foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--To Protect Democracy, Protect the Internet

Social media is now part of the foundational infrastructure of democracy .
It has become the main way politicians connect to voters and a major news source .
By connecting people worldwide , social media has also made it easier than ever before for authoritarian regimes to connect to voters outside their borders and manipulate democracies .
Social media companies have made great strides in blocking authoritarian propaganda , but ultimately their voluntary efforts are not enough .
In order to ensure the future of democratic governance worldwide , the U.S. government must take proactive steps to regulate social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which currently take advantage of weak U.S. laws .
As long as the world ’ s elections are increasingly mediated by U.S. social media companies , Washington must recognize that it has a unique responsibility to digitally protect them .
Social media has made it easier than ever for foreign powers to influence elections .
Even ineffective foreign interference can undermine the legitimacy of an electoral outcome .
In the 2016 U.S. presidential election , Russia ordered an influence campaign including both targeted leaks of political material and propaganda delivered via social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leaders ’ email servers and leaked their content via the websites WikiLeaks and DCLeaks .
Russia also launched a massive propaganda campaign , in which 80 or so contractors at the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency ( IRA ) created fake social media accounts purporting to be Americans in order to spread divisive content .
This campaign , which continued after Election Day , reached at least 126 million Americans on Facebook , 20 million on Instagram , and 1.4 million on Twitter .
Despite these numbers , there is no compelling evidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election determined the outcome of the race .
That ’ s because they had an even more subversive intent .
As the U.S. intelligence community concluded in its 2017 report “ Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections , ” Moscow ’ s objective was “ to undermine public faith in the US democratic process.
” Rather than focusing on the immensely challenging task of changing votes in swing states or voter suppression , Russian operatives sought to stoke existing racial resentment and partisan polarization .
Their ongoing efforts are likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’  increasing dissatisfaction with their democracy .
Russian leaders seem to think that they benefit from press coverage that promulgates the idea they can change the outcome of foreign elections .
The IRA resorted to meta-trolling during the 2018 midterms , claiming it was running thousands of troll accounts that probably didn ’ t exist .
Shortly thereafter , one of Vladimir Putin ’ s key aides declared that Russia had succeeded in altering the “ consciousness ” of the West by proving democracy was a sham .
Authoritarian regimes continue to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia sought to influence key votes including the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2017 French presidential election. While Russian efforts were far from decisive in either case , the fact that Russia intervened still had a negative effect on their legitimacy , especially in the U.K. , where Russian interference is one of many factors that sowed doubt about the legitimacy of Brexit .
This pattern—interference failing to change electoral outcomes but succeeding in undermining the legitimacy of those outcomes—is almost certain to continue .
Russian propagandists continue to devise new ways to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Graphika have found that they are active across more than 300 platforms in at least seven languages .
Social media companies have made great strides in preventing foreign political interference since 2016 .
Facebook ’ s reports indicate that it removes hundreds of millions of pieces of content , almost all of it proactively , and numerous “ coordinated inauthentic behavior ” networks monthly .
Twitter ’ s artificial intelligence-enabled censors ban millions of bots per week and have deleted billions of tweets .
Reddit ’ s censorship AI has achieved a “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Companies are also preparing for the 2020 election cycle and have begun making policy changes .
Twitter banned all paid political ads and demonstrated its willingness to censor heads of state .
YouTube changed its algorithm to upgrade authoritative news sources and removed thousands of Chinese propaganda accounts .
Reddit revamped its political ad policy and created an ad tracker to allow anyone to monitor advertisements on the platform .
Facebook launched a similar ad library and allowed users to opt out of political ads and is reportedly considering an election ad @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about $ 4,700 of IRA ad spending in 2016 ,  banned targeted political ads .
Their efforts should be applauded .
Most people agree that the private sector must take the lead in responding to the threat posed by information manipulation .
However , protecting the legitimacy of elections can not simply be an act of corporate charity .
Foreign manipulation , which exploits loopholes in U.S. law , must also be made illegal .
Currently , foreign propagandists can easily register for U.S.-based social media services by purporting to be Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ afforded to users of U.S. social networks , which are protected by the U.S. Constitution .
Currently , social media companies that unwittingly distribute their propaganda can not suffer any penalty worse than a bad hearing on Capitol Hill .
As so-called interactive computer services , they are generally protected from legal liability for content created by such users under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ( CDA ) of 1996 .
The protections afforded to social media companies under the CDA overlap with , but are also more expansive than , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Amendment .
While social media companies are free to enforce terms of use that ban foreign propaganda , they are not obligated to do so .
There is precedent for penalizing distributors that specifically invite users to engage in illegal behavior , which could apply in cases such as microtargeting political advertisements at minorities for the purposes of voter suppression .
But broadly speaking , while a Russian agent who covertly spreads political content on social media is violating U.S. law , the social media company that connects him to a voter is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who spreads content to manipulate a Taiwanese election on Facebook—as was the case in Taiwan ’ s recent presidential election and a major mayoral race—is immune to U.S. legal sanction , despite operating on a U.S. platform .
There is currently no legal framework that could be used to prosecute them .
Because the issue of international political interference mixes foreign and domestic public policy—and given that major tech companies have even invited more regulation—public-private sector cooperation is the only solution .
The United States needs a new legal framework that allows the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in protecting elections from foreign interference .
First , social media companies must become more transparent .
Social media is unique because it allows targeted advertisements that can not be easily seen by the general public .
In order to prevent targeted advertisements from being abused , Congress should create a statutory requirement compelling social media companies to publish data listing the identities of individuals and organizations that purchase advertisements regarding political or divisive social issues , the content of those advertisements , and the characteristics used to target those advertisements to specific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ journalists and researchers will be able to verify whether or not social media companies ’ efforts to prevent foreign influence are successful .
This would redirect the “ spotlight of pitiless publicity ” that the Foreign Agents Registration Act ( FARA ) of 1938 already strives to shine on foreign propagandists to their social media activities .
( FARA alone is likely inadequate to address these issues . )
As the companies that have launched ad libraries have recognized , they will benefit from increased transparency in the long run because it will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and assess which propaganda campaigns are ongoing .
Second , social media companies should be required by law to remove accounts that are covertly controlled by foreign states and used to distribute political content .
These accounts strive to cover their digital footprints , which is why government intelligence resources are sometimes needed to identify them .
There is precedent for restrictions on foreign political speech : U.S. law already restricts the right of foreign actors to speak about U.S. elections through donations .
The new law should be narrowly constructed to avoid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ speech police ” —the target here is not the content , or who may have retweeted it , but simply the covertly controlled foreign accounts used to spread it .
The government often can not share all of the information it has on covert activities by foreign states .
It is unreasonable to expect private companies to assume liability for voluntarily deleting accounts that the government merely asserts are controlled by foreign agents .
In such cases , the government must be able to compel companies to act ; the government should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proves inaccurate .
Third , social media companies should be required by law to label accounts overtly controlled by authoritarian states , including Russia , China , and Iran .
YouTube and Facebook already label state-controlled channels and pages .
Similarly , China ’ s “ Wolf Warrior ” diplomats deserve a “ red checkmark , ” warning users they are foreign propagandists , on all platforms .
Red checkmarks would also make it easier for companies to determine which content they should restrict the distribution of by tweaking content distribution algorithms .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ protections , although given their complexity and secrecy modifying them is best left to private companies .
Companies are already taking the lead on preventing abuse of their platforms .
The government must now do more to identify foreign manipulation , pass that information on to private companies for action , and in some cases order , rather than invite , the removal of foreign content .
Empowering the government to order such actions will allow it to address this threat more aggressively .
U.S. social media firms have become important global communications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and laws that enable free speech , privacy , and anonymity online .
Those rights must be protected by prudent measures to ensure they are not exploited .
It is possible to disarm most international election interference without overturning cherished civil rights or mandating widespread censorship , and there has rarely been a more important time to establish a new legal framework for social media .
This year , which began with a pandemic and will end with a U.S. presidential election , is providing unprecedented opportunities for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ institutions .
This is not only a domestic problem : A Chinese agent spreading propaganda intended to undermine Taiwanese democracy on Facebook is an American problem both because the activity is occurring on a U.S. platform and because protecting democracy abroad—and at home—remains a vital American interest .
To do so , Washington needs a new approach : a Digital Responsibility to Protect that views social media as part of election security and provides a legal framework for technology companies to constructively engage the U.S. government .
Failing to do so will continue @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hamstring government officials in their quest to bolster faith in democratic institutions .

Social media is now part of the foundational infrastructure of democracy. It has become the main way politicians connect to voters and a major news source . By connecting people worldwide, social media has also made it easier than ever before for authoritarian regimes to connect to voters outside their borders and manipulate democracies. Social media companies have made great strides in blocking authoritarian propaganda, but ultimately their voluntary efforts are not enough.
Social media is now part of the foundational infrastructure of democracy. It has become the main way politicians connect to voters and a major news source. By connecting people worldwide, social media has also made it easier than ever before for authoritarian regimes to connect to voters outside their borders and manipulate democracies. Social media companies have made great strides in blocking authoritarian propaganda, but ultimately their voluntary efforts are not enough.
In order to ensure the future of democratic governance worldwide, the U.S. government must take proactive steps to regulate social media and prevent foreign election interference efforts, which currently take advantage of weak U.S. laws. As long as the world’s elections are increasingly mediated by U.S. social media companies, Washington must recognize that it has a unique responsibility to digitally protect them.
Social media has made it easier than ever for foreign powers to influence elections. Even ineffective foreign interference can undermine the legitimacy of an electoral outcome. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russia ordered an influence campaign including both targeted leaks of political material and propaganda delivered via social media.
Russian actors hacked into U.S. political leaders’ email servers and leaked their content via the websites WikiLeaks and DCLeaks. Russia also launched a massive propaganda campaign, in which 80 or so contractors at the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) created fake social media accounts purporting to be Americans in order to spread divisive content. This campaign, which continued after Election Day, reached at least 126 million Americans on Facebook, 20 million on Instagram, and 1.4 million on Twitter.
Despite these numbers, there is no compelling evidence that Russian efforts to influence the 2016 election determined the outcome of the race. That’s because they had an even more subversive intent. As the U.S. intelligence community concluded in its 2017 report “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” Moscow’s objective was “to undermine public faith in the US democratic process.” Rather than focusing on the immensely challenging task of changing votes in swing states or voter suppression, Russian operatives sought to stoke existing racial resentment and partisan polarization. Their ongoing efforts are likely one of many factors contributing to Americans’ increasing dissatisfaction with their democracy.
Russian leaders seem to think that they benefit from press coverage that promulgates the idea they can change the outcome of foreign elections. The IRA resorted to meta-trolling during the 2018 midterms, claiming it was running thousands of troll accounts that probably didn’t exist. Shortly thereafter, one of Vladimir Putin’s key aides declared that Russia had succeeded in altering the “consciousness” of the West by proving democracy was a sham.
Authoritarian regimes continue to meddle in elections around the world. Russia sought to influence key votes including the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2017 French presidential election. While Russian efforts were far from decisive in either case, the fact that Russia intervened still had a negative effect on their legitimacy, especially in the U.K., where Russian interference is one of many factors that sowed doubt about the legitimacy of Brexit. This pattern—interference failing to change electoral outcomes but succeeding in undermining the legitimacy of those outcomes—is almost certain to continue. Russian propagandists continue to devise new ways to reach U.S. audiences, and researchers at Graphika have found that they are active across more than 300 platforms in at least seven languages.
Social media companies have made great strides in preventing foreign political interference since 2016. Facebook’s reports indicate that it removes hundreds of millions of pieces of content, almost all of it proactively, and numerous “coordinated inauthentic behavior” networks monthly. Twitter’s artificial intelligence-enabled censors ban millions of bots per week and have deleted billions of tweets. Reddit’s censorship AI has achieved a “proactive detection” rate above 99 percent.
Companies are also preparing for the 2020 election cycle and have begun making policy changes. Twitter banned all paid political ads and demonstrated its willingness to censor heads of state. YouTube changed its algorithm to upgrade authoritative news sources and removed thousands of Chinese propaganda accounts. Reddit revamped its political ad policy and created an ad tracker to allow anyone to monitor advertisements on the platform. Facebook launched a similar ad library and allowed users to opt out of political ads and is reportedly considering an election ad ban. Google, which saw only about $4,700 of IRA ad spending in 2016, banned targeted political ads.
Their efforts should be applauded. Most people agree that the private sector must take the lead in responding to the threat posed by information manipulation. However, protecting the legitimacy of elections cannot simply be an act of corporate charity. Foreign manipulation, which exploits loopholes in U.S. law, must also be made illegal.
Currently, foreign propagandists can easily register for U.S.-based social media services by purporting to be Americans and exploiting the anonymity and privacy rights afforded to users of U.S. social networks, which are protected by the U.S. Constitution. Currently, social media companies that unwittingly distribute their propaganda cannot suffer any penalty worse than a bad hearing on Capitol Hill.
As so-called interactive computer services, they are generally protected from legal liability for content created by such users under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996. The protections afforded to social media companies under the CDA overlap with, but are also more expansive than, the free speech protections in the First Amendment. While social media companies are free to enforce terms of use that ban foreign propaganda, they are not obligated to do so.
There is precedent for penalizing distributors that specifically invite users to engage in illegal behavior, which could apply in cases such as microtargeting political advertisements at minorities for the purposes of voter suppression. But broadly speaking, while a Russian agent who covertly spreads political content on social media is violating U.S. law, the social media company that connects him to a voter is indemnified. Likewise, a Chinese agent who spreads content to manipulate a Taiwanese election on Facebook—as was the case in Taiwan’s recent presidential election and a major mayoral race—is immune to U.S. legal sanction, despite operating on a U.S. platform. There is currently no legal framework that could be used to prosecute them.
Because the issue of international political interference mixes foreign and domestic public policy—and given that major tech companies have even invited more regulation—public-private sector cooperation is the only solution. The United States needs a new legal framework that allows the government to play a more central role in protecting elections from foreign interference.
First, social media companies must become more transparent. Social media is unique because it allows targeted advertisements that cannot be easily seen by the general public. In order to prevent targeted advertisements from being abused, Congress should create a statutory requirement compelling social media companies to publish data listing the identities of individuals and organizations that purchase advertisements regarding political or divisive social issues, the content of those advertisements, and the characteristics used to target those advertisements to specific audiences.
Armed with this data, journalists and researchers will be able to verify whether or not social media companies’ efforts to prevent foreign influence are successful. This would redirect the “spotlight of pitiless publicity” that the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 already strives to shine on foreign propagandists to their social media activities. (FARA alone is likely inadequate to address these issues.) As the companies that have launched ad libraries have recognized, they will benefit from increased transparency in the long run because it will allow other actors to help them identify and assess which propaganda campaigns are ongoing.
Second, social media companies should be required by law to remove accounts that are covertly controlled by foreign states and used to distribute political content. These accounts strive to cover their digital footprints, which is why government intelligence resources are sometimes needed to identify them. There is precedent for restrictions on foreign political speech: U.S. law already restricts the right of foreign actors to speak about U.S. elections through donations. The new law should be narrowly constructed to avoid turning the government or social media into “speech police”—the target here is not the content, or who may have retweeted it, but simply the covertly controlled foreign accounts used to spread it.
The government often cannot share all of the information it has on covert activities by foreign states. It is unreasonable to expect private companies to assume liability for voluntarily deleting accounts that the government merely asserts are controlled by foreign agents. In such cases, the government must be able to compel companies to act; the government should also assume legal liability if its information proves inaccurate.
Third, social media companies should be required by law to label accounts overtly controlled by authoritarian states, including Russia, China, and Iran. YouTube and Facebook already label state-controlled channels and pages. Similarly, China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomats deserve a “red checkmark,” warning users they are foreign propagandists, on all platforms. Red checkmarks would also make it easier for companies to determine which content they should restrict the distribution of by tweaking content distribution algorithms. Those algorithms do not enjoy First Amendment protections, although given their complexity and secrecy modifying them is best left to private companies.
Companies are already taking the lead on preventing abuse of their platforms. The government must now do more to identify foreign manipulation, pass that information on to private companies for action, and in some cases order, rather than invite, the removal of foreign content. Empowering the government to order such actions will allow it to address this threat more aggressively.
U.S. social media firms have become important global communications tools thanks to exceptional U.S. constitutional protections and laws that enable free speech, privacy, and anonymity online. Those rights must be protected by prudent measures to ensure they are not exploited. It is possible to disarm most international election interference without overturning cherished civil rights or mandating widespread censorship, and there has rarely been a more important time to establish a new legal framework for social media.
This year, which began with a pandemic and will end with a U.S. presidential election, is providing unprecedented opportunities for disinformation campaigns designed to undermine democracy and citizens’ faith in its institutions. This is not only a domestic problem: A Chinese agent spreading propaganda intended to undermine Taiwanese democracy on Facebook is an American problem both because the activity is occurring on a U.S. platform and because protecting democracy abroad—and at home—remains a vital American interest.
To do so, Washington needs a new approach: a Digital Responsibility to Protect that views social media as part of election security and provides a legal framework for technology companies to constructively engage the U.S. government. Failing to do so will continue to enable adversarial exploitation of voters and hamstring government officials in their quest to bolster faith in democratic institutions.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence

A world without U.S. leadership is no longer some vague and lamentable future possibility .
We are seeing with our own eyes what such a world looks like , with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic a prime example .
In May , as the worldwide death toll surpassed a quarter of a million people , leaders from all over the world joined by videoconference to coordinate efforts to find and raise money for an effective vaccine .
The summit was organized by the European Union and ended with pledges of more than $ 8 billion , along with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efforts to find and distribute effective medications against a virus from which none of their citizens were safe .
Other than its virtual nature , it was the kind of gathering we have always envisioned when we picture global cooperation to deal with a major emergency but for one striking fact : the absence of the world ’ s richest and most powerful country , the United States .
In the midst of the kind of global crisis that would usually lead much of the world to look to Washington for leadership , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States was empty .
The failure of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to build an international coalition to combat the coronavirus is in fact only the latest manifestation of a deeper and potentially lasting failure .
Indeed , among all of Trump ’ s foreign-policy legacies , none may be more consequential than the damage he has done to America ’ s standing , influence , and power in the world by weakening the system of partnerships and alliances the country has created and relied on for decades .
A world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vague and lamentable future possibility.Since the start of his presidency , Trump has abandoned multiple treaties and agreements , undermined the credibility of U.S. defense guarantees , bullied and belittled allies , and cozied up to dictators who threaten those allies and the United States .
His “ America First ” doctrine—with its ominous echoes of the 1930s—and indifference to the rule of law at home and abroad have left allies wondering if they can count on the United States ; many have started to look elsewhere for more reliable friends and partners @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which the United States is less safe , less respected , and less able to deal with the enormous challenges it faces : climate change , pandemics , refugees , cyberattacks , election interference , nuclear proliferation , terrorism , modern technology , and the rise of China .
The collapse in global regard for the United States has been breathtakingly swift under this president .
Even before collapsing further due to Trump ’ s mishandling of the pandemic , confidence in him to “ do the right thing ” in international affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries polled—down from 74 percent in former President Barack Obama ’ s final year in office .
Global confidence in Trump is significantly lower than in German Chancellor Angela Merkel ( 46 percent ) , French President Emmanuel Macron ( 41 percent ) , and Russian President Vladimir Putin ( 33 percent ) —and just one point higher than in Chinese leader Xi Jinping ( 28 percent ) .
Germans are now equally divided on whether the United States ( 37 percent ) or China ( 36 percent ) is their closest partner @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trust the United States to act responsibly .
Confidence in Trump is only 36 percent in Japan , 32 percent in the United Kingdom , 28 percent in Canada , 28 percent in Brazil , 20 percent in France , 13 percent in Germany , and a mere 8 percent in Mexico , while favorable views of the United States have fallen from 64 percent in 2016 to 53 percent in 2019 .
Asked in June whether she trusted Trump , Merkel paused before saying only “ I work with elected presidents around @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the American one.
” The importance of functioning international partnerships and institutions is not an abstract or an elite concern .
As we have observed firsthand in Afghanistan and Iraq , the troops who have to fight wars without allied military by their side come disproportionately from working families and from the U.S. heartland .
And as was made manifestly clear on the Democratic primary campaign trail earlier this year , it is farmers , consumers , and exporters who suffer heavily when the United States stumbles into trade wars .
Global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open markets for American companies , protect American workers , keep threats away from U.S. shores , govern technology , manage financial crises , and defend the country ’ s values abroad .
Americans agree that allies and partners should have to pay their fair share to help meet global challenges and keep the world safe .
But they also do not want to live in a world that would put their own interests at risk without rules , friends , or partners .
Recent polls show that nearly 7 in 10 Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an active part in world affairs ” ( compared with just 3 in 10 who say “ stay out ” ) , while more than 7 in 10 also believe that U.S. military alliances with other countries contribute to U.S. safety .
Clear majorities of Americans believe that security alliances in East Asia , Europe , and the Middle East either mostly benefit the United States or benefit both the United States and its allies , with less than a quarter of those polled saying—as Trump seems to believe—those alliances mostly benefit the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in her new book , Shields of the Republic , the United States has been joined by allies in every war it has fought since the early 1950s , and U.S. security guarantees have helped persuade a number of countries—including Japan , South Korea , Taiwan , Turkey , Australia , Sweden , and Germany—not to develop nuclear weapons programs .
As the coronavirus catastrophe has reminded us , a single war , terrorist attack , pandemic , catastrophic climate event , or nuclear confrontation could end up costing the United States far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in maintaining the alliances and partnerships that help prevent such tragedies from happening.A single war , terrorist attack , pandemic , catastrophic climate event , or nuclear confrontation could end up costing far more than maintaining the alliances and partnerships that help prevent such tragedies from happening .
Sadly , Trump ’ s systematic rejection of allies and alliances is accelerating rather than abating .
Indeed in the past two months alone , the United States has announced the unilateral withdrawal of some 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany without consulting or even informing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pleas that it remain party to the Open Skies arms control treaty ; found itself all alone on the United Nations Security Council trying to extend an arms embargo on Iran on dubious legal grounds ; alienated all its G-7 allies with a proposal to invite Putin to the group ’ s next meeting ; and terminated its relationship with the World Health Organization during a pandemic , drawing widespread criticism from allies while increasing China ’ s leverage in that organization .
With the United States now isolated on so many fronts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the authors , hope will be led by former Vice President Joe Biden—faces a daunting task in rebuilding the United States ’ global alliances and partnerships and restoring trust and confidence in the country and its leadership .
As Biden has recognized , that agenda starts at home : by restoring the moral authority and soft power that have been so critical to the United States ’ success around the world and by revitalizing the U.S. State Department , demoralized after years of poor leadership and funding cuts .
The project must also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomacy and rebuild U.S. alliances all around the world .
The first step of such a project must be to repair fractured ties with the United States ’ democratic partners in Europe .
For 75 years , presidents from both parties have believed it was in America ’ s interest to invest in a strong and united Europe after the devastation of two world wars .
In contrast , Trump has described the European Union as a “ foe ” that was “ really formed so they could treat us badly.
” Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and demonstrate an ideological fetish for “ national sovereignty ” —without appearing to realize or care that the last time the United States and other countries pursued trade wars and aggressive nationalism , it deepened the Great Depression and led to World War II .
Trump complains that the EU was “ set up in order to hurt the United States on trade , ” overlooking the reasons why former presidents such as Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy strongly supported European unification as a way of building a network of partners that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , invest in the U.S. economy , support the United States when it is threatened abroad , and contribute to development around the world .
Trump has also done serious damage to NATO , repeatedly questioning whether the United States would uphold its treaty commitment to stand by its partners—the underlying principle of any collective defense—unless they “ pay their bills.
” That approach not only undermines the solemn word of the United States but could make an attack on a NATO member more likely .
Trump falsely claimed that NATO was “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when he took over and pretends to have persuaded allies to contribute “ hundreds of billions ” of dollars more to the alliance .
In fact , defense spending in Europe has been rising since the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years before Trump took office .
Trump ’ s repeated argument that the United States pays up to 90 percent of the costs of defending Europe reflects either deep ignorance about NATO and defense budgeting or , worse , a deliberate attempt to mislead his supporters into turning against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that U.S. spending on NATO—a fraction of the overall defense budget—is not a charity project : European allies provide land , infrastructure , and financial subsidies for American bases that are used to protect U.S. interests not just in Europe but in Africa and the Middle East .
Trump ’ s decision in June to unilaterally withdraw troops from Germany doubtless pleased Putin , but it only raised further questions in Europe about the reliability of the United States.Repairing ties with the United States ’ most like-minded , democratic partners means working with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ change , global health , the Iran nuclear issue , and China .
Repairing ties with the United States ’ most like-minded , democratic partners means working with them on critical issues such as climate change , global health , the Iran nuclear issue , and China .
The policy changes necessary to achieve these goals are not gifts to Europe but in the United States ’ own interest and supported by most Americans .
Majorities of Americans want to see the United States maintain or increase its commitment to NATO ( 78 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Paris climate accord ( 68 percent ) and Iran nuclear deal ( 61 percent ) .
None of these challenges can be met by the United States alone .
Greater burden-sharing with allies is certainly necessary , but it can not be productively accomplished by bullying them or focusing only on the narrow and arbitrary measuring stick of defense spending as a share of GDP—a standard that rewards countries for spending inefficiently or on defense objectives that the United States may not share .
What the United States should expect from its allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not just for the conventional defense of Europe but to global development , nonproliferation , counterterrorism , poverty reduction , and peacekeeping .
The United States ’ global allies once willingly consented to U.S. leadership , but as Michael Fullilove , the head of Australia ’ s Lowy Institute , has put it , “ if you push your allies and partners to the brink in every negotiation , and present your ugliest face to the world , then this consent will evaporate.
” Rebuilding ties with democratic partners in Asia is just @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s greatest advantages in its growing strategic competition with China is its voluntary global network of alliances , while China—whose closest ally is North Korea—wins international support only out of fear or economic incentive .
Yet at a time when the United States should be consolidating those alliances to deal with China economically and strategically , Trump risks unraveling them.One of America ’ s greatest advantages in its competition with China is its voluntary global network of alliances , while China—whose closest ally is North Korea—wins support only out of fear or economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Asia from the moment he took office .
He flirted with the idea of cutting back support for Taiwan to satisfy China before backing away from that—at least for now .
He has repeatedly threatened to pull U.S. troops out of Japan and South Korea—a dramatic step that would embolden China and North Korea and increase the risk of conflict .
Instead of recognizing the benefits to the United States of forward-deployed forces—on bases largely paid for by the host countries—and negotiating allied burden-sharing in good faith , Trump has treated U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Seoul and Tokyo to maintain a continued U.S. presence .
Such an approach , which borders on extortion , damages the trust , credibility , and interoperability of forces that are the foundation of U.S. alliances .
As part of his failed courtship of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un , Trump agreed to scale back joint exercises with South Korea—a decision he made without informing the U.S. Defense Department or the South Korean government .
While focusing on North Korea ’ s long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ short-range nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea , undermining the very notion of alliance solidarity .
Trump ’ s willingness to tone down support for democracy protesters in Hong Kong while lavishing praise on Xi for his handling of the coronavirus crisis in order to curry favor with China over trade has also shaken the faith of the United States ’ Asian partners more widely .
Allies unable to rely on the United States to defend them will inevitably be forced to align with Beijing .
Trump has also damaged U.S. economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Korea and Japan at the very same moment that he embarked on a trade war with China .
That trade war resulted in high costs for U.S. taxpayers and consumers and lost markets for U.S. farmers before finally leading to a “ phase one ” trade deal that failed to address either the bilateral trade deficit with China or the main structural problems in the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship .
By requiring China to direct its heavily subsidized , state-owned enterprises to purchase more U.S. goods , the deal actually reinforced the role @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In an integrated global economy , China can easily get around unilateral U.S. tariffs by selling products in other markets , which is exactly what it is doing .
A united international front—based on shared economic and security interests with partners including Australia , Britain , Canada , the EU , India , Japan , Mexico , and South Korea—would boost U.S. leverage immeasurably and force China to open up its markets , stop stealing intellectual property , and abandon cyber-espionage for commercial gain .
Trump has not only undermined existing alliances @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ones—particularly in Africa and Latin America .
By 2025 , nearly one-fifth of the world ’ s population will live in Africa , 60 percent of whose people are now under the age of 25 .
Africa boasts 1.2 billion consumers , an increasingly innovative and technology-based business environment , and seven of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world , which have lifted millions of people out of poverty and into the global marketplace .
In 2019 , Africa launched its first-ever comprehensive free trade area : the African Continental Free Trade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and is expected to create a $ 2.2 trillion regional economy .
Pro-democracy movements are demanding better governance in countries such as Algeria , Sudan , Zimbabwe , and Cameroon .
Women ’ s groups and female leaders continue to play an increasing role—in Rwanda , women make up 61 percent of the country ’ s parliament , the largest female representation of parliamentarians anywhere in the world.Trump has not only undermined existing alliances but has missed opportunities to develop new ones—particularly in Africa and Latin America .
Unfortunately , instead of taking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump administration has largely ignored Africa , disparaged its governments and people , issued travel bans against the citizens of several of its most populous countries ( Nigeria , Eritrea , Sudan , and Tanzania ) , and sought massive cuts in U.S. development , counterterrorism , and humanitarian assistance .
While Russia and China have devoted increasing time and attention to the continent , the United States has been virtually absent , failing to take advantage of growing opportunities in trade , to support U.S. companies to compete better with Chinese and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its African partners to promote economic development and cooperation on climate change , food security , natural disasters , and the prevention of pandemics .
In the Americas , too , key bilateral relationships have been deeply strained by the Trump administration ’ s approach to immigration and trade and its rhetoric about Hispanic migrants .
Tackling these cross-border issues—as well as regional problems such as Venezuela and Cuba—simply can not be done without close cooperation with Latin American partners and institutions .
This means not only repairing ties with partners such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Colombia but also deepening U.S. engagement with multilateral forums like the Organization of American States , the Inter-American Development Bank , and the Mercosur and Pacific Alliance trading blocs .
To compete with China ’ s growing role in Latin America , the United States should work with like-minded governments—such as those of the free market-oriented Pacific Alliance and other extrahemispheric partners such as Japan , South Korea , Australia , New Zealand , and Taiwan—to develop truly enforceable protections against non-tariff barriers and intellectual property theft so that all states can interact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategic sectors targeted by the Chinese such as ports and logistics , the administration should use U.S. laws and regulations to incentivize the private sector to invest and work with Latin American states to dissuade them from turning to China .
And it should make cooperation on energy and climate a priority .
Countries of the Western Hemisphere are the source of more than 65 percent of U.S. energy imports and share the United States ’ profound interest in curbing climate change before it is too late .
Finally , no attempt to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and alliances will be possible without major changes in the Middle East .
The Trump administration has approached this challenge by ignoring U.S. values entirely and cutting cynical deals with regional leaders so long as they support some of the administration ’ s political or geopolitical goals .
Trump refers to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as his “ favorite dictator ” and a “ fantastic guy.
” Trump ’ s approach to Saudi Arabia , for example , is essentially to give its leadership a pass on domestic repression and reckless regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ American weapons and supports the administration ’ s policy of aggressively confronting Iran .
In Egypt , the administration seems untroubled by the government ’ s corruption , repression , and interference in neighboring Libya , with Trump referring to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as his “ favorite dictator ” and a “ fantastic guy.
” In Israel , Trump seems to have decided that his domestic political imperatives require him to give unqualified support to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government .
This had led the Trump administration to turn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and to present a so-called peace plan that has no chance of being adopted and has been rejected by the European Union , the Arab League , the Organization of Islamic Cooperation , and most other countries around the world .
Maintaining security partnerships with imperfect allies and partners in the region will be necessary , but the United States ’ relative energy independence and the realization that large military deployments are not the answer to the region ’ s problems should make it possible to maintain—and modernize—those partnerships without sacrificing the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should maintain security , intelligence , and economic cooperation with Gulf and other security partners but also make clear this will not prevent the United States from holding them to account for human rights violations , fighting corruption , or using its leverage to press them to resolve disputes with their neighbors .
The United States must always provide the support necessary to keep Israel secure but should not hesitate to oppose measures , such as the unilateral annexation of territory , that contradict the security interests of both the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ future as a secure , Jewish , democratic state .
In less than four years , Trump has caused unprecedented damage to the system of alliances and partnerships that took the United States many decades to construct .
It is frightening to think of the greater damage that would happen if Trump were elected for a second term .
Trump ’ s own former national security advisor , John Bolton , recently wrote that he thought it “ highly questionable ” that Trump would keep the United States in NATO if given another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the alliances with Japan , South Korea , and Australia were also “ question marks at this point.
” Current and potential allies and partners around the world are still crying out for U.S. leadership—even more so now that they have seen what its absence looks like.For decades , Trump has shown nothing but contempt for allies and alliances , and he has acted on that instinct throughout his presidency , even in the face of sustained resistance from some of his top advisors .
As Bolton put it , “ There ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do in a second term once he doesn ’ t have to worry about satisfying the Republicans in Congress anymore or the Republican base .
… Anything is possible in the Trump administration.
” Biden has made clear that it will be one of his highest priorities immediately on taking office to avoid this fate and repair the immense damage Trump has done to the United States ’ international partnerships .
Current and potential allies and partners around the world are still crying out for U.S. leadership—even more so now that they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A new administration can rebuild and revitalize U.S. leadership by restoring the United States ’ soft power , treating allies with respect , and working with others to address global problems .
The Lowy Institute ’ s Fullilove puts it succinctly : “ The world still wants to believe in America .
But we need Americans to help us believe.
” It is in the United States ’ own interest to do just that .

A world without U.S. leadership is no longer some vague and lamentable future possibility. We are seeing with our own eyes what such a world looks like, with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic a prime example. In May, as the worldwide death toll surpassed a quarter of a million people, leaders from all over the world joined by videoconference to coordinate efforts to find and raise money for an effective vaccine. The summit was organized by the European Union and ended with pledges of more than $8 billion, along with commitments by world leaders to pool their efforts to find and distribute effective medications against a virus from which none of their citizens were safe. Other than its virtual nature, it was the kind of gathering we have always envisioned when we picture global cooperation to deal with a major emergency but for one striking fact: the absence of the world’s richest and most powerful country, the United States. In the midst of the kind of global crisis that would usually lead much of the world to look to Washington for leadership, the chair normally reserved for the United States was empty .
A world without U.S. leadership is no longer some vague and lamentable future possibility. We are seeing with our own eyes what such a world looks like, with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic a prime example. In May, as the worldwide death toll surpassed a quarter of a million people, leaders from all over the world joined by videoconference to coordinate efforts to find and raise money for an effective vaccine. The summit was organized by the European Union and ended with pledges of more than $8 billion, along with commitments by world leaders to pool their efforts to find and distribute effective medications against a virus from which none of their citizens were safe. Other than its virtual nature, it was the kind of gathering we have always envisioned when we picture global cooperation to deal with a major emergency but for one striking fact: the absence of the world’s richest and most powerful country, the United States. In the midst of the kind of global crisis that would usually lead much of the world to look to Washington for leadership, the chair normally reserved for the United States was empty.
The failure of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to build an international coalition to combat the coronavirus is in fact only the latest manifestation of a deeper and potentially lasting failure. Indeed, among all of Trump’s foreign-policy legacies, none may be more consequential than the damage he has done to America’s standing, influence, and power in the world by weakening the system of partnerships and alliances the country has created and relied on for decades. A world without U.S. leadership is no longer some vague and lamentable future possibility.Since the start of his presidency, Trump has abandoned multiple treaties and agreements, undermined the credibility of U.S. defense guarantees, bullied and belittled allies, and cozied up to dictators who threaten those allies and the United States. His “America First” doctrine—with its ominous echoes of the 1930s—and indifference to the rule of law at home and abroad have left allies wondering if they can count on the United States; many have started to look elsewhere for more reliable friends and partners. The result is a world in which the United States is less safe, less respected, and less able to deal with the enormous challenges it faces: climate change, pandemics, refugees, cyberattacks, election interference, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, modern technology, and the rise of China.
The collapse in global regard for the United States has been breathtakingly swift under this president. Even before collapsing further due to Trump’s mishandling of the pandemic, confidence in him to “do the right thing” in international affairs stood at just 29 percent among 32 countries polled—down from 74 percent in former President Barack Obama’s final year in office. Global confidence in Trump is significantly lower than in German Chancellor Angela Merkel (46 percent), French President Emmanuel Macron (41 percent), and Russian President Vladimir Putin (33 percent)—and just one point higher than in Chinese leader Xi Jinping (28 percent). Germans are now equally divided on whether the United States (37 percent) or China (36 percent) is their closest partner, while just 28 percent of Britons trust the United States to act responsibly. Confidence in Trump is only 36 percent in Japan, 32 percent in the United Kingdom, 28 percent in Canada, 28 percent in Brazil, 20 percent in France, 13 percent in Germany, and a mere 8 percent in Mexico, while favorable views of the United States have fallen from 64 percent in 2016 to 53 percent in 2019. Asked in June whether she trusted Trump, Merkel paused before saying only “I work with elected presidents around the world, including, of course, the American one.”
The importance of functioning international partnerships and institutions is not an abstract or an elite concern. As we have observed firsthand in Afghanistan and Iraq, the troops who have to fight wars without allied military by their side come disproportionately from working families and from the U.S. heartland. And as was made manifestly clear on the Democratic primary campaign trail earlier this year, it is farmers, consumers, and exporters who suffer heavily when the United States stumbles into trade wars. Global rules, norms, and institutions help open markets for American companies, protect American workers, keep threats away from U.S. shores, govern technology, manage financial crises, and defend the country’s values abroad.
Americans agree that allies and partners should have to pay their fair share to help meet global challenges and keep the world safe. But they also do not want to live in a world that would put their own interests at risk without rules, friends, or partners. Recent polls show that nearly 7 in 10 Americans believe the United States should “take an active part in world affairs” (compared with just 3 in 10 who say “stay out”), while more than 7 in 10 also believe that U.S. military alliances with other countries contribute to U.S. safety. Clear majorities of Americans believe that security alliances in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East either mostly benefit the United States or benefit both the United States and its allies, with less than a quarter of those polled saying—as Trump seems to believe—those alliances mostly benefit the allies. As Mira Rapp-Hooper points out in her new book, Shields of the Republic, the United States has been joined by allies in every war it has fought since the early 1950s, and U.S. security guarantees have helped persuade a number of countries—including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Australia, Sweden, and Germany—not to develop nuclear weapons programs. As the coronavirus catastrophe has reminded us, a single war, terrorist attack, pandemic, catastrophic climate event, or nuclear confrontation could end up costing the United States far more than all the money it invests in maintaining the alliances and partnerships that help prevent such tragedies from happening.A single war, terrorist attack, pandemic, catastrophic climate event, or nuclear confrontation could end up costing far more than maintaining the alliances and partnerships that help prevent such tragedies from happening.
Sadly, Trump’s systematic rejection of allies and alliances is accelerating rather than abating. Indeed in the past two months alone, the United States has announced the unilateral withdrawal of some 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany without consulting or even informing the German government; rejected allies’ pleas that it remain party to the Open Skies arms control treaty; found itself all alone on the United Nations Security Council trying to extend an arms embargo on Iran on dubious legal grounds; alienated all its G-7 allies with a proposal to invite Putin to the group’s next meeting; and terminated its relationship with the World Health Organization during a pandemic, drawing widespread criticism from allies while increasing China’s leverage in that organization. With the United States now isolated on so many fronts, the next administration—one that we, the authors, hope will be led by former Vice President Joe Biden—faces a daunting task in rebuilding the United States’ global alliances and partnerships and restoring trust and confidence in the country and its leadership. As Biden has recognized, that agenda starts at home: by restoring the moral authority and soft power that have been so critical to the United States’ success around the world and by revitalizing the U.S. State Department, demoralized after years of poor leadership and funding cuts. The project must also be accompanied by a plan to revive diplomacy and rebuild U.S. alliances all around the world.
Repairing ties with Europe
The first step of such a project must be to repair fractured ties with the United States’ democratic partners in Europe. For 75 years, presidents from both parties have believed it was in America’s interest to invest in a strong and united Europe after the devastation of two world wars. In contrast, Trump has described the European Union as a “foe” that was “really formed so they could treat us badly.” Trump administration officials tout “America First” and demonstrate an ideological fetish for “national sovereignty”—without appearing to realize or care that the last time the United States and other countries pursued trade wars and aggressive nationalism, it deepened the Great Depression and led to World War II. Trump complains that the EU was “set up in order to hurt the United States on trade,” overlooking the reasons why former presidents such as Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy strongly supported European unification as a way of building a network of partners that share U.S. values, buy U.S. goods, invest in the U.S. economy, support the United States when it is threatened abroad, and contribute to development around the world.
Trump has also done serious damage to NATO, repeatedly questioning whether the United States would uphold its treaty commitment to stand by its partners—the underlying principle of any collective defense—unless they “pay their bills.” That approach not only undermines the solemn word of the United States but could make an attack on a NATO member more likely. Trump falsely claimed that NATO was “going down like a roller coaster” when he took over and pretends to have persuaded allies to contribute “hundreds of billions” of dollars more to the alliance. In fact, defense spending in Europe has been rising since the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years before Trump took office. Trump’s repeated argument that the United States pays up to 90 percent of the costs of defending Europe reflects either deep ignorance about NATO and defense budgeting or, worse, a deliberate attempt to mislead his supporters into turning against the alliance. It also fails to recognize that U.S. spending on NATO—a fraction of the overall defense budget—is not a charity project: European allies provide land, infrastructure, and financial subsidies for American bases that are used to protect U.S. interests not just in Europe but in Africa and the Middle East. Trump’s decision in June to unilaterally withdraw troops from Germany doubtless pleased Putin, but it only raised further questions in Europe about the reliability of the United States.Repairing ties with the United States’ most like-minded, democratic partners means working with them on critical issues such as climate change, global health, the Iran nuclear issue, and China.
Repairing ties with the United States’ most like-minded, democratic partners means working with them on critical issues such as climate change, global health, the Iran nuclear issue, and China. The policy changes necessary to achieve these goals are not gifts to Europe but in the United States’ own interest and supported by most Americans. Majorities of Americans want to see the United States maintain or increase its commitment to NATO (78 percent) and to participate in the Paris climate accord (68 percent) and Iran nuclear deal (61 percent). None of these challenges can be met by the United States alone.
Greater burden-sharing with allies is certainly necessary, but it cannot be productively accomplished by bullying them or focusing only on the narrow and arbitrary measuring stick of defense spending as a share of GDP—a standard that rewards countries for spending inefficiently or on defense objectives that the United States may not share. What the United States should expect from its allies are tangible contributions to common goals, not just for the conventional defense of Europe but to global development, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, poverty reduction, and peacekeeping. The United States’ global allies once willingly consented to U.S. leadership, but as Michael Fullilove, the head of Australia’s Lowy Institute, has put it, “if you push your allies and partners to the brink in every negotiation, and present your ugliest face to the world, then this consent will evaporate.”
Rebuilding partnerships in Asia
Rebuilding ties with democratic partners in Asia is just as essential. One of America’s greatest advantages in its growing strategic competition with China is its voluntary global network of alliances, while China—whose closest ally is North Korea—wins international support only out of fear or economic incentive. Yet at a time when the United States should be consolidating those alliances to deal with China economically and strategically, Trump risks unraveling them.One of America’s greatest advantages in its competition with China is its voluntary global network of alliances, while China—whose closest ally is North Korea—wins support only out of fear or economic incentive.
Trump has undermined U.S. alliances in Asia from the moment he took office. He flirted with the idea of cutting back support for Taiwan to satisfy China before backing away from that—at least for now. He has repeatedly threatened to pull U.S. troops out of Japan and South Korea—a dramatic step that would embolden China and North Korea and increase the risk of conflict. Instead of recognizing the benefits to the United States of forward-deployed forces—on bases largely paid for by the host countries—and negotiating allied burden-sharing in good faith, Trump has treated U.S. troops as mercenaries and demanded outlandish sums from Seoul and Tokyo to maintain a continued U.S. presence. Such an approach, which borders on extortion, damages the trust, credibility, and interoperability of forces that are the foundation of U.S. alliances.
As part of his failed courtship of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump agreed to scale back joint exercises with South Korea—a decision he made without informing the U.S. Defense Department or the South Korean government. While focusing on North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States, he has shown relative indifference to the short-range nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea, undermining the very notion of alliance solidarity. Trump’s willingness to tone down support for democracy protesters in Hong Kong while lavishing praise on Xi for his handling of the coronavirus crisis in order to curry favor with China over trade has also shaken the faith of the United States’ Asian partners more widely. Allies unable to rely on the United States to defend them will inevitably be forced to align with Beijing.
Trump has also damaged U.S. economic relations in Asia, placing tariffs on South Korea and Japan at the very same moment that he embarked on a trade war with China. That trade war resulted in high costs for U.S. taxpayers and consumers and lost markets for U.S. farmers before finally leading to a “phase one” trade deal that failed to address either the bilateral trade deficit with China or the main structural problems in the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship. By requiring China to direct its heavily subsidized, state-owned enterprises to purchase more U.S. goods, the deal actually reinforced the role of the Chinese state in the economy. In an integrated global economy, China can easily get around unilateral U.S. tariffs by selling products in other markets, which is exactly what it is doing. A united international front—based on shared economic and security interests with partners including Australia, Britain, Canada, the EU, India, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea—would boost U.S. leverage immeasurably and force China to open up its markets, stop stealing intellectual property, and abandon cyber-espionage for commercial gain.
Developing new alliances in Africa and Latin America
Trump has not only undermined existing alliances but has missed opportunities to develop new ones—particularly in Africa and Latin America. By 2025, nearly one-fifth of the world’s population will live in Africa, 60 percent of whose people are now under the age of 25. Africa boasts 1.2 billion consumers, an increasingly innovative and technology-based business environment, and seven of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world, which have lifted millions of people out of poverty and into the global marketplace. In 2019, Africa launched its first-ever comprehensive free trade area: the African Continental Free Trade Area, which currently comprises 28 countries and is expected to create a $2.2 trillion regional economy. Pro-democracy movements are demanding better governance in countries such as Algeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon. Women’s groups and female leaders continue to play an increasing role—in Rwanda, women make up 61 percent of the country’s parliament, the largest female representation of parliamentarians anywhere in the world.Trump has not only undermined existing alliances but has missed opportunities to develop new ones—particularly in Africa and Latin America.
Unfortunately, instead of taking advantage of this new dynamism, the Trump administration has largely ignored Africa, disparaged its governments and people, issued travel bans against the citizens of several of its most populous countries (Nigeria, Eritrea, Sudan, and Tanzania), and sought massive cuts in U.S. development, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance. While Russia and China have devoted increasing time and attention to the continent, the United States has been virtually absent, failing to take advantage of growing opportunities in trade, to support U.S. companies to compete better with Chinese and Russian initiatives, and to work with its African partners to promote economic development and cooperation on climate change, food security, natural disasters, and the prevention of pandemics.
In the Americas, too, key bilateral relationships have been deeply strained by the Trump administration’s approach to immigration and trade and its rhetoric about Hispanic migrants. Tackling these cross-border issues—as well as regional problems such as Venezuela and Cuba—simply cannot be done without close cooperation with Latin American partners and institutions. This means not only repairing ties with partners such as Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Colombia but also deepening U.S. engagement with multilateral forums like the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Mercosur and Pacific Alliance trading blocs.
To compete with China’s growing role in Latin America, the United States should work with like-minded governments—such as those of the free market-oriented Pacific Alliance and other extrahemispheric partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan—to develop truly enforceable protections against non-tariff barriers and intellectual property theft so that all states can interact on a level playing field. In strategic sectors targeted by the Chinese such as ports and logistics, the administration should use U.S. laws and regulations to incentivize the private sector to invest and work with Latin American states to dissuade them from turning to China. And it should make cooperation on energy and climate a priority. Countries of the Western Hemisphere are the source of more than 65 percent of U.S. energy imports and share the United States’ profound interest in curbing climate change before it is too late.
Revitalizing U.S. policy in the Middle East
Finally, no attempt to revitalize the United States’ global partnerships and alliances will be possible without major changes in the Middle East. The Trump administration has approached this challenge by ignoring U.S. values entirely and cutting cynical deals with regional leaders so long as they support some of the administration’s political or geopolitical goals. Trump refers to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as his “favorite dictator” and a “fantastic guy.”Trump’s approach to Saudi Arabia, for example, is essentially to give its leadership a pass on domestic repression and reckless regional actions—as long as Riyadh continues to buy American weapons and supports the administration’s policy of aggressively confronting Iran. In Egypt, the administration seems untroubled by the government’s corruption, repression, and interference in neighboring Libya, with Trump referring to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as his “favorite dictator” and a “fantastic guy.” In Israel, Trump seems to have decided that his domestic political imperatives require him to give unqualified support to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government. This had led the Trump administration to turn a blind eye to Israeli settlement expansion and to present a so-called peace plan that has no chance of being adopted and has been rejected by the European Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and most other countries around the world.
Maintaining security partnerships with imperfect allies and partners in the region will be necessary, but the United States’ relative energy independence and the realization that large military deployments are not the answer to the region’s problems should make it possible to maintain—and modernize—those partnerships without sacrificing the country’s values. The United States should maintain security, intelligence, and economic cooperation with Gulf and other security partners but also make clear this will not prevent the United States from holding them to account for human rights violations, fighting corruption, or using its leverage to press them to resolve disputes with their neighbors. The United States must always provide the support necessary to keep Israel secure but should not hesitate to oppose measures, such as the unilateral annexation of territory, that contradict the security interests of both the United States and Israel and will undermine Israel’s future as a secure, Jewish, democratic state.
Reversing unprecedented damage and restoring U.S. leadership
In less than four years, Trump has caused unprecedented damage to the system of alliances and partnerships that took the United States many decades to construct. It is frightening to think of the greater damage that would happen if Trump were elected for a second term. Trump’s own former national security advisor, John Bolton, recently wrote that he thought it “highly questionable” that Trump would keep the United States in NATO if given another four years in office, adding that the alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia were also “question marks at this point.” Current and potential allies and partners around the world are still crying out for U.S. leadership—even more so now that they have seen what its absence looks like.For decades, Trump has shown nothing but contempt for allies and alliances, and he has acted on that instinct throughout his presidency, even in the face of sustained resistance from some of his top advisors. As Bolton put it, “There’s no telling what he’ll do in a second term once he doesn’t have to worry about satisfying the Republicans in Congress anymore or the Republican base. … Anything is possible in the Trump administration.”
Biden has made clear that it will be one of his highest priorities immediately on taking office to avoid this fate and repair the immense damage Trump has done to the United States’ international partnerships. Current and potential allies and partners around the world are still crying out for U.S. leadership—even more so now that they have seen what its absence looks like. A new administration can rebuild and revitalize U.S. leadership by restoring the United States’ soft power, treating allies with respect, and working with others to address global problems. The Lowy Institute’s Fullilove puts it succinctly: “The world still wants to believe in America. But we need Americans to help us believe.” It is in the United States’ own interest to do just that.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-14--White House Installs Anti-Abortion Loyalist at USAID

The Trump White House has added another political loyalist and anti-abortion advocate to its roster of political hires at America ’ s premier international development agency , expanding the role and influence of the religious right in shaping U.S. priorities on global health and development , U.S. officials told Foreign Policy .
Patrina Mosley , who has been named advisor to the director of the Center of Excellence on Democracy , Human Rights , and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International Development ( USAID ) , is an outspoken anti-abortion advocate who recently accused the United Nations and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using the coronavirus pandemic to promote abortions—a claim the U.N. calls patently false .
The appointment was made at the instruction of the White House personnel office , which has been seeding various federal agencies with hard-line loyalists who have often espoused fringe political viewpoints .
This includes appointees who have expressed Islamophobic and anti-LGBTQ views on social media and promoted conspiracy theories .
At USAID , the White House personnel directives have left senior officials to deal with the fallout from sagging morale and internal dissensions over the controversial hires .
Mosley @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , culture , and women ’ s advocacy at the conservative Family Research Council ( FRC ) , which has been criticized for “ extreme anti-LGBT positions and actions ” by the Human Rights Campaign , a Washington-based advocacy organization .
The FRC also has been labeled an anti-LGBTQ hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center .
The FRC has denounced these assertions as “ defamatory accusations.
” Mosley began working at USAID on June 8 , according to acting USAID spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala .
But Jhunjhunwala referred further questions about “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House .
The White House declined to comment .
Mosley ’ s apparent Twitter profile—whose bio reads “ Jesus | Justice | # WakandaForever | # MAGA ” and is currently private—includes a fake quote attributed to presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden by the conservative Christian satirical site the Babylon Bee : “ If you don ’ t let me sniff your hair , you ain ’ t a woman.
” Mosley ’ s tweets—some of which were recovered by the Wayback Machine—reveals a partisan supporter of Donald Trump and anti-abortion advocate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an eight-year “ assault on religious freedom.
” Days after the president ’ s inauguration , she tweeted : “ Trump is off to a great start in renewing a culture of pro-life .
# MAGA.
” Her views have been detailed in congressional testimony and a lengthy archive of articles on the FRC ’ s website .
In one recent posting from May , Mosley took aim at the U.N. and WHO .
“ It has been apparent that world abortion leaders , like the World Health Organization , have been using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than ever before as ‘ essential , ’ ” Mosley wrote in a May 20 blog post for FRC .
“ Unfortunately , the United Nations is one of those leaders that is willing to use billions of U.S. dollars to deliver abortions as a part of coronavirus humanitarian aid.
” U.S. and U.N. officials say it is untrue that the United Nations uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund international abortions and that it does not fund abortions in countries that outlaw the practice .
“ Any suggestion that we are using @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to promote abortion is not correct , ” a U.N. official told Foreign Policy .
“ While we support health care that prevents millions of women from dying during pregnancy and childbirth and protects people from sexually transmitted infections including HIV , we do not seek to override any national laws.
” While the Trump administration has bungled its own response to the pandemic at home , it has made sure to inject its anti-abortion goals into the international response to the pandemic .
USAID has ramped up its campaign to pressure the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ agreements and documents promoting “ sexual and reproductive health , ” a phrase religious conservatives contend is code for abortions but which U.N. officials and most Western governments say represents a broad panoply of services designed to keep impoverished mothers and children healthy—including abortions in countries where they are legal .
On May 18 , John Barsa , USAID ’ s acting administrator , urged U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres not to use funds from the $ 6.7 billion U.N .
Global Humanitarian Response Plan for the pandemic to promote abortion or “ sexual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that it “ is essential that the UN ’ s response to the pandemic avoid creating controversy.
” The United States has contributed more than $ 475 million to fund the plan .
“ The United States stands with nations that have pledged to protect the unborn , ” he added .
The appointment of Mosley has infuriated Democratic officials , who learned about it from Foreign Policy .
“ Whatever happened to the idea that people should be hired on the basis of merit ?
” one Democratic Senate aide told Foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new , but is it too much to ask that they have the qualifications to carry out the mission of the agency , based on experience in the field ?
Instead , they get people whose sole qualifications seem to be their religious zeal and appeal to extreme ideologues in the White House.
” Mosley isn ’ t alone .
In a sign of the religious right ’ s ascendancy at USAID , a former advocate for social conservative causes , Bethany Kozma , an anti-transgender activist , was promoted this year to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The move elevated an ideologue who made a name for herself by denouncing same-sex bathrooms in public schools on the grounds that they could be exploited by sexual predators .
This month , Politico reported that a former Breitbart writer and ally of former Trump advisor Steve Bannon , Tera Dahl , would join USAID as a senior advisor .
Merritt Corrigan , USAID ’ s deputy White House liaison , has a history of anti-LGBTQ and anti-immigrant social media posts , as ProPublica first reported last month , including deriding “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ LGBT agenda ” in one post .
Mark Kevin Lloyd , a new religious freedom advisor at USAID and former field director for Trump ’ s 2016 campaign in Virginia , has written and promoted anti-Islamic social media content , including sharing a post that called Islam a “ barbaric cult ” in 2016 .
The new appointments have fueled a management and morale crisis for Barsa , USAID ’ s acting administrator , according to several current and former officials familiar with the matter .
A group of employees demanded a meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the recent hires would create a hostile work environment .
Barsa issued a statement defending the president ’ s appointees at USAID and decrying news reports about them as “ unwarranted and malicious attacks.
” “ USAID is honored to have Bethany Kozma , Merritt Corrigan , and Mark Lloyd serve at the agency .
They are committed to enacting the policies of President Donald J. Trump , ” Barsa said in the statement .
Barsa separately met with staff representatives and “ reiterated his zero tolerance for discrimination and harassment and emphasized @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accountable regardless of how they entered the Agency , ” according to USAID ’ s Jhunjhunwala .
“ We are not aware of any allegations of discrimination by the appointees in question or other actions that are less than professional or not up to the highest legal , moral and ethical standards that the agency has always upheld , ” Jhunjhunwala told Foreign Policy .
A group of seven Democratic senators , including Ben Cardin of Maryland , Cory Booker of New Jersey , and Patrick Leahy of Vermont , wrote to Barsa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hiring of Lloyd and Corrigan , saying it risked “ alienating the hardworking staff at USAID—not only women , Muslims and members of the LGBT community—but any employee that is justifiably dismayed that people who hold these views were appointed to represent the world ’ s premier international development agency.
” “ We are confounded by the counterproductive decision of appointing two people whose views are so antithetical to American values of tolerance and equality , and to USAID ’ s stated commitment to these values , ” the lawmakers wrote .

The Trump White House has added another political loyalist and anti-abortion advocate to its roster of political hires at America’s premier international development agency, expanding the role and influence of the religious right in shaping U.S. priorities on global health and development, U.S. officials told Foreign Policy .
The Trump White House has added another political loyalist and anti-abortion advocate to its roster of political hires at America’s premier international development agency, expanding the role and influence of the religious right in shaping U.S. priorities on global health and development, U.S. officials told Foreign Policy.
Patrina Mosley, who has been named advisor to the director of the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is an outspoken anti-abortion advocate who recently accused the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO) of using the coronavirus pandemic to promote abortions—a claim the U.N. calls patently false.
The appointment was made at the instruction of the White House personnel office, which has been seeding various federal agencies with hard-line loyalists who have often espoused fringe political viewpoints. This includes appointees who have expressed Islamophobic and anti-LGBTQ views on social media and promoted conspiracy theories.
At USAID, the White House personnel directives have left senior officials to deal with the fallout from sagging morale and internal dissensions over the controversial hires.
Mosley recently served as the director of life, culture, and women’s advocacy at the conservative Family Research Council (FRC), which has been criticized for “extreme anti-LGBT positions and actions” by the Human Rights Campaign, a Washington-based advocacy organization. The FRC also has been labeled an anti-LGBTQ hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. The FRC has denounced these assertions as “defamatory accusations.”
Mosley began working at USAID on June 8, according to acting USAID spokesperson Pooja Jhunjhunwala. But Jhunjhunwala referred further questions about “specific personnel decisions” to the White House. The White House declined to comment.
Mosley’s apparent Twitter profile—whose bio reads “Jesus | Justice | #WakandaForever | #MAGA” and is currently private—includes a fake quote attributed to presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden by the conservative Christian satirical site the Babylon Bee: “If you don’t let me sniff your hair, you ain’t a woman.”
Mosley’s tweets—some of which were recovered by the Wayback Machine—reveals a partisan supporter of Donald Trump and anti-abortion advocate who lambasted the Obama administration for mounting an eight-year “assault on religious freedom.” Days after the president’s inauguration, she tweeted: “Trump is off to a great start in renewing a culture of pro-life. #MAGA.”
Her views have been detailed in congressional testimony and a lengthy archive of articles on the FRC’s website. In one recent posting from May, Mosley took aim at the U.N. and WHO.
“It has been apparent that world abortion leaders, like the World Health Organization, have been using the current pandemic to push abortions now more than ever before as ‘essential,’” Mosley wrote in a May 20 blog post for FRC. “Unfortunately, the United Nations is one of those leaders that is willing to use billions of U.S. dollars to deliver abortions as a part of coronavirus humanitarian aid.”
U.S. and U.N. officials say it is untrue that the United Nations uses U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund international abortions and that it does not fund abortions in countries that outlaw the practice.
“Any suggestion that we are using the COVID-19 pandemic response as an opportunity to promote abortion is not correct,” a U.N. official told Foreign Policy. “While we support health care that prevents millions of women from dying during pregnancy and childbirth and protects people from sexually transmitted infections including HIV, we do not seek to override any national laws.”
While the Trump administration has bungled its own response to the pandemic at home, it has made sure to inject its anti-abortion goals into the international response to the pandemic. USAID has ramped up its campaign to pressure the U.N. to eliminate any language in international agreements and documents promoting “sexual and reproductive health,” a phrase religious conservatives contend is code for abortions but which U.N. officials and most Western governments say represents a broad panoply of services designed to keep impoverished mothers and children healthy—including abortions in countries where they are legal.
On May 18, John Barsa, USAID’s acting administrator, urged U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres not to use funds from the $6.7 billion U.N. Global Humanitarian Response Plan for the pandemic to promote abortion or “sexual and reproductive health” programs, writing that it “is essential that the UN’s response to the pandemic avoid creating controversy.” The United States has contributed more than $475 million to fund the plan.
“The United States stands with nations that have pledged to protect the unborn,” he added.
The appointment of Mosley has infuriated Democratic officials, who learned about it from Foreign Policy.
“Whatever happened to the idea that people should be hired on the basis of merit?” one Democratic Senate aide told Foreign Policy. “Political appointees are nothing new, but is it too much to ask that they have the qualifications to carry out the mission of the agency, based on experience in the field? Instead, they get people whose sole qualifications seem to be their religious zeal and appeal to extreme ideologues in the White House.”
Mosley isn’t alone. In a sign of the religious right’s ascendancy at USAID, a former advocate for social conservative causes, Bethany Kozma, an anti-transgender activist, was promoted this year to deputy chief of staff for the administrator. The move elevated an ideologue who made a name for herself by denouncing same-sex bathrooms in public schools on the grounds that they could be exploited by sexual predators.
This month, Politico reported that a former Breitbart writer and ally of former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, Tera Dahl, would join USAID as a senior advisor. Merritt Corrigan, USAID’s deputy White House liaison, has a history of anti-LGBTQ and anti-immigrant social media posts, as ProPublica first reported last month, including deriding “our homo-empire” and a “tyrannical LGBT agenda” in one post. Mark Kevin Lloyd, a new religious freedom advisor at USAID and former field director for Trump’s 2016 campaign in Virginia, has written and promoted anti-Islamic social media content, including sharing a post that called Islam a “barbaric cult” in 2016.
The new appointments have fueled a management and morale crisis for Barsa, USAID’s acting administrator, according to several current and former officials familiar with the matter. A group of employees demanded a meeting with Barsa last month, claiming that the recent hires would create a hostile work environment. Barsa issued a statement defending the president’s appointees at USAID and decrying news reports about them as “unwarranted and malicious attacks.”
“USAID is honored to have Bethany Kozma, Merritt Corrigan, and Mark Lloyd serve at the agency. They are committed to enacting the policies of President Donald J. Trump,” Barsa said in the statement.
Barsa separately met with staff representatives and “reiterated his zero tolerance for discrimination and harassment and emphasized his firm commitment to hold all employees accountable regardless of how they entered the Agency,” according to USAID’s Jhunjhunwala.
“We are not aware of any allegations of discrimination by the appointees in question or other actions that are less than professional or not up to the highest legal, moral and ethical standards that the agency has always upheld,” Jhunjhunwala told Foreign Policy.
A group of seven Democratic senators, including Ben Cardin of Maryland, Cory Booker of New Jersey, and Patrick Leahy of Vermont, wrote to Barsa last month to voice concern over the hiring of Lloyd and Corrigan, saying it risked “alienating the hardworking staff at USAID—not only women, Muslims and members of the LGBT community—but any employee that is justifiably dismayed that people who hold these views were appointed to represent the world’s premier international development agency.”
“We are confounded by the counterproductive decision of appointing two people whose views are so antithetical to American values of tolerance and equality, and to USAID’s stated commitment to these values,” the lawmakers wrote.