foreignpolicy--2020-08-03--Israel Can’t Hide Evidence of Its Occupation Anymore

For the past two decades , there has been a general—and mostly unchallenged—understanding that satellite imagery is restricted over Israel and the Palestinian and Syrian territories it occupies .
This was due to a 1996 U.S. regulation known as the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment ( KBA ) which has limited the quality and availability of high-resolution satellite imagery produced by U.S. companies covering Israel ( and by implicit extension , the occupied Palestinian territories and the occupied Golan Heights ) .
The result is that publicly available imagery on platforms such as Google Earth has been deliberately coarse and blurred .
On @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sustained pressure from academia and civil society , the 97-word KBA was unexpectedly reformed , making higher-resolution satellite imagery legally accessible and readily available to all .
The news , though welcome , raises certain questions : First , what were the effects of the KBA ?
Second , since satellite imagery has advanced significantly both in scale and diversity in the 24 years since the KBA was passed , why did it take so long to reverse ?
The combination of commercialization and declassification rang alarm bells in some quarters .
Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War secrecy , lobbied Congress for stricter regulation , which led to the passing of the KBA : the U.S. government ’ s only censorship of imagery of any part of the world .
The legislation , implemented under the guise of protecting Israel ’ s national security , was actually more an act of censorship .
After all , high-resolution satellite imagery allows researchers to understand , identify , and document landscape changes .
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( NOAA ) within the U.S. Department of Commerce is responsible for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Since the KBA did not specify the resolution permitted , the regulation was fixed at 2 meters per pixel .
By contrast , commercial imagery available today is more likely to range from 0.25-0.6 meters per pixel .
It is the difference between seeing the broad outline of a large building and being able to see individual vehicles parked outside .
It is possible to identify substantial changes in land use ( for instance , the building of city-size settlements or the bulldozing of Palestinian structures ) at the two-meter limit , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ settlements or small military emplacements—are harder to discern .
For 24 years , the legislation obfuscated the damaging effects of the Israeli occupation by literally hiding them from view .
The censorship over Israel and the occupied territories has had negative archeological , geographical , and humanitarian implications .
Arguably the most glaring of these has been its effects on monitoring the decades long Israeli occupation—including documenting home demolitions , territorial disputes , and settlement growth .
Lower-resolution imagery has forestalled efforts to challenge and verify human rights violations , especially in hard-to-reach @ @ @ @ @ @ @ which has been under siege since 2007 .
For instance , high-resolution satellite imagery could be used by investigative teams such as Forensic Architecture to identify the exact point from which a fatal shot was fired at unarmed protesters .
Although the KBA legislation only applied to U.S. companies , the biggest players in the global market—firms such as Maxar and Planet , and online open-access points such as Google and Bing—are American .
Even as foreign companies began producing high-resolution imagery during the 2010s , U.S. dominance meant that , in reality @ @ @ @ @ @ @ de facto global scale .
The KBA has harmed U.S. business interests , since U.S. technology companies are not able to compete internationally because of restrictions on the sale of detailed imagery .
Despite instances of muted resistance to the two-meter limitation from tech giants such as Google Earth and Bing Maps over the years , as well as calls for the KBA ’ s revocation , there was , until recently , little attempt at reform .
The censorship of satellite imagery over Israel and the occupied territories mutated into one of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Palestinian-Israeli dispute .
The KBA has also had an adverse impact on scientific research .
Satellite imagery is a crucial tool for surveying and monitoring , and low-resolution imagery does not have the required level of detail for a discipline such as archaeology to track changes to heritage sites or looting pits .
Similarly , climate change assessments frequently rely on data from satellite imagery , which has not been available despite the dangers posed by climate change to the region .
Taken together , these effects amounted to a deliberate blind spot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prohibited the vital work of researchers , academics , and humanitarians .
The problem became clear when a number of non-U.S. companies—beginning with French-owned Airbus in 2011—began producing and retailing high-resolution satellite imagery of Israel and the occupied territories .
In fact , Israel itself provides free high-resolution aerial imagery of the territories it controls , simultaneously rendering the KBA pointless and belying the claim that it serves Israeli national security interests .
These advances have made the KBA anachronistic and obsolete for almost a decade .
And although the KBA was supposed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ review took place until 2017 , with the result that technology has overtaken policy and U.S. firms have been disadvantaged .
Whether monitoring the persecution of the Uighurs in China , the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Myanmar , or U.S. drone strikes in Somalia , satellite imagery has long been used to document and monitor atrocities and war crimes .
This contradiction lay at the heart of the call to reverse the KBA .
The University of Oxford archeologists who identified this failure to reform , Michael Fradley and the late Andrea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 2018 calling for its reform .
Their research explicitly demonstrated that the KBA was obsolete , since several non-U.S. companies produced the images which should have sparked reform and adjustment of the law ’ s limits .
These findings led to two years of pressure on NOAA , the Department of Commerce , and Congress .
The demand was simple : Either allow U.S. companies to produce and disseminate high-resolution imagery of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories , or declare the KBA obsolete .
Then , suddenly , during the Advisory Council @ @ @ @ @ @ @ end of June , it was announced that NOAA had finally recognized that resolution imagery higher than 2 meters per pixel was available from non-U.S. sources to a maximum resolution of 0.4 meters per pixel , which would become the new restriction benchmark ; NOAA may be required to drop to 0.3 meters when Airbus launches its new generation of satellites later this year .
Significantly , the reversal empowers humanitarian groups working to hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law , including unlawful killings and settlement construction ( which , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a war crime ) .
It is perhaps for this reason that the KBA ’ s reversal has already caused some disquiet in Israeli military quarters .
The reversal also has geopolitical implications .
Satellite images of the border areas of Jordan , Syria , Lebanon , and Egypt have thus far been both downsampled and poorly covered ( with many operators wary of capturing any Israeli territory ) .
The change in legislation will provide uncensored images of these areas and allow for their monitoring and investigation , particularly around environmental issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from the perspective of historical justice and accountability , uncensored , high-resolution images enable Palestinians to accurately catalog the remnants of villages and towns destroyed during the events of 1948 and beyond .
The democratizing power of the reform will allow Palestinians to use technology to rediscover an erased past and to imagine an alternative future .
The reform of the KBA may have won the battle over commercialization , but declassification remains a separate battle altogether .
Ensuring that archival satellite imagery of Israel and the occupied territories is rereleased at the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it was a declassified image of the Dimona reactor ( an Israeli nuclear installation located in the Negev desert ) in the Israeli media that sparked the push for the KBA in the first place .
Declassified British Royal Air Force photographs of Palestine taken from 1944 to 1948 have already shown the monumental changes to the landscape since then ; declassified U.S. imagery from the latter half of the 20th century could reveal much more .
The role that technological advances can play in protecting human rights warrants scrutiny .
Whether monitoring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s so-called reeducation camps , the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas and other minority groups in Myanmar , or U.S. drone strikes in Somalia , satellite imagery has long been used by international advocacy groups , researchers , journalists , and civilians to document and monitor atrocities and war crimes .
The reversal of the KBA after 24 years has leveled the playing field and given those working towards freedom , justice , and equality a vital tool .
However , monitoring alone can only go so far .
High-resolution satellite imagery remains @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .

For the past two decades, there has been a general—and mostly unchallenged—understanding that satellite imagery is restricted over Israel and the Palestinian and Syrian territories it occupies. This was due to a 1996 U.S. regulation known as the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment (KBA) which has limited the quality and availability of high-resolution satellite imagery produced by U.S. companies covering Israel (and by implicit extension, the occupied Palestinian territories and the occupied Golan Heights). The result is that publicly available imagery on platforms such as Google Earth has been deliberately coarse and blurred.
For the past two decades, there has been a general—and mostly unchallenged—understanding that satellite imagery is restricted over Israel and the Palestinian and Syrian territories it occupies. This was due to a 1996 U.S. regulation known as the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment (KBA) which has limited the quality and availability of high-resolution satellite imagery produced by U.S. companies covering Israel (and by implicit extension, the occupied Palestinian territories and the occupied Golan Heights). The result is that publicly available imagery on platforms such as Google Earth has been deliberately coarse and blurred.
On June 25, following two years of sustained pressure from academia and civil society, the 97-word KBA was unexpectedly reformed, making higher-resolution satellite imagery legally accessible and readily available to all. The news, though welcome, raises certain questions: First, what were the effects of the KBA? Second, since satellite imagery has advanced significantly both in scale and diversity in the 24 years since the KBA was passed, why did it take so long to reverse?
The KBA was a byproduct of the aftermath of the Cold War, when the satellite imagery industry was still young. President Bill Clinton sought to refashion technology formerly used for espionage for a wider, commercial usage. He also moved to declassify U.S. spy satellite imagery from the 1960s and 1970s.
The combination of commercialization and declassification rang alarm bells in some quarters. Israel, driven by a desire for Cold War secrecy, lobbied Congress for stricter regulation, which led to the passing of the KBA: the U.S. government’s only censorship of imagery of any part of the world.
The legislation, implemented under the guise of protecting Israel’s national security, was actually more an act of censorship. After all, high-resolution satellite imagery allows researchers to understand, identify, and document landscape changes. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the U.S. Department of Commerce is responsible for implementing the regulations concerning remote sensing. Since the KBA did not specify the resolution permitted, the regulation was fixed at 2 meters per pixel.
By contrast, commercial imagery available today is more likely to range from 0.25-0.6 meters per pixel. It is the difference between seeing the broad outline of a large building and being able to see individual vehicles parked outside. It is possible to identify substantial changes in land use (for instance, the building of city-size settlements or the bulldozing of Palestinian structures) at the two-meter limit, but subtler changes—such as the growth of outpost settlements or small military emplacements—are harder to discern. For 24 years, the legislation obfuscated the damaging effects of the Israeli occupation by literally hiding them from view.
The censorship over Israel and the occupied territories has had negative archeological, geographical, and humanitarian implications. Arguably the most glaring of these has been its effects on monitoring the decades long Israeli occupation—including documenting home demolitions, territorial disputes, and settlement growth. Lower-resolution imagery has forestalled efforts to challenge and verify human rights violations, especially in hard-to-reach areas such as the Gaza Strip, which has been under siege since 2007. For instance, high-resolution satellite imagery could be used by investigative teams such as Forensic Architecture to identify the exact point from which a fatal shot was fired at unarmed protesters.
Although the KBA legislation only applied to U.S. companies, the biggest players in the global market—firms such as Maxar and Planet, and online open-access points such as Google and Bing—are American. Even as foreign companies began producing high-resolution imagery during the 2010s, U.S. dominance meant that, in reality, the KBA was applied on a de facto global scale.
The KBA has harmed U.S. business interests, since U.S. technology companies are not able to compete internationally because of restrictions on the sale of detailed imagery. Despite instances of muted resistance to the two-meter limitation from tech giants such as Google Earth and Bing Maps over the years, as well as calls for the KBA’s revocation, there was, until recently, little attempt at reform. The censorship of satellite imagery over Israel and the occupied territories mutated into one of those seemingly immovable exceptions that define the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.
The KBA has also had an adverse impact on scientific research. Satellite imagery is a crucial tool for surveying and monitoring, and low-resolution imagery does not have the required level of detail for a discipline such as archaeology to track changes to heritage sites or looting pits. Similarly, climate change assessments frequently rely on data from satellite imagery, which has not been available despite the dangers posed by climate change to the region.
Taken together, these effects amounted to a deliberate blind spot created by the KBA, which directly prohibited the vital work of researchers, academics, and humanitarians.
The KBA was generally vague, but it stated that restrictions on satellite imagery over Israel would only apply so long as high-resolution satellite imagery was not readily available from non-U.S. companies. If foreign firms began to release more detailed images, the KBA-imposed resolution limits were intended to change continually over time to match the quality of those produced by non-U.S. companies. But they didn’t.
The problem became clear when a number of non-U.S. companies—beginning with French-owned Airbus in 2011—began producing and retailing high-resolution satellite imagery of Israel and the occupied territories. In fact, Israel itself provides free high-resolution aerial imagery of the territories it controls, simultaneously rendering the KBA pointless and belying the claim that it serves Israeli national security interests.
These advances have made the KBA anachronistic and obsolete for almost a decade. And although the KBA was supposed to be reviewed regularly, no formal review took place until 2017, with the result that technology has overtaken policy and U.S. firms have been disadvantaged.
Whether monitoring the persecution of the Uighurs in China, the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Myanmar, or U.S. drone strikes in Somalia, satellite imagery has long been used to document and monitor atrocities and war crimes.
This contradiction lay at the heart of the call to reverse the KBA. The University of Oxford archeologists who identified this failure to reform, Michael Fradley and the late Andrea Zerbini, published a groundbreaking paper in 2018 calling for its reform. Their research explicitly demonstrated that the KBA was obsolete, since several non-U.S. companies produced the images which should have sparked reform and adjustment of the law’s limits.
These findings led to two years of pressure on NOAA, the Department of Commerce, and Congress. The demand was simple: Either allow U.S. companies to produce and disseminate high-resolution imagery of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, or declare the KBA obsolete.
Then, suddenly, during the Advisory Council of Commercial Remote Sensing meeting at the end of June, it was announced that NOAA had finally recognized that resolution imagery higher than 2 meters per pixel was available from non-U.S. sources to a maximum resolution of 0.4 meters per pixel, which would become the new restriction benchmark; NOAA may be required to drop to 0.3 meters when Airbus launches its new generation of satellites later this year.
The implications of this reversal are wide-ranging. Most obviously, U.S. technology companies will be more competitive against foreign companies. From a scientific perspective, the reform will result in a significant improvement in the ability to remotely monitor this environmentally fragile region. When it comes to climate change, high-resolution imagery will enable the more accurate detection of changes in vegetation, crop conditions, further spread of desertification (a key impact of climate change in the region), changes to water distribution, overuse of fertilizer, and pollution dumps—changes which are substantially harder to discern and record with low-resolution satellite imagery. For disciplines such as archaeology, it will help identify sites and monitor damage. The reversal empowers humanitarian groups working to hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law.
Significantly, the reversal empowers humanitarian groups working to hold Israel accountable for its violations of international law, including unlawful killings and settlement construction (which, under the fourth Geneva Convention, constitutes a war crime). It is perhaps for this reason that the KBA’s reversal has already caused some disquiet in Israeli military quarters. The reversal also has geopolitical implications. Satellite images of the border areas of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt have thus far been both downsampled and poorly covered (with many operators wary of capturing any Israeli territory). The change in legislation will provide uncensored images of these areas and allow for their monitoring and investigation, particularly around environmental issues such as water extraction.
Finally, from the perspective of historical justice and accountability, uncensored, high-resolution images enable Palestinians to accurately catalog the remnants of villages and towns destroyed during the events of 1948 and beyond. The democratizing power of the reform will allow Palestinians to use technology to rediscover an erased past and to imagine an alternative future.
The reform of the KBA may have won the battle over commercialization, but declassification remains a separate battle altogether. Ensuring that archival satellite imagery of Israel and the occupied territories is rereleased at the correct resolution is the next frontier—indeed, it was a declassified image of the Dimona reactor (an Israeli nuclear installation located in the Negev desert) in the Israeli media that sparked the push for the KBA in the first place. Declassified British Royal Air Force photographs of Palestine taken from 1944 to 1948 have already shown the monumental changes to the landscape since then; declassified U.S. imagery from the latter half of the 20th century could reveal much more.
The role that technological advances can play in protecting human rights warrants scrutiny. Whether monitoring the persecution of the Uighurs in China’s so-called reeducation camps, the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas and other minority groups in Myanmar, or U.S. drone strikes in Somalia, satellite imagery has long been used by international advocacy groups, researchers, journalists, and civilians to document and monitor atrocities and war crimes.
The reversal of the KBA after 24 years has leveled the playing field and given those working towards freedom, justice, and equality a vital tool. However, monitoring alone can only go so far. High-resolution satellite imagery remains a means of pursuing accountability—not the end.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Pompeo Holds Surprise Talks With Taliban

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo holds surprise video conference with top Taliban official , Lebanon ’ s foreign minister resigns , and Trump wants the U.S. Treasury to take a cut of TikTok sale .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held surprise talks with Taliban chief negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , the group ’ s Doha-based deputy leader .
According to Reuters , the talks covered the issue of Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government .
What the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they should be freed before they join negotiations with government officials and other Afghans on a political settlement .
The State Department has yet to issue a readout of the call but the Taliban was quick to post evidence of the meeting .
What ’ s the disagreement ?
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is hesitant to release the remaining 400 prisoners named on the Taliban ’ s list .
He contends that they were involved in serious crimes , including a 2017 bombing of the German embassy and other deadly attacks .
Ghani @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are not on the list instead .
Prison break .
The meeting occurred just as Afghan security forces were attempting to end the siege of a prison in eastern Afghanistan by Islamic State militants .
Afghan soldiers killed at least 10 Islamic State fighters who had taken control of the prison in Jalalabad , ending a siege in which hundreds of prisoners escaped .
At least 29 people died during the militants ’ assault on the prison on Sunday evening and in later clashes with security forces , a spokesman for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade hack .
Classified U.S.-U.K. trade documents that were leaked ahead of the December 2019 U.K. general election were obtained by suspected Russian hackers who had compromised the personal e-mail account of former Trade Minister Liam Fox , Reuters reported on Monday .
The news comes after a parliamentary report found that the British government had failed to follow up on Russian attempts to influence the 2016 Brexit vote .
Fox is currently Britain ’ s candidate for secretary-general of the World Trade Organization .
North Korean warheads .
A confidential report submitted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ several unnamed countries believe North Korea has “ probably developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into the warheads of its ballistic missiles.
” The report also states that North Korea is violating sanctions by conducting an illicit trade in coal and generating funds by cyberattacks on banks and cryptocurrency exchanges .
Resignation in Lebanon .
Lebanese Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti has resigned from his post , citing “ the absence of an effective will to achieve structural , comprehensive reform.
” President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab have appointed Charbel Wehbe @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Hitti ’ s replacement .
Lebanon ’ s talks with the International Monetary Fund ( IMF ) remain stalled .
Member of U.K. Parliament charged with rape .
A former Conservative Party minister was arrested in London on July 31 after a female parliamentary staffer accused him of rape , sexual assault , and coercive control .
London ’ s Metropolitan police confirmed they had launched an investigation into four alleged incidents between July 2019 and January 2020 .
They said “ a man in his 50s ” was taken into custody in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ identified .
The arrested MP has not yet been suspended from the Conservative Party pending the police investigation .
The accuser repeatedly raised the issue with top party officials and has called the party leadership ’ s inaction “ insulting.
” The Tory Chief Whip , Mark Spencer , claims the party is taking the matter “ very seriously.
” Another curfew in Kashmir .
The Indian government has imposed a curfew in many parts of Indian-controlled Kashmir , in advance of the one-year anniversary of New Delhi ’ s decision to revoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Indian officials said the security lockdown in Srinagar , the region ’ s largest city , was necessary because they had information about protests planned to mark the August 5 anniversary as a “ black day.
” Police and paramilitaries drove through the city ’ s streets and warned residents to stay indoors while laying barbed wire on roads and bridges .
Trump wants a cut from TikTok sale .
After threatening to ban the app TikTok , U.S. President Donald Trump now says he approves of Microsoft ’ s bid to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance .
However , Trump is now insisting that the U.S. government get a cut from the sale if an American firm buys it .
“ The United States should get a very large percentage of that price , because we ’ re making it possible , ” Trump said .
The MIT Technology Review called Trump ’ s approach “ Mafia-like behavior.
” Juan Carlos , the former king of Spain , has entered self-exile in an as yet undisclosed country as a corruption investigation into his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabian rail contract gathers steam .
Spanish prosecutors allege Juan Carlos , who abdicated in 2014 , received a $ 100 million “ donation ” from the king of Saudi Arabia that was then hidden in an offshore bank account .
In a letter , Juan Carlos said he was leaving Spain in order to allow his son , King Felipe VI , to carry out his role with “ tranquility.
” A spokesperson said the former monarch would still make himself available for questioning from prosecutors .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo holds surprise video conference with top Taliban official, Lebanon ’s foreign minister resigns, and Trump wants the U.S. Treasury to take a cut of TikTok sale.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo holds surprise video conference with top Taliban official, Lebanon’s foreign minister resigns, and Trump wants the U.S. Treasury to take a cut of TikTok sale.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Holds Talks With Taliban’s Baradar
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held surprise talks with Taliban chief negotiator Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the group’s Doha-based deputy leader. According to Reuters, the talks covered the issue of Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government.
What the Taliban wants. The Taliban insist that they should be freed before they join negotiations with government officials and other Afghans on a political settlement. The State Department has yet to issue a readout of the call but the Taliban was quick to post evidence of the meeting.
What’s the disagreement? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is hesitant to release the remaining 400 prisoners named on the Taliban’s list. He contends that they were involved in serious crimes, including a 2017 bombing of the German embassy and other deadly attacks. Ghani has offered to release 500 other prisoners who are not on the list instead.
Prison break. The meeting occurred just as Afghan security forces were attempting to end the siege of a prison in eastern Afghanistan by Islamic State militants.
Afghan soldiers killed at least 10 Islamic State fighters who had taken control of the prison in Jalalabad, ending a siege in which hundreds of prisoners escaped. At least 29 people died during the militants’ assault on the prison on Sunday evening and in later clashes with security forces, a spokesman for the governor of Nangarhar province said.
What We’re Following Today
British trade hack. Classified U.S.-U.K. trade documents that were leaked ahead of the December 2019 U.K. general election were obtained by suspected Russian hackers who had compromised the personal e-mail account of former Trade Minister Liam Fox, Reuters reported on Monday. The news comes after a parliamentary report found that the British government had failed to follow up on Russian attempts to influence the 2016 Brexit vote. Fox is currently Britain’s candidate for secretary-general of the World Trade Organization.
North Korean warheads. A confidential report submitted to the U.N. Security Council concludes that several unnamed countries believe North Korea has “probably developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into the warheads of its ballistic missiles.” The report also states that North Korea is violating sanctions by conducting an illicit trade in coal and generating funds by cyberattacks on banks and cryptocurrency exchanges.
Resignation in Lebanon. Lebanese Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti has resigned from his post, citing “the absence of an effective will to achieve structural, comprehensive reform.” President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab have appointed Charbel Wehbe, Aoun’s diplomatic adviser as Hitti’s replacement. Lebanon’s talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remain stalled.
Keep an Eye On
Member of U.K. Parliament charged with rape. A former Conservative Party minister was arrested in London on July 31 after a female parliamentary staffer accused him of rape, sexual assault, and coercive control.
London’s Metropolitan police confirmed they had launched an investigation into four alleged incidents between July 2019 and January 2020. They said “a man in his 50s” was taken into custody in east London. He has not been identified.
The arrested MP has not yet been suspended from the Conservative Party pending the police investigation. The accuser repeatedly raised the issue with top party officials and has called the party leadership’s inaction “insulting.” The Tory Chief Whip, Mark Spencer, claims the party is taking the matter “very seriously.”
Another curfew in Kashmir. The Indian government has imposed a curfew in many parts of Indian-controlled Kashmir, in advance of the one-year anniversary of New Delhi’s decision to revoke the disputed region’s special status. Indian officials said the security lockdown in Srinagar, the region’s largest city, was necessary because they had information about protests planned to mark the August 5 anniversary as a “black day.” Police and paramilitaries drove through the city’s streets and warned residents to stay indoors while laying barbed wire on roads and bridges.
Trump wants a cut from TikTok sale. After threatening to ban the app TikTok, U.S. President Donald Trump now says he approves of Microsoft’s bid to acquire the app, which is currently owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance. However, Trump is now insisting that the U.S. government get a cut from the sale if an American firm buys it. “The United States should get a very large percentage of that price, because we’re making it possible,” Trump said. The MIT Technology Review called Trump’s approach “Mafia-like behavior.”
Odds and Ends
Juan Carlos, the former king of Spain, has entered self-exile in an as yet undisclosed country as a corruption investigation into his involvement in the winning of a Saudi Arabian rail contract gathers steam. Spanish prosecutors allege Juan Carlos, who abdicated in 2014, received a $100 million “donation” from the king of Saudi Arabia that was then hidden in an offshore bank account. In a letter, Juan Carlos said he was leaving Spain in order to allow his son, King Felipe VI, to carry out his role with “tranquility.” A spokesperson said the former monarch would still make himself available for questioning from prosecutors.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Arab Dictators Are Learning to Love Collective Punishment

When Mohamed Ali began propping his cellphone on his desk in Spain [ WHEN ? ]
, he did not expect the resulting videos to trigger an uprising in his home country of Egypt .
( The videos by the contractor-turned-whistleblower , which revealed lavish spending by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his family , eventually led to rare nationwide anti-government protests last September . )
What he did expect , however , was that his family would be targeted by the regime as a way to discredit him .
On Egyptian TV , his father publicly disowned him .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ robbing his late brother .
“ My family lied , ” Ali told me in a phone call from Spain .
“ They are pro-Sisi .
I was not surprised by what they said , we are in a dictatorship .
From what I know , they were told exactly what to say.
” On several occasions , Ali ’ s father called him and demanded he publicly apologize for the videos .
“ He asked me why I would do such a thing ; we were happy .
He told me they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ I cried , but there ’ s no going back.
” Last month , news emerged that Egypt is seeking his extradition from Spain for alleged tax evasion as Sisi continues a relentless campaign to silence critics abroad .
Ali ’ s story is not unique , however .
He is part of a growing pool of dissidents who have chosen to exile themselves abroad in exchange for speaking freely against authoritarian regimes in the Arab region .
Many of them have seen their families facing tremendous pressure by security forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ silence .
In my interviews with numerous outspoken critics , I found that a recurring tactic seems to have been employed by more than one regime around the same time : Families are asked to pressure the dissenting relative into silence , disown them , discredit them and denounce their actions .
Families that fail to comply face travel bans , social isolation , job loss , and even incarceration .
But longtime government critics say these tactics were not common or this systematic in the past .
In Saudi Arabia , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been tied to the time after Mohammed bin Salman became crown prince in 2017 , and specifically after he began a string of crackdowns on critics , influential figures , royals , activists , scholars , and clerics .
A clear example of this is the arrest of the cleric Salman al-Odah in September 2017 .
Although he was previously arrested before Mohammed bin Salman ’ s rise to power and imprisoned from 1994 to 1999 , his son Abdullah al-Odah says his family had never been harassed at the time .
Now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ family , including children as young as 9 , are banned from travel ; his uncle remains in prison for tweeting about Odah ; and their home has been repeatedly searched .
In a bizarre twist of events , and after his family was denied access to visit Odah in prison , a Saudi journalist was given access to interview him , describing the prison as a place for relaxation .
The journalist also quoted Odah as asking his son Abdullah to stop campaigning for him and focus on his studies .
( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ because he had already completed his studies and his father knew that . )
Loujain al-Hathloul , a prominent Saudi women ’ s rights activist , also experienced the same shift in tactics .
Unlike during her initial arrest in 2014 , when she was arrested a second time in 2018 her parents were placed on a travel ban .
Her husband was forcibly returned to Saudi Arabia from Jordan .
The couple later divorced , but it remains unclear whether it was due to government pressure .
Her siblings were pressured to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they eventually spoke out after learning about the torture and sexual harassment Loujain was subjected to in prison .
“ Many [ critics and family ] have tried to stay silent , but the new thing about MBS is that even if you are silent , he will not change course , ” said Hala al-Dosari , a prominent Saudi activist and scholar , referring to the Saudi crown prince by his initials .
“ This is new in Saudi Arabia .
They are basically saying : We are going after you , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no room to negotiate .
That ’ s why staying silent doesn ’ t help.
” While travel bans are not new in Saudi Arabia , under former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef—sidelined by Mohammed bin Salman in 2017—they were reviewed yearly and could be contested , according to Dosari .
This is no longer the case .
It is unknown how many are on a travel ban in Saudi Arabia , but the number is estimated to be in the thousands .
“ Under MBS it is indefinite , ” she said @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Western countries where activists are exiled .
In 2018 , for example , the political asylee Omar Abdulaziz , an outspoken critic of Mohammed bin Salman , was visited by one of his brothers in Canada , accompanied by two men who said they carried a message from the crown prince .
Abdulaziz was told to either go to the Saudi Embassy in Canada or go home with them .
Abdulaziz did neither .
His brother was imprisoned upon return to Saudi Arabia , along with a number of Abdulaziz ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ pressure him .
Two years later , and with no sign of Abdulaziz slowing down his activism , the Canadian authorities warned him that he had become a potential target of the Saudi government .
Just as in Abdelaziz ’ s case , where his family members have been held hostage , the same tactic is being used on Saad al-Jabri , a former intelligence officer in Saudi Arabia , who helped foil an al Qaeda plot against the West .
The Saudi government arrested two of his children and one of his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
( After the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 , Saudi officials acknowledged the existence of a standing order to bring dissidents home that did not specify the method . )
Activists suspect family harassment became a go-to response because of the close relationship between the United Arab Emirates ’ Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman , especially because the UAE had employed such tactics years before .
The Emirati human rights activist Alaa al-Siddiq , who lives in London , where she is currently seeking asylum , says @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Arabia more viciously in recent years , but she experienced the same tactics firsthand in the UAE .
Siddiq is the daughter of one of 94 UAE nationals convicted in 2013 for “ compromising ” the country ’ s security , a case I reported on while working for a local publication inside the country at the time .
Siddiq said 20 relatives of those 94 had their citizenship revoked , including herself .
Others were banned from travel , faced social exclusion , and were unable to get certain jobs .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sister , the government would stop them , ” she told me from London .
“ We don ’ t know exactly how many are on travel bans , there is no paper or order given to people to notify them .
But once they try to cross a border , they then are told verbally .
This growing alliance between Saudi and the UAE is leading to the same human rights violations and tactics being used.
” Travel bans are also not communicated to people in Saudi Arabia but are discovered at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wished not to be named in fear of retaliation , said they privately encouraged their family to disown them , adding that before speaking out , dissidents are fully aware that the government would go to great lengths to silence them , including turning to their loved ones .
As regimes adopt increasingly more ruthless tactics against their critics , dissidents abroad are resorting to legal action to shed light on their abusers .
Through this approach , Western governments are pressured domestically to denounce human rights abusers , even while they try @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Earlier this year , a number of jailed Saudis and allies began retaining lawyers and lobbyists , bringing their cases to the United States .
More recently , the American Egyptian activist Mohamed Soltan , who was tortured while imprisoned in Egypt , filed a lawsuit in Washington , D.C. , against former Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi for ordering his arrest in 2013 .
In response , the Egyptian government arrested five of his cousins and interrogated his father before taking him to an undisclosed location .
The family was told by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hostage so that Soltan will drop the lawsuit .
U.S. policymakers called the arrests a clear interference in the U.S. judiciary .
The ongoing pursuit of dissidents and their families will likely cause an ongoing diplomatic headache for the West , and the United States in particular—whether under current President Donald Trump or under his election rival , Joe Biden—unless a collective effort is made to pressure regimes to improve their human rights record .
Biden has already voiced concern over the harassment of Soltan ’ s family and warned there would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s “ favorite dictator , ” in reference to Sisi , offering a glimpse of what his presidency could mean for Egypt and others in the region .
Sadly , in Soltan ’ s case , Egypt placed diplomatic pressure on the U.S. State Department to grant Beblawi diplomatic immunity from the torture lawsuit , which the department has now declared .
This will only lead to greater pressure on Soltan ’ s family , as well as others waiting in line to gain justice from their abusers and to free their families @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European nations can not export their human rights values to the Arab world , they can , at the very least , help those who escape in getting justice , particularly when their citizens are involved .
Any less would likely embolden these regimes to go further in their repression .

When Mohamed Ali began propping his cellphone on his desk in Spain, he did not expect the resulting videos to trigger an uprising in his home country of Egypt. (The videos by the contractor-turned-whistleblower, which revealed lavish spending by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his family, eventually led to rare nationwide anti-government protests last September.) What he did expect, however, was that his family would be targeted by the regime as a way to discredit him.
When Mohamed Ali began propping his cellphone on his desk in Spain, he did not expect the resulting videos to trigger an uprising in his home country of Egypt. (The videos by the contractor-turned-whistleblower, which revealed lavish spending by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his family, eventually led to rare nationwide anti-government protests last September.) What he did expect, however, was that his family would be targeted by the regime as a way to discredit him.
On Egyptian TV, his father publicly disowned him. His brother and mother accused him of robbing his late brother. “My family lied,” Ali told me in a phone call from Spain. “They are pro-Sisi. I was not surprised by what they said, we are in a dictatorship. From what I know, they were told exactly what to say.” On several occasions, Ali’s father called him and demanded he publicly apologize for the videos. “He asked me why I would do such a thing; we were happy. He told me they will kill me,” Ali said. “I cried, but there’s no going back.” Last month, news emerged that Egypt is seeking his extradition from Spain for alleged tax evasion as Sisi continues a relentless campaign to silence critics abroad.
Ali’s story is not unique, however. He is part of a growing pool of dissidents who have chosen to exile themselves abroad in exchange for speaking freely against authoritarian regimes in the Arab region. Many of them have seen their families facing tremendous pressure by security forces seeking to blackmail their relatives abroad into silence.
In my interviews with numerous outspoken critics, I found that a recurring tactic seems to have been employed by more than one regime around the same time: Families are asked to pressure the dissenting relative into silence, disown them, discredit them and denounce their actions. Families that fail to comply face travel bans, social isolation, job loss, and even incarceration. But longtime government critics say these tactics were not common or this systematic in the past.
In Saudi Arabia, for example, much of this strategy has been tied to the time after Mohammed bin Salman became crown prince in 2017, and specifically after he began a string of crackdowns on critics, influential figures, royals, activists, scholars, and clerics. A clear example of this is the arrest of the cleric Salman al-Odah in September 2017. Although he was previously arrested before Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power and imprisoned from 1994 to 1999, his son Abdullah al-Odah says his family had never been harassed at the time. Now, at least 18 members of his family, including children as young as 9, are banned from travel; his uncle remains in prison for tweeting about Odah; and their home has been repeatedly searched. In a bizarre twist of events, and after his family was denied access to visit Odah in prison, a Saudi journalist was given access to interview him, describing the prison as a place for relaxation. The journalist also quoted Odah as asking his son Abdullah to stop campaigning for him and focus on his studies. (Abdullah says this request was strange, because he had already completed his studies and his father knew that.)
Loujain al-Hathloul, a prominent Saudi women’s rights activist, also experienced the same shift in tactics. Unlike during her initial arrest in 2014, when she was arrested a second time in 2018 her parents were placed on a travel ban. Her husband was forcibly returned to Saudi Arabia from Jordan. The couple later divorced, but it remains unclear whether it was due to government pressure. Her siblings were pressured to remain quiet about her case, but they eventually spoke out after learning about the torture and sexual harassment Loujain was subjected to in prison.
“Many [critics and family] have tried to stay silent, but the new thing about MBS is that even if you are silent, he will not change course,” said Hala al-Dosari, a prominent Saudi activist and scholar, referring to the Saudi crown prince by his initials. “This is new in Saudi Arabia. They are basically saying: We are going after you, and your family, and there is no room to negotiate. That’s why staying silent doesn’t help.”
While travel bans are not new in Saudi Arabia, under former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef—sidelined by Mohammed bin Salman in 2017—they were reviewed yearly and could be contested, according to Dosari. This is no longer the case. It is unknown how many are on a travel ban in Saudi Arabia, but the number is estimated to be in the thousands. “Under MBS it is indefinite,” she said.
Such efforts have included direct pressure in Western countries where activists are exiled. In 2018, for example, the political asylee Omar Abdulaziz, an outspoken critic of Mohammed bin Salman, was visited by one of his brothers in Canada, accompanied by two men who said they carried a message from the crown prince. Abdulaziz was told to either go to the Saudi Embassy in Canada or go home with them. Abdulaziz did neither. His brother was imprisoned upon return to Saudi Arabia, along with a number of Abdulaziz’s friends, in an attempt to further pressure him. Two years later, and with no sign of Abdulaziz slowing down his activism, the Canadian authorities warned him that he had become a potential target of the Saudi government.
Just as in Abdelaziz’s case, where his family members have been held hostage, the same tactic is being used on Saad al-Jabri, a former intelligence officer in Saudi Arabia, who helped foil an al Qaeda plot against the West. The Saudi government arrested two of his children and one of his brothers to pressure him to return home. (After the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, Saudi officials acknowledged the existence of a standing order to bring dissidents home that did not specify the method.)
Activists suspect family harassment became a go-to response because of the close relationship between the United Arab Emirates’ Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman, especially because the UAE had employed such tactics years before. The Emirati human rights activist Alaa al-Siddiq, who lives in London, where she is currently seeking asylum, says the trend has been spreading in Saudi Arabia more viciously in recent years, but she experienced the same tactics firsthand in the UAE. Siddiq is the daughter of one of 94 UAE nationals convicted in 2013 for “compromising” the country’s security, a case I reported on while working for a local publication inside the country at the time. Siddiq said 20 relatives of those 94 had their citizenship revoked, including herself. Others were banned from travel, faced social exclusion, and were unable to get certain jobs.
“If someone came to propose to my sister, the government would stop them,” she told me from London. “We don’t know exactly how many are on travel bans, there is no paper or order given to people to notify them. But once they try to cross a border, they then are told verbally. This growing alliance between Saudi and the UAE is leading to the same human rights violations and tactics being used.” Travel bans are also not communicated to people in Saudi Arabia but are discovered at border crossings.
One dissident, who wished not to be named in fear of retaliation, said they privately encouraged their family to disown them, adding that before speaking out, dissidents are fully aware that the government would go to great lengths to silence them, including turning to their loved ones.
As regimes adopt increasingly more ruthless tactics against their critics, dissidents abroad are resorting to legal action to shed light on their abusers. Through this approach, Western governments are pressured domestically to denounce human rights abusers, even while they try to maintain diplomatic relations in the region.
Earlier this year, a number of jailed Saudis and allies began retaining lawyers and lobbyists, bringing their cases to the United States. More recently, the American Egyptian activist Mohamed Soltan, who was tortured while imprisoned in Egypt, filed a lawsuit in Washington, D.C., against former Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi for ordering his arrest in 2013. In response, the Egyptian government arrested five of his cousins and interrogated his father before taking him to an undisclosed location. The family was told by the Egyptian government they were being held hostage so that Soltan will drop the lawsuit. U.S. policymakers called the arrests a clear interference in the U.S. judiciary.
The ongoing pursuit of dissidents and their families will likely cause an ongoing diplomatic headache for the West, and the United States in particular—whether under current President Donald Trump or under his election rival, Joe Biden—unless a collective effort is made to pressure regimes to improve their human rights record. Biden has already voiced concern over the harassment of Soltan’s family and warned there would be no more blank checks for Trump’s “favorite dictator,” in reference to Sisi, offering a glimpse of what his presidency could mean for Egypt and others in the region. Sadly, in Soltan’s case, Egypt placed diplomatic pressure on the U.S. State Department to grant Beblawi diplomatic immunity from the torture lawsuit, which the department has now declared. This will only lead to greater pressure on Soltan’s family, as well as others waiting in line to gain justice from their abusers and to free their families.
While the United States and other European nations cannot export their human rights values to the Arab world, they can, at the very least, help those who escape in getting justice, particularly when their citizens are involved. Any less would likely embolden these regimes to go further in their repression.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-05--Thousands Injured in Giant Beirut Blast

Thousands Injured in Giant Beirut Blast

A pair of explosions rocked the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Tuesday , leaving at least 78 dead and more than 4,000 injured , according to figures supplied by the country ’ s health minister .
The cause of the blasts is yet to be determined , but Lebanese officials say it was accidental .
Scenes of the damage were broadcast across the world , leading to an outpouring of grief , with several countries offering to assist Lebanon in its recovery efforts , including France , Iran , and the United States .
Abbas Ibrahim , Lebanon ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the blasts was likely caused by the nearby presence of ammonium nitrate , which he said the government had confiscated from a ship in the city ’ s port several years ago .
Witnesses said they saw a cloud of orange-colored smoke coming from the site of the explosion , an occurrence consistent with explosions involving nitrate .
Ammonium nitrate is often used in bomb-making .
According to the country ’ s National News Agency , Prime Minister Hassan Diab has declared Wednesday a nationwide day of mourning .
Despite the assessments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ media outlets indirectly put the blame on the Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah , repeating reports that it housed some of its explosive material in the city .
Twitter was also initially abuzz with talk of the group ’ s indirect involvement .
In a statement , Hezbollah did not confirm or deny accusations that it was involved .
“ We extend our condolences to the Lebanese people over this national tragedy , ” the statement read .
Israel , which has sparred with Hezbollah in recent weeks and has carried out attacks in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on condition of anonymity , an Israeli official said Israel “ had nothing to do ” with the explosion .
U.S. President Donald Trump departed from the line being followed by Lebanese officials , giving credence to rumors that the explosion was an intentional attack .
He told reporters that U.S. military leaders “ [ seemed ] to think it was an attack .
It was a bomb of some kind.
” The accident strains a healthcare system already under severe pressure from the coronavirus pandemic .
Last week , the Lebanese government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spike in new COVID-19 cases .
The rise of new cases and the resulting strain it has put on the country ’ s healthcare system seems to have rendered it unequipped to deal with Tuesday ’ s emergency .
A Red Cross official said some of those injured had to be moved to hospitals in other parts of Lebanon because those in Beirut were at full capacity .
To make matters worse , several of the city ’ s hospitals , including some of the country ’ s largest , were destroyed in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ add to a barrage of crises Lebanon has faced in the last several months .
A wave of anti-government protests rocked the country late last year , forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and threatening to bring down the state ’ s entire ruling apparatus .
Despite restrictions imposed by the national lockdown , demonstrations have continued , creating an almost untenable situation for the government .
Lebanon is also in the throes of an economic disaster .
The Lebanese lira has plunged , losing between 85 to 90 percent of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to fuel the widespread feelings of discontent that led to the anti-government protests .
The resulting financial collapse has crippled the country ’ s economy , leading to soaring inflation , unemployment , and poverty .
On Monday , Lebanese Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti resigned amid the deepening financial crisis , warning that the government ’ s inability to stave off the crisis risked turning Lebanon into a “ failed state .
”

A pair of explosions rocked the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Tuesday, leaving at least 78 dead people and more than 4,000 injured, according to figures supplied by the country’s health minister. The cause of the blasts is yet to be determined, but Lebanese officials say it was accidental. Scenes of the damage were broadcast around the world, leading to an outpouring of grief, with several countries offering to assist Lebanon in its recovery efforts, including France, Iran, and the United States.
A pair of explosions rocked the Lebanese capital of Beirut on Tuesday, leaving at least 78 dead people and more than 4,000 injured, according to figures supplied by the country’s health minister. The cause of the blasts is yet to be determined, but Lebanese officials say it was accidental. Scenes of the damage were broadcast around the world, leading to an outpouring of grief, with several countries offering to assist Lebanon in its recovery efforts, including France, Iran, and the United States.
Abbas Ibrahim, Lebanon’s internal security chief, said the ferocity of the blasts was likely caused by the nearby presence of ammonium nitrate, which he said the government had confiscated from a ship in the city’s port several years ago. Witnesses said they saw a cloud of orange-colored smoke coming from the site of the explosion, an occurrence consistent with explosions involving nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is often used in bomb-making.
According to the country’s National News Agency, Prime Minister Hassan Diab has declared Wednesday a nationwide day of mourning.
Despite the assessments given by Lebanese officials, some right-wing media outlets indirectly put the blame on the Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah, repeating reports that it housed some of its explosive material in the city. Twitter was also initially abuzz with talk of the group’s indirect involvement. In a statement, Hezbollah did not confirm or deny accusations that it was involved. “We extend our condolences to the Lebanese people over this national tragedy,” the statement read.
Israel, which has sparred with Hezbollah in recent weeks and has carried out attacks in Beirut before, deflected blame. Speaking on condition of anonymity, an Israeli official told the Associated Press that Israel “had nothing to do” with the explosion.
U.S. President Donald Trump departed from the line being followed by Lebanese officials, giving credence to rumors that the explosion was an intentional attack. He told reporters that U.S. military leaders “[seemed] to think it was an attack. It was a bomb of some kind.”
The accident strains a health care system already under severe pressure from the coronavirus pandemic. Last week, the Lebanese government reimposed a nationwide lockdown after an alarming spike in new COVID-19 cases. The rise of new cases and the resulting strain it has put on the country’s health care system seem to have rendered it unequipped to deal with Tuesday’s emergency. A Red Cross official said some of those injured had to be moved to hospitals in other parts of Lebanon because those in Beirut were at full capacity. To make matters worse, several of the city’s hospitals, including some of the country’s largest, were destroyed in the blast.
Tuesday’s events add to a barrage of crises Lebanon has faced in the last several months. A wave of anti-government protests rocked the country late last year, forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and threatening to bring down the state’s entire ruling apparatus. Despite restrictions imposed by the national lockdown, demonstrations have continued, creating an almost untenable situation for the government.
Lebanon is also in the throes of an economic disaster. The Lebanese lira has plunged, losing between 85 to 90 percent of its value since September, which helped to fuel the widespread feelings of discontent that led to the anti-government protests. The resulting financial collapse has destroyed the country’s economy, leading to soaring inflation, unemployment, and poverty. On Monday, Lebanese Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti resigned amid the deepening financial crisis, warning that the government’s inability to stave off the crisis risked turning Lebanon into a “failed state.”
This is a developing story. More coverage to follow.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Kashmir, One Year Later

Kashmir, One Year Later

It has been one year since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made good on a long-standing electoral promise and announced the repeal of Article 370 from the Indian Constitution , doing away with some of the autonomies that had previously been granted to Indian-administered Kashmir .
Combined with a near-total blackout of communications and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops to the region , Kashmir seemed primed for chaos .
In the 12 months since , the region has remained on edge .
Communications are still slow , arrests are routine , and now the coronavirus pandemic threatens @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into an even deeper tailspin .
To explain how India got here—and what comes next—we gathered our top reads .
In the immediate aftermath of the repeal of Article 370 , one of the biggest questions was the extent to which violence would follow .
Presumably worried about that same issue , the Modi government sent in scores of troops and rushed to arrest nearly anyone it thought might make trouble .
“ According to an AFP report , ” Kashmir Walla ’ s Yashraj Sharma wrote in September , “ one district @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had recently been arrested and booked under the Public Safety Act , which allows government to detain any person above the age of 16 without a trial for two years.
” As a result , he said , India had largely run out of prison space in the region .
Even if the arrests kept violence down in the short run , many experts argued , they would surely create more over time .
Speaking to the reporter Soumya Shankar , one young Kashmiri pointed out that “ once innocent boys are picked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they join the militancy in reaction .
Then they ’ re declared terrorists by the state and gunned down.
” In a December article , the Kashmiri journalist Fahad Shah offered numbers to confirm that expectation : “ In Kashmir , spending time in jail can strengthen a young person ’ s resolve to get revenge .
Many of the jailed , who were never part of any protest , decide to join them when they are released .
Others who are taken in for small crimes , such as throwing stones , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ analysis on militancy from the Indian Army found that 83 percent of local youth who had joined a militant organization had a ‘ record of stone-pelting.
’ ” The 2019 crackdown , he argued , “ thus points to a further meltdown—be it next year , the one after , or the one after that.
” Another fear was that the repeal of Article 370 , which had prevented non-Kashmiris from owning property in the region , would lead to demographic changes there along the same lines as the Han Chinese in Tibet @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Delhi-based academic Idris Bhat noted the dangerous effects : “ If their representation in government erodes , Kashmiri and Jammu Muslims would become even more vulnerable than they already are .
Across India , Muslims are lynched for eating beef .
They ’ re labeled as anti-India or pro-Pakistan .
Such narratives serve the aim of Hindu nationalists like Prime Minister Narendra Modi , who see India as a Hindu country and paint Muslims are outsiders.
” Beyond political power , Sharma worried about jobs in an area already suffering massive unemployment .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Economic Survey 2016 , unemployment for 18- to 29-year-olds in Jammu and Kashmir had reached 24.6 percent , ” he wrote .
Yet with the repeal of Article 370 , “ the central government also reorganized the competition for jobs in the civil service , ” an important source of well-paid employment in the region .
“ Previously , nonlocals had been barred from these positions .
But now the law that used to make that possible has been repealed .
In turn , it is unclear whether local Kashmiris will have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the country for these highly sought-after postings.
” Beyond the problems in Kashmir , Modi ’ s move created challenges for his own government—at home and abroad .
The lockdown in Kashmir and a Modi-backed citizenship law that was seen a discriminatory toward Muslims sparked nationwide protests .
“ While there are Muslims among the protesters , the majority are non-Muslims , including many who do not usually take part in political protests , ” explained National University of Singapore ’ s Ronojoy Sen , writing in January on the unprecedented marches @ @ @ @ @ @ @ largest pan-Indian protest that the Modi government , more than six months into its second term , has faced.
” In the region , Pakistan was also quick to condemn the Modi government .
An ensuing escalation in Indian-Pakistani tensions , reported the journalists Muddasir Ali and Majid Maqbool from villages along the Line of Control that separates the two countries “ forced the residents of Mothal , like those in many other villages , to flee their homes .
The families have since returned , but the temporary migration has come at @ @ @ @ @ @ @ interview with Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman , Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan claimed that “ we ’ re not close to conflict right now , but it ’ s important that the United Nations act , that the U.S. act.
” But it wasn ’ t only Pakistan that rushed to take advantage of Modi ’ s move in Kashmir .
As the public policy writer Anik Joshi pointed out this June , it also handed China an opportunity to distract from criticism of its own treatment of Muslims .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kashmir and Article 370 , ” he wrote , “ is a cynical way to address these anti-Muslim claims , allowing China to , to an extent , deflect from its domestic misdeeds.
” Over the summer , Chinese-Indian relations reached a low point , spilling over into violence along a disputed section of the two countries ’ shared border .
On the anniversary of the repeal of Article 370 , things don ’ t look much better for India or Kashmir .
Internet access in the area is still slow , which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic .
“ The Indian government will not restore the high-speed internet despite the pressing need for the population to stay informed about the coronavirus pandemic , ” he wrote in April .
Meanwhile , “ the region is also grappling with a shortage of doctors .
There is one doctor for every 3,866 people in the region , according to a 2018 report by the Jammu and Kashmir health ministry .
That ratio falls short of the WHO norm ( one doctor per 1,000 people ) and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ doctor per 2,000 people ) .
” To date , Jammu and Kashmir have seen over 22,000 confirmed cases .
In short , “ the past year , ” wrote the journalists Adil Amin Akhoon and Sharafat Ali this month , “ has only brought more violence and uncertainty .
Even during the coronavirus pandemic , when many conflicts have been on hold amid the United Nations ’ call for a global cease-fire , New Delhi has intensified military operations in the region.
” That renewed violence , “ has left scores homeless @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to protect themselves from COVID-19 .
”

It has been one year since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made good on a long-standing electoral promise and announced the repeal of Article 370 from the Indian Constitution, doing away with some of the autonomies that had previously been granted to Indian-administered Kashmir. Combined with a near-total blackout of communications and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops to the region, Kashmir seemed primed for chaos .
It has been one year since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made good on a long-standing electoral promise and announced the repeal of Article 370 from the Indian Constitution, doing away with some of the autonomies that had previously been granted to Indian-administered Kashmir. Combined with a near-total blackout of communications and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops to the region, Kashmir seemed primed for chaos.
In the 12 months since, the region has remained on edge. Communications are still slow, arrests are routine, and now the coronavirus pandemic threatens to throw Kashmir, and India, into an even deeper tailspin. To explain how India got here—and what comes next—we gathered our top reads.
In the immediate aftermath of the repeal of Article 370, one of the biggest questions was the extent to which violence would follow. Presumably worried about that same issue, the Modi government sent in scores of troops and rushed to arrest nearly anyone it thought might make trouble. “According to an AFP report,” Kashmir Walla’s Yashraj Sharma wrote in September, “one district magistrate said that at least 4,000 people had recently been arrested and booked under the Public Safety Act, which allows government to detain any person above the age of 16 without a trial for two years.” As a result, he said, India had largely run out of prison space in the region.
Even if the arrests kept violence down in the short run, many experts argued, they would surely create more over time. Speaking to the reporter Soumya Shankar, one young Kashmiri pointed out that “once innocent boys are picked up and tortured on baseless suspicions, they join the militancy in reaction. Then they’re declared terrorists by the state and gunned down.” In a December article, the Kashmiri journalist Fahad Shah offered numbers to confirm that expectation: “In Kashmir, spending time in jail can strengthen a young person’s resolve to get revenge. Many of the jailed, who were never part of any protest, decide to join them when they are released. Others who are taken in for small crimes, such as throwing stones, become radicalized in jail. An internal analysis on militancy from the Indian Army found that 83 percent of local youth who had joined a militant organization had a ‘record of stone-pelting.’” The 2019 crackdown, he argued, “thus points to a further meltdown—be it next year, the one after, or the one after that.”
Another fear was that the repeal of Article 370, which had prevented non-Kashmiris from owning property in the region, would lead to demographic changes there along the same lines as the Han Chinese in Tibet. Writing in August 2019, New Delhi-based academic Idris Bhat noted the dangerous effects: “If their representation in government erodes, Kashmiri and Jammu Muslims would become even more vulnerable than they already are. Across India, Muslims are lynched for eating beef. They’re labeled as anti-India or pro-Pakistan. Such narratives serve the aim of Hindu nationalists like Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who see India as a Hindu country and paint Muslims are outsiders.”
Beyond political power, Sharma worried about jobs in an area already suffering massive unemployment. “According to the state government’s Economic Survey 2016, unemployment for 18- to 29-year-olds in Jammu and Kashmir had reached 24.6 percent,” he wrote. Yet with the repeal of Article 370, “the central government also reorganized the competition for jobs in the civil service,” an important source of well-paid employment in the region. “Previously, nonlocals had been barred from these positions. But now the law that used to make that possible has been repealed. In turn, it is unclear whether local Kashmiris will have to compete with applicants from the rest of the country for these highly sought-after postings.”
Beyond the problems in Kashmir, Modi’s move created challenges for his own government—at home and abroad. The lockdown in Kashmir and a Modi-backed citizenship law that was seen a discriminatory toward Muslims sparked nationwide protests. “While there are Muslims among the protesters, the majority are non-Muslims, including many who do not usually take part in political protests,” explained National University of Singapore’s Ronojoy Sen, writing in January on the unprecedented marches. “This is by far the largest pan-Indian protest that the Modi government, more than six months into its second term, has faced.”
In the region, Pakistan was also quick to condemn the Modi government. An ensuing escalation in Indian-Pakistani tensions, reported the journalists Muddasir Ali and Majid Maqbool from villages along the Line of Control that separates the two countries “forced the residents of Mothal, like those in many other villages, to flee their homes. The families have since returned, but the temporary migration has come at a cost.” Meanwhile, in an interview with Foreign Policy editor in chief Jonathan Tepperman, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan claimed that “we’re not close to conflict right now, but it’s important that the United Nations act, that the U.S. act.”
But it wasn’t only Pakistan that rushed to take advantage of Modi’s move in Kashmir. As the public policy writer Anik Joshi pointed out this June, it also handed China an opportunity to distract from criticism of its own treatment of Muslims. “Adopting Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir and Article 370,” he wrote, “is a cynical way to address these anti-Muslim claims, allowing China to, to an extent, deflect from its domestic misdeeds.” Over the summer, Chinese-Indian relations reached a low point, spilling over into violence along a disputed section of the two countries’ shared border.
On the anniversary of the repeal of Article 370, things don’t look much better for India or Kashmir. Internet access in the area is still slow, which, according to Ali, is hampering the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic. “The Indian government will not restore the high-speed internet despite the pressing need for the population to stay informed about the coronavirus pandemic,” he wrote in April. Meanwhile, “the region is also grappling with a shortage of doctors. There is one doctor for every 3,866 people in the region, according to a 2018 report by the Jammu and Kashmir health ministry. That ratio falls short of the WHO norm (one doctor per 1,000 people) and India’s nationwide average (one doctor per 2,000 people).” To date, Jammu and Kashmir have seen over 22,000 confirmed cases.
In short, “the past year,” wrote the journalists Adil Amin Akhoon and Sharafat Ali this month,
“has only brought more violence and uncertainty. Even during the coronavirus pandemic, when many conflicts have been on hold amid the United Nations’ call for a global cease-fire, New Delhi has intensified military operations in the region.” That renewed violence, “has left scores homeless, a double tragedy for families trying to protect themselves from COVID-19.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-04--Trump Looks to Arms Sales to Deepen Ties With India

Trump Looks to Arms Sales to Deepen Ties With India The Trump administration is looking to ramp up arms sales to India in the wake of the country ’ s deadly border clashes with China , opening a new front of tensions between Washington and Beijing , U.S. officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy .
The Trump administration in recent months has laid the groundwork for new arms sales to India that go above and beyond what previous administrations considered , including longer-term weapons systems with higher levels of technology and sophistication , such as armed drones , according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials , better ties with India , including a closer defense relationship , are key to countering China ’ s emerging superpower role .
“ It ’ s important that democracies like ours work together , especially as we see more clearly than ever … the true scope of the challenge posed by the Chinese Communist Party , ” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a virtual address to the U.S.-India Business Council on July 22 .
“ The recent clashes initiated by the [ Chinese military ] are just the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unacceptable behavior.
” The new push for U.S. arms sales comes in the wake of deadly clashes between India and China along their disputed border in the Himalayas in June that killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese soldiers .
Since then , both sides have engaged in diplomatic talks to ease tensions while simultaneously rushing new troops and military hardware to the high-altitude region , a 2,162-mile-long border known as the Line of Actual Control .
In recent weeks , senior Indian officials reportedly approved plans to send an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The border clashes were a wake-up call for India on the looming threat of China , experts said , one that could push India to cooperate more closely with the United States on defense .
While it ’ s unlikely that India will shed its historic policy of nonalignment and embrace a fully fledged alliance with the United States , American officials see arms sales as a new avenue to strengthen ties with New Delhi .
The clashes “ opened up a debate in India , a debate I never thought I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the Council on Foreign Relations .
“ Some people actually are advocating for an out and out alliance with the United States .
I don ’ t think it means an immediate alliance with the United States , but it might open up additional closer cooperation short of an alliance , ” she said .
President Donald Trump has sought to increase U.S. arms sales worldwide , viewing it as a blunt instrument of U.S. power around the world and an engine for job growth at home .
The administration has even @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. weapons sales abroad to expedite the process , angering some lawmakers who view the review process as an important part of congressional oversight .
Trump officially amended rules that restrict the sale of military-grade drones to foreign partners like India .
In late July , the State Department announced a new policy changing how the United States interprets the Missile Technology Control Regime , allowing the agency to consider the sale of armed drones—which had previously been restricted because of their speeds and payloads—to allow them to be considered alongside surveillance drones @ @ @ @ @ @ @ want to provide India with armed [ category-1 ] Predators , ” said a congressional aide familiar with the matter , referring to MQ-1 Predator drones that can carry more than 1,000 pounds of bombs and missiles .
The aide said the State and Defense Departments had been pushing for a transaction .
“ Part of the calculation behind the policy change was to free themselves up from the international and multilateral constraints so they could increase the sales pitch to India on [ drones ] , ” the aide added .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its defense relationship with India , only to see them dashed by India ’ s historic nonalignment .
The George W. Bush administration lifted sanctions on India ’ s nuclear program , which paved the way for more defense cooperation .
But India is still carefully balancing its defense procurements with other countries , including Russia and France , which has sold India the bulk of its new fighter jets , including Sukhoi Su-30MKIs and nearly 40 new Rafale jets .
Part of that is due to India ’ s cumbersome defense acquisition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ weapons acquisition is positively baroque , ” the congressional aide added .
“ It ’ s very difficult in their system to get to a final and firm yes.
” American military sales to India have also been snagged over the years by internal spats within the Indian military , experts said , and a desire for generous technology transfer agreements that would allow Indian companies to boost their manufacturing capabilities for high-tech systems .
“ One of the things that is holding it up is that the Indians want a package deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Force and Navy , ” said Dhruva Jaishankar , the director of the U.S. Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation , an independent India-based think tank .
But the services , he said , “ have different requirements for what they ’ d want to see.
” For many senior Indian officials , nonalignment dies hard , and they bristle at the idea of being forced to pick a side between the United States and China .
“ The U.S. really has to learn to work in a sense with a more multipolar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ go beyond alliances with which it has grown up over the last two generations , ” Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said last month .
“ China may have its own issues and problems with the U.S .
But to view us through an American lens would be a serious misreading of India .
And clearly do the relationship great disservice , ” he said in a separate interview with the Times of India on Aug. 2 .
“ India works very hard to balance and calibrate its relationships with different sets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the president of the U.S.-India Business Council and a former senior U.S. diplomat during the Obama administration .
“ India has moved by leaps and bounds in closer alignment with the United States , but I also think India is fiercely independent and wants to maintain its strategic autonomy.
” The technical and political roadblocks have made India a frustrating arms customer so far for the Trump administration—even as tremors on the border with China have grown increasingly worse since the border standoff .
While the United States named India as a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an effort the congressional aide told Foreign Policy was connected to a failed attempt to boost F-16 sales and move a part of a production line to the country , New Delhi hedged its bets .
It risked U.S. sanctions by purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system , before Congress enacted some exceptions to penalties against countries that buy Russian arms .
Still , India has begun to eye more American platforms with interest , experts and former Trump administration officials told Foreign Policy , including transport and combat helicopters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relevant in another high-altitude skirmish with Chinese forces .
India has also begun to make structural shifts in its foreign policy , experts said .
Efforts to say aloof from the United States and the other members of the so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ( which also includes Australia and Japan ) did nothing to deter Chinese aggression in the border region or Chinese adventurism in the Indian Ocean .
The talks were revitalized after a near-decade lapse at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in 2017 , and they have since been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is in the process of signing new agreements with the Quad nations that allow replenishment at sea and secure communications , and it also regularly conducts sophisticated naval exercises with the United States , Japan , Australia , Russia , and France .
“ If there is still anybody in India who thought that a nice peaceful relationship with Beijing was a possibility , that ’ s gone , ” said Elbridge Colby , a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration .
“ It ’ s going to put @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and farther behind us .
This old trope that the U.S. and India is the partnership of the future and always will be—that ’ s no longer the case .
”

The Trump administration is looking to ramp up arms sales to India in the wake of the country’s deadly border clashes with China, opening a new front of tensions between Washington and Beijing, U.S. officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy .
The Trump administration is looking to ramp up arms sales to India in the wake of the country’s deadly border clashes with China, opening a new front of tensions between Washington and Beijing, U.S. officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy.
The Trump administration in recent months has laid the groundwork for new arms sales to India that go above and beyond what previous administrations considered, including longer-term weapons systems with higher levels of technology and sophistication, such as armed drones, according to the officials.
For senior U.S. officials, better ties with India, including a closer defense relationship, are key to countering China’s emerging superpower role. “It’s important that democracies like ours work together, especially as we see more clearly than ever … the true scope of the challenge posed by the Chinese Communist Party,” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a virtual address to the U.S.-India Business Council on July 22. “The recent clashes initiated by the [Chinese military] are just the latest examples of the CCP’s unacceptable behavior.”
The new push for U.S. arms sales comes in the wake of deadly clashes between India and China along their disputed border in the Himalayas in June that killed 20 Indian soldiers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese soldiers. Since then, both sides have engaged in diplomatic talks to ease tensions while simultaneously rushing new troops and military hardware to the high-altitude region, a 2,162-mile-long border known as the Line of Actual Control. In recent weeks, senior Indian officials reportedly approved plans to send an additional 35,000 troops to the border region.
The border clashes were a wake-up call for India on the looming threat of China, experts said, one that could push India to cooperate more closely with the United States on defense. While it’s unlikely that India will shed its historic policy of nonalignment and embrace a fully fledged alliance with the United States, American officials see arms sales as a new avenue to strengthen ties with New Delhi.
The clashes “opened up a debate in India, a debate I never thought I would see,” said Alyssa Ayres of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Some people actually are advocating for an out and out alliance with the United States. I don’t think it means an immediate alliance with the United States, but it might open up additional closer cooperation short of an alliance,” she said.
President Donald Trump has sought to increase U.S. arms sales worldwide, viewing it as a blunt instrument of U.S. power around the world and an engine for job growth at home. The administration has even floated plans to end congressional review of U.S. weapons sales abroad to expedite the process, angering some lawmakers who view the review process as an important part of congressional oversight.
Trump officially amended rules that restrict the sale of military-grade drones to foreign partners like India. In late July, the State Department announced a new policy changing how the United States interprets the Missile Technology Control Regime, allowing the agency to consider the sale of armed drones—which had previously been restricted because of their speeds and payloads—to allow them to be considered alongside surveillance drones.
“They’re going to want to provide India with armed [category-1] Predators,” said a congressional aide familiar with the matter, referring to MQ-1 Predator drones that can carry more than 1,000 pounds of bombs and missiles. The aide said the State and Defense Departments had been pushing for a transaction.
“Part of the calculation behind the policy change was to free themselves up from the international and multilateral constraints so they could increase the sales pitch to India on [drones],” the aide added.
The United States often had high hopes for its defense relationship with India, only to see them dashed by India’s historic nonalignment. The George W. Bush administration lifted sanctions on India’s nuclear program, which paved the way for more defense cooperation. But India is still carefully balancing its defense procurements with other countries, including Russia and France, which has sold India the bulk of its new fighter jets, including Sukhoi Su-30MKIs and nearly 40 new Rafale jets.
Part of that is due to India’s cumbersome defense acquisition process.
“Their decision-making process on weapons acquisition is positively baroque,” the congressional aide added. “It’s very difficult in their system to get to a final and firm yes.”
American military sales to India have also been snagged over the years by internal spats within the Indian military, experts said, and a desire for generous technology transfer agreements that would allow Indian companies to boost their manufacturing capabilities for high-tech systems.
“One of the things that is holding it up is that the Indians want a package deal that would suit the Army, Air Force and Navy,” said Dhruva Jaishankar, the director of the U.S. Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, an independent India-based think tank. But the services, he said, “have different requirements for what they’d want to see.”
For many senior Indian officials, nonalignment dies hard, and they bristle at the idea of being forced to pick a side between the United States and China.
“The U.S. really has to learn to work in a sense with a more multipolar world, with more plurilateral arrangements, go beyond alliances with which it has grown up over the last two generations,” Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said last month.
“China may have its own issues and problems with the U.S. But to view us through an American lens would be a serious misreading of India. And clearly do the relationship great disservice,” he said in a separate interview with the Times of India on Aug. 2.
“India works very hard to balance and calibrate its relationships with different sets of partners,” said Nisha Biswal, the president of the U.S.-India Business Council and a former senior U.S. diplomat during the Obama administration. “India has moved by leaps and bounds in closer alignment with the United States, but I also think India is fiercely independent and wants to maintain its strategic autonomy.”
The technical and political roadblocks have made India a frustrating arms customer so far for the Trump administration—even as tremors on the border with China have grown increasingly worse since the border standoff. While the United States named India as a major defense partner during the Obama administration, an effort the congressional aide told Foreign Policy was connected to a failed attempt to boost F-16 sales and move a part of a production line to the country, New Delhi hedged its bets. It risked U.S. sanctions by purchasing the Russian S-400 air defense system, before Congress enacted some exceptions to penalties against countries that buy Russian arms.
Still, India has begun to eye more American platforms with interest, experts and former Trump administration officials told Foreign Policy, including transport and combat helicopters, as well as artillery that could be relevant in another high-altitude skirmish with Chinese forces.
India has also begun to make structural shifts in its foreign policy, experts said. Efforts to say aloof from the United States and the other members of the so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (which also includes Australia and Japan) did nothing to deter Chinese aggression in the border region or Chinese adventurism in the Indian Ocean. The talks were revitalized after a near-decade lapse at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in 2017, and they have since been upgraded to a ministerial exercise. India is in the process of signing new agreements with the Quad nations that allow replenishment at sea and secure communications, and it also regularly conducts sophisticated naval exercises with the United States, Japan, Australia, Russia, and France.
“If there is still anybody in India who thought that a nice peaceful relationship with Beijing was a possibility, that’s gone,” said Elbridge Colby, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Trump administration.
“It’s going to put a lot of those traditional hindrances farther and farther behind us. This old trope that the U.S. and India is the partnership of the future and always will be—that’s no longer the case.”