foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--How Will the Coronavirus Pandemic Reshape the U.S. Election?

How Will the Coronavirus Pandemic Reshape the U.S. Election ?
Matthew Kroenig : Hi , Emma .
I hope you ’ ve been doing well—and haven ’ t developed a fever or dry cough—since we last communicated .
I ’ ve been trying to stay productive while telecommuting with a toddler and infant at home .
So , I ’ m looking forward to our dialogue to take my mind off all of this craziness .
Although I suspect the craziness will be the primary subject of our discussion .
Emma Ashford : Me too !
Though if this doesn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ housebound toddler could debate yours—say , on the merits of trains versus trucks ?
I have to say , this is not exactly where I thought we ’ d be two weeks ago .
Then , we were debating the Democratic candidates ’ foreign policies .
Now , it seems like the primary is effectively over , and the election itself will be shaped primarily by the coronavirus rather than anything else .
MK : Yes .
Coronavirus has drowned out everything else .
And , if anything , this probably strengthens Joe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t think people will vote for Bernie Sanders ’ s promised revolution when the world is falling apart .
Political-science models of presidential elections are pretty crude , but they tend to find that economic performance in the third quarter of an election year matters quite a bit .
A few weeks ago , Trump seemed to be in a strong position , but since then Wall Street has pretty much erased all the gains made by the stock market since Trump was inaugurated .
Despite major Fed interventions and a stimulus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and now it looks like we ’ re heading into a recession .
What ’ s your take ?
EA : Well , President Trump ’ s been wanting low oil prices in 2020 for a while .
I ’ m not sure this is how he expected to get them , though .
And it ’ s not going to help him out the way he thought , either : Cheap gas doesn ’ t help much if you can ’ t leave the house !
I think you ’ re right @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economy is in free fall , and it ’ s not clear it will get any better any time soon .
I hope it ’ s just a recession .
Because the alternative is a depression .
Bottom line for the election : The only thing anyone will be talking about between now and November is the coronavirus and the economy .
That doesn ’ t bode well for Trump .
MK : It is amazing to me , however , how resilient we seem to be in many ways .
People are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ improve their work and social lives virtually .
I ’ m doing an online-only book launch later this month and people are hosting cocktail parties using Zoom videoconferencing .
I hope that American democracy also rises to the challenge .
It ’ s a shame , for example , that Ohio had to postpone their primary .
Estonians vote from their cell phones in bed , and cyberexperts I talk to say their system is probably more secure than ours .
There is no reason we can not do the same thing here @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It is worrying to see people suggesting we postpone an election for a health crisis .
Forget technology , we could do this by mail if we had to .
Washington state did that , and just told voters not to lick their envelopes !
But it ’ s another area where the government appears to be entirely unprepared for this crisis—or frankly any crisis .
I find it fascinating that the president is facing down a challenge that he simply can ’ t fight with his usual methods .
He can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus and dismiss it as “ fake news ” —though he certainly tried to do so early on .
And he can ’ t simply apply the U.S. military as a blunt instrument the way he has in every foreign-policy crisis .
You can ’ t bluff your way out of a pandemic .
But if we want to pivot to actually talking about foreign policy for a second , the one thing the president is trying to do is pin the blame on China .
What ’ s the point of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like wildfire in all 50 states ?
Does he think he ’ ll get less criticism if he succeeds ?
MK : Well , China does deserve its fair share of the blame .
Its early attempts to conceal the outbreak made it impossible to contain and helped export this disease to the rest of the world .
Then it engaged in draconian measures , including reportedly chaining people to trees , to try to get the disease under control .
And the Chinese Communist Party is still probably lying about the numbers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has earned some criticism ?
EA : Look , China ’ s leaders are who we always knew they were : authoritarian , unpleasant , and far more concerned about regime stability and power than the lives of their citizens .
I ’ m personally disturbed that we haven ’ t heard anything about what ’ s happened with coronavirus in the camps in Xinjiang .
But let ’ s be honest , the Trump administration isn ’ t trying to call them to account for human-rights concerns here .
They ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sort of yellow peril .
China ’ s leaders are who we always knew they were : authoritarian , unpleasant , and more concerned about power than the lives of their citizens .
But let ’ s be honest , the Trump administration isn ’ t trying to call them to account for human-rights concerns here .
They ’ re trying to paint this as some sort of yellow peril .
MK : I know people like to criticize the Trump administration for everything that ’ s wrong with the world ( and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s pin the blame where it belongs in this case : on the Chinese Communist Party .
There are , however , ramifications for U.S.-China relations .
Chinese officials are insinuating the virus was introduced by the U.S. military .
Some in the United States claim the virus was created in a People ’ s Liberation Army bioweapons lab .
China has expelled U.S. journalists who had been reporting on the outbreak .
The back-and-forth actuations are contributing to a downturn in relations at a time when U.S.-China cooperation could be helpful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ This is why I think Trump ’ s approach is so stupid .
It appeals to his base and attempts to shift blame through crass racism , but doesn ’ t consider the longer-term international consequences of the virus , which has the potential to be a world-changing event .
It ’ s not even clear that his base will approve if they start getting sick .
After all , they ’ re disproportionately older and at risk here .
On China , I ’ m worried that if the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other about the virus , it will worsen tensions in other areas too .
Not to be alarmist , but that kind of thing has led to war before .
We ’ ve seen throughout history that pandemics have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers .
How Washington and Beijing manage this crisis in the coming weeks could influence who leads the international system decades from now .
MK : War isn ’ t the only concern .
There are also big implications for the future of the global order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that pandemics have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers .
An epidemic in Athens contributed to its loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War .
And a plague in Italy shifted geopolitical power from Southern to Northern Europe in the 17th century .
How Washington and Beijing manage this crisis in the coming weeks could influence who leads the international system decades from now .
Both sides are suffering economically , but how far they fall and how quickly they recover will shape when , or whether , China overtakes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s largest economy .
Wavering nations around the world are watching closely to see whether the autocracy or the democracy can better manage this crisis , and their conclusions will have implications for the future of American and Chinese soft power and global alliances .
There are also military implications .
If the U.S. government is distracted , or an outbreak among U.S. troops calls into question Washington ’ s military readiness , do you think China would see an opportunity to act against Taiwan ?
EA : I doubt it .
But @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus will shape the contours of the great-power debate in coming years .
If this is a competition with China , the United States comes off looking really bad .
China has managed its outbreak , albeit through draconian means ; we look incapable of dealing with ours .
China is offering aid to other states ; we ’ re shutting down all air travel to Europe .
The comparisons are not good .
MK : I see it differently , but I am hardly an unbiased observer ; I have argued that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rivalry .
China has nearly six times more confirmed cases than the United States .
Beijing is reporting its worst economic numbers in decades .
And , the party made bald-faced lies about the pandemic just weeks ago , so why do we suddenly believe them now ?
I suspect things are much worse in China than their officials are letting on .
EA : The United States has many sources of strength .
But we ’ re not using many of them at the moment .
Our massive military is of limited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and where is our soft power ?
Instead of building ventilators for ourselves and the world , we ’ re shutting down trade and engaging in racist saber-rattling .
We used to be the Arsenal of Democracy .
What are we today ?
I ’ m not sure economic instability in China is something to be thrilled about either .
If this crisis has highlighted anything , it ’ s how closely integrated the world is .
That comes with huge advantages , but also makes us vulnerable too .
I ’ m @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to try to further shut off trade with China .
MK : In the spirit of never letting a good crisis go to waste , there are opportunities here .
It is clear that there is a need to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies in certain sensitive national-security areas—but with a scalpel , not a machete—and the natural decoupling that is happening as part of this crisis could facilitate that process .
EA : Yes , but who would wield that scalpel ?
This administration has proven repeatedly it can ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade protectionism .
MK : But countervailing measures , such as tariffs , are necessary in certain industries .
We can ’ t allow China to cheat its way to domination of the most important technologies of the 21st century , for example , and the Trump administration deserves credit for having had the courage to take on China ’ s unfair trading practices .
EA : That ’ s debatable .
But crises have a way of bringing problems to light , even if they ’ ve actually been there a long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see what many of us have been talking about for a long time : that there really isn ’ t as much European solidarity , or NATO cooperation , as some would have you believe .
When Italy called for medical aid , none of its European Union partners answered .
That bodes very poorly for the future of the EU and the NATO alliance .
MK : I would have liked to have seen stronger U.S. global leadership and transatlantic coordination in response to this crisis .
Fred Kempe , president of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have invoked NATO ’ s Article 5 to deal with COVID-19 .
But , ultimately , NATO is a military alliance and the military aspects of the alliance have been strengthened on the ground over the past few years in response to the Russian threat .
Speaking of Russia , do you believe that there are only 200 or so cases of COVID-19 there ?
Of course there aren ’ t so few cases .
Authoritarian states don ’ t produce reliable data .
That ’ s the exact same problem we have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worse in Iran , where the disease appears to be burning out of all control as the regime tries to hide it .
Russia may be at the same place as us on the curve , or it may be behind .
Only time—and independent news reporting—will tell .
Russia is particularly badly positioned to deal with the crisis in economic terms , of course .
It just started a price war with Saudi Arabia in the oil market , and declining oil prices are about to take a huge chunk out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ let ’ s talk for just a minute about the global economy .
Why do you think we haven ’ t seen the kind of coordinated global response that we did in 2008 ?
MK : You ’ re the international political economy expert .
You go first .
EA : Well , I moonlight as one , at least .
My gut feeling is that some crises draw countries together .
A pandemic , on the other hand , pushes them apart .
It suggests that every country is in this for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ massive response in some places .
Just look at the stimulus packages we ’ re seeing proposed in the United Kingdom , and even here in the United States .
What ’ s your take on the fact that right-leaning governments are suddenly embracing fiscal stimulus ?
MK : Well , they ’ re the ones in power !
But I think these plans will only be partially successful .
They can provide temporary relief to those hit hardest by this crisis .
But they are not going to do what a stimulus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stimulate the economy .
The economy is shutting down for good reason .
People are avoiding travel , not eating out , not meeting their friends for a drink at the bar due to the virus .
A government stimulus package will not change that .
And you can ’ t bail out every out-of-work pilot , waiter , and bartender in the country by sending them a $ 1,000 or $ 2,000 check , especially if this crisis goes on for months as some are predicting .
You can ’ t bail @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and bartender in the country by sending them a $ 1,000 or $ 2,000 check , especially if this crisis goes on for months as some are predicting .
EA : It ’ s an unprecedented time .
I mean , I work at the Cato Institute , and even some of my libertarian colleagues—who are normally opposed to any form of government intervention—are saying that action is warranted in this case .
One thing is clear , this has the potential to cause a massive upheaval in the international system .
I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other day that I still wonder about : Is this what it felt to live through 1914—as World War I started—or 1789 , as the French Revolution began ?
Are we seriously entering a period of major international change ?
Or will things look pretty much the same as they did before when we emerge , with the United States still the global leader , and the world still heavily economically integrated ?
MK : I ’ ve lived through the end of the Cold War , 9/11 , and the global financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ experienced anything quite like this .
Right now , it does feel more significant .
But you raise big questions that deserve further debate .
Let ’ s pick up here next time if all the Netflix streaming hasn ’ t crashed the Internet .
I think I hear my kids killing each other .
EA : Toddlers and great powers have a lot in common , particularly the bit about living in a state of anarchy !

Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma. I hope you’ve been doing well—and haven’t developed a fever or dry cough—since we last communicated. I’ve been trying to stay productive while telecommuting with a toddler and infant at home. So, I’m looking forward to our dialogue to take my mind off all of this craziness. Although I suspect the craziness will be the primary subject of our discussion.
Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma. I hope you’ve been doing well—and haven’t developed a fever or dry cough—since we last communicated. I’ve been trying to stay productive while telecommuting with a toddler and infant at home. So, I’m looking forward to our dialogue to take my mind off all of this craziness. Although I suspect the craziness will be the primary subject of our discussion.
Emma Ashford: Me too! Though if this doesn’t pan out, perhaps my housebound toddler could debate yours—say, on the merits of trains versus trucks?
I have to say, this is not exactly where I thought we’d be two weeks ago. Then, we were debating the Democratic candidates’ foreign policies. Now, it seems like the primary is effectively over, and the election itself will be shaped primarily by the coronavirus rather than anything else.
Emma Ashford is a research fellow at the Cato Institute.
Matthew Kroenig is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. They debate foreign policy and the 2020 election.
MK: Yes. Coronavirus has drowned out everything else. And, if anything, this probably strengthens Joe Biden’s position. I don’t think people will vote for Bernie Sanders’s promised revolution when the world is falling apart.
Political-science models of presidential elections are pretty crude, but they tend to find that economic performance in the third quarter of an election year matters quite a bit. A few weeks ago, Trump seemed to be in a strong position, but since then Wall Street has pretty much erased all the gains made by the stock market since Trump was inaugurated. Despite major Fed interventions and a stimulus plan, markets are still tanking, and now it looks like we’re heading into a recession. What’s your take?
EA: Well, President Trump’s been wanting low oil prices in 2020 for a while. I’m not sure this is how he expected to get them, though. And it’s not going to help him out the way he thought, either: Cheap gas doesn’t help much if you can’t leave the house!
I think you’re right on the economic question. The global economy is in free fall, and it’s not clear it will get any better any time soon. I hope it’s just a recession. Because the alternative is a depression.
Bottom line for the election: The only thing anyone will be talking about between now and November is the coronavirus and the economy. That doesn’t bode well for Trump.
MK: It is amazing to me, however, how resilient we seem to be in many ways. People are doing their best to continue and even improve their work and social lives virtually. I’m doing an online-only book launch later this month and people are hosting cocktail parties using Zoom videoconferencing.
I hope that American democracy also rises to the challenge. It’s a shame, for example, that Ohio had to postpone their primary. Estonians vote from their cell phones in bed, and cyberexperts I talk to say their system is probably more secure than ours. There is no reason we cannot do the same thing here in the United States.
EA: It is worrying to see people suggesting we postpone an election for a health crisis. Forget technology, we could do this by mail if we had to. Washington state did that, and just told voters not to lick their envelopes! But it’s another area where the government appears to be entirely unprepared for this crisis—or frankly any crisis.
I find it fascinating that the president is facing down a challenge that he simply can’t fight with his usual methods. He can’t make up a funny nickname for the coronavirus and dismiss it as “fake news”—though he certainly tried to do so early on. And he can’t simply apply the U.S. military as a blunt instrument the way he has in every foreign-policy crisis. You can’t bluff your way out of a pandemic.
But if we want to pivot to actually talking about foreign policy for a second, the one thing the president is trying to do is pin the blame on China. What’s the point of that now that it’s spreading like wildfire in all 50 states? Does he think he’ll get less criticism if he succeeds?
MK: Well, China does deserve its fair share of the blame. Its early attempts to conceal the outbreak made it impossible to contain and helped export this disease to the rest of the world. Then it engaged in draconian measures, including reportedly chaining people to trees, to try to get the disease under control. And the Chinese Communist Party is still probably lying about the numbers. You don’t think China has earned some criticism?
EA: Look, China’s leaders are who we always knew they were: authoritarian, unpleasant, and far more concerned about regime stability and power than the lives of their citizens. I’m personally disturbed that we haven’t heard anything about what’s happened with coronavirus in the camps in Xinjiang. But let’s be honest, the Trump administration isn’t trying to call them to account for human-rights concerns here. They’re literally trying to paint this as some sort of yellow peril.
China’s leaders are who we always knew they were: authoritarian, unpleasant, and more concerned about power than the lives of their citizens. But let’s be honest, the Trump administration isn’t trying to call them to account for human-rights concerns here. They’re trying to paint this as some sort of yellow peril.
MK: I know people like to criticize the Trump administration for everything that’s wrong with the world (and sometimes it is deserved) but let’s pin the blame where it belongs in this case: on the Chinese Communist Party.
There are, however, ramifications for U.S.-China relations. Chinese officials are insinuating the virus was introduced by the U.S. military. Some in the United States claim the virus was created in a People’s Liberation Army bioweapons lab. China has expelled U.S. journalists who had been reporting on the outbreak. The back-and-forth actuations are contributing to a downturn in relations at a time when U.S.-China cooperation could be helpful for stemming the crisis.
EA: This is why I think Trump’s approach is so stupid. It appeals to his base and attempts to shift blame through crass racism, but doesn’t consider the longer-term international consequences of the virus, which has the potential to be a world-changing event. It’s not even clear that his base will approve if they start getting sick. After all, they’re disproportionately older and at risk here.
On China, I’m worried that if the United States and China continue to throw mud at each other about the virus, it will worsen tensions in other areas too. Not to be alarmist, but that kind of thing has led to war before.
MK: War isn’t the only concern. There are also big implications for the future of the global order. We’ve seen throughout history that pandemics have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers. An epidemic in Athens contributed to its loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. And a plague in Italy shifted geopolitical power from Southern to Northern Europe in the 17th century. How Washington and Beijing manage this crisis in the coming weeks could influence who leads the international system decades from now.
Both sides are suffering economically, but how far they fall and how quickly they recover will shape when, or whether, China overtakes the United States as the world’s largest economy.
Wavering nations around the world are watching closely to see whether the autocracy or the democracy can better manage this crisis, and their conclusions will have implications for the future of American and Chinese soft power and global alliances.
We’ve seen throughout history that pandemics have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers. How Washington and Beijing manage this crisis in the coming weeks could influence who leads the international system decades from now.
There are also military implications. If the U.S. government is distracted, or an outbreak among U.S. troops calls into question Washington’s military readiness, do you think China would see an opportunity to act against Taiwan?
EA: I doubt it. But I agree that our responses to the coronavirus will shape the contours of the great-power debate in coming years. If this is a competition with China, the United States comes off looking really bad. China has managed its outbreak, albeit through draconian means; we look incapable of dealing with ours. China is offering aid to other states; we’re shutting down all air travel to Europe. The comparisons are not good.
MK: I see it differently, but I am hardly an unbiased observer; I have argued that democracies tend to outcompete autocracies in great-power rivalry. China has nearly six times more confirmed cases than the United States. Beijing is reporting its worst economic numbers in decades. And, the party made bald-faced lies about the pandemic just weeks ago, so why do we suddenly believe them now? I suspect things are much worse in China than their officials are letting on.
EA: The United States has many sources of strength. But we’re not using many of them at the moment. Our massive military is of limited use in a crisis like this, and where is our soft power? Instead of building ventilators for ourselves and the world, we’re shutting down trade and engaging in racist saber-rattling. We used to be the Arsenal of Democracy. What are we today?
I’m not sure economic instability in China is something to be thrilled about either. If this crisis has highlighted anything, it’s how closely integrated the world is. That comes with huge advantages, but also makes us vulnerable too. I’m concerned that this administration will take advantage to try to further shut off trade with China.
MK: In the spirit of never letting a good crisis go to waste, there are opportunities here. It is clear that there is a need to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies in certain sensitive national-security areas—but with a scalpel, not a machete—and the natural decoupling that is happening as part of this crisis could facilitate that process.
EA: Yes, but who would wield that scalpel? This administration has proven repeatedly it can’t be trusted to discern national security from trade protectionism.
MK: But countervailing measures, such as tariffs, are necessary in certain industries. We can’t allow China to cheat its way to domination of the most important technologies of the 21st century, for example, and the Trump administration deserves credit for having had the courage to take on China’s unfair trading practices.
EA: That’s debatable. But crises have a way of bringing problems to light, even if they’ve actually been there a long time. And in Italy, I see what many of us have been talking about for a long time: that there really isn’t as much European solidarity, or NATO cooperation, as some would have you believe. When Italy called for medical aid, none of its European Union partners answered. That bodes very poorly for the future of the EU and the NATO alliance.
MK: I would have liked to have seen stronger U.S. global leadership and transatlantic coordination in response to this crisis. Fred Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council, said Trump should have invoked NATO’s Article 5 to deal with COVID-19. But, ultimately, NATO is a military alliance and the military aspects of the alliance have been strengthened on the ground over the past few years in response to the Russian threat. Speaking of Russia, do you believe that there are only 200 or so cases of COVID-19 there?
EA: Nope.
Of course there aren’t so few cases. Authoritarian states don’t produce reliable data. That’s the exact same problem we have with China. It’s even worse in Iran, where the disease appears to be burning out of all control as the regime tries to hide it. Russia may be at the same place as us on the curve, or it may be behind. Only time—and independent news reporting—will tell.
Russia is particularly badly positioned to deal with the crisis in economic terms, of course. It just started a price war with Saudi Arabia in the oil market, and declining oil prices are about to take a huge chunk out of the government’s budget. But let’s talk for just a minute about the global economy. Why do you think we haven’t seen the kind of coordinated global response that we did in 2008?
MK: You’re the international political economy expert. You go first.
EA: Well, I moonlight as one, at least. My gut feeling is that some crises draw countries together. A pandemic, on the other hand, pushes them apart. It suggests that every country is in this for itself. And we have seen a massive response in some places. Just look at the stimulus packages we’re seeing proposed in the United Kingdom, and even here in the United States. What’s your take on the fact that right-leaning governments are suddenly embracing fiscal stimulus?
MK: Well, they’re the ones in power! But I think these plans will only be partially successful. They can provide temporary relief to those hit hardest by this crisis. But they are not going to do what a stimulus is meant to do, which is stimulate the economy. The economy is shutting down for good reason. People are avoiding travel, not eating out, not meeting their friends for a drink at the bar due to the virus. A government stimulus package will not change that. And you can’t bail out every out-of-work pilot, waiter, and bartender in the country by sending them a $1,000 or $2,000 check, especially if this crisis goes on for months as some are predicting.
You can’t bail out every out-of-work pilot, waiter, and bartender in the country by sending them a $1,000 or $2,000 check, especially if this crisis goes on for months as some are predicting.
EA: It’s an unprecedented time. I mean, I work at the Cato Institute, and even some of my libertarian colleagues—who are normally opposed to any form of government intervention—are saying that action is warranted in this case.
One thing is clear, this has the potential to cause a massive upheaval in the international system. I asked a question on social media the other day that I still wonder about: Is this what it felt to live through 1914—as World War I started—or 1789, as the French Revolution began? Are we seriously entering a period of major international change? Or will things look pretty much the same as they did before when we emerge, with the United States still the global leader, and the world still heavily economically integrated?
MK: I’ve lived through the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and the global financial crisis, but I’ve never experienced anything quite like this. Right now, it does feel more significant. But you raise big questions that deserve further debate. Let’s pick up here next time if all the Netflix streaming hasn’t crashed the Internet.
I think I hear my kids killing each other.
EA: Toddlers and great powers have a lot in common, particularly the bit about living in a state of anarchy!


foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--The Military Alone Can’t Rescue the U.S. From Coronavirus

The Military Alone Can ’ t Rescue the U.S. From Coronavirus Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
We hope all of our readers are staying safe , healthy , and socially distant .
What ’ s on tap today : The U.S. military is gearing up to respond to the coronavirus pandemic , NATO adds a new member to its alliance , and the United States hands base over to Iraqi forces .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
Can the Military Stave Off @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other political leaders have called on the military to help respond to the coronavirus pandemic , with Trump referring to himself as a “ wartime president.
” This week , he tasked the U.S. Navy to deploy two of its hospital ships to each coast to aid overburdened hospital systems in the United States as coronavirus cases rise .
Defense Secretary Mark Esper also announced that the military was redirecting medical supplies to the government to distribute across the United States , including 5 million N95 respirator masks and 2,000 ventilators .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians to process coronavirus tests .
Trump said he will invoke the Defense Production Act to compel domestic industry to pivot to making much-needed medical gear , though no such action has been taken yet .
Calling up the reserves ?
The Trump administration has also floated plans to call up reservists and the National Guard to respond to the pandemic , as Politico ’ s Lara Seligman reported .
Democratic contenders Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders have also urged the military to be called up to respond .
Multiple states , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ York , Rhode Island and Washington , have activated the National Guard .
Not a catch-all fix .
Esper cautioned that the hospital ships and the field hospitals the military could deploy are meant for treating trauma and wartime wounds , not infectious disease .
He also said that calling up the National Guard or reservists working in health care could take them away from their day jobs .
“ All those doctors and nurses come from our medical treatment facilities or they come from the reserves which means , civilians so what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as we call up these units and use them to support the states that we aren ’ t robbing Peter to pay Paul , ” Esper told reporters this week .
Limited resources .
Even the U.S. military has limited resources .
Given the rapidly rising coronavirus cases across the United States , it ’ s hard to see how the military ’ s resources would put a dent in the overburdened U.S. health system if the virus continues its spread and state by state lockdowns aren ’ t as effective as leaders @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is struggling to supply its own personnel with coronavirus test kits , even without demands from the civilian side of the government .
As Breaking Defense ’ s Paul McCleary reports , none of the Navy ’ s 82 deployed ships have coronavirus test kits for their crews .
At least two Navy personnel have tested positive so far .
[ Foreign Policy has lifted the paywall for our most essential coronavirus coverage from around the world .
You can read those articles here . ]
The United States hands over base to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Tuesday that it handed over a strategic base near the Syria-Iraq border to Iraqi forces .
The area is a hotbed for Iran-backed militia activity , and some experts worry that the base could eventually fall into the hands of the Kataib Hezbollah militia group .
But officials representing Operation Inherent Resolve called the transfer “ a historic moment ” and a way to consolidate coalition forces after operations against the Islamic State in the region .
World leaders are catching coronavirus .
The global elite aren ’ t immune from the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tab of how many world leaders , politicians , and lawmakers have come down with the virus , from South America to Europe to the Middle East .
The list gives more insight into how the pandemic is derailing politics and international diplomacy worldwide .
On Thursday , Michel Barnier , Europe ’ s point man negotiating Britain ’ s exit from the European Union , said he had tested positive .
NATO to gain a new member .
It may have been lost in the coronavirus fray , but this week NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ states have now approved adding North Macedonia as the 30th member of the alliance .
It ’ s seen as a major political win for the alliance as it tries to shore up Western influence and stability in the Balkans .
Afghanistan withdrawal .
The coronavirus is affecting everything , including the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan .
Quarantine procedures for U.S. military personnel could slow down the planned withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from Afghanistan , Military Times reports .
USAID chief leaving .
Former Rep. Mark Green intends to resign his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for International Development next month to become president of the McCain Institute for International Leadership .
Green was widely respected on both sides of the aisle and seen as a port in the storm for an embattled agency facing annual steep budget cut proposals from the Trump administration .
In the post for two and a half years , Green stood in stark contrast to other corners of the administration , where rapid hirings , firings , and resignations sowed chaos and uncertainty in the federal government .
John Barsa , currently the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ International Development ’ s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean , will replace him as acting head of the aid agency .
New Latin America envoy .
Trump on Tuesday tapped Carlos Trujillo to be the new top diplomat on Latin America .
Trujillo , currently the ambassador to the Organization of American States , will assume the role of assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs if confirmed by the Senate .
The post has sat empty for nearly eight months .
Pentagon moves .
The White House has nominated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under secretary of defense .
Anderson previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy , Plans , and Capabilities , overseeing the Department ’ s program , budget , and posture decisions .
Defense industry shake-up .
Lockheed Martin CEO Marillyn Hewson is leaving her post and will be replaced by James Taiclet , a Lockheed board member .
Even the Islamic State is taking coronavirus seriously .
The terror group has advised its members to avoid traveling to Europe amid the coronavirus outbreak .
As Reuters reports : “ The Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ healthcare workers instead of killing them.
” Saudi Arabia will convene an extraordinary G-20 summit next week to help coordinate a course of action to combat the spread of the coronavirus .
The summit will be held virtually to comply with social distancing recommendations .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’s Security Brief. We hope all of our readers are staying safe, healthy, and socially distant. What’s on tap today: The U.S. military is gearing up to respond to the coronavirus pandemic , NATO adds a new member to its alliance, and the United States hands base over to Iraqi forces .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. We hope all of our readers are staying safe, healthy, and socially distant. What’s on tap today: The U.S. military is gearing up to respond to the coronavirus pandemic, NATO adds a new member to its alliance, and the United States hands base over to Iraqi forces.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Can the Military Stave Off Coronavirus? U.S. President Donald Trump and other political leaders have called on the military to help respond to the coronavirus pandemic, with Trump referring to himself as a “wartime president.” This week, he tasked the U.S. Navy to deploy two of its hospital ships to each coast to aid overburdened hospital systems in the United States as coronavirus cases rise. Defense Secretary Mark Esper also announced that the military was redirecting medical supplies to the government to distribute across the United States, including 5 million N95 respirator masks and 2,000 ventilators. It will also open 16 labs up for civilians to process coronavirus tests. Trump said he will invoke the Defense Production Act to compel domestic industry to pivot to making much-needed medical gear, though no such action has been taken yet.
Calling up the reserves? The Trump administration has also floated plans to call up reservists and the National Guard to respond to the pandemic, as Politico’s Lara Seligman reported. Democratic contenders Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders have also urged the military to be called up to respond. Multiple states, including Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, Rhode Island and Washington, have activated the National Guard.
Not a catch-all fix. Esper cautioned that the hospital ships and the field hospitals the military could deploy are meant for treating trauma and wartime wounds, not infectious disease. He also said that calling up the National Guard or reservists working in health care could take them away from their day jobs.
“All those doctors and nurses come from our medical treatment facilities or they come from the reserves which means, civilians so what we need to be very conscious of as we call up these units and use them to support the states that we aren’t robbing Peter to pay Paul,” Esper told reporters this week.
Limited resources. Even the U.S. military has limited resources. Given the rapidly rising coronavirus cases across the United States, it’s hard to see how the military’s resources would put a dent in the overburdened U.S. health system if the virus continues its spread and state by state lockdowns aren’t as effective as leaders hope.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military is struggling to supply its own personnel with coronavirus test kits, even without demands from the civilian side of the government. As Breaking Defense’s Paul McCleary reports, none of the Navy’s 82 deployed ships have coronavirus test kits for their crews. At least two Navy personnel have tested positive so far.
[Foreign Policy has lifted the paywall for our most essential coronavirus coverage from around the world. You can read those articles here.]
What We’re Watching
The United States hands over base to Iraqi forces. The Pentagon announced on Tuesday that it handed over a strategic base near the Syria-Iraq border to Iraqi forces. The area is a hotbed for Iran-backed militia activity, and some experts worry that the base could eventually fall into the hands of the Kataib Hezbollah militia group. But officials representing Operation Inherent Resolve called the transfer “a historic moment” and a way to consolidate coalition forces after operations against the Islamic State in the region.
World leaders are catching coronavirus. The global elite aren’t immune from the coronavirus pandemic. Foreign Policy has a running tab of how many world leaders, politicians, and lawmakers have come down with the virus, from South America to Europe to the Middle East. The list gives more insight into how the pandemic is derailing politics and international diplomacy worldwide. On Thursday, Michel Barnier, Europe’s point man negotiating Britain’s exit from the European Union, said he had tested positive.
NATO to gain a new member. It may have been lost in the coronavirus fray, but this week NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced that all member states have now approved adding North Macedonia as the 30th member of the alliance. It’s seen as a major political win for the alliance as it tries to shore up Western influence and stability in the Balkans.
Afghanistan withdrawal. The coronavirus is affecting everything, including the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Quarantine procedures for U.S. military personnel could slow down the planned withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Military Times reports.
Movers and Shakers
USAID chief leaving. Former Rep. Mark Green intends to resign his position as chief of the U.S. Agency for International Development next month to become president of the McCain Institute for International Leadership. Green was widely respected on both sides of the aisle and seen as a port in the storm for an embattled agency facing annual steep budget cut proposals from the Trump administration.
In the post for two and a half years, Green stood in stark contrast to other corners of the administration, where rapid hirings, firings, and resignations sowed chaos and uncertainty in the federal government. John Barsa, currently the assistant administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, will replace him as acting head of the aid agency.
New Latin America envoy. Trump on Tuesday tapped Carlos Trujillo to be the new top diplomat on Latin America. Trujillo, currently the ambassador to the Organization of American States, will assume the role of assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs if confirmed by the Senate. The post has sat empty for nearly eight months.
Pentagon moves. The White House has nominated James H. Anderson to serve as deputy under secretary of defense. Anderson previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, overseeing the Department’s program, budget, and posture decisions.
Defense industry shake-up. Lockheed Martin CEO Marillyn Hewson is leaving her post and will be replaced by James Taiclet, a Lockheed board member.
Odds and Ends
Even the Islamic State is taking coronavirus seriously. The terror group has advised its members to avoid traveling to Europe amid the coronavirus outbreak. As Reuters reports: “The Taliban have pledged their readiness to work with healthcare workers instead of killing them.”
The Week Ahead
Saudi Arabia will convene an extraordinary G-20 summit next week to help coordinate a course of action to combat the spread of the coronavirus. The summit will be held virtually to comply with social distancing recommendations.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--Meanwhile, America’s Kosovo Strategy Is Melting Down

Meanwhile , America ’ s Kosovo Strategy Is Melting Down As the world struggles to combat the coronavirus pandemic , an extraordinary development has been unfolding in the Balkans : a challenged , dependent , and typically pliant little country has been openly defying the mighty administration of U.S. President Donald Trump .
The Republic of Kosovo has refused to knuckle under to hardball pressure from Richard Grenell , the acting director of national intelligence who also serves as U.S. envoy for peace talks between Serbia and Kosovo .
Neither country can join the European Union until they resolve the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which Serbia refuses to recognize .
Belgrade doggedly isolates the Republic of Kosovo , leaving the fledgling state outside the United Nations and most international organizations .
Determined to conclude a deal behind closed doors with the two countries ’ respective presidents , Grenell is furious with Kosovo ’ s prime minister , Albin Kurti .
The neophyte premier has defied Grenell ’ s demand to lift Kosovo ’ s punitive , 100 percent tariffs on Serbian goods .
In an unprecedented move against perhaps the most pro-U.S. country on the globe , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo and one legislator even threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO peacekeeping force .
The pressure from Washington weighs on Kosovo ’ s ability to deal with the coronavirus crisis , aggravating tensions between the prime minister and President Hashim Thaci , who is fully in line with Grenell on the approach to Serbia .
Just at the moment when national unity is needed , Thaci and Kurti are now battling over whether to declare a national emergency over the pandemic .
The prime minister has just dismissed Interior Minister Agim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emergency declaration , creating an untimely government crisis .
Lost in this drama is that Grenell is also being defied by the main antagonist in the long-running Kosovo saga : Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic .
In January , Grenell called for Belgrade to halt its de-recognition campaign against Kosovo .
Last week , Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic again refused , suggesting that the campaign would continue even if Kosovo lifted its tariffs .
Washington has said nothing about this .
There is no mystery why Grenell , eager for a deal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intransigent party in the negotiations .
The real puzzle is how U.S. diplomacy came to this extreme—a contorted effort to bully a weak , vulnerable U.S. ally to placate a Serbian strongman .
This is especially confounding because the major obstacle to a Kosovo settlement is Vucic .
Since Albanian riots in 2004 and angry Serbian remonstrations at newly installed border crossings in 2011 , there have been only sporadic , smaller-scale incidents between the ethnic Serbian minority and ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo .
While there has been no mass return of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo since the withdrawal of Serbian forces at the hands of NATO in 1999 , neither has Kosovo ’ s 2008 independence caused any mass exodus .
Most of Kosovo ’ s Serbs continue to live in the country ’ s south , surrounded by ethnic Albanians , as a small minority .
Life under ethnic Albanian rule is by no means paradise , but it is generally more stable than in the country ’ s lawless north , where separatist Serbs form the majority and where Belgrade ’ s writ prevails .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ north , including Serbs , exemplified by the unsolved murder of the outspoken moderate ethnic Serbian leader Oliver Ivanovic in 2018 .
A leading suspect in Ivanovic ’ s slaying walks freely in Serbia , untouched by the authorities—a message to all who would challenge the ruling power structure .
As for those 100 percent tariffs on Serbian goods that Vucic fulminates about , according to local accounts they have had little impact on daily economic life in the north .
Until Vucic ’ s Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern for Serbian citizens .
That year the party campaigned heavily on Kosovo , dramatizing the plight of Serbs and restoring the issue to prominence .
The party pledged to put forward a plan to address the matter , though it has yet to materialize .
In its place , Vucic has issued occasional cryptic appeals for realism on Kosovo alongside more frequent , strident rhetoric , declaiming , for example : “ Drag me through the streets , I will never recognize Kosovo !
” Rather than lay the groundwork for diplomacy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Prime Minister Ana Brnabic , have fired off caustic insults about ethnic Albanians .
In December , Vucic dusted off the most inflammatory charge from the war years , alleging that a notorious 1999 massacre of ethnic Albanian villagers by Serbian forces in Kosovo was concocted to provoke Western intervention .
For Vucic , the recent history of Kosovo begins with the 1999 NATO air campaign , and omits any mention of the prior , premeditated dismantling of Kosovo ’ s autonomy under former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic—well before the fall of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s independence .
A decade of systematic repression by Belgrade followed .
Despite the campaign to stoke nationalist sentiment over Kosovo , the Serbian public still shows readiness for a settlement .
In a recent survey , less than one-third of Serbian citizens cited Kosovo as a priority issue , while standard of living ( 84 percent ) and the related problem of corruption and criminality ( 68 percent ) easily topped the list of concerns .
What ’ s more , thanks to years of corrosive policies , Vucic has the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Serbia like no leader before him , including his mentor , Milosevic .
So intimidated are journalists and public figures in Serbia that self-censorship is common .
So dominant is Vucic ’ s party that his greatest concern in next month ’ s elections is achieving an election victory so large that it will damage the credibility of Serbian democracy in Western eyes .
Vucic controls almost all arms of government , including the intelligence services , and wields substantial influence over nongovernmental bastions of Serbian nationalism such as the Serbian Orthodox Church @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arts .
The point is that Vucic could sell a dignified , stabilizing settlement on Kosovo that includes full mutual recognition .
Unfortunately , he has only made reaching such an agreement more difficult .
Rather than grasp this fact and bring leverage on the Serbian president , diplomats—now including Grenell—have made the classic negotiating mistake : desperation .
Instead of biding their time , vaporizing Serbia ’ s nonrecognition campaign , and helping expose the systemic rot that Serbian citizens are concerned about , diplomats have done the opposite .
Imploring the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kosovo , U.S. and EU officials ( with a few exceptions ) have averted their eyes from the steady , worrying backslide in democracy in Serbia , including graphic examples of state capture by ruling-party cronies .
Grenell has fallen into the same trap , undermining rather than supporting Kurti—whose reputation as a genuine corruption fighter has even sent tremors to Belgrade , and who already has taken steps to rein in corruption in Pristina .
In turn , Vucic has manipulated this zeal for a deal , turning the basis of negotiations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Serbian president politically , rather than how to protect core Serbian interests in independent Kosovo .
For motives only known to himself , perhaps his own corrupt dealings or other criminal conduct , Thaci has been oddly accommodating to his Serbian counterpart .
Abetted by the EU ’ s then foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini and U.S. State Department diplomacy , Vucic and Thaci last year agreed to partition Kosovo .
Diplomats rationalized the radical concept by claiming that without partition , Kosovo would become a “ frozen conflict.
” ( If it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are frozen as well . )
When news of the partition plan leaked , an uproar ensued in Kosovo , in neighboring countries , and in Germany over “ Kosovo contagion ” —the invitation to reopen border questions around the Balkans , including in shaky Bosnia and Herzegovina .
For his part , Grenell insists that the parties have never discussed partition , at least “ in [ his ] presence.
” He maintains that his mediation is based on economic development and jobs .
Early this year Grenell proudly announced three positive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and road links between Serbia and Kosovo .
Nonetheless , concern remains that the Grenell-Vucic-Thaci deal involves territory .
In her tweeted announcement of a parliamentary resolution on the dialogue with Serbia , the speaker of Kosovo ’ s parliament , Vjosa Osmani , warned that “ no one shall be able to negotiate [ away Kosovo ’ s ] territorial integrity , sovereignty and its constitutional order.
” Osmani ’ s concerns over partition are well founded .
The lesson of a quarter-century of peacemaking in the Balkans is that agreements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 Prespa agreement , between Greece and North Macedonia , and the 2001 Ohrid agreement , ending the war between Macedonians and Albanians , work ; agreements based on territory , such as the 1995 Dayton agreement on the status of Bosnia , merely perpetuate conflict .
Indeed , the separatist leader Milorad Dodik , a Bosnian Serb , has championed partition of Kosovo as he has stepped up his threats to secede from Bosnia , a move that would reignite fighting .
Just as Bosnia is trapped by the country ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would be also condemned to permanent grievance .
Partition of Kosovo—regardless of the parties ’ consent—would be the cause for wholesale ethnic homogenization : Kosovo for Albanians , and Serbia for Serbs .
Tens of thousands of minorities left on the “ wrong side ” of the new border would flee .
In this scenario , the ancient ethnic Serbian patrimony in the south of Kosovo would be even more isolated , even if granted sovereignty .
It is for this reason that Father Sava Janjic , the Serbian Orthodox abbot at Kosovo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Decani , staunchly opposes partition .
He understands that a swap of territory also means a swap of population .
Vucic and Thaci , preoccupied with narrow concerns , have not absorbed these lessons .
Neither have U.S. diplomats learned them , preoccupied as they are with obtaining a deal—even a destabilizing one—for which there is no urgency .
If Grenell ’ s bid collapses amid local resistance and the spreading pandemic , there will be time to reflect on the entire strategy of forging a deal on Kosovo by mollifying the Serbian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vucic to prove that his interest in joining the European Union is genuine and not a bluff .
Nothing is lost by goading Belgrade and Pristina into a real dialogue over Kosovo—one that addresses the painful questions of the past as a way of creating a prosperous , stable future .
Neighboring countries such as Greece , North Macedonian , and Albania have proved that this is entirely possible .
The United States and EU together hold ample leverage over the parties to concentrate their minds , including the economic incentives that Grenell @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to decide if they want a short-term deal or a long-term settlement .

As the world struggles to combat the coronavirus pandemic, an extraordinary development has been unfolding in the Balkans: a challenged, dependent, and typically pliant little country has been openly defying the mighty administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.
As the world struggles to combat the coronavirus pandemic, an extraordinary development has been unfolding in the Balkans: a challenged, dependent, and typically pliant little country has been openly defying the mighty administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.
The Republic of Kosovo has refused to knuckle under to hardball pressure from Richard Grenell, the acting director of national intelligence who also serves as U.S. envoy for peace talks between Serbia and Kosovo. Neither country can join the European Union until they resolve the standoff over Kosovo’s independence, which Serbia refuses to recognize. Belgrade doggedly isolates the Republic of Kosovo, leaving the fledgling state outside the United Nations and most international organizations. Determined to conclude a deal behind closed doors with the two countries’ respective presidents, Grenell is furious with Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti. The neophyte premier has defied Grenell’s demand to lift Kosovo’s punitive, 100 percent tariffs on Serbian goods. In an unprecedented move against perhaps the most pro-U.S. country on the globe, Washington has suspended key U.S. assistance to Kosovo and one legislator even threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from the NATO peacekeeping force.
The pressure from Washington weighs on Kosovo’s ability to deal with the coronavirus crisis, aggravating tensions between the prime minister and President Hashim Thaci, who is fully in line with Grenell on the approach to Serbia. Just at the moment when national unity is needed, Thaci and Kurti are now battling over whether to declare a national emergency over the pandemic. The prime minister has just dismissed Interior Minister Agim Veliu, who backs Thaci’s emergency declaration, creating an untimely government crisis.
Lost in this drama is that Grenell is also being defied by the main antagonist in the long-running Kosovo saga: Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. In January, Grenell called for Belgrade to halt its de-recognition campaign against Kosovo. Last week, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic again refused, suggesting that the campaign would continue even if Kosovo lifted its tariffs. Washington has said nothing about this.
There is no mystery why Grenell, eager for a deal, would side with the stronger, more intransigent party in the negotiations. The real puzzle is how U.S. diplomacy came to this extreme—a contorted effort to bully a weak, vulnerable U.S. ally to placate a Serbian strongman. This is especially confounding because the major obstacle to a Kosovo settlement is Vucic. Since Albanian riots in 2004 and angry Serbian remonstrations at newly installed border crossings in 2011, there have been only sporadic, smaller-scale incidents between the ethnic Serbian minority and ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo. While there has been no mass return of displaced Serbs to their former homes in Kosovo since the withdrawal of Serbian forces at the hands of NATO in 1999, neither has Kosovo’s 2008 independence caused any mass exodus.
Most of Kosovo’s Serbs continue to live in the country’s south, surrounded by ethnic Albanians, as a small minority. Life under ethnic Albanian rule is by no means paradise, but it is generally more stable than in the country’s lawless north, where separatist Serbs form the majority and where Belgrade’s writ prevails. Fear stalks all those living in the north, including Serbs, exemplified by the unsolved murder of the outspoken moderate ethnic Serbian leader Oliver Ivanovic in 2018. A leading suspect in Ivanovic’s slaying walks freely in Serbia, untouched by the authorities—a message to all who would challenge the ruling power structure. As for those 100 percent tariffs on Serbian goods that Vucic fulminates about, according to local accounts they have had little impact on daily economic life in the north.
Until Vucic’s Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, Kosovo had faded as a top concern for Serbian citizens. That year the party campaigned heavily on Kosovo, dramatizing the plight of Serbs and restoring the issue to prominence. The party pledged to put forward a plan to address the matter, though it has yet to materialize. In its place, Vucic has issued occasional cryptic appeals for realism on Kosovo alongside more frequent, strident rhetoric, declaiming, for example: “Drag me through the streets, I will never recognize Kosovo!”
Rather than lay the groundwork for diplomacy, principals in his government, including Prime Minister Ana Brnabic, have fired off caustic insults about ethnic Albanians. In December, Vucic dusted off the most inflammatory charge from the war years, alleging that a notorious 1999 massacre of ethnic Albanian villagers by Serbian forces in Kosovo was concocted to provoke Western intervention. For Vucic, the recent history of Kosovo begins with the 1999 NATO air campaign, and omits any mention of the prior, premeditated dismantling of Kosovo’s autonomy under former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic—well before the fall of the Berlin Wall and any agitation for Kosovo’s independence. A decade of systematic repression by Belgrade followed.
Despite the campaign to stoke nationalist sentiment over Kosovo, the Serbian public still shows readiness for a settlement. In a recent survey, less than one-third of Serbian citizens cited Kosovo as a priority issue, while standard of living (84 percent) and the related problem of corruption and criminality (68 percent) easily topped the list of concerns. What’s more, thanks to years of corrosive policies, Vucic has the ability to control the public narrative in Serbia like no leader before him, including his mentor, Milosevic. So intimidated are journalists and public figures in Serbia that self-censorship is common. So dominant is Vucic’s party that his greatest concern in next month’s elections is achieving an election victory so large that it will damage the credibility of Serbian democracy in Western eyes. Vucic controls almost all arms of government, including the intelligence services, and wields substantial influence over nongovernmental bastions of Serbian nationalism such as the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
The point is that Vucic could sell a dignified, stabilizing settlement on Kosovo that includes full mutual recognition. Unfortunately, he has only made reaching such an agreement more difficult. Rather than grasp this fact and bring leverage on the Serbian president, diplomats—now including Grenell—have made the classic negotiating mistake: desperation. Instead of biding their time, vaporizing Serbia’s nonrecognition campaign, and helping expose the systemic rot that Serbian citizens are concerned about, diplomats have done the opposite. Imploring the Serbian leader to cut a deal on Kosovo, U.S. and EU officials (with a few exceptions) have averted their eyes from the steady, worrying backslide in democracy in Serbia, including graphic examples of state capture by ruling-party cronies. Grenell has fallen into the same trap, undermining rather than supporting Kurti—whose reputation as a genuine corruption fighter has even sent tremors to Belgrade, and who already has taken steps to rein in corruption in Pristina.
In turn, Vucic has manipulated this zeal for a deal, turning the basis of negotiations into a question of how to compensate the Serbian president politically, rather than how to protect core Serbian interests in independent Kosovo. For motives only known to himself, perhaps his own corrupt dealings or other criminal conduct, Thaci has been oddly accommodating to his Serbian counterpart. Abetted by the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini and U.S. State Department diplomacy, Vucic and Thaci last year agreed to partition Kosovo. Diplomats rationalized the radical concept by claiming that without partition, Kosovo would become a “frozen conflict.” (If it does, Serbia’s EU aspirations are frozen as well.) When news of the partition plan leaked, an uproar ensued in Kosovo, in neighboring countries, and in Germany over “Kosovo contagion”—the invitation to reopen border questions around the Balkans, including in shaky Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For his part, Grenell insists that the parties have never discussed partition, at least “in [his] presence.” He maintains that his mediation is based on economic development and jobs. Early this year Grenell proudly announced three positive agreements establishing and improving air, rail, and road links between Serbia and Kosovo. Nonetheless, concern remains that the Grenell-Vucic-Thaci deal involves territory. In her tweeted announcement of a parliamentary resolution on the dialogue with Serbia, the speaker of Kosovo’s parliament, Vjosa Osmani, warned that “no one shall be able to negotiate [away Kosovo’s] territorial integrity, sovereignty and its constitutional order.”
Osmani’s concerns over partition are well founded. The lesson of a quarter-century of peacemaking in the Balkans is that agreements based on rights, such as the 2018 Prespa agreement, between Greece and North Macedonia, and the 2001 Ohrid agreement, ending the war between Macedonians and Albanians, work; agreements based on territory, such as the 1995 Dayton agreement on the status of Bosnia, merely perpetuate conflict. Indeed, the separatist leader Milorad Dodik, a Bosnian Serb, has championed partition of Kosovo as he has stepped up his threats to secede from Bosnia, a move that would reignite fighting.
Just as Bosnia is trapped by the country’s ethnoterritorial division, so Kosovo and Serbia would be also condemned to permanent grievance. Partition of Kosovo—regardless of the parties’ consent—would be the cause for wholesale ethnic homogenization: Kosovo for Albanians, and Serbia for Serbs. Tens of thousands of minorities left on the “wrong side” of the new border would flee. In this scenario, the ancient ethnic Serbian patrimony in the south of Kosovo would be even more isolated, even if granted sovereignty. It is for this reason that Father Sava Janjic, the Serbian Orthodox abbot at Kosovo’s most important church site, Decani, staunchly opposes partition. He understands that a swap of territory also means a swap of population. Vucic and Thaci, preoccupied with narrow concerns, have not absorbed these lessons. Neither have U.S. diplomats learned them, preoccupied as they are with obtaining a deal—even a destabilizing one—for which there is no urgency.
If Grenell’s bid collapses amid local resistance and the spreading pandemic, there will be time to reflect on the entire strategy of forging a deal on Kosovo by mollifying the Serbian president. Nothing is lost by pressing Vucic to prove that his interest in joining the European Union is genuine and not a bluff. Nothing is lost by goading Belgrade and Pristina into a real dialogue over Kosovo—one that addresses the painful questions of the past as a way of creating a prosperous, stable future. Neighboring countries such as Greece, North Macedonian, and Albania have proved that this is entirely possible. The United States and EU together hold ample leverage over the parties to concentrate their minds, including the economic incentives that Grenell favors. Washington and Brussels only need to decide if they want a short-term deal or a long-term settlement.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-20--China Is Fighting the Coronavirus Propaganda War to Win

China Is Fighting the Coronavirus Propaganda War to Win China ’ s expulsion this week of American journalists from the Washington Post , New York Times and the Wall Street Journal represents a dangerous escalation of a feud over the freedom of each country ’ s journalists to report from inside the other ’ s borders .
China has cast the move as proportionate retaliation against the Trump administration ’ s decision to limit the number of reporters from Chinese government-controlled media outlets who may work in the United States .
But there are essential differences between Beijing ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ standoff .
Regrettably , the Trump administration ’ s betrayals , blunders , and jingoism have forfeited the high ground that the United State once claimed on matters of press freedom , allowing China to cast this as a two-way fight .
But China ’ s characterization belies the reality of a rising power bent on controlling its global image at all costs and by any means .
China ’ s ejection of journalists from some of the world ’ s most venerated news outlets is only the latest round in a long-standing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In 2016 , during a visit by U.S. President Barack Obama , Chinese guards prevented the traveling press corps from covering even so routine a moment the president ’ s disembarkation from his plane .
“ This is our country , ” a Chinese official chided .
“ This is our airport.
” As China has emerged as a global power in the last two decades , media interest in the country has spiked .
Around 700 accredited foreign journalists from more than 50 different countries worked on the mainland as of 2016 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on its own domestic media and ranks among the world ’ s leading jailers of journalists—meaning that objective reporting of the government ’ s activities depends on these international news outlets .
Coverage of the coronavirus earlier this year brought home the essential role of foreign media in informing the world about a crisis soon to reach their shores .
The New York Times , for example , managed to communicate via WeChat with a hospitalized Li Wenliang , the doctor who was disciplined for trying to sound an early warning alarm about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ himself .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it ’ s affecting countries around the world . ]
Traditionally , China has been less concerned about its international reputation than with perceptions of the government at home .
After the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011 , Beijing intensified controls over the internet and social media , aiming to silence critics , snuff out dissent , and seal off the Communist Party government from challenges .
Stringent controls block most foreign news sites and social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Twitter , none of which is available in China .
But the digital information realm is intrinsically permeable .
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 , Beijing has seen accurate , fact-based reporting on the Chinese government and society as a potent threat , to the country ’ s global reputation and to its domestic controls .
The Chinese government ’ s crackdown on foreign media over the last seven years has been multipronged .
Strictures imposed by a half dozen distinct government agencies prohibit Chinese nationals from reporting for international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ frequent and strict visa and credentialing requirements , and constrain travel to certain regions of the country .
( Almost all reporting on China ’ s gigantic Uighur internment camps in Xinjiang province is forbidden . )
News outlets receive warnings of harsh reprisals for stories that depict Chinese leaders as corrupt or authoritarian .
Stories questioning the health of the Chinese economy also rankle , sometimes resulting in foreign reporters being reprimanded or punished by .
One U.S. news outlet left out of this week ’ s ban is Bloomberg News .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vast financial and real estate holdings of Xi Jinping ’ s extended family , Beijing shut down access to the news site , withholding visas for its reporters and threatening to freeze out Bloomberg LP ’ s highly lucrative financial information business .
Having learned of the story before its publication , Chinese authorities had warned Bloomberg editors not to run it ; once the piece appeared , bylined journalists were subject to intimidation and death threats .
The journalists later recounted that the company began dialing back tough-minded coverage , admitting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their access—prompting several reporters and editors to quit .
Nearly two years later , Bloomberg LP ’ s then-Chairman Peter Grauer stated at an event in Hong Kong that henceforward the company would be “ primarily writing stories about the local business and economic environment ” and that “ every once in a while we wander a little bit away from that and write stories that we probably … should have rethought.
” After Grauer ’ s statement , China resumed granting visas to Bloomberg ; it ’ s not clear if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the company from the exclusions now confronting its competitors .
While Bloomberg ’ s news organization is part of a large corporation with interests distinct from a regular newspaper , other news organizations have paid a price for resisting Beijing ’ s edicts .
Before the New York Times published disclosures about the financial holdings of then-Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2012 , Chinese officials summoned Times journalists for a stern warning about heavy fallout .
When the story went up , China shut down the Times ’ Chinese website permanently .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ virtual private networks and other workarounds . )
China also stopped issuing new visas to Times correspondents ( forcing its reporters to extend their tours of duty , as they could not be replaced ) and threatened to refuse to renew visas for those in-country .
At the end of 2013 , nearly two dozen journalists from the New York Times and Bloomberg faced the prospect of having to leave China , because their visas were about to expire and had not been extended .
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden , during a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both privately and publicly to relent , saying , “ innovation thrives where people breathe freely , speak freely , are able to challenge orthodoxy , where newspapers can report the truth without fear of consequences.
” Shortly thereafter the situation eased somewhat , with reporters receiving visa renewals in the nick of time .
The granting of visas to allow new Times reporters in the country would take another two years .
In the ensuing years , foreign correspondents in China have been subject to periodic retaliatory visa revocations .
China has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outlets who are Chinese nationals , conducted surveillance against U.S. reporters , restricted their travel , imposed onerous visa renewal hurdles , and launched cyberattacks .
In an annual report issued this month , the Foreign Correspondents ’ Club of China found that 82 percent of the 114 correspondents surveyed had experienced harassment or violence while reporting .
Not a single respondent judged that conditions had improved in the last year .
While turning the screws on those reporting from the mainland , China has also mounted an aggressive effort to control its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese state media reporters abroad , bought foreign radio stations—at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries were owned by state broadcaster China Radio International as of 2015—and established start-up news media companies abroad that look and feel like independent news organizations but are in fact controlled by the Chinese Communist Party .
The advent of the new coronavirus has thrown these Chinese information control efforts into overdrive .
Alongside punishing doctors and dissidents who dare to criticize the government ’ s response to the outbreak , Beijing has lashed out against foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and muzzled debate across the country ’ s social media platforms .
Fearful that the initial denial and mismanagement of the outbreak could trigger social unrest , Beijing has now mounted an aggressive domestic and global propaganda campaign to tout its draconian approach to the epidemic , downplay its role in sparking the global outbreak , and contrast its efforts favorably against those of Western governments and particularly the United States .
That brute-force public relations campaign led to the outright expulsion in February of three Wall Street Journal reporters as punishment for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.
” Of note , none of the reporters had anything to do with the piece , much less the headline .
These developments come against the backdrop of a rise in aggressive , stealthy disinformation operations .
Often government-initiated , these campaigns have aimed to shape opinions , sow social disorder , and even influence elections in democracies , especially the United States .
It was in this context that the United States announced in mid-February that five Chinese news outlets—Xinhua , CGTN , China Radio @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Daily—previously all treated as media organizations , would now be dealt with as arms of the government in Beijing , subject to similar rules as those that apply to professional diplomats .
While provocative and ill-timed , the administration ’ s move was not unjustified : None of these media outlets has any semblance of editorial independence .
Their role is to promote Chinese government messages and interests .
While most press-freedom advocates opposed the move as likely to escalate constraints on Western media operating within China , as a matter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the United States was doing more than labeling the agencies accurately .
In early March , almost immediately after the banishment of the three Wall Street Journal reporters , the Trump administration took its policy a step further .
It limited to 100 the number of Chinese citizens allowed to work in the United States for five specific Chinese news entities and required that 60 such employees leave the country .
In announcing these new strictures , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that his goal was “ reciprocity ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The move was widely interpreted as yet another example of tit-for-tat statecraft that has marked the U.S.-China relationship in the era of President Donald Trump , cutting across trade , cybersecurity , human rights , and now the coronavirus pandemic .
Since then , the tensions have climbed .
The Trump administration has sought to deflect attention from its ill-preparedness for COVID-19 by constantly reminding people that the virus originated in China .
His administration and supporters have rebranded the coronavirus as the “ China virus ” or “ Chinese flu , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Americans , and fueling a self-defeating nativism in response to a pandemic that begs for transnational solutions .
When called out , Trump and his allies have maintained an aggrieved innocence , pointing out that few objected to the appellations of Spanish flu and German measles .
But no one is fooled , because the only officials who spurn the virus ’ s proper clinical names are those abetting Trump ’ s campaign to deflect blame for the unfolding catastrophe .
China ’ s most recent eviction of journalists ( and the imposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ finances and real estate on a broader group of U.S.-based media outlets including Time magazine and the Voice of America ) is another salvo in a futile war of words and gestures between two superpowers whose incentives to cooperate have never been plainer .
Besides thwarting needed collaboration , the fiasco has left many with the false impression of an equivalency between how Beijing and Washington treat the other ’ s press corps .
Until recently , the United States was known as the world ’ s standard-bearers on freedom of the press @ @ @ @ @ @ @ never unblemished , the United States was properly viewed as a global model for robust media freedom at home and support for embattled journalists everywhere .
Now that reputation lies in tatters .
The president ’ s persistent threats , attacks , acts of retaliation , insults , and denigration of the press have provided a practical playbook adopted by authoritarians around the world who seek to discredit their critics and muzzle objective coverage .
But this tragic development should not obscure China ’ s singular and dangerous acceleration of its war on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s obscene attempts to recast the U.S. press as “ enemies ” of the American people , America ’ s approach toward press freedom has remained infinitely more respectful and tolerant than China ’ s .
The United States doesn ’ t jail journalists , and its reporters produce harshly critical coverage and commentary about their government every day .
According to the New York Times , while China permits just 100 American journalists to work there , the U.S. granted 425 new media visas to Chinese journalists and their families @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo ’ s misplaced reference to “ reciprocity , ” the actions taken by Beijing and Washington toward one another ’ s journalists are far from symmetrical .
While the Chinese journalists in question were doing Beijing ’ s bidding as employees of state-controlled media organs , the American reporters and outlets targeted by China are , with the exception of Voice of America , employed by private , independent journalism outlets .
Whereas the U.S. government ’ s action responded to a bald Chinese attempt to shape the global narrative , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of journalism .
And the consequences are dire : With so many facets of the historic coronavirus story unfolding , the loss of access for dogged professional journalists reporting inside China risks hobbling our understanding of this pandemic and our ability to combat the next one .
Beijing is pursuing superpower status with a steely determination to dictate how its every deed is seen both at home and around the world .
The moral high ground that Joe Biden asserted just six years ago in reminding China of the value of a free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration .
The spectacle of a White House that has turned its back on press freedom so thoroughly that it can scarcely advocate on behalf of leading U.S. media outlets is sobering .
But the fact that Washington has forfeited much of its credibility in sticking up for press freedom should not lead Americans to lose sight of the stakes in this tussle with China : namely , the right of citizens across the globe to accurate , impartial , and fact-based reporting on the world ’ s most powerful nations .
It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the mantle of a nation fiercely committed to a free and independent press .
It must then set about to rally the world in insisting that these media outlets be free to cover China with neither favor nor fear .

China’s expulsion this week of American journalists from the Washington Post, New York Times and the Wall Street Journal represents a dangerous escalation of a feud over the freedom of each country’s journalists to report from inside the other’s borders. China has cast the move as proportionate retaliation against the Trump administration’s decision to limit the number of reporters from Chinese government-controlled media outlets who may work in the United States.
China’s expulsion this week of American journalists from the Washington Post, New York Times and the Wall Street Journal represents a dangerous escalation of a feud over the freedom of each country’s journalists to report from inside the other’s borders. China has cast the move as proportionate retaliation against the Trump administration’s decision to limit the number of reporters from Chinese government-controlled media outlets who may work in the United States.
But there are essential differences between Beijing’s and Washington’s actions in this standoff. Regrettably, the Trump administration’s betrayals, blunders, and jingoism have forfeited the high ground that the United State once claimed on matters of press freedom, allowing China to cast this as a two-way fight. But China’s characterization belies the reality of a rising power bent on controlling its global image at all costs and by any means.
China’s ejection of journalists from some of the world’s most venerated news outlets is only the latest round in a long-standing war between China and the press. In 2016, during a visit by U.S. President Barack Obama, Chinese guards prevented the traveling press corps from covering even so routine a moment the president’s disembarkation from his plane. “This is our country,” a Chinese official chided. “This is our airport.” As China has emerged as a global power in the last two decades, media interest in the country has spiked. Around 700 accredited foreign journalists from more than 50 different countries worked on the mainland as of 2016. China maintains stringent and ever-tightening controls on its own domestic media and ranks among the world’s leading jailers of journalists—meaning that objective reporting of the government’s activities depends on these international news outlets. Coverage of the coronavirus earlier this year brought home the essential role of foreign media in informing the world about a crisis soon to reach their shores. The New York Times, for example, managed to communicate via WeChat with a hospitalized Li Wenliang, the doctor who was disciplined for trying to sound an early warning alarm about the virus before he succumbed to it himself.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
Traditionally, China has been less concerned about its international reputation than with perceptions of the government at home. After the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011, Beijing intensified controls over the internet and social media, aiming to silence critics, snuff out dissent, and seal off the Communist Party government from challenges. Stringent controls block most foreign news sites and social media platforms including Google, Facebook, and Twitter, none of which is available in China. But the digital information realm is intrinsically permeable. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, Beijing has seen accurate, fact-based reporting on the Chinese government and society as a potent threat, to the country’s global reputation and to its domestic controls.
The Chinese government’s crackdown on foreign media over the last seven years has been multipronged. Strictures imposed by a half dozen distinct government agencies prohibit Chinese nationals from reporting for international news outlets, subject foreign journalists to frequent and strict visa and credentialing requirements, and constrain travel to certain regions of the country. (Almost all reporting on China’s gigantic Uighur internment camps in Xinjiang province is forbidden.) News outlets receive warnings of harsh reprisals for stories that depict Chinese leaders as corrupt or authoritarian. Stories questioning the health of the Chinese economy also rankle, sometimes resulting in foreign reporters being reprimanded or punished by.
One U.S. news outlet left out of this week’s ban is Bloomberg News. Following an explosive 2012 Bloomberg expose detailing the vast financial and real estate holdings of Xi Jinping’s extended family, Beijing shut down access to the news site, withholding visas for its reporters and threatening to freeze out Bloomberg LP’s highly lucrative financial information business. Having learned of the story before its publication, Chinese authorities had warned Bloomberg editors not to run it; once the piece appeared, bylined journalists were subject to intimidation and death threats. The journalists later recounted that the company began dialing back tough-minded coverage, admitting that they did not want to risk their access—prompting several reporters and editors to quit. Nearly two years later, Bloomberg LP’s then-Chairman Peter Grauer stated at an event in Hong Kong that henceforward the company would be “primarily writing stories about the local business and economic environment” and that “every once in a while we wander a little bit away from that and write stories that we probably … should have rethought.” After Grauer’s statement, China resumed granting visas to Bloomberg; it’s not clear if the terms of that truce are what exempted the company from the exclusions now confronting its competitors.
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While Bloomberg’s news organization is part of a large corporation with interests distinct from a regular newspaper, other news organizations have paid a price for resisting Beijing’s edicts. Before the New York Times published disclosures about the financial holdings of then-Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2012, Chinese officials summoned Times journalists for a stern warning about heavy fallout. When the story went up, China shut down the Times’ Chinese website permanently. (Its content continues to circulate through virtual private networks and other workarounds.) China also stopped issuing new visas to Times correspondents (forcing its reporters to extend their tours of duty, as they could not be replaced) and threatened to refuse to renew visas for those in-country. At the end of 2013, nearly two dozen journalists from the New York Times and Bloomberg faced the prospect of having to leave China, because their visas were about to expire and had not been extended. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, during a December 2013 visit, implored the Chinese both privately and publicly to relent, saying, “innovation thrives where people breathe freely, speak freely, are able to challenge orthodoxy, where newspapers can report the truth without fear of consequences.” Shortly thereafter the situation eased somewhat, with reporters receiving visa renewals in the nick of time. The granting of visas to allow new Times reporters in the country would take another two years.
In the ensuing years, foreign correspondents in China have been subject to periodic retaliatory visa revocations. China has also intimidated news assistants working for U.S. outlets who are Chinese nationals, conducted surveillance against U.S. reporters, restricted their travel, imposed onerous visa renewal hurdles, and launched cyberattacks. In an annual report issued this month, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China found that 82 percent of the 114 correspondents surveyed had experienced harassment or violence while reporting. Not a single respondent judged that conditions had improved in the last year.
While turning the screws on those reporting from the mainland, China has also mounted an aggressive effort to control its global image. It has sent more Chinese state media reporters abroad, bought foreign radio stations—at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries were owned by state broadcaster China Radio International as of 2015—and established start-up news media companies abroad that look and feel like independent news organizations but are in fact controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.
The advent of the new coronavirus has thrown these Chinese information control efforts into overdrive. Alongside punishing doctors and dissidents who dare to criticize the government’s response to the outbreak, Beijing has lashed out against foreign critics of its management of the pandemic and muzzled debate across the country’s social media platforms. Fearful that the initial denial and mismanagement of the outbreak could trigger social unrest, Beijing has now mounted an aggressive domestic and global propaganda campaign to tout its draconian approach to the epidemic, downplay its role in sparking the global outbreak, and contrast its efforts favorably against those of Western governments and particularly the United States. That brute-force public relations campaign led to the outright expulsion in February of three Wall Street Journal reporters as punishment for an opinion column headlined, “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.” Of note, none of the reporters had anything to do with the piece, much less the headline.
These developments come against the backdrop of a rise in aggressive, stealthy disinformation operations. Often government-initiated, these campaigns have aimed to shape opinions, sow social disorder, and even influence elections in democracies, especially the United States. It was in this context that the United States announced in mid-February that five Chinese news outlets—Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio, China Daily, and the People’s Daily—previously all treated as media organizations, would now be dealt with as arms of the government in Beijing, subject to similar rules as those that apply to professional diplomats.
While provocative and ill-timed, the administration’s move was not unjustified: None of these media outlets has any semblance of editorial independence. Their role is to promote Chinese government messages and interests. While most press-freedom advocates opposed the move as likely to escalate constraints on Western media operating within China, as a matter of principle it is hard to argue that the United States was doing more than labeling the agencies accurately.
In early March, almost immediately after the banishment of the three Wall Street Journal reporters, the Trump administration took its policy a step further. It limited to 100 the number of Chinese citizens allowed to work in the United States for five specific Chinese news entities and required that 60 such employees leave the country. In announcing these new strictures, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that his goal was “reciprocity” and “a long-overdue level playing field.” The move was widely interpreted as yet another example of tit-for-tat statecraft that has marked the U.S.-China relationship in the era of President Donald Trump, cutting across trade, cybersecurity, human rights, and now the coronavirus pandemic.
Since then, the tensions have climbed. The Trump administration has sought to deflect attention from its ill-preparedness for COVID-19 by constantly reminding people that the virus originated in China. His administration and supporters have rebranded the coronavirus as the “China virus” or “Chinese flu,” fanning racial tensions and bigotry toward Asian Americans, and fueling a self-defeating nativism in response to a pandemic that begs for transnational solutions. When called out, Trump and his allies have maintained an aggrieved innocence, pointing out that few objected to the appellations of Spanish flu and German measles. But no one is fooled, because the only officials who spurn the virus’s proper clinical names are those abetting Trump’s campaign to deflect blame for the unfolding catastrophe.
China’s most recent eviction of journalists (and the imposition of heightened disclosure requirements regarding staffing, finances and real estate on a broader group of U.S.-based media outlets including Time magazine and the Voice of America) is another salvo in a futile war of words and gestures between two superpowers whose incentives to cooperate have never been plainer. Besides thwarting needed collaboration, the fiasco has left many with the false impression of an equivalency between how Beijing and Washington treat the other’s press corps. Until recently, the United States was known as the world’s standard-bearers on freedom of the press. Though Washington’s record was never unblemished, the United States was properly viewed as a global model for robust media freedom at home and support for embattled journalists everywhere.
Now that reputation lies in tatters. The president’s persistent threats, attacks, acts of retaliation, insults, and denigration of the press have provided a practical playbook adopted by authoritarians around the world who seek to discredit their critics and muzzle objective coverage.
But this tragic development should not obscure China’s singular and dangerous acceleration of its war on factual information and credible journalism. Despite Trump’s obscene attempts to recast the U.S. press as “enemies” of the American people, America’s approach toward press freedom has remained infinitely more respectful and tolerant than China’s. The United States doesn’t jail journalists, and its reporters produce harshly critical coverage and commentary about their government every day. According to the New York Times, while China permits just 100 American journalists to work there, the U.S. granted 425 new media visas to Chinese journalists and their families in 2019 alone.
Moreover, despite Pompeo’s misplaced reference to “reciprocity,” the actions taken by Beijing and Washington toward one another’s journalists are far from symmetrical. While the Chinese journalists in question were doing Beijing’s bidding as employees of state-controlled media organs, the American reporters and outlets targeted by China are, with the exception of Voice of America, employed by private, independent journalism outlets. Whereas the U.S. government’s action responded to a bald Chinese attempt to shape the global narrative, the reporters targeted by China are guilty only of journalism. And the consequences are dire: With so many facets of the historic coronavirus story unfolding, the loss of access for dogged professional journalists reporting inside China risks hobbling our understanding of this pandemic and our ability to combat the next one.
Beijing is pursuing superpower status with a steely determination to dictate how its every deed is seen both at home and around the world. The moral high ground that Joe Biden asserted just six years ago in reminding China of the value of a free press has been squandered by the Trump administration. The spectacle of a White House that has turned its back on press freedom so thoroughly that it can scarcely advocate on behalf of leading U.S. media outlets is sobering. But the fact that Washington has forfeited much of its credibility in sticking up for press freedom should not lead Americans to lose sight of the stakes in this tussle with China: namely, the right of citizens across the globe to accurate, impartial, and fact-based reporting on the world’s most powerful nations. It is urgent that the United States reclaim the mantle of a nation fiercely committed to a free and independent press. It must then set about to rally the world in insisting that these media outlets be free to cover China with neither favor nor fear.