foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--Russia and North Korea Are Fighting—Over Fish

Throughout 2019 , a series of spats between Russian authorities and North Korean vessels occurred over illegal fishing in the Sea of Japan/East Sea .
In July , North Korea detained a Russian fishing vessel , claiming that the crew had illegally entered its territorial waters .
On Sept. 17 , the crew of a North Korean fishing vessel opened fire on Russian authorities , wounding several Russian border guards .
Later in September , Russia stopped three North Korean fishing vessels in Russia ’ s exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan/East Sea , claiming that the vessels @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alone , Russia ’ s coast guard is thought to have detained around 16 vessels from North Korea .
While Russia did summon North Korean diplomats over this issue and detained more than 250 North Korean sailors for a short time , the situation did not escalate beyond some sharp rhetoric .
This was a muted diplomatic response considering that this was not the first violent incident against Russian security personnel by North Korean fishermen in Russian waters .
While Russia has refrained from imposing harsher penalties in response to these crimes , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korean nationals involved .
The Primorye Fisheries Association , a union that represents fishermen in Russia ’ s Far East , where most of the country ’ s fishing stocks are caught , has appealed to the Russian government to respond more strongly to the poaching of Russian stocks .
But this has amounted to little , as Moscow is reluctant to damage relations with Pyongyang and risk any political instability in its Far East border region that could impact negatively on the foreign investment it hopes to attract there .
However @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response sooner rather than later .
Against these increasing incursions from North Korean fishermen , and should Russia prove unable to revive its fishing industry—on which many isolated communities depend—it may be obliged to respond more firmly , if only to send a message to its Far Eastern community that Moscow is listening .
Russia has some tools at its disposal to encourage North Korea to change its behavior at sea , including prolonging detentions of North Korean fishermen , threatening to bring them to trial , or even restricting some of Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ North Korea—an initiative that Russia ’ s Ministry for the Development of the Far East has taken the lead on .
Suspending these trade links would not likely have much of an economic effect on either side , given that only nascent exchanges are taking place , but it would send a clear political signal to North Korea .
Russia is unlikely to risk fundamentally damaging relations with North Korea or prompting any regional instability that could have implications for Russia ’ s own domestic security .
But ultimately , Russia is unlikely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea or prompting any regional instability that could have implications for Russia ’ s own domestic security , for two main reasons .
The first is security .
Russia has little interest in sparking instability on its own borders and is keen to defuse any potential spats in its Far East that could suggest a less attractive investment climate .
Part of the Russian government ’ s major economic strategy for the next few years is to develop the Far East as a regional business hub , with the aim of attracting investment @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and South Korea .
President Vladimir Putin has promoted the Russian Far East ’ s investment opportunities in numerous public statements and has poured government funding into business-friendly initiatives to encourage foreign investors to gain footholds in the region .
Irrespective of the limited investment that these initiatives have yielded , attracting foreign direct investment is a much greater priority for the Kremlin than wading into a diplomatic spat with North Korea , with the sole aim of defending Russia ’ s aging fishing industry .
The second reason for Russia ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ likely to be because of weaknesses in Russia ’ s own fishing industry .
Despite the high expectations from the Federal Agency for Fisheries and other national authorities , Russia ’ s Far Eastern fishing industry is not adequately positioned to compete with these North Korean fishermen .
Russia ’ s declining fishing industry means that it is not able to take advantage of the lucrative fishing stocks for itself , leaving a vacuum that North Korean poachers have filled .
Fishing has always been a staple industry of Russia ’ s Far @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems , including climate change , a lack of funding for expensive fishing vessels , and little interest among the population in taking up the trade .
In a bid to remedy this , the Russian authorities announced in early 2019 that they planned to increase Russia ’ s fishery export potential from $ 5.5 billion to $ 8.5 billion over the next five years , including investing in new processing plants near ports in the Far East .
In this vein , in January 2020 , the Federal Agency for Fisheries officially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fish , aimed at marketing Russian seafood products abroad .
It seemed that official figures supported the growth strategy ; in 2019 the Far East region collectively caught stocks 2.4 times higher than usual , at 30,500 tons .
But other facts belie these figures .
Russia ’ s squid stocks for 2019—like Japan ’ s—were lower than anticipated , driven by climate change and overfishing , including increasing activity from North Korean vessels .
Russia also has a fundamental shortage of skilled fishermen , preventing Russia from fulfilling many of the government-mandated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increase stocks .
But at the same time , North Korea in 2018 announced plans to develop fishing-related infrastructure on its eastern seaboard in an effort to boost its industry .
There are also indications that the North Korean government is selling its territorial fishing rights to as yet unnamed foreign fleets—in contravention of United Nations sanctions—which would result in more domestic competition for local North Korean fishermen .
This would provide another incentive for these fishermen to push further into Russian territory , seeking additional fishing stocks .
The challenges to meeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at a time when Moscow is tightening up key performance indicators for its regional governors , especially in the Far East .
This means that if governors are unable to boost the economic performance of their regions , attract foreign investment , and quell local protests , their jobs will be under threat .
Local tensions have risen over the fishing industry ; in recent years , there have been protests in regions like Khabarovsk over fish shortages and poachers encroaching on fishermen ’ s territory .
Despite the political importance placed on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Far East , the country ’ s security sector seems unable or unwilling to protect the vessels .
The Federal Security Service ( FSB ) , which is responsible for guarding Russia ’ s borders and coasts , has admitted that it can not keep up with the many poaching vessels operating in the region .
As North Korean vessels also seem unwilling to stop such incursions , there is little that the FSB can do without unduly damaging the bilateral relationship .
Indeed , in remarks after the detention of the fishermen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea in October 2019 offered a low-key response , highlighting the importance of a mutual resolution .
The government may also be wary of sending mixed messages : In December , along with China , Russia proposed that the U.N. Security Council roll back economic sanctions imposed against North Korea , with Russia ’ s U.N. ambassador , Vasily Nebenzya , maintaining that the move was prompted by humanitarian considerations .
Given this , Moscow may be especially reluctant to simultaneously impose its own economic or financial measures against Pyongyang in response to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ projection of strength , Russia will often defend its stake in regional politics but is unwilling to become particularly economically or politically embroiled in North Korea ’ s dealings .
Projecting stability in the Far East is key , and any sense of volatility there is likely to scare off investors .
All of this strongly suggests that on the foreign-policy front , Russia has not yet decided how to approach North Korea on this issue and is too focused on domestic issues to address it head on .
Russia appears to have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a confrontation with North Korea over the illegal fishing issue are more important than attempting to boost its own fishing industry .
As one of the traditional industries of the Far East declines , Russia will have to hope that other investments in the region pay off .

Throughout 2019, a series of spats between Russian authorities and North Korean vessels occurred over illegal fishing in the Sea of Japan/East Sea. In July, North Korea detained a Russian fishing vessel, claiming that the crew had illegally entered its territorial waters. On Sept. 17, the crew of a North Korean fishing vessel opened fire on Russian authorities, wounding several Russian border guards. Later in September, Russia stopped three North Korean fishing vessels in Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, claiming that the vessels were again illegally fishing. In September alone, Russia’s coast guard is thought to have detained around 16 vessels from North Korea.
Throughout 2019, a series of spats between Russian authorities and North Korean vessels occurred over illegal fishing in the Sea of Japan/East Sea. In July, North Korea detained a Russian fishing vessel, claiming that the crew had illegally entered its territorial waters. On Sept. 17, the crew of a North Korean fishing vessel opened fire on Russian authorities, wounding several Russian border guards. Later in September, Russia stopped three North Korean fishing vessels in Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, claiming that the vessels were again illegally fishing. In September alone, Russia’s coast guard is thought to have detained around 16 vessels from North Korea.
While Russia did summon North Korean diplomats over this issue and detained more than 250 North Korean sailors for a short time, the situation did not escalate beyond some sharp rhetoric. This was a muted diplomatic response considering that this was not the first violent incident against Russian security personnel by North Korean fishermen in Russian waters. While Russia has refrained from imposing harsher penalties in response to these crimes, Russian courts have taken punitive action against North Korean nationals involved.
The Primorye Fisheries Association, a union that represents fishermen in Russia’s Far East, where most of the country’s fishing stocks are caught, has appealed to the Russian government to respond more strongly to the poaching of Russian stocks. But this has amounted to little, as Moscow is reluctant to damage relations with Pyongyang and risk any political instability in its Far East border region that could impact negatively on the foreign investment it hopes to attract there.
However, Russia may be forced into a response sooner rather than later. Against these increasing incursions from North Korean fishermen, and should Russia prove unable to revive its fishing industry—on which many isolated communities depend—it may be obliged to respond more firmly, if only to send a message to its Far Eastern community that Moscow is listening.
Russia has some tools at its disposal to encourage North Korea to change its behavior at sea, including prolonging detentions of North Korean fishermen, threatening to bring them to trial, or even restricting some of Russia’s previously cordial business links with North Korea—an initiative that Russia’s Ministry for the Development of the Far East has taken the lead on. Suspending these trade links would not likely have much of an economic effect on either side, given that only nascent exchanges are taking place, but it would send a clear political signal to North Korea.
Russia is unlikely to risk fundamentally damaging relations with North Korea or prompting any regional instability that could have implications for Russia’s own domestic security.
But ultimately, Russia is unlikely to risk fundamentally damaging relations with North Korea or prompting any regional instability that could have implications for Russia’s own domestic security, for two main reasons.
The first is security. Russia has little interest in sparking instability on its own borders and is keen to defuse any potential spats in its Far East that could suggest a less attractive investment climate. Part of the Russian government’s major economic strategy for the next few years is to develop the Far East as a regional business hub, with the aim of attracting investment from partners such as China, Japan, and South Korea. President Vladimir Putin has promoted the Russian Far East’s investment opportunities in numerous public statements and has poured government funding into business-friendly initiatives to encourage foreign investors to gain footholds in the region. Irrespective of the limited investment that these initiatives have yielded, attracting foreign direct investment is a much greater priority for the Kremlin than wading into a diplomatic spat with North Korea, with the sole aim of defending Russia’s aging fishing industry.
The second reason for Russia’s muted response to North Korea is likely to be because of weaknesses in Russia’s own fishing industry. Despite the high expectations from the Federal Agency for Fisheries and other national authorities, Russia’s Far Eastern fishing industry is not adequately positioned to compete with these North Korean fishermen. Russia’s declining fishing industry means that it is not able to take advantage of the lucrative fishing stocks for itself, leaving a vacuum that North Korean poachers have filled.
Fishing has always been a staple industry of Russia’s Far East but has been beset by various problems, including climate change, a lack of funding for expensive fishing vessels, and little interest among the population in taking up the trade. In a bid to remedy this, the Russian authorities announced in early 2019 that they planned to increase Russia’s fishery export potential from $5.5 billion to $8.5 billion over the next five years, including investing in new processing plants near ports in the Far East.
In this vein, in January 2020, the Federal Agency for Fisheries officially launched a new government-organized initiative called Russian Fish, aimed at marketing Russian seafood products abroad. It seemed that official figures supported the growth strategy; in 2019 the Far East region collectively caught stocks 2.4 times higher than usual, at 30,500 tons. But other facts belie these figures. Russia’s squid stocks for 2019—like Japan’s—were lower than anticipated, driven by climate change and overfishing, including increasing activity from North Korean vessels. Russia also has a fundamental shortage of skilled fishermen, preventing Russia from fulfilling many of the government-mandated incentives to improve the fishing industry and increase stocks.
But at the same time, North Korea in 2018 announced plans to develop fishing-related infrastructure on its eastern seaboard in an effort to boost its industry. There are also indications that the North Korean government is selling its territorial fishing rights to as yet unnamed foreign fleets—in contravention of United Nations sanctions—which would result in more domestic competition for local North Korean fishermen. This would provide another incentive for these fishermen to push further into Russian territory, seeking additional fishing stocks.
The challenges to meeting national expectations for the fishing industry come at a time when Moscow is tightening up key performance indicators for its regional governors, especially in the Far East. This means that if governors are unable to boost the economic performance of their regions, attract foreign investment, and quell local protests, their jobs will be under threat. Local tensions have risen over the fishing industry; in recent years, there have been protests in regions like Khabarovsk over fish shortages and poachers encroaching on fishermen’s territory.
Despite the political importance placed on the fishing industry in Russia’s Far East, the country’s security sector seems unable or unwilling to protect the vessels. The Federal Security Service (FSB), which is responsible for guarding Russia’s borders and coasts, has admitted that it cannot keep up with the many poaching vessels operating in the region. As North Korean vessels also seem unwilling to stop such incursions, there is little that the FSB can do without unduly damaging the bilateral relationship. Indeed, in remarks after the detention of the fishermen, Russia’s ambassador to North Korea in October 2019 offered a low-key response, highlighting the importance of a mutual resolution.
The government may also be wary of sending mixed messages: In December, along with China, Russia proposed that the U.N. Security Council roll back economic sanctions imposed against North Korea, with Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, maintaining that the move was prompted by humanitarian considerations. Given this, Moscow may be especially reluctant to simultaneously impose its own economic or financial measures against Pyongyang in response to the illegal fishing incursions.
As a projection of strength, Russia will often defend its stake in regional politics but is unwilling to become particularly economically or politically embroiled in North Korea’s dealings. Projecting stability in the Far East is key, and any sense of volatility there is likely to scare off investors.
All of this strongly suggests that on the foreign-policy front, Russia has not yet decided how to approach North Korea on this issue and is too focused on domestic issues to address it head on. Russia appears to have calculated that maintaining regional stability and avoiding a confrontation with North Korea over the illegal fishing issue are more important than attempting to boost its own fishing industry. As one of the traditional industries of the Far East declines, Russia will have to hope that other investments in the region pay off.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--How Will China Respond to New Coronavirus Outbreaks?

How Will China Respond to New Coronavirus Outbreaks ?
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s weekly China Brief .
The highlights this week : A city in the far north responds to a cluster of new coronavirus cases , a new poll reveals worsening U.S. attitudes toward China , and China ’ s GDP officially contracts .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
The city of Harbin , in China ’ s far north , has tightened its coronavirus measures this week , after a small outbreak—52 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spread through China again .
The city authorities have forbidden entrance to residential compounds for anyone except residents themselves and limited travel for Harbin ’ s population of nearly 11 million .
The four districts where the outbreak is centered have been put under complete lockdown for the next two weeks .
The Harbin outbreak appears to be the result of reinfection from Russia .
The city , which is the capital of Heilongjiang province , has always had close ties with its northern neighbor .
It has a substantial Russian population and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ throughout China ’ s outbreak .
But in recent weeks , the border has been tightened across China ’ s northeast following cases across the region imported from Russia , which was late to enact coronavirus lockdown measures and has performed relatively few diagnostic tests .
Uneasy normality .
The Harbin outbreak emphasizes how fragile—and how protected—China ’ s victory over the coronavirus is .
Even with the return to relative normalcy outside of Hubei province , everyday life feels tenuous with the possibility of a lockdown always around the corner .
That @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as restaurants that are still struggling after months of closures .
This is especially true in Beijing , where the political necessity of protecting China ’ s leadership means that urban authorities will jump at the first hint of another outbreak .
Fears of reinfection .
With all foreigners effectively banned from entering into China after the recent cancellation of visas and residency permits , the new cases in Harbin likely involve Chinese citizens who became infected in Russia .
Reentrance by Chinese nationals returning from the outside world is increasingly difficult , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ That has worried the parents of students stranded abroad , especially in the United States , as Chinese media emphasizes the chaos caused there by the coronavirus .
U.S. attitudes toward China .
An annual Pew Research Center poll shows U.S. views of China reaching new lows , with 66 percent of Americans now holding an unfavorable view .
That number jumped sharply in 2019 , amid the U.S.-China trade war and widespread of coverage of Beijing ’ s oppression of minorities in Xinjiang .
The coronavirus itself appears to have produced only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far , but the trend could worsen as U.S. deaths from COVID-19 climb .
There is still a 10-point difference in attitudes toward China between Democrats and Republicans , with the latter viewing China more unfavorably—but both sets of voters now hold majority negative attitudes .
That makes China a hot-button issue in the U.S. presidential campaign , with President Donald Trump desperate to distract from his slow coronavirus response and determined to smear his rival , former Vice President Joe Biden , as soft on China .
Biden , meanwhile , has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ criticize Chinese President Xi Jinping ’ s virus response .
Coronavirus origin stories .
The Trump administration and its surrogates are now pushing the idea that the coronavirus resulted from a biosafety accident in a Chinese laboratory in Wuhan , including through targeted leaks to journalists .
Within the U.S. intelligence community there is no agreement on the specific origins of the virus , and U.S. sources inside China are limited .
It is theoretically possible that an accident was involved .
Given the impossibility of knowing for certain , this theorizing seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has played its own role in spreading coronavirus conspiracy theories .
Zoom arrests .
Xi ’ s war on religion continues , with the latest victims being Chinese churchgoers arrested for watching sermons on the Zoom videoconferencing platform .
Zoom has sometimes routed even outside data through China , raising concerns about information security .
Meanwhile , in other religion news , the authorities in Shanghai have strongly denied that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was given permission to build a new temple there—calling it “ wishful thinking.
” China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s official GDP figures saw a contraction in the first quarter for the first time in decades—a 6.8 percent decline that was higher than many analysts thought officials would admit .
Next quarter ’ s figures could be more critical : If the economy remains flat or even shrinks despite China ’ s relative success against the coronavirus , it bodes poorly for the world .
The contraction also poses a challenge to the Chinese Communist Party , which relies on economic success as the main pillar of public support .
Dying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is increasingly pessimistic about the implementation of the phase one trade deal with China given the economic effects of the coronavirus , as FP ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report .
The end of the agreement has seemed likely for weeks , but Trump officials publicly insisted it was still viable .
The Chinese are likely to invoke a natural disaster clause in the agreement—not unreasonably—but the end of the deal may push Trump to take a harsher stance against Beijing .
Spending spree ?
NATO has warned its members against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to acquire depressed assets during the coronavirus crash , especially infrastructure .
China ’ s own precarious finances may make that less likely , and the pandemic has also spurred further pushback against Chinese firms in democratic states .
The United Kingdom has denied reports that it is reconsidering the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei ’ s involvement in the country .
Spies and Scholars : Chinese Secrets and Imperial Russia ’ s Quest for World Power , by Gregory Afinogenov Long before Chinese attempts to pilfer U.S. technologies , the Qing dynasty ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by Western powers eager to probe its boundaries and discover the secrets of its crafts .
As Gregory Afinogenov traces in this vivid account , Russia—which frequently traded and clashed with the Qing—was one of the main players in this early great game as it sought the status of a global power .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up for our @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: A city in the far north responds to a cluster of new coronavirus cases , a new poll reveals worsening U.S. attitudes toward China , and China’s GDP officially contracts .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s weekly China Brief. The highlights this week: A city in the far north responds to a cluster of new coronavirus cases, a new poll reveals worsening U.S. attitudes toward China, and China’s GDP officially contracts.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
Northeastern China Tightens Restrictions
The city of Harbin, in China’s far north, has tightened its coronavirus measures this week, after a small outbreak—52 positive cases—prompted fears that the coronavirus could spread through China again. The city authorities have forbidden entrance to residential compounds for anyone except residents themselves and limited travel for Harbin’s population of nearly 11 million. The four districts where the outbreak is centered have been put under complete lockdown for the next two weeks.
The Harbin outbreak appears to be the result of reinfection from Russia. The city, which is the capital of Heilongjiang province, has always had close ties with its northern neighbor. It has a substantial Russian population and has maintained flights to and from Russia throughout China’s outbreak. But in recent weeks, the border has been tightened across China’s northeast following cases across the region imported from Russia, which was late to enact coronavirus lockdown measures and has performed relatively few diagnostic tests.
Uneasy normality. The Harbin outbreak emphasizes how fragile—and how protected—China’s victory over the coronavirus is. Even with the return to relative normalcy outside of Hubei province, everyday life feels tenuous with the possibility of a lockdown always around the corner. That uncertainty is especially difficult for businesses such as restaurants that are still struggling after months of closures. This is especially true in Beijing, where the political necessity of protecting China’s leadership means that urban authorities will jump at the first hint of another outbreak.
Fears of reinfection. With all foreigners effectively banned from entering into China after the recent cancellation of visas and residency permits, the new cases in Harbin likely involve Chinese citizens who became infected in Russia. Reentrance by Chinese nationals returning from the outside world is increasingly difficult, especially with limitations on international flights. That has worried the parents of students stranded abroad, especially in the United States, as Chinese media emphasizes the chaos caused there by the coronavirus.
What We’re Following
U.S. attitudes toward China. An annual Pew Research Center poll shows U.S. views of China reaching new lows, with 66 percent of Americans now holding an unfavorable view. That number jumped sharply in 2019, amid the U.S.-China trade war and widespread of coverage of Beijing’s oppression of minorities in Xinjiang. The coronavirus itself appears to have produced only a mild rise in unfavorable attitudes so far, but the trend could worsen as U.S. deaths from COVID-19 climb.
There is still a 10-point difference in attitudes toward China between Democrats and Republicans, with the latter viewing China more unfavorably—but both sets of voters now hold majority negative attitudes. That makes China a hot-button issue in the U.S. presidential campaign, with President Donald Trump desperate to distract from his slow coronavirus response and determined to smear his rival, former Vice President Joe Biden, as soft on China. Biden, meanwhile, has attacked Trump’s unwillingness to directly criticize Chinese President Xi Jinping’s virus response.
Coronavirus origin stories. The Trump administration and its surrogates are now pushing the idea that the coronavirus resulted from a biosafety accident in a Chinese laboratory in Wuhan, including through targeted leaks to journalists. Within the U.S. intelligence community there is no agreement on the specific origins of the virus, and U.S. sources inside China are limited. It is theoretically possible that an accident was involved. Given the impossibility of knowing for certain, this theorizing seems likely to unnecessarily worsen tensions unnecessarily—although Beijing has played its own role in spreading coronavirus conspiracy theories.
Zoom arrests. Xi’s war on religion continues, with the latest victims being Chinese churchgoers arrested for watching sermons on the Zoom videoconferencing platform. Zoom has sometimes routed even outside data through China, raising concerns about information security. Meanwhile, in other religion news, the authorities in Shanghai have strongly denied that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was given permission to build a new temple there—calling it “wishful thinking.”
Tech and Business
China’s economy officially contracts. China’s official GDP figures saw a contraction in the first quarter for the first time in decades—a 6.8 percent decline that was higher than many analysts thought officials would admit. Next quarter’s figures could be more critical: If the economy remains flat or even shrinks despite China’s relative success against the coronavirus, it bodes poorly for the world. The contraction also poses a challenge to the Chinese Communist Party, which relies on economic success as the main pillar of public support.
Dying U.S.-China trade deal. The U.S. side is increasingly pessimistic about the implementation of the phase one trade deal with China given the economic effects of the coronavirus, as FP’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer report. The end of the agreement has seemed likely for weeks, but Trump officials publicly insisted it was still viable. The Chinese are likely to invoke a natural disaster clause in the agreement—not unreasonably—but the end of the deal may push Trump to take a harsher stance against Beijing.
Spending spree? NATO has warned its members against what it sees as possible Chinese attempts to acquire depressed assets during the coronavirus crash, especially infrastructure. China’s own precarious finances may make that less likely, and the pandemic has also spurred further pushback against Chinese firms in democratic states. The United Kingdom has denied reports that it is reconsidering the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei’s involvement in the country.
What We’re Reading
Spies and Scholars: Chinese Secrets and Imperial Russia’s Quest for World Power, Gregory Afinogenov, Harvard University Press, April 14, 2020.
Spies and Scholars: Chinese Secrets and Imperial Russia’s Quest for World Power, by Gregory Afinogenov
Long before Chinese attempts to pilfer U.S. technologies, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) was the target of espionage by Western powers eager to probe its boundaries and discover the secrets of its crafts. As Gregory Afinogenov traces in this vivid account, Russia—which frequently traded and clashed with the Qing—was one of the main players in this early great game as it sought the status of a global power.
That’s it for this week.
We welcome your feedback at newsletters@foreignpolicy.com. You can find older editions of China Brief here. For more from Foreign Policy, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--NATO Has a New Weak Link for Russia to Exploit

NATO Has a New Weak Link for Russia to Exploit In 1938 , British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made it possible for Adolf Hitler to march into Czechoslovakia despite the overwhelming military superiority of Prague ’ s Western allies because Chamberlain had decided the issue was “ a quarrel in a faraway country , between people of whom we know nothing.
” Today , it is similarly difficult to believe that NATO would go to war over its far-flung commitments in Eastern Europe .
Nevertheless , on March 27 , the Western alliance admitted North Macedonia as its newest—and weakest—member @ @ @ @ @ @ @ given Russian President Vladimir Putin a terrific opportunity to expand his influence , further erode NATO ’ s unity , and test the bloc ’ s commitment to defend a member of the alliance .
North Macedonia is the definition of a weak link and easy pickings for an adversary .
A landlocked country of 2 million inhabitants , it has weak political institutions and only a short history of independence .
As of 2018 , it spent only 1 percent of its GDP on defense—short of the 2 percent NATO guideline—and had @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simmering communal tension between a Slavic Orthodox majority and a sizable ethnic Albanian , mainly Muslim minority , making it vulnerable to interference .
Within NATO , only neighboring Albania has a lower per capita GDP and a higher level of corruption .
The Economist Intelligence Unit ’ s Democracy Index ranks North Macedonia as having Europe ’ s least developed political culture.Russia has held massive war games that were only thinly disguised simulations of attacks on NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic States .
Moscow has viewed NATO ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the 1990s .
Yet it wasn ’ t until the 2000s , after Russia ’ s military and economy rebounded from the chaos of the post-Soviet era , that Putin declared NATO ’ s eastward expansion a “ direct threat ” and openly confronted the alliance .
Russia ’ s invasion of Georgia in 2008—not coincidentally , the year that NATO declared an interest in Georgia ’ s eventual accession to the alliance—stopped the bloc ’ s expansion into former Soviet-controlled areas in its tracks .
Putin ’ s 2014 invasion of Ukraine @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not a direct assault on a NATO member , further demonstrated Western impotence in the face of Russian aggression .
Further north , Russia has held massive war games that military experts say were thinly disguised simulations of attacks on NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic States .
Now that North Macedonia has joined NATO , Putin appears to be relishing his first chance to prove that the alliance is little more than a paper tiger .
In 2018 , Russia ’ s ambassador to North Macedonia declared the country a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO and Russia were to increase .
But there was no “ if ” about it : Even before North Macedonia became a member , Russia had already been working assiduously to ratchet up tensions in the region .
Moscow has supplied neighboring Serbia with S-400 anti-aircraft missiles , facilitated an attempted coup in Montenegro , and tried to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina by stoking sectarian tensions .
And in North Macedonia itself , Russia has funded troll factories that , among other things , were used to target the 2016 U.S. presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to influence North Macedonia ’ s September 2018 referendum on NATO membership , is using its embassy and consulates there as bases for intelligence-gathering operations , and has spread propaganda detailing alleged Western plots to break up the country .
That Russia would threaten NATO ’ s members in Eastern Europe is nothing new , of course .
Russia has long attempted to undermine the Baltic countries—Lithuania , Latvia , and Estonia—which joined NATO and the European Union after gaining their independence from the Soviet Union .
But today , the Baltic States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the European economy and are home to thousands of NATO troops .
Whereas the Baltics have become part of NATO ’ s well-armored front , the Balkans are its soft underbelly .
NATO ’ s posture in North Macedonia and its neighborhood is very limited .
The Balkan countries are also poorer , more ethnically divided , and less economically integrated with Europe .
Their potential instability and the much lower likelihood of a robust response by the West make North Macedonia and its neighbors ripe and easy targets for Russian meddling .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ playbook , Putin rightly assumes that most decision-makers in NATO capitals would consider North Macedonia a “ faraway country ” of “ people of whom we know nothing.
” U.S. President Donald Trump , whose relationship with Putin continues to attract attention , confirmed a similar suspicion with regard to neighboring Montenegro when he appeared to question NATO ’ s commitment to defend the Balkan nation during an interview aired on Fox News .
And while some may have taken offense at Trump ’ s statement , the truth is he speaks for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the Pew Research Center , less than half the populations of France , Spain , Turkey , and Greece hold a favorable view of NATO .
Pandering to the alliance ’ s critics , French President Emmanuel Macron last year declared that NATO had “ brain death.
” The citizens of only three European countries—Britain , the Netherlands , and Lithuania—say their country should respond with military force if Russia were to attack a NATO member in Eastern Europe .
No surprise then that NATO ’ s posture toward its newest member @ @ @ @ @ @ @ definition of its joint defense commitment—Article 5 of the alliance ’ s charter—to include cyberattacks in 2014 , it has failed to clarify just what that means .
When asked what level of cyberattack on one of its members would trigger a response , NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said only , “ We will see.
” The 2018 Brussels Declaration reaffirmed NATO ’ s intent to defend member states from nonconventional attacks—but only meekly asserted that in “ cases of hybrid warfare , the Council could decide to invoke Article 5.
” These @ @ @ @ @ @ @ noted in the Kremlin .
The type of meddling Russia has specialized in includes election interference , inflaming ethnic tensions , and provoking violent conflict .
These three real possibilities could trigger a NATO response under Article 5 .
The most pressing issue is securing North Macedonia ’ s upcoming elections , now postponed until further notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic .
Polls last showed VMRO-DPMNE , a pro-Russian nationalist party , in a dead heat with the pro-Western Social Democrats .
Russian interference in the election process or outcome not only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , could result in a government that tilts North Macedonia toward Moscow .
Russia may also seek to pressure and destabilize North Macedonia in other ways , including through Moscow ’ s regional client , Serbia .
Russian propaganda aimed at North Macedonia includes conspiracy theories about the country ’ s sizable Albanian minority supposedly colluding with NATO and Albania to fold North Macedonia into a “ greater Albania ” amid great bloodshed .
As any student of Balkan history knows , such rhetoric has led to ethnic violence in the region before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflicts in Serbia , whose unstable Presevo region directly borders North Macedonia , or the unresolved Kosovo dispute .
Either conflict could easily spill into North Macedonia .
NATO ’ s next steps to secure its new member could include adapting the successful tactics used when Montenegro joined the alliance in 2017 .
A NATO-sponsored cyberteam provided the Montenegrin government with technical support to learn to identify and counter hybrid warfare .
NATO raised awareness of the benefits of NATO membership by working with officials , civil society , local governments , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improve governance in Montenegro ’ s defense sector .
Similarly , the European Union , which has just opened accession talks with North Macedonia , could move quickly to signal to the world that the Balkan nations are an integral part of Europe .
More broadly , however , NATO needs a mechanism to respond to Russian aggression in the event that the alliance ’ s members can ’ t unanimously agree to do so .
Article 5 requires unanimity before invoking collective defense , but NATO ’ s members differ in their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be to form , as a backstop in case it is needed , a coalition of the willing comprising NATO members with credible defense capabilities that are willing to confront Russia and prepare a collective response to any attack .
Despite NATO ’ s overall military superiority , it has a weak hand in the Balkans , and Russia continues to outmaneuver it there .
NATO must quickly signal that it remains steadfast and , having decided to admit it , that North Macedonia is an integral member of the alliance .
If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members like North Macedonia , the chances have just risen that it will be met with Russian aggression—hybrid or conventional—that may just mean the end of NATO as a credible alliance .

In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made it possible for Adolf Hitler to march into Czechoslovakia despite the overwhelming military superiority of Prague’s Western allies because Chamberlain had decided the issue was “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.” Today, it is similarly difficult to believe that NATO would go to war over its far-flung commitments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, on March 27, the Western alliance admitted North Macedonia as its newest—and weakest—member. In so doing, it has given Russian President Vladimir Putin a terrific opportunity to expand his influence, further erode NATO’s unity, and test the bloc’s commitment to defend a member of the alliance.
In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made it possible for Adolf Hitler to march into Czechoslovakia despite the overwhelming military superiority of Prague’s Western allies because Chamberlain had decided the issue was “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.” Today, it is similarly difficult to believe that NATO would go to war over its far-flung commitments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, on March 27, the Western alliance admitted North Macedonia as its newest—and weakest—member. In so doing, it has given Russian President Vladimir Putin a terrific opportunity to expand his influence, further erode NATO’s unity, and test the bloc’s commitment to defend a member of the alliance.
North Macedonia is the definition of a weak link and easy pickings for an adversary. A landlocked country of 2 million inhabitants, it has weak political institutions and only a short history of independence. As of 2018, it spent only 1 percent of its GDP on defense—short of the 2 percent NATO guideline—and had just 8,000 active-duty soldiers. There is simmering communal tension between a Slavic Orthodox majority and a sizable ethnic Albanian, mainly Muslim minority, making it vulnerable to interference. Within NATO, only neighboring Albania has a lower per capita GDP and a higher level of corruption. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranks North Macedonia as having Europe’s least developed political culture.Russia has held massive war games that were only thinly disguised simulations of attacks on NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic States.
Moscow has viewed NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe with suspicion since the 1990s. Yet it wasn’t until the 2000s, after Russia’s military and economy rebounded from the chaos of the post-Soviet era, that Putin declared NATO’s eastward expansion a “direct threat” and openly confronted the alliance. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008—not coincidentally, the year that NATO declared an interest in Georgia’s eventual accession to the alliance—stopped the bloc’s expansion into former Soviet-controlled areas in its tracks. Putin’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea, while not a direct assault on a NATO member, further demonstrated Western impotence in the face of Russian aggression. Further north, Russia has held massive war games that military experts say were thinly disguised simulations of attacks on NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic States.
Now that North Macedonia has joined NATO, Putin appears to be relishing his first chance to prove that the alliance is little more than a paper tiger. In 2018, Russia’s ambassador to North Macedonia declared the country a “legitimate target” if tensions between NATO and Russia were to increase. But there was no “if” about it: Even before North Macedonia became a member, Russia had already been working assiduously to ratchet up tensions in the region. Moscow has shipped S-400 anti-aircraft missiles to neighboring Serbia for joint Russian-Serbian military drills, facilitated an attempted coup in Montenegro, and tried to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina by stoking sectarian tensions. And in North Macedonia itself, Russia has funded troll factories that, among other things, were used to target the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign with disinformation. Moscow also tried to influence North Macedonia’s September 2018 referendum on NATO membership, is using its embassy and consulates there as bases for intelligence-gathering operations, and has spread propaganda detailing alleged Western plots to break up the country.
That Russia would threaten NATO’s members in Eastern Europe is nothing new, of course. Russia has long attempted to undermine the Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—which joined NATO and the European Union after gaining their independence from the Soviet Union. But today, the Baltic States are well integrated into alliance structures and the European economy and are home to thousands of NATO troops. Whereas the Baltics have become part of NATO’s well-armored front, the Balkans are its soft underbelly. NATO’s posture in North Macedonia and its neighborhood is very limited. The Balkan countries are also poorer, more ethnically divided, and less economically integrated with Europe. Their potential instability and the much lower likelihood of a robust response by the West make North Macedonia and its neighbors ripe and easy targets for Russian meddling.
Taking a page from history’s playbook, Putin rightly assumes that most decision-makers in NATO capitals would consider North Macedonia a “faraway country” of “people of whom we know nothing.” U.S. President Donald Trump, whose relationship with Putin continues to attract attention, confirmed a similar suspicion with regard to neighboring Montenegro when he appeared to question NATO’s commitment to defend the Balkan nation during an interview aired on Fox News. And while some may have taken offense at Trump’s statement, the truth is he speaks for many.
According to a February poll by the Pew Research Center, less than half the populations of France, Spain, Turkey, and Greece hold a favorable view of NATO. Pandering to the alliance’s critics, French President Emmanuel Macron last year declared that NATO had “brain death.” The citizens of only three European countries—Britain, the Netherlands, and Lithuania—say their country should respond with military force if Russia were to attack a NATO member in Eastern Europe.
No surprise then that NATO’s posture toward its newest member remains unclear. Though NATO broadened the definition of its joint defense commitment—Article 5 of the alliance’s charter—to include cyberattacks in 2014, it has failed to clarify just what that means. When asked what level of cyberattack on one of its members would trigger a response, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said only, “We will see.” The 2018 Brussels Declaration reaffirmed NATO’s intent to defend member states from nonconventional attacks—but only meekly asserted that in “cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5.” These Western weasel words will have been duly noted in the Kremlin.
The type of meddling Russia has specialized in includes election interference, inflaming ethnic tensions, and provoking violent conflict. These three real possibilities could trigger a NATO response under Article 5. The most pressing issue is securing North Macedonia’s upcoming elections, now postponed until further notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Polls last showed VMRO-DPMNE, a pro-Russian nationalist party, in a dead heat with the pro-Western Social Democrats. Russian interference in the election process or outcome not only threatens Macedonian sovereignty but, if successful, could result in a government that tilts North Macedonia toward Moscow.
Russia may also seek to pressure and destabilize North Macedonia in other ways, including through Moscow’s regional client, Serbia. Russian propaganda aimed at North Macedonia includes conspiracy theories about the country’s sizable Albanian minority supposedly colluding with NATO and Albania to fold North Macedonia into a “greater Albania” amid great bloodshed. As any student of Balkan history knows, such rhetoric has led to ethnic violence in the region before. Alternatively, Russia may stoke simmering conflicts in Serbia, whose unstable Presevo region directly borders North Macedonia, or the unresolved Kosovo dispute. Either conflict could easily spill into North Macedonia.
NATO’s next steps to secure its new member could include adapting the successful tactics used when Montenegro joined the alliance in 2017. A NATO-sponsored cyberteam provided the Montenegrin government with technical support to learn to identify and counter hybrid warfare. NATO raised awareness of the benefits of NATO membership by working with officials, civil society, local governments, and media organizations. It also worked to improve governance in Montenegro’s defense sector. Similarly, the European Union, which has just opened accession talks with North Macedonia, could move quickly to signal to the world that the Balkan nations are an integral part of Europe.
More broadly, however, NATO needs a mechanism to respond to Russian aggression in the event that the alliance’s members can’t unanimously agree to do so. Article 5 requires unanimity before invoking collective defense, but NATO’s members differ in their attitudes to Russia. One solution would be to form, as a backstop in case it is needed, a coalition of the willing comprising NATO members with credible defense capabilities that are willing to confront Russia and prepare a collective response to any attack.
Despite NATO’s overall military superiority, it has a weak hand in the Balkans, and Russia continues to outmaneuver it there. NATO must quickly signal that it remains steadfast and, having decided to admit it, that North Macedonia is an integral member of the alliance. If NATO fails in its support of new members like North Macedonia, the chances have just risen that it will be met with Russian aggression—hybrid or conventional—that may just mean the end of NATO as a credible alliance.
Update, April 24, 2020: This story was updated to clarify that the S-400 anti-aircraft missiles were sent to neighboring Serbia as part of joint Russian-Serbian military drills.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--China and the United States Are Both Losing the Blame Game

China and the United States Are Both Losing the Blame Game In 1992 , Bill Clinton ran for U.S. president in part against “ tyrants , from Baghdad to Beijing.
” In 2000 , then-presidential candidate George W. Bush made a point in declaring that China was a strategic competitor .
And in 2016 , before he became president , Donald Trump accused China of “ raping ” America .
But if the last two weeks are any guide , the politics around China in the 2020 election cycle will make previous electoral contests seem like the seasonal flu compared @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Even before the outbreak of the coronavirus , U.S.-China relations were under serious strain .
The fraying of trust on trade , technology , and military deployments has played out as Beijing has expanded its global footprint , raising questions about its ambitions to alter the U.S.-centered international order .
Then came the coronavirus outbreak , originating in the Chinese city of Wuhan , which has sickened more than 2.5 million people and killed over 180,000 .
Let ’ s be clear : The Chinese government mishandled the outbreak , delaying its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for six inexcusable days .
Officials and agitators in Washington and Beijing have seized on the virus to point fingers for the outbreak itself and to disrupt traditional patterns of global assistance and leadership .
Yet in both cases , these efforts distract from domestic shortcomings in handling the pandemic .
In Washington , this includes the regular rumormongering and selective leaking that the pathogen started in a bioweapons lab ; in Beijing , it ’ s the fantastical notion that the U.S. military may have brought the virus to international military games @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , there have been charges and countercharges from the Trump and Joe Biden campaigns and their surrogates that the other team can ’ t be trusted to handle relations with China .
Given the charged rhetoric , it ’ s particularly important to find a careful way of framing analysis of China and the coronavirus crisis .
Beijing has much to answer for , but whether Trump , think tankers , and commentators like it or not , America ’ s national security , economic well-being , and social cohesion are intertwined with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ significant manufacturer of personal protective equipment , medical devices , and a range of therapeutics .
It is also a medical research powerhouse second only to the United States , including in the all-important area of vaccine development .
Meanwhile , as states and cities move slowly to restart economic activity , China—as well as South Korea and Taiwan—can offer best practices on what mix of technology , social distancing , and contact tracing has worked in different cities and locations .
Chinese cities have used different app configurations to slowly permit employees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; while privacy and surveillance concerns will make many solutions there inapplicable in the United States , having a clearing house of potential solutions could be the first step to give U.S. localities a menu of policy options .
To be sure , China ’ s own opaqueness can make it difficult to fairly evaluate the situation on the ground , especially as it moves to further block foreigners from entering , but it would be in Beijing ’ s own interests—to truly sell success—to let credible outsiders assess the progress .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ went unheeded have sadly demonstrated , we treat China as a distant “ other ” at our own peril .
Americans should not repeat the same mistake as they try to pull the country out of the economic crisis resulting from the pandemic .
Policymakers should not let geostrategic competition and the shifting international landscape cloud their thinking about U.S. priorities for the next year .
Yes , international institutions are under severe strain—including from a U.S. administration that would prefer to settle petty scores in the midst of a crisis instead of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
And Chinese “ mask diplomacy ” of high-profile shipments of medical equipment and personnel designed for the cameras rankles most observers as naked opportunism .
But these global trends are years and decades in the making and should not detract from cold calculations on what serves U.S. interests today : specific projects to protect the health and livelihood of Americans .
At the federal , state , and institutional level , the United States should adopt a clear approach to coordinating with counterparts in Beijing and elsewhere in China .
A small @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , Food and Drug Administration , and the Department of Homeland Security should lead this process .
From Customs clearance to certification , enhanced coordination for personal protective and medical equipment should expedite getting urgently needed items to front-line medical workers .
While individual research universities and companies have relied on connections across the Pacific in meeting the needs for testing and vaccine development , better coordination with China at the federal level will improve the likelihood of better health outcomes for millions of Americans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Europe and outright fraud in the procurement of medical supplies , having knowledgeable officials from both governments involved in this process can help ensure quality items get where they are needed most to save lives .
As Congress considers another rescue package , coordination with G-20 members , particularly China , would help limit the economic fallout from the coronavirus outbreak ; while the origins of this financial crisis differ markedly from that of 2008 , those mechanisms can still be useful in giving markets and businesses confidence and tools to weather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ moves from the immediacy of handling the health crisis to addressing the short- and medium-term economic fallout , central bankers , finance officials and regulators , tax authorities , and even small-business and labor administrators need to restart discussions with counterparts in Beijing to move the United States toward a sustainable recovery .
Understanding the detailed financial policies of the world ’ s second-largest economy will help ensure greater success of the U.S. effort .
The broader discussion about the potential desirability of reshoring manufacturing of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals should not prevent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and finance discussions with their Chinese counterparts in the coming months .
Critics of dialogue with the Chinese government have pointed to endless meetings with little to show for it .
But today , the objectives and need for technical finance and health experts to collaborate on specific projects could not be clearer .
In past global struggles , the United States was able to prioritize the need to reach shared strategic goals over distaste for a specific government—Joseph Stalin in World War II , strongmen in South Korea and Taiwan in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after 9/11 .
The current global health and economic crisis requires nothing less now .
Finally , in this age of disinformation and attack journalism , it is critical that writers , analysts , policymakers , and reporters separate truth from propaganda .
Beijing ’ s high-profile donations of protective equipment and forgiveness of African debt are , in part , an effort to distract from the initial botched handling of the outbreak .
At the same time , the Trump administration ’ s continual bugaboo about the naming of the “ Wuhan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ World Health Organization funding are efforts to distract from the federal government ’ s dismal response to the outbreak .
There is no moral equivalence here : An open democratic republic will , in the long run , outperform a one-party state .
But the U.S. government and its institutions will be judged by how they deal with the outbreak and its aftermath—not by a finger-pointing tweet .
Time to show some self-confidence and not sully the country with the eye-for-eye tactics of the Chinese Communist Party .
These efforts at distraction serve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demand rigorous examination before becoming global headlines or driving specific policies .
This task will only become more challenging as the presidential campaign kicks into high gear in the fall .
In recent weeks , U.S. officials and members of the foreign-policy cognoscenti have put dominating the news cycle above problem-solving and global coordination against the coronavirus .
Now is the time to focus on what ’ s necessary to protect lives and restart the economy—not on dangerous distractions .

In 1992, Bill Clinton ran for U.S. president in part against “tyrants, from Baghdad to Beijing.” In 2000, then-presidential candidate George W. Bush made a point in declaring that China was a strategic competitor. And in 2016, before he became president, Donald Trump accused China of “raping” America. But if the last two weeks are any guide, the politics around China in the 2020 election cycle will make previous electoral contests seem like the seasonal flu compared with, say, a global pandemic.
In 1992, Bill Clinton ran for U.S. president in part against “tyrants, from Baghdad to Beijing.” In 2000, then-presidential candidate George W. Bush made a point in declaring that China was a strategic competitor. And in 2016, before he became president, Donald Trump accused China of “raping” America. But if the last two weeks are any guide, the politics around China in the 2020 election cycle will make previous electoral contests seem like the seasonal flu compared with, say, a global pandemic.
Even before the outbreak of the coronavirus, U.S.-China relations were under serious strain. The fraying of trust on trade, technology, and military deployments has played out as Beijing has expanded its global footprint, raising questions about its ambitions to alter the U.S.-centered international order. Then came the coronavirus outbreak, originating in the Chinese city of Wuhan, which has sickened more than 2.5 million people and killed over 180,000. Let’s be clear: The Chinese government mishandled the outbreak, delaying its initial response for weeks and withholding information for six inexcusable days.
Officials and agitators in Washington and Beijing have seized on the virus to point fingers for the outbreak itself and to disrupt traditional patterns of global assistance and leadership. Yet in both cases, these efforts distract from domestic shortcomings in handling the pandemic. In Washington, this includes the regular rumormongering and selective leaking that the pathogen started in a bioweapons lab; in Beijing, it’s the fantastical notion that the U.S. military may have brought the virus to international military games in Wuhan. Over the last week, there have been charges and countercharges from the Trump and Joe Biden campaigns and their surrogates that the other team can’t be trusted to handle relations with China.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
Given the charged rhetoric, it’s particularly important to find a careful way of framing analysis of China and the coronavirus crisis.Beijing has much to answer for, but whether Trump, think tankers, and commentators like it or not, America’s national security, economic well-being, and social cohesion are intertwined with China’s.
China remains a significant manufacturer of personal protective equipment, medical devices, and a range of therapeutics. It is also a medical research powerhouse second only to the United States, including in the all-important area of vaccine development.
Given the charged rhetoric, it’s particularly important to find a careful way of framing analysis of China and the coronavirus crisis.
Meanwhile, as states and cities move slowly to restart economic activity, China—as well as South Korea and Taiwan—can offer best practices on what mix of technology, social distancing, and contact tracing has worked in different cities and locations. Chinese cities have used different app configurations to slowly permit employees to return to their places of work; while privacy and surveillance concerns will make many solutions there inapplicable in the United States, having a clearing house of potential solutions could be the first step to give U.S. localities a menu of policy options.
To be sure, China’s own opaqueness can make it difficult to fairly evaluate the situation on the ground, especially as it moves to further block foreigners from entering, but it would be in Beijing’s own interests—to truly sell success—to let credible outsiders assess the progress. As the warnings of a global outbreak that went unheeded have sadly demonstrated, we treat China as a distant “other” at our own peril. Americans should not repeat the same mistake as they try to pull the country out of the economic crisis resulting from the pandemic.
Policymakers should not let geostrategic competition and the shifting international landscape cloud their thinking about U.S. priorities for the next year. Yes, international institutions are under severe strain—including from a U.S. administration that would prefer to settle petty scores in the midst of a crisis instead of focusing on the urgent needs of today. And Chinese “mask diplomacy” of high-profile shipments of medical equipment and personnel designed for the cameras rankles most observers as naked opportunism. But these global trends are years and decades in the making and should not detract from cold calculations on what serves U.S. interests today: specific projects to protect the health and livelihood of Americans.
At the federal, state, and institutional level, the United States should adopt a clear approach to coordinating with counterparts in Beijing and elsewhere in China. A small group of senior officials from the Treasury Department, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security should lead this process. From Customs clearance to certification, enhanced coordination for personal protective and medical equipment should expedite getting urgently needed items to front-line medical workers. While individual research universities and companies have relied on connections across the Pacific in meeting the needs for testing and vaccine development, better coordination with China at the federal level will improve the likelihood of better health outcomes for millions of Americans. Given the reports about defective masks in Europe and outright fraud in the procurement of medical supplies, having knowledgeable officials from both governments involved in this process can help ensure quality items get where they are needed most to save lives.
Read More U.S. President Donald Trump U.S. President Donald Trump The United States Can’t Ditch China Yet Fraying ties need not spell the end of the U.S.-China relationship. Argument | Doug Bandow Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis speaks during a press conference held at the Florida National Guard Robert A. Ballard Armory in Miami, Florida. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis speaks during a press conference held at the Florida National Guard Robert A. Ballard Armory in Miami, Florida. DeSantis Is Out to Prove He’s the GOP’s Top China Hawk The Florida governor looks to correct his slide in the polls with a major China speech. Report | Jack Detsch Laborers wearing hats and neon safety vests pause their work to look at the camera. They stand in front of a scaffold-covered building with a cement truck beside it. Laborers wearing hats and neon safety vests pause their work to look at the camera. They stand in front of a scaffold-covered building with a cement truck beside it. Japan Might Have an Answer to Chinese Rare Earth Threats Tokyo successfully built alternative supply chains after tensions rose. Analysis | Joseph Rachman
As Congress considers another rescue package, coordination with G-20 members, particularly China, would help limit the economic fallout from the coronavirus outbreak; while the origins of this financial crisis differ markedly from that of 2008, those mechanisms can still be useful in giving markets and businesses confidence and tools to weather the storm.
As the United States moves from the immediacy of handling the health crisis to addressing the short- and medium-term economic fallout, central bankers, finance officials and regulators, tax authorities, and even small-business and labor administrators need to restart discussions with counterparts in Beijing to move the United States toward a sustainable recovery. Understanding the detailed financial policies of the world’s second-largest economy will help ensure greater success of the U.S. effort. The broader discussion about the potential desirability of reshoring manufacturing of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals should not prevent midlevel and senior U.S. officials from macroeconomic and finance discussions with their Chinese counterparts in the coming months.
Critics of dialogue with the Chinese government have pointed to endless meetings with little to show for it. But today, the objectives and need for technical finance and health experts to collaborate on specific projects could not be clearer. In past global struggles, the United States was able to prioritize the need to reach shared strategic goals over distaste for a specific government—Joseph Stalin in World War II, strongmen in South Korea and Taiwan in the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan after 9/11. The current global health and economic crisis requires nothing less now.
Finally, in this age of disinformation and attack journalism, it is critical that writers, analysts, policymakers, and reporters separate truth from propaganda. Beijing’s high-profile donations of protective equipment and forgiveness of African debt are, in part, an effort to distract from the initial botched handling of the outbreak. At the same time, the Trump administration’s continual bugaboo about the naming of the “Wuhan virus” and recent threat to suspend World Health Organization funding are efforts to distract from the federal government’s dismal response to the outbreak. There is no moral equivalence here: An open democratic republic will, in the long run, outperform a one-party state.
But the U.S. government and its institutions will be judged by how they deal with the outbreak and its aftermath—not by a finger-pointing tweet. Time to show some self-confidence and not sully the country with the eye-for-eye tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. These efforts at distraction serve as stark reminder that leaks and half-truths demand rigorous examination before becoming global headlines or driving specific policies. This task will only become more challenging as the presidential campaign kicks into high gear in the fall.
In recent weeks, U.S. officials and members of the foreign-policy cognoscenti have put dominating the news cycle above problem-solving and global coordination against the coronavirus. Now is the time to focus on what’s necessary to protect lives and restart the economy—not on dangerous distractions.


foreignpolicy--2020-04-22--India Is Scapegoating Muslims for the Spread of the Coronavirus

India Is Scapegoating Muslims for the Spread of the Coronavirus NEW DELHI—That Ambreen Khan was a nurse made little difference to her attackers : She was Muslim , and for the Hindu mob in Punjab , that outweighed all other considerations .
As Khan returned home from her hospital shift on April 10 , half a dozen men surrounded her car , wielding iron rods and bamboo sticks .
Most were neighbors—men she had known for years .
Now , they were shouting slurs at her .
They pulled Khan from her car , beat her , and molested her @ @ @ @ @ @ @ showing them her identity card and permission to move freely , they taunted her .
“ Go back to Pakistan , and do your duty there , ” one man yelled , according to the police report .
“ I fear for my life here now , ” Khan said .
“ It doesn ’ t feel like home .
It feels like another country.
” As the largest minority group in India , Muslims have long faced social , political , and economic marginalization .
The gulf between Hindus and Muslims—who make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s 1.3 billion citizens—has widened , particularly since the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) came to power under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 .
Attacks against Muslims have sparked repeatedly in recent years ; the coronavirus is now adding fuel to the fire .
On March 24 , Modi instituted a hastily organized full lockdown .
For three weeks ( since extended by another 19 days ) , Indians were ordered to remain inside .
Overnight , millions of day laborers , the movers of India ’ s informal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even before the pandemic , the Indian economy was faltering , and Modi was fast losing public trust .
As the virus spreads , Muslims have become a convenient scapegoat .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
“ Many Hindus say Muslims are deliberately attempting to spread coronavirus to wage a holy war or jihad against the majority Hindus , ” said Zainab Sikander , a political commentator based in New Delhi .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but has been encouraged through ruling party propaganda against Muslims.
” At the apex of such dangerous disinformation sit politicians like Amit Malviya , who heads the BJP ’ s information technology cell and serves as its chief propagandist .
In late March , Malviya tweeted to his nearly 500,000 followers : “ Delhi ’ s dark underbelly is exploding !
Last 3 months have seen an Islamic insurrection of sorts , first in the name of anti-CAA protests from Shaheen Bagh to Jamia , Jaffrabad to Seelampur .
And now the illegal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the markaz .
It needs a fix !
” The latest attacks began as news emerged of an outbreak tied to a large Tablighi Jamaat gathering in March .
The multinational Muslim missionary movement held a gathering in Delhi ’ s Nizamuddin Markaz , a center of Islamic preaching and a global headquarters for missionaries all over the world .
Held after Delhi issued a warning against large gatherings but without evident enforcement , the event drew about 3,000 people from a dozen countries .
Since then , approximately one-third of India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the gathering .
( Unsurprisingly , cases traced back to other massive gatherings , including a 10-day festival in Kerala that drew hundreds of thousands , have drawn little attention . )
India ’ s television news channels , already notorious for spreading hatred against Muslims , were quick to attack .
Anchors accused Muslim missionaries of “ deliberately ” spreading COVID-19 , dubbing them India ’ s “ virus villains ” and “ human bombs.
” Special programs , including a special investigation , were broadcast on prime-time television news as if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus .
Rangoli Chandel , the sister of a Bollywood star and a popular defender of the Modi government , called for the shooting of Muslims .
A hospital in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh said in a public advertisement that it would not admit Muslim patients unless they produced a negative test result for COVID-19 .
Leaders from the ruling BJP joined the chorus .
A federal minister in Modi ’ s party , Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi , said the Nizamuddin Markaz meeting was “ Talibani crime ” and that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t be overlooked or forgiven .
The recent spate of violence is just the latest cause for concern among India ’ s Muslim minority .
Last August , Modi ’ s government unilaterally revoked the semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir , the only Muslim-majority state .
Thousands of people have been jailed , and the region remains under lockdown .
In India ’ s troubled northeastern region of Assam , Modi last year introduced a controversial National Register of Citizens to identify Indian nationals among so-called foreigners from neighboring Bangladesh .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ majority of them Muslims who have lived there for generations but lack documentation—at the risk of becoming stateless .
Muslims have been demonized in India in the past for being sympathetic toward terrorism but the hatred against them was rarely expressed so explicitly .
Today , many face discrimination in every aspect of daily life—shunned by coworkers and neighbors , pushed out of jobs or communities because of their religion .
Their future looks bleak in India , and most fear speaking in public .
“ It is like an abusive relationship where @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is no way out , ” said Iqra Kilji , a Muslim poet from Madhya Pradesh .
“ The abuser knows you can ’ t sever the relationship and keeps abusing.
” A cascading effect of this propaganda is already being felt across the country .
Some residential areas in Delhi , for instance , are now banning entry for Muslims .
Lav Agarwal , a secretary in the health ministry who gives daily coronavirus updates , is trying hard to emphasize that Muslims are responsible for spreading the virus in India .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadly anti-Muslim violence in Delhi this year makes it all the more worrisome .
Many Muslims see the latest scapegoating as part of a larger ploy by Hindu nationalists to demonize them and ultimately deny them even the basic rights guaranteed to all citizens of India under the constitution , regardless of religion .
Some warn the endgame may be even worse , with threats that amount to incitement to genocide .
The Star of Mysore ran an editorial ( since removed ) referring to Muslims with the following advice : “ An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad apples is to get rid of them.
” Subramanian Swamy , a BJP leader and ideologue , said in an interview with Vice that when the Muslim population is more than 30 percent , there is trouble .
When the interviewer pointed out that India has 200 million Muslim residents , Swamy said he was being “ kind to them.
” Muslims “ are not in an equal category ” to non-Muslims , he said .
Muslims on the receiving end of such attacks are struggling to cope .
A Tablighi Jamaat @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced a social boycott , refusing to interact with him .
In Gujarat , coronavirus patients and suspected cases at one hospital were segregated into wards depending on their faith , reportedly at the behest of the government .
( The local health department denied it had ordered any such segregation . )
In Karnataka , Muslim volunteers have been beaten up while distributing food among the needy .
A pregnant Muslim woman recently lost her child after doctors in Rajasthan refused to operate because of her Muslim identity .
“ You are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t treat you here , ” her husband , Irfan Khan , recalled doctors telling him .
“ We are Indians first , but India seems to be on the path of self-destruction in which Muslims are becoming the first casualty , ” Khan added .
On Sunday , finally , Modi addressed the issue .
In a LinkedIn post , he wrote : “ COVID-19 does not see race , religion , colour , caste , creed , language or border before striking .
Our response and conduct thereafter should attach primacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has refused to tackle Islamophobia head on , instead just making passing references to equality .
His statement came far too late to prevent a slew of anti-Muslim attacks—whether it will prevent the further spread of propaganda and violence remains to be seen .
Many Muslims fear that the democratic India embraced by their ancestors in 1947 is on the path to becoming a majoritarian Hindu nation , where Muslims can only expect to live as second-class citizens “ A multipronged propaganda has been unleashed to create an impression that the 85 percent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great threat from a 15 percent Muslim minority , ” Kilji said .

NEW DELHI—That Ambreen Khan was a nurse made little difference to her attackers: She was Muslim, and for the Hindu mob in Punjab, that outweighed all other considerations. As Khan returned home from her hospital shift on April 10, half a dozen men surrounded her car, wielding iron rods and bamboo sticks. Most were neighbors—men she had known for years. Now, they were shouting slurs at her. They pulled Khan from her car, beat her, and molested her. As she begged for mercy, showing them her identity card and permission to move freely, they taunted her. “Go back to Pakistan, and do your duty there,” one man yelled, according to the police report.
NEW DELHI—That Ambreen Khan was a nurse made little difference to her attackers: She was Muslim, and for the Hindu mob in Punjab, that outweighed all other considerations. As Khan returned home from her hospital shift on April 10, half a dozen men surrounded her car, wielding iron rods and bamboo sticks. Most were neighbors—men she had known for years. Now, they were shouting slurs at her. They pulled Khan from her car, beat her, and molested her. As she begged for mercy, showing them her identity card and permission to move freely, they taunted her. “Go back to Pakistan, and do your duty there,” one man yelled, according to the police report.
“I fear for my life here now,” Khan said. “It doesn’t feel like home. It feels like another country.”
As the largest minority group in India, Muslims have long faced social, political, and economic marginalization. The gulf between Hindus and Muslims—who make up some 200 million of India’s 1.3 billion citizens—has widened, particularly since the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. Attacks against Muslims have sparked repeatedly in recent years; the coronavirus is now adding fuel to the fire.
On March 24, Modi instituted a hastily organized full lockdown. For three weeks (since extended by another 19 days), Indians were ordered to remain inside. Overnight, millions of day laborers, the movers of India’s informal economy, went out of work. Even before the pandemic, the Indian economy was faltering, and Modi was fast losing public trust. As the virus spreads, Muslims have become a convenient scapegoat.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
“Many Hindus say Muslims are deliberately attempting to spread coronavirus to wage a holy war or jihad against the majority Hindus,” said Zainab Sikander, a political commentator based in New Delhi. “Such bigotry has not only been normalized but has been encouraged through ruling party propaganda against Muslims.”
At the apex of such dangerous disinformation sit politicians like Amit Malviya, who heads the BJP’s information technology cell and serves as its chief propagandist. In late March, Malviya tweeted to his nearly 500,000 followers: “Delhi’s dark underbelly is exploding! Last 3 months have seen an Islamic insurrection of sorts, first in the name of anti-CAA protests from Shaheen Bagh to Jamia, Jaffrabad to Seelampur. And now the illegal gathering of the radical Tablighi Jamaat at the markaz. It needs a fix!”
The latest attacks began as news emerged of an outbreak tied to a large Tablighi Jamaat gathering in March. The multinational Muslim missionary movement held a gathering in Delhi’s Nizamuddin Markaz, a center of Islamic preaching and a global headquarters for missionaries all over the world. Held after Delhi issued a warning against large gatherings but without evident enforcement, the event drew about 3,000 people from a dozen countries. Since then, approximately one-third of India’s 20,000 cases have been traced to the gathering. (Unsurprisingly, cases traced back to other massive gatherings, including a 10-day festival in Kerala that drew hundreds of thousands, have drawn little attention.)
India’s television news channels, already notorious for spreading hatred against Muslims, were quick to attack. Anchors accused Muslim missionaries of “deliberately” spreading COVID-19, dubbing them India’s “virus villains” and “human bombs.” Special programs, including a special investigation, were broadcast on prime-time television news as if to establish the Muslim character of the coronavirus. Rangoli Chandel, the sister of a Bollywood star and a popular defender of the Modi government, called for the shooting of Muslims. A hospital in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh said in a public advertisement that it would not admit Muslim patients unless they produced a negative test result for COVID-19. Leaders from the ruling BJP joined the chorus. A federal minister in Modi’s party, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, said the Nizamuddin Markaz meeting was “Talibani crime” and that that kind of criminal act couldn’t be overlooked or forgiven.
The recent spate of violence is just the latest cause for concern among India’s Muslim minority. Last August, Modi’s government unilaterally revoked the semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim-majority state. Thousands of people have been jailed, and the region remains under lockdown. In India’s troubled northeastern region of Assam, Modi last year introduced a controversial National Register of Citizens to identify Indian nationals among so-called foreigners from neighboring Bangladesh. The register has put some 1.9 million citizens—the majority of them Muslims who have lived there for generations but lack documentation—at the risk of becoming stateless.
Muslims have been demonized in India in the past for being sympathetic toward terrorism but the hatred against them was rarely expressed so explicitly. Today, many face discrimination in every aspect of daily life—shunned by coworkers and neighbors, pushed out of jobs or communities because of their religion. Their future looks bleak in India, and most fear speaking in public.
“It is like an abusive relationship where you strike a humiliating compromise because there is no way out,” said Iqra Kilji, a Muslim poet from Madhya Pradesh. “The abuser knows you can’t sever the relationship and keeps abusing.”
A cascading effect of this propaganda is already being felt across the country. Some residential areas in Delhi, for instance, are now banning entry for Muslims. Lav Agarwal, a secretary in the health ministry who gives daily coronavirus updates, is trying hard to emphasize that Muslims are responsible for spreading the virus in India.
That this comes after a wave of deadly anti-Muslim violence in Delhi this year makes it all the more worrisome. Many Muslims see the latest scapegoating as part of a larger ploy by Hindu nationalists to demonize them and ultimately deny them even the basic rights guaranteed to all citizens of India under the constitution, regardless of religion.
Some warn the endgame may be even worse, with threats that amount to incitement to genocide. The Star of Mysore ran an editorial (since removed) referring to Muslims with the following advice: “An ideal solution to the problem created by bad apples is to get rid of them.”
Subramanian Swamy, a BJP leader and ideologue, said in an interview with Vice that when the Muslim population is more than 30 percent, there is trouble. When the interviewer pointed out that India has 200 million Muslim residents, Swamy said he was being “kind to them.” Muslims “are not in an equal category” to non-Muslims, he said.
Muslims on the receiving end of such attacks are struggling to cope. A Tablighi Jamaat member killed himself after his Hindu neighbors announced a social boycott, refusing to interact with him. In Gujarat, coronavirus patients and suspected cases at one hospital were segregated into wards depending on their faith, reportedly at the behest of the government. (The local health department denied it had ordered any such segregation.) In Karnataka, Muslim volunteers have been beaten up while distributing food among the needy. A pregnant Muslim woman recently lost her child after doctors in Rajasthan refused to operate because of her Muslim identity. “You are a Muslim, and we can’t treat you here,” her husband, Irfan Khan, recalled doctors telling him.
“We are Indians first, but India seems to be on the path of self-destruction in which Muslims are becoming the first casualty,” Khan added.
On Sunday, finally, Modi addressed the issue. In a LinkedIn post, he wrote: “COVID-19 does not see race, religion, colour, caste, creed, language or border before striking. Our response and conduct thereafter should attach primacy to unity and brotherhood.” But he has refused to tackle Islamophobia head on, instead just making passing references to equality. His statement came far too late to prevent a slew of anti-Muslim attacks—whether it will prevent the further spread of propaganda and violence remains to be seen.
Many Muslims fear that the democratic India embraced by their ancestors in 1947 is on the path to becoming a majoritarian Hindu nation, where Muslims can only expect to live as second-class citizens “A multipronged propaganda has been unleashed to create an impression that the 85 percent Hindu majority in India is under a great threat from a 15 percent Muslim minority,” Kilji said.