foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--All Great-Power Politics Is Local

All Great-Power Politics Is Local

Those of us who write about foreign policy and international affairs spend most of our time thinking about what states and other global actors are doing with and to each other .
We debate what different interests are , criticize the strategies and priorities ( or lack of each ) that leaders adopt , and offer advice on what goals should be sought and how they could be achieved more effectively .
The implicit assumption behind these efforts ( and the rationale for a magazine like Foreign Policy ) is that these decisions matter .
A lot .
People like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if you get foreign policy right , lots of good things will come your way .
Get it wrong and you ’ re likely to find yourself in a heap of trouble .
I ’ m no exception to this general tendency .
If you go back and read all the columns I ’ ve written here over the past decade or more , or the various books and articles I ’ ve published since I began my career , you will find that they are mostly focused on diagnosing why states are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ determining if their policies are working or not , and exploring how they might do better .
And with occasional exceptions , this focus is for most people who work in this field .
But recently I had a slightly heretical thought : What if foreign policy isn ’ t as important as foreign-policy mavens like me maintain ?
What if developments and policies inside the country are far more consequential—at least most of the time—than what its leaders do on the global stage ?
Granted , a good foreign policy is better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ whether a country ’ s foreign policy is successful or not can be tricky ) , and some foreign-policy blunders can be extremely costly , not least in terms of lives lost unnecessarily .
In a few cases , foreign-policy malpractice can be positively disastrous and lead to a country being conquered , occupied , looted , or incorporated .
So I ’ m not suggesting for a second that foreign policy is irrelevant .
Even so , the history of a number of major powers suggests that domestic policies were far more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the clever stratagems , initiatives , ploys , schemes , or interventions they undertook abroad .
Indeed , in some cases doing the right thing at home made it possible for the country to survive and recover after completely and disastrously mishandling its relations with others .
Consider the following examples .
The United States .
How did 13 small and weak colonies , perched precariously on the Eastern Seaboard in the late 18th century , rise to become the dominant world power ?
Partly by staying out of trouble with others—which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the North American continent had valuable resources , navigable rivers , and a temperate climate .
The original inhabitants turned out to be vulnerable to European diseases and colonial predations , which made expansion even easier .
It helped that the other major powers were often at odds with each other , too .
The United States also grew rapidly because it let people come there from many other countries and because its population had an unusually high birth rate during the 19th century ( though it declined gradually over time ) .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Louisiana Purchase and the seizure of what is now Texas , New Mexico , Arizona , and California during the Mexican-American War were important steps .
But by themselves , these actions would not have made the United States the dominant world power .
The more critical part of the equation was the rapid industrialization of the country in the latter part of the 19th century , which gave America the world ’ s largest and most advanced economy by 1900 and provided the essential economic foundation for its global role ever @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the primacy of domestic policy is America ’ s ability to brush off foreign-policy setbacks .
Missteps before and during the Korean War cost nearly 40,000 U.S. lives , and the Vietnam War lasted longer and cost even more blood and treasure .
Yet 14 years later , it was the Soviet Union that imploded .
The so-called global war on terrorism ( including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ) has cost fewer lives but a lot more money ( roughly $ 6 trillion and counting ) , yet Americans barely seem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world ’ s most dramatic terrorist attack on Sept. 11 , 2001 , but the subsequent war on terrorism cost much more than the damage suffered on that day or the likely damage that al Qaeda and its ilk would have been able to do even if the United States had not gone all-out to destroy them .
The past four U.S. administrations have committed any number of foreign-policy blunders ( NATO enlargement , dual containment , failed interventions in Syria , Libya , Somalia , etc . )
, yet no @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now be counted out of the world ’ s power equation .
Instead , perhaps the costliest mishaps in recent decades occurred at home : the financial meltdown in 2008 and the Trump ’ s administration ’ s bungled response to COVID-19 .
I am by no means suggesting that foreign policy is irrelevant , but these episodes remind us that , as I once wrote , “ external conditions impinge on U.S. power ; internal conditions generate it.
” The Soviet Union .
But it ’ s not just the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America ’ s geopolitical advantages ( e.g.
, the United States has no major powers nearby , whereas Russia has many ) , and its vast land , poor infrastructure , and forbidding climate have been formidable barriers to growth .
But its biggest problems were largely internal and especially the embrace of Marxism-Leninism after the 1917 revolution .
The United States and its allies won the Cold War for many reasons , but their rival ’ s sclerotic and inefficient state-controlled economy surely made it easier .
China .
Home to nearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ population , China punched below its weight and suffered at the hands of other powers for much of the past two centuries largely because of domestic disarray and a related failure to keep pace with Europe ’ s technological advances .
After 1949 , its power and influence were further limited by capricious and destructive polices like the so-called Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution .
As late as 1978 , China ’ s per capita income was well under $ 200 per year ( in current dollars ) ; the comparable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was roughly $ 10,500 .
But the country took off after Mao Zedong died and China embraced Deng Xiaoping ’ s “ Four Modernizations ” ; today , its per capita income is 65 times higher ( ~ $ 10,200 ) than it was 42 years ago , and it is now the world ’ s second-most powerful country .
Most importantly , these achievements are due primarily to internal reforms within China and the energy of the Chinese people themselves—and not to any particularly clever foreign-policy coup .
One can multiply examples @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and historical crimes during the first half of the 20th century and ended up occupied and divided after World War II .
Yet despite these major foreign-policy catastrophes , its internal strengths allowed it to keep coming back , and today it is the most influential country in Europe .
Japan rose to the ranks of major powers following the Meiji Restoration in the mid-19th century , and like Germany , it recovered rapidly after its costly defeat in World War II .
Adopting a more sensible foreign policy helped in both of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have recovered as quickly without the domestic strengths they already possessed .
On the other side of the ledger , the unhappy experiences of Argentina and Venezuela also remind us how once prosperous societies can be brought low not because of foreign interference , a foolish war , or some other foreign-policy mishap but largely because of domestic political blunders .
Argentina ’ s per capital income was 10th in the world in 1913 , and Venezuela was once the richest country in Latin America .
Today , Argentina ’ s per capita @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Spain , and Venezuela is essentially a failed state .
Foreign policy may have played some role in these states ’ misfortunes , but incompetent governments and misguided domestic policies are the primary cause .
To reiterate : Foreign policy is not irrelevant , and mistakes in that realm can have serious and often tragic human consequences .
But as the current pandemic is reminding us daily , so can misguided or incompetent actions taken at home .
For major powers—typically those with large populations , substantial territory , high levels of education @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choose to do at home will matter more in the long run than what they choose to do abroad .
For these states , at least , foreign-policy mistakes are rarely so consequential that the fate of the nation is lost forever and especially if a robust set of domestic institutions is still there to help the country rebound .
This argument carries some obvious implications for the next U.S. administration .
First , as Sino-American rivalry heats up , winning ( or at least not losing ) will require more than tariffs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ firms , and bombastic speeches .
It will also require preserving or regaining the lead in critical areas like artificial intelligence and 5G technology , which in turn means leveraging and incentivizing the impressive innovative capacity of U.S. firms and research institutions .
Second , the deep polarization that is hamstringing Americans at home and abroad must be addressed .
I place blame for the problem primarily on the Republican Party , which has embraced extremism and waged relentless partisan warfare since the days of Newt Gingrich and doubled down on this strategy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ initiatives that could temper this tendency—such as the widespread adoption of ranked-choice voting—and begin to pull more politicians back to the middle ground where effective bipartisan deals can be made .
Third , we are currently in an era when unemployment is high , interest rates are low , and working outdoors is safer than working inside a building .
If ever there were moment to be modernizing America ’ s frayed domestic infrastructure , this is it .
Trump promised to do that as president , but he seems to have forgotten @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( to include Trump if he somehow manages to keep himself in office ) would do well to make that promise a reality .
The next president will also need to fix some of what is still broken in U.S. foreign policy , like the growing sense of pity , confusion , and anger with which other nations now regard the United States ( and especially Trump himself ) .
But in the long run , whether Americans can get their own house in order will make a lot more of a difference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most of the foreign-policy issues that I ( and all the other foreign-policy mavens out there ) will be writing about in the months ahead .

Those of us who write about foreign policy and international affairs spend most of our time thinking about what states and other global actors are doing with and to each other. We debate what different interests are, criticize the strategies and priorities (or lack of each) that leaders adopt, and offer advice on what goals should be sought and how they could be achieved more effectively.
Those of us who write about foreign policy and international affairs spend most of our time thinking about what states and other global actors are doing with and to each other. We debate what different interests are, criticize the strategies and priorities (or lack of each) that leaders adopt, and offer advice on what goals should be sought and how they could be achieved more effectively.
The implicit assumption behind these efforts (and the rationale for a magazine like Foreign Policy) is that these decisions matter. A lot. People like me are (mostly) convinced that if you get foreign policy right, lots of good things will come your way. Get it wrong and you’re likely to find yourself in a heap of trouble.
I’m no exception to this general tendency. If you go back and read all the columns I’ve written here over the past decade or more, or the various books and articles I’ve published since I began my career, you will find that they are mostly focused on diagnosing why states are acting toward others in different ways, determining if their policies are working or not, and exploring how they might do better. And with occasional exceptions, this focus is for most people who work in this field.
But recently I had a slightly heretical thought: What if foreign policy isn’t as important as foreign-policy mavens like me maintain? What if developments and policies inside the country are far more consequential—at least most of the time—than what its leaders do on the global stage?
Granted, a good foreign policy is better than a bad one (although determining whether a country’s foreign policy is successful or not can be tricky), and some foreign-policy blunders can be extremely costly, not least in terms of lives lost unnecessarily. In a few cases, foreign-policy malpractice can be positively disastrous and lead to a country being conquered, occupied, looted, or incorporated. So I’m not suggesting for a second that foreign policy is irrelevant.
Even so, the history of a number of major powers suggests that domestic policies were far more critical to their international standing than any of the clever stratagems, initiatives, ploys, schemes, or interventions they undertook abroad. Indeed, in some cases doing the right thing at home made it possible for the country to survive and recover after completely and disastrously mishandling its relations with others.
Consider the following examples.
The United States. How did 13 small and weak colonies, perched precariously on the Eastern Seaboard in the late 18th century, rise to become the dominant world power? Partly by staying out of trouble with others—which was a smart foreign-policy decision—and partly because the North American continent had valuable resources, navigable rivers, and a temperate climate. The original inhabitants turned out to be vulnerable to European diseases and colonial predations, which made expansion even easier. It helped that the other major powers were often at odds with each other, too. The United States also grew rapidly because it let people come there from many other countries and because its population had an unusually high birth rate during the 19th century (though it declined gradually over time).
To be sure, foreign-policy initiatives like the Louisiana Purchase and the seizure of what is now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California during the Mexican-American War were important steps. But by themselves, these actions would not have made the United States the dominant world power. The more critical part of the equation was the rapid industrialization of the country in the latter part of the 19th century, which gave America the world’s largest and most advanced economy by 1900 and provided the essential economic foundation for its global role ever since.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the primacy of domestic policy is America’s ability to brush off foreign-policy setbacks. Missteps before and during the Korean War cost nearly 40,000 U.S. lives, and the Vietnam War lasted longer and cost even more blood and treasure. Yet 14 years later, it was the Soviet Union that imploded. The so-called global war on terrorism (including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) has cost fewer lives but a lot more money (roughly $6 trillion and counting), yet Americans barely seem to notice. The country also suffered the world’s most dramatic terrorist attack on Sept. 11, 2001, but the subsequent war on terrorism cost much more than the damage suffered on that day or the likely damage that al Qaeda and its ilk would have been able to do even if the United States had not gone all-out to destroy them. The past four U.S. administrations have committed any number of foreign-policy blunders (NATO enlargement, dual containment, failed interventions in Syria, Libya, Somalia, etc.), yet no serious person believes the United States should now be counted out of the world’s power equation.
Instead, perhaps the costliest mishaps in recent decades occurred at home: the financial meltdown in 2008 and the Trump’s administration’s bungled response to COVID-19. I am by no means suggesting that foreign policy is irrelevant, but these episodes remind us that, as I once wrote, “external conditions impinge on U.S. power; internal conditions generate it.”
The Soviet Union. But it’s not just the United States. The Soviet Union did not possess America’s geopolitical advantages (e.g., the United States has no major powers nearby, whereas Russia has many), and its vast land, poor infrastructure, and forbidding climate have been formidable barriers to growth. But its biggest problems were largely internal and especially the embrace of Marxism-Leninism after the 1917 revolution. The United States and its allies won the Cold War for many reasons, but their rival’s sclerotic and inefficient state-controlled economy surely made it easier.
China. Home to nearly a fifth of the world’s population, China punched below its weight and suffered at the hands of other powers for much of the past two centuries largely because of domestic disarray and a related failure to keep pace with Europe’s technological advances. After 1949, its power and influence were further limited by capricious and destructive polices like the so-called Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As late as 1978, China’s per capita income was well under $200 per year (in current dollars); the comparable figure for the United States in 1978 was roughly $10,500. But the country took off after Mao Zedong died and China embraced Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations”; today, its per capita income is 65 times higher (~$10,200) than it was 42 years ago, and it is now the world’s second-most powerful country. Most importantly, these achievements are due primarily to internal reforms within China and the energy of the Chinese people themselves—and not to any particularly clever foreign-policy coup.
One can multiply examples almost endlessly. Germany committed horrific blunders and historical crimes during the first half of the 20th century and ended up occupied and divided after World War II. Yet despite these major foreign-policy catastrophes, its internal strengths allowed it to keep coming back, and today it is the most influential country in Europe. Japan rose to the ranks of major powers following the Meiji Restoration in the mid-19th century, and like Germany, it recovered rapidly after its costly defeat in World War II. Adopting a more sensible foreign policy helped in both of these cases, but neither country would have recovered as quickly without the domestic strengths they already possessed.
On the other side of the ledger, the unhappy experiences of Argentina and Venezuela also remind us how once prosperous societies can be brought low not because of foreign interference, a foolish war, or some other foreign-policy mishap but largely because of domestic political blunders. Argentina’s per capital income was 10th in the world in 1913, and Venezuela was once the richest country in Latin America. Today, Argentina’s per capita income is roughly a third that of Spain, and Venezuela is essentially a failed state. Foreign policy may have played some role in these states’ misfortunes, but incompetent governments and misguided domestic policies are the primary cause.
To reiterate: Foreign policy is not irrelevant, and mistakes in that realm can have serious and often tragic human consequences. But as the current pandemic is reminding us daily, so can misguided or incompetent actions taken at home. For major powers—typically those with large populations, substantial territory, high levels of education, diverse internal markets, etc.—what leaders choose to do at home will matter more in the long run than what they choose to do abroad. For these states, at least, foreign-policy mistakes are rarely so consequential that the fate of the nation is lost forever and especially if a robust set of domestic institutions is still there to help the country rebound.
This argument carries some obvious implications for the next U.S. administration. First, as Sino-American rivalry heats up, winning (or at least not losing) will require more than tariffs, restrictions on Chinese students and high-tech firms, and bombastic speeches. It will also require preserving or regaining the lead in critical areas like artificial intelligence and 5G technology, which in turn means leveraging and incentivizing the impressive innovative capacity of U.S. firms and research institutions.
Second, the deep polarization that is hamstringing Americans at home and abroad must be addressed. I place blame for the problem primarily on the Republican Party, which has embraced extremism and waged relentless partisan warfare since the days of Newt Gingrich and doubled down on this strategy under Donald Trump. There are political initiatives that could temper this tendency—such as the widespread adoption of ranked-choice voting—and begin to pull more politicians back to the middle ground where effective bipartisan deals can be made.
Third, we are currently in an era when unemployment is high, interest rates are low, and working outdoors is safer than working inside a building. If ever there were moment to be modernizing America’s frayed domestic infrastructure, this is it. Trump promised to do that as president, but he seems to have forgotten all about it. The next president (to include Trump if he somehow manages to keep himself in office) would do well to make that promise a reality.
The next president will also need to fix some of what is still broken in U.S. foreign policy, like the growing sense of pity, confusion, and anger with which other nations now regard the United States (and especially Trump himself). But in the long run, whether Americans can get their own house in order will make a lot more of a difference to the country’s future than most of the foreign-policy issues that I (and all the other foreign-policy mavens out there) will be writing about in the months ahead.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--How Beirut Blast Could Further Enrich Lebanese Elites

How Beirut Blast Could Further Enrich Lebanese Elites BEIRUT—When Lebanon set about reconstructing Beirut after 15 years of civil war from 1975 to 1990 , the result was a bonanza for government officials and their friends .
Contracts went to cronies , aid money disappeared , and patronage networks thrived .
Now , as the government ponders what to do about a port area devastated by a huge blast earlier this month , many Lebanese are worried the cycle of corruption will spin yet again on its well-oiled axis—robbing residents of their homes .
Nowhere does the concern run more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ port , where almost 200 people died and thousands of homes were destroyed or damaged in the explosion of improperly stored ammonium nitrate .
“ The government isn ’ t helping , it doesn ’ t even exist , but I guarantee they will try to take over our land , our destroyed houses , ” said Vasken Mamoriyan , whose century-old family home , with its high and ornate ceilings , was damaged so badly in the Aug. 4 blast that it ’ s now marked for destruction .
“ It ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ happening , ” he said .
Mamoriyan was clearing debris from the house on a recent day , a task that has fallen on homeowners and volunteers instead of government contractors .
“ We don ’ t know who will pay for it , ” he said .
“ All I know is that for the past weeks , I ’ ve paid laborers to clear out the rubble.
” The explosion amounted to one more calamity in a country already suffering from an economic downturn , a debt crisis , and now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largely blame their government for the negligence—the 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate had been sitting at the port for six years despite concerns raised by various officials .
Karim Bitar , a professor of international relations at Beirut ’ s Saint Joseph University and the research director at the Institute for International and Strategic Affairs , said many of the residents lacked the money to make repairs and might be coerced into sell their property at less than market value .
“ Residents who need fresh dollars to rebuild their homes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could be tempted to accept a lump sum from certain politicians who are trying to take over the damaged neighborhoods , ” he said .
Bitar also said any aid money from abroad could end up going to the wrong people .
“ In the past , postwar international aid funds helped former warlords stay in office , rather than help rebuild the nation , ” Bitar added .
Even before the blast , many Lebanese were reeling from a protracted economic crisis .
The number of people suffering from poverty nearly doubled @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 50 percent of the population , according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia ( ESCWA ) .
About 23 percent of the country suffers from what is defined as extreme poverty , which for Lebanon means living on less than $ 6 per day .
The country has one of the most unequal wealth distributions in the world , with the richest 10 percent owning around 70 percent of all personal wealth , according to a ESCWA report .
“ Poverty and vulnerability rates are expected to increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the impact of the Beirut Port explosion , ” the report said .
Since late last year , the price of the U.S. dollar has surged against the Lebanese lira , after the government had kept it steady for more than 20 years .
Banks have made it difficult for people to obtain dollars and continue going by the official exchange rate of 1,507 lira to the dollar—even as the black-market rate surged to 7,000 lira per dollar .
The result is that home renovations , which require purchasing imports at dollar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most people , who continue to receive salaries in local currency , denominated at the official government rate .
“ Recovery will be a tedious path , ” said Mona Fawaz , a professor of urban studies and planning at the American University of Beirut .
“ The fear is that the post-blast reconstruction will come to consolidate the very forces that led to the demolition of Beirut ’ s neighborhoods in the first place.
” Many Lebanese are citing the work done in Beirut ’ s central district by the development and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a cautionary tale .
The Lebanese billionaire Rafik Hariri became the largest shareholder in Solidere even as he served as the country ’ s prime minister .
Critics say the company drove out the district ’ s original residents through harassment and intimidation .
“ Solidere expelled landowners and created the modern downtown , an unrecognizable area completely different to the old city , ” Bitar said .
Today many buildings in the district remain empty , and the project has become a source of public resentment .
When anti-government protests erupted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Following a trip to Lebanon this month , U.S .
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale said Washington would not provide long-term assistance until the Lebanese government made much-needed reforms .
He said Lebanese politicians “ have been ignoring their responsibility to meet the needs of the people and have resisted the kind of deep , fundamental reforms that are needed.
” French President Emmanuel Macron , who also visited Lebanon after the blast , was equally critical .
He said that a new political order was needed for the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lebanon will continue to sink .
”

BEIRUT—When Lebanon set about reconstructing Beirut after 15 years of civil war from 1975 to 1990, the result was a bonanza for government officials and their friends. Contracts went to cronies, aid money disappeared, and patronage networks thrived.
BEIRUT—When Lebanon set about reconstructing Beirut after 15 years of civil war from 1975 to 1990, the result was a bonanza for government officials and their friends. Contracts went to cronies, aid money disappeared, and patronage networks thrived.
Now, as the government ponders what to do about a port area devastated by a huge blast earlier this month, many Lebanese are worried the cycle of corruption will spin yet again on its well-oiled axis—robbing residents of their homes.
Nowhere does the concern run more deeply than in the neighborhoods around the port, where almost 200 people died and thousands of homes were destroyed or damaged in the explosion of improperly stored ammonium nitrate.
“The government isn’t helping, it doesn’t even exist, but I guarantee they will try to take over our land, our destroyed houses,” said Vasken Mamoriyan, whose century-old family home, with its high and ornate ceilings, was damaged so badly in the Aug. 4 blast that it’s now marked for destruction.
“It’s not the first time this is happening,” he said.
Vasken Mamoriyan (right) loads rubble from his home onto a truck in Beirut on Aug. 13.
Mamoriyan was clearing debris from the house on a recent day, a task that has fallen on homeowners and volunteers instead of government contractors. “We don’t know who will pay for it,” he said. “All I know is that for the past weeks, I’ve paid laborers to clear out the rubble.”
The explosion amounted to one more calamity in a country already suffering from an economic downturn, a debt crisis, and now a surge in coronavirus infections. Lebanese largely blame their government for the negligence—the 2,750 metric tons of ammonium nitrate had been sitting at the port for six years despite concerns raised by various officials.
Karim Bitar, a professor of international relations at Beirut’s Saint Joseph University and the research director at the Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, said many of the residents lacked the money to make repairs and might be coerced into sell their property at less than market value.
“Residents who need fresh dollars to rebuild their homes, which most can’t afford, could be tempted to accept a lump sum from certain politicians who are trying to take over the damaged neighborhoods,” he said.
A man clears debris in blast-hit Beirut on Aug. 21.
Bitar also said any aid money from abroad could end up going to the wrong people. “In the past, postwar international aid funds helped former warlords stay in office, rather than help rebuild the nation,” Bitar added.
Even before the blast, many Lebanese were reeling from a protracted economic crisis. The number of people suffering from poverty nearly doubled in the past year to more than 50 percent of the population, according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). About 23 percent of the country suffers from what is defined as extreme poverty, which for Lebanon means living on less than $6 per day.
The country has one of the most unequal wealth distributions in the world, with the richest 10 percent owning around 70 percent of all personal wealth, according to a ESCWA report. “Poverty and vulnerability rates are expected to increase further as a result of rising inflation and the impact of the Beirut Port explosion,” the report said.
Since late last year, the price of the U.S. dollar has surged against the Lebanese lira, after the government had kept it steady for more than 20 years. Banks have made it difficult for people to obtain dollars and continue going by the official exchange rate of 1,507 lira to the dollar—even as the black-market rate surged to 7,000 lira per dollar. The result is that home renovations, which require purchasing imports at dollar prices, are out of reach for most people, who continue to receive salaries in local currency, denominated at the official government rate.
A view of Beirut’s destroyed port on Aug. 14.
“Recovery will be a tedious path,” said Mona Fawaz, a professor of urban studies and planning at the American University of Beirut. “The fear is that the post-blast reconstruction will come to consolidate the very forces that led to the demolition of Beirut’s neighborhoods in the first place.”
Many Lebanese are citing the work done in Beirut’s central district by the development and construction company Solidere after the civil war as a cautionary tale.
The Lebanese billionaire Rafik Hariri became the largest shareholder in Solidere even as he served as the country’s prime minister. Critics say the company drove out the district’s original residents through harassment and intimidation.
“Solidere expelled landowners and created the modern downtown, an unrecognizable area completely different to the old city,” Bitar said.
Today many buildings in the district remain empty, and the project has become a source of public resentment. When anti-government protests erupted last October, they started there.
Following a trip to Lebanon this month, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale said Washington would not provide long-term assistance until the Lebanese government made much-needed reforms. He said Lebanese politicians “have been ignoring their responsibility to meet the needs of the people and have resisted the kind of deep, fundamental reforms that are needed.”
French President Emmanuel Macron, who also visited Lebanon after the blast, was equally critical. He said that a new political order was needed for the country to receive funds, or else “Lebanon will continue to sink.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Armenia and Azerbaijan Are at War Again—and Not in Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenia and Azerbaijan Are at War Again—and Not in Nagorno-Karabakh The long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated last month , and the two countries suffered their worst losses in four years .
Between July 12 and 16 , at least 16 service members from the two sides were killed : four Armenian soldiers and 12 Azerbaijanis , including a major general .
( A fifth Armenian soldier died from his wounds later that month . )
The fighting was the latest significant incident in a conflict that has continued without resolution since the fall of the Soviet Union .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ stood out in a number of ways .
They occurred not along the oft-contested Nagorno-Karabakh front line but along the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan proper , far to the north near the border with Georgia , in an area full of critical civilian infrastructure .
Both sides deployed new technology , in particular drones .
And perhaps the most significant development took place far from the battlefield—in the form of a pro-war demonstration in Azerbaijan ’ s capital , Baku , that saw anti-government slogans and clashes with police .
That served @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of how quickly any military setbacks can become a lightning rod for public dissatisfaction with the government—the same catalyst that saw the country ’ s first two presidents toppled in the early 1990s .
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic would raise the issue periodically over the next 60 years , but it was not until the Soviet Union ’ s dying days that it exploded .
In February 1988 , with nationalism on the rise throughout the Soviet Union , mass demonstrations took place in the Armenian capital , Yerevan , calling for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made a part of Armenia .
Ethnic infighting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians broke out across both republics , including events such as the infamous Sumgait pogrom , which saw ethnic Armenians expelled from a town near Baku .
The NKAO ’ s local authorities soon after voted to join the territory to Armenia , while Soviet security forces spent the next three years conducting violent and haphazard crackdowns across Armenia and Azerbaijan in a futile attempt to stop the spiraling violence .
As the Soviet Union crumbled in late 1991 , Nagorno-Karabakh declared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a full-scale war : Armenia and the new Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on one side , Azerbaijan on the other .
When a cease-fire was finally reached in 1994 , 20,000 people had died , 1 million were displaced , and Nagorno-Karabakh stood as an unrecognized republic : de facto independent and entirely outside of Azerbaijani control but de jure lying within that country ’ s internationally recognized borders .
While it is often termed a “ frozen conflict , ” the front lines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are anything but quiet .
The International @ @ @ @ @ @ @ violations in the area since January 2015 .
That ’ s not including April 2016 ’ s so-called Four-Day War , which saw nearly 100 soldiers killed on each side in the worst fighting since the initial conflict ended in 1994 .
A cease-fire agreement that year brought a halt to major combat operations , but it did not resolve the region ’ s status .
One reason behind increased tensions in the border area was the replacement of regular military units on the Azerbaijani side with border guard forces .
Accompanying this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new housing , roads , and other buildings , which caused “ a lot of confusion on both sides , ” Vartanyan said .
Both sides have plenty of reasons to avoid an escalation in this area .
Two major oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey pass through Tovuz district , only a few miles from the border .
On the Armenian side lies the Yerevan-Tbilisi highway , a crucial transit corridor for both goods and people , crossing one of Armenia ’ s only two open international borders to Georgia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ depopulated no man ’ s land along the Karabakh front line compounds the risks of heavier fighting .
Crisis Group estimated that around 150,000 civilians live within six miles of the border , with three-quarters of those on the Azerbaijani side .
“ In Karabakh , [ each side ] can use 120 mm heavy artillery without much problem .
Here , it would be a massive story , ” Vartanyan said .
While heavy artillery might be off the table , there are a lot of other shiny new toys each side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , thanks to an oil-funded defense procurement spree , has acquired high-end Russian and Israeli military equipment in recent years .
Azerbaijan ’ s defense spending ballooned in the late 2000s and early 2010s .
A 2018 report by the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies shows that annual defense spending rose from $ 700 million in 2007 to $ 3.7 billion in 2013 .
Included in this was roughly $ 5 billion in Russian arms purchases : Baku bought T-90C battle tanks , BTR-82A armored personnel carriers , Mi-35M helicopter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Israeli purchases , however , have been most visible on the battlefield , in particular its drones .
All eight drone types reportedly in Azerbaijan ’ s inventory hail from Israel , with which Azerbaijan has a long-running military relationship .
The 2016 conflict saw Azerbaijan deploy the IAI Harop , a so-called kamikaze drone ( named for its ability to dive directly into a target and detonate its explosive payload ) , against Armenian combatants .
An Azerbaijani Harop struck a bus carrying Armenian volunteers to the front lines that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ others .
It was these high-tech drones that Baku made most use of in July ’ s clashes .
Among the most advanced of those purchases was the Spike anti-tank guided missile , a top-of-the-line Israeli weapons system that several Azerbaijani Defense Ministry videos showed hitting Armenian targets .
The particular Spike model that Azerbaijan uses , the Spike NLOS , is capable of striking targets at a distance of up to 15 miles and beyond visual range .
“ This is literally the top stuff you can find in the world , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ candidate focused on Russia ’ s defense industry at King ’ s College London .
While Baku ’ s new technology is impressive , it doesn ’ t appear to have fundamentally changed the battlefield outcome in this round .
“ Most of the videos [ of Azerbaijani strikes ] showed them hitting targets of debatable military value , ” Lee told Foreign Policy .
This partly explains the outcome of the current round of fighting .
“ It didn ’ t go well for Azerbaijan , ” Lee said , citing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Azerbaijan has confirmed that 12 of its service members were killed , including a major general ; by contrast , Armenia ’ s official losses were only five soldiers .
But drones have another important advantage off the battlefield : their suitability for propaganda releases .
“ Ultimately , while it was hard to view the recent fighting as a success for Azerbaijan , one of the upsides was the drone footage , ” Lee said .
Even without significant battlefield success , flashy videos of shiny new drones still play well on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aren ’ t translating new military technology into battlefield victories , the demonstration of high-tech military equipment and footage of military strikes can somewhat placate domestic audiences by showing tangible results , ” Lee explained .
While this event proved to be a one-off , it could be a dark omen for Ilham Aliyev ’ s government .
“ Unlike past rallies , which are always state-approved , this [ rally ] was spontaneous , ” said Anar Mammadli , head of the Baku-based Election Monitoring and Democracy Center .
“ The government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a plan to deal with this.
” Military setbacks , whether real or perceived , in the conflict with Armenia have a dangerous history for governments in Baku .
In the 1990s , two previous governments were toppled as a result of battlefield failures in Karabakh .
The scale of the demonstration—estimated at 30,000 attendees—was particularly large , in a country where police are not shy about violently dispersing rallies .
And military setbacks , whether real or perceived , in the conflict with Armenia have a dangerous history for the authorities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , during the war ’ s height , two previous governments were toppled as a result of battlefield failures in Karabakh , and the Aliyev family came to power in the resulting vacuum .
Even amid the general chaos of the Soviet Union ’ s breakup , Azerbaijan ’ s reemergence as an sovereign country was particularly turbulent .
With Soviet troops departing the region as the USSR entered its final death throes in December 1991 , the position of Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh began to falter .
Meanwhile , back in Baku @ @ @ @ @ @ @ focused on jostling for control of the new state ; the conflict in faraway Karabakh was a lesser priority than the ultimate prize of holding power .
In February 1992 , Armenian forces took control of the town of Khojaly , killing hundreds of civilians and delivering a crippling blow to Azerbaijan ’ s president , Communist holdover Ayaz Mutallibov .
Widespread outrage was harnessed by the Azerbaijani Popular Front to force Mutallibov ’ s resignation within weeks , resulting in their own leader , Abulfaz Elchibey , ascending to the presidency .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Armenian momentum in Karabakh : His term in office was ended by a military coup in mid-1993 .
When the dust cleared , the presidency was held by Heydar Aliyev , previously general secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party from 1969 to 1982 .
Aliyev wisely negotiated a general cease-fire within nine months of acceding to power .
The current administration , especially President Ilham Aliyev ( Heydar ’ s son , who took power following his father ’ s death in 2003 ) , is keenly aware of this history .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ one , with the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic being felt .
“ After four months of lockdown , people have just been sitting jobless in front of their phones .
They are angry , ” Mammadli said .
“ With a rally like this , today it might be about Karabakh , but tomorrow it can be about anything : social issues , economic problems , even the fall of the government.
” The day after the Baku demonstration , the Azerbaijani president sacked his foreign minister , Elmar Mammadyarov , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ main proponents for dialogue with Armenia .
In the meantime , new joint military exercises with Turkey have also been taking place .
For the past two weeks , Azerbaijani and Turkish forces have conducted drills across the exclave of Nakhchivan , on the other side of Armenia from Azerbaijan proper .
“ This is partly also to show strength [ to the people ] , ” Mammadli explained .
There are signs that the tenuous peace may not hold .
Indeed , one of the less belligerent members of Aliyev ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after the Baku demonstration , the Azerbaijani president sacked his foreign minister , Elmar Mammadyarov .
Mammadyarov , who had held the post for 16 years , was known as one of the main proponents for dialogue with Armenia and had been the face of the government in international talks over Karabakh for over a decade .
His dismissal does not suggest that Baku is in the mood for further talks .
Yerevan has even less reason to be interested in a new round of clashes ; after all , the status quo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Still , the recent skirmish was an important boost to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ’ s security credentials .
The Armenian leader has been criticized by both Karabakh ’ s leaders and some in the Armenian opposition for allegedly being soft on security matters .
Presiding over a relatively successful border battle has helped blunt that line of attack .
At the moment , a tense calm in the area prevails .
For the hundreds of thousands of civilians in the range of artillery shells , this is enough .

The long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated last month, and the two countries suffered their worst losses in four years. Between July 12 and 16, at least 16 service members from the two sides were killed: four Armenian soldiers and 12 Azerbaijanis, including a major general. (A fifth Armenian soldier died from his wounds later that month.) The fighting was the latest significant incident in a conflict that has continued without resolution since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated last month, and the two countries suffered their worst losses in four years. Between July 12 and 16, at least 16 service members from the two sides were killed: four Armenian soldiers and 12 Azerbaijanis, including a major general. (A fifth Armenian soldier died from his wounds later that month.) The fighting was the latest significant incident in a conflict that has continued without resolution since the fall of the Soviet Union.
July’s clashes, however, stood out in a number of ways. They occurred not along the oft-contested Nagorno-Karabakh front line but along the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan proper, far to the north near the border with Georgia, in an area full of critical civilian infrastructure. Both sides deployed new technology, in particular drones.
And perhaps the most significant development took place far from the battlefield—in the form of a pro-war demonstration in Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, that saw anti-government slogans and clashes with police. That served as a harsh reminder to Azerbaijani authorities of how quickly any military setbacks can become a lightning rod for public dissatisfaction with the government—the same catalyst that saw the country’s first two presidents toppled in the early 1990s.
Located on the southern edge of the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh is a parcel of land roughly the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut. The dispute over the territory goes back to the early days of the Soviet Union: In 1923, Joseph Stalin, then the Soviet commissar of nationalities, drew up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) as an autonomous enclave within Azerbaijan despite the region’s 90 percent ethnic Armenian population.
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic would raise the issue periodically over the next 60 years, but it was not until the Soviet Union’s dying days that it exploded. In February 1988, with nationalism on the rise throughout the Soviet Union, mass demonstrations took place in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, calling for Karabakh to be detached from Azerbaijan and made a part of Armenia. Ethnic infighting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians broke out across both republics, including events such as the infamous Sumgait pogrom, which saw ethnic Armenians expelled from a town near Baku.
The NKAO’s local authorities soon after voted to join the territory to Armenia, while Soviet security forces spent the next three years conducting violent and haphazard crackdowns across Armenia and Azerbaijan in a futile attempt to stop the spiraling violence. As the Soviet Union crumbled in late 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence, and the conflict exploded into a full-scale war: Armenia and the new Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on one side, Azerbaijan on the other.
When a cease-fire was finally reached in 1994, 20,000 people had died, 1 million were displaced, and Nagorno-Karabakh stood as an unrecognized republic: de facto independent and entirely outside of Azerbaijani control but de jure lying within that country’s internationally recognized borders.
While it is often termed a “frozen conflict,” the front lines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are anything but quiet. The International Crisis Group has tracked nearly 300 cease-fire violations in the area since January 2015. That’s not including April 2016’s so-called Four-Day War, which saw nearly 100 soldiers killed on each side in the worst fighting since the initial conflict ended in 1994. A cease-fire agreement that year brought a halt to major combat operations, but it did not resolve the region’s status.
It’s still unclear how the latest Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes began. Armenia claims that its forces fired on an Azerbaijani military truck attempting to cross the border; Azerbaijan says Armenian artillery suddenly opened fire. Whatever the cause, Olesya Vartanyan, Crisis Group’s senior analyst for the South Caucasus, doesn’t believe it was premeditated. “If anyone was preparing for this, they did a bad job,” she said.
One reason behind increased tensions in the border area was the replacement of regular military units on the Azerbaijani side with border guard forces. Accompanying this was a sudden flurry of construction of new housing, roads, and other buildings, which caused “a lot of confusion on both sides,” Vartanyan said.
Both sides have plenty of reasons to avoid an escalation in this area. Two major oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey pass through Tovuz district, only a few miles from the border. On the Armenian side lies the Yerevan-Tbilisi highway, a crucial transit corridor for both goods and people, crossing one of Armenia’s only two open international borders to Georgia.
A dense civilian presence near the depopulated no man’s land along the Karabakh front line compounds the risks of heavier fighting. Crisis Group estimated that around 150,000 civilians live within six miles of the border, with three-quarters of those on the Azerbaijani side. “In Karabakh, [each side] can use 120 mm heavy artillery without much problem. Here, it would be a massive story,” Vartanyan said.
While heavy artillery might be off the table, there are a lot of other shiny new toys each side can bring to bear—particularly Azerbaijan, which, thanks to an oil-funded defense procurement spree, has acquired high-end Russian and Israeli military equipment in recent years.
Azerbaijan’s defense spending ballooned in the late 2000s and early 2010s. A 2018 report by the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies shows that annual defense spending rose from $700 million in 2007 to $3.7 billion in 2013. Included in this was roughly $5 billion in Russian arms purchases: Baku bought T-90C battle tanks, BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, Mi-35M helicopter gunships, and other equipment.
Baku’s Israeli purchases, however, have been most visible on the battlefield, in particular its drones. All eight drone types reportedly in Azerbaijan’s inventory hail from Israel, with which Azerbaijan has a long-running military relationship. The 2016 conflict saw Azerbaijan deploy the IAI Harop, a so-called kamikaze drone (named for its ability to dive directly into a target and detonate its explosive payload), against Armenian combatants. An Azerbaijani Harop struck a bus carrying Armenian volunteers to the front lines that year, killing nine and seriously wounding others.
It was these high-tech drones that Baku made most use of in July’s clashes. Among the most advanced of those purchases was the Spike anti-tank guided missile, a top-of-the-line Israeli weapons system that several Azerbaijani Defense Ministry videos showed hitting Armenian targets. The particular Spike model that Azerbaijan uses, the Spike NLOS, is capable of striking targets at a distance of up to 15 miles and beyond visual range. “This is literally the top stuff you can find in the world,” said Rob Lee, a Ph.D. candidate focused on Russia’s defense industry at King’s College London.
While Baku’s new technology is impressive, it doesn’t appear to have fundamentally changed the battlefield outcome in this round. “Most of the videos [of Azerbaijani strikes] showed them hitting targets of debatable military value,” Lee told Foreign Policy.
This partly explains the outcome of the current round of fighting. “It didn’t go well for Azerbaijan,” Lee said, citing its higher casualty count relative to Armenia. Azerbaijan has confirmed that 12 of its service members were killed, including a major general; by contrast, Armenia’s official losses were only five soldiers.
But drones have another important advantage off the battlefield: their suitability for propaganda releases. “Ultimately, while it was hard to view the recent fighting as a success for Azerbaijan, one of the upsides was the drone footage,” Lee said.
Even without significant battlefield success, flashy videos of shiny new drones still play well on state TV. “Even if you aren’t translating new military technology into battlefield victories, the demonstration of high-tech military equipment and footage of military strikes can somewhat placate domestic audiences by showing tangible results,” Lee explained.
Placating the domestic audience is not something Azerbaijan’s authorities are likely taking for granted these days. On the night of July 14, a large demonstration came together in Baku. While initially voicing support of the army, the mood of the crowd changed over the course of the evening. Anger over the deaths of high-ranking officers in the ongoing clashes began to emerge, and what had appeared to be a genuinely pro-government gathering ended with protesters demanding the resignation of various government officials. By the early morning of July 15, anger had taken over: Protesters stormed the parliament, before being forcibly dispersed by police.
While this event proved to be a one-off, it could be a dark omen for Ilham Aliyev’s government. “Unlike past rallies, which are always state-approved, this [rally] was spontaneous,” said Anar Mammadli, head of the Baku-based Election Monitoring and Democracy Center. “The government was shocked. They didn’t have a plan to deal with this.”
Military setbacks, whether real or perceived, in the conflict with Armenia have a dangerous history for governments in Baku. In the 1990s, two previous governments were toppled as a result of battlefield failures in Karabakh.
The scale of the demonstration—estimated at 30,000 attendees—was particularly large, in a country where police are not shy about violently dispersing rallies. And military setbacks, whether real or perceived, in the conflict with Armenia have a dangerous history for the authorities in Baku. In the early 1990s, during the war’s height, two previous governments were toppled as a result of battlefield failures in Karabakh, and the Aliyev family came to power in the resulting vacuum.
Even amid the general chaos of the Soviet Union’s breakup, Azerbaijan’s reemergence as an sovereign country was particularly turbulent. With Soviet troops departing the region as the USSR entered its final death throes in December 1991, the position of Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh began to falter. Meanwhile, back in Baku, the various political factions were more focused on jostling for control of the new state; the conflict in faraway Karabakh was a lesser priority than the ultimate prize of holding power.
In February 1992, Armenian forces took control of the town of Khojaly, killing hundreds of civilians and delivering a crippling blow to Azerbaijan’s president, Communist holdover Ayaz Mutallibov. Widespread outrage was harnessed by the Azerbaijani Popular Front to force Mutallibov’s resignation within weeks, resulting in their own leader, Abulfaz Elchibey, ascending to the presidency. But Elchibey was also unable to stem the Armenian momentum in Karabakh: His term in office was ended by a military coup in mid-1993. When the dust cleared, the presidency was held by Heydar Aliyev, previously general secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party from 1969 to 1982. Aliyev wisely negotiated a general cease-fire within nine months of acceding to power.
The current administration, especially President Ilham Aliyev (Heydar’s son, who took power following his father’s death in 2003), is keenly aware of this history. The present moment is a particularly inopportune one, with the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic being felt. “After four months of lockdown, people have just been sitting jobless in front of their phones. They are angry,” Mammadli said. “With a rally like this, today it might be about Karabakh, but tomorrow it can be about anything: social issues, economic problems, even the fall of the government.”
The day after the Baku demonstration, the Azerbaijani president sacked his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, who was known as one of the main proponents for dialogue with Armenia.
In the meantime, new joint military exercises with Turkey have also been taking place. For the past two weeks, Azerbaijani and Turkish forces have conducted drills across the exclave of Nakhchivan, on the other side of Armenia from Azerbaijan proper. “This is partly also to show strength [to the people],” Mammadli explained.
There are signs that the tenuous peace may not hold.
Indeed, one of the less belligerent members of Aliyev’s cabinet was just removed. The day after the Baku demonstration, the Azerbaijani president sacked his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov. Mammadyarov, who had held the post for 16 years, was known as one of the main proponents for dialogue with Armenia and had been the face of the government in international talks over Karabakh for over a decade. His dismissal does not suggest that Baku is in the mood for further talks.
Yerevan has even less reason to be interested in a new round of clashes; after all, the status quo in Karabakh is in its favor. Still, the recent skirmish was an important boost to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s security credentials. The Armenian leader has been criticized by both Karabakh’s leaders and some in the Armenian opposition for allegedly being soft on security matters. Presiding over a relatively successful border battle has helped blunt that line of attack.
At the moment, a tense calm in the area prevails. For the hundreds of thousands of civilians in the range of artillery shells, this is enough.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Pompeo Travels to the Middle East to Boost Regional Efforts Against Iran

Pompeo Travels to the Middle East to Boost Regional Efforts Against Iran Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures , protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force , and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire .
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U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will begin a tour of the Middle East today to boost the Trump administration ’ s recent raft of diplomatic activity aimed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ begin with a meeting between U.S. and Israeli officials today , before Pompeo heads to the United Arab Emirates tomorrow .
The meetings will focus on the implementation of the recently signed Israeli-UAE deal that normalized relations between the two countries , as well as the security threat posed by China and Iran .
Countering Iran .
The deal has formalized a longstanding trend as an increasing number of Arab states shift their geopolitical priorities away from confrontation with Israel toward cooperation against Iran .
Brokered by the United States , the deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to coordinate a multilateral bulwark against Iran .
The bigger picture .
On Sunday , White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner said that the deal should increase the probability of the United States selling F-35 fighter jets to the UAE , ostensibly to bolster the country ’ s military capabilities against Iran .
Kushner is expected to make his own trip to the Middle East beginning later this week .
These events are occurring against the backdrop of the Trump administration ’ s attempt to extend the arms embargo against Iran at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was supported by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council but failed to gain support from other key U.S. allies at the U.N. Scanning the region .
Pompeo is also expected to visit Bahrain and Sudan as part of this trip , both countries rumored to be in talks with the Israeli government to follow the UAE and normalize their own relations with Israel .
In Sudan , Pompeo will meet with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other top officials “ to discuss continued U.S. support for the civilian-led transitional government and express support for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the State Department .
Sudan was initially thought to be on the verge of normalizing its ties with Israel after a foreign ministry spokesman hinted that a deal was imminent .
But the foreign minister denied holding discussions with Israel , rejecting rumors that an agreement was forthcoming .
Talks between the two sides are still believed to be ongoing , however , and Pompeo ’ s trip could provide a critical boost to that process .
August 24 .
Mike Pompeo will lead a conversation at the Atlantic Council covering his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with China .
August 24-27 .
Sentencing of the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand takes place this week .
August 24-27 .
The Republican National Convention takes place this week .
Trump will be formally nominated as the Republican Party ’ s candidate for president .
August 24-28 .
Talks between the United Kingdom and the European Union over their post-Brexit economic relationship are set to resume .
August 26 .
Germany hosts an informal meeting of the EU ’ s defense ministers .
August 27 .
The United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Taliban as part of its February peace deal with the group .
Military threatens protesters in Belarus .
Tensions in Belarus escalated on Sunday after tens of thousands of people defied warnings from the military against protesting , flooding into the capital city of Minsk and briefly demonstrating near the residence of President Aleksandr Lukashenko .
Before the protests started , the defense ministry issued an unequivocal threat of force : “ We categorically warn : any violation of peace and order in such places , ” it said in a statement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ you will have the army to deal with now , not the police.
” Sunday marked the 15th consecutive day of protests against Lukashenko , which began after the longtime president claimed a landslide victory in elections on Aug. 9 despite facing his fiercest opposition in his 26 years in office .
Pressure on Mali .
Mediators from across West Africa met with Mali ’ s newly-formed military junta on Sunday to discuss a way out of the current crisis and a return to civilian rule .
In response to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the rest of the government , the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) imposed a series of sanctions on Mali ; barring Malian representatives from participating in its institutions , halting financial flows in and out of the country , and sealing off its borders .
The ECOWAS sanctions were also discussed on Sunday .
While mediators have been unable to reach a resolution , sources told Reuters that reinstating Keita is not an option .
But a long-term solution will have to do more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ As Philip Obaji Jr. wrote in Foreign Policy last week , ECOWAS needs to move beyond its past recommendations and offer a workable plan .
“ Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit , thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented , ” he wrote .
The protesters may also need to adjust their demands , even if it means letting Keita play a role .
Keeping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end Mali ’ s problems , ” Obaji argued .
“ The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and more patient .
For the stability of the country , it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament.
” There will also have to be financial support .
As former U.S. diplomats Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman argued in FP last week , what Mali needs is a comprehensive economic plan similar to the post-World War @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country ’ s deep social and economic problems .
Challenging the ceasefire in Libya .
The eastern Libya-based Libyan National Army ( LNA ) dismissed a ceasefire announcement by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) on Sunday , claiming it was little more than a stunt giving it political cover while it continues to build up its military presence in conflict zones .
Fighting had been underway in the coastal city of Sirte despite the failure of the LNA ’ s brutal 14-month campaign to take the capital city of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wrote in FP last week , the recently signed Israel-UAE deal could embolden the UAE-backed LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar—deepening regional rivalries and prolonging the war in Libya rather than bringing peace .
The GNA announced a nationwide ceasefire on Friday in an attempt to breathe life into the stalled peace negotiations and bring an end to the country ’ s years-long civil war .
But political options are running out .
As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy , the LNA ’ s international backers have been persistent in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country despite the LNA ’ s recent military setbacks .
That means partition is becoming an increasingly likely long-term scenario .
More U.S. troops pull out of Iraq .
U.S.-led coalition troops withdrew from Iraq ’ s Taji base located north of Baghdad on Sunday and transferred control of the facility to the Iraqi security forces , part of a larger drawdown of U.S. troops in the country .
The base has held up to 2,000 troops in the past , but most of those stationed there have departed this summer .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coming days .
Sunday ’ s withdrawal comes as the Trump administration has been working with the Iraqi government to coordinate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country .
On Friday , after a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi , Trump reiterated his desire to pull out of Iraq .
“ Frankly , I didn ’ t think ( the Iraq War ) was a good idea , ” he said .
“ Now we ’ re getting out , we ’ ll be leaving shortly.
” The handover @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transfer of an Iraqi base to Iraqi security forces .
Add one more shocking news event to what has already been a turbulent 2020 .
According to the Center for Near Earth Objects Studies at NASA ’ s Jet Propulsion Laboratory , a small asteroid is hurtling toward Earth and is projected to come close to our planet on November 2—the day before the U.S. presidential election .
Luckily , NASA said the object only has a 0.41 percent chance of actually hitting Earth , and even if it does , the likelihood @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Asteroid 2018VP1 is very small , approximately 6.5 feet , and poses no threat to Earth .
If it were to enter our planet ’ s atmosphere , it would disintegrate due to its extremely small size , ” NASA said in a statement .
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Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures, protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force, and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures, protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force, and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Begins Tour of the Middle East Today
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will begin a tour of the Middle East today to boost the Trump administration’s recent raft of diplomatic activity aimed at deterring Iran. The visit will begin with a meeting between U.S. and Israeli officials today, before Pompeo heads to the United Arab Emirates tomorrow. The meetings will focus on the implementation of the recently signed Israeli-UAE deal that normalized relations between the two countries, as well as the security threat posed by China and Iran.
Countering Iran. The deal has formalized a longstanding trend as an increasing number of Arab states shift their geopolitical priorities away from confrontation with Israel toward cooperation against Iran. Brokered by the United States, the deal also reflects Washington’s wider efforts to coordinate a multilateral bulwark against Iran.
The bigger picture. On Sunday, White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner said that the deal should increase the probability of the United States selling F-35 fighter jets to the UAE, ostensibly to bolster the country’s military capabilities against Iran. Kushner is expected to make his own trip to the Middle East beginning later this week. These events are occurring against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempt to extend the arms embargo against Iran at the U.N. Security Council, a move that was supported by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council but failed to gain support from other key U.S. allies at the U.N.
Scanning the region. Pompeo is also expected to visit Bahrain and Sudan as part of this trip, both countries rumored to be in talks with the Israeli government to follow the UAE and normalize their own relations with Israel. In Sudan, Pompeo will meet with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other top officials “to discuss continued U.S. support for the civilian-led transitional government and express support for deepening the Sudan-Israel relationship,” according to the State Department.
Sudan was initially thought to be on the verge of normalizing its ties with Israel after a foreign ministry spokesman hinted that a deal was imminent. But the foreign minister denied holding discussions with Israel, rejecting rumors that an agreement was forthcoming. Talks between the two sides are still believed to be ongoing, however, and Pompeo’s trip could provide a critical boost to that process.
The World This Week
August 24. Mike Pompeo will lead a conversation at the Atlantic Council covering his recent trip to Europe and increasing tensions with China.
August 24-27. Sentencing of the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand takes place this week.
August 24-27. The Republican National Convention takes place this week. Trump will be formally nominated as the Republican Party’s candidate for president.
August 24-28. Talks between the United Kingdom and the European Union over their post-Brexit economic relationship are set to resume.
August 26. Germany hosts an informal meeting of the EU’s defense ministers.
August 27. The United States is due to lift sanctions on the Taliban as part of its February peace deal with the group.
August 30. Montenegro will hold parliamentary elections.
What We’re Following Today
Military threatens protesters in Belarus. Tensions in Belarus escalated on Sunday after tens of thousands of people defied warnings from the military against protesting, flooding into the capital city of Minsk and briefly demonstrating near the residence of President Aleksandr Lukashenko. Before the protests started, the defense ministry issued an unequivocal threat of force: “We categorically warn: any violation of peace and order in such places,” it said in a statement, referring to World War II monuments, “you will have the army to deal with now, not the police.”
Sunday marked the 15th consecutive day of protests against Lukashenko, which began after the longtime president claimed a landslide victory in elections on Aug. 9 despite facing his fiercest opposition in his 26 years in office.
Pressure on Mali. Mediators from across West Africa met with Mali’s newly-formed military junta on Sunday to discuss a way out of the current crisis and a return to civilian rule. In response to the Aug. 19 military coup that deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the rest of the government, the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed a series of sanctions on Mali; barring Malian representatives from participating in its institutions, halting financial flows in and out of the country, and sealing off its borders. The ECOWAS sanctions were also discussed on Sunday.
While mediators have been unable to reach a resolution, sources told Reuters that reinstating Keita is not an option. But a long-term solution will have to do more than just address the political crisis. As Philip Obaji Jr. wrote in Foreign Policy last week, ECOWAS needs to move beyond its past recommendations and offer a workable plan. “Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit, thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented,” he wrote.
The protesters may also need to adjust their demands, even if it means letting Keita play a role. Keeping Keita out of government “would not end Mali’s problems,” Obaji argued. “The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and more patient. For the stability of the country, it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament.”
There will also have to be financial support. As former U.S. diplomats Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman argued in FP last week, what Mali needs is a comprehensive economic plan similar to the post-World War II Marshall Plan to truly address the country’s deep social and economic problems.
Keep an Eye On
Challenging the ceasefire in Libya. The eastern Libya-based Libyan National Army (LNA) dismissed a ceasefire announcement by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) on Sunday, claiming it was little more than a stunt giving it political cover while it continues to build up its military presence in conflict zones. Fighting had been underway in the coastal city of Sirte despite the failure of the LNA’s brutal 14-month campaign to take the capital city of Tripoli in June. As Jason Pack wrote in FP last week, the recently signed Israel-UAE deal could embolden the UAE-backed LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar—deepening regional rivalries and prolonging the war in Libya rather than bringing peace.
The GNA announced a nationwide ceasefire on Friday in an attempt to breathe life into the stalled peace negotiations and bring an end to the country’s years-long civil war. But political options are running out. As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy, the LNA’s international backers have been persistent in seeking to retain a footprint in the country despite the LNA’s recent military setbacks. That means partition is becoming an increasingly likely long-term scenario.
More U.S. troops pull out of Iraq. U.S.-led coalition troops withdrew from Iraq’s Taji base located north of Baghdad on Sunday and transferred control of the facility to the Iraqi security forces, part of a larger drawdown of U.S. troops in the country. The base has held up to 2,000 troops in the past, but most of those stationed there have departed this summer. The final troops are due to leave in the coming days.
Sunday’s withdrawal comes as the Trump administration has been working with the Iraqi government to coordinate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country. On Friday, after a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Trump reiterated his desire to pull out of Iraq. “Frankly, I didn’t think (the Iraq War) was a good idea,” he said. “Now we’re getting out, we’ll be leaving shortly.” The handover of Camp Taji is the eighth such transfer of an Iraqi base to Iraqi security forces.
Odds and Ends
Add one more shocking news event to what has already been a turbulent 2020. According to the Center for Near Earth Objects Studies at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a small asteroid is hurtling toward Earth and is projected to come close to our planet on November 2—the day before the U.S. presidential election.
Luckily, NASA said the object only has a 0.41 percent chance of actually hitting Earth, and even if it does, the likelihood that it does any damage is infinitesimal. “Asteroid 2018VP1 is very small, approximately 6.5 feet, and poses no threat to Earth. If it were to enter our planet’s atmosphere, it would disintegrate due to its extremely small size,” NASA said in a statement.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-22--Strategic Lunacy Doesn’t Play in Reality

Well before he assumed office , Trump made clear he would operate differently and set out to break conventional wisdom when it came to foreign affairs .
NATO was “ obsolete , ” until he decided after he entered office it was “ no longer obsolete.
” He toyed with bringing waterboarding back as a U.S. practice .
And he questioned why he couldn ’ t speak by phone with the president of Taiwan .
By the end of his first year , some policymakers attempted to make sense of his mercuriality by describing his approach as “ madman theory.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the “ madman theory ” when he sought to convey to North Vietnam via his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger his supposed willingness to use any means possible against them .
But he was hardly inventive .
An early reference shows up in Niccolò Machiavelli ’ s Discourses on Livy , when he notes that it can be “ a very wise thing to simulate madness.
” Whatever his character flaws , Nixon ’ s nuclear threat was a ploy , not a reality—albeit one that failed as badly as the rest of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s “ madman ” role , on the other hand , feels less simulated and much more lived .
In his most recent whack at the piñata , he has targeted Germany , announcing the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the country .
Already , officials warn the process could take months , in what looks to be a move to buy time and mitigate the commander in chief ’ s bad call .
Sciutto describes Trump ’ s style of diplomacy as a tactic that “ is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” a brand of brinkmanship whereby his unpredictability would corner opponents into concessions .
But is a “ madman theory ” real if it is not always intentional ?
Peter Navarro , the president ’ s trade advisor and sycophant , believes it .
“ He ’ s a strategic chess player , seeing all angles and moves , ” he enthuses .
“ There ’ s no preformed playbook .
It ’ s jazz versus classical music.
” For a brief while , North Korea was held up as the chief success @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see-sawing from insults to praise of Kim Jong Un brought the North Korean leader to the negotiating table in Hanoi , the president ’ s defenders argued .
That looks a lot less credible when the North returned to testing and its usual explosive rhetoric .
But Sciutto keeps score , chapter by chapter , country by country , from Pyongyang to Moscow to Beijing .
Perhaps mindful of critics from the right who consider CNN , where he is chief national security correspondent , a partisan news outlet , he anchors his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or worked for the administration and , as he emphasizes , “ chose to do so.
” You will not find many Democrats in these pages , railing predictably against the president .
Sciutto isn ’ t both-siding this—the withering words come from Trump ’ s own team .
Nearly every official has something unflattering to say about the president — except Navarro , who is also the only one speaking under his own name and still serving .
The experts “ failed on every foreign policy major initiative , in the last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ On China , on NAFTA , on Iraq , on Afghanistan.
” The book also features Steve Bannon , one of the original orchestrators of Trump ’ s “ Make America Great Again ” campaign .
( “ We ’ ve been in managed decline now for thirty years by our elites , ” he says . )
They may be the usual suspects , but that ’ s because both wield significant influence—Bannon exited early from the White House , but he continues to speak to people in the administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea , the book relays the remarkable dynamic following Trump ’ s “ fire and fury ” and “ bloody nose ” comments against Kim , when Pyongyang and Seoul — sworn enemies — coordinated to avert existential disaster by overpromising on the possibility of a denuclearized North , if only the president would restart talks .
“ They were in cahoots , ” a former official claims .
Trump , Sciutto points out , was possibly “ being played by both the ally and the adversary.
” This is where , perhaps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closest to war .
Measured by volume alone , two long , tense chapters cover the Koreas .
And after three face-to-face meetings , Trump has little to show beyond the pomp , while North Korea has used these years to expand its nuclear program .
Do not expect an excoriation of all of Trump ’ s actions .
Confronting China has become a bipartisan position , and regardless of who wins in November , “ the upending of the US-China relationship is the element of Trump ’ s foreign policy least likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Sciutto observes .
In his previous work , he described China as conducting a “ shadow war , ” one most Americans know little or nothing about .
This is no longer the case , and bilateral spats frequently top domestic headlines now .
Not a week goes by without a story of Chinese espionage , incursion , or “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomacy , often matched by an equally polemical United States .
If madman diplomacy is the approach , far less clear are what goals , if any , Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ His main obsession seems to be the same one he focuses on with almost all foreign powers : the idea that the United States is being cheated .
China ’ s growing human rights crisis certainly isn ’ t a concern .
When told of the so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang , Trump ’ s former advisor John Bolton claimed the president essentially signed off on the idea to Chinese leader Xi Jinping .
Trump has even given up on his signature trade policy , and we ’ ll likely not see a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Most observers assume his China policy has become an election ploy—a dangerous affair considering how badly Trump hates to lose .
With the U.S. Navy passing through the Taiwan Strait and Chinese fighter jets entering Taiwan ’ s air defense identification zone in the last few weeks , a clumsy few minutes might change the course of history .
Meanwhile , the administration ’ s hostility to China—from initiating the trade war to its barely disguised racism when calling the novel coronavirus a “ Chinese virus ” —has done little to substantively @ @ @ @ @ @ @ militarize the South China Sea , installing missiles on the Spratly Islands .
It has essentially thrown out Hong Kong ’ s constitution and independence .
And it continues to detain Uighurs in its western Xinjiang territory , despite growing global outcry .
Trump ’ s bluster and swings have largely been ignored by Beijing when it comes to actual actions , while it has continued to simply press on with its own concerned nationalist agenda .
If the relative high point in Sciutto ’ s estimation is China , the nadir is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there .
Sciutto ’ s account of the president ’ s own officials seeking creative ways to circumvent his withdrawal orders make for painful reading , but it serves as just one instance of many in this book when officials had to manage his worst decisions .
It is a mortifying moment when the commander of the Syrian Kurdish military forces sends a message to his friends in the U.S. military absolving them of blame , implicit in the communication a judgment on how morally bankrupt Trump ’ s decision was .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a foreign-policy victory in his hands that he squandered .
The United States had partnered with a capable local fighting force and had vastly diminished Islamic State territory and killed tens of thousands of its fighters .
It ceded that progress , allowing Bashar al-Assad ’ s government , Turkey , Russia , and Iran to make gains .
The madman , it turns out , does not like war , and he measures military options from a bang-for-your-buck benchmark .
He could pursue a one-off strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem @ @ @ @ @ @ @ did not spiral into something greater ) , but he generally prefers withdrawals over deployments—a consistency China may have noticed as it ratchets up tensions with Taiwan .
What emerges in addition to the prevailing “ madman theory ” in these pages are a few steady strands the president sticks to , at least directionally , if unevenly , such as on military conflict .
Sciutto ’ s book is a first-rate attempt to map a method behind four years of foreign-policy mayhem .
Even as he writes about the past , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he is constantly thinking—and worried—about the future .
Regardless of the election outcome , America faces tough years ahead , much of it because of a madman ’ s impulsiveness .

The cover of Jim Sciutto’s new book, The Madman Theory, depicts a blindfolded U.S. President Donald Trump with a bat, ready to take a swing at the world-turned-piñata. Sciutto’s previous work, The Shadow War, explored the threats Russia and China posed to the United States—now, he’s turned his attention around to consider America’s own contribution to global instability.
The cover of Jim Sciutto’s new book, The Madman Theory, depicts a blindfolded U.S. President Donald Trump with a bat, ready to take a swing at the world-turned-piñata. Sciutto’s previous work, The Shadow War, explored the threats Russia and China posed to the United States—now, he’s turned his attention around to consider America’s own contribution to global instability.
Well before he assumed office, Trump made clear he would operate differently and set out to break conventional wisdom when it came to foreign affairs. NATO was “obsolete,” until he decided after he entered office it was “no longer obsolete.” He toyed with bringing waterboarding back as a U.S. practice. And he questioned why he couldn’t speak by phone with the president of Taiwan. By the end of his first year, some policymakers attempted to make sense of his mercuriality by describing his approach as “madman theory.”
The Madman Theory: Trump Takes On the World, Jim Sciutto, Harper, 320 pp., .99, Aug. 11, 2020
U.S. President Richard Nixon famously invoked the “madman theory” when he sought to convey to North Vietnam via his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger his supposed willingness to use any means possible against them. But he was hardly inventive. An early reference shows up in Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, when he notes that it can be “a very wise thing to simulate madness.” Whatever his character flaws, Nixon’s nuclear threat was a ploy, not a reality—albeit one that failed as badly as the rest of the country’s Vietnam strategy. Trump’s “madman” role, on the other hand, feels less simulated and much more lived. In his most recent whack at the piñata, he has targeted Germany, announcing the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the country. Already, officials warn the process could take months, in what looks to be a move to buy time and mitigate the commander in chief’s bad call.
Sciutto describes Trump’s style of diplomacy as a tactic that “is sometimes by accident and sometimes deliberate,” a brand of brinkmanship whereby his unpredictability would corner opponents into concessions. But is a “madman theory” real if it is not always intentional? Peter Navarro, the president’s trade advisor and sycophant, believes it. “He’s a strategic chess player, seeing all angles and moves,” he enthuses. “There’s no preformed playbook. It’s jazz versus classical music.”
For a brief while, North Korea was held up as the chief success of this strategy. Trump’s see-sawing from insults to praise of Kim Jong Un brought the North Korean leader to the negotiating table in Hanoi, the president’s defenders argued. That looks a lot less credible when the North returned to testing and its usual explosive rhetoric. But Sciutto keeps score, chapter by chapter, country by country, from Pyongyang to Moscow to Beijing. Perhaps mindful of critics from the right who consider CNN, where he is chief national security correspondent, a partisan news outlet, he anchors his book on interviews with people who work or worked for the administration and, as he emphasizes, “chose to do so.” You will not find many Democrats in these pages, railing predictably against the president. Sciutto isn’t both-siding this—the withering words come from Trump’s own team.
Nearly every official has something unflattering to say about the president — except Navarro, who is also the only one speaking under his own name and still serving. The experts “failed on every foreign policy major initiative, in the last thirty years,” Navarro reminds Sciutto. “On China, on NAFTA, on Iraq, on Afghanistan.” The book also features Steve Bannon, one of the original orchestrators of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign. (“We’ve been in managed decline now for thirty years by our elites,” he says.) They may be the usual suspects, but that’s because both wield significant influence—Bannon exited early from the White House, but he continues to speak to people in the administration multiple times a day.
On North Korea, the book relays the remarkable dynamic following Trump’s “fire and fury” and “bloody nose” comments against Kim, when Pyongyang and Seoul — sworn enemies — coordinated to avert existential disaster by overpromising on the possibility of a denuclearized North, if only the president would restart talks. “They were in cahoots,” a former official claims. Trump, Sciutto points out, was possibly “being played by both the ally and the adversary.” This is where, perhaps, the United States may have come closest to war. Measured by volume alone, two long, tense chapters cover the Koreas. And after three face-to-face meetings, Trump has little to show beyond the pomp, while North Korea has used these years to expand its nuclear program.
Do not expect an excoriation of all of Trump’s actions. Confronting China has become a bipartisan position, and regardless of who wins in November, “the upending of the US-China relationship is the element of Trump’s foreign policy least likely to change when he leaves office,” Sciutto observes. In his previous work, he described China as conducting a “shadow war,” one most Americans know little or nothing about. This is no longer the case, and bilateral spats frequently top domestic headlines now. Not a week goes by without a story of Chinese espionage, incursion, or “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, often matched by an equally polemical United States.
If madman diplomacy is the approach, far less clear are what goals, if any, Trump has when it comes to China. His main obsession seems to be the same one he focuses on with almost all foreign powers: the idea that the United States is being cheated. China’s growing human rights crisis certainly isn’t a concern. When told of the so-called reeducation camps in Xinjiang, Trump’s former advisor John Bolton claimed the president essentially signed off on the idea to Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Trump has even given up on his signature trade policy, and we’ll likely not see a “phase two” U.S.-China trade deal. Most observers assume his China policy has become an election ploy—a dangerous affair considering how badly Trump hates to lose. With the U.S. Navy passing through the Taiwan Strait and Chinese fighter jets entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the last few weeks, a clumsy few minutes might change the course of history.
Meanwhile, the administration’s hostility to China—from initiating the trade war to its barely disguised racism when calling the novel coronavirus a “Chinese virus”—has done little to substantively check Beijing. The country continues to militarize the South China Sea, installing missiles on the Spratly Islands. It has essentially thrown out Hong Kong’s constitution and independence. And it continues to detain Uighurs in its western Xinjiang territory, despite growing global outcry. Trump’s bluster and swings have largely been ignored by Beijing when it comes to actual actions, while it has continued to simply press on with its own concerned nationalist agenda.
If the relative high point in Sciutto’s estimation is China, the nadir is Syria and U.S. abandonment of Kurdish fighters there. Sciutto’s account of the president’s own officials seeking creative ways to circumvent his withdrawal orders make for painful reading, but it serves as just one instance of many in this book when officials had to manage his worst decisions. It is a mortifying moment when the commander of the Syrian Kurdish military forces sends a message to his friends in the U.S. military absolving them of blame, implicit in the communication a judgment on how morally bankrupt Trump’s decision was. The author is clear here: Trump had a foreign-policy victory in his hands that he squandered. The United States had partnered with a capable local fighting force and had vastly diminished Islamic State territory and killed tens of thousands of its fighters. It ceded that progress, allowing Bashar al-Assad’s government, Turkey, Russia, and Iran to make gains.
The madman, it turns out, does not like war, and he measures military options from a bang-for-your-buck benchmark. He could pursue a one-off strike to kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani (and was lucky the decision did not spiral into something greater), but he generally prefers withdrawals over deployments—a consistency China may have noticed as it ratchets up tensions with Taiwan. What emerges in addition to the prevailing “madman theory” in these pages are a few steady strands the president sticks to, at least directionally, if unevenly, such as on military conflict.
Sciutto’s book is a first-rate attempt to map a method behind four years of foreign-policy mayhem. Even as he writes about the past, it’s difficult to shake the feeling he is constantly thinking—and worried—about the future. Regardless of the election outcome, America faces tough years ahead, much of it because of a madman’s impulsiveness.