foreignpolicy--2020-03-13--Who Needs a Coronavirus Quarantine When You Can Party in Thailand?

Who Needs a Coronavirus Quarantine When You Can Party in Thailand ?
When the coronavirus struck , among the first places outside the health care sector to feel the disruption were schools and universities .
Many have closed their doors and moved classes online .
Along with concerns over possible infection comes another worry : Will the virus keep away international students , who make up a large and growing share of students around the world ?
The starkly different ways in which schools and colleges in the United States and Australia have been dealing with this issue show how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this aspect of public health , has been getting it right—and Australia very wrong .
The United States played host to nearly 1.1 million international students in the 2018-2019 school year , the latest in a string of record-breaking years going back more than a decade .
The coronavirus pandemic may put a dent in the figures for the current academic year , but the impact is likely to be minimal .
Most international students had already returned from their winter breaks by Feb. 2 , when the United States restricted travel from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s March 11 imposition of a travel ban from the European Union , some European students who returned home for spring break will be stranded there as well .
If some commentators are worried about a decline in international enrollments , that is not yet any effect of the virus .
Even as total student numbers are up , new enrollments have declined in each of the last three years .
Inevitably , this has been attributed to the unpopularity of Donald Trump and his anti-foreigner rhetoric .
Look a little deeper @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the decline can be traced to a collapse in students coming from Saudi Arabia , where declining oil revenues have forced massive cuts in once-generous programs for studying abroad.With their large classes full of gregarious youngsters , universities are prime environments for viral transmission .
International students account for roughly 5.5 percent of America ’ s higher education student body .
Even as new enrollments have begun to go down , the quality of these students has risen , with students staying longer and shooting for higher degrees .
All of this points @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
International students enrich the educational environment while making valuable financial contributions to cash-strapped universities .
Although a few private universities have gone all-out for international students , no U.S. state university relies on international students for more than 20 percent of its total enrollments .
Most have a share well under 10 percent .
So when the coronavirus struck , U.S. universities were able to focus on what matters most : keeping their students safe .
Dozens of universities have closed their campuses in response to the pandemic and moved all classes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the number of confirmed coronavirus cases rises nationwide .
With their large classes full of gregarious youngsters , universities are prime environments for viral transmission .
U.S. universities are going to great lengths to avoid becoming the next hot spots for the disease .
On the opposite side of the world , the situation couldn ’ t be more different .
Australian universities rely on international students for nearly one-third of their total enrollments , and the education sector as a whole enrolled 957,000 international students in 2019—nearly as many as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has fewer people than Texas .
Unlike in the United States , where many international students attend on scholarships , nearly all of these students pay full tuition .
And the biggest group of fee-paying international students at Australian universities , making up roughly 40 percent of international students and 10 percent of total enrollments , comes from China .
The coronavirus has hit Australian universities hard—even if only one student , a Chinese student at the University of Queensland , has been identified as having the virus .
It is the financial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ University of Sydney is estimated to have as many as 21,000 Chinese students ( Australian universities refuse to release figures ) , roughly two-thirds of whom were caught outside the country when Australia imposed travel restrictions on Feb. 1 .
As a result , the university has been forced to make 200 million Australian dollars ( about $ 130 million ) of emergency budget cuts .
Other Australian universities have gone to extreme lengths to help their Chinese students find a way to make it to Australia in time for the Southern Hemisphere @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in last week of February .
The University of Melbourne , Australia ’ s top-ranked university , has offered Chinese students payments of AU $ 7,500 ( about $ 4,900 ) to help them circumvent Australia ’ s travel restrictions.The University of Melbourne has offered Chinese students AU $ 7,500 ( about $ 4,900 ) to help them circumvent travel restrictions .
Australian National University in Canberra is offering AU $ 5,000 ( about $ 3,200 ) .
Like the United States , Australia is now denying entry to any foreign national who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 14 days .
To get around this rule , Chinese students can travel to Thailand , spend two weeks partying on a tropical vacation , then fly to Australia—with no further quarantine required .
The Australian government has confirmed that the route via a third country is acceptable , and travel agents are even offering package tours to help students circumvent Australia ’ s travel restrictions .
China claims to have the coronavirus under control , and it is quite possible that travel restrictions may be lifted soon .
As the epidemic has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries such as Australia and the United States are perhaps no longer threatened by travelers coming from China .
In the meantime , no one seems to have considered the real nightmare scenario of the Thailand route : that a Chinese student could develop symptoms of the coronavirus disease while in transit .
The student would be dumped on the third country ’ s health system , prohibited from traveling to Australia , and probably unable to travel home .
Australia is , in effect , outsourcing its coronavirus quarantine to its poorer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States , Australia also hosts large numbers of international students in primary and secondary grades .
Unlike in the United States , however , even public schools have come to rely on tuition-paying students from abroad .
International students have become big moneymakers for public schools in two of Australia ’ s states in particular : Victoria ( whose capital is Melbourne ) and New South Wales ( whose capital is Sydney ) .
In both states , more than half of all international K-12 students come from China .
Thus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wasn ’ t university students , family members , or business travelers who were allowed into the country when Australia relaxed its China travel restrictions on Feb. 22 , but tuition-paying international high school students .
It was actually Victoria ’ s education minister who stood on the podium next to Australia ’ s health minister and chief medical officer to announce the unanimous advice of Australia ’ s Health Protection Principal Committee that high school students should be the first allowed in .
That ’ s a prime example of moral hazard @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when people expect to reap the rewards of success while others will bear the burdens of failure .
The education authorities want to relax travel restrictions so that they can maximize tuition revenue .
American universities have behaved responsibly in admitting sustainable numbers of international students.If those students transmit coronavirus to the general population , the health system will have to bear the costs of treatment .
And of course all Australians will face the risk of infection .
All Australian universities have prohibited staff from traveling to China , and it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ done the same .
The University of Sydney has prohibited all “ student or non-essential staff travel to China , Hong Kong , Iran , South Korea or Italy.
” Yet at the same time , Australian universities are desperately lobbying the government to lift travel restrictions for students coming in .
The University of Sydney has even served some of its own dormitory residents with an eviction warning to be ready to vacate on 48 hours ’ notice—because their building has been designated as quarantine housing for Chinese students in anticipation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel restrictions lifted .
If the United States has avoided this kind of moral hazard in its international student recruitment , it ’ s because American universities have behaved responsibly in admitting sustainable numbers of international students .
The United States can reasonably accommodate a million or more international students .
Australia can ’ t .
Most educators agree that internationalization is a good thing , but as with all good things , moderation is the key .
Australia ’ s universities have lost sight of that simple truth .
America ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and not be seduced by the prospect of earning ever-rising tuition revenues—at ever-greater risk .

When the coronavirus struck, among the first places outside the health care sector to feel the disruption were schools and universities. Many have closed their doors and moved classes online. Along with concerns over possible infection comes another worry: Will the virus keep away international students, who make up a large and growing share of students around the world? The starkly different ways in which schools and colleges in the United States and Australia have been dealing with this issue show how the United States, at least in this aspect of public health, has been getting it right—and Australia very wrong.
When the coronavirus struck, among the first places outside the health care sector to feel the disruption were schools and universities. Many have closed their doors and moved classes online. Along with concerns over possible infection comes another worry: Will the virus keep away international students, who make up a large and growing share of students around the world? The starkly different ways in which schools and colleges in the United States and Australia have been dealing with this issue show how the United States, at least in this aspect of public health, has been getting it right—and Australia very wrong.
The United States played host to nearly 1.1 million international students in the 2018-2019 school year, the latest in a string of record-breaking years going back more than a decade. The coronavirus pandemic may put a dent in the figures for the current academic year, but the impact is likely to be minimal. Most international students had already returned from their winter breaks by Feb. 2, when the United States restricted travel from China. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s March 11 imposition of a travel ban from the European Union, some European students who returned home for spring break will be stranded there as well.
If some commentators are worried about a decline in international enrollments, that is not yet any effect of the virus. Even as total student numbers are up, new enrollments have declined in each of the last three years. Inevitably, this has been attributed to the unpopularity of Donald Trump and his anti-foreigner rhetoric. Look a little deeper, however, and the bulk of the decline can be traced to a collapse in students coming from Saudi Arabia, where declining oil revenues have forced massive cuts in once-generous programs for studying abroad.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
With their large classes full of gregarious youngsters, universities are prime environments for viral transmission.
International students account for roughly 5.5 percent of America’s higher education student body. Even as new enrollments have begun to go down, the quality of these students has risen, with students staying longer and shooting for higher degrees. All of this points to a very healthy international student market. International students enrich the educational environment while making valuable financial contributions to cash-strapped universities. Although a few private universities have gone all-out for international students, no U.S. state university relies on international students for more than 20 percent of its total enrollments. Most have a share well under 10 percent.
So when the coronavirus struck, U.S. universities were able to focus on what matters most: keeping their students safe. Dozens of universities have closed their campuses in response to the pandemic and moved all classes online. Others are likely to follow as the number of confirmed coronavirus cases rises nationwide. With their large classes full of gregarious youngsters, universities are prime environments for viral transmission. U.S. universities are going to great lengths to avoid becoming the next hot spots for the disease.
On the opposite side of the world, the situation couldn’t be more different. Australian universities rely on international students for nearly one-third of their total enrollments, and the education sector as a whole enrolled 957,000 international students in 2019—nearly as many as the entire United States, even though Australia has fewer people than Texas. Unlike in the United States, where many international students attend on scholarships, nearly all of these students pay full tuition. And the biggest group of fee-paying international students at Australian universities, making up roughly 40 percent of international students and 10 percent of total enrollments, comes from China.
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The coronavirus has hit Australian universities hard—even if only one student, a Chinese student at the University of Queensland, has been identified as having the virus. It is the financial impact that has been severe. The University of Sydney is estimated to have as many as 21,000 Chinese students (Australian universities refuse to release figures), roughly two-thirds of whom were caught outside the country when Australia imposed travel restrictions on Feb. 1. As a result, the university has been forced to make 200 million Australian dollars (about $130 million) of emergency budget cuts.
Other Australian universities have gone to extreme lengths to help their Chinese students find a way to make it to Australia in time for the Southern Hemisphere’s fall semester, which started in last week of February. The University of Melbourne, Australia’s top-ranked university, has offered Chinese students payments of AU$7,500 (about $4,900) to help them circumvent Australia’s travel restrictions.The University of Melbourne has offered Chinese students AU$7,500 (about $4,900) to help them circumvent travel restrictions. Australian National University in Canberra is offering AU$5,000 (about $3,200).
Like the United States, Australia is now denying entry to any foreign national who has been in China during the previous 14 days. To get around this rule, Chinese students can travel to Thailand, spend two weeks partying on a tropical vacation, then fly to Australia—with no further quarantine required. The Australian government has confirmed that the route via a third country is acceptable, and travel agents are even offering package tours to help students circumvent Australia’s travel restrictions.
China claims to have the coronavirus under control, and it is quite possible that travel restrictions may be lifted soon. As the epidemic has moved on to Italy and Iran, countries such as Australia and the United States are perhaps no longer threatened by travelers coming from China. In the meantime, no one seems to have considered the real nightmare scenario of the Thailand route: that a Chinese student could develop symptoms of the coronavirus disease while in transit. The student would be dumped on the third country’s health system, prohibited from traveling to Australia, and probably unable to travel home. Australia is, in effect, outsourcing its coronavirus quarantine to its poorer and more poorly equipped neighbors.
Like the United States, Australia also hosts large numbers of international students in primary and secondary grades. Unlike in the United States, however, even public schools have come to rely on tuition-paying students from abroad. International students have become big moneymakers for public schools in two of Australia’s states in particular: Victoria (whose capital is Melbourne) and New South Wales (whose capital is Sydney). In both states, more than half of all international K-12 students come from China.
Thus it came as no surprise that it wasn’t university students, family members, or business travelers who were allowed into the country when Australia relaxed its China travel restrictions on Feb. 22, but tuition-paying international high school students. It was actually Victoria’s education minister who stood on the podium next to Australia’s health minister and chief medical officer to announce the unanimous advice of Australia’s Health Protection Principal Committee that high school students should be the first allowed in.
That’s a prime example of moral hazard run amok. Moral hazard is generated when people expect to reap the rewards of success while others will bear the burdens of failure. The education authorities want to relax travel restrictions so that they can maximize tuition revenue. American universities have behaved responsibly in admitting sustainable numbers of international students.If those students transmit coronavirus to the general population, the health system will have to bear the costs of treatment. And of course all Australians will face the risk of infection.
All Australian universities have prohibited staff from traveling to China, and it is very likely that all high schools have done the same. The University of Sydney has prohibited all “student or non-essential staff travel to China, Hong Kong, Iran, South Korea or Italy.” Yet at the same time, Australian universities are desperately lobbying the government to lift travel restrictions for students coming in. The University of Sydney has even served some of its own dormitory residents with an eviction warning to be ready to vacate on 48 hours’ notice—because their building has been designated as quarantine housing for Chinese students in anticipation of the university’s success in having travel restrictions lifted.
If the United States has avoided this kind of moral hazard in its international student recruitment, it’s because American universities have behaved responsibly in admitting sustainable numbers of international students. The United States can reasonably accommodate a million or more international students. Australia can’t. Most educators agree that internationalization is a good thing, but as with all good things, moderation is the key. Australia’s universities have lost sight of that simple truth. America’s would do well to heed their example and not be seduced by the prospect of earning ever-rising tuition revenues—at ever-greater risk.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-14--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s inability to effectively combat the coronavirus could ultimately doom his bid for reelection .
Meanwhile , a new round of constitutional changes implemented in Russia could see President Vladimir Putin remain at the helm for almost two more decades .
And Japan and South Korea are reeling due to the effects of the coronavirus , but they still find time to point fingers at each other .
1 .
How Trump Is Tanking His Own Presidency As the coronavirus takes hold in the United States and the economy faces recession , Trump ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s Michael Hirsh writes .
As the coronavirus spreads , a dangerous trend has followed : Government leaders and other officials are intentionally obfuscating data , suppressing information , and misinforming citizens about the outbreak , Suzanne Nossel writes .
3 .
Will Putin Be Russia ’ s President for Life ?
Russia ’ s political future became a little bit clearer when a series of choreographed moves in the country ’ s parliament set the stage for Putin to stay in his role for another 16 years , Foreign Policy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Japan and Korea Won ’ t Let a Pandemic Stop Them From Fighting Japan and South Korea have both been hit hard by the coronavirus , but they have shown that when times get tough , they will still prioritize the most important thing : blaming each other , William Sposato writes .
5 .
Christianity Has Been Handling Epidemics for 2,000 Years The ideas and practices that guided Christians through countless plagues across millennia still have relevance today , Lyman Stone writes .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s inability to effectively combat the coronavirus could ultimately doom his bid for reelection.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s inability to effectively combat the coronavirus could ultimately doom his bid for reelection.
Meanwhile, a new round of constitutional changes implemented in Russia could see President Vladimir Putin remain at the helm for almost two more decades.
And Japan and South Korea are reeling due to the effects of the coronavirus, but they still find time to point fingers at each other.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
U.S. President Donald Trump
As the coronavirus takes hold in the United States and the economy faces recession, Trump’s credibility is further eroded, Foreign Policy’s Michael Hirsh writes.
U.S. President Donald Trump gestures as he speaks during a news conference on the COVID-19 outbreak at the White House on Feb. 26. ANDREW CABALLERO-REYNOLDS/AFP via Getty Images
As the coronavirus spreads, a dangerous trend has followed: Government leaders and other officials are intentionally obfuscating data, suppressing information, and misinforming citizens about the outbreak, Suzanne Nossel writes.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall to mark the Defender of the Fatherland Day in Moscow on February 23, 2020. (YURI KOCHETKOV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Russia’s political future became a little bit clearer when a series of choreographed moves in the country’s parliament set the stage for Putin to stay in his role for another 16 years, Foreign Policy’s Reid Standish writes.
Officers assist passengers arriving at a quarantine station at Narita airport on March 9. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced on March 5 that foreign arrivals who have recently been in China or South Korea would be required to spend 14 days in quarantine.
Japan and South Korea have both been hit hard by the coronavirus, but they have shown that when times get tough, they will still prioritize the most important thing: blaming each other, William Sposato writes.
A municipal employee sprays disinfectant in St. Mark's Square in Venice, Italy
The ideas and practices that guided Christians through countless plagues across millennia still have relevance today, Lyman Stone writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-14--The United States Must Not Pick Sides in the Nile River Dispute

The United States Must Not Pick Sides in the Nile River Dispute Egypt and Ethiopia have once again locked horns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ( GERD ) on the Blue Nile .
On Feb. 26 , Ethiopia temporarily suspended its participation in the U.S.-mediated negotiations over the filling and operation of the GERD , requesting more time to deliberate on the draft agreement .
With the dam 70 percent complete and its reservoir expected to start being filled in July , the time for reaching an agreement is ticking away .
Ethiopia and Egypt should be ready to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ escalation in this seemingly intractable dispute .
The longest river in the world , the Nile stretches across 11 countries in its journey of 4,000 miles from the equatorial rivers that feed Lake Victoria to its final destination in the Mediterranean Sea .
Among the countries that share the Nile , two have the most at stake .
Egypt , a desert nation of 100 million people , is literally the creation of the Nile , relying on the river for 90 percent of its freshwater needs .
Ethiopia , an East African @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lion ’ s share of the Nile waters , with its three tributaries—the Blue Nile , Sobat , and Atbara—carrying about 84 percent of the total runoff in the Nile .
With a growing but otherwise resource-poor economy , Ethiopia is keen to develop its vast potential for hydroelectricity generation in the Nile basin to become a regional hub of electric power exports .
The GERD , a $ 5 billion project that will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa , is a part of that ambition .
The dam is located @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Blue Nile , just 12 miles from its border with Sudan .
It will have paramount economic value to Ethiopia , doubling the country ’ s electricity generation capacity and earning as much as a billion dollars annually from energy exports to Sudan , South Sudan , Djibouti , Kenya , and potentially Egypt .
The GERD ’ s massive reservoir will store 74 billion cubic meters ( BCM ) of water , roughly equal to a year-and-half ’ s worth of the Blue Nile ’ s flow , which will be gradually @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The Blue Nile is highly seasonal , with 80 percent of its discharge occurring from July to October during the short rainy season on the Ethiopian highlands .
This makes it prone to heavy flooding , while the heavy sedimentation it carries reduces hydropower production in dams with small reservoirs .
The GERD will help mitigate this , leading to a regulated , steady flow that will improve navigation , irrigation , and hydropower generation downstream .
Sudan , which does not have a major dam on the Nile , will enjoy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its decision to side with Ethiopia for the first time in the history of Nile politics .
Egypt , however , has less to gain from these changes as it regulates the flow of the Nile using the massive reservoir of the Aswan High Dam , which has a capacity of 169 BCM .
Egypt worries that an upstream dam on the Blue Nile , which contributes about 60 percent of the flow of the Nile , will reduce water supply and power generation at Aswan .
As a hydropower project , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its reservoir is filled .
It could , however , reduce the amount of water Egypt receives if it leads to a significant increase of irrigation in Sudan , which adds to Egypt ’ s worry .
In 2015 , Ethiopia , Sudan , and Egypt agreed on a Declaration of Principles that stipulated an “ equitable and reasonable ” utilization of the Nile that will not cause “ significant harm ” to other riparian countries .
In spite of years of negotiations , however , they have made little progress in specifying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating of the dam .
To safeguard its reservoir at Aswan , Egypt wants to secure an agreement that binds Ethiopia to releasing a fixed amount of the river ’ s flow and a process for monitoring Ethiopia ’ s compliance .
Ethiopia , on the other hand , seeks to avoid a permanent commitment for a water quota that extends beyond the GERD ’ s filling period and demands a flexible agreement with a provision for periodic reviews .
Behind the facade of legal wrangling , the scope for a future Nile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to avoid an agreement that restricts its capacity to harness its massive hydropower potential of about 45,000 megawatts ; Egypt wants exactly such a restriction .
The negotiations gained momentum in November 2019 after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called on U.S. President Donald Trump to help broker an agreement .
The foreign and water ministers of Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan have held a series of meetings in Washington since December and met Trump at the White House .
What the United States wants to accomplish through its involvement , however @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be inspired more by Trump ’ s desire to broker a deal than by a foreign policy imperative .
In a recent speech on the campaign trail , Trump implied that he deserved a Nobel Peace Prize for his brokering role in the Nile dispute .
The negotiations were also coordinated by the Department of the Treasury , sidelining the State Department , which possesses the appropriate expertise for this kind of engagement .
The Treasury Department serves as the U.S. governor to the International Monetary Fund , which , along with the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to aid Ethiopia ’ s reform efforts under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed .
The intent behind the involvement of the Treasury and the World Bank , therefore , seems to be stepping up pressure on Ethiopia by signaling the financial costs of recalcitrance .
Ethiopia ’ s withdrawal has left the negotiations in limbo at a critical time .
The country ’ s foreign ministry has expressed its disapproval of the draft agreement , characterizing it as “ unacceptable & highly partisan , ” while Egypt has noted that it signed the agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ present .
Instead of helping resolve these differences , the U.S. Treasury released a statement that argued that the draft agreement “ addresses all issues in a balanced and equitable manner ” and warned Ethiopia that “ final testing and filling [ of the GERD ] should not take place without an agreement.
” To Ethiopia , this seemed to confirm the longstanding fear that the United States has been a biased mediator .
David Shinn , a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia , argues that “ the United States seems to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ favor of Egypt.
” Ethiopian analysts interpret U.S. overreach in the Nile negotiations as an overture to appease Egypt in the context of Trump ’ s Middle East peace plan , which has been roundly rejected by Arab nations .
While there is no hard evidence , a backroom deal of this sort would not be inconceivable considering Trump ’ s closeness with Sisi , whom he was overheard calling his “ favorite dictator ” during the G-7 summit in Biarritz , France .
After the Nile negotiations stalled , Trump reportedly made @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would continue with his mediation effort .
Egypt has subsequently commanded the support of the Arab League in condemning Ethiopia ’ s position , escalating the conflict to a regional scale .
A war of words has ensued between the two countries , undermining the prospect of a negotiated solution to the dispute .
A failed U.S. mediation has thus ended up fueling tension in an already heated disagreement .
Through its involvement , the U.S. government has also squandered its hard-won soft power in Ethiopia , which has been a staunch @ @ @ @ @ @ @ holds a symbolic significance to Ethiopia , which financed it domestically through a bond offering that was widely bought by the public .
Abiy , who will be facing a national election in August , would be loath to sign an agreement that would expose him to accusations of shortchanging his country ’ s interests under American duress .
Sticks and carrots from Washington are hence unlikely to succeed in getting Ethiopia to step into a treaty that purportedly affects its right to use Nile waters .
Washington will have to find a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ success in mediating the dispute will depend on its ability to find a middle ground acceptable to both Ethiopia and Egypt , which is complicated by the fact that it has already thrown its weight behind a draft agreement that Ethiopia rejects .
Ethiopia ’ s buy-in is crucial for the success of a Nile treaty , especially considering the difficulty of externally enforcing such an agreement .
It is particularly important to avoid the risk of a future fallout from a poorly designed treaty that does not enjoy solid support by key @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stalls , the next step will be for the three countries to take the matter to their heads of government , as stipulated by the 2015 Declaration of Principles .
Major allies of the negotiating countries , in particular the European Union , can play a constructive role in facilitating an agreement by helping mitigate potential adverse effects for downstream countries during the filling period of the GERD .
The World Bank , which has been attending the Washington negotiations as an observer , can also offer its technical expertise to craft an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the field , having played a key role in helping India and Pakistan implement the highly effective Indus Waters Treaty .
A major stumbling block to Ethiopia is that the negotiations are being pushed to a rapid closure , even as the scope of the agreement is expanding to include the sensitive issue of water quotas .
This also undercuts the efforts of the expert panel commissioned by the three countries in 2015 , the National Independent Scientific Research Group , which is concluding a report to guide the filling and operation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aid of the U.S. government to quickly wrap up an agreement , Egypt appears to have preferred a political quick fix to the tedious process of consensus building .
During the negotiations , Ethiopia appears to have agreed to release 37 BCMs per year , which would allow it to fill the GERD ’ s reservoir by a maximum of 12 BCMs per annum .
( The average annual flow of the Blue Nile is 49 BCM . )
There is , however , less clarity on what should happen in years of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ falls below the agreed threshold .
These issues can be addressed effectively if the Nile negotiations are implemented through a staggered process .
The first chapter of the negotiations can focus on the filling of the GERD ’ s reservoir .
The negotiations have made significant progress on the initial filling of the dam ’ s reservoir , and Ethiopia has reportedly agreed to a plan of storing 4.9 BCMs per year ( equivalent to 10 percent of the annual flow of the Blue Nile and 7 percent of the reservoir ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ample time for finalizing an agreement on the last round of filling the dam ’ s reservoir .
The second chapter of the agreement could focus on the long-term operation of the GERD , where the crux of the current disagreement lies .
Ironically , the dam ’ s reservoir improves the basin countries ’ resilience for drought by creating a buffer supply of water that can be drawn from in times of water shortage .
At the same time , it introduces a dilemma on how much of the Blue Nile ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ GERD ’ s reservoir and how much should be allowed to flow downstream for storage in Egypt ’ s massive reservoir at Aswan .
The competing interests would likely be at odds in years of prolonged drought , when Ethiopia might want to store water for future hydropower generation , while Egypt would want continued flow to keep its Aswan reservoir at the minimum level required to generate hydropower .
The Nile is perhaps the only major river with two major reservoirs in different countries that need close coordination .
It is technically @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the GERD ’ s reservoir in a way that meets the water needs of Egypt , while also maximizing the dam ’ s hydropower production .
Ethiopia ’ s use of the GERD for hydropower offers it some degree of flexibility to accommodate Egypt ’ s worry of a depletion of its reservoir at Aswan during years of drought .
This , however , requires that the two countries work together in good faith to devise a flexible process of cooperation .
Currently , mutual suspicion is turning what should be an asset @ @ @ @ @ @ @ approach would help create a robust agreement that is informed by technical and legal issues that emerge during the initial filling of the GERD .
Moreover , it has the advantage of breaking what seems an insurmountable problem into smaller , manageable parts .
By allowing the negotiating parties to sequentially build on what they agree , it further creates an opportunity for developing a spirit of mutual trust .
Finally , a Nile agreement will have to be a part of a cooperative framework for greater regional and economic integration .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries that share the Nile and enhance the need for close and proactive coordination to optimize the river ’ s various uses across borders .
As climate change creates new vulnerabilities such as erratic rainfall , it will become even more essential to actively coordinate water usage across the full stretch of the Nile .
The three signatory countries can use trade and investment incentives to optimize water use , for example by encouraging water-intensive production to move to rain-abundant countries .
Upstream countries with hydropower potential can also consider joint development of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across borders .
Economic integration , in return , would provide a safeguard against polarizing political forces that could pit countries against one another in the event of severe water shortages .
A river with many masters , the Nile poses a unique coordination challenge to the countries that share it .
A successful Nile agreement will have to be founded on mutual trust and consensus .
Rather than bickering and seeking outside support for their respective national agendas , Egypt , Ethiopia , and Sudan should join forces to build a lasting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for the long haul .

Egypt and Ethiopia have once again locked horns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. On Feb. 26, Ethiopia temporarily suspended its participation in the U.S.-mediated negotiations over the filling and operation of the GERD, requesting more time to deliberate on the draft agreement. With the dam 70 percent complete and its reservoir expected to start being filled in July, the time for reaching an agreement is ticking away. Ethiopia and Egypt should be ready to make significant concessions to avoid a catastrophic escalation in this seemingly intractable dispute.
Egypt and Ethiopia have once again locked horns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. On Feb. 26, Ethiopia temporarily suspended its participation in the U.S.-mediated negotiations over the filling and operation of the GERD, requesting more time to deliberate on the draft agreement. With the dam 70 percent complete and its reservoir expected to start being filled in July, the time for reaching an agreement is ticking away. Ethiopia and Egypt should be ready to make significant concessions to avoid a catastrophic escalation in this seemingly intractable dispute.
The longest river in the world, the Nile stretches across 11 countries in its journey of 4,000 miles from the equatorial rivers that feed Lake Victoria to its final destination in the Mediterranean Sea. Among the countries that share the Nile, two have the most at stake. Egypt, a desert nation of 100 million people, is literally the creation of the Nile, relying on the river for 90 percent of its freshwater needs.
Ethiopia, an East African country of 112 million, contributes the lion’s share of the Nile waters, with its three tributaries—the Blue Nile, Sobat, and Atbara—carrying about 84 percent of the total runoff in the Nile. With a growing but otherwise resource-poor economy, Ethiopia is keen to develop its vast potential for hydroelectricity generation in the Nile basin to become a regional hub of electric power exports.
The GERD, a $5 billion project that will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, is a part of that ambition. The dam is located on Ethiopia’s flank of the Blue Nile, just 12 miles from its border with Sudan. It will have paramount economic value to Ethiopia, doubling the country’s electricity generation capacity and earning as much as a billion dollars annually from energy exports to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, and potentially Egypt. The GERD’s massive reservoir will store 74 billion cubic meters (BCM) of water, roughly equal to a year-and-half’s worth of the Blue Nile’s flow, which will be gradually filled upon the dam’s completion.
The Blue Nile is highly seasonal, with 80 percent of its discharge occurring from July to October during the short rainy season on the Ethiopian highlands. This makes it prone to heavy flooding, while the heavy sedimentation it carries reduces hydropower production in dams with small reservoirs. The GERD will help mitigate this, leading to a regulated, steady flow that will improve navigation, irrigation, and hydropower generation downstream. Sudan, which does not have a major dam on the Nile, will enjoy most of these benefits, which explains its decision to side with Ethiopia for the first time in the history of Nile politics.
Egypt, however, has less to gain from these changes as it regulates the flow of the Nile using the massive reservoir of the Aswan High Dam, which has a capacity of 169 BCM. Egypt worries that an upstream dam on the Blue Nile, which contributes about 60 percent of the flow of the Nile, will reduce water supply and power generation at Aswan. As a hydropower project, the GERD will not directly consume water once its reservoir is filled. It could, however, reduce the amount of water Egypt receives if it leads to a significant increase of irrigation in Sudan, which adds to Egypt’s worry.
In 2015, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt agreed on a Declaration of Principles that stipulated an “equitable and reasonable” utilization of the Nile that will not cause “significant harm” to other riparian countries. In spite of years of negotiations, however, they have made little progress in specifying the technical details on the filling and operating of the dam.
To safeguard its reservoir at Aswan, Egypt wants to secure an agreement that binds Ethiopia to releasing a fixed amount of the river’s flow and a process for monitoring Ethiopia’s compliance. Ethiopia, on the other hand, seeks to avoid a permanent commitment for a water quota that extends beyond the GERD’s filling period and demands a flexible agreement with a provision for periodic reviews. Behind the facade of legal wrangling, the scope for a future Nile project is at stake. Ethiopia wants to avoid an agreement that restricts its capacity to harness its massive hydropower potential of about 45,000 megawatts; Egypt wants exactly such a restriction.
The negotiations gained momentum in November 2019 after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called on U.S. President Donald Trump to help broker an agreement. The foreign and water ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have held a series of meetings in Washington since December and met Trump at the White House. What the United States wants to accomplish through its involvement, however, is not clear and appears to be inspired more by Trump’s desire to broker a deal than by a foreign policy imperative.
In a recent speech on the campaign trail, Trump implied that he deserved a Nobel Peace Prize for his brokering role in the Nile dispute. The negotiations were also coordinated by the Department of the Treasury, sidelining the State Department, which possesses the appropriate expertise for this kind of engagement. The Treasury Department serves as the U.S. governor to the International Monetary Fund, which, along with the World Bank, has committed significant resources to aid Ethiopia’s reform efforts under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The intent behind the involvement of the Treasury and the World Bank, therefore, seems to be stepping up pressure on Ethiopia by signaling the financial costs of recalcitrance.
Ethiopia’s withdrawal has left the negotiations in limbo at a critical time. The country’s foreign ministry has expressed its disapproval of the draft agreement, characterizing it as “unacceptable & highly partisan,” while Egypt has noted that it signed the agreement at a meeting where Ethiopia was not present. Instead of helping resolve these differences, the U.S. Treasury released a statement that argued that the draft agreement “addresses all issues in a balanced and equitable manner” and warned Ethiopia that “final testing and filling [of the GERD] should not take place without an agreement.”
To Ethiopia, this seemed to confirm the longstanding fear that the United States has been a biased mediator. David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia, argues that “the United States seems to be putting its thumb on the scale in favor of Egypt.” Ethiopian analysts interpret U.S. overreach in the Nile negotiations as an overture to appease Egypt in the context of Trump’s Middle East peace plan, which has been roundly rejected by Arab nations. While there is no hard evidence, a backroom deal of this sort would not be inconceivable considering Trump’s closeness with Sisi, whom he was overheard calling his “favorite dictator” during the G-7 summit in Biarritz, France. After the Nile negotiations stalled, Trump reportedly made a phone call to reassure Sisi that he would continue with his mediation effort.
Egypt has subsequently commanded the support of the Arab League in condemning Ethiopia’s position, escalating the conflict to a regional scale. A war of words has ensued between the two countries, undermining the prospect of a negotiated solution to the dispute. A failed U.S. mediation has thus ended up fueling tension in an already heated disagreement.
Through its involvement, the U.S. government has also squandered its hard-won soft power in Ethiopia, which has been a staunch security ally for decades. The GERD holds a symbolic significance to Ethiopia, which financed it domestically through a bond offering that was widely bought by the public.
Abiy, who will be facing a national election in August, would be loath to sign an agreement that would expose him to accusations of shortchanging his country’s interests under American duress. Sticks and carrots from Washington are hence unlikely to succeed in getting Ethiopia to step into a treaty that purportedly affects its right to use Nile waters.
Washington will have to find a way out of this conundrum. Its success in mediating the dispute will depend on its ability to find a middle ground acceptable to both Ethiopia and Egypt, which is complicated by the fact that it has already thrown its weight behind a draft agreement that Ethiopia rejects. Ethiopia’s buy-in is crucial for the success of a Nile treaty, especially considering the difficulty of externally enforcing such an agreement. It is particularly important to avoid the risk of a future fallout from a poorly designed treaty that does not enjoy solid support by key signatories.
If the U.S.-led mediation effort stalls, the next step will be for the three countries to take the matter to their heads of government, as stipulated by the 2015 Declaration of Principles. Major allies of the negotiating countries, in particular the European Union, can play a constructive role in facilitating an agreement by helping mitigate potential adverse effects for downstream countries during the filling period of the GERD.
The World Bank, which has been attending the Washington negotiations as an observer, can also offer its technical expertise to craft an agreement. The bank has rich experience in the field, having played a key role in helping India and Pakistan implement the highly effective Indus Waters Treaty.
A major stumbling block to Ethiopia is that the negotiations are being pushed to a rapid closure, even as the scope of the agreement is expanding to include the sensitive issue of water quotas. This also undercuts the efforts of the expert panel commissioned by the three countries in 2015, the National Independent Scientific Research Group, which is concluding a report to guide the filling and operation of the dam. In recruiting the aid of the U.S. government to quickly wrap up an agreement, Egypt appears to have preferred a political quick fix to the tedious process of consensus building.
During the negotiations, Ethiopia appears to have agreed to release 37 BCMs per year, which would allow it to fill the GERD’s reservoir by a maximum of 12 BCMs per annum. (The average annual flow of the Blue Nile is 49 BCM.) There is, however, less clarity on what should happen in years of drought when the river’s flow falls below the agreed threshold.
These issues can be addressed effectively if the Nile negotiations are implemented through a staggered process. The first chapter of the negotiations can focus on the filling of the GERD’s reservoir. The negotiations have made significant progress on the initial filling of the dam’s reservoir, and Ethiopia has reportedly agreed to a plan of storing 4.9 BCMs per year (equivalent to 10 percent of the annual flow of the Blue Nile and 7 percent of the reservoir’s full capacity). There is hence ample time for finalizing an agreement on the last round of filling the dam’s reservoir.
The second chapter of the agreement could focus on the long-term operation of the GERD, where the crux of the current disagreement lies. Ironically, the dam’s reservoir improves the basin countries’ resilience for drought by creating a buffer supply of water that can be drawn from in times of water shortage. At the same time, it introduces a dilemma on how much of the Blue Nile’s flow should be stored in the GERD’s reservoir and how much should be allowed to flow downstream for storage in Egypt’s massive reservoir at Aswan.
The competing interests would likely be at odds in years of prolonged drought, when Ethiopia might want to store water for future hydropower generation, while Egypt would want continued flow to keep its Aswan reservoir at the minimum level required to generate hydropower.
The Nile is perhaps the only major river with two major reservoirs in different countries that need close coordination. It is technically feasible to find a process for managing the GERD’s reservoir in a way that meets the water needs of Egypt, while also maximizing the dam’s hydropower production. Ethiopia’s use of the GERD for hydropower offers it some degree of flexibility to accommodate Egypt’s worry of a depletion of its reservoir at Aswan during years of drought. This, however, requires that the two countries work together in good faith to devise a flexible process of cooperation. Currently, mutual suspicion is turning what should be an asset into a liability.
Using a multistage approach would help create a robust agreement that is informed by technical and legal issues that emerge during the initial filling of the GERD. Moreover, it has the advantage of breaking what seems an insurmountable problem into smaller, manageable parts. By allowing the negotiating parties to sequentially build on what they agree, it further creates an opportunity for developing a spirit of mutual trust.
Finally, a Nile agreement will have to be a part of a cooperative framework for greater regional and economic integration. The GERD will heighten the interdependence among the countries that share the Nile and enhance the need for close and proactive coordination to optimize the river’s various uses across borders. As climate change creates new vulnerabilities such as erratic rainfall, it will become even more essential to actively coordinate water usage across the full stretch of the Nile.
The three signatory countries can use trade and investment incentives to optimize water use, for example by encouraging water-intensive production to move to rain-abundant countries. Upstream countries with hydropower potential can also consider joint development of dams to strengthen trust and facilitate coordination across borders. Economic integration, in return, would provide a safeguard against polarizing political forces that could pit countries against one another in the event of severe water shortages.
A river with many masters, the Nile poses a unique coordination challenge to the countries that share it. A successful Nile agreement will have to be founded on mutual trust and consensus. Rather than bickering and seeking outside support for their respective national agendas, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan should join forces to build a lasting agreement that will advance their shared interests for the long haul.


foreignpolicy--2020-03-14--Coronavirus Lockdown Launches Manila Into Pandemonium

MANILA , Philippines—Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Thursday ordered a “ lockdown ” of the entire metro Manila region from March 15 to April 14 due to the coronavirus pandemic .
Flanked by army and police officials , the president delivered a meandering , often contradictory address to the nation , leaving residents scrambling to prepare for a month of potential isolation in a region that already struggles to provide access to food , water , and medical care to over 12 million inhabitants .
The address left residents tense and confused , unsure how or why the sweeping lockdown @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ peace and order ” in the region , would be enforced , and how they would address the needs of Filipinos unable to work remotely or access hospitals .
And government officials seem to have no clearer idea than ordinary citizens .
Less than 24 hours before community quarantine begins , most people still didn ’ t understand what it meant—including the health workers responsible for treating suspected coronavirus patients .
As of Saturday evening , there were over 100 confirmed cases—but many more are suspected .
The Philippine health department came @ @ @ @ @ @ @ response after the first patient to die from COVID-19 outside of China died in Manila on Feb. 1 .
The country has so far procured just 4,000 tests , according to the World Health Organization ’ s Philippines office .
Authorities did not intensify contact tracing until late last week .
The University of the Philippines Manila has developed coronavirus testing kits , which were recently approved by the health department .
But these were not mentioned in Duterte ’ s speech announcing the lockdown .
On Friday morning , supermarkets were packed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were crowded with residents racing to the countryside to wait out the lockdown .
Schools will close for one month , and mass gatherings have been banned , although businesses and retailers have been urged to remain open .
Public transportation will continue to operate , as will some international flights to Manila ’ s airport , but domestic land , sea , and air connections will be suspended on Sunday at 12 a.m .
Residents are being ordered to practice social distancing .
For many in the crowded city , including the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impoverished neighborhoods , this is an impossible task .
Manila will become the first major city in the developing world outside of China to be quarantined due to the coronavirus .
But the lockdown may not be all that it seems .
Duterte ’ s own cabinet secretaries pushed back on aspects of the community quarantine measures on Friday—pointedly ignoring Duterte ’ s use of the term “ lockdown ” —making it possible that up to 2 million people could enter and leave metro Manila every day .
“ Every agency has its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] night , ” said Gene Nisperos , an assistant professor at the University of the Philippines Manila College of Medicine .
“ People are confused.
” Duterte ’ s decision came from , but did not abide entirely by , recommendations made earlier Thursday by an interagency task force .
His decision to deploy police and military to enforce quarantine measures , which he insisted was “ not martial law , ” was criticized harshly by Filipinos worried that the increased presence of the authorities could lead to rights abuses in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people killed in the drug war and dozens of civilians killed in military operations ostensibly targeting communist insurgents .
“ Martial law ” quickly began trending on Twitter after Duterte ’ s Thursday evening address .
“ You can not just enforce a cure , ” Nisperos said .
“ You can not use the power of the gun to mitigate the spread of the disease .
But this is what we ’ re looking at now.
” The address focused heavily on community quarantine measures , which opposition senators said on Friday @ @ @ @ @ @ @ travel restrictions based on the recommendations of the World Health Organization , which participated in the task force as an observer .
These efforts will hopefully slow the spread of the coronavirus to other islands of the Philippine archipelago and alleviate strains on the country ’ s health resources , said Emerito Faraon , an assistant professor of health policy and administration at the University of the Philippines Manila .
“ I think our government should have done it earlier , but because we follow protocols , we had to wait for tipping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ Our health front-liners must also be better equipped to protected themselves when they handle confirmed COVID-19 cases , ” he added .
“ They are the real heroes here , if we win this war.
” It may indeed be too late .
Several Manila residents told me on Friday they were making plans to flee the capital city before the lockdown went into effect on Sunday .
“ They think they ’ re safer there , but they don ’ t think they themselves might be carriers , ” Nisperos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the health care system is even worse .
When this thing strikes the provinces , we ’ re going to have a major disaster on our hands.
” Sara Duterte , the mayor of Davao and the president ’ s daughter , is under self-quarantine due to her possible exposure to the coronavirus .
Cases have been confirmed in northern Mindanao and in Batangas , a region south of Manila .
Other regions have placed themselves under voluntary community quarantine , potentially disrupting travel plans of Manila residents already fleeing for the countryside @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Manila , Nisperos said , did not mention clear plans to distribute resources such as face masks , provide financial subsidies to Filipinos unable to work or forced into quarantine , and support the country ’ s overburdened health care system .
“ Even before the [ pandemic ] , it has been teetering on the brink of collapse , ” he said .
Duterte ’ s speech lacked critical details or clear instructions for action .
“ The directives given by [ Duterte ] were still broadly stated ” and need “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government ] heads , ” Faraon said .
“ Effective communication is very important now .
Most don ’ t understand what [ community quarantine ] means , or why COVID-19 is disrupting their lives now.
” The government , Nisperos said , does not appear to have “ a clear , comprehensive outlook on what will happen over the next few days , much less the next few months .
”

MANILA, Philippines—Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Thursday ordered a “lockdown” of the entire metro Manila region from March 15 to April 14 due to the coronavirus pandemic. Flanked by army and police officials, the president delivered a meandering, often contradictory address to the nation, leaving residents scrambling to prepare for a month of potential isolation in a region that already struggles to provide access to food, water, and medical care to over 12 million inhabitants.
MANILA, Philippines—Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on Thursday ordered a “lockdown” of the entire metro Manila region from March 15 to April 14 due to the coronavirus pandemic. Flanked by army and police officials, the president delivered a meandering, often contradictory address to the nation, leaving residents scrambling to prepare for a month of potential isolation in a region that already struggles to provide access to food, water, and medical care to over 12 million inhabitants.
The address left residents tense and confused, unsure how or why the sweeping lockdown measures, which Duterte said would instill “peace and order” in the region, would be enforced, and how they would address the needs of Filipinos unable to work remotely or access hospitals.
And government officials seem to have no clearer idea than ordinary citizens. Less than 24 hours before community quarantine begins, most people still didn’t understand what it meant—including the health workers responsible for treating suspected coronavirus patients.
As of Saturday evening, there were over 100 confirmed cases—but many more are suspected. The Philippine health department came under fire last month for its sluggish response after the first patient to die from COVID-19 outside of China died in Manila on Feb. 1. The country has so far procured just 4,000 tests, according to the World Health Organization’s Philippines office. Authorities did not intensify contact tracing until late last week. The University of the Philippines Manila has developed coronavirus testing kits, which were recently approved by the health department. But these were not mentioned in Duterte’s speech announcing the lockdown.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
On Friday morning, supermarkets were packed with panicked shoppers, and bus stations were crowded with residents racing to the countryside to wait out the lockdown. Schools will close for one month, and mass gatherings have been banned, although businesses and retailers have been urged to remain open. Public transportation will continue to operate, as will some international flights to Manila’s airport, but domestic land, sea, and air connections will be suspended on Sunday at 12 a.m.
Residents are being ordered to practice social distancing. For many in the crowded city, including the millions of people living in dense, impoverished neighborhoods, this is an impossible task. Manila will become the first major city in the developing world outside of China to be quarantined due to the coronavirus.
But the lockdown may not be all that it seems. Duterte’s own cabinet secretaries pushed back on aspects of the community quarantine measures on Friday—pointedly ignoring Duterte’s use of the term “lockdown”—making it possible that up to 2 million people could enter and leave metro Manila every day.
“Every agency has its own interpretation of what happened [Thursday] night,” said Gene Nisperos, an assistant professor at the University of the Philippines Manila College of Medicine. “People are confused.”
Duterte’s decision came from, but did not abide entirely by, recommendations made earlier Thursday by an interagency task force. His decision to deploy police and military to enforce quarantine measures, which he insisted was “not martial law,” was criticized harshly by Filipinos worried that the increased presence of the authorities could lead to rights abuses in a country that has seen up to 27,000 people killed in the drug war and dozens of civilians killed in military operations ostensibly targeting communist insurgents. “Martial law” quickly began trending on Twitter after Duterte’s Thursday evening address.
“You cannot just enforce a cure,” Nisperos said. “You cannot use the power of the gun to mitigate the spread of the disease. But this is what we’re looking at now.”
The address focused heavily on community quarantine measures, which opposition senators said on Friday are still not clearly defined, and travel restrictions based on the recommendations of the World Health Organization, which participated in the task force as an observer. These efforts will hopefully slow the spread of the coronavirus to other islands of the Philippine archipelago and alleviate strains on the country’s health resources, said Emerito Faraon, an assistant professor of health policy and administration at the University of the Philippines Manila. “I think our government should have done it earlier, but because we follow protocols, we had to wait for tipping points,” he told Foreign Policy.
“Our health front-liners must also be better equipped to protected themselves when they handle confirmed COVID-19 cases,” he added. “They are the real heroes here, if we win this war.”
It may indeed be too late. Several Manila residents told me on Friday they were making plans to flee the capital city before the lockdown went into effect on Sunday. “They think they’re safer there, but they don’t think they themselves might be carriers,” Nisperos said. “Outside metro Manila, the health care system is even worse. When this thing strikes the provinces, we’re going to have a major disaster on our hands.”
Sara Duterte, the mayor of Davao and the president’s daughter, is under self-quarantine due to her possible exposure to the coronavirus. Cases have been confirmed in northern Mindanao and in Batangas, a region south of Manila. Other regions have placed themselves under voluntary community quarantine, potentially disrupting travel plans of Manila residents already fleeing for the countryside.
Duterte’s plan for metro Manila, Nisperos said, did not mention clear plans to distribute resources such as face masks, provide financial subsidies to Filipinos unable to work or forced into quarantine, and support the country’s overburdened health care system. “Even before the [pandemic], it has been teetering on the brink of collapse,” he said.
Duterte’s speech lacked critical details or clear instructions for action. “The directives given by [Duterte] were still broadly stated” and need “refinement and contextualization by respective [local government] heads,” Faraon said. “Effective communication is very important now. Most don’t understand what [community quarantine] means, or why COVID-19 is disrupting their lives now.”
The government, Nisperos said, does not appear to have “a clear, comprehensive outlook on what will happen over the next few days, much less the next few months.”


foreignpolicy--2020-03-14--The EU Is Abandoning Italy in Its Hour of Need

The EU Is Abandoning Italy in Its Hour of Need Italy is in lockdown .
Schools and universities are closed , soccer games suspended , and restaurant visits banned amid a rapid spread of the novel coronavirus in the country .
Just grocery stores and pharmacies are allowed to stay open , and only absolutely necessary travel is permitted .
One might think that fellow European Union countries would count their blessings and send their Italian friends a few vital supplies , especially since the Italians have asked for it .
They have sent nothing .
EU countries ’ shameful @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a larger problem : What would European countries do if one of them faced an even greater crisis ?
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism is the bland name under which the EU ’ s crisis hub—the Emergency Response Coordination Centre—operates .
It monitors natural and manmade disasters around the clock , and when an EU member state can no longer handle a crisis on its own it can turn to the crisis hub .
The hub forwards the appeal to other member states , which can then volunteer assistance .
( The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ country . )
Two years ago , for example , with devastating forest fires spreading around the country , Sweden turned to the Emergency Response Coordination Centre , and Stockholm ’ s plea yielded a heartwarming response .
Portugal sent two firefighting aircraft ; Germany contributed five helicopters and 53 firefighters ; Lithuania sent one helicopter and Norway eight .
France dispatched 60 firefighters and two aircraft ; Denmark sent 60 firefighters ; Poland sent over 130 firefighters and more than 40 fire trucks .
Italy , itself in a dangerous forest-fire season @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European helpers arrived in Sweden , locals greeted them with applause .
It was a powerful illustration of a frequently forgotten reality : The European Union is about more than tedious financial transactions ; it ’ s also about helping fellow European countries in need .
Last month , when COVID-19 began spreading rapidly in Italy , the country appealed for help via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre .
“ We asked for supplies of medical equipment , and the European Commission forwarded the appeal to the member states , ” Italy ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maurizio Massari , told me .
“ But it didn ’ t work.
” So far , not a single EU member state has sent Italy the needed supplies .
That ’ s tragic for a country with 21,157 coronavirus infections and 1,441 deaths as of March 14 , and with medical staff working under severe shortages of supplies .
To be sure , all governments need to make sure they have enough supplies for their own hospitals , patients , and medical staff .
But no European country is suffering remotely as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have a high caseload , but as of March 14 , Finland has just 225 cases , and Italy ’ s neighbor Austria only 655 .
Portugal has 169 cases ; Ireland 90 ; Romania , 109 ; Poland , 93 ; Bulgaria , 37 ; and Hungary has 25 cases .
Many of those countries have benefited greatly from European solidarity in the past ; a number of them are net beneficiaries of the EU , meaning they get more money out of their membership than they pay into it .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the European Union , has 1,140 coronavirus cases—and it , too , has failed to help the Italians .
On March 12 , a Chinese aircraft landed in Rome carrying nine medical experts and 31 tons of medical supplies including intensive care unit equipment , medical protective equipment , and antiviral drugs .
In the meantime , a partial and flawed savior has arrived .
Close to midnight on March 12 , a Chinese aircraft landed in Rome carrying nine medical experts and 31 tons of medical supplies including intensive care unit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antiviral drugs .
Around the same time , a Chinese truck arrived in Italy bringing more than 230 boxes of medical equipment .
It was less than Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi had promised Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio of Italy in a phone call on Tuesday , but two days after the phone call the supplies were on their way .
Italy has already had a taste of Europe ’ s lack of solidarity .
During the 2015 refugee crisis some 1.7 million people arrived on EU territory , mostly in Italy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most common destinations ) , but in 2017 some EU member states were still refusing to accept them under a solidarity scheme .
“ The coronavirus crisis is similar to the refugee crisis : Countries that are not immediately affected are mostly not willing to help , ” Massari said .
“ Different countries obviously have different threat perceptions .
We [ Italy ] feel that the coronavirus is a global and European threat that needs a European response , but other countries don ’ t see it that way.
” Europe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and it ’ s unwise , because misery loves company .
A struggling Italy will drag its European friends down , too , starting with their economies .
But the cold response to Italy ’ s plea points to a larger issue : How would European allies respond in case of crisis even more devastating than the coronavirus—say , a massive cyberattack that knocks out power for a prolonged period of time ?
Without electrical power , other critical functions quickly cease to function , too .
Brno University Hospital— home to one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ COVID-19 testing labs—has already been hit by a serious cyber attack .
The fact that no country—with the possible exception of China—can survive without close allies is the reason that NATO was founded 71 years ago and the European Coal and Steel Community three years later .
NATO ’ s member states are supposed to do their best to defend their countries , but they all know that they need one another : Collective defense is NATO ’ s raison d ’ être .
Only the United States has considerable supplies of ammunition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that they can turn to the U.S. military if they run out , as happened during NATO ’ s 2011 intervention in Libya .
Yet at a moment of extreme hardship for a key EU ( and NATO ) member , Italy ’ s allies are showing that they can ’ t be counted on in a severe crisis—and that means Italy may increasingly turn toward China .
It will remain stalwart member of the EU and NATO , but why should it support its various European allies next time they ’ re @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it pay heed to European allies ’ calls for it to reverse its participation in China ’ s Belt and Road Initiative , which it joined last year ?
The Belt and Road , China ’ s vast global infrastructure program , involves investments and constructions in a range of countries , primarily developing countries .
Italy and China have , however , been deepening their cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative and beyond ; last year , a police cooperation program saw Chinese police officers patrol the streets of Rome and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its some 6,000 troops on foreign missions , troops who lead and make up large parts of the United Nations ’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and NATO ’ s forces in Kosovo , soldiers who help defend Latvia as part of NATO ’ s Enhanced Forward Presence , and sailors who participate in the EU ’ s mission combating Somali piracy and who police the western Mediterranean for the benefit not just of Italy but the rest of Europe , too ?
“ La maledizione !
” cries Rigoletto , the title character @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
La maledizione—the curse—sometimes seems to be Italy ’ s destiny .
EU membership has been mostly good for Italy .
Its economy has been propelled upward by the single market and the euro , and its citizens have benefited enormously from free movement—some 2.7 million Italians currently live in other EU member states .
And Italians appreciate the alliance : a 2018 Pew Research Center survey showed that 58 percent of Italians have a favorable view of the EU , somewhat lower than the EU median of 62 percent but far higher @ @ @ @ @ @ @ On March 13 , the European Commission stepped in to at least help Italy ’ s economy , but so far no medical assistance from member states has materialized .
If Europe can ’ t send face masks , why should Italy keep its some 6,000 troops on foreign missions , troops who lead and make up large parts of the United Nations ’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and NATO ’ s forces in Kosovo Indeed , with the current lack of solidarity , the EU might lose Italy ’ s affection—and China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the situation .
That mustn ’ t happen .
Instead , the EU ’ s net beneficiaries ( and low-coronavirus-count nations ) such as Slovakia , Bulgaria , the Czech Republic , Hungary , Romania , and Poland should send Italy face masks and whatever else the country might need .
Indeed , would it be too much to ask those countries to fulfill their obligations under the EU ’ s solidarity scheme ?
Otherwise , don ’ t expect Italian soldiers to come to the aid of European allies when Russia stages @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its choice , or when a hostile state or its proxies knock out Poland ’ s power grid .

Italy is in lockdown. Schools and universities are closed, soccer games suspended , and restaurant visits banned amid a rapid spread of the novel coronavirus in the country. Just grocery stores and pharmacies are allowed to stay open, and only absolutely necessary travel is permitted. One might think that fellow European Union countries would count their blessings and send their Italian friends a few vital supplies, especially since the Italians have asked for it. They have sent nothing.
Italy is in lockdown. Schools and universities are closed, soccer games suspended, and restaurant visits banned amid a rapid spread of the novel coronavirus in the country. Just grocery stores and pharmacies are allowed to stay open, and only absolutely necessary travel is permitted. One might think that fellow European Union countries would count their blessings and send their Italian friends a few vital supplies, especially since the Italians have asked for it. They have sent nothing.
EU countries’ shameful lack of solidarity with the Italians points to a larger problem: What would European countries do if one of them faced an even greater crisis?
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism is the bland name under which the EU’s crisis hub—the Emergency Response Coordination Centre—operates. It monitors natural and manmade disasters around the clock, and when an EU member state can no longer handle a crisis on its own it can turn to the crisis hub. The hub forwards the appeal to other member states, which can then volunteer assistance. (The assistance is later reimbursed by the recipient country.)
Two years ago, for example, with devastating forest fires spreading around the country, Sweden turned to the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, and Stockholm’s plea yielded a heartwarming response. Portugal sent two firefighting aircraft; Germany contributed five helicopters and 53 firefighters; Lithuania sent one helicopter and Norway eight. France dispatched 60 firefighters and two aircraft; Denmark sent 60 firefighters; Poland sent over 130 firefighters and more than 40 fire trucks. Italy, itself in a dangerous forest-fire season, sent two aircraft.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic and learn how it’s affecting countries around the world.]
When the European helpers arrived in Sweden, locals greeted them with applause. It was a powerful illustration of a frequently forgotten reality: The European Union is about more than tedious financial transactions; it’s also about helping fellow European countries in need.
Last month, when COVID-19 began spreading rapidly in Italy, the country appealed for help via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. “We asked for supplies of medical equipment, and the European Commission forwarded the appeal to the member states,” Italy’s permanent representative to the EU, Maurizio Massari, told me. “But it didn’t work.”
So far, not a single EU member state has sent Italy the needed supplies. That’s tragic for a country with 21,157 coronavirus infections and 1,441 deaths as of March 14, and with medical staff working under severe shortages of supplies.
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To be sure, all governments need to make sure they have enough supplies for their own hospitals, patients, and medical staff. But no European country is suffering remotely as badly as Italy. Spain and France have a high caseload, but as of March 14, Finland has just 225 cases, and Italy’s neighbor Austria only 655. Portugal has 169 cases; Ireland 90; Romania, 109; Poland, 93; Bulgaria, 37; and Hungary has 25 cases. Many of those countries have benefited greatly from European solidarity in the past; a number of them are net beneficiaries of the EU, meaning they get more money out of their membership than they pay into it. The United Kingdom, no longer a member of the European Union, has 1,140 coronavirus cases—and it, too, has failed to help the Italians.
On March 12, a Chinese aircraft landed in Rome carrying nine medical experts and 31 tons of medical supplies including intensive care unit equipment, medical protective equipment, and antiviral drugs.
In the meantime, a partial and flawed savior has arrived. Close to midnight on March 12, a Chinese aircraft landed in Rome carrying nine medical experts and 31 tons of medical supplies including intensive care unit equipment, medical protective equipment, and antiviral drugs. Around the same time, a Chinese truck arrived in Italy bringing more than 230 boxes of medical equipment. It was less than Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi had promised Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio of Italy in a phone call on Tuesday, but two days after the phone call the supplies were on their way.
Italy has already had a taste of Europe’s lack of solidarity. During the 2015 refugee crisis some 1.7 million people arrived on EU territory, mostly in Italy and Greece (with Germany and Sweden the most common destinations), but in 2017 some EU member states were still refusing to accept them under a solidarity scheme. “The coronavirus crisis is similar to the refugee crisis: Countries that are not immediately affected are mostly not willing to help,” Massari said. “Different countries obviously have different threat perceptions. We [Italy] feel that the coronavirus is a global and European threat that needs a European response, but other countries don’t see it that way.”
Europe’s selfishness is morally lamentable, and it’s unwise, because misery loves company. A struggling Italy will drag its European friends down, too, starting with their economies. But the cold response to Italy’s plea points to a larger issue: How would European allies respond in case of crisis even more devastating than the coronavirus—say, a massive cyberattack that knocks out power for a prolonged period of time? Without electrical power, other critical functions quickly cease to function, too. Brno University Hospital— home to one of the Czech Republic’s largest COVID-19 testing labs—has already been hit by a serious cyber attack.
The fact that no country—with the possible exception of China—can survive without close allies is the reason that NATO was founded 71 years ago and the European Coal and Steel Community three years later. NATO’s member states are supposed to do their best to defend their countries, but they all know that they need one another: Collective defense is NATO’s raison d’être. Only the United States has considerable supplies of ammunition; all the other member states know that they can turn to the U.S. military if they run out, as happened during NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya.
Yet at a moment of extreme hardship for a key EU (and NATO) member, Italy’s allies are showing that they can’t be counted on in a severe crisis—and that means Italy may increasingly turn toward China. It will remain stalwart member of the EU and NATO, but why should it support its various European allies next time they’re in a pinch? And why should it pay heed to European allies’ calls for it to reverse its participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which it joined last year?
The Belt and Road, China’s vast global infrastructure program, involves investments and constructions in a range of countries, primarily developing countries. Italy and China have, however, been deepening their cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative and beyond; last year, a police cooperation program saw Chinese police officers patrol the streets of Rome and Milan.
And why should Italy keep its some 6,000 troops on foreign missions, troops who lead and make up large parts of the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and NATO’s forces in Kosovo, soldiers who help defend Latvia as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, and sailors who participate in the EU’s mission combating Somali piracy and who police the western Mediterranean for the benefit not just of Italy but the rest of Europe, too?
“La maledizione!” cries Rigoletto, the title character in Giuseppe Verdi’s famous opera. La maledizione—the curse—sometimes seems to be Italy’s destiny. EU membership has been mostly good for Italy. Its economy has been propelled upward by the single market and the euro, and its citizens have benefited enormously from free movement—some 2.7 million Italians currently live in other EU member states. And Italians appreciate the alliance: a 2018 Pew Research Center survey showed that 58 percent of Italians have a favorable view of the EU, somewhat lower than the EU median of 62 percent but far higher than Greece’s 37 percent. On March 13, the European Commission stepped in to at least help Italy’s economy, but so far no medical assistance from member states has materialized.
If Europe can’t send face masks, why should Italy keep its some 6,000 troops on foreign missions, troops who lead and make up large parts of the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and NATO’s forces in Kosovo.
Indeed, with the current lack of solidarity, the EU might lose Italy’s affection—and China will happily continue to take advantage of the situation. That mustn’t happen.
Instead, the EU’s net beneficiaries (and low-coronavirus-count nations) such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Poland should send Italy face masks and whatever else the country might need. Indeed, would it be too much to ask those countries to fulfill their obligations under the EU’s solidarity scheme?
Otherwise, don’t expect Italian soldiers to come to the aid of European allies when Russia stages a surprise on a European country of its choice, or when a hostile state or its proxies knock out Poland’s power grid.