foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Can Mali Escape Its Past?

Can Mali Escape Its Past?

This week , after weeks of protests over terrorism and corruption , Mali ’ s military arrested the country ’ s prime minister , Boubou Cissé , and president , Ibrahim Boubacar Keita , who soon officially resigned his post .
In the days since , powers around the world , including France , the United Nations , United States , and the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) , have demanded the reinstatement of the elected government—even as many Malians have cheered its demise .
The international community ’ s calls are unlikely to go heeded @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unrest in the days ahead .
To help explain how the country—once considered a key example of stability and democracy in the region—got here and what may follow , we ’ ve collected our best reads from the last few years .
The timing of the military ’ s action against Keita and Cissé may have come as a surprise , but the fact that the armed forces stepped in probably should not have been .
In fact , it follows “ a similar coup in 2012 that originated from the army base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Keita and Cissé are currently being held , ” wrote the journalist Philip Obaji Jr. That coup “ toppled then-President Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants.
” After a resolution at the U.N. Security Council that followed an official request for help from Mali ’ s interim government , France intervened in an operation that helped lead in 2015 to a peace agreement between the government and northern armed groups .
The French presence has continued in some form until today , yet so has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ James Blake wrote in 2019 , Mali is populated by many different groups , all with complicated relationships .
Their grievances are “ long-standing , ” he explained , “ often relating to disputes over land and water.
” And whereas disagreements used to be quickly resolved , “ containing the fighting is getting harder and harder to do , ” particularly because jihadi groups became adept at exploiting local concerns .
In March last year , that violence seemed to enter a new phase when “ 100 armed men dressed as ethnic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in central Mali , ” Blake explained .
After killing more than 160 ethnic Fulani civilians , many homes were burned the ground .
At the time , it was “ the latest and most deadly episode in a campaign of systematic violence against Fulani herders , who are being forced to flee their land , ” and looked likely to set off counterattacks .
A month after the strike on Ogossagou , the prime minister and the government resigned .
As Leiden University ’ s Liesbeth van der Heide reported at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sign that little had improved since the start of the French intervention .
There had been scant progress on disarming rebel groups , she explained , and the “ decentralization policy ” enacted after the 2012-2015 war that “ was meant to provide communities in the north with more autonomy in the hope that inclusion in governance would prevent local groups from taking up arms ” had been ineffective and mismanaged .
“ In response , armed groups that control large swaths of territories in northern and central Mali are carving out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Such problems , she argued , wouldn ’ t go away just because one government replaced another .
She was correct .
Throughout 2019 , Mali remained on edge .
In December , reported Foreign Policy ’ s Robbie Gramer , the Trump administration was “ preparing to create a new special envoy position and task force to deal with security threats in the Sahel region of Africa , reflecting a growing alarm in Washington about the rise of extremist groups in West Africa , including ones affiliated with the Islamic State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extremist groups carried out “ increasingly deadly attacks in Mali , Niger , and Burkina Faso and spread their reach further south.
” One reason for the uptick in violence , explained the experts Jacob Zenn and Colin P. Clarke , was that an apparent truce between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in the region had fallen apart , leading to a rise in scuffles between local affiliates .
By the summer , and in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic , some kind of reckoning seemed unavoidable .
“ Too many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a third of the country ’ s workforce—have no work .
Unemployment among young people has reached almost 15 percent , up from 7 percent eight years ago before Keita took office , ” Obaji noted .
“ The country ’ s poverty rate has increased from 45 percent in 2013 to almost 50 percent today .
More Malians were displaced by insecurity in 2019 than at any time in the country ’ s history .
The health care system is in shambles , and the threat of violence has left millions of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervention , violent extremist groups—one of which kidnapped a perpetual runner-up in presidential elections—are still very active in parts of the country.
” With the Keita administration now out , observers are wary of what may follow .
“ Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians , ” Obaji wrote , “ will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit , thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented.
” Yet a military regime seems like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ France , the United States , the African Union , and ECOWAS must act to force the military to stand down , ” urged Vicki J. Huddleston , who was U.S. ambassador to Mali between 2002 and 2005 , and Witney Schneidman , a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs .
“ Once calm is restored and mediation efforts led by ECOWAS are resumed , negotiations must result in the selection of an interim president and prime minister that are acceptable to Keita ’ s party and the June @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , “ France and the United States should lead the international community in providing a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan for postwar Europe that covers Mauritania , Niger , Mali , and Burkina Faso.
” Without sustained investment along those lines , the problems that have plagued Mali for years may only intensify .

This week, after weeks of protests over terrorism and corruption, Mali’s military arrested the country’s prime minister, Boubou Cissé, and president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who soon officially resigned his post. In the days since, powers around the world, including France, the United Nations, United States, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have demanded the reinstatement of the elected government—even as many Malians have cheered its demise. The international community’s calls are unlikely to go heeded, and Mali seems set for more unrest in the days ahead.
This week, after weeks of protests over terrorism and corruption, Mali’s military arrested the country’s prime minister, Boubou Cissé, and president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who soon officially resigned his post. In the days since, powers around the world, including France, the United Nations, United States, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have demanded the reinstatement of the elected government—even as many Malians have cheered its demise. The international community’s calls are unlikely to go heeded, and Mali seems set for more unrest in the days ahead.
To help explain how the country—once considered a key example of stability and democracy in the region—got here and what may follow, we’ve collected our best reads from the last few years.
The timing of the military’s action against Keita and Cissé may have come as a surprise, but the fact that the armed forces stepped in probably should not have been. In fact, it follows “a similar coup in 2012 that originated from the army base in the town of Kati, where Keita and Cissé are currently being held,” wrote the journalist Philip Obaji Jr. That coup “toppled then-President Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist militants.” After a resolution at the U.N. Security Council that followed an official request for help from Mali’s interim government, France intervened in an operation that helped lead in 2015 to a peace agreement between the government and northern armed groups.
The French presence has continued in some form until today, yet so has the violence. As the terrorism expert James Blake wrote in 2019, Mali is populated by many different groups, all with complicated relationships. Their grievances are “long-standing,” he explained, “often relating to disputes over land and water.” And whereas disagreements used to be quickly resolved, “containing the fighting is getting harder and harder to do,” particularly because jihadi groups became adept at exploiting local concerns. In March last year, that violence seemed to enter a new phase when “100 armed men dressed as ethnic Dogon hunters stormed the village of Ogossagou in central Mali,” Blake explained. After killing more than 160 ethnic Fulani civilians, many homes were burned the ground. At the time, it was “the latest and most deadly episode in a campaign of systematic violence against Fulani herders, who are being forced to flee their land,” and looked likely to set off counterattacks.
A month after the strike on Ogossagou, the prime minister and the government resigned. As Leiden University’s Liesbeth van der Heide reported at the time, the chain of events was a sign that little had improved since the start of the French intervention. There had been scant progress on disarming rebel groups, she explained, and the “decentralization policy” enacted after the 2012-2015 war that “was meant to provide communities in the north with more autonomy in the hope that inclusion in governance would prevent local groups from taking up arms” had been ineffective and mismanaged. “In response, armed groups that control large swaths of territories in northern and central Mali are carving out a political and administrative role by force.” Such problems, she argued, wouldn’t go away just because one government replaced another.
She was correct. Throughout 2019, Mali remained on edge. In December, reported Foreign Policy’s Robbie Gramer, the Trump administration was “preparing to create a new special envoy position and task force to deal with security threats in the Sahel region of Africa, reflecting a growing alarm in Washington about the rise of extremist groups in West Africa, including ones affiliated with the Islamic State,” a measure that came as extremist groups carried out “increasingly deadly attacks in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and spread their reach further south.” One reason for the uptick in violence, explained the experts Jacob Zenn and Colin P. Clarke, was that an apparent truce between al Qaeda and the Islamic State in the region had fallen apart, leading to a rise in scuffles between local affiliates.
By the summer, and in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, some kind of reckoning seemed unavoidable. “Too many Malians—particularly the young, who make up a third of the country’s workforce—have no work. Unemployment among young people has reached almost 15 percent, up from 7 percent eight years ago before Keita took office,” Obaji noted. “The country’s poverty rate has increased from 45 percent in 2013 to almost 50 percent today. More Malians were displaced by insecurity in 2019 than at any time in the country’s history. The health care system is in shambles, and the threat of violence has left millions of kids without schools. Despite French military intervention, violent extremist groups—one of which kidnapped a perpetual runner-up in presidential elections—are still very active in parts of the country.”
With the Keita administration now out, observers are wary of what may follow. “Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians,” Obaji wrote, “will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit, thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented.” Yet a military regime seems like a bad option, too. “France, the United States, the African Union, and ECOWAS must act to force the military to stand down,” urged Vicki J. Huddleston, who was U.S. ambassador to Mali between 2002 and 2005, and Witney Schneidman, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs. “Once calm is restored and mediation efforts led by ECOWAS are resumed, negotiations must result in the selection of an interim president and prime minister that are acceptable to Keita’s party and the June 5 Movement.” Even more than that, “France and the United States should lead the international community in providing a comprehensive economic recovery plan similar to the Marshall Plan for postwar Europe that covers Mauritania, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.” Without sustained investment along those lines, the problems that have plagued Mali for years may only intensify.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Imran Khan Isn’t Going Anywhere

Imran Khan Isn’t Going Anywhere

This past April , a Pakistani columnist named Suhail Warraich boldly predicted that Prime Minister Imran Khan ’ s government could fall in June—less than two years after it took office—if it didn ’ t make major improvements .
June came and went , and the government remained in place .
But Warraich is just one of many observers speculating in recent months that Khan ’ s days as premier could be numbered as his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf ( PTI ) party confronts internal turmoil , damaging political scandals , and overwhelming public policy challenges it has struggled to fix .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ will eventually sweep away ” the government .
Others claim it already finds itself “ on the edge of collapse.
” Still others speak of the possibility of a parliamentary initiative that ousts the government and replaces it with an interim administration .
It ’ s understandable that observers are questioning Khan ’ s survivability .
No prime minister in Pakistan ’ s history has served out his or her full term—thanks mostly to a powerful military that , even when it isn ’ t ruling the country directly , is prone to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vulnerable , but the fate of his predecessors doesn ’ t doom him .
In fact , he stands a strong chance of becoming the first Pakistani premier to complete a full term—thanks to the limitations of the opposition , some personal and policy success stories , and above all a military that has his back .
To be sure , Khan is feeling the heat .
Long-standing reports of internal PTI rifts were seemingly confirmed in late June , when Science and Technology Minister Fawad Chaudhry went on television to detail arguments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Planning Minister Asad Umar , and senior PTI leader Jahangir Tareen .
Chaudhry ’ s disclosure reportedly prompted Qureshi and Umar to ask Khan to fire Chaudhry .
He did not .
These revelations of internal turmoil came amid two major scandals .
In June , Pakistan ’ s aviation minister admitted that almost one-third of the nearly 900 active pilots in Pakistan—including many with Pakistan International Airlines , the flagship national carrier—have fake licenses and aren ’ t qualified to fly .
To be sure , Khan ’ s supporters may contend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ predates his term .
But the disclosure came on the heels of a more directly damaging revelation .
In May , a government report released by the Federal Investigative Agency ’ s Sugar Inquiry Commission alleged that sugar mills owned by Tareen and several non-PTI leaders in the ruling coalition had resorted to corrupt and fraudulent practices .
The optics of these scandals would be dreadful for any political leader .
They ’ re especially problematic for Khan , who has built his political image on being a relentless anti-corruption crusader .
All @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the coronavirus pandemic and a serious economic crisis projected to bring Pakistan ’ s gross-domestic-product growth down to less than 1 percent ( compared to nearly 6 percent in 2018 , when Khan took office ) —complex policy emergencies for a ruling party that never held national power until 2018 .
Its inexperience in the face of such immense challenges has fueled perceptions of Islamabad being in over its head—indecisive and incapable of crafting effective responses , and therefore amenable to help from the military .
During a trip to Pakistan in February @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people—including die-hard PTI supporters—used the term “ incompetent ” to describe Khan ’ s handling of the economic crisis .
Even back in late 2019 , polling revealed majorities of Pakistanis describing government ministers the same way .
And yet , the policy challenges have only grown since then .
To its credit , Islamabad has sought to address the inexperience problem by appointing a large number of top-qualified special assistants .
However , several have become embroiled in controversy over the issue of dual nationality , and two resigned on July 29 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies .
In mid-June , a key coalition partner withdrew from the governing alliance .
Later in the month , another refused to attend a dinner organized by Khan to smooth out tensions within his coalition .
Khan may be down .
But despite his travails , there ’ s no reason to believe he ’ s on his way out .
Pakistan ’ s political opposition may be emboldened by Khan ’ s struggles , but it lacks the capacity and desire to mount a mass movement resulting in his ouster .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ two main opposition parties , the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz ( PML-N ) and the Pakistan Peoples Party .
Pakistani analysts offer several reasons why the opposition will be hesitant to mobilize en masse to agitate for Khan ’ s removal .
These include an unwillingness to overly antagonize a government pursuing corruption investigations against senior opposition leaders , and a preference to let Khan stay in power and struggle , so that the military—which many opposition figures believe helped bring Khan to power in the 2018 election—will recognize that it banked on the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made on July 27 by an opposition leader , Maulana Fazlur Rehman , that the opposition will soon release a strategy outlining plans to oust the government is likely more a symbolic hope than a reflection of reality .
Incidentally , Rehman led a large anti-government march into Islamabad last fall .
That protest , which failed to unite the entire opposition and only lasted two weeks , was likely driven more by a long-standing vendetta harbored by Rehman against Khan than by a strong and universal desire within the opposition to oust @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be indecisive and inexperienced , he remains the military ’ s favorite son .
In a country where the army ’ s endorsement is a virtual sine qua non for holding power , that ’ s nothing to sneeze at .
Tellingly , Khan has not resisted the army ’ s ever-increasing influence over public policy , including the domestic-policy sphere typically managed by the civilian leadership .
This is in marked contrast to what happened during the government led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N , when Sharif and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over policy that resulted in Sharif being disqualified from office by Pakistan ’ s Supreme Court in 2017 .
On one level , Khan ’ s lack of pushback against the military ’ s deepening impact on policy can be read as an acknowledgement that his government is inexperienced and can use all the help it can get at a moment when Pakistan confronts some of its most serious policy challenges in years .
His deference can also be viewed as an indication of his alignment with the military ’ s views .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ eye to eye with the armed forces on policy .
And he has made adjustments in the few areas of potential disagreement .
Khan , for example , has toned down his support for the grievances of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement , a civil society organization harshly critical of the military .
He expressed such support more emphatically prior to taking office .
Khan has further endeared himself to the military by helping improve , albeit modestly , Pakistan ’ s troubled image abroad—no small matter for a military keen to shift global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arguably the most charismatic Pakistani civilian leader since the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto .
Like Bhutto , he is well schooled in the ways of the world , and especially the West , thanks to his globe-girdling cricket-star days .
The effusive public praise he garnered from influential leaders in Washington during a visit last July most certainly went down well with the military .
So did the international media and policy analyses highlighting Khan ’ s “ conciliatory ” role during a crisis with India in February 2019 , and more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ capitals for a plan he proposed that offers debt forgiveness for developing countries during the coronavirus pandemic .
Khan ’ s performance abroad helps blunt the impact of image-damaging developments at home .
These include continued capitulations to powerful religious hard-liners that prevent more tolerant policies , and harsh crackdowns on dissent .
In June , Khan lionized one of the world ’ s most notorious terrorists , declaring that the United States “ martyred ” Osama bin Laden .
Furthermore , Khan has helped his cause at home in recent days following @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numbers of new COVID-19 cases and deaths .
Pakistan is now being hailed as a pandemic response success story by Bill Gates and U.N. officials .
Khan may be flawed , but he ’ s still the safest bet for the military .
There is no logical replacement—neither from within the PTI , a party long dominated by Khan and bereft of logical prime minister candidates , nor from within the ranks of the opposition , where there is bad blood with the military .
To be sure , the prime minister isn @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Three years remain in his term—an eternity , given the volatility of Pakistani politics .
There ’ s plenty of time for his fortunes to go south .
But for now , the military has things right where it wants them .
It wields deep influence over policy without being burdened with the responsibility of holding power directly .
And it boasts a like-minded civilian partner who is willing to defer to the generals—and who can shoulder blame when things go wrong .

This past April, a Pakistani columnist named Suhail Warraich boldly predicted that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government could fall in June—less than two years after it took office—if it didn’t make major improvements.
This past April, a Pakistani columnist named Suhail Warraich boldly predicted that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government could fall in June—less than two years after it took office—if it didn’t make major improvements.
June came and went, and the government remained in place.
But Warraich is just one of many observers speculating in recent months that Khan’s days as premier could be numbered as his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party confronts internal turmoil, damaging political scandals, and overwhelming public policy challenges it has struggled to fix.
Some believe “a political storm … will eventually sweep away” the government. Others claim it already finds itself “on the edge of collapse.” Still others speak of the possibility of a parliamentary initiative that ousts the government and replaces it with an interim administration.
It’s understandable that observers are questioning Khan’s survivability. No prime minister in Pakistan’s history has served out his or her full term—thanks mostly to a powerful military that, even when it isn’t ruling the country directly, is prone to meddling in politics.
Khan may be vulnerable, but the fate of his predecessors doesn’t doom him. In fact, he stands a strong chance of becoming the first Pakistani premier to complete a full term—thanks to the limitations of the opposition, some personal and policy success stories, and above all a military that has his back.
To be sure, Khan is feeling the heat. Long-standing reports of internal PTI rifts were seemingly confirmed in late June, when Science and Technology Minister Fawad Chaudhry went on television to detail arguments between Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Planning Minister Asad Umar, and senior PTI leader Jahangir Tareen. Chaudhry’s disclosure reportedly prompted Qureshi and Umar to ask Khan to fire Chaudhry. He did not.
These revelations of internal turmoil came amid two major scandals. In June, Pakistan’s aviation minister admitted that almost one-third of the nearly 900 active pilots in Pakistan—including many with Pakistan International Airlines, the flagship national carrier—have fake licenses and aren’t qualified to fly. To be sure, Khan’s supporters may contend this is an old problem that long predates his term. But the disclosure came on the heels of a more directly damaging revelation. In May, a government report released by the Federal Investigative Agency’s Sugar Inquiry Commission alleged that sugar mills owned by Tareen and several non-PTI leaders in the ruling coalition had resorted to corrupt and fraudulent practices.
The optics of these scandals would be dreadful for any political leader. They’re especially problematic for Khan, who has built his political image on being a relentless anti-corruption crusader.
All of this comes against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and a serious economic crisis projected to bring Pakistan’s gross-domestic-product growth down to less than 1 percent (compared to nearly 6 percent in 2018, when Khan took office)—complex policy emergencies for a ruling party that never held national power until 2018. Its inexperience in the face of such immense challenges has fueled perceptions of Islamabad being in over its head—indecisive and incapable of crafting effective responses, and therefore amenable to help from the military. During a trip to Pakistan in February, I was struck how so many people—including die-hard PTI supporters—used the term “incompetent” to describe Khan’s handling of the economic crisis. Even back in late 2019, polling revealed majorities of Pakistanis describing government ministers the same way. And yet, the policy challenges have only grown since then. To its credit, Islamabad has sought to address the inexperience problem by appointing a large number of top-qualified special assistants. However, several have become embroiled in controversy over the issue of dual nationality, and two resigned on July 29.
Ominously, the PTI is losing allies. In mid-June, a key coalition partner withdrew from the governing alliance. Later in the month, another refused to attend a dinner organized by Khan to smooth out tensions within his coalition.
Khan may be down. But despite his travails, there’s no reason to believe he’s on his way out.
Pakistan’s political opposition may be emboldened by Khan’s struggles, but it lacks the capacity and desire to mount a mass movement resulting in his ouster. It is divided—tensions are rife between the two main opposition parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party. Pakistani analysts offer several reasons why the opposition will be hesitant to mobilize en masse to agitate for Khan’s removal. These include an unwillingness to overly antagonize a government pursuing corruption investigations against senior opposition leaders, and a preference to let Khan stay in power and struggle, so that the military—which many opposition figures believe helped bring Khan to power in the 2018 election—will recognize that it banked on the wrong leader.
Accordingly, an announcement made on July 27 by an opposition leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, that the opposition will soon release a strategy outlining plans to oust the government is likely more a symbolic hope than a reflection of reality. Incidentally, Rehman led a large anti-government march into Islamabad last fall. That protest, which failed to unite the entire opposition and only lasted two weeks, was likely driven more by a long-standing vendetta harbored by Rehman against Khan than by a strong and universal desire within the opposition to oust the premier.
And while Khan may be indecisive and inexperienced, he remains the military’s favorite son. In a country where the army’s endorsement is a virtual sine qua non for holding power, that’s nothing to sneeze at. Tellingly, Khan has not resisted the army’s ever-increasing influence over public policy, including the domestic-policy sphere typically managed by the civilian leadership. This is in marked contrast to what happened during the government led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the PML-N, when Sharif and the military embarked on a collision course over policy that resulted in Sharif being disqualified from office by Pakistan’s Supreme Court in 2017.
On one level, Khan’s lack of pushback against the military’s deepening impact on policy can be read as an acknowledgement that his government is inexperienced and can use all the help it can get at a moment when Pakistan confronts some of its most serious policy challenges in years. His deference can also be viewed as an indication of his alignment with the military’s views. Khan, unlike Sharif, largely sees eye to eye with the armed forces on policy. And he has made adjustments in the few areas of potential disagreement. Khan, for example, has toned down his support for the grievances of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a civil society organization harshly critical of the military. He expressed such support more emphatically prior to taking office.
Khan has further endeared himself to the military by helping improve, albeit modestly, Pakistan’s troubled image abroad—no small matter for a military keen to shift global perceptions of the country. Khan is arguably the most charismatic Pakistani civilian leader since the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Like Bhutto, he is well schooled in the ways of the world, and especially the West, thanks to his globe-girdling cricket-star days. The effusive public praise he garnered from influential leaders in Washington during a visit last July most certainly went down well with the military. So did the international media and policy analyses highlighting Khan’s “conciliatory” role during a crisis with India in February 2019, and more recently the endorsements he received from multiple capitals for a plan he proposed that offers debt forgiveness for developing countries during the coronavirus pandemic.
Khan’s performance abroad helps blunt the impact of image-damaging developments at home. These include continued capitulations to powerful religious hard-liners that prevent more tolerant policies, and harsh crackdowns on dissent. In June, Khan lionized one of the world’s most notorious terrorists, declaring that the United States “martyred” Osama bin Laden.
Furthermore, Khan has helped his cause at home in recent days following the release of new data showing decreasing numbers of new COVID-19 cases and deaths. Pakistan is now being hailed as a pandemic response success story by Bill Gates and U.N. officials.
Khan may be flawed, but he’s still the safest bet for the military. There is no logical replacement—neither from within the PTI, a party long dominated by Khan and bereft of logical prime minister candidates, nor from within the ranks of the opposition, where there is bad blood with the military.
To be sure, the prime minister isn’t out of the woods. Three years remain in his term—an eternity, given the volatility of Pakistani politics. There’s plenty of time for his fortunes to go south.
But for now, the military has things right where it wants them. It wields deep influence over policy without being burdened with the responsibility of holding power directly. And it boasts a like-minded civilian partner who is willing to defer to the generals—and who can shoulder blame when things go wrong.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Coup Plotters in Mali Were Trained by U.S. Military

Coup Plotters in Mali Were Trained by U.S. Military The United States has halted all security assistance training and support for Malian military forces that carried out a coup in the West African country after new details emerged that the coup was orchestrated in part by military officers who received training from the U.S. military .
Col. Assimi Goita , a Malian military officer who declared himself provisional leader of the country , participated in U.S.-led military exercises and training aimed to counter extremist groups operating in the Sahel region .
“ It ’ s clear that several participants in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or assistance , ” said J. Peter Pham , the State Department ’ s special envoy for the Sahel region of West Africa , on Friday .
He stressed that the United States condemned the actions by the military officials to topple the government .
“ Until our review of both the situation on the ground and of individuals is complete , let me say categorically there is no further training or support of the Malian Armed Forces , full stop .
We have halted everything until such time as we can clarify @ @ @ @ @ @ @ this past week , could present a significant setback in U.S. and multinational efforts to roll back the militant groups , some of which are affiliated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda .
It underscores the deep-seated governance problems in the Sahel that helped lead to the rise of extremist groups .
Pham said the mutiny , which deposed Mali ’ s president and prime minister , could hinder multinational efforts to combat terrorism .
“ Let ’ s be honest , it ’ s certainly not going to help , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ our best to try to minimize any negative impact , but clearly when you have a mutiny involving a military that is part of the effort , it can not but impact the effort .
We hope not excessively , and not to the detriment of all of our shared interests in containing the threat of Islamist extremists and other violent actors in this region.
” Mali is a major hub for yearslong multinational efforts to counter terrorist groups in West Africa .
In the aftermath of a 2012 military coup in Mali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory in the country .
Despite nearly a decade of international counterterrorism operations and security assistance programs , these groups have kept their grip on parts of central Mali and spread further south into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger .
The United States and other European countries have coordinated with a patchwork of multinational organizations , including the United Nations , G-5 Sahel , and the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) to build up the capacity of Mali ’ s military to counter the growing terrorist threat .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the head of the new junta , was trained by U.S. and European forces , including U.S. Special Operations forces .
Lt. Col. Anton Semelroth , a Pentagon spokesperson , told Foreign Policy in a statement that the U.S. military is “ looking into other Malians who have participated in U.S. training and , though counter to that training , may have played a role in the recent mutiny.
” “ The act of mutiny in Mali is strongly condemned and inconsistent with U.S. military training and education , ” Semelroth added .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mali soon in an effort to reverse the coup .
While the coup leaders have given no indication they would restore the previous government , they released two senior Malian officials on Friday who were detained in the putsch , Reuters reported : Finance Minister Abdoulaye Daffe and Sabane Mahalmoudou , the president ’ s private secretary .
Experts say the extremist groups were able to easily gain much territory and support in recent years in large part by exploiting grievances of local populations disaffected by corruption and mismanagement from the Malian government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Mali came to a head on Tuesday when soldiers mutinied at an army base outside of Bamako .
The mutineers detained President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita , Prime Minister Boubou Cissé , and other government officials .
Hours later , Keita resigned and dismissed parliament on state television .
A spokesperson for the soldiers , who have christened themselves the “ National Committee for the Salvation of the People , ” called for a “ civil political transition ” to democratic general elections , the BBC reported .
The coup , which left @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , followed more than two months of demonstrations in Bamako , where thousands had taken to the streets to protest alleged corruption , the lack of economic opportunity , the government ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic , and ongoing insecurity in the country ’ s north and central regions due to an Islamist insurgency .
The protests were led by a coalition of religious and political leaders , known as the June 5 Movement , who have since expressed support for the mutineers , though their connection to the soldiers remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coup was planned .
Rida Lyammouri , an expert on conflict in the Sahel and senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South , believes the coup wasn ’ t necessarily planned over time and instead rode the momentum of civil unrest in Bamako .
Pham said that U.S. officials have been in touch with members of the new junta , but he stressed it did not mean the United States was recognizing their authority .
“ Clearly because of our interest in obtaining a restoration of constitutional order , looking @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freedom of those who ’ ve been detained , we ’ ve had to have contacts with the so-called National Committee of Salvation for the People , ” Pham said .
“ These contacts are operational , they do not imply recognition .
It ’ s an acknowledgement these people are to a certain degree in control of certain things.
” Pham also said that U.S. diplomats had been in contact with an influential Malian religious leader , Mahmoud Dicko , who was a key figure in the anti-government protests and could play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military coup-plotters transition power to interim civilian rule .
U.S. and other foreign officials “ have engaged with Imam Dicko at least to hear his views and see his perspectives and I think that ’ s certainly part of their duty to maintain contact with all relevant actors on the pol spectrum , ” Pham said .
Experts and officials said it is too soon to tell how the coup will impact the precarious security situation in the Sahel , but they said any surge in support for the coup plotters will likely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end very quickly , because there ’ s no affection for the military , there ’ s just disaffection for the civilian leaders , ” said Judd Devermont , a former senior CIA analyst on Africa now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
International bodies , including the U.N. , the African Union , and ECOWAS , have joined in the United States in condemning the coup .
Charles Michel , the president of the European Council , expressed concern that Islamist militants will use the moment to expand their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after the coup in 2012 , also at the Kati base , which ousted then-President Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist groups .
However , other experts point out the Islamist extremist groups have themselves suffered major setbacks in Mali in recent months as a result of infighting and ongoing French-led counterterrorism operations .
“ I don ’ t see extremist groups taking advantage of what ’ s occurring in Mali right now , unless different military factions in Mali started to clash , ” Lyammouri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Africa director at Human Rights Watch , is also skeptical that the coup will lead to an expansion of Islamist operations , and she said that it ’ s “ standard fare ” for international bodies to take a strong stance against unconstitutional changes .
Devermont , the former CIA analyst , cautioned that if the coup leaders hand control over to an interim civilian leader , the international community should not rush Mali into new elections , thereby repeating the same mistakes made after the country ’ s 2012 coup .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the same cast of characters back in power , and so the same problems that led to that first coup repeated themselves in that second coup in 2020 , ” he said .
“ We need to have interim civilian leadership , but there has to be a reimagining of the Malian state , to bring back public confidence in the Malian state , which is severely lacking and underpins the mess that we ’ re in .
”

The United States has halted all security assistance training and support for Malian military forces that carried out a coup in the West African country after new details emerged that the coup was orchestrated in part by military officers who received training from the U.S. military.
The United States has halted all security assistance training and support for Malian military forces that carried out a coup in the West African country after new details emerged that the coup was orchestrated in part by military officers who received training from the U.S. military.
Col. Assimi Goita, a Malian military officer who declared himself provisional leader of the country, participated in U.S.-led military exercises and training aimed to counter extremist groups operating in the Sahel region.
“It’s clear that several participants in the mutiny … have received U.S. training or assistance,” said J. Peter Pham, the State Department’s special envoy for the Sahel region of West Africa, on Friday. He stressed that the United States condemned the actions by the military officials to topple the government.
“Until our review of both the situation on the ground and of individuals is complete, let me say categorically there is no further training or support of the Malian Armed Forces, full stop. We have halted everything until such time as we can clarify the situation.”
The coup, staged this past week, could present a significant setback in U.S. and multinational efforts to roll back the militant groups, some of which are affiliated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda. It underscores the deep-seated governance problems in the Sahel that helped lead to the rise of extremist groups.
Pham said the mutiny, which deposed Mali’s president and prime minister, could hinder multinational efforts to combat terrorism. “Let’s be honest, it’s certainly not going to help,” he said. “We will do our best to try to minimize any negative impact, but clearly when you have a mutiny involving a military that is part of the effort, it cannot but impact the effort. We hope not excessively, and not to the detriment of all of our shared interests in containing the threat of Islamist extremists and other violent actors in this region.”
Mali is a major hub for yearslong multinational efforts to counter terrorist groups in West Africa. In the aftermath of a 2012 military coup in Mali, extremist groups seized large swaths of territory in the country. Despite nearly a decade of international counterterrorism operations and security assistance programs, these groups have kept their grip on parts of central Mali and spread further south into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. The United States and other European countries have coordinated with a patchwork of multinational organizations, including the United Nations, G-5 Sahel, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to build up the capacity of Mali’s military to counter the growing terrorist threat.
The Washington Post first reported that Goita, the head of the new junta, was trained by U.S. and European forces, including U.S. Special Operations forces. Lt. Col. Anton Semelroth, a Pentagon spokesperson, told Foreign Policy in a statement that the U.S. military is “looking into other Malians who have participated in U.S. training and, though counter to that training, may have played a role in the recent mutiny.”
“The act of mutiny in Mali is strongly condemned and inconsistent with U.S. military training and education,” Semelroth added.
ECOWAS representatives are expected to travel to Mali soon in an effort to reverse the coup. While the coup leaders have given no indication they would restore the previous government, they released two senior Malian officials on Friday who were detained in the putsch, Reuters reported: Finance Minister Abdoulaye Daffe and Sabane Mahalmoudou, the president’s private secretary.
Experts say the extremist groups were able to easily gain much territory and support in recent years in large part by exploiting grievances of local populations disaffected by corruption and mismanagement from the Malian government.
The latest wave of political unrest in Mali came to a head on Tuesday when soldiers mutinied at an army base outside of Bamako. The mutineers detained President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Prime Minister Boubou Cissé, and other government officials. Hours later, Keita resigned and dismissed parliament on state television. A spokesperson for the soldiers, who have christened themselves the “National Committee for the Salvation of the People,” called for a “civil political transition” to democratic general elections, the BBC reported.
The coup, which left four dead and at least 15 injured, followed more than two months of demonstrations in Bamako, where thousands had taken to the streets to protest alleged corruption, the lack of economic opportunity, the government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, and ongoing insecurity in the country’s north and central regions due to an Islamist insurgency. The protests were led by a coalition of religious and political leaders, known as the June 5 Movement, who have since expressed support for the mutineers, though their connection to the soldiers remains unclear—as does the extent to which the coup was planned.
Rida Lyammouri, an expert on conflict in the Sahel and senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, believes the coup wasn’t necessarily planned over time and instead rode the momentum of civil unrest in Bamako.
Pham said that U.S. officials have been in touch with members of the new junta, but he stressed it did not mean the United States was recognizing their authority. “Clearly because of our interest in obtaining a restoration of constitutional order, looking after the welfare, safety, and freedom of those who’ve been detained, we’ve had to have contacts with the so-called National Committee of Salvation for the People,” Pham said. “These contacts are operational, they do not imply recognition. It’s an acknowledgement these people are to a certain degree in control of certain things.”
Pham also said that U.S. diplomats had been in contact with an influential Malian religious leader, Mahmoud Dicko, who was a key figure in the anti-government protests and could play the role of a kingmaker if the military coup-plotters transition power to interim civilian rule. U.S. and other foreign officials “have engaged with Imam Dicko at least to hear his views and see his perspectives and I think that’s certainly part of their duty to maintain contact with all relevant actors on the pol spectrum,” Pham said.
Experts and officials said it is too soon to tell how the coup will impact the precarious security situation in the Sahel, but they said any surge in support for the coup plotters will likely be short-lived. “The honeymoon will end very quickly, because there’s no affection for the military, there’s just disaffection for the civilian leaders,” said Judd Devermont, a former senior CIA analyst on Africa now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
International bodies, including the U.N., the African Union, and ECOWAS, have joined in the United States in condemning the coup. Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, expressed concern that Islamist militants will use the moment to expand their reach in the country. That happened after the coup in 2012, also at the Kati base, which ousted then-President Amadou Toumani Touré and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to Islamist groups.
However, other experts point out the Islamist extremist groups have themselves suffered major setbacks in Mali in recent months as a result of infighting and ongoing French-led counterterrorism operations. “I don’t see extremist groups taking advantage of what’s occurring in Mali right now, unless different military factions in Mali started to clash,” Lyammouri said.
Corinne Dufka, the West Africa director at Human Rights Watch, is also skeptical that the coup will lead to an expansion of Islamist operations, and she said that it’s “standard fare” for international bodies to take a strong stance against unconstitutional changes.
Devermont, the former CIA analyst, cautioned that if the coup leaders hand control over to an interim civilian leader, the international community should not rush Mali into new elections, thereby repeating the same mistakes made after the country’s 2012 coup.
“In 2012 and 2013, we got the same cast of characters back in power, and so the same problems that led to that first coup repeated themselves in that second coup in 2020,” he said.
“We need to have interim civilian leadership, but there has to be a reimagining of the Malian state, to bring back public confidence in the Malian state, which is severely lacking and underpins the mess that we’re in.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--The Israel-UAE Deal Won’t Bring Peace, but It Will Prolong the War in Libya

The Israel-UAE Deal Won ’ t Bring Peace , but It Will Prolong the War in Libya For decades , the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Middle East ’ s primary geopolitical fault line .
But in recent years that has ceased to be the case as Gulf states fearful of Iran ’ s growing regional power quietly aligned with Israel , without fully normalizing ties .
The recent deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates merely made that shift official .
And although the deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , which it largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elsewhere , hardening the contemporary cold war that has gripped the region since the Arab Spring .
It is these regional tensions that make solving proxy wars so difficult , especially in Libya , where on Aug. 21 , the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord ( GNA ) announced a unilateral ceasefire .
Despite the announcement , in the absence of a true détente between the Middle East ’ s two rival blocs , there is no hope of eliminating the genuine drivers of the region ’ s many proxy conflicts .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ upper hand when it comes to media optics by casting themselves as victorious and magnanimous peacemakers .
Although the fundamental drivers of regional conflict remain unaltered , pundits across the political spectrum are correct to note the regional significance of the UAE-Israel deal sealed last week .
It is likely to shape the region ’ s future by formalizing its division into two competing blocs , with Israel ’ s integration into the region firmly on the side of a traditionalist , pro-monarchy , anti-Muslim Brotherhood bloc consisting of Egypt , Jordan , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and , to a lesser extent , Oman , Sudan , and Kuwait .
Despite having most of the economic power , this bloc is currently on the backfoot regionally to an ascendant group of governments that oppose the status quo and that support political Islam of one stripe or another .
This rival insurgent bloc is led by Turkey , Iran , and Qatar .
Despite being hailed as a “ peace deal , ” the UAE-Israel agreement will more likely prolong ongoing regional wars .
It will intensify conflict in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where the two blocs back rival actors—primarily Yemen , Libya , and Syria .
The insurgent bloc is winning in all three conflicts .
The UAE has proved that its main strategy in these conflicts is to control the policymaking of its allies .
Emirati leaders have leveraged their relationships in Riyadh and Washington over the last three years to give them or their proxies a free hand to fight in these contested zones .
Yet at the moment of their great diplomatic success , the UAE is currently stumbling militarily in all @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are the United States ’ two biggest regional allies , and for good reason .
They possess cutting-edge economies and share certain values with the West such as religious tolerance , intelligence-sharing in the global fight against terrorism , and rigorous protections of private property .
Nonetheless , both have exhibited an authoritarian turn over the last decade .
Unfortunately , instead of providing the Emiratis with tough love—which might have reoriented their regional ambitions toward consensus-building—the Trump administration has acquiesced to their dreams of regional domination .
It has taken a similar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , abandoning the traditional U.S. role of mediator between Israel and its adversaries , and instead condoning all of Netanyahu ’ s excesses when it comes to settlement expansion , the increasing militarization of Israeli foreign policy , and corrupt , discriminatory , and undemocratic domestic practices .
The local communities and militias opposed to Haftar support the U.N.-backed GNA .
This group receives tangible diplomatic assistance from Italy , Germany , the United Kingdom , and occasionally the United States .
However , those countries refused to offer the requisite military assistance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
So , from early 2020 , the Turkish government has stepped in on behalf of the insurgent regional bloc , funneling drones and Syrian mercenaries to Libya ’ s shores to protect Tripoli and defeat Haftar .
Both sides have committed atrocities , and the Turks have pushed for a maritime exclusive zone , which clearly violates international law—and Greek , Cypriot , and Egyptian maritime rights—in an attempt to turn Turkey into the Eastern Mediterranean ’ s gas exploration and export hub .
Despite Turkey ’ s aggressive regional posture , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is keeping Haftar in place and making it more difficult to reach a compromise and end Libya ’ s civil war .
The time for Haftar to exit the stage is increasingly acknowledged even by his supporters .
After he definitively lost the battle for Tripoli this spring , both Cairo and Moscow have started cultivating Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives Aguila Saleh as an alternative powerbroker for the country ’ s east .
In response , Haftar has been preparing a golden parachute for his family .
On April 24 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tracked on its way to Caracas .
It then departed for Switzerland three days later , landing in Dubai in early May .
The purpose of the trip was allegedly to exchange U.S. dollars for Venezuelan gold .
This incident immediately appeared to change the primary dynamics at play in U.S. Libya policy .
Since President Donald Trump ’ s inauguration in 2017 , U.S. policymaking on Libya has been bifurcated—used by top administration grandees as a way to appease the UAE , Egypt , and Saudi Arabia , while it has been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ key arena to combat Russian influence and coordinate with NATO allies and the U.N .
When Haftar double-crossed the Trump administration by violating the U.S. Treasury ’ s Venezuelan sanctions , this long-standing split in U.S. Libya policy seemed to momentarily disappear .
During a brief period of about three months , the U.S. government spearheaded negotiations to lift Libya ’ s oil blockade ( imposed by the UAE , Russia , and Haftar ’ s tribal allies , who demand a greater share of oil revenue ) , coordinated with Turkey to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , called out Haftar ’ s forces for human rights violations , and engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two main factions .
The agreement between the UAE and Israel will likely bring an abrupt end to the gradual and beneficial convergence of White House and State Department-Pentagon views on Libya , and , with it , Washington ’ s potentially stabilizing role .
However , last week ’ s agreement between the UAE and Israel will likely bring an abrupt end to this gradual and beneficial convergence of White House and State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with it , Washington ’ s potentially stabilizing role .
Sadly , the United States appears to be returning to the bad old days where the White House ’ s engagement in Libya ( with senior advisor Jared Kushner in the lead ) was at the beck and call of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed .
Key administration figures , especially Secretary of State Mike Pompeo , remain incensed at Haftar ’ s helping their enemy in Caracas , yet appeasing the UAE is now overriding those emotions .
At a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to poor handling of the coronavirus pandemic and myriad scandals , the UAE-Israel deal helps Netanyahu and Trump with their domestic electoral problems .
It does no such thing for the rulers of the UAE , however ; in fact , it marginally hurts their domestic popularity .
Nonetheless , the Emiratis handed Netanyahu and Trump the top foreign-policy achievements of their current terms—clearly in exchange for geopolitical gains elsewhere .
The UAE-Israel agreement is extremely controversial in the Arab world because it can be understood as an abandonment of the Palestinians—hence the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allies in Sudan and Saudi Arabia to distance themselves .
This increases the extent to which Trump and Kushner are beholden to the Emirati leadership for helping deliver them a much-needed media boost .
As a result , the White House will now be unlikely to criticize the UAE ’ s role in Libya—let alone in Syria , Egypt , East Africa , or Yemen .
Even under a new U.S. administration if Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins in November , the overly optimistic view that the agreement may eventually encourage other Arab @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prevent annexation of parts of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories will mitigate any potential criticism of the UAE ’ s otherwise aggressive and polarizing regional role .
In Libya , the UAE will likely continue to block oil production—damaging Libya ’ s economy—and continue to support the ongoing military intervention by Egypt or Russia .
In short , the deal will implicitly force the United States to pull back from its mediating role in Libya , further hardening the region ’ s division into two blocs .
Trump and Kushner appear to have finally @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in exchange for a domestic victory .
Given that presidential engagement is likely off the table until at least January 2021 , when a new U.S. presidential term begins , one avenue for the U.S. government to continue pushing for peace in Libya is via the Libya Stabilization Act .
The bipartisan legislation mandates that the administration impose sanctions on countries interfering in the Libyan crisis , as well as smugglers and violators of human rights .
It would likely not be able to be used for sanctions against the Emiratis , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ teeming with the UAE ’ s supporters .
In its current form , the act names only Russia and Turkey and would potentially allow for sanctions against Egypt , which has recently threatened direct military action in Libya .
Nonetheless , it would be a stark reminder of Congress ’ s role in pushing back against a Trump foreign policy that elevates its relationship with the UAE over international law .
If a new administration that is more amenable to imposing sanctions takes office , such a move could help stem Libya ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those suffering in Libya .
U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders must wake up to the hardening regional divisions in the Middle East that have replaced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict , and seek to prevent—rather than exacerbate—the suffering those divisions are causing in Libya and elsewhere .

For decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Middle East’s primary geopolitical fault line. But in recent years that has ceased to be the case as Gulf states fearful of Iran’s growing regional power quietly aligned with Israel, without fully normalizing ties. The recent deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates merely made that shift official. And although the deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it largely sidesteps, it will have profound impacts elsewhere, hardening the contemporary cold war that has gripped the region since the Arab Spring.
For decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Middle East’s primary geopolitical fault line. But in recent years that has ceased to be the case as Gulf states fearful of Iran’s growing regional power quietly aligned with Israel, without fully normalizing ties. The recent deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates merely made that shift official. And although the deal might not have much impact on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it largely sidesteps, it will have profound impacts elsewhere, hardening the contemporary cold war that has gripped the region since the Arab Spring.
It is these regional tensions that make solving proxy wars so difficult, especially in Libya, where on Aug. 21, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) announced a unilateral ceasefire. Despite the announcement, in the absence of a true détente between the Middle East’s two rival blocs, there is no hope of eliminating the genuine drivers of the region’s many proxy conflicts. The GNA is simply trying to regain the upper hand when it comes to media optics by casting themselves as victorious and magnanimous peacemakers.
Although the fundamental drivers of regional conflict remain unaltered, pundits across the political spectrum are correct to note the regional significance of the UAE-Israel deal sealed last week. It is likely to shape the region’s future by formalizing its division into two competing blocs, with Israel’s integration into the region firmly on the side of a traditionalist, pro-monarchy, anti-Muslim Brotherhood bloc consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, Oman, Sudan, and Kuwait. Despite having most of the economic power, this bloc is currently on the backfoot regionally to an ascendant group of governments that oppose the status quo and that support political Islam of one stripe or another. This rival insurgent bloc is led by Turkey, Iran, and Qatar.
Despite being hailed as a “peace deal,” the UAE-Israel agreement will more likely prolong ongoing regional wars. It will intensify conflict in those contested zones of the Middle East where the two blocs back rival actors—primarily Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The insurgent bloc is winning in all three conflicts.
The UAE has proved that its main strategy in these conflicts is to control the policymaking of its allies. Emirati leaders have leveraged their relationships in Riyadh and Washington over the last three years to give them or their proxies a free hand to fight in these contested zones. Yet at the moment of their great diplomatic success, the UAE is currently stumbling militarily in all three theaters.
The UAE and Israel are the United States’ two biggest regional allies, and for good reason. They possess cutting-edge economies and share certain values with the West such as religious tolerance, intelligence-sharing in the global fight against terrorism, and rigorous protections of private property. Nonetheless, both have exhibited an authoritarian turn over the last decade. Unfortunately, instead of providing the Emiratis with tough love—which might have reoriented their regional ambitions toward consensus-building—the Trump administration has acquiesced to their dreams of regional domination.
It has taken a similar approach toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, abandoning the traditional U.S. role of mediator between Israel and its adversaries, and instead condoning all of Netanyahu’s excesses when it comes to settlement expansion, the increasing militarization of Israeli foreign policy, and corrupt, discriminatory, and undemocratic domestic practices.
Over the past nine years, Libya has served as a key battleground between the region’s two blocs. Foreign support to competing internal groups has largely come in the form of weapons, despite a United Nations resolution forbidding such arms transfers. Leaders of the traditionalist bloc, along with Russia, send support to the rogue Libyan general Khalifa Haftar, who commands the so-called Libyan National Army based in the east.
The local communities and militias opposed to Haftar support the U.N.-backed GNA. This group receives tangible diplomatic assistance from Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and occasionally the United States. However, those countries refused to offer the requisite military assistance when Tripoli was under attack in 2019.
So, from early 2020, the Turkish government has stepped in on behalf of the insurgent regional bloc, funneling drones and Syrian mercenaries to Libya’s shores to protect Tripoli and defeat Haftar. Both sides have committed atrocities, and the Turks have pushed for a maritime exclusive zone, which clearly violates international law—and Greek, Cypriot, and Egyptian maritime rights—in an attempt to turn Turkey into the Eastern Mediterranean’s gas exploration and export hub. Despite Turkey’s aggressive regional posture, it is Russian and Emirati maximalism that is keeping Haftar in place and making it more difficult to reach a compromise and end Libya’s civil war.
The time for Haftar to exit the stage is increasingly acknowledged even by his supporters. After he definitively lost the battle for Tripoli this spring, both Cairo and Moscow have started cultivating Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives Aguila Saleh as an alternative powerbroker for the country’s east. In response, Haftar has been preparing a golden parachute for his family. On April 24, Haftar’s private jet was tracked on its way to Caracas. It then departed for Switzerland three days later, landing in Dubai in early May. The purpose of the trip was allegedly to exchange U.S. dollars for Venezuelan gold.
This incident immediately appeared to change the primary dynamics at play in U.S. Libya policy. Since President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2017, U.S. policymaking on Libya has been bifurcated—used by top administration grandees as a way to appease the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, while it has been seen by professional civil servants as a key arena to combat Russian influence and coordinate with NATO allies and the U.N.
When Haftar double-crossed the Trump administration by violating the U.S. Treasury’s Venezuelan sanctions, this long-standing split in U.S. Libya policy seemed to momentarily disappear. During a brief period of about three months, the U.S. government spearheaded negotiations to lift Libya’s oil blockade (imposed by the UAE, Russia, and Haftar’s tribal allies, who demand a greater share of oil revenue), coordinated with Turkey to cement the GNA’s territorial gains, called out Haftar’s forces for human rights violations, and engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two main factions.
The agreement between the UAE and Israel will likely bring an abrupt end to the gradual and beneficial convergence of White House and State Department-Pentagon views on Libya, and, with it, Washington’s potentially stabilizing role.
However, last week’s agreement between the UAE and Israel will likely bring an abrupt end to this gradual and beneficial convergence of White House and State Department-Pentagon views on Libya, and, with it, Washington’s potentially stabilizing role.
Sadly, the United States appears to be returning to the bad old days where the White House’s engagement in Libya (with senior advisor Jared Kushner in the lead) was at the beck and call of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. Key administration figures, especially Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, remain incensed at Haftar’s helping their enemy in Caracas, yet appeasing the UAE is now overriding those emotions.
At a time when their popularity was tanking due to poor handling of the coronavirus pandemic and myriad scandals, the UAE-Israel deal helps Netanyahu and Trump with their domestic electoral problems. It does no such thing for the rulers of the UAE, however; in fact, it marginally hurts their domestic popularity. Nonetheless, the Emiratis handed Netanyahu and Trump the top foreign-policy achievements of their current terms—clearly in exchange for geopolitical gains elsewhere.
The UAE-Israel agreement is extremely controversial in the Arab world because it can be understood as an abandonment of the Palestinians—hence the recent decisions of the UAE’s allies in Sudan and Saudi Arabia to distance themselves. This increases the extent to which Trump and Kushner are beholden to the Emirati leadership for helping deliver them a much-needed media boost. As a result, the White House will now be unlikely to criticize the UAE’s role in Libya—let alone in Syria, Egypt, East Africa, or Yemen.
Even under a new U.S. administration if Democratic nominee Joe Biden wins in November, the overly optimistic view that the agreement may eventually encourage other Arab countries to restore relations with Israel and prevent annexation of parts of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories will mitigate any potential criticism of the UAE’s otherwise aggressive and polarizing regional role. In Libya, the UAE will likely continue to block oil production—damaging Libya’s economy—and continue to support the ongoing military intervention by Egypt or Russia.
In short, the deal will implicitly force the United States to pull back from its mediating role in Libya, further hardening the region’s division into two blocs. Trump and Kushner appear to have finally sold the Libya file to Abu Dhabi in exchange for a domestic victory.
Given that presidential engagement is likely off the table until at least January 2021, when a new U.S. presidential term begins, one avenue for the U.S. government to continue pushing for peace in Libya is via the Libya Stabilization Act. The bipartisan legislation mandates that the administration impose sanctions on countries interfering in the Libyan crisis, as well as smugglers and violators of human rights. It would likely not be able to be used for sanctions against the Emiratis, as Washington think tanks and Congress itself are teeming with the UAE’s supporters.
In its current form, the act names only Russia and Turkey and would potentially allow for sanctions against Egypt, which has recently threatened direct military action in Libya. Nonetheless, it would be a stark reminder of Congress’s role in pushing back against a Trump foreign policy that elevates its relationship with the UAE over international law.
If a new administration that is more amenable to imposing sanctions takes office, such a move could help stem Libya’s proxy war and bring relief to those suffering in Libya. U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders must wake up to the hardening regional divisions in the Middle East that have replaced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and seek to prevent—rather than exacerbate—the suffering those divisions are causing in Libya and elsewhere.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Why I, an Anti-Trump Republican, Didn’t Sign the Anti-Trump Letter

Why I , an Anti-Trump Republican , Didn ’ t Sign the Anti-Trump Letter In 2016 , I signed two high-profile public letters , in which senior national security professionals from various Republican administrations declared their opposition to a Donald Trump presidency ( see here and here ) .
I also organized a third anti-Trump letter signed by the country ’ s leading specialists in civil-military relations .
I do not regret signing those letters .
Trump ’ s destructive performance in office has entirely validated the concerns they raised .
There is now a similar letter endorsing former Vice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by some 70 former Republican colleagues , many from the ranks of the 2016 signatories .
Once again , I agree with its most important fundamental claim : It is not in the U.S. national interest for Trump to be given a second term .
It is time for the country to move on .
Yet this time , I did not sign .
These letters are a double-edged sword .
On the one hand , it can be helpful for voters to hear how specialists who have devoted their professional lives to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a candidate to manage global problems .
It is a striking fact that so many experienced professionals , even if they disagree on other issues , nevertheless come to the same conclusion : Trump was not fit to be president in 2016 and is still not fit in 2020 .
The letter makes the case against reelecting Trump , but it does not help the Republican Party prepare for the struggles that will come after Trump is defeated .
But the 2020 letter has an unavoidable , if unintended , downside : It @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what the United States needs the day after a possible Biden victory : a healthy opposition party .
The Republican Party will need a reboot , a fresh start , a post-Trumpist identity—one that is anchored in those aspects of the conservative worldview that have produced the greatest successes of previous Republican presidents and is not tethered to the fiasco of the past four years .
As president , Biden would be under enormous pressure from his own extreme-left flank to veer into new ditches .
A principled opposition party engaged in constructive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The 2020 letter ably makes the case against reelecting Trump , but it does not help the Republican Party prepare for the struggles that will come after Trump is defeated .
The letter may hobble Trump on the margins , but it may even more significantly hobble the influence of the signatories—some of the ablest Republican national security practitioners—on the forthcoming intraparty fight over the future direction of a post-Trump Republican Party .
Some may be writing themselves out of this fight intentionally , having given up on a party that could @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just accept it as an unavoidable consequence of coming out so publicly against their party ’ s standard bearer .
But Republicans will need strong figures working within the party to prevent a Trumpist restoration after a Biden victory , and I fear the people who signed the letters will start well on the sidelines of that fight .
Keeping their powder dry for what comes next may be the precise reason why many of the heavyweights from previous Republican administrations—former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice , former National Security Advisor Stephen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gates , and others—did not sign , even as they have conspicuously refused to endorse Trump so far .
Probably every signatory to the 2020 letter would argue that defeating Trump is the higher priority—indeed the necessary precursor of any post-Trump repair work in the party—and it is therefore incumbent on everyone to do whatever he or she can to ensure a Trump defeat .
This assumes these letters undermine Trump ’ s electoral prospects and do so without incurring other unintended costs .
Yet the record from 2016 is ambiguous on both @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was able to recast the criticism he received from so many who had served in previous Republican administrations as further proof that he was the anti-establishment candidate .
For the slice of the electorate that blamed both establishment Republicans and establishment Democrats for all their ills , the denunciations from establishment figures were tantamount to praising Trump with faint damns .
Several senior figures in the Trump 2016 campaign subsequently told me that the campaign saw the letters as a net plus : a major boon for fundraising , a minor benefit for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of an impact on voters already committed to voting against Trump .
Whereas the 2016 letters may not have had much impact on voters , they likely did further hobble the administration once Trump defied the odds and won .
At that point , he had to staff up an entire administration—without relevant experience of his own , without a capable national security advisory team from his campaign , without any serious transition planning before the election , and while disrupting the transition effort after the election .
The letters further complicated this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump access to the very pool of talent on which he needed to draw .
If Trump wins reelection , his talent pool will be roughly as shallow in 2021 as it was in 2017 .
In this , a hashtag is partly to blame .
The 2016 letters were explicit arguments to vote against Trump in the election , but someone branded them as # NeverTrump .
There is a big difference between “ not Trump ” and “ never Trump , ” as I explained shortly after the first letter was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not believing Trump to be qualified to be president , and not voting for him to become commander in chief .
“ Never Trump ” meant not even helping him if he does win .
All of the letter-signers in 2016 knew that their signatures would make them almost unemployable if Trump won .
But in my experience , most of them nonetheless believed that they had a patriotic duty to try to help the new president , whoever he or she would be , once the election was over .
And many @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to help the incoming Trump administration—even if only from the sidelines .
I , for one , informally consulted with numerous Trump appointees and did what I could to help them during an exceptionally chaotic time .
However , the letters had made an already tricky assignment even more difficult .
If Trump wins reelection , his talent pool will be roughly as shallow in 2021 as it was in 2017 .
He has not won over new converts .
Most of the people I have talked to who went to work for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that experience determined not to work for him again and warning others of the toll .
I am glad that there will at least be some qualified experts who signed neither the 2016 letters nor the 2020 letters who could form the kernel of a trustworthy team for a second Trump term , should that prove necessary .
My signatures under the 2016 letters preclude me from serving in a possible second term .
But I look forward to the vital challenge of what the Republican Party needs to do in case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Republican voice on national security .
It is this challenge that has my name on it .

In 2016, I signed two high-profile public letters, in which senior national security professionals from various Republican administrations declared their opposition to a Donald Trump presidency (see here and here ). I also organized a third anti-Trump letter signed by the country’s leading specialists in civil-military relations. I do not regret signing those letters. Trump’s destructive performance in office has entirely validated the concerns they raised.
In 2016, I signed two high-profile public letters, in which senior national security professionals from various Republican administrations declared their opposition to a Donald Trump presidency (see here and here). I also organized a third anti-Trump letter signed by the country’s leading specialists in civil-military relations. I do not regret signing those letters. Trump’s destructive performance in office has entirely validated the concerns they raised.
There is now a similar letter endorsing former Vice President Joe Biden for president, signed by some 70 former Republican colleagues, many from the ranks of the 2016 signatories. Once again, I agree with its most important fundamental claim: It is not in the U.S. national interest for Trump to be given a second term. It is time for the country to move on.
Yet this time, I did not sign.
These letters are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can be helpful for voters to hear how specialists who have devoted their professional lives to the United States assess the ability of a candidate to manage global problems. It is a striking fact that so many experienced professionals, even if they disagree on other issues, nevertheless come to the same conclusion: Trump was not fit to be president in 2016 and is still not fit in 2020.
The letter makes the case against reelecting Trump, but it does not help the Republican Party prepare for the struggles that will come after Trump is defeated.
But the 2020 letter has an unavoidable, if unintended, downside: It does not position the country well for what the United States needs the day after a possible Biden victory: a healthy opposition party. The Republican Party will need a reboot, a fresh start, a post-Trumpist identity—one that is anchored in those aspects of the conservative worldview that have produced the greatest successes of previous Republican presidents and is not tethered to the fiasco of the past four years. As president, Biden would be under enormous pressure from his own extreme-left flank to veer into new ditches. A principled opposition party engaged in constructive debate could help him avoid those mistakes.
The 2020 letter ably makes the case against reelecting Trump, but it does not help the Republican Party prepare for the struggles that will come after Trump is defeated. The letter may hobble Trump on the margins, but it may even more significantly hobble the influence of the signatories—some of the ablest Republican national security practitioners—on the forthcoming intraparty fight over the future direction of a post-Trump Republican Party. Some may be writing themselves out of this fight intentionally, having given up on a party that could nominate someone such as Trump. Others just accept it as an unavoidable consequence of coming out so publicly against their party’s standard bearer. But Republicans will need strong figures working within the party to prevent a Trumpist restoration after a Biden victory, and I fear the people who signed the letters will start well on the sidelines of that fight.
Keeping their powder dry for what comes next may be the precise reason why many of the heavyweights from previous Republican administrations—former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and others—did not sign, even as they have conspicuously refused to endorse Trump so far.
Probably every signatory to the 2020 letter would argue that defeating Trump is the higher priority—indeed the necessary precursor of any post-Trump repair work in the party—and it is therefore incumbent on everyone to do whatever he or she can to ensure a Trump defeat.
This assumes these letters undermine Trump’s electoral prospects and do so without incurring other unintended costs. Yet the record from 2016 is ambiguous on both points. As a candidate, Trump was able to recast the criticism he received from so many who had served in previous Republican administrations as further proof that he was the anti-establishment candidate. For the slice of the electorate that blamed both establishment Republicans and establishment Democrats for all their ills, the denunciations from establishment figures were tantamount to praising Trump with faint damns. Several senior figures in the Trump 2016 campaign subsequently told me that the campaign saw the letters as a net plus: a major boon for fundraising, a minor benefit for winning populist voters, and not much of an impact on voters already committed to voting against Trump.
Whereas the 2016 letters may not have had much impact on voters, they likely did further hobble the administration once Trump defied the odds and won. At that point, he had to staff up an entire administration—without relevant experience of his own, without a capable national security advisory team from his campaign, without any serious transition planning before the election, and while disrupting the transition effort after the election. The letters further complicated this difficult transition because they appeared to deny Trump access to the very pool of talent on which he needed to draw.
If Trump wins reelection, his talent pool will be roughly as shallow in 2021 as it was in 2017.
In this, a hashtag is partly to blame. The 2016 letters were explicit arguments to vote against Trump in the election, but someone branded them as #NeverTrump. There is a big difference between “not Trump” and “never Trump,” as I explained shortly after the first letter was circulated. “Not Trump” meant not believing Trump to be qualified to be president, and not voting for him to become commander in chief. “Never Trump” meant not even helping him if he does win.
All of the letter-signers in 2016 knew that their signatures would make them almost unemployable if Trump won. But in my experience, most of them nonetheless believed that they had a patriotic duty to try to help the new president, whoever he or she would be, once the election was over. And many of the signatories did what they could to help the incoming Trump administration—even if only from the sidelines. I, for one, informally consulted with numerous Trump appointees and did what I could to help them during an exceptionally chaotic time. However, the letters had made an already tricky assignment even more difficult.
If Trump wins reelection, his talent pool will be roughly as shallow in 2021 as it was in 2017. He has not won over new converts. Most of the people I have talked to who went to work for him on national security came out of that experience determined not to work for him again and warning others of the toll. I am glad that there will at least be some qualified experts who signed neither the 2016 letters nor the 2020 letters who could form the kernel of a trustworthy team for a second Trump term, should that prove necessary.
My signatures under the 2016 letters preclude me from serving in a possible second term. But I look forward to the vital challenge of what the Republican Party needs to do in case of a Biden win: to repair the Republican voice on national security. It is this challenge that has my name on it.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-21--Some Germans Will Be Happy to See U.S. Troops Leave

Some Germans Will Be Happy to See U.S .
Troops Leave STUTTGART , Germany—President Donald Trump ’ s decision last month to cut the U.S. deployment in Germany by nearly 12,000 troops angered many Germans , who viewed it as petty score-settling by Washington that could harm local businesses operating near U.S. bases .
But a few Germans will be happy to see the Americans leave .
In left-wing circles , some political figures and activists say the U.S. bases on German soil , including U.S. Africa Command—known by its acronym Africom—in Stuttgart , have made Germany complicit in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that have killed not just militants but many civilians .
“ It ’ s good that Africom is leaving , ” said one of those politicians , Tobias Pflüger , a parliament member from the left-wing Die Linke party .
“ Germany should not be involved with such crimes .
Considering what is happening in Somalia , it ’ s more than cynical how some are worried about the withdrawal ’ s economic impacts , ” he told Foreign Policy .
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced in late July that the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Italy , reducing the American troop presence in Germany from 36,000 to 24,000 .
The redeployment is expected to take months to implement , with 6,400 troops returning to the United States and the rest remaining in Europe .
Though Esper described it as part of a broader rethinking of U.S. deployments , Trump made clear it was driven by his own long-standing grievances , including that Germany isn ’ t spending enough on its own defense .
“ We don ’ t want to be the suckers anymore , ” he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The United States has maintained troops in Germany since in the end of World War II , in part to protect Europe from then-Soviet—and now Russian—aggression .
Criticism of U.S. airstrikes coordinated from German soil is not new here .
In 2013 , investigative journalists from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and NDR reported in detail on Africom airstrikes that killed Somali civilians .
The reports said every U.S. drone operation in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa is planned inside Kelley Barracks , home to Africom ’ s headquarters .
The journalists also pointed out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ host Africom , Germany welcomed the deployment in 2007 .
“ I think it ’ s good that they are leaving now .
They are involved in a very dirty war that targets and extralegally executes civilians since the so-called war on terror started , ” said Sulaiman Khan , a human rights activist from Stuttgart .
He said Somalis fleeing the war sometimes end up as refugees in Stuttgart .
Attacks on Somalia have risen sharply during Trump ’ s term .
In the first seven months of 2020 , the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Somalia , according to the U.S. Defense Department ’ s own numbers .
That ’ s one more than all the airstrikes the United States conducted against Somalia from 2007 to 2017—the decade after Africom ’ s establishment .
The target of those airstrikes is usually al-Shabab , a militant Somali group with ties to al Qaeda .
But many civilians have been killed as well .
At the end of July , a drone strike reportedly killed at least three Somali children in the city of Jilib .
While local journalists reported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ them as “ terrorists.
” An Africom spokesperson did not respond to multiple queries for this story .
According to Amnesty International , at least 32 civilians were killed or injured by drone strikes in Somalia during the last three years .
To this day , not a single victim has been compensated by the U.S. military .
In the past 13 years , the number might be as high as 145 civilians , according to data collected by Airwars .
Many drone strikes take place in remote areas where access to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ result , the real numbers could be even higher .
For Germans who benefit from their proximity to U.S. bases , the humanitarian issue is often trumped by economic concerns .
“ The troops are my best customers , ” said Shawkat Hussain , who runs a Syrian-Pakistani restaurant close to a U.S. military base in Stuttgart .
“ I am not a fan of American foreign policy but the departure is not good for my business.
” Many local politicians are unhappy as well .
“ It ’ s a decision against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the president of the federal state of Bavaria .
“ With this decision , the Trump administration dissolves a decade-long cooperation … by conducting a punitive action against an ally and without consent of Congress , ” Fritz Kuhn , the mayor of the city of Stuttgart , said in a statement .
But Pflüger , the left-wing parliament member , said he was looking forward to more redeployments .
“ We don ’ t need a relocation of the headquarters but a total dissolution , and it must include Ramstein Air Base @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ramstein is the Pentagon ’ s largest air base outside of the United States .
Whistleblowers cited in the Drone Papers in 2015 described it as the heart of U.S. drone warfare .
Without the relay station there , drone operators inside the United States would be unable to communicate with the unmanned vehicles in Somalia , Afghanistan , Syria , and elsewhere .
“ It ’ s vital to understand that civilians have no access to justice over U.S. lethal force , ” Khalil Dewan , an investigator with the London-based law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Dewan focuses on drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen at the firm .
“ Families of the dead are yet to receive compensation , let alone an explanation or apology , ” he said .

STUTTGART, Germany—President Donald Trump’s decision last month to cut the U.S. deployment in Germany by nearly 12,000 troops angered many Germans, who viewed it as petty score-settling by Washington that could harm local businesses operating near U.S. bases.
STUTTGART, Germany—President Donald Trump’s decision last month to cut the U.S. deployment in Germany by nearly 12,000 troops angered many Germans, who viewed it as petty score-settling by Washington that could harm local businesses operating near U.S. bases.
But a few Germans will be happy to see the Americans leave.
In left-wing circles, some political figures and activists say the U.S. bases on German soil, including U.S. Africa Command—known by its acronym Africom—in Stuttgart, have made Germany complicit in the U.S. drone wars in Africa and elsewhere that have killed not just militants but many civilians.
“It’s good that Africom is leaving,” said one of those politicians, Tobias Pflüger, a parliament member from the left-wing Die Linke party.
“Germany should not be involved with such crimes. Considering what is happening in Somalia, it’s more than cynical how some are worried about the withdrawal’s economic impacts,” he told Foreign Policy.
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced in late July that the United States would relocate some units to Belgium and Italy, reducing the American troop presence in Germany from 36,000 to 24,000. The redeployment is expected to take months to implement, with 6,400 troops returning to the United States and the rest remaining in Europe.
Though Esper described it as part of a broader rethinking of U.S. deployments, Trump made clear it was driven by his own long-standing grievances, including that Germany isn’t spending enough on its own defense. “We don’t want to be the suckers anymore,” he said at a White House briefing.
The United States has maintained troops in Germany since in the end of World War II, in part to protect Europe from then-Soviet—and now Russian—aggression.
Criticism of U.S. airstrikes coordinated from German soil is not new here. In 2013, investigative journalists from the Süddeutsche Zeitung and NDR reported in detail on Africom airstrikes that killed Somali civilians. The reports said every U.S. drone operation in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa is planned inside Kelley Barracks, home to Africom’s headquarters. The journalists also pointed out that while other European countries refused to host Africom, Germany welcomed the deployment in 2007.
“I think it’s good that they are leaving now. They are involved in a very dirty war that targets and extralegally executes civilians since the so-called war on terror started,” said Sulaiman Khan, a human rights activist from Stuttgart.
He said Somalis fleeing the war sometimes end up as refugees in Stuttgart.
Attacks on Somalia have risen sharply during Trump’s term. In the first seven months of 2020, the United States conducted at least 43 airstrikes in Somalia, according to the U.S. Defense Department’s own numbers. That’s one more than all the airstrikes the United States conducted against Somalia from 2007 to 2017—the decade after Africom’s establishment.
The target of those airstrikes is usually al-Shabab, a militant Somali group with ties to al Qaeda. But many civilians have been killed as well. At the end of July, a drone strike reportedly killed at least three Somali children in the city of Jilib. While local journalists reported details about the victims, Africom dismissed them as “terrorists.”
An Africom spokesperson did not respond to multiple queries for this story.
According to Amnesty International, at least 32 civilians were killed or injured by drone strikes in Somalia during the last three years. To this day, not a single victim has been compensated by the U.S. military. In the past 13 years, the number might be as high as 145 civilians, according to data collected by Airwars. Many drone strikes take place in remote areas where access to the outside world is limited. As a result, the real numbers could be even higher.
For Germans who benefit from their proximity to U.S. bases, the humanitarian issue is often trumped by economic concerns. “The troops are my best customers,” said Shawkat Hussain, who runs a Syrian-Pakistani restaurant close to a U.S. military base in Stuttgart. “I am not a fan of American foreign policy but the departure is not good for my business.”
Many local politicians are unhappy as well. “It’s a decision against Germany,” said Markus Söder, the president of the federal state of Bavaria.
“With this decision, the Trump administration dissolves a decade-long cooperation … by conducting a punitive action against an ally and without consent of Congress,” Fritz Kuhn, the mayor of the city of Stuttgart, said in a statement.
But Pflüger, the left-wing parliament member, said he was looking forward to more redeployments. “We don’t need a relocation of the headquarters but a total dissolution, and it must include Ramstein Air Base, too,” he said.
Ramstein is the Pentagon’s largest air base outside of the United States. Whistleblowers cited in the Drone Papers in 2015 described it as the heart of U.S. drone warfare. Without the relay station there, drone operators inside the United States would be unable to communicate with the unmanned vehicles in Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere.
“It’s vital to understand that civilians have no access to justice over U.S. lethal force,” Khalil Dewan, an investigator with the London-based law firm Stoke White, told Foreign Policy. Dewan focuses on drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen at the firm.
“Families of the dead are yet to receive compensation, let alone an explanation or apology,” he said.