foreignpolicy--2020-07-04--To Fight Inequality, the United States Needs an FDR. Can Biden Deliver?

The dominant and now discredited ideology known as neoliberalism held that markets work tolerably well most of the time and that market failure was rare .
Market fundamentalism—a total faith in the ability of free market capitalism to solve problems—was disgraced by the stock market crash of 1929 and the U.S. government ’ s successful New Deal reforms during Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s presidency .
But since the 1970s , a new neoliberal orthodoxy has been embraced by many Democrats as well as Republicans—who deregulated countless industries despite the mounting evidence that their policies were inviting financial crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generating extreme inequality .
The mispricing of toxic financial assets , enabled by deregulation , led to the financial collapse of 2008 .
Supply-side tax cuts didn ’ t increase public spending but instead exacerbated inequality .
Deregulation of labor markets led to wage stagnation at the bottom while concentrating wealth at the top as hyperglobalization decimated the U.S. manufacturing sector .
And the extreme commercialization of U.S. health care has created the Western world ’ s most expensive and least efficient system .
The costs of these systemic market failures vastly outweighed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improve economic efficiency or overall growth .
But they did make a few people very rich and tens of millions poorer .
Liberated markets did not improve economic efficiency or overall growth .
But they did make a few people very rich and tens of millions poorer .
This rampant inequality has undermined the economic security of the American middle class .
The coronavirus crisis , which cost the U.S. economy more than 25 million jobs in four months—disproportionately hurting minorities—has further vindicated the need for a massive government role and provided an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ideology once and for all .
In principle , widespread unhappiness with extreme inequality represents an opportunity to advance a bolder agenda than anything since Lyndon B. Johnson ’ s Great Society or even Roosevelt ’ s New Deal .
But bringing about a more egalitarian economy will be much harder than it seems .
Most people are not agitated about inequality as an abstract principle ; they are concerned about their own diminishing economic status .
Calls to end inequality have also long been associated with poverty and race .
To an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of greater equality has often had the ring of higher taxes on “ us ” or compensatory advantages to provide more for an undeserving “ them.
” Reversing the inequality of recent decades would require more regulation , increased public spending , much higher taxes on the rich , and some public ownership .
To win widespread support for a radically reformist agenda , a progressive president will need to be clear about the causes of today ’ s inequality and insecurity and propose remedies that could command broad popular and congressional support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it helps to look back at the egalitarian economy that the United States once had and how it was lost .
The rules of the postwar economy imposed strict controls on financial markets , which prevented speculative crashes and restrained incomes at the top .
Marginal tax rates exceeded 90 percent , and government policies empowered trade unions and provided labor regulation , which raised incomes at the bottom .
Various federal programs enabled the working and middle classes to accumulate household wealth through homeownership while free or very cheap higher education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them with debt .
The United States enhanced economic security with public social insurance alongside a private welfare state of company health and pension benefits .
This reached blue-collar workers as well as professionals .
In addition , the postwar economy was largely insulated from low-wage imports because trade was only about 5 percent of GDP as late as 1960 , which meant that domestic purchasing power could support domestic jobs .
In the 1950s , under Dwight Eisenhower ’ s Republican presidency , this economic system was not viewed as radical ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ normal .
But while the postwar order seemed to spring almost full-grown , its dismantling has been gradual and diffuse .
The reversal began in the 1970s , and when this regime of managed , egalitarian capitalism died , it did not jump—it was pushed .
However , it ’ s tricky to sort out whose fingerprints were on the deed .
Certainly , Republicans and libertarians were prime offenders , but Democratic presidents also bear some of the blame .
Hyperglobalization , which had devastating effects on industrial America , was one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both parties agreed on .
Indeed , deregulation did not begin under Ronald Reagan but under Jimmy Carter .
It reached new depths under Bill Clinton , as coached by advisors Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers .
Each worked both on Wall Street and in top economic policy jobs under Clinton and in Summers ’ s case for both Clinton and Barack Obama .
It was Obama ’ s administration in 2010—following a devastating financial crisis—that pursued austerity economics long before the economy was in full recovery .
Hyperglobalization , which had devastating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the few things that presidents of both parties agreed on .
On three occasions , when tougher labor laws to counteract union-bashing were just a few votes short of passage in the Senate , neither Carter nor Clinton nor Obama lifted a finger to put the legislation over the top .
They were not sure they wanted a stronger labor movement pushing them from the left .
The presidential wing of the Democratic Party was increasingly allied with Wall Street plutocrats , who liked the new economic order just fine .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the results of a grossly unequal economy have not been sure whom to blame or whom to trust—and they are not entirely wrong .
And at least partly as a result , voters were ready for an outlandish outsider like Donald Trump .
Extreme economic inequality has produced an undertow of concentrated political power that defends the status quo .
These forces tend to undermine Democratic presidents ’ progressive impulses .
Obama had everything going for him as an agent of Rooseveltian change .
He was an outsider , and history even delivered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watch just before his 2008 victory .
Extreme economic inequality has produced an undertow of concentrated political power that defends the status quo .
But Obama flinched and appointed as his top economic team the same Wall Street advisors whose policies had produced the collapse .
Obama ’ s would-be successor , Hillary Clinton , sought to navigate these shoals by steering left on cultural issues and center-right on economic ones .
That left some working-class voters to conclude that she cared more about bathroom laws than their economic pain .
Even if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there is the further challenge of Congress .
Joe Biden seems to be moving left .
But in order to actually enact New Deal-scale policies , he ’ d need Roosevelt- scale majorities in Congress .
Assuming a remotely fair election , the Democrats may well win majority control of both the House and Senate .
Yet a working progressive majority will be a stretch .
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is hobbled by dozens of centrist Democrats in the House ( some voting on their districts ’ behalf ; others voting on their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate the best-case scenario for Democrats is a small majority that includes some on the center-right .
And if a Rooseveltian Biden failed to deliver impressive gains by the 2022 midterm elections , he could kiss a precarious majority goodbye .
Until 2003 , dividends were taxed at the full individual tax rate ; taxes on interest , dividends , and capital gains have all been slashed .
Sen. Elizabeth Warren has proposed a wealth tax that would exempt everyone with wealth of under $ 50 million .
But so concentrated is today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still bring in an estimated $ 3.7 trillion over 10 years .
Just repealing the Trump tax cuts of 2018 would yield another $ 2 trillion .
While some remedies require taxing and spending , many are regulatory .
If Congress had the votes and Biden had the nerve , he could enact laws restoring Wall Street to the role of the economy ’ s servant rather than its master .
Warren , once again , has written the playbook in two pieces of legislation , the Accountable Capitalism Act of 2018 and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2019 .
As Warren suggests , the U.S. government would need to restore the separation between investment banking and commercial banking ; close the loopholes in tax and regulatory law that allow private equity companies to function as predators on the real economy ; return derivatives to the footnote that they were before the 1980s ; make banking simple and transparent enough to regulate , complemented by some public banks ; and require large corporations to get federal charters limiting their destructive behavior and put workers on their boards .
These reforms would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ model—but Wall Street would not exactly roll over .
Despite Biden ’ s repositioning , his default setting is to turn to the economic advisors with close Wall Street ties from the Clinton-Obama era who spearheaded financial deregulation , such as Summers and former Obama chief of staff Rahm Emanuel .
Biden is also reliant on donors from Wall Street ; his roots in Delaware—with its lax incorporation laws—have long made him indulgent of the financial industry .
Even if wealth can be constrained at the top , there is still the challenge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In addition to reviving the Wagner Act—to allow workers to organize or join unions—the U.S. government would have to confront the gig economy .
Many companies have redefined payroll jobs as contract work .
Some of this is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act—illegally disguising regular workers as freelancers in order to deny them rights and benefits—but some of it represents new hybrids such as Uber and Lyft .
To improve the pay and security of gig workers , the government would need to give them the same regulatory protections as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minimum wage covering all workers .
A Democratic administration serious about tackling inequality would also need to reverse the dismantling of antitrust laws .
Monopolies frustrate competition and lead to concentrated wealth and political influence .
Several of America ’ s richest people , such as Amazon ’ s Jeff Bezos , made their fortunes in tech platforms that are virtual monopolies .
Efforts to restore antitrust laws will mean confronting a Silicon Valley elite that has become a key source of funding for the Democratic Party .
To restore the U.S. government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reclaim domestic manufacturing , trade policy will also require reform .
The original Bretton Woods scheme of 1944 allowed national governments plenty of policy independence .
It permitted capital controls and the right of nations to condition imports on labor standards .
Trade policy in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly about reciprocal reductions in tariffs , not about an absolute shift to global free markets .
But by the 1990s , business groups branded many normal forms of public regulation and investment as illegal infringements on free trade .
Democratic presidents , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even more ferocious advocates of this approach than Republicans .
Even with a more robust trade policy , the United States will never have the manufacturing jobs it once had , thanks to automation .
Most jobs will be in the service economy , which is notorious for low wages .
The National Domestic Workers Alliance , and its project Caring Across America , has proposed a grand bargain to create a new category of social insurance .
All workers who cared for the old , the young , or the sick—such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care workers—would be paid a living wage , and families could get the high-quality child care , nursing care , and home care they needed at affordable costs .
This would help reduce inequality by bolstering the living standards of America ’ s working poor , as well as by giving the middle class the package of benefits that the rich are able to purchase .
But it would require annual public outlays in the hundreds of billions .
Health care represents another obstacle to a more egalitarian economy .
It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insurance system would be universal and organized by government .
Standing in the way are several powerful industries and a seemingly insurmountable structural challenge—moving from a system partly underwritten by employers to one that is tax-financed , without astronomical tax increases on the one hand and windfall gains to employers on the other .
But there ’ s a real opportunity here .
One strategy , proposed by Yale University ’ s Jacob Hacker , the author of the original so-called public option proposal , would require all employers to provide good insurance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies to meet the requirement by buying in to Medicare .
( The Medicare system is now just for people age 65 or older and those with disabilities ; Hacker ’ s approach would extend it to nearly everyone but without requiring a general tax increase since most costs would be paid by employers . )
Biden has embraced a much more modest reform , of lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 60 and other piecemeal reforms , but not fundamental change for the entire system , which is what Americans need .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a bleak economic landscape when it comes to income , wealth , job opportunities , and debt .
My generation of Americans born during or shortly after World War II enjoyed cheap homeownership , debt-free higher education , the likelihood of finding a payroll job with an employer that provided health and pension benefits , and affordable access to decent public schools ( on one income ) ; for today ’ s young adults , this package has been destroyed .
Indeed , people my age have enjoyed windfall gains from housing inflation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been prohibitively expensive housing for our children and grandchildren .
Young adults are less likely to have long-term payroll jobs and more likely to have precarious gigs ; they are less likely to have good , employer-provided pensions or health coverage and more likely to have university loan debt .
The rate of homeownership among young families has declined , in large part because it ’ s harder to get a mortgage if one is burdened with student loan repayments .
Some of this can be remedied with policy .
The U.S. government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and restore the model of free public higher education that the country enjoyed from the land-grant colleges of the 19th century through the 1980s , when state legislatures hellbent on cutting taxes began withdrawing public funding for higher education and replacing it with tuition and fees .
Affordable housing will be even harder to produce because much of the housing boom of the 1950s was the result not just of policies but of cheap farmland converted to suburbia .
Cheap land is gone .
Replicating the conditions of the 1950s would require a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a larger scale than the United States has ever seen .
This would entail using the government ’ s power to assemble and then subsidize land costs to produce both modestly priced homes for purchase and socially owned rental housing .
The current bipartisan policy of incentivizing private developers to build affordable homes and apartments has been a costly failure .
It will take uncommon political skill , resolve , and luck to connect these several dots and rally a broad coalition for what will be seen as drastic change—against bipartisan economic royalists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The needed package of policies would deliver a more productive , secure , and egalitarian America , just as it did during the postwar boom , but the political path is steep .
The coronavirus pandemic has revealed not just grotesque inequalities of race but has also underscored the vulnerabilities of the middle class and produced a broad movement for constructive change .
The essential role of government is evident , as are the predations of unfettered capitalism and extreme globalization .
Yet the United States ’ founders created a system of checks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only on rare occasions that combined large congressional majorities and a president capable of mobilizing broad public support for drastic reforms .
The current president has abused his office for his own imagined glory .
Should Biden win , Americans will soon learn if Trump ’ s successor will seize the moment and use the power of the office for the public good .
This article appears in the Summer 2020 print issue .

Warren Buffett famously said you only learn who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. It is now low tide for America’s hyperprivatized economy, and the receding waves have revealed catastrophic failures of ideology, policy, and business practice. The COVID-19 crisis has produced immense harm but one salutary effect: It has destroyed a lot of the conventional wisdom concerning governments and markets.
The dominant and now discredited ideology known as neoliberalism held that markets work tolerably well most of the time and that market failure was rare. Market fundamentalism—a total faith in the ability of free market capitalism to solve problems—was disgraced by the stock market crash of 1929 and the U.S. government’s successful New Deal reforms during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency. But since the 1970s, a new neoliberal orthodoxy has been embraced by many Democrats as well as Republicans—who deregulated countless industries despite the mounting evidence that their policies were inviting financial crisis, producing more corruption than efficiency, and generating extreme inequality.
The mispricing of toxic financial assets, enabled by deregulation, led to the financial collapse of 2008. Supply-side tax cuts didn’t increase public spending but instead exacerbated inequality. Deregulation of labor markets led to wage stagnation at the bottom while concentrating wealth at the top as hyperglobalization decimated the U.S. manufacturing sector. And the extreme commercialization of U.S. health care has created the Western world’s most expensive and least efficient system. The costs of these systemic market failures vastly outweighed the benefits.
Liberated markets did not improve economic efficiency or overall growth. But they did make a few people very rich and tens of millions poorer. This rampant inequality has undermined the economic security of the American middle class.
The coronavirus crisis, which cost the U.S. economy more than 25 million jobs in four months—disproportionately hurting minorities—has further vindicated the need for a massive government role and provided an opening for Democrats to bury a failed ideology once and for all.
In principle, widespread unhappiness with extreme inequality represents an opportunity to advance a bolder agenda than anything since Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society or even Roosevelt’s New Deal. But bringing about a more egalitarian economy will be much harder than it seems.
Most people are not agitated about inequality as an abstract principle; they are concerned about their own diminishing economic status. Calls to end inequality have also long been associated with poverty and race. To an anxious white middle class, the cause of greater equality has often had the ring of higher taxes on “us” or compensatory advantages to provide more for an undeserving “them.”
Reversing the inequality of recent decades would require more regulation, increased public spending, much higher taxes on the rich, and some public ownership. To win widespread support for a radically reformist agenda, a progressive president will need to be clear about the causes of today’s inequality and insecurity and propose remedies that could command broad popular and congressional support. To increase the chances of success, it helps to look back at the egalitarian economy that the United States once had and how it was lost.
During the three decades after World War II, the U.S. economy enjoyed a social contract that was a legacy of Roosevelt’s New Deal. The result was a remarkable degree of economic equality for a system that was still essentially capitalist. In the 25 years between 1948 and 1973, the economy not only grew at record peacetime rates of nearly 4 percent per year; it also became more equal, with the bottom quintile of earners gaining income at a faster rate than the top. The economist Claudia Goldin referred to this unusual era as the Great Compression.
The rules of the postwar economy imposed strict controls on financial markets, which prevented speculative crashes and restrained incomes at the top. Marginal tax rates exceeded 90 percent, and government policies empowered trade unions and provided labor regulation, which raised incomes at the bottom.
Various federal programs enabled the working and middle classes to accumulate household wealth through homeownership while free or very cheap higher education reached nearly half the population without burdening them with debt. The United States enhanced economic security with public social insurance alongside a private welfare state of company health and pension benefits. This reached blue-collar workers as well as professionals. In addition, the postwar economy was largely insulated from low-wage imports because trade was only about 5 percent of GDP as late as 1960, which meant that domestic purchasing power could support domestic jobs.
In the 1950s, under Dwight Eisenhower’s Republican presidency, this economic system was not viewed as radical; it was simply experienced as the new normal. But while the postwar order seemed to spring almost full-grown, its dismantling has been gradual and diffuse.
The reversal began in the 1970s, and when this regime of managed, egalitarian capitalism died, it did not jump—it was pushed. However, it’s tricky to sort out whose fingerprints were on the deed. Certainly, Republicans and libertarians were prime offenders, but Democratic presidents also bear some of the blame.
Hyperglobalization, which had devastating effects on industrial America, was one of the few things that presidents of both parties agreed on.
Indeed, deregulation did not begin under Ronald Reagan but under Jimmy Carter. It reached new depths under Bill Clinton, as coached by advisors Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers. Each worked both on Wall Street and in top economic policy jobs under Clinton and in Summers’s case for both Clinton and Barack Obama. It was Obama’s administration in 2010—following a devastating financial crisis—that pursued austerity economics long before the economy was in full recovery. Hyperglobalization, which had devastating effects on industrial America, was one of the few things that presidents of both parties agreed on.
On three occasions, when tougher labor laws to counteract union-bashing were just a few votes short of passage in the Senate, neither Carter nor Clinton nor Obama lifted a finger to put the legislation over the top. They were not sure they wanted a stronger labor movement pushing them from the left. The presidential wing of the Democratic Party was increasingly allied with Wall Street plutocrats, who liked the new economic order just fine. As a consequence, many voters unhappy with the results of a grossly unequal economy have not been sure whom to blame or whom to trust—and they are not entirely wrong. And at least partly as a result, voters were ready for an outlandish outsider like Donald Trump.
Extreme economic inequality has produced an undertow of concentrated political power that defends the status quo. These forces tend to undermine Democratic presidents’ progressive impulses. Obama had everything going for him as an agent of Rooseveltian change. He was an outsider, and history even delivered a financial collapse on the Republicans’ watch just before his 2008 victory.
Extreme economic inequality has produced an undertow of concentrated political power that defends the status quo.
But Obama flinched and appointed as his top economic team the same Wall Street advisors whose policies had produced the collapse. Obama’s would-be successor, Hillary Clinton, sought to navigate these shoals by steering left on cultural issues and center-right on economic ones. That left some working-class voters to conclude that she cared more about bathroom laws than their economic pain.
Even if the 2020 Democratic nominee changes course, there is the further challenge of Congress. Joe Biden seems to be moving left. But in order to actually enact New Deal-scale policies, he’d need Roosevelt-
scale majorities in Congress. Assuming a remotely fair election, the Democrats may well win majority control of both the House and Senate. Yet a working progressive majority will be a stretch.
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is hobbled by dozens of centrist Democrats in the House (some voting on their districts’ behalf; others voting on their donors’), and in the Senate the best-case scenario for Democrats is a small majority that includes some on the center-right. And if a Rooseveltian Biden failed to deliver impressive gains by the 2022 midterm elections, he could kiss a precarious majority goodbye.
What would it take to replicate the equality and security of the postwar era under very different circumstances? First, the United States would need more progressive taxation, both to contain great concentrations of wealth and to finance the social investment needed to give children from middle-class families a shot at the good life. As recently as 1982, the top marginal rate on individual incomes was 70 percent; today, it’s only 37 percent. Corporate profits once paid a tax of 50 percent; they now pay just 21 percent, and the effective rate is lower thanks to extensive loopholes.
Until 2003, dividends were taxed at the full individual tax rate; taxes on interest, dividends, and capital gains have all been slashed. Sen. Elizabeth Warren has proposed a wealth tax that would exempt everyone with wealth of under $50 million. But so concentrated is today’s wealth that her tax would still bring in an estimated $3.7 trillion over 10 years. Just repealing the Trump tax cuts of 2018 would yield another $2 trillion.
While some remedies require taxing and spending, many are regulatory. If Congress had the votes and Biden had the nerve, he could enact laws restoring Wall Street to the role of the economy’s servant rather than its master. Warren, once again, has written the playbook in two pieces of legislation, the Accountable Capitalism Act of 2018 and the Stop Wall Street Looting Act of 2019.
As Warren suggests, the U.S. government would need to restore the separation between investment banking and commercial banking; close the loopholes in tax and regulatory law that allow private equity companies to function as predators on the real economy; return derivatives to the footnote that they were before the 1980s; make banking simple and transparent enough to regulate, complemented by some public banks; and require large corporations to get federal charters limiting their destructive behavior and put workers on their boards.
These reforms would destroy Wall Street’s toxic business model—but Wall Street would not exactly roll over. Despite Biden’s repositioning, his default setting is to turn to the economic advisors with close Wall Street ties from the Clinton-Obama era who spearheaded financial deregulation, such as Summers and former Obama chief of staff Rahm Emanuel. Biden is also reliant on donors from Wall Street; his roots in Delaware—with its lax incorporation laws—have long made him indulgent of the financial industry.
Even if wealth can be constrained at the top, there is still the challenge of raising earnings at the bottom. In addition to reviving the Wagner Act—to allow workers to organize or join unions—the U.S. government would have to confront the gig economy.
Many companies have redefined payroll jobs as contract work. Some of this is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act—illegally disguising regular workers as freelancers in order to deny them rights and benefits—but some of it represents new hybrids such as Uber and Lyft. To improve the pay and security of gig workers, the government would need to give them the same regulatory protections as payroll workers and enact a much higher minimum wage covering all workers.
A Democratic administration serious about tackling inequality would also need to reverse the dismantling of antitrust laws. Monopolies frustrate competition and lead to concentrated wealth and political influence. Several of America’s richest people, such as Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, made their fortunes in tech platforms that are virtual monopolies. Efforts to restore antitrust laws will mean confronting a Silicon Valley elite that has become a key source of funding for the Democratic Party.
To restore the U.S. government’s capacity to regulate capitalism and reclaim domestic manufacturing, trade policy will also require reform. The original Bretton Woods scheme of 1944 allowed national governments plenty of policy independence. It permitted capital controls and the right of nations to condition imports on labor standards. Trade policy in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly about reciprocal reductions in tariffs, not about an absolute shift to global free markets. But by the 1990s, business groups branded many normal forms of public regulation and investment as illegal infringements on free trade. Democratic presidents, increasingly allied with Wall Street, were even more ferocious advocates of this approach than Republicans.
Even with a more robust trade policy, the United States will never have the manufacturing jobs it once had, thanks to automation. Most jobs will be in the service economy, which is notorious for low wages. The National Domestic Workers Alliance, and its project Caring Across America, has proposed a grand bargain to create a new category of social insurance. All workers who cared for the old, the young, or the sick—such as nurse aides and home care and child care workers—would be paid a living wage, and families could get the high-quality child care, nursing care, and home care they needed at affordable costs. This would help reduce inequality by bolstering the living standards of America’s working poor, as well as by giving the middle class the package of benefits that the rich are able to purchase. But it would require annual public outlays in the hundreds of billions.
Health care represents another obstacle to a more egalitarian economy. It’s clear that the most efficient and fair insurance system would be universal and organized by government. Standing in the way are several powerful industries and a seemingly insurmountable structural challenge—moving from a system partly underwritten by employers to one that is tax-financed, without astronomical tax increases on the one hand and windfall gains to employers on the other. But there’s a real opportunity here.
One strategy, proposed by Yale University’s Jacob Hacker, the author of the original so-called public option proposal, would require all employers to provide good insurance for their workers and create incentives for companies to meet the requirement by buying in to Medicare. (The Medicare system is now just for people age 65 or older and those with disabilities; Hacker’s approach would extend it to nearly everyone but without requiring a general tax increase since most costs would be paid by employers.) Biden has embraced a much more modest reform, of lowering the Medicare eligibility age to 60 and other piecemeal reforms, but not fundamental change for the entire system, which is what Americans need.
The shifts since 1980 have widened inequality in another subtle respect. Young people from affluent families are cushioned by what might be called the parental welfare state. As costs of housing and education have risen and social supports have fallen, wealthy parents can give their offspring a huge head start not available to others—providing everything from early childhood enrichment programs to university fees to down payments on a house. The Harvard University economist Raj Chetty and his colleagues have demonstrated the dramatic increase in intergenerational inequality: At some elite universities, there are more students from families in the top 1 percent than from the bottom 60 percent.
A 30-year-old today without rich parents faces a bleak economic landscape when it comes to income, wealth, job opportunities, and debt. My generation of Americans born during or shortly after World War II enjoyed cheap homeownership, debt-free higher education, the likelihood of finding a payroll job with an employer that provided health and pension benefits, and affordable access to decent public schools (on one income); for today’s young adults, this package has been destroyed.
Indeed, people my age have enjoyed windfall gains from housing inflation; the cost of those gains has been prohibitively expensive housing for our children and grandchildren. Young adults are less likely to have long-term payroll jobs and more likely to have precarious gigs; they are less likely to have good, employer-provided pensions or health coverage and more likely to have university loan debt. The rate of homeownership among young families has declined, in large part because it’s harder to get a mortgage if one is burdened with student loan repayments.
Some of this can be remedied with policy. The U.S. government could forgive a lot of student debt and restore the model of free public higher education that the country enjoyed from the land-grant colleges of the 19th century through the 1980s, when state legislatures hellbent on cutting taxes began withdrawing public funding for higher education and replacing it with tuition and fees.
Affordable housing will be even harder to produce because much of the housing boom of the 1950s was the result not just of policies but of cheap farmland converted to suburbia. Cheap land is gone. Replicating the conditions of the 1950s would require a massive government investment in affordable housing on a larger scale than the United States has ever seen. This would entail using the government’s power to assemble and then subsidize land costs to produce both modestly priced homes for purchase and socially owned rental housing. The current bipartisan policy of incentivizing private developers to build affordable homes and apartments has been a costly failure.
As a result of these shifts, most younger Americans correctly believe that they will never live as well as their parents. The abrogation of the postwar U.S. social contract, therefore, should not just be understood as rising inequality. It’s also a story of increasing economic precariousness, diminished life horizons, and greater hardening of intergenerational class lines. Many young people simply see themselves as having been born in an unlucky generation—not as victims of deliberate policy shift.
It will take uncommon political skill, resolve, and luck to connect these several dots and rally a broad coalition for what will be seen as drastic change—against bipartisan economic royalists who have never been more powerful. The needed package of policies would deliver a more productive, secure, and egalitarian America, just as it did during the postwar boom, but the political path is steep.
The coronavirus pandemic has revealed not just grotesque inequalities of race but has also underscored the vulnerabilities of the middle class and produced a broad movement for constructive change. The essential role of government is evident, as are the predations of unfettered capitalism and extreme globalization. Yet the United States’ founders created a system of checks and balances that allowed for sweeping transformation only on rare occasions that combined large congressional majorities and a president capable of mobilizing broad public support for drastic reforms. The current president has abused his office for his own imagined glory. Should Biden win, Americans will soon learn if Trump’s successor will seize the moment and use the power of the office for the public good.
This article appears in the Summer 2020 print issue.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--France Was Officially Colorblind—Until Now

Last month , France ’ s human rights watchdog released a biting assessment of discrimination in the country and urged the government to take quick measures to address deep inequalities along racial lines .
In France , where tension over national identity has defined public debate since the 1980s , talk of discrimination is hardly new .
But the report , issued by human rights ombudsman Jacques Toubon , stressed a crucial element that has long been minimized in mainstream conversations—that the discrimination faced by French citizens of foreign origin is “ systemic.
” The report isn ’ t the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has entered the public debate .
Anti-racism activists , especially among the younger generation , have been insisting on its consequences for years .
But Toubon ’ s intervention does mark a rare instance of that term coming from a public official—and has particular weight at a moment when racism , and France ’ s understanding of it , are more challenged than ever .
Toubon ’ s report comes on the heels of weeks of protest and debate in France .
Since early June , hundreds of thousands have taken to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And while the movement has been buoyed by similar mobilizations around the world in solidarity with George Floyd—a Black man who was killed at the hands of police in the United States —young French people in particular have rallied around Assa Traoré , leader of the Truth for Adama committee .
Traoré has spent the past four years demanding accountability for her younger brother Adama , who died in police custody on his 24th birthday in 2016 .
Although Traoré—who was recently honored with the BET International Global Good Award—isn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , she has managed to capture national and international attention in a way others have not .
For activists who for years have labored to make their voices heard , the current moment presents a new opportunity not just to advance the fight against racism and police violence but to chip away at the way France conceives of race .
France famously sees itself as colorblind , defending a strict universalism in which citizens are expected to identify with the nation rather than with any particular racial or religious identity .
The government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2013 , France stripped its laws of the term “ race , ” and in 2018 , the National Assembly voted to remove the word from the constitution .
Although politicians occasionally acknowledge the existence of racism , the establishment consistently rejects references to institutional or structural bias .
Racism , the narrative goes , is a moral flaw that stems from individuals rather than systems—and should accordingly be battled on those terms .
According to France ’ s universalist , Republican ideal , prioritizing national belonging over other forms of identity should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racism—uniting around “ Frenchness ” is considered essential to integration .
Defenders of this national myth often deride younger activists as importing an Anglo-Saxon or American obsession with identity that is ill-suited to the French context ; seeing inequality through a racial prism , they say , will fuel communautarisme—a segregated society where identity politics undermine social cohesion .
Tensions over national identity consumed the years preceding Emmanuel Macron ’ s presidency—a period marked by successive terror attacks and anxiety over a perceived failure to integrate minorities , French Muslims in particular .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to move beyond past controversies and reconcile with France ’ s troubled colonial history ; he defended a “ tolerant ” form of secularism and called colonization a “ crime against humanity ” —a statement he immediately walked back under political pressure .
Since taking office , he has often fallen back on old tropes around identity , in 2018 referring to the hijab as “ incompatible with the civility of our country ” and , in the wake of recent protests , brushing over activists ’ demands and denouncing an “ ethnicization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young people , particularly those with roots in France ’ s former colonies in Africa , the experiences of Black Americans do resonate .
Although it is far rarer for people to be killed by police in France than in the United States , the limited available data on racial inequality belies the notion of a post-racial society .
Police stop Blacks and Arabs at a rate 20 times higher than they do whites , and stop and frisk is common , particularly in neighborhoods with significant nonwhite communities .
People of color @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and numerous studies point to widespread discrimination in the housing and job markets .
Universalism , many young people of color contend , is a national myth that glosses over the reality of police profiling and unequal opportunity .
Over the past decade , this younger generation of activists has become louder in contesting the narrative of colorblindness .
And although for years they ’ ve struggled to penetrate the mainstream conversation , many see the recent protests—and energy around Traoré ’ s cause—as a sign of a shift .
Last month @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the streets , defying government bans on large gatherings because of the coronavirus pandemic .
On June 2 , somewhere between 20,000 and 80,000—according to official numbers and the organizers ’ count , respectively—packed the area outside the Tribunal de Paris as Traoré ’ s family released a new medical analysis describing the cause of her brother ’ s death as “ positional asphyxia caused by prone restraint.
” The independent analysis came after the family spent four years contesting numerous autopsies and reports that had ruled out any police wrongdoing .
Macron @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigate the Adama Traoré case .
Then on June 13 , Assa Traoré organized another rally at Place de la République , drawing somewhere between 15,000 and 120,000 protesters—despite official attempts to block the protest .
Mélanie Luce , president of the UNEF , France ’ s national student union , said that Toubon ’ s report , coupled with recent mobilizations , show that “ something has clicked.
” The 18-year-old law student at the Sorbonne has prioritized anti-racism in the UNEF ’ s objectives and drawn ire in the process , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the universalist framework .
But after attending last month ’ s protests , Luce feels newly optimistic .
“ For young people , it ’ s clear that it wasn ’ t one cop that killed Adama Traoré but an entire system that allowed him to be killed , ” she said .
For some time , she ’ s seen a widening gap between campus conversations and what ’ s discussed in the media and in government , but over the past month , that rift has “ accelerated.
” Echoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , Luce described a new consciousness and sense of responsibility among white people .
Although past anti-racism protests—organized by Traoré or others—have drawn a diverse crowd , “ the white people who showed up before were already aware of and engaged in these issues , ” she explained .
“ The difference today is that we ’ re seeing people turn out for the first time , and that shows that something has finally gotten through , in terms of racism and the role of white people in fighting it.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visible part of an intensifying debate .
“ People are not only showing up , they ’ re keeping the conversation going between rallies and gatherings , ” said Nacira Guénif , a sociologist at University of Paris 8 who has been involved in anti-racism activism for decades .
“ Young people are asking themselves questions and raising concerns in a way that allows everyone to take part .
There ’ s a clear expansion in the level of consciousness.
” That same dynamic has helped fuel momentum in the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crucial forum not just for organizing but for raising awareness about notions like white privilege .
Because much of mainstream French media have been slow to adapt to the changing conversation , Guénif said , young people—and especially young , white people—have seized social media as a place to explore and discuss ideas that have long been considered fringe .
“ I wouldn ’ t quite say that the conversation about systemic racism is now central , ” Guénif said .
“ What has become central , or has expanded across society , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Despite the sentiment that many citizens are beginning to question old assumptions about race , activists lament the government ’ s conservative response .
In a speech following the June 13 protest , Macron denounced the protesters ’ “ separatism ” and “ communautarisme.
” Shortly after the June 2 mobilization , Christophe Castaner , the interior minister , promised to hold police accountable for racist acts and pledged to ban chokeholds .
Police officers immediately erupted in protest across the country , and a week later , the director-general of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in place until Sept. 1—after which they would be replaced by tasers .
“ Castaner is a weak minister who can not imagine a different way , ” Guénif said .
Instead , she said , he bends to the pressure of the day—first , to protesters ’ calls to ban chokeholds , and then , to police outcry against any reform .
Kiyémis , a 28-year-old blogger and activist , called Castaner ’ s announcement laughable .
“ He gave no indication of how he ’ ll penalize racist police officers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be racist , ” she said .
Despite Castaner ’ s weak moves , the issue of police brutality has been thrust into the public debate—as a major feature of societal racism and as a problem in general .
Last month , new evidence regarding the death of a delivery driver following a police stop further energized calls for police reform ; throughout the yellow vest protests , sustained brutality drew international condemnation .
For Guénif , that generalized frustration could serve as an avenue for greater solidarity with anti-racism movements , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reluctant to support Traoré ’ s cause .
“ Protest against police brutality has led to a very strong feeling that people have to stand with Black people—or whatever stands for Black—across the world , ” she said .
Luce—who agreed that Macron and Castaner ’ s responses were “ insufficient ” and “ out of touch ” —sees in their reaction a realization that it will no longer be possible to ignore anti-racism protests .
“ Even if they don ’ t agree , the political class has clearly recognized that we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concerned about these questions , ” she said .
“ And that ’ s a huge advance.
” The interior minister ’ s mere mention of racism among police , she added , marks progress from what had long been a “ non-subject.
” “ Because we ’ re making progress , people will fight back in order to win some ideological battle , ” she said .
“ But unfortunately for them , they ’ ve already lost .
The debate has evolved because we forced it to , and that ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ”

Last month, France’s human rights watchdog released a biting assessment of discrimination in the country and urged the government to take quick measures to address deep inequalities along racial lines. In France, where tension over national identity has defined public debate since the 1980s, talk of discrimination is hardly new. But the report, issued by human rights ombudsman Jacques Toubon, stressed a crucial element that has long been minimized in mainstream conversations—that the discrimination faced by French citizens of foreign origin is “systemic.”
Last month, France’s human rights watchdog released a biting assessment of discrimination in the country and urged the government to take quick measures to address deep inequalities along racial lines. In France, where tension over national identity has defined public debate since the 1980s, talk of discrimination is hardly new. But the report, issued by human rights ombudsman Jacques Toubon, stressed a crucial element that has long been minimized in mainstream conversations—that the discrimination faced by French citizens of foreign origin is “systemic.”
The report isn’t the first time the notion of systemic discrimination has entered the public debate. Anti-racism activists, especially among the younger generation, have been insisting on its consequences for years. But Toubon’s intervention does mark a rare instance of that term coming from a public official—and has particular weight at a moment when racism, and France’s understanding of it, are more challenged than ever.
Toubon’s report comes on the heels of weeks of protest and debate in France. In June, hundreds of thousands took to the streets to denounce racism and police brutality. And while the movement has been buoyed by similar mobilizations around the world in solidarity with George Floyd—a Black man who was killed at the hands of police in the United States—young French people in particular have rallied around Assa Traoré, leader of the Truth for Adama committee. Traoré has spent the past four years demanding accountability for her younger brother Adama, who died in police custody on his 24th birthday in 2016. Although Traoré—who was recently honored with the BET International Global Good Award—isn’t alone in denouncing police profiling and violence, she has managed to capture national and international attention in a way others have not.
For activists who for years have labored to make their voices heard, the current moment presents a new opportunity not just to advance the fight against racism and police violence but to chip away at the way France conceives of race.
France famously sees itself as colorblind, defending a strict universalism in which citizens are expected to identify with the nation rather than with any particular racial or religious identity. The government does not collect race-based statistics. In 2013, France stripped its laws of the term “race,” and in 2018, the National Assembly voted to remove the word from the constitution. Although politicians occasionally acknowledge the existence of racism, the establishment consistently rejects references to institutional or structural bias. Racism, the narrative goes, is a moral flaw that stems from individuals rather than systems—and should accordingly be battled on those terms.
According to France’s universalist, Republican ideal, prioritizing national belonging over other forms of identity should serve as a de facto tool against racism—uniting around “Frenchness” is considered essential to integration. Defenders of this national myth often deride younger activists as importing an Anglo-Saxon or American obsession with identity that is ill-suited to the French context; seeing inequality through a racial prism, they say, will fuel communautarisme—a segregated society where identity politics undermine social cohesion.
Discussions of national identity consumed the years preceding Emmanuel Macron’s presidency—a period marked by successive terror attacks and anxiety over a perceived failure to integrate minorities, French Muslims in particular. During his 2017 campaign, Macron pledged to move beyond past controversies and reconcile with France’s troubled colonial history; he defended a “tolerant” form of secularism and called colonization a “crime against humanity”—a statement he immediately walked back under political pressure. Since taking office, he has often fallen back on old tropes around identity, in 2018 referring to the hijab as “incompatible with the civility of our country” and, in the wake of recent protests, chalking up activists’ demands to an “ethnicization of social questions.”
Many young people, particularly those with roots in France’s former colonies in Africa, have pushed to abandon the French model. And despite much of the establishment’s denunciation of American identity politics—and the insistence that race relations in the U.S. have little to do with France—the experiences of Black Americans do resonate for many French people of color. Although it is far rarer for people to be killed by police in France than in the United States, the limited available data on racial inequality belies the notion of a post-racial society. Police stop Blacks and Arabs at a rate 20 times higher than they do whites, and stop and frisk is common, particularly in neighborhoods with significant nonwhite communities. People of color are disproportionately represented among the prison population, and numerous studies point to widespread discrimination in the housing and job markets. Universalism, many young people of color contend, is a national myth that glosses over the reality of police profiling and unequal opportunity.
Over the past decade, this younger generation of activists has become louder in contesting the narrative of colorblindness. And while for years they’ve struggled to penetrate the mainstream conversation, many see the recent protests—and energy around Traoré’s cause—as a sign of a shift.
Last month, Traoré managed to draw thousands to the streets, defying government bans on large gatherings because of the coronavirus pandemic. On June 2, somewhere between 20,000 and 80,000—according to official numbers and the organizers’ count, respectively—packed the area outside the Tribunal de Paris as Traoré’s family released a new medical analysis describing the cause of her brother’s death as “positional asphyxia caused by prone restraint.” The independent analysis came after the family spent four years contesting numerous autopsies and reports that had ruled out any police wrongdoing. Macron announced that the justice minister would personally investigate the Adama Traoré case.
Then on June 13, Assa Traoré organized another rally at Place de la République, drawing somewhere between 15,000 and 120,000 protesters—despite official attempts to block the protest.
Mélanie Luce, president of the UNEF, France’s national student union, said that Toubon’s report, coupled with recent mobilizations, show that “something has clicked.” The 18-year-old law student at the Sorbonne has prioritized anti-racism in the UNEF’s objectives and drawn ire in the process, including from mainstream anti-racism associations that adhere to the universalist framework. But after attending last month’s protests, Luce feels newly optimistic.
“For young people, it’s clear that it wasn’t one cop that killed Adama Traoré but an entire system that allowed him to be killed,” she said. For some time, she’s seen a widening gap between campus conversations and what’s discussed in the media and in government, but over the past month, that rift has “accelerated.”
Echoing what many activists have observed in the United States, Luce described a new consciousness and sense of responsibility among white people. Although past anti-racism protests—organized by Traoré or others—have drawn a diverse crowd, “the white people who showed up before were already aware of and engaged in these issues,” she explained. “The difference today is that we’re seeing people turn out for the first time, and that shows that something has finally gotten through, in terms of racism and the role of white people in fighting it.”
The protests have been the one particularly visible part of an intensifying debate. “People are not only showing up, they’re keeping the conversation going between rallies and gatherings,” said Nacira Guénif, a sociologist at University of Paris 8 who has been involved in anti-racism activism for decades. “Young people are asking themselves questions and raising concerns in a way that allows everyone to take part. There’s a clear expansion in the level of consciousness.”
That same dynamic has helped fuel momentum in the United States, where social media—Instagram in particular—has been a crucial forum not just for organizing but for raising awareness about notions like white privilege. Because much of mainstream French media have been slow to adapt to the changing conversation, Guénif said, young people—and especially young white people—have seized social media as a place to explore and discuss ideas that have long been considered fringe. “I wouldn’t quite say that the conversation about systemic racism is now central,” Guénif said. “What has become central, or has expanded across society, is the issue of racism, period.”
Despite the sentiment that many citizens are beginning to question old assumptions about race, activists lament the government’s conservative response. In a speech following the June 13 protest, Macron denounced the protesters’ “separatism” and “communautarisme.” Shortly after the June 2 mobilization, Christophe Castaner, the interior minister, promised to hold police accountable for racist acts and pledged to ban chokeholds. Police officers immediately erupted in protest across the country, and a week later, the director-general of the national police announced that chokeholds would remain in place until Sept. 1—after which they would be replaced by tasers. “Castaner is a weak minister who cannot imagine a different way,” Guénif said. Instead, she added, he bends to the pressure of the day—first, to protesters’ calls to ban chokeholds, and then, to police outcry against any reform.
Kiyémis, a 28-year-old blogger and activist, called Castaner’s announcement laughable. “He gave no indication of how he’ll penalize racist police officers, so basically he just reminded them not to be racist,” she said.
Despite Castaner’s weak moves, the issue of police brutality has been thrust into the public debate—as a major feature of societal racism and as a problem in general. Last month, new evidence regarding the death of a delivery driver following a police stop further energized calls for police reform; throughout the yellow vest protests, sustained brutality drew international condemnation. For Guénif, that generalized frustration could serve as an avenue for greater solidarity with anti-racism movements, even among people who have otherwise been reluctant to support Traoré’s cause. “Protest against police brutality has led to a very strong feeling that people have to stand with Black people—or whatever stands for Black—across the world,” she said.
Luce—who agreed that Macron and Castaner’s responses were “insufficient” and “out of touch”—sees in their reaction a realization that it will no longer be possible to ignore anti-racism protests. “Even if they don’t agree, the political class has clearly recognized that we’re a generation that’s concerned about these questions,” she said. “And that’s a huge advance.” The interior minister’s mere mention of racism among police, she added, marks progress from what had long been a “non-subject.”
“Because we’re making progress, people will fight back in order to win some ideological battle,” she said. “But unfortunately for them, they’ve already lost. The debate has evolved because we forced it to, and that’s something that’s irreversible.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--The Curious Case of the Exploding Iranian Nuclear Site

The Curious Case of the Exploding Iranian Nuclear Site Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Iran says an explosion damaged a nuclear centrifuge site , French President Emmanuel Macron expected to name new cabinet , the Dominican Republic has a new president , and the world this week .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Iranian officials announced on Sunday that fire damage to “ an industrial shed ” at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility was in fact a new site for assembling centrifuges .
Behrouz Kamalvandi , a spokesman for Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ possibly cause a delay in development and production of advanced centrifuge machines in the medium term.
” Speculation surrounding foreign interference has grown in recent weeks after a string of fires and explosions across Iran .
Officials have played down some of the incidents as gas leaks gone wrong , but on Sunday the New York Times reported that the Natanz centrifuge site was destroyed using a bomb planted by Israel , citing a Middle Eastern intelligence official .
When asked about the incident by Israeli media on Sunday , Defense Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ every incident that transpires in Iran necessarily has something to do with us , ” Gantz said .
“ All those systems are complex , they have very high safety constraints and I ’ m not sure they always know how to maintain them.
” From bad to worse .
The setback for Iran ’ s nuclear program , which Tehran insists is peaceful , adds to more bad news as the country struggles to handle its resurgent coronavirus outbreak , which appeared to have subsided after a lockdown but has spread since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
On Sunday , Iran ’ s health ministry reported its highest one-day death toll of the pandemic so far , with 163 deaths .
Iran has now mandated mask-wearing indoors , whereas before it had only been a recommendation .
Zarif on the ropes .
Iran ’ s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was heckled as a liar by members of Iran ’ s new parliament as he delivered his first remarks to the recently elected body .
Zarif was attempting to make the case for supporting the 2015 nuclear deal with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s U.N. Security Council meeting showed how isolated the United States is on the issue .
Maximum pressure , minimum results ?
Writing in Foreign Policy on July 2 , Sina Toossi argued that the U.S. approach of the last three and a half years has only served to weaken moderates while emboldening hardliners .
“ Trump is mistaken if he believes “ maximum pressure ” is getting him closer to a deal with Iran , ” Toossi wrote .
“ The policy is not leading to Iran ’ s capitulation or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ keeping the United States perennially at the cusp of war in the Middle East.
” Macron to name new cabinet .
French President Emmanual Macron is expected to unveil a new cabinet this week , after his party ’ s lackluster results in recent local elections suggested dissatisfaction with his rule has not abated .
Macron appointed a new prime minister—Jean Castex—last week after the popular outgoing premier , Édouard Phillipe , left the post to begin a second term as mayor of Le Havre .
Some analysts see Philippe as a potential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his center-right roots and high approval ratings .
Croatia ’ s HDZ holds on .
Croatia ’ s ruling party , the center-right Croatian Democratic Union ( HDZ ) , looks to have won the country ’ s parliamentary elections , according to early reports .
With 90 percent of votes counted , HDZ had won 66 seats out of 151 in Croatian parliament , making a coaltion government likely .
Croatia ’ s Social Democratic Party came in second place , with 41 seats , while the Euroskeptic Homeland Movement won at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Sundays election had the lowest turnout since Croatia declared independence in 1991 .
At least 166 killed in Ethiopia unrest .
Protests over the killing of activist and singer Hachalu Hundessa led to at least 166 deaths , Ethiopian authorities have reported .
The number is more than double what the government originally announced , and could rise further if those being treated for injuries do not recover .
Hachalu was shot to death in late June .
It ’ s not yet known who is responsible for the attack .
Dominican @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abinader is expected to win the presidency the Dominican Republic , breaking a 16 year grip on power by the ruling Dominican Liberation Party .
Preliminary counts show Abinader with 53 percent of the vote and his rival Gonzalo Castillo with 37 percent .
Abinader is an economist known for his work in the country ’ s tourist industry and has not held political office before .
He contracted the coronavirus during his presidential campaign and has since recovered .
Myanmar rescue enters fifth day .
Rescue operations are ongoing in Mandalay , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ jade mine where 170 people have been found dead so far .
Global Witness , a human rights group , has condemned Myanmar ’ s leadership for the disaster , saying it is a “ damning indictment of the government ’ s failure to curb reckless and irresponsible mining practices.
” Coronavirus in the air .
A forthcoming paper signed by 239 scientists calls for a revision in coronavirus prevention guidelines because of evidence showing the virus can be spread indoors through tiny droplets in the air .
The scientists are hoping the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World Health Organization , whose guidelines do not yet warn about the airborne nature of the virus beyond water droplets ejected from a person ’ s mouth .
Jose Jimenez , a chemist at the University of Colorado who has signed the paper , said the group ’ s goal is not to undercut the WHO .
“ We only want it to adapt its guidance on aerosol transmission to the increasing evidence , ” he told the Washington Post .
Bubonic plague in Inner Mongolia .
Local authorities in the Chinese region @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for plague prevention after a case of bubonic plague was discovered in the city of Banyannur .
The public are being advised to report sightings of sick or dead marmots , which have been known to spread the disease .
According to the WHO , between 1,000 and 2,000 cases of the plague are recorded every year .
In November 2019 , one month before the world became aware of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan , Laurie Garrett wrote about a suspected plague outbreak in China in Foreign Policy—and warned that the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outbreaks could be more dangerous than the disease itself .
On Wednesday , July 8 , U.S. President Donald Trump hosts Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador at the White House—only the second visit from a head of state since the coronavirus pandemic began .
Also on July 8 , German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Marshall Billingslea , the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control , will deliver remarks at the Brookings Institution ’ s EU Defense Washington Forum , held via webcast .
July 8 is also the deadline for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the next World Trade Organization director-general .
Incumbent Robert Azevêdo leaves the post on August 31 .
On Friday , July 10 , Singapore holds parliamentary elections .
The People ’ s Action Party—in power since independence in 1965—is widely expected to win .
On Sunday , July 12 , Poland ’ s runoff presidential vote will take place between incumbent Andrzej Duda and Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski .
According to polls , the race is too close to call .
It was a Fourth of July to forget for the hundreds of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ biker groups that descended on Gettysburg , Pennsylvania , on Saturday to prevent an an imagined flag-burning protest that now appears the work of an online troll .
Word of the July 4 event had spread on Facebook after a page called Left Behind USA , and its anonymous owner , announced it in June .
The Facebook posts bordered on the absurd , claiming organizers would “ be giving away free small flags to children to safely throw into the fire ” and provide “ antifa face paint.
” The counterprotesters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ learn the flag burning ( and face painting ) was nowhere to be found .
“ It doesn ’ t matter if it ’ s a hoax or not , ” one biker from West Virginia noted .
“ They made a threat , and if we don ’ t make our voices heard , it ’ ll make it seem like it ’ s okay.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Iran says an explosion damaged a nuclear centrifuge site, French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to name a new cabinet, the Dominican Republic has a new president, and what to watch in the world this week .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Iran says an explosion damaged a nuclear centrifuge site, French President Emmanuel Macron is expected to name a new cabinet, the Dominican Republic has a new president, and what to watch in the world this week.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Iran Nuclear Program Sees Another Centrifuge Sabotage
Iranian officials announced on Sunday that fire damaged “an industrial shed” at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility that was in fact a new site for assembling centrifuges. Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for Iran’s nuclear agency, said the destruction would “possibly cause a delay in development and production of advanced centrifuge machines in the medium term.”
Speculation surrounding foreign interference has grown in recent weeks after a string of fires and explosions across Iran. Officials have played down some of the incidents as gas leaks gone wrong, but on Sunday the New York Times reported that the Natanz centrifuge site was destroyed using a bomb planted by Israel, citing a Middle Eastern intelligence official.
When asked about the incident by Israeli media on Sunday, Defense Minister Benny Gantz was circumspect. “Not every incident that transpires in Iran necessarily has something to do with us,” Gantz said. “All those systems are complex, they have very high safety constraints and I’m not sure they always know how to maintain them.”
From bad to worse. The setback for Iran’s nuclear program, which Tehran insists is peaceful, adds to more bad news as the country struggles to handle its resurgent coronavirus outbreak, which appeared to have subsided after a lockdown but has spread since the economy began reopening in late April. On Sunday, Iran’s health ministry reported its highest one-day death toll of the pandemic so far, with 163 deaths. Iran has now mandated mask-wearing indoors, whereas before it had only been a recommendation.
Zarif on the ropes. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was heckled as a liar by members of Iran’s new parliament as he delivered his first remarks to the recently elected body. Zarif was attempting to make the case for supporting the 2015 nuclear deal with Western nations and argued that last week’s U.N. Security Council meeting showed how isolated the United States is on the issue.
Maximum pressure, minimum results? Writing in Foreign Policy on July 2, Sina Toossi argued that the U.S. approach of the last three and a half years has only served to weaken moderates while emboldening hardliners. “Trump is mistaken if he believes “maximum pressure” is getting him closer to a deal with Iran,” Toossi wrote. “The policy is not leading to Iran’s capitulation or collapse, but entrenching U.S.-Iran hostilities and keeping the United States perennially at the cusp of war in the Middle East.”
What We’re Following Today
Macron to name new cabinet. French President Emmanual Macron is expected to unveil a new cabinet this week, after his party’s lackluster results in recent local elections suggested dissatisfaction with his rule has not abated. Macron appointed a new prime minister—Jean Castex—last week after the popular outgoing premier, Édouard Phillipe, left the post to begin a second term as mayor of Le Havre. Some analysts see Philippe as a potential rival to Macron in 2022, given his center-right roots and high approval ratings.
Croatia’s HDZ holds on. Croatia’s ruling party, the center-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), looks to have won the country’s parliamentary elections, according to early reports. With 90 percent of votes counted, HDZ had won 66 seats out of 151 in Croatian parliament, making a coaltion government likely. Croatia’s Social Democratic Party came in second place, with 41 seats, while the Euroskeptic Homeland Movement won at least 16 seats. At 46 percent, Sundays election had the lowest turnout since Croatia declared independence in 1991.
At least 166 killed in Ethiopia unrest. Protests over the killing of activist and singer Hachalu Hundessa led to at least 166 deaths, Ethiopian authorities have reported. The number is more than double what the government originally announced, and could rise further if those being treated for injuries do not recover. Hachalu was shot to death in late June. It’s not yet known who is responsible for the attack.
Dominican Republic votes for new president. Luis Abinader is expected to win the presidency the Dominican Republic, breaking a 16 year grip on power by the ruling Dominican Liberation Party. Preliminary counts show Abinader with 53 percent of the vote and his rival Gonzalo Castillo with 37 percent. Abinader is an economist known for his work in the country’s tourist industry and has not held political office before. He contracted the coronavirus during his presidential campaign and has since recovered.
Myanmar rescue enters fifth day. Rescue operations are ongoing in Mandalay, Myanmar, following a landslide at a jade mine where 170 people have been found dead so far. Global Witness, a human rights group, has condemned Myanmar’s leadership for the disaster, saying it is a “damning indictment of the government’s failure to curb reckless and irresponsible mining practices.”
Keep an Eye On
Coronavirus in the air. A forthcoming paper signed by 239 scientists calls for a revision in coronavirus prevention guidelines because of evidence showing the virus can be spread indoors through tiny droplets in the air. The scientists are hoping the paper’s publication can pressure the World Health Organization, whose guidelines do not yet warn about the airborne nature of the virus beyond water droplets ejected from a person’s mouth. Jose Jimenez, a chemist at the University of Colorado who has signed the paper, said the group’s goal is not to undercut the WHO. “We only want it to adapt its guidance on aerosol transmission to the increasing evidence,” he told the Washington Post.
Bubonic plague in Inner Mongolia. Local authorities in the Chinese region of Inner Mongolia have issued a warning for plague prevention after a case of bubonic plague was discovered in the city of Banyannur. The public are being advised to report sightings of sick or dead marmots, which have been known to spread the disease. According to the WHO, between 1,000 and 2,000 cases of the plague are recorded every year.
In November 2019, one month before the world became aware of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, Laurie Garrett wrote about a suspected plague outbreak in China in Foreign Policy—and warned that the Chinese government’s propensity to cover up outbreaks could be more dangerous than the disease itself.
The World This Week
On Wednesday, July 8, U.S. President Donald Trump hosts Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador at the White House—only the second visit from a head of state since the coronavirus pandemic began.
Also on July 8, German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Marshall Billingslea, the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, will deliver remarks at the Brookings Institution’s EU Defense Washington Forum, held via webcast.
July 8 is also the deadline for candidates to submit their application to be the next World Trade Organization director-general. Incumbent Robert Azevêdo leaves the post on August 31.
On Friday, July 10, Singapore holds parliamentary elections. The People’s Action Party—in power since independence in 1965—is widely expected to win.
On Sunday, July 12, Poland’s runoff presidential vote will take place between incumbent Andrzej Duda and Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski. According to polls, the race is too close to call.
Odds and Ends
It was a Fourth of July to forget for the hundreds of far-right protesters, militia members, and biker groups that descended on Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on Saturday to prevent an an imagined flag-burning protest that now appears the work of an online troll. Word of the July 4 event had spread on Facebook after a page called Left Behind USA, and its anonymous owner, announced it in June. The Facebook posts bordered on the absurd, claiming organizers would “be giving away free small flags to children to safely throw into the fire” and provide “antifa face paint.” The counterprotesters, some armed, arrived on Saturday to learn the flag burning (and face painting) was nowhere to be found. “It doesn’t matter if it’s a hoax or not,” one biker from West Virginia noted. “They made a threat, and if we don’t make our voices heard, it’ll make it seem like it’s okay.”
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-07-06--Britain Is Becoming America in All the Worst Ways

Britain Is Becoming America in All the Worst Ways Are Britain ’ s Conservatives taking a Republican turn ?
In the last week , two strange speeches , a resignation , and a think tank report have all suggested that Boris Johnson ’ s government is hoping to escape the consequences of a botched Brexit and a calamitous response to the COVID-19 pandemic by turning to a distinctly U.S. model of politics .
This makes some sense .
Johnson ’ s victories in the Brexit referendum and last year ’ s general election relied on disaffected former Labour voters who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of economic disaster .
They weren ’ t the only part of his coalition or even the largest , but they were the vital new ingredient of the majorities that overturned British politics .
These voters ’ attitudes were examined and compared to party activists and members of Parliament in a report by the UK in a Changing Europe think tank .
The results were quite startling .
Instead of voters and MPs being more or less aligned in Labour and Conservative , with the activists in both parties further from the center @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the right of both their activists and still more their voters when it comes to economic questions .
But on social or libertarian questions , they are well to the left of their voters and their activists .
They may even be slightly to the left of mainstream public opinion : On capital punishment , which half the population still supports , Conservative MPs are much more abolitionist .
Labour , by contrast , is slightly to the left of public opinion on economic matters and clearly to the left on cultural @ @ @ @ @ @ @ down into the attitudes of former Labour voters who had gone for Leave in the referendum and the Tories in the subsequent general election , they were uniformly to the right , or authoritarian , side of even other Conservative voters .
In American terms , they are the voters who were the matter with Kansas .
They vote consistently against their own economic interests on the basis of their cultural values .
If anyone was supposed to behave like this in traditional British politics , it was the altruistic middle classes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in a more fair society .
Now we have a section of the working class voting for tax cuts because they want a society with more law and order .
This very American phenomenon seems to be the last best hope of the Conservative Party now that Labour has a competent and electable leader .
As one Conservative MP told the Atlantic ’ s Helen Lewis , “ The party hoped beyond hope to fight the next election on identity rather than economics , given the British economy is likely to still be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ therapeutic crusade against the ‘ loony left ’ while actually being fairly social liberal in comparison to the average voter would be just the electoral ticket.
” But what do they plan to do with the power they have ?
One answer was provided by the resignation , over the weekend , of Sir Mark Sedwill , the head of the civil service and , simultaneously , the national security advisor .
This was clearly a move toward a much more politicized civil service and in particular one more malleable to the desires @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who has fought the civil service ever since he was an advisor to Michael Gove at the Education Department .
Gove ’ s remarkable Ditchley lecture last weekend ( which textual analysis suggests was written by Cummings ) was much taken up with the praise of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt , as was Johnson ’ s rather wafflier speech on Tuesday .
The degree of concentration on a rather mythical version of the United States in Gove ’ s speech was extraordinary : He mentioned “ Europe ” only twice—once as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ left were breaking up and once as a place that was hostile to refugees .
The chutzpah , from the man who masterminded the xenophobic Leave campaign , is breathtaking .
But the word “ Brexit ” nowhere appeared in his speech .
Neither , of course , did “ Trump.
” To paraphrase another absent U.S. president , Lyndon B. Johnson : If your mother-in-law had only one eye , and that one eye was in the middle of her forehead , would you keep her in the living room ?
Even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ills of the world , the choice of words suggested that they were already speaking from the other side of the Atlantic : “ As the British author David Goodhart analyzed in his book The Road to Somewhere , the gap between those with connections and credentials who can live and work anywhere and those with fewer resources who remain rooted to the heartland has only widened in recent years .
His work , preceded by Christopher Lasch , has been supplemented by the writings of Paul Collier and J.D .
Vance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that those in the elite with cognitive skills , qualifications , and professional mobility tend to have , or develop , different social and political values from other citizens.
” That ’ s four authors cited , and only the British one is identified by nationality .
And one has to wonder just how profound and groundbreaking it is for an Etonian like Goodhart to discover that the elite has “ different social and political values from other citizens.
” Do they teach anything else at Eton ?
The elevation of FDR as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moses whose example shows us how to lead a nation out of the wilderness , does mark a real break with British tradition , quite as much as the attempt to bend the will of the civil service to that of unelected political advisors like Cummings .
When Roosevelt was alive , and at least until the Margaret Thatcher years , the idea among British politicians was not that they should learn from America but that they should teach them : Greeks to your Romans , and all that .
It wasn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was an important defense against the reality of fading British power .
It was first in the Tony Blair years that the British left started to use the United States as an inspiration .
For the right , it was still Winston Churchill , and until very recently Churchill was certainly the wartime leader with whom Johnson most wanted to be confused .
He had after all written a sort of biography of him .
But under the strain of real government and real opposition , Johnson ’ s Churchill imitation has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to believe in .
The advantage of Roosevelt is that he is , for most British people now , an almost entirely mythical figure , quite as much as Moses .
The attempt to claim his mantle makes , then , a kind of diversionary sense .
What it diverts us from is the last and most significant way in which the Johnson government would like to ape the United States .
It is not just the weaponization of culture wars or even the rousing of the masses against the elite .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tradition .
Donald Trump and FDR have nothing else in common , but both were understood to be riding roughshod over the inherited rules—both written and unwritten—that limited the power of the presidency .
In the same way , the Brexiteer movement with Cummings at its center first used the referendum vote to bend Parliament to its will and now is using the general election victory to try to crush the independence of the civil service .
There is no consistency , of course , in the British Conservative Party following FDR in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scandalized conservative opinion at the time .
But the Tories are not concerned with ideas and never much have been .
That ’ s not to say they ’ re stupid , but they understand that ideas are only ever interesting as a means to power .

Are Britain’s Conservatives taking a Republican turn? In the last week, two strange speeches, a resignation, and a think tank report have all suggested that Boris Johnson’s government is hoping to escape the consequences of a botched Brexit and a calamitous response to the COVID-19 pandemic by turning to a distinctly U.S. model of politics.
Are Britain’s Conservatives taking a Republican turn? In the last week, two strange speeches, a resignation, and a think tank report have all suggested that Boris Johnson’s government is hoping to escape the consequences of a botched Brexit and a calamitous response to the COVID-19 pandemic by turning to a distinctly U.S. model of politics.
This makes some sense. Johnson’s victories in the Brexit referendum and last year’s general election relied on disaffected former Labour voters who placed cultural values ahead of the threats of economic disaster. They weren’t the only part of his coalition or even the largest, but they were the vital new ingredient of the majorities that overturned British politics.
These voters’ attitudes were examined and compared to party activists and members of Parliament in a report by the UK in a Changing Europe think tank. The results were quite startling. Instead of voters and MPs being more or less aligned in Labour and Conservative, with the activists in both parties further from the center, Conservative MPs are a huge distance to the right of both their activists and still more their voters when it comes to economic questions. But on social or libertarian questions, they are well to the left of their voters and their activists. They may even be slightly to the left of mainstream public opinion: On capital punishment, which half the population still supports, Conservative MPs are much more abolitionist.
Labour, by contrast, is slightly to the left of public opinion on economic matters and clearly to the left on cultural ones. But when the polling drilled down into the attitudes of former Labour voters who had gone for Leave in the referendum and the Tories in the subsequent general election, they were uniformly to the right, or authoritarian, side of even other Conservative voters. In American terms, they are the voters who were the matter with Kansas. They vote consistently against their own economic interests on the basis of their cultural values.
If anyone was supposed to behave like this in traditional British politics, it was the altruistic middle classes, voting for tax rises because they believed in a more fair society. Now we have a section of the working class voting for tax cuts because they want a society with more law and order. This very American phenomenon seems to be the last best hope of the Conservative Party now that Labour has a competent and electable leader. As one Conservative MP told the Atlantic’s Helen Lewis, “The party hoped beyond hope to fight the next election on identity rather than economics, given the British economy is likely to still be in the toilet by 2024. A therapeutic crusade against the ‘loony left’ while actually being fairly social liberal in comparison to the average voter would be just the electoral ticket.”
But what do they plan to do with the power they have? One answer was provided by the resignation, over the weekend, of Sir Mark Sedwill, the head of the civil service and, simultaneously, the national security advisor. This was clearly a move toward a much more politicized civil service and in particular one more malleable to the desires of the unelected advisor Dominic Cummings, who has fought the civil service ever since he was an advisor to Michael Gove at the Education Department.
Gove’s remarkable Ditchley lecture last weekend (which textual analysis suggests was written by Cummings) was much taken up with the praise of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as was Johnson’s rather wafflier speech on Tuesday. The degree of concentration on a rather mythical version of the United States in Gove’s speech was extraordinary: He mentioned “Europe” only twice—once as a place where the parties of the old left were breaking up and once as a place that was hostile to refugees. The chutzpah, from the man who masterminded the xenophobic Leave campaign, is breathtaking. But the word “Brexit” nowhere appeared in his speech. Neither, of course, did “Trump.” To paraphrase another absent U.S. president, Lyndon B. Johnson: If your mother-in-law had only one eye, and that one eye was in the middle of her forehead, would you keep her in the living room?
Even when Gove (or Cummings) diagnosed the ills of the world, the choice of words suggested that they were already speaking from the other side of the Atlantic: “As the British author David Goodhart analyzed in his book The Road to Somewhere, the gap between those with connections and credentials who can live and work anywhere and those with fewer resources who remain rooted to the heartland has only widened in recent years. His work, preceded by Christopher Lasch, has been supplemented by the writings of Paul Collier and J.D. Vance among others, and they all underline that those in the elite with cognitive skills, qualifications, and professional mobility tend to have, or develop, different social and political values from other citizens.”
That’s four authors cited, and only the British one is identified by nationality. And one has to wonder just how profound and groundbreaking it is for an Etonian like Goodhart to discover that the elite has “different social and political values from other citizens.” Do they teach anything else at Eton?
The elevation of FDR as a mythical leader, a kind of Moses whose example shows us how to lead a nation out of the wilderness, does mark a real break with British tradition, quite as much as the attempt to bend the will of the civil service to that of unelected political advisors like Cummings. When Roosevelt was alive, and at least until the Margaret Thatcher years, the idea among British politicians was not that they should learn from America but that they should teach them: Greeks to your Romans, and all that. It wasn’t a very good idea, but it was an important defense against the reality of fading British power.
It was first in the Tony Blair years that the British left started to use the United States as an inspiration. For the right, it was still Winston Churchill, and until very recently Churchill was certainly the wartime leader with whom Johnson most wanted to be confused. He had after all written a sort of biography of him. But under the strain of real government and real opposition, Johnson’s Churchill imitation has become impossible even for his own party to believe in.
The advantage of Roosevelt is that he is, for most British people now, an almost entirely mythical figure, quite as much as Moses. The attempt to claim his mantle makes, then, a kind of diversionary sense. What it diverts us from is the last and most significant way in which the Johnson government would like to ape the United States.
It is not just the weaponization of culture wars or even the rousing of the masses against the elite. It’s the attitude toward power and tradition. Donald Trump and FDR have nothing else in common, but both were understood to be riding roughshod over the inherited rules—both written and unwritten—that limited the power of the presidency. In the same way, the Brexiteer movement with Cummings at its center first used the referendum vote to bend Parliament to its will and now is using the general election victory to try to crush the independence of the civil service. There is no consistency, of course, in the British Conservative Party following FDR in all the ways in which he most scandalized conservative opinion at the time. But the Tories are not concerned with ideas and never much have been. That’s not to say they’re stupid, but they understand that ideas are only ever interesting as a means to power.