foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Erdogan’s Purges Have Replaced One Islamic Sect With Another

Erdogan ’ s Purges Have Replaced One Islamic Sect With Another More than three years after Turkey ’ s traumatic 2016 coup attempt—which the government pinned on the Gulenist sect though Turkey ’ s allies remain unconvinced—a controversy over religious orders is flaring anew .
After sweeping purges , Ankara claimed it had expunged the malignant Gulenists .
Yet since then , investigative journalists have pointed to the rise of other sects in their place .
In a country consumed by conspiracy theories and behind-the-scenes intrigue , the revelations have set off quite a stir .
Suspicions that sects have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sparked raucous TV debates and several parliamentary questions .
It has especially worried Turkey ’ s secular press outlets , long obsessed with religious orders and the specter of Islamization .
In particular , Turkish journalists say a shadowy group called “ Menzil ” has been infiltrating the police forces .
Two months ago , Turkey ’ s interior minister , Suleyman Soylu , denied the allegations .
“ Show me one [ member of the Menzil sect inside the police forces ] and I will resign from the ministry , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sects in Turkish politics is anything but new .
While Mustafa Kemal Ataturk , the founding father of secular Turkey , outlawed religious orders in 1925 , some began to make a comeback in the 1950s .
The most significant one was the Naqshbandi-Khalidi , a conservative brotherhood that is subdivided into several branches .
Today , the majority of Turkey ’ s Islamic sects spring from it , as does the much-feared Menzil .
One of those branches , the Iskenderpasa , was behind the creation of the country ’ s first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1970 .
Erdogan himself was a member of the Iskenderpasa , like many other figures of the current governing Justice and Development Party ( AKP ) .
In fact , since its ascent to power in 2002 , the religiously conservative , free-market party has built its rule on the co-opting of religious communities , including the now infamous Gulenists , distributing favors to them .
Their influence has grown alongside that of the AKP .
But none ever wielded the might of the Gulenists .
Unlike the Naqshbandi-Khalidi , the Gulenist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order but on a school of thought called Nur—which advocates a strand of Islam reconciled with technological progress and scientific enquiry .
Naqshbandi-Khalidi sects , on the other hand , tend to be hostile to modernity and the West .
Led by the preacher Fethullah Gulen , the group gained ground in the 1970s through a string of private schools it created to train a pious elite .
By the 1990s , it had started to export its schools abroad .
Domestically , Gulen ’ s followers moved to capture state institutions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By the early 2000s , they controlled the judiciary and much of the police .
When Erdogan ’ s AKP came to power in 2002 , it joined forces with the Gulenists to crush the Turkish military—a self-professed bulwark against Islamism .
Together , the Gulenists and the AKP carried out the so-called “ Ergenekon ” and “ Sledgehammer ” trials that landed hundreds of military officers in prison .
But soon after the military was tamed , a vicious power struggle ensued .
In 2012 , the Gulenists , buoyed by a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s entourage , attempting to jail some of his confidants .
A year later , they brought up corruption allegations to sabotage the AKP leadership .
To thwart the movement , Erdogan demoted thousands of suspected Gulenists in the police and judiciary .
He then shut down Gulenist media outlets , including the daily Zaman and businesses such as the Koza Ipek conglomerate .
In July 2016 , a coup attempt unfolded that claimed more than 250 lives .
Erdogan was quick to point to Gulen ’ s long arm .
In its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ employees and arrested more than 34,000 people over alleged Gulenist ties .
Though the defeat of the coup was vaunted as a democratic triumph , critics blame the purges for swallowing up an array of subversive figures , well beyond Gulenist circles .
The Gulenist movement , now referred to exclusively by its sobriquet FETO—an acronym for Fethullahist Terrorist Organization—became a national scourge .
“ We have drawn a lesson from [ the Gulenist threat ] and will not allow it to happen again !
” Erdogan proclaimed in a 2017 speech .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there is concern that the president might not have learned from his mistakes .
In Metastaz , or “ Metastasis , ” a book published last year , the investigative journalists Baris Terkoglu and Baris Pehlivan say the government has been filling the void left by the anti-Gulenist purges with substitute religious orders .
This process began as early as 2014 , they claim .
As suspected Gulenists were demoted within the police forces , new recruits were largely drawn from Naqshbandi-Khalidi and other non-Gulenist Nur sects .
Citing a source who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Terkoglu and Pehlivan say most candidates were granted positions after displaying loyalty to a certain group .
At times , the candidates even provided the name of the specific sheikh they followed .
One group dominated the recruits : the Menzil .
More recently , the independent outlet T24 revealed that this process was still ongoing .
Again , citing a source from the police , T24 disclosed that scores of appointments and promotions inside the department were made through “ direct or indirect references ” to Menzil membership over the past six @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been snatching posts formerly held by the Gulenists .
Little more than a week later , the police filed a complaint against the author of the piece .
Soon thereafter , a court decision ordered it be taken down from the website .
A Naqshbandi-Khalidi offshoot , the Menzil take their name from the eponymous village they hail from , nestled in the predominantly Kurdish southeast .
Like the Gulenists and other religious communities—known as cemaat in Turkish—the Menzil are not a spiritual congregation concerned solely with divine matters .
Rather , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they share the overarching intent of promoting Islam and conservative mores in Turkish society and abroad , their immediate goal is that of influence and power for the group itself .
The Menzil ’ s forays into Turkey ’ s cultural , business , and political arenas serve as a testament to this enterprise .
Since the 1980s , when then-President Turgut Ozal lifted restrictions on religious activities that benefited all sects , the group has grown steadily .
As the Soviet Union crumbed in the early 1990s , the Menzil were among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the newly independent republics of Central Asia to set up private schools .
That is something the Gulenists have been well known for .
In 2005 , the Menzil founded their own business association , Tumsiad , which now boasts more than 15,000 members .
Later , they launched a TV channel , Semerkand TV , and expanded a publishing house , Semerkand Yayinlari .
In 2018 , the government allowed them to establish a university , the Semerkand Science and Civilization University .
The network built by the Menzil bears an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ once commanded .
Until the authorities launched a crusade against it , the Gulenist movement ran a vast empire of media outlets , universities , and business and civic organizations .
As was once the case with the Gulenists , the AKP ’ s alleged association with the Menzil is likely due to the party ’ s lack of a sufficient number of elites from its own ranks to control the state .
Following the Gulenist purges , sects like the Menzil provided the AKP with readily available and ostensibly loyal cohorts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that sense , Erdogan and his party are merely perpetuating their customary policy of resorting to religious orders to buttress their sway .
Although the scandal brought them to light , the Menzil have maintained a discreet presence in the bureaucracy for quite some time .
In fact , their infiltration long predates the purges .
As Fevzeddin Erol , one of the Menzil ’ s chiefs , recently told a reporter from the daily Sozcu , two former AKP ministers stemmed from the Menzil : Recep Akdag , the health minister between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a brief stint in 2016-2017 ) , and Taner Yildiz , the energy minister between 2009 and 2015 .
Yet the sheikh also confided that he had “ men everywhere in the state.
” And as their numbers grow , the Menzil could impose their agenda .
Over the past few months , the acronym METO—a play on FETO—has widely circulated in Turkish media .
Still , however catchy that is , it would be precipitous to treat the Menzil as the “ new Gulenists.
” Rusen Cakir , a veteran journalist who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic communities , has warned against such comparisons .
On his upstart channel Medyascope , he stressed that the membership of any Naqshbandi-Khalidi group was a lot looser than that of the Gulenists , which hampered their organizational capacity .
Besides , if the Gulenist movement was united , then the T24 revelations suggested that the Menzil were undermined by internal rivalry .
A feud inside the group arose after one of its wings , Semerkand , based out of the city of Adiyaman , got more positions in the police than another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the city of Eskisehir .
That will doubtless hurt the sect ’ s prospective clout .
Even so , groups such as the Menzil pursue their own interests above all—just like the Gulenists did .
While they may currently side with Erdogan and his clique , their loyalty is prone to shifts .
And as the conflict between the AKP and Gulen demonstrated , the party ’ s strategy of relying on religious sects is a perilous one .
A sect-dominated state apparatus could pose risks that will long outlive Erdogan and his @ @

More than three years after Turkey’s traumatic 2016 coup attempt—which the government pinned on the Gulenist sect though Turkey’s allies remain unconvinced—a controversy over religious orders is flaring anew. After sweeping purges, Ankara claimed it had expunged the malignant Gulenists. Yet since then, investigative journalists have pointed to the rise of other sects in their place.
More than three years after Turkey’s traumatic 2016 coup attempt—which the government pinned on the Gulenist sect though Turkey’s allies remain unconvinced—a controversy over religious orders is flaring anew. After sweeping purges, Ankara claimed it had expunged the malignant Gulenists. Yet since then, investigative journalists have pointed to the rise of other sects in their place.
In a country consumed by conspiracy theories and behind-the-scenes intrigue, the revelations have set off quite a stir. Suspicions that sects have again crept into the state machinery have sparked raucous TV debates and several parliamentary questions. It has especially worried Turkey’s secular press outlets, long obsessed with religious orders and the specter of Islamization.
In particular, Turkish journalists say a shadowy group called “Menzil” has been infiltrating the police forces. Two months ago, Turkey’s interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, denied the allegations. “Show me one [member of the Menzil sect inside the police forces] and I will resign from the ministry,” he said daringly.
The involvement of Islamic sects in Turkish politics is anything but new. While Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of secular Turkey, outlawed religious orders in 1925, some began to make a comeback in the 1950s. The most significant one was the Naqshbandi-Khalidi, a conservative brotherhood that is subdivided into several branches. Today, the majority of Turkey’s Islamic sects spring from it, as does the much-feared Menzil.
One of those branches, the Iskenderpasa, was behind the creation of the country’s first Islamist party, the National Order Party in 1970. Erdogan himself was a member of the Iskenderpasa, like many other figures of the current governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). In fact, since its ascent to power in 2002, the religiously conservative, free-market party has built its rule on the co-opting of religious communities, including the now infamous Gulenists, distributing favors to them. Their influence has grown alongside that of the AKP.
But none ever wielded the might of the Gulenists. Unlike the Naqshbandi-Khalidi, the Gulenist movement is not based on a Sufi order but on a school of thought called Nur—which advocates a strand of Islam reconciled with technological progress and scientific enquiry. Naqshbandi-Khalidi sects, on the other hand, tend to be hostile to modernity and the West.
Led by the preacher Fethullah Gulen, the group gained ground in the 1970s through a string of private schools it created to train a pious elite. By the 1990s, it had started to export its schools abroad. Domestically, Gulen’s followers moved to capture state institutions, seeking to supplant long-established secular elites. By the early 2000s, they controlled the judiciary and much of the police.
When Erdogan’s AKP came to power in 2002, it joined forces with the Gulenists to crush the Turkish military—a self-professed bulwark against Islamism. Together, the Gulenists and the AKP carried out the so-called “Ergenekon” and “Sledgehammer” trials that landed hundreds of military officers in prison. But soon after the military was tamed, a vicious power struggle ensued.
In 2012, the Gulenists, buoyed by a feeling of omnipotence, assailed Erdogan’s entourage, attempting to jail some of his confidants. A year later, they brought up corruption allegations to sabotage the AKP leadership. To thwart the movement, Erdogan demoted thousands of suspected Gulenists in the police and judiciary. He then shut down Gulenist media outlets, including the daily Zaman and businesses such as the Koza Ipek conglomerate.
In July 2016, a coup attempt unfolded that claimed more than 250 lives. Erdogan was quick to point to Gulen’s long arm. In its wake, Ankara sacked some 150,000 public employees and arrested more than 34,000 people over alleged Gulenist ties. Though the defeat of the coup was vaunted as a democratic triumph, critics blame the purges for swallowing up an array of subversive figures, well beyond Gulenist circles.
The Gulenist movement, now referred to exclusively by its sobriquet FETO—an acronym for Fethullahist Terrorist Organization—became a national scourge. “We have drawn a lesson from [the Gulenist threat] and will not allow it to happen again!” Erdogan proclaimed in a 2017 speech.
Yet for all the castigations and witch-hunting, there is concern that the president might not have learned from his mistakes. In Metastaz, or “Metastasis,” a book published last year, the investigative journalists Baris Terkoglu and Baris Pehlivan say the government has been filling the void left by the anti-Gulenist purges with substitute religious orders.
This process began as early as 2014, they claim. As suspected Gulenists were demoted within the police forces, new recruits were largely drawn from Naqshbandi-Khalidi and other non-Gulenist Nur sects. Citing a source who witnessed job interviews at the time, Terkoglu and Pehlivan say most candidates were granted positions after displaying loyalty to a certain group. At times, the candidates even provided the name of the specific sheikh they followed. One group dominated the recruits: the Menzil.
More recently, the independent outlet T24 revealed that this process was still ongoing. Again, citing a source from the police, T24 disclosed that scores of appointments and promotions inside the department were made through “direct or indirect references” to Menzil membership over the past six months. It confirmed that the sect has been snatching posts formerly held by the Gulenists.
Little more than a week later, the police filed a complaint against the author of the piece. Soon thereafter, a court decision ordered it be taken down from the website.
A Naqshbandi-Khalidi offshoot, the Menzil take their name from the eponymous village they hail from, nestled in the predominantly Kurdish southeast. Like the Gulenists and other religious communities—known as cemaat in Turkish—the Menzil are not a spiritual congregation concerned solely with divine matters. Rather, they are a self-interested organization. While they share the overarching intent of promoting Islam and conservative mores in Turkish society and abroad, their immediate goal is that of influence and power for the group itself.
The Menzil’s forays into Turkey’s cultural, business, and political arenas serve as a testament to this enterprise. Since the 1980s, when then-President Turgut Ozal lifted restrictions on religious activities that benefited all sects, the group has grown steadily.
As the Soviet Union crumbled in the early 1990s, the Menzil were among a handful of Turkish sects that flocked to the newly independent republics of Central Asia to set up private schools. That is something the Gulenists have been well known for. In 2005, the Menzil founded their own business association, Tumsiad, which now boasts more than 15,000 members. Later, they launched a TV channel, Semerkand TV, and expanded a publishing house, Semerkand Yayinlari. In 2018, the government allowed them to establish a university, the Semerkand Science and Civilization University.
The network built by the Menzil bears an uncanny resemblance to the one the Gulenists once commanded. Until the authorities launched a crusade against it, the Gulenist movement ran a vast empire of media outlets, universities, and business and civic organizations.
As was once the case with the Gulenists, the AKP’s alleged association with the Menzil is likely due to the party’s lack of a sufficient number of elites from its own ranks to control the state. Following the Gulenist purges, sects like the Menzil provided the AKP with readily available and ostensibly loyal cohorts to replenish a gutted state apparatus. In that sense, Erdogan and his party are merely perpetuating their customary policy of resorting to religious orders to buttress their sway.
Although the scandal brought them to light, the Menzil have maintained a discreet presence in the bureaucracy for quite some time. In fact, their infiltration long predates the purges. As Fevzeddin Erol, one of the Menzil’s chiefs, recently told a reporter from the daily Sozcu, two former AKP ministers stemmed from the Menzil: Recep Akdag, the health minister between 2002 and 2013 (as well as a brief stint in 2016-2017), and Taner Yildiz, the energy minister between 2009 and 2015.
Yet the sheikh also confided that he had “men everywhere in the state.” And as their numbers grow, the Menzil could impose their agenda.
Over the past few months, the acronym METO—a play on FETO—has widely circulated in Turkish media. Still, however catchy that is, it would be precipitous to treat the Menzil as the “new Gulenists.”
Rusen Cakir, a veteran journalist who wrote a book about Turkey’s Islamic communities, has warned against such comparisons. On his upstart channel Medyascope, he stressed that the membership of any Naqshbandi-Khalidi group was a lot looser than that of the Gulenists, which hampered their organizational capacity.
Besides, if the Gulenist movement was united, then the T24 revelations suggested that the Menzil were undermined by internal rivalry. A feud inside the group arose after one of its wings, Semerkand, based out of the city of Adiyaman, got more positions in the police than another wing, Buhara, based out of the city of Eskisehir. That will doubtless hurt the sect’s prospective clout.
Even so, groups such as the Menzil pursue their own interests above all—just like the Gulenists did. While they may currently side with Erdogan and his clique, their loyalty is prone to shifts. And as the conflict between the AKP and Gulen demonstrated, the party’s strategy of relying on religious sects is a perilous one. A sect-dominated state apparatus could pose risks that will long outlive Erdogan and his government.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Radical Islamists Are Still a Threat Behind Bars

Radical Islamists Are Still a Threat Behind Bars In August 2014 , a homeless , unemployed petty crook had his plan to behead a British soldier thwarted by the police .
A recent convert to Islam from Jehovah ’ s Witnesses , Brusthom Ziamani appeared to be just another jihadi whose grand plans ultimately ended in failure—until , that is , he ended up in a British jail .
Operating among a sea of other radicals in HMP Woodhill , in Milton Keynes , a town 50 miles outside of London , Ziamani staked out a position of importance .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Times of London , Ziamani dubbed himself “ chief of the Sharia police , ” making the rounds in his block to ensure that no Muslim prisoners were breaking the fast during Ramadan .
Ziamani would bring wrongdoers to the makeshift sharia court he ran from the confines of a jail cell .
The Times describes how two “ accused ” appeared before Ziamani for the supposed crime of drinking alcohol .
Ziamani decreed the punishment to be a beating , which two of his acolytes quickly—and savagely—delivered to the guilty parties .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ which the radicalism Ziamani had adopted outside of prison manifested itself once he was locked up .
Ziamani would also approach newly detained Muslim prisoners about the depth of their faith , offering to take them to the “ emir ” of the prison , another convert , who would then deliver radical lectures from his prison cell .
Ziamani was eventually moved to another prison : HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire .
It was there , last Thursday , that he and an associate donned fake suicide belts , grabbed makeshift bladed weapons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff while yelling “ Allahu akbar.
” Although there were no fatalities , five victims ended up in the hospital .
British authorities are treating the incident as a terrorist attack .
The United Kingdom is not the only Western country to experience such attacks in its prisons .
Al Qaeda ’ s first attack in New York actually did not occur on 9/11 but 10 months earlier in a Manhattan jail .
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim , a founding member of al Qaeda awaiting trial in Manhattan on terrorism charges , sharpened a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corrections officer Louis Pepe in the eye .
The ordeal left Pepe physically and psychologically scarred .
This problem has also blighted France .
In September 2016 , a French Moroccan radical , Bilal Taghi , stabbed two guards in the radicalization assessment unit housing him in Val-d ’ Oise prison .
In January 2018 , a former associate of Osama bin Laden ’ s struck in a different French prison : Vendin-le-Vieil in the country ’ s north .
Christian Ganczarski , a German convert , attacked four guards with an edged @ @ @ @ @ @ @ out this attack in order to prolong his incarceration in France and prevent extradition to the United States , where he faces terrorism charges .
Then , in March 2019 , Michaël Chiolo—who had become an extremist in jail—conspired with his visiting wife , Hanane Aboulhana , to stab two guards at Condé-sur-Sarthe prison in northwestern France .
Chiolo was injured and Aboulhana killed during the police ’ s response .
Chiolo said his actions were intended as revenge for French authorities killing Chérif Chekatt , the Islamic State-inspired jihadi who killed five @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a firearm and knife attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market in December 2018 .
( Chekatt himself had also been radicalized in prison . )
Clearly , there is an issue to be addressed .
And while the U.K. is just the latest country to suffer the consequences , it had at least taken a preemptive approach to dealing with it .
In September 2015 , the British government commissioned a report into Islamist extremism in prisons , probation , and the youth justice system .
The report , carried out by Ian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , concluded that Islamist extremism was “ a growing problem within prisons.
” This extremism had manifested itself in a variety of ways , from so-called prison emirs who were “ exerting a controlling and radicalising influence on the wider Muslim prison population ” to “ aggressive encouragement ” of non-Muslims to convert to Islam to “ Muslim gang culture and the consequent violence.
” In response to this gathering problem , Acheson recommended “ a central , comprehensive and coordinated strategy … to monitor and counter ” Islamist extremism in prisons @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prisoners be held together within specialist units , as opposed to being housed among the general prison population , in order to diminish their influence .
On that front , the government correctly heeded his advice .
Yet there were other areas in which the government did not listen to him .
Last month , Acheson lamented that the prison and probation services are “ still not capable of managing a serious threat to our national security.
” These claims were bolstered by last week ’ s events .
One area of concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are Deobandis , a revivalist and highly conservative form of Islam .
While this is not an indicator of extremism in and of itself , Deobandis are not representative of Britain ’ s Muslim population .
Furthermore , the Acheson report concluded that the chaplaincy—while largely well intentioned—had “ a weak understanding ” of Islamist extremism .
There had also been “ a lack of management control over access to extremist literature and materials.
” ( This was likely a reference to a Times story from April 2016 that revealed extremist literature had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ content justifying the murder of apostates . )
The extent to which chaplains are properly qualified , properly vetted , and actually have a positive influence on prisoners remains an issue of ongoing concern .
The inability to recognize Islamist ideology when it presents itself is also a challenge .
This is not just a problem limited to government : For example , after seeing the Times headline concerning Ziamani ’ s sharia trials taking place in prison , one staffer who focuses on countering violent extremism at a Norwegian NGO tweeted : @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to practice their religion in prisons .
… Sometimes prison staff confuse religious practice with radicalisation.
” Unfortunately , well-meaning NGOs sometimes confuse radicalization with religious practice .
In order to understand the Islamist mindset , the U.K. prison services should engage more with former extremists who understand the roots of the ideology but now champion British values and Western democracy .
Governments also need to adopt a more cautious when assessing the dangers posed by Islamist prisoners .
Last November , Usman Khan , who had just been released from prison @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people to death and injured three others in London .
Khan was regarded as a reformed character : The two people he killed worked for an organization that enabled students from universities and prisoners to study and learn together and that had used Khan as an example of a successful case study .
Khan was only free because his initial sentence of being jailed for an indeterminate length of time was quashed at the Court of Appeal and replaced with a more lenient one : 16 years , of which only eight years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ obvious that this leniency was a mistake .
Khan was clearly still a risk .
Similarly , in May 2016 , appeals judges reduced Ziamani ’ s sentence from an initial 22 years down to 19 years due to his age .
( He had just turned 19 years old when arrested . )
He too , however , clearly posed an ongoing risk .
A safety-first approach is required when it comes to such individuals .
Just as intelligence services can not stop every terrorist plot , prison staff can not detect @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is daunting .
Prison services are attempting to diminish the prospect of those incarcerated getting exposed to extremist ideology .
However , just as intelligence services can not stop every terrorist plot , prison staff can not detect every potential pernicious influence .
No approach is fail-safe .
While accepting this reality , the U.K. government should assume that radical Islamist prisoners are ideological devotees , not vulnerable individuals who just happen to have been duped by extremist propaganda .
Naivety about their motives will only invite more problems for the U.K. government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last week—and as many others demonstrated before him—the risk posed by radical Islamist prisoners does not come to an end just because they are behind bars .

In August 2014, a homeless, unemployed petty crook had his plan to behead a British soldier thwarted by the police. A recent convert to Islam from Jehovah’s Witnesses, Brusthom Ziamani appeared to be just another jihadi whose grand plans ultimately ended in failure—until, that is, he ended up in a British jail.
In August 2014, a homeless, unemployed petty crook had his plan to behead a British soldier thwarted by the police. A recent convert to Islam from Jehovah’s Witnesses, Brusthom Ziamani appeared to be just another jihadi whose grand plans ultimately ended in failure—until, that is, he ended up in a British jail.
Operating among a sea of other radicals in HMP Woodhill, in Milton Keynes, a town 50 miles outside of London, Ziamani staked out a position of importance. According to an ex-prisoner speaking to the Times of London, Ziamani dubbed himself “chief of the Sharia police,” making the rounds in his block to ensure that no Muslim prisoners were breaking the fast during Ramadan.
Ziamani would bring wrongdoers to the makeshift sharia court he ran from the confines of a jail cell. The Times describes how two “accused” appeared before Ziamani for the supposed crime of drinking alcohol. Ziamani decreed the punishment to be a beating, which two of his acolytes quickly—and savagely—delivered to the guilty parties.
This was not the only way in which the radicalism Ziamani had adopted outside of prison manifested itself once he was locked up. Ziamani would also approach newly detained Muslim prisoners about the depth of their faith, offering to take them to the “emir” of the prison, another convert, who would then deliver radical lectures from his prison cell.
Ziamani was eventually moved to another prison: HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire. It was there, last Thursday, that he and an associate donned fake suicide belts, grabbed makeshift bladed weapons, and began to stab at prison staff while yelling “Allahu akbar.” Although there were no fatalities, five victims ended up in the hospital. British authorities are treating the incident as a terrorist attack.
The United Kingdom is not the only Western country to experience such attacks in its prisons. Al Qaeda’s first attack in New York actually did not occur on 9/11 but 10 months earlier in a Manhattan jail. Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a founding member of al Qaeda awaiting trial in Manhattan on terrorism charges, sharpened a comb into an 8-inch blade and stabbed corrections officer Louis Pepe in the eye. The ordeal left Pepe physically and psychologically scarred.
This problem has also blighted France. In September 2016, a French Moroccan radical, Bilal Taghi, stabbed two guards in the radicalization assessment unit housing him in Val-d’Oise prison.
In January 2018, a former associate of Osama bin Laden’s struck in a different French prison: Vendin-le-Vieil in the country’s north. Christian Ganczarski, a German convert, attacked four guards with an edged weapon. French officials believe he carried out this attack in order to prolong his incarceration in France and prevent extradition to the United States, where he faces terrorism charges.
Then, in March 2019, Michaël Chiolo—who had become an extremist in jail—conspired with his visiting wife, Hanane Aboulhana, to stab two guards at Condé-sur-Sarthe prison in northwestern France. Chiolo was injured and Aboulhana killed during the police’s response. Chiolo said his actions were intended as revenge for French authorities killing Chérif Chekatt, the Islamic State-inspired jihadi who killed five and injured around a dozen more during a firearm and knife attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market in December 2018. (Chekatt himself had also been radicalized in prison.)
Clearly, there is an issue to be addressed. And while the U.K. is just the latest country to suffer the consequences, it had at least taken a preemptive approach to dealing with it.
In September 2015, the British government commissioned a report into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation, and the youth justice system. The report, carried out by Ian Acheson (a former prison officer himself), concluded that Islamist extremism was “a growing problem within prisons.” This extremism had manifested itself in a variety of ways, from so-called prison emirs who were “exerting a controlling and radicalising influence on the wider Muslim prison population” to “aggressive encouragement” of non-Muslims to convert to Islam to “Muslim gang culture and the consequent violence.”
In response to this gathering problem, Acheson recommended “a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy … to monitor and counter” Islamist extremism in prisons. Acheson also suggested that radical Islamist prisoners be held together within specialist units, as opposed to being housed among the general prison population, in order to diminish their influence. On that front, the government correctly heeded his advice.
Yet there were other areas in which the government did not listen to him. Last month, Acheson lamented that the prison and probation services are “still not capable of managing a serious threat to our national security.” These claims were bolstered by last week’s events.
One area of concern involves prison chaplains. Most Muslim chaplains are Deobandis, a revivalist and highly conservative form of Islam. While this is not an indicator of extremism in and of itself, Deobandis are not representative of Britain’s Muslim population. Furthermore, the Acheson report concluded that the chaplaincy—while largely well intentioned—had “a weak understanding” of Islamist extremism. There had also been “a lack of management control over access to extremist literature and materials.” (This was likely a reference to a Times story from April 2016 that revealed extremist literature had been found in British prisons, including content justifying the murder of apostates.)
The extent to which chaplains are properly qualified, properly vetted, and actually have a positive influence on prisoners remains an issue of ongoing concern. The inability to recognize Islamist ideology when it presents itself is also a challenge. This is not just a problem limited to government: For example, after seeing the Times headline concerning Ziamani’s sharia trials taking place in prison, one staffer who focuses on countering violent extremism at a Norwegian NGO tweeted: “It is not strange if Muslims want to practice their religion in prisons. … Sometimes prison staff confuse religious practice with radicalisation.” Unfortunately, well-meaning NGOs sometimes confuse radicalization with religious practice.
In order to understand the Islamist mindset, the U.K. prison services should engage more with former extremists who understand the roots of the ideology but now champion British values and Western democracy.
Governments also need to adopt a more cautious when assessing the dangers posed by Islamist prisoners. Last November, Usman Khan, who had just been released from prison for previous terrorism offenses, stabbed two people to death and injured three others in London. Khan was regarded as a reformed character: The two people he killed worked for an organization that enabled students from universities and prisoners to study and learn together and that had used Khan as an example of a successful case study.
Khan was only free because his initial sentence of being jailed for an indeterminate length of time was quashed at the Court of Appeal and replaced with a more lenient one: 16 years, of which only eight years had been served. It is now obvious that this leniency was a mistake. Khan was clearly still a risk.
Similarly, in May 2016, appeals judges reduced Ziamani’s sentence from an initial 22 years down to 19 years due to his age. (He had just turned 19 years old when arrested.) He too, however, clearly posed an ongoing risk. A safety-first approach is required when it comes to such individuals.
Just as intelligence services cannot stop every terrorist plot, prison staff cannot detect every potential pernicious influence.
The challenge is daunting. Prison services are attempting to diminish the prospect of those incarcerated getting exposed to extremist ideology. However, just as intelligence services cannot stop every terrorist plot, prison staff cannot detect every potential pernicious influence.
No approach is fail-safe. While accepting this reality, the U.K. government should assume that radical Islamist prisoners are ideological devotees, not vulnerable individuals who just happen to have been duped by extremist propaganda.
Naivety about their motives will only invite more problems for the U.K. government in the future. As Ziamani showed last week—and as many others demonstrated before him—the risk posed by radical Islamist prisoners does not come to an end just because they are behind bars.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--The ‘Phase One’ Trade Deal Is Still Hypothetical

The ‘ Phase One ’ Trade Deal Is Still Hypothetical Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : The United States and China sign a preliminary trade deal , what Tsai Ing-wen ’ s victory means for China-Taiwan relations , and pork breeders profit amid swine fever shortage .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He signed a “ phase one ” trade deal on Wednesday in Washington .
Trump described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” but the reality is less clear .
While the deal isn ’ t insignificant—China has promised $ 200 billion in purchases—it is still somewhat hypothetical .
The question of the deal ’ s enforcement remains .
How will the two sides , neither of which has a trustworthy record , put mechanisms in place to ensure that its promises are kept ?
So far , it doesn ’ t seem that they will .
The sweeping U.S. goals to change the way China ’ s economy functions , from shrinking state-funded industries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ either absent from the deal or described in vague terms .
The chances of such substantial change were always slim : China ’ s back would have to be up against the wall before the Communist Party gave up its key tools of economic control .
Who has leverage ?
In practical terms , the phase one deal forestalls further escalation rather than scaling back measures in the short term .
The trade war ’ s existing tariffs will likely remain in place until the U.S. elections in November , giving the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its commitments—and perhaps creating the opportunity to boost the markets to aid Trump ’ s campaign .
While Chinese state media has remained relatively quiet on the deal , the general line seems to be that the trade war isn ’ t over yet .
Hawkish dissent .
There has always been a split within the Trump administration between the China hawks and the business-minded voices , whose interest in China was more about markets than ideology .
While the preliminary deal with China is a victory for the business-minded , the hawks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s rhetoric toward the Chinese Communist Party has grown more aggressive , and tensions are still high over the Chinese technology giant Huawei .
Tsai ’ s victory in Taiwan .
The defeat of the challenger Han Kuo-yu by Taiwan ’ s incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen has sent relations with the mainland—already frozen—to Arctic levels .
Tsai won on a platform to protect Taiwanese identity from Chinese intrusion , using advertisements explicitly comparing the Taiwan ’ s fate to Hong Kong ’ s .
Han , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sellout to China , as Lev Nachman argues in FP .
China has responded to Tsai ’ s victory with insults and threats .
It ’ s likely to take economic action as well as more active measures to disrupt Taiwanese life and politics .
The Wuhan virus .
The pneumonia outbreak that originated in Wuhan , in Central China , is spreading , with Hong Kong authorities taking measures against a possible epidemic .
Opinions differ sharply on whether China ’ s handling of the mystery virus has been dangerously opaque or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hong Kong economy in 2002 , and it permanently altered the landscape of Chinese transport : People rushed to buy cars to avoid the subway and buses .
If the Wuhan virus scales up during the holiday travel season , it would be a huge deal .
Tragic death prompts anger .
The public death of Wu Huayan , a severely malnourished 24-year-old , has horrified young people across China .
Wu , who grew up in rural poverty , was under 4.5 feet tall and weighed less than 50 pounds .
Her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shared online last October .
Now , scandal is brewing around $ 140,000 in donations that were sent to Wu but allegedly never reached her : China ’ s charity sector is famously corrupt .
The story has already been censored online .
Pork profiteers .
African swine fever has been a windfall for China ’ s pork breeders , who are profiting from the continued shortages after major culls last year .
Qin Yinglin , the founder of a major pig breeder , Muyuan Foodstuff , became the richest man in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ net worth of $ 8.6 billion .
That ’ s a risky position .
Expect government officials to take a closer interest in the sector , whether for anti-corruption efforts or for personal profit .
Trucking industry crisis .
Road fees and extortion by police are taking a serious toll on China ’ s beleaguered trucking industry .
China has some of the world ’ s most expensive roads : 70 percent of all tollways are in China , often forcing dangerous overloading of vehicles .
It is difficult to turn a profit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invest in new equipment .
One of the biggest food safety problems in China is the cold storage chain , despite recent growth in the sector .
Currency manipulations .
Earlier this week , the United States reversed its designation of China as a currency manipulator , a label it slapped on Beijing in August 2019 .
The move came just days before the signing of the phase one trade deal .
China has altered nothing substantial about how it handles its currency , highlighting the label ’ s use as a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yancheng ?
” by Long Ling , the London Review of Books This essay , written by a government official in Beijing—presumably writing under a pseudonym—describes the civil service examinations used to select personnel in China .
Conventional problem-solving makes up about half of the test , with ideology making up the other half .
The author zooms in on the degree to which the exams require regurgitating Marxist ideology : essentially , a test of one ’ s ability to follow the party line .
That ’ s it for this week @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: The United States and China sign a preliminary trade deal , what Tsai Ing-wen ’s victory means for China-Taiwan relations, and pork breeders profit amid swine fever shortage.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: The United States and China sign a preliminary trade deal, what Tsai Ing-wen’s victory means for China-Taiwan relations, and pork breeders profit amid swine fever shortage.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
U.S. and China Ink “Phase One” Trade Deal
U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He signed a “phase one” trade deal on Wednesday in Washington. Trump described it as a “momentous step,” but the reality is less clear. While the deal isn’t insignificant—China has promised $200 billion in purchases—it is still somewhat hypothetical. The question of the deal’s enforcement remains. How will the two sides, neither of which has a trustworthy record, put mechanisms in place to ensure that its promises are kept?
So far, it doesn’t seem that they will. The sweeping U.S. goals to change the way China’s economy functions, from shrinking state-funded industries to strengthening intellectual property laws, are either absent from the deal or described in vague terms. The chances of such substantial change were always slim: China’s back would have to be up against the wall before the Communist Party gave up its key tools of economic control.
Who has leverage? In practical terms, the phase one deal forestalls further escalation rather than scaling back measures in the short term. The trade war’s existing tariffs will likely remain in place until the U.S. elections in November, giving the United States potential leverage to hold China to its commitments—and perhaps creating the opportunity to boost the markets to aid Trump’s campaign. While Chinese state media has remained relatively quiet on the deal, the general line seems to be that the trade war isn’t over yet.
Hawkish dissent. There has always been a split within the Trump administration between the China hawks and the business-minded voices, whose interest in China was more about markets than ideology. While the preliminary deal with China is a victory for the business-minded, the hawks still dominate in other policy areas. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s rhetoric toward the Chinese Communist Party has grown more aggressive, and tensions are still high over the Chinese technology giant Huawei.
What We’re Following
Tsai’s victory in Taiwan. The defeat of the challenger Han Kuo-yu by Taiwan’s incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen has sent relations with the mainland—already frozen—to Arctic levels. Tsai won on a platform to protect Taiwanese identity from Chinese intrusion, using advertisements explicitly comparing the Taiwan’s fate to Hong Kong’s. Han, in contrast, was seen as a sellout to China, as Lev Nachman argues in FP. China has responded to Tsai’s victory with insults and threats. It’s likely to take economic action as well as more active measures to disrupt Taiwanese life and politics.
The Wuhan virus. The pneumonia outbreak that originated in Wuhan, in Central China, is spreading, with Hong Kong authorities taking measures against a possible epidemic. Opinions differ sharply on whether China’s handling of the mystery virus has been dangerously opaque or promisingly open. SARS nearly destroyed the Hong Kong economy in 2002, and it permanently altered the landscape of Chinese transport: People rushed to buy cars to avoid the subway and buses. If the Wuhan virus scales up during the holiday travel season, it would be a huge deal.
Tragic death prompts anger. The public death of Wu Huayan, a severely malnourished 24-year-old, has horrified young people across China. Wu, who grew up in rural poverty, was under 4.5 feet tall and weighed less than 50 pounds. Her story shocked urban Chinese when it was shared online last October. Now, scandal is brewing around $140,000 in donations that were sent to Wu but allegedly never reached her: China’s charity sector is famously corrupt. The story has already been censored online.
Tech and Business
Pork profiteers. African swine fever has been a windfall for China’s pork breeders, who are profiting from the continued shortages after major culls last year. Qin Yinglin, the founder of a major pig breeder, Muyuan Foodstuff, became the richest man in the agriculture sector this year, with a net worth of $8.6 billion. That’s a risky position. Expect government officials to take a closer interest in the sector, whether for anti-corruption efforts or for personal profit.
Trucking industry crisis. Road fees and extortion by police are taking a serious toll on China’s beleaguered trucking industry. China has some of the world’s most expensive roads: 70 percent of all tollways are in China, often forcing dangerous overloading of vehicles. It is difficult to turn a profit, meaning that it is hard to invest in new equipment. One of the biggest food safety problems in China is the cold storage chain, despite recent growth in the sector.
Currency manipulations. Earlier this week, the United States reversed its designation of China as a currency manipulator, a label it slapped on Beijing in August 2019. The move came just days before the signing of the phase one trade deal. China has altered nothing substantial about how it handles its currency, highlighting the label’s use as a political tool.
What We’re Reading
“What Really Happened in Yancheng?” by Long Ling, the London Review of Books
This essay, written by a government official in Beijing—presumably writing under a pseudonym—describes the civil service examinations used to select personnel in China. Conventional problem-solving makes up about half of the test, with ideology making up the other half. The author zooms in on the degree to which the exams require regurgitating Marxist ideology: essentially, a test of one’s ability to follow the party line.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Taiwan Deserves to Be a Normal Country

Taiwan Deserves to Be a Normal Country

This weekend , the people of Taiwan overwhelmingly voted to renew the mandate of the Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) and President Tsai Ing-wen for another four years , in an election that saw the incumbent win more votes than any other presidential candidate in Taiwan ’ s history .
Tsai ’ s DPP campaigned for clean energy , pension reform , and LGBT rights , in contrast to the more conservative policies of the opposition Kuomintang ( KMT ) and its unsuccessful presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu .
But the press has all but ignored these bread-and-butter issues in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and with good reason .
The overriding issue in this weekend ’ s vote can be summed up in one word : China .
The incumbent DPP has long held that Taiwan is an independent country , while the opposition KMT insists that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China—that just happens to be separated at the current moment .
China is forced to tolerate the de facto political independence of the government on Taiwan , thanks largely to the explicit promise of U.S. military protection , but will not abide any suggestion @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of the sovereign territory of China .
The KMT—descended from the losing side of China ’ s civil war—long maintained the ambition of retaking the mainland , until it settled into a semi-comfortable , mutually profitable relationship with Beijing .
During the period of ( relative ) Chinese liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s , the idea that Taiwan could strike some kind of Hong Kong-plus deal , retaining effective independence while joining Beijing under “ one country , two systems ” seemed plausible .
Today , that idea is dead .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , holding up five fingers for the five demands Hong Kongers have called for in recent mass protests .
Relations between China and Taiwan have been especially icy ever since the DPP unseated the KMT in 2016 .
Now that Tsai and her party have been reelected , relations are likely to remain on hold for another four years .
The United States recognizes the People ’ s Republic of China as “ the sole legal government of China ” and acknowledges the Chinese position on Taiwan without endorsing it .
In any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which under Chiang Kai-shek once aspired to return in force to the mainland , has long since given up such fantasies .
The Taiwanese state is still legally called the Republic of China ( zhonghua minguo ) , but it consistently brands itself as “ Taiwan ” and even uses the .tw internet domain .
Tsai , in her victory speech , referred to the country as “ The Republic of China : Taiwan ” ( zhonghua minguo taiwan ) —a usual term nowadays , and a shift from the previously favored term @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ( zhonghua minguo zai taiwan ) .
Ironically , the only thing stopping Taiwan from giving up the Republic of China name entirely is… China .
Beijing would throw a fit ( and maybe a few missiles ) if Taiwan ever removed “ China ” from its official name .
Yet little by little , as with its internet domain , Taiwan is giving up any pretense of being Chinese .
The vestigial mainland seats were removed from its legislature in 1991 .
Its maps and tourism posters show only the island @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese-heritage claims to the South China Sea , but without much conviction .
Slowly but inexorably , Taiwan is going its own way .
More than 90 percent of Taiwan ’ s current population was born after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 , and fewer than 2 percent were adults when the two Chinas parted ways .
Most of those who were adults in Taiwan back then actually grew up Japanese : The island was ruled from Tokyo between 1895 and 1945 .
In fact , Taiwan has only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the last 125 years , and even during that short period , the mainland-based KMT authorities managed to massacre tens of thousands of Taiwanese civilians .
Whatever the legal status of Taiwan , its moral connection to China is tenuous at best .
Today , surveys suggest that 56.9 percent of Taiwan ’ s people consider themselves to be solely Taiwanese , with a further 36.5 percent identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese .
Only a residual 3.6 percent identify as solely Chinese ( with the remainder declining to respond ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong ( where any sense of Chinese identity has also plunged ) has made the prospect of rule from Beijing even less appealing than it was when this data was collected in June 2019 .
Most analysts attribute the DPP ’ s late surge in the polls ( just six months ago , the party was projected to suffer a crushing defeat with Tsai at the helm ) to a reaction against the repression in Hong Kong , combined with the incumbent president ’ s strong response .
Tsai herself almost lost a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crackdown broadened the appeal of her vehement anti-China rhetoric .
There is no debating the fact that Taiwan draws its culture mainly from China .
But Taiwan is not China , any more than Austria is Germany or the United States is England .
Like everywhere else in the world , Taiwan has a complex history .
China is a big part of that history , but it makes up a smaller and smaller part of Taiwan ’ s present .
The days when China could consider Taiwan its so-called little brother , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the strait , are over .
Taiwan has grown up—and is ready to move out .
A plurality of people in Taiwan prefer to maintain the current ambiguous legal status of their country , according to the most recent survey data .
But that survey was conducted last June , just as the current wave of Hong Kong protests was getting started .
This weekend ’ s election results suggest that anti-China sentient may have hardened .
Whether or not that means Taiwan ’ s people are prepared to face the geopolitical uncertainties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ independence is unknown .
Most Taiwanese probably just want to be left in peace—and that means not provoking China .
But after seven decades of de facto independence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait , the “ One China ” myth is wearing thin .
Taiwan is never going to vote to become a province of China , and China is never going to invade Taiwan , one hopes .
Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly left open the possibility that they might use military force to take over the island , China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ logistically challenging amphibious assault is doubtful , to say the least .
Threats of future hostility are no reason to keep a country of 24 million people in perpetual limbo .
It ’ s high time for the world to recognize Taiwan as a member of the global community of nations .
If not now , when ?
Taiwan has not declared its independence , though the DPP maintains that the country is already independent .
Either way , the most practical next step isn ’ t a formal declaration that throws down @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It ’ s the simple recognition of realities on the ground through actions that treat Taiwan more like an ordinary country .
No one can reasonably expect Washington to recognize Taipei out of some vague sense of historical responsibility .
But the United States is now locked in an epic struggle with China to shape the character of the Pacific Basin for generations to come .
Taiwan is a key node in pan-Asian technology and production networks .
With Hong Kong ’ s autonomy now compromised , Taiwan may also become the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The United States doesn ’ t need naval facilities or air force bases in Taiwan .
Such trifles are the stuff of geopolitical fantasies , of overgrown boys playing at war by putting markers on maps .
But the United States would benefit from seeing Taiwan ’ s autonomy put on a firmer footing .
Obviously , nothing so dramatic as full U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is imminent , and little could realistically happen before the November elections .
But—if Tsai asks for it—a gradual escalation of U.S.-Taiwan relations should be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agenda in 2021 .
On Dec. 2 , 2016 , then president-elect Donald Trump took a historic congratulatory phone call from Tsai .
Renewed efforts to raise the status of Taiwan could start with more of the same : phone calls , trade delegations , official visits , and the like .
There ’ s no rush to get to the end goal of bringing Taiwan in from the diplomatic cold .
In any case , the main benefits to the United States are to be gained from the process of recognizing Taiwan—from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the diplomatic pressure on China—not from reaching the end goal of normalized relations .
Taiwan deserves to be a normal country .
That ’ s not America ’ s problem , but the United States can use gradual steps toward the recognition of Taiwan to help it achieve larger goals such as economic liberalization and the promotion of human rights .
Regional allies such as Japan and South Korea , as well as emerging partners such as India and Vietnam , can and should be brought into these efforts .
Taiwan is not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
If the United States starts the wheels turning , it may find the rest of Asia bandwagoning on its side .

This weekend, the people of Taiwan overwhelmingly voted to renew the mandate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Tsai Ing-wen for another four years, in an election that saw the incumbent win more votes than any other presidential candidate in Taiwan’s history. Tsai’s DPP campaigned for clean energy, pension reform, and LGBT rights, in contrast to the more conservative policies of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and its unsuccessful presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu. But the press has all but ignored these bread-and-butter issues in its coverage of the Taiwan elections, and with good reason. The overriding issue in this weekend’s vote can be summed up in one word: China.
This weekend, the people of Taiwan overwhelmingly voted to renew the mandate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Tsai Ing-wen for another four years, in an election that saw the incumbent win more votes than any other presidential candidate in Taiwan’s history. Tsai’s DPP campaigned for clean energy, pension reform, and LGBT rights, in contrast to the more conservative policies of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and its unsuccessful presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu. But the press has all but ignored these bread-and-butter issues in its coverage of the Taiwan elections, and with good reason. The overriding issue in this weekend’s vote can be summed up in one word: China.
The incumbent DPP has long held that Taiwan is an independent country, while the opposition KMT insists that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China—that just happens to be separated at the current moment. China is forced to tolerate the de facto political independence of the government on Taiwan, thanks largely to the explicit promise of U.S. military protection, but will not abide any suggestion that the island itself does not form part of the sovereign territory of China. The KMT—descended from the losing side of China’s civil war—long maintained the ambition of retaking the mainland, until it settled into a semi-comfortable, mutually profitable relationship with Beijing. During the period of (relative) Chinese liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s, the idea that Taiwan could strike some kind of Hong Kong-plus deal, retaining effective independence while joining Beijing under “one country, two systems” seemed plausible.
Today, that idea is dead. Taiwanese crowded the streets after the election, holding up five fingers for the five demands Hong Kongers have called for in recent mass protests. Relations between China and Taiwan have been especially icy ever since the DPP unseated the KMT in 2016. Now that Tsai and her party have been reelected, relations are likely to remain on hold for another four years.
The United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as “the sole legal government of China” and acknowledges the Chinese position on Taiwan without endorsing it. In any case, the government in Taiwan, which under Chiang Kai-shek once aspired to return in force to the mainland, has long since given up such fantasies. The Taiwanese state is still legally called the Republic of China (zhonghua minguo), but it consistently brands itself as “Taiwan” and even uses the .tw internet domain. Tsai, in her victory speech, referred to the country as “The Republic of China: Taiwan” (zhonghua minguo taiwan)—a usual term nowadays, and a shift from the previously favored term “The Republic of China in Taiwan” (zhonghua minguo zai taiwan).
Ironically, the only thing stopping Taiwan from giving up the Republic of China name entirely is… China. Beijing would throw a fit (and maybe a few missiles) if Taiwan ever removed “China” from its official name. Yet little by little, as with its internet domain, Taiwan is giving up any pretense of being Chinese. The vestigial mainland seats were removed from its legislature in 1991. Its maps and tourism posters show only the island of Taiwan. It maintains its expansive Chinese-heritage claims to the South China Sea, but without much conviction. Slowly but inexorably, Taiwan is going its own way.
More than 90 percent of Taiwan’s current population was born after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and fewer than 2 percent were adults when the two Chinas parted ways. Most of those who were adults in Taiwan back then actually grew up Japanese: The island was ruled from Tokyo between 1895 and 1945. In fact, Taiwan has only been governed from the mainland for five of the last 125 years, and even during that short period, the mainland-based KMT authorities managed to massacre tens of thousands of Taiwanese civilians. Whatever the legal status of Taiwan, its moral connection to China is tenuous at best.
Today, surveys suggest that 56.9 percent of Taiwan’s people consider themselves to be solely Taiwanese, with a further 36.5 percent identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Only a residual 3.6 percent identify as solely Chinese (with the remainder declining to respond). China’s crackdown in nearby Hong Kong (where any sense of Chinese identity has also plunged) has made the prospect of rule from Beijing even less appealing than it was when this data was collected in June 2019. Most analysts attribute the DPP’s late surge in the polls (just six months ago, the party was projected to suffer a crushing defeat with Tsai at the helm) to a reaction against the repression in Hong Kong, combined with the incumbent president’s strong response. Tsai herself almost lost a primary challenge, until the Hong Kong crackdown broadened the appeal of her vehement anti-China rhetoric.
There is no debating the fact that Taiwan draws its culture mainly from China. But Taiwan is not China, any more than Austria is Germany or the United States is England. Like everywhere else in the world, Taiwan has a complex history. China is a big part of that history, but it makes up a smaller and smaller part of Taiwan’s present. The days when China could consider Taiwan its so-called little brother, a mere appendage of Fujian province across the strait, are over. Taiwan has grown up—and is ready to move out.
A plurality of people in Taiwan prefer to maintain the current ambiguous legal status of their country, according to the most recent survey data. But that survey was conducted last June, just as the current wave of Hong Kong protests was getting started. This weekend’s election results suggest that anti-China sentient may have hardened. Whether or not that means Taiwan’s people are prepared to face the geopolitical uncertainties that would accompany a formal declaration of independence is unknown. Most Taiwanese probably just want to be left in peace—and that means not provoking China.
But after seven decades of de facto independence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the “One China” myth is wearing thin. Taiwan is never going to vote to become a province of China, and China is never going to invade Taiwan, one hopes. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly left open the possibility that they might use military force to take over the island, China’s capacity to undertake such a logistically challenging amphibious assault is doubtful, to say the least. Threats of future hostility are no reason to keep a country of 24 million people in perpetual limbo. It’s high time for the world to recognize Taiwan as a member of the global community of nations. If not now, when?
Taiwan has not declared its independence, though the DPP maintains that the country is already independent. Either way, the most practical next step isn’t a formal declaration that throws down a gauntlet to an already-embattled China. It’s the simple recognition of realities on the ground through actions that treat Taiwan more like an ordinary country. No one can reasonably expect Washington to recognize Taipei out of some vague sense of historical responsibility. But the United States is now locked in an epic struggle with China to shape the character of the Pacific Basin for generations to come. Taiwan is a key node in pan-Asian technology and production networks. With Hong Kong’s autonomy now compromised, Taiwan may also become the last free media zone in the Chinese-speaking world.
The United States doesn’t need naval facilities or air force bases in Taiwan. Such trifles are the stuff of geopolitical fantasies, of overgrown boys playing at war by putting markers on maps. But the United States would benefit from seeing Taiwan’s autonomy put on a firmer footing. Obviously, nothing so dramatic as full U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan is imminent, and little could realistically happen before the November elections. But—if Tsai asks for it—a gradual escalation of U.S.-Taiwan relations should be on the next American administration’s agenda in 2021.
On Dec. 2, 2016, then president-elect Donald Trump took a historic congratulatory phone call from Tsai. Renewed efforts to raise the status of Taiwan could start with more of the same: phone calls, trade delegations, official visits, and the like. There’s no rush to get to the end goal of bringing Taiwan in from the diplomatic cold. In any case, the main benefits to the United States are to be gained from the process of recognizing Taiwan—from the slow but consistent ratcheting up of the diplomatic pressure on China—not from reaching the end goal of normalized relations.
Taiwan deserves to be a normal country. That’s not America’s problem, but the United States can use gradual steps toward the recognition of Taiwan to help it achieve larger goals such as economic liberalization and the promotion of human rights. Regional allies such as Japan and South Korea, as well as emerging partners such as India and Vietnam, can and should be brought into these efforts. Taiwan is not the only country being bullied by China. If the United States starts the wheels turning, it may find the rest of Asia bandwagoning on its side.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-15--Canadians’ Royal Fever Doesn’t Run That Hot

When the U.K. ’ s Prince Harry finally arrives in Canada , after much speculation and palace intrigue , there ’ s bound to be fanfare .
Whenever a member of the royal family graces its former dominion with a visit , the hoopla brings crowds to line the streets for a chance at a flat-hand wave or a glimpse at a tiny king-to-be .
That jubilation , the white-hot royalist fervor , is so pronounced in Canada specifically because it is pretty uncommon .
The Duke of York made a jaunt through two provinces last May .
The Prince @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arctic in 2017 , and made it to the capital for Canada ’ s 150th birthday .
Queen Elizabeth II hit four cities in 2010 .
Generally , the royal family has avoided more than one big visit a year .
And , truthfully , that ’ s probably about as much as Canadian royal enthusiasm can sustain .
There are good odds that Prince Harry and Meghan , the Duchess of Sussex , will discover exactly that when they settle down in Canada .
In fact , that may be exactly why @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coldest part of the Commonwealth .
It ’ s hard to blame the pair for fleeing the United Kingdom for Canada .
The prince ’ s mother died fleeing vulturous paparazzi .
These days , the British tabloids have occupied themselves by publishing racist trash about his wife .
Meghan has been treated as the “ new element ” by the flocks of royal watchers who keep a beady eye on Buckingham Palace .
Fleeing the media obsession sounds like a smart bit of self-care for the young family .
The two have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is close with Jessica Mulroney , the wife of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ’ s TV host son Ben .
Integrating into the relatively tame Canadian celebrity world shouldn ’ t be hard .
It ’ s unclear whether the married couple and their infant son , Archie , will settle down in Toronto , where Meghan shot Suits and where Prince Harry hosted the Invictus games , or in the sleepier Vancouver Island , where Meghan is now with her son .
Either way , there are even odds that Canadians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ care all that much .
For one thing , those who might otherwise be their most loyal supporters are also the ones most prone to tut-tutting change .
The Monarchist League of Canada was anything but jubilant at the news of royals moving in next door .
“ A friendly caution to Harry and Meghan : any public support for their desire to occupy a new , hybrid role combining their royal status with more personal freedom could disappear quickly were there to develop a feeling that , even inadvertently , they had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Queen , whose style is self-effacing and whose watchword is duty , ” the organization wrote on Facebook last week .
The Globe and Mail , Canada ’ s paper of record , which generally leans royalist , even politely requested that the royals not settle there .
“ You are welcome to visit , but so long as you are senior royals , Canada can not allow you to come to stay , ” .
The monarchy is omnipresent in Canada , in a way .
The queen is on Canada ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ named for various members of the royal family past and present ; and Canadians are active members of the Commonwealth , yes .
But Canada has never really sustained much of an interest above and beyond that , apart from the occasional royal tour and binge-watching The Crown .
Canadian media , upon learning of the royals ’ plans to decamp there , seemed more interested in probing what the news says about how the world views Canada .
The Canadian media spent ample time agonizing over how the New York Times wrote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The move is ] injecting some glamour into the sprawling , bone-chillingly cold country.
” ) Outright excitement , though , was in short supply .
There was some idle speculation that the prince could be appointed Canada ’ s governor general—the queen ’ s representative in Canada .
That was buoyed by a poll showing such an idea was tepidly popular .
The odds of Prince Harry actually being appointed are slim to none .
“ It would be pretty colonial to have him there , ” said Philippe Lagassé , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ associate professor at Carleton University ’ s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs .
The custom is to have a Canadian stand-in as head of state .
Appointing a member of the royal family as governor general would certainly be a step back—though not totally unprecedented in the Commonwealth .
Edward VIII was made governor of the Bahamas after he abdicated the throne .
At the same time , there would be nothing particularly special about Prince Harry , should he be appointed governor general .
He would still , legally , be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his ceremonial role would still be largely limited to attending state functions , providing royal assent to legislation , delivering the speech from the throne , and so on .
The idea itself seems like a solution in search of a problem—as though Canada ought to be a hospitable host and give the fleeing royal something to do with his time .
But it seems there are good odds that the pair aren ’ t terribly interested in more ceremonial duties .
To that end , they might have plenty in common with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as status quo , with little interest in the pomp and circumstance that surrounds it .
Legally , Canada has its own monarchy .
“ Her Majesty in Right of Canada is a separate and distinct entity from Her Majesty in Right of the United Kingdom , ” Lagassé explained .
Those two titles , of course , are currently held by the same person , Queen Elizabeth II .
It seems unlikely there will ever be an independent monarch of Canada .
The title , in the United Kingdom , is forever @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , joy , grief , fascination , and a whack of other emotions , sometimes simultaneously .
In Canada , the crown elicits emotions ranging from mild discomfort to subdued happiness .
Polling data bears out Canada ’ s polite indifference .
Queen Elizabeth II is considered fairly popular—she has , after all , been queen longer than Canada has had its own constitution—but opinion is divided on what should happen when her reign ends .
Half the country want to see the monarchy abolished outright , half want to carry on .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Quebec , where there ’ s never been much love for the British Crown , but right around half of English Canadians say they actually oppose abolishing the monarchy .
Many don ’ t know or care .
Those numbers have edged up in recent years ; the latest poll shows a slight edge in favor of republicanism .
Nearly one in three Canadians , when asked which member of the royal family they admire the most , said , simply , none .
Having the royal couple in Canada , with no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ man and a talented actress , might actually feed into the country ’ s monarchist malaise .
“ With Harry hanging around here with no legal status or citizenship , it ’ s a reminder that the royal family and monarchy are still fundamentally British , ” Lagassé said .
What ’ s more , he said , “ We ’ re at their whims.
” When the prince arrives , Canada is called upon to respond—to play host .
If Buckingham Palace and the U.K. Parliament decide someone else ought to rule @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to them .
“ They consult the other realms , ” Lagassé noted , but for the rest of the Commonwealth “ there ’ s a good deal of pressure to simply go along.
” Truthfully , there wouldn ’ t even be much appetite in Canada to try to carry more sway in deciding who the next monarch is .
When the topic came up for discussion in 2011 , Ottawa opted to leave those sorts of decisions with London .
The Canadian government is now faced with a unique puzzle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ going overboard .
It ’ s like a host deciding just how many bottles of wine and bowls of snacks signal “ welcome , but I have to be up for work in the morning.
” Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has said the country may be covering some of the security costs for the family , but he doesn ’ t seem eager to foot the bill forever .
73 percent of the public wants the couple to foot the security bill themselves .
There ’ s also the question of immigration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a citizen of Canada .
( Neither is the queen . )
As British citizens , they are generally free to live and work in Canada without much paperwork , though if they ’ re angling for actual settled status , they ’ ll need to apply like everyone else .
If they want to go that route , they ’ ll probably have a go at the Express Entry system , which grades would-be residents through a rubric based on everything including education , work experience , and skills in both official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the scorecard , to see just how desirable the two would be , should they apply .
Prince Harry , with no university degree , no formal job in Canada , and no second language skills , scores—assuming he does all of his language tests and can get a job offer—about 540 points out of a possible 1,200 .
Meghan , on the other hand , with her double major in theater and international studies , proficiency in French , and previous work experience in Canada , is a shoo-in , with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trudeau government could decide to let the family jump the line .
Doing so would dirty up the couple ’ s professed goal to live a more normal , less privileged life , however .
It would only worsen the existing perception of Canadian immigration that the rich and powerful have their own line for citizenship .
All told , there ’ s not likely to be much royal mania in Canada for the incoming family .
They may suit them just fine .
In fact , it may be exactly what @ @ @ @ @ @

When the U.K.’s Prince Harry finally arrives in Canada , after much speculation and palace intrigue, there’s bound to be fanfare. Whenever a member of the royal family graces its former dominion with a visit, the hoopla brings crowds to line the streets for a chance at a flat-hand wave or a glimpse at a tiny king-to-be.
When the U.K.’s Prince Harry finally arrives in Canada, after much speculation and palace intrigue, there’s bound to be fanfare. Whenever a member of the royal family graces its former dominion with a visit, the hoopla brings crowds to line the streets for a chance at a flat-hand wave or a glimpse at a tiny king-to-be.
That jubilation, the white-hot royalist fervor, is so pronounced in Canada specifically because it is pretty uncommon.
The Duke of York made a jaunt through two provinces last May. The Prince of Wales took a trip to the Arctic in 2017, and made it to the capital for Canada’s 150th birthday. Queen Elizabeth II hit four cities in 2010.
Generally, the royal family has avoided more than one big visit a year. And, truthfully, that’s probably about as much as Canadian royal enthusiasm can sustain. There are good odds that Prince Harry and Meghan, the Duchess of Sussex, will discover exactly that when they settle down in Canada. In fact, that may be exactly why they’re so keen on the coldest part of the Commonwealth.
It’s hard to blame the pair for fleeing the United Kingdom for Canada. The prince’s mother died fleeing vulturous paparazzi. These days, the British tabloids have occupied themselves by publishing racist trash about his wife. Meghan has been treated as the “new element” by the flocks of royal watchers who keep a beady eye on Buckingham Palace. Fleeing the media obsession sounds like a smart bit of self-care for the young family.
The two have friends in Canada, too. Meghan is close with Jessica Mulroney, the wife of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s TV host son Ben. Integrating into the relatively tame Canadian celebrity world shouldn’t be hard.
It’s unclear whether the married couple and their infant son, Archie, will settle down in Toronto, where Meghan shot Suits and where Prince Harry hosted the Invictus games, or in the sleepier Vancouver Island, where Meghan is now with her son. Either way, there are even odds that Canadians, generally, just won’t care all that much.
For one thing, those who might otherwise be their most loyal supporters are also the ones most prone to tut-tutting change. The Monarchist League of Canada was anything but jubilant at the news of royals moving in next door.
“A friendly caution to Harry and Meghan: any public support for their desire to occupy a new, hybrid role combining their royal status with more personal freedom could disappear quickly were there to develop a feeling that, even inadvertently, they had in some way showed disrespect to The Queen, whose style is self-effacing and whose watchword is duty,” the organization wrote on Facebook last week.
The Globe and Mail, Canada’s paper of record, which generally leans royalist, even politely requested that the royals not settle there. “You are welcome to visit, but so long as you are senior royals, Canada cannot allow you to come to stay,” the paper’s editorial board wrote .
The monarchy is omnipresent in Canada, in a way. The queen is on Canada’s money; roads and highways are named for various members of the royal family past and present; and Canadians are active members of the Commonwealth, yes. But Canada has never really sustained much of an interest above and beyond that, apart from the occasional royal tour and binge-watching The Crown.
Canadian media, upon learning of the royals’ plans to decamp there, seemed more interested in probing what the news says about how the world views Canada. The Canadian media spent ample time agonizing over how the New York Times wrote the country up. (“[The move is] injecting some glamour into the sprawling, bone-chillingly cold country.”) Outright excitement, though, was in short supply.
There was some idle speculation that the prince could be appointed Canada’s governor general—the queen’s representative in Canada. That was buoyed by a poll showing such an idea was tepidly popular.
The odds of Prince Harry actually being appointed are slim to none.
“It would be pretty colonial to have him there,” said Philippe Lagassé, a preeminent scholar on the monarchy and an associate professor at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.
The custom is to have a Canadian stand-in as head of state. Appointing a member of the royal family as governor general would certainly be a step back—though not totally unprecedented in the Commonwealth. Edward VIII was made governor of the Bahamas after he abdicated the throne.
At the same time, there would be nothing particularly special about Prince Harry, should he be appointed governor general. He would still, legally, be a representative of the queen, and his ceremonial role would still be largely limited to attending state functions, providing royal assent to legislation, delivering the speech from the throne, and so on. The idea itself seems like a solution in search of a problem—as though Canada ought to be a hospitable host and give the fleeing royal something to do with his time.
But it seems there are good odds that the pair aren’t terribly interested in more ceremonial duties. To that end, they might have plenty in common with their soon-to-be compatriots—an acceptance of the monarchy as status quo, with little interest in the pomp and circumstance that surrounds it.
Legally, Canada has its own monarchy. “Her Majesty in Right of Canada is a separate and distinct entity from Her Majesty in Right of the United Kingdom,” Lagassé explained. Those two titles, of course, are currently held by the same person, Queen Elizabeth II. It seems unlikely there will ever be an independent monarch of Canada.
The title, in the United Kingdom, is forever subject to worry, panic, rage, joy, grief, fascination, and a whack of other emotions, sometimes simultaneously. In Canada, the crown elicits emotions ranging from mild discomfort to subdued happiness.
Polling data bears out Canada’s polite indifference. Queen Elizabeth II is considered fairly popular—she has, after all, been queen longer than Canada has had its own constitution—but opinion is divided on what should happen when her reign ends. Half the country want to see the monarchy abolished outright, half want to carry on. Support for republicanism is largely focused in Quebec, where there’s never been much love for the British Crown, but right around half of English Canadians say they actually oppose abolishing the monarchy. Many don’t know or care. Those numbers have edged up in recent years; the latest poll shows a slight edge in favor of republicanism.
Nearly one in three Canadians, when asked which member of the royal family they admire the most, said, simply, none.
Having the royal couple in Canada, with no particular status beyond being an exceptionally wealthy man and a talented actress, might actually feed into the country’s monarchist malaise.
“With Harry hanging around here with no legal status or citizenship, it’s a reminder that the royal family and monarchy are still fundamentally British,” Lagassé said.
What’s more, he said, “We’re at their whims.” When the prince arrives, Canada is called upon to respond—to play host. If Buckingham Palace and the U.K. Parliament decide someone else ought to rule after the queen, it’s up to them. “They consult the other realms,” Lagassé noted, but for the rest of the Commonwealth “there’s a good deal of pressure to simply go along.”
Truthfully, there wouldn’t even be much appetite in Canada to try to carry more sway in deciding who the next monarch is. When the topic came up for discussion in 2011, Ottawa opted to leave those sorts of decisions with London.
The Canadian government is now faced with a unique puzzle in how to welcome the pair without going overboard. It’s like a host deciding just how many bottles of wine and bowls of snacks signal “welcome, but I have to be up for work in the morning.”
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has said the country may be covering some of the security costs for the family, but he doesn’t seem eager to foot the bill forever. 73 percent of the public wants the couple to foot the security bill themselves.
There’s also the question of immigration: Neither Prince Harry nor Meghan is a citizen of Canada. (Neither is the queen.) As British citizens, they are generally free to live and work in Canada without much paperwork, though if they’re angling for actual settled status, they’ll need to apply like everyone else.
If they want to go that route, they’ll probably have a go at the Express Entry system, which grades would-be residents through a rubric based on everything including education, work experience, and skills in both official languages. I decided to fill out the scorecard, to see just how desirable the two would be, should they apply.
Prince Harry, with no university degree, no formal job in Canada, and no second language skills, scores—assuming he does all of his language tests and can get a job offer—about 540 points out of a possible 1,200. Meghan, on the other hand, with her double major in theater and international studies, proficiency in French, and previous work experience in Canada, is a shoo-in, with a score around 730.
Of course, the Trudeau government could decide to let the family jump the line. Doing so would dirty up the couple’s professed goal to live a more normal, less privileged life, however. It would only worsen the existing perception of Canadian immigration that the rich and powerful have their own line for citizenship.
All told, there’s not likely to be much royal mania in Canada for the incoming family. They may suit them just fine. In fact, it may be exactly what they’re looking for.