foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--In Death Suleimani May Achieve His Life’s Dream: Preserving Iranian Power in Iraq

In Death Suleimani May Achieve His Life ’ s Dream : Preserving Iranian Power in Iraq BAGHDAD—Early Sunday morning , Sarkawt Shams , a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament , received a text on his phone from the political bureau of the Kataib Hezbollah militia , which had just lost its leader to a U.S. drone strike .
The parliament was due to vote on whether to expel U.S. troops from Iraq following the U.S. assassination of the Shiite militia leader , Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , and his ally Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani early Friday morning .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personal threat : Vote to oust the Americans or else .
“ They were saying either you are going to side with the people or you will be considered traitors and your houses will be burned , ” Shams said .
Shams ultimately stayed away , along with at least 150 other legislators who boycotted the vote .
But inside the parliament , the atmosphere resembled a political rally , with lawmakers chanting , “ Yes , yes Suleimani .
No , no America.
” The irony is that until U.S. President Donald @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Muhandis with a drone strike on Jan. 3 , Iran faced a serious threat to its influence inside Iraq in the form of thousands of Iraqis protesting against the corrupt politicians propped up by Tehran , often through Suleimani ’ s machinations .
The Iraqi protests had posed the greatest challenge to Iran ’ s influence over Iraq in years .
Mass outrage was mounting against leading politicians whom demonstrators accused of serving Iran before they served Iraq .
And so Suleimani may now be closer to achieving in death what he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a countermovement to the demonstrations , one that pivots Iraq back toward Iran and solidifies its political establishment .
Suleimani ’ s assassination by the Americans has provided a much-needed shot of legitimacy to Iraq ’ s unpopular—and Shiite-dominated—leadership , who have not only close links to Iran but also a vested interest in suppressing the domestic popular movement against them .
“ I think the assassination has given the Iran-aligned elements in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi political system what they ’ ve been looking for since October , namely a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way of creating counter-pressure to push back against the protests , ” said Fanar Haddad , a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute think tank .
Renad Mansour , a research fellow at Chatham House , another think tank , believes that in the coming days many of the pro-Iranian groups will try to use any new U.S. airstrikes to fuel anti-American sentiment .
Many of the mostly youthful protesters were raised in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion and have made clear that they support neither the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stop them from being branded with a pro-American brush .
“ There will be a purge I think—this is the biggest threat—of anti-establishment protesters or leaders and now they have the ammunition of using anti-Americanism , ” Mansour said .
“ So anyone who is critical of them they can just say is an American spy.
” Thus , for the first time since protests against the Iraqi government began late this past year , protesters find their demands for a new government have been sidelined into a desperate push against foreign interference @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran .
Now they hold up signs declaring they do not want Iraq to become a battleground , rather than ones with their demands for fair elections , education , and work opportunities .
“ This is impacting the protests in a very negative way , ” Haddad said .
“ It ’ s bumped them off the news cycle .
It ’ s created this counter issue .
It ’ s directly juxtaposed against what the protesters have been saying , at least where Iran is concerned.
” The U.S. airstrikes that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ condemned as a violation of Iraq ’ s sovereignty by almost every Iraqi leader , from acting Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to Iraq ’ s foremost cleric , Supreme Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani .
But some members of parliament such as Shams and many of his Sunni and Kurdish colleagues remain worried about the repercussions of expelling U.S. troops—especially the power vacuum it could cause , giving the Islamic State a chance to mount a resurgence in their home provinces .
Shams said he was outraged by the threats from Iran-affiliated groups such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we will not accept a threat , we didn ’ t accept it from Saddam [ Hussein ] , and we didn ’ t accept it from [ Islamic State leader Abu Bakr ] al-Baghdadi , and we will not accept it from anyone else.
” Ultimately , the parliament passed a nonbinding resolution recommending the government expel U.S. troops on Sunday afternoon .
The move does not actually require U.S. troops to leave , as that decision is in the hands of the Iraqi government , but Sajad Jiyad from the Al-Bayan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqi think tank , said he thinks “ the government is likely to press on , ” adding , “ If they can ’ t be protected and they risk violating sovereignty , it ’ s best for them to leave , because we don ’ t want to see things escalate in our country due to their presence.
” Late Monday night , U.S. troops seemed posed to do just that .
The noisy whir of helicopters filled the sky as security escort helicopters started to leave the Green Zone , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Iraqi Ministry of Defense saying that in compliance to the parliament it would be “ repositioning forces.
” In a chaotic series of events , Department of Defense officials later said the letter was a draft and U.S. forces would remain in Iraq .
Myles Caggins , the spokesperson for U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq , confirmed to Foreign Policy that the helicopters were indeed U.S. troops repositioning , although he did not give further details .
Now chaos and uncertainty reign over Iraq ’ s relationship with the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ closed ranks .
In mid-October 2019 , Suleimani reportedly met with top militia leaders in Baghdad and instructed them to increase attacks on U.S. targets .
He wanted to engineer anti-American sentiment to distract from the popular protests against Iranian-backed politicians and militia groups .
He hoped that these provocations would spark a U.S. military response , giving Iran the opportunity to try to shift the narrative and refocus public anger on America ’ s violation of Iraqi sovereignty .
While he was alive , these efforts largely failed .
Even after the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ late last month , protesters held steadfast to their demands of an independent Iraq and an end to corrupt governance .
“ What happened with the protests for the last few months is that they increasingly turned against the system , against the Hashd [ the mostly Shiite militias ] as part of that system , and against Iran as a foreign external backer of that system , ” said Chatham House ’ s Mansour .
The three months of massive popular protests also swept through southern Iraq , which is Shiite-dominated , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demanding an end to corruption and the ousting of the political elite .
Due to the entanglement among major political parties , politicians , and Iranian-power brokers such as Suleimani , many in Iraq ’ s protests saw Iran as the power behind the throne .
Protesters regularly chanted “ Iran , out , out , ” and held up signs with red Xs etched across the face of Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei .
Iran continues to hold great influence over the current government .
After Abdul-Mahdi announced late this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ prime minister , Suleimani flew to Iraq to help oversee the negotiations for his successor .
Many of the major political parties are supported by Iran , including the influential Fatah Alliance headed up by Hadi al-Amiri , the commander of the Badr Organization , another Iran-backed militia .
Protesters accuse the Iranian-aligned militias and politicians of using brutal campaign of kidnapping , torture , and assassinations to suppress Iraq ’ s popular demonstrations .
Suleimani himself helped engineer the crackdown , telling top officials , “ We in Iran know how to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ visit to Baghdad at the outbreak of the demonstrations .
“ Iran is responsible for interference in Iraq , they suppressed and created an agenda to steal from the country , ” said Mithal Alaa , a 35-year-old protester .
“ Those people destroyed everything through killing and arrests.
” The crackdown did not silence the protests , which continued for three months despite the killing of 500 people and the injuries of thousands more .
Now protesters are acutely aware of the attempts to co-opt their efforts , as well as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nasiriyah , Iran-backed militia supporters attempted to carry a symbolic coffin into the center of the city ’ s protests , but protesters prevented them .
In response , the militia supporters opened fire on demonstrators .
On the same day as the march on the U.S. Embassy , protesters issued a statement through loudspeakers in the square disassociating themselves from those actions and reasserting their commitment to peaceful protests .
But Suleimani ’ s killing has unquestionably united Iraq ’ s southern political elite and reignited the nationalist language that frames those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said that ahead of the parliamentary session , pro-Iranian members of parliament warned him that a vote against the U.S. withdrawal would be considered close to treason .
“ Our WhatsApp groups were saying we will publish all the names , whoever didn ’ t attend the session will be considered a traitor or someone working for foreign powers , ” Shams said .
Trump himself didn ’ t make things easier for the protesters when , in response to the Iraqi parliament ’ s resolution , he threatened sanctions on Iraq , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqis who remember the devastating sanctions of the 1990s .
“ We are so worried , we don ’ t want to be like before 2003 when we were isolated from the world , ” said Nour , a young activist in the street who didn ’ t want his full name used for fear of government retaliation .
“ It strikes me that at the moment America ’ s tools are all coercive , ” said Haddad , “ There ’ s the might of American military power , there ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But it strikes me that America is really lacking in soft power and political assets within Iraq.
” He added the Iranians , on the other hand , are leveraging their full arsenal of soft power .
“ They ’ re using their leverage in Iraqi politics to mobilize the Iraqi political classes in their favor in order to try and consolidate their control over Iraqi politics and marginalize the Americans to the greatest extent possible , ” Haddad said .
As repercussions of these massive geopolitical decisions ripple throughout the country @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they fought so hard for may get left behind .
A feat Suleimani was unable to engineer through crackdowns or attempts at infiltration may be caused by U.S. airstrikes that ended his life when he was barely out of the airport .
“ We just want our Iraq , ” Nour said .
“ I really worry about it .
I don ’ t want to lose my country again and travel to another .
After this revolution , after the biggest and strongest revolution that happened in Iraq , if Iran and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bad beliefs and stupid thinking … I will leave Iraq .
”

BAGHDAD—Early Sunday morning, Sarkawt Shams, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, received a text on his phone from the political bureau of the Kataib Hezbollah militia, which had just lost its leader to a U.S. drone strike. The parliament was due to vote on whether to expel U.S. troops from Iraq following the U.S. assassination of the Shiite militia leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and his ally Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani early Friday morning.
BAGHDAD—Early Sunday morning, Sarkawt Shams, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, received a text on his phone from the political bureau of the Kataib Hezbollah militia, which had just lost its leader to a U.S. drone strike. The parliament was due to vote on whether to expel U.S. troops from Iraq following the U.S. assassination of the Shiite militia leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and his ally Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani early Friday morning.
The text Shams received was an unmistakable and personal threat: Vote to oust the Americans or else. “They were saying either you are going to side with the people or you will be considered traitors and your houses will be burned,” Shams said.
Shams ultimately stayed away, along with at least 150 other legislators who boycotted the vote. But inside the parliament, the atmosphere resembled a political rally, with lawmakers chanting, “Yes, yes Suleimani. No, no America.” The irony is that until U.S. President Donald Trump violated Iraqi sovereignty by killing Suleimani and Muhandis with a drone strike on Jan. 3, Iran faced a serious threat to its influence inside Iraq in the form of thousands of Iraqis protesting against the corrupt politicians propped up by Tehran, often through Suleimani’s machinations. The Iraqi protests had posed the greatest challenge to Iran’s influence over Iraq in years. Mass outrage was mounting against leading politicians whom demonstrators accused of serving Iran before they served Iraq.
And so Suleimani may now be closer to achieving in death what he was unable to produce in life: a countermovement to the demonstrations, one that pivots Iraq back toward Iran and solidifies its political establishment. Suleimani’s assassination by the Americans has provided a much-needed shot of legitimacy to Iraq’s unpopular—and Shiite-dominated—leadership, who have not only close links to Iran but also a vested interest in suppressing the domestic popular movement against them.
“I think the assassination has given the Iran-aligned elements in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi political system what they’ve been looking for since October, namely a counter-cause, a counter-protest, and a way of creating counter-pressure to push back against the protests,” said Fanar Haddad, a senior research fellow at the Middle East Institute think tank.
Renad Mansour, a research fellow at Chatham House, another think tank, believes that in the coming days many of the pro-Iranian groups will try to use any new U.S. airstrikes to fuel anti-American sentiment. Many of the mostly youthful protesters were raised in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion and have made clear that they support neither the United States nor Iran, but that does not stop them from being branded with a pro-American brush.
“There will be a purge I think—this is the biggest threat—of anti-establishment protesters or leaders and now they have the ammunition of using anti-Americanism,” Mansour said. “So anyone who is critical of them they can just say is an American spy.”
Thus, for the first time since protests against the Iraqi government began late this past year, protesters find their demands for a new government have been sidelined into a desperate push against foreign interference from the United States as well as Iran. Now they hold up signs declaring they do not want Iraq to become a battleground, rather than ones with their demands for fair elections, education, and work opportunities.
“This is impacting the protests in a very negative way,” Haddad said. “It’s bumped them off the news cycle. It’s created this counter issue. It’s directly juxtaposed against what the protesters have been saying, at least where Iran is concerned.”
The U.S. airstrikes that killed Suleimani and Muhandis have been roundly condemned as a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty by almost every Iraqi leader, from acting Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi to Iraq’s foremost cleric, Supreme Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. But some members of parliament such as Shams and many of his Sunni and Kurdish colleagues remain worried about the repercussions of expelling U.S. troops—especially the power vacuum it could cause, giving the Islamic State a chance to mount a resurgence in their home provinces. Shams said he was outraged by the threats from Iran-affiliated groups such as Kataib Hezbollah: “We told them we will not accept a threat, we didn’t accept it from Saddam [Hussein], and we didn’t accept it from [Islamic State leader Abu Bakr] al-Baghdadi, and we will not accept it from anyone else.”
Ultimately, the parliament passed a nonbinding resolution recommending the government expel U.S. troops on Sunday afternoon. The move does not actually require U.S. troops to leave, as that decision is in the hands of the Iraqi government, but Sajad Jiyad from the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, an Iraqi think tank, said he thinks “the government is likely to press on,” adding, “If they can’t be protected and they risk violating sovereignty, it’s best for them to leave, because we don’t want to see things escalate in our country due to their presence.”
Late Monday night, U.S. troops seemed posed to do just that. The noisy whir of helicopters filled the sky as security escort helicopters started to leave the Green Zone, and the United States issued a statement to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense saying that in compliance to the parliament it would be “repositioning forces.” In a chaotic series of events, Department of Defense officials later said the letter was a draft and U.S. forces would remain in Iraq. Myles Caggins, the spokesperson for U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, confirmed to Foreign Policy that the helicopters were indeed U.S. troops repositioning, although he did not give further details.
Now chaos and uncertainty reign over Iraq’s relationship with the United States, while Iran-backed politicians appear to have closed ranks. In mid-October 2019, Suleimani reportedly met with top militia leaders in Baghdad and instructed them to increase attacks on U.S. targets. He wanted to engineer anti-American sentiment to distract from the popular protests against Iranian-backed politicians and militia groups. He hoped that these provocations would spark a U.S. military response, giving Iran the opportunity to try to shift the narrative and refocus public anger on America’s violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
While he was alive, these efforts largely failed. Even after the attack on the U.S. Embassy that began late last month, protesters held steadfast to their demands of an independent Iraq and an end to corrupt governance.
“What happened with the protests for the last few months is that they increasingly turned against the system, against the Hashd [the mostly Shiite militias] as part of that system, and against Iran as a foreign external backer of that system,” said Chatham House’s Mansour.
The three months of massive popular protests also swept through southern Iraq, which is Shiite-dominated, as young people poured into the streets demanding an end to corruption and the ousting of the political elite. Due to the entanglement among major political parties, politicians, and Iranian-power brokers such as Suleimani, many in Iraq’s protests saw Iran as the power behind the throne. Protesters regularly chanted “Iran, out, out,” and held up signs with red Xs etched across the face of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Iran continues to hold great influence over the current government. After Abdul-Mahdi announced late this past year he was stepping down as prime minister, Suleimani flew to Iraq to help oversee the negotiations for his successor. Many of the major political parties are supported by Iran, including the influential Fatah Alliance headed up by Hadi al-Amiri, the commander of the Badr Organization, another Iran-backed militia.
Protesters accuse the Iranian-aligned militias and politicians of using brutal campaign of kidnapping, torture, and assassinations to suppress Iraq’s popular demonstrations. Suleimani himself helped engineer the crackdown, telling top officials, “We in Iran know how to deal with protests,” during a visit to Baghdad at the outbreak of the demonstrations.
“Iran is responsible for interference in Iraq, they suppressed and created an agenda to steal from the country,” said Mithal Alaa, a 35-year-old protester. “Those people destroyed everything through killing and arrests.”
The crackdown did not silence the protests, which continued for three months despite the killing of 500 people and the injuries of thousands more. Now protesters are acutely aware of the attempts to co-opt their efforts, as well as the cost of keeping them independent. In Nasiriyah, Iran-backed militia supporters attempted to carry a symbolic coffin into the center of the city’s protests, but protesters prevented them. In response, the militia supporters opened fire on demonstrators.
On the same day as the march on the U.S. Embassy, protesters issued a statement through loudspeakers in the square disassociating themselves from those actions and reasserting their commitment to peaceful protests.
But Suleimani’s killing has unquestionably united Iraq’s southern political elite and reignited the nationalist language that frames those who are anti-Iran as pro-American. Shams said that ahead of the parliamentary session, pro-Iranian members of parliament warned him that a vote against the U.S. withdrawal would be considered close to treason. “Our WhatsApp groups were saying we will publish all the names, whoever didn’t attend the session will be considered a traitor or someone working for foreign powers,” Shams said.
Trump himself didn’t make things easier for the protesters when, in response to the Iraqi parliament’s resolution, he threatened sanctions on Iraq, something that brings back haunting memories to Iraqis who remember the devastating sanctions of the 1990s. “We are so worried, we don’t want to be like before 2003 when we were isolated from the world,” said Nour, a young activist in the street who didn’t want his full name used for fear of government retaliation.
“It strikes me that at the moment America’s tools are all coercive,” said Haddad, “There’s the might of American military power, there’s coercive economic measures that they can take. But it strikes me that America is really lacking in soft power and political assets within Iraq.”
He added the Iranians, on the other hand, are leveraging their full arsenal of soft power. “They’re using their leverage in Iraqi politics to mobilize the Iraqi political classes in their favor in order to try and consolidate their control over Iraqi politics and marginalize the Americans to the greatest extent possible,” Haddad said.
As repercussions of these massive geopolitical decisions ripple throughout the country, Iraqi protesters fear that the revolution they fought so hard for may get left behind. A feat Suleimani was unable to engineer through crackdowns or attempts at infiltration may be caused by U.S. airstrikes that ended his life when he was barely out of the airport.
“We just want our Iraq,” Nour said. “I really worry about it. I don’t want to lose my country again and travel to another. After this revolution, after the biggest and strongest revolution that happened in Iraq, if Iran and America restart war in Iraq with their bad beliefs and stupid thinking … I will leave Iraq.”


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--South Asia’s Shiites Are Eschewing Sectarianism

The targeted killing of Iran ’ s Quds Force commander , Qassem Suleimani , raises questions about the future of Shiite sectarianism .
The Quds Force specializes in unconventional warfare , and under Suleimani ’ s two decades of charismatic leadership , it commanded a network of Shiite militias responsible for propping up Bashar al-Assad ’ s brutal regime in Syria , fighting the Islamic State , and committing acts of terrorism .
In 2004 , King Abdullah of Jordan coined the term “ Shiite crescent ” to describe Iran ’ s influence across the Middle East .
But another @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Pakistan .
Its history suggests that the state-backed sectarianism of the Middle East is not inevitable .
Iranian influence on pan-Shiism is as much a product of regional fissures outside Iran as campaigns by the Islamic Republic .
The Shiites of the newly formed Pakistan found themselves partitioned from their former seminaries of Lucknow , and during the 1980s , Saddam Hussein ’ s regime blocked visas for students to attend the seminary in Najaf , Iraq , one of the most important Shiite sites .
These restrictions and Iranian scholarships enticed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But this influence has not translated into anti-state sentiments among Pakistan ’ s Shiites .
The tone was set early on when the then-president of the Pakistani Shiite political organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria ( TNFJ ) vehemently defended Pakistan against the leading questions of the Iranian press .
Life as a Shiite in Pakistan is not easy .
South Asia is home to an estimated 36-64 million Shiites—perhaps as many as 25 million in Pakistan alone .
Accounts of Shiite life in Pakistan frequently portray a minority under siege by Sunni extremists .
In 1988 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gilgit in the northeast of Pakistan and killed an estimated 400 people .
In 2012 , a bus headed toward Gilgit was stopped by armed men , and 20 Shiite passengers were executed on the spot .
The primarily Shiite Hazara ethnic group is the target of both sectarian and ethnic violence .
In 2003 , Sunni gunmen killed 53 people after opening fire on a Hazara mosque in Quetta , and in 2010 , a suicide bomber killed 56 people at a rally in the same city .
The violence afflicts Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , 30 Shiites in Karachi were killed by a suicide bomber during the holiday of Arbaeen.Iranian influence on pan-Shiism is as much a product of regional fissures outside Iran as campaigns by the Islamic Republic .
Most of this violence is perpetuated by nonstate actors , and the government has taken security measures to protect the population and reduce violence .
This was not always the case : In 1985 , during Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ’ s military dictatorship , 13 protesters were killed by Quetta police while demanding greater religious freedoms .
Still @ @ @ @ @ @ @ government regularly cuts cell-phone service across Pakistan ’ s urban centers on Shiite mourning days to prevent coordinated attacks , and the Hazara residents of Quetta ’ s Mariabad neighborhood face great danger whenever they leave their protected enclave because they are easily distinguished from the rest of the population .
Following the prevailing logic of prominent neoconservative groups in Washington that argue Iran seeks to “ export its revolutionary ideology , ” such violence should make Pakistan ’ s Shiites receptive to Tehran ’ s message .
However , individual Shiites play @ @ @ @ @ @ @ politics , and even Shiite movements have chosen to work within the system rather than against it .
This approach is supported by Tehran , which does not view Pakistan as a battleground against Western influence .
Historically , Shiites participated heavily in the Indian nationalist movement , including within the All-India Muslim League .
The founder of Pakistan himself , Muhammad Ali Jinnah , was born a Khoja Ismaili Shiite and converted to Twelver Shiism but concealed his sectarian identity from the public .
Other Shiite heads of state have included Pakistan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the martial law dictator Yahya Khan .
Former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo , who was discreet about his Shiite background , indirectly challenged Zia ’ s absolute authority and also helped walk back his ban on Shiite mourning ceremonies .
Lt. Gen. Nadeem Raza—a Shiite—currently serves as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and previously was commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy .
Lt. Gen. Asim Munir briefly served as director-general of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency in the early months of Prime Minister Imran Khan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ April 2019 visit to Iran .
Syeda Abida Hussain served as ambassador to the United States during the early 1990s , as relations grew tense over Pakistan ’ s nuclear program , and is also a Shiite .
In some parts of Pakistan , such as Jhang , Shiites are overrepresented among landed families , and violent terrorist groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan use resentment against feudal Shiite landlords to stoke sectarian flames .
Former Pakistan Peoples Party senator Faisal Raza Abidi is known for plastering posters around Karachi depicting his own name and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Symbols of Shiism , including its shrines , also imbue Sufi devotional songs that are popular in Pakistan .
But Shiite leaders at the apex of Pakistan ’ s government have proved unable to prevent the sporadic violence that afflicts their communities .
They remain constrained by a prevailing Pakistani patriotism that is deeply suspicious of ethnic or sectarian identity.Tehran … does not view Pakistan as a battleground against Western influence .
Arif Hussain al-Hussaini led the TNFJ during the 1980s .
Arguably the most politically ambitious TNFJ leader , he paid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1988 .
Today , the TNFJ is careful to support the military and focus blame on outside imperialist and sectarian forces when pointing to the violence that Shiites endure .
Community grievances are subsumed into those of Pakistan itself , even though a handful of regions and groups endure the brunt of violence .
Community activists risk accusations of dual loyalty , foreign sponsorship , or simply exaggeration , and addressing the hierarchy of economic , ethnic , and sectarian privilege remains a taboo .
Pakistan ’ s Shiites have not found advocates @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iran either .
Under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani , who manages Najaf ’ s seminaries , the grand ayatollahs who developed Shiite thought shed their national and ethnic identities in favor of a quietest scholarly approach , despite the tendency of some Western analysts to focus on their origins .
Grand Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi , who grew up in post-partition Pakistan , could have used his status in Najaf to advocate for Pakistan ’ s Shiites but chose the customary path of avoiding politics and maintains few connections to Pakistan .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khomeini , and later Ali Khamenei , took a far greater interest in the Levant than Pakistan ’ s Shiites .
Suleimani ’ s successor , Esmail Qaani , focused on Central and South Asia for much of his career but in the context of Afghanistan .
Tehran is the defender of Shiites under siege by its own enemies but is reluctant to challenge the sectarian violence that Shiites face in countries where warmer relations exist , such as Egypt and Pakistan .
Like their Saudi co-religionist , Hassan al-Saffar , who chose @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Riyadh , Pakistan ’ s Shiite clerics have prioritized efforts to compromise with larger Sunni society rather than challenge it , with mixed results .
Mass protests in 1980—partly supported by Iran—helped exempt Pakistan ’ s Shiites from paying their religious tax , or zakat , to Sunni institutions .
This concession was tempered by a constitutional provision prohibiting tabarra—the practice by some Shiites of publicly denouncing historical figures venerated in Sunni Islam .
But this restriction is easily circumvented by the use of metaphorical language .
For instance , one cleric @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ historical personalities ” and then compared them to brake “ pedals ” that should be stepped on .
Another preacher referred to the Sunni Caliph Uthman as a “ beggar ” rather than his conventional Sunni title of al-Ghani , or “ generous.
” But popular clerics such as Syed Jawad Naqvi—a major supporter of Iran ’ s theocracy—limit tabarra to focus on reconciliation , and Shiite clerics , or ulema , also sit on the Council of Islamic Ideology.If Iran ’ s ambitions were truly rooted in an ideological desire to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South Asia should be larger .
The relative integration of Pakistan ’ s Shiites into the greater society is partly a result of other sectarian conflicts .
First , an all-consuming focus on the Ahmadi sect shields Pakistan ’ s Shiites from the crosshairs of extremist groups .
Ahmadis are declared non-Muslims by the Second Amendment of Pakistan ’ s constitution ( due to their belief in a prophet after Mohammed ) and face open violence and discrimination .
Second , South Asia ’ s Shiites and the Barelvi order of Sunni Islam @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pakistan ’ s religious landscape , both practice syncretic versions of the faith that defies the purist inclinations of clerical elites .
In fact , Shiites and Barelvis both have faced similar attacks on shrines and gatherings to honor members of the Prophet Mohammed ’ s family , which the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sects view as heretical .
Pakistani views of Iran are not shaped by sectarian conflict , which protects its Shiite minority from being labeled a fifth column of Tehran as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain .
Approximately @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Iran , regardless of their sectarian affiliation , according to a 2013 Pew Research Center poll .
In comparison , 60 percent of Lebanese and 78 percent of Egyptians held an unfavorable view of Iran in the same poll .
Even Mian Tufail Mohammad , who served as emir of the Deobandi-influenced political movement Jamaat-e-Islami , praised the religiosity of Iran ’ s Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini after visiting in 1979 .
The case of Pakistan challenges explanations of sectarianism that focus on power competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yemen , Iraq , and Lebanon to become battlegrounds in the first place .
If Iran ’ s ambitions were truly rooted in an ideological desire to lead pan-Shiism , then its footprint in South Asia should be larger , but instead it focuses on filling power vacuums and supporting communities where the demographic balance favors Shiite mobilization that can provide a security buffer against Iran ’ s enemies .
In fact , in places where Iran sees no threat it often chooses to eschew sectarian messaging .
The influence of Pakistan ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Pakistani state also challenges the notion that sectarianism is a result of relative deprivation or that political representation alone by a particular group can shield it from the whims of the majority .
Policymakers should heed these experiences before applying foreign solutions to a localized problem in a post-Suleimani Middle East and South Asia .

The targeted killing of Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Suleimani, raises questions about the future of Shiite sectarianism. The Quds Force specializes in unconventional warfare, and under Suleimani’s two decades of charismatic leadership , it commanded a network of Shiite militias responsible for propping up Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria, fighting the Islamic State, and committing acts of terrorism. In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined the term “ Shiite crescent ” to describe Iran’s influence across the Middle East.
The targeted killing of Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Suleimani, raises questions about the future of Shiite sectarianism. The Quds Force specializes in unconventional warfare, and under Suleimani’s two decades of charismatic leadership, it commanded a network of Shiite militias responsible for propping up Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria, fighting the Islamic State, and committing acts of terrorism. In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined the term “Shiite crescent” to describe Iran’s influence across the Middle East.
But another important group has been overlooked—the Shiite population of Pakistan. Its history suggests that the state-backed sectarianism of the Middle East is not inevitable.
Iranian influence on pan-Shiism is as much a product of regional fissures outside Iran as campaigns by the Islamic Republic. The Shiites of the newly formed Pakistan found themselves partitioned from their former seminaries of Lucknow, and during the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s regime blocked visas for students to attend the seminary in Najaf, Iraq, one of the most important Shiite sites. These restrictions and Iranian scholarships enticed students to study in Iran instead. But this influence has not translated into anti-state sentiments among Pakistan’s Shiites. The tone was set early on when the then-president of the Pakistani Shiite political organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) vehemently defended Pakistan against the leading questions of the Iranian press.
Life as a Shiite in Pakistan is not easy. South Asia is home to an estimated 36-64 million Shiites—perhaps as many as 25 million in Pakistan alone. Accounts of Shiite life in Pakistan frequently portray a minority under siege by Sunni extremists. In 1988, Sunni militias burned Shiite villages in Gilgit in the northeast of Pakistan and killed an estimated 400 people. In 2012, a bus headed toward Gilgit was stopped by armed men, and 20 Shiite passengers were executed on the spot.
The primarily Shiite Hazara ethnic group is the target of both sectarian and ethnic violence. In 2003, Sunni gunmen killed 53 people after opening fire on a Hazara mosque in Quetta, and in 2010, a suicide bomber killed 56 people at a rally in the same city. The violence afflicts Pakistan’s largest cities: In 2009, 30 Shiites in Karachi were killed by a suicide bomber during the holiday of Arbaeen.Iranian influence on pan-Shiism is as much a product of regional fissures outside Iran as campaigns by the Islamic Republic.
Most of this violence is perpetuated by nonstate actors, and the government has taken security measures to protect the population and reduce violence. This was not always the case: In 1985, during Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorship, 13 protesters were killed by Quetta police while demanding greater religious freedoms. Still, the threat remains real: The government regularly cuts cell-phone service across Pakistan’s urban centers on Shiite mourning days to prevent coordinated attacks, and the Hazara residents of Quetta’s Mariabad neighborhood face great danger whenever they leave their protected enclave because they are easily distinguished from the rest of the population.
Following the prevailing logic of prominent neoconservative groups in Washington that argue Iran seeks to “export its revolutionary ideology,” such violence should make Pakistan’s Shiites receptive to Tehran’s message. However, individual Shiites play a prominent role in Pakistan’s politics, and even Shiite movements have chosen to work within the system rather than against it. This approach is supported by Tehran, which does not view Pakistan as a battleground against Western influence.
Historically, Shiites participated heavily in the Indian nationalist movement, including within the All-India Muslim League. The founder of Pakistan himself, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was born a Khoja Ismaili Shiite and converted to Twelver Shiism but concealed his sectarian identity from the public. Other Shiite heads of state have included Pakistan’s first president, Iskander Mirza, and the martial law dictator Yahya Khan. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, who was discreet about his Shiite background, indirectly challenged Zia’s absolute authority and also helped walk back his ban on Shiite mourning ceremonies.
Lt. Gen. Nadeem Raza—a Shiite—currently serves as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and previously was commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy. Lt. Gen. Asim Munir briefly served as director-general of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency in the early months of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government and accompanied him on his April 2019 visit to Iran. Syeda Abida Hussain served as ambassador to the United States during the early 1990s, as relations grew tense over Pakistan’s nuclear program, and is also a Shiite. In some parts of Pakistan, such as Jhang, Shiites are overrepresented among landed families, and violent terrorist groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan use resentment against feudal Shiite landlords to stoke sectarian flames.
Former Pakistan Peoples Party senator Faisal Raza Abidi is known for plastering posters around Karachi depicting his own name and Shiite symbols such as Karbala and Hussein. Symbols of Shiism, including its shrines, also imbue Sufi devotional songs that are popular in Pakistan. But Shiite leaders at the apex of Pakistan’s government have proved unable to prevent the sporadic violence that afflicts their communities. They remain constrained by a prevailing Pakistani patriotism that is deeply suspicious of ethnic or sectarian identity.Tehran … does not view Pakistan as a battleground against Western influence.
Arif Hussain al-Hussaini led the TNFJ during the 1980s. Arguably the most politically ambitious TNFJ leader, he paid for his boldness with an assassination in 1988. Today, the TNFJ is careful to support the military and focus blame on outside imperialist and sectarian forces when pointing to the violence that Shiites endure. Community grievances are subsumed into those of Pakistan itself, even though a handful of regions and groups endure the brunt of violence. Community activists risk accusations of dual loyalty, foreign sponsorship, or simply exaggeration, and addressing the hierarchy of economic, ethnic, and sectarian privilege remains a taboo.
Pakistan’s Shiites have not found advocates among the clerical elite of Iraq or Iran either. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who manages Najaf’s seminaries, the grand ayatollahs who developed Shiite thought shed their national and ethnic identities in favor of a quietest scholarly approach, despite the tendency of some Western analysts to focus on their origins. Grand Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi, who grew up in post-partition Pakistan, could have used his status in Najaf to advocate for Pakistan’s Shiites but chose the customary path of avoiding politics and maintains few connections to Pakistan. In Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and later Ali Khamenei, took a far greater interest in the Levant than Pakistan’s Shiites. Suleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, focused on Central and South Asia for much of his career but in the context of Afghanistan. Tehran is the defender of Shiites under siege by its own enemies but is reluctant to challenge the sectarian violence that Shiites face in countries where warmer relations exist, such as Egypt and Pakistan.
Like their Saudi co-religionist, Hassan al-Saffar, who chose to abandon resistance in favor of detente with Riyadh, Pakistan’s Shiite clerics have prioritized efforts to compromise with larger Sunni society rather than challenge it, with mixed results. Mass protests in 1980—partly supported by Iran—helped exempt Pakistan’s Shiites from paying their religious tax, or zakat, to Sunni institutions. This concession was tempered by a constitutional provision prohibiting tabarra—the practice by some Shiites of publicly denouncing historical figures venerated in Sunni Islam.
But this restriction is easily circumvented by the use of metaphorical language. For instance, one cleric in Karachi alluded to Sunni caliphs as “historical personalities” and then compared them to brake “pedals” that should be stepped on. Another preacher referred to the Sunni Caliph Uthman as a “beggar” rather than his conventional Sunni title of al-Ghani, or “generous.” But popular clerics such as Syed Jawad Naqvi—a major supporter of Iran’s theocracy—limit tabarra to focus on reconciliation, and Shiite clerics, or ulema, also sit on the Council of Islamic Ideology.If Iran’s ambitions were truly rooted in an ideological desire to lead pan-Shiism, then its footprint in South Asia should be larger.
The relative integration of Pakistan’s Shiites into the greater society is partly a result of other sectarian conflicts. First, an all-consuming focus on the Ahmadi sect shields Pakistan’s Shiites from the crosshairs of extremist groups. Ahmadis are declared non-Muslims by the Second Amendment of Pakistan’s constitution (due to their belief in a prophet after Mohammed) and face open violence and discrimination. Second, South Asia’s Shiites and the Barelvi order of Sunni Islam, the latter of which still dominates Pakistan’s religious landscape, both practice syncretic versions of the faith that defies the purist inclinations of clerical elites. In fact, Shiites and Barelvis both have faced similar attacks on shrines and gatherings to honor members of the Prophet Mohammed’s family, which the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sects view as heretical.
Pakistani views of Iran are not shaped by sectarian conflict, which protects its Shiite minority from being labeled a fifth column of Tehran as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Approximately two-thirds of Pakistanis hold a favorable view of Iran, regardless of their sectarian affiliation, according to a 2013 Pew Research Center poll. In comparison, 60 percent of Lebanese and 78 percent of Egyptians held an unfavorable view of Iran in the same poll. Even Mian Tufail Mohammad, who served as emir of the Deobandi-influenced political movement Jamaat-e-Islami, praised the religiosity of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini after visiting in 1979.
The case of Pakistan challenges explanations of sectarianism that focus on power competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran but ignore the conditions that allow countries like Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon to become battlegrounds in the first place. If Iran’s ambitions were truly rooted in an ideological desire to lead pan-Shiism, then its footprint in South Asia should be larger, but instead it focuses on filling power vacuums and supporting communities where the demographic balance favors Shiite mobilization that can provide a security buffer against Iran’s enemies. In fact, in places where Iran sees no threat it often chooses to eschew sectarian messaging.
The influence of Pakistan’s elite Shiites in the trajectory of the Pakistani state also challenges the notion that sectarianism is a result of relative deprivation or that political representation alone by a particular group can shield it from the whims of the majority. Policymakers should heed these experiences before applying foreign solutions to a localized problem in a post-Suleimani Middle East and South Asia.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Suleimani’s Killing Could Change the Middle East for the Better

Suleimani ’ s Killing Could Change the Middle East for the Better From the killing of al Qaeda head Osama bin Laden to the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi , assassinations of high-profile U.S. enemies have been hugely symbolic in recent years .
Their practical importance , though , has often been overstated .
But the strike that killed Qassem Suleimani , the commander of Iran ’ s Quds Force , an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) , is different .
It has the potential to change the Middle East in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the right strategy , for the better .
To understand why , it is important to acknowledge that Suleimani was no ordinary Iranian general : He was the standard-bearer for the Iranian regime ’ s violent and extremist ideology , someone who sought to turn Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ’ s Islamist utopian dream into reality .
From the moment Iran ’ s clerical establishment seized control of the Iranian people ’ s revolution in 1979 , the ayatollahs set their sights on exporting their militant brand of Islamism to other countries in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to create a pan-Shiite state , centered on Khomeini as the supreme authority of not just Iran but of all Muslims—a role enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic to this very day .
To achieve this , Khomeini ’ s followers came up with the idea of creating the Quds ( Jerusalem ) Force : an Islamic army dedicated to exporting the revolution and liberating Palestine through the destruction of Israel .
But the Quds Force would only come to real prominence when the son of peasant with blind loyalty to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khamenei , assumed its leadership in 1998 .
That person was Suleimani , an embodiment of Iran ’ s state-sanctioned Shiite Islamist ideology .
Suleimani was the architect of Iran ’ s extraterritorial activities—he was responsible for coordinating all terrorist plots linked to Iran ’ s regime , reaching as far afield as Thailand and Bulgaria—and the force behind the building of Tehran ’ s so-called Shiite crescent : an arc of Iranian influence stretching from Iraq to Syria through to southern Lebanon .
Only months before his death , the Quds Force @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the force had “ created a territorial link between the [ Shiite ] resistance , connecting Iran to Iraq , Syria , [ and ] Lebanon.
” Indeed , Iran ’ s current ascendency in the Middle East is inextricably linked to the Iranian general and his willingness to spill blood .
Over the course of two decades , Suleimani nurtured Shiite militancy from Baghdad to Beirut and strategized terrorism with a degree of finesse that bin Laden and Baghdadi could only ever have dreamt of .
In Iraq in 2003 , for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dictator Saddam Hussein , Suleimani and his associates worked tirelessly to recruit , radicalize , and organize young Shiite men into militias , loyal not to the Iraqi state but to Iran ’ s supreme leader .
Equipped with rockets and roadside bombs , they would kill hundreds and injure thousands of British and American troops .
Through the militias , the Iranian general was also able to begin cultivating a command and control relationship over Iraq .
Tehran ’ s sectarian agenda would bring Iraq to the brink of civil war and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic State in 2014 .
The biggest test to Suleimani ’ s career , however , would emerge in a land further from Iran ’ s borders : Syria .
Starting in 2011 , as millions of Syrians poured onto the streets against President Bashar al-Assad , the Quds Force general rushed to keep the dictator in power .
Under Assad , after all , Syria was the main artery through which Iran could arm and equip its militias .
The degree of unbridled violence it took to keep Assad in power @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syrians have died since .
It is therefore unsurprising that , after hearing about Suleimani ’ s demise , many Syrians flocked to the streets in celebration , chanting : “ Gone , gone , gone Suleimani … you are next Bashar.
” Suleimani took the form of a messianic warrior akin to a modern-day Imam Hussein .
Related to that conflict , despite Suleimani ’ s reputation as the man who helped defeat the Islamic State , in reality , the rise of the anti-Shiite militant group in Syria and Iraq was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ It enabled Tehran to justify its deep-rooted involvement abroad and gave a veneer of religious justification to the bloodshed it had caused .
Overnight , the IRGC and its Shiite foreign fighters , who had suppressed Sunni anti-Assad demonstrators , became “ defenders of the holy Shiite shrines ” from the threat of the Islamic State .
And Suleimani took the form of a messianic warrior akin to a modern-day Imam Hussein , the third divinely ordained infallible Shiite Imam , who rose against the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 680 and was martyred @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Shiite Islam .
This messianic veil , however , could not hide Tehran ’ s true agenda from the people who lived under the consequences of Iran ’ s actions .
In October 2019 , the Iraqi population took to the streets demanding an end to years of Iranian interference in their affairs while burning images of both Khamenei and Suleimani .
This turned out to be a step too far .
Just a day after protests erupted in Iraq , the Iranian general flew to Baghdad to order Iranian-backed militias to crack @ @ @ @ @ @ @ dead and more than 27,000 injured .
Only weeks later , in November 2019 , similar scenes would be repeated in Iran , where the IRGC would use unbridled force against anti-regime protesters , killing 1,500 in just two weeks of protest .
All this hints at why Suleimani ’ s death is so important .
Unlike bin Laden and Baghdadi , Suleimani was not leading jihad from some far away podium ; he was doing so on the battlefield as the operational mastermind .
From regular trips to Beirut to meet Hezbollah @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to and from Syria and Iraq , he spent time dictating strategic next steps and cultivating and mobilizing proxies for Tehran .
When the Syrian conflict erupted , Suleimani was already in prime position to leverage the militant networks he had built for more than a decade , applying a tested model he proved in Lebanon and Iraq .
Wanting to guarantee that the Islamic Revolution would live on beyond the confines of Iran ’ s borders , by the time of his death , Suleimani had created and armed militants in Syria @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Afghanistan , and Pakistan and even had his sights on sub-Saharan Africa .
His absence will not just be a loss for the regime in Iran but for those like Assad and Nasrallah , who in the past had relied on him for their survival .
Killing Suleimani was a high-risk gamble by the United States that marks a genuinely significant moment in the effort to clamp down on Iranian expansionism .
But it must be accompanied by a comprehensive strategy in order to be truly successful .
As a first step , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to unite around the common cause of containing Iran .
If they do not , when Iran responds—and it will—there is a danger that the two will only divide further , with Europe blaming Trump for Iran ’ s actions , not the Iranian regime itself—which is exactly what Tehran ’ s clerical establishment wants .
The British government has struck the right tone in explicitly blaming the rise in tensions on Suleimani and the Iranian regime ’ s “ menacing , destabilizing activities.
” Other European leaders must follow suit .
Meanwhile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ IRGC still stands .
Tehran will , of course , try to use what it calls Suleimani ’ s martyrdom as a way to galvanize its network of foreign fighters across the Middle East and radicalize them further .
That makes it all the more important for Europe and the United States to work collectively with regional partners to find ways of further constraining activities of the IRGC and its militias .
This means a joint assessment of the threat posed by Iran-backed militias is critical , as is a coherent strategy that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Suleimani has left behind .
While the focus must be to de-escalate tensions , it should be clear to both Washington and Europe that now is not the time to withdraw from the Middle East—doing so risks emboldening the IRGC and its militias .
Above all else , the West needs to prioritize the interests of the people of the region , who are the real victims of the Iranian regime ’ s bloodlust and militancy .
The stakes could not be higher , but the end of Suleimani ’ s reign of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a positive opportunity to bring change to the Middle East .

From the killing of al Qaeda head Osama bin Laden to the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, assassinations of high-profile U.S. enemies have been hugely symbolic in recent years. Their practical importance, though, has often been overstated.
From the killing of al Qaeda head Osama bin Laden to the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, assassinations of high-profile U.S. enemies have been hugely symbolic in recent years. Their practical importance, though, has often been overstated.
But the strike that killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is different. It has the potential to change the Middle East in fundamental ways—and, if followed through with the right strategy, for the better.
To understand why, it is important to acknowledge that Suleimani was no ordinary Iranian general: He was the standard-bearer for the Iranian regime’s violent and extremist ideology, someone who sought to turn Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamist utopian dream into reality.
From the moment Iran’s clerical establishment seized control of the Iranian people’s revolution in 1979, the ayatollahs set their sights on exporting their militant brand of Islamism to other countries in the Middle East. Their grand ambition was to create a pan-Shiite state, centered on Khomeini as the supreme authority of not just Iran but of all Muslims—a role enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic to this very day.
To achieve this, Khomeini’s followers came up with the idea of creating the Quds (Jerusalem) Force: an Islamic army dedicated to exporting the revolution and liberating Palestine through the destruction of Israel. But the Quds Force would only come to real prominence when the son of peasant with blind loyalty to Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, assumed its leadership in 1998. That person was Suleimani, an embodiment of Iran’s state-sanctioned Shiite Islamist ideology.
Suleimani was the architect of Iran’s extraterritorial activities—he was responsible for coordinating all terrorist plots linked to Iran’s regime, reaching as far afield as Thailand and Bulgaria—and the force behind the building of Tehran’s so-called Shiite crescent: an arc of Iranian influence stretching from Iraq to Syria through to southern Lebanon. Only months before his death, the Quds Force commander boasted about how under his leadership the force had “created a territorial link between the [Shiite] resistance, connecting Iran to Iraq, Syria, [and] Lebanon.” Indeed, Iran’s current ascendency in the Middle East is inextricably linked to the Iranian general and his willingness to spill blood. Over the course of two decades, Suleimani nurtured Shiite militancy from Baghdad to Beirut and strategized terrorism with a degree of finesse that bin Laden and Baghdadi could only ever have dreamt of.
In Iraq in 2003, for example, following the fall of Baathist dictator Saddam Hussein, Suleimani and his associates worked tirelessly to recruit, radicalize, and organize young Shiite men into militias, loyal not to the Iraqi state but to Iran’s supreme leader. Equipped with rockets and roadside bombs, they would kill hundreds and injure thousands of British and American troops. Through the militias, the Iranian general was also able to begin cultivating a command and control relationship over Iraq. Tehran’s sectarian agenda would bring Iraq to the brink of civil war and would later contribute to the rise of the Islamic State in 2014.
The biggest test to Suleimani’s career, however, would emerge in a land further from Iran’s borders: Syria. Starting in 2011, as millions of Syrians poured onto the streets against President Bashar al-Assad, the Quds Force general rushed to keep the dictator in power. Under Assad, after all, Syria was the main artery through which Iran could arm and equip its militias. The degree of unbridled violence it took to keep Assad in power was astounding; nearly half a million Syrians have died since. It is therefore unsurprising that, after hearing about Suleimani’s demise, many Syrians flocked to the streets in celebration, chanting: “Gone, gone, gone Suleimani … you are next Bashar.”
Suleimani took the form of a messianic warrior akin to a modern-day Imam Hussein.
Related to that conflict, despite Suleimani’s reputation as the man who helped defeat the Islamic State, in reality, the rise of the anti-Shiite militant group in Syria and Iraq was a godsend for the Iranian regime. It enabled Tehran to justify its deep-rooted involvement abroad and gave a veneer of religious justification to the bloodshed it had caused. Overnight, the IRGC and its Shiite foreign fighters, who had suppressed Sunni anti-Assad demonstrators, became “defenders of the holy Shiite shrines” from the threat of the Islamic State. And Suleimani took the form of a messianic warrior akin to a modern-day Imam Hussein, the third divinely ordained infallible Shiite Imam, who rose against the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 680 and was martyred in his quest to stand up for Shiite Islam.
This messianic veil, however, could not hide Tehran’s true agenda from the people who lived under the consequences of Iran’s actions. In October 2019, the Iraqi population took to the streets demanding an end to years of Iranian interference in their affairs while burning images of both Khamenei and Suleimani. This turned out to be a step too far. Just a day after protests erupted in Iraq, the Iranian general flew to Baghdad to order Iranian-backed militias to crack down on Iraqi protesters, leaving 500 dead and more than 27,000 injured. Only weeks later, in November 2019, similar scenes would be repeated in Iran, where the IRGC would use unbridled force against anti-regime protesters, killing 1,500 in just two weeks of protest.
All this hints at why Suleimani’s death is so important. Unlike bin Laden and Baghdadi, Suleimani was not leading jihad from some far away podium; he was doing so on the battlefield as the operational mastermind. From regular trips to Beirut to meet Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to his many expeditions to and from Syria and Iraq, he spent time dictating strategic next steps and cultivating and mobilizing proxies for Tehran. When the Syrian conflict erupted, Suleimani was already in prime position to leverage the militant networks he had built for more than a decade, applying a tested model he proved in Lebanon and Iraq. Wanting to guarantee that the Islamic Revolution would live on beyond the confines of Iran’s borders, by the time of his death, Suleimani had created and armed militants in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and even had his sights on sub-Saharan Africa. His absence will not just be a loss for the regime in Iran but for those like Assad and Nasrallah, who in the past had relied on him for their survival.
Killing Suleimani was a high-risk gamble by the United States that marks a genuinely significant moment in the effort to clamp down on Iranian expansionism. But it must be accompanied by a comprehensive strategy in order to be truly successful.
As a first step, Europe and the United States will need to unite around the common cause of containing Iran. If they do not, when Iran responds—and it will—there is a danger that the two will only divide further, with Europe blaming Trump for Iran’s actions, not the Iranian regime itself—which is exactly what Tehran’s clerical establishment wants. The British government has struck the right tone in explicitly blaming the rise in tensions on Suleimani and the Iranian regime’s “menacing, destabilizing activities.” Other European leaders must follow suit.
Meanwhile, Suleimani is gone, but the IRGC still stands. Tehran will, of course, try to use what it calls Suleimani’s martyrdom as a way to galvanize its network of foreign fighters across the Middle East and radicalize them further. That makes it all the more important for Europe and the United States to work collectively with regional partners to find ways of further constraining activities of the IRGC and its militias. This means a joint assessment of the threat posed by Iran-backed militias is critical, as is a coherent strategy that matches the scale of the problem that Suleimani has left behind. While the focus must be to de-escalate tensions, it should be clear to both Washington and Europe that now is not the time to withdraw from the Middle East—doing so risks emboldening the IRGC and its militias.
Above all else, the West needs to prioritize the interests of the people of the region, who are the real victims of the Iranian regime’s bloodlust and militancy. The stakes could not be higher, but the end of Suleimani’s reign of terror can and should be treated as a positive opportunity to bring change to the Middle East.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Iran’s Next Move May Be No Move

Iran’s Next Move May Be No Move

Iran ’ s Next Move May Be No Move At the funeral of Qassem Suleimani on Monday , Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wept openly , and Suleimani ’ s deputy , Esmail Qaani—who has now taken over his role as commander of the Quds Force—pledged vengeance against the United States for killing him .
“ God the Almighty has promised to take revenge , and God is the main avenger , ” Qaani said .
“ Certainly measures will be taken.
” But what measures ?
That is what Washington and much of the rest of the world @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was assassinated by a U.S. drone attack on Jan. 3 .
Few U.S. actions have hit the Iranian leadership harder than the killing of Suleimani , who led the Quds Force , an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that conducts military operations outside Iran .
Though Qaani is already serving in his place , the new commander is a stolid workhorse focused on Afghanistan , and he is considered to be a far remove from Suleimani ’ s star quality or his predecessor ’ s intimate grasp of strategic battlefields @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Syria , and Lebanon .
Beyond that , the Iranian leadership appears somewhat divided about the sort of retaliation needed—what would satisfy national pride as well as the throngs of angry Iranians , dozens of whom were reportedly trampled to death Monday at Suleimani ’ s funeral procession—while at the same time not starting an open war with the United States , which would be an unmitigated disaster for Iran .
Khamenei himself threatened “ severe revenge ” on those who killed Suleimani , with the United States and Israel being held responsible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Iraqi leaders .
Local partners of the United States in Iraq may also be targeted .
Suleimani viewed Saudi Arabia as an intractable foe of the Islamic Republic and all Shiites , suggesting that Saudi Arabia and its satellite Bahrain might also be in the crosshairs .
But whatever comes , the worst of it may not happen right away .
In terms of U.S. strikes on Iran , the only comparable moment was the April 1988 destruction of the Iranian navy by U.S. strikes , followed by the July 1988 accidental downing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occupants by the United States .
In that case , it was eight years before Iran took its full revenge with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. military personnel .
In today ’ s scenario , retaliation may come sooner but not necessarily in days or weeks .
Those who know Iranian strategic culture are fond of saying that Iran has a “ long breath , ” meaning the Iranians are capable of tremendous strategic patience .
This is not always the case , of course .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ charged for plotting a car bombing at a restaurant in Washington , D.C. , to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States .
The attack seems to have been a hasty retaliatory blow after Saudi Arabia crushed Iranian hopes of an Arab Spring uprising of Bahraini Shiites eight months earlier .
That bungled plot , one of Suleimani ’ s less illustrious ventures , was an embarrassing fiasco and might caution Tehran against a new hasty response .
But for Khamenei , who formed a close fatherly bond with Suleimani and viewed @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and a next-generation leader , his death is deeply personal .
And the Islamic Republic is sending some unique messages this time .
On Jan. 4 , Iran took the unprecedented step of raising a red flag over the Jamkaran Mosque , near the regime ’ s religious center at Qom .
This important mosque is where the Persian Shiites believe their messiah , the Hidden Imam , reappeared one night during Ramadan .
For Shiites , red is the color of blood and revenge .
It is the symbol of Imam Abbas @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fight the caliph Yazid ’ s army even after his hands were cut off .
( The only recognizable part of Suleimani to survive was his ring-bearing hand . )
If retaliation comes , Iran may be tempted to strike on or near the Feb. 11 anniversary of the Islamic Revolution , which also happens to coincide with the 40th day of mourning for Suleimani , when Muslims memorialize the dead .
If alerted U.S. forces have demobilized , and if President Donald Trump is focused elsewhere , there could be an action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Indeed , Iran faces a major problem that could cause its leaders to think twice about Khamenei ’ s pledge of “ severe revenge.
” While national pride demands a direct response—and Khamenei reportedly has called for such a response , not one conducted through proxy forces—the country ’ s leadership does not want to go to war with the United States and can ill afford one , especially with its economy tottering under severe sanctions .
Though some Revolutionary Guard hard-liners might see a war as their last hope for rallying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Islamic Republic could just as easily lose control of new rounds of protests .
Thus , unless a super-risky “ rally the flag ” strategy is the regime ’ s last card , there may be resistance to a rushed retaliatory strike that creates all-out war with the United States .
That still leaves many options open .
In the near term , Tehran may look to its nuclear program for a distraction .
The nuclear issue is , in many ways , smarter terrain on which to fight .
To much @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fault for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA ) .
Europeans and U.N. leaders can not ignore the risk of a nuclear crisis .
This drove Iran to announce its newest step back from JCPOA commitments , ending some restrictions on uranium enrichment capacity , storage of enriched material , and research and development .
Other options would include painful military strikes on allies such as Israel , partners such as Saudi Arabia , or U.S.-leaning politicians inside Iraq .
Deniable strikes would be preferable .
Cyberattacks might be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ track record of meeting lethal force with lethal force and using cyber-retaliation for lesser offenses .
Over the longer term , Iran is likely to mount its real and heavier response in the summer or fall , in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election .
Such an attack might find Trump distracted and less willing to incur political negatives by appearing to invite war ( unpopular with most Americans ) and by threatening to drive up gas prices .
Iran could go for it .
Coordinated missile and rocket attacks on U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and military strikes on U.S. bases and ships in the Persian Gulf and Bab el-Mandeb ; attacks on U.S. diplomatic stations in Lebanon , Iraq , and elsewhere ; interference with shipping lanes ; cyberattacks on air traffic control or major industrial plants ; and terrorism attacks on the U.S. homeland—Iran can certainly do some of these actions and possibly all of them .
To figure out what moves Tehran might make next , it ’ s useful to trace the evolution of its policy toward Washington .
On Jan. 1 , Khamenei @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s usual policy against open conflict , a long-standing preference formed during the grueling eight-year war with Iraq .
“ We would not take the country to war , ” Khamenei said .
“ But if others want to impose something on this country , we will stand before them forcefully.
” At the moment that Khamenei made this comment , Suleimani ’ s proxies in Iraq had just killed an American contractor and suffered heavier than expected retaliation in the Dec. 29 strikes that killed 25 militiamen and wounded more than 50 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been killed at that point , leaving Khamenei in his comfort zone : fighting the Americans to the last Iraqi , Afghan , Lebanese , or Pakistani proxy .
Will Suleimani ’ s death ( alongside four other Iranian staff officers ) change Khamenei ’ s calculus ?
The last six months provide puzzling but potentially important insights into the Iranian regime ’ s real objectives .
One can identify three phases of escalation in Iranian-armed actions .
The first phase followed U.S. sanctioning of Iran ’ s oil sales in April 2019 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at Saudi pipelines , attack an Emirati oil anchorage , harass tankers in the Strait of Hormuz , and finally launch a breathtakingly audacious cruise missile strike on the largest energy sites in the world in Saudi Arabia .
In this phase , Iran was careful not to kill Americans , only targeting U.S. drones on two occasions .
Iran ’ s motive seemed reasonably clear : to scare the world about cutting off Iranian oil and to indirectly pressure the United States to relent .
The problem was that Trump did not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and ceased the actions .
A new phase began with the October 2019 protests against Iranian-controlled governments in Iraq and Lebanon , which led to similar protests in Iran .
From the outset , a pressured Iranian regime seemed to have genuinely believed that the United States had a hand in fomenting the protests , and this may have driven Iran to cross the U.S. red line against harming an American .
In November and December 2019 , Iranian-backed strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq grew more reckless and finally killed an American @ @ @ @ @ @ @ earlier provocative shootdown of a valuable U.S. MQ-4 drone over Hormuz on June 20 , 2019 , Iran seemed to have “ costed in ” some form of retaliation when it risked killing Americans in Iraq .
Even the heavy U.S. strikes on Iran ’ s local proxy Kataib Hezbollah were tolerable to Tehran , but the unanticipated killing of Suleimani marked the outset of a new phase .
Today , for the first time , the Iranian regime is not only being strangled by sanctions and threatened by uprising , but it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ personally wounded by a U.S. strike .
Offsetting the deep anger inside the Iranian leadership is the recognition that Trump is alerted and in punchy form .
Unlike in June , when he nixed retaliation for the lost U.S. drone over collateral damage concerns , Trump is now threatening expansive retaliatory airstrikes on the Iranian mainland .
The worm has turned once again .
Neither the summer ’ s naval and missile actions nor the recent killing of an American have improved Iran ’ s position at all .
Open war initiated by @ @ @ @ @ @ @ domestic worries about the lack of an authorization for the use of military force .
In the end , despite the current rhetoric , it is even possible that Iran ’ s response might be nonexistent—as was the case despite its thundering at the United States for the February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah ’ s Imad Mughniyeh , the highest-profile Iranian-backed commander to be killed until Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis , who also died in the Jan. 3 attack .
We are still waiting almost 12 years later .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ which it is famous , the Iranian regime may choose to do the minimum , knowing that in 2021 it gets either a second-term Trump ( who is not vulnerable to reelection and who likes making deals ) or a peacenik Democrat with four or eight years of running time .

In a speech broadcast on Iranian state television on Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tacitly acknowledged that his nation's missile strike on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops hadn't amounted to much of a retaliation for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. “Last night, they were given one slap,” Khamenei said . “Such military actions are not enough as far the importance of retaliation is concerned. What’s important is that their corruption-creating presence should end.”
In a speech broadcast on Iranian state television on Wednesday, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei tacitly acknowledged that his nation’s missile strike on two military bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops hadn’t amounted to much of a retaliation for the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani. “Last night, they were given one slap,” Khamenei said. “Such military actions are not enough as far the importance of retaliation is concerned. What’s important is that their corruption-creating presence should end.”
The question now is: What else can Iran do to drive the U.S. out of the Middle East, short of the all-out war that both Tehran and Washington have made clear they don’t want? Few U.S. actions have hit the Iranian leadership harder than the killing of Suleimani, who led the Quds Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that conducts military operations outside Iran. Though Suleimani’s deputy, Esmail Qaani, is already serving in his place, the new commander is a stolid workhorse focused on Afghanistan, and he is considered to be a far remove from Suleimani’s star quality or his predecessor’s intimate grasp of strategic battlefields, such as those in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Beyond that, the Iranian leadership appears somewhat divided about the sort of retaliation needed—what would satisfy national pride as well as the throngs of angry Iranians, dozens of whom were reportedly trampled to death Monday at Suleimani’s funeral procession—while at the same time not starting an open war with the United States, which would be an unmitigated disaster for Iran.
Whatever comes, the worst of it may not happen right away. In terms of U.S. strikes on Iran, the only comparable moment was the April 1988 destruction of the Iranian navy by U.S. strikes, followed by the July 1988 accidental downing of an Iranian airliner and its 290 occupants by the United States. In that case, it was eight years before Iran took its full revenge with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. military personnel.
In today’s scenario, serious retaliation may come sooner but not necessarily in days or weeks. Those who know Iranian strategic culture are fond of saying that Iran has a “long breath,” meaning the Iranians are capable of tremendous strategic patience.
This is not always the case, of course. In October 2011, two Iranians were charged for plotting a car bombing at a restaurant in Washington, D.C., to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The attack seems to have been a hasty retaliatory blow after Saudi Arabia crushed Iranian hopes of an Arab Spring uprising of Bahraini Shiites eight months earlier. That bungled plot, one of Suleimani’s less illustrious ventures, was an embarrassing fiasco and might caution Tehran against a new hasty response.
But for Khamenei, who formed a close fatherly bond with Suleimani and viewed him as a paragon of soldierly virtues and a next-generation leader, his death is deeply personal. And the Islamic Republic is sending some unique messages this time. On Jan. 4, Iran took the unprecedented step of raising a red flag over the Jamkaran Mosque, near the regime’s religious center at Qom. This important mosque is where the Persian Shiites believe their messiah, the Hidden Imam, reappeared one night during Ramadan.
For Shiites, red is the color of blood and revenge. It is the symbol of Imam Abbas, a courageous warrior who tried to fight the caliph Yazid’s army even after his hands were cut off. (The only recognizable part of Suleimani to survive was his ring-bearing hand.)
If additional retaliation comes, Iran may be tempted to strike on or near the Feb. 11 anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, which also happens to coincide with the 40th day of mourning for Suleimani, when Muslims memorialize the dead. If alerted U.S. forces have demobilized, and if President Donald Trump is focused elsewhere, there could be an action intended to hurt but not goad America.
Indeed, Iran faces a major problem that could cause its leaders to think twice about Khamenei’s pledge of “severe revenge.” While national pride demanded a direct response, Tuesday night’s missile strike apparently was designed to minimize casualties since Iran’s leadership can ill afford a war with the United States, especially with its economy tottering under severe sanctions. (The missile strike was preceded by a warning to Iraq’s government that was bound to be detected by the U.S. and followed by Iranian statements that underlined Tehran’s desire to de-escalate, for now.)
But that still leaves many options for retaliation open. In the near term, Tehran may look to its nuclear program for a distraction. The nuclear issue is, in many ways, smarter terrain on which to fight, dividing Trump from his European allies: To much of the world, America—not Iran—is at fault for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Europeans and U.N. leaders cannot ignore the risk of a nuclear crisis. This drove Iran to announce its newest step back from JCPOA commitments, ending some restrictions on uranium enrichment capacity, storage of enriched material, and research and development.
Other options would include painful military strikes on allies such as Israel, partners such as Saudi Arabia, or U.S.-leaning politicians inside Iraq. Deniable strikes would be preferable. Cyberattacks might be used, counting on Trump’s track record of meeting lethal force with lethal force and using cyber-retaliation for lesser offenses. As Tuesday night’s non-lethal strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq showed, Iran is quite capable of “aiming to miss,” something it has turned into an art form when it wants to send a message to the world without triggering devastating retaliation.
Over the longer term, Iran is likely to mount its real and heavier response in the summer or fall, in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election. Such an attack might find Trump distracted and less willing to incur political negatives by appearing to invite war (unpopular with most Americans) and by threatening to drive up gas prices. The attacks might take the form of terrorist and military strikes on U.S. bases and ships in the Persian Gulf and Bab el-Mandeb; proxy attacks on U.S. diplomatic stations in Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere; interference with shipping lanes; cyberattacks on air traffic control or major industrial plants; and terrorism attacks on the U.S. homeland—Iran can certainly do some of these actions and possibly all of them.
An evolving Iranian response
To figure out what moves Tehran might make next, it’s useful to trace the evolution of its policy toward Washington. On Jan. 1, Khamenei made a statement that reflected Iran’s usual policy against open conflict, a long-standing preference formed during the grueling eight-year war with Iraq. “We would not take the country to war,” Khamenei said. “But if others want to impose something on this country, we will stand before them forcefully.”
At the moment that Khamenei made this comment, Suleimani’s proxies in Iraq had just killed an American contractor and suffered heavier than expected retaliation in the Dec. 29 strikes that killed 25 militiamen and wounded more than 50.
Even so, Iranians had not been killed at that point, leaving Khamenei in his comfort zone: fighting the Americans to the last Iraqi, Afghan, Lebanese, or Pakistani proxy. Will Suleimani’s death (alongside four other Iranian staff officers) change Khamenei’s calculus?
The last six months provide puzzling but potentially important insights into the Iranian regime’s real objectives. One can identify three phases of escalation in Iranian-armed actions.
The first phase followed U.S. sanctioning of Iran’s oil sales in April 2019, whereon Iran began to fire drones at Saudi pipelines, attack an Emirati oil anchorage, harass tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and finally launch a breathtakingly audacious cruise missile strike on the largest energy sites in the world in Saudi Arabia.
In this phase, Iran was careful not to kill Americans, only targeting U.S. drones on two occasions. Iran’s motive seemed reasonably clear: to scare the world about cutting off Iranian oil and to indirectly pressure the United States to relent. The problem was that Trump did not respond. Iran seemed to recognize that and ceased the actions.
A new phase began with the October 2019 protests against Iranian-controlled governments in Iraq and Lebanon, which led to similar protests in Iran. From the outset, a pressured Iranian regime seemed to have genuinely believed that the United States had a hand in fomenting the protests, and this may have driven Iran to cross the U.S. red line against harming an American. In November and December 2019, Iranian-backed strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq grew more reckless and finally killed an American on Dec. 27.
As with the earlier provocative shootdown of a valuable U.S. MQ-4 drone over Hormuz on June 20, 2019 – and now the January 7, 2020 missile strikes on U.S. bases -, Iran seemed to have “costed in” some form of retaliation when it risked killing Americans in Iraq. Even the heavy U.S. strikes on Iran’s local proxy Kataib Hezbollah were tolerable to Tehran, but the unanticipated killing of Suleimani marked the outset of a new phase. Today, for the first time, the Iranian regime is not only being strangled by sanctions and threatened by uprising, but it is also deeply, directly, and personally wounded by a U.S. strike.
Offsetting the deep anger inside the Iranian leadership is the recognition that Trump is alerted and in punchy form. Unlike in June, when he nixed retaliation for the lost U.S. drone over collateral damage concerns, Trump is now threatening expansive retaliatory airstrikes on the Iranian mainland. The worm has turned once again.
Neither the summer’s naval and missile actions nor the recent killing of an American have improved Iran’s position at all. Open war initiated by Tehran would only ease Trump’s domestic worries about the lack of an authorization for the use of military force.
In the end, despite the current rhetoric, it is even possible that Iran’s main response might be nonexistent—as was the case despite its thundering at the United States for the February 2008 assassination of Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, the highest-profile Iranian-backed commander to be killed until Suleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who also died in the Jan. 3 attack. We are still waiting almost 12 years later.
Showing the “long breath” for which it is famous, the Iranian regime may choose to do the minimum, knowing that in 2021 it gets either a second-term Trump (who is not vulnerable to reelection and who likes making deals) or a peacenik Democrat with four or eight years of running time.


foreignpolicy--2020-01-07--Europe’s Green Deal Could Open a New Front in the Trade War

Europe ’ s Green Deal Could Open a New Front in the Trade War In mid-January , U.S. President Donald Trump is slated to sign a so-called phase one trade deal with China , which may put the U.S.-Chinese trade war on the back burner for the coming year .
But that doesn ’ t mean the United States ’ trade disputes are over .
In fact , all signs now point to a trans-Atlantic trade war taking center stage in 2020 .
Over the coming year , the Trump administration will likely ratchet up tariffs on a variety of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will retaliate in kind .
Such tit-for-tat skirmishing risks spiraling out of control as Brussels gets serious about limiting climate change while Washington continues to pull back from its international commitments to contain carbon emissions .
In an election year , the incumbent Trump needs a foreign foil .
China has proved too risky an adversary , as his tariffs on Chinese imports imperil U.S. economic growth .
Enter a new boogeyman : Europe .
Alleged European trade unfairness—coupled with the continent ’ s efforts to curb global warming—provide Trump with a rhetorical @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his electoral base : foreigners and their elite concerns threatening to victimize his supporters .
Trump has long complained about European trade unfairness , particularly the $ 169 billion annual merchandise trade deficit the United States runs with the European Union .
He has already taken or threatened action to reverse it ; obsessed with the fact that European automakers export over six times as many cars by value to the United States as U.S. automakers export to Europe , the president has threatened for the last two years to impose duties on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on national security grounds .
While the administration recently let the deadline for such action pass , he could always change his mind .
And not all of his threats where rhetorical posturing .
In 2018 , the administration imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum as part of its confrontation with China .
Now Washington is reportedly mulling boosting tariffs on European products to pressure Brussels to further curb its subsidies to the European aircraft-maker Airbus .
The administration is likewise considering new duties on French goods in retaliation against a French @ @ @ @ @ @ @ companies such as Amazon and Facebook .
And by recently sabotaging the dispute settlement mechanism at the World Trade Organization , the White House has insured that there is no peaceful way to resolve these disputes .
Not to be bullied , Phil Hogan , the recently appointed EU trade commissioner , has talked of using Europe ’ s own might—through yet-to-be-crafted trade weapons—as a means of getting “ Mr .
Trump to see the error of his ways.
” This is how trade differences escalate into trade wars .
And a new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new European Commission has promised to put forward a draft European climate law by March in an effort to decarbonize the EU economy by 2050 .
Any such laws would have confrontation with the Trump administration written all over them .
After all , in a not-too-subtle reference to the Trump administration ’ s plans to formally withdraw from the Paris climate accord in 2020 , the commission ’ s recent paper on a European Green Deal noted that “ as long as many international partners do not share the same ambition as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of carbon leakage , either because production is transferred from the EU to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction , or because EU products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports .
… Should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist … the Commission will propose a carbon border adjustment mechanism , for selected sectors , to reduce the risk of carbon leakage .
This would ensure that the price of imports reflect more accurately their carbon content.
” The EU may put up a carbon border tax , which would hit @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , steel , and many manufactured products hard .
In other words , the EU would put up a carbon border tax , which would hit U.S. exports of coal , natural gas , steel , and many manufactured products hard .
A Trump administration committed to boosting such U.S. exports is unlikely to turn the other cheek .
There will likely be other elements in any decarbonization law that run afoul of Trump , too .
In its paper , the commission also proposed promoting “ new forms of collaboration with industry @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” raising competition policy and subsidy issues that will not go unnoticed in Washington .
And flying in the face of Trump administration efforts to curtail improvements in fuel efficiency and emissions standards , the commission has hinted that it will also propose more stringent standards for combustion-engine vehicles , making it even harder for U.S. automakers to export to Europe .
It will also surely pursue stricter agricultural policy around sustainable practices , which will put a damper on imports of U.S. foodstuffs .
The European Union and the United States are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
A trans-Atlantic trade war , whether launched over protectionist grievances or in the pursuit of slowing climate change , would prove devastating to both economies .
Politicians on neither side can be trusted to avoid this eventuality .
Trump ’ s electoral imperatives and his long-standing antipathy toward Europe effectively rule out any de-escalation led by his administration .
And unprecedented European public dislike of Trump and widespread concern about climate change mean that European leaders will pay a stiff political price if they fail to stand up to the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Congress , the Chamber of Commerce , and their European counterparts to stage a preemptive intervention .
There should be early hearings in Brussels and on Capitol Hill to sound the alarm about the coming trade troubles and to explore legislative avenues to block a trade war .
The trans-Atlantic business community must lean on politicians—perhaps by threating to withhold campaign contributions in the United States—to convince Trump and his peers that diplomacy , not confrontation , is the prudent approach to resolving trade and climate differences , while preserving the fraying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ truce with China , the Trump administration now risks confrontation with Europe .
Without an early and forceful intervention , 2020 could well prove to be another year of living dangerously .

In mid-January, U.S. President Donald Trump is slated to sign a so-called phase one trade deal with China, which may put the U.S.-Chinese trade war on the back burner for the coming year. But that doesn’t mean the United States’ trade disputes are over. In fact, all signs now point to a trans-Atlantic trade war taking center stage in 2020.
In mid-January, U.S. President Donald Trump is slated to sign a so-called phase one trade deal with China, which may put the U.S.-Chinese trade war on the back burner for the coming year. But that doesn’t mean the United States’ trade disputes are over. In fact, all signs now point to a trans-Atlantic trade war taking center stage in 2020.
Over the coming year, the Trump administration will likely ratchet up tariffs on a variety of European goods. And the European Union will retaliate in kind. Such tit-for-tat skirmishing risks spiraling out of control as Brussels gets serious about limiting climate change while Washington continues to pull back from its international commitments to contain carbon emissions.
In an election year, the incumbent Trump needs a foreign foil. China has proved too risky an adversary, as his tariffs on Chinese imports imperil U.S. economic growth. Enter a new boogeyman: Europe. Alleged European trade unfairness—coupled with the continent’s efforts to curb global warming—provide Trump with a rhetorical witches’ brew tailor-made to appeal to his electoral base: foreigners and their elite concerns threatening to victimize his supporters.
Trump has long complained about European trade unfairness, particularly the $169 billion annual merchandise trade deficit the United States runs with the European Union. He has already taken or threatened action to reverse it; obsessed with the fact that European automakers export over six times as many cars by value to the United States as U.S. automakers export to Europe, the president has threatened for the last two years to impose duties on European vehicles, dubiously justifying the threat on national security grounds. While the administration recently let the deadline for such action pass, he could always change his mind. And not all of his threats where rhetorical posturing. In 2018, the administration imposed tariffs on European steel and aluminum as part of its confrontation with China.
Now Washington is reportedly mulling boosting tariffs on European products to pressure Brussels to further curb its subsidies to the European aircraft-maker Airbus. The administration is likewise considering new duties on French goods in retaliation against a French tax on the earnings of U.S. digital companies such as Amazon and Facebook. And by recently sabotaging the dispute settlement mechanism at the World Trade Organization, the White House has insured that there is no peaceful way to resolve these disputes.
Not to be bullied, Phil Hogan, the recently appointed EU trade commissioner, has talked of using Europe’s own might—through yet-to-be-crafted trade weapons—as a means of getting “Mr. Trump to see the error of his ways.”
This is how trade differences escalate into trade wars.
And a new battlefront is about to open. The new European Commission has promised to put forward a draft European climate law by March in an effort to decarbonize the EU economy by 2050. Any such laws would have confrontation with the Trump administration written all over them.
After all, in a not-too-subtle reference to the Trump administration’s plans to formally withdraw from the Paris climate accord in 2020, the commission’s recent paper on a European Green Deal noted that “as long as many international partners do not share the same ambition as the EU, there is a risk of carbon leakage, either because production is transferred from the EU to other countries with lower ambition for emission reduction, or because EU products are replaced by more carbon-intensive imports. … Should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist … the Commission will propose a carbon border adjustment mechanism, for selected sectors, to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. This would ensure that the price of imports reflect more accurately their carbon content.”
The EU may put up a carbon border tax, which would hit U.S. exports of coal, natural gas, steel, and many manufactured products hard.
In other words, the EU would put up a carbon border tax, which would hit U.S. exports of coal, natural gas, steel, and many manufactured products hard. A Trump administration committed to boosting such U.S. exports is unlikely to turn the other cheek.
There will likely be other elements in any decarbonization law that run afoul of Trump, too. In its paper, the commission also proposed promoting “new forms of collaboration with industry and investments in strategic value chains,” raising competition policy and subsidy issues that will not go unnoticed in Washington. And flying in the face of Trump administration efforts to curtail improvements in fuel efficiency and emissions standards, the commission has hinted that it will also propose more stringent standards for combustion-engine vehicles, making it even harder for U.S. automakers to export to Europe. It will also surely pursue stricter agricultural policy around sustainable practices, which will put a damper on imports of U.S. foodstuffs.
The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest export markets. A trans-Atlantic trade war, whether launched over protectionist grievances or in the pursuit of slowing climate change, would prove devastating to both economies.
Politicians on neither side can be trusted to avoid this eventuality. Trump’s electoral imperatives and his long-standing antipathy toward Europe effectively rule out any de-escalation led by his administration. And unprecedented European public dislike of Trump and widespread concern about climate change mean that European leaders will pay a stiff political price if they fail to stand up to the United States.
So it is up to the U.S. Congress, the Chamber of Commerce, and their European counterparts to stage a preemptive intervention. There should be early hearings in Brussels and on Capitol Hill to sound the alarm about the coming trade troubles and to explore legislative avenues to block a trade war. The trans-Atlantic business community must lean on politicians—perhaps by threating to withhold campaign contributions in the United States—to convince Trump and his peers that diplomacy, not confrontation, is the prudent approach to resolving trade and climate differences, while preserving the fraying trans-Atlantic relationship.
Having achieved a trade truce with China, the Trump administration now risks confrontation with Europe. Without an early and forceful intervention, 2020 could well prove to be another year of living dangerously.