foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks

With the likely death of the Afghan Taliban ’ s supreme leader from COVID-19 and the illness of many other senior figures , the son of Mullah Mohammad Omar , the militant group ’ s founder , has taken control .
But now the Afghan government is worried that a power struggle within the Taliban could damage the tenuous peace process that is barely underway .
Indeed , as the Taliban move closer to a return to at least partial power in Kabul , thanks to a deal with the United States aimed at ending its war in Afghanistan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set to descend into an internal battle of its own , as rival factions and tribes fight for control of its vast financial and military assets .
At stake is close to $ 2 billion in annual revenues , a well-armed and battle-hardened militia , and alliances with international terrorist groups , including al Qaeda , eager to piggyback on the Taliban ’ s supposed victory over the United States and its allies and use Afghanistan , as it once again becomes an ungoverned space , for training and operational planning .
Uncertainty @ @ @ @ @ @ @ struggle will unfold comes amid the latest stage of U.S. efforts to broker peace , following the signing of a bilateral deal on Feb. 29 that transformed the Taliban into an ally and facilitated the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in 14 months .
That drawdown is already ahead of schedule , and some analysts believe it could even be completed before the November U.S. presidential election .
“ We need one united Taliban , ” said an Afghan government official who spoke on the condition that he not be named .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that until two years ago , in the central leadership , it was all about jihad , about getting rid of the ‘ occupiers , ’ about religious principles .
Now it is purely about power .
Who gets what .
It comes down to money and power.
” “ Before the agreement with the United States , they could say they had one larger cause that they were all standing for .
Now it ’ s gone , the Americans are going , [ and ] they are facing many issues internally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the long run , a divided Taliban could work to Kabul ’ s benefit , since until now the group has refused to acknowledge the Afghan national government as legitimate .
The ideological and tribal rivalries becoming apparent once more at the upper reaches of the militant group should provide greater leverage for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to force his own conditions for peace , including an unconditional nationwide cease-fire .
But Ghani has been unable so far to master Afghanistan ’ s complex mix of tribal and ethnic politics .
U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khalilzad , who granted sweeping concessions to the Taliban to secure the deal , is this week concentrating on bringing the Kabul government and the Taliban together for peace talks .
He has visited Islamabad , which has long supported , funded , and armed the Taliban , and Doha , the capital of Qatar , where the Taliban ’ s political operation is based .
Next stop is Kabul , which was sidelined from all negotiations .
The focus of Khalilzad ’ s meetings is the progress of a prisoner swap he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which Kabul releases around 5,000 Taliban prisoners in return for about 1,000 captives held by the militants .
Once this is complete , talks between Kabul and the Taliban are supposed to begin .
Afghan media have reported this could be as soon as July .
But new doubts have arisen in the wake of the apparent death of Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada , the supreme leader , who has not been seen in public for almost a year since a bombing at a mosque in Pakistan killed his brother , who was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close to the Taliban , Akhunzada died after being stricken by COVID-19 .
“ For many months , there have been no messages from him [ Akhunzada ] —everything is done on his behalf , and this increases suspicion that he is no longer alive , ” said a source in Kabul who is in close contact with Afghan and Taliban leaders .
“ There is nothing to say or show that he is dead .
Or alive.
” The Taliban have publicly denied Akhunzada is dead .
Akhunzada ’ s absence won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s power and influence , experts say ; never known as a strong strategist , Akhunzada was chosen for his religious credentials , seen then as useful for relegitimizing the Taliban ’ s war as a jihadi cause aimed at removing the “ infidel occupiers.
” Even so , Akhunzada supported the peace process , Taliban sources said .
Also stricken by the coronavirus was Akhunzada ’ s deputy , Sirajuddin Haqqani , who as chief of operations was the Taliban ’ s prime decision-maker and led the al Qaeda-aligned Haqqani terrorist network @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well , according to sources , the vacuum has been filled by Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob , Mullah Omar ’ s ambitious son .
Yaqoob has taken on Haqqani ’ s role as chief of operations , as well as the Afghanistan affairs portfolio , said Taliban , Afghan government , and Western intelligence sources .
He also controls military operations .
Even so , Yaqoob is not popular within the militant group and is widely seen as arrogant and entitled , believing that the mantle of supreme leader is his “ birthright.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ position ahead of an expected series of shuras later this year , which he hopes will confirm his ambition , and he appears to be deft at shoring up support among his Hotak tribe and his late father ’ s trusted confidants .
Since losing his bid for the leadership in 2015 , Yaqoob has tightened his grip on the Taliban ’ s finances , setting up his own financial commission that his advisors have said now controls around $ 1.7 billion in annual revenues , from opium , mining , rent seeking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , telecommunications , and trade in agricultural products other than poppy .
This has exacerbated tensions with Gul Agha Ishakzai , who controlled finances for Mullah Omar and was instrumental in ensuring he was succeeded as supreme leader—when his death became public more than two years after he had died—by Mullah Akhtar Mansour .
Mansour was deeply involved in the drugs trade and regarded by battlefield commanders as lacking the religious credibility that had given their fight legitimacy .
Mansour was killed a year later , in May 2016 , by a U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Akhunzada , who was imam at the mosque where his brother was killed in August 2019 , before being elevated to the Taliban ’ s top job .
Amid the infighting , Afghan , Western , and Taliban sources say Yaqoob is maneuvering to consolidate power and then formalize his position by moving key supporters into positions in Quetta , Pakistan , and Doha .
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , co-founder of the Taliban with Mullah Omar , his close advisor , and the lead interlocutor in the talks with the United States—he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sources said .
One source described him as the “ kingmaker.
” The Afghan source with knowledge of the Taliban said Muhammad Tayyab Agha , who was Mullah Omar ’ s chief of staff and led the political office from 2009 to 2015 , “ will come back to Doha.
” Tayyab Agha resigned as head of the Doha political operation , apparently fearing rifts after Mansour , who had tribal links to the Ishakzai , was named supreme leader .
For the most part , Yaqoob and the other top leaders are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and dissidents who still oppose them have been edged out .
Last year , the Rasool Shura , a minority faction led by Mullah Mohammad Rasool , based in western Afghanistan and reportedly supported by Iran , declared opposition to the negotiations , as did Iran .
The faction quickly lost its power .
“ A lesson , ” said a Quetta source , “ that you can not survive outside the family.
” The question now is whether the Taliban will take a different direction than in the past .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back to Kabul , largely on their own terms .
A power struggle could delay progress in meeting that goal , especially if it spills into intrafactional violence .
One Taliban source said Yaqoob ’ s cooperation with the peace talks could depend on how much support he receives in his bid for the supreme leadership , from within and outside the Taliban .
Either way , it is a matter of time before the Taliban become “ an influential legal-political force in Afghanistan , ” as Russia ’ s special presidential envoy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ put it in a recent interview .
Nor have the Taliban paid little more than lip service to a U.S. demand in the agreement that they cut ties with al Qaeda : Links between the Taliban and international jihadi groups remain as strong now as they ever have been .
In its latest report on Afghanistan , the U.N. Security Council said : “ The Taliban regularly consulted with Al-Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered guarantees that it would honour their historical ties .
Al-Qaida has reacted positively to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ celebrating it as a victory for the Taliban ’ s cause and thus for global militancy.
” Michael Semple , a former European Union and U.N. advisor on Afghanistan , said the Taliban “ have intensified their relationship with al Qaeda and the other international jihadist factions in the wake of the signing ” of the February agreement .
“ Although obviously the majority of fighters in the Taliban ranks are Afghans , there ’ s a significant role for the foreign militants .
That has intensified—it ’ s systematic .
They are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There ’ s no sign that that ’ s changing , ” he told an online discussion hosted by London ’ s Frontline Club last week .
“ The reality on the ground is that if the U.S. completes its withdrawal from Afghanistan without a serious program of ongoing support for the Afghan government , then the Taliban , who roll back into power in Kabul restoring the Islamic Emirate , will be triumphantly allied with al Qaeda , ” Semple said .
“ The empirical evidence tells us that Taliban intelligence have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and rely on them for servicing the war effort.
” The Afghan government has so far failed to secure a permanent cease-fire ahead of talks , and the Security Council report concedes that securing the terms of the agreement with the Taliban will be “ challenging.
” American officials have said that if the terms of the deal are breached , they will return , though it is unlikely that once U.S. troops are gone , they will redeploy , under Trump or Joe Biden , the presumptive Democratic nominee , if he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a Biden win , a Western intelligence source said , Afghanistan is not likely to be a priority for a new U.S. administration .
“ He has to repair relations with Europe and NATO , the trade war with China will be his biggest problem , Iran , North Korea .
The United States has become an unreliable partner for the Kurds and for Afghanistan , ” he said .
Beyond that , as vice president to President Barack Obama , Biden was among those who pushed for a rapid U.S. drawdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there will only be four months left on the drawdown timetable—and that ’ s if all U.S. troops aren ’ t out by November .
Biden will have a lot to do , and Afghanistan will not be high in the order of operations .
”

With the likely death of the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader from COVID-19 and the illness of many other senior figures, the son of Mullah Mohammad Omar, the militant group’s founder, has taken control. But now the Afghan government is worried that a power struggle within the Taliban could damage the tenuous peace process that is barely underway.
With the likely death of the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader from COVID-19 and the illness of many other senior figures, the son of Mullah Mohammad Omar, the militant group’s founder, has taken control. But now the Afghan government is worried that a power struggle within the Taliban could damage the tenuous peace process that is barely underway.
Indeed, as the Taliban move closer to a return to at least partial power in Kabul, thanks to a deal with the United States aimed at ending its war in Afghanistan, there are signs the jihadi movement is set to descend into an internal battle of its own, as rival factions and tribes fight for control of its vast financial and military assets.
At stake is close to $2 billion in annual revenues, a well-armed and battle-hardened militia, and alliances with international terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, eager to piggyback on the Taliban’s supposed victory over the United States and its allies and use Afghanistan, as it once again becomes an ungoverned space, for training and operational planning.
Uncertainty about how the Taliban’s leadership struggle will unfold comes amid the latest stage of U.S. efforts to broker peace, following the signing of a bilateral deal on Feb. 29 that transformed the Taliban into an ally and facilitated the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan in 14 months. That drawdown is already ahead of schedule, and some analysts believe it could even be completed before the November U.S. presidential election.
“We need one united Taliban,” said an Afghan government official who spoke on the condition that he not be named. “But the real problem now is that until two years ago, in the central leadership, it was all about jihad, about getting rid of the ‘occupiers,’ about religious principles. Now it is purely about power. Who gets what. It comes down to money and power.”
“Before the agreement with the United States, they could say they had one larger cause that they were all standing for. Now it’s gone, the Americans are going, [and] they are facing many issues internally,” the official said.
In the long run, a divided Taliban could work to Kabul’s benefit, since until now the group has refused to acknowledge the Afghan national government as legitimate. The ideological and tribal rivalries becoming apparent once more at the upper reaches of the militant group should provide greater leverage for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to force his own conditions for peace, including an unconditional nationwide cease-fire. But Ghani has been unable so far to master Afghanistan’s complex mix of tribal and ethnic politics.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, who granted sweeping concessions to the Taliban to secure the deal, is this week concentrating on bringing the Kabul government and the Taliban together for peace talks. He has visited Islamabad, which has long supported, funded, and armed the Taliban, and Doha, the capital of Qatar, where the Taliban’s political operation is based. Next stop is Kabul, which was sidelined from all negotiations.
The focus of Khalilzad’s meetings is the progress of a prisoner swap he agreed to bilaterally with the Taliban, in which Kabul releases around 5,000 Taliban prisoners in return for about 1,000 captives held by the militants. Once this is complete, talks between Kabul and the Taliban are supposed to begin. Afghan media have reported this could be as soon as July.
But new doubts have arisen in the wake of the apparent death of Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, the supreme leader, who has not been seen in public for almost a year since a bombing at a mosque in Pakistan killed his brother, who was the imam. According to several sources close to the Taliban, Akhunzada died after being stricken by COVID-19. “For many months, there have been no messages from him [Akhunzada]—everything is done on his behalf, and this increases suspicion that he is no longer alive,” said a source in Kabul who is in close contact with Afghan and Taliban leaders. “There is nothing to say or show that he is dead. Or alive.” The Taliban have publicly denied Akhunzada is dead.
Akhunzada’s absence won’t immediately blunt the Taliban’s power and influence, experts say; never known as a strong strategist, Akhunzada was chosen for his religious credentials, seen then as useful for relegitimizing the Taliban’s war as a jihadi cause aimed at removing the “infidel occupiers.” Even so, Akhunzada supported the peace process, Taliban sources said.
Also stricken by the coronavirus was Akhunzada’s deputy, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who as chief of operations was the Taliban’s prime decision-maker and led the al Qaeda-aligned Haqqani terrorist network. With Haqqani out of the picture as well, according to sources, the vacuum has been filled by Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, Mullah Omar’s ambitious son. Yaqoob has taken on Haqqani’s role as chief of operations, as well as the Afghanistan affairs portfolio, said Taliban, Afghan government, and Western intelligence sources. He also controls military operations.
Even so, Yaqoob is not popular within the militant group and is widely seen as arrogant and entitled, believing that the mantle of supreme leader is his “birthright.” He is seeking to consolidate his position ahead of an expected series of shuras later this year, which he hopes will confirm his ambition, and he appears to be deft at shoring up support among his Hotak tribe and his late father’s trusted confidants.
Since losing his bid for the leadership in 2015, Yaqoob has tightened his grip on the Taliban’s finances, setting up his own financial commission that his advisors have said now controls around $1.7 billion in annual revenues, from opium, mining, rent seeking, extortion, real estate, construction, telecommunications, and trade in agricultural products other than poppy.
This has exacerbated tensions with Gul Agha Ishakzai, who controlled finances for Mullah Omar and was instrumental in ensuring he was succeeded as supreme leader—when his death became public more than two years after he had died—by Mullah Akhtar Mansour. Mansour was deeply involved in the drugs trade and regarded by battlefield commanders as lacking the religious credibility that had given their fight legitimacy.
Mansour was killed a year later, in May 2016, by a U.S. drone strike. He was succeeded by Akhunzada, who was imam at the mosque where his brother was killed in August 2019, before being elevated to the Taliban’s top job.
Amid the infighting, Afghan, Western, and Taliban sources say Yaqoob is maneuvering to consolidate power and then formalize his position by moving key supporters into positions in Quetta, Pakistan, and Doha. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the Taliban with Mullah Omar, his close advisor, and the lead interlocutor in the talks with the United States—he signed the agreement—is supporting Yaqoob, Taliban sources said. One source described him as the “kingmaker.”
The Afghan source with knowledge of the Taliban said Muhammad Tayyab Agha, who was Mullah Omar’s chief of staff and led the political office from 2009 to 2015, “will come back to Doha.” Tayyab Agha resigned as head of the Doha political operation, apparently fearing rifts after Mansour, who had tribal links to the Ishakzai, was named supreme leader.
For the most part, Yaqoob and the other top leaders are united in favor of the U.S.-Taliban talks, and dissidents who still oppose them have been edged out. Last year, the Rasool Shura, a minority faction led by Mullah Mohammad Rasool, based in western Afghanistan and reportedly supported by Iran, declared opposition to the negotiations, as did Iran. The faction quickly lost its power. “A lesson,” said a Quetta source, “that you cannot survive outside the family.”
The question now is whether the Taliban will take a different direction than in the past. The peace process offers the Taliban a path back to Kabul, largely on their own terms. A power struggle could delay progress in meeting that goal, especially if it spills into intrafactional violence. One Taliban source said Yaqoob’s cooperation with the peace talks could depend on how much support he receives in his bid for the supreme leadership, from within and outside the Taliban. Either way, it is a matter of time before the Taliban become “an influential legal-political force in Afghanistan,” as Russia’s special presidential envoy to the country, Zamir Kabulov, put it in a recent interview.
Nor have the Taliban paid little more than lip service to a U.S. demand in the agreement that they cut ties with al Qaeda: Links between the Taliban and international jihadi groups remain as strong now as they ever have been. In its latest report on Afghanistan, the U.N. Security Council said: “The Taliban regularly consulted with Al-Qaida during negotiations with the United States and offered guarantees that it would honour their historical ties. Al-Qaida has reacted positively to the agreement, with statements from its acolytes celebrating it as a victory for the Taliban’s cause and thus for global militancy.”
Michael Semple, a former European Union and U.N. advisor on Afghanistan, said the Taliban “have intensified their relationship with al Qaeda and the other international jihadist factions in the wake of the signing” of the February agreement. “Although obviously the majority of fighters in the Taliban ranks are Afghans, there’s a significant role for the foreign militants. That has intensified—it’s systematic. They are contributing to the ongoing military campaign. There’s no sign that that’s changing,” he told an online discussion hosted by London’s Frontline Club last week.
“The reality on the ground is that if the U.S. completes its withdrawal from Afghanistan without a serious program of ongoing support for the Afghan government, then the Taliban, who roll back into power in Kabul restoring the Islamic Emirate, will be triumphantly allied with al Qaeda,” Semple said. “The empirical evidence tells us that Taliban intelligence have strengthened their relationship with the foreign militants and rely on them for servicing the war effort.”
The Afghan government has so far failed to secure a permanent cease-fire ahead of talks, and the Security Council report concedes that securing the terms of the agreement with the Taliban will be “challenging.” American officials have said that if the terms of the deal are breached, they will return, though it is unlikely that once U.S. troops are gone, they will redeploy, under Trump or Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, if he wins in November.
In the case of a Biden win, a Western intelligence source said, Afghanistan is not likely to be a priority for a new U.S. administration. “He has to repair relations with Europe and NATO, the trade war with China will be his biggest problem, Iran, North Korea. The United States has become an unreliable partner for the Kurds and for Afghanistan,” he said. Beyond that, as vice president to President Barack Obama, Biden was among those who pushed for a rapid U.S. drawdown.
“By the inauguration in January, there will only be four months left on the drawdown timetable—and that’s if all U.S. troops aren’t out by November. Biden will have a lot to do, and Afghanistan will not be high in the order of operations.”


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--The United States Needs German Bases More Than Germany Does

The United States Needs German Bases More Than Germany Does Last week , Trump administration officials announced a new cap of 25,000 on U.S. forces based in Germany—a reduction of 9,500 troops .
The move supposedly punishes Berlin for not spending enough on defense , a perennial bugbear of Trumpism .
In reality , though , it betrays a lack of understanding about U.S. force posture in Europe and is based on three false but common assumptions : that the U.S. military is in Germany solely for the benefit of its hosts , that the United States and Germany share @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the argument over defense spending is ultimately about spending a compulsory 2 percent of GDP on defense .
The next administration will need to correct these errors if it wants to preserve U.S. power in Europe .
The framework for overseas basing was established in 1943 when War Department military planners decided to preserve newly acquired American hegemony in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans .
The rise of long-range strategic bombing and the development of atomic weapons led planners to the assumption that future enemies would bomb the U.S. mainland to destroy the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effort .
Overseas bases would allow the United States to engage an attack from any state far from U.S. shores and allow for power projection in peacetime .
As then-Assistant Secretary of War Robert Lovett put it in a memo to other senior U.S. leaders , “ I can not over-emphasize the importance that I place on this entire base problem.
” U.S. President Harry S. Truman even went so far as to ask Soviet leader Joseph Stalin for basing rights in the Kuril Islands .
The request was quickly rebuffed , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the move was not meant to be anti-Soviet .
Rather “ it simply reflected the expansive conception of U.S. security objectives that was embodied in the overseas base planning that went on at the end of the war.
” That expansive conception of U.S. security continues today , with tens of thousands of American troops based in 80 countries around the world .
The bases and transit rights acquired by U.S. planners in the 1940s remain integral to U.S. power projection , and facilities in Germany are especially important .
Ramstein Air Base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. operations in the Middle East , North Africa , and South Asia .
The base is also a relay station for all communications with U.S. drones deployed over the horizon from their operators in Nevada .
The issue is a volatile one for German elites and landed Chancellor Angela Merkel ’ s government in hot water over the legality of such usage .
Both U.S. Africa Command and European Command are headquartered in Stuttgart , Germany , and , perhaps most importantly , Landstuhl Regional Medical Center was a critical waypoint for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iraq and Afghanistan .
To top this off , the United States is currently building a new , larger military hospital in Weilerbach with some 5,000 rooms , 42 specialty departments , and nine operating rooms at a cost of $ 990 million .
That hospital , in case you are wondering , is for U.S. troops—not German soldiers .
Despite the naked national interest and critical necessity of basing U.S. troops in Germany , Trump administration officials continue to trot out banal talking points about how “ offensive ” it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense ” of Germany while ignoring the obvious benefit of U.S. bases in Germany for U.S. national security .
Furthermore , the argument doesn ’ t track , because the majority of Germans do not agree that Russia is a military threat .
During the Cold War , there were differences of opinion between West German and U.S. leaders on how best to address the Soviet threat , but there was a shared perception that Soviet Russia was indeed a serious military threat .
NATO was the primary vehicle for West Germany to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” being the operative word , because a war in Europe would reduce West Germany to rubble .
West Germans pushed for de-escalation and viewed escalatory policies hesitantly or fearfully .
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union , a reunited Germany has continually sought to engage Russia , much to the chagrin of many in Washington .
For 20 years German policymakers across the political spectrum did not believe European security policy could be defined against Russia .
German elites never bought into the far-fetched notion that Putin wanted to gobble up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Kremlin ’ s militarization of relations with Ukraine and seizure of Crimea prompted a more hard-nosed German response .
Merkel led the way on the Western sanctions regime and coordinated policy within the European Union .
She pushed the German business community—long sympathetic to Moscow because of trade issues—even further .
Berlin deployed troops to Lithuania as a framework nation , meaning that Berlin provides the bulk of the force along with key enablers , and then smaller allies can plug in capabilities .
The move shows a strong commitment to common @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once again focused on the Baltic Sea to shore up NATO ’ s northern flank .
And long before U.S. President Donald Trump took to furiously tweeting about freeloading European allies , Berlin committed at NATO ’ s 2014 Wales Summit to increase defense investment .
In 2019 Germany ’ s defense spending rose by $ 5.6 billion—the largest increase since the end of the Cold War .
The current defense minister , Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , continues to push for more capability development .
More importantly , recent polling indicates that Germans feel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world stage—but exactly what “ more ” means remains to be seen .
One thing is for certain—they don ’ t want to antagonize Russia .
The German approach to Russia has long favored diplomacy and engagement over tantrums and militarization , and this will not change .
Problematically for Germany , NATO is no longer a deterrent against Russian invasion .
Rather , if Germany and Russia were to come to blows it would be because of Germany ’ s alliance commitments .
Elites in Berlin do not want to shirk such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dragged into a conflict are all the greater as Trump abandons arms control agreements and international treaties at an alarming rate .
The alliance with Washington increasingly looks more and more like a liability than an asset .
A debate about right-sizing the U.S. military and the necessity of creatively rethinking strategy is a debate worth having , but a rebalance is not an all-out withdrawal .
U.S. bases in Europe support U.S. national security first and foremost .
Without them U.S. force projection would be difficult , some operations would be impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ questionable .
Current U.S. troop commitments in Germany and across Europe are nearly the minimum required for alliance cohesion , interoperability , and partner assurance .
A further reduction in Germany would be self-destructive ; moving U.S. troops to Poland—an increasingly illiberal ally—is nonsensical and costly .
Policymakers in Washington are right to be concerned about low levels of defense investment in Europe .
Even if it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain bases in Europe , the United States wants capable partners .
But Washington needs to address the difference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discussion around alliance solidarity and capabilities , not the empty rhetoric of the 2 percent of GDP defense spending pledge .
As Jan Techau , one of Kramp-Karrenbauer ’ s advisors , has written , “ As a way to measure an increase in military capability , the 2 percent metric is barely useful .
It does not measure spending in real terms or actual output.
” Repeatedly bludgeoning allies with this empty target sets the wrong goals and allows allies to claim pointless progress .
Instead , a focus on capabilities would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deployability .
The focus should be on strategy and force planning to establish the necessary capabilities to deter Russian interference that is decidedly not conventional .
A continued focus on an abstract bottom line is doomed to fail , especially in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and ensuing economic downturn—European defense spending will inevitably continue to fall short of the 2 percent target for the foreseeable future .
The next U.S. administration needs to change the narrative and focus on capabilities that advance an actual strategy related to Germany , NATO , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a space for productive discussion and allies to define NATO for the 2020s , rather than relying on Cold War metrics ill-suited to the contemporary era .

Last week, Trump administration officials announced a new cap of 25,000 on U.S. forces based in Germany—a reduction of 9,500 troops. The move supposedly punishes Berlin for not spending enough on defense, a perennial bugbear of Trumpism. In reality, though, it betrays a lack of understanding about U.S. force posture in Europe and is based on three false but common assumptions: that the U.S. military is in Germany solely for the benefit of its hosts, that the United States and Germany share a common threat perception, and that the argument over defense spending is ultimately about spending a compulsory 2 percent of GDP on defense. The next administration will need to correct these errors if it wants to preserve U.S. power in Europe.
Last week, Trump administration officials announced a new cap of 25,000 on U.S. forces based in Germany—a reduction of 9,500 troops. The move supposedly punishes Berlin for not spending enough on defense, a perennial bugbear of Trumpism. In reality, though, it betrays a lack of understanding about U.S. force posture in Europe and is based on three false but common assumptions: that the U.S. military is in Germany solely for the benefit of its hosts, that the United States and Germany share a common threat perception, and that the argument over defense spending is ultimately about spending a compulsory 2 percent of GDP on defense. The next administration will need to correct these errors if it wants to preserve U.S. power in Europe.
The framework for overseas basing was established in 1943 when War Department military planners decided to preserve newly acquired American hegemony in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The rise of long-range strategic bombing and the development of atomic weapons led planners to the assumption that future enemies would bomb the U.S. mainland to destroy the industrial mobilization necessary for an American war effort. Overseas bases would allow the United States to engage an attack from any state far from U.S. shores and allow for power projection in peacetime.
As then-Assistant Secretary of War Robert Lovett put it in a memo to other senior U.S. leaders, “I cannot over-emphasize the importance that I place on this entire base problem.” U.S. President Harry S. Truman even went so far as to ask Soviet leader Joseph Stalin for basing rights in the Kuril Islands. The request was quickly rebuffed, but as the historian Melvyn Leffler wrote, the move was not meant to be anti-Soviet. Rather “it simply reflected the expansive conception of U.S. security objectives that was embodied in the overseas base planning that went on at the end of the war.” That expansive conception of U.S. security continues today, with tens of thousands of American troops based in 80 countries around the world.
The bases and transit rights acquired by U.S. planners in the 1940s remain integral to U.S. power projection, and facilities in Germany are especially important. Ramstein Air Base is the primary logistical hub for all U.S. operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The base is also a relay station for all communications with U.S. drones deployed over the horizon from their operators in Nevada. The issue is a volatile one for German elites and landed Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government in hot water over the legality of such usage.
Both U.S. Africa Command and European Command are headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, and, perhaps most importantly, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center was a critical waypoint for thousands of wounded troops from U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To top this off, the United States is currently building a new, larger military hospital in Weilerbach with some 5,000 rooms, 42 specialty departments, and nine operating rooms at a cost of $990 million. That hospital, in case you are wondering, is for U.S. troops—not German soldiers.
Despite the naked national interest and critical necessity of basing U.S. troops in Germany, Trump administration officials continue to trot out banal talking points about how “offensive” it is that Americans are paying for the “defense” of Germany while ignoring the obvious benefit of U.S. bases in Germany for U.S. national security. Furthermore, the argument doesn’t track, because the majority of Germans do not agree that Russia is a military threat.
During the Cold War, there were differences of opinion between West German and U.S. leaders on how best to address the Soviet threat, but there was a shared perception that Soviet Russia was indeed a serious military threat. NATO was the primary vehicle for West Germany to deter a potential Soviet invasion—“deterrence” being the operative word, because a war in Europe would reduce West Germany to rubble. West Germans pushed for de-escalation and viewed escalatory policies hesitantly or fearfully.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a reunited Germany has continually sought to engage Russia, much to the chagrin of many in Washington. For 20 years German policymakers across the political spectrum did not believe European security policy could be defined against Russia. German elites never bought into the far-fetched notion that Putin wanted to gobble up the Baltics or invade Poland, although the Kremlin’s militarization of relations with Ukraine and seizure of Crimea prompted a more hard-nosed German response.
Merkel led the way on the Western sanctions regime and coordinated policy within the European Union. She pushed the German business community—long sympathetic to Moscow because of trade issues—even further. Berlin deployed troops to Lithuania as a framework nation, meaning that Berlin provides the bulk of the force along with key enablers, and then smaller allies can plug in capabilities. The move shows a strong commitment to common defense. The German navy is also once again focused on the Baltic Sea to shore up NATO’s northern flank. And long before U.S. President Donald Trump took to furiously tweeting about freeloading European allies, Berlin committed at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit to increase defense investment. In 2019 Germany’s defense spending rose by $5.6 billion—the largest increase since the end of the Cold War. The current defense minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, continues to push for more capability development. More importantly, recent polling indicates that Germans feel that Germany should do more on the world stage—but exactly what “more” means remains to be seen. One thing is for certain—they don’t want to antagonize Russia.
The German approach to Russia has long favored diplomacy and engagement over tantrums and militarization, and this will not change. Problematically for Germany, NATO is no longer a deterrent against Russian invasion. Rather, if Germany and Russia were to come to blows it would be because of Germany’s alliance commitments. Elites in Berlin do not want to shirk such commitments, but the worries around being dragged into a conflict are all the greater as Trump abandons arms control agreements and international treaties at an alarming rate. The alliance with Washington increasingly looks more and more like a liability than an asset.
A debate about right-sizing the U.S. military and the necessity of creatively rethinking strategy is a debate worth having, but a rebalance is not an all-out withdrawal. U.S. bases in Europe support U.S. national security first and foremost. Without them U.S. force projection would be difficult, some operations would be impossible, and stability in Europe would be questionable. Current U.S. troop commitments in Germany and across Europe are nearly the minimum required for alliance cohesion, interoperability, and partner assurance. A further reduction in Germany would be self-destructive; moving U.S. troops to Poland—an increasingly illiberal ally—is nonsensical and costly.
Policymakers in Washington are right to be concerned about low levels of defense investment in Europe. Even if it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain bases in Europe, the United States wants capable partners. But Washington needs to address the difference in threat perception and to frame the discussion around alliance solidarity and capabilities, not the empty rhetoric of the 2 percent of GDP defense spending pledge.
As Jan Techau, one of Kramp-Karrenbauer’s advisors, has written, “As a way to measure an increase in military capability, the 2 percent metric is barely useful. It does not measure spending in real terms or actual output.” Repeatedly bludgeoning allies with this empty target sets the wrong goals and allows allies to claim pointless progress. Instead, a focus on capabilities would make it possible to improve agility and deployability. The focus should be on strategy and force planning to establish the necessary capabilities to deter Russian interference that is decidedly not conventional. A continued focus on an abstract bottom line is doomed to fail, especially in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and ensuing economic downturn—European defense spending will inevitably continue to fall short of the 2 percent target for the foreseeable future.
The next U.S. administration needs to change the narrative and focus on capabilities that advance an actual strategy related to Germany, NATO, and Russia. Doing so will open a space for productive discussion and allies to define NATO for the 2020s, rather than relying on Cold War metrics ill-suited to the contemporary era.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--China Is Pushing India Closer to the United States

China Is Pushing India Closer to the United States As Chinese soldiers rough up Indian ones around Pangong Lake in Ladakh along the two countries ’ disputed border , one thing is clear—while India and China have faced off in the region before , nobody knows what ’ s coming next .
India ’ s friendship with China once seemed natural for a country that put socialist principles in its national constitution and that prided itself on Cold War neutrality .
It was unsurprising that India under its first prime minister , Jawaharlal Nehru , was interested in broadening ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ including China .
But factors more powerful than ideological affiliation knocked the relationship off course , leading to an overlooked war and the tensions of today .
At first , the relationship was all smiles and comradeship .
In its early days , the Indo-Chinese relationship was supposedly based on five principles enunciated in the Panchsheel Agreement : mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty , mutual nonaggression , mutual noninterference in internal affairs , equality and mutual benefit , and peaceful coexistence .
These principles , plus a shared belief in socialist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As the slogan went , “ Hindi Chini bhai-bhai ” —India and China are brothers .
In 1954 , Nehru met Mao Zedong in Beijing , and the two leaders agreed on many issues—chiefly , the need to remain strong against Western imperialism .
Nehru had little love for the United States , despite being hosted by Presidents Harry Truman , Dwight D. Eisenhower , and John F. Kennedy .
In the early days of the Cold War , he commented that “ there is on the whole more reason on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as continuing the anti-imperialist tradition of Chinese revolutionaries .
But India and China disagreed on the border between the two nations , thanks in part to the legacy of uncertain colonial boundaries .
The Ardagh-Johnson Line was a border drawn by British India that placed Aksai Chin inside Jammu and Kashmir in India .
China claimed to have never accepted this border and instead argued for the Macartney-MacDonald Line , a later boundary that gave it more territory .
The McMahon Line , meanwhile , was named for a former foreign secretary for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ McMahon , who signed an agreement in 1914 in Simla with the then-effectively independent Tibet—though China rejected this agreement .
There were talks in India in April 1960 between Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to address the border issues but no solution .
Keen to maintain a strategic barrier between the two nations , India kept funding resistance movements in Tibet and hosted the Dalai Lama when he fled .
Tensions on the border continued to grow , and India and China continued to send forces to the region .
In 1962 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 14,000 feet above sea level when the two nations went to war .
The Indian forces were overwhelmed as Nehru was caught off guard .
China was able to breach Indian territory and later withdraw on its own terms .
Yet China didn ’ t see India as a permanent enemy—Mao once remarked that force would be able to “ knock Nehru to the negotiating table.
” The war of 1962 had domino effects that would be felt for years domestically after the fact .
Future Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ denounced Nehru ’ s government for its failure , and even today , the events of 1962 are broadly seen as humiliating domestically .
But even more critical to understanding the India-China relationship today may be the role of the Pakistan-China alliance .
Initially , the United States was an important ally to Pakistan , and as a function of that , Pakistan and China weren ’ t especially close .
But that soon changed .
As both Pakistan and China had border issues with India , common cause soon emerged .
One @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Bangladesh war of independence in 1971 .
China supported Pakistan in this war both with military aid and through millions of dollars in loans .
Though Pakistan lost the war to India in 1971 , favors continued to flow both ways .
China vetoed Bangladesh ’ s attempt to enter the United Nations until 1974 .
In addition , Pakistan offered support to the Chinese in the days after the Tiananmen Square massacre and has taken China ’ s side on a number of key issues , such as Taiwan and Tibet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Imran Khan and his predecessors have sought to deepen ties with China through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor , combined with Chinese funding for Gwadar Port and other economic initiatives .
That has muted any Pakistani criticism of China ’ s oppression of Muslims , such as the million-plus Uighurs and other minorities sent to camps in Xinjiang .
At the same time , Pakistani cooperation with the United States has crumbled under pressure .
If there is a new cold war , Pakistan has chosen a side .
This has in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and India , although there are also other factors at play .
Since the 1990s , India has been slowly pushed ever closer to the West .
In the early 1990s , India undertook incredibly ambitious economic reforms—more radical than those required by the International Monetary Fund for desperately needed loans .
The two key economic reforms dealt with conducting business in India and international commerce .
Business in India between 1947 and the early 1990s was subject to the License Raj , the burdensome regulations needed to run even a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberalized its economy to a degree in the 1980s , was storming ahead as a result .
India choosing free markets was a sea change for a nation , demonstrating that the country was ready to move past failed economic policies , and a shift toward the Western/American economic sphere soon followed .
As India began to see high rates of growth , it became more of a viable competitor with China .
This happened in tandem with India tightening relations with Chinese adversaries and American allies such as Vietnam and Japan .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Indo-Chinese relationship .
In recent times , India has sought to strengthen ties with Washington , partially powered by a fear of Chinese economic and political influence in the region—especially in ports in nearby oceans .
As the Chinese get more aggressive in the Indian Ocean , India has been seeking an ally to bolster deterrence .
Then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a civilian nuclear deal with President George W. Bush in the early 2000s , and Barack Obama maintained close ties with New Delhi .
Finally , the relationship between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Minister Narendra Modi , and that between Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump , set up an interesting contrast .
When Xi visited India in 2014 , Modi allowed Tibetan exiles to protest—a luxury that had not been extended by the previous government in Delhi .
When Trump visited this year , Modi greeted him with a rally in his home state attended by more than 100,000 people and viewed by nearly 50 million .
China has responded to this by further strengthening ties with Pakistan .
Beijing and Islamabad have joined efforts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
China has donated both products like masks and expertise in managing the fallout from the twin crises .
Meanwhile , defense ties between the United States and India have only grown .
2019 featured the first land , sea , and air exercise in the history of Indo-American relations .
This was in many ways a continuation of policy pursued by the Bush and Obama administrations—both of which saw India as a partner in the pivot to Asia and tried to move closer through areas like arms sales .
Border issues may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , from the near-clash in Doklam in 2017 to today ’ s standoff—but the geopolitical tensions and alignments involved are much bigger .
India ’ s growingly comfortable relationship with the West heralds a clear choice in any global conflict .
We ’ re a long way from Hindi Chini bhai-bhai .

As Chinese soldiers rough up Indian ones around Pangong Lake in Ladakh along the two countries’ disputed border, one thing is clear—while India and China have faced off in the region before, nobody knows what’s coming next. India’s friendship with China once seemed natural for a country that put socialist principles in its national constitution and that prided itself on Cold War neutrality. It was unsurprising that India under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was interested in broadening ties with other newly created socialist nations, including China. But factors more powerful than ideological affiliation knocked the relationship off course, leading to an overlooked war and the tensions of today.
As Chinese soldiers rough up Indian ones around Pangong Lake in Ladakh along the two countries’ disputed border, one thing is clear—while India and China have faced off in the region before, nobody knows what’s coming next. India’s friendship with China once seemed natural for a country that put socialist principles in its national constitution and that prided itself on Cold War neutrality. It was unsurprising that India under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was interested in broadening ties with other newly created socialist nations, including China. But factors more powerful than ideological affiliation knocked the relationship off course, leading to an overlooked war and the tensions of today.
At first, the relationship was all smiles and comradeship. In its early days, the Indo-Chinese relationship was supposedly based on five principles enunciated in the Panchsheel Agreement: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These principles, plus a shared belief in socialist economics, led to a strong relationship. As the slogan went, “Hindi Chini bhai-bhai”—India and China are brothers.
In 1954, Nehru met Mao Zedong in Beijing, and the two leaders agreed on many issues—chiefly, the need to remain strong against Western imperialism. Nehru had little love for the United States, despite being hosted by Presidents Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. In the early days of the Cold War, he commented that “there is on the whole more reason on the side of Russia.” Mao saw himself as continuing the anti-imperialist tradition of Chinese revolutionaries.
But India and China disagreed on the border between the two nations, thanks in part to the legacy of uncertain colonial boundaries. The Ardagh-Johnson Line was a border drawn by British India that placed Aksai Chin inside Jammu and Kashmir in India. China claimed to have never accepted this border and instead argued for the Macartney-MacDonald Line, a later boundary that gave it more territory. The McMahon Line, meanwhile, was named for a former foreign secretary for the British government in India, Henry McMahon, who signed an agreement in 1914 in Simla with the then-effectively independent Tibet—though China rejected this agreement. There were talks in India in April 1960 between Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to address the border issues but no solution. Keen to maintain a strategic barrier between the two nations, India kept funding resistance movements in Tibet and hosted the Dalai Lama when he fled.
Tensions on the border continued to grow, and India and China continued to send forces to the region. In 1962, the idea of Indo-Chinese brotherhood died 14,000 feet above sea level when the two nations went to war. The Indian forces were overwhelmed as Nehru was caught off guard. China was able to breach Indian territory and later withdraw on its own terms. Yet China didn’t see India as a permanent enemy—Mao once remarked that force would be able to “knock Nehru to the negotiating table.” The war of 1962 had domino effects that would be felt for years domestically after the fact. Future Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then a young member of parliament, denounced Nehru’s government for its failure, and even today, the events of 1962 are broadly seen as humiliating domestically.
But even more critical to understanding the India-China relationship today may be the role of the Pakistan-China alliance. Initially, the United States was an important ally to Pakistan, and as a function of that, Pakistan and China weren’t especially close. But that soon changed.
As both Pakistan and China had border issues with India, common cause soon emerged. One of the most important events was the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. China supported Pakistan in this war both with military aid and through millions of dollars in loans. Though Pakistan lost the war to India in 1971, favors continued to flow both ways. China vetoed Bangladesh’s attempt to enter the United Nations until 1974. In addition, Pakistan offered support to the Chinese in the days after the Tiananmen Square massacre and has taken China’s side on a number of key issues, such as Taiwan and Tibet.
In recent years, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and his predecessors have sought to deepen ties with China through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, combined with Chinese funding for Gwadar Port and other economic initiatives. That has muted any Pakistani criticism of China’s oppression of Muslims, such as the million-plus Uighurs and other minorities sent to camps in Xinjiang. At the same time, Pakistani cooperation with the United States has crumbled under pressure. If there is a new cold war, Pakistan has chosen a side.
This has in turn helped strengthen the relationship between the United States and India, although there are also other factors at play. Since the 1990s, India has been slowly pushed ever closer to the West. In the early 1990s, India undertook incredibly ambitious economic reforms—more radical than those required by the International Monetary Fund for desperately needed loans. The two key economic reforms dealt with conducting business in India and international commerce. Business in India between 1947 and the early 1990s was subject to the License Raj, the burdensome regulations needed to run even a small business. China, which had liberalized its economy to a degree in the 1980s, was storming ahead as a result.
India choosing free markets was a sea change for a nation, demonstrating that the country was ready to move past failed economic policies, and a shift toward the Western/American economic sphere soon followed. As India began to see high rates of growth, it became more of a viable competitor with China. This happened in tandem with India tightening relations with Chinese adversaries and American allies such as Vietnam and Japan.
Today, the United States remains important to the Indo-Chinese relationship. In recent times, India has sought to strengthen ties with Washington, partially powered by a fear of Chinese economic and political influence in the region—especially in ports in nearby oceans. As the Chinese get more aggressive in the Indian Ocean, India has been seeking an ally to bolster deterrence.
Then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a civilian nuclear deal with President George W. Bush in the early 2000s, and Barack Obama maintained close ties with New Delhi. Finally, the relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and that between Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump, set up an interesting contrast. When Xi visited India in 2014, Modi allowed Tibetan exiles to protest—a luxury that had not been extended by the previous government in Delhi. When Trump visited this year, Modi greeted him with a rally in his home state attended by more than 100,000 people and viewed by nearly 50 million.
China has responded to this by further strengthening ties with Pakistan. Beijing and Islamabad have joined efforts against both locusts and the coronavirus pandemic. China has donated both products like masks and expertise in managing the fallout from the twin crises. Meanwhile, defense ties between the United States and India have only grown. 2019 featured the first land, sea, and air exercise in the history of Indo-American relations. This was in many ways a continuation of policy pursued by the Bush and Obama administrations—both of which saw India as a partner in the pivot to Asia and tried to move closer through areas like arms sales.
Border issues may be the focus of Sino-Indian conflict today, from the near-clash in Doklam in 2017 to today’s standoff—but the geopolitical tensions and alignments involved are much bigger. India’s growingly comfortable relationship with the West heralds a clear choice in any global conflict. We’re a long way from Hindi Chini bhai-bhai.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--Pentagon Won’t Disclose Cost of DC Troops

The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington , D.C. , area amid protests last week , Foreign Policy has learned , another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon .
The office of Sen. Chris Van Hollen , which also asked Defense Secretary Mark Esper to explain why he reversed a decision to redeploy several hundred U.S. troops out of Washington after a reportedly fiery exchange with President Donald Trump last week , told Foreign Policy that the Pentagon had not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Monday evening .
“ The President ’ s use of military force against American citizens peacefully protesting is plainly unconstitutional , ” Van Hollen and six other Democratic senators wrote to Esper last week .
“ To add insult to injury , the American people will have to foot the bill for these violations of their First Amendment rights.
” The Defense Department acknowledged the request last week , Van Hollen ’ s office told Foreign Policy , but has not followed up with the Maryland Democrat and his colleagues , including Ben @ @ @ @ @ @ @ senator .
“ We are working [ on ] the response to the senators and will respond directly to them , ” said Jessica Maxwell , a Defense Department spokesperson .
Over the weekend , chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman contradicted reports that Esper and Gen. Mark Milley , the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , had refused a request from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith to testify in open session about the Pentagon ’ s response .
The Trump administration ultimately decided not to deploy active-duty U.S. troops @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proceeded peacefully for the past week since looting erupted on Washington ’ s streets during the last weekend of May following the death of George Floyd , a 46-year-old black man , at the hands of Minneapolis police .
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters on Sunday that the Trump administration came “ right up to the edge ” of deploying U.S. troops amid the protests , though Esper ultimately came out publicly against using the 1807 Insurrection Act on Tuesday that would have allowed active-duty units to cross the bridge from Virginia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ We postured them outside [ of Washington ] on the other side of the river , ” McCarthy said on Sunday .
“ They did not cross the river into the capital .
They were on the outskirts.
” Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division had been waiting at Fort Belvoir , Virginia , and Joint Base Andrews in Maryland but were never called up , along with active-duty rapid response and military police units from Fort Bragg , North Carolina , and Fort Drum , New York .
Esper ordered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Washington area on Friday , and McCarthy said out-of-state National Guardsmen who remained in D.C. to potentially respond to Saturday ’ s protests were set to leave by the middle of this week .
But even with the deployments scrapped , lawmakers insist that the fight to drag Defense Department leaders to Capitol Hill for testimony will continue , though McCarthy participated in a telephone call with the House Armed Services Committee this week alongside uniformed Army and D.C. National Guard leaders .
“ The Chairman [ Adam Smith ] remains adamant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley testify before the committee to give an on-the-record account leading up to the events in the military ’ s response in the District , including the clearing of demonstrators in Lafayette Square and the helicopter response in the area , as well as engage in a more broad policy discussion about the use of military service members during civil unrest , ” Monica Matoush , a Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee , told Foreign Policy .
Yet news this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Risch , a Trump ally , will not press for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to publicly defend his agency ’ s budget has watchdog groups worried that the Trump administration is having success in stonewalling oversight requests .
“ I think systemically with the White House we ’ re seeing a low point with the administration failing to provide [ witnesses ] , ” said Mandy Smithberger , the director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight .
There is a track record for the Pentagon sidestepping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Obama administration , to which lawmakers have responded with stern condemnation and threats to withhold money .
In 2015 , the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee accused the White House of breaking federal law by failing to notify Congress in advance of the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap with the Taliban , a finding supported by the Government Accountability Office .
But amid threats from House progressives to slash the Pentagon ’ s budget as the coronavirus pandemic forced the U.S. economy into a recession—ending more than 10 straight years of economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far , by threatening to vote “ no ” on the Defense Department ’ s authorization bill .
The annual bill gives lawmakers the ability to force the agency to respond to oversight requests through reporting requirements and the power of the purse .
“ That would be weakening Congress ’ s own power , ” Smithberger said .
“ It would be like setting off a bomb in your own house.
” Update , June 9 , 2020 : This article previously stated that Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy visited Capitol Hill for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Committee this week .
The engagement was an informal telephone call .

The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington, D.C., area amid protests last week, Foreign Policy has learned, another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon.
The U.S. Defense Department has failed to meet a deadline to detail to Congress the cost of deploying some 1,600 active-duty troops to the Washington, D.C., area amid protests last week, Foreign Policy has learned, another potential blow to congressional oversight of the Pentagon.
The office of Sen. Chris Van Hollen, which also asked Defense Secretary Mark Esper to explain why he reversed a decision to redeploy several hundred U.S. troops out of Washington after a reportedly fiery exchange with President Donald Trump last week, told Foreign Policy that the Pentagon had not provided a response, which was due Monday evening.
“The President’s use of military force against American citizens peacefully protesting is plainly unconstitutional,” Van Hollen and six other Democratic senators wrote to Esper last week. “To add insult to injury, the American people will have to foot the bill for these violations of their First Amendment rights.”
The Defense Department acknowledged the request last week, Van Hollen’s office told Foreign Policy, but has not followed up with the Maryland Democrat and his colleagues, including Ben Cardin, the state’s senior senator.
“We are working [on] the response to the senators and will respond directly to them,” said Jessica Maxwell, a Defense Department spokesperson.
Over the weekend, chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman contradicted reports that Esper and Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had refused a request from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith to testify in open session about the Pentagon’s response.
The Trump administration ultimately decided not to deploy active-duty U.S. troops to quash the demonstrations, which have proceeded peacefully for the past week since looting erupted on Washington’s streets during the last weekend of May following the death of George Floyd, a 46-year-old black man, at the hands of Minneapolis police.
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told reporters on Sunday that the Trump administration came “right up to the edge” of deploying U.S. troops amid the protests, though Esper ultimately came out publicly against using the 1807 Insurrection Act on Tuesday that would have allowed active-duty units to cross the bridge from Virginia and Maryland into the District of Columbia.
“We postured them outside [of Washington] on the other side of the river,” McCarthy said on Sunday. “They did not cross the river into the capital. They were on the outskirts.” Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division had been waiting at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Joint Base Andrews in Maryland but were never called up, along with active-duty rapid response and military police units from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Drum, New York.
Esper ordered the last of the units to depart the Washington area on Friday, and McCarthy said out-of-state National Guardsmen who remained in D.C. to potentially respond to Saturday’s protests were set to leave by the middle of this week.
But even with the deployments scrapped, lawmakers insist that the fight to drag Defense Department leaders to Capitol Hill for testimony will continue, though McCarthy participated in a telephone call with the House Armed Services Committee this week alongside uniformed Army and D.C. National Guard leaders.
“The Chairman [Adam Smith] remains adamant that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley testify before the committee to give an on-the-record account leading up to the events in the military’s response in the District, including the clearing of demonstrators in Lafayette Square and the helicopter response in the area, as well as engage in a more broad policy discussion about the use of military service members during civil unrest,” Monica Matoush, a Democratic spokesperson for the House Armed Services Committee, told Foreign Policy.
Yet news this week that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch, a Trump ally, will not press for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to publicly defend his agency’s budget has watchdog groups worried that the Trump administration is having success in stonewalling oversight requests.
“I think systemically with the White House we’re seeing a low point with the administration failing to provide [witnesses],” said Mandy Smithberger, the director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project on Government Oversight.
There is a track record for the Pentagon sidestepping Congress on specific oversight requests dating back to the Obama administration, to which lawmakers have responded with stern condemnation and threats to withhold money.
In 2015, the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee accused the White House of breaking federal law by failing to notify Congress in advance of the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap with the Taliban, a finding supported by the Government Accountability Office.
But amid threats from House progressives to slash the Pentagon’s budget as the coronavirus pandemic forced the U.S. economy into a recession—ending more than 10 straight years of economic growth—experts say that Democrats could go too far, by threatening to vote “no” on the Defense Department’s authorization bill. The annual bill gives lawmakers the ability to force the agency to respond to oversight requests through reporting requirements and the power of the purse.
“That would be weakening Congress’s own power,” Smithberger said. “It would be like setting off a bomb in your own house.”
Update, June 9, 2020: This article previously stated that Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy visited Capitol Hill for a briefing with the House Armed Services Committee this week. The engagement was an informal telephone call.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--Where Should Confederate Statues Go to Die?

Where Should Confederate Statues Go to Die ?
It ’ s been five years since white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine black churchgoers at a Bible study meeting at the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston , South Carolina .
His goal was to start a race war , but images of Roof with the Confederate flag shocked Americans , and the fallout was immediate .
His crime kicked off a grassroots movement to remove the Confederate flag , and Confederate monuments in general , from public spaces .
Reflecting on this moment , the Southern Poverty Law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like an instant , the South ’ s 150-year reverence for the Confederacy was shaken.
” Since 2015 , at least 138 Confederate monuments have been removed from public view .
Yet about 800 remain .
That number is changing as a renewed urgency to remove Confederate monuments has surged amid the Black Lives Matter protests that have erupted across the country following the murders of George Floyd , Breonna Taylor , and Ahmaud Arbery , among others .
The movement hasn ’ t been limited to the United States .
In Britain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ slave trader Edward Colston and threw it into Bristol Harbour , echoing the tens of thousands of dead Africans his slave ships tossed into the Atlantic .
In Belgium , protesters swarmed a statue of 19th-century King Leopold II , whose rule of the Congo saw millions killed for his profit .
Removing Confederate monuments isn ’ t going to erase the past , but lifts some of the burden off the shoulders of Americans living under the weight of that history , as it did in post-Soviet countries .
The Confederacy isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ memorials in the United States : Last week the statue of toxic racist Frank Rizzo , a Philadelphia police chief and mayor in the 1970s , was finally removed from the steps of City Hall .
But what happens to these monuments after they come down ?
Some have been damaged or destroyed , others moved into museums , but the majority seem to go into storage , including the Robert E. Lee statue soon to be removed from Richmond ’ s historic Monument Avenue , and others in cities such as New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Florida .
But there may be a better answer than just warehousing them , one already adopted by other countries dealing with painful historical legacies .
Former Soviet countries transferred Soviet-era memorials to cemeteries or statue parks .
Monuments in Moscow , Budapest , and Lithuania were moved out of city centers and into cemeteries to show the death of their legitimacy or into parks to be recontextualized .
In Hungary , Memento Park hosts the plaques and statues of Soviet occupiers and communist dictators , alongside exhibits on the fall of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a decadeslong effort gradually shifted the statues of the Raj into a quiet park , the flag of India flying high over them .
Can the same thing happen in the United States ?
The current situation is ad hoc and expensive .
Sitting in storage , these monuments remain ghosts of the Confederacy and unexamined memories of the ongoing culture of racism in America .
As new monuments begin to come down , it ’ s time to figure out how they can be used to heal these scars .
And unlike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Hungary , these are not the images of an occupying power , but of the past injustices of the nation itself—cruelties that a disturbing number of people still support .
That makes dealing with the legacy more complicated , and more painful .
Reaching out to artists , museum educators , and cultural workers elicited intense responses , some calling for the statues to be destroyed outright .
“ I do not believe that they have any place in our public spaces , ” said one artist who asked not to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important that we remember that during this moment , activists are publicly illuminating the violent history of the Confederacy and the hundreds of years of institutionalized racism that led to the murders of countless Black citizens .
Preserving the work of Black activists during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests is in my opinion , infinitely more valuable than preserving a false representation of the Confederate Army.
” “ It is important to try and incorporate the voices of Black , indigenous , and people of color whenever possible , from the commentary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ … to the voices of activists today as they discuss the painful legacy of these objects and the harm they still cause , ” said Kate Sunderlin , a doctoral candidate at Virginia Commonwealth University , whose research involves 19th-century American sculpture .
Confederate monuments might be most appropriately stored and kept in museums that are responsible about contextualizing what they represent .
But that ’ s an expensive proposition .
In 2017 , Van Turner , a commissioner in Shelby County , Tennessee , hid several Confederate statues removed from Memphis to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interview with NPR , “ Turner wasn ’ t planning to hold onto the statues indefinitely .
He had imagined a museum would take them .
Or maybe a Confederate cemetery or historic battlefield.
” Instead , it cost him around $ 30,000 that year to store them .
These monuments are huge .
The statue of Raphael Semmes removed on June 5 from Mobile , Alabama , weighs 33 tons .
Not many museums are large enough to display one of these .
And then there ’ s the cost .
Take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” a Confederate statue originally displayed in Gainesville , Florida .
The local Matheson History Museum rejected it , citing the $ 36,000 price tag to move , insure , maintain , create exhibit signage , and fund other related expenses , well above its budget .
Old Joe ended up being returned to the United Daughters of the Confederacy , an organization founded during the Civil War that has funded some monuments , markers , buildings and other commemoratives—but which has been a vigorous defender of the Confederacy ’ s racism historically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statues .
Old Joe now sits back on display in a private cemetery .
Transferring the statues to private hands makes little sense if private displays perpetuate the old myths of the “ Lost Cause ” anyway .
Still , museums have thoughtfully presented exhibits that explore racism in America .
Take , for example , exhibitions like “ Without Sanctuary : Photographs and Postcards of Lynching in America , ” Fred Wilson ’ s project “ Mining the Museum , ” and the labels installed at the Worcester Art Museum that draw @ @ @ @ @ @ @ art and the history of slavery in the United States .
A national monument park might be able to solve some of these issues , if the commitment and funding was there .
The trick is to avoid creating a site that might become a place of worship for white supremacists , said Isabel Singer , an exhibit developer at Luci Creative .
“ If the decisions about whether to display them and how to display them are made in consultation with local communities , particularly black communities , ” Singer said , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ past horrors and inspire people to fight for greater equality.
” Rebecca Keller , an artist and educator at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago , has some ideas for dynamic engagements museums could host .
“ I could imagine a laboratory , an experimental situation , where Black artists and collaborative teams recontextualized , physically altered/added to , incorporated text or other imagery , projections , or created counter-monuments to be situated in particular relation to the existing statuary once removed from its place of honor.… The idea is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conceptual challenges , viewing them as an ongoing question : what is to be done with this ?
” In December , the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts unveiled its own countermonument : Kehinde Wiley ’ s Rumors of War .
The enormous statue resembles a traditional Confederate monument from afar , but up close the rider is revealed to be a young Black man with his dreadlocks in a ponytail .
Rumors of War sits not far from the United Daughters of the Confederacy ’ s Memorial Building , now charred after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Confederate monuments get destroyed , recontextualized in statue parks or cemeteries , displayed in museums , or challenged by countermonuments , actions have to follow that creates meaningful change not just in the memory of the dead , but in the reality of the living .
For example , the Hungarian government placed a statue of Imre Nagy , Hungary ’ s leader during the country ’ s 1956 uprising , with his back turned to a monument to the Soviet Red Army in Budapest , while a Russian nongovernmental organization installed a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the statue of Soviet secret police founder Felix Dzerzhinsky in central Moscow .
In his eulogy for the Rev .
Clementa Pinckney , who died in the Charleston killings , then President Barack Obama said that “ history can ’ t be a sword to justify injustice , or a shield against progress , but must be a manual for how to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past—how to break the cycle.
” Americans ’ job is to reckon with their racist past—and present—and move forward .

It’s been five years since white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine black churchgoers at a Bible study meeting at the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. His goal was to start a race war, but images of Roof with the Confederate flag shocked Americans, and the fallout was immediate. His crime kicked off a grassroots movement to remove the Confederate flag, and Confederate monuments in general, from public spaces.
It’s been five years since white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine black churchgoers at a Bible study meeting at the historic Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. His goal was to start a race war, but images of Roof with the Confederate flag shocked Americans, and the fallout was immediate. His crime kicked off a grassroots movement to remove the Confederate flag, and Confederate monuments in general, from public spaces.
Reflecting on this moment, the Southern Poverty Law Center wrote, “In what seemed like an instant, the South’s 150-year reverence for the Confederacy was shaken.” Since 2015, at least 138 Confederate monuments have been removed from public view. Yet about 800 remain.
That number is changing as a renewed urgency to remove Confederate monuments has surged amid the Black Lives Matter protests that have erupted across the country following the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery, among others. The movement hasn’t been limited to the United States. In Britain, protesters toppled a statue of 17th-century slave trader Edward Colston and threw it into Bristol Harbour, echoing the tens of thousands of dead Africans his slave ships tossed into the Atlantic. In Belgium, protesters swarmed a statue of 19th-century King Leopold II, whose rule of the Congo saw millions killed for his profit.
Removing Confederate monuments isn’t going to erase the past, but lifts some of the burden off the shoulders of Americans living under the weight of that history, as it did in post-Soviet countries. The Confederacy isn’t the only issue of racist memorials in the United States: Last week the statue of toxic racist Frank Rizzo, a Philadelphia police chief and mayor in the 1970s, was finally removed from the steps of City Hall.
But what happens to these monuments after they come down? Some have been damaged or destroyed, others moved into museums, but the majority seem to go into storage, including the Robert E. Lee statue soon to be removed from Richmond’s historic Monument Avenue, and others in cities such as New Orleans, Baltimore, and Bradenton, Florida. But there may be a better answer than just warehousing them, one already adopted by other countries dealing with painful historical legacies.
Former Soviet countries transferred Soviet-era memorials to cemeteries or statue parks. Monuments in Moscow, Budapest, and Lithuania were moved out of city centers and into cemeteries to show the death of their legitimacy or into parks to be recontextualized. In Hungary, Memento Park hosts the plaques and statues of Soviet occupiers and communist dictators, alongside exhibits on the fall of the regime in 1989. In Delhi, a decadeslong effort gradually shifted the statues of the Raj into a quiet park, the flag of India flying high over them.
Can the same thing happen in the United States? The current situation is ad hoc and expensive. Sitting in storage, these monuments remain ghosts of the Confederacy and unexamined memories of the ongoing culture of racism in America. As new monuments begin to come down, it’s time to figure out how they can be used to heal these scars. And unlike in many other countries such as India and Hungary, these are not the images of an occupying power, but of the past injustices of the nation itself—cruelties that a disturbing number of people still support. That makes dealing with the legacy more complicated, and more painful.
Reaching out to artists, museum educators, and cultural workers elicited intense responses, some calling for the statues to be destroyed outright. “I do not believe that they have any place in our public spaces,” said one artist who asked not to be identified. “I think it is important that we remember that during this moment, activists are publicly illuminating the violent history of the Confederacy and the hundreds of years of institutionalized racism that led to the murders of countless Black citizens. Preserving the work of Black activists during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests is in my opinion, infinitely more valuable than preserving a false representation of the Confederate Army.”
“It is important to try and incorporate the voices of Black, indigenous, and people of color whenever possible, from the commentary of period figures, like Frederick Douglas … to the voices of activists today as they discuss the painful legacy of these objects and the harm they still cause,” said Kate Sunderlin, a doctoral candidate at Virginia Commonwealth University, whose research involves 19th-century American sculpture.
Confederate monuments might be most appropriately stored and kept in museums that are responsible about contextualizing what they represent. But that’s an expensive proposition.
In 2017, Van Turner, a commissioner in Shelby County, Tennessee, hid several Confederate statues removed from Memphis to protect them. According to a 2018 interview with NPR, “Turner wasn’t planning to hold onto the statues indefinitely. He had imagined a museum would take them. Or maybe a Confederate cemetery or historic battlefield.” Instead, it cost him around $30,000 that year to store them.
These monuments are huge. The statue of Raphael Semmes removed on June 5 from Mobile, Alabama, weighs 33 tons. Not many museums are large enough to display one of these. And then there’s the cost. Take the case of “Old Joe,” a Confederate statue originally displayed in Gainesville, Florida. The local Matheson History Museum rejected it, citing the $36,000 price tag to move, insure, maintain, create exhibit signage, and fund other related expenses, well above its budget.
Old Joe ended up being returned to the United Daughters of the Confederacy, an organization founded during the Civil War that has funded some monuments, markers, buildings and other commemoratives—but which has been a vigorous defender of the Confederacy’s racism historically and more recently fought attempts to remove statues. Old Joe now sits back on display in a private cemetery. Transferring the statues to private hands makes little sense if private displays perpetuate the old myths of the “Lost Cause” anyway.
Still, museums have thoughtfully presented exhibits that explore racism in America. Take, for example, exhibitions like “Without Sanctuary: Photographs and Postcards of Lynching in America,” Fred Wilson’s project “Mining the Museum,” and the labels installed at the Worcester Art Museum that draw attention to the connections between works of art and the history of slavery in the United States.
A national monument park might be able to solve some of these issues, if the commitment and funding was there. The trick is to avoid creating a site that might become a place of worship for white supremacists, said Isabel Singer, an exhibit developer at Luci Creative. “If the decisions about whether to display them and how to display them are made in consultation with local communities, particularly black communities,” Singer said, “they can become powerful reminders of past horrors and inspire people to fight for greater equality.”
Rebecca Keller, an artist and educator at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago, has some ideas for dynamic engagements museums could host. “I could imagine a laboratory, an experimental situation, where Black artists and collaborative teams recontextualized, physically altered/added to, incorporated text or other imagery, projections, or created counter-monuments to be situated in particular relation to the existing statuary once removed from its place of honor.… The idea is to use the statues as both physical and conceptual challenges, viewing them as an ongoing question: what is to be done with this?”
In December, the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts unveiled its own countermonument: Kehinde Wiley’s Rumors of War. The enormous statue resembles a traditional Confederate monument from afar, but up close the rider is revealed to be a young Black man with his dreadlocks in a ponytail. Rumors of War sits not far from the United Daughters of the Confederacy’s Memorial Building, now charred after it was recently set ablaze.
Whether Confederate monuments get destroyed, recontextualized in statue parks or cemeteries, displayed in museums, or challenged by countermonuments, actions have to follow that creates meaningful change not just in the memory of the dead, but in the reality of the living.
For example, the Hungarian government placed a statue of Imre Nagy, Hungary’s leader during the country’s 1956 uprising, with his back turned to a monument to the Soviet Red Army in Budapest, while a Russian nongovernmental organization installed a memorial to victims of political repression steps from the statue of Soviet secret police founder Felix Dzerzhinsky in central Moscow.
In his eulogy for the Rev. Clementa Pinckney, who died in the Charleston killings, then President Barack Obama said that “history can’t be a sword to justify injustice, or a shield against progress, but must be a manual for how to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past—how to break the cycle.” Americans’ job is to reckon with their racist past—and present—and move forward.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-09--Demonstrations Prompt National Security Community Push for Diversity

Nationwide demonstrations against racial injustice and police brutality in the wake of the killing of an African American man in police custody in Minnesota last month have prompted soul-searching within Washington ’ s national security community about the lack of diversity in its own ranks .
In a letter undersigned by more than 150 organizations and practitioners in the peace and security , national security , and foreign-policy communities , and shared exclusively with Foreign Policy , organizations are pledging to add more diversity to their ranks and boards of directors .
“ These racial attitudes exist in all facets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and opposing our values of equality , justice , and freedom , ” said the letter , led by Women of Color Advancing Peace , Security and Conflict Transformation , a Washington-based advocacy organization .
“ To root out institutional racism , it is vital that we re-examine our implicit and explicit biases , as well as biases within our organizations.
” “ Institutional racism purposefully disadvantages Black people and people of color through social , economic , and political systems , reinforcing white supremacy , and must be consciously confronted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ added in the letter , which also calls for national security organizations to develop mentorship programs for African Americans and to develop processes to hire more employees from lower-income communities .
Among the signatories on the letter are think tank , advocacy , and charitable organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , Truman Center for National Policy , National Iranian American Council , Oxfam America , Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft , Center for American Progress , Win Without War , Arms Control Association , and New America .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Floyd , advocates have worried that there are not enough avenues for young African Americans to seek out careers in national security and foreign service .
In the Office of Personnel Management ’ s last report on diversity levels in government , released in 2018 , the percentage of black employees in the U.S. government went backward , from 11.4 percent to 11 percent .
African Americans represent just over 13 percent of the U.S. population overall .
The administration of President Donald Trump has also struggled to bring in diverse picks for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy reported that the State Department ’ s efforts to boost diversity in the foreign and civil service had often come up short and had sometimes resulted in a decrease in the number of minorities and women coming to work in Foggy Bottom and at U.S. embassies and consulates around the world , according to a Government Accountability Office finding .
“ There ’ s not the presence of them , there ’ s not the mentorships for them , and so the policies that are developed do not reflect their input , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department official during the Obama administration who organized the letter .
“ Younger people don ’ t see people of color , so they don ’ t go into these fields.
” Both the Pickering and Rangel fellowship programs seek to bring members of historically underrepresented groups into the foreign service , but successive U.S. secretaries of state haven ’ t been able to live up to pledges to bring more diverse candidates into high-level posts .
Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was criticized within the agency failing to boost diversity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were forced out of the administration .
State Department Undersecretary for Management Brian Bulatao , a close confidant of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , is currently leading efforts to develop a strategy for the agency ’ s diversity and inclusion practices over the next four years .
But advocates seeking more diversity in the national security community have seen a reason for hope , as embrace of the protests has become increasingly part of the political mainstream after Trump stirred controversy by walking to St. John ’ s Episcopal Church last week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dispersed demonstrators .
On Sunday , former Republican presidential contender and Utah Sen. Mitt Romney was seen marching to the church , across from the White House , along a stretch of street renamed Black Lives Matter Plaza by D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser last week .
Jenkins said that the moment of nationwide protest offers the U.S. government an opportunity to add diverse voices and perspectives to the U.S. foreign-policy conversation .
“ If we ’ re making a foreign policy in Africa , in the Middle East , in Asia and you @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that culture , having that perspective in the room will enrich that conversation , ” Jenkins said .
“ I can not see how that policy can not be enriched if you do have that perspective .
”

Nationwide demonstrations against racial injustice and police brutality in the wake of the killing of an African American man in police custody in Minnesota last month have prompted soul-searching within Washington’s national security community about the lack of diversity in its own ranks.
Nationwide demonstrations against racial injustice and police brutality in the wake of the killing of an African American man in police custody in Minnesota last month have prompted soul-searching within Washington’s national security community about the lack of diversity in its own ranks.
In a letter undersigned by more than 150 organizations and practitioners in the peace and security, national security, and foreign-policy communities, and shared exclusively with Foreign Policy, organizations are pledging to add more diversity to their ranks and boards of directors.
“These racial attitudes exist in all facets of our lives, weakening our democracy, and opposing our values of equality, justice, and freedom,” said the letter, led by Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, a Washington-based advocacy organization. “To root out institutional racism, it is vital that we re-examine our implicit and explicit biases, as well as biases within our organizations.”
“Institutional racism purposefully disadvantages Black people and people of color through social, economic, and political systems, reinforcing white supremacy, and must be consciously confronted, addressed and removed,” the signatories added in the letter, which also calls for national security organizations to develop mentorship programs for African Americans and to develop processes to hire more employees from lower-income communities.
Among the signatories on the letter are think tank, advocacy, and charitable organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Truman Center for National Policy, National Iranian American Council, Oxfam America, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Center for American Progress, Win Without War, Arms Control Association, and New America.
In the wake of the death of George Floyd, advocates have worried that there are not enough avenues for young African Americans to seek out careers in national security and foreign service. In the Office of Personnel Management’s last report on diversity levels in government, released in 2018, the percentage of black employees in the U.S. government went backward, from 11.4 percent to 11 percent. African Americans represent just over 13 percent of the U.S. population overall.
June 9 WCAPS Sign on Letter (PDF)
June 9 WCAPS Sign on Letter (Text)
The administration of President Donald Trump has also struggled to bring in diverse picks for high-level roles. In February, Foreign Policy reported that the State Department’s efforts to boost diversity in the foreign and civil service had often come up short and had sometimes resulted in a decrease in the number of minorities and women coming to work in Foggy Bottom and at U.S. embassies and consulates around the world, according to a Government Accountability Office finding.
“There’s not the presence of them, there’s not the mentorships for them, and so the policies that are developed do not reflect their input,” said Bonnie Jenkins, a former State Department official during the Obama administration who organized the letter. “Younger people don’t see people of color, so they don’t go into these fields.”
Both the Pickering and Rangel fellowship programs seek to bring members of historically underrepresented groups into the foreign service, but successive U.S. secretaries of state haven’t been able to live up to pledges to bring more diverse candidates into high-level posts. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was criticized within the agency failing to boost diversity among top U.S. diplomats as top officials were forced out of the administration. State Department Undersecretary for Management Brian Bulatao, a close confidant of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, is currently leading efforts to develop a strategy for the agency’s diversity and inclusion practices over the next four years.
But advocates seeking more diversity in the national security community have seen a reason for hope, as embrace of the protests has become increasingly part of the political mainstream after Trump stirred controversy by walking to St. John’s Episcopal Church last week just minutes after U.S. Park Police violently dispersed demonstrators. On Sunday, former Republican presidential contender and Utah Sen. Mitt Romney was seen marching to the church, across from the White House, along a stretch of street renamed Black Lives Matter Plaza by D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser last week.
Jenkins said that the moment of nationwide protest offers the U.S. government an opportunity to add diverse voices and perspectives to the U.S. foreign-policy conversation.
“If we’re making a foreign policy in Africa, in the Middle East, in Asia and you do not have people who are from that culture, having that perspective in the room will enrich that conversation,” Jenkins said. “I cannot see how that policy cannot be enriched if you do have that perspective.”