foreignpolicy--2020-12-15--Blinken Is Good Enough

Blinken Is Good Enough

The Man Who Ran Washington : The Life and Times of James A. Baker III , a recent book from journalists Peter Baker and Susan Glasser , isn ’ t just a terrific read ; it couldn ’ t be more relevant or timely .
The book portrays a time—and a Washington—when political compromise and deal-making between Republicans and Democrats was not just possible , but desirable .
Against that background , it also tells the story of a great secretary of state presiding over the last time the United States was respected , admired , and even feared in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Whether it can come back—whether a Baker or a Henry Kissinger like-figure will ever walk the corridors of Foggy Bottom—is unlikely .
But the answer may not matter , or at least not matter as much as many people think .
As President-elect Joe Biden and Antony Blinken , his pick for secretary of state , gear up to operate in the cruel and unforgiving world they ’ ll inherit , it is worth reminding oneself what makes a great secretary of state , and perhaps why—paradoxically and fortuitously—these challenging times may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do great things .
Instead , a chief diplomat who is talented and committed to helping America get its diplomatic groove back may be all the country needs .
First , both Kissinger and Baker not only had the respect and confidence of their presidents ; their bosses knew foreign policy and could direct and validate strategy and command respect themselves .
Baker ’ s lifelong friendship with President George H.W .
Bush was closer than any pairing in history .
Indeed , when one of us interviewed the late president in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Baker , whom he described as a “ tough trader , ” was like a “ gim me ” in golf—the right decision that was just taken for granted .
Kissinger ’ s relationship with President Richard Nixon was more complex and competitive .
But he gave Kissinger enormous authority ; indeed , in the wake of Watergate , especially during the post-1973 era of Middle East shuttle diplomacy , Kissinger was effectively running U.S. foreign policy with Nixon ’ s blessing .
That ensured that the United States was not seen as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s allies and adversaries alike , it takes about five minutes to figure out if there ’ s daylight between the president and the secretary of state—that is , whether the secretary of state is speaking authoritatively for the president .
If there is even a glimmer , one might as well hang a “ closed for the season ” sign at Foggy Bottom .
Second , the nation ’ s top diplomat needs to have the mindset and skillset of a negotiator .
Kissinger and Baker saw how the pieces fit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how to cajole , persuade , and flatter .
They were both adept at understanding the positions of their negotiating partners and grasping their political needs , vulnerabilities , and the vital interests of their countries ; equally important , they realized that negotiations succeed when both sides were convinced they ’ d won .
Effective secretaries of state can not be ideologues whose view of a negotiation is “ my way or else.
” Once Kissinger and Baker sensed that a deal was possible , their tenacity in going after it became @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nine trips to put together the Madrid Peace Conference ; Kissinger conducted 30-plus days of shuttle talks to conclude the 1974 Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement .
They also understood when to walk away , as Baker demonstrated when he slammed his notebook shut and threatened to leave in the middle of a meeting with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad ; or in 1975 , when Kissinger threatened to reassess relations with Israel to wheedle Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to an agreement .
Third , and there ’ s no other way to say it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
No matter how formidable their diplomatic skills , without some major crisis or opportunity they could not have succeeded .
Call it fortune .
Egypt ’ s attack on Israel in 1973 offered Kissinger his Middle East moment ; Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ’ s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 provided Bush and Baker with their opportunity to organize the Madrid Summit to advance the cause of Middle East peace .
The collapse of the former Soviet Union that same year facilitated Baker ’ s success in managing German reunification without a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when their moments came , they knew how to exploit the opportunity .
As he prepares to join the Biden administration , Blinken will need to tend a lot of gardens simultaneously to achieve job number one : keeping the United States out of trouble abroad so that the new president can focus all his time , energy , and political capital on fixing America ’ s problems at home .
For this overriding mission , the new secretary of state does not need to be a brilliant strategist or conceptualizer—or have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of a Kissinger or a Baker .
He needs to be highly competent , understand the deliberative process , have the experience to navigate Washington and the world , and reflect the president ’ s deep commitment to restoring America ’ s standing abroad .
The good news on that front is that Blinken possesses many of those qualities—as well as traits his predecessor , Pompeo , lacked .
He ’ s got a pragmatic and prudent streak and good interpersonal and consensus-building skills .
Those will help him keep problems off Biden @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of issuing diktats to the other side and then refusing to negotiate and compromise when your counterpart , understandably , refuses to submit to your ultimatums .
In other words , Blinken will not be an “ our way or the highway ” negotiator like Pompeo was—and he will know when the perfect outcome should not be the enemy of a good enough one .
It might appear like bad news for Blinken , though , that a tour of the horizon suggests precious few opportunities for heroic diplomacy and transformational outcomes .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ from China and Russia are too deep seated to be resolved through quick resets or grand bargains .
They can only be managed through a framework , as scholar Robert Manning recently argued in these pages , of “ competitive coexistence ” to avoid the worst outcomes that would distract from Biden ’ s domestic priorities .
Making progress on global warming and pandemic response will require deft diplomatic footwork , but former Secretary of State John Kerry , the new climate czar , will own the climate change portfolio and other agencies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ international cooperation on global health .
A quick breakthrough in U.S.-North Korean relations is highly unlikely ; at best , he can hope to start the process of building mutual trust to lay a longer-term foundation for agreements on arms control and measures to enhance security on the Korean Peninsula .
So what does that leave for Blinken ?
The State Department has been hollowed out and morale has tanked .
As a former deputy secretary of state , he is the right person to begin the monumental task of rebuilding and reforming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hit the road right way to begin mending diplomatic fences and he will be bombarded with requests to travel .
But rather than go on a globe-girdling listening tour to show that “ America is back , ” he should focus his trips on the most significant relationships in Europe and the Asia Pacific that need care while delegating other foreign travels to subordinates .
The new secretary of state will almost certainly achieve considerable success on the important goal of rebuilding and maintaining America ’ s alliance relationships and refurbishing trust in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , through such actions as rejoining Paris Accord and the World Health Organization , and deepening ties with our NATO allies , Japan , and South Korea .
Truly consequential secretaries of state , of course , take ownership of significant foreign-policy issues and make them better .
Reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran , while extremely complicated and politically fraught , may offer such an opportunity : There is an existing framework that can provide a basis for a new nuclear deal .
The sanctions the United States and others have imposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ there are follow-on negotiations on other issues .
And there will be a deep bench of experience and expertise to help Blinken navigate the treacherous shoals of a multi-dimensional game of diplomatic and geopolitical chess that will be played out in delicate negotiations between the administration , congress , European allies , China and Russia , and the United States ’ Israeli , Saudi , and Emirati partners .
The risks are quite high but so are the rewards : A failure to reach agreement on Iran ’ s nuclear program is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ literally and figuratively , in the administration ’ s face , and cause serious collateral damage to the president ’ s domestic agenda early in his tenure .
Given the fate of the 2015 Iran nuclear accord , trying to reach another is likely a no-good-deed-goes-unpunished undertaking .
But after all , what are great or good secretaries of state for ?

The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James A. Baker III, a recent book from journalists Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, isn’t just a terrific read; it couldn’t be more relevant or timely. The book portrays a time—and a Washington—when political compromise and deal-making between Republicans and Democrats was not just possible, but desirable. Against that background, it also tells the story of a great secretary of state presiding over the last time the United States was respected, admired, and even feared in the world.
The Man Who Ran Washington: The Life and Times of James A. Baker III, a recent book from journalists Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, isn’t just a terrific read; it couldn’t be more relevant or timely. The book portrays a time—and a Washington—when political compromise and deal-making between Republicans and Democrats was not just possible, but desirable. Against that background, it also tells the story of a great secretary of state presiding over the last time the United States was respected, admired, and even feared in the world.
That world is gone. Whether it can come back—whether a Baker or a Henry Kissinger like-figure will ever walk the corridors of Foggy Bottom—is unlikely. But the answer may not matter, or at least not matter as much as many people think. As President-elect Joe Biden and Antony Blinken, his pick for secretary of state, gear up to operate in the cruel and unforgiving world they’ll inherit, it is worth reminding oneself what makes a great secretary of state, and perhaps why—paradoxically and fortuitously—these challenging times may not require a Baker or a Kissinger to do great things. Instead, a chief diplomat who is talented and committed to helping America get its diplomatic groove back may be all the country needs.
The abysmal tenure of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has cast in bold relief the gap between the best and the worst. In the past half century, two secretaries of state stand at the top. Three essential elements defined their excellence.
First, both Kissinger and Baker not only had the respect and confidence of their presidents; their bosses knew foreign policy and could direct and validate strategy and command respect themselves. Baker’s lifelong friendship with President George H.W. Bush was closer than any pairing in history. Indeed, when one of us interviewed the late president in 2006, he made clear that choosing Baker, whom he described as a “tough trader,” was like a “gimme” in golf—the right decision that was just taken for granted. Kissinger’s relationship with President Richard Nixon was more complex and competitive. But he gave Kissinger enormous authority; indeed, in the wake of Watergate, especially during the post-1973 era of Middle East shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger was effectively running U.S. foreign policy with Nixon’s blessing. That ensured that the United States was not seen as weakened by domestic scandal. For America’s allies and adversaries alike, it takes about five minutes to figure out if there’s daylight between the president and the secretary of state—that is, whether the secretary of state is speaking authoritatively for the president. If there is even a glimmer, one might as well hang a “closed for the season” sign at Foggy Bottom.
Second, the nation’s top diplomat needs to have the mindset and skillset of a negotiator. Kissinger and Baker saw how the pieces fit together and had an intuitive sense of how to cajole, persuade, and flatter. They were both adept at understanding the positions of their negotiating partners and grasping their political needs, vulnerabilities, and the vital interests of their countries; equally important, they realized that negotiations succeed when both sides were convinced they’d won. Effective secretaries of state cannot be ideologues whose view of a negotiation is “my way or else.”
Once Kissinger and Baker sensed that a deal was possible, their tenacity in going after it became the stuff of legend. Baker made nine trips to put together the Madrid Peace Conference; Kissinger conducted 30-plus days of shuttle talks to conclude the 1974 Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement. They also understood when to walk away, as Baker demonstrated when he slammed his notebook shut and threatened to leave in the middle of a meeting with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; or in 1975, when Kissinger threatened to reassess relations with Israel to wheedle Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to an agreement.
Third, and there’s no other way to say it, Kissinger and Baker were also lucky. No matter how formidable their diplomatic skills, without some major crisis or opportunity they could not have succeeded. Call it fortune. Egypt’s attack on Israel in 1973 offered Kissinger his Middle East moment; Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 provided Bush and Baker with their opportunity to organize the Madrid Summit to advance the cause of Middle East peace. The collapse of the former Soviet Union that same year facilitated Baker’s success in managing German reunification without a crisis. The point is, though, when their moments came, they knew how to exploit the opportunity.
When the two of us worked in the State Department’s Policy Planning Office for George P. Shultz, who also belongs in the top ranks of secretaries of state, he would often liken his role to “tending the diplomatic garden.” He used this metaphor to describe the tireless and sometimes thankless (or fruitless) effort to cultivate productive relationships with foreign countries to advance U.S. interests. Like Kissinger and Baker, Shultz understood that effective diplomacy depends on forging trust, building up negotiating capital with foreign leaders, knowing when and how to use leverage, and understanding how culture, history, geography, ideology, and national narratives drive leaders’ ambitions.
As he prepares to join the Biden administration, Blinken will need to tend a lot of gardens simultaneously to achieve job number one: keeping the United States out of trouble abroad so that the new president can focus all his time, energy, and political capital on fixing America’s problems at home. For this overriding mission, the new secretary of state does not need to be a brilliant strategist or conceptualizer—or have the stature, gravitas, or charisma of a Kissinger or a Baker. He needs to be highly competent, understand the deliberative process, have the experience to navigate Washington and the world, and reflect the president’s deep commitment to restoring America’s standing abroad.
The good news on that front is that Blinken possesses many of those qualities—as well as traits his predecessor, Pompeo, lacked. He’s got a pragmatic and prudent streak and good interpersonal and consensus-building skills. Those will help him keep problems off Biden’s plate and avoid the pitfall of issuing diktats to the other side and then refusing to negotiate and compromise when your counterpart, understandably, refuses to submit to your ultimatums. In other words, Blinken will not be an “our way or the highway” negotiator like Pompeo was—and he will know when the perfect outcome should not be the enemy of a good enough one.
It might appear like bad news for Blinken, though, that a tour of the horizon suggests precious few opportunities for heroic diplomacy and transformational outcomes. The problems that divide the United States from China and Russia are too deep seated to be resolved through quick resets or grand bargains. They can only be managed through a framework, as scholar Robert Manning recently argued in these pages, of “competitive coexistence” to avoid the worst outcomes that would distract from Biden’s domestic priorities. Making progress on global warming and pandemic response will require deft diplomatic footwork, but former Secretary of State John Kerry, the new climate czar, will own the climate change portfolio and other agencies will play the leading role in improving international cooperation on global health. A quick breakthrough in U.S.-North Korean relations is highly unlikely; at best, he can hope to start the process of building mutual trust to lay a longer-term foundation for agreements on arms control and measures to enhance security on the Korean Peninsula.
So what does that leave for Blinken? The State Department has been hollowed out and morale has tanked. As a former deputy secretary of state, he is the right person to begin the monumental task of rebuilding and reforming the institution. He will need to hit the road right way to begin mending diplomatic fences and he will be bombarded with requests to travel. But rather than go on a globe-girdling listening tour to show that “America is back,” he should focus his trips on the most significant relationships in Europe and the Asia Pacific that need care while delegating other foreign travels to subordinates. The new secretary of state will almost certainly achieve considerable success on the important goal of rebuilding and maintaining America’s alliance relationships and refurbishing trust in the United States and its image abroad, through such actions as rejoining Paris Accord and the World Health Organization, and deepening ties with our NATO allies, Japan, and South Korea.
Truly consequential secretaries of state, of course, take ownership of significant foreign-policy issues and make them better. Reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, while extremely complicated and politically fraught, may offer such an opportunity: There is an existing framework that can provide a basis for a new nuclear deal. The sanctions the United States and others have imposed on Iran provide some negotiating leverage if there are follow-on negotiations on other issues. And there will be a deep bench of experience and expertise to help Blinken navigate the treacherous shoals of a multi-dimensional game of diplomatic and geopolitical chess that will be played out in delicate negotiations between the administration, congress, European allies, China and Russia, and the United States’ Israeli, Saudi, and Emirati partners.
The risks are quite high but so are the rewards: A failure to reach agreement on Iran’s nuclear program is the one issue that could blow up, literally and figuratively, in the administration’s face, and cause serious collateral damage to the president’s domestic agenda early in his tenure. Given the fate of the 2015 Iran nuclear accord, trying to reach another is likely a no-good-deed-goes-unpunished undertaking. But after all, what are great or good secretaries of state for?


foreignpolicy--2020-12-16--Lloyd Austin Isn’t Who You Think He Is

Lloyd Austin Isn’t Who You Think He Is

Lloyd Austin Isn ’ t Who You Think He Is It was in 2010 , when General Lloyd Austin was head of U.S .
Forces in Iraq , that he got to know then-Vice President Biden .
Austin had already become friendly with Biden ’ s son Beau ( they regularly attended Catholic services together in Iraq , where Beau Biden was also deployed , according to the Washington Post ) , but it was his unflappability in person that most impressed the vice president , according to a senior Pentagon official with contacts in the Biden transition team .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraq were one factor in president-elect Biden ’ s decision to select Austin as his secretary of defense .
Austin has powerful Biden allies and political supporters , including retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal , who retains the president-elect ’ s admiration despite the embarrassing critiques McChrystal ’ s staff made of Biden back in 2010 .
( McChrystal did not respond to the author ’ s invitation to comment on his relationship with Austin . )
But most crucially , it ’ s clear that Biden and Austin share common beliefs , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ serial Middle East interventions , a deep-seated belief in the efficacy of diplomacy , and a nearly instinctive commitment to rebuilding U.S. alliances .
These are the foreign-policy ideas that helped secure the White House for Biden—but have not always been as popular with the military as with the American public .
Austin ’ s commitment to these themes is a testimony to the equanimity Biden first noticed in him in Iraq—and which was prominently reflected in a notorious disaster that could have curtailed Austin ’ s career before it started .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an F-16 Fighting Falcon collided with a C-130 Hercules troop transport over Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina .
The C-130 was able to land safely , but the F-16 barreled into the parking ramp of Pope ’ s east-west runway , where two battalions—about 500 soldiers—of the 82nd Airborne Division were lined up on the airfield ’ s “ green ramp ” in preparation for a training mission .
The resulting carnage was horrific : 23 paratroopers of the two battalions were killed , and more than 80 were injured @ @ @ @ @ @ @ burns , and one died the following year .
The commander of one of the battalions was then-Lt. Col. Stanley McChrystal ; the commander of the other was then-Lt. Col. Lloyd Austin The “ green ramp disaster ” was a searing experience for both McChrystal and Austin , who had attended West Point together—McChrystal graduated in 1976 , Austin the year before—but had never been particularly close .
In the tragedy ’ s aftermath , both commanders received high marks for reshaping units scarred by the disaster , but Austin ’ s work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ command .
Forged by the tragedy , McChrystal and Austin followed dissimilar but parallel tracks to high command—with McChrystal ’ s meteoric rise resulting in a five-year stint at the head of the Joint Special Operations Command ( and a controversial , all-too-public stint as the U.S. commander in Afghanistan ) , while Austin ’ s more prosaic arc resulted in steady if unspectacular promotions until he became assistant commander of the 3rd Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom .
It was during the 3rd Infantry Division ’ s assault on Baghdad , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his reputation .
With the division poised outside of Baghdad , Austin greenlit the 2nd Brigade Combat Team ’ s sprint into Baghdad .
“ Austin was the brains behind the assault on Baghdad , ” a senior military commander told me several years ago .
“ He was always pushing .
Pushing , pushing , pushing .
He was one of the finest combat commanders I ’ ve ever seen.
” The assault was a spectacular success , and the high command noticed .
In the war ’ s aftermath , Austin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by then-Lt. Gen. Dan Kelly McNeill , one of the Army ’ s most respected , if under-the-radar , senior commanders .
The McNeill report kicked Austin into the Army ’ s stratosphere—where he served as command general of U.S. Forces-Iraq , Army vice chief of staff , and then head of U.S. Central Command .
While Austin remained predictably silent about the Obama administration ’ s 2008 surge of troops into Afghanistan , his doubts about implementing a counterinsurgency strategy ( aimed at wresting control of Afghanistan from the hands of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fellow officers .
Austin , his colleagues argue , believed the United States should adopt a more targeted counterterrorism strategy—aimed at disrupting and defeating al Qaeda .
Biden , as it turns out , made the same argument to President Barack Obama .
Austin was also a private , though outspoken , critic of how Obama shaped the anti-Islamic State coalition in Iraq , in 2014 , when Austin was the head of the U.S. Central Command .
Austin stewed when Obama appointed retired Marine Gen. John Allen as the administration ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the president appoint a veteran diplomat .
Austin complained to aides that Allen ’ s appointment would lead to confusion about who was leading the anti-Islamic State effort .
Austin wasn ’ t alone in his criticism , which extended to Allen ’ s former service .
“ John Allen is a great guy , ” retired U.S. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni told one reporter , “ but does it take a retired general to coordinate a coalition ?
What is Centcom , chopped liver ?
” Austin was so angered by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requested that Centcom provide him with air transport to the region , Austin ’ s staff turned him down—which would not have happened without Austin ’ s approval .
Since he now worked for the State Department , Allen was told , he should check with them .
The incidents provide a counternarrative to what has been written about Biden ’ s “ quiet , ” “ low-key , ” and “ introverted ” secretary of defense-designate .
That is all true : Austin is known in military circles as “ the silent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often followed by one other description : that his reticence masks a deep competence—an ability to capably manage large organizations , like the Defense Department .
“ There are very few people I can think of who are more competent than Lloyd Austin , ” retired U.S. Army Col. David Johnson , a senior researcher at the Rand Corp. , said .
“ And if there ’ s one thing we need in a secretary of defense , it ’ s competence.
” Then too , and for those who know him , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in public , but he ’ s less reticent than is generally portrayed .
It ’ s not that he doesn ’ t have opinions , it ’ s that “ he just doesn ’ t like talking to reporters , ” as one of his colleagues said .
Nor do Austin ’ s reputed command failures stand up to scrutiny .
Austin is criticized for failing to predict the rise of the Islamic State and for failing to anticipate Saudi Arabia ’ s March 2015 intervention in Yemen .
“ That ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retired Army officer who worked with Austin in Iraq told me .
“ Why blame Austin ?
No one saw ISIS coming and no one predicted what the Saudis would do .
In both cases , this was a J-2 [ military intelligence ] failure .
If you know anything about the military that ’ s not exactly shocking.
” What ’ s crucial is what Austin did in the aftermath of these failures , particularly after the Saudi intervention in Yemen .
“ Lloyd was enraged by the Saudi intervention , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Centcom said , “ because we [ the Americans ] were quietly supporting the Houthi fight against AQAP [ al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ] at the time.
” Austin was so angered by the Saudi move , this now-retired officer said , that he considered formally requesting that the Obama administration denounce the intervention .
“ We waved him off of that , ” the officer with whom I spoke at the time said .
But Austin also predicted the troubles the Saudis would face and made his views known @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ He thought the Saudis would lose in Yemen and that , before it was all over , we would have to bail them out , ” this same officer noted .
Austin was right on both counts : The Saudis found themselves mired in Yemen and dependent on U.S. intelligence assets in their fight .
As crucially , the Saudi intervention marked the first time that Austin would cross swords with then-Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain , who slammed the military for its failure to fully support the Saudi effort @ @ @ @ @ @ @ t notify Centcom of their plans ahead of time , McCain said , was because “ they believe we are siding with Iran.
” The rebuke didn ’ t sit well with senior U.S. officers at Centcom or at the U.S. Special Operations Command , who had been quietly supporting the anti-AQAP effort .
And it didn ’ t sit well with Lloyd Austin .
A senior commander who served with Austin said that McCain purposely “ blindsided ” Austin in order to make the Obama White House look bad .
Siding with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , knew better : “ The reason the Saudis didn ’ t inform us of their plans , ” the officer told me at the time , “ is because they knew we would have told them exactly what we think—that it was a bad idea.
” Austin sparred publicly with McCain several months after the Saudi intervention when the Arizona senator slammed him for his lack of enthusiasm for a more intensive intervention against the Islamic State in Syria .
“ Lloyd just sat there and took it , ” the senior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and I have to say , I thought he looked bad .
But after the confrontation Austin ’ s reputation grew .
He could have told McCain to stuff it , that he was following the direction of the commander in chief .
But he didn ’ t do it , and that was the right thing to do .
He took one for the team.
” Austin ’ s willingness to take one for the team impressed Obama , and it impressed Biden .
But it was not only this willingness that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden was attracted to Austin ’ s oft-stated belief in “ strategic patience , ” a phrase that Austin has regularly used in implying his skepticism of those who think the United States should take a harder line on foreign competitors—and particularly on China .
And that , it appears , is the rub .
For while Biden has been criticized for appointing yet another retired general to head up the Pentagon , there ’ s a growing suspicion that the opposition to Austin isn ’ t because official Washington is worried @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s notorious military mafia , or that he won ’ t speak his mind when dealing with a new president , or even that his presence at the top of the U.S. chain of command will wreak havoc on civilian-military relations .
The real problem with Lloyd Austin is that he ’ s not seen as sufficiently willing to take on China , the enemy du jour among a host of Washington policymakers , many of whom would prefer the appointment of someone who reflects their own interventionist credentials , like Michèle Flournoy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and pro-Austin voices largely fall neatly into two categories : those who repeat the China-is-a-threat mantra and those who don ’ t .
For Washington ’ s China-is-a-threat crowd , the appointment of Lloyd Austin looms as a counterpoint to their foreign-policy agenda : one of larger defense budgets , less reliance on diplomacy , and a greater willingness to use force—all reasons why Biden appointed Austin in the first place .

It was in 2010, when General Lloyd Austin was head of U.S. Forces in Iraq, that he got to know then-Vice President Biden. Austin had already become friendly with Biden’s son Beau (they regularly attended Catholic services together in Iraq, where Beau Biden was also deployed, according to the Washington Post), but it was his unflappability in person that most impressed the vice president, according to a senior Pentagon official with contacts in the Biden transition team.
It was in 2010, when General Lloyd Austin was head of U.S. Forces in Iraq, that he got to know then-Vice President Biden. Austin had already become friendly with Biden’s son Beau (they regularly attended Catholic services together in Iraq, where Beau Biden was also deployed, according to the Washington Post), but it was his unflappability in person that most impressed the vice president, according to a senior Pentagon official with contacts in the Biden transition team.
Ten years later, those encounters in Iraq were one factor in president-elect Biden’s decision to select Austin as his secretary of defense. Austin has powerful Biden allies and political supporters, including retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who retains the president-elect’s admiration despite the embarrassing critiques McChrystal’s staff made of Biden back in 2010. (McChrystal did not respond to the author’s invitation to comment on his relationship with Austin.) But most crucially, it’s clear that Biden and Austin share common beliefs, including a healthy skepticism about America’s serial Middle East interventions, a deep-seated belief in the efficacy of diplomacy, and a nearly instinctive commitment to rebuilding U.S. alliances. These are the foreign-policy ideas that helped secure the White House for Biden—but have not always been as popular with the military as with the American public.
Austin’s commitment to these themes is a testimony to the equanimity Biden first noticed in him in Iraq—and which was prominently reflected in a notorious disaster that could have curtailed Austin’s career before it started. On the afternoon of March 23, 1994, an F-16 Fighting Falcon collided with a C-130 Hercules troop transport over Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina. The C-130 was able to land safely, but the F-16 barreled into the parking ramp of Pope’s east-west runway, where two battalions—about 500 soldiers—of the 82nd Airborne Division were lined up on the airfield’s “green ramp” in preparation for a training mission. The resulting carnage was horrific: 23 paratroopers of the two battalions were killed, and more than 80 were injured. Many of the injured suffered life-threatening burns, and one died the following year. The commander of one of the battalions was then-Lt. Col. Stanley McChrystal; the commander of the other was then-Lt. Col. Lloyd Austin.
The “green ramp disaster” was a searing experience for both McChrystal and Austin, who had attended West Point together—McChrystal graduated in 1976, Austin the year before—but had never been particularly close. In the tragedy’s aftermath, both commanders received high marks for reshaping units scarred by the disaster, but Austin’s work stood out, marking him for higher command. Forged by the tragedy, McChrystal and Austin followed dissimilar but parallel tracks to high command—with McChrystal’s meteoric rise resulting in a five-year stint at the head of the Joint Special Operations Command (and a controversial, all-too-public stint as the U.S. commander in Afghanistan), while Austin’s more prosaic arc resulted in steady if unspectacular promotions until he became assistant commander of the 3rd Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
It was during the 3rd Infantry Division’s assault on Baghdad, in April 2003, that Austin made his reputation. With the division poised outside of Baghdad, Austin greenlit the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s sprint into Baghdad. “Austin was the brains behind the assault on Baghdad,” a senior military commander told me several years ago. “He was always pushing. Pushing, pushing, pushing. He was one of the finest combat commanders I’ve ever seen.” The assault was a spectacular success, and the high command noticed. In the war’s aftermath, Austin received a now-celebrated Officer Evaluation Report written by then-Lt. Gen. Dan Kelly McNeill, one of the Army’s most respected, if under-the-radar, senior commanders. The McNeill report kicked Austin into the Army’s stratosphere—where he served as command general of U.S. Forces-Iraq, Army vice chief of staff, and then head of U.S. Central Command.
While Austin remained predictably silent about the Obama administration’s 2008 surge of troops into Afghanistan, his doubts about implementing a counterinsurgency strategy (aimed at wresting control of Afghanistan from the hands of the Taliban) was well known among his fellow officers. Austin, his colleagues argue, believed the United States should adopt a more targeted counterterrorism strategy—aimed at disrupting and defeating al Qaeda. Biden, as it turns out, made the same argument to President Barack Obama.
Austin was also a private, though outspoken, critic of how Obama shaped the anti-Islamic State coalition in Iraq, in 2014, when Austin was the head of the U.S. Central Command. Austin stewed when Obama appointed retired Marine Gen. John Allen as the administration’s special envoy to the coalition, preferring that the president appoint a veteran diplomat. Austin complained to aides that Allen’s appointment would lead to confusion about who was leading the anti-Islamic State effort. Austin wasn’t alone in his criticism, which extended to Allen’s former service. “John Allen is a great guy,” retired U.S. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni told one reporter, “but does it take a retired general to coordinate a coalition? What is Centcom, chopped liver?” Austin was so angered by Allen’s appointment that when Allen requested that Centcom provide him with air transport to the region, Austin’s staff turned him down—which would not have happened without Austin’s approval. Since he now worked for the State Department, Allen was told, he should check with them.
The incidents provide a counternarrative to what has been written about Biden’s “quiet,” “low-key,” and “introverted” secretary of defense-designate. That is all true: Austin is known in military circles as “the silent general,” a description that is often followed by one other description: that his reticence masks a deep competence—an ability to capably manage large organizations, like the Defense Department. “There are very few people I can think of who are more competent than Lloyd Austin,” retired U.S. Army Col. David Johnson, a senior researcher at the Rand Corp., said. “And if there’s one thing we need in a secretary of defense, it’s competence.” Then too, and for those who know him, the now-retired four-star general might be self-effacing in public, but he’s less reticent than is generally portrayed. It’s not that he doesn’t have opinions, it’s that “he just doesn’t like talking to reporters,” as one of his colleagues said. Nor do Austin’s reputed command failures stand up to scrutiny. Austin is criticized for failing to predict the rise of the Islamic State and for failing to anticipate Saudi Arabia’s March 2015 intervention in Yemen. “That’s all bullshit,” a senior retired Army officer who worked with Austin in Iraq told me. “Why blame Austin? No one saw ISIS coming and no one predicted what the Saudis would do. In both cases, this was a J-2 [military intelligence] failure. If you know anything about the military that’s not exactly shocking.”
What’s crucial is what Austin did in the aftermath of these failures, particularly after the Saudi intervention in Yemen. “Lloyd was enraged by the Saudi intervention,” a senior officer who worked with Austin at Centcom said, “because we [the Americans] were quietly supporting the Houthi fight against AQAP [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] at the time.” Austin was so angered by the Saudi move, this now-retired officer said, that he considered formally requesting that the Obama administration denounce the intervention. “We waved him off of that,” the officer with whom I spoke at the time said. But Austin also predicted the troubles the Saudis would face and made his views known to senior civilians at the Pentagon. “He thought the Saudis would lose in Yemen and that, before it was all over, we would have to bail them out,” this same officer noted. Austin was right on both counts: The Saudis found themselves mired in Yemen and dependent on U.S. intelligence assets in their fight.
As crucially, the Saudi intervention marked the first time that Austin would cross swords with then-Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, who slammed the military for its failure to fully support the Saudi effort. The reason the Saudis didn’t notify Centcom of their plans ahead of time, McCain said, was because “they believe we are siding with Iran.” The rebuke didn’t sit well with senior U.S. officers at Centcom or at the U.S. Special Operations Command, who had been quietly supporting the anti-AQAP effort. And it didn’t sit well with Lloyd Austin. A senior commander who served with Austin said that McCain purposely “blindsided” Austin in order to make the Obama White House look bad. Siding with Iran? McCain, this officer suggested, knew better: “The reason the Saudis didn’t inform us of their plans,” the officer told me at the time, “is because they knew we would have told them exactly what we think—that it was a bad idea.”
Austin sparred publicly with McCain several months after the Saudi intervention when the Arizona senator slammed him for his lack of enthusiasm for a more intensive intervention against the Islamic State in Syria. “Lloyd just sat there and took it,” the senior officer told me last week, “and I have to say, I thought he looked bad. But after the confrontation Austin’s reputation grew. He could have told McCain to stuff it, that he was following the direction of the commander in chief. But he didn’t do it, and that was the right thing to do. He took one for the team.” Austin’s willingness to take one for the team impressed Obama, and it impressed Biden. But it was not only this willingness that impressed the now president-elect. As crucially, Biden was attracted to Austin’s oft-stated belief in “strategic patience,” a phrase that Austin has regularly used in implying his skepticism of those who think the United States should take a harder line on foreign competitors—and particularly on China.
And that, it appears, is the rub.
For while Biden has been criticized for appointing yet another retired general to head up the Pentagon, there’s a growing suspicion that the opposition to Austin isn’t because official Washington is worried his tenure will replicate James Mattis’s notorious military mafia, or that he won’t speak his mind when dealing with a new president, or even that his presence at the top of the U.S. chain of command will wreak havoc on civilian-military relations. The real problem with Lloyd Austin is that he’s not seen as sufficiently willing to take on China, the enemy du jour among a host of Washington policymakers, many of whom would prefer the appointment of someone who reflects their own interventionist credentials, like Michèle Flournoy. Indeed, the roster of anti-Austin and pro-Austin voices largely fall neatly into two categories: those who repeat the China-is-a-threat mantra and those who don’t.
For Washington’s China-is-a-threat crowd, the appointment of Lloyd Austin looms as a counterpoint to their foreign-policy agenda: one of larger defense budgets, less reliance on diplomacy, and a greater willingness to use force—all reasons why Biden appointed Austin in the first place.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-16--WTO Meeting Pits Rich Against Poor In Fight For Vaccines

WTO Meeting Pits Rich Against Poor In Fight For Vaccines Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The World Trade Organization is expected to discuss vaccine access at today ’ s general meeting , Somalia cuts diplomatic ties with Kenya , and Europe locks down .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
South Africa and India are leading a group of low- and middle-income countries calling for a waiver on intellectual property rights on products related to the pandemic—including personal protective equipment , therapeutics , and vaccines .
China has also backed the measure .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and the European Union oppose the move , claiming that IP rights are not the hurdle they are made out to be , since voluntary licensing and global facilities like COVAX can help poorer countries meet their needs effectively .
Empty shelves .
High-income countries may find the issue less urgent since they have already bought up the majority of the global supply of vaccines ( as well as funded their development in many cases ) .
A New York Times analysis found that based on current purchasing agreements , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Britain and the United States could do so four times over , and Canada six times over .
No silver bullet .
Mustaqeem De Gama , a counsellor at the South African Permanent Mission to the WTO and a coauthor of today ’ s proposal , said the waiver is necessary to combat a broken system .
“ We realize this waiver is not a silver bullet .
But COVID has proven that the IP system doesn ’ t work .
It is not designed to deal with pandemics .
Hopefully , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ talk about how to reform the IP system to react to the needs that members have .
Because this is not the only pandemic we will face , ” de Gama told the Lancet .
( The entire Lancet report by Ann Danaiya Usher is worth a look ) .
Outside support .
The medical charity Doctors Without Borders supports the proposal , arguing that poorer countries won ’ t be able to afford vaccines otherwise .
“ We ’ re calling on all governments to urgently throw their support behind this ground-breaking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ profits at this critical moment for global health , ” said Sidney Wong of the organization ’ s Access Campaign .
A losing battle .
Because the WTO works on a consensus basis , it ’ s likely that the South African-Indian led proposal will fail .
Still , poorer countries are unlikely to forget the day when rich countries barred the door while disease raged outside among their poorer neighbors .
Somalia cuts ties with Kenya Somalia has cut diplomatic ties with Kenya , alleging its neighbor has been meddling in its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ comes after Somalia expelled the Kenyan ambassador in November over suspected electoral interference in the Somali state of Jubaland .
Kenya provides 3,600 troops to an African Union-led peacekeeping force in Somalia .
Their position is now in question .
Somalia was likely irritated by the recent two-day visit to Kenya of Muse Bihi Abdi , the president of the secessionist region of Somaliland , during which both Abdi and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta pledged to deepen ties .
Europe closing up .
Germany enters a stricter lockdown phase today , as most @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contacts are limited to one other household until Jan. 10 .
In the Netherlands , schools will finish their term early and a range of businesses are closed until Jan. 19 .
In the United Kingdom , two leading medical journals have issued a rare joint editorial asking the British government to reverse its decision to relax restrictions over the Christmas period or risk overwhelming its hospital system .
Facebook calls out French activity .
Facebook has removed dozens of accounts affiliated with the French military after it found instances of fake accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parrot French talking points to African networks .
It ’ s the first time Facebook has called out a Western government-affiliated entity for this kind of activity .
The accounts posed as Africans voicing support for French military action while also discussing politics in West and Central Africa .
Additionally , Facebook found that the French accounts had engaged in arguments with Russian accounts also posing as Africans .
Journalists detained in record numbers .
More journalists were imprisoned for their work in 2020 than in any year on record , according to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Journalists .
In the past year , 274 journalists in total have been jailed , slightly more than the previous record set in 2016 .
China arrested the most journalists , 47 , for the second year in a row , followed by Turkey , Egypt , and Saudi Arabia .
The report found that the biggest spike in jailings this year were in Belarus and Ethiopia .
Hungary ’ s anti-LGBT policies .
Hungary has continued its crusade against LGBT people by changing its constitution to effectively ban same-sex couples from adopting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ definition of the family as “ based on marriage and the parent-child relation .
The mother is a woman , the father a man.
” Before the change , gay couples could still adopt children if one applied as a single person .
By only allowing married couples to adopt , that route is now closed .
EU ’ s big tech plans .
The European Commission is planning to impose new regulations targeting large tech firms , with high penalties for non-compliance .
The new laws—the Digital Services Act and the Digital @ @ @ @ @ @ @ data that tech platforms could harvest and push big players like Facebook and Google to move faster in removing criminal and harmful content .
The new laws would impose fines of up to 10 percent of a company ’ s annual revenue if it fails to live up to the new standards .
Foreign Policy ’ s Editor in Chief , Ravi Agrawal , interviewed EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager earlier this year to discuss her plans for taking on Big Tech .
Iran ’ s oil exports .
Iranian oil exports have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , despite tough U.S. sanctions , according to a number of research firms .
The Wall Street Journal reports that high-end estimates put Iranian crude exports at 1.2 million barrels a day over the fall period , up from 481,000 barrels a day in February .
Buyers in China and Venezuela have facilitated the surge , which has been helped along by steep discounts offered by Tehran .
Paris municipal authorities have been issued a $ 110,000 fine by France ’ s public service ministry for hiring too many women .
Anne Hidalgo @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , hired 11 women and five men in 2018 , breaching a rule that states that no one gender should represent more than 60 percent of management positions .
Hidalgo said she was filled with joy upon hearing about the fine but added that it was “ obviously absurd , unfair , irresponsible and dangerous.
” The rule on gender parity has been repealed since 2018 , but the fine still applies retroactively .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The World Trade Organization is expected to discuss vaccine access at today’s general meeting, Somalia cuts diplomatic ties with Kenya, and Europe locks down.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The World Trade Organization is expected to discuss vaccine access at today’s general meeting, Somalia cuts diplomatic ties with Kenya, and Europe locks down.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Rich vs. Poor at WTO General Meeting Poorer countries are bringing a fight for equal access to coronavirus vaccines to the World Trade Organization today, as rich countries like the United Kingdom and United States begin rolling out vaccines to their residents.
South Africa and India are leading a group of low- and middle-income countries calling for a waiver on intellectual property rights on products related to the pandemic—including personal protective equipment, therapeutics, and vaccines. China has also backed the measure.
Rich countries and entities such as the United States and the European Union oppose the move, claiming that IP rights are not the hurdle they are made out to be, since voluntary licensing and global facilities like COVAX can help poorer countries meet their needs effectively.
Empty shelves. High-income countries may find the issue less urgent since they have already bought up the majority of the global supply of vaccines (as well as funded their development in many cases). A New York Times analysis found that based on current purchasing agreements, the European Union could vaccinate its residents twice, Britain and the United States could do so four times over, and Canada six times over.
No silver bullet. Mustaqeem De Gama, a counsellor at the South African Permanent Mission to the WTO and a coauthor of today’s proposal, said the waiver is necessary to combat a broken system.
“We realize this waiver is not a silver bullet. But COVID has proven that the IP system doesn’t work. It is not designed to deal with pandemics. Hopefully, this puts us on a path to talk about how to reform the IP system to react to the needs that members have. Because this is not the only pandemic we will face,” de Gama told the Lancet. (The entire Lancet report by Ann Danaiya Usher is worth a look).
Outside support. The medical charity Doctors Without Borders supports the proposal, arguing that poorer countries won’t be able to afford vaccines otherwise. “We’re calling on all governments to urgently throw their support behind this ground-breaking proposal that puts human lives over corporate profits at this critical moment for global health,” said Sidney Wong of the organization’s Access Campaign.
A losing battle. Because the WTO works on a consensus basis, it’s likely that the South African-Indian led proposal will fail. Still, poorer countries are unlikely to forget the day when rich countries barred the door while disease raged outside among their poorer neighbors.
What We’re Following Today
Somalia cuts ties with Kenya Somalia has cut diplomatic ties with Kenya, alleging its neighbor has been meddling in its affairs without citing specifics. The move comes after Somalia expelled the Kenyan ambassador in November over suspected electoral interference in the Somali state of Jubaland.
Kenya provides 3,600 troops to an African Union-led peacekeeping force in Somalia. Their position is now in question.
Somalia was likely irritated by the recent two-day visit to Kenya of Muse Bihi Abdi, the president of the secessionist region of Somaliland, during which both Abdi and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta pledged to deepen ties.
Europe closing up. Germany enters a stricter lockdown phase today, as most shops will be forced to close and contacts are limited to one other household until Jan. 10. In the Netherlands, schools will finish their term early and a range of businesses are closed until Jan. 19.
In the United Kingdom, two leading medical journals have issued a rare joint editorial asking the British government to reverse its decision to relax restrictions over the Christmas period or risk overwhelming its hospital system.
Facebook calls out French activity. Facebook has removed dozens of accounts affiliated with the French military after it found instances of fake accounts or so-called sock puppets being used to parrot French talking points to African networks. It’s the first time Facebook has called out a Western government-affiliated entity for this kind of activity.
The accounts posed as Africans voicing support for French military action while also discussing politics in West and Central Africa. Additionally, Facebook found that the French accounts had engaged in arguments with Russian accounts also posing as Africans.
Keep an Eye On
Journalists detained in record numbers. More journalists were imprisoned for their work in 2020 than in any year on record, according to a report by the Committee to Protect Journalists. In the past year, 274 journalists in total have been jailed, slightly more than the previous record set in 2016.
China arrested the most journalists, 47, for the second year in a row, followed by Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The report found that the biggest spike in jailings this year were in Belarus and Ethiopia.
Hungary’s anti-LGBT policies. Hungary has continued its crusade against LGBT people by changing its constitution to effectively ban same-sex couples from adopting children. The constitutional amendment clarified the definition of the family as “based on marriage and the parent-child relation. The mother is a woman, the father a man.”
Before the change, gay couples could still adopt children if one applied as a single person. By only allowing married couples to adopt, that route is now closed.
EU’s big tech plans. The European Commission is planning to impose new regulations targeting large tech firms, with high penalties for non-compliance.
The new laws—the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act—would further constrain the kinds of data that tech platforms could harvest and push big players like Facebook and Google to move faster in removing criminal and harmful content. The new laws would impose fines of up to 10 percent of a company’s annual revenue if it fails to live up to the new standards.
Foreign Policy’s Editor in Chief, Ravi Agrawal, interviewed EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager earlier this year to discuss her plans for taking on Big Tech.
Iran’s oil exports. Iranian oil exports have roughly doubled in the past few months, despite tough U.S. sanctions, according to a number of research firms.
The Wall Street Journal reports that high-end estimates put Iranian crude exports at 1.2 million barrels a day over the fall period, up from 481,000 barrels a day in February. Buyers in China and Venezuela have facilitated the surge, which has been helped along by steep discounts offered by Tehran.
Odds and Ends
Paris municipal authorities have been issued a $110,000 fine by France’s public service ministry for hiring too many women. Anne Hidalgo, the city’s socialist mayor, hired 11 women and five men in 2018, breaching a rule that states that no one gender should represent more than 60 percent of management positions.
Hidalgo said she was filled with joy upon hearing about the fine but added that it was “obviously absurd, unfair, irresponsible and dangerous.” The rule on gender parity has been repealed since 2018, but the fine still applies retroactively.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-16--How a Chinese Communist Party Members List Became a Scare Story

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s China Brief .
The highlights this week : A list of Chinese Communist Party members receives over-hyped coverage in foreign media , a Bloomberg staff member is arrested in Beijing , and why Disney ’ s executive chairman isn ’ t likely to be the next U.S. ambassador to China .
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday , please sign up here .
This week , the Australian , Sky News Australia , and Britain ’ s Daily Mail all ran stories about a list of Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shanghai .
The list , which appears to date to 2016 , is an interesting data source for researchers .
But the somewhat hysterical tone of the stories shows how easily unnecessary panic can be created , even about as serious an issue as CCP influence .
The stories described a “ state-sponsored spy ring , ” called the presence of party members in foreign firms “ infiltration , ” and presented the list as a dramatic new development .
None of this is true .
The presence of CCP cells in Western @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The party ’ s constitution requires companies with three or more members to form a cell .
Cells are much less prevalent in foreign firms than in domestic firms .
In the majority of cases , cell meetings are tedious box-ticking affairs , although they ’ ve increasingly become a tool of direct influence inside private business under President Xi Jinping .
Foreign firms have raised concerns about party cells influencing business decisions under the new regime , but their presence is well known .
Equally , consulates and embassies have always @ @ @ @ @ @ @ members , but that doesn ’ t make them any more of a risk than other local hires .
All mainland Chinese citizens are subject to pressure to spy from state security forces , and foreign embassies recognize that .
The Australian ’ s story claimed as a scoop that hiring for consulates in Shanghai goes through a government-run body .
But this is the case in every Chinese city—for both consulates and foreign media—as it has been since they began operating in the People ’ s Republic of China .
Treating CCP @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the state is also dubious .
People primarily join the party as a resume booster , often in university or soon after .
There isn ’ t a way to leave , only to get kicked out .
The English-speaking , upper-middle-class staff of foreign companies are probably more likely to be party members than most people , simply because of the strata of society they often come from .
Questions of Chinese influence are going to be a major subject of debate over the next few years .
There are real issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Western countries , but they need to be discussed carefully .
Drawing clear lines about what ’ s important or threatening , what is merely concerning , and what is hysterical or racist will be vital .
Expect similar stories in the future—and be prepared to read them critically and with an eye for context .
Bloomberg staff member arrested .
Haze Fan , a talented Chinese reporter who works as what ’ s known as a news assistant for Bloomberg in Beijing , was arrested on suspicion of endangering national security last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foreign news organizations can only be employed as news assistants , but in practice they often do most of the work .
Internally , Bloomberg is among the fairest employers of Chinese staff .
It pays well and publishes many stories under a generic newsroom title instead of giving foreign staff credit for pieces done by Chinese staff .
Fan ’ s arrest worrying on a few fronts .
It ’ s part of a general assault on press freedom , and especially the foreign press , over the last year .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is little Bloomberg can do to protect her .
Since being punished for its expose on Xi ’ s family wealth , the outlet is cautious about its dealings with the authorities , including moving some vulnerable staff overseas .
It ’ s possible that Fan ’ s case is linked to the detention of Australian citizen Cheng Lei , a friend of hers , earlier this year .
Mongolian turnover .
The ethnically Mongolian head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission has been replaced with a new Han Chinese leader , marking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led by a nonminority member since 1954 .
The move comes after protests against linguistic imperialism in Chinese-ruled Inner Mongolia unleashed a new wave of state violence .
It is another sign that ethnonationalism dominates CCP policy under Xi .
Jimmy Lai charged .
Hong Kong pro-democracy advocate and tycoon Jimmy Lai has been formally charged under the Beijing ’ s national security law , making him the highest-profile victim so far of the draconian measures .
Lai , who has been denied bail , was arrested on trumped-up charges around his building @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China seems determined to make an example of him .
Hong Kong ’ s billionaire class generally supports Beijing , while also quietly diversifying their assets into other countries .
Gaming fuss .
The Polish firm GOG has pulled the Taiwanese game Devotion , which was forced off the main PC gaming platform Steam for including a derogatory image of Xi after mainlanders bombarded its review section .
The decision has caused an outcry among gamers , who see the move as giving in to Chinese censorship .
That is becoming a tricky @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has gradually legalized video games and opened up its market while imposing considerable censorship .
The fear is that the platforms used for video games will become reluctant to allow any material that criticizes China even outside the mainland .
Mickey Mouse , Beijing ambassador .
The Hollywood Reporter reports that Bob Iger , Disney ’ s executive chairman , is being considered for an ambassadorial posting to the United Kingdom or China .
Despite Iger ’ s weight in Hollywood , that seems unlikely , even in the ridiculous U.S. system that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Disney took a reputational hit over the filming of Mulan in Xinjiang and cooperation with Chinese censors .
The appointment would be a gift to a Republican Party keen to paint Biden as a Chinese tool , and Iger would be torn apart in confirmation .
Forced labor chain .
The extent of coerced Uighur labor—slavery , effectively—in the Xinjiang cotton market may be greater than feared , according to new research that shows over half a million workers forcibly mobilized from three areas alone for the cotton picking season .
China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ job-creation scheme .
Those forced into it , however , include large numbers of professors , business leaders , and other professionals .
Foreign clothing firms are under increased pressure following investigations by the BBC and others into the supply chain .
Monkey King : Journey to the West , by Wu Cheng ’ en , translated by Julia Lovell Julia Lovell ’ s upcoming translation of Journey to the West , the most beloved of Chinese classics , is a vivacious delight : a genuinely very funny book is given its full @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rightly beloved Arthur Waley translation . )
Sun Wukong , the Monkey King , is as vital a figure in Chinese as Robin Hood and King Arthur are in English .
His barely contained anarchism is also a good reminder that Chinese have never been the meek , obedient figures depicted in Orientalism .
That ’ s it for this week .
We welcome your feedback at newsletters @ foreignpolicy.com .
You can find older editions of China Brief here .
For more from Foreign Policy , subscribe here or sign up @ @ @ @ @

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.
The highlights this week: A list of Chinese Communist Party members receives over-hyped coverage in foreign media, a Bloomberg staff member is arrested in Beijing, and why Disney’s executive chairman isn’t likely to be the next U.S. ambassador to China.
If you would like to receive China Brief in your inbox every Wednesday, please sign up here.
A China Scare That Doesn’t Stand Up
This week, the Australian, Sky News Australia, and Britain’s Daily Mail all ran stories about a list of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members in Shanghai. The list, which appears to date to 2016, is an interesting data source for researchers. But the somewhat hysterical tone of the stories shows how easily unnecessary panic can be created, even about as serious an issue as CCP influence.
The stories described a “state-sponsored spy ring,” called the presence of party members in foreign firms “infiltration,” and presented the list as a dramatic new development. None of this is true.
The presence of CCP cells in Western companies operating branches in China is unremarkable. The party’s constitution requires companies with three or more members to form a cell. Cells are much less prevalent in foreign firms than in domestic firms. In the majority of cases, cell meetings are tedious box-ticking affairs, although they’ve increasingly become a tool of direct influence inside private business under President Xi Jinping. Foreign firms have raised concerns about party cells influencing business decisions under the new regime, but their presence is well known.
Equally, consulates and embassies have always been aware that some staff are CCP members, but that doesn’t make them any more of a risk than other local hires. All mainland Chinese citizens are subject to pressure to spy from state security forces, and foreign embassies recognize that. The Australian’s story claimed as a scoop that hiring for consulates in Shanghai goes through a government-run body. But this is the case in every Chinese city—for both consulates and foreign media—as it has been since they began operating in the People’s Republic of China.
Treating CCP membership as a sign of loyalty to the state is also dubious. People primarily join the party as a resume booster, often in university or soon after. There isn’t a way to leave, only to get kicked out. The English-speaking, upper-middle-class staff of foreign companies are probably more likely to be party members than most people, simply because of the strata of society they often come from.
Questions of Chinese influence are going to be a major subject of debate over the next few years. There are real issues with Chinese influence in Australia and other Western countries, but they need to be discussed carefully. Drawing clear lines about what’s important or threatening, what is merely concerning, and what is hysterical or racist will be vital. Expect similar stories in the future—and be prepared to read them critically and with an eye for context.
What We’re Following
Bloomberg staff member arrested. Haze Fan, a talented Chinese reporter who works as what’s known as a news assistant for Bloomberg in Beijing, was arrested on suspicion of endangering national security last Friday. Legally, Chinese members of foreign news organizations can only be employed as news assistants, but in practice they often do most of the work. Internally, Bloomberg is among the fairest employers of Chinese staff. It pays well and publishes many stories under a generic newsroom title instead of giving foreign staff credit for pieces done by Chinese staff.
Fan’s arrest worrying on a few fronts. It’s part of a general assault on press freedom, and especially the foreign press, over the last year. As Fan is a Chinese citizen, there is little Bloomberg can do to protect her. Since being punished for its expose on Xi’s family wealth, the outlet is cautious about its dealings with the authorities, including moving some vulnerable staff overseas. It’s possible that Fan’s case is linked to the detention of Australian citizen Cheng Lei, a friend of hers, earlier this year.
Mongolian turnover. The ethnically Mongolian head of the National Ethnic Affairs Commission has been replaced with a new Han Chinese leader, marking the first time the body has been led by a nonminority member since 1954. The move comes after protests against linguistic imperialism in Chinese-ruled Inner Mongolia unleashed a new wave of state violence. It is another sign that ethnonationalism dominates CCP policy under Xi.
Jimmy Lai charged. Hong Kong pro-democracy advocate and tycoon Jimmy Lai has been formally charged under the Beijing’s national security law, making him the highest-profile victim so far of the draconian measures. Lai, who has been denied bail, was arrested on trumped-up charges around his building’s lease in August, and China seems determined to make an example of him. Hong Kong’s billionaire class generally supports Beijing, while also quietly diversifying their assets into other countries.
Tech and Business
Gaming fuss. The Polish firm GOG has pulled the Taiwanese game Devotion, which was forced off the main PC gaming platform Steam for including a derogatory image of Xi after mainlanders bombarded its review section. The decision has caused an outcry among gamers, who see the move as giving in to Chinese censorship.
That is becoming a tricky issue for video game companies as China has gradually legalized video games and opened up its market while imposing considerable censorship. The fear is that the platforms used for video games will become reluctant to allow any material that criticizes China even outside the mainland.
Mickey Mouse, Beijing ambassador. The Hollywood Reporter reports that Bob Iger, Disney’s executive chairman, is being considered for an ambassadorial posting to the United Kingdom or China. Despite Iger’s weight in Hollywood, that seems unlikely, even in the ridiculous U.S. system that sends millionaire donors to critical diplomat roles.
Disney took a reputational hit over the filming of Mulan in Xinjiang and cooperation with Chinese censors. The appointment would be a gift to a Republican Party keen to paint Biden as a Chinese tool, and Iger would be torn apart in confirmation.
Forced labor chain. The extent of coerced Uighur labor—slavery, effectively—in the Xinjiang cotton market may be greater than feared, according to new research that shows over half a million workers forcibly mobilized from three areas alone for the cotton picking season. China claims that the coerced labor is a job-creation scheme. Those forced into it, however, include large numbers of professors, business leaders, and other professionals.
Foreign clothing firms are under increased pressure following investigations by the BBC and others into the supply chain.
What We’re Reading
Monkey King: Journey to the West, by Wu Cheng’en, translated by Julia Lovell, Penguin Random House, Feb. 9, 2021
Monkey King: Journey to the West, by Wu Cheng’en, translated by Julia Lovell
Julia Lovell’s upcoming translation of Journey to the West, the most beloved of Chinese classics, is a vivacious delight: a genuinely very funny book is given its full due. (No disrespect intended to the rightly beloved Arthur Waley translation.) Sun Wukong, the Monkey King, is as vital a figure in Chinese as Robin Hood and King Arthur are in English. His barely contained anarchism is also a good reminder that Chinese have never been the meek, obedient figures depicted in Orientalism.
That’s it for this week.
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foreignpolicy--2020-12-16--Peru’s Presidential Frenzy Is Threatening Hard-Won Coronavirus Victories

On Nov. 9 , only five months before the next presidential elections , Peru was left without a leader .
Martín Vizcarra , president since March 2018 , was removed by Congress on still-unproven corruption charges .
Protests in the streets against this measure and against Manuel Merino , the new acting president , led Merino to resign less than a week after taking office , along with all his ministers .
Francisco Sagasti , the current president , has brought calm—but probably only for the moment .
In a country riven by deep crises , from COVID-19 to economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is putting everything in danger .
The current instability in Peru began in 2016 , when Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the presidency of the country by defeating Keiko Fujimori , daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori—sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2007 for corruption and serious crimes against humanity—by a razor-thin margin .
“ Since 2016 , there has a situation of permanent tension between the main powers of the State , the power of the legislative congress and the executive branch , ” says Juan Antonio Trelles , an expert in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policy .
“ After Kuczynski ’ s movement won by just around 40,000 votes , the opposition party , the Fujimorista , became a kind of political steamroller of all Kuczynski ’ s proposals .
The tension between these two powers of the State reached its peak with Vizcarra ’ s impeachment.
” Impeachment became a tool wielded against presidents .
When Kuczynski resigned in March 2018 , he was already accused of multiple charges of corruption—and had survived a failed impeachment attempt the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Vizcarra , then vice president , who took over the presidential office .
Even before Vizcarra was removed from office , he also had problems with Congress , dissolving it on Sep. 30 , 2019 , over a clash concerning the election of positions for the Constitutional Court .
In September 2020 , he faced his first impeachment attempt , this time with newly elected congressmen , but they did not reach enough votes to remove him from office .
This time history repeated itself , but with a different result .
Vizcarra @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into the president ’ s alleged receipt of bribes in exchange for public works contracts between 2013 and 2014 , when he was governor of Moquegua , in the south of the country .
For many experts , and much of the public , this was an unconstitutional removal .
“ Vizcarra was in government for two years , and Congress tried to remove him once without success .
This second time they succeeded and the president of Congress at that time , Merino , entered and took over the government , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Institute of Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú , who describes the move as an effective coup .
Thousands of people agreed , taking to the streets just hours after the dismissal was announced , organizing coordinated marches and protests that lasted almost a week .
These protests , which were intended to show their rejection of Merino , faced strong police repression , which resulted in the death of two students and more than 94 injured and 42 disappeared , most of whom were found @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the deaths , almost a week after Merino ’ s ascension to power , was the main reason for the resignation of the president and all his ministers .
“ Merino had no legitimacy in the streets .
There was a sector of the population , especially the youth , who came out to protest this decision of the Congress to remove the president .
Martín Vizcarra was a president who was very popular , and although he faced corruption accusations , these were unproven .
The Congress , which was already discredited @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” says José Manuel Villalobos Campana , lawyer for the Peruvian Institute of Electoral Law , Democracy , and Public Management ( IPDE ) .
Villalobos says the young people who took to the streets may play a critical role in the upcoming elections , especially with Vizcarra running for Congress with the Partido Democrático Somos Perú ( PDSP ) , the party better known as Somos Perú ( We Are Peru ) , founded just over two decades ago .
But not all experts agree that the removal of Vizcarra , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the presidency , was unconstitutional .
“ To be sure , on the strictly constitutional plane the Congress applied what the constitution indicates , that is , that here there has not been a coup d ’ etat , it was a legal succession , ” says Villalobos .
Trelles agrees .
“ There was a lot of consensus at the technical level that Merino ’ s entry was legal , that is , that he complied with all the standards of the norms , ” he says .
“ He was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On this occasion , a motion of impeachment to remove the president was voted on , succeeded , and he was removed .
From that point of view , Merino has legal backing .
The problem is one of legitimacy.
” That legitimacy question leaks down into the country ’ s ability to handle crisis .
Every Peruvian president for the past three decades has been prosecuted , arrested , or accused of corruption .
The malaise at the top has wrecked national governance .
“ If there are changes of ministers in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the executive branch was carrying out until then stop and go in another direction , some programs stop completely , or there are very big delays , ” explains Jave .
“ There is also a kind of inhibition by officials working in the executive branch when it comes to making some decisions , because the government can change at any time , and they also fear being accused of corruption.
” That was one factor in the government ’ s failure to cope with COVID-19 , leading to one of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ America .
But after the pandemic devastated the country , it seems finally to have been contained .
“ The government ’ s approach , with great economic destruction , was a hospital-based approach .
That led to the neglect of the primary community level , which is the level at which epidemics or plagues are historically controlled , ” explains Ciro Maguiña , a physician specializing in infectious diseases and vice dean of the Peruvian Medical Association .
But the arrival of Pilar Mazzetti , a doctor who took command of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , brought much needed leadership .
Mazzetti resigned under Merino but has now been bought back to lead the health ministry .
Her skill and leadership , experts hope , will carry the country through the second wave despite the lack of guidance from the top .
“ Health workers have their lives , knowing that there was a lack of equipment , a lack of oxygen .
There we were , on the front lines .
We sent planes with our resources , small planes , air transport was done by us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ us , ” says Maguiña .
“ And let ’ s hope that we will never see again , in the streets of the Amazon , the lungs of the world , people begging for oxygen .
”

On Nov. 9, only five months before the next presidential elections, Peru was left without a leader. Martín Vizcarra, president since March 2018, was removed by Congress on still-unproven corruption charges. Protests in the streets against this measure and against Manuel Merino, the new acting president, led Merino to resign less than a week after taking office, along with all his ministers. Francisco Sagasti, the current president, has brought calm—but probably only for the moment. In a country riven by deep crises, from COVID-19 to economic devastation, the instability at the top is putting everything in danger.
On Nov. 9, only five months before the next presidential elections, Peru was left without a leader. Martín Vizcarra, president since March 2018, was removed by Congress on still-unproven corruption charges. Protests in the streets against this measure and against Manuel Merino, the new acting president, led Merino to resign less than a week after taking office, along with all his ministers. Francisco Sagasti, the current president, has brought calm—but probably only for the moment. In a country riven by deep crises, from COVID-19 to economic devastation, the instability at the top is putting everything in danger.
The current instability in Peru began in 2016, when Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the presidency of the country by defeating Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori—sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2007 for corruption and serious crimes against humanity—by a razor-thin margin.
“Since 2016, there has a situation of permanent tension between the main powers of the State, the power of the legislative congress and the executive branch,” says Juan Antonio Trelles, an expert in government and public policy and consultant to the International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policy. “After Kuczynski’s movement won by just around 40,000 votes, the opposition party, the Fujimorista, became a kind of political steamroller of all Kuczynski’s proposals. The tension between these two powers of the State reached its peak with Vizcarra’s impeachment.”
Impeachment became a tool wielded against presidents. When Kuczynski resigned in March 2018, he was already accused of multiple charges of corruption—and had survived a failed impeachment attempt the previous December. After his resignation, Vizcarra, then vice president, who took over the presidential office.
Even before Vizcarra was removed from office, he also had problems with Congress, dissolving it on Sep. 30, 2019, over a clash concerning the election of positions for the Constitutional Court. In September 2020, he faced his first impeachment attempt, this time with newly elected congressmen, but they did not reach enough votes to remove him from office.
This time history repeated itself, but with a different result. Vizcarra’s impeachment came after an investigation into the president’s alleged receipt of bribes in exchange for public works contracts between 2013 and 2014, when he was governor of Moquegua, in the south of the country. For many experts, and much of the public, this was an unconstitutional removal.
“Vizcarra was in government for two years, and Congress tried to remove him once without success. This second time they succeeded and the president of Congress at that time, Merino, entered and took over the government,” says Iris Jave, researcher and coordinator of the Institute of Democracy and Human Rights of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú, who describes the move as an effective coup.
Thousands of people agreed, taking to the streets just hours after the dismissal was announced, organizing coordinated marches and protests that lasted almost a week. These protests, which were intended to show their rejection of Merino, faced strong police repression, which resulted in the death of two students and more than 94 injured and 42 disappeared, most of whom were found days after the protests. News of the deaths, almost a week after Merino’s ascension to power, was the main reason for the resignation of the president and all his ministers.
“Merino had no legitimacy in the streets. There was a sector of the population, especially the youth, who came out to protest this decision of the Congress to remove the president. Martín Vizcarra was a president who was very popular, and although he faced corruption accusations, these were unproven. The Congress, which was already discredited, was accused of generating a coup,” says José Manuel Villalobos Campana, lawyer for the Peruvian Institute of Electoral Law, Democracy, and Public Management (IPDE). Villalobos says the young people who took to the streets may play a critical role in the upcoming elections, especially with Vizcarra running for Congress with the Partido Democrático Somos Perú (PDSP), the party better known as Somos Perú (We Are Peru), founded just over two decades ago.
But not all experts agree that the removal of Vizcarra, and the subsequent entry of Merino into the presidency, was unconstitutional. “To be sure, on the strictly constitutional plane the Congress applied what the constitution indicates, that is, that here there has not been a coup d’etat, it was a legal succession,” says Villalobos.
Trelles agrees. “There was a lot of consensus at the technical level that Merino’s entry was legal, that is, that he complied with all the standards of the norms,” he says. “He was a deputy and has been democratically elected. On this occasion, a motion of impeachment to remove the president was voted on, succeeded, and he was removed. From that point of view, Merino has legal backing. The problem is one of legitimacy.”
That legitimacy question leaks down into the country’s ability to handle crisis. Every Peruvian president for the past three decades has been prosecuted, arrested, or accused of corruption. The malaise at the top has wrecked national governance.
“If there are changes of ministers in the executive branch, then the policies that the executive branch was carrying out until then stop and go in another direction, some programs stop completely, or there are very big delays,” explains Jave. “There is also a kind of inhibition by officials working in the executive branch when it comes to making some decisions, because the government can change at any time, and they also fear being accused of corruption.”
That was one factor in the government’s failure to cope with COVID-19, leading to one of the highest death rates in a hard-hit Latin America. But after the pandemic devastated the country, it seems finally to have been contained. “The government’s approach, with great economic destruction, was a hospital-based approach. That led to the neglect of the primary community level, which is the level at which epidemics or plagues are historically controlled,” explains Ciro Maguiña, a physician specializing in infectious diseases and vice dean of the Peruvian Medical Association.
But the arrival of Pilar Mazzetti, a doctor who took command of the anti-pandemic efforts during Vizcarra’s presidency, brought much needed leadership. Mazzetti resigned under Merino but has now been bought back to lead the health ministry. Her skill and leadership, experts hope, will carry the country through the second wave despite the lack of guidance from the top.
“Health workers have their lives, knowing that there was a lack of equipment, a lack of oxygen. There we were, on the front lines. We sent planes with our resources, small planes, air transport was done by us when the minister at that time abandoned us,” says Maguiña. “And let’s hope that we will never see again, in the streets of the Amazon, the lungs of the world, people begging for oxygen.”