foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--How Israeli Annexation Talk Is Already Reshaping the Middle East

How Israeli Annexation Talk Is Already Reshaping the Middle East TEL AVIV , Israel—With Israel weighing whether to annex parts of the West Bank in the coming months , Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced Tuesday that his self-governing administration in Ramallah would no longer be bound by existing agreements with the Jewish state , including security cooperation , in what could be the beginning of a violent spiral in the region .
Other Arab leaders have also warned Israel against annexing any West Bank territory , including Jordan ’ s King Abdullah II , who said last week that Israel @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conflict ” with his country .
While annexation could be months off—and might not happen at all—the responses from the two leaders who stand to be affected most by any Israeli move underscored just how sensitive the issue is , even after more than 50 years of Israeli occupation of the territory .
“ The Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Palestine are absolved , as of today , of all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments and of all the obligations based on these understandings and agreements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Abbas said at a meeting for the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah , according to the official Wafa news agency .
The possibility of annexation was included in a power-sharing deal between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former rival , Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party , which ended nearly 500 days of political deadlock last month .
Their joint government—which Netanyahu will lead for 18 months before handing the reins to Gantz—was sworn in this past Sunday .
Although it ’ s not clear which parts of the West Bank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it would go ahead with annexation , the coalition deal allows Netanyahu to bypass his own cabinet and put the issue directly to parliament after July 1—so long as he has the support of the Trump administration .
That means Gantz , who is considered a relative moderate , could not veto the move .
Even if Gantz ’ s faction opposes annexation , Netanyahu is likely to have a majority for it in parliament .
Israel has occupied the West Bank for over five decades—since fighting a quick and decisive war with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ any move to make Israeli rule there official would send shockwaves through the region .
Senior Trump administration officials have indicated that it will be “ Israel ’ s decision ” on whether to press ahead with annexation , although recent reports have raised some doubt as to the exact timeline and process expected by Washington .
U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s Middle East peace plan , released earlier this year , envisions up to 30 percent of the West Bank being incorporated into Israel , including the strategic Jordan Valley .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ term as prime minister , might settle for a smaller area that includes the larger and more populous settlement blocs Israel has built in the territory over the decades .
Right-wing Israeli politicians , including Netanyahu , have said they view the current moment as a “ historic window of opportunity ” to fulfill their ideological vision—just ahead of November ’ s U.S. election while a cheerleading president is still in the White House , and with the entire world consumed by the coronavirus .
Outside of Jerusalem and Washington , however , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the possible death blow to any negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict .
Already , officials stretching the gamut from the United Nations to the European Union and Arab League , Canada to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates , have issued warnings to Israel .
Europe is reportedly debating some form of sanctions , including freezing Israel out of joint scientific and educational projects—although member states are still divided on the issue .
Among the people raising concerns are some former security officials in Israel .
“ We already have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] , ” said retired Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin , the head of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a former military intelligence chief .
“ Annexation won ’ t change anything , our legitimacy there will decrease , and only one country in the world will support it—and even that may change with a new American president , ” he told Foreign Policy .
“ There ’ s only an ideological interest here , with only economic and diplomatic downsides.
” Yadlin made clear that the doomsday scenarios @ @ @ @ @ @ @ treaty with Jordan , escalation in the West Bank , referral to the International Criminal Court—were not inevitable , although annexation would increase the chances of them coming to pass .
“ And even if none of these happen , ” Yadlin said , “ this would still be a bad move .
It would end the option of ever separating from the Palestinians and , with that , the option of two states.
” Saeb Erekat , the secretary-general of the Palestine Liberation Organization , told Foreign Policy that “ annexation of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crime that will end the prospects of a negotiated solution just as it is an attack against international law and the whole idea of a rules-based world order.
” Erekat added that diplomatic action—including sanctions on Israel—was “ an international responsibility , ” with the Palestinians already attempting to coordinate a united front with European and Arab partners .
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh already warned last week that annexation would force the Palestinian Authority to reconsider every aspect of its relationship with Israel .
“ Things are going to be really ugly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ what they are planning to do , ” he said in a private roundtable last week for the Middle East Institute , a Washington think tank .
The Palestinians have made such threats innumerable times in the past .
But Abbas , while still vague on details Tuesday , sounded more decisive than in the past .
His announcement regarding security coordination was sure to raise concerns among Israeli officials .
A catchall term , security coordination between the Israeli military and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces—30,000 armed fighters in those areas of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence-sharing , counterterrorism , deconfliction during Israeli military raids into Palestinian-controlled territory , safe retrieval of wayward Israelis , and riot control .
The cooperation has been a core tenet of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ’ s approach to Israel for more than a decade and has helped underpin stability in the West Bank .
Annexation , however , may make the future of the Palestinian Authority a moot point , at least politically .
“ The idea of the Palestinian Authority … was the idea of a negotiated settlement [ to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retired Lt. Col. Alon Eviatar , a former Israeli intelligence officer with long experience in Palestinian affairs , told Foreign Policy .
“ Annexation would be the last nail in the coffin , the most dramatic and most lethal.
” Looking to push back against Israel , Abbas would likely allow demonstrations and even some small-scale violence against Israel to coalesce .
Under that scenario , Palestinian security forces would no longer halt protesters before they reached the sensitive seam zones between Israeli and Palestinian control .
There is even a chance that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Fatah party ’ s long-dormant popular militia , the Tanzim , to take to the streets—a situation that multiple Israeli security officials have described to Foreign Policy as a game-changer .
Eviatar predicted that Abbas would not allow Palestinians to stage armed attacks nor let members of his security forces turn their guns on Israel .
“ So long as Abbas doesn ’ t release everything completely ” there is still a chance , however remote , that the escalation could be controlled , if not calibrated , he said .
But an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ it , from the Palestinian perspective it may be a case of , “ If not now , then when ?
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—With Israel weighing whether to annex parts of the West Bank in the coming months, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced Tuesday that his self-governing administration in Ramallah would no longer be bound by existing agreements with the Jewish state, including security cooperation, in what could be the beginning of a violent spiral in the region.
TEL AVIV, Israel—With Israel weighing whether to annex parts of the West Bank in the coming months, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced Tuesday that his self-governing administration in Ramallah would no longer be bound by existing agreements with the Jewish state, including security cooperation, in what could be the beginning of a violent spiral in the region.
Other Arab leaders have also warned Israel against annexing any West Bank territory, including Jordan’s King Abdullah II, who said last week that Israel was on course for a “massive conflict” with his country.
While annexation could be months off—and might not happen at all—the responses from the two leaders who stand to be affected most by any Israeli move underscored just how sensitive the issue is, even after more than 50 years of Israeli occupation of the territory.
“The Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Palestine are absolved, as of today, of all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments and of all the obligations based on these understandings and agreements, including the security ones,” Abbas said at a meeting for the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, according to the official Wafa news agency.
The possibility of annexation was included in a power-sharing deal between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former rival, Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party, which ended nearly 500 days of political deadlock last month. Their joint government—which Netanyahu will lead for 18 months before handing the reins to Gantz—was sworn in this past Sunday.
Although it’s not clear which parts of the West Bank Israel would incorporate, nor even if it would go ahead with annexation, the coalition deal allows Netanyahu to bypass his own cabinet and put the issue directly to parliament after July 1—so long as he has the support of the Trump administration.
That means Gantz, who is considered a relative moderate, could not veto the move. Even if Gantz’s faction opposes annexation, Netanyahu is likely to have a majority for it in parliament.
Israel has occupied the West Bank for over five decades—since fighting a quick and decisive war with its neighbors in 1967. Still, any move to make Israeli rule there official would send shockwaves through the region.
Senior Trump administration officials have indicated that it will be “Israel’s decision” on whether to press ahead with annexation, although recent reports have raised some doubt as to the exact timeline and process expected by Washington. U.S. President Donald Trump’s Middle East peace plan, released earlier this year, envisions up to 30 percent of the West Bank being incorporated into Israel, including the strategic Jordan Valley. But Netanyahu, now in his fifth term as prime minister, might settle for a smaller area that includes the larger and more populous settlement blocs Israel has built in the territory over the decades.
Right-wing Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu, have said they view the current moment as a “historic window of opportunity” to fulfill their ideological vision—just ahead of November’s U.S. election while a cheerleading president is still in the White House, and with the entire world consumed by the coronavirus.
Outside of Jerusalem and Washington, however, annexation is viewed with increasing alarm as the possible death blow to any negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Already, officials stretching the gamut from the United Nations to the European Union and Arab League, Canada to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have issued warnings to Israel. Europe is reportedly debating some form of sanctions, including freezing Israel out of joint scientific and educational projects—although member states are still divided on the issue.
Among the people raising concerns are some former security officials in Israel.
“We already have security control [in the Jordan Valley],” said retired Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, the head of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a former military intelligence chief.
“Annexation won’t change anything, our legitimacy there will decrease, and only one country in the world will support it—and even that may change with a new American president,” he told Foreign Policy. “There’s only an ideological interest here, with only economic and diplomatic downsides.”
Yadlin made clear that the doomsday scenarios forecasted by some—a severing of the peace treaty with Jordan, escalation in the West Bank, referral to the International Criminal Court—were not inevitable, although annexation would increase the chances of them coming to pass.
“And even if none of these happen,” Yadlin said, “this would still be a bad move. It would end the option of ever separating from the Palestinians and, with that, the option of two states.”
Saeb Erekat, the secretary-general of the Palestine Liberation Organization, told Foreign Policy that “annexation of any part of occupied Palestine is a crime that will end the prospects of a negotiated solution just as it is an attack against international law and the whole idea of a rules-based world order.” Erekat added that diplomatic action—including sanctions on Israel—was “an international responsibility,” with the Palestinians already attempting to coordinate a united front with European and Arab partners.
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh already warned last week that annexation would force the Palestinian Authority to reconsider every aspect of its relationship with Israel.
“Things are going to be really ugly if they are going to go do what they are planning to do,” he said in a private roundtable last week for the Middle East Institute, a Washington think tank.
The Palestinians have made such threats innumerable times in the past. But Abbas, while still vague on details Tuesday, sounded more decisive than in the past. His announcement regarding security coordination was sure to raise concerns among Israeli officials.
A catchall term, security coordination between the Israeli military and the Palestinian Authority Security Forces—30,000 armed fighters in those areas of the West Bank controlled by the Palestinians—includes intelligence-sharing, counterterrorism, deconfliction during Israeli military raids into Palestinian-controlled territory, safe retrieval of wayward Israelis, and riot control. The cooperation has been a core tenet of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s approach to Israel for more than a decade and has helped underpin stability in the West Bank.
Annexation, however, may make the future of the Palestinian Authority a moot point, at least politically.
“The idea of the Palestinian Authority … was the idea of a negotiated settlement [to the conflict] and two states,” retired Lt. Col. Alon Eviatar, a former Israeli intelligence officer with long experience in Palestinian affairs, told Foreign Policy. “Annexation would be the last nail in the coffin, the most dramatic and most lethal.”
Looking to push back against Israel, Abbas would likely allow demonstrations and even some small-scale violence against Israel to coalesce. Under that scenario, Palestinian security forces would no longer halt protesters before they reached the sensitive seam zones between Israeli and Palestinian control. There is even a chance that Abbas would mobilize the members of his Fatah party’s long-dormant popular militia, the Tanzim, to take to the streets—a situation that multiple Israeli security officials have described to Foreign Policy as a game-changer.
Eviatar predicted that Abbas would not allow Palestinians to stage armed attacks nor let members of his security forces turn their guns on Israel.
“So long as Abbas doesn’t release everything completely” there is still a chance, however remote, that the escalation could be controlled, if not calibrated, he said. But an escalation was likely. As Eviatar put it, from the Palestinian perspective it may be a case of, “If not now, then when?”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--Trump Stumbles in Effort to Confront China at WHO

Trump Stumbles in Effort to Confront China at WHO The Trump administration set itself two goals for this week at the World Health Organization : secure international support for an “ immediate investigation ” into the origins of the coronavirus in Wuhan , China , and restore Taiwan ’ s observer status at the United Nations health agency .
It got neither .
The setbacks underscore the challenges Washington is facing in rallying international support for a tougher line against Beijing in the months after one of the biggest pandemics in a century began its spread from Wuhan to more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the stage for a volcanic reaction from President Donald Trump , who warned late Monday that he may make good on a threat to withdraw from WHO and cut hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. assistance to the U.N. health agency .
“ It is clear the repeated missteps by you and your organization in responding to the pandemic have been extremely costly for the world , ” Trump wrote in a letter to WHO ’ s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus .
“ If the World Health Organization does not commit to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ days , I will make my temporary freeze of United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our membership.
” The president ’ s threat to withdraw from the health agency provided a fresh opportunity for China to step into the vacuum left by a U.S. government that has turned away from the multilateral institutions it constructed to manage world affairs at the end of World War II .
It also provoked criticism from the camp of former vice president and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden .
[ Mapping @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on the pandemic . ]
“ It is a big mistake to pull back in the way that we ’ ve done , ” Biden ’ s foreign-policy chief , Tony Blinken , said Tuesday in a virtual discussion moderated by CBS News ’ Margaret Brennan .
“ This simply creates a vacuum that someone else is going to fill , and China has now raised its hands and said we ’ re going to fill it .
Speaking Tuesday at a virtual summit of the World Health Assembly , the health agency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s President Xi Jinping defended his government ’ s response to the virus , insisting “ we have acted with openness , transparency , and responsibility ” and “ we have done everything in our power to support and assist countries in need.
” Xi pledged to spend more than $ 2 billion over the next two years to strengthen the international fight against the pandemic and help developing countries improve their health systems .
He also promised that vaccines developed in China , “ when available , will be made a global @ @ @ @ @ @ @ idea of a comprehensive review of the global response to COVID-19 after it is brought under control to sum up experience and address deficiencies , ” Xi added .
“ This work should be based on science and professionalism , led by WHO and conducted in an objective and impartial manner.
” On Tuesday , the health agency ’ s member states , including China and the United States , adopted a European-drafted resolution acknowledging the “ key leadership role of WHO ” in responding to the pandemic and calling for the initiation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , ” of an “ impartial , independent and comprehensive evaluation ” of the WHO-coordinated international response to the pandemic .
The timing of the evaluation , which would be subject to further negotiations by governments , was unclear .
Late last month , the United States proposed the WHO “ immediately initiate an independent expert evaluation , in consultation with Member States , to review lessons learned from the WHO-coordinated international health response to COVID-19 , ” according to the confidential proposal , which was reviewed by Foreign Policy .
The evaluation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Member State actions … since the outbreak began ; a full assessment of the timelines , accuracy , and information sharing aimed at containing the outbreak of the source.
” Both China and WHO leadership have argued that any review of the agency ’ s handling of the crisis should be put off until after the pandemic has been contained .
“ It may be useful , at an appropriate time , to independently assess the Organization ’ s performance during this response and identify lessons for the future , ” according @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Programme ’ s Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee , or IOAC , which concluded a preliminary assessment of WHO ’ s COVID-19 response .
“ The scope of such assessment … should cover both Member States ’ and WHO Secretariat ’ s actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic , ” the preliminary report said .
“ The IOAC would caution that conducting such a review during the heat of the response , even in a limited manner , could disrupt WHO ’ s ability to respond effectively.
” “ The pandemic has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ crisis has become a major issue in domestic politics in many settings , ” according to the report , which noted that Tedros and staff have received “ credible threats ” following criticism leveled against the health agency in the media .
Tuesday ’ s resolution fell short of U.S. aims to see an immediate international inquiry into China ’ s handling of the outbreak .
But U.S. officials said they were pleased with the outcome and that they would continue to press for a swift inquiry .
“ We wholeheartedly endorse the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States to provide the WHO with timely , accurate , and sufficiently-detailed public health information related to the COVID-19 pandemic , ” the United States said in a statement .
“ We further appreciate the mandate given by the resolution to the WHO to investigate the origins of the virus , and we are confident that through this knowledge , researchers and medical practitioners around the world will be empowered in the pursuit of vaccines and other countermeasures.
” But the United States broke with the consensus on two key provisions in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for a range of health care needs , including for sexual and reproductive health , and ensuring universal access to critical medicines and supplies needed to confront the pandemic in poor countries .
“ We do not accept reference to ‘ sexual and reproductive health , ’ or other language that suggests or explicitly states that access to abortion is included in the provision of population and individual level health services , ” the U.S. statement reads .
“ The United States believes in legal protections for the unborn.
” The United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ universal ” and “ fair ” access to affordable health technologies needed to battle COVID-19 , and for promoting affordable access to tests , therapeutic medicines , and vaccines .
The U.S. move appeared to be aimed at protecting the patent rights of American pharmaceutical companies .
The U.S. retreat on Taiwan ’ s observer status , its other negotiating priority , came weeks after Washington , backed by Tokyo , persuaded half a dozen countries—Australia , the United Kingdom , Canada , France , Germany , and New Zealand—to issue a joint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan to attend the May 18-19 virtual meeting of the World Health Assembly .
But Tedros—who faced pressure from China not to invite Taiwan—insisted in talks with the United States that he needed a formal mandate from the health agency ’ s member states to invite Taiwan .
The United States—which has been pressing Tedros for months to demonstrate greater independence from China—countered that he did have the authority to issue an invitation .
The Chinese , the United States argued , might well oppose the action , forcing the matter to a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It remained unlikely that the United States would be able to muster the votes needed to override Chinese objections .
The matter will now be taken up at the next meeting of the World Health Assembly in six months .
“ The U.S. and Japan knew they would not get the numbers in a vote , ” said one senior diplomat .
“ They live to fight another day in November .
”

The Trump administration set itself two goals for this week at the World Health Organization: secure international support for an “immediate investigation” into the origins of the coronavirus in Wuhan, China, and restore Taiwan’s observer status at the United Nations health agency. It got neither.
The Trump administration set itself two goals for this week at the World Health Organization: secure international support for an “immediate investigation” into the origins of the coronavirus in Wuhan, China, and restore Taiwan’s observer status at the United Nations health agency. It got neither.
The setbacks underscore the challenges Washington is facing in rallying international support for a tougher line against Beijing in the months after one of the biggest pandemics in a century began its spread from Wuhan to more than 200 countries. It also set the stage for a volcanic reaction from President Donald Trump, who warned late Monday that he may make good on a threat to withdraw from WHO and cut hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. assistance to the U.N. health agency.
“It is clear the repeated missteps by you and your organization in responding to the pandemic have been extremely costly for the world,” Trump wrote in a letter to WHO’s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. “If the World Health Organization does not commit to major substantive improvements within the next 30 days, I will make my temporary freeze of United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our membership.”
The president’s threat to withdraw from the health agency provided a fresh opportunity for China to step into the vacuum left by a U.S. government that has turned away from the multilateral institutions it constructed to manage world affairs at the end of World War II. It also provoked criticism from the camp of former vice president and presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
“It is a big mistake to pull back in the way that we’ve done,” Biden’s foreign-policy chief, Tony Blinken, said Tuesday in a virtual discussion moderated by CBS News’ Margaret Brennan. “This simply creates a vacuum that someone else is going to fill, and China has now raised its hands and said we’re going to fill it.
Speaking Tuesday at a virtual summit of the World Health Assembly, the health agency’s decision-making body, China’s President Xi Jinping defended his government’s response to the virus, insisting “we have acted with openness, transparency, and responsibility” and “we have done everything in our power to support and assist countries in need.” Xi pledged to spend more than $2 billion over the next two years to strengthen the international fight against the pandemic and help developing countries improve their health systems. He also promised that vaccines developed in China, “when available, will be made a global public good.”
“China supports the idea of a comprehensive review of the global response to COVID-19 after it is brought under control to sum up experience and address deficiencies,” Xi added. “This work should be based on science and professionalism, led by WHO and conducted in an objective and impartial manner.”
On Tuesday, the health agency’s member states, including China and the United States, adopted a European-drafted resolution acknowledging the “key leadership role of WHO” in responding to the pandemic and calling for the initiation, “at the earliest appropriate moment,” of an “impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation” of the WHO-coordinated international response to the pandemic. The timing of the evaluation, which would be subject to further negotiations by governments, was unclear.
Late last month, the United States proposed the WHO “immediately initiate an independent expert evaluation, in consultation with Member States, to review lessons learned from the WHO-coordinated international health response to COVID-19,” according to the confidential proposal, which was reviewed by Foreign Policy. The evaluation would address the “adequacy of WHO and Member State actions … since the outbreak began; a full assessment of the timelines, accuracy, and information sharing aimed at containing the outbreak of the source.”
Both China and WHO leadership have argued that any review of the agency’s handling of the crisis should be put off until after the pandemic has been contained.
“It may be useful, at an appropriate time, to independently assess the Organization’s performance during this response and identify lessons for the future,” according to the WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme’s Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee, or IOAC, which concluded a preliminary assessment of WHO’s COVID-19 response. “The scope of such assessment … should cover both Member States’ and WHO Secretariat’s actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,” the preliminary report said. “The IOAC would caution that conducting such a review during the heat of the response, even in a limited manner, could disrupt WHO’s ability to respond effectively.”
“The pandemic has heightened geopolitical tension and the public health crisis has become a major issue in domestic politics in many settings,” according to the report, which noted that Tedros and staff have received “credible threats” following criticism leveled against the health agency in the media.
Tuesday’s resolution fell short of U.S. aims to see an immediate international inquiry into China’s handling of the outbreak. But U.S. officials said they were pleased with the outcome and that they would continue to press for a swift inquiry.
“We wholeheartedly endorse the call in the resolution for all Member States to provide the WHO with timely, accurate, and sufficiently-detailed public health information related to the COVID-19 pandemic,” the United States said in a statement. “We further appreciate the mandate given by the resolution to the WHO to investigate the origins of the virus, and we are confident that through this knowledge, researchers and medical practitioners around the world will be empowered in the pursuit of vaccines and other countermeasures.”
But the United States broke with the consensus on two key provisions in the resolution that called for maintaining international support for a range of health care needs, including for sexual and reproductive health, and ensuring universal access to critical medicines and supplies needed to confront the pandemic in poor countries.
“We do not accept reference to ‘sexual and reproductive health,’ or other language that suggests or explicitly states that access to abortion is included in the provision of population and individual level health services,” the U.S. statement reads. “The United States believes in legal protections for the unborn.”
The United States also objected to language calling for “universal” and “fair” access to affordable health technologies needed to battle COVID-19, and for promoting affordable access to tests, therapeutic medicines, and vaccines. The U.S. move appeared to be aimed at protecting the patent rights of American pharmaceutical companies.
The U.S. retreat on Taiwan’s observer status, its other negotiating priority, came weeks after Washington, backed by Tokyo, persuaded half a dozen countries—Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and New Zealand—to issue a joint letter to Tedros asking him to invite Taiwan to attend the May 18-19 virtual meeting of the World Health Assembly.
But Tedros—who faced pressure from China not to invite Taiwan—insisted in talks with the United States that he needed a formal mandate from the health agency’s member states to invite Taiwan. The United States—which has been pressing Tedros for months to demonstrate greater independence from China—countered that he did have the authority to issue an invitation. The Chinese, the United States argued, might well oppose the action, forcing the matter to a vote by WHO’s member states. It remained unlikely that the United States would be able to muster the votes needed to override Chinese objections.
The matter will now be taken up at the next meeting of the World Health Assembly in six months.
“The U.S. and Japan knew they would not get the numbers in a vote,” said one senior diplomat. “They live to fight another day in November.”


foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--Strategists Have Forgotten the Power of Stories

Strategists Have Forgotten the Power of Stories Two armies faced each other for 10 years without victory in sight .
The Trojans , who favored Ares—the god of war , tactics , and brutality—sat behind their walls and endured the siege .
But the Greeks , claiming as their patron Athena—the deity for strategy , art , and war—decided that conventional warfighting approaches would not turn the tide in their favor .
Through a combination of creativity and disinformation , the Greeks not only built a giant horse filled with soldiers ; they managed to convince the Trojans to bring @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gates .
As a result , the Greeks bested the Trojans , Athena humiliated Ares , and the whole episode underscored that militarism without strategy and creativity is a losing proposition .
The long shadow of the Trojan War reminds us that creative methodologies are essential components of the national security and foreign-policy toolkit .
And we will need to use all the tools we can get in order to figure out our way forward while COVID-19 ravages an already complicated world .
In just the past five years—the blink of an eye @ @ @ @ @ @ @ South China Sea , put its Uighur population into detention camps , and promulgated its version of 5G technology globally .
Russia waged globally disruptive disinformation campaigns as well as proxy wars in Syria and Ukraine .
North Korea and the United States grew eerily close to an all-out confrontation over Pyongyang ’ s burgeoning intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities .
The Islamic State rose and in the process helped displace millions of Syrians and Iraqis before it collapsed—for the moment .
Iran still wages its hybrid war in the Middle East against the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gulf .
The challenge of climate change looms .
We do not know how these issues will play out , much less how they might intersect and interact with each other , nor how the ramifications of COVID-19 might shake everything to the ground .
Given the vast challenge before us , it is curious that many in Washington seem to be apprehensive about using creative tools to think through contemporary challenges .
Unfortunately , Athena appears to be absent ; we instead often turn to quantitative analyses to dissect the inherently unquantifiable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sciences in the 1950s , we learned to prioritize the quantitative toolkit ; we calculated battle damage assessments and streamlined defense programs and applauded the efficiencies we created by treating national security problems to rational choice economic analysis .
But those same tools proved wholly inappropriate to waging the Vietnam War .
Today , we still seem to want to reduce the world to rational , quantifiable problems , but to do that , one needs fixed data .
Statecraft is inherently a wicked problem ; it is made by living , breathing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spreadsheet .
Key information gaps , fogs , and frictions will always exist , and solving one of its effects creates another problem down the road .
Rinse , repeat .
While quantitative analytic tools can prove useful , as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara painfully discerned , it is dangerous to apply these quantitative tools to problems that can not be understood or solved through metrics .
Policymaking and statecraft have always been about making choices with imperfect information .
One key trick to getting over that perennial conundrum is in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intuition and insight based on imagination , experience , learning , and observation that allows the decision-maker to comprehend his or her situation and determine the best path forward .
The coup d ’ oeil ’ s absence was arguably what the 9/11 Commission was lamenting when it attributed the U.S. government ’ s failure to thwart those attacks to a “ failure of imagination.
” Finely tuned intuitive and creative senses are essential to cultivating the coup d ’ oeil .
This is why we call it the art of war .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclusively study histories and think tank reports and technical pieces to guide our decisions .
Fiction is a frivolity—unless it ’ s the scene-setter for a war game .
We ask “ what is ?
” instead of “ what if ?
” But humans are arguably hard-wired to need creative tools and stories to access the parts of ourselves that cultivate the coup d ’ oeil .
As Karen Armstrong points out in A Short History of Myth , the ancient Greeks had two primary forms of knowledge : mythos and logos @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” ) was the pragmatic way of viewing the world .
It was forward-looking , problem-solving , always on the lookout to improve understanding of the physical world and how they could better position themselves within that world .
Logos is inherently limited , however .
It can not help us understand how to give our lives meaning or assuage our grief .
For that , the Greeks turned to mythos , the sphere of knowledge that allowed them to creatively contemplate their circumstances .
The myths , the stories , the tragedies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of how to be better humans , and how to live a well-lived life , within the world they inhabited .
Armstrong writes that both mythos and logos were essential and “ neither was considered superior to the other.
” They each had their own sphere of competence .
This is perhaps why , to the ancient Greeks , the goddess Athena was responsible for translating war into victory ; she reminds us that victory is a product of holistic thinking , that it is essential to infuse creativity into decisions of state @ @ @ @ @ @ @ art .
Knowledge without imagination can tell you where you are but not where to go .
Harnessing mythos and combining it with logos is therefore critically important .
What are we losing—what have we lost ?
—by prioritizing logos at the expense of mythos ?
Tackling wicked problems requires unique , multifaceted , and creative approaches—in other words , Athena ’ s stomping ground .
Might we get better policy outcomes if we resurrect Athena and the analytic approach that she represents ?
Of course , it ’ s one thing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and holistic in our thinking .
It ’ s another thing entirely to actually build and explore such methodologically unbound spaces .
Luckily , Charles Hill , in Grand Strategies : Literature , Statecraft and World Order , has an answer .
He points out that Paul Nitze , one of the leading architects of post-World War II foreign policy , would study Shakespeare in his spare time .
The bard ’ s characters and their circumstances give us space to empathize with their situations , to understand and appreciate their steps and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those insights might apply to our own lives and our own strategic circumstances .
All this is why efforts in recent years to use science fiction as a tool for understanding strategy and national security choices are so exciting .
Australian Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan is using sci-fi as a tool for designing military education electives .
Natasha Bajema is applying her deep subject matter expertise in weapons of mass destruction to her novel writing .
Max Brooks ’ s World War Z is a compelling tool for discussing about pandemics , as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ August Cole and P.W .
Singer ’ s forthcoming book Burn-In explores the implications of artificial intelligence and robotics for national security and society in our not-too-distant future .
Alex Finley uses satire to explore bureaucratic craziness in the intelligence community .
Steve Leonard and the gang at West Point ’ s Modern War Institute have been organizing multi-author projects exploring the intersection of sci-fi and defense issues , including the brilliant Strategy Strikes Back : How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict .
( Full disclosure : I wrote one of its @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but there ’ s still a lot more to do if we ’ re going to more meaningfully embrace our creative sides .
Sci-fi is proving its utility , but the creative arts more broadly provide useful metaphors for contemplating our strategic circumstances .
We need to remember that fiction is not frivolous , as well as the power of creative readings .
Hamlet , for example , teaches us the dangers of internal political dithering when existential challenges loom .
Hill reminds us that Jane Austen ’ s Emma provides us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is applied poorly .
The wicked problems we face are endlessly complicated , but the possibilities for using the arts to better understand these challenges are also limitless .
Strategists need to actively cultivate holistic and creative approaches to national security policy if we want to be more like Athena and less like Ares .

Two armies faced each other for 10 years without victory in sight. The Trojans, who favored Ares—the god of war, tactics, and brutality—sat behind their walls and endured the siege. But the Greeks, claiming as their patron Athena—the deity for strategy, art, and war—decided that conventional warfighting approaches would not turn the tide in their favor. Through a combination of creativity and disinformation, the Greeks not only built a giant horse filled with soldiers; they managed to convince the Trojans to bring the massive statue through Troy’s gates. As a result, the Greeks bested the Trojans, Athena humiliated Ares, and the whole episode underscored that militarism without strategy and creativity is a losing proposition. The long shadow of the Trojan War reminds us that creative methodologies are essential components of the national security and foreign-policy toolkit. And we will need to use all the tools we can get in order to figure out our way forward while COVID-19 ravages an already complicated world.
Two armies faced each other for 10 years without victory in sight. The Trojans, who favored Ares—the god of war, tactics, and brutality—sat behind their walls and endured the siege. But the Greeks, claiming as their patron Athena—the deity for strategy, art, and war—decided that conventional warfighting approaches would not turn the tide in their favor. Through a combination of creativity and disinformation, the Greeks not only built a giant horse filled with soldiers; they managed to convince the Trojans to bring the massive statue through Troy’s gates. As a result, the Greeks bested the Trojans, Athena humiliated Ares, and the whole episode underscored that militarism without strategy and creativity is a losing proposition. The long shadow of the Trojan War reminds us that creative methodologies are essential components of the national security and foreign-policy toolkit. And we will need to use all the tools we can get in order to figure out our way forward while COVID-19 ravages an already complicated world.
In just the past five years—the blink of an eye in strategic terms—China built islands in the South China Sea, put its Uighur population into detention camps, and promulgated its version of 5G technology globally. Russia waged globally disruptive disinformation campaigns as well as proxy wars in Syria and Ukraine. North Korea and the United States grew eerily close to an all-out confrontation over Pyongyang’s burgeoning intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. The Islamic State rose and in the process helped displace millions of Syrians and Iraqis before it collapsed—for the moment. Iran still wages its hybrid war in the Middle East against the United States and its partners in the Gulf. The challenge of climate change looms. We do not know how these issues will play out, much less how they might intersect and interact with each other, nor how the ramifications of COVID-19 might shake everything to the ground.
Given the vast challenge before us, it is curious that many in Washington seem to be apprehensive about using creative tools to think through contemporary challenges. Unfortunately, Athena appears to be absent; we instead often turn to quantitative analyses to dissect the inherently unquantifiable. With the rise of the behavioral sciences in the 1950s, we learned to prioritize the quantitative toolkit; we calculated battle damage assessments and streamlined defense programs and applauded the efficiencies we created by treating national security problems to rational choice economic analysis. But those same tools proved wholly inappropriate to waging the Vietnam War. Today, we still seem to want to reduce the world to rational, quantifiable problems, but to do that, one needs fixed data. Statecraft is inherently a wicked problem; it is made by living, breathing, unpredictable people, not a Rand spreadsheet. Key information gaps, fogs, and frictions will always exist, and solving one of its effects creates another problem down the road. Rinse, repeat. While quantitative analytic tools can prove useful, as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara painfully discerned, it is dangerous to apply these quantitative tools to problems that cannot be understood or solved through metrics.
Policymaking and statecraft have always been about making choices with imperfect information. One key trick to getting over that perennial conundrum is in the coup d’oeil—the moment of strategic intuition and insight based on imagination, experience, learning, and observation that allows the decision-maker to comprehend his or her situation and determine the best path forward. The coup d’oeil’s absence was arguably what the 9/11 Commission was lamenting when it attributed the U.S. government’s failure to thwart those attacks to a “failure of imagination.” Finely tuned intuitive and creative senses are essential to cultivating the coup d’oeil. This is why we call it the art of war.
Yet strangely, most scholars and practitioners exclusively study histories and think tank reports and technical pieces to guide our decisions. Fiction is a frivolity—unless it’s the scene-setter for a war game. We ask “what is?” instead of “what if?” But humans are arguably hard-wired to need creative tools and stories to access the parts of ourselves that cultivate the coup d’oeil. As Karen Armstrong points out in A Short History of Myth, the ancient Greeks had two primary forms of knowledge: mythos and logos. Logos (“reason, science”) was the pragmatic way of viewing the world. It was forward-looking, problem-solving, always on the lookout to improve understanding of the physical world and how they could better position themselves within that world.
Logos is inherently limited, however. It cannot help us understand how to give our lives meaning or assuage our grief. For that, the Greeks turned to mythos, the sphere of knowledge that allowed them to creatively contemplate their circumstances. The myths, the stories, the tragedies, and the arts informed their understanding of how to be better humans, and how to live a well-lived life, within the world they inhabited. Armstrong writes that both mythos and logos were essential and “neither was considered superior to the other.” They each had their own sphere of competence. This is perhaps why, to the ancient Greeks, the goddess Athena was responsible for translating war into victory; she reminds us that victory is a product of holistic thinking, that it is essential to infuse creativity into decisions of state, and that war itself is an art.
Knowledge without imagination can tell you where you are but not where to go. Harnessing mythos and combining it with logos is therefore critically important. What are we losing—what have we lost?—by prioritizing logos at the expense of mythos? Tackling wicked problems requires unique, multifaceted, and creative approaches—in other words, Athena’s stomping ground. Might we get better policy outcomes if we resurrect Athena and the analytic approach that she represents?
Of course, it’s one thing to say we ought to be more creative and holistic in our thinking. It’s another thing entirely to actually build and explore such methodologically unbound spaces. Luckily, Charles Hill, in Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft and World Order, has an answer. He points out that Paul Nitze, one of the leading architects of post-World War II foreign policy, would study Shakespeare in his spare time. The bard’s characters and their circumstances give us space to empathize with their situations, to understand and appreciate their steps and missteps, and to think about how those insights might apply to our own lives and our own strategic circumstances.
All this is why efforts in recent years to use science fiction as a tool for understanding strategy and national security choices are so exciting. Australian Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan is using sci-fi as a tool for designing military education electives. Natasha Bajema is applying her deep subject matter expertise in weapons of mass destruction to her novel writing. Max Brooks’s World War Z is a compelling tool for discussing about pandemics, as is Chuck Wendig’s Wanderers. August Cole and P.W. Singer’s forthcoming book Burn-In explores the implications of artificial intelligence and robotics for national security and society in our not-too-distant future. Alex Finley uses satire to explore bureaucratic craziness in the intelligence community. Steve Leonard and the gang at West Point’s Modern War Institute have been organizing multi-author projects exploring the intersection of sci-fi and defense issues, including the brilliant Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict. (Full disclosure: I wrote one of its chapters.)
These are great starts, but there’s still a lot more to do if we’re going to more meaningfully embrace our creative sides. Sci-fi is proving its utility, but the creative arts more broadly provide useful metaphors for contemplating our strategic circumstances. We need to remember that fiction is not frivolous, as well as the power of creative readings. Hamlet, for example, teaches us the dangers of internal political dithering when existential challenges loom. Hill reminds us that Jane Austen’s Emma provides us a useful metaphor for poor intelligence that is applied poorly. The wicked problems we face are endlessly complicated, but the possibilities for using the arts to better understand these challenges are also limitless. Strategists need to actively cultivate holistic and creative approaches to national security policy if we want to be more like Athena and less like Ares.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--Trump’s Epic Coronavirus Fail Follows Bush’s 9/11 Playbook

Hopeful , rousing , presidential—former U.S. President George W. Bush ’ s video message calling for national unity during the COVID-19 crisis struck all the right notes we have learned not to expect from Donald Trump .
True to his vindictive form , Trump lost no time mocking Bush , whose message quickly went viral after it was released on May 2 .
The exchange put the contrast between the two men ’ s characters in stark relief .
On the one side , an unstable and irresponsible Trump , presiding over an administration that has more to do with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or Harry S. Truman .
On the other , Bush—not a poseur but a wartime president who staffed his administration with deeply experienced officials who took foreign policy seriously in a way that seems alien to the grifter commune that has coalesced around Trump .
Indeed , Bush was guided by a concept of national interest that wasn ’ t solely defined as his own personal political interest , even if the two are necessarily linked .
Bush was capable of ethical thinking , most notably in the case of AIDS in Africa @ @ @ @ @ @ @ help address .
Nor was he a bigot or an open supporter of white supremacists in the way that Trump surely is .
And even as he was waging war against countries whose populations were largely or almost exclusively Muslim , he urged Americans not to demonize Islam , and unhesitatingly shared the stage with Muslim clerics .
As president , Bush was considered stubborn , incurious , and inarticulate—but capable of learning from his mistakes , especially during his second term , when he worked to repair the damage he had done @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He was rigid but not always .
Trump , on the other hand , is flexible to the point of incoherence and incomprehensible on policy issues .
[ Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak : Get daily updates on the pandemic . ]
However , the focus on the two men ’ s real character differences—along with nostalgia for U.S. leadership before Trump—obscures the similarity of the two administrations in the way they handled their defining crises , COVID-19 and 9/11 .
These shared traits were on full display in the run-up to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ attacks , and the Bush administration ’ s response .
They were equally vivid in the period leading up to the coronavirus crisis , the Trump administration ’ s handling of the outbreak , and Trump ’ s murky plan for managing what promises to be a lengthy pandemic .
Trump ’ s handling of the current crisis uses the playbook that the Bush administration wrote nearly 20 years ago .
9/11 was preceded by five years of experts in and outside government warning about a new form of warfare inspired and justified @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by states but by substate actors with the aim of causing mass casualties .
A year and a half before the attacks , my colleague Daniel Benjamin and I sounded the alarm in the New York Times .
We were not divulging any secrets : Jihadists had announced their intention in a crystal-clear declaration of war in 1996 , had carried out a string of devastating attacks in the Middle East and Africa , and had made a previous attempt in 1993 to take down the World Trade Center in New York .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ small group of officials worked to prepare the country for an impending assault .
It was an uphill climb because the threat seemed so improbable—and the enemy looked so small and weak compared with nation-states .
When the Bush administration took office , Clinton ’ s national security team , some of whom had remained in their jobs , tried to convince Bush and his new national security advisor , Condoleezza Rice , to focus on the new enemy .
As evidence of an imminent attack on the United States mounted , Bush @ @ @ @ @ @ @ they construed as a Clinton-era obsession , irrelevant to the traditional world of great-power competition .
By the time they agreed to gather the National Security Council to discuss the threat , it was too late .
The meeting took place on Sept. 4 , 2001 .
In the aftermath of the attack , the willful incompetence of his administration was compounded by the single-minded fixation on an old and familiar U.S. adversary , Iraq .
Ignoring the contrary advice of intelligence experts , Bush and his team insisted that Saddam Hussein was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ invasion and regime change .
Richard Clarke , the White House counterterrorism advisor who had warned Bush about al Qaeda , was quietly demoted and ultimately left the administration .
In a pattern that would be repeated almost to the letter by Trump , the Bush administration removed its own government experts on Iraq , cast aside a detailed planning process led by deeply informed career officials , and substituted political hacks with no relevant experience , whose only qualification was loyalty to Bush .
Just as Trump declared the virus beaten before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ announced “ mission accomplished ” as soon as Saddam fell .
Within a year , profound U.S. mistakes triggered a civil war in Iraq that took many American and Iraqi lives and whose only beneficiary was Iran .
For years , a small group of experts has been warning about pandemics .
The Clinton administration established an international health security directorate on the National Security Council ( NSC ) , led by an able U.S. Public Health Service rear admiral , Kenneth Bernard .
The Barack Obama administration not only beefed up the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ swiftly to clamp down on SARS , MERS , swine flu , West Nile virus , and Ebola by spearheading an international response together with experts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC ) and the Department of Homeland Security .
These outbreaks led experts to anticipate a pandemic that would be both highly transmissible and lethal .
They were , in essence , warning of a viral 9/11 .
They also left Trump and his team a detailed playbook for handling a future pandemic .
But just as Bush @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump and his advisors came in with nothing but contempt for the preceding administration .
They dismissed the warnings , sent the NSC ’ s pandemic preparedness staff to a bureaucratic dungeon , stripped the CDC of essential funding , and replaced government experts with hucksters , cranks , and bootlickers .
The government response is led by the president ’ s son-in-law and within the Department of Health and Human Services by a former dog breeder .
The few experts who haven ’ t been fired yet , such as Anthony Fauci @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Allergy and Infectious Diseases , are routinely derided by the president .
Like Bush , Trump ignored months of systematic intelligence collection regarding the impending threat .
As early as November 2019 , U.S. intelligence experts were already exchanging information about the coronavirus with their Israeli counterparts .
As under Bush , the intelligence community fought to get heard by inserting repeated warnings into the daily presidential briefings .
As under Bush , they were ignored because Trump had his own preconceptions and preoccupations .
When Secretary of Health and Human Services @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s attention to the gathering storm , Trump responded by asking when Azar ’ s department would approve flavored vape.Just as Bush shifted the nation ’ s focus to Iraq , Trump seized the coronavirus to justify his obsession with China .
Like Bush , who couldn ’ t grasp the fact that al Qaeda was not the tool of an adversarial state , Trump refused to believe—or professed not to believe—that the virus was not an instrument of a hostile Chinese state , invented in a laboratory , and unleashed on an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the nation ’ s focus to Iraq , Trump seized the coronavirus to justify his obsession with China .
The pattern should be obvious by now .
Bush , despite his welcome and genuine call for unity , is not the virtuous opposite of Trump .
Rather , his administration ’ s disregard for a clearly identified threat , hostility to the experts who anticipated an attack , and inattention to crisis management was the template for Trump ’ s disastrous response to the crisis .
While Trump ’ s character might differ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a momentous challenge to U.S. security looks very much the same .

Hopeful, rousing, presidential—former U.S. President George W. Bush’s video message calling for national unity during the COVID-19 crisis struck all the right notes we have learned not to expect from Donald Trump. True to his vindictive form, Trump lost no time mocking Bush, whose message quickly went viral after it was released on May 2.
Hopeful, rousing, presidential—former U.S. President George W. Bush’s video message calling for national unity during the COVID-19 crisis struck all the right notes we have learned not to expect from Donald Trump. True to his vindictive form, Trump lost no time mocking Bush, whose message quickly went viral after it was released on May 2.
The exchange put the contrast between the two men’s characters in stark relief. On the one side, an unstable and irresponsible Trump, presiding over an administration that has more to do with Barnum & Bailey than Franklin D. Roosevelt or Harry S. Truman. On the other, Bush—not a poseur but a wartime president who staffed his administration with deeply experienced officials who took foreign policy seriously in a way that seems alien to the grifter commune that has coalesced around Trump.
Indeed, Bush was guided by a concept of national interest that wasn’t solely defined as his own personal political interest, even if the two are necessarily linked. Bush was capable of ethical thinking, most notably in the case of AIDS in Africa, which he directed his administration to help address. Nor was he a bigot or an open supporter of white supremacists in the way that Trump surely is. And even as he was waging war against countries whose populations were largely or almost exclusively Muslim, he urged Americans not to demonize Islam, and unhesitatingly shared the stage with Muslim clerics.
As president, Bush was considered stubborn, incurious, and inarticulate—but capable of learning from his mistakes, especially during his second term, when he worked to repair the damage he had done to the trans-Atlantic alliance during the first. He was rigid but not always. Trump, on the other hand, is flexible to the point of incoherence and incomprehensible on policy issues.
[Mapping the Coronavirus Outbreak: Get daily updates on the pandemic.]
However, the focus on the two men’s real character differences—along with nostalgia for U.S. leadership before Trump—obscures the similarity of the two administrations in the way they handled their defining crises, COVID-19 and 9/11.
These shared traits were on full display in the run-up to the 9/11 attacks, the action surrounding the attacks, and the Bush administration’s response. They were equally vivid in the period leading up to the coronavirus crisis, the Trump administration’s handling of the outbreak, and Trump’s murky plan for managing what promises to be a lengthy pandemic.
Trump’s handling of the current crisis uses the playbook that the Bush administration wrote nearly 20 years ago.
9/11 was preceded by five years of experts in and outside government warning about a new form of warfare inspired and justified by religion that would be waged not by states but by substate actors with the aim of causing mass casualties. A year and a half before the attacks, my colleague Daniel Benjamin and I sounded the alarm in the New York Times. We were not divulging any secrets: Jihadists had announced their intention in a crystal-clear declaration of war in 1996, had carried out a string of devastating attacks in the Middle East and Africa, and had made a previous attempt in 1993 to take down the World Trade Center in New York.
During the Bill Clinton administration, a small group of officials worked to prepare the country for an impending assault. It was an uphill climb because the threat seemed so improbable—and the enemy looked so small and weak compared with nation-states.
When the Bush administration took office, Clinton’s national security team, some of whom had remained in their jobs, tried to convince Bush and his new national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, to focus on the new enemy. As evidence of an imminent attack on the United States mounted, Bush and Rice showed increasing contempt for what they construed as a Clinton-era obsession, irrelevant to the traditional world of great-power competition. By the time they agreed to gather the National Security Council to discuss the threat, it was too late. The meeting took place on Sept. 4, 2001.
In the aftermath of the attack, the willful incompetence of his administration was compounded by the single-minded fixation on an old and familiar U.S. adversary, Iraq. Ignoring the contrary advice of intelligence experts, Bush and his team insisted that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attacks and prepared for invasion and regime change. Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism advisor who had warned Bush about al Qaeda, was quietly demoted and ultimately left the administration.
In a pattern that would be repeated almost to the letter by Trump, the Bush administration removed its own government experts on Iraq, cast aside a detailed planning process led by deeply informed career officials, and substituted political hacks with no relevant experience, whose only qualification was loyalty to Bush. Just as Trump declared the virus beaten before it truly began to spread, Bush announced “mission accomplished” as soon as Saddam fell. Within a year, profound U.S. mistakes triggered a civil war in Iraq that took many American and Iraqi lives and whose only beneficiary was Iran.
Fast forward to Trump and COVID-19.
For years, a small group of experts has been warning about pandemics. The Clinton administration established an international health security directorate on the National Security Council (NSC), led by an able U.S. Public Health Service rear admiral, Kenneth Bernard. The Barack Obama administration not only beefed up the NSC pandemic preparedness staff but also moved swiftly to clamp down on SARS, MERS, swine flu, West Nile virus, and Ebola by spearheading an international response together with experts at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Homeland Security. These outbreaks led experts to anticipate a pandemic that would be both highly transmissible and lethal. They were, in essence, warning of a viral 9/11. They also left Trump and his team a detailed playbook for handling a future pandemic.
But just as Bush dismissed warnings of impending terrorist attacks, Trump and his advisors came in with nothing but contempt for the preceding administration. They dismissed the warnings, sent the NSC’s pandemic preparedness staff to a bureaucratic dungeon, stripped the CDC of essential funding, and replaced government experts with hucksters, cranks, and bootlickers. The government response is led by the president’s son-in-law and within the Department of Health and Human Services by a former dog breeder. The few experts who haven’t been fired yet, such as Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, are routinely derided by the president.
Like Bush, Trump ignored months of systematic intelligence collection regarding the impending threat. As early as November 2019, U.S. intelligence experts were already exchanging information about the coronavirus with their Israeli counterparts. As under Bush, the intelligence community fought to get heard by inserting repeated warnings into the daily presidential briefings. As under Bush, they were ignored because Trump had his own preconceptions and preoccupations. When Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar tried to draw Trump’s attention to the gathering storm, Trump responded by asking when Azar’s department would approve flavored vape.Just as Bush shifted the nation’s focus to Iraq, Trump seized the coronavirus to justify his obsession with China.
Like Bush, who couldn’t grasp the fact that al Qaeda was not the tool of an adversarial state, Trump refused to believe—or professed not to believe—that the virus was not an instrument of a hostile Chinese state, invented in a laboratory, and unleashed on an unsuspecting world. Just as Bush shifted the nation’s focus to Iraq, Trump seized the coronavirus to justify his obsession with China.
The pattern should be obvious by now. Bush, despite his welcome and genuine call for unity, is not the virtuous opposite of Trump. Rather, his administration’s disregard for a clearly identified threat, hostility to the experts who anticipated an attack, and inattention to crisis management was the template for Trump’s disastrous response to the crisis. While Trump’s character might differ from Bush’s, his approach to a momentous challenge to U.S. security looks very much the same.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--The Pentagon Tries to Pivot out of the Middle East—Again

The Pentagon Tries to Pivot out of the Middle East—Again When the U.S. Defense Department announced , on May 7 , that it would withdraw two Patriot missile batteries and several fighter aircraft from Saudi Arabia , it looked like an ominous development in the tense relationship between Washington and Riyadh.When the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of Patriot missiles and fighter aircraft , it looked like an ominous development in the U.S.-Saudi relationship .
Speculation was rife that it was an effort by the Trump administration to punish the kingdom for starting an oil price war that—in concert with collapsing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wreaked havoc in the U.S. shale oil industry .
After all , angry Republican Senators had already introduced legislation calling for a complete U.S. military withdrawal , including the Patriot batteries .
There were also credible reports that Trump himself had used these threats in negotiations with Riyadh to achieve the historic April 12 deal to cut oil production by 9.7 million barrels per day in an attempt to prop up prices and save U.S. shale .
But widespread anger in Washington at Saudi Arabia—over the oil price war , over the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi—doesn ’ t make the speculation correct .
The withdrawal was much less about punishing the kingdom than about the Pentagon ’ s effort to manage its finite resources and shift many of them elsewhere from the Middle East .
But just like previous attempts to pivot , this one also comes with dangers .
While withdrawing some forces from the region may be a manageable and necessary risk , pulling out too many could send the wrong message about U.S. capabilities and invite the increased regional conflict @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The withdrawal reverses , at least in part , a significant U.S. military buildup in the Middle East that began last year to counter the threat from Iran .
Privately , U.S. officials explained that these additional deployments to Saudi Arabia were always a temporary measure to augment Saudi defense capabilities and address a spike in Iranian aggression .
Once adequate arrangements were in place to close the gap in Saudi defenses , the emergency deployment was , by definition , to end .
The defensive missiles and fighter aircraft were clearly @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Following Tehran ’ s Sept. 14 attacks on Saudi Arabia ’ s Khurais oil field and Abqaiq oil processing facility , the Pentagon sent a significant number of additional military personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia .
These U.S. deployments included Patriot missile batteries to augment the kingdom ’ s own missile defense capabilities , which had failed to prevent Tehran ’ s drones and cruise missiles from attacking the world ’ s largest oil processing facility .
The two departing Patriot batteries were guarding the oil facilities .
Another two batteries @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. forces are stationed , will reportedly stay in place for now .
If the withdrawal confused allies and unleashed speculation about the motives behind it , Washington only had itself to blame .
From the Pentagon to the State Department to the White House , no one seemed prepared to provide an authoritative public explanation for the withdrawal and to underscore the United States ’ commitment to regional partners .
Consequently , an information vacuum emerged that was quickly filled by rumors and speculation .
In an unsuccessful attempt at damage control @ @ @ @ @ @ @ described the withdrawal as part of a global redeployment process that “ routinely circulates troops and assets to address emerging threats and maintain readiness.
” In the context of an ongoing campaign of maximum pressure on Iran , however , a badly executed or poorly justified withdrawal could quickly become anything but routine .
Even if there are now fewer attacks by Iran and its proxies , more than four decades of history suggest it is likely a fleeting tactical or operational pause rather than a durable and strategic change of course .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ gunboats to harass U.S. ships in a move the U.S. Navy called “ dangerous and provocative.
” In March , Tehran ’ s proxies in Iraq launched multiple rocket attacks at bases hosting U.S. forces .
And in Syria , Israel has conducted repeated strikes to counter Iran ’ s relentless efforts to equip Lebanon ’ s Hezbollah with precision munitions .
The Pentagon insists it is staying vigilant and has forces ready .
The United States retains “ robust in-theater capabilities , including air defense , to address any Iran-related contingencies as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We also maintain the capability to augment these forces on short notice.
” That ’ s a point Washington and its regional allies should emphasize .
Otherwise , Tehran could perceive the withdrawal as a waning commitment to defend U.S. partners and regional interests—inviting more of the aggression Washington wants to avoid .
Saudi sources emphasized last week that Riyadh will be deploying its own Patriot systems to backfill the departing U.S. batteries .
The Saudis have used the intervening months to strengthen their defenses and conduct additional training with U.S. advisors .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to utilize their own air defense arsenal to protect the kingdom ’ s vital economic assets .
Given the growing missile threats to U.S. forces , it is easy to see why the Patriots are so much in demand .
In January , Iran launched 16 ballistic missiles at bases housing American troops in Iraq .
The Pentagon had decided to deploy its limited inventory of Patriot systems elsewhere , so U.S. troops had no choice but to brace for impact .
After the attack injured more than 100 Americans , the Pentagon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. Congress and the Trump administration must ensure that sufficient air and missile defense capabilities are procured and deployed in order to avoid leaving large concentrations of U.S. personnel and equipment unprotected while they are in easy reach of a hostile regime with ample missile capability .
In the meantime , many in the Pentagon note that every deployment to the Middle East is a military asset that is not available to deter China in the Pacific .
The 2018 National Defense Strategy anticipated this tension : While the strategy identified China and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ principal priorities , ” it also emphasized that the U.S. military must “ sustain its efforts to deter and counter ” Iran .
Finding the right balance to deter both Iran and China is much easier said than done , even for the world ’ s best military .
Too many U.S. military forces in the Middle East will deprive the Pentagon of resources needed elsewhere , but too few will leave U.S. interests , personnel , and allies insufficiently protected .
That could permit the resurgence of the Islamic State or invite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ spark a larger conflict in the Middle East that would pull U.S. military personnel and assets needed to meet the Pentagon ’ s priorities in the Pacific .
In 2018 , then-Defense Secretary James Mattis pulled four Patriot batteries and a U.S. aircraft carrier out of the Middle East for redeployment to Asia .
Less than a year later , those assets and more had to be rushed back to the Gulf to counter a spike in Iranian aggression—including the precision strike on Saudi oil facilities .
That should serve as a cautionary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ far in withdrawing forces , expect them to be returning soon when the next crisis emerges .

When the U.S. Defense Department announced, on May 7, that it would withdraw two Patriot missile batteries and several fighter aircraft from Saudi Arabia, it looked like an ominous development in the tense relationship between Washington and Riyadh.When the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of Patriot missiles and fighter aircraft, it looked like an ominous development in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Speculation was rife that it was an effort by the Trump administration to punish the kingdom for starting an oil price war that—in concert with collapsing oil demand due to the coronavirus pandemic—has wreaked havoc in the U.S. shale oil industry.
When the U.S. Defense Department announced, on May 7, that it would withdraw two Patriot missile batteries and several fighter aircraft from Saudi Arabia, it looked like an ominous development in the tense relationship between Washington and Riyadh.When the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of Patriot missiles and fighter aircraft, it looked like an ominous development in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Speculation was rife that it was an effort by the Trump administration to punish the kingdom for starting an oil price war that—in concert with collapsing oil demand due to the coronavirus pandemic—has wreaked havoc in the U.S. shale oil industry.
After all, angry Republican Senators had already introduced legislation calling for a complete U.S. military withdrawal, including the Patriot batteries. There were also credible reports that Trump himself had used these threats in negotiations with Riyadh to achieve the historic April 12 deal to cut oil production by 9.7 million barrels per day in an attempt to prop up prices and save U.S. shale.
But widespread anger in Washington at Saudi Arabia—over the oil price war, over the war in Yemen, over the killing of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi—doesn’t make the speculation correct. The withdrawal was much less about punishing the kingdom than about the Pentagon’s effort to manage its finite resources and shift many of them elsewhere from the Middle East.
But just like previous attempts to pivot, this one also comes with dangers. While withdrawing some forces from the region may be a manageable and necessary risk, pulling out too many could send the wrong message about U.S. capabilities and invite the increased regional conflict that the Pentagon most wants to avoid.
The withdrawal reverses, at least in part, a significant U.S. military buildup in the Middle East that began last year to counter the threat from Iran. Privately, U.S. officials explained that these additional deployments to Saudi Arabia were always a temporary measure to augment Saudi defense capabilities and address a spike in Iranian aggression. Once adequate arrangements were in place to close the gap in Saudi defenses, the emergency deployment was, by definition, to end.
The defensive missiles and fighter aircraft were clearly purposed to ward off threats from Iran. Following Tehran’s Sept. 14 attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Khurais oil field and Abqaiq oil processing facility, the Pentagon sent a significant number of additional military personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia. These U.S. deployments included Patriot missile batteries to augment the kingdom’s own missile defense capabilities, which had failed to prevent Tehran’s drones and cruise missiles from attacking the world’s largest oil processing facility. The two departing Patriot batteries were guarding the oil facilities. Another two batteries guarding Prince Sultan Air Base, where U.S. forces are stationed, will reportedly stay in place for now.
If the withdrawal confused allies and unleashed speculation about the motives behind it, Washington only had itself to blame. From the Pentagon to the State Department to the White House, no one seemed prepared to provide an authoritative public explanation for the withdrawal and to underscore the United States’ commitment to regional partners. Consequently, an information vacuum emerged that was quickly filled by rumors and speculation.
In an unsuccessful attempt at damage control, Pentagon spokesperson Cmdr. Sean Robertson described the withdrawal as part of a global redeployment process that “routinely circulates troops and assets to address emerging threats and maintain readiness.” In the context of an ongoing campaign of maximum pressure on Iran, however, a badly executed or poorly justified withdrawal could quickly become anything but routine. Even if there are now fewer attacks by Iran and its proxies, more than four decades of history suggest it is likely a fleeting tactical or operational pause rather than a durable and strategic change of course.
Only last month, Tehran sent 11 gunboats to harass U.S. ships in a move the U.S. Navy called “dangerous and provocative.” In March, Tehran’s proxies in Iraq launched multiple rocket attacks at bases hosting U.S. forces. And in Syria, Israel has conducted repeated strikes to counter Iran’s relentless efforts to equip Lebanon’s Hezbollah with precision munitions.
The Pentagon insists it is staying vigilant and has forces ready. The United States retains “robust in-theater capabilities, including air defense, to address any Iran-related contingencies as needed,” Robertson said. “We also maintain the capability to augment these forces on short notice.” That’s a point Washington and its regional allies should emphasize. Otherwise, Tehran could perceive the withdrawal as a waning commitment to defend U.S. partners and regional interests—inviting more of the aggression Washington wants to avoid.
Saudi sources emphasized last week that Riyadh will be deploying its own Patriot systems to backfill the departing U.S. batteries. The Saudis have used the intervening months to strengthen their defenses and conduct additional training with U.S. advisors. It clearly makes sense for the Saudis to utilize their own air defense arsenal to protect the kingdom’s vital economic assets.
Given the growing missile threats to U.S. forces, it is easy to see why the Patriots are so much in demand. In January, Iran launched 16 ballistic missiles at bases housing American troops in Iraq. The Pentagon had decided to deploy its limited inventory of Patriot systems elsewhere, so U.S. troops had no choice but to brace for impact. After the attack injured more than 100 Americans, the Pentagon finally deployed Patriots to Iraq.
The U.S. Congress and the Trump administration must ensure that sufficient air and missile defense capabilities are procured and deployed in order to avoid leaving large concentrations of U.S. personnel and equipment unprotected while they are in easy reach of a hostile regime with ample missile capability.
In the meantime, many in the Pentagon note that every deployment to the Middle East is a military asset that is not available to deter China in the Pacific. The 2018 National Defense Strategy anticipated this tension: While the strategy identified China and Russia as the Pentagon’s “principal priorities,” it also emphasized that the U.S. military must “sustain its efforts to deter and counter” Iran.
Finding the right balance to deter both Iran and China is much easier said than done, even for the world’s best military. Too many U.S. military forces in the Middle East will deprive the Pentagon of resources needed elsewhere, but too few will leave U.S. interests, personnel, and allies insufficiently protected. That could permit the resurgence of the Islamic State or invite increased aggression from Iran. Either could spark a larger conflict in the Middle East that would pull U.S. military personnel and assets needed to meet the Pentagon’s priorities in the Pacific.
In 2018, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis pulled four Patriot batteries and a U.S. aircraft carrier out of the Middle East for redeployment to Asia. Less than a year later, those assets and more had to be rushed back to the Gulf to counter a spike in Iranian aggression—including the precision strike on Saudi oil facilities. That should serve as a cautionary tale: If the Pentagon goes too far in withdrawing forces, expect them to be returning soon when the next crisis emerges.


foreignpolicy--2020-05-19--In the Post-Pandemic Cold War, America Is Losing Europe

In the Post-Pandemic Cold War , America Is Losing Europe The COVID-19 pandemic has opened the world ’ s eyes to the true nature of the Chinese regime , countless articles have told us in recent weeks .
And perhaps they are right .
But in Europe , it is the U.S. response to the virus , even more so than China ’ s , that is deeply unsettling politicians and the wider public .
A new poll from the Körber Foundation , released on Monday , is the latest evidence of this .
The results are astonishing—and should give @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a robust , united U.S.-led front against China emerging in the wake of this crisis .
The survey shows that Germans are now almost equally divided on whether Washington or Beijing is the more important partner , with 37 percent choosing the United States and 36 percent China .
This represents a significant shift compared with Körber ’ s last survey in September 2019 , when Germans gave the United States a commanding 26 percentage-point edge over China .
This doesn ’ t mean that Germans are giving China a free pass .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ more transparency from the Chinese government would have reduced the impact or even prevented the pandemic from spreading .
Yet only 36 percent say their opinion of China has worsened , compared with 73 percent whose view of the United States has deteriorated in the crisis .
What does this mean ?
First , some caveats .
Few people expect transparency from the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) .
They hold the United States to a higher standard and are thus more easily disappointed when Washington fails .
Moreover , German views @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the most negative in all of Europe ever since President Donald Trump entered the White House .
That was also the case under President George W. Bush , only for opinions to swing back sharply into positive territory as soon as Barack Obama replaced him .
The German public is fickle , and—rightly or wrongly—its views of the United States are heavily influenced by the person sitting in the Oval Office .
“ German attitudes towards the U.S. were in free fall before the corona crisis , ” Nora Müller , the executive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told Foreign Policy .
“ Doubts about the Trump administration ’ s management of the pandemic and a perceived absence of U.S. global leadership have obviously aggravated the alienation.
” German politicians , on the other hand , must take broader considerations into account when balancing the relationship with Washington and Beijing .
The United States is a democracy that shares essential values with Europe .
China is not .
The United States has guaranteed the security of Germany and other European countries for 75 years .
China spent a large part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the world is changing .
We may be at the dawn of an Asian century .
Politicians in Germany and elsewhere in Europe see the geopolitical arc shifting , and this affects their calculations .
They see a CCP that covered up the virus in its early weeks and then , after it spread around the world , employed an aggressive propaganda and disinformation campaign to try to shift the narrative in its favor .
They also see how the CCP successfully contained the virus at home—albeit with tactics that would not be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mind to it .
Because of that , the Chinese economy is likely to bounce back faster .
When they look to the United States , they see chaos—a country where even in the face of a disease that has killed more than 91,000 Americans , politicians are unable to put aside partisan sniping and come together .
They see an administration that eschews science and global cooperation when they are needed most .
And they see a president who seems ready to take a scorched-earth approach to the U.S.-China relationship if that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his flagging reelection hopes .
Importantly , Trump is not seen in Europe as the cause of U.S. dysfunction but rather a symptom or accelerator of it .
If Joe Biden is sitting in the White House come January , the crippling partisan divide will still be there .
And so will the economic devastation left by a crisis that Americans—after decades of ever smaller government—seem totally unprepared to cope with .
Working with the United States may be easier once Trump is gone .
But for how long ?
The U.S. response @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Germany and other European countries .
According to a survey by the British Foreign Policy Group this month , just 28 percent of Britons said they trusted the United States to act responsibly in the world , a fall of 13 percentage points since January .
Conservative voters , who previously expressed outsized levels of trust in the United States , are responsible for the largest loss of confidence .
A survey by the Ifop polling group asked French people this month which countries were best placed to confront the challenges of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ chose the United States .
An April poll by the SWG research institute showed that 36 percent of Italians surveyed believed their country should focus on developing close ties with China , compared with 30 percent who chose the United States .
In the Körber poll , a younger generation raised on the Iraq War , tales of NSA spying , and now Trump showed the most skepticism toward the United States .
Among Germans in the 18-34 age group , 46 percent said it was important to have close ties to China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States .
This does not mean that Europe is heading toward a policy of equidistance between the United States and China .
Concern about the direction in which President Xi Jinping is taking China—more state control , more surveillance , more intimidation abroad—has been building for years .
But it does mean that Europe will continue to be wary about siding with Washington against Beijing .
Do you agree to take on the school bully together with your old friend if that friend is unreliable ?
What if the friend has started bullying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with Europe on the 5G question and appears to be doing now with the United Kingdom by insisting it choose between a trade deal with Washington and one with Beijing .
You probably don ’ t want to take on the bully with this friend .
Instead , Europe is hedging .
It is currently in negotiations with Beijing on a comprehensive investment agreement and joint measures to combat climate change .
Clinching these deals is a long shot .
But if it does come together , just as the U.S. election is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ signal that the United States is losing Europe on its No .
1 foreign-policy priority : China .

The COVID-19 pandemic has opened the world’s eyes to the true nature of the Chinese regime, countless articles have told us in recent weeks. And perhaps they are right. But in Europe, it is the U.S. response to the virus, even more so than China’s, that is deeply unsettling politicians and the wider public.
The COVID-19 pandemic has opened the world’s eyes to the true nature of the Chinese regime, countless articles have told us in recent weeks. And perhaps they are right. But in Europe, it is the U.S. response to the virus, even more so than China’s, that is deeply unsettling politicians and the wider public.
A new poll from the Körber Foundation, released on Monday, is the latest evidence of this. The results are astonishing—and should give pause to anyone in Washington who sees a robust, united U.S.-led front against China emerging in the wake of this crisis.
The survey shows that Germans are now almost equally divided on whether Washington or Beijing is the more important partner, with 37 percent choosing the United States and 36 percent China. This represents a significant shift compared with Körber’s last survey in September 2019, when Germans gave the United States a commanding 26 percentage-point edge over China.
This doesn’t mean that Germans are giving China a free pass. As many as 71 percent agree that more transparency from the Chinese government would have reduced the impact or even prevented the pandemic from spreading. Yet only 36 percent say their opinion of China has worsened, compared with 73 percent whose view of the United States has deteriorated in the crisis.
What does this mean? First, some caveats. Few people expect transparency from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They hold the United States to a higher standard and are thus more easily disappointed when Washington fails.
Moreover, German views of the United States have been among the most negative in all of Europe ever since President Donald Trump entered the White House. That was also the case under President George W. Bush, only for opinions to swing back sharply into positive territory as soon as Barack Obama replaced him. The German public is fickle, and—rightly or wrongly—its views of the United States are heavily influenced by the person sitting in the Oval Office.
“German attitudes towards the U.S. were in free fall before the corona crisis,” Nora Müller, the executive director for international affairs at Körber, told Foreign Policy. “Doubts about the Trump administration’s management of the pandemic and a perceived absence of U.S. global leadership have obviously aggravated the alienation.”
German politicians, on the other hand, must take broader considerations into account when balancing the relationship with Washington and Beijing. The United States is a democracy that shares essential values with Europe. China is not. The United States has guaranteed the security of Germany and other European countries for 75 years. China spent a large part of that period preoccupied with itself.
But the world is changing. We may be at the dawn of an Asian century. Politicians in Germany and elsewhere in Europe see the geopolitical arc shifting, and this affects their calculations. They see a CCP that covered up the virus in its early weeks and then, after it spread around the world, employed an aggressive propaganda and disinformation campaign to try to shift the narrative in its favor. They also see how the CCP successfully contained the virus at home—albeit with tactics that would not be acceptable in liberal democracies—once it set its mind to it. Because of that, the Chinese economy is likely to bounce back faster.
When they look to the United States, they see chaos—a country where even in the face of a disease that has killed more than 91,000 Americans, politicians are unable to put aside partisan sniping and come together. They see an administration that eschews science and global cooperation when they are needed most. And they see a president who seems ready to take a scorched-earth approach to the U.S.-China relationship if that’s what it takes to rescue his flagging reelection hopes.
Importantly, Trump is not seen in Europe as the cause of U.S. dysfunction but rather a symptom or accelerator of it. If Joe Biden is sitting in the White House come January, the crippling partisan divide will still be there. And so will the economic devastation left by a crisis that Americans—after decades of ever smaller government—seem totally unprepared to cope with. Working with the United States may be easier once Trump is gone. But for how long? The U.S. response to the coronavirus has deepened these doubts in Germany and other European countries.
According to a survey by the British Foreign Policy Group this month, just 28 percent of Britons said they trusted the United States to act responsibly in the world, a fall of 13 percentage points since January. Conservative voters, who previously expressed outsized levels of trust in the United States, are responsible for the largest loss of confidence.
A survey by the Ifop polling group asked French people this month which countries were best placed to confront the challenges of the coming decades. Just 3 percent chose the United States. An April poll by the SWG research institute showed that 36 percent of Italians surveyed believed their country should focus on developing close ties with China, compared with 30 percent who chose the United States.
In the Körber poll, a younger generation raised on the Iraq War, tales of NSA spying, and now Trump showed the most skepticism toward the United States. Among Germans in the 18-34 age group, 46 percent said it was important to have close ties to China against 35 percent who picked the United States.
This does not mean that Europe is heading toward a policy of equidistance between the United States and China. Concern about the direction in which President Xi Jinping is taking China—more state control, more surveillance, more intimidation abroad—has been building for years. But it does mean that Europe will continue to be wary about siding with Washington against Beijing.
Do you agree to take on the school bully together with your old friend if that friend is unreliable? What if the friend has started bullying you himself—as the United States has done with Europe on the 5G question and appears to be doing now with the United Kingdom by insisting it choose between a trade deal with Washington and one with Beijing. You probably don’t want to take on the bully with this friend.
Instead, Europe is hedging. It is currently in negotiations with Beijing on a comprehensive investment agreement and joint measures to combat climate change. Clinching these deals is a long shot. But if it does come together, just as the U.S. election is taking place, it will send another signal that the United States is losing Europe on its No. 1 foreign-policy priority: China.