foreignpolicy--2020-04-14--We Can Make the Post-Coronavirus World a Much Less Violent Place

The coronavirus pandemic will surely affect the patterns of this violence , but how ?
Conventional wisdom suggests that times of great stress produce more violence , but the data doesn ’ t bear that out : During the horrific Spanish flu pandemic of 1918-1919 , neither the United States nor Britain experienced a significant increase in violence .
Homicide rates actually fell during the Great Depression of the 1930s .
They also declined during the recession that began in 2007.Conventional wisdom suggests that times of great stress produce more violence , but the data doesn ’ t bear that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ quarantines keeping people off the streets and out of the bars , some forms of violent crime are dropping quickly in North America and parts of Latin America .
But with people cooped up and getting agitated , domestic abuse appears to be increasing .
Cybercrime is rising as well .
And in countries such as Mexico that are beset by organized crime , homicide rates have spiked to record highs—which suggests a breakdown of public order as the pandemic spreads .
The longer-term prospects are even less clear .
A major worry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rise when supply chains break down .
The price of basic food products is a life-or-death issue for the more than 60 percent of the world ’ s population who depend on the informal economy .
There are also fears of increased social disorder when governments violently enforce lockdowns and quarantines , as they are doing in Kenya , South Africa and Uganda .
In the Philippines , the president has issued shoot-to-kill orders for those protesting the lockdown .
Meanwhile , in Brazil , El Salvador , and Italy , gangs and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to keep the virus from spreading .
But the potential for certain forms of violence to escalate in the wake of the pandemic should not blind us to the fact that the world , on average , has become a much safer place .
Most countries experienced sharply declining rates of lethal violence over the past two decades .
Just as importantly , we are starting to understand , based on evidence from around the world , which kinds of policies and programs actually work to diminish violent crime , and which don @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , we have the power to reduce violence further—whether it is caused by the pandemic or not .
The scale of these reductions in lethal violence has been stunning .
Between 1990 and 2015 , North America halved its homicide rate , which is now close to historic lows in the United States and Canada .
European countries also registered sharp drops .
In Asia , the homicide rate was was 38 percent lower in 2017 than in 2000 .
Declines of more than 50 percent were recorded in countries such as Colombia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , and Sri Lanka .
In many cities and neighborhoods , the drop in homicides has been staggering .
In the United States , most of the 30 largest cities are much safer today than a few decades ago .
New York recorded more than 2,200 murders in 1990 , but barely 300 in 2019 .
Washington , D.C. , experienced a drop from more than 700 homicides in 1990 to just 163 in 2019 .
Other North American and Western European cities have followed a similar trend .
Good news even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s most violent places .
The onetime murder capital of the planet , Medellín , Colombia , experienced a dizzying decline of lethal violence , from a high of 266 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the early 1990s to 30 per 100,000 in 2015 , a fall of nearly 90 percent .
Bogotá ’ s homicide rate fell from 81 per 100,000 in 1993 to roughly 17 per 100,000 in 2015 .
São Paulo , a notoriously homicidal city , is currently registering the lowest homicide rate since records began .
Notwithstanding these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Latin America and the Caribbean .
The region still registers a third of the world ’ s homicides , even though it contains less than 9 percent of the world ’ s population .
Of the 50 most murderous cities in the world in 2016 , 43 were in Latin America and the Caribbean .
Why has life in so many places become so much safer ?
As so often happens , there are many causes , and they are not easy to separate with confidence .
Individual violence is largely a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ societies with a higher proportion of teens and young adults tend to have higher levels of violent crime .
By contrast , countries with older populations such as Japan , Italy , and Germany are often more peaceful .
But a country ’ s age distribution changes slowly and can not explain a halving of violence in a decade by itself .
When we compare regions , violence is statistically correlated to the level of inequality , perhaps because men at the bottom of a steeply unequal income distribution become more sensitive to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affronts .
But that hypothesis can not explain why violence is poorly correlated with inequality over time : Violence has dramatically decreased even as income inequality has increased in many countries .
It may not be inequality in income that predicts violence but inequality in protection against violence by institutions .
In A Savage Order , the security expert Rachel Kleinfeld observes that in the most violent societies , the state acts as a security force for elites rather than a universal guarantor of peace .
When societies begin to entrust their protection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system , they come to enjoy more law and order for all.Political leaders need to decide that homicide reduction is an achievable goal , not a campaign slogan or source of pork-barrel spending .
A common thread in regions that have reduced violence is larger and better-trained police forces targeted at reducing violence in the places where it is worst .
Social and political solidarity are essential parts of this virtuous circle .
When political leaders enlist police and communities as partners in enforcing norms that sanction delinquent behavior and promote collective safety @ @ @ @ @ @ @ circle of crime reduction often starts when cities and regions set clear targets spanning multiple election cycles and administrative fiefs .
Political leaders need to decide that homicide reduction is an achievable goal , not a campaign slogan or source of pork-barrel spending , and commit adequate resources to the task .
Implementing these plans requires sustained buy-in from mayors , police chiefs , and civic and business leaders .
The policies and programs must be selected on the basis of reliable data showing that they work , rather than on fads , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ root causes such as poverty and racism .
Police must be seen not as antagonists but as service providers delivering what everyone in the community wants : safer streets and homes .
And because criminal violence is so concentrated—we know from the data that a small number of neighborhoods and perpetrators account for a large share of the violence—successful crime reduction must focus resources on the places that are most violent .
These efforts can draw on a growing body of evidence about what works and what doesn ’ t .
In his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ literature of thousands of studies on violence reduction , the criminal justice researcher Thomas Abt shows that one of the most effective tactics is hot-spot policing , which homes in on the cities , neighborhoods , and street corners where violence is most rampant .
A complementary proven strategy is focused deterrence , which singles out the most aggressive gangs and individuals and sends them the clear message that they will be punished for committing violence and rewards them ( with jobs , training , and other opportunities ) for refraining from it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ another strategy whose effectiveness is clear from evidence is cognitive behavioral therapy .
These interventions are designed to override the maladaptive thought habits and impulsive behavior that cause criminal delinquency , and to teach strategies of self-control that can stop an escalation into aggression before it begins .
They include training in anger management and social skills , together with counselling in strategies that are explicitly designed to prevent recidivism .
These good habits can be reinforced by engineering urban environments with fewer temptations to resist—with earlier bar closings and fewer dark streets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
According to the sociologist Patrick Sharkey , urban renewal and local mobilization efforts to reclaim parks , city blocks , and open plazas in the United States played a pivotal role in reducing crime and victimization .
Just as important as knowing what works is knowing what doesn ’ t .
Aggressive , zero-tolerance policing , three-strikes-and-you ’ re-out mandatory sentencing , police-led drug awareness programs , so-called scared-straight interventions exposing young children to prisons and inmates , firearm buybacks , and slum clearance programs are either ineffective or make things worse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killing each other in large numbers is not just desirable but achievable .
The goal of reducing the global homicide rate by 50 percent by 2030—about 6.5 percent a year—has been embraced by Pathfinders for Peaceful , Just and Inclusive Societies , a coalition of governments , national and international organizations , and foundations and private sector partners .
The first order of business is to double down on evidence-based interventions in the most dangerous countries , cities , and neighborhoods , capitalizing on our knowledge of what works and what doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lethal violence tends to concentrate in a few areas and among a small number of people .
When the right measures are applied in the right places , homicide and other forms of violent crime can drop quickly .
The moral value of looking at data is not just that it ’ s the only basis for choosing policies that actually save lives .
Quantifying goals for reducing violence is also ethical because it treats all lives as equally valuable .
Actions to prevent the greatest number of murders prevent the greatest amount @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reminds us , there is no more important goal than saving lives .

The world is convulsed by the novel coronavirus, but that is not the only pathogen that afflicts us. Criminal violence is also endemic, contagious, and highly virulent. More than 464,000 people were killed in homicides in 2017 (the last year for which we have reliable data), at least five times as many as were killed in war. Millions more suffer from physical and psychological injuries left by domestic abuse, gang fights, and extrajudicial violence.
The coronavirus pandemic will surely affect the patterns of this violence, but how? Conventional wisdom suggests that times of great stress produce more violence, but the data doesn’t bear that out: During the horrific Spanish flu pandemic of 1918-1919, neither the United States nor Britain experienced a significant increase in violence. Homicide rates actually fell during the Great Depression of the 1930s. They also declined during the recession that began in 2007.Conventional wisdom suggests that times of great stress produce more violence, but the data doesn’t bear that out.
With nighttime curfews and enforced quarantines keeping people off the streets and out of the bars, some forms of violent crime are dropping quickly in North America and parts of Latin America. But with people cooped up and getting agitated, domestic abuse appears to be increasing. Cybercrime is rising as well. And in countries such as Mexico that are beset by organized crime, homicide rates have spiked to record highs—which suggests a breakdown of public order as the pandemic spreads.
The longer-term prospects are even less clear. A major worry is what will happen if food prices rise when supply chains break down. The price of basic food products is a life-or-death issue for the more than 60 percent of the world’s population who depend on the informal economy. There are also fears of increased social disorder when governments violently enforce lockdowns and quarantines, as they are doing in Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. In the Philippines, the president has issued shoot-to-kill orders for those protesting the lockdown. Meanwhile, in Brazil, El Salvador, and Italy, gangs and mafia groups are imposing their own curfews to keep the virus from spreading.
But the potential for certain forms of violence to escalate in the wake of the pandemic should not blind us to the fact that the world, on average, has become a much safer place. Most countries experienced sharply declining rates of lethal violence over the past two decades. Just as importantly, we are starting to understand, based on evidence from around the world, which kinds of policies and programs actually work to diminish violent crime, and which don’t. Armed with this evidence, we have the power to reduce violence further—whether it is caused by the pandemic or not.
The scale of these reductions in lethal violence has been stunning. Between 1990 and 2015, North America halved its homicide rate, which is now close to historic lows in the United States and Canada. European countries also registered sharp drops. In Asia, the homicide rate was was 38 percent lower in 2017 than in 2000. Declines of more than 50 percent were recorded in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Sri Lanka.
In many cities and neighborhoods, the drop in homicides has been staggering. In the United States, most of the 30 largest cities are much safer today than a few decades ago. New York recorded more than 2,200 murders in 1990, but barely 300 in 2019. Washington, D.C., experienced a drop from more than 700 homicides in 1990 to just 163 in 2019. Other North American and Western European cities have followed a similar trend.
Good news even comes from some of the world’s most violent places. The onetime murder capital of the planet, Medellín, Colombia, experienced a dizzying decline of lethal violence, from a high of 266 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the early 1990s to 30 per 100,000 in 2015, a fall of nearly 90 percent. Bogotá’s homicide rate fell from 81 per 100,000 in 1993 to roughly 17 per 100,000 in 2015. São Paulo, a notoriously homicidal city, is currently registering the lowest homicide rate since records began.
Notwithstanding these improvements, homicide rates remain stubbornly high in Latin America and the Caribbean. The region still registers a third of the world’s homicides, even though it contains less than 9 percent of the world’s population. Of the 50 most murderous cities in the world in 2016, 43 were in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Why has life in so many places become so much safer? As so often happens, there are many causes, and they are not easy to separate with confidence. Individual violence is largely a young man’s game, and societies with a higher proportion of teens and young adults tend to have higher levels of violent crime. By contrast, countries with older populations such as Japan, Italy, and Germany are often more peaceful.
But a country’s age distribution changes slowly and cannot explain a halving of violence in a decade by itself. When we compare regions, violence is statistically correlated to the level of inequality, perhaps because men at the bottom of a steeply unequal income distribution become more sensitive to social status and react violently to minor affronts. But that hypothesis cannot explain why violence is poorly correlated with inequality over time: Violence has dramatically decreased even as income inequality has increased in many countries.
It may not be inequality in income that predicts violence but inequality in protection against violence by institutions. In A Savage Order, the security expert Rachel Kleinfeld observes that in the most violent societies, the state acts as a security force for elites rather than a universal guarantor of peace. When societies begin to entrust their protection in a capable police force and justice system, they come to enjoy more law and order for all.Political leaders need to decide that homicide reduction is an achievable goal, not a campaign slogan or source of pork-barrel spending.
A common thread in regions that have reduced violence is larger and better-trained police forces targeted at reducing violence in the places where it is worst. Social and political solidarity are essential parts of this virtuous circle. When political leaders enlist police and communities as partners in enforcing norms that sanction delinquent behavior and promote collective safety, violent crime declines.
The virtuous circle of crime reduction often starts when cities and regions set clear targets spanning multiple election cycles and administrative fiefs. Political leaders need to decide that homicide reduction is an achievable goal, not a campaign slogan or source of pork-barrel spending, and commit adequate resources to the task. Implementing these plans requires sustained buy-in from mayors, police chiefs, and civic and business leaders.
The policies and programs must be selected on the basis of reliable data showing that they work, rather than on fads, slogans, or utopian hopes of extirpating root causes such as poverty and racism. Police must be seen not as antagonists but as service providers delivering what everyone in the community wants: safer streets and homes. And because criminal violence is so concentrated—we know from the data that a small number of neighborhoods and perpetrators account for a large share of the violence—successful crime reduction must focus resources on the places that are most violent.
These efforts can draw on a growing body of evidence about what works and what doesn’t. In his book Bleeding Out, which reviews a literature of thousands of studies on violence reduction, the criminal justice researcher Thomas Abt shows that one of the most effective tactics is hot-spot policing, which homes in on the cities, neighborhoods, and street corners where violence is most rampant. A complementary proven strategy is focused deterrence, which singles out the most aggressive gangs and individuals and sends them the clear message that they will be punished for committing violence and rewards them (with jobs, training, and other opportunities) for refraining from it.
When potential troublemakers are identified, another strategy whose effectiveness is clear from evidence is cognitive behavioral therapy. These interventions are designed to override the maladaptive thought habits and impulsive behavior that cause criminal delinquency, and to teach strategies of self-control that can stop an escalation into aggression before it begins. They include training in anger management and social skills, together with counselling in strategies that are explicitly designed to prevent recidivism.
These good habits can be reinforced by engineering urban environments with fewer temptations to resist—with earlier bar closings and fewer dark streets, secluded corners, and abandoned buildings. According to the sociologist Patrick Sharkey, urban renewal and local mobilization efforts to reclaim parks, city blocks, and open plazas in the United States played a pivotal role in reducing crime and victimization.
Just as important as knowing what works is knowing what doesn’t. Aggressive, zero-tolerance policing, three-strikes-and-you’re-out mandatory sentencing, police-led drug awareness programs, so-called scared-straight interventions exposing young children to prisons and inmates, firearm buybacks, and slum clearance programs are either ineffective or make things worse.
The goal of preventing people from killing each other in large numbers is not just desirable but achievable. The goal of reducing the global homicide rate by 50 percent by 2030—about 6.5 percent a year—has been embraced by Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, a coalition of governments, national and international organizations, and foundations and private sector partners.
The first order of business is to double down on evidence-based interventions in the most dangerous countries, cities, and neighborhoods, capitalizing on our knowledge of what works and what doesn’t, and on the fact that lethal violence tends to concentrate in a few areas and among a small number of people. When the right measures are applied in the right places, homicide and other forms of violent crime can drop quickly.
The moral value of looking at data is not just that it’s the only basis for choosing policies that actually save lives. Quantifying goals for reducing violence is also ethical because it treats all lives as equally valuable. Actions to prevent the greatest number of murders prevent the greatest amount of human tragedy. As the pandemic reminds us, there is no more important goal than saving lives.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-14--How to Stop a Looming Food Crisis

How to Stop a Looming Food Crisis

The coronavirus has focused the world ’ s attention on the woeful lack of ventilators , respiratory masks , and intensive care unit beds available in many countries .
Far less attention has been paid to another pandemic-driven shortage lurking over the horizon : food .
As trade walls go up and governments panic about preserving their own food sources , the coronavirus threatens to disrupt global supply chains .
Russia , the world ’ s largest wheat exporter , is limiting grain exports from April to June .
Egypt , the world ’ s biggest wheat importer , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of legumes .
The looming food shortage has an echo of the financial crisis of 2008 , when large exporters that were worried about food supplies limited exports , causing a global price surge .
In response , other countries began importing food like there was no tomorrow .
This bolstered demand , pushing prices up even further .
As prices shot up , the result was devastating for the world ’ s poor .
Insufficient food increased malnutrition , especially in children , and plunged already poor people deeper into poverty .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ will only intensify the crisis and further disrupt supply chains .
Municipalities in Argentina , the world ’ s largest exporter of soybean products , closed the roads in major soybean production areas—ignoring a federal government order to keep them open .
This resulted in the country ’ s grain supplies shrinking by half until the municipalities loosened restrictions .
With planes grounded , Canadian imports of onions and eggplants from India have plummeted over the past two weeks .
Unlike previous food crises , this one stands to be exacerbated by global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ workers involved in agriculture and food production are now immobile because of border crackdowns .
This has left produce unharvested and much-needed food left to rot in fields .
Seasonal laborers from Eastern Europe are missing on the farms of Spain , Germany , Italy , and France .
The U.K. government , desperate for farm labor , has looked to tap its reservoir of unemployed to pick strawberries or cut asparagus .
India has limited rice exports due to labor shortages .
The production of staple crops such as wheat , corn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by lockdowns , as their harvests are largely mechanized .
But the availability of fresh fruits and vegetables depends on people , not machines , to harvest , process , and package them .
Fruits and vegetables are also perishable , so logistical problems pose even more threat to their supply .
Shipping accounts for 90 percent of all global trade , including food trade .
Due to border closures , commercial ships can ’ t freely access ports or change crews .
This makes no sense , as ports can be maintained @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shuttering would have a catastrophic effect on trade .
No country is immune , and consumers are already feeling the impact .
Wheat prices have gone up by 8 percent and rice prices by 25 percent .
In Nigeria , Africa ’ s biggest economy , rice prices jumped by more than 30 percent just in the last four days of March .
Poorer countries will be hit hard , because people there simply can ’ t eat when food costs more .
Countries that usually import more food than export them will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weaker currencies .
But the situation is very different today from what it was in 2008 , and a global food shortage need not be inevitable .
The global stocks of food staples are significantly higher now , with more than double the amount of what it was back then .
The U.S. Department of Agriculture expects record-breaking wheat harvests this year .
China , Russia , and the United States are among the countries that have good stockpiles at the moment .
So hoarding food will only cause panic in the food @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transparency and information on market conditions , from production and consumption to stocks and prices .
This can encourage countries to not resort to the misguided and nationalistic beggar-thy-neighbor policies of 2008 .
It is imperative , too , that trade channels stay open .
Both exporters and importers of foods should agree not to impose trade barriers in response to the coronavirus pandemic .
Countries should eliminate existing export restrictions , including export taxes and export bans .
There is no reason for ports and global shipping to not continue operation as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus , making sure that their workers are healthy and the vessels transporting food are safe .
Countries should temporarily reduce tariffs and taxes , as well .
Lower import tariffs can facilitate imports , for example , which means they can address immediate concerns about low food supplies and high prices caused by currency fluctuations .
It ’ s also high time to facilitate regional trade and transport .
For example , in Africa , if countries can ’ t buy fruits and vegetables from international markets due to slowing trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ African countries .
It ’ s the same in Latin America , where the region ’ s countries can meet the region ’ s food demand .
The potential for regional trade is enormous .
These measures will stabilize food markets worldwide and prevent massive food shortages .
Trading in cereal futures can help exporters .
Importers can reduce import tariffs or value-added tax to neutralize the effects of high prices , but each country has to make its own call , taking trade-offs and revenues into account .
Governments have to work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is produced to where it is needed most .
On April 1 , the United Nations ’ maritime agency called on nations to declare seafarers , port staff , and other maritime workers as essential personnel to ensure trade flows .
Some have done so , including the United States and the United Kingdom , but to have maximum impact , every country has to follow suit as soon as possible .
They also need to protect the health and safety of essential workers by providing health checks and protective gear .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to reduce uncertainties .
Countries are throwing up trade walls because they don ’ t know what to expect .
Greater transparency and real-time data on stocks , production availability , and logistical issues can provide clarity .
Lessons from the past , including how wrong policies can cause more harm than good , can goad them to right action .
When countries realize that it is in their best interest to work in concert , they do come together .
Earlier this month , the agriculture ministers of 25 Latin American and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces to ensure food supply for the region ’ s 620 million consumers .
The spring growing season is in full swing in the Northern Hemisphere , so governments will have to move fast to keep food production going while containing the virus .
The United States has deemed agricultural laborers as an essential labor force with special responsibility to continue working during an emergency .
It has allowed farmworkers from Mexico to enter the country and travel .
These laborers also need onsite health checks , protective gear , working and living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ paid sick leave .
The crushing economic toll of the pandemic has people scared .
Global job losses are expected to be in the hundreds of millions .
In the United States alone , almost 17 million people lost their jobs just in the past three weeks .
Some have argued that widespread death may be preferable to the economic depression that follows from containing the virus .
That is outrageous .
But it doesn ’ t mean that governments can not strike a balance between keeping the food supply flowing and protecting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ supply is part of the immediate health response to COVID-19 .
With unemployment rates skyrocketing , it is crucial that vulnerable people have access to nutritious food .
The strain on food banks makes it even more important for governments to stabilize the food market .
On top of a public health crisis and pandemic , the last thing the world needs is a food shortage .

The coronavirus has focused the world’s attention on the woeful lack of ventilators, respiratory masks, and intensive care unit beds available in many countries. Far less attention has been paid to another pandemic-driven shortage lurking over the horizon: food.
The coronavirus has focused the world’s attention on the woeful lack of ventilators, respiratory masks, and intensive care unit beds available in many countries. Far less attention has been paid to another pandemic-driven shortage lurking over the horizon: food.
As trade walls go up and governments panic about preserving their own food sources, the coronavirus threatens to disrupt global supply chains. Russia, the world’s largest wheat exporter, is limiting grain exports from April to June. Egypt, the world’s biggest wheat importer, has ramped up grain purchases and stopped exports of legumes.
The looming food shortage has an echo of the financial crisis of 2008, when large exporters that were worried about food supplies limited exports, causing a global price surge. In response, other countries began importing food like there was no tomorrow. This bolstered demand, pushing prices up even further.
As prices shot up, the result was devastating for the world’s poor. Insufficient food increased malnutrition, especially in children, and plunged already poor people deeper into poverty.
Today, trade restrictions and panic hoarding will only intensify the crisis and further disrupt supply chains. Municipalities in Argentina, the world’s largest exporter of soybean products, closed the roads in major soybean production areas—ignoring a federal government order to keep them open. This resulted in the country’s grain supplies shrinking by half until the municipalities loosened restrictions. With planes grounded, Canadian imports of onions and eggplants from India have plummeted over the past two weeks.
Unlike previous food crises, this one stands to be exacerbated by global restrictions on movement. Millions of migrant workers involved in agriculture and food production are now immobile because of border crackdowns. This has left produce unharvested and much-needed food left to rot in fields. Seasonal laborers from Eastern Europe are missing on the farms of Spain, Germany, Italy, and France. The U.K. government, desperate for farm labor, has looked to tap its reservoir of unemployed to pick strawberries or cut asparagus. India has limited rice exports due to labor shortages.
The production of staple crops such as wheat, corn, and soybeans has been less affected by lockdowns, as their harvests are largely mechanized. But the availability of fresh fruits and vegetables depends on people, not machines, to harvest, process, and package them. Fruits and vegetables are also perishable, so logistical problems pose even more threat to their supply.
Shipping accounts for 90 percent of all global trade, including food trade. Due to border closures, commercial ships can’t freely access ports or change crews. This makes no sense, as ports can be maintained with a small staff, whereas their shuttering would have a catastrophic effect on trade.
No country is immune, and consumers are already feeling the impact. Wheat prices have gone up by 8 percent and rice prices by 25 percent. In Nigeria, Africa’s biggest economy, rice prices jumped by more than 30 percent just in the last four days of March. Poorer countries will be hit hard, because people there simply can’t eat when food costs more. Countries that usually import more food than export them will suffer most because of price increases and weaker currencies.
But the situation is very different today from what it was in 2008, and a global food shortage need not be inevitable. The global stocks of food staples are significantly higher now, with more than double the amount of what it was back then. The U.S. Department of Agriculture expects record-breaking wheat harvests this year. China, Russia, and the United States are among the countries that have good stockpiles at the moment. So hoarding food will only cause panic in the food market. Countries and investors have more transparency and information on market conditions, from production and consumption to stocks and prices. This can encourage countries to not resort to the misguided and nationalistic beggar-thy-neighbor policies of 2008.
It is imperative, too, that trade channels stay open. Both exporters and importers of foods should agree not to impose trade barriers in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Countries should eliminate existing export restrictions, including export taxes and export bans. There is no reason for ports and global shipping to not continue operation as long as they practice preventive measures for the virus, making sure that their workers are healthy and the vessels transporting food are safe.
Countries should temporarily reduce tariffs and taxes, as well. Lower import tariffs can facilitate imports, for example, which means they can address immediate concerns about low food supplies and high prices caused by currency fluctuations. It’s also high time to facilitate regional trade and transport. For example, in Africa, if countries can’t buy fruits and vegetables from international markets due to slowing trade, they could find them in other African countries. It’s the same in Latin America, where the region’s countries can meet the region’s food demand. The potential for regional trade is enormous.
These measures will stabilize food markets worldwide and prevent massive food shortages. Trading in cereal futures can help exporters. Importers can reduce import tariffs or value-added tax to neutralize the effects of high prices, but each country has to make its own call, taking trade-offs and revenues into account.
Governments have to work together quickly to move food from where it is produced to where it is needed most. On April 1, the United Nations’ maritime agency called on nations to declare seafarers, port staff, and other maritime workers as essential personnel to ensure trade flows. Some have done so, including the United States and the United Kingdom, but to have maximum impact, every country has to follow suit as soon as possible. They also need to protect the health and safety of essential workers by providing health checks and protective gear.
A key to implementing these measures is to reduce uncertainties. Countries are throwing up trade walls because they don’t know what to expect. Greater transparency and real-time data on stocks, production availability, and logistical issues can provide clarity. Lessons from the past, including how wrong policies can cause more harm than good, can goad them to right action.
When countries realize that it is in their best interest to work in concert, they do come together. Earlier this month, the agriculture ministers of 25 Latin American and Caribbean countries signed an agreement to join forces to ensure food supply for the region’s 620 million consumers.
The spring growing season is in full swing in the Northern Hemisphere, so governments will have to move fast to keep food production going while containing the virus. The United States has deemed agricultural laborers as an essential labor force with special responsibility to continue working during an emergency. It has allowed farmworkers from Mexico to enter the country and travel. These laborers also need onsite health checks, protective gear, working and living arrangements that promote social distancing, and paid sick leave.
The crushing economic toll of the pandemic has people scared. Global job losses are expected to be in the hundreds of millions. In the United States alone, almost 17 million people lost their jobs just in the past three weeks. Some have argued that widespread death may be preferable to the economic depression that follows from containing the virus. That is outrageous. But it doesn’t mean that governments cannot strike a balance between keeping the food supply flowing and protecting the public’s health.
Food supply is part of the immediate health response to COVID-19. With unemployment rates skyrocketing, it is crucial that vulnerable people have access to nutritious food. The strain on food banks makes it even more important for governments to stabilize the food market.
On top of a public health crisis and pandemic, the last thing the world needs is a food shortage.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-14--Coronavirus Has Paralyzed Europe’s Far Right

Coronavirus Has Paralyzed Europe ’ s Far Right BERLIN—For the populist far-right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) , getting near-constant attention and turning it into political momentum is not usually a problem .
Through its politicians ’ innate talent for provocation , their relentless focus on refugee and immigration issues , and their countless frustration-filled social media posts about government failures , the party has managed to consistently dominate headlines and hold disproportionate sway over the direction of political debate in Germany .
AfD politicians are still tweeting anti-refugee messages and still criticizing Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus outbreak , with more than 125,000 confirmed cases of the virus in Germany and citizens largely sequestered at home , people don ’ t seem to be listening the way they used to .
Far-right parties that are in power , to be sure , have already used the coronavirus as an opportunity to push through further authoritarian measures : Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has passed legislation that significantly expands his emergency powers without an end date , and Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice party is pushing ahead with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that its lockdown effectively prevents an actual campaign from taking place .
But those currently in opposition , like the AfD , are facing a new dilemma : As voters turn overwhelmingly to government officials and experts to lead them through the crisis , they ’ ve lost the spotlight they ’ ve long depended on .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
Ironically , this newfound situation comes despite the fact that such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with internal borders and strong nation-states that look out for their own citizens first—have actually in the short term gotten much of what they wanted .
Still , no longer able to dominate the political discussion the way they usually do as the outbreak rages on , they ’ re now struggling to find attention and a coherent message .
“ This crisis is not like the other crises that the AfD has benefited from , the euro crisis and the refugee crisis , ” said Johannes Hillje , a Berlin-based political consultant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ communication and rhetorical tactics .
“ Both crises had an enemy which was an outsider … but now it ’ s a virus , and it ’ s spreading from within .
The default populist narrative—us versus them , insiders versus outsiders—doesn ’ t work anymore.
” Germany is perhaps the best example of this newfound dynamic and how quickly things shifted : Even just a few weeks before the coronavirus became the main topic of discussion , the country was still deeply embroiled in a debate about the AfD ’ s direct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February , two right-leaning parties—including Merkel ’ s Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) —voted with the AfD to defeat a left-wing governor in the central state of Thuringia .
The taboo-breaking vote triggered the resignation of Merkel ’ s chosen successor in the CDU and opened a period of national soul-searching about the AfD ’ s role in German politics and society .
That debate was compounded later that month when a right-wing extremist shot and killed nine people—overwhelmingly of foreign descent—in two shisha bars in the city of Hanau , raising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anti-immigrant rhetoric contributes to right-wing extremist violence .
These topics , deeply emotional in Germany , felt then as if they ’ d dominate the political discussion for months to come .
And then came the coronavirus , which quickly claimed a monopoly on citizens ’ collective attention spans .
At first , AfD politicians cheered the closed borders and stronger national focus : Beatrix von Storch , among the party ’ s leaders , said the virus proved the “ failure of border-free globalization ” and called for the new border controls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authoritarian leader has granted himself dictatorial powers , but his neglect of the country ’ s health system and his powerlessness in the face of a depreciating currency will come back to haunt him .
Since then , however , they ’ ve spent recent weeks jumping from argument to argument .
The party and its politicians have , among other things , criticized Merkel for not responding to the outbreak quickly enough ; said her measures were too harsh and authoritarian ; gotten into an intra-party fight over a proposed split between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blasted gender studies programs at German universities ; and called for churches to be open on Easter Sunday in spite of the pandemic .
When AfD politicians last week unveiled their 10-point policy paper on combating the coronavirus , it looked , with some small exceptions , largely similar to the kinds of measures other parties and politicians were proposing .
Increasing testing capacity , producing additional protective equipment for health workers , and protecting high-risk citizens are hardly partisan or novel suggestions .
On social media , the party ’ s main @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their normally strong and active base seems less enthused .
Hillje , who examined AfD social media figures for the three weeks leading up to the coronavirus situation and the three weeks since it began dominating headlines , found that their posts have been receiving barely half the engagement they normally do .
What ’ s more , posts about the crisis itself were among the least likely to see likes , shares , or comments from supporters .
Meanwhile , Merkel ’ s steady , no-nonsense presence seems to be exactly what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ survey released by the German broadcaster ZDF last week , an overwhelming 80 percent approved of Merkel ’ s handling of the crisis , and an even higher 88 percent approved of the government ’ s work during this time .
As a result , Merkel ’ s CDU has gained back significant ground in the national opinion polls , while the AfD is barely breaking double digits ( and indeed fell to 9 percent in some surveys ) .
“ Now during a health crisis , where a range of experts have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] actually have very little say , except in those countries where they form part of the government , ” said Ruth Wodak , an expert on far-right rhetoric at the University of Vienna and Lancaster University .
Though the situation is perhaps clearest in Germany , the AfD ’ s counterparts in countries across Europe are facing the same challenges .
In neighboring Austria , the far-right Freedom Party ’ s messaging has been similarly inconsistent ; posts on the party ’ s Facebook page have included railing against fines for violating @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary ’ s Orban , calling for distance from the European Union , and telling people to stop having parties .
In Italy , the far-right League ’ s Matteo Salvini—who , as of a government shuffle last year , no longer serves as the country ’ s interior minister—has resorted to spreading debunked conspiracy theories about the origins of the virus .
Both parties have lost ground in opinion polls since the crisis began .
Though these forces are struggling for relevance at the moment , they may find more fertile ground @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the virus recedes .
As the discussion shifts to the economic destruction the coronavirus will undoubtedly leave in its wake , the far-right will surely seek to capitalize on thorny issues surrounding EU aid for harder-hit member states .
For Salvini in Italy , this will almost certainly focus on the initial lack of aid from his country ’ s European neighbors and the dearth of European solidarity .
And in Germany and other Northern European countries , responses could mirror the same dynamics seen in the eurozone crisis : Dissatisfaction with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ financially support their neighbors in Southern Europe .
Indeed , that sentiment was what led to the creation of the AfD in 2013 as an anti-euro movement ; the party has already begun voicing strong opposition to proposed “ coronabonds ” for hard-hit EU member states .
“ Right now [ the AfD ] don ’ t really have a part to play , but in a couple of months they will , ” said Marcel Dirsus , a political scientist and nonresident fellow at Kiel University ’ s Institute for Security Policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other countries , as it should .
And when that does happen , they will be there—and they will exploit it .
”

BERLIN—For the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), getting near-constant attention and turning it into political momentum is not usually a problem. Through its politicians’ innate talent for provocation, their relentless focus on refugee and immigration issues, and their countless frustration-filled social media posts about government failures, the party has managed to consistently dominate headlines and hold disproportionate sway over the direction of political debate in Germany.
BERLIN—For the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), getting near-constant attention and turning it into political momentum is not usually a problem. Through its politicians’ innate talent for provocation, their relentless focus on refugee and immigration issues, and their countless frustration-filled social media posts about government failures, the party has managed to consistently dominate headlines and hold disproportionate sway over the direction of political debate in Germany.
AfD politicians are still tweeting anti-refugee messages and still criticizing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government. But in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak, with more than 125,000 confirmed cases of the virus in Germany and citizens largely sequestered at home, people don’t seem to be listening the way they used to.
Far-right parties that are in power, to be sure, have already used the coronavirus as an opportunity to push through further authoritarian measures: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has passed legislation that significantly expands his emergency powers without an end date, and Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party is pushing ahead with a May presidential election despite the fact that its lockdown effectively prevents an actual campaign from taking place.
But those currently in opposition, like the AfD, are facing a new dilemma: As voters turn overwhelmingly to government officials and experts to lead them through the crisis, they’ve lost the spotlight they’ve long depended on.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
Ironically, this newfound situation comes despite the fact that such parties—which have long advocated for a Europe with internal borders and strong nation-states that look out for their own citizens first—have actually in the short term gotten much of what they wanted. Still, no longer able to dominate the political discussion the way they usually do as the outbreak rages on, they’re now struggling to find attention and a coherent message.
“This crisis is not like the other crises that the AfD has benefited from, the euro crisis and the refugee crisis,” said Johannes Hillje, a Berlin-based political consultant and expert on the AfD’s communication and rhetorical tactics. “Both crises had an enemy which was an outsider … but now it’s a virus, and it’s spreading from within. The default populist narrative—us versus them, insiders versus outsiders—doesn’t work anymore.”
Germany is perhaps the best example of this newfound dynamic and how quickly things shifted: Even just a few weeks before the coronavirus became the main topic of discussion, the country was still deeply embroiled in a debate about the AfD’s direct and indirect political influence. In early February, two right-leaning parties—including Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—voted with the AfD to defeat a left-wing governor in the central state of Thuringia. The taboo-breaking vote triggered the resignation of Merkel’s chosen successor in the CDU and opened a period of national soul-searching about the AfD’s role in German politics and society. That debate was compounded later that month when a right-wing extremist shot and killed nine people—overwhelmingly of foreign descent—in two shisha bars in the city of Hanau, raising questions about how the party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric contributes to right-wing extremist violence.
These topics, deeply emotional in Germany, felt then as if they’d dominate the political discussion for months to come. And then came the coronavirus, which quickly claimed a monopoly on citizens’ collective attention spans. At first, AfD politicians cheered the closed borders and stronger national focus: Beatrix von Storch, among the party’s leaders, said the virus proved the “failure of border-free globalization” and called for the new border controls to remain permanent.
Read More Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (center) votes with other representatives in the Hungarian parliament in Budapest on March 30. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (center) votes with other representatives in the Hungarian parliament in Budapest on March 30. Viktor Orban Can’t Eradicate the Coronavirus by Decree Hungary’s authoritarian leader has granted himself dictatorial powers, but his neglect of the country’s health system and his powerlessness in the face of a depreciating currency will come back to haunt him. Argument | Garvan Walshe A visitor views an exhibit of cluster bomb remnants at the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise Visitor Center in Vientiane, Laos, on July 11. A visitor views an exhibit of cluster bomb remnants at the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise Visitor Center in Vientiane, Laos, on July 11. Ukraine Can Learn From Southeast Asia Cambodia and Laos have direct experience with the aftermath of U.S. cluster bombs, now deployed on the battlefield in Ukraine. Analysis | Verena Hölzl Vacationers on the shore of the Caspian Sea watch the parade in honor of the Day of the Navy of the Russian Federation in Kaspiysk, Russia. Vacationers on the shore of the Caspian Sea watch the parade in honor of the Day of the Navy of the Russian Federation in Kaspiysk, Russia. The Caspian Sea Is a Sanctions-Busting Paradise Ghost voyages and dark port calls by Russian and Iranian vessels are enabling both countries to circumvent Western sanctions and thrive in a shadow economy. Analysis | Elisabeth Braw
Since then, however, they’ve spent recent weeks jumping from argument to argument. The party and its politicians have, among other things, criticized Merkel for not responding to the outbreak quickly enough; said her measures were too harsh and authoritarian; gotten into an intra-party fight over a proposed split between its more moderate and far-right wings; blasted gender studies programs at German universities; and called for churches to be open on Easter Sunday in spite of the pandemic.
When AfD politicians last week unveiled their 10-point policy paper on combating the coronavirus, it looked, with some small exceptions, largely similar to the kinds of measures other parties and politicians were proposing. Increasing testing capacity, producing additional protective equipment for health workers, and protecting high-risk citizens are hardly partisan or novel suggestions.
On social media, the party’s main vehicle for communication with its supporters, their normally strong and active base seems less enthused. Hillje, who examined AfD social media figures for the three weeks leading up to the coronavirus situation and the three weeks since it began dominating headlines, found that their posts have been receiving barely half the engagement they normally do. What’s more, posts about the crisis itself were among the least likely to see likes, shares, or comments from supporters.
Meanwhile, Merkel’s steady, no-nonsense presence seems to be exactly what Germans want right now. In a survey released by the German broadcaster ZDF last week, an overwhelming 80 percent approved of Merkel’s handling of the crisis, and an even higher 88 percent approved of the government’s work during this time. As a result, Merkel’s CDU has gained back significant ground in the national opinion polls, while the AfD is barely breaking double digits (and indeed fell to 9 percent in some surveys).
“Now during a health crisis, where a range of experts have become important again … [far-right parties] actually have very little say, except in those countries where they form part of the government,” said Ruth Wodak, an expert on far-right rhetoric at the University of Vienna and Lancaster University.
Though the situation is perhaps clearest in Germany, the AfD’s counterparts in countries across Europe are facing the same challenges. In neighboring Austria, the far-right Freedom Party’s messaging has been similarly inconsistent; posts on the party’s Facebook page have included railing against fines for violating Austria’s coronavirus restrictions, defending Hungary’s Orban, calling for distance from the European Union, and telling people to stop having parties. In Italy, the far-right League’s Matteo Salvini—who, as of a government shuffle last year, no longer serves as the country’s interior minister—has resorted to spreading debunked conspiracy theories about the origins of the virus. Both parties have lost ground in opinion polls since the crisis began.
Though these forces are struggling for relevance at the moment, they may find more fertile ground for their message once the immediate threat of the virus recedes. As the discussion shifts to the economic destruction the coronavirus will undoubtedly leave in its wake, the far-right will surely seek to capitalize on thorny issues surrounding EU aid for harder-hit member states.
For Salvini in Italy, this will almost certainly focus on the initial lack of aid from his country’s European neighbors and the dearth of European solidarity. And in Germany and other Northern European countries, responses could mirror the same dynamics seen in the eurozone crisis: Dissatisfaction with the idea that wealthier EU countries should financially support their neighbors in Southern Europe. Indeed, that sentiment was what led to the creation of the AfD in 2013 as an anti-euro movement; the party has already begun voicing strong opposition to proposed “coronabonds” for hard-hit EU member states.
“Right now [the AfD] don’t really have a part to play, but in a couple of months they will,” said Marcel Dirsus, a political scientist and nonresident fellow at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy. “Germany is going to help other countries, as it should. And when that does happen, they will be there—and they will exploit it.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-14--In Canada, Patience Wearing Thin Over Trump’s Antics

Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump took office , Canada ’ s approach to dealing with its southern neighbor has centered largely on quiet diplomacy and damage control .
But COVID-19 has changed Ottawa ’ s most basic calculations .
With more than 570,000 confirmed cases and more than 23,000 deaths , the United States now has the highest number of cases in the world .
Canada , which has been lauded for its response , has seen more than 25,500 cases and more than 750 deaths .
Today , Canada ’ s number of diagnosed cases per capita is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As Trump continues to bungle the response to the pandemic at home , while seeking to block medical supplies from reaching Canada and other countries , Ottawa seems to have had enough .
Canada ’ s patience has worn thin in the past two weeks , particularly amid two decidedly Trumpian acts .
In late March , leaked memos obtained by the Nation revealed that U.S. Customs and Border Protection had requested 1,000 troops to guard the U.S.-Canada border .
While militarizing the border would have benefited Canada more than the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ south to north than in the other direction—Ottawa considered it an overblown move .
As talks of a militarized northern border grew stronger within the United States , Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took pains to push back against the White House .
Thus far , the effort has been successful , but whether it will stay that way remains to be seen .
Days later , Trump drew outcry from Canada after invoking the 1950 Defense Production Act to bar 3M from exporting N95 masks to Canada .
As with the border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ walked back its threats , signing an agreement allowing the exports to move forward .
But such wrangling has begun to change the tenor of the relationship .
“ The U.S.-Canada relationship will survive this , ” Bruce Heyman , former U.S. ambassador to Canada , told Foreign Policy .
“ [ But ] like anything else , that ’ s a wound that ’ ll take time to heal and the next administration is going to work hard to repair the relationship and the reestablishment of trust.
” At the outset of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relationship with special care , even as it required some social distancing between neighbors .
When Canada closed its borders to the world on March 16 , it left out a crucial exception : the United States .
While both countries ’ outbreaks were much smaller at the time , cases in the United States were growing at a far faster clip—sped by a slow response and inadequate testing .
If Trudeau ’ s reason for banning all foreigners was to protect Canadians from the virus , letting Americans in undercut his entire @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s deputy prime minister , then called U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to strike a deal .
But doing so was part of a tactful strategy : Trudeau arrived at the same destination by letting Trump take the lead .
“ We will be , by mutual consent , temporarily closing our Northern Border with Canada to non-essential traffic .
Trade will not be affected .
Details to follow !
” Trump tweeted the next day .
The border was closed to all nonessential movement , though the estimated $ 2 billion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ still cross .
( Closing the borders fully is something that the two countries have never done , save for briefly following 9/11 . )
By allowing Trump to lead the way on a two-sided closure that still permitted essential and trade movement , Trudeau saved the country from a geopolitical ( or Twitter ) fight with the U.S. president and the prospect of any ruinous economic retaliation .
A full closure of the border would hit the two countries hard : Automobiles , for example , are shipped back and forth between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during their fabrication .
Complete shutdown would have been detrimental to both countries and something to be avoided at all cost .
“ Canada ’ s approach has been taking [ Trump ’ s ] personality into consideration and effectively communicating widely about the importance of the relationship and what the United States is doing is wrong in terms of how it ’ s impacting the United States itself , ” Heyman said .
Keeping a good and healthy relationship with the United States has been a chief domestic challenge in recent years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a “ war room ” dedicated solely to handling a volatile Trump .
Canada has nevertheless not been immune to Trump ’ s wild-card antics .
In 2018 , Trump caught Trudeau off guard with surprise tariffs on aluminum and steel—removed only after a nearly yearlong standoff .
And while the two leaders have mostly maintained cordial relations , awkward encounters at international summits ( including a leaked video showing Trudeau making fun of Trump ) have led to name-calling and tensions .
Typically , those tensions have been diffused by Trudeau .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ however .
When it came to talking Trump down from sending troops to the longest nonmilitarized border in the world , Trudeau took a different tack .
He started making what some called threats , albeit the Canadian way : polite and almost apologetic .
Over and over , Trudeau reminded his U.S. counterpart of the “ mutually beneficial relationship ” and , more importantly , the thousands of Canadian health care workers who cross the border every day to work in U.S. hospitals .
Even as nerves are fraying in Ottawa , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the relationship .
Some 75 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States , while 18 percent of U.S. exports are sent to Canada .
But while there is hardly any “ Canada first ” policy , the country will take the actions most needed to protect itself .
Or as Freeland put it : Ottawa will “ do whatever it takes to defend the national interest .
”

Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump took office, Canada’s approach to dealing with its southern neighbor has centered largely on quiet diplomacy and damage control. But COVID-19 has changed Ottawa’s most basic calculations. With more than 570,000 confirmed cases and more than 23,000 deaths, the United States now has the highest number of cases in the world. Canada, which has been lauded for its response , has seen more than 25,500 cases and more than 750 deaths. Today, Canada’s number of diagnosed cases per capita is about one-third that of the United States.
Ever since U.S. President Donald Trump took office, Canada’s approach to dealing with its southern neighbor has centered largely on quiet diplomacy and damage control. But COVID-19 has changed Ottawa’s most basic calculations. With more than 570,000 confirmed cases and more than 23,000 deaths, the United States now has the highest number of cases in the world. Canada, which has been lauded for its response, has seen more than 25,500 cases and more than 750 deaths. Today, Canada’s number of diagnosed cases per capita is about one-third that of the United States.
As Trump continues to bungle the response to the pandemic at home, while seeking to block medical supplies from reaching Canada and other countries, Ottawa seems to have had enough. Canada’s patience has worn thin in the past two weeks, particularly amid two decidedly Trumpian acts. In late March, leaked memos obtained by the Nation revealed that U.S. Customs and Border Protection had requested 1,000 troops to guard the U.S.-Canada border. While militarizing the border would have benefited Canada more than the United States—as there is more irregular crossing from south to north than in the other direction—Ottawa considered it an overblown move. As talks of a militarized northern border grew stronger within the United States, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took pains to push back against the White House. Thus far, the effort has been successful, but whether it will stay that way remains to be seen. Days later, Trump drew outcry from Canada after invoking the 1950 Defense Production Act to bar 3M from exporting N95 masks to Canada. As with the border issue, the Trump administration has since walked back its threats, signing an agreement allowing the exports to move forward. But such wrangling has begun to change the tenor of the relationship.
“The U.S.-Canada relationship will survive this,” Bruce Heyman, former U.S. ambassador to Canada, told Foreign Policy. “[But] like anything else, that’s a wound that’ll take time to heal and the next administration is going to work hard to repair the relationship and the reestablishment of trust.”
At the outset of the crisis, Canada handled the U.S. relationship with special care, even as it required some social distancing between neighbors. When Canada closed its borders to the world on March 16, it left out a crucial exception: the United States. While both countries’ outbreaks were much smaller at the time, cases in the United States were growing at a far faster clip—sped by a slow response and inadequate testing. If Trudeau’s reason for banning all foreigners was to protect Canadians from the virus, letting Americans in undercut his entire premise. Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s deputy prime minister, then called U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to strike a deal. But doing so was part of a tactful strategy: Trudeau arrived at the same destination by letting Trump take the lead.
“We will be, by mutual consent, temporarily closing our Northern Border with Canada to non-essential traffic. Trade will not be affected. Details to follow!” Trump tweeted the next day. The border was closed to all nonessential movement, though the estimated $2 billion in goods that passes each day can still cross. (Closing the borders fully is something that the two countries have never done, save for briefly following 9/11.) By allowing Trump to lead the way on a two-sided closure that still permitted essential and trade movement, Trudeau saved the country from a geopolitical (or Twitter) fight with the U.S. president and the prospect of any ruinous economic retaliation. A full closure of the border would hit the two countries hard: Automobiles, for example, are shipped back and forth between Canada and the United States many times during their fabrication. Complete shutdown would have been detrimental to both countries and something to be avoided at all cost. “Canada’s approach has been taking [Trump’s] personality into consideration and effectively communicating widely about the importance of the relationship and what the United States is doing is wrong in terms of how it’s impacting the United States itself,” Heyman said.
Keeping a good and healthy relationship with the United States has been a chief domestic challenge in recent years. Trudeau’s office even includes a “war room” dedicated solely to handling a volatile Trump. Canada has nevertheless not been immune to Trump’s wild-card antics. In 2018, Trump caught Trudeau off guard with surprise tariffs on aluminum and steel—removed only after a nearly yearlong standoff. And while the two leaders have mostly maintained cordial relations, awkward encounters at international summits (including a leaked video showing Trudeau making fun of Trump) have led to name-calling and tensions. Typically, those tensions have been diffused by Trudeau.
The pandemic has changed this dynamic, however. When it came to talking Trump down from sending troops to the longest nonmilitarized border in the world, Trudeau took a different tack. He started making what some called threats, albeit the Canadian way: polite and almost apologetic. Over and over, Trudeau reminded his U.S. counterpart of the “mutually beneficial relationship” and, more importantly, the thousands of Canadian health care workers who cross the border every day to work in U.S. hospitals.
Even as nerves are fraying in Ottawa, there is much at stake to maintaining the relationship. Some 75 percent of Canadian exports go to the United States, while 18 percent of U.S. exports are sent to Canada.
But while there is hardly any “Canada first” policy, the country will take the actions most needed to protect itself. Or as Freeland put it: Ottawa will “do whatever it takes to defend the national interest.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-14--Viktor Orban Can’t Eradicate the Coronavirus by Decree

Since coming to power in 2010 , the man they call the “ Viktator ” has wrapped his brand of authoritarianism in a semitransparent gown—transparent enough to show his clients and enemies where the real power was , but with just enough substance for his friends to pretend he was just another democratically elected head of government .
This pretense has allowed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to resist most threats to his power .
Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) has refused to join other European parties , now including Poland ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in calling for Orban ’ s expulsion from the center-right European People ’ s Party ( EPP ) alliance .
Yet the brazenness of his latest power grab has finally exposed the limits of Hungary ’ s democratic facade .
Like Google or Facebook , Orban built an effective monopoly in a formally competitive environment .
Other parties could fight in elections ; they just could never win them—and Orban has used his emergency powers to siphon 50 percent of political parties ’ state funding to a coronavirus fund .
Independent media are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just find it hard to make ends meet because of taxes on private advertising .
Somehow the companies belonging to Lorinc Meszaros , a childhood friend of Orban ’ s , have done so well from public contracts that the pipe fitter has become a U.S.-dollar billionaire .
Thanks to an electoral system that entrenches majoritarianism and suffers from electoral fraud ( exposed by Unhack Democracy , a nongovernmental organization which I chair ) , Orban has obtained the two-thirds majority in parliament that gives him legal power to change the constitution at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parliamentary representation prevents it from acting as any kind of check on the executive .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
After 10 years in power , his arrogance is showing .
A culture war against the Central European University founded by George Soros drew international opprobrium and provoked the European Parliament to demand the start of proceedings , under Article 7 of the European Union treaty , against his government .
The ramming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the opposition together , enabling it to win the mayoralties of five of the largest Hungarian cities , including Budapest .
Now , by exploiting the coronavirus epidemic to give himself broad powers to rule by decree indefinitely , Orban has thrown his chiffon gown away , forcing his friends to see him as the naked autocrat that he is .
Included in the package of emergency measures was the creation of a new criminal offense : spreading misinformation about the coronavirus .
Many observers see it as a device for intimidating journalists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or doctors not being given proper protective equipment .
This evokes neighboring Serbia , whose political system suffers from many of the same ills as Hungary ’ s , and where journalist Ana Lalic was arrested for reporting on “ chaotic working conditions ” at a Serbian health facility .
Orban didn ’ t need to give himself indefinite emergency rule .
He could have kept up democratic appearances by including a sunset clause , requiring a vote of his rubber-stamp two-thirds majority to extend the emergency .
Instead he ’ s made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that until the 2022 elections , which will be competitive as long as the opposition presents joint candidates in Hungary ’ s 106 single-member districts , he holds absolute power in Hungary and no domestic actor can stand in his way .
Abroad , however , the picture is different .
His enabling act drew immediate criticism : from the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee ; from Norbert Röttgen , an outsider candidate to lead Germany ’ s center-right CDU ; and from the governments of Slovakia and the Czech Republic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also includes Hungary and Poland ) .
The European Parliament had already demanded the invocation of Article 7 procedures to punish countries that violate democratic values , though as long as Poland vetoes their application these can not proceed further .
The case of the European Commission is more nuanced .
It issued a veiled statement stating that measures could not be indefinite , but the commission is constrained by the convention that all member states are considered to be in good standing , and didn ’ t mention Hungary .
When at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ letter ( which , being diplomatic , didn ’ t name names ) , Hungary promptly ridiculed it by endorsing it .
Orban even responded to a demand by EPP members that he be expelled from the party by claiming he was busy with the epidemic and had “ no time for this.
” How much can he continue to taunt his fellow European leaders ?
The Shocking ‘ Coronavirus Coup ’ in Hungary Was a Wake-Up Call While the world is shut down , history hasn ’ t stopped .
Authoritarians are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Just Getting Started Hungary ’ s leader used fearmongering propaganda to win .
As he entrenches his power , the country ’ s democratic backsliding will get even worse .
Viktor Orban may have won , but a narrow loss in the countryside suggests that corruption could one day be his undoing .
EU law is a more formidable opponent .
The commission ’ s mildly written letter was in fact a coded legal threat , effectively telling him : We ’ re watching you , and if you use these emergency powers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to court .
The European Court of Justice has been increasingly tough on Orban , deploying assertive legal arguments against his anti-NGO legislation .
The scope of EU law is now so wide that many emergency measures , insofar as they apply to EU citizens or companies , would fall under the court ’ s jurisdiction .
Orban ’ s second front is the currency markets .
The Hungarian forint lost nearly 10 percent of its value against the euro after the emergency powers were announced .
This is the direct result of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currency .
As a state outside the eurozone , Hungary won ’ t be able to benefit from the policies being developed to safeguard eurozone members ’ financial systems .
The Hungarian economy is heavily dependent on industrial production for sale in Western Europe , and that demand has now dried up .
And , with a depreciating currency , Orban can ’ t easily afford to borrow to support afflicted workers or deal with a long-underfunded health system without putting further pressure on the currency .
His third , and most serious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hungary is ill-prepared for the epidemic .
Its health system is so stretched that one of the opposition Momentum party ’ s favorite campaign stunts was to distribute toilet paper to hospitals .
It is desperately short of intensive care beds , with even Orban admitting that the country has only 2,560 ventilators , which means capacity could be expected to run out with a caseload between 25,000 and 50,000 .
Hungary currently has 1,512 cases detected using the limited testing at its disposal .
Correcting for underreporting using a model developed by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Medicine , which estimates that Hungary tests only 7 percent of those with the virus , it is likely to have more than 20,000 cases already .
Even if the disease spreads at a slower rate than in other countries , this could see the country ’ s health system come under severe pressure in the four weeks it will take for social distancing measures to have an impact .
More worrying still is supply of medical personnel .
Hungarian doctors have left to Western Europe in large numbers in search of higher @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff shortage is so severe that Orban made an exception to his normal hostility to immigration from Muslim countries and has supplied state scholarships to doctors from Iran and the Arab world in recent years .
( True to form , he recently deported some of them back to Iran . )
Orban is a master of exploiting public fear of his own creation .
He manufactured a supposed threat from refugees to consolidate his power in 2015 and , when his doomsday warning didn ’ t materialize , he took credit for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ time the threat is a real virus , and he ’ s put himself in charge .
He ’ ll try to blame George Soros , the EU , and anyone else he can think of , but he won ’ t be able to hide his neglect of his country ’ s health system over the past 10 years .
The depreciating forint stops with him .

Since coming to power in 2010, the man they call the "Viktator" has wrapped his brand of authoritarianism in a semitransparent gown—transparent enough to show his clients and enemies where the real power was, but with just enough substance for his friends to pretend he was just another democratically elected head of government.
Since coming to power in 2010, the man they call the “Viktator” has wrapped his brand of authoritarianism in a semitransparent gown—transparent enough to show his clients and enemies where the real power was, but with just enough substance for his friends to pretend he was just another democratically elected head of government.
This pretense has allowed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to resist most threats to his power. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has refused to join other European parties, now including Poland’s large and influential Civic Platform, in calling for Orban’s expulsion from the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) alliance. Yet the brazenness of his latest power grab has finally exposed the limits of Hungary’s democratic facade.
Like Google or Facebook, Orban built an effective monopoly in a formally competitive environment. Other parties could fight in elections; they just could never win them—and Orban has used his emergency powers to siphon 50 percent of political parties’ state funding to a coronavirus fund. Independent media are allowed to operate in Hungary; they just find it hard to make ends meet because of taxes on private advertising. Somehow the companies belonging to Lorinc Meszaros, a childhood friend of Orban’s, have done so well from public contracts that the pipe fitter has become a U.S.-dollar billionaire.
Thanks to an electoral system that entrenches majoritarianism and suffers from electoral fraud (exposed by Unhack Democracy, a nongovernmental organization which I chair), Orban has obtained the two-thirds majority in parliament that gives him legal power to change the constitution at will. The opposition’s meager parliamentary representation prevents it from acting as any kind of check on the executive.
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After 10 years in power, his arrogance is showing. A culture war against the Central European University founded by George Soros drew international opprobrium and provoked the European Parliament to demand the start of proceedings, under Article 7 of the European Union treaty, against his government. The ramming through parliament of a labor law brought the opposition together, enabling it to win the mayoralties of five of the largest Hungarian cities, including Budapest. Now, by exploiting the coronavirus epidemic to give himself broad powers to rule by decree indefinitely, Orban has thrown his chiffon gown away, forcing his friends to see him as the naked autocrat that he is.
Included in the package of emergency measures was the creation of a new criminal offense: spreading misinformation about the coronavirus. Many observers see it as a device for intimidating journalists who might report on inadequate hospital facilities or doctors not being given proper protective equipment. This evokes neighboring Serbia, whose political system suffers from many of the same ills as Hungary’s, and where journalist Ana Lalic was arrested for reporting on “chaotic working conditions” at a Serbian health facility.
Orban didn’t need to give himself indefinite emergency rule. He could have kept up democratic appearances by including a sunset clause, requiring a vote of his rubber-stamp two-thirds majority to extend the emergency. Instead he’s made it impossible to deny the truth: that until the 2022 elections, which will be competitive as long as the opposition presents joint candidates in Hungary’s 106 single-member districts, he holds absolute power in Hungary and no domestic actor can stand in his way.
Abroad, however, the picture is different. His enabling act drew immediate criticism: from the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; from Norbert Röttgen, an outsider candidate to lead Germany’s center-right CDU; and from the governments of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, fracturing the Visegrad Group alliance (which also includes Hungary and Poland).
The European Parliament had already demanded the invocation of Article 7 procedures to punish countries that violate democratic values, though as long as Poland vetoes their application these cannot proceed further. The case of the European Commission is more nuanced. It issued a veiled statement stating that measures could not be indefinite, but the commission is constrained by the convention that all member states are considered to be in good standing, and didn’t mention Hungary. When at least 13 member states signed a diplomatic letter (which, being diplomatic, didn’t name names), Hungary promptly ridiculed it by endorsing it.
Orban even responded to a demand by EPP members that he be expelled from the party by claiming he was busy with the epidemic and had “no time for this.” How much can he continue to taunt his fellow European leaders?
Read More Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers his state of the nation address in Budapest on Feb. 18, 2018. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban delivers his state of the nation address in Budapest on Feb. 18, 2018. The Shocking ‘Coronavirus Coup’ in Hungary Was a Wake-Up Call While the world is shut down, history hasn’t stopped. Authoritarians are seizing the opportunity. Shadow Government | Daniel B. Baer Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Berlin, Germany, on May 8, 2014. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Berlin, Germany, on May 8, 2014. Viktor Orban Is Just Getting Started Hungary’s leader used fearmongering propaganda to win. As he entrenches his power, the country’s democratic backsliding will get even worse. Argument | Zselyke Csaky An activist of the new centrist-liberal Momentum party over-pastes an anti-migration billboard on March 28 in Budapest, Hungary. (Attila Kisbenedek/AFP/Getty Images) An activist of the new centrist-liberal Momentum party over-pastes an anti-migration billboard on March 28 in Budapest, Hungary. (Attila Kisbenedek/AFP/Getty Images) Hungary’s Strongman Has a Weak Spot Viktor Orban may have won, but a narrow loss in the countryside suggests that corruption could one day be his undoing. Argument | Dariusz Kalan
EU law is a more formidable opponent. The commission’s mildly written letter was in fact a coded legal threat, effectively telling him: We’re watching you, and if you use these emergency powers illegitimately, we’ll take you to court. The European Court of Justice has been increasingly tough on Orban, deploying assertive legal arguments against his anti-NGO legislation. The scope of EU law is now so wide that many emergency measures, insofar as they apply to EU citizens or companies, would fall under the court’s jurisdiction.
Orban’s second front is the currency markets. The Hungarian forint lost nearly 10 percent of its value against the euro after the emergency powers were announced. This is the direct result of Orban’s hostility to the single currency. As a state outside the eurozone, Hungary won’t be able to benefit from the policies being developed to safeguard eurozone members’ financial systems. The Hungarian economy is heavily dependent on industrial production for sale in Western Europe, and that demand has now dried up. And, with a depreciating currency, Orban can’t easily afford to borrow to support afflicted workers or deal with a long-underfunded health system without putting further pressure on the currency.
His third, and most serious, enemy is the virus itself. Hungary is ill-prepared for the epidemic. Its health system is so stretched that one of the opposition Momentum party’s favorite campaign stunts was to distribute toilet paper to hospitals. It is desperately short of intensive care beds, with even Orban admitting that the country has only 2,560 ventilators, which means capacity could be expected to run out with a caseload between 25,000 and 50,000.
Hungary currently has 1,512 cases detected using the limited testing at its disposal. Correcting for underreporting using a model developed by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, which estimates that Hungary tests only 7 percent of those with the virus, it is likely to have more than 20,000 cases already.
Even if the disease spreads at a slower rate than in other countries, this could see the country’s health system come under severe pressure in the four weeks it will take for social distancing measures to have an impact. More worrying still is supply of medical personnel. Hungarian doctors have left to Western Europe in large numbers in search of higher salaries and less political interference. The staff shortage is so severe that Orban made an exception to his normal hostility to immigration from Muslim countries and has supplied state scholarships to doctors from Iran and the Arab world in recent years. (True to form, he recently deported some of them back to Iran.)
Orban is a master of exploiting public fear of his own creation. He manufactured a supposed threat from refugees to consolidate his power in 2015 and, when his doomsday warning didn’t materialize, he took credit for protecting his people from it. This time the threat is a real virus, and he’s put himself in charge. He’ll try to blame George Soros, the EU, and anyone else he can think of, but he won’t be able to hide his neglect of his country’s health system over the past 10 years. The depreciating forint stops with him.