foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Moldova’s Election Result Is a Blow to Russia’s Regional Dominance

President Vladimir Putin ’ s attempts to keep Russia ’ s immediate neighbors close are unraveling , with the citizens of Moldova joining those of Kyrgyzstan and Belarus in signaling in recent days and months that they have lost patience with discredited Moscow-backed leaders .
The aftermath of elections in all three countries indicates that Putin ’ s policy of backing allied regimes in Russia ’ s historical sphere of influence is failing .
Emerging democratic forces in slow-to-reform former communist states are pushing back against the Russian leader ’ s favored political system of managed democracy—a system comprising democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and elections ) that mask de facto autocracy , with the same authoritarian leaders and their parties elected to office time after time , through ballot and media manipulation .
Putin ’ s diminishing ability to influence events on Russia ’ s fringe was further underlined by the recent resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , during which he was reluctant to support close ally Armenia against Azerbaijan—only managing to secure a cease-fire under which the former was forced to make territorial concessions .
Putin was wary not only of confronting Azerbaijan ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Premier Nikol Pashinyan whose grassroots Velvet Revolution saw off the pro-Moscow Republican Party .
It is all a far cry from the power and confidence Putin exuded when in 2014 he brazenly annexed Crimea and facilitated his local proxies ’ seizure of much of eastern Ukraine , less than a decade after a similar Russian intervention in Georgia .
He casually dismissed Western outrage over both military campaigns , presenting himself to his domestic audience as a bold defender of Russian interests in the near abroad .
Now , struggling to halt economic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and facing falling approval ratings , Putin does not appear to be as self-assured as he once was .
Moldova ’ s election result earlier this month will give the Kremlin one more reason to examine why and where his long-held , but increasingly frustrated , neo-imperial ambitions are going wrong .
His closest aides were apparently convinced that Igor Dodon—their man in small yet strategically important Moldova—would coast to victory in presidential elections , after all the financial and administrative support that came his way over the course of campaigning .
Moscow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a rerun of the 2016 presidential ballot , when Russia is believed to have helped Dodon to victory .
But the divisive , pro-Moscow Dodon was defeated by West-leaning Maia Sandu , an ardent reformer keen to expedite her country ’ s integration into the European Union .
Putin congratulated her , but he is likely stunned by her success , which seems to reflect an important shift in the public mood .
In a country where politicians frequently exploit geopolitical tensions , it suggests that many Moldovans have tired not only of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Moreover , Moldovans have begun to appreciate the West for the good things it represents—such as a decent education , fair elections , and low tolerance for corruption—rather than a hedge against Russian tanks .
This apparent shift in perception will worry Putin , yet Moldovans with Russian sympathies still constitute a substantial electoral force that he can mobilize when needed .
So while Sandu ’ s victory confirms a weakening of Russia ’ s hold , it nonetheless continues to cast a shadow over the country , part of which , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occupied by Russian troops ever since independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s .
The Russian troops initially deployed there as peacekeepers , and Moscow has continued to be Transnistria ’ s main financial backer .
Shortly after the annexation of Crimea , Transnistrian officials called for the Kremlin either to integrate the entity into Russia or recognize it as a sovereign state .
These calls were “ acknowledged ” by Moscow , with the territory clearly remaining a strategic card that can be played whenever the Kremlin needs it .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ months after another Putin ally , fellow strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko , triumphed in what was widely believed to be a rigged presidential election in Belarus , triggering mass protests by Belarusians no longer prepared to put up with political corruption and authoritarian rule .
Prior to the ballot , relations between Putin and Lukashenko had cooled , largely over Belarusian concerns about the Russian leader ’ s apparent determination to integrate their country into the Russian Federation .
It prompted Lukashenko to start courting the West , a rapprochement nixed by the conduct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters , which has prompted a flurry of international sanctions .
Russia warned against sanctions and , reportedly at Lukashenko ’ s request , formed a special law enforcement unit to be deployed in Belarus if needed .
But that was the extent of his support for the Belarusian leader .
Putin may have calculated that a weakened , vulnerable Lukashenko might move closer to Moscow .
Yet it ’ s clear that Belarus ’ s resurgent opposition , which has refused to be cowed by the state ’ s heavy-handed attempts to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ until Lukashenko is gone .
On Russia ’ s southern flank , Putin ’ s political fortunes have fared little better .
Moscow has a military base in Kyrgyzstan , so maintaining a pliant government in Bishkek is of utmost importance .
The trouble is that the country has proved to be very politically volatile , with three presidents toppled in the last 15 years .
The most recent uprising in October over suspected fraud in parliamentary elections led to the resignation of pro-Moscow President Sooronbay Jeenbekov .
Prior to stepping down to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s replacement , the staunch nationalist acting President Sadyr Japarov , said the revolt will not change Kyrgyzstan ’ s strategic relations with Moscow .
And this is probably the case—the two previous uprisings did not result in a shift in allegiances—given Kyrgyzstan ’ s economic dependence on Russia .
For its part , the Kremlin , likely confident that Kyrgyzstan will remain reliant on Russia , is probably more concerned about sudden , unpredictable political turmoil in the country .
When Putin met Jeenbekov recently , he told him , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in [ Kyrgyzstan ] and particularly in the postelection period.
” Moscow was clearly rattled by events in Kyrgyzstan , describing them as chaotic and reportedly suspending financial assistance until political stability has been restored , even suggesting that it might intervene if the situation deteriorated .
Putin must realize , though , that doing so would only inflame tensions , as would the imposition of economic sanctions on a country considered to be one of the poorest in the former Soviet Union .
Some say Moscow , while unsettled by Japarov ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to him being in power , though it will want him to keep the country on an even keel .
The color revolutions of the 2000s were seen by the Kremlin as a direct challenge as they were not part of the post-Soviet playbook for the near abroad .
Putin wanted to see either authoritarian regimes , albeit economically liberal , or managed democracies , enabling him to pursue his neo-imperial ambitions and keep NATO and other Western organizations at bay .
But the overthrow of corrupt , autocratic governments in Ukraine and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that has spread across a number of Russia ’ s satellites , as once quiescent citizens understood that the foundations of the regimes that had ruled over them since independence from the Soviet Union were weak and shiftable .
Putin , at first , tried to stem the dynamic through direct intervention and economic coercion , notably in Ukraine and Georgia , but this has not succeeded .
While he now seems reluctant to use military force to bring neighbors to heel , he is unlikely to change his policy of relying on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to do his bidding , even though the tactic could potentially push them further away from Moscow .
In this regard , Sandu ’ s victory in Moldova is particularly significant .
It is far more than an impressive electoral triumph .
The outcome will resonate across the region , likely encouraging other reform-minded politicians and their supporters .
Sandu overcame not only a pro-Russia incumbent but also the heavy burden of Russian expectation .
The Kremlin reportedly invested so much in getting the preferred result—by way of a media support , advice @ @ @ @ @ @ @ deliver a win for its ally .
Dodon ’ s spokespeople denied receiving any such backing from Moscow .
Just as significantly , many observers imagined that the pro-Dodon camp would have tried to rig the election if it was clear he would lose , yet they did not .
This suggests a degree of political maturity .
But it is not quite an outlier .
In last year ’ s trouble-free presidential election in Ukraine , pro-Western Volodymyr Zelensky won an absolute majority despite pro-Russia factions capable of wielding considerable influence .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ her first speech after the polls closed , she spoke in Romanian and Russian , pledging to work in the interest of the people of Moldova , which would include , naturally , pursuing good relations with Russia .
This is what Putin needs to understand .
The countries on Russia ’ s fringe want to maintain ties with Moscow , as their economies remain so dependent on Russia and they continue to have strong cultural and linguistic links with Russia .
And that means that if there are more peaceful elections bringing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ across the near abroad , Putin may end up having to become more of a good neighbor than a playground bully , in order to keep them close .

President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to keep Russia’s immediate neighbors close are unraveling, with the citizens of Moldova joining those of Kyrgyzstan and Belarus in signaling in recent days and months that they have lost patience with discredited Moscow-backed leaders.
President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to keep Russia’s immediate neighbors close are unraveling, with the citizens of Moldova joining those of Kyrgyzstan and Belarus in signaling in recent days and months that they have lost patience with discredited Moscow-backed leaders.
The aftermath of elections in all three countries indicates that Putin’s policy of backing allied regimes in Russia’s historical sphere of influence is failing. Emerging democratic forces in slow-to-reform former communist states are pushing back against the Russian leader’s favored political system of managed democracy—a system comprising democratic elements (parliaments, multiple parties, and elections) that mask de facto autocracy, with the same authoritarian leaders and their parties elected to office time after time, through ballot and media manipulation.
Putin’s diminishing ability to influence events on Russia’s fringe was further underlined by the recent resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, during which he was reluctant to support close ally Armenia against Azerbaijan—only managing to secure a cease-fire under which the former was forced to make territorial concessions. Putin was wary not only of confronting Azerbaijan’s backer Turkey but also of buttressing Armenian Premier Nikol Pashinyan whose grassroots Velvet Revolution saw off the pro-Moscow Republican Party.
It is all a far cry from the power and confidence Putin exuded when in 2014 he brazenly annexed Crimea and facilitated his local proxies’ seizure of much of eastern Ukraine, less than a decade after a similar Russian intervention in Georgia. He casually dismissed Western outrage over both military campaigns, presenting himself to his domestic audience as a bold defender of Russian interests in the near abroad.
Now, struggling to halt economic decline and control a rampant pandemic, and facing falling approval ratings, Putin does not appear to be as self-assured as he once was. Moldova’s election result earlier this month will give the Kremlin one more reason to examine why and where his long-held, but increasingly frustrated, neo-imperial ambitions are going wrong.
His closest aides were apparently convinced that Igor Dodon—their man in small yet strategically important Moldova—would coast to victory in presidential elections, after all the financial and administrative support that came his way over the course of campaigning. Moscow likely assumed that the poll would be a rerun of the 2016 presidential ballot, when Russia is believed to have helped Dodon to victory.
But the divisive, pro-Moscow Dodon was defeated by West-leaning Maia Sandu, an ardent reformer keen to expedite her country’s integration into the European Union. Putin congratulated her, but he is likely stunned by her success, which seems to reflect an important shift in the public mood. In a country where politicians frequently exploit geopolitical tensions, it suggests that many Moldovans have tired not only of anti-Western scaremongering but also of Russia-bashing.
Moreover, Moldovans have begun to appreciate the West for the good things it represents—such as a decent education, fair elections, and low tolerance for corruption—rather than a hedge against Russian tanks. This apparent shift in perception will worry Putin, yet Moldovans with Russian sympathies still constitute a substantial electoral force that he can mobilize when needed.
So while Sandu’s victory confirms a weakening of Russia’s hold, it nonetheless continues to cast a shadow over the country, part of which, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, has been occupied by Russian troops ever since independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
The Russian troops initially deployed there as peacekeepers, and Moscow has continued to be Transnistria’s main financial backer. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea, Transnistrian officials called for the Kremlin either to integrate the entity into Russia or recognize it as a sovereign state. These calls were “acknowledged” by Moscow, with the territory clearly remaining a strategic card that can be played whenever the Kremlin needs it.
The Russian setback in Moldova came just months after another Putin ally, fellow strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko, triumphed in what was widely believed to be a rigged presidential election in Belarus, triggering mass protests by Belarusians no longer prepared to put up with political corruption and authoritarian rule.
Prior to the ballot, relations between Putin and Lukashenko had cooled, largely over Belarusian concerns about the Russian leader’s apparent determination to integrate their country into the Russian Federation. It prompted Lukashenko to start courting the West, a rapprochement nixed by the conduct of the election and subsequent crackdown on protesters, which has prompted a flurry of international sanctions.
Russia warned against sanctions and, reportedly at Lukashenko’s request, formed a special law enforcement unit to be deployed in Belarus if needed. But that was the extent of his support for the Belarusian leader. Putin may have calculated that a weakened, vulnerable Lukashenko might move closer to Moscow. Yet it’s clear that Belarus’s resurgent opposition, which has refused to be cowed by the state’s heavy-handed attempts to crush their protests, will not rest until Lukashenko is gone.
On Russia’s southern flank, Putin’s political fortunes have fared little better. Moscow has a military base in Kyrgyzstan, so maintaining a pliant government in Bishkek is of utmost importance. The trouble is that the country has proved to be very politically volatile, with three presidents toppled in the last 15 years. The most recent uprising in October over suspected fraud in parliamentary elections led to the resignation of pro-Moscow President Sooronbay Jeenbekov.
Prior to stepping down to contest presidential elections in January, Jeenbekov’s replacement, the staunch nationalist acting President Sadyr Japarov, said the revolt will not change Kyrgyzstan’s strategic relations with Moscow. And this is probably the case—the two previous uprisings did not result in a shift in allegiances—given Kyrgyzstan’s economic dependence on Russia.
For its part, the Kremlin, likely confident that Kyrgyzstan will remain reliant on Russia, is probably more concerned about sudden, unpredictable political turmoil in the country. When Putin met Jeenbekov recently, he told him, “The Russian side is interested in stability in [Kyrgyzstan] and particularly in the postelection period.”
Moscow was clearly rattled by events in Kyrgyzstan, describing them as chaotic and reportedly suspending financial assistance until political stability has been restored, even suggesting that it might intervene if the situation deteriorated. Putin must realize, though, that doing so would only inflame tensions, as would the imposition of economic sanctions on a country considered to be one of the poorest in the former Soviet Union. Some say Moscow, while unsettled by Japarov’s emergence, may have no objections to him being in power, though it will want him to keep the country on an even keel.
The color revolutions of the 2000s were seen by the Kremlin as a direct challenge as they were not part of the post-Soviet playbook for the near abroad. Putin wanted to see either authoritarian regimes, albeit economically liberal, or managed democracies, enabling him to pursue his neo-imperial ambitions and keep NATO and other Western organizations at bay.
But the overthrow of corrupt, autocratic governments in Ukraine and Georgia strengthened an emerging post-Soviet democratic dynamic that has spread across a number of Russia’s satellites, as once quiescent citizens understood that the foundations of the regimes that had ruled over them since independence from the Soviet Union were weak and shiftable. Putin, at first, tried to stem the dynamic through direct intervention and economic coercion, notably in Ukraine and Georgia, but this has not succeeded.
While he now seems reluctant to use military force to bring neighbors to heel, he is unlikely to change his policy of relying on friendly politicians and officials in these countries to do his bidding, even though the tactic could potentially push them further away from Moscow.
In this regard, Sandu’s victory in Moldova is particularly significant. It is far more than an impressive electoral triumph. The outcome will resonate across the region, likely encouraging other reform-minded politicians and their supporters. Sandu overcame not only a pro-Russia incumbent but also the heavy burden of Russian expectation. The Kremlin reportedly invested so much in getting the preferred result—by way of a media support, advice, and campaign funding—yet still failed to deliver a win for its ally. Dodon’s spokespeople denied receiving any such backing from Moscow.
Just as significantly, many observers imagined that the pro-Dodon camp would have tried to rig the election if it was clear he would lose, yet they did not. This suggests a degree of political maturity. But it is not quite an outlier. In last year’s trouble-free presidential election in Ukraine, pro-Western Volodymyr Zelensky won an absolute majority despite pro-Russia factions capable of wielding considerable influence.
Sandu was magnanimous in victory. In her first speech after the polls closed, she spoke in Romanian and Russian, pledging to work in the interest of the people of Moldova, which would include, naturally, pursuing good relations with Russia.
This is what Putin needs to understand. The countries on Russia’s fringe want to maintain ties with Moscow, as their economies remain so dependent on Russia and they continue to have strong cultural and linguistic links with Russia. And that means that if there are more peaceful elections bringing true democrats to power in other countries across the near abroad, Putin may end up having to become more of a good neighbor than a playground bully, in order to keep them close.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--Ethiopia Poised to Attack Tigray Capital

Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Ethiopia ’ s military prepares for an assault on Tigray ’ s capital , Afghanistan suffers a dual bomb blast in Bamiyan , and Thai protesters stage a mass anti-government demonstration .
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The 500,000 inhabitants of the Tigray region ’ s capital , Mekele , are bracing for an assault by Ethiopian federal troops as a 72-hour window calling for the Tigrayan leadership ’ s surrender elapses .
The past week has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ethiopian government and the Tigray People ’ s Liberation Front ( TPLF ) .
The government seems assured that its offensive is having the desired effect , and that many Tigrayan forces have agreed to lay down their arms following Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ’ s Sunday proclamation .
The TPLF tell a different story , of government forces routed by former Ethiopian military commanders now aligned with the TPLF .
Information wars .
With communication lines cut and roads blocked , it ’ s difficult to know exactly what is happening on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ even harder when the Ethiopian government seems bent on controlling the story of the war at all costs .
On Friday , Ethiopia expelled William Davison , the International Crisis Group ’ s Ethiopia senior analyst based in Addis Ababa .
A press release from the International Crisis Group pointed to “ the authorities ’ increasing sensitivity to points of view that do not hew to its line ” as the likely reason for his expulsion .
Foreign Policy has even been dragged into the information war after an Ethiopian government social media @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nizar Manek and Mohamed Kheir Omer as “ outright lies.
” In recent days , the government has been aggressively promoting other articles published in FP .
Diplomatic efforts .
While spokesmen spin , diplomats deliberate .
On Tuesday , the United Nations Security Council met for the first time to discuss the issue and expressed support for a mediation effort led by the African Union .
Ethiopia has rejected the move as they don ’ t wish to legitimize the TPLF .
As Mekele ’ s residents prepare for war , United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ warned Ethiopian forces to exercise restraint .
Reports of Tigrayan leaders hiding among the civilian population “ does not then give the Ethiopian state carte blanche to respond with the use of artillery in densely populated areas , ” Bachelet said .
“ Bothsidesism.
” Hailemariam Desalegn , who governed as Ethiopia ’ s prime minister as part of a TPLF-dominated coalition from 2012 to 2018 , had stern words for Tigray ’ s leadership in a piece published on Tuesday in Foreign Policy .
The TPLF , Hailemariam writes , has “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ meant to capitalize on the propensity of the international community to fall into its default mode of bothsidesism and calls for a negotiated settlement.
” He argues that such talks would set a “ precedent for other groupings within the Ethiopian federation to learn the wrong lesson : that violence pays off.
” Afghan blast kills 14 .
At least 14 people were killed and 45 were injured on Tuesday after a pair of bombs detonated in Bamiyan , an area of Afghanistan known for its relative peace .
The Taliban have denied @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coincided with a donor conference in Geneva where more than 60 countries agreed to pledge roughly $ 12 billion in aid over the next four years .
The aid figure is reduced from a 2016 pledge of $ 15 billion , reflecting donor anxieties over corruption and the outcome of the intra-Afghan peace talks .
U.S.-Russia naval confrontation .
The United States and Russia are offering competing explanations after a Russian warship confronted a U.S. destroyer on Russia ’ s eastern coast .
Russia accuses the United States of overstepping its maritime border @ @ @ @ @ @ @ miles , and allegedly threatened to ram the U.S. ship in order to get it to leave its waters .
The United States asserts its ship was in international waters and was conducting a freedom of navigation operation in assertion of its right to travel through the area .
Protesters rally in Bangkok .
Anti-government protesters hold another mass rally today in Bangkok calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and reformation of the countries monarchy .
Thai authorities have stacked shipping containers to block protesters from accessing the Crown Property @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The rally comes after 15 of the protest ’ s leaders have been charged with insulting the monarchy .
Period policy .
In a global first , Scotland will provide free period products to all who need them , following the culmination of a years-long campaign to normalize menstruation as a subject of public policy .
Along with making lives easier at a cost of only $ 11.6 million annually , the move is meant to tackle “ period poverty ” and the often high prices women must pay for sanitary products @ @ @ @ @ @ @ vote on Sunday in a landmark referendum on whether to ban the country ’ s central bank and pension funds from holding shares in companies that make more than 5 percent of sales from weapons components .
The initiative would also ban Swiss banks from lending to weapons companies .
The Swiss central bank is against the measure , as are the major Swiss banks .
Despite industry pushback , a recent poll showed 50 percent of respondents supported the ban , while 45 percent were opposed .
India-China tensions .
India banned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ total to more than 170 apps since the border clash in June that left 20 Indian soldiers dead .
“ This action was taken based on the inputs regarding these apps for engaging in activities which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India , defense of India , security of state and public order , ” India ’ s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology said in a statement .
This is third wave of apps to be banned after similar blanket bans in June and September .
A different kind of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Thai authorities announced the biggest drug bust in the country ’ s history : 11.5 tonnes of ketamine with a street value of $ 1 billion .
A string of officials posed in front of the haul , lauding the catch as a victory in the country ’ s war on drugs .
However on Tuesday , one major problem with the story emerged : it wasn ’ t ketamine at all , but trisodium phosphate—a common food additive .
The mistake was only noticed when a sample of the substance was tested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the weekend .
“ This was a misunderstanding that our agency must accept , ” Justice Minister Somsak Thepsuthin told reporters .
“ This wasn ’ t a mistake .
It ’ s new knowledge.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia’s military prepares for an assault on Tigray’s capital, Afghanistan suffers a dual bomb blast in Bamiyan, and Thai protesters stage a mass anti-government demonstration.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Ethiopia’s military prepares for an assault on Tigray’s capital, Afghanistan suffers a dual bomb blast in Bamiyan, and Thai protesters stage a mass anti-government demonstration.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Decision Day for Tigray’s Leadership as Clock Winds Down
The 500,000 inhabitants of the Tigray region’s capital, Mekele, are bracing for an assault by Ethiopian federal troops as a 72-hour window calling for the Tigrayan leadership’s surrender elapses.
The past week has seen dueling narratives take shape between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The government seems assured that its offensive is having the desired effect, and that many Tigrayan forces have agreed to lay down their arms following Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Sunday proclamation. The TPLF tell a different story, of government forces routed by former Ethiopian military commanders now aligned with the TPLF.
Information wars. With communication lines cut and roads blocked, it’s difficult to know exactly what is happening on the ground. That’s made even harder when the Ethiopian government seems bent on controlling the story of the war at all costs. On Friday, Ethiopia expelled William Davison, the International Crisis Group’s Ethiopia senior analyst based in Addis Ababa. A press release from the International Crisis Group pointed to “the authorities’ increasing sensitivity to points of view that do not hew to its line” as the likely reason for his expulsion.
Foreign Policy has even been dragged into the information war after an Ethiopian government social media account attacked this Nov. 14 piece by Nizar Manek and Mohamed Kheir Omer as “outright lies.” In recent days, the government has been aggressively promoting other articles published in FP.
Diplomatic efforts. While spokesmen spin, diplomats deliberate. On Tuesday, the United Nations Security Council met for the first time to discuss the issue and expressed support for a mediation effort led by the African Union. Ethiopia has rejected the move as they don’t wish to legitimize the TPLF.
As Mekele’s residents prepare for war, United Nations human rights chief Michelle Bachelet has warned Ethiopian forces to exercise restraint. Reports of Tigrayan leaders hiding among the civilian population “does not then give the Ethiopian state carte blanche to respond with the use of artillery in densely populated areas,” Bachelet said.
“Bothsidesism.” Hailemariam Desalegn, who governed as Ethiopia’s prime minister as part of a TPLF-dominated coalition from 2012 to 2018, had stern words for Tigray’s leadership in a piece published on Tuesday in Foreign Policy. The TPLF, Hailemariam writes, has “designed and is now executing a strategy meant to capitalize on the propensity of the international community to fall into its default mode of bothsidesism and calls for a negotiated settlement.”
He argues that such talks would set a “precedent for other groupings within the Ethiopian federation to learn the wrong lesson: that violence pays off.”
What We’re Following Today
Afghan blast kills 14. At least 14 people were killed and 45 were injured on Tuesday after a pair of bombs detonated in Bamiyan, an area of Afghanistan known for its relative peace. The Taliban have denied responsibility for the attack. The bombings coincided with a donor conference in Geneva where more than 60 countries agreed to pledge roughly $12 billion in aid over the next four years. The aid figure is reduced from a 2016 pledge of $15 billion, reflecting donor anxieties over corruption and the outcome of the intra-Afghan peace talks.
U.S.-Russia naval confrontation. The United States and Russia are offering competing explanations after a Russian warship confronted a U.S. destroyer on Russia’s eastern coast. Russia accuses the United States of overstepping its maritime border in Peter the Great Gulf by 1.2 miles, and allegedly threatened to ram the U.S. ship in order to get it to leave its waters. The United States asserts its ship was in international waters and was conducting a freedom of navigation operation in assertion of its right to travel through the area.
Protesters rally in Bangkok. Anti-government protesters hold another mass rally today in Bangkok calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and reformation of the countries monarchy. Thai authorities have stacked shipping containers to block protesters from accessing the Crown Property Bureau where the protest was originally planned. The rally comes after 15 of the protest’s leaders have been charged with insulting the monarchy.
Keep an Eye On
Period policy. In a global first, Scotland will provide free period products to all who need them, following the culmination of a years-long campaign to normalize menstruation as a subject of public policy. Along with making lives easier at a cost of only $11.6 million annually, the move is meant to tackle “period poverty” and the often high prices women must pay for sanitary products.
Swiss poll. Swiss citizens will vote on Sunday in a landmark referendum on whether to ban the country’s central bank and pension funds from holding shares in companies that make more than 5 percent of sales from weapons components. The initiative would also ban Swiss banks from lending to weapons companies. The Swiss central bank is against the measure, as are the major Swiss banks. Despite industry pushback, a recent poll showed 50 percent of respondents supported the ban, while 45 percent were opposed.
India-China tensions. India banned 43 more Chinese apps, bringing the total to more than 170 apps since the border clash in June that left 20 Indian soldiers dead. “This action was taken based on the inputs regarding these apps for engaging in activities which are prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of state and public order,” India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology said in a statement. This is third wave of apps to be banned after similar blanket bans in June and September.
Odds and Ends
A different kind of drug bust. Two weeks ago, Thai authorities announced the biggest drug bust in the country’s history: 11.5 tonnes of ketamine with a street value of $1 billion. A string of officials posed in front of the haul, lauding the catch as a victory in the country’s war on drugs. However on Tuesday, one major problem with the story emerged: it wasn’t ketamine at all , but trisodium phosphate—a common food additive. The mistake was only noticed when a sample of the substance was tested by the Thai narcotics control board over the weekend. “This was a misunderstanding that our agency must accept,” Justice Minister Somsak Thepsuthin told reporters. “This wasn’t a mistake. It’s new knowledge.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-25--The Quad’s Malabar Exercises Point the Way to an Asian NATO

The Quad ’ s Malabar Exercises Point the Way to an Asian NATO Last week , the four Indo-Pacific Quad countries—India , Japan , Australia , and the United States—completed a series of joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean .
The Malabar exercises began in the Bay of Bengal with routine air-sea drills involving destroyers , frigates , and helicopters .
The second phase , held off the Malabar coast in the Arabian Sea , brought in the big ships : the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the supercarrier USS Nimitz .
It was a rare opportunity for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s Russian-built MiG-29Ks under the direction of the U.S. Navy ’ s E-2 Hawkeye surveillance aircraft .
Both the Quad itself—a loose relationship more formally known as the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations—and the Malabar exercises linking its four members have been touted ( and dismissed ) as an “ Asian NATO.
” Some of the impetus for the idea that the Quad could turn into a full-fledged military alliance came from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun , who pointed out that “ even NATO started with relatively modest expectations ” when it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ way to imagine a path forward for the Quad is to compare it to NATO today .
Most people regard NATO as a hard military alliance , but no one seriously expects Russian tanks to sweep into Germany and France—and NATO ’ s Eastern European members are certainly not waiting for Iceland and Portugal to rise to their defense .
In reality , today ’ s NATO is primarily a training and standards-setting organization , with a military alliance tacked on for show .
Its own website lists its first purpose as political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ) and only its second as military ( “ NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes ” ) .
NATO maintains programs on arms control , human trafficking , gender diversity , energy security , and the environment .
Those are all issues the Quad can and should be tackling .
As for NATO ’ s harder edge , exercises like Malabar can be extended to embrace NATO missions like counterterrorism , cybersecurity , and ballistic missile defense .
About the only thing NATO does that doesn ’ t make sense @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Quad is the forward deployment of multinational battlegroups .
There are four of these battalion-sized formations in Eastern Europe , totaling just 4,500 troops as of 2017 .
That ’ s smaller than the crew of a single U.S. supercarrier .
India alone has 10 times that number facing China on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh , where hostilities briefly broke out in May .
It would be laughable to suggest that India wants or needs a multinational Quad battalion to reinforce its positions on the Chinese border .
Nearly every @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China ’ s salami-slicing tactics to degrade target countries ’ maritime sovereignty .
What India does need ( and want ) is greater air-sea training collaboration with the United States and its allies .
In addition to this year ’ s Malabar exercises involving its three Quad partners , India conducts regular bilateral exercises with Japan and the United States .
India also holds regular annual exercises with France and has initiated naval cooperation talks with the European Union .
India has purchased Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from the United States and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and it has to learn how make them work together with its existing armory of Russian jets and anti-aircraft missiles .
All of that takes practice .
Looking beyond India , other countries in the region would also benefit from working with an Asian NATO that is primarily a training and standards-setting organization , not an armed defense force .
Vietnam , for example , would never contemplate joining a U.S.-sponsored military alliance , but it engages in naval training exercises with both India and Japan , in addition to the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ difficulty engaging in bilateral security cooperation with Japan , but it might be easier for the country to participate in a broader regional grouping .
And Taiwan ’ s special status prevents it from joining most treaty organizations , but that needn ’ t prevent it from participating in civilian programs covering NATO-type topics like human trafficking and cybersecurity .
A more muscular Quad might also sponsor deeper naval cooperation through the creation of a kind of permanent Malabar .
There is a perpetual need for search-and-rescue , anti-piracy , and maritime security @ @ @ @ @ @ @ waters of Southeast Asia .
Nearly every country in the region must also deal with China ’ s salami-slicing tactics to degrade target countries ’ maritime sovereignty , often relying on irregular forces such as fishing fleets .
Outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite has actually suggested the reactivation of a U.S. First Fleet to be based in the area .
But with Trump ’ s 350-ship Navy plan unlikely to be endorsed by President-elect Joe Biden , there is little chance that the ships required @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if a country could be found to host the force .
The naval strategist James Fanell has suggested a provocative alternative : The Quad countries and their prospective partners could establish a standing multinational naval force operating on a rotational basis .
In contrast to NATO , the individual units of this force would not be integrated ; each country would operate its own ships .
But they would work together to pursue common maritime security missions , gaining valuable interoperability experience along the way .
An initially more modest Asian NATO might @ @ @ @ @ @ @ $ 1 billion .
If Biden ’ s designated secretary of state nominee , Antony Blinken , is looking for a mission for the Quad , then using it to build an Asian NATO might be just the thing .
And it wouldn ’ t take tremendous resources .
Contrary to popular perceptions , NATO itself is not a particularly large organization .
Its permanent headquarters employs approximately 500 military and 1,000 civilian staff .
A total of 6,000 civilians work in “ different agencies and strategic and regional commands ” —NATO-speak for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ annual military and civilian budgets combined total less than $ 2.2 billion .
An initially more modest Asian NATO might start with a budget of less than $ 1 billion , a small secretariat based in Japan or Australia , and naval-only forces committed on a purely rotational basis .
It would send a strong message to China without being explicitly directed against it .
Like Malabar and other regional exercises , its purpose would be to raise professional standards and improve interoperability , not to oppose any particular enemy .
Of course @ @ @ @ @ @ @ region ’ s naval and air forces , this more muscular Quad would better prepare them to confront China—or any other opponent—should the need arise .
But like today ’ s NATO , the group ’ s core missions would be largely peaceful , not confrontational .
As currently constituted , the Quad is just as superfluous as it was in 2007 and 2008 , the first time its four members got together—only to abandon the group again .
The Quad isn ’ t even useful as an anti-China talking shop : At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the only participant to publicly call out China .
There is certainly no appetite in Asia for a pan-Asian military alliance to confront China in the way that NATO once confronted the Soviet Union ’ s Warsaw Pact .
Luckily , that ’ s not what Asia needs .
Each country in the region faces its own China challenges , none of which involves tanks sweeping across the frontiers .
An Asian security organization modeled on today ’ s more genteel NATO would help its members deal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and cyberwar while maintaining a plausible facade that none of these efforts were directed at Beijing directly .
And , in fact , they wouldn ’ t be .
The Quad ’ s members and partners would only be cooperating to better maintain peace in the region .
If that happens to thwart China ’ s ambitions in particular , it ’ s only because China is the only country in the region that seems intent on disturbing the peace .

Last week, the four Indo-Pacific Quad countries—India, Japan, Australia, and the United States—completed a series of joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. The Malabar exercises began in the Bay of Bengal with routine air-sea drills involving destroyers, frigates, and helicopters. The second phase , held off the Malabar coast in the Arabian Sea, brought in the big ships: the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the supercarrier USS Nimitz. It was a rare opportunity for U.S. F-18s to train alongside India’s Russian-built MiG-29Ks under the direction of the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye surveillance aircraft.
Last week, the four Indo-Pacific Quad countries—India, Japan, Australia, and the United States—completed a series of joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. The Malabar exercises began in the Bay of Bengal with routine air-sea drills involving destroyers, frigates, and helicopters. The second phase, held off the Malabar coast in the Arabian Sea, brought in the big ships: the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the supercarrier USS Nimitz. It was a rare opportunity for U.S. F-18s to train alongside India’s Russian-built MiG-29Ks under the direction of the U.S. Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye surveillance aircraft.
Both the Quad itself—a loose relationship more formally known as the U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations—and the Malabar exercises linking its four members have been touted (and dismissed) as an “Asian NATO.” Some of the impetus for the idea that the Quad could turn into a full-fledged military alliance came from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, who pointed out that “even NATO started with relatively modest expectations” when it was founded in 1949. But a better way to imagine a path forward for the Quad is to compare it to NATO today. Most people regard NATO as a hard military alliance, but no one seriously expects Russian tanks to sweep into Germany and France—and NATO’s Eastern European members are certainly not waiting for Iceland and Portugal to rise to their defense.
In reality, today’s NATO is primarily a training and standards-setting organization, with a military alliance tacked on for show. Its own website lists its first purpose as political (“NATO promotes democratic values”) and only its second as military (“NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes”). NATO maintains programs on arms control, human trafficking, gender diversity, energy security, and the environment. Those are all issues the Quad can and should be tackling. As for NATO’s harder edge, exercises like Malabar can be extended to embrace NATO missions like counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense.
About the only thing NATO does that doesn’t make sense for the future of Malabar and the Quad is the forward deployment of multinational battlegroups. There are four of these battalion-sized formations in Eastern Europe, totaling just 4,500 troops as of 2017. That’s smaller than the crew of a single U.S. supercarrier. India alone has 10 times that number facing China on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh, where hostilities briefly broke out in May. It would be laughable to suggest that India wants or needs a multinational Quad battalion to reinforce its positions on the Chinese border.
Nearly every country in the region must deal with China’s salami-slicing tactics to degrade target countries’ maritime sovereignty.
What India does need (and want) is greater air-sea training collaboration with the United States and its allies. In addition to this year’s Malabar exercises involving its three Quad partners, India conducts regular bilateral exercises with Japan and the United States. India also holds regular annual exercises with France and has initiated naval cooperation talks with the European Union. India has purchased Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from the United States and Dassault Rafale air superiority jets from France, and it has to learn how make them work together with its existing armory of Russian jets and anti-aircraft missiles. All of that takes practice.
Looking beyond India, other countries in the region would also benefit from working with an Asian NATO that is primarily a training and standards-setting organization, not an armed defense force. Vietnam, for example, would never contemplate joining a U.S.-sponsored military alliance, but it engages in naval training exercises with both India and Japan, in addition to the United States. South Korea has historically had difficulty engaging in bilateral security cooperation with Japan, but it might be easier for the country to participate in a broader regional grouping. And Taiwan’s special status prevents it from joining most treaty organizations, but that needn’t prevent it from participating in civilian programs covering NATO-type topics like human trafficking and cybersecurity.
A more muscular Quad might also sponsor deeper naval cooperation through the creation of a kind of permanent Malabar. There is a perpetual need for search-and-rescue, anti-piracy, and maritime security patrols in the Indian Ocean and the waters of Southeast Asia. Nearly every country in the region must also deal with China’s salami-slicing tactics to degrade target countries’ maritime sovereignty, often relying on irregular forces such as fishing fleets. Outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump’s Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite has actually suggested the reactivation of a U.S. First Fleet to be based in the area. But with Trump’s 350-ship Navy plan unlikely to be endorsed by President-elect Joe Biden, there is little chance that the ships required for such a fleet would be available—even if a country could be found to host the force.
The naval strategist James Fanell has suggested a provocative alternative: The Quad countries and their prospective partners could establish a standing multinational naval force operating on a rotational basis. In contrast to NATO, the individual units of this force would not be integrated; each country would operate its own ships. But they would work together to pursue common maritime security missions, gaining valuable interoperability experience along the way.
An initially more modest Asian NATO might start with a budget of less than $1 billion.
If Biden’s designated secretary of state nominee, Antony Blinken, is looking for a mission for the Quad, then using it to build an Asian NATO might be just the thing. And it wouldn’t take tremendous resources. Contrary to popular perceptions, NATO itself is not a particularly large organization. Its permanent headquarters employs approximately 500 military and 1,000 civilian staff. A total of 6,000 civilians work in “different agencies and strategic and regional commands”—NATO-speak for “on projects.” NATO’s annual military and civilian budgets combined total less than $2.2 billion.
An initially more modest Asian NATO might start with a budget of less than $1 billion, a small secretariat based in Japan or Australia, and naval-only forces committed on a purely rotational basis. It would send a strong message to China without being explicitly directed against it. Like Malabar and other regional exercises, its purpose would be to raise professional standards and improve interoperability, not to oppose any particular enemy. Of course, by enhancing the readiness of the region’s naval and air forces, this more muscular Quad would better prepare them to confront China—or any other opponent—should the need arise. But like today’s NATO, the group’s core missions would be largely peaceful, not confrontational.
As currently constituted, the Quad is just as superfluous as it was in 2007 and 2008, the first time its four members got together—only to abandon the group again. The Quad isn’t even useful as an anti-China talking shop: At its October ministerial in Tokyo, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the only participant to publicly call out China. There is certainly no appetite in Asia for a pan-Asian military alliance to confront China in the way that NATO once confronted the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact.
Luckily, that’s not what Asia needs. Each country in the region faces its own China challenges, none of which involves tanks sweeping across the frontiers. An Asian security organization modeled on today’s more genteel NATO would help its members deal with 21st-century threats like Chinese salami tactics and cyberwar while maintaining a plausible facade that none of these efforts were directed at Beijing directly. And, in fact, they wouldn’t be. The Quad’s members and partners would only be cooperating to better maintain peace in the region. If that happens to thwart China’s ambitions in particular, it’s only because China is the only country in the region that seems intent on disturbing the peace.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-24--Antony Blinken’s Wonk Rock Is Everything a D.C. Dad Could Dream Of

Antony Blinken ’ s Wonk Rock Is Everything a D.C. Dad Could Dream Of The hastily scrambled-together portraits of Antony Blinken that various media outlets released this weekend , following U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s announcement he would nominate his longtime aide for secretary of state , painted a fairly consistent picture : that of an urbane , French-speaking career diplomat ; a loyal deputy and low-key team player ; a moderate with a taste for both intervention and multilateralism .
In fact , only one incongruity stands out from his otherwise immaculate credentials .
Most Americans have probably @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s a subgenre indigenous , and mercifully confined to the Washington , D.C. , metropolitan area .
The city that gave the world go-go , the local music that depends on call-and-response from overwhelmingly Black audiences , also gave it this , perhaps the whitest music imaginable .
As the name suggests , participants in wonk rock are morbid dweebs who by day haunt the city ’ s innumerable think tanks , media institutions , consultancies , and other government-adjacent bastions of nerddom .
Wonk rockers congregate at events like the annual @ @ @ @ @ @ @ groan-inducing names like Suspicious Package and Beats Workin ’ , and perform covers of songs that rocked when they were young , shiny-eyed wonklings .
You may find it humanizing that men with the power to shape the national media narrative , conduct domestic surveillance ops , and greenlight bombing campaigns in Libya still feel compelled to produce and share middle-aged guitar solos in their downtime .
Or , like me , you may find it disturbing .
Can world-historical decisions really be made in a context of such utter lameness ?
Does @ @ @ @ @ @ @ same everyday indifference where the lives and deaths of millions are shaped in D.C. offices ?
But one thing is for sure : A wonk never truly leaves his work behind .
Although it may seem innocuous , wonk rock is always informed by the wonk ’ s day job ; beneath the funky bass lines and power chords there always lurks a passion for a comprehensive data report , a finely crafted policy proposal , a pragmatic bipartisan compromise .
Which is why I spent several hours last night—quite possibly more time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ has spent—listening to Blinken ’ s band , trying to divine the future of this country ’ s foreign policy .
Like the artistic works of the powerful elsewhere , they need careful parsing .
The expected secretary of state has two songs on Spotify under the moniker “ ABlinken ” ( get it ?
“ Abe Lincoln ” ?
? )
.
They are , as others have noted , surprisingly good .
“ Lip Service ” is a bluesy , Zeppelin-sounding jam that seemingly details a failed carnal encounter ; while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ wistful and lovelorn .
I ’ m sorry to report that on both of these tracks it is easy to imagine the future shaper of U.S. power worldwide soulfully shutting his eyes as he croons lyrics like “ So give me a chance to let you feel what I feel/ Cause my heart is sighing ” in a husky baritone .
Below I have highlighted choice lyrics from “ Lip Service ” and “ Patience ” along with my interpretation of what they portend for the next four years of international relations .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ is a powerful fight ” It didn ’ t take too many listens to determine that “ Lip Service , ” which on the surface seems to be a straightforward account of sexual rejection , is actually telling the story of Blinken ’ s frustration with President Barack Obama , under whom he served as a deputy secretary of state .
Blinken , who is openly pro-intervention , was reportedly upset when Obama failed to follow through on his promise to intervene in Syria after the Bashar al-Assad regime crossed the “ red @ @ @ @ @ @ @ civilians .
Was all of Obama ’ s talk about the red line just “ lip service ” ?
“ Patience is the test of life itself/ And to fail would be suicidal ” “ Patience ” strikes a more reflective note than “ Lip Service , ” suggesting that Blinken has reconsidered his ardently pro-interventionist stance .
“ Patience ” came out the same year as Blinken joined a number of other foreign-policy wonks in signing an open letter calling for an end to American support of the Saudi bombing campaign against @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
The campaign , which Blinken had supported , quickly turned out to be a large-scale humanitarian disaster .
Will Blinken take this nuanced view of intervention to his new job ?
“ From my heart I ’ m telling you I think I could love you for our lives ” It took me a while to figure this one out , but on the 25th or so listen it finally clicked : This line is about the South China Sea .
The desire to resolve the conflict in the South China Sea @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the heart of every foreign-policy wonk .
Expect Blinken to take a stance on the Spratly Islands as soon as he takes office .
With Blinken set to assume one of the most powerful and challenging jobs in the world , we may not be getting much more from ABlinken .
But perhaps , as travel resumes post-coronavirus , there ’ s the opportunity to take the show on the road .
What could do more to promote the idea of America as a fundamentally benign , dorky power than to have the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Like former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin ’ s fondness for breaking into “ Love Me Tender ” on international occasions , this could be soft power at its very softest .

The hastily scrambled-together portraits of Antony Blinken that various media outlets released this weekend, following U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s announcement he would nominate his longtime aide for secretary of state, painted a fairly consistent picture: that of an urbane, French-speaking career diplomat; a loyal deputy and low-key team player; a moderate with a taste for both intervention and multilateralism. In fact, only one incongruity stands out from his otherwise immaculate credentials.
The hastily scrambled-together portraits of Antony Blinken that various media outlets released this weekend, following U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s announcement he would nominate his longtime aide for secretary of state, painted a fairly consistent picture: that of an urbane, French-speaking career diplomat; a loyal deputy and low-key team player; a moderate with a taste for both intervention and multilateralism. In fact, only one incongruity stands out from his otherwise immaculate credentials.
Antony Blinken is a perpetrator of wonk rock.
Most Americans have probably never heard of wonk rock. It’s a subgenre indigenous, and mercifully confined to the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The city that gave the world go-go, the local music that depends on call-and-response from overwhelmingly Black audiences, also gave it this, perhaps the whitest music imaginable. As the name suggests, participants in wonk rock are morbid dweebs who by day haunt the city’s innumerable think tanks, media institutions, consultancies, and other government-adjacent bastions of nerddom. Wonk rockers congregate at events like the annual Journopalooza, where they form bands with groan-inducing names like Suspicious Package and Beats Workin’, and perform covers of songs that rocked when they were young, shiny-eyed wonklings.
You may find it humanizing that men with the power to shape the national media narrative, conduct domestic surveillance ops, and greenlight bombing campaigns in Libya still feel compelled to produce and share middle-aged guitar solos in their downtime. Or, like me, you may find it disturbing. Can world-historical decisions really be made in a context of such utter lameness? Does the banality of wonk rock reflect the same everyday indifference where the lives and deaths of millions are shaped in D.C. offices? But one thing is for sure: A wonk never truly leaves his work behind. Although it may seem innocuous, wonk rock is always informed by the wonk’s day job; beneath the funky bass lines and power chords there always lurks a passion for a comprehensive data report, a finely crafted policy proposal, a pragmatic bipartisan compromise.
Which is why I spent several hours last night—quite possibly more time than any human being except Blinken himself has spent—listening to Blinken’s band, trying to divine the future of this country’s foreign policy. Like the artistic works of the powerful elsewhere, they need careful parsing. The expected secretary of state has two songs on Spotify under the moniker “ABlinken” (get it? “Abe Lincoln”??). They are, as others have noted, surprisingly good. “Lip Service” is a bluesy, Zeppelin-sounding jam that seemingly details a failed carnal encounter; while the acoustic ballad “Patience” gets wistful and lovelorn. I’m sorry to report that on both of these tracks it is easy to imagine the future shaper of U.S. power worldwide soulfully shutting his eyes as he croons lyrics like “So give me a chance to let you feel what I feel/ Cause my heart is sighing” in a husky baritone.
Below I have highlighted choice lyrics from “Lip Service” and “Patience” along with my interpretation of what they portend for the next four years of international relations.
“I want to convince you/ This is a powerful fight”
It didn’t take too many listens to determine that “Lip Service,” which on the surface seems to be a straightforward account of sexual rejection, is actually telling the story of Blinken’s frustration with President Barack Obama, under whom he served as a deputy secretary of state. Blinken, who is openly pro-intervention, was reportedly upset when Obama failed to follow through on his promise to intervene in Syria after the Bashar al-Assad regime crossed the “red line” by using chemical weapons on civilians. Was all of Obama’s talk about the red line just “lip service”?
“Patience is the test of life itself/ And to fail would be suicidal”
“Patience” strikes a more reflective note than “Lip Service,” suggesting that Blinken has reconsidered his ardently pro-interventionist stance. “Patience” came out the same year as Blinken joined a number of other foreign-policy wonks in signing an open letter calling for an end to American support of the Saudi bombing campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen initiated under Obama. The campaign, which Blinken had supported, quickly turned out to be a large-scale humanitarian disaster. Will Blinken take this nuanced view of intervention to his new job?
“From my heart I’m telling you I think I could love you for our lives”
It took me a while to figure this one out, but on the 25th or so listen it finally clicked: This line is about the South China Sea. The desire to resolve the conflict in the South China Sea and the nine-dash line rests deep in the heart of every foreign-policy wonk. Expect Blinken to take a stance on the Spratly Islands as soon as he takes office.
With Blinken set to assume one of the most powerful and challenging jobs in the world, we may not be getting much more from ABlinken. But perhaps, as travel resumes post-coronavirus, there’s the opportunity to take the show on the road. What could do more to promote the idea of America as a fundamentally benign, dorky power than to have the secretary of state serenade foreign leaders? Like former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin’s fondness for breaking into “Love Me Tender” on international occasions, this could be soft power at its very softest.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-24--Biden Has the Team Obama Always Wanted

Biden Has the Team Obama Always Wanted

Biden Has the Team Obama Always Wanted In the summer of 2007 , when I spent many hours talking to presidential candidate Barack Obama about his view of world affairs , I was surprised to find that he looked to the administration of George H. W. Bush as a model of professionalism , prudence , and stewardship of American national interests .
For all his own transformational impulses , he wanted to put together a team like the one led by Secretary of State James Baker and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft .
Unlike Bush , Obama arrived in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security .
He needed to demonstrate his seriousness .
And so when it came time to choose his own team , Obama turned to a superstar , Hillary Clinton , for secretary of state , and to James Jones , an erudite general he barely knew , as national security advisor .
Clinton turned out to be a fine choice ; Jones was a disaster , soon replaced .
Obama did finally put together the team he wanted , though it never meshed quite as smoothly as the Bush machine .
With the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to appoint Antony Blinken as secretary of state , Jake Sullivan as national security advisor , and Linda Thomas-Greenfield as United States ambassador to the United Nations , President-elect Joe Biden , who will be the first president since Bush Senior to arrive with deep foreign policy experience , may have built precisely the kind of team that Obama had in mind , and that national security professionals have been yearning for since the Bush era .
Professionalism is not , of course , a substantive point of view about the world .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ of texts for the views of these three figures , and of the others whom Biden has since named .
Within hours of the announcement , I found in my inbox copies of Blinken ’ s recent discussion of foreign policy at the Hudson Institute and Thomas-Greenfield ’ s co-authored article on diplomacy in Foreign Affairs .
Feel free to parse away ; but don ’ t waste time looking for the eccentric apercu .
The views you find will not stretch very far beyond the 40-yard-lines as they are understood in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mainstream foreign policy think tanks .
The Biden team promises restoration , not transformation .
Everyone hoping for sharp departures from the pre-Trump past—leftists like Bernie Sanders who recoil from shows of power , unreconstructed neoconservatives who have had it with “ leading from behind , ” astringent realists who believe that America has been on a reckless bender ever since the Berlin Wall fell—is going to be disappointed .
Thomas-Greenfield and her co-author , William Burns , both career diplomats , write that a prudent foreign policy will reject both “ the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ retrenchment.
” That will be the Biden sweet spot .
A restorationist foreign policy does not , as I pointed out in my series on Biden ‘ s likely foreign policy , mean a return to the status quo ante .
The world has changed drastically since 2016 .
Biden ‘ s team will have to stand up to new challenges from China and Russia , reaffirm the centrality of democracy in the global order , coordinate the global response to the pandemic , and forge long-term changes on trade , taxation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more equitable global economy .
My conversations with Biden ‘ s key advisors left no doubt that they recognize the magnitude of the challenge .
What is to be restored , then , is not a set of policies but rather the actual practice of statecraft , which is the art of applying available means to desired ends .
What was truly bizarre about outgoing President Donald Trump ’ s foreign policy , after all , was not so much the ends , some of them quite familiar , as the means chosen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ explained only in reference to Trump ’ s own whims .
Trump bargained with North Korea ’ s Kim Jong Un with no plan save to rely on his negotiating skills ; he withdrew troops from Syria , abandoning our Kurdish allies , to curry favor with Turkey ’ s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ; he proposed a “ Middle East peace plan ” designed to prop up Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rather than actually create peace .
His Secretary of State , Mike Pompeo , stood by while Trump castigated , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ told the truth about the secret policy towards Ukraine that got the president impeached .
Biden and his team certainly have a sense of ends , which have to do with restoring America ’ s moral , economic , and diplomatic leadership—American exceptionalism in a new key .
Some of those ends will not differ very much from Trump ’ s ; but they will choose means most likely to actually attain those ends .
For example , both Biden and his chief advisors , very much including Blinken , have said time @ @ @ @ @ @ @ China to behave according to the rules of both global economics and state sovereignty is to act in concert with allies and to insist upon respect for the rule of law .
That ‘ s a pretty low bar , but it ’ s one Trump only rarely met .
Absolutely anyone Biden could have appointed to senior national security posts would have represented a return to normalcy .
Yet the appointment of Blinken as secretary of state is revealing .
Biden could have chosen a global celebrity like Hillary Clinton or John @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as equals before heads of state .
He could have chosen a wise old dealmaker like Warren Christopher , or even State ’ s senior-most diplomat , William Burns .
But Biden doesn ’ t need those things ; he already knows everybody .
Antony Blinken is family ; he has been thinking , talking , and traveling with Biden for the last 18 years .
What each believes is an extension of the beliefs of the other .
I have known Blinken since 2009 .
He is a careful thinker with an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ proudly tough-minded , in the manner of the hard-bitten realist .
He does not feature in his own stories , and is very unlikely ever to upstage the president .
He is , like his boss , an extremely decent person .
He has a very pleasing , almost velvety voice , and an elegant manner .
His French is perfect .
Altogether , in fact , Blinken puts one in mind of “ the Wise Men , ” Robert Lovett and John McCloy and Chip Bohlen , the prep schoolboys and Ivy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ after World War II .
He may , however , have some trouble locating the voice of authority suitable to a secretary of state rather than a senior aide .
Jake Sullivan is also family .
Yet it was easier to imagine the discreet and finely balanced Blinken as national security advisor , and Sullivan as a kind of super-counselor-on-all-things .
Sullivan ranges beyond the 40-yard-lines , on both foreign and domestic policy , and he has thought deeply about the connection between the two .
Earlier this year he and economist Jennifer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ arguing that for the last 30 years , grand strategy has depended on a neoliberal economic paradigm that has now exhausted itself .
Thinkers on the left have looked to Sullivan to import their ideas into Biden ‘ s world .
That is not normally a job for the national security advisor .
Yet Sullivan , like Blinken , is so close to Biden , and has such an important role in policy matters , that he may have a remit that runs well beyond the honest broker role of national security advisor @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The U.N. position is often filled by a political celebrity like Bill Richardson , who served under President Bill Clinton , or an ideologue like John Bolton , Jeanne Kirkpatrick , or Andrew Young .
Given that , at least skipping over Trump , you ‘ d have to go back to Clinton ’ s first term to find two white men running State and the National Security Council , no doubt it was important to place a Black woman in a senior national security position .
Yet Biden chose a professional diplomat—the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in George W. Bush ’ s first term as president Since Biden , unlike Bush , plans to take the U.N. seriously—and thus has elevated the ambassador to Cabinet-rank—the appointment also constitutes a validation of the Foreign Service , which has been so mercilessly abused over the last four years .
It ’ s also worth noting that even a ludicrously partisan Republican Senate majority may find very little pretext to withhold nomination votes for either Thomas-Greenfield or Blinken ( a consideration that may have helped rule out Susan Rice at State ) @ @ @ @ @ @ @ seats in the Georgia run-off in January , Mitch McConnell will remain Senate majority leader , and he will do everything in his power to foil ambitious domestic legislation .
Real change may have to wait until after the 2022 by-election .
Foreign policy is different ; it depends far more upon action by the executive branch than upon legislation .
Biden and his team can do a great deal to restore America to that position between hegemony and retrenchment from which it can exercise leadership .
They will be able to start @ @ @

In the summer of 2007, when I spent many hours talking to presidential candidate Barack Obama about his view of world affairs, I was surprised to find that he looked to the administration of George H. W. Bush as a model of professionalism, prudence, and stewardship of American national interests. For all his own transformational impulses, he wanted to put together a team like the one led by Secretary of State James Baker and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft.
In the summer of 2007, when I spent many hours talking to presidential candidate Barack Obama about his view of world affairs, I was surprised to find that he looked to the administration of George H. W. Bush as a model of professionalism, prudence, and stewardship of American national interests. For all his own transformational impulses, he wanted to put together a team like the one led by Secretary of State James Baker and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft.
Unlike Bush, Obama arrived in the White House with scant experience in national security. He needed to demonstrate his seriousness. And so when it came time to choose his own team, Obama turned to a superstar, Hillary Clinton, for secretary of state, and to James Jones, an erudite general he barely knew, as national security advisor. Clinton turned out to be a fine choice; Jones was a disaster, soon replaced. Obama did finally put together the team he wanted, though it never meshed quite as smoothly as the Bush machine.
With the announcement on Sunday night that he plans to appoint Antony Blinken as secretary of state, Jake Sullivan as national security advisor, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield as United States ambassador to the United Nations, President-elect Joe Biden, who will be the first president since Bush Senior to arrive with deep foreign policy experience, may have built precisely the kind of team that Obama had in mind, and that national security professionals have been yearning for since the Bush era.
Professionalism is not, of course, a substantive point of view about the world. There will now be much minute parsing of texts for the views of these three figures, and of the others whom Biden has since named. Within hours of the announcement, I found in my inbox copies of Blinken’s recent discussion of foreign policy at the Hudson Institute and Thomas-Greenfield’s co-authored article on diplomacy in Foreign Affairs. Feel free to parse away; but don’t waste time looking for the eccentric apercu. The views you find will not stretch very far beyond the 40-yard-lines as they are understood in the Council on Foreign Relations and the other mainstream foreign policy think tanks.
The Biden team promises restoration, not transformation. Everyone hoping for sharp departures from the pre-Trump past—leftists like Bernie Sanders who recoil from shows of power, unreconstructed neoconservatives who have had it with “leading from behind,” astringent realists who believe that America has been on a reckless bender ever since the Berlin Wall fell—is going to be disappointed. Thomas-Greenfield and her co-author, William Burns, both career diplomats, write that a prudent foreign policy will reject both “the restoration of American hegemony” and “retrenchment.” That will be the Biden sweet spot.
A restorationist foreign policy does not, as I pointed out in my series on Biden‘s likely foreign policy, mean a return to the status quo ante. The world has changed drastically since 2016. Biden‘s team will have to stand up to new challenges from China and Russia, reaffirm the centrality of democracy in the global order, coordinate the global response to the pandemic, and forge long-term changes on trade, taxation, and regulation in order to create a more equitable global economy. My conversations with Biden‘s key advisors left no doubt that they recognize the magnitude of the challenge.
What is to be restored, then, is not a set of policies but rather the actual practice of statecraft, which is the art of applying available means to desired ends. What was truly bizarre about outgoing President Donald Trump’s foreign policy, after all, was not so much the ends, some of them quite familiar, as the means chosen to achieve them, which could be explained only in reference to Trump’s own whims. Trump bargained with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un with no plan save to rely on his negotiating skills; he withdrew troops from Syria, abandoning our Kurdish allies, to curry favor with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; he proposed a “Middle East peace plan” designed to prop up Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rather than actually create peace. His Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, stood by while Trump castigated, and then fired, the diplomats who told the truth about the secret policy towards Ukraine that got the president impeached.
Biden and his team certainly have a sense of ends, which have to do with restoring America’s moral, economic, and diplomatic leadership—American exceptionalism in a new key. Some of those ends will not differ very much from Trump’s; but they will choose means most likely to actually attain those ends. For example, both Biden and his chief advisors, very much including Blinken, have said time and again that the way to induce China to behave according to the rules of both global economics and state sovereignty is to act in concert with allies and to insist upon respect for the rule of law. That‘s a pretty low bar, but it’s one Trump only rarely met.
Absolutely anyone Biden could have appointed to senior national security posts would have represented a return to normalcy. Yet the appointment of Blinken as secretary of state is revealing. Biden could have chosen a global celebrity like Hillary Clinton or John Kerry or Colin Powell who could stand as equals before heads of state. He could have chosen a wise old dealmaker like Warren Christopher, or even State’s senior-most diplomat, William Burns. But Biden doesn’t need those things; he already knows everybody.
Antony Blinken is family; he has been thinking, talking, and traveling with Biden for the last 18 years. What each believes is an extension of the beliefs of the other. I have known Blinken since 2009. He is a careful thinker with an even keel, neither unduly optimistic nor proudly tough-minded, in the manner of the hard-bitten realist. He does not feature in his own stories, and is very unlikely ever to upstage the president. He is, like his boss, an extremely decent person. He has a very pleasing, almost velvety voice, and an elegant manner. His French is perfect. Altogether, in fact, Blinken puts one in mind of “the Wise Men,” Robert Lovett and John McCloy and Chip Bohlen, the prep schoolboys and Ivy League chums who forged American foreign policy after World War II. He may, however, have some trouble locating the voice of authority suitable to a secretary of state rather than a senior aide.
Jake Sullivan is also family. Yet it was easier to imagine the discreet and finely balanced Blinken as national security advisor, and Sullivan as a kind of super-counselor-on-all-things. Sullivan ranges beyond the 40-yard-lines, on both foreign and domestic policy, and he has thought deeply about the connection between the two. Earlier this year he and economist Jennifer Harris wrote a piece in Foreign Policy arguing that for the last 30 years, grand strategy has depended on a neoliberal economic paradigm that has now exhausted itself. Thinkers on the left have looked to Sullivan to import their ideas into Biden‘s world. That is not normally a job for the national security advisor. Yet Sullivan, like Blinken, is so close to Biden, and has such an important role in policy matters, that he may have a remit that runs well beyond the honest broker role of national security advisor.
I do not know Thomas-Greenfield. The U.N. position is often filled by a political celebrity like Bill Richardson, who served under President Bill Clinton, or an ideologue like John Bolton, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, or Andrew Young. Given that, at least skipping over Trump, you‘d have to go back to Clinton’s first term to find two white men running State and the National Security Council, no doubt it was important to place a Black woman in a senior national security position. Yet Biden chose a professional diplomat—the first since John Negroponte, who served in George W. Bush’s first term as president Since Biden, unlike Bush, plans to take the U.N. seriously—and thus has elevated the ambassador to Cabinet-rank—the appointment also constitutes a validation of the Foreign Service, which has been so mercilessly abused over the last four years.
It’s also worth noting that even a ludicrously partisan Republican Senate majority may find very little pretext to withhold nomination votes for either Thomas-Greenfield or Blinken (a consideration that may have helped rule out Susan Rice at State).
Unless the Democrats win both Senate seats in the Georgia run-off in January, Mitch McConnell will remain Senate majority leader, and he will do everything in his power to foil ambitious domestic legislation. Real change may have to wait until after the 2022 by-election. Foreign policy is different; it depends far more upon action by the executive branch than upon legislation. Biden and his team can do a great deal to restore America to that position between hegemony and retrenchment from which it can exercise leadership. They will be able to start right away.