsing fast .
“ The middle class has lost approximately two-thirds of its purchasing power and moved to the low end of the spectrum , ” Badaro said .
“ When a middle class tends to almost disappear in any country , it brings a total imbalance of the whole system and a social disruption , which could lead to anywhere.
” Lebanon was undergoing a crisis long before the upset caused by the coronavirus pandemic .
Its genesis hails back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had to be rebuilt after its civil war during the previous decade .
But then as now , the country exported next to nothing and imported a lot , rendering public coffers empty .
In 1997 , the country lured the diaspora to invest back in Lebanon by fixing the exchange rate at 1,500 Lebanese liras to the U.S. dollar and , by doing so , minimized depositors ’ risk .
But as the economy stagnated , particularly after the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war began , successive governments overspent and failed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lethal concoction of corruption and clientelism impeded the growth of the economy .
To keep the currency peg , the central bank relied on financial engineering , offering unsustainably high interest rates to big depositors in what has been described as a state-sponsored Ponzi scheme .
When the real-world economy tanked , the banks were left exposed , and customers panicked .
As they rushed to withdraw their money , the banks imposed stern capital controls .
Now , ordinary Lebanese do not know whether they will ever get their money back .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ an increase in its value and a consequent decrease in the lira ’ s , reducing the value of the currency most Lebanese earn in .
Lebanon is now in dire straits .
According to a warning by the World Bank in November , poverty in Lebanon was expected to rise from 30 to 50 percent ; that figure is expected to rise way beyond the halfway mark once the effect of the devaluation of the currency and joblessness created by the pandemic is factored in .
In more bad news , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contract this year , the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) has forecasted a 12 percent contraction for the Lebanese economy .
In March , for the first time , Lebanon defaulted on its Eurobond debt of $ 1.2 billion as a way of keeping money inside the country to pay for basic services .
However , that is feared to have further reduced its credibility among creditors .
Meanwhile , the country ’ s debt remains the third-highest in the world , equivalent to 170 percent of its GDP .
The Lebanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in hopes of agreeing to a bailout .
It sought a $ 9 billion loan from the IMF and asked the European nations to release $ 11 billion in funding promised back in 2018 to resuscitate the ailing economy .
But in the absence of reforms to deal with cronyism and endemic corruption , the international community has held back .
Moreover , experts say that any deal with the IMF would be linked to austerity measures that may not sit well with the protesters .
Nasser Yassin , a professor at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The austerity measures will include cutting jobs in the public sectors , such as of teachers and others .
This will , consequently , lead to popular protests and major pushbacks from unions and professional groups.
” Even if the IMF ’ s conditions are acceptable and the talks succeed , it will be long before the people on the streets can derive any benefit .
The poor and the lower-middle class are in urgent need of pecuniary support .
They are the worst-hit and , unlike the middle classes , can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ They are forced to line up outside soup kitchens , even elbow each other , to get their hands on a loaf of bread .
Downtown Tripoli , densely packed with glorious 14th-century Mamluk architecture , is among the poorest parts of Lebanon ; 60 percent of the population here earned a dollar a day even before the current crisis .
The residents who used to love to indulge in stories of former glory have lost confidence that achievements of the past will one day ensure a return to good times .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month as thousands took to the streets chanting , “ We are hungry.
” Tripolitans had hoped their harbor—the second largest in Lebanon and merely 19 miles from the Syrian border—would become the hub for Syria ’ s reconstruction , thus saving the city itself .
But reconstruction in Syria is still nowhere in sight .
For now , it seems , the people of Tripoli , as of the rest of the country , have only each other to rely on .
Abu Saad lives near the old souk in downtown embellished @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , so he did what most Lebanese do—drove around his family car as a taxi .
But he did not have the required permits , and his vehicle was impounded .
He needs to pay 400,000 liras , or $ 100 according to the current market exchange rate , to pay the fine and regain his livelihood .
He does not have the money .
The father of four now banks on food from charitable organizations and for the rest from his extended family , yet he expects nothing from the government .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to us , ” he said .
“ They never cared and never will .
We will challenge them on the street.
” That Lebanon ’ s protests will continue to gain pace is among the country ’ s few certainties .

TRIPOLI, Lebanon—In the second-biggest city in Lebanon, activists are on a mission. They are scouting Tripoli’s middle-class neighborhoods, lined with well-kept apartment buildings and designer boutiques, for families who desperately need help but are too embarrassed to ask for it. The activists’ charity efforts had originally been concentrating on outreach to Syrian refugees.
TRIPOLI, Lebanon—In the second-biggest city in Lebanon, activists are on a mission. They are scouting Tripoli’s middle-class neighborhoods, lined with well-kept apartment buildings and designer boutiques, for families who desperately need help but are too embarrassed to ask for it. The activists’ charity efforts had originally been concentrating on outreach to Syrian refugees.
But over the last few months, as the Lebanese lira devalued by 60 percent, precisely as the pandemic lockdown shuttered businesses and produced mass layoffs, charity workers have learned that poverty has become a far more widespread experience. The beautiful exteriors of Tripoli’s buildings are increasingly a facade masking despair. It is a new experience for residents of the city and the country.
Grocery store owners and pharmacists in most parts of the city have tens or hundreds of open tabs by households unable to pay their bills. These essential service providers have been recruited by activists as providers of local intelligence. They share sensitive information, including names and addresses of indebted families, with activists on the condition that the identities of the borrowers must never be revealed. It is a matter of shame to incur debt among the Arab middle classes, and any form of public acknowledgment of dwindling fortunes can lead to catastrophic collapses of social standing.
The humanitarians, also locals, understand the predicament. They are quietly handing out little white envelopes with $350 to $550 in cash, donated by Tripolitans abroad, to some of those in need. The interaction is brief and furtively carried out, usually between a female activist and the woman who manages the household, on the understanding that men in the house must never find out.
Hala Kabara, an activist with the Tripoli-based Sanobel Aid organization, recounted many such experiences. “Lebanon’s middle classes were not rich but managed to pay house rent and send their children to decent schools. It is much harder now,” she said. “We have given money to about a hundred such women, but they were ashamed of it. One of them just cried and said thank you.” Fida Jundi Hajjeh, Kabara’s colleague and the manager of the NGO, said Lebanon’s economic crisis is crushing the extremely poor but it is also biting the middle classes. The impact is hard to see but heard loud and clear in the roar of protesters who engulfed city squares even amid the coronavirus lockdown. “There is no middle class left. There are only low-income socioeconomic groups struggling to make ends meet,” Hajjeh said. “You can see unemployed men loitering around everywhere you go.”
Lebanon, historically a land of seafarers and traders on the Mediterranean, has maintained itself as a middle-income nation in modern times. But a country that hitherto sought international aid for almost 2 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees now finds that 75 percent of its own population is in need of assistance, most of whom previously hailed from the middle class. They have enough to buy bread, unlike income groups below them, but are running short of cash to pay phone bills and purchase fuel, detergent soap, and other such daily necessities.
Roy Badaro, a Lebanese economist, said that until recently 65 percent of Lebanon’s population belonged to the middle classes. But the class structure in Lebanon was collapsing fast. “The middle class has lost approximately two-thirds of its purchasing power and moved to the low end of the spectrum,” Badaro said. “When a middle class tends to almost disappear in any country, it brings a total imbalance of the whole system and a social disruption, which could lead to anywhere.”
Lebanon was undergoing a crisis long before the upset caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Its genesis hails back to the 1990s, when the country had to be rebuilt after its civil war during the previous decade. But then as now, the country exported next to nothing and imported a lot, rendering public coffers empty.
In 1997, the country lured the diaspora to invest back in Lebanon by fixing the exchange rate at 1,500 Lebanese liras to the U.S. dollar and, by doing so, minimized depositors’ risk. But as the economy stagnated, particularly after the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war began, successive governments overspent and failed to carry out reforms, and a lethal concoction of corruption and clientelism impeded the growth of the economy. To keep the currency peg, the central bank relied on financial engineering, offering unsustainably high interest rates to big depositors in what has been described as a state-sponsored Ponzi scheme. When the real-world economy tanked, the banks were left exposed, and customers panicked. As they rushed to withdraw their money, the banks imposed stern capital controls. Now, ordinary Lebanese do not know whether they will ever get their money back. Moreover, the dollar shortage led to an increase in its value and a consequent decrease in the lira’s, reducing the value of the currency most Lebanese earn in.
Lebanon is now in dire straits. According to a warning by the World Bank in November, poverty in Lebanon was expected to rise from 30 to 50 percent; that figure is expected to rise way beyond the halfway mark once the effect of the devaluation of the currency and joblessness created by the pandemic is factored in. In more bad news, while economies across the world are expected to contract this year, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted a 12 percent contraction for the Lebanese economy. In March, for the first time, Lebanon defaulted on its Eurobond debt of $1.2 billion as a way of keeping money inside the country to pay for basic services. However, that is feared to have further reduced its credibility among creditors. Meanwhile, the country’s debt remains the third-highest in the world, equivalent to 170 percent of its GDP.
The Lebanese government recently began talks with the IMF in hopes of agreeing to a bailout. It sought a $9 billion loan from the IMF and asked the European nations to release $11 billion in funding promised back in 2018 to resuscitate the ailing economy. But in the absence of reforms to deal with cronyism and endemic corruption, the international community has held back. Moreover, experts say that any deal with the IMF would be linked to austerity measures that may not sit well with the protesters. Nasser Yassin, a professor at the American University of Beirut, said: “The austerity measures will include cutting jobs in the public sectors, such as of teachers and others. This will, consequently, lead to popular protests and major pushbacks from unions and professional groups.” Even if the IMF’s conditions are acceptable and the talks succeed, it will be long before the people on the streets can derive any benefit.
The poor and the lower-middle class are in urgent need of pecuniary support. They are the worst-hit and, unlike the middle classes, cannot afford a veneer of respectability. They are forced to line up outside soup kitchens, even elbow each other, to get their hands on a loaf of bread. Downtown Tripoli, densely packed with glorious 14th-century Mamluk architecture, is among the poorest parts of Lebanon; 60 percent of the population here earned a dollar a day even before the current crisis. The residents who used to love to indulge in stories of former glory have lost confidence that achievements of the past will one day ensure a return to good times. One man was killed in the protests last month as thousands took to the streets chanting, “We are hungry.”
Tripolitans had hoped their harbor—the second largest in Lebanon and merely 19 miles from the Syrian border—would become the hub for Syria’s reconstruction, thus saving the city itself. But reconstruction in Syria is still nowhere in sight. For now, it seems, the people of Tripoli, as of the rest of the country, have only each other to rely on.
Abu Saad lives near the old souk in downtown embellished with ruins. There were no jobs, so he did what most Lebanese do—drove around his family car as a taxi. But he did not have the required permits, and his vehicle was impounded. He needs to pay 400,000 liras, or $100 according to the current market exchange rate, to pay the fine and regain his livelihood. He does not have the money. The father of four now banks on food from charitable organizations and for the rest from his extended family, yet he expects nothing from the government.
“The government, they are dead to us,” he said. “They never cared and never will. We will challenge them on the street.” That Lebanon’s protests will continue to gain pace is among the country’s few certainties.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--Trump Administration Says Iran Could Exit Syria Amid Pandemic

The Trump administration believes Iran has growing incentives to pull out of a multibillion-dollar military campaign in Syria as the coronavirus pandemic has ravaged the country , the U.S. State Department ’ s top official for Iran told Foreign Policy .
Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook said the United States has seen “ tactical displacement ” of Iranian troops in Syria , where Tehran-backed militias have provided much of the firepower for the Bashar al-Assad regime ’ s assault on Idlib province , one of the last remaining opposition holdouts in the war-torn country .
Hook ’ s comments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enthusiasm for proxy campaigns across the Middle East could be flagging , with COVID-19 killing more than 7,000 people in Iran so far , a figure that U.S. officials believe could be much higher .
Israel ’ s departing defense minister said this week that he ’ d seen Iranian forces leaving Syria but offered no evidence to back up his claim .
An Iranian lawmaker also said this week that the campaign on behalf of Assad has cost as much as $ 30 billion .
This interview has been edited for length @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ ve seen COVID-19 penetrate deeply into Iran ’ s leadership and hamper its economy .
Do you see any change in Iran ’ s military posture as a result ?
Brian Hook : Iran has [ declared ] about 7,000 deaths .
Based on what we know , the number is probably five times that number given how they underreport .
We see a pattern of behavior in both Iran and China , where people are jailed for disclosing accurate statistics .
You have doctors who are fired and other people who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obviously , it did not help the Iranian people when the regime in the very early stages denied and hoped it wasn ’ t a problem while people were dying .
This is a notoriously opaque regime that has a hard time being transparent not only with its own people but the world .
We have seen some tactical displacement of Iranian troops .
We see both Russia and Syria recognizing the incentives for Iranian troops and forces under Iranian command and control to leave Syria .
And that has been a condition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reconstruction assistance .
Iran is using Syria as a platform to threaten Israel and as a corridor to keep its ties with Hezbollah .
You ’ ve got a number of people who want to move to a post-conflict scenario in Syria , and the Iranian regime is an obstacle to that : to moving along toward a post-conflict political process .
So we think that there are increasing incentives for Iran to leave Syria .
FP : The U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions against Iran ’ s interior minister and several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ does this specifically add to the maximum pressure campaign , and what ’ s even left to sanction , given that the Trump administration has already targeted so much of Iran ’ s economy ?
BH : I think a year ago , journalists started asking me what ’ s left to hit in Iran .
One year later , we continue to find many targets of opportunity to squeeze the regime financially .
When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo two years ago in May announced our new Iran strategy post-deal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going to continue to stand with the Iranian people .
And we ’ ve done this by calling out the regime for killing its own people .
In November , the regime murdered over 1,500 people , injured thousands , and jailed anywhere between 8,000 and 10,000 people .
And so today we ’ ve sanctioned 12 Iranians who were complicit in human rights abuses .
The interior minister was one of the 12 .
He authorized Iran ’ s public forces to use lethal force on peaceful protesters .
I would refer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There were 23 children who were killed .
One of them was a 12-year-old who was returning home from school .
He was fatally shot by the regime as he walked past protesters near his house .
We ’ ve sanctioned judges , we ’ ve sanctioned judiciary [ sector ] , we ’ ve sanctioned the interior [ ministry ] .
And these are both financial sanctions , but they ’ re also visa sanctions .
Given America ’ s reach in the global economy , these have consequences .
FP : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talks in June with the new Iraqi government .
What are the priorities that the administration will be asking from Iraq related to Iran ?
BH : It ’ s a similar problem we see in places like Lebanon and Syria in Iraq .
The Iranian regime since the time of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has the desire to dominate all governments in the Middle East .
Our policy is to reverse Iran ’ s influence across the Middle East and to help countries like Iraq and Lebanon be free of Iranian interference .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot of support for that among the Iraqi people .
And one of the things the prime minister will be focused on , I think , is reclaiming Iraq ’ s sovereignty from Iranian interference .
I think the death of Qassem Suleimani [ from a U.S. strike ] presents a better environment for the Iraqi people to have a government that represents their interests and not the interests of the Iranian regime .
FP : The Trump administration has stated repeatedly that it wants to see Iran behave like a normal nation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime in place and behave like a normal state ?
BH : Well , we know that the Iranian people do not have a representative government .
Iran is not a poor country—it is a rich country that is governed by thieves .
The regime has been robbing its own people blind for 41 years .
I think that there ’ s a real desire among the Iranian people—you saw this in November—they ’ re tired of their government behaving like an outlaw regime around the world and being an international pariah .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis of legitimacy and credibility with its own people .
Our campaign of maximum economic pressure and diplomatic isolation has expanded the space for the Iranian people to have a more representative government .
That ’ s why in November , when you had protests in 31 provinces , there was not a single protest against U.S. President Donald Trump , the United States , or American sanctions .
Because they know who to blame for their economic troubles .
It is the regime ; it is not the United States .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian regime come to the table so that we can negotiate a truly comprehensive deal that addresses Iran ’ s range of threats to peace and security .
We have amassed the leverage that will be necessary to accomplish a deal of that kind of scope .
The pressure we put in place dwarfs the pressure that was put in place prior to the Iran nuclear deal , and we very much like our position .
We ’ re very pleased with the success that our foreign policy has had : restoring deterrence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatically isolating Iran .
And we ’ re going to continue down this road with a lot of confidence that our policy .
FP : Given that it has been two years since the Trump administration exited the nuclear deal in 2018 , do you assess that you ’ re closer now to getting into a new nuclear deal with potential safeguards on the missile program and other aspects of Iranian power ?
BH : That ’ s a question for the regime .
President Trump has been open to sitting down with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidency .
And so whether we ’ re closer to a deal is a question for the regime—they should meet our diplomacy with diplomacy and not meet it with threats and extortion and nuclear blackmail , which we don ’ t fall for .
In this case , we know that Iran will not come to the table without economic pressure , diplomatic isolation , and the credible threat of military deterrence to defend our interests .
So we know that we have put all three of these in place , and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal that we need .
While we are in that process , we are denying the regime levels of revenue that have no historic precedent .
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani himself said that our sanctions have cost the regime $ 200 billion , and that matters when that regime is the world ’ s leading state sponsor of terrorism and anti-Semitism .
Iran faces a much more constrained and less permissive environment because the regime is largely broke .
I ’ m not suggesting that we have eliminated the regime ’ s asymmetric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which is something no one can eliminate .
But the regime is weaker today than they were three years ago , and so are its proxies .
So Iran faces a choice : They can continue to watch their economy collapse and their proxies be starved for cash .
And we ’ re going to continue that policy because it ’ s working .
And in many ways , we ’ re in no hurry .
We have a good policy in place .
The regime needs to decide when it wants to @ @ @ @ @

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foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--Has the Coronavirus Disappeared Climate Politics?

On Monday , in a live video address , French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel restarted the European Union ’ s Franco-German motor by proposing that the EU disperse a total of €500 billion ( $ 545 billion ) in recovery money , borrowed by Brussels on financial markets , to the bloc ’ s hardest-hit nations and regions .
The entire 27-member union must still approve the EU package , which is not guaranteed : Austria , the Netherlands , and Finland have complained that the borrowing program is a form of debt mutualization that they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But Monday ’ s press conference at least offered some glimmer of reassurance to one increasingly anxious group in European civil society : climate activists .
It ’ s just not yet clear how long that reassurance will last .
Climate experts have feared Europe ’ s climate goals could get drowned out in the cacophony of panicked calls amid the coronavirus pandemic for rekindling conventional industries .
Macron explicitly underscored that the rescue program would buttress the European Green Deal , the sweeping program of economic reforms advocated by European Commission President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the bloc to go carbon neutral by 2050 , a key target of the 2015 Paris climate accord .
Macron and Merkel , but also other European leaders and even major industries , have recently professed a newfound commitment to a green transition at this most complex of times .
But the decisive battles are still to be fought , and Europe ’ s traditional economic forces are not backing down quietly .
Across Europe , as lockdowns are cautiously being lifted , many businesses and industries are now reopening .
But the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as 59 million jobs could be lost and trillions of dollars in revenue and taxes .
There ’ s a broad consensus that economic stimulus of historic proportions—from the EU budget and European Central Bank , as well as from nation-states—will be required to fight recession and put devastated economies back on their feet .
Less certain is to what degree the stimulus and recovery will take climate policy into account .
The most recent precedents are not encouraging .
Though the post-financial-crisis measures lifted many European countries out of recession—and rescued others @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debt—they did very little to accelerate the transition to more sustainable , climate-friendly economies .
In many ways , they did the opposite , rewarding polluting industries that only caused Europe ’ s carbon footprint to swell .
Case in point was Germany ’ s gift to its auto industry : a €5 billion ( $ 5.5 billion ) “ cash for clunkers ” —or scrapping bonus—program that refunded car owners €2,500 ( $ 3,560 ) for selling their old cars and buying new ones .
The result was a huge boon for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heavy luxury cars , including a new generation of SUVs , the kind of notorious gas guzzlers that Germany ’ s auto industry has specialized in for decades and continues to do so—and which for years left it lagging badly in the global electric car market .
This train wreck , though , happened before the Paris climate accord in 2015 and the mass climate protests last year led by Fridays for Future , among other events such as record droughts and wildfires , drove the climate crisis to the fore in Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for example , even in those political circles that devised the clunkers program—namely those of Merkel and von der Leyen , though not the whole of their conservative Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) —there ’ s a growing consensus that a post-coronavirus recovery program must look much different than that during the debt crisis of 2009 .
The trillions of dollars in investment , grants , and loans will again go toward kindling economic activity and job creation , but this time they must have a “ transformative ” function , setting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ modernization .
Indeed , even in Northern Europe the recovery measures of 2009 are viewed more critically than one might assume .
As upside-down as it might sound , the Europeans are even invoking the Obama administration ’ s post-Great Recession American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as a much better model to follow .
The measures directed $ 90 billion in investment toward sustainable sectors such as renewable energies and green tech , as well as research projects .
And a new U.S. study shows the act ’ s renewable energy investments successfully @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Aside from the lofty promises and high price tags of the various EU and nation-state recovery efforts , however , their content is still very much up in the air , said Olga Chiappinelli , an economist at the German Institute for Economic Research ( DIW ) , a Berlin-based research institute .
“ At the moment there ’ s really a lot that we still don ’ t know , ” she said , though it ’ s expected that there ’ ll be more investment in green sectors than in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the recovery funds went to green projects .
A DIW report on post-pandemic green stimulus efforts argues that the recovery packages must include clearly defined climate targets in order to motivate the private sector to invest and to leverage the impact of the fiscal stimulus .
“ This can lead to the creation of markets similar to those in the US renewable energy industry , ” the report reads .
“ Furthermore , short-term stimulus measures should be integrated into a long-term energy and climate policy framework , so that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attractive for the private sector.
” A green recovery strategy “ can not only give the economy a temporary bump , ” said Chiappinelli , a co-author of the report , “ but also set it on a low-carbon transformative path.
” For this , significant carbon pricing has to apply across Europe ’ s economies , she said .
Until recently , Macron has been more forward thinking than his cautious colleague in Berlin on Europe ’ s low-carbon transformation .
But Merkel has of late been ever more outspoken on climate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of politicians in the twilight of their careers , ” said Toby Couture , the director of E3 Analytics , an energy consultancy in Berlin , “ Merkel seems to be thinking about her legacy , and she wants to go down as a leader on climate change .
There ’ s a shift in her positions that you see in Germany ’ s schedule to phase out the coal industry and new laws to encourage the expansion of wind and solar energy , which had been on hold for years.
” In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the climate crisis has an unlikely new ally in the form of Foundation 2° , an initiative of German businesses and CEOs , including the likes of Deutsche Bahn , Puma , Deutsche Telekom , and others committed to limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius .
In April , 68 large German and international companies signed a letter drafted by the organization committing themselves to the Paris climate agreement and urging governments to supply “ urgently needed investment security with climate friendly long-term economic stimulus programmes.
” There also remain vocal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wing of Merkel ’ s own CDU .
They , backed by Germany ’ s powerful industrial lobby , the Federation of German Industries , say that given the proportions of the crisis , the more ambitious climate goals should be set aside for the moment and traditional Germany industries supported as directly and quickly as possible .
Pushing the emissions reduction target from 40 percent up to 50-55 percent , the CDU parliamentary group charged , would cause Germany massive damage .
But the chancellor has thus far stuck to her guns @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lobbying , for example , by Germany ’ s automobile sector , an employer of 840,000 and until now the coddled liebling of Merkel and her party .
Not surprisingly , German carmakers—as do their French counterparts—want another scrapping bonus like that in 2009 .
But Merkel turned them down .
Germany ’ s major airline Lufthansa , too , was denied a no-strings-attached bailout .
The French government ’ s aid to Air France commits the airline to slashing its carbon emissions for domestic flights by 50 percent by 2025 .
Austria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Air Austria must cut its domestic flights , cooperate better with the rail system , and sink emissions using alternative fuels .
This time around , it seems , Europe ’ s recovery funds will be used to transform the economy , not reinforce bad habits .

On Monday, in a live video address, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel restarted the European Union’s Franco-German motor by proposing that the EU disperse a total of €500 billion ($545 billion) in recovery money, borrowed by Brussels on financial markets, to the bloc’s hardest-hit nations and regions. The entire 27-member union must still approve the EU package, which is not guaranteed: Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland have complained that the borrowing program is a form of debt mutualization that they, unlike Germany, still oppose.
On Monday, in a live video address, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel restarted the European Union’s Franco-German motor by proposing that the EU disperse a total of €500 billion ($545 billion) in recovery money, borrowed by Brussels on financial markets, to the bloc’s hardest-hit nations and regions. The entire 27-member union must still approve the EU package, which is not guaranteed: Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland have complained that the borrowing program is a form of debt mutualization that they, unlike Germany, still oppose.
But Monday’s press conference at least offered some glimmer of reassurance to one increasingly anxious group in European civil society: climate activists. It’s just not yet clear how long that reassurance will last.
Climate experts have feared Europe’s climate goals could get drowned out in the cacophony of panicked calls amid the coronavirus pandemic for rekindling conventional industries. Macron explicitly underscored that the rescue program would buttress the European Green Deal, the sweeping program of economic reforms advocated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that would enable the bloc to go carbon neutral by 2050, a key target of the 2015 Paris climate accord. Macron and Merkel, but also other European leaders and even major industries, have recently professed a newfound commitment to a green transition at this most complex of times.
But the decisive battles are still to be fought, and Europe’s traditional economic forces are not backing down quietly. Across Europe, as lockdowns are cautiously being lifted, many businesses and industries are now reopening. But the economic fallout in Europe is vast—as many as 59 million jobs could be lost and trillions of dollars in revenue and taxes. There’s a broad consensus that economic stimulus of historic proportions—from the EU budget and European Central Bank, as well as from nation-states—will be required to fight recession and put devastated economies back on their feet. Less certain is to what degree the stimulus and recovery will take climate policy into account.
The most recent precedents are not encouraging. Though the post-financial-crisis measures lifted many European countries out of recession—and rescued others from insolvency, though burying them in debt—they did very little to accelerate the transition to more sustainable, climate-friendly economies. In many ways, they did the opposite, rewarding polluting industries that only caused Europe’s carbon footprint to swell. Case in point was Germany’s gift to its auto industry: a €5 billion ($5.5 billion) “cash for clunkers”—or scrapping bonus—program that refunded car owners €2,500 ($3,560) for selling their old cars and buying new ones. The result was a huge boon for carmakers, which sold record numbers of heavy luxury cars, including a new generation of SUVs, the kind of notorious gas guzzlers that Germany’s auto industry has specialized in for decades and continues to do so—and which for years left it lagging badly in the global electric car market.
This train wreck, though, happened before the Paris climate accord in 2015 and the mass climate protests last year led by Fridays for Future, among other events such as record droughts and wildfires, drove the climate crisis to the fore in Europe and beyond. Today in Germany, for example, even in those political circles that devised the clunkers program—namely those of Merkel and von der Leyen, though not the whole of their conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—there’s a growing consensus that a post-coronavirus recovery program must look much different than that during the debt crisis of 2009. The trillions of dollars in investment, grants, and loans will again go toward kindling economic activity and job creation, but this time they must have a “transformative” function, setting Europe on a new path of technical modernization.
Indeed, even in Northern Europe the recovery measures of 2009 are viewed more critically than one might assume. As upside-down as it might sound, the Europeans are even invoking the Obama administration’s post-Great Recession American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as a much better model to follow. The measures directed $90 billion in investment toward sustainable sectors such as renewable energies and green tech, as well as research projects. And a new U.S. study shows the act’s renewable energy investments successfully stimulated job creation in the energy sector.
Aside from the lofty promises and high price tags of the various EU and nation-state recovery efforts, however, their content is still very much up in the air, said Olga Chiappinelli, an economist at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a Berlin-based research institute. “At the moment there’s really a lot that we still don’t know,” she said, though it’s expected that there’ll be more investment in green sectors than in 2009, when in Germany only 13 percent of the recovery funds went to green projects.
A DIW report on post-pandemic green stimulus efforts argues that the recovery packages must include clearly defined climate targets in order to motivate the private sector to invest and to leverage the impact of the fiscal stimulus. “This can lead to the creation of markets similar to those in the US renewable energy industry,” the report reads. “Furthermore, short-term stimulus measures should be integrated into a long-term energy and climate policy framework, so that the investments in climate-friendly technologies and businesses are attractive for the private sector.” A green recovery strategy “can not only give the economy a temporary bump,” said Chiappinelli, a co-author of the report, “but also set it on a low-carbon transformative path.” For this, significant carbon pricing has to apply across Europe’s economies, she said.
Until recently, Macron has been more forward thinking than his cautious colleague in Berlin on Europe’s low-carbon transformation. But Merkel has of late been ever more outspoken on climate crisis issues. “Like a lot of politicians in the twilight of their careers,” said Toby Couture, the director of E3 Analytics, an energy consultancy in Berlin, “Merkel seems to be thinking about her legacy, and she wants to go down as a leader on climate change. There’s a shift in her positions that you see in Germany’s schedule to phase out the coal industry and new laws to encourage the expansion of wind and solar energy, which had been on hold for years.”
In Germany, Merkel’s rekindled interest in the climate crisis has an unlikely new ally in the form of Foundation 2°, an initiative of German businesses and CEOs, including the likes of Deutsche Bahn, Puma, Deutsche Telekom, and others committed to limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius. In April, 68 large German and international companies signed a letter drafted by the organization committing themselves to the Paris climate agreement and urging governments to supply “urgently needed investment security with climate friendly long-term economic stimulus programmes.”
There also remain vocal naysayers, mostly in the free market wing of Merkel’s own CDU. They, backed by Germany’s powerful industrial lobby, the Federation of German Industries, say that given the proportions of the crisis, the more ambitious climate goals should be set aside for the moment and traditional Germany industries supported as directly and quickly as possible. Pushing the emissions reduction target from 40 percent up to 50-55 percent, the CDU parliamentary group charged, would cause Germany massive damage.
But the chancellor has thus far stuck to her guns, even in the face of fierce lobbying, for example, by Germany’s automobile sector, an employer of 840,000 and until now the coddled liebling of Merkel and her party. Not surprisingly, German carmakers—as do their French counterparts—want another scrapping bonus like that in 2009. But Merkel turned them down. Germany’s major airline Lufthansa, too, was denied a no-strings-attached bailout. The French government’s aid to Air France commits the airline to slashing its carbon emissions for domestic flights by 50 percent by 2025. Austria’s demands go even further: Air Austria must cut its domestic flights, cooperate better with the rail system, and sink emissions using alternative fuels.
This time around, it seems, Europe’s recovery funds will be used to transform the economy, not reinforce bad habits.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--Yukio Okamoto’s Death Is a Tragic Loss for U.S.-Japan Relations

It was a shock for many of us in Japan ’ s diplomatic corps to hear that our former colleague and incisive commentator Yukio Okamoto , who always appeared robust and full of energy , had succumbed to pneumonia caused by the novel coronavirus last month .
Okamoto ’ s death is a tragic loss for everyone involved in U.S.-Japan affairs at a critical time in the two country ’ s relations .
Okamoto , who died on April 24 at age 74 , followed a couple of years behind me as , successively , politico-military officer at the Japanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ then as director of the Japan-U.S. security affairs desk and the Japan-U.S. political affairs desk in the North American Bureau of the foreign ministry ( 1988-1991 ) .
He continued his abiding commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance for decades after he established his own consultancy , earning the nickname “ Mr .
Nichibei Kankei ” ( Mr. Japan-U.S. Relations ) .
In his comments to the public broadcaster NHK , Richard Armitage , a former U.S. deputy secretary of state and assistant secretary of defense , who had worked closely with Okamoto over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ giant ” and a true patriot .
Okamoto was far from the image of a conventional buttoned-up diplomat .
He preferred acting on the spot to being desk-bound .
While he was heading the Japan-U.S. political desk at the foreign ministry , the only sign of his presence was said to be his suit jacket draped over the back of his chair .
Even his superiors did not know where he had gone AWOL , possibly running around the halls of the National Diet members ’ office buildings or somewhere meeting his American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and other circles .
As far as national security was concerned , Okamoto was considered a hawk or a conservative realist .
In Japan , the domestic debate over the country ’ s place in the world was largely influenced by the idealistic pacifism and anti-militaristic tendencies caused by defeat in World War II .
But Okamoto was consistently an advocate of a proactive Japanese role under the Japan-U.S. alliance and in the context of global peace and security .
In February 1986 , there was a serious test of how Japan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the negotiations on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union .
Edward Rowny , U.S. President Ronald Reagan ’ s special envoy to the arms talks , came to Tokyo to broach to the Japanese leaders the U.S. proposal , in response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ’ s Jan. 15 disarmament proposal , to remove all Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe ( west of the Ural Mountains ) and reduce the SS-20s in Asia by half .
This would create new and difficult circumstances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Asia would pose a serious threat to the country , affecting the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent .
Okamoto and three other colleagues in the foreign ministry , subsequently dubbed the “ Gang of Four ” by their American counterparts , crafted in a rush the Japanese counterproposal , which was to concentrate all the SS-20s in the central Soviet Union ( Barnaul , southwest Siberia ) so that Japan and Western Europe would share the risk equally in the sense that they would both be within the striking range of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Washington to brief Bob Linhard , the assistant to the president on arms control , on the Japanese counterproposal contained in Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone ’ s letter to Reagan .
Some years later , Okamoto said that his American counterpart found the sharply focused specificity , as opposed to a simple “ no , ” of the Japanese counterproposal “ very refreshing.
” Influenced by the Japanese idea , Reagan presented to Gorbachev a revised version of his 1981 zero option , calling for the “ elimination [ by 1990 ] of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Soviet SS-20 missiles not only in Europe , but in Asia as well.
” In July 1987 , the Soviets accepted the double global option to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia and all short-range missiles worldwide , leading to the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987 .
Japan was ill-prepared to tackle the challenge posed by the Gulf War of 1990 .
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu ’ s government at the time was still conditioned to avoid entrapment in America ’ s wars and was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops to help the United States and the other coalition members .
Japan instead chose to contribute by way of providing $ 13 billion in total to the war efforts , doled out in several installments and derided as too little , too late by the U.S. Congress and media .
Amid this challenge , Okamoto spearheaded the efforts among working-level officials to supply as much materiel as possible to aid the U.S. military indirectly .
He rushed into the Japan Seamen ’ s Union office and successfully persuaded them to dispatch ships @ @ @ @ @ @ @ troops in the Persian Gulf area .
Kunihiko Miyake , a diplomat focused on the Middle East , was working with Okamoto at the time on Japan ’ s materiel support to the U.S. military .
Miyake admired Okamoto , 10 years senior to him , as a man of ideas , action , and persuasive power .
In 1991 , Okamoto surprised his colleagues by leaving his foreign ministry job to start his own political and economic consultancy .
In a recent radio interview , Miyake surmised that Okamoto must have decided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talents by thinking and acting outside the “ box ” of the bureaucracy .
Even in the private sector , Okamoto ’ s work was dedicated to Japan ’ s positive role in the world .
In 2003 and 2004 , as Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ’ s special advisor , Okamoto played a key role in overseeing preparations for Japan ’ s assistance to Iraq ’ s reconstruction efforts following the U.S. invasion .
This included the dispatching of Japan Self-Defense Forces troops there for humanitarian reconstruction assistance .
Thus he was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he had been advocating since the Gulf War over a decade earlier , namely , Japanese forces playing a proactive role for international security .
Miyake , then acting head of mission in Baghdad , again worked closely with Okamoto , whom he saw as a mentor and role model , amid the tension and turbulence .
Following in Okamoto ’ s footsteps , he also resigned from the foreign ministry shortly afterward and is now active as a foreign-policy commentator .
One of the most painful issues in U.S.-Japan relations has long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the presence of U.S. troops is controversial among locals .
Okamoto was appointed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto as special assistant on issues related to the island from 1996 to 1998 .
He felt deep empathy for the burden borne by the people of Okinawa .
I personally experienced the difficulty of managing the nitty-gritty of the Japan-U.S. alliance in Okinawa as ambassador in charge of Okinawan affairs in 2003-2004 .
The post is within the foreign ministry to help deal with issues related to the U.S. military presence there .
Okinawans feel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal : Around 100,000 Okinawan civilian lives were sacrificed in the Battle of Okinawa in the final months of World War II , they were under U.S. administration until 1972 , and even today more than 70 percent of U.S. bases in Japan and 60 percent of U.S. military personnel in the country are located there .
Okinawans also feel that they have not been treated as equal partners by the United States and , traditionally , by mainland Japan .
Thus they are viscerally averse to all things military and resent the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ syndrome on the main Japanese islands with regard to the U.S. military , while feeling that their own NIMBY sentiments have ample historical justification .
Okamoto plunged himself into this delicate tripartite relationship among the U.S. government , the Japanese government , and Okinawa .
He paid a number of visits to Okinawa to establish rapport with the local people , including bouts of drinking awamori , the local brew .
Thus he became the most consistent and trusted channel between the Okinawan capital of Naha , Tokyo , and Washington , urging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. military presence on the island , including the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma .
Among the Okinawans who mourned Okamoto ’ s sudden passing was Seitoku Shimabukuro , a former mayor of Ie Village , where a fierce battle was fought in the Battle of Okinawa between the Japanese Army and U.S. forces over control of the Japanese airfield .
A third of Okinawa ’ s Ie Island is used today as a U.S. Marine airfield .
When Okamoto met the mayor in 1996 , he listened with full @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s tale of hardships , including mass suicide , suffered by the villagers as the island was decimated by U.S. troops in 1945 , and his plan for the village ’ s economic development .
Shimamoto was so impressed that he named Okamoto an honorary resident of Ie , an unusual recognition given the often-fraught relations between Okinawa and the central government .
Okamoto performed an important role as a public intellectual .
Keenly interested in nurturing a younger generation of talented individuals , Okamoto taught at Ritsumeikan University and other Japanese schools @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senior research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology .
He was a popular public speaker among Japanese business and other leaders , and a frequent guest on public affairs and news television programs .
Unlike many Japanese public intellectuals , he was able to present his incisive views in fluent English to audiences in the United States and elsewhere in the world .
He was reportedly in the process of writing a new book on Japan ’ s foreign policy , apparently driven by his concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rapidly changing global power balance .
Born and raised on the Shonan coast not far from Tokyo , Okamoto had a lifelong love of the sea .
He managed to find time to go diving and take marine photographs , which he shared with his friends .
Many in Japan , the United States , and elsewhere wish they could still admire these photographs over glasses of his favorite chilled single-malt whiskey and listen to his insight on how this pandemic will affect the global power balance and Japan ’ s role @ @ @

It was a shock for many of us in Japan’s diplomatic corps to hear that our former colleague and incisive commentator Yukio Okamoto, who always appeared robust and full of energy, had succumbed to pneumonia caused by the novel coronavirus last month. Okamoto’s death is a tragic loss for everyone involved in U.S.-Japan affairs at a critical time in the two country’s relations.
It was a shock for many of us in Japan’s diplomatic corps to hear that our former colleague and incisive commentator Yukio Okamoto, who always appeared robust and full of energy, had succumbed to pneumonia caused by the novel coronavirus last month. Okamoto’s death is a tragic loss for everyone involved in U.S.-Japan affairs at a critical time in the two country’s relations.
Okamoto, who died on April 24 at age 74, followed a couple of years behind me as, successively, politico-military officer at the Japanese Embassy in Washington (1983-1985) and then as director of the Japan-U.S. security affairs desk and the Japan-U.S. political affairs desk in the North American Bureau of the foreign ministry (1988-1991). He continued his abiding commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance for decades after he established his own consultancy, earning the nickname “Mr. Nichibei Kankei” (Mr. Japan-U.S. Relations). In his comments to the public broadcaster NHK, Richard Armitage, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state and assistant secretary of defense, who had worked closely with Okamoto over the years, called him a “giant” and a true patriot.
Okamoto was far from the image of a conventional buttoned-up diplomat. He preferred acting on the spot to being desk-bound. While he was heading the Japan-U.S. political desk at the foreign ministry, the only sign of his presence was said to be his suit jacket draped over the back of his chair. Even his superiors did not know where he had gone AWOL, possibly running around the halls of the National Diet members’ office buildings or somewhere meeting his American contacts or opinion-makers in business, academia, and other circles.
As far as national security was concerned, Okamoto was considered a hawk or a conservative realist. In Japan, the domestic debate over the country’s place in the world was largely influenced by the idealistic pacifism and anti-militaristic tendencies caused by defeat in World War II. But Okamoto was consistently an advocate of a proactive Japanese role under the Japan-U.S. alliance and in the context of global peace and security.
In February 1986, there was a serious test of how Japan might inject itself into the early phase of the negotiations on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. Edward Rowny, U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s special envoy to the arms talks, came to Tokyo to broach to the Japanese leaders the U.S. proposal, in response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s Jan. 15 disarmament proposal, to remove all Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe (west of the Ural Mountains) and reduce the SS-20s in Asia by half.
This would create new and difficult circumstances for Japan, because the SS-20s remaining in Asia would pose a serious threat to the country, affecting the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Okamoto and three other colleagues in the foreign ministry, subsequently dubbed the “Gang of Four” by their American counterparts, crafted in a rush the Japanese counterproposal, which was to concentrate all the SS-20s in the central Soviet Union (Barnaul, southwest Siberia) so that Japan and Western Europe would share the risk equally in the sense that they would both be within the striking range of the missile.
Okamoto immediately flew to Washington to brief Bob Linhard, the assistant to the president on arms control, on the Japanese counterproposal contained in Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s letter to Reagan. Some years later, Okamoto said that his American counterpart found the sharply focused specificity, as opposed to a simple “no,” of the Japanese counterproposal “very refreshing.” Influenced by the Japanese idea, Reagan presented to Gorbachev a revised version of his 1981 zero option, calling for the “elimination [by 1990] of U.S. Pershing II, GLCMs, and Soviet SS-20 missiles not only in Europe, but in Asia as well.” In July 1987, the Soviets accepted the double global option to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia and all short-range missiles worldwide, leading to the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987.
Japan was ill-prepared to tackle the challenge posed by the Gulf War of 1990. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s government at the time was still conditioned to avoid entrapment in America’s wars and was not ready to send Japan Self-Defense Forces troops to help the United States and the other coalition members. Japan instead chose to contribute by way of providing $13 billion in total to the war efforts, doled out in several installments and derided as too little, too late by the U.S. Congress and media. Amid this challenge, Okamoto spearheaded the efforts among working-level officials to supply as much materiel as possible to aid the U.S. military indirectly. He rushed into the Japan Seamen’s Union office and successfully persuaded them to dispatch ships to supply four-wheel-drive vehicles to the U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf area.
Kunihiko Miyake, a diplomat focused on the Middle East, was working with Okamoto at the time on Japan’s materiel support to the U.S. military. Miyake admired Okamoto, 10 years senior to him, as a man of ideas, action, and persuasive power. In 1991, Okamoto surprised his colleagues by leaving his foreign ministry job to start his own political and economic consultancy. In a recent radio interview, Miyake surmised that Okamoto must have decided to make the best use of his talents by thinking and acting outside the “box” of the bureaucracy.
Even in the private sector, Okamoto’s work was dedicated to Japan’s positive role in the world. In 2003 and 2004, as Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s special advisor, Okamoto played a key role in overseeing preparations for Japan’s assistance to Iraq’s reconstruction efforts following the U.S. invasion. This included the dispatching of Japan Self-Defense Forces troops there for humanitarian reconstruction assistance. Thus he was actively involved in translating into reality what he had been advocating since the Gulf War over a decade earlier, namely, Japanese forces playing a proactive role for international security. Miyake, then acting head of mission in Baghdad, again worked closely with Okamoto, whom he saw as a mentor and role model, amid the tension and turbulence. Following in Okamoto’s footsteps, he also resigned from the foreign ministry shortly afterward and is now active as a foreign-policy commentator.
One of the most painful issues in U.S.-Japan relations has long been the status of Okinawa, where the presence of U.S. troops is controversial among locals. Okamoto was appointed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto as special assistant on issues related to the island from 1996 to 1998. He felt deep empathy for the burden borne by the people of Okinawa.
I personally experienced the difficulty of managing the nitty-gritty of the Japan-U.S. alliance in Okinawa as ambassador in charge of Okinawan affairs in 2003-2004. The post is within the foreign ministry to help deal with issues related to the U.S. military presence there. Okinawans feel that they have been given a raw deal: Around 100,000 Okinawan civilian lives were sacrificed in the Battle of Okinawa in the final months of World War II, they were under U.S. administration until 1972, and even today more than 70 percent of U.S. bases in Japan and 60 percent of U.S. military personnel in the country are located there. Okinawans also feel that they have not been treated as equal partners by the United States and, traditionally, by mainland Japan. Thus they are viscerally averse to all things military and resent the NIMBY (not in my backyard) syndrome on the main Japanese islands with regard to the U.S. military, while feeling that their own NIMBY sentiments have ample historical justification.
Okamoto plunged himself into this delicate tripartite relationship among the U.S. government, the Japanese government, and Okinawa. He paid a number of visits to Okinawa to establish rapport with the local people, including bouts of drinking awamori, the local brew. Thus he became the most consistent and trusted channel between the Okinawan capital of Naha, Tokyo, and Washington, urging both governments to realign and reduce the U.S. military presence on the island, including the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Among the Okinawans who mourned Okamoto’s sudden passing was Seitoku Shimabukuro, a former mayor of Ie Village, where a fierce battle was fought in the Battle of Okinawa between the Japanese Army and U.S. forces over control of the Japanese airfield. A third of Okinawa’s Ie Island is used today as a U.S. Marine airfield. When Okamoto met the mayor in 1996, he listened with full attention and empathy to the mayor’s tale of hardships, including mass suicide, suffered by the villagers as the island was decimated by U.S. troops in 1945, and his plan for the village’s economic development. Shimamoto was so impressed that he named Okamoto an honorary resident of Ie, an unusual recognition given the often-fraught relations between Okinawa and the central government.
Okamoto performed an important role as a public intellectual. Keenly interested in nurturing a younger generation of talented individuals, Okamoto taught at Ritsumeikan University and other Japanese schools, and he was appointed as a senior research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was a popular public speaker among Japanese business and other leaders, and a frequent guest on public affairs and news television programs. Unlike many Japanese public intellectuals, he was able to present his incisive views in fluent English to audiences in the United States and elsewhere in the world. He was reportedly in the process of writing a new book on Japan’s foreign policy, apparently driven by his concern that Japan is being increasingly marginalized in the rapidly changing global power balance.
Born and raised on the Shonan coast not far from Tokyo, Okamoto had a lifelong love of the sea. He managed to find time to go diving and take marine photographs, which he shared with his friends. Many in Japan, the United States, and elsewhere wish they could still admire these photographs over glasses of his favorite chilled single-malt whiskey and listen to his insight on how this pandemic will affect the global power balance and Japan’s role in it.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--China’s Farms Are Petri Dishes of Antibiotic Resistance

The first alarm came from China .
It was a startling discovery—likely the result of how animals were raised for human consumption—that was a global health crisis in waiting , experts warned .
But by then it was already too late to contain its spread .
Soon , the gene , known as “ mcr-1 , ” was found in countries around the world , shocking researchers who study how bacteria and other pathogens evolve to resist the drugs prescribed to defeat them .
This phenomenon , known as antimicrobial resistance , is receiving renewed attention as the current coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health emergencies can be .
Though antimicrobial resistance ’ s effects are unlikely to be as acute as COVID-19 ’ s , over the long term it could be deadlier .
A slow-moving pandemic , it causes about 700,000 deaths yearly , including over 200,000 people who die from tuberculosis that is resistant to at least one drug .
The discovery of mcr-1 , reported in 2015 , and its rapid global spread set off particularly loud alarm bells because the gene gives bacteria resistance to colistin , an antibiotic with serious side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed , and because the gene is of a type that is easily transmissible between different families of bacteria .
In a worst-case scenario , it could mix with other types of resistance to create untreatable strains of bacteria known as “ superbugs.
” In a world where the spread of antimicrobial resistance isn ’ t curbed , all doctors can do to fight what are now common ailments is treat their symptoms—a situation similar to the one they face at present with COVID-19 .
Procedures whose infection risks are currently mitigated with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , will become too risky to perform .
In total , antimicrobial resistance ’ s yearly death toll is predicted to rise to 10 million by 2050 , higher than cancer ’ s death toll today .
And as microbiologists warned years ago that China ’ s natural reservoir of SARS-like viruses and the local practice of eating wild animals made the country a probable source of a new viral outbreak , so too was it unsurprising that scientists eventually traced mcr-1 ’ s likely origin to one of China ’ s many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antimicrobials in intensive livestock production is a major force behind the spread of antimicrobial resistance .
Farmers buy nearly three-quarters of all antibiotics worldwide , many of which contain the same compounds used to treat sick humans .
The drugs keep animals healthy despite crowded living conditions and , because animals expend less energy fighting pathogens , accelerate their growth .
Such practices are believed to be widespread in China , which leads the world in pork and chicken meat production .
Its aquaculture industry , another large antibiotics consumer , is bigger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Reliable public figures to make up-to-date international comparisons on antibiotics usage are scarce , but , in 2015 , a Chinese researcher put the country ’ s consumption of the medicines , for both animal and human use , at nearly half the global total .
A paper from the same year estimated China ’ s share at about a quarter of the world ’ s and predicted its usage would increase rapidly in absolute terms .
When looking at antimicrobial resistance in food animals , China and India are the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to another study published last year .
As such , even though antimicrobial resistance is a global issue , China ’ s role is crucial , says Thomas van Boeckel , a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and a co-author of both studies .
To its credit , the Chinese government has formed an ambitious plan to tackle the issue .
Following the World Health Organization ’ s launch of its Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance in 2015 , China has enacted a variety of “ aggressive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said Zhou Wanqing , an associate at the environmental nongovernmental organization Brighter Green .
“ The government is aware of the vicious cycle : the more antibiotics used , the worse the resistance , which pushes the growers to use even more antibiotics.
” “ Their reaction has been very swift , ” van Boeckel told Foreign Policy .
But , without a public monitoring system for antibiotics use , which has proved effective in fighting antibiotics abuse in Europe , there is no way to know whether China ’ s policies are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Evasion of regulations is common in China across most sectors , from construction to medicine , and agriculture is no exception .
Enforcement appears inadequate .
A survey published in January found that three-quarters of sampled chicken farms continued to use antibiotics that had been placed on the country ’ s ban list .
Against regulations , majorities of farmers were able to buy antibiotics without a prescription and neglected to keep records of their antibiotics use , it found .
Efforts to rein in overuse of antibiotics in Chinese hospitals , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more successful , Xiao Yonghong , an infectious disease professor at Zhejiang University in eastern China , told Foreign Policy .
Government figures for larger hospitals show that antibiotics use , measured per patient-days , dropped 43 percent in just three years .
Though , Xiao said , “ much still remains to be improved at more basic levels of care ” such as at small clinics .
Also , other researchers , using a different data set and looking at total usage , arrived at the opposite conclusion : a 40 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ divergence from official figures , they write , is hard to explain but could be due to an increase in how many people seek inpatient care at hospitals .
Even though COVID-19 is caused by a virus and thus can not be treated with antibacterial methods , the global fight against the disease is likely speeding up the spread of antimicrobial resistance .
Bacterial infections are common during viral pandemics—the majority of deaths during both the 1918-1919 Spanish flu and 2009 H1N1 pandemics were caused by bacterial pneumonia .
To prevent COVID-19 patients @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world over are administering antibiotics without the usual care or moderation .
To Xiao , the pandemic has a silver lining .
“ Everyone is reflecting on public health , and how it can be improved , ” he said .
The outbreak of COVID-19 , likely the result of humans getting into close contact with wild animals and disturbing their habitats , is also an argument in favor of “ One Health ” —the concept , popularized by WHO and other organizations following the H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks in the early @ @ @ @ @ @ @ linked to the health of all ecosystems .
Similarly , Xiao said , the high levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria and genes found in Chinese rivers and lakes as a result of agricultural drug use show that solving the issue of antimicrobial resistance also goes beyond hospitals .
One study found several veterinary antibiotics in the urine of Shanghainese schoolchildren .
Bacteria will inevitably continue to develop resistance .
“ That ’ s just basic Darwinian evolution , ” van Boeckel said .
Though pharmaceutical companies have found it hard to recover investments into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to be developed to replace current ones .
But countries , chief among them China , getting a better grip on their antibiotics use will go a long way .
“ There are things you can do to reduce antimicrobial resistance level and the most obvious one is to decrease [ antibiotics ] consumption , ” he said .
As a top producer and importer of meat , China has enough clout to set the world ’ s standards for agricultural antibiotics use , van Boeckel said .
“ What would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truly acknowledge and accept that they have to be the leader on this to solve the problem globally.
” The slow-rolling nature of antimicrobial resistance means we can blunt its deadly potential .
“ We have the time and the opportunity to do something about this , ” Xiao said , referring to the global struggle against the phenomenon .
“ It ’ s just a matter of whether we will .
”

The first alarm came from China. It was a startling discovery—likely the result of how animals were raised for human consumption—that was a global health crisis in waiting, experts warned.
The first alarm came from China. It was a startling discovery—likely the result of how animals were raised for human consumption—that was a global health crisis in waiting, experts warned.
But by then it was already too late to contain its spread.
Soon, the gene, known as “mcr-1,” was found in countries around the world, shocking researchers who study how bacteria and other pathogens evolve to resist the drugs prescribed to defeat them.
This phenomenon, known as antimicrobial resistance, is receiving renewed attention as the current coronavirus crisis reminds the world how destructive public health emergencies can be. Though antimicrobial resistance’s effects are unlikely to be as acute as COVID-19’s, over the long term it could be deadlier. A slow-moving pandemic, it causes about 700,000 deaths yearly, including over 200,000 people who die from tuberculosis that is resistant to at least one drug.
The discovery of mcr-1, reported in 2015, and its rapid global spread set off particularly loud alarm bells because the gene gives bacteria resistance to colistin, an antibiotic with serious side effects that is used when others have failed, and because the gene is of a type that is easily transmissible between different families of bacteria. In a worst-case scenario, it could mix with other types of resistance to create untreatable strains of bacteria known as “superbugs.”
In a world where the spread of antimicrobial resistance isn’t curbed, all doctors can do to fight what are now common ailments is treat their symptoms—a situation similar to the one they face at present with COVID-19. Procedures whose infection risks are currently mitigated with antibiotics, including chemotherapy and hip replacements, will become too risky to perform. In total, antimicrobial resistance’s yearly death toll is predicted to rise to 10 million by 2050, higher than cancer’s death toll today.
And as microbiologists warned years ago that China’s natural reservoir of SARS-like viruses and the local practice of eating wild animals made the country a probable source of a new viral outbreak, so too was it unsurprising that scientists eventually traced mcr-1’s likely origin to one of China’s many pig farms.
Misuse and overuse of antimicrobials in intensive livestock production is a major force behind the spread of antimicrobial resistance. Farmers buy nearly three-quarters of all antibiotics worldwide, many of which contain the same compounds used to treat sick humans. The drugs keep animals healthy despite crowded living conditions and, because animals expend less energy fighting pathogens, accelerate their growth. Such practices are believed to be widespread in China, which leads the world in pork and chicken meat production. Its aquaculture industry, another large antibiotics consumer, is bigger than those of all other countries combined.
Reliable public figures to make up-to-date international comparisons on antibiotics usage are scarce, but, in 2015, a Chinese researcher put the country’s consumption of the medicines, for both animal and human use, at nearly half the global total. A paper from the same year estimated China’s share at about a quarter of the world’s and predicted its usage would increase rapidly in absolute terms. When looking at antimicrobial resistance in food animals, China and India are the world’s biggest hot spots, according to another study published last year. As such, even though antimicrobial resistance is a global issue, China’s role is crucial, says Thomas van Boeckel, a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and a co-author of both studies.
To its credit, the Chinese government has formed an ambitious plan to tackle the issue. Following the World Health Organization’s launch of its Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance in 2015, China has enacted a variety of “aggressive” policies to limit antibiotics consumption, said Zhou Wanqing, an associate at the environmental nongovernmental organization Brighter Green. “The government is aware of the vicious cycle: the more antibiotics used, the worse the resistance, which pushes the growers to use even more antibiotics.”
“Their reaction has been very swift,” van Boeckel told Foreign Policy. But, without a public monitoring system for antibiotics use, which has proved effective in fighting antibiotics abuse in Europe, there is no way to know whether China’s policies are having their stated effect, he said. Evasion of regulations is common in China across most sectors, from construction to medicine, and agriculture is no exception. Enforcement appears inadequate. A survey published in January found that three-quarters of sampled chicken farms continued to use antibiotics that had been placed on the country’s ban list. Against regulations, majorities of farmers were able to buy antibiotics without a prescription and neglected to keep records of their antibiotics use, it found.
Efforts to rein in overuse of antibiotics in Chinese hospitals, which intensified in 2011, have been more successful, Xiao Yonghong, an infectious disease professor at Zhejiang University in eastern China, told Foreign Policy. Government figures for larger hospitals show that antibiotics use, measured per patient-days, dropped 43 percent in just three years. Though, Xiao said, “much still remains to be improved at more basic levels of care” such as at small clinics. Also, other researchers, using a different data set and looking at total usage, arrived at the opposite conclusion: a 40 percent increase between 2011 and 2018. This divergence from official figures, they write, is hard to explain but could be due to an increase in how many people seek inpatient care at hospitals.
Even though COVID-19 is caused by a virus and thus cannot be treated with antibacterial methods, the global fight against the disease is likely speeding up the spread of antimicrobial resistance. Bacterial infections are common during viral pandemics—the majority of deaths during both the 1918-1919 Spanish flu and 2009 H1N1 pandemics were caused by bacterial pneumonia. To prevent COVID-19 patients catching such secondary infections, overburdened hospitals the world over are administering antibiotics without the usual care or moderation.
To Xiao, the pandemic has a silver lining. “Everyone is reflecting on public health, and how it can be improved,” he said. The outbreak of COVID-19, likely the result of humans getting into close contact with wild animals and disturbing their habitats, is also an argument in favor of “One Health”—the concept, popularized by WHO and other organizations following the H5N1 avian influenza outbreaks in the early 2000s, that human health is inextricably linked to the health of all ecosystems. Similarly, Xiao said, the high levels of antibiotic-resistant bacteria and genes found in Chinese rivers and lakes as a result of agricultural drug use show that solving the issue of antimicrobial resistance also goes beyond hospitals. One study found several veterinary antibiotics in the urine of Shanghainese schoolchildren.
Bacteria will inevitably continue to develop resistance. “That’s just basic Darwinian evolution,” van Boeckel said. Though pharmaceutical companies have found it hard to recover investments into finding new antibiotics, new treatments will have to be developed to replace current ones. But countries, chief among them China, getting a better grip on their antibiotics use will go a long way. “There are things you can do to reduce antimicrobial resistance level and the most obvious one is to decrease [antibiotics] consumption,” he said. As a top producer and importer of meat, China has enough clout to set the world’s standards for agricultural antibiotics use, van Boeckel said. “What would be a huge game-changer is for China to truly acknowledge and accept that they have to be the leader on this to solve the problem globally.”
The slow-rolling nature of antimicrobial resistance means we can blunt its deadly potential. “We have the time and the opportunity to do something about this,” Xiao said, referring to the global struggle against the phenomenon. “It’s just a matter of whether we will.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-21--China’s Mask Diplomacy Won’t Work in the Czech Republic

As China wages a public relations offensive during the coronavirus pandemic , the Czech Republic is getting special attention .
Facing pushback from the Czech political establishment , which has sought to disrupt efforts to deepen ties with China , Beijing is keen to use the global crisis to claw back its influence—beginning with so-called mask diplomacy .
When a plane carrying Chinese medical supplies arrived at the Prague airport in March , a gaggle of Czech government officials including Prime Minister Andrej Babis crowded the runway .
With criticism mounting over a lack of personal protective equipment for health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a hole .
It also offered President Milos Zeman , who has long sought closer ties with China , room to maneuver and the chance for a dig at the European Union .
“ China was the only country that helped us , ” he said in a speech on March 19 .
Further supply shipments have followed .
Zeman ’ s comments likely played well in Beijing , but diplomatic sources suggest that regaining its lost ground in the Czech Republic may prove a tough task .
Western allies view Prague @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while a “ longer-term cooling in relations with China ” is ongoing , according to a senior official at the foreign ministry .
China ’ s renewed focus on the Czech Republic has not gone unnoticed .
In April , a leaked foreign ministry report warned that China was using the pandemic to accelerate efforts to boost its international position , promote its system of governance , and divide the West by obtaining support from EU member states , particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe .
The report explicitly notes Chinese President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which pledges investment in Central and Eastern European countries—creating a new Silk Road that would link China with Western Europe .
Analysts say that China ’ s end goal is not to gain access to the region ’ s small economies but rather to use its influence to destabilize Western multilateral institutions .
“ Czechia is not so important on issues such as geopolitical position or innovation , ” said Ivana Karaskova , an analyst at the Association for International Affairs , a Prague-based think-tank , using the government ’ s preferred moniker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ re valuable as EU and NATO members .
China wants to use us to influence these institutions.
” In the past few years , Czech-Chinese relations have gone into reverse .
The corporation CEFC China Energy—which had pledged huge investment in the Czech Republic—collapsed in 2018 amid rumors of links to the Chinese secret services .
Beijing ’ s influence in the Czech Republic then began to slide .
The Chinese state fund CITIC took over CEFC ’ s Czech assets , followed by a high-profile spat with J & T Financial Group @ @ @ @ @ @ @ partnered with the corporation .
When the mayor of Prague ended a sister-city agreement with Beijing due to pressure to honor the “ One China ” policy of recognizing Beijing ’ s territorial claims , China threatened economic reprisals .
In November 2019 , it was revealed that Chinese money had infiltrated one of the country ’ s top universities in attempt to build influence .
Around the same time , Petr Kellner—the Czech Republic ’ s richest person—was found to be placing pro-China articles in the media .
These scandals have been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Czech security services that Chinese espionage and hybrid warfare are now some of the nation ’ s top security threats .
Beijing ’ s response to these episodes has been bombastic , driving Czech public opinion of China to among the lowest levels in the EU .
The mood pushed the populist Zeman to complain in January that the billions of korunas in investment promised by China have failed to arrive .
From 2005 to 2019 , Chinese capital flows to the Czech Republic totaled just $ 960 million , compared with $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ period .
In particular , Beijing now hopes to restart the discussion around the development of 5G networks in the Czech Republic .
Last year , the government blocked the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei from participating in 5G mobile communications infrastructure—perhaps the most damaging bump in the road for China in its cooling relations with the Czech political establishment .
The move followed warnings from the National Cyber and Information Security Agency ( NUKIB ) that Huawei may be required to hand data to Beijing .
The warnings have influenced the wider EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an EU security assessment report released last year echoed NUKIB .
“ NUKIB ’ s warning came early and was unique in Europe at the time , ” Karaskova said .
“ That saw the EU take it very seriously.
” China ’ s influence strategy has worked better in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe than in others .
Hungary ’ s autocratic regime embraces Chinese capital as a counterweight to the EU , which provides funds while demanding transparency and rule of law .
In return , Budapest has resisted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China Sea and human rights issues , such as China ’ s alleged torture of human rights lawyers .
Greece and Serbia—both recipients of Chinese investment projects—have also offered support to Beijing .
But in the Czech Republic , China has long fueled a foreign-policy debate between the controversial Zeman and the political establishment .
Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek has recently suggested a potential shift in Czech policy away from China , warning against dependence on Chinese medical supplies .
Petricek is the public face of the pro-Western political establishment .
But he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a minority governing coalition , giving him little political clout .
Babis , the embattled prime minister , also emphasizes the Czech Republic ’ s EU and NATO membership , but he depends on Zeman and extremist parties linked to the president for political support .
Since his election in 2013 , Zeman has tested the boundaries of his largely ceremonial post to pursue an alternative foreign policy , seeking deeper ties with China and Russia .
The president ’ s patronage of Chinese interests has included the CEFC investment drive in 2015 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China and the remarkable market access granted by Beijing to businesses with links to the Czech president raised suspicion at home and abroad that Czech foreign policy was drifting from its Western orientation .
When Xi visited Prague in 2016 , much of the city was shut down , and organized groups attacked protesters , illustrating Beijing ’ s growing political influence .
When three ministers met with the Dalai Lama shortly afterward , a joint statement from Zeman and then-Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka including a pledge of loyalty to Beijing ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese sovereignty over Tibet , was quickly issued .
Now , the coronavirus crisis has revived the president ’ s encouragement of closer ties and Beijing ’ s push for influence .
In April , a Czech consultancy disseminated a report to the media insisting that the pandemic made the swift development of 5G crucial and that excluding Huawei would raise costs dramatically .
It quickly became apparent that the Chinese telecommunications company had secretly paid for the analysis .
Ignoring Huawei ’ s view , on May 6 the government in Prague @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5G networks .
China ’ s clumsy lobbying efforts have proved effective in Hungary and other countries with illiberal governments that are receptive to its message .
It will still have a tougher time in the Czech Republic , where political institutions remain robust and democracy has developed deeper roots .

As China wages a public relations offensive during the coronavirus pandemic, the Czech Republic is getting special attention. Facing pushback from the Czech political establishment, which has sought to disrupt efforts to deepen ties with China, Beijing is keen to use the global crisis to claw back its influence—beginning with so-called mask diplomacy.
As China wages a public relations offensive during the coronavirus pandemic, the Czech Republic is getting special attention. Facing pushback from the Czech political establishment, which has sought to disrupt efforts to deepen ties with China, Beijing is keen to use the global crisis to claw back its influence—beginning with so-called mask diplomacy.
When a plane carrying Chinese medical supplies arrived at the Prague airport in March, a gaggle of Czech government officials including Prime Minister Andrej Babis crowded the runway. With criticism mounting over a lack of personal protective equipment for health workers, the shipment helped Babis out of a hole. It also offered President Milos Zeman, who has long sought closer ties with China, room to maneuver and the chance for a dig at the European Union. “China was the only country that helped us,” he said in a speech on March 19. Further supply shipments have followed.
Zeman’s comments likely played well in Beijing, but diplomatic sources suggest that regaining its lost ground in the Czech Republic may prove a tough task. Western allies view Prague as a “reliable partner,” while a “longer-term cooling in relations with China” is ongoing, according to a senior official at the foreign ministry.
China’s renewed focus on the Czech Republic has not gone unnoticed. In April, a leaked foreign ministry report warned that China was using the pandemic to accelerate efforts to boost its international position, promote its system of governance, and divide the West by obtaining support from EU member states, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe.
The report explicitly notes Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 17+1 initiative, which pledges investment in Central and Eastern European countries—creating a new Silk Road that would link China with Western Europe. Analysts say that China’s end goal is not to gain access to the region’s small economies but rather to use its influence to destabilize Western multilateral institutions.
“Czechia is not so important on issues such as geopolitical position or innovation,” said Ivana Karaskova, an analyst at the Association for International Affairs, a Prague-based think-tank, using the government’s preferred moniker for the country. “We’re valuable as EU and NATO members. China wants to use us to influence these institutions.”
In the past few years, Czech-Chinese relations have gone into reverse. The corporation CEFC China Energy—which had pledged huge investment in the Czech Republic—collapsed in 2018 amid rumors of links to the Chinese secret services. Beijing’s influence in the Czech Republic then began to slide. The Chinese state fund CITIC took over CEFC’s Czech assets, followed by a high-profile spat with J&T Financial Group, run by local oligarchs that had partnered with the corporation.
When the mayor of Prague ended a sister-city agreement with Beijing due to pressure to honor the “One China” policy of recognizing Beijing’s territorial claims, China threatened economic reprisals. In November 2019, it was revealed that Chinese money had infiltrated one of the country’s top universities in attempt to build influence. Around the same time, Petr Kellner—the Czech Republic’s richest person—was found to be placing pro-China articles in the media.
These scandals have been accompanied by increasingly explicit warnings from the Czech security services that Chinese espionage and hybrid warfare are now some of the nation’s top security threats. Beijing’s response to these episodes has been bombastic, driving Czech public opinion of China to among the lowest levels in the EU. The mood pushed the populist Zeman to complain in January that the billions of korunas in investment promised by China have failed to arrive. From 2005 to 2019, Chinese capital flows to the Czech Republic totaled just $960 million, compared with $4.84 billion to Hungary in the same period.
In particular, Beijing now hopes to restart the discussion around the development of 5G networks in the Czech Republic. Last year, the government blocked the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei from participating in 5G mobile communications infrastructure—perhaps the most damaging bump in the road for China in its cooling relations with the Czech political establishment. The move followed warnings from the National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) that Huawei may be required to hand data to Beijing.
The warnings have influenced the wider EU debate over Huawei and 5G, and an EU security assessment report released last year echoed NUKIB. “NUKIB’s warning came early and was unique in Europe at the time,” Karaskova said. “That saw the EU take it very seriously.”
China’s influence strategy has worked better in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe than in others. Hungary’s autocratic regime embraces Chinese capital as a counterweight to the EU, which provides funds while demanding transparency and rule of law. In return, Budapest has resisted EU resolutions on disputes in the South China Sea and human rights issues, such as China’s alleged torture of human rights lawyers. Greece and Serbia—both recipients of Chinese investment projects—have also offered support to Beijing.
But in the Czech Republic, China has long fueled a foreign-policy debate between the controversial Zeman and the political establishment.
Foreign Minister Tomas Petricek has recently suggested a potential shift in Czech policy away from China, warning against dependence on Chinese medical supplies. Petricek is the public face of the pro-Western political establishment. But he hails from the weak junior partner in a minority governing coalition, giving him little political clout. Babis, the embattled prime minister, also emphasizes the Czech Republic’s EU and NATO membership, but he depends on Zeman and extremist parties linked to the president for political support.
Since his election in 2013, Zeman has tested the boundaries of his largely ceremonial post to pursue an alternative foreign policy, seeking deeper ties with China and Russia. The president’s patronage of Chinese interests has included the CEFC investment drive in 2015. Zeman’s high-profile visits to China and the remarkable market access granted by Beijing to businesses with links to the Czech president raised suspicion at home and abroad that Czech foreign policy was drifting from its Western orientation. When Xi visited Prague in 2016, much of the city was shut down, and organized groups attacked protesters, illustrating Beijing’s growing political influence. When three ministers met with the Dalai Lama shortly afterward, a joint statement from Zeman and then-Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka including a pledge of loyalty to Beijing’s One China policy, which includes recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, was quickly issued.
Now, the coronavirus crisis has revived the president’s encouragement of closer ties and Beijing’s push for influence. In April, a Czech consultancy disseminated a report to the media insisting that the pandemic made the swift development of 5G crucial and that excluding Huawei would raise costs dramatically. It quickly became apparent that the Chinese telecommunications company had secretly paid for the analysis. Ignoring Huawei’s view, on May 6 the government in Prague pledged to work with Washington on its 5G networks.
China’s clumsy lobbying efforts have proved effective in Hungary and other countries with illiberal governments that are receptive to its message. It will still have a tougher time in the Czech Republic, where political institutions remain robust and democracy has developed deeper roots.