foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Let’s Make Women’s Power Culturally Acceptable

Twenty-five years ago this month , delegates from 189 countries descended on Beijing to participate in the United Nations ’ Fourth World Conference on Women .
This meeting was notable for many reasons , not least because it was , at the time , the largest gathering of women ’ s rights advocates in history : In addition to official government delegations , some 30,000 activists from around the world attended the conference .
The rallying cry that emanated from Beijing , “ Women ’ s rights are human rights ” —famously proclaimed in a speech by the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today .
At the conclusion of the summit , years of activism culminated in a historic inflection point , as governments meeting in Beijing agreed to the most ambitious Platform for Action on women ’ s rights in history , one that called for the “ full and equal participation of women in political , civil , economic , social and cultural life.
” Perhaps less well known , but just as important , was the formation of a network of civil society activists—who had been relegated to run-down buildings in Huairou , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , by a Chinese government fearful of their power—who shared plans to implement the platform and address the issues that women faced around the globe .
From gender-based violence to restrictions on access to health care , and from unequal responsibility for caregiving and household labor to laws preventing ownership of property , access to credit , and fair pay , women found common cause in a universal set of struggles .
They left Beijing buoyed by the global recognition that violations of women ’ s rights and dignity—practices once seen as cultural—contravened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a half decades since , women ’ s rights activists have used the Beijing Platform as a springboard from which to press for legal and political change .
In some respects—most notably in the areas of legal rights , health , and education—they have succeeded .
In 1995 , only 13 countries around the world had laws criminalizing domestic violence ; today , more than 150 nations do , and 85 percent have provisions enshrining the promise of gender equality in their constitutions .
The scourge of maternal mortality , which previously @ @ @ @ @ @ @ year , has dropped by almost 50 percent .
And the gender gap in access to primary schooling has virtually closed on a global level , meaning that an entire generation of girls now has the chance for an education that was too often denied to their mothers or grandmothers .
Women ’ s rights activists have used the Beijing Platform as a springboard from which to press for legal and political change .
But in other areas—including the economy , politics , and security sector—women have made far less progress and in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gains in girls ’ education , women ’ s participation in the labor force actually dropped during the post-Beijing era , from 51 to 47 percent globally , even before the onset of COVID-19 decimated jobs disproportionately held by women .
Although the proportion of women in political power has risen slightly—from 10 female heads of state or government in 1995 to 21 today—women remain dramatically underrepresented in politics in almost all 193 U.N. member states across the globe .
Two decades after the U.N. Security Council recognized the importance of women ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ two women have ever served as chief negotiators of a peace agreement .
And women ’ s power to control their bodies and lives continues to be undermined by pervasive sexual harassment , gender-based violence , and restrictions on access to reproductive health care .
The coronavirus pandemic and the economic crisis that followed have added to these challenges .
Because women are more likely to be employed in the hardest-hit industries , such as retail and hospitality , their already tenuous place in the global economy has worsened .
Even those who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burden of caregiving and household work—a responsibility that disproportionately falls on women everywhere in the world .
As stress levels rise amid the pandemic , so has the incidence of intimate partner violence , jeopardizing the safety of women confined to their homes .
Meanwhile , in this moment of upheaval that has further threatened progress toward gender equality , the global women ’ s movement is growing rapidly .
While the Beijing conference welcomed women by the tens of thousands , today technology has permitted women to join forces by the tens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speed .
And while the Beijing summit was five years in the making , the Women ’ s March of 2017—the largest global women ’ s protest in history—was organized online on every continent in only six weeks .
In the fall of 2017 , the # MeToo movement exploded , ultimately reaching more than 100 countries .
And this year , COVID-19 and racial unrest have sparked new uprisings , from moms protesting in Portland to women marching in Minsk , adding to the tinder that has burned over the past several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fed political organizing : Women around the globe are running for office in historic numbers and campaigning for gender and racial equality .
If the 25 years since Beijing have been about women naming their rights , the next 25 must be about amassing sufficient power to claim them .
The need for this new wave of women ’ s activism demonstrates that many of the important rights won since Beijing—to prosecute abusers and harassers , fight discrimination , and compete in the economy—are too often unenforceable .
And while there are still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in law , frequently even women who have won rights on paper are unable to apply them in practice , in part because of deeply embedded cultural norms .
It is no accident that the areas where women have made the least progress—including the economic , political , and security sectors—have been historically male dominated .
Twenty-five years after the world first recognized women ’ s rights as human rights , staggering numbers of people remain deeply uncomfortable with women wielding power in areas traditionally reserved for men : About half of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ men make better political leaders than women , notwithstanding clear evidence that women ’ s inclusion in public life makes democracies stronger , more representative , and equitable .
More than 40 percent of those surveyed also believe that men make better business executives , disregarding research confirming that women ’ s participation on corporate boards and in the C-suite improves the bottom line .
Certainly , legal barriers remain , and more political will and resources are needed to pass , implement , and enforce laws .
Yet even where laws no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ compete for political office or in the economy , local and cultural norms hold women back , contributing to their dramatic underrepresentation in politics and corporate leadership and their overrepresentation in low-wage work .
And cultural limits on women ’ s personal autonomy—to resist sexual harassment , make reproductive choices , and share caregiving burdens—create barriers to equal opportunity at work and at home .
If the 25 years since Beijing have been about women naming their rights , the next 25 must be about amassing sufficient power to claim them .
Changing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shift .
Societies need to shift the expectations and attitudes that undergird the resistance to women ’ s power .
Though persistent , norms are mutable : Consider domestic violence , which was largely viewed as cultural or a private family matter a generation ago and today is recognized globally as a crime .
This breakthrough was achieved through not only advocacy for laws , policies , and treaties but also a revolution in attitudes .
To effect cultural change , we need to name and reframe the norms that still hold women @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outdated at best and debilitating at worst .
There are many , but three in particular sap women ’ s power .
First , stereotypes about the motives , authenticity , or so-called likability of women seeking power have hampered those running for elected office or rising in the private sector .
Second , preconceived ideas that peg women as caregivers and men as breadwinners have fueled the undervaluation of care work and limited women ’ s labor force participation , with dramatic consequences for their own financial security and for global economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harassment has been a cause and a result of a power imbalance , which in turn has left women in the workplace—particularly low-paid women and women of color—unprotected and underpaid , undermining their collective potential .
To effect cultural change , we need to name and reframe the norms that still hold women back from reaching power and influence .
Countries and communities need to arm the global women ’ s movement that has been flexing its muscles in recent years with resources , a clear and coordinated message , and a concerted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well as a ground game engaging grassroots communities to push back on outdated norms and divisions of labor .
Campaigns to make women ’ s power culturally acceptable will help ensure that women have the leverage to claim their rights not just in theory but also in practice—and demonstrate that power may come in the form of a woman wearing a mask , rather than a man behind a desk or wielding an army .
This recognition , in part , will help us finally realize the promise of the Beijing Platform—and unleash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and our sons .

Twenty-five years ago this month, delegates from 189 countries descended on Beijing to participate in the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women . This meeting was notable for many reasons, not least because it was, at the time, the largest gathering of women’s rights advocates in history: In addition to official government delegations, some 30,000 activists from around the world attended the conference. The rallying cry that emanated from Beijing, “ Women’s rights are human rights ”—famously proclaimed in a speech by the United States’ then-first lady, Hillary Clinton—still reverberates today.
Twenty-five years ago this month, delegates from 189 countries descended on Beijing to participate in the United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women. This meeting was notable for many reasons, not least because it was, at the time, the largest gathering of women’s rights advocates in history: In addition to official government delegations, some 30,000 activists from around the world attended the conference. The rallying cry that emanated from Beijing, “Women’s rights are human rights”—famously proclaimed in a speech by the United States’ then-first lady, Hillary Clinton—still reverberates today.
At the conclusion of the summit, years of activism culminated in a historic inflection point, as governments meeting in Beijing agreed to the most ambitious Platform for Action on women’s rights in history, one that called for the “full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life.” Perhaps less well known, but just as important, was the formation of a network of civil society activists relegated to run-down buildings in Huairou, a muddy, far-off suburb of Beijing, by a Chinese government fearful of their power—who shared plans to implement the platform and address the issues that women faced around the globe. From gender-based violence to restrictions on access to health care, and from unequal responsibility for caregiving and household labor to laws preventing ownership of property, access to credit, and fair pay, women found common cause in a universal set of struggles. They left Beijing buoyed by the global recognition that violations of women’s rights and dignity—practices once seen as cultural—contravened fundamental human rights.
In the two and a half decades since, women’s rights activists have used the Beijing Platform as a springboard from which to press for legal and political change. In some respects—most notably in the areas of legal rights, health, and education—they have succeeded. In 1995, only 13 countries around the world had laws criminalizing domestic violence; today, more than 150 nations do, and 85 percent have provisions enshrining the promise of gender equality in their constitutions. The scourge of maternal mortality, which previously stood at half a million women per year, has dropped by almost 50 percent. And the gender gap in access to primary schooling has virtually closed on a global level, meaning that an entire generation of girls now has the chance for an education that was too often denied to their mothers or grandmothers.
Women’s rights activists have used the Beijing Platform as a springboard from which to press for legal and political change.
But in other areas—including the economy, politics, and security sector—women have made far less progress and in some cases even regressed. Despite the gains in girls’ education, women’s participation in the labor force actually dropped during the post-Beijing era, from 51 to 47 percent globally, even before the onset of COVID-19 decimated jobs disproportionately held by women. Although the proportion of women in political power has risen slightly—from 10 female heads of state or government in 1995 to 21 today—women remain dramatically underrepresented in politics in almost all 193 U.N. member states across the globe. Two decades after the U.N. Security Council recognized the importance of women’s contributions to security processes, only two women have ever served as chief negotiators of a peace agreement. And women’s power to control their bodies and lives continues to be undermined by pervasive sexual harassment, gender-based violence, and restrictions on access to reproductive health care.
The coronavirus pandemic and the economic crisis that followed have added to these challenges. Because women are more likely to be employed in the hardest-hit industries, such as retail and hospitality, their already tenuous place in the global economy has worsened. Even those who are employed remain saddled with a double burden of caregiving and household work—a responsibility that disproportionately falls on women everywhere in the world. As stress levels rise amid the pandemic, so has the incidence of intimate partner violence, jeopardizing the safety of women confined to their homes.
Meanwhile, in this moment of upheaval that has further threatened progress toward gender equality, the global women’s movement is growing rapidly. While the Beijing conference welcomed women by the tens of thousands, today technology has permitted women to join forces by the tens of millions and to organize with remarkable speed. And while the Beijing summit was five years in the making, the Women’s March of 2017—the largest global women’s protest in history—was organized online on every continent in only six weeks. In the fall of 2017, the #MeToo movement exploded, ultimately reaching more than 100 countries. And this year, COVID-19 and racial unrest have sparked new uprisings, from moms protesting in Portland to women marching in Minsk, adding to the tinder that has burned over the past several years. This digital activism has also fed political organizing: Women around the globe are running for office in historic numbers and campaigning for gender and racial equality.
If the 25 years since Beijing have been about women naming their rights, the next 25 must be about amassing sufficient power to claim them.
The need for this new wave of women’s activism demonstrates that many of the important rights won since Beijing—to prosecute abusers and harassers, fight discrimination, and compete in the economy—are too often unenforceable. And while there are still many places where gender inequalities remain enshrined in law, frequently even women who have won rights on paper are unable to apply them in practice, in part because of deeply embedded cultural norms. It is no accident that the areas where women have made the least progress—including the economic, political, and security sectors—have been historically male dominated. Twenty-five years after the world first recognized women’s rights as human rights, staggering numbers of people remain deeply uncomfortable with women wielding power in areas traditionally reserved for men: About half of the people surveyed across 75 countries believe that men make better political leaders than women, notwithstanding clear evidence that women’s inclusion in public life makes democracies stronger, more representative, and equitable. More than 40 percent of those surveyed also believe that men make better business executives, disregarding research confirming that women’s participation on corporate boards and in the C-suite improves the bottom line.
Certainly, legal barriers remain, and more political will and resources are needed to pass, implement, and enforce laws. Yet even where laws no longer limit women’s ability to compete for political office or in the economy, local and cultural norms hold women back, contributing to their dramatic underrepresentation in politics and corporate leadership and their overrepresentation in low-wage work. And cultural limits on women’s personal autonomy—to resist sexual harassment, make reproductive choices, and share caregiving burdens—create barriers to equal opportunity at work and at home. If the 25 years since Beijing have been about women naming their rights, the next 25 must be about amassing sufficient power to claim them.
Changing these underlying dynamics will require a cultural shift. Societies need to shift the expectations and attitudes that undergird the resistance to women’s power. Though persistent, norms are mutable: Consider domestic violence, which was largely viewed as cultural or a private family matter a generation ago and today is recognized globally as a crime. This breakthrough was achieved through not only advocacy for laws, policies, and treaties but also a revolution in attitudes.
To effect cultural change, we need to name and reframe the norms that still hold women back from reaching power and influence—which are outdated at best and debilitating at worst. There are many, but three in particular sap women’s power. First, stereotypes about the motives, authenticity, or so-called likability of women seeking power have hampered those running for elected office or rising in the private sector. Second, preconceived ideas that peg women as caregivers and men as breadwinners have fueled the undervaluation of care work and limited women’s labor force participation, with dramatic consequences for their own financial security and for global economic growth. Third, tolerance of sexual harassment has been a cause and a result of a power imbalance, which in turn has left women in the workplace—particularly low-paid women and women of color—unprotected and underpaid, undermining their collective potential.
To effect cultural change, we need to name and reframe the norms that still hold women back from reaching power and influence.
The global women’s movement that has been flexing its muscles in recent years needs resources, a clear and coordinated message, and a concerted strategy—an air game enlisting cultural influencers as well as a ground game engaging grassroots communities to push back on outdated norms and divisions of labor. Campaigns to make women’s power culturally acceptable will help ensure that women have the leverage to claim their rights not just in theory but also in practice—and demonstrate that power may come in the form of a woman wearing a mask, rather than a man behind a desk or wielding an army. This recognition, in part, will help us finally realize the promise of the Beijing Platform—and unleash the full potential of both our daughters and our sons.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Pompeo Ramps Up Diplomatic War on China

Pompeo Ramps Up Diplomatic War on China

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump administration cracks down on movements of Chinese diplomats in the U.S. , a new DoD report on China ’ s growing military might , new details on the U.S. counter-terror campaign in Somalia , personnel shake-ups at the Pentagon , and more .
Chloe Hadavas and Augusta Saraiva contributed to this report .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that senior Chinese diplomats would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campuses , meet with local government officials , and organize events larger than 50 people outside of embassy grounds .
It ’ s the latest escalation in the simmering tit-for-tat diplomatic battle between Washington and Beijing with tensions over military maneuverings in the Asia-Pacific , the coronavirus pandemic , and trade .
The move reflects how distrustful the Trump administration is of China ’ s soft power forays in the United States , including Chinese-funded Confucius Institutes on college campuses .
It ’ s also likely to worsen relations between Washington and Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closure of China ’ s consulate in Houston amid espionage accusations .
Pompeo in his announcement on Wednesday characterized the move as only fair , given how many restrictions American diplomats in China face in trying to conduct routine business .
“ We ’ re simply demanding reciprocity .
Access for our diplomats in China should be reflective of the access that Chinese diplomats in the United States have , and today ’ s steps will move us substantially in that direction , ” he said .
China ’ s growing military might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Liberation Army ( PLA ) into a force that rivals the U.S. military within 30 years , according to the U.S. Department of Defense ’ s new annual report on China ’ s military and security developments .
Not only have China ’ s navy , ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles , and air defense systems recently surpassed those of the United States , but the country has also entirely restructured the PLA , forged closer ties to foreign militaries , and expanded its presence overseas .
The modernization of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s plans for “ the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation ” by 2049 , and its ambitions are far from symbolic : The government ’ s goal , according to the report , is to use the PLA as a tool in its statecraft to bolster China ’ s place in the international order and help the country “ lead the reform of the global governance system.
” You down with I-C-C ?
( Not U.S.G . )
On Wednesday , the Trump administration announced sanctions on top International Criminal Court officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and personnel without the consent of the U.S. government .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said U.S. sanctions first unveiled in June will be slapped on ICC ’ s top prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and its head of jurisdiction , Phakiso Mochochoko , freezing their American assets and hitting them with harsh travel restrictions typically reserved for war criminals .
One of just a few nations that have not signed up to the court , U.S. grievances against the Hague-based body come as it is investigating whether American forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the Defense Department ’ s online content hub are shedding new light on how secretive U.S. counter-terrorism forces in Somalia operate , according to ace national security reporters Wesley Morgan and Chad Garland .
The article posted late last week by the Pentagon ’ s top task force in the Horn of Africa reveals more clearly the structure of American forces in the war-torn country than previously known .
The United States is using a military assistance group , office of security cooperation , and joint special operations task force that likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team operating there , Morgan said .
The Pentagon statement indicated that the military assistance group works with United Nations-backed military forces in Somalia to develop their “ capability to conduct combined operations.
” ( But as VOA ’ s Jeff Seldin reports this week , a new Pentagon watchdog assessment found that terrorist groups are gaining ground in Africa despite U.S. and international counter-terrorism efforts . )
An olive branch to Kim .
Japan ’ s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga , a favorite to replace departing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to start talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions to resolve the abductions of Japanese nationals .
Japan estimates that 875 citizens are suspected of being kidnapped by North Korea since the 1970s , and though Pyongyang denies most of the cases , they have cast a longstanding pall over the two countries ’ relations .
Abe ’ s Liberal Democratic Party is set to pick his successor on Sept. 14 .
New DARPA chief .
Dr. Victoria Coleman , an expert on artificial intelligence and microelectronics , has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Advanced Research Projects Agency , the Pentagon ’ s secretive research arm .
Coleman is the third woman to lead the agency since its inception in 1958 , as Military.com ’ s Richard Sisk reports .
Revolving door at the Pentagon .
Michael Cutrone , a former national security aide to Vice President Mike Pence who officials feared would try to weed out civilians seen as disloyal to Trump when he joined the Pentagon in May , is moving up .
Politico reported on Thursday that Cutrone will lead the Pentagon ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Africa , and the Middle East .
Cutrone follows a quick succession of officials in that role , after Katie Wheelbarger , who acted in the position for two years but was spurned for a top Pentagon intelligence role , resigned in June .
Michael Ryan , the deputy assistant secretary for Europe who had temporarily stepped into the position after Wheelbarger ’ s departure , will retain his old role .
Top Esper aide launched into space ( policy ) .
Justin Johnson , a former policy analyst at the conservative @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mark Esper ’ s deputy chief of staff , is getting a promotion to become the Pentagon ’ s civilian lead for the nascent Space Force .
Stephen Kitay , the last deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy , left the administration in August .
New State Department watchdog… again .
The Trump administration tapped Michael Klimow , a career government employee and recent ambassador to Turkmenistan , to head the State Department ’ s troubled Office of Inspector General , Politico ’ s Nahal Toosi reports .
The watchdog office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ battles between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Democratic lawmakers over investigations into allegations of mismanagement and controversial arms sales under Trump .
The last watchdog quit after less than three months on the job .
Aas-ta la vista .
Kåre Aas , Norwegian ambassador to the United States , announced his tour is coming to an end after 7 years , leaving a Washington that is very different from the one he entered in 2013 .
Paramilitary president ?
Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe–currently under house arrest amid a probe into alleged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ witness tampering–might have worked closely with right-wing militias in the 1990s , newly declassified U.S. intelligence reports disclosed this week indicate .
Additional U.S. cables suggest that backstage deals with paramilitary groups might have continued during his presidency .
Beyond the militias , past U.S. reports have also indicated that the former president might have worked with his home state ’ s Medellín Cartel , describing him as “ a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar.
” There is no evidence that Uribe ’ s alleged ties to the United Self-Defense Forces of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acronym ) , which Washington declared a foreign terrorist organization in 2001 , jeopardized U.S. aid to Colombia during his presidency .
Tour the Pentagon ’ s nuke museum .
Thanks to a Freedom of Information Act request , you can now tour the Pentagon ’ s own museum of nuclear weapons dating back to the Manhattan Project .
Some of the highlights : rarely seen pictures of scuttled Cold War-era nukes and the Defense Department ’ s very own collection of Soviet missiles .
Spy games in East Africa .
From the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigative reporting that details the CIA and MI6 ’ s secret counter-terrorism wars in Kenya .
On Tuesday , Sept. 8 , Pompeo will speak at the Atlantic Council about China ’ s influence on Europe after visiting the Czech Republic , Slovenia , Austria , and Poland last month .
Former South African President Jacob Zuma–forced from office earlier this year–will begin a corruption trial linked with a 1990s arms deal on Tuesday .
Director of the National Institutes of Health Francis Collins and Surgeon General Vice Adm. Jerome Adams are set @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on U.S. efforts to develop a coronavirus vaccine .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump administration cracks down on movements of Chinese diplomats in the U.S., a new DoD report on China’s growing military might, new details on the U.S. counter-terror campaign in Somalia , personnel shake-ups at the Pentagon, and more.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump administration cracks down on movements of Chinese diplomats in the U.S., a new DoD report on China’s growing military might, new details on the U.S. counter-terror campaign in Somalia, personnel shake-ups at the Pentagon, and more.
Chloe Hadavas and Augusta Saraiva contributed to this report.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
No Room to Maneuver
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that senior Chinese diplomats would need advance permission to visit U.S. university campuses, meet with local government officials, and organize events larger than 50 people outside of embassy grounds. It’s the latest escalation in the simmering tit-for-tat diplomatic battle between Washington and Beijing with tensions over military maneuverings in the Asia-Pacific, the coronavirus pandemic, and trade.
The move reflects how distrustful the Trump administration is of China’s soft power forays in the United States, including Chinese-funded Confucius Institutes on college campuses. It’s also likely to worsen relations between Washington and Beijing after the United States abruptly forced the closure of China’s consulate in Houston amid espionage accusations.
Pompeo in his announcement on Wednesday characterized the move as only fair, given how many restrictions American diplomats in China face in trying to conduct routine business. “We’re simply demanding reciprocity. Access for our diplomats in China should be reflective of the access that Chinese diplomats in the United States have, and today’s steps will move us substantially in that direction,” he said.
What We’re Watching
China’s growing military might. China plans to transform its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a force that rivals the U.S. military within 30 years, according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s new annual report on China’s military and security developments. Not only have China’s navy, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and air defense systems recently surpassed those of the United States, but the country has also entirely restructured the PLA, forged closer ties to foreign militaries, and expanded its presence overseas. The modernization of the PLA is part of the government’s plans for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049, and its ambitions are far from symbolic: The government’s goal, according to the report, is to use the PLA as a tool in its statecraft to bolster China’s place in the international order and help the country “lead the reform of the global governance system.”
You down with I-C-C? (Not U.S.G.) On Wednesday, the Trump administration announced sanctions on top International Criminal Court officials who investigate or prosecute American service members and personnel without the consent of the U.S. government. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said U.S. sanctions first unveiled in June will be slapped on ICC’s top prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and its head of jurisdiction, Phakiso Mochochoko, freezing their American assets and hitting them with harsh travel restrictions typically reserved for war criminals. One of just a few nations that have not signed up to the court, U.S. grievances against the Hague-based body come as it is investigating whether American forces committed war crimes in Afghanistan.
Oops Sec. Photo captions posted on the Defense Department’s online content hub are shedding new light on how secretive U.S. counter-terrorism forces in Somalia operate, according to ace national security reporters Wesley Morgan and Chad Garland. The article posted late last week by the Pentagon’s top task force in the Horn of Africa reveals more clearly the structure of American forces in the war-torn country than previously known. The United States is using a military assistance group, office of security cooperation, and joint special operations task force that likely oversees the bulk of the Navy SEAL team operating there, Morgan said. The Pentagon statement indicated that the military assistance group works with United Nations-backed military forces in Somalia to develop their “capability to conduct combined operations.” (But as VOA’s Jeff Seldin reports this week, a new Pentagon watchdog assessment found that terrorist groups are gaining ground in Africa despite U.S. and international counter-terrorism efforts.)
An olive branch to Kim. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, a favorite to replace departing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, said on Wednesday he’s prepared to start talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un without preconditions to resolve the abductions of Japanese nationals. Japan estimates that 875 citizens are suspected of being kidnapped by North Korea since the 1970s, and though Pyongyang denies most of the cases, they have cast a longstanding pall over the two countries’ relations. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party is set to pick his successor on Sept. 14.
Movers and Shakers
New DARPA chief. Dr. Victoria Coleman, an expert on artificial intelligence and microelectronics, has been named the new head of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagon’s secretive research arm. Coleman is the third woman to lead the agency since its inception in 1958, as Military.com’s Richard Sisk reports.
Revolving door at the Pentagon. Michael Cutrone, a former national security aide to Vice President Mike Pence who officials feared would try to weed out civilians seen as disloyal to Trump when he joined the Pentagon in May, is moving up. Politico reported on Thursday that Cutrone will lead the Pentagon’s international policy shop, which oversees Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Cutrone follows a quick succession of officials in that role, after Katie Wheelbarger, who acted in the position for two years but was spurned for a top Pentagon intelligence role, resigned in June. Michael Ryan, the deputy assistant secretary for Europe who had temporarily stepped into the position after Wheelbarger’s departure, will retain his old role.
Top Esper aide launched into space (policy). Justin Johnson, a former policy analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation and most recently Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s deputy chief of staff, is getting a promotion to become the Pentagon’s civilian lead for the nascent Space Force. Stephen Kitay, the last deputy assistant secretary of defense for space policy, left the administration in August.
New State Department watchdog… again. The Trump administration tapped Michael Klimow, a career government employee and recent ambassador to Turkmenistan, to head the State Department’s troubled Office of Inspector General, Politico’s Nahal Toosi reports. The watchdog office has been at the center of pitched battles between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Democratic lawmakers over investigations into allegations of mismanagement and controversial arms sales under Trump. The last watchdog quit after less than three months on the job.
Aas-ta la vista. Kåre Aas, Norwegian ambassador to the United States, announced his tour is coming to an end after 7 years, leaving a Washington that is very different from the one he entered in 2013.
From the Vault
Paramilitary president? Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe–currently under house arrest amid a probe into alleged acts of fraud, bribery, and witness tampering–might have worked closely with right-wing militias in the 1990s, newly declassified U.S. intelligence reports disclosed this week indicate. Additional U.S. cables suggest that backstage deals with paramilitary groups might have continued during his presidency. Beyond the militias, past U.S. reports have also indicated that the former president might have worked with his home state’s Medellín Cartel, describing him as “a close personal friend of Pablo Escobar.” There is no evidence that Uribe’s alleged ties to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, for its Spanish acronym), which Washington declared a foreign terrorist organization in 2001, jeopardized U.S. aid to Colombia during his presidency.
Odds and Ends
Tour the Pentagon’s nuke museum. Thanks to a Freedom of Information Act request, you can now tour the Pentagon’s own museum of nuclear weapons dating back to the Manhattan Project. Some of the highlights: rarely seen pictures of scuttled Cold War-era nukes and the Defense Department’s very own collection of Soviet missiles.
What We’re Reading
Spy games in East Africa. From the Daily Maverick, a must-read piece of investigative reporting that details the CIA and MI6’s secret counter-terrorism wars in Kenya.
The Week Ahead:
On Tuesday, Sept. 8, Pompeo will speak at the Atlantic Council about China’s influence on Europe after visiting the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria, and Poland last month.
Former South African President Jacob Zuma–forced from office earlier this year–will begin a corruption trial linked with a 1990s arms deal on Tuesday.
Director of the National Institutes of Health Francis Collins and Surgeon General Vice Adm. Jerome Adams are set to testify in the Senate on Wednesday on U.S. efforts to develop a coronavirus vaccine.
That’s it for today.
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foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Kosovo PM: ‘There Is No Other Solution Than Mutual Recognition’

Kosovo PM : ‘ There Is No Other Solution Than Mutual Recognition ’ The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo are meeting at the White House for two days of talks starting Thursday in a bid to improve economic cooperation between the unreconciled neighbors—a key moment as both try to put the ghosts of the Balkan war behind them and look toward a joint future inside the European Union .
The Trump administration is hopeful that job creation and economic development between the feuding countries—both formerly part of Yugoslavia—can pave the way for peace .
“ We ’ re going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic ties first , and political issues later , an advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters in a call Tuesday .
But it ’ s still unclear whether Belgrade will budge on the fundamental issue of recognizing the independence of Kosovo , which was its former province that for historic reasons looms large in Serbian national identity .
Following a bitter war in the 1990s , Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 , and over 100 countries have since recognized it—though not some important players in the Balkans , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stakes are high for both parties to reach an agreement : Normalization of ties is a key precondition for them to join the EU , something both Pristina and Belgrade have said is a top priority .
Kosovo is not yet an official candidate to join the bloc while Serbia has already begun accession talks but still has a long road ahead .
On the eve of the talks , Foreign Policy spoke with Kosovo ’ s Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti about his hopes for the two-day meeting .
What follows has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Policy : What are your aspirations for these talks at the White House with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic ?
What are you hoping that will come of this ?
Avdullah Hoti : We have been talking with Serbia for almost a decade .
We declared our independence back in 2008 , and then Serbia asked for an opinion from the International Court of Justice whether our Declaration of Independence violated any international law .
In July 2010 , the International Court of Justice decided that this declaration did not violate international law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we started our discussions in Brussels about various issues to normalize relations between the two countries .
And we reached a number of agreements , more than 30 agreements .
Most of them have not been implemented .
Why ?
Because we just couldn ’ t address the main issue , which is mutual recognition between the two countries .
This time in Washington , we have a strong agenda on improving and strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries , developing large-scale infrastructure projects that would make our two economies more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region , and beyond the region as well .
Of course , the main issue remains a final settlement , a peace agreement between the two countries that will solve once and forever the open issue between the two countries , which is mutual recognition , because it seems that without addressing this main issue , we just can not achieve a full normalization between the two countries .
FP : Are you optimistic that President Vucic would agree to those terms ?
In an interview with us earlier this year he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict with Kosovo to continue .
AH : It ’ s hard to say because President Vucic keeps saying that he is not going to accept an agreement that includes mutual recognition .
The reality is that there is no other solution than mutual recognition between the two countries .
But I think that the good thing is that now we see strong commitment by key countries such as the U.S. , Germany , France , and some other EU countries on engaging very , very actively to reach a final agreement .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to break the stalemate ?
AH : Well , I think it should be made very clear to Serbia that the only way to progress on EU integration and Euro-Atlantic integration is reaching a final agreement with Kosovo .
We are trying to be very constructive .
But again , Serbia is playing with both cards .
Just before coming here and before other meetings in Brussels , President Vucic visits Moscow and meets other countries , kind of , as I said , playing with both cards .
FP : Are you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship with China and the very close relationship with Moscow could undermine the influence that Western powers have over Serbia to help bring it to the negotiating table on key issues ?
AH : I believe that the only solution for the whole region , including Serbia , is EU integration .
It ’ s a pity to see the Serbian leadership turn to the east from time to time , strengthening economic ties with the east or even entering into some agreements to buy and sell military weapons .
But there is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an EU perspective .
And as soon as Serbia realizes this , the better for the whole region .
As far as we are concerned as a country , we see no other alternative than Euro-Atlantic integration .
When I started my job as prime minister [ this June ] , we removed all obstacles as they were seen by the international community .
And now we are actually asking for some concrete results .
FP : The U.S. special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo negotiations , Ric Grenell , has said that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on economic cooperation .
Are you optimistic that greater economic ties can lead to an improvement in political relations ?
AH : I hope so .
I firmly believe that by engaging in a dialogue on economic cooperation and starting large-scale projects , I think we would strengthen the economy , and cooperation between the two countries .
I see this as a complementary , supportive action toward the final agreement .
FP : There ’ s speculation that the White House is keen for a deal between Serbia and Kosovo to bolster @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal-maker .
Are you concerned Kosovo could be pressured into a deal that might be unfavorable ?
AH : There is no pressure at all whatsoever .
We were asked to come to Washington to sit together to reach an agreement on economic cooperation between the countries concentrated on , as I said before , some large-scale infrastructure projects that will strengthen the economic cooperation between the two countries and that it would integrate the region in terms of economic cooperation .
But there is no pressure whatsoever .

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foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Defying Peace Deal, Freed Taliban Return to Battlefield

Taliban prisoners released by the Afghan government as part of a deal brokered by the United States aimed at ending almost 20 years of war are returning to the battlefield as commanders and fighters , in direct contravention of pledges made by the insurgents to the White House .
Confidential research obtained by Foreign Policy shows that the majority of Taliban prisoners released under an agreement signed by insurgent leaders and the United States are taking up arms to fight Afghan forces and continue their “ jihad ” to overthrow the U.S.-backed Afghan government and replace it with an Islamic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the Afghan Peace Dialogue Project at Queen ’ s University in Belfast , Norther Ireland , the Taliban experts Michael Semple and Felix Kuehn found that former Taliban prisoners were “ participating in combat , being killed fighting , being taken prisoner and one case of an ex-prisoner being involved with revenge assassinations.
” A majority , 68 percent , of the 108 former Taliban prisoners profiled for the research “ have already been re-integrated into the Taliban and have resumed active roles in the conflict , or are in Taliban groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occupying military or political positions which are fundamentally linked to the Taliban war effort , ” Semple and Kuehn write .
“ A number of ex-prisoners have been appointed to direct command positions since their release , ” they found .
“ Two ex-prisoners have reassumed their former military command positions where brothers or sons had taken over temporarily .
… A number have already assumed oﬃcial positions within the Taliban shadow administration .
The appointment of ex-prisoners as uluswals—which are essentially in charge of military aﬀairs and oversee civilian matters at a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent of the interviewees wished to return to the battle but were “ being held back by family opposition , ” mostly by their wives .
A further 27 , or 24 percent , “ will categorically not re-join the conflict ” for various reasons , mainly because they wished to return to civilian life .
A senior Afghan official , who did not wish to be identified , said the report ’ s findings “ comport with what we have observed.
” The research appears to confirm doubts about the value of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their men off the battlefield once released from prison , and comply with other conditions in their agreement with the United States , including renouncing ties with al Qaeda .
Critics of the deal suspect the Taliban are interested only in a return to power that will facilitate their ultimate goal of establishing an Islamist government , hand in hand with al Qaeda .
The revelations of Taliban deception come as an Afghan security official confirmed that all prisoners have been released from both sides .
An Afghan government delegation is preparing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , speaking confidentially , to prepare for direct talks with the Taliban leadership , which maintains a political office in the emirate .
The United States signed a bilateral deal on Feb. 29 with the Taliban in which Washington agreed to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and end almost 20 years of war following the al Qaeda attacks of Sept. 11 , 2001 .
In return , the insurgents agreed to cut ties with al Qaeda and stop attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan .
The prisoner swap was seen as a precursor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the Taliban .
Both sides are preparing delegations , and Afghan officials say the talks could start within weeks .
The U.S. troop drawdown is proceeding at such pace military sources say it could be complete ahead of the deadline .
But the Taliban have not cut ties with al Qaeda , and some experts say the two groups have become closer since the Doha agreement .
The deal brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s envoy , Zalmay Khalilzad , makes no mention of drugs , which provide almost $ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , nor does it oblige Pakistan , which hosts and helps fund the insurgents , to curtail its support .
The Afghan government was not included in the negotiations .
Khalilzad touted the prisoner releases as a trust-building exercise between the Afghan government and its enemy .
Taliban leaders promised their released prisoners would not redeploy and instead return to their homes “ peacefully , ” with a cash stipend provided by the government of Qatar , which hosts the insurgents ’ political office , and from Taliban coffers .
Initially , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces—was to take place within weeks of the Doha agreement , but it has been drawn out by practical and political disagreements .
Most recently , Australia and France objected to the scheduled release of Taliban implicated in the deaths of their soldiers .
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani convened a Loya Jirga , or consultative council of community leaders , to gain national consent for the swap to continue .
It was completed on Wednesday with the release of the final tranche of Taliban prisoners , the security official said , after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commandos .
With the swap completed , the two sides are expected to commence talks aimed at formalizing a peace , with the Taliban seeking a role in the governance of the country .
Yet the Taliban—which styles itself as the government-in-exile of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—refuses to recognize the legitimacy of Ghani ’ s government .
Afghan , American , and international officials say the Taliban ’ s apparent failure to abide by all conditions of the agreement could scupper progress , though there appears to be no move to slow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violence has escalated—with a brief cease-fire to mark Eid at the end of July .
They have largely adhered to the commitment not to attack U.S. forces—though rocket attacks on bases in Helmand in July were blamed on the Taliban , a New York Times report said .
The United Nations recorded 3,500 conflict-related civilian casualties , including 1,300 deaths , in the first half of 2020 .
As doubts about the Taliban ’ s integrity in the negotiations finally rise to the surface , the new research for Queen ’ s University @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for Global Peace , Security and Justice has found that a majority of the Taliban prisoners released so far have indeed returned to the fight , or to previously held positions within the organization .
The Taliban ’ s public pledge that released prisoners would not resume fighting was seen by many of the interviewees as meaningless , with one saying it was “ simply a deception , as part of a trick that we are playing on the foreigners .
We ex-prisoners have to return to our place in the ranks of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight against occupation until the coming of an Islamic government.
” The Taliban ’ s Prisoners ’ Affairs Commission issued a statement on May 27 outlining guidance to released prisoners , urging them to “ start a peaceful life with their families , ” and to emphasize this in any media interviews .
Queen ’ s University ’ s Semple and Kuehn say there is no question of the prisoners “ returning ” to the Taliban as by definition they never left and are obliged to continue “ jihad.
” By sending released @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taliban leaders were complying with a directive of their senior leader “ to refrain from placing obstacles to the progress of the jihad .
Preventing Taliban from willingly joining the ﬁght would be a classic example of such an obstacle , and is therefore prohibited , ” they write .
“ Some Taliban interviewed understood the stance , that prisoners should not return to the ﬁght , as a deliberate deception .
… They understood that pretending that prisoners would not be allowed to return to ﬁght was a necessary price to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continued.
” Some senior American military leaders have expressed concerns that the Taliban have not adhered to conditions of the Doha agreement , though there does not appear to have been any halt to the drawdown of U.S. troops .
Around 8,600 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan , down from 13,000 ahead of the Doha accord .
The next tranche of departures is scheduled for coming months—Trump said in a recent interview that the figure would be between 4,000 and 5,000 ahead of November ’ s U.S. presidential election .
Some U.S. military @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s enduring links with al Qaeda .
Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said in June that the Taliban had not “ fully met ” the conditions of the Doha deal .
“ I think the Taliban needs to demonstrate they ’ re going to be faithful partners too , ” he said .
The Kabul government official hinted , without detail , that the United States was dissatisfied with the level of Taliban compliance with the terms of the agreement .
He said the Queen ’ s University report showed that “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy inconsistency .
Their struggle to manage the fighting force , which has borne the brunt of the violence , amid their rhetoric for peace will be an Achilles ’ heel for any possible agreement .
“ They have to demonstrate in action their rhetoric about wanting peace .
And , of course , there is the expectation that the U.S. has to help them adhere to the letter of their deal , including commitments on the post-release activities of the convicts , ” he said .

Taliban prisoners released by the Afghan government as part of a deal brokered by the United States aimed at ending almost 20 years of war are returning to the battlefield as commanders and fighters, in direct contravention of pledges made by the insurgents to the White House.
Taliban prisoners released by the Afghan government as part of a deal brokered by the United States aimed at ending almost 20 years of war are returning to the battlefield as commanders and fighters, in direct contravention of pledges made by the insurgents to the White House.
Confidential research obtained by Foreign Policy shows that the majority of Taliban prisoners released under an agreement signed by insurgent leaders and the United States are taking up arms to fight Afghan forces and continue their “jihad” to overthrow the U.S.-backed Afghan government and replace it with an Islamic emirate.
In an unreleased paper written for the Afghan Peace Dialogue Project at Queen’s University in Belfast, Norther Ireland, the Taliban experts Michael Semple and Felix Kuehn found that former Taliban prisoners were “participating in combat, being killed fighting, being taken prisoner and one case of an ex-prisoner being involved with revenge assassinations.”
A majority, 68 percent, of the 108 former Taliban prisoners profiled for the research “have already been re-integrated into the Taliban and have resumed active roles in the conflict, or are in Taliban groups intent on resuming fighting, or are occupying military or political positions which are fundamentally linked to the Taliban war effort,” Semple and Kuehn write.
“A number of ex-prisoners have been appointed to direct command positions since their release,” they found. “Two ex-prisoners have reassumed their former military command positions where brothers or sons had taken over temporarily. … A number have already assumed oﬃcial positions within the Taliban shadow administration. The appointment of ex-prisoners as uluswals—which are essentially in charge of military aﬀairs and oversee civilian matters at a district level—is now widespread.”
Another 8 percent of the interviewees wished to return to the battle but were “being held back by family opposition,” mostly by their wives. A further 27, or 24 percent, “will categorically not re-join the conflict” for various reasons, mainly because they wished to return to civilian life.
A senior Afghan official, who did not wish to be identified, said the report’s findings “comport with what we have observed.”
The research appears to confirm doubts about the value of Taliban promises to reduce violence, keep their men off the battlefield once released from prison, and comply with other conditions in their agreement with the United States, including renouncing ties with al Qaeda. Critics of the deal suspect the Taliban are interested only in a return to power that will facilitate their ultimate goal of establishing an Islamist government, hand in hand with al Qaeda.
The revelations of Taliban deception come as an Afghan security official confirmed that all prisoners have been released from both sides. An Afghan government delegation is preparing to leave for Qatar on Friday, he said, speaking confidentially, to prepare for direct talks with the Taliban leadership, which maintains a political office in the emirate.
The United States signed a bilateral deal on Feb. 29 with the Taliban in which Washington agreed to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and end almost 20 years of war following the al Qaeda attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In return, the insurgents agreed to cut ties with al Qaeda and stop attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
The prisoner swap was seen as a precursor to direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Both sides are preparing delegations, and Afghan officials say the talks could start within weeks. The U.S. troop drawdown is proceeding at such pace military sources say it could be complete ahead of the deadline. But the Taliban have not cut ties with al Qaeda, and some experts say the two groups have become closer since the Doha agreement. The deal brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, makes no mention of drugs, which provide almost $500 million a year in Taliban funding, nor does it oblige Pakistan, which hosts and helps fund the insurgents, to curtail its support. The Afghan government was not included in the negotiations.
Khalilzad touted the prisoner releases as a trust-building exercise between the Afghan government and its enemy. Taliban leaders promised their released prisoners would not redeploy and instead return to their homes “peacefully,” with a cash stipend provided by the government of Qatar, which hosts the insurgents’ political office, and from Taliban coffers.
Initially, the swap—5,000 Taliban prisoners for 1,000 Afghan security forces—was to take place within weeks of the Doha agreement, but it has been drawn out by practical and political disagreements. Most recently, Australia and France objected to the scheduled release of Taliban implicated in the deaths of their soldiers. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani convened a Loya Jirga, or consultative council of community leaders, to gain national consent for the swap to continue. It was completed on Wednesday with the release of the final tranche of Taliban prisoners, the security official said, after the release by the Taliban of Afghan forces commandos.
With the swap completed, the two sides are expected to commence talks aimed at formalizing a peace, with the Taliban seeking a role in the governance of the country. Yet the Taliban—which styles itself as the government-in-exile of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—refuses to recognize the legitimacy of Ghani’s government. Afghan, American, and international officials say the Taliban’s apparent failure to abide by all conditions of the agreement could scupper progress, though there appears to be no move to slow momentum.
Since Feb. 29, Taliban violence has escalated—with a brief cease-fire to mark Eid at the end of July. They have largely adhered to the commitment not to attack U.S. forces—though rocket attacks on bases in Helmand in July were blamed on the Taliban, a New York Times report said. The United Nations recorded 3,500 conflict-related civilian casualties, including 1,300 deaths, in the first half of 2020.
As doubts about the Taliban’s integrity in the negotiations finally rise to the surface, the new research for Queen’s University’s Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice has found that a majority of the Taliban prisoners released so far have indeed returned to the fight, or to previously held positions within the organization.
The Taliban’s public pledge that released prisoners would not resume fighting was seen by many of the interviewees as meaningless, with one saying it was “simply a deception, as part of a trick that we are playing on the foreigners. We ex-prisoners have to return to our place in the ranks of the jihad. I am obliged to fight against occupation until the coming of an Islamic government.”
The Taliban’s Prisoners’ Affairs Commission issued a statement on May 27 outlining guidance to released prisoners, urging them to “start a peaceful life with their families,” and to emphasize this in any media interviews.
Queen’s University’s Semple and Kuehn say there is no question of the prisoners “returning” to the Taliban as by definition they never left and are obliged to continue “jihad.” By sending released prisoners back to the battlefield, regional Taliban leaders were complying with a directive of their senior leader “to refrain from placing obstacles to the progress of the jihad. Preventing Taliban from willingly joining the ﬁght would be a classic example of such an obstacle, and is therefore prohibited,” they write.
“Some Taliban interviewed understood the stance, that prisoners should not return to the ﬁght, as a deliberate deception. … They understood that pretending that prisoners would not be allowed to return to ﬁght was a necessary price to be paid for ensuring that the prisoner release continued.”
Some senior American military leaders have expressed concerns that the Taliban have not adhered to conditions of the Doha agreement, though there does not appear to have been any halt to the drawdown of U.S. troops. Around 8,600 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, down from 13,000 ahead of the Doha accord. The next tranche of departures is scheduled for coming months—Trump said in a recent interview that the figure would be between 4,000 and 5,000 ahead of November’s U.S. presidential election.
Some U.S. military leaders have publicly raised the Taliban’s enduring links with al Qaeda. Central Command chief Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said in June that the Taliban had not “fully met” the conditions of the Doha deal. “I think the Taliban needs to demonstrate they’re going to be faithful partners too,” he said.
The Kabul government official hinted, without detail, that the United States was dissatisfied with the level of Taliban compliance with the terms of the agreement.
He said the Queen’s University report showed that “the Taliban need to manage their internal policy inconsistency. Their struggle to manage the fighting force, which has borne the brunt of the violence, amid their rhetoric for peace will be an Achilles’ heel for any possible agreement.
“They have to demonstrate in action their rhetoric about wanting peace. And, of course, there is the expectation that the U.S. has to help them adhere to the letter of their deal, including commitments on the post-release activities of the convicts,” he said.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-03--Biden Is Now a China Hawk—With Limits

Biden Is Now a China Hawk—With Limits

Joe Biden seems to have concluded that China has become America ’ s sworn enemy .
In April he ran on ad that depicted Donald Trump as a stooge who had “ rolled over for the Chinese ” in the midst of a pandemic for which the Chinese themselves may well have been responsible .
In his one-on-one debate with Bernie Sanders , Biden claimed that China ’ s communist regime had made only “ marginal ” improvements in national well-being over the previous 40 years , cutting short any further comment with a curt , “ China is an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , who in a speech earlier this mocked what he called “ the old paradigm of blind engagement ” with China , accusing President Xi Jinping of seeking “ global hegemony of Chinese communism.
” I wrote earlier that a President Biden would rally the world ’ s democracies against a rising authoritarian threat .
Does he , like Pompeo , foresee a new Cold War with China ?
Actually , he doesn ’ t .
Biden has simply learned that beating up on China has become @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That wasn ’ t true even when he left office ; his new bellicosity demonstrates how very quickly the consensus on China has shifted both in the broad public and among policymakers .
In a series of articles in Foreign Affairs , Ely Ratner , who served as Biden ’ s deputy national security advisor and now heads the China team of his foreign policy advisors , accused a generation of officials in both parties—himself included—of indulging in “ hopeful thinking ” about China .
China had spurned the American offer to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stakeholder ” in the global order .
In China the United States faced not merely a competitor , but a rival .
This conclusion is by no means universal .
Fareed Zakaria has argued that China is behaving just as other rising powers have done in the past , including the United States , and that American policy-makers have come to regard that behavior as intolerable only because China is far more powerful than other rivals to American supremacy .
But both Biden and his advisors are committed to the engagement-has-failed line of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ratner , praise the language of Donald Trump ’ s 2017 national security strategy , which states , “ China and Russia challenge American power , influence , and interests , attempting to erode American security and prosperity.
” Biden wants to stand up to China without provoking a new Cold War .
He and his advisors recognize that they will not make progress on transnational issues like climate change or pandemics without the active engagement of the world ’ s biggest economy .
For that reason , they deprecate Secretary Pompeo ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the fantasy of economic “ decoupling ” which Trump ’ s trade advisor , Peter Navarro , entertains .
Washington will need to limit its vulnerability to China by , for example , replacing global supply chains of sensitive products with domestic ones even as the two countries remain intricately linked in the world ’ s economy .
Biden ’ s China policy would begin with domestic renewal .
Biden insists that the United States can out-compete China if it makes strategic investments in infrastructure , research and development , health care @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be another example of hopeful thinking .
China ’ s growth rate , though slowing , remains about triple that of the United States .
Several years ago , China became the world ’ s largest economy as measured by “ purchasing power parity ” ; within a few years it is almost bound to be the largest by any measure .
But this may be the wrong metric .
In a world governed by rules , supremacy is ultimately determined by who holds the pen .
Perhaps , as Graham Allison concludes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , that power , too , will likely pass to China .
But that is hardly a tolerable conclusion for those who , like Biden , believe devoutly in the “ liberal world order ” fashioned largely by Washington after World War II .
That order was built on alliances , with the alliance of Western democracies at its core , and it is those institutions and networks that provide the counterweight to China .
In an article last year , Julianne Smith , who preceded Ratner as Biden ’ s deputy national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observed that Germany , France , and other European states , long more trusting of China that the United States , have been deeply disturbed by China ’ s cyber-espionage into their economies , its repression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang , and its crackdown in Hong Kong .
French President Emmanuel Macron had used the occasion of a visit by Xi to declare an end to “ European naiveté ” about China .
Europe shares the American critique of China ’ s theft of intellectual property , its massive state support of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its insistence on gaining access to the technological secrets of foreign investors—what I described in my previous article as the “ geo-economic ” agenda .
Yet when he began his assault on China ’ s trade policies soon after taking office , Donald Trump attacked the Europeans in even harsher terms instead of making common case with them .
This was—assuming that Trump actually cared about the opportunity—a wasted opportunity .
What would have been obvious to almost any president save Trump is that Western democracies are bound together not only by their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China threatens those values .
Biden is eager to join that contest , and he would do so from within a revitalized liberal order .
He has called on “ the Free World ” —a favorite phrase— ” to come together to compete with China ’ s efforts to proliferate its model of high-tech authoritarianism.
” Relations with China would rank near the top of the agenda of the “ Summit of Democracies ” that Biden plans to convene .
This would be a matter of pragmatic calculation as well as ideological solidarity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Australia didn ’ t suffer from serious consequences by saying they wouldn ’ t take Huawei , ” China ’ s 5G giant .
“ Japan has been dealing with China from the beginning of time.
” The world ’ s major democracies would also have the credibility to decry China ’ s growing repression in Hong Kong , in Xinjiang , and at home—even if they could do very little to change it .
Biden will not lose his party ’ s left by standing up to China on human rights or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ however , do so by seeking to block China ’ s regional expansion in the South China Seas and elsewhere .
“ We are a Pacific power , ” says Jeffrey Prescott , one of the four or five figures ( along with Smith ) who serve on the inner circle of Biden ’ s outside foreign policy advisors .
The United States , Prescott says , will need to bolster its advanced radar technology and missile-defense capacity to deal with threats from North Korea as well as China .
Biden , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confrontations .
When China tried to stop the United States from flying through self-described “ air-defense zones ” in international waters , Biden told Xi , “ We ’ re going to fly right though them.
” Since then , Prescott says , China hasn ’ t added any new zones .
Russia , the other great authoritarian rival , poses almost no such problem .
“ It ’ s a very , very narrow list of operations where there ’ s scope for cooperation , ” says Michael Carpenter , another former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the innermost of the concentric rings— “ mitigating the consequences of climate change in the Arctic , combating infectious diseases , risk reduction between our armed forces , and arms control.
” That is a much shorter list than Obama Administration officials imagined for the 2009 “ reset ” of relations with Russia .
Almost everything lies on the other side of the ledger .
President Vladimir Putin ’ s war-by-proxy in Ukraine and seizure of Crimea , his threatening posture towards Baltic and eastern European neighbors , and of course his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make Russia an outright enemy , as it has not been since the fall of the Berlin Wall .
Putin ’ s conviction that Western democracy poses a threat to the survival of his regime makes Russia , despite its sharply diminished capacities , more dangerous than China , at least in the short term .
In a 2018 article , Biden and Carpenter wrote—as many others have—that Russia had turned corruption into a weapon of statecraft .
The foremost example , of course , is the scheme hatched by Ukrainian and Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sums to Paul Manafort , Rudy Giuliani , and other Trump intimates both to destabilize Ukraine and to gain access to Trump ’ s inner circle .
Trump , of course , gave them only encouragement .
Here , as elsewhere , both the threat and the necessary response blur the distinction between foreign and domestic policy .
Biden would—who wouldn ’ t ?
—prosecute those at home who were betraying America to its enemy .
Beyond that , says Carpenter , he would “ root out Russia ’ s networks of malign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , strengthen cyber defenses and electoral infrastructure , pass laws to ban anonymous shell companies and provide more transparency about beneficial ownership in real-estate transactions , and work with NATO allies to build stronger deterrence and defense capabilities.
” He would issue an unmistakable warning warn to Putin .
“ The cost-benefit calculus has to be changed , ” as Carpenter puts it .
In the case of Ukraine , that might include additional sanctions and stepped-up military assistance to Ukraine , including weapons .
Donald Trump ’ s policy towards China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ towards Russia so—it ’ s hard to avoid the word—treasonous , that almost any imaginable alternative would be preferable .
Yet Biden ’ s plan to turn up the dial of confrontation with both , even if done ever so carefully and with the company of democratic allies , carries the very real risk of a brinksmanship that sends everyone over the brink .
In the actual Cold War , both parties kept a hand on the dial steady enough—sometimes just barely—to ward off direct confrontation .
In retrospect , that seems slightly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to strike a delicate balance between prudence and nerve .

Joe Biden seems to have concluded that China has become America’s sworn enemy. In April he ran on ad that depicted Donald Trump as a stooge who had “rolled over for the Chinese” in the midst of a pandemic for which the Chinese themselves may well have been responsible. In his one-on-one debate with Bernie Sanders, Biden claimed that China’s communist regime had made only “marginal” improvements in national well-being over the previous 40 years, cutting short any further comment with a curt, “China is an authoritarian dictatorship.”
Joe Biden seems to have concluded that China has become America’s sworn enemy. In April he ran on ad that depicted Donald Trump as a stooge who had “rolled over for the Chinese” in the midst of a pandemic for which the Chinese themselves may well have been responsible. In his one-on-one debate with Bernie Sanders, Biden claimed that China’s communist regime had made only “marginal” improvements in national well-being over the previous 40 years, cutting short any further comment with a curt, “China is an authoritarian dictatorship.”
Biden sounds a lot like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who in a speech earlier this mocked what he called “the old paradigm of blind engagement” with China, accusing President Xi Jinping of seeking “global hegemony of Chinese communism.” I wrote earlier that a President Biden would rally the world’s democracies against a rising authoritarian threat. Does he, like Pompeo, foresee a new Cold War with China?
Actually, he doesn’t. Biden has simply learned that beating up on China has become a cost-free way to prove your toughness. That wasn’t true even when he left office; his new bellicosity demonstrates how very quickly the consensus on China has shifted both in the broad public and among policymakers.
In a series of articles in Foreign Affairs, Ely Ratner, who served as Biden’s deputy national security advisor and now heads the China team of his foreign policy advisors, accused a generation of officials in both parties—himself included—of indulging in “hopeful thinking” about China. China had spurned the American offer to take its place as a “responsible stakeholder” in the global order. In China the United States faced not merely a competitor, but a rival.
This conclusion is by no means universal. Fareed Zakaria has argued that China is behaving just as other rising powers have done in the past, including the United States, and that American policy-makers have come to regard that behavior as intolerable only because China is far more powerful than other rivals to American supremacy. But both Biden and his advisors are committed to the engagement-has-failed line of thinking. Many of them, including Ratner, praise the language of Donald Trump’s 2017 national security strategy, which states, “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”
Biden wants to stand up to China without provoking a new Cold War. He and his advisors recognize that they will not make progress on transnational issues like climate change or pandemics without the active engagement of the world’s biggest economy. For that reason, they deprecate Secretary Pompeo’s Cold War-era ideological diatribes as well as the fantasy of economic “decoupling” which Trump’s trade advisor, Peter Navarro, entertains. Washington will need to limit its vulnerability to China by, for example, replacing global supply chains of sensitive products with domestic ones even as the two countries remain intricately linked in the world’s economy.
Biden’s China policy would begin with domestic renewal. Biden insists that the United States can out-compete China if it makes strategic investments in infrastructure, research and development, health care, education and training. That may be another example of hopeful thinking. China’s growth rate, though slowing, remains about triple that of the United States. Several years ago, China became the world’s largest economy as measured by “purchasing power parity”; within a few years it is almost bound to be the largest by any measure.
But this may be the wrong metric. In a world governed by rules, supremacy is ultimately determined by who holds the pen. Perhaps, as Graham Allison concludes in Destined for War (2017), that power, too, will likely pass to China. But that is hardly a tolerable conclusion for those who, like Biden, believe devoutly in the “liberal world order” fashioned largely by Washington after World War II. That order was built on alliances, with the alliance of Western democracies at its core, and it is those institutions and networks that provide the counterweight to China. In an article last year, Julianne Smith, who preceded Ratner as Biden’s deputy national security advisor, and Torey Taussig, observed that Germany, France, and other European states, long more trusting of China that the United States, have been deeply disturbed by China’s cyber-espionage into their economies, its repression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang, and its crackdown in Hong Kong. French President Emmanuel Macron had used the occasion of a visit by Xi to declare an end to “European naiveté” about China.
Europe shares the American critique of China’s theft of intellectual property, its massive state support of export industries, its currency manipulation, its insistence on gaining access to the technological secrets of foreign investors—what I described in my previous article as the “geo-economic” agenda. Yet when he began his assault on China’s trade policies soon after taking office, Donald Trump attacked the Europeans in even harsher terms instead of making common case with them.
This was—assuming that Trump actually cared about the opportunity—a wasted opportunity. What would have been obvious to almost any president save Trump is that Western democracies are bound together not only by their geo-economic interests but by their values—and that China threatens those values. Biden is eager to join that contest, and he would do so from within a revitalized liberal order. He has called on “the Free World”—a favorite phrase—”to come together to compete with China’s efforts to proliferate its model of high-tech authoritarianism.”
Relations with China would rank near the top of the agenda of the “Summit of Democracies” that Biden plans to convene. This would be a matter of pragmatic calculation as well as ideological solidarity. As Julianne Smith notes, “Australia didn’t suffer from serious consequences by saying they wouldn’t take Huawei,” China’s 5G giant. “Japan has been dealing with China from the beginning of time.” The world’s major democracies would also have the credibility to decry China’s growing repression in Hong Kong, in Xinjiang, and at home—even if they could do very little to change it.
Biden will not lose his party’s left by standing up to China on human rights or even on trade; he may, however, do so by seeking to block China’s regional expansion in the South China Seas and elsewhere. “We are a Pacific power,” says Jeffrey Prescott, one of the four or five figures (along with Smith) who serve on the inner circle of Biden’s outside foreign policy advisors. The United States, Prescott says, will need to bolster its advanced radar technology and missile-defense capacity to deal with threats from North Korea as well as China. Biden, he says, will not shy away from confrontations. When China tried to stop the United States from flying through self-described “air-defense zones” in international waters, Biden told Xi, “We’re going to fly right though them.” Since then, Prescott says, China hasn’t added any new zones.
Russia, the other great authoritarian rival, poses almost no such problem. “It’s a very, very narrow list of operations where there’s scope for cooperation,” says Michael Carpenter, another former Biden national security aide who now serves on the innermost of the concentric rings— “mitigating the consequences of climate change in the Arctic, combating infectious diseases, risk reduction between our armed forces, and arms control.” That is a much shorter list than Obama Administration officials imagined for the 2009 “reset” of relations with Russia. Almost everything lies on the other side of the ledger. President Vladimir Putin’s war-by-proxy in Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, his threatening posture towards Baltic and eastern European neighbors, and of course his hacking of the 2016 American presidential election make Russia an outright enemy, as it has not been since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Putin’s conviction that Western democracy poses a threat to the survival of his regime makes Russia, despite its sharply diminished capacities, more dangerous than China, at least in the short term. In a 2018 article, Biden and Carpenter wrote—as many others have—that Russia had turned corruption into a weapon of statecraft. The foremost example, of course, is the scheme hatched by Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs close to Putin to pay vast sums to Paul Manafort, Rudy Giuliani, and other Trump intimates both to destabilize Ukraine and to gain access to Trump’s inner circle. Trump, of course, gave them only encouragement.
Here, as elsewhere, both the threat and the necessary response blur the distinction between foreign and domestic policy. Biden would—who wouldn’t?—prosecute those at home who were betraying America to its enemy. Beyond that, says Carpenter, he would “root out Russia’s networks of malign influence using law enforcement and intelligence tools, strengthen cyber defenses and electoral infrastructure, pass laws to ban anonymous shell companies and provide more transparency about beneficial ownership in real-estate transactions, and work with NATO allies to build stronger deterrence and defense capabilities.” He would issue an unmistakable warning warn to Putin. “The cost-benefit calculus has to be changed,” as Carpenter puts it. In the case of Ukraine, that might include additional sanctions and stepped-up military assistance to Ukraine, including weapons.
Donald Trump’s policy towards China has been so incoherent, and his policy towards Russia so—it’s hard to avoid the word—treasonous, that almost any imaginable alternative would be preferable. Yet Biden’s plan to turn up the dial of confrontation with both, even if done ever so carefully and with the company of democratic allies, carries the very real risk of a brinksmanship that sends everyone over the brink. In the actual Cold War, both parties kept a hand on the dial steady enough—sometimes just barely—to ward off direct confrontation. In retrospect, that seems slightly miraculous. A President Biden would need to strike a delicate balance between prudence and nerve.