foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Bernie’s Outsider on the Inside

Bernie’s Outsider on the Inside

This is one in a series of profiles of the people advising the 2020 Democratic field on foreign policy .
Instead , the Vermont senator doubled down at a fiery Democratic debate in Charleston , South Carolina , on Tuesday night , parrying blows from other Democratic presidential contenders as he defended Cuban literacy programs while rebuking Castro ’ s authoritarianism .
As Sanders sticks to his guns , he ’ s backed up by his chief foreign-policy advisor , Matt Duss , who has very publicly used the controversy to point out the hypocrisy and moral blinders in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Lots of outrage over positive comments about Cuba ’ s education system from the ‘ MBS is a bold reformer ’ crowd , ” Duss tweeted on Tuesday before the debate , referring to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman , who U.S. intelligence believes orchestrated the murder of a Washington Post columnist critical of the government .
A day later , after former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak died , Duss tweeted : “ As the DC establishment gins up outrage over some complimentary words about Cuban literacy programs , a timely reminder @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and continue to back his even worse successor.
” With the presidential primaries in full swing , Democratic foreign-policy pros are clamoring to join different campaigns they hope can oust President Donald Trump from office .
Some contenders , including former South Bend , Indiana , Mayor Pete Buttigieg and former Vice President Joe Biden , have hundreds of influential former senior officials and experts in their camp carefully crafting memos and talking points and policy positions for their candidate .
For Sanders , much of that work falls to Duss .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , leaving the bulk of public messaging to the phalanx of campaign spokespeople crowding the race .
But Duss , a relative anomaly among campaign aides , remains a feisty Twitter presence , willing to publicly spar with any of Sanders ’ s critics over foreign policy .
The former journalist and think tank blogger joined Sanders ’ s Senate team in 2017 , shortly after Trump ’ s surprising journey to the White House jolted Washington ’ s establishment and threw into questions decades of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to become one of the most influential advisors to the Democratic front-runner—and along the way has helped Sanders craft a substantive foreign-policy platform from the ground up .
If Sanders is a household name across the country , Duss has cultivated his own reputation among Washington insiders as a foil to the Democratic old guard .
He personifies a small but increasingly vocal group of experts on the left who are challenging their own party ’ s foreign-policy orthodoxies , including heavy defense spending , staunch support for Israel , long-standing U.S. ties @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Egypt , and expansive free trade agreements .
In calling for the creation of a new foreign-policy consensus that would buck those orthodoxies , Duss doesn ’ t just take aim at Democrats—but also at Trump .
Despite the president ’ s reputation as a wrecking ball to the establishment , he has in many ways simply espoused a throatier version of longtime U.S. foreign-policy positions , from securitizing immigration to overhyping the global war on terrorism to siding with autocrats .
“ One of the most dangerous ideas in this city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the status quo , rather than a product of the status quo , ” Duss said Wednesday at the Foreign Policy-Quincy Institute Forum in Washington .
Foreign policy doesn ’ t dominate presidential elections and certainly isn ’ t the most important issue in the internecine primary season .
But Sanders—currently leading a crowded field that includes Biden , Buttigieg , Sens .
Elizabeth Warren and Amy Klobuchar , and former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg—needs to show voters he can respond to questions and attacks on foreign policy that arise @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Cuba , all his primary rivals zeroed in on what appeared to be a vulnerable flank for Sanders , especially at Tuesday ’ s South Carolina debate .
That ’ s where Duss comes in , furnishing Sanders with research , talking points , and advice on the hot-button issues that arise in the marathon of debates and town halls .
“ During the primaries , it ’ s rare that foreign policy is a top issue , but it can become a top issue very quickly in moments of crisis , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those moments of crisis are where a candidate ’ s principles and values and ideas really come into play.
” Most foreign-policy advisors cut their teeth in government or academia for decades .
Working for a candidate who spurns the establishment , Duss fittingly is an exception , despite his years working in Washington .
“ He ’ s the outsider on the inside , ” said Sarah Margon , a former colleague of Duss ’ s and director of foreign-policy advocacy at the Open Society Foundations .
Duss , born in a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , grew up in a close-knit evangelical community .
His father ’ s family was one of millions displaced by World War II and the subsequent Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe ; they emigrated to the United States when his father was 2 .
“ We ’ re a family of refugees .
… That ’ s always been part of my understanding of where we came from , ” he recounted to the Nation last year , which published a lengthy profile on him .
Music , not foreign policy , was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passions—until the 9/11 attacks galvanized in him a sense of wanting to do more on U.S. politics and policy toward the Middle East .
He earned an undergraduate degree at 31 and a master ’ s degree at 34 in Middle Eastern studies from the University of Washington .
Once he moved back east to Washington , D.C. , he began writing prolifically on foreign-policy issues for left-leaning outlets , including the American Prospect .
In 2008 , he joined the Center for American Progress ( CAP ) , where he would spend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and writing on foreign policy , including for CAP ’ s blog , ThinkProgress .
While at CAP , Duss was “ consistently trying to move things to the left , ” said Margon , who previously worked with Duss at the think tank .
( He hasn ’ t abandoned his passion for music though , as he and his colleagues attest . )
In his writings , he targeted parts of the left as much as the right , especially the neoconservative movement , over U.S. foreign policy , particularly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Alongside articles rebuking prominent Republican hawks like John Bolton were articles attacking Democratic luminaries , including Sen. Bob Menendez—now the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—for pushing sanctions against Iran .
He was an outspoken critic of U.S. policy toward Israel , Washington ’ s closest democratic ally in the Middle East , and became a central figure in an heated internal debate among Democratic ranks over Israel—a rift that continues to this day .
“ Like segregation in the American South , the siege of Gaza ( and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) is a moral abomination that should be intolerable to anyone claiming progressive values , ” he wrote in one 2010 article .
He left CAP in 2014 to head the Foundation for Middle East Peace ( FMEP ) , a small nonprofit based in Washington that focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
His positions earned him charges of anti-Semitism from right-wing media outlets and even a Republican congressman , who in 2015 falsely accused Duss ’ s family members of anti-Semitism for their past remarks on Israel—a move one Duss ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ad hominem attack.
” The attacks didn ’ t deter Duss .
“ He ’ s a gentle giant with a spine of steel , ” joked Margon , alluding to Duss ’ s stocky 6-foot-5-inch frame .
Trump has clearly positioned himself as staunchly pro-Israel , moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and unveiling a Middle East peace plan with no Palestinian buy-in—policies that could earn him sorely needed votes in battleground states like Florida .
Democrats , in contrast , are still wrestling with how Israel fits into their foreign-policy platform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has punched through political taboos in Washington , referring to Israel as an “ occupying power ” and labeling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “ racist.
” In the primaries , Sanders ’ s opponents have latched on to his stance on Israel , and his comments on Cuba , to attack the front-runner , arguing that he leans too far left to win a general election against Trump .
“ I don ’ t want , as a Democrat , to be explaining why our nominee is encouraging people to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Castro regime when we ’ re going into the election for our lives , ” Buttigieg said at a CNN town hall on Monday .
Sanders refused to back down on his praise for Castro ’ s literacy program , though he condemned the Cuban leader ’ s authoritarian rule , or his past sympathies for the socialist regime in Nicaragua .
“ Occasionally , it might be a good idea to be honest about American foreign policy .
And that includes the fact that America has overthrown governments all over the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Iran—and when dictatorships , whether it ’ s the Chinese or the Cubans , do something good , you acknowledge that , ” Sanders said at Tuesday ’ s debate .
In many ways , Sanders ’ s 2020 campaign strikes the same tone as in 2016 , where he lost the nomination to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton .
But many progressive experts agree he has added more substance to his foreign-policy platform , which was an Achilles ’ s heel in his 2016 contest against Clinton .
“ If @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Should the campaign have been talking about national security more ?
They ’ re going to say yes , ” Joseph Cirincione , a senior Sanders advisor and president of the Ploughshares Fund , a foundation focused on conflict and nuclear weapons issues , told Foreign Policy in 2016 .
“ I think Sen. Sanders should have talked more , and earlier , about his national security vision.
” If Sanders seems more serious about foreign policy now , some experts and congressional aides say it ’ s thanks in no small part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staff shortly after Trump ’ s inauguration in 2017 .
Duss himself shies away from claiming credit , saying Sanders already had clear foreign-policy priorities for decades .
“ Adding some heft and detail to [ Sanders ’ s ] foreign-policy vision was not difficult because we ’ re building on a set of very clearly defined principles , ” Duss said .
Some of Duss ’ s former colleagues were surprised by his decision to go to Capitol Hill after spending so many years criticizing the establishment from the outside .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because I think of Matt as an incredibly thoughtful policy person , but I didn ’ t think of him as a ‘ get into politics and foreign-policy making ’ person , ” said Lara Friedman , a friend and former colleague who now runs FMEP .
Since 2017 , Sanders has become one of the most prominent voices in the Senate on congressional war powers authority and ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen , where a yearslong civil war has plunged the country into the world ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up with an unusual coalition of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans to advance a resolution that would roll back the president ’ s authority to engage in military conflicts without prior congressional approval .
Duss played a key behind-the-scenes role in passing the resolution ; even in the hyperpartisan atmosphere of Washington , he was “ very professional and great to work with ” and “ always willing to keep the bipartisan channels of communication open , ” one Senate Republican aide told Foreign Policy .
Some lawmakers who voted against the resolution @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a president ’ s ability to swiftly respond to national security threats ; Trump ultimately vetoed it .
But Sanders and other backers saw it as an important legislative victory , exercising a congressional muscle that hadn ’ t been flexed in generations and helping to push the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to the negotiating table .
The war powers resolution “ played a very positive role with regard to the Saudi and Emirati coalition , making clear that they had lost the support of Congress and that they needed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ toward a diplomatic resolution , ” Duss said .
For his former colleagues , the war powers resolution also underscored how Duss wasn ’ t just trying to fight the proverbial Washington blob but to work with them to make changes .
“ He didn ’ t agree with the Washington establishment on many foreign-policy issues , but he still built ties with many of them when there was the opportunity or a need , ” Margon said .
With an eye on the Oval Office , Sanders and his team , including @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on his platform with an eye toward the general election .
Top national security issues include North Korea , Venezuela , and extricating the United States from costly conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan .
On North Korea , Sanders set himself apart from Democrats by praising Trump for opening a dialogue with Kim Jong Un on denuclearization talks .
Sanders has said he would be open to more of that continued engagement with North Korea—but only after there was genuine groundwork for progress , rather than what he has called an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Democrats in rebuking Trump ’ s decision to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela , after leftist strongman Nicolás Maduro extended his grab for power .
Duss said a Sanders administration would seek to enlist allies to help work out a diplomatic solution—unlike the Trump administration , which has ramped up economic pressure on the Maduro regime and even broached a U.S. invasion to oust him .
“ The Trump administration policy has actually made the situation worse , ” Duss said .
A Sanders administration would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between the opposition and the Maduro government with an eye toward securing free and fair elections , he said .
“ The focus here should be on supporting the right of Venezuelans to determine their own future.
” In dealing with both North Korea and Venezuela—as well as Iran , Cuba , Russia , and a host of other countries—the Trump administration has vastly expanded the use of U.S. financial and economic sanctions , leveraging America ’ s dominant financial position in the world to strong-arm friends and foes alike .
Sanders , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s knee-jerk use of the financial weapon .
“ We have just been using these sanction tools all over the place .
I would say even abusing them , ” Duss said .
“ Sanctions are an important tool , but we need to take a hard look at where and how we use those tools and not just keep piling them on in ways that ultimately don ’ t advance policy goals.
” Whether it ’ s on Israel , Venezuela , North Korea , or the broader role of the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and financial policeman , the Sanders approach to foreign policy represents a break with decades of Democratic orthodoxy .
A Sanders win in the primaries would prompt the same kind of tectonic shift for Democrats that Trump ’ s victory ushered in for Republicans .
And even if Sanders loses , many experts agree he has already tugged the party to the left on issues such as health care and education—and , perhaps , foreign policy .
Regardless of whether Sanders ultimately lands the Democratic nomination , the progressive push on foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in part thank , or blame , Duss for that .

This is one in a series of profiles of the people advising the 2020 Democratic field on foreign policy.
When Bernie Sanders said in a CBS interview last Sunday that it was “unfair to simply say everything” was bad in Cuba under Fidel Castro, it sparked outcry in Washington and the battleground state of Florida. A traditional Democratic presidential campaign might have backtracked and done damage control.
Instead, the Vermont senator doubled down at a fiery Democratic debate in Charleston, South Carolina, on Tuesday night, parrying blows from other Democratic presidential contenders as he defended Cuban literacy programs while rebuking Castro’s authoritarianism. As Sanders sticks to his guns, he’s backed up by his chief foreign-policy advisor, Matt Duss, who has very publicly used the controversy to point out the hypocrisy and moral blinders in the rest of the foreign-policy establishment.
“Lots of outrage over positive comments about Cuba’s education system from the ‘MBS is a bold reformer’ crowd,” Duss tweeted on Tuesday before the debate, referring to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who U.S. intelligence believes orchestrated the murder of a Washington Post columnist critical of the government. A day later, after former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak died, Duss tweeted: “As the DC establishment gins up outrage over some complimentary words about Cuban literacy programs, a timely reminder that they backed this dictator for decades, and continue to back his even worse successor.”
With the presidential primaries in full swing, Democratic foreign-policy pros are clamoring to join different campaigns they hope can oust President Donald Trump from office. Some contenders, including former South Bend, Indiana, Mayor Pete Buttigieg and former Vice President Joe Biden, have hundreds of influential former senior officials and experts in their camp carefully crafting memos and talking points and policy positions for their candidate.
For Sanders, much of that work falls to Duss. Most advisors carefully avoid the public spotlight, leaving the bulk of public messaging to the phalanx of campaign spokespeople crowding the race. But Duss, a relative anomaly among campaign aides, remains a feisty Twitter presence, willing to publicly spar with any of Sanders’s critics over foreign policy.
The former journalist and think tank blogger joined Sanders’s Senate team in 2017, shortly after Trump’s surprising journey to the White House jolted Washington’s establishment and threw into questions decades of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. Now, he has emerged from inside-the-Beltway obscurity to become one of the most influential advisors to the Democratic front-runner—and along the way has helped Sanders craft a substantive foreign-policy platform from the ground up.
If Sanders is a household name across the country, Duss has cultivated his own reputation among Washington insiders as a foil to the Democratic old guard. He personifies a small but increasingly vocal group of experts on the left who are challenging their own party’s foreign-policy orthodoxies, including heavy defense spending, staunch support for Israel, long-standing U.S. ties with autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and expansive free trade agreements.
In calling for the creation of a new foreign-policy consensus that would buck those orthodoxies, Duss doesn’t just take aim at Democrats—but also at Trump. Despite the president’s reputation as a wrecking ball to the establishment, he has in many ways simply espoused a throatier version of longtime U.S. foreign-policy positions, from securitizing immigration to overhyping the global war on terrorism to siding with autocrats.
“One of the most dangerous ideas in this city is that Donald Trump is a break from the status quo, rather than a product of the status quo,” Duss said Wednesday at the Foreign Policy-Quincy Institute Forum in Washington.
Foreign policy doesn’t dominate presidential elections and certainly isn’t the most important issue in the internecine primary season. But Sanders—currently leading a crowded field that includes Biden, Buttigieg, Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Amy Klobuchar, and former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg—needs to show voters he can respond to questions and attacks on foreign policy that arise during the campaign. After his comments on Cuba, all his primary rivals zeroed in on what appeared to be a vulnerable flank for Sanders, especially at Tuesday’s South Carolina debate.
That’s where Duss comes in, furnishing Sanders with research, talking points, and advice on the hot-button issues that arise in the marathon of debates and town halls.
“During the primaries, it’s rare that foreign policy is a top issue, but it can become a top issue very quickly in moments of crisis,” Duss said. “I think those moments of crisis are where a candidate’s principles and values and ideas really come into play.”
Most foreign-policy advisors cut their teeth in government or academia for decades. Working for a candidate who spurns the establishment, Duss fittingly is an exception, despite his years working in Washington.
“He’s the outsider on the inside,” said Sarah Margon, a former colleague of Duss’s and director of foreign-policy advocacy at the Open Society Foundations.
Duss, born in a small town north of New York City, grew up in a close-knit evangelical community. His father’s family was one of millions displaced by World War II and the subsequent Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe; they emigrated to the United States when his father was 2.
“We’re a family of refugees. … That’s always been part of my understanding of where we came from,” he recounted to the Nation last year, which published a lengthy profile on him.
Music, not foreign policy, was one of Duss’s biggest life passions—until the 9/11 attacks galvanized in him a sense of wanting to do more on U.S. politics and policy toward the Middle East. He earned an undergraduate degree at 31 and a master’s degree at 34 in Middle Eastern studies from the University of Washington. Once he moved back east to Washington, D.C., he began writing prolifically on foreign-policy issues for left-leaning outlets, including the American Prospect. In 2008, he joined the Center for American Progress (CAP), where he would spend the next six years researching, editing, and writing on foreign policy, including for CAP’s blog, ThinkProgress. While at CAP, Duss was “consistently trying to move things to the left,” said Margon, who previously worked with Duss at the think tank. (He hasn’t abandoned his passion for music though, as he and his colleagues attest.)
In his writings, he targeted parts of the left as much as the right, especially the neoconservative movement, over U.S. foreign policy, particularly when it came to the Middle East. Alongside articles rebuking prominent Republican hawks like John Bolton were articles attacking Democratic luminaries, including Sen. Bob Menendez—now the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—for pushing sanctions against Iran.
He was an outspoken critic of U.S. policy toward Israel, Washington’s closest democratic ally in the Middle East, and became a central figure in an heated internal debate among Democratic ranks over Israel—a rift that continues to this day.
“Like segregation in the American South, the siege of Gaza (and the entire Israeli occupation, for that matter) is a moral abomination that should be intolerable to anyone claiming progressive values,” he wrote in one 2010 article.
He left CAP in 2014 to head the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), a small nonprofit based in Washington that focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His positions earned him charges of anti-Semitism from right-wing media outlets and even a Republican congressman, who in 2015 falsely accused Duss’s family members of anti-Semitism for their past remarks on Israel—a move one Duss’s colleagues sharply rebuked as a “sleazy ad hominem attack.” The attacks didn’t deter Duss.
“He’s a gentle giant with a spine of steel,” joked Margon, alluding to Duss’s stocky 6-foot-5-inch frame.
Trump has clearly positioned himself as staunchly pro-Israel, moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and unveiling a Middle East peace plan with no Palestinian buy-in—policies that could earn him sorely needed votes in battleground states like Florida. Democrats, in contrast, are still wrestling with how Israel fits into their foreign-policy platform. Sanders, like his foreign-policy advisor, has punched through political taboos in Washington, referring to Israel as an “occupying power” and labeling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “racist.”
In the primaries, Sanders’s opponents have latched on to his stance on Israel, and his comments on Cuba, to attack the front-runner, arguing that he leans too far left to win a general election against Trump.
“I don’t want, as a Democrat, to be explaining why our nominee is encouraging people to look on the bright side of the Castro regime when we’re going into the election for our lives,” Buttigieg said at a CNN town hall on Monday.
Sanders refused to back down on his praise for Castro’s literacy program, though he condemned the Cuban leader’s authoritarian rule, or his past sympathies for the socialist regime in Nicaragua.
“Occasionally, it might be a good idea to be honest about American foreign policy. And that includes the fact that America has overthrown governments all over the world, in Chile, in Guatemala, in Iran—and when dictatorships, whether it’s the Chinese or the Cubans, do something good, you acknowledge that,” Sanders said at Tuesday’s debate.
In many ways, Sanders’s 2020 campaign strikes the same tone as in 2016, where he lost the nomination to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. But many progressive experts agree he has added more substance to his foreign-policy platform, which was an Achilles’s heel in his 2016 contest against Clinton. “If you ask a national security expert: Should the campaign have been talking about national security more? They’re going to say yes,” Joseph Cirincione, a senior Sanders advisor and president of the Ploughshares Fund, a foundation focused on conflict and nuclear weapons issues, told Foreign Policy in 2016. “I think Sen. Sanders should have talked more, and earlier, about his national security vision.”
If Sanders seems more serious about foreign policy now, some experts and congressional aides say it’s thanks in no small part to Duss, who joined his Senate staff shortly after Trump’s inauguration in 2017. Duss himself shies away from claiming credit, saying Sanders already had clear foreign-policy priorities for decades. “Adding some heft and detail to [Sanders’s] foreign-policy vision was not difficult because we’re building on a set of very clearly defined principles,” Duss said.
Some of Duss’s former colleagues were surprised by his decision to go to Capitol Hill after spending so many years criticizing the establishment from the outside. “It struck me as an interesting move because I think of Matt as an incredibly thoughtful policy person, but I didn’t think of him as a ‘get into politics and foreign-policy making’ person,” said Lara Friedman, a friend and former colleague who now runs FMEP.
Since 2017, Sanders has become one of the most prominent voices in the Senate on congressional war powers authority and ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, where a yearslong civil war has plunged the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
Sanders teamed up with an unusual coalition of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans to advance a resolution that would roll back the president’s authority to engage in military conflicts without prior congressional approval. Duss played a key behind-the-scenes role in passing the resolution; even in the hyperpartisan atmosphere of Washington, he was “very professional and great to work with” and “always willing to keep the bipartisan channels of communication open,” one Senate Republican aide told Foreign Policy.
Some lawmakers who voted against the resolution saw it as a dangerous constraint on a president’s ability to swiftly respond to national security threats; Trump ultimately vetoed it. But Sanders and other backers saw it as an important legislative victory, exercising a congressional muscle that hadn’t been flexed in generations and helping to push the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels to the negotiating table.
The war powers resolution “played a very positive role with regard to the Saudi and Emirati coalition, making clear that they had lost the support of Congress and that they needed to make some changes and move more forcefully toward a diplomatic resolution,” Duss said.
For his former colleagues, the war powers resolution also underscored how Duss wasn’t just trying to fight the proverbial Washington blob but to work with them to make changes. “He didn’t agree with the Washington establishment on many foreign-policy issues, but he still built ties with many of them when there was the opportunity or a need,” Margon said.
With an eye on the Oval Office, Sanders and his team, including Duss, are now fleshing out details on his platform with an eye toward the general election. Top national security issues include North Korea, Venezuela, and extricating the United States from costly conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
On North Korea, Sanders set himself apart from Democrats by praising Trump for opening a dialogue with Kim Jong Un on denuclearization talks. Sanders has said he would be open to more of that continued engagement with North Korea—but only after there was genuine groundwork for progress, rather than what he has called an empty photo-op.
Sanders has also broken with Democrats in rebuking Trump’s decision to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela, after leftist strongman Nicolás Maduro extended his grab for power. Duss said a Sanders administration would seek to enlist allies to help work out a diplomatic solution—unlike the Trump administration, which has ramped up economic pressure on the Maduro regime and even broached a U.S. invasion to oust him.
“The Trump administration policy has actually made the situation worse,” Duss said. A Sanders administration would seek to “facilitate real talks” between the opposition and the Maduro government with an eye toward securing free and fair elections, he said. “The focus here should be on supporting the right of Venezuelans to determine their own future.”
In dealing with both North Korea and Venezuela—as well as Iran, Cuba, Russia, and a host of other countries—the Trump administration has vastly expanded the use of U.S. financial and economic sanctions, leveraging America’s dominant financial position in the world to strong-arm friends and foes alike. Sanders, Duss said, is reevaluating America’s knee-jerk use of the financial weapon.
“We have just been using these sanction tools all over the place. I would say even abusing them,” Duss said. “Sanctions are an important tool, but we need to take a hard look at where and how we use those tools and not just keep piling them on in ways that ultimately don’t advance policy goals.”
Whether it’s on Israel, Venezuela, North Korea, or the broader role of the United States as the world’s military and financial policeman, the Sanders approach to foreign policy represents a break with decades of Democratic orthodoxy. A Sanders win in the primaries would prompt the same kind of tectonic shift for Democrats that Trump’s victory ushered in for Republicans.
And even if Sanders loses, many experts agree he has already tugged the party to the left on issues such as health care and education—and, perhaps, foreign policy. Regardless of whether Sanders ultimately lands the Democratic nomination, the progressive push on foreign policy will likely live on—and the party can in part thank, or blame, Duss for that.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Slovakia Faces a Stark Choice

Slovakia Faces a Stark Choice

Slovakia has been in the grip of nationalist populism for most of the past 14 years , and far-right contenders are gathering strength .
But the opening of a historic trial ahead of the parliamentary election on Feb. 29 has offered liberal democrats the chance to take the country in another direction .
On Jan. 13 , the Slovak oligarch Marian Kocner arrived at a special court in the small city of Pezinok to stand trial for ordering the murder of the investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée , Martina Kusnirova , two years ago .
If convicted , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kuciak and Kusnirova were gunned down in their home on Feb. 21 , 2018 .
At the time , the 27-year-old journalist was working on an investigation in eastern Slovakia that allegedly connected Kocner with Italy ’ s ‘ Ndrangheta mafia .
Kuciak ’ s story , published posthumously , linked the case directly to Maria Troskova , an advisor in the prime minister ’ s office .
Former Prime Minister Robert Fico , who remains the leader of the nominally center-left Direction-Social Democracy ( Smer ) party , had shrugged off corruption @ @ @ @ @ @ @ power , but the journalist ’ s murder proved too big a scandal for him to contain .
Fury exploded onto the streets , and Fico was swept aside .
The Smer-led coalition government limps on .
But the shock of Kuciak ’ s murder , which has revealed just how deeply Kocner ’ s tentacles reached into the Slovak state , has revived both liberal forces and the specter of fascism .
The liberal-democratic bloc hopes that evidence of the corruption that has thrived under Smer will mobilize voters in its favor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s murder has already partly shifted power in Slovakia , reawakening the country ’ s liberal forces and catapulting the political newcomer Zuzana Caputova to the presidency last March .
A crucial fight awaits .
“ This election will decide if we will have basic decency in Slovak politics or move to a primitive form of populism , ” said Tomas Koziak , the rector of Academia Rerum Civilium in Kutna Hora .
While nothing can dispel the horror of the murders for Kuciak ’ s and Kusnirova ’ s families , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in which he admitted to the killings , has raised the pressure on Smer and the other nationalist parties in the governing coalition .
Ministers , prosecutors , judges , and even police have dropped like flies as investigators uncovered evidence on Kocner ’ s phone detailing their roles in his nefarious schemes .
Fico insists that messages suggesting he regularly met with Kocner , who happened to be his next-door neighbor , are misleading .
“ The trial will help confirm the information that has been released in the media , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Slovak newspaper Pravda .
“ In the current climate of mistrust in the media , that ’ s a very important point ahead of the election.
” Kocner has already tried to use this mistrust to his advantage by claiming to have been “ ambushed ” by the press , he added .
Suggestions in the international media that Caputova ’ s election to the largely ceremonial presidential post represented a clean break with nationalist populism were off the mark .
Nationalists and extremists also attracted significant support in the March presidential @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political force .
The parliamentary election is the key battleground where Slovakia ’ s political path in the wake of Kuciak ’ s murder will be decided .
Smer is just leading the polls with around 17 percent of the electorate , more than 10 points below the most recent election in 2016 .
“ Everyone is keeping tabs on the trial , and that ’ s clearly bad news for Smer , ” said Matisak .
“ They were the ruling party and allowed this cancer to thrive.
” But it ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the governing party are going to the centrist democratic bloc .
The neo-Nazi People ’ s Party-Our Slovakia ( LSNS ) , which is polling around 10 percent , appears to be benefiting .
Party leader Marian Kotleba has ditched the black uniforms he used to wear in a bid to project a softer image , but he retains his anti-establishment message .
Despite the fascist party ’ s rise , the fragmented political landscape should keep Kotleba away from the levers of power .
The neo-Nazi party is so toxic that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ alongside it in a coalition .
Still , the corrupt networks exposed by the Kocner case make Kotleba ’ s promise of fair treatment for all—except , of course Slovakia ’ s Roma and Muslim populations—more seductive for the poorer and less-educated provincial voters who have lost the most under the system that replaced communism .
( Kotleba ’ s ideology has also appealed to the rich . )
The party leader ’ s shaved head and trimmed mustache dot billboards around Slovakia , sending a message : LSNS is the only party @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The Kocner trial is a double-edged sword , ” said Milan Nic , an expert on Central Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations .
“ It helps mobilize support for the democratic parties , but at the same time offers a boost to Kotleba as an opponent of the whole system.
” Progressive Slovakia has taken a strong stance against right-wing extremism .
“ Fascism is still alive , ” Caputova warned at Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland last month during events to mark the 75th anniversary of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ votes , the party has also organized protests against LSNS events across the country .
Despite Kotleba ’ s gains , most analysts say they expect the Kocner case to offer enough momentum to push the democratic bloc acrossa the line to a slim majority .
But that won ’ t be the end of it .
Cleaning up a system riddled with corruption wouldn ’ t be easy even with a strong mandate .
A government cobbled together from five or six parties with little in common besides their commitment to basic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The recent brief detainment of former state prosecutor Dobroslav Trnka illustrates the challenge .
On Jan. 16 , Caputova hailed Trnka ’ s arrest as a “ breakthrough for justice.
” Evidence from the Kocner investigation revealed that Trnka had blackmailed government ministers and others on behalf of the oligarch .
But prosecutors dropped their charges of “ abuse of office , ” and he was released the following day .
The prosecutor ’ s office has offered only a vague explanation .
The problems run deep , according to Koziak , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fico merely upgraded a system built in the years immediately after the end of communism , with corruption at its core .
In the 1990s , murders and kidnapping linked to authoritarian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar prompted then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to label Slovakia the “ black hole of Europe.
” While opposition parties ousted Meciar in 1998 , the corruption was never cleaned up .
The Kocner case has exposed just how deeply the rot runs , and Slovakia must now harness the resulting anger to throw off the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the post-communist countries of Central Europe , said Nic .
“ This is crunch time , ” he said .
“ The deep corruption revealed has killed trust in the state , but also accelerated a shift to a new generation charged with renewing the quality of governance.
” Should the democratic opposition fail to cleanse the system , the danger is that Slovaks could be tempted to invite extremists like Kotleba to blow it up .
“ We realize that risk , ” said Pavel Sibyla , a senior Progressive Slovakia official @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the democratic parties will feel the same deep responsibility towards the country .
”

Slovakia has been in the grip of nationalist populism for most of the past 14 years, and far-right contenders are gathering strength. But the opening of a historic trial ahead of the parliamentary election on Feb. 29 has offered liberal democrats the chance to take the country in another direction.
Slovakia has been in the grip of nationalist populism for most of the past 14 years, and far-right contenders are gathering strength. But the opening of a historic trial ahead of the parliamentary election on Feb. 29 has offered liberal democrats the chance to take the country in another direction.
On Jan. 13, the Slovak oligarch Marian Kocner arrived at a special court in the small city of Pezinok to stand trial for ordering the murder of the investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kusnirova, two years ago. If convicted, Kocner could face a life sentence.
Kuciak and Kusnirova were gunned down in their home on Feb. 21, 2018. At the time, the 27-year-old journalist was working on an investigation in eastern Slovakia that allegedly connected Kocner with Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta mafia. Kuciak’s story, published posthumously, linked the case directly to Maria Troskova, an advisor in the prime minister’s office.
Former Prime Minister Robert Fico, who remains the leader of the nominally center-left Direction-Social Democracy (Smer) party, had shrugged off corruption scandals for his 10 cumulative years in power, but the journalist’s murder proved too big a scandal for him to contain. Fury exploded onto the streets, and Fico was swept aside.
The Smer-led coalition government limps on. But the shock of Kuciak’s murder, which has revealed just how deeply Kocner’s tentacles reached into the Slovak state, has revived both liberal forces and the specter of fascism. The liberal-democratic bloc hopes that evidence of the corruption that has thrived under Smer will mobilize voters in its favor. The anger unleashed by Kuciak’s murder has already partly shifted power in Slovakia, reawakening the country’s liberal forces and catapulting the political newcomer Zuzana Caputova to the presidency last March.
A crucial fight awaits. “This election will decide if we will have basic decency in Slovak politics or move to a primitive form of populism,” said Tomas Koziak, the rector of Academia Rerum Civilium in Kutna Hora.
While nothing can dispel the horror of the murders for Kuciak’s and Kusnirova’s families, the gunman Miroslav Marcek’s testimony, in which he admitted to the killings, has raised the pressure on Smer and the other nationalist parties in the governing coalition. Ministers, prosecutors, judges, and even police have dropped like flies as investigators uncovered evidence on Kocner’s phone detailing their roles in his nefarious schemes. Fico insists that messages suggesting he regularly met with Kocner, who happened to be his next-door neighbor, are misleading.
“The trial will help confirm the information that has been released in the media,” said Andrej Matisak, an editor at the Slovak newspaper Pravda. “In the current climate of mistrust in the media, that’s a very important point ahead of the election.” Kocner has already tried to use this mistrust to his advantage by claiming to have been “ambushed” by the press, he added.
Suggestions in the international media that Caputova’s election to the largely ceremonial presidential post represented a clean break with nationalist populism were off the mark. Nationalists and extremists also attracted significant support in the March presidential vote, showing they remain a strong political force. The parliamentary election is the key battleground where Slovakia’s political path in the wake of Kuciak’s murder will be decided.
To push Smer out of government, up to six disparate parties considered to be Slovakia’s democratic opposition will likely need to form a coalition. Of the bunch, the populist, anti-graft Ordinary People party has emerged as the strongest, polling at 16.4 percent. Two new centrist parties emerged with the liberal revival: Progressive Slovakia, co-founded by Caputova, and For the People, founded by her presidential predecessor Andrej Kiska in September 2019. Both are polling at between 8 and 9 percent.
Smer is just leading the polls with around 17 percent of the electorate, more than 10 points below the most recent election in 2016. “Everyone is keeping tabs on the trial, and that’s clearly bad news for Smer,” said Matisak. “They were the ruling party and allowed this cancer to thrive.”
But it’s unlikely that all the votes shed by the governing party are going to the centrist democratic bloc. The neo-Nazi People’s Party-Our Slovakia (LSNS), which is polling around 10 percent, appears to be benefiting. Party leader Marian Kotleba has ditched the black uniforms he used to wear in a bid to project a softer image, but he retains his anti-establishment message.
Despite the fascist party’s rise, the fragmented political landscape should keep Kotleba away from the levers of power. The neo-Nazi party is so toxic that few can imagine any parties—including the nationalists—working alongside it in a coalition.
Still, the corrupt networks exposed by the Kocner case make Kotleba’s promise of fair treatment for all—except, of course Slovakia’s Roma and Muslim populations—more seductive for the poorer and less-educated provincial voters who have lost the most under the system that replaced communism. (Kotleba’s ideology has also appealed to the rich.) The party leader’s shaved head and trimmed mustache dot billboards around Slovakia, sending a message: LSNS is the only party untainted by links to oligarchs and scandals.
“The Kocner trial is a double-edged sword,” said Milan Nic, an expert on Central Europe at the German Council on Foreign Relations. “It helps mobilize support for the democratic parties, but at the same time offers a boost to Kotleba as an opponent of the whole system.”
Progressive Slovakia has taken a strong stance against right-wing extremism. “Fascism is still alive,” Caputova warned at Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland last month during events to mark the 75th anniversary of its liberation. As well as campaigning for votes, the party has also organized protests against LSNS events across the country.
Despite Kotleba’s gains, most analysts say they expect the Kocner case to offer enough momentum to push the democratic bloc acrossa the line to a slim majority. But that won’t be the end of it. Cleaning up a system riddled with corruption wouldn’t be easy even with a strong mandate. A government cobbled together from five or six parties with little in common besides their commitment to basic democratic standards will find it doubly difficult.
The recent brief detainment of former state prosecutor Dobroslav Trnka illustrates the challenge. On Jan. 16, Caputova hailed Trnka’s arrest as a “breakthrough for justice.” Evidence from the Kocner investigation revealed that Trnka had blackmailed government ministers and others on behalf of the oligarch. But prosecutors dropped their charges of “abuse of office,” and he was released the following day. The prosecutor’s office has offered only a vague explanation.
The problems run deep, according to Koziak, the political scientist. He contends that Fico merely upgraded a system built in the years immediately after the end of communism, with corruption at its core. In the 1990s, murders and kidnapping linked to authoritarian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar prompted then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to label Slovakia the “black hole of Europe.” While opposition parties ousted Meciar in 1998, the corruption was never cleaned up.
The Kocner case has exposed just how deeply the rot runs, and Slovakia must now harness the resulting anger to throw off the nationalist populism that has taken root across the post-communist countries of Central Europe, said Nic. “This is crunch time,” he said. “The deep corruption revealed has killed trust in the state, but also accelerated a shift to a new generation charged with renewing the quality of governance.”
Should the democratic opposition fail to cleanse the system, the danger is that Slovaks could be tempted to invite extremists like Kotleba to blow it up. “We realize that risk,” said Pavel Sibyla, a senior Progressive Slovakia official. “I just hope that all of the democratic parties will feel the same deep responsibility towards the country.”


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--The U.N. Won’t Save Idlib. The EU and NATO Can.

The U.N. Won ’ t Save Idlib .
The EU and NATO Can .
In its latest convulsion , the war in Syria has produced its biggest humanitarian calamity yet .
But the world ’ s attention is focused elsewhere .
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ’ s military operation targeting Idlib , in the northwest of the country , has uprooted more than 900,000 civilians—the majority of them women and children—according to United Nations figures .
These internally displaced persons have found temporary refuge near the Turkish border in makeshift camps under harsh winter conditions .
The latest U.N. report @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their few belongings to fight the cold .
Already , many children have died .
A humanitarian crisis of this scale should have already galvanized the international community to launch a coordinated campaign to end this suffering .
But , so far , regional and global politics have stymied such efforts .
And in the absence of any outside intervention , the conflict is likely to further aggravate the humanitarian consequences .
One reason is that the Syrian regime , with Russian backing , is pushing ahead to reconquer territory held by opposition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shiite militias have used brutal tactics with the aim of depopulating Idlib so regime forces can more effectively control this territory with a predominantly Sunni population .
The international community has so far looked the other way , allowing the Assad regime ’ s progress because of the presence of myriad jihadis in Idlib , including al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Suqour al-Sham Brigades .
Idlib incidentally became a safe haven for many of these groups , which have been forced to relocate as they gradually lost territory in other parts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the absence of a clear policy related to the repatriation of these foreign fighters , most Western countries favor an outcome where these jihadis would end up being killed in Syria and never make it back to their original countries .
This is also the argument espoused by Damascus and Moscow to justify the Idlib operation .
In this equation , the only country that remains directly exposed to the negative consequences of the Idlib operation is Turkey .
Already host to more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees , Turkey justifiably fears another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to open the country ’ s borders to yet another million people under duress .
That is also one reason why Ankara has amassed forces at the border , carried out several retaliatory strikes on Syrian forces after being targeted , and threatened the Syrian regime with further military action should the advance continue .
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave an ultimatum to Damascus with a deadline of Feb. 29 , seeking to force Syrian troops to relinquish part of the territory they acquired in Idlib .
Erdogan is asking the regime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategically important M5 highway linking Damascus to Aleppo .
Such a move would lessen the pressure on the refugees .
Many observers believe that with Russian mediation Ankara and Damascus will reach a temporary truce , consolidating their current positions on the ground .
But talks have not produced an agreement yet , and the situation remains precarious with no guarantee of a negotiated outcome .
In addition , even if the Syrian regime buckles under Turkish pressure and agrees to suspend its current campaign , it could easily resume it in coming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scale of the humanitarian tragedy , the U.N. did try in December 2019 to increase its humanitarian aid mission in Idlib .
But the opening of new routes for the delivery of aid was blocked in the Security Council by Russia and China .
Their concern was that the increased U.N. assistance would help the armed opposition and jihadi groups .
There is no reason to think therefore that the U.N. could , in the imminent future , overcome this political obstacle and be an active player on the ground to address the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days of the Syria crisis , talk of an international intervention was scrapped due to Russia ’ s opposition .
The consequence of Western inaction then has been a decade-long war and untold human suffering in Syria—as well as a refugee crisis that has strained Turkey and caused political upheaval across Europe .
The window of opportunity for regime change in Syria is now closed .
But the West could and should still act on humanitarian grounds in Idlib despite Russian resistance .
Idlib is a textbook case of the sort of situation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But a broken system of international governance that ensures U.N. inaction means that the only option therefore is for Western nations to lead in the establishment of a “ coalition of the willing ” outside the U.N. umbrella .
The aim would be to bring in large-scale humanitarian assistance to the displaced population of Idlib .
A joint European Union-NATO humanitarian mission would allow the EU civilian mission to rely on NATO protection .
The NATO-backed military component would be necessary to protect the zone from Syrian aggression .
After its strategic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at least strive to protect civilians caught in Idlib—moving beyond a superficial interest in their fate and relying on Turkey to open its borders .
The proposed formula for Western action would require the U.S. government to accept NATO to serve a primarily civilian mission to be led by the EU in northwestern Syria .
It would also compel Turkey to give up its political objective of retaining control in Idlib and abetting its motley crew of proxy groups .
Most importantly , it would test whether Europe is indeed ready to speak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its new leadership .
The emergence of a humanitarian crisis near Europe ’ s borders unrivaled in its severity since the Yugoslav wars should convince Western nations to reassess the risks of nonintervention .

In its latest convulsion, the war in Syria has produced its biggest humanitarian calamity yet. But the world’s attention is focused elsewhere. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s military operation targeting Idlib, in the northwest of the country, has uprooted more than 900,000 civilians—the majority of them women and children—according to United Nations figures.
In its latest convulsion, the war in Syria has produced its biggest humanitarian calamity yet. But the world’s attention is focused elsewhere. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s military operation targeting Idlib, in the northwest of the country, has uprooted more than 900,000 civilians—the majority of them women and children—according to United Nations figures.
These internally displaced persons have found temporary refuge near the Turkish border in makeshift camps under harsh winter conditions. The latest U.N. report showcases several examples of displaced civilians burning their few belongings to fight the cold. Already, many children have died.
A humanitarian crisis of this scale should have already galvanized the international community to launch a coordinated campaign to end this suffering. But, so far, regional and global politics have stymied such efforts. And in the absence of any outside intervention, the conflict is likely to further aggravate the humanitarian consequences.
One reason is that the Syrian regime, with Russian backing, is pushing ahead to reconquer territory held by opposition forces. The Assad regime and Iranian-backed Shiite militias have used brutal tactics with the aim of depopulating Idlib so regime forces can more effectively control this territory with a predominantly Sunni population.
The international community has so far looked the other way, allowing the Assad regime’s progress because of the presence of myriad jihadis in Idlib, including al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Suqour al-Sham Brigades. Idlib incidentally became a safe haven for many of these groups, which have been forced to relocate as they gradually lost territory in other parts of Syria to government forces.
In the absence of a clear policy related to the repatriation of these foreign fighters, most Western countries favor an outcome where these jihadis would end up being killed in Syria and never make it back to their original countries. This is also the argument espoused by Damascus and Moscow to justify the Idlib operation.
In this equation, the only country that remains directly exposed to the negative consequences of the Idlib operation is Turkey. Already host to more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees, Turkey justifiably fears another refugee wave that could force Turkish policymakers to open the country’s borders to yet another million people under duress.
That is also one reason why Ankara has amassed forces at the border, carried out several retaliatory strikes on Syrian forces after being targeted, and threatened the Syrian regime with further military action should the advance continue. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave an ultimatum to Damascus with a deadline of Feb. 29, seeking to force Syrian troops to relinquish part of the territory they acquired in Idlib. Erdogan is asking the regime forces to move back east of the strategically important M5 highway linking Damascus to Aleppo. Such a move would lessen the pressure on the refugees.
Many observers believe that with Russian mediation Ankara and Damascus will reach a temporary truce, consolidating their current positions on the ground. But talks have not produced an agreement yet, and the situation remains precarious with no guarantee of a negotiated outcome. In addition, even if the Syrian regime buckles under Turkish pressure and agrees to suspend its current campaign, it could easily resume it in coming weeks and months.
Having acknowledged the scale of the humanitarian tragedy, the U.N. did try in December 2019 to increase its humanitarian aid mission in Idlib. But the opening of new routes for the delivery of aid was blocked in the Security Council by Russia and China. Their concern was that the increased U.N. assistance would help the armed opposition and jihadi groups. There is no reason to think therefore that the U.N. could, in the imminent future, overcome this political obstacle and be an active player on the ground to address the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.
In the early days of the Syria crisis, talk of an international intervention was scrapped due to Russia’s opposition. The consequence of Western inaction then has been a decade-long war and untold human suffering in Syria—as well as a refugee crisis that has strained Turkey and caused political upheaval across Europe. The window of opportunity for regime change in Syria is now closed. But the West could and should still act on humanitarian grounds in Idlib despite Russian resistance.
Idlib is a textbook case of the sort of situation in which international humanitarian intervention is warranted. But a broken system of international governance that ensures U.N. inaction means that the only option therefore is for Western nations to lead in the establishment of a “coalition of the willing” outside the U.N. umbrella.
The aim would be to bring in large-scale humanitarian assistance to the displaced population of Idlib. A joint European Union-NATO humanitarian mission would allow the EU civilian mission to rely on NATO protection. The NATO-backed military component would be necessary to protect the zone from Syrian aggression.
After its strategic failure in Syria, the West should at least strive to protect civilians caught in Idlib—moving beyond a superficial interest in their fate and relying on Turkey to open its borders. The proposed formula for Western action would require the U.S. government to accept NATO to serve a primarily civilian mission to be led by the EU in northwestern Syria. It would also compel Turkey to give up its political objective of retaining control in Idlib and abetting its motley crew of proxy groups.
Most importantly, it would test whether Europe is indeed ready to speak the language of power as claimed by its new leadership. The emergence of a humanitarian crisis near Europe’s borders unrivaled in its severity since the Yugoslav wars should convince Western nations to reassess the risks of nonintervention.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Coronavirus Fears Halt U.S. Military Exercises

Welcome to Foreign Policy ’ s Security Brief .
What ’ s on tap today : The United States and South Korea have postponed plans for a joint military exercise over coronavirus fears , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testifies before Congress on Middle East policy , and the British government unveils plans for new nukes .
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday , please sign up here .
The United States and South Korea have postponed annual joint military exercises until further notice amid the coronavirus outbreak .
The announcement comes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 28,500 service members stationed in South Korea tested positive for the virus the virus .
The South Korean military has tracked nearly two dozen cases of the virus among its ranks .
The news presents one of the starkest examples yet of the effects of the virus on U.S. national security as it spreads across Asia , the Middle East , and Europe .
South Korea has recorded over 1,500 coronavirus cases in recent days , leading the State Department to issue a warning to U.S. citizens to reconsider traveling to the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Control has tracked over 80,000 cases and 2,700 deaths globally .
U.S. bases in Europe brace for impact .
The head of U.S. European Command , Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters , told a congressional panel this week that he is preparing for the possibility of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe put on lockdown or facing restrictions on movement as the virus spreads across Italy and more cases are expected in Germany , Military.com reports .
Knocking on America ’ s door .
In a news conference on Wednesday , U.S. President @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as global financial markets took a significant hit , saying his administration was on top of the response and insisting the threat to Americans was “ very low.
” Stock markets continued to decline on Thursday .
As Trump spoke , the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) confirmed a virus case in Northern California in a person who hadn ’ t traveled outside the United States , an indicator the disease is spreading locally .
“ Ultimately , we expect we will see coronavirus spread in this country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ CDC official , said on Tuesday .
“ It ’ s not so much a question of if , but a question of when.
” Pompeo testifies before Congress .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is scheduled to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Friday .
The hearing could be fiery , as Democrats prepare to grill the top diplomat on the Trump administration ’ s Middle East policy .
It presents the first opportunity for lawmakers to press Pompeo on the Trump administration ’ s justification for assassinating Iranian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ last month .
The administration insists it did so to head off an “ imminent ” attack on U.S. interests , but some Democratic lawmakers briefed on the intelligence remain skeptical .
New British nukes .
British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace announced in a written statement to Parliament that the United Kingdom was in the process of developing a new nuclear warhead for its Trident submarine fleet .
Wallace ’ s announcement confirmed earlier reports from U.S. defense officials .
David Cullen , the director at the U.K.-based Nuclear Information Service , said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identical ” to a warhead currently used by the United States .
U.S. officials welcomed the news as a sign that cooperation between the United States and United Kingdom on nuclear weapons development will continue after Brexit .
Locust swarms wreak havoc in East Africa .
Swarms of locusts are descending on East Africa in numbers not seen in decades , a crisis that could exacerbate regional conflicts and undercut food security for one of the world ’ s most impoverished places .
Foreign Policy spoke to Mark Green , head of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warned that if the swarms aren ’ t eradicated , it could plunge 3 million people into food insecurity .
“ You really have to go back to decades ago in the U.S. , to Dust Bowl days , to understand just how devastating this can be .
So it really is a crisis , ” he said .
State ’ s new acting envoy for international organizations .
A longtime political appointee at the State Department , Pam Pryor , became the new acting envoy for international organizations this month .
Pryor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , is transitioning from her role as a senior advisor on democracy human rights issues .
She replaces Kevin Moley , who stepped down after Foreign Policy wrote a series of reports on allegations of mismanagement that led to congressional and State watchdog investigations .
Intel community shake-up .
New U.S. intelligence chief Ric Grenell wasted no time shaking up the Office of National Intelligence .
Shortly after his appointment , Grenell hired another Trump loyalist , Kash Patel , to serve as one of his senior advisors .
Patel is a former @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a reputation as a Trump stalwart after playing a key role in helping congressional Republicans discredit the Russia probe .
New face at the Pentagon .
The White House nominated William Jordan Gillis , a U.S. Army official , to fill the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment at the Department of Defense replacing Robert McMahon , who left the position in November 2019 with a wave of senior staff who left at the end of last year .
And another .
Gregory Kausner , the former deputy director of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ replaced Tina Kaidanow as head of the Pentagon ’ s International Cooperation Office .
Kaidanow was also part of the wave of senior defense officials to leave the Pentagon late last year .
Moves in academia .
Mike Horowitz , a prominent academic on national security issues , has been named director of the University of Pennsylvania ’ s global affairs institute , Perry World House .
Horowitz is a consultant on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and previously worked at the Pentagon .
Afghan peace deal deadline .
U.S. Secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week that if the reduction of violence in Afghanistan holds , a peace deal is expected to be signed with the Taliban on Saturday , Feb. 29 .
The peace deal is almost identical to a draft version tabled last September .
Then , Washington promised to withdraw thousands of troops in exchange for assurances that the Taliban will not harbor terrorist groups hostile to the West .
Divine intervention .
Pope Francis has asked Catholics across the world to quit bashing each other on social media , urging them to give up @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leads to Easter .
“ Today , people insult each other as if they were saying ‘ Good Day , ’ ” he said .
That ’ s it for today .
For more from FP , subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or typos to securitybrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The United States and South Korea have postponed plans for a joint military exercise over coronavirus fears , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testifies before Congress on Middle East policy, and the British government unveils plans for new nukes .
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Security Brief. What’s on tap today: The United States and South Korea have postponed plans for a joint military exercise over coronavirus fears, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testifies before Congress on Middle East policy, and the British government unveils plans for new nukes.
If you would like to receive Security Brief in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Coronavirus Upends U.S. Military Plans in Asia
The United States and South Korea have postponed annual joint military exercises until further notice amid the coronavirus outbreak. The announcement comes after the U.S. military reported one its 28,500 service members stationed in South Korea tested positive for the virus the virus. The South Korean military has tracked nearly two dozen cases of the virus among its ranks.
The news presents one of the starkest examples yet of the effects of the virus on U.S. national security as it spreads across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. South Korea has recorded over 1,500 coronavirus cases in recent days, leading the State Department to issue a warning to U.S. citizens to reconsider traveling to the country. Overall, the Center for Disease Control has tracked over 80,000 cases and 2,700 deaths globally.
U.S. bases in Europe brace for impact. The head of U.S. European Command, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, told a congressional panel this week that he is preparing for the possibility of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe put on lockdown or facing restrictions on movement as the virus spreads across Italy and more cases are expected in Germany, Military.com reports.
Knocking on America’s door. In a news conference on Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump sought to allay growing fears as global financial markets took a significant hit, saying his administration was on top of the response and insisting the threat to Americans was “very low.” Stock markets continued to decline on Thursday.
As Trump spoke, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed a virus case in Northern California in a person who hadn’t traveled outside the United States, an indicator the disease is spreading locally. “Ultimately, we expect we will see coronavirus spread in this country,” Nancy Messonnier, a senior CDC official, said on Tuesday. “It’s not so much a question of if, but a question of when.”
What We’re Watching
Pompeo testifies before Congress. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is scheduled to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Friday. The hearing could be fiery, as Democrats prepare to grill the top diplomat on the Trump administration’s Middle East policy. It presents the first opportunity for lawmakers to press Pompeo on the Trump administration’s justification for assassinating Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani in a strike last month. The administration insists it did so to head off an “imminent” attack on U.S. interests, but some Democratic lawmakers briefed on the intelligence remain skeptical.
New British nukes. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace announced in a written statement to Parliament that the United Kingdom was in the process of developing a new nuclear warhead for its Trident submarine fleet. Wallace’s announcement confirmed earlier reports from U.S. defense officials. David Cullen, the director at the U.K.-based Nuclear Information Service, said that the new warhead is “virtually identical” to a warhead currently used by the United States. U.S. officials welcomed the news as a sign that cooperation between the United States and United Kingdom on nuclear weapons development will continue after Brexit.
Locust swarms wreak havoc in East Africa. Swarms of locusts are descending on East Africa in numbers not seen in decades, a crisis that could exacerbate regional conflicts and undercut food security for one of the world’s most impoverished places. Foreign Policy spoke to Mark Green, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who warned that if the swarms aren’t eradicated, it could plunge 3 million people into food insecurity. “You really have to go back to decades ago in the U.S., to Dust Bowl days, to understand just how devastating this can be. So it really is a crisis,” he said.
Movers and Shakers
State’s new acting envoy for international organizations. A longtime political appointee at the State Department, Pam Pryor, became the new acting envoy for international organizations this month. Pryor, a former aide to Sarah Palin, is transitioning from her role as a senior advisor on democracy human rights issues. She replaces Kevin Moley, who stepped down after Foreign Policy wrote a series of reports on allegations of mismanagement that led to congressional and State watchdog investigations.
Intel community shake-up. New U.S. intelligence chief Ric Grenell wasted no time shaking up the Office of National Intelligence. Shortly after his appointment, Grenell hired another Trump loyalist, Kash Patel, to serve as one of his senior advisors. Patel is a former senior National Security Council official and earned a reputation as a Trump stalwart after playing a key role in helping congressional Republicans discredit the Russia probe.
New face at the Pentagon. The White House nominated William Jordan Gillis, a U.S. Army official, to fill the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment at the Department of Defense replacing Robert McMahon, who left the position in November 2019 with a wave of senior staff who left at the end of last year.
And another. Gregory Kausner, the former deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, has officially replaced Tina Kaidanow as head of the Pentagon’s International Cooperation Office. Kaidanow was also part of the wave of senior defense officials to leave the Pentagon late last year.
Moves in academia. Mike Horowitz, a prominent academic on national security issues, has been named director of the University of Pennsylvania’s global affairs institute, Perry World House. Horowitz is a consultant on the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence and previously worked at the Pentagon.
The Week Ahead
Afghan peace deal deadline. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced earlier this week that if the reduction of violence in Afghanistan holds, a peace deal is expected to be signed with the Taliban on Saturday, Feb. 29. The peace deal is almost identical to a draft version tabled last September. Then, Washington promised to withdraw thousands of troops in exchange for assurances that the Taliban will not harbor terrorist groups hostile to the West.
Odds and Ends Newsworthy? A former top French intelligence official, Alain Juillet of the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), has a new role at RT, Russia’s state-backed propaganda outlet, according to French media. Juillet will offer twice-monthly segments on geopolitical issues. The move is bound to have some Western intelligence officials shaking their heads.
Divine intervention. Pope Francis has asked Catholics across the world to quit bashing each other on social media, urging them to give up trolling for Lent, the season that leads to Easter. “Today, people insult each other as if they were saying ‘Good Day,’” he said.
That’s it for today. For more from FP, subscribe here or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or typos to securitybrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-02-27--Why Israel’s Political System Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed

Why Israel ’ s Political System Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed For the third time in less than a year , voters will head to the polls on Monday in a parliamentary election that ’ s supposed to decide whether Benjamin Netanyahu gets a fifth term as prime minister or challenger Benny Gantz , Israel ’ s former military chief , becomes the country ’ s new leader .
Two previous rounds of voting—one in April 2019 and a second in September—delivered deadlock : Each time , unsuccessful coalition negotiations gave way to decisions by Israel ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to dissolve itself and hold a new election .
The limbo is unprecedented in Israel ’ s 71-year history : The country has been operating on autopilot with a caretaker government since the end of 2018 .
And with polls predicting the same gridlocked parliament—neither a right-wing religious bloc nor a center-left bloc is forecast to get a 61-seat absolute majority—a fourth election seems like a realistic scenario .
“ It would be chaos .
I don ’ t even want to think about it , ” said Avraham Diskin , a political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Forum .
“ The whole system may collapse.
” Is Israel ’ s political system broken ?
Not necessarily , experts say , but it ’ s in trouble .
The paralysis stems from a confluence of factors .
The first is the looming corruption trial for a polarizing prime minister—Netanyahu ’ s first day in court is scheduled for just two weeks after election day .
That has clogged up parliamentary maneuvering , making a majority beyond reach .
“ The simple answer [ for the stalemate ] is Netanyahu .
Without @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government probably in April , definitely in September , ” said Reuven Hazan , a political science professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem .
“ The system did not produce deadlocks until last year .
If you look at the first 70 years of Israel and the first 20 elections we had , we always managed to put together a government.
” Israel ’ s longest-serving leader faces charges of fraud , breach of trust , and bribery in three cases—making Netanyahu the first sitting prime minister to go on trial .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s innocent , alleging instead that he ’ s the target of a biased media , the police , and prosecutors .
Despite that , Netanyahu has stubbornly clung to the premiership .
( There ’ s no legal requirement that he resign . )
He has kept members of his Likud party solidly behind him by arguing that he ’ s the only one capable of leading the country—he won a Likud primary challenge in December by a landslide .
Netanyahu has also convinced right-wing religious party allies to stay loyal , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vowed not to join a government under his rival .
Even though Gantz ’ s Blue and White party isn ’ t that different from Likud on many key issues , Gantz has refused to join a Netanyahu-led government , saying that he can ’ t lead the country and plead his case in court at the same time .
Much of his support draws from a constituency of center and left-wing voters who are virulently anti-Netanyahu .
“ It ’ s a matter of people who put an absolute veto on Netanyahu @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ m sure that if Netanyahu would step down , a national unity coalition would be formed immediately [ composed of Likud and Blue and White ] .
” The second complication is Israel ’ s tribal politics—parties based around social identity have become inflexible about whom they ’ ll partner with in a coalition .
Exhibit A : Yisrael Beiteinu , a party of secular right-wingers that appeals to Russian-speaking immigrants , refuses to join a coalition that relies on the three Jewish religious parties—alleging that they ’ re bent on turning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is led by former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman .
Over the years , Israel ’ s ultra-Orthodox parties have evolved from acting as kingmakers between the left and right blocs to solidly identified and loyal to the right-wing .
Meanwhile , the party representing Israel ’ s Arab minority—the Joint List—has been delegitimized by centrist and right-wing Israeli politicians as a group of terrorist-supporting lawmakers who oppose Israel ’ s definition as a Jewish state .
Nearly all the parties in the Knesset have ruled out sitting in a government with the Joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yisrael Beiteinu .
With identity politics as an electoral wedge , it ’ s more difficult for Israel ’ s proportional parliament system to deliver a decisive outcome .
“ Rather than political parties playing a role in mediating the conflicts between the groups , our electoral system instead creates an incentive to amplify those differences , ” said Yohanan Plesner , the president of the Israel Democracy Institute .
“ There are some inherent weaknesses in our democracy and election system that have been brought to the fore and need to be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that a reform conferring the premiership on the head of the party with the largest representation in the Knesset—even if that party does not win a majority of the seats—would mitigate the problem .
( Under the current system , a party head becomes prime minister only if he or she can assemble a majority coalition . )
Experts also believe that a law barring a prime minister from serving under indictment would prevent a repeat of the current paralysis .
But Bernard Avishai , a professor at Dartmouth College and an author @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the problem is beyond structural and goes to Israel ’ s lack of a constitution and a common set of political values .
“ If there are chickens coming home to roost , it ’ s not that there ’ s a political system that ’ s broken .
It ’ s a society that ’ s fractured , ” he said .
To be sure , for fragmentation and tribalism to roil elections isn ’ t unique to Israel .
Last November , Spain held its fourth election in four years .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ days in 2017 to form a government .
Nearly a decade ago , Belgium operated with a caretaker government for 18 months .
Diskin noted that ideological stalemates in European countries between World War I and II prompted the collapse of democracies and the rise of dictators .
Since the turn of the century , several democracies in Latin America and Europe facing similar issues regressed to authoritarianism .
In Israel , the electoral redundancy has meant less efficient governing .
The country has been led for almost a year now by interim @ @ @ @ @ @ @ budget issues and make key appointments .
As a result , a larger-than-anticipated budget deficit has gone unaddressed ; a new multiyear plan for the military has languished ; a much-needed infusion of funds for the health care system has failed to materialize ; and top appointments in the police department and state prosecutor ’ s office have been postponed .
“ Basically the government is paralyzed , ” Plesner said .
“ It ’ s unhealthy for our political culture.
” The rapid-fire votes are also threatening to depress turnout .
Voter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ points in the September election to 69.8 percent , but that could reverse itself , according to polls .
One poll conducted this month by the Yisrael Hayom newspaper and the i24News channel found 62 percent of respondents said they would definitely vote and another 24 percent said “ probably.
” According to the latest surveys , Likud and Blue and White are running neck and neck , suggesting an outcome similar to the one in the September vote .
The Joint List is projected as the third-largest party .
Lieberman ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the two blocs .
And though a fourth election is already being widely discussed , some analysts believe that the start of Netanyahu ’ s trial could make it more difficult for him to initiate a new round of voting .
“ [ The stalemate ] can really create legitimacy issues in this country , ” Hazan said .
“ And I think this already has started .
People are not seeing democratic government produce what it should.
” Correction , Feb. 27 , 2020 : Israel has been operating under a caretaker @ @ @ @ @ @ @ A previous version of this story misstated the year .

TEL AVIV, Israel—Israel is stuck in a political twilight zone.
For the third time in less than a year, voters will head to the polls on Monday in a parliamentary election that’s supposed to decide whether Benjamin Netanyahu gets a fifth term as prime minister or challenger Benny Gantz, Israel’s former military chief, becomes the country’s new leader.
Two previous rounds of voting—one in April 2019 and a second in September—delivered deadlock: Each time, unsuccessful coalition negotiations gave way to decisions by Israel’s 120-member parliament, the Knesset, to dissolve itself and hold a new election.
The limbo is unprecedented in Israel’s 71-year history: The country has been operating on autopilot with a caretaker government since the end of 2018. And with polls predicting the same gridlocked parliament—neither a right-wing religious bloc nor a center-left bloc is forecast to get a 61-seat absolute majority—a fourth election seems like a realistic scenario.
“It would be chaos. I don’t even want to think about it,” said Avraham Diskin, a political scientist and fellow at the Kohelet Policy Forum. “The whole system may collapse.”
Is Israel’s political system broken? Not necessarily, experts say, but it’s in trouble.
The paralysis stems from a confluence of factors. The first is the looming corruption trial for a polarizing prime minister—Netanyahu’s first day in court is scheduled for just two weeks after election day. That has clogged up parliamentary maneuvering, making a majority beyond reach.
“The simple answer [for the stalemate] is Netanyahu. Without him, we would have had a government probably in April, definitely in September,” said Reuven Hazan, a political science professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. “The system did not produce deadlocks until last year. If you look at the first 70 years of Israel and the first 20 elections we had, we always managed to put together a government.”
Israel’s longest-serving leader faces charges of fraud, breach of trust, and bribery in three cases—making Netanyahu the first sitting prime minister to go on trial. The prime minister has said he’s innocent, alleging instead that he’s the target of a biased media, the police, and prosecutors.
Despite that, Netanyahu has stubbornly clung to the premiership. (There’s no legal requirement that he resign.) He has kept members of his Likud party solidly behind him by arguing that he’s the only one capable of leading the country—he won a Likud primary challenge in December by a landslide. Netanyahu has also convinced right-wing religious party allies to stay loyal, organizing them into a bloc that has vowed not to join a government under his rival.
Even though Gantz’s Blue and White party isn’t that different from Likud on many key issues, Gantz has refused to join a Netanyahu-led government, saying that he can’t lead the country and plead his case in court at the same time. Much of his support draws from a constituency of center and left-wing voters who are virulently anti-Netanyahu.
“It’s a matter of people who put an absolute veto on Netanyahu,” Diskin said. “I’m sure that if Netanyahu would step down, a national unity coalition would be formed immediately [composed of Likud and Blue and White].”
The second complication is Israel’s tribal politics—parties based around social identity have become inflexible about whom they’ll partner with in a coalition.
Exhibit A: Yisrael Beiteinu, a party of secular right-wingers that appeals to Russian-speaking immigrants, refuses to join a coalition that relies on the three Jewish religious parties—alleging that they’re bent on turning Israel into a theocracy. The party is led by former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman.
Over the years, Israel’s ultra-Orthodox parties have evolved from acting as kingmakers between the left and right blocs to solidly identified and loyal to the right-wing.
Meanwhile, the party representing Israel’s Arab minority—the Joint List—has been delegitimized by centrist and right-wing Israeli politicians as a group of terrorist-supporting lawmakers who oppose Israel’s definition as a Jewish state. Nearly all the parties in the Knesset have ruled out sitting in a government with the Joint List, including Blue and White and Yisrael Beiteinu.
With identity politics as an electoral wedge, it’s more difficult for Israel’s proportional parliament system to deliver a decisive outcome.
“Rather than political parties playing a role in mediating the conflicts between the groups, our electoral system instead creates an incentive to amplify those differences,” said Yohanan Plesner, the president of the Israel Democracy Institute. “There are some inherent weaknesses in our democracy and election system that have been brought to the fore and need to be remedied.”
Scholars at the institute believe that a reform conferring the premiership on the head of the party with the largest representation in the Knesset—even if that party does not win a majority of the seats—would mitigate the problem. (Under the current system, a party head becomes prime minister only if he or she can assemble a majority coalition.)
Experts also believe that a law barring a prime minister from serving under indictment would prevent a repeat of the current paralysis.
But Bernard Avishai, a professor at Dartmouth College and an author of numerous books on Israel, says the problem is beyond structural and goes to Israel’s lack of a constitution and a common set of political values.
“If there are chickens coming home to roost, it’s not that there’s a political system that’s broken. It’s a society that’s fractured,” he said.
To be sure, for fragmentation and tribalism to roil elections isn’t unique to Israel. Last November, Spain held its fourth election in four years. It took the Netherlands more than 200 days in 2017 to form a government. Nearly a decade ago, Belgium operated with a caretaker government for 18 months.
Diskin noted that ideological stalemates in European countries between World War I and II prompted the collapse of democracies and the rise of dictators. Since the turn of the century, several democracies in Latin America and Europe facing similar issues regressed to authoritarianism.
In Israel, the electoral redundancy has meant less efficient governing. The country has been led for almost a year now by interim governments that have limited authority to address budget issues and make key appointments. As a result, a larger-than-anticipated budget deficit has gone unaddressed; a new multiyear plan for the military has languished; a much-needed infusion of funds for the health care system has failed to materialize; and top appointments in the police department and state prosecutor’s office have been postponed.
“Basically the government is paralyzed,” Plesner said. “It’s unhealthy for our political culture.”
The rapid-fire votes are also threatening to depress turnout. Voter participation unexpectedly ticked up by 1.4 percentage points in the September election to 69.8 percent, but that could reverse itself, according to polls. One poll conducted this month by the Yisrael Hayom newspaper and the i24News channel found 62 percent of respondents said they would definitely vote and another 24 percent said “probably.”
According to the latest surveys, Likud and Blue and White are running neck and neck, suggesting an outcome similar to the one in the September vote. The Joint List is projected as the third-largest party. Lieberman’s party will likely hold the balance between the two blocs. And though a fourth election is already being widely discussed, some analysts believe that the start of Netanyahu’s trial could make it more difficult for him to initiate a new round of voting.
“[The stalemate] can really create legitimacy issues in this country,” Hazan said. “And I think this already has started. People are not seeing democratic government produce what it should.”
Correction, Feb. 27, 2020: Israel has been operating under a caretaker government since the end of 2018. A previous version of this story misstated the year.