foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--South Korea Matters More to the United States Than North Korea’s Nukes

South Korea Matters More to the United States Than North Korea ’ s Nukes In the last four years , despite outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s boasts , the threat posed by North Korea ’ s nuclear arsenal has become greater than ever .
But the incoming Biden administration should not be blinkered by a singular focus on North Korea leader Kim Jong Un ’ s weapons , because the most important change in the peninsula has been happening on the southern side of the DMZ .
In a world where China is now the main foreign-policy challenge for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as an indispensable U.S. ally , with the potential to play the role that West Germany did during the height of the Cold War .
The time has come for the United States to reorder its priorities in the Korean Peninsula : Rather than treating South Korea as a part of the solution for the North , Washington must treat the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a standalone concern , and seek to leverage the alliance to establish a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region .
To be sure , North Korea ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But take away the weapons , and North Korea is the same country that it has been since 1973 , when President-elect Joe Biden became a senator : an isolated and impoverished country whose sole importance in the world comes from the harm that it causes to its own people and the potential harm it may cause to its neighbors .
Now , consider South Korea , which is certainly not the same country as it was in 1973 when it was an economically struggling right-wing dictatorship .
Today , South Korea is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , bigger even than Russia or Brazil .
It is a world leader in technology and a crucial link in the global supply chain of high tech materials such as memory chips and 5G equipment .
Few can match South Korea ’ s soft power that churns out Academy Award-winning movies and Billboard chart-topping music .
( K-pop group BTS ’ s fandom was so strong that even Chinese state-owned media backed off from criticizing them . )
Seoul ’ s vibrant democracy inspires others in Asia ; protesters in Hong Kong and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and K-pop as their own anthem .
In addition , South Korea is an underrated military power .
Born out of an apocalyptic civil war and after spending entire existence preparing for the next one , South Korea has seventh-largest standing army in the world with nearly 600,000 soldiers , fifth-largest air force in the world by the number of aircrafts , and its own very large arsenal of ballistic missiles .
Seoul ’ s defense plan goes beyond merely defending against North Korea .
Under President Moon Jae-in—belying his reputation as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a blue water navy with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines to protect the remote sea lanes crucial for its trade .
Seoul ’ s foreign policy circles are quietly debating whether South Korea should pursue its own nuclear-weapons program , especially considering the uncertainty of U.S. commitment in its East Asian allies shown during the Trump administration .
The latter point poses a significant challenge to the Biden administration .
Following the four years of Trump , South Korea ’ s opinion of the United States is at an all-time low .
This @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , originating from fear and resentment of the United States ’ overwhelming power and influence over Korea .
Under Trump , the United States became small , unreliable , and petty in the eyes of Koreans .
Doubt over U.S. commitment to South Korea began to set in immediately after Trump took office , as Washington failed to support—or even acknowledge—South Korea as it was subject to China ’ s massive economic retaliation for deploying U.S. ’ s THAAD missile defense system .
The temporary euphoria caused by Trump ’ s diplomacy with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the flashy photo ops failed to lead to any tangible result .
Then the extortionate demand of fivefold increase for South Korea ’ s contribution to stationing U.S. troops in its territory soured the public opinion once and for all .
An overwhelming 96 percent of the public opposed the hike at one point ; so boorish was U.S. ambassador Harry Harris with this demand—reportedly , he said the word “ five billion dollars ” at least 20 times in a 30-minute conversation with a South Korean lawmaker—that even South Korea ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On the other hand , self-confidence is running high among South Koreans .
The defeatist self-conceptualization as “ shrimp among whales , ” buffeted by the crosswinds from Korea ’ s more powerful neighbors , has faded significantly .
In particular , South Korea ’ s successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic , contrasted especially with the Trump administration ’ s abject incompetence , has given Koreans the sense that they have arrived .
A recent study showed Korean public ’ s national pride rose sharply from 2019 to 2020 .
High-ranking officials @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to shape their own destiny , even in the face of global superpowers .
In a recent symposium , Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said : “ Korea is certainly in a geopolitical position that looks like we are caught in a crossfire .
But I think you can turn that around and say it ’ s leverage.
” Lee Soo-hyuk , Korea ’ s ambassador to United States , was even more blunt : “ I feel pride that we are now a country that can choose [ between the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ choose.
” KBS , South Korea ’ s public broadcaster , carried a two-part article called : “ No More America Number One ” —a harsh title with even harsher assessment of the decline of the United States under the Trump administration , made all the more shocking because of the broadcaster ’ s usual stiff-necked decorum .
All of this puts the U.S.-South Korean relationship at an inflection point .
Repairing the alliance does not simply mean going back to the pre-Trump era , when South Korea was seen more as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ limited to how much it helped advancing the U.S. objectives with North Korea .
Such a crabbed view of the alliance , in fact , introduced unnecessary strain in the relationship , as the success of the alliance was judged solely on how closely the two countries were aligned as to Pyongyang .
As the slogan for Biden ’ s transition team goes , the U.S.-South Korean alliance must be built back better .
If China is the main challenge for the U.S. foreign policy , it naturally follows that the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ democratic ally nearest to China .
For the United States , the health of its alliance with South Korea may well determine the outcome of its strategic competition with China as well as the establishment of the rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific .
Fortunately , the United States is still in a good position with respect to South Korea .
In some corners of Washington , D.C. , there are concerns that South Korea might abandon the U.S. alliance and join the Sinosphere , informed by a vague notion of Samuel Huntington ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( which lumps them together as “ Confucian ” powers ) and the idea that South Korea ’ s liberals ( who are currently in power ) are secret communists who are in league with the Chinese Communist Party .
Such views are ignorant and overblown .
South Koreans still like the United States much more than they like China .
( In a recent poll asking a favorability rating between 0 and 100 , Koreans gave the United States the score of 49.9 , and China 29.6 . )
Koreans are fiercely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are not at all fans of illiberal China or North Korea .
Further , as an exporting economy , South Korea recognizes that free trade and the liberal world order—underwritten by the United States—are indispensable to its success .
But inevitably , there are smaller yet significant points at which U.S. and South Korean interests will diverge .
The United States may wish its two foremost democratic allies in East Asia to get along better , but South Korea will not stop demanding that Japan face the crimes of its imperialist past .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ initiatives to check China ’ s rise , but it will not adopt an openly hostile rhetoric or join a group whose explicit purpose is to oppose China .
Most importantly , South Korea absolutely will not begin a war with North Korea , which may very easily escalate into a nuclear war that destroys millions of lives .
Taking South Korea seriously as an ally means that , in these situations , the United States will not get 100 percent of what it wants .
Instead , Washington will have to persuade @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of liberal international order that they share and nudging its partner closer to its own position—as it might do with any ally .
Doing so will require patience and persistence on the part of the United States .
Restoring the trust in the alliance may take longer than the four or eight years of the Biden administration , when South Koreans can plainly see the United States is just one election and one Trump—or a similar figure—away from sliding back .
The recent joint fact sheet issued by the State Department and South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to harmonize the United States ’ Indo-Pacific Strategy and Korea ’ s New Southern Policy focusing on South Korea ’ s role in Southeast Asia , is a commendable effort to align the two countries ’ foreign policies rather than Washington demanding Seoul to toe the line set by the United States .
The Biden administration should do many more of these in different areas such as combating the COVID-19 pandemic , climate change , or free trade and movement of people , to assure that it sees South Korea as an important @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mental adjustment .
For a long time , Washington approached the Korean Peninsula with North Korea as the main issue , and South Korea as perhaps one component of the overall solution .
This order of priority must be now be reversed : Alliance maintenance with South Korea is the main issue to be addressed , one of whose components is North Korea .
Fortunately , some in the D.C. foreign-policy circles are coming to this view .
For the U.S. foreign policy in Asia to succeed in the next several decades , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ well .

In the last four years, despite outgoing President Donald Trump’s boasts, the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has become greater than ever. But the incoming Biden administration should not be blinkered by a singular focus on North Korea leader Kim Jong Un’s weapons, because the most important change in the peninsula has been happening on the southern side of the DMZ. In a world where China is now the main foreign-policy challenge for the United States, South Korea emerged as an indispensable U.S. ally, with the potential to play the role that West Germany did during the height of the Cold War. The time has come for the United States to reorder its priorities in the Korean Peninsula: Rather than treating South Korea as a part of the solution for the North, Washington must treat the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a standalone concern, and seek to leverage the alliance to establish a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the last four years, despite outgoing President Donald Trump’s boasts, the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has become greater than ever. But the incoming Biden administration should not be blinkered by a singular focus on North Korea leader Kim Jong Un’s weapons, because the most important change in the peninsula has been happening on the southern side of the DMZ. In a world where China is now the main foreign-policy challenge for the United States, South Korea emerged as an indispensable U.S. ally, with the potential to play the role that West Germany did during the height of the Cold War. The time has come for the United States to reorder its priorities in the Korean Peninsula: Rather than treating South Korea as a part of the solution for the North, Washington must treat the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a standalone concern, and seek to leverage the alliance to establish a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.
To be sure, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a serious matter. But take away the weapons, and North Korea is the same country that it has been since 1973, when President-elect Joe Biden became a senator: an isolated and impoverished country whose sole importance in the world comes from the harm that it causes to its own people and the potential harm it may cause to its neighbors.
Now, consider South Korea, which is certainly not the same country as it was in 1973 when it was an economically struggling right-wing dictatorship. Today, South Korea is among the world’s top-10 economies, bigger even than Russia or Brazil. It is a world leader in technology and a crucial link in the global supply chain of high tech materials such as memory chips and 5G equipment. Few can match South Korea’s soft power that churns out Academy Award-winning movies and Billboard chart-topping music. (K-pop group BTS’s fandom was so strong that even Chinese state-owned media backed off from criticizing them.) Seoul’s vibrant democracy inspires others in Asia; protesters in Hong Kong and Thailand adopted Korea’s protest music and K-pop as their own anthem.
In addition, South Korea is an underrated military power. Born out of an apocalyptic civil war and after spending entire existence preparing for the next one, South Korea has seventh-largest standing army in the world with nearly 600,000 soldiers, fifth-largest air force in the world by the number of aircrafts, and its own very large arsenal of ballistic missiles. Seoul’s defense plan goes beyond merely defending against North Korea. Under President Moon Jae-in—belying his reputation as a liberal dove—South Korea has been actively building a blue water navy with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines to protect the remote sea lanes crucial for its trade. Seoul’s foreign policy circles are quietly debating whether South Korea should pursue its own nuclear-weapons program, especially considering the uncertainty of U.S. commitment in its East Asian allies shown during the Trump administration.
The latter point poses a significant challenge to the Biden administration. Following the four years of Trump, South Korea’s opinion of the United States is at an all-time low. This is different from the anti-Americanism of yesteryear, originating from fear and resentment of the United States’ overwhelming power and influence over Korea. Under Trump, the United States became small, unreliable, and petty in the eyes of Koreans. Doubt over U.S. commitment to South Korea began to set in immediately after Trump took office, as Washington failed to support—or even acknowledge—South Korea as it was subject to China’s massive economic retaliation for deploying U.S.’s THAAD missile defense system. The temporary euphoria caused by Trump’s diplomacy with North Korea did not last, as the flashy photo ops failed to lead to any tangible result. Then the extortionate demand of fivefold increase for South Korea’s contribution to stationing U.S. troops in its territory soured the public opinion once and for all. An overwhelming 96 percent of the public opposed the hike at one point; so boorish was U.S. ambassador Harry Harris with this demand—reportedly, he said the word “five billion dollars” at least 20 times in a 30-minute conversation with a South Korean lawmaker—that even South Korea’s pro-US conservative politicians came away insulted.
On the other hand, self-confidence is running high among South Koreans. The defeatist self-conceptualization as “shrimp among whales,” buffeted by the crosswinds from Korea’s more powerful neighbors, has faded significantly. In particular, South Korea’s successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic, contrasted especially with the Trump administration’s abject incompetence, has given Koreans the sense that they have arrived. A recent study showed Korean public’s national pride rose sharply from 2019 to 2020. High-ranking officials freely express that they have the power to shape their own destiny, even in the face of global superpowers. In a recent symposium, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said: “Korea is certainly in a geopolitical position that looks like we are caught in a crossfire. But I think you can turn that around and say it’s leverage.” Lee Soo-hyuk, Korea’s ambassador to United States, was even more blunt: “I feel pride that we are now a country that can choose [between the United States and China], not be forced to choose.” KBS, South Korea’s public broadcaster, carried a two-part article called: “No More America Number One”—a harsh title with even harsher assessment of the decline of the United States under the Trump administration, made all the more shocking because of the broadcaster’s usual stiff-necked decorum.
All of this puts the U.S.-South Korean relationship at an inflection point. Repairing the alliance does not simply mean going back to the pre-Trump era, when South Korea was seen more as a U.S. client state whose international importance was limited to how much it helped advancing the U.S. objectives with North Korea. Such a crabbed view of the alliance, in fact, introduced unnecessary strain in the relationship, as the success of the alliance was judged solely on how closely the two countries were aligned as to Pyongyang. As the slogan for Biden’s transition team goes, the U.S.-South Korean alliance must be built back better. If China is the main challenge for the U.S. foreign policy, it naturally follows that the United States must give very high priority to its democratic ally nearest to China. For the United States, the health of its alliance with South Korea may well determine the outcome of its strategic competition with China as well as the establishment of the rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
Fortunately, the United States is still in a good position with respect to South Korea. In some corners of Washington, D.C., there are concerns that South Korea might abandon the U.S. alliance and join the Sinosphere, informed by a vague notion of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis (which lumps them together as “Confucian” powers) and the idea that South Korea’s liberals (who are currently in power) are secret communists who are in league with the Chinese Communist Party. Such views are ignorant and overblown. South Koreans still like the United States much more than they like China. (In a recent poll asking a favorability rating between 0 and 100, Koreans gave the United States the score of 49.9, and China 29.6.) Koreans are fiercely proud of their hard-won democracy, and are not at all fans of illiberal China or North Korea. Further, as an exporting economy, South Korea recognizes that free trade and the liberal world order—underwritten by the United States—are indispensable to its success.
But inevitably, there are smaller yet significant points at which U.S. and South Korean interests will diverge. The United States may wish its two foremost democratic allies in East Asia to get along better, but South Korea will not stop demanding that Japan face the crimes of its imperialist past. South Korea may quietly support the U.S. initiatives to check China’s rise, but it will not adopt an openly hostile rhetoric or join a group whose explicit purpose is to oppose China. Most importantly, South Korea absolutely will not begin a war with North Korea, which may very easily escalate into a nuclear war that destroys millions of lives. Taking South Korea seriously as an ally means that, in these situations, the United States will not get 100 percent of what it wants. Instead, Washington will have to persuade Seoul by pointing to the greater ideals of liberal international order that they share and nudging its partner closer to its own position—as it might do with any ally.
Doing so will require patience and persistence on the part of the United States. Restoring the trust in the alliance may take longer than the four or eight years of the Biden administration, when South Koreans can plainly see the United States is just one election and one Trump—or a similar figure—away from sliding back. The recent joint fact sheet issued by the State Department and South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, seeking to harmonize the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy and Korea’s New Southern Policy focusing on South Korea’s role in Southeast Asia, is a commendable effort to align the two countries’ foreign policies rather than Washington demanding Seoul to toe the line set by the United States. The Biden administration should do many more of these in different areas such as combating the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, or free trade and movement of people, to assure that it sees South Korea as an important partner.
It will also require a mental adjustment. For a long time, Washington approached the Korean Peninsula with North Korea as the main issue, and South Korea as perhaps one component of the overall solution. This order of priority must be now be reversed: Alliance maintenance with South Korea is the main issue to be addressed, one of whose components is North Korea. Fortunately, some in the D.C. foreign-policy circles are coming to this view. For the U.S. foreign policy in Asia to succeed in the next several decades, the Biden administration must do so as well.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--How Will Iran React to Another High-Profile Assassination?

How Will Iran React to Another High-Profile Assassination ?
Last Friday , Iran announced that an important player in its security apparatus had been killed .
The target of the attack was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh , a key architect of the country ’ s nuclear weapons program known as Project Amad that ended in 2003 ( though elements of it continued for a few years after ) .
Fakhrizadeh ’ s death marks the second time this year that a foreign adversary successfully targeted and killed a major Iranian figure : In January , the United States killed Qassem Suleimani , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Corps ( IRGC ) Quds Force—the unit responsible for designing and implementing much of the country ’ s proxy strategy .
Unlike Suleimani , Fakhrizadeh was not a household name in Iran , much less outside of the country .
In fact , until recently , very few photos of Fakhrizadeh had been made public .
However , the two men were similar in that they were both senior officers in the IRGC and instrumental to key projects undertaken by the regime .
Suleimani expanded and institutionalized Iran ’ s network of nonstate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regional strategy , while Fakhrizadeh helped develop the country ’ s nuclear capabilities .
Their deaths are symbolic and important blows to Iran , and highlight the country ’ s vulnerability .
After Fakhrizadeh ’ s death , Iranian officials were quick to attribute the attack to one of their chief adversaries : Israel .
Jerusalem is also believed to have been behind an explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility—which is currently housing much of the country ’ s uranium enrichment program—this past summer .
Israel has a history of targeting the nuclear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s .
It has reportedly assassinated nuclear scientists and conducted cyberattacks in the hopes of setting back Tehran ’ s nuclear advances over the past decade .
In 2011 , an explosion killed the architect of a third key pillar of Iran ’ s national defense , Hassan Tehrani-Moghaddam , another member of the IRGC , who had helped develop the country ’ s missile program .
Israel appeared implicated .
Israeli operations in Iran have also included intelligence gathering .
In 2018 , Israeli intelligence seized an archive of documents pertaining to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which shed more light on the activities led by Fakhrizadeh .
In fact , while presenting the archive to the public two years ago , Israel ’ s Prime Minister , Benjamin Netanyahu , noted Fakhrizadeh ’ s importance and said to “ remember that name.
” That Israel has been so successful in conducting such sophisticated operations on Iranian soil—going as far as allegedly hitting a high-profile target identified publicly by Netanyahu in the countryside outside of Tehran—exposes once again the failure of the Iranian regime ’ s internal security and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ covert action .
This presents Iran with a dilemma .
Tehran has an incentive to avoid appearing weak .
The country has been hit successfully and repeatedly over the course of 2020 , against the backdrop of a pandemic its government has struggled to contain .
In addition to the assassination of two high-profile Iranian figures this year and the Natanz explosion , the United States and Israel appear to have killed al Qaeda ’ s second-in-command , Abu Muhammad al-Masri , in Tehran in August .
And the Trump administration continues to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and entities to exert pressure on Iran , and to complicate the Biden-Harris administration ’ s return to the 2015 nuclear deal—from which Trump withdrew in 2018 .
Iran ’ s response to these events has been calculated and calibrated .
It has tried to balance two potentially conflicting objectives : avoiding leaving these actions unanswered while refraining from escalating tensions even further , potentially inviting direct military action by the United States .
In doing so , Iran has had some embarrassing failures : In January , shortly after Suleimani ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq that house U.S. forces .
This step was meant to be the first of several , designed to restore deterrence and retaliate for the targeting of one of Iran ’ s most important military commanders .
However , the IRGC then accidentally shot down a Ukrainian airliner , killing all 176 passengers and crew onboard and then sought to cover up the error .
This tragic incident was deeply embarrassing for the Iranian armed forces , which proved not only incapable of protecting a top military commander but also killed innocent civilians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ restraint in the months that followed .
But now , with U.S. and Israeli pressure mounting , the Iranian leadership may find it more difficult to sustain its relative restraint .
Iran ’ s leaders may view a failure to act as a sign of weakness to adversaries , inviting more covert operations and even an attack on their country .
After all , President Donald Trump was reportedly considering conducting an attack on Natanz but was dissuaded from doing so by his advisors .
There would also be domestic costs to inaction @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , arbitrarily detains , and tortures individuals it often falsely accuses of spying for adversaries all the while failing to even protect a valued regime insider on its own soil .
Already , some Iranian officials are arguing that the nation must act to retaliate for this attack and deter potential future ones .
Others are noting that a return to the nuclear deal under these circumstances only further strengthens the hands of its enemies .
This is in tension with the other objective harbored by the Iranian system : Preventing further escalation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President-Elect Joe Biden will be sworn in and likely position Washington to return to the nuclear deal in some form .
As Henry Rome and I argued in Foreign Policy in September , “ Despite extraordinary steps to stabilize the stock market and cover the budget deficit , Iran ’ s economic situation in not sustainable .
The regime can almost certainly not risk the return of widespread protests as it falters further.
” If Iran were to retaliate for Fakhrizadeh ’ s killing or attempt to restore deterrence , it would almost @ @ @ @ @ @ @ calibrated manner .
It would likely choose options that afford it some level of plausible deniability , as it so often does—including cyber operations and attacks via proxies .
However , it still risks provoking a chain reaction .
Israel could choose to respond in kind and any such move could further complicate a U.S. return to the nuclear agreement , potentially denying Iran much-needed economic relief .
In such a scenario , Iran ’ s so-called strategic patience over the past two years would have been for naught .
Moreover , Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ erratic decision-maker .
After Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq killed an American in December , he ordered the killing of Suleimani and his Iraqi deputy , Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis .
Just months later , in March , these forces killed two U.S. service members and a British soldier .
The U.S. response was muted .
With just weeks to go before he leaves office , the Iranians could choose to wait for Trump to depart from the White House or to humiliate him on his way out .
Regardless of how Iran decides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , none of its short-term options are risk-free .
And if such incidents continue to occur in the 50 remaining days of the Trump presidency , they could drag Iran down a path it would prefer not to take .
In the medium term , Tehran may become less inclined to negotiate meaningful limits to other areas of concern—including its missile program and support for proxies—which Biden promised on the campaign trail his administration would seek to curtail .
In the long term , Iranian leaders may come to the conclusion that their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ adversaries from undertaking such actions in the future regardless of the costs associated with it .
Some Israeli observers contend that taking out Fakhrizadeh will make it harder for Iran to succeed in building a nuclear deterrent .
Fakhrizadeh ’ s leadership and knowledge were no doubt critical .
But this line of reasoning overestimates the importance of a single individual—regardless of how instrumental and influential he may have once been—in the development of Iran ’ s nuclear program .
It also ignores the myriad institutions and organizations involved in Iran ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ overt civil nuclear program and covert weapons-related activities .
Finally , it misunderstands one of Fakhrizadeh ’ s most important legacies for the regime : helping build its nuclear infrastructure and creating and preserving know-how it could later use should it decide to resume pursuit of the bomb .
Fakhrizadeh ’ s killing on Iranian soil is a significant blow to the government .
No matter how Tehran chooses to respond , the second- and third-order effects could be far more significant , leading to a hardened line if and when the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as envisioned by Biden .
More worrying yet , Iran may decide that it should scale up the very activities the Trump administration has sought to prevent with its maximum pressure campaign , including a renewed decision to pursue a nuclear weapon .

Last Friday, Iran announced that an important player in its security apparatus had been killed. The target of the attack was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a key architect of the country’s nuclear weapons program known as Project Amad that ended in 2003 (though elements of it continued for a few years after). Fakhrizadeh’s death marks the second time this year that a foreign adversary successfully targeted and killed a major Iranian figure: In January, the United States killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force—the unit responsible for designing and implementing much of the country’s proxy strategy.
Last Friday, Iran announced that an important player in its security apparatus had been killed. The target of the attack was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a key architect of the country’s nuclear weapons program known as Project Amad that ended in 2003 (though elements of it continued for a few years after). Fakhrizadeh’s death marks the second time this year that a foreign adversary successfully targeted and killed a major Iranian figure: In January, the United States killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force—the unit responsible for designing and implementing much of the country’s proxy strategy.
Unlike Suleimani, Fakhrizadeh was not a household name in Iran, much less outside of the country. In fact, until recently, very few photos of Fakhrizadeh had been made public. However, the two men were similar in that they were both senior officers in the IRGC and instrumental to key projects undertaken by the regime. Suleimani expanded and institutionalized Iran’s network of nonstate allies and partners that has underpinned its regional strategy, while Fakhrizadeh helped develop the country’s nuclear capabilities. Their deaths are symbolic and important blows to Iran, and highlight the country’s vulnerability.
After Fakhrizadeh’s death, Iranian officials were quick to attribute the attack to one of their chief adversaries: Israel. Jerusalem is also believed to have been behind an explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility—which is currently housing much of the country’s uranium enrichment program—this past summer. Israel has a history of targeting the nuclear programs of rivals, including Iran’s. It has reportedly assassinated nuclear scientists and conducted cyberattacks in the hopes of setting back Tehran’s nuclear advances over the past decade. In 2011, an explosion killed the architect of a third key pillar of Iran’s national defense, Hassan Tehrani-Moghaddam, another member of the IRGC, who had helped develop the country’s missile program. Israel appeared implicated.
Israeli operations in Iran have also included intelligence gathering. In 2018, Israeli intelligence seized an archive of documents pertaining to Iran’s past nuclear weapon work, which shed more light on the activities led by Fakhrizadeh. In fact, while presenting the archive to the public two years ago, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, noted Fakhrizadeh’s importance and said to “remember that name.”
That Israel has been so successful in conducting such sophisticated operations on Iranian soil—going as far as allegedly hitting a high-profile target identified publicly by Netanyahu in the countryside outside of Tehran—exposes once again the failure of the Iranian regime’s internal security and the country’s vulnerability to foreign covert action. This presents Iran with a dilemma.
Tehran has an incentive to avoid appearing weak. The country has been hit successfully and repeatedly over the course of 2020, against the backdrop of a pandemic its government has struggled to contain. In addition to the assassination of two high-profile Iranian figures this year and the Natanz explosion, the United States and Israel appear to have killed al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, in Tehran in August. And the Trump administration continues to expand the list of sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities to exert pressure on Iran, and to complicate the Biden-Harris administration’s return to the 2015 nuclear deal—from which Trump withdrew in 2018.
Iran’s response to these events has been calculated and calibrated. It has tried to balance two potentially conflicting objectives: avoiding leaving these actions unanswered while refraining from escalating tensions even further, potentially inviting direct military action by the United States. In doing so, Iran has had some embarrassing failures: In January, shortly after Suleimani’s death, Iran struck two bases in Iraq that house U.S. forces.
This step was meant to be the first of several, designed to restore deterrence and retaliate for the targeting of one of Iran’s most important military commanders. However, the IRGC then accidentally shot down a Ukrainian airliner, killing all 176 passengers and crew onboard and then sought to cover up the error. This tragic incident was deeply embarrassing for the Iranian armed forces, which proved not only incapable of protecting a top military commander but also killed innocent civilians by mistake—perhaps prompting them to exercise some restraint in the months that followed.
But now, with U.S. and Israeli pressure mounting, the Iranian leadership may find it more difficult to sustain its relative restraint. Iran’s leaders may view a failure to act as a sign of weakness to adversaries, inviting more covert operations and even an attack on their country. After all, President Donald Trump was reportedly considering conducting an attack on Natanz but was dissuaded from doing so by his advisors. There would also be domestic costs to inaction. The paranoid regime routinely uses force, arbitrarily detains, and tortures individuals it often falsely accuses of spying for adversaries all the while failing to even protect a valued regime insider on its own soil.
Already, some Iranian officials are arguing that the nation must act to retaliate for this attack and deter potential future ones. Others are noting that a return to the nuclear deal under these circumstances only further strengthens the hands of its enemies. This is in tension with the other objective harbored by the Iranian system: Preventing further escalation until Jan. 20, 2021, when President-Elect Joe Biden will be sworn in and likely position Washington to return to the nuclear deal in some form. As Henry Rome and I argued in Foreign Policy in September, “Despite extraordinary steps to stabilize the stock market and cover the budget deficit, Iran’s economic situation in not sustainable. The regime can almost certainly not risk the return of widespread protests as it falters further.”
If Iran were to retaliate for Fakhrizadeh’s killing or attempt to restore deterrence, it would almost certainly do so in a deliberate and calibrated manner. It would likely choose options that afford it some level of plausible deniability, as it so often does—including cyber operations and attacks via proxies. However, it still risks provoking a chain reaction. Israel could choose to respond in kind and any such move could further complicate a U.S. return to the nuclear agreement, potentially denying Iran much-needed economic relief. In such a scenario, Iran’s so-called strategic patience over the past two years would have been for naught.
Moreover, Trump has proven to be an unpredictable and erratic decision-maker. After Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq killed an American in December, he ordered the killing of Suleimani and his Iraqi deputy, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Just months later, in March, these forces killed two U.S. service members and a British soldier. The U.S. response was muted. With just weeks to go before he leaves office, the Iranians could choose to wait for Trump to depart from the White House or to humiliate him on his way out.
Regardless of how Iran decides to retaliate between now and inauguration day, none of its short-term options are risk-free. And if such incidents continue to occur in the 50 remaining days of the Trump presidency, they could drag Iran down a path it would prefer not to take. In the medium term, Tehran may become less inclined to negotiate meaningful limits to other areas of concern—including its missile program and support for proxies—which Biden promised on the campaign trail his administration would seek to curtail. In the long term, Iranian leaders may come to the conclusion that their country needs a nuclear weapon to deter adversaries from undertaking such actions in the future regardless of the costs associated with it.
Some Israeli observers contend that taking out Fakhrizadeh will make it harder for Iran to succeed in building a nuclear deterrent. Fakhrizadeh’s leadership and knowledge were no doubt critical. But this line of reasoning overestimates the importance of a single individual—regardless of how instrumental and influential he may have once been—in the development of Iran’s nuclear program. It also ignores the myriad institutions and organizations involved in Iran’s nuclear decision-making and the development of its overt civil nuclear program and covert weapons-related activities. Finally, it misunderstands one of Fakhrizadeh’s most important legacies for the regime: helping build its nuclear infrastructure and creating and preserving know-how it could later use should it decide to resume pursuit of the bomb.
Fakhrizadeh’s killing on Iranian soil is a significant blow to the government. No matter how Tehran chooses to respond, the second- and third-order effects could be far more significant, leading to a hardened line if and when the country agrees to build on the nuclear deal as envisioned by Biden. More worrying yet, Iran may decide that it should scale up the very activities the Trump administration has sought to prevent with its maximum pressure campaign, including a renewed decision to pursue a nuclear weapon.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-28--India’s Farmers Come Out in Force Against Modi

Barnala , Punjab , INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers ’ rights .
At this gathering , on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India , Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban .
She is a 20-year-old journalism student , and she has come with her father , who is a farmer .
Wearing a green shirt and white trousers , she squints her eyes at her father , Kewal Singh , who is addressing the farmers as they block a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are protesting three new laws , all passed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) government on Sept 20 .
The first , The Farmers ( Empowerment & Protection ) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill , claims to “ empower farmers for engaging with processors , wholesalers , aggregators , wholesalers , large retailers , exporters etc.
, on a level playing field.
” It promises “ price assurance to farmers even before sowing of crops.
” The second , The Essential Commodities Act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ drive up investment in cold storages and modernization of the food supply chain ” and creates a “ competitive market environment and also prevents wastage of agri-produce that happens due to lack of storage facilities.
” And the third , the Farmers ’ Produce Trade and Commerce ( Promotion and Facilitation ) Bill , is notionally meant to “ act as a catalyst to attract private sector investment for building supply chains for supply of Indian farm produce to national and global markets , and in agricultural infrastructure.
” The government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farming in India and will transform the agriculture sector through increased private investment .
Many activists , though , believe that measures will help a few corporations while leading to unemployment and growing debt for smaller scale farmers .
Farmers also believe that many could lose land if they are forced to sell their property to corporates , which will directly deal with production and marketing of goods .
In a tweet , Modi responded to such criticism by saying : “ For decades , the Indian farmer was bound by various constraints @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passed by Parliament liberate the farmers from such adversities.
” What happens to India ’ s farmers is no small matter .
The agriculture sector employs half of India ’ s 1.35 billion people and contributes nearly 15 percent of India ’ s $ 2.7 trillion economy .
Given growing debt , poor harvests , and draught , in 2019 , 28 people who depend on farming died by suicide every day .
If the protesters are right about the effects of the new law , that figure could climb .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ old when she attended her first farmers ’ protest with her father , came out that Friday .
She had left her home in Bhagike village early in the morning with her neighbors to travel two hours by tractor to the protest .
Two months before , her son , Karamjeet Singh , 48 , took his own life by drinking pesticide .
After selling his family land to marry off his two sisters , Singh had gone to work as a laborer for other farmers .
With India ’ s inflation rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debts had surged to over $ 13,000 .
“ He had enormous debt on him , ” says Naseemo later , while sitting on a cot in back in her home .
“ He sold his land and crop and paid back .
He worked as a laborer , but he could hardly earn anything .
He would often cry and say , ‘ What will we do , how will I marry my children , how will we sustain ?
’ Then he thought that his life had no meaning and drank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was declared dead at the hospital .
The family now has his framed portrait photograph with his birth and death dates that they plan to hang next to a similar one of his father who succumbed to cancer on Dec. 15 , 2017 .
“ After he sold all his land , he strongly believed that he was way beyond help .
During this pandemic , he couldn ’ t find work every day .
How can a government who has lost the respect of the world be a good government ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has never done anything for us , ” says Naseemo .
With no farmland or savings , it is now Sukhwinder , Singh ’ s son and Naseemo ’ s grandson , who goes out to look for work to provide for his family .
There ’ s a bit of his father ’ s debt left to repay—and of course , ever present fears , that the family could have to take on more .
Back at the protest , Sukhdev Singh Khokri , speaks .
He is Punjab general secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-partisan farmers ’ representative organization .
In his remarks , he takes up the theme of debt , railing against the government which , “ says that its treasury is not able to resolve debts.
” In his yellow turban and white kurta , Khokri is respected by everyone at the protest .
Modi ’ s new measures , he predicted , would lead to more indebtedness .
“ These laws are going to fundamentally destroy the occupation of farming , ” he said , they ’ ll “ loot the crops produced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of free market , these laws will sell the market space to the private traders.
” As the sun touches the lush paddy fields , the farmers begin to board tractors , bikes , and cars to leave for home .
Naseemo , too , leaves .
But she is not ready to stop protesting .
“ I will also fight .
I will not stop protesting for what is right .
People like me who are protesting understand my struggles , ” she says .
“ I returned home recently and since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the central government passed the new laws , ” says Kaur , as her father listens .
“ We are going to the villages to inform the people how the laws will destroy the farming , deprive us of everything , and snatch our lands .
I consider this as a threat to Indian democracy if we impose laws on people without their consent.
” According to the government , the new laws are to reform the agriculture sector in the country by providing more choices to farmers and help them get better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aims to enable farmers to enhance their trade by use of technology and also reduce the marketing costs , which can improve their income .
Seen as a trap by farmers , the government ’ s move also paves way for corporate investment into farming .
Days after the farm laws were passed , a Punjab-based political party , Shiromani Akali Dal ( SAD ) —one the BJP ’ s oldest allies in government , quit the alliance .
SAD ’ s president , Sukhbir Badal , said the party couldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such anti-farmer and anti-Punjab bills.
” In the last state elections of 2017 , the BJP only won three seats out of 117 in Punjab , and the protesting farmers hope that its standing will fall even further in the next election , in 2022 .
Kaur believes that defeating the BJP is possible , especially if the “ youth face up to this threat.
” Farmers don ’ t only have sons , she says , they also have daughters , who will also fight for farmlands .
“ We will fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” But the protests have not attracted significant attention from the Modi government yet .
This month , the officials of the agriculture ministry met farmers ’ unions for talks but the meeting ended with the unions ’ representatives leaving after an hour , because unions are demanding that the agricultural minister or Modi himself should attend the talks .
So far Modi and his senior ministers have declined , and protests have escalated .
On Nov. 5 , at least one million farmers at over 5,000 locations across 20 states took to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another march is planned for Delhi on Nov. 26-27 .
Kaur , who wants to become a journalist to tell the story of her people , her family , the farmers , says that for the past six years , she has only seen the poor sections of society getting poorer .
That ’ s something most Indians must acutely feel , too .

Barnala, Punjab, INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers’ rights. At this gathering, on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India, Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban. She is a 20-year-old journalism student, and she has come with her father, who is a farmer.
Barnala, Punjab, INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers’ rights. At this gathering, on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India, Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban. She is a 20-year-old journalism student, and she has come with her father, who is a farmer.
Wearing a green shirt and white trousers, she squints her eyes at her father, Kewal Singh, who is addressing the farmers as they block a toll plaza on a highway. They are protesting three new laws, all passed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government on Sept 20.
The first, The Farmers (Empowerment & Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, claims to “empower farmers for engaging with processors, wholesalers, aggregators, wholesalers, large retailers, exporters etc., on a level playing field.” It promises “price assurance to farmers even before sowing of crops.” The second, The Essential Commodities Act (Amendment) Bill, aims to “drive up investment in cold storages and modernization of the food supply chain” and creates a “competitive market environment and also prevents wastage of agri-produce that happens due to lack of storage facilities.” And the third, the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, is notionally meant to “act as a catalyst to attract private sector investment for building supply chains for supply of Indian farm produce to national and global markets, and in agricultural infrastructure.”
The government has claimed that its new laws will streamline farming in India and will transform the agriculture sector through increased private investment. Many activists, though, believe that measures will help a few corporations while leading to unemployment and growing debt for smaller scale farmers. Farmers also believe that many could lose land if they are forced to sell their property to corporates, which will directly deal with production and marketing of goods.
In a tweet, Modi responded to such criticism by saying: “For decades, the Indian farmer was bound by various constraints and bullied by middlemen. The bills passed by Parliament liberate the farmers from such adversities.”
What happens to India’s farmers is no small matter. The agriculture sector employs half of India’s 1.35 billion people and contributes nearly 15 percent of India’s $2.7 trillion economy. Given growing debt, poor harvests, and draught, in 2019, 28 people who depend on farming died by suicide every day. If the protesters are right about the effects of the new law, that figure could climb. That is why Kaur, who was five years old when she attended her first farmers’ protest with her father, came out that Friday.
Wearing faded green floral kurta, Naseemo Kaur, no relation to Sumandeep, sits in the front row chanting slogans with over a dozen other women outside a grain silo in Moga area of Punjab at another protest on Oct. 2. The silo is owned by Gautam Adani, an Indian industrialist whose net worth is an estimated $25.2 billion. Adani has been accused of receiving benefits from Modi to grow his business network across the country. The farmers’ union that had organized this particular protest accused Modi of imposing new laws to benefit his “industrialist friends,” like Adani. As each speaker at the protest accused the government of facilitating corporate looting of the agricultural sector, Naseemo took a break to drink water in the scorching heat.
She had left her home in Bhagike village early in the morning with her neighbors to travel two hours by tractor to the protest. Two months before, her son, Karamjeet Singh, 48, took his own life by drinking pesticide. After selling his family land to marry off his two sisters, Singh had gone to work as a laborer for other farmers. With India’s inflation rate reaching 7.4 percent, Singh’s debts had surged to over $13,000.
“He had enormous debt on him,” says Naseemo later, while sitting on a cot in back in her home. “He sold his land and crop and paid back. He worked as a laborer, but he could hardly earn anything. He would often cry and say, ‘What will we do, how will I marry my children, how will we sustain?’ Then he thought that his life had no meaning and drank pesticide spray.” Three days later, he was declared dead at the hospital. The family now has his framed portrait photograph with his birth and death dates that they plan to hang next to a similar one of his father who succumbed to cancer on Dec. 15, 2017.
“After he sold all his land, he strongly believed that he was way beyond help. During this pandemic, he couldn’t find work every day. How can a government who has lost the respect of the world be a good government? The government has given us nothing, it has never done anything for us,” says Naseemo.
With no farmland or savings, it is now Sukhwinder, Singh’s son and Naseemo’s grandson, who goes out to look for work to provide for his family. There’s a bit of his father’s debt left to repay—and of course, ever present fears, that the family could have to take on more.
Back at the protest, Sukhdev Singh Khokri, speaks. He is Punjab general secretary of the Bhartiya Kisan Union—Ekta Ugrahan—a nationwide non-partisan farmers’ representative organization. In his remarks, he takes up the theme of debt, railing against the government which, “says that its treasury is not able to resolve debts.”
In his yellow turban and white kurta, Khokri is respected by everyone at the protest. Modi’s new measures, he predicted, would lead to more indebtedness. “These laws are going to fundamentally destroy the occupation of farming,” he said, they’ll “loot the crops produced by the farmers; in the name of free market, these laws will sell the market space to the private traders.”
As the sun touches the lush paddy fields, the farmers begin to board tractors, bikes, and cars to leave for home. Naseemo, too, leaves. But she is not ready to stop protesting. “I will also fight. I will not stop protesting for what is right. People like me who are protesting understand my struggles,” she says.
Back in her village, Sumandeep Kaur vows to fight on as well. Since March 2020, when a countrywide lockdown was announced for the COVID-19 pandemic, Kaur’s college has been closed. In a large compound with one story main house and two outhouses adjoining farmland, she lives with the families of her two uncles. Over a dozen buffaloes turn their heads as she walks to pour them water in the stable.
“I returned home recently and since then I have been joining protests after the central government passed the new laws,” says Kaur, as her father listens. “We are going to the villages to inform the people how the laws will destroy the farming, deprive us of everything, and snatch our lands. I consider this as a threat to Indian democracy if we impose laws on people without their consent.”
According to the government, the new laws are to reform the agriculture sector in the country by providing more choices to farmers and help them get better prices to their produce. It also aims to enable farmers to enhance their trade by use of technology and also reduce the marketing costs, which can improve their income. Seen as a trap by farmers, the government’s move also paves way for corporate investment into farming.
Laborers rest on bags of shelled corn at the Khanna market in Punjab on Oct. 3.
Days after the farm laws were passed, a Punjab-based political party, Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)—one the BJP’s oldest allies in government, quit the alliance. SAD’s president, Sukhbir Badal, said the party couldn’t stand by as the BJP brought “such anti-farmer and anti-Punjab bills.” In the last state elections of 2017, the BJP only won three seats out of 117 in Punjab, and the protesting farmers hope that its standing will fall even further in the next election, in 2022.
Kaur believes that defeating the BJP is possible, especially if the “youth face up to this threat.” Farmers don’t only have sons, she says, they also have daughters, who will also fight for farmlands. “We will fight against the Modi government and the ordinances.” But the protests have not attracted significant attention from the Modi government yet.
This month, the officials of the agriculture ministry met farmers’ unions for talks but the meeting ended with the unions’ representatives leaving after an hour, because unions are demanding that the agricultural minister or Modi himself should attend the talks. So far Modi and his senior ministers have declined, and protests have escalated. On Nov. 5, at least one million farmers at over 5,000 locations across 20 states took to streets to in demonstration against the laws. Another march is planned for Delhi on Nov. 26-27.
Kaur, who wants to become a journalist to tell the story of her people, her family, the farmers, says that for the past six years, she has only seen the poor sections of society getting poorer. That’s something most Indians must acutely feel, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-01--The Feminine Appeal of Macho Populism

The Feminine Appeal of Macho Populism

Miriam Goulart was crestfallen when President Donald Trump lost the election .
The 45-year-old Brazilian mother of three was rooting for Trump , whom she describes as having “ tenacity ” and someone who “ wants the best for his country.
” He reminds her of the president of her own country—Jair Bolsonaro , another brash strongman who rode to power on a wave of populist anger and has sparked controversy for his public remarks about women .
Bolsonaro once told a female member of Congress he wouldn ’ t rape her because she “ didn ’ t deserve it.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Goulart or the millions of women around the world who revere leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro despite their hostility toward women .
Though Trump lost reelection , his support among women increased in 2020 .
World leaders like Bolsonaro , President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines , and President Andrzej Duda of Poland also continue to enjoy strong support from many women , suggesting that—while Trump ’ s defeat may have dealt a blow to his brand of “ macho populism ” —the phenomenon isn ’ t going away any time soon .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s women who are fueling it .
While there is no single unifying explanation for why women in different countries support macho populists— politicians who project an ideal of male dominance—there are some commonalities .
Women tend to be more religious than men , a fact that macho populists often use to their advantage .
Trump has aggressively courted religious voters and three-quarters of white Evangelicals voted for him in 2020 .
In Brazil and Poland , a similar dynamic draws women to men who seem to fit traditional gender norms .
When @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who to vote for in Brazil ’ s 2018 presidential election , she found everything she was looking for in Bolsonaro , a former military captain who had promised to restore Christian ideals in a country where 81 percent of the population is Catholic or Evangelical .
“ He ’ s talking about principles based on the nuclear family , which is what we need to have in our homes , ” she said .
Nunes grew up in a home where “ men were men and women were women ” and she @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ what a lot of other people see as sexism or authoritarianism coming from the president.
” Claudia Félix , a 49-year-old married mother of two from Brazil , was similarly unconcerned .
“ Men don ’ t usually react the same way as women , ” said Félix .
“ They ’ re more in-your-face , especially when they ’ re from the military like he is.
” During public appearances , Bolsonaro often uses his middle name , Messias , rhetorically equating himself to Christ the Messiah .
He told supporters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Brazil from chaos caused by corruption , violence , radical leftists , and feminism .
“ Bolsonaro ’ s supporters act as if they are his believers , ” said Daniela Gomes , McGill visiting assistant professor of international studies at Trinity College-Hartford .
“ They worship him no matter what.
” In Poland , Duda , who has called LGBTQ rights an “ ideology ” more destructive than communism , won reelection this summer by a narrow margin .
A few months later , he praised a court decision ruling that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abortions performed in the country— were unconstitutional .
( He backtracked somewhat after nationwide protests ) .
Female supporters of macho populism also tend to share a desire for a hard line on crime .
In the Philippines , Duterte has styled himself as a protector of women , many of whom believe he has made them safer .
As president , he has waged a violent war on drugs that has led to more than 8,600 deaths .
Last year , he signed a law criminalizing public sexual harassment .
For many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cover for his innumerable remarks seemingly promoting sexual violence , including attributing an increase in rape cases in his hometown to the fact that there are “ many beautiful women there .
He has admitted to sexually assaulting a housemaid as a teenager and ordered Filipino soldiers to shoot female rebels in the vagina , saying , “ If there is no vagina , it would be useless.
” Duterte insists these are jokes and many Filipino women believe him .
When he forcibly kissed a migrant woman at an event in South @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Filipina women not as a violation but a sign of relatability .
“ It ’ s read as , ‘ He ’ s one of us .
He ’ s not disgusted by us , ’ ” said Sharmila Parmanand , who has a doctorate in gender studies from the University of Cambridge .
But macho populist rhetoric , which often fetishizes women as chaste and in need of protection , can fly in the face of actual policy outcomes .
Duterte ’ s drug war has left large swaths of women more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s expansion of the Mexico City Policy has drastically cut funding for reproductive health services in the United States and globally .
Bolsonaro has curtailed Brazil ’ s longstanding social welfare program Bolsa Família , which provides financial aid to 13 million families—most of them single-parent households run by women—living in poverty and extreme poverty .
Some forms of domestic violence have been decriminalized in Vladimir Putin ’ s Russia .
And in Narendra Modi ’ s India , sexual violence against women has risen despite the prime minister ’ s promises of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ positions of power aren ’ t necessarily a salve , either .
Newly elected U.S. congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene , French politician Marine Le Pen , Brazilian politician Joice Hasselmann , and other female public figures have embraced a tough , anti-feminist brand of politics .
“ Male populist charisma is appealing to both men and women , ” said Susi Meret , associate professor of politics and society at Denmark ’ s Aalborg University .
In the United States , that appeal is far stronger among white women , 55 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points more than in 2016 ) .
Both Black and Hispanic women overwhelmingly voted for President-elect Joe Biden ( though Trump got a higher share of their votes in 2020 than he did in 2016 ) .
“ Some women don ’ t view what ’ s going on at the border with sterilizations or what ’ s happening to communities of color as in any way related to their lives , ” said Christina M. Greer , associate professor of political science and American studies at Fordham University .
“ We all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot of white women have chosen whiteness over gender.
” While Trump ’ s defeat isn ’ t a death knell for macho populism , it may weaken the coalition of like-minded leaders that has emerged in recent years .
Macho populists have made no secret of their affinity for one another .
China ’ s President Xi Jinping has called Putin his “ best and bosom friend.
” Bolsonaro had repeatedly praised Trump , even telling him “ I love you ” at a United Nations General Assembly meeting last year .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he suffered major losses .
Seventy-eight local candidates added “ Bolsonaro ” next to their names—candidates are permitted to include nicknames on ballots—to show their allegiance to the sitting president .
Only one was elected .
Bolsonaro now appears to be distancing himself from the outgoing U.S. president , reportedly saying after Trump ’ s loss that he “ is not the most important person in the world.
” Goulart doesn ’ t see Bolsonaro ’ s lack of support in the municipal elections as a loss , but as a stepping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And she is sure he ’ ll win again in 2022 .
“ It ’ s only been two years since the people have woken up , ” she said .
“ Not everything is going to change in four years , in just one mandate.
” Goulart still believes that Bolsonaro ’ s military toughness is just what Brazil needs .
“ Look what he ’ s already done with the population , ” she said .
“ He made everyone think .
It ’ s spectacular .
How could you not @ @ @ @ @

Miriam Goulart was crestfallen when President Donald Trump lost the election.
The 45-year-old Brazilian mother of three was rooting for Trump, whom she describes as having “tenacity” and someone who “wants the best for his country.” He reminds her of the president of her own country—Jair Bolsonaro, another brash strongman who rode to power on a wave of populist anger and has sparked controversy for his public remarks about women. Bolsonaro once told a female member of Congress he wouldn’t rape her because she “didn’t deserve it.”
That rhetoric hasn’t deterred Goulart or the millions of women around the world who revere leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro despite their hostility toward women. Though Trump lost reelection, his support among women increased in 2020. World leaders like Bolsonaro, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, and President Andrzej Duda of Poland also continue to enjoy strong support from many women, suggesting that—while Trump’s defeat may have dealt a blow to his brand of “macho populism”—the phenomenon isn’t going away any time soon. And in many cases, it’s women who are fueling it.
While there is no single unifying explanation for why women in different countries support macho populists— politicians who project an ideal of male dominance—there are some commonalities. Women tend to be more religious than men, a fact that macho populists often use to their advantage. Trump has aggressively courted religious voters and three-quarters of white Evangelicals voted for him in 2020. In Brazil and Poland, a similar dynamic draws women to men who seem to fit traditional gender norms.
When Ellen Nunes, 29, was deciding who to vote for in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, she found everything she was looking for in Bolsonaro, a former military captain who had promised to restore Christian ideals in a country where 81 percent of the population is Catholic or Evangelical.
“He’s talking about principles based on the nuclear family, which is what we need to have in our homes,” she said. Nunes grew up in a home where “men were men and women were women” and she doesn’t see a problem with “what a lot of other people see as sexism or authoritarianism coming from the president.”
Claudia Félix, a 49-year-old married mother of two from Brazil, was similarly unconcerned. “Men don’t usually react the same way as women,” said Félix. “They’re more in-your-face, especially when they’re from the military like he is.”
During public appearances, Bolsonaro often uses his middle name, Messias, rhetorically equating himself to Christ the Messiah. He told supporters he was chosen to save the people of Brazil from chaos caused by corruption, violence, radical leftists, and feminism. “Bolsonaro’s supporters act as if they are his believers,” said Daniela Gomes, McGill visiting assistant professor of international studies at Trinity College-Hartford. “They worship him no matter what.”
In Poland, Duda, who has called LGBTQ rights an “ideology” more destructive than communism, won reelection this summer by a narrow margin. A few months later, he praised a court decision ruling that abortions based on fetal abnormalities—which constitute most abortions performed in the country— were unconstitutional. (He backtracked somewhat after nationwide protests).
Female supporters of macho populism also tend to share a desire for a hard line on crime. In the Philippines, Duterte has styled himself as a protector of women, many of whom believe he has made them safer. As president, he has waged a violent war on drugs that has led to more than 8,600 deaths. Last year, he signed a law criminalizing public sexual harassment.
For many of his supporters, these measures are cover for his innumerable remarks seemingly promoting sexual violence, including attributing an increase in rape cases in his hometown to the fact that there are “many beautiful women ” there. He has admitted to sexually assaulting a housemaid as a teenager and ordered Filipino soldiers to shoot female rebels in the vagina, saying, “If there is no vagina, it would be useless.” Duterte insists these are jokes and many Filipino women believe him. When he forcibly kissed a migrant woman at an event in South Korea, it was viewed by many Filipina women not as a violation but a sign of relatability.
“It’s read as, ‘He’s one of us. He’s not disgusted by us,’” said Sharmila Parmanand, who has a doctorate in gender studies from the University of Cambridge.
But macho populist rhetoric, which often fetishizes women as chaste and in need of protection, can fly in the face of actual policy outcomes. Duterte’s drug war has left large swaths of women more economically and physically vulnerable. Trump’s expansion of the Mexico City Policy has drastically cut funding for reproductive health services in the United States and globally. Bolsonaro has curtailed Brazil’s longstanding social welfare program , Bolsa Família, which provides financial aid to 13 million families—most of them single-parent households run by women—living in poverty and extreme poverty. Some forms of domestic violence have been decriminalized in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. And in Narendra Modi’s India, sexual violence against women has risen despite the prime minister’s promises of “zero tolerance.”
More women in positions of power aren’t necessarily a salve, either. Newly elected U.S. congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, French politician Marine Le Pen, Brazilian politician Joice Hasselmann, and other female public figures have embraced a tough, anti-feminist brand of politics. “Male populist charisma is appealing to both men and women,” said Susi Meret, associate professor of politics and society at Denmark’s Aalborg University.
In the United States, that appeal is far stronger among white women, 55 percent of whom voted for Trump (2 percentage points more than in 2016). Both Black and Hispanic women overwhelmingly voted for President-elect Joe Biden (though Trump got a higher share of their votes in 2020 than he did in 2016). “Some women don’t view what’s going on at the border with sterilizations or what’s happening to communities of color as in any way related to their lives,” said Christina M. Greer, associate professor of political science and American studies at Fordham University. “We all have multiple identities and I think a lot of white women have chosen whiteness over gender.”
While Trump’s defeat isn’t a death knell for macho populism, it may weaken the coalition of like-minded leaders that has emerged in recent years. Macho populists have made no secret of their affinity for one another. China’s President Xi Jinping has called Putin his “best and bosom friend.” Bolsonaro had repeatedly praised Trump, even telling him “I love you” at a United Nations General Assembly meeting last year. But in recent municipal elections in Brazil, he suffered major losses. Seventy-eight local candidates added “Bolsonaro” next to their names—candidates are permitted to include nicknames on ballots—to show their allegiance to the sitting president. Only one was elected. Bolsonaro now appears to be distancing himself from the outgoing U.S. president, reportedly saying after Trump’s loss that he “is not the most important person in the world.”
Goulart doesn’t see Bolsonaro’s lack of support in the municipal elections as a loss, but as a stepping stone on the path to change. And she is sure he’ll win again in 2022.
“It’s only been two years since the people have woken up,” she said. “Not everything is going to change in four years, in just one mandate.” Goulart still believes that Bolsonaro’s military toughness is just what Brazil needs.
“Look what he’s already done with the population,” she said. “He made everyone think. It’s spectacular. How could you not love this president?”


foreignpolicy--2020-12-01--NATO Foreign Ministers Meet as Alliance Seeks New Path

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : NATO foreign ministers begin two days of talks , OPEC countries to decide on production limits , and Brazil ’ s deforestation hits 12-year high .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The alliance has spent the last two decades finding purpose in its Afghanistan mission , but with U.S. interest waning , and troops departing , it ’ s in search of a new raison d ’ être .
Pivot to Asia ?
The group appears to have found its motivation in a challenger thousands of miles @ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to be reviewed at today ’ s meeting calls for fresh thinking on dealing with a rising China , including deepening ties with Asian allies and increasing technological capabilities .
A. Wess Mitchell , one of the report ’ s co-authors and a former assistant secretary of state for Europe , laid out the core message in an interview with the New York Times .
“ NATO has to adapt itself for an era of strategic rivalry with Russia and China , for the return of a geopolitical competition that has a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ’ ’ he said .
The shift in focus is in line with a draft European Commission report that seeks to engage the United States in a new spirit of cooperation , including on subjects as far apart as digital regulation and deforestation .
NATO ’ s posture should also catch Biden ’ s eye ; he has championed the alliance in the past and whose administration looks set to continue the Asia “ rebalance ” embraced by the Obama administration .
Public support remains high .
Despite its identity crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ solace in public support for the organization .
A Pew survey taken in 2019 found that public support is relatively high , and largely unchanged over the past decade ; 82 percent of Poles approve of the alliance and the median approval rating across members states is 53 percent .
France and Germany have seen the biggest drops in support among European members , with just 49 percent and 57 percent respectively holding a favorable view of the organization in 2019 .
The Turkey problem .
The outlier in those polls is Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ polled held a favorable view of NATO , while 55 percent thought of the organization unfavorably .
Turkey ’ s membership in NATO is starting to make less and less sense by the day , exemplified by its de facto alliance with Russia in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its insistence on adopting Russia ’ s S-400 air defense system against the wishes of Washington .
OPEC decision .
Oil producing nations are expected to decide today on whether to increase production in the new year after a day of talks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
OPEC+ countries were due to increase production by 1.9 million barrels per day in January as part of a groupwide cut agreed in April , but the still-sluggish global demand for oil has prompted a rethink .
The likely outcome , according to Bloomberg reporting , is a three-month extension to production cuts , although disagreements remain between cartel members on the exact terms of the deal .
Vaccine standoff .
The head of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ( FDA ) , Stephen Hahn , will visit the White House @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the agency ’ s approval process for coronavirus vaccines .
The decision to summon Hahn comes as Trump administration officials offering differing accounts of when vaccines will begin being distributed .
Robert Redfield , the director of the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control ( CDC ) , has said the Pfizer vaccine should be available as soon as Dec. 10 , although an FDA official responsible for approving the vaccine said it could take “ a few weeks.
” The news comes as the U.S. reported a total of 4 million cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November , a figure higher than any country has recorded in total over the course of the entire pandemic except for Brazil and India .
U.S. Supreme Court hears international child labor case .
The U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that will help determine whether U.S. corporations can be held responsible for human rights abuses committed abroad .
The plaintiffs in the case allege that Nestlé and Cargill are liable for “ aiding and abetting child slavery ” for allowing child labor on cocoa farms that they control in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can ’ t be held liable and that they are not directly responsible for any harm caused .
Scottish independence .
Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has called for an independence referendum “ in the early part of the new parliament , ” ahead of Scottish parliamentary elections in May .
Sturgeon made the remarks in an address at a Scottish National Party ( SNP ) conference .
Although Scottish voters rejected independence by a 55-45 percent margin in 2014 , recent polls show a majority in favor of secession , likely due @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Union among Scots .
Westminster would have to give Edinburgh permission to hold another referendum , and Sturgeon has said she will take the British government to court if they block a vote .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Jamie Maxwell explains why Boris Johnson may have inadvertently furthered Sturgeon ’ s cause .
Somalia-Kenya tensions .
Somalia has expelled its Kenyan ambassador and recalled its own from Nairobi , alleging that Kenya had interfered in its electoral procedures in the state of Jubaland , while providing no evidence .
The news was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s foreign ministry , and according to their Kenyan counterparts , no formal communication has been made about the ambassador ’ s removal .
Brazil ’ s rainforest .
The level of deforestation in Brazil ’ s Amazon rainforest has hit a 12-year high , according to official data released on Monday .
11,088 square kilometers ( 4,281 square miles ) of rainforest was destroyed in 2020 , a 9.5 percent increase since 2019 .
Although deforestation has increased under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro , Monday ’ s figures left some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9.5 percent increase was much lower than in 2019 , when deforestation was 34 percent higher than the previous year .
Tensions are fermenting between South Korea and China after a Chinese news outlet claimed China was leading the way on a traditional Korean dish .
The spat begins with kimchi , a fermented vegetable dish that is a mainstay of Korean cuisine , but that goes by the name of pao cai in China ( complicated further by a similar Chinese dish also called pao cai ) .
The global standards body @ @ @ @ @ @ @ storage and transport of the Chinese variant , prompting the Global Times to crow that China was leading the world in kimchi standards .
The comment caused such anger on social media that Korea ’ s agricultural ministry issued a statement that international standards for kimchi were already set by the United Nations in 2001 and attempted to set the record straight once and for all .
“ It is inappropriate to report [ the pao cai certification ] without differentiating kimchi from pao cai of China ’ s Sichuan , ” it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: NATO foreign ministers begin two days of talks, OPEC countries to decide on production limits, and Brazil’s deforestation hits 12-year high.
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NATO Searches For Meaning in Biden Era Foreign ministers of NATO member nations meet today for a two-day conference to discuss the future of the alliance as the organization searches for relevance ahead of the impending Joe Biden presidency.
The alliance has spent the last two decades finding purpose in its Afghanistan mission, but with U.S. interest waning, and troops departing, it’s in search of a new raison d’être.
Pivot to Asia? The group appears to have found its motivation in a challenger thousands of miles from its borders. A new report due to be reviewed at today’s meeting calls for fresh thinking on dealing with a rising China, including deepening ties with Asian allies and increasing technological capabilities.
A. Wess Mitchell, one of the report’s co-authors and a former assistant secretary of state for Europe, laid out the core message in an interview with the New York Times. “NATO has to adapt itself for an era of strategic rivalry with Russia and China, for the return of a geopolitical competition that has a military dimension but also a political one,’’ he said.
The shift in focus is in line with a draft European Commission report that seeks to engage the United States in a new spirit of cooperation, including on subjects as far apart as digital regulation and deforestation. NATO’s posture should also catch Biden’s eye; he has championed the alliance in the past and whose administration looks set to continue the Asia “rebalance” embraced by the Obama administration.
Public support remains high. Despite its identity crisis, NATO’s supporters can take some solace in public support for the organization. A Pew survey taken in 2019 found that public support is relatively high, and largely unchanged over the past decade; 82 percent of Poles approve of the alliance and the median approval rating across members states is 53 percent. France and Germany have seen the biggest drops in support among European members, with just 49 percent and 57 percent respectively holding a favorable view of the organization in 2019.
The Turkey problem. The outlier in those polls is Turkey, where only 21 percent of those polled held a favorable view of NATO, while 55 percent thought of the organization unfavorably. Turkey’s membership in NATO is starting to make less and less sense by the day, exemplified by its de facto alliance with Russia in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its insistence on adopting Russia’s S-400 air defense system against the wishes of Washington.
What We’re Following Today
OPEC decision. Oil producing nations are expected to decide today on whether to increase production in the new year after a day of talks failed to yield a resolution on Monday. OPEC+ countries were due to increase production by 1.9 million barrels per day in January as part of a groupwide cut agreed in April, but the still-sluggish global demand for oil has prompted a rethink. The likely outcome, according to Bloomberg reporting, is a three-month extension to production cuts, although disagreements remain between cartel members on the exact terms of the deal.
Vaccine standoff. The head of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Stephen Hahn, will visit the White House today amid frustration at the speed of the agency’s approval process for coronavirus vaccines. The decision to summon Hahn comes as Trump administration officials offering differing accounts of when vaccines will begin being distributed. Robert Redfield, the director of the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC), has said the Pfizer vaccine should be available as soon as Dec. 10, although an FDA official responsible for approving the vaccine said it could take “a few weeks.” The news comes as the U.S. reported a total of 4 million cases of the coronavirus in the month of November, a figure higher than any country has recorded in total over the course of the entire pandemic except for Brazil and India.
U.S. Supreme Court hears international child labor case. The U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that will help determine whether U.S. corporations can be held responsible for human rights abuses committed abroad. The plaintiffs in the case allege that Nestlé and Cargill are liable for “aiding and abetting child slavery” for allowing child labor on cocoa farms that they control in Ivory Coast. Both corporations argue they can’t be held liable and that they are not directly responsible for any harm caused.
Keep an Eye On
Scottish independence. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has called for an independence referendum “in the early part of the new parliament,” ahead of Scottish parliamentary elections in May. Sturgeon made the remarks in an address at a Scottish National Party (SNP) conference. Although Scottish voters rejected independence by a 55-45 percent margin in 2014, recent polls show a majority in favor of secession, likely due to the strong support for the European Union among Scots. Westminster would have to give Edinburgh permission to hold another referendum, and Sturgeon has said she will take the British government to court if they block a vote. Writing in Foreign Policy, Jamie Maxwell explains why Boris Johnson may have inadvertently furthered Sturgeon’s cause.
Somalia-Kenya tensions. Somalia has expelled its Kenyan ambassador and recalled its own from Nairobi, alleging that Kenya had interfered in its electoral procedures in the state of Jubaland, while providing no evidence. The news was announced via a Facebook post by Somalia’s foreign ministry, and according to their Kenyan counterparts, no formal communication has been made about the ambassador’s removal.
Brazil’s rainforest. The level of deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon rainforest has hit a 12-year high, according to official data released on Monday. 11,088 square kilometers (4,281 square miles) of rainforest was destroyed in 2020, a 9.5 percent increase since 2019. Although deforestation has increased under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro, Monday’s figures left some room for optimism: 2020’s 9.5 percent increase was much lower than in 2019, when deforestation was 34 percent higher than the previous year.
Odds and Ends
Tensions are fermenting between South Korea and China after a Chinese news outlet claimed China was leading the way on a traditional Korean dish. The spat begins with kimchi, a fermented vegetable dish that is a mainstay of Korean cuisine, but that goes by the name of pao cai in China (complicated further by a similar Chinese dish also called pao cai). The global standards body ISO recently published new regulations for the storage and transport of the Chinese variant, prompting the Global Times to crow that China was leading the world in kimchi standards.
The comment caused such anger on social media that Korea’s agricultural ministry issued a statement that international standards for kimchi were already set by the United Nations in 2001 and attempted to set the record straight once and for all. “It is inappropriate to report [the pao cai certification] without differentiating kimchi from pao cai of China’s Sichuan,” it said.
That’s it for today.
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