foreignpolicy--2020-11-28--India’s Farmers Come out in Force Against Modi

Barnala , Punjab , INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers ’ rights .
At this gathering , on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India , Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban .
She is a 20-year-old journalism student , and she has come with her father , who is a farmer .
Wearing a green shirt and white trousers , she squints her eyes at her father , Kewal Singh , who is addressing the farmers as they block a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are protesting three new laws , all passed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi ’ s Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP ) government on Sept 20 .
The first , The Farmers ( Empowerment & Protection ) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill , claims to “ empower farmers for engaging with processors , wholesalers , aggregators , wholesalers , large retailers , exporters etc.
, on a level playing field.
” It promises “ price assurance to farmers even before sowing of crops.
” The second , The Essential Commodities Act @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ drive up investment in cold storages and modernization of the food supply chain ” and creates a “ competitive market environment and also prevents wastage of agri-produce that happens due to lack of storage facilities.
” And the third , the Farmers ’ Produce Trade and Commerce ( Promotion and Facilitation ) Bill , is notionally meant to “ act as a catalyst to attract private sector investment for building supply chains for supply of Indian farm produce to national and global markets , and in agricultural infrastructure.
” The government has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ farming in India and will transform the agriculture sector through increased private investment .
Many activists , though , believe that measures will help a few corporations while leading to unemployment and growing debt for smaller scale farmers .
Farmers also believe that many could lose land if they are forced to sell their property to corporates , which will directly deal with production and marketing of goods .
In a tweet , Modi responded to such criticism by saying : “ For decades , the Indian farmer was bound by various constraints @ @ @ @ @ @ @ passed by Parliament liberate the farmers from such adversities.
” What happens to India ’ s farmers is no small matter .
The agriculture sector employs half of India ’ s 1.35 billion people and contributes nearly 15 percent of India ’ s $ 2.7 trillion economy .
Given growing debt , poor harvests , and draught , in 2019 , 28 people who depend on farming died by suicide every day .
If the protesters are right about the effects of the new law , that figure could climb .
That is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ old when she attended her first farmers ’ protest with her father , came out that Friday .
She had left her home in Bhagike village early in the morning with her neighbors to travel two hours by tractor to the protest .
Two months before , her son , Karamjeet Singh , 48 , took his own life by drinking pesticide .
After selling his family land to marry off his two sisters , Singh had gone to work as a laborer for other farmers .
With India ’ s inflation rate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ debts had surged to over $ 13,000 .
“ He had enormous debt on him , ” says Naseemo later , while sitting on a cot in back in her home .
“ He sold his land and crop and paid back .
He worked as a laborer , but he could hardly earn anything .
He would often cry and say , ‘ What will we do , how will I marry my children , how will we sustain ?
’ Then he thought that his life had no meaning and drank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he was declared dead at the hospital .
The family now has his framed portrait photograph with his birth and death dates that they plan to hang next to a similar one of his father who succumbed to cancer on Dec. 15 , 2017 .
“ After he sold all his land , he strongly believed that he was way beyond help .
During this pandemic , he couldn ’ t find work every day .
How can a government who has lost the respect of the world be a good government ?
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ it has never done anything for us , ” says Naseemo .
With no farmland or savings , it is now Sukhwinder , Singh ’ s son and Naseemo ’ s grandson , who goes out to look for work to provide for his family .
There ’ s a bit of his father ’ s debt left to repay—and of course , ever present fears , that the family could have to take on more .
Back at the protest , Sukhdev Singh Khokri , speaks .
He is Punjab general secretary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-partisan farmers ’ representative organization .
In his remarks , he takes up the theme of debt , railing against the government which , “ says that its treasury is not able to resolve debts.
” In his yellow turban and white kurta , Khokri is respected by everyone at the protest .
Modi ’ s new measures , he predicted , would lead to more indebtedness .
“ These laws are going to fundamentally destroy the occupation of farming , ” he said , they ’ ll “ loot the crops produced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of free market , these laws will sell the market space to the private traders.
” As the sun touches the lush paddy fields , the farmers begin to board tractors , bikes , and cars to leave for home .
Naseemo , too , leaves .
But she is not ready to stop protesting .
“ I will also fight .
I will not stop protesting for what is right .
People like me who are protesting understand my struggles , ” she says .
“ I returned home recently and since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the central government passed the new laws , ” says Kaur , as her father listens .
“ We are going to the villages to inform the people how the laws will destroy the farming , deprive us of everything , and snatch our lands .
I consider this as a threat to Indian democracy if we impose laws on people without their consent.
” According to the government , the new laws are to reform the agriculture sector in the country by providing more choices to farmers and help them get better @ @ @ @ @ @ @ aims to enable farmers to enhance their trade by use of technology and also reduce the marketing costs , which can improve their income .
Seen as a trap by farmers , the government ’ s move also paves way for corporate investment into farming .
Days after the farm laws were passed , a Punjab-based political party , Shiromani Akali Dal ( SAD ) —one the BJP ’ s oldest allies in government , quit the alliance .
SAD ’ s president , Sukhbir Badal , said the party couldn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such anti-farmer and anti-Punjab bills.
” In the last state elections of 2017 , the BJP only won three seats out of 117 in Punjab , and the protesting farmers hope that its standing will fall even further in the next election , in 2022 .
Kaur believes that defeating the BJP is possible , especially if the “ youth face up to this threat.
” Farmers don ’ t only have sons , she says , they also have daughters , who will also fight for farmlands .
“ We will fight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” But the protests have not attracted significant attention from the Modi government yet .
This month , the officials of the agriculture ministry met farmers ’ unions for talks but the meeting ended with the unions ’ representatives leaving after an hour , because unions are demanding that the agricultural minister or Modi himself should attend the talks .
So far Modi and his senior ministers have declined , and protests have escalated .
On Nov. 5 , at least one million farmers at over 5,000 locations across 20 states took to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Another march is planned for Delhi on Nov. 26-27 .
Kaur , who wants to become a journalist to tell the story of her people , her family , the farmers , says that for the past six years , she has only seen the poor sections of society getting poorer .
That ’ s something most Indians must acutely feel , too .

Barnala, Punjab, INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers’ rights. At this gathering, on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India, Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban. She is a 20-year-old journalism student, and she has come with her father, who is a farmer.
Barnala, Punjab, INDIA—Dozens of colorful turbans dot the road where men from various villages and towns have come together to demand farmers’ rights. At this gathering, on Oct. 2 in the Punjab state of northern India, Sumandeep Kaur is the only one without a turban. She is a 20-year-old journalism student, and she has come with her father, who is a farmer.
Wearing a green shirt and white trousers, she squints her eyes at her father, Kewal Singh, who is addressing the farmers as they block a toll plaza on a highway. They are protesting three new laws, all passed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government on Sept 20.
The first, The Farmers (Empowerment & Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, claims to “empower farmers for engaging with processors, wholesalers, aggregators, wholesalers, large retailers, exporters etc., on a level playing field.” It promises “price assurance to farmers even before sowing of crops.” The second, The Essential Commodities Act (Amendment) Bill, aims to “drive up investment in cold storages and modernization of the food supply chain” and creates a “competitive market environment and also prevents wastage of agri-produce that happens due to lack of storage facilities.” And the third, the Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, is notionally meant to “act as a catalyst to attract private sector investment for building supply chains for supply of Indian farm produce to national and global markets, and in agricultural infrastructure.”
The government has claimed that its new laws will streamline farming in India and will transform the agriculture sector through increased private investment. Many activists, though, believe that measures will help a few corporations while leading to unemployment and growing debt for smaller scale farmers. Farmers also believe that many could lose land if they are forced to sell their property to corporates, which will directly deal with production and marketing of goods.
In a tweet, Modi responded to such criticism by saying: “For decades, the Indian farmer was bound by various constraints and bullied by middlemen. The bills passed by Parliament liberate the farmers from such adversities.”
What happens to India’s farmers is no small matter. The agriculture sector employs half of India’s 1.35 billion people and contributes nearly 15 percent of India’s $2.7 trillion economy. Given growing debt, poor harvests, and draught, in 2019, 28 people who depend on farming died by suicide every day. If the protesters are right about the effects of the new law, that figure could climb. That is why Kaur, who was five years old when she attended her first farmers’ protest with her father, came out that Friday.
Wearing faded green floral kurta, Naseemo Kaur, no relation to Sumandeep, sits in the front row chanting slogans with over a dozen other women outside a grain silo in Moga area of Punjab at another protest on Oct. 2. The silo is owned by Gautam Adani, an Indian industrialist whose net worth is an estimated $25.2 billion. Adani has been accused of receiving benefits from Modi to grow his business network across the country. The farmers’ union that had organized this particular protest accused Modi of imposing new laws to benefit his “industrialist friends,” like Adani. As each speaker at the protest accused the government of facilitating corporate looting of the agricultural sector, Naseemo took a break to drink water in the scorching heat.
She had left her home in Bhagike village early in the morning with her neighbors to travel two hours by tractor to the protest. Two months before, her son, Karamjeet Singh, 48, took his own life by drinking pesticide. After selling his family land to marry off his two sisters, Singh had gone to work as a laborer for other farmers. With India’s inflation rate reaching 7.4 percent, Singh’s debts had surged to over $13,000.
“He had enormous debt on him,” says Naseemo later, while sitting on a cot in back in her home. “He sold his land and crop and paid back. He worked as a laborer, but he could hardly earn anything. He would often cry and say, ‘What will we do, how will I marry my children, how will we sustain?’ Then he thought that his life had no meaning and drank pesticide spray.” Three days later, he was declared dead at the hospital. The family now has his framed portrait photograph with his birth and death dates that they plan to hang next to a similar one of his father who succumbed to cancer on Dec. 15, 2017.
“After he sold all his land, he strongly believed that he was way beyond help. During this pandemic, he couldn’t find work every day. How can a government who has lost the respect of the world be a good government? The government has given us nothing, it has never done anything for us,” says Naseemo.
With no farmland or savings, it is now Sukhwinder, Singh’s son and Naseemo’s grandson, who goes out to look for work to provide for his family. There’s a bit of his father’s debt left to repay—and of course, ever present fears, that the family could have to take on more.
Back at the protest, Sukhdev Singh Khokri, speaks. He is Punjab general secretary of the Bhartiya Kisan Union—Ekta Ugrahan—a nationwide non-partisan farmers’ representative organization. In his remarks, he takes up the theme of debt, railing against the government which, “says that its treasury is not able to resolve debts.”
In his yellow turban and white kurta, Khokri is respected by everyone at the protest. Modi’s new measures, he predicted, would lead to more indebtedness. “These laws are going to fundamentally destroy the occupation of farming,” he said, they’ll “loot the crops produced by the farmers; in the name of free market, these laws will sell the market space to the private traders.”
As the sun touches the lush paddy fields, the farmers begin to board tractors, bikes, and cars to leave for home. Naseemo, too, leaves. But she is not ready to stop protesting. “I will also fight. I will not stop protesting for what is right. People like me who are protesting understand my struggles,” she says.
Back in her village, Sumandeep Kaur vows to fight on as well. Since March 2020, when a countrywide lockdown was announced for the COVID-19 pandemic, Kaur’s college has been closed. In a large compound with one story main house and two outhouses adjoining farmland, she lives with the families of her two uncles. Over a dozen buffaloes turn their heads as she walks to pour them water in the stable.
“I returned home recently and since then I have been joining protests after the central government passed the new laws,” says Kaur, as her father listens. “We are going to the villages to inform the people how the laws will destroy the farming, deprive us of everything, and snatch our lands. I consider this as a threat to Indian democracy if we impose laws on people without their consent.”
According to the government, the new laws are to reform the agriculture sector in the country by providing more choices to farmers and help them get better prices to their produce. It also aims to enable farmers to enhance their trade by use of technology and also reduce the marketing costs, which can improve their income. Seen as a trap by farmers, the government’s move also paves way for corporate investment into farming.
Laborers rest on bags of shelled corn at the Khanna market in Punjab on Oct. 3.
Days after the farm laws were passed, a Punjab-based political party, Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)—one the BJP’s oldest allies in government, quit the alliance. SAD’s president, Sukhbir Badal, said the party couldn’t stand by as the BJP brought “such anti-farmer and anti-Punjab bills.” In the last state elections of 2017, the BJP only won three seats out of 117 in Punjab, and the protesting farmers hope that its standing will fall even further in the next election, in 2022.
Kaur believes that defeating the BJP is possible, especially if the “youth face up to this threat.” Farmers don’t only have sons, she says, they also have daughters, who will also fight for farmlands. “We will fight against the Modi government and the ordinances.” But the protests have not attracted significant attention from the Modi government yet.
This month, the officials of the agriculture ministry met farmers’ unions for talks but the meeting ended with the unions’ representatives leaving after an hour, because unions are demanding that the agricultural minister or Modi himself should attend the talks. So far Modi and his senior ministers have declined, and protests have escalated. On Nov. 5, at least one million farmers at over 5,000 locations across 20 states took to streets to in demonstration against the laws. Another march is planned for Delhi on Nov. 26-27.
Kaur, who wants to become a journalist to tell the story of her people, her family, the farmers, says that for the past six years, she has only seen the poor sections of society getting poorer. That’s something most Indians must acutely feel, too.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-28--Bangladesh Is Everyone’s Economic Darling. It Might Not Last.

Bangladesh Is Everyone ’ s Economic Darling .
It Might Not Last .
Shortly after Bangladesh became independent in 1971 , Henry Kissinger , then the U.S. national security advisor , derisively referred to the country as a “ basket case.
” Bangladesh became associated with poverty , and for decades was seen as an economic laggard in South Asia , making woeful progress in alleviating mass poverty or promoting sustained economic growth .
Many scholars and analysts feared that the country would remain a ward of the global community , acutely dependent on foreign aid .
Some went as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the country , with its population outgrowing the availability of food .
Despite the dire expectations , military coups in 1975 , 1982 , and 2007 , and a series of natural disasters , Bangladesh has in fact made significant progress in reducing poverty and in promoting economic growth .
Last month , the International Monetary Fund forecast that Bangladesh ’ s gross domestic product per capita would exceed that of India ’ s in 2020 .
The particulars of the IMF ’ s prediction are quite stark ; it suggests that India @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as a consequence of the effects of the coronavirus pandemic , is likely to shrink by 10.3 percent .
Bangladesh ’ s GDP per capita , on the other hand , is expected to grow by as much as 4 percent .
How did a country that was widely seen as teetering on the brink of economic disaster manage to so dramatically improve its prospects and even threaten to overtake India ’ s economic standing , at least on a per capita basis ?
The immediate answer lies in how Bangladesh sustained fast @ @ @ @ @ @ @ while India ’ s performance over the same time span significantly lagged .
But Dhaka ’ s success in promoting rapid growth ( and thereby also reducing poverty ) begs the question : How exactly did it perform such an economic miracle ?
For Bangladesh ’ s economic success to continue , it needs to return to one of its founding principles : democracy .
The answers are complex .
At one level , Bangladesh ’ s success stems from a substantial inflow of funds from expatriate Bangladeshi workers , most of whom @ @ @ @ @ @ @ More than 10 million Bangladeshis remit $ 15 billion on an annual basis .
Apart from their substantial financial contributions , these expatriate workers have also helped ease unemployment at home , where there are more than 160 million people packed into a country about the size of Illinois .
Furthermore , this mostly steady infusion of funds has gone a long way toward easing poverty across the country .
But foreign remittances alone do not explain Bangladesh ’ s success story .
Another important contributor to the country ’ s recent march @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the extraordinary success of its garment industry , which employs nearly 4 million workers and generates more than 80 percent of the country ’ s export income .
This industry , which Bangladesh carefully nurtured as China and Vietnam started to focus on other areas , has proved to be both a vital source of employment for Bangladeshi women and a critical source of income for the country .
Employment in this sector has been an important source of women ’ s empowerment both in terms of their social as well as their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the country ’ s economic success can also be attributed to another source .
Unlike India , which has made mostly piecemeal interventions in its social sector , several Bangladeshi governments , regardless of their ideological underpinnings , have made vast strides in boosting maternal health and providing rudimentary health care .
These interventions have helped reduce infant mortality , alleviated widespread malnutrition , and fended off a range of diseases .
But despite Dhaka ’ s smart economic planning , political trends in the country remain a cause for considerable concern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ hands of the ruling party could , over time , contribute to cronyism and corruption—a development that would damage the country ’ s economic progress.Despite Dhaka ’ s smart economic planning , political trends in the country remain a cause for considerable concern .
Like several other countries , Bangladesh has been increasingly lurching toward authoritarianism .
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina , the daughter of the founder of the country , Sheikh Mujibur Rahman , is in her fourth term in office with her party , the Awami League , whose coalition controls @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Parliament .
The 2018 elections which saw her reelection were marked by allegations of widespread electoral irregularities .
Earlier that year , the leader of the principal opposition party , the Bangladesh Nationalist Party , was given a 17-year prison term on charges of corruption .
The opposition , quite unsurprisingly , has alleged that these charges are baseless and politically motivated .
Hasina has shown no interest in tolerating any legitimate challenge to her government .
Her government has used existing and new legislation to harass , intimidate , and silence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ most striking examples of these practices was the 2018 detention of a noted photographer and activist , Shahidul Alam , for his support for schoolchildren who were protesting the poor quality of traffic safety in Dhaka .
Alam , who was ultimately released after an international outcry , was forced to spend more than 100 days in custody , during which time he was tortured .
Beyond the dubious grounds for his confinement , the government has also used a draconian law , the Digital Security Act of 2018 , to suppress dissent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the Internet , Dhaka can now impose on its critics a sentence of up to 10 years in prison .
This suppression of dissent in inherently undesirable , as it corrodes democratic norms .
Worse still , it can give leeway to corruption and cronyism , as electronic news outlets will be chary of investigating dubious practices .
In the end , those willing to cozy up to the government but willing to cut corners could end up counting on its protection .
Others could easily run afoul under the sweeping provisions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic progress is certainly worth celebrating .
However , a couple of caveats are in order .
A reliance on a single sector—the garment industry—does not bode well for its economic future .
For example , an economic downturn in any of the countries that import its garments can exact significant costs on this industry .
Nor , for that matter , can it indefinitely count on the receipt of remittances .
As the coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated , migrant workers can be shed at a moment ’ s notice .
Finally , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ came from empowering the country ’ s poorest , those advances could easily be reversed by a turn toward authoritarianism , which would lead to policies designed for an elite class focused on preserving its political and economic capital .
For Bangladesh ’ s economic success to continue , it needs to return to one of its founding principles , back when it was Kissinger ’ s basket case : democracy .

Shortly after Bangladesh became independent in 1971, Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. national security advisor, derisively referred to the country as a “basket case.” Bangladesh became associated with poverty, and for decades was seen as an economic laggard in South Asia, making woeful progress in alleviating mass poverty or promoting sustained economic growth. Many scholars and analysts feared that the country would remain a ward of the global community, acutely dependent on foreign aid. Some went as far to predict a Malthusian nightmare in the country, with its population outgrowing the availability of food.
Shortly after Bangladesh became independent in 1971, Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. national security advisor, derisively referred to the country as a “basket case.” Bangladesh became associated with poverty, and for decades was seen as an economic laggard in South Asia, making woeful progress in alleviating mass poverty or promoting sustained economic growth. Many scholars and analysts feared that the country would remain a ward of the global community, acutely dependent on foreign aid. Some went as far to predict a Malthusian nightmare in the country, with its population outgrowing the availability of food.
Despite the dire expectations, military coups in 1975, 1982, and 2007, and a series of natural disasters, Bangladesh has in fact made significant progress in reducing poverty and in promoting economic growth. Last month, the International Monetary Fund forecast that Bangladesh’s gross domestic product per capita would exceed that of India’s in 2020.
The particulars of the IMF’s prediction are quite stark; it suggests that India’s GDP per capita, mostly as a consequence of the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, is likely to shrink by 10.3 percent. Bangladesh’s GDP per capita, on the other hand, is expected to grow by as much as 4 percent.
How did a country that was widely seen as teetering on the brink of economic disaster manage to so dramatically improve its prospects and even threaten to overtake India’s economic standing, at least on a per capita basis? The immediate answer lies in how Bangladesh sustained fast economic growth over the past five years while India’s performance over the same time span significantly lagged. But Dhaka’s success in promoting rapid growth (and thereby also reducing poverty) begs the question: How exactly did it perform such an economic miracle?For Bangladesh’s economic success to continue, it needs to return to one of its founding principles: democracy.
The answers are complex. At one level, Bangladesh’s success stems from a substantial inflow of funds from expatriate Bangladeshi workers, most of whom live in the Persian Gulf states. More than 10 million Bangladeshis remit $15 billion on an annual basis. Apart from their substantial financial contributions, these expatriate workers have also helped ease unemployment at home, where there are more than 160 million people packed into a country about the size of Illinois. Furthermore, this mostly steady infusion of funds has gone a long way toward easing poverty across the country.
But foreign remittances alone do not explain Bangladesh’s success story. Another important contributor to the country’s recent march toward some prosperity must be attributed to the extraordinary success of its garment industry, which employs nearly 4 million workers and generates more than 80 percent of the country’s export income. This industry, which Bangladesh carefully nurtured as China and Vietnam started to focus on other areas, has proved to be both a vital source of employment for Bangladeshi women and a critical source of income for the country. Employment in this sector has been an important source of women’s empowerment both in terms of their social as well as their economic status.
Beyond these two factors, the country’s economic success can also be attributed to another source. Unlike India, which has made mostly piecemeal interventions in its social sector, several Bangladeshi governments, regardless of their ideological underpinnings, have made vast strides in boosting maternal health and providing rudimentary health care. These interventions have helped reduce infant mortality, alleviated widespread malnutrition, and fended off a range of diseases.
But despite Dhaka’s smart economic planning, political trends in the country remain a cause for considerable concern. Unbridled political power concentrated in the hands of the ruling party could, over time, contribute to cronyism and corruption—a development that would damage the country’s economic progress.Despite Dhaka’s smart economic planning, political trends in the country remain a cause for considerable concern.
Like several other countries, Bangladesh has been increasingly lurching toward authoritarianism. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the founder of the country, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is in her fourth term in office with her party, the Awami League, whose coalition controls 288 out of 300 directly elected seats in Parliament. The 2018 elections which saw her reelection were marked by allegations of widespread electoral irregularities. Earlier that year, the leader of the principal opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was given a 17-year prison term on charges of corruption. The opposition, quite unsurprisingly, has alleged that these charges are baseless and politically motivated.
Hasina has shown no interest in tolerating any legitimate challenge to her government. Her government has used existing and new legislation to harass, intimidate, and silence dissidents and critics. One of the most striking examples of these practices was the 2018 detention of a noted photographer and activist, Shahidul Alam, for his support for schoolchildren who were protesting the poor quality of traffic safety in Dhaka. Alam, who was ultimately released after an international outcry, was forced to spend more than 100 days in custody, during which time he was tortured. Beyond the dubious grounds for his confinement, the government has also used a draconian law, the Digital Security Act of 2018, to suppress dissent. With its sweeping provisions on speech on the Internet, Dhaka can now impose on its critics a sentence of up to 10 years in prison.
This suppression of dissent in inherently undesirable, as it corrodes democratic norms. Worse still, it can give leeway to corruption and cronyism, as electronic news outlets will be chary of investigating dubious practices. In the end, those willing to cozy up to the government but willing to cut corners could end up counting on its protection. Others could easily run afoul under the sweeping provisions of the act.
Bangladesh’s economic progress is certainly worth celebrating. However, a couple of caveats are in order. A reliance on a single sector—the garment industry—does not bode well for its economic future. For example, an economic downturn in any of the countries that import its garments can exact significant costs on this industry. Nor, for that matter, can it indefinitely count on the receipt of remittances. As the coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated, migrant workers can be shed at a moment’s notice.
Finally, if at least part of the gains came from empowering the country’s poorest, those advances could easily be reversed by a turn toward authoritarianism, which would lead to policies designed for an elite class focused on preserving its political and economic capital. For Bangladesh’s economic success to continue, it needs to return to one of its founding principles, back when it was Kissinger’s basket case: democracy.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-28--Our Top Weekend Reads

Our Top Weekend Reads

Now , more than ever , a lasting peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh is of paramount importance .
That ’ s largely because Russia ’ s and Turkey ’ s involvement in the conflict—and the recent cease-fire—has raised the stakes of resolution .
Meanwhile , the more the world abandons the children of Islamic State fighters , the more likely they are to feel they have no other option than to become the future face of the terrorist group .
And environmental crises have become caught up in petty political struggles in India and California .
Russia and Turkey may have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but it ’ s uncertain whether their interests in the region—and beyond—will continue to align .
That arguably makes the current peace more , not less , dangerous , Hans Gutbrod writes .
2 .
What to Do About the Children of the Islamic State What to do with the tens of thousands of children of Islamic State affiliates still in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria is not only a serious humanitarian concern , but also a security one , Vera Mironova writes .
President Vladimir Putin ’ s attempts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are unraveling , as the aftermath of recent elections in Moldova , Kyrgyzstan , and Belarus indicate , Nicolae Reutoi writes .
4 .
Indian and Californian Politics Are Both Playing With Fire National leaders in both India and the United States are using annual fires and escalating air pollution as an opportunity to achieve political goals .
And as citizens choke , politicians trade blame , Ian Miller writes .
5 .
Antony Blinken ’ s Wonk Rock Is Everything a D.C. Dad Could Dream Of Only one incongruity stands out from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : The likely next U.S. secretary of state is a perpetrator of wonk rock , Lauren Teixeira writes .

Now, more than ever, a lasting peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh is of paramount importance. That’s largely because Russia’s and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict—and the recent cease-fire—has raised the stakes of resolution.
Now, more than ever, a lasting peace settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh is of paramount importance. That’s largely because Russia’s and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict—and the recent cease-fire—has raised the stakes of resolution.
Meanwhile, the more the world abandons the children of Islamic State fighters, the more likely they are to feel they have no other option than to become the future face of the terrorist group.
And environmental crises have become caught up in petty political struggles in India and California.
Here are Foreign Policy’s top weekend reads.
Russian peacekeepers patrol the village of Dadivank in Nagorno-Karabakh on Nov. 20.
Russia and Turkey may have helped broker the cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, but it’s uncertain whether their interests in the region—and beyond—will continue to align. That arguably makes the current peace more, not less, dangerous, Hans Gutbrod writes.
A woman walks next to a child by tents at Camp Roj, housing family members of people accused to belong to the Islamic State group, in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah province on Sept. 30.
What to do with the tens of thousands of children of Islamic State affiliates still in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria is not only a serious humanitarian concern, but also a security one, Vera Mironova writes.
Maia Sandu, the winner of the recent election, wearing a face mask as she casts her ballot at a polling station during the second round of Moldova's presidential election in Chisinau, Moldova on Nov. 15, amid the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.
President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to keep Russia’s immediate neighbors close are unraveling, as the aftermath of recent elections in Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus indicate, Nicolae Reutoi writes.
Firefighters set a backfire to protect homes in California
National leaders in both India and the United States are using annual fires and escalating air pollution as an opportunity to achieve political goals. And as citizens choke, politicians trade blame, Ian Miller writes.
Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken
Only one incongruity stands out from Antony Blinken’s otherwise immaculate credentials: The likely next U.S. secretary of state is a perpetrator of wonk rock, Lauren Teixeira writes.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-28--Scottish Independence Is Only Gaining Popularity

Boris Johnson became prime minister of the United Kingdom in July 2019 .
Since then , he has launched four separate initiatives aimed at supposedly saving the Union from the threat of Scottish nationalism .
The most recent of these , announced on Nov. 18 , intends to “ boost the social and cultural case ” for Britain following a “ series of missteps ” by the Conservative leader , according to the Financial Times .
On Nov. 16 , Johnson reportedly told a group of Tory MPs that the transfer of partial legislative powers to Scotland from London in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the border.
” His remark was clearly not meant for a Scottish audience : Two decades after its creation , the Scottish Parliament remains hugely popular with Scottish voters , whereas opposition to devolution is a fringe pursuit .
Increasingly , it seems that the prime minister ’ s efforts have backfired .
Johnson ’ s leadership is a significant factor pushing swing voters in Scotland towards independence , one survey , conducted by JL Partners and cited by POLITICO Europe , concluded in September .
“ The single biggest threat to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the prime minister , every time he opens his mouth , ” the Labour leader , Sir Keir Starmer , told Johnson over the House of Commons dispatch box earlier this month .
Starmer ’ s assessment may well be right .
For the first time in modern British history , polls show a sustained majority of Scots in favor of leaving the U.K .
The Scottish National Party ( SNP ) , meanwhile , looks set for a sweeping victory at Scotland ’ s devolved elections next May—an outcome that would significantly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the break-up of Britain .
This weekend , members of the pro-independence SNP will meet , via socially distanced video link , for their annual conference , confident in the belief that Johnson has become an all-powerful recruiting sergeant for their cause .
Johnson will redouble his defense of the Union in the coming months , as the crucial spring election for the Scottish parliament approaches , likely by emphasizing the professed economic benefits of the U.K. and attacking the SNP ’ s domestic political record .
But there ’ s little reason @ @ @ @ @ @ @ be any more effective—or less counter-productive—than the last .
As criticism mounts over Johnson ’ s response to the coronavirus pandemic , the devastating effect of the virus has played a key role in the unraveling of Anglo-Scottish unity .
Britain has one of the worst COVID-19 death rates in the world—a consequence , critics say , of the U.K. Conservative administration ’ s belated embrace of lockdown measures in March .
Notably , support for Scottish independence only began moving into majority territory after the onset of the pandemic ten months ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s lead in trying to contain the health crisis , and , on a per-capita basis , its excess mortality figures are only marginally lower than those of England .
Yet SNP chief Nicola Sturgeon—who runs Scotland ’ s semi-autonomous government in Edinburgh , and has jurisdiction over Scottish health and policing policies—has benefited politically from the prime minister ’ s botched PR handling of the outbreak .
“ Johnson has game-show charisma but he ’ s a poor communicator , ” the British writer and journalist Anthony Barnett told me .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the separate , serious , modest nature of the independence movement.
” This contrast is reflected in Scottish perceptions of the two leaders : 74 percent of Scots think Sturgeon , an assured media performer , has dealt with the COVID-19 crisis well , a poll for the BBC found in mid-November .
The figure for Johnson stands at just 19 percent .
Johnson ’ s political toxicity in Scotland predates COVID-19 , however , and points to a more entrenched set of divisions .
The Conservatives haven ’ t won a general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the party ’ s commitment to Brexit , which Scots rejected by a 24-point margin in 2016 , suggests that losing streak will continue for the foreseeable future .
James Mitchell , a professor of public policy at Edinburgh University , thinks Johnson ’ s gilded Old Etonian upbringing and Anglo-centric worldview have profoundly alienated the Scottish electorate , marking the prime minister out as the most polarizing English politician in Scotland since Margaret Thatcher .
“ He is like Thatcher plus , ” Mitchell told me .
“ He doesn ’ t @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to engage with Scotland.
” Johnson may have led the Conservatives to a historic victory in England at the U.K. general election last December by sweeping up Brexit-backing seats in Labour ’ s northern English heartlands .
But in Scotland , he actually lost ground to the SNP .
The arrival of a youthful new Scottish Conservative leader this August , in the form of Moray MP Douglas Ross , has so far failed to reverse the party ’ s fortunes .
After four months in charge , and despite various attempts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ross has struggled to make a positive impact on Scottish public opinion .
Research published in October revealed that 34 percent of Scots undecided on independence had a “ very ” or “ fairly ” negative view of the 37-year old .
The remaining 66 percent didn ’ t feel strongly about him at all .
The SNP is framing next May ’ s devolved election as , in effect , a referendum on a referendum .
If pro-independence parties secure a majority of the Holyrood parliament ’ s 129 seats , nationalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have no choice but to grant a fresh , legally binding plebiscite on Scottish secession .
Ian Blackford , the SNP ’ s group leader at Westminster , has even suggested that new a vote could take place by the end of 2021—although this seems optimistic , given ’ s Downing Street ’ s explicit opposition to a rerun of the 2014 contest .
Remarkably for a party that has been in power for almost 15 years—the nationalists , then under the leadership of Alex Salmond , secured minority control of Holyrood in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ highs .
According to YouGov , Sturgeon ’ s party is currently comfortably ahead in the polls , with a massive 56 percent share of the Scottish Parliamentary constituency vote , compared to the Conservatives at 19 percent and Labour , once a hegemonic force in Scottish politics , trailing in third with just 15 percent .
John Curtice , one of the U.K. ’ s leading election experts , thinks enthusiasm for the SNP and independence is being driven by deep-seated concerns regarding the Brexit process , which has fueled a steady @ @ @ @ @ @ @ state .
“ The pursuit of Brexit has weakened many people ’ s views of the merits of the Union , ” he said on Nov. 3 .
“ For a significant body of people in Scotland , independence inside the EU has now come to look more attractive than being part of a U.K. that is outside the EU.
” Sturgeon seems confident that Scotland ’ s exit from the U.K. is imminent .
The Scots will be independent “ sooner rather than later , ” she asserted over the summer .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of political obstacles .
In March , Salmond , Sturgeon ’ s predecessor as SNP leader and Scottish first minister , was acquitted in an Edinburgh courtroom of multiple charges of sexual misconduct dating back to his time running the Holyrood Parliament .
Since then , Salmond and his allies have hinted at the idea that Sturgeon was involved in a conspiracy to discredit her one-time friend and mentor—an allegation Sturgeon denies .
“ There was no conspiracy ” against Salmond , she told the BBC in June .
“ It ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ now thought to be writing a tell-all book about the controversy , which one of his supporters , the veteran nationalist politician Jim Sillars , says will be like a “ volcanic eruption ” for the party .
The SNP is also grappling with difficult questions about the raw economics of self-government .
Some commentators think the party ’ s plan to continue using the British pound after independence , instead of establishing a separate Scottish currency and central bank , will place Scotland ’ s newly independent national finances under intense strain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ account deficits , and borrowing heavily in a foreign currency , there ’ s only so long Scotland would survive outside the U.K. , Laurie Macfarlane , economics editor at openDemocracy , wrote in October .
So-called sterlingization , which would see Scotland ’ s monetary policy continue to be run from the Bank of England , offers a future of “ less sovereignty , not more , ” he added .
Other observers , including Olli Rehn , the former European Commissioner for Economic Affairs , have argued that Scotland would need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in order to qualify for reentry into the European Union , in line with the E.U.
’ s Maastricht convergence criteria .
There are concerns , too , among left-wing nationalists that the party ’ s restrictive spending plans might limit space for ambitious social and environmental policies post-independence .
In 2018 , the SNP published a report indicating that Scotland may face up to ten years of fiscal constraints after leaving the U.K. “ Personally , I think they don ’ t go far enough , ” Roza Salih , a prominent @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investment will be needed if , as many on the grassroots left hope , an independent Scotland decides to fund radical initiatives like the Green New Deal , she said .
And yet , the disagreements within Scotland ’ s independence movement are dwarfed by the wider fractures that now dominate Britain ’ s political and constitutional landscape .
After a decade of Tory rule , the dual crises of COVID-19 and Brexit , coupled with Johnson ’ s increasingly beleaguered premiership , have turbocharged Scottish hostility towards Westminster , bringing Scotland ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than ever to the brink of extinction .
“ Until recently , the U.S. looked like the West ’ s most divided and dysfunctional democracy , ” the ex-Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown , a Scot and fierce opponent of the SNP , wrote in the New Statesman magazine on Nov. 19 .
“ Now , those on the other side of the Atlantic would be excused for pointing the finger in our direction.
” The nationalist campaigners convening over the next few days would obviously agree .

Boris Johnson became prime minister of the United Kingdom in July 2019. Since then, he has launched four separate initiatives aimed at supposedly saving the Union from the threat of Scottish nationalism . The most recent of these, announced on Nov. 18, intends to “boost the social and cultural case” for Britain following a “series of missteps” by the Conservative leader, according to the Financial Times.
Boris Johnson became prime minister of the United Kingdom in July 2019. Since then, he has launched four separate initiatives aimed at supposedly saving the Union from the threat of Scottish nationalism. The most recent of these, announced on Nov. 18, intends to “boost the social and cultural case” for Britain following a “series of missteps” by the Conservative leader, according to the Financial Times.
On Nov. 16, Johnson reportedly told a group of Tory MPs that the transfer of partial legislative powers to Scotland from London in 1999 had been a “disaster north of the border.” His remark was clearly not meant for a Scottish audience: Two decades after its creation, the Scottish Parliament remains hugely popular with Scottish voters, whereas opposition to devolution is a fringe pursuit.
Increasingly, it seems that the prime minister’s efforts have backfired. Johnson’s leadership is a significant factor pushing swing voters in Scotland towards independence, one survey, conducted by JL Partners and cited by POLITICO Europe, concluded in September. “The single biggest threat to the future of the United Kingdom is the prime minister, every time he opens his mouth,” the Labour leader, Sir Keir Starmer, told Johnson over the House of Commons dispatch box earlier this month.
Starmer’s assessment may well be right. For the first time in modern British history, polls show a sustained majority of Scots in favor of leaving the U.K. The Scottish National Party (SNP), meanwhile, looks set for a sweeping victory at Scotland’s devolved elections next May—an outcome that would significantly increase the likelihood of another referendum on the break-up of Britain. This weekend, members of the pro-independence SNP will meet, via socially distanced video link, for their annual conference, confident in the belief that Johnson has become an all-powerful recruiting sergeant for their cause.
Johnson will redouble his defense of the Union in the coming months, as the crucial spring election for the Scottish parliament approaches, likely by emphasizing the professed economic benefits of the U.K. and attacking the SNP’s domestic political record. But there’s little reason to believe his next anti-nationalist strategy will be any more effective—or less counter-productive—than the last.
As criticism mounts over Johnson’s response to the coronavirus pandemic, the devastating effect of the virus has played a key role in the unraveling of Anglo-Scottish unity. Britain has one of the worst COVID-19 death rates in the world—a consequence, critics say, of the U.K. Conservative administration’s belated embrace of lockdown measures in March. Notably, support for Scottish independence only began moving into majority territory after the onset of the pandemic ten months ago.
Scotland has broadly followed London’s lead in trying to contain the health crisis, and, on a per-capita basis, its excess mortality figures are only marginally lower than those of England. Yet SNP chief Nicola Sturgeon—who runs Scotland’s semi-autonomous government in Edinburgh, and has jurisdiction over Scottish health and policing policies—has benefited politically from the prime minister’s botched PR handling of the outbreak. “Johnson has game-show charisma but he’s a poor communicator,” the British writer and journalist Anthony Barnett told me. “Sturgeon is the opposite: She personifies the separate, serious, modest nature of the independence movement.”
This contrast is reflected in Scottish perceptions of the two leaders: 74 percent of Scots think Sturgeon, an assured media performer, has dealt with the COVID-19 crisis well, a poll for the BBC found in mid-November. The figure for Johnson stands at just 19 percent. Johnson’s political toxicity in Scotland predates COVID-19, however, and points to a more entrenched set of divisions. The Conservatives haven’t won a general election in Scotland since the 1950s and the party’s commitment to Brexit, which Scots rejected by a 24-point margin in 2016, suggests that losing streak will continue for the foreseeable future.
James Mitchell, a professor of public policy at Edinburgh University, thinks Johnson’s gilded Old Etonian upbringing and Anglo-centric worldview have profoundly alienated the Scottish electorate, marking the prime minister out as the most polarizing English politician in Scotland since Margaret Thatcher. “He is like Thatcher plus,” Mitchell told me. “He doesn’t understand Scotland. He makes no effort to engage with Scotland.”
Johnson may have led the Conservatives to a historic victory in England at the U.K. general election last December by sweeping up Brexit-backing seats in Labour’s northern English heartlands. But in Scotland, he actually lost ground to the SNP. The arrival of a youthful new Scottish Conservative leader this August, in the form of Moray MP Douglas Ross, has so far failed to reverse the party’s fortunes. After four months in charge, and despite various attempts to differentiate himself from the prime minister, Ross has struggled to make a positive impact on Scottish public opinion. Research published in October revealed that 34 percent of Scots undecided on independence had a “very” or “fairly” negative view of the 37-year old. The remaining 66 percent didn’t feel strongly about him at all.
The SNP is framing next May’s devolved election as, in effect, a referendum on a referendum. If pro-independence parties secure a majority of the Holyrood parliament’s 129 seats, nationalist leaders say, the U.K. government will have no choice but to grant a fresh, legally binding plebiscite on Scottish secession. Ian Blackford, the SNP’s group leader at Westminster, has even suggested that new a vote could take place by the end of 2021—although this seems optimistic, given’s Downing Street’s explicit opposition to a rerun of the 2014 contest.
Remarkably for a party that has been in power for almost 15 years—the nationalists, then under the leadership of Alex Salmond, secured minority control of Holyrood in 2007—support for the SNP has reached near-record highs. According to YouGov, Sturgeon’s party is currently comfortably ahead in the polls, with a massive 56 percent share of the Scottish Parliamentary constituency vote, compared to the Conservatives at 19 percent and Labour, once a hegemonic force in Scottish politics, trailing in third with just 15 percent.
John Curtice, one of the U.K.’s leading election experts, thinks enthusiasm for the SNP and independence is being driven by deep-seated concerns regarding the Brexit process, which has fueled a steady erosion of Scottish loyalty to the British state. “The pursuit of Brexit has weakened many people’s views of the merits of the Union,” he said on Nov. 3. “For a significant body of people in Scotland, independence inside the EU has now come to look more attractive than being part of a U.K. that is outside the EU.” Sturgeon seems confident that Scotland’s exit from the U.K. is imminent. The Scots will be independent “sooner rather than later,” she asserted over the summer. But her path isn’t clear of political obstacles.
In March, Salmond, Sturgeon’s predecessor as SNP leader and Scottish first minister, was acquitted in an Edinburgh courtroom of multiple charges of sexual misconduct dating back to his time running the Holyrood Parliament. Since then, Salmond and his allies have hinted at the idea that Sturgeon was involved in a conspiracy to discredit her one-time friend and mentor—an allegation Sturgeon denies. “There was no conspiracy” against Salmond, she told the BBC in June. “It’s a heap of nonsense.” Salmond is now thought to be writing a tell-all book about the controversy, which one of his supporters, the veteran nationalist politician Jim Sillars, says will be like a “volcanic eruption” for the party.
The SNP is also grappling with difficult questions about the raw economics of self-government. Some commentators think the party’s plan to continue using the British pound after independence, instead of establishing a separate Scottish currency and central bank, will place Scotland’s newly independent national finances under intense strain. Burdened with sizable fiscal and current account deficits, and borrowing heavily in a foreign currency, there’s only so long Scotland would survive outside the U.K., Laurie Macfarlane, economics editor at openDemocracy, wrote in October. So-called sterlingization, which would see Scotland’s monetary policy continue to be run from the Bank of England, offers a future of “less sovereignty, not more,” he added. Other observers, including Olli Rehn, the former European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, have argued that Scotland would need to set up its own monetary authority in order to qualify for reentry into the European Union, in line with the E.U.’s Maastricht convergence criteria.
There are concerns, too, among left-wing nationalists that the party’s restrictive spending plans might limit space for ambitious social and environmental policies post-independence. In 2018, the SNP published a report indicating that Scotland may face up to ten years of fiscal constraints after leaving the U.K. “Personally, I think they don’t go far enough,” Roza Salih, a prominent Glasgow-based activist, told me. More investment will be needed if, as many on the grassroots left hope, an independent Scotland decides to fund radical initiatives like the Green New Deal, she said.
And yet, the disagreements within Scotland’s independence movement are dwarfed by the wider fractures that now dominate Britain’s political and constitutional landscape. After a decade of Tory rule, the dual crises of COVID-19 and Brexit, coupled with Johnson’s increasingly beleaguered premiership, have turbocharged Scottish hostility towards Westminster, bringing Scotland’s 313-year old union with England closer than ever to the brink of extinction.
“Until recently, the U.S. looked like the West’s most divided and dysfunctional democracy,” the ex-Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, a Scot and fierce opponent of the SNP, wrote in the New Statesman magazine on Nov. 19. “Now, those on the other side of the Atlantic would be excused for pointing the finger in our direction.” The nationalist campaigners convening over the next few days would obviously agree.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-29--Iraqi Kurds Turn Against the PKK

Iraqi Kurds Turn Against the PKK

ERBIL , Iraq—Tensions are rising in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq , where officials in the Kurdistan Regional Government ( KRG ) are speaking out against the long-accommodated but increasingly unwelcome Kurdistan Workers ’ Party , better known as the PKK .
The intensified rhetoric—complemented by a new security agreement between authorities in Erbil and Baghdad that takes a decidedly anti-PKK stance—seems to be part of a coordinated effort to pressure the group to leave its historic hideouts in the mountains of northern Iraq .
The Oct. 8 assassination of a Kurdish border official—which the KRG ’ s security forces @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on a key pipeline and Peshmerga soldiers in early November have brought to the fore the long-simmering tensions between the KRG and PKK .
The latter group is making it known that it has no intention of leaving Iraq peacefully .
The Kurdish-led PKK has long been designated a terrorist organization in the United States , European Union , and Turkey .
It was also named a significant foreign narcotics trafficker by the United States in 2008 , and exerts a sort of mafia-like power in certain areas .
The PKK has long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are just across the border from Turkey—as a hideout and training ground during its decades-long fight against Turkey .
In June , Turkey began stepping up attacks on the PKK in Iraq , targeting its military positions in the Qandil and Sinjar mountains as well as other locations where the group has a presence .
The present standoff between the KRG and PKK has been a long time coming—a burgeoning impasse I ’ ve witnessed in my reporting in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq over the years .
In a 2014 interview with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Barzani , who was then fighting on the frontlines against the Islamic State , he told me that the PKK was a major problem for the Kurds .
At the time , however , the Islamic State had recently taken over vast swathes of Iraqi territory , and was setting its sights on the city of Erbil , the capital of the KRG , as well .
The KRG forces had enough to deal with without opening another conflict with a different group , Barzani implied—though the PKK had , admittedly , helped @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Five years later , in early 2019 , Barzani doubled down on his claims that the PKK was a problem for the KRG but said the time had not yet come to discuss the matter publicly .
There were still more pressing concerns : Our interview took place near the Qarachogh mountains , which had faced a rash of fires allegedly started by Islamic State .
But in early September 2020 , with the threat of the Islamic State significantly reduced , Barzani was more open .
He adamantly insisted to me @ @ @ @ @ @ @ PKK in northern Iraq and urged the Iraqi government to make a move .
He noted that , until all weapons in Iraq as a whole were brought under state control , people would continue to be attacked by the group—and security concerns would prevent investment in the cash-strapped region .
According to its own reports , the PKK maintains 37 bases in the Kurdistan region of Iraq—and has said it may resort to violence in response to KRG encroachment .
Gen. Barzani also lamented the influence of the PKK in the disputed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Syrian border , noting that many internally displaced Yazidis could not return due to the confusion and lack of security resulting from the of presence of several armed groups .
One KRG security official I met in Sinjar in 2016 has been targeted in PKK assassination attempts in recent years , causing him to be transferred to a different district .
Also in September , former KRG President Masoud Barzani spoke out against the PKK ’ s confiscation of land and extortion of locals in Iraqi Kurdistan .
A statement by his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has ended in the world but continued within the PKK.
” On Oct. 9 , authorities in Baghdad and Erbil—the KRG capital—finally signed an agreement that aims to restore security in Sinjar .
One key part of the accord requires the removal of the PKK from the area .
On Nov. 24 , the KRG and Iraqi federal government deployed 6,000 security forces to Sinjar , setting this plan into motion .
Unsurprisingly , the agreement provoked a violent reaction from the PKK .
In the past two months , the PKK has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , facilities , and infrastructure .
The Iraqi , U.S. , and French governments have all condemned the attacks .
Still , the KRG ’ s public condemnation of the PKK has opened the door for others who have felt victimized by the group to speak out .
Recently , Assyrian communities living near Duhok in northern Iraq have seized the opportunity to denounce the PKK .
On Nov. 10 , the Assyrian Policy Institute tweeted that “ PKK militants occupy various Assyrian villages , ” which “ has caused many negative consequences @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to their safety and restrictions on their movement.
” Gen. Barzani said that the KRG ’ s PUK-linked forces in and around Sulaymaniyah have tended to be more supportive—or at least accommodating—of the PKK than in areas further north and near the Turkish border , where trade with Turkey is essential and many local Kurds can not return to their villages due to the presence of the PKK .
Many within Kurdish-led People ’ s Protection Units ( YPG ) have fought for years as part of the PKK against Turkey prior to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ For this reason , many of the foreign so-called volunteers—including Westerners—who fought alongside the YPG against the Islamic State in Syria were helped by PUK-linked forces , transiting through Sulaymaniyah rather than Erbil , which is closer to the border .
During the years of the fight against the Islamic State , KRG forces in Erbil had instead trained several thousand Syrian Kurds whom the YPG still , as of early November 2020 , prevented from returning home because talks between various Syrian Kurdish parties are currently stalled .
In the meantime , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in their fight against the Islamic State , including by manning checkpoints .
These Syrian Kurdish so-called Rojava Peshmerga are linked to the Kurdish National Council ( KNC ) party , which opposes the YPG-linked Democratic Union Party ( PYD ) and accuses it of having a tacit agreement with the Syrian regime .
The KNC is part of the Istanbul-based Syrian Opposition Coalition .
In 2014 , the KRG reportedly sent more than 20 vehicles with Iraqi Peshmerga through Turkey to fight in the Battle of Kobane against the Islamic State .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ due to the tensions between the KRG-trained Syrian Kurdish fighters and the YPG .
The longstanding support for , or at least acceptance of , the PKK in southeastern Iraqi Kurdistan has also begun to change .
Locals report that both female and male teenagers from their area have been “ kidnapped ” by the PKK , never to be heard from again .
Many say PKK recruiters frequent cafés and other areas where young people gather , “ targeting and preying on the weak.
” One Asayish security official—who asked not to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ authorized to speak to the media—angrily decried the PKK ’ s “ refusal to listen ” to KRG officials despite the fact that they had long provided refuge for PKK fighters as part of what they saw as a greater struggle for a Kurdish state .
He also claimed that the PKK kidnaps and recruits troubled youth as well as those with financial and family issues , likening the group to a cult .
Several international bodies have documented that the PKK and its alleged “ affiliates ” —such as the U.S.-backed and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in northeastern Syria—continue to make use of child fighters .
The dominant faction in the SDF is the YPG .
Mazloum Abdi ( also known as Mazloum Kobane ) , who was in the PKK for decades and is now the top military commander of the SDF , told Al-Monitor in an interview on Nov. 7 that he was optimistic about the upcoming Joe Biden presidency .
Abdi is a friend of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and joined the PKK in 1990 .
In 2011 , after the war started in Syria , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ organize Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria .
In early 2016 , Biden compared the PKK to the Islamic State , saying that it is “ equally a threat ” and “ a terrorist group plain and simple.
” Unlike many Western media outlets , the president-elect has avoided the mistake of lumping an entire ethnic group and its variant political organizations into one—as if they all share the same goals .
Biden does not , however , consider the YPG to be a part of the PKK , a position he reiterated while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Peace Spring after the United States withdrew troops from Kurdish regions of northern Syria .
Biden wrote that “ Donald Trump sold out the Syrian Democratic Forces ” and “ betrayed a key local ally in the fight against terrorism.
” Still , the fact that the YPG ’ s current leader spent decades with the PKK—and that many others in its ranks were and possibly still are linked to the terrorist organization—means that any crackdown on the PKK in Iraq will invariably affect eastern Syria as well .
Though the KRG differentiates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ officials admit that there are close ties between them .
For now , though , a state monopoly on arms that can enable a post-Islamic State recovery and security for its population are more important to the KRG than simple ethnically based alliances .
The PKK seems to have hurt a few too many Iraqi Kurds to be tolerated further .

ERBIL, Iraq—Tensions are rising in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where officials in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are speaking out against the long-accommodated but increasingly unwelcome Kurdistan Workers’ Party, better known as the PKK. The intensified rhetoric—complemented by a new security agreement between authorities in Erbil and Baghdad that takes a decidedly anti-PKK stance—seems to be part of a coordinated effort to pressure the group to leave its historic hideouts in the mountains of northern Iraq.
ERBIL, Iraq—Tensions are rising in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where officials in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are speaking out against the long-accommodated but increasingly unwelcome Kurdistan Workers’ Party, better known as the PKK. The intensified rhetoric—complemented by a new security agreement between authorities in Erbil and Baghdad that takes a decidedly anti-PKK stance—seems to be part of a coordinated effort to pressure the group to leave its historic hideouts in the mountains of northern Iraq.
The Oct. 8 assassination of a Kurdish border official—which the KRG’s security forces said was perpetrated by the PKK—and attacks on a key pipeline and Peshmerga soldiers in early November have brought to the fore the long-simmering tensions between the KRG and PKK. The latter group is making it known that it has no intention of leaving Iraq peacefully.
In Western discourse, “the Kurds” are too often referred to as a monolithic ethnic group with shared aims, glossing over very palpable historical, geographical, and ideological divides between various Kurdish political parties and factions. Belligerent activities by Kurdish-led armed groups have eroded stability both at the local and regional levels in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Unfortunately, these attacks receive only scant attention, even when those most severely affected are Kurdish.
The Kurdish-led PKK has long been designated a terrorist organization in the United States, European Union, and Turkey. It was also named a significant foreign narcotics trafficker by the United States in 2008, and exerts a sort of mafia-like power in certain areas. The PKK has long used the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq—which are just across the border from Turkey—as a hideout and training ground during its decades-long fight against Turkey. In June, Turkey began stepping up attacks on the PKK in Iraq, targeting its military positions in the Qandil and Sinjar mountains as well as other locations where the group has a presence. According to some reports, Turkey maintains 37 bases in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
The present standoff between the KRG and PKK has been a long time coming—a burgeoning impasse I’ve witnessed in my reporting in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq over the years. In a 2014 interview with Peshmerga Sector Six commander Maj. Gen. Sirwan Barzani, who was then fighting on the frontlines against the Islamic State, he told me that the PKK was a major problem for the Kurds. At the time, however, the Islamic State had recently taken over vast swathes of Iraqi territory, and was setting its sights on the city of Erbil, the capital of the KRG, as well. The KRG forces had enough to deal with without opening another conflict with a different group, Barzani implied—though the PKK had, admittedly, helped in the fight against the Islamic State.
Five years later, in early 2019, Barzani doubled down on his claims that the PKK was a problem for the KRG but said the time had not yet come to discuss the matter publicly. There were still more pressing concerns: Our interview took place near the Qarachogh mountains, which had faced a rash of fires allegedly started by Islamic State.
But in early September 2020, with the threat of the Islamic State significantly reduced, Barzani was more open. He adamantly insisted to me that action must be taken against the PKK in northern Iraq and urged the Iraqi government to make a move. He noted that, until all weapons in Iraq as a whole were brought under state control, people would continue to be attacked by the group—and security concerns would prevent investment in the cash-strapped region. The PKK has said it may resort to violence in response to KRG encroachment.
Gen. Barzani also lamented the influence of the PKK in the disputed territory of Sinjar, which lies along the Syrian border, noting that many internally displaced Yazidis could not return due to the confusion and lack of security resulting from the of presence of several armed groups. One KRG security official I met in Sinjar in 2016 has been targeted in PKK assassination attempts in recent years, causing him to be transferred to a different district.
Also in September, former KRG President Masoud Barzani spoke out against the PKK’s confiscation of land and extortion of locals in Iraqi Kurdistan. A statement by his Kurdistan Democratic Party claimed that “slavery has ended in the world but continued within the PKK.”
On Oct. 9, authorities in Baghdad and Erbil—the KRG capital—finally signed an agreement that aims to restore security in Sinjar. One key part of the accord requires the removal of the PKK from the area. On Nov. 24, the KRG and Iraqi federal government deployed 6,000 security forces to Sinjar, setting this plan into motion. Unsurprisingly, the agreement provoked a violent reaction from the PKK. In the past two months, the PKK has carried out several attacks on KRG forces, facilities, and infrastructure. The Iraqi, U.S., and French governments have all condemned the attacks.
Still, the KRG’s public condemnation of the PKK has opened the door for others who have felt victimized by the group to speak out. Recently, Assyrian communities living near Duhok in northern Iraq have seized the opportunity to denounce the PKK. On Nov. 10, the Assyrian Policy Institute tweeted that “PKK militants occupy various Assyrian villages,” which “has caused many negative consequences for local Assyrians, such as threats to their safety and restrictions on their movement.”
In the southeastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan, public opinion is starting to shift against the PKK as well. There has long been a marked political divide between the Erbil-headquartered Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the north and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which enjoys stronger support in the southeastern part of the region close to the Iranian border. Among various other attempts to bridge the gaps—and often open animosity—between the two, a Nov. 9 meeting between the KDP and PUK sought to overcome recent tensions and create a unified front against the PKK.
Gen. Barzani said that the KRG’s PUK-linked forces in and around Sulaymaniyah have tended to be more supportive—or at least accommodating—of the PKK than in areas further north and near the Turkish border, where trade with Turkey is essential and many local Kurds cannot return to their villages due to the presence of the PKK.
Many within Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG) have fought for years as part of the PKK against Turkey prior to joining the YPG in northeastern Syria. For this reason, many of the foreign so-called volunteers—including Westerners—who fought alongside the YPG against the Islamic State in Syria were helped by PUK-linked forces, transiting through Sulaymaniyah rather than Erbil, which is closer to the border.
During the years of the fight against the Islamic State, KRG forces in Erbil had instead trained several thousand Syrian Kurds whom the YPG still, as of early November 2020, prevented from returning home because talks between various Syrian Kurdish parties are currently stalled. In the meantime, Syrian Kurds have helped the KRG forces in their fight against the Islamic State, including by manning checkpoints.
These Syrian Kurdish so-called Rojava Peshmerga are linked to the Kurdish National Council (KNC) party, which opposes the YPG-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) and accuses it of having a tacit agreement with the Syrian regime. The KNC is part of the Istanbul-based Syrian Opposition Coalition.
In 2014, the KRG reportedly sent more than 20 vehicles with Iraqi Peshmerga through Turkey to fight in the Battle of Kobane against the Islamic State. No Syrian Kurds were on the convoy due to the tensions between the KRG-trained Syrian Kurdish fighters and the YPG.
The longstanding support for, or at least acceptance of, the PKK in southeastern Iraqi Kurdistan has also begun to change. Locals report that both female and male teenagers from their area have been “kidnapped” by the PKK, never to be heard from again. Many say PKK recruiters frequent cafés and other areas where young people gather, “targeting and preying on the weak.”
One Asayish security official—who asked not to be identified as he had not been authorized to speak to the media—angrily decried the PKK’s “refusal to listen” to KRG officials despite the fact that they had long provided refuge for PKK fighters as part of what they saw as a greater struggle for a Kurdish state. He also claimed that the PKK kidnaps and recruits troubled youth as well as those with financial and family issues, likening the group to a cult.
Several international bodies have documented that the PKK and its alleged “affiliates”—such as the U.S.-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria—continue to make use of child fighters. The dominant faction in the SDF is the YPG.
Mazloum Abdi (also known as Mazloum Kobane), who was in the PKK for decades and is now the top military commander of the SDF, told Al-Monitor in an interview on Nov. 7 that he was optimistic about the upcoming Joe Biden presidency. Abdi is a friend of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and joined the PKK in 1990. In 2011, after the war started in Syria, he was sent by the PKK to organize Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria.
U.S. President-elect Joe Biden, who will take office in January, is widely seen as a pro-Kurdish politician. His concern for Kurds was reportedly one of the main reasons he voted for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. During a visit to northern Iraq in December 2002, he pledged U.S. support for the KRG and stressed that “the mountains are not your only friends” —a nod to the common Kurdish expression, “the mountains are our only friend.” Unlike many Western media outlets, Biden does not make the mistake of lumping an entire ethnic group and its variant political organizations into one—as if they all share the same goals.
In early 2016, Biden compared the PKK to the Islamic State, saying that it is “equally a threat” and “a terrorist group plain and simple.” Unlike many Western media outlets, the president-elect has avoided the mistake of lumping an entire ethnic group and its variant political organizations into one—as if they all share the same goals.
Biden does not, however, consider the YPG to be a part of the PKK, a position he reiterated while condemning Turkey’s October 2019 Operation Peace Spring after the United States withdrew troops from Kurdish regions of northern Syria. Biden wrote that “Donald Trump sold out the Syrian Democratic Forces” and “betrayed a key local ally in the fight against terrorism.”
Still, the fact that the YPG’s current leader spent decades with the PKK—and that many others in its ranks were and possibly still are linked to the terrorist organization—means that any crackdown on the PKK in Iraq will invariably affect eastern Syria as well. Though the KRG differentiates between the YPG and the SDF, officials admit that there are close ties between them.
For now, though, a state monopoly on arms that can enable a post-Islamic State recovery and security for its population are more important to the KRG than simple ethnically based alliances. The PKK seems to have hurt a few too many Iraqi Kurds to be tolerated further.
CORRECTION: Due to an editing error, an earlier version of this article inaccurately reported on the ownership of 37 military bases in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. They are reportedly maintained by Turkey, not by the PKK, as originally stated.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Zelensky’s Midterm Report Card

Zelensky’s Midterm Report Card

Despite their essentially local character , many observers ( including in Russia ) saw Ukraine ’ s mayoral and community elections , held on Oct. 25 , as a referendum on the country ’ s geopolitical orientation .
More than anything , though , they turned out to be a midterm report card on political neophyte President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People ( SP ) party .
He made a good start .
After a parliamentary snap election in July of that year , about 80 percent of the body ’ s seats were turned over to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the parliament produced a majority government that passed an overdue law ending immunity from civil lawsuits for sitting members ; a law against illegal enrichment ; a law that saw Zelensky ’ s oligarchic ally , Ihor Kolomoisky , lose his bid to regain control over Privatbank , which was nationalized in 2016 ; and land reform .
Meanwhile , Zelensky himself has not been caught up in any corruption scandals , a rarity for Ukrainian presidents , and most of his colleagues have likewise stayed on the right side of the law @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a work in progress and many public service institutions are as weak as ever .
The picture on Russia is ambiguous .
Zelensky initially stressed the defense of his country ’ s national interests , but over time has been lured into concessions to Russia that have lowered his standing with the pro-West sections of the public .
For example , in the fall of 2019 , he pulled back troops from three segments of the Donbass front , without reciprocal moves from the separatist and Russian forces .
He also forbade his @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( a charge the government has denied ) , something that has been deeply demoralizing for the soldiers .
Zelensky has come under criticism for his Russia policy from Western powers .
In an unprecedented meeting in October of this year , the head of Britain ’ s MI6 foreign-policy intelligence agency discussed with Zelensky concerns about sensitive information leaking from Kyiv to foreign countries .
Zelensky was also grilled on BBC ’ s HARDtalk , where host Stephen Sackur exposed his circumlocutions about negotiation “ successes ” concerning the Donbass war .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ appeared set to become the latest in a long list of failed Ukrainian vassals who thought they could finesse the wily Kremlin .
In actual matters of defense , though , Zelensky ’ s record is at least passable .
Early in his term , he visited the arms factory in Turkey that manufactures and sells Ukraine the combat-proven Bayraktar TB-2 drone .
Discussions are well underway about production in Ukraine of a larger Akinci model , already undergoing flight tests in Turkey , which will use Ukrainian engines .
More recently , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ goodwill ” agreement that foresees imminent free trade between the two countries and continued close cooperation in arms development .
That partnership should beef up the Ukrainian military to withstand Russian aggression .
In addition , his government has followed through on deals to buy coastal patrol boats from France , the United States , and the United Kingdom , in each case with technology transfer and co-manufacturing benefits .
The purchase of eight British Barzan patrol boats was confirmed under a larger free trade and strategic partnership agreement between the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those two poles , Zelensky was left little room to maneuver in the middle .
This occurred as pro-Russian oligarchs , fed up with the president ’ s anti-corruption efforts , were starting to use their dominant positions in television broadcasting to discredit him .
For Zelensky , the best chance of coming through unscathed was if local concerns beat out foreign policy when Ukrainians went to the polls .
And there was reason for him to be hopeful .
In Ukraine , national and local elections are distinct ; the former are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and ideology , while the latter are focused on social services .
Whichever party provides the best administration generally wins its small districts .
In this regard , a poll taken in mid-August provided a remarkable insight into the public mood .
A full 55 percent rated candidate honesty as an important criterion ahead of this fall ’ s local elections .
Just over 48 percent listed community management experience .
Backing by a personally preferred political party was mentioned by only 8.5 percent , and language of communication ( whether the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by 6.3 percent .
More than 34 percent of voters expected local conditions to improve after the vote if decentralization was implemented , while 4.7 percent expected worse .
These measures indicate a surprising degree of optimism .
In the end , at 37 percent , the election turnout was about 10 precent lower than in 2015 , indicating that the public was not particularly motivated to make a change .
Both the OPFL and Poroshenko ’ s European Solidarity party regained some of the vote that had gone to Zelensky and the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Some interpret this as a rebuke of Zelensky , but the party vote shares largely suggest a return to an earlier pattern , which is not surprising , since new SP candidates are not particularly well known and established locally .
Regardless of party , almost all incumbent big-city mayors who had reputations as efficient providers of public services were reelected .
Many victors in the eastern regions were affiliated with or sympathetic to the OPFL , but on social welfare grounds as much as on geopolitical .
In the Kyiv city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ categorized as pro-national ( anti-Russian ) took about 63 percent of the vote , while the OPFL took 7 percent .
These results show long-term continuity in basic public preferences , including considerable staying-power by the OPFL .
However , the voter optimism may indicate that the decentralization of politics , introduced by Poroshenko , is having a positive effect .
In the short run , decentralization marks the further democratization of the country , a move away from the centralizing Russian model .
Over the long run , it should also increase @ @ @ @ @ @ @ society from the ground up .
Local elections , thus , are less report cards on national leaders than on local progress .
This represents a maturing of democracy , where the political parties have been served notice that they need to create stronger public service institutions—including institutions to crack down on corruption and protect the country ’ s security .
As Alexis de Tocqueville once noted , democracy enables people to correct their mistakes .
Overall , Ukrainian democracy is on a satisfactory learning curve .

Despite their essentially local character, many observers (including in Russia) saw Ukraine’s mayoral and community elections, held on Oct. 25, as a referendum on the country’s geopolitical orientation. More than anything, though, they turned out to be a midterm report card on political neophyte President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People (SP) party.
Despite their essentially local character, many observers (including in Russia) saw Ukraine’s mayoral and community elections, held on Oct. 25, as a referendum on the country’s geopolitical orientation. More than anything, though, they turned out to be a midterm report card on political neophyte President Volodymyr Zelensky and his Servant of the People (SP) party.
When Zelensky became president in May 2019, he needed to do two things. First, he had to move quickly to make good on his promises to fight corruption. Second, he had to avoid making concessions to Moscow in the war in Donbass, which would compromise his standing as commander in chief of the armed forces and indicate to his critics a naiveté about Moscow’s ultimate intentions.
He made a good start. After a parliamentary snap election in July of that year, about 80 percent of the body’s seats were turned over to new members. In short order, the parliament produced a majority government that passed an overdue law ending immunity from civil lawsuits for sitting members; a law against illegal enrichment; a law that saw Zelensky’s oligarchic ally, Ihor Kolomoisky, lose his bid to regain control over Privatbank, which was nationalized in 2016; and land reform. Meanwhile, Zelensky himself has not been caught up in any corruption scandals, a rarity for Ukrainian presidents, and most of his colleagues have likewise stayed on the right side of the law and morality. But judicial reform remains a work in progress and many public service institutions are as weak as ever.
The picture on Russia is ambiguous. Zelensky initially stressed the defense of his country’s national interests, but over time has been lured into concessions to Russia that have lowered his standing with the pro-West sections of the public. For example, in the fall of 2019, he pulled back troops from three segments of the Donbass front, without reciprocal moves from the separatist and Russian forces. He also forbade his troops in those areas from returning fire (a charge the government has denied), something that has been deeply demoralizing for the soldiers.
Zelensky has come under criticism for his Russia policy from Western powers. In an unprecedented meeting in October of this year, the head of Britain’s MI6 foreign-policy intelligence agency discussed with Zelensky concerns about sensitive information leaking from Kyiv to foreign countries. Zelensky was also grilled on BBC’s HARDtalk, where host Stephen Sackur exposed his circumlocutions about negotiation “successes” concerning the Donbass war. For many commentators back home, Zelensky appeared set to become the latest in a long list of failed Ukrainian vassals who thought they could finesse the wily Kremlin.
In actual matters of defense, though, Zelensky’s record is at least passable. Early in his term, he visited the arms factory in Turkey that manufactures and sells Ukraine the combat-proven Bayraktar TB-2 drone. Discussions are well underway about production in Ukraine of a larger Akinci model, already undergoing flight tests in Turkey, which will use Ukrainian engines. More recently, he visited Turkey again and signed a “goodwill” agreement that foresees imminent free trade between the two countries and continued close cooperation in arms development. That partnership should beef up the Ukrainian military to withstand Russian aggression.
In addition, his government has followed through on deals to buy coastal patrol boats from France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, in each case with technology transfer and co-manufacturing benefits. The purchase of eight British Barzan patrol boats was confirmed under a larger free trade and strategic partnership agreement between the United Kingdom and Ukraine in October.
In some ways, Zelensky’s ambiguity on Russia has served him well. But during the most recent election, he found himself trapped. On the one side was the Opposition Platform for Life (OPFL)—a splinter party formed in 2018 after the demise of former President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions—which ran on an explicitly pro-Russian message. On the other were politicians aligned with former President Petro Poroshenko, whom Zelensky had previously cast as too obdurate in relations with the Kremlin. It is not Russian aggression that has prolonged the war, he maintained, but unreasonableness from the Ukrainian side.
Between those two poles, Zelensky was left little room to maneuver in the middle. This occurred as pro-Russian oligarchs, fed up with the president’s anti-corruption efforts, were starting to use their dominant positions in television broadcasting to discredit him.
For Zelensky, the best chance of coming through unscathed was if local concerns beat out foreign policy when Ukrainians went to the polls. And there was reason for him to be hopeful. In Ukraine, national and local elections are distinct; the former are concerned with geopolitics, the national economy, and ideology, while the latter are focused on social services. Whichever party provides the best administration generally wins its small districts.
In this regard, a poll taken in mid-August provided a remarkable insight into the public mood. A full 55 percent rated candidate honesty as an important criterion ahead of this fall’s local elections. Just over 48 percent listed community management experience. Backing by a personally preferred political party was mentioned by only 8.5 percent, and language of communication (whether the candidate speaks primarily Russian or Ukrainian) by 6.3 percent. More than 34 percent of voters expected local conditions to improve after the vote if decentralization was implemented, while 4.7 percent expected worse. These measures indicate a surprising degree of optimism.
In the end, at 37 percent, the election turnout was about 10 precent lower than in 2015, indicating that the public was not particularly motivated to make a change. Both the OPFL and Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party regained some of the vote that had gone to Zelensky and the SP in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Some interpret this as a rebuke of Zelensky, but the party vote shares largely suggest a return to an earlier pattern, which is not surprising, since new SP candidates are not particularly well known and established locally.
Regardless of party, almost all incumbent big-city mayors who had reputations as efficient providers of public services were reelected. Many victors in the eastern regions were affiliated with or sympathetic to the OPFL, but on social welfare grounds as much as on geopolitical. In the Kyiv city council vote, candidates who could be categorized as pro-national (anti-Russian) took about 63 percent of the vote, while the OPFL took 7 percent.
These results show long-term continuity in basic public preferences, including considerable staying-power by the OPFL. However, the voter optimism may indicate that the decentralization of politics, introduced by Poroshenko, is having a positive effect. In the short run, decentralization marks the further democratization of the country, a move away from the centralizing Russian model. Over the long run, it should also increase interest in local elections and strengthen civil society from the ground up.
Given Ukraine’s progress on decentralization, local elections will become ever more important. Decentralization has significantly increased local budgets and improved infrastructure. Local political participation is blossoming. Further maidans seem far off, inasmuch as free elections can be lost by incumbents and won by challengers. Citizens see that their votes are significant and that election outcomes are products of their preferences.
Local elections, thus, are less report cards on national leaders than on local progress. This represents a maturing of democracy, where the political parties have been served notice that they need to create stronger public service institutions—including institutions to crack down on corruption and protect the country’s security.
As Alexis de Tocqueville once noted, democracy enables people to correct their mistakes. Overall, Ukrainian democracy is on a satisfactory learning curve.