foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Chinese Media Is Selling Snake Oil to Fight the Wuhan Virus

Chinese Media Is Selling Snake Oil to Fight the Wuhan Virus As the new coronavirus continued its march across China this weekend , Xinhua , the nation ’ s official news service , advised a worried public to turn to herbal medicine .
Shuanghuanglian , an oral remedy , sold out in stores across the country .
The impetus for the Xinhua article came from a study supposedly conducted by two institutions , the Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica and the Wuhan Institute of Virology , using the principles of what the state calls traditional Chinese medicine ( TCM ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ medical system .
State-backed TCM doesn ’ t include all traditional medical practices , it ’ s a very specific , state-backed set of treatments , theories , and drugs , many of which were invented in the 20th century .
Skeptics immediately criticized the advice , and the backlash to the initial Xinhua report led other parts of state media to play down the medicine ’ s magical properties .
The popular medical site dxy.cn , which has become a go-to resource for information about the virus , also debunked the claims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only role TCM is playing in fighting the virus .
One hundred and twenty-five practitioners have been dispatched to Wuhan .
( Imagine an outbreak in Florida , and the United States responding by sending the nation ’ s finest homeopaths . )
China ’ s official devotion to nationalist pseudoscience hurts its medical system—and could hamper its handling of the viral crisis .
Shuanghuanglian is a mixture of honeysuckle , Chinese skullcap , and forsythia .
Like many so-called traditional Chinese medicines , it was in fact invented in the 1960s , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humoral theories that underpin pre-modern Chinese medical theories and the herbology accumulated by Chinese medical practitioners over centuries .
As with most such practices , the clinical evidence is highly inconclusive ; there is some suggestion shuanghuanglian may aid in respiratory tract illnesses , but there is no evidence it can achieve success in the treatment of bacterial and viral infections , especially at scale .
( Allergic reactions are also common in traditional medicine , despite regular claims by advocates that they are impossible ; shuanghuanglian is no exception . )
TCM @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a matter of herbalists and amateur doctors but industrialized pharmaceuticals—a $ 45 billion market in China annually just for such drugs .
The industry in China is not alternative medicine but a thoroughly conventional and heavily government-backed business .
Shuanghuanglian , although a staple for sore throats and produced by four different manufacturers , is not as prevalent as Yunnan Baiyao , an example of 1930s quackery that seemingly every grandmother in the country swears by .
But the stamp of approval over the virus might be enough to send it into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stock crash in China , pharmaceutical companies producing TCM soared .
Runs on folk cures are common during health crises all over the world .
In India , for example , a government department devoted to traditional medicines issued a notice last week advising the use of homeopathic and Unani herbs to prevent and manage symptoms of coronavirus infections .
But TCM occupies a particularly dangerous role in China .
The idea of a separate body of study from Western medicine derives from professional and business squabbles between doctors in the 1920s , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the early years of the People ’ s Republic of China and institutionalized .
It was formulated as a uniquely Chinese form of medicine , an answer to a more technologically advanced West , and an integral part of the medical system .
Early practice turned it from an art into a pseudoscience , throwing out some of the more overtly magical elements while retaining a fundamentally imaginary core theory and practices such as poorly measured herbal dosing and premodern diagnostic techniques .
Large portions of the Chinese health care system are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Roughly 10 percent of all hospitals center around the industry , and such services are provided at almost all institutions .
The actual amount of medical care practiced in hospitals labelled as TCM varies wildly—but sometimes such hospitals are seen as the best option available .
And the inherently unclear system can encourage graft : for example , the story of a man trying to pay for care for his dying wife in Hubei , the province surrounding Wuhan , and being charged many times the couple ’ s monthly income for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Huanggang TCM hospital .
( It ’ s not clear what techniques were used to treat her ; the mixture of vague diagnosis , demands for money , and unexplained treatments is sadly typical of Chinese provincial hospitals of all types . )
The traditional Chinese pharmacopeia , of course , contains plenty of medicines whose value has been clinically proven .
Bringing that knowledge into evidence-based medicine is a project that aids everyone as , for instance , the discovery of artemisinin , a powerful antimalarial drug , by the eventual Nobel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these discoveries are easily incorporated into mainstream medical practice—without the irregular doses and spurious diagnoses that TCM encourages .
Clinical standards inside traditional practices , meanwhile , remain appalling , not only in theory but practice ; faking of data is common , as is pharmacological fraud .
A 1998 study found 99 percent of TCM papers published in China produced positive results—a statistical impossibility and a sure sign of malpractice .
Around 30 to 35 percent of TCM drugs , when tested in British laboratories , turned out to contain conventional medicine—often @ @ @ @ @ @ @ painkillers were packaged with ibuprofen , sexual aids with Viagra , and healing patches with steroids .
The industry has seen a renewed push under Chinese President Xi Jinping , always keen to emphasize historical nationalism .
Xi has repeatedly praised TCM in public , calling it a “ gem of Chinese culture , ” and an ongoing push to institutionalize it in global health care organizations like the World Health Organization has been given more emphasis and funding .
Before 2013 , Chinese newspapers sometimes hosted vigorous debates over the value of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ criticism of Xi-backed institutions , have disappeared .
Xi ’ s past praise means that such practices have to be given a place in treating the virus , regardless of their usefulness or practicality , because of their institutional weight .
Resources that could be going to effective research or treatment in a dangerously overstretched medical system will instead be diverted to state-backed quackery .
TCM-trained staff may have a role in fighting the epidemic—if only because many are jointly trained in conventional medical practice and can be effectively deployed as nurses or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the front line .
For poor Chinese unable to afford hospital treatment or afraid of being snatched up into quarantine , home remedies may be the only options available .
But spurious herbs and imaginary theories can only harm the attempts to battle a virus that needs a scientific answer , not a politicalized pseudoscience .

As the new coronavirus continued its march across China this weekend, Xinhua, the nation’s official news service, advised a worried public to turn to herbal medicine. Shuanghuanglian, an oral remedy, sold out in stores across the country. The impetus for the Xinhua article came from a study supposedly conducted by two institutions, the Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, using the principles of what the state calls traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), a major part of the Chinese medical system. State-backed TCM doesn’t include all traditional medical practices, it's a very specific, state-backed set of treatments, theories, and drugs, many of which were invented in the 20th century.
As the new coronavirus continued its march across China this weekend, Xinhua, the nation’s official news service, advised a worried public to turn to herbal medicine. Shuanghuanglian, an oral remedy, sold out in stores across the country. The impetus for the Xinhua article came from a study supposedly conducted by two institutions, the Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, using the principles of what the state calls traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), a major part of the Chinese medical system. State-backed TCM doesn’t include all traditional medical practices, it’s a very specific, state-backed set of treatments, theories, and drugs, many of which were invented in the 20th century.
Skeptics immediately criticized the advice, and the backlash to the initial Xinhua report led other parts of state media to play down the medicine’s magical properties. The popular medical site dxy.cn, which has become a go-to resource for information about the virus, also debunked the claims. But it’s not the only role TCM is playing in fighting the virus. One hundred and twenty-five practitioners have been dispatched to Wuhan. (Imagine an outbreak in Florida, and the United States responding by sending the nation’s finest homeopaths.) China’s official devotion to nationalist pseudoscience hurts its medical system—and could hamper its handling of the viral crisis.
Shuanghuanglian is a mixture of honeysuckle, Chinese skullcap, and forsythia. Like many so-called traditional Chinese medicines, it was in fact invented in the 1960s, based on a mixture of the fictional humoral theories that underpin pre-modern Chinese medical theories and the herbology accumulated by Chinese medical practitioners over centuries. As with most such practices, the clinical evidence is highly inconclusive; there is some suggestion shuanghuanglian may aid in respiratory tract illnesses, but there is no evidence it can achieve success in the treatment of bacterial and viral infections, especially at scale. (Allergic reactions are also common in traditional medicine, despite regular claims by advocates that they are impossible; shuanghuanglian is no exception.)
TCM is big business. Modern practice is not a matter of herbalists and amateur doctors but industrialized pharmaceuticals—a $45 billion market in China annually just for such drugs. The industry in China is not alternative medicine but a thoroughly conventional and heavily government-backed business. Shuanghuanglian, although a staple for sore throats and produced by four different manufacturers, is not as prevalent as Yunnan Baiyao, an example of 1930s quackery that seemingly every grandmother in the country swears by. But the stamp of approval over the virus might be enough to send it into the stratosphere. Amid the Monday morning stock crash in China, pharmaceutical companies producing TCM soared.
Runs on folk cures are common during health crises all over the world. In India, for example, a government department devoted to traditional medicines issued a notice last week advising the use of homeopathic and Unani herbs to prevent and manage symptoms of coronavirus infections. But TCM occupies a particularly dangerous role in China. The idea of a separate body of study from Western medicine derives from professional and business squabbles between doctors in the 1920s, but it was codified by Mao Zedong in the early years of the People’s Republic of China and institutionalized. It was formulated as a uniquely Chinese form of medicine, an answer to a more technologically advanced West, and an integral part of the medical system. Early practice turned it from an art into a pseudoscience, throwing out some of the more overtly magical elements while retaining a fundamentally imaginary core theory and practices such as poorly measured herbal dosing and premodern diagnostic techniques.
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Large portions of the Chinese health care system are still given over to TCM—at least nominally. Roughly 10 percent of all hospitals center around the industry, and such services are provided at almost all institutions. The actual amount of medical care practiced in hospitals labelled as TCM varies wildly—but sometimes such hospitals are seen as the best option available. And the inherently unclear system can encourage graft: for example, the story of a man trying to pay for care for his dying wife in Hubei, the province surrounding Wuhan, and being charged many times the couple’s monthly income for each day of her treatment at the Huanggang TCM hospital. (It’s not clear what techniques were used to treat her; the mixture of vague diagnosis, demands for money, and unexplained treatments is sadly typical of Chinese provincial hospitals of all types.)
The traditional Chinese pharmacopeia, of course, contains plenty of medicines whose value has been clinically proven. Bringing that knowledge into evidence-based medicine is a project that aids everyone as, for instance, the discovery of artemisinin, a powerful antimalarial drug, by the eventual Nobel Prize winner Tu Youyou proved. But these discoveries are easily incorporated into mainstream medical practice—without the irregular doses and spurious diagnoses that TCM encourages.
Clinical standards inside traditional practices, meanwhile, remain appalling, not only in theory but practice; faking of data is common, as is pharmacological fraud. A 1998 study found 99 percent of TCM papers published in China produced positive results—a statistical impossibility and a sure sign of malpractice. Around 30 to 35 percent of TCM drugs, when tested in British laboratories, turned out to contain conventional medicine—often in dangerously unsafe doses. Purported herbal painkillers were packaged with ibuprofen, sexual aids with Viagra, and healing patches with steroids.
The industry has seen a renewed push under Chinese President Xi Jinping, always keen to emphasize historical nationalism. Xi has repeatedly praised TCM in public, calling it a “gem of Chinese culture,” and an ongoing push to institutionalize it in global health care organizations like the World Health Organization has been given more emphasis and funding. Before 2013, Chinese newspapers sometimes hosted vigorous debates over the value of such treatments; those, like other criticism of Xi-backed institutions, have disappeared. Xi’s past praise means that such practices have to be given a place in treating the virus, regardless of their usefulness or practicality, because of their institutional weight. Resources that could be going to effective research or treatment in a dangerously overstretched medical system will instead be diverted to state-backed quackery.
TCM-trained staff may have a role in fighting the epidemic—if only because many are jointly trained in conventional medical practice and can be effectively deployed as nurses or nurse-practitioners as hospitals struggle to keep bodies on the front line. For poor Chinese unable to afford hospital treatment or afraid of being snatched up into quarantine, home remedies may be the only options available. But spurious herbs and imaginary theories can only harm the attempts to battle a virus that needs a scientific answer, not a politicalized pseudoscience.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Greece Accidentally Steered Into a Foreign Policy Crisis

In late November last year , Greece was caught by surprise when Turkey announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government in Tripoli .
The deal demarcated new maritime boundaries between the two countries—boundaries that now run very close to Crete , Greece ’ s biggest island .
Turkey ’ s aim is to start drilling operations for natural gas in the area , in humiliating disregard of Greece ’ s territorial claims .
The country ’ s traditional allies , in Washington and across Europe , have done essentially nothing to intervene .
The result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and political crises in recent Greek history , exposing the country ’ s international weakness .
A promising path forward is available , however , to Greece ’ s conservative government led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis—it just needs to follow the diplomatic examples set by the leftist party Syriza when it was in power in Athens from 2015 to 2019 .
During a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump last month , Mitsotakis failed to get any commitment to take Greece ’ s side in the dispute with Turkey .
In response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Parliament called the prime minister ’ s diplomatic foray an “ unprecedented fiasco.
” The problems were compounded by the conference on Libya organized by Germany in January , where Russian President Vladimir Putin , French President Emmanuel Macron , German Chancellor Angela Merkel , and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met to discuss a possible cease-fire with the two warring Libyan sides , as well as a possible resolution to the conflict .
Greece was not invited at all , despite the fact its interests are now directly involved in Libya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the German tabloid Bild suggest the decisive factor may have been Turkey ’ s insistence that Greece not be involved in the negotiations .
It seems that Mitsotakis ’ s approach to diplomacy hasn ’ t done Greece any favors , wasting the extent of clout it has at its disposal .
Above all , the prime minister has been at pains to prove his reliability to his country ’ s more powerful allies .
Speaking at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington before the recent meeting with Trump , Mitsotakis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s decision to kill the Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani , even as other European countries were notably more cautious in assessing the repercussions of the strike .
“ We are allies with the U.S , so we stand by our allies through difficult times , ” Mitsotakis said—even as the United States failed to intervene in Greece ’ s dispute with Turkey and Libya .
Mitsotakis said he was at peace with Trump ’ s choices .
“ I understand that this particular decision was taking into consideration what is the U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ decision.
” Alongside this passivity , the Greek government has indulged in spasms of adventurism , which are too minor to figure in any plans the United States has for the region or to otherwise promote Greek interests on its own .
Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias has suggested that Greece might soon send active personnel to Libya as part of the European Union ’ s Sofia mission , which enforces an arms embargo on the country ’ s warring sides ( and their patrons ) , and an array of Patriot missiles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ infrastructure , ” presumably against attacks like the ones Iran is believed to have organized against the Abqaiq and Khurais oil fields last year .
This marks a break with traditional Greek foreign policy , in which it seeks to remain neutral in active conflicts and maintain friendly relations with larger nearby countries like Iran and Russia .
These initiatives have predictably had no direct effect on the defense of Greece ’ s direct interests in the Aegean Sea .
Turkey has escaped any international penalty for its unilateral diplomacy with Libya .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ worsen in the near future as Turkey and Russia deepen their ties ( despite the fact the Syrian conflict has placed them on opposite sides ) , with the latter having already recognized the former ’ s statelet in Northern Cyprus and planning to open a military base there .
Supporters of the government in Greece have pointed a finger at Germany and Merkel , whom they accuse of fully capitulating to Turkey ’ s demands .
They are right—up to a point .
Germany ’ s indulgence of Turkey seems to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its direct involvement in the Libya crisis—and its dependence on Erdogan to forestall future crises involving migrants from the Middle East .
This has led many Greeks to claim Germany is abusing its hegemonic position in the EU to further its own interests , while disregarding its obligations to defend Europe ’ s existing borders .
But the government under Mitsotakis ’ s New Democracy party shares a considerable portion of the blame for the country ’ s marginalization in the Aegean .
The prime minister ’ s diplomatic approach has accelerated , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mitsotakis would have been better served if he spent his years in opposition trying to understand the Syriza-led government ’ s diplomatic strategy , rather than attacking it at every opportunity .
Syriza didn ’ t hesitate to cause problems for its more powerful allies for the sake of earning their respect .
When the EU planned a resolution to deepen sanctions against Russia in January 2015 , the Syriza-led government demanded to know why Greece wasn ’ t consulted , implicitly threatening a veto .
Many took it as a sign the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in favor of a deeper relationship with Russia .
But that was far from the point .
In the end , Greece did sign on for the sanctions , the European commissioner thanked Greece for its positive contributions , and the Greek government had made its point : The country shouldn ’ t just be taken for granted .
In the following years , Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias successfully stewarded their country ’ s geopolitical power , actively participating in multiple diplomatic conferences .
Ultimately , there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Mitsotakis ’ s unequivocal support for the U.S. decision to take out Iran ’ s Suleimani or Dendias ’ s announcements of ineffectual military participation in the Middle East .
So what explains the decision-making ?
A clue is offered by Mitsotakis ’ s book on foreign policy , released in 2006 in Greece ( a translation of his Harvard University dissertation ) .
Its main thesis can be summed up in this passage : “ the satisfaction of domestic obligations might require foreign-policy decisions that are not the most suitable from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ player , but which provide gains domestically ” —or , to paraphrase , the country ’ s foreign policy should be carved with an eye on domestic politics.
” But this is an approach that a small country like Greece simply can not afford geopolitically .
Perhaps Mitsotakis is now learning that lesson .
His meeting in Athens with Turkey ’ s Libyan ally Gen. Khalifa Haftar , a few days prior to the German conference , was a good first step .
His trip to Paris that won over Macron to Greece @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But overall , the government still seems dangerously out of its depth as it needlessly risks Greece ’ s interests .
After attacking his predecessor government for so long , Mitsotakis should examine how it ensured Greece had a place at the table when its fate was being decided .

In late November last year, Greece was caught by surprise when Turkey announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government in Tripoli. The deal demarcated new maritime boundaries between the two countries—boundaries that now run very close to Crete, Greece’s biggest island. Turkey’s aim is to start drilling operations for natural gas in the area, in humiliating disregard of Greece’s territorial claims. The country’s traditional allies, in Washington and across Europe, have done essentially nothing to intervene.
In late November last year, Greece was caught by surprise when Turkey announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government in Tripoli. The deal demarcated new maritime boundaries between the two countries—boundaries that now run very close to Crete, Greece’s biggest island. Turkey’s aim is to start drilling operations for natural gas in the area, in humiliating disregard of Greece’s territorial claims. The country’s traditional allies, in Washington and across Europe, have done essentially nothing to intervene.
The result has been one of the greatest diplomatic and political crises in recent Greek history, exposing the country’s international weakness. A promising path forward is available, however, to Greece’s conservative government led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis—it just needs to follow the diplomatic examples set by the leftist party Syriza when it was in power in Athens from 2015 to 2019.
During a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump last month, Mitsotakis failed to get any commitment to take Greece’s side in the dispute with Turkey. In response, the opposition in Greece’s Parliament called the prime minister’s diplomatic foray an “unprecedented fiasco.” The problems were compounded by the conference on Libya organized by Germany in January, where Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met to discuss a possible cease-fire with the two warring Libyan sides, as well as a possible resolution to the conflict. Greece was not invited at all, despite the fact its interests are now directly involved in Libya. To add insult to injury, reports in the German tabloid Bild suggest the decisive factor may have been Turkey’s insistence that Greece not be involved in the negotiations.
It seems that Mitsotakis’s approach to diplomacy hasn’t done Greece any favors. Above all, the prime minister has been at pains to prove his reliability to his country’s more powerful allies. Speaking at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington before the recent meeting with Trump, Mitsotakis declared his support for the U.S. president’s decision to kill the Iranian commander Qassem Suleimani, even as other European countries were notably more cautious in assessing the repercussions of the strike. “We are allies with the U.S, so we stand by our allies through difficult times,” Mitsotakis said—even as the United States failed to intervene in Greece’s dispute with Turkey and Libya. Mitsotakis said he was at peace with Trump’s choices. “I understand that this particular decision was taking into consideration what is the U.S. national interest and we stand by this decision.”
The Greek government has also indulged in spasms of adventurism, which are too minor to figure in any plans the United States has for the region or to otherwise promote Greek interests on its own. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias has suggested that Greece might soon send active personnel to Libya as part of the European Union’s Sofia mission, which enforces an arms embargo on the country’s warring sides (and their patrons), and an array of Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia “to protect critical infrastructure,” presumably against attacks like the ones Iran is believed to have organized against the Abqaiq and Khurais oil fields last year. This marks a break with traditional Greek foreign policy, in which it seeks to remain neutral in active conflicts and maintain friendly relations with larger nearby countries like Iran and Russia.
These initiatives have predictably had no direct effect on the defense of Greece’s direct interests in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has escaped any international penalty for its unilateral diplomacy with Libya. Greece’s position seems likely to worsen in the near future as Turkey and Russia deepen their ties (despite the fact the Syrian conflict has placed them on opposite sides), with the latter reportedly considering recognizing the former’s statelet in Northern Cyprus and planning to open a military base there.
Supporters of the government in Greece have pointed a finger at Germany and Merkel, whom they accuse of fully capitulating to Turkey’s demands. They are right—up to a point. Germany’s indulgence of Turkey seems to be motivated by its own desire to limit its direct involvement in the Libya crisis—and its dependence on Erdogan to forestall future crises involving migrants from the Middle East. This has led many Greeks to claim Germany is abusing its hegemonic position in the EU to further its own interests, while disregarding its obligations to defend Europe’s existing borders.
But the government under Mitsotakis’s New Democracy party shares a considerable portion of the blame for the country’s marginalization in the Aegean. The prime minister’s diplomatic approach has accelerated, rather than impeded, this process.
Mitsotakis would have been better served if he spent his years in opposition trying to understand the Syriza-led government’s diplomatic strategy, rather than attacking it at every opportunity. Syriza didn’t hesitate to cause problems for its more powerful allies for the sake of earning their respect. When the EU planned a resolution to deepen sanctions against Russia in January 2015, the Syriza-led government demanded to know why Greece wasn’t consulted, implicitly threatening a veto. Many took it as a sign the Syriza administration was preparing to abandon Europe in favor of a deeper relationship with Russia.
But that was far from the point. In the end, Greece did sign on for the sanctions, the European commissioner thanked Greece for its positive contributions, and the Greek government had made its point: The country shouldn’t just be taken for granted. In the following years, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias successfully stewarded their country’s geopolitical power, actively participating in multiple diplomatic conferences.
Ultimately, there was nothing to be gained for Greece either in Mitsotakis’s unequivocal support for the U.S. decision to take out Iran’s Suleimani or Dendias’s announcements of ineffectual military participation in the Middle East. So what explains the decision-making? A clue is offered by Mitsotakis’s book on foreign policy, released in 2006 in Greece (a translation of his Harvard University dissertation). Its main thesis can be summed up in this passage: “the satisfaction of domestic obligations might require foreign-policy decisions that are not the most suitable from the point of view of a rational player, but which provide gains domestically”—or, to paraphrase, the country’s foreign policy should be carved with an eye on domestic politics.
But this is an approach that a small country like Greece simply cannot afford geopolitically. Perhaps Mitsotakis is now learning that lesson. His meeting in Athens with Turkey’s Libyan adversary Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a few days prior to the German conference, was a good first step. His trip to Paris that won over Macron to Greece’s side was also important. But overall, the government still seems dangerously out of its depth as it needlessly risks Greece’s interests. After attacking his predecessor government for so long, Mitsotakis should examine how it ensured Greece had a place at the table when its fate was being decided.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--The Trump-Netanyahu Alliance Is Endangering Americans and Israelis

The Trump-Netanyahu Alliance Is Endangering Americans and Israelis U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s much-touted Middle East peace plan—presented as the “ deal of the century ” and a realistic vision to achieve lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians—has crystallized a new reality : U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has become , under Trump , a byproduct of a self-serving alliance between two populist leaders who are now under duress and suspicion in their own countries .
Indeed , on the very day of the White House ceremony , Trump ’ s impeachment trial was being conducted in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Benjamin Netanyahu , who already had been indicted in three cases of corruption , was formally declared a defendant in a criminal trial .
This alliance has given birth to a new U.S. foreign-policy posture that marks a total departure from a long-standing , bipartisan consensus on dealing with the Middle East .
U.S. policymaking in the Middle East is beholden now to the wants of a corrupt alliance that rests on political and personal needs of the two leaders and not on well-established , bipartisan American principles involving both interests and values @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very long-standing American objective of serving as an honest broker between the Middle Eastern parties has vanished .
Apart from Trump ’ s one-sided and dead-on-arrival Israeli-Palestinian peace plan , the alliance ’ s hold over U.S. foreign policy has manifested itself in several other key regional policy decisions : the decision to assassinate Iran ’ s Qassem Suleimani , the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal , the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel , the moving of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem , the defunding of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel , and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization .
The Trump-Netanyahu compact has shaken the fundamentals of U.S. policies , forged out of decades of bipartisanship-driven consensus-building measures designed to arbitrate the Middle East ’ s longest-running conflict .
In the past , Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States have both asserted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , and most prominently the question of the final status of the West Bank and Jerusalem , must be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the parties themselves .
The U.S. role has been limited to serving both parties as an honest broker , whose role is to facilitate and stimulate negotiations .
For this reason , the United States has avoided creating or presenting its own map .
The Trump vision is anathema to this approach .
Because of the lopsided deal , most parties have reacted to Trump ’ s Middle East peace cynically .
Since the plan has no realistic chance of being accepted by the Palestinians , the peace ploy is ultimately about enhancing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chances of retaining political power in 2020 , rather than about truly establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East .
This unbalanced approach is not the way to build peace out of a bloody , century-old conflict .
The absence of representatives from Egypt and Jordan—the only Arab countries that have peace pacts with Israel—at the event announcing the peace plan was also conspicuous and self-defeating .
The Trump-Netanyahu alliance has also rewritten U.S. policy toward Iran .
While both the United States and Israel have imposed official silence , the Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was striking from the start .
The relentless focus , the meticulous planning , and ultimately the precise execution seemed a replica of a distinctly Israeli modus operandi—a way of doing business that the United States has borrowed and mimicked .
This led some to wonder what role—inspirational , political , operational—Israel might have played in the effort that led to the death of Suleimani .
U.S. and Israeli collaboration in killing Iranian officials would not be new .
The Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman ’ s 2018 book , Rise and Kill First @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Mossad ’ s assassinations of Iranian nuclear and missile scientists were conducted in collaboration with the United States .
In fact , the New York Times reported that Netanyahu was the only foreign leader whom the Trump administration informed of the operation .
NBC News added that intelligence from Israel helped to confirm Suleimani ’ s location and details regarding his traveling party .
More than any other Israeli prime minister , Netanyahu has been obsessed with Iran , especially with Iran ’ s nuclear program .
Netanyahu believes that Tehran is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the basis for its dream to dominate the Middle East .
Hence , a nuclear Iran has been the single issue that has haunted Netanyahu since 2009 .
This obsession is the source of Netanyahu ’ s total aversion to the 2015 nuclear deal the Obama administration struck with Iran .
Netanyahu believes that the Iran deal is too weak to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons once the terms of the agreement expire .
To sabotage the deal , Netanyahu was willing to risk the fundamentals of U.S.-Israeli relations by openly asking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Obama administration ’ s initiative .
Netanyahu ’ s effort in 2015 was both futile and inappropriate , but at least one person was impressed by it : Donald Trump .
Indeed , Trump ’ s aversion to the Iran deal—by then , he had already referred to it as a “ disaster ” —was introduced into his campaign .
When Netanyahu and Trump met at the White House in early 2017 , the Israeli premier was already forcefully lobbying for the Trump administration to withdraw from it .
Beyond the unraveling of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ influence on Trump is manifested through U.S.-Israel counterterrorism cooperation .
The United States has often designated individuals and organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations at Israel ’ s behest .
The April 2019 State Department designation of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps ( IRGC ) was , according to Trump , made at Israel ’ s request .
The designation of the IRGC—a state entity—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization was an unprecedented step and a strategic misstep that has put U.S. citizens at risk .
Indeed , the designation upped the ante @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the April designation , the IRGC has acted more directly against U.S. and allied interests throughout the Middle East , and , after the killing of its commander , that cycle of violence is likely to increase further .
The consequences of this corrupt alliance go far beyond the current personal and political needs of the two leaders .
They constitute a devastating legacy for the United States as well as for Israelis and Palestinians alike .
For the United States , it bankrupts the American brand in the Middle East .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blanche endorsement of the colonialist , apartheid-like project of the Israeli far-right—legitimizing it with a U.S. seal .
For Palestinians , the Trump plan is a blunt expression of contempt toward their national aspirations .
No U.S. administration has ever shown such open hostility to the Palestinians .
The plan is an endorsement of the Israeli far-right ’ s vision , but for the rest of Israel the Trump initiative is a crude intervention in the political , ideological , and cultural struggle for the soul of the country as it nears a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one month away .
By subordinating U.S. foreign policy to the Israeli far-right , Trump has ravaged the hopes of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence .
In truth , despite the lip service paid to the two-state solution , the Trump plan is a farewell to the dream of two independent states .
Instead it will create permanent semi-autonomous Palestinian enclaves under Israeli control , thereby eternalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
The humiliation of the Palestinians is likely to embolden Palestinian terrorist groups , like Hamas and Islamic Jihad—and the latter has a robust relationship with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with arms for decades .
Those rockets could soon take aim at innocent Israeli civilians , because it is unlikely that the United States and Israel have witnessed Iran ’ s final retaliation for the death of Suleimani .
The Trump-Netanyahu axis may or may not lead to electoral success , but it will without a doubt leave both Israel and the United States less safe .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s much-touted Middle East peace plan —presented as the “deal of the century” and a realistic vision to achieve lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians—has crystallized a new reality: U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has become, under Trump, a byproduct of a self-serving alliance between two populist leaders who are now under duress and suspicion in their own countries.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s much-touted Middle East peace plan—presented as the “deal of the century” and a realistic vision to achieve lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians—has crystallized a new reality: U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has become, under Trump, a byproduct of a self-serving alliance between two populist leaders who are now under duress and suspicion in their own countries.
Indeed, on the very day of the White House ceremony, Trump’s impeachment trial was being conducted in the Senate, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who already had been indicted in three cases of corruption, was formally declared a defendant in a criminal trial. This alliance has given birth to a new U.S. foreign-policy posture that marks a total departure from a long-standing, bipartisan consensus on dealing with the Middle East.
U.S. policymaking in the Middle East is beholden now to the wants of a corrupt alliance that rests on political and personal needs of the two leaders and not on well-established, bipartisan American principles involving both interests and values. A case in point: the very long-standing American objective of serving as an honest broker between the Middle Eastern parties has vanished.
Apart from Trump’s one-sided and dead-on-arrival Israeli-Palestinian peace plan, the alliance’s hold over U.S. foreign policy has manifested itself in several other key regional policy decisions: the decision to assassinate Iran’s Qassem Suleimani, the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the moving of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the defunding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
The Trump-Netanyahu compact has shaken the fundamentals of U.S. policies, forged out of decades of bipartisanship-driven consensus-building measures designed to arbitrate the Middle East’s longest-running conflict. In the past, Democratic and Republican administrations in the United States have both asserted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and most prominently the question of the final status of the West Bank and Jerusalem, must be determined through free and direct negotiations between the parties themselves. The U.S. role has been limited to serving both parties as an honest broker, whose role is to facilitate and stimulate negotiations. For this reason, the United States has avoided creating or presenting its own map. The Trump vision is anathema to this approach.
Because of the lopsided deal, most parties have reacted to Trump’s Middle East peace cynically. Since the plan has no realistic chance of being accepted by the Palestinians, the peace ploy is ultimately about enhancing Netanyahu’s and Trump’s chances of retaining political power in 2020, rather than about truly establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East. This unbalanced approach is not the way to build peace out of a bloody, century-old conflict. The absence of representatives from Egypt and Jordan—the only Arab countries that have peace pacts with Israel—at the event announcing the peace plan was also conspicuous and self-defeating.
The Trump-Netanyahu alliance has also rewritten U.S. policy toward Iran. While both the United States and Israel have imposed official silence, the Israeli signature on the U.S. assassination of Suleimani was striking from the start. The relentless focus, the meticulous planning, and ultimately the precise execution seemed a replica of a distinctly Israeli modus operandi—a way of doing business that the United States has borrowed and mimicked. This led some to wonder what role—inspirational, political, operational—Israel might have played in the effort that led to the death of Suleimani.
U.S. and Israeli collaboration in killing Iranian officials would not be new. The Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman’s 2018 book, Rise and Kill First, highlights the fact that many of the Mossad’s assassinations of Iranian nuclear and missile scientists were conducted in collaboration with the United States. In fact, the New York Times reported that Netanyahu was the only foreign leader whom the Trump administration informed of the operation. NBC News added that intelligence from Israel helped to confirm Suleimani’s location and details regarding his traveling party.
More than any other Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu has been obsessed with Iran, especially with Iran’s nuclear program. Netanyahu believes that Tehran is firmly committed to acquiring the bomb as the basis for its dream to dominate the Middle East. Hence, a nuclear Iran has been the single issue that has haunted Netanyahu since 2009.
This obsession is the source of Netanyahu’s total aversion to the 2015 nuclear deal the Obama administration struck with Iran. Netanyahu believes that the Iran deal is too weak to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons once the terms of the agreement expire. To sabotage the deal, Netanyahu was willing to risk the fundamentals of U.S.-Israeli relations by openly asking the U.S. Congress to vote against the Obama administration’s initiative.
Netanyahu’s effort in 2015 was both futile and inappropriate, but at least one person was impressed by it: Donald Trump. Indeed, Trump’s aversion to the Iran deal—by then, he had already referred to it as a “disaster”—was introduced into his campaign. When Netanyahu and Trump met at the White House in early 2017, the Israeli premier was already forcefully lobbying for the Trump administration to withdraw from it.
Beyond the unraveling of U.S. diplomatic accomplishments, Netanyahu’s influence on Trump is manifested through U.S.-Israel counterterrorism cooperation. The United States has often designated individuals and organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations at Israel’s behest. The April 2019 State Department designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was, according to Trump, made at Israel’s request.
The designation of the IRGC—a state entity—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization was an unprecedented step and a strategic misstep that has put U.S. citizens at risk. Indeed, the designation upped the ante and the result—increased belligerence—was predictable. Since the April designation, the IRGC has acted more directly against U.S. and allied interests throughout the Middle East, and, after the killing of its commander, that cycle of violence is likely to increase further.
The consequences of this corrupt alliance go far beyond the current personal and political needs of the two leaders. They constitute a devastating legacy for the United States as well as for Israelis and Palestinians alike. For the United States, it bankrupts the American brand in the Middle East. The unevenness of the plan is a carte blanche endorsement of the colonialist, apartheid-like project of the Israeli far-right—legitimizing it with a U.S. seal.
For Palestinians, the Trump plan is a blunt expression of contempt toward their national aspirations. No U.S. administration has ever shown such open hostility to the Palestinians. The plan is an endorsement of the Israeli far-right’s vision, but for the rest of Israel the Trump initiative is a crude intervention in the political, ideological, and cultural struggle for the soul of the country as it nears a watershed third election in one year—now only one month away.
By subordinating U.S. foreign policy to the Israeli far-right, Trump has ravaged the hopes of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence. In truth, despite the lip service paid to the two-state solution, the Trump plan is a farewell to the dream of two independent states. Instead it will create permanent semi-autonomous Palestinian enclaves under Israeli control, thereby eternalizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The humiliation of the Palestinians is likely to embolden Palestinian terrorist groups, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad—and the latter has a robust relationship with Iran, which has supplied the group with arms for decades. Those rockets could soon take aim at innocent Israeli civilians, because it is unlikely that the United States and Israel have witnessed Iran’s final retaliation for the death of Suleimani.
The Trump-Netanyahu axis may or may not lead to electoral success, but it will without a doubt leave both Israel and the United States less safe.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Chronicle of an Acquittal Foretold

Chronicle of an Acquittal Foretold

President Donald Trump ’ s impeachment trial appears ready to end with a whimper , not a bang .
On Monday , Democratic House impeachment managers and the president ’ s defense team presented their closing arguments to the Senate , wrapping up the third-ever impeachment trial of a U.S. president in history , which was defined by Trump ’ s controversial foreign-policy maneuvering in Ukraine and bitter partisan feuds in Washington .
Formally , the final vote that will end the four-month impeachment investigation and trial will come on Wednesday , ending in Trump ’ s all-but-inevitable acquittal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into November .
Over the coming months of the 2020 campaign season , both sides are expected to invoke the impeachment trial record—with Trump boasting exoneration but using the chance to smear one of his leading Democratic rivals , former Vice President Joe Biden , and his Democratic opponents contending that the evidence shows Trump should not be reelected .
By Monday , most of the tension and drama that defined the impeachment investigation and first part of the trial had passed .
Both sides presented their cases to senators who had mostly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would vote on two impeachment counts of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress .
A monthslong investigation in the House and heated trial in the Senate fell short of convincing enough Republicans to break from their support for Trump and vote to impeach ; Democrats even failed to gain a simple majority to vote for new witnesses and documents in the trial .
Perhaps the biggest remaining unknown was whether some Democratic senators from states where Trump is still popular might vote to acquit him on one or both counts , giving @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he ’ d won a bipartisan victory .
Democratic Sens .
Doug Jones of Alabama , Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona , and Joe Manchin of West Virginia have not said yet whether they would vote to convict Trump .
On the Republican side , Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski said on Monday that she privately decided which way she would vote but didn ’ t offer any more details .
Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander said in a statement that he believes the House Democrats proved their case—Trump wrongfully pressured a foreign government to investigate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not warrant removing him from office , let alone 10 months before a presidential election .
Nebraska Sen. Ben Sasse said , “ Lamar speaks for lots and lots of us.
” Either way , Trump is expected to be acquitted a day after he gives his annual State of the Union address .
A supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate is required to convict a president facing impeachment charges—and it ’ s unclear whether the Democrats can peel off even one vote in favor of conviction from the Republicans , who control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their closing arguments—speaking for history and perhaps to voters in November—House Democrats made a final effort to convince enough senators in the Republican-controlled chamber to convict Trump .
Both sides made their case citing U.S. history , the upcoming 2020 elections , and , in one case , referencing Harry Potter : “ It is our choices that show who we truly are , far more than our abilities , ” implored one of the House managers , Rep. Jason Crow , quoting Hogwarts headmaster Albus Dumbledore .
“ Absent conviction and removal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this president will not do it again ?
” said Democratic Rep. Hakeem Jeffries , one of the House impeachment managers .
“ If we are to rely on the next election to judge the president ’ s efforts to cheat in that election , how can we know that the election will be free and fair ?
” Trump ’ s lawyers repeated arguments that Democrats were using impeachment to undo the 2016 election results .
“ At the end of the day , this is an effort to overturn the results @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interfere in the coming election , ” said White House counsel Pat Cipollone .
Trump became the third president in U.S. history to be impeached after a House investigation found that he had sought to leverage military aid and the promise of a White House visit to pressure Ukraine ’ s president to open investigations that could aid his 2020 reelection campaign .
Dozens of hours of testimony by current and former officials revealed how over the spring and summer of 2019 , Trump ’ s personal lawyer , Rudy Giuliani , had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back channel to Ukraine in a bid to convince the country ’ s new president to commit to investigating the work of Biden and his son Hunter Biden , who had accepted a well-compensated seat on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was involved in policymaking toward that country .
In December , the Democrat-controlled House passed the two articles of impeachment for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress for stonewalling the investigative work of House committees .
The State Department found itself at the center of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomats were called as fact witnesses , often accruing extensive legal bills in the process .
Reports that Giuliani and his allies had successfully worked to oust U.S .
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch last May put Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the spotlight and raised questions about whether he had sufficiently defended his diplomats from politically motivated attacks .
The impeachment investigation was set in motion after an anonymous whistleblower complaint filed by a CIA officer alleged that Trump had used his power to solicit interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigate his political rivals .
A transcript of the call released by the White House revealed that Trump made reference to widely debunked conspiracy theories about the source of the 2016 hack on the Democratic National Committee and about Joe Biden ’ s work in Ukraine .

President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial appears ready to end with a whimper, not a bang. On Monday, Democratic House impeachment managers and the president’s defense team presented their closing arguments to the Senate, wrapping up the third-ever impeachment trial of a U.S. president in history, which was defined by Trump’s controversial foreign-policy maneuvering in Ukraine and bitter partisan feuds in Washington.
President Donald Trump’s impeachment trial appears ready to end with a whimper, not a bang. On Monday, Democratic House impeachment managers and the president’s defense team presented their closing arguments to the Senate, wrapping up the third-ever impeachment trial of a U.S. president in history, which was defined by Trump’s controversial foreign-policy maneuvering in Ukraine and bitter partisan feuds in Washington.
Formally, the final vote that will end the four-month impeachment investigation and trial will come on Wednesday, ending in Trump’s all-but-inevitable acquittal, but the repercussions will undoubtedly be felt into November. Over the coming months of the 2020 campaign season, both sides are expected to invoke the impeachment trial record—with Trump boasting exoneration but using the chance to smear one of his leading Democratic rivals, former Vice President Joe Biden, and his Democratic opponents contending that the evidence shows Trump should not be reelected.
By Monday, most of the tension and drama that defined the impeachment investigation and first part of the trial had passed. Both sides presented their cases to senators who had mostly made up their minds about how they would vote on two impeachment counts of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. A monthslong investigation in the House and heated trial in the Senate fell short of convincing enough Republicans to break from their support for Trump and vote to impeach; Democrats even failed to gain a simple majority to vote for new witnesses and documents in the trial.
Perhaps the biggest remaining unknown was whether some Democratic senators from states where Trump is still popular might vote to acquit him on one or both counts, giving the president a chance to claim that he’d won a bipartisan victory. Democratic Sens. Doug Jones of Alabama, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, and Joe Manchin of West Virginia have not said yet whether they would vote to convict Trump.
On the Republican side, Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski said on Monday that she privately decided which way she would vote but didn’t offer any more details. Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander said in a statement that he believes the House Democrats proved their case—Trump wrongfully pressured a foreign government to investigate one of his political rivals—but that did not warrant removing him from office, let alone 10 months before a presidential election. Nebraska Sen. Ben Sasse said, “Lamar speaks for lots and lots of us.”
Either way, Trump is expected to be acquitted a day after he gives his annual State of the Union address. A supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate is required to convict a president facing impeachment charges—and it’s unclear whether the Democrats can peel off even one vote in favor of conviction from the Republicans, who control the Senate 53 to 47.
In their closing arguments—speaking for history and perhaps to voters in November—House Democrats made a final effort to convince enough senators in the Republican-controlled chamber to convict Trump. Both sides made their case citing U.S. history, the upcoming 2020 elections, and, in one case, referencing Harry Potter: “It is our choices that show who we truly are, far more than our abilities,” implored one of the House managers, Rep. Jason Crow, quoting Hogwarts headmaster Albus Dumbledore.
“Absent conviction and removal, how can we be assured that this president will not do it again?” said Democratic Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, one of the House impeachment managers. “If we are to rely on the next election to judge the president’s efforts to cheat in that election, how can we know that the election will be free and fair?”
Trump’s lawyers repeated arguments that Democrats were using impeachment to undo the 2016 election results. “At the end of the day, this is an effort to overturn the results of one election and to try to interfere in the coming election,” said White House counsel Pat Cipollone.
Trump became the third president in U.S. history to be impeached after a House investigation found that he had sought to leverage military aid and the promise of a White House visit to pressure Ukraine’s president to open investigations that could aid his 2020 reelection campaign.
Dozens of hours of testimony by current and former officials revealed how over the spring and summer of 2019, Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, had defied diplomatic protocols to carve out a back channel to Ukraine in a bid to convince the country’s new president to commit to investigating the work of Biden and his son Hunter Biden, who had accepted a well-compensated seat on the board of a Ukrainian energy company while his father was involved in policymaking toward that country. In December, the Democrat-controlled House passed the two articles of impeachment for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress for stonewalling the investigative work of House committees.
The State Department found itself at the center of the impeachment maelstrom as several current and former diplomats were called as fact witnesses, often accruing extensive legal bills in the process. Reports that Giuliani and his allies had successfully worked to oust U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch last May put Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the spotlight and raised questions about whether he had sufficiently defended his diplomats from politically motivated attacks.
The impeachment investigation was set in motion after an anonymous whistleblower complaint filed by a CIA officer alleged that Trump had used his power to solicit interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential election by asking his Ukrainian counterpart to investigate his political rivals.
A transcript of the call released by the White House revealed that Trump made reference to widely debunked conspiracy theories about the source of the 2016 hack on the Democratic National Committee and about Joe Biden’s work in Ukraine.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Can China Replace the United States in Israel?

Can China Replace the United States in Israel ?
In the wake of the United States and China ’ s phase one trade deal , the latter is quietly trying to strike an agreement of its own with Israel .
Reports last December indicated that , after years of secret talks , China and Israel could conclude a trade pact sometime in 2020 .
This news renders an already contentious trilateral relationship even more so .
The great-power competition between the United States and China has clouded both countries ’ ties with Israel .
Some observers , such as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ speculate that Israel ’ s political relationship with the United States could be a casualty of deeper commercial ties to China .
The commentator Jake Novak went so far as to say that Israel may be forced to “ choose between ” the two sides .
A trade deal would give this group more reason for disquiet .
A Chinese-Israeli agreement would be as much of a political gesture as an economic one .
Although China would presumably welcome the increased trade any agreement would bring , of far greater value is access @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reputed Silicon Wadi offers much to the Chinese economy , not the least of which is advanced technology that could enhance China ’ s expanding surveillance state .
Whether or not the deal addresses head-on Chinese access to these companies matters little relative to the geostrategic victory , as it would at least pave the way for future discussions about access .
An agreement would make Israel more economically dependent on China—right now Israel ’ s second-largest trade partner—and as such beholden to the Communist Party in not only commerce but also politics @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deal , which granted Shanghai International Port Group rights to operate the port for 25 years , much to the United States ’ chagrin , may have brought just a fraction of future Chinese influence over Israel .
Beijing , characteristically cryptic in its public pronouncements , will likely frame a trade pact as another example of “ win-win cooperation.
” Win-win for China , perhaps—Israel has decided that getting into the Chinese market is worth the risk of whatever the blowback from Washington may be .
It is telling that the warnings @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have largely fallen on deaf ears .
In turn , Israel ’ s dealings with China have become bar none the most contentious issue in the U.S.-Israeli relationship .
Resolute U.S. support for Israel in security , economics , and politics—already crumbling on the American left—could also be eroded on the American right by this agreement .
What is more , Washington ’ s perceived withdrawal from the Middle East—justified by waning U.S. interests in the region—has prompted Israel to seek other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. protestations will not prevent Israel from moving ahead with China .
For one , there is little internal opposition to warmer relations with Beijing .
A full 66 percent of Israelis view China favorably ( in comparison to much lower proportions in other advanced democracies such as Australia , Germany , and the United States ) .
What helps explain this trend is the relative absence of anti-Semitism in Chinese history as well as the Israeli view that much of the West ( Europe especially ) is irredeemably opposed to the Jewish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ these perceptions , leading the Chinese ambassador to Israel to tout the supposedly “ unbreakable foundation of the China-Israel friendship.
” Israel ’ s shifting orientation toward China will likely continue .
But Israel should count its blessings in its alliance with the United States .
At its disposal is , among other things , the richest defense supplier across the globe , an influential domestic lobby , and a virtually guaranteed veto of anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations Security Council .
Beijing presently offers none of these .
Although China may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world ’ s largest economy , it will lag behind on other measures of national power .
Israel should also keep in mind China is the same country that has aggressively provided weapons technology to Israel ’ s Middle Eastern adversaries , including Iran .
Israel may think that its courtship of China accords with the Palmerstonian maxim that nations have no permanent allies , only permanent interests .
Yet the Israeli foreign-policy establishment needs to ask itself whether these economic interests are worth jeopardizing the country ’ s one indispensable alliance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they seem to think they are .

In the wake of the United States and China’s phase one trade deal, the latter is quietly trying to strike an agreement of its own with Israel. Reports last December indicated that, after years of secret talks, China and Israel could conclude a trade pact sometime in 2020. This news renders an already contentious trilateral relationship even more so.
In the wake of the United States and China’s phase one trade deal, the latter is quietly trying to strike an agreement of its own with Israel. Reports last December indicated that, after years of secret talks, China and Israel could conclude a trade pact sometime in 2020. This news renders an already contentious trilateral relationship even more so.
The great-power competition between the United States and China has clouded both countries’ ties with Israel. Some observers, such as the American diplomat and commentator Elliott Abrams, speculate that Israel’s political relationship with the United States could be a casualty of deeper commercial ties to China. The commentator Jake Novak went so far as to say that Israel may be forced to “choose between” the two sides. A trade deal would give this group more reason for disquiet.
A Chinese-Israeli agreement would be as much of a political gesture as an economic one. Although China would presumably welcome the increased trade any agreement would bring, of far greater value is access to the Israeli high-tech sector. The reputed Silicon Wadi offers much to the Chinese economy, not the least of which is advanced technology that could enhance China’s expanding surveillance state. Whether or not the deal addresses head-on Chinese access to these companies matters little relative to the geostrategic victory, as it would at least pave the way for future discussions about access. An agreement would make Israel more economically dependent on China—right now Israel’s second-largest trade partner—and as such beholden to the Communist Party in not only commerce but also politics and security. The 2015 Haifa Port deal, which granted Shanghai International Port Group rights to operate the port for 25 years, much to the United States’ chagrin, may have brought just a fraction of future Chinese influence over Israel.
Beijing, characteristically cryptic in its public pronouncements, will likely frame a trade pact as another example of “win-win cooperation.” Win-win for China, perhaps—Israel has decided that getting into the Chinese market is worth the risk of whatever the blowback from Washington may be. It is telling that the warnings of such pro-Israel stalwarts as former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have largely fallen on deaf ears.
In turn, Israel’s dealings with China have become bar none the most contentious issue in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Resolute U.S. support for Israel in security, economics, and politics—already crumbling on the American left—could also be eroded on the American right by this agreement. What is more, Washington’s perceived withdrawal from the Middle East—justified by waning U.S. interests in the region—has prompted Israel to seek other patrons, China chief among them.
U.S. protestations will not prevent Israel from moving ahead with China. For one, there is little internal opposition to warmer relations with Beijing. A full 66 percent of Israelis view China favorably (in comparison to much lower proportions in other advanced democracies such as Australia, Germany, and the United States). What helps explain this trend is the relative absence of anti-Semitism in Chinese history as well as the Israeli view that much of the West (Europe especially) is irredeemably opposed to the Jewish state. Beijing has caught on to these perceptions, leading the Chinese ambassador to Israel to tout the supposedly “unbreakable foundation of the China-Israel friendship.” Israel’s shifting orientation toward China will likely continue.
But Israel should count its blessings in its alliance with the United States. At its disposal is, among other things, the richest defense supplier across the globe, an influential domestic lobby, and a virtually guaranteed veto of anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations Security Council. Beijing presently offers none of these. Although China may soon surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy, it will lag behind on other measures of national power. Israel should also keep in mind China is the same country that has aggressively provided weapons technology to Israel’s Middle Eastern adversaries, including Iran.
Israel may think that its courtship of China accords with the Palmerstonian maxim that nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Yet the Israeli foreign-policy establishment needs to ask itself whether these economic interests are worth jeopardizing the country’s one indispensable alliance. If the trade deal is any indication, they seem to think they are.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Brexit Is Fake News

Brexit Is Fake News

On Jan. 31 , Britain finally left the European Union , three and a half rancorous years after 52 percent of Brits voted to leave the bloc in 2016 .
EU officials hauled down the Union Jack from official buildings .
British members of the European Parliament surrendered their seats in the EU ’ s legislature .
“ Brexit is done !
” tweeted former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton , providing a standard interpretation .
“ Happy first full day of UK Independence.
” But Brexit is not done .
Nor will it ever really happen .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the EU is what Bolton ’ s former boss might call “ fake news.
” And so , in the days after Brexit , British newspapers ’ editorial pages were full of opinion pieces about—what else ?
—Brexit .
Opening the website of the Daily Telegraph , the United Kingdom ’ s main conservative newspaper , after Brexit day , four of the seven columns I read opined about Brexit .
It is as though Brits themselves don ’ t want Brexit to end , lest their conversations revert to topics such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it is not just that Brits , despite their protestations to the contrary , love talking about Brexit .
They have to talk about it because the process will never end .
In a strictly legal sense , of course , Britain is out .
But this means little .
All the things that drove the United Kingdom to vote for Brexit—the need to comply with EU regulations , debates about migration , a sense that Britain is not in control of its own laws—none of these will change or go away .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Start with the obvious .
Right now , the United Kingdom is in a transition period during which both London and Brussels agreed that almost nothing would change , except for the flag .
The European Court of Justice , hated by Brexiteers for violating British sovereignty , will continue to judge U.K. law .
Even migration from other EU member states will continue as before .
The only real difference is that now the country will have no votes in the European Council or the European Parliament , despite agreeing to follow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the year .
“ Take back control !
” was the slogan of the Brexiteers .
But for now at least , the British have less .
In theory , the transition period could end in late 2020 .
But the Brexit agreement itself includes an option to extend that period for up to two years , which seems likely to be utilized .
Suppose then that the United Kingdom finally leaves the transition at the end of 2022 .
Will it then finally take back control from the Brussels bureaucrats ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ The EU forged 28 different nations ( including the United Kingdom ) into a single market by unifying regulations across countries , allowing businesses to sell easily in all countries .
This has created a market as vast and as integrated as any except for the domestic markets of the United States and China .
Roughly half of the United Kingdom ’ s trade is with the European Union .
The figure is slightly higher if countries such as Turkey , which is not in the EU but is in a customs union @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Britain wants to trade with the EU—and it does , given the vast trade flows—it will have to agree on a set of rules governing product safety , food standards , and other regulatory measures .
For decades , British media have condemned the EU for imposing unneeded regulations , covering topics as banal as the shape of bananas .
Brexiteers have promised a “ bonfire of the EU laws , ” as the Daily Mail put it .
But British firms looking to trade with the EU are unlikely to see regulations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that is jointly assembled in the U.K. and EU is still likely to follow EU laws .
So , too , are many foreign products sold across Europe .
It will be easier to follow the rules of the bigger market .
( The EU ’ s economy is more than five times bigger than Britain ’ s , depending on how you calculate . )
And if British firms want to sell in the EU , they will still follow Brussels ’ s rulebook .
There are so many regulatory battles on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Brexit never actually happened .
The same is true for trade deals .
It has been three years since the British government began negotiating its own trade deals with other countries .
Thus far , London has signed deals with partners , including Georgia and Jordan , that constitute only 8 percent of British trade .
These deals have proved not that the United Kingdom is an independent trading nation but rather that it continues to accept EU rules .
Indeed , its biggest new trade deals , including with South Korea and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nothing .
The Swiss , with whom the United Kingdom has also signed a trade deal , provide a template for what will come .
Switzerland also stands outside the EU , but many Swiss firms choose to implement EU laws because it makes cross-border trade easier .
Switzerland ’ s government , meanwhile , finds itself in nearly constant battles with the bossy Brussels bureaucrats over whether it must implement new EU rules governing the two countries ’ trade .
The Swiss usually put up a weak fight and then surrender .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ humiliation of having laws dictated from Brussels .
In the three and half years since the Brexit referendum , the United Kingdom has found itself in a position of Swiss subservience but has not yet come to terms with the new reality .
It is no longer a member of the EU , but it has not really left .
The flag has been hauled down , but the detested regulations remain .
Sovereignty will be circumscribed so long as Britain wants access to EU markets .
Brexiteers will describe this as betrayal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for them .
They can keep blaming everything that goes wrong on Brussels .
It will feel almost as if Britain never actually left .

On Jan. 31, Britain finally left the European Union, three and a half rancorous years after 52 percent of Brits voted to leave the bloc in 2016. EU officials hauled down the Union Jack from official buildings. British members of the European Parliament surrendered their seats in the EU’s legislature. “Brexit is done!” tweeted former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton, providing a standard interpretation. “Happy first full day of UK Independence.”
On Jan. 31, Britain finally left the European Union, three and a half rancorous years after 52 percent of Brits voted to leave the bloc in 2016. EU officials hauled down the Union Jack from official buildings. British members of the European Parliament surrendered their seats in the EU’s legislature. “Brexit is done!” tweeted former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton, providing a standard interpretation. “Happy first full day of UK Independence.”
But Brexit is not done. Nor will it ever really happen. The whole thesis that Britain has actually left the EU is what Bolton’s former boss might call “fake news.” And so, in the days after Brexit, British newspapers’ editorial pages were full of opinion pieces about—what else?—Brexit. Opening the website of the Daily Telegraph, the United Kingdom’s main conservative newspaper, after Brexit day, four of the seven columns I read opined about Brexit. It is as though Brits themselves don’t want Brexit to end, lest their conversations revert to topics such as the queen or the weather.
But it is not just that Brits, despite their protestations to the contrary, love talking about Brexit. They have to talk about it because the process will never end. In a strictly legal sense, of course, Britain is out. But this means little. All the things that drove the United Kingdom to vote for Brexit—the need to comply with EU regulations, debates about migration, a sense that Britain is not in control of its own laws—none of these will change or go away. Neither, therefore, will Brexit.
Start with the obvious. Right now, the United Kingdom is in a transition period during which both London and Brussels agreed that almost nothing would change, except for the flag. The European Court of Justice, hated by Brexiteers for violating British sovereignty, will continue to judge U.K. law. Even migration from other EU member states will continue as before. The only real difference is that now the country will have no votes in the European Council or the European Parliament, despite agreeing to follow their rules until at least the end of the year. “Take back control!” was the slogan of the Brexiteers. But for now at least, the British have less.
In theory, the transition period could end in late 2020. But the Brexit agreement itself includes an option to extend that period for up to two years, which seems likely to be utilized. Suppose then that the United Kingdom finally leaves the transition at the end of 2022. Will it then finally take back control from the Brussels bureaucrats? Not quite.
Start with regulation. The EU forged 28 different nations (including the United Kingdom) into a single market by unifying regulations across countries, allowing businesses to sell easily in all countries. This has created a market as vast and as integrated as any except for the domestic markets of the United States and China.
Roughly half of the United Kingdom’s trade is with the European Union. The figure is slightly higher if countries such as Turkey, which is not in the EU but is in a customs union with Europe, are included. If Britain wants to trade with the EU—and it does, given the vast trade flows—it will have to agree on a set of rules governing product safety, food standards, and other regulatory measures.
For decades, British media have condemned the EU for imposing unneeded regulations, covering topics as banal as the shape of bananas. Brexiteers have promised a “bonfire of the EU laws,” as the Daily Mail put it. But British firms looking to trade with the EU are unlikely to see regulations going up in smoke. Any product that is jointly assembled in the U.K. and EU is still likely to follow EU laws. So, too, are many foreign products sold across Europe. It will be easier to follow the rules of the bigger market. (The EU’s economy is more than five times bigger than Britain’s, depending on how you calculate.) And if British firms want to sell in the EU, they will still follow Brussels’s rulebook. There are so many regulatory battles on the horizon that it may seem like Brexit never actually happened.
The same is true for trade deals. It has been three years since the British government began negotiating its own trade deals with other countries. Thus far, London has signed deals with partners, including Georgia and Jordan, that constitute only 8 percent of British trade. These deals have proved not that the United Kingdom is an independent trading nation but rather that it continues to accept EU rules. Indeed, its biggest new trade deals, including with South Korea and Norway, are openly advertised as changing nothing.
The Swiss, with whom the United Kingdom has also signed a trade deal, provide a template for what will come. Switzerland also stands outside the EU, but many Swiss firms choose to implement EU laws because it makes cross-border trade easier. Switzerland’s government, meanwhile, finds itself in nearly constant battles with the bossy Brussels bureaucrats over whether it must implement new EU rules governing the two countries’ trade. The Swiss usually put up a weak fight and then surrender. Access to EU markets is worth the humiliation of having laws dictated from Brussels.
In the three and half years since the Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom has found itself in a position of Swiss subservience but has not yet come to terms with the new reality. It is no longer a member of the EU, but it has not really left. The flag has been hauled down, but the detested regulations remain. Sovereignty will be circumscribed so long as Britain wants access to EU markets. Brexiteers will describe this as betrayal, but it is especially good news for them. They can keep blaming everything that goes wrong on Brussels. It will feel almost as if Britain never actually left.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-03--Chinese Officials Can’t Help Lying About the Wuhan Virus

Chinese Officials Can ’ t Help Lying About the Wuhan Virus As fear of the Wuhan coronavirus seizes China , the outlines of the local government mistakes that gave the disease a critical monthlong head start are becoming apparent .
Reporting in both foreign and domestic media paints a picture of a city government in Wuhan more concerned with political meetings than epidemic control—and where attempts by insiders , including eight separate doctors , to speak out were stamped on by police .
The central government is now promising to perform where Wuhan officials failed .
Officials in Beijing have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and outside groups like the World Health Organization—even introducing a whistleblower hotline within the massively popular WeChat messaging app .
Such measures are about as convincing as an organized crime boss who launches a “ Start Snitching ” campaign .
The hostility to transparency and fear of speaking out baked into the fabric of Xi Jinping ’ s China can ’ t be thrown away for one crisis .
Transparency is not a window that can be opened and shut at the state ’ s will when it finds it useful .
Brave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Chinese government ’ s habits of opaqueness , concealment , and distrust of the public will impede attempts to control the outbreak .
The central government authorities may truly want transparency—if only so that they themselves know what ’ s going on .
But they don ’ t want it across the board : only on this one specific issue .
And the repression of speech and distortion of data in China aren ’ t a matter of a singular central will .
It ’ s mostly carried out by local @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lose if people can complain freely about mistakes or cover-ups .
In a public health crisis , that could have fatal consequences .
For instance , it ’ s unclear whether it ’ s deliberate policy or simply an overwhelmed system , but numerous reports testify to bodies being cremated in Wuhan without the death being recorded as a coronavirus fatality , which has made it highly difficult to tell just how lethal the virus is .
To be sure , the men responsible for covering up the initial outbreak—the online monitors who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ posted to a relatively private group chat ) ; the police who threatened them ; and the local government officials who signed off on their harassment or detention—will be punished at the central government ’ s insistence , if only to appease public anger .
But there ’ s a perverse injustice , given that they were following the expected standards of the party-state .
Under ordinary circumstances , in fact , their behavior would have , from the party ’ s perspective , been laudable .
Hundreds of similar incidents play out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a program of “ stability maintenance ” that officially costs the country around $ 200 billion a year , more than double the figure of a decade ago .
( That figure includes some policing activities that would be normal in any country , but it also excludes much of the apparatus of control , such as the domestic United Front programs that look to co-opt non-party groups into serving the party ’ s purposes . )
The kind of repression that occurred in Wuhan didn ’ t even need any special conspiracy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus .
Rumormongering—a euphemism for drawing attention to potential sources of social or political scandal—has been a priority of the authorities since 2013 , especially online .
Most of the time , of course , it ’ s over far smaller matters than an epidemic : a police killing , a polluting factory , a hospital turning away a dying child .
The monitoring of messages for destabilizing information intensified in 2017 , when the administrators of chat groups began to be held accountable for content posted by any user , allowing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For Wuhan ’ s police , threatening people for posting information that might cause trouble , true or false , was as routine and automatic an action as a traffic arrest .
The local government authorities tipping the national media off about the story showed their bosses they had the situation under control .
The public is well aware of what the score is .
For years , the government has signaled that the fate of whistleblowers isn ’ t a happy one .
This is not a new habit ; take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heroic doctors who exposed the illicit blood sales and subsequent AIDS crisis in Henan in the 1990s .
Both of them faced years of persecution as a result , even after the state admitted they were right ; both were forced to take refuge in the United States .
Activists like Tan Zuoren , who attempted to document the corruption that led to the collapse of supposedly reinforced school buildings during the Sichuan earthquake of 2008 , were put in prison .
Despite all this , between around 2000 and 2012 , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , particularly over local corruption .
Journalists often shared information from scandals , backed by a public keen to haul greedy officials over the coals .
Crackdowns were relatively rare , and there were those within the party itself who saw this kind of monitoring as a useful tool to engage the public in the work of maintaining some accountability .
All that ended in 2012-2013 , as a concerted campaign against some of the most prominent watchdogs , combined with sweeping new online restrictions , signaled the end of any tolerance for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2013 , Weibo , the most popular social media site for such stories , had seen its traffic drop by 70 percent .
In the next few years , that campaign broadened to a mass crackdown on human rights activists , lawyers , and anyone else who dared to monitor officials ’ business , even as it was joined by a sweeping purge within the party of supposedly corrupt figures , who also happened to be Xi ’ s political foes .
Humiliating TV confessions became a normal part of evening broadcasts .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughout China for spreading so-called rumors about the virus .
Some of that is directed against genuine misinformation , but some of it is simply the state ’ s usual crushing of any perceived dissent .
Any potential whistleblowers eyeing up that WeChat hotline , for instance , have to be very aware that the app requires them to sign up with their real government ID numbers .
To speak up , citizens need to believe not only that they won ’ t be punished now but that local authorities won ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Given the record , that ’ s unlikely .
Take the village of Wukan , once heralded for resisting corrupt local officials in 2011 .
By 2016 , the villagers involved in the protests had been picked off one by one , and the local government was more repressive than ever .
The state has a long memory and keeps records .
It ’ s true that Chinese reporting has enjoyed a rare spring and that media has been doing brilliant and honest work from inside Wuhan itself and elsewhere .
( See @ @ @ @ @ @ @ together by the reporter Shen Lu . )
But such flourishing has happened after disasters in the past , such as the Tianjin explosions of 2015 and the high-speed rail crash in Wenzhou in 2011 , and it has always been short-lived .
There ’ s no real new transparency .
Instead , the old red lines have been temporarily erased in the wake of disaster , and the many talented and frustrated journalists in China are able to quickly occupy the new space created—until the authorities decide what can and can not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ again .
In the case of the coronavirus , the disruption may be such that the freedom lasts longer than usual—but it ’ s still ultimately temporary .
Officials , on the other hand , persist unless unlucky enough to be scapegoated ; as some sardonically noted this week , the man in charge of the port area of Tianjin that exploded is now a prominent member of the Hubei government .
Actual , lasting openness would need watchdogs outside the party-state itself .
It would need a media environment where the censor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over every piece of copy filed .
It would need protections for whistleblowers and an independent judiciary able to enforce those protections .
It would need a willingness to let control slip out of the party ’ s hands and to bear the consequences .
None of this is remotely likely in the foreseeable future .
That means the Chinese people will be left in darkness about what their institutions are doing—until something else slithers out of the shadows that endangers them all .

As fear of the Wuhan coronavirus seizes China, the outlines of the local government mistakes that gave the disease a critical monthlong head start are becoming apparent. Reporting in both foreign and domestic media paints a picture of a city government in Wuhan more concerned with political meetings than epidemic control—and where attempts by insiders, including eight separate doctors , to speak out were stamped on by police.
As fear of the Wuhan coronavirus seizes China, the outlines of the local government mistakes that gave the disease a critical monthlong head start are becoming apparent. Reporting in both foreign and domestic media paints a picture of a city government in Wuhan more concerned with political meetings than epidemic control—and where attempts by insiders, including eight separate doctors, to speak out were stamped on by police.
The central government is now promising to perform where Wuhan officials failed. Officials in Beijing have pledged greater transparency to both the public and outside groups like the World Health Organization—even introducing a whistleblower hotline within the massively popular WeChat messaging app.
Such measures are about as convincing as an organized crime boss who launches a “Start Snitching” campaign. The hostility to transparency and fear of speaking out baked into the fabric of Xi Jinping’s China can’t be thrown away for one crisis. Transparency is not a window that can be opened and shut at the state’s will when it finds it useful. Brave calls for transparency by Chinese media aside, the Chinese government’s habits of opaqueness, concealment, and distrust of the public will impede attempts to control the outbreak.
The central government authorities may truly want transparency—if only so that they themselves know what’s going on. But they don’t want it across the board: only on this one specific issue. And the repression of speech and distortion of data in China aren’t a matter of a singular central will. It’s mostly carried out by local officials, who have the most to lose if people can complain freely about mistakes or cover-ups. In a public health crisis, that could have fatal consequences. For instance, it’s unclear whether it’s deliberate policy or simply an overwhelmed system, but numerous reports testify to bodies being cremated in Wuhan without the death being recorded as a coronavirus fatality, which has made it highly difficult to tell just how lethal the virus is.
To be sure, the men responsible for covering up the initial outbreak—the online monitors who stifled the doctors’ comments (originally posted to a relatively private group chat); the police who threatened them; and the local government officials who signed off on their harassment or detention—will be punished at the central government’s insistence, if only to appease public anger. But there’s a perverse injustice, given that they were following the expected standards of the party-state.
Under ordinary circumstances, in fact, their behavior would have, from the party’s perspective, been laudable. Hundreds of similar incidents play out every day across China as part of a program of “stability maintenance” that officially costs the country around $200 billion a year, more than double the figure of a decade ago. (That figure includes some policing activities that would be normal in any country, but it also excludes much of the apparatus of control, such as the domestic United Front programs that look to co-opt non-party groups into serving the party’s purposes.)
The kind of repression that occurred in Wuhan didn’t even need any special conspiracy behind it to specifically cover up the coronavirus. Rumormongering—a euphemism for drawing attention to potential sources of social or political scandal—has been a priority of the authorities since 2013, especially online. Most of the time, of course, it’s over far smaller matters than an epidemic: a police killing, a polluting factory, a hospital turning away a dying child. The monitoring of messages for destabilizing information intensified in 2017, when the administrators of chat groups began to be held accountable for content posted by any user, allowing the authorities to leverage the power of self-censorship. For Wuhan’s police, threatening people for posting information that might cause trouble, true or false, was as routine and automatic an action as a traffic arrest. The local government authorities tipping the national media off about the story showed their bosses they had the situation under control.
The public is well aware of what the score is. For years, the government has signaled that the fate of whistleblowers isn’t a happy one. This is not a new habit; take Shuping Wang and Gao Yaojie, the heroic doctors who exposed the illicit blood sales and subsequent AIDS crisis in Henan in the 1990s. Both of them faced years of persecution as a result, even after the state admitted they were right; both were forced to take refuge in the United States. Activists like Tan Zuoren, who attempted to document the corruption that led to the collapse of supposedly reinforced school buildings during the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, were put in prison.
Despite all this, between around 2000 and 2012, the Chinese internet developed its own watchdog culture, particularly over local corruption. Journalists often shared information from scandals, backed by a public keen to haul greedy officials over the coals. Crackdowns were relatively rare, and there were those within the party itself who saw this kind of monitoring as a useful tool to engage the public in the work of maintaining some accountability. All that ended in 2012-2013, as a concerted campaign against some of the most prominent watchdogs, combined with sweeping new online restrictions, signaled the end of any tolerance for outside monitoring. By the end of 2013, Weibo, the most popular social media site for such stories, had seen its traffic drop by 70 percent. In the next few years, that campaign broadened to a mass crackdown on human rights activists, lawyers, and anyone else who dared to monitor officials’ business, even as it was joined by a sweeping purge within the party of supposedly corrupt figures, who also happened to be Xi’s political foes. Humiliating TV confessions became a normal part of evening broadcasts.
Even now, arrests and threats continue throughout China for spreading so-called rumors about the virus. Some of that is directed against genuine misinformation, but some of it is simply the state’s usual crushing of any perceived dissent. Any potential whistleblowers eyeing up that WeChat hotline, for instance, have to be very aware that the app requires them to sign up with their real government ID numbers.
To speak up, citizens need to believe not only that they won’t be punished now but that local authorities won’t remember them and take vengeance later. Given the record, that’s unlikely. Take the village of Wukan, once heralded for resisting corrupt local officials in 2011. By 2016, the villagers involved in the protests had been picked off one by one, and the local government was more repressive than ever. The state has a long memory and keeps records.
It’s true that Chinese reporting has enjoyed a rare spring and that media has been doing brilliant and honest work from inside Wuhan itself and elsewhere. (See this compiled list in Chinese, put together by the reporter Shen Lu.) But such flourishing has happened after disasters in the past, such as the Tianjin explosions of 2015 and the high-speed rail crash in Wenzhou in 2011, and it has always been short-lived.
There’s no real new transparency. Instead, the old red lines have been temporarily erased in the wake of disaster, and the many talented and frustrated journalists in China are able to quickly occupy the new space created—until the authorities decide what can and cannot be said and the lines are drawn again. In the case of the coronavirus, the disruption may be such that the freedom lasts longer than usual—but it’s still ultimately temporary. Officials, on the other hand, persist unless unlucky enough to be scapegoated; as some sardonically noted this week, the man in charge of the port area of Tianjin that exploded is now a prominent member of the Hubei government.
Actual, lasting openness would need watchdogs outside the party-state itself. It would need a media environment where the censor’s pen doesn’t hover over every piece of copy filed. It would need protections for whistleblowers and an independent judiciary able to enforce those protections. It would need a willingness to let control slip out of the party’s hands and to bear the consequences. None of this is remotely likely in the foreseeable future. That means the Chinese people will be left in darkness about what their institutions are doing—until something else slithers out of the shadows that endangers them all.