foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Annexation Isn’t Dead. A Desperate Trump Could Bring It Back to Life.

Annexation Isn ’ t Dead .
A Desperate Trump Could Bring It Back to Life .
The monthslong saga about whether Israel would unilaterally annex portions of the West Bank seems to be ending with a whimper .
Israelis , far more focused on their struggle to control the coronavirus and deal with the staggering 21 percent unemployment rate it fueled , largely ignore the issue .
One poll recorded only 4 percent of Israelis who rated annexation as their priority for government action .
Those who oppose annexation as a terrible blow to prospects for a two-state solution to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Jewish and democratic character , and to the bipartisan U.S. support for Israel might consider exhaling .
A catastrophe has been seemingly avoided , even as other huge challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian arena remain .
But the story is not over yet .
The political interests of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could still move annexation forward .
The political interests of Trump and Netanyahu could still move annexation forward .
Netanyahu originally planned to proceed this summer with the annexation of up to 30 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s Israeli-Palestinian peace plan envisions Israel keeping .
In Netanyahu ’ s power-sharing government with his coalition partner—and rival—from the Blue and White party , Defense Minister Benny Gantz , he secured an agreement allowing him to bring annexation before the Knesset or the cabinet even without Gantz ’ s approval .
Several other factors intervened , in addition to the pandemic and attendant economic crisis .
Key leaders of the Israeli settlement movement in the West Bank , whose interests annexation would ostensibly serve , opposed the move if carried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plan , which envisions a Palestinian ministate—something the settlers oppose in any dimension .
In the United States , Democratic Party leaders—from presumptive presidential nominee Joe Biden to key Democrats in the U.S. Congress—expressed a consensus opposed to annexation as a unilateral measure that would harm prospects for two states .
Most importantly , Trump and his son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner made clear they wanted a broad Israeli political consensus for annexation in order to rebut charges they were intervening in Israeli politics and to make it easier to recruit the support @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition .
That gave Gantz and his partner , Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi—both skeptics on annexation—real leverage , and they used it .
Together , they established several conditions that needed to be met before they would support annexation : It must be coupled with expanding areas of the West Bank under sole Palestinian Authority control ; it must ensure transportation continuity for Palestinians to travel between all major West Bank cities without encountering Israeli military checkpoints ; there must be economic benefits and other measures to stabilize the Palestinian economy , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Allenby Bridge and through Israeli ports ; annexed areas should include no Palestinian residents unless they are offered full Israeli citizenship ; and Israel must accept the full Trump plan , including its call for a Palestinian state .
Each of these conditions is a poison pill for Netanyahu , who could never get his own Likud party to support even one of them .
This combined Israeli and American political pressure seemed to bury the issue .
But it could yet rise zombielike from the grave .
And the cause of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ own political needs .
Until now , Trump has paid little attention to the annexation issue , as crisis after crisis has washed over the United States .
Until now , Trump has paid little attention to the issue , as crisis after crisis has washed over the United States , laying bare the failures of his leadership and imperiling his reelection .
He left it to Kushner to arrange the parameters of U.S. support for annexation , but there is no evidence the issue is on the minds of most American voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the home stretch , Trump ’ s interests could change .
Specifically , as polls show him continually trailing Biden by 5 to 8 percentage points , including in most swing states , and as a large majority of Americans say they disapprove of his management of the coronavirus pandemic , Trump ’ s best chance of eking out a narrow victory is to boost enthusiasm among his base so that they turn out to vote in disproportionate numbers .
There is scant evidence that Jewish voters , even those who might vote @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the calculation might be different for a much larger portion of Trump ’ s base , evangelical Christians .
Would evangelicals respond positively to annexation ?
It ’ s hard to say .
Some experts , like the author and activist Joel Rosenberg , argue that while Trump ’ s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital and transfer of the U.S. Embassy there resonated deeply with evangelicals , the more arcane questions of Israel ’ s precise borders generate no special enthusiasm .
Other leaders , like John Hagee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ urged that annexation go forward and promise to use it to rally their flocks .
By helping Israel secure its hold on biblical locales where settlements now sit , such as Beit El and Shiloh , and by garnering the praise of Netanyahu , whom many evangelicals admire , Trump , they argue , could excite these key voters .
Whether or not it would work is beside the point .
If Trump and his key campaign advisors believe annexation would boost evangelical turnout by even a point or two , and if @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he may decide that he needs it .
That is , Trump ’ s quest for political survival may impel him to try to force through an annexation that Israelis have not embraced .
In this scenario , Trump would essentially tell Kushner : “ Tell Bibi to annex something .
Don ’ t bother me with the details.
” In this scenario , Trump would essentially tell Kushner : “ Tell Bibi to annex something .
Don ’ t bother me with the details.
” Kushner would then inform the Israelis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Israeli cabinet has been dropped .
Netanyahu could proceed without meeting Gantz and Ashkenazi ’ s conditions .
The concern about losing Arab states ’ support or Palestinian cooperation would be jettisoned as problems to be dealt with later , if Trump survives .
And while the vote in the cabinet may be close , Netanyahu would likely have a majority to prevail .
Would Netanyahu proceed ?
He faces an enraged public , a corruption trial , and the likelihood of a Biden victory , which could lead to a clash @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. election .
But Netanyahu is also on the verge of calling the fourth Israeli election in the last 19 months , in which case he would have his own voters to energize .
Could he say no to an offer—if not an outright order—from the White House to proceed with annexation , having tied himself so tightly to Trump , who retains strong affection in Netanyahu ’ s base ?
With questions like these hanging in the air , annexation opponents can not rest easy and must continue to make a strong @ @ @ @ @ @ @

The monthslong saga about whether Israel would unilaterally annex portions of the West Bank seems to be ending with a whimper. Israelis, far more focused on their struggle to control the coronavirus and deal with the staggering 21 percent unemployment rate it fueled, largely ignore the issue. One poll recorded only 4 percent of Israelis who rated annexation as their priority for government action.
The monthslong saga about whether Israel would unilaterally annex portions of the West Bank seems to be ending with a whimper. Israelis, far more focused on their struggle to control the coronavirus and deal with the staggering 21 percent unemployment rate it fueled, largely ignore the issue. One poll recorded only 4 percent of Israelis who rated annexation as their priority for government action.
Those who oppose annexation as a terrible blow to prospects for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to Israel’s Jewish and democratic character, and to the bipartisan U.S. support for Israel might consider exhaling. A catastrophe has been seemingly avoided, even as other huge challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian arena remain.
But the story is not over yet. The political interests of U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could still move annexation forward.
The political interests of Trump and Netanyahu could still move annexation forward.
Netanyahu originally planned to proceed this summer with the annexation of up to 30 percent of the West Bank, encompassing areas that Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian peace plan envisions Israel keeping. In Netanyahu’s power-sharing government with his coalition partner—and rival—from the Blue and White party, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, he secured an agreement allowing him to bring annexation before the Knesset or the cabinet even without Gantz’s approval.
Several other factors intervened, in addition to the pandemic and attendant economic crisis. Key leaders of the Israeli settlement movement in the West Bank, whose interests annexation would ostensibly serve, opposed the move if carried out in the framework of the Trump plan, which envisions a Palestinian ministate—something the settlers oppose in any dimension. In the United States, Democratic Party leaders—from presumptive presidential nominee Joe Biden to key Democrats in the U.S. Congress—expressed a consensus opposed to annexation as a unilateral measure that would harm prospects for two states. Most importantly, Trump and his son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner made clear they wanted a broad Israeli political consensus for annexation in order to rebut charges they were intervening in Israeli politics and to make it easier to recruit the support of Arab states and cast aside Palestinian opposition.
That gave Gantz and his partner, Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi—both skeptics on annexation—real leverage, and they used it. Together, they established several conditions that needed to be met before they would support annexation: It must be coupled with expanding areas of the West Bank under sole Palestinian Authority control; it must ensure transportation continuity for Palestinians to travel between all major West Bank cities without encountering Israeli military checkpoints; there must be economic benefits and other measures to stabilize the Palestinian economy, including increased movement of goods and people across the Allenby Bridge and through Israeli ports; annexed areas should include no Palestinian residents unless they are offered full Israeli citizenship; and Israel must accept the full Trump plan, including its call for a Palestinian state.
Each of these conditions is a poison pill for Netanyahu, who could never get his own Likud party to support even one of them.
This combined Israeli and American political pressure seemed to bury the issue. But it could yet rise zombielike from the grave. And the cause of that rise would be Trump’s own political needs.
Until now, Trump has paid little attention to the annexation issue, as crisis after crisis has washed over the United States.
Until now, Trump has paid little attention to the issue, as crisis after crisis has washed over the United States, laying bare the failures of his leadership and imperiling his reelection. He left it to Kushner to arrange the parameters of U.S. support for annexation, but there is no evidence the issue is on the minds of most American voters.
But as the election heads into the home stretch, Trump’s interests could change. Specifically, as polls show him continually trailing Biden by 5 to 8 percentage points, including in most swing states, and as a large majority of Americans say they disapprove of his management of the coronavirus pandemic, Trump’s best chance of eking out a narrow victory is to boost enthusiasm among his base so that they turn out to vote in disproportionate numbers.
There is scant evidence that Jewish voters, even those who might vote for Trump, are enthusiastic about annexation. But the calculation might be different for a much larger portion of Trump’s base, evangelical Christians.
Would evangelicals respond positively to annexation? It’s hard to say. Some experts, like the author and activist Joel Rosenberg, argue that while Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and transfer of the U.S. Embassy there resonated deeply with evangelicals, the more arcane questions of Israel’s precise borders generate no special enthusiasm. Other leaders, like John Hagee of Christians United for Israel, have urged that annexation go forward and promise to use it to rally their flocks. By helping Israel secure its hold on biblical locales where settlements now sit, such as Beit El and Shiloh, and by garnering the praise of Netanyahu, whom many evangelicals admire, Trump, they argue, could excite these key voters.
Whether or not it would work is beside the point. If Trump and his key campaign advisors believe annexation would boost evangelical turnout by even a point or two, and if he is in desperate enough electoral straits, he may decide that he needs it. That is, Trump’s quest for political survival may impel him to try to force through an annexation that Israelis have not embraced.
In this scenario, Trump would essentially tell Kushner: “Tell Bibi to annex something. Don’t bother me with the details.”
In this scenario, Trump would essentially tell Kushner: “Tell Bibi to annex something. Don’t bother me with the details.” Kushner would then inform the Israelis that the U.S. requirement for consensus in the Israeli cabinet has been dropped. Netanyahu could proceed without meeting Gantz and Ashkenazi’s conditions. The concern about losing Arab states’ support or Palestinian cooperation would be jettisoned as problems to be dealt with later, if Trump survives.
And while the vote in the cabinet may be close, Netanyahu would likely have a majority to prevail.
Would Netanyahu proceed? He faces an enraged public, a corruption trial, and the likelihood of a Biden victory, which could lead to a clash if annexation is rushed through before the U.S. election. But Netanyahu is also on the verge of calling the fourth Israeli election in the last 19 months, in which case he would have his own voters to energize. Could he say no to an offer—if not an outright order—from the White House to proceed with annexation, having tied himself so tightly to Trump, who retains strong affection in Netanyahu’s base?
With questions like these hanging in the air, annexation opponents cannot rest easy and must continue to make a strong case against this highly damaging move.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Beirut Explosion Imperils Lebanon’s Refugee Population—and Aid Routes to Syria

The massive explosion that rocked Beirut and destroyed much of the Lebanese capital ’ s port last week threatens to have disastrous consequences for the roughly 1.5 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees who have long relied on humanitarian aid in the country , according to officials and aid workers who spoke to Foreign Policy .
Lebanon hosts one of the highest populations of refugees in the world .
The blast last week came on the heels of months of civil unrest , an economy on the brink of collapse if not beyond it , and a resurgent coronavirus pandemic .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ imperils Lebanon ’ s refugee population , half of whom lived in deep poverty before all the crises began .
More than half of Palestinian refugees are unemployed , and over two-thirds of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the poverty line .
“ They were already vulnerable , not just because of their situation as refugees but also because of the spiraling economic crisis and coronavirus crisis and measures that had impacted the whole country , ” said Ruth Hetherington , the Middle East spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red @ @ @ @ @ @ @ catastrophe layers more misery on top of already very deep crises.
” Many refugees from the nearly decadelong civil war in Syria are spread out across Lebanon ’ s farmlands , but without the prospect of a flow of international aid to help them in Lebanon , things will get worse—for them and for their host country .
“ It ’ s hard to see how they can absorb any more , and it will be increasingly difficult to take care of those they have been hosting , ” said Andrew Miller , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Obama administration .
“ It really does make the absence of an off-ramp to these conflicts and the return of refugees a ticking time bomb , at least from Lebanon ’ s perspective , ” said Miller , now the deputy director for policy at Project on Middle East Democracy .
The Lebanese government had already sought to repatriate refugees in recent years , despite lingering dangers in their home countries .
Now , some fear that Lebanon , faced with no money , little food , and a massive reconstruction bill @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable population .
“ The situation for a full-fledged citizen in Lebanon was already extremely dire , ” said Bachir Ayoub , a Beirut-based expert with the humanitarian organization Oxfam .
“ You can only imagine the impact it would have on the refugee community.
” The biggest immediate problem in the wake of the explosion is food , at a time when prices for food and other goods had nearly doubled in Lebanon over the past year .
The Beirut port , an entry point for much of what Lebanon consumes and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the region , will be inoperable for at least a month , a United Nations spokesperson said .
Lebanon imports 80 to 85 percent of its food , and one of its largest grain silos was among the wreckage .
U.N. and humanitarian officials also fear the knock-on effects of the explosion on the aid pipeline to Syria , where over 11 million people rely on international aid to survive as the country ’ s civil war grinds into its ninth year .
The Beirut port “ was one of the main logistical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ other aid organizations sent supplies to Syria , Ayoub said .
Now humanitarian officials are scrambling to find ways to keep the supply chain open as the dust settles on the destroyed port .
Aid officials are looking to Lebanon ’ s other main port , Tripoli , where aid will continue to arrive via air freight or ship .
But it ’ s unclear whether the U.N. and other aid organizations that had used Beirut ’ s port as a gateway to provide aid to the region can do the same from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the capacity of the port in Beirut .
Another problem is the lack of a proper government in Lebanon , after the entire leadership resigned en masse on Monday .
The resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his entire cabinet won ’ t stop the flow of humanitarian aid into the country , but it could make efforts to unlock long-term international aid pledges more challenging , experts told Foreign Policy .
Diab ’ s resignation means that his government will have caretaker status , giving it just enough legal power to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to enact reforms demanded by Western nations .
“ The Lebanese financial system is completely broken , you can not transfer money in and out of the country , ” said Heiko Wimmen , a project director for the International Crisis Group overseeing Iraq , Syria , and Lebanon .
“ The banks are completely bankrupt.
” So far , Lebanon has seen a muted response from the United States and the international community .
A French-backed online conference over the weekend garnered nearly $ 300 million in donations , well short of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by last week ’ s blast , and potential contributors have pushed for reforms to Lebanon ’ s government , accused of endemic corruption .
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut reported on Tuesday that the Trump administration had so far provided $ 2 million in food and medical supplies .
But the Trump administration , which supplies hundreds of millions of dollars annually in military and economic aid to Lebanon , never embraced the Diab government , and has called for reforms before pitching in major contributions .
The National reported that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the push for an independent government and other reforms when it visits the country later this week .
Another potential hurdle to more aid from Washington is the Trump administration ’ s antipathy to the United Nations .
“ They ’ re deeply distrustful of the U.N. Their preference is to provide aid bilaterally or through orgs that are not part of the U.N. structure , ” Miller said .
“ Unless you already have the mechanisms in place to provide aid , you have to build them from scratch.
” If there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the short-term government vacuum , aid experts say , it ’ s an easing of restrictions that normally apply to imported goods .
Lebanon , for instance , used to reject medicine that had expiration dates more than a year away .
That restriction may be lifted , allowing for the import of medicines a little closer to expiration .
“ One thing we want to make sure we do is obviously take advantage of any relaxation of some of the restrictions but also make sure that we ’ re still sending in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” said Sean Carroll , the president and CEO of the humanitarian organization Anera .
He suspects that there will be an even greater reliance on outside aid due to the country ’ s ongoing political strife and economic tailspin .
At least 43 Syrian workers were among the victims of the blast , which killed more than 200 people and wounded thousands , and many refugee families who lived along the industrial neighborhoods near the port have seen their homes and savings destroyed .
Despite these setbacks , neighboring Palestinian refugee camps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cases , and residents within these camps have reportedly come in to help with cleanup .
“ Up until now , we don ’ t know their names and stories .
They are victims as much as everyone else , ” said Sawssan Abou-Zahr , an independent journalist based in Beirut whose home was destroyed in the blast .
For Abou-Zahr , the blast , caused by explosive chemicals left for years in a portside warehouse , is a punctuation mark to years of government neglect and misrule that have suddenly gone from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deadly .
“ I despise—and you can quote me on this—I despise every single one among this rotten political system .
Every single one , ” Abou-Zahr said .
“ Perhaps COVID-19 will not kill us , but they will kill us .
”

Kelly Kimball, Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch

The massive explosion that rocked Beirut and destroyed much of the Lebanese capital’s port last week threatens to have disastrous consequences for the roughly 1.5 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees who have long relied on humanitarian aid in the country, according to officials and aid workers who spoke to Foreign Policy.
The massive explosion that rocked Beirut and destroyed much of the Lebanese capital’s port last week threatens to have disastrous consequences for the roughly 1.5 million Syrian and Palestinian refugees who have long relied on humanitarian aid in the country, according to officials and aid workers who spoke to Foreign Policy.
Lebanon hosts one of the highest populations of refugees in the world. The blast last week came on the heels of months of civil unrest, an economy on the brink of collapse if not beyond it, and a resurgent coronavirus pandemic. Experts and humanitarian workers say it further imperils Lebanon’s refugee population, half of whom lived in deep poverty before all the crises began. More than half of Palestinian refugees are unemployed, and over two-thirds of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the poverty line.
“They were already vulnerable, not just because of their situation as refugees but also because of the spiraling economic crisis and coronavirus crisis and measures that had impacted the whole country,” said Ruth Hetherington, the Middle East spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red Cross. “For everybody, this catastrophe layers more misery on top of already very deep crises.”
Many refugees from the nearly decadelong civil war in Syria are spread out across Lebanon’s farmlands, but without the prospect of a flow of international aid to help them in Lebanon, things will get worse—for them and for their host country.
“It’s hard to see how they can absorb any more, and it will be increasingly difficult to take care of those they have been hosting,” said Andrew Miller, a former National Security Council director during the Obama administration. “It really does make the absence of an off-ramp to these conflicts and the return of refugees a ticking time bomb, at least from Lebanon’s perspective,” said Miller, now the deputy director for policy at Project on Middle East Democracy.
The Lebanese government had already sought to repatriate refugees in recent years, despite lingering dangers in their home countries. Now, some fear that Lebanon, faced with no money, little food, and a massive reconstruction bill, will take it out on that vulnerable population.
“The situation for a full-fledged citizen in Lebanon was already extremely dire,” said Bachir Ayoub, a Beirut-based expert with the humanitarian organization Oxfam. “You can only imagine the impact it would have on the refugee community.”
The biggest immediate problem in the wake of the explosion is food, at a time when prices for food and other goods had nearly doubled in Lebanon over the past year. The Beirut port, an entry point for much of what Lebanon consumes and a key hub for other shipments throughout the region, will be inoperable for at least a month, a United Nations spokesperson said. Lebanon imports 80 to 85 percent of its food, and one of its largest grain silos was among the wreckage.
U.N. and humanitarian officials also fear the knock-on effects of the explosion on the aid pipeline to Syria, where over 11 million people rely on international aid to survive as the country’s civil war grinds into its ninth year.
The Beirut port “was one of the main logistical hubs” through which the U.N. and other aid organizations sent supplies to Syria, Ayoub said. Now humanitarian officials are scrambling to find ways to keep the supply chain open as the dust settles on the destroyed port.
Aid officials are looking to Lebanon’s other main port, Tripoli, where aid will continue to arrive via air freight or ship. But it’s unclear whether the U.N. and other aid organizations that had used Beirut’s port as a gateway to provide aid to the region can do the same from Tripoli, which has only about one-third the capacity of the port in Beirut.
Another problem is the lack of a proper government in Lebanon, after the entire leadership resigned en masse on Monday. The resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his entire cabinet won’t stop the flow of humanitarian aid into the country, but it could make efforts to unlock long-term international aid pledges more challenging, experts told Foreign Policy. Diab’s resignation means that his government will have caretaker status, giving it just enough legal power to run day-to-day functions but not allowing it to enact reforms demanded by Western nations.
“The Lebanese financial system is completely broken, you cannot transfer money in and out of the country,” said Heiko Wimmen, a project director for the International Crisis Group overseeing Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. “The banks are completely bankrupt.”
So far, Lebanon has seen a muted response from the United States and the international community. A French-backed online conference over the weekend garnered nearly $300 million in donations, well short of the $15 billion in damage wreaked by last week’s blast, and potential contributors have pushed for reforms to Lebanon’s government, accused of endemic corruption.
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut reported on Tuesday that the Trump administration had so far provided $2 million in food and medical supplies. But the Trump administration, which supplies hundreds of millions of dollars annually in military and economic aid to Lebanon, never embraced the Diab government, and has called for reforms before pitching in major contributions. The National reported that a U.S.-led delegation to the country will make the push for an independent government and other reforms when it visits the country later this week.
Another potential hurdle to more aid from Washington is the Trump administration’s antipathy to the United Nations.
“They’re deeply distrustful of the U.N. Their preference is to provide aid bilaterally or through orgs that are not part of the U.N. structure,” Miller said. “Unless you already have the mechanisms in place to provide aid, you have to build them from scratch.”
If there’s one tiny silver lining to the short-term government vacuum, aid experts say, it’s an easing of restrictions that normally apply to imported goods. Lebanon, for instance, used to reject medicine that had expiration dates more than a year away. That restriction may be lifted, allowing for the import of medicines a little closer to expiration.
“One thing we want to make sure we do is obviously take advantage of any relaxation of some of the restrictions but also make sure that we’re still sending in quality and relevant and needed goods,” said Sean Carroll, the president and CEO of the humanitarian organization Anera. He suspects that there will be an even greater reliance on outside aid due to the country’s ongoing political strife and economic tailspin.
At least 43 Syrian workers were among the victims of the blast, which killed more than 200 people and wounded thousands, and many refugee families who lived along the industrial neighborhoods near the port have seen their homes and savings destroyed. Despite these setbacks, neighboring Palestinian refugee camps have reportedly opened their hospitals to outside cases, and residents within these camps have reportedly come in to help with cleanup.
“Up until now, we don’t know their names and stories. They are victims as much as everyone else,” said Sawssan Abou-Zahr, an independent journalist based in Beirut whose home was destroyed in the blast.
For Abou-Zahr, the blast, caused by explosive chemicals left for years in a portside warehouse, is a punctuation mark to years of government neglect and misrule that have suddenly gone from making daily life unmanageable to making it deadly.
“I despise—and you can quote me on this—I despise every single one among this rotten political system. Every single one,” Abou-Zahr said. “Perhaps COVID-19 will not kill us, but they will kill us.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Hong Kong Police Mix Colonial and Communist Brutality

At the end of last month , 19-year-old pro-democracy activist Tony Chung was arrested in his home and frog-marched into an unmarked car by plainclothes police in the early hours of the morning .
“ Snatched in the middle of the night ” was how one former independence activist described it to me .
Now facing charges that could land him life imprisonment—or even the death penalty in mainland China—the shadowy unit that oversaw and carried out his arrest , by pro-Beijing media ’ s own admission , has been designed using the former British colonial administration ’ s elite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ template.
” It ’ s the same team that just carried out a raid to arrest the pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai and raid his newspaper ’ s offices .
It is a shocking reminder of how Beijing will go to any lengths and co-opt almost anything in pursuit of stamping out what it regards as among the gravest threats to its rule in decades .
The text of the national security law compelled the Hong Kong government to establish a new national security taskforce , described as a “ department for safeguarding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Critics have rightly pointed to the grim history of the secret police on the mainland—but the actual blueprint is the colonial Special Branch , which has its own grim history .
In its 1976 annual report , the Royal Hong Kong Police ( RHKP ) defined the Special Branch ’ s mission as the “ prevention and detection of subversive and espionage activities and the collection , collation , assessment and dissemination of intelligence.
” But its resurrection as a national security taskforce is just the latest in a long line of cases @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and institutions have been resurrected and fused with the Leninist hardware of the one-party state in the mainland to create bastardized versions of their British-instituted predecessors .
Another fresh example of Beijing ’ s fusion of colonial institutions with Communist orthodoxy can be seen in the central government ’ s choice to head the secretariat of the newly formed Committee for Safeguarding National Security .
It is chaired by Zheng Yanxiong , a hard-line mainland official distinguished for his role in suppressing the Wukan village protests in 2011 .
His role sees him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security law .
Speaking on Zheng ’ s appointment , a retired RHKP officer who served in the Special Branch for over a decade told me that the “ Special Branch was answerable only to the governor [ of Hong Kong ] .
And now the Hong Kong government has been totally sidelined .
Zheng will be the one presiding over this new colonial-style national security committee and police unit—he is the man Beijing has picked to make the day-to-day decisions on their behalf.
” The text of the law outlines the taskforce @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security , ” in a clear echo of the aforementioned mission statement of its colonial predecessor from 1976 .
“ Special Branch ” is a general term used for police tasked to the intelligence and security services , but its most well-known form was the elite police unit with close links to the security services set up in Northern Ireland to monitor and combat armed republican groups , including the Irish Republican Army .
Controversy over the Northern Ireland Special Branch ’ s operations and allegations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rule , many of which were eventually confirmed , continues to swirl to this day .
But for most of its history , the Hong Kong Special Branch and its operations were nowhere near as controversial as its counterpart in Northern Ireland , despite performing many of the same duties .
Its responsibilities began to change in the 1960s before it exploded into public life in 1967 as a Communist insurgency gripped Hong Kong , a spillover from the mainland in the throes of the Cultural Revolution .
The RHKP ’ s uncompromising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which over 1,000 bombs were planted in the space of a year , was extremely effective and led by the Special Branch , with the sinologist and historian Steve Tsang describing the unit as being “ put to the test in the Communist confrontation of 1967 and it passed with flying colours.
” But of the 51 killings over the course of the riots , at least 22 were perpetrated by police .
In the process , new formations and tactics were devised and used for the first time that would later form @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world over .
An examination of the colonial past of the wider Hong Kong Police Force beyond the Special Branch uncovers a host of institutional issues , many of which last to this day .
For one , during the riots , both the police force and Special Branch operated with absolute impunity .
Corruption was also an endemic problem in the RHKP , with the force ’ s own official history noting it was “ universally known but never admitted that corruption was widespread throughout the Force.
” It was during this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police , ” referencing both police corruption and collusion with triad gangs , came into common use .
This issue exploded back onto the scene last year after triad gang members indiscriminately attacked protesters and bystanders in Yuen Long train station after a major protest march .
Despite the nearest police station being just minutes away , officers took 39 minutes to attend the scene .
Footage apparently showing officers walking away from the station as the attack began and subsequent videos showing senior officers fraternizing with individuals with known triad links—including senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dispel rumors of modern-day police-triad collusion .
History also betrays the fact that the Hong Kong police as an institution has proved incapable of reforming itself since the colonial period .
Rampant corruption in the force was only tackled with the creation of the highly successful Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974 .
And decades later , the Hong Kong police now faces an internal epidemic of a different kind—an inability to control officers ’ use of force against protesters and a total loss of discipline on the front lines .
Police violence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proportions .
It is now the case that at virtually every major protest , officers can be seen beating defenseless activists and bystanders indiscriminately , stamping on the heads of protesters already in custody , and kneeling on the necks of detainees , a technique that recently became the focus of global attention following the police killing of George Floyd in the United States .
Heinous accounts of sexual assault and rape in police custody have also grown to a deafening cacophony .
It is an institution totally out of control .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the wake of Floyd ’ s killing , politicians have been forced to respond .
An example of this would be the recent decision by the Minneapolis City Council to disband the police department in favor of funding a new community safety program .
But while pro-democracy legislators in Hong Kong have led similar calls , the Legislative Council in which they sit has only limited powers and is unable to force reform onto an institution punch-drunk on unchecked power and zero accountability .
With democratic legislators set to be forced out of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only shrink .
The prospect of the government heeding such calls for change is nonexistent .
Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam , who cornered herself by steadfastly refusing calls for an inquiry into police brutality at the start of the protests , has backed the police to the hilt throughout the saga .
The recently released report into the Hong Kong police ’ s response to the protests by the Independent Police Complaints Council ( IPCC ) has been widely criticized , with former IPCC panel of experts member Clifford Stott describing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purpose.
” Speaking of his fellow foreign expert panel members , Stott stated : “ We were manipulated and put in an awkward position .
… There is no way I could have stood by that report.
” Yet the IPCC report unwittingly drew an important contrast between the 1967 riots and the present unrest .
For all its brute force , the response by the RHKP to the riots was overwhelmingly supported by the public , heralding an era of unprecedented popularity and respect for a force referred to as “ Asia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand in starker contrast to today .
Even the statistics of the heavily discredited IPCC report show that 72.6 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the police ’ s performance during the protests , with 69.5 percent blaming “ use of excessive force/too violent.
” The police ’ s violent track record and aversion to any accountability have had severe consequences .
For one , this behavior has fueled the trend of the most radical protesters responding to police brutality with extreme violence of their own .
On July 1 , a man @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in broad daylight was arrested only after boarding a flight to London the very same day , with the plane being recalled to the gate after taxiing on the tarmac .
The cycle of violence in Hong Kong will continue to escalate as the mainland uses colonial techniques to impose its new order .
Martin Purbrick , a former RHKP officer who served in the Special Branch , notes how the Hong Kong police ’ s present-day “ paramilitary internal security mode ” means that it has maintained the “ same paramilitary structure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ post-1997 return ” of Hong Kong to China .
For it to ever again enjoy support from the public , the Hong Kong police would have to shatter this mold and completely restructure itself into a genuine civil force and away from being a wholly politicized organization that increasingly is answerable only to the central authorities in Beijing .
This would have to start with the wholesale dismissal of its senior management who have presided over the saga of the past year .
Yet Beijing has no intention of launching police reform of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security law and canceling the Legislative Council elections , the authorities have decided to double down on their strategy of seeking to extinguish all dissent in Hong Kong .
It is a regime that by its very nature seeks not to compromise with but crush any threats to its rule , real or imagined .
Post-pandemic , the violence on the streets of Hong Kong will likely not just continue but intensify , driven by a regime intent on extinguishing any and all dissent .

At the end of last month, 19-year-old pro-democracy activist Tony Chung was arrested in his home and frog-marched into an unmarked car by plainclothes police in the early hours of the morning. “Snatched in the middle of the night” was how one former independence activist described it to me.
At the end of last month, 19-year-old pro-democracy activist Tony Chung was arrested in his home and frog-marched into an unmarked car by plainclothes police in the early hours of the morning. “Snatched in the middle of the night” was how one former independence activist described it to me.
Now facing charges that could land him life imprisonment—or even the death penalty in mainland China—the shadowy unit that oversaw and carried out his arrest, by pro-Beijing media’s own admission, has been designed using the former British colonial administration’s elite intelligence and counterespionage unit as a “template.” It’s the same team that just carried out a raid to arrest the pro-democracy media tycoon Jimmy Lai and raid his newspaper’s offices. It is a shocking reminder of how Beijing will go to any lengths and co-opt almost anything in pursuit of stamping out what it regards as among the gravest threats to its rule in decades.
The text of the national security law compelled the Hong Kong government to establish a new national security taskforce, described as a “department for safeguarding national security with law enforcement capacity.” Critics have rightly pointed to the grim history of the secret police on the mainland—but the actual blueprint is the colonial Special Branch, which has its own grim history.
In its 1976 annual report, the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) defined the Special Branch’s mission as the “prevention and detection of subversive and espionage activities and the collection, collation, assessment and dissemination of intelligence.” But its resurrection as a national security taskforce is just the latest in a long line of cases in which colonial-era laws, practices, and institutions have been resurrected and fused with the Leninist hardware of the one-party state in the mainland to create bastardized versions of their British-instituted predecessors.
Another fresh example of Beijing’s fusion of colonial institutions with Communist orthodoxy can be seen in the central government’s choice to head the secretariat of the newly formed Committee for Safeguarding National Security. It is chaired by Zheng Yanxiong, a hard-line mainland official distinguished for his role in suppressing the Wukan village protests in 2011. His role sees him directly oversee the implementation of the national security law.
Speaking on Zheng’s appointment, a retired RHKP officer who served in the Special Branch for over a decade told me that the “Special Branch was answerable only to the governor [of Hong Kong]. And now the Hong Kong government has been totally sidelined. Zheng will be the one presiding over this new colonial-style national security committee and police unit—he is the man Beijing has picked to make the day-to-day decisions on their behalf.”
The text of the law outlines the taskforce’s primary duty as “collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security,” in a clear echo of the aforementioned mission statement of its colonial predecessor from 1976. “Special Branch” is a general term used for police tasked to the intelligence and security services, but its most well-known form was the elite police unit with close links to the security services set up in Northern Ireland to monitor and combat armed republican groups, including the Irish Republican Army.
Controversy over the Northern Ireland Special Branch’s operations and allegations of collusion with paramilitaries supportive of British rule, many of which were eventually confirmed, continues to swirl to this day. But for most of its history, the Hong Kong Special Branch and its operations were nowhere near as controversial as its counterpart in Northern Ireland, despite performing many of the same duties. Its responsibilities began to change in the 1960s before it exploded into public life in 1967 as a Communist insurgency gripped Hong Kong, a spillover from the mainland in the throes of the Cultural Revolution.
The RHKP’s uncompromising response to the ferocious attacks, in which over 1,000 bombs were planted in the space of a year, was extremely effective and led by the Special Branch, with the sinologist and historian Steve Tsang describing the unit as being “put to the test in the Communist confrontation of 1967 and it passed with flying colours.” But of the 51 killings over the course of the riots, at least 22 were perpetrated by police. In the process, new formations and tactics were devised and used for the first time that would later form the basis of modern-day riot policing the world over.
An examination of the colonial past of the wider Hong Kong Police Force beyond the Special Branch uncovers a host of institutional issues, many of which last to this day. For one, during the riots, both the police force and Special Branch operated with absolute impunity. Corruption was also an endemic problem in the RHKP, with the force’s own official history noting it was “universally known but never admitted that corruption was widespread throughout the Force.”
It was during this era that the Cantonese phrase “black police,” referencing both police corruption and collusion with triad gangs, came into common use. This issue exploded back onto the scene last year after triad gang members indiscriminately attacked protesters and bystanders in Yuen Long train station after a major protest march.
Despite the nearest police station being just minutes away, officers took 39 minutes to attend the scene. Footage apparently showing officers walking away from the station as the attack began and subsequent videos showing senior officers fraternizing with individuals with known triad links—including senior expatriate officer John Carroll—have done little to dispel rumors of modern-day police-triad collusion.
History also betrays the fact that the Hong Kong police as an institution has proved incapable of reforming itself since the colonial period. Rampant corruption in the force was only tackled with the creation of the highly successful Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974. And decades later, the Hong Kong police now faces an internal epidemic of a different kind—an inability to control officers’ use of force against protesters and a total loss of discipline on the front lines.
Police violence against pro-democracy demonstrators has now reached grotesque proportions. It is now the case that at virtually every major protest, officers can be seen beating defenseless activists and bystanders indiscriminately, stamping on the heads of protesters already in custody, and kneeling on the necks of detainees, a technique that recently became the focus of global attention following the police killing of George Floyd in the United States. Heinous accounts of sexual assault and rape in police custody have also grown to a deafening cacophony. It is an institution totally out of control.
As protests broke out across the globe in the wake of Floyd’s killing, politicians have been forced to respond. An example of this would be the recent decision by the Minneapolis City Council to disband the police department in favor of funding a new community safety program. But while pro-democracy legislators in Hong Kong have led similar calls, the Legislative Council in which they sit has only limited powers and is unable to force reform onto an institution punch-drunk on unchecked power and zero accountability. With democratic legislators set to be forced out of the council entirely, that role will only shrink.
The prospect of the government heeding such calls for change is nonexistent. Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam, who cornered herself by steadfastly refusing calls for an inquiry into police brutality at the start of the protests, has backed the police to the hilt throughout the saga. The recently released report into the Hong Kong police’s response to the protests by the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) has been widely criticized, with former IPCC panel of experts member Clifford Stott describing the report as “not fit for purpose.” Speaking of his fellow foreign expert panel members, Stott stated: “We were manipulated and put in an awkward position. … There is no way I could have stood by that report.”
Yet the IPCC report unwittingly drew an important contrast between the 1967 riots and the present unrest. For all its brute force, the response by the RHKP to the riots was overwhelmingly supported by the public, heralding an era of unprecedented popularity and respect for a force referred to as “Asia’s finest.” This could not stand in starker contrast to today. Even the statistics of the heavily discredited IPCC report show that 72.6 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the police’s performance during the protests, with 69.5 percent blaming “use of excessive force/too violent.”
The police’s violent track record and aversion to any accountability have had severe consequences. For one, this behavior has fueled the trend of the most radical protesters responding to police brutality with extreme violence of their own. On July 1, a man alleged to have stabbed a police officer in broad daylight was arrested only after boarding a flight to London the very same day, with the plane being recalled to the gate after taxiing on the tarmac.
The cycle of violence in Hong Kong will continue to escalate as the mainland uses colonial techniques to impose its new order. Martin Purbrick, a former RHKP officer who served in the Special Branch, notes how the Hong Kong police’s present-day “paramilitary internal security mode” means that it has maintained the “same paramilitary structure … from the colonial period to the post-1997 return” of Hong Kong to China.
For it to ever again enjoy support from the public, the Hong Kong police would have to shatter this mold and completely restructure itself into a genuine civil force and away from being a wholly politicized organization that increasingly is answerable only to the central authorities in Beijing. This would have to start with the wholesale dismissal of its senior management who have presided over the saga of the past year.
Yet Beijing has no intention of launching police reform of any kind. In imposing the national security law and canceling the Legislative Council elections, the authorities have decided to double down on their strategy of seeking to extinguish all dissent in Hong Kong. It is a regime that by its very nature seeks not to compromise with but crush any threats to its rule, real or imagined. Post-pandemic, the violence on the streets of Hong Kong will likely not just continue but intensify, driven by a regime intent on extinguishing any and all dissent.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--No More Resets With Russia

No More Resets With Russia

No More Resets With Russia Most critics say U.S. President Donald Trump is too soft on Russia and unwilling to criticize it or Russian President Vladimir Putin—for example , on election interference , placing a bounty on the killing of U.S. soldiers , or continuing aggression in Ukraine .
It is striking , therefore , to see a large number of experienced and respected U.S. foreign-policy experts criticize the administration ’ s approach to Russia as too hard-line , calling instead in an open letter for a “ rethink ” of U.S.-Russia policy .
The argument for rethinking Russia policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ George W. Bush took office in 2001 seeking to build a fresh relationship with the newly elected Putin , famously saying he got “ a sense of his soul ” during a meeting in Ljubljana , Slovenia .
By the end of Bush ’ s tenure in January 2009 , however , his understanding of Putin had changed .
The year before , Putin had orchestrated a sham role-swap with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in order to stay in power .
That came after a long list of other troubling activities , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iraq as the United States was ramping up pressure on Saddam Hussein , recklessly murdering the Russian defector Alexander Litvinenko in London , driving a wedge between NATO allies over missile defense , supporting Iran ’ s supposedly civilian nuclear program , and stopping implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe .
In August 2008 , Russia invaded neighboring Georgia .
In response , NATO suspended the NATO-Russia Council , which Russia had long stopped taking seriously anyway .
Despite that record , President Barack Obama came into office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia , to the dismay of Georgia , whose territory remained occupied , as well as U.S. allies in the Baltic states , Poland , and the Czech Republic , who feared further Russian aggression .
The administration ’ s decision on Sept. 17 , 2009—the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939—to seek greater cooperation with Russia by rewriting U.S. missile defense plans further shocked Polish and Czech allies .
The result ?
By 2014 , Russia had illegally seized Crimea from Ukraine , started a war in eastern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ al-Assad ’ s chemical attacks on his own people .
Moscow later fudged a pledge to oversee the removal of chemical weapons from Syria , increased spying on the United States , attempted a coup in Montenegro , buzzed U.S. naval ships with fighter aircraft , interfered in U.S. elections , and attempted to murder the Russian double agent Sergei Skripal with a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom .
The Obama administration imposed sanctions on Russia beginning in 2014 .
So much for a reset .
Like his predecessors , and despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also sought to keep a hand outstretched to the country .
Even at the risk of appearing to support accusations of collusion with Russia , Trump has attempted to convey that the United States is prepared for a better relationship if and when Russian behavior improves .
But in contrast to its predecessors , the administration has also pushed back hard on Russia from the beginning—for example , through additional sanctions ; lethal arms assistance to Ukraine ; cuts to Russia ’ s diplomatic presence in the United States to reduce opportunities for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ training with Georgia , Ukraine , and the Baltic states ; calling out Russia ’ s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ; and the forward-positioning of some U.S. forces in Poland and Romania .
But Russian behavior has still not changed .
In 2020 , Russia ’ s war in Ukraine continues .
The country still occupies part of Georgia , has continued confrontations with the United States over Venezuela and Syria , reportedly paid the Taliban to kill American soldiers , and continues to try to interfere in elections in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Putin has cracked down on opposition and the media , and paved the way to extend his rule until at least 2036 .
Against this history of Russian aggression and despite multiple attempts by U.S. administrations to work together , it is therefore stunning that , as the United States enters another presidential election , arguments are again surfacing for yet another reset with Russia , be it in a second Trump term or a first term for Democratic candidate Joe Biden .
The fundamental fallacy in such an argument is to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s actions .
They don ’ t .
Authors of the open letter argue that we must deal with Russia “ as it is.
” Indeed we must .
Russia “ as it is ” is an increasingly authoritarian state determined to act aggressively against its neighbors , extend its disruptive influence in the Middle East and Asia , and strategically weaken and divide Europe and NATO .
By the end of each of the last few U.S. administrations , the presidents became convinced that pushing back against Russia was essential .
Rather @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a new presidential term , it is time to recognize that Russia is aggressive for its own reasons .
Instead of a reset , the West needs the patience to apply consistent and steady pressure against Russian aggression , and to support those in Russia and in neighboring states who seek freedom , democracy , and security .
For once , it is time for Russia , not the West , to rethink its policy .

Most critics say U.S. President Donald Trump is too soft on Russia and unwilling to criticize it or Russian President Vladimir Putin—for example, on election interference, placing a bounty on the killing of U.S. soldiers, or continuing aggression in Ukraine. It is striking, therefore, to see a large number of experienced and respected U.S. foreign-policy experts criticize the administration’s approach to Russia as too hard-line, calling instead in an open letter for a “rethink” of U.S.-Russia policy.
Most critics say U.S. President Donald Trump is too soft on Russia and unwilling to criticize it or Russian President Vladimir Putin—for example, on election interference, placing a bounty on the killing of U.S. soldiers, or continuing aggression in Ukraine. It is striking, therefore, to see a large number of experienced and respected U.S. foreign-policy experts criticize the administration’s approach to Russia as too hard-line, calling instead in an open letter for a “rethink” of U.S.-Russia policy.
The argument for rethinking Russia policy arises with surprising regularity. U.S. President George W. Bush took office in 2001 seeking to build a fresh relationship with the newly elected Putin, famously saying he got “a sense of his soul” during a meeting in Ljubljana, Slovenia. By the end of Bush’s tenure in January 2009, however, his understanding of Putin had changed. The year before, Putin had orchestrated a sham role-swap with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in order to stay in power. That came after a long list of other troubling activities, including, among other things, selling radars to Iraq as the United States was ramping up pressure on Saddam Hussein, recklessly murdering the Russian defector Alexander Litvinenko in London, driving a wedge between NATO allies over missile defense, supporting Iran’s supposedly civilian nuclear program, and stopping implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In August 2008, Russia invaded neighboring Georgia. In response, NATO suspended the NATO-Russia Council, which Russia had long stopped taking seriously anyway.
Despite that record, President Barack Obama came into office hoping for a “reset” with Russia, to the dismay of Georgia, whose territory remained occupied, as well as U.S. allies in the Baltic states, Poland, and the Czech Republic, who feared further Russian aggression. The administration’s decision on Sept. 17, 2009—the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939—to seek greater cooperation with Russia by rewriting U.S. missile defense plans further shocked Polish and Czech allies.
The result? By 2014, Russia had illegally seized Crimea from Ukraine, started a war in eastern Ukraine, and supported Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks on his own people. Moscow later fudged a pledge to oversee the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, increased spying on the United States, attempted a coup in Montenegro, buzzed U.S. naval ships with fighter aircraft, interfered in U.S. elections, and attempted to murder the Russian double agent Sergei Skripal with a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom. The Obama administration imposed sanctions on Russia beginning in 2014. So much for a reset.
Like his predecessors, and despite Russia’s behavior, Trump has also sought to keep a hand outstretched to the country. Even at the risk of appearing to support accusations of collusion with Russia, Trump has attempted to convey that the United States is prepared for a better relationship if and when Russian behavior improves. But in contrast to its predecessors, the administration has also pushed back hard on Russia from the beginning—for example, through additional sanctions; lethal arms assistance to Ukraine; cuts to Russia’s diplomatic presence in the United States to reduce opportunities for Russian espionage; increased military exercises and training with Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states; calling out Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and the forward-positioning of some U.S. forces in Poland and Romania.
But Russian behavior has still not changed. In 2020, Russia’s war in Ukraine continues. The country still occupies part of Georgia, has continued confrontations with the United States over Venezuela and Syria, reportedly paid the Taliban to kill American soldiers, and continues to try to interfere in elections in the United States and Europe. Domestically, Putin has cracked down on opposition and the media, and paved the way to extend his rule until at least 2036.
Against this history of Russian aggression and despite multiple attempts by U.S. administrations to work together, it is therefore stunning that, as the United States enters another presidential election, arguments are again surfacing for yet another reset with Russia, be it in a second Trump term or a first term for Democratic candidate Joe Biden.
The fundamental fallacy in such an argument is to believe that U.S. policies drive Putin’s actions. They don’t.
Authors of the open letter argue that we must deal with Russia “as it is.” Indeed we must. Russia “as it is” is an increasingly authoritarian state determined to act aggressively against its neighbors, extend its disruptive influence in the Middle East and Asia, and strategically weaken and divide Europe and NATO.
By the end of each of the last few U.S. administrations, the presidents became convinced that pushing back against Russia was essential. Rather than rethinking that stance at the start of a new presidential term, it is time to recognize that Russia is aggressive for its own reasons. Instead of a reset, the West needs the patience to apply consistent and steady pressure against Russian aggression, and to support those in Russia and in neighboring states who seek freedom, democracy, and security. For once, it is time for Russia, not the West, to rethink its policy.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Erdogan Has Hidden an Economic Disaster Deep in Turkish Banks

Erdogan Has Hidden an Economic Disaster Deep in Turkish Banks Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not usually known as an economic innovator .
But for the past year , his government has been running a high-stakes economic experiment .
The test : How long can Turkey hide the fact that it is spending far beyond its means ?
Normally when governments spend more than they tax , the difference appears as a budget deficit .
They fund that deficit by issuing bonds , which are traded on international markets and so are easy to track .
If the debt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ borrowing costs spike , then then country must default or seek a bailout .
This type of debt crisis isn ’ t pleasant , as Argentina or Greece or Pakistan could attest , but it is at least straightforward and familiar .
Turkey has also spent well more than it should , but it has done so in way that hid the costs deep in its financial system , leaving them invisible to all but the most committed financial sleuths .
There ’ s relatively little sovereign debt—the type usually funded by international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ value is ticking up somewhat .
The big borrowing has been by the country ’ s banks , including both private and state-owned banks—and that is where Turkey ’ s trouble has built up .
Since the 2008 financial crisis , the U.S. Federal Reserve has kept interest rates low , hoping to spur an economic recovery in the United States .
This had the side effect of making it cheap to borrow dollars , for both Americans and for anyone else looking for credit .
Turkish banks took note and binged on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s banks came to have lots of dollars .
What to do with them ?
First , they lent the dollars to Turkish firms , in industries such as tourism , energy , infrastructure , and real estate , which preferred loans in dollars rather than lira due to the cheap interest rates on offer .
Sectors like infrastructure and real estate sell primarily to Turks , so their revenues are priced in Turkish lira .
But their loan repayments were still in dollars .
The problem is that , if the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallen substantially over the past few years—it would become harder for Turkish firms to repay their dollar loans .
And that , in turn , could lead to a banking crisis .
Not all the dollars that Turkish banks borrowed from abroad were given out to Turkey ’ s companies .
Individual Turks mostly take out loans to buy houses or cars in lira , not dollars .
So Turkey ’ s banks needed lira to lend them .
The banks took the dollars they had accumulated and swapped them into lira on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the lira interest rate set by the Turkish central bank .
This created a second risk burrowed deep in the country ’ s banking system : If interest rates rise , the cost of banks ’ lira borrowing would shoot upward , cutting into bank profits .
Fast forward to the past few months .
As COVID-19 slammed into the global economy , emerging markets such as Turkey were hard hit .
The lira lost 10 percent of its value in March and April alone .
When the lira falls , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Turks ’ living standards fall .
Fearing a backlash , Turkey ’ s government decided to stop the lira from falling further .
It used a standard tactic , selling dollars to buy up lira on the open market , bolstering the value of Turkey ’ s currency .
For most of the summer , this trick worked : The lira was steady at around 6.85 to the dollar for almost all of June and July .
But spending dollar reserves to defend the value of your currency only works so long as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government started the year with far fewer reserves than it should have , and it soon faced demand for more spending , as Erdogan insisted that the currency be defended .
Where to find more dollars ?
This is where Turkey ’ s banks come back in .
They had an excess , having borrowed billions from abroad in previous years .
So Turkey ’ s central bank began borrowing dollars from the country ’ s own banks , too .
The central bank owes $ 54 billion—dollars , not lira—to Turkey ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more than that , around $ 65 billion already this year , according to estimates from Goldman Sachs , on top of an additional $ 40 billion in 2019 .
So according to the most recent data released by Turkey ’ s government , the central bank is facing a shortfall of around $ 25 billion , once you subtract the funds they hold in gold and Qatari riyal .
A big hole is not what you want in your central bank ’ s balance sheet , but this it is the reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ longer possible to defend the lira at its level of earlier this summer .
It has already slipped by several percent in value , and a steeper fall seems only a matter of time .
What options does Erdogan have ?
The path ahead is strewn with risks .
Let the lira fall , and Turkish companies with dollar debts will struggle to pay them bank .
A steep decline in the lira could even make Turkey ’ s banks go bust .
Hike interest rates , and currency might stabilize , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deeper recession , exacerbating the coronavirus slump and denting Erdogan ’ s popularity .
Both options are dangerous .
But doing nothing is probably worse : The lira will fall anyway , and the economy will sink into a prolonged recession , too .
Erdogan ’ s economic experiment was interesting while it lasted , generating a false sense of stability .
But hiding the country ’ s economic problems deep in the banking system was never more than a temporary cover-up .

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not usually known as an economic innovator. But for the past year, his government has been running a high-stakes economic experiment. The test: How long can Turkey hide the fact that it is spending far beyond its means? Normally when governments spend more than they tax, the difference appears as a budget deficit. They fund that deficit by issuing bonds, which are traded on international markets and so are easy to track. If the debt load grows too large, and if borrowing costs spike, then then country must default or seek a bailout. This type of debt crisis isn’t pleasant, as Argentina or Greece or Pakistan could attest, but it is at least straightforward and familiar.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not usually known as an economic innovator. But for the past year, his government has been running a high-stakes economic experiment. The test: How long can Turkey hide the fact that it is spending far beyond its means? Normally when governments spend more than they tax, the difference appears as a budget deficit. They fund that deficit by issuing bonds, which are traded on international markets and so are easy to track. If the debt load grows too large, and if borrowing costs spike, then then country must default or seek a bailout. This type of debt crisis isn’t pleasant, as Argentina or Greece or Pakistan could attest, but it is at least straightforward and familiar.
Turkey has also spent well more than it should, but it has done so in way that hid the costs deep in its financial system, leaving them invisible to all but the most committed financial sleuths. There’s relatively little sovereign debt—the type usually funded by international bonds—to be found, though its overall value is ticking up somewhat. The big borrowing has been by the country’s banks, including both private and state-owned banks—and that is where Turkey’s trouble has built up.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve has kept interest rates low, hoping to spur an economic recovery in the United States. This had the side effect of making it cheap to borrow dollars, for both Americans and for anyone else looking for credit. Turkish banks took note and binged on cheap dollar loans.
And so Turkey’s banks came to have lots of dollars. What to do with them? First, they lent the dollars to Turkish firms, in industries such as tourism, energy, infrastructure, and real estate, which preferred loans in dollars rather than lira due to the cheap interest rates on offer. Sectors like infrastructure and real estate sell primarily to Turks, so their revenues are priced in Turkish lira. But their loan repayments were still in dollars. The problem is that, if the lira fell against the dollar—and it has fallen substantially over the past few years—it would become harder for Turkish firms to repay their dollar loans. And that, in turn, could lead to a banking crisis.
Not all the dollars that Turkish banks borrowed from abroad were given out to Turkey’s companies. Individual Turks mostly take out loans to buy houses or cars in lira, not dollars. So Turkey’s banks needed lira to lend them. The banks took the dollars they had accumulated and swapped them into lira on financial markets, paying a fee linked to the lira interest rate set by the Turkish central bank. This created a second risk burrowed deep in the country’s banking system: If interest rates rise, the cost of banks’ lira borrowing would shoot upward, cutting into bank profits.
Fast forward to the past few months. As COVID-19 slammed into the global economy, emerging markets such as Turkey were hard hit. The lira lost 10 percent of its value in March and April alone. When the lira falls, the price of imported goods rises, and Turks’ living standards fall. Fearing a backlash, Turkey’s government decided to stop the lira from falling further. It used a standard tactic, selling dollars to buy up lira on the open market, bolstering the value of Turkey’s currency. For most of the summer, this trick worked: The lira was steady at around 6.85 to the dollar for almost all of June and July.
But spending dollar reserves to defend the value of your currency only works so long as you have dollars to spend. The government started the year with far fewer reserves than it should have, and it soon faced demand for more spending, as Erdogan insisted that the currency be defended. Where to find more dollars?
This is where Turkey’s banks come back in. They had an excess, having borrowed billions from abroad in previous years. So Turkey’s central bank began borrowing dollars from the country’s own banks, too. The central bank owes $54 billion—dollars, not lira—to Turkey’s banks. But it spent even more than that, around $65 billion already this year, according to estimates from Goldman Sachs, on top of an additional $40 billion in 2019. So according to the most recent data released by Turkey’s government, the central bank is facing a shortfall of around $25 billion, once you subtract the funds they hold in gold and Qatari riyal.
A big hole is not what you want in your central bank’s balance sheet, but this is the reality that Turkey faces. It is no longer possible to defend the lira at its level of earlier this summer. It has already slipped by several percent in value, and a steeper fall seems only a matter of time.
What options does Erdogan have? The path ahead is strewn with risks. Let the lira fall, and Turkish companies with dollar debts will struggle to pay them bank. A steep decline in the lira could even make Turkey’s banks go bust. Hike interest rates, and currency might stabilize, but the economy would be thrown into a deeper recession, exacerbating the coronavirus slump and denting Erdogan’s popularity. Both options are dangerous. But doing nothing is probably worse: The lira will fall anyway, and the economy will sink into a prolonged recession, too. Erdogan’s economic experiment was interesting while it lasted, generating a false sense of stability. But hiding the country’s economic problems deep in the banking system was never more than a temporary cover-up.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-11--Don’t Give Zimbabwe’s Government Aid Until It Gets Serious About Land Reform

Don ’ t Give Zimbabwe ’ s Government Aid Until It Gets Serious About Land Reform Zimbabwe ’ s president , Emmerson Mnangagwa , turned heads in July by signing an agreement to compensate white farmers with ties to the British colonial era for the government ’ s seizure of their property nearly 20 years ago .
The catch : Zimbabwe ’ s government doesn ’ t have the cash to pay up .
So it is turning to the international community in an effort to mend broken ties and shore up the economy .
Lenders should not to take @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government to simultaneously recognize the property rights of the country ’ s majority of Black Zimbabweans .
Zimbabwe in recent decades has gone from one of Africa ’ s most fertile breadbaskets to an economy on the brink of collapse .
Land reform was at the heart of this transformation .
The country ’ s long-standing former strongman , Robert Mugabe , electrified supporters and outraged much of the international community by expropriating the land of white farmers en masse in the early 2000s .
Land expropriation was one of Mugabe ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ controversial moves coincided with the waning of the United Kingdom ’ s influence over Zimbabwe ’ s laws and policies , which it had retained for a time after the formal end of its colonization of Zimbabwe , then called Rhodesia , in 1980 .
Mugabe followed the expropriation of white farmers ’ land with the nationalization of the country ’ s farmland .
The Black Zimbabweans who were settled on the land therefore largely did not own it .
Instead of title deeds , they mainly received long-term 99-year leases to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from subleasing that land out to others if they decided to engage in other economic activities .
Mugabe ’ s land reform helped to isolate Zimbabwe from the West and drive its economy into the ground .
Zimbabwe ’ s economy is again spiraling .
Mnangagwa , a former right-hand man of Mugabe who ousted him in a coup in 2017 , is facing major political challenges .
Opposition groups have exposed government corruption and gross human-rights violations .
The government ’ s inept handling of the coronavirus , including an alleged scheme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at inflated prices from a shadowy foreign firm , has placed these issues front and center .
Mnangagwa is adopting a two-pronged strategy to face these challenges .
The first is cracking down on opposition .
The government shut down the capital of Harare on July 31 in order to halt planned opposition protests .
And it has used the coronavirus as a pretext for clamping down on civil society .
The second part of the strategy is to try to shore up the economy with a lifeline from the international community .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ white farmers comes in .
The government agreed to compensate white farmers $ 3.5 billion for the improvements and infrastructure on their former property .
It is now seeking to issue long-term government bonds and to approach international donors jointly with the farmers in order to fund the proposal .
Recognizing white farmers ’ ostensible property rights through compensation is controversial within Zimbabwe not only because this was a privileged group formed during the colonial era—that benefited from land expropriated from Black Zimbabweans—but also because the majority of Zimbabweans face heavily restricted property @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Research I have conducted in Latin America suggests that this is a common tactic of authoritarian regimes that conduct land reform .
Such regimes redistribute property from elites to ordinary citizens but then deprive citizens of property rights over their land .
Sometimes beneficiaries are forced into collective or cooperative farming , as in the Soviet Union , much of Eastern Europe , China , and Peru during the Cold War .
In other cases , such as Zimbabwe ’ s , beneficiaries do not receive land title deeds .
Working land @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it hard for rural citizens to scrape by .
In Zimbabwe , for instance , the lack of land titles means that land can not reliably be used as collateral to access bank loans .
While the government has tried repeatedly to come to an agreement with Zimbabwe ’ s financial institutions to make 99-year leases bankable , banks still largely refuse to accept these leases as collateral .
This makes it hard to access the capital necessary to make productivity-enhancing improvements in land and to afford expensive mechanized equipment for harvests .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ if a farmer wants to change occupations or retire elsewhere and invest the proceeds of a property in their family members .
The international community should not return to financially supporting Zimbabwe just because it recognizes the property rights of white farmers .
It should also insist on broader property rights for rural Black Zimbabweans .
These complications create a dependency on the government for the basic tools for survival .
Land reform beneficiaries have to turn to the government for many of the inputs that they need to produce ; they need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And many are relegated to remaining in rural areas since they are loath to give up their most valuable asset but also can not entirely rid themselves of it .
These dependencies are hooks that a government can use to manipulate beneficiaries for political support , to forestall their active opposition to the government , and to keep them in rural areas where they are easier to control than if they moved to urban centers .
The international community should not fall for it .
Wealthy countries should not return to financially supporting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights of white farmers through compensation .
It should also insist on broader property rights for rural Black Zimbabweans .
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have successfully pushed for broader rural property rights through land titling programs in places such as Mexico , Bolivia , and Peru .
They should use their leverage to do the same in Zimbabwe .
As is the case elsewhere , land titles should be accompanied by commensurate rights—including the ability to freely lease and mortgage land .
Even if the government won ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ could construct a framework to sell land use rights to users for specified periods of time —perhaps at heavily subsidized rates for the rural poor—and make these use rights transferable .
That could empower rural Black Zimbabweans , bringing them greater upward mobility and potentially a chance to challenge the government ’ s authoritarianism in the future .

Zimbabwe’s president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, turned heads in July by signing an agreement to compensate white farmers with ties to the British colonial era for the government’s seizure of their property nearly 20 years ago. The catch: Zimbabwe’s government doesn’t have the cash to pay up. So it is turning to the international community in an effort to mend broken ties and shore up the economy. Lenders should not to take the bait unless they can convince the government to simultaneously recognize the property rights of the country’s majority of Black Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe’s president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, turned heads in July by signing an agreement to compensate white farmers with ties to the British colonial era for the government’s seizure of their property nearly 20 years ago. The catch: Zimbabwe’s government doesn’t have the cash to pay up. So it is turning to the international community in an effort to mend broken ties and shore up the economy. Lenders should not to take the bait unless they can convince the government to simultaneously recognize the property rights of the country’s majority of Black Zimbabweans.
Zimbabwe in recent decades has gone from one of Africa’s most fertile breadbaskets to an economy on the brink of collapse. Land reform was at the heart of this transformation. The country’s long-standing former strongman, Robert Mugabe, electrified supporters and outraged much of the international community by expropriating the land of white farmers en masse in the early 2000s. Land expropriation was one of Mugabe’s most divisive and high-profile policies. His controversial moves coincided with the waning of the United Kingdom’s influence over Zimbabwe’s laws and policies, which it had retained for a time after the formal end of its colonization of Zimbabwe, then called Rhodesia, in 1980.
Mugabe followed the expropriation of white farmers’ land with the nationalization of the country’s farmland. The Black Zimbabweans who were settled on the land therefore largely did not own it. Instead of title deeds, they mainly received long-term 99-year leases to the land. And they were long prohibited from subleasing that land out to others if they decided to engage in other economic activities. Mugabe’s land reform helped to isolate Zimbabwe from the West and drive its economy into the ground.
Zimbabwe’s economy is again spiraling. Mnangagwa, a former right-hand man of Mugabe who ousted him in a coup in 2017, is facing major political challenges. Opposition groups have exposed government corruption and gross human-rights violations. The government’s inept handling of the coronavirus, including an alleged scheme by the health minister to buy supplies at inflated prices from a shadowy foreign firm, has placed these issues front and center.
Mnangagwa is adopting a two-pronged strategy to face these challenges. The first is cracking down on opposition. The government shut down the capital of Harare on July 31 in order to halt planned opposition protests. And it has used the coronavirus as a pretext for clamping down on civil society.
The second part of the strategy is to try to shore up the economy with a lifeline from the international community. This is where the compensation of expropriated white farmers comes in. The government agreed to compensate white farmers $3.5 billion for the improvements and infrastructure on their former property. It is now seeking to issue long-term government bonds and to approach international donors jointly with the farmers in order to fund the proposal.
Recognizing white farmers’ ostensible property rights through compensation is controversial within Zimbabwe not only because this was a privileged group formed during the colonial era—that benefited from land expropriated from Black Zimbabweans—but also because the majority of Zimbabweans face heavily restricted property rights under the system implemented by Mugabe.
Research I have conducted in Latin America suggests that this is a common tactic of authoritarian regimes that conduct land reform. Such regimes redistribute property from elites to ordinary citizens but then deprive citizens of property rights over their land. Sometimes beneficiaries are forced into collective or cooperative farming, as in the Soviet Union, much of Eastern Europe, China, and Peru during the Cold War. In other cases, such as Zimbabwe’s, beneficiaries do not receive land title deeds.
Working land without holding property rights over it makes it hard for rural citizens to scrape by. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the lack of land titles means that land cannot reliably be used as collateral to access bank loans. While the government has tried repeatedly to come to an agreement with Zimbabwe’s financial institutions to make 99-year leases bankable, banks still largely refuse to accept these leases as collateral.
This makes it hard to access the capital necessary to make productivity-enhancing improvements in land and to afford expensive mechanized equipment for harvests. It is also illegal to sell land if a farmer wants to change occupations or retire elsewhere and invest the proceeds of a property in their family members.
The international community should not return to financially supporting Zimbabwe just because it recognizes the property rights of white farmers . It should also insist on broader property rights for rural Black Zimbabweans.
These complications create a dependency on the government for the basic tools for survival. Land reform beneficiaries have to turn to the government for many of the inputs that they need to produce; they need government approval to lease their land. And many are relegated to remaining in rural areas since they are loath to give up their most valuable asset but also cannot entirely rid themselves of it. These dependencies are hooks that a government can use to manipulate beneficiaries for political support, to forestall their active opposition to the government, and to keep them in rural areas where they are easier to control than if they moved to urban centers.
The international community should not fall for it. Wealthy countries should not return to financially supporting Zimbabwe just because it recognizes the property rights of white farmers through compensation. It should also insist on broader property rights for rural Black Zimbabweans. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have successfully pushed for broader rural property rights through land titling programs in places such as Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru. They should use their leverage to do the same in Zimbabwe. As is the case elsewhere, land titles should be accompanied by commensurate rights—including the ability to freely lease and mortgage land.
Even if the government won’t allow full land transferability rights, it could construct a framework to sell land use rights to users for specified periods of time —perhaps at heavily subsidized rates for the rural poor—and make these use rights transferable. That could empower rural Black Zimbabweans, bringing them greater upward mobility and potentially a chance to challenge the government’s authoritarianism in the future.