foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--State Department Cancels Hill Briefings as Tensions Escalate Between Pompeo and Lawmakers

State Department Cancels Hill Briefings as Tensions Escalate Between Pompeo and Lawmakers The State Department has canceled briefings with congressional oversight staff on counterterrorism issues and the closure of a U.S. diplomatic outpost in China amid deteriorating relations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee , according to congressional aides and officials familiar with the matter .
The House Foreign Affairs Committee had worked with the State Department to schedule briefings this week with diplomats on the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu , China , as tensions between Washington and Beijing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ brief Congressional staff the recent takeover of a key port city in Mozambique near huge deposits of natural gas by a militant group linked to the Islamic State , as well as counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region of West Africa .
But on Monday evening , the State Department abruptly informed the committee that the previously scheduled briefings were off , in part citing an Aug. 7 letter that Pompeo sent to the committee ’ s chairman , Rep. Eliot Engel , about the committee ’ s ongoing investigation into the firing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ watchdog .
In the letter , Pompeo rebuked Engel for saying that the State Department was “ stonewalling ” an investigation into President Donald Trump ’ s firing of Steve Linick , the State Department inspector general , in May .
Pompeo referred to Engel ’ s assertions as “ outrageous ” and said the committee rebuffed efforts by the State Department to accommodate its investigation .
Congressional aides said it would be inappropriate to halt staff-level briefings on issues unrelated to any dispute between the department and committee over the inspector general @ @ @ @ @ @ @ petty , even for this State Department , that they ’ re pulling down these staff briefings on legitimate security matters because they don ’ t like that the Foreign Affairs Committee is conducting oversight , ” said one Democratic congressional aide .
In an email response , a State Department spokesperson defended halting staff-level briefings , citing committee treatment of State Department officials who have testified in the past .
“ The House Foreign Affairs Committee ’ s unwillingness to engage in the Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process has compelled multiple career and non-career @ @ @ @ @ @ @ great expense , ” the spokesperson said .
“ In addition , at least one has been accused of lying before Congress without being given the opportunity to clear his name in an open hearing .
The Committee ’ s treatment of officials is not one that is limited to one ‘ issue area , ’ so the Secretary ’ s direction with respect to engagements with the Committee is not limited by issue area.
” “ If the Chairman and his staff are unwilling to accept the testimony of Department officials , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ additional Department officials to brief his staff on any topic if their testimony won ’ t be accepted ?
” the spokesperson added .
“ The State Department doesn ’ t get to dictate how Congress conducts oversight .
Their half-truths and falsehoods are a distraction .
The record is clear that they ’ ve tried to thwart this committee ’ s oversight efforts at nearly every turn , ” a Democratic committee aide said in response .
The “ briefings they cancelled have nothing to do with the committee ’ s oversight @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with issues that bear on our national security , ” the aide added .
China closed the U.S. consulate in Chengdu late last month after the Trump administration shuttered the Chinese consulate in Houston , which U.S. officials alleged may have been used to conduct industrial espionage against research universities and hospitals looking for a vaccine for the novel coronavirus .
The briefings also would have given experts who staff the committee a chance to discuss with administration officials counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel as reports of a potential coup in Mali emerge @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , located near natural gas reserves worth more than $ 60 billion , by an Islamic State-linked group last week .
The Defense Department told Foreign Policy it is “ aware of and concerned by ” the threat in Mozambique .
The Pentagon is conducting a review of its operations in Africa that could limit the U.S. footprint on the continent in the future .
Government agencies and the congressional committees that oversee them routinely organize closed-door briefings between agency officials and committee staff .
Democratic lawmakers have accused Pompeo ’ s State @ @ @ @ @ @ @ matters , including the Democratic-led impeachment investigation earlier this year .
Trump was acquitted of charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress on mostly partisan lines in February .
The State Department spokesperson said that in the last 12 months , the department has supplied over 500 reports to Congress , responded to over 2,000 written questions , provided over 2,000 briefings to members , responded to over 1,200 congressional letters , and supported nearly 600 congressional trips .
At the time of his ouster , Linick , the State Department @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Pompeo expedited weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections and allegations that Pompeo was misusing State Department resources .
Pompeo has flatly rejected these allegations and said he was not aware of them at the time of Linick ’ s firing .
Linick was replaced in an acting capacity by Stephen Akard , a political appointee at the State Department who was a close ally of Vice President Mike Pence .
Earlier this month , Akard resigned from the post—less than three months into the job .
Pompeo sent his Aug. 7 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Affairs Committee chairman subpoenaed four top State Department aides to testify over Linick ’ s firing .
“ The Administration continues to cover up the real reasons for Mr. Linick ’ s firing by stonewalling the Committees ’ investigation and refusing to engage in good faith , ” Engel said in a joint statement announcing the subpoenas , alongside House Oversight Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney and Sen. Bob Menendez , the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee .
“ That stonewalling has made today ’ s subpoenas necessary.
” Pompeo in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ House Foreign Affairs Committee had rejected State Department offers to supply testimony and information to accommodate their investigation .
“ [ L ] et me express how outrageous it is for you to suggest that the Department is ‘ stonewalling ’ any investigation into the President ’ s replacing of Steve Linick , ” Pompeo wrote in the letter .
“ For the past three months , you have refused every offer and attempt by the Department to reach a mutual agreeable accommodation to provide you with the information you purport to seek.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ to prioritize hearing and briefing requests for other Committees and Members who continue to adhere to good-faith efforts of accommodation and who treat all Department employees with the professionalism and respect they deserve , ” he wrote .
Engel first invited senior State Department officials to testify on Linick ’ s firing in May .
In July , the committee agreed to a State Department request to delay a hearing with Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao on the matter after the inspector general filed its report on the arms sales .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ committee .
Linick ’ s ouster and the controversy over Pompeo ’ s move to expedite arms sales to Middle Eastern partners exacerbated already fraught relations between the State Department and congressional overseers .
In a final report released earlier this month , the State Department ’ s Office of Inspector General ruled that the agency used proper procedures to issue an emergency declaration that allowed the Trump administration to route $ 8.1 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , and Jordan over congressional objections , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ humanitarian impact of the move .
After Politico published an unredacted version of the report , one Democratic congressman , Rep. Andy Levin , accused the State Department ’ s top political-military affairs official , R. Clarke Cooper , of lying about whether an emergency actually necessitated the sale .
The unredacted version showed that the State Department had begun planning an emergency declaration weeks earlier .
“ The timeline in the unclassified , unredacted report makes clear that Secretary Pompeo wasn ’ t reacting to an emergency in May 2019 , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was months in the making , ” wrote Engel and Levin in a statement released on Aug. 14 .
“ If this factually inaccurate statement was made intentionally , it was a lie to Congress , and lying to Congress is a federal crime.
” Update , Aug. 18 , 2020 : This article was updated with response from a State Department spokesperson and Democratic aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee .

The State Department has canceled briefings with congressional oversight staff on counterterrorism issues and the closure of a U.S. diplomatic outpost in China amid deteriorating relations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, according to congressional aides and officials familiar with the matter.
The State Department has canceled briefings with congressional oversight staff on counterterrorism issues and the closure of a U.S. diplomatic outpost in China amid deteriorating relations between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, according to congressional aides and officials familiar with the matter.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee had worked with the State Department to schedule briefings this week with diplomats on the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, China, as tensions between Washington and Beijing escalate. Diplomats were also set to brief Congressional staff the recent takeover of a key port city in Mozambique near huge deposits of natural gas by a militant group linked to the Islamic State, as well as counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region of West Africa.
But on Monday evening, the State Department abruptly informed the committee that the previously scheduled briefings were off, in part citing an Aug. 7 letter that Pompeo sent to the committee’s chairman, Rep. Eliot Engel, about the committee’s ongoing investigation into the firing of the State Department’s top watchdog.
In the letter, Pompeo rebuked Engel for saying that the State Department was “stonewalling” an investigation into President Donald Trump’s firing of Steve Linick, the State Department inspector general, in May. Pompeo referred to Engel’s assertions as “outrageous” and said the committee rebuffed efforts by the State Department to accommodate its investigation.
Congressional aides said it would be inappropriate to halt staff-level briefings on issues unrelated to any dispute between the department and committee over the inspector general investigation. “It’s incredibly petty, even for this State Department, that they’re pulling down these staff briefings on legitimate security matters because they don’t like that the Foreign Affairs Committee is conducting oversight,” said one Democratic congressional aide.
In an email response, a State Department spokesperson defended halting staff-level briefings, citing committee treatment of State Department officials who have testified in the past. “The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s unwillingness to engage in the Constitutionally-mandated accommodation process has compelled multiple career and non-career Department officials to seek personal counsel at great expense,” the spokesperson said. “In addition, at least one has been accused of lying before Congress without being given the opportunity to clear his name in an open hearing. The Committee’s treatment of officials is not one that is limited to one ‘issue area,’ so the Secretary’s direction with respect to engagements with the Committee is not limited by issue area.”
“If the Chairman and his staff are unwilling to accept the testimony of Department officials, what is the point of sending up additional Department officials to brief his staff on any topic if their testimony won’t be accepted?” the spokesperson added.
“The State Department doesn’t get to dictate how Congress conducts oversight. Their half-truths and falsehoods are a distraction. The record is clear that they’ve tried to thwart this committee’s oversight efforts at nearly every turn,” a Democratic committee aide said in response. The “briefings they cancelled have nothing to do with the committee’s oversight efforts. They’re playing games with issues that bear on our national security,” the aide added.
China closed the U.S. consulate in Chengdu late last month after the Trump administration shuttered the Chinese consulate in Houston, which U.S. officials alleged may have been used to conduct industrial espionage against research universities and hospitals looking for a vaccine for the novel coronavirus. The briefings also would have given experts who staff the committee a chance to discuss with administration officials counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel as reports of a potential coup in Mali emerge and the takeover of a Mozambique port, located near natural gas reserves worth more than $60 billion, by an Islamic State-linked group last week. The Defense Department told Foreign Policy it is “aware of and concerned by” the threat in Mozambique. The Pentagon is conducting a review of its operations in Africa that could limit the U.S. footprint on the continent in the future.
Government agencies and the congressional committees that oversee them routinely organize closed-door briefings between agency officials and committee staff.
Democratic lawmakers have accused Pompeo’s State Department of refusing to cooperate on other matters, including the Democratic-led impeachment investigation earlier this year. Trump was acquitted of charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress on mostly partisan lines in February.
The State Department spokesperson said that in the last 12 months, the department has supplied over 500 reports to Congress, responded to over 2,000 written questions, provided over 2,000 briefings to members, responded to over 1,200 congressional letters, and supported nearly 600 congressional trips.
At the time of his ouster, Linick, the State Department inspector general, was investigating allegations that Pompeo expedited weapons sales to Saudi Arabia over congressional objections and allegations that Pompeo was misusing State Department resources. Pompeo has flatly rejected these allegations and said he was not aware of them at the time of Linick’s firing. Linick was replaced in an acting capacity by Stephen Akard, a political appointee at the State Department who was a close ally of Vice President Mike Pence. Earlier this month, Akard resigned from the post—less than three months into the job.
Pompeo sent his Aug. 7 letter to Engel days after the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman subpoenaed four top State Department aides to testify over Linick’s firing. “The Administration continues to cover up the real reasons for Mr. Linick’s firing by stonewalling the Committees’ investigation and refusing to engage in good faith,” Engel said in a joint statement announcing the subpoenas, alongside House Oversight Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney and Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. “That stonewalling has made today’s subpoenas necessary.”
Pompeo in his letter responding to Engel said the House Foreign Affairs Committee had rejected State Department offers to supply testimony and information to accommodate their investigation. “[L]et me express how outrageous it is for you to suggest that the Department is ‘stonewalling’ any investigation into the President’s replacing of Steve Linick,” Pompeo wrote in the letter. “For the past three months, you have refused every offer and attempt by the Department to reach a mutual agreeable accommodation to provide you with the information you purport to seek.”
“I have directed Department officials to prioritize hearing and briefing requests for other Committees and Members who continue to adhere to good-faith efforts of accommodation and who treat all Department employees with the professionalism and respect they deserve,” he wrote.
Engel first invited senior State Department officials to testify on Linick’s firing in May. In July, the committee agreed to a State Department request to delay a hearing with Undersecretary of State for Management Brian Bulatao on the matter after the inspector general filed its report on the arms sales. Bulatao has yet to appear before the committee.
Linick’s ouster and the controversy over Pompeo’s move to expedite arms sales to Middle Eastern partners exacerbated already fraught relations between the State Department and congressional overseers.
In a final report released earlier this month, the State Department’s Office of Inspector General ruled that the agency used proper procedures to issue an emergency declaration that allowed the Trump administration to route $8.1 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan over congressional objections, but the department did not properly assess the humanitarian impact of the move.
After Politico published an unredacted version of the report, one Democratic congressman, Rep. Andy Levin, accused the State Department’s top political-military affairs official, R. Clarke Cooper, of lying about whether an emergency actually necessitated the sale. The unredacted version showed that the State Department had begun planning an emergency declaration weeks earlier.
“The timeline in the unclassified, unredacted report makes clear that Secretary Pompeo wasn’t reacting to an emergency in May 2019, but rather was carrying out a plan that was months in the making,” wrote Engel and Levin in a statement released on Aug. 14. “If this factually inaccurate statement was made intentionally, it was a lie to Congress, and lying to Congress is a federal crime.”
Update, Aug. 18, 2020: This article was updated with response from a State Department spokesperson and Democratic aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Latin America Won’t Give In to Trump Without a Fight

Latin America Won ’ t Give In to Trump Without a Fight Usually a rather obscure diplomatic process , the upcoming election of the new president of the Inter-American Development Bank ( IDB ) is becoming anything but .
In recent days , several Latin American countries have come out in favor of postponing the vote , now scheduled for Sept. 12-13 , until March 2021 .
The move represents a direct rebuke of the U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s administration , which in June nominated Mauricio Claver-Carone , a hard-line advisor to the president on Latin American affairs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ next five years .
Like much of Trump ’ s Latin America policy , the nomination was perceived as an affront in the region .
And it became clear over the summer that it would not go unchallenged .
The first sign of trouble came when five former Latin American presidents ( all of whom had friendly relations with the United States while in office ) openly opposed Claver-Carone ’ s nomination , arguing that the IDB presidency should remain in Latin American hands , as it had since the bank ’ s @ @ @ @ @ @ @ reinforced by letters from a slew of former foreign ministers , linked with governments of varied political orientations , from Argentina to Brazil , Chile , Guatemala , and Peru .
Strong declarations from a wide array of influential Latin Americans joined the chorus .
Next , sitting governments began to join in the criticism .
To date , Argentina , Chile , Costa Rica , and Mexico have joined in insisting the vote be delayed .
Peru is expected to do so soon , and Canada and some European governments that have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ board as well , taking their cue from the shifting momentum in the region .
Other governments are reviewing their options .
What binds the diverse group is an interest in defending Latin American interests and autonomy against an overzealous White House and a desire to avoid regional polarization .
It remains unclear if the gambit will work , but the likelihood of postponement is increasing by the day .
And yet , by pushing forward with Claver-Carone ’ s candidacy , the Trump administration seems to have crossed several lines .
Claver-Carone @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Latin America policy at the National Security Council , would not only be the least experienced person to lead the IDB in its 60-year history ; he would also be the first U.S. citizen to do so .
The tradition of having a Latin American in that job is not mere ritual .
Rather , it is a way in which Republican and Democratic administrations alike have strengthened the IDB ’ s legitimacy and effectiveness .
The bank is based in Washington , an American has always held the executive vice presidency @ @ @ @ @ @ @ veto power due to the 30 percent of shares it directly controls .
Selecting a Latin American as president has been a way of respecting regional autonomy and giving other governments involved a sense of ownership in the institution .
Further , the White House , without any prior consultation , announced its intention to break this tradition in June , only a few months before the scheduled election of the new IDB president .
In doing so , it sidelined the several qualified Latin American candidates already in the race or about @ @ @ @ @ @ @ disclosure , one of the other candidates , Laura Chinchilla , is on leave as co-chair of the board of directors of the Inter-American Dialogue , where we are president and fellow . )
After Claver-Carone ’ s sudden entry , Brazil and Colombia quickly endorsed him , as did 15 other Latin American and Caribbean countries .
He has been campaigning for the job from his perch at the National Security Council , mixing U.S. policy announcements with statements about his future plans for the IDB .
Claver-Carone ’ s strong identification @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would harm the bank ’ s capacity to work with governments of different ideological tendencies .
His stint at the National Security Council has been almost exclusively devoted to reinstating sanctions on Cuba—an attempt to resume a decadeslong policy of punishment that failed to bring political change to the island—and applying the same tactics to dealing with the Venezuelan dictatorship , with similar results .
His narrow lens has distorted U.S. policy toward a highly complex and variegated region .
If anything , the candidate ’ s combative style and intimidation tactics evoke @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was taken seriously .
The doctrine dates from the 19th century and became largely synonymous with unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean .
The doctrine has been widely rejected and deemed obsolete throughout the region , but it has been revived by the Trump administration .
Defenders include former National Security Advisor John Bolton , who hired and worked closely with Claver-Carone and shared his Manichean “ you ’ re either with us or against us ” view of the region .
In particular , Claver-Carone seems intent on turning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that division and counter Chinese influence in the region .
Since the early 2000s , Beijing has vastly expanded its economic presence there through trade , investment , and multibillion-dollar loans for infrastructure development .
Under Trump , and in the context of worsening relations between the two major powers , Washington has stepped up pressure on Latin American countries , urging them to take sides and reduce ties with Chinese actors .
To be sure , deploying more resources to compete with Beijing is a reasonable U.S. objective , but efforts need @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s status as a key partner for many Latin American countries .
Using the IDB as an institution to fight China is unlikely to work and would go against the interests of many Latin American countries , which prefer to promote good relations with Washington while also maintaining vital economic ties with Beijing .
In fact , China became a contributing member of the IDB in 2009 and supports some of the institution ’ s programs .
Yet the most compelling rationale for postponement is simply practical and is related to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump ’ s relatively weak poll numbers and Democratic nominee Joe Biden ’ s rejection of Claver-Carone ’ s candidacy , it makes little sense to elect an IDB leader for a five-year term in September who is so closely linked to a U.S. administration that may no longer be in office come January .
Moreover , if Biden wins and Democrats take the Senate , a Claver-Carone presidency could jeopardize congressional approval of a capital increase , which is vital for the bank to meet exponentially expanding needs in the region .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ polarizing style he would likely bring to the IDB , at a press briefing on Aug. 11 , Claver-Carone lashed out against countries that are calling to delay the vote , accusing them of trying to subvert the process .
His attack generated a strong response from Chile ’ s conservative government , which favors a postponement but can hardly be accused of having anti-U.S. sentiments or left-wing tendencies .
Chilean Foreign Minister Andrés Allamand called Claver-Carone ’ s remarks “ aggressive ” and said “ they confirm that his election would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Latin America ’ s court .
It ’ s up to the region ’ s governments , and their partners in Europe and North America , to decide if , for the sake of averting a confrontation with the Trump administration , they are prepared to risk even deeper divisions among countries and possibly a weakened and more ideological IDB at such a critical moment .
Postponing the vote would require the approval of more than half of IDB member states .
Given still majoritarian support for Claver-Carone , this would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ countries to deny the meeting the necessary quorum , which would happen if countries with 25 percent of the bank ’ s shares miss the vote .
This last option , however , would be highly aggressive and should be avoided if possible .
Countries that favor a postponement , therefore , hope to gather more support until even proponents of Claver-Carone accept a delay to avoid more confrontation .
If the vote is postponed , the Latin American governments would then face the challenge and responsibility of coming up with a candidate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , who would be voted on by all member countries next March .
By then , it will be clear who will occupy the White House over the next four years .

Usually a rather obscure diplomatic process, the upcoming election of the new president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is becoming anything but. In recent days, several Latin American countries have come out in favor of postponing the vote, now scheduled for Sept. 12-13, until March 2021. The move represents a direct rebuke of the U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, which in June nominated Mauricio Claver-Carone, a hard-line advisor to the president on Latin American affairs, to lead the bank for the next five years.
Usually a rather obscure diplomatic process, the upcoming election of the new president of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is becoming anything but. In recent days, several Latin American countries have come out in favor of postponing the vote, now scheduled for Sept. 12-13, until March 2021. The move represents a direct rebuke of the U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, which in June nominated Mauricio Claver-Carone, a hard-line advisor to the president on Latin American affairs, to lead the bank for the next five years.
Like much of Trump’s Latin America policy, the nomination was perceived as an affront in the region. And it became clear over the summer that it would not go unchallenged. The first sign of trouble came when five former Latin American presidents (all of whom had friendly relations with the United States while in office) openly opposed Claver-Carone’s nomination, arguing that the IDB presidency should remain in Latin American hands, as it had since the bank’s founding in 1959. That message was reinforced by letters from a slew of former foreign ministers, linked with governments of varied political orientations, from Argentina to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. Strong declarations from a wide array of influential Latin Americans joined the chorus.
Next, sitting governments began to join in the criticism. To date, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico have joined in insisting the vote be delayed. Peru is expected to do so soon, and Canada and some European governments that have shares in the IDB may get on board as well, taking their cue from the shifting momentum in the region. Other governments are reviewing their options. What binds the diverse group is an interest in defending Latin American interests and autonomy against an overzealous White House and a desire to avoid regional polarization. It remains unclear if the gambit will work, but the likelihood of postponement is increasing by the day.
Although Claver-Carone still commands a majority of the region’s governments behind his candidacy, that is hardly the acclamation the Trump administration was expecting in June, when it made its surprise and unprecedented—the United States has never nominated an American for the post—announcement. In some ways, securing the IDB’s top job should not be difficult for the United States: Latin America is internally divided and economically battered, and most of the region’s governments are either relatively close to or deeply intimidated by Washington. Even nationalists such as Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador have acquiesced to Trump’s hard-line tactics and bullying, as demonstrated during his warm and friendly Washington visit last month.
And yet, by pushing forward with Claver-Carone’s candidacy, the Trump administration seems to have crossed several lines.
Claver-Carone, who’s now in charge of Latin America policy at the National Security Council, would not only be the least experienced person to lead the IDB in its 60-year history; he would also be the first U.S. citizen to do so. The tradition of having a Latin American in that job is not mere ritual. Rather, it is a way in which Republican and Democratic administrations alike have strengthened the IDB’s legitimacy and effectiveness. The bank is based in Washington, an American has always held the executive vice presidency, and the United States already holds veto power due to the 30 percent of shares it directly controls. Selecting a Latin American as president has been a way of respecting regional autonomy and giving other governments involved a sense of ownership in the institution.
Further, the White House, without any prior consultation, announced its intention to break this tradition in June, only a few months before the scheduled election of the new IDB president. In doing so, it sidelined the several qualified Latin American candidates already in the race or about to jump in. (For full disclosure, one of the other candidates, Laura Chinchilla, is on leave as co-chair of the board of directors of the Inter-American Dialogue, where we are president and fellow.) After Claver-Carone’s sudden entry, Brazil and Colombia quickly endorsed him, as did 15 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. He has been campaigning for the job from his perch at the National Security Council, mixing U.S. policy announcements with statements about his future plans for the IDB.
Claver-Carone’s strong identification with Trump’s Latin America policy would harm the bank’s capacity to work with governments of different ideological tendencies. His stint at the National Security Council has been almost exclusively devoted to reinstating sanctions on Cuba—an attempt to resume a decadeslong policy of punishment that failed to bring political change to the island—and applying the same tactics to dealing with the Venezuelan dictatorship, with similar results. His narrow lens has distorted U.S. policy toward a highly complex and variegated region.
If anything, the candidate’s combative style and intimidation tactics evoke a bygone era when the Monroe Doctrine was taken seriously. The doctrine dates from the 19th century and became largely synonymous with unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean. The doctrine has been widely rejected and deemed obsolete throughout the region, but it has been revived by the Trump administration. Defenders include former National Security Advisor John Bolton, who hired and worked closely with Claver-Carone and shared his Manichean “you’re either with us or against us” view of the region.
In particular, Claver-Carone seems intent on turning the bank into an instrument to reinforce that division and counter Chinese influence in the region. Since the early 2000s, Beijing has vastly expanded its economic presence there through trade, investment, and multibillion-dollar loans for infrastructure development. Under Trump, and in the context of worsening relations between the two major powers, Washington has stepped up pressure on Latin American countries, urging them to take sides and reduce ties with Chinese actors.
To be sure, deploying more resources to compete with Beijing is a reasonable U.S. objective, but efforts need to respect regional autonomy and recognize China’s status as a key partner for many Latin American countries. Using the IDB as an institution to fight China is unlikely to work and would go against the interests of many Latin American countries, which prefer to promote good relations with Washington while also maintaining vital economic ties with Beijing. In fact, China became a contributing member of the IDB in 2009 and supports some of the institution’s programs.
For the Trump administration, there seem to be only two options in dealing with multilateral institutions: withdraw (as in the case of the World Health Organization) or take them over. However, the IDB is a development bank where genuinely cooperative efforts on a range of topics—including climate change, transparency and accountability, gender, and digitalization—are designed and carried out. Countries that favor a postponement of the vote argue that the coronavirus pandemic, which has devastated the region and already set it back a decade or more, demands a serious discussion among all member governments about the bank’s role in addressing daunting development challenges and charting a productive path forward. In this line of thinking, deepening conflicts and divisions in the IDB would complicate its efforts to promote economic recovery, and the region would suffer as a result.
Yet the most compelling rationale for postponement is simply practical and is related to the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election. Given Trump’s relatively weak poll numbers and Democratic nominee Joe Biden’s rejection of Claver-Carone’s candidacy, it makes little sense to elect an IDB leader for a five-year term in September who is so closely linked to a U.S. administration that may no longer be in office come January. Moreover, if Biden wins and Democrats take the Senate, a Claver-Carone presidency could jeopardize congressional approval of a capital increase, which is vital for the bank to meet exponentially expanding needs in the region.
In a deeply worrying sign of the polarizing style he would likely bring to the IDB, at a press briefing on Aug. 11, Claver-Carone lashed out against countries that are calling to delay the vote, accusing them of trying to subvert the process. His attack generated a strong response from Chile’s conservative government, which favors a postponement but can hardly be accused of having anti-U.S. sentiments or left-wing tendencies. Chilean Foreign Minister Andrés Allamand called Claver-Carone’s remarks “aggressive” and said “they confirm that his election would be clearly inadequate.”
The ball is now in Latin America’s court. It’s up to the region’s governments, and their partners in Europe and North America, to decide if, for the sake of averting a confrontation with the Trump administration, they are prepared to risk even deeper divisions among countries and possibly a weakened and more ideological IDB at such a critical moment. Postponing the vote would require the approval of more than half of IDB member states. Given still majoritarian support for Claver-Carone, this would be difficult. An alternative would be for countries to deny the meeting the necessary quorum, which would happen if countries with 25 percent of the bank’s shares miss the vote. This last option, however, would be highly aggressive and should be avoided if possible. Countries that favor a postponement, therefore, hope to gather more support until even proponents of Claver-Carone accept a delay to avoid more confrontation.
If the vote is postponed, the Latin American governments would then face the challenge and responsibility of coming up with a candidate to assume the presidency of the IDB, who would be voted on by all member countries next March. By then, it will be clear who will occupy the White House over the next four years.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--Lukashenko Doesn’t Want to Be Putin’s Deputy Tsar

Lukashenko Doesn ’ t Want to Be Putin ’ s Deputy Tsar The uprising in Belarus is unprecedented , and it doesn ’ t just matter for the country itself .
The future of this small state will have serious global consequences , not least in the choices that Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to make .
No one anticipated such resounding success for the opposition and such failure for President Aleksandr Lukashenko in the presidential elections .
The exact results are not known , but polling places that have reported undistorted results recorded 60 to 90 percent of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Svetlana Tikhanovskaya , and no more than 17 percent for Lukashenko—more often around 10 percent .
If Lukashenko ’ s results were actually anywhere near the officially announced ones—more than 80 percent of the vote—his supporters would have taken to the streets to show that the elections were fair .
Instead , he was only able to gather several thousand people a week later , and they were reportedly bussed in by assignment from state enterprises throughout Belarus .
Some of them joined the protest marches after the official rally was over .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ standoff between Lukashenko ’ s supporters and his opponents .
There is only a standoff between Lukashenko and his remaining forces on the one hand and a society that wants change on the other .
When the preliminary results came in , Lukashenko had a choice .
Not so long ago he was a national leader , not an international criminal .
Lukashenko ’ s crimes of recent years—falsification of elections and repression of the opposition—were still in line with the usual behavior of authoritarian regimes .
Had he started negotiations , he @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , he chose a different path .
He announced absolutely unrealistic results and began to suppress protests by force .
Now there is no level of violence that he will stop at in an effort to maintain power .
At first glance , this seems like a winning strategy .
Unarmed citizens are going up against well-armed brutes acting with deliberate cruelty .
Sooner or later , once enough people are killed and maimed , once enough people are arrested and jailed , the protests should begin to die down .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Lukashenko is being met with open chants of “ Resign !
” at events .
The protests are only growing , strikes are beginning , and women are linking arms in solidarity .
Then there is the problem of loyalty among the siloviki , the military and special forces .
So far , there have been only occasional incidents of the siloviki refusing to follow orders ; for the most part , the special forces have remained loyal to top-down command structure .
But that ’ s only the case for now @ @ @ @ @ @ @ protesters have been officially recognized .
Yet Belarus is a small and relatively homogeneous country , with only two or three degrees of separation between a police officer and the protester he ’ s beating .
Once the casualties are high enough , police officers will refuse to follow orders or start sabotaging them .
What will the commanding officers do if the standoff continues ?
Lukashenko doesn ’ t have an ideology ; he is only fighting to keep a hold on power .
He will be obeyed while he remains in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ demonstrate his weakness .
Whatever happens over the next few days and weeks , Lukashenko will not survive in the long term without support from abroad .
He has no diamonds or oil to provide him with revenues that he could use to pay the security forces while ignoring the rest of the population .
Someone must supply him with the cash to sustain the infrastructure of his autocracy .
Technically , either China or Russia could do this .
But the Kremlin will not agree to the emergence of a Chinese protectorate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ have no strong interest in Belarus , although it issued statements of support for Lukashenko .
So , Russia will give Lukashenko money , but only the bare minimum needed .
The best scenario for the Kremlin is a weak Lukashenko who is in conflict with the people , isolated from the West , and fully dependent on Moscow .
That paves the way for the Kremlin ’ s long-awaited “ unification , ” i.e.
, absorption , of Belarus .
But Lukashenko understands this as well ; he wants to be a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Belarus , so he is willing to escalate the situation , hoping to win the conflict .
Judging from the first few days , a quick victory is not in the cards .
The protests continue ; the banishment from Belarus of Tikhanovskaya—who had clearly won the election—is unlikely to bring success .
( It appears that the authorities forced her to call for an end to the protests and leave the country by leveraging the lives of her children and her husband , who is in prison . )
Tikhanovskaya put it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t a leader but rather a symbol , that people are taking to the streets against Lukashenko and not for her .
It ’ s not Tikhanovskaya and her campaign that are going up against Lukashenko , it ’ s the tens of thousands of Belarusians who do not need a leader .
Instead , Lukashenko let the special forces loose against them .
Dictators don ’ t really see people ; they see the entire world as clans—financial , military , or criminal bosses that they need to negotiate with .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ streets because they are paid to , because they are manipulated , or because they are ordered to from abroad .
Dictators think that as long as they don ’ t show weakness , then the people will get tired of protesting or will be intimidated .
History shows that dictators are wrong , but only realize this when it ’ s too late .
However , the Kremlin will not hand Belarus over to the opposition .
Putin seems to dislike Lukashenko and would likely be happy to have someone else in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ not allow Lukashenko to be removed by the will of the people .
Russia and Belarus are too close in culture and mentality : The ouster of the Belarusian dictator as a result of the elections could energize the democratic movement in Russia , where the authoritarian regime is already barely hanging on .
So , if Lukashenko can ’ t handle the situation himself , Russia might help him .
The Kremlin could use the tactics it tested in Ukraine to justify invading Belarus : cite an impending NATO intervention ; contend @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use of the Russian language or persecute ethnic Russians ; or—on the contrary—claim that it is saving the Belarusians , rescuing them from the repressions of the bankrupt Lukashenko regime .
In the last scenario , Putin would play the role of the protector of the fraternal Belarusian people from tyranny .
In fact , Lukashenko has already asked Putin for help , decrying the threat of a NATO invasion .
Lukashenko said that he has received a promise of assistance , but the Kremlin has not made any comment on the subject @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Russian intervention would allow Putin to do more than just finally annex Belarus .
Facing a rapid loss of popularity , sweeping disillusionment with the regime and with him personally , and mass protests throughout Russia , Putin seems to think that he can count on the same kind of public enthusiasm that accompanied the annexation of Crimea .
This would be another mistake for Putin .
The Russian people are tired of being in a face-off with the entire world , and an intervention in Belarus would result in the loss of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ leadership , which has no plan for bringing the country out of the systemic crisis it is in , could take this gamble .
Here , much depends on the West ’ s willingness to take strong and coordinated action .
The West must not only apply serious sanctions against Lukashenko and his regime , but also formally recognize Tikhanovskaya as the president-elect .
This would not only extend moral support to the anti-Lukashenko forces , but also promote the emergence of an alternative political player that the Russian leadership would have to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intervention .

The uprising in Belarus is unprecedented, and it doesn’t just matter for the country itself. The future of this small state will have serious global consequences, not least in the choices that Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to make.
The uprising in Belarus is unprecedented, and it doesn’t just matter for the country itself. The future of this small state will have serious global consequences, not least in the choices that Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to make.
No one anticipated such resounding success for the opposition and such failure for President Aleksandr Lukashenko in the presidential elections. The exact results are not known, but polling places that have reported undistorted results recorded 60 to 90 percent of the vote for the main opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, and no more than 17 percent for Lukashenko—more often around 10 percent.
If Lukashenko’s results were actually anywhere near the officially announced ones—more than 80 percent of the vote—his supporters would have taken to the streets to show that the elections were fair. Instead, he was only able to gather several thousand people a week later, and they were reportedly bussed in by assignment from state enterprises throughout Belarus. Some of them joined the protest marches after the official rally was over. The elections showed that there is no standoff between Lukashenko’s supporters and his opponents. There is only a standoff between Lukashenko and his remaining forces on the one hand and a society that wants change on the other.
When the preliminary results came in, Lukashenko had a choice. Not so long ago he was a national leader, not an international criminal. Lukashenko’s crimes of recent years—falsification of elections and repression of the opposition—were still in line with the usual behavior of authoritarian regimes. Had he started negotiations, he might have received guarantees of personal security.
However, he chose a different path. He announced absolutely unrealistic results and began to suppress protests by force. Now there is no level of violence that he will stop at in an effort to maintain power.
At first glance, this seems like a winning strategy. Unarmed citizens are going up against well-armed brutes acting with deliberate cruelty. Sooner or later, once enough people are killed and maimed, once enough people are arrested and jailed, the protests should begin to die down.
But the people aren’t scared. Lukashenko is being met with open chants of “Resign!” at events. The protests are only growing, strikes are beginning, and women are linking arms in solidarity. Then there is the problem of loyalty among the siloviki, the military and special forces. So far, there have been only occasional incidents of the siloviki refusing to follow orders; for the most part, the special forces have remained loyal to top-down command structure. But that’s only the case for now, when the deaths of only two protesters have been officially recognized.
Yet Belarus is a small and relatively homogeneous country, with only two or three degrees of separation between a police officer and the protester he’s beating. Once the casualties are high enough, police officers will refuse to follow orders or start sabotaging them. What will the commanding officers do if the standoff continues? Lukashenko doesn’t have an ideology; he is only fighting to keep a hold on power. He will be obeyed while he remains in control, but a drawn-out protest will demonstrate his weakness.
Whatever happens over the next few days and weeks, Lukashenko will not survive in the long term without support from abroad. He has no diamonds or oil to provide him with revenues that he could use to pay the security forces while ignoring the rest of the population. Someone must supply him with the cash to sustain the infrastructure of his autocracy.
Technically, either China or Russia could do this. But the Kremlin will not agree to the emergence of a Chinese protectorate in its backyard. China appears to have no strong interest in Belarus, although it issued statements of support for Lukashenko. So, Russia will give Lukashenko money, but only the bare minimum needed. The best scenario for the Kremlin is a weak Lukashenko who is in conflict with the people, isolated from the West, and fully dependent on Moscow. That paves the way for the Kremlin’s long-awaited “unification,” i.e., absorption, of Belarus.
But Lukashenko understands this as well; he wants to be a tsar, not a deputy tsar for Belarus, so he is willing to escalate the situation, hoping to win the conflict.
Judging from the first few days, a quick victory is not in the cards. The protests continue; the banishment from Belarus of Tikhanovskaya—who had clearly won the election—is unlikely to bring success. (It appears that the authorities forced her to call for an end to the protests and leave the country by leveraging the lives of her children and her husband, who is in prison.)
Tikhanovskaya put it best when she said that she isn’t a leader but rather a symbol, that people are taking to the streets against Lukashenko and not for her. It’s not Tikhanovskaya and her campaign that are going up against Lukashenko, it’s the tens of thousands of Belarusians who do not need a leader. Instead, Lukashenko let the special forces loose against them. Dictators don’t really see people; they see the entire world as clans—financial, military, or criminal bosses that they need to negotiate with. Dictators think that people take to the streets because they are paid to, because they are manipulated, or because they are ordered to from abroad. Dictators think that as long as they don’t show weakness, then the people will get tired of protesting or will be intimidated. History shows that dictators are wrong, but only realize this when it’s too late.
However, the Kremlin will not hand Belarus over to the opposition. Putin seems to dislike Lukashenko and would likely be happy to have someone else in power in Belarus, but he cannot allow Lukashenko to be removed by the will of the people. Russia and Belarus are too close in culture and mentality: The ouster of the Belarusian dictator as a result of the elections could energize the democratic movement in Russia, where the authoritarian regime is already barely hanging on. So, if Lukashenko can’t handle the situation himself, Russia might help him.
The Kremlin could use the tactics it tested in Ukraine to justify invading Belarus: cite an impending NATO intervention; contend that nationalists are trying to prohibit the use of the Russian language or persecute ethnic Russians; or—on the contrary—claim that it is saving the Belarusians, rescuing them from the repressions of the bankrupt Lukashenko regime. In the last scenario, Putin would play the role of the protector of the fraternal Belarusian people from tyranny.
In fact, Lukashenko has already asked Putin for help, decrying the threat of a NATO invasion. Lukashenko said that he has received a promise of assistance, but the Kremlin has not made any comment on the subject.
Whatever slogans are used, a Russian intervention would allow Putin to do more than just finally annex Belarus. Facing a rapid loss of popularity, sweeping disillusionment with the regime and with him personally, and mass protests throughout Russia, Putin seems to think that he can count on the same kind of public enthusiasm that accompanied the annexation of Crimea.
This would be another mistake for Putin. The Russian people are tired of being in a face-off with the entire world, and an intervention in Belarus would result in the loss of many lives. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership, which has no plan for bringing the country out of the systemic crisis it is in, could take this gamble.
Here, much depends on the West’s willingness to take strong and coordinated action. The West must not only apply serious sanctions against Lukashenko and his regime, but also formally recognize Tikhanovskaya as the president-elect. This would not only extend moral support to the anti-Lukashenko forces, but also promote the emergence of an alternative political player that the Russian leadership would have to contend with—and possibly forestall a stronger Russian intervention.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?

How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm ?
In mid-August , a Turkish and a Greek warship collided in the Eastern Mediterranean , raising tensions in the most combustible naval stand-off the region has witnessed in 20 years .
The crisis had started two days before , when Turkey deployed an energy exploration ship along with its naval escort to search for oil and natural gas in waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo—waters Athens claims as its own maritime territory .
More than ever before , the latest cycle of escalation risks spiraling into @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of staunch support for Greece against Turkey , France dispatched warships to the contested waters and promised more .
Egypt and Israel , which hold regular joint military exercises with Greece , have also expressed their solidarity with Athens .
With France and Egypt already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya , observers around the world fear that any further escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean could set off a Euro-Middle Eastern maelstrom .
How did the Eastern Mediterranean become the eye of a geopolitical storm ?
For decades , Eastern Mediterranean maritime @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confined to sovereignty claims and counterclaims among Cyprus , Greece , and Turkey .
But over the past five years , the region ’ s offshore natural gas resources have turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a key strategic arena through which larger geopolitical fault-lines involving the EU and the MENA region converge .
Italy and France have played integral roles in driving that change , which has placed the EU and Turkey ’ s already complicated relationship onto more adversarial terms .
The game changer was the August 2015 discovery of the massive @ @ @ @ @ @ @ territory by the Italian energy major Eni .
The largest Eastern Mediterranean gas find to date , Zohr ’ s advent meant the region suddenly collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas .
Eni , which is also the lead operator in Cyprus ’ s natural gas development , began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot , Egyptian , and Israeli gas and use Egypt ’ s liquefaction plants to cost-effectively market the region ’ s gas to Europe as liquified natural gas ( LNG ) .
The Italian company also happens to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of Egypt ’ s two LNG plants .
Although commercially sensible , there was a geopolitical glitch to the Egypt-based LNG marketing scheme : It left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe , dashing Ankara ’ s in-progress plans to become a regional energy hub .
In 2018 , French energy giant Total , the EU ’ s third largest company by revenue , dealt another blow to Turkey by partnering with Eni in all of the Italian firm ’ s gas development operations in Cyprus , placing France @ @ @ @ @ @ @ energy morass .
Around the same time , Cyprus officially agreed to supply Egypt ’ s LNG plants for export .
After Cyprus inked that deal , Israel , which had previously been considering building an Israel-Turkey undersea gas pipeline , followed suit and contracted to sell its gas to Egypt as well .
Turkey expressed its displeasure at these developments by engaging in a series of measured exercises of gunboat diplomacy , sending exploration and drillships into Cypriot waters , each with naval escort .
The country continues to refuse to recognize @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ankara maintains were drawn illegally at Turkey ’ s expense .
In doing so , it claims to be defending the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the northern half of the ethnically divided island , who have been left out of the development of Cyprus ’ s offshore natural gas reserves despite being the legal co-owners of Cyprus ’ s natural resources .
With each Turkish action , the Egypt-Israel-Cyprus-Greece front increasingly gained military support from France , Italy , and the United States , each of which has significant economic investments in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its NATO allies ’ support of this group is a betrayal , and tantamount to a policy of containment , which it can not tolerate .
How did Libya enter the Eastern Mediterranean Morass ?
In a bid to break out of its regional isolation , in November 2019 Turkey signed its own maritime demarcation agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord ( GNA ) in war-torn Libya .
The deal was an attempt to gain greater legal standing to challenge the maritime borders Greece had established with Cyprus and Egypt , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ development plans depend .
The Ankara-Tripoli maritime boundary agreement was accompanied by a military cooperation pact providing the GNA a security guarantee against the efforts of General Khalifa Haftar ’ s forces , backed by France and Egypt , to topple the Tripoli-based government .
The GNA formally activated its military pact with Ankara in December , linking the already tense maritime stand-off in the Eastern Mediterranean to the Libyan civil war .
Ankara ’ s overt intervention in the conflict in the first half of 2020 turned the tide of the Libyan @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the GNA , Turkey ’ s large military presence in Libya now provides Ankara a platform from which to challenge Cyprus , Egypt , and Greece over the Eastern Mediterranean ’ s maritime boundaries .
Taking advantage of its newly enhanced regional position , Turkey sought to press its claims against Greece by sending its Oruç Reis seismic survey ship , accompanied by a group of five naval vessels , to the contested waters near Kastellorizo .
So what ’ s Turkey beef in the Eastern Mediterranean ?
From Turkey ’ s viewpoint @ @ @ @ @ @ @ maritime boundaries unjustly and illegally deny Turkey part of its rightful maritime territory .
Therefore , the region ’ s arrangements for offshore natural gas development , which depend on these de facto boundaries , are likewise illegitimate .
In turn , Turkey regards its actions as defending international law .
The divide goes back to the so-called Seville map that informs the region ’ s commonly accepted maritime boundaries .
This European Union-commissioned map study , which was prepared by the University of Seville in the early 2000s , made the decision @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Cyprus at Turkey ’ s expense by using the coast of every inhabited Greek island—no matter how small and no matter how close to Turkey ’ s shores—as its starting point .
Turkey has a point about the demarcations being unfair .
Turkey ’ s Mediterranean coastline is longer than the U.S.-Mexico border .
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ) principle of equity and the international case law based upon it , Turkey is likely entitled to a larger maritime zone than it is has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
However , Turkey refuses to become an UNCLOS signatory , closing off its avenue of legal recourse .
Instead , Turkey found a partner with which to make its own map .
In a mirror-image move to the Seville Map , the map of the Turkey-Libya maritime boundary agreement defines a maximal maritime zone for Turkey by denying any of Greece ’ s islands a continental shelf or an exclusive economic zone ( EEZ ) , which provides sovereign rights over offshore energy resources .
The agreement establishes an 18.6 nautical mile @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and then , projecting out from that line , the Ankara-Tripoli map exclusively divides the entire maritime zone between Turkey and Libya , an area stretching from Turkey ’ s southwestern corner to the opposite coast in eastern Libya .
All of Greece ’ s islands are effectively ignored .
Turkey ’ s method for drawing the Ankara-Tripoli map is specious .
Most egregiously , the map ignores the presence of Crete , which is 3,219 square miles and between these coasts .
UNCLOS Article 121 , an article dealing with the legal @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coastlines generate continental shelves and EEZs the same as any coastal land formation , except those that “ can not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.
” Crete , with a population of almost 650,000 ( nearly the same as Athens ) , would unquestionably generate an EEZ .
On Aug. 6 this year , Greece decided to answer Turkey in kind by signing a similar maritime delimitation agreement with Egypt .
Days later , the Oruç Reis research ship and its naval escort charged into waters within Greece ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ incentives for most of the parties in the region and the European Union to contain the current escalation and find an off-ramp to the crisis .
Despite backing Greece , neither Egypt nor Israel can afford to be drawn into a war with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean .
The EU has expressed its unequivocal support for members Greece and Cyprus , but the bloc is divided on how to handle the current crisis .
The six Mediterranean EU countries are evenly split .
Greece , Cyprus , and France advocate strong action @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Spain—which all share significant commercial interests with Turkey in the central and western Mediterranean—have refrained .
Germany , holding the EU presidency since July , could break the deadlock .
Although Berlin typically defers to Paris on Mediterranean policy , it is keen to keep Ankara as close to the EU as possible .
Still , Turkey is playing close to the edge .
If it pushes too far , the European Union , as well as the United States , will swing fully over to the side of Greece .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is Crete , whose southern waters are thought to contain significant volumes of oil or natural gas .
Although internationally recognized as Greek territorial waters , the Ankara-Tripoli map assigns the area to Libya .
If Turkey sends its energy exploration ship near the southern shores of Crete , then all bets are off .
So far , Turkey has not crossed that line .
Ankara may be holding exploration in Crete ’ s waters as a negotiating card .
Any serious deescalation process between Turkey and Greece requires a third party with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ into serious talks .
In that respect , perhaps the most hopeful sign for the region is the recent constructive efforts of the United States to achieve a cease-fire and buffer zone in Libya .
The de-linking of the various regional conflicts creates an opening for a pragmatic dialogue on Mediterranean maritime boundaries .
There is a window for an off-ramp .
That opportunity will require the United States , perhaps in concert with Germany , to act with diplomatic skill and commitment .

In mid-August, a Turkish and a Greek warship collided in the Eastern Mediterranean, raising tensions in the most combustible naval stand-off the region has witnessed in 20 years. The crisis had started two days before, when Turkey deployed an energy exploration ship along with its naval escort to search for oil and natural gas in waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo—waters Athens claims as its own maritime territory.
In mid-August, a Turkish and a Greek warship collided in the Eastern Mediterranean, raising tensions in the most combustible naval stand-off the region has witnessed in 20 years. The crisis had started two days before, when Turkey deployed an energy exploration ship along with its naval escort to search for oil and natural gas in waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo—waters Athens claims as its own maritime territory.
More than ever before, the latest cycle of escalation risks spiraling into a multinational conflict. Making a show of staunch support for Greece against Turkey, France dispatched warships to the contested waters and promised more. Egypt and Israel, which hold regular joint military exercises with Greece, have also expressed their solidarity with Athens. With France and Egypt already in open conflict with Turkey in Libya, observers around the world fear that any further escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean could set off a Euro-Middle Eastern maelstrom.
How did the Eastern Mediterranean become the eye of a geopolitical storm?
For decades, Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary disputes were a local affair, confined to sovereignty claims and counterclaims among Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. But over the past five years, the region’s offshore natural gas resources have turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a key strategic arena through which larger geopolitical fault-lines involving the EU and the MENA region converge. Italy and France have played integral roles in driving that change, which has placed the EU and Turkey’s already complicated relationship onto more adversarial terms.
The game changer was the August 2015 discovery of the massive Zohr natural gas field in Egyptian maritime territory by the Italian energy major Eni. The largest Eastern Mediterranean gas find to date, Zohr’s advent meant the region suddenly collectively had marketable volumes of natural gas. Eni, which is also the lead operator in Cyprus’s natural gas development, began promoting a plan to pool Cypriot, Egyptian, and Israeli gas and use Egypt’s liquefaction plants to cost-effectively market the region’s gas to Europe as liquified natural gas (LNG). The Italian company also happens to be a lead stake holder in one of Egypt’s two LNG plants.
Although commercially sensible, there was a geopolitical glitch to the Egypt-based LNG marketing scheme: It left no role for Turkey and its pipeline infrastructure to Europe, dashing Ankara’s in-progress plans to become a regional energy hub. In 2018, French energy giant Total, the EU’s third largest company by revenue, dealt another blow to Turkey by partnering with Eni in all of the Italian firm’s gas development operations in Cyprus, placing France in the middle of the eastern Mediterranean energy morass. Around the same time, Cyprus officially agreed to supply Egypt’s LNG plants for export. After Cyprus inked that deal, Israel, which had previously been considering building an Israel-Turkey undersea gas pipeline, followed suit and contracted to sell its gas to Egypt as well.
Turkey expressed its displeasure at these developments by engaging in a series of measured exercises of gunboat diplomacy, sending exploration and drillships into Cypriot waters, each with naval escort. The country continues to refuse to recognize Cyprus’s maritime boundaries, which Ankara maintains were drawn illegally at Turkey’s expense. In doing so, it claims to be defending the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the northern half of the ethnically divided island, who have been left out of the development of Cyprus’s offshore natural gas reserves despite being the legal co-owners of Cyprus’s natural resources.
With each Turkish action, the Egypt-Israel-Cyprus-Greece front increasingly gained military support from France, Italy, and the United States, each of which has significant economic investments in Eastern Mediterranean gas. For Turkey, its NATO allies’ support of this group is a betrayal, and tantamount to a policy of containment, which it cannot tolerate.
How did Libya enter the Eastern Mediterranean Morass?
In a bid to break out of its regional isolation, in November 2019 Turkey signed its own maritime demarcation agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) in war-torn Libya. The deal was an attempt to gain greater legal standing to challenge the maritime borders Greece had established with Cyprus and Egypt, upon which their eastern Mediterranean natural gas development plans depend. The Ankara-Tripoli maritime boundary agreement was accompanied by a military cooperation pact providing the GNA a security guarantee against the efforts of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces, backed by France and Egypt, to topple the Tripoli-based government. The GNA formally activated its military pact with Ankara in December, linking the already tense maritime stand-off in the Eastern Mediterranean to the Libyan civil war.
Ankara’s overt intervention in the conflict in the first half of 2020 turned the tide of the Libyan civil war. Having succeeded in preserving the GNA, Turkey’s large military presence in Libya now provides Ankara a platform from which to challenge Cyprus, Egypt, and Greece over the Eastern Mediterranean’s maritime boundaries. Taking advantage of its newly enhanced regional position, Turkey sought to press its claims against Greece by sending its Oruç Reis seismic survey ship, accompanied by a group of five naval vessels, to the contested waters near Kastellorizo.
So what’s Turkey beef in the Eastern Mediterranean?
From Turkey’s viewpoint, Eastern Mediterranean’s de facto maritime boundaries unjustly and illegally deny Turkey part of its rightful maritime territory. Therefore, the region’s arrangements for offshore natural gas development, which depend on these de facto boundaries, are likewise illegitimate. In turn, Turkey regards its actions as defending international law. The divide goes back to the so-called Seville map that informs the region’s commonly accepted maritime boundaries. This European Union-commissioned map study, which was prepared by the University of Seville in the early 2000s, made the decision to define maximal boundaries for Greece and Cyprus at Turkey’s expense by using the coast of every inhabited Greek island—no matter how small and no matter how close to Turkey’s shores—as its starting point. Turkey has a point about the demarcations being unfair. Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline is longer than the U.S.-Mexico border. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) principle of equity and the international case law based upon it, Turkey is likely entitled to a larger maritime zone than it is has received on account of that extensive coastline. However, Turkey refuses to become an UNCLOS signatory, closing off its avenue of legal recourse.
Instead, Turkey found a partner with which to make its own map. In a mirror-image move to the Seville Map, the map of the Turkey-Libya maritime boundary agreement defines a maximal maritime zone for Turkey by denying any of Greece’s islands a continental shelf or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which provides sovereign rights over offshore energy resources. The agreement establishes an 18.6 nautical mile boundary segment between Turkey and Libya, and then, projecting out from that line, the Ankara-Tripoli map exclusively divides the entire maritime zone between Turkey and Libya, an area stretching from Turkey’s southwestern corner to the opposite coast in eastern Libya. All of Greece’s islands are effectively ignored.
Turkey’s method for drawing the Ankara-Tripoli map is specious. Most egregiously, the map ignores the presence of Crete, which is 3,219 square miles and between these coasts. UNCLOS Article 121, an article dealing with the legal status of islands, affirms that island coastlines generate continental shelves and EEZs the same as any coastal land formation, except those that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.” Crete, with a population of almost 650,000 (nearly the same as Athens), would unquestionably generate an EEZ.
On Aug. 6 this year, Greece decided to answer Turkey in kind by signing a similar maritime delimitation agreement with Egypt. Days later, the Oruç Reis research ship and its naval escort charged into waters within Greece’s maritime boundaries.
What’s Next?
There are strong incentives for most of the parties in the region and the European Union to contain the current escalation and find an off-ramp to the crisis. Despite backing Greece, neither Egypt nor Israel can afford to be drawn into a war with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU has expressed its unequivocal support for members Greece and Cyprus, but the bloc is divided on how to handle the current crisis. The six Mediterranean EU countries are evenly split. Greece, Cyprus, and France advocate strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain—which all share significant commercial interests with Turkey in the central and western Mediterranean—have refrained.
Germany, holding the EU presidency since July, could break the deadlock.
Although Berlin typically defers to Paris on Mediterranean policy, it is keen to keep Ankara as close to the EU as possible. Still, Turkey is playing close to the edge. If it pushes too far, the European Union, as well as the United States, will swing fully over to the side of Greece. The red line that Turkey cannot cross is Crete, whose southern waters are thought to contain significant volumes of oil or natural gas. Although internationally recognized as Greek territorial waters, the Ankara-Tripoli map assigns the area to Libya. If Turkey sends its energy exploration ship near the southern shores of Crete, then all bets are off.
So far, Turkey has not crossed that line. Ankara may be holding exploration in Crete’s waters as a negotiating card. Any serious deescalation process between Turkey and Greece requires a third party with sufficient sway to push Ankara and Athens into serious talks. In that respect, perhaps the most hopeful sign for the region is the recent constructive efforts of the United States to achieve a cease-fire and buffer zone in Libya. The de-linking of the various regional conflicts creates an opening for a pragmatic dialogue on Mediterranean maritime boundaries. There is a window for an off-ramp. That opportunity will require the United States, perhaps in concert with Germany, to act with diplomatic skill and commitment.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-18--This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy

This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy One week before Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017 , we argued in Foreign Policy that the president-elect did not have a grand strategy—and would never develop one .
Trump ’ s “ foreign policy approach is explicitly anti-strategic , ” we wrote , and Americans should expect “ ‘ tactical transactionalism ’ —a foreign-policy framework that seeks discrete wins ( or the initial , tweetable impressions of them ) , treats foreign relations bilaterally rather than multidimensionally , and resists the alignment of means and ends that is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fewer than 90 days until he stands for reelection , Trump has amassed a robust foreign policy record .
How has our preliminary assessment and prediction held up over his 43-plus months in the Oval Office ?
Far better than we expected .
To be sure , the president ’ s foreign policy preferences—already apparent when he took office—have become even clearer with time : infatuation with theoretical diplomatic and trade “ deals ” ( which Trump now promises will happen soon after his reelection ) ; adoration for strongmen ; and hostility @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their consistency , however , our expectation that these predilections would not constitute a reliable guide to policy has been proved accurate .
In fact , the implementation gap we presaged has become a yawning chasm , as the administration ’ s own marquee strategy documents—primarily the National Security Strategy , intended to elucidate the Trump Doctrine—are at odds with the president ’ s inclinations .
On a near-weekly basis , Trump reaffirms a worldview that clashes directly with what senior civilian and military officials promote as the purpose of U.S. foreign policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ concern : Rather , it undermines America ’ s ability to articulate and execute a grand strategy equal to the monumental challenges it faces .
Grand strategies are theories of national security : They orient states in a complex international system by identifying priorities and aligning available resources with desired objectives .
Although the United States no longer enjoys the margin of advantage—and for error—it had in the early post-Cold War world , it remains the world ’ s most powerful nations , with an extraordinary ability to shape an international order that @ @ @ @ @ @ @ more competitive global environment , success requires Washington to define its interests sharply and apply American military , diplomatic , and economic power shrewdly .
What ’ s more , amidst triple health , economic , and racial justice crises at home , any effective grand strategy for the United States must heed the close linkage between America ’ s domestic vitality and its global influence .
An economically weakened and societally fractured nation is far less capable of even pursuing , much less achieving , its foreign policy goals .
It is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of foreign-policy instincts for a grand strategy .
Indeed , the foreign-policy views Trump articulated during the 2016 campaign ( and before ) remain his lodestars—the world apparently looks much the same to him from the Oval Office as it did from Trump Tower .
Yet for all the consistency of the president ’ s proclivities , his administration has repeatedly pursued opposing initiatives—making it impossible to prioritize and link the means and ends required for grand strategy .
For more than 30 years , Trump has expressed aversion to American alliances .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ said , “ our ‘ allies ’ are making billion screwing us.
” This antagonism surfaced repeatedly in the 2016 campaign and , since assuming office , has translated into hostility toward America ’ s closest global partners .
In his memoir , former national security advisor John Bolton alleges that after repeated complains about inadequate allied military spending , Trump nearly called the NATO alliance quits .
Although that decision never came to pass , the president ordered the drawdown of 12,000 troops from Germany in late July .
He has also @ @ @ @ @ @ @ cost sharing from South Korea and his administration is now reportedly considering troop cuts there—rising threats from North Korea and China notwithstanding .
Far from strategically coordinated , however , these presidential decisions have been explicitly at odds with the administration ’ s stated goals .
The White House ’ s National Security Strategy contends that “ allies and partners magnify our power ” and strengthening alliances is a pillar of the National Defense Strategy .
The United States remains bound to its treaty allies by mutual defense commitments , continues to conduct @ @ @ @ @ @ @ than 200,000 troops overseas .
President Trump even signed into law a bill designed to strengthen and fund cooperation with Asian allies .
Strategic incoherence on this issue has resulted in a dangerous condition : alliances that endure , but with their ability to credibly deter adversaries clearly diminished .
As consistent as Trump ’ s aversion to allies is his admiration for autocrats .
In the same Playboy interview , Trump commended the Chinese Communist Party ’ s ( CCP ) 1989 crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square as strong .
As @ @ @ @ @ @ @ s President Xi Jinping for being someone “ I like a lot .
I consider him a friend , ” and when the CCP eliminated presidential term limits , Trump glowed : “ He ’ s now president for life , president for life .
And he ’ s great.
” During the 2016 campaign , then-candidate Trump called Russian strongman Vladimir Putin a “ brilliant and talented person , ” and throughout his presidency has sided with Putin ’ s interpretation of world events over his own government ’ s intelligence community @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Trump has lauded authoritarian rulers in North Korea , Egypt , the Philippines , Turkey , and Saudi Arabia .
President Trump ’ s admonishment for allies and admiration for dictators provide important context for the most important—and strategically incoherent—element of this administration ’ s foreign policy : how to respond to an increasingly powerful and assertive China .
Every Trump administration strategy document proclaims that in the long term , strategic competition with China will be the biggest challenge to American interests over the coming decades .
The sharpening rivalry between the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bound by economic interdependence even as their security , commercial , technological , and political competition intensifies—will shape the future of geopolitics .
And it just such complex and long-term foreign policy concerns where a well-articulated grand strategy would be essential .
Yet Secretary of State Mike Pompeo ’ s landmark China speech last month provided a case-in-point for the Trump administration ’ s strategic incoherence .
All but declaring a new Cold War with China , Pompeo called for “ a new alliance of democracies.
” He added that “ the United @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the G20 , our combined economic , diplomatic , and military power is surely enough to meet this challenge if we direct it clearly.
” The same allies and partners that the Trump administration disparaged , the same multilateral institutions that were defunded and disregarded , the same countries dismissed because they were ruled by elected leaders and not undemocratic strongmen , are now being called upon to follow American leadership in a Manichean struggle with China .
Unsurprisingly , this Coalition of Countries and Institutions He ’ s Constantly Belittled is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Those who disagree with Trump have found some solace in the incoherence with which his preferences have been put into practice—worse than a shambolic foreign policy would have been a ruthlessly effective one .
Perhaps that is what a second Trump term will hold .
But there are still reasons to doubt any grand strategy will be forthcoming , even now that Trump has accrued experience as commander-in-chief and kicked the so-called adults out of the room .
Indeed , Pompeo ’ s speech demonstrates the persistence of this administration ’ s say-do @ @ @ @ @ @ @ loyal foreign policy lieutenant , trumpeting a strategy that is demonstrably at odds with Trump ’ s own instincts , was met with little enthusiasm from the countries and institutions needed for its implementation .
Since January 2017 , the United States ’ mercurial foreign policy has been a source of great global consternation , as both allies and adversaries have grappled with how to respond to acute unpredictability from the world ’ s mightiest power .
Should it continue for another four years , the reaction to Pompeo ’ s speech may @ @ @ @ @ @ @ : indifference .
If America remains adrift , its traditional mantle of global leadership—whether in countering China or combatting COVID-19—will become ever-more elusive .

One week before Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017, we argued in Foreign Policy that the president-elect did not have a grand strategy—and would never develop one. Trump’s “foreign policy approach is explicitly anti-strategic,” we wrote, and Americans should expect “‘tactical transactionalism’—a foreign-policy framework that seeks discrete wins (or the initial, tweetable impressions of them), treats foreign relations bilaterally rather than multidimensionally, and resists the alignment of means and ends that is necessary for effective grand strategy.”
One week before Donald Trump entered the White House in 2017, we argued in Foreign Policy that the president-elect did not have a grand strategy—and would never develop one. Trump’s “foreign policy approach is explicitly anti-strategic,” we wrote, and Americans should expect “‘tactical transactionalism’—a foreign-policy framework that seeks discrete wins (or the initial, tweetable impressions of them), treats foreign relations bilaterally rather than multidimensionally, and resists the alignment of means and ends that is necessary for effective grand strategy.”
With fewer than 90 days until he stands for reelection, Trump has amassed a robust foreign policy record. How has our preliminary assessment and prediction held up over his 43-plus months in the Oval Office?
Far better than we expected.
To be sure, the president’s foreign policy preferences—already apparent when he took office—have become even clearer with time: infatuation with theoretical diplomatic and trade “deals” (which Trump now promises will happen soon after his reelection); adoration for strongmen; and hostility toward long-standing allies and partners.
Despite their consistency, however, our expectation that these predilections would not constitute a reliable guide to policy has been proved accurate. In fact, the implementation gap we presaged has become a yawning chasm, as the administration’s own marquee strategy documents—primarily the National Security Strategy, intended to elucidate the Trump Doctrine—are at odds with the president’s inclinations. On a near-weekly basis, Trump reaffirms a worldview that clashes directly with what senior civilian and military officials promote as the purpose of U.S. foreign policy.
This incoherence is not an idle concern: Rather, it undermines America’s ability to articulate and execute a grand strategy equal to the monumental challenges it faces. Grand strategies are theories of national security: They orient states in a complex international system by identifying priorities and aligning available resources with desired objectives. Although the United States no longer enjoys the margin of advantage—and for error—it had in the early post-Cold War world, it remains the world’s most powerful nations, with an extraordinary ability to shape an international order that advances its interests.
Yet in a more competitive global environment, success requires Washington to define its interests sharply and apply American military, diplomatic, and economic power shrewdly. What’s more, amidst triple health, economic, and racial justice crises at home, any effective grand strategy for the United States must heed the close linkage between America’s domestic vitality and its global influence. An economically weakened and societally fractured nation is far less capable of even pursuing, much less achieving, its foreign policy goals.
It is easy to mistake Trump’s constellation of foreign-policy instincts for a grand strategy. Indeed, the foreign-policy views Trump articulated during the 2016 campaign (and before) remain his lodestars—the world apparently looks much the same to him from the Oval Office as it did from Trump Tower. Yet for all the consistency of the president’s proclivities, his administration has repeatedly pursued opposing initiatives—making it impossible to prioritize and link the means and ends required for grand strategy.
For more than 30 years, Trump has expressed aversion to American alliances. Speaking to Playboy in 1990, he said, “our ‘allies’ are making billion screwing us.” This antagonism surfaced repeatedly in the 2016 campaign and, since assuming office, has translated into hostility toward America’s closest global partners. In his memoir, former national security advisor John Bolton alleges that after repeated complains about inadequate allied military spending, Trump nearly called the NATO alliance quits. Although that decision never came to pass, the president ordered the drawdown of 12,000 troops from Germany in late July. He has also waged a long campaign to extract more cost sharing from South Korea and his administration is now reportedly considering troop cuts there—rising threats from North Korea and China notwithstanding.
Far from strategically coordinated, however, these presidential decisions have been explicitly at odds with the administration’s stated goals. The White House’s National Security Strategy contends that “allies and partners magnify our power” and strengthening alliances is a pillar of the National Defense Strategy. The United States remains bound to its treaty allies by mutual defense commitments, continues to conduct joint military exercises, and forward-deploys more than 200,000 troops overseas. President Trump even signed into law a bill designed to strengthen and fund cooperation with Asian allies. Strategic incoherence on this issue has resulted in a dangerous condition: alliances that endure, but with their ability to credibly deter adversaries clearly diminished.
As consistent as Trump’s aversion to allies is his admiration for autocrats. In the same Playboy interview, Trump commended the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 1989 crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square as strong. As sitting president, he praised China’s President Xi Jinping for being someone “I like a lot. I consider him a friend,” and when the CCP eliminated presidential term limits, Trump glowed: “He’s now president for life, president for life. And he’s great.” During the 2016 campaign, then-candidate Trump called Russian strongman Vladimir Putin a “brilliant and talented person,” and throughout his presidency has sided with Putin’s interpretation of world events over his own government’s intelligence community analysts. Beyond China and Russia, Trump has lauded authoritarian rulers in North Korea, Egypt, the Philippines, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
President Trump’s admonishment for allies and admiration for dictators provide important context for the most important—and strategically incoherent—element of this administration’s foreign policy: how to respond to an increasingly powerful and assertive China. Every Trump administration strategy document proclaims that in the long term, strategic competition with China will be the biggest challenge to American interests over the coming decades. The sharpening rivalry between the world’s two largest economies—which remain bound by economic interdependence even as their security, commercial, technological, and political competition intensifies—will shape the future of geopolitics. And it just such complex and long-term foreign policy concerns where a well-articulated grand strategy would be essential.
Yet Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s landmark China speech last month provided a case-in-point for the Trump administration’s strategic incoherence. All but declaring a new Cold War with China, Pompeo called for “a new alliance of democracies.” He added that “the United Nations, NATO, the G7 countries, the G20, our combined economic, diplomatic, and military power is surely enough to meet this challenge if we direct it clearly.” The same allies and partners that the Trump administration disparaged, the same multilateral institutions that were defunded and disregarded, the same countries dismissed because they were ruled by elected leaders and not undemocratic strongmen, are now being called upon to follow American leadership in a Manichean struggle with China. Unsurprisingly, this Coalition of Countries and Institutions He’s Constantly Belittled is hardly falling in line behind Trump.
Those who disagree with Trump have found some solace in the incoherence with which his preferences have been put into practice—worse than a shambolic foreign policy would have been a ruthlessly effective one. Perhaps that is what a second Trump term will hold. But there are still reasons to doubt any grand strategy will be forthcoming, even now that Trump has accrued experience as commander-in-chief and kicked the so-called adults out of the room. Indeed, Pompeo’s speech demonstrates the persistence of this administration’s say-do gap: The president’s most loyal foreign policy lieutenant, trumpeting a strategy that is demonstrably at odds with Trump’s own instincts, was met with little enthusiasm from the countries and institutions needed for its implementation.
Since January 2017, the United States’ mercurial foreign policy has been a source of great global consternation, as both allies and adversaries have grappled with how to respond to acute unpredictability from the world’s mightiest power. Should it continue for another four years, the reaction to Pompeo’s speech may foreshadow a new global attitude toward Washington: indifference. If America remains adrift, its traditional mantle of global leadership—whether in countering China or combatting COVID-19—will become ever-more elusive.