foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--Merkel’s China Reset Is Mostly Hollow

Merkel’s China Reset Is Mostly Hollow

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is enjoying praise for her cabinet ’ s recent volte-face on China , including a de facto ban of Huawei , a fresh strategy for the Indo-Pacific , and a newfound willingness to call out Beijing ’ s human rights abuses .
Germany ’ s apparent shift is welcome news in Washington , which has subjected Merkel to extraordinary pressure on ties with Beijing .
But Germany ’ s dependence on China goes far deeper than its recent efforts can address , and there are reasons to doubt the sincerity of its supposed reset .
Germany @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for example , stops short of excluding Huawei from the country ’ s wireless network by imposing a dual-track approval process .
The first track involves technical certification by Germany ’ s pro-Huawei Federal Office for Information Security .
The second track requires a “ declaration of trustworthiness ” to be assessed by various ministries , some of which—like the influential Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy—are headed by vocal China doves .
In theory , the legislation gives Merkel the ability to outlaw Huawei by citing security concerns and consigning the Chinese @ @ @ @ @ @ @ if Beijing threatens to retaliate against any number of German business interests in China—from Merkel ’ s coveted European Union-China investment treaty to BASF ’ s $ 10 billion plastics factory in Zhanjiang and Volkswagen ’ s $ 17.5 billion electric-vehicle deal—it is unclear how much pain Berlin will be willing to take over Huawei ’ s security issues .
Indeed , soon after Berlin announced its IT security bill , news broke that in 2018 , a high-ranking official suppressed intelligence on China ’ s influence operations at all levels of German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fear it would damage economic ties .
According to Axios , the chancellor personally reviewed the report before visiting Beijing the following year amid a crackdown on Hong Kong democracy protests .
The result was 13 business deals between German and Chinese executives , signed in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square and overseen by Merkel .
If there are reasons to question the efficacy of Berlin ’ s new IT policy , the same goes for its other China initiatives .
For all the publicity about a “ new @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strategy , the Foreign Office ’ s recent Indo-Pacific guidelines shun the U.S.-led security order in Asia in favor of what it calls “ entanglement ” through trade , investment , and development aid .
As for human rights , Merkel has clarified that “ solutions ” to problems like Hong Kong “ can only be achieved through dialogue , ” while even more hawkish officials such as Omid Nouripour , a Green member of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs , have claimed that Berlin must take a “ much clearer stance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Tibet but that it must stop short of “ full confrontation.
” The German government ’ s tendency to close ranks behind business interests has also been demonstrated by the international financial scandal around Wirecard , the German payments company .
A recent Financial Times report detailed the failure of Germany ’ s regulators , market watchdog , anti-money laundering agency , and other government bodies to play any role in uncovering the largest case of financial fraud in postwar German history , despite numerous tipoffs .
Tellingly , while the German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ investigations into Wirecard last September , he did not stop Merkel from lobbying for the German company on her business trip to China .
To be fair , behind what can seem like a ruthless pursuit of German economic interests in China is a serious strategy for stability .
Berlin is at pains to stave off the mass losses in manufacturing and economic dislocation that have rocked the United States , United Kingdom , and Southern Europe in recent years .
German officials believe the kind of economically driven nationalist populism which led @ @ @ @ @ @ @ President Donald Trump must be avoided in Germany at all costs , and Germany ’ s neighbors might be the first to agree .
As the engine of German export growth , the destination of $ 100 billion worth of German goods last year , and Germany ’ s biggest overall trading partner , China is not just a large and profitable market .
Germans see China as the mechanism for sustaining the only prolonged era of domestic harmony their country has ever known .
German leaders do not help their own case @ @ @ @ @ @ @ soaring rhetoric about human rights and multilateralism .
But on any issue impacting Germany ’ s economic well-being , Berlin ’ s actual decision-making is remarkably consistent .
In addition to securing ties with China , Merkel is currently defending the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia against threatened sanctions from the U.S. Senate , and low levels of defense spending against White House plans to withdraw 12,000 U.S. troops from German soil .
As far as Berlin is concerned , Americans can list the sacrifices they ’ ve made for German @ @ @ @ @ @ @ blue in the face .
The benefits to domestic stability of economic cooperation with strategic rivals remain a core German national interest .
As long as that is the case , the German government will continue to irritate U.S. officials by showing less interest in its own security than the United States does , and by giving the impression that it would be worse for Washington than for Berlin if Germany ever became a Chinese dependency .
But recognizing the consistency of Germany ’ s foreign-policy decisions should help Americans ask better questions @ @ @ @ @ @ @ How much alignment with Germany does U.S. China policy require ?
How much German autonomy can Washington tolerate ?
What economic incentives and backstops can the United States offer Germany to reduce the existential risk it sees in confronting China ?
Washington and Berlin can still form a community of interests around issues such as trade and climate policy , but until Americans come up with answers to these questions , a comprehensive consensus on China is unlikely to emerge any time soon .
Appeals to Xinjiang and the Taiwan Strait will not @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply do not perceive immediate threats to their security or prosperity there .
Nor will reports of Chinese espionage and surveillance , which Berlin will continue to view as the unpleasant but necessary price of political stability at home .
The United States likes to criticize Germany for being stuck in the past on everything from infrastructure and energy to technology and geopolitics .
But after being stifled on so many issues by a country over which it supposedly has so much leverage , U.S. officials should take a look in the mirror @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of hegemony , Americans seem to have forgotten that powerful countries such as Germany do not make radical changes in policy out of fairness to others .
They do so out of necessity or fear .
Until Berlin is made to feel one or the other , Germany ’ s “ new direction ” on China will likely remain cosmetic .

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is enjoying praise for her cabinet’s recent volte-face on China, including a de facto ban of Huawei, a fresh strategy for the Indo-Pacific, and a newfound willingness to call out Beijing’s human rights abuses. Germany’s apparent shift is welcome news in Washington, which has subjected Merkel to extraordinary pressure on ties with Beijing. But Germany’s dependence on China goes far deeper than its recent efforts can address, and there are reasons to doubt the sincerity of its supposed reset.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is enjoying praise for her cabinet’s recent volte-face on China, including a de facto ban of Huawei, a fresh strategy for the Indo-Pacific, and a newfound willingness to call out Beijing’s human rights abuses. Germany’s apparent shift is welcome news in Washington, which has subjected Merkel to extraordinary pressure on ties with Beijing. But Germany’s dependence on China goes far deeper than its recent efforts can address, and there are reasons to doubt the sincerity of its supposed reset.
Germany’s new information-technology security bill, for example, stops short of excluding Huawei from the country’s wireless network by imposing a dual-track approval process. The first track involves technical certification by Germany’s pro-Huawei Federal Office for Information Security. The second track requires a “declaration of trustworthiness” to be assessed by various ministries, some of which—like the influential Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy—are headed by vocal China doves.
In theory, the legislation gives Merkel the ability to outlaw Huawei by citing security concerns and consigning the Chinese telecommunications giant to regulatory perdition. But if Beijing threatens to retaliate against any number of German business interests in China—from Merkel’s coveted European Union-China investment treaty to BASF’s $10 billion plastics factory in Zhanjiang and Volkswagen’s $17.5 billion electric-vehicle deal—it is unclear how much pain Berlin will be willing to take over Huawei’s security issues.
Indeed, soon after Berlin announced its IT security bill, news broke that in 2018, a high-ranking official suppressed intelligence on China’s influence operations at all levels of German government, society, and business for fear it would damage economic ties. According to Axios, the chancellor personally reviewed the report before visiting Beijing the following year amid a crackdown on Hong Kong democracy protests. The result was 13 business deals between German and Chinese executives, signed in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square and overseen by Merkel.
If there are reasons to question the efficacy of Berlin’s new IT policy, the same goes for its other China initiatives. For all the publicity about a “new direction” in Germany’s China strategy, the Foreign Office’s recent Indo-Pacific guidelines shun the U.S.-led security order in Asia in favor of what it calls “entanglement” through trade, investment, and development aid. As for human rights, Merkel has clarified that “solutions” to problems like Hong Kong “can only be achieved through dialogue,” while even more hawkish officials such as Omid Nouripour, a Green member of the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, have claimed that Berlin must take a “much clearer stance” on human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet but that it must stop short of “full confrontation.”
The German government’s tendency to close ranks behind business interests has also been demonstrated by the international financial scandal around Wirecard, the German payments company. A recent Financial Times report detailed the failure of Germany’s regulators, market watchdog, anti-money laundering agency, and other government bodies to play any role in uncovering the largest case of financial fraud in postwar German history, despite numerous tipoffs. Tellingly, while the German finance minister was reportedly aware of explosive investigations into Wirecard last September, he did not stop Merkel from lobbying for the German company on her business trip to China.
To be fair, behind what can seem like a ruthless pursuit of German economic interests in China is a serious strategy for stability. Berlin is at pains to stave off the mass losses in manufacturing and economic dislocation that have rocked the United States, United Kingdom, and Southern Europe in recent years. German officials believe the kind of economically driven nationalist populism which led to Brexit and the election of U.S. President Donald Trump must be avoided in Germany at all costs, and Germany’s neighbors might be the first to agree. As the engine of German export growth, the destination of $100 billion worth of German goods last year, and Germany’s biggest overall trading partner, China is not just a large and profitable market. Germans see China as the mechanism for sustaining the only prolonged era of domestic harmony their country has ever known.
German leaders do not help their own case by coupling seemingly pitiless economic nationalism with soaring rhetoric about human rights and multilateralism. But on any issue impacting Germany’s economic well-being, Berlin’s actual decision-making is remarkably consistent. In addition to securing ties with China, Merkel is currently defending the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia against threatened sanctions from the U.S. Senate, and low levels of defense spending against White House plans to withdraw 12,000 U.S. troops from German soil. As far as Berlin is concerned, Americans can list the sacrifices they’ve made for German security and prosperity until they’re blue in the face. The benefits to domestic stability of economic cooperation with strategic rivals remain a core German national interest.
As long as that is the case, the German government will continue to irritate U.S. officials by showing less interest in its own security than the United States does, and by giving the impression that it would be worse for Washington than for Berlin if Germany ever became a Chinese dependency. But recognizing the consistency of Germany’s foreign-policy decisions should help Americans ask better questions than they have in the past. How much alignment with Germany does U.S. China policy require? How much German autonomy can Washington tolerate? What economic incentives and backstops can the United States offer Germany to reduce the existential risk it sees in confronting China?
Washington and Berlin can still form a community of interests around issues such as trade and climate policy, but until Americans come up with answers to these questions, a comprehensive consensus on China is unlikely to emerge any time soon. Appeals to Xinjiang and the Taiwan Strait will not supply the impetus, because most Germans simply do not perceive immediate threats to their security or prosperity there. Nor will reports of Chinese espionage and surveillance, which Berlin will continue to view as the unpleasant but necessary price of political stability at home.
The United States likes to criticize Germany for being stuck in the past on everything from infrastructure and energy to technology and geopolitics. But after being stifled on so many issues by a country over which it supposedly has so much leverage, U.S. officials should take a look in the mirror. Stuck in their own past assumptions of hegemony, Americans seem to have forgotten that powerful countries such as Germany do not make radical changes in policy out of fairness to others. They do so out of necessity or fear. Until Berlin is made to feel one or the other, Germany’s “new direction” on China will likely remain cosmetic.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--The Feds Moved Migrants in Unmarked Vans Overseas

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security rented unmarked vans to pick up migrants in Guatemala and transport them back to the country ’ s border with Honduras , misusing U.S. government funds and violating its agreement with the State Department—potentially exposing the United States to legal risk , according to a report released Tuesday by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee .
The incident , which took place in January , lacked measures to ensure the security and safety of the migrants or to screen whether any were seeking asylum , the report said .
DHS was unable to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ families and children had become separated during transportation .
“ The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection have no business acting as un-deputized international migration police throughout Latin America .
Congress must once again step in to serve as a check on this president ’ s unhinged anti-immigration agenda , ” said Sen. Bob Menendez , the seniormost Democrat on the committee .
News of the operation comes as the Trump administration has sought to increase the role played by DHS in Central America , supplanting the State Department ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy in the region .
In 2019 , the Trump administration suspended most foreign aid to the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala , Honduras , and El Salvador until Central American governments took effective steps to stop migration into the United States .
“ The big picture is that DHS has completely taken over foreign policy at the State Department with respect to the Northern Triangle , ” said Francisco Bencosme , a senior policy advisor for Latin America with the Open Society Foundation .
Both DHS and the Department of Justice work @ @ @ @ @ @ @ police and border authorities using funds from the State Department ’ s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement .
Agreements between the agencies explicitly prohibit DHS employees from conducting immigration or law enforcement operations with those funds .
However , in January as a large group of migrants crossed from Honduras into Guatemala , DHS personnel in the area departed from past practice and deployed in support of Guatemala ’ s border police in a bid to break up a so-called caravan of migrants looking to travel to the United States together @ @ @ @ @ @ @ DHS agents hired unmarked vehicles and drivers to transport migrants back to the border with Honduras .
The move was a direct violation of the agency ’ s agreement with the State Department and may have exposed the U.S. government to possible financial and legal liabilities , according to the report .
On Jan. 16 , as the migrants began crossing the border into Guatemala , acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf said in a Fox News radio interview that , “ [ w ] e have CBP agents—tactical agents—in Guatemala.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Maryland ruled that Wolf ’ s installation as acting secretary of DHS may have been unlawful under agency succession rules .
“ Wolf ’ s comments about the deployment of ‘ tactical agents ’ alluded to an unauthorized DHS operation conducted by Customs and Border Protection ( CBP ) personnel in the country , ” the report notes .
According to the report , DHS then lied to the State Department about its role in working with the authorities in Guatemala to send migrants back to the border , which in turn caused @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to Congress when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made inquiries about DHS ’ s work in the country .
DHS later acknowledged that it had used State Department funds to rent three 12-person passenger vans to forcibly return migrants back to the border with Honduras .
In a meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff at the end of January , DHS officials said that the person who had authorized the operation in Guatemala was being immediately returned to Washington and that their assignment in the country had been cut short .
Neither @ @ @ @ @ @ @ responded to requests for comment .
Earlier this year , Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei argued that U.S.-Guatemala relations are one-sided .
“ Guatemala is an ally of the United States , but I don ’ t believe the U.S. is an ally to Guatemala , because they don ’ t treat us like one , ” he said .
Bencosme of the Open Society Foundation said it was “ inconceivable ” that the incident was the result of a rogue DHS operative in Guatemala .
“ It ’ s part of a larger @ @ @ @ @ @ @ levels , of policies of deportation , and DHS has to some extent been given a green light to run amok with this policy which contravenes international human rights norms and treaty obligations , ” he said .
While women and children were transported separately from men , DHS was unable to confirm to the committee whether any families had been separated by the operation , whether children were left unaccompanied , or whether their agents had put in place measures to reunite families once they arrived at the border with Honduras .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ they were unaware whether any of the people transported back to the border with Honduras had applied for asylum in Guatemala .
“ In failing to develop appropriate screening protocols for the Honduran migrants , the DHS operation exposed the U.S. Government to possible complicity in any potential violation of the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol , as well as the 1984 Convention Against Torture , which both Guatemala and the United States are required to uphold , ” the report notes .
Jason Marczak @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atlantic Council , said that the report highlighted the challenges that migrants endure .
“ This is an incredibly perilous journey .
And along the journey migrants face extortion , kidnapping , rape .
They face a whole host of awful things , ” he said .
“ And then on top of that , there ’ s a secret operation being carried out by DHS .
Migrants don ’ t know who they ’ re dealing with .
I mean , imagine being put into an unmarked van and being transported back @ @

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security rented unmarked vans to pick up migrants in Guatemala and transport them back to the country’s border with Honduras, misusing U.S. government funds and violating its agreement with the State Department—potentially exposing the United States to legal risk, according to a report released Tuesday by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security rented unmarked vans to pick up migrants in Guatemala and transport them back to the country’s border with Honduras, misusing U.S. government funds and violating its agreement with the State Department—potentially exposing the United States to legal risk, according to a report released Tuesday by Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The incident, which took place in January, lacked measures to ensure the security and safety of the migrants or to screen whether any were seeking asylum, the report said. DHS was unable to confirm to Democratic committee staff whether any families and children had become separated during transportation.
“The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection have no business acting as un-deputized international migration police throughout Latin America. Congress must once again step in to serve as a check on this president’s unhinged anti-immigration agenda,” said Sen. Bob Menendez, the seniormost Democrat on the committee.
News of the operation comes as the Trump administration has sought to increase the role played by DHS in Central America, supplanting the State Department’s traditional job of charting U.S. foreign policy in the region. In 2019, the Trump administration suspended most foreign aid to the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador until Central American governments took effective steps to stop migration into the United States.
“The big picture is that DHS has completely taken over foreign policy at the State Department with respect to the Northern Triangle,” said Francisco Bencosme, a senior policy advisor for Latin America with the Open Society Foundation.
Both DHS and the Department of Justice work in Central America to help train local police and border authorities using funds from the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Agreements between the agencies explicitly prohibit DHS employees from conducting immigration or law enforcement operations with those funds.
However, in January as a large group of migrants crossed from Honduras into Guatemala, DHS personnel in the area departed from past practice and deployed in support of Guatemala’s border police in a bid to break up a so-called caravan of migrants looking to travel to the United States together. It was during this operation that DHS agents hired unmarked vehicles and drivers to transport migrants back to the border with Honduras. The move was a direct violation of the agency’s agreement with the State Department and may have exposed the U.S. government to possible financial and legal liabilities, according to the report.
On Jan. 16, as the migrants began crossing the border into Guatemala, acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf said in a Fox News radio interview that, “[w]e have CBP agents—tactical agents—in Guatemala.” Last month, a federal judge in Maryland ruled that Wolf’s installation as acting secretary of DHS may have been unlawful under agency succession rules.
“Wolf ’s comments about the deployment of ‘tactical agents’ alluded to an unauthorized DHS operation conducted by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel in the country,” the report notes.
According to the report, DHS then lied to the State Department about its role in working with the authorities in Guatemala to send migrants back to the border, which in turn caused the State Department to submit misleading information to Congress when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made inquiries about DHS’s work in the country.
DHS later acknowledged that it had used State Department funds to rent three 12-person passenger vans to forcibly return migrants back to the border with Honduras. In a meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff at the end of January, DHS officials said that the person who had authorized the operation in Guatemala was being immediately returned to Washington and that their assignment in the country had been cut short.
Neither DHS nor the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington responded to requests for comment. Earlier this year, Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei argued that U.S.-Guatemala relations are one-sided. “Guatemala is an ally of the United States, but I don’t believe the U.S. is an ally to Guatemala, because they don’t treat us like one,” he said.
Bencosme of the Open Society Foundation said it was “inconceivable” that the incident was the result of a rogue DHS operative in Guatemala.
“It’s part of a larger culture of impunity set at the highest levels, of policies of deportation, and DHS has to some extent been given a green light to run amok with this policy which contravenes international human rights norms and treaty obligations,” he said.
While women and children were transported separately from men, DHS was unable to confirm to the committee whether any families had been separated by the operation, whether children were left unaccompanied, or whether their agents had put in place measures to reunite families once they arrived at the border with Honduras. DHS also told the State Department that they were unaware whether any of the people transported back to the border with Honduras had applied for asylum in Guatemala.
“In failing to develop appropriate screening protocols for the Honduran migrants, the DHS operation exposed the U.S. Government to possible complicity in any potential violation of the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the 1984 Convention Against Torture, which both Guatemala and the United States are required to uphold,” the report notes.
Jason Marczak, a Latin America expert at the Atlantic Council, said that the report highlighted the challenges that migrants endure.
“This is an incredibly perilous journey. And along the journey migrants face extortion, kidnapping, rape. They face a whole host of awful things,” he said. “And then on top of that, there’s a secret operation being carried out by DHS. Migrants don’t know who they’re dealing with. I mean, imagine being put into an unmarked van and being transported back.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--How a Maritime Deal With Israel Could Ease Lebanon’s Woes

How a Maritime Deal With Israel Could Ease Lebanon ’ s Woes TEL AVIV , Israel—Lebanon will become the third Arab country in recent months to inaugurate public talks with Israel when representatives of the two sides meet this week to negotiate an agreement on a maritime border dispute .
The U.S.-mediated talks , to begin Wednesday in Lebanon ’ s border town of Naqoura , will focus on a 330-square-mile patch of the Mediterranean Sea where natural gas reserves are abundant and where each side has territorial claims .
A resolution to the dispute could have a meaningful impact @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the wider region .
Most critically , a deal would be a long-term boon for Lebanon ’ s battered economy .
It would also strengthen a U.S.-backed Eastern Mediterranean energy alliance , of which Israel , which has already tapped gas fields in its own offshore waters , is a leading participant .
The talks are not expected to blossom into a normalization deal—the kind Israel reached with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain last month .
But they do represent another achievement for the Trump administration in its endeavor to improve @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the expense of the Palestinians .
“ This isn ’ t a negotiation for peace and normalization , ” said Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz , in an interview with Israeli public television .
The talks are strictly focused on demarcating each country ’ s exclusive economic zone “ to allow for the exploitation of natural resources in the sea for the benefit of both peoples.
” A senior official in Israel ’ s Energy Ministry suggested that Lebanon could extract natural gas worth $ 6 billion annually from the disputed area , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sea with its point at the Israel-Lebanon border .
Without a deal , the disputed waters remain a point of angry rhetoric between the two sides and off-limits for commercial developers .
The United States had tried for years to bring the two countries to the bargaining table .
The turning point appears to have been the August explosion of a depot that wrecked Beirut ’ s port , escalating Lebanon ’ s economic crisis and putting Hezbollah , a local power broker representing many of the country ’ s Shiite Muslims , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have accused Hezbollah , which fought a war with Israel in 2006 , of storing dangerous materials in the port .
The sense of despair deepened last month , after an initiative sponsored by France to form a new government failed to bear fruit .
At the same time , U.S. sanctions recently went into effect targeting members of Amal , a Shiite Lebanese parliamentary party led by parliament speaker Nabih Berri that is politically allied with Hezbollah , increasing pressure on the Iran-backed organization .
It was Berri who announced the agreement @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is being cornered , even by its own allies , ” said Nadim Koteich , a Lebanese political columnist and Sky News Arabic show host .
“ This is prompting Hezbollah to think out of the box and to say , ‘ I still have cards to play , and one of them is having this border demarcation.
’ … Hezbollah is trying to tell the Lebanese , ‘ No , I ’ m not responsible for this economic meltdown.
’ ” When Israel withdrew its military from southern Lebanon in 2000 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ neighbor to kick out the PLO , the United Nations traced out a land border .
One section on the eastern side of the border , a mountainous region known as Shebaa Farms , remains contested and an occasional flash point for Israel and Hezbollah .
Since the two sides fought a monthlong war in 2006 , Hezbollah has amassed an arsenal that includes tens of thousands of rockets .
Israel has threatened to lay waste to Lebanon in case of a new outbreak of violence .
Despite the tension , there has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ war to air complaints over the land border : Military officers from Israel and the Lebanese Armed Forces have held monthly meetings mediated by peacekeeping officials from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon .
The maritime dispute didn ’ t arise until several years after the war , with the countries disputing precisely what angle the border continues from the land into the sea .
Dan Shapiro , a former U.S. ambassador to Israel , said the United States has been promoting maritime border talks between the sides as far back as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fruit .
“ This is a win-win , if you can get the deal .
Both sides can do the exploration .
Both sides can get the revenue that it would produce .
How you split the baby is a technical matter and not really that difficult .
The political hurdle was Hezbollah not being prepared to give its assent ” to talks with Israel because of the de facto recognition that it would confer , he said .
Commentators say Hezbollah , which has attacked Emirati normalization with Israel as a selling @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent days has been criticized by its political opponents in Lebanon for doing exactly the same thing .
The Lebanese delegation to the talks will be led by a brigadier general , and the Israeli delegation will be headed by the director-general of the Energy Ministry .
U.S .
Ambassador to Algeria John Desrocher will serve as the mediator .
“ It ’ s quite significant : direct Israel-Lebanon talks , which Hezbollah agrees to .
It ’ s a step that regulates the Israel-Hezbollah relationship , ” said Ehud Eiran , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ expert on maritime geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean .
“ It is an achievement for the Trump administration .
The U.S. has been mediating this issue for many years .
We have an image of the U.S. departing the Middle East , but this is a deepening of American involvement .
It ’ s a reminder that traditional diplomacy can still make a difference.
” Though the talks won ’ t address the main points of contention between Israel and Lebanon—the Shebaa Farms dispute , Hezbollah ’ s missile stockpile , and Israeli @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Council resolutions by building covert weapons depots and military positions in southern Lebanon—reaching a deal over economic rights would open up an important resource that would serve as a counterweight to an escalation , according to analysts .
“ The moment that the countries are tied together with such a major financial energy-related interest , then this can be a de-escalating , normalizing factor , ” said Shimrit Meir , an Israeli columnist and expert on Arab affairs .
She argued that an agreement on a maritime border would be a form of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ scale , a deal removing the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute would strengthen a U.S.-backed geopolitical alliance of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean that aspires to link up their offshore fields in order to export the natural gas—a development that would put a check on the regional aspirations of both Turkey and Russia , said Sami Nader , the director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs in Beirut .
“ This is a key region for the Americans .
They have a strategic interest in finalizing agreement on the maritime borders , all over @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have already established a kind of mini-NATO , an alliance of Israel , Italy , Egypt , Cyprus , and Greece .
“ It ’ s not just about the gas .
It ’ s about accessing a pipeline going from Israel to Greece to Europe .
This would be the first pipeline from the East not under Russian control , ” Nader said .
An Israeli energy official said on Wednesday that the border talks could be wrapped up within a matter of months .
However , analysts noted that it was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ final agreement .
While holding talks may put the brakes on new U.S. sanctions against Shiite allies and relieve French pressure , a successful deal might weaken Hezbollah ’ s influence within Lebanon by creating a source of revenue that it can ’ t control , said David Makovsky , a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former U.S. peace negotiator .
“ The question is whether Hezbollah is feeling the heat to conclude maritime negotiations or whether this is just a tactical move to merely embark upon @ @ @ @ @ @ @ said .
“ Culminating a deal could dilute Iran ’ s influence in what appears to many as a failing state .
We hope for the best , but there is a reason why nobody is popping champagne corks .
The politics are very treacherous .
Nothing is easy in the Middle East .
”

TEL AVIV, Israel—Lebanon will become the third Arab country in recent months to inaugurate public talks with Israel when representatives of the two sides meet this week to negotiate an agreement on a maritime border dispute.
TEL AVIV, Israel—Lebanon will become the third Arab country in recent months to inaugurate public talks with Israel when representatives of the two sides meet this week to negotiate an agreement on a maritime border dispute.
The U.S.-mediated talks, to begin Wednesday in Lebanon’s border town of Naqoura, will focus on a 330-square-mile patch of the Mediterranean Sea where natural gas reserves are abundant and where each side has territorial claims. A resolution to the dispute could have a meaningful impact on the two neighbors, as well as the wider region.
Most critically, a deal would be a long-term boon for Lebanon’s battered economy. It would also strengthen a U.S.-backed Eastern Mediterranean energy alliance, of which Israel, which has already tapped gas fields in its own offshore waters, is a leading participant.
The talks are not expected to blossom into a normalization deal—the kind Israel reached with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain last month. But they do represent another achievement for the Trump administration in its endeavor to improve Israel’s position in the region—at the expense of the Palestinians.
“This isn’t a negotiation for peace and normalization,” said Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, in an interview with Israeli public television. The talks are strictly focused on demarcating each country’s exclusive economic zone “to allow for the exploitation of natural resources in the sea for the benefit of both peoples.”
A senior official in Israel’s Energy Ministry suggested that Lebanon could extract natural gas worth $6 billion annually from the disputed area, a thin, pizza slice-shaped tract of sea with its point at the Israel-Lebanon border. Without a deal, the disputed waters remain a point of angry rhetoric between the two sides and off-limits for commercial developers.
The United States had tried for years to bring the two countries to the bargaining table. The turning point appears to have been the August explosion of a depot that wrecked Beirut’s port, escalating Lebanon’s economic crisis and putting Hezbollah, a local power broker representing many of the country’s Shiite Muslims, on the defensive. Many in Lebanon have accused Hezbollah, which fought a war with Israel in 2006, of storing dangerous materials in the port.
The sense of despair deepened last month, after an initiative sponsored by France to form a new government failed to bear fruit. At the same time, U.S. sanctions recently went into effect targeting members of Amal, a Shiite Lebanese parliamentary party led by parliament speaker Nabih Berri that is politically allied with Hezbollah, increasing pressure on the Iran-backed organization. It was Berri who announced the agreement to hold the talks.
“Hezbollah is being cornered, even by its own allies,” said Nadim Koteich, a Lebanese political columnist and Sky News Arabic show host. “This is prompting Hezbollah to think out of the box and to say, ‘I still have cards to play, and one of them is having this border demarcation.’ … Hezbollah is trying to tell the Lebanese, ‘No, I’m not responsible for this economic meltdown.’”
When Israel withdrew its military from southern Lebanon in 2000, some 18 years after invading its northern neighbor to kick out the PLO, the United Nations traced out a land border.
One section on the eastern side of the border, a mountainous region known as Shebaa Farms, remains contested and an occasional flash point for Israel and Hezbollah. Since the two sides fought a monthlong war in 2006, Hezbollah has amassed an arsenal that includes tens of thousands of rockets. Israel has threatened to lay waste to Lebanon in case of a new outbreak of violence.
Despite the tension, there has been one channel of communication since the war to air complaints over the land border: Military officers from Israel and the Lebanese Armed Forces have held monthly meetings mediated by peacekeeping officials from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
The maritime dispute didn’t arise until several years after the war, with the countries disputing precisely what angle the border continues from the land into the sea.
Dan Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, said the United States has been promoting maritime border talks between the sides as far back as 2012, viewing it as low-hanging diplomatic fruit.
“This is a win-win, if you can get the deal. Both sides can do the exploration. Both sides can get the revenue that it would produce. How you split the baby is a technical matter and not really that difficult. The political hurdle was Hezbollah not being prepared to give its assent” to talks with Israel because of the de facto recognition that it would confer, he said.
Commentators say Hezbollah, which has attacked Emirati normalization with Israel as a selling out of the Arab cause, in recent days has been criticized by its political opponents in Lebanon for doing exactly the same thing.
The Lebanese delegation to the talks will be led by a brigadier general, and the Israeli delegation will be headed by the director-general of the Energy Ministry. U.S. Ambassador to Algeria John Desrocher will serve as the mediator.
“It’s quite significant: direct Israel-Lebanon talks, which Hezbollah agrees to. It’s a step that regulates the Israel-Hezbollah relationship,” said Ehud Eiran, a political scientist at Haifa University and an expert on maritime geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean.
“It is an achievement for the Trump administration. The U.S. has been mediating this issue for many years. We have an image of the U.S. departing the Middle East, but this is a deepening of American involvement. It’s a reminder that traditional diplomacy can still make a difference.”
Though the talks won’t address the main points of contention between Israel and Lebanon—the Shebaa Farms dispute, Hezbollah’s missile stockpile, and Israeli accusations that Hezbollah has violated U.N. Security Council resolutions by building covert weapons depots and military positions in southern Lebanon—reaching a deal over economic rights would open up an important resource that would serve as a counterweight to an escalation, according to analysts.
“The moment that the countries are tied together with such a major financial energy-related interest, then this can be a de-escalating, normalizing factor,” said Shimrit Meir, an Israeli columnist and expert on Arab affairs. She argued that an agreement on a maritime border would be a form of recognition of Israel.
On a regional scale, a deal removing the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute would strengthen a U.S.-backed geopolitical alliance of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean that aspires to link up their offshore fields in order to export the natural gas—a development that would put a check on the regional aspirations of both Turkey and Russia, said Sami Nader, the director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs in Beirut.
“This is a key region for the Americans. They have a strategic interest in finalizing agreement on the maritime borders, all over the East Mediterranean. And the Americans have already established a kind of mini-NATO, an alliance of Israel, Italy, Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece.
“It’s not just about the gas. It’s about accessing a pipeline going from Israel to Greece to Europe. This would be the first pipeline from the East not under Russian control,” Nader said.
An Israeli energy official said on Wednesday that the border talks could be wrapped up within a matter of months.
However, analysts noted that it was still unclear whether Hezbollah would support a final agreement. While holding talks may put the brakes on new U.S. sanctions against Shiite allies and relieve French pressure, a successful deal might weaken Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanon by creating a source of revenue that it can’t control, said David Makovsky, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former U.S. peace negotiator.
“The question is whether Hezbollah is feeling the heat to conclude maritime negotiations or whether this is just a tactical move to merely embark upon them at this time,” he said.
“Culminating a deal could dilute Iran’s influence in what appears to many as a failing state. We hope for the best, but there is a reason why nobody is popping champagne corks. The politics are very treacherous. Nothing is easy in the Middle East.”


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--Lukashenko’s Talk Offers Could Trap Him or Protesters

Lukashenko ’ s Talk Offers Could Trap Him or Protesters It has now been two months since the outbreak of massive street demonstrations in Belarus in the wake of the massively falsified Aug. 9 presidential election .
The initial government strategy of simply waiting out the protests has failed .
The democratic opposition has the support of a majority of the population and demonstrates a tireless capacity to put at least 100,000 protesters onto the streets of Minsk every single Sunday .
The long stalemate between the government and the opposition concluded , however , as the long-standing autocrat Aleksandr @ @ @ @ @ @ @ After arranging a secret inauguration for his sixth term as president , Lukashenko appeared in person at a KGB prison to engage in roundtable negotiations along with a group of political prisoners who included his rival , the banker Viktar Babaryka .
It ’ s a scene that ’ s familiar from 1989 , when wrong-footed communist leaders found themselves at the negotiating table with people they ’ d arrested in the past .
It may be the start of a transition process that allows a new start for the country—or it may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ rule .
Lukashenko has found himself boxed into a particularly difficult situation .
The longer the stalemate with the opposition continues the more likely he is to lose control of his security forces , to face a possible collapse of the economy , or to be forced into taking further unpalatable positions by the Kremlin .
Responding with overwhelming , deadly force against protesters could culminate in a full-scale revolution as the very patient Belarusian people run out of patience .
A Russian invasion still remains unlikely , but if it did happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in place even as a puppet .
The yearslong balance between the Russians and the West over Belarus has been mostly abandoned , but he still hopes to weather the storm with some slight amount of independence at the end of it .
Lukashenko certainly does not want to follow former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych into Russian exile .
Lukashenko and the prisoners spent four hours discussing constitutional reform , in what both Belarusian state TV and opposition telegram channels reported as “ emotional but constructive arguments.
” The detained Belarusian American political @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an aide to both the Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders presidential campaigns and whose release U.S. authorities have demanded , was seated at the table along with other prominent political prisoners .
On Sunday , Belarusian media reported that at least two of the participants of the Saturday meeting in the prison were to be released under house arrest , seemingly having agreed to take part in drafting the new constitution .
That helped elevate Lukashenko ’ s meeting with the political prisoners from presidential whimsy or manipulation to a serious concession .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the legitimate president of the country by most European states , underlined that Lukashenko had de facto “ acknowledged the existence of political prisoners whom he used to call criminals.
” She was also allowed to speak by phone with her imprisoned husband for the first time in four months .
But the protesters need to be careful in this situation .
A redrafting of the flawed Belarusian Constitution , established in 1996 , was always on the table .
It was later amended to radically expand the president ’ s powers and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , including by Lukashenko , as not allowing for a proper balance of power in the country .
But it has also been Lukashenko ’ s preferred strategy for diffusing and subduing the protest movement .
Russian President Vladimir Putin also backed the initiative during his and Lukashenko ’ s one-on-one meeting in Sochi last month .
At the time , the Belarusian opposition roundly and unitedly rejected the overtures as meaningless stalling .
Lukashenko has never allowed Belarus to establish any semblance of authentic parliamentarianism , instead concentrating all power in an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ apparatus .
The Belarusian parliament does not exist as an independent institution , with all Belarusian political parties exiting as completely hollow structures .
This was always part of Lukashenko ’ s strategy to minimize the Russian influence on the nation ’ s internal politics , as the robust representation of the pro-Russian position within parliament by local proxy parties is a central mechanism of Moscow ’ s influence and a major internal problem for the Moldovans , Georgians , and Ukrainians .
For the most part , Lukashenko simply did not allow @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that would further extend Russian influence within the country to develop .
For its part , the Kremlin likewise favors a rewritten and rebooted constitution as its preferred mechanism for increasing Russian influence over the country .
That would allow for the inception of useful articles into the new constitutional structure .
From the standpoint of the Kremlin , any transition process would require reformatting the power structures as well as bringing in its favored elites to govern the country .
But even as Lukashenko reached out one hand to the protesters , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ regime engaged in a renewed bout of intense violence during the next day ’ s demonstrations .
Social media and Telegram channels filled up ideas of indiscriminate beatings of protesters by interior ministry troops and plainclothes security agents .
As many as 400 protesters and 40 journalists were arrested by riot police who deployed rubber bullets and pepper spray .
The security service ’ s violence against peaceful protesters was ratcheted back up to the levels previously only seen on Aug. 9-11 , immediately after the presidential election .
The simultaneous gestures toward @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and brutality on the streets of Minsk make a perverse sort of sense .
The beatings underlined the regime ’ s leverage on political opponents and signaled that Lukashenko would not tolerate being seen as offering political concessions out of weakness .
Tikhanovskaya had spent the previous week publicly meeting with seemingly every leader across the continent as European Union support for her and the democratic opposition has continued to solidify .
The government ’ s strategy now is to try to split the cohesion of the opposition and to cut off those @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those members of the opposition who are sitting in detention cells .
The choice that this presents to the opposition is a difficult one , as it might lose credibility with the electorate and legitimacy with the international community if it seems to reject Lukashenko ’ s proposals outright .
On the other hand , accepting his offer of partnership in what is very likely a false promise of serious dialogue might lead to losing momentum or even the chance of victory outright .
The decision is not an enviable one .

It has now been two months since the outbreak of massive street demonstrations in Belarus in the wake of the massively falsified Aug. 9 presidential election. The initial government strategy of simply waiting out the protests has failed. The democratic opposition has the support of a majority of the population and demonstrates a tireless capacity to put at least 100,000 protesters onto the streets of Minsk every single Sunday.
It has now been two months since the outbreak of massive street demonstrations in Belarus in the wake of the massively falsified Aug. 9 presidential election. The initial government strategy of simply waiting out the protests has failed. The democratic opposition has the support of a majority of the population and demonstrates a tireless capacity to put at least 100,000 protesters onto the streets of Minsk every single Sunday.
The long stalemate between the government and the opposition concluded, however, as the long-standing autocrat Aleksandr Lukashenko shifted tactics over the weekend. After arranging a secret inauguration for his sixth term as president, Lukashenko appeared in person at a KGB prison to engage in roundtable negotiations along with a group of political prisoners who included his rival, the banker Viktar Babaryka. It’s a scene that’s familiar from 1989, when wrong-footed communist leaders found themselves at the negotiating table with people they’d arrested in the past. It may be the start of a transition process that allows a new start for the country—or it may be merely a case of divide and rule.
Lukashenko has found himself boxed into a particularly difficult situation. The longer the stalemate with the opposition continues the more likely he is to lose control of his security forces, to face a possible collapse of the economy, or to be forced into taking further unpalatable positions by the Kremlin. Responding with overwhelming, deadly force against protesters could culminate in a full-scale revolution as the very patient Belarusian people run out of patience.
A Russian invasion still remains unlikely, but if it did happen, Lukashenko would certainly not be kept in place even as a puppet. The yearslong balance between the Russians and the West over Belarus has been mostly abandoned, but he still hopes to weather the storm with some slight amount of independence at the end of it. Lukashenko certainly does not want to follow former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych into Russian exile.
Lukashenko and the prisoners spent four hours discussing constitutional reform, in what both Belarusian state TV and opposition telegram channels reported as “emotional but constructive arguments.” The detained Belarusian American political analyst Vitali Shkliarov, who had been an aide to both the Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders presidential campaigns and whose release U.S. authorities have demanded, was seated at the table along with other prominent political prisoners.
On Sunday, Belarusian media reported that at least two of the participants of the Saturday meeting in the prison were to be released under house arrest, seemingly having agreed to take part in drafting the new constitution. That helped elevate Lukashenko’s meeting with the political prisoners from presidential whimsy or manipulation to a serious concession. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, now widely acknowledged as the legitimate president of the country by most European states, underlined that Lukashenko had de facto “acknowledged the existence of political prisoners whom he used to call criminals.” She was also allowed to speak by phone with her imprisoned husband for the first time in four months.
But the protesters need to be careful in this situation. A redrafting of the flawed Belarusian Constitution, established in 1996, was always on the table. It was later amended to radically expand the president’s powers and is seen by most all parties involved, including by Lukashenko, as not allowing for a proper balance of power in the country. But it has also been Lukashenko’s preferred strategy for diffusing and subduing the protest movement. Russian President Vladimir Putin also backed the initiative during his and Lukashenko’s one-on-one meeting in Sochi last month. At the time, the Belarusian opposition roundly and unitedly rejected the overtures as meaningless stalling.
Lukashenko has never allowed Belarus to establish any semblance of authentic parliamentarianism, instead concentrating all power in an authoritarian executive and control over the security apparatus. The Belarusian parliament does not exist as an independent institution, with all Belarusian political parties exiting as completely hollow structures. This was always part of Lukashenko’s strategy to minimize the Russian influence on the nation’s internal politics, as the robust representation of the pro-Russian position within parliament by local proxy parties is a central mechanism of Moscow’s influence and a major internal problem for the Moldovans, Georgians, and Ukrainians. For the most part, Lukashenko simply did not allow pro-Russian or Russian nationalist parties and organizations that would further extend Russian influence within the country to develop.
For its part, the Kremlin likewise favors a rewritten and rebooted constitution as its preferred mechanism for increasing Russian influence over the country. That would allow for the inception of useful articles into the new constitutional structure. From the standpoint of the Kremlin, any transition process would require reformatting the power structures as well as bringing in its favored elites to govern the country.
But even as Lukashenko reached out one hand to the protesters, the other held a truncheon. The regime engaged in a renewed bout of intense violence during the next day’s demonstrations. Social media and Telegram channels filled up ideas of indiscriminate beatings of protesters by interior ministry troops and plainclothes security agents.
As many as 400 protesters and 40 journalists were arrested by riot police who deployed rubber bullets and pepper spray. The security service’s violence against peaceful protesters was ratcheted back up to the levels previously only seen on Aug. 9-11, immediately after the presidential election.
The simultaneous gestures toward opening up dialogue along with increased repression and brutality on the streets of Minsk make a perverse sort of sense. The beatings underlined the regime’s leverage on political opponents and signaled that Lukashenko would not tolerate being seen as offering political concessions out of weakness.
Tikhanovskaya had spent the previous week publicly meeting with seemingly every leader across the continent as European Union support for her and the democratic opposition has continued to solidify. The government’s strategy now is to try to split the cohesion of the opposition and to cut off those who are currently outside the country from those members of the opposition who are sitting in detention cells. The choice that this presents to the opposition is a difficult one, as it might lose credibility with the electorate and legitimacy with the international community if it seems to reject Lukashenko’s proposals outright. On the other hand, accepting his offer of partnership in what is very likely a false promise of serious dialogue might lead to losing momentum or even the chance of victory outright. The decision is not an enviable one.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--Investors Are Already Treating America Like an Emerging Market

Investors Are Already Treating America Like an Emerging Market An incumbent leader refuses to commit to a peaceful transfer of power .
While his political allies rail about an attempted coup , he calls for his opponents to be arrested .
Expectations of political violence grow as the leader calls for his supporters , who include armed vigilantes , to man polling stations .
As investors brace for political and social instability , the country ’ s financial markets gyrate with each election poll and cryptic update on the leader ’ s medical state .
Welcome to the United States @ @ @ @ @ @ @ market .
With its deep and liquid financial markets , large consumer-driven economy , and global reserve currency , the United States—at least economically—remains the most developed of the world ’ s developed markets .
But its politics increasingly resemble that of an emerging market , where weak political institutions and polarized societies increase the risk of instability around elections .
Disputed elections , political violence , and precarious transitions have long been hallmarks of emerging markets ; Turkey , Nigeria , and Argentina are recent examples where election mayhem precipitated economic pain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In developed countries , by contrast , institutions are normally strong enough to ensure that political competition remains peaceful and electoral outcomes are recognized as legitimate by all parties .
In the United States , however , developed-world stability may be a relic of the past .
The level of U.S. institutional risk has increased by 29 percent , a change on par with trends seen in Hungary and Thailand .
Extreme outcomes such as civil war or a sustained insurgency are rare events even in emerging markets , and in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” —what economists call an extreme but low-probability outcome—as well .
But the tails are clearly fatter for this election than any other in recent history .
Indeed , as recently as September , futures trading for the Chicago Board Options Exchange ’ s Volatility Index—a measure of unpredictability in stock prices sometimes called the “ fear gauge ” —was pricing the Nov. 3 U.S. election as the single worst event risk since the index first began trading in 2004 .
Wall Street fund managers , too , have consistently cited the election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ risk in 2020 .
When professional investors normally hedge against outsized risks of this sort , they buy assets seen as safe such as U.S. Treasury bonds .
But with the specter of instability hanging over the United States , some are diversifying into emerging market bonds instead—an inversion of the usual pattern .
Meanwhile , the growing list of risks emanating from the United States is heightening concerns about the status of the U.S. dollar as a safe haven for investors .
Over the past few days , Biden ’ s solidifying @ @ @ @ @ @ @ contested election and the market volatility that would come with it .
But the situation surrounding the election remain unpredictable , and the fact that U.S. markets have now rallied on prospects for a more stable transition of power speaks volumes about the emerging-markets-style uncertainty gripping U.S. politics .
How we got here is , in part , obvious : U.S. President Donald Trump has quite clearly based his reelection strategy on stoking societal divisions , casting doubt over the legitimacy of the vote , and encouraging outright political vigilantism .
But there @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that lies within the deeper trends in U.S. politics and society that predate the Trump presidency but have been exacerbated by it .
The United States has seen growing institutional instability and social polarization more often found in fledgling democracies such as Hungary or coup-prone countries such as Thailand than in stable , developed societies .
According to data tracked by my firm , GeoQuant , the level of U.S. institutional risk has increased by 29 percent over the last eight years , a change on par with trends seen in Hungary and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , when then-President Barack Obama started his second term in office , U.S. institutional risk measured somewhere between Germany ’ s and Canada ’ s ; today , it lies between that of Uruguay and Taiwan , two emerging markets .
In our index for social instability , the United States now ranks between Malaysia and Brazil .
GeoQuant ’ s data—derived from measures of risk , institutional stability , state capacity , and rule of law—suggests that U.S. legislators have become less bound by rules and less effective at making policy , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of carrying those policies out .
U.S. political parties are weaker and more fractious , while judges and prosecutors are all the more politicized .
Rule by the leader ’ s decree ( or , in developed-market speak , by executive order ) is now more common .
Checks and balances have weakened .
Meanwhile , U.S. society has changed as well .
As we all know , a more diverse and urban country has also become more economically unequal .
Education and health outcomes have deteriorated , especially in rural areas , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more elusive .
In data terms , this translates to a marked increase in both social polarization and human development risks .
In our index for social instability , the United States now ranks between Malaysia and Brazil .
These institutional and social trends have combined to undermine Americans ’ faith in democratic institutions , including the electoral process .
Much of today ’ s contentious debates about the legitimacy of the Electoral College , the U.S. Senate , and the two-party system reflect the fact that these institutions vastly overrepresent whiter and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ election districts , voter suppression , and an antiquated system for casting ballots and validating results , these factors undermine citizens ’ options for political participation and facilitate minority rule .
All this , too , is more familiar from developing countries than Western democracies .
To be sure , these trends are what brought Trump to power in 2016 , and they will persist after he is gone from the White House .
Even if Democratic challenger Joe Biden wins easily and U.S. politics begins to look more like that of a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s darker currents won ’ t subside completely .
A new Democratic president would face tremendous pressure to play hardball with his former Republican colleagues in Congress , while large parts of the Republican Party will continue to be motivated by the ethnonationalism that has become the party ’ s hallmark under Trump .
In other words , no matter what happens in November , the world ’ s oldest democracy may well continue to act as its newest emerging market .

An incumbent leader refuses to commit to a peaceful transfer of power. While his political allies rail about an attempted coup, he calls for his opponents to be arrested . Expectations of political violence grow as the leader calls for his supporters, who include armed vigilantes, to man polling stations. As investors brace for political and social instability, the country’s financial markets gyrate with each election poll and cryptic update on the leader’s medical state .
An incumbent leader refuses to commit to a peaceful transfer of power. While his political allies rail about an attempted coup, he calls for his opponents to be arrested. Expectations of political violence grow as the leader calls for his supporters, who include armed vigilantes, to man polling stations. As investors brace for political and social instability, the country’s financial markets gyrate with each election poll and cryptic update on the leader’s medical state.
Welcome to the United States’ first modern-era election as an emerging market.
With its deep and liquid financial markets, large consumer-driven economy, and global reserve currency, the United States—at least economically—remains the most developed of the world’s developed markets. But its politics increasingly resemble that of an emerging market, where weak political institutions and polarized societies increase the risk of instability around elections.
Disputed elections, political violence, and precarious transitions have long been hallmarks of emerging markets; Turkey, Nigeria, and Argentina are recent examples where election mayhem precipitated economic pain, social unrest, and tumbling markets. In developed countries, by contrast, institutions are normally strong enough to ensure that political competition remains peaceful and electoral outcomes are recognized as legitimate by all parties. In the United States, however, developed-world stability may be a relic of the past.
The level of U.S. institutional risk has increased by 29 percent, a change on par with trends seen in Hungary and Thailand.
Extreme outcomes such as civil war or a sustained insurgency are rare events even in emerging markets, and in the United States they remain “tail risks”—what economists call an extreme but low-probability outcome—as well. But the tails are clearly fatter for this election than any other in recent history. Indeed, as recently as September, futures trading for the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index—a measure of unpredictability in stock prices sometimes called the “fear gauge”—was pricing the Nov. 3 U.S. election as the single worst event risk since the index first began trading in 2004. Wall Street fund managers, too, have consistently cited the election as the market’s greatest tail risk in 2020. When professional investors normally hedge against outsized risks of this sort, they buy assets seen as safe such as U.S. Treasury bonds. But with the specter of instability hanging over the United States, some are diversifying into emerging market bonds instead—an inversion of the usual pattern. Meanwhile, the growing list of risks emanating from the United States is heightening concerns about the status of the U.S. dollar as a safe haven for investors.
Over the past few days, Biden’s solidifying poll lead has reduced fears of a contested election and the market volatility that would come with it. But the situation surrounding the election remain unpredictable, and the fact that U.S. markets have now rallied on prospects for a more stable transition of power speaks volumes about the emerging-markets-style uncertainty gripping U.S. politics.
How we got here is, in part, obvious: U.S. President Donald Trump has quite clearly based his reelection strategy on stoking societal divisions, casting doubt over the legitimacy of the vote, and encouraging outright political vigilantism.
But there is a less obvious—and ultimately more important—answer that lies within the deeper trends in U.S. politics and society that predate the Trump presidency but have been exacerbated by it. The United States has seen growing institutional instability and social polarization more often found in fledgling democracies such as Hungary or coup-prone countries such as Thailand than in stable, developed societies.
According to data tracked by my firm, GeoQuant, the level of U.S. institutional risk has increased by 29 percent over the last eight years, a change on par with trends seen in Hungary and Thailand. At the beginning of 2013, when then-President Barack Obama started his second term in office, U.S. institutional risk measured somewhere between Germany’s and Canada’s; today, it lies between that of Uruguay and Taiwan, two emerging markets.
In our index for social instability, the United States now ranks between Malaysia and Brazil.
GeoQuant’s data—derived from measures of risk, institutional stability, state capacity, and rule of law—suggests that U.S. legislators have become less bound by rules and less effective at making policy, while government agencies have become less capable of carrying those policies out. U.S. political parties are weaker and more fractious, while judges and prosecutors are all the more politicized. Rule by the leader’s decree (or, in developed-market speak, by executive order) is now more common. Checks and balances have weakened.
Meanwhile, U.S. society has changed as well. As we all know, a more diverse and urban country has also become more economically unequal. Education and health outcomes have deteriorated, especially in rural areas, where the American dream has become ever more elusive. In data terms, this translates to a marked increase in both social polarization and human development risks. In our index for social instability, the United States now ranks between Malaysia and Brazil.
These institutional and social trends have combined to undermine Americans’ faith in democratic institutions, including the electoral process. Much of today’s contentious debates about the legitimacy of the Electoral College, the U.S. Senate, and the two-party system reflect the fact that these institutions vastly overrepresent whiter and more Republican constituencies. Together with gerrymandered election districts, voter suppression, and an antiquated system for casting ballots and validating results, these factors undermine citizens’ options for political participation and facilitate minority rule. All this, too, is more familiar from developing countries than Western democracies.
To be sure, these trends are what brought Trump to power in 2016, and they will persist after he is gone from the White House. Even if Democratic challenger Joe Biden wins easily and U.S. politics begins to look more like that of a developed market again, the country’s darker currents won’t subside completely. A new Democratic president would face tremendous pressure to play hardball with his former Republican colleagues in Congress, while large parts of the Republican Party will continue to be motivated by the ethnonationalism that has become the party’s hallmark under Trump. In other words, no matter what happens in November, the world’s oldest democracy may well continue to act as its newest emerging market.


Orban’s Macbeth

BUDAPEST , Hungary—If Attila Vidnyanszky were a character in a play , he would have fit well into the fourth act of Shakespeare ’ s Macbeth .
This is when the king , after years of bloody rule , learns from a group of witches about his impending fall .
The prophecy is so vague , though , that Macbeth doesn ’ t know when and how his demise will come .
And that makes him even more paranoid .
That is , at least , how Judit Csaki , a Hungarian theater critic , sees Vidnyanszky , who in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ close ties to Viktor Orban , Hungary ’ s nationalistic prime minister .
Vidnyanszky holds several prestigious positions in the Hungarian theatrical world , including the head of National Theater and Hungarian Theater Society .
He got some of those posts after Fidesz , Orban ’ s party , took power in 2010 .
And in early August , he added another : chairman of the new board of the Budapest-based University of Theater and Film Arts ( SZFE ) , Hungary ’ s oldest and most prestigious university of arts .
In @ @ @ @ @ @ @ who feared that Vidnyanszky would force the university to promote Orban ’ s nationalistic agenda took over the school ’ s main headquarters in central Budapest .
A month later , they blockaded another SZFE building , two streets away .
The school ’ s employees launched an ongoing strike .
Artists all over the world , including established writers and Oscar-winning actors , declared their support for the protesters .
And among the locals who backed the students was Vidnyanszky ’ s own actor son .
All the previous university transitions went @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s surprise , SZFE students pushed back .
That ’ s why Csaki hopes that Vidnyanszky is Macbeth before the fall , pushed to the edge by his own tenacity .
Most recently , he nominated , apparently without consultation , two new deputy rectors and replaced the sitting SZFE chancellor with the former chief of staff of Orban ’ s defense minister—moves the university community interpreted as attempts to escalate the conflict .
“ He has against himself local and foreign artistic circles .
If things go too far , Orban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and has no interest in art , will sacrifice him without hesitation .
After all , Fidesz will not bring the police to the university , ” Csaki said .
Vidnyanszky , the critic concluded , “ sold his soul to politics and now is paying the price.
” She met Vidnyanszky nine years ago when , despite not having an academic title , he expressed his desire to become the head of the theater institute at the University of Kaposvar in southern Hungary .
That would have made him the superior to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a theater department at that time and was competing for the same post .
Eventually , about a year after he did take charge of the institute in 2011 , Vidnyanszky fired Csaki during a reorganization .
In 2015 , she won a lawsuit for wrongful dismissal .
Critics say that this recipe has led to a dramatic drop in viewership for the National Theater .
The weekly Hungarian magazine HVG reported that in 2018 , despite state subsidies worth over $ 6 million , only half of the tickets had been sold @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and the season ended with a loss of about $ 500,000 .
Vidnyanszky replied that the unsold seats had , in fact , been free tickets distributed to those who couldn ’ t afford them .
Especially during the recent protests , Vidnyanszky has hewed close to Fidesz talking points .
He called the protesters “ Lenin boys , ” compared them to radical Hungarian communists from the interwar period , and accused them of being manipulated and accepting aid from international organizations .
“ He seemed offended .
As if we @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mihaly Csernai , a 23-year-old student and the head of the SZFE student government , recalled after meeting with Vidnyanszky .
Indeed , Vidnyanszky has a long history of feeling left out .
Born in a family of teachers in Berehove—or Beregszasz , as this small town in the Ukrainian Transcarpathia region is known in Hungary—he was a wrestler and a boxer in his youth .
He had wanted to study at SZFE , but after he reportedly missed his audition , he learned his artistic craft in Kyiv instead .
In more @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of being harassed by the Budapest theatrical community because of his Transcarpathian origins and his innovative vision .
To the later point , Arpad Schilling , a director and one of Vidnyanszky ’ s most ardent critics , has admitted that his foe had “ added something new and interesting to Hungarian theater , which is based on words and psychological truths.
” Schilling continued , “ from the East he brought mysticism , lyricism , poetry.
” Yet all that was not enough for Vidnyanszky to feel accepted in the capital city @ @ @ @ @ @ @ years leading a theater in Berehove in often difficult conditions , he applied to be artistic director at the Budapest-based National Theater .
But he was turned down due , as he saw it , to a conspiracy between the culture ministry and local artistic circles , which he has referred to as a “ theater mafia.
” He also complained that he was not allowed to teach at SZFE , an accusation that SZFE leadership denied .
“ He was invited to do a course but was too busy to attend , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Laszlo Upor , a former deputy rector at SZFE , said in an interview .
Gabor Nemeth , a screenwriter and a lecturer at SZFE , thinks Fidesz took advantage of Vidnyanszky ’ s frustration .
“ His private war against part of the theater community became an element of the system , ” Nemeth said , adding that plays directed by Vidnyanszky were actually staged in Budapest in the 2000s and that he was part of the mainstream .
After all , he was awarded with others the Jaszai Mari Prize , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in 2002 , as well as the Silver Cross of Merit of the Republic of Hungary in 2005 .
Vidnyanszky ’ s apparent sense of alienation seems to have been common among future Fidesz figures .
When the party won local elections in 2006 , it started appointing friendly figures as theater directors across the country .
Vidnyanszky , for his part , became artistic director of a theatre in the Fidesz-ruled city of Debrecen in eastern Hungary that year .
In his time , he “ transformed it from a provincial theatre @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Gábor Turi , former deputy major of Debrecen who employed Vidnyánszky , said .
“ He has never had political ambitions .
He has remained first and foremost an artist , whose mission is to make Hungarian theatre more open to conservative values.
” In 2008 , while Vidnyánszky was still artistic director in Debrecen , he founded the Hungarian Theater Society , a representative body , where many of those close to Fidesz found a home .
And then , in 2010 , the party saw nationwide electoral triumph .
In the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ changes , including rewriting Hungary ’ s constitution in 2011 , overseeing an ongoing overhaul of the country ’ s judiciary , and taking control of public media outlets and many private ones .
In 2018 , after winning a two-thirds majority in the parliament for the third time , Orban said in his annual speech in Baile Tusnad , Romania , that “ we must embed the political system in a cultural era.
” And so , last year Fidesz changed the way theaters receive state funding and also pushed its nationalist @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t think Fidesz tells artists what they should do theatrical plays about , ” said Ferenc Czinki , a writer .
“ But , the atmosphere has been created that the artists themselves start to wonder what will satisfy the leaders and what not.
” For former SZFE staff member Upor , Vidnyanszky , whom he sees as central in Fidesz ’ s attempts to spread its nationalistic view throughout Hungary , is a tragic figure .
The two met some 30 years ago in Zalaegerszeg doing a small play .
At @ @ @ @ @ @ @ charming boy and an inventive creator.
” Now , he has “ too much power and vanity , ” Upor added .
“ If he stayed in the theater , he would have gained—due to his talent—a large group of devoted students , followers , and colleagues .
Now , he provokes emotions not because of achievements , but political involvement.
” Vidnyanszky has never paid much mind to such critiques .
His opponents say his recent moves to place loyalists in the SZFE leadership suggest that he is determined enough to maintain @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
In many ways , he has nothing to lose .
“ He went too far [ into politics ] and will not go back to doing a serious theater , ” Czinki said .
According to him , the talented and powerful Vidnyanszky , locked in a showdown with a large portion of the theatrical community—even his own son—could be a good character for a play .
“ But who would write it ?
Our theatrical community is too divided.
” Attila Vidnyanszky did not respond to a request for an interview @

BUDAPEST, Hungary—If Attila Vidnyanszky were a character in a play, he would have fit well into the fourth act of Shakespeare’s Macbeth.
This is when the king, after years of bloody rule, learns from a group of witches about his impending fall. The prophecy is so vague, though, that Macbeth doesn’t know when and how his demise will come. And that makes him even more paranoid.
That is, at least, how Judit Csaki, a Hungarian theater critic, sees Vidnyanszky, who in real life is a 56-year-old director with close ties to Viktor Orban, Hungary’s nationalistic prime minister. Vidnyanszky holds several prestigious positions in the Hungarian theatrical world, including the head of National Theater and Hungarian Theater Society. He got some of those posts after Fidesz, Orban’s party, took power in 2010. And in early August, he added another: chairman of the new board of the Budapest-based University of Theater and Film Arts (SZFE), Hungary’s oldest and most prestigious university of arts.
In late August, nearly 100 SZFE students who feared that Vidnyanszky would force the university to promote Orban’s nationalistic agenda took over the school’s main headquarters in central Budapest. A month later, they blockaded another SZFE building, two streets away. The school’s employees launched an ongoing strike. Artists all over the world, including established writers and Oscar-winning actors, declared their support for the protesters. And among the locals who backed the students was Vidnyanszky’s own actor son.
Vidnyanszky’s is not the first university appointment to rankle during Orban’s time in office. In fact, by transferring ownership of state-run universities to private foundations, many with Fidesz-related figures on the board, Orban’s party has in recent months virtually seized control of six schools. It maintains that its goal was to eliminate state influence and modernize outdated teaching programs.
All the previous university transitions went smoothly. But much to the government’s surprise, SZFE students pushed back. That’s why Csaki hopes that Vidnyanszky is Macbeth before the fall, pushed to the edge by his own tenacity. Most recently, he nominated, apparently without consultation, two new deputy rectors and replaced the sitting SZFE chancellor with the former chief of staff of Orban’s defense minister—moves the university community interpreted as attempts to escalate the conflict.
“He has against himself local and foreign artistic circles. If things go too far, Orban, who is dealing with the pandemic and has no interest in art, will sacrifice him without hesitation. After all, Fidesz will not bring the police to the university,” Csaki said. Vidnyanszky, the critic concluded, “sold his soul to politics and now is paying the price.”
She met Vidnyanszky nine years ago when, despite not having an academic title, he expressed his desire to become the head of the theater institute at the University of Kaposvar in southern Hungary. That would have made him the superior to Csaki, who was the head of a theater department at that time and was competing for the same post. Eventually, about a year after he did take charge of the institute in 2011, Vidnyanszky fired Csaki during a reorganization. In 2015, she won a lawsuit for wrongful dismissal.
Years of heavy-handed influence over the theatrical world won Vidnyanszky a reputation as a “pope,” “messiah,” “demon,” and “titan,” as opponents and supporters alternatively call him. He’s particularly admired in Christian and conservative circles, whose members, he argues, should get the floor after years of liberal domination. In an interview with the ATV television channel, he suggested SZFE should also focus more on “the nation, the homeland, Christianity.”
Critics say that this recipe has led to a dramatic drop in viewership for the National Theater. The weekly Hungarian magazine HVG reported that in 2018, despite state subsidies worth over $6 million, only half of the tickets had been sold at the theater’s main stage, and the season ended with a loss of about $500,000. Vidnyanszky replied that the unsold seats had, in fact, been free tickets distributed to those who couldn’t afford them.
Especially during the recent protests, Vidnyanszky has hewed close to Fidesz talking points. He called the protesters “Lenin boys,” compared them to radical Hungarian communists from the interwar period, and accused them of being manipulated and accepting aid from international organizations. “He seemed offended. As if we protest just to spite him,” Mihaly Csernai, a 23-year-old student and the head of the SZFE student government, recalled after meeting with Vidnyanszky.
Indeed, Vidnyanszky has a long history of feeling left out. Born in a family of teachers in Berehove—or Beregszasz, as this small town in the Ukrainian Transcarpathia region is known in Hungary—he was a wrestler and a boxer in his youth. He had wanted to study at SZFE, but after he reportedly missed his audition, he learned his artistic craft in Kyiv instead.
In more recent years, Vidnyanszky has often complained of being harassed by the Budapest theatrical community because of his Transcarpathian origins and his innovative vision. To the later point, Arpad Schilling, a director and one of Vidnyanszky’s most ardent critics, has admitted that his foe had “added something new and interesting to Hungarian theater, which is based on words and psychological truths.” Schilling continued, “from the East he brought mysticism, lyricism, poetry.”
Yet all that was not enough for Vidnyanszky to feel accepted in the capital city. In 2002, after several well-received years leading a theater in Berehove in often difficult conditions, he applied to be artistic director at the Budapest-based National Theater. But he was turned down due, as he saw it, to a conspiracy between the culture ministry and local artistic circles, which he has referred to as a “theater mafia.” He also complained that he was not allowed to teach at SZFE, an accusation that SZFE leadership denied. “He was invited to do a course but was too busy to attend, and the work remained unfinished,” Laszlo Upor, a former deputy rector at SZFE, said in an interview.
Gabor Nemeth, a screenwriter and a lecturer at SZFE, thinks Fidesz took advantage of Vidnyanszky’s frustration. “His private war against part of the theater community became an element of the system,” Nemeth said, adding that plays directed by Vidnyanszky were actually staged in Budapest in the 2000s and that he was part of the mainstream. After all, he was awarded with others the Jaszai Mari Prize, the highest theatrical prize in Hungary, in 2002, as well as the Silver Cross of Merit of the Republic of Hungary in 2005.
Vidnyanszky’s apparent sense of alienation seems to have been common among future Fidesz figures. When the party won local elections in 2006, it started appointing friendly figures as theater directors across the country. Vidnyanszky, for his part, became artistic director of a theatre in the Fidesz-ruled city of Debrecen in eastern Hungary that year. In his time, he “transformed it from a provincial theatre into internationally recognized cultural institution,” Gábor Turi, former deputy major of Debrecen who employed Vidnyánszky, said. “He has never had political ambitions. He has remained first and foremost an artist, whose mission is to make Hungarian theatre more open to conservative values.” In 2008, while Vidnyánszky was still artistic director in Debrecen, he founded the Hungarian Theater Society, a representative body, where many of those close to Fidesz found a home. And then, in 2010, the party saw nationwide electoral triumph. In the following years, the party introduced several changes, including rewriting Hungary’s constitution in 2011, overseeing an ongoing overhaul of the country’s judiciary, and taking control of public media outlets and many private ones. In 2018, after winning a two-thirds majority in the parliament for the third time, Orban said in his annual speech in Baile Tusnad, Romania, that “we must embed the political system in a cultural era.”
And so, last year Fidesz changed the way theaters receive state funding and also pushed its nationalist agenda into academia. “I don’t think Fidesz tells artists what they should do theatrical plays about,” said Ferenc Czinki, a writer. “But, the atmosphere has been created that the artists themselves start to wonder what will satisfy the leaders and what not.”
For former SZFE staff member Upor, Vidnyanszky, whom he sees as central in Fidesz’s attempts to spread its nationalistic view throughout Hungary, is a tragic figure. The two met some 30 years ago in Zalaegerszeg doing a small play. At that time, Vidnyanszky “was a charming boy and an inventive creator.” Now, he has “too much power and vanity,” Upor added. “If he stayed in the theater, he would have gained—due to his talent—a large group of devoted students, followers, and colleagues. Now, he provokes emotions not because of achievements, but political involvement.”
Vidnyanszky has never paid much mind to such critiques. His opponents say his recent moves to place loyalists in the SZFE leadership suggest that he is determined enough to maintain control over the school at all costs. In many ways, he has nothing to lose. “He went too far [into politics] and will not go back to doing a serious theater,” Czinki said. According to him, the talented and powerful Vidnyanszky, locked in a showdown with a large portion of the theatrical community—even his own son—could be a good character for a play. “But who would write it? Our theatrical community is too divided.”
Attila Vidnyanszky did not respond to a request for an interview.


foreignpolicy--2020-10-13--Arctic Competition – Part One

Arctic Competition – Part One

Rapidly receding sea ice is enabling access to a range of highly valuable resources across the Artic .
In addition to energy reserves , critical minerals , and fisheries , newly opened shipping routes across the Arctic could potentially help to re-route global trade and enable high-speed Internet connectivity between Europe and Asia .
The ability to exploit newly available Arctic resources is drawing increasing interest from both commercial and national actors and is enticing nations , such as China and Japan , to pour both political and financial capital into the region .
When oil prices peaked in 2008 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ secure oil resources in the Arctic was inevitable .
However , due to a rapid fall in global oil demand and the high cost of oil extraction in the Arctic , development failed to materialize .
Instead , the dynamics of resource competition in the Arctic have shifted toward securing critical minerals , exploiting natural gas reserves , and asserting territorial control over recently opened shipping routes along the Arctic coast .
Additionally , the entrance of Asian and European Nations into Arctic affairs has dramatically shifted regional geopolitical dynamics .
The admittance @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Korea , India , and Singapore—as Observer states to the Arctic Council in 2013 significantly expanded the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic .
As more national interests converge there , new commercial alliances are being forged .
China now looks to Russia ’ s Arctic energy resources as a means to diversify its energy supply , while European nations are eager to partner with Asian nations to develop high-speed Internet and shipping along the Northern Sea Route .
With new players and commercial relationships emerging in the Arctic , there has been an @ @ @ @ @ @ @ commercial ties between Asian and European nations , and deepening levels of Chinese investment across the region—coupled with Russia ’ s emerging primacy—are generating pushback from the U.S .
In May of 2019 , U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly called out Chinese and Russian activities in the Arctic as threats to U.S. national interests and security .
Moreover , the wider uncoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies are making the Arctic an arena of great power competition .
Growing tensions over control of critical minerals that are essential to modern @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Chinese entrenchment across the Arctic are also putting pressure on the region ’ s governance framework .
Consisting of an amalgamation of governance organizations and treaties , the region ’ s governance structures are not designed to contain or mitigate potential great power conflicts .
An escalation between the U.S. and China or Russia would divide the region and significantly harm cooperative efforts toward environmental preservation and mitigation of climate change .
Part I of FP Analytics ’ Arctic Competition Power Map breaks down key emerging trends across the Arctic by : • @ @ @ @ @ @ @ collaborating and competing for Arctic access and influence ; • Projecting the key points of geopolitical tension and the relative power positions of the actors involved ; and , • Outlining the legal landscape and governance structures in place to mitigate conflict across the region .
FP Analytics ’ Arctic Competition Power Map is a powerful tool for businesses and others seeking to understand how emerging great power competition across the Artic will help shape and influence the wider geopolitical landscape .
Part II will map out Russian and NATO military activities in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security risks .

Executive Summary
Rapidly receding sea ice is enabling access to a range of highly valuable resources across the Arctic. In addition to energy reserves, critical minerals, and fisheries, newly opened shipping routes across the Arctic could potentially help to re-route global trade and enable high-speed Internet connectivity between Europe and Asia. The ability to exploit newly available Arctic resources is drawing increasing interest from both commercial and national actors and is enticing nations, such as China and Japan, to pour both political and financial capital into the region.
When oil prices peaked in 2008, it appeared that a race to secure oil resources in the Arctic was inevitable. However, due to a rapid fall in global oil demand and the high cost of oil extraction in the Arctic, development failed to materialize. Instead, the dynamics of resource competition in the Arctic have shifted toward securing critical minerals, exploiting natural gas reserves, and asserting territorial control over recently opened shipping routes along the Arctic coast. Additionally, the entrance of Asian and European Nations into Arctic affairs has dramatically shifted regional geopolitical dynamics.
The admittance of Asian countries—China, Japan, South Korea, India, and Singapore—as Observer states to the Arctic Council in 2013 significantly expanded the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic. As more national interests converge there, new commercial alliances are being forged. China now looks to Russia’s Arctic energy resources as a means to diversify its energy supply, while European nations are eager to partner with Asian nations to develop high-speed Internet and shipping along the Northern Sea Route.
With new players and commercial relationships emerging in the Arctic, there has been an attendant increase in international tensions. Strengthening commercial ties between Asian and European nations, and deepening levels of Chinese investment across the region—coupled with Russia’s emerging primacy—are generating pushback from the U.S. In May of 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly called out Chinese and Russian activities in the Arctic as threats to U.S. national interests and security. Moreover, the wider uncoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies are making the Arctic an arena of great power competition.
Growing tensions over control of critical minerals that are essential to modern technologies, disputed shipping routes, and Chinese entrenchment across the Arctic are also putting pressure on the region’s governance framework. Consisting of an amalgamation of governance organizations and treaties, the region’s governance structures are not designed to contain or mitigate potential great power conflicts. An escalation between the U.S. and China or Russia would divide the region and significantly harm cooperative efforts toward environmental preservation and mitigation of climate change.
Part I of FP Analytics’ Arctic Competition Power Map breaks down key emerging trends across the Arctic by:
Mapping access and control of key resource bases;
Breaking down the public- and private-sector actors collaborating and competing for Arctic access and influence;
Projecting the key points of geopolitical tension and the relative power positions of the actors involved; and,
Outlining the legal landscape and governance structures in place to mitigate conflict across the region.
FP Analytics’ Arctic Competition Power Map is a powerful tool for businesses and others seeking to understand how emerging great power competition across the Arctic will help shape and influence the wider geopolitical landscape. Part II will map out Russian and NATO military activities in the Arctic and will explore materializing national security risks.