Europe’s Faustian Union

On Tuesday last week , European Union leaders agreed to a pandemic recovery deal that marks a historic step forward for European integration .
By Friday , cronies of Hungary ’ s autocratic prime minister , Viktor Orban , had effectively shut down the largest remaining independent news website in Hungary .
The timing was not a coincidence .
The EU pandemic recovery deal , which includes large-scale collective borrowing and offers grants to states hit hard by the pandemic , contains much for Europhiles to praise .
As the French economist Shahin Vallée wrote in the Guardian , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ possibility of common taxation—which all seemed out of reach over the last decade—were accepted this week unanimously.
” But the deal also comes with a dark underbelly .
Although it included some vague , watered-down language about plans to condition EU funds on respect for the rule of law , its main message to autocrats and aspiring autocrats in the bloc was one of appeasement : The EU would continue to hand them billions of euros in subsidies and not stand up to them for the time being .
In short , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , but one that still provides a comfortable home for hybrid authoritarian regimes .
It turned out that they were not serious .
The final text of the deal does require states to introduce economic reforms to access the recovery fund , but it barely mentions rule of law .
The deal simply kicks the issue down the road by noting that “ a regime of conditionality to protect the budget and Next Generation EU will be introduced ” at some point in the future .
To be fair , the deal did @ @ @ @ @ @ @ action : The European Council has spent the past two years blocking outright a proposal for a rule of law conditionality mechanism , and the deal did indicate that leaders may eventually give their blessing to a watered-down version of that proposal .
But whether the EU will actually introduce a robust system tying its funding to respect for democratic values—much less whether that system will ever lead to the actual suspension of funds—remains to be seen .
No one should be surprised that EU members backed down on rule of law .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ consequences of the pandemic were desperate for financial assistance .
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Macron were determined to prevent a north-south split within the union and to show that , after initial missteps , the EU could deliver an effective response to the crisis .
There was huge pressure to reach an agreement quickly , but that deal had to be agreed by unanimity in the European Council .
And it is no surprise that Orban and the increasingly authoritarian government of Poland would have vetoed any plan they believed might lead @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
It would thus be unfair to view the pandemic rescue package as a new Faustian pact with the EU ’ s pet autocrats , because in truth the union traded its democratic soul to them long ago .
EU leaders ’ real failures in defending the rule of law didn ’ t occur at last week ’ s summit but over the past several years , when they persistently looked the other way as Hungary and Poland made a mockery of the EU ’ s values .
In a sense , the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ mechanism was a distraction .
It offered yet another example of what the Middlesex University professor Laurent Pech has called the EU “ new-instrument creation cycle , ” in which Brussels excuses its failure to respond to democratic backsliding by member governments with the false claim that it lacks adequate tools for doing so and then calls for the introduction of new tools .
As the old saying goes , a bad workman always blames his tools .
The truth is that the EU has plenty of tools at its disposal , but @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to make robust use of them .
Consider first the European Commission .
As the Princeton University professor Kim Lane Scheppele and I have argued , the commission already has the authority under the EU ’ s structural funds regulations to suspend money to member states if they don ’ t follow the union ’ s rules and norms .
But it has refused to do this .
The commission could also make much more robust use of its standard law-enforcement tool—infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice—to defend democratic values .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ new infringement proceedings against the Orban government relating to the Treaty on European Union ’ s Article 2 values and has slow-pedaled existing infringements against the Polish government , even as Polish authorities openly defy European Court of Justice rulings against it .
The commission has also refused to use other powerful tools in its arsenal , such as its power to investigate and sanction violations of EU competition law , which could provide a basis for legal action against the Orban regime ’ s manipulation of media markets .
The passivity of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , given that its president , Ursula von der Leyen , depended on votes from the governing parties in Poland and Hungary to become president and that—as a politician from Germany ’ s center-right Christian Democratic Union ( CDU ) —she is herself a member of the same European political party ( the European People ’ s Party , or EPP ) as Orban .
When she came to office , she promised to take the heat out of political clashes with the regimes in Poland and Hungary .
Since then she has @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , even putting a political ally of Orban , Oliver Varhelyi , in charge of the EU enlargement policy .
In that role , he is in charge of promoting in candidate states the very democratic values his political boss has systematically undermined in Hungary .
If the commission has failed in its duties as guardian of the EU ’ s values , the failure of national leaders in the European Council to react to the rise of authoritarian governments in their ranks is even more inexcusable .
Many apologists claim that the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , under Article 7 of the EU treaty , sanctions require a unanimous vote among member governments , and that Poland and Hungary have pledged to veto sanctions against each other .
There is a kernel of truth to this ( even if there might be a way to prevent those two states from shielding each other from sanctions ) .
But the surrender to autocracy by the council is about far more than a supposed Polish-Hungarian mutual protection pact .
The council has consistently refused to take a vote on even the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ would require the support of only four-fifths of the member states to declare the risk of a serious breach of EU values .
Indeed , the council ’ s real problems run far deeper .
First , there are strong norms of deference between leaders in the council—particularly when it comes to what are seen as domestic political affairs .
Clearly , northern Frugals make an exception when it comes to their willingness to intervene and impose economic conditions on southern states , but more generally governments avoid openly criticizing one another or @ @ @ @ @ @ @ one another .
Second , the governments of Poland and even more so of Hungary can count on other allies in the council .
States with their own problems with kleptocracy or democratic backsliding including Bulgaria , the Czech Republic , and Malta understand that any tool that can be used against Hungary or Poland might one day be used against them .
Other governments that are exemplars of democracy and the rule of law may side with Hungary or Poland for purely partisan reasons .
Orban ’ s party , Fidesz , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and Merkel ’ s CDU has been a crucial player in blocking his expulsion from the party .
Indeed , shortly before the EU summit , CDU leaders hosted leaders of Orban ’ s party in Berlin , reaffirming their alliance and stating that they aimed to restore a “ sensible tone ” in discussions about the Hungarian regime within the EPP .
The erosion of the rule of law and of democracy itself in Hungary and Poland is not the fault of the EU , and ultimately it will be up to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ liberal democracy .
But EU funding is crucial to sustaining these regimes and the patronage networks that support them , and the new recovery package promises to keep that money flowing to them , at least for now .
The fight is not over , and defenders of the rule of law in the European Parliament are promising to strengthen the rule-of-law conditions in the deal .
One wise move might be for the parliament to demand that the council adopt the commission ’ s 2018 proposal on rule of law conditionality before @ @ @ @ @ @ @ But even if that new tool is introduced , it may simply end up sitting on the shelf , alongside all of the EU ’ s other unused tools .
Ultimately , EU leaders in the commission and council will only use the EU ’ s enormous political and economic leverage—and its ample tools for defending democracy—if more of them decide that it is in their interest to do so .
Until then , the EU ’ s “ authoritarian equilibrium ” will endure , and the authoritarian rot will likely spread to @ @ @ @

On Tuesday last week, European Union leaders agreed to a pandemic recovery deal that marks a historic step forward for European integration. By Friday, cronies of Hungary’s autocratic prime minister, Viktor Orban, had effectively shut down the largest remaining independent news website in Hungary. The timing was not a coincidence.
The EU pandemic recovery deal, which includes large-scale collective borrowing and offers grants to states hit hard by the pandemic, contains much for Europhiles to praise. As the French economist Shahin Vallée wrote in the Guardian, “common debt, common expenditure and the possibility of common taxation—which all seemed out of reach over the last decade—were accepted this week unanimously.”
But the deal also comes with a dark underbelly. Although it included some vague, watered-down language about plans to condition EU funds on respect for the rule of law, its main message to autocrats and aspiring autocrats in the bloc was one of appeasement: The EU would continue to hand them billions of euros in subsidies and not stand up to them for the time being. In short, the deal delivered a more deeply integrated EU, but one that still provides a comfortable home for hybrid authoritarian regimes.
Coming into the summit, there had been talk of explicitly linking the 750 billion euro ($880 billion) “Next Generation EU” recovery fund and the 1.074 trillion euro ($1.26 trillion) EU budget for 2021-2027 to a so-called rule of law conditionality that would explicitly authorize the EU to suspend funding to governments with “generalised deficiencies” in the rule of law. Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Rutte—a leader of the so-called Frugal Four group of member states that resisted large pandemic-related bailouts and demanded that recipients commit to economic reforms—insisted that rule of law conditionality for EU funding was one of his government’s red lines. In turn, Orban complained that “the Dutch guy” was blocking the budget deal and speculated that he must “hate me or Hungary . ” Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that EU money should not flow to rogue regimes, insisting on a new maxim: “no rule of law, zero euros.”
It turned out that they were not serious. The final text of the deal does require states to introduce economic reforms to access the recovery fund, but it barely mentions rule of law. The deal simply kicks the issue down the road by noting that “a regime of conditionality to protect the budget and Next Generation EU will be introduced” at some point in the future.
To be fair, the deal did at least open a small window for action: The European Council has spent the past two years blocking outright a proposal for a rule of law conditionality mechanism, and the deal did indicate that leaders may eventually give their blessing to a watered-down version of that proposal. But whether the EU will actually introduce a robust system tying its funding to respect for democratic values—much less whether that system will ever lead to the actual suspension of funds—remains to be seen.
No one should be surprised that EU members backed down on rule of law. Southern members struggling most with the economic consequences of the pandemic were desperate for financial assistance. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Macron were determined to prevent a north-south split within the union and to show that, after initial missteps, the EU could deliver an effective response to the crisis. There was huge pressure to reach an agreement quickly, but that deal had to be agreed by unanimity in the European Council. And it is no surprise that Orban and the increasingly authoritarian government of Poland would have vetoed any plan they believed might lead to the suspension of their EU funds.
It would thus be unfair to view the pandemic rescue package as a new Faustian pact with the EU’s pet autocrats, because in truth the union traded its democratic soul to them long ago. EU leaders’ real failures in defending the rule of law didn’t occur at last week’s summit but over the past several years, when they persistently looked the other way as Hungary and Poland made a mockery of the EU’s values. In a sense, the whole debate last week about the conditionality mechanism was a distraction. It offered yet another example of what the Middlesex University professor Laurent Pech has called the EU “new-instrument creation cycle,” in which Brussels excuses its failure to respond to democratic backsliding by member governments with the false claim that it lacks adequate tools for doing so and then calls for the introduction of new tools. As the old saying goes, a bad workman always blames his tools.
The truth is that the EU has plenty of tools at its disposal, but that for political reasons it simply refuses to make robust use of them. Consider first the European Commission. As the Princeton University professor Kim Lane Scheppele and I have argued, the commission already has the authority under the EU’s structural funds regulations to suspend money to member states if they don’t follow the union’s rules and norms. But it has refused to do this. The commission could also make much more robust use of its standard law-enforcement tool—infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice—to defend democratic values. But the current commission has brought no new infringement proceedings against the Orban government relating to the Treaty on European Union’s Article 2 values and has slow-pedaled existing infringements against the Polish government, even as Polish authorities openly defy European Court of Justice rulings against it. The commission has also refused to use other powerful tools in its arsenal, such as its power to investigate and sanction violations of EU competition law, which could provide a basis for legal action against the Orban regime’s manipulation of media markets.
The passivity of the commission should come as no surprise, given that its president, Ursula von der Leyen, depended on votes from the governing parties in Poland and Hungary to become president and that—as a politician from Germany’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—she is herself a member of the same European political party (the European People’s Party, or EPP) as Orban. When she came to office, she promised to take the heat out of political clashes with the regimes in Poland and Hungary . Since then she has failed to crack down on those governments, even putting a political ally of Orban, Oliver Varhelyi, in charge of the EU enlargement policy. In that role, he is in charge of promoting in candidate states the very democratic values his political boss has systematically undermined in Hungary.
If the commission has failed in its duties as guardian of the EU’s values, the failure of national leaders in the European Council to react to the rise of authoritarian governments in their ranks is even more inexcusable. Many apologists claim that the council is paralyzed by the fact that, under Article 7 of the EU treaty, sanctions require a unanimous vote among member governments, and that Poland and Hungary have pledged to veto sanctions against each other. There is a kernel of truth to this (even if there might be a way to prevent those two states from shielding each other from sanctions). But the surrender to autocracy by the council is about far more than a supposed Polish-Hungarian mutual protection pact. The council has consistently refused to take a vote on even the first stage of Article 7, which would require the support of only four-fifths of the member states to declare the risk of a serious breach of EU values.
Indeed, the council’s real problems run far deeper. First, there are strong norms of deference between leaders in the council—particularly when it comes to what are seen as domestic political affairs. Clearly, northern Frugals make an exception when it comes to their willingness to intervene and impose economic conditions on southern states, but more generally governments avoid openly criticizing one another or trying to enforce EU legal obligations against one another. Second, the governments of Poland and even more so of Hungary can count on other allies in the council. States with their own problems with kleptocracy or democratic backsliding including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Malta understand that any tool that can be used against Hungary or Poland might one day be used against them. Other governments that are exemplars of democracy and the rule of law may side with Hungary or Poland for purely partisan reasons. Orban’s party, Fidesz, remains a member of the EPP, and Merkel’s CDU has been a crucial player in blocking his expulsion from the party. Indeed, shortly before the EU summit, CDU leaders hosted leaders of Orban’s party in Berlin, reaffirming their alliance and stating that they aimed to restore a “sensible tone” in discussions about the Hungarian regime within the EPP.
The erosion of the rule of law and of democracy itself in Hungary and Poland is not the fault of the EU, and ultimately it will be up to Hungarians and Poles to mobilize for functioning liberal democracy. But EU funding is crucial to sustaining these regimes and the patronage networks that support them , and the new recovery package promises to keep that money flowing to them, at least for now.
The fight is not over, and defenders of the rule of law in the European Parliament are promising to strengthen the rule-of-law conditions in the deal. One wise move might be for the parliament to demand that the council adopt the commission’s 2018 proposal on rule of law conditionality before they approve the new EU budget. But even if that new tool is introduced, it may simply end up sitting on the shelf, alongside all of the EU’s other unused tools. Ultimately, EU leaders in the commission and council will only use the EU’s enormous political and economic leverage—and its ample tools for defending democracy—if more of them decide that it is in their interest to do so. Until then, the EU’s “authoritarian equilibrium” will endure, and the authoritarian rot will likely spread to other member states.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--As Europe Reckons With Racism, Italy Still Won’t Confront Its Colonial Past

As Europe Reckons With Racism , Italy Still Won ’ t Confront Its Colonial Past When people get loud , Italians say it ’ s an “ ambaradan.
” The word , which can be translated as “ messy situation , ” comes from Amba Aradam , a mountain in Ethiopia , where Italian troops crushed the local resistance in 1936 using mustard gas , in violation of the Geneva Protocol .
Most Italians ignore the fact that the word ’ s etymology stems from a colonial war crime .
In fact , Italy ’ s colonial past is largely @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Even in the past few months , while other European nations have reckoned with their colonial past as a reaction to the protests inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement , in Italy the topic has remained on the fringes and is barely mentioned .
Last month , an anti-racist group in Milan asked for the removal of a statue of the journalist Indro Montanelli , pointing out that he bought a 12-year-old Eritrean girl as a “ temporary wife ” —that is , a sex slave—when he was a young colonial @ @ @ @ @ @ @ no secret .
Montanelli , a celebrity conservative journalist who also enjoyed a following among the left , repeatedly bragged about the episode until his death in 2001 .
He resorted to overtly racist tropes , describing the girl , whose name was either Fatima or Destà , as “ a docile tiny pet ” and stressing that he was repulsed by her smell .
He dismissed the charges of pedophilia , claiming that African girls are different from Europeans : “ At 14 , they ’ re women ; at 20 they @ @ @ @ @ @ @ occupation of the Horn of Africa , it was fairly common for Italian soldiers to take local girls as temporary wives , a practice known as “ madamato ” ( from the word “ madama , ” or mistress ) , which Italians authorities considered legal—and even encouraged .
With such a repertoire , one would guess that Montanelli would be quite unpopular with liberals .
But when the anti-racist group , I Sentinelli , made its request , Milan ’ s progressive mayor , Giuseppe Sala , dismissed the request because , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ” Both the right and the mainstream left were quick to defend Montanelli ’ s memory .
“ If an isolated episode were enough to disqualify a life , not a single statue would remain standing , ” wrote Beppe Severgnini , a columnist for Corriere della Sera and a contributor at the New York Times .
A more left-leaning commentator , Luca Telese , said that the world was different back then : “ To see Montanelli ’ s marriage as a violence , and his actions as an isolated case of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ anything.
” On one count , Telese was right .
Montanelli ’ s actions were far from isolated .
During Italy ’ s occupation of the Horn of Africa , it was fairly common for Italian soldiers to take local girls as temporary wives , a practice known as “ madamato ” ( from the word “ madama , ” or mistress ) , which Italians authorities considered legal—and even encouraged—until 1937 , when the Fascist regime outlawed it in the name of racial purity .
Obviously the only possible union was between @ @ @ @ @ @ @ local male population wasn ’ t even allowed to have contact with white women .
Italy ’ s colonial endeavor came late , compared to its European neighbors , partially because modern Italy is a recent creation .
In 1882 , the Kingdom of Italy , which was founded only two decades earlier , invaded Eritrea , and seven years later , it conquered Somalia .
Between 1895 and 1896 Italy also tried to conquer Ethiopia , but it failed spectacularly , with the Ethiopian troops inflicting on the Italian attackers the worst @ @ @ @ @ @ @ in Africa .
In 1911 , the Italians took Libya .
When Benito Mussolini came to power , he vowed to further expand the colonies—and to avenge the defeat in Ethiopia .
The Fascist troops conquered Ethiopia in 1936 , with the help of chemical weapons , and took Albania in 1939 .
At the time , Italians were very proud of having an empire at last ; they saw it as a way to overcome their inferiority complex toward wealthier and more powerful European nations , noted Nicola Labanca , a historian @ @ @ @ @ @ @ author of the book Oltremare ( “ Overseas ” ) on Italian colonialism .
“ Having colonies was seen as a way of being modern , ” he said .
But that idea of modernity also included brutal repression .
It ’ s estimated that during the 60 years of Italian colonialism , almost 1 million people died due to war , deportations , and internment .
In the 1920s , when the Italian Army started a military campaign to recapture the Libyan territories controlled by rebels , they resorted to widespread summary @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
To crush the Libyan resistance , in 1930 the Italian general Rodolfo Graziani , nicknamed “ the butcher of Fezzan , ” put the civilian population in concentration camps .
In Ethiopia , the Fascists deployed chemical attacks .
When Ethiopian rebels tried to kill him , in 1937 , Graziani had 19,000 Ethiopian civilians executed in retaliation .
Unlike in Germany , which has had a public reckoning with Nazi-era crimes , or France , which is belatedly addressing the brutality of its colonial rule in Algeria and elsewhere , such @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
After the end of World War II , Italy ’ s new ruling class , largely composed of anti-Fascists , created two intertwined myths : the myth of the “ good Italian colonialist ” and the myth of the “ good Italian soldier.
” Italian soldiers , so went the narrative , were poor and generous , reluctant to fight the war , and always willing to help the natives , as opposed to the true villains , the Germans .
The point was that Italians , as a people , were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ persisted even when they were misled by an evil regime .
The aim was to create a sense of cohesion between the new anti-Fascist government and the general population , by reassuring the latter they don ’ t share the blame of the dictatorship ’ s deeds .
“ The good Italian soldier was good also in the colonies , ” said Filippo Focardi , a historian at the University of Padua and the author of the book Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano ( “ The Bad German and the Good @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the good Italian soldier was created , Focardi said , to try to convince the Allies to grant better peace conditions for Italy .
The myth of the good colonialist was devised as a propaganda tool to make the point that Italy should keep its colonies that were conquered before Fascism , which didn ’ t work out .
For decades , Italy didn ’ t admit that it had used chemical weapons in Africa .
Only in 1996 did Italy ’ s defense minister finally acknowledge it .
Even if they were @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , the new ruling class chose to forget the atrocities it committed in Africa , because admitting to them would have clashed with their narrative .
After all , how could Italian troops , who were of course always eager to help the natives , even think of committing a war crime ?
When Ethiopia requested the extradition of Graziani in 1949 , Italy refused , despite the fact that he was included in a list of war criminals of the United Nations for the use of toxic gases and the bombing of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Italy didn ’ t admit that it had used chemical weapons in Africa .
Only in 1996 did Italy ’ s defense minister finally acknowledge it .
That year , a left-leaning lawmaker formally asked the minister of defense if the Italians used gas in the Ethiopia war , to which the minister replied yes ; that was the first time that an Italian official had ever acknowledged the use of chemical weapons .
A year later , then-President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro formally apologized for the occupation of Eritrea .
In 1952 @ @ @ @ @ @ @ of its past colonial activities from a group of 24 scholars , largely former colonial officials , including governors and geographers .
The committee , known as “ Comitato per la documentazione dell ’ Opera dell ’ Italia in Africa , ” ( Committee for the Documentation of the Italian Activities in Africa ) continued its work until 1984 , producing 40 volumes , most of them hagiographies .
To be fair , since the 1970s some historians have tackled the dark side of Italian colonialism ( for instance Angelo Del Boca and @ @ @ @ @ @ @ ’ t get much attention beyond academia .
Italian colonialism was never a hot-button issue , points out Labanca , the historian , and Italy certainly didn ’ t have a Jean-Paul Sartre .
Unlike other European countries , Italy never had prominent voices confronting its colonial crimes .
France had at least two famous public intellectuals who restlessly campaigned against colonialism , namely Sartre—the rock-star philosopher who wrote strong opinion pieces against the war in Algeria—and the Martinique-born psychiatrist and political theorist Frantz Fanon , whose Wretched of the Earth , a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ colonialism , became a political classic .
But Italy had none : “ The French public might not have agreed with the position of Sartre or Fanon , but they knew who they were , ” said the historian Focardi .
It ’ s not that Italy removed all the sins of colonialism from its collective conscience .
On the contrary , colonialism was considered an interesting topic—as long as it did not involve Italy .
Indeed , colonial brutality is the subject of a classic of Italian cinema : Gillo Pontecorvo ’ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , which won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival and a nomination at the Academy Awards , chronicled the brutal French repression of Algeria .
It posed no problem , because the bad guys were the French .
By contrast , the Italian governement intervened in 1982 to prevent the distribution of a movie that would have put Italy ’ s colonialism in bad light : Lion of the Desert , chronicling Italy ’ s repression of the Libyan resistance led by Omar al-Mukhtar , was not aired until 2009 , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
As recently as 1997 , Italy formally protested against the United Kingdom because the BBC aired a documentary , called Fascist Legacy , about Italian war crimes .
The Italian state TV channel RAI bought a copy of the movie but never aired it .
Then , in 2012 , a mausoleum honoring Graziani , the war criminal , was erected near Rome .
A court ordered it to be taken down , because it violated a law against “ Fascist propaganda ” ( Graziani also headed the pro-Nazi army of the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ was never carried out .
While it has been defaced and mocked with graffiti , the mausoleum still stands .
Today , Italian streets are still full of references to the colonial past , names of the streets or monuments that celebrate the soldiers who died building the Italian empire .
For instance , there ’ s an Amba Aradam Street in Rome ; Milan and Palermo both have streets dedicated to Vincenzo Magliocco , the general who launched mustard gas attacks against the Ethiopians .
But , in practice , most Italians @ @ @ @ @ @ @ come from .
Labanca , the historian , also attributes this lack of knowledge to the fact that for Italy decolonization was “ a passive process , not an active one.
” Italy did not go through a lengthy independence war , as France did in Algeria , nor did it witness a large-scale civil rights movement , as Britain did in India : Italy simply lost its colonies because it lost the war , and that , Labanca says , didn ’ t spur a heated debate .
The Italian Somali writer @ @ @ @ @ @ @ book La Linea del Colore ( “ The Color Line ” ) that will soon be published in English , said that there were “ two types of removal : one from the authority but also one from the Italian people.
” She points out that many Italian families have recent ancestors who fought in colonial wars in Africa .
“ If people were to check in their attics , they will likely find memorabilia of that period , ” but they ignore it , she said .
Scego sees herself as part @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Italian authors who are tackling Italy ’ s colonial violence head on , including Giulia Barrera , who studied the practice of madamato , or Giulietta Stefani , who has studied gender and Italian colonialism .
Some best-selling fiction writers , such as Carlo Lucarelli , the Wu Ming collective , and Francesca Melandri , have recently set their stories during the colonial era .
But Scego says these are just small steps .
To overcome the general oblivion about colonialism , she argues , Italian authorities should build monuments to the victims @ @ @ @ @ @ @ schools : “ Many high school books still claim that Italy went to Africa to bring civilization.
” Given the reactions to the Montanelli statue controversy , this doesn ’ t seem likely to happen anytime soon .
Despite the fact that Italy is fast becoming a multiethnic society , and despite the fact that its colonies came to an end almost 80 years ago , the country doesn ’ t seem ready to face its own past .

When people get loud, Italians say it’s an “ambaradan.” The word, which can be translated as “messy situation,” comes from Amba Aradam, a mountain in Ethiopia, where Italian troops crushed the local resistance in 1936 using mustard gas, in violation of the Geneva Protocol .
When people get loud, Italians say it’s an “ambaradan.” The word, which can be translated as “messy situation,” comes from Amba Aradam, a mountain in Ethiopia, where Italian troops crushed the local resistance in 1936 using mustard gas, in violation of the Geneva Protocol.
Most Italians ignore the fact that the word’s etymology stems from a colonial war crime. In fact, Italy’s colonial past is largely absent from public debate in the country.
Even in the past few months, while other European nations have reckoned with their colonial past as a reaction to the protests inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement, in Italy the topic has remained on the fringes and is barely mentioned.
Last month, an anti-racist group in Milan asked for the removal of a statue of the journalist Indro Montanelli, pointing out that he bought a 12-year-old Eritrean girl as a “temporary wife”—that is, a sex slave—when he was a young colonial soldier in the 1930s. It was no secret. Montanelli, a celebrity conservative journalist who also enjoyed a following among the left, repeatedly bragged about the episode until his death in 2001. He resorted to overtly racist tropes, describing the girl, whose name was either Fatima or Destà, as “a docile tiny pet” and stressing that he was repulsed by her smell. He dismissed the charges of pedophilia, claiming that African girls are different from Europeans: “At 14, they’re women; at 20 they are old.”
During Italy’s occupation of the Horn of Africa, it was fairly common for Italian soldiers to take local girls as temporary wives, a practice known as “madamato” (from the word “madama,” or mistress), which Italians authorities considered legal—and even encouraged.
With such a repertoire, one would guess that Montanelli would be quite unpopular with liberals. But when the anti-racist group, I Sentinelli, made its request, Milan’s progressive mayor, Giuseppe Sala, dismissed the request because, he said, “Everyone makes mistakes.”
Both the right and the mainstream left were quick to defend Montanelli’s memory. “If an isolated episode were enough to disqualify a life, not a single statue would remain standing,” wrote Beppe Severgnini, a columnist for Corriere della Sera and a contributor at the New York Times. A more left-leaning commentator, Luca Telese, said that the world was different back then: “To see Montanelli’s marriage as a violence, and his actions as an isolated case of rape, one needs not to understand anything.”
On one count, Telese was right. Montanelli’s actions were far from isolated. During Italy’s occupation of the Horn of Africa, it was fairly common for Italian soldiers to take local girls as temporary wives, a practice known as “madamato” (from the word “madama,” or mistress), which Italians authorities considered legal—and even encouraged—until 1937, when the Fascist regime outlawed it in the name of racial purity. Obviously the only possible union was between Italian men and African women: The local male population wasn’t even allowed to have contact with white women.
Italy’s colonial endeavor came late, compared to its European neighbors, partially because modern Italy is a recent creation. In 1882, the Kingdom of Italy, which was founded only two decades earlier, invaded Eritrea, and seven years later, it conquered Somalia. Between 1895 and 1896 Italy also tried to conquer Ethiopia, but it failed spectacularly, with the Ethiopian troops inflicting on the Italian attackers the worst defeat ever suffered by a European nation in Africa. In 1911, the Italians took Libya.
When Benito Mussolini came to power, he vowed to further expand the colonies—and to avenge the defeat in Ethiopia. The Fascist troops conquered Ethiopia in 1936, with the help of chemical weapons, and took Albania in 1939.
At the time, Italians were very proud of having an empire at last; they saw it as a way to overcome their inferiority complex toward wealthier and more powerful European nations, noted Nicola Labanca, a historian at the University of Siena and the author of the book Oltremare (“Overseas”) on Italian colonialism. “Having colonies was seen as a way of being modern,” he said.
But that idea of modernity also included brutal repression.
It’s estimated that during the 60 years of Italian colonialism, almost 1 million people died due to war, deportations, and internment. In the 1920s, when the Italian Army started a military campaign to recapture the Libyan territories controlled by rebels, they resorted to widespread summary executions, torture, and mass incarceration. To crush the Libyan resistance, in 1930 the Italian general Rodolfo Graziani, nicknamed “the butcher of Fezzan,” put the civilian population in concentration camps. In Ethiopia, the Fascists deployed chemical attacks. When Ethiopian rebels tried to kill him, in 1937, Graziani had 19,000 Ethiopian civilians executed in retaliation.
Unlike in Germany, which has had a public reckoning with Nazi-era crimes, or France, which is belatedly addressing the brutality of its colonial rule in Algeria and elsewhere, such atrocities are hardly discussed in contemporary Italy.
After the end of World War II, Italy’s new ruling class, largely composed of anti-Fascists, created two intertwined myths: the myth of the “good Italian colonialist” and the myth of the “good Italian soldier.” Italian soldiers, so went the narrative, were poor and generous, reluctant to fight the war, and always willing to help the natives, as opposed to the true villains, the Germans. The point was that Italians, as a people, were good-natured, and that such good nature persisted even when they were misled by an evil regime. The aim was to create a sense of cohesion between the new anti-Fascist government and the general population, by reassuring the latter they don’t share the blame of the dictatorship’s deeds.
“The good Italian soldier was good also in the colonies,” said Filippo Focardi, a historian at the University of Padua and the author of the book Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano (“The Bad German and the Good Italian”). The myth of the good Italian soldier was created, Focardi said, to try to convince the Allies to grant better peace conditions for Italy. The myth of the good colonialist was devised as a propaganda tool to make the point that Italy should keep its colonies that were conquered before Fascism, which didn’t work out.
For decades, Italy didn’t admit that it had used chemical weapons in Africa. Only in 1996 did Italy’s defense minister finally acknowledge it.
Even if they were staunch opponents of Mussolini’s regime, the new ruling class chose to forget the atrocities it committed in Africa, because admitting to them would have clashed with their narrative. After all, how could Italian troops, who were of course always eager to help the natives, even think of committing a war crime?
When Ethiopia requested the extradition of Graziani in 1949, Italy refused, despite the fact that he was included in a list of war criminals of the United Nations for the use of toxic gases and the bombing of some Red Cross hospitals.
For decades, Italy didn’t admit that it had used chemical weapons in Africa. Only in 1996 did Italy’s defense minister finally acknowledge it.
That year, a left-leaning lawmaker formally asked the minister of defense if the Italians used gas in the Ethiopia war, to which the minister replied yes; that was the first time that an Italian official had ever acknowledged the use of chemical weapons. A year later, then-President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro formally apologized for the occupation of Eritrea.
In 1952, the Italian government commissioned a study of its past colonial activities from a group of 24 scholars, largely former colonial officials, including governors and geographers. The committee, known as “Comitato per la documentazione dell’Opera dell’Italia in Africa,” (Committee for the Documentation of the Italian Activities in Africa) continued its work until 1984, producing 40 volumes, most of them hagiographies.
To be fair, since the 1970s some historians have tackled the dark side of Italian colonialism (for instance Angelo Del Boca and Giorgio Rochat) but their work didn’t get much attention beyond academia. Italian colonialism was never a hot-button issue, points out Labanca, the historian, and Italy certainly didn’t have a Jean-Paul Sartre.
Unlike other European countries, Italy never had prominent voices confronting its colonial crimes. France had at least two famous public intellectuals who restlessly campaigned against colonialism, namely Sartre—the rock-star philosopher who wrote strong opinion pieces against the war in Algeria—and the Martinique-born psychiatrist and political theorist Frantz Fanon, whose Wretched of the Earth, a book on the dehumanization of non-Europeans under colonialism, became a political classic. But Italy had none: “The French public might not have agreed with the position of Sartre or Fanon, but they knew who they were,” said the historian Focardi.
It’s not that Italy removed all the sins of colonialism from its collective conscience. On the contrary, colonialism was considered an interesting topic—as long as it did not involve Italy.
Indeed, colonial brutality is the subject of a classic of Italian cinema: Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film The Battle of Algiers, which won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival and a nomination at the Academy Awards, chronicled the brutal French repression of Algeria. It posed no problem, because the bad guys were the French.
By contrast, the Italian governement intervened in 1982 to prevent the distribution of a movie that would have put Italy’s colonialism in bad light: Lion of the Desert, chronicling Italy’s repression of the Libyan resistance led by Omar al-Mukhtar, was not aired until 2009, during a state visit by Muammar al-Qaddafi.
As recently as 1997, Italy formally protested against the United Kingdom because the BBC aired a documentary, called Fascist Legacy, about Italian war crimes. The Italian state TV channel RAI bought a copy of the movie but never aired it.
Then, in 2012, a mausoleum honoring Graziani, the war criminal, was erected near Rome. A court ordered it to be taken down, because it violated a law against “Fascist propaganda” (Graziani also headed the pro-Nazi army of the Salò Republic), but the order was never carried out. While it has been defaced and mocked with graffiti, the mausoleum still stands.
Today, Italian streets are still full of references to the colonial past, names of the streets or monuments that celebrate the soldiers who died building the Italian empire. For instance, there’s an Amba Aradam Street in Rome; Milan and Palermo both have streets dedicated to Vincenzo Magliocco, the general who launched mustard gas attacks against the Ethiopians.
But, in practice, most Italians don’t know where such names come from.
Labanca, the historian, also attributes this lack of knowledge to the fact that for Italy decolonization was “a passive process, not an active one.” Italy did not go through a lengthy independence war, as France did in Algeria, nor did it witness a large-scale civil rights movement, as Britain did in India: Italy simply lost its colonies because it lost the war, and that, Labanca says, didn’t spur a heated debate.
The Italian Somali writer Igiaba Scego, the author of the book La Linea del Colore (“The Color Line”) that will soon be published in English, said that there were “two types of removal: one from the authority but also one from the Italian people.” She points out that many Italian families have recent ancestors who fought in colonial wars in Africa. “If people were to check in their attics, they will likely find memorabilia of that period,” but they ignore it, she said.
Scego sees herself as part of a small but growing number of Italian authors who are tackling Italy’s colonial violence head on, including Giulia Barrera, who studied the practice of madamato, or Giulietta Stefani, who has studied gender and Italian colonialism. Some best-selling fiction writers, such as Carlo Lucarelli, the Wu Ming collective, and Francesca Melandri, have recently set their stories during the colonial era.
But Scego says these are just small steps. To overcome the general oblivion about colonialism, she argues, Italian authorities should build monuments to the victims and start teaching about colonial violence in schools: “Many high school books still claim that Italy went to Africa to bring civilization.”
Given the reactions to the Montanelli statue controversy, this doesn’t seem likely to happen anytime soon. Despite the fact that Italy is fast becoming a multiethnic society, and despite the fact that its colonies came to an end almost 80 years ago, the country doesn’t seem ready to face its own past.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-30--Trump to Pull U.S. Troops From Germany

Trump to Pull U.S. Troops From Germany

Trump to Pull U.S .
Troops From Germany Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : The United States lays out plans for the removal of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany , U.S. coronavirus deaths reach worst levels since May , and Iran hails its latest missile launch .
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday , please sign up here .
On Wednesday , U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced plans to withdraw roughly 12,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany .
Of the approximately 12,000 troops , 6,400 will be returning @ @ @ @ @ @ @ remainder will be sent to other countries in Europe .
Esper presented the move as good strategic sense .
“ These changes will achieve the core principles of enhancing U.S. and NATO deterrence of Russia , strengthening NATO , reassuring allies and improving U.S. strategic flexibility , ” he said .
Mixed messages .
But over at the White House , only minutes after Esper ’ s remarks , U.S. President Donald Trump was more blunt : “ We don ’ t want to be the suckers anymore , ” Trump said on @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the force because they ’ re not paying their bills ; it ’ s very simple.
” “ It ’ s always a good thing to revisit how many troops the U.S. has deployed abroad , especially in Europe , ” Rachel Rizzo , an expert on European security issues with the Truman Center for National Policy told Foreign Policy .
“ But this particular move is just clearly punishment for Germany .
It seems like it was done without any real analysis or strategy behind it.
” Not just troops .
U.S. @ @ @ @ @ @ @ relocate as part of the troop reduction .
U.S. European Command is moving to Belgium and U.S. officials suggested that U.S. Africa Command , currently based in Stuttgart , would also be moved elsewhere .
A slow march .
In his comments , Esper pointed out that the relocation of troops would likely take years and cost in the “ single-digit ” billions of dollars .
If November ’ s presidential election brings the Democrats to power , it may not happen at all : Joe Biden ’ s campaign has promised to @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Coronavirus deaths rise .
Daily coronavirus deaths in the United States passed 1,400 for the first time since May on Wednesday as the states of Florida , North Carolina , and California set records for deaths in a single day .
The United States has now recorded 150,000 deaths in total .
Wednesday ’ s U.S. death toll was only topped by Brazil , where over 1,500 new deaths were reported .
U.S. sanctions Assad ’ s son .
The United States imposed new sanctions on Syria on Tuesday , targeting ten entities @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Assad ’ s son , Hafez .
They are the second round of U.S. sanctions imposed under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act , which targets those dealing with Syria , regardless of nationality .
The White House has said more sanctions will follow “ as part of a sustained campaign of economic and political pressure to deny the Assad regime the resources it uses to wage war against the Syrian people.
” Iran touts ballistic missiles .
Iran has hailed what it says was its first ever launch of ballistic missiles from @ @ @ @ @ @ @ achievement that could pose serious challenges to enemy intelligence organizations.
” The launches took place on Wednesday on the final day of military exercises that included a missile strike on a mock aircraft carrier .
The U.S. military called the launches “ irresponsible ” and placed two neighboring bases on high alert during the exercises .
NASA Mars launch .
The United States is set to join the United Arab Emirates and China as the third mission to Mars launched this summer as it prepares to launch its rover , Perseverance , today @ @ @ @ @ @ @ a months-long journey to the planet , the rover will search for signs of past microscopic life on an ancient lakebed and gather rock samples to be returned to earth for further study .
If successful , it would be ninth U.S. spacecraft to operate on the Martian surface .
India opens up higher education sector .
India has approved a new plan to allow foreign universities to open campuses in the country as it seeks to halt the flow of students to overseas institutions .
The move is part of a policy @ @ @ @ @ @ @ education from 4 percent to 6 percent of gross domestic product .
Any foreign university opening in India would also have to contend with a cap on the amount of fees educational institutions are allowed to charge in the country .
Lead levels dangerously high in world ’ s children .
One in three children in the world have been found to have dangerously high levels of lead in their blood , according to a report published by UNICEF .
The report found that up to 800 million children have blood levels of @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the World Health Organization and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention call for intervention .
Improper disposal of car batteries is one leading source of lead contamination , as they currently make up 85 percent of lead used globally .
Archeologists appear to have solved the centuries-old mystery of where the ancient stones of Stonehenge came from .
After analyzing a recently discovered sample taken from one of the original giant sarsen stones , researchers were able to pinpoint the specific spot where the stones were sourced : The West Woods , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ miles from the site of Stonehenge , and it ’ s still not known how the stones were transported there 4,500 years ago .
“ We weren ’ t really setting out to find the source of Stonehenge , ” said David Nash , a professor at the University of Brighton who led the research .
“ We picked 20 areas and our goal was to try to eliminate them , to find ones that didn ’ t match .
We didn ’ t think we ’ d get a direct match .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ goodness ’ moment.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States lays out plans for the removal of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany , U.S. coronavirus deaths reach worst levels since May, and Iran hails its latest missile launch.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: The United States lays out plans for the removal of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany, U.S. coronavirus deaths reach worst levels since May, and Iran hails its latest missile launch.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
“We Don’t Want to Be the Suckers Anymore”
On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced plans to withdraw roughly 12,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany. Of the approximately 12,000 troops, 6,400 will be returning to the United States, while the remainder will be sent to other countries in Europe.
Esper presented the move as good strategic sense. “These changes will achieve the core principles of enhancing U.S. and NATO deterrence of Russia, strengthening NATO, reassuring allies and improving U.S. strategic flexibility,” he said.
Mixed messages. But over at the White House, only minutes after Esper’s remarks, U.S. President Donald Trump was more blunt: “We don’t want to be the suckers anymore,” Trump said on Wednesday. “We’re reducing the force because they’re not paying their bills; it’s very simple.”
“It’s always a good thing to revisit how many troops the U.S. has deployed abroad, especially in Europe,” Rachel Rizzo, an expert on European security issues with the Truman Center for National Policy told Foreign Policy. “But this particular move is just clearly punishment for Germany. It seems like it was done without any real analysis or strategy behind it.”
Not just troops. U.S. military command centers are also set to relocate as part of the troop reduction. U.S. European Command is moving to Belgium and U.S. officials suggested that U.S. Africa Command, currently based in Stuttgart, would also be moved elsewhere.
A slow march. In his comments, Esper pointed out that the relocation of troops would likely take years and cost in the “single-digit” billions of dollars. If November’s presidential election brings the Democrats to power, it may not happen at all: Joe Biden’s campaign has promised to review the decision if he wins.
What We’re Following Today
Coronavirus deaths rise. Daily coronavirus deaths in the United States passed 1,400 for the first time since May on Wednesday as the states of Florida, North Carolina, and California set records for deaths in a single day. The United States has now recorded 150,000 deaths in total. Wednesday’s U.S. death toll was only topped by Brazil, where over 1,500 new deaths were reported.
U.S. sanctions Assad’s son. The United States imposed new sanctions on Syria on Tuesday, targeting ten entities and four individuals—including Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s son, Hafez. They are the second round of U.S. sanctions imposed under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which targets those dealing with Syria, regardless of nationality. The White House has said more sanctions will follow “as part of a sustained campaign of economic and political pressure to deny the Assad regime the resources it uses to wage war against the Syrian people.”
Iran touts ballistic missiles. Iran has hailed what it says was its first ever launch of ballistic missiles from underground, calling it an “important achievement that could pose serious challenges to enemy intelligence organizations.” The launches took place on Wednesday on the final day of military exercises that included a missile strike on a mock aircraft carrier. The U.S. military called the launches “irresponsible” and placed two neighboring bases on high alert during the exercises.
NASA Mars launch. The United States is set to join the United Arab Emirates and China as the third mission to Mars launched this summer as it prepares to launch its rover, Perseverance, today from Cape Canaveral in Florida. Following a months-long journey to the planet, the rover will search for signs of past microscopic life on an ancient lakebed and gather rock samples to be returned to earth for further study. If successful, it would be ninth U.S. spacecraft to operate on the Martian surface.
Keep an Eye On
India opens up higher education sector. India has approved a new plan to allow foreign universities to open campuses in the country as it seeks to halt the flow of students to overseas institutions. The move is part of a policy that aims to increase public spending on education from 4 percent to 6 percent of gross domestic product. Any foreign university opening in India would also have to contend with a cap on the amount of fees educational institutions are allowed to charge in the country.
Lead levels dangerously high in world’s children. One in three children in the world have been found to have dangerously high levels of lead in their blood, according to a report published by UNICEF. The report found that up to 800 million children have blood levels of 5 micrograms per deciliter—a level at which the World Health Organization and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention call for intervention. Improper disposal of car batteries is one leading source of lead contamination, as they currently make up 85 percent of lead used globally.
Odds and Ends
Archeologists appear to have solved the centuries-old mystery of where the ancient stones of Stonehenge came from. After analyzing a recently discovered sample taken from one of the original giant sarsen stones, researchers were able to pinpoint the specific spot where the stones were sourced: The West Woods, in Wiltshire.
The area is 15 miles from the site of Stonehenge, and it’s still not known how the stones were transported there 4,500 years ago. “We weren’t really setting out to find the source of Stonehenge,” said David Nash, a professor at the University of Brighton who led the research. “We picked 20 areas and our goal was to try to eliminate them, to find ones that didn’t match. We didn’t think we’d get a direct match. It was a real ‘Oh my goodness’ moment.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


foreignpolicy--2020-07-31--The U.S. Economy Is in Free Fall as Unemployment Benefits End

The U.S. Economy Is in Free Fall as Unemployment Benefits End Here is today ’ s Foreign Policy brief : Pandemic unemployment benefits come to an end in the United States , Hong Kong bars opposition leaders from elections , and Russian-linked mercenaries are arrested in Belarus .
I ’ m filling in for Colm Quinn , who has the day off .
We welcome your feedback at morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .
Senate Republicans have proposed a new stimulus package which would cut weekly payments down to $ 200 until states can implement a new plan , but Democrats are @ @ @ @ @ @ @ the meantime , millions of unemployed people will be left without any relief , as FP ’ s Audrey Wilson reports .
When , not if .
The expiration of additional unemployment benefits is happening just as the United States appears to be on the verge of another recession .
The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported on Thursday that the U.S. economy contracted by 32.9 percent between April and June , its worst drop on record .
The economy looks like it ’ s in free fall , and economists predict that a @ @ @ @ @ @ @ and west of the country could lead to another economic downturn later this year .
Running out of options .
The state of the economy puts President Donald Trump ’ s re-election hopes in serious danger , and the latest Gallup poll places his approval rating at just 41 percent .
His behavior has grown increasingly erratic in response , and he caused a social media storm yesterday when he questioned the validity of mail-in voting and floated the possibility of delaying the November election .
China tightens its grip on Hong Kong @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Kong continues as the local government announced on Thursday that it was barring 12 pro-democracy activists from running in the upcoming legislative elections scheduled for September .
The move follows Beijing ’ s passage of a draconian national security law earlier this month that severely limits the civil liberties of Hong Kongers , aiming to curtail opposition to the ruling pro-Beijing administration .
Pro-democracy candidates rode a wave of public discontent in the recent local elections in November , notching major victories across the territory that shocked observers in mainland China .
Hanging @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Ghannouchi , Tunisia ’ s parliamentary speaker , barely survived a confidence vote on Thursday after 97 members of parliament voted to remove him from office .
According to Tunisian law , a vote of no confidence requires at least 109 votes in favor to pass , but the degree of dissatisfaction suggests that the Ennahda party , the largest political grouping in parliament , will face a more determined opposition moving forward .
The vote follows the collapse of Tunisia ’ s short-lived government earlier this month , and adds to the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ by the coronavirus pandemic .
Just a stop in Belarus .
On Wednesday , Belarusian authorities said they arrested 33 operatives from the Wagner Group , the private security firm linked to the Kremlin which has supported Russian interventions in Syria , Libya , and Ukraine .
Belarus ’ s state-run media agency claimed that Moscow had dispatched several hundred fighters in an effort to shape next weekend ’ s presidential elections , further raising concerns over Moscow ’ s relations with its neighbors .
Incumbent Aleksandr Lukashenko , who has served as @ @ @ @ @ @ @ history of the state , is considered pro-Russian but is facing one of his biggest challenges since first taking office in 1994 .
On Thursday , tens of thousands of demonstrators defied pandemic restrictions and attended an opposition rally in Minsk .
But FP ’ s Amy Mackinnon reported that it is more likely the Wagner operatives were using Belarus as a transit post on their way to hotspots in the Middle East or North Africa .
Ouattara pushes the envelope .
The Ivory Coast ’ s ruling RHDP alliance has formally nominated @ @ @ @ @ @ @ its candidate in presidential elections in October , edging the country closer to a constitutional crisis .
The constitution is ambiguous over whether an individual can serve as president for more than two terms , and Ouattara previously floated the possibility of pushing the constitutional bounds by seeking a third term as president .
He ultimately opted to stand down and then nominated Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly as his chosen successor .
But the country was thrown into political turmoil earlier this month after Coulibaly ’ s sudden death , after which @ @ @ @ @ @ @ him to reconsider his decision not to run .
Despite the nomination , Ouattara has not yet confirmed whether he will stand .
Americans agree with Trump on China .
Pew Research Center released a new poll yesterday showing that a large majority of the U.S. public holds unfavorable views on China , a trend that has increased considerably in recent years and puts it broadly in line with the Trump administration ’ s own hostility toward Beijing .
According to the data , 73 percent of respondents view China unfavorably , while @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
Much of this was rooted in negative attitudes toward China ’ s handling of the coronavirus pandemic , as well as the strained economic ties between the two countries .
As Foreign Policy has reported , this could give Trump a lifeline in his battle for reelection as his poll numbers continue to sag .
Salvini cast adrift .
The Italian Senate voted by a slim majority on Thursday to strip former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini of parliamentary immunity as prosecutors pursue a case of illegal detention against him .
While @ @ @ @ @ @ @ Salvini blocked a Spanish rescue ship carrying more than 100 migrants from entering Italian ports before a prosecutor ordered the seizure and evacuation of the ship .
Salvini rose to prominence in 2018 as the head of Italy ’ s League party which espouses strong anti-immigration , right-wing populist views .
After a protracted political impasse following the 2018 federal elections , Salvini served as the country ’ s deputy prime minister before a major split in the governing coalition tied to his stance on refugee ships brought him down in September .
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ 90 degrees Fahrenheit ( 32°C ) in England and local lockdowns are imposed to prevent further coronavirus outbreaks , British police are preparing to keep crowds away from the sea after approximately 500,000 people flocked to beaches in Bournemouth and Poole during an earlier heatwave in June .
According to the Guardian , “ Police are ready to set up roadblocks , create diversions and close off sections of Bournemouth beach to prevent a repeat of last month ’ s chaotic scenes.
” Prime Minister Boris Johnson urged Britons not to risk spreading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ saying to people is : don ’ t lose focus , don ’ t lose discipline , continue to observe those guidelines , and if you have symptoms , get a test.
” For more from FP , visit foreignpolicy.com , subscribe here , or sign up for our other newsletters .
Send your tips , comments , questions , or corrections to morningbrief @ foreignpolicy.com .

Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pandemic unemployment benefits come to an end in the United States, Hong Kong bars opposition leaders from elections, and Russian-linked mercenaries are arrested in Belarus.
Here is today’s Foreign Policy brief: Pandemic unemployment benefits come to an end in the United States, Hong Kong bars opposition leaders from elections, and Russian-linked mercenaries are arrested in Belarus.
If you would like to receive Morning Brief in your inbox every weekday, please sign up here.
Trump Tweets as the Economy Tanks The U.S. Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program, which provided financial relief to Americans hit hardest by the pandemic-induced recession, expires today as the country hurtles toward another economic downturn. Under the program, claimants received an additional $600 per week in unemployment benefits to offset widespread business closures resulting from lockdowns.
Senate Republicans have proposed a new stimulus package which would cut weekly payments down to $200 until states can implement a new plan, but Democrats are pushing back on the cuts. In the meantime, millions of unemployed people will be left without any relief, as FP’s Audrey Wilson reports.
When, not if. The expiration of additional unemployment benefits is happening just as the United States appears to be on the verge of another recession. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported on Thursday that the U.S. economy contracted by 32.9 percent between April and June, its worst drop on record. The economy looks like it’s in free fall, and economists predict that a surge of coronavirus cases in the south and west of the country could lead to another economic downturn later this year.
Running out of options. The state of the economy puts President Donald Trump’s re-election hopes in serious danger, and the latest Gallup poll places his approval rating at just 41 percent. His behavior has grown increasingly erratic in response, and he caused a social media storm yesterday when he questioned the validity of mail-in voting and floated the possibility of delaying the November election.
What We’re Following Today
China tightens its grip on Hong Kong. The crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong continues as the local government announced on Thursday that it was barring 12 pro-democracy activists from running in the upcoming legislative elections scheduled for September.
The move follows Beijing’s passage of a draconian national security law earlier this month that severely limits the civil liberties of Hong Kongers, aiming to curtail opposition to the ruling pro-Beijing administration. Pro-democracy candidates rode a wave of public discontent in the recent local elections in November, notching major victories across the territory that shocked observers in mainland China.
Hanging by a thread in Tunisia. Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunisia’s parliamentary speaker, barely survived a confidence vote on Thursday after 97 members of parliament voted to remove him from office. According to Tunisian law, a vote of no confidence requires at least 109 votes in favor to pass, but the degree of dissatisfaction suggests that the Ennahda party, the largest political grouping in parliament, will face a more determined opposition moving forward. The vote follows the collapse of Tunisia’s short-lived government earlier this month, and adds to the growing instability of a country hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic.
Just a stop in Belarus. On Wednesday, Belarusian authorities said they arrested 33 operatives from the Wagner Group, the private security firm linked to the Kremlin which has supported Russian interventions in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine. Belarus’s state-run media agency claimed that Moscow had dispatched several hundred fighters in an effort to shape next weekend’s presidential elections, further raising concerns over Moscow’s relations with its neighbors.
Incumbent Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has served as Belarusian president for the entire post-Cold War history of the state, is considered pro-Russian but is facing one of his biggest challenges since first taking office in 1994. On Thursday, tens of thousands of demonstrators defied pandemic restrictions and attended an opposition rally in Minsk.
But FP’s Amy Mackinnon reported that it is more likely the Wagner operatives were using Belarus as a transit post on their way to hotspots in the Middle East or North Africa.
Keep an Eye On
Ouattara pushes the envelope. The Ivory Coast’s ruling RHDP alliance has formally nominated two-term incumbent Alassane Ouattara to stand as its candidate in presidential elections in October, edging the country closer to a constitutional crisis.
The constitution is ambiguous over whether an individual can serve as president for more than two terms, and Ouattara previously floated the possibility of pushing the constitutional bounds by seeking a third term as president. He ultimately opted to stand down and then nominated Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly as his chosen successor. But the country was thrown into political turmoil earlier this month after Coulibaly’s sudden death, after which members of Ouattara’s party urged him to reconsider his decision not to run. Despite the nomination, Ouattara has not yet confirmed whether he will stand.
Americans agree with Trump on China. Pew Research Center released a new poll yesterday showing that a large majority of the U.S. public holds unfavorable views on China, a trend that has increased considerably in recent years and puts it broadly in line with the Trump administration’s own hostility toward Beijing. According to the data, 73 percent of respondents view China unfavorably, while only 22 percent expressed a favorable opinion. Much of this was rooted in negative attitudes toward China’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as the strained economic ties between the two countries.
As Foreign Policy has reported, this could give Trump a lifeline in his battle for reelection as his poll numbers continue to sag.
Salvini cast adrift. The Italian Senate voted by a slim majority on Thursday to strip former Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini of parliamentary immunity as prosecutors pursue a case of illegal detention against him. While serving as interior minister last August, Salvini blocked a Spanish rescue ship carrying more than 100 migrants from entering Italian ports before a prosecutor ordered the seizure and evacuation of the ship. Salvini rose to prominence in 2018 as the head of Italy’s League party which espouses strong anti-immigration, right-wing populist views.
After a protracted political impasse following the 2018 federal elections, Salvini served as the country’s deputy prime minister before a major split in the governing coalition tied to his stance on refugee ships brought him down in September.
Odds and Ends
Beach ban. As temperatures rise above 90 degrees Fahrenheit (32°C) in England and local lockdowns are imposed to prevent further coronavirus outbreaks, British police are preparing to keep crowds away from the sea after approximately 500,000 people flocked to beaches in Bournemouth and Poole during an earlier heatwave in June.
According to the Guardian, “Police are ready to set up roadblocks, create diversions and close off sections of Bournemouth beach to prevent a repeat of last month’s chaotic scenes.” Prime Minister Boris Johnson urged Britons not to risk spreading COVID-19. “What I’m saying to people is: don’t lose focus, don’t lose discipline, continue to observe those guidelines, and if you have symptoms, get a test.”
That’s it for today.
For more from FP, visit foreignpolicy.com, subscribe here, or sign up for our other newsletters. Send your tips, comments, questions, or corrections to morningbrief@foreignpolicy.com.


Najib’s Dirty Money

This week , a Malaysian court found former Prime Minister Najib Razak guilty in the first of what will be several corruption trials .
The court sentenced him to 12 years in prison for abuse of power and then 60 additional years on six counts of money laundering and breach of trust .
Najib will appeal the verdict , and with allies from his party , the United Malays National Organization ( UMNO ) , in control of the government , his fate will reveal a lot about Kuala Lumpur ’ s seriousness in tackling corruption .
As the story @ @ @ @ @ @ @ gathered our top reads to explain how Malaysia got here—and what Najib ’ s legacy means for the country ’ s future .
Najib became Malaysia ’ s prime minister in 2009 as part of the UMNO , which had held power in the nation since its independence in 1957 .
“ [ L ] ike many Southeast Asian countries , ” wrote the researcher Aaron Connelly , “ it has long charted a careful course between Washington , with which it maintains low-key security cooperation , and Beijing , its largest trading @ @ @ @ @ @ @ worked hard to form a close personal relationship with his American counterparts ; but he also sought financial assistance from Chinese President Xi Jinping.
” And , in some ways , that may have sown the seeds of his eventual undoing .
As the journalist Will Doig reported , by the time Najib was sent out of office in 2018 , “ it ’ s possible that no one was more dismayed than officials in Beijing .
After all , Najib had granted China extraordinary access to Malaysia .
Across the country , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ or breaking ground.
” And those projects came at a cost .
In 2015 , “ Najib was accused of massive corruption linked to the development fund known as 1MDB .
As the [ 2018 ] election neared , his opponent , Mahathir Mohamad , alleged that some of the Chinese money pouring into Malaysia was being used to refill the fund ’ s graft-depleted coffers.
” In time , the 1MDB scandal grew to encompass billions of dollars that had allegedly been siphoned from the fund into Najib ’ s own accounts @ @ @ @ @ @ @ just touch China .
In 2016 , the U.S. Justice Department seized $ 2 billion worth of assets from a Najib associate , Jho Low , in the United States .
As Alex Helan , a documentary filmmaker , explained , the move “ blindsided Najib and temporarily upended Malaysia ’ s foreign policy.
” After all , Najib and U.S. President Barack Obama had a friendly relationship before that point , even meeting in Hawaii in 2014 .
In retaliation for the seizure , “ Najib ’ s press secretary accused the @ @ @ @ @ @ @ to ‘ domestic political manipulation and interference.
’ ” Soon , Helan wrote , “ Najib dropped any pretense of domestic reform and began to appeal to his supporters ’ basest political sentiments , racial and religious supremacy , directed against Malaysia ’ s ethnic Chinese population.
” He also tried to gerrymander the country ’ s electoral map ahead of the May 2018 general elections .
But the prime minister could not recover from the scandal .
After a “ bungled attempt to fly out the country on a private jet ” @ @ @ @ @ @ @ , Najib and his wife were “ effectively under house arrest .
Days later , police launched dawn searches of their properties in Kuala Lumpur .
Photos , probably taken by police and leaked on social media , showed the shattered pair slouched in armchairs , dressed in their fine silks , as officers broke open a series of safes .
In scenes reminiscent of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos ’ s downfall , inside was $ 28 million in cash ( in 26 different currencies ) and $ 50 million in luxury items @ @ @ @ @ @ @ All of that hurt Najib and his party at the polls .
“ At the grassroots , though , everyday incompetence and graft , ” wrote the journalist Betsy Joles , “ may have taken a greater toll on the BN [ the latest incarnation of the old ruling party ] vote than high-level corruption.
” The prime minister ’ s defeat was remarkable , representing the country ’ s first transition of parties in 60 years .
As the writer Krithika Varagur explained in 2018 , under a new party , “ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ minister , Mahathir Mohamad , came out of retirement to lead the opposition to Najib Razak.
” And Mahathir , who won , was meant to hand the prime ministership to his de facto running mate , the jailed leader Anwar Ibrahim , after Anwar ’ s release from jail .
If all that sounds less than promising , that is because it was : “ Amid the euphoria , it ’ s worth recalling , ” Varagur urged at the time , “ that Mahathir ’ s record as prime minister was @ @ @ @ @ @ @ .
He was hostile to the free press , brutally purged dissenters , and bailed out his friends ’ banks.
” By 2020 , argued Varagur in a separate article , it was clear that the complicated dealing was holding Malaysia back .
“ On March 1 , Malaysia ’ s recent political crisis moved to a resolution after nearly two weeks of drama .
Muhyiddin Yassin , a member of Parliament , was sworn in as prime minister , ending a chaotic period during which his predecessor , Mahathir Mohamad , resigned @ @ @ @ @ @ @ numerous politicians switched sides and jockeyed for an audience with the king in the hopes of being appointed prime minister.
” In other words , it is politics as usual in Malaysia—and whether UMNO decides to protect Najib and his allies or allow the courts to continue their efforts to bring them to justice will say a lot about how long that status quo will persist .

This week, a Malaysian court found former Prime Minister Najib Razak guilty in the first of what will be several corruption trials. The court sentenced him to 12 years in prison for abuse of power and then 60 additional years on six counts of money laundering and breach of trust. Najib will appeal the verdict, and with allies from his party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in control of the government, his fate will reveal a lot about Kuala Lumpur’s seriousness in tackling corruption.
This week, a Malaysian court found former Prime Minister Najib Razak guilty in the first of what will be several corruption trials. The court sentenced him to 12 years in prison for abuse of power and then 60 additional years on six counts of money laundering and breach of trust. Najib will appeal the verdict, and with allies from his party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in control of the government, his fate will reveal a lot about Kuala Lumpur’s seriousness in tackling corruption.
As the story continues to unfold, we’ve gathered our top reads to explain how Malaysia got here—and what Najib’s legacy means for the country’s future.
Najib became Malaysia’s prime minister in 2009 as part of the UMNO, which had held power in the nation since its independence in 1957. “[L]ike many Southeast Asian countries,” wrote the researcher Aaron Connelly, “it has long charted a careful course between Washington, with which it maintains low-key security cooperation, and Beijing, its largest trading partner.” In turn, “Najib worked hard to form a close personal relationship with his American counterparts; but he also sought financial assistance from Chinese President Xi Jinping.” And, in some ways, that may have sown the seeds of his eventual undoing.
As the journalist Will Doig reported, by the time Najib was sent out of office in 2018, “it’s possible that no one was more dismayed than officials in Beijing. After all, Najib had granted China extraordinary access to Malaysia. Across the country, huge China-backed infrastructure projects were being planned or breaking ground.” And those projects came at a cost. In 2015, “Najib was accused of massive corruption linked to the development fund known as 1MDB. As the [2018] election neared, his opponent, Mahathir Mohamad, alleged that some of the Chinese money pouring into Malaysia was being used to refill the fund’s graft-depleted coffers.”
In time, the 1MDB scandal grew to encompass billions of dollars that had allegedly been siphoned from the fund into Najib’s own accounts. And the case didn’t just touch China. In 2016, the U.S. Justice Department seized $2 billion worth of assets from a Najib associate, Jho Low, in the United States. As Alex Helan, a documentary filmmaker, explained, the move “blindsided Najib and temporarily upended Malaysia’s foreign policy.” After all, Najib and U.S. President Barack Obama had a friendly relationship before that point, even meeting in Hawaii in 2014. In retaliation for the seizure, “Najib’s press secretary accused the United States of imperial overreach … tantamount to ‘domestic political manipulation and interference.’” Soon, Helan wrote, “Najib dropped any pretense of domestic reform and began to appeal to his supporters’ basest political sentiments, racial and religious supremacy, directed against Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese population.” He also tried to gerrymander the country’s electoral map ahead of the May 2018 general elections.
But the prime minister could not recover from the scandal. After a “bungled attempt to fly out the country on a private jet” ahead of the vote, Helan wrote, Najib and his wife were “effectively under house arrest. Days later, police launched dawn searches of their properties in Kuala Lumpur. Photos, probably taken by police and leaked on social media, showed the shattered pair slouched in armchairs, dressed in their fine silks, as officers broke open a series of safes. In scenes reminiscent of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos’s downfall, inside was $28 million in cash (in 26 different currencies) and $50 million in luxury items including 284 boxes of designer handbags.
All of that hurt Najib and his party at the polls. “At the grassroots, though, everyday incompetence and graft,” wrote the journalist Betsy Joles, “may have taken a greater toll on the BN [the latest incarnation of the old ruling party] vote than high-level corruption.” The prime minister’s defeat was remarkable, representing the country’s first transition of parties in 60 years. As the writer Krithika Varagur explained in 2018, under a new party, “the country’s 92-year-old former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, came out of retirement to lead the opposition to Najib Razak.” And Mahathir, who won, was meant to hand the prime ministership to his de facto running mate, the jailed leader Anwar Ibrahim, after Anwar’s release from jail.
If all that sounds less than promising, that is because it was: “Amid the euphoria, it’s worth recalling,” Varagur urged at the time, “that Mahathir’s record as prime minister was hardly that of a champion of democracy. He was hostile to the free press, brutally purged dissenters, and bailed out his friends’ banks.”
By 2020, argued Varagur in a separate article, it was clear that the complicated dealing was holding Malaysia back. “On March 1, Malaysia’s recent political crisis moved to a resolution after nearly two weeks of drama. Muhyiddin Yassin, a member of Parliament, was sworn in as prime minister, ending a chaotic period during which his predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, resigned; the ruling coalition disbanded; and numerous politicians switched sides and jockeyed for an audience with the king in the hopes of being appointed prime minister.”
In other words, it is politics as usual in Malaysia—and whether UMNO decides to protect Najib and his allies or allow the courts to continue their efforts to bring them to justice will say a lot about how long that status quo will persist.