foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--India’s Alliance With Israel Is a Model for the World’s Illiberal Leaders

India ’ s Alliance With Israel Is a Model for the World ’ s Illiberal Leaders In late November 2019 , there was widespread outrage over a video of the Indian Consul-General in New York , Sandeep Chakravorty , in which he suggested to a gathering of Kashmiri Hindus that India should follow the Israeli model , and build settlements in the Kashmir Valley to secure the return of Hindus .
Kashmiri activists and journalists were shocked by his apparent support for Israel ’ s occupation of the Palestinian territories .
But this is only one of many recent examples @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India and Israel .
Ties between the two countries have not always been this friendly .
In October 1937 , a decade before Indian independence from British rule , the Indian National Congress passed a resolution that declared its support for the Palestinian national movement .
It assured “ the Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian People with them in their struggle for national freedom.
” A year later , Mahatma Gandhi wrote that the “ cry for the national home for the Jews ” in Palestine had little appeal for him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French.
” Maintaining this position after independence , India was one of only 13 countries—and one of only three non-Muslim countries—to vote against the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine .
India officially recognized the State of Israel in 1950 , but relations between the two countries remained largely informal until the end of the Cold War .
As one of the architects of the Non-Aligned Movement , India ’ s official allegiance remained with its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its embassy opened in Tel Aviv in 1992 , India cautiously built its relations with Israel while maintaining its official commitment to the Palestinian cause .
When Israel , the United Kingdom , and France invaded Egypt and sparked the Suez Crisis of 1956 , India expressed its support for its nonaligned ally , Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser , and its stance against Western imperialism in the region .
In 1974 , India recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole , legitimate representative of the Palestinians ; it was the first @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Israel enjoyed the strong support of the West while India had well-known political leanings towards the Soviet Union , so the two countries almost inevitably found themselves in opposing camps during the Cold War .
But with the fall of the Soviet Union , India embarked on a process of economic liberalization that included a drastic reduction in import tariffs and the removal of restrictions on foreign direct investment .
India also saw this as an opportunity to reposition itself in a new world order , and in 1992 established formal diplomatic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its embassy opened in Tel Aviv , India cautiously built its relations with Israel while maintaining its official commitment to the Palestinian cause .
At the same time , Indian-Israeli relations began to encompass a wide array of economic , technological , and strategic partnerships .
In 2006 , the Indian and Israeli agricultural ministries signed a Memorandum of Understanding , leading to the Indo-Israeli Agricultural Project which focused on increasing India ’ s agricultural productivity and water use efficiency .
Bilateral trade has also increased from $ 200 million in 1992 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And , compared with the same period in the previous year , Israeli goods and services exports to India were up 4.6 percent in the first nine months of 2019 .
However , the most significant facet of Indian-Israeli relations is a robust security-defense cooperation .
The foundations of this cooperation were laid long before 1992 .
During the Sino-Indian War of 1962 , the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion expressed his “ fullest sympathy and understanding ” and , on the request of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru , supplied weapons to India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 .
Since the early days of its establishment in 1968 , the Research and Analysis Wing—India ’ s external intelligence agency—has also maintained close relations with Israel ’ s Mossad .
Israel has replaced Russia as India ’ s preferred all-season weapons supplier .
For instance , when India conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998 , it faced international condemnation .
But while the Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions and banned the export of U.S. weapons and military technology , Israel refrained from criticizing India .
Instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ building its brand as a reliable , but apolitical , partner .
During the Kargil War in 1999 , it supplied the Indian Air Force with UAVs and surveillance systems .
Israel also upgraded India ’ s aging , Soviet-era MiG-21 fighter jets and supplied Laser Guided Bombs and 160-mm mortar shells .
Today , Israel is second only to Russia as India ’ s largest weapons supplier .
But while Russian supplies fell by 47 percent in 2015-2019 , weapons imports from Israel increased by 175 percent .
India is also the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 46 percent of Israel ’ s exports .
Both countries are part of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and have signed agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters , cooperation in homeland security , protection of classified material , and cybersecurity .
Indian Police Service trainees visit the Israel National Police Academy every year for training .
The Indian Border Security Force uses Israeli-developed smart fencing systems as well as radar and surveillance technology in the volatile Kashmir valley .
In the midst of the ongoing pandemic , the Indian Ministry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also collaborating on developing a rapid testing system .
And to this end , an Israeli delegation collected 20,000 samples from Indian COVID-19 patients in early August 2020 .
India ’ s overtures toward Israel are no longer a low-key affair .
It is something that India ’ s government and many Indians celebrate .
In 2008 , following the Mumbai attacks , Indian talking heads were already proposing the Israeli approach to fighting terrorism .
A poll conducted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 2009 showed that 58 percent of Indians supported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States ( 56 percent ) , Russia ( 52 percent ) , Mexico ( 50 percent ) , China ( 48 percent ) , and Italy ( 39 percent ) .
During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s 2018 visit to India , his last evening in the country was marked by a special event “ Shalom Bollywood ” attended by Indian film industry heavyweights .
At the event , Netanyahu declared , “ We believe in Bollywood .
The world loves Bollywood .
Israel loves Bollywood .
We want Bollywood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ money where our mouth is.
” Drive—the Indian version of Fast & Furious—was released in November 2019 on Netflix ; it is the first Hindi movie to be filmed in Israel .
The scenes were shot in Tel Aviv and partly funded by the Israeli Prime Minister ’ s Office and the Ministry of Tourism , with the expectation that a positive portrayal of Israel in Hindi films would boost tourism from India .
He went on to declare : “ The Kashmiri culture , is the Indian culture , it is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under the leadership of Hindu nationalist governments that Indian-Israeli relations have blossomed , as a majority of the most important diplomatic exchanges have taken place when the Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) has been in power in New Delhi .
The electoral successes of the BJP have meant that what was once a fringe Hindu nationalist love affair with Israel has now become a matter of public policy .
Israel has always been popular among the Hindu right .
In 1967 , the Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Jana Sangh reacted to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India and Israel .
One of the founding fathers of the paramilitary Hindu nationalist organization , Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ( RSS ) Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar , may have once expressed his sympathies for Nazi Germany .
But the present-day organization has repeatedly declared its support for efforts to strengthen India ’ s ties with Israel .
In 2016 , the RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat voiced his admiration for the Jewish state when he said , “ Israel was attacked by surrounding Islamic countries on five occasions , but the Israeli people repulsed their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strong resolve to save motherland.
” But the electoral successes of the BJP have meant that what was once a fringe Hindu nationalist love affair with Israel has now become a matter of public policy .
Officially , India now considers Israel a strategic partner as both countries—each under its right-wing leadership—position themselves as bastions of progress and democracy while surrounded by hostile Muslim nations .
In this sense , they consider each other to be natural allies , engaged in a historic struggle against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist forces .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pro-Israel advocacy organization that publishes pamphlets in Hindi and the Israeli Consul General for South India Dana Kursh , reacted to India passing the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act ( CAA ) by saying : “ India as a sovereign nation has the right in enacting the CAA … India ’ s sovereignty is to be respected and she knows how to protect her people.
” India , for its part , displayed the extent of its alliance with Israel when in June 2019 it voted against granting Palestinians consultative status in the U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Responding to the vote—a historic shift in India ’ s usual , pro-Palestine voting record at the U.N.— Netanyahu tweeted , “ Thank you @ NarendraModi , thank you India , for your support and for standing with Israel at the UN.
” Trade , cultural exchange , and strategic partnerships—including the arms trade—are , of course , the building blocks of international relations .
But as India now openly expresses ( and celebrates ) its support for Israel in international forums and Israel , in return , expresses its support for India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it is evident that the India-Israel relationship is no longer purely a matter of realpolitik ; it is also being strengthened by a shared ideology .
The India-Israel relationship is no longer purely a matter of realpolitik ; it is also being strengthened by a shared ideology .
The consequences of this are significant .
India , and its Hindu nationalist leadership , has found an ally that is willing to publicly support its widely criticized and often draconian political moves .
At the same time Israel , has found an ally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and strategic partnership irrespective of its conduct towards Palestinians .
It may be too early to assess the long-term impact of such an alliance .
Nonetheless , authoritarian leaders in Brazil , Russia , Hungary , Azerbaijan , and the Philippines have also upgraded their diplomatic relations with Netanyahu ’ s Israel .
Today ’ s warm Indian-Israeli ties may soon become a model for strongmen across the world—an alliance that combines diplomatic cover in Washington with military support for populist leaders while easing the consequences of their illiberal ways .

In late November 2019, there was widespread outrage over a video of the Indian Consul-General in New York, Sandeep Chakravorty, in which he suggested to a gathering of Kashmiri Hindus that India should follow the Israeli model, and build settlements in the Kashmir Valley to secure the return of Hindus. Kashmiri activists and journalists were shocked by his apparent support for Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. But this is only one of many recent examples of a growing political love affair between India and Israel.
In late November 2019, there was widespread outrage over a video of the Indian Consul-General in New York, Sandeep Chakravorty, in which he suggested to a gathering of Kashmiri Hindus that India should follow the Israeli model, and build settlements in the Kashmir Valley to secure the return of Hindus. Kashmiri activists and journalists were shocked by his apparent support for Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. But this is only one of many recent examples of a growing political love affair between India and Israel.
Ties between the two countries have not always been this friendly. In October 1937, a decade before Indian independence from British rule, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution that declared its support for the Palestinian national movement. It assured “the Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian People with them in their struggle for national freedom.” A year later, Mahatma Gandhi wrote that the “cry for the national home for the Jews” in Palestine had little appeal for him. He added: “Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French.”
Maintaining this position after independence, India was one of only 13 countries—and one of only three non-Muslim countries—to vote against the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. India officially recognized the State of Israel in 1950, but relations between the two countries remained largely informal until the end of the Cold War. As one of the architects of the Non-Aligned Movement, India’s official allegiance remained with its Arab allies.
As the doors of its embassy opened in Tel Aviv in 1992, India cautiously built its relations with Israel while maintaining its official commitment to the Palestinian cause.
When Israel, the United Kingdom, and France invaded Egypt and sparked the Suez Crisis of 1956, India expressed its support for its nonaligned ally, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and its stance against Western imperialism in the region. In 1974, India recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians; it was the first non-Arab country do so. Of course, Israel enjoyed the strong support of the West while India had well-known political leanings towards the Soviet Union, so the two countries almost inevitably found themselves in opposing camps during the Cold War.
But with the fall of the Soviet Union, India embarked on a process of economic liberalization that included a drastic reduction in import tariffs and the removal of restrictions on foreign direct investment. India also saw this as an opportunity to reposition itself in a new world order, and in 1992 established formal diplomatic relations with Israel. As the doors of its embassy opened in Tel Aviv, India cautiously built its relations with Israel while maintaining its official commitment to the Palestinian cause.
Having already recognized the State of Palestine in 1988, India inaugurated its representative office in Gaza in 1996, which later moved to Ramallah. India also consistently voted in favor of the Palestinian position at the United Nations. This included the vote on the General Assembly resolution against Israel’s separation wall in 2003, for Palestine’s full membership of UNESCO in 2011, and for Palestine’s non-member observer status in the U.N. General Assembly in 2012.
At the same time, Indian-Israeli relations began to encompass a wide array of economic, technological, and strategic partnerships. In 2006, the Indian and Israeli agricultural ministries signed a Memorandum of Understanding, leading to the Indo-Israeli Agricultural Project which focused on increasing India’s agricultural productivity and water use efficiency. Bilateral trade has also increased from $200 million in 1992 to $5.84 billion in 2018. And, compared with the same period in the previous year, Israeli goods and services exports to India were up 4.6 percent in the first nine months of 2019.
However, the most significant facet of Indian-Israeli relations is a robust security-defense cooperation. The foundations of this cooperation were laid long before 1992. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion expressed his “fullest sympathy and understanding” and, on the request of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, supplied weapons to India. India sourced Israeli weapons during the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. Since the early days of its establishment in 1968, the Research and Analysis Wing—India’s external intelligence agency—has also maintained close relations with Israel’s Mossad.
Israel has replaced Russia as India’s preferred all-season weapons supplier. For instance, when India conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1998, it faced international condemnation. But while the Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions and banned the export of U.S. weapons and military technology, Israel refrained from criticizing India. Instead, over the years Israel worked on building its brand as a reliable, but apolitical, partner. During the Kargil War in 1999, it supplied the Indian Air Force with UAVs and surveillance systems. Israel also upgraded India’s aging, Soviet-era MiG-21 fighter jets and supplied Laser Guided Bombs and 160-mm mortar shells.
Today, Israel is second only to Russia as India’s largest weapons supplier. But while Russian supplies fell by 47 percent in 2015-2019, weapons imports from Israel increased by 175 percent. India is also the largest buyer of Israeli weapons, buying 46 percent of Israel’s exports. Both countries are part of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and have signed agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, cooperation in homeland security, protection of classified material, and cybersecurity. Indian Police Service trainees visit the Israel National Police Academy every year for training. The Indian Border Security Force uses Israeli-developed smart fencing systems as well as radar and surveillance technology in the volatile Kashmir valley.
In the midst of the ongoing pandemic, the Indian Ministry of Defense and its Israeli counterpart are also collaborating on developing a rapid testing system. And to this end, an Israeli delegation collected 20,000 samples from Indian COVID-19 patients in early August 2020.
India’s overtures toward Israel are no longer a low-key affair. It is something that India’s government and many Indians celebrate. In 2008, following the Mumbai attacks, Indian talking heads were already proposing the Israeli approach to fighting terrorism. A poll conducted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 2009 showed that 58 percent of Indians supported Israel and that India ranked above the United States (56 percent), Russia (52 percent), Mexico (50 percent), China (48 percent), and Italy (39 percent).
During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2018 visit to India, his last evening in the country was marked by a special event “Shalom Bollywood” attended by Indian film industry heavyweights. At the event, Netanyahu declared, “We believe in Bollywood. The world loves Bollywood. Israel loves Bollywood. We want Bollywood in Israel. We are putting our money where our mouth is.” Drive—the Indian version of Fast & Furious—was released in November 2019 on Netflix; it is the first Hindi movie to be filmed in Israel. The scenes were shot in Tel Aviv and partly funded by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Tourism, with the expectation that a positive portrayal of Israel in Hindi films would boost tourism from India.
It wasn’t a coincidence that the Indian Consul General in New York was speaking to a gathering of Kashmiri Hindus. The return of exiled Hindus to Kashmir has long been central to the Hindu nationalist political agenda. And for the Consul General, Israel serves as a model for the way exiled people might reclaim their homeland. So, referring to the controversial revocation of Article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution, Chakravorty described the move as an attempt to protect Hindu culture in Kashmir—not unlike the way Jewish people maintained their cultural identity in their years of exile.
He went on to declare: “The Kashmiri culture, is the Indian culture, it is the Hindu culture.” And it has been under the leadership of Hindu nationalist governments that Indian-Israeli relations have blossomed, as a majority of the most important diplomatic exchanges have taken place when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been in power in New Delhi.
The electoral successes of the BJP have meant that what was once a fringe Hindu nationalist love affair with Israel has now become a matter of public policy.
Israel has always been popular among the Hindu right. In 1967, the Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Jana Sangh reacted to the Six Day War by drawing parallels between India and Israel. One of the founding fathers of the paramilitary Hindu nationalist organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, may have once expressed his sympathies for Nazi Germany. But the present-day organization has repeatedly declared its support for efforts to strengthen India’s ties with Israel.
In 2016, the RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat voiced his admiration for the Jewish state when he said, “Israel was attacked by surrounding Islamic countries on five occasions, but the Israeli people repulsed their aggressions and extended their boundaries due to strong resolve to save motherland.”
But the electoral successes of the BJP have meant that what was once a fringe Hindu nationalist love affair with Israel has now become a matter of public policy. Officially, India now considers Israel a strategic partner as both countries—each under its right-wing leadership—position themselves as bastions of progress and democracy while surrounded by hostile Muslim nations. In this sense, they consider each other to be natural allies, engaged in a historic struggle against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist forces.
It is no surprise then that StandWithUs, a pro-Israel advocacy organization that publishes pamphlets in Hindi and the Israeli Consul General for South India Dana Kursh, reacted to India passing the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) by saying: “India as a sovereign nation has the right in enacting the CAA … India’s sovereignty is to be respected and she knows how to protect her people.” India, for its part, displayed the extent of its alliance with Israel when in June 2019 it voted against granting Palestinians consultative status in the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council. Responding to the vote—a historic shift in India’s usual, pro-Palestine voting record at the U.N.— Netanyahu tweeted, “Thank you @NarendraModi, thank you India, for your support and for standing with Israel at the UN.”
Trade, cultural exchange, and strategic partnerships—including the arms trade—are, of course, the building blocks of international relations. But as India now openly expresses (and celebrates) its support for Israel in international forums and Israel, in return, expresses its support for India’s controversial laws and constitutional amendments, it is evident that the India-Israel relationship is no longer purely a matter of realpolitik; it is also being strengthened by a shared ideology.
The India-Israel relationship is no longer purely a matter of realpolitik; it is also being strengthened by a shared ideology.
The consequences of this are significant. India, and its Hindu nationalist leadership, has found an ally that is willing to publicly support its widely criticized and often draconian political moves. At the same time Israel, has found an ally willing to cultivate a political, economic, and strategic partnership irrespective of its conduct towards Palestinians.
It may be too early to assess the long-term impact of such an alliance. Nonetheless, authoritarian leaders in Brazil, Russia, Hungary, Azerbaijan, and the Philippines have also upgraded their diplomatic relations with Netanyahu’s Israel. Today’s warm Indian-Israeli ties may soon become a model for strongmen across the world—an alliance that combines diplomatic cover in Washington with military support for populist leaders while easing the consequences of their illiberal ways.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--No Gas, No War in the Mediterranean

No Gas, No War in the Mediterranean

No Gas , No War in the Mediterranean In the Eastern Mediterranean , Greece , Cyprus , and Turkey are in the midst of a bitter joust , on the precipice of violence , over rights to drill for natural gas .
That ’ s despite the fact that gas is a fossil fuel that is neither environmentally sustainable nor a lucrative business proposition for the region .
The parties involved can kill two birds with one stone by calling a moratorium on the exploitation of new hydrocarbon reserves in the Hellenic Trench , where the gas fields lie .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ as well as serve Europe ’ s long-term goal to rein in greenhouse gas emissions .
The notion of a drilling ban—which could begin with a two-year moratorium on all undersea energy exploration—isn ’ t sheer fancy , as much of the Western and Central Mediterranean is already off limits to gas and oil exploration , on diverse environmental grounds .
In the Aegean , most hydrocarbon exploration has been prohibited in the sea shared by Greece and Turkey since 1976 .
Foremost , new gas and oil production undermines the aims of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to curb global warming by 2050 ; and it also poses an immediate threat to the sea ’ s highly sensitive marine environment .
Moreover , the economic prospects of deep-water natural gas are extremely poor , even if gas bounces back from the dizzying price collapse prompted by the coronavirus pandemic .
Should drilling ever really happen in the Hellenic Trench—a 400-mile-long , 17,000-foot-deep marine canyon that stretches from northwestern Greece to southernmost Turkey—the area would surely become the burial site of billions in stranded assets , say experts .
In declaring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bordering countries—the European Union nations Greece and Cyprus , as well as Turkey—would be following in the footsteps of France , Italy , and Croatia .
In 2016 France led the way by announcing a moratorium on drilling in all French seas—in the Mediterranean , the Atlantic , and the waters of French territories abroad .
All currently licensed extraction will be terminated by 2040 .
France argued that hydrocarbon mining contradicted the global effort to dramatically reduce fossil fuel use , which was inscribed into law in the Paris climate agreement a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot underscored the reasoning of climate scientists across the globe : “ 80 percent of the world ’ s fossil fuels must remain below the Earth ’ s surface if we want to respect the Paris climate treaty.
” New Zealand , Ireland , Spain and 11 U.S. states have also followed suit .
Spain ’ s measure , when approved this year by parliament as expected , will ban all new coal , oil , and gas extraction immediately , and end direct subsidies for fossil fuels .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fossil fuel-related projects as of the end of 2021 .
The countries of the Eastern Mediterranean are also responsible for curbing global warming .
All of them , with the notable exception of Turkey , have signed the Paris agreement and have emissions-reduction schedules .
Moreover , Greece and Cyprus will be part of the EU ’ s drive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 55 percent by 2030 , should this benchmark be turned into law , as expected .
Cyprus is already way behind on its targets and faces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Furthermore , the natural gas lobby ’ s claim that gas is a green-tinged “ bridge ” energy on the road to a zero-carbon world has never rung so phony .
A wide array of recent studies show that natural gas , which consists mostly of methane , can be significantly more harmful to the climate than previously thought .
Methane is a potent greenhouse gas that in the first two decades after its release is 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide , according to the U.S.-based Environmental Defense Fund .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ transport , and processing of natural gas and its export form , liquefied natural gas .
Environmental degradation is another sound reason not to drill .
Drilling ’ s impact on the Mediterranean ’ s natural ecosystems figured significantly in the bans imposed in the Western seas and apply no less to the fragile Eastern Mediterranean .
( The bans in place were driven by environmentalists and the tourism branch , the latter not wanting drill rigs or their detritus befouling seaside resorts . )
The Hellenic Trench is a deep-water sanctuary of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as sperm whales , fin whales , Cuvier ’ s beaked whales , dolphins , Mediterranean monk seals , and loggerhead sea turtles .
In 2018 , 100 world-renowned scientists and environmental associations wrote a declaration pleading with Athens to call off exploration of the trench .
Diverse aquatic species “ in the Hellenic Trench are already facing a series of direct and severe threats , ” the experts wrote , which include shipping noise , collisions with vessels , overfishing , plastic pollution , and climate change .
Lastly , natural gas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ age when fossil fuels are being priced out of markets .
Not only are natural gas ’ s “ green credentials ” in tatters—which could prompt a policy backlash against gas that would surely doom it—but the coronavirus pandemic has also caused the price of gas to crash .
Its record-low value , now selling at even less than coal-fired power , has buoyed demand but not at a price that makes its business viable .
The extremely deep seabeds and long pipelines to the mainland make deep-water gas particularly costly to extract @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to find markets in regional countries where it can be delivered at low cost , and where decarbonization isn ’ t so high on government agendas , ” Jonathan Stern of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in the United Kingdom told me .
“ The export of East Mediterranean gas to Europe didn ’ t even make business sense at 2017 and 2018 prices , ” when they were roughly twice as high as today , Stern said .
“ But now it ’ s out of the question.
” By @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sites flow into pipelines , perhaps in the late 2020s or early 2030s , carbon pricing and other disincentives would cut significantly into revenue .
And the ever-lower prices of renewables and battery storage dim the prospects for gas even more .
“ These wells are going to be orphaned , ” said Toby Couture of the Berlin consulting firm E3 Analytics , “ and the public purse will be left to take over the clean-up and remediation costs.
” Countries across the Eastern Mediterranean have received overtures from the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Exxon Mobil , Spain ’ s Repsol , and the French conglomerate Total , all of which are hunting for new vistas since they ’ ve been stopped from drilling elsewhere .
The specter of being a big player on the global gas market might appear tempting to the region ’ s political leaders , but it is illusory .
The EU could play a constructive role in the Greece-Turkey conflict by helping the three parties declare a moratorium—even if initially for one or two years—on exploration and switch their focus to renewable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turkey have immensely favorable conditions for clean energy generation—which they should exploit , with as much help from the EU as possible , rather than sparring over gas fields that will issue nothing but problems for years to come .

In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey are in the midst of a bitter joust, on the precipice of violence, over rights to drill for natural gas. That’s despite the fact that gas is a fossil fuel that is neither environmentally sustainable nor a lucrative business proposition for the region. The parties involved can kill two birds with one stone by calling a moratorium on the exploitation of new hydrocarbon reserves in the Hellenic Trench, where the gas fields lie. This would eradicate the source of conflict as well as serve Europe’s long-term goal to rein in greenhouse gas emissions.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey are in the midst of a bitter joust, on the precipice of violence, over rights to drill for natural gas. That’s despite the fact that gas is a fossil fuel that is neither environmentally sustainable nor a lucrative business proposition for the region. The parties involved can kill two birds with one stone by calling a moratorium on the exploitation of new hydrocarbon reserves in the Hellenic Trench, where the gas fields lie. This would eradicate the source of conflict as well as serve Europe’s long-term goal to rein in greenhouse gas emissions.
The notion of a drilling ban—which could begin with a two-year moratorium on all undersea energy exploration—isn’t sheer fancy, as much of the Western and Central Mediterranean is already off limits to gas and oil exploration, on diverse environmental grounds. In the Aegean, most hydrocarbon exploration has been prohibited in the sea shared by Greece and Turkey since 1976.
Foremost, new gas and oil production undermines the aims of the United Nations’ Paris climate treaty to curb global warming by 2050; and it also poses an immediate threat to the sea’s highly sensitive marine environment. Moreover, the economic prospects of deep-water natural gas are extremely poor, even if gas bounces back from the dizzying price collapse prompted by the coronavirus pandemic. Should drilling ever really happen in the Hellenic Trench—a 400-mile-long, 17,000-foot-deep marine canyon that stretches from northwestern Greece to southernmost Turkey—the area would surely become the burial site of billions in stranded assets, say experts.
In declaring the trench a protected area, its bordering countries—the European Union nations Greece and Cyprus, as well as Turkey—would be following in the footsteps of France, Italy, and Croatia. In 2016 France led the way by announcing a moratorium on drilling in all French seas—in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the waters of French territories abroad. All currently licensed extraction will be terminated by 2040. France argued that hydrocarbon mining contradicted the global effort to dramatically reduce fossil fuel use, which was inscribed into law in the Paris climate agreement a year earlier.
At the time, Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot underscored the reasoning of climate scientists across the globe: “80 percent of the world’s fossil fuels must remain below the Earth’s surface if we want to respect the Paris climate treaty.”
New Zealand, Ireland, Spain and 11 U.S. states have also followed suit. Spain’s measure, when approved this year by parliament as expected, will ban all new coal, oil, and gas extraction immediately, and end direct subsidies for fossil fuels. The European Investment Bank will stop investing in fossil fuel-related projects as of the end of 2021.
The countries of the Eastern Mediterranean are also responsible for curbing global warming. All of them, with the notable exception of Turkey, have signed the Paris agreement and have emissions-reduction schedules. Moreover, Greece and Cyprus will be part of the EU’s drive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 55 percent by 2030, should this benchmark be turned into law, as expected. Cyprus is already way behind on its targets and faces EU fines should it not catch up.
Furthermore, the natural gas lobby’s claim that gas is a green-tinged “bridge” energy on the road to a zero-carbon world has never rung so phony. A wide array of recent studies show that natural gas, which consists mostly of methane, can be significantly more harmful to the climate than previously thought. Methane is a potent greenhouse gas that in the first two decades after its release is 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide, according to the U.S.-based Environmental Defense Fund. Methane is released during the extraction, transport, and processing of natural gas and its export form, liquefied natural gas.
Environmental degradation is another sound reason not to drill. Drilling’s impact on the Mediterranean’s natural ecosystems figured significantly in the bans imposed in the Western seas and apply no less to the fragile Eastern Mediterranean. (The bans in place were driven by environmentalists and the tourism branch, the latter not wanting drill rigs or their detritus befouling seaside resorts.)
The Hellenic Trench is a deep-water sanctuary of unique and threatened marine mammals, such as sperm whales, fin whales, Cuvier’s beaked whales, dolphins, Mediterranean monk seals, and loggerhead sea turtles. In 2018, 100 world-renowned scientists and environmental associations wrote a declaration pleading with Athens to call off exploration of the trench. Diverse aquatic species “in the Hellenic Trench are already facing a series of direct and severe threats,” the experts wrote, which include shipping noise, collisions with vessels, overfishing, plastic pollution, and climate change.
Lastly, natural gas is a supremely bad investment in an age when fossil fuels are being priced out of markets. Not only are natural gas’s “green credentials” in tatters—which could prompt a policy backlash against gas that would surely doom it—but the coronavirus pandemic has also caused the price of gas to crash. Its record-low value, now selling at even less than coal-fired power, has buoyed demand but not at a price that makes its business viable.
The extremely deep seabeds and long pipelines to the mainland make deep-water gas particularly costly to extract and deliver. “Mediterranean gas will need to find markets in regional countries where it can be delivered at low cost, and where decarbonization isn’t so high on government agendas,” Jonathan Stern of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in the United Kingdom told me.
“The export of East Mediterranean gas to Europe didn’t even make business sense at 2017 and 2018 prices,” when they were roughly twice as high as today, Stern said. “But now it’s out of the question.”
By the time that gas from Hellenic Trench sites flow into pipelines, perhaps in the late 2020s or early 2030s, carbon pricing and other disincentives would cut significantly into revenue. And the ever-lower prices of renewables and battery storage dim the prospects for gas even more.
“These wells are going to be orphaned,” said Toby Couture of the Berlin consulting firm E3 Analytics, “and the public purse will be left to take over the clean-up and remediation costs.”
Countries across the Eastern Mediterranean have received overtures from the world’s largest oil giants, including Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Spain’s Repsol, and the French conglomerate Total, all of which are hunting for new vistas since they’ve been stopped from drilling elsewhere. The specter of being a big player on the global gas market might appear tempting to the region’s political leaders, but it is illusory.
The EU could play a constructive role in the Greece-Turkey conflict by helping the three parties declare a moratorium—even if initially for one or two years—on exploration and switch their focus to renewable energies. Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey have immensely favorable conditions for clean energy generation—which they should exploit, with as much help from the EU as possible, rather than sparring over gas fields that will issue nothing but problems for years to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-09--In ‘Da 5 Bloods,’ Vietnam Is Just Another Backdrop for American Pain

In ‘ Da 5 Bloods , ’ Vietnam Is Just Another Backdrop for American Pain Spike Lee ’ s recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war .
It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr. , Muhammad Ali , and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States ’ racism at home to imperialism abroad .
Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye ’ s 1971 anti-war album What ’ s Going On .
With deliberate didacticism , it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ subject , from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg ’ s 1968 film The Green Berets to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola ’ s 1979 film Apocalypse Now , which center the experience of white soldiers .
Yet the movie ’ s heist plot is at variance with its anti-war themes .
Four Black U.S. soldiers return to Vietnam decades after their service , and you are encouraged to cheer as they shoot anonymous Vietnamese gangsters while stealing Vietnamese gold .
Even as it condemns U.S. involvement in Vietnam , the movie reflexively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ thrills .
Lee ’ s anti-war and anti-racist commitments crumble before the firepower of the genre he ’ s working in .
The rules of that genre say that U.S. Vietnam films must be about the United States .
They must show Vietnamese secondary characters getting shot down as part of the spiritual or material journey of the U.S. soldiers you are supposed to identify with .
As Viet Thanh Nguyen wrote in an article about Da 5 Bloods for the New York Times , “ For Vietnamese people , as well as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ role [ in Hollywood films ] is almost always that of the extra , their function : to be helpful , rescued , blamed , analyzed , mocked , abused , raped , killed , spoken for , spoken over , misunderstood or all of the above.
” It is difficult to create a U.S. anti-war film when the United States is unwilling to fully acknowledge the humanity , and the stories , of the roughly 1 million Vietnamese people it helped to kill .
That ’ s been the pattern throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vietnam at the movies .
Instead of trying to see the war through Vietnamese eyes , U.S. filmmakers have tried to convey anti-war messages through two related methods : showing that war is hell and trying to bring the war home .
The ultimate horror is for the United States to become what Vietnam is already assumed to be .
Movies such as Apocalypse Now , Platoon , and Full Metal Jacket use Hollywood ’ s full barrage of special effects to create panoramas of explosions , blood , and terror .
They @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to scare the U.S. public straight into pacifism .
Other films move away from this hyperbolic realism to create fanciful scenarios in which the war is transplanted to the United States .
In First Blood , the distinctly unheroic 1982 launch of the Rambo franchise , U.S. veteran John Rambo ( played by Sylvester Stallone ) terrorizes a small town in Washington state , using Viet Cong tactics to make them experience a war they thought they had safely left overseas and in the past .
Jacob ’ s Ladder , released in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dream , in which the military stalks a veteran through his civilian life , extending a war he can never escape .
The problem with these movies is that intense identification with veterans does not necessarily lead to a repudiation of war .
On the contrary , the slogan “ support the troops ” is typically used in contemporary U.S. discourse by militarists who want to silence antiwar critiques .
First Blood , which was meant at least in part to show civilians the horror of war , gave way in its 1985 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ II , to an orgy of violent validation as Rambo returned to Vietnam to kill lots of people and blow up stuff .
To take the side of veterans can mean ending war , but much more often it means committing more viscerally to victory and killing the enemy .
That ’ s the case in Da 5 Bloods , which , like Rambo , has its veterans return to Vietnam to symbolically complete the mission they left unfinished the first time out .
Instead of suggesting that we owe veterans less war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ victory , in the form of cathartic victories over old enemies and cash payments .
In this vein , Da 5 Bloods ends up effectively conflating reparations owed to Black soldiers as Black people in the United States , which is a moral necessity , and reparations owed to Black soldiers as soldiers in a war of imperial conquest , which is much less righteous , especially when those funds are stolen from the people who were invaded .
The same dynamic is in effect with the “ war is hell ” films @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but it ’ s also a cool and exciting part of narratives about boys becoming men and taking revenge .
Full Metal Jacket , in particular , shows Vietnam as a grubby fantasy of cheap sex workers and male bonding , concluding with the hero shooting a dying woman enemy while a companion breathes in awe , “ Hardcore.
” This is not a recipe for dissuading young men from enlisting .
Indeed , at least one former soldier has written about how the movie helped convince him to sign up .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ protagonists of Vietnam War films , viewers are going to want to be those protagonists—even if the protagonists are morally compromised , even if they die .
U.S. war films that center U.S. soldiers will always end up justifying U.S. wars .
It ’ s illuminating in this respect to look at Vietnamese films about what is known in Vietnam as the American War .
Vietnam ’ s film industry is not large , and movies available in English translation are few and far between .
There are some examples , though .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Girl From Hanoi provides a starkly different view of the conflict than any U.S. film .
The Girl From Hanoi is a frankly propagandistic North Vietnamese production .
It is about a young girl , Ha Ngoc ( played by Lan Huong Nguyen ) whose father goes off to fight the invading U.S. troops .
Her mother dies in a U.S. bombing while trying to save other children .
Ha Ngoc heads toward the front to find her father .
She is helped along the way by other soldiers and civilians , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The movie ends with scenes of the Vietnamese shooting down U.S. planes and an anti-imperialist speech by North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh .
The Girl From Hanoi is not anti-war .
It is anti-imperialist , though , and it does considerably more to question the logic of U.S. intervention than Platoon or even Da 5 Bloods .
After watching U.S. Vietnam films all one ’ s life , it ’ s a shock to see the Vietnamese as the heroes , caring for each other as they are bombed and shot by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. military .
There are more subtle tweaks to Hollywood narratives too .
Linh Dinh at the Guardian has noted that most U.S. Vietnam war movies portray Vietnam as an atavistic nightmare .
“ In Apocalypse Now , ” he writes , “ Vietnam is more or less one continuous jungle , with corpses casually dangling from trees , and arrows and spears flying out of the foliage.
” In fact , Vietnam was heavily urbanized even in the 1970s , and The Girl From Hanoi shows a densely populated country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States with anti-aircraft guns , not arrows .
It was heavy artillery dragged for hundreds of miles that defeated the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu , not jungle skills .
The Girl From Hanoi portrays Vietnamese people as contemporary peers , rather than as a backward culture to be swept away for its own good .
The 1984 film When the Tenth Month Comes is even more bracing for Western viewers .
Written and directed by Dang Nhat Minh in black and white , it may be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ avoids being propaganda .
It tells the story of Duyen ( played by Van Le ) , a woman whose husband has died fighting in the South .
She finds out about his death only a year afterward , and continues to keep the news from his father , her young son , and the village , to spare them and herself .
The only gunfire in the movie is the “ bang !
bang !
” noise that Duyen ’ s son makes when he fires the toy gun she buys him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from his dad .
The story is not about revenge or fighting , but about grief and the relationship between memory , fantasy , and violence .
Duyen is an actress who takes part in a traditional Vietnamese drama about a soldier who fails to return ; she breaks down and flees the stage after singing the lines , “ The seasons will pass , dead flowers and leaves will return to the land.
” At a shrine she meets ghosts of past battles in Vietnam , including her husband , reflecting a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hauntings of the land that persists in Vietnam today .
“ I want those still living to have happiness , ” the ghost says quietly .
U.S. Vietnam War films , including Da 5 Bloods , restage combat over and over , trying to cauterize the wound with more blood .
When the Tenth Month Comes , in contrast , suggests that we honor the dead best by loving each other .
Dayun tries to imagine her way into a world where war didn ’ t take her husband from her .
Doing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but may point a way to a better future .

Spike Lee's recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war. It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr. , Muhammad Ali , and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States' racism at home to imperialism abroad. Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye's 1971 anti-war album What's Going On. With deliberate didacticism, it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates , and implicitly rebukes past films on the subject, from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg’s 1968 film The Green Berets to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now, which center the experience of white soldiers.
Spike Lee’s recent Netflix Vietnam War film Da 5 Bloods is deliberately and forthrightly anti-war. It includes footage of Martin Luther King Jr., Muhammad Ali, and Malcolm X trenchantly connecting the United States’ racism at home to imperialism abroad. Its soundtrack is centered on Marvin Gaye’s 1971 anti-war album What’s Going On. With deliberate didacticism, it points out that Black soldiers were drafted to fight in Vietnam at brutally disproportionate rates, and implicitly rebukes past films on the subject, from John Wayne and Ray Kellogg’s 1968 film The Green Berets to classics such as Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now, which center the experience of white soldiers.
Yet the movie’s heist plot is at variance with its anti-war themes. Four Black U.S. soldiers return to Vietnam decades after their service, and you are encouraged to cheer as they shoot anonymous Vietnamese gangsters while stealing Vietnamese gold. Even as it condemns U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the movie reflexively restages that conflict for the usual violent thrills. Lee’s anti-war and anti-racist commitments crumble before the firepower of the genre he’s working in.
The rules of that genre say that U.S. Vietnam films must be about the United States. They must show Vietnamese secondary characters getting shot down as part of the spiritual or material journey of the U.S. soldiers you are supposed to identify with. As Viet Thanh Nguyen wrote in an article about Da 5 Bloods for the New York Times, “For Vietnamese people, as well as Laotians, Cambodians and Hmong, their role [in Hollywood films] is almost always that of the extra, their function: to be helpful, rescued, blamed, analyzed, mocked, abused, raped, killed, spoken for, spoken over, misunderstood or all of the above.” It is difficult to create a U.S. anti-war film when the United States is unwilling to fully acknowledge the humanity, and the stories, of the roughly 1 million Vietnamese people it helped to kill.
That’s been the pattern throughout the United States’ attempts to engage with Vietnam at the movies. Instead of trying to see the war through Vietnamese eyes, U.S. filmmakers have tried to convey anti-war messages through two related methods: showing that war is hell and trying to bring the war home. The ultimate horror is for the United States to become what Vietnam is already assumed to be.
Movies such as Apocalypse Now, Platoon, and Full Metal Jacket use Hollywood’s full barrage of special effects to create panoramas of explosions, blood, and terror. They emphasize the carnage and chaos of war to scare the U.S. public straight into pacifism.
Other films move away from this hyperbolic realism to create fanciful scenarios in which the war is transplanted to the United States. In First Blood, the distinctly unheroic 1982 launch of the Rambo franchise, U.S. veteran John Rambo (played by Sylvester Stallone) terrorizes a small town in Washington state, using Viet Cong tactics to make them experience a war they thought they had safely left overseas and in the past. Jacob’s Ladder, released in 1990, is a hallucinatory paranoid fever dream, in which the military stalks a veteran through his civilian life, extending a war he can never escape.
The problem with these movies is that intense identification with veterans does not necessarily lead to a repudiation of war. On the contrary, the slogan “support the troops” is typically used in contemporary U.S. discourse by militarists who want to silence antiwar critiques. First Blood, which was meant at least in part to show civilians the horror of war, gave way in its 1985 sequel, Rambo: First Blood Part II, to an orgy of violent validation as Rambo returned to Vietnam to kill lots of people and blow up stuff.
To take the side of veterans can mean ending war, but much more often it means committing more viscerally to victory and killing the enemy. That’s the case in Da 5 Bloods, which, like Rambo, has its veterans return to Vietnam to symbolically complete the mission they left unfinished the first time out. Instead of suggesting that we owe veterans less war, these films suggest we owe veterans victory, in the form of cathartic victories over old enemies and cash payments. In this vein, Da 5 Bloods ends up effectively conflating reparations owed to Black soldiers as Black people in the United States, which is a moral necessity, and reparations owed to Black soldiers as soldiers in a war of imperial conquest, which is much less righteous, especially when those funds are stolen from the people who were invaded.
The same dynamic is in effect with the “war is hell” films. Violence may be meant to dissuade, but it’s also a cool and exciting part of narratives about boys becoming men and taking revenge. Full Metal Jacket, in particular, shows Vietnam as a grubby fantasy of cheap sex workers and male bonding, concluding with the hero shooting a dying woman enemy while a companion breathes in awe, “Hardcore.” This is not a recipe for dissuading young men from enlisting. Indeed, at least one former soldier has written about how the movie helped convince him to sign up. As long as U.S. soldiers are the protagonists of Vietnam War films, viewers are going to want to be those protagonists—even if the protagonists are morally compromised, even if they die. U.S. war films that center U.S. soldiers will always end up justifying U.S. wars.
It’s illuminating in this respect to look at Vietnamese films about what is known in Vietnam as the American War. Vietnam’s film industry is not large, and movies available in English translation are few and far between. There are some examples, though. For instance, the 1975 film The Girl From Hanoi provides a starkly different view of the conflict than any U.S. film.
The Girl From Hanoi is a frankly propagandistic North Vietnamese production. It is about a young girl, Ha Ngoc (played by Lan Huong Nguyen) whose father goes off to fight the invading U.S. troops. Her mother dies in a U.S. bombing while trying to save other children. Ha Ngoc heads toward the front to find her father. She is helped along the way by other soldiers and civilians, and is finally adopted by an artilleryman. The movie ends with scenes of the Vietnamese shooting down U.S. planes and an anti-imperialist speech by North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh.
The Girl From Hanoi is not anti-war. It is anti-imperialist, though, and it does considerably more to question the logic of U.S. intervention than Platoon or even Da 5 Bloods. After watching U.S. Vietnam films all one’s life, it’s a shock to see the Vietnamese as the heroes, caring for each other as they are bombed and shot by the distant, implacable antagonist which is the U.S. military.
There are more subtle tweaks to Hollywood narratives too. Linh Dinh at the Guardian has noted that most U.S. Vietnam war movies portray Vietnam as an atavistic nightmare. “In Apocalypse Now,” he writes, “Vietnam is more or less one continuous jungle, with corpses casually dangling from trees, and arrows and spears flying out of the foliage.” In fact, Vietnam was heavily urbanized even in the 1970s, and The Girl From Hanoi shows a densely populated country, with military tech advanced enough to challenge the United States with anti-aircraft guns, not arrows. It was heavy artillery dragged for hundreds of miles that defeated the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, not jungle skills. The Girl From Hanoi portrays Vietnamese people as contemporary peers, rather than as a backward culture to be swept away for its own good.
The 1984 film When the Tenth Month Comes is even more bracing for Western viewers. Written and directed by Dang Nhat Minh in black and white, it may be the only Vietnamese film of the era that avoids being propaganda. It tells the story of Duyen (played by Van Le), a woman whose husband has died fighting in the South. She finds out about his death only a year afterward, and continues to keep the news from his father, her young son, and the village, to spare them and herself.
The only gunfire in the movie is the “bang! bang!” noise that Duyen’s son makes when he fires the toy gun she buys him, pretending it’s a gift from his dad. The story is not about revenge or fighting, but about grief and the relationship between memory, fantasy, and violence. Duyen is an actress who takes part in a traditional Vietnamese drama about a soldier who fails to return; she breaks down and flees the stage after singing the lines, “The seasons will pass, dead flowers and leaves will return to the land.” At a shrine she meets ghosts of past battles in Vietnam, including her husband, reflecting a real and common belief in the literal hauntings of the land that persists in Vietnam today. “I want those still living to have happiness,” the ghost says quietly.
U.S. Vietnam War films, including Da 5 Bloods, restage combat over and over, trying to cauterize the wound with more blood. When the Tenth Month Comes, in contrast, suggests that we honor the dead best by loving each other. Dayun tries to imagine her way into a world where war didn’t take her husband from her. Doing so doesn’t erase the past, but may point a way to a better future.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-11--Disney’s ‘Mulan’ Disaster Highlights Dangers of China Deals

Disney ’ s Mulan has had a cursed run .
First came the comments of its star Li Yu , who praised Hong Kong ’ s police amid the city ’ s pro-democracy demonstrations , causing outrage in the city .
Then there was the pandemic , pushing back the film ’ s release date and leaving it stuck as an expensive add-on for home screening .
When the movie was finally available , it turned out that its credits thanked the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang , where a few of the outdoor shots were filmed .
Unfortunately , those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ongoing genocide .
Then came the coldest blow .
China , Disney ’ s last , best hope to turn the movie into a hit , silenced all coverage of the film on the mainland a couple of days before its release .
All Disney ’ s pandering to Chinese authorities meant nothing as soon as there was a whiff of political trouble .
With the movie already rated a grim 4.7 out of 10 on Douban , the most popular Chinese film review site , the chance of a word-of-mouth hit was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ project in 2015 , the idea of a marquee blockbuster geared toward the Chinese market made sense .
So , even , did filming in Xinjiang .
To be sure , there were human rights issues , but from a cynical business perspective they were fringe concerns , not blared across the front page .
U.S. lawmakers were making occasional noises about China , but the government wasn ’ t banning swathes of Chinese firms and the president wasn ’ t calling a deadly outbreak “ the China virus.
” Hong Kong was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not an incipient police state .
The whole of Hollywood had spent decades accepting China ’ s limits on movie content ; the last movie criticizing China in any way had been made in 1997 .
Disney ’ s own executives had apologized to China ’ s leaders for making movies about Tibet .
The break-down of China-U.S. relations , combined with the intensification of domestic repression in China under President Xi and the new nationalism of Trumpism , have left businesses struggling to adjust as the ground shifts under their feet .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ or even months ago can be destroyed overnight .
The distance between what firms expected going into dealing with China , and what they ’ re now coping with , is enormous .
To be sure , to some degree that applies to any foreign deal , especially between two countries with a contentious history .
But the sheer speed with which the relationships between China and the rest of the world are snapping makes a mockery of the risk assessments of even a few years ago .
Businesses are now left trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conditions when they started a deal and today .
Disney isn ’ t the only foreign firm to have fallen into the China Gap .
The NBA has lost hundreds of millions of dollars in television revenue after a controversy stemming from comments about Hong Kong .
The English Premier League had its viewership in China slashed by a forced move to a less-watched sports channel because of Britain ’ s complaints over Hong Kong .
Canadian canola oil producers lost their ability to export directly to China , their biggest market , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s arrest of a Huawei executive .
Australian exporters have been repeatedly targeted as Australian-Chinese relations reach new lows .
South Korean supermarket Lotte ’ s entire China operation was closed after a government-sponsored boycott over Seoul ’ s decision to install an American missile defense system , writing off a $ 9.6 billion investment .
Then there are the companies attempting deals with Chinese firms or investors , only to find themselves scuppered by their own government ’ s reaction to Chinese influence or aggression .
India has embarked on a vast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clashes with China in the Himalayas .
The United States is adding to a list of restricted Chinese companies on a weekly basis .
The knock-on effects often hit even firms that aren ’ t directly targeted ; it ’ s now probably illegal , for instance , for any U.S. business to advertise on WeChat—China ’ s biggest advertising platform .
The instinct among businesses has often been to try and wait these changes out .
The scale of the Chinese market is too tempting for anyone to give up on easily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the fight with Norway over the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident in 2011 , the government often softens after a few years .
Political concerns in China are dismissed with the idea that the pendulum will eventually swing back toward more liberal ideas .
But that doesn ’ t make sense today .
China ’ s political pendulum has snapped clean off the chain .
Barring Xi losing power , political paranoia and the xenophobia that comes with it are only going to grow , as they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And Washington ’ s new tone on Beijing isn ’ t going to disappear if President Trump loses .
As Bill Bishop , writer of the Sinocism newsletter , likes to say about any given day , “ Today is the best day in the Sino-US relationship for years , if not decades , to come.
” The other approach for multinational companies is to double down on compliance with Beijing ’ s wishes .
That worked for the hotel chain Marriott , for instance , which offered abject apologies over an employee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Beijing ’ s demands over Taiwan .
Hong Kong-based businesses have lined up to kiss the boot after China ’ s new National Security Law .
But that ’ s now coming with significant costs back home , as the NBA and Mulan scandals show .
Businesses that comply with Chinese demands can expect to find themselves hauled up before Congressional committees , frozen out of U.S. government contracts , and pilloried in the international media .
Yet the temptation of the China market is still there .
Finance companies , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the last year , and brushed off warnings .
That seems like a short-term approach , and one likely to leave them scrambling to get out of the gap that will open underneath them .
“ If you think China-US bilateral tensions will leave your market untouched , then , in the words of Hannah Gadsby , your confidence is making you stupid , ” noted one China analyst .
Firms still dreaming of 1.3 billion customers should wake up ; even if you think you ’ re capable of dealing with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no idea what the China of tomorrow will bring .

Disney’s Mulan has had a cursed run. First came the comments of its star Liu Yifei, who praised Hong Kong’s police amid the city’s pro-democracy demonstrations, causing outrage in the city. Then there was the pandemic, pushing back the film’s release date and leaving it stuck as an expensive add-on for home screening. When the movie was finally available, it turned out that its credits thanked the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang, where a few of the outdoor shots were filmed. Unfortunately, those authorities are also active participants in an ongoing genocide.
Disney’s Mulan has had a cursed run. First came the comments of its star Liu Yifei, who praised Hong Kong’s police amid the city’s pro-democracy demonstrations, causing outrage in the city. Then there was the pandemic, pushing back the film’s release date and leaving it stuck as an expensive add-on for home screening. When the movie was finally available, it turned out that its credits thanked the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang, where a few of the outdoor shots were filmed. Unfortunately, those authorities are also active participants in an ongoing genocide.
Then came the coldest blow. China, Disney’s last, best hope to turn the movie into a hit, silenced all coverage of the film on the mainland a couple of days before its release. All Disney’s pandering to Chinese authorities meant nothing as soon as there was a whiff of political trouble. With the movie already rated a grim 4.7 out of 10 on Douban, the most popular Chinese film review site, the chance of a word-of-mouth hit was small.
But when Disney began the project in 2015, the idea of a marquee blockbuster geared toward the Chinese market made sense. So, even, did filming in Xinjiang. To be sure, there were human rights issues, but from a cynical business perspective they were fringe concerns, not blared across the front page. U.S. lawmakers were making occasional noises about China, but the government wasn’t banning swathes of Chinese firms and the president wasn’t calling a deadly outbreak “the China virus.” Hong Kong was still an oasis of free speech, not an incipient police state. The whole of Hollywood had spent decades accepting China’s limits on movie content; the last movie criticizing China in any way had been made in 1997. Disney’s own executives had apologized to China’s leaders for making movies about Tibet.
The break-down of China-U.S. relations, combined with the intensification of domestic repression in China under President Xi and the new nationalism of Trumpism, have left businesses struggling to adjust as the ground shifts under their feet. A deal inked only a few years or even months ago can be destroyed overnight. The distance between what firms expected going into dealing with China, and what they’re now coping with, is enormous. To be sure, to some degree that applies to any foreign deal, especially between two countries with a contentious history. But the sheer speed with which the relationships between China and the rest of the world are snapping makes a mockery of the risk assessments of even a few years ago. Businesses are now left trying to span the China Gap between the conditions when they started a deal and today.
Disney isn’t the only foreign firm to have fallen into the China Gap. The NBA has lost hundreds of millions of dollars in television revenue after a controversy stemming from comments about Hong Kong. The English Premier League had its viewership in China slashed by a forced move to a less-watched sports channel because of Britain’s complaints over Hong Kong. Canadian canola oil producers lost their ability to export directly to China, their biggest market, for a year thanks to Canada’s arrest of a Huawei executive. Australian exporters have been repeatedly targeted as Australian-Chinese relations reach new lows. South Korean supermarket Lotte’s entire China operation was closed after a government-sponsored boycott over Seoul’s decision to install an American missile defense system, writing off a $9.6 billion investment.
Then there are the companies attempting deals with Chinese firms or investors, only to find themselves scuppered by their own government’s reaction to Chinese influence or aggression. India has embarked on a vast and hasty project of decoupling following its clashes with China in the Himalayas. The United States is adding to a list of restricted Chinese companies on a weekly basis. The knock-on effects often hit even firms that aren’t directly targeted; it’s now probably illegal, for instance, for any U.S. business to advertise on WeChat—China’s biggest advertising platform.
The instinct among businesses has often been to try and wait these changes out. The scale of the Chinese market is too tempting for anyone to give up on easily. For temporary ructions, such as the fight with Norway over the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident in 2011, the government often softens after a few years. Political concerns in China are dismissed with the idea that the pendulum will eventually swing back toward more liberal ideas.
But that doesn’t make sense today. China’s political pendulum has snapped clean off the chain. Barring Xi losing power, political paranoia and the xenophobia that comes with it are only going to grow, as they have done for the last eight years. And Washington’s new tone on Beijing isn’t going to disappear if President Trump loses. As Bill Bishop, writer of the Sinocism newsletter, likes to say about any given day, “Today is the best day in the Sino-US relationship for years, if not decades, to come.”
The other approach for multinational companies is to double down on compliance with Beijing’s wishes. That worked for the hotel chain Marriott, for instance, which offered abject apologies over an employee’s tweet. Foreign airlines complied with Beijing’s demands over Taiwan. Hong Kong-based businesses have lined up to kiss the boot after China’s new National Security Law. But that’s now coming with significant costs back home, as the NBA and Mulan scandals show. Businesses that comply with Chinese demands can expect to find themselves hauled up before Congressional committees, frozen out of U.S. government contracts, and pilloried in the international media.
Yet the temptation of the China market is still there. Finance companies, for instance, have rushed into the country in the last year, and brushed off warnings. That seems like a short-term approach, and one likely to leave them scrambling to get out of the gap that will open underneath them. “If you think China-US bilateral tensions will leave your market untouched, then, in the words of Hannah Gadsby, your confidence is making you stupid,” noted one China analyst. Firms still dreaming of 1.3 billion customers should wake up; even if you think you’re capable of dealing with the China of today, you have no idea what the China of tomorrow will bring.


foreignpolicy--2020-09-10--India and China Have a Trust Deficit

India and China Have a Trust Deficit

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s South Asia Brief , the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity .
Today : Rising tensions between India and China , the Afghan peace deal , protests in Pakistan , and a check-in on the coronavirus pandemic in South Asia .
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China ’ s military is blaming Indian troops , whom it accuses of firing warning shots across the two countries ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a grave military provocation of a vile character.
” If true , the shots would mark the first time that bullets have been fired in that area since 1975 .
While New Delhi concurs that guns were used , however , it claims that it was Beijing that fired them , and that India ’ s soldiers “ exercised great restraint.
” Which of the two versions of events should the world believe ?
We may never know the truth .
Either way , with both countries claiming that guns were used , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escalation .
Already , a deadly brawl between the two countries in June , in which neither side had resorted to using firearms , left 20 Indian soldiers dead .
China hasn ’ t acknowledged any deaths on its side , but reports suggest it may have lost a similar number of troops .
Once forces from the two countries start using guns , the number of casualties in future skirmishes could escalate sharply .
A precedent has been set .
A trust deficit .
One of the things that is becoming increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India and China is that neither side trusts the other .
Just last week , the two countries ’ defense ministers met each other in Moscow to de-escalate the military buildup along their shared border .
And around that time , as the Indian website the Wire reports , Chinese and Indian commanders on the ground in Ladakh spoke with each other about not moving their troops at night .
But without trust , talking accomplished little .
“ The same night , [ the Chinese commander ] moved his men towards our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told the Wire .
It is amid this backdrop of mistrust and allegations that India and China ’ s foreign ministers met on Thursday in Moscow on the sidelines of a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation .
While details will soon emerge about their discussions , the question is how they can reverse the ongoing escalation between the two sides—and whether they can succeed where their defense ministers failed .
The media ’ s role .
More than in most conflicts , the media has an outsized role to play , I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughout the ongoing tensions , reliable information from either country has been hard to come by .
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi , for example , said after the deadly June clash that Chinese forces hadn ’ t intruded on Indian territory—a statement that contradicted satellite evidence .
( Those words , carried live , were later edited out of official video reports on government websites . )
Out of 180 countries ranked for press freedom by Reporters Without Borders , India ranks 142nd and China places 177th .
Neither side has allowed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go near the conflict areas .
Both governments have routinely accused the other side of lying .
And amid these challenges , domestic media on both sides have become increasingly jingoistic .
Not only have they whipped up nationalist fervor and recklessly called for tough responses by their respective governments , they have also “ reported ” on day-to-day developments without corroborating facts on the ground .
Last year , amid border tensions between Pakistan and India , the media played a similar role .
As India ’ s government claimed it shot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claim that Foreign Policy ’ s reporting disproved—Indian media unquestioningly promoted and celebrated New Delhi ’ s version of events .
That strategy ended up creating an opening for India ’ s government to claim victory and step back from the brink of open conflict .
But while that approach may have worked with Pakistan , it is less likely to work with China—a country with a military and an economy that are orders of magnitude larger than India ’ s .
New Delhi needs a different approach to dealing with Beijing .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they need to build trust through transparency .
They need to admit setbacks when they occur and put an end to their collective appetites for nationalist triumphalism .
It takes time to build trust among rivals , but countries can begin by being truthful at home .
Afghan peace talks .
Finally , after months of delays and hurdles , peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are set to begin this weekend in Doha , Qatar , after the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners .
On Wednesday , Afghanistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attack that killed 10 other people .
The Taliban has denied involvement , but Kabul says the attack bore hallmarks of the insurgents ’ Haqqani wing .
Sri Lankan tanker .
The Sri Lanka Navy has towed out to sea a supertanker that caught fire earlier this week .
The tanker contains 2 million barrels of oil , but it appears that that crude has not yet caught fire or leaked ; the fire is believed to have stemmed from an ignition in the ship ’ s engine room .
Pakistan protests .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Friday against French magazine Charlie Hebdo ’ s reprinting of cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed .
Demonstrators shouted “ Death to France ” and called for punishments against blasphemy .
A few days later , on Tuesday , a Pakistani court sentenced a Christian man to death for allegedly sending derogatory text messages about the Prophet Mohammed .
Human rights groups have for years pointed out that Pakistan ’ s blasphemy laws are often misused to target minorities .
India ’ s economy .
Last week , India announced that its economy had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same April-to-May period last year .
The steep decline in economic activity was mostly because of a strict national lockdown .
With the spread of the coronavirus increasing , economic disruptions will continue to harm India ’ s economy .
Coming Out As Dalit , by Yashica Dutt .
Journalist Yashica Dutt grew up hiding her caste .
In her 2019 book , which hasn ’ t yet been released in the United States but is available online , she addresses her background bravely and boldly .
As people around the world discuss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from a Western context , Dutt ’ s work opens a path for people in South Asia to reexamine their own social structures .
Watch out for Dutt ’ s forthcoming writing for Foreign Policy , too .
The International Monetary Fund ’ s take .
Where will the global economy head next ?
Read the Foreign Policy essay by the IMF ’ s managing director , Kristalina Georgieva , and chief economist Gita Gopinath .
The two economists point out that for countries to emerge stronger from the Great Lockdown they will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis , then focus on job creation , and finally build economies that are more inclusive .
Biden and Asia .
Foreign Policy columnist James Crabtree just published a sharp essay that will interest readers of this newsletter .
“ The prospect of a Biden presidency , ” he writes , “ brings back uncomfortable memories of an Obama era that many Asian movers and shakers recall as unfocused and soft toward Beijing .
Whether or not that memory is correct is beside the point .
Biden has an Asian credibility problem—and one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ You can read the full essay here .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: Rising tensions between India and China , the Afghan peace deal , protests in Pakistan , and a check-in on the coronavirus pandemic in South Asia.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief, the weekly newsletter that keeps you up to date on a region that is home to one-fourth of humanity. Today: Rising tensions between India and China, the Afghan peace deal, protests in Pakistan, and a check-in on the coronavirus pandemic in South Asia.
If you would like to receive South Asia Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
India-China Tensions
Who blinked first?
China’s military is blaming Indian troops, whom it accuses of firing warning shots across the two countries’ disputed border on Monday, for “a grave military provocation of a vile character.” If true, the shots would mark the first time that bullets have been fired in that area since 1975. While New Delhi concurs that guns were used, however, it claims that it was Beijing that fired them, and that India’s soldiers “exercised great restraint.”
Which of the two versions of events should the world believe? We may never know the truth. Either way, with both countries claiming that guns were used, Monday’s showdown represents a dangerous escalation. Already, a deadly brawl between the two countries in June, in which neither side had resorted to using firearms, left 20 Indian soldiers dead. China hasn’t acknowledged any deaths on its side, but reports suggest it may have lost a similar number of troops. Once forces from the two countries start using guns, the number of casualties in future skirmishes could escalate sharply. A precedent has been set.
A trust deficit. One of the things that is becoming increasingly clear in the ongoing—and increasingly worrying—tensions between India and China is that neither side trusts the other. Just last week, the two countries’ defense ministers met each other in Moscow to de-escalate the military buildup along their shared border. And around that time, as the Indian website the Wire reports, Chinese and Indian commanders on the ground in Ladakh spoke with each other about not moving their troops at night. But without trust, talking accomplished little. “The same night, [the Chinese commander] moved his men towards our posts,” an Indian government source told the Wire.
It is amid this backdrop of mistrust and allegations that India and China’s foreign ministers met on Thursday in Moscow on the sidelines of a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. While details will soon emerge about their discussions, the question is how they can reverse the ongoing escalation between the two sides—and whether they can succeed where their defense ministers failed.
The media’s role. More than in most conflicts, the media has an outsized role to play, I think. And that’s because throughout the ongoing tensions, reliable information from either country has been hard to come by. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for example, said after the deadly June clash that Chinese forces hadn’t intruded on Indian territory—a statement that contradicted satellite evidence. (Those words, carried live, were later edited out of official video reports on government websites.) Out of 180 countries ranked for press freedom by Reporters Without Borders, India ranks 142nd and China places 177th. Neither side has allowed reporters to embed with armed forces or go near the conflict areas. Both governments have routinely accused the other side of lying. And amid these challenges, domestic media on both sides have become increasingly jingoistic. Not only have they whipped up nationalist fervor and recklessly called for tough responses by their respective governments, they have also “reported” on day-to-day developments without corroborating facts on the ground.
Last year, amid border tensions between Pakistan and India, the media played a similar role. As India’s government claimed it shot down Pakistani F-16s in an aerial dogfight—a claim that Foreign Policy’s reporting disproved—Indian media unquestioningly promoted and celebrated New Delhi’s version of events. That strategy ended up creating an opening for India’s government to claim victory and step back from the brink of open conflict. But while that approach may have worked with Pakistan, it is less likely to work with China—a country with a military and an economy that are orders of magnitude larger than India’s.
New Delhi needs a different approach to dealing with Beijing. If both sides really want to de-escalate, they need to build trust through transparency. They need to admit setbacks when they occur and put an end to their collective appetites for nationalist triumphalism. It takes time to build trust among rivals, but countries can begin by being truthful at home.
What We’re Following The rise of the coronavirus. India is reporting more new daily cases than any other country in the world. And it now has the second-highest number of total cases, behind only the United States. At current rates, India could catch up with the United States by the end of October. Elsewhere in South Asia, Pakistan now has fewer confirmed cases than Bangladesh. The two countries have dramatically slowed down their rates of infection since around Eid al-Adha, the Muslim religious festival, in early August.
Afghan peace talks. Finally, after months of delays and hurdles, peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban are set to begin this weekend in Doha, Qatar, after the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners. On Wednesday, Afghanistan’s vice president survived a bomb attack that killed 10 other people. The Taliban has denied involvement, but Kabul says the attack bore hallmarks of the insurgents’ Haqqani wing.
Sri Lankan tanker. The Sri Lanka Navy has towed out to sea a supertanker that caught fire earlier this week. The tanker contains 2 million barrels of oil, but it appears that that crude has not yet caught fire or leaked; the fire is believed to have stemmed from an ignition in the ship’s engine room.
Pakistan protests. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis protested last Friday against French magazine Charlie Hebdo’s reprinting of cartoons mocking the Prophet Mohammed. Demonstrators shouted “Death to France” and called for punishments against blasphemy. A few days later, on Tuesday, a Pakistani court sentenced a Christian man to death for allegedly sending derogatory text messages about the Prophet Mohammed. Human rights groups have for years pointed out that Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are often misused to target minorities.
South Asia, Inc.
India’s economy. Last week, India announced that its economy had contracted by 23.9 percent compared with the same April-to-May period last year. The steep decline in economic activity was mostly because of a strict national lockdown. With the spread of the coronavirus increasing, economic disruptions will continue to harm India’s economy.
Things to Read.
Coming Out As Dalit, by Yashica Dutt. Journalist Yashica Dutt grew up hiding her caste. In her 2019 book, which hasn’t yet been released in the United States but is available online, she addresses her background bravely and boldly. As people around the world discuss issues of race and inequality, mostly from a Western context, Dutt’s work opens a path for people in South Asia to reexamine their own social structures. Watch out for Dutt’s forthcoming writing for Foreign Policy, too.
The International Monetary Fund’s take. Where will the global economy head next? Read the Foreign Policy essay by the IMF’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, and chief economist Gita Gopinath. The two economists point out that for countries to emerge stronger from the Great Lockdown they will need to first fight the ongoing health crisis, then focus on job creation, and finally build economies that are more inclusive.
Biden and Asia. Foreign Policy columnist James Crabtree just published a sharp essay that will interest readers of this newsletter. “The prospect of a Biden presidency,” he writes, “brings back uncomfortable memories of an Obama era that many Asian movers and shakers recall as unfocused and soft toward Beijing. Whether or not that memory is correct is beside the point. Biden has an Asian credibility problem—and one that may prove tricky to solve.”
You can read the full essay here.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of South Asia Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.