foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--Washington Still Wants China to Be a Responsible Stakeholder

Washington Still Wants China to Be a Responsible Stakeholder The U.S. policy community has produced no shortage of strategies for competing with China .
Increasingly frustrated that the long-standing U.S. policy of engagement failed to turn Beijing into a “ responsible stakeholder , ” the Trump administration , along with a bipartisan cross section of Washington ’ s policy community , changed tact .
Their competitive strategies are willing to impose costs on Beijing , restrict economic engagement , and tolerate greater bilateral friction to push back on China and more aggressively defend U.S. interests .
But competition , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an end in itself .
What , then , do these competitive strategies seek to achieve ?
Washington ’ s objectives in shaping China ’ s international behavior remain largely unchanged , even as the means for achieving them have shifted .
This is seldom acknowledged , in part because it doesn ’ t fit comfortably with the narratives of either hawks or doves on China .
In addition to deterring Chinese aggression and maintaining its strategic position in the region , the United States is still trying to shape China into a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
In other words , it continues to seek to shape China into a “ responsible stakeholder , ” just as Robert Zoellick famously called for 15 years ago .
Thus , those that suggest the responsible-stakeholder approach is “ dead ” overstate just how much has changed for a wide swath of Washington .
To be sure , today ’ s vision of China as a responsible stakeholder is a less ambitious one .
No one expects Beijing to altogether stop doing business with unsavory regimes , and Washington , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an economically less interdependent relationship .
However , much as Zoellick outlined , Washington continues to aspire to shape China into a state that “ not only adjusts to the international rules , ” but also works “ with us to sustain the international system ” and helps to “ address the challenges of the new century.
” As long as transforming China into a responsible stakeholder remains a U.S. objective , the United States would do well not only to acknowledge it but to publicize it to China and the world .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s policies have put the U.S.-China relationship on a confrontational path , its May 2020 white paper on competition with China is clear that it does “ not seek to contain China ’ s development.
” Rather , it aims to compel China “ to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior.
” Among the norms most commonly cited by the administration are those that Zoellick urged China to abide by in 2005—for example , to adhere to the terms of international agreements , embrace transparency and accountability , and resolve its territorial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over its first three years in office , the administration also continues to seek to enlist China ’ s help in achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula , the principal international challenge Zoellick called on China to help address .
Alongside its competitive and often inflammatory language ( which is addressed below ) , the Trump White House declares that the United States “ stands ready to welcome China ’ s positive contributions ” and hopes that the United States and China can cooperate “ in ways that benefit the peace , stability , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the biggest change in the administration ’ s objectives have come in the economic domain .
The administration has moved to reduce U.S. dependence on China-based supply chains and to limit Chinese participation in sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy and those of its allies .
While this is an important change in U.S. policy , the administration has been clear that its “ approach is to not exclude China.
” Rather , it aims to put an end to “ unfair Chinese trade practices ” and compel Beijing to “ protect intellectual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States-China economic relationship.
” These were all goals articulated by Zoellick in 2005 .
In pursuit of these and other objectives , the administration embraced the tactics of reciprocity , the use of which now enjoys bipartisan support .
By establishing a tit-for-tat dynamic , reciprocity seeks to incentivize China to lower trade and investment barriers , decrease government subsidies , lift visa restrictions on foreign journalists , and provide U.S. diplomats with greater access to Chinese society .
Reciprocity aims to compel Beijing to adhere to international rules and norms by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration has largely maintained the goal of shaping China into a responsible stakeholder , senior officials ’ use of inflammatory ideological rhetoric has obscured this fact and worked at cross purposes with it .
In a high-profile July speech , Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that the Chinese Communist Party threatens the world with a “ new tyranny , ” suggested that the Party ’ s rule in China is illegitimate , and implied that the United States must work to change China ’ s domestic political system .
U.S. hopes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ existed uneasily alongside the reassuring message of welcoming China ’ s rise as a responsible stakeholder .
But it is difficult to see how such rhetoric does not entirely undermine U.S. declarations that its goals are limited to altering Beijing ’ s behavior and that it aspires to partner with China to sustain the international system .
The result has been a confused—if not incoherent—articulation of U.S. China policy .
While most of Washington ’ s broader policy community has avoided such provocative rhetoric , it shares the administration ’ s aim to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President-elect Joe Biden has stated that he would confront Beijing by working with U.S. allies to “ to shape the rules of the road ” in a way “ China can ’ t afford to ignore.
” His objective is not to reduce China ’ s access to the international system but to ensure that Beijing stays involved and plays by the rules .
He has also said that he will maintain the Trump administration ’ s tariffs on Chinese goods and use them as “ leverage ” to advance the same economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has called for partnering with China to address “ climate change , nonproliferation , and global health security , ” just as Zoellick sought to have Beijing work with the United States on “ energy conservation and efficiency ” and to combat “ the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction , poverty , [ and ] disease.
” The president-elect also seeks to work with Beijing in a “ coordinated campaign … to advance our shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea.
” Jake Sullivan , the incoming national security adviser , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , have similarly advocated establishing reciprocity to force Beijing to “ start complying with trade rules ” and envision China as an “ essential partner ” in addressing a number of the biggest transnational challenges .
With few exceptions , proposals from across the political spectrum continue to seek to shape China into a responsible stakeholder .
A competitive strategy written by analysts at a left-leaning Washington think tank aims to have China use its “ growing capabilities to address global challenges , ” calling for Beijing to play “ an increasingly active @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and outcomes.
” To this end , they encourage Washington “ to create more space within the international governance system for China.
” Two scholars at a right-leaning think tank propose applying pressure on the Chinese Communist Party so great that it either “ modifies its objectives or loses its grip on power.
” They are explicit , however , that Washington should “ leave the door open ” for China to become a responsible stakeholder , providing an off-ramp from the pressure they suggest applying and implying that the modifications they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a responsible stakeholder .
When the White House says that it does not seek “ a particular end state for China ” and others suggest that Washington should not aim to achieve a “ definitive end state ” in its competition with Beijing , they may be referring to China ’ s domestic political system .
However , much of Washington does seek to achieve a particular end state for China : They seek to transform it into a responsible stakeholder .
As long as this remains a de facto U.S. objective @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Senior Chinese leaders themselves now publicly state what they long would say only privately and via state media : The United States does not in fact welcome China ’ s rise and instead seeks to contain it .
It will be difficult to convince Beijing otherwise but , because such a belief is sure to exacerbate bilateral competition and doom any possibility of shaping Beijing into a responsible stakeholder , it would be foolish for Washington not to make every effort to counter it .
In this regard , simply denying that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is far less compelling than offering Beijing the affirmative and familiar vision of it as a responsible stakeholder , one that will compel Chinese leaders to reflect on the enduring aspirations of U.S.-China policy .
Washington should also note that Beijing need not simply take its word for it : It should encourage Beijing to test its commitment to reciprocity by positively altering its behavior in ways requiring reciprocal U.S. action .
Calling for China to be a responsible stakeholder has always been an ambitious and principled objective—and , as ever , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should seek to maximize the likelihood of success while minimizing the costs and risks of failure .
Doing so does not require making unilateral concessions or placing faith in the miraculous , socializing power of participation into the international system .
It requires the United States to hew closely to the logic of reciprocity , altering the mix and sequencing of the carrots and sticks it presents to Beijing to incentivize constructive behavior and penalize its opposite .
It also requires the United States to abandon the maximalist rhetoric of democratizing China and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up to its commitments to treat its citizens humanely .
Critically , even if Beijing never comes around , declaring that the United States continues to seek to shape China into a responsible stakeholder is also a valuable message to send to partners around the world .
It will help to reassure the many states increasingly concerned about being pulled into a maelstrom of deteriorating U.S.-China ties that far from seeking conflict with China , or regime change in Beijing , the United States desires to welcome it into the community of responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the responsible-stakeholder objective , Washington can help debunk the oft-stated Chinese refrain that the United States is seeking to create a new cold war with China , a message Beijing leverages to present itself as a geopolitical victim and to alienate partners from Washington .
Needless to say , no element of U.S. strategy toward China is more important than its objectives .
If U.S. policymakers neglect to recognize that , even as competition with Beijing intensifies and relations deteriorate , they still seek to transform China into a responsible stakeholder , they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what winning looks like .
And if they can not compellingly express their objectives to Beijing and the world , they are almost certain to compete ineffectively .

The U.S. policy community has produced no shortage of strategies for competing with China. Increasingly frustrated that the long-standing U.S. policy of engagement failed to turn Beijing into a “responsible stakeholder,” the Trump administration, along with a bipartisan cross section of Washington’s policy community, changed tact. Their competitive strategies are willing to impose costs on Beijing, restrict economic engagement, and tolerate greater bilateral friction to push back on China and more aggressively defend U.S. interests. But competition, it is often pointed out, is not an end in itself. What, then, do these competitive strategies seek to achieve?
The U.S. policy community has produced no shortage of strategies for competing with China. Increasingly frustrated that the long-standing U.S. policy of engagement failed to turn Beijing into a “responsible stakeholder,” the Trump administration, along with a bipartisan cross section of Washington’s policy community, changed tact. Their competitive strategies are willing to impose costs on Beijing, restrict economic engagement, and tolerate greater bilateral friction to push back on China and more aggressively defend U.S. interests. But competition, it is often pointed out, is not an end in itself. What, then, do these competitive strategies seek to achieve?
Washington’s objectives in shaping China’s international behavior remain largely unchanged, even as the means for achieving them have shifted. This is seldom acknowledged, in part because it doesn’t fit comfortably with the narratives of either hawks or doves on China. In addition to deterring Chinese aggression and maintaining its strategic position in the region, the United States is still trying to shape China into a rule-abiding and system-sustaining member of the international community. In other words, it continues to seek to shape China into a “responsible stakeholder,” just as Robert Zoellick famously called for 15 years ago. Thus, those that suggest the responsible-stakeholder approach is “dead” overstate just how much has changed for a wide swath of Washington.
To be sure, today’s vision of China as a responsible stakeholder is a less ambitious one. No one expects Beijing to altogether stop doing business with unsavory regimes, and Washington, for its part, seems motivated to cultivate an economically less interdependent relationship. However, much as Zoellick outlined, Washington continues to aspire to shape China into a state that “not only adjusts to the international rules,” but also works “with us to sustain the international system” and helps to “address the challenges of the new century.” As long as transforming China into a responsible stakeholder remains a U.S. objective, the United States would do well not only to acknowledge it but to publicize it to China and the world.
As much as the Trump administration’s policies have put the U.S.-China relationship on a confrontational path, its May 2020 white paper on competition with China is clear that it does “not seek to contain China’s development.” Rather, it aims to compel China “to adhere to norms of responsible state behavior.” Among the norms most commonly cited by the administration are those that Zoellick urged China to abide by in 2005—for example, to adhere to the terms of international agreements, embrace transparency and accountability, and resolve its territorial disputes peacefully.
Consistent with its efforts over its first three years in office, the administration also continues to seek to enlist China’s help in achieving a denuclearized Korean peninsula, the principal international challenge Zoellick called on China to help address. Alongside its competitive and often inflammatory language (which is addressed below), the Trump White House declares that the United States “stands ready to welcome China’s positive contributions” and hopes that the United States and China can cooperate “in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and prosperity of the world.”
Perhaps the biggest change in the administration’s objectives have come in the economic domain. The administration has moved to reduce U.S. dependence on China-based supply chains and to limit Chinese participation in sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy and those of its allies. While this is an important change in U.S. policy, the administration has been clear that its “approach is to not exclude China.” Rather, it aims to put an end to “unfair Chinese trade practices” and compel Beijing to “protect intellectual property,” while “rebalancing the United States-China economic relationship.” These were all goals articulated by Zoellick in 2005.
In pursuit of these and other objectives, the administration embraced the tactics of reciprocity, the use of which now enjoys bipartisan support. By establishing a tit-for-tat dynamic, reciprocity seeks to incentivize China to lower trade and investment barriers, decrease government subsidies, lift visa restrictions on foreign journalists, and provide U.S. diplomats with greater access to Chinese society. Reciprocity aims to compel Beijing to adhere to international rules and norms by penalizing it for non-compliance.
If the Trump administration has largely maintained the goal of shaping China into a responsible stakeholder, senior officials’ use of inflammatory ideological rhetoric has obscured this fact and worked at cross purposes with it. In a high-profile July speech, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that the Chinese Communist Party threatens the world with a “new tyranny,” suggested that the Party’s rule in China is illegitimate, and implied that the United States must work to change China’s domestic political system. U.S. hopes for political liberalization in China have long existed uneasily alongside the reassuring message of welcoming China’s rise as a responsible stakeholder. But it is difficult to see how such rhetoric does not entirely undermine U.S. declarations that its goals are limited to altering Beijing’s behavior and that it aspires to partner with China to sustain the international system. The result has been a confused—if not incoherent—articulation of U.S. China policy.
While most of Washington’s broader policy community has avoided such provocative rhetoric, it shares the administration’s aim to shape China into a responsible stakeholder. President-elect Joe Biden has stated that he would confront Beijing by working with U.S. allies to “to shape the rules of the road” in a way “China can’t afford to ignore.” His objective is not to reduce China’s access to the international system but to ensure that Beijing stays involved and plays by the rules. He has also said that he will maintain the Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese goods and use them as “leverage” to advance the same economic goals Trump sought to achieve.
Biden has called for partnering with China to address “climate change, nonproliferation, and global health security,” just as Zoellick sought to have Beijing work with the United States on “energy conservation and efficiency” and to combat “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, [and] disease.” The president-elect also seeks to work with Beijing in a “coordinated campaign … to advance our shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea.” Jake Sullivan, the incoming national security adviser, and Kurt Campbell, a senior Biden adviser, have similarly advocated establishing reciprocity to force Beijing to “start complying with trade rules” and envision China as an “essential partner” in addressing a number of the biggest transnational challenges.
With few exceptions, proposals from across the political spectrum continue to seek to shape China into a responsible stakeholder. A competitive strategy written by analysts at a left-leaning Washington think tank aims to have China use its “growing capabilities to address global challenges,” calling for Beijing to play “an increasingly active role to shape global institutions, norms, and outcomes.” To this end, they encourage Washington “to create more space within the international governance system for China.” Two scholars at a right-leaning think tank propose applying pressure on the Chinese Communist Party so great that it either “modifies its objectives or loses its grip on power.” They are explicit, however, that Washington should “leave the door open” for China to become a responsible stakeholder, providing an off-ramp from the pressure they suggest applying and implying that the modifications they seek in Chinese objectives are those reflective of a responsible stakeholder.
When the White House says that it does not seek “a particular end state for China” and others suggest that Washington should not aim to achieve a “definitive end state” in its competition with Beijing, they may be referring to China’s domestic political system. However, much of Washington does seek to achieve a particular end state for China: They seek to transform it into a responsible stakeholder. As long as this remains a de facto U.S. objective, Washington should embrace and broadcast it.
Senior Chinese leaders themselves now publicly state what they long would say only privately and via state media: The United States does not in fact welcome China’s rise and instead seeks to contain it. It will be difficult to convince Beijing otherwise but, because such a belief is sure to exacerbate bilateral competition and doom any possibility of shaping Beijing into a responsible stakeholder, it would be foolish for Washington not to make every effort to counter it.
In this regard, simply denying that the United States aims to contain China is far less compelling than offering Beijing the affirmative and familiar vision of it as a responsible stakeholder, one that will compel Chinese leaders to reflect on the enduring aspirations of U.S.-China policy. Washington should also note that Beijing need not simply take its word for it: It should encourage Beijing to test its commitment to reciprocity by positively altering its behavior in ways requiring reciprocal U.S. action.
Calling for China to be a responsible stakeholder has always been an ambitious and principled objective—and, as ever, it may fail. Prudence suggests that Washington should seek to maximize the likelihood of success while minimizing the costs and risks of failure. Doing so does not require making unilateral concessions or placing faith in the miraculous, socializing power of participation into the international system. It requires the United States to hew closely to the logic of reciprocity, altering the mix and sequencing of the carrots and sticks it presents to Beijing to incentivize constructive behavior and penalize its opposite. It also requires the United States to abandon the maximalist rhetoric of democratizing China and focus instead on compelling Beijing to live up to its commitments to treat its citizens humanely.
Critically, even if Beijing never comes around, declaring that the United States continues to seek to shape China into a responsible stakeholder is also a valuable message to send to partners around the world. It will help to reassure the many states increasingly concerned about being pulled into a maelstrom of deteriorating U.S.-China ties that far from seeking conflict with China, or regime change in Beijing, the United States desires to welcome it into the community of responsible nations. Moreover, by publicly embracing the responsible-stakeholder objective, Washington can help debunk the oft-stated Chinese refrain that the United States is seeking to create a new cold war with China, a message Beijing leverages to present itself as a geopolitical victim and to alienate partners from Washington.
Needless to say, no element of U.S. strategy toward China is more important than its objectives. If U.S. policymakers neglect to recognize that, even as competition with Beijing intensifies and relations deteriorate, they still seek to transform China into a responsible stakeholder, they risk operating with an incomplete picture of what winning looks like. And if they cannot compellingly express their objectives to Beijing and the world, they are almost certain to compete ineffectively.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--Polarization Is Ruining America—Just Not the Way You Think

Polarization Is Ruining America—Just Not the Way You Think For the past several decades , pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization .
From Bill Clinton ’ s impeachment to the global war on terrorism , and from Obamacare to “ build the wall , ” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps .
Yet to the extent that polarization implies a hollowing of the middle ground , its supposed prevalence in U.S. politics doesn ’ t square with the fact that an adamantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidential election .
To be fair , Biden ’ s victory certainly drew on anti-Trump sentiment .
But that raises the question of how Biden prevailed over those candidates further to the left , such as Sen. Bernie Sanders , in the first place .
The crystallization of a centrist camp around him during the primary process demonstrated that progressives don ’ t comprise a majority , even within the Democratic Party .
Wasn ’ t polarization supposed to imply a run to the extremes ?
To make sense of Biden ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possible consequences —it is necessary to dissect the United States ’ two main political parties .
Doing so makes clear that mere partisan polarization is an inadequate description of U.S. political reality .
That ’ s because , in addition to the bitter conflict between the two parties , there is also an increasingly salient conflict within each .
And this largely overlooked internal conflict is set to play a decisive role in determining future political outcomes .
Recognizing this intrapartisan rivalry allows contemporary U.S. politics to be analyzed in terms of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ multiparty systems than the increasingly obsolete two-party system dynamics familiar to U.S. political commentators .
This transformation doesn ’ t necessarily spell the death of U.S. democracy , but it does mean we need to start thinking differently about it .
Extending this analogy with European multiparty systems can help Americans better understand the gridlock within their own .
Hanging on to the myth of U.S. exceptionalism obscures important lessons that can be learned from the Old World .
So how exactly does the U.S. political spectrum map onto those on the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the progressive faction of the Democratic Party explicitly models itself on the continental European tradition of social democracy .
Proposals such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal may be perceived as “ radical ” or “ far-left ” in the United States , but they appear pretty familiar from a European perspective .
Most continental European countries take for granted their publicly funded universal health care systems , and many Northern European countries have already implemented sweeping new environmental regimes under social democratic leadership .
Sanders may not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States take after Sweden or Denmark .
Moving toward the center , the more moderate faction of the Democratic Party has a surprising number of features in common with the European tradition of Christian democracy : from their self-presentation as centrists blazing a moderate middle path between the far-left and the far-right to their goal of restoring social harmony through political compromise—aptly encapsulated in Biden ’ s campaign promise to “ restore the soul of America.
” In this respect , it is noteworthy that Biden will be only the second Catholic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his religion does not determine his political persuasions , he has maintained that it functions as an important source of inspiration for him .
Biden places rhetorical emphasis on notions such as human dignity , social civility , and the resolutely multilateralist conception of international affairs .
It ’ s a similar approach to that of Germany ’ s current chancellor , Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union .
On the other side of the U.S. political center , there is a residual rump of traditional Republicans , most of whom have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ may now resurface along with the political ambitions of figures such as Mitt Romney , John Kasich , and Larry Hogan .
More socially conservative and free market-friendly than centrist Democrats—often invoking former President Ronald Reagan as inspiration—this ideological current can be likened to the right-leaning strand of liberalism traditionally espoused by European liberal parties or the British Conservatives under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher .
Finally , on the far-right of the contemporary U.S. political spectrum , there is a form of authoritarian populism that was , until recently , considered quite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ culture : Trumpism .
Some commentators have debated whether one might go so far as to label it a form of proto- or neofascism .
U.S. President Donald Trump certainly flaunts his strong , racially tinged nationalism and strategic disregard for democratic procedures .
But he has so far stopped short of openly glorifying violence and still appeals to democratic themes—such as his false claims that he won the 2020 election—in claiming legitimacy ; a real fascist wouldn ’ t even try to pretend his rule was cemented by democratic means .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be compared to European leaders like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Viktor Orban in Hungary , who are authoritarian populists .
Given that the U.S. political landscape has become so Europeanized , it makes sense to look at classical European political science for insight into which partisan dynamics are most likely to shape the United States in the near future .
The concept of polarized pluralism , originally developed by the Columbia University political scientist Giovanni Sartori to explain the stalemate of Italian party politics in the 1960s and ’ 70s , appears @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time .
Sartori ’ s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time .
He predicted two main consequences of this double whammy .
First , political discourse becomes “ centrifugal , ” as parties on the extremes have an incentive to distinguish themselves from others by outbidding each other with more and more radical stances .
Second , governmental action becomes “ centripetal , ” as the only possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ various strands of the center in cross-party coalitions that settle for the little they can agree on .
Italy in the 1960s and ’ 70s featured bitter attacks on the very legitimacy of the democratic order from two parties : the Communists on the far-left and the neofascists on the far-right .
Between them lay a multitude of fragmented parties and party factions that gravitated around the centrist Christian Democrats , with the Socialists to their left and the Liberals to their right .
But this framework made alternation in leadership effectively impossible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had to stick together in a succession of unstable coalitions to keep the far-left and the far-right out of power .
Sound familiar ?
Italy half a century ago displays an uncanny likeness with what is already taking shape in the United States today : a residually and internally fragmented centrist government—condemned to tow a status quo line in order to keep together its cross-partisan appeal—besieged on both sides by radical opposition .
This sort of polarized pluralism is bound to only be further consolidated if the Republican Party retains control of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Georgia—mandating an intraparty coalition to get anything done .
Biden ’ s cabinet nominations—and the reactions they have elicited—are providing us a preview of what ’ s to come .
Both Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin are prominent figures of Washington ’ s centrist establishment , and their appointments are designed so as not to alienate the moderate wing of the Republican Party .
Both , however , have already been sternly condemned by Trumpists and progressives alike as signaling a return to the “ swamp.
” What ’ s important to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the kind of residual centrism that results from polarized pluralism was a cause for concern , not reassurance .
Even though its status quo bias may please business interests in the short run , polarized pluralism also tends to undermine the legitimacy of the whole political framework in the long run , since it both generates and frustrates increasingly radical social demands .
In situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country ’ s institutional framework as a whole .
The lesson contemporary Americans can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ party politics , then , is that in situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country ’ s institutional framework as a whole .
The fact that Trump has so far refused to accept his election loss—as well as the delegitimation of the democratic process among large swaths of the Republican base that has ensued—is not to be taken lightly .
Nor is there any easy fix for polarized pluralism , since it is a reflection of real social divisions that increasingly correspond to solidified ideological @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the past century may invite speculation that the United States is faced with a radical choice between a complete breakdown of the political system—as happened in Italy and Germany during the interwar years—and a radical overhaul of the underlying socioeconomic order comparable to the postwar welfarist revolution .
The most probable scenario , however , remains something more akin to the stagnation and breakdown that happened in Europe after all the midcentury ’ s sound and fury .
For now , the United States is likely to be governed by a form of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the far-left and the far-right—perpetually kicking the can down the road and maintaining a veneer of stability while social dissatisfaction continues to brew beneath the surface .
Eventually , it will boil over .

For the past several decades, pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization . From Bill Clinton’s impeachment to the global war on terrorism, and from Obamacare to “build the wall,” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps.
For the past several decades, pundits have clamored to ascribe fluctuations in U.S. politics and policy to partisan polarization. From Bill Clinton’s impeachment to the global war on terrorism, and from Obamacare to “build the wall,” virtually all salient political issues are said to divide American society into two irreconcilable partisan camps.
Yet to the extent that polarization implies a hollowing of the middle ground, its supposed prevalence in U.S. politics doesn’t square with the fact that an adamantly moderate centrist—Joe Biden—ended up winning the 2020 presidential election. To be fair, Biden’s victory certainly drew on anti-Trump sentiment. But that raises the question of how Biden prevailed over those candidates further to the left, such as Sen. Bernie Sanders, in the first place. The crystallization of a centrist camp around him during the primary process demonstrated that progressives don’t comprise a majority, even within the Democratic Party. Wasn’t polarization supposed to imply a run to the extremes?
To make sense of Biden’s victory—and begin thinking about some of its possible consequences —it is necessary to dissect the United States’ two main political parties. Doing so makes clear that mere partisan polarization is an inadequate description of U.S. political reality. That’s because, in addition to the bitter conflict between the two parties, there is also an increasingly salient conflict within each. And this largely overlooked internal conflict is set to play a decisive role in determining future political outcomes.
Recognizing this intrapartisan rivalry allows contemporary U.S. politics to be analyzed in terms of a four-way struggle more reminiscent of continental European multiparty systems than the increasingly obsolete two-party system dynamics familiar to U.S. political commentators. This transformation doesn’t necessarily spell the death of U.S. democracy, but it does mean we need to start thinking differently about it.
Extending this analogy with European multiparty systems can help Americans better understand the gridlock within their own. Hanging on to the myth of U.S. exceptionalism obscures important lessons that can be learned from the Old World.
So how exactly does the U.S. political spectrum map onto those on the other side of the Atlantic? For starters, the progressive faction of the Democratic Party explicitly models itself on the continental European tradition of social democracy. Proposals such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal may be perceived as “radical” or “far-left” in the United States, but they appear pretty familiar from a European perspective. Most continental European countries take for granted their publicly funded universal health care systems, and many Northern European countries have already implemented sweeping new environmental regimes under social democratic leadership. Sanders may not be that far off when he suggests the United States take after Sweden or Denmark.
Moving toward the center, the more moderate faction of the Democratic Party has a surprising number of features in common with the European tradition of Christian democracy: from their self-presentation as centrists blazing a moderate middle path between the far-left and the far-right to their goal of restoring social harmony through political compromise—aptly encapsulated in Biden’s campaign promise to “restore the soul of America.”
In this respect, it is noteworthy that Biden will be only the second Catholic president of the United States. While his religion does not determine his political persuasions, he has maintained that it functions as an important source of inspiration for him. Biden places rhetorical emphasis on notions such as human dignity, social civility, and the resolutely multilateralist conception of international affairs. It’s a similar approach to that of Germany’s current chancellor, Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union.
On the other side of the U.S. political center, there is a residual rump of traditional Republicans, most of whom have remained submerged during the Trump era but may now resurface along with the political ambitions of figures such as Mitt Romney, John Kasich, and Larry Hogan. More socially conservative and free market-friendly than centrist Democrats—often invoking former President Ronald Reagan as inspiration—this ideological current can be likened to the right-leaning strand of liberalism traditionally espoused by European liberal parties or the British Conservatives under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
Finally, on the far-right of the contemporary U.S. political spectrum, there is a form of authoritarian populism that was, until recently, considered quite foreign to the country’s political culture: Trumpism. Some commentators have debated whether one might go so far as to label it a form of proto- or neofascism.
U.S. President Donald Trump certainly flaunts his strong, racially tinged nationalism and strategic disregard for democratic procedures. But he has so far stopped short of openly glorifying violence and still appeals to democratic themes—such as his false claims that he won the 2020 election—in claiming legitimacy; a real fascist wouldn’t even try to pretend his rule was cemented by democratic means. In that vein, Trump can more appropriately be compared to European leaders like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy or Viktor Orban in Hungary, who are authoritarian populists.
Given that the U.S. political landscape has become so Europeanized, it makes sense to look at classical European political science for insight into which partisan dynamics are most likely to shape the United States in the near future. The concept of polarized pluralism, originally developed by the Columbia University political scientist Giovanni Sartori to explain the stalemate of Italian party politics in the 1960s and ’70s, appears particularly illuminating in this regard.
Sartori’s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time.
Sartori’s key intuition was that ideological fragmentation and polarization can take place at the same time. He predicted two main consequences of this double whammy. First, political discourse becomes “centrifugal,” as parties on the extremes have an incentive to distinguish themselves from others by outbidding each other with more and more radical stances. Second, governmental action becomes “centripetal,” as the only possible governing majorities are ones that unite the various strands of the center in cross-party coalitions that settle for the little they can agree on.
Italy in the 1960s and ’70s featured bitter attacks on the very legitimacy of the democratic order from two parties: the Communists on the far-left and the neofascists on the far-right. Between them lay a multitude of fragmented parties and party factions that gravitated around the centrist Christian Democrats, with the Socialists to their left and the Liberals to their right. But this framework made alternation in leadership effectively impossible; all the factions of the center had to stick together in a succession of unstable coalitions to keep the far-left and the far-right out of power.
Sound familiar? Italy half a century ago displays an uncanny likeness with what is already taking shape in the United States today: a residually and internally fragmented centrist government—condemned to tow a status quo line in order to keep together its cross-partisan appeal—besieged on both sides by radical opposition. This sort of polarized pluralism is bound to only be further consolidated if the Republican Party retains control of the Senate after January’s runoff elections in Georgia—mandating an intraparty coalition to get anything done.
Biden’s cabinet nominations—and the reactions they have elicited—are providing us a preview of what’s to come. Both Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin are prominent figures of Washington’s centrist establishment, and their appointments are designed so as not to alienate the moderate wing of the Republican Party. Both, however, have already been sternly condemned by Trumpists and progressives alike as signaling a return to the “swamp.”
What’s important to highlight here is that, for Sartori, the kind of residual centrism that results from polarized pluralism was a cause for concern, not reassurance. Even though its status quo bias may please business interests in the short run, polarized pluralism also tends to undermine the legitimacy of the whole political framework in the long run, since it both generates and frustrates increasingly radical social demands.
In situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country’s institutional framework as a whole.
The lesson contemporary Americans can draw from the history of continental European party politics, then, is that in situations of polarized pluralism—even if the center holds—increasing strain may be placed on the country’s institutional framework as a whole. The fact that Trump has so far refused to accept his election loss—as well as the delegitimation of the democratic process among large swaths of the Republican base that has ensued—is not to be taken lightly. Nor is there any easy fix for polarized pluralism, since it is a reflection of real social divisions that increasingly correspond to solidified ideological blocs.
The comparison to Europe over the past century may invite speculation that the United States is faced with a radical choice between a complete breakdown of the political system—as happened in Italy and Germany during the interwar years—and a radical overhaul of the underlying socioeconomic order comparable to the postwar welfarist revolution. The most probable scenario, however, remains something more akin to the stagnation and breakdown that happened in Europe after all the midcentury’s sound and fury. For now, the United States is likely to be governed by a form of residual centrism defined primarily by opposition to the far-left and the far-right—perpetually kicking the can down the road and maintaining a veneer of stability while social dissatisfaction continues to brew beneath the surface. Eventually, it will boil over.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-29--Will Virus Mutations Threaten COVID-19 Vaccines?

On Dec. 8 , the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus , with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may , in fact , be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe .
To date , COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide , harrowing numbers by any measure .
For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection , COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rather , in order to preserve it—it ’ s important not to abandon pandemic protocols like mask-wearing and physical distancing too soon : Just because we now have shots against COVID-19 hardly means it has disappeared .
In fact , the coronavirus has already begun to resurface in other forms—or mutations—and will continue to do so until it ’ s completely stamped out .
Vigilance has always been key , but it is all the more critical now .
SARS-CoV-2 , the virus that causes COVID-19 , is thought to have initially crossed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t a transaction that stopped once the pandemic reached humans a year ago : Since June , more than 200 human cases of COVID-19 have been traced to mink farms , indicating that the virus likely spread from humans to mink and then back again .
In November , Denmark reported 12 cases of a unique strain of the virus with a cluster of variants that had not been seen before .
Global concern about the outbreak prompted Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to order a cull of 17 million living @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farming for the foreseeable future .
In response , many countries—fearing that the outbreak could spread beyond Denmark—imposed stricter border controls with the country .
Despite that foresight , Canada announced this month that eight people at a mink farm in British Columbia had contracted COVID-19 .
The farm sent its animals and staff into quarantine and adopted enhanced biosecurity measures to protect against further infection—to little avail .
Numerous U.S. states , including Oregon , have also reported outbreaks linked to mink farms .
This raises serious concerns about the possibility of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least contained—and becoming established in the wild .
If minks weren ’ t enough , attention has turned to a new strain of the virus that emerged in the United Kingdom , reported to be more transmissible than its counterparts .
B.1.1.7.
, as the mutation is known , has prompted global chaos reminiscent of mid-March and led more than 50 countries to ban travel with the U.K .
While B.1.1.7 .
is not reported to affect the severity of infection , it is much more transmissible than the standard variant of COVID-19—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southern England .
A different strain—which shares a mutation with the U.K. strain—appears to have evolved separately in South Africa , where it has similarly become dominant .
These developments come at a critical time : in the midst of a winter surge in cases and mass distribution of vaccines against the standard variant of SARS-CoV-2 .
To understand the implications of the mink strain , and the recently detected new strains of the coronavirus within the U.K. and South Africa , for public health—and policy—we need to understand how viruses mutate , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impact they can have .
Still , thousands of mutations have been identified in SARS-CoV-2 viruses across the globe .
Most are not a reason for concern : The vast majority of mutations are likely to be neutral , meaning they are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous for the virus .
Disadvantageous mutations are good news for public health : They can disrupt the virus ’ s functions , such as the ability to bind and enter human cells , and impair its ability to spread efficiently between humans .
Unfortunately , disadvantageous mutations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transmit less effectively .
The prospect of advantageous mutations , however , merits more concern .
Advantageous mutations can help the virus bind to human cells more efficiently or escape an immune response altogether .
In theory , advantageous mutations of a virus will be naturally selected over time , becoming the dominant strain in a community or population .
Neutral mutations can also spread widely across populations , a fact that can make it difficult to discern whether a specific mutation is common due to random spread or because it is advantageous @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more copies of itself ; in that sense , it ’ s only natural that we ’ ll see more mutations of the coronavirus over time .
But when levels of viral transmission and replication are high , selection pressure can cause advantageous mutations to accumulate .
Selection pressures can arise when a virus adapts to a new species , faces a new treatment or immune response , or is thwarted by a vaccine .
SARS-CoV-2 appears to adapt quickly to new animal reservoirs ; in one study conducted in China , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , establishing a new animal reservoir .
Notably , the mutation that allowed the coronavirus to adapt to mice is a key component of the new strains spreading across the U.K. and South Africa .
This suggests that the viral adaptation of COVID-19—and the spread between species—can happen relatively easily .
Mutations matter because they affect whether we recognize the virus and how we ultimately deal with it .
Sometimes , tests—and our immune systems—can ’ t recognize a mutated virus .
Antigen tests based on one strain of virus may not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antibodies , and immune systems that have encountered a given viral strain may not recognize a new strain—which can make reinfection more likely .
Most important , this reality is cause for tempering the global vaccine euphoria : The emergence of mutations could reduce the protection offered by vaccines and antibody treatments , all of which have been based on the original strain of COVID-19 .
The immunity generated by vaccines usually produces a complex response to many components of the viral protein—making them generally resilient to a few mutations in the virus—but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changes has the potential to escape immune responses directed against the original strain .
Most coronavirus vaccines work by generating an immune response to the spike protein , which is the part of the virus that binds to the ACE2 receptor on human cells .
ACE2 is an enzyme found in many of our tissues that has many important functions , including regulating our blood pressure .
At the same time , the prevalence of ACE2 receptors also provides ample opportunity for coronaviruses to enter our cells .
Since the binding of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ step for infection , it was previously thought that mutations featuring changes in the spike protein would not lead to infection and , by consequence , spread .
But scientists have recently discovered several mutations in the spike protein that don ’ t reduce the ability of the virus to bind to receptors , flipping conventional wisdom on its head .
Overall , mutations in the spike protein have proved more resistant to neutralization by dominant-strain antibodies , raising concerns about their potential consequences—particularly as the standard variant of the coronavirus is greeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vaccines .
Whether that applies to the mink and U.K. variants is yet to be seen .
Preliminary analyses suggest the mink mutation is less likely to be susceptible to antibodies directed against the standard strain of SARS-CoV-2 .
To be sure , these studies were conducted in laboratories—and thus do not capture the full range of human immune responses .
But the possible implications for vaccine efficacy are worrying .
And though BioNTech CEO Ugur Sahin has assured the world of the high likelihood that his company ’ s vaccine offers immunity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the U.K. strain is thought to be an adaptation able to escape immune responses directed at the original strain .
Recently , an immunocompromised patient with COVID-19 developed a strain with the B.1.1.7 .
deletion during treatment with convalescent plasma , which contains antibodies from people who ’ ve recovered from the standard variant of the virus .
The new mutation appears to have allowed the virus to escape these antibodies , allowing it to survive even after treatment .
The solution is the same as it has been all throughout the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that mitigate the spread of COVID-19 , whatever its form .
Since mutations occur through random processes and accumulate with uncontrolled spread of the virus as well as through adaptation to different selection pressures , mutations are less likely to threaten immune responses when transmission rates are lower , both among humans and other species .
We know what to do on the human front .
But to prevent new reservoirs of virus from emerging in other species , governments must urgently reform farming practices , enhance biosecurity measures , and actively keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ virus in humans and animals .
This data must be shared globally so outbreaks can be identified and controlled rapidly , before they spread across different regions .
The world has invested billions of dollars in coronavirus vaccine development .
Now that safe and effective vaccines are becoming available , it ’ s essential we protect these precious resources .
The best way to do this is to control virus transmission using the measures we know work—testing , tracing , isolating , mask-wearing , and physical distancing .
Vaccination is , of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this strategy , but must be rolled out alongside the tried and true methods .
Controlling the pandemic globally requires us to work together .
Only then can we be protected from the very real threat posed by virus mutations today—and in the future .

On Dec. 8, the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus, with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may, in fact, be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe. To date, COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide , harrowing numbers by any measure. For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection, COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its head.
On Dec. 8, the United Kingdom became the first Western country to begin inoculating its citizens against the coronavirus, with Canada and the United States close behind—a sign for many that there may, in fact, be a light at the end of the tunnel after a year of public health catastrophe. To date, COVID-19 has caused more than 79 million infections and 1.7 million deaths worldwide, harrowing numbers by any measure. For those who have weathered or thus far avoided infection, COVID-19 has turned life as we know it on its head.
Yet despite that hope—or, rather, in order to preserve it—it’s important not to abandon pandemic protocols like mask-wearing and physical distancing too soon: Just because we now have shots against COVID-19 hardly means it has disappeared. In fact, the coronavirus has already begun to resurface in other forms—or mutations—and will continue to do so until it’s completely stamped out. Vigilance has always been key, but it is all the more critical now.
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is thought to have initially crossed into humans from animal reservoirs. That wasn’t a transaction that stopped once the pandemic reached humans a year ago: Since June, more than 200 human cases of COVID-19 have been traced to mink farms, indicating that the virus likely spread from humans to mink and then back again. In November, Denmark reported 12 cases of a unique strain of the virus with a cluster of variants that had not been seen before. Global concern about the outbreak prompted Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen to order a cull of 17 million living mink and announce plans to end mink farming for the foreseeable future. In response, many countries—fearing that the outbreak could spread beyond Denmark—imposed stricter border controls with the country.
Despite that foresight, Canada announced this month that eight people at a mink farm in British Columbia had contracted COVID-19. The farm sent its animals and staff into quarantine and adopted enhanced biosecurity measures to protect against further infection—to little avail. Numerous U.S. states, including Oregon, have also reported outbreaks linked to mink farms. This raises serious concerns about the possibility of infections spreading outside farms—where they are at least contained—and becoming established in the wild.
If minks weren’t enough, attention has turned to a new strain of the virus that emerged in the United Kingdom, reported to be more transmissible than its counterparts. B.1.1.7., as the mutation is known, has prompted global chaos reminiscent of mid-March and led more than 50 countries to ban travel with the U.K. While B.1.1.7. is not reported to affect the severity of infection, it is much more transmissible than the standard variant of COVID-19—and has rapidly become the preeminent strain in southern England. A different strain—which shares a mutation with the U.K. strain—appears to have evolved separately in South Africa, where it has similarly become dominant.
These developments come at a critical time: in the midst of a winter surge in cases and mass distribution of vaccines against the standard variant of SARS-CoV-2. To understand the implications of the mink strain, and the recently detected new strains of the coronavirus within the U.K. and South Africa, for public health—and policy—we need to understand how viruses mutate, how these mutations spread, and what impact they can have.
SARS-CoV-2 is an RNA virus that has around 30,000 bases in its genetic sequence. Mutations—spontaneous changes that arise in the genetic sequence of the virus—are nothing out of the ordinary for RNA viruses. In fact, RNA viruses, such as influenza, mutate frequently during replication as the mechanism that copies the RNA is prone to errors. But mutations occur far less frequently in SARS-CoV-2, as its copying mechanism has a low error rate. That’s why the average case of SARS-CoV-2 contracted during the pandemic differs from the original Wuhan strain by only around 20 bases.
Still, thousands of mutations have been identified in SARS-CoV-2 viruses across the globe. Most are not a reason for concern: The vast majority of mutations are likely to be neutral, meaning they are neither advantageous nor disadvantageous for the virus. Disadvantageous mutations are good news for public health: They can disrupt the virus’s functions, such as the ability to bind and enter human cells, and impair its ability to spread efficiently between humans. Unfortunately, disadvantageous mutations usually get selected out, as they transmit less effectively.
The prospect of advantageous mutations, however, merits more concern. Advantageous mutations can help the virus bind to human cells more efficiently or escape an immune response altogether. In theory, advantageous mutations of a virus will be naturally selected over time, becoming the dominant strain in a community or population. Neutral mutations can also spread widely across populations, a fact that can make it difficult to discern whether a specific mutation is common due to random spread or because it is advantageous.
Mutations accumulate as the virus makes more copies of itself; in that sense, it’s only natural that we’ll see more mutations of the coronavirus over time. But when levels of viral transmission and replication are high, selection pressure can cause advantageous mutations to accumulate. Selection pressures can arise when a virus adapts to a new species, faces a new treatment or immune response, or is thwarted by a vaccine.
SARS-CoV-2 appears to adapt quickly to new animal reservoirs; in one study conducted in China, the virus mutated and rapidly adapted to mice, establishing a new animal reservoir. Notably, the mutation that allowed the coronavirus to adapt to mice is a key component of the new strains spreading across the U.K. and South Africa. This suggests that the viral adaptation of COVID-19—and the spread between species—can happen relatively easily.
Mutations matter because they affect whether we recognize the virus and how we ultimately deal with it. Sometimes, tests—and our immune systems—can’t recognize a mutated virus. Antigen tests based on one strain of virus may not be able to detect new virus lineages or antibodies, and immune systems that have encountered a given viral strain may not recognize a new strain—which can make reinfection more likely. Most important, this reality is cause for tempering the global vaccine euphoria: The emergence of mutations could reduce the protection offered by vaccines and antibody treatments, all of which have been based on the original strain of COVID-19. The immunity generated by vaccines usually produces a complex response to many components of the viral protein—making them generally resilient to a few mutations in the virus—but a strain with a large number of changes has the potential to escape immune responses directed against the original strain.
Most coronavirus vaccines work by generating an immune response to the spike protein, which is the part of the virus that binds to the ACE2 receptor on human cells. ACE2 is an enzyme found in many of our tissues that has many important functions, including regulating our blood pressure. At the same time, the prevalence of ACE2 receptors also provides ample opportunity for coronaviruses to enter our cells.
Since the binding of the virus with a receptor is a necessary step for infection, it was previously thought that mutations featuring changes in the spike protein would not lead to infection and, by consequence, spread. But scientists have recently discovered several mutations in the spike protein that don’t reduce the ability of the virus to bind to receptors, flipping conventional wisdom on its head. Overall, mutations in the spike protein have proved more resistant to neutralization by dominant-strain antibodies, raising concerns about their potential consequences—particularly as the standard variant of the coronavirus is greeted with a small squadron of highly effective vaccines.
All of this has immense real-world consequences. Just as the world is developing new coronavirus-related drugs, there are reports of people who’d been infected with an earlier strain of the virus becoming reinfected with a different variant. Thus, there is reason to be concerned that some mutations of the virus could escape immune responses generated by standard inoculation, such as the Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna vaccine.
Whether that applies to the mink and U.K. variants is yet to be seen. Preliminary analyses suggest the mink mutation is less likely to be susceptible to antibodies directed against the standard strain of SARS-CoV-2. To be sure, these studies were conducted in laboratories—and thus do not capture the full range of human immune responses. But the possible implications for vaccine efficacy are worrying.
And though BioNTech CEO Ugur Sahin has assured the world of the high likelihood that his company’s vaccine offers immunity against B.1.1.7., one of the deletions in the U.K. strain is thought to be an adaptation able to escape immune responses directed at the original strain. Recently, an immunocompromised patient with COVID-19 developed a strain with the B.1.1.7. deletion during treatment with convalescent plasma, which contains antibodies from people who’ve recovered from the standard variant of the virus. The new mutation appears to have allowed the virus to escape these antibodies, allowing it to survive even after treatment.
The solution is the same as it has been all throughout the pandemic: adhere to public health guidelines that mitigate the spread of COVID-19, whatever its form. Since mutations occur through random processes and accumulate with uncontrolled spread of the virus as well as through adaptation to different selection pressures, mutations are less likely to threaten immune responses when transmission rates are lower, both among humans and other species.
We know what to do on the human front. But to prevent new reservoirs of virus from emerging in other species, governments must urgently reform farming practices, enhance biosecurity measures, and actively keep tabs on COVID-19 by frequently sequencing the virus in humans and animals. This data must be shared globally so outbreaks can be identified and controlled rapidly, before they spread across different regions.
The world has invested billions of dollars in coronavirus vaccine development. Now that safe and effective vaccines are becoming available, it’s essential we protect these precious resources. The best way to do this is to control virus transmission using the measures we know work—testing, tracing, isolating, mask-wearing, and physical distancing. Vaccination is, of course, also a very important part of this strategy, but must be rolled out alongside the tried and true methods. Controlling the pandemic globally requires us to work together. Only then can we be protected from the very real threat posed by virus mutations today—and in the future.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-30--How Press Freedom Came Under Attack in 2020

How Press Freedom Came Under Attack in 2020 Malala Maiwand , a reporter for Enikass Radio and TV in Jalalabad , Afghanistan , was on her way to work on Dec. 10 when gunmen opened fire on her car , killing her and her driver , Mohammad Tahir .
She was the fourth journalist killed in Afghanistan in 2020 and the 28th worldwide in a year that has seen journalism come under a new and sustained level of attack .
New restrictions on press freedoms—many of them imposed in connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic—made it ever harder for journalists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was not inevitable that the onset of a pandemic should have resulted in an assault on the press .
In a public health emergency , most authorities accept that it is vital to communicate with a public hungry for information .
And the most effective way of doing that can be via the news media—whether online , broadcast , or print .
And indeed , when COVID-19 first began to spread in the spring , people turned to the media in masses .
Data collected in late March and early April by the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in six countries—Argentina , Britain , Germany , South Korea , Spain , and the United States—showed that news consumption surged as people went online or turned on their television to get information about the crisis .
The biggest and most urgent danger to the future of independent media is the new wave of political leaders conducting an all-out assault on the press .
But as the pandemic spread , many authorities around the world began to crack down on journalists .
One of the earliest cases emerged from Wuhan , where the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had been reporting about the new disease while official channels were still suppressing vital information , disappeared in February .
After having been detained by the authorities , he reemerged only in September .
Zhang Zhan , another citizen journalist arrested in May for “ picking quarrels and provoking trouble , ” has been sentenced to four years in jail .
China ’ s chilling impact on media freedom has also been felt in Hong Kong , where a new national security law was enacted in June .
Hong Kong police have tightened @ @ @ @ @ @ @ working journalist , cutting out many freelancers and photographers who have been documenting the city ’ s protests .
And the year ended with the arrest of Jimmy Lai , the founder of Apple Daily , the print and online newspaper that has become the voice of the pro-democracy movement .
We all know that journalism was already in crisis going into the pandemic .
The reasons are the familiar mix of plummeting subscription and advertising revenues , competition from social media and other online information sources , and a breakdown of trust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ competing narratives from both quality newcomers and bad-faith actors peddling disinformation .
But the biggest and most urgent danger to the future of an independent media is the new wave of political leaders conducting an all-out assault on the press .
They are restricting independent media , imprisoning journalists , branding critical reporting as fake news , using social media to spread disinformation and discredit independent news , and encouraging their followers to harass reporters—both online and in real life .
Many of these leaders have seized the pandemic as an excuse to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the World Health Organization , Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus , lashed out at the “ infodemic ” of misinformation about COVID-19 , he inadvertently gave many governments just the cover they were looking for to pass yet more laws restricting the media—ostensibly in a quest to eliminate fake news but often a barely disguised attack on independent journalism .
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was one of the first leaders to use the pandemic in this way .
In late March , he changed the country ’ s criminal code to threaten up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anyone deemed to be hampering the virus fight by “ distorting ” facts .
Other countries quickly followed suit : The International Press Institute counted 17 countries worldwide passing new laws against fake news in 2020 .
The list includes Brazil , the Philippines , Hungary , and Russia—countries whose leaders had a previous record of systematically undermining and dismantling journalism .
In many cases , governments have not needed to actually use the laws to stifle critical reporting .
Merely passing them has a chilling effect on journalists , deterring them from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government line .
Critical reporting on a country ’ s pandemic response has been branded unpatriotic .
In Serbia , the journalist Ana Lalic was detained for “ spreading panic and unrest ” when she wrote about the shortage of personal protective equipment at a local health center .
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi , after an unsuccessful attempt to have his country ’ s highest court compel media to publish only official accounts of the pandemic , wrote instead to leading editors asking them to refrain from publishing negative stories .
Several @ @ @ @ @ @ @ India while reporting on the pandemic nonetheless .
In South Africa , the editor of the community newspaper Mohokare News , Paul Nthoba , was assaulted by police in May as he was photographing them on patrol enforcing lockdown regulations .
After the assault , he fled to Lesotho , the first time in post-apartheid South Africa that a journalist has fled the country .
The pandemic raised new challenges for journalists trying to gather information—and gave politicians new tools to control the media .
The very nature of the pandemic—the lockdowns , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the move of much activity and communication online—raised new challenges for journalists trying to gather information , access sources , and report their stories .
It also gave politicians who wanted to control the media new tools to do so .
In various ways , COVID-19 has made it easier for governments to restrict the dissemination of uncomfortable information or simply to withhold it .
Press conferences—the noisy , crowded rooms where reporters jostle with each other to shout questions at politicians and spokespeople—have been replaced with online question-and-answer sessions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalists and preselect friendly questions .
In many countries , officials have also used the pandemic as an excuse to suspend requests for information under government transparency laws or scrap legally mandated deadlines to respond to them .
But the bluntest information blackouts have come by ways of internet shutdowns , which governments have been increasingly willing to use in order to silence dissent and debate .
Internet blackouts have long been a way of life in regions such as Egypt ’ s restive Sinai Peninsula and Indian-controlled Kashmir , but in 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ imposed blackouts in some of its regions , including Tigray , but has occasionally shut down online access in the entire country , as in late June amid protests following the killing of the musician and social activist Haacaaluu Hundeessaa .
Internet blackouts act as a block against collective behavior , stopping civil society from organizing , agitating , and drawing media attention to their issues .
In a year when it has been exceedingly difficult or dangerous to gather physically , blocking online communication can effectively shut down all dissent .
Internet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during a pandemic , they take away citizens ’ access to lifesaving information and their ability to communicate at all .
Naturally , they also stop journalists from reporting and filing their stories from the affected region .
The wider story this year has been the relationship between the public and the media .
At the start of the pandemic , interest in news and trust in media were relatively high , but as the pandemic progressed , this trust fell away .
Journalists were once more seen as taking sides in increasingly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ observers .
Journalists were once more accused of being part of the establishment elite—and not to be trusted .
In public demonstrations , crowds have often turned on journalists reporting on protests .
That was the case at many anti-lockdown protests in Western countries , where journalists were not generally targeted in the past .
In Germany , a camera crew from a public broadcaster was attacked while filming at an anti-lockdown demonstration in May .
And in Slovenia on Nov. 5 , the photojournalist Borut Zivulovic was knocked unconscious while taking photos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the site of weekly protests against the government .
He woke up hours later in the hospital to hear that several other journalists , including the well-known television presenter Vladimir Vodusek , had also been attacked by unknown assailants that same night .
Slovenia was not previously known for violence against journalists .
The more the authorities attack and undermine journalism , the more militants , criminal gangs , and extremists feel they can target journalists with impunity .
Journalists face the biggest risks wherever there is a sense that they will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the case of Maiwand ’ s killing in Afghanistan , militants claiming to belong to the Islamic State took responsibility .
In Mexico , the photojournalist Jaime Castaño Zacarías was killed after taking photographs of dead bodies he came across on the side of the road shortly after a clash between rival drug cartels .
He was the eighth journalist killed during 2020 in Mexico , where organized crime groups treat the media as an enemy to be vanquished ( a ninth journalist was found dead in January 2020 after having disappeared in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media paves the way for these kinds of attacks .
The more the authorities attack and undermine journalists and journalism , the more militants , criminal gangs , extremists , and agitators feel that they , too , can attack journalists with impunity .
The pandemic ’ s next stage—a massive , coordinated global rollout of vaccines—is crucially dependent on another wave of public health messaging and information if it is to proceed smoothly , with public trust in the process .
Journalists will be needed to speak to and present the facts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ask critical questions about the pharmaceuticals industry and the contracts awarded by governments to private corporations .
But whether the media will be able to keep the financial independence , legal protections , and public trust it needs to continue fulfilling its crucial role remains to be seen .

Malala Maiwand, a reporter for Enikass Radio and TV in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was on her way to work on Dec. 10 when gunmen opened fire on her car, killing her and her driver, Mohammad Tahir. She was the fourth journalist killed in Afghanistan in 2020 and the 28th worldwide in a year that has seen journalism come under a new and sustained level of attack. New restrictions on press freedoms—many of them imposed in connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic—made it ever harder for journalists to independently report the news.
Malala Maiwand, a reporter for Enikass Radio and TV in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was on her way to work on Dec. 10 when gunmen opened fire on her car, killing her and her driver, Mohammad Tahir. She was the fourth journalist killed in Afghanistan in 2020 and the 28th worldwide in a year that has seen journalism come under a new and sustained level of attack. New restrictions on press freedoms—many of them imposed in connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic—made it ever harder for journalists to independently report the news.
It was not inevitable that the onset of a pandemic should have resulted in an assault on the press. In a public health emergency, most authorities accept that it is vital to communicate with a public hungry for information. And the most effective way of doing that can be via the news media—whether online, broadcast, or print.
And indeed, when COVID-19 first began to spread in the spring, people turned to the media in masses. Data collected in late March and early April by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in six countries—Argentina, Britain, Germany, South Korea, Spain, and the United States—showed that news consumption surged as people went online or turned on their television to get information about the crisis.
The biggest and most urgent danger to the future of independent media is the new wave of political leaders conducting an all-out assault on the press.
But as the pandemic spread, many authorities around the world began to crack down on journalists. One of the earliest cases emerged from Wuhan, where the Chinese citizen journalist Chen Qiushi, who had been reporting about the new disease while official channels were still suppressing vital information, disappeared in February. After having been detained by the authorities, he reemerged only in September. Zhang Zhan, another citizen journalist arrested in May for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” has been sentenced to four years in jail.
China’s chilling impact on media freedom has also been felt in Hong Kong, where a new national security law was enacted in June. Hong Kong police have tightened the definition of who is considered a working journalist, cutting out many freelancers and photographers who have been documenting the city’s protests. And the year ended with the arrest of Jimmy Lai, the founder of Apple Daily, the print and online newspaper that has become the voice of the pro-democracy movement.
We all know that journalism was already in crisis going into the pandemic. The reasons are the familiar mix of plummeting subscription and advertising revenues, competition from social media and other online information sources, and a breakdown of trust in the media—combined with an explosion of competing narratives from both quality newcomers and bad-faith actors peddling disinformation.
But the biggest and most urgent danger to the future of an independent media is the new wave of political leaders conducting an all-out assault on the press. They are restricting independent media, imprisoning journalists, branding critical reporting as fake news, using social media to spread disinformation and discredit independent news, and encouraging their followers to harass reporters—both online and in real life.
Many of these leaders have seized the pandemic as an excuse to crack down further. When the director-general of the World Health Organization, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, lashed out at the “infodemic” of misinformation about COVID-19, he inadvertently gave many governments just the cover they were looking for to pass yet more laws restricting the media—ostensibly in a quest to eliminate fake news but often a barely disguised attack on independent journalism.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was one of the first leaders to use the pandemic in this way. In late March, he changed the country’s criminal code to threaten up to five years of prison time for anyone deemed to be hampering the virus fight by “distorting” facts. Other countries quickly followed suit: The International Press Institute counted 17 countries worldwide passing new laws against fake news in 2020. The list includes Brazil, the Philippines, Hungary, and Russia—countries whose leaders had a previous record of systematically undermining and dismantling journalism.
In many cases, governments have not needed to actually use the laws to stifle critical reporting. Merely passing them has a chilling effect on journalists, deterring them from reporting anything that strays from the official government line.
Critical reporting on a country’s pandemic response has been branded unpatriotic. In Serbia, the journalist Ana Lalic was detained for “spreading panic and unrest” when she wrote about the shortage of personal protective equipment at a local health center. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after an unsuccessful attempt to have his country’s highest court compel media to publish only official accounts of the pandemic, wrote instead to leading editors asking them to refrain from publishing negative stories. Several dozen journalists were arrested by police across India while reporting on the pandemic nonetheless.
In South Africa, the editor of the community newspaper Mohokare News, Paul Nthoba, was assaulted by police in May as he was photographing them on patrol enforcing lockdown regulations. After the assault, he fled to Lesotho, the first time in post-apartheid South Africa that a journalist has fled the country.
The pandemic raised new challenges for journalists trying to gather information—and gave politicians new tools to control the media.
The very nature of the pandemic—the lockdowns, the shutdown of public gatherings and spaces, and the move of much activity and communication online—raised new challenges for journalists trying to gather information, access sources, and report their stories. It also gave politicians who wanted to control the media new tools to do so.
In various ways, COVID-19 has made it easier for governments to restrict the dissemination of uncomfortable information or simply to withhold it. Press conferences—the noisy, crowded rooms where reporters jostle with each other to shout questions at politicians and spokespeople—have been replaced with online question-and-answer sessions, where it is easier to exclude critical journalists and preselect friendly questions. In many countries, officials have also used the pandemic as an excuse to suspend requests for information under government transparency laws or scrap legally mandated deadlines to respond to them.
But the bluntest information blackouts have come by ways of internet shutdowns, which governments have been increasingly willing to use in order to silence dissent and debate. Internet blackouts have long been a way of life in regions such as Egypt’s restive Sinai Peninsula and Indian-controlled Kashmir, but in 2020 they became more widespread. Ethiopia has imposed blackouts in some of its regions, including Tigray, but has occasionally shut down online access in the entire country, as in late June amid protests following the killing of the musician and social activist Haacaaluu Hundeessaa.
Internet blackouts act as a block against collective behavior, stopping civil society from organizing, agitating, and drawing media attention to their issues. In a year when it has been exceedingly difficult or dangerous to gather physically, blocking online communication can effectively shut down all dissent. Internet blackouts are hugely disruptive in normal times—but during a pandemic, they take away citizens’ access to lifesaving information and their ability to communicate at all. Naturally, they also stop journalists from reporting and filing their stories from the affected region.
The wider story this year has been the relationship between the public and the media. At the start of the pandemic, interest in news and trust in media were relatively high, but as the pandemic progressed, this trust fell away. Journalists were once more seen as taking sides in increasingly polarized societies, rather than remaining impartial observers. Journalists were once more accused of being part of the establishment elite—and not to be trusted.
In public demonstrations, crowds have often turned on journalists reporting on protests. That was the case at many anti-lockdown protests in Western countries, where journalists were not generally targeted in the past. In Germany, a camera crew from a public broadcaster was attacked while filming at an anti-lockdown demonstration in May. And in Slovenia on Nov. 5, the photojournalist Borut Zivulovic was knocked unconscious while taking photos in Republic Square in central Ljubljana, the site of weekly protests against the government. He woke up hours later in the hospital to hear that several other journalists, including the well-known television presenter Vladimir Vodusek, had also been attacked by unknown assailants that same night. Slovenia was not previously known for violence against journalists.
The more the authorities attack and undermine journalism, the more militants, criminal gangs, and extremists feel they can target journalists with impunity.
Journalists face the biggest risks wherever there is a sense that they will not be protected by the authorities. In the case of Maiwand’s killing in Afghanistan, militants claiming to belong to the Islamic State took responsibility. In Mexico, the photojournalist Jaime Castaño Zacarías was killed after taking photographs of dead bodies he came across on the side of the road shortly after a clash between rival drug cartels. He was the eighth journalist killed during 2020 in Mexico, where organized crime groups treat the media as an enemy to be vanquished (a ninth journalist was found dead in January 2020 after having disappeared in 2019).
Government disrespect for independent media paves the way for these kinds of attacks. The more the authorities attack and undermine journalists and journalism, the more militants, criminal gangs, extremists, and agitators feel that they, too, can attack journalists with impunity.
The pandemic’s next stage—a massive, coordinated global rollout of vaccines—is crucially dependent on another wave of public health messaging and information if it is to proceed smoothly, with public trust in the process. Journalists will be needed to speak to and present the facts to a wary public but also to ask critical questions about the pharmaceuticals industry and the contracts awarded by governments to private corporations. But whether the media will be able to keep the financial independence, legal protections, and public trust it needs to continue fulfilling its crucial role remains to be seen.