foreignpolicy--2020-04-24--Nobody Can Help Iraq Anymore

Nobody Can Help Iraq Anymore

Nobody Can Help Iraq Anymore Raise your hand if you were aware that there was a new Iraqi prime minister-designate .
No , not the guy who was nominated in mid-March or the guy before him .
The new , new one .
For those keeping score at home ( which at this point is almost no one ) : On April 9 , Iraqi President Barham Salih tapped Mustafa al-Kadhimi to be the country ’ s next prime minister .
The incumbent , Adil Abdul-Mahdi , resigned in late November but continues to lead a caretaker government .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi , could not form a government and then came Adnan al-Zurfi , who was also unable to garner enough support to form a government , resulting in Kadhimi ’ s nomination .
America ’ s newspapers of record in turn published what now seem to be perfunctory articles about the maybe new Iraqi prime minister that read a lot like so many previous articles about all the other Iraqi prime minister-designates dating back to the invasion of Iraq .
Like his predecessors , Kadhimi apparently can balance between the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of integrity who can elicit political support from different factions .
But such testimonials , in typical fashion , are followed by caveats about the significant shortcomings of Iraq ’ s political system that will likely make it difficult for the prime minister-designate to form a government and subsequently govern .
The articles generally close with a fingers-crossed quality .
It is a formula that journalists in the field and their editors at home seem to have perfected .
The person nominated is always the big story , but the far more consequential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ merely allude to is Iraq ’ s political institutions .
Even the most casual observers of Iraq know that the country ’ s problems are significant , complex , and seemingly unresolvable .
No one knows how to fix them , despite years of trying , so everyone in Washington who ever cared about Iraq seems now to be advocating for the United States to head for the exits .
That is clearly the Trump administration ’ s policy .
Yet sooner or later—most likely the former—it ’ s inevitable that the White @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ramifications of Iraq ’ s collapse .
It has become clear in recent years that both institutions and character matter .
A country can have democratic institutions , but if leaders do not embrace the norms and principles of democracy , the system can be compromised , even fatally .
Similarly , a politician can be high-minded but nevertheless operate in a system with perverse institutions that makes it hard to overcome political pathologies baked into the political order .
The latter seems to be Kadhimi ’ s predicament .
Both Iraqis and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ He is not a member of any of Iraq ’ s political parties , and as director of Iraq ’ s National Intelligence Service , he is said to have overseen its depoliticization and professionalization .
These are pluses , but it seems almost certain that Iraq ’ s political institutions will undermine Kadhimi ’ s ability to govern .
This does not mean that Iraqis who have suffered so much for so long are fated to live under a rotten government .
Their current mess demonstrates , however , that even the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to persist in perpetuity .
Without getting into all the nitty-gritty details , Iraq ’ s post-invasion politics resemble a system of spoils with its attendant corruption and zero oversight , and most politicians and political parties are complicit .
It does not help matters that Iraq ’ s more powerful neighbor , Iran , benefits from the political dysfunction that renders Baghdad weak .
These problems are so resonant that even Moqtada al-Sadr—Remember him ?
Leader of the Mahdi Army ?
America ’ s bête noir in Baghdad ?
—was able to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( despite his on again-off again ties to Iran ) and anti-corruption crusader .
More significant than Sadr ’ s return , however , was the wave of protests that broke out in October 2019 .
A large cross-section of Iraqis turned out in the streets , not specifically because they did not like the job Abdul-Mahdi was doing but rather because they understood how Iraq ’ s perverse political system was destroying any hope they had of a more prosperous and decent future .
These protesters sought a complete overhaul of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the so-called Arab Spring almost a decade ago , Iraqis “ demand [ ed ] the end of the regime ” —regime meaning the political system , not just the leaders of that system .
That the Arab uprisings proved to be a false dawn does not diminish the fact that Iraq ’ s political institutions and the social order that reinforces the system need to be overturned before Iraqis have any real chance of achieving their goals .
This is something left best to Iraqis , however .
For many years , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prodding Iraq ’ s leaders to do the right thing for their people , but the system America helped set up incentivizes Iraqi politicians in Baghdad to mostly do what is in their own parochial interests at the expense of others .
The sectarian nature of the party system is particularly debilitating and puts fragmentary pressure on the country .
Fighting for , hoarding , and distributing resources to a favored constituency is the definition of politics , but in Iraq ’ s system , sectarian differences and subsequent differences within these groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can sit across from five officials in an Iraqi ministry and all five have different loyalties and are pursuing different agendas .
The record of failure is so clear that it is striking that there is anyone at all advocating intensive U.S. engagement with Iraq ’ s political actors in the same Sisyphean effort to get them to make better decisions .
The Trump administration has clearly come to the conclusion that getting involved in Iraqi politics is a waste of energy .
The U.S. position on the selection of Iraqi prime minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ person is acceptable so long as they are an “ Iraqi nationalist , ” meaning the person is not on Iran ’ s payroll .
Kadhimi passed the test—but that does not diminish the current trajectory of U.S. policy toward Iraq , which ( finally ) places the burden on Iraqis to figure their situation out for themselves .
That is going to upset some of them , especially Sunnis who want to be allies of the United States , but they have no choice but to accept their new reality .
Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
No doubt the Islamic State will remain a threat in Iraq , which is why the United States and NATO will want to keep a relatively small counterterrorism training mission in Baghdad , but otherwise America ’ s lack of interest will force Iraq ’ s leaders to make substantial changes or face the wrath of angry Iraqis who continue to demand the regime ’ s end .
If somehow Iraq ’ s political class muddles through , the country ’ s cumulative problems will at least be the responsibility of Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse with the combination of the coronavirus pandemic that has depressed global demand for oil and a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia .
There does not seem to be a way for Iraq ’ s budget numbers to work , portending the country ’ s further collapse .
It is a terrible situation for Iraqis , but there are very few in the United States who want to invest the time and resources into Iraq , especially now with COVID-19 ravaging Americans ’ health and Congress spending trillions of dollars just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may very well be that Kadhimi is as competent as advertised , but he will not save Iraq .
The political system is too rotten , Americans are too distracted , and Iran likes Iraq just the way it is .

Raise your hand if you were aware that there was a new Iraqi prime minister-designate. No, not the guy who was nominated in mid-March or the guy before him. The new, new one. For those keeping score at home (which at this point is almost no one): On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih tapped Mustafa al-Kadhimi to be the country’s next prime minister. The incumbent, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, resigned in late November but continues to lead a caretaker government. The man initially chosen to succeed him, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, could not form a government and then came Adnan al-Zurfi, who was also unable to garner enough support to form a government, resulting in Kadhimi’s nomination.
Raise your hand if you were aware that there was a new Iraqi prime minister-designate. No, not the guy who was nominated in mid-March or the guy before him. The new, new one. For those keeping score at home (which at this point is almost no one): On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih tapped Mustafa al-Kadhimi to be the country’s next prime minister. The incumbent, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, resigned in late November but continues to lead a caretaker government. The man initially chosen to succeed him, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, could not form a government and then came Adnan al-Zurfi, who was also unable to garner enough support to form a government, resulting in Kadhimi’s nomination.
America’s newspapers of record in turn published what now seem to be perfunctory articles about the maybe new Iraqi prime minister that read a lot like so many previous articles about all the other Iraqi prime minister-designates dating back to the invasion of Iraq. Like his predecessors, Kadhimi apparently can balance between the United States and Iran and is a person of integrity who can elicit political support from different factions. But such testimonials, in typical fashion, are followed by caveats about the significant shortcomings of Iraq’s political system that will likely make it difficult for the prime minister-designate to form a government and subsequently govern. The articles generally close with a fingers-crossed quality. It is a formula that journalists in the field and their editors at home seem to have perfected.
The person nominated is always the big story, but the far more consequential issue that these articles and commentaries often merely allude to is Iraq’s political institutions. Even the most casual observers of Iraq know that the country’s problems are significant, complex, and seemingly unresolvable. No one knows how to fix them, despite years of trying, so everyone in Washington who ever cared about Iraq seems now to be advocating for the United States to head for the exits. That is clearly the Trump administration’s policy. Yet sooner or later—most likely the former—it’s inevitable that the White House will have to confront all the ramifications of Iraq’s collapse.
It has become clear in recent years that both institutions and character matter. A country can have democratic institutions, but if leaders do not embrace the norms and principles of democracy, the system can be compromised, even fatally. Similarly, a politician can be high-minded but nevertheless operate in a system with perverse institutions that makes it hard to overcome political pathologies baked into the political order. The latter seems to be Kadhimi’s predicament. Both Iraqis and Americans have testified to his competence: He is not a member of any of Iraq’s political parties, and as director of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service, he is said to have overseen its depoliticization and professionalization. These are pluses, but it seems almost certain that Iraq’s political institutions will undermine Kadhimi’s ability to govern.
This does not mean that Iraqis who have suffered so much for so long are fated to live under a rotten government. Their current mess demonstrates, however, that even the worst political systems can be stable enough to persist in perpetuity. Without getting into all the nitty-gritty details, Iraq’s post-invasion politics resemble a system of spoils with its attendant corruption and zero oversight, and most politicians and political parties are complicit. It does not help matters that Iraq’s more powerful neighbor, Iran, benefits from the political dysfunction that renders Baghdad weak.
These problems are so resonant that even Moqtada al-Sadr—Remember him? Leader of the Mahdi Army? America’s bête noir in Baghdad?—was able to rehabilitate his political career as a nationalist (despite his on again-off again ties to Iran) and anti-corruption crusader. More significant than Sadr’s return, however, was the wave of protests that broke out in October 2019. A large cross-section of Iraqis turned out in the streets, not specifically because they did not like the job Abdul-Mahdi was doing but rather because they understood how Iraq’s perverse political system was destroying any hope they had of a more prosperous and decent future.
These protesters sought a complete overhaul of the political order. In the argot of the so-called Arab Spring almost a decade ago, Iraqis “demand[ed] the end of the regime”—regime meaning the political system, not just the leaders of that system. That the Arab uprisings proved to be a false dawn does not diminish the fact that Iraq’s political institutions and the social order that reinforces the system need to be overturned before Iraqis have any real chance of achieving their goals.
This is something left best to Iraqis, however. For many years, the United States has been pushing and prodding Iraq’s leaders to do the right thing for their people, but the system America helped set up incentivizes Iraqi politicians in Baghdad to mostly do what is in their own parochial interests at the expense of others. The sectarian nature of the party system is particularly debilitating and puts fragmentary pressure on the country. Fighting for, hoarding, and distributing resources to a favored constituency is the definition of politics, but in Iraq’s system, sectarian differences and subsequent differences within these groups are reflected across the government. One can sit across from five officials in an Iraqi ministry and all five have different loyalties and are pursuing different agendas. The record of failure is so clear that it is striking that there is anyone at all advocating intensive U.S. engagement with Iraq’s political actors in the same Sisyphean effort to get them to make better decisions.
The Trump administration has clearly come to the conclusion that getting involved in Iraqi politics is a waste of energy. The U.S. position on the selection of Iraqi prime minister has accordingly become an exercise in minimalism—the person is acceptable so long as they are an “Iraqi nationalist,” meaning the person is not on Iran’s payroll. Kadhimi passed the test—but that does not diminish the current trajectory of U.S. policy toward Iraq, which (finally) places the burden on Iraqis to figure their situation out for themselves. That is going to upset some of them, especially Sunnis who want to be allies of the United States, but they have no choice but to accept their new reality.
Washington’s stance may prove strategically wise. No doubt the Islamic State will remain a threat in Iraq, which is why the United States and NATO will want to keep a relatively small counterterrorism training mission in Baghdad, but otherwise America’s lack of interest will force Iraq’s leaders to make substantial changes or face the wrath of angry Iraqis who continue to demand the regime’s end. If somehow Iraq’s political class muddles through, the country’s cumulative problems will at least be the responsibility of Iran. And those problems are just getting worse with the combination of the coronavirus pandemic that has depressed global demand for oil and a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia. There does not seem to be a way for Iraq’s budget numbers to work, portending the country’s further collapse.
It is a terrible situation for Iraqis, but there are very few in the United States who want to invest the time and resources into Iraq, especially now with COVID-19 ravaging Americans’ health and Congress spending trillions of dollars just to keep the economy afloat. It may very well be that Kadhimi is as competent as advertised, but he will not save Iraq. The political system is too rotten, Americans are too distracted, and Iran likes Iraq just the way it is.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-24--Pentagon Asks for More Cash to Cut Down Civilian Deaths

Pentagon Asks for More Cash to Cut Down Civilian Deaths Under fire from human rights groups , the U.S. Department of Defense is asking lawmakers for a cash infusion to improve its ability to track civilian casualties in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups , Foreign Policy has learned .
It ’ s not immediately clear how much the new setup , which includes funds to set up a database that would allow members of the public to directly submit claims of U.S.-caused deaths , will ultimately cost .
Those estimates are expected to come @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unveil a new policy to curb civilian casualties in combat later this year , first prompted by former Defense Secretary James Mattis and continuing under his successor , Mark Esper .
The report sent to Congress in February from Thomas Alexander , the Pentagon ’ s acting top civilian overseer for special operations , asks for significant new staff to be added at the Defense Department ’ s civilian policy shop , and at major geographic commands , such as U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command .
Foreign Policy reviewed a copy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been under increased scrutiny to improve its civilian casualty reporting since the London-based Airwars outfit began reporting higher tallies of civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes in Iraq and Syria , said Larry Lewis , a former State Department official now at the CNA defense think tank .
“ It became really hard to just live with that , because Airwars just put so much effort into that , and it really did seem conservative , ” he said .
The pressure has had an impact .
At the end of last month , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ issuing a new report revealing ongoing civilian casualty investigations , after Amnesty International said that retaliatory American strikes against the al Qaeda-linked Somalian group al-Shabab killed two civilians in February , contradicting U.S. findings .
Under the new proposal , additional military staff are likely to be asked to draw up no-strike lists of civilian targets and to staff up cells at the combatant command “ tasked with reconciling external and US military reports , ” the document reviewed by Foreign Policy said .
“ Currently , information from the public is received @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as through email , reports by impartial humanitarian organizations and civil society groups , media reports , and social-media , ” a defense spokesperson told Foreign Policy .
“ We are looking at additional options for receiving information from the public , such as creating a webpage that identifies what types of information helps in conducting assessments and how to submit it.
” The directive comes on the heels of a January memo sent by James Anderson , the Pentagon ’ s acting policy chief who is heading up the civilian casualty response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to field more accurate intelligence and weapons systems to detect civilians on the battlefield to prevent the unnecessary loss of life .
But after a U.S.-led coalition drove the Islamic State out of the self-described caliphate ’ s twin capitals of Mosul , Iraq , and Raqqa , Syria , in 2017 , spearheaded by foreign troops backed by American advisors and strikes , rights groups that accused the Pentagon of vastly undercounting the number of civilian dead are pushing the agency to fold in public assessments to get smarter about choosing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past the ‘ military age male ’ assessment , ” said one nongovernmental organization official involved in the Pentagon policy process , referring to a process by which the Obama administration once marked all adult men as possible terrorist combatants in areas where the United States conducted drone strikes .
“ But those types of issues keep cropping up .
It ’ s hard when you don ’ t have more transparency.
” “ What intelligence can be gathered about vulnerable civilians when you ’ re privileging airstrikes , ” the NGO official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ air-dominant strategy in taking on the Islamic State .
“ Information coming from third parties is valuable to flesh out their intelligence picture .
It ’ s almost taken for granted that they have superior situational awareness.
” Defense Secretary Esper ’ s office is currently coordinating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pentagon entities to determine what the Pentagon will need to carry out the policy , the defense spokesperson told Foreign Policy .
Coming onboard at the Pentagon to help craft the plan will be Stephanie Hammond , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aide who began serving as the agency ’ s new acting deputy assistant secretary for stability and humanitarian affairs in March .
Two former defense officials told Foreign Policy that the stabilization office had long been under threat of elimination during the Trump administration amid a Pentagon mandate to examine the number of civilian deputy assistant secretaries , senior positions that are not appointed by Congress , for possible cuts .
Hammond will be the first person to fill the role on an acting basis since Mark Swayne left the Pentagon last year @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s new instruction , more than a dozen NGOs have called for the agency to engage more directly with external reports of civilian harm and honor more payments to victims of U.S. strikes .
But even as experts say U.S. practices have improved , there is still concern about the bandwidth of Pentagon civilians to roll out the upcoming policy as the U.S. military remains the kingmaker in many Defense Department budget talks .
“ One of the hardest things as you move out on this is that OSD policy doesn ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so resources are going to be an issue , ” said Lewis , the former State Department official .
“ You may see other combatant commands saying this won ’ t be a priority.
” Two officials from NGOs familiar with the Pentagon ’ s policy development said the effort to curb civilian casualties has gotten an additional push since Anderson , the officer in charge of the effort , took over as acting deputy secretary of defense for policy last year .
But the Pentagon and the NGO community , first brought @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , have consistently been at odds over a lack of desire at the agency to do onsite monitoring of bombing sites by U.S. troops , which the military has pushed back on over concerns of protecting American troops in harm ’ s way .
The Defense Department has also chafed at building a fund to pay back the families of innocent victims of U.S. strikes , allowing only $ 3 million to be authorized each year , despite a tabletop exercise meant to reconcile the differences between the agency and the NGO community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ They weren ’ t spending it , ” another NGO official told Foreign Policy .
“ They ’ re definitely not spending that amount.
” Meanwhile , the Pentagon has been tasked by Congress with completing a study this year on the lessons learned from the Islamic State fight in Raqqa and Mosul , where the Defense Department ’ s usual intelligence advantages were muted by dense urban terrain .
Yet within the military , as the Pentagon tries to gear up for a possible future war against China or Russia , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enough work being done to prepare the U.S. military .
John Spencer , a retired U.S. Army major who now chairs urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point , said the service ’ s national training center at Fort Irwin in California ’ s Mojave Desert only has one yearly brigade-level exercise that is an urban fight .
“ These major battles will not go away , ” he said .
“ You can report more civilian casualties all you want .
These wars will continue .
”

Under fire from human rights groups, the U.S. Department of Defense is asking lawmakers for a cash infusion to improve its ability to track civilian casualties in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, Foreign Policy has learned.
Under fire from human rights groups, the U.S. Department of Defense is asking lawmakers for a cash infusion to improve its ability to track civilian casualties in the ongoing fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, Foreign Policy has learned.
It’s not immediately clear how much the new setup, which includes funds to set up a database that would allow members of the public to directly submit claims of U.S.-caused deaths, will ultimately cost. Those estimates are expected to come later as the Pentagon appears set to unveil a new policy to curb civilian casualties in combat later this year, first prompted by former Defense Secretary James Mattis and continuing under his successor, Mark Esper.
The report sent to Congress in February from Thomas Alexander, the Pentagon’s acting top civilian overseer for special operations, asks for significant new staff to be added at the Defense Department’s civilian policy shop, and at major geographic commands, such as U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command. Foreign Policy reviewed a copy of the report.
The Pentagon has been under increased scrutiny to improve its civilian casualty reporting since the London-based Airwars outfit began reporting higher tallies of civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, said Larry Lewis, a former State Department official now at the CNA defense think tank. “It became really hard to just live with that, because Airwars just put so much effort into that, and it really did seem conservative,” he said.
The pressure has had an impact. At the end of last month, U.S. Africa Command announced it would begin issuing a new report revealing ongoing civilian casualty investigations, after Amnesty International said that retaliatory American strikes against the al Qaeda-linked Somalian group al-Shabab killed two civilians in February, contradicting U.S. findings.
Under the new proposal, additional military staff are likely to be asked to draw up no-strike lists of civilian targets and to staff up cells at the combatant command “tasked with reconciling external and US military reports,” the document reviewed by Foreign Policy said.
“Currently, information from the public is received in a variety of ways — such as through email, reports by impartial humanitarian organizations and civil society groups, media reports, and social-media,” a defense spokesperson told Foreign Policy. “We are looking at additional options for receiving information from the public, such as creating a webpage that identifies what types of information helps in conducting assessments and how to submit it.”
The directive comes on the heels of a January memo sent by James Anderson, the Pentagon’s acting policy chief who is heading up the civilian casualty response, that called for the Defense Department to field more accurate intelligence and weapons systems to detect civilians on the battlefield to prevent the unnecessary loss of life.
But after a U.S.-led coalition drove the Islamic State out of the self-described caliphate’s twin capitals of Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria, in 2017, spearheaded by foreign troops backed by American advisors and strikes, rights groups that accused the Pentagon of vastly undercounting the number of civilian dead are pushing the agency to fold in public assessments to get smarter about choosing its targets.
“We’ve moved past the ‘military age male’ assessment,” said one nongovernmental organization official involved in the Pentagon policy process, referring to a process by which the Obama administration once marked all adult men as possible terrorist combatants in areas where the United States conducted drone strikes. “But those types of issues keep cropping up. It’s hard when you don’t have more transparency.”
“What intelligence can be gathered about vulnerable civilians when you’re privileging airstrikes,” the NGO official added, describing the Pentagon’s air-dominant strategy in taking on the Islamic State. “Information coming from third parties is valuable to flesh out their intelligence picture. It’s almost taken for granted that they have superior situational awareness.”
Defense Secretary Esper’s office is currently coordinating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pentagon entities to determine what the Pentagon will need to carry out the policy, the defense spokesperson told Foreign Policy. Coming onboard at the Pentagon to help craft the plan will be Stephanie Hammond, the official said, a longtime Capitol Hill aide who began serving as the agency’s new acting deputy assistant secretary for stability and humanitarian affairs in March.
Two former defense officials told Foreign Policy that the stabilization office had long been under threat of elimination during the Trump administration amid a Pentagon mandate to examine the number of civilian deputy assistant secretaries, senior positions that are not appointed by Congress, for possible cuts. Hammond will be the first person to fill the role on an acting basis since Mark Swayne left the Pentagon last year.
Anticipating the release of the Pentagon’s new instruction, more than a dozen NGOs have called for the agency to engage more directly with external reports of civilian harm and honor more payments to victims of U.S. strikes. But even as experts say U.S. practices have improved, there is still concern about the bandwidth of Pentagon civilians to roll out the upcoming policy as the U.S. military remains the kingmaker in many Defense Department budget talks.
“One of the hardest things as you move out on this is that OSD policy doesn’t own a lot of things, so resources are going to be an issue,” said Lewis, the former State Department official. “You may see other combatant commands saying this won’t be a priority.”
Two officials from NGOs familiar with the Pentagon’s policy development said the effort to curb civilian casualties has gotten an additional push since Anderson, the officer in charge of the effort, took over as acting deputy secretary of defense for policy last year.
But the Pentagon and the NGO community, first brought into the fold by Mattis in 2017, have consistently been at odds over a lack of desire at the agency to do onsite monitoring of bombing sites by U.S. troops, which the military has pushed back on over concerns of protecting American troops in harm’s way.
The Defense Department has also chafed at building a fund to pay back the families of innocent victims of U.S. strikes, allowing only $3 million to be authorized each year, despite a tabletop exercise meant to reconcile the differences between the agency and the NGO community first reported by the Washington Post.
“They weren’t spending it,” another NGO official told Foreign Policy. “They’re definitely not spending that amount.”
Meanwhile, the Pentagon has been tasked by Congress with completing a study this year on the lessons learned from the Islamic State fight in Raqqa and Mosul, where the Defense Department’s usual intelligence advantages were muted by dense urban terrain.
Yet within the military, as the Pentagon tries to gear up for a possible future war against China or Russia, some experts fear there’s not enough work being done to prepare the U.S. military.
John Spencer, a retired U.S. Army major who now chairs urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, said the service’s national training center at Fort Irwin in California’s Mojave Desert only has one yearly brigade-level exercise that is an urban fight.
“These major battles will not go away,” he said. “You can report more civilian casualties all you want. These wars will continue.”


foreignpolicy--2020-04-25--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

A prominent Trump loyalist is being moved from the White House to the State Department in the first shuffle of its kind since the impeachment .
Meanwhile , Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro ’ s denialist approach to the coronavirus could exacerbate the problems the country ’ s health system already faces .
And a decision by North Macedonia ’ s government to allow church services to go ahead before Easter might accelerate the spread of the virus .
1 .
In Latest Impeachment Move , Trump Administration Shifts a Loyalist to the State Department Alexander Alden is being moved to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of European and Eurasian Affairs , the first political appointee to take up a senior post in that bureau since President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment , Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer reports .
The coronavirus crisis has further tested an already stretched public health care system in many parts of Brazil , and Bolsonaro continues to balk at the seriousness of the pandemic , Ana Ionova writes .
3 .
Russia Isn ’ t the Only Ones Getting Its Hands Dirty in Libya The United Arab Emirates is one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war .
This needs to change if the international community is serious about forging a resolution between the country ’ s warring factions , Emadeddin Badi writes .
North Macedonia ’ s government decided to allow churches to be open on the Orthodox Maundy Thursday and Good Friday , paving the way for believers to share the same communion spoons and kiss the same icons , Igor Bosilkovski writes .
The latest rumors about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ’ s health highlight a major problem in U.S.-North Korean relations : Pyongyang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make decisions about war and peace on the basis of rumors and misinformation , Jessica Lee writes .

A prominent Trump loyalist is being moved from the White House to the State Department in the first shuffle of its kind since the impeachment.
A prominent Trump loyalist is being moved from the White House to the State Department in the first shuffle of its kind since the impeachment.
Meanwhile, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s denialist approach to the coronavirus could exacerbate the problems the country’s health system already faces.
And a decision by North Macedonia’s government to allow church services to go ahead before Easter might accelerate the spread of the virus.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
The U.S. State Department
Alexander Alden is being moved to the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the first political appointee to take up a senior post in that bureau since President Donald Trump’s impeachment, Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer reports.
An aerial view of an emergency makeshift field hospital at Pacaembu Stadium for coronavirus patients with a capacity of 200 beds in São Paulo on March 27.
The coronavirus crisis has further tested an already stretched public health care system in many parts of Brazil, and Bolsonaro continues to balk at the seriousness of the pandemic, Ana Ionova writes.
French President Emmanuel Macron walks with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, after talks aimed at easing tensions in Libya.
The United Arab Emirates is one of the primary actors involved in the Libyan civil war. This needs to change if the international community is serious about forging a resolution between the country’s warring factions, Emadeddin Badi writes.
An Orthodox believer with protective mask attends a religious service at an Orthodox church in Skopje, North Macedonia, on April 16.
North Macedonia’s government decided to allow churches to be open on the Orthodox Maundy Thursday and Good Friday, paving the way for believers to share the same communion spoons and kiss the same icons, Igor Bosilkovski writes.
The Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge
The latest rumors about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s health highlight a major problem in U.S.-North Korean relations: Pyongyang’s opacity forces U.S. leaders to make decisions about war and peace on the basis of rumors and misinformation, Jessica Lee writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-25--Don’t Bash Globalization—It Will Rescue Our Economies After the Pandemic

Don ’ t Bash Globalization—It Will Rescue Our Economies After the Pandemic A global recession is deepening as one major economy after another falls prey to the coronavirus pandemic .
China ’ s economy shrunk for the first time in decades—a downturn that not even the country ’ s notoriously rosy economic statisticians can hide .
U.S. unemployment is approaching 20 percent , close to Depression-era levels .
Travel restrictions have killed global tourism and plunged the oil industry into pandemonium .
Auto production has virtually ceased , retail has moved online , and restaurants are closed almost everywhere .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ out of the coronavirus pandemic are medical equipment makers , video streaming services , and Amazon .
In this coronavirus winter of our discontent , it ’ s hard to imagine that a glorious economic summer may be just a few months away .
People are buying nothing but toilet paper , and pundits , as usual , are proclaiming the end of capitalism .
Economic forecasts for this year range from sharp recession to protracted depression ; the International Monetary Fund forecasts global GDP to contract by 3 percent in 2020 and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Europe , North America , and East Asia to contract by 6 percent .
Yet , just as epidemiologists ’ projections of tens of millions of coronavirus deaths had to be taken with a bit of caution ( and perhaps a grain of salt ) , economists ’ forecasts may also turn out to be overblown .
If the worst-case scenarios prove wrong and GDP does come roaring back sooner than expected , then it will be because of globalization .
Far from being the boogeyman its critics make it out to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are more productive , more efficient , and , yes , more resilient in the face of shocks .
As a result , we can now do more with less—and keep doing it even as the world itself comes crashing down around us .
The popular impression is that globalized production networks are vulnerably fragile due to their incredible complexity and easily disrupted due to just-in-time inventory management practices .
In fact , much of the pandemic-related unraveling of the economy has been blamed on these networks breaking down .
But this impression @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incredibly complex—but that complexity gives them strength , like a dense web made of delicate threads .
And skimpy inventories would only threaten production schedules if an entire industry of airborne logistics hadn ’ t grown up around them .
Before globalization , a typical factory might have kept several weeks or months of parts in stock , just to be sure never to run out .
That suppressed innovation , since it meant that any product redesign might turn expensive inventory into obsolete paperweights .
In the globalization era , factories effectively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : When a factory needs a part , it orders it .
If the part can ’ t be sourced from its usual supplier ( for example , in a China locked down by the coronavirus ) , the supply chain can easily shift to alternative providers in other countries .
Alternatively , factories with state-of-the-art , reprogrammable machines can just shift to producing different models for which parts happen to be available .
This kind of globalization-enabled flexibility is exactly what we ’ ve seen in response to the coronavirus crisis .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ down many Chinese suppliers in February , pundits predicted that global auto production would grind to a halt .
They seized on the temporary shutdown of a Fiat Chrysler plant in Serbia as evidence of the fragility of 21st-century supply chains .
Read the fine print and it turns out that the Serbian plant was already scheduled to close for retooling ; Fiat Chrysler didn ’ t expect the change in scheduling to impact its total monthly production .
Then , as things turned out , the Serbian plant didn ’ t shut @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all its European plants as a safeguard against coronavirus infection and in response to slumping demand .
Supposedly fragile far-flung supply chains held firm ; it was the larger economy that failed .
A few other plants around the world had to fly in specialized parts to make up for shortfalls .
In Japan , Nissan had to halt production at one plant for two days due to supply chain disruptions , while in South Korea , Hyundai closed one plant for five days , and Kia closed three plants for one day @ @ @ @ @ @ @ No collapse , no disruption—not even a slowdown until slack demand forced automakers to close up shop to prevent overstocking at their dealerships .
Tesla shut its California factory only after government orders , not because of any lack of parts .
It ’ s been the same story in the electronics industry .
Samsung had to close a smartphone assembly plant in South Korea—not because it couldn ’ t get parts but because a worker tested positive for the coronavirus .
It flew the parts to another factory in Vietnam for assembly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an LG camera factory closed because of sick staff , not broken supply chains .
Neither closure caused so much as a ripple in smartphone supplies .
The global interconnectedness of electronics production networks ensures that no single point of failure can disrupt output for long .
Even if the output of a particular product is temporarily halted due to supply chain problems , globalization has spawned such a multiplicity of products that near-substitutes are always available .
Today ’ s automobiles and mobile phones are some of the most complex consumer products @ @ @ @ @ @ @ face of the most severely disruptive disaster since World War II , no one in the world has been denied the opportunity to buy a car or a phone due to production problems .
The world ’ s health authorities may have failed us , but global production networks have passed with flying colors .
This gives us hope for a quicker economic recovery if and when demand returns .
That ’ s a big if , to be sure , as long as so many people and businesses are struggling .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ production networks can be restarted at a moment ’ s notice .
When people are ready to buy , the products will be ready to sell .
That makes today ’ s coronavirus crisis very different from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis .
That crisis began on Wall Street and infected much of the Western financial system , leaving a decadelong legacy of global stagnation .
Apparently the financial system is a lot less resilient than the real economy .
Globalization has made the real economy look a lot like the internet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it can survive nuclear Armageddon intact .
The coronavirus surge in internet traffic from millions of people working and studying from home has hardly dented average download speeds , let along crashed the net .
The anarchic weblike architecture of the internet has proved itself much more robust than the highly regulated networks of global finance .
Global production networks have the same advantage .
That ’ s why supposedly fragile production networks have hardly been dented by the pandemic .
Local and national economies may be shut down by social distancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ networks have kept going .
Nor have global production networks been responsible for spreading the coronavirus itself .
The chief vectors have been cocktail parties , religious congregations , and tourism .
None of the commentators who now rail against globalization are talking about closing Colorado ’ s ski slopes or Europe ’ s art galleries , to say nothing of the cruise ship industry .
Yet the pandemic didn ’ t spread on the screens of Chinese-manufactured mobile phones .
It spread because people like to travel , and no amount of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. economy comes back online in a few months , it will find a global economy eager for its goods and ready to absorb its pent-up potential .
The globalization of production makes it entirely possible that the coronavirus recession will be over almost as fast as it came .
That ’ s no consolation to the thousands of businesses that will go under or the millions of people who have already lost their jobs .
But a short and deep recession is better than a long depression .
Thanks to globalization , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to return to once the pandemic winds down in each individual country .
Right now , the United States may be shutting down , but East Asia is already opening back up , and the first countries in Europe are easing their lockdowns .
When the U.S. economy comes back online in a few months , it will find a global economy eager for its goods and ready to absorb its pent-up potential .
That ’ s the magic of globalization .
It can ’ t cure the virus , but it will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faster together than we ever could on our own .

A global recession is deepening as one major economy after another falls prey to the coronavirus pandemic. China’s economy shrunk for the first time in decades—a downturn that not even the country’s notoriously rosy economic statisticians can hide. U.S. unemployment is approaching 20 percent , close to Depression-era levels. Travel restrictions have killed global tourism and plunged the oil industry into pandemonium. Auto production has virtually ceased, retail has moved online, and restaurants are closed almost everywhere.
A global recession is deepening as one major economy after another falls prey to the coronavirus pandemic. China’s economy shrunk for the first time in decades—a downturn that not even the country’s notoriously rosy economic statisticians can hide. U.S. unemployment is approaching 20 percent, close to Depression-era levels. Travel restrictions have killed global tourism and plunged the oil industry into pandemonium. Auto production has virtually ceased, retail has moved online, and restaurants are closed almost everywhere.
Just about the only companies doing well out of the coronavirus pandemic are medical equipment makers, video streaming services, and Amazon.
In this coronavirus winter of our discontent, it’s hard to imagine that a glorious economic summer may be just a few months away. People are buying nothing but toilet paper, and pundits, as usual, are proclaiming the end of capitalism. Economic forecasts for this year range from sharp recession to protracted depression; the International Monetary Fund forecasts global GDP to contract by 3 percent in 2020 and the GDP of the advanced economies of Europe, North America, and East Asia to contract by 6 percent.
Yet, just as epidemiologists’ projections of tens of millions of coronavirus deaths had to be taken with a bit of caution (and perhaps a grain of salt), economists’ forecasts may also turn out to be overblown. If the worst-case scenarios prove wrong and GDP does come roaring back sooner than expected, then it will be because of globalization. Far from being the boogeyman its critics make it out to be, globalization is the reason that economies are more productive, more efficient, and, yes, more resilient in the face of shocks. As a result, we can now do more with less—and keep doing it even as the world itself comes crashing down around us.
In this coronavirus winter of our discontent, it’s hard to imagine that a glorious economic summer may be just a few months away.
The popular impression is that globalized production networks are vulnerably fragile due to their incredible complexity and easily disrupted due to just-in-time inventory management practices. In fact, much of the pandemic-related unraveling of the economy has been blamed on these networks breaking down. But this impression is completely misguided. Production networks are incredibly complex—but that complexity gives them strength, like a dense web made of delicate threads. And skimpy inventories would only threaten production schedules if an entire industry of airborne logistics hadn’t grown up around them.
Before globalization, a typical factory might have kept several weeks or months of parts in stock, just to be sure never to run out. That suppressed innovation, since it meant that any product redesign might turn expensive inventory into obsolete paperweights. In the globalization era, factories effectively outsource their inventory management to logistics companies: When a factory needs a part, it orders it. If the part can’t be sourced from its usual supplier (for example, in a China locked down by the coronavirus), the supply chain can easily shift to alternative providers in other countries. Alternatively, factories with state-of-the-art, reprogrammable machines can just shift to producing different models for which parts happen to be available.
This kind of globalization-enabled flexibility is exactly what we’ve seen in response to the coronavirus crisis. Take automobiles. When the pandemic closed down many Chinese suppliers in February, pundits predicted that global auto production would grind to a halt. They seized on the temporary shutdown of a Fiat Chrysler plant in Serbia as evidence of the fragility of 21st-century supply chains.
Read the fine print and it turns out that the Serbian plant was already scheduled to close for retooling; Fiat Chrysler didn’t expect the change in scheduling to impact its total monthly production. Then, as things turned out, the Serbian plant didn’t shut down at all—until Fiat Chrysler shut down all its European plants as a safeguard against coronavirus infection and in response to slumping demand. Supposedly fragile far-flung supply chains held firm; it was the larger economy that failed.
A few other plants around the world had to fly in specialized parts to make up for shortfalls. In Japan, Nissan had to halt production at one plant for two days due to supply chain disruptions, while in South Korea, Hyundai closed one plant for five days, and Kia closed three plants for one day. And that’s it. No collapse, no disruption—not even a slowdown until slack demand forced automakers to close up shop to prevent overstocking at their dealerships.
Tesla shut its California factory only after government orders, not because of any lack of parts.
Read More economy-after-coronavirus-brian-stauffer-illustration-3_2l economy-after-coronavirus-brian-stauffer-illustration-3_2l How the Economy Will Look After the Coronavirus Pandemic The pandemic will change the economic and financial order forever. We asked nine leading global thinkers for their predictions. Roundup | Joseph E. Stiglitz, Robert J. Shiller, Gita Gopinath, Carmen M. Reinhart, Adam Posen, Eswar Prasad, Adam Tooze, Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Kishore Mahbubani, Stefan Theil Demonstrators set up a mock customs checkpoint to protest against potential trade restrictions due to Brexit in Killeen, Northern Ireland, on Feb. 18, 2017. Demonstrators set up a mock customs checkpoint to protest against potential trade restrictions due to Brexit in Killeen, Northern Ireland, on Feb. 18, 2017. Globalization Will Look Very Different After the Coronavirus Pandemic New barriers are going up at breathtaking speed. The pandemic will accelerate not the demise of globalization but its transformation. Argument | Richard Fontaine Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Kathmandu, Nepal, for a summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation on Nov. 25, 2014. India Is Pushing Back Against China in South Asia Beijing’s attempts to encircle New Delhi are being systematically reversed. Analysis | Derek Grossman
It’s been the same story in the electronics industry. Samsung had to close a smartphone assembly plant in South Korea—not because it couldn’t get parts but because a worker tested positive for the coronavirus. It flew the parts to another factory in Vietnam for assembly there. Also in South Korea, an LG camera factory closed because of sick staff, not broken supply chains. Neither closure caused so much as a ripple in smartphone supplies. The global interconnectedness of electronics production networks ensures that no single point of failure can disrupt output for long.
Even if the output of a particular product is temporarily halted due to supply chain problems, globalization has spawned such a multiplicity of products that near-substitutes are always available. Today’s automobiles and mobile phones are some of the most complex consumer products ever made, yet even in the face of the most severely disruptive disaster since World War II, no one in the world has been denied the opportunity to buy a car or a phone due to production problems. The world’s health authorities may have failed us, but global production networks have passed with flying colors.
This gives us hope for a quicker economic recovery if and when demand returns. That’s a big if, to be sure, as long as so many people and businesses are struggling. But as soon as orders come in, production networks can be restarted at a moment’s notice. When people are ready to buy, the products will be ready to sell. That makes today’s coronavirus crisis very different from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. That crisis began on Wall Street and infected much of the Western financial system, leaving a decadelong legacy of global stagnation. Apparently the financial system is a lot less resilient than the real economy.
Globalization has made the real economy look a lot like the internet. The internet’s distributed structure means that it can survive nuclear Armageddon intact. The coronavirus surge in internet traffic from millions of people working and studying from home has hardly dented average download speeds, let along crashed the net. The anarchic weblike architecture of the internet has proved itself much more robust than the highly regulated networks of global finance. Global production networks have the same advantage.
That’s why supposedly fragile production networks have hardly been dented by the pandemic. Local and national economies may be shut down by social distancing rules and mandated lockdowns, but global networks have kept going.
Nor have global production networks been responsible for spreading the coronavirus itself. The chief vectors have been cocktail parties, religious congregations, and tourism. None of the commentators who now rail against globalization are talking about closing Colorado’s ski slopes or Europe’s art galleries, to say nothing of the cruise ship industry. Yet the pandemic didn’t spread on the screens of Chinese-manufactured mobile phones. It spread because people like to travel, and no amount of deglobalization is going to change that.When the U.S. economy comes back online in a few months, it will find a global economy eager for its goods and ready to absorb its pent-up potential.
The globalization of production makes it entirely possible that the coronavirus recession will be over almost as fast as it came. That’s no consolation to the thousands of businesses that will go under or the millions of people who have already lost their jobs. But a short and deep recession is better than a long depression. Thanks to globalization, there will still be a global economy to return to once the pandemic winds down in each individual country.
Right now, the United States may be shutting down, but East Asia is already opening back up, and the first countries in Europe are easing their lockdowns. When the U.S. economy comes back online in a few months, it will find a global economy eager for its goods and ready to absorb its pent-up potential. That’s the magic of globalization. It can’t cure the virus, but it will help all of us recover a lot faster together than we ever could on our own.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-25--Why Populists Want a Multipolar World

Why Populists Want a Multipolar World

As the COVID-19 crisis worsened in Europe , Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic launched a blistering attack on the European Union , arguing that “ European solidarity does not exist .
That was a fairy tale on paper , ” and praising China for its willingness to assist with the pandemic .
Even Italian politicians normally supportive of the EU joined their populist counterparts in hailing China and criticizing Brussels after Beijing supplied critically needed equipment following the EU ’ s initial failure to step up .
These developments underscore the growing sense that the international order sits at an inflection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of leadership by the Trump administration ; China ’ s aggressive efforts to showcase its domestic political model and its status as a provider of international club and private goods ; and the possibility that the pandemic may fuel a growing populist backlash against political , economic , and cultural liberalism .
These pressures are not , in fact , entirely distinct from one another .
The Serbian and Italian examples highlight an important but often overlooked relationship between the decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of populism .
Despite important regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ many contemporary populists embrace multipolarity—an international system composed of multiple great powers rather than one or two superpowers .
They do so as a rhetorical aspiration , a vision of a global order that privileges national sovereignty over liberal rights and values , and as a tool to increase their freedom of action by playing alternative suppliers of international club and private goods against one another .
Indeed , this multipolar populism is fast becoming a core part of the contemporary populist playbook .
As the political philosopher Jan-Werner Müller argues , populists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identity politics—one that is rhetorically anti-elite and anti-pluralist in orientation and that emphasizes their own moral superiority while denying the basic legitimacy of their political opponents .
Once in power , populists seek to erode the independence of political , legal , and economic institutions ; they hijack the apparatus of the state in order to build patronage networks that secure the loyalty of clients .
They pursue these efforts by , in part , scapegoating vulnerable populations and communities .
Populist rhetoric and policies thus constitute a rejection of important aspects of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a mix of ideological and instrumental concerns .
First , the ideological vision offered by most populists usually treats internationalism as a source of threat to the political community .
In right-wing populism , this sensibility finds expression in the idea that contemporary politics are driven by a struggle between nationalists and globalists .
Populists thus emphasize the overriding importance of some combination of sovereignty , territorial borders , and national identity and culture .
They routinely claim that efforts , spearheaded by sinister external forces , to undermine all three constitute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Thus , stemming migration , offering protection to political clients from market competition , and cracking down on the activities of foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations all form part of the populist toolkit for leaders as geographically diverse as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte , Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban , and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
Second , in order to implement their policies , populists need to shield themselves from pressure to , variously , protect human rights , maintain the rule of law , combat corruption , and respect domestic pluralism @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hegemonic power in the 1990s and early 2000s , the United States , of course , did not consistently apply such pressures to other states .
It often actively supported repressive regimes , especially as part of the so-called global war on terrorism .
Such hypocrisy , which is also shared by the leading European powers , does not change the degree that liberal pressures have been baked into the international order via multiple treaties and institutional arrangements .
Nor does it change the fact that the United States and other liberal great @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even if more in rhetoric than practice , to conform with liberal political and economic expectations .
For example , last year Washington imposed sanctions on high-ranking leaders of Myanmar ’ s military over systematic killings of minority Rohingyas .
For their part , populists in Europe rightly see the liberal values that undergird the EU as an obstacle to their political programs .
Orban , for example , frequently draws criticism from Brussels for his democratic backsliding and corruption , including the recent move by the Hungarian parliament to consent to allowing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the pretext of combating the coronavirus .
Even as he depends on EU subsidies to maintain his patronage networks , Orban positions himself as defending Hungary against EU efforts to subvert its sovereignty and values .
In consequence , populists have converged on the idea that a multipolar international system will best serve their interests and is therefore something to both welcome and advance .
In essence , they have come around to the position taken by Russia and China in 1997 against hegemony and in favor of diversity in foreign relations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president of the United States is himself a right-wing populist and his administration is pushing a similar vision of international order .
Populists tend to emphasize the availability of new external partners , usually China or Russia .
Most often , they point to Beijing and Moscow as actual , or simply potential , suppliers of international club and private goods that were , during the 1990s and early 2000s , delivered almost exclusively by the United States , the EU , Japan , and Western-dominated multilateral organizations such as the World Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ includes development assistance from China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ) , commodity-backed short-term loans , and , now , public health assistance .
Leaders argue that , unlike Western donors , China and other new patrons do not demand intrusive conditions such as economic conditionality or respect for individual rights .
However , these deals involve opaque schemes and private payoffs , as well as expectations of future support .
Beijing , for example , expects recipients to back its foreign-policy priorities and support—or at least not overtly criticize—China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights in general or its current policies toward Uighurs in Xinjiang in particular .
In response to the outbreaks in Europe , both China and Russia have made a public showing of providing medical supplies , equipment , and trained personnel to Italy and other ravaged European countries .
While doing so , they have taken pains to promote the narrative that they have stepped in where the United States and the EU have failed .
This “ goods substitution ” is significant on its own terms because the provision of international club @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by which great powers order international politics .
But countries such as China and Russia often do not , in fact , provide superior goods and bargains to those offered by the United States and its allies .
China ’ s behavior surrounding the BRI and its preexisting aid programs has led recipients to accuse Beijing of neocolonialism , and growing evidence suggests that Chinese development projects are more problematic than Western ones .
Of course , Beijing ’ s comparative lack of concern about corruption is a feature rather than a bug @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also telling that the rhetoric of lauding alternative patronage sometimes matters more than the reality .
For example , the Chinese aid lauded by Italian politicians was actually the fulfillment of a procurement contract rather than humanitarian assistance .
As the Washington Post ’ s Anna Fifield noted , Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio , who has pushed the narrative of Chinese largesse , “ is the euroskeptic leader of the populist Five Star Movement and led the effort to make Italy the first Group of Seven country to join China ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ critical part of the domestic politics of goods substitution is that populists claim that their pragmatic courting of illiberal or authoritarian states affords them a wider range of partnerships and international networks .
The fact that new partners like China and Russia are authoritarian becomes a net political positive : a signal that populist leaders are pragmatic and committed to protecting national interests—because they are flexible enough to find new partners who can deliver the goods .
Actively promoting partnerships—or , once again , the simple potential of partnerships—with new goods providers also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements and partnerships .
After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the United States used its position as the sole superpower to expand its network of security relationships and alliances around the world .
This involved not only NATO expansion but also , following 9/11 , the creation of a comprehensive set of security partnerships and global access agreements to assist with the global war on terrorism .
Opposing alignment with the United States—which , along with its partners , was then pretty much the only game in town for effective security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ costs .
With a few notable exceptions , regimes did their best to stay on Washington ’ s good side , which , in turn , furthered the creation of a truly global U.S.-centered security order .
Now conditions have changed , often dramatically .
Leaders , and populists especially , now increasingly see partnership with the United States—once viewed as an indispensable pillar of foreign policy—and its Western allies as overly constraining .
For example , Duterte , Erdogan , and Orban all came to power in states that were fully integrated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All three now point to potential security relations with Russia and China as providing the possibility of greater balance with , if not outright exit from , that order .
Duterte even canceled the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the United States after Washington denied a visa to one of his political allies .
Obviously , military partnerships and security cooperation with the United States have always been an object of political contention—and not just in countries run by multipolar populists .
The difference now is that elites in multiple , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ actually implementing policies that distance themselves from the U.S.-led security order .
In all of these cases , populist leaders are invoking multipolarity as a rhetorical commonplace , taking advantage of the growing shift toward a multipolar order , or both .
In doing so , they contribute to a power transition away from the United States by reducing its influence .
Finally , invoking multipolarity also makes it easier for populists to reject external , mostly Western , criticism of their domestic governance practices .
When the West was dominant , even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their domestic sovereignty—such as critical election monitors , foreign-sponsored NGOs , and members of the Western press .
Now , emulating the practices of China and Russia , populists are much more comfortable with banning or repressing these same actors—and in justifying their actions as ways of protecting their national values and interests .
The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic , at first glance , strengthens and fuels these dynamics .
The closing of borders and the curtailment of international economic exchange increase the appeal of national fortress narratives conjured by populists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the political scientist Ivan Krastev argues , this presents profound challenges to the integrity of the European Union ; more broadly , how major powers like China and the United States manage the trade-off between supporting public health and economic openness will acutely impact their authority to lead global institutions and set international agendas going forward .
In the end , for smaller states , multipolar populism may prove self-defeating .
It ’ s one thing to use exit options to reduce external liberalizing pressure , but it ’ s another when new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Beijing ’ s defense of sovereignty as an international principle , its practices toward clients suggest that , eventually , it will use its leverage in ways no less coercive than other great powers .
Moscow has already demonstrated its lack of concern for the sovereignty of clients and partners .
Perhaps some multipolar populists will find it convivial to trade away their national autonomy for the freedom to extract rents but otherwise may find themselves nostalgic for the older order .
But , until then , the COVID-19 crisis underscores that international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populists will find ample opportunities to embrace multipolarity .
The authors ’ most recent book is the co-written Exit from Hegemony : the Unraveling of the American Global Order .

As the COVID-19 crisis worsened in Europe, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic launched a blistering attack on the European Union, arguing that “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper,” and praising China for its willingness to assist with the pandemic. Even Italian politicians normally supportive of the EU joined their populist counterparts in hailing China and criticizing Brussels after Beijing supplied critically needed equipment following the EU’s initial failure to step up.
As the COVID-19 crisis worsened in Europe, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic launched a blistering attack on the European Union, arguing that “European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper,” and praising China for its willingness to assist with the pandemic. Even Italian politicians normally supportive of the EU joined their populist counterparts in hailing China and criticizing Brussels after Beijing supplied critically needed equipment following the EU’s initial failure to step up.
These developments underscore the growing sense that the international order sits at an inflection point, driven by the conspicuous lack of leadership by the Trump administration; China’s aggressive efforts to showcase its domestic political model and its status as a provider of international club and private goods; and the possibility that the pandemic may fuel a growing populist backlash against political, economic, and cultural liberalism.
These pressures are not, in fact, entirely distinct from one another. The Serbian and Italian examples highlight an important but often overlooked relationship between the decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of populism. Despite important regional, cultural, and political differences, many contemporary populists embrace multipolarity—an international system composed of multiple great powers rather than one or two superpowers. They do so as a rhetorical aspiration, a vision of a global order that privileges national sovereignty over liberal rights and values, and as a tool to increase their freedom of action by playing alternative suppliers of international club and private goods against one another. Indeed, this multipolar populism is fast becoming a core part of the contemporary populist playbook.
As the political philosopher Jan-Werner Müller argues, populists worldwide share a specific form of personalized identity politics—one that is rhetorically anti-elite and anti-pluralist in orientation and that emphasizes their own moral superiority while denying the basic legitimacy of their political opponents. Once in power, populists seek to erode the independence of political, legal, and economic institutions; they hijack the apparatus of the state in order to build patronage networks that secure the loyalty of clients. They pursue these efforts by, in part, scapegoating vulnerable populations and communities.
Populist rhetoric and policies thus constitute a rejection of important aspects of the post-Cold War liberal order, driven by a mix of ideological and instrumental concerns.
First, the ideological vision offered by most populists usually treats internationalism as a source of threat to the political community. In right-wing populism, this sensibility finds expression in the idea that contemporary politics are driven by a struggle between nationalists and globalists. Populists thus emphasize the overriding importance of some combination of sovereignty, territorial borders, and national identity and culture. They routinely claim that efforts, spearheaded by sinister external forces, to undermine all three constitute an existential threat to the political community. Thus, stemming migration, offering protection to political clients from market competition, and cracking down on the activities of foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations all form part of the populist toolkit for leaders as geographically diverse as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Second, in order to implement their policies, populists need to shield themselves from pressure to, variously, protect human rights, maintain the rule of law, combat corruption, and respect domestic pluralism. Even during its apex as a hegemonic power in the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States, of course, did not consistently apply such pressures to other states. It often actively supported repressive regimes, especially as part of the so-called global war on terrorism. Such hypocrisy, which is also shared by the leading European powers, does not change the degree that liberal pressures have been baked into the international order via multiple treaties and institutional arrangements. Nor does it change the fact that the United States and other liberal great powers have frequently pressured weaker states, even if more in rhetoric than practice, to conform with liberal political and economic expectations.
For example, last year Washington imposed sanctions on high-ranking leaders of Myanmar’s military over systematic killings of minority Rohingyas. For their part, populists in Europe rightly see the liberal values that undergird the EU as an obstacle to their political programs. Orban, for example, frequently draws criticism from Brussels for his democratic backsliding and corruption, including the recent move by the Hungarian parliament to consent to allowing the president to rule by decree indefinitely under the pretext of combating the coronavirus. Even as he depends on EU subsidies to maintain his patronage networks, Orban positions himself as defending Hungary against EU efforts to subvert its sovereignty and values.
In consequence, populists have converged on the idea that a multipolar international system will best serve their interests and is therefore something to both welcome and advance. In essence, they have come around to the position taken by Russia and China in 1997 against hegemony and in favor of diversity in foreign relations. This remains true even though the president of the United States is himself a right-wing populist and his administration is pushing a similar vision of international order.
Populists tend to emphasize the availability of new external partners, usually China or Russia. Most often, they point to Beijing and Moscow as actual, or simply potential, suppliers of international club and private goods that were, during the 1990s and early 2000s, delivered almost exclusively by the United States, the EU, Japan, and Western-dominated multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Such patronage includes development assistance from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), commodity-backed short-term loans, and, now, public health assistance.
Leaders argue that, unlike Western donors, China and other new patrons do not demand intrusive conditions such as economic conditionality or respect for individual rights. However, these deals involve opaque schemes and private payoffs, as well as expectations of future support. Beijing, for example, expects recipients to back its foreign-policy priorities and support—or at least not overtly criticize—China on matters such as respect for human rights in general or its current policies toward Uighurs in Xinjiang in particular.
In response to the outbreaks in Europe, both China and Russia have made a public showing of providing medical supplies, equipment, and trained personnel to Italy and other ravaged European countries. While doing so, they have taken pains to promote the narrative that they have stepped in where the United States and the EU have failed.
This “goods substitution” is significant on its own terms because the provision of international club and private goods is the main mechanism by which great powers order international politics. But countries such as China and Russia often do not, in fact, provide superior goods and bargains to those offered by the United States and its allies. China’s behavior surrounding the BRI and its preexisting aid programs has led recipients to accuse Beijing of neocolonialism, and growing evidence suggests that Chinese development projects are more problematic than Western ones.
Of course, Beijing’s comparative lack of concern about corruption is a feature rather than a bug for some recipients. But it is also telling that the rhetoric of lauding alternative patronage sometimes matters more than the reality. For example, the Chinese aid lauded by Italian politicians was actually the fulfillment of a procurement contract rather than humanitarian assistance. As the Washington Post’s Anna Fifield noted, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, who has pushed the narrative of Chinese largesse, “is the euroskeptic leader of the populist Five Star Movement and led the effort to make Italy the first Group of Seven country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”
A critical part of the domestic politics of goods substitution is that populists claim that their pragmatic courting of illiberal or authoritarian states affords them a wider range of partnerships and international networks. The fact that new partners like China and Russia are authoritarian becomes a net political positive: a signal that populist leaders are pragmatic and committed to protecting national interests—because they are flexible enough to find new partners who can deliver the goods.
Actively promoting partnerships—or, once again, the simple potential of partnerships—with new goods providers also allows populists to more credibly question existing agreements and partnerships. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States used its position as the sole superpower to expand its network of security relationships and alliances around the world. This involved not only NATO expansion but also, following 9/11, the creation of a comprehensive set of security partnerships and global access agreements to assist with the global war on terrorism.
Opposing alignment with the United States—which, along with its partners, was then pretty much the only game in town for effective security guarantees and other goods—carried international and domestic costs. With a few notable exceptions, regimes did their best to stay on Washington’s good side, which, in turn, furthered the creation of a truly global U.S.-centered security order.
Now conditions have changed, often dramatically. Leaders, and populists especially, now increasingly see partnership with the United States—once viewed as an indispensable pillar of foreign policy—and its Western allies as overly constraining. For example, Duterte, Erdogan, and Orban all came to power in states that were fully integrated members of the U.S.-led security order. All three now point to potential security relations with Russia and China as providing the possibility of greater balance with, if not outright exit from, that order. Duterte even canceled the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the United States after Washington denied a visa to one of his political allies.
Obviously, military partnerships and security cooperation with the United States have always been an object of political contention—and not just in countries run by multipolar populists. The difference now is that elites in multiple, and otherwise very different, countries are actually implementing policies that distance themselves from the U.S.-led security order. In all of these cases, populist leaders are invoking multipolarity as a rhetorical commonplace, taking advantage of the growing shift toward a multipolar order, or both. In doing so, they contribute to a power transition away from the United States by reducing its influence.
Finally, invoking multipolarity also makes it easier for populists to reject external, mostly Western, criticism of their domestic governance practices. When the West was dominant, even autocrats had to accept significant incursions on their domestic sovereignty—such as critical election monitors, foreign-sponsored NGOs, and members of the Western press. Now, emulating the practices of China and Russia, populists are much more comfortable with banning or repressing these same actors—and in justifying their actions as ways of protecting their national values and interests.
The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, at first glance, strengthens and fuels these dynamics. The closing of borders and the curtailment of international economic exchange increase the appeal of national fortress narratives conjured by populists about the perils of globalism. As the political scientist Ivan Krastev argues, this presents profound challenges to the integrity of the European Union; more broadly, how major powers like China and the United States manage the trade-off between supporting public health and economic openness will acutely impact their authority to lead global institutions and set international agendas going forward.
In the end, for smaller states, multipolar populism may prove self-defeating. It’s one thing to use exit options to reduce external liberalizing pressure, but it’s another when new patrons start calling in favors. Despite Beijing’s defense of sovereignty as an international principle, its practices toward clients suggest that, eventually, it will use its leverage in ways no less coercive than other great powers. Moscow has already demonstrated its lack of concern for the sovereignty of clients and partners. Perhaps some multipolar populists will find it convivial to trade away their national autonomy for the freedom to extract rents but otherwise may find themselves nostalgic for the older order. But, until then, the COVID-19 crisis underscores that international goods provision abhors a vacuum and that populists will find ample opportunities to embrace multipolarity.
The authors’ most recent book is the co-written Exit from Hegemony: the Unraveling of the American Global Order.