foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--We Remember World War II Wrong

We Remember World War II Wrong

One of the casualties of the COVID-19 pandemic is the great Victory Day parade that had been planned for Moscow ’ s Red Square for May 9 .
It was to have commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in World War II and the heroic fight of the Red Army in particular .
The latest generation of Russian military hardware was to have been on display .
For the first time in many years , Moscow was also expecting substantial delegations from the West .
In 2015 , the Western states had absented themselves from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Beijing .
In 2020 , public health concerns kept them away .
It is ironic in a sense because , at least in Anglophone countries , COVID-19 has catapulted the war back into the public mind .
In Britain , references to the war have been everywhere .
Since his miraculous hospital recovery , Prime Minister Boris Johnson seems to want to be both Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee at the same time .
In the scramble for ventilators and personal protective equipment , countries have invoked the model of the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now expected to exceed levels reached during World War II .
It is not just COVID-19 .
The last 18 months have seen repeated references to the war as a moment of collective mobilization .
The New Dealers thrilled to Franklin D. Roosevelt ’ s call in 1940 to construct a giant air fleet .
If the United States could do that then , why could it not do a green industrial revolution today ?
Among both advocates of global financial reform on the left and defenders of mainstream multilateralism at the World @ @ @ @ @ @ @ references to the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944 are de rigueur .
The occasion of Victory Day ( or Victory in Europe Day ) , celebrated on May 8 in the West and at the turn of midnight on May 9 in Russia , will be an opportunity to repeat such gestures .
But it should be a moment to reflect on their distortions and how this use of history threatens to warp present-day politics .
The Blitz is invoked as an image of national solidarity while denying the rather harsher truth @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Birmingham , and other southern cities of England were as bad as they were because of the threadbare air raid precautions deliberately adopted by a cost-conscious Conservative government .
Radical think tank experts advising U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez invoke Roosevelt ’ s waves of bombers , powered of course by high-octane aircraft fuel , while passing over the fact that those aircraft were meant to rain down fire and destruction on the cities of Europe and Japan .
In imaginative rearrangement , Bretton Woods comes to figure as a postwar conference at which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic order , rather than a wartime meeting—coinciding with the breakout battle at Normandy and the destruction of the Army Group Center on the Eastern Front—of a victorious coalition presided over by the United States .
The height of historical reimagining is reached when French and German diplomats look back to 1945 and piously assure each other that this was the moment when they learned to get along better and not to repeat the mistakes of the vindictive Treaty of Versailles .
In fact , the reverse is closer to the truth .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ a mere unconditional surrender had been a mistake .
As the fighting finally ended in May 1945 , the first best option was simply to erase Germany from the map .
One of the historically remarkable things about 1945 is precisely how late Germany ’ s surrender actually came .
For the most obtuse members of the Wehrmacht leadership , it was clear from June 1944 , when the D-Day invasion was not hurled back into the sea , that Germany ’ s cause was lost .
But the Third Reich steeled itself @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bitter end , at huge cost both to the Germans and those who had to pay the price of crushing them .
We associate Japan with the kamikaze myth , but it surrendered before the Home Islands were invaded .
German resistance ended when Soviet and American forces joined hands with no live Germans in between .
Not surprisingly , as the end approached , many in and around Adolf Hitler ’ s regime were haunted by apocalyptic imaginings of finis Germaniae ( “ the end of Germany ” ) , an outcome @ @ @ @ @ @ @ make come true through their own actions .
The point of insisting on this violence is not to question its legitimacy in a self-righteous armchair exercise in ethics .
The point is to put in question the 21st-century memory of 1945 that leaves the violence out and imagines the world that came after as made out of the positive energies of solidarity , mobilization , and cooperation alone .
What this causes us to do is to lose sight of the war itself and how it remade the world .
Three types of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Reich in the spring of 1945 , each of which helped shape the world down to the present day .
The first was the gigantic clash of land armies and accompanying tactical air power that culminated in the battle for Berlin itself .
It was preeminently the war waged between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army , and it was out of that furnace that the Soviet military emerged as the most formidable land army the world had ever seen .
It founded Soviet domination across Eastern Europe and into the Far East @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as an afterthought in August 1945 .
This stood in a tradition that extends back , by way of the great struggle with Napoleon , to the emergence of Russia as a modern military power under Peter the Great .
This line extends forward into the use of force as part of Russian statecraft today .
And that is the tradition that Russian President Vladimir Putin was hoping to put on display in Red Square this week .
The second type of warfare on display in 1945 was the massive war of colonization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earlier , which climaxed as the Red Army itself advanced into Germany .
Soviet troops unleashed a wave of violence against civilians , and in particular sexual violence against German women , that gave a new edge to the notion of a racial war .
In the immediate aftermath began the ethnic cleansing of the German population of Eastern Europe , the largest forced movement of people at that point , variously estimated at between 12 million and 14.6 million people displaced .
This would reshape the ethnic map of Europe and complete @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the nationalisms of the 19th century .
The reason the reparations that Germany paid after 1945 weren ’ t even larger was because so much of its territory had already been sliced off and so much property simply seized .
Finally , the air war and its close relative the naval blockade were the quintessential expression of a modern mode of warfare , in which both Britain and the United States invested the majority of their war efforts .
The city of Berlin , which the Red Army blasted its way into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was ruined ahead of time by the attacks of the British and American bomber fleets that had begun in earnest in November 1943 .
All told , they dropped 68,000 tons of explosives on the German capital in addition to the 40,000 tons fired at the city by Soviet artillery in the final two weeks of the war .
By 1943 , London and Washington had gained complete control of the oceanic highways and much of the airspace of the world .
Out of this gigantic effort was born the technology of modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new generation of aircraft with jet propulsion , and the Manhattan Project .
Meanwhile , Germany ’ s vain effort to find an answer to the West ’ s air power gave birth to ballistic weapons programs .
By the end of the war , cameras mounted on the tips of V-2 rockets fired vertically upward rather than at London or Antwerp were the first to glimpse the outer edge of Earth ’ s atmosphere .
The crushing defeat of the challenger powers of the 1930s—Germany , Italy , and Japan—was absolute .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the way that they feared .
For all the ruination of Germany in 1945 , finis Germaniae was a dark nationalist fantasy , not a postwar reality .
By the 1950s , Germany , Italy and Japan were all back on their feet and integrated into the Western bloc .
For the British , French , and Dutch , though they were on the victorious side , the war brought the end of their empires .
Their grievous defeats between 1940 and 1942 unleashed a landslide in their colonies that continued down to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1950s .
In the British case , part of the alchemy of historical memory is to have reconfigured 1945 as the founding moment of a new national narrative centered on the welfare state , as though the empire never existed .
The Battle of Dunkirk leads on to the National Health Service .
The shameful rout in Singapore in February 1942 , the violent repression of the Quit India campaign , and the Bengal famine of 1943 have no place in this parochial national story .
The unambiguous victors were the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world between them .
To call what emerged “ empires ” is to lack historical imagination .
The Cold War blocs were newfangled assemblages of power based on a far more self-conscious articulation of global military power , mobilizing ideologies and economic development more than any empire had ever delivered .
In a stark contrast to the experience after World War I , wartime models of production and organization were continued into the aftermath of 1945 .
The most important manifestation of that continuity of mobilization was in the field of energy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the atomic age and the widespread adoption of oil as the primary driver of economic growth after 1945 .
Allied victory and postwar affluence were based not just on their superior political and social organization but on their vastly greater mobilization of natural resources .
From the vantage point of the 21st century , if there is a historical grand narrative that does justice to the significance of the 1945 moment , it is not that of international organizations like the Bretton Woods institutions or national welfare states .
It is what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Acceleration , ” the vast and dramatic acceleration of humanity ’ s appropriation of nature that reached a turning point in the middle of the 20th century .
In its globe-spanning dimensions , in its multifaceted integration of the land , the sea , and the air , and in its violent intensity , World War II was an anticipation and driver of that process , which continues down to the present day .
Of course , invoking the war in political speech can serve many purposes .
In the version preferred in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of solidarity with a low-key patriotism that can be bent to many different ends .
But it also encourages a kind of escapism , the progressive political equivalent of children playing at GI Joe .
That is not the spirit that the anniversary of the Third Reich ’ s annihilating defeat should evoke .
It should remind us of the giant political and material forces that were mobilized to achieve that victory—the violence that was involved and the price that was paid .
It should remind us , for better and for worse @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from that reality , both from its dangers and its possibilities .

One of the casualties of the COVID-19 pandemic is the great Victory Day parade that had been planned for Moscow’s Red Square for May 9. It was to have commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in World War II and the heroic fight of the Red Army in particular. The latest generation of Russian military hardware was to have been on display. For the first time in many years, Moscow was also expecting substantial delegations from the West. In 2015, the Western states had absented themselves from the mammoth 70th anniversary parades in Moscow and Beijing. In 2020, public health concerns kept them away.
One of the casualties of the COVID-19 pandemic is the great Victory Day parade that had been planned for Moscow’s Red Square for May 9. It was to have commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in World War II and the heroic fight of the Red Army in particular. The latest generation of Russian military hardware was to have been on display. For the first time in many years, Moscow was also expecting substantial delegations from the West. In 2015, the Western states had absented themselves from the mammoth 70th anniversary parades in Moscow and Beijing. In 2020, public health concerns kept them away.
It is ironic in a sense because, at least in Anglophone countries, COVID-19 has catapulted the war back into the public mind. In Britain, references to the war have been everywhere. Since his miraculous hospital recovery, Prime Minister Boris Johnson seems to want to be both Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee at the same time. In the scramble for ventilators and personal protective equipment, countries have invoked the model of the war economy. The U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is now expected to exceed levels reached during World War II.
It is not just COVID-19. The last 18 months have seen repeated references to the war as a moment of collective mobilization. The New Dealers thrilled to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s call in 1940 to construct a giant air fleet. If the United States could do that then, why could it not do a green industrial revolution today? Among both advocates of global financial reform on the left and defenders of mainstream multilateralism at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, references to the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944 are de rigueur.
The occasion of Victory Day (or Victory in Europe Day), celebrated on May 8 in the West and at the turn of midnight on May 9 in Russia, will be an opportunity to repeat such gestures. But it should be a moment to reflect on their distortions and how this use of history threatens to warp present-day politics.
If China and Russia instrumentalize the war for the purposes of revived nationalism, the weird thing in the West is the peculiarly bloodless quality of people’s collective memory. Particularly in what might be called reformist discourse, the war stands as a moment of collective organization and mobilization—but with the violence taken out.
The Blitz is invoked as an image of national solidarity while denying the rather harsher truth that the civilian casualties in London, Birmingham, and other southern cities of England were as bad as they were because of the threadbare air raid precautions deliberately adopted by a cost-conscious Conservative government. Radical think tank experts advising U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez invoke Roosevelt’s waves of bombers, powered of course by high-octane aircraft fuel, while passing over the fact that those aircraft were meant to rain down fire and destruction on the cities of Europe and Japan. In imaginative rearrangement, Bretton Woods comes to figure as a postwar conference at which world powers agreed on a cooperative world economic order, rather than a wartime meeting—coinciding with the breakout battle at Normandy and the destruction of the Army Group Center on the Eastern Front—of a victorious coalition presided over by the United States.
The height of historical reimagining is reached when French and German diplomats look back to 1945 and piously assure each other that this was the moment when they learned to get along better and not to repeat the mistakes of the vindictive Treaty of Versailles. In fact, the reverse is closer to the truth. The Allies learned that forcing Germany to a mere unconditional surrender had been a mistake. As the fighting finally ended in May 1945, the first best option was simply to erase Germany from the map.
One of the historically remarkable things about 1945 is precisely how late Germany’s surrender actually came. For the most obtuse members of the Wehrmacht leadership, it was clear from June 1944, when the D-Day invasion was not hurled back into the sea, that Germany’s cause was lost. But the Third Reich steeled itself and its population to fight to the bitter end, at huge cost both to the Germans and those who had to pay the price of crushing them. We associate Japan with the kamikaze myth, but it surrendered before the Home Islands were invaded. German resistance ended when Soviet and American forces joined hands with no live Germans in between. Not surprisingly, as the end approached, many in and around Adolf Hitler’s regime were haunted by apocalyptic imaginings of finis Germaniae (“the end of Germany”), an outcome which they were doing their best to make come true through their own actions.
The point of insisting on this violence is not to question its legitimacy in a self-righteous armchair exercise in ethics. The point is to put in question the 21st-century memory of 1945 that leaves the violence out and imagines the world that came after as made out of the positive energies of solidarity, mobilization, and cooperation alone. What this causes us to do is to lose sight of the war itself and how it remade the world. Three types of war came together to consume the Third Reich in the spring of 1945, each of which helped shape the world down to the present day.
The first was the gigantic clash of land armies and accompanying tactical air power that culminated in the battle for Berlin itself. It was preeminently the war waged between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, and it was out of that furnace that the Soviet military emerged as the most formidable land army the world had ever seen. It founded Soviet domination across Eastern Europe and into the Far East, crushing the Japanese empire in Manchuria as an afterthought in August 1945. This stood in a tradition that extends back, by way of the great struggle with Napoleon, to the emergence of Russia as a modern military power under Peter the Great. This line extends forward into the use of force as part of Russian statecraft today. And that is the tradition that Russian President Vladimir Putin was hoping to put on display in Red Square this week.
The second type of warfare on display in 1945 was the massive war of colonization started by the Third Reich six years earlier, which climaxed as the Red Army itself advanced into Germany. Soviet troops unleashed a wave of violence against civilians, and in particular sexual violence against German women, that gave a new edge to the notion of a racial war. In the immediate aftermath began the ethnic cleansing of the German population of Eastern Europe, the largest forced movement of people at that point, variously estimated at between 12 million and 14.6 million people displaced. This would reshape the ethnic map of Europe and complete the logic of ethnonationalism set in motion by the nationalisms of the 19th century. The reason the reparations that Germany paid after 1945 weren’t even larger was because so much of its territory had already been sliced off and so much property simply seized.
(1945 not only marked the end of the great wars of colonial conquest; it gave rise to their antithesis—a new type of revolutionary anti-colonial peasant warfare. The Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong would lay claim to this tradition. But it had its counterparts in the war against Germany waged by Soviet partisans and Josip Broz Tito’s Partisan armies in Yugoslavia. After 1945, it would remake large parts of Asia and Africa.)
Finally, the air war and its close relative the naval blockade were the quintessential expression of a modern mode of warfare, in which both Britain and the United States invested the majority of their war efforts. The city of Berlin, which the Red Army blasted its way into beginning on April 16, 1945, was ruined ahead of time by the attacks of the British and American bomber fleets that had begun in earnest in November 1943. All told, they dropped 68,000 tons of explosives on the German capital in addition to the 40,000 tons fired at the city by Soviet artillery in the final two weeks of the war. By 1943, London and Washington had gained complete control of the oceanic highways and much of the airspace of the world. Out of this gigantic effort was born the technology of modern logistics, radar and sonar, a new generation of aircraft with jet propulsion, and the Manhattan Project. Meanwhile, Germany’s vain effort to find an answer to the West’s air power gave birth to ballistic weapons programs. By the end of the war, cameras mounted on the tips of V-2 rockets fired vertically upward rather than at London or Antwerp were the first to glimpse the outer edge of Earth’s atmosphere.
Surprisingly, there are historians who want to argue the priority of one or other of these modes of warfare. That is to miss the point. World War II was what it was because it was all three at once—a global, hypermodern confrontation of air and sea power, the greatest land conflict in history, and the death pangs of colonial warfare. The Axis powers were overwhelmed by the vast pressure brought to bear on all three fronts, from the Atlantic Ocean to the skies above the Pacific, from North Africa to Ukraine and the interior of China. But the complexity of the war also produced the complexity of its outcome.
The crushing defeat of the challenger powers of the 1930s—Germany, Italy, and Japan—was absolute. But none of them was extinguished in the way that they feared. For all the ruination of Germany in 1945, finis Germaniae was a dark nationalist fantasy, not a postwar reality. By the 1950s, Germany, Italy and Japan were all back on their feet and integrated into the Western bloc.
For the British, French, and Dutch, though they were on the victorious side, the war brought the end of their empires. Their grievous defeats between 1940 and 1942 unleashed a landslide in their colonies that continued down to the liberation struggles of Vietnam in the 1950s. In the British case, part of the alchemy of historical memory is to have reconfigured 1945 as the founding moment of a new national narrative centered on the welfare state, as though the empire never existed. The Battle of Dunkirk leads on to the National Health Service. The shameful rout in Singapore in February 1942, the violent repression of the Quit India campaign, and the Bengal famine of 1943 have no place in this parochial national story.
The unambiguous victors were the United States and the Soviet Union, which divided the world between them. To call what emerged “empires” is to lack historical imagination. The Cold War blocs were newfangled assemblages of power based on a far more self-conscious articulation of global military power, mobilizing ideologies and economic development more than any empire had ever delivered. In a stark contrast to the experience after World War I, wartime models of production and organization were continued into the aftermath of 1945. The most important manifestation of that continuity of mobilization was in the field of energy. World War II gave birth both to the atomic age and the widespread adoption of oil as the primary driver of economic growth after 1945. Allied victory and postwar affluence were based not just on their superior political and social organization but on their vastly greater mobilization of natural resources.
From the vantage point of the 21st century, if there is a historical grand narrative that does justice to the significance of the 1945 moment, it is not that of international organizations like the Bretton Woods institutions or national welfare states. It is what 21st-century environmental historians call the “Great Acceleration,” the vast and dramatic acceleration of humanity’s appropriation of nature that reached a turning point in the middle of the 20th century. In its globe-spanning dimensions, in its multifaceted integration of the land, the sea, and the air, and in its violent intensity, World War II was an anticipation and driver of that process, which continues down to the present day.
Of course, invoking the war in political speech can serve many purposes. In the version preferred in the English-speaking world, it combines connotations of solidarity with a low-key patriotism that can be bent to many different ends. But it also encourages a kind of escapism, the progressive political equivalent of children playing at GI Joe. That is not the spirit that the anniversary of the Third Reich’s annihilating defeat should evoke. It should remind us of the giant political and material forces that were mobilized to achieve that victory—the violence that was involved and the price that was paid. It should remind us, for better and for worse, of how far removed we are from that reality, both from its dangers and its possibilities.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--Sorry, Americans, You Haven’t Even Had a Real Lockdown Yet

Sorry , Americans , You Haven ’ t Even Had a Real Lockdown Yet MADRID—Spain began easing its draconian , six-week coronavirus lockdown this week , and I still somehow found a way to get in trouble with the cops—again .
We ’ d taken the dog for a walk in the early evening .
The kids had been trapped inside—not a moment outside , not a foot out the door—since the national state of alarm began in mid-March , one of the severest lockdown regimes in Europe .
At the end of April , the government relented and said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ outside between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m .
But the government ’ s rules and regulations for the methodical reopening of the country change seemingly by the day .
The patrol car screeched to the curb , the officer tapping his watch .
After 7 p.m. , it turns out , the streets are reserved for the over-70s .
So are the mornings , it seems .
Who knew ?
Apparently we should have been speed-refreshing the webpage of the Official State Bulletin before reaching for a leash , I guess .
We @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sent scurrying back home .
As many U.S. states rush headlong to reopen after a short , partial , and none-too-comprehensive simulacrum of a lockdown , Spain ’ s experience is instructive .
Even with this partial lifting , Spain ’ s measures remain—like those of most other European nations—far stricter than those of the United States .
By global standards , the United States hasn ’ t really had a lockdown at all , only a spotty and inconsistent set of measures that it ’ s already abandoning .
In Spain , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ order since March , and that will remain the case until almost the end of May , perhaps longer .
The second-hardest-hit country in the world from the coronavirus by reported infections , Spain is taking calibrated ( if confusing ) baby steps to get back to normal little by agonizingly little .
Meanwhile , a slew of U.S. states are basically going back to normal , with restaurants reopening as usual in many states and gyms and even movie theaters back in business in others .
The White House , which has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic , has meanwhile decided to ignore the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ’ s guidelines for a responsible reopening .
Officially , even though the worst of the virus outbreak here came weeks ago , we ’ re still in Phase Zero of the reopening .
That means a total stay-at-home order , with some exceptions for exercise ( armadas of joggers have suspiciously materialized on the streets around our house ) , essential shopping , and a few new treats , like appointment-only haircuts ( apparently only for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ orders in restaurants .
Some small shops can reopen , provided they only have one customer at a time and disinfect the store between customers , and again at midday , and again at closing , which seems like a major undertaking .
It may seem harsh , but it ’ s largely in line with other European countries as they emerge from weeks or months of near-total hibernation .
Italy just started Phase Two of its opening , with takeaways from restaurants and some public transit ; German barbers , offering appointment-only @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stores are tentatively opening up in Greece .
The United Kingdom , late to shut down , remains locked down for now .
But next week , we could make it to Phase One .
Nearly every region in Spain has asked the central government to let them begin a very partial reopening starting Monday .
And it would be partial : Nobody can leave their local province or be in groups of more than ten ; outdoor bars , markets , and churches , like public transit , will have strictly reduced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no restaurant dining , or movie theaters , or soccer games .
Just to make sure nobody lets their guard down , the government extended the state of alarm until May 24 and is talking about further extending it throughout the summer , if opposition parties don ’ t rebel entirely by then .
The driver behind the push to get back to something resembling normal is , of course , the same in Spain as anywhere else in Europe or in the United States .
Not only are parents desperate , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gotten the Rasputin treatment : repeatedly poisoned , shot several times , and dumped in a river .
Spain has posted record jumps in unemployment and slumps in GDP ; activity in both manufacturing and services in Spain , as in other European countries , has literally fallen off the charts .
The United States seems to be faring even worse , with well over 33 million fresh out of work and the country on pace for an unprecedented contraction of perhaps 30 percent or more in second-quarter GDP .
The big difference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now starting to take the first steps toward a very partial reopening , now that new daily cases are about 8 percent of what they were at the peak .
In the United States , where new daily cases are still about 70 percent of what they were in the darkest days , and where more than 2,500 people are still dying every day , states are rushing to crowd people into restaurants , onto beaches , and into gyms and theaters .
Spain is gingerly limping back toward normal after having bent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States mostly never bothered to lock down , didn ’ t really bend the curve , and is already raring to reopen .
We ’ ll see over the summer how the differing approaches play out .
Spain ’ s opposition parties have lost patience with the government ’ s go-slow approach and insistence on maintaining the state of alarm ; the head of the main opposition party , Pablo Casado of the People ’ s Party , said extending it any more at this point “ makes no sense.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government to force through further extensions over the summer , which means the stage-managed , step-by-step opening could fall apart just as it gets going .
In the United States , the Trump administration seems fine with allowing a 9/11 ’ s worth of death every single day as long as there is the hope of some sort of economic uptick before the election in November .
But while the virus ’ s scythe keeps swinging , many Americans will still be staying indoors whenever possible—even as just enough decide , or are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sure there are enough victims to go around .
In the meantime , I ’ ve got to find that leash and round up the kids : We only have a couple hours to step outside till the paddy wagons come circling back .

MADRID—Spain began easing its draconian, six-week coronavirus lockdown this week, and I still somehow found a way to get in trouble with the cops— again .
MADRID—Spain began easing its draconian, six-week coronavirus lockdown this week, and I still somehow found a way to get in trouble with the cops—again.
We’d taken the dog for a walk in the early evening. The kids had been trapped inside—not a moment outside, not a foot out the door—since the national state of alarm began in mid-March, one of the severest lockdown regimes in Europe. At the end of April, the government relented and said children could get an hour a day outside between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m.
But the government’s rules and regulations for the methodical reopening of the country change seemingly by the day. The patrol car screeched to the curb, the officer tapping his watch. After 7 p.m., it turns out, the streets are reserved for the over-70s. So are the mornings, it seems. Who knew? Apparently we should have been speed-refreshing the webpage of the Official State Bulletin before reaching for a leash, I guess. We were threatened with a fine, then sent scurrying back home.
As many U.S. states rush headlong to reopen after a short, partial, and none-too-comprehensive simulacrum of a lockdown, Spain’s experience is instructive. Even with this partial lifting, Spain’s measures remain—like those of most other European nations—far stricter than those of the United States. By global standards, the United States hasn’t really had a lockdown at all, only a spotty and inconsistent set of measures that it’s already abandoning.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
In Spain, everybody nationwide has been on a stay-at-home order since March, and that will remain the case until almost the end of May, perhaps longer. The second-hardest-hit country in the world from the coronavirus by reported infections, Spain is taking calibrated (if confusing) baby steps to get back to normal little by agonizingly little. Meanwhile, a slew of U.S. states are basically going back to normal, with restaurants reopening as usual in many states and gyms and even movie theaters back in business in others. The White House, which has punted on any national coordination in battling the pandemic, has meanwhile decided to ignore the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s guidelines for a responsible reopening.
Officially, even though the worst of the virus outbreak here came weeks ago, we’re still in Phase Zero of the reopening. That means a total stay-at-home order, with some exceptions for exercise (armadas of joggers have suspiciously materialized on the streets around our house), essential shopping, and a few new treats, like appointment-only haircuts (apparently only for the well-connected) or a return to takeout orders in restaurants. Some small shops can reopen, provided they only have one customer at a time and disinfect the store between customers, and again at midday, and again at closing, which seems like a major undertaking.
It may seem harsh, but it’s largely in line with other European countries as they emerge from weeks or months of near-total hibernation. Italy just started Phase Two of its opening, with takeaways from restaurants and some public transit; German barbers, offering appointment-only haircuts, are swamped; small retail stores are tentatively opening up in Greece. The United Kingdom, late to shut down, remains locked down for now.
But next week, we could make it to Phase One. (Spoiler: We won’t, not in Madrid or Barcelona. Another couple weeks of lockdown for the worst-hit areas, the government has decided.) Nearly every region in Spain has asked the central government to let them begin a very partial reopening starting Monday. And it would be partial: Nobody can leave their local province or be in groups of more than ten; outdoor bars, markets, and churches, like public transit, will have strictly reduced visitor quotas and distancing measures. Still no restaurant dining, or movie theaters, or soccer games. Just to make sure nobody lets their guard down, the government extended the state of alarm until May 24 and is talking about further extending it throughout the summer, if opposition parties don’t rebel entirely by then.
The driver behind the push to get back to something resembling normal is, of course, the same in Spain as anywhere else in Europe or in the United States. Not only are parents desperate, but so are businesses. Economies everywhere have gotten the Rasputin treatment: repeatedly poisoned, shot several times, and dumped in a river. Spain has posted record jumps in unemployment and slumps in GDP; activity in both manufacturing and services in Spain, as in other European countries, has literally fallen off the charts. The United States seems to be faring even worse, with well over 33 million fresh out of work and the country on pace for an unprecedented contraction of perhaps 30 percent or more in second-quarter GDP.
The big difference is the timing. Spain is just now starting to take the first steps toward a very partial reopening, now that new daily cases are about 8 percent of what they were at the peak. In the United States, where new daily cases are still about 70 percent of what they were in the darkest days, and where more than 2,500 people are still dying every day, states are rushing to crowd people into restaurants, onto beaches, and into gyms and theaters. Spain is gingerly limping back toward normal after having bent the curve by a severe lockdown; the United States mostly never bothered to lock down, didn’t really bend the curve, and is already raring to reopen.
We’ll see over the summer how the differing approaches play out. Spain’s opposition parties have lost patience with the government’s go-slow approach and insistence on maintaining the state of alarm; the head of the main opposition party, Pablo Casado of the People’s Party, said extending it any more at this point “makes no sense.” It will be hard for the Socialist government to force through further extensions over the summer, which means the stage-managed, step-by-step opening could fall apart just as it gets going.
In the United States, the Trump administration seems fine with allowing a 9/11’s worth of death every single day as long as there is the hope of some sort of economic uptick before the election in November. But while the virus’s scythe keeps swinging, many Americans will still be staying indoors whenever possible—even as just enough decide, or are forced, to go out to make sure there are enough victims to go around.
In the meantime, I’ve got to find that leash and round up the kids: We only have a couple hours to step outside till the paddy wagons come circling back.
May 8: This article was updated to reflect the extension of the lockdown.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--Trump’s War on Congressional War Powers Isn’t Over

Welcome to Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : Trump vetoes an Iran war powers resolution , inside the massive backlog in Pentagon vacancies , and what to make of a bizarre botched Venezuela coup attempt .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
On Wednesday , U.S. President Donald Trump vetoed a bipartisan war powers resolution that would have required congressional approval to carry out military strikes against Iran , the latest in an ongoing battle between the White House and Capitol Hill over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the stage for a Senate vote today to override the veto that is all but certain to fail : The resolution passed the Senate by a 55-45 vote , short of the necessary two-thirds majority .
War of attrition .
Wednesday ’ s veto is not the first time that Trump has batted away congressional attempts to restrict his ability to use military force without a legislative greenlight .
Lawmakers advanced similar measures to stop U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen ’ s war last year , which Trump also vetoed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resolution are undeterred , saying they ’ re playing the long game and inching their way closer to getting war powers authorities on the books .
“ It used to be that we couldn ’ t get the time of day on this issue , ” one senior Democratic congressional aide told Foreign Policy .
“ But now we can get multiple war powers resolutions passed in a Republican-controlled Senate , with some Republican backing , so the trendlines are going in the right direction.
” Pentagon vacancies .
Congress is reviewing nominees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ part of its push to close a massive gap in U.S. Defense Department leadership under Trump .
According to data from a spokesperson , the Pentagon has a backlog of 20 Senate-confirmed roles that are vacant or filled only in acting capacities—that ’ s one-third of all top Pentagon civilian jobs .
Many have sat unfilled for months , and lawmakers have voiced concerns that the empty seats undercut U.S. national security .
Here are the vacancies : 12 senior Pentagon jobs with no White House nominee , including the undersecretary of defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness , and deputyunder secretary of defense for intelligence and security .
One nominee awaiting vote by committee after a confirmation hearing : Victorino Mercado , tapped to be assistant secretary of defense for strategy , plans , and capabilities .
Two nominees with confirmation hearings scheduled in the Senate this week : Kenneth Braithwaite as secretary of the Navy and James Anderson as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy .
Four nominees with no confirmation hearings scheduled in the Senate : Jason Abend as inspector general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assessment and program evaluation , Shon Manasco as undersecretary of the Air Force , and Michele A. Pearce as general counsel of the Army .
One intended nomination yet to be announced by the White House : Louis Bremer to be assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict .
A botched raid in Venezuela .
Think Bay of Pigs meets reality TV .
In one of the more bizarre chapters of 2020 , a former U.S. Green Beret allegedly mounted an attempted coup against embattled Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and several U.S. citizens working for Silvercorp , his U.S.-based private security firm .
The U.S. government has denied any involvement in the plot , which unsurprisingly failed .
Maduro announced this week he had captured 13 of the plotters , including two U.S. citizens .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday added , “ If we had been involved , it would have gone differently.
” But with the reports of detained U.S. citizens , the State Department has a new diplomatic headache on top of the quagmire that is its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fact , these are Americans that are there… If the Maduro regime decides to hold them , we ’ ll use every tool to try to get them back .
It ’ s our responsibility to do so , ” Pompeo said .
U.S. News and World Report ’ s Paul Shinkman has more on the story .
Failure to communicate .
The Senate Armed Services Committee hosted its first hearing since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic on Wednesday , with a new and unusual turf battle between two different parts of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Federal Communications Commission ( FCC ) .
Top Pentagon officials have slammed the FCC ’ s decision to give Ligado , a Virginia-based telecommunications company , permission to deploy a nationwide 5G broadband network—saying it could disrupt the military ’ s access to critical GPS signals .
“ If you ’ ve ever tried to talk to a friend while standing next to the speakers at a rock concert , you get the point , ” Defense Secretary Mark Esper wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed .
New tensions in Kashmir @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces killed a top commander of one of Kashmir ’ s largest paramilitary groups in a firefight , part of a surge in counterinsurgency operations during the coronavirus lockdown .
The development could fuel new tensions in the disputed territory .
Riyaz Naikoo , of the indigenous rebel group Hizbul Mujahideen , was reportedly killed in a raid on Tuesday .
Tensions between the Indian government and Kashmiri rebel groups have risen sharply since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s government revoked the Indian-administered Kashmir ’ s special autonomous status in August @ @ @ @ @ @ @ control .
A loyalist at the Pentagon .
Michael Cutrone , a former top aide to Vice President Mike Pence , is moving to the Pentagon to take on a role aimed at vetting defense officials for their loyalty to the White House , as Foreign Policy reported in an exclusive on Wednesday .
Shake-ups in the intel community .
Trump ’ s nominee for the next head of U.S. intelligence , Rep. John Ratcliffe , faces a divided Senate confirmation process after his hearing this week , as Foreign Policy ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nominated Patrick Hovakimian to be general counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence .
New U.S. envoy to Venezuela .
Trump this week nominated veteran U.S. diplomat James Story to be the new U.S. ambassador to Venezuela .
Last year , the United States withdrew its diplomats from Venezuela after it recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the rightful president .
Pompeo has said the United States is ready to reopen its embassy in Caracas “ as soon as Maduro steps aside.
” McMaster joins Zoom .
Zoom—the teleconferencing service @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic lockdown—has hired Trump ’ s former national security advisor , H.R .
McMaster , to serve on its board of directors .
Top USAID pandemic expert to leave post .
Timothy Zeimer , a well-regarded senior official at the U.S. Agency for International Development and a former Navy rear admiral , is stepping down from his post next month after reportedly being sidelined during the pandemic crisis , Politico reports .
Former SecNav leads new investment fund .
Richard Spencer , Trump ’ s former secretary of the Navy , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment fund set up by Pallas Advisors .
The fund , called Pallas Ventures , will provide capital to technology companies working in the national security field .
COVID-19 conspiracies .
Seventy-seven cell phone towers have been set on fire in the United Kingdom due to an online conspiracy theory claiming that 5G internet is responsible for spreading the coronavirus .
Most of the towers were not even 5G-enabled , and some attacks have even targeted telecommunications engineers .
Pompeo will reportedly travel to Israel on May 12 to meet with Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gantz , days before the new Israeli government is due to be sworn in .
It will be the first foreign trip for Pompeo since March , with most international travel for U.S. diplomats halted during the coronavirus pandemic .
On May 12 , the U.S. Senate holds a hearing on the coronavirus response by the Trump administration , with one of the president ’ s top task force leaders , Anthony Fauci , set to testify .
The next court date for Paul Whelan , a U.S. citizen detained in Russia on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The U.S. government insists Whelan is wrongfully detained on false charges .
He was imprisoned without trial for over 15 months .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch and Dan Haverty

Welcome to Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump vetoes an Iran war powers resolution, inside the massive backlog in Pentagon vacancies , and what to make of a bizarre botched Venezuela coup attempt .
Welcome to Security Brief. What’s on tap today: Trump vetoes an Iran war powers resolution, inside the massive backlog in Pentagon vacancies, and what to make of a bizarre botched Venezuela coup attempt.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Trump Vetoes Iran War Powers Resolution
On Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump vetoed a bipartisan war powers resolution that would have required congressional approval to carry out military strikes against Iran, the latest in an ongoing battle between the White House and Capitol Hill over war powers authorities. The move sets the stage for a Senate vote today to override the veto that is all but certain to fail: The resolution passed the Senate by a 55-45 vote, short of the necessary two-thirds majority.
War of attrition. Wednesday’s veto is not the first time that Trump has batted away congressional attempts to restrict his ability to use military force without a legislative greenlight. Lawmakers advanced similar measures to stop U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen’s war last year, which Trump also vetoed. But the lawmakers backing the latest resolution are undeterred, saying they’re playing the long game and inching their way closer to getting war powers authorities on the books.
“It used to be that we couldn’t get the time of day on this issue,” one senior Democratic congressional aide told Foreign Policy. “But now we can get multiple war powers resolutions passed in a Republican-controlled Senate, with some Republican backing, so the trendlines are going in the right direction.”
What We’re Watching
Pentagon vacancies. Congress is reviewing nominees for two top Pentagon jobs today, part of its push to close a massive gap in U.S. Defense Department leadership under Trump. According to data from a spokesperson, the Pentagon has a backlog of 20 Senate-confirmed roles that are vacant or filled only in acting capacities—that’s one-third of all top Pentagon civilian jobs. Many have sat unfilled for months, and lawmakers have voiced concerns that the empty seats undercut U.S. national security.
Here are the vacancies:
12 senior Pentagon jobs with no White House nominee, including the undersecretary of defense for policy, Pentagon comptroller, deputy undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, and deputyunder secretary of defense for intelligence and security.
One nominee awaiting vote by committee after a confirmation hearing: Victorino Mercado, tapped to be assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities.
Two nominees with confirmation hearings scheduled in the Senate this week: Kenneth Braithwaite as secretary of the Navy and James Anderson as deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.
Four nominees with no confirmation hearings scheduled in the Senate: Jason Abend as inspector general, John Whitley as director of cost assessment and program evaluation, Shon Manasco as undersecretary of the Air Force, and Michele A. Pearce as general counsel of the Army.
One intended nomination yet to be announced by the White House: Louis Bremer to be assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict.
A botched raid in Venezuela. Think Bay of Pigs meets reality TV. In one of the more bizarre chapters of 2020, a former U.S. Green Beret allegedly mounted an attempted coup against embattled Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro with a ragtag group of exiled militants and several U.S. citizens working for Silvercorp, his U.S.-based private security firm. The U.S. government has denied any involvement in the plot, which unsurprisingly failed. Maduro announced this week he had captured 13 of the plotters, including two U.S. citizens.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday added, “If we had been involved, it would have gone differently.” But with the reports of detained U.S. citizens, the State Department has a new diplomatic headache on top of the quagmire that is its Venezuela policy. “If, in fact, these are Americans that are there… If the Maduro regime decides to hold them, we’ll use every tool to try to get them back. It’s our responsibility to do so,” Pompeo said. U.S. News and World Report’s Paul Shinkman has more on the story.
Failure to communicate. The Senate Armed Services Committee hosted its first hearing since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic on Wednesday, with a new and unusual turf battle between two different parts of the Trump administration: the Pentagon and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Top Pentagon officials have slammed the FCC’s decision to give Ligado, a Virginia-based telecommunications company, permission to deploy a nationwide 5G broadband network—saying it could disrupt the military’s access to critical GPS signals. “If you’ve ever tried to talk to a friend while standing next to the speakers at a rock concert, you get the point,” Defense Secretary Mark Esper wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed.
New tensions in Kashmir. India announced this week that its forces killed a top commander of one of Kashmir’s largest paramilitary groups in a firefight, part of a surge in counterinsurgency operations during the coronavirus lockdown. The development could fuel new tensions in the disputed territory. Riyaz Naikoo, of the indigenous rebel group Hizbul Mujahideen, was reportedly killed in a raid on Tuesday. Tensions between the Indian government and Kashmiri rebel groups have risen sharply since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government revoked the Indian-administered Kashmir’s special autonomous status in August 2019, bringing it under tighter central control.
Movers and Shakers
A loyalist at the Pentagon. Michael Cutrone, a former top aide to Vice President Mike Pence, is moving to the Pentagon to take on a role aimed at vetting defense officials for their loyalty to the White House, as Foreign Policy reported in an exclusive on Wednesday.
Shake-ups in the intel community. Trump’s nominee for the next head of U.S. intelligence, Rep. John Ratcliffe, faces a divided Senate confirmation process after his hearing this week, as Foreign Policy’s team reports. Meanwhile, Trump has nominated Patrick Hovakimian to be general counsel at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
New U.S. envoy to Venezuela. Trump this week nominated veteran U.S. diplomat James Story to be the new U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. Last year, the United States withdrew its diplomats from Venezuela after it recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the rightful president. Pompeo has said the United States is ready to reopen its embassy in Caracas “as soon as Maduro steps aside.”
McMaster joins Zoom. Zoom—the teleconferencing service that everyone seems to be using during the pandemic lockdown—has hired Trump’s former national security advisor, H.R. McMaster, to serve on its board of directors.
Top USAID pandemic expert to leave post. Timothy Zeimer, a well-regarded senior official at the U.S. Agency for International Development and a former Navy rear admiral, is stepping down from his post next month after reportedly being sidelined during the pandemic crisis, Politico reports.
Former SecNav leads new investment fund. Richard Spencer, Trump’s former secretary of the Navy, is taking the helm of a new private investment fund set up by Pallas Advisors. The fund, called Pallas Ventures, will provide capital to technology companies working in the national security field.
Odds and Ends
COVID-19 conspiracies. Seventy-seven cell phone towers have been set on fire in the United Kingdom due to an online conspiracy theory claiming that 5G internet is responsible for spreading the coronavirus. Most of the towers were not even 5G-enabled, and some attacks have even targeted telecommunications engineers.
The Week Ahead
Pompeo will reportedly travel to Israel on May 12 to meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former rival Benny Gantz, days before the new Israeli government is due to be sworn in. It will be the first foreign trip for Pompeo since March, with most international travel for U.S. diplomats halted during the coronavirus pandemic.
On May 12, the U.S. Senate holds a hearing on the coronavirus response by the Trump administration, with one of the president’s top task force leaders, Anthony Fauci, set to testify.
The next court date for Paul Whelan, a U.S. citizen detained in Russia on charges of espionage, is May 13. The U.S. government insists Whelan is wrongfully detained on false charges. He was imprisoned without trial for over 15 months.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--What Democracy Will Fall Next?

What Democracy Will Fall Next?

What Democracy Will Fall Next ?
In March , Hungary became the first democracy to succumb to the coronavirus .
With stunning speed , Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban jammed through an emergency decree that gave him extraordinary powers for an indefinite period of time and put in place draconian restrictions on political freedoms .
Experts immediately began debating which democracy would be the next to fall from an autocratic power grab .
Yet while other democracies face increasing political turmoil , none has experienced a similar seizure of power .
There have been plenty of instances of democratic slippage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of leadership weakness , populist consolidation of power , political transition uncertainties , and violent crackdowns undermining state legitimacy .
If the democracies experiencing these problems can ’ t reverse course , the political consequences will be severe .
Pandemic-fueled leadership wobbles are widespread but especially serious in Brazil , Indonesia , and the Philippines .
Brazil is by far the most likely to see its leader replaced due to his failed response to the pandemic .
Rather than following the Hungarian government ’ s example of exploiting the crisis for political gain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support through an erratic and inconsistent response .
He has labeled the virus a hoax , suggested unproven self-medication remedies , and rejected any national social distancing measures .
Deaths from the virus have grown steeply , and researchers from Imperial College London assess that Brazil ’ s rate of transmission is now the highest in the world .
As a result , Bolsonaro ’ s approval rating has plummeted .
( Of course , one could argue the departure of an erratic leader like Bolsonaro would be a gain for Brazil ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ isn ’ t always a bad thing . )
While Indonesian President Joko “ Jokowi ” Widodo and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte have not flailed nearly as much as Bolsonaro , both have displayed unexpected deficiencies in leadership , raising questions about their continued rule .
In Indonesia , Jokowi also neglected to provide clear social distancing guidelines and even peddled an unproven herbal remedy to ward off the virus .
Partly as a result , Indonesia is second only to China in the number of coronavirus-related deaths in Asia .
There are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has opened the door for the military to reemerge into a larger political role .
In the Philippines , Duterte has followed his typical playbook of adopting strongman tactics to confront political challenges .
He authorized “ shoot to kill ” orders for quarantine violators and has reportedly rounded up over 17,000 individuals for curfew-related infractions .
Popular frustration with his leadership has boiled over on social media with # OustDuterteNow trending globally with almost 500,000 tweets .
While these democratically elected leaders are now losing support through gross mismanagement of the pandemic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power in questionably democratic fashion .
India , Israel , Poland , and Sri Lanka are apt examples .
In India , Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s government has encouraged and in some cases directly contributed to coronavirus disinformation targeting Muslims , Dalits , and other political minorities .
In Sri Lanka , President Gotabaya Rajapaksa won a recent and divisive election last November , rallying Sri Lanka ’ s Sinhala ethnic majority .
As the sociologist Ahilan Kadirgamar writes , the pandemic has allowed the government to reinforce “ its push @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , and forestall an economic crisis.
” It has adopted a militarized response to the pandemic and initiated widespread anti-Muslim scapegoating .
Rajapaksa is no stranger to exploiting identity politics for political gain—he honed many of these tactics when he served as defense secretary in the final phases of Sri Lanka ’ s brutal civil war .
Israel and Poland , meanwhile , are stronger democracies and present a lower possibility of political upheaval .
Yet both countries demonstrate worrying signs of populist excesses .
In Israel , Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , using a mixture of alarmism , populist rhetoric , and self-promotion to snatch a political power-sharing deal out of thin air and remain head of state .
Poland ’ s ruling Law and Justice party is forging ahead with presidential elections on May 10 , despite a national quarantine that essentially prevents opposition members from campaigning .
At the same time , the government is pushing changes to the judiciary in order to establish a “ chamber of extraordinary control ” to certify the elections .
Other democracies—including Bolivia and Lebanon—now face @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the pandemic .
In Bolivia , the caretaker government led by Jeanine Áñez had committed to holding elections in May 2020 to choose a successor to longtime leader Evo Morales .
In the intervening months , she initiated a wave of political persecutions and dismantled key parts of the country ’ s socialist safety net—actions far beyond the mandate of a caretaker government .
The coronavirus has brought an indefinite electoral delay , allowing Áñez to continue pursuing her exclusionary political agenda .
Lebanon , for its part , had been rocked by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resulted in an uneasy calm as a national lockdown kept citizens at home , but on April 26 , coinciding with the easing of coronavirus restrictions , protests started anew .
Demonstrators were particularly incensed by surging food prices created by Lebanon ’ s tanking currency .
Thus far , the government has been unable to obtain a parliamentary quorum needed to pass a big spending bill to alleviate the food crisis .
What happens next is uncertain .
As Human Rights Watch ’ s Aya Majzoub observes : “ The government ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pandemic has further eroded public trust in its ability to help people weather this pandemic and pull Lebanon out of its worst economic crisis in decades.
” The final and perhaps most dangerous type of democratic disruption amid the pandemic is the violence undertaken by overzealous security forces to maintain quarantine restrictions .
In both Nigeria and Kenya , police forces have killed tens of people to enforce strict curfews .
In Kenya , at least 12 people have been shot dead by the police , making its quarantine “ one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Washington Post reports .
The killings have been accompanied by other forms of police brutality , including use of live ammunition to disperse crowds , widespread beatings , harassment of journalists , and even the tear-gassing of commuters rushing to make curfew .
Kenya is rivaled only by Nigeria when it comes to police-initiated fatalities related to its coronavirus lockdown .
In April , Nigeria had the dubious distinction of having had more people killed by its security forces enforcing its quarantine ( at least 18 individuals ) than recorded coronavirus deaths @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Both countries suffer from persistent democratic weakness and regular state violence .
It is not immediately clear that their heavy-handed responses will lead to political disruption .
But if fatalities continue to rise under the lockdowns , then the prospect for political instability commensurately increases as well .
While the Philippines hasn ’ t recorded nearly as many security-related deaths as Kenya or Nigeria , its massive quarantine arrest figure , along with the government ’ s alarming human rights record ( groups estimate that Duterte ’ s “ war on drugs ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is foreboding .
How best to counter democratic backsliding in this array of countries ?
Each situation carries its own particular challenges .
The first set of countries , displaying unexpected leadership weakness ( Brazil , Indonesia , and the Philippines ) , run the risk of sudden political transition initiated by a military coup .
Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere hoping to forestall such moves must be direct in their messaging : Coups will not be tolerated and will bring considerable political and economic consequences .
A similar message @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particularly relevant in Brazil and the Philippines ) choose to double down on violent repression to preempt political challengers .
The concern for the second group of countries ( India , Sri Lanka , Israel , and Poland ) is longer-term patterns of democratic decay .
While the immediate risks for political volatility are minimal , there is potential for significant future damage .
The optimal strategy would be for U.S. policymakers and their allies to identify specific democracy guardrails that should be respected and to make it clear that tough measures will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sanctions , if their leaders continue to dismantle their democratic structures .
For the third set of countries—Bolivia and Lebanon , whose political transitions have been jeopardized—policymakers have more options .
In Bolivia , the conspicuous silence of the Trump administration in the face of increasingly egregious political behavior by Áñez should end .
Public support for a transparent and accountable pathway to credible elections might make Áñez think twice about continuing to double down on illiberal actions .
In Lebanon , the biggest short-term risk is a major food crisis that threatens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international community should work with government authorities to address the immediate humanitarian problem .
While resources are scarce , the world can ill afford an escalating emergency in Lebanon that would further destabilize the region .
Hopefully , this would provide space for a serious political dialogue to address protesters ’ broader concerns .
Finally , for the fourth group of countries experiencing heightened levels of police violence , namely Nigeria and Kenya , policymakers should be very clear about their disproval .
Like-minded democracies might consider running a resolution through the U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shames this behavior .
The United States and other nations have pushed Nigerian and Kenyan authorities in the past to carry out reforms and develop proper accountability for security forces .
It may be time to reinforce these admonishments with real sticks , such as withholding assistance or sanctioning culpable individuals .
The coronavirus is proving to be a significant test case for democracies worldwide .
But the negative implications do not fit neatly into a single basket of political overreach à la Hungary .
Other democracies are experiencing more complicated disruptions , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ If democratic backsliding intensifies , then we can add another casualty to the terrible toll already inflicted by the coronavirus : the demise of democracies that were too fragile to withstand the authoritarian inclinations of their leaders .

In March, Hungary became the first democracy to succumb to the coronavirus. With stunning speed, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban jammed through an emergency decree that gave him extraordinary powers for an indefinite period of time and put in place draconian restrictions on political freedoms. Experts immediately began debating which democracy would be the next to fall from an autocratic power grab.
In March, Hungary became the first democracy to succumb to the coronavirus. With stunning speed, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban jammed through an emergency decree that gave him extraordinary powers for an indefinite period of time and put in place draconian restrictions on political freedoms. Experts immediately began debating which democracy would be the next to fall from an autocratic power grab.
Yet while other democracies face increasing political turmoil, none has experienced a similar seizure of power. There have been plenty of instances of democratic slippage during the pandemic, including unexpected signs of leadership weakness, populist consolidation of power, political transition uncertainties, and violent crackdowns undermining state legitimacy. If the democracies experiencing these problems can’t reverse course, the political consequences will be severe.
Pandemic-fueled leadership wobbles are widespread but especially serious in Brazil, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Brazil is by far the most likely to see its leader replaced due to his failed response to the pandemic. Rather than following the Hungarian government’s example of exploiting the crisis for political gain, President Jair Bolsonaro has hemorrhaged public support through an erratic and inconsistent response. He has labeled the virus a hoax, suggested unproven self-medication remedies, and rejected any national social distancing measures. Deaths from the virus have grown steeply, and researchers from Imperial College London assess that Brazil’s rate of transmission is now the highest in the world. As a result, Bolsonaro’s approval rating has plummeted. (Of course, one could argue the departure of an erratic leader like Bolsonaro would be a gain for Brazil’s democracy, showing that democratic disruption isn’t always a bad thing.)
While Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte have not flailed nearly as much as Bolsonaro, both have displayed unexpected deficiencies in leadership, raising questions about their continued rule. In Indonesia, Jokowi also neglected to provide clear social distancing guidelines and even peddled an unproven herbal remedy to ward off the virus. Partly as a result, Indonesia is second only to China in the number of coronavirus-related deaths in Asia. There are murmurings that Jokowi’s inconsistent response has opened the door for the military to reemerge into a larger political role. In the Philippines, Duterte has followed his typical playbook of adopting strongman tactics to confront political challenges. He authorized “shoot to kill” orders for quarantine violators and has reportedly rounded up over 17,000 individuals for curfew-related infractions. Popular frustration with his leadership has boiled over on social media with #OustDuterteNow trending globally with almost 500,000 tweets.
While these democratically elected leaders are now losing support through gross mismanagement of the pandemic, others are managing to consolidate their power in questionably democratic fashion. India, Israel, Poland, and Sri Lanka are apt examples. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has encouraged and in some cases directly contributed to coronavirus disinformation targeting Muslims, Dalits, and other political minorities. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa won a recent and divisive election last November, rallying Sri Lanka’s Sinhala ethnic majority. As the sociologist Ahilan Kadirgamar writes, the pandemic has allowed the government to reinforce “its push to mobilize majoritarian social forces, consolidate power, and forestall an economic crisis.” It has adopted a militarized response to the pandemic and initiated widespread anti-Muslim scapegoating. Rajapaksa is no stranger to exploiting identity politics for political gain—he honed many of these tactics when he served as defense secretary in the final phases of Sri Lanka’s brutal civil war.
Israel and Poland, meanwhile, are stronger democracies and present a lower possibility of political upheaval. Yet both countries demonstrate worrying signs of populist excesses. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leveraged the coronavirus crisis to the hilt, using a mixture of alarmism, populist rhetoric, and self-promotion to snatch a political power-sharing deal out of thin air and remain head of state. Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party is forging ahead with presidential elections on May 10, despite a national quarantine that essentially prevents opposition members from campaigning. At the same time, the government is pushing changes to the judiciary in order to establish a “chamber of extraordinary control” to certify the elections.
Other democracies—including Bolivia and Lebanon—now face political transitions that have been disrupted by the pandemic. In Bolivia, the caretaker government led by Jeanine Áñez had committed to holding elections in May 2020 to choose a successor to longtime leader Evo Morales. In the intervening months, she initiated a wave of political persecutions and dismantled key parts of the country’s socialist safety net—actions far beyond the mandate of a caretaker government. The coronavirus has brought an indefinite electoral delay, allowing Áñez to continue pursuing her exclusionary political agenda. Lebanon, for its part, had been rocked by economic protests since October. The pandemic resulted in an uneasy calm as a national lockdown kept citizens at home, but on April 26, coinciding with the easing of coronavirus restrictions, protests started anew. Demonstrators were particularly incensed by surging food prices created by Lebanon’s tanking currency. Thus far, the government has been unable to obtain a parliamentary quorum needed to pass a big spending bill to alleviate the food crisis. What happens next is uncertain. As Human Rights Watch’s Aya Majzoub observes: “The government’s uncoordinated and inadequate response to the pandemic has further eroded public trust in its ability to help people weather this pandemic and pull Lebanon out of its worst economic crisis in decades.”
The final and perhaps most dangerous type of democratic disruption amid the pandemic is the violence undertaken by overzealous security forces to maintain quarantine restrictions. In both Nigeria and Kenya, police forces have killed tens of people to enforce strict curfews. In Kenya, at least 12 people have been shot dead by the police, making its quarantine “one of the deadliest in the world,” as the Washington Post reports. The killings have been accompanied by other forms of police brutality, including use of live ammunition to disperse crowds, widespread beatings, harassment of journalists, and even the tear-gassing of commuters rushing to make curfew. Kenya is rivaled only by Nigeria when it comes to police-initiated fatalities related to its coronavirus lockdown. In April, Nigeria had the dubious distinction of having had more people killed by its security forces enforcing its quarantine (at least 18 individuals) than recorded coronavirus deaths (12) at the time. Both countries suffer from persistent democratic weakness and regular state violence. It is not immediately clear that their heavy-handed responses will lead to political disruption. But if fatalities continue to rise under the lockdowns, then the prospect for political instability commensurately increases as well. While the Philippines hasn’t recorded nearly as many security-related deaths as Kenya or Nigeria, its massive quarantine arrest figure, along with the government’s alarming human rights record (groups estimate that Duterte’s “war on drugs” campaign has claimed over 20,000 lives), is foreboding.
How best to counter democratic backsliding in this array of countries? Each situation carries its own particular challenges.
The first set of countries, displaying unexpected leadership weakness (Brazil, Indonesia, and the Philippines), run the risk of sudden political transition initiated by a military coup. Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere hoping to forestall such moves must be direct in their messaging: Coups will not be tolerated and will bring considerable political and economic consequences. A similar message must be offered if embattled leaders (particularly relevant in Brazil and the Philippines) choose to double down on violent repression to preempt political challengers.
The concern for the second group of countries (India, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Poland) is longer-term patterns of democratic decay. While the immediate risks for political volatility are minimal, there is potential for significant future damage. The optimal strategy would be for U.S. policymakers and their allies to identify specific democracy guardrails that should be respected and to make it clear that tough measures will be taken, such as implementing targeted sanctions, if their leaders continue to dismantle their democratic structures.
For the third set of countries—Bolivia and Lebanon, whose political transitions have been jeopardized—policymakers have more options. In Bolivia, the conspicuous silence of the Trump administration in the face of increasingly egregious political behavior by Áñez should end. Public support for a transparent and accountable pathway to credible elections might make Áñez think twice about continuing to double down on illiberal actions. In Lebanon, the biggest short-term risk is a major food crisis that threatens millions of Lebanese with hunger. The international community should work with government authorities to address the immediate humanitarian problem. While resources are scarce, the world can ill afford an escalating emergency in Lebanon that would further destabilize the region. Hopefully, this would provide space for a serious political dialogue to address protesters’ broader concerns.
Finally, for the fourth group of countries experiencing heightened levels of police violence, namely Nigeria and Kenya, policymakers should be very clear about their disproval. Like-minded democracies might consider running a resolution through the U.N. Human Rights Council that publicly names and shames this behavior. The United States and other nations have pushed Nigerian and Kenyan authorities in the past to carry out reforms and develop proper accountability for security forces. It may be time to reinforce these admonishments with real sticks, such as withholding assistance or sanctioning culpable individuals.
The coronavirus is proving to be a significant test case for democracies worldwide. But the negative implications do not fit neatly into a single basket of political overreach à la Hungary. Other democracies are experiencing more complicated disruptions, requiring differentiated and nuanced response strategies. If democratic backsliding intensifies, then we can add another casualty to the terrible toll already inflicted by the coronavirus: the demise of democracies that were too fragile to withstand the authoritarian inclinations of their leaders.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-07--In the Coronavirus Era, Trump’s ‘America First’ Means ‘Latin America Alone’

The coronavirus pandemic arrived late in Latin America , but the number of cases is now doubling every two weeks .
More than 300,000 cases have been confirmed in the region .
Brazil , which had its first coronavirus death in March , has reported more than 125,000 cases and some 8,500 fatalities as of May 6—figures that Brazil ’ s Health Ministry acknowledges are understated because only hospital patients are tested .
Images of cardboard coffins and abandoned corpses on the streets of Guayaquil in Ecuador , which has one of the highest per capita rates of infection of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ viral.U.S .
disengagement from Latin America during the coronavirus crisis could mean trouble for both sides .
Until recently , U.S. President Donald Trump kept silent as the coronavirus surged across Latin America .
Finally , in late April , he tweeted that the United States would send ventilators and other medical equipment to Ecuador , Honduras , and El Salvador , the latter of which he noted had “ worked well with us on immigration.
” Last week , the U.S. State Department cited a paltry $ 73 million in aid to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States was “ continuing to lead ” the global COVID-19 response .
Contrary to the Trump administration ’ s spin , however , its response to the pandemic in Latin America shows that U.S. relations with the region aren ’ t healthy but on life support .
U.S. disengagement from Latin America during the coronavirus crisis could mean trouble for both the region and the United States .
A recent study by Imperial College London predicted that even if Latin American countries could adopt the strict virus containment strategies embraced by developed nations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 45 million cases and 158,000 deaths in 2020 .
If this prediction holds , the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to ravage Latin America after infection numbers begin to decline in the United States—thereby increasing the risk of a second wave of the virus in the United States .
Americans understand their vulnerability : A poll conducted in late April found that over three-quarters of U.S. voters surveyed believe they will not be safe as long as the virus is spreading elsewhere in the world .
But strict suppression strategies are beyond the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , where per capita spending on health care is a third of Italy ’ s .
Compared with the United States , for example , Mexico has half the number of hospital beds per person and less than one-tenth of the respirators .
For every positive coronavirus test in Mexico , there are least eight other infections going undetected , according to Mexico ’ s deputy health secretary .
In Haiti , hospital medical staff have walked out over the government ’ s failure to furnish adequate personal protective equipment.Over three-quarters of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as long as the virus is spreading elsewhere in the world .
Even before the pandemic , the region ’ s economies were ill-equipped to upgrade their health care systems .
Latin America had close to zero economic growth last year , and the International Monetary Fund estimates that GDP will contract by at least 5.2 percent in 2020 , with some Caribbean nations dependent on tourism revenue dropping by much more .
Brazil , the region ’ s top economy , is expected to contract by 5.3 percent and Mexico by 6.6 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which normally exceed oil revenues in Mexico and are the lifeblood of several Central American nations , are forecast to fall by 19.3 percent .
In what could be the beginning of a financial meltdown , Ecuador recently delayed interest payments on its foreign loans .
Argentina has sought to restructure its government debt , leading one rating agency to downgrade the country to “ selective default.
” When faced with the HIV and Ebola outbreaks in Africa , Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama led a global response .
Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back on the unfolding catastrophe in Latin America .
Before the onset of the crisis , Trump had slashed aid to Guatemala , Honduras , and El Salvador by nearly a third of what they received during Obama ’ s last year in office .
That ’ s in addition to a $ 3 billion decrease for international global health programs proposed for this year , which included a 50 percent cut to the World Health Organization even before the recent funding freeze .
Much of the $ 73 million in coronavirus aid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent announcement consists of existing funding redirected from other programs .
To make matters worse , last month Brazil ’ s health minister accused the United States of hijacking shipments of medical supplies and equipment that Brazil had purchased from China .
( The U.S. ambassador to Brazil denied the charges . )
Trump ’ s promised additional aid to Ecuador , if it truly materializes , will come following news reports that the country ’ s death toll at the height of the outbreak was 15 times higher than the official number @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Supplying ventilators to Honduras and El Salvador now will not make up for three years and hundreds of millions of dollars of reduced support .
In the face of U.S. indifference , Latin America has begun to look elsewhere .
In a rare example of regional coordination , nine South American nations recently agreed to work together to purchase medical supplies and equipment , exchange information about adopted health measures , and request aid from multilateral institutions .
But the United States , which was not mentioned in the joint declaration that followed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledge the regional effort .
Latin America has also turned to China .
Following the Great Recession , China ’ s trade with Latin America boomed , and China has since become the largest trading partner for many South American countries .
During this crisis , several nations have already received Chinese testing kits and protective masks .
While some Chinese medical equipment ordered never arrived and has at times proved defective ( echoing the experience of other countries ) , that didn ’ t keep a grateful Mexican foreign minister from tweeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ receiving several shipments of Chinese medical equipment .
Alibaba founder Jack Ma ’ s foundation has pledged 2 million masks , 400,000 testing kits , and 104 ventilators to 24 Latin American countries .
China ’ s soft-power diplomacy is already bearing fruit : When the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro , taking a page from the Trump playbook , blamed the pandemic on the “ Chinese virus , ” his father called Chinese President Xi Jinping to patch up relations .
Days later , against U.S. entreaties , the Brazilian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ participate in the upcoming national 5G auction .
The Trump administration ’ s bluster notwithstanding , the coronavirus pandemic has confirmed to Latin America that in times of need the region must fend for itself or look someplace other than the United States for help .
In the COVID-19 era , Trump ’ s “ America First ” has become “ Latin America Alone .
”

The coronavirus pandemic arrived late in Latin America, but the number of cases is now doubling every two weeks. More than 300,000 cases have been confirmed in the region. Brazil, which had its first coronavirus death in March, has reported more than 125,000 cases and some 8,500 fatalities as of May 6—figures that Brazil’s Health Ministry acknowledges are understated because only hospital patients are tested. Images of cardboard coffins and abandoned corpses on the streets of Guayaquil in Ecuador, which has one of the highest per capita rates of infection of any South American country, have gone viral .
The coronavirus pandemic arrived late in Latin America, but the number of cases is now doubling every two weeks. More than 300,000 cases have been confirmed in the region. Brazil, which had its first coronavirus death in March, has reported more than 125,000 cases and some 8,500 fatalities as of May 6—figures that Brazil’s Health Ministry acknowledges are understated because only hospital patients are tested. Images of cardboard coffins and abandoned corpses on the streets of Guayaquil in Ecuador, which has one of the highest per capita rates of infection of any South American country, have gone viral.
Until recently, U.S. President Donald Trump kept silent as the coronavirus surged across Latin America. Finally, in late April, he tweeted that the United States would send ventilators and other medical equipment to Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador, the latter of which he noted had “worked well with us on immigration.” Last week, the U.S. State Department cited a paltry $73 million in aid to Latin America as evidence that the United States was “continuing to lead” the global COVID-19 response. Contrary to the Trump administration’s spin, however, its response to the pandemic in Latin America shows that U.S. relations with the region aren’t healthy but on life support.
U.S. disengagement from Latin America during the coronavirus crisis could mean trouble for both sides.
U.S. disengagement from Latin America during the coronavirus crisis could mean trouble for both the region and the United States. A recent study by Imperial College London predicted that even if Latin American countries could adopt the strict virus containment strategies embraced by developed nations, the region would still see more than 45 million cases and 158,000 deaths in 2020. If this prediction holds, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to ravage Latin America after infection numbers begin to decline in the United States—thereby increasing the risk of a second wave of the virus in the United States. Americans understand their vulnerability: A poll conducted in late April found that over three-quarters of U.S. voters surveyed believe they will not be safe as long as the virus is spreading elsewhere in the world.
But strict suppression strategies are beyond the means of most countries in Latin America, where per capita spending on health care is a third of Italy’s. Compared with the United States, for example, Mexico has half the number of hospital beds per person and less than one-tenth of the respirators. For every positive coronavirus test in Mexico, there are least eight other infections going undetected, according to Mexico’s deputy health secretary. In Haiti, hospital medical staff have walked out over the government’s failure to furnish adequate personal protective equipment.
Even before the pandemic, the region’s economies were ill-equipped to upgrade their health care systems. Latin America had close to zero economic growth last year, and the International Monetary Fund estimates that GDP will contract by at least 5.2 percent in 2020, with some Caribbean nations dependent on tourism revenue dropping by much more. Brazil, the region’s top economy, is expected to contract by 5.3 percent and Mexico by 6.6 percent. Remittances from the United States, which normally exceed oil revenues in Mexico and are the lifeblood of several Central American nations, are forecast to fall by 19.3 percent. In what could be the beginning of a financial meltdown, Ecuador recently delayed interest payments on its foreign loans. Argentina has sought to restructure its government debt, leading one rating agency to downgrade the country to “selective default.”
When faced with the HIV and Ebola outbreaks in Africa, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama led a global response. Trump, by contrast, has turned his back on the unfolding catastrophe in Latin America. Before the onset of the crisis, Trump had slashed aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador by nearly a third of what they received during Obama’s last year in office. That’s in addition to a $3 billion decrease for international global health programs proposed for this year, which included a 50 percent cut to the World Health Organization even before the recent funding freeze. Much of the $73 million in coronavirus aid listed in the State Department’s recent announcement consists of existing funding redirected from other programs. To make matters worse, last month Brazil’s health minister accused the United States of hijacking shipments of medical supplies and equipment that Brazil had purchased from China. (The U.S. ambassador to Brazil denied the charges.)
Trump’s promised additional aid to Ecuador, if it truly materializes, will come following news reports that the country’s death toll at the height of the outbreak was 15 times higher than the official number reported and weeks after infections peaked. Supplying ventilators to Honduras and El Salvador now will not make up for three years and hundreds of millions of dollars of reduced support.
In the face of U.S. indifference, Latin America has begun to look elsewhere. In a rare example of regional coordination, nine South American nations recently agreed to work together to purchase medical supplies and equipment, exchange information about adopted health measures, and request aid from multilateral institutions. But the United States, which was not mentioned in the joint declaration that followed the nine-country meeting, did not even acknowledge the regional effort.
Latin America has also turned to China. Following the Great Recession, China’s trade with Latin America boomed, and China has since become the largest trading partner for many South American countries. During this crisis, several nations have already received Chinese testing kits and protective masks. While some Chinese medical equipment ordered never arrived and has at times proved defective (echoing the experience of other countries), that didn’t keep a grateful Mexican foreign minister from tweeting “Gracias China” last month after receiving several shipments of Chinese medical equipment. Alibaba founder Jack Ma’s foundation has pledged 2 million masks, 400,000 testing kits, and 104 ventilators to 24 Latin American countries.
China’s soft-power diplomacy is already bearing fruit: When the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, taking a page from the Trump playbook, blamed the pandemic on the “Chinese virus,” his father called Chinese President Xi Jinping to patch up relations. Days later, against U.S. entreaties, the Brazilian government announced that Huawei would be allowed to participate in the upcoming national 5G auction.
The Trump administration’s bluster notwithstanding, the coronavirus pandemic has confirmed to Latin America that in times of need the region must fend for itself or look someplace other than the United States for help. In the COVID-19 era, Trump’s “America First” has become “Latin America Alone.”