foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--How to (Finally) Defeat Populism

How to (Finally) Defeat Populism

After all the ballots cast in the 2020 U.S. election were tallied , it became increasingly clear that Joe Biden had successfully rebuilt the “ Blue wall ” across the Midwest , home to white working-class voters who powered Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016 .
Peek over the wall , however , and the view is clear : Biden ’ s narrow victories in Michigan , Pennsylvania , and Wisconsin were made possible by historically high anti-Trump turnout , particularly among Black urban voters .
Working-class whites from struggling manufacturing communities doubled down on Trumpism .
Voters angry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anxious about their own economic futures , and uncomfortable with social changes turned out in droves , more excited than ever by Trump ’ s message of nostalgia , nationalism , and nativism .
Around the world , rust belt regions like these—locked in a difficult and prolonged phase of economic restructuring—are crucibles of neopopulism .
Everywhere , former economic powerhouses have become fertile ground for anti-immigrant sentiment and ethnonationalism , nostalgia for an economy and society of yesteryear , and retreat from the international order .
Rust belt regions are not the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas are equally significant—but they represent a uniquely concentrated and intense manifestation of the populist moment , especially in the United States and Europe , which undermines from within support for democracy and , by extension , support for the international political order that has delivered decades of political stability , global security , and economic opportunity .
So , what to do ?
Evidence suggests that where struggling rust belt communities have secured new economic footing , the lure of populism wanes .
And so , as Biden prepares to take office @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should focus on creating the conditions for economic success in rust belt regions .
The work can begin with measures to promote the regional exchange of best practices across the Atlantic and the adoption of “ ally-shoring , ” to restructure and shore up supply chains in response to the COVID-19 pandemic .
“ Populism in place ” is a trans-Atlantic problem , and if it isn ’ t treated that way , the United States and Europe will continue to face anxious , angry electorates capable of sowing political chaos at home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ always found an eager audience among citizens struggling to adapt to economic and social change and feeling ignored or scorned by elites .
But it was long assumed that a strong nationalist and xenophobic political movement would not capture the halls of power in a mature Western democracy .
All that changed with the success of the 2016 British “ Leave ” campaign , which led the country out of the European Union .
Brexit ’ s success in a public referendum proved that politicians who whipped up nationalist sentiments and tapped voters @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , particularly in the United Kingdom ’ s struggling industrial heartlands , could win against all apparent odds .
The 2016 U.S. presidential election delivered an even bigger shock , as voters in and around the once mighty , now hollowed-out manufacturing communities of Michigan , Pennsylvania , Wisconsin , and the Upper Midwest joined conservative voters in the rural regions to install Trump in the White House , turning the country upside down .
Similarly , in the 2017 German federal elections , the extreme right Alternative for Germany ( AfD ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Ruhr Valley , the formerly left-leaning industrial coal and steel region , as well as from deindustrialized and rural regions in the former East Germany .
As in the United States , the backlash against immigrants , aggressively fanned by nationalist leaders , was the central issue and helped win the AfD support in more traditionally conservative strongholds such as Bavaria as well .
In France , meanwhile , the far-right National Rally ( formerly National Front ) has established itself in the old steel and coal country in the north of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ National Front leader Marine Le Pen found majorities in her 2017 presidential election loss to Emmanuel Macron .
The country ’ s yellow vest protests that began in late 2018 likewise originated in France ’ s postindustrial zones , where many citizens believed that a proposed fuel tax hike was an unacceptable economic hardship .
Much like the United States ’ Tea Party movement , these colorful French protests quickly morphed into a clash between out-country working-class residents under economic stress and more prosperous urban elites .
Further south , in Italy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parties was evident in the 2018 general election , as the populist League and the Five Star Movement rode a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment to significant electoral gains .
Their support came from the industrial north and struggling regions of the rural south—eerily mimicking the cross-regional coalition that pushed Trump to power two years before .
The most recent national election in the trans-Atlantic space provides little cause for optimism , despite the outcome .
The 2020 U.S. vote reflects an even more polarized electorate than in 2016 , underlining sharp asymmetries in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ among Trump and Biden voters .
Biden owes his narrow win to a coalition of women , young people , and above all the Black community .
In the heartland , Biden ’ s support among white voters was centered in those communities where residents are better educated , better off , and benefiting from revitalized regional economies .
Trump , on the other hand , received overwhelming support from the rural heartland , as well as from residents of struggling industrial communities in the Midwest that are still experiencing long-term population loss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ place , ” in short , is still here to stay .
The United Kingdom , France , and Germany have seen similar results , where populist sentiments are strongest in struggling communities , while residents of older industrial centers that have turned the economic corner are more resistant to the pull of populist appeals .
In Germany ’ s Ruhr Valley , some communities have begun a successful transition of enterprises , workers , and localities to a new economy ; in Duisburg , home to a successful effort to rebuild the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ AfD underperformed significantly relative to the regional average in the 2017 national elections .
In France , although Le Pen carried nine of the 10 French departments with the highest unemployment rates in the 2017 elections , former industrial cities such as Lyon and Strasbourg that have navigated economic change supported the more moderate and ultimately successful party led by Macron .
In the Brexit referendum , recovering manufacturing centers such as Leeds , Manchester , and Newcastle upon Tyne voted Remain , while still-struggling communities including Sheffield and Blackpool chose Leave .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ feel more optimistic about their future appear to gain the psychic space to be reflective , tolerant , and forward-looking .
And it is clear that these regional transformations do not happen by chance .
They are the product of deliberate actions that public and private leaders have taken to transform regional economies .
For elected officials to do nothing , in other words , is to leave the people living in these regions feeling alienated and left behind , and thus more likely to continue to drive a politics of nationalism , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from international alliances .
What might an expanded trans-Atlantic agenda look like ?
It should start by actively promoting the creation of structured transnational networks across the Atlantic to foster the exchange of best policy practice and innovation at the city and regional levels , with special attention to diffusing models of successful economic transitions to places that are still looking for a way up and out .
After that should come an even more ambitious agenda item , one that would require Western governments to rethink critical supply chains in the context @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see the pandemic as an opportunity to onshore supply chains and production systems for economic and national security reasons , a more fruitful path , both economically and politically , would be to adopt an “ ally-shoring ” approach .
Ally-shoring entails leaning into economic partnerships with countries that share democratic values and strategic interests .
It means working closely with allies—above all , Europe—with which the United States already has tightly wound production and business service networks .
With forethought , planning , and coordination , ally-shoring the production of critical goods @ @ @ @ @ @ @ foodstuffs , and communications equipment could boost economic activity in the transitioning rust belt regions in the United States and Europe and at the same time rebuild the international order .
The time is ripe for the trans-Atlantic partners to recognize the plight of their old rust belts and help them adapt successfully to profound economic and social changes .
The United States and Europe can do this best in concert , by revitalizing their alliance , rebuilding their economies , and learning from each other about the best ways to tackle the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ By adapting the spirit of the Marshall Plan to the radically different circumstances of the present-day trans-Atlantic relationship , these nations can pull themselves—and the world—out of political chaos once again .

John Austin, Jeffrey Anderson and Brian Hanson

After all the ballots cast in the 2020 U.S. election were tallied, it became increasingly clear that Joe Biden had successfully rebuilt the “Blue wall” across the Midwest, home to white working-class voters who powered Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016. Peek over the wall, however, and the view is clear: Biden’s narrow victories in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin were made possible by historically high anti-Trump turnout, particularly among Black urban voters. Working-class whites from struggling manufacturing communities doubled down on Trumpism. Voters angry about the deterioration of their communities, anxious about their own economic futures, and uncomfortable with social changes turned out in droves, more excited than ever by Trump’s message of nostalgia, nationalism, and nativism.
After all the ballots cast in the 2020 U.S. election were tallied, it became increasingly clear that Joe Biden had successfully rebuilt the “Blue wall” across the Midwest, home to white working-class voters who powered Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016. Peek over the wall, however, and the view is clear: Biden’s narrow victories in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin were made possible by historically high anti-Trump turnout, particularly among Black urban voters. Working-class whites from struggling manufacturing communities doubled down on Trumpism. Voters angry about the deterioration of their communities, anxious about their own economic futures, and uncomfortable with social changes turned out in droves, more excited than ever by Trump’s message of nostalgia, nationalism, and nativism.
Around the world, rust belt regions like these—locked in a difficult and prolonged phase of economic restructuring—are crucibles of neopopulism. Everywhere, former economic powerhouses have become fertile ground for anti-immigrant sentiment and ethnonationalism, nostalgia for an economy and society of yesteryear, and retreat from the international order. Rust belt regions are not the sum total of the geography of populism—rural areas are equally significant—but they represent a uniquely concentrated and intense manifestation of the populist moment, especially in the United States and Europe, which undermines from within support for democracy and, by extension, support for the international political order that has delivered decades of political stability, global security, and economic opportunity.
So, what to do? Evidence suggests that where struggling rust belt communities have secured new economic footing, the lure of populism wanes. And so, as Biden prepares to take office, he and his counterparts in Europe should focus on creating the conditions for economic success in rust belt regions. The work can begin with measures to promote the regional exchange of best practices across the Atlantic and the adoption of “ally-shoring,” to restructure and shore up supply chains in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. “Populism in place” is a trans-Atlantic problem, and if it isn’t treated that way, the United States and Europe will continue to face anxious, angry electorates capable of sowing political chaos at home and abroad.
Populist political parties have always found an eager audience among citizens struggling to adapt to economic and social change and feeling ignored or scorned by elites. But it was long assumed that a strong nationalist and xenophobic political movement would not capture the halls of power in a mature Western democracy. All that changed with the success of the 2016 British “Leave” campaign, which led the country out of the European Union. Brexit’s success in a public referendum proved that politicians who whipped up nationalist sentiments and tapped voters’ unease about economic and social change, particularly in the United Kingdom’s struggling industrial heartlands, could win against all apparent odds. The 2016 U.S. presidential election delivered an even bigger shock, as voters in and around the once mighty, now hollowed-out manufacturing communities of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the Upper Midwest joined conservative voters in the rural regions to install Trump in the White House, turning the country upside down.
Similarly, in the 2017 German federal elections, the extreme right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party received significant support from communities in the Ruhr Valley, the formerly left-leaning industrial coal and steel region, as well as from deindustrialized and rural regions in the former East Germany. As in the United States, the backlash against immigrants, aggressively fanned by nationalist leaders, was the central issue and helped win the AfD support in more traditionally conservative strongholds such as Bavaria as well.
In France, meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (formerly National Front) has established itself in the old steel and coal country in the north of the country. This is also where National Front leader Marine Le Pen found majorities in her 2017 presidential election loss to Emmanuel Macron. The country’s yellow vest protests that began in late 2018 likewise originated in France’s postindustrial zones, where many citizens believed that a proposed fuel tax hike was an unacceptable economic hardship. Much like the United States’ Tea Party movement, these colorful French protests quickly morphed into a clash between out-country working-class residents under economic stress and more prosperous urban elites.
Further south, in Italy, the dramatic resurgence of populist and nationalist parties was evident in the 2018 general election, as the populist League and the Five Star Movement rode a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment to significant electoral gains. Their support came from the industrial north and struggling regions of the rural south—eerily mimicking the cross-regional coalition that pushed Trump to power two years before.
The most recent national election in the trans-Atlantic space provides little cause for optimism, despite the outcome. The 2020 U.S. vote reflects an even more polarized electorate than in 2016, underlining sharp asymmetries in economic opportunities and optimism about the future among Trump and Biden voters. Biden owes his narrow win to a coalition of women, young people, and above all the Black community. In the heartland, Biden’s support among white voters was centered in those communities where residents are better educated, better off, and benefiting from revitalized regional economies. Trump, on the other hand, received overwhelming support from the rural heartland, as well as from residents of struggling industrial communities in the Midwest that are still experiencing long-term population loss and economic decline. “Populism in place,” in short, is still here to stay.
Research makes clear that, when “old economy” communities succeed in finding new economic opportunity, the attitudes of residents change—as do outcomes at the ballot box. For example, in regions anchored by economically resurgent industrial communities such as Pittsburgh and Grand Rapids, Michigan, nationalism and nostalgia lost ground to moderate centrism in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections and in the November 2020 elections as well.
The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have seen similar results, where populist sentiments are strongest in struggling communities, while residents of older industrial centers that have turned the economic corner are more resistant to the pull of populist appeals. In Germany’s Ruhr Valley, some communities have begun a successful transition of enterprises, workers, and localities to a new economy; in Duisburg, home to a successful effort to rebuild the local economy around microelectronics, the far-right AfD underperformed significantly relative to the regional average in the 2017 national elections.
In France, although Le Pen carried nine of the 10 French departments with the highest unemployment rates in the 2017 elections, former industrial cities such as Lyon and Strasbourg that have navigated economic change supported the more moderate and ultimately successful party led by Macron. In the Brexit referendum, recovering manufacturing centers such as Leeds, Manchester, and Newcastle upon Tyne voted Remain, while still-struggling communities including Sheffield and Blackpool chose Leave.
The logic is understandable. Communities that feel more optimistic about their future appear to gain the psychic space to be reflective, tolerant, and forward-looking. And it is clear that these regional transformations do not happen by chance. They are the product of deliberate actions that public and private leaders have taken to transform regional economies. For elected officials to do nothing, in other words, is to leave the people living in these regions feeling alienated and left behind, and thus more likely to continue to drive a politics of nationalism, protectionism, nativism, and a retreat from international alliances.
There are already encouraging signs of a restoration of U.S.-European ties. Biden has announced that his administration will give priority to the task of repairing and restoring the trans-Atlantic relationship. Meanwhile, the worsening pandemic provides added urgency for the United States and Europe to find new ways of working together. The manner in which the trans-Atlantic partners respond to the weakened state of trans-Atlantic ties and the pandemic can either ameliorate or exacerbate the condition of these rust belt communities that now serve as the territorial base for nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-globalism. To fully address what ails them, both the United States and Europe must work to integrate “populism in place” into their relationship, thereby broadening the traditional definition of the trans-Atlantic agenda beyond trade and security.
What might an expanded trans-Atlantic agenda look like? It should start by actively promoting the creation of structured transnational networks across the Atlantic to foster the exchange of best policy practice and innovation at the city and regional levels, with special attention to diffusing models of successful economic transitions to places that are still looking for a way up and out.
After that should come an even more ambitious agenda item, one that would require Western governments to rethink critical supply chains in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Although many see the pandemic as an opportunity to onshore supply chains and production systems for economic and national security reasons, a more fruitful path, both economically and politically, would be to adopt an “ally-shoring” approach. Ally-shoring entails leaning into economic partnerships with countries that share democratic values and strategic interests. It means working closely with allies—above all, Europe—with which the United States already has tightly wound production and business service networks. With forethought, planning, and coordination, ally-shoring the production of critical goods and commodities such as medical products, foodstuffs, and communications equipment could boost economic activity in the transitioning rust belt regions in the United States and Europe and at the same time rebuild the international order.
The time is ripe for the trans-Atlantic partners to recognize the plight of their old rust belts and help them adapt successfully to profound economic and social changes. The United States and Europe can do this best in concert, by revitalizing their alliance, rebuilding their economies, and learning from each other about the best ways to tackle the problem of “populism in place.” By adapting the spirit of the Marshall Plan to the radically different circumstances of the present-day trans-Atlantic relationship, these nations can pull themselves—and the world—out of political chaos once again.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--How Biden Can Stop Iran’s Conservatives From Undermining the Nuclear Deal

How Biden Can Stop Iran ’ s Conservatives From Undermining the Nuclear Deal U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has so far spoken sparingly on Iran , including an op-ed on the CNN website and in an interview with the New York Times .
As part of a step-by-step strategy , he has said that he would return to the nuclear deal as the first step and then address other concerns about Iran ’ s regional influence and missile capabilities .
But how will the Iranian government react to the United States ’ demand that the regional issues and the missile capabilities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There are two different approaches in Iran to handling comprehensive negotiations with the United States .
There is broad consensus within the Iranian establishment that Iran will not make any concessions regarding its deterrence and defense strategy .
Iran has traditionally used a deterrent strategy to strengthen its national security and defend its territorial integrity in recent years .
This strategy has two prongs .
The first is strengthening and supporting regional allies and militant movements in Lebanon , Iraq , Syria , Yemen , and elsewhere ; the second is enhancing its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and long-range missiles , as well as ballistic missiles .
This strategy has expanded since the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan , which brought hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops into the region just a few miles from Iran ’ s eastern and western borders , dramatically increasing the risk of an imminent military strike on Iranian territory .
Tehran has pointed to security threats in its vicinity and the fact that it is not a member of any regional military coalitions as the reasons it needs to develop missile capabilities and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Middle Eastern region .
Despite this general consensus on deterrence strategy , the Iranian government ’ s approach to Biden ’ s call for comprehensive negotiations can be divided into two camps .
The first group is made up of conservatives , who recently gained an absolute majority earlier this year in parliamentary elections and are expected to win the next presidential election .
The conservatives strongly reject any talks with the United States on non-nuclear issues and their position has been further strengthened by the assassinations of the commander Gen. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recently the prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh .
In their view , these assassinations were an attempt by Iran ’ s enemies to paralyze Iran ’ s deterrence , and now is the time to revive this deterrence , rather than negotiate .
Reflecting this view , Saeed Jalili , a senior member of Iran ’ s Supreme National Security Council ( SNSC ) and the former nuclear negotiator during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , harshly criticized President Hassan Rouhani for discussing the missile issue with French President Emmanuel Macron in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the refusal of such talks on the part of Rouhani , declaring that non-nuclear talks are prohibited and unacceptable . )
Conservatives believe that just as the West sought to limit Iran ’ s nuclear capabilities in past nuclear talks with the country , any negotiations on missile and regional issues would inflict a crushing blow to Iran ’ s national security .
The hardline speaker of the parliament , Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf , recently said , “ Negotiations with the United States are absolutely harmful and forbidden.
” During Ahmadinejad ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the world witnessed six years of fruitless negotiations between Iran and the West from 2008 to 2014 , and this trend could repeat itself if the conservatives win the next presidential election .
The other group is made up of pragmatists and moderates who , despite emphasizing the need to strengthen Iran ’ s deterrence strategy , do not see non-nuclear negotiations as a threat to Iran ’ s national interests .
Even so , they will not accept that the implementation of the nuclear agreement should be conditional on regional and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Biden ’ s foreign policy team focuses on the alleged need for so-called Middle East security and arms control talks instead of insisting on countering Iran ’ s regional influence and the need for limiting and disarming its missiles , it will be possible to reach an agreement between Iran and the West with the cooperation of countries in the region .
To them , when “ countering Iran ’ s regional influence and its missiles , ” is on the U.S. agenda , it means an aggressive approach toward Iran that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimate security concerns .
Such an approach will not be effective as the Iranians have shown with their resilience in the face of unprecedented U.S. sanctions , resulting from outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s maximum-pressure campaign .
The pragmatists believe that Iran ’ s missile policy is entirely defensive and deterrent in nature ; Tehran has already stated that its missiles ’ range will not exceed 2,000 kilometers ( 1,240 miles ) while some Arab states in the region such Saudi Arabia have purchased missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that in potential future regionwide negotiations , if pressure is put on Iran to limit its missile capabilities , Iran could rightfully bring up the issues of Saudi Arabia ’ s missiles , Israel ’ s nuclear warheads , and modern arms purchases by the Gulf states as a justification for its insistence on keeping its own missile capabilities .
The purchase of F-35 fighter jets by the UAE and Israeli nuclear weapons could be on the agenda of the possible future talks , which will give Iran the upper hand in those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the United States and regional actors must decide whether to move toward a broader arms-control process in the Middle East or to recognize Iran ’ s right to have a missile capability .
The pragmatists think that there should not be any fear of negotiation ; instead , they argue that the opportunity of negotiations should be used to consolidate Iran ’ s regional and defense achievements .
They see Biden ’ s victory as an opportunity to resolve Iran ’ s regional and international problems and see his approach to solving the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in contrast to Trump ’ s .
This pragmatists ’ view is even more relevant given Biden ’ s talk about reconsidering the U.S. position on Saudi Arabia .
During his presidential campaign , he vowed to reassess the U.S. relationship with the Saudis and put an end to U.S. support for Saudi Arabia ’ s war in Yemen .
The pragmatists argue that former President Barack Obama was moving in that direction , and now Biden could step into Obama ’ s shoes and continue along that unfinished path .
In an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Obama emphasized that an approach that rewards Arab allies while presenting Iran as the source of all regional problems would mean continuing sectarian strife in the region .
Obama stressed that Saudi Arabia had to learn to share the Middle East region with its sworn enemy , Iran .
Biden ’ s pick for national security advisor , Jake Sullivan , said in a lengthy interview with The Center for Strategic and International Studies that the Biden administration will stop Trump ’ s maximum pressure campaign against Iran and would not hold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ missile talks , but by returning to deal it would put pressure on regional actors—including Iran and Saudi Arabia—to undertake regional talks .
He also said that the United States will hand over these negotiations to regional countries and will not take the lead .
Such a position aligns with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif ’ s recent statement reiterating Iran ’ s readiness to hold talks with countries in the region on security and stability in the Middle East .
Even China ’ s foreign minister has recently called for Middle @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Sergei Lavrov recently reiterated Putin ’ s proposal for talks between the U.N. Security Council permanent members and Iran to establish a collective security order in the Persian Gulf .
Iran ’ s readiness to use the influence it enjoys over the Houthis to end the Yemeni war—which Biden has insisted on and which lies at the core of Saudi Arabia ’ s national interests and security—seems to be a golden starting point .
Iran can persuade its Yemeni allies to sign a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia .
However , there are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the resolution of which will depend on the approach of the Biden foreign policy team .
The atmosphere of mistrust between Iran and the United States , influenced by Trump ’ s maximum-pressure campaign and the assassinations of Suleimani and Fakhrizadeh , is the primary obstacle .
The second obstacle is the short period that Rouhani is still in office .
With Biden taking office on Jan. 20 , 2021 , the two countries have only five months before Iran ’ s upcoming presidential election to revive the nuclear deal and work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration ’ s plans to revive the JCPOA and lift sanctions do not go ahead as predicted , the two sides will be in serious trouble in early February , when the deadline included in a bill pushed by hardliners as an intentional spoiler and recently passed in the Iranian parliament expires .
Iran ’ s parliament has given European countries and the United States two months to lift sanctions .
The Rouhani administration has expressed its opposition to the bill , describing it harmful to diplomatic efforts .
However , because it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent it from being enforced .
Zarif has said the government will be forced to implement the law , according to which Iran will abandon almost all its nuclear obligations .
If such a law is implemented , it is possible that the JCPOA—which has survived four years of Trump administration ’ s immense pressure—would die in the first month of Biden ’ s presidency .
Biden could lift the sanctions that were suspended by the nuclear deal with several executive orders , and then , as Rouhani recently announced , Iran will @ @ @ @ @ @

U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has so far spoken sparingly on Iran, including an op-ed on the CNN website and in an interview with the New York Times. As part of a step-by-step strategy, he has said that he would return to the nuclear deal as the first step and then address other concerns about Iran’s regional influence and missile capabilities. But how will the Iranian government react to the United States’ demand that the regional issues and the missile capabilities should be part of the negotiation?
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden has so far spoken sparingly on Iran, including an op-ed on the CNN website and in an interview with the New York Times. As part of a step-by-step strategy, he has said that he would return to the nuclear deal as the first step and then address other concerns about Iran’s regional influence and missile capabilities. But how will the Iranian government react to the United States’ demand that the regional issues and the missile capabilities should be part of the negotiation?
There are two different approaches in Iran to handling comprehensive negotiations with the United States.
There is broad consensus within the Iranian establishment that Iran will not make any concessions regarding its deterrence and defense strategy. Iran has traditionally used a deterrent strategy to strengthen its national security and defend its territorial integrity in recent years. This strategy has two prongs. The first is strengthening and supporting regional allies and militant movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere; the second is enhancing its missile capabilities and building and testing short- and long-range missiles, as well as ballistic missiles.
This strategy has expanded since the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which brought hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops into the region just a few miles from Iran’s eastern and western borders, dramatically increasing the risk of an imminent military strike on Iranian territory. Tehran has pointed to security threats in its vicinity and the fact that it is not a member of any regional military coalitions as the reasons it needs to develop missile capabilities and expand its influence in the Islamic countries in the Middle Eastern region.
Despite this general consensus on deterrence strategy, the Iranian government’s approach to Biden’s call for comprehensive negotiations can be divided into two camps.
The first group is made up of conservatives, who recently gained an absolute majority earlier this year in parliamentary elections and are expected to win the next presidential election. The conservatives strongly reject any talks with the United States on non-nuclear issues and their position has been further strengthened by the assassinations of the commander Gen. Qassem Suleimani in early 2020 and more recently the prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
In their view, these assassinations were an attempt by Iran’s enemies to paralyze Iran’s deterrence, and now is the time to revive this deterrence, rather than negotiate. Reflecting this view, Saeed Jalili, a senior member of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the former nuclear negotiator during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, harshly criticized President Hassan Rouhani for discussing the missile issue with French President Emmanuel Macron in a telephone conversation. (He called for the refusal of such talks on the part of Rouhani, declaring that non-nuclear talks are prohibited and unacceptable.)
Conservatives believe that just as the West sought to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in past nuclear talks with the country, any negotiations on missile and regional issues would inflict a crushing blow to Iran’s national security. The hardline speaker of the parliament, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, recently said, “Negotiations with the United States are absolutely harmful and forbidden.” During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, when conservatives were in power, the world witnessed six years of fruitless negotiations between Iran and the West from 2008 to 2014, and this trend could repeat itself if the conservatives win the next presidential election.
The other group is made up of pragmatists and moderates who, despite emphasizing the need to strengthen Iran’s deterrence strategy, do not see non-nuclear negotiations as a threat to Iran’s national interests. Even so, they will not accept that the implementation of the nuclear agreement should be conditional on regional and missile negotiations.
In their view, if Biden’s foreign policy team focuses on the alleged need for so-called Middle East security and arms control talks instead of insisting on countering Iran’s regional influence and the need for limiting and disarming its missiles, it will be possible to reach an agreement between Iran and the West with the cooperation of countries in the region.
To them, when “countering Iran’s regional influence and its missiles,” is on the U.S. agenda, it means an aggressive approach toward Iran that does not consider the country’s legitimate security concerns. Such an approach will not be effective as the Iranians have shown with their resilience in the face of unprecedented U.S. sanctions, resulting from outgoing President Donald Trump’s maximum-pressure campaign.
The pragmatists believe that Iran’s missile policy is entirely defensive and deterrent in nature; Tehran has already stated that its missiles’ range will not exceed 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) while some Arab states in the region such Saudi Arabia have purchased missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles).
The pragmatists believe that in potential future regionwide negotiations, if pressure is put on Iran to limit its missile capabilities, Iran could rightfully bring up the issues of Saudi Arabia’s missiles, Israel’s nuclear warheads, and modern arms purchases by the Gulf states as a justification for its insistence on keeping its own missile capabilities. The purchase of F-35 fighter jets by the UAE and Israeli nuclear weapons could be on the agenda of the possible future talks, which will give Iran the upper hand in those negotiations.
In such a situation, the United States and regional actors must decide whether to move toward a broader arms-control process in the Middle East or to recognize Iran’s right to have a missile capability. The pragmatists think that there should not be any fear of negotiation; instead, they argue that the opportunity of negotiations should be used to consolidate Iran’s regional and defense achievements. They see Biden’s victory as an opportunity to resolve Iran’s regional and international problems and see his approach to solving the Middle East’s problems as balanced in contrast to Trump’s.
This pragmatists’ view is even more relevant given Biden’s talk about reconsidering the U.S. position on Saudi Arabia. During his presidential campaign, he vowed to reassess the U.S. relationship with the Saudis and put an end to U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.
The pragmatists argue that former President Barack Obama was moving in that direction, and now Biden could step into Obama’s shoes and continue along that unfinished path. In an interview with the Atlantic in May 2015, Obama emphasized that an approach that rewards Arab allies while presenting Iran as the source of all regional problems would mean continuing sectarian strife in the region. Obama stressed that Saudi Arabia had to learn to share the Middle East region with its sworn enemy, Iran.
Biden’s pick for national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, said in a lengthy interview with The Center for Strategic and International Studies that the Biden administration will stop Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran and would not hold the nuclear deal hostage for regional and missile talks, but by returning to deal it would put pressure on regional actors—including Iran and Saudi Arabia—to undertake regional talks. He also said that the United States will hand over these negotiations to regional countries and will not take the lead. Such a position aligns with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s recent statement reiterating Iran’s readiness to hold talks with countries in the region on security and stability in the Middle East.
Even China’s foreign minister has recently called for Middle East security talks. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently reiterated Putin’s proposal for talks between the U.N. Security Council permanent members and Iran to establish a collective security order in the Persian Gulf.
Iran’s readiness to use the influence it enjoys over the Houthis to end the Yemeni war—which Biden has insisted on and which lies at the core of Saudi Arabia’s national interests and security—seems to be a golden starting point. Iran can persuade its Yemeni allies to sign a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia.
However, there are serious barriers to regional and missile negotiations, the resolution of which will depend on the approach of the Biden foreign policy team. The atmosphere of mistrust between Iran and the United States, influenced by Trump’s maximum-pressure campaign and the assassinations of Suleimani and Fakhrizadeh, is the primary obstacle.
The second obstacle is the short period that Rouhani is still in office. With Biden taking office on Jan. 20, 2021, the two countries have only five months before Iran’s upcoming presidential election to revive the nuclear deal and work on other issues.
If the Biden administration’s plans to revive the JCPOA and lift sanctions do not go ahead as predicted, the two sides will be in serious trouble in early February, when the deadline included in a bill pushed by hardliners as an intentional spoiler and recently passed in the Iranian parliament expires.
Iran’s parliament has given European countries and the United States two months to lift sanctions. The Rouhani administration has expressed its opposition to the bill, describing it harmful to diplomatic efforts. However, because it has become law, they cannot prevent it from being enforced. Zarif has said the government will be forced to implement the law, according to which Iran will abandon almost all its nuclear obligations.
If such a law is implemented, it is possible that the JCPOA—which has survived four years of Trump administration’s immense pressure—would die in the first month of Biden’s presidency. Biden could lift the sanctions that were suspended by the nuclear deal with several executive orders, and then, as Rouhani recently announced, Iran will return to its nuclear obligations.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--Palestinians Place Their Bets on Biden Undoing Trump’s Snubs

This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Palestinians are eager to see U.S. President-elect Joe Biden take office in January , not for what he may do but what they hope he will undo .
After four years in which outgoing President Donald Trump shut the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Washington , slashed hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid to refugees , recognized a divided Jerusalem as Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ settlers that they deserve a third of the West Bank , expectations are low .
Forget about grand gestures like former President Barack Obama ’ s 2009 historic speech in Cairo to strike a “ new beginning ” with the Muslim world , which was followed by years of fruitlessly prodding Israelis and Palestinians to embrace a two-state solution .
You won ’ t see Biden shuttling between Riyadh and Jerusalem as Trump did in 2017 to boast about his unique abilities to engineer an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal .
What Palestinian President Mahmoud @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Democratic administration is a will to restore balance .
While Trump took his Middle East policy straight from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ’ s right-wing playbook , he mostly ignored the 85-year-old Palestinian leader , who became persona non grata at the White House .
Abbas recognizes that trying to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians is not an immediate priority for Biden , who will focus in his first year on U.S. domestic issues—above all , how to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic and recharge the economy .
In foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—for stopping Iran from producing nuclear weapons , which Trump exited , will take precedence , along with addressing threats from China and Russia .
In a sign that he wants to move forward , Abbas has tempered his objections to the new Arab-Israeli peace agreements .
Prospects for making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace front are considered remote to nonexistent in 2021 , especially since the lead characters haven ’ t changed since Obama left office .
Netanyahu and Abbas detest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s uninhibited swing in Israel ’ s favor only deepened their mutual distrust .
“ I don ’ t think Palestinians are going to have a problem with the new U.S. administration as much as they ’ re going to have a problem with Netanyahu , ” said Mkhaimar Abusada , a political scientist at Gaza ’ s Al-Azhar University .
But the ground has been shifting in the Middle East , creating new options for breaking what looks like a hardened stalemate .
When the time comes to push further and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden may be able to capitalize on the new willingness of Arab countries to engage with Israel , as demonstrated by the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords that have normalized the country ’ s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain .
Though Abbas is deeply wary of the UAE , which harbors his bitter Palestinian rival , Mohammed Dahlan , he may be more willing to respond to involvement by Saudi Arabia , which has facilitated Gulf-Israel rapprochement and has its own growing ties with Israel but has resisted signing its own @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that Palestinians want Biden to undo is led by Trump ’ s cutoff in U.S. money going to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency , which takes care of some 1.4 million poverty-stricken Palestinians living in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip .
Their plight has been exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19 on the Palestinian economy , which is projected to have contracted 8 percent in 2020 .
Also up for reversal is the Trump administration policy that settlements are “ not inconsistent with international law ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as being made in Israel .
The European Union requires that wine , dates , and other exports from settlements indicate that they were made in occupied territory by listing their origin as the West Bank or Golan Heights .
Besides asking that the shuttered PLO office in Washington be allowed to operate and fly its flag again , Abbas also wants Biden to reopen the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem , which historically kept Palestinian affairs separate from the U.S. Embassy , whose priority was dealing with Israel .
On the other @ @ @ @ @ @ @ probably not reverse the decision Trump took in 2018 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel ’ s capital and transfer the U.S. Embassy there from Tel Aviv , a move long authorized by Congress .
While Palestinians are trying to keep their expectations low , Abbas reacted quickly to Biden ’ s election victory in November by sending signals he was ready to engage again with Israel .
The Palestinian leader restored coordination between his West Bank security forces and Israel ’ s military administration , which had been suspended since May .
He @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collects import and export duties at its ports on behalf of the Palestinian Authority .
In another sign that he wants to move forward , Abbas also tempered his objections to the series of normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states .
Having accused the UAE of backstabbing the Palestinians when that country ’ s peace deal with Israel was announced in August , the Palestinian leader issued no such public objection when Morocco agreed to a similar pact in December .
Netanyahu , who has a personal relationship with Biden stretching back @ @ @ @ @ @ @ shifting gears to prepare for the change in Washington and making low-key efforts to reach out to Democrats .
At the same time , the Israeli leader will inevitably clash with the new administration as he tries to retain the support of West Bank settlers in national elections likely to take place in March .
Netanyahu has also warned against Washington restoring the Iran nuclear agreement , reviving memories of his public alignment with U.S. Republicans and his protocol-breaching denunciation of Obama ’ s support for the pact before a joint session of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now , however , even the Biden team has very low expectations for breaking the Israeli-Palestinian impasse .
A peek into the incoming administration ’ s developing policy is available in a detailed report—clearly counseling a go-slow approach—that was published by the Center for a New American Security on Dec. 16 .
The co-authors include former Obama administration officials Ilan Goldenberg and Tamara Cofman Wittes , along with Michael Koplow from the left-leaning Israel Policy Forum .
“ Donald Trump ’ s administration has fundamentally undercut the U.S. role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authors write in the 69-page report .
“ But U.S. policy in the pre-Trump era , under Presidents Bill Clinton , George W. Bush , and Barack Obama , also failed to produce lasting peace , and a simple return to those policies will not succeed.
” For all the skepticism , there are new ideas for building on the changes happening in the Middle East in ways that benefit the Palestinians .
As Biden assembles his Middle East team , he will try to learn from errors of the past .
No @ @ @ @ @ @ @ John Kerry , the former U.S. secretary of state whom Biden has designated as his climate envoy .
Kerry ’ s approach has been lampooned through circulation of a 2016 video clip where Kerry insists that “ there will be no separate peace between Israel and the Arab world ” before an agreement is reached with the Palestinians .
“ Everybody needs to understand that , ” Kerry said with an air of authority that makes him look especially clueless now that four additional Arab states have made peace with Israel .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ desire to avoid going back to old routines .
“ It would be better not to fail all over again , ” said David Pollock , a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former State Department official who tracks Palestinian public opinion .
But for all the skepticism , there are new ideas for building on the changes happening in the Middle East in ways that benefit the Palestinians .
Among the opportunities explored in the Trump era that might have special appeal for Biden is a plan to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Famous for commuting daily on Amtrak between his home in Wilmington , Delaware , and his Senate office in Washington , Biden could probably get behind the plan to connect Israel ’ s Mediterranean port city of Haifa with the Saudi harbor of Dammam on the Persian Gulf .
The 1,100-mile route would traverse Jordan and include a stop in the Galilee serving Palestinians in the West Bank .
Biden may not be flying anytime soon between Riyadh and Jerusalem , but what a tableau it would make to see the U.S. president @ @ @ @ @ @ @ glorious railroad trip through the new Middle East .

Palestinians are eager to see U.S. President-elect Joe Biden take office in January, not for what he may do but what they hope he will undo. After four years in which outgoing President Donald Trump shut the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Washington, slashed hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid to refugees, recognized a divided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and told Israeli settlers that they deserve a third of the West Bank, expectations are low.
Palestinians are eager to see U.S. President-elect Joe Biden take office in January, not for what he may do but what they hope he will undo. After four years in which outgoing President Donald Trump shut the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Washington, slashed hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid to refugees, recognized a divided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and told Israeli settlers that they deserve a third of the West Bank, expectations are low.
Forget about grand gestures like former President Barack Obama’s 2009 historic speech in Cairo to strike a “new beginning” with the Muslim world, which was followed by years of fruitlessly prodding Israelis and Palestinians to embrace a two-state solution. You won’t see Biden shuttling between Riyadh and Jerusalem as Trump did in 2017 to boast about his unique abilities to engineer an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.
What Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas can hope for from the incoming Democratic administration is a will to restore balance. While Trump took his Middle East policy straight from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing playbook, he mostly ignored the 85-year-old Palestinian leader, who became persona non grata at the White House. Abbas recognizes that trying to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians is not an immediate priority for Biden, who will focus in his first year on U.S. domestic issues—above all, how to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic and recharge the economy.
In foreign policy, Biden’s intention to reenter the Iran nuclear deal—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—for stopping Iran from producing nuclear weapons, which Trump exited, will take precedence, along with addressing threats from China and Russia.
In a sign that he wants to move forward, Abbas has tempered his objections to the new Arab-Israeli peace agreements.
Prospects for making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace front are considered remote to nonexistent in 2021, especially since the lead characters haven’t changed since Obama left office. Netanyahu and Abbas detest each other, and the Trump administration’s uninhibited swing in Israel’s favor only deepened their mutual distrust. “I don’t think Palestinians are going to have a problem with the new U.S. administration as much as they’re going to have a problem with Netanyahu,” said Mkhaimar Abusada, a political scientist at Gaza’s Al-Azhar University.
But the ground has been shifting in the Middle East, creating new options for breaking what looks like a hardened stalemate. When the time comes to push further and actually try to renew Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Biden may be able to capitalize on the new willingness of Arab countries to engage with Israel, as demonstrated by the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords that have normalized the country’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Though Abbas is deeply wary of the UAE, which harbors his bitter Palestinian rival, Mohammed Dahlan, he may be more willing to respond to involvement by Saudi Arabia, which has facilitated Gulf-Israel rapprochement and has its own growing ties with Israel but has resisted signing its own normalization pact.
The list of actions that Palestinians want Biden to undo is led by Trump’s cutoff in U.S. money going to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which takes care of some 1.4 million poverty-stricken Palestinians living in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their plight has been exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19 on the Palestinian economy, which is projected to have contracted 8 percent in 2020.
Also up for reversal is the Trump administration policy that settlements are “not inconsistent with international law” and goods produced in them can be labeled as being made in Israel. The European Union requires that wine, dates, and other exports from settlements indicate that they were made in occupied territory by listing their origin as the West Bank or Golan Heights.
Besides asking that the shuttered PLO office in Washington be allowed to operate and fly its flag again, Abbas also wants Biden to reopen the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem, which historically kept Palestinian affairs separate from the U.S. Embassy, whose priority was dealing with Israel. On the other hand, Palestinians recognize that Biden will probably not reverse the decision Trump took in 2018 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and transfer the U.S. Embassy there from Tel Aviv, a move long authorized by Congress.
While Palestinians are trying to keep their expectations low, Abbas reacted quickly to Biden’s election victory in November by sending signals he was ready to engage again with Israel. The Palestinian leader restored coordination between his West Bank security forces and Israel’s military administration, which had been suspended since May. He also renewed the arrangement by which Israel collects import and export duties at its ports on behalf of the Palestinian Authority.
In another sign that he wants to move forward, Abbas also tempered his objections to the series of normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states. Having accused the UAE of backstabbing the Palestinians when that country’s peace deal with Israel was announced in August, the Palestinian leader issued no such public objection when Morocco agreed to a similar pact in December.
Netanyahu, who has a personal relationship with Biden stretching back more than 30 years, is also shifting gears to prepare for the change in Washington and making low-key efforts to reach out to Democrats. At the same time, the Israeli leader will inevitably clash with the new administration as he tries to retain the support of West Bank settlers in national elections likely to take place in March. Netanyahu has also warned against Washington restoring the Iran nuclear agreement, reviving memories of his public alignment with U.S. Republicans and his protocol-breaching denunciation of Obama’s support for the pact before a joint session of the U.S. Congress in 2015.
For now, however, even the Biden team has very low expectations for breaking the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. A peek into the incoming administration’s developing policy is available in a detailed report—clearly counseling a go-slow approach—that was published by the Center for a New American Security on Dec. 16. The co-authors include former Obama administration officials Ilan Goldenberg and Tamara Cofman Wittes, along with Michael Koplow from the left-leaning Israel Policy Forum. “Donald Trump’s administration has fundamentally undercut the U.S. role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking by taking a one-sided approach,” the authors write in the 69-page report. “But U.S. policy in the pre-Trump era, under Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, also failed to produce lasting peace, and a simple return to those policies will not succeed.”
For all the skepticism, there are new ideas for building on the changes happening in the Middle East in ways that benefit the Palestinians.
As Biden assembles his Middle East team, he will try to learn from errors of the past. No one stands for those mistakes more than John Kerry, the former U.S. secretary of state whom Biden has designated as his climate envoy. Kerry’s approach has been lampooned through circulation of a 2016 video clip where Kerry insists that “there will be no separate peace between Israel and the Arab world” before an agreement is reached with the Palestinians. “Everybody needs to understand that,” Kerry said with an air of authority that makes him look especially clueless now that four additional Arab states have made peace with Israel. The episode underlines the Biden team’s desire to avoid going back to old routines. “It would be better not to fail all over again,” said David Pollock, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former State Department official who tracks Palestinian public opinion.
But for all the skepticism, there are new ideas for building on the changes happening in the Middle East in ways that benefit the Palestinians. Among the opportunities explored in the Trump era that might have special appeal for Biden is a plan to knit the region together by rail. Famous for commuting daily on Amtrak between his home in Wilmington, Delaware, and his Senate office in Washington, Biden could probably get behind the plan to connect Israel’s Mediterranean port city of Haifa with the Saudi harbor of Dammam on the Persian Gulf. The 1,100-mile route would traverse Jordan and include a stop in the Galilee serving Palestinians in the West Bank.
Biden may not be flying anytime soon between Riyadh and Jerusalem, but what a tableau it would make to see the U.S. president riding alongside Netanyahu and Abbas on a glorious railroad trip through the new Middle East.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--How Arab Ties With Israel Became the Middle East’s New Normal

How Arab Ties With Israel Became the Middle East ’ s New Normal And yet , the normalization deals stand as the most significant breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1990s .
Already , Israel ’ s interactions with the UAE appear to be warmer than its ties with Egypt and Jordan , Arab countries that forged peace with Israel decades ago .
Thousands of Israeli tourists have visited Abu Dhabi since direct flights were inaugurated in late August .
And earlier this month , an Emirati royal bought a large stake in an Israeli soccer team ( which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ racist shunning of Arab and Muslim players ) —in the kind of high-profile investment that until recently seemed unimaginable .
For Palestinians , of course , the deals amount to more tragedy and betrayal .
In peace talks over the years , Arab normalization was held out as a prize Israel would get only once it allowed independence for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip .
Instead , Israel has gained acceptance in the region without making significant concessions in return .
( While it backtracked on imposing sovereignty over parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ believe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was never serious about annexation . )
In the political scorecard of the Middle East , Palestinians were once again the big losers .
Foreign Policy ’ s reporters and contributors covered the deals and analyzed them extensively .
Here are five of this year ’ s best stories on the topic .
One of the behind-the-scenes architects of the deal between Israel and the UAE is , ironically , a Palestinian : the former Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan .
A rival of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestinian territories almost a decade ago and has since faced corruption charges in absentia .
He makes his home in Abu Dhabi , where he acts as an advisor to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan .
In this piece , reporter Jonathan H. Ferziger profiles Dahlan and explains his motive for helping bring about the deal .
The Trump administration believes that the UAE ’ s recognition of Israel advances the cause of peace in the region .
But Kenneth M. Pollack , a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute @ @ @ @ @ @ @ antagonize the “ Axis of Resistance , ” including Iran and Hezbollah , and lead to war .
Pollack draws an analogy between the normalization deal and the Anglo-Russian Convention that preceded—and perhaps precipitated—World War I .
Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer , Colum Lynch , and Jack Detsch reconstruct U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s meetings in Khartoum earlier this year , describing his relentless pressure on Sudan to forge ties with Israel .
Rarely are reporters able to get this level of detail from closed-door meetings .
Their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ willing to lift Sudan ’ s terrorist sponsor designation only if it agreed to normalize relations with the Jewish state .
4 .
Why the United States Shouldn t Sell Jets to the UAE Following the normalization deal—or possibly as part of it—the Trump administration agreed to sell F-35 fighter planes and other advanced military hardware to the UAE .
In this piece , Samuel Ramani , a nonresident fellow at the Gulf International Forum , argues that Abu Dhabi ’ s growing relationship with Russia makes the arms deal counterproductive for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ about the UAE ’ s alleged support for Russian-backed troops in Libya .
5 .
Biden Must Reverse Course on Western Sahara The former U.S. national security advisor describes Washington ’ s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as “ yet another low ” for the Trump administration he once served .
The recognition was part of a deal to get Morocco to normalize ties with Israel , but Bolton says it breaks a “ rock-solid ” American commitment to the Sahrawis who claim the territory .
Before Trump , it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top official to turn against his own president on the pages of Foreign Policy .
Now , it ’ s practically de rigueur .

The decision by four Arab countries to forge ties with Israel in 2020 was not about peace, love, or understanding. The United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, and (to a lesser extent) Bahrain were all motivated by narrow interests—including the promise of either advanced weapons or diplomatic favors from the United States.
The decision by four Arab countries to forge ties with Israel in 2020 was not about peace, love, or understanding. The United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, and (to a lesser extent) Bahrain were all motivated by narrow interests—including the promise of either advanced weapons or diplomatic favors from the United States.
And yet, the normalization deals stand as the most significant breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1990s. Already, Israel’s interactions with the UAE appear to be warmer than its ties with Egypt and Jordan, Arab countries that forged peace with Israel decades ago. Thousands of Israeli tourists have visited Abu Dhabi since direct flights were inaugurated in late August. And earlier this month, an Emirati royal bought a large stake in an Israeli soccer team (which, perversely, is known for its racist shunning of Arab and Muslim players)—in the kind of high-profile investment that until recently seemed unimaginable.
For Palestinians, of course, the deals amount to more tragedy and betrayal. In peace talks over the years, Arab normalization was held out as a prize Israel would get only once it allowed independence for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Instead, Israel has gained acceptance in the region without making significant concessions in return. (While it backtracked on imposing sovereignty over parts of the West Bank, many analysts believe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was never serious about annexation.) In the political scorecard of the Middle East, Palestinians were once again the big losers.
Foreign Policy’s reporters and contributors covered the deals and analyzed them extensively. Here are five of this year’s best stories on the topic.
by Jonathan H. Ferziger, Oct. 30
One of the behind-the-scenes architects of the deal between Israel and the UAE is, ironically, a Palestinian: the former Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan. A rival of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Dahlan was forced to leave the Palestinian territories almost a decade ago and has since faced corruption charges in absentia. He makes his home in Abu Dhabi, where he acts as an advisor to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In this piece, reporter Jonathan H. Ferziger profiles Dahlan and explains his motive for helping bring about the deal.
by Kenneth M. Pollack, Aug. 21
The Trump administration believes that the UAE’s recognition of Israel advances the cause of peace in the region. But Kenneth M. Pollack, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, makes the opposite case—that normalization could antagonize the “Axis of Resistance,” including Iran and Hezbollah, and lead to war. Pollack draws an analogy between the normalization deal and the Anglo-Russian Convention that preceded—and perhaps precipitated—World War I.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
by Robbie Gramer, Colum Lynch, and Jack Detsch, Sept. 11
Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer, Colum Lynch, and Jack Detsch reconstruct U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s meetings in Khartoum earlier this year, describing his relentless pressure on Sudan to forge ties with Israel. Rarely are reporters able to get this level of detail from closed-door meetings. Their reporting shows that the United States was willing to lift Sudan’s terrorist sponsor designation only if it agreed to normalize relations with the Jewish state.
by Samuel Ramani, Sept. 30
Following the normalization deal—or possibly as part of it—the Trump administration agreed to sell F-35 fighter planes and other advanced military hardware to the UAE. In this piece, Samuel Ramani, a nonresident fellow at the Gulf International Forum, argues that Abu Dhabi’s growing relationship with Russia makes the arms deal counterproductive for the United States. In particular he warns about the UAE’s alleged support for Russian-backed troops in Libya.
by John Bolton, Dec. 15
The former U.S. national security advisor describes Washington’s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as “yet another low” for the Trump administration he once served. The recognition was part of a deal to get Morocco to normalize ties with Israel, but Bolton says it breaks a “rock-solid” American commitment to the Sahrawis who claim the territory. Before Trump, it would have been astonishing for a former top official to turn against his own president on the pages of Foreign Policy. Now, it’s practically de rigueur.


foreignpolicy--2020-12-21--The New Geopolitics of Energy

The New Geopolitics of Energy

The New Geopolitics of Energy In between , an oil-price collapse fueled by the coronavirus pandemic threatened new alliances and old certainties , shaking the foundations not just of a 60-year-old oil cartel but the very underpinnings of the modern economy .
In the midst of it all , China , the world ’ s worst polluter , made the biggest and perhaps most far-reaching promise of all on climate change , while India , long a laggard in cleaning up its energy sector , emerged as a surprising green champion .
It has been , to say the least @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to energy and climate change .
This spring , the world ’ s oil producers tried , and failed , to come to grips with the scale and scope of the pandemic that was just emerging .
Russia and Saudi Arabia , which had forged an unlikely partnership to rule the world ’ s energy markets , suddenly found themselves at loggerheads .
Their disagreement didn ’ t just tank oil prices , but also tanked Russia ’ s chances of rebuilding its Cold War-era influence in the region .
And then , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , China improbably took the lead on global climate diplomacy , pledging to zero out its emissions by 2060 .
Now , for the first time , the globe looks to the developing world to find solutions to a climate emergency that has only accelerated .
India , surprising many , seems to have risen to the occasion , ditching coal and embracing renewable energy .
The ball is now in U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s court .
He has pledged to curtail fossil fuel production and has embedded the fight against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the person of former Secretary of State John Kerry .
That may not mean the end of oil , but it does spell a respite from an oil-fueled energy policy .
Not that the coming transition will be neat or tidy .
Countries with coveted goods , like rare-earth minerals , will gain more influence—China , in particular .
Petrostates will shudder , then retool .
Renewable energies will reshape how—and whether—countries battle over access to energy .
The geopolitics of energy that have prevailed since that gusher burst forth in Pennsylvania @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , like the Titusville well , spent .
Here are five of our best stories this year on energy and climate change .
1 .
Russia Is Losing the Oil War—and the Middle East Earlier this year , as the pandemic threatened to take a toll on global oil demand , the OPEC oil cartel had a fatal showdown , with Saudi Arabia pressing for cuts , even as Russia was leery of giving American producers a break .
In the end , the two oil giants fell out , with disastrous consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cook laid out just how badly Russia miscalculated in this year ’ s oil-price war—and what that will mean for its long-term influence on the region .
2 .
Welcome to the Final Battle for the Climate Even as the Trump administration pulled out of the landmark Paris climate deal , China officially ramped up plans to tackle climate change , pledging to end decades of fossil fuel-powered development by 2060 .
China ’ s goals remain far off , and Western countries have done a better job so far at curbing pollutants @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s bombshell announcement about tackling emissions is such a big deal , and why that changes the calculus about bending another disturbing curve .
A few years ago , India was all-in on coal , shrugging off demands to deal with global warming .
Like China , India sought to prioritize economic growth by tapping cheap , if dirty , sources of energy .
But , due to public outcry over air pollution , as well as technological advances that have dramatically lowered the price of wind and solar power , India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy , Vivek Wadhwa wrote .
While U.S. President Donald Trump governed , and ran , on the promise of ever-more oil drilling , Democrats have been pressing for an end to the controversial practice of fracking .
President-elect Joe Biden never promised as radical a course as some of his colleagues , but he has vowed to shift America ’ s center of gravity when it comes to energy .
Biden ’ s win might mean oil ’ s days are numbered , if he can usher in some version of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
5 .
Everything You Think About the Geopolitics of Climate Change Is Wrong One of the biggest questions in the energy and climate world is how the climate fight will affect the geopolitics of energy .
For more than a century , oil and gas—and who controls them—have determined who has the upper hand in war and peace .
But a growing global consensus for clean energy , coupled with rising new oil powers , is redrawing the whole map .
The new geopolitics of energy won ’ t amount to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be a messy hybrid , playing out over decades , argued Jason Bordoff , with petrostates clinging to influence and new technologies determining who has the upper hand .

A year that began with a climate-change-denying U.S. president doing everything in his power to aggravate the climate crisis, eventually opening up an Arctic wildlife refuge to unwanted and unneeded oil drilling, ended with a president-elect who has committed to putting a green revolution at the heart of his domestic and foreign policy.
A year that began with a climate-change-denying U.S. president doing everything in his power to aggravate the climate crisis, eventually opening up an Arctic wildlife refuge to unwanted and unneeded oil drilling, ended with a president-elect who has committed to putting a green revolution at the heart of his domestic and foreign policy.
In between, an oil-price collapse fueled by the coronavirus pandemic threatened new alliances and old certainties, shaking the foundations not just of a 60-year-old oil cartel but the very underpinnings of the modern economy. In the midst of it all, China, the world’s worst polluter, made the biggest and perhaps most far-reaching promise of all on climate change, while India, long a laggard in cleaning up its energy sector, emerged as a surprising green champion.
It has been, to say the least, a revolutionary year when it comes to energy and climate change.
This spring, the world’s oil producers tried, and failed, to come to grips with the scale and scope of the pandemic that was just emerging. Russia and Saudi Arabia, which had forged an unlikely partnership to rule the world’s energy markets, suddenly found themselves at loggerheads. Their disagreement didn’t just tank oil prices, but also tanked Russia’s chances of rebuilding its Cold War-era influence in the region.
And then, stepping neatly into America’s absence, China improbably took the lead on global climate diplomacy, pledging to zero out its emissions by 2060. Now, for the first time, the globe looks to the developing world to find solutions to a climate emergency that has only accelerated. India, surprising many, seems to have risen to the occasion, ditching coal and embracing renewable energy.
The ball is now in U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s court. He has pledged to curtail fossil fuel production and has embedded the fight against climate change inside the National Security Council in the person of former Secretary of State John Kerry. That may not mean the end of oil, but it does spell a respite from an oil-fueled energy policy.
Not that the coming transition will be neat or tidy. Countries with coveted goods, like rare-earth minerals, will gain more influence—China, in particular. Petrostates will shudder, then retool. Renewable energies will reshape how—and whether—countries battle over access to energy. The geopolitics of energy that have prevailed since that gusher burst forth in Pennsylvania a century and a half ago are, like the Titusville well, spent.
Here are five of our best stories this year on energy and climate change.
by Steven A. Cook, April 9
Earlier this year, as the pandemic threatened to take a toll on global oil demand, the OPEC oil cartel had a fatal showdown, with Saudi Arabia pressing for cuts, even as Russia was leery of giving American producers a break. In the end, the two oil giants fell out, with disastrous consequences for oil producers everywhere. Steven A. Cook laid out just how badly Russia miscalculated in this year’s oil-price war—and what that will mean for its long-term influence on the region.
by Adam Tooze, Oct. 17
Even as the Trump administration pulled out of the landmark Paris climate deal, China officially ramped up plans to tackle climate change, pledging to end decades of fossil fuel-powered development by 2060. China’s goals remain far off, and Western countries have done a better job so far at curbing pollutants. But Adam Tooze explained why China’s bombshell announcement about tackling emissions is such a big deal, and why that changes the calculus about bending another disturbing curve.
by Vivek Wadhwa, Oct. 22
A few years ago, India was all-in on coal, shrugging off demands to deal with global warming. Like China, India sought to prioritize economic growth by tapping cheap, if dirty, sources of energy. But, due to public outcry over air pollution, as well as technological advances that have dramatically lowered the price of wind and solar power, India is suddenly an unlikely champion of clean energy, Vivek Wadhwa wrote.
by Edoardo Campanella, Oct. 29
While U.S. President Donald Trump governed, and ran, on the promise of ever-more oil drilling, Democrats have been pressing for an end to the controversial practice of fracking. President-elect Joe Biden never promised as radical a course as some of his colleagues, but he has vowed to shift America’s center of gravity when it comes to energy. Biden’s win might mean oil’s days are numbered, if he can usher in some version of a Green New Deal, Edoardo Campanella argued.
by Jason Bordoff, Oct. 5
One of the biggest questions in the energy and climate world is how the climate fight will affect the geopolitics of energy. For more than a century, oil and gas—and who controls them—have determined who has the upper hand in war and peace. But a growing global consensus for clean energy, coupled with rising new oil powers, is redrawing the whole map. The new geopolitics of energy won’t amount to a clear break with the past but will be a messy hybrid, playing out over decades, argued Jason Bordoff, with petrostates clinging to influence and new technologies determining who has the upper hand.