foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--Can Europe’s Green Parties Learn to Love Power?

As a parent might talk to a child , Germany ’ s interior minister , Horst Seehofer , said last month that he was disappointed at Austria for the country ’ s continued refusal to participate in a European scheme to resettle child refugees currently living in the Moria refugee camp .
On the night of Sept. 8 , a fire swept through the camp on the Greek island of Lesbos , leaving most of its 12,000 residents without a bed for the night .
By Sept. 11 , Germany , France , Finland , Luxembourg , Slovenia , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and Switzerland had all declared themselves ready to take in some of the children made homeless by the disaster .
But not Austria .
The Alpine republic ’ s recalcitrance was “ somewhat surprising , ” Seehofer observed , in view “ of the participation of a certain political party in the government , ” a not-so-subtle dig in the ribs of the pro-migration Green Party , which joined a governing coalition with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz ’ s conservative People ’ s Party ( OVP ) this year .
But Seehofer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warning relevant to a far wider audience .
Europe paid careful attention when the OVP and Greens formed their government in January .
As social democracy has weakened as a political force , Green parties in Austria , Germany , France , Denmark , the Netherlands , and Finland have been the beneficiaries .
Though Austria ’ s conservative-green coalition was the first of its kind at the national level , it will not be the last .
Ireland ’ s Greens entered into a partnership with both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so-called black-green coalition is now perceived as the most likely outcome of next year ’ s general election , a deal that would place a party with anti-establishment credentials at the center of global politics .
Conservative-green coalitions , if not the future , are at least a future for European politics , and Austria ’ s Greens are acting as a forerunner for other Green parties in Europe .
The party ’ s fate matters far beyond Vienna ; it shows that though it may be entirely natural for Europe ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to effectively wield it is another matter entirely .
Although Austria ’ s Greens protested during the 2019 general election that they would never go into coalition with Kurz and the OVP , in January 93 percent of delegates to the party ’ s federal congress voted to do just that .
“ It is a risk , ” Green leader Werner Kogler , who is now vice chancellor , told the congress , “ but we want to take this course.
” Now that road has led to a dead end @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Austria will not take in a single child refugee , and the most recent opinion poll on the subject indicated a majority of Austrians believe the country has taken in too many refugees already .
That , therefore , is that , and now the Greens find themselves in the absurd situation of having to vote against measures in parliament with which it purports to agree , falling back on the excuse that Moria is something that can only be dealt with at the European level .
Faced with a choice between principle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ discipline , the Greens opted for the latter .
Looking back , the reaction when the coalition was formed was one of mild bafflement and bemusement combined with a frisson of excitement .
This government was an “ unlikely ” one , it was reported , the result of a “ political transformation ” and a “ pivot ” by the Austrian chancellor .
It was “ unexpected.
” It was “ unusual.
” It represented a “ slight swing to the left , ” which wouldn ’ t be difficult considering the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that collapsed in scandal and corruption .
The Greens ’ progressive positions on environmental and social issues including discrimination , immigration , and marriage equality were to take the government in a different direction .
From the party ’ s origins , however , Austria ’ s Greens have been a movement of the middle class with both a younger , left-wing tendency and a bourgeois , conservative one .
Consider that its defining event—the December 1984 occupation of the Hainburger Au , a wooded area of low ground where a hydroelectric power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by journalists , students , and academics in opposition to the Social Democratic Party ( SPO ) and trade union movement .
The educated middle class remains the party ’ s vanguard .
In the last election , the Greens performed well in Austria ’ s largest cities , in regions with higher income levels per capita , and among women , the young , and those who went through higher education .
The priorities of its core voters are reflected in the party ’ s policy agenda .
Campaigning for state-level elections @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the local SPO has leaned into traditional themes like housing , employment , and health care and the OVP has parked its tanks on the far-right ’ s lawn by talking nonstop about integration .
The Greens ’ effort has amounted to pop-up cycle lanes and computerized representations of new parks , tree-lined streets , and pedestrian zones .
Its core themes are politics for the haves .
Far from being unexpected , unusual , or unlikely , this conservative-green coalition is , then , a union of two parties of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up until this mini-crisis surrounding Moria , functioned as smoothly and efficiently as the right-wing government that preceded it .
This is partially a product of circumstance , the coronavirus outbreak more or less coinciding with the lifespan of this coalition .
Such times of crisis demand national unity , and the conservative-green government competently handled the first wave of the virus from mid-February to mid-June .
For the most part , though , the coalition hums because the Greens have not dissented from the OVP ’ s agenda .
A crisis of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by coronavirus-induced unemployment was addressed by bringing forward a previously scheduled tax cut instead of a temporary raise in unemployment benefits .
At the European level , the Greens could do nothing as Kurz—as part of the “ frugal four ” along with Denmark , Sweden , and the Netherlands—tried to pare back the size and scope of the European Union ’ s historic 750 billion euro ( $ 880 billion ) coronavirus recovery package .
Though the party has carved out niches for itself in government—an enlarged environmental portfolio with responsibility for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important government ministries lie in conservative hands : interior , foreign , defense , finance , and education .
Much of the government ’ s agenda bares no sign of the Green Party ’ s fingerprints .
Its policy victories have thus far been limited to cosmetic ones such as new regional and nationwide public transport tickets that will cost between 1 and 3 euros a day , currently mired in negotiations between the federal government and the states over the not-insignificant question of who might pay for it .
When asked to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kogler always answers as follows .
First , had the Greens not agreed to enter into coalition with the OVP , the far-right Freedom Party ( FPO ) would have .
He is right .
Of the options on the table , the Greens and the FPO were the only viable partners for the OVP , the liberals having too few seats and the SPO ’ s contempt for Kurz making their relationship irreparable and a grand coalition impossible .
Second , the Greens had to have the courage to move from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in order to change and better the world.
” The unresolved refugee crisis in Moria , however , shows that the latter is easier said than done .
In coalition negotiations , the Greens only managed to win concessions on environmental policy : not only the aforementioned “ 1-2-3 ” public transport ticket but an increase in air passenger duty and commitments to renewable energy and long-term carbon neutralization .
But from a tax-cutting economic agenda to integration and immigration policies the far-right could have written , the dominance of the OVP showed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ all the early coverage only Manès Weisskircher , a researcher at the Technische Universität Dresden , had it right when he cautioned of the prospect of more continuity than change , “ a conservative course with some Green flavor.
” Having won 13.9 percent of the vote in the 2019 general election to the OVP ’ s 37.5 , the Greens find themselves an underpowered junior partner bound to an economic agenda about which they have few qualms and foreign and immigration policies they have little or no room to influence , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Considering the impasse over Moria , the head of the Greens ’ parliamentary group , Sigrid Maurer , admitted , “ If we vote [ with the opposition ] , then we breach the coalition.
” Austria ’ s Greens should be a lesson .
For political observers , it is not to mistake environmentalism for radicalism .
For parties like Germany ’ s Greens , more principled and idealistic than their sister party in Austria , it is to avoid being bought off with titles and ministries and ensure the green agenda @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of policy , including matters foreign and social , during coalition negotiations .
Otherwise Europe ’ s Greens will find that , far from being an instrument to shape the world , it will be power that shapes and binds them .

As a parent might talk to a child, Germany’s interior minister, Horst Seehofer, said last month that he was disappointed at Austria for the country’s continued refusal to participate in a European scheme to resettle child refugees currently living in the Moria refugee camp. On the night of Sept. 8, a fire swept through the camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, leaving most of its 12,000 residents without a bed for the night. By Sept. 11, Germany, France, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Croatia, Portugal, Belgium, and Switzerland had all declared themselves ready to take in some of the children made homeless by the disaster. But not Austria.
As a parent might talk to a child, Germany’s interior minister, Horst Seehofer, said last month that he was disappointed at Austria for the country’s continued refusal to participate in a European scheme to resettle child refugees currently living in the Moria refugee camp. On the night of Sept. 8, a fire swept through the camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, leaving most of its 12,000 residents without a bed for the night. By Sept. 11, Germany, France, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Croatia, Portugal, Belgium, and Switzerland had all declared themselves ready to take in some of the children made homeless by the disaster. But not Austria.
The Alpine republic’s recalcitrance was “somewhat surprising,” Seehofer observed, in view “of the participation of a certain political party in the government,” a not-so-subtle dig in the ribs of the pro-migration Green Party, which joined a governing coalition with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’s conservative People’s Party (OVP) this year. But Seehofer’s cross-border insult was also a warning relevant to a far wider audience.
Europe paid careful attention when the OVP and Greens formed their government in January. As social democracy has weakened as a political force, Green parties in Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland have been the beneficiaries. Though Austria’s conservative-green coalition was the first of its kind at the national level, it will not be the last. Ireland’s Greens entered into a partnership with both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail in June. In Germany, a so-called black-green coalition is now perceived as the most likely outcome of next year’s general election, a deal that would place a party with anti-establishment credentials at the center of global politics.
Conservative-green coalitions, if not the future, are at least a future for European politics, and Austria’s Greens are acting as a forerunner for other Green parties in Europe. The party’s fate matters far beyond Vienna; it shows that though it may be entirely natural for Europe’s Green parties to assume power, their ability to effectively wield it is another matter entirely.
Although Austria’s Greens protested during the 2019 general election that they would never go into coalition with Kurz and the OVP, in January 93 percent of delegates to the party’s federal congress voted to do just that. “It is a risk,” Green leader Werner Kogler, who is now vice chancellor, told the congress, “but we want to take this course.”
Now that road has led to a dead end. Kurz has been quite clear that Austria will not take in a single child refugee, and the most recent opinion poll on the subject indicated a majority of Austrians believe the country has taken in too many refugees already. That, therefore, is that, and now the Greens find themselves in the absurd situation of having to vote against measures in parliament with which it purports to agree, falling back on the excuse that Moria is something that can only be dealt with at the European level. Faced with a choice between principle and pragmatism, aiding refugees and coalition discipline, the Greens opted for the latter.
Looking back, the reaction when the coalition was formed was one of mild bafflement and bemusement combined with a frisson of excitement. This government was an “unlikely” one, it was reported, the result of a “political transformation” and a “pivot” by the Austrian chancellor. It was “unexpected.” It was “unusual.” It represented a “slight swing to the left,” which wouldn’t be difficult considering the last Austrian government was a conservative-far-right coalition that collapsed in scandal and corruption. The Greens’ progressive positions on environmental and social issues including discrimination, immigration, and marriage equality were to take the government in a different direction.
From the party’s origins, however, Austria’s Greens have been a movement of the middle class with both a younger, left-wing tendency and a bourgeois, conservative one. Consider that its defining event—the December 1984 occupation of the Hainburger Au, a wooded area of low ground where a hydroelectric power station had been planned—was a protest led by journalists, students, and academics in opposition to the Social Democratic Party (SPO) and trade union movement. The educated middle class remains the party’s vanguard. In the last election, the Greens performed well in Austria’s largest cities, in regions with higher income levels per capita, and among women, the young, and those who went through higher education.
The priorities of its core voters are reflected in the party’s policy agenda. Campaigning for state-level elections in Vienna is currently in full swing, and the local SPO has leaned into traditional themes like housing, employment, and health care and the OVP has parked its tanks on the far-right’s lawn by talking nonstop about integration. The Greens’ effort has amounted to pop-up cycle lanes and computerized representations of new parks, tree-lined streets, and pedestrian zones. Its core themes are politics for the haves.
Far from being unexpected, unusual, or unlikely, this conservative-green coalition is, then, a union of two parties of the Austrian middle class that has, up until this mini-crisis surrounding Moria, functioned as smoothly and efficiently as the right-wing government that preceded it. This is partially a product of circumstance, the coronavirus outbreak more or less coinciding with the lifespan of this coalition. Such times of crisis demand national unity, and the conservative-green government competently handled the first wave of the virus from mid-February to mid-June.
For the most part, though, the coalition hums because the Greens have not dissented from the OVP’s agenda. A crisis of people’s household budgets brought about by coronavirus-induced unemployment was addressed by bringing forward a previously scheduled tax cut instead of a temporary raise in unemployment benefits. At the European level, the Greens could do nothing as Kurz—as part of the “frugal four” along with Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands—tried to pare back the size and scope of the European Union’s historic 750 billion euro ($880 billion) coronavirus recovery package.
Though the party has carved out niches for itself in government—an enlarged environmental portfolio with responsibility for transport and energy, for example—the most important government ministries lie in conservative hands: interior, foreign, defense, finance, and education. Much of the government’s agenda bares no sign of the Green Party’s fingerprints. Its policy victories have thus far been limited to cosmetic ones such as new regional and nationwide public transport tickets that will cost between 1 and 3 euros a day, currently mired in negotiations between the federal government and the states over the not-insignificant question of who might pay for it.
When asked to defend his party’s record, Kogler always answers as follows. First, had the Greens not agreed to enter into coalition with the OVP, the far-right Freedom Party (FPO) would have. He is right. Of the options on the table, the Greens and the FPO were the only viable partners for the OVP, the liberals having too few seats and the SPO’s contempt for Kurz making their relationship irreparable and a grand coalition impossible. Second, the Greens had to have the courage to move from the fringes to the heart of power “in order to change and better the world.”
The unresolved refugee crisis in Moria, however, shows that the latter is easier said than done. In coalition negotiations, the Greens only managed to win concessions on environmental policy: not only the aforementioned “1-2-3” public transport ticket but an increase in air passenger duty and commitments to renewable energy and long-term carbon neutralization. But from a tax-cutting economic agenda to integration and immigration policies the far-right could have written, the dominance of the OVP showed in the final deal.
Perhaps of all the early coverage only Manès Weisskircher, a researcher at the Technische Universität Dresden, had it right when he cautioned of the prospect of more continuity than change, “a conservative course with some Green flavor.” Having won 13.9 percent of the vote in the 2019 general election to the OVP’s 37.5, the Greens find themselves an underpowered junior partner bound to an economic agenda about which they have few qualms and foreign and immigration policies they have little or no room to influence, and their room for maneuver is limited. Considering the impasse over Moria, the head of the Greens’ parliamentary group, Sigrid Maurer, admitted, “If we vote [with the opposition], then we breach the coalition.”
Austria’s Greens should be a lesson. For political observers, it is not to mistake environmentalism for radicalism. For parties like Germany’s Greens, more principled and idealistic than their sister party in Austria, it is to avoid being bought off with titles and ministries and ensure the green agenda is present and obvious in every area of policy, including matters foreign and social, during coalition negotiations. Otherwise Europe’s Greens will find that, far from being an instrument to shape the world, it will be power that shapes and binds them.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--How ‘Free Zones’ Became the Middle Eastern Diplomacy Tool of Choice

How ‘ Free Zones ’ Became the Middle Eastern Diplomacy Tool of Choice In geopolitics , free zones and other types of special economic zones used to facilitate global trade and investment usually fly under the radar .
However , these commercial entities , in which the rules of business are laxer than those in the national territory , are fast becoming prominent features of controversial strategic partnerships emerging across the Middle East .
In turn , beyond serving as commercial incubators for select industries , free zones have now started to act as bellwethers for the geopolitical and economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That ’ s particularly true when it comes to relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates .
Following the announcement of a normalization agreement between the two in August , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu mentioned that his country would import from the UAE free zones , saying that “ we know that we will get good prices , ” and hinting that further engagement would follow .
Israel may be turning over a new leaf with the UAE , but its ties to free zones aren ’ t anything new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Qualifying Industrial Zones in Egypt and Jordan—the result of a program authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1996 to strengthen ties between Israel and its neighboring Arab states .
These free zone-related entities permit Egyptian and Jordanian firms to export to the United States duty-free , provided that the exported products contain inputs from Israel .
The latest cooperation over free zones follows an older trend in which economic partnerships prefigure better relations .
The emirate of Dubai , widely considered the Gulf ’ s de facto free zone hub , is using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Israeli counterparts .
In September , DP World—the Dubai-based multinational logistics company—and other government-related entities signed multiple agreements with Israel-based DoverTower Group , a shareholder of the Israel Shipyards port in Haifa and a partner in Eilat Port .
DP World plans to assess port and free zone development opportunities in Israel as well as establish a direct shipping route between Eilat and the UAE port of Jebel Ali .
Moreover , the Israel Diamond Exchange and the Dubai Diamond Exchange , which is part of the government-owned Dubai Multi Commodities Centre @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enhance cooperation in the diamond trade .
The Jebel Ali Free Zone and Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority both signed memorandums of understanding with the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce in late September to support Israeli companies intending to establish businesses in Dubai .
The involvement of free zones in geopolitical reconfigurations is not restricted to the Persian Gulf states .
Plans by Iran and China to formalize a 25-year strategic partnership include Chinese commitments to develop Iranian free zones in Maku , Abadan , and Qeshm Island .
In 2019 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ oil into what is known as bonded storage—a component of free zones—in China so that the oil would not pass through customs or appear on national import records .
The Trump administration nevertheless imposed economic sanctions on the associated Chinese oil-trading company .
Free zones and other megaprojects with free zone characteristics are also crucial channels for foreign direct investment flows into the Middle East .
Chinese firms have invested or pledged billions of dollars for projects in Abu Dhabi ’ s Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone and the special economic zone in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Egypt set high expectations that a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone would attract $ 7 billion in new investments .
Actual investments , however , can be slow to materialize after the completion of signing ceremonies .
Several factors explain why free zones have moved to the forefront of geopolitical relations in the broader Middle East .
First , there is a widely held perception that free zones reduce risks associated with entering new markets .
Marketing strategies depict free zones as politically neutral commercial gateways with seamless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ create free zones and other forms of special economic zones to gauge the effects of potential economic reforms—such as easing local ownership requirements—or to develop new industries .
In this respect , governments and policymakers may treat free zones as commercial litmus tests .
Second , free zones attract a wide array of local , regional , and international economic actors .
This diversity of players can shield individual governments from criticism relating to new international relationships , for example between Gulf states and Israel .
Global business actors operating in Gulf free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which include greater ownership rights , lax labor regulations , and exemptions from customs duties and taxes .
Third , free zones are already prominent structural components of the Middle East ’ s political economy , especially that of the Gulf region .
In Dubai , for example , investors can choose between dozens of operating free zones , and the emirate ’ s 50-year charter sets out its vision of a virtual commercial city that can host 100,000 firms .
Saudi Arabia ’ s Neom—a megaproject-cum-free zone in northwest of the country—stretches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to incorporate nearby Egyptian and Jordanian territories .
Saudi policymakers have also proposed free zones along Saudi Arabia ’ s borders with Yemen and Iraq , presumably to advance its objectives in those countries .
The Qatar Free Zones Authority aims to offer “ state of the art infrastructure ” next to Hamad Port and Hamad International Airport , while Omani free zones ostensibly seek to promote growth in underdeveloped parts of the country .
Free zone development occasionally faces local opposition .
Some Kuwaiti policymakers fret that a planned economic zone in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adverse commercial and legal effects , such as excluding local developers or permitting the consumption of alcohol .
However , other Kuwaitis believe that creating an economic zone and adjoining business hubs is a promising approach for strengthening Kuwait ’ s links with the northern Gulf , Central Asia , and Europe .
While free zones do play a role in broader efforts to encourage friendlier political ties between countries , it is difficult to identify a clear causal link between this economic mechanism and positive foreign relations outcomes .
The considerations underlining @ @ @ @ @ @ @ affairs objectives .
Moreover , employing free zones within the domain of foreign relations has the potential to enrich small , isolated segments of given populations without engaging larger swaths of respective societies .
Ultimately , free zones are attractive because of their flexibility as economic policy instruments .
If Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden wins the U.S. election in November and his administration permits Iran to engage more fully with the global economic community , free zones in places like Dubai will be among the first beneficiaries .
Existing free zones are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future free zones may foster new and surprising global linkages over the coming years .

In geopolitics, free zones and other types of special economic zones used to facilitate global trade and investment usually fly under the radar. However, these commercial entities, in which the rules of business are laxer than those in the national territory, are fast becoming prominent features of controversial strategic partnerships emerging across the Middle East. In turn, beyond serving as commercial incubators for select industries, free zones have now started to act as bellwethers for the geopolitical and economic reconfigurations underway across the broader Middle East.
In geopolitics, free zones and other types of special economic zones used to facilitate global trade and investment usually fly under the radar. However, these commercial entities, in which the rules of business are laxer than those in the national territory, are fast becoming prominent features of controversial strategic partnerships emerging across the Middle East. In turn, beyond serving as commercial incubators for select industries, free zones have now started to act as bellwethers for the geopolitical and economic reconfigurations underway across the broader Middle East.
That’s particularly true when it comes to relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Following the announcement of a normalization agreement between the two in August, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu mentioned that his country would import from the UAE free zones, saying that “we know that we will get good prices,” and hinting that further engagement would follow.
Israel may be turning over a new leaf with the UAE, but its ties to free zones aren’t anything new. Israel has long engaged with similar Qualifying Industrial Zones in Egypt and Jordan—the result of a program authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1996 to strengthen ties between Israel and its neighboring Arab states. These free zone-related entities permit Egyptian and Jordanian firms to export to the United States duty-free, provided that the exported products contain inputs from Israel. The latest cooperation over free zones follows an older trend in which economic partnerships prefigure better relations.
The emirate of Dubai, widely considered the Gulf’s de facto free zone hub, is using its flagship commercial entities to cement ties with Israeli counterparts. In September, DP World—the Dubai-based multinational logistics company—and other government-related entities signed multiple agreements with Israel-based DoverTower Group, a shareholder of the Israel Shipyards port in Haifa and a partner in Eilat Port. DP World plans to assess port and free zone development opportunities in Israel as well as establish a direct shipping route between Eilat and the UAE port of Jebel Ali. Moreover, the Israel Diamond Exchange and the Dubai Diamond Exchange, which is part of the government-owned Dubai Multi Commodities Centre free zone, inked an agreement to enhance cooperation in the diamond trade. The Jebel Ali Free Zone and Dubai Airport Free Zone Authority both signed memorandums of understanding with the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce in late September to support Israeli companies intending to establish businesses in Dubai.
The involvement of free zones in geopolitical reconfigurations is not restricted to the Persian Gulf states. Plans by Iran and China to formalize a 25-year strategic partnership include Chinese commitments to develop Iranian free zones in Maku, Abadan, and Qeshm Island. In 2019, a state-owned Chinese oil-trading company imported Iranian oil into what is known as bonded storage—a component of free zones—in China so that the oil would not pass through customs or appear on national import records. The Trump administration nevertheless imposed economic sanctions on the associated Chinese oil-trading company.
Free zones and other megaprojects with free zone characteristics are also crucial channels for foreign direct investment flows into the Middle East. Chinese firms have invested or pledged billions of dollars for projects in Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone and the special economic zone in Duqm, Oman. The Russian ambassador to Egypt set high expectations that a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone would attract $7 billion in new investments. Actual investments, however, can be slow to materialize after the completion of signing ceremonies.
Several factors explain why free zones have moved to the forefront of geopolitical relations in the broader Middle East.
First, there is a widely held perception that free zones reduce risks associated with entering new markets. Marketing strategies depict free zones as politically neutral commercial gateways with seamless and cost-effective services. Host governments may create free zones and other forms of special economic zones to gauge the effects of potential economic reforms—such as easing local ownership requirements—or to develop new industries. In this respect, governments and policymakers may treat free zones as commercial litmus tests.
Second, free zones attract a wide array of local, regional, and international economic actors. This diversity of players can shield individual governments from criticism relating to new international relationships, for example between Gulf states and Israel. Global business actors operating in Gulf free zones also enjoy preferential business incentives, which include greater ownership rights, lax labor regulations, and exemptions from customs duties and taxes.
Third, free zones are already prominent structural components of the Middle East’s political economy, especially that of the Gulf region. In Dubai, for example, investors can choose between dozens of operating free zones, and the emirate’s 50-year charter sets out its vision of a virtual commercial city that can host 100,000 firms. Saudi Arabia’s Neom—a megaproject-cum-free zone in northwest of the country—stretches the bounds of national sovereignty by aspiring to incorporate nearby Egyptian and Jordanian territories. Saudi policymakers have also proposed free zones along Saudi Arabia’s borders with Yemen and Iraq, presumably to advance its objectives in those countries. The Qatar Free Zones Authority aims to offer “state of the art infrastructure” next to Hamad Port and Hamad International Airport, while Omani free zones ostensibly seek to promote growth in underdeveloped parts of the country.
Free zone development occasionally faces local opposition. Some Kuwaiti policymakers fret that a planned economic zone in the massive Silk City project would have adverse commercial and legal effects, such as excluding local developers or permitting the consumption of alcohol. However, other Kuwaitis believe that creating an economic zone and adjoining business hubs is a promising approach for strengthening Kuwait’s links with the northern Gulf, Central Asia, and Europe.
While free zones do play a role in broader efforts to encourage friendlier political ties between countries, it is difficult to identify a clear causal link between this economic mechanism and positive foreign relations outcomes. The considerations underlining business interests often diverge from key foreign affairs objectives. Moreover, employing free zones within the domain of foreign relations has the potential to enrich small, isolated segments of given populations without engaging larger swaths of respective societies.
Ultimately, free zones are attractive because of their flexibility as economic policy instruments. If Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden wins the U.S. election in November and his administration permits Iran to engage more fully with the global economic community, free zones in places like Dubai will be among the first beneficiaries. Existing free zones are keeping pace with changing international relations; future free zones may foster new and surprising global linkages over the coming years.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--Beware the China Reset

Beware the China Reset

If he is elected as U.S. president in November , Joe Biden will come under intense pressure to seek a reset in relations with China , of the kind that President Barack Obama once sought to extend to Russia .
Yielding to this pressure would be a serious mistake .
Despite its excesses and omissions , the Trump administration has done the right thing by beginning to push back against Beijing .
Biden should build on what he inherits , keeping the good policies , discarding the bad , and eliminating the ugliness that has marred Donald Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to meet its greatest strategic challenge .
The list of those lobbying for an easing of tensions will be long .
In the business world it will likely include U.S. semiconductor manufacturers anxious about the impact of new export controls , financial firms hoping to manage the money of millions of new Chinese investors if Beijing continues to open its market , farmers looking to resume sales of soybeans , and manufacturers whose costs have risen due to Trump ’ s tariffs on imported materials and components .
Professional China watchers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be eager to make their voices heard again , especially those who already blame the White House for causing the sharp downturn in relations by “ treat [ ing ] China as an enemy.
” When last in power , the Democrats failed to respond effectively to China ’ s mounting aggression in the South China Sea , its efforts to extend its influence in the developing world via the Belt and Road Initiative , or its plans to dominate the world ’ s next-generation 5G telecommunications networks .
Some members of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tough on China , and they may be prepared to follow through .
But they will face opposition from progressives who want to cut defense spending and prioritize cooperation with China on climate change and other global issues For its part , Beijing would be smart to extend an initial olive branch to a new administration , perhaps offering to work together to achieve what Chinese President Xi Jinping referred to in a recent speech as a “ green recovery ” from the global economic crisis prompted by the coronavirus pandemic .
Xi @ @ @ @ @ @ @ corner has been turned and a new era of increasingly intense and open rivalry is already underway .
Still , a temporary relaxation in tensions could help to lull the United States and its allies into a false sense of security , giving Beijing more time to tilt the Asian military balance in its favor , build positions of strength in the developing world , and reduce its dependence on Western markets and technology .
Beijing ’ s unceasing efforts to gain economic , diplomatic , and military advantage would likely eventually force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ respond—but valuable time will have been lost .
Instead of giving Beijing the breathing space it seeks , a new administration—if elected—should press ahead on three fronts opened by its predecessor : Trump ’ s strategists correctly identified China as the No .
1 threat to the nation ’ s security , and started to shift the primary focus of the armed forces and the intelligence community away from counterinsurgency and terrorism back toward the more strenuous demands of great-power competition .
The next administration needs to double down on this effort , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The last four years have seen a series of belated but much-needed initiatives designed to constrict China ’ s access to U.S. technology and data , including tighter export controls and procurement regulations , closer scrutiny of foreign investment and talent recruitment programs , and a crackdown on scientific and industrial espionage .
The Trump administration has also broken important ground by calling out Beijing ’ s pervasive political influence operations , namely its use of money , front organizations , and other intermediaries to try to exploit the openness of American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese diaspora , and shape the perceptions and policy preferences of the nation ’ s political and business elites .
Taking these sound policies as a foundation , a Biden presidency would also have the opportunity to correct some of its predecessor ’ s most egregious errors .
While it did help heighten awareness of the problems posed by China ’ s market-distorting trade and industrial policies , Trump ’ s trade war ultimately failed to compel Beijing to abandon them .
In order to sustain domestic support for a continued pressure campaign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least a partial cease-fire , one that would cut tariffs on agricultural goods and some consumer products .
A new president will find it easier to mobilize collective action against China on trade , technology , and other issues if he can refrain from insulting America ’ s democratic allies , openly disrespecting their elected leaders , threatening them with tariffs , accusing them of free-riding , and raising doubts about the long-term reliability of American security guarantees .
A president free from the ugly taint of racism can confront the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ animus against the Chinese people .
And a president who does not feel moved to sing the praises of autocratic rulers but can instead speak credibly about the superior virtues of liberal democracy will also be better able to mobilize the American people , rally a coalition of like-minded states , and put Beijing on the ideological defensive .
Trump deserves credit for presiding over an administration that finally , fully accepted the reality of the challenge posed by China and began to implement some of the policies that will be needed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s protectionist , isolationist impulses , corrosive and divisive leadership , and contempt for democratic principles have weakened the nation from within and render him uniquely ill-suited to lead it forward .
If he wins , Joe Biden should reject the idea of a reset and pick up where Trump left off .

If he is elected as U.S. president in November, Joe Biden will come under intense pressure to seek a reset in relations with China, of the kind that President Barack Obama once sought to extend to Russia. Yielding to this pressure would be a serious mistake. Despite its excesses and omissions, the Trump administration has done the right thing by beginning to push back against Beijing. Biden should build on what he inherits, keeping the good policies, discarding the bad, and eliminating the ugliness that has marred Donald Trump’s presidency and damaged the nation’s ability to meet its greatest strategic challenge.
If he is elected as U.S. president in November, Joe Biden will come under intense pressure to seek a reset in relations with China, of the kind that President Barack Obama once sought to extend to Russia. Yielding to this pressure would be a serious mistake. Despite its excesses and omissions, the Trump administration has done the right thing by beginning to push back against Beijing. Biden should build on what he inherits, keeping the good policies, discarding the bad, and eliminating the ugliness that has marred Donald Trump’s presidency and damaged the nation’s ability to meet its greatest strategic challenge.
The list of those lobbying for an easing of tensions will be long. In the business world it will likely include U.S. semiconductor manufacturers anxious about the impact of new export controls, financial firms hoping to manage the money of millions of new Chinese investors if Beijing continues to open its market, farmers looking to resume sales of soybeans, and manufacturers whose costs have risen due to Trump’s tariffs on imported materials and components. Professional China watchers, largely ignored by the Trump administration, will be eager to make their voices heard again, especially those who already blame the White House for causing the sharp downturn in relations by “treat[ing] China as an enemy.”
When last in power, the Democrats failed to respond effectively to China’s mounting aggression in the South China Sea, its efforts to extend its influence in the developing world via the Belt and Road Initiative, or its plans to dominate the world’s next-generation 5G telecommunications networks. Some members of the Democratic foreign-policy establishment are now talking tough on China, and they may be prepared to follow through. But they will face opposition from progressives who want to cut defense spending and prioritize cooperation with China on climate change and other global issues
For its part, Beijing would be smart to extend an initial olive branch to a new administration, perhaps offering to work together to achieve what Chinese President Xi Jinping referred to in a recent speech as a “green recovery” from the global economic crisis prompted by the coronavirus pandemic. Xi and his colleagues clearly believe that a corner has been turned and a new era of increasingly intense and open rivalry is already underway. Still, a temporary relaxation in tensions could help to lull the United States and its allies into a false sense of security, giving Beijing more time to tilt the Asian military balance in its favor, build positions of strength in the developing world, and reduce its dependence on Western markets and technology. Beijing’s unceasing efforts to gain economic, diplomatic, and military advantage would likely eventually force a Biden administration to face reality and respond—but valuable time will have been lost.
Instead of giving Beijing the breathing space it seeks, a new administration—if elected—should press ahead on three fronts opened by its predecessor:
Trump’s strategists correctly identified China as the No. 1 threat to the nation’s security, and started to shift the primary focus of the armed forces and the intelligence community away from counterinsurgency and terrorism back toward the more strenuous demands of great-power competition. The next administration needs to double down on this effort, funding it properly despite post-pandemic budget constraints.
The last four years have seen a series of belated but much-needed initiatives designed to constrict China’s access to U.S. technology and data, including tighter export controls and procurement regulations, closer scrutiny of foreign investment and talent recruitment programs, and a crackdown on scientific and industrial espionage.
The Trump administration has also broken important ground by calling out Beijing’s pervasive political influence operations, namely its use of money, front organizations, and other intermediaries to try to exploit the openness of American society, exercise coercive power over the Chinese diaspora, and shape the perceptions and policy preferences of the nation’s political and business elites.
Taking these sound policies as a foundation, a Biden presidency would also have the opportunity to correct some of its predecessor’s most egregious errors.
While it did help heighten awareness of the problems posed by China’s market-distorting trade and industrial policies, Trump’s trade war ultimately failed to compel Beijing to abandon them. In order to sustain domestic support for a continued pressure campaign, the next administration needs to negotiate at least a partial cease-fire, one that would cut tariffs on agricultural goods and some consumer products.
A new president will find it easier to mobilize collective action against China on trade, technology, and other issues if he can refrain from insulting America’s democratic allies, openly disrespecting their elected leaders, threatening them with tariffs, accusing them of free-riding, and raising doubts about the long-term reliability of American security guarantees. A president free from the ugly taint of racism can confront the Chinese Communist Party without being accused of harboring animus against the Chinese people. And a president who does not feel moved to sing the praises of autocratic rulers but can instead speak credibly about the superior virtues of liberal democracy will also be better able to mobilize the American people, rally a coalition of like-minded states, and put Beijing on the ideological defensive.
Trump deserves credit for presiding over an administration that finally, fully accepted the reality of the challenge posed by China and began to implement some of the policies that will be needed in order to meet it. But Trump’s protectionist, isolationist impulses, corrosive and divisive leadership, and contempt for democratic principles have weakened the nation from within and render him uniquely ill-suited to lead it forward. If he wins, Joe Biden should reject the idea of a reset and pick up where Trump left off.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-01--EU Leaders Plan Response to Belarus Crisis and Greece-Turkey Tensions

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Belarus and Turkey top the agenda as EU leaders meet in Brussels , India struggles with caste-based violence , and an alleged participant of the Rwandan genocide faces extradition .
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EU leaders are set to meet today in Brussels to begin a two-day special summit aimed primarily at untangling the two major crises currently gripping the region—the political upheaval in Belarus and the dispute in the eastern Mediterranean .
Attendees will also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the unfolding conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia .
Sanctions on Belarus .
The European Union has been slow to respond to the worsening political crisis in Belarus , in part due to concerns over Russia ’ s increasingly hostile stance .
Weeks after Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed a landslide victory in an election that was mired in allegations of fraud , Russian President Vladimir Putin warned EU powers against meddling in Belarus ’ s internal affairs and went as far as offering Lukashenko military support .
After a secret inaugural ceremony @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weekend , the EU said it did not recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus , but stopped short of announcing sanctions .
A German official told Reuters that the bloc could make a decision on sanctions during the summit .
Going their own way .
But this hasn ’ t stopped some EU member states from unilaterally imposing sanctions .
Estonia , Latvia , and Lithuania—the latter of which is current housing exiled opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya—preempted action by the bloc and imposed sanctions on Lukashenko and several other top government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ kind on Wednesday by imposing retaliatory sanctions .
Intertwined crises .
But the EU ’ s approach to Belarus has also been hampered by the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean .
Cyprus has insisted that it will not support sanctions on Belarus unless Brussels takes similar action against Turkey over its growing assertiveness in the region—a move that the EU is reluctant to make .
Last week , Cyprus blocked an attempt by EU ministers to impose sanctions on Lukashenko and several other key government figures .
EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this summit to placate Cyprus .
Although the bloc is unlikely to impose sanctions on Ankara , it is actively supporting efforts by Greece and Turkey to negotiate an end to their dispute .
Widening crisis .
International powers have traded barbs over the violence gripping the Caucasus as Armenia and Azerbaijan continued their clashes for a fourth day on Wednesday over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh .
NATO powers have grown increasingly concerned over the involvement of Turkey , which is offering strong words of support to Azerbaijan .
During a visit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said he was concerned about Ankara ’ s “ warlike messages … which essentially remove any of Azerbaijan ’ s inhibitions in reconquering Nagorno-Karabakh.
” Turkey , which is also a NATO member , has given strong indications that it would support Azerbaijan militarily .
Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday that Turkey would “ do what is necessary ” if Azerbaijan requested military support .
Ankara has already been accused of moving militants from Syria to Azerbaijan .
Anger over caste-based violence in India .
Protests have erupted across India after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently died after a brutal gang rape was cremated without the permission of her family .
The woman belonged to the Dalit community , a heavily marginalized group at the bottom of the country ’ s caste hierarchy , and was allegedly attacked earlier in September by upper caste men in the state of Uttar Pradesh .
The incident has sparked public outrage at the treatment of individuals from lower castes in the country , bringing renewed scrutiny to India ’ s system of social stratification .
Senior opposition leader Rahul Gandhi tweeted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ class-specific ’ rule of the land has killed another woman .
The government said it was fake news and left the victim to die .
This unfortunate incident , the death of the victim and the callousness of the government—none of this is fake news.
” More U.S. sanctions on Syria .
The United States slapped a new round of sanctions on key Syrian entities and individuals whom it accuses of supporting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad .
The sanctions are an effort to press Syria to re-engage with U.N.-led efforts at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s near-decade long civil war .
“ The United States will continue to employ all of its tools and authorities to target the finances of anyone who profits from or facilitates the Assad regime ’ s abuse of the Syrian people , ” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement .
Cuba to devalue its currency .
The Cuban government is preparing plans to devalue the peso for the first time since the 1959 revolution that brought the communist regime to power as the country reels from its worst economic crisis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 1991 .
The economy has come under heavy pressure from the impact of the coronavirus and renewed U.S. sanctions , forcing the government to implement drastic monetary reforms .
In addition to the devaluation of the peso , the government also plans to eliminate the convertible peso , a second form of currency used in the country , and to allow Cubans to make purchases in U.S. dollars .
Iraq promises to protect diplomats .
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi pledged to ensure the protection of foreign diplomats in the country and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on violence in an apparent response to threats made by the United States to withdraw from its embassy in Baghdad .
“ Iraq is keen on enforcing the rule of law , the state ’ s monopoly on having weapons , protecting foreign missions , and diplomatic buildings , ” Kadhimi said at a meeting with 25 ambassadors .
Earlier this week , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Iraqi government that it would close down its embassy if it failed to prevent attacks from rogue militia groups against U.S. interests @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a U.S. diplomatic withdrawal could lead to violence between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militias .
But as Shelly Kittleson wrote in Foreign Policy in August , efforts to extend the government ’ s authority over the country ’ s vast array of armed groups will be a serious challenge .
Extradition in Rwandan genocide case .
France ’ s top civil court has ruled that Felicien Kabuga can be extradited to a U.N. tribunal in Tanzania to face trial over his alleged involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide .
Kabuga , a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and importing mass supplies of machetes for use by Hutu militants against ethnic Tutsis during the genocide , which claimed the lives of some 800,000 people over a 100-day period .
Kabuga was arrested in France in May following a two-decade-long manhunt that ended in a nondescript apartment in the Paris suburbs .
The charges against him include genocide and incitement to commit genocide .
Despite the genocide having ended more than a quarter century ago , the United Nations is still pursuing those that helped perpetrate atrocities in Rwanda .
In May @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lynch reported on the efforts of one retired U.N. official to secure the prosecution of Callixte Mbarushimana , a fellow retired U.N. official , who allegedly oversaw the murder of 32 people during the genocide .
Several underlying factors can make an individual more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 , including , as it turns out , sharing some genes with prehistoric Neanderthals .
Scientists in Sweden and Germany recently claimed that a strand of DNA passed on from Neanderthals to modern humans during a relatively brief overlap in their history some 50,000 years @ @ @ @ @ @ @ developing COVID-19 .
Researchers took the DNA from several patients with severe cases of the disease and compared it to DNA taken from a Neanderthal in Croatia and found that the stretch of DNA that makes individuals more likely to contract serious illness matched .
“ I almost fell off my chair because the segment of DNA was exactly the same as in the Neanderthal genome , ” said Hugo Zeberg , an assistant professor at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Belarus and Turkey top the agenda as EU leaders meet in Brussels, India struggles with caste-based violence, and an alleged participant of the Rwandan genocide faces extradition.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Belarus and Turkey top the agenda as EU leaders meet in Brussels, India struggles with caste-based violence, and an alleged participant of the Rwandan genocide faces extradition.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Sanctions on Belarus Could Be Forthcoming
EU leaders are set to meet today in Brussels to begin a two-day special summit aimed primarily at untangling the two major crises currently gripping the region—the political upheaval in Belarus and the dispute in the eastern Mediterranean. Attendees will also discuss ongoing issues with China as well as the unfolding conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Sanctions on Belarus. The European Union has been slow to respond to the worsening political crisis in Belarus, in part due to concerns over Russia’s increasingly hostile stance. Weeks after Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko claimed a landslide victory in an election that was mired in allegations of fraud, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned EU powers against meddling in Belarus’s internal affairs and went as far as offering Lukashenko military support.
After a secret inaugural ceremony in the Belarusian capital of Minsk last weekend, the EU said it did not recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus, but stopped short of announcing sanctions. A German official told Reuters that the bloc could make a decision on sanctions during the summit.
Going their own way. But this hasn’t stopped some EU member states from unilaterally imposing sanctions. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the latter of which is current housing exiled opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya—preempted action by the bloc and imposed sanctions on Lukashenko and several other top government officials in August. Belarus responded in kind on Wednesday by imposing retaliatory sanctions.
Intertwined crises. But the EU’s approach to Belarus has also been hampered by the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus has insisted that it will not support sanctions on Belarus unless Brussels takes similar action against Turkey over its growing assertiveness in the region—a move that the EU is reluctant to make. Last week, Cyprus blocked an attempt by EU ministers to impose sanctions on Lukashenko and several other key government figures.
EU leaders will likely expend considerable effort during this summit to placate Cyprus. Although the bloc is unlikely to impose sanctions on Ankara, it is actively supporting efforts by Greece and Turkey to negotiate an end to their dispute.
What We’re Following Today
Widening crisis. International powers have traded barbs over the violence gripping the Caucasus as Armenia and Azerbaijan continued their clashes for a fourth day on Wednesday over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. NATO powers have grown increasingly concerned over the involvement of Turkey, which is offering strong words of support to Azerbaijan. During a visit to Latvia, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was concerned about Ankara’s “warlike messages … which essentially remove any of Azerbaijan’s inhibitions in reconquering Nagorno-Karabakh.”
Turkey, which is also a NATO member, has given strong indications that it would support Azerbaijan militarily. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday that Turkey would “do what is necessary” if Azerbaijan requested military support. Ankara has already been accused of moving militants from Syria to Azerbaijan.
Anger over caste-based violence in India. Protests have erupted across India after the body of a 19-year-old woman who recently died after a brutal gang rape was cremated without the permission of her family. The woman belonged to the Dalit community, a heavily marginalized group at the bottom of the country’s caste hierarchy, and was allegedly attacked earlier in September by upper caste men in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
The incident has sparked public outrage at the treatment of individuals from lower castes in the country, bringing renewed scrutiny to India’s system of social stratification. Senior opposition leader Rahul Gandhi tweeted that “Uttar Pradesh’s ‘class-specific’ rule of the land has killed another woman. The government said it was fake news and left the victim to die. This unfortunate incident, the death of the victim and the callousness of the government—none of this is fake news.”
More U.S. sanctions on Syria. The United States slapped a new round of sanctions on key Syrian entities and individuals whom it accuses of supporting the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The sanctions are an effort to press Syria to re-engage with U.N.-led efforts at a peaceful resolution to the country’s near-decade long civil war. “The United States will continue to employ all of its tools and authorities to target the finances of anyone who profits from or facilitates the Assad regime’s abuse of the Syrian people,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement.
Cuba to devalue its currency. The Cuban government is preparing plans to devalue the peso for the first time since the 1959 revolution that brought the communist regime to power as the country reels from its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The economy has come under heavy pressure from the impact of the coronavirus and renewed U.S. sanctions, forcing the government to implement drastic monetary reforms. In addition to the devaluation of the peso, the government also plans to eliminate the convertible peso, a second form of currency used in the country, and to allow Cubans to make purchases in U.S. dollars.
Keep an Eye On
Iraq promises to protect diplomats. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi pledged to ensure the protection of foreign diplomats in the country and to enforce the state’s monopoly on violence in an apparent response to threats made by the United States to withdraw from its embassy in Baghdad. “Iraq is keen on enforcing the rule of law, the state’s monopoly on having weapons, protecting foreign missions, and diplomatic buildings,” Kadhimi said at a meeting with 25 ambassadors.
Earlier this week, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Iraqi government that it would close down its embassy if it failed to prevent attacks from rogue militia groups against U.S. interests in the country, sparking concerns that a U.S. diplomatic withdrawal could lead to violence between U.S. forces and Iran-backed militias. But as Shelly Kittleson wrote in Foreign Policy in August, efforts to extend the government’s authority over the country’s vast array of armed groups will be a serious challenge.
Extradition in Rwandan genocide case. France’s top civil court has ruled that Felicien Kabuga can be extradited to a U.N. tribunal in Tanzania to face trial over his alleged involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Kabuga, a former tea tycoon, is accused of bankrolling and importing mass supplies of machetes for use by Hutu militants against ethnic Tutsis during the genocide, which claimed the lives of some 800,000 people over a 100-day period. Kabuga was arrested in France in May following a two-decade-long manhunt that ended in a nondescript apartment in the Paris suburbs. The charges against him include genocide and incitement to commit genocide.
Despite the genocide having ended more than a quarter century ago, the United Nations is still pursuing those that helped perpetrate atrocities in Rwanda. In May 2019, Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch reported on the efforts of one retired U.N. official to secure the prosecution of Callixte Mbarushimana, a fellow retired U.N. official, who allegedly oversaw the murder of 32 people during the genocide.
Odds and Ends
Several underlying factors can make an individual more susceptible to contracting COVID-19, including, as it turns out, sharing some genes with prehistoric Neanderthals. Scientists in Sweden and Germany recently claimed that a strand of DNA passed on from Neanderthals to modern humans during a relatively brief overlap in their history some 50,000 years ago triples one’s risk of developing COVID-19. Researchers took the DNA from several patients with severe cases of the disease and compared it to DNA taken from a Neanderthal in Croatia and found that the stretch of DNA that makes individuals more likely to contract serious illness matched.
“I almost fell off my chair because the segment of DNA was exactly the same as in the Neanderthal genome,” said Hugo Zeberg, an assistant professor at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-02--Trump Has COVID-19. How Will It Affect the Campaign?

Trump Has COVID-19 .
How Will It Affect the Campaign ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. President Donald Trump has tested positive for COVID-19 , European countries impose new coronavirus restrictions , Azerbaijan demands that Armenia withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh , and Israel and Lebanon are due to meet for the first time in decades .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com Early on Friday morning , U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he and his wife , Melania Trump , had tested positive for the coronavirus .
They were tested after learning that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a significant amount of time in the Oval Office and traveling with the president—had been infected .
Trump said that he and the First Lady were both feeling fine and would immediately quarantine at the White House .
How long has the president been infected ?
The 1 a.m. announcement immediately prompted questions about the timing of Trump ’ s infection and whether others he has been in close contact with might have been exposed—including his rival , Joe Biden , who shared the stage with Trump at the presidential debate held on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ member of Trump ’ s inner circle .
She flew with Trump to Pennsylvania for a weekend rally and to Cleveland for the Tuesday debate .
According to the Washington Post , Hicks has been in close proximity to the president and other top officials .
She was photographed without a mask at the Pennsylvania rally with other Trump aides and in Cleveland disembarking from Air Force One .
She tested positive after showing symptoms at a Wednesday rally in Minnesota and was reportedly quarantined on the plane going home .
After learning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the president did not stop campaigning .
“ Trump and his entourage flew Thursday to New Jersey , where he attended a fundraiser at his golf club in Bedminster and delivered a speech .
Trump was in close contact with dozens of other people , including campaign supporters , at a roundtable event , ” according to the Post , and he reportedly did not wear a mask at the golf course event or on the plane .
Will it change the state of the race ?
The news of Trump ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one month before the election , but much will depend on the severity of his illness .
Given that Trump has repeatedly downplayed the dangers of the virus and shown hostility toward mask mandates—while pushing a message of economic optimism and reopening—his illness may have an impact on voters ’ perceptions .
Trump has canceled his public schedule and promised to quarantine , a dramatic shift after months of mocking Biden for wearing a mask and reducing his campaign appearances due to safety concerns .
As recently as Tuesday , when asked about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ campaign events where most people don ’ t wear masks , the president was dismissive : “ We ’ ve had no negative effect , and we ’ ve had 35 to 40,000 people at some of these rallies , ” Trump said .
How serious a health risk does he face ?
Trump is not the first world leader to contract the coronavirus .
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was infected and recovered and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson ended up in an intensive care unit after contracting COVID-19 and eventually made a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York Times notes , it can be disruptive when a leader is sick and isolated .
“ Britain ’ s experience shows that even in a country with a well-organized political system , a leader ’ s sudden illness can be deeply unsettling .
When Mr. Johnson contracted the virus in March , the government was adrift for several days while he struggled to keep leading the response to the pandemic , via Zoom calls , from isolation in his official residence on Downing Street , ” the Times wrote .
Due to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ higher-risk category than both Bolsonaro and Johnson .
Barry Dixon , an intensive care physician at St Vincent ’ s hospital in Melbourne , Australia told the Guardian “ He ’ s at a much higher risk of dying if he does develop that bad pneumonia … The key risk factors for Trump that we know about are his age and the fact he ’ s overweight , and they ’ d be high-risk factors.
” Mild symptoms soon after an infection are not a good indicator of how severe the disease will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the first few days after testing positive and then took a turn for the worse.
“ We tend to see people with very mild symptoms for the first week , that is typical , and in the second week typically people either develop pneumonia or not , ” said Dixon .
“ It ’ s a quick deterioration , and that ’ s what we saw with Boris Johnson.
” What if his condition worsens ?
If Trump is hospitalized or incapacitated , he could invoke the 25th amendment to the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vice President Mike Pence and assume power once healthy again .
This has happened three times since the amendment came into force in 1967 .
President Ronald Reagan invoked it for eight hours in 1985 during a medical procedure and George W. Bush handed power to his vice president twice for approximately two hours while undergoing colonoscopies in 2002 and 2007 .
If a U.S. president dies in office , the vice president is sworn in as president .
Europe ’ s second wave .
The French government announced on Thursday that it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set of restrictions aimed at curbing the spread of the coronavirus as early as Monday if a recent surge of new cases does not subside .
Paris now has 263 new daily cases per 100,000 people , 105 new daily cases per 100,000 people over the age of 65 , and an increase in the number of patients in intensive care units .
This is part of a larger spike across the country over the previous few weeks .
France ’ s move is part of a wider effort by several other European @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the virus slamming the continent .
Spain also ordered a partial lockdown in metropolitan Madrid as the area has accounted for more than a third of the country ’ s new cases over the past two weeks .
The British government also expanded a local lockdown in northern England on Thursday .
There are some signs of progress , however .
A report published by Imperial College London suggests that the United Kingdom ’ s rate of new infections is beginning to stabilize , a sign that the worst could be behind it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bracing for a bad winter .
On Tuesday during a press conference , German Chancellor Angela Merkel said “ we know that a more difficult time is coming , fall and winter , ” as she explained a new round of restrictions she was introducing .
Vatican snubs Pompeo .
Pope Francis declined to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during his visit to the Vatican on Thursday over concerns that doing so could drag him into the U.S. presidential election .
“ Yes , he asked [ to meet with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Parolin , the Vatican ’ s secretary of state , “ But the pope had already said clearly that political figures are not received in election periods .
That is the reason.
” Pompeo has been pressing the Vatican to condemn China ’ s human rights abuses , especially in Xinjiang province .
Despite not getting an audience with Francis , Pompeo still met with other senior Vatican officials , discussing religious freedom as well as their differences on China .
Withdrawal or nothing .
Azerbaijan has raised the stakes in its ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country withdraw from the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh as a necessary condition to restoring peace .
“ We have only one condition , ” said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev , “ the Armenian armed forces must immediately and definitely leave our lands in full force .
If the Armenian government complies with this condition , the fighting and bloodshed will stop.
” Fighting broke out on Sunday and quickly escalated , worrying governments across the world given the conflict ’ s potential to spark a wider regional confrontation .
Russian President Vladimir Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to join him in calls for a cease-fire .
But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , whose country has strong cultural and military ties to Azerbaijan , called these efforts “ unacceptable ” and echoed Aliyev ’ s statement while pledging Turkey ’ s full support for its “ brother country.
” Meanwhile , the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and a commander of Turkish-backed rebels in Syria reported that Turkey has facilitated the transfer of hundreds of Syrian fighters from Syria to Azerbaijan ; the Turkish government denies the allegation .
EU @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced on Thursday that it is taking legal action against the United Kingdom over the British government ’ s efforts to override parts of last year ’ s Brexit withdrawal agreement .
Last month , the government introduced a bill to parliament that would allow it to ignore certain parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol , a mechanism designed to ensure peace and stability in Northern Ireland after Brexit .
Shortly after the publication of the bill , Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted that it “ does break international law in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now has one month to reply to a formal letter of complaint , after which the EU can formally sue the United Kingdom if it finds the response to be unsatisfactory .
Navalny blames Putin .
Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny accused President Vladimir Putin of being responsible for poisoning him last month in his first public appearance since the attack .
“ Putin is behind the crime , ” he said .
“ I have no other versions of the crime .
I am not saying this to flatter myself , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kremlin spokesman denounced the claims as “ baseless and unacceptable , ” and Moscow accused Navalny of working with the CIA .
Navalny , a prominent Putin critic , fell ill and entered a coma in August after campaigning for opposition figures near the Siberian city of Tomsk .
He was subsequently flown to Berlin where doctors determined he had been poisoned by Novichok , a Soviet-era nerve agent that has been tied to the poisonings of Kremlin critics in the past .
Israel and Lebanon to meet .
Officials from Israel and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first time in 30 years to discuss their ongoing maritime border dispute , a key development that could settle one of the most contentious points of disagreement between them .
The two countries have overlapping maritime claims in the eastern Mediterranean in addition to a heavily contested land border .
Pompeo praised the move , tweeting that it “ offers the potential for greater stability , security , and prosperity for citizens in both nations.
” The Irish Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that the bread used by the popular fast food sandwich @ @ @ @ @ @ @ classified as bread due to its high sugar content , saying it is closer to a “ confectionary or fancy baked good.
” The case emerged after a Subway franchisee insisted it shouldn ’ t have to pay a value-added tax on the bread because it is a staple food , which doesn ’ t require the payment of taxes in Ireland .
The law , however , states that in order for a food to be considered a staple , sugar can not exceed 2 percent of the weight of the flour @ @ @ @ @ @ @ percent sugar .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump has tested positive for COVID-19 , European countries impose new coronavirus restrictions , Azerbaijan demands that Armenia withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh , and Israel and Lebanon are due to meet for the first time in decades.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. President Donald Trump has tested positive for COVID-19, European countries impose new coronavirus restrictions, Azerbaijan demands that Armenia withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh, and Israel and Lebanon are due to meet for the first time in decades.
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Will Trump’s Coronavirus Infection Impact the Campaign?
Early on Friday morning, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he and his wife, Melania Trump, had tested positive for the coronavirus. They were tested after learning that the White House advisor Hope Hicks—who spends a significant amount of time in the Oval Office and traveling with the president—had been infected. Trump said that he and the First Lady were both feeling fine and would immediately quarantine at the White House.
How long has the president been infected? The 1 a.m. announcement immediately prompted questions about the timing of Trump’s infection and whether others he has been in close contact with might have been exposed—including his rival, Joe Biden, who shared the stage with Trump at the presidential debate held on Tuesday night.
Hicks is a key member of Trump’s inner circle. She flew with Trump to Pennsylvania for a weekend rally and to Cleveland for the Tuesday debate. According to the Washington Post, Hicks has been in close proximity to the president and other top officials. She was photographed without a mask at the Pennsylvania rally with other Trump aides and in Cleveland disembarking from Air Force One. She tested positive after showing symptoms at a Wednesday rally in Minnesota and was reportedly quarantined on the plane going home.
After learning that Hicks had tell-tale symptoms of COVID-19, the president did not stop campaigning. “Trump and his entourage flew Thursday to New Jersey, where he attended a fundraiser at his golf club in Bedminster and delivered a speech. Trump was in close contact with dozens of other people, including campaign supporters, at a roundtable event,” according to the Post, and he reportedly did not wear a mask at the golf course event or on the plane.
Will it change the state of the race? The news of Trump’s infection could jolt the race just one month before the election, but much will depend on the severity of his illness. Given that Trump has repeatedly downplayed the dangers of the virus and shown hostility toward mask mandates—while pushing a message of economic optimism and reopening—his illness may have an impact on voters’ perceptions.
Trump has canceled his public schedule and promised to quarantine, a dramatic shift after months of mocking Biden for wearing a mask and reducing his campaign appearances due to safety concerns. As recently as Tuesday, when asked about his decision to hold large, crowded campaign events where most people don’t wear masks, the president was dismissive: “We’ve had no negative effect, and we’ve had 35 to 40,000 people at some of these rallies,” Trump said.
How serious a health risk does he face? Trump is not the first world leader to contract the coronavirus. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was infected and recovered and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson ended up in an intensive care unit after contracting COVID-19 and eventually made a full recovery. But as the New York Times notes, it can be disruptive when a leader is sick and isolated. “Britain’s experience shows that even in a country with a well-organized political system, a leader’s sudden illness can be deeply unsettling. When Mr. Johnson contracted the virus in March, the government was adrift for several days while he struggled to keep leading the response to the pandemic, via Zoom calls, from isolation in his official residence on Downing Street,” the Times wrote.
Due to his age, Trump is in a higher-risk category than both Bolsonaro and Johnson. Barry Dixon, an intensive care physician at St Vincent’s hospital in Melbourne, Australia told the Guardian “He’s at a much higher risk of dying if he does develop that bad pneumonia … The key risk factors for Trump that we know about are his age and the fact he’s overweight, and they’d be high-risk factors.”
Mild symptoms soon after an infection are not a good indicator of how severe the disease will be; Johnson was healthy and working for the first few days after testing positive and then took a turn for the worse.“We tend to see people with very mild symptoms for the first week, that is typical, and in the second week typically people either develop pneumonia or not,” said Dixon. “It’s a quick deterioration, and that’s what we saw with Boris Johnson.”
What if his condition worsens? If Trump is hospitalized or incapacitated, he could invoke the 25th amendment to the United States Constitution and temporarily transfer power to Vice President Mike Pence and assume power once healthy again. This has happened three times since the amendment came into force in 1967. President Ronald Reagan invoked it for eight hours in 1985 during a medical procedure and George W. Bush handed power to his vice president twice for approximately two hours while undergoing colonoscopies in 2002 and 2007. If a U.S. president dies in office, the vice president is sworn in as president.
What We’re Following Today Europe’s second wave. The French government announced on Thursday that it’s prepared to implement a new set of restrictions aimed at curbing the spread of the coronavirus as early as Monday if a recent surge of new cases does not subside. Paris now has 263 new daily cases per 100,000 people, 105 new daily cases per 100,000 people over the age of 65, and an increase in the number of patients in intensive care units. This is part of a larger spike across the country over the previous few weeks. France’s move is part of a wider effort by several other European countries to stop a second wave of the virus slamming the continent. Spain also ordered a partial lockdown in metropolitan Madrid as the area has accounted for more than a third of the country’s new cases over the past two weeks. The British government also expanded a local lockdown in northern England on Thursday. There are some signs of progress, however. A report published by Imperial College London suggests that the United Kingdom’s rate of new infections is beginning to stabilize, a sign that the worst could be behind it. Still, some European leaders are bracing for a bad winter. On Tuesday during a press conference, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said “we know that a more difficult time is coming, fall and winter,” as she explained a new round of restrictions she was introducing.
Vatican snubs Pompeo. Pope Francis declined to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during his visit to the Vatican on Thursday over concerns that doing so could drag him into the U.S. presidential election. “Yes, he asked [to meet with Francis,]” said Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s secretary of state, “But the pope had already said clearly that political figures are not received in election periods. That is the reason.” Pompeo has been pressing the Vatican to condemn China’s human rights abuses, especially in Xinjiang province.
Despite not getting an audience with Francis, Pompeo still met with other senior Vatican officials, discussing religious freedom as well as their differences on China.
Withdrawal or nothing. Azerbaijan has raised the stakes in its ongoing clashes with Armenia, demanding that the country withdraw from the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh as a necessary condition to restoring peace. “We have only one condition,” said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, “the Armenian armed forces must immediately and definitely leave our lands in full force. If the Armenian government complies with this condition, the fighting and bloodshed will stop.”
Fighting broke out on Sunday and quickly escalated, worrying governments across the world given the conflict’s potential to spark a wider regional confrontation. Russian President Vladimir Putin has asked France and the United States to join him in calls for a cease-fire. But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose country has strong cultural and military ties to Azerbaijan, called these efforts “unacceptable” and echoed Aliyev’s statement while pledging Turkey’s full support for its “brother country.”
Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and a commander of Turkish-backed rebels in Syria reported that Turkey has facilitated the transfer of hundreds of Syrian fighters from Syria to Azerbaijan; the Turkish government denies the allegation.
EU to sue Britain. The European Union announced on Thursday that it is taking legal action against the United Kingdom over the British government’s efforts to override parts of last year’s Brexit withdrawal agreement. Last month, the government introduced a bill to parliament that would allow it to ignore certain parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol, a mechanism designed to ensure peace and stability in Northern Ireland after Brexit. Shortly after the publication of the bill, Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted that it “does break international law in a specific and limited way.”
The government now has one month to reply to a formal letter of complaint, after which the EU can formally sue the United Kingdom if it finds the response to be unsatisfactory.
Keep an Eye On
Navalny blames Putin. Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny accused President Vladimir Putin of being responsible for poisoning him last month in his first public appearance since the attack. “Putin is behind the crime,” he said. “I have no other versions of the crime. I am not saying this to flatter myself, but on the basis of facts.” A Kremlin spokesman denounced the claims as “baseless and unacceptable,” and Moscow accused Navalny of working with the CIA.
Navalny, a prominent Putin critic, fell ill and entered a coma in August after campaigning for opposition figures near the Siberian city of Tomsk. He was subsequently flown to Berlin where doctors determined he had been poisoned by Novichok, a Soviet-era nerve agent that has been tied to the poisonings of Kremlin critics in the past.
Israel and Lebanon to meet. Officials from Israel and Lebanon are set to meet for the first time in 30 years to discuss their ongoing maritime border dispute, a key development that could settle one of the most contentious points of disagreement between them. The two countries have overlapping maritime claims in the eastern Mediterranean in addition to a heavily contested land border. Pompeo praised the move, tweeting that it “offers the potential for greater stability, security, and prosperity for citizens in both nations.”
Odds and Ends
The Irish Supreme Court ruled on Thursday that the bread used by the popular fast food sandwich chain Subway can no longer legally be classified as bread due to its high sugar content, saying it is closer to a “confectionary or fancy baked good.” The case emerged after a Subway franchisee insisted it shouldn’t have to pay a value-added tax on the bread because it is a staple food, which doesn’t require the payment of taxes in Ireland. The law, however, states that in order for a food to be considered a staple, sugar cannot exceed 2 percent of the weight of the flour. Subway’s bread contains 10 percent sugar.
That’s it for today.
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