foreignpolicy--2020-07-03--Lawmakers Allege Egyptian Interference in Torture Suit

House lawmakers are accusing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of an attack on the U.S. judicial system , according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy , after authorities arrested family members of an Egyptian American human rights advocate , jailings perceived as an attempt to derail U.S. litigation against high-ranking officials .
The move comes as part of a public and private lobbying effort from U.S. lawmakers to force Egypt to release the father and cousins of Mohamed Soltan , a human rights advocate who spent two years in jail in Egypt .
His family members were detained after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi of ordering his arrest in 2013 and life sentence in prison .
( He was later released and returned to the United States . )
In the letter led by Rep. Tom Malinowski , lawmakers are calling on Sisi and Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Yasser Reda to release Soltan ’ s family members and to reaffirm Soltan ’ s right to sue Beblawi under U.S. law .
The lawmakers deemed the arrests a “ transparent attempt to interfere with and undermine a judicial process in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reprisal came just days after Soltan ’ s suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia .
Soltan accuses Egyptian officials , including Beblawi , of “ attempted extrajudicial killing , ” citing torture and abuse during the 21 months he spent in an Egyptian prison .
Soltan ’ s cousins have been detained since June 15 , according to Human Rights Watch .
Lawmakers said the actions by Egyptian security forces “ can only be interpreted as an effort to intimidate [ Soltan ] into dropping ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Marco Rubio sent a private letter to Reda urging Egypt to “ halt its harassment of the Soltan family , ” Sean Coit , a spokesperson for Coons , told Foreign Policy .
Soltan ’ s father , a prominent member of the government of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Mohamed Morsi , who briefly ruled Egypt after the Arab Spring , was imprisoned alongside him .
Around two weeks ago , Soltan found out that his father had been taken for interrogation .
His whereabouts are unknown .
While foreign leaders are immune @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most circumstances , Beblawi recently moved to McLean , Virginia , after joining the executive board of the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .
That allowed Soltan to bring a lawsuit against him under the Torture Victim Protection Act , a statute that allows U.S. litigation against foreign officials accused of torture or extrajudicial killing .
Egypt has pushed back , retaining American lawyers and asking the State Department to grant Beblawi diplomatic immunity as a representative to the IMF , since the allegations occurred during his time as Egypt ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sisi and Egypt ’ s current intelligence chief , Abbas Kamel , as liable to be sued if they travel to the United States , along with three former interior and security ministry leaders .
“ It ’ s outrageous that they would try to protect a former government official from his responsibility for torture , ” Eric Lewis , Soltan ’ s lawyer , told Foreign Policy .
“ Torture is never a legitimate act of any sovereign government .
So to say well , ‘ Oh , we tortured , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it ’ s authorized ’ —you can ’ t authorize torture .
It is a breach of international law .
It is basically an attempt by the Egyptians to call in a political favor and have the United States give a free pass to torture .
That is contrary to law and contrary to our values.
” Lewis said that other than the official lawsuit , he and his client have not been in contact with any representative from Egypt .
In 2013 , Soltan was shot in the arm and then arrested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces against Morsi supporters .
He was one of the tens of thousands of political prisoners arrested as a result of Beblawi ’ s campaign .
He was eventually released in 2015 after an appeal from the Obama administration .
Despite receiving $ 1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid , Egypt has become known for its frequent human rights abuses , including violent censorship of the press and brutal attacks against religious minorities and its LGBT population .
A 2019 State Department report on human rights conditions in Egypt found that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by its government and forced disappearances .
While Egypt ’ s detentions of American citizens have strained U.S.-Egyptian relations recently , the Trump administration has repeatedly avoided challenging Cairo over perceived human rights abuses .
After the January death of Mustafa Kassem in an Egyptian prison , a dual American and Egyptian citizen , the State Department considered cutting $ 300 million of its $ 1.3 billion aid to Egypt , but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has not moved to do so .
President Donald Trump has also frequently praised Sisi , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictator.
” But as the coronavirus has continued to spread , members of Congress have repeatedly called on Pompeo to urge the release of American citizens incarcerated in Egypt , amid fears of poor health conditions inside Egyptian prisons .
An Egyptian human rights organization reported that 245 detainees died in prison in 2018 from medical neglect .
Yet the response from the Trump administration to the detention of Soltan ’ s family has not been one of outright condemnation .
In response to the arrests of Soltan ’ s family , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Eastern Affairs released a tweet saying , “ We are concerned about reports that relatives of U.S. citizen and former detainee Mohammad Soltan are facing acts of intimidation in # Egypt .
We will continue to monitor the situation and take seriously all allegations of harassment and intimidation.
” Lewis said he is currently talking to the State Department to try to secure the release of Soltan ’ s family .
“ The only coherence coming from the administration is that they like Sisi [ and ] they ’ re not too interested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than bringing U.S. citizens home , ” said Allison McManus , a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy , a Washington think tank .
“ That ’ s what this administration ’ s policy has been in the Middle East : not rocking the boat with allies despite their behavior .
If it ’ s not Iran , it ’ s OK .
”

House lawmakers are accusing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of an attack on the U.S. judicial system, according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy , after authorities arrested family members of an Egyptian American human rights advocate, jailings perceived as an attempt to derail U.S. litigation against high-ranking officials.
House lawmakers are accusing Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of an attack on the U.S. judicial system, according to a letter obtained by Foreign Policy, after authorities arrested family members of an Egyptian American human rights advocate, jailings perceived as an attempt to derail U.S. litigation against high-ranking officials.
The move comes as part of a public and private lobbying effort from U.S. lawmakers to force Egypt to release the father and cousins of Mohamed Soltan, a human rights advocate who spent two years in jail in Egypt. His family members were detained after Soltan filed a lawsuit in June accusing former Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi of ordering his arrest in 2013 and life sentence in prison. (He was later released and returned to the United States.)
In the letter led by Rep. Tom Malinowski, lawmakers are calling on Sisi and Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Yasser Reda to release Soltan’s family members and to reaffirm Soltan’s right to sue Beblawi under U.S. law. The lawmakers deemed the arrests a “transparent attempt to interfere with and undermine a judicial process in the United States.”
Egypt’s apparent reprisal came just days after Soltan’s suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Soltan accuses Egyptian officials, including Beblawi, of “attempted extrajudicial killing,” citing torture and abuse during the 21 months he spent in an Egyptian prison.
Soltan’s cousins have been detained since June 15, according to Human Rights Watch. Lawmakers said the actions by Egyptian security forces “can only be interpreted as an effort to intimidate [Soltan] into dropping” the lawsuit. Sens. Chris Coons and Marco Rubio sent a private letter to Reda urging Egypt to “halt its harassment of the Soltan family,” Sean Coit, a spokesperson for Coons, told Foreign Policy.
Soltan’s father, a prominent member of the government of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Mohamed Morsi, who briefly ruled Egypt after the Arab Spring, was imprisoned alongside him. Around two weeks ago, Soltan found out that his father had been taken for interrogation. His whereabouts are unknown.
While foreign leaders are immune from civil suits in U.S. courts under most circumstances, Beblawi recently moved to McLean, Virginia, after joining the executive board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). That allowed Soltan to bring a lawsuit against him under the Torture Victim Protection Act, a statute that allows U.S. litigation against foreign officials accused of torture or extrajudicial killing.
Egypt has pushed back, retaining American lawyers and asking the State Department to grant Beblawi diplomatic immunity as a representative to the IMF, since the allegations occurred during his time as Egypt’s prime minister. The lawsuit also names Sisi and Egypt’s current intelligence chief, Abbas Kamel, as liable to be sued if they travel to the United States, along with three former interior and security ministry leaders.
“It’s outrageous that they would try to protect a former government official from his responsibility for torture,” Eric Lewis, Soltan’s lawyer, told Foreign Policy. “Torture is never a legitimate act of any sovereign government. So to say well, ‘Oh, we tortured, and he was prime minister, and therefore it’s authorized’—you can’t authorize torture. It is a breach of international law. It is basically an attempt by the Egyptians to call in a political favor and have the United States give a free pass to torture. That is contrary to law and contrary to our values.” Lewis said that other than the official lawsuit, he and his client have not been in contact with any representative from Egypt.
In 2013, Soltan was shot in the arm and then arrested after Beblawi authorized a crackdown by security forces against Morsi supporters. He was one of the tens of thousands of political prisoners arrested as a result of Beblawi’s campaign. He was eventually released in 2015 after an appeal from the Obama administration.
Despite receiving $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid, Egypt has become known for its frequent human rights abuses, including violent censorship of the press and brutal attacks against religious minorities and its LGBT population. A 2019 State Department report on human rights conditions in Egypt found that the country frequently committed abuses including arbitrary killings by its government and forced disappearances.
While Egypt’s detentions of American citizens have strained U.S.-Egyptian relations recently, the Trump administration has repeatedly avoided challenging Cairo over perceived human rights abuses. After the January death of Mustafa Kassem in an Egyptian prison, a dual American and Egyptian citizen, the State Department considered cutting $300 million of its $1.3 billion aid to Egypt, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has not moved to do so. President Donald Trump has also frequently praised Sisi, calling the Egyptian leader “my favorite dictator.”
But as the coronavirus has continued to spread, members of Congress have repeatedly called on Pompeo to urge the release of American citizens incarcerated in Egypt, amid fears of poor health conditions inside Egyptian prisons. An Egyptian human rights organization reported that 245 detainees died in prison in 2018 from medical neglect.
Yet the response from the Trump administration to the detention of Soltan’s family has not been one of outright condemnation. In response to the arrests of Soltan’s family, the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs released a tweet saying, “We are concerned about reports that relatives of U.S. citizen and former detainee Mohammad Soltan are facing acts of intimidation in #Egypt. We will continue to monitor the situation and take seriously all allegations of harassment and intimidation.” Lewis said he is currently talking to the State Department to try to secure the release of Soltan’s family.
“The only coherence coming from the administration is that they like Sisi [and] they’re not too interested in getting involved in rights issues other than bringing U.S. citizens home,” said Allison McManus, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, a Washington think tank.
“That’s what this administration’s policy has been in the Middle East: not rocking the boat with allies despite their behavior. If it’s not Iran, it’s OK.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--These Countries Reformed Their Brutal, Biased Police. The U.S. Can,Too.

These Countries Reformed Their Brutal , Biased Police .
The U.S. Can , Too .
In Bogotá , the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station .
In Monterrey , Mexico , it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas , the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded .
In the United States , the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform , activists and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck .
The United States is far from the only country where police brutality , corruption , or biased treatment of parts of the population have driven demands for reform .
Success , however , has been rare—not because reformers don ’ t know what policies to implement , but because the required reforms were blocked or didn ’ t stick .
To increase the odds of successful police reform , U.S. activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries and communities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , what works for fair and effective policing is well known .
Decades of research confirm that trust between law enforcement and communities is essential , because controlling crime requires community help .
In the United States and Britain , for instance , the vast majority of the crimes that people fear the most , such as homicide and rape , required public tips to solve .
Building trust , however , is based less on bringing down crime ( the metric many police monitor ) than on treating people with respect and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a force that resembles the community it serves ( although sadly , diversity doesn ’ t necessarily reduce police violence ) .
Finally , hiring more women in law enforcement—a strategy Peru used to break perceptions of widespread corruption—results in more trust and less use of force .
Once officers have gained a community ’ s trust , they can use public tips to implement policies proven to drastically reduce crime , such as targeting hot spots ( the small number of places where most violence happens ) , and focusing deterrence on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vast majority of violent crime to prevent them from resorting to violence .
Executing both strategies with respect and fairness is , needless to say , essential to their effectiveness .
The problem is getting police—and political leaders—to make these changes and make them stick .
In the past few weeks , the United States has taken the first steps .
Politicians are on notice from the vocal , voting middle class .
That step is crucial—even in Venezuela , one of the world ’ s most violent countries , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political power that bear the brunt of overly violent and underresponsive policing .
In every democracy where systemic police abuse has been tackled , change usually began when the broader public started to care .
As a result of this pressure , the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a police reform bill ; various U.S. states and communities are making changes as well .
Legal changes , however , aren ’ t enough .
Well-meaning reforms often get bogged down under the assumption that change is a technical process .
But formal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Different ways of organizing police have found success as long as they kept an eye on the overall goal : a culture of community service reinforced with clear incentives and ongoing accountability .
For instance , most jurisdictions opt for selectively firing particularly abusive or corrupt officers .
But some—including the countries of El Salvador and Georgia and the cities of Bogotá and Camden , New Jersey—have disbanded entire police forces , rehiring only officers who passed stringent tests .
Which is a better strategy ?
Trick question .
Both options can bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purge is accompanied by significant , ongoing investment of political capital to reinforce a new culture through incentives , norms , and swift , ongoing , external accountability .
In Georgia , for instance , if one officer on a shift was found to take a bribe , all the officers on that shift would be fired .
That ensured that customs and border guards , the most corrupt part of law enforcement in Georgia at the time , held each other accountable .
Conversely , in 1995 , Colombia ’ s police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government then cut oversight by slashing the small accountability office ’ s budget and eventually closing it altogether .
The new police became just as corrupt and abusive as their predecessors—until the next reform effort took place .
One reason for the more extreme strategy of mass firing is that it can be among the few ways for reform-minded politicians to disband police unions that , in their quest for workers ’ rights , prevent corrupt and abusive agents from being fired .
Unions play an awkward role : While they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change—such as promoting best performers or putting new recruits at the cutting edge of reform so that they are immediately acculturated to where the organization wants to go .
The key to accountability is for policymakers grappling with reform to be independent from the police themselves and from ongoing political pressure .
The most committed politicians prevent slippage by ensuring that their own fortunes rise and fall with the success of police reform .
In Bogotá , former Mayor Antanas Mockus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more civil , less criminal police .
He demanded daily briefings from the police force and experimented with policies from mass firing to hiring mimes to regulate traffic .
In Medellín , Colombia , former Mayor Sergio Fajardo required police statistics to be maintained by an independent agency and made public monthly .
Such pressure kept the reform agenda front and center .
Growing crime , however , can undermine the ability of even the most reform-minded politicians to hold the line .
Often , police and politicians erroneously view efforts to improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ odds with police effectiveness .
Increased crime leads to public clamor for “ toughness ” —and tough-on-crime policies nearly always offer greater impunity for the use of force by police .
Despite actually causing crime to increase , these tough-sounding policies are election winners in nearly every democracy .
If crime rises , reform will backslide , even if reform is the best way to bring crime back down.While labor unions are essential for democracy , in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ passive subjects of reform .
Unwilling officers can slow-walk any policy change—whether by willful subversion or half-hearted implementation—until attention flags or political will dissolves .
Deep reform requires that police accept change .
Reforms only stick when they ’ re done with police , not against them .
Officers must co-create a new culture that only they can realize and embody .
Awkwardly , at the very moment police are most reviled , they need a vision of what they could be and an enhanced sense of their status as professionals , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
To achieve those goals , the president of Georgia attended the start of the first new class of cadets , and constantly spoke about the importance of democratic and honest policing .
For police to embrace reform , they must see the change as enhancing their mission and daily work .
It was not hard to convince officers in Tbilisi , Georgia , where police corruption was rampant , that honesty would aid effectiveness .
Sadly , while demilitarizing police forces is standard international practice for successful reform , many police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to be persuaded that regulating their use of force , giving up military technology , and abandoning a military mindset will make them safer and their work more effective .
If support within the ranks of police is essential , that will require activists to change their approach .
Calling for defunding or disbanding the police obviously won ’ t win the latter over .
In other cases , it ’ s a matter of how demands for reform are communicated .
For example , when activists call for removing mental health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only on real crime , that may actually be quite popular among police untrained in mental issues and unhappy with mission creep .
Selling this as a sensible , pro-police measure—rather than as part of punishment by defunding—would require a change in messaging that activists may be unwilling to make .
If activists can make that hard pivot to try to win over police , it would also help them overcome the greatest danger to police reform—polarization .
If the forces of law and order face off against those demanding equity and social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During Italy ’ s “ Years of Lead ” in the 1970s and early ’ 80s , that kind of irreconcilable polarization allowed for police to work hand in glove with neofascists , while far-left extremists turned to the terrorist Red Brigades .
Police kept their fascist-era organization , ethos , and behavior while violence spiraled .
The same polarization led to decades of growing state violence and stalled reform in Colombia , several countries in Central America , and other homicide hot spots .
It ’ s hard to ask activists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law enforcement now , as videos of active and retired officers murdering unarmed U.S. citizens circulate .
But some level of understanding is going to be necessary for real reform .
Psychologists claim that anger and violence are often fueled by fear .
Many officers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from policing a violent , armed society ; the profession is grappling with high suicide rates .
Honest cops fear their violent and dishonest colleagues .
In the 1970s , the scholar Hans Toch found that police who were afraid but unable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to use excessive force .
Society pays the price .
With about 800,000 officers in 18,000 police forces and a long legacy of unequal or blatantly racist policing , the United States requires one of the biggest and most difficult reform efforts any country has ever faced .
Lasting democratic police reform everywhere is hard and rare .
Change may start with outrage , but its proponents must gird themselves with seriousness of purpose .
For African Americans to be protected by and from the police , as all citizens should expect , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on .

In Bogotá, the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station. In Monterrey, Mexico, it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas, the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded. In the United States, the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform, activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck.
In Bogotá, the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station. In Monterrey, Mexico, it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas, the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded. In the United States, the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform, activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck.
The United States is far from the only country where police brutality, corruption, or biased treatment of parts of the population have driven demands for reform. Success, however, has been rare—not because reformers don’t know what policies to implement, but because the required reforms were blocked or didn’t stick. To increase the odds of successful police reform, U.S. activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries and communities where changes succeeded and stuck.
Luckily, what works for fair and effective policing is well known. Decades of research confirm that trust between law enforcement and communities is essential, because controlling crime requires community help. In the United States and Britain, for instance, the vast majority of the crimes that people fear the most, such as homicide and rape, required public tips to solve.
Building trust, however, is based less on bringing down crime (the metric many police monitor) than on treating people with respect and fairness. Trust is enhanced by recruiting a force that resembles the community it serves (although sadly, diversity doesn’t necessarily reduce police violence). Finally, hiring more women in law enforcement—a strategy Peru used to break perceptions of widespread corruption—results in more trust and less use of force.
Once officers have gained a community’s trust, they can use public tips to implement policies proven to drastically reduce crime, such as targeting hot spots (the small number of places where most violence happens), and focusing deterrence on the tiny percentage of people responsible for the vast majority of violent crime to prevent them from resorting to violence. Executing both strategies with respect and fairness is, needless to say, essential to their effectiveness.
The problem is getting police—and political leaders—to make these changes and make them stick. In the past few weeks, the United States has taken the first steps. Politicians are on notice from the vocal, voting middle class. That step is crucial—even in Venezuela, one of the world’s most violent countries, it is the most marginalized communities with the least political power that bear the brunt of overly violent and underresponsive policing. In every democracy where systemic police abuse has been tackled, change usually began when the broader public started to care. As a result of this pressure, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a police reform bill; various U.S. states and communities are making changes as well.
Legal changes, however, aren’t enough. Well-meaning reforms often get bogged down under the assumption that change is a technical process. But formal reorganizations don’t change behavior. Different ways of organizing police have found success as long as they kept an eye on the overall goal: a culture of community service reinforced with clear incentives and ongoing accountability.
For instance, most jurisdictions opt for selectively firing particularly abusive or corrupt officers. But some—including the countries of El Salvador and Georgia and the cities of Bogotá and Camden, New Jersey—have disbanded entire police forces, rehiring only officers who passed stringent tests.
Which is a better strategy? Trick question. Both options can bring about systemic change—but only when the initial purge is accompanied by significant, ongoing investment of political capital to reinforce a new culture through incentives, norms, and swift, ongoing, external accountability.
In Georgia, for instance, if one officer on a shift was found to take a bribe, all the officers on that shift would be fired. That ensured that customs and border guards, the most corrupt part of law enforcement in Georgia at the time, held each other accountable. Conversely, in 1995, Colombia’s police reform entailed firing 5,000 officers, but the government then cut oversight by slashing the small accountability office’s budget and eventually closing it altogether. The new police became just as corrupt and abusive as their predecessors—until the next reform effort took place.
One reason for the more extreme strategy of mass firing is that it can be among the few ways for reform-minded politicians to disband police unions that, in their quest for workers’ rights, prevent corrupt and abusive agents from being fired. Unions play an awkward role: While they are essential for democracy, in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change—such as promoting best performers or putting new recruits at the cutting edge of reform so that they are immediately acculturated to where the organization wants to go.
The key to accountability is for policymakers grappling with reform to be independent from the police themselves and from ongoing political pressure. The most committed politicians prevent slippage by ensuring that their own fortunes rise and fall with the success of police reform. In Bogotá, former Mayor Antanas Mockus ran on a platform of creating a more civil, less criminal police. He demanded daily briefings from the police force and experimented with policies from mass firing to hiring mimes to regulate traffic. In Medellín, Colombia, former Mayor Sergio Fajardo required police statistics to be maintained by an independent agency and made public monthly. Such pressure kept the reform agenda front and center.
Growing crime, however, can undermine the ability of even the most reform-minded politicians to hold the line. Often, police and politicians erroneously view efforts to improve the treatment of citizens as inherently at odds with police effectiveness. Increased crime leads to public clamor for “toughness”—and tough-on-crime policies nearly always offer greater impunity for the use of force by police. Despite actually causing crime to increase, these tough-sounding policies are election winners in nearly every democracy. If crime rises, reform will backslide, even if reform is the best way to bring crime back down.While labor unions are essential for democracy, in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change.
Police, meanwhile, aren’t passive subjects of reform. Unwilling officers can slow-walk any policy change—whether by willful subversion or half-hearted implementation—until attention flags or political will dissolves.
Deep reform requires that police accept change. Reforms only stick when they’re done with police, not against them. Officers must co-create a new culture that only they can realize and embody. Awkwardly, at the very moment police are most reviled, they need a vision of what they could be and an enhanced sense of their status as professionals, in their own eyes and those of the community. To achieve those goals, the president of Georgia attended the start of the first new class of cadets, and constantly spoke about the importance of democratic and honest policing.
For police to embrace reform, they must see the change as enhancing their mission and daily work. It was not hard to convince officers in Tbilisi, Georgia, where police corruption was rampant, that honesty would aid effectiveness. Sadly, while demilitarizing police forces is standard international practice for successful reform, many police in the United States and elsewhere still need to be persuaded that regulating their use of force, giving up military technology, and abandoning a military mindset will make them safer and their work more effective.
If support within the ranks of police is essential, that will require activists to change their approach. Calling for defunding or disbanding the police obviously won’t win the latter over. In other cases, it’s a matter of how demands for reform are communicated. For example, when activists call for removing mental health calls from police dockets and focusing officers only on real crime, that may actually be quite popular among police untrained in mental issues and unhappy with mission creep. Selling this as a sensible, pro-police measure—rather than as part of punishment by defunding—would require a change in messaging that activists may be unwilling to make.
If activists can make that hard pivot to try to win over police, it would also help them overcome the greatest danger to police reform—polarization. If the forces of law and order face off against those demanding equity and social justice, the fight is already lost. During Italy’s “Years of Lead” in the 1970s and early ’80s, that kind of irreconcilable polarization allowed for police to work hand in glove with neofascists, while far-left extremists turned to the terrorist Red Brigades. Police kept their fascist-era organization, ethos, and behavior while violence spiraled. The same polarization led to decades of growing state violence and stalled reform in Colombia, several countries in Central America, and other homicide hot spots.
It’s hard to ask activists or anyone else to have empathy for law enforcement now, as videos of active and retired officers murdering unarmed U.S. citizens circulate. But some level of understanding is going to be necessary for real reform. Psychologists claim that anger and violence are often fueled by fear. Many officers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from policing a violent, armed society; the profession is grappling with high suicide rates. Honest cops fear their violent and dishonest colleagues. In the 1970s, the scholar Hans Toch found that police who were afraid but unable to admit their fear were more likely to use excessive force. Society pays the price.
With about 800,000 officers in 18,000 police forces and a long legacy of unequal or blatantly racist policing, the United States requires one of the biggest and most difficult reform efforts any country has ever faced. Lasting democratic police reform everywhere is hard and rare. Change may start with outrage, but its proponents must gird themselves with seriousness of purpose. For African Americans to be protected by and from the police, as all citizens should expect, reformers must begin now and keep the pressure on.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-03--IMF Loans Will Further Entrench Corruption in Egypt

IMF Loans Will Further Entrench Corruption in Egypt On June 26 , the executive board of the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) voted to disburse an additional $ 5.2 billion to Egypt .
While purporting to offset Egypt ’ s economic woes , the funds will also be used to reward those still loyal to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi , who has overseen the torture of thousands of political prisoners , including Americans .
Now , Egypt ’ s massive and ongoing counterrevolution can only succeed with the complicity of international actors who provide billions in financial aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promoting structural reform of Egypt ’ s economy , the IMF loan will further entrench and protect an economy dominated by security services and state-owned enterprises .
Sisi rose to power after a military coup on July 3 , 2013 , that toppled President Mohamed Morsi , the country ’ s first democratically elected president since the founding of the republic in 1953 .
Sisi had the financial backing of powerful Persian Gulf monarchs with little interest in the spread of democracy in their neighborhood .
This shored up Egypt ’ s faltering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new post-coup regime .
The IMF loans to Egypt—totaling some $ 20 billion since 2016—now serve a similar function.Egypt ’ s massive and ongoing counterrevolution can only succeed with the complicity of international actors .
Hazem el-Beblawi is a key civilian figure in Egypt ’ s highly corrupt military regime under Sisi .
As the interim prime minister after the 2013-14 coup , Beblawi presided over the bloodiest period in modern Egyptian history .
His government ordered security forces to open fire on anti-coup protesters at the Rabaa sit-in in August 2013 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ single day .
Unable to quell the protests with brute force alone , Beblawi ’ s cabinet then issued a protest law even more draconian than the assembly law issued by British colonial authorities in 1914 , effectively banning public gatherings of more than 10 people .
Beblawi now sits on the IMF executive board , giving him undue influence over funneling IMF money to his allies in the Egyptian government .
A U.S. citizen who survived an assassination attempt during the Rabaa massacre is beginning to expose the web of relations between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ notorious sycophants .
A graduate of Ohio State University , Mohamed Soltan grew up mainly in the Midwestern United States , but was attending the Rabaa sit-in in August 2013 where he was shot by security forces .
Soltan was subsequently imprisoned for almost two years and subjected to inhumane treatment , including being left alone in a cell next to a decomposing corpse .
Prison guards encouraged him to commit suicide .
After a high-level intervention by the Obama administration , Soltan was finally released and sent back to the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a landmark lawsuit , Soltan brought a case against his former torturers .
Citing the Torture Victim Protection Act , Beblawi stands accused of having “ directed and monitored ” the mistreatment of Soltan while he spent 643 days in prison .
Soltan brought the lawsuit against Beblawi on June 1 , five years after his release from prison .
On June 9 and again on June 15 , security forces launched coordinated raids against Soltan ’ s family members across multiple governorates in Egypt .
Five of his cousins were arrested at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Alexandria and Menofia governorates .
The security officers had no arrest warrants and gave no reason for arresting Soltan ’ s cousins .
They did , however , reportedly tell his cousins that if Soltan drops the case against Beblawi , they would be released .
On the same day , unidentified policemen visited Soltan ’ s father , Salah Soltan , in the Wadi al-Natroun prison .
He has been imprisoned since the 2013 coup , and has now been moved to an undisclosed location .
The message Sisi ’ s regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Drop the case against Beblawi or we will continue to hold your family hostage .
This course of events seems to have done little to deter the IMF .
Soltan ’ s case is emblematic of the systemic financial corruption and egregious torture in Egypt .
In March 2016 , Sisi fired Hisham Geneina , the head of the Central Auditing Agency , after Geneina reported that Egypt had lost 600 billion Egyptian pounds ( about $ 76 billion ) because of official corruption .
Geneina was subsequently sentenced to five years in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Sisi empowered with the mandate to “ fight corruption ” is the Administrative Control Authority ( ACA ) .
Although nominally a civilian institution , the ACA has surveillance powers and the ability to arrest and interrogate suspects .
Sisi placed one of his sons in a high-ranking position in the ACA and has used the agency to tighten his personal grip over Egypt ’ s sprawling state bureaucracy .
There are virtually no independent oversight agencies left in Egypt , meaning there is almost no guarantee that the IMF ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hands of sinister actors .
But it ’ s not too late to change course.A corrupt system does not absolve individuals of responsibility .
Eight human rights organizations have petitioned the IMF to ensure that mechanisms are in place that guarantee the $ 5.2 billion will be used not to reward Sisi loyalists , but rather for their intended purposes of supporting inclusive growth , improving fiscal transparency , and increasing social spending .
The $ 5.2 billion will be disbursed over three tranches .
While the first tranche will be released immediately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be released after a review process .
The release of the second two tranches should be conditional .
At the very least , the IMF should require that an independent audit and report on how the initial IMF funds were spent be made available to the public .
The IMF has rightly identified corruption as a key threat to achieving economic stability in Egypt , but a corrupt system does not absolve individuals of responsibility .
At the same time Beblawi served as prime minister , Mohammed el-Baradei was serving alongside him as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Rabaa massacre , Baradei resigned in protest over the slaughter of civilians .
But Beblawi continues to act as cheerleader for Sisi ’ s brutal regime .
The new managing director of the IMF , Kristalina Georgieva , appears interested in tackling corruption .
If she is serious , she should impose conditionalities related to governance and transparency on successive loans to Egypt .
This should include establishing a truly independent agency to monitor the use of IMF funds .
This could be done by restoring the independence of the Egyptian Central @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that now allows Sisi to appoint and fire the director .
This would be a game-changing decision , sending a signal that IMF funds can not be used as patronage for dictators .
The IMF may also want to reconsider the optics of having Beblawi , whose cabinet presided over the Rabaa massacre and who stands accused of torturing a U.S. citizen , on its executive board .

On June 26, the executive board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) voted to disburse an additional $5.2 billion to Egypt. While purporting to offset Egypt’s economic woes, the funds will also be used to reward those still loyal to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has overseen the torture of thousands of political prisoners, including Americans. Now, Egypt’s massive and ongoing counterrevolution can only succeed with the complicity of international actors who provide billions in financial aid to the post-coup regime. Instead of promoting structural reform of Egypt’s economy, the IMF loan will further entrench and protect an economy dominated by security services and state-owned enterprises.
On June 26, the executive board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) voted to disburse an additional $5.2 billion to Egypt. While purporting to offset Egypt’s economic woes, the funds will also be used to reward those still loyal to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has overseen the torture of thousands of political prisoners, including Americans. Now, Egypt’s massive and ongoing counterrevolution can only succeed with the complicity of international actors who provide billions in financial aid to the post-coup regime. Instead of promoting structural reform of Egypt’s economy, the IMF loan will further entrench and protect an economy dominated by security services and state-owned enterprises.
Sisi rose to power after a military coup on July 3, 2013, that toppled President Mohamed Morsi, the country’s first democratically elected president since the founding of the republic in 1953. Sisi had the financial backing of powerful Persian Gulf monarchs with little interest in the spread of democracy in their neighborhood. This shored up Egypt’s faltering economy and ensured the survival of the new post-coup regime. The IMF loans to Egypt—totaling some $20 billion since 2016—now serve a similar function.Egypt’s massive and ongoing counterrevolution can only succeed with the complicity of international actors.
Hazem el-Beblawi is a key civilian figure in Egypt’s highly corrupt military regime under Sisi. As the interim prime minister after the 2013-14 coup, Beblawi presided over the bloodiest period in modern Egyptian history. His government ordered security forces to open fire on anti-coup protesters at the Rabaa sit-in in August 2013, killing more than 900 people in a single day. Unable to quell the protests with brute force alone, Beblawi’s cabinet then issued a protest law even more draconian than the assembly law issued by British colonial authorities in 1914, effectively banning public gatherings of more than 10 people. Beblawi now sits on the IMF executive board, giving him undue influence over funneling IMF money to his allies in the Egyptian government.
A U.S. citizen who survived an assassination attempt during the Rabaa massacre is beginning to expose the web of relations between the IMF and Egypt’s most notorious sycophants. A graduate of Ohio State University, Mohamed Soltan grew up mainly in the Midwestern United States, but was attending the Rabaa sit-in in August 2013 where he was shot by security forces. Soltan was subsequently imprisoned for almost two years and subjected to inhumane treatment, including being left alone in a cell next to a decomposing corpse. Prison guards encouraged him to commit suicide.
After a high-level intervention by the Obama administration, Soltan was finally released and sent back to the United States in 2015. In what could be a landmark lawsuit, Soltan brought a case against his former torturers. Citing the Torture Victim Protection Act, Beblawi stands accused of having “directed and monitored” the mistreatment of Soltan while he spent 643 days in prison.
Soltan brought the lawsuit against Beblawi on June 1, five years after his release from prison. On June 9 and again on June 15, security forces launched coordinated raids against Soltan’s family members across multiple governorates in Egypt. Five of his cousins were arrested at the same time from their homes in Alexandria and Menofia governorates. The security officers had no arrest warrants and gave no reason for arresting Soltan’s cousins. They did, however, reportedly tell his cousins that if Soltan drops the case against Beblawi, they would be released. On the same day, unidentified policemen visited Soltan’s father, Salah Soltan, in the Wadi al-Natroun prison. He has been imprisoned since the 2013 coup, and has now been moved to an undisclosed location. The message Sisi’s regime is sending to Soltan is clear: Drop the case against Beblawi or we will continue to hold your family hostage. This course of events seems to have done little to deter the IMF.
Soltan’s case is emblematic of the systemic financial corruption and egregious torture in Egypt. In March 2016, Sisi fired Hisham Geneina, the head of the Central Auditing Agency, after Geneina reported that Egypt had lost 600 billion Egyptian pounds (about $76 billion) because of official corruption. Geneina was subsequently sentenced to five years in prison. One of the state agencies that Sisi empowered with the mandate to “fight corruption” is the Administrative Control Authority (ACA). Although nominally a civilian institution, the ACA has surveillance powers and the ability to arrest and interrogate suspects. Sisi placed one of his sons in a high-ranking position in the ACA and has used the agency to tighten his personal grip over Egypt’s sprawling state bureaucracy. There are virtually no independent oversight agencies left in Egypt, meaning there is almost no guarantee that the IMF’s aid will not end up in the hands of sinister actors.
But it’s not too late to change course.A corrupt system does not absolve individuals of responsibility.
Eight human rights organizations have petitioned the IMF to ensure that mechanisms are in place that guarantee the $5.2 billion will be used not to reward Sisi loyalists, but rather for their intended purposes of supporting inclusive growth, improving fiscal transparency, and increasing social spending. The $5.2 billion will be disbursed over three tranches. While the first tranche will be released immediately, the subsequent two tranches will only be released after a review process. The release of the second two tranches should be conditional. At the very least, the IMF should require that an independent audit and report on how the initial IMF funds were spent be made available to the public.
The IMF has rightly identified corruption as a key threat to achieving economic stability in Egypt, but a corrupt system does not absolve individuals of responsibility. At the same time Beblawi served as prime minister, Mohammed el-Baradei was serving alongside him as vice president. On the day of the Rabaa massacre, Baradei resigned in protest over the slaughter of civilians. But Beblawi continues to act as cheerleader for Sisi’s brutal regime.
The new managing director of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, appears interested in tackling corruption. If she is serious, she should impose conditionalities related to governance and transparency on successive loans to Egypt. This should include establishing a truly independent agency to monitor the use of IMF funds. This could be done by restoring the independence of the Egyptian Central Auditing Organization and revoking the executive decree that now allows Sisi to appoint and fire the director. This would be a game-changing decision, sending a signal that IMF funds cannot be used as patronage for dictators. The IMF may also want to reconsider the optics of having Beblawi, whose cabinet presided over the Rabaa massacre and who stands accused of torturing a U.S. citizen, on its executive board.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-03--White House to Interview Defense Officials in Perceived Loyalty Test

A pair of 20-something White House staffers will begin conducting interviews with political appointees at the Defense Department starting next week , three current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy , a move that some fear could lead to more dismissals of Pentagon officials considered disloyal to President Donald Trump .
The White House liaison office sent an email to political appointees at the Pentagon on Wednesday , inviting officials to schedule a meeting with representatives from the Presidential Personnel Office ( PPO ) .
The message , described in detail to Foreign Policy , touts the meetings as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ off their credentials for a position in a possible second Trump term .
Advertised as “ office calls , ” the meetings over the course of several weeks will include each political appointee in the Pentagon , from presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed appointees to their subordinates , according to the email .
“ This is an opportunity for each appointee to discuss their career and interests for 2021 and beyond , ” the email said .
The interviews will be conducted by two subordinates of John McEntee , Trump ’ s former body @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : John Troup Hemenway , an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia , and Jordan Hayley , who graduated from Liberty University in June and heads up PPO ’ s external relations .
Politico first reported in April that Hayley had joined PPO , after Hemenway was brought on in March .
“ These meetings were set up by DoD so that our political appointees could discuss second-term opportunities at the Department and throughout the administration , ” Chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Rath Hoffman told Foreign Policy .
Though the email described @ @ @ @ @ @ @ appointed Pentagon officials , a defense official said senior officials such as Defense Secretary Mark Esper are not intended to participate and described the meetings as nonmandatory .
Following interviews at the Pentagon , White House personnel are also expected to interview appointees at the State Department and Department of Homeland Security in the coming weeks , officials familiar with the matter said .
But current and former officials who spoke to Foreign Policy worry that the 30-minute interviews will be used to root out officials who aren ’ t seen as sufficiently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has been rocked by the recent departures of several top appointees who broke with the White House on the hold of military aid to Ukraine or had ties to Trump ’ s political foes .
“ I think the assumption is correct—aligned with Trump or you ’ re out , ” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy .
“ Suffice it to say that in my 30 years in government I am unaware of anything quite like this , ” Eric Edelman , a former Pentagon policy chief during the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Policy in an email .
Foreign Policy reported this week that the McEntee-led PPO has been pushing for Rich Higgins , a former National Security Council staffer under Trump fired for a memo that alleged “ deep state ” political actors were conspiring to overthrow the president , to be hired for a top job in the Pentagon over objections from inside the department .
Moving loyalists into political appointments at the Pentagon could position them to move into higher-level jobs if Trump is reelected in November .
The news of the interviews @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perceived as disloyal to Trump .
The resignation of Kathryn Wheelbarger , who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs for nearly two years , will become effective on Saturday , after the White House dropped her intended nomination for a top Pentagon intelligence post .
Other recent Pentagon exits appear to be casualties of the House ’ s impeachment of Trump .
Elaine McCusker resigned her role as acting comptroller in June .
She was removed from consideration for the permanent post after raising questions about Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the center of the impeachment trial .
Former Pentagon policy chief John Rood was also fired in February after finding himself at odds with the president on Ukraine and other behind-the-scenes clashes with the White House .
Reelected presidents often send out top White House officials to head up U.S. government agencies during their second terms .
President George W. Bush tapped his national security advisor , Condoleezza Rice , as secretary of state in 2005 after a narrow reelection win .
President Barack Obama tried to float then-U.S .
Ambassador to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be secretary of state in 2013 , but she removed herself from consideration after the Benghazi attacks.w Former Pentagon officials told Foreign Policy that it ’ s normal for the White House liaison office at the Defense Department to informally check in with political appointees .
It ’ s also not unusual for churn at the end of any administration , and first-term administrations often map out potential personnel changes in advance of a potential second term , said Jim Townsend , a former Pentagon official who served as Obama ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and NATO issues for eight years .
If the review leads to resignations or the removals of officials , former officials say there appears to be little basis in past precedent .
“ I think it ’ s fair that you want to do an evaluation of the appointees and current roles , but I ’ ve never heard of anyone doing a political litmus test between one term and the next , ” a former Pentagon official said .
“ It ’ s very odd.
” “ What this White House personnel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are good for the job with the right expertise but complete loyalists … regardless of whether they ’ re fit for the job , ” Townsend said .
“ This is more about factions within a faction , ” said Edelman , who served in four U.S. administrations .
“ Or a Stalinoid search for ‘ wreckers ’ or ‘ right-wing deviationists.
’ ” “ Shouldn ’ t they have done this vetting before appointing noncareer people ?
” said Kori Schake , the director of foreign and defense policy studies at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ State Department official during the George W. Bush administration .
She suggested the White House ’ s renewed interest in loyalty tests could be linked to the quick repudiation by top Pentagon officials , including the defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , of Trump ’ s efforts to politicize the military during recent nationwide protests over police brutality .
“ They ’ ll try and put supine advocates into position to eliminate the possibility of future repudiations , ” she said .
Other officials painted this as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a potential second term .
“ The president has a right to his personnel and the PPO has right to make sure the president has people in government there to enact his agenda , ” said one U.S. official .
“ That to me is a good governance effort.
” Hayley , the other PPO official who will be conducting the interviews , told a Liberty alumni publication last month that PPO is “ the one putting people in place to shape policies.
” “ We are trying to find people with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said in the profile .
The Trump administration has struggled to staff the Pentagon and other agencies for years , as much of the Republican establishment disavowed serving under Trump .
Even many who did , such as former Defense Secretary James Mattis and former National Security Advisor H.R .
McMaster , were soon defenestrated .
With two more departures this month , the Pentagon will have 20 Senate-confirmed positions that are vacant or held by acting officials , according to a Politico tally .
Townsend said the White House personnel office will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people to serve at the end of the administration , especially with Trump ’ s reelection prospects so uncertain .
Even if he wins reelection , many conservative foreign-policy experts could be reluctant to go back into government .
“ I ’ m not sure A-listers and B-listers will be excited to go in .
They see what happened in the first term and saw how people like Mattis and McMaster were so burned , ” he said .
“ You ’ re not going to see lifeboats rowing toward the Titanic with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” Townsend said .
Update , July 3 , 2020 : This article was updated with new comments from a U.S. official .

A pair of 20-something White House staffers will begin conducting interviews with political appointees at the Defense Department starting next week, three current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy , a move that some fear could lead to more dismissals of Pentagon officials considered disloyal to President Donald Trump.
A pair of 20-something White House staffers will begin conducting interviews with political appointees at the Defense Department starting next week, three current and former U.S. officials told Foreign Policy, a move that some fear could lead to more dismissals of Pentagon officials considered disloyal to President Donald Trump.
The White House liaison office sent an email to political appointees at the Pentagon on Wednesday, inviting officials to schedule a meeting with representatives from the Presidential Personnel Office (PPO). The message, described in detail to Foreign Policy, touts the meetings as a platform for noncareer officials to show off their credentials for a position in a possible second Trump term.
Advertised as “office calls,” the meetings over the course of several weeks will include each political appointee in the Pentagon, from presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed appointees to their subordinates, according to the email. “This is an opportunity for each appointee to discuss their career and interests for 2021 and beyond,” the email said.
The interviews will be conducted by two subordinates of John McEntee, Trump’s former body man who now runs the personnel office: John Troup Hemenway, an undergraduate student at the University of Virginia, and Jordan Hayley, who graduated from Liberty University in June and heads up PPO’s external relations. Politico first reported in April that Hayley had joined PPO, after Hemenway was brought on in March.
“These meetings were set up by DoD so that our political appointees could discuss second-term opportunities at the Department and throughout the administration,” Chief Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Rath Hoffman told Foreign Policy.
Though the email described to Foreign Policy appears to include all appointed Pentagon officials, a defense official said senior officials such as Defense Secretary Mark Esper are not intended to participate and described the meetings as nonmandatory. Following interviews at the Pentagon, White House personnel are also expected to interview appointees at the State Department and Department of Homeland Security in the coming weeks, officials familiar with the matter said.
But current and former officials who spoke to Foreign Policy worry that the 30-minute interviews will be used to root out officials who aren’t seen as sufficiently loyal to Trump, as the Pentagon has been rocked by the recent departures of several top appointees who broke with the White House on the hold of military aid to Ukraine or had ties to Trump’s political foes.
“I think the assumption is correct—aligned with Trump or you’re out,” a former senior Trump administration official told Foreign Policy.
“Suffice it to say that in my 30 years in government I am unaware of anything quite like this,” Eric Edelman, a former Pentagon policy chief during the George W. Bush administration, told Foreign Policy in an email.
Foreign Policy reported this week that the McEntee-led PPO has been pushing for Rich Higgins, a former National Security Council staffer under Trump fired for a memo that alleged “deep state” political actors were conspiring to overthrow the president, to be hired for a top job in the Pentagon over objections from inside the department. Moving loyalists into political appointments at the Pentagon could position them to move into higher-level jobs if Trump is reelected in November.
The news of the interviews also comes after high-profile departures of officials perceived as disloyal to Trump. The resignation of Kathryn Wheelbarger, who performed the duties of assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs for nearly two years, will become effective on Saturday, after the White House dropped her intended nomination for a top Pentagon intelligence post.
Other recent Pentagon exits appear to be casualties of the House’s impeachment of Trump. Elaine McCusker resigned her role as acting comptroller in June. She was removed from consideration for the permanent post after raising questions about Trump’s aid freeze to Ukraine at the center of the impeachment trial. Former Pentagon policy chief John Rood was also fired in February after finding himself at odds with the president on Ukraine and other behind-the-scenes clashes with the White House.
Reelected presidents often send out top White House officials to head up U.S. government agencies during their second terms. President George W. Bush tapped his national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, as secretary of state in 2005 after a narrow reelection win. President Barack Obama tried to float then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice as his pick to be secretary of state in 2013, but she removed herself from consideration after the Benghazi attacks.w
Former Pentagon officials told Foreign Policy that it’s normal for the White House liaison office at the Defense Department to informally check in with political appointees. It’s also not unusual for churn at the end of any administration, and first-term administrations often map out potential personnel changes in advance of a potential second term, said Jim Townsend, a former Pentagon official who served as Obama’s deputy assistant secretary of defense on European and NATO issues for eight years.
If the review leads to resignations or the removals of officials, former officials say there appears to be little basis in past precedent.
“I think it’s fair that you want to do an evaluation of the appointees and current roles, but I’ve never heard of anyone doing a political litmus test between one term and the next,” a former Pentagon official said. “It’s very odd.”
“What this White House personnel office is looking for is not people who are good for the job with the right expertise but complete loyalists … regardless of whether they’re fit for the job,” Townsend said.
“This is more about factions within a faction,” said Edelman, who served in four U.S. administrations. “Or a Stalinoid search for ‘wreckers’ or ‘right-wing deviationists.’”
“Shouldn’t they have done this vetting before appointing noncareer people?” said Kori Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior State Department official during the George W. Bush administration. She suggested the White House’s renewed interest in loyalty tests could be linked to the quick repudiation by top Pentagon officials, including the defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Trump’s efforts to politicize the military during recent nationwide protests over police brutality.
“They’ll try and put supine advocates into position to eliminate the possibility of future repudiations,” she said.
Other officials painted this as a routine matter for an administration readying itself for a potential second term.
“The president has a right to his personnel and the PPO has right to make sure the president has people in government there to enact his agenda,” said one U.S. official. “That to me is a good governance effort.”
Hayley, the other PPO official who will be conducting the interviews, told a Liberty alumni publication last month that PPO is “the one putting people in place to shape policies.”
“We are trying to find people with certain perspectives and values,” Hayley said in the profile.
The Trump administration has struggled to staff the Pentagon and other agencies for years, as much of the Republican establishment disavowed serving under Trump. Even many who did, such as former Defense Secretary James Mattis and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, were soon defenestrated. With two more departures this month, the Pentagon will have 20 Senate-confirmed positions that are vacant or held by acting officials, according to a Politico tally.
Townsend said the White House personnel office will find it increasingly difficult to get quality people to serve at the end of the administration, especially with Trump’s reelection prospects so uncertain. Even if he wins reelection, many conservative foreign-policy experts could be reluctant to go back into government.
“I’m not sure A-listers and B-listers will be excited to go in. They see what happened in the first term and saw how people like Mattis and McMaster were so burned,” he said.
“You’re not going to see lifeboats rowing toward the Titanic with top people eager to get on board,” Townsend said.
Update, July 3, 2020: This article was updated with new comments from a U.S. official.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-03--Putin’s Russia Gets Voters’ Rubber Stamp

Welcome to While You Weren ’ t Looking , Foreign Policy ’ s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news .
Here ’ s what we ’ re watching this week : Russia ’ s constitutional referendum means that President Vladimir Putin could remain in power until 2036 , the assassination of a popular Ethiopian musician inflames ethnic tensions , and an investigation exposes the Chinese government ’ s use of forced sterilization in Xinjiang .
If you would like to receive While You Weren ’ t Looking in your inbox on Fridays , please sign up here .
I distinctly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sitting in a restaurant in Tver , Russia , a friend told me that recent changes to the constitution would enable Vladimir Putin to return to power for another 12 years once then-President Dmitry Medvedev ’ s time was up .
Putin had cracked down on the independent media and presided over a brutal counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya , and the thought of him remaining in power until 2024 was then a daunting prospect for both Russia and the world .
Over the past week , Russian voters overwhelmingly approved new changes to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , already Russia ’ s longest-serving leader since Joseph Stalin , run for two more terms in office .
He could remain in power through 2036 .
The vote , which was delayed by the pandemic , took place over a week to prevent crowding at polling stations .
It was seen as a foregone conclusion .
At least two weeks before the vote , Russian bookstores were selling recently printed copies of the constitution that included the new amendments .
Russian lawmakers approved the changes earlier this year , and there was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the plebiscite gives an important veneer of legitimacy to Putin , who has long sought to avoid the appearance of an unseemly power grab .
It also comes after the president ’ s approval ratings reached a record low of 59 percent in March .
A raft of changes .
Voters were asked to vote yes or no on a single package of over 200 measures , the biggest shake-up to the constitution since it was adopted in 1993 .
Many of the changes will serve to gird the conservative and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , including a ban on same-sex marriage , measures to prevent senior officials from holding foreign passports or bank accounts , and a move to constitutionally enshrine the “ historical truth ” of World War II .
( Putin has been accused of rewriting history of the war to both foment patriotism and throw mud at neighbors . )
Another provision prevents the surrender of any Russian territory , a bid to cement Russia ’ s authority over Crimea .
Credible turnout ?
According to Russia ’ s Central Election Commission , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , with turnout at around 65 percent .
In a statement published Wednesday as polls closed , the independent election watchdog Golos detailed severe shortcomings with the way in which the campaign and referendum were conducted , including accusations of ballot-stuffing , voter coercion , and double-voting .
The European Union has called for an investigation of reports of irregularities .
Violent clashes in Ethiopia .
More than 80 people have been killed this week in Ethiopia ’ s Oromia region after violent clashes were triggered by the assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Monday .
Haacaaluu was a vocal advocate for the country ’ s largest ethnic group , the Oromo , who have historically been marginalized economically and politically .
The killing has inflamed long-standing grievances .
On Wednesday , the military was deployed to the streets of the Ethiopian capital .
Haacaaluu ’ s music galvanized the anti-government protests in 2015 led by the Oromo and the Amhara ethnic group that culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2018 .
The appointment of Abiy Ahmed , an Oromo , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end to almost three decades of dominance by the hard-line Tigrayan People ’ s Liberation Front party .
Abiy has embarked on an ambitious program of reforms , but analysts fear they may have lifted the lid on simmering tensions between religious and ethnic groups .
Cultural genocide in Xinjiang .
The Chinese government is routinely subjecting Uighurs and other ethnic minorities to pregnancy checks , forced birth control , forced abortion , and sterilization in a bid to slash birth rates among the country ’ s Muslims , according to an investigation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In the Xinjiang region , where the Chinese government has waged a campaign to stamp out Uighur cultural identity , birth rates have plummeted since 2017—falling 24 percent in 2019 .
This population control has coincided with the abolition of the one-child policy for the rest of the Chinese population , lucrative offers intended to lure more people from the Han majority to move to Xinjiang , and efforts to encourage interethnic marriages .
“ These findings indicate that Beijing is complementing its pursuit of cultural genocide in Xinjiang with a campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ writes in Foreign Policy .
Billion-dollar drug bust .
On Wednesday , police in Italy announced that they had intercepted a $ 1 billion stash of the synthetic drug Captagon en route from Syria to Europe .
They found more than 84 million tablets , the largest seizure of the amphetamine drug in history .
Captagon is known to be used by Islamic State fighters to keep them alert during battle , while the terrorist organization ’ s production and sale of the drug has brought in crucial revenue streams .
“ We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the production and distribution of synthetic drugs in Europe practically ground to a halt and therefore many traffickers have turned to Syria , where production does not seem to have slowed down during the pandemic , ” Col. Domenico Napolitano , the commander of the Guardia di Finanza of Naples , told the Guardian .
1 million displaced .
Since the year began , 1 million people have been forced to flee their homes due to ongoing violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo , the U.N. High Commissioner for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Babar Baloch said that there had been an alarming increase in the number of attacks by armed groups on displaced people : as they fled , in hosting areas , and as they have tried to return to their homes .
Conflict has raged in eastern Congo since the mid-1990s , making it one of the most protracted and complicated humanitarian crises in the world .
More than 5 million people have been displaced within Congo since 2017 , and 1 million more have sought refuge in neighboring countries .
Government control in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of armed groups vying for power and territory .
A mystery elephant die-off .
Since the beginning of May , more than 350 elephants have died from unknown causes in Botswana in what scientists have described as a “ conservation disaster.
” The bodies of the elephants have been found intact and with their tusks , ruling out poaching .
An outbreak of the bacteria anthrax , found naturally in soil , killed over 100 elephants in the country last fall , but it has also been ruled out .
Other possible causes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Authorities in Botswana , where ecotourism contributes to 10 to 12 percent of GDP , have been criticized for not responding quickly enough .
The illegal fishing industry .
A fleet of Iranian vessels is engaged in one of the world ’ s largest illegal fishing operations off the coast of Somalia , according to analysis released Monday by the nonprofit Global Fishing Watch and the NGO Trygg Mat Tracking .
Tracking information revealed that some 200 Iranian vessels are operating in the exclusive economic zones of Somalia and Yemen , depleting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insecurity .
That ’ s it for this week .
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Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to While You Weren’t Looking, Foreign Policy’s weekly newsletter focused on non-coronavirus news.
Here’s what we’re watching this week: Russia’s constitutional referendum means that President Vladimir Putin could remain in power until 2036, the assassination of a popular Ethiopian musician inflames ethnic tensions, and an investigation exposes the Chinese government’s use of forced sterilization in Xinjiang.
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It’s Official: Putin Could Rule Until 2036
I distinctly remember the moment in 2009 when, sitting in a restaurant in Tver, Russia, a friend told me that recent changes to the constitution would enable Vladimir Putin to return to power for another 12 years once then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s time was up. Putin had cracked down on the independent media and presided over a brutal counterterrorism campaign in Chechnya, and the thought of him remaining in power until 2024 was then a daunting prospect for both Russia and the world.
Over the past week, Russian voters overwhelmingly approved new changes to the constitution that will now let Putin, already Russia’s longest-serving leader since Joseph Stalin, run for two more terms in office. He could remain in power through 2036. The vote, which was delayed by the pandemic, took place over a week to prevent crowding at polling stations. It was seen as a foregone conclusion. At least two weeks before the vote, Russian bookstores were selling recently printed copies of the constitution that included the new amendments.
Russian lawmakers approved the changes earlier this year, and there was no legal requirement to hold a referendum. But the plebiscite gives an important veneer of legitimacy to Putin, who has long sought to avoid the appearance of an unseemly power grab. It also comes after the president’s approval ratings reached a record low of 59 percent in March.
A raft of changes. Voters were asked to vote yes or no on a single package of over 200 measures, the biggest shake-up to the constitution since it was adopted in 1993. Many of the changes will serve to gird the conservative and nationalist turn taken under Putin’s leadership, including a ban on same-sex marriage, measures to prevent senior officials from holding foreign passports or bank accounts, and a move to constitutionally enshrine the “historical truth” of World War II. (Putin has been accused of rewriting history of the war to both foment patriotism and throw mud at neighbors.) Another provision prevents the surrender of any Russian territory, a bid to cement Russia’s authority over Crimea.
Credible turnout? According to Russia’s Central Election Commission, 78 percent of voters supported the changes, with turnout at around 65 percent. In a statement published Wednesday as polls closed, the independent election watchdog Golos detailed severe shortcomings with the way in which the campaign and referendum were conducted, including accusations of ballot-stuffing, voter coercion, and double-voting. The European Union has called for an investigation of reports of irregularities.
What We’re Following
Violent clashes in Ethiopia. More than 80 people have been killed this week in Ethiopia’s Oromia region after violent clashes were triggered by the assassination of Haacaaluu Hundeessaa, a popular musician, in Addis Ababa on Monday. Haacaaluu was a vocal advocate for the country’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, who have historically been marginalized economically and politically. The killing has inflamed long-standing grievances. On Wednesday, the military was deployed to the streets of the Ethiopian capital.
Haacaaluu’s music galvanized the anti-government protests in 2015 led by the Oromo and the Amhara ethnic group that culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2018. The appointment of Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, as prime minister the same year brought an end to almost three decades of dominance by the hard-line Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front party. Abiy has embarked on an ambitious program of reforms, but analysts fear they may have lifted the lid on simmering tensions between religious and ethnic groups.
Cultural genocide in Xinjiang. The Chinese government is routinely subjecting Uighurs and other ethnic minorities to pregnancy checks, forced birth control, forced abortion, and sterilization in a bid to slash birth rates among the country’s Muslims, according to an investigation published by the Associated Press on Monday. In the Xinjiang region, where the Chinese government has waged a campaign to stamp out Uighur cultural identity, birth rates have plummeted since 2017—falling 24 percent in 2019.
This population control has coincided with the abolition of the one-child policy for the rest of the Chinese population, lucrative offers intended to lure more people from the Han majority to move to Xinjiang, and efforts to encourage interethnic marriages. “These findings indicate that Beijing is complementing its pursuit of cultural genocide in Xinjiang with a campaign of ethno-racial supremacy,” Adrian Zenz writes in Foreign Policy.
Billion-dollar drug bust. On Wednesday, police in Italy announced that they had intercepted a $1 billion stash of the synthetic drug Captagon en route from Syria to Europe. They found more than 84 million tablets, the largest seizure of the amphetamine drug in history. Captagon is known to be used by Islamic State fighters to keep them alert during battle, while the terrorist organization’s production and sale of the drug has brought in crucial revenue streams.
“We believe that, during the COVID-19 lockdown, the production and distribution of synthetic drugs in Europe practically ground to a halt and therefore many traffickers have turned to Syria, where production does not seem to have slowed down during the pandemic,” Col. Domenico Napolitano, the commander of the Guardia di Finanza of Naples, told the Guardian.
Keep an Eye On
1 million displaced. Since the year began, 1 million people have been forced to flee their homes due to ongoing violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said on Tuesday. Agency spokesperson Babar Baloch said that there had been an alarming increase in the number of attacks by armed groups on displaced people: as they fled, in hosting areas, and as they have tried to return to their homes.
Conflict has raged in eastern Congo since the mid-1990s, making it one of the most protracted and complicated humanitarian crises in the world. More than 5 million people have been displaced within Congo since 2017, and 1 million more have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Government control in the region is weak, with dozens of armed groups vying for power and territory.
A mystery elephant die-off. Since the beginning of May, more than 350 elephants have died from unknown causes in Botswana in what scientists have described as a “conservation disaster.” The bodies of the elephants have been found intact and with their tusks, ruling out poaching. An outbreak of the bacteria anthrax, found naturally in soil, killed over 100 elephants in the country last fall, but it has also been ruled out. Other possible causes are poisoning or an unknown disease. Authorities in Botswana, where ecotourism contributes to 10 to 12 percent of GDP, have been criticized for not responding quickly enough.
The illegal fishing industry. A fleet of Iranian vessels is engaged in one of the world’s largest illegal fishing operations off the coast of Somalia, according to analysis released Monday by the nonprofit Global Fishing Watch and the NGO Trygg Mat Tracking. Tracking information revealed that some 200 Iranian vessels are operating in the exclusive economic zones of Somalia and Yemen, depleting the fishing stocks of countries with chronic food insecurity.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-07-04--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

DO N'T LOSE ACCESS : Your IP access to ForeignPolicy.com will expire on June 15 .
An opportunity existed in the earliest days of the United States to abolish slavery , but the founders opted to delay the debate in the interests of stability .
Meanwhile , attacks on the press have always been commonplace in authoritarian regimes , but they are creeping into democratic societies , too .
And U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s attempts to pressure Iran have only emboldened those in Tehran opposed to negotiations with the United States .
In an effort to stabilize the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Founding Fathers pushed off the question of slavery , prolonging the institution and helping to create racial divisions that remain today , Foreign Policy ’ s Michael Hirsh writes .
An increasing number of attacks on the media have occurred in places where press freedom was once enshrined , Sushma Raman writes .
3 .
The Chinese Communist Party Wants a Han Baby Boom That Isn ’ t Coming China never formally ended its one-child policy , but now public allies of the government are calling for explicit childbearing subsidies , Lyman @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Becoming Immune to U.S. Pressure U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s bellicose rhetoric and actions have not made Iran more inclined to make a deal , but they have undermined any Iranian officials who supported negotiations with the United States , Sina Toossi writes .
5 .
This Time , Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win Russia has been quietly working in the background to enhance its ties with the Taliban , with a view toward exorcising the failings of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s , Sajjan M. Gohel and @ @ @ @

An opportunity existed in the earliest days of the United States to abolish slavery, but the founders opted to delay the debate in the interests of stability.
An opportunity existed in the earliest days of the United States to abolish slavery, but the founders opted to delay the debate in the interests of stability.
Meanwhile, attacks on the press have always been commonplace in authoritarian regimes, but they are creeping into democratic societies, too.
And U.S. President Donald Trump’s attempts to pressure Iran have only emboldened those in Tehran opposed to negotiations with the United States.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
George Washington and some of the more than 300 enslaved people who worked at Mount Vernon
In an effort to stabilize the United States in its early years, the Founding Fathers pushed off the question of slavery, prolonging the institution and helping to create racial divisions that remain today, Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh writes.
Media at Minneapolis Protest
An increasing number of attacks on the media have occurred in places where press freedom was once enshrined, Sushma Raman writes.
A girl wearing a face mask plays on her scooter at a park in Beijing on Feb. 15.
China never formally ended its one-child policy, but now public allies of the government are calling for explicit childbearing subsidies, Lyman Stone writes.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf gives an address during the 2017 Iranian presidential election.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s bellicose rhetoric and actions have not made Iran more inclined to make a deal, but they have undermined any Iranian officials who supported negotiations with the United States, Sina Toossi writes.
Taliban spokesman Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai greets a participant during the opening of the two-day talks between the Taliban and Afghan opposition representatives.
Russia has been quietly working in the background to enhance its ties with the Taliban, with a view toward exorcising the failings of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s, Sajjan M. Gohel and Allison Bailey write.