foreignpolicy--2020-10-03--What Happens If a Presidential Candidate Dies Before Election Day?

What Happens If a Presidential Candidate Dies Before Election Day ?
President Donald Trump ’ s battle against the coronavirus appeared to intensify today as reports emerged that the U.S. commander in chief was given oxygen before being hospitalized , with anonymous sources close to the White House warning that Trump has entered a critical stage in his treatment .
The scant reports coming out of Walter Reed Medical Center , where Trump was admitted Friday for treatment , are deepening questions among U.S. officials , allies , and adversaries about the 74-year-old president ’ s condition , and what @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of serving .
To help answer those questions , Foreign Policy took a look at Trump ’ s prospects for recovery , the potential paths of presidential succession , and what it means less than a month before a hotly contested election .
How serious is the president ’ s condition ?
As of Saturday afternoon , there are contradictory messages coming out of the White House , almost simultaneously .
In a briefing to reporters on Saturday , White House physician Sean Conley said Trump was “ doing very well ” and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
But then immediately following the briefing , White House pool reporters released the following statement from “ a source familiar with the president ’ s health ” : “ The president ’ s vitals over the last 24 hours were very concerning and the next 48 hours will be critical in terms of his care .
We ’ re still not on a clear path to a full recovery.
” ( Later reports suggested the anonymous source was White House chief of staff Mark Meadows . )
Trump has been given an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ clinical trials , and the vast majority of people with COVID-19 recover ; overall fatality rates from the virus are just shy of 3 percent of confirmed cases in the United States .
But he ’ s still considered to be at a high risk , given his advanced age and obesity .
The dueling messages led Trump himself to issue a Twitter missive downplaying worries about his health on Saturday afternoon : “ Doctors , Nurses and ALL at the GREAT Walter Reed Medical Center , and others from likewise incredible institutions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ !
!
!
” The president insisted he was “ feeling well ” and began firing off more tweets , urging for Congress to pass a stalled coronavirus stimulus measure .
Joe Biden , the Democratic presidential candidate and former vice president , announced Friday that he tested negative for the coronavirus , after sparring in close proximity to Trump in the first presidential debate this week shortly before the president announced his diagnosis .
( Both were maskless . )
Biden ’ s running mate , California Sen. Kamala Harris , also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ health experts say that Biden will have to take more tests in the coming days to confirm the negative diagnosis after facing possible contagion from the president .
What happens if Trump takes a turn for the worse ?
As legal experts and election observers have pointed out , it ’ s important to understand election processes if a president becomes severely ill , incapacitated , or worse—without being too alarmist .
The 25th Amendment to the Constitution allows the president to temporarily grant his powers to the vice president if he becomes @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his job .
Vice President Mike Pence , unlike other White House advisors , has tested negative for the virus .
If the vice president were to somehow become incapacitated , the powers of the presidency would move to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi .
In turn , the third in line to the presidency is the president pro tempore of the Senate , Iowa Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley , and the fourth in line is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
But even though administration officials have insisted that the chain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ military need to respond to a crisis , historically , the temporary incapacitation of the president has at least created optics issues for the White House .
After the 1981 assassination attempt that hospitalized President Ronald Reagan , then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig insisted—wrongly—at a press briefing that he was temporarily in charge of the country .
OK , but what happens if either candidate becomes incapacitated or dies before the election ?
That ’ s where things get complicated , even if it ’ s an unlikely scenario , according to Joshua @ @ @ @ @ @ @ at New York University who have explored these questions in-depth for Washington Post ’ s Monkey Cage blog .
The constitution provides a road map , but not for every possible contingency .
If a candidate wins the presidency , but then dies before assuming office in January , there ’ s a straightforward answer , thanks to the 20th Amendment to the constitution : The vice president-elect ( either Pence or Harris in this instance ) would become president .
If a candidate dies before the election , the national party committees @ @ @ @ @ @ @ top of each ticket .
But we ’ re a month away from the election , and some states have already started voting .
That ’ s where the already complicated becomes much more complicated , as Tucker and Pildes explain .
Each state has deadlines for when candidates ’ names can be placed on the ballot ; most have come and gone .
And in many states , particularly in the wake of the pandemic , mail-in ballots have already been sent and voters are already mailing in their ballots .
So @ @ @ @ @ @ @ were to die or become incapacitated , there would be no practical way for the Republican National Committee to pick a new candidate , then have each state recast its ballots to reflect the new ticket .
Those are uncharted waters , and it would take historic and complex legal battles to figure out how to proceed .
So it could be up to the Electoral College ?
Sort of .
In some states , but not all , Electoral College delegates are required to cast a vote for the candidate that won @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Even in states without those binding laws , electoral delegates still follow the popular vote in practice .
The problem comes if a winning candidate dies or becomes incapacitated : There is no precedent and little state legislation to address such a contingency .
This points to more uncharted waters and more looming legal battles if that were to happen .
What if no candidate can secure a majority in the Electoral College ?
Then , as in 1876 , it would go to the House of Representatives to decide—but not on a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Instead , each state congressional delegation gets one vote for any of the top three electoral vote recipients in the election .
In that long-shot scenario , that could give the Republicans a slight edge , since they control slightly more state delegations than do Democrats .

President Donald Trump’s battle against the coronavirus appeared to intensify today as reports emerged that the U.S. commander in chief was given oxygen before being hospitalized, with anonymous sources close to the White House warning that Trump has entered a critical stage in his treatment.
President Donald Trump’s battle against the coronavirus appeared to intensify today as reports emerged that the U.S. commander in chief was given oxygen before being hospitalized, with anonymous sources close to the White House warning that Trump has entered a critical stage in his treatment.
The scant reports coming out of Walter Reed Medical Center, where Trump was admitted Friday for treatment, are deepening questions among U.S. officials, allies, and adversaries about the 74-year-old president’s condition, and what might happen if Trump is rendered incapable of serving.
To help answer those questions, Foreign Policy took a look at Trump’s prospects for recovery, the potential paths of presidential succession, and what it means less than a month before a hotly contested election.
How serious is the president’s condition?
As of Saturday afternoon, there are contradictory messages coming out of the White House, almost simultaneously. In a briefing to reporters on Saturday, White House physician Sean Conley said Trump was “doing very well” and improving from a mild cough and fatigue. But then immediately following the briefing, White House pool reporters released the following statement from “a source familiar with the president’s health”: “The president’s vitals over the last 24 hours were very concerning and the next 48 hours will be critical in terms of his care. We’re still not on a clear path to a full recovery.” (Later reports suggested the anonymous source was White House chief of staff Mark Meadows.)
Trump has been given an experimental antibody treatment that is still undergoing clinical trials, and the vast majority of people with COVID-19 recover; overall fatality rates from the virus are just shy of 3 percent of confirmed cases in the United States. But he’s still considered to be at a high risk, given his advanced age and obesity.
The dueling messages led Trump himself to issue a Twitter missive downplaying worries about his health on Saturday afternoon: “Doctors, Nurses and ALL at the GREAT Walter Reed Medical Center, and others from likewise incredible institutions who have joined them, are AMAZING!!!” The president insisted he was “feeling well” and began firing off more tweets, urging for Congress to pass a stalled coronavirus stimulus measure.
How about Joe Biden?
Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential candidate and former vice president, announced Friday that he tested negative for the coronavirus, after sparring in close proximity to Trump in the first presidential debate this week shortly before the president announced his diagnosis. (Both were maskless.) Biden’s running mate, California Sen. Kamala Harris, also announced she tested negative. But many health experts say that Biden will have to take more tests in the coming days to confirm the negative diagnosis after facing possible contagion from the president.
What happens if Trump takes a turn for the worse?
As legal experts and election observers have pointed out, it’s important to understand election processes if a president becomes severely ill, incapacitated, or worse—without being too alarmist. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution allows the president to temporarily grant his powers to the vice president if he becomes incapacitated or too ill to properly do his job. Vice President Mike Pence, unlike other White House advisors, has tested negative for the virus. If the vice president were to somehow become incapacitated, the powers of the presidency would move to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. In turn, the third in line to the presidency is the president pro tempore of the Senate, Iowa Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley, and the fourth in line is Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
But even though administration officials have insisted that the chain of command remains intact should the U.S. military need to respond to a crisis, historically, the temporary incapacitation of the president has at least created optics issues for the White House. After the 1981 assassination attempt that hospitalized President Ronald Reagan, then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig insisted—wrongly—at a press briefing that he was temporarily in charge of the country.
OK, but what happens if either candidate becomes incapacitated or dies before the election?
That’s where things get complicated, even if it’s an unlikely scenario, according to Joshua Tucker and Richard Pildes, both professors at New York University who have explored these questions in-depth for Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog. The constitution provides a road map, but not for every possible contingency. If a candidate wins the presidency, but then dies before assuming office in January, there’s a straightforward answer, thanks to the 20th Amendment to the constitution: The vice president-elect (either Pence or Harris in this instance) would become president.
If a candidate dies before the election, the national party committees would pick a new candidate for the top of each ticket.
But we’re a month away from the election, and some states have already started voting.
That’s where the already complicated becomes much more complicated, as Tucker and Pildes explain. Each state has deadlines for when candidates’ names can be placed on the ballot; most have come and gone. And in many states, particularly in the wake of the pandemic, mail-in ballots have already been sent and voters are already mailing in their ballots. So at this point, even if Trump were to die or become incapacitated, there would be no practical way for the Republican National Committee to pick a new candidate, then have each state recast its ballots to reflect the new ticket. Those are uncharted waters, and it would take historic and complex legal battles to figure out how to proceed.
So it could be up to the Electoral College?
Sort of. In some states, but not all, Electoral College delegates are required to cast a vote for the candidate that won the state’s popular vote. Even in states without those binding laws, electoral delegates still follow the popular vote in practice. The problem comes if a winning candidate dies or becomes incapacitated: There is no precedent and little state legislation to address such a contingency. This points to more uncharted waters and more looming legal battles if that were to happen.
What if no candidate can secure a majority in the Electoral College?
Then, as in 1876, it would go to the House of Representatives to decide—but not on a straight vote as in normal House legislation. Instead, each state congressional delegation gets one vote for any of the top three electoral vote recipients in the election. In that long-shot scenario, that could give the Republicans a slight edge, since they control slightly more state delegations than do Democrats.
Staff writer Jack Detsch contributed to this report.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-04--The War for the Future of Syria and Iraq Will Be Fought on Smartphones

As Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was on his way to Washington in mid-August to discuss the continued U.S. role in Iraq , a package of smartphones was making the opposite journey to U.S. soldiers in Iraq .
They had been ordered by Col. Myles Caggins , the then-spokesperson for the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition .
“ I ’ m fairly certain this will be the first time iPhone 11 Pro Max are issued to public affairs soldiers—quite a breakthrough , ” he told me .
The phones are symbolic of a larger challenge facing the international coalition and especially @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that spreads in Iraq and Syria and also to explain the coalition ’ s mission .
The United States must confront sophisticated information warfare from pro-Iranian groups , the Syrian regime , and Moscow that is designed to erode trust in the anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq and Syria .
For the last six months , there have been increasing rocket and improvised explosive device ( IED ) attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq by groups that boast of removing Americans from the country .
Videos of the attacks are put online to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groups such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba regularly put out messages accusing the United States of operating its embassy as a military base to justify further attacks .
Iranian media prints claims daily alleging U.S. wrongdoing , such as looting Syria ’ s oil .
In Syria , Russian ground troops harass U.S. patrols , and Russian officials and media seek to portray the confrontations as America ’ s fault .
This combination of military confrontation in Iraq and Syria with messaging on the ground that is put out for local consumption and regional @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presence .
In an unprecedented step in late September , Washington told Baghdad that if attacks on the embassy and U.S. personnel didn ’ t stop , then the United States would pull out of its massive embassy compound .
When Caggins arrived in Iraq in August 2019 , the coalition ’ s public affairs officers in Baghdad had few connections with their counterparts in the Syrian Democratic Forces ( SDF ) .
Despite four years of working together , the coalition ’ s Twitter account didn ’ t even follow the account @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s spokesperson in northern Syria .
Caggins was the first spokesperson to tweet in Kurdish and reach out to his counterparts in Syria to coordinate messaging .
The coalition ’ s use of tweets to message to adversaries and partners on the ground emphasizes the way wars are being influenced by social media today .
As spokesperson , Caggins called rumors of attacks on U.S. convoys “ false ” and showed solidarity with tribes in the Euphrates Valley that suffered from Islamic States massacres .
The tribes are key to shoring up security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today .
Tamping down pro-Iranian fake news is also key to discouraging escalation .
In his year as spokesperson , he played a key role in pioneering new technology , tweeting in Kurdish , cultivating local relationships , and pushing for more proactive social media use .
Caggins left the post last month , but his vision could transform the way the United States fights future wars and illustrates the struggle Washington has faced at this pivotal moment in Baghdad .
Caggins arrived in Iraq last year as the top public affairs officer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the early years of the U.S. war in Iraq , having served in Diyala province in 2003 , he transitioned into public affairs for the military in 2006 and was a public affairs officer for the 1st Armored Division in southern Iraq in 2009-2010 .
The twin crises of the Turkish invasion in Syria and U.S.-Iran tensions in Iraq mean that the United States ’ continued role at the head of the international coalition against the Islamic State is in doubt .
Kadhimi ’ s trip to Washington in August was part of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ States , and President Donald Trump said in the meeting that the U.S. military in Iraq was down to a “ very small number of soldiers.
” Those soldiers , now concentrated on a handful of bases after the coalition handed over more than six posts and bases to Iraqi forces in 2020 , face weekly rocket attacks by pro-Iranian militias .
Trump also indicated on Aug. 20 that the United States had completed its withdrawal from Syria ’ s border areas and would make a decision on whether to remain and keep @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soon.
” U.S. Central Command recently sent Bradley armored vehicles back to Syria to bolster the U.S. presence there as the Trump administration contemplates what to do next .
During this tenuous , challenging period for U.S. forces , the role of public affairs officers has grown .
With U.S. troops confined to their bases , often no longer going outside the wire on patrols with their counterparts , and the COVID-19 pandemic raging , causing even more isolation from partner forces , much of the conflict now focuses on the front line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confined to their bases and the COVID-19 pandemic raging much of the conflict now focuses on the front line of information warfare .
This aspect of the U.S. effort in Iraq and Syria has often been overlooked or taken for granted .
During the war against the Islamic State , the need to get out information or respond to queries about civilian deaths , for instance , meant managing talking points and providing responses on one battlefield .
However , the increased role of Russia and the Syrian regime in eastern Syria , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the need to respond to propaganda videos in Iraq by pro-Iranian groups , has added new dimensions to the conflict .
In February , a U.S. patrol was driving through a village near Qamishli when they came upon a group of armed men in civilian clothes .
After being fired on , the Americans returned fire , and a Syrian was killed .
The Syrian regime leapt on the incident to portray the Americans as occupiers gunning down civilians .
The reality was likely that Russians helped instigate this incident .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need advanced intelligence about which villages support the Syrian regime and which ones are more sympathetic to the United States .
That means being in constant contact on the ground .
It also means giving soldiers access to technology to be able to confront propaganda put out by Damascus and Moscow .
For instance , the Russians appear to get video of incidents online quickly ; the U.S. spokesperson has to constantly refute stories that are spread in Syria and Iraq about the United States deploying Patriot missiles or even burning people ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and military spokespersons is changing from just reacting to news to driving narratives .
This is an area where China and other countries , such as Iran , have invested resources in having top diplomats become key figures abroad , using social media and other mediums to send messages .
Iran ’ s foreign minister , Mohammad Javad Zarif , is an example of the kind of rock star status a diplomat can achieve , and he uses Twitter to effectively confront the U.S. government .
Similarly , Israel takes public affairs so @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategic affairs and public diplomacy .
Israel ’ s Arabic-language military spokesperson , Avichay Adraee , has 1.5 million followers on Facebook and 377,000 on Twitter .
He is just one part of Israel ’ s public affairs machine , which has learned from past conflicts in Gaza that getting out information first and quickly is an essential part of winning conflicts .
Israel learned from incidents such as the killing of Mohammed al-Dura in the Second Intifada , when a Palestinian boy was killed in crossfire between Israel and Palestinian militants , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ such incidents , even if Israel is in the wrong , to set the narrative .
Iran ’ s foreign minister , Mohammad Javad Zarif , is an example of the kind of rock star status a diplomat can achieve , and he uses Twitter to effectively confront the U.S. government .
Historically , the U.S. military has been aware of the importance that messaging and responding to the public have on its operations .
The role of managing access for journalists has changed drastically from the Vietnam War , when journalists rode @ @ @ @ @ @ @ War and war on the Islamic State , as the Pentagon has shifted its policies on embedded journalists and access .
Scandals like Abu Ghraib and controversies such as that over the resignation of Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal have had the potential to change the course of wars .
That appears to have made the U.S. military more cautious over the years .
Caggins said a course at the Harvard Kennedy School opened his eyes to the need to be likable , credible , and believable .
But what he found was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ up ” and “ in the Queen ’ s English or wonky jargon , and that ’ s not how people get messages in life.
” This means talking more in plain terms—with more pictures and videos and an understanding of which social media platforms are popular today—and less reams of talking points .
He believed that showing the human face of the coalition was important .
With the coronavirus crisis meaning that most Iraqis and Syrians would never see coalition personnel , this at least put their faces on social media .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Caggins tweeted personally to around 100,000 followers of the coalition ’ s Operation Inherent Resolve Twitter account .
In early August , he posted a photo of Spanish soldiers playing soccer .
“ The sub-message is that the coalition is not just U.S. troops with machine guns .
It has many nations , and its message is that soldiers are not all robots with body armor bayonetting ISIS terrorists—they unwind , ” Caggins said .
He chose a photo with Spanish soldiers , including a female member of the contingent , to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ This is because deployment isn ’ t all rocket attacks and IEDs .
There is a lot to life on camp , even though the number of forces got smaller over last six months.
” An incident last year illustrates the challenge .
Iraqi forces under Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi from the elite Counterterrorism Service ( CTS ) were sent to watch an island in northern Iraq where Islamic State forces were suspected to be hiding .
Qanus Island , located in the Tigris River , was known as an Islamic State hot @ @ @ @ @ @ @ heavily bomb it with F-35s and F-15s in an extraordinary display of firepower .
It was September 2019 , on the eve of the 9/11 anniversary .
Caggins watched videos of the strike from drones and wanted to tweet it out , but drone footage is notoriously common and has been criticized for making war look like a video game .
Instead , he had the video spliced up with phone footage from the ground taken by the Iraqi CTS team .
The result was a crescendo of explosions and a bit of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Caggins ’ s decision was questioned by a junior public affairs officer .
“ I want people to know what we are doing , ” he said .
The resulting video went viral .
Caggins , who left Iraq in mid-September after his one-year posting as coalition spokesperson was complete , is now in Texas , where he will transition to a new position at Fort Hood .
On Sept. 19 , he texted that he was in quarantine after having returned .
“ I get plenty of sleep , no rockets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ United States was considering closing its embassy in Baghdad as the crescendo of rocket and other attacks increased against the embassy , airport , and convoys that supply U.S. and coalition facilities .
Caggins is scheduled to speak to the Association of the U.S. Army this year about the need to value public information warfare .
He argues that the U.S. government should put more approved phones in the hands of soldiers .
“ [ If ] we trust them with rifles , then trust them with cameras.
” He calls this fighting @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the public space.
” This means having a kind of “ squad-designated spokesperson ” the way army squads have a machine gunner or marksman .
Inevitably , this would mean dealing with the fact that most soldiers don ’ t have the language training for this in a place like Syria .
But Caggins argues that one can shift from a mentality of “ I ’ m not authorized to talk ” to a willingness to answer basic questions and give several simple messages .
Pushing for more modern technology , such as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ information battlefield and trying to humanize the coalition were only the start .
The third challenge has been trying to reassure U.S. partners on the ground—and not just in Iraq .
In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion in October 2019 , confidence that the United States would stay in Syria had eroded .
The SDF was considering working with the Syrian regime if U.S. forces left entirely .
Caggins went to eastern Syria in November 2019 and formed a personal connection with counterparts in the SDF that has improved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a survey done by the coalition .
Despite lack of clarity from Washington on the long-term U.S. goal in the country , the survey showed that trust increased in the coalition from a low of 28 percent to between 65 and 75 percent .
“ They see value in the coalition , ” Caggins said .
Because the White House tends to change policies in Syria without notice , it ’ s difficult to know if this renewed confidence will result in long-term effects there .
However , recent visits by U.S. envoys @ @ @ @ @ @ @ team took—along with the deployment of Bradley armored vehicles to Syria—have sent the message that the United States isn ’ t closing up shop just yet .

As Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was on his way to Washington in mid-August to discuss the continued U.S. role in Iraq, a package of smartphones was making the opposite journey to U.S. soldiers in Iraq. They had been ordered by Col. Myles Caggins, the then-spokesperson for the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. “I’m fairly certain this will be the first time iPhone 11 Pro Max are issued to public affairs soldiers—quite a breakthrough,” he told me. The phones are symbolic of a larger challenge facing the international coalition and especially U.S. soldiers: to combat fake news that spreads in Iraq and Syria and also to explain the coalition’s mission.
As Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi was on his way to Washington in mid-August to discuss the continued U.S. role in Iraq, a package of smartphones was making the opposite journey to U.S. soldiers in Iraq. They had been ordered by Col. Myles Caggins, the then-spokesperson for the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. “I’m fairly certain this will be the first time iPhone 11 Pro Max are issued to public affairs soldiers—quite a breakthrough,” he told me. The phones are symbolic of a larger challenge facing the international coalition and especially U.S. soldiers: to combat fake news that spreads in Iraq and Syria and also to explain the coalition’s mission.
The United States must confront sophisticated information warfare from pro-Iranian groups, the Syrian regime, and Moscow that is designed to erode trust in the anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq and Syria. For the last six months, there have been increasing rocket and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq by groups that boast of removing Americans from the country. Videos of the attacks are put online to send a message to Washington. Pro-Iranian groups such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba regularly put out messages accusing the United States of operating its embassy as a military base to justify further attacks. Iranian media prints claims daily alleging U.S. wrongdoing, such as looting Syria’s oil.
In Syria, Russian ground troops harass U.S. patrols, and Russian officials and media seek to portray the confrontations as America’s fault. This combination of military confrontation in Iraq and Syria with messaging on the ground that is put out for local consumption and regional leaders is designed to undermine the U.S. presence. In an unprecedented step in late September, Washington told Baghdad that if attacks on the embassy and U.S. personnel didn’t stop, then the United States would pull out of its massive embassy compound.
When Caggins arrived in Iraq in August 2019, the coalition’s public affairs officers in Baghdad had few connections with their counterparts in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite four years of working together, the coalition’s Twitter account didn’t even follow the account of Mustafa Bali, the SDF’s spokesperson in northern Syria. Caggins was the first spokesperson to tweet in Kurdish and reach out to his counterparts in Syria to coordinate messaging.
The coalition’s use of tweets to message to adversaries and partners on the ground emphasizes the way wars are being influenced by social media today. As spokesperson, Caggins called rumors of attacks on U.S. convoys “false” and showed solidarity with tribes in the Euphrates Valley that suffered from Islamic States massacres. The tribes are key to shoring up security for the coalition role protecting oil fields today. Tamping down pro-Iranian fake news is also key to discouraging escalation.
In his year as spokesperson, he played a key role in pioneering new technology, tweeting in Kurdish, cultivating local relationships, and pushing for more proactive social media use. Caggins left the post last month, but his vision could transform the way the United States fights future wars and illustrates the struggle Washington has faced at this pivotal moment in Baghdad.
U.S. Army Col. Myles Caggins, then official military spokesperson for international military intervention against the Islamic State, speaks at a military base in Rumaylan in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 28.
Caggins is a senior-ranking Black man who served in a unique public position at a time when the United States is going through a profound confrontation with racism at home. He told me that his skin color helped him form connections with locals in places like Iraq. “My dad was a retired colonel, and in 1964, after he graduated from Tuskegee, white sergeants would cross the street at Fort Benning so they didn’t have to salute him. And 50 years later, I represent all these countries and live out the dreams of my grandparents and great-grandparents,” he said. When the George Floyd demonstrations began in the United States, he said many Kurds sent him messages expressing solidarity because they had also faced historic discrimination in Iraq and Syria. “This kinship that comes with the color of my skin and understanding those who were left out and left behind and marginalized and oppressed. … I was speaking to Iraqi PM Spokesman Mullah Talal, and he said, ‘Hey, Col, you look like one of us,’ and so these types of conversations I can have and my predecessors didn’t have,” he said.
Caggins arrived in Iraq last year as the top public affairs officer in the coalition. A veteran of the early years of the U.S. war in Iraq, having served in Diyala province in 2003, he transitioned into public affairs for the military in 2006 and was a public affairs officer for the 1st Armored Division in southern Iraq in 2009-2010.
The twin crises of the Turkish invasion in Syria and U.S.-Iran tensions in Iraq mean that the United States’ continued role at the head of the international coalition against the Islamic State is in doubt. Kadhimi’s trip to Washington in August was part of the developing strategic dialogue with the United States, and President Donald Trump said in the meeting that the U.S. military in Iraq was down to a “very small number of soldiers.”
Those soldiers, now concentrated on a handful of bases after the coalition handed over more than six posts and bases to Iraqi forces in 2020, face weekly rocket attacks by pro-Iranian militias. Trump also indicated on Aug. 20 that the United States had completed its withdrawal from Syria’s border areas and would make a decision on whether to remain and keep securing oil in southeastern Syria “fairly soon.” U.S. Central Command recently sent Bradley armored vehicles back to Syria to bolster the U.S. presence there as the Trump administration contemplates what to do next.
During this tenuous, challenging period for U.S. forces, the role of public affairs officers has grown. With U.S. troops confined to their bases, often no longer going outside the wire on patrols with their counterparts, and the COVID-19 pandemic raging, causing even more isolation from partner forces, much of the conflict now focuses on the front line of information warfare.
With U.S. troops confined to their bases and the COVID-19 pandemic raging, much of the conflict now focuses on the front line of information warfare.
This aspect of the U.S. effort in Iraq and Syria has often been overlooked or taken for granted. During the war against the Islamic State, the need to get out information or respond to queries about civilian deaths, for instance, meant managing talking points and providing responses on one battlefield. However, the increased role of Russia and the Syrian regime in eastern Syria, where U.S. patrols often encounter Russians, and the need to respond to propaganda videos in Iraq by pro-Iranian groups, has added new dimensions to the conflict.
In February, a U.S. patrol was driving through a village near Qamishli when they came upon a group of armed men in civilian clothes. After being fired on, the Americans returned fire, and a Syrian was killed. The Syrian regime leapt on the incident to portray the Americans as occupiers gunning down civilians. The reality was likely that Russians helped instigate this incident.
The problem for U.S. troops is that they need advanced intelligence about which villages support the Syrian regime and which ones are more sympathetic to the United States. That means being in constant contact on the ground. It also means giving soldiers access to technology to be able to confront propaganda put out by Damascus and Moscow. For instance, the Russians appear to get video of incidents online quickly; the U.S. spokesperson has to constantly refute stories that are spread in Syria and Iraq about the United States deploying Patriot missiles or even burning people’s crops.
Boys look at smartphones as they sit outside a cafeteria tent at a camp for internally displaced persons in the Sharya area, in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan region, on Aug. 30, 2019.
When I called Caggins in Iraq in early August, it was clear to me that Caggins brought a different conception of how to fight in the information space. First, he crafted a message that was less stilted and more personal, celebrating coalition successes, like dropping bombs on Islamic State hideouts, and humanizing the face of the coalition. On Aug. 15, he introduced the deputy spokesperson, Maj. Gabby Thompson, with a tweet in English, Arabic, and Kurdish. He also made time for a variety of local news teams, talking more directly to locals in their language than just responding to Western media inquiries. Throughout the last year, he improved the coalition’s connections to locals, responding quickly and personally without the normal layers of bureaucracy and long wait times that bedevil those trying to get an answer from the U.S. Defense Department.
The role of government and military spokespersons is changing from just reacting to news to driving narratives. This is an area where China and other countries, such as Iran, have invested resources in having top diplomats become key figures abroad, using social media and other mediums to send messages. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is an example of the kind of rock star status a diplomat can achieve, and he uses Twitter to effectively confront the U.S. government.
Caggins’s tweet introducing his deputy spokesperson, Maj. Gabby Thompson, with a tweet in English, Arabic, and Kurdish.
Similarly, Israel takes public affairs so seriously it created a whole ministry for strategic affairs and public diplomacy. Israel’s Arabic-language military spokesperson, Avichay Adraee, has 1.5 million followers on Facebook and 377,000 on Twitter. He is just one part of Israel’s public affairs machine, which has learned from past conflicts in Gaza that getting out information first and quickly is an essential part of winning conflicts. Israel learned from incidents such as the killing of Mohammed al-Dura in the Second Intifada, when a Palestinian boy was killed in crossfire between Israel and Palestinian militants, that it needs to react quickly to such incidents, even if Israel is in the wrong, to set the narrative.
Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is an example of the kind of rock star status a diplomat can achieve, and he uses Twitter to effectively confront the U.S. government.
Historically, the U.S. military has been aware of the importance that messaging and responding to the public have on its operations. The role of managing access for journalists has changed drastically from the Vietnam War, when journalists rode along on helicopters, to the Gulf War and war on the Islamic State, as the Pentagon has shifted its policies on embedded journalists and access. Scandals like Abu Ghraib and controversies such as that over the resignation of Afghanistan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal have had the potential to change the course of wars. That appears to have made the U.S. military more cautious over the years.
Caggins said a course at the Harvard Kennedy School opened his eyes to the need to be likable, credible, and believable. But what he found was a tendency for statements being “lawyered up” and “in the Queen’s English or wonky jargon, and that’s not how people get messages in life.” This means talking more in plain terms—with more pictures and videos and an understanding of which social media platforms are popular today—and less reams of talking points. He believed that showing the human face of the coalition was important. With the coronavirus crisis meaning that most Iraqis and Syrians would never see coalition personnel, this at least put their faces on social media.
In a world of social media-driven narratives, Caggins tweeted personally to around 100,000 followers of the coalition’s Operation Inherent Resolve Twitter account. In early August, he posted a photo of Spanish soldiers playing soccer. “The sub-message is that the coalition is not just U.S. troops with machine guns. It has many nations, and its message is that soldiers are not all robots with body armor bayonetting ISIS terrorists—they unwind,” Caggins said. He chose a photo with Spanish soldiers, including a female member of the contingent, to showcase the diversity of the coalition. “This is because deployment isn’t all rocket attacks and IEDs. There is a lot to life on camp, even though the number of forces got smaller over last six months.”
A local uses his phone to capture images of a U.S. military convoy as it drives on the outskirts of the Kurdish-controlled northern Syrian city of Qamishli on Feb. 12.
Sitting in an office in the Union III base next to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is not the best way to do public affairs. This was one of the reasons Caggins asked for phones for his soldiers. In 2020, almost everyone has a smartphone, and increasingly in Iraq and Syria U.S. adversaries are using smartphones at all times to record incidents. Responding to those incidents requires getting information out first and being able to record one’s own side of the story. It’s extraordinary that in the U.S. effort in Iraq for years this wasn’t obvious, but concerns over operational security, budgets, or the wrong kinds of photos being published appear to have stopped the Pentagon issuing approved smartphones among public affairs officers.
An incident last year illustrates the challenge. Iraqi forces under Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi from the elite Counterterrorism Service (CTS) were sent to watch an island in northern Iraq where Islamic State forces were suspected to be hiding. Qanus Island, located in the Tigris River, was known as an Islamic State hot spot, and the coalition decided to heavily bomb it with F-35s and F-15s in an extraordinary display of firepower.
It was September 2019, on the eve of the 9/11 anniversary. Caggins watched videos of the strike from drones and wanted to tweet it out, but drone footage is notoriously common and has been criticized for making war look like a video game. Instead, he had the video spliced up with phone footage from the ground taken by the Iraqi CTS team. The result was a crescendo of explosions and a bit of braggadocio from the coalition about its capabilities. Caggins’s decision was questioned by a junior public affairs officer. “I want people to know what we are doing,” he said. The resulting video went viral.
Caggins, who left Iraq in mid-September after his one-year posting as coalition spokesperson was complete, is now in Texas, where he will transition to a new position at Fort Hood. On Sept. 19, he texted that he was in quarantine after having returned. “I get plenty of sleep, no rockets here.” Back in Iraq, the United States was considering closing its embassy in Baghdad as the crescendo of rocket and other attacks increased against the embassy, airport, and convoys that supply U.S. and coalition facilities.
Caggins is scheduled to speak to the Association of the U.S. Army this year about the need to value public information warfare. He argues that the U.S. government should put more approved phones in the hands of soldiers. “[If] we trust them with rifles, then trust them with cameras.” He calls this fighting “word war on the cheap in the public space.” This means having a kind of “squad-designated spokesperson” the way army squads have a machine gunner or marksman. Inevitably, this would mean dealing with the fact that most soldiers don’t have the language training for this in a place like Syria. But Caggins argues that one can shift from a mentality of “I’m not authorized to talk” to a willingness to answer basic questions and give several simple messages.
Pushing for more modern technology, such as smartphones, to help respond in the information battlefield and trying to humanize the coalition were only the start. The third challenge has been trying to reassure U.S. partners on the ground—and not just in Iraq. In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion in October 2019, confidence that the United States would stay in Syria had eroded.
The SDF was considering working with the Syrian regime if U.S. forces left entirely. Caggins went to eastern Syria in November 2019 and formed a personal connection with counterparts in the SDF that has improved messaging and restored confidence, according to a survey done by the coalition. Despite lack of clarity from Washington on the long-term U.S. goal in the country, the survey showed that trust increased in the coalition from a low of 28 percent to between 65 and 75 percent. “They see value in the coalition,” Caggins said.
Because the White House tends to change policies in Syria without notice, it’s difficult to know if this renewed confidence will result in long-term effects there. However, recent visits by U.S. envoys and the trips that Caggins and his team took—along with the deployment of Bradley armored vehicles to Syria—have sent the message that the United States isn’t closing up shop just yet.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--U.S. and Russia Meet for Nuclear Talks as Landmark Treaty Nears End

U.S. and Russia Meet for Nuclear Talks as Landmark Treaty Nears End Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : U.S. and Russian representatives meet to discuss nuclear arms control , disputes over Kyrgyzstan ’ s election results , and Nicaraguan President Ortega moves to further suppress the opposition .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
The United States and Russia are due to meet in Helsinki , Finland , today in their ongoing effort to renegotiate and replace the New START nuclear arms treaty which is set to expire in February 2021 .
New START @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arms between the two countries .
Marshall Billingslea , the U.S. chief arms negotiator , will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to continue a prior meeting held in Vienna in August .
The China factor .
Much of the delay in renegotiating the treaty was due to Washington ’ s insistence that China be included in any new agreement .
“ The next treaty will have to be multilateral , it will have to include China , and the framework that we are articulating together as two great powers , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the framework going forward that China will be expected to join , ” Billingslea told reporters in a briefing in August .
But the White House has since backed off that condition as Trump has become embroiled in his reelection campaign , and now the hope among many U.S. allies is that Washington will seek a standalone deal with Russia before the deadline and pursue another agreement with China at a later time .
Losing hope .
The United States has so far only proposed new conditions for Russia , a move that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a thinly-veiled attempt by the White House to scuttle the deal entirely .
Billingslea reportedly told Ryabkov during their meeting in August that a new treaty would need to address Russia ’ s build-up of short-range missiles which aren ’ t covered by the current treaty .
“ The ball is now in Russia ’ s court , ” he said at the time .
As Foreign Policy ’ s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer recently reported , “ former officials and arms control experts worry the administration may be seeking to slow-walk @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demands of Russia just months before the treaty is slated to end.
” Oct. 5 .
The United Nations holds a high-level meeting to discuss ongoing peace efforts in Libya .
Oct. 5-6 .
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits Ankara for meetings with top Turkish officials .
He then travels to Athens for meetings with Greek officials .
Oct. 7 .
The U.S. vice presidential debate takes place between Vice President Mike Pence and Democratic vice presidential candidate Kamala Harris .
Oct. 8 .
The United Nations Security Council meets to discuss @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 9 .
The winner of the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize is announced .
Oct. 11 .
Lithuania holds legislative elections .
A second round , if necessary , will take place on Oct. 25 .
Oct. 11 .
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus , a de facto state that is unrecognized by almost the entire international community , holds its presidential election .
Kyrgyzstan crisis looming ?
Two pro-government parties , Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan , are set for a strong showing in Kyrgyzstan ’ s parliamentary elections , which took place @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unclear if they will find common ground and forge a grand coalition .
After Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan , it appears that only two of the 16 parties that contested the election crossed the 7 percent threshold required to actually win seats .
Opposition parties alleged widespread irregularities in the vote and staged a nonviolent protest in the capital of Bishkek and the city of Talas , and they have planned more rallies for today .
The aftermath of the elections in Kyrgyzstan could cause a new set of problems for Russia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Libya and Syria , and it is currently dealing with crises in neighboring Belarus and Azerbaijan .
Another political crisis in Kyrgyzstan could draw Moscow into yet another regional dispute .
Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh spreads .
Fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated on Sunday after Armenian forces launched a series of airstrikes on targets in Azerbaijan ’ s second city of Ganja .
The city lies to the north of Nagorno-Karabakh and sits near an important series of oil and gas pipelines that run from the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The airstrikes killed one person and injured more than 30 others .
Arayik Haratyunyan , the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh , said in a tweet that he ordered the attack as an “ act of self-protection , in response to days-long deliberate shelling ” of civilian areas in the region .
Turkey , which has been backing Azerbaijan throughout the clashes , called the attack a “ violation of all the principles of International law.
” Conflicting reports on Trump .
U.S. President Donald Trump could be discharged from Walter Reed military hospital today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Conley , despite Trump ’ s blood oxygen levels dropping twice in recent days .
The apparent inconsistency has raised concerns that officials are painting an inaccurate picture of Trump ’ s condition and failing to deliver accurate information to the public .
Trump generated further controversy when he took a ride outside the hospital in a presidential vehicle to wave to his supporters .
Although he wore a mask , medical professionals warned that he is likely still highly infectious and could have exposed the Secret Service agents driving him to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ He ’ s not even pretending to care now , ” one agent told the Washington Post after Trump ’ s drive .
Trump announced that he had tested positive for COVID-19 early on Friday and was admitted to Walter Reed on Saturday .
Shortly after his admission , Conley told reporters that Trump was “ doing very well , ” an assessment that was quickly contradicted by White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows .
He said Trump ’ s vitals “ were very concerning ” and that “ the next @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is reportedly receiving the steroid dexamethasone , which is often administered to patients with severe cases of COVID-19 .
Sudan under pressure .
Efforts by the United States to pressure Sudan into reaching a normalization agreement with Israel are causing rifts to form within Sudan ’ s transitional government .
Military leaders , who share power jointly with civilian leaders , have called for a deal with Israel similar to those recently signed with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates .
“ Whether we like it or not , the removal [ of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tied to [ normalization ] with Israel , ” Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo said last week , referring to an offer from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to remove Sudan from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list in exchange for normalizing ties with Israel .
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok , the top civilian leader in the transitional government , has pushed back , saying the military does not have the authority to make foreign-policy decisions of that kind of importance .
Repression in Nicaragua .
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is trying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political opponents and foreign journalists in a move opposition leaders have charged is an attempt to suppress Ortega ’ s opponents ahead of next year ’ s presidential election .
One bill would require international journalists to register as foreign agents and would severely restrict their reporting activities in the country .
Another would require groups receiving funding from abroad to register with the government or face harsh penalties .
Ortega ’ s Sandinista party controls the country ’ s legislature with a large majority and will have little problem pushing the legislation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ take place later this week .
The hashtag # ProudBoys went viral on Twitter over the weekend but not due to anything the far-right , ultra-nationalist group did .
After Trump pushed the group into the national spotlight during last week ’ s presidential debate by calling on the group to “ stand back and stand by , ” thousands of men in same-sex relationships took to social media to reclaim the Proud Boys moniker and share images and stories from their relationships using the hashtag .
The spontaneous campaign was an instant @ @ @ @ @ @ @ using the hashtag .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. and Russian representatives meet to discuss nuclear arms control, disputes over Kyrgyzstan’s election results , and Nicaraguan President Ortega moves to further suppress the opposition.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: U.S. and Russian representatives meet to discuss nuclear arms control, disputes over Kyrgyzstan’s election results, and Nicaraguan President Ortega moves to further suppress the opposition.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
U.S. Allies Worry the White House Wants to End New START Treaty
The United States and Russia are due to meet in Helsinki, Finland, today in their ongoing effort to renegotiate and replace the New START nuclear arms treaty which is set to expire in February 2021. New START is the only remaining agreement limiting nuclear arms between the two countries. Marshall Billingslea, the U.S. chief arms negotiator, will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to continue a prior meeting held in Vienna in August.
The China factor. Much of the delay in renegotiating the treaty was due to Washington’s insistence that China be included in any new agreement. “The next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China, and the framework that we are articulating together as two great powers, us and the Russians, will be the framework going forward that China will be expected to join,” Billingslea told reporters in a briefing in August.
But the White House has since backed off that condition as Trump has become embroiled in his reelection campaign, and now the hope among many U.S. allies is that Washington will seek a standalone deal with Russia before the deadline and pursue another agreement with China at a later time.
Losing hope. The United States has so far only proposed new conditions for Russia, a move that some officials worry is little more than a thinly-veiled attempt by the White House to scuttle the deal entirely. Billingslea reportedly told Ryabkov during their meeting in August that a new treaty would need to address Russia’s build-up of short-range missiles which aren’t covered by the current treaty. “The ball is now in Russia’s court,” he said at the time.
As Foreign Policy’s Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer recently reported, “former officials and arms control experts worry the administration may be seeking to slow-walk the accord to death by making impossible demands of Russia just months before the treaty is slated to end.”
The World This Week
Oct. 5. German Chancellor Angela Merkel meets with Michel Barnier, the European Union’s chief Brexit negotiator.
Oct. 5. The United Nations holds a high-level meeting to discuss ongoing peace efforts in Libya.
Oct. 5-6. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits Ankara for meetings with top Turkish officials. He then travels to Athens for meetings with Greek officials.
Oct. 6. Merkel meets with Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
Oct. 7. The U.S. vice presidential debate takes place between Vice President Mike Pence and Democratic vice presidential candidate Kamala Harris.
Oct. 8. The United Nations Security Council meets to discuss the ongoing crisis in Mali.
Oct. 9. The winner of the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize is announced.
Oct. 11. Lithuania holds legislative elections. A second round, if necessary, will take place on Oct. 25.
Oct. 11. Tajikistan holds its presidential election.
Oct. 11. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a de facto state that is unrecognized by almost the entire international community, holds its presidential election.
What We’re Following Today
Kyrgyzstan crisis looming? Two pro-government parties, Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, are set for a strong showing in Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections, which took place on Sunday, but it is still unclear if they will find common ground and forge a grand coalition. After Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, it appears that only two of the 16 parties that contested the election crossed the 7 percent threshold required to actually win seats. Opposition parties alleged widespread irregularities in the vote and staged a nonviolent protest in the capital of Bishkek and the city of Talas, and they have planned more rallies for today.
The aftermath of the elections in Kyrgyzstan could cause a new set of problems for Russia. Moscow is already deeply involved in conflicts in Libya and Syria, and it is currently dealing with crises in neighboring Belarus and Azerbaijan. Another political crisis in Kyrgyzstan could draw Moscow into yet another regional dispute.
Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh spreads. Fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated on Sunday after Armenian forces launched a series of airstrikes on targets in Azerbaijan’s second city of Ganja. The city lies to the north of Nagorno-Karabakh and sits near an important series of oil and gas pipelines that run from the capital city of Baku to Turkey. The airstrikes killed one person and injured more than 30 others.
Arayik Haratyunyan, the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, said in a tweet that he ordered the attack as an “act of self-protection, in response to days-long deliberate shelling” of civilian areas in the region. Turkey, which has been backing Azerbaijan throughout the clashes, called the attack a “violation of all the principles of International law.”
Conflicting reports on Trump. U.S. President Donald Trump could be discharged from Walter Reed military hospital today, according to his doctor, Sean Conley, despite Trump’s blood oxygen levels dropping twice in recent days. The apparent inconsistency has raised concerns that officials are painting an inaccurate picture of Trump’s condition and failing to deliver accurate information to the public.
Trump generated further controversy when he took a ride outside the hospital in a presidential vehicle to wave to his supporters. Although he wore a mask, medical professionals warned that he is likely still highly infectious and could have exposed the Secret Service agents driving him to the virus while in an enclosed space. “He’s not even pretending to care now,” one agent told the Washington Post after Trump’s drive.
Trump announced that he had tested positive for COVID-19 early on Friday and was admitted to Walter Reed on Saturday. Shortly after his admission, Conley told reporters that Trump was “doing very well,” an assessment that was quickly contradicted by White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows. He said Trump’s vitals “were very concerning” and that “the next 48 hours will be critical.” Trump is reportedly receiving the steroid dexamethasone, which is often administered to patients with severe cases of COVID-19.
Keep an Eye On
Sudan under pressure. Efforts by the United States to pressure Sudan into reaching a normalization agreement with Israel are causing rifts to form within Sudan’s transitional government. Military leaders, who share power jointly with civilian leaders, have called for a deal with Israel similar to those recently signed with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. “Whether we like it or not, the removal [of Sudan from the terror list] is tied to [normalization] with Israel,” Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo said last week, referring to an offer from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to remove Sudan from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list in exchange for normalizing ties with Israel.
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the top civilian leader in the transitional government, has pushed back, saying the military does not have the authority to make foreign-policy decisions of that kind of importance.
Repression in Nicaragua. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is trying to push through legislation that could criminalize political opponents and foreign journalists in a move opposition leaders have charged is an attempt to suppress Ortega’s opponents ahead of next year’s presidential election. One bill would require international journalists to register as foreign agents and would severely restrict their reporting activities in the country. Another would require groups receiving funding from abroad to register with the government or face harsh penalties.
Ortega’s Sandinista party controls the country’s legislature with a large majority and will have little problem pushing the legislation through. A vote is expected to take place later this week.
Odds and Ends
The hashtag #ProudBoys went viral on Twitter over the weekend but not due to anything the far-right, ultra-nationalist group did. After Trump pushed the group into the national spotlight during last week’s presidential debate by calling on the group to “stand back and stand by,” thousands of men in same-sex relationships took to social media to reclaim the Proud Boys moniker and share images and stories from their relationships using the hashtag. The spontaneous campaign was an instant hit, with several thousand tweets posted using the hashtag.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--Bolsonaro’s Brush With the Coronavirus Empowered Him

Bolsonaro ’ s Brush With the Coronavirus Empowered Him U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro have a lot in common : Both were elected on anti-establishment platforms meant to disrupt sclerotic political systems ; both promote nationalist outlooks ; both sought to downplay the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic .
And now , both are members of the burgeoning group of world leaders stricken by the virus .
Although it is too early to say anything definitive about the political consequences for Trump—especially so close to a historic election—Bolsonaro , who caught the virus in early July @ @ @ @ @ @ @ only unscathed , but also politically empowered .
It is worth considering whether his post-coronavirus renewal holds any clues for Trump ’ s future .
With a few caveats , comparisons between the United States and Brazil are quite illustrative .
The countries are comparable in size and share similar political systems .
They are the two largest countries by population in the Western Hemisphere .
And Brazil ’ s 1988 constitution , which helped to restore democracy after two decades of brutal military rule , found inspiration in the U.S. Constitution and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numerous occasions , Bolsonaro has noted the resemblances between Brazil and the United States , from which he draws inspiration , and has invited personal comparisons to Trump by enthusiastically embracing the moniker “ Trump of the Tropics.
” For Bolsonaro , infection with the coronavirus came at a highly inopportune time .
Not only did it pierce the armor of his strongman persona , but earlier in March , he had famously referred to the coronavirus as a gripezinha , or “ little flu.
” As if to confirm the recklessness of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ plummeted to the high 20s ( and disapproval ratings rocketed to nearly 50 percent ) as news of his illness spread .
His convalescence , however , documented assiduously on social media , seemed to reaffirm his own earlier predictions that , should he get sick , his virility and history as an athlete would portend a rapid recovery .
That recovery eventually brought a rise in Bolsonaro ’ s popularity and , with it , a resurrection of his political fortunes .
Two months after contracting COVID-19 , Bolsonaro ’ s popularity @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his disapproval ratings have fallen to 30 percent ) , hovering there since early August .
Those are some of the highest numbers of his entire presidency .
Astonishingly , recent polling revealed that a near majority of Brazilians surveyed consider him blameless for the country ’ s more than 140,000 COVID-19 deaths—the second-highest death toll in the world behind the United States .
Although the next presidential election is not scheduled until 2022 , Bolsonaro comfortably leads all hypothetical matchups—including the marquee one against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—making him @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Yet , the primary source of Bolsonaro ’ s newfangled popularity offers a potential cautionary tale for Trump ’ s political future .
Bolsonaro appears to have staved off damage to his political standing by boosting a popular cash transfer program for the poor , known as Bolsa Família .
When the increased payments expired in early September , Bolsonaro expended precious political capital in Brazil ’ s Congress to earn its renewal through the end of the year , despite fears among his advisors of a looming budget crisis .
The result @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even in the perpetually downtrodden northeast region of the country , the birthplace of former president Lula and long a stronghold of the Brazilian Workers ’ Party , Bolsonaro ’ s archrival on the political left .
However , Bolsonaro garners little institutional support within Brazil .
At present , he is a politician without a political party , having split from the Social Liberal Party ( PSL ) last November over a spat with party godfather Luciano Bivar .
Bolsonaro ’ s intention is to eventually create a political party called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the PSL with him , but the still inchoate effort means that the Alliance currently lacks any legal status .
Instead , in municipal elections in November , allies of the president will have to run under the banner of other parties .
The expectation is that the winners will switch affiliations once the Alliance is an official political party .
But should they fail to do so , it could leave Bolsonaro without institutional backing and searching for a new party as he heads into his reelection campaign .
Of course , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unlikely to be a reservoir of support for a president seeking solace in difficult times .
Bolsonaro ran for president on the PSL ’ s platform , but it was merely a temporary home .
Over the course of his three-decade political career , he has belonged to no fewer than nine political parties .
With dozens of parties enjoying representation in Brazil ’ s Congress , the Brazilian party system is highly fragmented and remains largely unconsolidated .
For instance , the two largest parties in Brazil ’ s lower house each @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seats .
Brazilian political parties are mostly ideologically amorphous , lending ample opportunity for institutionalized graft as unwieldy governing coalitions attempt to hold together and pass legislation by any means possible .
The resulting “ coalitional presidentialism ” can make politics in Brasília feel like a never-ending game of musical chairs .
By contrast , the consolidated political party system in the United States ( and party polarization ) lends itself as an obvious font of stability for presidents during troubled times .
Indeed , Trump relies on a wellspring of support among @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 94 percent in a recent Gallup poll .
Over 82 percent of Republicans approve of the Trump administration ’ s response to the pandemic .
Stratospheric levels of party support have allowed Trump to weather controversies and mitigate the fallout .
Yet Trump ’ s electoral standing seems to be withering , and , according to most polls , he trails former Vice President Joe Biden nationally ahead of the presidential election .
Biden appears keen to press what his campaign feels is an electoral advantage on the handling of the pandemic , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s death toll and stubbornly high caseloads .
Unlike in Bolsonaro ’ s case , U.S. data shows that many Americans do blame the Trump administration for its handling of the pandemic .
Indeed , recent polls taken just after Trump ’ s hospitalization demonstrate a widening lead for Biden , with a clear majority of Americans believing Trump could have avoided the virus were it not for his cavalier attitude .
Meanwhile , like Bolsonaro , Trump has been eager to document how little COVID-19 has slowed his pace .
In addition @ @ @ @ @ @ @ greeted supporters outside Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in a SUV on Sunday night .
Critics even accused the Trump administration of staging several photos purporting to show him hard at work .
( On closer examination , Trump may have been signing blank pieces of paper . )
Trump also announced he will depart the hospital early , returning to the White House Monday evening .
While Bolsonaro ’ s political messaging during his recovery period may have helped to rally support with his base , Trump already commands sky-high approval @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s political comeback may offer a cautionary tale for Trump .
In the middle of the summer , analysts wondered aloud if Bolsonaro would survive politically or suffer humiliation and impeachment .
Now , his once moribund presidency has been resuscitated and stabilized—at least in the short term .
Although Bolsonaro lacks the natural refuge of a consolidated party system for support , his rapid recovery seemed to confirm his narrative that COVID-19 is just a little flu , and now he has been rewarded with buoyed reelection prospects .
While Trump can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ encounters a highly uncertain reelection landscape .
If there is a lesson from Trump ’ s fellow populists in Brasília , it is this : If he is to neutralize Biden ’ s electoral advantage on his administration ’ s handling of COVID-19 , and on an expedited timeframe , he must use his recovery as a sign of political strength and a metaphor that the United States will also prevail over the pandemic .

U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro have a lot in common: Both were elected on anti-establishment platforms meant to disrupt sclerotic political systems; both promote nationalist outlooks; both sought to downplay the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. And now, both are members of the burgeoning group of world leaders stricken by the virus. Although it is too early to say anything definitive about the political consequences for Trump—especially so close to a historic election—Bolsonaro, who caught the virus in early July, has emerged from the ordeal not only unscathed, but also politically empowered. It is worth considering whether his post-coronavirus renewal holds any clues for Trump’s future.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro have a lot in common: Both were elected on anti-establishment platforms meant to disrupt sclerotic political systems; both promote nationalist outlooks; both sought to downplay the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. And now, both are members of the burgeoning group of world leaders stricken by the virus. Although it is too early to say anything definitive about the political consequences for Trump—especially so close to a historic election—Bolsonaro, who caught the virus in early July, has emerged from the ordeal not only unscathed, but also politically empowered. It is worth considering whether his post-coronavirus renewal holds any clues for Trump’s future.
With a few caveats, comparisons between the United States and Brazil are quite illustrative. The countries are comparable in size and share similar political systems. They are the two largest countries by population in the Western Hemisphere. And Brazil’s 1988 constitution, which helped to restore democracy after two decades of brutal military rule, found inspiration in the U.S. Constitution and the federal republic it created. On numerous occasions, Bolsonaro has noted the resemblances between Brazil and the United States, from which he draws inspiration, and has invited personal comparisons to Trump by enthusiastically embracing the moniker “Trump of the Tropics.”
For Bolsonaro, infection with the coronavirus came at a highly inopportune time. Not only did it pierce the armor of his strongman persona, but earlier in March, he had famously referred to the coronavirus as a gripezinha, or “little flu.” As if to confirm the recklessness of such views, Bolsonaro’s popularity plummeted to the high 20s (and disapproval ratings rocketed to nearly 50 percent) as news of his illness spread. His convalescence, however, documented assiduously on social media, seemed to reaffirm his own earlier predictions that, should he get sick, his virility and history as an athlete would portend a rapid recovery.
That recovery eventually brought a rise in Bolsonaro’s popularity and, with it, a resurrection of his political fortunes. Two months after contracting COVID-19, Bolsonaro’s popularity has stabilized around 40 percent (and his disapproval ratings have fallen to 30 percent), hovering there since early August. Those are some of the highest numbers of his entire presidency. Astonishingly, recent polling revealed that a near majority of Brazilians surveyed consider him blameless for the country’s more than 140,000 COVID-19 deaths—the second-highest death toll in the world behind the United States. Although the next presidential election is not scheduled until 2022, Bolsonaro comfortably leads all hypothetical matchups—including the marquee one against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—making him a favorite in all election scenarios.
Yet, the primary source of Bolsonaro’s newfangled popularity offers a potential cautionary tale for Trump’s political future. Bolsonaro appears to have staved off damage to his political standing by boosting a popular cash transfer program for the poor, known as Bolsa Família. When the increased payments expired in early September, Bolsonaro expended precious political capital in Brazil’s Congress to earn its renewal through the end of the year, despite fears among his advisors of a looming budget crisis. The result is expanding support for the Brazilian president, even in the perpetually downtrodden northeast region of the country, the birthplace of former president Lula and long a stronghold of the Brazilian Workers’ Party, Bolsonaro’s archrival on the political left.
However, Bolsonaro garners little institutional support within Brazil. At present, he is a politician without a political party, having split from the Social Liberal Party (PSL) last November over a spat with party godfather Luciano Bivar. Bolsonaro’s intention is to eventually create a political party called Alliance for Brazil, taking half of the PSL with him, but the still inchoate effort means that the Alliance currently lacks any legal status. Instead, in municipal elections in November, allies of the president will have to run under the banner of other parties. The expectation is that the winners will switch affiliations once the Alliance is an official political party. But should they fail to do so, it could leave Bolsonaro without institutional backing and searching for a new party as he heads into his reelection campaign.
Of course, Brazil’s party system was always unlikely to be a reservoir of support for a president seeking solace in difficult times. Bolsonaro ran for president on the PSL’s platform, but it was merely a temporary home. Over the course of his three-decade political career, he has belonged to no fewer than nine political parties. With dozens of parties enjoying representation in Brazil’s Congress, the Brazilian party system is highly fragmented and remains largely unconsolidated. For instance, the two largest parties in Brazil’s lower house each possess a mere 10 percent of the seats. Brazilian political parties are mostly ideologically amorphous, lending ample opportunity for institutionalized graft as unwieldy governing coalitions attempt to hold together and pass legislation by any means possible. The resulting “coalitional presidentialism” can make politics in Brasília feel like a never-ending game of musical chairs.
By contrast, the consolidated political party system in the United States (and party polarization) lends itself as an obvious font of stability for presidents during troubled times. Indeed, Trump relies on a wellspring of support among registered Republicans, reaching as high as 94 percent in a recent Gallup poll. Over 82 percent of Republicans approve of the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic. Stratospheric levels of party support have allowed Trump to weather controversies and mitigate the fallout. Yet Trump’s electoral standing seems to be withering, and, according to most polls, he trails former Vice President Joe Biden nationally ahead of the presidential election.
Biden appears keen to press what his campaign feels is an electoral advantage on the handling of the pandemic, repeatedly drawing attention to the country’s death toll and stubbornly high caseloads. Unlike in Bolsonaro’s case, U.S. data shows that many Americans do blame the Trump administration for its handling of the pandemic. Indeed, recent polls taken just after Trump’s hospitalization demonstrate a widening lead for Biden, with a clear majority of Americans believing Trump could have avoided the virus were it not for his cavalier attitude.
Meanwhile, like Bolsonaro, Trump has been eager to document how little COVID-19 has slowed his pace. In addition to frequent social media updates, he greeted supporters outside Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in a SUV on Sunday night. Critics even accused the Trump administration of staging several photos purporting to show him hard at work. (On closer examination, Trump may have been signing blank pieces of paper.) Trump also announced he will depart the hospital early, returning to the White House Monday evening. While Bolsonaro’s political messaging during his recovery period may have helped to rally support with his base, Trump already commands sky-high approval ratings from his.
Yet Bolsonaro’s political comeback may offer a cautionary tale for Trump. In the middle of the summer, analysts wondered aloud if Bolsonaro would survive politically or suffer humiliation and impeachment. Now, his once moribund presidency has been resuscitated and stabilized—at least in the short term. Although Bolsonaro lacks the natural refuge of a consolidated party system for support, his rapid recovery seemed to confirm his narrative that COVID-19 is just a little flu, and now he has been rewarded with buoyed reelection prospects. While Trump can count on robust party support, he encounters a highly uncertain reelection landscape. If there is a lesson from Trump’s fellow populists in Brasília, it is this: If he is to neutralize Biden’s electoral advantage on his administration’s handling of COVID-19, and on an expedited timeframe, he must use his recovery as a sign of political strength and a metaphor that the United States will also prevail over the pandemic.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-05--Syrians Make Up Turkey’s Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh

Early Sunday morning , the bodies of more than 50 Syrians killed in a conflict raging far from their own borders—in a land many had barely heard of a few months ago—were returned home for funeral preparations .
They were members of militias that had fought previously in northern Syria , then Libya , and now in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh—but always on behalf of Turkey .
“ No one wants to make money from wars ” after almost a decade of civil war , said the father of one Syrian mercenary .
But displacement inside Syria , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ unrest , has left some young men with little choice .
According to sources within the Syrian National Army ( SNA ) , the umbrella term for a group of opposition militias backed by Turkey , around 1,500 Syrians have so far been deployed to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the southern Caucasus .
It ’ s the latest proxy standoff between Turkey and Russia , which are already on opposing sides in Syria and Libya .
Ankara has declared strong support for Azerbaijan , while Moscow is traditionally closer to Armenia .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is recognized internationally as Azerbaijan ’ s territory but has a mostly Armenian population .
The two countries went to war between 1988 and 1994 , eventually declaring a cease-fire , but never reached a settlement over the dispute .
The border between the two is considered one of the most militarized in the world , and the current fighting , which broke out last month , is the worst seen since the cease-fire , with each of the two former Soviet republics placing the blame on the other .
Heavy clashes continued @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fired rockets at Ganja , Azerbaijan ’ s second-largest city , killing at least one civilian and injuring four more .
More than 220 people have died since violence flared just over a week ago , many of them from artillery shelling .
Shortly after conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan , Turkey sought to mobilize the SNA , sometimes called Turkey ’ s proxy army .
Thousands of SNA fighters have been hired by Turkey over the last year to fight in Libya on behalf of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forces .
Some of the SNA fighters have since reportedly returned to Syria for training ahead of dispatch to Nagorno-Karabakh ; some were given only five days of training before shipping out , while others had between two weeks and a month of training , according to SNA sources .
The first fighters were transferred in late September to southern Turkey and then flown from Gaziantep to Ankara , before being transferred to Azerbaijan on Sept. 25 .
According to fighter accounts , SNA commanders arrived earlier to explore the region and coordinate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of troops .
For many young men , displaced by years of civil war at home and bereft of economic opportunities , the lures of a mercenary life are religious propaganda—and money .
Fighters are offered four-month contracts for $ 1,500 a month , paid in Turkish lira .
But many are already regretting it , especially now that a reported 55 Syrian mercenaries have been killed after being confronted with a lot more hands-on fighting than they ’ d been promised .
“ All fighters are unhappy with the situation here in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the ground in Azerbaijan ’ s Barda district , who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal .
“ The psychological situation is bad after the martyrdom of a number of our friends.
” Told they would be mostly manning guard posts along border demarcation lines , they have instead been thrust into direct clashes , with little support from Azerbaijan ’ s regular forces .
“ There is no synergy or communication between us and the Azerbaijani fighters , ” he said .
Another SNA fighter in Azerbaijan said he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 30 other fighters and pulls two six-hour shifts of guard duty each day .
He said a number of fighters “ wish to return to Syria after regretting coming here .
We are not happy , but at the same time , no one forced us to fight in Azerbaijan .
Our hearts are for our friends , who are being killed here , in a country other than theirs , far from their families and their revolution.
” One of those close friends was Muhammad al-Shuhneh , 25 , who was displaced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by a Syrian regime offensive to retake the rebel stronghold of Idlib this year .
He arrived in Azerbaijan late last month in the second batch of fighters but was killed Thursday evening by an Armenian sniper near the city of Barda .
The family believed that Shuhneh—unmarried , the only son among eight sisters—was working in Turkey to help make ends meet .
The arrival of the bodies of the dead mercenaries in Syria cast a dark cloud over places that have already been shrouded in mourning .
One SNA fighter in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the dead was a “ tragic day like had not been witnessed before ” in rural Aleppo .
“ We blame the Turkish government for taking advantage of our poor and the young ’ s hunger for money , ” said one grieving family member of a slain fighter .
Families don ’ t want to reveal their identity , lest they lose the promised 60,000 Turkish lira ( about $ 7,800 ) in compensation for the fallen fighters .
The SNA fighters are hardly saints .
A United Nations report last @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and extortion carried out by the SNA against Kurds , Christians , and other minorities during the fighting in Syria .
The Turkish Defense Ministry has denied sending mercenaries to Azerbaijan , despite widespread media reports and footage from Syrians on the front line of the conflict .
Turkey has also claimed , without providing evidence , that fighters from the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party ( PKK ) —which has fought an insurgency against Turkey for decades—are aiding Armenia .
Turkey ’ s aggressive foreign policy , including forays into the ongoing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has sometimes helped turn the tide of battle , especially in Libya , where Turkish support helped the Tripoli government defeat a Russian-backed effort to capture the capital .
But those geopolitical wins , such as they are , leave young Syrians in the crossfire .
“ The whole world abandoned the Syrian revolution and people , who suffer from the [ Bashar al- ] Assad regime ’ s brutality , and our young people have become a tool for the agendas of other countries , ” said Riyad Kazmouz , 57 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ currently fighting in Libya .
“ We feel sadness and despair for how things turned out and that our children are forced to die for battles that do not concern us .
”

Early Sunday morning, the bodies of more than 50 Syrians killed in a conflict raging far from their own borders—in a land many had barely heard of a few months ago—were returned home for funeral preparations.
Early Sunday morning, the bodies of more than 50 Syrians killed in a conflict raging far from their own borders—in a land many had barely heard of a few months ago—were returned home for funeral preparations.
They were members of militias that had fought previously in northern Syria, then Libya, and now in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh—but always on behalf of Turkey.
“No one wants to make money from wars” after almost a decade of civil war, said the father of one Syrian mercenary. But displacement inside Syria, and the inevitable economic troubles that accompany long-term unrest, has left some young men with little choice.
According to sources within the Syrian National Army (SNA), the umbrella term for a group of opposition militias backed by Turkey, around 1,500 Syrians have so far been deployed to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the southern Caucasus. It’s the latest proxy standoff between Turkey and Russia, which are already on opposing sides in Syria and Libya. Ankara has declared strong support for Azerbaijan, while Moscow is traditionally closer to Armenia.
The mountainous and landlocked region of Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized internationally as Azerbaijan’s territory but has a mostly Armenian population. The two countries went to war between 1988 and 1994, eventually declaring a cease-fire, but never reached a settlement over the dispute. The border between the two is considered one of the most militarized in the world, and the current fighting, which broke out last month, is the worst seen since the cease-fire, with each of the two former Soviet republics placing the blame on the other.
Heavy clashes continued over the weekend, and Armenian forces fired rockets at Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, killing at least one civilian and injuring four more. More than 220 people have died since violence flared just over a week ago, many of them from artillery shelling.
Shortly after conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey sought to mobilize the SNA, sometimes called Turkey’s proxy army. Thousands of SNA fighters have been hired by Turkey over the last year to fight in Libya on behalf of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli, which is fighting Russian-backed forces. Some of the SNA fighters have since reportedly returned to Syria for training ahead of dispatch to Nagorno-Karabakh; some were given only five days of training before shipping out, while others had between two weeks and a month of training, according to SNA sources.
The first fighters were transferred in late September to southern Turkey and then flown from Gaziantep to Ankara, before being transferred to Azerbaijan on Sept. 25. According to fighter accounts, SNA commanders arrived earlier to explore the region and coordinate with the Azerbaijani army about the distribution of troops.
For many young men, displaced by years of civil war at home and bereft of economic opportunities, the lures of a mercenary life are religious propaganda—and money. Fighters are offered four-month contracts for $1,500 a month, paid in Turkish lira.
But many are already regretting it, especially now that a reported 55 Syrian mercenaries have been killed after being confronted with a lot more hands-on fighting than they’d been promised.
“All fighters are unhappy with the situation here in Azerbaijan,” said one Syrian on the ground in Azerbaijan’s Barda district, who asked to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisal. “The psychological situation is bad after the martyrdom of a number of our friends.”
Told they would be mostly manning guard posts along border demarcation lines, they have instead been thrust into direct clashes, with little support from Azerbaijan’s regular forces.
“There is no synergy or communication between us and the Azerbaijani fighters,” he said.
Another SNA fighter in Azerbaijan said he sleeps in a tent with 20 to 30 other fighters and pulls two six-hour shifts of guard duty each day. He said a number of fighters “wish to return to Syria after regretting coming here. We are not happy, but at the same time, no one forced us to fight in Azerbaijan. Our hearts are for our friends, who are being killed here, in a country other than theirs, far from their families and their revolution.”
One of those close friends was Muhammad al-Shuhneh, 25, who was displaced from his home city of Maarat al-Numan by a Syrian regime offensive to retake the rebel stronghold of Idlib this year. He arrived in Azerbaijan late last month in the second batch of fighters but was killed Oct. 1 in Nagarno-Karabakh.
The family believed that Shuhneh—unmarried, the only son among eight sisters—was working in Turkey to help make ends meet.
The arrival of the bodies of the dead mercenaries in Syria cast a dark cloud over places that have already been shrouded in mourning. One SNA fighter in Afrin, Syria, said the arrival of the dead was a “tragic day like had not been witnessed before” in rural Aleppo.
“We blame the Turkish government for taking advantage of our poor and the young’s hunger for money,” said one grieving family member of a slain fighter. Families don’t want to reveal their identity, lest they lose the promised 60,000 Turkish lira (about $7,800) in compensation for the fallen fighters.
The SNA fighters are hardly saints. A United Nations report last month detailed crimes including kidnappings, rape, and extortion carried out by the SNA against Kurds, Christians, and other minorities during the fighting in Syria.
The Turkish Defense Ministry has denied sending mercenaries to Azerbaijan, despite widespread media reports and footage from Syrians on the front line of the conflict. Turkey has also claimed, without providing evidence, that fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—which has fought an insurgency against Turkey for decades—are aiding Armenia.
Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy, including forays into the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Libya, has sometimes helped turn the tide of battle, especially in Libya, where Turkish support helped the Tripoli government defeat a Russian-backed effort to capture the capital. But those geopolitical wins, such as they are, leave young Syrians in the crossfire.
“The whole world abandoned the Syrian revolution and people, who suffer from the [Bashar al-]Assad regime’s brutality, and our young people have become a tool for the agendas of other countries,” said Riyad Kazmouz, 57, the father of a mercenary who is currently fighting in Libya.
“We feel sadness and despair for how things turned out and that our children are forced to die for battles that do not concern us.”
Correction, Oct. 12, 2020: Muhammad al-Shuhneh was killed in Nagorno-Karabakh on Oct. 1. A previous version of this story misstated where he was killed.