foreignpolicy--2020-12-09--The East Timor Model Offers a Way out for Western Sahara and Morocco

The East Timor Model Offers a Way out for Western Sahara and Morocco It ’ s not often that Western Sahara makes international headlines , but in mid-November it did : Nov. 14 marked the tragic—if unsurprising—breakup of a tenuous , 29-year cease-fire in Western Sahara between the occupying Moroccan government and pro-independence fighters .
The outbreak of violence is concerning not only because it flew in the face of nearly three decades of relative stasis , but also because Western governments ’ reflexive response to the resurgent conflict may be to upend—and thereby hamper and delegitimize for perpetuity—more than @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It is imperative that the global community realize that , in both Western Sahara and Morocco , the path forward lies in adhering to international law , not overriding it .
The conflict in Western Sahara dates back to 1975 , when the territory was on the verge of gaining independence from its colonizer , Spain .
Under pressure from the United States , which did not want to see the leftist independence movement known as the Polisario Front lead an independent state , Madrid granted administrative authority over the northern two-thirds @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the southern third to neighboring Mauritania .
In early 1976 , the Polisario established the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic ( SADR ) , which has been recognized by 80 countries and is a full member state of the African Union .
Mauritania ceded its portion of Western Sahara to the SADR in 1979 , only to see it immediately seized by Morocco .
For over a decade , Morocco—with French and U.S. support—continued to battle Polisario guerrillas while violently suppressing pro-independence demonstrations and other nationalist activities within the occupied Western Saharan territory it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the now newly defunct cease-fire quelled the armed struggle of the Polisario , which agreed to halt its militant operations in return for a U.N.-supervised independence referendum .
The occupying Moroccan army , however , has never allowed that vote to take place .
In fact , Moroccans only continued to settle the land ; today , Moroccan settlers outnumber Western Sahara ’ s indigenous inhabitants .
Besides the flouted promise of a referendum , the 1991 cease-fire allowed Moroccan forces to remain on the northern and western sides of a Moroccan-built @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the territory—including its major cities and mineral wealth .
The SADR , in turn , remains in control of the territory ’ s sparsely populated remaining areas and administering refugee camps in Algeria , which house close to 40 percent of the Sahrawi population .
Virtually no country recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara .
The U.N. , for its part , has affirmed that Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory—a verdict repeated by a landmark ruling of the International Court of Justice Still , recognition only goes so far when the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.N. ’ s peacekeeping and human-rights operations in Western Sahara have been severely curtailed by Rabat—and key allies with veto power on the U.N. Security Council .
November ’ s clashes can be traced back to a skirmish in 2016 , when Morocco violated the 1991 cease-fire agreement by moving its forces into a five-kilometer buffer zone between Moroccan-held territory and the El Guergarat border crossing into Mauritania , in order to complete a road connecting the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara with most of West Africa .
Starting on Oct. 21 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ engaged in a nonviolent sit-in to block the highway , only to be violently dispersed by Moroccan troops two weeks later .
To the Polisario—which has repeatedly threatened to abrogate the cease-fire over the years following various Moroccan violations—this assault was the final straw .
The group announced its withdrawal from the cease-fire agreement and has resumed attacks against Moroccan forces along the 1675-mile sand berm that separates the Moroccan and Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara .
It appears that the Moroccan armed forces were unprepared for the Polisario ’ s coordinated attacks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ number of Moroccan casualties .
The Moroccan government has been surprisingly quiet in response to recent events , and has even threatened families of soldiers not to report casualties .
Still , it is doubtful that a new war will win the Sahrawis their rights .
For one , Morocco ’ s sand berm consolidating its hold on the majority of the territory is fortified and—while vulnerable to shelling and to hit and run attacks—would be hard to penetrate for a sustained period .
These external controls are dwarfed by Morocco ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past , even nonviolent Sahrawi resistance—of peaceful protests , sit-ins , occupations , strikes , and boycotts—has been met with severe repression .
Opportunities for dissent—much less sustained guerilla activity—is thus limited Western Sahara , which Freedom House considers one of the dozen least free nations in the world , featuring ( a lack of ) rights on par with the dearth thereof in Tibet , Uzbekistan , North Korea , and Saudi Arabia .
Perhaps the Polisario hopes that resuming an armed struggle after 29 years of comparative quiet will push Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Unfortunately , the tendency in Washington , Paris , and other Western capitals has been to regard any armed resistance against an allied Arab government as terrorism .
Morocco has exploited this assumption , launching contradictory claims about the Polisario ’ s alleged ties to rivals like the Islamic State , al Qaeda , and Hezbollah—never mind that the secular and moderately leftist Polisario has nothing to do with extremist Islamist organizations .
In this perverse sense , then , the Polisario ’ s resumption of guerrilla activity could actually increase foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be counterproductive—and misguided .
Though war is not the answer , neither is the continued occupation of Western Sahara .
The failure of the international community to force Morocco to live up to its international legal obligations is what has led to the Western Saharan crisis in the first place .
As is the case with the Israeli occupation of Palestine—and as was the case with the 24-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor—having friends on the U.N. Security Council has allowed Morocco to run roughshod under international legal norms .
For France—Morocco @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close political , strategic , and economic ties with the Moroccan monarchy has overridden any concerns regarding international law .
Similarly , the United States , which considers Morocco as an important regional ally—first during the Cold War and now in the fight against Islamist extremists—has been similarly willing to overlook such legal and moral imperatives .
The Polisario , meanwhile , has counted primarily on the support of countries in Africa , Latin America , and Southeast Asia—which recognize the conflict in Western Sahara as an incomplete decolonization .
Chief among these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Polisario ’ s primary supporter .
Any burgeoning conflict in Western Sahara would not simply be a proxy war : The call for a return to war has been growing among both among Sahrawis under Moroccan occupation as well as refugees in Algeria , who have been waiting upwards of 45 years to return to their homeland .
But this is bad timing for Algeria , which would be loath to be dragged into a conflict with its Western-backed neighbor—at least right now .
The semi-autocratic and increasingly unpopular regime in Algiers has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the face of mass domestic protests and shoring up the domestic economy during the COVID-19 pandemic , which has seen oil prices tank .
As a result , Algeria would likely cooperate in efforts to end the fighting between Morocco and the Polisario , provided there was at least some hope of diplomatically moving Morocco toward accepting Sahrawis ’ right to self-determination .
The chances of such a mutually satisfying diplomatic settlement , however , are slim .
For years , French and U.S. veto threats on the U.N. Security Council have stymied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sahara under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter , which would give the international community the power to impose sanctions or other appropriate leverage on Morocco to force the country to abide by the U.N. mandates it has to date disregarded .
Instead , the United States and France have endorsed a Moroccan “ autonomy ” plan for Western Sahara that is quite limited in scope and would fail to meet the international standard for autonomy .
It does not allow the Sahrawis the option of independence—to which they are entitled as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law , a series of U.N. resolutions , and a landmark World Court ruling .
If the plan were to be imposed by the Security Council , as Washington and Paris are advocating , it would constitute the first time since the signing of the U.N. Charter that the international community recognized an incomplete decolonization and the expansion of a country ’ s territory by force—a grim milestone for the globe .
This flagrant double-standard led human-rights organizations , church groups , and a wide array of activists in the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure their governments to end their support for the occupation .
As a result , the Indonesian government was finally willing to offer a referendum on independence .
In 2000 , the East Timorese voted for self-determination and the country is now free .
It may take similar grassroots campaigns in Europe and North America to ensure that Western powers live up to their international legal obligations and pressure Morocco to allow the people of Western Sahara the right to determine their own destiny .
There is a small but growing movement in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to national self-determination , as well as some similar civil society initiatives in many African countries , Australia , Japan , and the United States .
A growing focus on the issue of illegal exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara is providing proponents of international law and human rights a way to challenge governments and companies that illegally take advantage of the occupation , by targeting them through campaigns that advocate boycotts , divestment , and sanctions .
At this point , however , such movements are too small to have much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of France and the United States , which are the two governments most responsible for the failure of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions addressing the conflict .
This can change , however : Twenty-five years ago , there was relatively little civil society activity in developed nations regarding East Timor , but a dramatic growth in such activism in the late 1990s—which came on the heels of widely publicized human-rights abuses by Indonesian forces—played an important role in making East Timor ’ s eventual independence possible .
A similar campaign may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Western Sahara—and the vitally important international legal principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter .
There may be an opening now , too , with the incoming Biden administration .
Neutrality is an inappropriate position in a dispute between the people of a non-self-governing territory demanding their right to self-determination and an occupying power denying them that right .
Following mixed signals from both the Trump and Obama administrations , former U.S. ambassador to Morocco , Edward M. Gabriel , sees a Biden administration returning to the “ constructive relations ” that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administrations , which amounts to a euphemistic endorsement of the Moroccan takeover .
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden himself has indicated that he is neutral regarding Western Sahara .
However , neutrality is an inappropriate position in a dispute between the people of a non-self-governing territory demanding their right to self-determination and an occupying power denying them that right .
Meanwhile , Congress has been actively supporting the Moroccan conquest by insisting that U.S. foreign aid to Morocco “ shall be made available for assistance for the Western Sahara , ” as a way @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between Morocco and its occupied territory .
Despite this track record , a Biden government could be malleable to pressure .
In order to ensure international law isn ’ t breached , Washington must first work for at the U.N. Security Council and provide a human-rights mandate like those of other peacekeeping operations to investigate and report on human-rights abuses in both the Moroccan-occupied zones and Polisario-run refugee camps .
In the medium term , the United States should halt military aid , arms sales , and other military cooperation with Morocco , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ illegally extracted from Western Sahara , and work with Europeans and Africans to limit economic cooperation that supports the occupation .
Finally , and perhaps most importantly , Biden should support any U.N. efforts to ensure that the Sahrawi people are allowed to participate in an internationally supervised referendum on the fate of the territory—one which actually includes the option of independence and , importantly , allows Sahrawi refugees in Algeria to participate .
Biden , who will arrive at the White House with a foreign-policy portfolio unrivaled by most of his predecessors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be set by recognizing an incomplete decolonization .
Continuing to do Morocco ’ s bidding at the U.N. would amount to an implicit endorsement of countries expanding their territory by force , a slap in the face for all who seek to promote—universally—the right to self-determination .
The fate of Western Sahara is a rare issue that does not fall neatly along partisan lines , and senators ranging from Democrat Patrick Leahy to Republican James Inhofe have pushed successive U.S. administrations to support Sahrawi ’ s right to a referendum on independence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the aisle , and Western Sahara may be the one area where it is actually feasible to do so .
The return to war in the deserts of Western Sahara is a tragedy .
It could have been prevented—and it can finally be ended—if the United States and France live up to their obligations under the U.N. Charter and insist that their ally Morocco abide by well-established international legal norms .
Washington must recognize the importance of upholding international legal norms , even if the violator is a U.S. ally .
Failing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prolong the bitter conflict in Western Sahara , but to upend the liberal global order in its entirety .

It’s not often that Western Sahara makes international headlines, but in mid-November it did: Nov. 14 marked the tragic—if unsurprising—breakup of a tenuous, 29-year cease-fire in Western Sahara between the occupying Moroccan government and pro-independence fighters. The outbreak of violence is concerning not only because it flew in the face of nearly three decades of relative stasis, but also because Western governments’ reflexive response to the resurgent conflict may be to upend—and thereby hamper and delegitimize for perpetuity—more than 75 years of established international legal principles. It is imperative that the global community realize that, in both Western Sahara and Morocco, the path forward lies in adhering to international law, not overriding it.
It’s not often that Western Sahara makes international headlines, but in mid-November it did: Nov. 14 marked the tragic—if unsurprising—breakup of a tenuous, 29-year cease-fire in Western Sahara between the occupying Moroccan government and pro-independence fighters. The outbreak of violence is concerning not only because it flew in the face of nearly three decades of relative stasis, but also because Western governments’ reflexive response to the resurgent conflict may be to upend—and thereby hamper and delegitimize for perpetuity—more than 75 years of established international legal principles. It is imperative that the global community realize that, in both Western Sahara and Morocco, the path forward lies in adhering to international law, not overriding it.
The conflict in Western Sahara dates back to 1975, when the territory was on the verge of gaining independence from its colonizer, Spain. Under pressure from the United States, which did not want to see the leftist independence movement known as the Polisario Front lead an independent state, Madrid granted administrative authority over the northern two-thirds of the country to Morocco and ceded the southern third to neighboring Mauritania. In early 1976, the Polisario established the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which has been recognized by 80 countries and is a full member state of the African Union. Mauritania ceded its portion of Western Sahara to the SADR in 1979, only to see it immediately seized by Morocco. For over a decade, Morocco—with French and U.S. support—continued to battle Polisario guerrillas while violently suppressing pro-independence demonstrations and other nationalist activities within the occupied Western Saharan territory it considers part of Morocco.
In 1991, the now newly defunct cease-fire quelled the armed struggle of the Polisario, which agreed to halt its militant operations in return for a U.N.-supervised independence referendum. The occupying Moroccan army, however, has never allowed that vote to take place. In fact, Moroccans only continued to settle the land; today, Moroccan settlers outnumber Western Sahara’s indigenous inhabitants.
Besides the flouted promise of a referendum, the 1991 cease-fire allowed Moroccan forces to remain on the northern and western sides of a Moroccan-built sand berm that encompasses close to three-quarters of the territory—including its major cities and mineral wealth. The SADR, in turn, remains in control of the territory’s sparsely populated remaining areas and administering refugee camps in Algeria, which house close to 40 percent of the Sahrawi population.
Virtually no country recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The U.N., for its part, has affirmed that Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory—a verdict repeated by a landmark ruling of the International Court of Justice. Still, recognition only goes so far when the occupying power refuses to budge: The U.N.’s peacekeeping and human-rights operations in Western Sahara have been severely curtailed by Rabat—and key allies with veto power on the U.N. Security Council.
November’s clashes can be traced back to a skirmish in 2016, when Morocco violated the 1991 cease-fire agreement by moving its forces into a five-kilometer buffer zone between Moroccan-held territory and the El Guergarat border crossing into Mauritania, in order to complete a road connecting the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara with most of West Africa.
Starting on Oct. 21 this year, scores of Sahrawi civilians engaged in a nonviolent sit-in to block the highway, only to be violently dispersed by Moroccan troops two weeks later. To the Polisario—which has repeatedly threatened to abrogate the cease-fire over the years following various Moroccan violations—this assault was the final straw. The group announced its withdrawal from the cease-fire agreement and has resumed attacks against Moroccan forces along the 1675-mile sand berm that separates the Moroccan and Polisario-controlled areas of Western Sahara.
It appears that the Moroccan armed forces were unprepared for the Polisario’s coordinated attacks, which have reportedly resulted in a number of Moroccan casualties. The Moroccan government has been surprisingly quiet in response to recent events, and has even threatened families of soldiers not to report casualties.
The Polisario believes that Morocco’s failure to live up to its end of the agreement—particularly its failure to allow for a just referendum—leaves them no obligation to uphold their end of the deal. After 29 years of stagnation on self-determination, patience in Western Sahara has been wearing thin. This time, the Polisario insists that renewed clashes won’t simply function as retaliation for yet another Moroccan provocation; instead, they say, Morocco’s latest breach provoked a return to war that will continue until their country is liberated.
Still, it is doubtful that a new war will win the Sahrawis their rights. For one, Morocco’s sand berm consolidating its hold on the majority of the territory is fortified and—while vulnerable to shelling and to hit and run attacks—would be hard to penetrate for a sustained period. These external controls are dwarfed by Morocco’s tactics in Western Sahara: In the past, even nonviolent Sahrawi resistance—of peaceful protests, sit-ins, occupations, strikes, and boycotts—has been met with severe repression. Opportunities for dissent—much less sustained guerilla activity—are thus limited in Western Sahara, which Freedom House considers one of the dozen least free nations in the world, featuring (a lack of) rights on par with the dearth thereof in Tibet, Uzbekistan, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia.
Perhaps the Polisario hopes that resuming an armed struggle after 29 years of comparative quiet will push Western governments to finally pressure Morocco to compromise. Unfortunately, the tendency in Washington, Paris, and other Western capitals has been to regard any armed resistance against an allied Arab government as terrorism. Morocco has exploited this assumption, launching contradictory claims about the Polisario’s alleged ties to rivals like the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and Hezbollah—never mind that the secular and moderately leftist Polisario has nothing to do with extremist Islamist organizations. In this perverse sense, then, the Polisario’s resumption of guerrilla activity could actually increase foreign support for Morocco.
But bolstering Rabat would be counterproductive—and misguided. Though war is not the answer, neither is the continued occupation of Western Sahara. The failure of the international community to force Morocco to live up to its international legal obligations is what has led to the Western Saharan crisis in the first place. As is the case with the Israeli occupation of Palestine—and as was the case with the 24-year Indonesian occupation of East Timor—having friends on the U.N. Security Council has allowed Morocco to run roughshod under international legal norms.
For France—Morocco’s former colonial power alongside Spain—maintaining close political, strategic, and economic ties with the Moroccan monarchy has overridden any concerns regarding international law. Similarly, the United States, which considers Morocco as an important regional ally—first during the Cold War and now in the fight against Islamist extremists—has been similarly willing to overlook such legal and moral imperatives. The Polisario, meanwhile, has counted primarily on the support of countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia—which recognize the conflict in Western Sahara as an incomplete decolonization. Chief among these allies is neighboring Algeria, traditionally the Polisario’s primary supporter. Any burgeoning conflict in Western Sahara would not simply be a proxy war: The call for a return to war has been growing among both among Sahrawis under Moroccan occupation as well as refugees in Algeria, who have been waiting upwards of 45 years to return to their homeland.
But this is bad timing for Algeria, which would be loath to be dragged into a conflict with its Western-backed neighbor—at least right now. The semi-autocratic and increasingly unpopular regime in Algiers has been focused primarily on consolidating control in the face of mass domestic protests and shoring up the domestic economy during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen oil prices tank. As a result, Algeria would likely cooperate in efforts to end the fighting between Morocco and the Polisario, provided there was at least some hope of diplomatically moving Morocco toward accepting Sahrawis’ right to self-determination.
The chances of such a mutually satisfying diplomatic settlement, however, are slim. For years, French and U.S. veto threats on the U.N. Security Council have stymied efforts to place the issue of Western Sahara under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which would give the international community the power to impose sanctions or other appropriate leverage on Morocco to force the country to abide by the U.N. mandates it has to date disregarded.
Instead, the United States and France have endorsed a Moroccan “autonomy” plan for Western Sahara that is quite limited in scope and would fail to meet the international standard for autonomy. It does not allow the Sahrawis the option of independence—to which they are entitled as a U.N.-recognized non-self-governing territory according to international law, a series of U.N. resolutions, and a landmark World Court ruling. If the plan were to be imposed by the Security Council, as Washington and Paris are advocating, it would constitute the first time since the signing of the U.N. Charter that the international community recognized an incomplete decolonization and the expansion of a country’s territory by force—a grim milestone for the globe.
It was similar Western support for Indonesia that for many years prevented independence in East Timor. Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of the former Portuguese colony took place only six weeks after Morocco’s seizure of Western Sahara. Like Western Sahara, the takeover was seen as particular egregious, since it involved the invasion and brutal annexation of an entire country—the kind of aggression that prompted the 1991 U.N.-sanctioned Gulf War in response to Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait. But Indonesia’s move was not met by an accompanying resolution or staunch warning from the U.N. Security Council.
This flagrant double-standard led human-rights organizations, church groups, and a wide array of activists in the United States, Great Britain, and Australia to successfully pressure their governments to end their support for the occupation. As a result, the Indonesian government was finally willing to offer a referendum on independence. In 2000, the East Timorese voted for self-determination and the country is now free. It may take similar grassroots campaigns in Europe and North America to ensure that Western powers live up to their international legal obligations and pressure Morocco to allow the people of Western Sahara the right to determine their own destiny.
There is a small but growing movement in Europe supporting Western Sahara’s right to national self-determination, as well as some similar civil society initiatives in many African countries, Australia, Japan, and the United States. A growing focus on the issue of illegal exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara is providing proponents of international law and human rights a way to challenge governments and companies that illegally take advantage of the occupation, by targeting them through campaigns that advocate boycotts, divestment, and sanctions.
At this point, however, such movements are too small to have much impact on government policies, particularly those of France and the United States, which are the two governments most responsible for the failure of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions addressing the conflict. This can change, however: Twenty-five years ago, there was relatively little civil society activity in developed nations regarding East Timor, but a dramatic growth in such activism in the late 1990s—which came on the heels of widely publicized human-rights abuses by Indonesian forces—played an important role in making East Timor’s eventual independence possible.
A similar campaign may be the best hope for the people of Western Sahara—and the vitally important international legal principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. There may be an opening now, too, with the incoming Biden administration.
Neutrality is an inappropriate position in a dispute between the people of a non-self-governing territory demanding their right to self-determination and an occupying power denying them that right.
Following mixed signals from both the Trump and Obama administrations, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco, Edward M. Gabriel, sees a Biden administration returning to the “constructive relations” that Morocco enjoyed under the Bush and Clinton administrations, which amounts to a euphemistic endorsement of the Moroccan takeover. U.S. President-elect Joe Biden himself has indicated that he is neutral regarding Western Sahara. However, neutrality is an inappropriate position in a dispute between the people of a non-self-governing territory demanding their right to self-determination and an occupying power denying them that right. Meanwhile, Congress has been actively supporting the Moroccan conquest by insisting that U.S. foreign aid to Morocco “shall be made available for assistance for the Western Sahara,” as a way of undercutting State Department efforts to distinguish between Morocco and its occupied territory.
Despite this track record, a Biden government could be malleable to pressure. In order to ensure international law isn’t breached, Washington must first work for at the U.N. Security Council and provide a human-rights mandate like those of other peacekeeping operations to investigate and report on human-rights abuses in both the Moroccan-occupied zones and Polisario-run refugee camps. In the medium term, the United States should halt military aid, arms sales, and other military cooperation with Morocco, prohibit the import of any natural resources illegally extracted from Western Sahara, and work with Europeans and Africans to limit economic cooperation that supports the occupation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Biden should support any U.N. efforts to ensure that the Sahrawi people are allowed to participate in an internationally supervised referendum on the fate of the territory—one which actually includes the option of independence and, importantly, allows Sahrawi refugees in Algeria to participate.
Biden, who will arrive at the White House with a foreign-policy portfolio unrivaled by most of his predecessors, should understand the dangerous precedent that could be set by recognizing an incomplete decolonization. Continuing to do Morocco’s bidding at the U.N. would amount to an implicit endorsement of countries expanding their territory by force, a slap in the face for all who seek to promote—universally—the right to self-determination. The fate of Western Sahara is a rare issue that does not fall neatly along partisan lines, and senators ranging from Democrat Patrick Leahy to Republican James Inhofe have pushed successive U.S. administrations to support Sahrawi’s right to a referendum on independence. Biden has promised to work across the aisle, and Western Sahara may be the one area where it is actually feasible to do so.
The return to war in the deserts of Western Sahara is a tragedy. It could have been prevented—and it can finally be ended—if the United States and France live up to their obligations under the U.N. Charter and insist that their ally Morocco abide by well-established international legal norms. Washington must recognize the importance of upholding international legal norms, even if the violator is a U.S. ally. Failing to do so not only has the potential to prolong the bitter conflict in Western Sahara, but to upend the liberal global order in its entirety.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-09--Democracies Need a United Strategy Against China

The U.S.-led countries of the trans-Atlantic alliance and their democratic East Asian allies lack a strategy for dealing with their most formidable competitor : China .
But the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) has a strategy for dealing with these opponents .
Its goal affects everyone ’ s futures : The CCP wants an international order where it is the rule-maker , not a rule-taker .
Given the way Xi Jinping ’ s regime treats its own people , we should not assume that it will be more benevolent toward outsiders .
The CCP implements this strategy with decisive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appreciation of and means of exploiting foreign diplomatic , economic , political , and social weaknesses .
These “ sharp power ” tactics include censorship and manipulation of the information system , cyberoperations , leverage of trade and investment , propaganda , and military bluff and intimidation .
The United States and its allies , by contrast , lack leadership and goals .
Their approach has for years been based on the flawed assumption that globalization , prosperity , and technology make China more liberal .
They underestimated their own vulnerabilities .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
They prioritized short-term economic benefits over political and strategic considerations .
They underestimated the risks of other countries ’ engagement with the Chinese party-state .
They did not help victims of CCP aggression .
They let the CCP set the terms in which China is discussed , depicting criticism as unfounded , malevolent , or racist , and projecting a sense of inevitability .
China—so the message goes—will likely be the richest and most powerful country in the world by 2049 .
Get used to it .
Yet these other countries are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict of means .
It is a contest based on respective capabilities in willpower and coordination .
The CCP ’ s disciplined , long-term approach , imbued by Leninist principles of political warfare , has strengths but also weaknesses .
Its opponents ’ whole-of-government , whole-of-society , and whole-of-the-world responses are , potentially , far more creative , adaptable , and resilient than anything that China ’ s party-state can manage .
Solidarity and spontaneity are mystifying for those schooled in the CCP ’ s doctrinal approach to politics and human nature .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Western alliances are real , notably NATO , the most successful military alliance in recent history .
Allied democracies can bewilder , distract , and demoralize foes while reenergizing their own systems and institutions with a sense of purpose and shared mission .
This conflict is indeed real and daunting .
But it does not need to end in a military confrontation .
Nor need it—yet—end in defeat .
The world ’ s major democracies do not lack resources .
They lack the purpose , prioritization , and creativity to focus their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Most of all , they lack leadership .
The paradox here is that only the United States has the clout and stature to lead these countries ’ efforts to curb the CCP ’ s influence and channel China ’ s rise .
But the United States can not lead on its terms alone .
It needs alliances and allies , with relations based on compromise , dialogue , and mutual respect .
International leadership was the great failing of the Trump administration .
It grasped the CCP ’ s hegemonic ambitions—but its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to spurn allies and abandon battlefields .
Pulling out of the World Health Organization , for example , simply allowed China a still greater influence on global health policy .
That President Donald Trump termed the EU a “ foe ” gravely hampered a trans-Atlantic response to China .
This global anti-China alliance needs a strategy .
It would involve decisions about goals , leadership , alliances , and priorities .
It must feature new thinking , decisive leadership , and hard choices .
Humility will be helpful , both internally and toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledge the mistakes of their policy in past decades ( and centuries ) , and welcome China ’ s recovery from poverty and chaos .
The goal should not be to topple the CCP : The risk of confrontation and chaos is great .
Nor can they practice Cold War-style containment .
China is too big , too important , and too closely integrated into international supply chains and financial markets .
The aim should be to constrain China ’ s most harmful behavior .
The world ’ s wealthy democracies will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but they can aim for a China that they can safely live with .
Effective U.S. leadership carries costs .
“ America first ” can not be the rallying cry when other countries are being asked to make sacrifices in a common cause .
A united industrial policy on countering China ’ s near-monopolies in rare-earth processing or 5G technology , for example , should be designed not only with cost competitiveness in mind , but also to share the costs and benefits involved .
Initiatives abandoned by the Trump administration , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership , should be revisited , with less focus on free trade and harmonization of investment rules , and a greater focus on economic and digital governance .
Subgroupings such as the D-10 ( a proposed gathering of 10 leading democracies ) , the Three Seas Initiative ( which improves connectivity in Central and Eastern Europe ) , and the Five Eyes Plus intelligence and political-warfare groupings can all play a part .
The first priority is the preservation of political and cultural freedoms and the independence of democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the whole world to bite their tongues on issues it deems out of bounds , from genocide in Xinjiang to repression in Hong Kong .
That coercion has long been applied to the Chinese diaspora ; it is now embedded into the national security law in Hong Kong , which claims to apply to everyone , everywhere , and manifests in the threats wielded against Australia and others that attempt to stand up for the CCP .
Open societies should individually and collectively reject this overbearing claim and turn it to their advantage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , information , and economic systems is itself a deterrent .
Next is collective action against other CCP intimidation and influence operations , such as its focus on isolating Taiwan .
Joint symbolic and practical international action in support of the island democracy is not just a tactical win but a strategic one .
It counters the CCP ’ s projection of inevitability , and it strengthens the best counterexample to CCP propaganda : the existence of a free , prosperous , law-governed “ other China.
” The U.S.-led alliance needs well-resourced interagency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , against Chinese policy on internet regulation , fisheries , health , and space .
These issues have become the lowest priority of these countries ’ diplomatic efforts .
Instead , they should be the front line , attracting the most able staff , adequate funding , and high-level political attention .
Scrutiny of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation is too often at a boutique level .
It should be strategic .
Government agencies have a role to play here—but so too do civil society initiatives , once armed with greater expertise and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to improve its legislative , regulatory , and institutional toolkit .
Strategic use of counterintelligence capabilities offers great potential .
Public purchasing power can be used to penalize supply-chain fragility ( no contracts for companies that are overly dependent on China ) and to support alternative providers ( for example to Huawei in telecommunications systems ) .
Third , the world ’ s democracies need to puncture the climate of impunity .
The United Front Work Department runs China ’ s clandestine and avowed foreign influence operations .
Exposing and countering its efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all allied efforts .
Intimidatory behavior by United Front agents , for example , should bring firm , prompt responses .
Even a partial reaction—expelling an intelligence officer , canceling a trade deal , or withdrawing a broadcasting license—is better than none .
The broader and more unexpected the response , the better .
China ’ s opponents need to build their own “ united front ” : networks between countries and within them , across government , private sector , academic , civil society , and military silos , to enable and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s mischief and bullying .
Such action reduces its impact and its incidence .
These networks should involve individuals and institutions , instigated and sponsored by governments and civil society groups , accompanied by strong public messaging , cybersecurity , legal backup , and intensive support for soft-target individuals such as campaigners , critical academics , and investigative journalists , who are the prime target for CCP harassment .
Fourth , the U.S.-led alliance should exploit the CCP ’ s vulnerabilities , ranging from its shaky historical legitimacy to individuals in the ruling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other democracies , these states can integrate their cross-border criminal justice , intelligence , and financial regulatory efforts to expose corruption and influence-peddling in CCP weaponized infrastructure projects , for example .
Any decision-maker , anywhere in the world , who accepts a bribe from a CCP entity should fear the consequences .
So too should their banker , lawyer , accountant , and colleagues .
Fixing the democratic world ’ s corruption and influence-peddling enablers does not just deter China .
It also makes the system more efficient and more credible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voters .
The United States and its allies need to communicate to the Chinese people that their ire is not directed against the citizens but their leaders .
A global Chinese-language television channel supported by the world ’ s democracies is one avenue for this message .
Short-wave radio broadcasts are far harder to block than internet-based media and should be revived .
But the biggest target is Chinese living abroad .
Their media has been easy prey for the CCP , buying up and driving out independent and critical outlets .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is easier to compete—and to win .
Promoting the study of Chinese history and culture free of CCP control is another .
Highlighting global ties with Taiwan and support for Hong Kong dispels CCP propaganda tropes that criticism of China is based on racism .
They should also expand broadcasting and social media efforts aimed at Cantonese , Mongolian , Tibetan , and Uighur audiences .
Many of these tactics were strong capabilities when dealing with the Soviet empire during the Cold War .
They may seem long forgotten , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some cases the human expertise ) is not entirely gone .
It can be revived , adapted , and strengthened .
None of this comes free .
Political leaders will have to be honest with their voters .
Cheap stuff from China is costlier than it looks .
World leaders need to diversify supply chains , curb inward investment in strategic sectors , reduce technology transfer to China , accept the possibility of trade sanctions , and in some countries spend more on defense and security .
That will hurt output , jobs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not suffer these costs should help share the burden with those that do .
The paradox is that the more credibly they show that they are willing to accept these sacrifices , the less likely it is that they will actually have to make them .

The U.S.-led countries of the trans-Atlantic alliance and their democratic East Asian allies lack a strategy for dealing with their most formidable competitor: China. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for dealing with these opponents. Its goal affects everyone’s futures: The CCP wants an international order where it is the rule-maker, not a rule-taker. Given the way Xi Jinping’s regime treats its own people, we should not assume that it will be more benevolent toward outsiders.
The U.S.-led countries of the trans-Atlantic alliance and their democratic East Asian allies lack a strategy for dealing with their most formidable competitor: China. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for dealing with these opponents. Its goal affects everyone’s futures: The CCP wants an international order where it is the rule-maker, not a rule-taker. Given the way Xi Jinping’s regime treats its own people, we should not assume that it will be more benevolent toward outsiders.
The CCP implements this strategy with decisive leadership, as well as a clear-eyed appreciation of and means of exploiting foreign diplomatic, economic, political, and social weaknesses. These “sharp power” tactics include censorship and manipulation of the information system, cyberoperations, leverage of trade and investment, propaganda, and military bluff and intimidation.
The United States and its allies, by contrast, lack leadership and goals. Their approach has for years been based on the flawed assumption that globalization, prosperity, and technology make China more liberal. They underestimated their own vulnerabilities. They refrained from exploiting China’s weaknesses. They prioritized short-term economic benefits over political and strategic considerations. They underestimated the risks of other countries’ engagement with the Chinese party-state. They did not help victims of CCP aggression. They let the CCP set the terms in which China is discussed, depicting criticism as unfounded, malevolent, or racist, and projecting a sense of inevitability. China—so the message goes—will likely be the richest and most powerful country in the world by 2049. Get used to it.
Yet these other countries are not doomed. This is not a conflict of means. It is a contest based on respective capabilities in willpower and coordination. The CCP’s disciplined, long-term approach, imbued by Leninist principles of political warfare, has strengths but also weaknesses. Its opponents’ whole-of-government, whole-of-society, and whole-of-the-world responses are, potentially, far more creative, adaptable, and resilient than anything that China’s party-state can manage. Solidarity and spontaneity are mystifying for those schooled in the CCP’s doctrinal approach to politics and human nature. China has no allies, only clients. Western alliances are real, notably NATO, the most successful military alliance in recent history. Allied democracies can bewilder, distract, and demoralize foes while reenergizing their own systems and institutions with a sense of purpose and shared mission.
This conflict is indeed real and daunting. But it does not need to end in a military confrontation. Nor need it—yet—end in defeat.
The world’s major democracies do not lack resources. They lack the purpose, prioritization, and creativity to focus their resources in a meaningful and effective way. Most of all, they lack leadership. The paradox here is that only the United States has the clout and stature to lead these countries’ efforts to curb the CCP’s influence and channel China’s rise. But the United States cannot lead on its terms alone. It needs alliances and allies, with relations based on compromise, dialogue, and mutual respect.
International leadership was the great failing of the Trump administration. It grasped the CCP’s hegemonic ambitions—but its allergic reaction to foreign entanglements led it to spurn allies and abandon battlefields. Pulling out of the World Health Organization, for example, simply allowed China a still greater influence on global health policy. That President Donald Trump termed the EU a “foe” gravely hampered a trans-Atlantic response to China.
This global anti-China alliance needs a strategy. It would involve decisions about goals, leadership, alliances, and priorities. It must feature new thinking, decisive leadership, and hard choices. Humility will be helpful, both internally and toward the Chinese people. These countries should acknowledge the mistakes of their policy in past decades (and centuries), and welcome China’s recovery from poverty and chaos.
The goal should not be to topple the CCP: The risk of confrontation and chaos is great. Nor can they practice Cold War-style containment. China is too big, too important, and too closely integrated into international supply chains and financial markets. The aim should be to constrain China’s most harmful behavior. The world’s wealthy democracies will not necessarily get a China that they like, but they can aim for a China that they can safely live with.
Effective U.S. leadership carries costs. “America first” cannot be the rallying cry when other countries are being asked to make sacrifices in a common cause. A united industrial policy on countering China’s near-monopolies in rare-earth processing or 5G technology, for example, should be designed not only with cost competitiveness in mind, but also to share the costs and benefits involved.
Initiatives abandoned by the Trump administration, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, should be revisited, with less focus on free trade and harmonization of investment rules, and a greater focus on economic and digital governance. Subgroupings such as the D-10 (a proposed gathering of 10 leading democracies), the Three Seas Initiative (which improves connectivity in Central and Eastern Europe), and the Five Eyes Plus intelligence and political-warfare groupings can all play a part.
The first priority is the preservation of political and cultural freedoms and the independence of democratic legal systems. The Chinese party-state expects the whole world to bite their tongues on issues it deems out of bounds, from genocide in Xinjiang to repression in Hong Kong. That coercion has long been applied to the Chinese diaspora; it is now embedded into the national security law in Hong Kong, which claims to apply to everyone, everywhere, and manifests in the threats wielded against Australia and others that attempt to stand up for the CCP. Open societies should individually and collectively reject this overbearing claim and turn it to their advantage. Resilience in these countries’ political, information, and economic systems is itself a deterrent.
Next is collective action against other CCP intimidation and influence operations, such as its focus on isolating Taiwan. Joint symbolic and practical international action in support of the island democracy is not just a tactical win but a strategic one. It counters the CCP’s projection of inevitability, and it strengthens the best counterexample to CCP propaganda: the existence of a free, prosperous, law-governed “other China.”
The U.S.-led alliance needs well-resourced interagency efforts to push back, for example, against Chinese policy on internet regulation, fisheries, health, and space. These issues have become the lowest priority of these countries’ diplomatic efforts. Instead, they should be the front line, attracting the most able staff, adequate funding, and high-level political attention. Scrutiny of the mechanics of Chinese manipulation is too often at a boutique level. It should be strategic. Government agencies have a role to play here—but so too do civil society initiatives, once armed with greater expertise and focus.
This anti-China alliance also needs to improve its legislative, regulatory, and institutional toolkit. Strategic use of counterintelligence capabilities offers great potential. Public purchasing power can be used to penalize supply-chain fragility (no contracts for companies that are overly dependent on China) and to support alternative providers (for example to Huawei in telecommunications systems).
Third, the world’s democracies need to puncture the climate of impunity. The United Front Work Department runs China’s clandestine and avowed foreign influence operations. Exposing and countering its efforts should be the central tactical goal of all allied efforts.
Intimidatory behavior by United Front agents, for example, should bring firm, prompt responses. Even a partial reaction—expelling an intelligence officer, canceling a trade deal, or withdrawing a broadcasting license—is better than none. The broader and more unexpected the response, the better. China’s opponents need to build their own “united front”: networks between countries and within them, across government, private sector, academic, civil society, and military silos, to enable and ensure collective action against the party-state’s mischief and bullying. Such action reduces its impact and its incidence. These networks should involve individuals and institutions, instigated and sponsored by governments and civil society groups, accompanied by strong public messaging, cybersecurity, legal backup, and intensive support for soft-target individuals such as campaigners, critical academics, and investigative journalists, who are the prime target for CCP harassment.
Fourth, the U.S.-led alliance should exploit the CCP’s vulnerabilities, ranging from its shaky historical legitimacy to individuals in the ruling caste with personal ties to Western countries and other democracies, these states can integrate their cross-border criminal justice, intelligence, and financial regulatory efforts to expose corruption and influence-peddling in CCP weaponized infrastructure projects, for example. Any decision-maker, anywhere in the world, who accepts a bribe from a CCP entity should fear the consequences. So too should their banker, lawyer, accountant, and colleagues. Fixing the democratic world’s corruption and influence-peddling enablers does not just deter China. It also makes the system more efficient and more credible in the eyes of these countries’ voters.
The United States and its allies need to communicate to the Chinese people that their ire is not directed against the citizens but their leaders. A global Chinese-language television channel supported by the world’s democracies is one avenue for this message. Short-wave radio broadcasts are far harder to block than internet-based media and should be revived. But the biggest target is Chinese living abroad. Their media has been easy prey for the CCP, buying up and driving out independent and critical outlets. On this, democratic countries’ home turf, it is easier to compete—and to win. Promoting the study of Chinese history and culture free of CCP control is another. Highlighting global ties with Taiwan and support for Hong Kong dispels CCP propaganda tropes that criticism of China is based on racism. They should also expand broadcasting and social media efforts aimed at Cantonese, Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur audiences.
Many of these tactics were strong capabilities when dealing with the Soviet empire during the Cold War. They may seem long forgotten, but the institutional muscle memory (and in some cases the human expertise) is not entirely gone. It can be revived, adapted, and strengthened.
None of this comes free. Political leaders will have to be honest with their voters. Cheap stuff from China is costlier than it looks. World leaders need to diversify supply chains, curb inward investment in strategic sectors, reduce technology transfer to China, accept the possibility of trade sanctions, and in some countries spend more on defense and security. That will hurt output, jobs, and incomes.
Countries that do not suffer these costs should help share the burden with those that do. The paradox is that the more credibly they show that they are willing to accept these sacrifices, the less likely it is that they will actually have to make them.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--How to Kick-Start a New Trans-Atlantic Era

How to Kick-Start a New Trans-Atlantic Era Go through the alternatives and anyone can see : No other pair on the international stage can match the partnership between the European Union and the United States .
Neither Europe nor America will find a major partner that is more aligned and more powerful .
After a rocky four years , it is time for a fresh start .
The election of Joe Biden as U.S. president gives us the chance to make it happen .
This does not mean we will always agree or that we have identical interests .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump , and it will not be under Biden .
What we do have is an enduring partnership , based on shared values and decades of experience of working together .
The past four years have been difficult .
And there are underlying reasons—demographic , economic , and political—why the historical trajectory of the United States and Europe could well diverge .
But we appreciate that at least for the next four years there will be a U.S. president who believes in partnership with democratic allies .
And we don ’ t just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognize its necessity .
As the EU ’ s high representative for foreign affairs , my message is clear : Europe wants to make the most of this opportunity .
And we come not just with wishes and demands , but also with offerings .
There is much to repair and even more to build together .
Both the United States and the EU struggle with polarization and societal divisions at home .
Abroad , we see autocrats and other political disruptors undermining regional security and global order .
We have a pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a European neighborhood in flames , and fierce competition over who will write the rules of the digital age .
What is striking is that our capacity to find solutions has not kept pace with the speed and scope of change .
Time , in politics , is relative .
As in physics , it depends on your own speed : If the world is changing faster than your capacity to cope , then in relative terms you go backward .
This we can not afford .
President-elect Biden has underlined the key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the United States and the EU .
Europe has its own ideas for an ambitious trans-Atlantic agenda .
Now we need to translate the positive mood into concrete action .
To this end , the European Commission has proposed a “ New EU-US Agenda for Global Change ” with joint action to focus on COVID-19 , the recovery , climate change , technology , trade and standards , and strengthening democracy around the world .
EU foreign ministers discussed the future of EU-U.S. relations at their meeting on Dec. 7 and collectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda that covers the full policy spectrum .
For now , I want to focus on foreign and security policy and underline three points .
First , the U.S. role in European security is indispensable .
At the same time , we Europeans need to look more after our own security .
Hence , we are fully engaged to strengthen European defense capabilities and our operational engagement .
We have today 17 crisis management operations and missions from the Western Balkans , to Ukraine , to the Sahel and beyond .
And we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into acquiring the capabilities we need .
It is a distraction to debate—mostly in abstract terms—whether we should go either “ European ” or “ trans-Atlantic , ” when these are clearly flip sides of the same coin .
This is also why we should continue with our work on strategic autonomy : A strong and capable Europe is not a rival to the trans-Atlantic alliance but a precondition for it .
We need concrete steps both to enhance our capacity to act and to become more resilient in strategic domains .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bed and focus on the substance .
When it comes to European security , we will need to act together , to bring the whole Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic structures ; support Ukrainian sovereignty and reform ; develop a robust and consistent approach to Russia ; and prevent a further drifting away by Turkey .
In all these cases , I see a compelling need for the EU and the United States to work in lockstep , because we can only succeed if we act together .
Additionally , on its periphery Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and tensions , for example in the Sahel , in Libya , and in the Eastern Mediterranean .
In those three cases , Europe must be ready to take the lead , as these problems concern Europe more directly than the United States .
Secondly , we know that the rise and growing assertiveness of China and the related competition with the United States will shape the global landscape .
Some of the challenges that China represents we should discuss together even if we will not always agree , from persistent asymmetries on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 5G , to Beijing ’ s attempts to push for rival standards in multilateral organizations and weaken collective action on human rights .
The new EU-U.S. dialogue on China will provide a key mechanism for advancing our interests and managing our differences .
The EU is ready to engage and work for a balanced approach , combining areas of cooperation with China such as climate change where its role as the world ’ s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide is essential , with pushback where needed .
We see China , depending on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , a competitor , and a systemic rival .
We are clear that with the United States we share a democratic political system , based on fundamental values .
This means that we are not equidistant between the United States and China .
At the same time , the depth of Europe ’ s trade and investment links with China is such that we have no interest in a strategy of decoupling .
All this should be combined with an active EU approach to the wider Indo-Pacific region working with democratic partners in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ features of EU policymaking in and with Asia has been the strengthening of ties with Japan ( including the Economic Partnership Agreement last year , linking two of the world ’ s largest economies ) ; with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( including the launch of a formal strategic partnership this month , overcoming the impasse on palm oil ) ; and with India , South Korea , Australia and New Zealand .
Indeed , many like-minded partners tell us they want to see more EU engagement .
Like us , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open and rules-based , avoiding closed blocs and binary choices .
Thirdly , we need to find a way for the United States to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and for Iran to come back into full compliance .
The nuclear deal still stands as a landmark of successful diplomacy .
We have worked hard to preserve it , and it has delivered clear benefits .
Thanks to the agreement , the Iranian nuclear program is still far below the level before the pact was agreed .
But the nuclear deal has clearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the United States dramatically reduced the expected economic benefits for Iran , which is why the deal could never develop its full potential .
The EU and the United States should prioritize ways to ensure the deal is fully implemented by all , thus also rebuilding trust among all .
Once this is achieved , we must be ready to build on this success and find ways to address further regional security concerns .
I am convinced that the only long-term solution for the chronic instability is a regional solution .
Of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issues and priorities .
But let us focus on these three , using them to kick-start the engine of trans-Atlantic cooperation .
The further we go , the more ambitious we can become .

Go through the alternatives and anyone can see: No other pair on the international stage can match the partnership between the European Union and the United States. Neither Europe nor America will find a major partner that is more aligned and more powerful. After a rocky four years, it is time for a fresh start. The election of Joe Biden as U.S. president gives us the chance to make it happen.
Go through the alternatives and anyone can see: No other pair on the international stage can match the partnership between the European Union and the United States. Neither Europe nor America will find a major partner that is more aligned and more powerful. After a rocky four years, it is time for a fresh start. The election of Joe Biden as U.S. president gives us the chance to make it happen.
This does not mean we will always agree or that we have identical interests. That was not the case before President Donald Trump, and it will not be under Biden. What we do have is an enduring partnership, based on shared values and decades of experience of working together. The past four years have been difficult. And there are underlying reasons—demographic, economic, and political—why the historical trajectory of the United States and Europe could well diverge.
But we appreciate that at least for the next four years there will be a U.S. president who believes in partnership with democratic allies. And we don’t just feel appreciation for this restoration; we recognize its necessity. As the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, my message is clear: Europe wants to make the most of this opportunity. And we come not just with wishes and demands, but also with offerings.
There is much to repair and even more to build together. Both the United States and the EU struggle with polarization and societal divisions at home. Abroad, we see autocrats and other political disruptors undermining regional security and global order. We have a pandemic raging, a global climate crisis, a European neighborhood in flames, and fierce competition over who will write the rules of the digital age.
What is striking is that our capacity to find solutions has not kept pace with the speed and scope of change. Time, in politics, is relative. As in physics, it depends on your own speed: If the world is changing faster than your capacity to cope, then in relative terms you go backward. This we cannot afford.
President-elect Biden has underlined the key role he sees for a close partnership between the United States and the EU. Europe has its own ideas for an ambitious trans-Atlantic agenda. Now we need to translate the positive mood into concrete action. To this end, the European Commission has proposed a “New EU-US Agenda for Global Change” with joint action to focus on COVID-19, the recovery, climate change, technology, trade and standards, and strengthening democracy around the world. EU foreign ministers discussed the future of EU-U.S. relations at their meeting on Dec. 7 and collectively underlined their desire for a scaled-up common agenda that covers the full policy spectrum.
For now, I want to focus on foreign and security policy and underline three points.
First, the U.S. role in European security is indispensable. At the same time, we Europeans need to look more after our own security. Hence, we are fully engaged to strengthen European defense capabilities and our operational engagement. We have today 17 crisis management operations and missions from the Western Balkans, to Ukraine, to the Sahel and beyond. And we are investing through various EU defense initiatives into acquiring the capabilities we need.
It is a distraction to debate—mostly in abstract terms—whether we should go either “European” or “trans-Atlantic,” when these are clearly flip sides of the same coin. This is also why we should continue with our work on strategic autonomy: A strong and capable Europe is not a rival to the trans-Atlantic alliance but a precondition for it. We need concrete steps both to enhance our capacity to act and to become more resilient in strategic domains.
So let’s put abstract debates to bed and focus on the substance. When it comes to European security, we will need to act together, to bring the whole Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic structures; support Ukrainian sovereignty and reform; develop a robust and consistent approach to Russia; and prevent a further drifting away by Turkey. In all these cases, I see a compelling need for the EU and the United States to work in lockstep, because we can only succeed if we act together.
Additionally, on its periphery Europe is also facing a number of conflicts and tensions, for example in the Sahel, in Libya, and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In those three cases, Europe must be ready to take the lead, as these problems concern Europe more directly than the United States.
Secondly, we know that the rise and growing assertiveness of China and the related competition with the United States will shape the global landscape. Some of the challenges that China represents we should discuss together even if we will not always agree, from persistent asymmetries on market access, to legitimate questions about 5G, to Beijing’s attempts to push for rival standards in multilateral organizations and weaken collective action on human rights. The new EU-U.S. dialogue on China will provide a key mechanism for advancing our interests and managing our differences.
The EU is ready to engage and work for a balanced approach, combining areas of cooperation with China such as climate change where its role as the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide is essential, with pushback where needed. We see China, depending on the policy area, as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. We are clear that with the United States we share a democratic political system, based on fundamental values. This means that we are not equidistant between the United States and China. At the same time, the depth of Europe’s trade and investment links with China is such that we have no interest in a strategy of decoupling.
All this should be combined with an active EU approach to the wider Indo-Pacific region working with democratic partners in Asia. One of the most prominent features of EU policymaking in and with Asia has been the strengthening of ties with Japan (including the Economic Partnership Agreement last year, linking two of the world’s largest economies); with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (including the launch of a formal strategic partnership this month, overcoming the impasse on palm oil); and with India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, many like-minded partners tell us they want to see more EU engagement. Like us, they want to keep the regional order open and rules-based, avoiding closed blocs and binary choices.
Thirdly, we need to find a way for the United States to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal and for Iran to come back into full compliance. The nuclear deal still stands as a landmark of successful diplomacy. We have worked hard to preserve it, and it has delivered clear benefits. Thanks to the agreement, the Iranian nuclear program is still far below the level before the pact was agreed. But the nuclear deal has clearly come under enormous pressure. The departure of the United States dramatically reduced the expected economic benefits for Iran, which is why the deal could never develop its full potential. The EU and the United States should prioritize ways to ensure the deal is fully implemented by all, thus also rebuilding trust among all. Once this is achieved, we must be ready to build on this success and find ways to address further regional security concerns. I am convinced that the only long-term solution for the chronic instability is a regional solution.
Of course, there are many other foreign-policy issues and priorities. But let us focus on these three, using them to kick-start the engine of trans-Atlantic cooperation. The further we go, the more ambitious we can become.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--Is Argentina About to Legalize Abortion?

Is Argentina About to Legalize Abortion ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Argentina considers an abortion legalization measure , the European Council meets as the Brexit negotiating deadline is pushed to Sunday , and President-elect Biden names Katherine Tai as U.S. Trade Representative .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Lawmakers in Argentina will consider legislation today on whether to legalize abortion as President Alberto Fernández attempts to make good on a campaign promise .
Abortion is a fraught issue in the country and in Latin America in general , where only two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take place without extenuating circumstances such as rape and danger to the mother being considered .
Nevertheless , activists in Mexico , Chile , and Colombia are also pushing for greater abortion access .
That today ’ s bill has been presented by the president shows how far Argentina has come on the issue in such a short time .
An abortion bill failed in the country ’ s Senate in 2018 in a 38-31 vote .
Back then it did not receive support from then-President Mauricio Macri , who nevertheless said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A promise kept ?
Fernández made abortion rights a key part of his inaugural address in March , and promised to send a bill to legislators within days—only for the coronavirus pandemic to derail his agenda .
Argentina ’ s pro-abortion grassroots movement , identifiable by its members ’ green handkerchiefs , has continued to push Fernández on the issue , culminating in today ’ s vote .
Public outrage .
Although there is a strong anti-abortion movement in the largely Catholic country , shocking headlines have crystallized the debate and it has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as Ana Ionova reported in Foreign Policy last year .
In February 2019 , the case of an 11-year-old girl who gave birth via C-section after she had been raped caused outrage .
The girl had asked for an abortion but her procedure was repeatedly delayed as authorities attempted to identify the girl ’ s guardian .
If today ’ s vote is successful , the bill will head to the Senate where supporters will be hoping that history does not repeat itself .
A report in the Guardian says that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon as next week.
” The abortion doctor .
Back in 2016 , FP profiled Germán Cardoso , an Argentinian gynecologist who for years has defied the country ’ s abortion laws , offering abortions to any woman who seeks one in his hometown of Tandil .
“ Women are going to have abortions , ” Cardoso said .
“ If a doctor doesn ’ t do it , someone else is going to.
” European Council meets as Brexit deadline pushed back .
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a deal on fisheries or other outstanding disputes while dining on a symbolic menu of scallops and turbot last night in Brussels .
They agreed that EU and British negotiators could hold further talks until Sunday , the final deadline to reach a deal on the United Kingdom ’ s post-Brexit relationship with the EU .
Von der Leyen will brief European Union heads of state and government on the issue at a European Council meeting today .
With the prospect of a no-deal outcome becoming more likely , the commission is set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will prepare for the new landscape on Jan. 1 .
Akufo-Addo reelected .
Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo prevailed in a tight election contest against his predecessor John Mahama , according to official results .
Akufo-Addo , won with 51.6 percent of the vote , while Mahama took 47.4 percent .
Although the election was largely peaceful , police reported five deaths and multiple people injured in election related violence .
Biden chooses Tai as USTR .
President-elect Joe Biden has named Katherine Tai , the top Democratic trade counsel on the House Ways @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Trade Representative , according to reports .
A longtime Democratic staffer , Tai speaks fluent Mandarin and brought several trade disputes against China before the World Trade Organization during her time in the Obama administration .
FDA meets on Pfizer vaccine .
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration hosts a public meeting today to discuss whether to approve the Pfizer-BioNTech coronavirus vaccine .
The meeting comes as Canada approved the vaccine on Wednesday , and as the United Kingdom enters its third day of a nationwide vaccine rollout .
Even if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to take it may be an uphill battle .
An AP-NORC poll found that although 47 percent of those polled said they would get vaccinated , 26 percent said they wouldn ’ t .
Black respondents scored highest in their rejection of the vaccine , with 40 percent saying they would not take one .
Capriles advises opposition to move on .
Venezuelan opposition figure Henrique Capriles has called on the Venezuela ’ s interim government led by Juan Guaidó to abandon its plan to continue as an organized force following legislative elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition parties largely boycotted the vote , allowing the ruling Socialist party to win easily .
Capriles , who twice ran for president , said the opposition plan to assert their legitimacy even after its five year term expires on Jan. 5 sets a dangerous example that could provide an opening for President Nicolás Maduro .
“ It ’ s a very complicated precedent for the future , because we open the door to Maduro saying that he will extend his government without holding an election , ” Capriles told the BBC .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlined her dilemma to Reuters .
“ I ’ m unlikely to not be able to drink for 80 days and I reckon the stress on the body of giving up alcohol , especially during what is a festive period , would be worse than the ( side effects of the ) vaccine and its alleged benefits , ” she said .
Russia sits behind France as the country with the fifth highest alcohol consumption per capita , according to World Health Organization figures .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Argentina considers an abortion legalization measure, the European Council meets as the Brexit negotiating deadline is pushed to Sunday, and President-elect Biden names Katherine Tai as U.S. Trade Representative.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Argentina considers an abortion legalization measure, the European Council meets as the Brexit negotiating deadline is pushed to Sunday, and President-elect Biden names Katherine Tai as U.S. Trade Representative.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Lawmakers in Argentina Consider Historic Abortion Bill
Lawmakers in Argentina will consider legislation today on whether to legalize abortion as President Alberto Fernández attempts to make good on a campaign promise.
Abortion is a fraught issue in the country and in Latin America in general, where only two other countries—Cuba and Uruguay—currently allow abortions to take place without extenuating circumstances such as rape and danger to the mother being considered. Nevertheless, activists in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia are also pushing for greater abortion access.
That today’s bill has been presented by the president shows how far Argentina has come on the issue in such a short time. An abortion bill failed in the country’s Senate in 2018 in a 38-31 vote. Back then it did not receive support from then-President Mauricio Macri, who nevertheless said he would have signed such a bill.
A promise kept? Fernández made abortion rights a key part of his inaugural address in March, and promised to send a bill to legislators within days—only for the coronavirus pandemic to derail his agenda. Argentina’s pro-abortion grassroots movement, identifiable by its members’ green handkerchiefs, has continued to push Fernández on the issue, culminating in today’s vote.
Public outrage. Although there is a strong anti-abortion movement in the largely Catholic country, shocking headlines have crystallized the debate and it has become a major issue for young voters, as Ana Ionova reported in Foreign Policy last year. In February 2019, the case of an 11-year-old girl who gave birth via C-section after she had been raped caused outrage. The girl had asked for an abortion but her procedure was repeatedly delayed as authorities attempted to identify the girl’s guardian.
If today’s vote is successful, the bill will head to the Senate where supporters will be hoping that history does not repeat itself. A report in the Guardian says that the senate could pass the bill “as soon as next week.”
The abortion doctor. Back in 2016, FP profiled Germán Cardoso, an Argentinian gynecologist who for years has defied the country’s abortion laws, offering abortions to any woman who seeks one in his hometown of Tandil. “Women are going to have abortions,” Cardoso said. “If a doctor doesn’t do it, someone else is going to.”
What We’re Following Today European Council meets as Brexit deadline pushed back. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson did not reach a deal on fisheries or other outstanding disputes while dining on a symbolic menu of scallops and turbot last night in Brussels. They agreed that EU and British negotiators could hold further talks until Sunday, the final deadline to reach a deal on the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU. Von der Leyen will brief European Union heads of state and government on the issue at a European Council meeting today. With the prospect of a no-deal outcome becoming more likely, the commission is set to release plans on how the bloc will prepare for the new landscape on Jan. 1.
Akufo-Addo reelected. Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo prevailed in a tight election contest against his predecessor John Mahama, according to official results. Akufo-Addo, won with 51.6 percent of the vote, while Mahama took 47.4 percent. Although the election was largely peaceful, police reported five deaths and multiple people injured in election related violence.
Biden chooses Tai as USTR. President-elect Joe Biden has named Katherine Tai, the top Democratic trade counsel on the House Ways and Means Committee to serve as the U.S. Trade Representative, according to reports. A longtime Democratic staffer, Tai speaks fluent Mandarin and brought several trade disputes against China before the World Trade Organization during her time in the Obama administration.
Keep an Eye On FDA meets on Pfizer vaccine. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration hosts a public meeting today to discuss whether to approve the Pfizer-BioNTech coronavirus vaccine. The meeting comes as Canada approved the vaccine on Wednesday, and as the United Kingdom enters its third day of a nationwide vaccine rollout. Even if the vaccine gets approved, getting enough Americans to take it may be an uphill battle. An AP-NORC poll found that although 47 percent of those polled said they would get vaccinated, 26 percent said they wouldn’t. Black respondents scored highest in their rejection of the vaccine, with 40 percent saying they would not take one.
Capriles advises opposition to move on. Venezuelan opposition figure Henrique Capriles has called on the Venezuela’s interim government led by Juan Guaidó to abandon its plan to continue as an organized force following legislative elections earlier this month. Venezuela’s opposition parties largely boycotted the vote, allowing the ruling Socialist party to win easily. Capriles, who twice ran for president, said the opposition plan to assert their legitimacy even after its five year term expires on Jan. 5 sets a dangerous example that could provide an opening for President Nicolás Maduro. “It’s a very complicated precedent for the future, because we open the door to Maduro saying that he will extend his government without holding an election,” Capriles told the BBC.
Odds and Ends Stoli or Sputnik? Some Russians will have to choose between their habit and their health after a Russian official issued a warning on mixing alcohol consumption with the Sputnik coronavirus vaccine. Anna Popova, Russia’s top consumer health watchdog has advised those receiving the vaccine to refrain from drinking 14 days before getting their first shot, and to continue abstaining for 42 days after the final jab. Popova’s comments prompted pushback from the vaccine’s developer, who countered that a dry period three days before and after the jabs was sufficient.
Elena Kriven, a Moscow resident, outlined her dilemma to Reuters. “I’m unlikely to not be able to drink for 80 days and I reckon the stress on the body of giving up alcohol, especially during what is a festive period, would be worse than the (side effects of the) vaccine and its alleged benefits,” she said. Russia sits behind France as the country with the fifth highest alcohol consumption per capita, according to World Health Organization figures.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-10--Why India Is Witnessing Its Biggest Protests in History

Why India Is Witnessing Its Biggest Protests in History Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief .
Today : Why India ’ s farmers are protesting , Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality , and Twitter stirs controversy in India .
Before we get to the news , a personal note : Readers , this is my final South Asia Brief .
Right before Thanksgiving , I was named FP ’ s new editor in chief .
In my new role , I plan to write more broadly for FP and have decided to pass on this newsletter to another writer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If you know someone who could be a good fit , the job posting is here or you can email me at ravi.agrawal @ foreignpolicy.com .
Although I now live in New York , writing this newsletter has been a nice way to stay in touch with news and trends from across South Asia , my old stomping grounds .
Thanks for your time and feedback , and I hope you ’ ll keep reading as this newsletter evolves with a new writer in 2021 .
I also encourage you to subscribe to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rupee rates for readers in India . )
For more than two weeks , tens of thousands of Indian farmers have camped out around New Delhi to protest a set of farm bills passed by the country ’ s parliament in September .
Thousands more from the neighboring states of Haryana , Punjab , and Uttar Pradesh look set to join in the coming days , even as police try to block them from entering the city .
The protests are not an isolated movement .
On Nov. 26 , an estimated 250 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strike held to challenge the new laws .
The magnitude of the protests should not be a surprise : Agriculture employs about half of the Indian workforce , although it accounts for only one-sixth of India ’ s GDP .
What ’ s at stake ?
So far , Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government are holding firm against the protesters , arguing that the new laws will give farmers more autonomy , allow better marketing , and remove regulatory barriers .
To some extent , the government has a point @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India needs to reform its archaic farm sector , where middlemen drive up prices , slow down supply chains , and contribute to food wastage .
Most Indian farmers operate with just a few acres of land , unable to afford the mechanization and efficiencies of scale common in developed economies .
But India ’ s millions of farmers are clearly angry .
They believe the new rules will open them up to exploitation by giant companies .
And as Barkha Dutt writes in the Washington Post , there is broad national sympathy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ force of the Indian farmer can not be underestimated , ” she argues , describing scenes of elderly protesters spreading blankets under the wheels of their trucks to sleep in the cold of winter .
“ There is subliminal collective guilt at the sight of farmers.
” What it means for Modi .
Whether or not the farm reforms were essential or economically viable seems to be a question for another time .
( Follow Foreign Policy this weekend for more on this by Sumit Ganguly and Surupa Gupta . )
For now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi may have made a political miscalculation .
Not only were the reforms passed quickly in September without referral to a parliamentary panel , but they also came amid India ’ s botched response to the coronavirus pandemic , with most people busy with other issues .
At least some of the anger of the protest movement likely stems from this lack of consultation or debate .
Modi has gotten away with other big , bold decisions with little care for democratic decision-making .
In 2016 , he announced the sudden demonetization of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country ’ s markets .
Last year , New Delhi ’ s abrogation of Kashmir ’ s special status caught the country by surprise .
And in February , Modi announced a sudden lockdown—one of the strictest in the world—that left millions of migrant workers no choice but to journey on foot from the cities to their homes in far-off villages .
However , none of these shocks to India ’ s system ended up hurting Modi ’ s reputation .
If anything , the public mood seems to support a decisive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strength of the sustained farmers ’ protests present a serious challenge for Modi ?
It ’ s difficult to tell .
Controversies—and even mistakes—don ’ t seem to hurt India ’ s prime minister .
Until the day they do .
ISIS claims killing of female TV presenter .
The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the targeted killing of Malalai Maiwand , a presenter at Enikas Radio and TV in Nangarhar , Afghanistan , on Thursday .
Maiwand ’ s death highlights a worrying trend of increased terrorist activity in the region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a count by Reuters , 10 media workers have been killed in Afghanistan this year .
Maiwand was only 25 years old .
Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality .
A joint session of Bhutan ’ s two houses of parliament approved a bill today to legalize gay sex .
All 63 members of parliament present voted in favor of the bill .
The changes still need to be approved by the country ’ s king , but that is seen as a formality .
Bhutan ’ s move comes just two years after India made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prohibition on gay sex .
Rights groups voice concerns over Rohingya resettlement .
The United Nations says it has been denied access to Bhasan Char , a remote and flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal to which Bangladesh moved 1,600 Rohingya refugees last week .
The U.N. ’ s call for a safety assessment of the island comes amid concerns from the United States over whether the relocations were voluntary or forced .
Twitter controversy .
It ’ s been a mixed week for Twitter in South Asia .
Last Sunday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amitav Ghosh expressed alarm over Twitter ’ s suspension of writer and activist Salil Tripathi .
A fringe right-wing Hindu outfit called the Deshi Army claimed victory for the suspension , but it was unclear why exactly the decision was made .
Tripathi , who wrote an essay for FP last month called “ Why India Has Become a Different Country , ” told me that Twitter later asked him to remove a personal list of muted users that he maintained .
Tripathi is now back on Twitter .
The surprising aspect of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a well-known advocate of human rights and free speech , even as abusive trolls often swarm the social media platform .
Meanwhile , Twitter flagged a post by politician Amit Malviya as “ manipulated content , ” marking the first time it had targeted a prominent member of Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party .
Gitanjali Rao , a 15-year-old Indian American inventor , landed on the cover of Time magazine last week as its first ever Kid of the Year .
Rao has invented a device that identifies contaminations in drinking water @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imagine being a South Asian teenager right now .
On the one hand , there ’ s the obvious pride and sense of representation at seeing a young brown girl on the most recognizable cover on earth .
But on the other hand , imagine all the parents going , “ See ?
Instead of those video games , this is what you could be doing !
” I ’ m excited to see what Rao does next .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief. Today: Why India’s farmers are protesting, Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality, and Twitter stirs controversy in India.
Before we get to the news, a personal note: Readers, this is my final South Asia Brief. Right before Thanksgiving, I was named FP’s new editor in chief. In my new role, I plan to write more broadly for FP and have decided to pass on this newsletter to another writer, preferably based in the region.
If you know someone who could be a good fit, the job posting is here or you can email me at ravi.agrawal@foreignpolicy.com. Although I now live in New York, writing this newsletter has been a nice way to stay in touch with news and trends from across South Asia, my old stomping grounds. Thanks for your time and feedback, and I hope you’ll keep reading as this newsletter evolves with a new writer in 2021.
I also encourage you to subscribe to Foreign Policy. (We have special rupee rates for readers in India.)
Why India’s Farmers Are Protesting
For more than two weeks, tens of thousands of Indian farmers have camped out around New Delhi to protest a set of farm bills passed by the country’s parliament in September. Thousands more from the neighboring states of Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh look set to join in the coming days, even as police try to block them from entering the city.
The protests are not an isolated movement. On Nov. 26, an estimated 250 million citizens participated in a 24-hour general strike held to challenge the new laws. The magnitude of the protests should not be a surprise: Agriculture employs about half of the Indian workforce, although it accounts for only one-sixth of India’s GDP.
What’s at stake? So far, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government are holding firm against the protesters, arguing that the new laws will give farmers more autonomy, allow better marketing, and remove regulatory barriers. To some extent, the government has a point. Economists have long pointed out that India needs to reform its archaic farm sector, where middlemen drive up prices, slow down supply chains, and contribute to food wastage. Most Indian farmers operate with just a few acres of land, unable to afford the mechanization and efficiencies of scale common in developed economies.
But India’s millions of farmers are clearly angry. They believe the new rules will open them up to exploitation by giant companies. And as Barkha Dutt writes in the Washington Post, there is broad national sympathy for the protests. “The moral force of the Indian farmer cannot be underestimated,” she argues, describing scenes of elderly protesters spreading blankets under the wheels of their trucks to sleep in the cold of winter. “There is subliminal collective guilt at the sight of farmers.”
What it means for Modi. Whether or not the farm reforms were essential or economically viable seems to be a question for another time. (Follow Foreign Policy this weekend for more on this by Sumit Ganguly and Surupa Gupta.) For now, what is clear is that New Delhi may have made a political miscalculation.
Not only were the reforms passed quickly in September without referral to a parliamentary panel, but they also came amid India’s botched response to the coronavirus pandemic, with most people busy with other issues. At least some of the anger of the protest movement likely stems from this lack of consultation or debate.
Modi has gotten away with other big, bold decisions with little care for democratic decision-making. In 2016, he announced the sudden demonetization of the Indian rupee, wreaking havoc on the country’s markets. Last year, New Delhi’s abrogation of Kashmir’s special status caught the country by surprise. And in February, Modi announced a sudden lockdown—one of the strictest in the world—that left millions of migrant workers no choice but to journey on foot from the cities to their homes in far-off villages.
However, none of these shocks to India’s system ended up hurting Modi’s reputation. If anything, the public mood seems to support a decisive, strongman leader. Will the sheer strength of the sustained farmers’ protests present a serious challenge for Modi? It’s difficult to tell. Controversies—and even mistakes—don’t seem to hurt India’s prime minister. Until the day they do.
What We’re Following
ISIS claims killing of female TV presenter. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the targeted killing of Malalai Maiwand, a presenter at Enikas Radio and TV in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, on Thursday. Maiwand’s death highlights a worrying trend of increased terrorist activity in the region, often targeting journalists. According to a count by Reuters, 10 media workers have been killed in Afghanistan this year. Maiwand was only 25 years old.
Bhutan decriminalizes homosexuality. A joint session of Bhutan’s two houses of parliament approved a bill today to legalize gay sex. All 63 members of parliament present voted in favor of the bill. The changes still need to be approved by the country’s king, but that is seen as a formality. Bhutan’s move comes just two years after India made a similar decision to remove a colonial-era prohibition on gay sex.
Rights groups voice concerns over Rohingya resettlement. The United Nations says it has been denied access to Bhasan Char, a remote and flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal to which Bangladesh moved 1,600 Rohingya refugees last week. The U.N.’s call for a safety assessment of the island comes amid concerns from the United States over whether the relocations were voluntary or forced.
Twitter controversy. It’s been a mixed week for Twitter in South Asia. Last Sunday, several famous writers including Salman Rushdie and Amitav Ghosh expressed alarm over Twitter’s suspension of writer and activist Salil Tripathi. A fringe right-wing Hindu outfit called the Deshi Army claimed victory for the suspension, but it was unclear why exactly the decision was made.
Tripathi, who wrote an essay for FP last month called “Why India Has Become a Different Country,” told me that Twitter later asked him to remove a personal list of muted users that he maintained. Tripathi is now back on Twitter. The surprising aspect of the temporary suspension was that it targeted a well-known advocate of human rights and free speech, even as abusive trolls often swarm the social media platform.
Meanwhile, Twitter flagged a post by politician Amit Malviya as “manipulated content,” marking the first time it had targeted a prominent member of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party.
And Finally…
Gitanjali Rao, a 15-year-old Indian American inventor, landed on the cover of Time magazine last week as its first ever Kid of the Year. Rao has invented a device that identifies contaminations in drinking water and an app that detects cyberbullying. Imagine being a South Asian teenager right now. On the one hand, there’s the obvious pride and sense of representation at seeing a young brown girl on the most recognizable cover on earth. But on the other hand, imagine all the parents going, “See? Instead of those video games, this is what you could be doing!”
I’m excited to see what Rao does next.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.