foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--How Trump Lost the Balkans

How Trump Lost the Balkans

In the Balkans , the voice of a superpower counts for a lot .
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker ’ s cavalier words in June 1991— “ We don ’ t have a dog in that fight ” —helped set off the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia .
A similar dynamic is underway today .
The see-no-evil economic agenda of the Trump administration has contributed to the sharpest deterioration in relations since the region ’ s wars ended two decades ago .
The administration brags that President Donald Trump has accomplished “ flipping the script ” in the Balkans with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political engagement—and he has .
No fewer than six mostly quiescent countries—Serbia , Kosovo , Montenegro , Bosnia-Herzegovina , Bulgaria , and North Macedonia—are now experiencing dangerous levels of interethnic toxicity , all on the Trump administration ’ s watch .
In the latest graphic example , senior U.S. officials this month unwittingly encouraged one NATO ally , Bulgaria , to threaten military intervention against another , North Macedonia .
On Oct. 6 , U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper met with his Bulgarian counterpart , Krasimir Karakachanov , a strident nationalist with a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Macedonia .
Last month , amid escalating pressure from his government , Karakachanov reiterated Sofia ’ s threat to block Skopje ’ s long-postponed negotiations for European Union membership—a pillar in the trans-Atlantic strategy to stabilize the Balkans .
Rather than press Karakachanov on his provocations and seek restraint , according to the U.S. Defense Department ’ s own readout , the Bulgarian minister was plied with whiskey and praise in Washington , as officials negotiated a 10-year “ road map for defense cooperation ” and the sale of eight F-16 fighters .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s diktats , Esper saluted Karakachanov , who reciprocated with his own salute to Trump .
The bonhomie in Washington was followed by a visit to Bulgaria on Oct. 20 by a senior State Department official , R. Clarke Cooper , who unequivocally expressed “ the United States ’ gratitude to Bulgaria for its commitment to the Alliance.
” Two days later , Karakachanov shocked the region by openly threatening to send Bulgarian troops into North Macedonia .
Compounding the ultimatum was Karakachanov ’ s claim that North Macedonia was threatening “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ implying that Sofia had a casus belli .
Not only did the Trump administration fail to send any meaningful signal before this outburst , but the United states has said little in the aftermath .
It fell to North Macedonia ’ s defense minister , Radmila Sekerinska , to issue the appropriate , dignified reprimand : “ Bulgaria is a member of NATO , and we are a member of NATO , and this is not the way members of the alliance communicate or should communicate.
” The United States ’ silence is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ assailed their government ’ s bullying of the Macedonians over identity disputes , noting that it will harm Bulgaria itself .
To wit , Sofia last week blocked North Macedonia ’ s entrance into Frontex , the European border management agency , weakening Skopje ’ s ability to stop illegal migration and check transnational crime on the border it shares with Bulgaria .
Sofia is isolated within the EU , which bars—but can ’ t prevent—member states from importing bilateral disputes into the EU negotiating framework .
Karakachanov ’ s unrepentant assertion that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” by Macedonians has only compounded the affair .
The U.S. sale of F-16s to Bulgaria is no excuse for Esper ’ s silence or that of his State Department colleagues ; a competent administration can sell F-16s to one NATO ally ( Bulgaria ) without selling out another ( North Macedonia ) .
U.S. officials could easily have reminded Karakachanov of his own words , uttered last month before a parliamentary committee , concerning tensions between Greece and Turkey : “ Knowing the history of relations in the Balkans … contentious issues @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and dialogue and not through use of threats and military force.
” As in Bulgaria , Trump ’ s shortsighted diplomacy has imposed another dangerous cone of silence , this time over Serbia .
At the much-ballyhooed Oval Office summit between Serbia and Kosovo on Sept. 4 , the president hailed the sides ’ two-page collection of commitments as “ historic ” and a “ major breakthrough.
” At rallies , Trump has insisted that he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize , given that his initiative is “ stopping mass killings between Serbia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s hyperbole , and his administration ’ s solitary focus on economic matters , has had three deleterious consequences .
First , the “ economic normalization ” deal has alleviated pressure on the intransigent party , Belgrade .
By participating in the White House initiative , Serbia ’ s autocratic president , Aleksandar Vucic , another staunch nationalist , has burnished his image without pressure to make significant concessions to his adversary .
Trump ’ s special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo , Richard Grenell , has repeatedly emphasized that Washington is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ turn to the essential question of mutual recognition ( which Vucic wants to avoid ) after the economic provisions take hold .
Predictably , the EU-led dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo—which centers on the thorny political questions—has faltered .
This is a particular problem for isolated , unrecognized Kosovo because , under U.S. pressure , it has given up the right even to apply for membership in international organizations—yielding more recriminations between Belgrade and Pristina .
Second , because the Trump administration is so invested in the image of success , Belgrade , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ promote its noxious brand of nationalism without fear of American reproach .
In calculated provocations , Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin has repeatedly employed a highly offensive epithet for the Albanian people in official communiques .
Then-Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic issued a sinister threat against Serbs who assist in the EU-led process to identify missing persons—the unfinished business from the mass killings of the 1990s that Trump referenced .
Like a mafia don , Dacic asked television viewers menacingly , “ What will we do with Serbs who show Albanians where the bodies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ since been appointed Speaker of Parliament . )
While U.S. officials have remained mute , the invective provoked a fierce reaction in Pristina , from the government and opposition .
Kosovo ’ s speaker of parliament , Vjosa Osmani , said the remarks were proof that “ Serbia is still led by … genocidal minds ” —hardly the relaxation of relations that Trump administration officials had touted .
Finally , because the administration has already proclaimed instant success , it has turned a blind eye to Serbia ’ s chiseling on commitments .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Serbian officials were walking back the prohibition against the use of 5G equipment from “ untrusted vendors ” —a euphemism for Huawei .
Within two weeks , Prime Minister Ana Brnabic was opening a Huawei innovations and development center in Belgrade , praising the company as “ one of our biggest and best partners ” in “ the digital transformation of our economy , ” in 5G and beyond .
Meanwhile , China continues to expand its relations with Serbia , Beijing ’ s European “ anchor.
” Defense Minister Vulin recently @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese drones , noting that Beijing had transferred associated technology to Serbia .
Vucic this month promised the Russian ambassador to Serbia that a gas pipeline would be completed this year , amid other projects in the energy sphere , contravening the White House commitment to diversify energy supplies away from Russia .
After receiving a humiliating rebuke for his servility at the White House , Vucic was made to recite a servile list of pledges to the Kremlin , including for Serbia never to join NATO , never to change its view @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , never to impose sanctions on Russia , and to continue its friendly , kindred , and independent policies toward Russia despite EU criticism .
Vucic has just launched the legal process for the opening of a Russian Defense Ministry mission in Belgrade , deepening the military relationship with Moscow .
The big surprise of the administration ’ s deal-making—the inclusion of Israel—may bring Israelis closer to Albanians and Serbs—but not Serbs and Albanians closer to each other .
Preoccupied with its own tormented relations , Israel has no ambition or ability to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sum , Trump ’ s braggadocio about a “ major breakthrough ” has seen a breakdown of relations between Serbia and Kosovo .
There are no signs that the administration ’ s diplomacy has done anything to arrest Serbia ’ s growing , multifaceted relationship with China or its long-standing dependence on Russia .
Indeed , Moscow and Belgrade are exultant over election results in Montenegro at the end of August that propelled pro-Russian , pro-Serbian , and anti-NATO forces into a stunning election victory .
The administration was caught flat-footed once again @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” at the expense of attentiveness to subversion from Moscow and Belgrade .
Officials largely ignored the State Department ’ s own report in June , citing the fears of analysts and the Montenegrin government of a “ coordinated campaign of disinformation , propaganda , and provocation , some of which coming from third countries , seeking to fan ethnonationalistic divisions and provoke conflict through the protests.
” With a hybrid disinformation campaign that some analysts have compared to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections , Serb and Russian actors heavily influenced @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Montenegrin electorate .
While Serbian bots infected social media with fake news , Russian media promoted the crusade of the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Montenegrin government ’ s new law on religious property .
When Serbian Orthodox priests refused to abide by Montenegro ’ s COVID-19 restrictions , Moscow flamboyantly stood by the priests , claiming anti-Christian discrimination .
Throughout the months-long campaign , the Trump administration was complacent , failing to call out the meddling from Serbia and Russia .
In the aftermath of the elections , triumphant Serb nationalists in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as graffiti popped up celebrating the Srebrenica genocide .
Within neighboring Bosnia itself , interethnic relations continue their downward trajectory .
Aware of U.S. disinterest , the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik , a client of both Moscow and Belgrade , has escalated his threat to engineer the secession of the Serb entity .
Dodik has received no admonishment for his provocative claim that recognition of Kosovo would demand recognition of Republika Srpska as well .
With Balkan countries facing a crisis of depopulation as their citizens continue to flee in search @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the time for myopic grandstanding on the economy while ignoring political tensions that threaten to reopen conflict .
Interethnic strife is the death knell for economic reform , foreign investment , and job creation .
As the Germany-based Bertelsmann Stiftung think tank concluded in a recent study , “ Ultimately , economics can only provide part of the answer to how to advance regional integration , the normalisation of relations , and the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries.
” Even the “ mini-Schengen ” provision in the Trump economic agreement—which aims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ movement of people , goods , services , and capital—brings complications .
Smaller countries with big trade deficits like Kosovo worry that it will seal the dominance of Serbia ’ s substantially larger economy .
The EU has just anted up 9 billion euros ( $ 10.6 billion ) to develop , modernize , and connect the economies of Southeastern Europe .
Washington ’ s job isn ’ t to outdo and outspend the EU with flashy , uncoordinated projects that may end up wasting taxpayer money .
The crucial American role is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , principle , and urgency , ensuring that neither Brussels nor Balkan capitals like Sofia and Belgrade stray from the difficult task of resolving the region ’ s political disputes .

In the Balkans, the voice of a superpower counts for a lot. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s cavalier words in June 1991—“We don’t have a dog in that fight”—helped set off the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. A similar dynamic is underway today.
In the Balkans, the voice of a superpower counts for a lot. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s cavalier words in June 1991—“We don’t have a dog in that fight”—helped set off the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. A similar dynamic is underway today.
The see-no-evil economic agenda of the Trump administration has contributed to the sharpest deterioration in relations since the region’s wars ended two decades ago. The administration brags that President Donald Trump has accomplished “flipping the script” in the Balkans with his focus on economics and disdain for political engagement—and he has. No fewer than six mostly quiescent countries—Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia—are now experiencing dangerous levels of interethnic toxicity, all on the Trump administration’s watch.
In the latest graphic example, senior U.S. officials this month unwittingly encouraged one NATO ally, Bulgaria, to threaten military intervention against another, North Macedonia. On Oct. 6, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper met with his Bulgarian counterpart, Krasimir Karakachanov, a strident nationalist with a long record of bombast against neighboring North Macedonia. Last month, amid escalating pressure from his government, Karakachanov reiterated Sofia’s threat to block Skopje’s long-postponed negotiations for European Union membership—a pillar in the trans-Atlantic strategy to stabilize the Balkans.
Rather than press Karakachanov on his provocations and seek restraint, according to the U.S. Defense Department’s own readout, the Bulgarian minister was plied with whiskey and praise in Washington, as officials negotiated a 10-year “road map for defense cooperation” and the sale of eight F-16 fighters. Without a hint of concern over Bulgaria’s diktats, Esper saluted Karakachanov, who reciprocated with his own salute to Trump. The bonhomie in Washington was followed by a visit to Bulgaria on Oct. 20 by a senior State Department official, R. Clarke Cooper, who unequivocally expressed “the United States’ gratitude to Bulgaria for its commitment to the Alliance.”
Two days later, Karakachanov shocked the region by openly threatening to send Bulgarian troops into North Macedonia. Compounding the ultimatum was Karakachanov’s claim that North Macedonia was threatening “the territorial integrity of Bulgaria,” implying that Sofia had a casus belli. Not only did the Trump administration fail to send any meaningful signal before this outburst, but the United states has said little in the aftermath. It fell to North Macedonia’s defense minister, Radmila Sekerinska, to issue the appropriate, dignified reprimand: “Bulgaria is a member of NATO, and we are a member of NATO, and this is not the way members of the alliance communicate or should communicate.”
The United States’ silence is inexcusable. Many prominent Bulgarians themselves have assailed their government’s bullying of the Macedonians over identity disputes, noting that it will harm Bulgaria itself. To wit, Sofia last week blocked North Macedonia’s entrance into Frontex, the European border management agency, weakening Skopje’s ability to stop illegal migration and check transnational crime on the border it shares with Bulgaria. Sofia is isolated within the EU, which bars—but can’t prevent—member states from importing bilateral disputes into the EU negotiating framework. Karakachanov’s unrepentant assertion that the Bulgarian forces would be “welcomed” by Macedonians has only compounded the affair.
The U.S. sale of F-16s to Bulgaria is no excuse for Esper’s silence or that of his State Department colleagues; a competent administration can sell F-16s to one NATO ally (Bulgaria) without selling out another (North Macedonia). U.S. officials could easily have reminded Karakachanov of his own words, uttered last month before a parliamentary committee, concerning tensions between Greece and Turkey: “Knowing the history of relations in the Balkans … contentious issues between neighbors should be resolved through negotiations and dialogue and not through use of threats and military force.”
As in Bulgaria, Trump’s shortsighted diplomacy has imposed another dangerous cone of silence, this time over Serbia. At the much-ballyhooed Oval Office summit between Serbia and Kosovo on Sept. 4, the president hailed the sides’ two-page collection of commitments as “historic” and a “major breakthrough.” At rallies, Trump has insisted that he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize, given that his initiative is “stopping mass killings between Serbia and Kosovo.”
In fact, Trump’s hyperbole, and his administration’s solitary focus on economic matters, has had three deleterious consequences. First, the “economic normalization” deal has alleviated pressure on the intransigent party, Belgrade. By participating in the White House initiative, Serbia’s autocratic president, Aleksandar Vucic, another staunch nationalist, has burnished his image without pressure to make significant concessions to his adversary.
Trump’s special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo, Richard Grenell, has repeatedly emphasized that Washington is focused on economic arrangements and will only turn to the essential question of mutual recognition (which Vucic wants to avoid) after the economic provisions take hold. Predictably, the EU-led dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo—which centers on the thorny political questions—has faltered. This is a particular problem for isolated, unrecognized Kosovo because, under U.S. pressure, it has given up the right even to apply for membership in international organizations—yielding more recriminations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Second, because the Trump administration is so invested in the image of success, Belgrade, like Sofia, knows that it can promote its noxious brand of nationalism without fear of American reproach. In calculated provocations, Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin has repeatedly employed a highly offensive epithet for the Albanian people in official communiques. Then-Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic issued a sinister threat against Serbs who assist in the EU-led process to identify missing persons—the unfinished business from the mass killings of the 1990s that Trump referenced. Like a mafia don, Dacic asked television viewers menacingly, “What will we do with Serbs who show Albanians where the bodies are buried?” (Dacic has since been appointed Speaker of Parliament.)
While U.S. officials have remained mute, the invective provoked a fierce reaction in Pristina, from the government and opposition. Kosovo’s speaker of parliament, Vjosa Osmani, said the remarks were proof that “Serbia is still led by … genocidal minds”—hardly the relaxation of relations that Trump administration officials had touted.
Finally, because the administration has already proclaimed instant success, it has turned a blind eye to Serbia’s chiseling on commitments. Within days of the Oval Office signing, Serbian officials were walking back the prohibition against the use of 5G equipment from “untrusted vendors”—a euphemism for Huawei. Within two weeks, Prime Minister Ana Brnabic was opening a Huawei innovations and development center in Belgrade, praising the company as “one of our biggest and best partners” in “the digital transformation of our economy,” in 5G and beyond. Meanwhile, China continues to expand its relations with Serbia, Beijing’s European “anchor.” Defense Minister Vulin recently attended a live-fire exercise of recently acquired Chinese drones, noting that Beijing had transferred associated technology to Serbia.
Vucic this month promised the Russian ambassador to Serbia that a gas pipeline would be completed this year, amid other projects in the energy sphere, contravening the White House commitment to diversify energy supplies away from Russia. After receiving a humiliating rebuke for his servility at the White House, Vucic was made to recite a servile list of pledges to the Kremlin, including for Serbia never to join NATO, never to change its view on the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, never to impose sanctions on Russia, and to continue its friendly, kindred, and independent policies toward Russia despite EU criticism. Vucic has just launched the legal process for the opening of a Russian Defense Ministry mission in Belgrade, deepening the military relationship with Moscow.
The big surprise of the administration’s deal-making—the inclusion of Israel—may bring Israelis closer to Albanians and Serbs—but not Serbs and Albanians closer to each other. Preoccupied with its own tormented relations, Israel has no ambition or ability to foster reconciliation between the parties.
In sum, Trump’s braggadocio about a “major breakthrough” has seen a breakdown of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. There are no signs that the administration’s diplomacy has done anything to arrest Serbia’s growing, multifaceted relationship with China or its long-standing dependence on Russia. Indeed, Moscow and Belgrade are exultant over election results in Montenegro at the end of August that propelled pro-Russian, pro-Serbian, and anti-NATO forces into a stunning election victory.
The administration was caught flat-footed once again by its emphasis on “trade diplomacy” at the expense of attentiveness to subversion from Moscow and Belgrade. Officials largely ignored the State Department’s own report in June, citing the fears of analysts and the Montenegrin government of a “coordinated campaign of disinformation, propaganda, and provocation, some of which coming from third countries, seeking to fan ethnonationalistic divisions and provoke conflict through the protests.”
With a hybrid disinformation campaign that some analysts have compared to Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, Serb and Russian actors heavily influenced preelection narratives and sharpened polarization of the Montenegrin electorate. While Serbian bots infected social media with fake news, Russian media promoted the crusade of the Serbian Orthodox Church against the Montenegrin government’s new law on religious property. When Serbian Orthodox priests refused to abide by Montenegro’s COVID-19 restrictions, Moscow flamboyantly stood by the priests, claiming anti-Christian discrimination. Throughout the months-long campaign, the Trump administration was complacent, failing to call out the meddling from Serbia and Russia.
In the aftermath of the elections, triumphant Serb nationalists in Montenegro targeted Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), as graffiti popped up celebrating the Srebrenica genocide. Within neighboring Bosnia itself, interethnic relations continue their downward trajectory. Aware of U.S. disinterest, the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, a client of both Moscow and Belgrade, has escalated his threat to engineer the secession of the Serb entity. Dodik has received no admonishment for his provocative claim that recognition of Kosovo would demand recognition of Republika Srpska as well.
With Balkan countries facing a crisis of depopulation as their citizens continue to flee in search of better opportunities, now is not the time for myopic grandstanding on the economy while ignoring political tensions that threaten to reopen conflict. Interethnic strife is the death knell for economic reform, foreign investment, and job creation. As the Germany-based Bertelsmann Stiftung think tank concluded in a recent study, “Ultimately, economics can only provide part of the answer to how to advance regional integration, the normalisation of relations, and the EU accession of the Western Balkan countries.” Even the “mini-Schengen” provision in the Trump economic agreement—which aims to reduce barriers to speed up the movement of people, goods, services, and capital—brings complications. Smaller countries with big trade deficits like Kosovo worry that it will seal the dominance of Serbia’s substantially larger economy.
The EU has just anted up 9 billion euros ($10.6 billion) to develop, modernize, and connect the economies of Southeastern Europe. Washington’s job isn’t to outdo and outspend the EU with flashy, uncoordinated projects that may end up wasting taxpayer money. The crucial American role is to supply a consistent voice of authority, principle, and urgency, ensuring that neither Brussels nor Balkan capitals like Sofia and Belgrade stray from the difficult task of resolving the region’s political disputes.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Shutting Down SARS Won’t End Nigeria’s Security Crisis

Weeks of protests by young people against police brutality convinced Nigeria ’ s government to disband its controversial Special Anti-Robbery Squad ( SARS ) police unit , but the move may not be the victory for the protesters that it appears to be .
In fact , disbanding SARS may ironically lead to more , not less , armed security presence on Nigeria ’ s streets Although Nigeria suffers from much violent insecurity , it is actually an underpoliced society .
The country already has a shortage of police officers , and if their number is further reduced , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ usually does ) call on the Army to substitute for , or support , the police .
This could lead to more clashes between the Army—which has also been accused of human rights abuses—and civilians .
In an Orwellian sounding statement reminiscent of Nigeria ’ s era of military rule , the Army has already warned “ subversive elements and trouble makers ” among the protesters that “ it remains highly committed to defend the country and her democracy at all cost.
” Historically , Nigeria ’ s military has often been the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ problems .
When Nigeria ’ s military dictatorship resigned in 1999 , much-needed security sector reforms were overlooked due to the relief at finally having a democratically elected civilian government after 29 years of military rule .
During the military era , the security forces engaged in corruption , torture , summary executions of suspects , and extortion of civilians .
There was no transitional justice or accountability for these crimes and the incoming civilian government swept them under the rug .
This created a precedent of impunity for abuses by the security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ efficiency and morale as military governments marginalized , underequipped , and underfunded them .
Military rulers instead entrusted to soldiers basic law enforcement duties such as mounting checkpoints and fighting armed robbery and kidnapping .
When military rule ended , the Army was unable to get its soldiers off the streets because Nigeria suffers from twin deficits in the areas of policing quantity and quality .
Nigeria does not have enough police officers to patrol the entire country , and the officers it has can not not be relied upon to suppress the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Although Nigeria has approximately 370,000 police officers , over 150,000 of them are employed as escorts or guards for VIPs .
In other words , more than 40 percent of the police are not actually protecting the public but instead are protecting VIPs from the public .
Nigeria ’ s ratio of one police officer to every 540 civilians is well below the United Nations ’ recommended ratio of one police officer per 450 citizens .
Many of those who remain on policing duties are not fit for purpose .
Twelve years ago @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reform bluntly stated that the police force is “ saddled with a very large number of unqualified , under-trained and ill-equipped officers and men many of whose suitability to wear the respected uniform of the Force is in doubt.
” The inability of the police to contain crime waves and multiple communal insecurity outbursts resulted in the government continually deploying military units to reinforce or substitute for police formations across the country .
As a result , the military spends much of its time conducting police duties such as combating armed robbery , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and other communal riots .
The shortage of police has led to a highly militarized society in which soldiers are scattered in civilian spaces throughout the country .
As recently as 2017 , the Army was deployed on internal security operations in 32 of Nigeria ’ s 36 states .
A former chief of army staff said that “ It is not normal … in Nigeria today , the armed forces are the ones doing the duties of the police.
” The military has already responded to the anti-SARS protests by offering @ @ @ @ @ @ @ populous city , Lagos , where police shot unarmed protesters last week .
Soldiers are by no means a gentler alternative to the police and often have to defend themselves from accusations of using excessive force against civilians .
Some Nigerians have reacted to the dearth of competent security forces by creating vigilante groups .
Although such vigilante groups are illegal , they are popular in many communities for the swift and ruthless manner in which they dispense of criminals .
However , the untrained young men who volunteer for these vigilante groups @ @ @ @ @ @ @ abuse that make the police unpopular .
Without forensic and investigative training , vigilante groups often use torture to extract confessions , condemn criminals to death based on mere suspicion , or hire themselves out to settle disputes between private parties .
The addition of vigilantes further complicates Nigeria ’ s security matrix .
Police , soldiers , and vigilantes simultaneously patrolling Nigeria ’ s streets and engaged with the same professed aim of combating crime are likely to increase the risk of further clashes between civilians and state security forces .
Disbanding @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a large ocean of much-needed security sector reforms .
Nigeria ’ s crime and security challenges mean that soldiers will keep being drawn into civilian spaces where they do not want to be .
Nigeria ’ s people are likely to remain caught between a police force that is intensely disliked and distrusted for its corruption and brutality and a military that is less corrupt but has a similarly bad reputation for human rights abuses .
Things are likely to get worse before they get better .

Weeks of protests by young people against police brutality convinced Nigeria’s government to disband its controversial Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) police unit, but the move may not be the victory for the protesters that it appears to be. In fact, disbanding SARS may ironically lead to more, not less, armed security presence on Nigeria’s streets
Weeks of protests by young people against police brutality convinced Nigeria’s government to disband its controversial Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) police unit, but the move may not be the victory for the protesters that it appears to be. In fact, disbanding SARS may ironically lead to more, not less, armed security presence on Nigeria’s streets
Although Nigeria suffers from much violent insecurity, it is actually an underpoliced society. The country already has a shortage of police officers, and if their number is further reduced, the government may once again (as it usually does) call on the Army to substitute for, or support, the police. This could lead to more clashes between the Army—which has also been accused of human rights abuses—and civilians.
In an Orwellian sounding statement reminiscent of Nigeria’s era of military rule, the Army has already warned “subversive elements and trouble makers” among the protesters that “it remains highly committed to defend the country and her democracy at all cost.”
Historically, Nigeria’s military has often been the cause of—and solution for—the country’s problems. When Nigeria’s military dictatorship resigned in 1999, much-needed security sector reforms were overlooked due to the relief at finally having a democratically elected civilian government after 29 years of military rule.
During the military era, the security forces engaged in corruption, torture, summary executions of suspects, and extortion of civilians. There was no transitional justice or accountability for these crimes and the incoming civilian government swept them under the rug. This created a precedent of impunity for abuses by the security forces.
Nigerian police also lost much efficiency and morale as military governments marginalized, underequipped, and underfunded them. Military rulers instead entrusted to soldiers basic law enforcement duties such as mounting checkpoints and fighting armed robbery and kidnapping. When military rule ended, the Army was unable to get its soldiers off the streets because Nigeria suffers from twin deficits in the areas of policing quantity and quality.
Nigeria does not have enough police officers to patrol the entire country, and the officers it has cannot not be relied upon to suppress the country’s crime and insecurity. Although Nigeria has approximately 370,000 police officers, over 150,000 of them are employed as escorts or guards for VIPs. In other words, more than 40 percent of the police are not actually protecting the public but instead are protecting VIPs from the public.
Nigeria’s ratio of one police officer to every 540 civilians is well below the United Nations’ recommended ratio of one police officer per 450 citizens. Many of those who remain on policing duties are not fit for purpose. Twelve years ago, a presidential committee report on police reform bluntly stated that the police force is “saddled with a very large number of unqualified, under-trained and ill-equipped officers and men many of whose suitability to wear the respected uniform of the Force is in doubt.”
The inability of the police to contain crime waves and multiple communal insecurity outbursts resulted in the government continually deploying military units to reinforce or substitute for police formations across the country. As a result, the military spends much of its time conducting police duties such as combating armed robbery, kidnappings, and tackling ethnic, religious, and other communal riots.
The shortage of police has led to a highly militarized society in which soldiers are scattered in civilian spaces throughout the country. As recently as 2017, the Army was deployed on internal security operations in 32 of Nigeria’s 36 states.
A former chief of army staff said that “It is not normal … in Nigeria today, the armed forces are the ones doing the duties of the police.” The military has already responded to the anti-SARS protests by offering to deploy in Nigeria’s most populous city, Lagos, where police shot unarmed protesters last week. Soldiers are by no means a gentler alternative to the police and often have to defend themselves from accusations of using excessive force against civilians.
Some Nigerians have reacted to the dearth of competent security forces by creating vigilante groups. Although such vigilante groups are illegal, they are popular in many communities for the swift and ruthless manner in which they dispense of criminals. However, the untrained young men who volunteer for these vigilante groups sometimes lapse into the same sorts of abuse that make the police unpopular.
Without forensic and investigative training, vigilante groups often use torture to extract confessions, condemn criminals to death based on mere suspicion, or hire themselves out to settle disputes between private parties.
The addition of vigilantes further complicates Nigeria’s security matrix. Police, soldiers, and vigilantes simultaneously patrolling Nigeria’s streets and engaged with the same professed aim of combating crime are likely to increase the risk of further clashes between civilians and state security forces.
Disbanding SARS will be a tiny ripple in a large ocean of much-needed security sector reforms. Nigeria’s crime and security challenges mean that soldiers will keep being drawn into civilian spaces where they do not want to be.
Nigeria’s people are likely to remain caught between a police force that is intensely disliked and distrusted for its corruption and brutality and a military that is less corrupt but has a similarly bad reputation for human rights abuses. Things are likely to get worse before they get better.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-28--Let’s Be Honest About Religion and the Courts

Let ’ s Be Honest About Religion and the Courts As Amy Coney Barrett was hurriedly advanced to the highest court in America , the notion that her religion might influence judicial decisions became almost completely taboo , tantamount to anti-religious bigotry .
Judges look to the law , not to God .
Their holy texts have no bearing on their interpretation of legal texts .
How dare anyone suggest otherwise ?
Yet this absurd position runs against everything we know about human psychology and the role of religion , or lack of it , in people ’ s lives @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exist distorts our understanding of the courts by substituting fantasy for reality .
Just as financial incentives can create conflicts of interest that influence scientific conclusions and legal findings , religious ideology can do the same .
In fact , it demeans religious belief to think there ’ s no connection .
Individual faith arguably exerts at least as much influence on their decision-making as the promise of financial rewards .
But don ’ t take it from me—take it from Amy Coney Barrett herself .
In 1998 , she co-authored an article @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the difficulty of deciding death penalty cases for Catholic judges and argued that they should consider recusing themselves .
“ We believe that Catholic judges ( if they are faithful to the teaching of their church ) are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty , ” she wrote .
In a footnote , she suggests that abortion presents a more clear cut case for recusal , approvingly quoting another legal scholar : “ Where there is no honest , legitimate alternative for deciding the case but to follow positive law supporting the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ] the judge should recuse himself.
” There ’ s plenty of empirical evidence for this intuitive view .
In a review of judicial decisions on religious liberty cases , scholars found that the “ single most prominent , salient , and consistent influence on judicial decision making was ” …wait for it… “ religion—religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant , the background of the judge , and the demographics of the community.
” Another more general review found religious beliefs—Evangelical Protestant , mainstream Protestant , Jew , Catholic—were clearly a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ penalty , gender discrimination , and obscenity , even after controlling for other variables like party affiliation .
Those who see hidden anti-religious bigotry in pushing this connection are mistaken .
After all , there is no such thing as “ religion ” or even “ Christianity ” writ large , which is why Catholicism and Judaism and Evangelical Protestantism exert different kinds of influence depending on the judicial decision .
Nor does the issue of how religion influences judicial decisions break along party lines .
A climate change skeptic could—with justification—point to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the environment and wonder about its influence on a Catholic judge .
In their journal article , Coney Barrett and her co-author wisely observe that not all Catholics are the same .
Some may see themselves as capable of enforcing a law even if it means breaking Church prohibitions on executing criminals or—to use phrasing reflective of certain beliefs—murdering an unborn child .
Others may not , for the obvious reason that believing your decision will lead to infanticide would understandably lead to a crisis of conscience .
Moreover , it ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ least if religion is narrowly defined .
Americans should abandon their myopic focus on the influence of religion per se , an amorphous category that fails to adequately describe the deeply held beliefs of many secular people .
In its place should be what the political philosopher John Rawls referred to as a “ comprehensive doctrine.
” Everyone has a comprehensive doctrine , a set of beliefs about everything from the existence of souls to the importance of certain virtues .
And everyone has potential conflicts of conscience that stem from their comprehensive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ non-religious beliefs can have the same lived significance and power as religious beliefs is amply evident when , for instance , the linguist John McWhorter refers to anti-racism as a “ new religion ” or the New York Times ’ Ross Douthat talks about the “ orthodoxy ” of the progressive left .
They ’ re right : It really doesn ’ t make sense to distinguish between traditionally religious beliefs and beliefs that are profoundly felt and existentially important .
An atheist ’ s “ non-religious ” belief that fetuses don ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their decision making on abortion .
Saying so isn ’ t anti-atheist bigotry , for the same reason that claiming Coney Barrett ’ s belief in fetuses ’ souls might affect her rulings on abortion isn ’ t anti-religious bigotry .
To assuage the faithful ’ s concern on this score , we should abandon discussions of how religion affects judicial decisions and shift to the effects of people ’ s “ deeply held metaphysical beliefs ” more generally .
Such beliefs inescapably shape our behavior in all aspects of life , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ separation of metaphysics and State may be an honorable political ideal , but it is an impossibility for actual humans .
Americans must be able to have tough , honest conversations about this .
We should be able to ask openly how people ’ s “ dogma , ” religious or otherwise , might influence their approach to cases—and when they should choose to step back from a decision as a result .
Instead , legal analysts pretend to believe in mythical “ unbiased ” judges whose personal positions on the existence ( @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and divinely revealed truths have , remarkably , no bearing whatsoever on the decisions they make .
Even those who oppose Barrett can be thankful that she is under no such illusion .

As Amy Coney Barrett was hurriedly advanced to the highest court in America, the notion that her religion might influence judicial decisions became almost completely taboo, tantamount to anti-religious bigotry . Judges look to the law, not to God. Their holy texts have no bearing on their interpretation of legal texts. How dare anyone suggest otherwise ?
As Amy Coney Barrett was hurriedly advanced to the highest court in America, the notion that her religion might influence judicial decisions became almost completely taboo, tantamount to anti-religious bigotry. Judges look to the law, not to God. Their holy texts have no bearing on their interpretation of legal texts. How dare anyone suggest otherwise?
Yet this absurd position runs against everything we know about human psychology and the role of religion, or lack of it, in people’s lives. Pretending that influence doesn’t exist distorts our understanding of the courts by substituting fantasy for reality. Just as financial incentives can create conflicts of interest that influence scientific conclusions and legal findings, religious ideology can do the same. In fact, it demeans religious belief to think there’s no connection. Individual faith arguably exerts at least as much influence on their decision-making as the promise of financial rewards.
But don’t take it from me—take it from Amy Coney Barrett herself. In 1998, she co-authored an article for the Marquette Law Review that acknowledged the difficulty of deciding death penalty cases for Catholic judges and argued that they should consider recusing themselves. “We believe that Catholic judges (if they are faithful to the teaching of their church) are morally precluded from enforcing the death penalty,” she wrote. In a footnote, she suggests that abortion presents a more clear cut case for recusal, approvingly quoting another legal scholar: “Where there is no honest, legitimate alternative for deciding the case but to follow positive law supporting the right to commit an abortion […] the judge should recuse himself.”
There’s plenty of empirical evidence for this intuitive view. In a review of judicial decisions on religious liberty cases, scholars found that the “single most prominent, salient, and consistent influence on judicial decision making was”…wait for it…“religion—religion in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and the demographics of the community.”
Another more general review found religious beliefs—Evangelical Protestant, mainstream Protestant, Jew, Catholic—were clearly a factor in decisions related to the death penalty, gender discrimination, and obscenity, even after controlling for other variables like party affiliation.
Those who see hidden anti-religious bigotry in pushing this connection are mistaken. After all, there is no such thing as “religion” or even “Christianity” writ large, which is why Catholicism and Judaism and Evangelical Protestantism exert different kinds of influence depending on the judicial decision. Nor does the issue of how religion influences judicial decisions break along party lines. A climate change skeptic could—with justification—point to Pope Francis’s enthusiasm for protecting the environment and wonder about its influence on a Catholic judge.
In their journal article, Coney Barrett and her co-author wisely observe that not all Catholics are the same. Some may see themselves as capable of enforcing a law even if it means breaking Church prohibitions on executing criminals or—to use phrasing reflective of certain beliefs—murdering an unborn child. Others may not, for the obvious reason that believing your decision will lead to infanticide would understandably lead to a crisis of conscience.
Moreover, it’s not religion alone that exerts this influence—at least if religion is narrowly defined. Americans should abandon their myopic focus on the influence of religion per se, an amorphous category that fails to adequately describe the deeply held beliefs of many secular people. In its place should be what the political philosopher John Rawls referred to as a “comprehensive doctrine.” Everyone has a comprehensive doctrine, a set of beliefs about everything from the existence of souls to the importance of certain virtues. And everyone has potential conflicts of conscience that stem from their comprehensive doctrine, even materialist atheists.
That non-religious beliefs can have the same lived significance and power as religious beliefs is amply evident when, for instance, the linguist John McWhorter refers to anti-racism as a “new religion” or the New York Times’ Ross Douthat talks about the “orthodoxy” of the progressive left. They’re right: It really doesn’t make sense to distinguish between traditionally religious beliefs and beliefs that are profoundly felt and existentially important. An atheist’s “non-religious” belief that fetuses don’t have souls is likely to influence their decision making on abortion. Saying so isn’t anti-atheist bigotry, for the same reason that claiming Coney Barrett’s belief in fetuses’ souls might affect her rulings on abortion isn’t anti-religious bigotry.
To assuage the faithful’s concern on this score, we should abandon discussions of how religion affects judicial decisions and shift to the effects of people’s “deeply held metaphysical beliefs” more generally. Such beliefs inescapably shape our behavior in all aspects of life, and judicial decisions are no exception. The separation of metaphysics and State may be an honorable political ideal, but it is an impossibility for actual humans.
Americans must be able to have tough, honest conversations about this. We should be able to ask openly how people’s “dogma,” religious or otherwise, might influence their approach to cases—and when they should choose to step back from a decision as a result. Instead, legal analysts pretend to believe in mythical “unbiased” judges whose personal positions on the existence (or non-existence) of Heaven, souls and divinely revealed truths have, remarkably, no bearing whatsoever on the decisions they make. Even those who oppose Barrett can be thankful that she is under no such illusion.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--Are We Not Talking About Canada and Mexico Because It’s So Obvious?

Are We Not Talking About Canada and Mexico Because It ’ s So Obvious ?
This article is part of Election 2020 : What We ’ re Missing , FP ’ s series of daily takes by leading global thinkers on the most important foreign-policy issues not being talked about during the presidential election campaign .
It ’ s a truism : Bounded by oceans and friendly neighbors , the United States is blessed by geography .
Few others could afford the luxury of isolationism as the United States did for two centuries , and no superpower has ever been @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s the United States that has historically caused trouble in its backyard .
As the Mexican General Porfirio Díaz once complained : “ Poor Mexico—so far from God , so close to the United States.
” Today , the United States is once again proving a bad neighbor .
President Donald Trump , when he was a candidate , called Mexicans “ criminals ” and “ rapists ” and the country an “ enemy.
” By now , he has turned the southern U.S. border into an international disgrace .
He called @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and weak ” and invoked spurious national security grounds—as if Canada were planning an attack—to slap tariffs on Canadian steel .
Now the shoe seems to be on the other foot : Canada has closed its border to Americans because of U.S. pandemic failures ; in Mexico , the mayor of the border city Juárez has asked the national government to do the same .
It ’ s all so self-defeating—consolidating North America would create a strategic advantage with a monumental payoff .
It ’ s all so self-defeating .
Consolidating North America @ @ @ @ @ @ @ monumental payoff for the United States .
Closer cooperation with Mexico and Canada would provide strategic depth for the United States in dealing with illegal immigration and terrorism .
Californians experiencing rolling blackouts would benefit from a regional energy grid .
Businesses in the United States need both high-skilled and low-skilled labor that a coordinated North American immigration policy could provide .
Affordable labor in Mexico can help secure supply chains close to home and removed from exposure to China—for example , to ensure the availability of medical supplies during pandemics .
A @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the United States would be a formidable force in trade negotiations , and an international standard-setter .
These mutually beneficial policies would also mitigate the least discussed and most detrimental potential threat to the United States : Mexico ’ s descent into lawlessness , violence , and instability due to the drug cartel corruption that is poisoning the country .
Local politicians and journalists have been routinely targeted for 15 years , but the arrest earlier this month of Mexican former Defense Minister General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda in Los Angeles on drug @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wake-up call to Washington .
Not only do Americans , as the main consumers of cartel-supplied drugs , have a moral responsibility and public-health interest in working with Mexico on this issue , but an urgent national security rationale as well .
Canada has much to offer in helping the United States help Mexico .
Working together to strengthen North America as a common foundation for security and prosperity is the biggest opportunity the United States is missing—and one with the greatest penalty for inattention or failure .
The next administration should take @ @

It’s a truism: Bounded by oceans and friendly neighbors, the United States is blessed by geography. Few others could afford the luxury of isolationism as the United States did for two centuries, and no superpower has ever been so secure. If anything, it’s the United States that has historically caused trouble in its backyard. As the Mexican General Porfirio Díaz once complained: “Poor Mexico—so far from God, so close to the United States.”
It’s a truism: Bounded by oceans and friendly neighbors, the United States is blessed by geography. Few others could afford the luxury of isolationism as the United States did for two centuries, and no superpower has ever been so secure. If anything, it’s the United States that has historically caused trouble in its backyard. As the Mexican General Porfirio Díaz once complained: “Poor Mexico—so far from God, so close to the United States.”
Today, the United States is once again proving a bad neighbor. President Donald Trump, when he was a candidate, called Mexicans “criminals” and “rapists” and the country an “enemy.” By now, he has turned the southern U.S. border into an international disgrace. He called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “dishonest and weak” and invoked spurious national security grounds—as if Canada were planning an attack—to slap tariffs on Canadian steel. Now the shoe seems to be on the other foot: Canada has closed its border to Americans because of U.S. pandemic failures; in Mexico, the mayor of the border city Juárez has asked the national government to do the same.
It’s all so self-defeating—consolidating North America would create a strategic advantage with a monumental payoff.
It’s all so self-defeating. Consolidating North America would be a strategic advantage with a monumental payoff for the United States.
Closer cooperation with Mexico and Canada would provide strategic depth for the United States in dealing with illegal immigration and terrorism. Californians experiencing rolling blackouts would benefit from a regional energy grid. Businesses in the United States need both high-skilled and low-skilled labor that a coordinated North American immigration policy could provide. Affordable labor in Mexico can help secure supply chains close to home and removed from exposure to China—for example, to ensure the availability of medical supplies during pandemics. A common front by Canada, Mexico, and the United States would be a formidable force in trade negotiations, and an international standard-setter.
These mutually beneficial policies would also mitigate the least discussed and most detrimental potential threat to the United States: Mexico’s descent into lawlessness, violence, and instability due to the drug cartel corruption that is poisoning the country. Local politicians and journalists have been routinely targeted for 15 years, but the arrest earlier this month of Mexican former Defense Minister General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda in Los Angeles on drug and money laundering charges should be a wake-up call to Washington. Not only do Americans, as the main consumers of cartel-supplied drugs, have a moral responsibility and public-health interest in working with Mexico on this issue, but an urgent national security rationale as well. Canada has much to offer in helping the United States help Mexico.
Working together to strengthen North America as a common foundation for security and prosperity is the biggest opportunity the United States is missing—and one with the greatest penalty for inattention or failure. The next administration should take note.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--Ivory Coast’s Election Could Do Lasting Harm to Democratic Norms in West Africa

Ivory Coast ’ s Election Could Do Lasting Harm to Democratic Norms in West Africa There is a sense of foreboding to Ivory Coast ’ s upcoming presidential election , due to be held on Oct. 31 .
The last time Ivorians went to the polls against the backdrop of fractious political debate and elevated intercommunal tensions , in 2010 , the result was widespread violence that left at least 3,000 people dead .
That year the election pitted then-President Laurent Gbagbo against opposition leader Henri Konan Bédié and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara , the country ’ s current @ @ @ @ @ @ @ when the Electoral Commission declared Ouattara the winner , but Gbagbo , supported by the Constitutional Council , refused to stand down .
Ouattara , with the assistance of Forces Nouvelles rebels , France , and the United Nations , seized the presidency , and Gbagbo was later sent to the International Criminal Court , where he was tried for crimes against humanity , only to be acquitted in January 2019 .
This year , the election , which had looked like it might include those very same politicians—Gbagbo , Ouattara , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ political figures in Ivory Coast—now appears to be a much more solitary affair for the president .
Ouattara had initially intended to stand down from politics ahead of the 2020 poll and pass power on to “ the next generation.
” However , when his anointed successor Amadou Gon Coulibaly died suddenly in July , he said he would stand in his place .
The opposition has perceived this as deeply controversial because the constitution allows for only two presidential terms , and yet this will be Ouattara ’ s third , should @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand for a third term because a new constitution was introduced in 2016 , effectively resetting term limits early in his second term .
By contrast , Gbagbo , although he had sought to stand , was disqualified on Sept. 14 , along with 39 other politicians who had declared their candidacies .
Meanwhile , Bédié and Pascal Affi N ’ Guessan , two of the only four candidates who were allowed to run , have called for an “ active boycott ” of the election , indicating that their supporters should use @ @ @ @ @ @ @ from taking place .
The only remaining participant who will contest the poll against Ouattara is Kouadio Konan Bertin , an independent candidate who commands little broad support .
Ouattara has succeeded where Gbagbo could not in 2010 .
He has made the election into a one-horse race .
Although Gbagbo had repeatedly delayed the 2010 election during Ivory Coast ’ s lengthy civil war that occurred between 2002 and 2011 , he eventually agreed to face off against both Ouattara and Bédié .
Gbagbo was president of a nation at the time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and in which French and U.N. troops manned a cease-fire line in the middle of the country .
Forces Nouvelles rebels , who supported Ouattara , occupied the north , following a failed coup attempt on Gbagbo ’ s government in 2002 , which triggered the civil war .
Ouattara faces rather different circumstances .
Crucially , he has a much firmer grip on power .
He has no rebel force opposing him and has managed , following a series of mutinies in 2014 and 2017 , to bring the army under @ @ @ @ @ @ @ forced one of his most prominent adversaries , the former head of the National Assembly and leader of the Forces Nouvelles Guillaume Soro , who had some power over the army , into exile .
There is no longer a U.N. mission based in the country , and France , which in Gbagbo ’ s later years grew increasingly troubled by his presidency , is very much in favor of Ouattara .
French President Emmanuel Macron and Ouattara have met since the Ivorian president declared he would stand for a third term , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ensure elections take place peacefully , and relations have become more tense since Ouattara ’ s declaration , there has been no open criticism of this move .
Ivorian opposition figures have complained that France has not publicly condemned the third-term bid , especially since the French president had so widely praised Ouattara ’ s initial decision to retire from politics ahead of the poll .
Additionally , Ouattara , unlike Gbagbo , has made the forthcoming vote so controversial and lacking in legitimacy that the opposition has been left with few choices @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council ’ s ruling on Sept. 14 that Ouattara could stand for president , but so many opposition candidates could not , cemented the sense that it was being manipulated by the presidency .
Further , the Electoral Commission has long been seen as disproportionately advantageous for the ruling party because the opposition believed there were too many seats within the commission allocated to either the ruling party or its supporters .
Extensive negotiations with the opposition have been undertaken to address this , but the opposition continues to regard it as illegitimate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including one representative designated by the president ; one by the minister of territorial administration ; seven representatives of political parties ( three representatives from the ruling party and four from opposition parties ) ; six civil society representatives , including one from the National Commission for Human Rights and one from the legal profession ; and one representative from the Superior Council of the Judiciary .
The opposition regards the human rights commission and the Superior Council of the Judiciary as too close to the ruling party .
This remains contentious @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elevate the government ’ s power within the commission .
The composition of the Electoral Commission has been so controversial that Affi N ’ Guessan recently withdrew the less radical wing of the Ivorian Popular Front , which he leads , from the opposition seats of the institution , leaving the opposition with only one of its four mandated seats filled .
Thus , neither the commission nor the Constitutional Council , the two institutions charged with overseeing the election , are perceived as credible .
The boycott is a sign of desperation @ @ @ @ @ @ @ legitimacy of the poll , which Ouattara has made virtually unwinnable for anyone other than himself .
Recognizing this , the opposition had pledged to unite against Ouattara and establish a barrier to his third term .
They called first for a campaign of civil disobedience , then for the intervention of France and the U.N. , claiming that unless Ouattara withdrew his candidacy and the commission and the Constitutional Council were dissolved , there could be no election .
However , as time has gone on it has become increasingly apparent that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and the election is likely to go ahead regardless .
The boycott is , then , a sign of desperation and a last-ditch effort to undermine the legitimacy of the poll , which Ouattara has made virtually unwinnable for anyone other than himself .
Internal divisions and a lack of planning on the part of the opposition have not helped matters .
While Ouattara has toured the country announcing new infrastructure projects and increased the farmgate price of cocoa , attempting to win over the nearly 20 percent of Ivorians who rely on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a living , the opposition has been conspicuous by their absence from the campaign trail .
They were frozen by the challenge of organizing a coherent election bid in an unfair race .
That election took place against a backdrop of ethnic tension , which had been mounting for decades , manipulated by politicians for their own gain .
This remains the case to this day .
Whereas Gbagbo , an ethnic Bete from the southwestern town of Gagnoa , was renowned for his politics of exclusion and his marginalization of the Dioula @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been accused of giving too much prominence to northern communities .
Bete and Guere people , who typically hail from the southwest , feel particularly excluded by Ouattara ’ s presidency , while he has also failed to resolve long-running tensions over access to land in the center and west of the country .
As the election draws closer , some of these animosities have been rekindled by electoral tensions .
Bédié remarked in 2019 that Ivorians should never be made to feel like foreigners in their own country .
This was a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ exclusion of so-called foreign ethnic groups , who originated in the north of the country but who had parents from northern neighbors Burkina Faso and Mali , that had stoked so much animosity in the 1990s and 2000s .
More recently he has upped the ante again by commenting that he thinks the election could result in a “ civil war without precedent ” in Ivory Coast .
The government has done little more to quell rising tensions .
Amnesty International has accused the government of using quasi-militias to put down opposition demonstrations @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been exacerbated by the opposition ’ s call for a boycott , in which it said its supporters should do everything in their power to legally prevent the distribution and the collection of electoral materials in the country , as well as to impede campaign meetings held by the ruling party .
Although the opposition has been careful to stipulate that these actions should remain legal , there is much room for these attempts to descend into violence as the government seeks to push ahead with the vote .
In the aftermath of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ stand for a third term in August , violence broke out in several cities around Ivory Coast , resulting in the deaths of at least 15 people and the burning down of several local restaurants .
These clashes were sparked by local protests by those in favor of , or opposed to , Ouattara , which rapidly escalated .
There seems little doubt that similar violence will occur in the lead-up to this poll and will follow the announcement of the October results .
The credibility of the election is already in doubt @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who are opposed to Ouattara furious that he will likely remain in power beyond his constitutionally mandated two terms , similar local-level clashes are likely to break out around the country .
Ivory Coast is not the only country in West Africa that appears to be moving steadily away from democratic governance .
Guinea has recently seen its incumbent stand for a third term , while the longtime authoritarian leader Faure Gnassingbé in Togo also raised eyebrows when he , using a similar logic to that employed by Ouattara in Ivory Coast , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ February , despite the constitution ruling that only two terms are permitted .
Civil society activists in Benin have increasingly protested against unfair electoral rule changes and arrests of opposition supporters , while Ivory Coast ’ s northern neighbor Mali witnessed a coup in August .
These are worrying signs for a region that once appeared to be almost totally democratic .
In 2015 , it was only the votes of Gambia and Togo that prevented the Economic Community of West African States from introducing a ban on third terms .
Now this @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the region .
Indeed , Freedom House reported in March that West Africa experienced the fastest decline in political rights and civil liberties last year .
The fact that both France and the United States appear to be turning a blind eye to the manipulation of the constitution in Ivory Coast suggests that Ouattara ’ s move is likely to go unchallenged and may lay the foundations for future leaders in the region to trample on delicate democratic norms in the years to come .

There is a sense of foreboding to Ivory Coast’s upcoming presidential election, due to be held on Oct. 31. The last time Ivorians went to the polls against the backdrop of fractious political debate and elevated intercommunal tensions, in 2010, the result was widespread violence that left at least 3,000 people dead.
There is a sense of foreboding to Ivory Coast’s upcoming presidential election, due to be held on Oct. 31. The last time Ivorians went to the polls against the backdrop of fractious political debate and elevated intercommunal tensions, in 2010, the result was widespread violence that left at least 3,000 people dead.
That year the election pitted then-President Laurent Gbagbo against opposition leader Henri Konan Bédié and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the country’s current president. The vote sparked significant unrest when the Electoral Commission declared Ouattara the winner, but Gbagbo, supported by the Constitutional Council, refused to stand down. Ouattara, with the assistance of Forces Nouvelles rebels, France, and the United Nations, seized the presidency, and Gbagbo was later sent to the International Criminal Court, where he was tried for crimes against humanity, only to be acquitted in January 2019.
This year, the election, which had looked like it might include those very same politicians—Gbagbo, Ouattara, and Bédié, all of whom remain key political figures in Ivory Coast—now appears to be a much more solitary affair for the president.
Ouattara had initially intended to stand down from politics ahead of the 2020 poll and pass power on to “the next generation.” However, when his anointed successor Amadou Gon Coulibaly died suddenly in July, he said he would stand in his place. The opposition has perceived this as deeply controversial because the constitution allows for only two presidential terms, and yet this will be Ouattara’s third, should he win. Ouattara claims he can stand for a third term because a new constitution was introduced in 2016, effectively resetting term limits early in his second term.
By contrast, Gbagbo, although he had sought to stand, was disqualified on Sept. 14, along with 39 other politicians who had declared their candidacies. Meanwhile, Bédié and Pascal Affi N’Guessan, two of the only four candidates who were allowed to run, have called for an “active boycott” of the election, indicating that their supporters should use all legal means to prevent the vote from taking place. The only remaining participant who will contest the poll against Ouattara is Kouadio Konan Bertin, an independent candidate who commands little broad support.
Ouattara has succeeded where Gbagbo could not in 2010. He has made the election into a one-horse race. Although Gbagbo had repeatedly delayed the 2010 election during Ivory Coast’s lengthy civil war that occurred between 2002 and 2011, he eventually agreed to face off against both Ouattara and Bédié. Gbagbo was president of a nation at the time that was divided between north and south, and in which French and U.N. troops manned a cease-fire line in the middle of the country. Forces Nouvelles rebels, who supported Ouattara, occupied the north, following a failed coup attempt on Gbagbo’s government in 2002, which triggered the civil war.
Ouattara faces rather different circumstances. Crucially, he has a much firmer grip on power. He has no rebel force opposing him and has managed, following a series of mutinies in 2014 and 2017, to bring the army under tighter control. Meanwhile, he has forced one of his most prominent adversaries, the former head of the National Assembly and leader of the Forces Nouvelles Guillaume Soro, who had some power over the army, into exile. There is no longer a U.N. mission based in the country, and France, which in Gbagbo’s later years grew increasingly troubled by his presidency, is very much in favor of Ouattara.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Ouattara have met since the Ivorian president declared he would stand for a third term, and while Macron has urged him to ensure elections take place peacefully, and relations have become more tense since Ouattara’s declaration, there has been no open criticism of this move. Ivorian opposition figures have complained that France has not publicly condemned the third-term bid, especially since the French president had so widely praised Ouattara’s initial decision to retire from politics ahead of the poll.
Additionally, Ouattara, unlike Gbagbo, has made the forthcoming vote so controversial and lacking in legitimacy that the opposition has been left with few choices but to boycott it. The Constitutional Council’s ruling on Sept. 14 that Ouattara could stand for president, but so many opposition candidates could not, cemented the sense that it was being manipulated by the presidency.
Further, the Electoral Commission has long been seen as disproportionately advantageous for the ruling party because the opposition believed there were too many seats within the commission allocated to either the ruling party or its supporters. Extensive negotiations with the opposition have been undertaken to address this, but the opposition continues to regard it as illegitimate.
The commission now has 16 members, including one representative designated by the president; one by the minister of territorial administration; seven representatives of political parties (three representatives from the ruling party and four from opposition parties); six civil society representatives, including one from the National Commission for Human Rights and one from the legal profession; and one representative from the Superior Council of the Judiciary. The opposition regards the human rights commission and the Superior Council of the Judiciary as too close to the ruling party. This remains contentious, because it has the potential to elevate the government’s power within the commission.
The composition of the Electoral Commission has been so controversial that Affi N’Guessan recently withdrew the less radical wing of the Ivorian Popular Front, which he leads, from the opposition seats of the institution, leaving the opposition with only one of its four mandated seats filled. Thus, neither the commission nor the Constitutional Council, the two institutions charged with overseeing the election, are perceived as credible.
The boycott is a sign of desperation and a last-ditch effort to undermine the legitimacy of the poll, which Ouattara has made virtually unwinnable for anyone other than himself.
Recognizing this, the opposition had pledged to unite against Ouattara and establish a barrier to his third term. They called first for a campaign of civil disobedience, then for the intervention of France and the U.N., claiming that unless Ouattara withdrew his candidacy and the commission and the Constitutional Council were dissolved, there could be no election. However, as time has gone on it has become increasingly apparent that these demands will not be met, and the election is likely to go ahead regardless. The boycott is, then, a sign of desperation and a last-ditch effort to undermine the legitimacy of the poll, which Ouattara has made virtually unwinnable for anyone other than himself.
Internal divisions and a lack of planning on the part of the opposition have not helped matters. While Ouattara has toured the country announcing new infrastructure projects and increased the farmgate price of cocoa, attempting to win over the nearly 20 percent of Ivorians who rely on this “brown gold” to earn a living, the opposition has been conspicuous by their absence from the campaign trail. They were frozen by the challenge of organizing a coherent election bid in an unfair race.
Even if the politics of the 2020 election are rather different from those of 2010, there remain some parallels with 2010.
That election took place against a backdrop of ethnic tension, which had been mounting for decades, manipulated by politicians for their own gain. This remains the case to this day. Whereas Gbagbo, an ethnic Bete from the southwestern town of Gagnoa, was renowned for his politics of exclusion and his marginalization of the Dioula communities of the north, Ouattara has been accused of giving too much prominence to northern communities. Bete and Guere people, who typically hail from the southwest, feel particularly excluded by Ouattara’s presidency, while he has also failed to resolve long-running tensions over access to land in the center and west of the country. As the election draws closer, some of these animosities have been rekindled by electoral tensions.
Bédié remarked in 2019 that Ivorians should never be made to feel like foreigners in their own country. This was a clear reference to the historical policies of exclusion of so-called foreign ethnic groups, who originated in the north of the country but who had parents from northern neighbors Burkina Faso and Mali, that had stoked so much animosity in the 1990s and 2000s. More recently he has upped the ante again by commenting that he thinks the election could result in a “civil war without precedent” in Ivory Coast. The government has done little more to quell rising tensions. Amnesty International has accused the government of using quasi-militias to put down opposition demonstrations.
The likelihood of violence has only been exacerbated by the opposition’s call for a boycott, in which it said its supporters should do everything in their power to legally prevent the distribution and the collection of electoral materials in the country, as well as to impede campaign meetings held by the ruling party. Although the opposition has been careful to stipulate that these actions should remain legal, there is much room for these attempts to descend into violence as the government seeks to push ahead with the vote.
In the aftermath of Ouattara’s declaration that he would stand for a third term in August, violence broke out in several cities around Ivory Coast, resulting in the deaths of at least 15 people and the burning down of several local restaurants. These clashes were sparked by local protests by those in favor of, or opposed to, Ouattara, which rapidly escalated.
There seems little doubt that similar violence will occur in the lead-up to this poll and will follow the announcement of the October results. The credibility of the election is already in doubt, and, with many of those who are opposed to Ouattara furious that he will likely remain in power beyond his constitutionally mandated two terms, similar local-level clashes are likely to break out around the country.
The 2020 election in Ivory Coast is the culmination of a gradual trend toward authoritarian rule. Ouattara held credible, free, and fair elections in 2015 and was initially widely regarded as a liberal, democratic leader. Yet his decision to force one of his main rivals, Soro, into exile in December 2019—after issuing an arrest warrant for his alleged involvement in a coup attempt in Ivory Coast—and to imprison many other opposition figures and members of civil society who criticize his regime has epitomized a drift toward authoritarianism. Standing for a third term and bending the constitution to his will is the nail in the coffin of the once democratic leader who, it had been hoped, would pull Ivory Coast out of its years of cyclical conflict.
Ivory Coast is not the only country in West Africa that appears to be moving steadily away from democratic governance. Guinea has recently seen its incumbent stand for a third term, while the longtime authoritarian leader Faure Gnassingbé in Togo also raised eyebrows when he, using a similar logic to that employed by Ouattara in Ivory Coast, was reelected for a fourth term in February, despite the constitution ruling that only two terms are permitted. Civil society activists in Benin have increasingly protested against unfair electoral rule changes and arrests of opposition supporters, while Ivory Coast’s northern neighbor Mali witnessed a coup in August.
These are worrying signs for a region that once appeared to be almost totally democratic. In 2015, it was only the votes of Gambia and Togo that prevented the Economic Community of West African States from introducing a ban on third terms. Now this scourge is becoming much more widely accepted in the region. Indeed, Freedom House reported in March that West Africa experienced the fastest decline in political rights and civil liberties last year.
The fact that both France and the United States appear to be turning a blind eye to the manipulation of the constitution in Ivory Coast suggests that Ouattara’s move is likely to go unchallenged and may lay the foundations for future leaders in the region to trample on delicate democratic norms in the years to come.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-29--They Conquered COVID-19. Now They’re Struggling.

Kerala is a coastal state in southern India .
A few months ago , when the coronavirus pandemic was starting to engulf the country of my birth , the Marxist-ruled state was an exemplar of what was possible , even in poor countries , when political will , an educated population , and a pinch of foresight came together .
Kerala has long been a supplier of workers to other economies , in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere—workers who came flooding back when the coronavirus pandemic started shutting down economies worldwide .
Many of them carried the virus with them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was reported in Kerala .
But as national numbers peaked over the summer , Kerala ’ s own indicators remained stubbornly good .
The positive rate was lower than the national percentage ; test-and-trace systems actually worked ; recoveries led the nation .
In the last few weeks , however , cases have mounted , hospitals have filled up again , and the proportion of those testing positive has risen .
This is a pattern repeating itself around the world .
Places that seemed to have gotten out in front of the virus @ @ @ @ @ @ @ see their numbers rise , in most cases exponentially .
Germany , where I now live with my family , is a case in point .
The near-panic of early spring—buy toilet paper !
—settled into a calm acceptance of what the government was recommending .
The country came together to defeat the spread of the virus by complying with what the experts recommended .
The results were obvious .
Germany opened up before most of its neighbors ; the warm weather saw guests flocking to the nation ’ s beer gardens ; @ @ @ @ @ @ @ safety .
Dubious records are now falling like dominos .
Sometimes it seems that people are , too .
Last week , a fellow student almost collapsed in my German class .
But dubious records are now falling like dominos .
Sometimes it seems that people are , too .
Last week , a fellow student almost collapsed in my German class .
The anxieties of the moment crystallized in the immediate aftermath of his dizzy spell ; in those few seconds as we debated coming to his aid or giving him a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the school had him leave .
He came back the next day with a clean diagnosis from his doctor .
He had been dehydrated .
Nothing more .
For six months , the pandemic was something that was happening to other people .
The trepidation we felt when checking our phones in the morning was for others .
These past few weeks , it has gotten very , very real .
It isn ’ t just Germany , of course .
Or Kerala .
The Czech Republic and Poland , two of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ routinely praised for their responses to the pandemic over late spring and summer .
Now cases are surging in both , and the Czech government is moving toward a full national lockdown .
Germany ’ s western neighbors , all of which took a beating in the spring , are flaring up again as well .
This is all complicated by the freedom of movement within the European Economic Area .
Nations have scrambled to stay on top of who is allowed to enter , and what to do with those returning home @ @ @ @ @ @ @ headache in areas like the German-Swiss border or the Dutch-Belgian frontier , with citizens of one country routinely having their entire lives in another .
Within Germany , the emergence of local virus hot spots has led to recrimination and finger-pointing .
Earlier in October , those who were from or had visited certain Berlin neighborhoods were told by Schleswig-Holstein ( a northern German state ) that they would be quarantined for two weeks if they arrived without two negative tests in the previous five days .
This measure , among others , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ enforceability .
Even in a culture as compliant as Germany ’ s , who is going to show up at the local health office , demanding to be quarantined ?
There are dark whispers of invasive monitoring of mobile usage and profiling based on license plates .
People in less-infected areas are asking for greater restrictions ; those from the hot spots naturally chafe at this .
The word “ Ausländer ” ( “ foreigner ” ) takes on a whole other meaning in this context .
It depends who you ask .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ growing , and an already fractured Indian polity has new fault lines to contend with .
This is happening , to some degree , in Germany as well .
Various commentators have speculated that the rise in numbers in Europe was practically inevitable .
As in Germany , so in its European neighbors .
Vast numbers of people returned from their summer vacations in places where compliance was perhaps not as stringent as at home .
Kids went back to school , releasing the combined germs of their family units into the petri @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in October has been unseasonably cold thus far , driving more people indoors .
The idea of “ pandemic fatigue , ” a combined listlessness in the face of restrictions seemingly without end , is gaining traction as well .
This is despite—or perhaps because of—its intangibility .
Who doesn ’ t yearn for the old normal again ?
Allied to this , and perhaps more insidious , is a discernible turning away from factuality .
Skeptics of all descriptions point to the absence of verifiable conclusions .
“ You told us to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ argument .
“ Now it ’ s masks !
Will they still be relevant next month ?
” From there to a justification not to wear masks at all is but a small step .
This breakdown of the consensus on COVID-19 , if indeed that is what is happening as the QAnon conspiracy theory gains traction in Germany , is deeply worrying .
Back in India , an anti-mask protester recently described his stand as based on a lack of “ policy-grade evidence.
” The facts aren ’ t enough , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are dealing with this in real time , just like the rest of us , makes no difference .
The policy must be shown to be working , before it is adhered to .
That this puts the cart before the horse is immaterial to people who think this way .
There are countries that have preserved their records , thus far , of dealing with the various crests of the COVID-19 pandemic .
New Zealand has leveraged the privilege of its geographic isolation and solid communication from a trusted leadership .
Certain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Taiwan—have made a virtue both of their previous experience with SARS and a robust attitude toward digital monitoring that nations in the West balk at .
( Personally , I ’ m fine with giving up some data privacy in return for the certainty that the guy next to me in the train doesn ’ t belong in quarantine . )
But these success stories are few and far between .
My experience of living in Germany tells me that yesterday ’ s shared triumph can morph too easily into standing by as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ six months collapses next to you .
Back home in India , restrictions are easing , as they must .
The economy demands it .
Diwali is around the corner .
Winter is also wedding season .
Couples around the country won ’ t wait until the pandemic is over to get married , and Indian marriages are famed for their clamorous conviviality .
We ’ ll wear masks and distance , the groom ’ s family might say .
But what if the bride ’ s crew are skeptics , choosing instead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to a table ?
Will you cancel the wedding if they arrive with naked faces ?
In Germany , the talk is of canceled Christmas markets and holidays without extended families .
The implacability of mid-March , the steadfast determination to get on with things—to “ manage it , ” as Chancellor Angela Merkel memorably put it in another context—seems to be eroding .
The minister presidents of the German state governments point fingers at each other , the numbers rise ever higher , and parents worry , again , about sending their @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goes the wisdom .
Prepare for the restrictions to come , because they ’ re now inevitable .
And keep an eye on the local supermarket ’ s toilet paper aisle .

Kerala is a coastal state in southern India. A few months ago, when the coronavirus pandemic was starting to engulf the country of my birth, the Marxist-ruled state was an exemplar of what was possible, even in poor countries, when political will, an educated population, and a pinch of foresight came together.
Kerala is a coastal state in southern India. A few months ago, when the coronavirus pandemic was starting to engulf the country of my birth, the Marxist-ruled state was an exemplar of what was possible, even in poor countries, when political will, an educated population, and a pinch of foresight came together.
Kerala has long been a supplier of workers to other economies, in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere—workers who came flooding back when the coronavirus pandemic started shutting down economies worldwide. Many of them carried the virus with them. The first confirmed case in India was reported in Kerala. But as national numbers peaked over the summer, Kerala’s own indicators remained stubbornly good. The positive rate was lower than the national percentage; test-and-trace systems actually worked; recoveries led the nation.
In the last few weeks, however, cases have mounted, hospitals have filled up again, and the proportion of those testing positive has risen.
This is a pattern repeating itself around the world. Places that seemed to have gotten out in front of the virus earlier in the year have started to see their numbers rise, in most cases exponentially.
Germany, where I now live with my family, is a case in point. The near-panic of early spring—buy toilet paper!—settled into a calm acceptance of what the government was recommending. The country came together to defeat the spread of the virus by complying with what the experts recommended. The results were obvious. Germany opened up before most of its neighbors; the warm weather saw guests flocking to the nation’s beer gardens; our kids went back to school in safety.
Dubious records are now falling like dominos. Sometimes it seems that people are, too. Last week, a fellow student almost collapsed in my German class.
But dubious records are now falling like dominos. Sometimes it seems that people are, too. Last week, a fellow student almost collapsed in my German class. The anxieties of the moment crystallized in the immediate aftermath of his dizzy spell; in those few seconds as we debated coming to his aid or giving him a wide berth. When he could walk, the school had him leave. He came back the next day with a clean diagnosis from his doctor. He had been dehydrated. Nothing more.
For six months, the pandemic was something that was happening to other people. The trepidation we felt when checking our phones in the morning was for others. These past few weeks, it has gotten very, very real.
It isn’t just Germany, of course. Or Kerala. The Czech Republic and Poland, two of Germany’s immediate neighbors, were routinely praised for their responses to the pandemic over late spring and summer. Now cases are surging in both, and the Czech government is moving toward a full national lockdown. Germany’s western neighbors, all of which took a beating in the spring, are flaring up again as well. This is all complicated by the freedom of movement within the European Economic Area. Nations have scrambled to stay on top of who is allowed to enter, and what to do with those returning home. It is even more of a headache in areas like the German-Swiss border or the Dutch-Belgian frontier, with citizens of one country routinely having their entire lives in another.
Within Germany, the emergence of local virus hot spots has led to recrimination and finger-pointing. Earlier in October, those who were from or had visited certain Berlin neighborhoods were told by Schleswig-Holstein (a northern German state) that they would be quarantined for two weeks if they arrived without two negative tests in the previous five days.
This measure, among others, sparked charges of discrimination and questions of enforceability. Even in a culture as compliant as Germany’s, who is going to show up at the local health office, demanding to be quarantined? There are dark whispers of invasive monitoring of mobile usage and profiling based on license plates. People in less-infected areas are asking for greater restrictions; those from the hot spots naturally chafe at this.
The word “Ausländer” (“foreigner”) takes on a whole other meaning in this context.
To make matters worse, no one knows exactly what is driving the surge in places where the coronavirus was once well contained. Was the resurgence of the virus in Kerala due to the loosening of restrictions around Onam (an important regional festival) in late August and early September? Is it just down to the superior rate and quality of testing in a state that prides itself on the efficiency of its health system? Or were the numbers artificially low to begin with—some detractors claim the Marxist state government has been fudging the numbers—and the true picture is only really emerging now?
It depends who you ask. What is clear is that skepticism is growing, and an already fractured Indian polity has new fault lines to contend with.
This is happening, to some degree, in Germany as well. Various commentators have speculated that the rise in numbers in Europe was practically inevitable. As in Germany, so in its European neighbors.
Vast numbers of people returned from their summer vacations in places where compliance was perhaps not as stringent as at home. Kids went back to school, releasing the combined germs of their family units into the petri dishes of their classrooms. The weather in October has been unseasonably cold thus far, driving more people indoors.
The idea of “pandemic fatigue,” a combined listlessness in the face of restrictions seemingly without end, is gaining traction as well. This is despite—or perhaps because of—its intangibility. Who doesn’t yearn for the old normal again?
Allied to this, and perhaps more insidious, is a discernible turning away from factuality. Skeptics of all descriptions point to the absence of verifiable conclusions. “You told us to wash our hands,” goes one argument. “Now it’s masks! Will they still be relevant next month?” From there to a justification not to wear masks at all is but a small step. This breakdown of the consensus on COVID-19, if indeed that is what is happening as the QAnon conspiracy theory gains traction in Germany, is deeply worrying.
Back in India, an anti-mask protester recently described his stand as based on a lack of “policy-grade evidence.” The facts aren’t enough, in other words; the fact that policymakers are dealing with this in real time, just like the rest of us, makes no difference.
The policy must be shown to be working, before it is adhered to. That this puts the cart before the horse is immaterial to people who think this way.
There are countries that have preserved their records, thus far, of dealing with the various crests of the COVID-19 pandemic. New Zealand has leveraged the privilege of its geographic isolation and solid communication from a trusted leadership. Certain Asian countries—South Korea, China, and Taiwan—have made a virtue both of their previous experience with SARS and a robust attitude toward digital monitoring that nations in the West balk at. (Personally, I’m fine with giving up some data privacy in return for the certainty that the guy next to me in the train doesn’t belong in quarantine.) But these success stories are few and far between. My experience of living in Germany tells me that yesterday’s shared triumph can morph too easily into standing by as a man you’ve known for six months collapses next to you.
Back home in India, restrictions are easing, as they must. The economy demands it. Diwali is around the corner. Winter is also wedding season. Couples around the country won’t wait until the pandemic is over to get married, and Indian marriages are famed for their clamorous conviviality.
We’ll wear masks and distance, the groom’s family might say. But what if the bride’s crew are skeptics, choosing instead to hug and dance and sit 10 to a table? Will you cancel the wedding if they arrive with naked faces?
In Germany, the talk is of canceled Christmas markets and holidays without extended families. The implacability of mid-March, the steadfast determination to get on with things—to “manage it,” as Chancellor Angela Merkel memorably put it in another context—seems to be eroding. The minister presidents of the German state governments point fingers at each other, the numbers rise ever higher, and parents worry, again, about sending their kids to school.
Hunker down, goes the wisdom. Prepare for the restrictions to come, because they’re now inevitable. And keep an eye on the local supermarket’s toilet paper aisle.