foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--These Countries Reformed Their Brutal, Biased Police. The U.S. can, too.

These Countries Reformed Their Brutal , Biased Police .
The U.S. can , too .
In Bogotá , the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station .
In Monterrey , Mexico , it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas , the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded .
In the United States , the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform , activists and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck .
The United States is far from the only country where police brutality , corruption , or biased treatment of parts of the population have driven demands for reform .
Success , however , has been rare—not because reformers don ’ t know what policies to implement , but because the required reforms were blocked or didn ’ t stick .
To increase the odds of successful police reform , U.S. activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries and communities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , what works for fair and effective policing is well known .
Decades of research confirm that trust between law enforcement and communities is essential , because controlling crime requires community help .
In the United States and Britain , for instance , the vast majority of the crimes that people fear the most , such as homicide and rape , required public tips to solve .
Building trust , however , is based less on bringing down crime ( the metric many police monitor ) than on treating people with respect and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a force that resembles the community it serves ( although sadly , diversity doesn ’ t necessarily reduce police violence ) .
Finally , hiring more women in law enforcement—a strategy Peru used to break perceptions of widespread corruption—results in more trust and less use of force .
Once officers have gained a community ’ s trust , they can use public tips to implement policies proven to drastically reduce crime , such as targeting hot spots ( the small number of places where most violence happens ) , and focusing deterrence on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the vast majority of violent crime to prevent them from resorting to violence .
Executing both strategies with respect and fairness is , needless to say , essential to their effectiveness .
The problem is getting police—and political leaders—to make these changes and make them stick .
In the past few weeks , the United States has taken the first steps .
Politicians are on notice from the vocal , voting middle class .
That step is crucial—even in Venezuela , one of the world ’ s most violent countries , it is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political power that bear the brunt of overly violent and underresponsive policing .
In every democracy where systemic police abuse has been tackled , change usually began when the broader public started to care .
As a result of this pressure , the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a police reform bill ; various U.S. states and communities are making changes as well .
Legal changes , however , aren ’ t enough .
Well-meaning reforms often get bogged down under the assumption that change is a technical process .
But formal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Different ways of organizing police have found success as long as they kept an eye on the overall goal : a culture of community service reinforced with clear incentives and ongoing accountability .
For instance , most jurisdictions opt for selectively firing particularly abusive or corrupt officers .
But some—including the countries of El Salvador and Georgia and the cities of Bogotá and Camden , New Jersey—have disbanded entire police forces , rehiring only officers who passed stringent tests .
Which is a better strategy ?
Trick question .
Both options can bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ purge is accompanied by significant , ongoing investment of political capital to reinforce a new culture through incentives , norms , and swift , ongoing , external accountability .
In Georgia , for instance , if one officer on a shift was found to take a bribe , all the officers on that shift would be fired .
That ensured that customs and border guards , the most corrupt part of law enforcement in Georgia at the time , held each other accountable .
Conversely , in 1995 , Colombia ’ s police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the government then cut oversight by slashing the small accountability office ’ s budget and eventually closing it altogether .
The new police became just as corrupt and abusive as their predecessors—until the next reform effort took place .
One reason for the more extreme strategy of mass firing is that it can be among the few ways for reform-minded politicians to disband police unions that , in their quest for workers ’ rights , prevent corrupt and abusive agents from being fired .
Unions play an awkward role : While they are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change—such as promoting best performers or putting new recruits at the cutting edge of reform so that they are immediately acculturated to where the organization wants to go .
The key to accountability is for policymakers grappling with reform to be independent from the police themselves and from ongoing political pressure .
The most committed politicians prevent slippage by ensuring that their own fortunes rise and fall with the success of police reform .
In Bogotá , former Mayor Antanas Mockus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more civil , less criminal police .
He demanded daily briefings from the police force and experimented with policies from mass firing to hiring mimes to regulate traffic .
In Medellín , Colombia , former Mayor Sergio Fajardo required police statistics to be maintained by an independent agency and made public monthly .
Such pressure kept the reform agenda front and center .
Growing crime , however , can undermine the ability of even the most reform-minded politicians to hold the line .
Often , police and politicians erroneously view efforts to improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ odds with police effectiveness .
Increased crime leads to public clamor for “ toughness ” —and tough-on-crime policies nearly always offer greater impunity for the use of force by police .
Despite actually causing crime to increase , these tough-sounding policies are election winners in nearly every democracy .
If crime rises , reform will backslide , even if reform is the best way to bring crime back down.While labor unions are essential for democracy , in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ passive subjects of reform .
Unwilling officers can slow-walk any policy change—whether by willful subversion or half-hearted implementation—until attention flags or political will dissolves .
Deep reform requires that police accept change .
Reforms only stick when they ’ re done with police , not against them .
Officers must co-create a new culture that only they can realize and embody .
Awkwardly , at the very moment police are most reviled , they need a vision of what they could be and an enhanced sense of their status as professionals , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ community .
To achieve those goals , the president of Georgia attended the start of the first new class of cadets , and constantly spoke about the importance of democratic and honest policing .
For police to embrace reform , they must see the change as enhancing their mission and daily work .
It was not hard to convince officers in Tbilisi , Georgia , where police corruption was rampant , that honesty would aid effectiveness .
Sadly , while demilitarizing police forces is standard international practice for successful reform , many police @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to be persuaded that regulating their use of force , giving up military technology , and abandoning a military mindset will make them safer and their work more effective .
If support within the ranks of police is essential , that will require activists to change their approach .
Calling for defunding or disbanding the police obviously won ’ t win the latter over .
In other cases , it ’ s a matter of how demands for reform are communicated .
For example , when activists call for removing mental health @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only on real crime , that may actually be quite popular among police untrained in mental issues and unhappy with mission creep .
Selling this as a sensible , pro-police measure—rather than as part of punishment by defunding—would require a change in messaging that activists may be unwilling to make .
If activists can make that hard pivot to try to win over police , it would also help them overcome the greatest danger to police reform—polarization .
If the forces of law and order face off against those demanding equity and social @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
During Italy ’ s “ Years of Lead ” in the 1970s and early ’ 80s , that kind of irreconcilable polarization allowed for police to work hand in glove with neofascists , while far-left extremists turned to the terrorist Red Brigades .
Police kept their fascist-era organization , ethos , and behavior while violence spiraled .
The same polarization led to decades of growing state violence and stalled reform in Colombia , several countries in Central America , and other homicide hot spots .
It ’ s hard to ask activists @ @ @ @ @ @ @ law enforcement now , as videos of active and retired officers murdering unarmed U.S. citizens circulate .
But some level of understanding is going to be necessary for real reform .
Psychologists claim that anger and violence are often fueled by fear .
Many officers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from policing a violent , armed society ; the profession is grappling with high suicide rates .
Honest cops fear their violent and dishonest colleagues .
In the 1970s , the scholar Hans Toch found that police who were afraid but unable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to use excessive force .
Society pays the price .
With about 800,000 officers in 18,000 police forces and a long legacy of unequal or blatantly racist policing , the United States requires one of the biggest and most difficult reform efforts any country has ever faced .
Lasting democratic police reform everywhere is hard and rare .
Change may start with outrage , but its proponents must gird themselves with seriousness of purpose .
For African Americans to be protected by and from the police , as all citizens should expect , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure on .

In Bogotá, the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station. In Monterrey, Mexico, it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas, the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded. In the United States, the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform, activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck.
In Bogotá, the moment for long overdue reforms finally came after police raped and murdered a nine-year-old girl at a police station. In Monterrey, Mexico, it arrived years after locals began calling officers polizetas—a mash-up of policía and Los Zetas, the violent drug cartel with whom they often colluded. In the United States, the moment may have come after the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police.To increase the odds of successful police reform, activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries where changes succeeded and stuck.
The United States is far from the only country where police brutality, corruption, or biased treatment of parts of the population have driven demands for reform. Success, however, has been rare—not because reformers don’t know what policies to implement, but because the required reforms were blocked or didn’t stick. To increase the odds of successful police reform, U.S. activists and reformers would be wise to look at lessons from countries and communities where changes succeeded and stuck.
Luckily, what works for fair and effective policing is well known. Decades of research confirm that trust between law enforcement and communities is essential, because controlling crime requires community help. In the United States and Britain, for instance, the vast majority of the crimes that people fear the most, such as homicide and rape, required public tips to solve.
Building trust, however, is based less on bringing down crime (the metric many police monitor) than on treating people with respect and fairness. Trust is enhanced by recruiting a force that resembles the community it serves (although sadly, diversity doesn’t necessarily reduce police violence). Finally, hiring more women in law enforcement—a strategy Peru used to break perceptions of widespread corruption—results in more trust and less use of force.
Once officers have gained a community’s trust, they can use public tips to implement policies proven to drastically reduce crime, such as targeting hot spots (the small number of places where most violence happens), and focusing deterrence on the tiny percentage of people responsible for the vast majority of violent crime to prevent them from resorting to violence. Executing both strategies with respect and fairness is, needless to say, essential to their effectiveness.
The problem is getting police—and political leaders—to make these changes and make them stick. In the past few weeks, the United States has taken the first steps. Politicians are on notice from the vocal, voting middle class. That step is crucial—even in Venezuela, one of the world’s most violent countries, it is the most marginalized communities with the least political power that bear the brunt of overly violent and underresponsive policing. In every democracy where systemic police abuse has been tackled, change usually began when the broader public started to care. As a result of this pressure, the U.S. House of Representatives has passed a police reform bill; various U.S. states and communities are making changes as well.
Legal changes, however, aren’t enough. Well-meaning reforms often get bogged down under the assumption that change is a technical process. But formal reorganizations don’t change behavior. Different ways of organizing police have found success as long as they kept an eye on the overall goal: a culture of community service reinforced with clear incentives and ongoing accountability.
For instance, most jurisdictions opt for selectively firing particularly abusive or corrupt officers. But some—including the countries of El Salvador and Georgia and the cities of Bogotá and Camden, New Jersey—have disbanded entire police forces, rehiring only officers who passed stringent tests.
Which is a better strategy? Trick question. Both options can bring about systemic change—but only when the initial purge is accompanied by significant, ongoing investment of political capital to reinforce a new culture through incentives, norms, and swift, ongoing, external accountability.
In Georgia, for instance, if one officer on a shift was found to take a bribe, all the officers on that shift would be fired. That ensured that customs and border guards, the most corrupt part of law enforcement in Georgia at the time, held each other accountable. Conversely, in 1995, Colombia’s police reform entailed firing 5,000 officers, but the government then cut oversight by slashing the small accountability office’s budget and eventually closing it altogether. The new police became just as corrupt and abusive as their predecessors—until the next reform effort took place.
One reason for the more extreme strategy of mass firing is that it can be among the few ways for reform-minded politicians to disband police unions that, in their quest for workers’ rights, prevent corrupt and abusive agents from being fired. Unions play an awkward role: While they are essential for democracy, in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change—such as promoting best performers or putting new recruits at the cutting edge of reform so that they are immediately acculturated to where the organization wants to go.
The key to accountability is for policymakers grappling with reform to be independent from the police themselves and from ongoing political pressure. The most committed politicians prevent slippage by ensuring that their own fortunes rise and fall with the success of police reform. In Bogotá, former Mayor Antanas Mockus ran on a platform of creating a more civil, less criminal police. He demanded daily briefings from the police force and experimented with policies from mass firing to hiring mimes to regulate traffic. In Medellín, Colombia, former Mayor Sergio Fajardo required police statistics to be maintained by an independent agency and made public monthly. Such pressure kept the reform agenda front and center.
Growing crime, however, can undermine the ability of even the most reform-minded politicians to hold the line. Often, police and politicians erroneously view efforts to improve the treatment of citizens as inherently at odds with police effectiveness. Increased crime leads to public clamor for “toughness”—and tough-on-crime policies nearly always offer greater impunity for the use of force by police. Despite actually causing crime to increase, these tough-sounding policies are election winners in nearly every democracy. If crime rises, reform will backslide, even if reform is the best way to bring crime back down.While labor unions are essential for democracy, in the area of law enforcement they are often obstacles to policies that enable cultural change.
Police, meanwhile, aren’t passive subjects of reform. Unwilling officers can slow-walk any policy change—whether by willful subversion or half-hearted implementation—until attention flags or political will dissolves.
Deep reform requires that police accept change. Reforms only stick when they’re done with police, not against them. Officers must co-create a new culture that only they can realize and embody. Awkwardly, at the very moment police are most reviled, they need a vision of what they could be and an enhanced sense of their status as professionals, in their own eyes and those of the community. To achieve those goals, the president of Georgia attended the start of the first new class of cadets, and constantly spoke about the importance of democratic and honest policing.
For police to embrace reform, they must see the change as enhancing their mission and daily work. It was not hard to convince officers in Tbilisi, Georgia, where police corruption was rampant, that honesty would aid effectiveness. Sadly, while demilitarizing police forces is standard international practice for successful reform, many police in the United States and elsewhere still need to be persuaded that regulating their use of force, giving up military technology, and abandoning a military mindset will make them safer and their work more effective.
If support within the ranks of police is essential, that will require activists to change their approach. Calling for defunding or disbanding the police obviously won’t win the latter over. In other cases, it’s a matter of how demands for reform are communicated. For example, when activists call for removing mental health calls from police dockets and focusing officers only on real crime, that may actually be quite popular among police untrained in mental issues and unhappy with mission creep. Selling this as a sensible, pro-police measure—rather than as part of punishment by defunding—would require a change in messaging that activists may be unwilling to make.
If activists can make that hard pivot to try to win over police, it would also help them overcome the greatest danger to police reform—polarization. If the forces of law and order face off against those demanding equity and social justice, the fight is already lost. During Italy’s “Years of Lead” in the 1970s and early ’80s, that kind of irreconcilable polarization allowed for police to work hand in glove with neofascists, while far-left extremists turned to the terrorist Red Brigades. Police kept their fascist-era organization, ethos, and behavior while violence spiraled. The same polarization led to decades of growing state violence and stalled reform in Colombia, several countries in Central America, and other homicide hot spots.
It’s hard to ask activists or anyone else to have empathy for law enforcement now, as videos of active and retired officers murdering unarmed U.S. citizens circulate. But some level of understanding is going to be necessary for real reform. Psychologists claim that anger and violence are often fueled by fear. Many officers suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from policing a violent, armed society; the profession is grappling with high suicide rates. Honest cops fear their violent and dishonest colleagues. In the 1970s, the scholar Hans Toch found that police who were afraid but unable to admit their fear were more likely to use excessive force. Society pays the price.
With about 800,000 officers in 18,000 police forces and a long legacy of unequal or blatantly racist policing, the United States requires one of the biggest and most difficult reform efforts any country has ever faced. Lasting democratic police reform everywhere is hard and rare. Change may start with outrage, but its proponents must gird themselves with seriousness of purpose. For African Americans to be protected by and from the police, as all citizens should expect, reformers must begin now and keep the pressure on.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Why Taiwan’s Assistance to Hong Kong Matters

On July 1 , Taiwan formally launched a new humanitarian assistance and resettlement program for Hong Kong residents .
The move comes as Beijing tightens its grip on the city , most recently through the passage of a new national security law that allows mainland security forces to operate in the city and grants mainland courts jurisdiction over national security-related cases .
The law was unanimously approved and promulgated by the Chinese government earlier this week , and Hong Kong police have already made their first arrests under it .
Shortly after beginning her second term in late May , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ people seeking to leave Hong Kong , calling on Taiwan ’ s legislature to develop a “ humanitarian assistance action plan.
” Last month , the Mainland Affairs Council , Taiwan ’ s governmental office for relations with the mainland , announced details of the program , framing it as Taiwan ’ s support for Hong Kong ’ s people in their defense of democracy , freedom , and human rights .
That announcement prompted a stern response from Beijing ’ s Taiwan Affairs Office , which warned that “ taking onto the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chaos to Hong Kong will only continue to bring harm to Taiwan ’ s people.
” In fact , what Taiwan is doing solidifies a particular nationalist path that differs from others in Asia and has the potential to fundamentally alter the region ’ s power dynamics .
Taiwan ’ s recent move might look like a straightforward humanitarian response to the intensifying crisis in neighboring Hong Kong , but there ’ s more to the emerging policy framework than meets the eye .
In fact , what Taiwan is doing solidifies a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Asia and has the potential to fundamentally alter the region ’ s power dynamics .
A comparison helps to make the distinctiveness of Taiwan ’ s approach clear .
Taiwan has framed its assistance program as humanitarian , aimed at aiding the fight for democracy and human rights .
While that might seem obvious , it contrasts with the way another democracy in the region , South Korea , characterizes its resettlement program for North Korean refugees : assisting ethnic brethren .
These differences reflect the divergent paths taken by Taiwan and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in recent years .
Taiwan nationalism—the notion of Taiwan as a national community distinct from China—was forged during the period when the island was under martial law and ruled by the Kuomintang ( KMT ) , the party that had fled mainland China after losing the civil war to Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party .
Despite shared Han roots , many islanders saw major cultural differences between themselves and the mainlanders ( waishengren , or “ out-of-province people ” ) .
But with democratization and generational turnover , the ethnic cleavage @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , leaving a growing consensus in support of maintaining the status quo with China and a shared civic identity focused on Taiwan ’ s democratic status .
In recent years , the percentage of citizens who identify as solely Taiwanese , rather than Chinese or both , has reached an all-time high .
Although that identity crosses party lines , it is particularly strong among the Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP ) , the long-standing opposition party that pushed the KMT toward democratization and whose leader , Tsai Ing-wen , now holds the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ further solidifies the civic basis of this identity : Rather than taking an ethnic or pan-Chinese approach , as it once did , Taiwan sees itself as a democratic nation , first and foremost .
In recent years , the percentage of citizens who identify as solely Taiwanese , rather than Chinese or both , has reached an all-time high .
South Korea , meanwhile , is stuck between old and new identities .
The country is moving toward a “ multicultural ” Korea in many respects—something it acutely needs , as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ increased need for immigration and foreign labor .
But when it comes to North Koreans , the state strictly upholds a co-ethnic principle : North Koreans are often spoken of as having “ automatic citizenship ” and receive preferential resettlement benefits not offered to multicultural immigrants or even to Korean-Chinese immigrants , or joseonjok .
The resettlement center for North Korean refugees is named Hanawon , or “ house of unity , ” a reference to the idea that Korea is a single nation based on shared Korean lineage and only temporarily divided @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the tragedy of the Korean War .
The ethnic dimension of Korean identity has remained durable , in part because it was how the nation survived when political autonomy was lost to Japan during the first half of the 20th century .
But looking to the 21st century , South Korea ’ s ethnic exception toward North Koreans creates a dual-track approach , and it holds back its national identity from evolving to include the growing influx of foreigners , a trend that is inevitable given the country ’ s demographic realities .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Korea come with domestic and international trade-offs .
Domestically , research shows that strong identity linkage between nation and state drives a greater sense of civic duty among citizens .
At a moment when both democracies face integration challenges from their resettlement programs , they will need high levels of civic cooperation from native citizens .
Taiwan ’ s identity consolidation toward civic nationalism stands to fare better at incorporating a diverse array of newcomers than South Korea ’ s approach , which uses multicultural rhetoric , but , in practice , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on an ethnic conception of nationhood .
South Korea ’ s co-ethnic exception toward North Koreans has also sent mixed messages to the community it was most intended to help , as many North Koreans perceive that state rhetoric about ethnic unity doesn ’ t always translate into full membership in South Korean society in practice .
They become disillusioned when they face discrimination , unemployment , and other social challenges in the South .
Taiwan ’ s gesture toward Hong Kong embeds Taiwan within a global community interested in preserving and defending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ world .
There are trade-offs in foreign policy , too .
South Korea ’ s ethnic nationalist approach to North Korea contains responsibility for the issue to the Korean peninsula and portrays South Korea ’ s operating principle as taking care of its own .
There are good reasons for this , especially if the state ’ s ultimate goal is to move toward national reconciliation .
But it also closes off the North Korean refugee issue from becoming a focal point for larger , multilateral efforts to protect human rights worldwide , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a broader regional or global leadership role in related pro-democracy efforts .
By contrast , Taiwan ’ s liberal appeal toward Hong Kong aligns the island clearly with the most recent version of the U.S. National Security Strategy , which portrays the Indo-Pacific as defined by “ a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order ” and embeds Taiwan within a global community interested in preserving and defending democracy in Hong Kong and around the world .
This seemingly small difference establishes Taiwan as the new front line in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rights in Asia , and worldwide .

On July 1, Taiwan formally launched a new humanitarian assistance and resettlement program for Hong Kong residents. The move comes as Beijing tightens its grip on the city, most recently through the passage of a new national security law that allows mainland security forces to operate in the city and grants mainland courts jurisdiction over national security-related cases. The law was unanimously approved and promulgated by the Chinese government earlier this week, and Hong Kong police have already made their first arrests under it.
On July 1, Taiwan formally launched a new humanitarian assistance and resettlement program for Hong Kong residents. The move comes as Beijing tightens its grip on the city, most recently through the passage of a new national security law that allows mainland security forces to operate in the city and grants mainland courts jurisdiction over national security-related cases. The law was unanimously approved and promulgated by the Chinese government earlier this week, and Hong Kong police have already made their first arrests under it.
Shortly after beginning her second term in late May, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen offered assistance to people seeking to leave Hong Kong, calling on Taiwan’s legislature to develop a “humanitarian assistance action plan.” Last month, the Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan’s governmental office for relations with the mainland, announced details of the program, framing it as Taiwan’s support for Hong Kong’s people in their defense of democracy, freedom, and human rights. That announcement prompted a stern response from Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, which warned that “taking onto the island the rioters and elements who bring chaos to Hong Kong will only continue to bring harm to Taiwan’s people.”
In fact, what Taiwan is doing solidifies a particular nationalist path that differs from others in Asia and has the potential to fundamentally alter the region’s power dynamics.
Taiwan’s recent move might look like a straightforward humanitarian response to the intensifying crisis in neighboring Hong Kong, but there’s more to the emerging policy framework than meets the eye. In fact, what Taiwan is doing solidifies a particular nationalist path that differs from others in Asia and has the potential to fundamentally alter the region’s power dynamics.
A comparison helps to make the distinctiveness of Taiwan’s approach clear. Taiwan has framed its assistance program as humanitarian, aimed at aiding the fight for democracy and human rights. While that might seem obvious, it contrasts with the way another democracy in the region, South Korea, characterizes its resettlement program for North Korean refugees: assisting ethnic brethren.
These differences reflect the divergent paths taken by Taiwan and South Korea in framing their national identities in recent years. Taiwan nationalism—the notion of Taiwan as a national community distinct from China—was forged during the period when the island was under martial law and ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT), the party that had fled mainland China after losing the civil war to Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party.
Despite shared Han roots, many islanders saw major cultural differences between themselves and the mainlanders (waishengren, or “out-of-province people”). But with democratization and generational turnover, the ethnic cleavage between mainlanders and islanders has largely faded, leaving a growing consensus in support of maintaining the status quo with China and a shared civic identity focused on Taiwan’s democratic status.
In recent years, the percentage of citizens who identify as solely Taiwanese, rather than Chinese or both, has reached an all-time high. Although that identity crosses party lines, it is particularly strong among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the long-standing opposition party that pushed the KMT toward democratization and whose leader, Tsai Ing-wen, now holds the presidency. Tsai’s latest move further solidifies the civic basis of this identity: Rather than taking an ethnic or pan-Chinese approach, as it once did, Taiwan sees itself as a democratic nation, first and foremost.
In recent years, the percentage of citizens who identify as solely Taiwanese, rather than Chinese or both, has reached an all-time high.
South Korea, meanwhile, is stuck between old and new identities. The country is moving toward a “multicultural” Korea in many respects—something it acutely needs, as a dramatic decline in fertility has prompted an increased need for immigration and foreign labor. But when it comes to North Koreans, the state strictly upholds a co-ethnic principle: North Koreans are often spoken of as having “automatic citizenship” and receive preferential resettlement benefits not offered to multicultural immigrants or even to Korean-Chinese immigrants, or joseonjok.
The resettlement center for North Korean refugees is named Hanawon, or “house of unity,” a reference to the idea that Korea is a single nation based on shared Korean lineage and only temporarily divided into two opposing systems of governance by the tragedy of the Korean War. The ethnic dimension of Korean identity has remained durable, in part because it was how the nation survived when political autonomy was lost to Japan during the first half of the 20th century. But looking to the 21st century, South Korea’s ethnic exception toward North Koreans creates a dual-track approach, and it holds back its national identity from evolving to include the growing influx of foreigners, a trend that is inevitable given the country’s demographic realities.
The different paths taken by Taiwan and South Korea come with domestic and international trade-offs. Domestically, research shows that strong identity linkage between nation and state drives a greater sense of civic duty among citizens. At a moment when both democracies face integration challenges from their resettlement programs, they will need high levels of civic cooperation from native citizens. Taiwan’s identity consolidation toward civic nationalism stands to fare better at incorporating a diverse array of newcomers than South Korea’s approach, which uses multicultural rhetoric, but, in practice, remains fragmented and at least partly reliant on an ethnic conception of nationhood.
South Korea’s co-ethnic exception toward North Koreans has also sent mixed messages to the community it was most intended to help, as many North Koreans perceive that state rhetoric about ethnic unity doesn’t always translate into full membership in South Korean society in practice. They become disillusioned when they face discrimination, unemployment, and other social challenges in the South.
Taiwan’s gesture toward Hong Kong embeds Taiwan within a global community interested in preserving and defending democracy in Hong Kong and around the world.
There are trade-offs in foreign policy, too. South Korea’s ethnic nationalist approach to North Korea contains responsibility for the issue to the Korean peninsula and portrays South Korea’s operating principle as taking care of its own. There are good reasons for this, especially if the state’s ultimate goal is to move toward national reconciliation. But it also closes off the North Korean refugee issue from becoming a focal point for larger, multilateral efforts to protect human rights worldwide, and it limits South Korea from taking on a broader regional or global leadership role in related pro-democracy efforts.
By contrast, Taiwan’s liberal appeal toward Hong Kong aligns the island clearly with the most recent version of the U.S. National Security Strategy, which portrays the Indo-Pacific as defined by “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order” and embeds Taiwan within a global community interested in preserving and defending democracy in Hong Kong and around the world. This seemingly small difference establishes Taiwan as the new front line in a broader struggle for democracy and human rights in Asia, and worldwide.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Corporations Will Be Complicit if Israel Goes Through With Annexation

Corporations Will Be Complicit if Israel Goes Through With Annexation International companies doing business in the West Bank and East Jerusalem face a unique predicament .
They can stay and risk complicity in major breaches of international law , or they can leave and risk legal and economic sanctions under so-called anti-boycott laws in the United States and Israel .
Companies such as Mexico ’ s Cemex and Germany ’ s HeidelbergCement facilitate settlement expansion and the pillage of land and natural resources.Most companies have so far chosen to stay put , just like those that continue to operate in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ parts of the world rife with human rights violations stemming from territorial occupations .
With Israeli annexation of large swaths of occupied Palestinian territory seemingly around the corner , however , they may soon find it wiser to leave .
Construction and infrastructure companies operating in the West Bank and East Jerusalem , such as Mexico ’ s Cemex and Germany ’ s HeidelbergCement , facilitate settlement expansion and the pillage of land and natural resources .
Makers of heavy machinery , including Sweden ’ s Volvo and Britain ’ s JCB , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home demolitions and displace Palestinian communities .
Specialized technology firms , such as Italy ’ s Videotec , contribute to a system of control and surveillance designed to restrict Palestinians ’ movement and maintain separation between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territory .
This year the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a database of more than 100 Israeli and international companies involved in the settlements .
Many of these activities constitute clear breaches of international law , and in some cases even war crimes .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ land , extraction of resources , destruction of property , displacement of population , and imposition of restrictions on movement and access to basic services are all prohibited ( with only narrow exceptions ) .
A common misconception is that international law applies to state actors alone—but companies directly perpetrating or otherwise enabling these abuses may themselves be in violation of international law .
The evolution of international law over the past century has clarified that private actors , including businesses , are bound by both human rights law and the laws of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ refrain from committing or assisting violations of these laws .
An early example is the prosecution of corporate actors for their complicity in crimes committed during World War II , including genocide and forced labor .
In recent years , a growing number of countries have passed laws making it illegal for their companies to be involved in these types of violations , even when committed overseas .
These companies and their executives may now be subject to civil or criminal sanction under the domestic laws of their home countries .
To date @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been held liable for violating international law or human rights in Palestinian territory .
Instead , companies that dare to do the right thing and leave the occupied territory face legal and financial sanctions , and attacks on their reputation .
Leaving turned into a fiasco for Airbnb : Immediately after heeding civil society calls and announcing a new policy to delist some 200 rental properties located in illegal Israeli settlements , Airbnb was served with discrimination lawsuits in both the United States and Israel .
Plaintiffs in the U.S.-based lawsuits invoked the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on race , religion , or national origin .
In Israel , plaintiffs sued under an equivalent section of Israel ’ s anti-discrimination law intended to force businesses to provide goods and services to settlements in occupied territory .
Airbnb made an about-face and settled the suits before any legal decision .
Even without lawsuits , individuals and companies are heavily discouraged from ending their business with the settlements by so-called anti-boycott laws enacted in Israel and 29 U.S. states .
More than half of these laws explicitly conflate Israel and the settlements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ company seeking to disengage from illegal activities in the settlements finds itself treated as if it were boycotting Israel proper .
Israel recently amended its immigration laws to deny entry to visitors who advocate boycotts , including those calling on businesses to disengage from settlements based on international human rights standards .
In practice , the anti-boycott laws are rarely employed .
U.S. federal courts have already invalidated several states ’ laws , and additional challenges are pending .
In Israel , the law has only been invoked twice in nine years .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ chilling effect on companies , which typically say that their hands are tied when it comes to exiting occupied territory in order to ensure that their products , services , funds , or expertise are not violating human rights there .
Most companies will not give weight to the risks of staying unless they face a credible threat of legal liability .
The reason these risks remain low is the lack of enforcement in their home countries .
Between the years 2005 and 2011 , legal proceedings were initiated against corporations operating in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Gaza.Between the years 2005 and 2011 , legal proceedings were initiated in North America , Europe , and Africa against corporations operating in the West Bank , East Jerusalem , and Gaza .
( I was a member of the legal team against two of these corporations . )
These efforts sought to replicate the type of transnational corporate accountability litigation that had already been successful in human rights and environmental justice contexts at the time .
Instead , the cases ran into reluctance on the part of prosecutors and judges , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ faced obstacles typical in any attempt to break legal ground .
All were dismissed at early stages , underscoring the impunity enjoyed by companies that continue to violate international law in the occupied Palestinian territory .
But since those early cases , the field of business and human rights has developed by leaps and bounds .
In 2011 , the U.N. Human Rights Office released its Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights , which obligates companies to respect human rights norms in all their business activities .
In 2017 , France passed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requires French companies to evaluate and reduce human rights and environmental harm throughout their supply chains anywhere in the world .
Similar legislation is expected to pass in Australia , Britain , Germany , and Switzerland .
The world has also witnessed a surge in criminal indictments of corporations for war crimes , crimes against humanity , and other offenses .
In 2018 , top executives of the French cement-maker Lafarge were indicted for crimes against humanity and other crimes allegedly committed in Syria .
That same year , the Swedish public prosecutor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humanity in Sudan .
Against this changing legal backdrop , European companies should be particularly concerned about their activities in the Palestinian territory should Israel go forward with annexation .
Not only do numerous European countries now have tougher civil and criminal laws against corporate complicity in human rights abuses and war crimes , but European Union courts have also ruled in recent years that Israeli settlements are not a part of Israel and that activists demonstrating for a boycott of Israeli products inside European supermarkets are engaging in legitimate and protected speech @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will automatically become complicit in additional violations.Should the Israeli government proceed with its plans for annexation , companies doing business in annexed land will automatically become complicit in additional violations .
That would make their current illicit activities more egregious , and prosecutors and judges more likely to take interest in these cases .
That ’ s because annexation is essentially an act of war that violates the very premise of the laws of occupation—that an occupation is temporary and does not convey sovereignty .
Under both international law and local law in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annexed territory is still considered occupied—except it now has a major new violation superimposed on it .
In addition , some activities that are permitted under occupation are prohibited in annexed occupied territory .
For instance , until now the Israeli military ’ s eviction of Palestinians and demolition of their homes could ostensibly be justified as part of the occupying power ’ s duty to maintain safety and order .
But in annexed areas no longer administered by the military , laws or orders to evacuate Palestinian residential areas in order to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ constitute the war crime of forced displacement .
If committed systematically , these actions could constitute crimes against humanity .
Companies doing business in annexed territory are therefore liable to be held accountable for far graver violations than they would be today .
When advocates of anti-boycott laws suggest that companies think twice before withdrawing their business from territories annexed by Israel , that is dangerous and misleading advice .
Anti-boycott laws create an outrageous situation in which a company faces sanctions for ending its complicity in human rights violations and war crimes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies would be wise to rethink the risk of doing business in occupied Palestinian territory—the risks of staying put may soon far outweigh those of doing the right thing .

International companies doing business in the West Bank and East Jerusalem face a unique predicament. They can stay and risk complicity in major breaches of international law, or they can leave and risk legal and economic sanctions under so-called anti-boycott laws in the United States and Israel.
International companies doing business in the West Bank and East Jerusalem face a unique predicament. They can stay and risk complicity in major breaches of international law, or they can leave and risk legal and economic sanctions under so-called anti-boycott laws in the United States and Israel.
Companies such as Mexico’s Cemex and Germany’s HeidelbergCement facilitate settlement expansion and the pillage of land and natural resources.Most companies have so far chosen to stay put, just like those that continue to operate in Western Sahara, Crimea, and other parts of the world rife with human rights violations stemming from territorial occupations. With Israeli annexation of large swaths of occupied Palestinian territory seemingly around the corner, however, they may soon find it wiser to leave.
Construction and infrastructure companies operating in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, such as Mexico’s Cemex and Germany’s HeidelbergCement, facilitate settlement expansion and the pillage of land and natural resources. Makers of heavy machinery, including Sweden’s Volvo and Britain’s JCB, knowingly supply equipment used to carry out home demolitions and displace Palestinian communities. Specialized technology firms, such as Italy’s Videotec, contribute to a system of control and surveillance designed to restrict Palestinians’ movement and maintain separation between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territory. This year the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a database of more than 100 Israeli and international companies involved in the settlements.
Many of these activities constitute clear breaches of international law, and in some cases even war crimes. In an occupied territory, the confiscation of land, extraction of resources, destruction of property, displacement of population, and imposition of restrictions on movement and access to basic services are all prohibited (with only narrow exceptions). A common misconception is that international law applies to state actors alone—but companies directly perpetrating or otherwise enabling these abuses may themselves be in violation of international law.
The evolution of international law over the past century has clarified that private actors, including businesses, are bound by both human rights law and the laws of armed conflict. Companies are required to refrain from committing or assisting violations of these laws. An early example is the prosecution of corporate actors for their complicity in crimes committed during World War II, including genocide and forced labor.
In recent years, a growing number of countries have passed laws making it illegal for their companies to be involved in these types of violations, even when committed overseas. These companies and their executives may now be subject to civil or criminal sanction under the domestic laws of their home countries.
To date, however, no corporate actor has been held liable for violating international law or human rights in Palestinian territory. Instead, companies that dare to do the right thing and leave the occupied territory face legal and financial sanctions, and attacks on their reputation. Leaving turned into a fiasco for Airbnb: Immediately after heeding civil society calls and announcing a new policy to delist some 200 rental properties located in illegal Israeli settlements, Airbnb was served with discrimination lawsuits in both the United States and Israel. Plaintiffs in the U.S.-based lawsuits invoked the Fair Housing Act, claiming discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. In Israel, plaintiffs sued under an equivalent section of Israel’s anti-discrimination law intended to force businesses to provide goods and services to settlements in occupied territory. Airbnb made an about-face and settled the suits before any legal decision.
Even without lawsuits, individuals and companies are heavily discouraged from ending their business with the settlements by so-called anti-boycott laws enacted in Israel and 29 U.S. states. More than half of these laws explicitly conflate Israel and the settlements outside its borders, so that any company seeking to disengage from illegal activities in the settlements finds itself treated as if it were boycotting Israel proper. Israel recently amended its immigration laws to deny entry to visitors who advocate boycotts, including those calling on businesses to disengage from settlements based on international human rights standards.
In practice, the anti-boycott laws are rarely employed. U.S. federal courts have already invalidated several states’ laws, and additional challenges are pending. In Israel, the law has only been invoked twice in nine years. Nevertheless, these laws have created a chilling effect on companies, which typically say that their hands are tied when it comes to exiting occupied territory in order to ensure that their products, services, funds, or expertise are not violating human rights there.
Most companies will not give weight to the risks of staying unless they face a credible threat of legal liability. The reason these risks remain low is the lack of enforcement in their home countries.
Between the years 2005 and 2011, legal proceedings were initiated against corporations operating in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.Between the years 2005 and 2011, legal proceedings were initiated in North America, Europe, and Africa against corporations operating in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. (I was a member of the legal team against two of these corporations.) These efforts sought to replicate the type of transnational corporate accountability litigation that had already been successful in human rights and environmental justice contexts at the time. Instead, the cases ran into reluctance on the part of prosecutors and judges, were out-resourced by their opponents, and faced obstacles typical in any attempt to break legal ground. All were dismissed at early stages, underscoring the impunity enjoyed by companies that continue to violate international law in the occupied Palestinian territory.
But since those early cases, the field of business and human rights has developed by leaps and bounds. In 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Office released its Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which obligates companies to respect human rights norms in all their business activities. In 2017, France passed the Duty of Vigilance Law, which requires French companies to evaluate and reduce human rights and environmental harm throughout their supply chains anywhere in the world. Similar legislation is expected to pass in Australia, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland.
The world has also witnessed a surge in criminal indictments of corporations for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other offenses. In 2018, top executives of the French cement-maker Lafarge were indicted for crimes against humanity and other crimes allegedly committed in Syria. That same year, the Swedish public prosecutor indicted Lundin Petroleum for alleged crimes against humanity in Sudan.
Against this changing legal backdrop, European companies should be particularly concerned about their activities in the Palestinian territory should Israel go forward with annexation. Not only do numerous European countries now have tougher civil and criminal laws against corporate complicity in human rights abuses and war crimes, but European Union courts have also ruled in recent years that Israeli settlements are not a part of Israel and that activists demonstrating for a boycott of Israeli products inside European supermarkets are engaging in legitimate and protected speech.
Companies doing business in annexed land will automatically become complicit in additional violations.Should the Israeli government proceed with its plans for annexation, companies doing business in annexed land will automatically become complicit in additional violations. That would make their current illicit activities more egregious, and prosecutors and judges more likely to take interest in these cases.
That’s because annexation is essentially an act of war that violates the very premise of the laws of occupation—that an occupation is temporary and does not convey sovereignty. Under both international law and local law in numerous companies’ home countries, unilaterally annexed territory is still considered occupied—except it now has a major new violation superimposed on it. In addition, some activities that are permitted under occupation are prohibited in annexed occupied territory. For instance, until now the Israeli military’s eviction of Palestinians and demolition of their homes could ostensibly be justified as part of the occupying power’s duty to maintain safety and order. But in annexed areas no longer administered by the military, laws or orders to evacuate Palestinian residential areas in order to make way for Israeli development would unequivocally constitute the war crime of forced displacement. If committed systematically, these actions could constitute crimes against humanity. Companies doing business in annexed territory are therefore liable to be held accountable for far graver violations than they would be today.
When advocates of anti-boycott laws suggest that companies think twice before withdrawing their business from territories annexed by Israel, that is dangerous and misleading advice. Anti-boycott laws create an outrageous situation in which a company faces sanctions for ending its complicity in human rights violations and war crimes. With annexation on the table, companies would be wise to rethink the risk of doing business in occupied Palestinian territory—the risks of staying put may soon far outweigh those of doing the right thing.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--The United States Has Nothing to Fear From the ICC

The United States Has Nothing to Fear From the ICC During my 38 years in the U.S. Army , beginning as a cadet at West Point and ultimately serving as supreme allied commander in Europe , I always took pride in the fact that the U.S. military led the way in upholding the highest legal and ethical standards .
We did not torture ; we were not to abuse prisoners ; we took pains to protect civilians from the collateral damage of war .
And in those instances where we failed , we took remedial action .
Now Secretary of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ graduate , is leading a campaign against an international court that more than 120 countries have charged with helping uphold those standards .
President Donald Trump himself has threatened economic sanctions against the court ’ s staff , their families , and those who assist their work when that work touches on U.S. conduct .
This is a tragic mistake .
The United States benefits from its leading role in developing and complying with international law and from the institutions that help enforce that law .
It is also unnecessary , because U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledge its errors and defend its interests without taking actions that place it in the company of rogue states like Burundi and the Philippines , which have threatened United Nations investigators and international prosecutors .
The immediate issue that sparked Pompeo ’ s attack on the International Criminal Court ( ICC ) is an investigation into serious crimes in Afghanistan .
The gravest allegations concern widespread murder , persecution , and other horrible crimes that the Taliban and their allies have committed against Afghan civilians .
The investigation also covers allegations of U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. intervention—a charge that is painful , given precisely the long history of U.S. leadership in international law .
The United States has played that leading role not only to protect innocent civilians but also to protect its own military forces .
American men and women in uniform benefit from the expectation that all parties to a conflict will respect the Geneva Conventions and customary international law in how they conduct hostilities and treat prisoners .
When the United States holds itself to these rules , allies that share the same values @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States and defer to U.S. jurisdiction through status of forces agreements while U.S. service members are on their territory .
Taking the law seriously has also meant helping ensure there are consequences for the worst violations of it .
Building on the precedent of the trials of German and Japanese leaders after World War II , the United States supported independent tribunals focused on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia after the Cold War .
The U.S. government has not joined the permanent ICC , as most of its allies have , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its rules and procedures—under which the ICC can only investigate acts committed by Americans on the territory of an ICC member state if U.S. authorities do not investigate and prosecute those acts themselves .
I know from experience both the benefits and challenges these tribunals present .
As commander of NATO forces in 1999 , I witnessed firsthand how the U.N. ’ s Yugoslavia tribunal helped end the conflict in Kosovo and drive Slobodan Milosevic and other abusive leaders from power .
But the tribunal also looked at whether the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ during the alliance ’ s intervention there .
The tribunal ’ s prosecutor examined all of the incidents where there had been damage to civilian life or property—including the bombing of a bridge , an attack on a TV tower , and a mistaken airstrike on the Chinese Embassy—before determining that further investigation would not be justified .
This kind of scrutiny is uncomfortable , especially when it touches on acts under one ’ s own command , but the United States ’ commitment to complying with the law , its reliance on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the U.S. justice system give Americans the tools to manage it .
I had strong legal counsel at every step in our mission in NATO and so have our commanders in Afghanistan .
Responding to that scrutiny , though , requires an honest assessment of it .
Some have given the impression with respect to Afghanistan that the ICC is investigating U.S. service members for their actions in combat— “ attempting to go after the young men and women of the United States of America who fought so hard , ” as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ young men and women and their leaders have certainly earned their compatriots ’ unceasing support .
But the ICC investigation is not focused on how U.S. service members fought in the heat of battle .
Indeed , the ICC prosecutor , Fatou Bensouda , stated in 2017 when seeking authorization to investigate that she had “ no reasonable basis to believe ” that war crimes had occurred in incidents where U.S. action in Afghanistan had killed civilians , including the tragic and accidental U.S. strike on a hospital in Kunduz .
Rather , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personnel treated detainees in their custody during a specific and shameful period , primarily between 2003 and 2004 , when , among other things , U.S. intelligence personnel were authorized to use waterboarding and other abusive interrogation techniques that U.S. authorities once prosecuted themselves .
Secretary Pompeo can boast that the United States is “ the most civilized nation in the world , ” but its actions will determine whether it lives up to that self-image—and whether the ICC and courts in other countries will defer to U.S. investigations .
American justice institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government upholds or corrodes their credibility day by day .
The pardons that President Trump issued last year , reversing or ending proceedings against U.S. service members convicted or charged with serious crimes against civilians and prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq , did great damage in this respect .
So , too , has the president ’ s loose talk about committing war crimes , such as pillaging Syrian oil or destroying Iranian cultural sites .
The most important issue in determining whether the ICC and other courts defer to U.S. institutions is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of torture—particularly on the intelligence side , where it is hard to avoid the conclusion that no one has faced consequences for the decisions that U.S. policymakers made .
As a step toward showing that U.S. authorities can and will deliver justice themselves , even in this context , the United States should organize a truth commission that would provide a forum for admitting mistakes and offering restitution where appropriate .
Washington should also provide greater clarity about certain investigations the United States has undertaken into these allegations , including why they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are willing to face the truth , accept accountability , and admit their mistakes .
In the Kosovo campaign , the secretary of defense and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency publicly apologized for the mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade .
Of course , the Afghan people themselves—and the better future for which U.S. servicemen and women have helped them fight for two decades—should not be an afterthought in all this .
The ICC can play a useful role with respect to the alleged abuses of the Taliban , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ operating in the country .
Some form of transitional justice is essential for the health and long-term stability of a society that has endured the trauma of brutal wars .
An ICC investigation can help ensure that accountability is not neglected in Afghanistan ’ s ongoing peace process and make it more difficult for persons responsible for heinous crimes to become the country ’ s leaders .
U.S. support for even this part of the investigation seems unlikely , but it could help .
Attacking international bodies like the ICC may feel like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But just as Americans benefit from the work of the World Health Organization and other multilateral institutions the Trump administration has turned against , the existence of tribunals to help enforce international law is an asset to U.S. security .
Americans should continue to protect U.S. service members with a firm commitment to international law .
And when Americans ’ actions are scrutinized , the U.S. government should have the confidence to react in a way that preserves the benefits of these institutions , protects U.S. personnel , and does justice to @ @ @

During my 38 years in the U.S. Army, beginning as a cadet at West Point and ultimately serving as supreme allied commander in Europe, I always took pride in the fact that the U.S. military led the way in upholding the highest legal and ethical standards. We did not torture; we were not to abuse prisoners; we took pains to protect civilians from the collateral damage of war. And in those instances where we failed, we took remedial action.
During my 38 years in the U.S. Army, beginning as a cadet at West Point and ultimately serving as supreme allied commander in Europe, I always took pride in the fact that the U.S. military led the way in upholding the highest legal and ethical standards. We did not torture; we were not to abuse prisoners; we took pains to protect civilians from the collateral damage of war. And in those instances where we failed, we took remedial action.
Now Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a West Point graduate, is leading a campaign against an international court that more than 120 countries have charged with helping uphold those standards. President Donald Trump himself has threatened economic sanctions against the court’s staff, their families, and those who assist their work when that work touches on U.S. conduct.
This is a tragic mistake. The United States benefits from its leading role in developing and complying with international law and from the institutions that help enforce that law. It is also unnecessary, because U.S. domestic institutions give America the ability to acknowledge its errors and defend its interests without taking actions that place it in the company of rogue states like Burundi and the Philippines, which have threatened United Nations investigators and international prosecutors.
The immediate issue that sparked Pompeo’s attack on the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an investigation into serious crimes in Afghanistan. The gravest allegations concern widespread murder, persecution, and other horrible crimes that the Taliban and their allies have committed against Afghan civilians. The investigation also covers allegations of U.S. detainee abuse in the early years of the U.S. intervention—a charge that is painful, given precisely the long history of U.S. leadership in international law.
The United States has played that leading role not only to protect innocent civilians but also to protect its own military forces. American men and women in uniform benefit from the expectation that all parties to a conflict will respect the Geneva Conventions and customary international law in how they conduct hostilities and treat prisoners. When the United States holds itself to these rules, allies that share the same values have greater confidence to work with the United States and defer to U.S. jurisdiction through status of forces agreements while U.S. service members are on their territory.
Taking the law seriously has also meant helping ensure there are consequences for the worst violations of it. Building on the precedent of the trials of German and Japanese leaders after World War II, the United States supported independent tribunals focused on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia after the Cold War. The U.S. government has not joined the permanent ICC, as most of its allies have, but U.S. officials were deeply involved in negotiating its rules and procedures—under which the ICC can only investigate acts committed by Americans on the territory of an ICC member state if U.S. authorities do not investigate and prosecute those acts themselves.
I know from experience both the benefits and challenges these tribunals present. As commander of NATO forces in 1999, I witnessed firsthand how the U.N.’s Yugoslavia tribunal helped end the conflict in Kosovo and drive Slobodan Milosevic and other abusive leaders from power. But the tribunal also looked at whether the United States and its NATO allies had committed war crimes during the alliance’s intervention there.
The tribunal’s prosecutor examined all of the incidents where there had been damage to civilian life or property—including the bombing of a bridge, an attack on a TV tower, and a mistaken airstrike on the Chinese Embassy—before determining that further investigation would not be justified. This kind of scrutiny is uncomfortable, especially when it touches on acts under one’s own command, but the United States’ commitment to complying with the law, its reliance on professional legal guidance, and the rigor of the U.S. justice system give Americans the tools to manage it. I had strong legal counsel at every step in our mission in NATO and so have our commanders in Afghanistan.
Responding to that scrutiny, though, requires an honest assessment of it. Some have given the impression with respect to Afghanistan that the ICC is investigating U.S. service members for their actions in combat—“attempting to go after the young men and women of the United States of America who fought so hard,” as Secretary Pompeo recently put it. Those young men and women and their leaders have certainly earned their compatriots’ unceasing support. But the ICC investigation is not focused on how U.S. service members fought in the heat of battle.
Indeed, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, stated in 2017 when seeking authorization to investigate that she had “no reasonable basis to believe” that war crimes had occurred in incidents where U.S. action in Afghanistan had killed civilians, including the tragic and accidental U.S. strike on a hospital in Kunduz. Rather, the prosecutor has focused on how U.S. personnel treated detainees in their custody during a specific and shameful period, primarily between 2003 and 2004, when, among other things, U.S. intelligence personnel were authorized to use waterboarding and other abusive interrogation techniques that U.S. authorities once prosecuted themselves.
Secretary Pompeo can boast that the United States is “the most civilized nation in the world,” but its actions will determine whether it lives up to that self-image—and whether the ICC and courts in other countries will defer to U.S. investigations. American justice institutions are generally strong, but the U.S. government upholds or corrodes their credibility day by day. The pardons that President Trump issued last year, reversing or ending proceedings against U.S. service members convicted or charged with serious crimes against civilians and prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq, did great damage in this respect. So, too, has the president’s loose talk about committing war crimes, such as pillaging Syrian oil or destroying Iranian cultural sites.
The most important issue in determining whether the ICC and other courts defer to U.S. institutions is how the United States has handled allegations of torture—particularly on the intelligence side, where it is hard to avoid the conclusion that no one has faced consequences for the decisions that U.S. policymakers made. As a step toward showing that U.S. authorities can and will deliver justice themselves, even in this context, the United States should organize a truth commission that would provide a forum for admitting mistakes and offering restitution where appropriate. Washington should also provide greater clarity about certain investigations the United States has undertaken into these allegations, including why they have not led to prosecutions.
Great nations are willing to face the truth, accept accountability, and admit their mistakes. In the Kosovo campaign, the secretary of defense and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency publicly apologized for the mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
Of course, the Afghan people themselves—and the better future for which U.S. servicemen and women have helped them fight for two decades—should not be an afterthought in all this. The ICC can play a useful role with respect to the alleged abuses of the Taliban, Afghan security forces, and terrorist groups operating in the country. Some form of transitional justice is essential for the health and long-term stability of a society that has endured the trauma of brutal wars. An ICC investigation can help ensure that accountability is not neglected in Afghanistan’s ongoing peace process and make it more difficult for persons responsible for heinous crimes to become the country’s leaders. U.S. support for even this part of the investigation seems unlikely, but it could help.
Attacking international bodies like the ICC may feel like a cost-free way to score political points. But just as Americans benefit from the work of the World Health Organization and other multilateral institutions the Trump administration has turned against, the existence of tribunals to help enforce international law is an asset to U.S. security. Americans should continue to protect U.S. service members with a firm commitment to international law. And when Americans’ actions are scrutinized, the U.S. government should have the confidence to react in a way that preserves the benefits of these institutions, protects U.S. personnel, and does justice to American values.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-02--Iran Is Becoming Immune to U.S. Pressure

Iran Is Becoming Immune to U.S. Pressure U.S. President Donald Trump said on June 5 that Iran should not wait until after the presidential election “ to make the Big deal , ” but can get a “ better deal ” with him now .
Trump ’ s remarks came after a recent prisoner swap , which saw detained U.S. Navy veteran Michael White released from Iran in exchange for Iranian American doctor Majid Taheri .
However , while Trump may want to negotiate with Iran and reinforce his self-avowed reputation as a deal-maker before the U.S. election , his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but eliminated the chance for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy in the months to come.Iran has proven resilient in the face of U.S. pressure .
Iran has proven resilient in the face of U.S. pressure .
While many ordinary Iranians are suffering , the economy is not in total free fall , as many in Washington hoped for .
Instead , the country has shown signs of economic recovery , with domestic production and employment increasing .
According to Iran ’ s Central Bank chief Abdolnaser Hemmati , Iran ’ s nonoil gross domestic product grew @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian economist Saeed Laylaz also contends that Iran ’ s economy can weather the coronavirus pandemic and may experience growth this year despite the virus .
Trump ’ s bellicose rhetoric and actions have not made Iran more inclined to do a deal , but they have undermined any Iranian officials who supported negotiations with the United States .
Whether wittingly or not , Trump ’ s policy decisions have closed the potential for diplomacy .
The political cost one faces in Tehran for arguing in favor of negotiations is now simply too @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian officials have reacted to the recent prisoner exchange .
The situation was different just a few months ago .
The only other time the United States and Iran exchanged prisoners under the Trump administration was in December 2019 , when Iran released Princeton doctorate student Xiyue Wang for Iranian scientist Masoud Soleimani .
Unlike the recent White-Taheri exchange , the December swap also saw high-level meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials , a rare instance of bilateral U.S.-Iranian talks under the Trump administration .
The United States has called for such a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ accuse it of sabotaging diplomatic efforts .
Rouhani ’ s rhetoric around the time of the December swap also suggested he was more open to a new round of negotiations with the United States .
Rouhani explicitly declared in the lead-up to the swap that Tehran had not ruled out talks and that negotiations could be “ revolutionary.
” The political climate in Iran has decisively turned hostile to any talk of negotiating with the United States .
Then , in late December , Rouhani traveled to Japan in a trip that Japanese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There was speculation that the trip could have led to a “ small deal ” between the United States and Iran , with Iranian media reporting that Japan could get a U.S. waiver for importing Iranian oil and release billions of dollars in frozen Iranian oil revenues .
Such a deal could have built confidence and met Rouhani ’ s precondition of sanctions removal for negotiating with Trump .
However , any hope that the positive diplomatic momentum built in late 2019 would lead to diplomatic progress between the United States and Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani .
Many millions thronged Iran ’ s cities calling for revenge after the killing .
Rouhani defiantly exclaimed in February : “ They thought that with maximum pressure they can take us to the table of negotiation in a position of weakness … this will never happen.
” The political climate in Iran has since decisively turned hostile to any talk of negotiating with the United States , reestablishing a taboo that existed for years before the nuclear negotiations during the presidency of Barack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and an old friend of Suleimani , unsuccessfully ran against Rouhani in both Iran ’ s 2013 and 2017 presidential elections .
He assumed his parliamentary post in May , after parliamentary elections in February that swept conservatives to power .
Importantly , that conservative victory occurred amid record-low turnout in the election and the widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates by the Guardian Council .
Nevertheless , the total capture of parliament by conservatives cements the marginalization of reformists such as Rouhani and his allies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ nuclear deal .
Rouhani had sunk all his political capital into negotiating the accord and promised it would give the Iranian people major economic dividends .
Ghalibaf has now replaced Rouhani ’ s ally Ali Larijani as parliamentary speaker .
Meanwhile , the judiciary , considered one of the three branches of government in Iran alongside the presidency and legislature , is being run by Rouhani ’ s other former 2017 rival , conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi.The changing political winds are significant for the future of Iranian foreign policy .
The changing political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iranian foreign policy .
Within the byzantine Islamic Republic system , Rouhani managed to forge necessary consensus on negotiations with the United States during the Obama administration , which included nods of approval from both the Supreme National Security Council and the supreme leader , Ayatollah Ali Khamenei .
Unlike his hard-line predecessor , the boisterous and belligerent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , Rouhani formed a cabinet of many U.S.-educated technocrats and his ambitions laid squarely on securing Iran ’ s economic integration to the world .
For a time , Rouhani was riding high @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has dramatically reversed .
Ghalibaf , while not as aggressively ideological as Ahmadinejad , has made it clear that he will do everything in his power to ensure Rouhani remains a lame duck for the rest of his presidency .
In his first address as parliamentary speaker , he lambasted Rouhani ’ s administration for its “ focus on the outside [ world ] ” and not believing in “ the principles of jihadi management.
” Ironically , Ghalibaf himself has been described as a technocrat , drawing from his 12-year run as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , he oversaw the construction of major infrastructure projects , voiced support for the nuclear deal , and participated in international summits such as the World Economic Forum in Davos , Switzerland , where in 2008 he called for international investment in Iran .
However , political expediency compels Ghalibaf to oppose Rouhani for the rest of his term , which ends next year .
As parliamentary speaker , Ghalibaf presides over disparate conservative factions , ranging from the fundamentalist Front of Islamic Revolution Stability to the free-market-oriented Islamic Coalition Party .
Targeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and effective way for Ghalibaf to unite conservatives behind him .
Above all , the goal will be to obstruct Rouhani ’ s ability to negotiate with the United States and restore the political fortunes of his camp .
An alternative approach is possible but requires Trump to ditch maximum pressure and rebuild the trust necessary for successful negotiations .
International relations and the real estate market are not similar .
Bullying and bluster do not win deals ; mutual respect and “ win-win ” compromise do .
Trump has styled himself as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ November election he has zero foreign-policy victories to his name .
If he wants any semblance of a positive foreign-policy legacy , he needs to get off the path to war and on a path to negotiations with Iran .

U.S. President Donald Trump said on June 5 that Iran should not wait until after the presidential election “to make the Big deal,” but can get a “better deal” with him now. Trump’s remarks came after a recent prisoner swap, which saw detained U.S. Navy veteran Michael White released from Iran in exchange for Iranian American doctor Majid Taheri. However, while Trump may want to negotiate with Iran and reinforce his self-avowed reputation as a deal-maker before the U.S. election, his “maximum pressure” policy has all but eliminated the chance for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy in the months to come.Iran has proven resilient in the face of U.S. pressure.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on June 5 that Iran should not wait until after the presidential election “to make the Big deal,” but can get a “better deal” with him now. Trump’s remarks came after a recent prisoner swap, which saw detained U.S. Navy veteran Michael White released from Iran in exchange for Iranian American doctor Majid Taheri. However, while Trump may want to negotiate with Iran and reinforce his self-avowed reputation as a deal-maker before the U.S. election, his “maximum pressure” policy has all but eliminated the chance for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy in the months to come.Iran has proven resilient in the face of U.S. pressure.
Iran has proven resilient in the face of U.S. pressure. While many ordinary Iranians are suffering, the economy is not in total free fall, as many in Washington hoped for. Instead, the country has shown signs of economic recovery, with domestic production and employment increasing. According to Iran’s Central Bank chief Abdolnaser Hemmati, Iran’s nonoil gross domestic product grew by 1.1 percent last year. Prominent Iranian economist Saeed Laylaz also contends that Iran’s economy can weather the coronavirus pandemic and may experience growth this year despite the virus.
Trump’s bellicose rhetoric and actions have not made Iran more inclined to do a deal, but they have undermined any Iranian officials who supported negotiations with the United States. Whether wittingly or not, Trump’s policy decisions have closed the potential for diplomacy. The political cost one faces in Tehran for arguing in favor of negotiations is now simply too high. This is evident in how Iranian officials have reacted to the recent prisoner exchange.
Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, one of the highest decision-making bodies in Iran, said in response to Trump’s offer for a deal, “The exchange of prisoners is not the result of negotiations & no talks will happen in the future.” Shamkhani’s remarks reflect a consistent line in Tehran: Negotiations with the United States are off the table. Even moderate President Hassan Rouhani’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, and spokesperson Ali Rabiee now maintain that prisoner swaps can occur without negotiations.
The situation was different just a few months ago. The only other time the United States and Iran exchanged prisoners under the Trump administration was in December 2019, when Iran released Princeton doctorate student Xiyue Wang for Iranian scientist Masoud Soleimani. Unlike the recent White-Taheri exchange, the December swap also saw high-level meetings between U.S. and Iranian officials, a rare instance of bilateral U.S.-Iranian talks under the Trump administration. The United States has called for such a meeting again, but Iranian officials now accuse it of sabotaging diplomatic efforts.
Rouhani’s rhetoric around the time of the December swap also suggested he was more open to a new round of negotiations with the United States. Rouhani explicitly declared in the lead-up to the swap that Tehran had not ruled out talks and that negotiations could be “revolutionary.”The political climate in Iran has decisively turned hostile to any talk of negotiating with the United States.
Then, in late December, Rouhani traveled to Japan in a trip that Japanese media said was greenlighted by Washington. There was speculation that the trip could have led to a “small deal” between the United States and Iran, with Iranian media reporting that Japan could get a U.S. waiver for importing Iranian oil and release billions of dollars in frozen Iranian oil revenues. Such a deal could have built confidence and met Rouhani’s precondition of sanctions removal for negotiating with Trump.
However, any hope that the positive diplomatic momentum built in late 2019 would lead to diplomatic progress between the United States and Iran was crushed in early January, with the U.S. assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani. Many millions thronged Iran’s cities calling for revenge after the killing. Rouhani defiantly exclaimed in February: “They thought that with maximum pressure they can take us to the table of negotiation in a position of weakness … this will never happen.”
The political climate in Iran has since decisively turned hostile to any talk of negotiating with the United States, reestablishing a taboo that existed for years before the nuclear negotiations during the presidency of Barack Obama.
“Negotiations and compromise with America, the focal point of global arrogance, are useless and harmful,” said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s new parliamentary speaker, in his first speech to the body, “Our strategy toward the terroristic America is to complete our vengeance for the blood of the martyr Suleimani.”
Ghalibaf, a former commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and an old friend of Suleimani, unsuccessfully ran against Rouhani in both Iran’s 2013 and 2017 presidential elections. He assumed his parliamentary post in May, after parliamentary elections in February that swept conservatives to power. Importantly, that conservative victory occurred amid record-low turnout in the election and the widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates by the Guardian Council.
Nevertheless, the total capture of parliament by conservatives cements the marginalization of reformists such as Rouhani and his allies that began after Trump scuttled the 2015 nuclear deal. Rouhani had sunk all his political capital into negotiating the accord and promised it would give the Iranian people major economic dividends.
Ghalibaf has now replaced Rouhani’s ally Ali Larijani as parliamentary speaker. Meanwhile, the judiciary, considered one of the three branches of government in Iran alongside the presidency and legislature, is being run by Rouhani’s other former 2017 rival, conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi.The changing political winds are significant for the future of Iranian foreign policy.
The changing political winds are significant for the future of Iranian foreign policy. Within the byzantine Islamic Republic system, Rouhani managed to forge necessary consensus on negotiations with the United States during the Obama administration, which included nods of approval from both the Supreme National Security Council and the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Unlike his hard-line predecessor, the boisterous and belligerent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Rouhani formed a cabinet of many U.S.-educated technocrats and his ambitions laid squarely on securing Iran’s economic integration to the world. For a time, Rouhani was riding high in public opinion polls, but that has dramatically reversed.
Ghalibaf, while not as aggressively ideological as Ahmadinejad, has made it clear that he will do everything in his power to ensure Rouhani remains a lame duck for the rest of his presidency. In his first address as parliamentary speaker, he lambasted Rouhani’s administration for its “focus on the outside [world]” and not believing in “the principles of jihadi management.”
Ironically, Ghalibaf himself has been described as a technocrat, drawing from his 12-year run as mayor of Tehran. During his tenure, he oversaw the construction of major infrastructure projects, voiced support for the nuclear deal, and participated in international summits such as the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where in 2008 he called for international investment in Iran.
However, political expediency compels Ghalibaf to oppose Rouhani for the rest of his term, which ends next year. As parliamentary speaker, Ghalibaf presides over disparate conservative factions, ranging from the fundamentalist Front of Islamic Revolution Stability to the free-market-oriented Islamic Coalition Party. Targeting Rouhani and his agenda is an easy and effective way for Ghalibaf to unite conservatives behind him. Above all, the goal will be to obstruct Rouhani’s ability to negotiate with the United States and restore the political fortunes of his camp.
Trump is mistaken if he believes “maximum pressure” is getting him closer to a deal with Iran. The policy is not leading to Iran’s capitulation or collapse, but entrenching U.S.-Iran hostilities and keeping the United States perennially at the cusp of war in the Middle East. Trump, who ran in 2016 on getting the United States out of costly Middle Eastern wars, nearly went to war last June and again in January over his decision to escalate with Iran.
An alternative approach is possible but requires Trump to ditch maximum pressure and rebuild the trust necessary for successful negotiations. International relations and the real estate market are not similar. Bullying and bluster do not win deals; mutual respect and “win-win” compromise do. Trump has styled himself as a deal-maker, but ahead of the November election he has zero foreign-policy victories to his name. If he wants any semblance of a positive foreign-policy legacy, he needs to get off the path to war and on a path to negotiations with Iran.