foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--Don’t Give Up on Chinese Democracy

Don’t Give Up on Chinese Democracy

China ’ s popularity in the world is plummeting , and antagonism between China and the United States is growing .
Many blame China for allowing a series of new viruses to emerge , for failing to stop COVID-19 when it first appeared , and for not sharing information about it with the rest of the world in time to prevent it from spreading .
People say China seeks to use its strong economic power to dominate the world and that as it extends its influence it promotes authoritarianism , denying to others the freedom and democracy it also denies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ led policymakers in some Western countries to call for the end of engagement .
When Deng Xiaoping launched his “ reform and opening ” policy over 40 years ago , he received strong support from the U.S. government and business community on the expectation that as China grew richer it would liberalize its politics and become a supporter of the U.S.-led world order .
But China ’ s policies changed in the opposite direction : Its extension of military muscle into the South China Sea , economic and political expansion through the Belt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ trade practices with the United States , and theft and forced transfer of American and European technology have convinced many countries that China ’ s government misled them .
We seem to be on the brink of an ideological confrontation—a new cold war that would bring disaster to China , the United States , and the world .
It does not have to be this way .
I have been promoting democratic change in China since 1998 .
That year , I persuaded officials in Buyun , a township in Sichuan province , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of China ’ s first direct election of a local government leader above the village level , conducted debates village by village , and finally more than 6,000 voters in the town cast ballots .
In 2005 , in Wenling city , Zhejiang province , I helped the local government conduct China ’ s first budget transparency and participation reform , in which the government allowed local citizens to review and comment on its spending plans .
Over the years , I have helped farmers , lawyers , and civil society leaders to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
I have advised individuals and NGOs about how to protect their rights under Chinese law , promoted the value of democratic reform and rule of law in academic meetings , and worked with journalists reporting on bureaucratic resistance to reform attempts .
As a political reformer , I was optimistic .
Forward-looking Chinese have aspired to modernization for some 200 years .
In the 1970s , that hope reemerged , the government had adopted a stance of reform and openness to the world , and the local officials with whom I interacted @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local citizens rather than over their heads or behind their backs to make progress in their communities .
I was inspired by them and believed that China was close to a democratic breakthrough .
It is true that democracy in China today is in retreat .
A decade ago—even before Xi Jinping came to power—the ruling Chinese Communist Party began to worry about the threat to its power from civil society and political reformers .
The party reversed the more liberal , tolerant policies of reform of the Deng era and reverted to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s regime .
The government arrested and detained many civil society leaders and independent candidates , cracked down on strikes and demonstrations , blocked international NGOs ’ activities , closed independent Christian churches , censored ideas on websites and in newspapers , and even restricted what was taught in university classes .
China became a police state , in silence everywhere , its government fearful of its own people .
Yet even now , civil society is quietly growing .
I continue to see people criticizing the government and promoting ideas of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ freedom on websites and social media .
I have observed growing membership in house churches .
Citizens are organizing at the local level and engaging in a wider range of activities .
Farmers are organizing to protect their rights .
Even more remarkable , environmental NGOs are still working to supervise conditions in their localities .
Civic groups are still very active working at the community level .
Some local governments are still conducting good governance reform , such as the participatory budgeting reforms that are taking place in many cities in southern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nanchang , and Fuzhou .
People dubbed “ democratic consultants ” are busy helping government officials improve their relations with residents in many places around China , using lessons from reforms undertaken in Wenling .
Local officials seek such advice because they understand that good governance reform and greater public participation reduce tension and build trust between themselves and the people they govern .
In 2004 , I was invited by the Canadian government to attend an international conference about China .
When I finished my speech about China ’ s political reform @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his hand and said , “ I visited China many times .
I found that your government officials are very rough in the way they treat their people .
How do you think that can be changed ?
” My answer was , “ During the direct elections for local government chiefs that I have observed in some places , candidates ’ behaviors have changed .
They can walk among the crowds of people , shake hands with them , kiss their children , say thank you to the people .
Elections changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ so far has confirmed the predictions of modernization theory that underlay the policy of engagement : As China became wealthier , its citizens became more educated , more urbanized , and more sophisticated .
They felt more qualified to evaluate their government , took a greater interest in politics , and demanded that the government protect their personal rights and interests .
China lacks a tradition of democracy , but during four decades of reform , relative openness , and foreign engagement , Chinese people learned about freedom , rule of law , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ In some places , they found ways to practice democracy and freedom .
They tasted the forbidden fruits and learned that democracy is better than tyranny .
No one can stop them from hoping for freedom and democracy ; they believe that democracy can make China change for the better .
I know it looks to many that the critics of engagement are right .
Modernization has not yet produced the outcome it was supposed to produce .
The same economic growth that has given people a better life has also augmented the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that , China ’ s current retreat is not a result of the failure of the policy of engagement but , rather , a response to internal developments within China .
In the earlier stages of post-Mao reform , economic and political reform were linked .
Deng not only paid attention to economic reform but promoted term limits and retirement ages for officials—important reforms in a system where high-level officials served at the will of the leader and often to the ends of their lives .
Deng encouraged other reformers like Hu Yaobang @ @ @ @ @ @ @ over universities , media , state enterprises , and private enterprises .
All these reforms faced opposition within the party , but as long as Deng was alive and active , they made halting progress .
However , after the tragic 1989 Tiananmen crackdown , party conservatives gained the upper hand .
Deng became ill , and except for one final intervention in 1992 to push economic reform , he faded from the scene and died in 1997 .
Since then , vested interests in the party and in the state capitalist class @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political liberalization .
This does not mean the engagement policy for China was wrong .
It means that modernization is facing its final stage .
I believe China has reached the last mile to change .
The current retrenchment faces challenges that will sooner or later bring it to an end .
Tyranny will stifle the economy—already slowing and made much worse by the pandemic—companies will close , and employees will be laid off .
China ’ s long period of rapid economic growth will pass into history .
It now looks as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the West .
But Chinese people will remember the good time of reform and openness , when life was better .
They will want to return to the time when reform aimed at democracy .
We are all living on the same Earth and share the same environment ; we must have freedom as well as prosperity .
Chinese people have made great efforts for 200 years to modernize their country .
We have achieved many goals , such as industrialization , urbanization , and the spread of modern knowledge everywhere .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one .
The ideas of rule of law , civil society , freedom , and democracy have been deeply planted in the hearts of Chinese people .
As I see it , engagement is right , and the Chinese people need it .
Interaction with governments , international organizations , civil society organizations , scholars , and media has had a deep effect .
And it should be allowed to continue to deepen .
I believe only democracy can make China change .
This essay was originally published at ChinaFile .

China’s popularity in the world is plummeting, and antagonism between China and the United States is growing. Many blame China for allowing a series of new viruses to emerge, for failing to stop COVID-19 when it first appeared, and for not sharing information about it with the rest of the world in time to prevent it from spreading. People say China seeks to use its strong economic power to dominate the world and that as it extends its influence it promotes authoritarianism, denying to others the freedom and democracy it also denies its own people.
China’s popularity in the world is plummeting, and antagonism between China and the United States is growing. Many blame China for allowing a series of new viruses to emerge, for failing to stop COVID-19 when it first appeared, and for not sharing information about it with the rest of the world in time to prevent it from spreading. People say China seeks to use its strong economic power to dominate the world and that as it extends its influence it promotes authoritarianism, denying to others the freedom and democracy it also denies its own people.
These concerns have led policymakers in some Western countries to call for the end of engagement. When Deng Xiaoping launched his “reform and opening” policy over 40 years ago, he received strong support from the U.S. government and business community on the expectation that as China grew richer it would liberalize its politics and become a supporter of the U.S.-led world order. But China’s policies changed in the opposite direction: Its extension of military muscle into the South China Sea, economic and political expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative, persistence in unfair trade practices with the United States, and theft and forced transfer of American and European technology have convinced many countries that China’s government misled them. We seem to be on the brink of an ideological confrontation—a new cold war that would bring disaster to China, the United States, and the world.
It does not have to be this way. I have been promoting democratic change in China since 1998. That year, I persuaded officials in Buyun, a township in Sichuan province, to hold the People’s Republic of China’s first direct election of a local government leader above the village level, conducted debates village by village, and finally more than 6,000 voters in the town cast ballots. In 2005, in Wenling city, Zhejiang province, I helped the local government conduct China’s first budget transparency and participation reform, in which the government allowed local citizens to review and comment on its spending plans. Over the years, I have helped farmers, lawyers, and civil society leaders to run as independent candidates in local elections. I have advised individuals and NGOs about how to protect their rights under Chinese law, promoted the value of democratic reform and rule of law in academic meetings, and worked with journalists reporting on bureaucratic resistance to reform attempts.
As a political reformer, I was optimistic. Forward-looking Chinese have aspired to modernization for some 200 years. In the 1970s, that hope reemerged, the government had adopted a stance of reform and openness to the world, and the local officials with whom I interacted were convinced that they should work with local citizens rather than over their heads or behind their backs to make progress in their communities. I was inspired by them and believed that China was close to a democratic breakthrough.
It is true that democracy in China today is in retreat. A decade ago—even before Xi Jinping came to power—the ruling Chinese Communist Party began to worry about the threat to its power from civil society and political reformers. The party reversed the more liberal, tolerant policies of reform of the Deng era and reverted to some of the methods of Mao Zedong’s regime. The government arrested and detained many civil society leaders and independent candidates, cracked down on strikes and demonstrations, blocked international NGOs’ activities, closed independent Christian churches, censored ideas on websites and in newspapers, and even restricted what was taught in university classes. China became a police state, in silence everywhere, its government fearful of its own people.
Yet even now, civil society is quietly growing. I continue to see people criticizing the government and promoting ideas of democracy, rule of law, and freedom on websites and social media. I have observed growing membership in house churches. Citizens are organizing at the local level and engaging in a wider range of activities. Farmers are organizing to protect their rights. Even more remarkable, environmental NGOs are still working to supervise conditions in their localities. Civic groups are still very active working at the community level. Some local governments are still conducting good governance reform, such as the participatory budgeting reforms that are taking place in many cities in southern China, including Wenling, Haikou, Nanchang, and Fuzhou. People dubbed “democratic consultants” are busy helping government officials improve their relations with residents in many places around China, using lessons from reforms undertaken in Wenling. Local officials seek such advice because they understand that good governance reform and greater public participation reduce tension and build trust between themselves and the people they govern.
In 2004, I was invited by the Canadian government to attend an international conference about China. When I finished my speech about China’s political reform, a member of the audience raised his hand and said, “I visited China many times. I found that your government officials are very rough in the way they treat their people. How do you think that can be changed?” My answer was, “During the direct elections for local government chiefs that I have observed in some places, candidates’ behaviors have changed. They can walk among the crowds of people, shake hands with them, kiss their children, say thank you to the people. Elections changed their behavior.”
China’s trajectory so far has confirmed the predictions of modernization theory that underlay the policy of engagement: As China became wealthier, its citizens became more educated, more urbanized, and more sophisticated. They felt more qualified to evaluate their government, took a greater interest in politics, and demanded that the government protect their personal rights and interests.
China lacks a tradition of democracy, but during four decades of reform, relative openness, and foreign engagement, Chinese people learned about freedom, rule of law, human rights, and civil society. In some places, they found ways to practice democracy and freedom. They tasted the forbidden fruits and learned that democracy is better than tyranny. No one can stop them from hoping for freedom and democracy; they believe that democracy can make China change for the better.
I know it looks to many that the critics of engagement are right. Modernization has not yet produced the outcome it was supposed to produce. The same economic growth that has given people a better life has also augmented the central government’s power. Despite that, China’s current retreat is not a result of the failure of the policy of engagement but, rather, a response to internal developments within China. In the earlier stages of post-Mao reform, economic and political reform were linked. Deng not only paid attention to economic reform but promoted term limits and retirement ages for officials—important reforms in a system where high-level officials served at the will of the leader and often to the ends of their lives. Deng encouraged other reformers like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to loosen party control over universities, media, state enterprises, and private enterprises.
All these reforms faced opposition within the party, but as long as Deng was alive and active, they made halting progress. However, after the tragic 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, party conservatives gained the upper hand. Deng became ill, and except for one final intervention in 1992 to push economic reform, he faded from the scene and died in 1997. Since then, vested interests in the party and in the state capitalist class have been able gradually to block further political liberalization.
This does not mean the engagement policy for China was wrong. It means that modernization is facing its final stage. I believe China has reached the last mile to change. The current retrenchment faces challenges that will sooner or later bring it to an end. Tyranny will stifle the economy—already slowing and made much worse by the pandemic—companies will close, and employees will be laid off. China’s long period of rapid economic growth will pass into history. It now looks as if China will close the door to the West. But Chinese people will remember the good time of reform and openness, when life was better. They will want to return to the time when reform aimed at democracy.
We are all living on the same Earth and share the same environment; we must have freedom as well as prosperity. Chinese people have made great efforts for 200 years to modernize their country. We have achieved many goals, such as industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of modern knowledge everywhere. The remaining goal is political modernization—the most difficult one.
The ideas of rule of law, civil society, freedom, and democracy have been deeply planted in the hearts of Chinese people. As I see it, engagement is right, and the Chinese people need it. Interaction with governments, international organizations, civil society organizations, scholars, and media has had a deep effect. And it should be allowed to continue to deepen. I believe only democracy can make China change.
This essay was originally published at ChinaFile.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--In Pakistan, the Army Tightens Its Grip

In Pakistan, the Army Tightens Its Grip

In Pakistan , the Army Tightens Its Grip Pakistan has faced an unprecedented set of challenges this year—from a locust invasion that threatened to infest 40 percent of the agrarian economy ’ s major crops to a pandemic that brought business activity to a grinding halt , prompting layoffs , falling household incomes , and a decline in purchasing power .
But when Prime Minister Imran Khan ’ s administration unveiled the federal budget for the fiscal year 2020-2021 last month , a response to those calamities was nowhere to be seen .
The budget allocated 1.29 trillion rupees ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , an 11.8 percent increase from last year ’ s budget and almost 18 percent of the total budget .
Health , on the other hand , received 25 billion rupees ( $ 148.6 million ) in the central budget .
Even after provincial governments stepped in to allocate an additional 467 billion rupees ( $ 2.7 billion ) , health spending totaled a third of the military budget .
As opposition Sen. Sherry Rehman said in a tweet , this is “ not a national # budget for a country facing a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ funding , and failure to account for the country ’ s already stressed health infrastructure , isn ’ t simply an oversight .
The latest budget would have been an apt time to push for much needed equitable resource allocation and a bigger development budget—more than 40 million Pakistanis are living in a state of food insecurity , and hospitals across the country are buckling as they cope with an influx of coronavirus patients .
But Islamabad ’ s excessive defense funding , and failure to account for the country ’ s already @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply an oversight .
Rather , it is indicative of the military ’ s influence over the government and the weak government ’ s reluctance to push back .
Despite poor testing , there have been nearly 240,000 confirmed cases of the coronavirus in Pakistan and almost 5,000 deaths—figures scientists estimate are more likely in the millions and tens of thousands respectively .
Already , at least 5,000 health care workers have tested positive for the coronavirus since the outbreak began , and 65 have died .
At the same time , growing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have routinely dismissed the coronavirus as the flu—have resulted in medical workers being assaulted by frustrated patients .
Khan runs a precariously balanced government where his party holds only 46 percent of seats in the National Assembly and is reeling from the shambolic aftereffects of a poorly managed coronavirus response—one of which seems to be widening military influence in day-to-day government operations .
Armies have been played a critical role in emergency responses across the world : The Australian state of Victoria called for military assistance after a spike in coronavirus cases in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and South Africa , soldiers patrolled the streets to enforce lockdowns .
But in Pakistan , where the military has long wielded immense power and sometimes seized direct control , such efforts indicate more than civic mindedness .
“ I think there ’ s an additional factor at play right now , ” said Arif Rafiq , the president of New York-based Vizier Consulting .
“ The Army is filling a void in areas in which it perceives Imran Khan ’ s government and the civil administration to be weak.
” There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government is sliding fast out of Khan ’ s hands .
A host of retired and serving Army officers sit in prominent government roles , and the military ( along with the Inter-Services Intelligence , the country ’ s politically influential and conservative intelligence service ) has been overseeing the government ’ s coronavirus response .
It was the military that called for a countrywide lockdown on March 23 , a day after Khan opposed it .
Retired Lt. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa is now the prime minister ’ s communications advisor , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ( NCOC ) set up to manage the country ’ s response to the coronavirus pandemic is run by Army Lt. Gen. Hamood Uz Zaman Khan .
Subsequently , the health ministry has been relegated to a largely advisory role in decision-making , having to rely on institutions such as the military-led NCOC and the National Disaster Management Authority , also run by a general .
Undoubtedly , the military ’ s expanding footprint doesn ’ t bode well for the country ’ s feeble democracy or its citizens , particularly since neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seems to have paid heed to World Health Organization ( WHO ) recommendations .
Official numbers of coronavirus infections soared dramatically after Pakistan lifted its nationwide lockdown on May 9 , citing economic concerns—a move criticized by WHO and by the country ’ s medical fraternity .
In a letter addressed to the government in early June , WHO recommended intermittent lockdowns of target areas , adding that the country ’ s health system should be able to “ detect , test , isolate and treat every case and trace every contact.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced it was imposing 227 smaller “ smart lockdowns.
” ) Now , many hospitals in the country are full .
“ Shockingly , even the specter of hundreds of thousands of deaths is insufficient to convince the military and civilian establishment to allocate a greater share of scarce public resources toward life-saving welfare , ” said Ammar Rashid , a public health researcher based in Islamabad .
“ As with every other aspect of Pakistan ’ s pandemic response , cold calculations of power and patronage have taken precedence over the critical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” In a country where democracy has often been interrupted by military coups , it is ironic that a government allegedly backed by the military ( word on the street when Khan won election in July 2018 was that he was the military ’ s favored candidate , a notion he was quick to deny ) is now fighting for survival .
The budget debacle was followed by yet another catastrophic scandal—just one month after a plane crash that killed 98 people , 150 out of 434 pilots working for national carrier PIA @ @ @ @ @ @ @ suspicious licenses.
” On June 28 , Khan hosted a dinner at his residence for his advisors and parliamentarians that read like a last hurrah .
Over plates of pulao and mutton handi , he assured them that his government would complete its term .
Two days later , on the floor of the National Assembly , however , Khan quoted Charles Dickens and hinted at his possible departure .
“ No one remains in power forever , ” he said .
For now , things remain uncertain in Islamabad .
While there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one ” formula—suggesting Khan ’ s removal as prime minister—it is unclear how this will impact his party ’ s already fragile National Assembly majority .
But one conclusion is certain : Those caught in the crossfire of the government ’ s waning power and the military ’ s gradual attempts at taking control will be far removed from politics and the hallowed halls of the National Assembly .
With the festival of Eid-ul-Adha right around the corner , Pakistan is likely to witness another surge of coronavirus cases—a catastrophe the country is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ southwestern city of Gujrat , Tamkenat Mansoor , a physician at a local public hospital , is already sounding alarm bells .
“ Within a few weeks , our hospitals are going to reach maximum capacity , ” she said .
“ Eventually , the coronavirus is going to turn into another case of polio for Pakistan .
The world will have eradicated it , and we will be the only ones still struggling .
”

Pakistan has faced an unprecedented set of challenges this year—from a locust invasion that threatened to infest 40 percent of the agrarian economy’s major crops to a pandemic that brought business activity to a grinding halt, prompting layoffs, falling household incomes, and a decline in purchasing power.
But when Prime Minister Imran Khan’s administration unveiled the federal budget for the fiscal year 2020-2021 last month, a response to those calamities was nowhere to be seen. The budget allocated 1.29 trillion rupees ($7.7 billion) to defense expenditure, an 11.8 percent increase from last year’s budget and almost 18 percent of the total budget. Health, on the other hand, received 25 billion rupees ($148.6 million) in the central budget. Even after provincial governments stepped in to allocate an additional 467 billion rupees ($2.7 billion), health spending totaled a third of the military budget. As opposition Sen. Sherry Rehman said in a tweet, this is “not a national #budget for a country facing a crisis.”
Islamabad’s excessive defense funding, and failure to account for the country’s already stressed health infrastructure, isn’t simply an oversight. The latest budget would have been an apt time to push for much needed equitable resource allocation and a bigger development budget—more than 40 million Pakistanis are living in a state of food insecurity, and hospitals across the country are buckling as they cope with an influx of coronavirus patients. But Islamabad’s excessive defense funding, and failure to account for the country’s already stressed health infrastructure, isn’t simply an oversight. Rather, it is indicative of the military’s influence over the government and the weak government’s reluctance to push back.
Despite poor testing, there have been nearly 240,000 confirmed cases of the coronavirus in Pakistan and almost 5,000 deaths—figures scientists estimate are more likely in the millions and tens of thousands respectively. Already, at least 5,000 health care workers have tested positive for the coronavirus since the outbreak began, and 65 have died. At the same time, growing mistrust and government-propagated misinformation—Khan and his aides have routinely dismissed the coronavirus as the flu—have resulted in medical workers being assaulted by frustrated patients. Khan runs a precariously balanced government where his party holds only 46 percent of seats in the National Assembly and is reeling from the shambolic aftereffects of a poorly managed coronavirus response—one of which seems to be widening military influence in day-to-day government operations.
Armies have been played a critical role in emergency responses across the world: The Australian state of Victoria called for military assistance after a spike in coronavirus cases in June, and in Italy, Spain, and South Africa, soldiers patrolled the streets to enforce lockdowns. But in Pakistan, where the military has long wielded immense power and sometimes seized direct control, such efforts indicate more than civic mindedness. “I think there’s an additional factor at play right now,” said Arif Rafiq, the president of New York-based Vizier Consulting. “The Army is filling a void in areas in which it perceives Imran Khan’s government and the civil administration to be weak.”
There are growing signs that control of the government is sliding fast out of Khan’s hands. A host of retired and serving Army officers sit in prominent government roles, and the military (along with the Inter-Services Intelligence, the country’s politically influential and conservative intelligence service) has been overseeing the government’s coronavirus response. It was the military that called for a countrywide lockdown on March 23, a day after Khan opposed it. Retired Lt. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa is now the prime minister’s communications advisor, and the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC) set up to manage the country’s response to the coronavirus pandemic is run by Army Lt. Gen. Hamood Uz Zaman Khan. Subsequently, the health ministry has been relegated to a largely advisory role in decision-making, having to rely on institutions such as the military-led NCOC and the National Disaster Management Authority, also run by a general.
Undoubtedly, the military’s expanding footprint doesn’t bode well for the country’s feeble democracy or its citizens, particularly since neither Khan’s government nor the military seems to have paid heed to World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations. Official numbers of coronavirus infections soared dramatically after Pakistan lifted its nationwide lockdown on May 9, citing economic concerns—a move criticized by WHO and by the country’s medical fraternity. In a letter addressed to the government in early June, WHO recommended intermittent lockdowns of target areas, adding that the country’s health system should be able to “detect, test, isolate and treat every case and trace every contact.” (On Wednesday, the government finally announced it was imposing 227 smaller “smart lockdowns.”) Now, many hospitals in the country are full. “Shockingly, even the specter of hundreds of thousands of deaths is insufficient to convince the military and civilian establishment to allocate a greater share of scarce public resources toward life-saving welfare,” said Ammar Rashid, a public health researcher based in Islamabad. “As with every other aspect of Pakistan’s pandemic response, cold calculations of power and patronage have taken precedence over the critical health and economic needs of the public.”
In a country where democracy has often been interrupted by military coups, it is ironic that a government allegedly backed by the military (word on the street when Khan won election in July 2018 was that he was the military’s favored candidate, a notion he was quick to deny) is now fighting for survival. The budget debacle was followed by yet another catastrophic scandal—just one month after a plane crash that killed 98 people, 150 out of 434 pilots working for national carrier PIA were found to have “bogus or suspicious licenses.” On June 28, Khan hosted a dinner at his residence for his advisors and parliamentarians that read like a last hurrah. Over plates of pulao and mutton handi, he assured them that his government would complete its term. Two days later, on the floor of the National Assembly, however, Khan quoted Charles Dickens and hinted at his possible departure. “No one remains in power forever,” he said.
For now, things remain uncertain in Islamabad. While there has been talk of a “minus one” formula—suggesting Khan’s removal as prime minister—it is unclear how this will impact his party’s already fragile National Assembly majority. But one conclusion is certain: Those caught in the crossfire of the government’s waning power and the military’s gradual attempts at taking control will be far removed from politics and the hallowed halls of the National Assembly. With the festival of Eid-ul-Adha right around the corner, Pakistan is likely to witness another surge of coronavirus cases—a catastrophe the country is not ready to bear. In the southwestern city of Gujrat, Tamkenat Mansoor, a physician at a local public hospital, is already sounding alarm bells. “Within a few weeks, our hospitals are going to reach maximum capacity,” she said. “Eventually, the coronavirus is going to turn into another case of polio for Pakistan. The world will have eradicated it, and we will be the only ones still struggling.”


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--López Obrador Goes to Washington to Play Nice With Trump

López Obrador Goes to Washington to Play Nice With Trump After more than 18 months in office without leaving the country on any official trips , Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is finally venturing on his maiden voyage to Washington to mark the signing of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement .
López Obrador ’ s attendance at Wednesday ’ s White House ceremony hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump has drawn widespread ire at home , where Trump ’ s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center.López Obrador ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ceremony has drawn widespread ire at home , where Trump ’ s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center .
Critics have denounced the trip as a “ colossal error ” that will enable Trump to use López Obrador as a prop in his reelection campaign , with one prominent Mexican commentator going so far as to call it an act of “ national treason.
” Absent from the summit will be the third country that signed the new trade agreement .
On Monday , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ he would not attend the meeting , citing coronavirus concerns and U.S. threats to impose new tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Canada .
López Obrador is already playing down the significance of the trip , and his foreign minister recently made it clear that the purpose of the visit will be limited to the signing of the trade agreement , which some are calling a mere update of the old NAFTA that Trump famously labeled as “ perhaps the worst trade deal ever made.
” But the success of López Obrador @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump noticed the many unflattering statements the now-Mexican president made about his host during his previous visits to the United States .
While running for president in 2017 , López Obrador made several stops in the United States to campaign among the millions of Mexican nationals living there but able to vote back home .
Not only did he strike a defiant tone at these rallies in response to Trump ’ s broadsides against Mexicans as criminals and “ rapists.
” He also published a book aimed at these voters , titled Oye @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that includes such headings as “ A Bankruptcy Called Trump ” and assails the American president as someone with “ racist contempt ” for Mexicans .
At a rally held hours after Trump ’ s January 2017 inauguration speech , López Obrador dismissed the speech as an affront to the “ dignity ” of Mexicans and a “ vulgar threat to human rights.
” He was even harsher a month later in Los Angeles , where he described Trump ’ s plans for a border wall as the work of “ cunning and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and particularly our fellow migrants with the stigmatized and persecuted Jews of Hitler ’ s time.
” A veteran of three presidential campaigns and a former mayor of Mexico City , López Obrador understood that Trump ’ s tirades against Mexicans were more than just political rhetoric .
“ We should not underestimate the capacity of the current government officials in the United States ; they are not fools , ” he cautioned in the February 2017 speech .
“ Donald Trump ’ s angry discourse follows a cold and calculated political strategy.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States , López Obrador was under no illusions that Trump would morph into Mexico ’ s amigo once in office .
Instead , López Obrador predicted that Trump would drill down on his anti-immigrant message “ because he won the presidency with words of hate and discrimination , [ and ] plans to use the same propaganda in government and [ to ] win reelection in 2020.
” One month later in El Paso , however , López Obrador was doubtful that Trump ’ s anti-immigrant strategy would succeed the second time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of phobia against migrants and Mexicans ” would not help him win reelection .
On the campaign trail , López Obrador promised direct confrontation with Donald Trump on social media .
Referring to one of Trump ’ s anti-immigrant tirades , he assured Mexicans that Trump “ is going to have to learn to respect us … every time he does what he did today , he will have a direct answer .
… He uses his Twitter , his Facebook—I am going to use it too .
And I ’ m going @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in office , however , López Obrador ’ s defiance subsided .
When Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexican imports unless Mexico moved to block a group of migrants from Central America , López Obrador sidestepped questions and said he preferred “ love and peace , ” but nonetheless sent the Mexican National Guard to the Guatemalan border to keep migrants from crossing north .
Mexico also agreed to implement the U.S. government ’ s “ Remain in Mexico ” policy , which deports asylum-seekers to makeshift camps on the Mexican side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ petitions to be heard .
To many Mexicans , López Obrador ’ s willingness to enforce Washington ’ s immigration edicts meant that “ Mexico has agreed to become Trump ’ s wall , ” as one Mexican commentator put it.To many Mexicans , López Obrador ’ s willingness to enforce Washington ’ s immigration edicts meant that “ Mexico has agreed to become Trump ’ s wall , ” as one commentator put it .
Trump recently referred to his Mexican counterpart as “ a great guy.
” López Obrador does not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strength .
His administration stumbled in its initial response to the coronavirus , which is now ravaging the country even as health officials acknowledge severe undercounting of confirmed cases .
In June , Mexican health officials proclaimed that the pandemic was “ under control ” and would run its course later that month .
More than 32,000 deaths later and with numbers still rising , last week Mexico overtook France as the country with the fifth-most total fatalities in the world .
To make matters worse , Mexico has the world ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a sign that not enough tests are being administered .
López Obrador came into office promising to grow the economy by 4 percent annually , create over 2 million paid apprenticeships for young people , and reduce crime while avoiding the bloody confrontations of his predecessors .
However , the country ’ s gross domestic product was virtually flat during his first year , and in April alone , more jobs were lost than were created in all of 2019 .
The national oil company ’ s bonds are rated “ junk , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the government is embroiled in several disputes with local and foreign investors .
The International Monetary Fund recently predicted that Mexico ’ s economy will shrink by 10.5 percent in 2020 .
In the current crisis , the United States , which buys over three-quarters of Mexican exports , is Mexico ’ s critical lifeline .
Unlike the recently reelected Trudeau , López Obrador still has more than four years left of his six-year term and can not afford to alienate Trump .
And although López Obrador ’ s approval ratings are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , they are still high at 56 percent , and he may believe that his loyal supporter base will understand that he must placate the U.S. president—even if Trump is universally rejected by Mexicans .
López Obrador once predicted that Trump would intensify his vitriol against Mexico and Mexicans as the November 2020 U.S. election grew near .
Whether López Obrador was correct that Trump ’ s reelection strategy would fail remains to be seen .
But with a faltering economy and rising pandemic numbers , don ’ t expect López Obrador to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at the White House this week .

After more than 18 months in office without leaving the country on any official trips, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is finally venturing on his maiden voyage to Washington to mark the signing of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement. López Obrador’s attendance at Wednesday’s White House ceremony hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump has drawn widespread ire at home, where Trump’s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center .López Obrador’s attendance at Wednesday’s White House ceremony has drawn widespread ire at home, where Trump’s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center. Critics have denounced the trip as a “ colossal error ” that will enable Trump to use López Obrador as a prop in his reelection campaign, with one prominent Mexican commentator going so far as to call it an act of “national treason.”
After more than 18 months in office without leaving the country on any official trips, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is finally venturing on his maiden voyage to Washington to mark the signing of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement. López Obrador’s attendance at Wednesday’s White House ceremony hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump has drawn widespread ire at home, where Trump’s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center.López Obrador’s attendance at Wednesday’s White House ceremony has drawn widespread ire at home, where Trump’s single-digit confidence rating is the lowest of any country surveyed by the Pew Research Center. Critics have denounced the trip as a “colossal error” that will enable Trump to use López Obrador as a prop in his reelection campaign, with one prominent Mexican commentator going so far as to call it an act of “national treason.”
Absent from the summit will be the third country that signed the new trade agreement. On Monday, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that he would not attend the meeting, citing coronavirus concerns and U.S. threats to impose new tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Canada.
López Obrador is already playing down the significance of the trip, and his foreign minister recently made it clear that the purpose of the visit will be limited to the signing of the trade agreement, which some are calling a mere update of the old NAFTA that Trump famously labeled as “perhaps the worst trade deal ever made.” But the success of López Obrador’s trip may depend on whether Trump noticed the many unflattering statements the now-Mexican president made about his host during his previous visits to the United States.
While running for president in 2017, López Obrador made several stops in the United States to campaign among the millions of Mexican nationals living there but able to vote back home. Not only did he strike a defiant tone at these rallies in response to Trump’s broadsides against Mexicans as criminals and “rapists.” He also published a book aimed at these voters, titled Oye Trump (Listen, Trump), that includes such headings as “A Bankruptcy Called Trump” and assails the American president as someone with “racist contempt” for Mexicans. At a rally held hours after Trump’s January 2017 inauguration speech, López Obrador dismissed the speech as an affront to the “dignity” of Mexicans and a “vulgar threat to human rights.” He was even harsher a month later in Los Angeles, where he described Trump’s plans for a border wall as the work of “cunning and irresponsible neofascist leaders who … equate Mexicans and particularly our fellow migrants with the stigmatized and persecuted Jews of Hitler’s time.”
A veteran of three presidential campaigns and a former mayor of Mexico City, López Obrador understood that Trump’s tirades against Mexicans were more than just political rhetoric. “We should not underestimate the capacity of the current government officials in the United States; they are not fools,” he cautioned in the February 2017 speech. “Donald Trump’s angry discourse follows a cold and calculated political strategy.” And unlike many pundits in the United States, López Obrador was under no illusions that Trump would morph into Mexico’s amigo once in office. Instead, López Obrador predicted that Trump would drill down on his anti-immigrant message “because he won the presidency with words of hate and discrimination, [and] plans to use the same propaganda in government and [to] win reelection in 2020.” One month later in El Paso, however, López Obrador was doubtful that Trump’s anti-immigrant strategy would succeed the second time around, arguing that “a campaign of phobia against migrants and Mexicans” would not help him win reelection.
On the campaign trail, López Obrador promised direct confrontation with Donald Trump on social media. Referring to one of Trump’s anti-immigrant tirades, he assured Mexicans that Trump “is going to have to learn to respect us … every time he does what he did today, he will have a direct answer. … He uses his Twitter, his Facebook—I am going to use it too. And I’m going to say what I think.”
Once in office, however, López Obrador’s defiance subsided. When Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexican imports unless Mexico moved to block a group of migrants from Central America, López Obrador sidestepped questions and said he preferred “love and peace,” but nonetheless sent the Mexican National Guard to the Guatemalan border to keep migrants from crossing north. Mexico also agreed to implement the U.S. government’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, which deports asylum-seekers to makeshift camps on the Mexican side of the border while waiting for their petitions to be heard. To many Mexicans, López Obrador’s willingness to enforce Washington’s immigration edicts meant that “Mexico has agreed to become Trump’s wall,” as one Mexican commentator put it.To many Mexicans, López Obrador’s willingness to enforce Washington’s immigration edicts meant that “Mexico has agreed to become Trump’s wall,” as one commentator put it. Trump recently referred to his Mexican counterpart as “a great guy.”
López Obrador does not come to Washington in a position of strength. His administration stumbled in its initial response to the coronavirus, which is now ravaging the country even as health officials acknowledge severe undercounting of confirmed cases. In June, Mexican health officials proclaimed that the pandemic was “under control” and would run its course later that month. More than 32,000 deaths later and with numbers still rising, last week Mexico overtook France as the country with the fifth-most total fatalities in the world. To make matters worse, Mexico has the world’s highest rate of positive coronavirus tests, a sign that not enough tests are being administered.
López Obrador came into office promising to grow the economy by 4 percent annually, create over 2 million paid apprenticeships for young people, and reduce crime while avoiding the bloody confrontations of his predecessors. However, the country’s gross domestic product was virtually flat during his first year, and in April alone, more jobs were lost than were created in all of 2019. The national oil company’s bonds are rated “junk,” crime is on the rise, and the government is embroiled in several disputes with local and foreign investors. The International Monetary Fund recently predicted that Mexico’s economy will shrink by 10.5 percent in 2020. In the current crisis, the United States, which buys over three-quarters of Mexican exports, is Mexico’s critical lifeline. Unlike the recently reelected Trudeau, López Obrador still has more than four years left of his six-year term and cannot afford to alienate Trump. And although López Obrador’s approval ratings are at the lowest point in his tenure, they are still high at 56 percent, and he may believe that his loyal supporter base will understand that he must placate the U.S. president—even if Trump is universally rejected by Mexicans.
López Obrador once predicted that Trump would intensify his vitriol against Mexico and Mexicans as the November 2020 U.S. election grew near. Whether López Obrador was correct that Trump’s reelection strategy would fail remains to be seen. But with a faltering economy and rising pandemic numbers, don’t expect López Obrador to bring up his old grievances with Trump at the White House this week.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--Why India and Russia Are Going to Stay Friends

In December 1971 , India and Pakistan fought for 13 days—one of the shortest wars in history—over the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan , now Bangladesh .
India had , for months , been trying to convince the world that West Pakistan ’ s subjugation of East Pakistan was an emergency .
Refugees from East Pakistan were pouring into India , and the situation would only be improved with a resolution of the political predicament between West and East Pakistan .
The Soviet Union was the only country that listened .
In August of that year , Indian Prime Minister @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Peace , Friendship and Cooperation .
Gandhi had held off on completing the agreement for domestic political reasons ; she had not wanted to give fodder to those political opponents who accused her of being too cozy with the Soviet Union .
But international concerns were soon more pressing : With the signing of the treaty , the Soviet Union provided India both the diplomatic and arms support it needed for the war Gandhi knew was coming , helping India over Pakistan .
While the world in 2020 is in many ways changed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the India-Russia relationship today .
Moscow was a reliable partner for New Delhi when no one else was .
And the United States , meanwhile , actively ignored India ’ s pleas to deal with the situation in East Pakistan : President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered Pakistan a key go-between in opening relations with China .
Even today , in 2020 , it is Moscow that organized a trilateral meeting among the foreign ministers of Russia , India , and China on June 23 , bringing New @ @ @ @ @ @ @ between their countries ’ armed forces in the Galwan Valley in the disputed territory of Ladakh .
Once again , amid an increasingly tense international problem , Moscow has stepped in .
And what ’ s more , Russia assured India that , on New Delhi ’ s request , it would deliver new defense equipment in two to three months .
While the world in 2020 is in many ways changed from that time , 1971 looms large in the India-Russia relationship today .
There are some who see Moscow ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ memory .
While the Indian government maintains that it must have good relations with both the United States and Russia , there are others in India today who insist its future is solely , or at least primarily , with the United States .
The “ best ” and “ most substantive ” relationship that India has is with the United States , said C. Raja Mohan , the director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore .
India “ is not going to sacrifice that to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to the Russians.
’ ” Certainly , that U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s secretaries of state , Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo , both gave major speeches about India and the Indo-Pacific early on in their tenures suggests that India is important to the United States ; that Trump went to India in February of this year on a visit that was heavy on ceremony ( if light on substance ) suggests the same .
But being friendly with Washington does not mean New Delhi can ’ t maintain important ties with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but India and Russia have found ways for their relationship to hold firm , standing steady for each other at times when the rest of the world wouldn ’ t , maintaining largely consistent foreign policies despite changing leaderships , and refusing to bury a historic partnership .
“ The Russians , ” said the New Delhi-based defense journalist Saurabh Joshi , “ are in the best position they ’ ve been in in this town since the fall of the Soviet Union.
” But the former Indian diplomat Ronen Sen , who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1968 and 1985 and was the ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1992 to 1998 , said that the country with which India had a common ideology—or was expected to have shared values and views that go along with it—was the United States .
“ The expectations , ” he said , “ were higher on both sides.
” That , by extension , meant that the frustrations when those expectations were not met were more deeply felt , too .
The Soviet Union , meanwhile , was exceeding expectations it was never @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its first nuclear tests in the 1970s , it created tensions with the United States ; while Washington disapproved of New Delhi ’ s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons , Indian diplomats resented their American counterparts ’ lecturing .
The Soviet Union , by comparison , publicly stressed the tests ’ peaceful nature , though historical records show the Soviets privately tried to persuade India not to go ahead with them .
The Soviet Union did not just provide tacit support for , or at least less vocal disapproval of , India ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ build out India ’ s defense force .
Historians describe India as having been “ addicted ” to Soviet defense machinery in the 1970s and 1980s .
And the addiction came at little cost : Soviet machinery was often bought on credit .
India mattered quite a lot to the Soviet Union , which considered it more consistently than the United States did .
There was also the reality that India mattered quite a lot to the Soviet Union , which considered it more consistently than the United States did .
While there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States decided to pay attention to India , they were sporadic and need-based ; the Soviet Union ’ s focus was sustained .
That not one but two chapters of the second volume of The Mitrokhin Archive , a look at the KGB files and plans from Soviet times , is dedicated to India suggests just how important Delhi was to Moscow .
Famously , the conspiracy theory that the CIA created the HIV/AIDS epidemic was planted by Moscow in an Indian newspaper .
There was also the added bonus that India and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ morals on one another .
India , which was quick to point out the evils and ills of Western imperialism , held its tongue when the Soviet Union quashed the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and again when it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 .
But the Soviet Union more than repaid India for its relative quiet .
It backed India on Kashmir , the status of which India and Pakistan have disputed since their independence in 1947 .
“ Since the 1950s , the Russian position on Kashmir has been the key driving force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former Indian ambassador to Kyrgyzstan .
When China or , until more recently , the United States might have censured India over Kashmir at the United Nations , the Soviet Union ( and now Russia ) could use its veto to protect India .
And it did .
In 1957 , 1962 , and 1971 , the Soviet Union was the only country to veto resolutions seeking U.N. intervention over Kashmir ; in the summer of 2019 , when India revoked Kashmir ’ s special status and plunged the state into lockdown and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ first to describe it as an internal matter .
But there are a few ways in which this story—of a lost decade between India and Russia—is incomplete .
The reality is that India , which used Russian arms and weaponry for its Army , Navy , and Air Force , needed the Russian defense industry—and essentially kept it afloat during Russia ’ s chaotic transition .
And though people-to-people contacts and cultural connections were not what they were in the Soviet years , there were some families and businesses—for example , the Khemka @ @ @ @ @ @ @ do business in Russia and with Russians , and that are still working in Russia today .
Indian pharmaceuticals , for example , found a sizable market in Russia : In 2000 , India was the second-largest exporter of drugs to Russia behind Germany .
Overall , however , it is fair to say the trade relationship between the two countries declined .
While Russia ranked as the top destination for Indian exports in 1990 , by 2015 , it was not even among the top 30 countries India exported to .
There @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that could not be discounted , which was that in 1998 India conducted a second round of nuclear tests .
That year , after the tests , relations between India and the United States cooled yet again .
Russia , by comparison , accepted which way the wind was blowing and , with it , the idea of a nuclear India .
It was Russian President Vladimir Putin who , by all accounts , made clear to Delhi that the road to India being accepted as a nuclear power ran through Washington .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did indeed complete a civil nuclear deal , a major milestone in U.S.-Indian relations .
But the real beneficiary of that deal , said Asoke Mukerji , a former permanent representative of India to the United Nations , was Russia : Moscow , and not Washington , has worked with New Delhi on the construction of nuclear reactors and has plans to build more .
Critically , Russia leases India its only nuclear attack submarine .
According to the defense journalist and former Indian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as Russia is the only country willing to do so—and is the only one willing to provide India crucial technologies that go into building its own line of nuclear missile submarines—the India-Russia relationship will continue .
The same is true for the defense relationship more broadly .
While India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has diversified the sources of its arms and defense procurements—such as a recent $ 3 billion deal with the United States following Trump ’ s visit in February—it still counts on Russia for a reported 60 percent of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from Russia for the future .
In 2018 , Putin and Modi appeared to careful observers to recommit to the relationship with an informal summit in the Russian city of Sochi .
Both because it wanted a missile defense system and to make a point to the United States , India approved a purchase of Russia ’ s S-400 missile defense system that year , blocking off the opportunity to buy other equipment from the United States because , as the White House put it , “ the [ American ] F-35 can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.
” That was a risk .
New Delhi decided it was a risk worth taking .
The same can not be said for the United States .
Even with Trump at the helm , many in the United States advance criticisms on human rights in India .
Rep. Ilhan Omar , a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives , has been critical of India ’ s actions in and on Kashmir .
Rep. Pramila Jayapal has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Jaishankar , India ’ s external affairs minister , refused to meet with Jayapal and the House Foreign Affairs Committee , saying he had “ no interest in meeting her.
” And despite Modi and Trump ’ s professed affinity for each other , some Republicans , including Sens .
Lindsey Graham and Todd Young , have criticized what they see as human rights violations in Modi ’ s India .
Russia , by comparison , has no prominent politician ( save , perhaps , Chechnya ’ s mini-dictator Ramzan Kadyrov ) who @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kashmir and the treatment of Muslims in India internal matters ; it will defend India at the U.N. Security Council .
And so the relationship will endure .
And there are , if not large trade numbers , then particular industries such as energy in which India and Russia can work together .
And perhaps the sector most emblematic of the India-Russia relationship is the diamond trade , a unique situation and opportunity—diamond mining in the far east—where only Russians and Indians can help one another .
The diamonds are in the Russian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ how to polish them are in India .
( Ninety percent of the world ’ s diamonds pass through India—and specifically through Modi ’ s home state of Gujarat—for exactly that reason . )
Further , and most importantly , while the trade partnership continues to not be what either side would want , you can ’ t measure Russia ’ s importance in terms of the business value .
“ When they say Russia is not so important , they are not looking at a world map , ” said P.S .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russia .
“ Geography dictates good relations , ” he said .
“ America is a distant power.
” And one could add that the United States , despite its ongoing military cooperation with Australia , India , and Japan as part of the so-called Quad , is an ally whose security umbrella may get diverted by other preoccupations .
Neither India—nor Russia , for that matter—wants to be a junior partner to China or the United States .
And one way that they can try to avoid that outcome is to remind @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the rest of the world , that they can turn back to and bolster each other .
India , following recent tensions with China , may want to turn more fully to the United States .
But if past is prologue and the present is any indication , it will not give up on its ties with Russia .
The year is not 1971 .
The relationship may not be as robust as it once was or as all-consuming as it once was—and , certainly , defense expenditures and even cultural ties between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But the rest of the world is not in 1971 , either .
There ’ s the United States under Trump and an increasingly aggressive China .
And neither India nor Russia needs it to be 1971 to remain to each other now what they were then : of consistently unique use .

Listen to this article
In December 1971, India and Pakistan fought for 13 days—one of the shortest wars in history—over the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. India had, for months, been trying to convince the world that West Pakistan’s subjugation of East Pakistan was an emergency. Refugees from East Pakistan were pouring into India, and the situation would only be improved with a resolution of the political predicament between West and East Pakistan.
The Soviet Union was the only country that listened. In August of that year, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Gandhi had held off on completing the agreement for domestic political reasons; she had not wanted to give fodder to those political opponents who accused her of being too cozy with the Soviet Union. But international concerns were soon more pressing: With the signing of the treaty, the Soviet Union provided India both the diplomatic and arms support it needed for the war Gandhi knew was coming, helping India over Pakistan.
While the world in 2020 is in many ways changed from that time, 1971 looms large in the India-Russia relationship today. Moscow was a reliable partner for New Delhi when no one else was. And the United States, meanwhile, actively ignored India’s pleas to deal with the situation in East Pakistan: President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered Pakistan a key go-between in opening relations with China.
Even today, in 2020, it is Moscow that organized a trilateral meeting among the foreign ministers of Russia, India, and China on June 23, bringing New Delhi and Beijing together following deadly clashes between their countries’ armed forces in the Galwan Valley in the disputed territory of Ladakh. Once again, amid an increasingly tense international problem, Moscow has stepped in. And what’s more, Russia assured India that, on New Delhi’s request, it would deliver new defense equipment in two to three months.
While the world in 2020 is in many ways changed from that time, 1971 looms large in the India-Russia relationship today.
There are some who see Moscow’s importance as little more than a fond memory. While the Indian government maintains that it must have good relations with both the United States and Russia, there are others in India today who insist its future is solely, or at least primarily, with the United States.
The “best” and “most substantive” relationship that India has is with the United States, said C. Raja Mohan, the director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. India “is not going to sacrifice that to say, ‘I was once married to the Russians.’” Certainly, that U.S. President Donald Trump’s secretaries of state, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, both gave major speeches about India and the Indo-Pacific early on in their tenures suggests that India is important to the United States; that Trump went to India in February of this year on a visit that was heavy on ceremony (if light on substance) suggests the same.
But being friendly with Washington does not mean New Delhi can’t maintain important ties with Moscow. The world has changed, but India and Russia have found ways for their relationship to hold firm, standing steady for each other at times when the rest of the world wouldn’t, maintaining largely consistent foreign policies despite changing leaderships, and refusing to bury a historic partnership.
“The Russians,” said the New Delhi-based defense journalist Saurabh Joshi, “are in the best position they’ve been in in this town since the fall of the Soviet Union.”
The India-Russia relationship did not begin in 1971. Moscow and Delhi had been strengthening ties, with some interruptions and hiccups, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union provided development assistance in the post-Stalin 1950s and military assistance in the 1960s, said Anuradha Chenoy, a Russia expert and former dean of the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. That Nehru, India’s first prime minister, envisioned his country as noncapitalist and at least partially socialist helped too, she said.
But the former Indian diplomat Ronen Sen, who served twice in the Soviet Union between 1968 and 1985 and was the ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1992 to 1998, said that the country with which India had a common ideology—or was expected to have shared values and views that go along with it—was the United States. “The expectations,” he said, “were higher on both sides.” That, by extension, meant that the frustrations when those expectations were not met were more deeply felt, too.
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was exceeding expectations it was never meant to meet. When India conducted its first nuclear tests in the 1970s, it created tensions with the United States; while Washington disapproved of New Delhi’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, Indian diplomats resented their American counterparts’ lecturing. The Soviet Union, by comparison, publicly stressed the tests’ peaceful nature, though historical records show the Soviets privately tried to persuade India not to go ahead with them.
A crater marks the site of the first Indian underground nuclear test, conducted May 18, 1974, at Pokhran in the desert state of Rajasthan.
The Soviet Union did not just provide tacit support for, or at least less vocal disapproval of, India’s nuclear program. It also helped build out India’s defense force. Historians describe India as having been “addicted” to Soviet defense machinery in the 1970s and 1980s. And the addiction came at little cost: Soviet machinery was often bought on credit.
India mattered quite a lot to the Soviet Union, which considered it more consistently than the United States did.
There was also the reality that India mattered quite a lot to the Soviet Union, which considered it more consistently than the United States did. While there might have been moments where the United States decided to pay attention to India, they were sporadic and need-based; the Soviet Union’s focus was sustained. That not one but two chapters of the second volume of The Mitrokhin Archive, a look at the KGB files and plans from Soviet times, is dedicated to India suggests just how important Delhi was to Moscow. Famously, the conspiracy theory that the CIA created the HIV/AIDS epidemic was planted by Moscow in an Indian newspaper.
There was also the added bonus that India and the Soviet Union did not impose their morals on one another. India, which was quick to point out the evils and ills of Western imperialism, held its tongue when the Soviet Union quashed the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and again when it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the Soviet Union more than repaid India for its relative quiet. It backed India on Kashmir, the status of which India and Pakistan have disputed since their independence in 1947.
“Since the 1950s, the Russian position on Kashmir has been the key driving force,” said Phunchok Stobdan, a former Indian ambassador to Kyrgyzstan. When China or, until more recently, the United States might have censured India over Kashmir at the United Nations, the Soviet Union (and now Russia) could use its veto to protect India. And it did. In 1957, 1962, and 1971, the Soviet Union was the only country to veto resolutions seeking U.N. intervention over Kashmir; in the summer of 2019, when India revoked Kashmir’s special status and plunged the state into lockdown and an information blackout, Russia was the first to describe it as an internal matter.
The INS Vikramaditya, a modified former Kiev-class aviation aircraft carrier, is seen at the Sevmash shipyard June 15, 2010, in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk. The ship was commissioned in 1987; however, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it went inactive in 1991. In 2004, an agreement was signed with India to commission and transfer the ship to the Indian Navy, which occurred in 2013-2014.
In the 1990s, the story goes, times changed. The Soviet Union dissolved, and the Russian Federation was more interested, at least for most of a decade, with looking west than with developing its special relationship with India. And India, which was undertaking major fiscal reforms and opening up its economy, was looking to the United States again, too.
But there are a few ways in which this story—of a lost decade between India and Russia—is incomplete. The reality is that India, which used Russian arms and weaponry for its Army, Navy, and Air Force, needed the Russian defense industry—and essentially kept it afloat during Russia’s chaotic transition. And though people-to-people contacts and cultural connections were not what they were in the Soviet years, there were some families and businesses—for example, the Khemka family of the SUN Group—that managed to do business in Russia and with Russians, and that are still working in Russia today. Indian pharmaceuticals, for example, found a sizable market in Russia: In 2000, India was the second-largest exporter of drugs to Russia behind Germany. Overall, however, it is fair to say the trade relationship between the two countries declined. While Russia ranked as the top destination for Indian exports in 1990, by 2015, it was not even among the top 30 countries India exported to.
There was, of course, another reality that could not be discounted, which was that in 1998 India conducted a second round of nuclear tests. That year, after the tests, relations between India and the United States cooled yet again. Russia, by comparison, accepted which way the wind was blowing and, with it, the idea of a nuclear India.
It was Russian President Vladimir Putin who, by all accounts, made clear to Delhi that the road to India being accepted as a nuclear power ran through Washington. And, in 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did indeed complete a civil nuclear deal, a major milestone in U.S.-Indian relations.
But the real beneficiary of that deal, said Asoke Mukerji, a former permanent representative of India to the United Nations, was Russia: Moscow, and not Washington, has worked with New Delhi on the construction of nuclear reactors and has plans to build more.
Critically, Russia leases India its only nuclear attack submarine. According to the defense journalist and former Indian Army colonel Ajai Shukla, as long as Russia is the only country willing to do so—and is the only one willing to provide India crucial technologies that go into building its own line of nuclear missile submarines—the India-Russia relationship will continue.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (left) and U.S. President Donald Trump arrive for a joint press conference in New Delhi on Feb. 25.
The same is true for the defense relationship more broadly. While India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has diversified the sources of its arms and defense procurements—such as a recent $3 billion deal with the United States following Trump’s visit in February—it still counts on Russia for a reported 60 percent of its supplies. And India is still buying from Russia for the future. In 2018, Putin and Modi appeared to careful observers to recommit to the relationship with an informal summit in the Russian city of Sochi. Both because it wanted a missile defense system and to make a point to the United States, India approved a purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system that year, blocking off the opportunity to buy other equipment from the United States because, as the White House put it, “the [American] F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” That was a risk. New Delhi decided it was a risk worth taking.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin confer on a boat in the Black Sea on May 21, 2018.
Russia, one is told time and again in India, is a dependable partner. It will not pursue policy that will drag India into conflict. It will not, say, kill an Iranian general without bothering to so much as pick up the phone to let New Delhi know. (That it, say, annexed Crimea is of less concern to New Delhi, which did not issue a statement against the move back in 2014.) It will not change its foreign policy with each new president, because it will not have new presidents, and Russia will hold its tongue when it comes to what India regards as its internal affairs.
The same cannot be said for the United States. Even with Trump at the helm, many in the United States advance criticisms on human rights in India. Rep. Ilhan Omar, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, has been critical of India’s actions in and on Kashmir. Rep. Pramila Jayapal has been, too—as a result, S. Jaishankar, India’s external affairs minister, refused to meet with Jayapal and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, saying he had “no interest in meeting her.” And despite Modi and Trump’s professed affinity for each other, some Republicans, including Sens. Lindsey Graham and Todd Young, have criticized what they see as human rights violations in Modi’s India.
U.S. Reps. Ilhan Omar (right) and Pramila Jayapal attend an Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation subcommittee hearing in Washington on Oct. 22, 2019. Omar and Jayapal have been critical of India’s actions in and on Kashmir.
Russia, by comparison, has no prominent politician (save, perhaps, Chechnya’s mini-dictator Ramzan Kadyrov) who would criticize India. Russia will call Kashmir and the treatment of Muslims in India internal matters; it will defend India at the U.N. Security Council. And so the relationship will endure.
And there are, if not large trade numbers, then particular industries such as energy in which India and Russia can work together. And perhaps the sector most emblematic of the India-Russia relationship is the diamond trade, a unique situation and opportunity—diamond mining in the far east—where only Russians and Indians can help one another. The diamonds are in the Russian far east; the people who know how to polish them are in India. (Ninety percent of the world’s diamonds pass through India—and specifically through Modi’s home state of Gujarat—for exactly that reason.)
Further, and most importantly, while the trade partnership continues to not be what either side would want, you can’t measure Russia’s importance in terms of the business value. “When they say Russia is not so important, they are not looking at a world map,” said P.S. Raghavan, another former Indian ambassador to Russia.
“Geography dictates good relations,” he said. “America is a distant power.” And one could add that the United States, despite its ongoing military cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan as part of the so-called Quad, is an ally whose security umbrella may get diverted by other preoccupations.
Neither India—nor Russia, for that matter—wants to be a junior partner to China or the United States. And one way that they can try to avoid that outcome is to remind China and the United States, and the rest of the world, that they can turn back to and bolster each other. India, following recent tensions with China, may want to turn more fully to the United States. But if past is prologue and the present is any indication, it will not give up on its ties with Russia.
The year is not 1971. The relationship may not be as robust as it once was or as all-consuming as it once was—and, certainly, defense expenditures and even cultural ties between the two are not what they were.
But the rest of the world is not in 1971, either. There’s the United States under Trump and an increasingly aggressive China. And neither India nor Russia needs it to be 1971 to remain to each other now what they were then: of consistently unique use.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-08--China Is NATO’s New Problem

China Is NATO’s New Problem

Over the past decade , Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars throughout Europe—buying up critical infrastructure and increasing Beijing ’ s political clout across the continent .
As Chinese firms , often with strong ties to the state and Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) , acquire parts of sensitive ports , pipelines , and telecommunication networks , China ’ s incursions into Europe ’ s security umbrella are drawing serious concern .
But NATO , long worried about Russia , has largely been silent on China .
Now , that is changing .
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Beijing ’ s “ bullying and coercion , ” underscoring how China ’ s rise is fundamentally shifting the global balance of power .
It ’ s apparent that NATO can no longer ignore the threat .
If the alliance hopes to remain competitive , it will need to develop a new strategy for dealing with Beijing .
First , NATO needs a common assessment of China ’ s hybrid threats—a mix of diplomatic , economic , security , information , and technological actions designed to quietly undermine democratic states and institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a traditional conflict .
While China ’ s conventional military threat in the Indo-Pacific is far from NATO ’ s borders , its hybrid activities are happening in the alliance ’ s own backyard .
Cyber-espionage , intellectual property theft , infiltration of critical infrastructure , debt manipulation , and disinformation are prime examples .
While these threats may seem to fall outside of NATO ’ s purview , they pose serious security risks for the alliance .
For instance , China ’ s desire to invest in Lithuania ’ s Klaipeda Port @ @ @ @ @ @ @ NATO on its surface .
But its investments have worrying strings attached that give China operating control over the infrastructure .
That control could decrease allies ’ willingness to move military forces—including sensitive technologies—through the port and its surrounding networks .
This could lead to disrupted planning and fewer military exercises , decreasing NATO ’ s ability to defend the Baltic States during a crisis with Russia .
This could also open the door for pragmatic collaboration between China and Russia to undermine trans-Atlantic security .
Allies need to forge a shared understanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small feat for countries that do not see eye to eye on China .
Some are even willing to ignore such vulnerabilities , due to economic benefits or disenchantment with trans-Atlantic institutions .
The United States has a critical role to play in getting allies on the same page and setting common goals for countering China ’ s hybrid activities .
Second , NATO needs to focus on public diplomacy .
NATO has an important role to play in the battle against the CCP ’ s global narratives , which Beijing promulgates through @ @ @ @ @ @ @ values on which the alliance is built—freedom , democracy , rule of law , and human rights—NATO should clearly communicate China ’ s violations of these principles and its propaganda efforts to cover them up .
( These include , among others , human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea . )
NATO should also enhance its outreach to key partners in the Indo-Pacific , such as Australia , Japan , New Zealand , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ important counterweights to Chinese influence in the region .
Effective public messaging also means getting serious about attributing the blame for attacks , as the European Commission recently did over Chinese disinformation around COVID-19 , to raise the pressure on Chinese officials .
Trans-Atlantic countries have struggled to shape China ’ s behavior because they can not prove malign intent or agree to call out Beijing for its subversive efforts .
Allies should develop clearer guidelines—what needs to be proved , by whom , and to what degree—to enable collective attribution .
NATO @ @ @ @ @ @ @ voice .
It should use that voice to demand transparency and change from China .
Third , the alliance should step up its counteroffensive .
China ’ s hybrid actions intentionally blur the lines between what is legally permissible , politically inappropriate , and downright escalatory .
This makes it difficult for leaders to determine appropriate responses , producing a reactionary approach thus far .
But an intensifying geostrategic competition has already begun .
To compete in this environment , the trans-Atlantic community needs a more proactive approach .
Rather than waiting for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ European port , allies should coordinate legislation to prevent the riskiest Chinese acquisitions .
And rather than waiting for more Chinese cyberintrusions , allies should collaborate on responsible , targeted offensive cyberactions .
Over time , this would help dissuade China from manipulating investments in critical infrastructure , conducting cyber-espionage , and other hybrid activities .
While adopting a more offensive posture remains controversial among certain allies , it is gaining traction across Europe and is strongly supported in Washington .
Although NATO , as a defensive alliance , should not implement such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the primary forum to coordinate actions among willing nations .
Fourth , NATO needs to deepen its cooperation with other key players , such as the European Union and the private sector .
Where NATO lacks the mandate and means , the EU and multinational businesses play critical roles in developing , implementing , and enforcing the legislation and financial incentives necessary to counter Chinese hybrid threats .
Complementary to that , NATO and its allies can focus on providing intelligence , defending cyberspace , developing capability targets for new technologies , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ resilience requirements for secure infrastructure , and bolstering deterrence .
Despite the political obstacles that impede more formal NATO-EU cooperation , allies should look to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki to bring together NATO and EU staff , national officials , and industry voices in one place to align their counter-hybrid policies for China .
The Chinese government ’ s manipulative efforts around the coronavirus have thrust China ’ s hybrid activities to the center of trans-Atlantic debates .
Policymakers need to seize the moment and respond @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” in Stoltenberg ’ s words .
NATO is first and foremost about its nations .
In the fight against China ’ s hybrid threats , these nations bring much more to the table than military power alone .
They have access to a broad range of tools—military , political , economic , technological , and information—which the alliance can use to its collective geopolitical advantage in the competition with China .
What NATO needs now is a strategy to leverage those tools in a coordinated manner .
That will go a long @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problem .
This piece is based on a forthcoming Atlantic Council report , “ A Strategic Concept for Countering Russian and Chinese Hybrid Threats .
”

Over the past decade, Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars throughout Europe—buying up critical infrastructure and increasing Beijing’s political clout across the continent. As Chinese firms, often with strong ties to the state and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), acquire parts of sensitive ports, pipelines, and telecommunication networks, China’s incursions into Europe’s security umbrella are drawing serious concern.
Over the past decade, Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars throughout Europe—buying up critical infrastructure and increasing Beijing’s political clout across the continent. As Chinese firms, often with strong ties to the state and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), acquire parts of sensitive ports, pipelines, and telecommunication networks, China’s incursions into Europe’s security umbrella are drawing serious concern.
But NATO, long worried about Russia, has largely been silent on China. Now, that is changing. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently called on the alliance to stand up to Beijing’s “bullying and coercion,” underscoring how China’s rise is fundamentally shifting the global balance of power. It’s apparent that NATO can no longer ignore the threat. If the alliance hopes to remain competitive, it will need to develop a new strategy for dealing with Beijing.
First, NATO needs a common assessment of China’s hybrid threats—a mix of diplomatic, economic, security, information, and technological actions designed to quietly undermine democratic states and institutions to Beijing’s benefit while avoiding a traditional conflict. While China’s conventional military threat in the Indo-Pacific is far from NATO’s borders, its hybrid activities are happening in the alliance’s own backyard. Cyber-espionage, intellectual property theft, infiltration of critical infrastructure, debt manipulation, and disinformation are prime examples. While these threats may seem to fall outside of NATO’s purview, they pose serious security risks for the alliance. For instance, China’s desire to invest in Lithuania’s Klaipeda Port may not look like a problem for NATO on its surface. But its investments have worrying strings attached that give China operating control over the infrastructure. That control could decrease allies’ willingness to move military forces—including sensitive technologies—through the port and its surrounding networks. This could lead to disrupted planning and fewer military exercises, decreasing NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States during a crisis with Russia. This could also open the door for pragmatic collaboration between China and Russia to undermine trans-Atlantic security.
Allies need to forge a shared understanding of these risks through information-sharing and dialogue—no small feat for countries that do not see eye to eye on China. Some are even willing to ignore such vulnerabilities, due to economic benefits or disenchantment with trans-Atlantic institutions. The United States has a critical role to play in getting allies on the same page and setting common goals for countering China’s hybrid activities.
Second, NATO needs to focus on public diplomacy. NATO has an important role to play in the battle against the CCP’s global narratives, which Beijing promulgates through hybrid activities. To defend the trans-Atlantic values on which the alliance is built—freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights—NATO should clearly communicate China’s violations of these principles and its propaganda efforts to cover them up. (These include, among others, human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea.) NATO should also enhance its outreach to key partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, which can serve as important counterweights to Chinese influence in the region. Effective public messaging also means getting serious about attributing the blame for attacks, as the European Commission recently did over Chinese disinformation around COVID-19, to raise the pressure on Chinese officials. Trans-Atlantic countries have struggled to shape China’s behavior because they cannot prove malign intent or agree to call out Beijing for its subversive efforts. Allies should develop clearer guidelines—what needs to be proved, by whom, and to what degree—to enable collective attribution. NATO is strongest when it speaks with one voice. It should use that voice to demand transparency and change from China.
Third, the alliance should step up its counteroffensive. China’s hybrid actions intentionally blur the lines between what is legally permissible, politically inappropriate, and downright escalatory. This makes it difficult for leaders to determine appropriate responses, producing a reactionary approach thus far. But an intensifying geostrategic competition has already begun. To compete in this environment, the trans-Atlantic community needs a more proactive approach. Rather than waiting for China to invest in the next major European port, allies should coordinate legislation to prevent the riskiest Chinese acquisitions. And rather than waiting for more Chinese cyberintrusions, allies should collaborate on responsible, targeted offensive cyberactions. Over time, this would help dissuade China from manipulating investments in critical infrastructure, conducting cyber-espionage, and other hybrid activities. While adopting a more offensive posture remains controversial among certain allies, it is gaining traction across Europe and is strongly supported in Washington. Although NATO, as a defensive alliance, should not implement such a counteroffensive, policymakers should leverage it as the primary forum to coordinate actions among willing nations.
Fourth, NATO needs to deepen its cooperation with other key players, such as the European Union and the private sector. Where NATO lacks the mandate and means, the EU and multinational businesses play critical roles in developing, implementing, and enforcing the legislation and financial incentives necessary to counter Chinese hybrid threats. Complementary to that, NATO and its allies can focus on providing intelligence, defending cyberspace, developing capability targets for new technologies, conducting exercises and contingency planning, informing resilience requirements for secure infrastructure, and bolstering deterrence. Despite the political obstacles that impede more formal NATO-EU cooperation, allies should look to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki to bring together NATO and EU staff, national officials, and industry voices in one place to align their counter-hybrid policies for China.
The Chinese government’s manipulative efforts around the coronavirus have thrust China’s hybrid activities to the center of trans-Atlantic debates. Policymakers need to seize the moment and respond by “using NATO more politically,” in Stoltenberg’s words. NATO is first and foremost about its nations. In the fight against China’s hybrid threats, these nations bring much more to the table than military power alone. They have access to a broad range of tools—military, political, economic, technological, and information—which the alliance can use to its collective geopolitical advantage in the competition with China. What NATO needs now is a strategy to leverage those tools in a coordinated manner. That will go a long way in solving NATO’s China problem.
This piece is based on a forthcoming Atlantic Council report, “A Strategic Concept for Countering Russian and Chinese Hybrid Threats.”