foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Erdogan’s Economic Hail Mary Won’t Work

Erdogan’s Economic Hail Mary Won’t Work

The reason for Turkey ’ s economic precariousness—it is by far the worst performing emerging market this year—is no secret : Over the long term , markets react favorably to certainty and crumble in the face of haphazardness .
In the short term , though , they have a tendency to spring up when positive news surfaces , however unlikely that news is to lead to actual benefits It thus came as no surprise that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ’ s Nov. 11 pledge to take Turkey down a new economic route drove the Turkish lira to its highest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ month .
His speech came on the heels of a shakeup in the Turkish economic apparatus , including the firing of the governor of the Turkish Central Bank and the departure of Berat Albayrak , Turkey ’ s finance minister and the president ’ s son-in-law .
Although investors greeted this news with great fanfare , with both Citi and Societe Generale banks improving their outlook on the lira for the first time in a while , there is reason for caution .
The road to getting the Turkish economy back on track @ @ @ @ @ @ @ requiring coherent economic policy not driven by the conspiratorial finger pointing and power politics of the last few years .
It will also require a government that reins in its foreign policy adventurism , and particularly its aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean , which has severely tarnished Turkey ’ s relations with its largest trading partner , the European Union .
As a consequence of Turkish violations of its obligations under the EU-Turkish customs union , trade has been significantly reduced .
Turkish foreign policy decisions have similarly created widespread reluctance to invest @ @ @ @ @ @ @ recent Santander investment report warned of “ proximity to/exposure to conflicts in Syria and Iraq which enhance the security risk ” alongside “ increasing unrest and political conflict.
” Only significant and concrete changes will restore investors ’ confidence in the country ’ s ability to resolve its severe fiscal deficit and bring back the foreign direct investment the country needs .
Given the state of Turkey ’ s economy today , it is easy to forget that it was once an attractive option for those interested in emerging markets .
But 17 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ sent foreign money fleeing .
This was particularly evident in the Turkish Central Bank ’ s June report , where statistics showed more than $ 8 billion of foreign investment being withdrawn from Turkish stocks between January and June .
Total foreign investment in the Turkish stock exchange currently stands at a quarter of the $ 82 billion recorded in 2013 .
Although the capital flight was surely encouraged by the coronavirus pandemic leading investors to seek less speculative investments , Turkish economic policy has certainly not helped .
Measures eroding investor confidence @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a practice where investors bet against a security , selling it now to potentially drive the price down and repurchase it later for less , and securities lending which is integral for short selling .
This has taken place alongside well-founded concerns over the prospect for the nationalization of private entities .
Istanbul has also placed restrictions on liquidity and derivative transactions—complex and opaque financial instruments often employed by aggressive investors with little regard for their inherent extreme volatility—all contributing to investor reluctance .
Aside from measures like these that undermine the free @ @ @ @ @ @ @ tone towards foreign involvement in the Turkish economy since his 2018 consolidation of power , as well as rash economic statements , have not helped either .
Denying any connection between his government ’ s policy and Turkey ’ s economic collapse , the president ’ s rudimentary understanding of basic economic principles has bordered on the absurd .
Stirring up controversy by citing Turkey ’ s invisible enemies , such an “ interest rate lobby , ” Erdogan has called out bankers advocating for higher interest rates , the issuing of government @ @ @ @ @ @ @ generally accepted monetary policies employed by countries seeking to lower inflation rates .
Despite urgent need to do so ( Turkey ’ s inflation rate stands at almost 12 percent ) Erdogan has stood in the way .
All this is to say : Don ’ t get too excited for whatever course correction Erdogan has in store now .
In all likelihood , it won ’ t reflect Turkey ’ s actual needs .
In general , free markets simply don ’ t coexist with the authoritarian tendencies Erdogan ’ s policies @ @ @ @ @ @ @ economic manipulation ; wide scale jailing of journalists critical to Erdogan ’ s policies ; and the purging of so-called dissenters from the civil service , academia , and the justice system .
A country can not be on the path to real reform as long as the independence of its institutions is undermined by cronyism , its population hoards its savings in foreign currency out of fear of the l ira losing its value overnight , and external debt stands at over 50 percent of GDP .
The restoration of the Turkish @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a speech or the replacement of some cronies with others ( the newly appointed Central Bank governor , Naci Agbal , and finance minister , Lutfi Elvan , are both close Erdogan confidants and members of the governing AKP ) .
It will require measures which although they might hurt Turkish economic pride in the short term—such as pegging the lira to the euro or the dollar and expressing a willingness to consider an IMF bailout—will certainly be conducive to getting the Turkish economy back on track .
None of that will happen @ @ @ @ @ @ @ strongman and particularly the acceptance of international bailout funds which would require Erdogan to put a stop to his patronage-focused economy .
Although his second presidential term is meant to come to an end in 2023 , creative interpretations of the Turkish constitution may extend the timeline , delaying impactful economic reform for the foreseeable future .
For now , Erdogan may be banking on Eastern Mediterranean gas finds to buoy the economy , but those might not have an effect for a long time .
An alternative resolution would see Turkey securing @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would surely come with transparency requirements , the cutting of excessive government bureaucracy , and credit limitations—all of which would be unacceptable to Erdogan ’ s pride and his supporter base , which at Erdogan ’ s encouragement has come to see the West as responsible for their country ’ s economic woes .
An alternative source of funding might be cash flush countries such as China or Qatar .
Despite his anti-Western rhetoric , Erdogan understands these ‘ non-economic motives and the way in which a turn eastward would negatively impact Turkey @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Brussels and Washington .
Three hundred years ago , Montesquieu described the Ottoman Empire as “ a sick body not supported by a mild and regular diet , but by a powerful treatment which continually exhausted it.
” True economic change will only come about when this exhaustion has peaked .
This realization will hopefully set in before the Turkish economy completely collapses .
If history teaches us anything it is that inefficient rule by despots can only persevere for so long .
For the time being though , it appears that @ @ @ @ @ @

The reason for Turkey’s economic precariousness—it is by far the worst performing emerging market this year—is no secret: Over the long term, markets react favorably to certainty and crumble in the face of haphazardness. In the short term, though, they have a tendency to spring up when positive news surfaces, however unlikely that news is to lead to actual benefits
The reason for Turkey’s economic precariousness—it is by far the worst performing emerging market this year—is no secret: Over the long term, markets react favorably to certainty and crumble in the face of haphazardness. In the short term, though, they have a tendency to spring up when positive news surfaces, however unlikely that news is to lead to actual benefits
It thus came as no surprise that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Nov. 11 pledge to take Turkey down a new economic route drove the Turkish lira to its highest rate against the dollar in almost a month. His speech came on the heels of a shakeup in the Turkish economic apparatus, including the firing of the governor of the Turkish Central Bank and the departure of Berat Albayrak, Turkey’s finance minister and the president’s son-in-law. Although investors greeted this news with great fanfare, with both Citi and Societe Generale banks improving their outlook on the lira for the first time in a while, there is reason for caution.
The road to getting the Turkish economy back on track will indeed be a long one, requiring coherent economic policy not driven by the conspiratorial finger pointing and power politics of the last few years. It will also require a government that reins in its foreign policy adventurism, and particularly its aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has severely tarnished Turkey’s relations with its largest trading partner, the European Union. As a consequence of Turkish violations of its obligations under the EU-Turkish customs union, trade has been significantly reduced.
Turkish foreign policy decisions have similarly created widespread reluctance to invest money in the Turkish market; a recent Santander investment report warned of “proximity to/exposure to conflicts in Syria and Iraq which enhance the security risk” alongside “increasing unrest and political conflict.” Only significant and concrete changes will restore investors’ confidence in the country’s ability to resolve its severe fiscal deficit and bring back the foreign direct investment the country needs.
Given the state of Turkey’s economy today, it is easy to forget that it was once an attractive option for those interested in emerging markets. But 17 years of Erdogan’s mismanagement has sent foreign money fleeing. This was particularly evident in the Turkish Central Bank’s June report, where statistics showed more than $8 billion of foreign investment being withdrawn from Turkish stocks between January and June. Total foreign investment in the Turkish stock exchange currently stands at a quarter of the $82 billion recorded in 2013. Although the capital flight was surely encouraged by the coronavirus pandemic leading investors to seek less speculative investments, Turkish economic policy has certainly not helped.
Measures eroding investor confidence have included bans on short selling, a practice where investors bet against a security, selling it now to potentially drive the price down and repurchase it later for less, and securities lending which is integral for short selling. This has taken place alongside well-founded concerns over the prospect for the nationalization of private entities. Istanbul has also placed restrictions on liquidity and derivative transactions—complex and opaque financial instruments often employed by aggressive investors with little regard for their inherent extreme volatility—all contributing to investor reluctance. Aside from measures like these that undermine the free market, Erdogan’s increasingly hostile tone towards foreign involvement in the Turkish economy since his 2018 consolidation of power, as well as rash economic statements, have not helped either.
Denying any connection between his government’s policy and Turkey’s economic collapse, the president’s rudimentary understanding of basic economic principles has bordered on the absurd. Stirring up controversy by citing Turkey’s invisible enemies, such an “interest rate lobby,” Erdogan has called out bankers advocating for higher interest rates, the issuing of government bond, currency devaluation, and other generally accepted monetary policies employed by countries seeking to lower inflation rates. Despite urgent need to do so (Turkey’s inflation rate stands at almost 12 percent) Erdogan has stood in the way.
All this is to say: Don’t get too excited for whatever course correction Erdogan has in store now. In all likelihood, it won’t reflect Turkey’s actual needs. In general, free markets simply don’t coexist with the authoritarian tendencies Erdogan’s policies have time and time again exhibited: economic manipulation; wide scale jailing of journalists critical to Erdogan’s policies; and the purging of so-called dissenters from the civil service, academia, and the justice system. A country cannot be on the path to real reform as long as the independence of its institutions is undermined by cronyism, its population hoards its savings in foreign currency out of fear of the l ira losing its value overnight, and external debt stands at over 50 percent of GDP.
The restoration of the Turkish economy will thus take far more than a speech or the replacement of some cronies with others (the newly appointed Central Bank governor, Naci Agbal, and finance minister, Lutfi Elvan, are both close Erdogan confidants and members of the governing AKP). It will require measures which although they might hurt Turkish economic pride in the short term—such as pegging the lira to the euro or the dollar and expressing a willingness to consider an IMF bailout—will certainly be conducive to getting the Turkish economy back on track. None of that will happen before the departure of Turkey’s strongman and particularly the acceptance of international bailout funds which would require Erdogan to put a stop to his patronage-focused economy. Although his second presidential term is meant to come to an end in 2023, creative interpretations of the Turkish constitution may extend the timeline, delaying impactful economic reform for the foreseeable future.
For now, Erdogan may be banking on Eastern Mediterranean gas finds to buoy the economy, but those might not have an effect for a long time. An alternative resolution would see Turkey securing a significant loan from the IMF that would surely come with transparency requirements, the cutting of excessive government bureaucracy, and credit limitations—all of which would be unacceptable to Erdogan’s pride and his supporter base, which at Erdogan’s encouragement has come to see the West as responsible for their country’s economic woes. An alternative source of funding might be cash flush countries such as China or Qatar. Despite his anti-Western rhetoric, Erdogan understands these ‘ non-economic motives and the way in which a turn eastward would negatively impact Turkey’s already strained relationship with allies in Brussels and Washington.
Three hundred years ago, Montesquieu described the Ottoman Empire as “a sick body not supported by a mild and regular diet, but by a powerful treatment which continually exhausted it.” True economic change will only come about when this exhaustion has peaked. This realization will hopefully set in before the Turkish economy completely collapses. If history teaches us anything it is that inefficient rule by despots can only persevere for so long. For the time being though, it appears that Erdogan is content to try.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Biden Eyes Humanitarian Experts to Lead U.S. Agency for International Development

Biden Eyes Humanitarian Experts to Lead U.S. Agency for International Development This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
A former senior United Nations executive and food security expert is among several people in the running to lead to the U.S. Agency for International Development under President-elect Joe Biden ’ s administration , according to people familiar with the matter .
Ertharin Cousin , a former executive director of the U.N. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ list of people favored to take the helm of the leading U.S. aid agency .
Other names that have been floated for the job in Democratic foreign-policy circles include Liz Schrayer , president and CEO of the U.S .
Global Leadership Coalition , a nonprofit group ; Frederick Barton , a former senior U.N. envoy and U.S. diplomat in the Obama administration ; and Jeremy Konyndyk , a seasoned humanitarian expert who was a senior USAID official during the Obama administration and is a member of the Biden transition ’ s teams for @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Human Services .
Experts in Biden foreign-policy circles cautioned that no final decision has yet been made for who will take the helm of USAID under Biden .
The president-elect has yet to announce a nominee , and his transition team declined to comment when approached for this story .
When reached for comment , Cousin said she did not know if she was shortlisted for the job but said she is a strong supporter of the president-elect and “ made it very clear that I would be able to serve ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ also said he had not been contacted about being under consideration for the top USAID job .
Neither Konyndyk nor Schrayer offered comment .
Whomever Biden ultimately picks to lead USAID will have their work cut out for them .
The global coronavirus pandemic has strained already limited resources to deal with spiraling humanitarian crises and heightened health risks for U.S. aid officials and other humanitarian aid organizations across the world .
In Washington , the next administrator will inherit an agency that has buckled under controversy , allegations of mismanagement , and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Trump administration .
Several political appointees came under fire for anti-LGBT and Islamophobic remarks ; others have been accused of mismanaging programs meant to prevent conflict in the world ’ s most fragile countries and promote democratic transitions .
Even in the midst of a global pandemic that has strained international aid programs , the agency has been without a full-fledged leader for over seven months , following the departure of Administrator Mark Green in April .
Earlier this month , the White House abruptly ousted USAID ’ s second-highest-ranking official , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ former officials said she was fired to pave the way for Trump ’ s acting USAID chief , John Barsa , to remain de facto leader of the agency and get around federal vacancy laws that limit the time appointees can serve in senior posts in an acting capacity without Senate confirmation .
Barsa is now acting deputy administrator , performing the duties of the acting administrator .
Barsa recently joined a growing number of President Donald Trump ’ s political appointees to test positive for COVID-19 .
He reportedly often failed to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ U.S. aid agency has been a prime destination for anti-abortion advocates popular with the Trump administration ’ s evangelical base .
In the past four years , they have steered foreign aid to Christian communities in the Middle East and beyond , and pushed back at efforts at the United Nations and other international agencies to promote access to sexual and reproductive health care services .
Current and former USAID officials said the leadership vacancies and controversy sown by some Trump political appointees have hampered the agency ’ s effectiveness and sapped employee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Biden transition team ’ s thinking , who spoke on condition of anonymity , hailed all four possible candidates as strong contenders for the job given their decades of experience and expertise .
Cousin has shown an instinct for picking the winning horse out of the gate , backing both Barack Obama and Biden in the early stages of their respective presidential primaries before it was clear they would win the Democratic nomination .
An expert on food security , Cousin served as U.S. ambassador to the Rome-based U.N. agencies for food @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and then as executive director for the World Food Program from 2012 to 2017 .
Since stepping down from her role at the World Food Program , Cousin has served as a visiting scholar at Stanford University ’ s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies , at the university ’ s Center on Food Security and the Environment , and as a distinguished fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs , a think tank .
Konyndyk , currently a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development , served as the director @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Foreign Disaster Assistance from 2013 to 2017 and was involved in the U.S. response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa .
He has been involved with the Biden campaign ’ s transition and is a vocal critic of the Trump administration ’ s response to the coronavirus pandemic .
Schrayer , a seasoned political strategist with close contacts across the political spectrum on Capitol Hill , heads the U.S .
Global Leadership Coalition , an organization that supports U.S. diplomacy and development abroad .
She serves on USAID ’ s Advisory Committee @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that worked as national political director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ( AIPAC ) for over a decade .
Dan Glickman , a former Democratic congressman for Kansas and secretary of agriculture under President Bill Clinton who has worked with Schrayer at the U.S .
Global Leadership Coalition , said she is a strong candidate for the job , particularly given her relationships on Capitol Hill .
Her big asset … is this exceptionally close relationship [ she has ] to dozens and dozens of members of Congress on both sides @ @ @ @ @ @ @ The congressional role is so important , especially as it relates to the appropriations of money for these aid programs , and she probably knows that process better than anybody I know .
Barton is an academic and former senior diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for conflict and stabilization operations and U.S. envoy to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations under Obama .
He also served as deputy high commissioner at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1999 to 2001 and founding director of USAID @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 1994 to 1999 .
He is currently a lecturer on international affairs at Princeton University .
Update , Nov. 30 , 2020 : This article was updated to include comment from former Rep. Dan Glickman .

A former senior United Nations executive and food security expert is among several people in the running to lead to the U.S. Agency for International Development under President-elect Joe Biden’s administration, according to people familiar with the matter.
A former senior United Nations executive and food security expert is among several people in the running to lead to the U.S. Agency for International Development under President-elect Joe Biden’s administration, according to people familiar with the matter.
Ertharin Cousin, a former executive director of the U.N. World Food Program, tops the narrowing list of people favored to take the helm of the leading U.S. aid agency.
Other names that have been floated for the job in Democratic foreign-policy circles include Liz Schrayer, president and CEO of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, a nonprofit group; Frederick Barton, a former senior U.N. envoy and U.S. diplomat in the Obama administration; and Jeremy Konyndyk, a seasoned humanitarian expert who was a senior USAID official during the Obama administration and is a member of the Biden transition’s teams for the State Department and Department of Health and Human Services.
Experts in Biden foreign-policy circles cautioned that no final decision has yet been made for who will take the helm of USAID under Biden. The president-elect has yet to announce a nominee, and his transition team declined to comment when approached for this story.
When reached for comment, Cousin said she did not know if she was shortlisted for the job but said she is a strong supporter of the president-elect and “made it very clear that I would be able to serve” if called to do so. Barton also said he had not been contacted about being under consideration for the top USAID job. Neither Konyndyk nor Schrayer offered comment.
Whomever Biden ultimately picks to lead USAID will have their work cut out for them. The global coronavirus pandemic has strained already limited resources to deal with spiraling humanitarian crises and heightened health risks for U.S. aid officials and other humanitarian aid organizations across the world.
In Washington, the next administrator will inherit an agency that has buckled under controversy, allegations of mismanagement, and leadership vacancies in the latter half of the Trump administration. Several political appointees came under fire for anti-LGBT and Islamophobic remarks; others have been accused of mismanaging programs meant to prevent conflict in the world’s most fragile countries and promote democratic transitions.
Even in the midst of a global pandemic that has strained international aid programs, the agency has been without a full-fledged leader for over seven months, following the departure of Administrator Mark Green in April.
Earlier this month, the White House abruptly ousted USAID’s second-highest-ranking official, Deputy Administrator Bonnie Glick. Current and former officials said she was fired to pave the way for Trump’s acting USAID chief, John Barsa, to remain de facto leader of the agency and get around federal vacancy laws that limit the time appointees can serve in senior posts in an acting capacity without Senate confirmation. Barsa is now acting deputy administrator, performing the duties of the acting administrator.
Barsa recently joined a growing number of President Donald Trump’s political appointees to test positive for COVID-19. He reportedly often failed to wear a mask at work.
The U.S. aid agency has been a prime destination for anti-abortion advocates popular with the Trump administration’s evangelical base. In the past four years, they have steered foreign aid to Christian communities in the Middle East and beyond, and pushed back at efforts at the United Nations and other international agencies to promote access to sexual and reproductive health care services.
Current and former USAID officials said the leadership vacancies and controversy sown by some Trump political appointees have hampered the agency’s effectiveness and sapped employee morale.
Seasoned humanitarian experts familiar with the Biden transition team’s thinking, who spoke on condition of anonymity, hailed all four possible candidates as strong contenders for the job given their decades of experience and expertise.
Cousin has shown an instinct for picking the winning horse out of the gate, backing both Barack Obama and Biden in the early stages of their respective presidential primaries before it was clear they would win the Democratic nomination.
An expert on food security, Cousin served as U.S. ambassador to the Rome-based U.N. agencies for food and agriculture from 2009 to 2012, and then as executive director for the World Food Program from 2012 to 2017. Since stepping down from her role at the World Food Program, Cousin has served as a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, at the university’s Center on Food Security and the Environment, and as a distinguished fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a think tank.
Konyndyk, currently a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, served as the director of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance from 2013 to 2017 and was involved in the U.S. response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. He has been involved with the Biden campaign’s transition and is a vocal critic of the Trump administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Schrayer, a seasoned political strategist with close contacts across the political spectrum on Capitol Hill, heads the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, an organization that supports U.S. diplomacy and development abroad. She serves on USAID’s Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and prior to that worked as national political director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for over a decade.
Dan Glickman, a former Democratic congressman for Kansas and secretary of agriculture under President Bill Clinton who has worked with Schrayer at the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, said she is a strong candidate for the job, particularly given her relationships on Capitol Hill.
“ Her big asset … is this exceptionally close relationship [she has] to dozens and dozens of members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, ” he said. “ The congressional role is so important, especially as it relates to the appropriations of money for these aid programs, and she probably knows that process better than anybody I know. ”
Barton is an academic and former senior diplomat who served as assistant secretary of state for conflict and stabilization operations and U.S. envoy to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations under Obama. He also served as deputy high commissioner at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1999 to 2001 and founding director of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives from 1994 to 1999. He is currently a lecturer on international affairs at Princeton University.
Update, Nov. 30, 2020: This article was updated to include comment from former Rep. Dan Glickman.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Israel Is the Wrench in Biden’s Iran Policy

Israel Is the Wrench in Biden ’ s Iran Policy This article is part of The Biden Transition , Foreign Policy ’ s ongoing coverage of how U.S. President-elect Joe Biden builds a new White House administration—and what the new team ’ s policies might be .
TEL AVIV , Israel—If one thing can be learned from the assassination of the top Iranian nuclear scientist outside Tehran last Friday , it is this : Israel and the incoming Biden administration are on a collision course over Iran policy .
Analysts in Israel chalked up the timing of the operation , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , to the coming change of administrations in Washington and U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s plan to return to the nuclear deal signed with Iran in 2015 .
Outgoing President Donald Trump withdrew from the arms-control agreement in 2018 , with backing from the Israeli government , citing flaws in the deal .
In the wake of the recent U.S. election , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it clear he opposes any reengagement with Iran .
While there is near consensus in Israeli political circles with Netanyahu ’ s hard-line @ @ @ @ @ @ @ security officials hold a more nuanced position .
“ There can be no going back to the previous nuclear agreement .
We must stick to an uncompromising policy of ensuring that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons , ” Netanyahu said earlier this month .
In a joint appearance with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Jerusalem earlier this month , the Israeli premier went further , expressing gratitude for Washington ’ s “ maximum pressure ” campaign of increased sanctions on Iran and defending Pompeo ’ s list of 12 demands @ @ @ @ @ @ @ set the standard for what Iran needs to do if it wants to be treated like a normal country .
Those who claim that your 12 points are either unnecessary or unrealistic simply want to give Iran a free pass .
… The tyrants of Tehran deserve no free passes , ” Netanyahu said .
Biden and his presumptive foreign-policy team have already indicated that “ maximum pressure ” and Pompeo ’ s “ 12 points ” for Iran—including halting its nuclear programs , missile development , and support for regional proxy militias—will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ push .
Biden has called Trump ’ s withdrawal from the nuclear deal a “ self-inflicted disaster ” and said that once in office he would “ offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy.
” Both Biden and his incoming Secretary of State Antony Blinken have indicated the United States would rejoin the agreement ( and almost certainly provide some sanctions relief ) if Iran resumes abiding by the restrictions set out in the accords .
That arrangement would serve as a basis for follow-on talks aimed at “ strengthening and extending @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other areas of concern .
Netanyahu and other Israeli officials view such a move as a repudiation of all the ostensible leverage garnered over the last two years under Trump .
Last week ’ s assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh , considered the father of Iran ’ s military nuclear program , was likely not a coincidence .
“ The timing has to do with the situation that emerged as a result of the [ U.S. ] presidential elections and the fact that … Biden was a part of the team that cooked @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and he has said during the campaign that he intends to go back to the deal , ” retired Brig .
Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser , a former senior Israeli military intelligence officer , told foreign journalists on Sunday .
One unnamed Western intelligence official went further , telling Israel ’ s Channel 12 on Saturday that the assassination marked the “ last chance [ for Israel to strike a blow against Iran ] before Biden enters the White House and returns to the nuclear agreement that will give the Iranians immunity.
” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ use the cover of “ Western intelligence officials ” when discussing sensitive matters in the media . )
The Fakhrizadeh operation was only the most recent and palpable manifestation of Israel ’ s displeasure with Biden ’ s planned diplomatic outreach—if not an outright attempt to sabotage it .
In line with Netanyahu ’ s public warnings , Israel does not want to see any concessions granted to Iran .
“ My message to the Biden administration is : do not rush to the table with the Iranians , ” retired Brig .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ security advisor to Netanyahu , told Foreign Policy .
“ The Iranians are under pressure .
If they want a negotiation with the U.S. on the deal you can ’ t say , from the beginning , that the Biden administration should atone for what Trump did [ in pulling out of the nuclear deal ] .
It ’ s the opposite .
Iran should atone.
” Critics of this approach point out that the pressure Iran is under has not translated into tangible behavioral changes—quite the opposite .
Since 2018 , Iran @ @ @ @ @ @ @ grown twelvefold , missile development work has continued , and its support for regional proxies in Lebanon , Syria , Yemen , Iraq , and elsewhere in the Middle East rumbles on .
“ Iran is far from falling to its knees , it has not folded , ” Brig .
Gen. Dror Shalom , the outgoing head of Israeli military intelligence ’ s research division , told the Yedioth Ahronoth daily in October .
Shalom justified the “ pressure strategy ” on Iran and highlighted the holes in the original nuclear accord @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ shortened its jumping off point to the bomb ” since Washington ’ s withdrawal from the deal .
“ The nuclear agreement , despite its shortcomings , also had space to influence other issues , ” Shalom added .
“ It has not yet been proven that the exit from the nuclear agreement served Israel.
” Israeli government officials have ostensibly rejected this more nuanced analysis by their own national intelligence assessor .
One Israeli government source , speaking on condition of anonymity , said there was “ no daylight ” between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ coalition partner ) Defense Minister Benny Gantz on the question of “ maximum pressure ” on Iran .
Other Israeli security analysts have pointed to positive elements in the 2015 nuclear deal , even as they acknowledged its flaws .
Retired Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin , the former military intelligence chief and now the head of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv , told Foreign Policy that he rejected the two polar analyses surrounding the original 2015 nuclear accord : It was neither “ the best non-proliferation agreement ever reached @ @ @ @ @ @ @ second Munich Agreement , or maybe a second Holocaust … like some in Jerusalem , Riyadh , and elsewhere ” would have people believe .
Yadlin credited the agreement with rolling back Iran ’ s breakout time to a nuclear weapon from two months to one year , and ( contingent on Iranian compliance ) possibly a decade .
“ It is better than the situation was in 2015 … and this is something you can ’ t underestimate as an achievement , ” Yadlin added .
And yet , it would be @ @ @ @ @ @ @ back to the original 2015 nuclear agreement , Yadlin said , laying out a litany of concerns that must be addressed in any new negotiation : Iran ’ s ballistic missile development and nuclear weapons research , along with a harsher international inspection regime and a 20-year extension to the deal ’ s sunset provision .
The question for the Biden administration is whether such a deal with Iran , along the lines demanded by Israel , is even possible .
“ I find it difficult to resolve the Israeli , American , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ impossible to bridge , ” Raz Zimmt , a former Iran watcher in the Israeli military , told Foreign Policy .
“ Biden wants to go back to the nuclear deal [ in some fashion ] , and the Iranians won ’ t agree without sanctions relief—so the strategic decision in Washington is whether you pay to get Iran back into compliance .
The Israeli position is wishful thinking and doesn ’ t correspond with reality.
” Zimmt did allow that Netanyahu likely “ truly believes ” that maximum pressure will , in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s capitulation— “ not Pompeo ’ s 12 points , but something significant.
” Yet Iran ’ s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would almost certainly never relent .
“ Khamenei may believe that giving up all these things—a threshold nuclear program , missiles , and regional proxies—is more a threat to the regime than economic collapse.
” The Biden administration , upon taking office in late January , will inherit this escalating policy dilemma—and in extremis , as Zimmt put it , “ will have to essentially choose between Israel and Iran @ @

TEL AVIV, Israel—If one thing can be learned from the assassination of the top Iranian nuclear scientist outside Tehran last Friday, it is this: Israel and the incoming Biden administration are on a collision course over Iran policy.
TEL AVIV, Israel—If one thing can be learned from the assassination of the top Iranian nuclear scientist outside Tehran last Friday, it is this: Israel and the incoming Biden administration are on a collision course over Iran policy.
Analysts in Israel chalked up the timing of the operation, widely attributed to Israel’s Mossad, to the coming change of administrations in Washington and U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s plan to return to the nuclear deal signed with Iran in 2015. Outgoing President Donald Trump withdrew from the arms-control agreement in 2018, with backing from the Israeli government, citing flaws in the deal.
In the wake of the recent U.S. election, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it clear he opposes any reengagement with Iran. While there is near consensus in Israeli political circles with Netanyahu’s hard-line policy on Iran, some former Israeli security officials hold a more nuanced position.
“There can be no going back to the previous nuclear agreement. We must stick to an uncompromising policy of ensuring that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons,” Netanyahu said earlier this month.
In a joint appearance with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Jerusalem earlier this month, the Israeli premier went further, expressing gratitude for Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign of increased sanctions on Iran and defending Pompeo’s list of 12 demands to Tehran.
“Your 12 points set the standard for what Iran needs to do if it wants to be treated like a normal country. Those who claim that your 12 points are either unnecessary or unrealistic simply want to give Iran a free pass. … The tyrants of Tehran deserve no free passes,” Netanyahu said.
Biden and his presumptive foreign-policy team have already indicated that “maximum pressure” and Pompeo’s “12 points” for Iran—including halting its nuclear programs, missile development, and support for regional proxy militias—will not be part of the new diplomatic push.
Biden has called Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal a “self-inflicted disaster” and said that once in office he would “offer Tehran a credible path back to diplomacy.” Both Biden and his incoming Secretary of State Antony Blinken have indicated the United States would rejoin the agreement (and almost certainly provide some sanctions relief) if Iran resumes abiding by the restrictions set out in the accords. That arrangement would serve as a basis for follow-on talks aimed at “strengthening and extending” the nuclear deal’s provisions and other areas of concern.
Netanyahu and other Israeli officials view such a move as a repudiation of all the ostensible leverage garnered over the last two years under Trump. Last week’s assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, considered the father of Iran’s military nuclear program, was likely not a coincidence.
“The timing has to do with the situation that emerged as a result of the [U.S.] presidential elections and the fact that … Biden was a part of the team that cooked [up] the deal with Iran, and he has said during the campaign that he intends to go back to the deal,” retired Brig. Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser, a former senior Israeli military intelligence officer, told foreign journalists on Sunday.
One unnamed Western intelligence official went further, telling Israel’s Channel 12 on Saturday that the assassination marked the “last chance [for Israel to strike a blow against Iran] before Biden enters the White House and returns to the nuclear agreement that will give the Iranians immunity.” (Israeli intelligence officials are known to use the cover of “Western intelligence officials” when discussing sensitive matters in the media.)
The Fakhrizadeh operation was only the most recent and palpable manifestation of Israel’s displeasure with Biden’s planned diplomatic outreach—if not an outright attempt to sabotage it. In line with Netanyahu’s public warnings, Israel does not want to see any concessions granted to Iran.
“My message to the Biden administration is: do not rush to the table with the Iranians,” retired Brig. Gen. Jacob Nagel, a former national security advisor to Netanyahu, told Foreign Policy. “The Iranians are under pressure. If they want a negotiation with the U.S. on the deal you can’t say, from the beginning, that the Biden administration should atone for what Trump did [in pulling out of the nuclear deal]. It’s the opposite. Iran should atone.”
Critics of this approach point out that the pressure Iran is under has not translated into tangible behavioral changes—quite the opposite. Since 2018, Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium has grown twelvefold, missile development work has continued, and its support for regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East rumbles on.
“Iran is far from falling to its knees, it has not folded,” Brig. Gen. Dror Shalom, the outgoing head of Israeli military intelligence’s research division, told the Yedioth Ahronoth daily in October. Shalom justified the “pressure strategy” on Iran and highlighted the holes in the original nuclear accord. But he stressed that Tehran had “shortened its jumping off point to the bomb” since Washington’s withdrawal from the deal.
“The nuclear agreement, despite its shortcomings, also had space to influence other issues,” Shalom added. “It has not yet been proven that the exit from the nuclear agreement served Israel.”
Israeli government officials have ostensibly rejected this more nuanced analysis by their own national intelligence assessor. One Israeli government source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there was “no daylight” between Netanyahu and his political rival (and coalition partner) Defense Minister Benny Gantz on the question of “maximum pressure” on Iran.
Other Israeli security analysts have pointed to positive elements in the 2015 nuclear deal, even as they acknowledged its flaws.
Retired Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, the former military intelligence chief and now the head of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, told Foreign Policy that he rejected the two polar analyses surrounding the original 2015 nuclear accord: It was neither “the best non-proliferation agreement ever reached … [nor was it] a second Munich Agreement, or maybe a second Holocaust … like some in Jerusalem, Riyadh, and elsewhere” would have people believe.
Yadlin credited the agreement with rolling back Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon from two months to one year, and (contingent on Iranian compliance) possibly a decade. “It is better than the situation was in 2015 … and this is something you can’t underestimate as an achievement,” Yadlin added.
And yet, it would be wrong for the Biden administration to go back to the original 2015 nuclear agreement, Yadlin said, laying out a litany of concerns that must be addressed in any new negotiation: Iran’s ballistic missile development and nuclear weapons research, along with a harsher international inspection regime and a 20-year extension to the deal’s sunset provision.
The question for the Biden administration is whether such a deal with Iran, along the lines demanded by Israel, is even possible.
“I find it difficult to resolve the Israeli, American, and Iranian positions, which are almost impossible to bridge,” Raz Zimmt, a former Iran watcher in the Israeli military, told Foreign Policy.
“Biden wants to go back to the nuclear deal [in some fashion], and the Iranians won’t agree without sanctions relief—so the strategic decision in Washington is whether you pay to get Iran back into compliance. The Israeli position is wishful thinking and doesn’t correspond with reality.”
Zimmt did allow that Netanyahu likely “truly believes” that maximum pressure will, in the long term, lead to Iran’s capitulation—“not Pompeo’s 12 points, but something significant.” Yet Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would almost certainly never relent.
“Khamenei may believe that giving up all these things—a threshold nuclear program, missiles, and regional proxies—is more a threat to the regime than economic collapse.”
The Biden administration, upon taking office in late January, will inherit this escalating policy dilemma—and in extremis, as Zimmt put it, “will have to essentially choose between Israel and Iran.”


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--It’s Time for an Africa Policy Upgrade

It’s Time for an Africa Policy Upgrade

U.S. President Donald Trump ’ s policy toward Africa will be remembered by its tone of disrespect , from his calling African nations “ shithole countries ” to canceled cabinet-level trips to the region .
But while he needs to restore civility to U.S. foreign policy , President-elect Joe Biden shouldn ’ t fully reject Trump-era Africa policy when he takes office .
In part , that ’ s because Africa policy is unique .
It has historically been uncontroversially bipartisan , and U.S. presidents from Bill Clinton to Trump have continued their predecessors ’ Africa programs .
Since the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ presidents have built their policy towards Africa on a series of promising but standalone programs .
Clinton ’ s African Growth and Opportunity Act , George W. Bush ’ s President ’ s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief , Barack Obama ’ s Power Africa , and Trump ’ s Prosper Africa have all , to some degree , been—and continue to be—successful in enhancing trade , improving health , or expanding needed infrastructure on the continent .
As a series of siloed programs , however , they have been less equipped to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ transitioning to a green economy , combating insecurity , and peacefully managing a rising China .
The Biden administration can improve in that regard .
Now that African countries are becoming younger , more urban , digitally connected , and globally integrated—and now that great-power competition with China is on the rise—engagement with African nations should have a central place in the United States ’ grand strategy , advancing more than just regional interests .
It ’ s time for Biden to give Africa policy an upgrade , while still drawing on elements @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the United States can truly work alongside African nations to address globally shared challenges .
Before looking ahead , the Biden administration should recognize two positive aspects of Trump ’ s Africa policy .
First , Trump ’ s approach to Africa was rooted partially in his broader framing of U.S. foreign policy—namely , confronting a rising China , which then National Security Advisor John Bolton mentioned more than a dozen times when he announced the establishment of Prosper Africa in December 2018 .
While Trump officials ’ zero-sum thinking on China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ acknowledged that African partners are critical to peacefully managing a rising China .
Partly , that ’ s because African nations have an important role in international governance : They maintain a voting bloc of 44 in the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) and 54 in the United Nations .
They ’ re also increasingly important in the global economy .
Each year , citizens of Africa make up more of the global labor force , and the continent is home to elements and minerals , such as lithium , cobalt , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to future U.S. competitiveness in energy storage and high-tech industries .
The Trump administration correctly acknowledged that African partners are critical to peacefully managing a rising China.The focus on managing a rising China largely aligns with Biden ’ s own thinking .
In a 2019 speech , Biden acknowledged the need to be tough on China and “ to build a united front of friends and partners to challenge China ’ s abusive behavior.
” That front includes African nations , a plurality of which still maintain a slightly higher public opinion of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Second , through Prosper Africa and the newly expanded Development Finance Corporation ( DFC ) , which provides financing for projects in emerging markets , the Trump administration prioritized commercial ties to African countries .
Prosper Africa ’ s aim to double two-way trade and investment in African markets speaks to African countries ’ dual economic priorities of attracting capital and creating millions of jobs .
Prosper Africa has brought increased visibility to African opportunities , improved coordination among U.S. government agencies to support U.S. investors interested in African markets , and eased @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for companies doing business in Africa through political risk insurance and long-term trade finance .
Since becoming operational in December 2019 , the DFC has approved more than $ 2 billion in environmental and energy projects in the region , including a natural gas pipeline in Egypt , marine conservation in Kenya , and a natural gas power plant in Mozambique .
The Biden administration should build on this progress to further support trade and investment , as African markets continue to evolve rapidly and become more powerful in the global economy .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ the underlying structural trends supporting African growth and opportunity remain in place .
These include a young , increasingly urban population , whose tech-focused , entrepreneurial spirit contributed to African start-ups ’ raising $ 2 billion in funding in 2019 in sectors as varied as financial technology , logistics , energy , and health .
And once the African Continental Free Trade Area , the largest free trade area to be established since the founding of the WTO , starts being implemented in January , Africa will begin to integrate its fragmented markets @ @ @ @ @ @ @ billion people .
By eliminating restrictions on the free movement of goods , people , and capital , the free trade area will create an attractive opportunity for U.S. companies to sell and invest in a combined consumer and business base of $ 6.7 trillion by 2030 .
Fundamentally , the Biden administration needs to base the United States ’ relationship with African nations on respect.Recognizing the shifts in African markets and the continent ’ s rising geopolitical importance , the Biden administration needs to prioritize Africa more than Trump and his predecessors @ @ @ @ @ @ @ needs to base the United States ’ relationship with African nations on respect .
The underlying values , tone , and execution of all policies need an overhaul .
Trump ’ s rhetoric and other administration slights , such as Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross ’ s decision to cancel his appearance at the U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Mozambique in 2019 , hurt the United States ’ image as a trusted , committed partner .
To remedy this , the Biden administration should make presidential and other cabinet-level trips to African nations within the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ particular , the Biden administration will need to prioritize and actively engage with regional giants .
Nigeria , Egypt , South Africa , Morocco , Kenya , Ethiopia , and the Democratic Republic of the Congo hold considerable economic and political weight compared with their smaller neighbors .
Based on International Monetary Fund data , Africa ’ s three largest economies—Nigeria , South Africa , and Egypt—account for almost 50 percent of the continent ’ s gross domestic product .
While other nations should not be overlooked , Biden should make sure to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and partnership initiatives early on .
The Biden administration also needs to integrate the continent into more of its global priorities—not just competition with China .
Notably , these include climate change and the fight against extremism .
On these issues , regional efforts should continue , such as the United States-Africa Leaders Summit , a three-day White House summit hosted by Obama with 50 African leaders in 2014 to deepen partnerships in trade , investment , and security .
But more than that , in its foreign policy more broadly , Washington @ @ @ @ @ @ @ their Asian , European , and Latin American counterparts to create forums that can systematically address global challenges and opportunities , such as the rise of megacities .
African nations have a wide variety of potential partners—including Japan , Russia , China , Britain , and the European Union—so Biden should also play up the United States ’ comparative advantages to position his country on the continent .
One way of doing that is to leverage the United States ’ most competitive sectors , which include technology , entertainment , financial services , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gas services , and the creative industries .
The United States can ’ t really compete , for instance , with China on large-scale infrastructure projects , but it does have the wherewithal to increase investment in the service and creative sectors—and especially music , movies , and sports—which strengthens U.S. soft power and builds closer people-to-people ties between the continents .
Another U.S. advantage is its African diaspora .
As of 2015 , there were 2.1 million African immigrants living in the United States—a number that ’ s risen drastically in the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should involve the diaspora in the formation and execution of Africa policy , which could include partnering with the International Career Advancement Program and Congressional Black Caucus Foundation to recruit African immigrants in the administration and increase the number of Black Americans in the foreign service .
Biden ’ s team should also find ways to support the already extensive financial flows that the African diaspora directs to the continent—in 2017 , for example , Nigeria received an estimated $ 6.19 billion in remittances from the United States , more than from any @ @ @ @ @ @ @ will have the chance to draw an immediate line in the sand from Trump ’ s approach to Africa while still continuing the commercial progress of the past four years .
A new commitment to Africa would come at the right time , since the Biden administration wants to return to multilateralism and heal Washington ’ s political divisions .
The bipartisanship that has always characterized Africa policy would be a welcome break from the divisiveness of the Trump era and promote future collaboration across the aisle .
Hopefully , the Biden administration @ @ @ @ @ @ @ new era in U.S.-Africa relations .

U.S. President Donald Trump’s policy toward Africa will be remembered by its tone of disrespect, from his calling African nations “shithole countries” to canceled cabinet-level trips to the region. But while he needs to restore civility to U.S. foreign policy, President-elect Joe Biden shouldn’t fully reject Trump-era Africa policy when he takes office. In part, that’s because Africa policy is unique. It has historically been uncontroversially bipartisan, and U.S. presidents from Bill Clinton to Trump have continued their predecessors’ Africa programs.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s policy toward Africa will be remembered by its tone of disrespect, from his calling African nations “shithole countries” to canceled cabinet-level trips to the region. But while he needs to restore civility to U.S. foreign policy, President-elect Joe Biden shouldn’t fully reject Trump-era Africa policy when he takes office. In part, that’s because Africa policy is unique. It has historically been uncontroversially bipartisan, and U.S. presidents from Bill Clinton to Trump have continued their predecessors’ Africa programs.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have built their policy towards Africa on a series of promising but standalone programs. Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act, George W. Bush’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, Barack Obama’s Power Africa, and Trump’s Prosper Africa have all, to some degree, been—and continue to be—successful in enhancing trade, improving health, or expanding needed infrastructure on the continent. As a series of siloed programs, however, they have been less equipped to advance 21st-century U.S. geostrategic priorities such as transitioning to a green economy, combating insecurity, and peacefully managing a rising China.
The Biden administration can improve in that regard. Now that African countries are becoming younger, more urban, digitally connected, and globally integrated—and now that great-power competition with China is on the rise—engagement with African nations should have a central place in the United States’ grand strategy, advancing more than just regional interests. It’s time for Biden to give Africa policy an upgrade, while still drawing on elements of his predecessors’ initiatives, so that the United States can truly work alongside African nations to address globally shared challenges.
Before looking ahead, the Biden administration should recognize two positive aspects of Trump’s Africa policy. First, Trump’s approach to Africa was rooted partially in his broader framing of U.S. foreign policy—namely, confronting a rising China, which then National Security Advisor John Bolton mentioned more than a dozen times when he announced the establishment of Prosper Africa in December 2018. While Trump officials’ zero-sum thinking on China is excessive, the administration has correctly acknowledged that African partners are critical to peacefully managing a rising China. Partly, that’s because African nations have an important role in international governance: They maintain a voting bloc of 44 in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 54 in the United Nations. They’re also increasingly important in the global economy. Each year, citizens of Africa make up more of the global labor force, and the continent is home to elements and minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earths, that are crucial to future U.S. competitiveness in energy storage and high-tech industries.
The Trump administration correctly acknowledged that African partners are critical to peacefully managing a rising China.The focus on managing a rising China largely aligns with Biden’s own thinking. In a 2019 speech, Biden acknowledged the need to be tough on China and “to build a united front of friends and partners to challenge China’s abusive behavior.” That front includes African nations, a plurality of which still maintain a slightly higher public opinion of the United States than of China.
Second, through Prosper Africa and the newly expanded Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which provides financing for projects in emerging markets, the Trump administration prioritized commercial ties to African countries. Prosper Africa’s aim to double two-way trade and investment in African markets speaks to African countries’ dual economic priorities of attracting capital and creating millions of jobs. Prosper Africa has brought increased visibility to African opportunities, improved coordination among U.S. government agencies to support U.S. investors interested in African markets, and eased access to Washington’s commercial support for companies doing business in Africa through political risk insurance and long-term trade finance. Since becoming operational in December 2019, the DFC has approved more than $2 billion in environmental and energy projects in the region, including a natural gas pipeline in Egypt, marine conservation in Kenya, and a natural gas power plant in Mozambique.
The Biden administration should build on this progress to further support trade and investment, as African markets continue to evolve rapidly and become more powerful in the global economy. Despite COVID-19’s economic damage, the underlying structural trends supporting African growth and opportunity remain in place. These include a young, increasingly urban population, whose tech-focused, entrepreneurial spirit contributed to African start-ups’ raising $2 billion in funding in 2019 in sectors as varied as financial technology, logistics, energy, and health. And once the African Continental Free Trade Area, the largest free trade area to be established since the founding of the WTO, starts being implemented in January, Africa will begin to integrate its fragmented markets into a single market home to 1.2 billion people. By eliminating restrictions on the free movement of goods, people, and capital, the free trade area will create an attractive opportunity for U.S. companies to sell and invest in a combined consumer and business base of $6.7 trillion by 2030.
Fundamentally, the Biden administration needs to base the United States’ relationship with African nations on respect.Recognizing the shifts in African markets and the continent’s rising geopolitical importance, the Biden administration needs to prioritize Africa more than Trump and his predecessors did. And, fundamentally, it needs to base the United States’ relationship with African nations on respect. The underlying values, tone, and execution of all policies need an overhaul. Trump’s rhetoric and other administration slights, such as Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s decision to cancel his appearance at the U.S.-Africa Business Summit in Mozambique in 2019, hurt the United States’ image as a trusted, committed partner. To remedy this, the Biden administration should make presidential and other cabinet-level trips to African nations within the first 18 months in office.
In particular, the Biden administration will need to prioritize and actively engage with regional giants. Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo hold considerable economic and political weight compared with their smaller neighbors. Based on International Monetary Fund data, Africa’s three largest economies—Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt—account for almost 50 percent of the continent’s gross domestic product. While other nations should not be overlooked, Biden should make sure to give these nations attention through meaningful investments and partnership initiatives early on.
The Biden administration also needs to integrate the continent into more of its global priorities—not just competition with China. Notably, these include climate change and the fight against extremism. On these issues, regional efforts should continue, such as the United States-Africa Leaders Summit, a three-day White House summit hosted by Obama with 50 African leaders in 2014 to deepen partnerships in trade, investment, and security. But more than that, in its foreign policy more broadly, Washington should work with African nations along with their Asian, European, and Latin American counterparts to create forums that can systematically address global challenges and opportunities, such as the rise of megacities.
African nations have a wide variety of potential partners—including Japan, Russia, China, Britain, and the European Union—so Biden should also play up the United States’ comparative advantages to position his country on the continent. One way of doing that is to leverage the United States’ most competitive sectors, which include technology, entertainment, financial services, agribusiness and renewables, specialized oil and gas services, and the creative industries. The United States can’t really compete, for instance, with China on large-scale infrastructure projects, but it does have the wherewithal to increase investment in the service and creative sectors—and especially music, movies, and sports—which strengthens U.S. soft power and builds closer people-to-people ties between the continents.
Another U.S. advantage is its African diaspora. As of 2015, there were 2.1 million African immigrants living in the United States—a number that’s risen drastically in the past few decades. The Biden administration should involve the diaspora in the formation and execution of Africa policy, which could include partnering with the International Career Advancement Program and Congressional Black Caucus Foundation to recruit African immigrants in the administration and increase the number of Black Americans in the foreign service. Biden’s team should also find ways to support the already extensive financial flows that the African diaspora directs to the continent—in 2017, for example, Nigeria received an estimated $6.19 billion in remittances from the United States, more than from any other country.
Come January, Biden will have the chance to draw an immediate line in the sand from Trump’s approach to Africa while still continuing the commercial progress of the past four years. A new commitment to Africa would come at the right time, since the Biden administration wants to return to multilateralism and heal Washington’s political divisions. The bipartisanship that has always characterized Africa policy would be a welcome break from the divisiveness of the Trump era and promote future collaboration across the aisle. Hopefully, the Biden administration will seize the moment and define a new era in U.S.-Africa relations.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Democracy Is Still Not Safe in the United States

Democracy Is Still Not Safe in the United States Despite the headlines , democracy has not been saved .
Yes , the anti-democratic candidate lost ; yes , the election result in this case was aligned with the popular vote ; yes , the courts have been upholding that result .
But the same undemocratic conditions that allowed the election of an unpopular liar —voter suppression , the Electoral College , unchecked disinformation—are still in place , and a roadmap in how to use them is available for the next unscrupulous rich person who wants to try .
At best @ @ @ @ @ @ @ been given a reprieve .
Let ’ s use it .
Now is the time to make the United States more democratic .
Voter rights must be at the top of the list , but also scrapping the Electoral College , which has given two of the last six elections to the candidate the people didn ’ t vote for , and outlawing gerrymandering , which skews legislative seats and affects representation .
The House of Representatives has been capped at 435 seats since 1929 , meaning that as population has grown , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ representative .
At this point , each congressperson represents ten times or more as many people as in peer countries ; uncapping the House would be an immediate step towards a more representative democracy .
We could make Washington , D.C. , a state and reform the convoluted , expensive , and unfair primary system .
In fact , we could get rid of the Senate altogether .
All these process , rules , or institutions are venerable traditions , but they are also undemocratic .
Realistically , none of these changes will @ @ @ @ @ @ @ are workarounds for some of them , like the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact , which would make the Electoral College obsolete without needing to legally remove it .
But these ideas still need to be promoted and supported ; after all , democracy was never supposed to be easy .
Most of all , undemocratic processes have to become seen as unacceptable , instead of winked at or justified by history and tradition .
The evidence of the last four years is clear .
A weak party system will not winnow out @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ; instead , national committee members and downticket candidates are likely to support such candidates if they think they will lead to power .
Vetting by the media does not serve to eliminate criminals who lie outright and obviously , especially when large swaths of the electorate might call anything they disagree with “ fake news.
” The redoubted checks and balances of U.S. government have not stopped abuse of power and will not do so in the future .
And no norms or conventions will compel an autocrat , once they have @ @ @ @ @ @ @ common good rather than their own enrichment .
The challenges in instituting the changes aren ’ t the only obstacle .
Many direct policy areas will be clamoring for attention , and tasks from pandemic response to restoring climate change research are undeniably urgent .
It might seem difficult , dry , or counterproductive to focus instead on the parameters of the U.S. election system .
But reforming the democratic process is the right thing to do if the United States wants to call itself a democracy .
It also might be the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy goals of the incoming administration .
Public opinion on most issues is significantly closer to Democratic positions .
On gun control , health care , taxes , the role of government , the so-called representatives in Congress are not representing what most people want .
Allowing elections to reflect public opinion more accurately—surely the goal of any supporter of democracy—would instantly shift the Overton window of political discourse to be more aligned with what people actually want out of their government .
Crucially , to fix the dangerous gaps in U.S. election @ @ @ @ @ @ @ need to compromise principles or design complicated safeguards .
All they need to do is return emphatically to the founding principle of the United States : democracy .
Primary processes are complex , time-consuming , expensive , and designed to consolidate and maintain party power rather than to display the will of the people .
They are also entirely artificial and extra-constitutional , relatively modern , and therefore relatively easy to change .
The Electoral College , meanwhile , is an artifice designed to let the elites override the people .
Now unthinkable @ @ @ @ @ @ @ simply become a mathematical mess that gives some Americans a much greater say in the presidential election than others .
Reforming these systems is a clear step towards greater democracy .
Some people argue that more direct voting risks populism , that so-called low-information voters will vote against their own interests and therefore can ’ t be trusted with democracy .
That was , after all , more or less the reasoning of the Founders when they developed the Electoral College .
But consider that a simple popular vote would have given us @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Consider that the single-party control that abandoned all moderating role in the interests of appointing partisan judges and personal enrichment was enabled by gerrymandering and corporate funding .
The Republican proportion of seats in the House is consistently greater than its share of the popular vote .
The District of Columbia and its 700,000 residents have no voting power in Congress at all .
The populism and venality in our elections are not the result of too much democracy , but of too little .
This should be an easy call for the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , as well as the issue polls referenced above , hold that less voter suppression , higher voter turnout , and direct popular votes result in a better showing for Democratic candidates .
Removing gerrymandered districts would be likely to increase Democratic representation in Congress , and statehood for Washington , D.C. , would change the balance of the Senate at a stroke .
More importantly , all of those changes would make the country more democratic .
And yet , official statements on any of these issues are full of caution and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ goes up against tradition and inertia .
Some of them require difficult battles or complicated work-arounds .
But both principle and interest urge the administration , and the democratic party , to commit to reform now .
It ’ s our best hope of protecting ourselves from another wannabe dictator manipulating our flawed system to his own benefit .
We can see the risks of not reforming and the possibilities if we do .
It ’ s time to move the United States closer to the democracy it claims to be .

Despite the headlines, democracy has not been saved. Yes, the anti-democratic candidate lost; yes, the election result in this case was aligned with the popular vote; yes, the courts have been upholding that result. But the same undemocratic conditions that allowed the election of an unpopular liar —voter suppression, the Electoral College, unchecked disinformation—are still in place, and a roadmap in how to use them is available for the next unscrupulous rich person who wants to try. At best, democracy in the United States has been given a reprieve.
Despite the headlines, democracy has not been saved. Yes, the anti-democratic candidate lost; yes, the election result in this case was aligned with the popular vote; yes, the courts have been upholding that result. But the same undemocratic conditions that allowed the election of an unpopular liar —voter suppression, the Electoral College, unchecked disinformation—are still in place, and a roadmap in how to use them is available for the next unscrupulous rich person who wants to try. At best, democracy in the United States has been given a reprieve.
Let’s use it. Now is the time to make the United States more democratic.
Voter rights must be at the top of the list, but also scrapping the Electoral College, which has given two of the last six elections to the candidate the people didn’t vote for, and outlawing gerrymandering, which skews legislative seats and affects representation. The House of Representatives has been capped at 435 seats since 1929, meaning that as population has grown, so has the number of people per representative. At this point, each congressperson represents ten times or more as many people as in peer countries; uncapping the House would be an immediate step towards a more representative democracy. We could make Washington, D.C., a state and reform the convoluted, expensive, and unfair primary system. In fact, we could get rid of the Senate altogether. All these process, rules, or institutions are venerable traditions, but they are also undemocratic.
Realistically, none of these changes will be easy to accomplish, although there are workarounds for some of them, like the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which would make the Electoral College obsolete without needing to legally remove it. But these ideas still need to be promoted and supported; after all, democracy was never supposed to be easy. Most of all, undemocratic processes have to become seen as unacceptable, instead of winked at or justified by history and tradition.
The evidence of the last four years is clear. A weak party system will not winnow out the candidacy of undemocratic and bigoted candidates; instead, national committee members and downticket candidates are likely to support such candidates if they think they will lead to power. Vetting by the media does not serve to eliminate criminals who lie outright and obviously, especially when large swaths of the electorate might call anything they disagree with “fake news.” The redoubted checks and balances of U.S. government have not stopped abuse of power and will not do so in the future. And no norms or conventions will compel an autocrat, once they have gained power, to govern for the common good rather than their own enrichment.
The challenges in instituting the changes aren’t the only obstacle. Many direct policy areas will be clamoring for attention, and tasks from pandemic response to restoring climate change research are undeniably urgent. It might seem difficult, dry, or counterproductive to focus instead on the parameters of the U.S. election system. But reforming the democratic process is the right thing to do if the United States wants to call itself a democracy. It also might be the easiest way to accomplish some of the policy goals of the incoming administration. Public opinion on most issues is significantly closer to Democratic positions. On gun control, health care, taxes, the role of government, the so-called representatives in Congress are not representing what most people want. Allowing elections to reflect public opinion more accurately—surely the goal of any supporter of democracy—would instantly shift the Overton window of political discourse to be more aligned with what people actually want out of their government.
Crucially, to fix the dangerous gaps in U.S. election systems, the new administration does not need to compromise principles or design complicated safeguards. All they need to do is return emphatically to the founding principle of the United States: democracy.
Primary processes are complex, time-consuming, expensive, and designed to consolidate and maintain party power rather than to display the will of the people. They are also entirely artificial and extra-constitutional, relatively modern, and therefore relatively easy to change. The Electoral College, meanwhile, is an artifice designed to let the elites override the people. Now unthinkable in its original form, it has simply become a mathematical mess that gives some Americans a much greater say in the presidential election than others.
Reforming these systems is a clear step towards greater democracy. Some people argue that more direct voting risks populism, that so-called low-information voters will vote against their own interests and therefore can’t be trusted with democracy. That was, after all, more or less the reasoning of the Founders when they developed the Electoral College. But consider that a simple popular vote would have given us a different result four years ago. Consider that the single-party control that abandoned all moderating role in the interests of appointing partisan judges and personal enrichment was enabled by gerrymandering and corporate funding. The Republican proportion of seats in the House is consistently greater than its share of the popular vote. The District of Columbia and its 700,000 residents have no voting power in Congress at all. The populism and venality in our elections are not the result of too much democracy, but of too little.
This should be an easy call for the Democrats. Recent history and conventional wisdom, as well as the issue polls referenced above, hold that less voter suppression, higher voter turnout, and direct popular votes result in a better showing for Democratic candidates. Removing gerrymandered districts would be likely to increase Democratic representation in Congress, and statehood for Washington, D.C., would change the balance of the Senate at a stroke. More importantly, all of those changes would make the country more democratic. And yet, official statements on any of these issues are full of caution and doubt.
True, making these changes goes up against tradition and inertia. Some of them require difficult battles or complicated work-arounds. But both principle and interest urge the administration, and the democratic party, to commit to reform now. It’s our best hope of protecting ourselves from another wannabe dictator manipulating our flawed system to his own benefit.
We can see the risks of not reforming and the possibilities if we do. It’s time to move the United States closer to the democracy it claims to be.


foreignpolicy--2020-11-30--Note to Mohammed bin Salman: Stop Digging Yourself Deeper

Late on Nov. 22 , flight-tracking websites monitored a business jet , frequently used by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu , making a five-hour round trip from Tel Aviv to Neom , the futuristic city that Saudi Arabia is building on its Red Sea coast .
Within hours , the Middle East was abuzz with reports that Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen , the head of Mossad , had held secret talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo .
Though the Saudi foreign minister quickly tweeted a denial that the meeting occurred , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that the historic session had indeed been held , and that Israeli-Saudi normalization and countering Iran had topped the agenda .
It ’ s a critically important development for all kinds of reasons , not least being the powerful signal it seemed intended to send to an incoming Biden administration about Saudi Arabia ’ s crucial role in any efforts to advance stability in a volatile region that remains critical to U.S. interests .
The Saudis have plenty of reason to try and get on U.S. President-elect Joe Biden ’ s good side @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ s inner circle , the kingdom ’ s friends in Washington are few and far between these days .
Over the past four years , the bipartisan bill of indictment against Mohammed bin Salman has grown too long to list in full .
But the highlights include the ineffective prosecution of a brutal war in Yemen , the kidnapping of Lebanon ’ s prime minister , the unjust arrest and mistreatment of women ’ s rights activists , planting spies in U.S. technology giants , and , of course , the horrific @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Khashoggi by a Saudi hit team .
Trump ’ s refusal to hold the crown prince to account— “ I saved his ass , ” Trump famously bragged to Bob Woodward after shielding the prince from congressional sanction—was widely seen as enabling Saudi Arabia ’ s repeat offenses against U.S. interests and values .
Biden appears to share that dim view .
His growing antipathy toward the Saudis featured prominently in his campaign .
He promised to order a “ reassessment ” of the U.S.-Saudi relationship .
He attacked Trump for issuing “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bin Salman had abused to pursue reckless policies abroad and repression at home .
The insults flew fast and furious .
Biden called the kingdom a “ pariah , ” said there is “ very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia , ” and accused the Saudis of “ murdering children ” in Yemen .
He pledged to make Riyadh “ pay the price ” for its misdeeds , including cutting off support for the kingdom ’ s war effort .
The Saudis pay lobbyists in Washington , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ should try listening to them for once .
Add to the mix Biden ’ s commitment to reversing Trump ’ s maximum pressure campaign against Iran , Saudi Arabia ’ s most dangerous foe , and it ’ s clear that the Saudis have got a real problem on their hands .
So what ’ s a crown prince to do when the superpower that remains the irreplaceable bedrock of his kingdom ’ s security and stability starts doubting the value of the partnership ?
If he ’ s smart , he needs @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to put it bluntly , stop doing stupid shit that ’ s guaranteed to make the situation worse .
Last week ’ s transfer of the case of Loujain al-Hathloul , Saudi Arabia ’ s most prominent women ’ s rights activist , to a special terrorism court is a case in point .
Talk about poking a stick in Biden ’ s eye , not to mention the 10 powerful senators—nine Democrats and one Republican—who only two days earlier wrote a joint letter urging Riyadh to release Loujain and several other female @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Washington , D.C. , millions of dollars a year for advice on how to improve his country ’ s standing in the U.S. capital .
He should try listening to them for once .
But second , the Saudis need to launch some affirmative initiatives that will generate goodwill , show that they take U.S. concerns seriously , and underscore Mohammed bin Salman ’ s commitment to safeguarding the strategic partnership no matter who occupies the White House .
Rapidly resolving the highest-profile human rights cases seems like the obvious place to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ handful of people—the group of women activists , the blogger Raif Badawi , and three U.S.-Saudi dual nationals .
Most have been detained for years .
Many have suffered abuses .
None poses a serious threat to the Saudi state or Mohammed bin Salman ’ s grip on power .
On the contrary , it ’ s their continued imprisonment that systematically erodes Saudi Arabia ’ s standing with its most important Western partners .
Granting clemency at this point would be seen as an act of strength and wisdom , not weakness @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and his father , King Salman .
The gesture would no doubt garner Biden ’ s appreciation—he ’ s made clear his plan to elevate human rights as a foreign-policy priority—and be interpreted as a good-faith effort by Riyadh to turn a new page with the incoming administration .
Addressing U.S. concerns about the war in Yemen will be harder , but it ’ s not impossible .
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels seem determined to keep fighting , including regularly targeting Saudi Arabia itself with missiles , drones , and rockets .
But it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Mohammed bin Salman is looking for a way out of the long and costly quagmire .
The Saudis have undertaken unilateral cease-fires , opened negotiations with the Houthis , and most recently accepted a United Nations proposal for a cease-fire and an easing of the Saudi economic blockade of Yemen in exchange for a security buffer along the Saudi-Yemeni border .
For reasons of its own national interests , the kingdom is looking to be a part of the solution rather than the problem when it comes to efforts to de-escalate the war @ @ @ @ @ @ @ narrative that Riyadh should seek to drive home to the incoming Biden administration through continued word and deed .
The challenges facing Saudi Arabia with the end of the Trump era are real , but far from insurmountable .
Of course , the issue with the greatest potential for positively transforming Saudi Arabia ’ s fortunes in Washington is the one that was on display in Neom earlier this month : normalization with Israel and the expansion of the Jewish state ’ s peaceful relations across the Arab and Muslim worlds .
The @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for decades , and Saudi Arabia—as Islam ’ s birthplace , the custodian of its two holiest mosques , and arguably the world ’ s most influential Muslim state—holds the key to unlocking a veritable tidal wave of normalization , from Morocco to Pakistan , that would fundamentally shift the Middle East ’ s balance of power in ways overwhelmingly favorable to U.S. interests .
Needless to say , the prospect of delivering that kind of historic achievement for U.S. foreign policy and global peace and security would give the Biden administration a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the Saudis than it appears to have now .
The challenges facing Saudi Arabia in Washington with the end of the Trump era are real .
But they ’ re far from insurmountable .
For all the heated rhetoric during the campaign , Biden is a realist .
Based on long experience , he still recognizes “ the value of [ Saudi ] cooperation on counterterrorism and deterring Iran.
” But in light of Mohammed bin Salman ’ s most troubling actions of recent years , he “ would want to hear how @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to work with a more responsible U.S. administration.
” Read correctly , that sounds less like a threat and more like an invitation for the Saudis to take some meaningful steps to right the relationship going forward .
They would be wise to accept .
Hopefully , this month ’ s extraordinary get-together on the shores of the Red Sea is a signal of their intention to do precisely that .

Late on Nov. 22, flight-tracking websites monitored a business jet, frequently used by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, making a five-hour round trip from Tel Aviv to Neom, the futuristic city that Saudi Arabia is building on its Red Sea coast. Within hours, the Middle East was abuzz with reports that Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen, the head of Mossad, had held secret talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Though the Saudi foreign minister quickly tweeted a denial that the meeting occurred, several other Saudi and Israeli sources confirmed that the historic session had indeed been held, and that Israeli-Saudi normalization and countering Iran had topped the agenda. It’s a critically important development for all kinds of reasons, not least being the powerful signal it seemed intended to send to an incoming Biden administration about Saudi Arabia’s crucial role in any efforts to advance stability in a volatile region that remains critical to U.S. interests.
Late on Nov. 22, flight-tracking websites monitored a business jet, frequently used by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, making a five-hour round trip from Tel Aviv to Neom, the futuristic city that Saudi Arabia is building on its Red Sea coast. Within hours, the Middle East was abuzz with reports that Netanyahu and Yossi Cohen, the head of Mossad, had held secret talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Though the Saudi foreign minister quickly tweeted a denial that the meeting occurred, several other Saudi and Israeli sources confirmed that the historic session had indeed been held, and that Israeli-Saudi normalization and countering Iran had topped the agenda. It’s a critically important development for all kinds of reasons, not least being the powerful signal it seemed intended to send to an incoming Biden administration about Saudi Arabia’s crucial role in any efforts to advance stability in a volatile region that remains critical to U.S. interests.
The Saudis have plenty of reason to try and get on U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s good side. Outside of outgoing President Donald Trump’s inner circle, the kingdom’s friends in Washington are few and far between these days. Over the past four years, the bipartisan bill of indictment against Mohammed bin Salman has grown too long to list in full. But the highlights include the ineffective prosecution of a brutal war in Yemen, the kidnapping of Lebanon’s prime minister, the unjust arrest and mistreatment of women’s rights activists, planting spies in U.S. technology giants, and, of course, the horrific murder and dismemberment of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi by a Saudi hit team. Trump’s refusal to hold the crown prince to account—“I saved his ass,” Trump famously bragged to Bob Woodward after shielding the prince from congressional sanction—was widely seen as enabling Saudi Arabia’s repeat offenses against U.S. interests and values.
Biden appears to share that dim view. His growing antipathy toward the Saudis featured prominently in his campaign. He promised to order a “reassessment” of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. He attacked Trump for issuing “a dangerous blank check” that Mohammed bin Salman had abused to pursue reckless policies abroad and repression at home. The insults flew fast and furious. Biden called the kingdom a “pariah,” said there is “very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia,” and accused the Saudis of “murdering children” in Yemen. He pledged to make Riyadh “pay the price” for its misdeeds, including cutting off support for the kingdom’s war effort.
The Saudis pay lobbyists in Washington, D.C., millions of dollars a year—and should try listening to them for once.
Add to the mix Biden’s commitment to reversing Trump’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran, Saudi Arabia’s most dangerous foe, and it’s clear that the Saudis have got a real problem on their hands. So what’s a crown prince to do when the superpower that remains the irreplaceable bedrock of his kingdom’s security and stability starts doubting the value of the partnership?
If he’s smart, he needs to do two things. First, to put it bluntly, stop doing stupid shit that’s guaranteed to make the situation worse. Last week’s transfer of the case of Loujain al-Hathloul, Saudi Arabia’s most prominent women’s rights activist, to a special terrorism court is a case in point. Talk about poking a stick in Biden’s eye, not to mention the 10 powerful senators—nine Democrats and one Republican—who only two days earlier wrote a joint letter urging Riyadh to release Loujain and several other female prisoners. Mohammed bin Salman pays lobbyists in Washington, D.C., millions of dollars a year for advice on how to improve his country’s standing in the U.S. capital. He should try listening to them for once.
But second, the Saudis need to launch some affirmative initiatives that will generate goodwill, show that they take U.S. concerns seriously, and underscore Mohammed bin Salman’s commitment to safeguarding the strategic partnership no matter who occupies the White House.
Rapidly resolving the highest-profile human rights cases seems like the obvious place to start. It’s only a handful of people—the group of women activists, the blogger Raif Badawi, and three U.S.-Saudi dual nationals. Most have been detained for years. Many have suffered abuses. None poses a serious threat to the Saudi state or Mohammed bin Salman’s grip on power. On the contrary, it’s their continued imprisonment that systematically erodes Saudi Arabia’s standing with its most important Western partners. Granting clemency at this point would be seen as an act of strength and wisdom, not weakness on the part of Mohammed bin Salman and his father, King Salman. The gesture would no doubt garner Biden’s appreciation—he’s made clear his plan to elevate human rights as a foreign-policy priority—and be interpreted as a good-faith effort by Riyadh to turn a new page with the incoming administration.
Addressing U.S. concerns about the war in Yemen will be harder, but it’s not impossible. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels seem determined to keep fighting, including regularly targeting Saudi Arabia itself with missiles, drones, and rockets. But it’s become clear in 2020 that Mohammed bin Salman is looking for a way out of the long and costly quagmire. The Saudis have undertaken unilateral cease-fires, opened negotiations with the Houthis, and most recently accepted a United Nations proposal for a cease-fire and an easing of the Saudi economic blockade of Yemen in exchange for a security buffer along the Saudi-Yemeni border. For reasons of its own national interests, the kingdom is looking to be a part of the solution rather than the problem when it comes to efforts to de-escalate the war. This is a critical shift in narrative that Riyadh should seek to drive home to the incoming Biden administration through continued word and deed.
The challenges facing Saudi Arabia with the end of the Trump era are real, but far from insurmountable.
Of course, the issue with the greatest potential for positively transforming Saudi Arabia’s fortunes in Washington is the one that was on display in Neom earlier this month: normalization with Israel and the expansion of the Jewish state’s peaceful relations across the Arab and Muslim worlds. The latter has been a top U.S. priority for decades, and Saudi Arabia—as Islam’s birthplace, the custodian of its two holiest mosques, and arguably the world’s most influential Muslim state—holds the key to unlocking a veritable tidal wave of normalization, from Morocco to Pakistan, that would fundamentally shift the Middle East’s balance of power in ways overwhelmingly favorable to U.S. interests. Needless to say, the prospect of delivering that kind of historic achievement for U.S. foreign policy and global peace and security would give the Biden administration a considerably greater stake in good relations with the Saudis than it appears to have now.
The challenges facing Saudi Arabia in Washington with the end of the Trump era are real. But they’re far from insurmountable. For all the heated rhetoric during the campaign, Biden is a realist. Based on long experience, he still recognizes “the value of [Saudi] cooperation on counterterrorism and deterring Iran.” But in light of Mohammed bin Salman’s most troubling actions of recent years, he “would want to hear how Saudi Arabia intends to change its approach to work with a more responsible U.S. administration.” Read correctly, that sounds less like a threat and more like an invitation for the Saudis to take some meaningful steps to right the relationship going forward. They would be wise to accept. Hopefully, this month’s extraordinary get-together on the shores of the Red Sea is a signal of their intention to do precisely that.