foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Chinese Acquisitions of Western Firms Threaten National Security

Ten years ago , the idea that a gay dating app or a video-sharing app popular with teens could pose a national security risk would have seemed ludicrous .
Today , Grindr and TikTok—along with countless other less famous companies that never thought of themselves as intersecting with national security—are at the center of a geopolitical standoff .
U.S. President Donald Trump and many European governments are trying to ban foreign ownership of strategic firms , and these popular apps are being swept up into the mix .
But banning is the easy part .
Who ’ s going to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ilk are not allowed to ?
I bet you didn ’ t know that the social media personality Addison Rae is now TikTok ’ s top earner , beating out fellow stars Charli D ’ Amelio and Loren Gray .
Most of us over the age of 20 don ’ t follow the latest trends on the app .
We simply know that on Aug. 6 Trump signed two executive orders banning TikTok and WeChat , another popular messaging app based in China , on the grounds that they “ threaten the national @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of the United States.
” Around the same time , he conducted what amounted to a public negotiation for the sale of TikTok to Microsoft .
Since then , Oracle—backed by venture capitalists—has reportedly entered the takeover race as well .
Corporate ownership is the new front line in geopolitical competition .
I previously wrote for Foreign Policy about Chinese firms ’ growing interest in buying coronavirus-weakened European businesses and warned that this posed a national security threat .
In Sweden , for example , Chinese acquisitions of Swedish firms have accelerated since @ @ @ @ @ @ @ those takeovers covering focus areas of China ’ s Made in China 2025 plan for economic superpower status , according to a 2019 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency .
Before the coronavirus crisis struck , governments didn ’ t seem to consider this issue urgent .
Given that cross-border investments are the lifeblood of globalization , one can understand their reluctance .
The United States was virtually alone in imposing restrictions , with Congress passing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018 , though the same year Germany lowered @ @ @ @ @ @ @ areas required government approval , from 25 percent to 10 percent .
Then the pandemic hit , and Chinese firms started preying on struggling Western businesses .
In May , BOC Aviation ( whose ultimate owner is the Bank of China ) bought a large stake in Norwegian , the world ’ s fifth-largest budget airline .
China ’ s duplicitous behavior during the pandemic made governments and citizens alike realize that more circumspection was needed , and now several Western governments are trying to protect their firms from takeovers by the firms @ @ @ @ @ @ @ extended government regulation of foreign investments ; it now includes areas that don ’ t just directly affect the country ’ s national security but also areas where foreign investments are likely to pose a threat .
France , Poland , and Spain have all taken similar steps , while Italy is strengthening its Golden Power legislation .
Stricter legislation is also underway in the Swedish parliament , and the European Commission has issued stricter foreign investment guidelines that will come into force this October .
The United Kingdom , meanwhile , is @ @ @ @ @ @ @ conducting a parliamentary inquiry into foreign countries ’ use of corporate takeovers .
It even has a new subcommittee dedicated to the issue .
And this month , the Trump administration announced plans to ban Chinese firms that don ’ t comply with U.S. accounting standards from U.S. stock exchanges .
It is against Western countries ’ interests to lose key technology to a geopolitical rival .
But the protection of firms must go further than the finished product .
These restrictions are a good step ; it is against Western countries ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ geopolitical rival .
But the protection of firms must go further than the finished product .
“ We need a comprehensive strategy to protect U.S. and allied critical technology supply chains , ” said retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery , who is the executive director of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission , a nonpartisan commission appointed by Congress .
“ This strategy should include identifying critical materials and equipment to ensure that the U.S. and its key allies can produce these goods should global supply chains be disrupted.
” But that leaves one @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and other non-friendly countries aren ’ t kosher , who ’ s going to acquire the firms ?
Sometimes businesses may happily remain independent .
But often owners want to sell , especially if the firm—however cutting-edge it may be—needs a financial boost .
Washington is discovering that the invisible hand is not infallible .
The United States lacks serious 5G firms that are able to compete with Huawei , meaning that when Western governments reject a Chinese or other foreign bidder , it could lead to a situation where no friendly candidate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ German government found itself part of a nail-biting exercise in precisely such a case .
A large Australian shareholder of 50Hertz , a key German energy utility , was selling its shares—and the State Grid Corporation of China ( SGCC ) declared that it wanted to buy a 20 percent stake .
SGCC had previously tried to buy a larger stake but was thwarted by a Belgian firm .
The 20 percent stake , though , remained available .
With German law at the time only requiring government approval of stakes of 25 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t stop the deal .
Instead , it took the highly unusual step of instructing the government-owned bank KfW to buy the stake .
( The KfW , founded in 1948 as part of the Marshall Plan , primarily lends money to public institutions and German and European companies . )
The 50Hertz deal , though , was an exception , and Western governments still lack an overarching strategy for dealing with this issue .
Trump seems to believe in an ad hoc approach , with the U.S. government acting as the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , has in the past sometimes quietly urged U.K.-based companies to buy British businesses , preventing Chinese outfits from doing so .
But these are just improvised measures , and China knows Western countries don ’ t have a long-term plan .
After Britain ’ s decision this summer to ban Huawei from its 5G networks , Beijing ’ s ambassador to London , Liu Xiaoming , ominously suggested that Chinese firms may withdraw their participation in two U.K. nuclear plants .
If the invisible hand won ’ t produce candidates , governments @ @ @ @ @ @ @ We need to ensure that there ’ s sufficient capital to replace the lost potential from Chinese investors , ” Montgomery said .
One strategy might be to incentivize domestic firms and others in EU , NATO , and Five Eyes countries to acquire or buy large stakes in companies whose Chinese would-be buyers have been blocked by the government .
Governments themselves could also invest .
Germany has pioneered a 500 billion euro Economic Stabilization Fund that will provide loans and loan guarantees to companies weakened by the coronavirus crisis ; it @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to invest in companies that Chinese firms would otherwise have bought .
And countries could follow the United States ’ successful model of government-owned venture capital firms .
In-Q-Tel , the CIA ’ s ( nonprofit ) venture capital firm , has a portfolio of dozens of start-ups with technology pertinent to the firm ’ s mission , and the Army Venture Capital Initiative performs the same role for the U.S. Army .
Other countries could set up similar venture capital initiatives , which could be connected to , say , the interior @ @ @ @ @ @ @ intelligence agency .
The U.K. government , for example , could beef up its small National Security Strategic Investment Fund .
“ Providing alternative capital for start-ups and increased public research and development funding can be part of the solution , ” said Pal Jonson , the head of the Swedish parliament ’ s defense committee , but he cautioned that “ it will also require companies in the tech sector to make more selective decisions whom they partner up with.
” If firms are important enough to warrant exclusion of certain foreign @ @ @ @ @ @ @ must be important enough for governments to invest in .
In some countries , it may not ( yet ) be legally possible , but where it is , investments and acquisitions could even be a good deal for taxpayers : Businesses with cutting-edge technology vital to the nation ’ s well-being are likely to prosper in the long term .
In 2018 , after Grindr was acquired by the Chinese gaming company Kunlun , the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ( CFIUS ) grasped the national security implications of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in the hands of a Chinese owner .
In a rare move , it forced Kunlun to sell Grindr .
But the Chinese firm pulled a trick .
The new owner , a completely new Delaware-based investment group jointly led by a former executive at the Chinese search engine Baidu and a Singapore-based businessman , has close links to Kunlun .
When CFIUS ordered Kunlun to sell Grindr last year , the two businessmen advised Kunlun .
They then founded the firm that bought the app , Reuters reported .
Grindr has , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Western governments need to plan their next steps .
Otherwise , their well-intentioned plans to keep intellectual property and key technology safe from subversive firms could seriously damage U.S. and European security .

Ten years ago, the idea that a gay dating app or a video-sharing app popular with teens could pose a national security risk would have seemed ludicrous. Today, Grindr and TikTok—along with countless other less famous companies that never thought of themselves as intersecting with national security—are at the center of a geopolitical standoff. U.S. President Donald Trump and many European governments are trying to ban foreign ownership of strategic firms, and these popular apps are being swept up into the mix. But banning is the easy part. Who’s going to buy companies if the Chinese and their ilk are not allowed to?
Ten years ago, the idea that a gay dating app or a video-sharing app popular with teens could pose a national security risk would have seemed ludicrous. Today, Grindr and TikTok—along with countless other less famous companies that never thought of themselves as intersecting with national security—are at the center of a geopolitical standoff. U.S. President Donald Trump and many European governments are trying to ban foreign ownership of strategic firms, and these popular apps are being swept up into the mix. But banning is the easy part. Who’s going to buy companies if the Chinese and their ilk are not allowed to?
I bet you didn’t know that the social media personality Addison Rae is now TikTok’s top earner, beating out fellow stars Charli D’Amelio and Loren Gray. Most of us over the age of 20 don’t follow the latest trends on the app. We simply know that on Aug. 6 Trump signed two executive orders banning TikTok and WeChat, another popular messaging app based in China, on the grounds that they “threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” Around the same time, he conducted what amounted to a public negotiation for the sale of TikTok to Microsoft. Since then, Oracle—backed by venture capitalists—has reportedly entered the takeover race as well.
Corporate ownership is the new front line in geopolitical competition. I previously wrote for Foreign Policy about Chinese firms’ growing interest in buying coronavirus-weakened European businesses and warned that this posed a national security threat. In Sweden, for example, Chinese acquisitions of Swedish firms have accelerated since 2014, with more than half of those takeovers covering focus areas of China’s Made in China 2025 plan for economic superpower status, according to a 2019 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency.
Before the coronavirus crisis struck, governments didn’t seem to consider this issue urgent. Given that cross-border investments are the lifeblood of globalization, one can understand their reluctance. The United States was virtually alone in imposing restrictions, with Congress passing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018, though the same year Germany lowered the limit for when investments in sensitive areas required government approval, from 25 percent to 10 percent.
Then the pandemic hit, and Chinese firms started preying on struggling Western businesses. In May, BOC Aviation (whose ultimate owner is the Bank of China) bought a large stake in Norwegian, the world’s fifth-largest budget airline.
China’s duplicitous behavior during the pandemic made governments and citizens alike realize that more circumspection was needed, and now several Western governments are trying to protect their firms from takeovers by the firms of unfriendly countries. The German government extended government regulation of foreign investments; it now includes areas that don’t just directly affect the country’s national security but also areas where foreign investments are likely to pose a threat.
France, Poland, and Spain have all taken similar steps, while Italy is strengthening its Golden Power legislation. Stricter legislation is also underway in the Swedish parliament, and the European Commission has issued stricter foreign investment guidelines that will come into force this October. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, is expanding its limited Enterprise Act and is conducting a parliamentary inquiry into foreign countries’ use of corporate takeovers. It even has a new subcommittee dedicated to the issue. And this month, the Trump administration announced plans to ban Chinese firms that don’t comply with U.S. accounting standards from U.S. stock exchanges.
It is against Western countries’ interests to lose key technology to a geopolitical rival. But the protection of firms must go further than the finished product.
These restrictions are a good step; it is against Western countries’ interests to lose key technology to a geopolitical rival. But the protection of firms must go further than the finished product. “We need a comprehensive strategy to protect U.S. and allied critical technology supply chains,” said retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, who is the executive director of the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, a nonpartisan commission appointed by Congress. “This strategy should include identifying critical materials and equipment to ensure that the U.S. and its key allies can produce these goods should global supply chains be disrupted.”
But that leaves one major complication: If buyers from China and other non-friendly countries aren’t kosher, who’s going to acquire the firms? Sometimes businesses may happily remain independent.
But often owners want to sell, especially if the firm—however cutting-edge it may be—needs a financial boost. Washington is discovering that the invisible hand is not infallible. The United States lacks serious 5G firms that are able to compete with Huawei, meaning that when Western governments reject a Chinese or other foreign bidder, it could lead to a situation where no friendly candidate emerges.
Two years ago, the German government found itself part of a nail-biting exercise in precisely such a case. A large Australian shareholder of 50Hertz, a key German energy utility, was selling its shares—and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) declared that it wanted to buy a 20 percent stake. SGCC had previously tried to buy a larger stake but was thwarted by a Belgian firm. The 20 percent stake, though, remained available.
With German law at the time only requiring government approval of stakes of 25 percent or above, the government couldn’t stop the deal. Instead, it took the highly unusual step of instructing the government-owned bank KfW to buy the stake. (The KfW, founded in 1948 as part of the Marshall Plan, primarily lends money to public institutions and German and European companies.)
The 50Hertz deal, though, was an exception, and Western governments still lack an overarching strategy for dealing with this issue. Trump seems to believe in an ad hoc approach, with the U.S. government acting as the matchmaker. The British government, meanwhile, has in the past sometimes quietly urged U.K.-based companies to buy British businesses, preventing Chinese outfits from doing so.
But these are just improvised measures, and China knows Western countries don’t have a long-term plan. After Britain’s decision this summer to ban Huawei from its 5G networks, Beijing’s ambassador to London, Liu Xiaoming, ominously suggested that Chinese firms may withdraw their participation in two U.K. nuclear plants.
If the invisible hand won’t produce candidates, governments will need to do so. “We need to ensure that there’s sufficient capital to replace the lost potential from Chinese investors,” Montgomery said. One strategy might be to incentivize domestic firms and others in EU, NATO, and Five Eyes countries to acquire or buy large stakes in companies whose Chinese would-be buyers have been blocked by the government.
Governments themselves could also invest. Germany has pioneered a 500 billion euro Economic Stabilization Fund that will provide loans and loan guarantees to companies weakened by the coronavirus crisis; it and other countries could create similar funds to invest in companies that Chinese firms would otherwise have bought.
And countries could follow the United States’ successful model of government-owned venture capital firms. In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s (nonprofit) venture capital firm, has a portfolio of dozens of start-ups with technology pertinent to the firm’s mission, and the Army Venture Capital Initiative performs the same role for the U.S. Army. Other countries could set up similar venture capital initiatives, which could be connected to, say, the interior ministry rather than the army or an intelligence agency.
The U.K. government, for example, could beef up its small National Security Strategic Investment Fund. “Providing alternative capital for start-ups and increased public research and development funding can be part of the solution,” said Pal Jonson, the head of the Swedish parliament’s defense committee, but he cautioned that “it will also require companies in the tech sector to make more selective decisions whom they partner up with.”
If firms are important enough to warrant exclusion of certain foreign buyers on national security grounds, they must be important enough for governments to invest in. In some countries, it may not (yet) be legally possible, but where it is, investments and acquisitions could even be a good deal for taxpayers: Businesses with cutting-edge technology vital to the nation’s well-being are likely to prosper in the long term.
In 2018, after Grindr was acquired by the Chinese gaming company Kunlun, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) grasped the national security implications of a gay dating app’s data in the hands of a Chinese owner. In a rare move, it forced Kunlun to sell Grindr. But the Chinese firm pulled a trick.
The new owner, a completely new Delaware-based investment group jointly led by a former executive at the Chinese search engine Baidu and a Singapore-based businessman, has close links to Kunlun. When CFIUS ordered Kunlun to sell Grindr last year, the two businessmen advised Kunlun. They then founded the firm that bought the app, Reuters reported. Grindr has, in other words, barely left Kunlun.
Western governments need to plan their next steps. Otherwise, their well-intentioned plans to keep intellectual property and key technology safe from subversive firms could seriously damage U.S. and European security.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Pompeo to Travel to the Middle East to Boost Regional Efforts Against Iran

Pompeo to Travel to the Middle East to Boost Regional Efforts Against Iran Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures , protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force , and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will begin a tour of the Middle East today to boost the Trump administration ’ s recent raft of diplomatic activity aimed at deterring Iran .
The visit will begin with @ @ @ @ @ @ @ today , before Pompeo heads to the United Arab Emirates tomorrow .
The meetings will focus on the implementation of the recently signed Israeli-UAE deal that normalized relations between the two countries , as well as the security threat posed by China and Iran .
Countering Iran .
The deal has formalized a longstanding trend as an increasing number of Arab states shift their geopolitical priorities away from confrontation with Israel toward cooperation against Iran .
Brokered by the United States , the deal also reflects Washington ’ s wider efforts to coordinate @ @ @ @ @ @ @ bigger picture .
On Sunday , White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner said that the deal should increase the probability of the United States selling F-35 fighter jets to the UAE , ostensibly to bolster the country ’ s military capabilities against Iran .
Kushner is expected to make his own trip to the Middle East beginning later this week .
These events are occurring against the backdrop of the Trump administration ’ s attempt to extend the arms embargo against Iran at the U.N. Security Council , a move that was supported @ @ @ @ @ @ @ failed to gain support from other key U.S. allies at the U.N. Scanning the region .
Pompeo is also expected to visit Bahrain and Sudan as part of this trip , both countries rumored to be in talks with the Israeli government to follow the UAE and normalize their own relations with Israel .
In Sudan , Pompeo will meet with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other top officials “ to discuss continued U.S. support for the civilian-led transitional government and express support for deepening the Sudan-Israel relationship , ” according to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to be on the verge of normalizing its ties with Israel after a foreign ministry spokesman hinted that a deal was imminent .
But the foreign minister denied holding discussions with Israel , rejecting rumors that an agreement was forthcoming .
Talks between the two sides are still believed to be ongoing , however , and Pompeo ’ s trip could provide a critical boost to that process .
August 24 .
Mike Pompeo will lead a conversation at the Atlantic Council covering his recent trip to Europe and increasing tensions with China @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand takes place this week .
August 24-27 .
The Republican National Convention takes place this week .
Trump will be formally nominated as the Republican Party ’ s candidate for president .
August 24-28 .
Talks between the United Kingdom and the European Union over their post-Brexit economic relationship are set to resume .
August 26 .
Germany hosts an informal meeting of the EU ’ s defense ministers .
August 27 .
The United States is due to lift sanctions on the Taliban @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with the group .
Military threatens protesters in Belarus .
Tensions in Belarus escalated on Sunday after tens of thousands of people defied warnings from the military against protesting , flooding into the capital city of Minsk and briefly demonstrating near the residence of President Aleksandr Lukashenko .
Before the protests started , the defense ministry issued an unequivocal threat of force : “ We categorically warn : any violation of peace and order in such places , ” it said in a statement , referring to World War II monuments , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with now , not the police.
” Sunday marked the 15th consecutive day of protests against Lukashenko , which began after the longtime president claimed a landslide victory in elections on Aug. 9 despite facing his fiercest opposition in his 26 years in office .
Pressure on Mali .
Mediators from across West Africa met with Mali ’ s newly-formed military junta on Sunday to discuss a way out of the current crisis and a return to civilian rule .
In response to the Aug. 19 military coup that deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) imposed a series of sanctions on Mali ; barring Malian representatives from participating in its institutions , halting financial flows in and out of the country , and sealing off its borders .
The ECOWAS sanctions were also discussed on Sunday .
While mediators have been unable to reach a resolution , sources told Reuters that reinstating Keita is not an option .
But a long-term solution will have to do more than just address the political crisis .
As Philip @ @ @ @ @ @ @ week , ECOWAS needs to move beyond its past recommendations and offer a workable plan .
“ Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit , thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented , ” he wrote .
The protesters may also need to adjust their demands , even if it means letting Keita play a role .
Keeping Keita out of government “ would not end Mali @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and more patient .
For the stability of the country , it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament.
” There will also have to be financial support .
As former U.S. diplomats Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman argued in FP last week , what Mali needs is a comprehensive economic plan similar to the post-World War II Marshall Plan to truly address the country ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Challenging the ceasefire in Libya .
The eastern Libya-based Libyan National Army ( LNA ) dismissed a ceasefire announcement by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord ( GNA ) on Sunday , claiming it was little more than a stunt giving it political cover while it continues to build up its military presence in conflict zones .
Fighting had been underway in the coastal city of Sirte despite the failure of the LNA ’ s brutal 14-month campaign to take the capital city of Tripoli in June .
As Jason Pack wrote in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Israel-UAE deal could embolden the UAE-backed LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar—deepening regional rivalries and prolonging the war in Libya rather than bringing peace .
The GNA announced a nationwide ceasefire on Friday in an attempt to breathe life into the stalled peace negotiations and bring an end to the country ’ s years-long civil war .
But political options are running out .
As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy , the LNA ’ s international backers have been persistent in seeking to retain a footprint in the country despite @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
That means partition is becoming an increasingly likely long-term scenario .
More U.S. troops pull out of Iraq .
U.S.-led coalition troops withdrew from Iraq ’ s Taji base located north of Baghdad on Sunday and transferred control of the facility to the Iraqi security forces , part of a larger drawdown of U.S. troops in the country .
The base has held up to 2,000 troops in the past , but most of those stationed there have departed this summer .
The final troops are due to leave in the coming @ @ @ @ @ @ @ as the Trump administration has been working with the Iraqi government to coordinate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country .
On Friday , after a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi , Trump reiterated his desire to pull out of Iraq .
“ Frankly , I didn ’ t think ( the Iraq War ) was a good idea , ” he said .
“ Now we ’ re getting out , we ’ ll be leaving shortly.
” The handover of Camp Taji is the eighth such transfer of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Add one more shocking news event to what has already been a turbulent 2020 .
According to the Center for Near Earth Objects Studies at NASA ’ s Jet Propulsion Laboratory , a small asteroid is hurtling toward Earth and is projected to come close to our planet on November 2—the day before the U.S. presidential election .
Luckily , NASA said the object only has a 0.41 percent chance of actually hitting Earth , and even if it does , the likelihood that it does any damage is infinitesimal .
“ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ 6.5 feet , and poses no threat to Earth .
If it were to enter our planet ’ s atmosphere , it would disintegrate due to its extremely small size , ” NASA said in a statement .
For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures, protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force, and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire .
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pompeo travels to the Middle East to push anti-Iran measures, protesters in Belarus defy an implied threat of military force, and the Libyan National Army rejects a nationwide ceasefire.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Pompeo Begins Tour of the Middle East Today
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will begin a tour of the Middle East today to boost the Trump administration’s recent raft of diplomatic activity aimed at deterring Iran. The visit will begin with a meeting between U.S. and Israeli officials today, before Pompeo heads to the United Arab Emirates tomorrow. The meetings will focus on the implementation of the recently signed Israeli-UAE deal that normalized relations between the two countries, as well as the security threat posed by China and Iran.
Countering Iran. The deal has formalized a longstanding trend as an increasing number of Arab states shift their geopolitical priorities away from confrontation with Israel toward cooperation against Iran. Brokered by the United States, the deal also reflects Washington’s wider efforts to coordinate a multilateral bulwark against Iran.
The bigger picture. On Sunday, White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner said that the deal should increase the probability of the United States selling F-35 fighter jets to the UAE, ostensibly to bolster the country’s military capabilities against Iran. Kushner is expected to make his own trip to the Middle East beginning later this week. These events are occurring against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempt to extend the arms embargo against Iran at the U.N. Security Council, a move that was supported by the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council but failed to gain support from other key U.S. allies at the U.N.
Scanning the region. Pompeo is also expected to visit Bahrain and Sudan as part of this trip, both countries rumored to be in talks with the Israeli government to follow the UAE and normalize their own relations with Israel. In Sudan, Pompeo will meet with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other top officials “to discuss continued U.S. support for the civilian-led transitional government and express support for deepening the Sudan-Israel relationship,” according to the State Department.
Sudan was initially thought to be on the verge of normalizing its ties with Israel after a foreign ministry spokesman hinted that a deal was imminent. But the foreign minister denied holding discussions with Israel, rejecting rumors that an agreement was forthcoming. Talks between the two sides are still believed to be ongoing, however, and Pompeo’s trip could provide a critical boost to that process.
The World This Week
August 24. Mike Pompeo will lead a conversation at the Atlantic Council covering his recent trip to Europe and increasing tensions with China.
August 24-27. Sentencing of the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand takes place this week.
August 24-27. The Republican National Convention takes place this week. Trump will be formally nominated as the Republican Party’s candidate for president.
August 24-28. Talks between the United Kingdom and the European Union over their post-Brexit economic relationship are set to resume.
August 26. Germany hosts an informal meeting of the EU’s defense ministers.
August 27. The United States is due to lift sanctions on the Taliban as part of its February peace deal with the group.
August 30. Montenegro will hold parliamentary elections.
What We’re Following Today
Military threatens protesters in Belarus. Tensions in Belarus escalated on Sunday after tens of thousands of people defied warnings from the military against protesting, flooding into the capital city of Minsk and briefly demonstrating near the residence of President Aleksandr Lukashenko. Before the protests started, the defense ministry issued an unequivocal threat of force: “We categorically warn: any violation of peace and order in such places,” it said in a statement, referring to World War II monuments, “you will have the army to deal with now, not the police.”
Sunday marked the 15th consecutive day of protests against Lukashenko, which began after the longtime president claimed a landslide victory in elections on Aug. 9 despite facing his fiercest opposition in his 26 years in office.
Pressure on Mali. Mediators from across West Africa met with Mali’s newly-formed military junta on Sunday to discuss a way out of the current crisis and a return to civilian rule. In response to the Aug. 19 military coup that deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the rest of the government, the 15-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed a series of sanctions on Mali; barring Malian representatives from participating in its institutions, halting financial flows in and out of the country, and sealing off its borders. The ECOWAS sanctions were also discussed on Sunday.
While mediators have been unable to reach a resolution, sources told Reuters that reinstating Keita is not an option. But a long-term solution will have to do more than just address the political crisis. As Philip Obaji Jr. wrote in Foreign Policy last week, ECOWAS needs to move beyond its past recommendations and offer a workable plan. “Insisting that the Keita government be replaced by other politicians will only mean bringing in another group of people who will likely use power for their personal benefit, thereby maintaining the status quo and leaving much of the country discontented,” he wrote.
The protesters may also need to adjust their demands, even if it means letting Keita play a role. Keeping Keita out of government “would not end Mali’s problems,” Obaji argued. “The mutinying soldiers and the opposition have to be more clever and more patient. For the stability of the country, it will be better to let him serve his legitimate term but check his powers through a new and robust parliament.”
There will also have to be financial support. As former U.S. diplomats Vicki J. Huddleston and Witney Schneidman argued in FP last week, what Mali needs is a comprehensive economic plan similar to the post-World War II Marshall Plan to truly address the country’s deep social and economic problems.
Keep an Eye On
Challenging the ceasefire in Libya. The eastern Libya-based Libyan National Army (LNA) dismissed a ceasefire announcement by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) on Sunday, claiming it was little more than a stunt giving it political cover while it continues to build up its military presence in conflict zones. Fighting had been underway in the coastal city of Sirte despite the failure of the LNA’s brutal 14-month campaign to take the capital city of Tripoli in June. As Jason Pack wrote in FP last week, the recently signed Israel-UAE deal could embolden the UAE-backed LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar—deepening regional rivalries and prolonging the war in Libya rather than bringing peace.
The GNA announced a nationwide ceasefire on Friday in an attempt to breathe life into the stalled peace negotiations and bring an end to the country’s years-long civil war. But political options are running out. As Anas El Gomati recently wrote for Foreign Policy, the LNA’s international backers have been persistent in seeking to retain a footprint in the country despite the LNA’s recent military setbacks. That means partition is becoming an increasingly likely long-term scenario.
More U.S. troops pull out of Iraq. U.S.-led coalition troops withdrew from Iraq’s Taji base located north of Baghdad on Sunday and transferred control of the facility to the Iraqi security forces, part of a larger drawdown of U.S. troops in the country. The base has held up to 2,000 troops in the past, but most of those stationed there have departed this summer. The final troops are due to leave in the coming days.
Sunday’s withdrawal comes as the Trump administration has been working with the Iraqi government to coordinate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country. On Friday, after a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Trump reiterated his desire to pull out of Iraq. “Frankly, I didn’t think (the Iraq War) was a good idea,” he said. “Now we’re getting out, we’ll be leaving shortly.” The handover of Camp Taji is the eighth such transfer of an Iraqi base to Iraqi security forces.
Odds and Ends
Add one more shocking news event to what has already been a turbulent 2020. According to the Center for Near Earth Objects Studies at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a small asteroid is hurtling toward Earth and is projected to come close to our planet on November 2—the day before the U.S. presidential election.
Luckily, NASA said the object only has a 0.41 percent chance of actually hitting Earth, and even if it does, the likelihood that it does any damage is infinitesimal. “Asteroid 2018VP1 is very small, approximately 6.5 feet, and poses no threat to Earth. If it were to enter our planet’s atmosphere, it would disintegrate due to its extremely small size,” NASA said in a statement.
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-25--The Republican National Convention Is Already Over

The Republican National Convention Is Already Over For more than four years , Donald Trump has demolished every tradition and norm of American politics , and on Monday he did it again .
Minutes after his formal re-nomination as the Republican Party ’ s candidate on the opening day of the Republican National Convention , the president made an unexpected appearance and declared flatly that there was no way his Democratic opponent , Joe Biden , could win fairly on Nov. 3 .
“ The only way they can take this election away from us is if this is a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ small but cheering crowd of his adorers in Charlotte , N.C .
It is a version of a line that Trump has turned into a mantra of mockery about U.S. democratic traditions in recent weeks , as he lays the groundwork to claim victory in an election that every major polls shows him losing , in some cases by double digits .
At another point on Monday , Trump suggested the chant of “ four more years !
” —another tradition at national conventions—wasn ’ t good enough .
“ If you want @ @ @ @ @ @ @ twelve more years , ” Trump told the crowd .
The Constitution limits the president to two terms .
So once again the Republican agenda has been hijacked and heaved overboard , as it has been since Trump appeared on the national scene .
RNC Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel , who is known to be passionately devoted to Trump , told media outlets last week that the convention would be positive and forward-looking .
But Trump quickly set the tone for what is likely to be a series of fierce attacks on imagined Democratic @ @ @ @ @ @ @ some really bad things in 2016 and we have to be careful because they ’ re trying it again , ” he said , referring to alleged Democratic attempts to steal the election for which no evidence exists .
Thus , there is very little mystery about what is to ensue in the next three days—or two months until election day .
It will be , as it was on Monday , Donald Trump talking once again about how his administration is the greatest in American history , and the American people can @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
“ It ’ s just part of the pathology , that he can ’ t let a single day go by where he ’ s not the center of attention , ” said Rich Galen , a former leading Republican consultant and one of hundreds of Republican officials and party loyalists who say they can not support Trump this time .
Although normally the presidential nominee of a party doesn ’ t appear until the final night of the four-day convention , Trump plans to speak every day , organizers said .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ nearly hour-long remarks , declared : “ This is the most important election in the history of our country.
” It is an assessment that many political experts would agree with , though for the opposite reasons laid out by the president .
Many historians , diplomats and political experts have said they believe a second Trump term would do major , lasting damage to the U.S. republic , with an administration helmed by a president who has flagrantly defied Congress and the courts , leading to his impeachment .
Experts also fear @ @ @ @ @ @ @ system that Washington has led since World War II , in part because Trump has spent much of his first term withdrawing from it , including major agreements such as the Paris climate accord , the Iran nuclear deal and the Trans-Pacific Partnership intended largely to bring China in line with open-and-fair trade norms .
Biden has said he would try to renegotiate the TPP to put renewed pressure on Beijing , albeit with more of a focus on returning manufacturing jobs to U.S. shores .
Trump , however , said China would @ @ @ @ @ @ @ elected and the Democratic nominee would appoint “ super radical left crazy judges.
” He also said he was presiding once again over the strongest economy in U.S. history , despite post-pandemic numbers that show GDP is shrinking and unemployment is still above 10 percent .
“ Before the plague came in from China … we were going in a direction like we have never seen—the most successful economy in the history of our country , ” Trump said .
Trump spent a good portion of his remarks on Monday trying to make @ @ @ @ @ @ @ harvesting ” by sending out mail-in ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic to people who normally wouldn ’ t vote .
“ They ’ re using COVID to steal the election , ” Trump said .
He was arguing , in effect , for low turnout to win , since Republicans are more enthusiastic about him , he said , than Democrats are about Biden .
Trump said frankly he was banking on his base to turn out in big numbers and win the election for him , and the RNC lineup featured speakers @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fiercely identified with that base .
In contrast to the DNC convention , which featured three ex-presidents ( Barack Obama , Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter ) and a former Republican secretary of state ( Colin Powell ) as well as ex-governor ( John Kasich ) , the RNC speakers ’ list is filled with family member and lower-level Trump adherents like Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan , who served as Trump ’ s most ferocious defender during the impeachment hearings late last year .
Two notable exceptions will be Sen. Tim Scott , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , and former U.N .
Ambassador Nikki Haley , who is widely seen as a possible heir to Trump .
But in a further effort to portray the Democrats as radicals , the speakers ’ list also included Mark and Patricia McCloskey , the St. Louis couple who in late June pointed guns at Black Lives Matter protesters as they marched past their home .
All of Trump ’ s children will speak and , in a controversial move that mixes official U.S. business with politics—a habit of this administration—Secretary of State Mike @ @ @ @ @ @ @ diplomatic trip to Israel .
Although early speakers at the RNC convention said Trump had acted quickly to save the nation from the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic—which is likely to be one of the main issues in the campaign—a special report from FP Analytics in August ranked the U.S. among the six worst-performing countries in the world , alongside Turkey , Iran , Mexico and Indonesia , and rock bottom in the world for its failure of “ fact-based communication.
” The detailed study , the first of its kind to analyze @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy metrics , found that the U.S. ranked so poorly because of the federal government ’ s inability to mount an appropriate scientific response ; inadequate emergency health care spending ; insufficient testing and hospital beds ; and limited debt relief .

For more than four years, Donald Trump has demolished virtually every tradition and norm of American politics, and on Monday he did it again. Minutes after his formal renomination as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate on the opening day of the Republican National Convention (RNC), the president made an unexpected appearance and declared flatly that there was no way his Democratic opponent, Joe Biden, could win fairly on Nov. 3.
For more than four years, Donald Trump has demolished virtually every tradition and norm of American politics, and on Monday he did it again. Minutes after his formal renomination as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate on the opening day of the Republican National Convention (RNC), the president made an unexpected appearance and declared flatly that there was no way his Democratic opponent, Joe Biden, could win fairly on Nov. 3.
“The only way they can take this election away from us is if this is a rigged election,” Trump told the small but cheering crowd of his adorers in Charlotte, North Carolina. It is a version of a line that Trump has made into a mantra of mockery about U.S. democratic traditions in recent weeks, as he seemingly lays the groundwork to claim victory in an election that every major poll shows him losing, in some cases by double digits. At another point on Monday, Trump suggested the chant of “four more years!”—another tradition at national conventions—wasn’t good enough. “If you want to really drive them crazy, say 12 more years,” Trump told the crowd. The Constitution limits the president to two four-year terms.
So once again the Republican agenda has been hijacked and heaved overboard, as it has been since Trump appeared on the national scene. Republican National Committee Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel, who is known to be passionately devoted to Trump, told media outlets last week that the convention would be positive and forward-looking. But Trump quickly set the tone for what is likely to be a series of fierce attacks on imagined Democratic conspiracies. “We caught them doing some really bad things in 2016 and we have to be careful because they’re trying it again,” he said, referring to alleged Democratic attempts to steal the election for which no evidence exists.
Thus, there is very little mystery about what is to ensue in the next three days of the convention—or the two months until election day. It will be, as it was on Monday, Trump talking once again about how his administration is the greatest in U.S. history, and the American people can’t afford to do without him. “It’s just part of the pathology, that he can’t let a single day go by where he’s not the center of attention,” said Rich Galen, a former leading Republican consultant and one of hundreds of Republican officials and party loyalists who say they cannot support Trump this time.
Although normally the presidential nominee of a party doesn’t appear until the final night of the four-day convention, Trump plans to speak every day, organizers said. Indeed he made two more appearances Monday night, using the White House as a campaign platform. In an apparent effort to show that he possesses as much “empathy” as Biden has—the Democratic National Convention focused a great deal on the former Democratic vice president’s decency and humane qualities—Trump appeared with COVID-19 survivors who thanked him for his efforts to fight the pandemic. Then he appeared again from the White House, touting his interventions in bringing U.S. hostages home from abroad. Both segments were previously recorded.
Trump, in his seemingly impromptu, nearly hourlong remarks earlier Monday, declared: “This is the most important election in the history of our country.” It is an assessment that many political experts would agree with, though for reasons opposite to those laid out by the president. Many historians, diplomats, and political experts have said they believe a second Trump term would do major, lasting damage to the U.S. republic, with an administration helmed by a president who has flagrantly defied Congress and the courts and demonstrably used official U.S. foreign policy to further his political interests, leading to his impeachment. Experts also fear for the survival of the Westernized international system that Washington has led since World War II, in part because Trump has spent much of his first term withdrawing from it, including major agreements such as the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership intended largely to bring China in line with open and fair trade norms. Biden has said he would try to renegotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership to put renewed pressure on Beijing, albeit with more of a focus on returning manufacturing jobs to U.S. shores.
Trump, however, said China would “own” Biden if he were elected and the Democratic nominee would appoint “super radical left crazy judges.” He also said he was presiding once again over the strongest economy in U.S. history, despite coronavirus pandemic numbers that show GDP is shrinking and unemployment is still above 10 percent. “Before the plague came in from China … we were going in a direction like we have never seen—the most successful economy in the history of our country,” Trump said.
Monday night’s speakers laid out what is certain to be one of the party’s main campaign lines in coming weeks—that Biden, a confirmed centrist for his entire career, will bring a “dangerous socialist agenda” into the White House, as former Fox News host Kimberly Guilfoyle put it. Former United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley, one of the biggest stars in the party, later made a similar claim, saying that Biden would be dominated by the Democratic Party’s progressive wing. “Their vision for America is socialism,” which “would be a disaster for our economy,” Haley said. Yet another speaker, Donald Trump Jr., condemned Biden’s “radical left-wing” politics, even as he paradoxically criticized Biden for supporting free-trade deals. Most of the speakers sought to warn that a Biden administration would promote left-wing “cancel culture” suppressing free speech, and they identified Black Lives Matter protests with violent mobs attacking American cities.
Trump himself, meanwhile, spent a good portion of his remarks on Monday trying to make the case that Democrats are “harvesting” votes by sending out mail-in ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic to people who normally wouldn’t vote. “They’re using COVID to steal the election,” Trump said. He was arguing, in effect, for low turnout to win, since Republicans are more enthusiastic about him, he said, than Democrats are about Biden.
Trump said frankly he was banking on his base to turn out in big numbers and win the election for him. And the RNC lineup featured speakers who, like him, are most fiercely identified with that largely white base (though organizers also deftly managed to promote diversity, bringing in several pro-Trump African Americans and Latinos). In contrast to last week’s Democratic National Convention, which featured three ex-presidents (Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, and Jimmy Carter) and a former Republican secretary of state (Colin Powell) as well as a Republican ex-governor (John Kasich), the RNC speakers list is filled with family members and lower-level Trump adherents such as Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan, who served as Trump’s most ferocious defender during the impeachment hearings late last year. Two notable exceptions were Haley and South Carolina Sen. Tim Scott, the only Black Republican in the Senate. But in a further effort to portray the Democrats as radicals, the speakers also included Mark and Patricia McCloskey, the St. Louis couple who in late June pointed guns at Black Lives Matter protesters as they marched past their home.
Led by Donald Trump Jr., most of Trump’s children plan to speak and, in a controversial move that mixes official U.S. business with politics—a habit of this administration—Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will address the convention during a diplomatic trip to Israel.
Several early speakers at the RNC said Trump had acted quickly to save the nation from the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is likely to be one of the main issues in the campaign. Even so, a special report from FP Analytics in August ranked the United States among the six worst-performing countries among 36 that were rated, just above Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, Iran, and China, and rock bottom in the world for its failure of “fact-based communication.” The detailed study, the first of its kind to analyze national leaders’ pandemic responses by critical policy metrics, found that the United States ranked so poorly because of the federal government’s inability to mount an appropriate scientific response, inadequate emergency health care spending, insufficient testing and hospital beds, and limited debt relief. Although the United States represents only 4 percent of the world’s population, it has recorded a quarter of all COVID-19 cases and 22 percent of the total number of deaths.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Racial Injustice Protests Spark Think Tank Diversity Push

Hundreds of Washington think tank and policy professionals , including some directors and CEOs , have signed a letter advocating for more diversity in their profession after nationwide protests against racial injustice shook the country this summer .
The letter , signed by more than 300 current and former employees from 43 think tanks and research organizations , provides a detailed blueprint for reforms in the largely white Washington policy scene , recommending that think tanks make public their diversity data and work harder to recruit and retain people of color by adding human resources staff and paid internships , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ “ The lack of diversity amongst decision-makers across organizations has severely hindered the ability of these institutions to promote and retain people of color , particularly Black Americans , ” the letter says , building on an initial push for greater diversity in the think tank community led by Women of Color Advancing Peace , Security and Conflict Transformation , a Washington-based advocacy organization .
“ As long as the boards , leadership , and research fellows at think tanks remain overwhelmingly white , the work they produce is a product of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ very fabric of these organizations themselves , ” the letter reads .
Prompted by nationwide protests over the death of George Floyd , a Black man , at the hands of police in Minneapolis earlier this year , the pledge includes among its signatories current and former staffers from the Atlantic Council , the Brookings Institution , the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , the Center for Strategic and International Studies , the Council on Foreign Relations , and New America .
“ Our industry largely focuses its efforts on promoting innovative policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ staffers of color , ” the signatories add .
“ What a loss for the United States when organizations can not see that stifling the latter actively hurts advancement of the former .
Our industry must do better.
” One of the organizers of the letter , who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity and was not authorized to speak to the media , said the issue had long been on the radar of employees “ but there hasn ’ t really been a means of channeling those criticisms and making @ @ @ @ @ @ @ for name-blind recruitment to address biases , and higher salaries and tuition reimbursement as a means of improving retention .
“ The pipeline only works if the pipeline doesn ’ t break down once it feeds people into an institution , ” one of the organizers said .
“ If you ’ re focusing on recruitment and the pipeline but you ’ re not focusing on retention , there ’ s a big discrepancy there as well in retaining your female talent and your talent of color.
” One signatory of the letter @ @ @ @ @ @ @ had few people of color in senior-ranking positions and tended to pay their white scholars more than others .
A former U.S. Agency for International Development official and Atlantic Council employee , Romero said the imbalance in diversity in senior-ranking positions and pay disparities convinced her not to return to the think tank arena .
“ Coming out of government I chose not to go back into the think tank space because I didn ’ t have any confidence that I would get paid equitably or I would get promoted equitably , ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ like you carry the weight of your community on your shoulders when you ’ re the only person there , ” she added .
“ You just don ’ t find as a person of color that they invest in you in the same way.
” Former think tank employees who spoke to Foreign Policy said that a lack of diversity has also hampered the way policy organizations have tackled the U.S. role in Latin America and Africa .
In one instance , Romero said , a Washington think tank set up a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ that failed to include people from the region or fluent Spanish speakers .
Another former Washington think tank employee told Foreign Policy that the lack of diversity at the institutions where she ’ d worked , including the Council on Foreign Relations , was reflected in how teams would approach issues .
The employee described the impact of an overwhelmingly white team working on a project concerning Nigeria .
“ Even the way that we approached it was from this place of , ‘ Oh , Nigeria doesn ’ t know what they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Nigeria , what a developing country ’ —and I think that that is in part because [ the team ] was predominantly white people , ” she said .
She said think tanks often consider topics such as energy , labor , and women ’ s issues in a “ really race-blind way , ” even as the issues they seek to address , such as sufficient parental leave , disproportionately affect Black people and other people of color .
The problem is not just a lack of diversity in the think tank @ @ @ @ @ @ @ an absence of proper sensitivity training and an unwillingness among higher-level staff to understand perspectives outside their own .
So far , think tanks have not valued or prioritized diversity and inclusion , she said , citing her experiences of being tokenized as a reality for most people of color working in these spaces .
“ Unfortunately , I feel like many think tanks think the solution here is performative , and it really does need to be transformative , ” she said .
“ We ’ re not going to change these @ @ @ @ @ @ @ we think about how we ’ re talking about bigger issues.
” The lack of diversity in the think tank world is not just an American problem .
Oheneba Boateng , who has a Ph.D. in political science and currently works as a fellow at a think tank in Berlin , characterizes the issue as endemic in most Western countries .
Boateng , who has worked at policy organizations in Canada , Germany , and his native Ghana , told Foreign Policy that , as a Black African man in the European and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ feels that his colleagues “ refuse to see [ him ] as an individual , ” twisting the diversity mantra to anoint him representative of all Ghanaians or Africans and then check diversity off their to-do lists .
Boateng recounts numerous discussions where he was asked to provide an “ African perspective , ” a prompt he found absurd .
He says he also faces more scrutiny over his work than white colleagues .
In one instance at an institute in Canada , a white female colleague subjected Boateng ’ s writing to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the editorial standard .
Asked why she chose to scrutinize his work , Boateng ’ s colleague said she wanted to ensure his work was of the highest quality .
Boateng said he felt his “ credibility had been undermined.
” Meanwhile , two young academics who research peace and security issues in Germany , Sarah Bressan and Theresa Lütkefend , have taken it upon themselves to reform the system from the inside , launching an initiative called “ Better Think Tanking , ” which aims to make professional advancement more dependent on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ culture .
They say the current think tank career ladder is “ marked by unchecked biases , intersectional discrimination and a generational divide.
” Romero , the former USAID official and Atlantic Council fellow , said things would change only when people of color were represented at all levels of the profession .
“ We should be having people in programmatic , policy , leadership positions that are people of color , that are women of color , and I don ’ t see that at all .
”

Jack Detsch, Chloe Hadavas and Allison Meakem

Hundreds of Washington think tank and policy professionals, including some directors and CEOs, have signed a letter advocating for more diversity in their profession after nationwide protests against racial injustice shook the country this summer.
Hundreds of Washington think tank and policy professionals, including some directors and CEOs, have signed a letter advocating for more diversity in their profession after nationwide protests against racial injustice shook the country this summer.
The letter, signed by more than 300 current and former employees from 43 think tanks and research organizations, provides a detailed blueprint for reforms in the largely white Washington policy scene, recommending that think tanks make public their diversity data and work harder to recruit and retain people of color by adding human resources staff and paid internships, and by interviewing more diverse candidates.
“The lack of diversity amongst decision-makers across organizations has severely hindered the ability of these institutions to promote and retain people of color, particularly Black Americans,” the letter says, building on an initial push for greater diversity in the think tank community led by Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, a Washington-based advocacy organization.
“As long as the boards, leadership, and research fellows at think tanks remain overwhelmingly white, the work they produce is a product of the white experience alone, along with the very fabric of these organizations themselves,” the letter reads.
Prompted by nationwide protests over the death of George Floyd, a Black man, at the hands of police in Minneapolis earlier this year, the pledge includes among its signatories current and former staffers from the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and New America.
“Our industry largely focuses its efforts on promoting innovative policy ideas, but inadequately promotes its own staffers of color,” the signatories add. “What a loss for the United States when organizations cannot see that stifling the latter actively hurts advancement of the former. Our industry must do better.”
One of the organizers of the letter, who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity and was not authorized to speak to the media, said the issue had long been on the radar of employees “but there hasn’t really been a means of channeling those criticisms and making any change.” The letter also calls for name-blind recruitment to address biases, and higher salaries and tuition reimbursement as a means of improving retention.
“The pipeline only works if the pipeline doesn’t break down once it feeds people into an institution,” one of the organizers said. “If you’re focusing on recruitment and the pipeline but you’re not focusing on retention, there’s a big discrepancy there as well in retaining your female talent and your talent of color.”
One signatory of the letter, Cynthia Romero, said think tanks had few people of color in senior-ranking positions and tended to pay their white scholars more than others. A former U.S. Agency for International Development official and Atlantic Council employee, Romero said the imbalance in diversity in senior-ranking positions and pay disparities convinced her not to return to the think tank arena. “Coming out of government I chose not to go back into the think tank space because I didn’t have any confidence that I would get paid equitably or I would get promoted equitably,” she said.
“You do feel like you carry the weight of your community on your shoulders when you’re the only person there,” she added. “You just don’t find as a person of color that they invest in you in the same way.”
Former think tank employees who spoke to Foreign Policy said that a lack of diversity has also hampered the way policy organizations have tackled the U.S. role in Latin America and Africa. In one instance, Romero said, a Washington think tank set up a Latin America center with an advisory board that failed to include people from the region or fluent Spanish speakers.
Another former Washington think tank employee told Foreign Policy that the lack of diversity at the institutions where she’d worked, including the Council on Foreign Relations, was reflected in how teams would approach issues. The employee described the impact of an overwhelmingly white team working on a project concerning Nigeria.
“Even the way that we approached it was from this place of, ‘Oh, Nigeria doesn’t know what they’re doing,’ or ‘Nigeria, what a developing country’—and I think that that is in part because [the team] was predominantly white people,” she said.
She said think tanks often consider topics such as energy, labor, and women’s issues in a “really race-blind way,” even as the issues they seek to address, such as sufficient parental leave, disproportionately affect Black people and other people of color.
The problem is not just a lack of diversity in the think tank community, she said, but also an absence of proper sensitivity training and an unwillingness among higher-level staff to understand perspectives outside their own.
So far, think tanks have not valued or prioritized diversity and inclusion, she said, citing her experiences of being tokenized as a reality for most people of color working in these spaces. “Unfortunately, I feel like many think tanks think the solution here is performative, and it really does need to be transformative,” she said. “We’re not going to change these systems unless we hire intentionally, unless we think about how we’re talking about bigger issues.”
The lack of diversity in the think tank world is not just an American problem. Oheneba Boateng, who has a Ph.D. in political science and currently works as a fellow at a think tank in Berlin, characterizes the issue as endemic in most Western countries. Boateng, who has worked at policy organizations in Canada, Germany, and his native Ghana, told Foreign Policy that, as a Black African man in the European and North American policy arena, he often feels that his colleagues “refuse to see [him] as an individual,” twisting the diversity mantra to anoint him representative of all Ghanaians or Africans and then check diversity off their to-do lists.
Boateng recounts numerous discussions where he was asked to provide an “African perspective,” a prompt he found absurd. He says he also faces more scrutiny over his work than white colleagues. In one instance at an institute in Canada, a white female colleague subjected Boateng’s writing to three more rounds of proofreading than was the editorial standard. Asked why she chose to scrutinize his work, Boateng’s colleague said she wanted to ensure his work was of the highest quality. Boateng said he felt his “credibility had been undermined.”
Meanwhile, two young academics who research peace and security issues in Germany, Sarah Bressan and Theresa Lütkefend, have taken it upon themselves to reform the system from the inside, launching an initiative called “Better Think Tanking,” which aims to make professional advancement more dependent on expertise than an adherence to a professional culture. They say the current think tank career ladder is “marked by unchecked biases, intersectional discrimination and a generational divide.”
Romero, the former USAID official and Atlantic Council fellow, said things would change only when people of color were represented at all levels of the profession.
“We should be having people in programmatic, policy, leadership positions that are people of color, that are women of color, and I don’t see that at all.”


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--Lukashenko Mistakes Protesters’ Principles for Weakness

MINSK , Belarus — Anti-government protesters took to the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday , marking the 15th day of the Belarusian political crisis in the wake of the blatant falsification of presidential election results in favor of the country ’ s long-term authoritarian president , Aleksandr Lukashenko .
Despite dramatic government threats against protesters , the imposition of travel barriers inside and around the capital , and predictions of rain , the opposition resoundingly disproved fears that the protest movement had begun to lose steam and momentum .
By putting around 200,000 people , perhaps @ @ @ @ @ @ @ opposition ignored the progressively more histrionic threats that had been emanating from Lukashenko and his security forces .
Earlier in the weekend , Lukashenko ordered a full mobilization of the Belarusian military and denounced an imminent NATO invasion on the Lithuanian border , even as generals openly discussed the possibility of civil war .
This continues to be the most velvet of revolutions , as I have written elsewhere .
The Belarusian protesters are strikingly peaceful , mature , disciplined and civilized .
While they demonstrated that they can dominate the streets , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ confrontations with the security services .
But that may be dangerous .
The opposition and Lukashenko are speaking very different languages when it comes to force .
Lukashenko has successfully used violence to repress protesters after previous elections .
The young people I speak with at the protests have consciously chosen the 1989 Czech model and consistently reject comparisons to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2014 .
“ We are a different sort of people , ” they have told me , while remaining aware of the possibility of tanks being deployed against them @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , sending out messages to avoid provocations through Telegram channels , Lukashenko saw this not as an invitation to negotiation but as a sign of weakness .
For Lukashenko , who has jettisoned the conciliatory tone he had briefly adapted last week , that perception of weakness will likely only encourage the ratcheting-up of ever more repressive violence .
To do that , he may need help from outside .
The OMON special riot police , which has been beating and torturing protesters since the first days after the election , have proved @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Yet security services made no attempt to arrest demonstrators or to assault the protest ’ s main column , retreating to secure only the presidential palace and the Belarusian Great Patriotic War Museum , which commemorates World War II .
The Museum had symbolic impact : Throwing a military cordon around it signaled the regime ’ s embrace of the Moscow narrative of the place of war memory in conferring post-Soviet political legitimacy .
Faced with the loss of power , Lukashenko has now abandoned his decadelong dance of playing off Russia @ @ @ @ @ @ @ lot with Moscow ’ s willingness to rescue him .
That may mean a future he has vigorously resisted for years : running Belarus as little more than the governor of a Russian province .
But if it ’ s his only choice , as he sees it , he ’ ll take it .
The gulf between the protesters ’ understanding of confrontation and Lukashenko ’ s was highlighted during a spontaneous march on the presidential palace , Lukashenko ’ s working residency .
The surreal events that resulted may be some @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Lukashenko seems to have panicked at the protests reaching the palace and , upon reinforcing the garrison , took off in his military helicopter to fly over the heads of the protesters .
State-controlled media would later publish footage of Lukashenko looking down from the window of the helicopter and referring to protesters as “ rats.
” Upon touching back down on the grass inside the presidential compound , Lukashenko leapt out of the helicopter with an unloaded AK-47 rifle in his left hand .
Lukashenko than proceeded to thank the stolid @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the barricades outside of the palace .
“ Thank you , you are all legends !
” he bellowed to them , adding , “ We will sort them out !
” They applauded vigorously , and some can be heard replying , “ To the very end !
” Belarusian Telegram channels and activists swiftly began to refer to the security services as Lukashenko ’ s “ real constituency.
” Lukashenko ’ s son Nikolai , who has been used as a prop by his father ever since a PR agency suggested @ @ @ @ @ @ @ with him .
Despite being over 6 feet tall , the boy , still just 15 years old , looked awkward and terrified dressed up as a soldier .
But Lukashenko ’ s personal security was never actually under any sort of threat .
The protesters ’ own sense of decorum and determination to stick to a peaceful route meant that actions such as actually seizing the palace were just not in the cards .
That may be a problem for resolving the political crisis .
As well-meaning and idealistic as the determination @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the protesters really did possess the numbers to conclude the stand-off by seizing the palace with Lukashenko inside it .
Their failure to do so may embolden Lukashenko , pushing him further toward the use of repressive violence out of the belief that the protesters can be crushed by the use of force against those unwilling or unable to fight back .
Two major opposition leaders were arrested on Monday , and the rhetoric from the regime has only intensified .
Ratcheting up force to the point where negotiations are no longer possible @ @ @ @ @ @ @ on Lukashenko ’ s part .
Nonviolent opposition movements can very quickly embrace martial virtues if people are provoked too far .
Missing the opportunity for a negotiated outcome may be something that Lukashenko himself comes to regret .

MINSK, Belarus — Anti-government protesters took to the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday, marking the 15th day of the Belarusian political crisis in the wake of the blatant falsification of presidential election results in favor of the country’s long-term authoritarian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko. Despite dramatic government threats against protesters, the imposition of travel barriers inside and around the capital, and predictions of rain, the opposition resoundingly disproved fears that the protest movement had begun to lose steam and momentum.
MINSK, Belarus — Anti-government protesters took to the streets of the Belarusian capital of Minsk on Sunday, marking the 15th day of the Belarusian political crisis in the wake of the blatant falsification of presidential election results in favor of the country’s long-term authoritarian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko. Despite dramatic government threats against protesters, the imposition of travel barriers inside and around the capital, and predictions of rain, the opposition resoundingly disproved fears that the protest movement had begun to lose steam and momentum.
By putting around 200,000 people, perhaps more, on the streets, the opposition ignored the progressively more histrionic threats that had been emanating from Lukashenko and his security forces. Earlier in the weekend, Lukashenko ordered a full mobilization of the Belarusian military and denounced an imminent NATO invasion on the Lithuanian border, even as generals openly discussed the possibility of civil war.
This continues to be the most velvet of revolutions, as I have written elsewhere. The Belarusian protesters are strikingly peaceful, mature, disciplined and civilized. While they demonstrated that they can dominate the streets, they almost universally strived to avoid any confrontations with the security services.
But that may be dangerous. The opposition and Lukashenko are speaking very different languages when it comes to force. Lukashenko has successfully used violence to repress protesters after previous elections. The young people I speak with at the protests have consciously chosen the 1989 Czech model and consistently reject comparisons to the Ukrainian Maidan of 2014. “We are a different sort of people,” they have told me, while remaining aware of the possibility of tanks being deployed against them. While the protesters avoided direct threats, sending out messages to avoid provocations through Telegram channels, Lukashenko saw this not as an invitation to negotiation but as a sign of weakness. For Lukashenko, who has jettisoned the conciliatory tone he had briefly adapted last week, that perception of weakness will likely only encourage the ratcheting-up of ever more repressive violence.
To do that, he may need help from outside. The OMON special riot police, which has been beating and torturing protesters since the first days after the election, have proved themselves to be deeply committed to Lukashenko. Yet security services made no attempt to arrest demonstrators or to assault the protest’s main column, retreating to secure only the presidential palace and the Belarusian Great Patriotic War Museum, which commemorates World War II. The Museum had symbolic impact: Throwing a military cordon around it signaled the regime’s embrace of the Moscow narrative of the place of war memory in conferring post-Soviet political legitimacy. Faced with the loss of power, Lukashenko has now abandoned his decadelong dance of playing off Russia against Western interests and thrown in his lot with Moscow’s willingness to rescue him. That may mean a future he has vigorously resisted for years: running Belarus as little more than the governor of a Russian province. But if it’s his only choice, as he sees it, he’ll take it.
The gulf between the protesters’ understanding of confrontation and Lukashenko’s was highlighted during a spontaneous march on the presidential palace, Lukashenko’s working residency. The surreal events that resulted may be some of the defining imagery of the revolution. Lukashenko seems to have panicked at the protests reaching the palace and, upon reinforcing the garrison, took off in his military helicopter to fly over the heads of the protesters. State-controlled media would later publish footage of Lukashenko looking down from the window of the helicopter and referring to protesters as “rats.” Upon touching back down on the grass inside the presidential compound, Lukashenko leapt out of the helicopter with an unloaded AK-47 rifle in his left hand. Lukashenko than proceeded to thank the stolid line of black-clad troops who were manning the barricades outside of the palace. “Thank you, you are all legends!” he bellowed to them, adding, “We will sort them out!” They applauded vigorously, and some can be heard replying, “To the very end!” Belarusian Telegram channels and activists swiftly began to refer to the security services as Lukashenko’s “real constituency.”
Lukashenko’s son Nikolai, who has been used as a prop by his father ever since a PR agency suggested it might humanize his image, was with him. Despite being over 6 feet tall, the boy, still just 15 years old, looked awkward and terrified dressed up as a soldier. But Lukashenko’s personal security was never actually under any sort of threat. The protesters’ own sense of decorum and determination to stick to a peaceful route meant that actions such as actually seizing the palace were just not in the cards.
That may be a problem for resolving the political crisis. As well-meaning and idealistic as the determination to stick to nonviolent methods is, the protesters really did possess the numbers to conclude the stand-off by seizing the palace with Lukashenko inside it. Their failure to do so may embolden Lukashenko, pushing him further toward the use of repressive violence out of the belief that the protesters can be crushed by the use of force against those unwilling or unable to fight back. Two major opposition leaders were arrested on Monday, and the rhetoric from the regime has only intensified. Ratcheting up force to the point where negotiations are no longer possible is very much a possible critical error on Lukashenko’s part. Nonviolent opposition movements can very quickly embrace martial virtues if people are provoked too far. Missing the opportunity for a negotiated outcome may be something that Lukashenko himself comes to regret.


foreignpolicy--2020-08-24--If Lukashenko Falls, Is Putin Next?

If Lukashenko Falls, Is Putin Next?

If Lukashenko Falls , Is Putin Next ?
Fifteen years ago , then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice referred to Belarus under President Aleksandr Lukashenko as “ the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.
” After his regime rigged yet another election this month and brutally suppressed peaceful protests , arresting some 7,000 people , the moniker resurfaced in headlines .
But the truth is that if angry citizens manage to overthrow Lukashenko , there ’ s still Vladimir Putin , an autocrat in his own right who has steadily eroded human rights and democratic norms in @ @ @ @ @ @ @ effectively make him president for life .
Could he be next ?
Not so fast .
Though the two men have certain things in common , it turns out that not all authoritarians are created equally .
Lukashenko rose to power in the 1990s as a firebrand populist who promised to take on the country ’ s elites .
But in recent years he has shown little appetite for cultivating popular support , letting it wane as the Belarusian economy limped from crisis to crisis and setting the stage for the countrywide uprising @ @ @ @ @ @ @ is still dominated by the state .
Any hint of political opposition is quickly smothered , and Lukashenko ’ s power is almost absolute .
“ It ’ s very personal .
It ’ s very sultanistic , ” said Ryhor Astapenia , a fellow at Chatham House and the founder and research director of the Center for New Ideas in Belarus .
“ Elites don ’ t have any significant role in the decision-making.
” Putin ’ s system of control is more sophisticated , a kabuki theater of democracy in which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ his popularity has declined , he has proved savvy enough to pacify key constituencies at least some of the time , making the prospect of a nationwide uprising in which Russians from Moscow to Khabarovsk could be united by a singular point of discontent unlikely .
Lukashenko abolished term limits altogether in a referendum in 2004 .
He has faced few serious challenges in five successive presidential elections and imprisoned opposition candidates for organizing street protests .
Lukashenko has even taken pride in his authoritarianism , remarking in 2012 that it was “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” He was responding to Guido Westerwelle , at the time Germany ’ s openly gay foreign minister , who used the words “ Europe ’ s last dictator ” to describe Lukashenko .
Many Belarusians meet the phrase with an eye roll , not because they have any illusions about the brutality of the state—some 7,000 people have been arrested since peaceful protests against the disputed election results began two weeks ago—but because they see it as a reductive cliche that obscures the existence of a brave civil society , burgeoning art @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , all of which have taken root in spite of the president .
They are also quick to point out that Lukashenko is by no means the only or last authoritarian in the neighborhood , as next door in Russia Putin has presided over a steady crackdown on human rights and democratic norms .
Unlike Lukashenko , Putin has gone to great lengths to avoid unseemly power grabs , even as he has managed to rule Russia for 20 years .
In 2008 , as Putin reached his constitutionally mandated two-term limit , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ but was still widely regarded as the power behind the throne .
A referendum he initiated on sweeping changes to the constitution passed last month , enabling Putin to run for another two terms in office and remain in power until 2036 .
There was no legal need to hold the referendum , as lawmakers approved the constitutional changes earlier this year .
But the theatrics of the vote gave Putin his much-craved veneer of legitimacy .
It ’ s this flair for faux democratic stagecraft that has underpinned Putin ’ s two @ @ @ @ @ @ @ perfected the art of disinformation , both at home and abroad .
Slickly produced news shows on Russian state TV create an alternate reality in which Ukraine has been overrun by Nazis , gay people are a threat to children , and Donald Trump is possibly the purveyor of the coronavirus pandemic .
The purpose of this messaging is not to persuade the Russian public that any of these things is actually true but rather to leave people “ confused , paranoid , and passive—living in a Kremlin-controlled virtual reality , ” the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Atlantic in 2014 .
In contrast , Belarusian state TV is stale and strapped for cash .
“ Russian TV is much more professional , simply because they have more money and resources .
Many Belarusians do watch this [ Russian ] TV because the content is more attractive , ” said Katsiaryna Shmatsina , a political analyst with the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies .
A 2019 study by the Belarusian Association of Journalists found that Russian-made television content accounted for nearly half of all prime-time programming in the basic cable package @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Putin ’ s centralized control , Russia continues to have competing power bases , including rival security services , oligarchs , regional elites , and the powerful Orthodox church .
“ In Russia , there are a lot of resources that are given to maintain this ruling elite .
It ’ s very spread .
It requires compromises , ” said Maryia Rohava , a Belarusian doctoral student at the University of Oslo who studies nationalism and symbolic politics in post-Soviet autocracies .
While these rivals have undoubtedly made life complicated for Putin @ @ @ @ @ @ @ provides handy scapegoats when things go awry .
Still , Putin might be wise to see Lukashenko as a cautionary tale .
Having fixed his term limit problem , the Russian leader is on track to match Lukashenko ’ s 26-year reign .
Even as the spotlight has been on Belarus in the past weeks , the Kremlin has contended with its own persistent protests in the Far Eastern region of Khabarovsk .
Eventually , Russians across the country could find themselves in agreement about the source of their problems .
“ I @ @ @ @ @ @ @ policy in Belarus is precisely the concern that what is happening in Belarus creates an undesirable precedent for Putin and the Kremlin , ” said Nigel Gould-Davies , a former British ambassador to Belarus .
Shmatsina of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies summed it up this way : “ It ’ s hard to stay in power and to please everyone .
”

Fifteen years ago, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice referred to Belarus under President Aleksandr Lukashenko as “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.” After his regime rigged yet another election this month and brutally suppressed peaceful protests, arresting some 7,000 people, the moniker resurfaced in headlines .
Fifteen years ago, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice referred to Belarus under President Aleksandr Lukashenko as “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.” After his regime rigged yet another election this month and brutally suppressed peaceful protests, arresting some 7,000 people, the moniker resurfaced in headlines.
But the truth is that if angry citizens manage to overthrow Lukashenko, there’s still Vladimir Putin, an autocrat in his own right who has steadily eroded human rights and democratic norms in Russia and engineered constitutional changes that would effectively make him president for life.
Could he be next?
Not so fast. Though the two men have certain things in common, it turns out that not all authoritarians are created equally.
Lukashenko rose to power in the 1990s as a firebrand populist who promised to take on the country’s elites. But in recent years he has shown little appetite for cultivating popular support, letting it wane as the Belarusian economy limped from crisis to crisis and setting the stage for the countrywide uprising now underway. Belarus’s economy is still dominated by the state. Any hint of political opposition is quickly smothered, and Lukashenko’s power is almost absolute.
“It’s very personal. It’s very sultanistic,” said Ryhor Astapenia, a fellow at Chatham House and the founder and research director of the Center for New Ideas in Belarus. “Elites don’t have any significant role in the decision-making.”
Putin’s system of control is more sophisticated, a kabuki theater of democracy in which public sentiment is carefully monitored. While his popularity has declined, he has proved savvy enough to pacify key constituencies at least some of the time, making the prospect of a nationwide uprising in which Russians from Moscow to Khabarovsk could be united by a singular point of discontent unlikely.
Lukashenko abolished term limits altogether in a referendum in 2004. He has faced few serious challenges in five successive presidential elections and imprisoned opposition candidates for organizing street protests. Lukashenko has even taken pride in his authoritarianism, remarking in 2012 that it was “better to be a dictator than gay.” He was responding to Guido Westerwelle, at the time Germany’s openly gay foreign minister, who used the words “Europe’s last dictator” to describe Lukashenko.
Many Belarusians meet the phrase with an eye roll, not because they have any illusions about the brutality of the state—some 7,000 people have been arrested since peaceful protests against the disputed election results began two weeks ago—but because they see it as a reductive cliche that obscures the existence of a brave civil society, burgeoning art scene, and rapidly expanding tech sector, all of which have taken root in spite of the president.
They are also quick to point out that Lukashenko is by no means the only or last authoritarian in the neighborhood, as next door in Russia Putin has presided over a steady crackdown on human rights and democratic norms.
Unlike Lukashenko, Putin has gone to great lengths to avoid unseemly power grabs, even as he has managed to rule Russia for 20 years. In 2008, as Putin reached his constitutionally mandated two-term limit, he stepped down to become prime minister but was still widely regarded as the power behind the throne. A referendum he initiated on sweeping changes to the constitution passed last month, enabling Putin to run for another two terms in office and remain in power until 2036.
There was no legal need to hold the referendum, as lawmakers approved the constitutional changes earlier this year. But the theatrics of the vote gave Putin his much-craved veneer of legitimacy. It’s this flair for faux democratic stagecraft that has underpinned Putin’s two decades in power.
Russia has also perfected the art of disinformation, both at home and abroad. Slickly produced news shows on Russian state TV create an alternate reality in which Ukraine has been overrun by Nazis, gay people are a threat to children, and Donald Trump is possibly the purveyor of the coronavirus pandemic.
The purpose of this messaging is not to persuade the Russian public that any of these things is actually true but rather to leave people “confused, paranoid, and passive—living in a Kremlin-controlled virtual reality,” the disinformation expert Peter Pomerantsev wrote in the Atlantic in 2014.
In contrast, Belarusian state TV is stale and strapped for cash. “Russian TV is much more professional, simply because they have more money and resources. Many Belarusians do watch this [Russian] TV because the content is more attractive,” said Katsiaryna Shmatsina, a political analyst with the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies. A 2019 study by the Belarusian Association of Journalists found that Russian-made television content accounted for nearly half of all prime-time programming in the basic cable package on Belarusian television.
For all of Putin’s centralized control, Russia continues to have competing power bases, including rival security services, oligarchs, regional elites, and the powerful Orthodox church. “In Russia, there are a lot of resources that are given to maintain this ruling elite. It’s very spread. It requires compromises,” said Maryia Rohava, a Belarusian doctoral student at the University of Oslo who studies nationalism and symbolic politics in post-Soviet autocracies. While these rivals have undoubtedly made life complicated for Putin, this more diffuse system of control provides handy scapegoats when things go awry.
Still, Putin might be wise to see Lukashenko as a cautionary tale. Having fixed his term limit problem, the Russian leader is on track to match Lukashenko’s 26-year reign.
Even as the spotlight has been on Belarus in the past weeks, the Kremlin has contended with its own persistent protests in the Far Eastern region of Khabarovsk. Eventually, Russians across the country could find themselves in agreement about the source of their problems.
“I think one of the drivers of Russian policy in Belarus is precisely the concern that what is happening in Belarus creates an undesirable precedent for Putin and the Kremlin,” said Nigel Gould-Davies, a former British ambassador to Belarus.
Shmatsina of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies summed it up this way: “It’s hard to stay in power and to please everyone.”