foreignpolicy--2020-06-04--A Modest Proposal: Open Ties With North Korea

The world has seen North Korea ’ s Kim Jong Un exactly twice since April 11 .
His absences have sparked intense global speculation , with highlights including multiple reports of his death or incapacitation .
Korea analysts—myself included—have debated endlessly which blood relative might take over .
This endless “ where is Kim ” talk , however , distracts from the far bigger problem at hand : What can be done about a nuclear North Korea ?
With barely five months to go before the U.S. presidential election , a resumption of nuclear negotiations appears unlikely .
The Trump @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pyongyang remove all nukes at once .
Kim is at the opposite end of the spectrum .
It is hard to imagine a scenario in which a serious , practical , and realistic North Korean leader—and Kim appears to be all three , despite the inherent bizarreness of Pyongyang ’ s system—would give up nuclear weapons .
North Korea is a true “ shrimp among whales , ” as the Korean saying goes , surrounded by colossal and potentially threatening neighbors : China , Japan , Russia , and South Korea .
And @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pacific , ever ready to destroy regimes on its naughty list .
( Muammar al-Qaddafi ’ s ugly fate will forever remind dictators of what happens when they trust Washington . )
Emphasizing arms control and seeking to limit North Korea ’ s nuclear program are far more realistic approaches by the United States .
However , any such agreement would take time , with serious negotiations over details necessary before a summit to seal the deal .
That isn ’ t likely to happen before November .
And even if an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it could have a short half-life if Joe Biden wins the presidency .
President Donald Trump should take a different approach and , for the moment , forget denuclearization .
Instead , Trump should make a historic overture and create diplomatic ties with North Korea .
Clear lines of communication are needed now more than ever ; opening them could be a rare , winning foreign-policy legacy for the Trump administration .
U.S. hawks have patented several foolish and ineffective policies , such as sanctioning most any country that engages in behavior they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration has filled the Treasury Department ’ s sanctions list .
Yet all the president ’ s so-called maximum pressure campaigns have failed ; so far not one target , including North Korea , has been forced to change one action .
The strategy of treating diplomatic relations with the United States as a reward has also disappointed .
Washington considers its refusal to acknowledge another state ’ s existence a devastating blow that no self-respecting government can survive .
Except they do , always .
And they do so without having any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States .
It took the United States almost a quarter century—from planning to execution—to talk to China and several more years to establish formal diplomatic relations .
North Korea , meanwhile , has been around for 72 years without exchanging any diplomats with the world ’ s primary superpower .
Indeed , current administration policy bars Americans from visiting North Korea .
Diplomacy is no magic elixir , but talking is most essential between countries at potential military odds .
The United States faced no greater threat than the Soviet Union , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confronted the U.S. military around the world .
Imagine the standoff over Berlin , the Soviet invasion of Hungary , the Cuban missile crisis , and other dangerous moments without the ability to communicate .
One of the most dramatic moments between the two governments came in 1962 , when Attorney General Robert Kennedy , the president ’ s brother , dropped by the Soviet Embassy for a private conversation with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin as their respective nations seemed headed for war .
Dobrynin later observed : “ I had no doubt that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tide in Moscow.
” U.S. relations with China offer another important example of the importance of diplomatic channels .
In September 1950 , the allied forces outflanked the North Korean military by landing at Inchon .
Soon , Kim Il Sung ’ s legions were in full retreat , with U.S. units in hot pursuit headed toward the Yalu River border with China .
Beijing sought to warn Washington against invading the North but had no reliable means of doing so .
Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai passed one message through India ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ties might have allowed consultations that would have reached a satisfactory modus vivendi , weakening the North Korean regime while allaying Chinese security concerns—perhaps halting the allied advance at the peninsula ’ s narrow neck between Pyongyang and Wonsan .
A simple conversation might have ended the war in six months rather than three-and-a-half years .
The Trump administration should announce that it will lift travel restrictions and is prepared to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea .
Washington should indicate that once diplomats are talking , they will be expected to discuss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Other subjects would include sanctions relief , disarmament steps , recovery of American remains , and cultural and sporting exchanges .
While no one should have any illusions about magically solving the nuclear standoff , the two governments could make contact routine .
Moreover , North Korean diplomats might be drawn into the larger international community in Washington .
While denuclearization would remain as distant as ever , agreement on those less sensitive subjects might move into reach .
Opening channels of communication—without the pressure of grand gestures about nukes—could ease resolution of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a visiting American .
Diplomatic relations would offer practical evidence of diminished U.S. hostility to North Korea , which Kim indicated was necessary before making any nuclear deal .
A diplomatic presence would offer U.S. policymakers a small window into one of the world ’ s most closed societies .
Formal relations might discourage Pyongyang ’ s policy of brinkmanship , since the regime could get attention without testing another missile .
And an open communication channel would allow informal transmission of ideas on relaxing tensions , addressing conventional arms , and limiting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ denuclearization a dead end , more traditional arms control , preserving Pyongyang ’ s deterrent while restricting its size and/or reach , might have better success .
And if not , little would be lost in the attempt .
Trump could also seek to end the Korean cold war .
That doesn ’ t mean the North and South will be lying down together anytime soon .
But Washington could normalize relations , encouraging Seoul and Tokyo to follow .
Adopting a peace declaration or treaty and targeting sanctions relief to encourage greater @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
For instance , Kim ’ s desire for greater economic development might incline him to be more responsive to Japan ’ s demand for an accounting of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea decades ago .
Of course , maybe nothing would change .
Although Kim appears more interested in both economic development and diplomatic engagement than his father and grandfather were , that hardly means he is a closet liberal seeking acceptance by the West .
But even so , the United States would have lost nothing .
Diplomatic relations recognize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ case , official ties might also nudge serious negotiations forward as well .
What ’ s up with Kim Jong Un ?
Who knows ?
Instead of continuing to guess without having anyone on the ground in Pyongyang , the Trump administration could rely on diplomatic ties .
That would be one foreign policy likely to survive even a change in administrations and would be a worthy legacy of an administration otherwise short of foreign-policy achievements .

The world has seen North Korea’s Kim Jong Un exactly twice since April 11. His absences have sparked intense global speculation, with highlights including multiple reports of his death or incapacitation. Korea analysts— myself included —have debated endlessly which blood relative might take over. This endless “where is Kim” talk, however, distracts from the far bigger problem at hand: What can be done about a nuclear North Korea?
The world has seen North Korea’s Kim Jong Un exactly twice since April 11. His absences have sparked intense global speculation, with highlights including multiple reports of his death or incapacitation. Korea analysts—myself included—have debated endlessly which blood relative might take over. This endless “where is Kim” talk, however, distracts from the far bigger problem at hand: What can be done about a nuclear North Korea?
With barely five months to go before the U.S. presidential election, a resumption of nuclear negotiations appears unlikely. The Trump administration appears wedded to its demand that Pyongyang remove all nukes at once. Kim is at the opposite end of the spectrum. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which a serious, practical, and realistic North Korean leader—and Kim appears to be all three, despite the inherent bizarreness of Pyongyang’s system—would give up nuclear weapons. North Korea is a true “shrimp among whales,” as the Korean saying goes, surrounded by colossal and potentially threatening neighbors: China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. And then there is the aggressive superpower across the Pacific, ever ready to destroy regimes on its naughty list. (Muammar al-Qaddafi’s ugly fate will forever remind dictators of what happens when they trust Washington.)
Emphasizing arms control and seeking to limit North Korea’s nuclear program are far more realistic approaches by the United States. However, any such agreement would take time, with serious negotiations over details necessary before a summit to seal the deal. That isn’t likely to happen before November. And even if an agreement was reached before the election, it could have a short half-life if Joe Biden wins the presidency.
President Donald Trump should take a different approach and, for the moment, forget denuclearization. Instead, Trump should make a historic overture and create diplomatic ties with North Korea. Clear lines of communication are needed now more than ever; opening them could be a rare, winning foreign-policy legacy for the Trump administration.
U.S. hawks have patented several foolish and ineffective policies, such as sanctioning most any country that engages in behavior they find to be offensive. The Trump administration has filled the Treasury Department’s sanctions list. Yet all the president’s so-called maximum pressure campaigns have failed; so far not one target, including North Korea, has been forced to change one action. The strategy of treating diplomatic relations with the United States as a reward has also disappointed. Washington considers its refusal to acknowledge another state’s existence a devastating blow that no self-respecting government can survive. Except they do, always. And they do so without having any regular and reliable communication channel with the United States.
It took the United States almost a quarter century—from planning to execution—to talk to China and several more years to establish formal diplomatic relations. North Korea, meanwhile, has been around for 72 years without exchanging any diplomats with the world’s primary superpower. Indeed, current administration policy bars Americans from visiting North Korea.
Diplomacy is no magic elixir, but talking is most essential between countries at potential military odds. The United States faced no greater threat than the Soviet Union, a hostile nuclear-armed superpower whose armed forces confronted the U.S. military around the world. Imagine the standoff over Berlin, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Cuban missile crisis, and other dangerous moments without the ability to communicate. One of the most dramatic moments between the two governments came in 1962, when Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the president’s brother, dropped by the Soviet Embassy for a private conversation with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin as their respective nations seemed headed for war. Dobrynin later observed: “I had no doubt that my report of this conversation turned the tide in Moscow.”
U.S. relations with China offer another important example of the importance of diplomatic channels. In September 1950, the allied forces outflanked the North Korean military by landing at Inchon. Soon, Kim Il Sung’s legions were in full retreat, with U.S. units in hot pursuit headed toward the Yalu River border with China. Beijing sought to warn Washington against invading the North but had no reliable means of doing so. Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai passed one message through India’s ambassador, without apparent effect. Diplomatic ties might have allowed consultations that would have reached a satisfactory modus vivendi, weakening the North Korean regime while allaying Chinese security concerns—perhaps halting the allied advance at the peninsula’s narrow neck between Pyongyang and Wonsan. A simple conversation might have ended the war in six months rather than three-and-a-half years.
The Trump administration should announce that it will lift travel restrictions and is prepared to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Washington should indicate that once diplomats are talking, they will be expected to discuss all topics, including human rights. Other subjects would include sanctions relief, disarmament steps, recovery of American remains, and cultural and sporting exchanges. While no one should have any illusions about magically solving the nuclear standoff, the two governments could make contact routine. Moreover, North Korean diplomats might be drawn into the larger international community in Washington. While denuclearization would remain as distant as ever, agreement on those less sensitive subjects might move into reach.
Opening channels of communication—without the pressure of grand gestures about nukes—could ease resolution of sticking points such as the detention of a visiting American. Diplomatic relations would offer practical evidence of diminished U.S. hostility to North Korea, which Kim indicated was necessary before making any nuclear deal. A diplomatic presence would offer U.S. policymakers a small window into one of the world’s most closed societies. Formal relations might discourage Pyongyang’s policy of brinkmanship, since the regime could get attention without testing another missile. And an open communication channel would allow informal transmission of ideas on relaxing tensions, addressing conventional arms, and limiting if not eliminating nukes. With full denuclearization a dead end, more traditional arms control, preserving Pyongyang’s deterrent while restricting its size and/or reach, might have better success. And if not, little would be lost in the attempt.
Trump could also seek to end the Korean cold war. That doesn’t mean the North and South will be lying down together anytime soon. But Washington could normalize relations, encouraging Seoul and Tokyo to follow. Adopting a peace declaration or treaty and targeting sanctions relief to encourage greater inter-Korean cooperation also would aid the process. For instance, Kim’s desire for greater economic development might incline him to be more responsive to Japan’s demand for an accounting of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea decades ago.
Of course, maybe nothing would change. Although Kim appears more interested in both economic development and diplomatic engagement than his father and grandfather were, that hardly means he is a closet liberal seeking acceptance by the West. But even so, the United States would have lost nothing. Diplomatic relations recognize reality—another government—and ease communication. In this case, official ties might also nudge serious negotiations forward as well.
What’s up with Kim Jong Un? Who knows? Instead of continuing to guess without having anyone on the ground in Pyongyang, the Trump administration could rely on diplomatic ties. That would be one foreign policy likely to survive even a change in administrations and would be a worthy legacy of an administration otherwise short of foreign-policy achievements.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-03--The Pentagon Distances Itself From Trump

The Pentagon Distances Itself From Trump Confronted with fierce criticism from retired senior military officials , Defense Secretary Mark Esper insisted on Wednesday that the U.S. Defense Department was not playing politics and distanced himself from suggestions by President Donald Trump that the military might be used to quell domestic unrest under the two-century-old Insurrection Act .
“ The option to use active-duty forces in a law enforcement role should only be used as a matter of last resort and only in the most urgent and dire of situations .
We are not in one of those situations now .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Act now , ” Esper said at a news conference .
Esper also said , “ I do everything I can to stay apolitical.
” The comments came after Esper ’ s much-criticized statement to NBC News that he was not aware of Trump ’ s intentions when the Pentagon chief joined the president for a photo-op at St. John ’ s Episcopal Church on Monday after the forcible clearing of peaceful protesters near the White House .
The latest remarks suggested that Esper was consciously distancing himself from Trump , even though @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the defense secretary had himself advocated for the invocation of the 1807 Insurrection Act to deploy active-duty forces .
Esper also prompted criticism by calling on governors to “ mass and dominate the battlespace ” in reference to containing rioters .
The defense secretary ’ s remarks to the governors , along with his appearance at Trump ’ s photo-op together with Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark Milley , provoked a spate of fierce criticism from former senior military officials , including Trump ’ s own previous defense secretary , James Mattis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ When I joined the military , some 50 years ago , I swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution .
Never did I dream that troops taking that same oath would be ordered under any circumstance to violate the Constitutional rights of their fellow citizens—much less to provide a bizarre photo op for the elected commander-in-chief , with military leadership standing alongside , ” Mattis , a former Marine general , said in the statement to reporters .
“ Militarizing our response , as we witnessed in Washington , D.C. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the military and civilian society.
” In a stunning rebuke to the president he once served , Mattis added : “ Donald Trump is the first president in my lifetime who does not try to unite the American people—does not even pretend to try .
Instead he tries to divide us .
We are witnessing the consequences of three years of this deliberate effort .
We are witnessing the consequences of three years without mature leadership.
” Mattis ’ s criticism was preceded by that of former Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ America is not a battleground .
Our fellow citizens are not the enemy.
” Another former Joint Chiefs chairman , retired Adm. Mike Mullen , wrote in the Atlantic on Tuesday that he was “ sickened ” by the spectacle at the church .
Esper , looking somber behind the podium at the Pentagon , was giving his first public response Wednesday to the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody , a full nine days after the killing sparked nationwide protests .
Appearing to finesse the narrative around the heavily @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s , the Pentagon chief said he knew that Trump had planned the walk from the White House to the church but was unaware of any clearing of demonstrators from the park in-between .
“ I did know that following the president ’ s remarks on Monday evening that many of us were going to join President Trump and review damage at Lafayette Park and at St. John ’ s Episcopal Church , ” Esper told reporters .
“ What I was not aware of was exactly where we were going when we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the plans were once we got there.
” “ There ’ s a political tone to this , ” Esper acknowledged .
“ This is a challenge for every Department of Defense during an election year.
” In a memo sent to Pentagon civilians and military members on Tuesday night , he called on the agency “ to stay apolitical in these turbulent days , ” amid concerns that Trump is leveraging a possible military deployment to quell protests and appeal to his voter base ahead of the November election .
Esper ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , first broken by Bloomberg , that the defense secretary was on thin ice with Trump for pushing back on the use of the Insurrection Act .
But administration officials indicated that Esper ’ s job would be safe for now , while stopping far short of a full-throated endorsement of the Pentagon chief ’ s job performance .
“ As of right now Secretary Esper is Secretary Esper , ” White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Wednesday , adding that Trump has “ the sole authority ” to invoke the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Department spent much of the week separating itself from Trump ’ s response to the protests , Esper was forced to pivot abruptly on another issue Wednesday , reversing an earlier decision to redeploy active-duty soldiers out of the D.C. area , a defense official told Foreign Policy .
Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told the Associated Press that the move to leave 200 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division in the greater Washington area came after Esper had meetings in the White House and with other Pentagon officials .
The head-spinning turn of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ defense official appeared to walk back the Pentagon ’ s involvement in Monday ’ s scene , telling reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday that Esper and Milley were unaware that they would join Trump for the walk and that the visit was a surprise .
Esper insisted that Milley , who was criticized for joining the walk in his battle dress , was wearing the “ appropriate uniform ” for reviewing troops , which is what the defense secretary thought would occur on the walk through Lafayette Square , and he said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bullets or tear gas to clear the area , contradicting several eyewitness reports .
But the scenes of the past week have raised concerns that the Trump administration is using the Defense Department in an increasingly political light .
“ I think in the aftermath of this presidency , the Pentagon will need to rebuild trust between civilian and military institutions and leaders , ” said Alice Hunt Friend , a former Pentagon official who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies , a Washington think tank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to trust that civilian leaders will not put them in compromising political positions for those civilians ’ own political benefit.
” Sen. Elizabeth Warren , a former 2020 Democratic presidential candidate who was seen at a protest gathering near the White House on Tuesday night , called on the Pentagon ’ s inspector general to investigate the Defense Department ’ s role in the dispersal of demonstrations .
The District of Columbia National Guard is also investigating a “ low-flying maneuver ” by a medical evacuation helicopter against protesters that went viral on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chairman Adam Smith , a Democrat , said he plans to call Esper and Milley over to Capitol Hill for a hearing explaining Monday ’ s tumult .
While Esper on Wednesday said he used the term “ battlespace ” to commend Minnesota Gov .
Tim Walz , himself a retired member of the National Guard , on his response to the demonstrations , other former officials told Foreign Policy that the phrase isn ’ t used when referring to U.S. cities .
“ It was a foul up , ” a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ And then to follow that with the photo op in Lafayette park—he and Milley both would pay a lot for a ‘ do over.
’ ” Esper , the source said , relies on jargon “ because it always seems more mission oriented , ” dating back to his time as Trump ’ s secretary of the army .
But the images of members of the National Guard driving convoys through Washington , D.C. , and the surge of 1,600 active-duty U.S. troops into the surrounding area on Tuesday night to deploy onto @ @ @ @ @ @ @ raise eyebrows about the potential use of the military in responding to demonstrations .
“ The decision to use active military forces in crowd control in the United States should only be made as a last resort , ” said Mick Mulroy , a retired U.S. Marine , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration , and an ABC News analyst .
“ Active Army and Marine Corps units are trained to fight our nation ’ s enemies , not their fellow Americans .
American cities are not battlefields.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ : This article was updated to include the White House ’ s response to Esper ’ s remarks .
It has been further updated to provide details about the U.S. troop deployment to the Washington D.C. area .
It was subsequently updated to include details of former Defense Secretary James Mattis ’ s statement to the press .

Confronted with fierce criticism from retired senior military officials, Defense Secretary Mark Esper insisted on Wednesday that the U.S. Defense Department was not playing politics and distanced himself from suggestions by President Donald Trump that the military might be used to quell domestic unrest under the two-century-old Insurrection Act.
Confronted with fierce criticism from retired senior military officials, Defense Secretary Mark Esper insisted on Wednesday that the U.S. Defense Department was not playing politics and distanced himself from suggestions by President Donald Trump that the military might be used to quell domestic unrest under the two-century-old Insurrection Act.
“The option to use active-duty forces in a law enforcement role should only be used as a matter of last resort and only in the most urgent and dire of situations. We are not in one of those situations now. I do not support invoking the Insurrection Act now,” Esper said at a news conference. Esper also said, “I do everything I can to stay apolitical.”
The comments came after Esper’s much-criticized statement to NBC News that he was not aware of Trump’s intentions when the Pentagon chief joined the president for a photo-op at St. John’s Episcopal Church on Monday after the forcible clearing of peaceful protesters near the White House. The latest remarks suggested that Esper was consciously distancing himself from Trump, even though the New York Times reported on Tuesday that the defense secretary had himself advocated for the invocation of the 1807 Insurrection Act to deploy active-duty forces. Esper also prompted criticism by calling on governors to “mass and dominate the battlespace” in reference to containing rioters.
The defense secretary’s remarks to the governors, along with his appearance at Trump’s photo-op together with Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark Milley, provoked a spate of fierce criticism from former senior military officials, including Trump’s own previous defense secretary, James Mattis, who issued a scathing statement Wednesday.
“When I joined the military, some 50 years ago, I swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution. Never did I dream that troops taking that same oath would be ordered under any circumstance to violate the Constitutional rights of their fellow citizens—much less to provide a bizarre photo op for the elected commander-in-chief, with military leadership standing alongside,” Mattis, a former Marine general, said in the statement to reporters. “Militarizing our response, as we witnessed in Washington, D.C., sets up a conflict—a false conflict—between the military and civilian society.”
In a stunning rebuke to the president he once served, Mattis added: “Donald Trump is the first president in my lifetime who does not try to unite the American people—does not even pretend to try. Instead he tries to divide us. We are witnessing the consequences of three years of this deliberate effort. We are witnessing the consequences of three years without mature leadership.”
Mattis’s criticism was preceded by that of former Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey, who wrote on Twitter on Monday that “America is not a battleground. Our fellow citizens are not the enemy.” Another former Joint Chiefs chairman, retired Adm. Mike Mullen, wrote in the Atlantic on Tuesday that he was “sickened” by the spectacle at the church.
Esper, looking somber behind the podium at the Pentagon, was giving his first public response Wednesday to the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis police custody, a full nine days after the killing sparked nationwide protests. Appearing to finesse the narrative around the heavily criticized photo-op outside of St. John’s, the Pentagon chief said he knew that Trump had planned the walk from the White House to the church but was unaware of any clearing of demonstrators from the park in-between.
“I did know that following the president’s remarks on Monday evening that many of us were going to join President Trump and review damage at Lafayette Park and at St. John’s Episcopal Church,” Esper told reporters. “What I was not aware of was exactly where we were going when we arrived at the church, and what the plans were once we got there.”
“There’s a political tone to this,” Esper acknowledged. “This is a challenge for every Department of Defense during an election year.” In a memo sent to Pentagon civilians and military members on Tuesday night, he called on the agency “to stay apolitical in these turbulent days,” amid concerns that Trump is leveraging a possible military deployment to quell protests and appeal to his voter base ahead of the November election.
Esper’s turn at the podium prompted reports, first broken by Bloomberg, that the defense secretary was on thin ice with Trump for pushing back on the use of the Insurrection Act. But administration officials indicated that Esper’s job would be safe for now, while stopping far short of a full-throated endorsement of the Pentagon chief’s job performance. “As of right now Secretary Esper is Secretary Esper,” White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said on Wednesday, adding that Trump has “the sole authority” to invoke the Insurrection Act.
But after the Defense Department spent much of the week separating itself from Trump’s response to the protests, Esper was forced to pivot abruptly on another issue Wednesday, reversing an earlier decision to redeploy active-duty soldiers out of the D.C. area, a defense official told Foreign Policy. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told the Associated Press that the move to leave 200 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division in the greater Washington area came after Esper had meetings in the White House and with other Pentagon officials.
The head-spinning turn of events on Wednesday came after a second defense official appeared to walk back the Pentagon’s involvement in Monday’s scene, telling reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday that Esper and Milley were unaware that they would join Trump for the walk and that the visit was a surprise.
Esper insisted that Milley, who was criticized for joining the walk in his battle dress, was wearing the “appropriate uniform” for reviewing troops, which is what the defense secretary thought would occur on the walk through Lafayette Square, and he said that Park Police had not used rubber bullets or tear gas to clear the area, contradicting several eyewitness reports.
But the scenes of the past week have raised concerns that the Trump administration is using the Defense Department in an increasingly political light.
“I think in the aftermath of this presidency, the Pentagon will need to rebuild trust between civilian and military institutions and leaders,” said Alice Hunt Friend, a former Pentagon official who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “The military must be able to trust that civilian leaders will not put them in compromising political positions for those civilians’ own political benefit.”
Sen. Elizabeth Warren, a former 2020 Democratic presidential candidate who was seen at a protest gathering near the White House on Tuesday night, called on the Pentagon’s inspector general to investigate the Defense Department’s role in the dispersal of demonstrations. The District of Columbia National Guard is also investigating a “low-flying maneuver” by a medical evacuation helicopter against protesters that went viral on social media, and House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith, a Democrat, said he plans to call Esper and Milley over to Capitol Hill for a hearing explaining Monday’s tumult.
While Esper on Wednesday said he used the term “battlespace” to commend Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, himself a retired member of the National Guard, on his response to the demonstrations, other former officials told Foreign Policy that the phrase isn’t used when referring to U.S. cities.
“It was a foul up,” a former military official told Foreign Policy. “And then to follow that with the photo op in Lafayette park—he and Milley both would pay a lot for a ‘do over.’”
Esper, the source said, relies on jargon “because it always seems more mission oriented,” dating back to his time as Trump’s secretary of the army.
But the images of members of the National Guard driving convoys through Washington, D.C., and the surge of 1,600 active-duty U.S. troops into the surrounding area on Tuesday night to deploy onto the streets of the capital continued to raise eyebrows about the potential use of the military in responding to demonstrations.
“The decision to use active military forces in crowd control in the United States should only be made as a last resort,” said Mick Mulroy, a retired U.S. Marine, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration, and an ABC News analyst. “Active Army and Marine Corps units are trained to fight our nation’s enemies, not their fellow Americans. American cities are not battlefields.”
Update, June 3, 2020: This article was updated to include the White House’s response to Esper’s remarks. It has been further updated to provide details about the U.S. troop deployment to the Washington D.C. area. It was subsequently updated to include details of former Defense Secretary James Mattis’s statement to the press.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-05--Israel and Iran Just Showed Us the Future of Cyberwar With Their Unusual Attacks

Israel and Iran Just Showed Us the Future of Cyberwar With Their Unusual Attacks In late April , Israeli media reported on a possible cyberattack on several water and sewage treatment facilities around the country .
Israel ’ s national water agency initially spoke of a technical malfunction , but later acknowledged it was a cyberstrike .
According to Israeli officials , the event caused no damage other than limited disruptions in local water distribution systems .
At the time , the reports went all but unnoticed amid the flood of pandemic-related media coverage .
Israeli media later blamed Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ routed through U.S. and European servers .
Iran has denied involvement.A closer look suggests that cyberwarfare is maturing into a new phase , where new rules of engagement and deterrence are in the process of being established .
Then , on May 9 , a cyberattack targeted the computer systems at Iran ’ s busiest hub for maritime trade , Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormuz .
According to Iran ’ s Ports and Maritime Organization , the attack did not penetrate central security and information systems but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for several hours .
On May 18 , the Washington Post cited unnamed officials who identified Israel as the author of what appeared to be a retaliatory attack .
Contradicting official Iranian claims of negligible effects , the Post reported that the attack triggered serious road and waterway congestion for several days .
Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi didn ’ t directly acknowledge responsibility , but he alluded to the event when he declared that “ Israel will continue acting [ against its enemies ] with a mix of instruments.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Middle East ’ s arch-adversaries brings a shadow war fought largely in secret into a new , more open phase .
Just as unusually , both parties focused on critical civilian targets but caused relatively low damage .
A closer look at this new type of Israeli-Iranian exchange suggests that cyberwarfare is maturing into a new phase , where new rules of engagement and deterrence are in the process of being established .
Cyberattacks have been increasingly recognized as one of the world ’ s biggest threats .
In its 2020 Global Risks @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Economic Forum ranked cyberattacks among the top 10 risks in terms of likelihood and impact .
This concern is neither new nor surprising .
Cyberwarfare technologies allow countries to attack an adversary covertly at relatively low risk .
It ’ s not only the attacker who gains deniability .
Even if an attack incurs visible consequences such as disruptions to the national power grid or telecommunications networks , the victim may claim that these are the result of technical issues rather than admitting it has been successfully attacked .
State-sponsored cyber-operations have long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they have become more important as routine instruments of statecraft in the pursuit of power , influence , and security .
Their covert character isn ’ t limited to deniability but inherent in the anonymous nature of the technological medium itself .
However , as the Israeli-Iranian cyberspat shows , silence and plausible deniability have lately been giving way to public attribution .
States and their agencies are increasingly acknowledging their roles—whether as victim or perpetrator .
That Iran and Israel would herald a new phase in cyberwarfare shouldn ’ t be surprising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nation , ” is a world-leading cyberpower with vast government resources invested in digital security and cyberwarfare capabilities .
Together with the United States , Israel was reportedly behind the Stuxnet computer virus—the world ’ s first digital weapon that specifically targeted and successfully paralyzed Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities about a decade ago .
As the target of the attack , Iran in turn invested furiously in its own militarized cyber-infrastructure .
While its capabilities are not as sophisticated as Israel ’ s , they are steadily improving , fueled by Tehran ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unremitting thirst for technological equality.States and their agencies are increasingly acknowledging their roles—whether as victim or perpetrator .
Their most recent cyberskirmish raises questions about motivations .
Both adversaries targeted civilian infrastructure without , deliberately or otherwise , causing durable damage , even if Iran denied involvement while Israel apparently opted to leak details about its counterstrike .
Furthermore , both sides were forthcoming about having been targeted and about the cyberattacks not having completely failed , likely preparing the ground for justified retaliation .
For Iran , the motive may be hidden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a growing frequency of Israeli strikes on Iranian assets and weaponry , and Iranian or Iran-backed fighters , overwhelmingly inside Syria .
Cyber-retaliation targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Israel is one way for Tehran to strike back .
The latest skirmish appears to mark the beginning of a shift in the Israeli-Iranian cyberconflict , one that will likely be more public than clandestine going forward .
Another change is the shift to strictly civilian facilities , whereas past cyberattacks have focused on traditional military or security targets .
Disrupting civilian targets raises the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , if the attacks on civilian targets are uncalibrated or botched , Israel and Iran risk escalation .
Had Iran ’ s attack on water treatment facilities intended to tamper with , or successfully tampered with , the injection systems for chlorine , for instance , Israeli public health could have been at risk .
Similarly , while disruptions at Shahid Rajaee Port are unlikely to kill , serious dislocations in the logistics chains of essential goods such as medicines could have real humanitarian consequences .
Even as cyberwarfare becomes more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ public view , it is still a murky and uncontrolled realm .
There are no hard international rules resembling the accepted conventions of armed conflict .
This leaves state actors to push boundaries , with dangerous margins for error .
These dangers put a premium on deterring against unpredictable attacks—and there is an ongoing debate about the effectiveness of deterrence in cyberspace .
That may be the biggest lesson from this latest Israeli-Iranian exchange : That Israel likely leaked its own cyberattack on Shahid Rajaee Port suggests it is pursuing three objectives one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ First , Israel is signaling to Iran , and to other potential cyber-aggressors , that it will tolerate no attempts to strike critical civilian infrastructure .
As we know from traditional deterrence , such red lines implicitly lay out the rules of future engagement.Israel ’ s retaliatory cyberattack suggests it is pursuing three objectives one would normally associate with conventional deterrence .
Second , Israel has demonstrated its options for retaliation—and its ability to scale up from disruption to destruction within cyberspace .
Retaliation could also potentially cross over to other types of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ although this would likely erode both states ’ ability to control the ladder of escalation .
Third , Israel is communicating not just its capabilities , but also its commitment to respond to future cyber-offensives .
This strengthens the credibility of its deterrence posture , even if the notion of cyberdeterrence remains nebulous .
If we can assume that Israel ’ s cyberwarfare capabilities , including cyberdefense , remain more powerful than Iran ’ s , then Israel ’ s demonstrated red line could convey the threat of offensive responses with disproportionate effects @ @ @ @ @ @ @ open would have been counterintuitive in an earlier age of cyberwarfare , when Israel and Iran might have chosen to remain silent or blame technical glitches .
But their conflict has entered a new phase—and not just in the cybersecurity realm .
In Syria , the Israeli-Iranian contest has already seen a shift to open quasi-warfare from earlier conflicts conducted in the shadows or through proxies .
The digital wars between both adversaries—and potentially elsewhere—are also now likely to become more frequent , more open , and aimed at a wider swath of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first tenuous attempts to establish new rules for deterrence , the scope for miscalculation has just become bigger .

In late April, Israeli media reported on a possible cyberattack on several water and sewage treatment facilities around the country. Israel’s national water agency initially spoke of a technical malfunction, but later acknowledged it was a cyberstrike. According to Israeli officials, the event caused no damage other than limited disruptions in local water distribution systems. At the time, the reports went all but unnoticed amid the flood of pandemic-related media coverage. Israeli media later blamed Iran for the cyberattack, which had been routed through U.S. and European servers. Iran has denied involvement.A closer look suggests that cyberwarfare is maturing into a new phase, where new rules of engagement and deterrence are in the process of being established.
In late April, Israeli media reported on a possible cyberattack on several water and sewage treatment facilities around the country. Israel’s national water agency initially spoke of a technical malfunction, but later acknowledged it was a cyberstrike. According to Israeli officials, the event caused no damage other than limited disruptions in local water distribution systems. At the time, the reports went all but unnoticed amid the flood of pandemic-related media coverage. Israeli media later blamed Iran for the cyberattack, which had been routed through U.S. and European servers. Iran has denied involvement.A closer look suggests that cyberwarfare is maturing into a new phase, where new rules of engagement and deterrence are in the process of being established.
Then, on May 9, a cyberattack targeted the computer systems at Iran’s busiest hub for maritime trade, Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormuz. According to Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, the attack did not penetrate central security and information systems but instead disrupted private operating companies’ systems for several hours. On May 18, the Washington Post cited unnamed officials who identified Israel as the author of what appeared to be a retaliatory attack. Contradicting official Iranian claims of negligible effects, the Post reported that the attack triggered serious road and waterway congestion for several days. Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi didn’t directly acknowledge responsibility, but he alluded to the event when he declared that “Israel will continue acting [against its enemies] with a mix of instruments.”
The unusually public cyberskirmish between the Middle East’s arch-adversaries brings a shadow war fought largely in secret into a new, more open phase. Just as unusually, both parties focused on critical civilian targets but caused relatively low damage. A closer look at this new type of Israeli-Iranian exchange suggests that cyberwarfare is maturing into a new phase, where new rules of engagement and deterrence are in the process of being established.
Cyberattacks have been increasingly recognized as one of the world’s biggest threats. In its 2020 Global Risks Report, for instance, the World Economic Forum ranked cyberattacks among the top 10 risks in terms of likelihood and impact. This concern is neither new nor surprising. Cyberwarfare technologies allow countries to attack an adversary covertly at relatively low risk. It’s not only the attacker who gains deniability. Even if an attack incurs visible consequences such as disruptions to the national power grid or telecommunications networks, the victim may claim that these are the result of technical issues rather than admitting it has been successfully attacked.
State-sponsored cyber-operations have long been defined by secrecy, even as they have become more important as routine instruments of statecraft in the pursuit of power, influence, and security. Their covert character isn’t limited to deniability but inherent in the anonymous nature of the technological medium itself. However, as the Israeli-Iranian cyberspat shows, silence and plausible deniability have lately been giving way to public attribution. States and their agencies are increasingly acknowledging their roles—whether as victim or perpetrator.
That Iran and Israel would herald a new phase in cyberwarfare shouldn’t be surprising. Israel, the technology-driven “Start-up Nation,” is a world-leading cyberpower with vast government resources invested in digital security and cyberwarfare capabilities. Together with the United States, Israel was reportedly behind the Stuxnet computer virus—the world’s first digital weapon that specifically targeted and successfully paralyzed Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities about a decade ago. As the target of the attack, Iran in turn invested furiously in its own militarized cyber-infrastructure. While its capabilities are not as sophisticated as Israel’s, they are steadily improving, fueled by Tehran’s perception of the cyberthreat and an unremitting thirst for technological equality.States and their agencies are increasingly acknowledging their roles—whether as victim or perpetrator.
Their most recent cyberskirmish raises questions about motivations. Both adversaries targeted civilian infrastructure without, deliberately or otherwise, causing durable damage, even if Iran denied involvement while Israel apparently opted to leak details about its counterstrike. Furthermore, both sides were forthcoming about having been targeted and about the cyberattacks not having completely failed, likely preparing the ground for justified retaliation.
For Iran, the motive may be hidden in plain sight. There has been a growing frequency of Israeli strikes on Iranian assets and weaponry, and Iranian or Iran-backed fighters, overwhelmingly inside Syria. Cyber-retaliation targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Israel is one way for Tehran to strike back.
The latest skirmish appears to mark the beginning of a shift in the Israeli-Iranian cyberconflict, one that will likely be more public than clandestine going forward. Another change is the shift to strictly civilian facilities, whereas past cyberattacks have focused on traditional military or security targets. Disrupting civilian targets raises the stakes without heating up the military conflict. However, if the attacks on civilian targets are uncalibrated or botched, Israel and Iran risk escalation. Had Iran’s attack on water treatment facilities intended to tamper with, or successfully tampered with, the injection systems for chlorine, for instance, Israeli public health could have been at risk. Similarly, while disruptions at Shahid Rajaee Port are unlikely to kill, serious dislocations in the logistics chains of essential goods such as medicines could have real humanitarian consequences.
Even as cyberwarfare becomes more established and—as we have seen—moves into the public view, it is still a murky and uncontrolled realm. There are no hard international rules resembling the accepted conventions of armed conflict. This leaves state actors to push boundaries, with dangerous margins for error.
These dangers put a premium on deterring against unpredictable attacks—and there is an ongoing debate about the effectiveness of deterrence in cyberspace. That may be the biggest lesson from this latest Israeli-Iranian exchange: That Israel likely leaked its own cyberattack on Shahid Rajaee Port suggests it is pursuing three objectives one would normally associate with conventional deterrence.
First, Israel is signaling to Iran, and to other potential cyber-aggressors, that it will tolerate no attempts to strike critical civilian infrastructure. As we know from traditional deterrence, such red lines implicitly lay out the rules of future engagement.Israel’s retaliatory cyberattack suggests it is pursuing three objectives one would normally associate with conventional deterrence.
Second, Israel has demonstrated its options for retaliation—and its ability to scale up from disruption to destruction within cyberspace. Retaliation could also potentially cross over to other types of deterrence, including the military kind, although this would likely erode both states’ ability to control the ladder of escalation.
Third, Israel is communicating not just its capabilities, but also its commitment to respond to future cyber-offensives. This strengthens the credibility of its deterrence posture, even if the notion of cyberdeterrence remains nebulous. If we can assume that Israel’s cyberwarfare capabilities, including cyberdefense, remain more powerful than Iran’s, then Israel’s demonstrated red line could convey the threat of offensive responses with disproportionate effects.
Conducting a cyberskirmish out in the open would have been counterintuitive in an earlier age of cyberwarfare, when Israel and Iran might have chosen to remain silent or blame technical glitches. But their conflict has entered a new phase—and not just in the cybersecurity realm. In Syria, the Israeli-Iranian contest has already seen a shift to open quasi-warfare from earlier conflicts conducted in the shadows or through proxies. The digital wars between both adversaries—and potentially elsewhere—are also now likely to become more frequent, more open, and aimed at a wider swath of targets. Even as we see the first tenuous attempts to establish new rules for deterrence, the scope for miscalculation has just become bigger.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-05--How High Will the U.S. Unemployment Rate Go?

How High Will the U.S. Unemployment Rate Go ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Analysts await the latest U.S. employment report , in Libya , Khalifa Haftar ’ s forces are pushed back from Tripoli , and Hong Kong remembers Tiananmen Square .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
At 8:30 a.m. Washington time , the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will release nationwide unemployment figures for the month of May .
With 1.9 million workers filing for unemployment last week ( making it 42.6 million jobless claims since the pandemic began ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rate climb ?
Figures released by ADP on Wednesday , seem to suggest that this month ’ s report will be less catastrophic than the 20.5 million jobs lost in April , but will still number in the millions .
The ADP report forecast 2.76 million job losses , only about a third of the losses some economists have predicted .
Even with fewer Americans losing jobs , the employment situation is still dire .
The White House is planning a $ 1 trillion remedy , according to Bloomberg , but such stimulus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he doesn ’ t plan to take up any stimulus bill before the Senate ’ s three-week break on July 3 , meaning any action wouldn ’ t take place until at least July 20 .
Europe ’ s other path revealed .
The European Union ’ s slower method of gathering figures meant that a fuller comparison to the United States only became possible on Wednesday , when the EU released unemployment figures for the month of April .
A policy of wage subsidies seems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The EU unemployment rate only increased to 6.6 percent in April compared to 6.4 percent in March .
The increase was slight compared to the United States , where March ’ s 4.4 percent unemployment rate surged to 14.7 percent rate in April .
If the U.S. economy is hemorrhaging jobs , why is the stock market up ?
On May 29 , FP asked leading experts to explain the recent rally , which appeared to slow on Thursday .
“ What is driving markets is a bet investors believe they can ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the economy quickly returns to normal ; they also win if it doesn ’ t , given that the U.S. Federal Reserve has repeatedly demonstrated that it is both willing and able to backstop markets .
After all , what is more reassuring than a buyer with a seemingly endless appetite and a money-printing press to boot ?
” Mohamed A. El-Erian , chief economic advisor at Allianz , wrote .
With its effect on tourism and travel , the pandemic has potentially disrupted a key source of revenue for some of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has tried to avert the sort of economic catastrophe that Giorgio Ghiglione warned about in Foreign Policy last month .
The country reopened its borders to tourists on Wednesday .
In April , FP looked at the countries with the most to lose from a drop in tourism spending .
U.S. and Iran complete prisoner swap .
Michael White , a U.S. Navy veteran , has been released from custody in Iran as part of a deal that freed an American-Iranian physician convicted of breaking U.S. sanctions on Iran .
White had been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ insulting Iran ’ s supreme leader on social media while in the country and served 683 days of his sentence .
He had been temporarily released on medical furlough in March and is recovering from a COVID-19 infection .
White ’ s return comes a day after Iranian scientist Sirous Asgari was deported to Iran after being held for months by U.S. immigration authorities .
Tripoli siege ends .
Forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar have retreated from Tripoli , ending a 14-month siege of the city as peace talks between Haftar ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) loom .
The extent of the LNA retreat will depend on Russian support—the United States revealed Russia was providing fighter jet assistance to the LNA in May .
Meanwhile , Turkey has said it would increase its support for the GNA while also backing U.N. peace talks .
During a Thursday visit by GNA leader Fayez al-Serraj , Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also announced that both countries would explore oil drilling opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean .
Tiananmen remembrance .
A crowd of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Victoria Park yesterday to commemorate the 31st anniversary of the bloody crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square .
Later in the day , some protesters were pepper-sprayed by police during an attempt to disperse gatherings in the Mong Kok area .
Hong Kong police had officially banned mass gatherings citing coronavirus fears .
“ We are afraid this will be the last time we can have a ceremony but Hong Kongers will always remember what happened on June 4 , ” one protester told Reuters .
Iran ’ s second wave .
Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coronavirus wave as the number of daily cases rose above March ’ s initial peak .
Iranian authorities hope the increased number of cases is down to a higher testing rate , as the number of deaths has not risen at the same time .
Iran has moved to reopen much of its society in recent weeks , and opened its border with Turkey to truck traffic on Thursday .
EU denounces Venezuela ’ s changing leadership .
The European Union has refused to recognize the Venezuelan Supreme Court ’ s decision in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an ally of President Nicolás Maduro , as the new president of the National Assembly .
“ The EU considers that the voting session that led to the ‘ election ’ of Luis Parra was not legitimate … The EU continues to fully support Juan Guaidó as president of the National Assembly , ” the statement said .
Despite the brinksmanship , there has been some recent cooperation between Maduro and Guaidó as the two signed an agreement to cooperate on fundraising for the country ’ s coronavirus epidemic on Wednesday .
An @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison ’ s media appearance outside his house at a new housing development .
The homeowner , who has not been identified , came out of his house in Googong , New South Wales , as Morrison was being interviewed to firmly tell the Australian leader and the media scrum to get off his lawn .
The outburst may have been due to the political nature of Morrison ’ s presence ( although he currently enjoys a 65 percent approval rating ) , but was more likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ Hey guys , I ’ ve just reseeded that , ” the man shouted before he closed his front door .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Analysts await the latest U.S. employment report , in Libya, Khalifa Haftar's forces are pushed back from Tripoli , and Hong Kong remembers Tiananmen Square .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Analysts await the latest U.S. employment report, in Libya, Khalifa Haftar’s forces are pushed back from Tripoli, and Hong Kong remembers Tiananmen Square.
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.
How Many More Jobs Will Be Lost?
At 8:30 a.m. Washington time, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics will release nationwide unemployment figures for the month of May. With 1.9 million workers filing for unemployment last week (making it 42.6 million jobless claims since the pandemic began), how high can the U.S. unemployment rate climb?
Figures released by ADP on Wednesday, seem to suggest that this month’s report will be less catastrophic than the 20.5 million jobs lost in April, but will still number in the millions. The ADP report forecast 2.76 million job losses, only about a third of the losses some economists have predicted.
Even with fewer Americans losing jobs, the employment situation is still dire. The White House is planning a $1 trillion remedy, according to Bloomberg, but such stimulus is not expected to come soon. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has said he doesn’t plan to take up any stimulus bill before the Senate’s three-week break on July 3, meaning any action wouldn’t take place until at least July 20.
Europe’s other path revealed. The European Union’s slower method of gathering figures meant that a fuller comparison to the United States only became possible on Wednesday, when the EU released unemployment figures for the month of April. A policy of wage subsidies seems to have kept workers in jobs: The EU unemployment rate only increased to 6.6 percent in April compared to 6.4 percent in March. The increase was slight compared to the United States, where March’s 4.4 percent unemployment rate surged to 14.7 percent rate in April.
If the U.S. economy is hemorrhaging jobs, why is the stock market up? On May 29, FP asked leading experts to explain the recent rally, which appeared to slow on Thursday. “What is driving markets is a bet investors believe they can’t lose: They win if … the economy quickly returns to normal; they also win if it doesn’t, given that the U.S. Federal Reserve has repeatedly demonstrated that it is both willing and able to backstop markets. After all, what is more reassuring than a buyer with a seemingly endless appetite and a money-printing press to boot?” Mohamed A. El-Erian, chief economic advisor at Allianz, wrote.
Tourism’s Toll
With its effect on tourism and travel, the pandemic has potentially disrupted a key source of revenue for some of the world’s wealthiest nations. Italy has tried to avert the sort of economic catastrophe that Giorgio Ghiglione warned about in Foreign Policy last month. The country reopened its borders to tourists on Wednesday. In April, FP looked at the countries with the most to lose from a drop in tourism spending.
What We’re Following Today ECB spending. The European Central Bank will inject a further 600 billion euros ($675 billion) into Eurozone economies by expanding its bond-buying program. The bank has also decided to keep interest rates at zero until inflation reaches the 2 percent mark. At a press conference on Thursday, ECB chief Christine Lagarde did not rule out further action. “In the current rapidly evolving economic environment, the governing council remains fully committed to doing everything necessary within its mandate,” she said.
U.S. and Iran complete prisoner swap. Michael White, a U.S. Navy veteran, has been released from custody in Iran as part of a deal that freed an American-Iranian physician convicted of breaking U.S. sanctions on Iran. White had been sentenced to ten years in prison for insulting Iran’s supreme leader on social media while in the country and served 683 days of his sentence. He had been temporarily released on medical furlough in March and is recovering from a COVID-19 infection. White’s return comes a day after Iranian scientist Sirous Asgari was deported to Iran after being held for months by U.S. immigration authorities.
Tripoli siege ends. Forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar have retreated from Tripoli, ending a 14-month siege of the city as peace talks between Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the internationally-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) loom. The extent of the LNA retreat will depend on Russian support—the United States revealed Russia was providing fighter jet assistance to the LNA in May. Meanwhile, Turkey has said it would increase its support for the GNA while also backing U.N. peace talks. During a Thursday visit by GNA leader Fayez al-Serraj, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also announced that both countries would explore oil drilling opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Tiananmen remembrance. A crowd of thousands gathered in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park yesterday to commemorate the 31st anniversary of the bloody crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square. Later in the day, some protesters were pepper-sprayed by police during an attempt to disperse gatherings in the Mong Kok area. Hong Kong police had officially banned mass gatherings citing coronavirus fears. “We are afraid this will be the last time we can have a ceremony but Hong Kongers will always remember what happened on June 4,” one protester told Reuters.
Keep an Eye On
Iran’s second wave. Iran appears to be dealing with a second coronavirus wave as the number of daily cases rose above March’s initial peak. Iranian authorities hope the increased number of cases is down to a higher testing rate, as the number of deaths has not risen at the same time. Iran has moved to reopen much of its society in recent weeks, and opened its border with Turkey to truck traffic on Thursday.
EU denounces Venezuela’s changing leadership. The European Union has refused to recognize the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s decision in late May to authorize Luis Parra, an ally of President Nicolás Maduro, as the new president of the National Assembly. “The EU considers that the voting session that led to the ‘election’ of Luis Parra was not legitimate … The EU continues to fully support Juan Guaidó as president of the National Assembly,” the statement said. Despite the brinksmanship, there has been some recent cooperation between Maduro and Guaidó as the two signed an agreement to cooperate on fundraising for the country’s coronavirus epidemic on Wednesday.
Odds and Ends An Australian man has made global headlines for his response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s media appearance outside his house at a new housing development. The homeowner, who has not been identified, came out of his house in Googong, New South Wales, as Morrison was being interviewed to firmly tell the Australian leader and the media scrum to get off his lawn. The outburst may have been due to the political nature of Morrison’s presence (although he currently enjoys a 65 percent approval rating), but was more likely the dramatics of a protective gardener. “Hey guys, I’ve just reseeded that,” the man shouted before he closed his front door.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com
Image credit: Stephanie Keith/Getty Images


foreignpolicy--2020-06-05--The Coronavirus Could Hit Putin Most of All

The Coronavirus Could Hit Putin Most of All The coronavirus pandemic has created problems for countries around the world , but it seems it may hurt Russia in particular , creating new and complicated challenges for President Vladimir Putin .
Findings from a new study conducted with the independent survey company Levada Center show that the conditions created by the pandemic have seriously undermined the Kremlin ’ s ability to deliver economic growth and public goods—two key historical bulwarks of Putin ’ s stability .
Put together with other long-term trends , such as the growing importance of civil rights @ @ @ @ @ @ @ emerges for the man who has led Russia for the past 20 years .
Since the early 2000s , Putin has drawn support from two main sources .
First , the Kremlin won over middle-class professionals with promises of booming economic growth .
Second , it attracted the support of lower-income social groups—including public sector employees and retirees—dependent on state support and nostalgic for the Soviet era through a mix of populist promises and great-power rhetoric .
Russians historically prioritized the state ’ s ability to provide social rights over civil rights—a reflection @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with communist legacies—and this played into Putin ’ s broader strategy .
Over the last 20 years , the biggest blow to this system of support came after the 2008 financial crisis .
The economic stagnation that followed led to a significant decline in support for the government , which culminated in a series of countrywide protests starting in 2011 and the dramatic electoral losses of the pro-Putin United Russia party in the Duma elections that year .
While the decline in Putin ’ s approval continued throughout 2013 , in 2014 the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it annexed the region of Crimea from Ukraine , leading to a surge in patriotic and nationalist mobilization .
This effect lasted for about two and a half years , but the slow erosion of support for Putin returned around 2017.The ongoing pandemic will probably hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis .
The ongoing pandemic will probably hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis .
First , a precipitous fall in oil prices combined with a virtual halt to economic activity will cause long-term structural damage to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reported wage delays , cuts , or layoffs in May 2020 as compared with October 2019 .
This has led to the sharpest drop in Russians ’ assessments of the economy since the 2008 crisis : By March , before most Russian regions introduced social distancing policies , the Levada Center recorded a 20-point decline in its consumer sentiment index .
But the situation this year now looks worse than in 2008 .
For example , Putin ’ s trust ratings , as measured by asking Russians to name leaders they trusted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to 25 percent in May 2020 .
This indicator has never fallen that far in 20 years of observations .
( The previous low was 30 percent in 2013 . )
Another indicator—Putin ’ s approval rating—has also now reached a historic low of 59 percent .
For now , the current economic situation in Russia may be comparable to 2008 .
But past crises occurred when support for Putin was at its peak .
Back in 2008 , before the financial crisis , Putin ’ s ratings were at a high after @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Another economic crisis in late 2014 was balanced by the news of Putin annexing Crimea , after which his public support reached record highs .
What makes 2020 unique is that by the start of the pandemic domestic support for Putin had already been in decline for several years in a row following an unpopular increase in the retirement age and five years of decline in real disposable incomes .
As a result of these developments , the army overcame the presidency as the most trusted institution in Russia in 2018 .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ability to provide public services .
In a study by the Center for European Policy Analysis and the Levada Center we found that even prior to the start of the pandemic , respondents were particularly concerned about a lack of access to medical care , followed by the right to social protection , decent living standards , and the right to work , good conditions , and fair wages .
We discovered that respondents who came to experience such concerns—about 40 percent of our sample—tended to fundamentally revise their view of the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of confidence in the country ’ s direction and lower approval of Putin ’ s leadership .
The ongoing pandemic is likely to expose the deficiencies within Russia ’ s health care system even further .
Local social media are already inundated with viral videos showcasing the poor quality of Russian hospitals and accidents and deaths caused by unsafe medical equipment .
As the coronavirus spreads across Russia , more and more people will gain firsthand experience of the deficiencies of the country ’ s medical system .
Access to medical care is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups , which tend to rely on medical services more than the average population .
Currently , Putin retains higher levels of trust among respondents older than 55 years—37 percent in this age group said they trusted Putin in May , as opposed to 10 percent people between the ages of 18 and 24 .
But , as our study demonstrates , respondents who gain experience of the deficiencies of Russia ’ s medical system fundamentally revise their view of the political system—and attitudes toward Putin .
Put another way , the coronavirus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ support among his core constituencies.As short-term trends work against Putin ’ s regime , the longer-term trends are also not in its favor .
As short-term trends work against Putin ’ s regime , the longer-term trends are also not in its favor .
Russian society continues to modernize .
As a result of urbanization , a quarter of Russia ’ s population now resides in big cities .
More than 40 percent of Russians now rely on internet and social networks for information , bypassing Putin ’ s traditional hold over broadcast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has grown in Russia , which contributed to strengthening social ties , especially at the community level .
As a result of this dynamic , the importance of civil rights has sharply increased for Russians in recent years .
For example , in answering the question “ Which rights and freedoms , in your opinion , are the most important ?
” the share of respondents who chose “ freedom of speech ” grew between 2017 and 2019 from 34 percent to 58 percent , the share of those who chose “ peaceful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 28 percent , and the share of those who picked “ access to information ” grew from 25 percent to 39 percent .
The three most important rights in the eyes of the respondents were “ life , freedom , personal integrity ” ( an increase from 72 percent to 78 percent since December 2017 ) , “ medical care ” ( stayed constant at 70 percent ) , and “ fair trial ” ( grew from 50 percent to 64 percent ) .
The trend toward valuing more freedom was more pronounced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , implying that these feelings will only grow in the future .
What do these findings mean for the sustainability of Putin ’ s regime ?
While previous crises such as the 2008 recession were seen as problems that the state could assist in surmounting , the ongoing pandemic exposes the Kremlin ’ s failure to deliver both longer-term economic growth and daily social services .
An impending health care crisis will accelerate the trend of public disapproval in the Kremlin .
And as Putin gets older , Russian society is becoming more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dependent on state-controlled media .
Russia is no longer a society that can be ruled in a purely autocratic fashion .
While Moscow still has strong economic reserves , Putin himself could become a liability to the very system he has created .
And by 2024—the year of the next national election—these changes may become deep enough to represent fundamentally new challenges to Putin ’ s ability to sustain his hold on power .

Maria Snegovaya, Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov

The coronavirus pandemic has created problems for countries around the world, but it seems it may hurt Russia in particular, creating new and complicated challenges for President Vladimir Putin. Findings from a new study conducted with the independent survey company Levada Center show that the conditions created by the pandemic have seriously undermined the Kremlin’s ability to deliver economic growth and public goods—two key historical bulwarks of Putin’s stability. Put together with other long-term trends, such as the growing importance of civil rights and urbanization, a surprisingly bleak picture emerges for the man who has led Russia for the past 20 years.
The coronavirus pandemic has created problems for countries around the world, but it seems it may hurt Russia in particular, creating new and complicated challenges for President Vladimir Putin. Findings from a new study conducted with the independent survey company Levada Center show that the conditions created by the pandemic have seriously undermined the Kremlin’s ability to deliver economic growth and public goods—two key historical bulwarks of Putin’s stability. Put together with other long-term trends, such as the growing importance of civil rights and urbanization, a surprisingly bleak picture emerges for the man who has led Russia for the past 20 years.
Since the early 2000s, Putin has drawn support from two main sources. First, the Kremlin won over middle-class professionals with promises of booming economic growth. Second, it attracted the support of lower-income social groups—including public sector employees and retirees—dependent on state support and nostalgic for the Soviet era through a mix of populist promises and great-power rhetoric. Russians historically prioritized the state’s ability to provide social rights over civil rights—a reflection of a paternalistic orientation common for societies with communist legacies—and this played into Putin’s broader strategy.
Over the last 20 years, the biggest blow to this system of support came after the 2008 financial crisis. The economic stagnation that followed led to a significant decline in support for the government, which culminated in a series of countrywide protests starting in 2011 and the dramatic electoral losses of the pro-Putin United Russia party in the Duma elections that year. While the decline in Putin’s approval continued throughout 2013, in 2014 the Kremlin temporarily reversed this downward trend after it annexed the region of Crimea from Ukraine, leading to a surge in patriotic and nationalist mobilization. This effect lasted for about two and a half years, but the slow erosion of support for Putin returned around 2017.The ongoing pandemic will probably hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis.
The ongoing pandemic will probably hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis. First, a precipitous fall in oil prices combined with a virtual halt to economic activity will cause long-term structural damage to the economy. Twice as many Russians have reported wage delays, cuts, or layoffs in May 2020 as compared with October 2019. This has led to the sharpest drop in Russians’ assessments of the economy since the 2008 crisis: By March, before most Russian regions introduced social distancing policies, the Levada Center recorded a 20-point decline in its consumer sentiment index.
But the situation this year now looks worse than in 2008. For example, Putin’s trust ratings, as measured by asking Russians to name leaders they trusted, have declined from 35 percent in January to 25 percent in May 2020. This indicator has never fallen that far in 20 years of observations. (The previous low was 30 percent in 2013.) Another indicator—Putin’s approval rating—has also now reached a historic low of 59 percent.
For now, the current economic situation in Russia may be comparable to 2008. But past crises occurred when support for Putin was at its peak. Back in 2008, before the financial crisis, Putin’s ratings were at a high after several years of continuous economic growth. Another economic crisis in late 2014 was balanced by the news of Putin annexing Crimea, after which his public support reached record highs. What makes 2020 unique is that by the start of the pandemic domestic support for Putin had already been in decline for several years in a row following an unpopular increase in the retirement age and five years of decline in real disposable incomes. As a result of these developments, the army overcame the presidency as the most trusted institution in Russia in 2018.
The pandemic also undermines the Kremlin’s ability to provide public services. In a study by the Center for European Policy Analysis and the Levada Center we found that even prior to the start of the pandemic, respondents were particularly concerned about a lack of access to medical care, followed by the right to social protection, decent living standards, and the right to work, good conditions, and fair wages. We discovered that respondents who came to experience such concerns—about 40 percent of our sample—tended to fundamentally revise their view of the Russian political system and reported significantly lower levels of confidence in the country’s direction and lower approval of Putin’s leadership. The ongoing pandemic is likely to expose the deficiencies within Russia’s health care system even further. Local social media are already inundated with viral videos showcasing the poor quality of Russian hospitals and accidents and deaths caused by unsafe medical equipment. As the coronavirus spreads across Russia, more and more people will gain firsthand experience of the deficiencies of the country’s medical system. Access to medical care is a particularly sensitive topic for older age groups, which tend to rely on medical services more than the average population. Currently, Putin retains higher levels of trust among respondents older than 55 years—37 percent in this age group said they trusted Putin in May, as opposed to 10 percent people between the ages of 18 and 24. But, as our study demonstrates, respondents who gain experience of the deficiencies of Russia’s medical system fundamentally revise their view of the political system—and attitudes toward Putin. Put another way, the coronavirus crisis will likely undermine Putin’s support among his core constituencies.As short-term trends work against Putin’s regime, the longer-term trends are also not in its favor.
As short-term trends work against Putin’s regime, the longer-term trends are also not in its favor. Russian society continues to modernize. As a result of urbanization, a quarter of Russia’s population now resides in big cities. More than 40 percent of Russians now rely on internet and social networks for information, bypassing Putin’s traditional hold over broadcast media. Since 2010, grassroots mobilization has grown in Russia, which contributed to strengthening social ties, especially at the community level. As a result of this dynamic, the importance of civil rights has sharply increased for Russians in recent years. For example, in answering the question “Which rights and freedoms, in your opinion, are the most important?” the share of respondents who chose “freedom of speech” grew between 2017 and 2019 from 34 percent to 58 percent, the share of those who chose “peaceful assembly” grew from 13 percent to 28 percent, and the share of those who picked “access to information” grew from 25 percent to 39 percent. The three most important rights in the eyes of the respondents were “life, freedom, personal integrity” (an increase from 72 percent to 78 percent since December 2017), “medical care” (stayed constant at 70 percent), and “fair trial” (grew from 50 percent to 64 percent). The trend toward valuing more freedom was more pronounced among younger people and more educated respondents, implying that these feelings will only grow in the future.
What do these findings mean for the sustainability of Putin’s regime? While previous crises such as the 2008 recession were seen as problems that the state could assist in surmounting, the ongoing pandemic exposes the Kremlin’s failure to deliver both longer-term economic growth and daily social services. An impending health care crisis will accelerate the trend of public disapproval in the Kremlin. And as Putin gets older, Russian society is becoming more modernized, more urbanized, and less dependent on state-controlled media. Russia is no longer a society that can be ruled in a purely autocratic fashion. While Moscow still has strong economic reserves, Putin himself could become a liability to the very system he has created. And by 2024—the year of the next national election—these changes may become deep enough to represent fundamentally new challenges to Putin’s ability to sustain his hold on power.


foreignpolicy--2020-06-05--The Pandemic and the Protests

The Pandemic and the Protests

The Pandemic and the Protests On June 3 , Foreign Policy ’ s editor in chief hosted an FP Insider conference call with two leading U.S. national security experts : Kori Schake , currently the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute , and Jake Sullivan , a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an informal senior campaign advisor to former Vice President Joe Biden .
On the agenda : how the twin crises , and the president ’ s response , are threatening America ’ s security .
The following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for length and clarity .
Jonathan Tepperman : How do you connect what ’ s happening in America ’ s streets right now with the country ’ s international interests ?
Are the protests and the underlying injustices and inequalities that inspired them affecting U.S. national security ?
Do they have the potential to do so ?
Kori Schake : There are three kinds of consequences .
The first is whether we can sustain American power , by which I mean to say America ’ s fundamental democratic institutions , from the pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ under for the last three-and-a-half years .
Second , it will of course affect our standing in the world that we look no different and no better than the kinds of countries that we have sanctioned and tried to draw into more stable , liberal patterns of governance .
American soft power takes a big hit here , as does our ability to criticize China ’ s crackdown in Hong Kong , for example , or the disgraceful behavior of the Sisi government in Egypt .
And the third way is that these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of national security to include health , for example , and the ability to track the spread of disease internationally .
Meanwhile , the injustice and crackdown on peaceful protests will make our domestic compact a much more central part of how we think about national security .
JT : Jake , how worried you are about foreign powers exploiting this new crisis ?
Jake Sullivan : The United States can not be a secure country if we are not an equal country .
For those who spend their time thinking about foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no more urgent priority right now than to focus in on these really basic questions about what this says about who the United States is , what our institutions are made of , and what we ’ re delivering for all of our citizens .
For that reason , holding a mirror up to ourselves is a higher priority right now than thinking about how foreign powers might try to exploit and take advantage of it the moment .
But that doesn ’ t mean it ’ s not an important question .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ The Russian playbook is all about trying to take preexisting divisions and inflame them and create an information warfare campaign that seeks to drive further wedges between various segments of American society .
I expect that we will see that in the months to come .
It will not be the dominant story compared to what ’ s actually just happening on America ’ s streets .
But it is something our intelligence community and international security professionals should be paying attention to .
JT : Do you mean foreign interference risks being @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , seemingly more pressing , priorities ?
JS : I ’ m not sure what ’ s happening today in the United States changes the basic equation , which is that the current administration does not believe that it should be at the top of its agenda to protect America ’ s democratic system and institutions from foreign interference .
More fundamentally , the things we have seen—from the invocation of the Insurrection Act to the scene in Lafayette Park to the way that the police treat African American citizens in general—they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dictators , autocrats , and thugs in other parts of the world .
I think it has led them to believe , in this moment of great contestation around democracy today , that they are righteous , that no longer should they have to listen to any of the countries who are complaining to them about human rights or freedoms or equality .
And I think that has a profoundly corrosive effect .
JT : Kori , are you surprised that this eroding of American norms and values has happened so quickly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is more famous than the military for the way it spends years and years inculcating these very values into our men and women in uniform .
KS : I wouldn ’ t take Secretary Esper ’ s and Gen. Milley ’ s comportment as the sole indicator of where the U.S. military establishment is on this .
Adm. Mike Mullen—Milley ’ s predecessor as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—made a very eloquent and heartfelt plea .
I know that there are lots of other senior military leaders and lots of rank-and-file @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this as well : the commandant of the Marine Corps banning the Confederate flag and Confederate symbols a few months ago , before the protests even started , because the military wanted everybody on the team to feel like full contributors .
I would also note the exemplary behavior of the chief of staff of the Air Force , Gen. Dave Goldfein , and the chief master sergeant of the Air Force , Kaleth Wright , both of whom have spoken profoundly about the challenges facing the country .
So I believe that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and are getting an earful from the American military establishment .
JT : To pivot to the pandemic , Kori , if you ’ ll forgive the cliche , I want to ask you : When you think national security , what keeps you awake these nights ( apart from the general existential dread we all feel ) ?
KS : My biggest concern is the damage the Trump administration has done to patterns and institutions for international cooperation that give the United States the ability to see and act on problems @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have to wait to start solving problems until they are already on our shores .
In this sense , the most important missed opportunity recently involved the U.S. Centers for Disease Control , which had a position in the Chinese health administration—until the Trump administration unfunded it as part of its 30 percent cut to U.S. diplomatic and international representation .
That move removed America ’ s ability to see what was happening inside China ’ s health care system .
And it damaged our ability to build alliances among health care professionals @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would have made us safer .
JT : Has the pandemic allowed China to increase its strength , power , and threat relative to the United States ?
JS : China has managed to secure some tactical gains .
First , the United States picking up its ball and going home from a major international organizations like the WHO only serves China ’ s purposes .
That vacuum that Washington leaves gets filled by Beijing .
Second , the fact that the United States is No .
1 in the world in COVID-19 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ claims , while the Chinese response did not produce those kinds of outcomes ( even if the numbers are cooked ) , gives China the capacity to say , “ Look , our system actually knows how to deal with this , and the United States is a complete and utter mess.
” That has reverberating consequences .
Third , I think China is positioning itself to take advantage of fiscal and debt crises around the world to continue to expand their economic influence .
But does that mean that China will emerge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is by no means a foregone conclusion .
China still has to contend with enormous domestic economic and governance challenges .
And an authoritarian regime that relies on repression and an extreme set of policies to keep its own people in line is not going to be very attractive to the rest of the world .
The United States still has an opportunity to emerge from this in a sound place , but that ’ s going to take sound leadership .
JT : How optimistic are you that the next president , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will be able to undo all of this damage ?
Clearly Vice President Biden ’ s initial sales pitch , which was competent management , is no longer going to cut it .
What do you think his top national security priorities will have to be when he takes office ?
And how do you rate his chances in changing the broader narrative ?
JS : Projecting confidence to the American people and to the world will make allies and partners want to work with us on meaningful reforms to the international order @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to updating the international economic and technology rules of the road .
Coming out of a crisis like this creates an opportunity .
You ask what the priorities should be ?
Some of them do involve reversing steps that the Trump administration has taken , with respect to the Paris climate agreement , nuclear diplomacy , with Iran , reinvigorating our alliances and democratic partnerships , reasserting American leadership in international institutions .
Those are fairly straightforward steps .
But then beyond that , I think the vice president ’ s view is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that no one country can deal with on their own , that require collective action , and that the United States should be driving that action .
Putting the United States back in a position of leading , mobilizing , and catalyzing cooperation around the big challenges that we all face will be a critical part of the vice president ’ s agenda .
JT : Our system has become so fundamentally broken in so many ways , particularly thanks to the gerrymandering of congressional districts and the Citizens United decision .
Polarization @ @ @ @ @ @ @ can anybody turn things around ?
KS : I am still an optimist .
You ’ re right that increasing polarization is in part the result of things like gerrymandering .
But you already see the reaction to it : Ranked-choice voting is making progress in several states , and there are efforts to create a nonpartisan commission to align congressional districts .
There are solutions to these problems , and the United States is actually really good on a 10-year timeframe at creating institutional fixes to the institutional problems we create .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a political system tied so tightly to the beliefs and priorities of its voters is incapable of solving its problems .
I ’ m about two-thirds convinced that the Trump administration may actually prove to be good for democracy in America , because it is forcing all of us to confront what it looks like when we don ’ t vote , when we don ’ t encourage civil society to be a counterweight to government , and when we allow Congress not to exercise its constitutional prerogatives of balancing executive power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. government has made over the course of the last several years—and , in particular , during the pandemic—we shouldn ’ t underestimate the systemic sources of American dominance of the international order .
Look at the independence of the Federal Reserve and the fact that it has moved in the last six months to become central bank to the entire world .
Look at how fast Congress moved to pump $ 4 trillion of stimulus into the system , something that would have made John Maynard Keynes ’ s eyes pop out—and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We make a lot of bad choices .
But the dynamism of a society structured the way that ours is , with very limited federal power , and the strength of civil society and the experimentation that federalism brings us , and the vitality of immigration—all these things have helped us solve a lot of problems that countries like China haven ’ t even begun to address .

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