foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Can Europe Come Together to Save Itself?

Can Europe Come Together to Save Itself ?
Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : European leaders meet to discuss coronavirus measures , Australia apologizes for war crimes in Afghanistan , the Trump administration continues maximum pressure against Iran .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
European Union heads of state meet today as tensions are rising both between member states and between the bloc ’ s institutions .
Today ’ s summit was supposed to include a briefing on the latest developments on Brexit trade talks , but movement has been so slow that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not expected to brief leaders .
The pace of talks , and what kind of deal a soon-to-retire Barnier may accept , is causing anxiety among member states .
With the hard deadline of Jan. 1 , 2021 fast approaching , EU leaders are to call for the publication of the European Commission ’ s plans for a no-deal scenario , a signal that their faith in Barnier ’ s negotiating team is not rock solid .
Bickering over a bailout .
The coronavirus pandemic—and how to deal with it—tops the agenda for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ before any public health measures can be discussed , member states must first agree on the roughly $ 890 billion economic recovery fund .
On Monday , Poland and Hungary withdrew their support for the measure over legislation that would tie the distribution of the funds to respect for the rule of law in EU countries .
The legislation is meant to address allegations of democratic backsliding in the two countries , something that Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has bristled at .
“ We say yes to the European Union , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no to mechanisms that mean Poland and other countries are treated unequally , ” he said .
Although coronavirus cases are now on the decline across the continent , three countries—France , Spain , and Italy—are in the global top 10 countries with the highest number of new coronavirus cases daily .
A special relationship .
As EU countries suffer , so does the United States .
The U.S. death toll from the coronavirus surpassed 250,000 on Wednesday , and new cases have not dropped lower than 100,000 per day since Nov. 4 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ powers are in stark contrast to those in the Asia-Pacific region , where most countries eschewed the false choice between economic health and public health and pursued an aggressive approach to tackling the virus .
Vietnam saw only 12 new cases on Wednesday ; Taiwan has recorded 607 cases over the course of the entire pandemic ; On Wednesday , Australia hosted the largest gathering in the world since March , when almost 50,000 people filled Suncorp Stadium in Brisbane for a rugby match .
American exceptionalism kills .
So why is the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ flatten the curve ?
FP ’ s James Palmer has a theory : stubborn exceptionalism and disbelief .
Writing in Foreign Policy , Palmer expands on “ an idea that has dominated American ( and to some degree , European ) responses since the start of the pandemic : This can ’ t really be happening.
” Australia publishes war crimes report .
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has publicly apologized to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani following the publication of a damning report into murders of civilians committed by Australian special forces in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 39 Afghans were unlawfully killed in 23 incidents that all meet the criteria of murder .
Among other shocking revelations , the report reveals that Special Air Service ( SAS ) non-commissioned officers “ allegedly demanded junior soldiers “ blood ” themselves by shooting unarmed prisoners , and then planted weapons to cover up these crimes , while falsifying reports about what happened , ” according to the Sydney Morning Herald .
The SAS 2nd Squadron will be disbanded and up to 19 soldiers could face prosecution , including a decorated veteran-turned-media executive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ til the end .
The Trump administration added more roadblocks to the incoming Biden administration ’ s Iran policy by announcing more sanctions on a foundation controlled by Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and 10 individuals .
All U.S. assets of those sanctioned have been frozen and anyone doing business with them could also be subject to sanctions .
Iran ’ s United Nations spokesman called the sanctions “ a sign of desperation.
” Speaking on Wednesday , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo defended the U.S. maximum pressure @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Biden administration .
“ Reducing that pressure is a dangerous choice , bound to weaken new partnerships for peace in the region and strengthen only the Islamic Republic , ” he said .
Ebola eradicated in DRC .
An Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is over , six months after it began .
The World Health Organization certified that no new cases have been detected in Congo ’ s Equateur province for 42 days , bringing an end to an outbreak that killed 55 people .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the beginning of the outbreak , which has stirred hopes of a coronavirus vaccine being distributed in the country a similar way because , like the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines , the Ebola vaccine must be transported and stored at super cold temperatures .
Trump at APEC .
U.S. President Donald Trump plans to attend the virtual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC ) summit on Friday , his first appearance at the annual gathering since he assumed the presidency .
Malaysia is the host this year , and Chinese President Xi Jinping is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is likely the last gathering of world leaders Trump will be a part of before he leaves office , after the White House said on Wednesday that they have no plans for hosting a G-7 summit following one that was cancelled in June .
In January , the presidency of the G-7 passes to the United Kingdom .
Ghana corruption in the spotlight as election looms .
Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo has denied any impropriety after the country ’ s anti-corruption chief , Martin Amidu , resigned earlier this week , claiming interference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ allegations as “ errors of fact.
” When Amidu was appointed two years ago , there were high hopes that he could stamp out corruption among government officials .
His resignation comes just a few weeks before the country goes to the polls to decide whether to re-elect Akufo-Addo .
U.K. defense spending .
The United Kingdom is to beef up its post-Brexit defense spending after Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a further $ 21.8 billion would be added to the existing budget of roughly $ 55 billion .
The funds will be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the formation of groups covering artificial intelligence , cyberdefense , and space security .
According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , the extra expenditure should see the United Kingdom leapfrog NATO allies France and Germany to become the sixth-highest military spender worldwide , one place behind Saudi Arabia .
MAX returns .
The Boeing 737-MAX has been cleared to fly again after receiving approval from U.S. regulators , who mandated fixes to the plane along with extra training for pilots .
The planes were grounded in March 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ killing 346 people .
American Airlines will be the first carrier to resume using the plane , starting with a Miami-New York route on December 29 .
Approvals from foreign regulators are expected to follow soon .
If you feel silly for not purchasing Moderna or BioNTech shares before the news of their blockbuster vaccine trial results broke , things could be worse .
New filings show that hedge funds sold 1.9 million shares in BioNTech and 2.2 million shares in Moderna between the beginning and end of the third quarter of 2020 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as stock prices of both companies surged in November .
It ’ s believed that investors sold their stakes in order to lock in gains before a potentially volatile environment following the U.S. presidential election .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: European leaders meet to discuss coronavirus measures, Australia apologizes for war crimes in Afghanistan , the Trump administration continues maximum pressure against Iran .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: European leaders meet to discuss coronavirus measures, Australia apologizes for war crimes in Afghanistan, the Trump administration continues maximum pressure against Iran.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Europe’s Leaders Meet Amid Discord Over Recovery Package and Brexit
European Union heads of state meet today as tensions are rising both between member states and between the bloc’s institutions.
Today’s summit was supposed to include a briefing on the latest developments on Brexit trade talks, but movement has been so slow that EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier is now not expected to brief leaders.
The pace of talks, and what kind of deal a soon-to-retire Barnier may accept, is causing anxiety among member states. With the hard deadline of Jan. 1, 2021 fast approaching, EU leaders are to call for the publication of the European Commission’s plans for a no-deal scenario, a signal that their faith in Barnier’s negotiating team is not rock solid.
Bickering over a bailout. The coronavirus pandemic—and how to deal with it—tops the agenda for today’s virtual meeting. But before any public health measures can be discussed, member states must first agree on the roughly $890 billion economic recovery fund. On Monday, Poland and Hungary withdrew their support for the measure over legislation that would tie the distribution of the funds to respect for the rule of law in EU countries.
The legislation is meant to address allegations of democratic backsliding in the two countries, something that Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has bristled at. “We say yes to the European Union, but no to being punished like children, no to mechanisms that mean Poland and other countries are treated unequally,” he said.
Although coronavirus cases are now on the decline across the continent, three countries—France, Spain, and Italy—are in the global top 10 countries with the highest number of new coronavirus cases daily.
A special relationship. As EU countries suffer, so does the United States. The U.S. death toll from the coronavirus surpassed 250,000 on Wednesday, and new cases have not dropped lower than 100,000 per day since Nov. 4.
The fortunes of the two Western powers are in stark contrast to those in the Asia-Pacific region, where most countries eschewed the false choice between economic health and public health and pursued an aggressive approach to tackling the virus. Vietnam saw only 12 new cases on Wednesday; Taiwan has recorded 607 cases over the course of the entire pandemic; On Wednesday, Australia hosted the largest gathering in the world since March, when almost 50,000 people filled Suncorp Stadium in Brisbane for a rugby match.
American exceptionalism kills. So why is the U.S. government still failing while poorer countries flatten the curve? FP’s James Palmer has a theory: stubborn exceptionalism and disbelief. Writing in Foreign Policy, Palmer expands on “an idea that has dominated American (and to some degree, European) responses since the start of the pandemic: This can’t really be happening.”
What We’re Following Today
Australia publishes war crimes report. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has publicly apologized to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani following the publication of a damning report into murders of civilians committed by Australian special forces in Afghanistan. The government-sanctioned report found that 39 Afghans were unlawfully killed in 23 incidents that all meet the criteria of murder.
Among other shocking revelations, the report reveals that Special Air Service (SAS) non-commissioned officers “allegedly demanded junior soldiers “blood” themselves by shooting unarmed prisoners, and then planted weapons to cover up these crimes, while falsifying reports about what happened,” according to the Sydney Morning Herald. The SAS 2nd Squadron will be disbanded and up to 19 soldiers could face prosecution, including a decorated veteran-turned-media executive, Ben Roberts-Smith.
‘Maximum pressure’ til the end. The Trump administration added more roadblocks to the incoming Biden administration’s Iran policy by announcing more sanctions on a foundation controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and 10 individuals. All U.S. assets of those sanctioned have been frozen and anyone doing business with them could also be subject to sanctions. Iran’s United Nations spokesman called the sanctions “a sign of desperation.” Speaking on Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo defended the U.S. maximum pressure campaign against Iran and offered a warning to the Biden administration. “Reducing that pressure is a dangerous choice, bound to weaken new partnerships for peace in the region and strengthen only the Islamic Republic,” he said.
Ebola eradicated in DRC. An Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is over, six months after it began. The World Health Organization certified that no new cases have been detected in Congo’s Equateur province for 42 days, bringing an end to an outbreak that killed 55 people. A new Ebola vaccine had been deployed from the beginning of the outbreak, which has stirred hopes of a coronavirus vaccine being distributed in the country a similar way because, like the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, the Ebola vaccine must be transported and stored at super cold temperatures.
Keep an Eye On Trump at APEC. U.S. President Donald Trump plans to attend the virtual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on Friday, his first appearance at the annual gathering since he assumed the presidency. Malaysia is the host this year, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is also attending the videoconference summit. It is likely the last gathering of world leaders Trump will be a part of before he leaves office, after the White House said on Wednesday that they have no plans for hosting a G-7 summit following one that was cancelled in June. In January, the presidency of the G-7 passes to the United Kingdom. Ghana corruption in the spotlight as election looms. Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo has denied any impropriety after the country’s anti-corruption chief, Martin Amidu, resigned earlier this week, claiming interference from the president. Akufo-Addo described the allegations as “errors of fact.” When Amidu was appointed two years ago, there were high hopes that he could stamp out corruption among government officials. His resignation comes just a few weeks before the country goes to the polls to decide whether to re-elect Akufo-Addo. U.K. defense spending. The United Kingdom is to beef up its post-Brexit defense spending after Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a further $21.8 billion would be added to the existing budget of roughly $55 billion. The funds will be spent across four years and will lead to the formation of groups covering artificial intelligence, cyberdefense, and space security. According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the extra expenditure should see the United Kingdom leapfrog NATO allies France and Germany to become the sixth-highest military spender worldwide, one place behind Saudi Arabia.
MAX returns. The Boeing 737-MAX has been cleared to fly again after receiving approval from U.S. regulators, who mandated fixes to the plane along with extra training for pilots. The planes were grounded in March 2019 after two of the planes crashed, killing 346 people. American Airlines will be the first carrier to resume using the plane, starting with a Miami-New York route on December 29. Approvals from foreign regulators are expected to follow soon.
Odds and Ends
If you feel silly for not purchasing Moderna or BioNTech shares before the news of their blockbuster vaccine trial results broke, things could be worse. New filings show that hedge funds sold 1.9 million shares in BioNTech and 2.2 million shares in Moderna between the beginning and end of the third quarter of 2020, missing out on a potential bonanza as stock prices of both companies surged in November. It’s believed that investors sold their stakes in order to lock in gains before a potentially volatile environment following the U.S. presidential election.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-19--Trump Abused U.S. Sanctions and Failed to Get Results. Biden Can Do Better.

Trump Abused U.S. Sanctions and Failed to Get Results .
Biden Can Do Better .
This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
Now that Joe Biden has won the 2020 U.S. presidential election , pundits , policy wonks , and lawmakers are focusing on the policy shifts that a Biden administration could pursue in order to repair the damage done by President Donald Trump .
One area where a significant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ application of terrorism sanctions .
The Trump administration ’ s use of sanctions across the board—such as the designations of foreign terrorist organizations , terrorist designations made under executive order authority , and the sanctioning of state sponsors of terrorism—have been based on sloganeering and politics .
Slogans such as “ maximum-pressure sanctions , ” directed against Iran and others , have replaced other tools of statecraft , such as diplomacy .
The resulting byproduct , a punitive U.S. sanctions regime instead of a preventative one that stops bad actors from accessing the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has roiled allies and entrenched enemies .
Simply put , the Trump administration ’ s use of sanctions has become a bludgeon—one that is undermining broader U.S. national security interests—instead of a scalpel that could help achieve U.S. policy objectives and alliances .
First , the Biden administration should work closely with lawmakers to amend the sanctions-related sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( INA ) —the underlying law that guides the State Department ’ s use of foreign terrorist organization ( FTO ) designations .
The last substantive amendment to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ made in 2004 .
Since then , the terrorism threat has significantly evolved because of the ubiquity of the internet and connections terrorist groups can forge via a wide array of social media platforms .
This is especially true of the threat posed by radical right-wing groups that espouse white supremacist views .
For these groups , alliances are not based merely upon geographic borders but are instead developed because of access to encrypted communications platforms , virtual private networks , and online social networks .
These communications occur beyond the contours of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of “ foreign ” and its interpretation by the State Department obsolete .
Revising and updating this provision is vitally important , because currently the first legal criterion relevant to a group ’ s possible designation as an FTO is where it is physically based .
In this day and age , any effective laws must consider the group ’ s cyber-reach and international connections , not just where the group ’ s leadership may be physically situated .
Second , the Biden administration should require deadlines for the FTO review period .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , it gave the State Department more latitude in conducting its legally required FTO reviews .
Instead of evaluating FTOs every two years , Congress allowed the State Department to begin a review of an FTO ’ s status every five years , but Congress did not require the review to be completed by the end of the fifth year .
In giving the State Department this ambiguous deadline , some defunct groups have remained on the FTO list for political reasons when legally they should have been removed .
One example is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ right-wing Jewish group , an organization that has been dormant for more than a decade but was last reviewed in 2010 .
Politically , Kahane Chai has remained on the list because of concerns that there would be blowback from the Arab world if it ’ s removed .
But there are easy solutions to this political dilemma .
The State Department , for instance , could add other right-wing Jewish radical groups to the FTO list that meet the legal criteria .
Since 2010 , there have been a few—such as Lehava @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chai ’ s deadly footsteps , are still active , and may be eligible for designation .
Another case of an overdue delisting is the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group , better known by the acronym ETA—an ethnonationalist separatist organization that carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Spain for decades but should now be removed from the FTO list .
ETA , according to the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database , hasn ’ t carried out an act of violence since at least 2011 .
Moreover , the group in 2017 gave @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and in May 2018 the organization announced in its last audio message that it “ completely dismantled all of its structures ” and will , “ no longer express political positions , promote initiatives , or interact with other actors.
” When groups modify their behavior and come in from the cold , it is imperative that they be delisted .
Delistings acknowledge new realities—namely that terrorism and terrorist groups do end .
And , very importantly , delistings demonstrate the dynamism that is so key to maintaining a credible listing regime .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ world , or elsewhere—are no excuse for keeping defunct groups on the list .
The INA , after all , does not provide for FTOs to remain on the list for political reasons .
That ’ s why Congress , in collaboration with the Biden administration , should amend the INA and require the State Department to start and complete its FTO reviews before the five years elapse .
Failure to do that would automatically result in the FTO listing to lapse .
Doing that will ensure the FTO list remains factually credible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ administration should use FTO authorities under Executive Order 13224—which provides the State and Treasury departments the ability to sanction organizations and individuals as terrorists as a tactical tool against radical right-wing groups .
The fact that the Trump administration hasn ’ t used the power of FTO sanctions against any white supremacist group demonstrates that the Trump team isn ’ t taking the menace these groups pose seriously or , even worse , has decided it would send the wrong message to an important segment of his political base .
By all indications @ @ @ @ @ @ @ home by right-wing groups is greater than that of Salafi-jihadi groups .
For that reason , among many others , the first new FTO designation Biden ’ s secretary of state should announce must be a white supremacist group .
Sadly , there are many to choose from .
For example , neo-Nazi groups such as the National Socialist Order ( formerly known as the Atomwaffen Division ) have a domestic presence while also maintaining alliances with overseas networks .
Fourth , Biden should scrap Trump ’ s maximum pressure sanctions campaign targeting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ continue to sanction Iran ’ s proxies , such as Lebanese Hezbollah , there have been no benefits to the United States by turning its back on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran .
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently seemed to acknowledge this failure when he tweeted that Iran has expanded its uranium stockpile on the Trump administration ’ s watch .
Instead of bringing Iran to the negotiating table again , the administration ’ s tactics have prompted Iran and much of the international community to ignore U.S. unilateral efforts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Iran , it ’ s imperative that broader U.S. interests drive sanctions policy , not the reverse .
That means finding and creating diplomatic and multilateral solutions to rein in Iran ’ s weapon of mass destruction ambitions .
To date , nobody has come up with a better plan than the 2015 deal .
Fifth , the Biden administration should consider removing certain countries designated on the State Department ’ s state sponsors of terrorism blacklist .
Rightfully , Iran is on the list , and a Biden administration would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
What the Biden team needs to avoid are dangerous transactional policies like what has recently transpired with Sudan , where the Trump administration has announced its intent to remove Sudan from the terrorism sponsor list .
The New York Times reported in September that the Trump administration would remove Sudan from the list if it began the process to recognize Israel .
Sudan took that step recently , resulting in the Trump administration notifying Congress of its intent to remove Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list , which could culminate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is little doubt that it is bad form for the lame duck administration to implement such a major foreign-policy move during its last gasps , it is in keeping with the undisciplined decision-making processes the Trump team has adopted from day one .
The transactional ploys of the Trump administration call into question the seriousness of its review of Sudan ’ s terrorism sponsor status .
The Biden administration must eschew this type of transactional approach and handle future terrorism sponsor determinations based on the merits of the case—one that takes into account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the Biden administration should renew a multilateral approach to sanctions .
Trump ’ s White House abandoned the use of multilateral mechanisms to counter national security threats .
Just as the United States abandoned its European allies when it walked away from the Iran deal , the United States has sparingly used the United Nations ’ 1267 Sanctions Committee—the world ’ s only multilateral terrorist sanctions regime that imposes a worldwide asset freeze , arms embargo , and travel ban upon designated individuals and groups—to target al Qaeda and Islamic State financiers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the number of Islamic State- and al Qaeda-linked individuals for U.N. listing .
At the same time , Biden should urge the U.N. Security Council to consider the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to sanction extreme far-right actors , especially white supremacists , who have carried out acts of violence .
Expanding the U.N. ’ s scope of work to this area is appropriate , particularly after its Counter-Terrorism Committee executive director published a report in April that demonstrated that extreme right-wing terrorism attacks increased by 320 percent worldwide over the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Biden must utilize sanctions as a tactical tool to further strategic objectives .
How the Biden team applies sanctions against individuals , organizations , and states must be evaluated through the broad lens of diplomatic , humanitarian , intelligence , nonproliferation , and defense objectives rather than using them to further narrow political goals .
If that happens , U.S. terrorism sanction regimes may yet become an effective preventative tool that serves broader U.S. foreign-policy interests .

Now that Joe Biden has won the 2020 U.S. presidential election, pundits, policy wonks, and lawmakers are focusing on the policy shifts that a Biden administration could pursue in order to repair the damage done by President Donald Trump. One area where a significant strategic shift is necessary is in the application of terrorism sanctions.
Now that Joe Biden has won the 2020 U.S. presidential election, pundits, policy wonks, and lawmakers are focusing on the policy shifts that a Biden administration could pursue in order to repair the damage done by President Donald Trump. One area where a significant strategic shift is necessary is in the application of terrorism sanctions.
The Trump administration’s use of sanctions across the board—such as the designations of foreign terrorist organizations, terrorist designations made under executive order authority, and the sanctioning of state sponsors of terrorism—have been based on sloganeering and politics. Slogans such as “maximum-pressure sanctions,” directed against Iran and others, have replaced other tools of statecraft, such as diplomacy.
The resulting byproduct, a punitive U.S. sanctions regime instead of a preventative one that stops bad actors from accessing the finance they need to do bad things, has roiled allies and entrenched enemies. Simply put, the Trump administration’s use of sanctions has become a bludgeon—one that is undermining broader U.S. national security interests—instead of a scalpel that could help achieve U.S. policy objectives and alliances.
First, the Biden administration should work closely with lawmakers to amend the sanctions-related sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—the underlying law that guides the State Department’s use of foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designations. The last substantive amendment to the INA relevant to FTO designations was made in 2004. Since then, the terrorism threat has significantly evolved because of the ubiquity of the internet and connections terrorist groups can forge via a wide array of social media platforms.
This is especially true of the threat posed by radical right-wing groups that espouse white supremacist views. For these groups, alliances are not based merely upon geographic borders but are instead developed because of access to encrypted communications platforms, virtual private networks, and online social networks.
These communications occur beyond the contours of traditional borders—rendering the INA’s definition of “foreign” and its interpretation by the State Department obsolete. Revising and updating this provision is vitally important, because currently the first legal criterion relevant to a group’s possible designation as an FTO is where it is physically based. In this day and age, any effective laws must consider the group’s cyber-reach and international connections, not just where the group’s leadership may be physically situated.
Second, the Biden administration should require deadlines for the FTO review period. When Congress amended the INA in 2004, it gave the State Department more latitude in conducting its legally required FTO reviews. Instead of evaluating FTOs every two years, Congress allowed the State Department to begin a review of an FTO’s status every five years, but Congress did not require the review to be completed by the end of the fifth year. In giving the State Department this ambiguous deadline, some defunct groups have remained on the FTO list for political reasons when legally they should have been removed.
One example is that of Kahane Chai, a radical right-wing Jewish group, an organization that has been dormant for more than a decade but was last reviewed in 2010. Politically, Kahane Chai has remained on the list because of concerns that there would be blowback from the Arab world if it’s removed. But there are easy solutions to this political dilemma. The State Department, for instance, could add other right-wing Jewish radical groups to the FTO list that meet the legal criteria. Since 2010, there have been a few—such as Lehava and the Hilltop Youth—that followed in Kahane Chai’s deadly footsteps, are still active, and may be eligible for designation.
Another case of an overdue delisting is the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group, better known by the acronym ETA—an ethnonationalist separatist organization that carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Spain for decades but should now be removed from the FTO list. ETA, according to the University of Maryland Global Terrorism Database, hasn’t carried out an act of violence since at least 2011. Moreover, the group in 2017 gave up its weapons to government authorities, and in May 2018 the organization announced in its last audio message that it “completely dismantled all of its structures” and will, “no longer express political positions, promote initiatives, or interact with other actors.”
When groups modify their behavior and come in from the cold, it is imperative that they be delisted. Delistings acknowledge new realities—namely that terrorism and terrorist groups do end. And, very importantly, delistings demonstrate the dynamism that is so key to maintaining a credible listing regime.
Political sensitivities—whether in Spain, the Arab world, or elsewhere—are no excuse for keeping defunct groups on the list. The INA, after all, does not provide for FTOs to remain on the list for political reasons. That’s why Congress, in collaboration with the Biden administration, should amend the INA and require the State Department to start and complete its FTO reviews before the five years elapse. Failure to do that would automatically result in the FTO listing to lapse. Doing that will ensure the FTO list remains factually credible and dynamic.
Third, a Biden administration should use FTO authorities under Executive Order 13224—which provides the State and Treasury departments the ability to sanction organizations and individuals as terrorists as a tactical tool against radical right-wing groups. The fact that the Trump administration hasn’t used the power of FTO sanctions against any white supremacist group demonstrates that the Trump team isn’t taking the menace these groups pose seriously or, even worse, has decided it would send the wrong message to an important segment of his political base.
By all indications, the threat posed to Americans at home by right-wing groups is greater than that of Salafi-jihadi groups. For that reason, among many others, the first new FTO designation Biden’s secretary of state should announce must be a white supremacist group. Sadly, there are many to choose from. For example, neo-Nazi groups such as the National Socialist Order (formerly known as the Atomwaffen Division) have a domestic presence while also maintaining alliances with overseas networks.
Fourth, Biden should scrap Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions campaign targeting Iran. While the Biden team should continue to sanction Iran’s proxies, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, there have been no benefits to the United States by turning its back on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently seemed to acknowledge this failure when he tweeted that Iran has expanded its uranium stockpile on the Trump administration’s watch.
Instead of bringing Iran to the negotiating table again, the administration’s tactics have prompted Iran and much of the international community to ignore U.S. unilateral efforts to renegotiate the deal. When it comes to Iran, it’s imperative that broader U.S. interests drive sanctions policy, not the reverse. That means finding and creating diplomatic and multilateral solutions to rein in Iran’s weapon of mass destruction ambitions. To date, nobody has come up with a better plan than the 2015 deal.
Fifth, the Biden administration should consider removing certain countries designated on the State Department’s state sponsors of terrorism blacklist. Rightfully, Iran is on the list, and a Biden administration would be wise to ensure that remains the case. What the Biden team needs to avoid are dangerous transactional policies like what has recently transpired with Sudan, where the Trump administration has announced its intent to remove Sudan from the terrorism sponsor list.
The New York Times reported in September that the Trump administration would remove Sudan from the list if it began the process to recognize Israel. Sudan took that step recently, resulting in the Trump administration notifying Congress of its intent to remove Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list, which could culminate as soon as mid-December.
While there is little doubt that it is bad form for the lame duck administration to implement such a major foreign-policy move during its last gasps, it is in keeping with the undisciplined decision-making processes the Trump team has adopted from day one. The transactional ploys of the Trump administration call into question the seriousness of its review of Sudan’s terrorism sponsor status. The Biden administration must eschew this type of transactional approach and handle future terrorism sponsor determinations based on the merits of the case—one that takes into account broader legal and foreign-policy objectives.
Finally, the Biden administration should renew a multilateral approach to sanctions. Trump’s White House abandoned the use of multilateral mechanisms to counter national security threats. Just as the United States abandoned its European allies when it walked away from the Iran deal, the United States has sparingly used the United Nations’ 1267 Sanctions Committee—the world’s only multilateral terrorist sanctions regime that imposes a worldwide asset freeze, arms embargo, and travel ban upon designated individuals and groups—to target al Qaeda and Islamic State financiers.
The Biden administration should significantly increase the number of Islamic State- and al Qaeda-linked individuals for U.N. listing. At the same time, Biden should urge the U.N. Security Council to consider the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to sanction extreme far-right actors, especially white supremacists, who have carried out acts of violence. Expanding the U.N.’s scope of work to this area is appropriate, particularly after its Counter-Terrorism Committee executive director published a report in April that demonstrated that extreme right-wing terrorism attacks increased by 320 percent worldwide over the past five years.
From day one, Biden must utilize sanctions as a tactical tool to further strategic objectives. How the Biden team applies sanctions against individuals, organizations, and states must be evaluated through the broad lens of diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, nonproliferation, and defense objectives rather than using them to further narrow political goals. If that happens, U.S. terrorism sanction regimes may yet become an effective preventative tool that serves broader U.S. foreign-policy interests.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Top Pentagon Policy Official Tests Positive for Coronavirus

The Defense Department ’ s temporary top policy official , retired officer and conspiracy theorist Anthony Tata , has tested positive for coronavirus after meeting with a foreign official infected with the virus who recently visited the Pentagon , adding even more turmoil to a building still rattled by outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s recent purge of top officials .
Tata , who was elevated to perform the duties of undersecretary of defense for policy last week after Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller fired his predecessor , tested positive for the virus after meeting with Lithuanian Minister of Defense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pentagon on Thursday that Karoblis had contracted COVID-19 .
Tata will quarantine at home for the next two weeks but Miller and service secretaries who met with Karoblis will continue attending meetings at the Pentagon .
“ The Department has learned much over the last 10 months of COVID , and even recently we have recommitted to fastidiously following the [ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ] guidelines with respect to mitigation measures—face coverings , social distancing , contact tracing , hand washing and virtual engagements among others , ” Chief @ @ @ @ @ @ @ statement Thursday night after Bloomberg first reported that Tata had contracted the virus .
While the Pentagon has publicly made the case that it has become more watchful of CDC guidelines for coronavirus , two officials inside the building said on condition of anonymity that the routine use of masks under Tata ’ s predecessor James Anderson has fallen by the wayside , with Tata and other Trump loyalists often eschewing them .
Though fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper had frequently worn masks during public events and in meetings with foreign leaders , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ performing the duties of both undersecretary of defense for intelligence and the Pentagon ’ s top civilian oversight role of special forces , also removed their masks for a close-quarters photo-op at Ft. Bragg , North Carolina on Wednesday .
The masking policy had been under strain in the weeks leading up to Anderson ’ s ouster , as the Pentagon ’ s new White House Liaison Joshua Whitehouse drew complaints for frequently entering the policy office without wearing a mask or testing his temperature .
The Pentagon did not immediately respond to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s job while he self-isolates through Thanksgiving and into December .
But according to a memo on the order of succession signed by Miller last week , the move would set up Thomas Williams—a former career official bumped up several levels from a National Security Council post this year—to perform the duties of undersecretary , while Michael Cutrone , who came into the Pentagon in May as officials first began to fear purges of people seen as disloyal to Trump , would be in line to perform the duties of deputy undersecretary .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Senate-confirmed officials , Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy , Plans , and Capabilities Victorino Mercado and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Kenneth Rapuano .
Mercado had previously served as acting deputy undersecretary in the policy shop and officials said he is helping Miller ’ s freshly minted deputy chief of staff Joe Francescon , a Trump loyalist who was a lower-ranking civil servant just six months ago , learn on the job while Kash Patel , the new chief of staff , has carved out a role as a so-called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ placed Jennifer Walsh , Rapuano ’ s top deputy , in succession to lead the policy shop .
Miller , a former Green Beret who served in Afghanistan and Iraq , has also been emphasizing his credentials in meetings with senior officials amid concerns he ’ s not qualified to lead the Pentagon , officials said .
Despite making major policy changes in his first week as acting secretary , including a drawdown of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq and making the assistant secretary of defense for special operations report directly to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ taken any on-the-record questions from the press .
He ignored questions from reporters after making a statement on the troop withdrawals on Tuesday and during a bilateral meeting on Thursday .

The Defense Department’s temporary top policy official, retired officer and conspiracy theorist Anthony Tata, has tested positive for coronavirus after meeting with a foreign official infected with the virus who recently visited the Pentagon, adding even more turmoil to a building still rattled by outgoing President Donald Trump’s recent purge of top officials.
The Defense Department’s temporary top policy official, retired officer and conspiracy theorist Anthony Tata, has tested positive for coronavirus after meeting with a foreign official infected with the virus who recently visited the Pentagon, adding even more turmoil to a building still rattled by outgoing President Donald Trump’s recent purge of top officials.
Tata, who was elevated to perform the duties of undersecretary of defense for policy last week after Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller fired his predecessor, tested positive for the virus after meeting with Lithuanian Minister of Defense Raimundas Karoblis. The Lithuanian Embassy notified the Pentagon on Thursday that Karoblis had contracted COVID-19.
Tata will quarantine at home for the next two weeks but Miller and service secretaries who met with Karoblis will continue attending meetings at the Pentagon.
“The Department has learned much over the last 10 months of COVID, and even recently we have recommitted to fastidiously following the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] guidelines with respect to mitigation measures—face coverings, social distancing, contact tracing, hand washing and virtual engagements among others,” Chief Pentagon Spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said in a statement Thursday night after Bloomberg first reported that Tata had contracted the virus.
While the Pentagon has publicly made the case that it has become more watchful of CDC guidelines for coronavirus, two officials inside the building said on condition of anonymity that the routine use of masks under Tata’s predecessor James Anderson has fallen by the wayside, with Tata and other Trump loyalists often eschewing them.
Though fired Defense Secretary Mark Esper had frequently worn masks during public events and in meetings with foreign leaders, Miller and Ezra Cohen-Watnick, who is performing the duties of both undersecretary of defense for intelligence and the Pentagon’s top civilian oversight role of special forces, also removed their masks for a close-quarters photo-op at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina on Wednesday. The masking policy had been under strain in the weeks leading up to Anderson’s ouster, as the Pentagon’s new White House Liaison Joshua Whitehouse drew complaints for frequently entering the policy office without wearing a mask or testing his temperature.
In a statement, a Pentagon spokesperson said that Tata would continue to serve in his job while quarantining at home “similar to the way many in the Pentagon, including senior leadership, have worked remotely as the Pentagon reduced its footprint in response to COVID-19.” His deputy, Thomas Williams, will cover day-to-day requirements at the Pentagon.
According to a memo on the order of succession in the policy shop signed by Miller last week and obtained by Foreign Policy, Williams—a former career official bumped up several levels from a National Security Council post this year—is tasked to perform the duties of undersecretary if Tata is incapacitated, while Michael Cutrone, who came into the Pentagon in May as officials first began to fear purges of people seen as disloyal to Trump, would be in line to perform the duties of deputy undersecretary.
The memo also removes from succession two Senate-confirmed officials, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Victorino Mercado and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Kenneth Rapuano. Mercado had previously served as acting deputy undersecretary in the policy shop and officials said he is helping Miller’s freshly minted deputy chief of staff Joe Francescon, a Trump loyalist who was a lower-ranking civil servant just six months ago, learn on the job while Kash Patel, the new chief of staff, has carved out a role as a so-called body man. Instead, Miller has placed Jennifer Walsh, Rapuano’s top deputy, in succession to lead the policy shop.
Miller, a former Green Beret who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, has also been emphasizing his credentials in meetings with senior officials amid concerns he’s not qualified to lead the Pentagon, officials said. Despite making major policy changes in his first week as acting secretary, including a drawdown of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq and making the assistant secretary of defense for special operations report directly to the Pentagon chief, he has not taken any on-the-record questions from the press. He ignored questions from reporters after making a statement on the troop withdrawals on Tuesday and during a bilateral meeting on Thursday.
Update, Nov. 20, 2020: This article was updated to provide further details from a Pentagon spokesperson.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--Yes, Islam Is Facing a Crisis. No, France Isn’t Helping Solve It.

Yes , Islam Is Facing a Crisis .
No , France Isn ’ t Helping Solve It .
“ Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today.
” That is what the French President Emmanuel Macron said on Oct. 2 , while announcing his “ anti-radicalism plan.
” Just two weeks later , on Oct. 16 , a devotee of that radicalism killed and beheaded a high-school teacher , Samuel Paty , in a Paris suburb , merely for showing the infamous cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in his classroom .
And soon after , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were savagely murdered by another terrorist who seemed to have the same motivation : to punish blasphemy against the prophet of Islam .
In return , the French authorities initiated a crackdown on anything they deemed to be Islamism , and also projected the controversial cartoons of Prophet Muhammad on government buildings in France—only to provoke mass protests in various parts of the Muslim world .
Macron is doing little to resolve this crisis and could actually be inflaming it , because the sort of freedom he claims to defend is full of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All these events have initiated an ongoing debate about France , Islam , and freedom .
Some in the West now see France as the beacon of Enlightenment values against the dark forces of religious fanaticism .
Others argue that the main problem is Islamophobia , racism and the colonial arrogance of France in a world where—except for a handful of extremists—Muslims are the real victims .
As a Muslim who has been writing about these issues for about two decades , let me offer a more nuanced view : First , France—like @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fallen and solidarity against the threat .
Moreover , Macron is largely correct that Islam is facing a “ crisis ” —not “ all over world , ” but certainly in some parts of the world—and we Muslims need an honest conversation about that .
Unfortunately , Macron is doing little to resolve this crisis and could actually be inflaming it , because the sort of freedom he claims to defend is full of painful shortcomings and cynical double standards .
Let ’ s take the burning issue at hand : What should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ against the Prophet—or sabb al-rasul , as medieval jurists called it .
They all agreed it should be severely punished .
According to mainline Shafi and Maliki jurists , the blasphemer would be executed immediately , unless he or she repented .
According to the stricter Hanbalis , the blasphemer would be executed even if he or she repented .
And according to the milder Hanafis , there was no clear ground for execution , but the blasphemer could be jailed and beaten with sticks .
None of these verdicts had any basis @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Islamic jurisprudence—but jurists inferred them from some targeted killings that reportedly took place during the Prophet ’ s battles with the polytheists of his time .
What is less noticed is that medieval Muslim jurists reasoned according to the norms of their time , where the concept of free speech simply didn ’ t exist .
Indeed , their Christian contemporaries weren ’ t any more lenient to blasphemers or heretics .
The Byzantine Empire , under the Justinian Laws of the 6th century , declared , “ Men shall not … blaspheme @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalty for those who did .
Later , in Europe , the Catholic Inquisition took blasphemy law a step further by making this capital punishment just more painful with new techniques like auto-da-fé , or burning people alive at the stake .
We Muslims need this reform not to please Westerners , but to save our own societies from the sectarianism , bigotry , misogyny , and oppression that is being justified in the name of Islam Yet Christianity has changed immensely in the past four centuries—first with the lessons taken from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) , and then new ideas of tolerance advocated by Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke .
Debates on freedom among Catholics continued well into the 20th century , but ultimately all mainline Christians gave up coercive power in the name of their faith .
However , the same transformation hasn ’ t yet fully taken place in Islam—and that lies at the core of the crisis , that not just Macron but also critical Muslims are talking about .
Medieval Islamic jurisprudence is still there , with some violent and coercive verdicts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Most Muslims are not interested in these verdicts , let alone eager to implement them , but some are .
Their zealotry , in the extreme , leads to vigilante violence and terrorism .
In the mainstream , it leads to blasphemy laws that are in place in many Muslim-majority states—Pakistan being one of the most ferocious .
A fairly conservative but thoughtful American Muslim , Yasir Qadi , a popular preacher and a dean at the Al-Maghrib Institute , recently admitted this problem in an interesting post “ on the French terrorist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such terrorist attacks , he noted , but “ don ’ t directly address the fiqh [ jurisprudence ] texts involved.
” Especially on the issue of blasphemy , he added , “ There are texts and fiqh issues that need to be discussed frankly—hardly anyone has done that ( still ! )
.
” Having such frank discussions on Islamic jurisprudence—and the underlying theological assumptions—could open Islam ’ s path toward its own authentic Enlightenment , the gist of which should be giving up coercive power in the name of the faith @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to please Westerners , but to save our own societies from the sectarianism , bigotry , misogyny , and oppression that is being justified in the name of Islam , and to better reflect the true values of our faith .
In other words , Islam needs its own Enlightenment , but Macron is advocating the wrong sort of Enlightenment .
And that ’ s a problem deeply rooted in France ’ s own history .
Having subdued Catholicism long ago with this aggressive Enlightenment , France seems to be reviving it against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ laïcité , its unmistakably illiberal form of secularism .
The French often say foreigners don ’ t understand laïcité .
I do—because my country , Turkey , imitated the French model for almost a century .
The main problem of this specific form of secularism is its reliance on preemptive intolerance ; assuming that religion and its symbols might become oppressive if they are visible , laïcité suppresses them in the first place .
The result of such policies is often a simmering grudge among the religious , and ultimately a backlash , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ got its great Islamic avenger , President Recep Tayyip Erdogan .
Although Macron says the target of laïcité is not Islam , but only “ Islamism , ” the latter term is left quite vague in his rhetoric .
In practice , it ’ s not vague at all .
In France it has long been obvious that personal Muslim practices are targeted : For many years , Muslim women in France have been banned from wearing headscarves in public buildings , or so-called burkinis on beaches .
Last September , a French @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a young French Muslim woman for merely walking into the National Assembly while wearing a headscarf .
And , in October , the French interior minister even took issue with halal food aisles in supermarkets—and kosher ones , too , signaling a threat to the religious freedom of just not Muslims , but other practicing believers as well .
In other words , what France requires from its Muslims is not just accepting the freedom of speech of blasphemers , but also giving up a part of their own freedom of religion .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but also myopic and counterproductive .
It just makes it harder for practicing French Muslims to feel respected , accepted , and therefore fully French—precisely the sort of integration radical Islamists would like to avert .
In fact , laïcité has been counterproductive for the whole Muslim world , by giving secularism a bad name .
I have seen this personally over the years among Muslim audiences around the world .
Whenever I have advocated freedom , I often received the heated reaction : “ What freedom are you talking about ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ hijabs in France ?
!
” It provides the perfect excuse for whataboutism among Islamists , and a recruiting tool for them , too .
While France glorifies blasphemy against God , it bans blasphemy against “ the Republic ” —its own secular deity .
Moreover , the shortcomings of France are not just in freedom of religion , but also what it claims to heroically defend : freedom of speech .
It is true that in a free society people have the right to blaspheme against any religion , and religious believers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way—which is precisely what the Quran commands us Muslims .
( When Muslims see mockers of Islam , the Quran says , they should just “ not sit with them ” —not kill or silence them . )
But the problem is that while France glorifies blasphemy against God , it bans blasphemy against “ the Republic ” —its own secular deity , so to speak .
More specifically , French laws ban “ defamation against government institutions and office-holders , as well as disrespecting the national anthem and flag.
” Alas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crime in France until 2013 , when the European Court of Human Rights finally pushed for a legal reform .
Even so , in 2018 French courts went after protesters who burned effigies of Macron .
And just last September , the French Justice Minister proudly declared that “ insulting a mayor ” will also soon be “ a criminal offense.
” So , those who argue that “ France is not the free-speech champion it says it is ” are quite right .
And the whataboutism that this double standard will fuel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The fact that the French government appears to be flexing its muscles in an effort to curb free speech even beyond its borders—as appears to have occurred recently in the pages of the Financial Times and Politico—only makes it harder to see Macron as a great defender of the freedom of expression .
There is a country in which this experiment has already taken place—and its results are not bad .
This country is , of course , the United States—the heir of the more religion-friendly Enlightenment , and the pinnacle of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ often disparaged in France .
I am aware that the United States ’ current political crisis can make it a hard sell , but from a broader perspective , it is a success story : It is a country with much higher levels of freedom of speech and religion than those of France—and a much better integrated Muslim minority , which increasingly appreciates liberal values .
This phenomenon , noted by research institutes or American Muslims themselves , have complex reasons , such as the United States ’ lack of a long colonial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a more middle-class immigrant population .
But even its African-American Muslims , who have suffered racism , can feel proudly American .
The secret to this success is freedom , which allows Muslims to live in America without giving up their personal piety and communal identity , being visible everywhere—including in Congress—with their religious symbols , and realizing that free speech works for them as well—in addition to economic freedom , which allows them to compete and flourish .
In other words , U.S. authorities are not sending secularism police to American beaches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sufficiently undressed , in order to create an “ American Islam.
” The latter just grows naturally .
Because when people see freedom , and understand that it is really for everyone , they tend to appreciate it .
And when they sense that freedom is only for those who look , live , and think in a certain way , they retreat to their cultural trenches .

“Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today.” That is what the French President Emmanuel Macron said on Oct. 2, while announcing his “anti-radicalism plan.” Just two weeks later, on Oct. 16, a devotee of that radicalism killed and beheaded a high-school teacher, Samuel Paty, in a Paris suburb, merely for showing the infamous cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in his classroom. And soon after, three worshippers at a church in Nice were savagely murdered by another terrorist who seemed to have the same motivation : to punish blasphemy against the prophet of Islam.
“Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today.” That is what the French President Emmanuel Macron said on Oct. 2, while announcing his “anti-radicalism plan.” Just two weeks later, on Oct. 16, a devotee of that radicalism killed and beheaded a high-school teacher, Samuel Paty, in a Paris suburb, merely for showing the infamous cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in his classroom. And soon after, three worshippers at a church in Nice were savagely murdered by another terrorist who seemed to have the same motivation: to punish blasphemy against the prophet of Islam.
In return, the French authorities initiated a crackdown on anything they deemed to be Islamism, and also projected the controversial cartoons of Prophet Muhammad on government buildings in France—only to provoke mass protests in various parts of the Muslim world.
Macron is doing little to resolve this crisis and could actually be inflaming it, because the sort of freedom he claims to defend is full of painful shortcomings and cynical double standards.
All these events have initiated an ongoing debate about France, Islam, and freedom. Some in the West now see France as the beacon of Enlightenment values against the dark forces of religious fanaticism. Others argue that the main problem is Islamophobia, racism and the colonial arrogance of France in a world where—except for a handful of extremists—Muslims are the real victims.
As a Muslim who has been writing about these issues for about two decades, let me offer a more nuanced view: First, France—like any target of terrorism—deserves sympathy for its fallen and solidarity against the threat. Moreover, Macron is largely correct that Islam is facing a “crisis”—not “all over world,” but certainly in some parts of the world—and we Muslims need an honest conversation about that. Unfortunately, Macron is doing little to resolve this crisis and could actually be inflaming it, because the sort of freedom he claims to defend is full of painful shortcomings and cynical double standards.
Many Muslims would find any talk of Islam facing a crisis unacceptable, if not heretical, for they think of Islam as a divinely ordained, perfect, and eternal truth. Yet one can well believe in the divine core of Islam, as I do, while being critical of the many layers of human interpretation built on top of that. It is this human interpretation that gave us much of the Islamic fiqh, or jurisprudence, which has some harsh verdicts that conflict with what the modern world calls human rights and civil liberties—the notions that people should be free to believe or disbelieve in a religion, and free to evangelize or criticize it.
Let’s take the burning issue at hand: What should Muslims do in the face of blasphemy against the Prophet—or sabb al-rasul, as medieval jurists called it. They all agreed it should be severely punished. According to mainline Shafi and Maliki jurists, the blasphemer would be executed immediately, unless he or she repented. According to the stricter Hanbalis, the blasphemer would be executed even if he or she repented. And according to the milder Hanafis, there was no clear ground for execution, but the blasphemer could be jailed and beaten with sticks.
None of these verdicts had any basis in the Quran—like most similar verdicts in Islamic jurisprudence—but jurists inferred them from some targeted killings that reportedly took place during the Prophet’s battles with the polytheists of his time.
What is less noticed is that medieval Muslim jurists reasoned according to the norms of their time, where the concept of free speech simply didn’t exist. Indeed, their Christian contemporaries weren’t any more lenient to blasphemers or heretics. The Byzantine Empire, under the Justinian Laws of the 6th century, declared, “Men shall not … blaspheme God,” and gave the death penalty for those who did. Later, in Europe, the Catholic Inquisition took blasphemy law a step further by making this capital punishment just more painful with new techniques like auto-da-fé, or burning people alive at the stake.
We Muslims need this reform not to please Westerners, but to save our own societies from the sectarianism, bigotry, misogyny, and oppression that is being justified in the name of Islam
Yet Christianity has changed immensely in the past four centuries—first with the lessons taken from the horrific Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), and then new ideas of tolerance advocated by Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke. Debates on freedom among Catholics continued well into the 20th century, but ultimately all mainline Christians gave up coercive power in the name of their faith.
However, the same transformation hasn’t yet fully taken place in Islam—and that lies at the core of the crisis, that not just Macron but also critical Muslims are talking about. Medieval Islamic jurisprudence is still there, with some violent and coercive verdicts unrefuted by most contemporary religious scholars. Most Muslims are not interested in these verdicts, let alone eager to implement them, but some are. Their zealotry, in the extreme, leads to vigilante violence and terrorism. In the mainstream, it leads to blasphemy laws that are in place in many Muslim-majority states—Pakistan being one of the most ferocious.
A fairly conservative but thoughtful American Muslim, Yasir Qadi, a popular preacher and a dean at the Al-Maghrib Institute, recently admitted this problem in an interesting post “on the French terrorist attack.” Most mainstream Muslim authorities condemn such terrorist attacks, he noted, but “don’t directly address the fiqh [jurisprudence] texts involved.” Especially on the issue of blasphemy, he added, “There are texts and fiqh issues that need to be discussed frankly—hardly anyone has done that (still!).”
Having such frank discussions on Islamic jurisprudence—and the underlying theological assumptions—could open Islam’s path toward its own authentic Enlightenment, the gist of which should be giving up coercive power in the name of the faith. We Muslims need this reform not to please Westerners, but to save our own societies from the sectarianism, bigotry, misogyny, and oppression that is being justified in the name of Islam, and to better reflect the true values of our faith.
In other words, Islam needs its own Enlightenment, but Macron is advocating the wrong sort of Enlightenment. And that’s a problem deeply rooted in France’s own history.
It is worth recalling that the Enlightenment was not a monolithic movement. As the late great historian Gertrude Himmelfarb explained in Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American Enlightenments, there was rather a clear distinction between the French and the Anglo-Saxon paths: In France, Enlightenment often implied a combat between faith and reason. In Britain and America, it often implied a harmony of them. Therefore, the French path has been much more assertive, anti-clerical, and also bloody. The French Revolution, lest we forget, was an extremely violent affair, where hundreds of priests were killed—often by beheading—and the Church’s dominance of the public square was replaced, not by neutrality, but an alternative religion called the Cult of Reason.
Having subdued Catholicism long ago with this aggressive Enlightenment, France seems to be reviving it against Islam, especially under the banner of laïcité, its unmistakably illiberal form of secularism.
The French often say foreigners don’t understand laïcité. I do—because my country, Turkey, imitated the French model for almost a century.
The main problem of this specific form of secularism is its reliance on preemptive intolerance; assuming that religion and its symbols might become oppressive if they are visible, laïcité suppresses them in the first place. The result of such policies is often a simmering grudge among the religious, and ultimately a backlash, if not revenge—which is precisely how Turkey got its great Islamic avenger, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Although Macron says the target of laïcité is not Islam, but only “Islamism,” the latter term is left quite vague in his rhetoric. In practice, it’s not vague at all. In France it has long been obvious that personal Muslim practices are targeted: For many years, Muslim women in France have been banned from wearing headscarves in public buildings, or so-called burkinis on beaches. Last September, a French politician from Macron’s party protested a young French Muslim woman for merely walking into the National Assembly while wearing a headscarf. And, in October, the French interior minister even took issue with halal food aisles in supermarkets—and kosher ones, too, signaling a threat to the religious freedom of just not Muslims, but other practicing believers as well.
In other words, what France requires from its Muslims is not just accepting the freedom of speech of blasphemers, but also giving up a part of their own freedom of religion. This is not only wrong in principle, but also myopic and counterproductive. It just makes it harder for practicing French Muslims to feel respected, accepted, and therefore fully French—precisely the sort of integration radical Islamists would like to avert.
In fact, laïcité has been counterproductive for the whole Muslim world, by giving secularism a bad name. I have seen this personally over the years among Muslim audiences around the world. Whenever I have advocated freedom, I often received the heated reaction: “What freedom are you talking about? The one that bans our sisters’ hijabs in France?!” It provides the perfect excuse for whataboutism among Islamists, and a recruiting tool for them, too.
While France glorifies blasphemy against God, it bans blasphemy against “the Republic”—its own secular deity.
Moreover, the shortcomings of France are not just in freedom of religion, but also what it claims to heroically defend: freedom of speech. It is true that in a free society people have the right to blaspheme against any religion, and religious believers should simply learn to look the other way—which is precisely what the Quran commands us Muslims. (When Muslims see mockers of Islam, the Quran says, they should just “not sit with them” —not kill or silence them.)
But the problem is that while France glorifies blasphemy against God, it bans blasphemy against “the Republic”—its own secular deity, so to speak. More specifically, French laws ban “defamation against government institutions and office-holders, as well as disrespecting the national anthem and flag.” Alas, “insulting the President” was a crime in France until 2013, when the European Court of Human Rights finally pushed for a legal reform. Even so, in 2018 French courts went after protesters who burned effigies of Macron. And just last September, the French Justice Minister proudly declared that “insulting a mayor” will also soon be “a criminal offense.”
So, those who argue that “France is not the free-speech champion it says it is” are quite right. And the whataboutism that this double standard will fuel in the Muslim world is quite predictable. The fact that the French government appears to be flexing its muscles in an effort to curb free speech even beyond its borders—as appears to have occurred recently in the pages of the Financial Times and Politico—only makes it harder to see Macron as a great defender of the freedom of expression.
If Macron really wants to help the crisis of Islam, instead of making it worse, what he needs to do is to raise France’s own standards of freedom of speech and religion, so that more Muslims can actually benefit from and appreciate these crucial values, giving them an incentive to make a clean break from the coercive understandings of Islam. The United States’ current political crisis can make it a hard sell, but from a broader perspective, it is a success story: It is a country with much higher levels of freedom of speech and religion than those of France—and a much better integrated Muslim minority
There is a country in which this experiment has already taken place—and its results are not bad. This country is, of course, the United States—the heir of the more religion-friendly Enlightenment, and the pinnacle of the “Anglo-Saxon liberalism” that is often disparaged in France. I am aware that the United States’ current political crisis can make it a hard sell, but from a broader perspective, it is a success story: It is a country with much higher levels of freedom of speech and religion than those of France—and a much better integrated Muslim minority, which increasingly appreciates liberal values.
This phenomenon, noted by research institutes or American Muslims themselves, have complex reasons, such as the United States’ lack of a long colonial history in the Muslim world, and a more middle-class immigrant population. But even its African-American Muslims, who have suffered racism, can feel proudly American. The secret to this success is freedom, which allows Muslims to live in America without giving up their personal piety and communal identity, being visible everywhere—including in Congress—with their religious symbols, and realizing that free speech works for them as well—in addition to economic freedom, which allows them to compete and flourish.
In other words, U.S. authorities are not sending secularism police to American beaches to make sure that Muslim women are sufficiently undressed, in order to create an “American Islam.” The latter just grows naturally. Because when people see freedom, and understand that it is really for everyone, they tend to appreciate it. And when they sense that freedom is only for those who look, live, and think in a certain way, they retreat to their cultural trenches.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-20--As Ethiopian War Drags On, WHO Chief Gets Pulled In

As Ethiopian War Drags On , WHO Chief Gets Pulled In Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Ethiopia ’ s government seeks to tarnish the image of the WHO chief , U.S. President Donald Trump to address APEC Summit , and protests in Uganda leave 16 dead .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. President Donald Trump is not the only leader taking shots at World Health Organization Chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus .
Tedros ’ s name has now been dragged into debates surrounding the Ethiopian civil war , while U.S. leaders have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Berhanu Jula , the Ethiopian army chief of staff , has accused Tedros of trying to supply the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) with weapons and called for his resignation from the global health body .
Berhanu did not provide evidence to support his allegations and suggested Tedros ’ s Tigrayan ethnicity was testing his allegiance .
“ This man is a member of that group , and he has been doing everything to support them , ” Berhanu said .
Tedros , who once served as Ethiopia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a coalition led by the TPLF , has rubbished the claims .
“ There have been reports suggesting I am taking sides in this situation , ” he said on Thursday .
“ This is not true , and I want to say that I am on only one side , and that is the side of peace.
” Although Berhanu ’ s comments could easily be meant as deflection from a war that Ethiopian officials have repeatedly claimed would be over quickly , the incident highlights the perilous position in which Tigrayans @ @ @ @ @ @ @ where members of the once-dominant minority group have reported being questioned and threatened .
Asked by FP ’ s Robbie Gramer whether the United States was seeing signs of ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia , Tibor Nagy , the top U.S. diplomat for African affairs , said that while he has yet to see such actions , “ the ethnic dimension is one that everybody is very concerned about.
” Is Ethiopia the next Yugoslavia ?
Earlier this week , Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu warned in FP that the current situation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a Yugoslav-style breakup .
“ Once violence becomes a means to address disputes , it is hard to stop , and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence , ” they argued , noting that “ serious violations , including ethnically motivated killings and displacement , are going unchecked and unpunished ” across the country .
No peace in sight .
Addressing reporters , U.S .
Ambassador to Ethiopia Michael A. Raynor confirmed that while he had spoken with both Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Tigrayan leader Debretsion Gebremichael , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ There was a strong commitment on both sides to see the military conflict through.
” Raynor said .
“ And in fact , neither side felt they could articulate a basis for a negotiated or a mediated solution at that time.
” Advice for Biden .
While Biden ’ s top foreign policy advisor Antony Blinken has begun to speak out on the conflict , Alex de Waal has some concrete advice for his incoming team : “ Head off military operations before they escalate and spread.
” Writing in Foreign Policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ both sides to stop the fighting , “ or else Biden ’ s term will open with an insoluble quagmire in the Horn of Africa that will drag down his administration ’ s foreign policy and quite possibly destroy Ethiopia.
” It ’ s the economy , stupid .
Although many observers think the current conflict started due to Tigray ’ s intransigence—holding a regional election against Addis Ababa ’ s wishes—the real reason for the fighting is the old TPLF regime ’ s desire to regain full control of Ethiopia ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ What ’ s at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy ’ s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled , ” Melesse writes .
“ This is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray , a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia ’ s more than 110 million people .
It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country ’ s economy , a prize that Tigray ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to recapture at any cost.
” Melesse ends with a warning .
“ The risk now is that the TPLF ’ s persistent and increasingly audacious actions could make Abiy ’ s peaceful reforms impossible and thereby make a violent transition inevitable.
” Trump at APEC .
U.S. President Donald Trump will today make his first public appearance at an international gathering since his loss to President-elect Joe Biden as he addresses the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC ) forum , hosted virtually by Malaysia .
It will be just the second time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ president .
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga delivered speeches earlier in the week .
Uganda clashes .
At least 16 people have been killed in Uganda following two days of protests sparked by the detention of opposition presidential candidate Bobi Wine on Wednesday .
Wine was arrested while campaigning in eastern Uganda after police charged him with violating coronavirus restrictions by holding mass rallies .
At least 65 people have been wounded and a further 350 have been arrested in clashes with authorities , according to Uganda ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s second arrest in less than three weeks as he campaigns to unseat President Yoweri Museveni in January elections .
COVID-19 strikes Brexit talks .
Slow-moving Brexit talks were delivered another blow on Thursday when a member of the European Union negotiating team tested positive for COVID-19 , leading the two sides to suspend in-person talks and continue them virtually instead .
Michel Barnier , the EU chief negotiator , said that the teams “ will continue their work in full respect of guidelines.
” Joint resolution .
Mexico could soon become the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bill to legalize and regulate the drug passes its lower house .
Mexico ’ s Senate already passed the measure with an overwhelming 82 to 18 vote on Thursday .
Legalization would bring it in line with states along the U.S.-Mexico border who have either embraced full legalization or allow its use for medical purposes .
The Mexican bill ’ s text says the new law would “ contribute to the reduction of crime linked to drug trafficking.
” If the bill becomes law , it would represent a win in the international @ @ @ @ @ @ @ New Zealand voters rejected a legalization measure in October .
Tax dodging .
A new study has found that tax avoidance and tax evasion amount to $ 427 billion in lost revenue for governments around the world .
The report—from the Tax Justice Network , the Global Alliance for Tax Justice , and Public Services International—found that the United States lost the most from tax cheats— $ 90 billion annually .
Relying on new data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) , the authors showed that the use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from taxes on $ 1.38 trillion in profits .
Wealthy individuals ’ use of tax havens amounted to a loss of $ 182 billion in potential government revenue .
Burkina Faso elections .
Burkina Faso holds presidential and legislative elections on Sunday , as the country ’ s deteriorating security situation under the threat of jihadist violence threatens turnout .
President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré , is the favorite to win on Sunday , and would secure a second five-year term in the process .
His main opposition comes from Zéphirin Diabré , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kaboré in the 2015 election .
The U.S. State Department has warned that terrorist groups “ may attempt to conduct attacks on or around election day.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia’s government seeks to tarnish the image of the WHO chief , U.S. President Donald Trump to address APEC Summit, and protests in Uganda leave 16 dead.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia’s government seeks to tarnish the image of the WHO chief, U.S. President Donald Trump to address APEC Summit, and protests in Uganda leave 16 dead.
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As Ethiopia War Continues, Regional Dangers Grow
U.S. President Donald Trump is not the only leader taking shots at World Health Organization Chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Tedros’s name has now been dragged into debates surrounding the Ethiopian civil war, while U.S. leaders have begun to speak out on the conflict.
Berhanu Jula, the Ethiopian army chief of staff, has accused Tedros of trying to supply the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) with weapons and called for his resignation from the global health body. Berhanu did not provide evidence to support his allegations and suggested Tedros’s Tigrayan ethnicity was testing his allegiance. “This man is a member of that group, and he has been doing everything to support them,” Berhanu said.
Tedros, who once served as Ethiopia’s health and foreign minister under a coalition led by the TPLF, has rubbished the claims. “There have been reports suggesting I am taking sides in this situation,” he said on Thursday. “This is not true, and I want to say that I am on only one side, and that is the side of peace.”
Although Berhanu’s comments could easily be meant as deflection from a war that Ethiopian officials have repeatedly claimed would be over quickly, the incident highlights the perilous position in which Tigrayans now find themselves in Ethiopian society, where members of the once-dominant minority group have reported being questioned and threatened. Asked by FP’s Robbie Gramer whether the United States was seeing signs of ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia, Tibor Nagy, the top U.S. diplomat for African affairs, said that while he has yet to see such actions, “the ethnic dimension is one that everybody is very concerned about.”
Is Ethiopia the next Yugoslavia? Earlier this week, Florian Bieber and Wondemagegn Tadesse Goshu warned in FP that the current situation, if left unchecked, could deteriorate into a Yugoslav-style breakup. “Once violence becomes a means to address disputes, it is hard to stop, and demands for autonomy quickly escalate toward claims for independence,” they argued, noting that “serious violations, including ethnically motivated killings and displacement, are going unchecked and unpunished” across the country.
No peace in sight. Addressing reporters, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Michael A. Raynor confirmed that while he had spoken with both Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Tigrayan leader Debretsion Gebremichael, neither man was considering peace. “There was a strong commitment on both sides to see the military conflict through.” Raynor said. “And in fact, neither side felt they could articulate a basis for a negotiated or a mediated solution at that time.”
Advice for Biden. While Biden’s top foreign policy advisor Antony Blinken has begun to speak out on the conflict, Alex de Waal has some concrete advice for his incoming team: “Head off military operations before they escalate and spread.” Writing in Foreign Policy, de Waal argues that Biden must pressure both sides to stop the fighting, “or else Biden’s term will open with an insoluble quagmire in the Horn of Africa that will drag down his administration’s foreign policy and quite possibly destroy Ethiopia.”
It’s the economy, stupid. Although many observers think the current conflict started due to Tigray’s intransigence—holding a regional election against Addis Ababa’s wishes—the real reason for the fighting is the old TPLF regime’s desire to regain full control of Ethiopia’s economy, argues Kassahun Melesse in FP.
“What’s at the heart of the ongoing conflict are Abiy’s economic and political reforms and the unrelenting pace at which they were unveiled,” Melesse writes. “This is not a conflict over who gets to rule Tigray, a small region whose population accounts for a mere 6 percent of Ethiopia’s more than 110 million people. It is a fight over who gets to dominate the commanding heights of the country’s economy, a prize that Tigray’s regional leaders once held and are determined to recapture at any cost.”
Melesse ends with a warning. “The risk now is that the TPLF’s persistent and increasingly audacious actions could make Abiy’s peaceful reforms impossible and thereby make a violent transition inevitable.”
What We’re Following Today
Trump at APEC. U.S. President Donald Trump will today make his first public appearance at an international gathering since his loss to President-elect Joe Biden as he addresses the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, hosted virtually by Malaysia. It will be just the second time Trump has attended the event since becoming president. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga delivered speeches earlier in the week.
Uganda clashes. At least 16 people have been killed in Uganda following two days of protests sparked by the detention of opposition presidential candidate Bobi Wine on Wednesday. Wine was arrested while campaigning in eastern Uganda after police charged him with violating coronavirus restrictions by holding mass rallies. At least 65 people have been wounded and a further 350 have been arrested in clashes with authorities, according to Uganda’s police. This is Wine’s second arrest in less than three weeks as he campaigns to unseat President Yoweri Museveni in January elections.
COVID-19 strikes Brexit talks. Slow-moving Brexit talks were delivered another blow on Thursday when a member of the European Union negotiating team tested positive for COVID-19, leading the two sides to suspend in-person talks and continue them virtually instead. Michel Barnier, the EU chief negotiator, said that the teams “will continue their work in full respect of guidelines.”
Keep an Eye On
Joint resolution. Mexico could soon become the biggest legal market for marijuana if a bill to legalize and regulate the drug passes its lower house. Mexico’s Senate already passed the measure with an overwhelming 82 to 18 vote on Thursday. Legalization would bring it in line with states along the U.S.-Mexico border who have either embraced full legalization or allow its use for medical purposes. The Mexican bill’s text says the new law would “contribute to the reduction of crime linked to drug trafficking.” If the bill becomes law, it would represent a win in the international battle to legalize the drug, after New Zealand voters rejected a legalization measure in October.
Tax dodging. A new study has found that tax avoidance and tax evasion amount to $427 billion in lost revenue for governments around the world. The report—from the Tax Justice Network, the Global Alliance for Tax Justice, and Public Services International—found that the United States lost the most from tax cheats—$90 billion annually. Relying on new data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the authors showed that the use of tax havens by corporations shielded them from taxes on $1.38 trillion in profits. Wealthy individuals’ use of tax havens amounted to a loss of $182 billion in potential government revenue.
Burkina Faso elections. Burkina Faso holds presidential and legislative elections on Sunday, as the country’s deteriorating security situation under the threat of jihadist violence threatens turnout. President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, is the favorite to win on Sunday, and would secure a second five-year term in the process. His main opposition comes from Zéphirin Diabré, a former finance minister who lost to Kaboré in the 2015 election. The U.S. State Department has warned that terrorist groups “may attempt to conduct attacks on or around election day.”
Odds and Ends The Vatican has appealed to Instagram for answers after the account belonging to Pope Francis appeared to click “like” on a racy picture posted by Brazilian model Natalia Garibotto. “We can exclude that the ‘like’ came from the Holy See, and it has turned to Instagram for explanations,” a Vatican spokesperson told the Guardian. Divine intervention has been ruled out in the case of the mysterious like; the Pope is, however, known to have a social media team that assists in his earthly outreach efforts. Garibotto herself has seen the lighter side of the mini-scandal. “At least I’m going to heaven,” she said.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.